{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_38267/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_38267","id":"gutenberg_38267","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/38267","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Reports & Conference Proceedings","Conference proceedings","Medicine -- Congresses","Science and the humanities -- Congresses","Technology -- Congresses"],"text":"Produced by Robin Monks, Carol Brown, and the Online\nDistributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net. This\nfile was produced from images generously made available\nby The Internet Archive.\n\n\n\n\n\n [Illustration: Cover Title Page]\n\n _OF THE_\n\n Cambridge Edition\n\n _There have been printed seven hundred and fifty sets\n of which this is copy_\n\n _No._ 337\n\n INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS\n OF ARTS AND SCIENCE\n\n\n\n\n [Illustration: ALMA MATER\n\n _Photogravure of the Statue by Daniel C. French_\n\n The colossal figure of French's Alma Mater adorns the fine suite of\n stone steps leading up to the picturesque library building of\n Columbia University. It is a bronze statue, gilded with pure gold.\n The female figure typifying \"Alma Mater\" is represented as sitting\n in a chair of classic shape, her elbows resting on the arms of the\n chair. Both hands are raised. The right hand holds and is supported\n by a sceptre. On her head is a classic wreath, and on her lap lies\n an open book, from which her eyes seem to have just been raised in\n meditation. Drapery falls in semi-classic folds from her neck to her\n sandalled feet, only the arms and neck being left bare.\n\n Every University man cherishes a kindly feeling for his Alma Mater,\n and the famous American sculptor, Daniel C. French, has been most\n successful in his artistic creation of the \"Fostering Mother\"\n spiritualized--the familiar ideal of the mother of minds trained to\n thought and consecrated to intellectual service.]\n\n\n\n\n INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS\n\n OF\n\n ARTS AND SCIENCE\n\n _EDITED BY_\n\n HOWARD J. ROGERS, A.M., LL.D.\n\n DIRECTOR OF CONGRESSES\n\n\n VOLUME I\n\n PHILOSOPHY AND METAPHYSICS\n\n COMPRISING\n\n Lectures on Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century,\n Philosophy of Religion, Sciences of the\n Ideal, Problems of Metaphysics,\n The Theory of Science,\n and Logic\n\n [Illustration: University Alliance logo]\n\n UNIVERSITY ALLIANCE\n LONDON NEW YORK\n\n\n\n\n COPYRIGHT 1906 BY HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN & CO.\n\n ALL RIGHTS RESERVED\n\n COPYRIGHT 1908 BY UNIVERSITY ALLIANCE\n\n\n\n\n _ILLUSTRATIONS_\n\n\n VOLUME I\n\n FACING\n PAGE\n\n ALMA MATER _Frontispiece_\n Photogravure from the statue by Daniel C. French\n\n DR. HOWARD J. ROGERS 1\n Photogravure from a photograph\n\n DR. SIMON NEWCOMB 135\n Photogravure from a photograph\n\n THE UNIVERSITY OF PARIS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 168\n Photogravure from the painting by OTTO KNILLE\n\n\n\n\n _TABLE OF CONTENTS_\n\n\n VOLUME I\n\n THE HISTORY OF THE CONGRESS 1\n HOWARD J. ROGERS, A.M., LL.D.\n\n PROGRAMME 47\n\n PURPOSE AND PLAN OF THE CONGRESS 50\n\n ORGANIZATION OF THE CONGRESS 52\n\n OFFICERS OF THE CONGRESS 53\n\n SPEAKERS AND CHAIRMEN 54\n\n CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF PROCEEDINGS 77\n\n PROGRAMME OF SOCIAL EVENTS 81\n\n LIST OF TEN-MINUTE SPEAKERS 82\n\n THE SCIENTIFIC PLAN OF THE CONGRESS 85\n HUGO MUENSTERBERG, PH.D., LL.D.\n\n INTRODUCTORY ADDRESS.\n _The Evolution of the Scientific Investigator_ 135\n SIMON NEWCOMB, PH.D., LL.D.\n\n NORMATIVE SCIENCE\n\n _The Sciences of the Ideal_ 151\n BY PROF. JOSIAH ROYCE, PH.D., LL.D.\n\n PHILOSOPHY.\n\n _Philosophy: Its Fundamental Conceptions and its Methods_ 173\n BY PROF. GEORGE HOLMES HOWISON, LL.D.\n\n _The Development of Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century_ 194\n BY PROF. GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD, D.D., LL.D.\n\n METAPHYSICS.\n\n _The Relations Between Metaphysics and the Other Sciences_ 227\n BY PROF. ALFRED EDWARD TAYLOR, M.A.\n\n _The Present Problems of Metaphysics_ 246\n BY PROF. ALEXANDER THOMAS ORMOND, PH.D., LL.D.\n\n PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.\n\n _The Relation of the Philosophy of Religion to the Other Sciences_ 263\n BY PROF. OTTO PFLEIDERER, D.D.\n\n _Main Problems of the Philosophy of Religion: Psychology and\n Theory Of Knowledge in the Science of Religion_ 275\n BY PROF. ERNST TROELTSCH, D.D.\n\n _Some Roots and Factors of Religion_ 289\n BY PROF. ALEXANDER T. ORMOND.\n\n LOGIC.\n\n _The Relations of Logic to Other Disciplines_ 296\n BY PROF. WILLIAM ALEXANDER HAMMOND, PH.D.\n\n _The Field of Logic_ 313\n BY PROF. FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE, LL.D.\n\n METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCE.\n\n _On the Theory of Science_ 333\n BY PROF. WILHELM OSTWALD, LL.D.\n\n _The Content and Validity of the Causal Law_ 353\n BY PROF. BENNO ERDMANN, PH.D.\n\n\n\n\n [Illustration: _HOWARD J. ROGERS, A.M., LL.D._\n\n Howard Jason Rogers, born Stephentown, Rensselaer Co., N. Y.,\n November 16, 1861; graduated from Williams College, 1884; admitted\n to bar, 1877; Superintendent New York State Exhibit World's\n Columbian Exposition, 1893; Deputy State Superintendent Public\n Institution, 1895-1899; Republican Director Department of Education\n and Social Economy of U. S. Commission to Paris Exposition 1900;\n Chief Department of Education, St. Louis Exposition, 1904; First.\n Asst. Commissioner State Department of Education, N. Y., since 1904,\n when he received degree of A.M. from Columbia and degree of LL.D.\n from Northwestern University. He is an officer of the Legion of\n Honor of France; Chevalier of San Maurice and Lazare, Italy;\n Chevalier de l'Etoile Polaire, Sweden; Chevalier Nat. order of\n Leopold, Belgium; and officer of the Red Eagle, Germany.]\n\n\n\n\nTHE HISTORY OF THE CONGRESS\n\nBY HOWARD J. ROGERS A.M., LL.D.\n\n\nThe forces which bring to a common point the thousandfold energies of a\nuniversal exposition can best promote an international congress of\nideas. Under national patronage and under the spur of international\ncompetition the best products and the latest inventions of man in\nscience, in literature, and in art are grouped together in orderly\nclassification. Whether the motive underlying the exhibits be the\npromotion of commerce and trade, or whether it be individual ambition,\nor whether it be national pride and loyalty, the resultant is the same.\nThe space within the boundaries of the exposition is a forum of the\nnations where equal rights are guaranteed to every representative from\nany quarter of the globe, and where the sovereignty of each nation is\nrecognized whenever its flag floats over a national pavilion or an\nexhibit area. The productive genius of every governed people contends in\npeaceful rivalry for world recognition, and the exposition becomes an\ninternational clearing-house for practical ideas.\n\nFor the demonstration of the value of these products men thoroughly\nskilled in their development and use are sent by the various exhibitors.\nThe exposition by the logic of its creation thus gathers to itself the\nexpert representatives of every art and industry. For at least two\nmonths in the exposition period there are present the members of the\ninternational jury of awards, selected specially by the different\ngovernments for their thorough knowledge, theoretical and practical, of\nthe departments to which they are assigned, and selected further for\ntheir ability to impress upon others the correctness of their views. The\nrenown of a universal exposition brings, as visitors, students and\ninvestigators bent upon the solution of problems and anxious to know the\nlatest contributions to the facts and the theories which underlie every\nphase of the world's development.\n\nThe material therefore is ready at hand with which to construct the\nframework of a conference of parts, or a congress of the whole of any\nsubject. It was a natural and logical step to accompany the study of the\nexhibits with a debate on their excellence, an analysis of their growth,\nand an argument for their future. Hence the congress. The exposition and\nthe congress are correlative terms. The former concentres the visible\nproducts of the brain and hand of man; the congress is the literary\nembodiment of its activities.\n\nYet it was not till the Paris Exposition of 1889 that the idea of a\nseries of congresses, international in membership and universal in\nscope, was fully developed. The three preceding expositions, Paris,\n1878, Philadelphia, 1876, and Vienna, 1873, had held under their\nauspices many conferences and congresses, and indeed the germ of the\ncongress idea may be said to have been the establishment of the\nInternational Scientific Commission in connection with the Paris\nExposition of 1867; but all of these meetings were unrelated and\nsometimes almost accidental in their organization, although many were of\ngreat scientific interest and value.\n\nThe success of the series of seventy congresses in Paris in 1889 led the\nauthorities of the World's Columbian Exposition in 1893 to establish the\nWorld's Congress Auxiliary designed \"to supplement the exhibit of\nmaterial progress by the Exposition, by a portrayal of the wonderful\nachievements of the new age in science, literature, education,\ngovernment, jurisprudence, morals, charity, religion, and other\ndepartments of human activity, as the most effective means of increasing\nthe fraternity, progress, prosperity, and peace of mankind.\" The\nwidespread interest in this series of meetings is a matter easily within\nrecollection, but they were in no wise interrelated to each other, nor\nmore than ordinarily comprehensive in their scope.\n\nIt remained for the Paris Exposition of 1900 to bring to a perfect\norganization this type of congress development. By ministerial decree\nissued two years prior to the exposition the conduct of the department\nwas set forth to the minutest detail. One hundred twenty-five\ncongresses, each with its separate secretary and organizing committee,\nwere authorized and grouped under twelve sections corresponding closely\nto the exhibit classification. The principal delegate, M. Gariel,\nreported to a special commission, which was directly responsible to the\ngovernment. The department was admirably conducted and reached as high a\ndegree of success as a highly diversified, ably administered, but\nunrelated system of international conferences could. And yet the\nattendance on a majority of these congresses was disappointing, and in\nmany there was scarcely any one present outside the immediate circle of\nthose concerned in its development. If this condition could prevail in\nParis, the home of arts and letters, in the immediate centre of the\ngreat constituency of the University and of many scientific circles and\nlearned societies, and within easy traveling distance of other European\nuniversity and literary centres, it was fair to presume that the\nusefulness of this class of congress was decreasing. It certainly was\nsafe to assume, on the part of the authorities of the St. Louis\nExposition of 1904, that such a series could not be a success in that\ncity, owing to its geographical position and the limited number of\nuniversity and scientific circles within a reasonable traveling\ndistance. Something more than a repetition of the stereotyped form of\nconference was admitted to be necessary in order to arouse interest\namong scholars and to bring credit to the Exposition.\n\nThis was the serious problem which confronted the Exposition of St.\nLouis. No exposition was ever better fitted to serve as the groundwork\nof a congress of ideas than that of St. Louis. The ideal of the\nExposition, which was created in time and fixed in place to commemorate\na great historic event, was its educational influence. Its appeal to the\ncitizens of the United States for support, to the Federal Congress for\nappropriations, and to foreign governments for co\u00f6peration, was made\npurely on this basis. For the first time in the history of expositions\nthe educational influence was made the dominant factor and the\nclassification and installation of exhibits made contributory to that\nprinciple. The main purpose of the Exposition was to place within reach\nof the investigator the objective thought of the world, so classified as\nto show its relations to all similar phases of human endeavor, and so\narranged as to be practically available for reference and study. As a\npart of the organic scheme a congress plan was contemplated which should\nbe correlative with the exhibit features of the Exposition, and whose\npublished proceedings should stand as a monument to the breadth and\nenterprise of the Exposition long after its buildings had disappeared\nand its commercial achievements grown dim in the minds of men.\n\n\nDEVELOPMENT OF THE CONGRESS\n\nThe Department of Congresses, to which was to be intrusted this\ndifficult task, was not formed until the latter part of 1902, although\nthe question was for a year previous the subject of many discussions and\nconferences between the President of the Exposition, Mr. Francis; the\nDirector of Exhibits, Mr. Skiff; the Chief of the Department of\nEducation, Mr. Rogers; President Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia\nUniversity, and President William R. Harper of Chicago University. To\nthe disinterested and valuable advice of the two last-named gentlemen\nduring the entire history of the Congress the Exposition is under heavy\nobligations. During this period proposals had been made to two men of\ninternational reputation to give all their time for two years to the\norganization of a plan of congresses which should accomplish the\nultimate purpose of the Exposition authorities. Neither one, however,\ncould arrange to be relieved of the pressure of his regular duties, and\nthe entire scheme of supervision was consequently changed. The plan\nadopted was based upon the idea of an advisory board composed of men of\nhigh literary and scientific standing who should consider and recommend\nthe kind of congress most worthy of promotion, and the details of its\ndevelopment.\n\nIn November, 1902, Howard J. Rogers, LL.D., was appointed Director of\nCongresses, and the members of the Advisory (afterwards termed\nAdministrative) Board selected as follows:--\n\nCHAIRMAN: NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER, PH.D., LL.D., President Columbia\nUniversity.\n\nWILLIAM R. HARPER, PH.D., LL.D., President University of Chicago.\n\nHONORABLE FREDERICK W. HOLLS, A.M., LL.B., New York.\n\nR. H. JESSE, PH.D., LL.D., President University of Missouri.\n\nHENRY S. PRITCHETT, PH.D., LL.D., President Massachusetts Institute of\nTechnology.\n\nHERBERT PUTNAM, LITT.D., LL.D., Librarian of Congress.\n\nFREDERICK J. V. SKIFF, A.M., Director of Field Columbian Museum.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe action of the Executive Committee of the Exposition, approved by the\nPresident, was as follows:--\n\n There shall be appointed by the President of the Exposition\n Company a Director of Congresses who shall report to the\n President of the Exposition Company.\n\n There shall be appointed by the President of the Exposition\n Company an Advisory Board of seven persons, the chairman to\n be named by the President, who shall meet at the call of the\n Director of Congresses, or the Chairman of the Advisory\n Board.\n\n The expenses of the members of the Advisory Board while on\n business of the Exposition shall be a charge against the\n funds of the Exposition Company.\n\n The duties of the said Advisory Board shall be: to consider\n and make recommendations to the Director of Congresses on\n all matters submitted to them; to determine the number and\n the extent of the congresses; the emphasis to be placed upon\n special features; the prominent men to be invited to\n participate; the character of the programmes; and the\n methods for successfully carrying out the enterprise.\n\n There shall be set aside from the Exposition funds for the\n maintenance of the congresses the sum of two hundred\n thousand dollars ($200,000).\n\nThe standing Committee on Congresses from the Exposition board of\ndirectors was shortly afterwards appointed and was composed of five of\nthe most prominent men in St. Louis:--\n\nCHAIRMAN: HON. FREDERICK W. LEHMANN, Attorney at Law.\n\nBRECKENRIDGE JONES, Banker.\n\nCHARLES W. KNAPP, Editor of _The St. Louis Republic_.\n\nJOHN SCHROERS, Manager of the _Westliche Post_.\n\nA. F. SHAPLEIGH, Merchant.\n\nTo this committee were referred for consideration by the President all\nmatters of policy submitted by the Director of Congresses. This\ncommittee had jurisdiction over all congress matters, including not only\nthe Congress of Arts and Science, but also the many miscellaneous\ncongresses and conventions, and a great part of the success of the\ncongresses is due to their broad-minded and liberal determination of the\nquestions laid before them.\n\n\nIDEA OF THE CONGRESS OF ARTS AND SCIENCE\n\nIt is impossible to ascribe the original idea of the Congress of Arts\nand Science to any one person. It was a matter of slow growth from the\nmany conferences which had been held for a year by men of many\noccupations, and as finally worked out bore little resemblance to the\noriginal plans under discussion. The germ of the idea may fairly be said\nto have been contained in Director Skiff's insistence to the Executive\nCommittee of the Exposition that the congress work stand for something\nmore than an unrelated series of independent gatherings, and that some\nproject be authorized which would at once be distinctive and of real\nscientific worth. To support this view Director Skiff brought the\nExecutive Committee to the view of expending $200,000, if need be, to\ninsure the project. Starting from this suggestion many plans were\nbrought forward, but one which seems to belong of right to the late\nHonorable Frederick W. Holls, of New York City, contained perhaps the\nnext recognizable step in advance. This thought was, briefly, that a\nseries of lectures on scientific and literary topics by men prominent in\ntheir respective fields be delivered at the Exposition and that the\nExposition pay the speakers for their services. This point was\nthoroughly discussed by Mr. Holls and President Butler, and the next\nstep in the evolution of the Congress was the idea of bringing these\nlecturers together at the Exposition at about the same time or all\nduring one month. At this stage Professor Hugo M\u00fcnsterberg, who was the\nguest of Mr. Holls and an invited participant in the conference, made\nthe important suggestion that such a series of unrelated lectures, even\nthough given by most eminent men, would have little or no scientific\nvalue, but that if some relation, or underlying thought, could be\nintroduced into the addresses, then the best work could be done, which\nwould be of real value to the scientific world. He further stated that\nonly in this case would scientific leaders be likely to favor the plan\nof a St. Louis congress, as they would feel attracted not so much\nthrough the honorariums to be given for their services as through the\nvaluable opportunity of developing such a contribution to scientific\nthought. Subsequently Professor M\u00fcnsterberg was asked by Mr. Holls to\nformulate his ideas in a manner to be submitted to the Exposition\nauthorities. This was done in a communication under date of October 20,\n1902, which contained logically presented the foundation of the plan\nafterwards worked out in detail. At this juncture the Department of\nCongresses was organized, as has been stated, the Director named, and\nthe Administrative Board appointed, and on December 27, 1902, the first\nmeeting of the Director with the Administrative Board took place in New\nYork City.\n\nA thorough canvass of the subject was made at this meeting and as a\nresult the following recommendations were made to the Exposition\nauthorities:--\n\n(1) That the sessions of this Congress be held within a period of four\nweeks, beginning September 15, 1904.\n\n(2) That the various groups of learned men who may come together be\nasked to discuss their several sciences or professions with reference to\nsome theme of universal human interest, in order that thereby a certain\nunity of interest and of action may be had. Under such a plan the groups\nof men who come together would thus form sections of a single Congress\nrather than separate congresses.\n\n(3) As a subject which has universal significance, and one likely to\nserve as a connecting thread for all of the discussions of the Congress,\nthe theme \"The Progress of Man since the Louisiana Purchase\" was\nconsidered by the Administrative Board fit and suggestive. It is\nbelieved that discussions by leaders of thought in the various branches\nof pure and applied science, in philosophy, in politics, and in\nreligion, from the standpoint of man's progress in the century which has\nelapsed, would be fruitful, not only in clearing the thoughts of men not\ntrained in science and in government, but also in preparing the way for\nnew advances.\n\n(4) The Administrative Board further recommends that the Congress be\nmade up from men of thought and of action, whose work would probably\nfall under the following general heads:--\n\n_a._ The Natural Sciences (such as Astronomy, Biology, Mathematics,\netc.).\n\n_b._ The Historical, Sociological, and Economic group of studies\n(History, Political Economy, etc.).\n\n_c._ Philosophy and Religion.\n\n_d._ Medicine and Surgery.\n\n_e._ Law, Politics, and Government (including development and history of\nthe colonies, their government, revenue and prosperity, arbitration,\netc.).\n\n_f._ Applied Science (including the various branches of engineering).\n\n(5) The Administrative Board recommends further referring to a special\ncommittee of seven the problem of indicating in detail the method in\nwhich this plan can best be carried out. To this committee is assigned\nthe duty of choosing the general divisions of the Congress, the various\nbranches of science and of study in these divisions, and of recommending\nto the Administrative Board a detailed plan of the sections in which, in\ntheir judgment, those who come to the Congress may be most effectively\ngrouped, with a view not only to bring out the central theme, but also\nto represent in a helpful way and in a suggestive manner the present\nboundary of knowledge in the various lines of study and investigation\nwhich the committee may think wise to accept.\n\nThese recommendations were transmitted by the Director of Congresses to\nthe Committee on Congresses, approved by them, and afterwards approved\nby the Executive Committee and the President. The first four\nrecommendations were of a preliminary character, but the fifth contained\na distinct advance in the formation of a Committee on Plan and Scope\nwhich should be composed of eminent scientists capable of developing the\nfundamental idea into a plan which should harmonize with the scientific\nwork in every field. The committee selected were as follows:--\n\nDR. SIMON NEWCOMB, PH.D., LL.D., Retired Professor of Mathematics, U. S.\nNavy.\n\nPROF. HUGO M\u00dcNSTERBERG, PH.D., LL.D., Professor of Psychology, Harvard\nUniversity.\n\nPROF. JOHN BASSETT MOORE, LL.D., ex-assistant Secretary of State, and\nProfessor of International Law and Diplomacy, Columbia University.\n\nPROF. ALBION W. SMALL, PH.D., Professor of Sociology, University of\nChicago.\n\nDR. WILLIAM H. WELCH, M.D., LL.D., Professor of Pathology, Johns Hopkins\nUniversity.\n\nHON. ELIHU THOMSON, Consulting Engineer General Electric Company.\n\nPROF. GEORGE F. MOORE, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Comparative Religion,\nHarvard University.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIn response to a letter from President Butler, Chairman of the\nAdministrative Board, giving a complete r\u00e9sum\u00e9 of the growth of the idea\nof the Congress to that time, all of the members of the committee, with\nthe exception of Mr. Thomson, met at the Hotel Manhattan on January 10,\n1903, for a preliminary discussion. The entire field was canvassed,\nusing the recommendations of the Administrative Board and the\naforementioned letter of Professor M\u00fcnsterberg's to Mr. Holls as a\nbasis, and an adjournment taken until January 17 for the preparation of\ndetailed recommendations.\n\nThe Committee on Plan and Scope again met, all members being present, at\nthe Hotel Manhattan on January 17, and arrived at definite conclusions,\nwhich were embodied in the report to the Administrative Board, a meeting\nof which had been called at the Hotel Manhattan for January 19, 1903.\nThe report of the Committee on Plan and Scope is of such historic\nimportance in the development of the Congress that it is given as\nfollows, although many points were afterwards materially modified:--\n\n NEW YORK, January 19, 1903.\n\n President Nicholas Murray Butler,\n Chairman Administrative Board of World's Congress at\n The Louisiana Purchase Exposition:\n\n Dear Sir,--The undersigned, appointed by your Board a\n committee on the scope and plan of the proposed World's\n Congress, at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition, have the\n honor to submit the following report:--\n\n The authority under which the Committee acted is found in a\n communication addressed to its members by the Chairman of\n the Administrative Board. A subsequent communication to the\n Chairman of the Committee indicated that the widest scope\n was allowed to it in preparing its plan. Under this\n authority the Committee met on January 10, 1903, and again\n on January 17. The Committee was, from the beginning,\n unanimous in accepting the general plan of the\n Administrative Board, that there should be but a single\n congress, which, however, might be divided and subdivided,\n in accord with the general plan, into divisions,\n departments, and sections, as its deliberations proceed.\n\n\n PLANS OF THE CONGRESS\n\n As a basis of discussion two plans were drawn up by members\n of the Committee and submitted to it. The one, by Professor\n M\u00fcnsterberg, started from a comprehensive classification and\n review of human achievement in advancing knowledge, the\n other, by Professor Small, from an equally comprehensive\n review of the great public questions involved in human\n progress.\n\n Professor M\u00fcnsterberg proposed a congress having the\n definite task of bringing out the unity of knowledge with a\n view of correlating the scattered theoretical and practical\n scientific work of our day. This plan proposed that the\n congress should continue through one week. The first day was\n to be devoted to the discussion of the most general problem\n of knowledge in one comprehensive discussion and four\n general divisions. On the second day the congress was to\n divide into several groups and on the remaining days into\n yet more specialized groups, as set forth in detail in the\n plan.\n\n The plan by Professor Small proposed a congress which would\n exhibit not merely the scholar's interpretation of progress\n in scholarship, but rather the scholar's interpretation of\n progress in civilization in general. The proposal was based\n on a division of human interests into six great groups:--\n\n I. The Promotion of Health.\n II. The Production of Wealth.\n III. The Harmonizing of Human Relations.\n IV. Discovery and Spread of Knowledge.\n V. Progress in the Fine Arts.\n VI. Progress in Religion.\n\n The plan agreed with the other in beginning with a general\n discussion and then subdividing the congress into divisions\n and groups.\n\n As a third plan the Chairman of the Committee suggested the\n idea of a congress of publicists and representative men of\n all nations and of all civilized peoples, which should\n discuss relations of each to all the others and throw light\n on the question of promoting the unity and progress of the\n race.\n\n After due consideration of these plans the Committee reached\n the conclusion that the ends aimed at in the second and\n third plans could be attained by taking the first plan as a\n basis, and including in its subdivisions, so far as was\n deemed advisable, the subjects proposed in the second and\n third plans. They accordingly adopted a resolution that \"Mr.\n M\u00fcnsterberg's plan be adopted as setting forth the general\n object of the Congress and defining the scope of its work,\n and that Mr. Small's plan be communicated to the General\n Committee as containing suggestions as to details, but\n without recommending its adoption as a whole.\"\n\n\n DATE OF THE CONGRESS\n\n Your Committee is of opinion that, in view of the climatic\n conditions at St. Louis during the summer and early autumn,\n it is desirable that the meeting of this general Congress be\n held during the six days beginning on Monday, September 19,\n 1904, and continuing until the Saturday following. Special\n associations choosing St. Louis as their meeting-place may\n then convene at such other dates as may be deemed fit; but\n it is suggested that learned societies whose field is\n connected with that of the Congress should meet during the\n week beginning September 26.\n\n The sectional discussions of the Congress will then be\n continued by these societies, the whole forming a continuous\n discussion of human progress during the last century.\n\n\n PLAN OF ADDRESSES\n\n The Committee believe that in order to carry out the\n proposed plan in the most effective way it is necessary that\n the addresses be prepared by the highest living authorities\n in each and every branch. In the last subdivisions, each\n section embraces two papers; one on the history of the\n subject during the last one hundred years and the other on\n the problems of to-day.\n\n The programme of papers suggested by the Committee as\n embraced in Professor M\u00fcnsterberg's plan may be summarized\n as follows:--\n\n On the first day four papers will be read on the general\n subject, and four on each of the four large divisions,\n twenty in all. On the second day those four divisions will\n be divided into twenty groups, or departments, each of which\n will have four papers referring to the divisions and\n relations of the sciences, eighty in all. On the last four\n days, two papers in each of the 120 sections, 240 in all,\n thus making a total of 340 papers.\n\n In view of the fact that the men who will make the addresses\n should not be expected to bear all the expense of their\n attendance at the Congress, it seems advisable that the\n authorities of the Fair should provide for the expenses\n necessarily incurred in the journey, as well as pay a small\n honorarium for the addresses. The Committee suggest,\n therefore, that each American invited be offered $100 for\n his traveling expenses and each European $400. In addition\n to this that each receive $150 as an honorarium. Assuming\n that one half of those invited to deliver addresses will be\n Americans and one half Europeans, this arrangement will\n involve the expenditure of $136,000. This estimate will be\n reduced if the same person prepares more than one address.\n It will also be reduced if more than half of the speakers\n are Americans, and increased in the opposite case.\n\n As the Committee is not advised of the amount which the\n management of the Exposition may appropriate for the purpose\n of the Congress, it cannot, at present, enter further into\n details of adjustment, but it records its opinion that the\n sum suggested is the least by which the ends sought to be\n attained by the Congress can be accomplished. To this must\n be added the expenses of administration and publication.\n\n All addresses paid for by the Congress should be regarded as\n its property, and be printed and published together, thus\n constituting a comprehensive work exhibiting the unity,\n progress, and present state of knowledge.\n\n This plan does not preclude the delivery of more than one\n address by a single scholar. The directors of the Exposition\n may sometimes find it advisable to ask the same scholar to\n deliver two addresses, possibly even three.\n\n The Committee recommends that full liberty be allowed to\n each section of the Congress in arranging the general\n character and programme of its discussions within the field\n proposed.\n\n As an example of how the plan will work in the case of any\n one section, the Committee take the case of a neurologist\n desiring to profit by those discussions which relate to his\n branch of medicine. This falls under C of the four main\n divisions as related to the physical sciences. His interest\n on the first day will therefore be centred in Division C,\n where he may hear the general discussion of the physical\n sciences and the relations to the other sciences. On the\n second day he will hear four papers in Group 18 on the\n Subjects embraced in the general science of anthropology;\n one on its fundamental conceptions; one on its methods and\n two on the relation of anthropology to the sciences most\n closely connected with it. During the remaining four days he\n will meet with the representatives of medicine and its\n related subjects, who will divide into sections, and listen\n to four papers in each section. One paper will consider the\n progress of that section in the last one hundred years, one\n paper will be devoted to the problems of to-day, leaving\n room for such contributions and discussions as may seem\n appropriate during the remainder of the day.\n\n\n CO\u00d6PERATION OF LEARNED SOCIETIES INVOKED\n\n In presenting this general plan, your Committee wishes to\n point out the difficulty of deciding in advance what\n subjects should be included in every section. Therefore, the\n Committee deems it of the utmost importance to secure the\n advice and assistance of learned societies in this country\n in perfecting the details of the proposed plan, especially\n the selection of speakers and the programme of work in each\n section. It will facilitate the latter purpose if such\n societies be invited and encouraged to hold meetings at St.\n Louis during the week immediately preceding, or, preferably,\n the week following the General Congress. The selection of\n speakers should be made as soon as possible, and, in any\n case, before the end of the present academic year, in order\n that formal invitations may be issued and final arrangements\n made with the speakers a year in advance of the Congress.\n\n\n CONCLUDING SUGGESTIONS\n\n With the view of securing the co\u00f6peration of the governments\n and leading scholars of the principal countries of Western\n and Central Europe in the proposed Congress, it seems\n advisable to send two commissioners to these countries for\n this purpose. It seems unnecessary to extend the operations\n of this commission outside the European continent or to\n other than the leading countries. In other cases\n arrangements can be made by correspondence.\n\n It is the opinion of the Committee that an American of\n world-wide reputation as a scholar should be selected to\n preside over the Congress.\n\n All which is respectfully submitted.\n (Signed) SIMON NEWCOMB,\n Chairman;\n GEORGE F. MOORE,\n JOHN B. MOORE,\n HUGO M\u00dcNSTERBERG,\n ALBION W. SMALL,\n WILLIAM H. WELCH,\n ELIHU THOMSON,\n Committee.\n\nThe Administrative Board met on January 19 to receive the report of the\nCommittee on Plan and Scope which was presented by Dr. Newcomb.\nProfessor M\u00fcnsterberg and Professor John Bassett Moore were also present\nby invitation to discuss the details of the scheme. In the afternoon the\nBoard went into executive session, and the following recommendations\nwere adopted and transmitted by the Director of Congresses to the\nCommittee on Congresses of the Exposition and to the President and\nExecutive Committee, who duly approved them.\n\n To the Director of Congresses:--\n\n The Administrative Board have the honor to make the\n following recommendations in reference to the Department of\n Congresses:--\n\n (1) That there be held in connection with the Universal\n Exposition of St. Louis in 1904, an International Congress\n of Arts and Science.\n\n (2) That the plan recommended by the Committee on Plan and\n Scope for a general congress of Arts and Science, to be held\n during the six days beginning on Monday, September 19, 1904,\n be approved and adopted, subject to such revision in point\n of detail as may be advisable, preserving its fundamental\n principles.\n\n (3) That Simon Newcomb, LL.D., of Washington, D. C., be\n named for President of the International Congress of Arts\n and Science, provided for in the foregoing resolution.\n\n (4) That Professor M\u00fcnsterberg, of Harvard University, and\n Professor Albion W. Small, of the University of Chicago, be\n invited to act as Vice-Presidents of the Congress.\n\n (5) That the Directors of the World's Fair be requested to\n change the name of this Board from the \"Advisory Board\" to\n the \"Administrative Board of the International Congress of\n Arts and Science.\"\n\n (6) That the detailed arrangements for the Congress be\n intrusted to a committee consisting of the President and two\n Vice-Presidents already named, subject to the general\n oversight and control of the Administrative Board, and that\n the Directors of the Exposition be requested to make\n appropriate provision for their compensation and necessary\n expenses.\n\n (7) That it be recommended to the Directors of the World's\n Fair that appropriate provision should be made in the office\n of the Department of Congresses for an executive secretary\n and such clerical assistance as may be needed.\n\n (8) That the following payment be recommended to those\n scholars who accept invitations to participate and do a\n specified piece of work, or submit a specified contribution\n in the International Congress of Arts and Science: For\n traveling expenses for a European scholar, $500. For\n traveling expenses for an American scholar, $150.\n\n (9) That provision be made for the publication of the\n proceedings of the Congress in suitable form to constitute a\n permanent memorial of the work of the World's Fair for the\n promotion of science and art, under competent editorial\n supervision.\n\n (10) That an appropriation of $200,000 be made to cover\n expenses of the Department of Congresses, of which sum\n $130,000 be specifically appropriated for an International\n Congress of Arts and Science, and the remainder to cover all\n expenses connected with the publication of the proceedings\n of said International Congress of Arts and Science, and the\n expenses for promotion of all other congresses.\n\nIn addition to the foregoing recommendations, Professor M\u00fcnsterberg was\nrequested at his earliest convenience to furnish each member with a\nrevised plan of his classification, which would reduce as far as\npossible the number of sections into which the Congress was finally to\nbe divided.\n\nWith the adjournment of the Board on January 19 the Congress may be\nfairly said to have been launched upon its definite course, and such\nchanges as were thereafter made in the programme did not in any wise\naffect the principle upon which the Congress was based, but were due to\nthe demands of time, of expediency, and in some cases to the accidents\nattending the participation. The organization of the Congress and the\npersonnel of its officers from this time on remained unchanged, and the\nhistory of the meeting is one of steady and progressive development. The\nCommittee on Plan and Scope were discharged of their duties, with a vote\nof thanks for the laborious and painstaking work which they had\naccomplished and the thoroughly scientific and novel plan for an\ninternational congress which they had recommended.\n\nIt was determined by the Administrative Board to keep the services of\nthree of the members of the Committee on Plan and Scope, who should act\nas a scientific organizing committee and who should also be the\npresiding officers of the Congress. The choice for President of the\nCongress fell without debate to the dean of American scientific circles,\nwhose eminent services to the Government of the United States and whose\nrecognized position in foreign and domestic scientific circles made him\nparticularly fitted to preside over such an international gathering of\nthe leading scientists of the world, Dr. Simon Newcomb, retired\nProfessor of Mathematics, United States Navy. Professor Hugo\nM\u00fcnsterberg, of Harvard University, and Professor Albion W. Small, of\nthe University of Chicago, were designated as the first and second\nVice-Presidents respectively.\n\nThe work of the succeeding spring, with both the Organizing Committee\nand the Administrative Board, was devoted to the perfecting of the\nprogramme and the selection of foreign scientists to be invited to\nparticipate in the Congress. The theory of the development of the\nprogramme and its logical bases are fully and forcibly treated by\nProfessor M\u00fcnsterberg in the succeeding chapter, and therefore will not\nbe touched upon in this record of facts. As an illustration of the\ngrowth of the programme, however, it is interesting to compare its form,\nwhich was adopted at the next meeting of the Organizing Committee on\nFebruary 23, 1903, in New York City, with its final form as given in the\ncompleted programme presented at St. Louis in September, 1904 (pp.\n47-49). No better illustration can be given of the immense amount of\nlabor and painstaking adjustment, both to scientific and to physical\nconditions, and of the admirable adaptability of the original plan to\nthe exigencies of actual practice. At the meeting of February 23, 1903,\nwhich was attended by all of the members of the Organizing Committee and\nby President Butler of the Administrative Board, it was determined that\nthe number of Departments should be sixteen, with the following\ndesignations:--\n\n A. NORMATIVE SCIENCES\n\n 1. Philosophical Sciences.\n 2. Mathematical Sciences.\n\n B. HISTORICAL SCIENCES\n\n 3. Political Sciences.\n 4. Legal Sciences.\n 5. Economic Sciences.\n 6. Philological Sciences.\n 7. Pedagogical Sciences.\n 8. \u00c6sthetic Sciences.\n 9. Theological Sciences.\n\n C. PHYSICAL SCIENCES\n\n 10. General Physical Sciences.\n 11. Astronomical Sciences.\n 12. Geological Sciences.\n 13. Biological Sciences.\n 14. Anthropological Sciences.\n\n D. MENTAL SCIENCES\n\n 15. Psychological Sciences.\n 16. Sociological Sciences.\n\n SECTIONS\n\n 1. _a_ Metaphysics.\n _b_ Logic.\n _c_ Ethics.\n _d_ \u00c6sthetics.\n\n 2. _a_ Algebra.\n _b_ Geometry.\n _c_ Statistical Methods.\n\n 3. _a_ Classical Political History of Asia.\n _b_ Classical Political History of Europe.\n _c_ Medieval Political History of Europe.\n _d_ Modern Political History of Europe.\n _e_ Political History of America.\n\n 4. _a_ History of Roman Law.\n _b_ History of Common Law.\n _aa_ Constitutional Law.\n _bb_ Criminal Law.\n _cc_ Civil Law.\n _dd_ History of International Law.\n\n 5. _a_ History of Economic Institutions.\n _b_ History of Economic Theories.\n _c_ Economic Law.\n _aa_ Finance.\n _bb_ Commerce and Transportation.\n _cc_ Labor.\n\n 6. _a_ Indo-Iranian Languages.\n _b_ Semitic Languages.\n _c_ Classical Languages.\n _d_ Modern Languages.\n\n 7. _a_ History of Education.\n _aa_ Educational Institutions.\n\n 8. _a_ History of Architecture.\n _b_ History of Fine Arts.\n _c_ History of Music.\n _d_ Oriental Literature.\n _e_ Classical Literature.\n _f_ Modern Literature.\n _aa_ Architecture.\n _bb_ Fine Arts.\n _cc_ Music.\n\n 9. _a_ Primitive Religions.\n _b_ Asiatic Religions.\n _c_ Semitic Religions.\n _d_ Christianity.\n _aa_ Religious Institutions.\n\n 10. _a_ Mechanics and Sound.\n _b_ Light and Heat.\n _c_ Electricity.\n _d_ Inorganic Chemistry.\n _e_ Organic Chemistry.\n _f_ Physical Chemistry.\n _aa_ Mechanical Technology.\n _bb_ Optical Technology.\n _cc_ Electrical Technology\n _dd_ Chemical Technology.\n\n 11. a_ Theoretical Astronomy.\n b_ Astrophysics.\n\n 12. _a_ Geodesy.\n _b_ Geology.\n _c_ Mineralogy.\n _d_ Physiography.\n _e_ Meteorology.\n _aa_ Surveying.\n _bb_ Metallurgy.\n\n 13. _a_ Botany.\n _b_ Plant Physiology.\n _c_ Ecology.\n _d_ Bacteriology.\n _e_ Zo\u00f6logy.\n _f_ Embryology.\n _g_ Comparative Anatomy.\n _h_ Physiology.\n _aa_ Agronomy.\n _bb_ Veterinary Medicine.\n\n 14. Anthropological Sciences:\n _a_ Human Anatomy.\n _b_ Human Physiology.\n _c_ Neurology.\n _d_ Physical Chemistry.\n _e_ Pathology.\n _f_ Raceomatology.\n _aa_ Hygiene.\n _bb_ Contagious Diseases.\n _cc_ Internal Medicine.\n _dd_ Surgery.\n _ee_ Gynecology.\n _ff_ Ophthalmology.\n _gg_ Therapeutics.\n _hh_ Dentistry.\n\n 15. Psychological Sciences:\n _a_ General Psychology.\n _b_ Experimental Psychology.\n _c_ Comparative Psychology.\n _d_ Child Psychology.\n _e_ Abnormal Psychology.\n\n 16. Sociological Sciences:\n _a_ Social Morphology.\n _b_ Social Psychology.\n _c_ Laws of Civilization.\n _d_ Laws of Language and Myths.\n _e_ Ethnology.\n _aa_ Social Technology.\n\nIt was also resolved, that the discussion of subjects falling under the\nfirst four divisions should be held in the forenoon of each of the four\ndays, from Wednesday until Saturday, and those relating to the three\ndivisions of Practical Science in the afternoon of the same days. The\nprogramme was thus rearranged by the addition of the following:--\n\n E. UTILITARIAN SCIENCES\n\n 17. Medical Sciences:\n _a_ Hygiene.\n _b_ Sanitation.\n _c_ Contagious Diseases.\n _d_ Internal Medicine.\n _e_ Psychiatry.\n _f_ Surgery.\n _g_ Gynecology.\n _h_ Ophthalmology.\n _i_ Otology.\n _j_ Therapeutics.\n _k_ Dentistry.\n\n 18. Practical Economic Sciences:\n _a_ Extractive Productions of Wealth.\n _b_ Transportation.\n _c_ Commerce.\n _d_ Postal Service.\n _e_ Money and Banking.\n\n 19. Technological Sciences:\n _a_ Mechanical Technology.\n _b_ Electrical Technology.\n _c_ Chemical Technology.\n _d_ Optical Technology.\n _e_ Surveying.\n _f_ Metallurgy.\n _g_ Agronomy.\n _h_ Veterinary Medicine.\n\n F. REGULATIVE SCIENCES\n\n 20. Practical Political Sciences:\n _a_ Internal Practical Politics.\n _b_ National Practical Politics.\n _c_ Tariff.\n _d_ Taxation.\n _e_ Municipal Practical Politics.\n _f_ Colonial Practical Politics.\n\n 21. Practical Legal Sciences:\n _a_ International Law.\n _b_ Constitutional Law.\n _c_ Criminal Law.\n _d_ Civil Law.\n\n 22. Practical Social Sciences:\n _a_ Treatment of the Poor.\n _b_ Treatment of the Defective.\n _c_ Treatment of the Dependent.\n _d_ Treatment of Vice and Crime.\n _e_ Problems of Labor.\n _f_ Problems of the Family.\n\n G. CULTURAL SCIENCES\n\n 23. Practical Educational Sciences:\n _a_ Kindergarten and Home.\n _b_ Primary Education.\n _c_ Universities and Research--Secondary.\n _d_ Moral Education.\n _e_ \u00c6sthetic Education.\n _f_ Manual Training.\n _g_ University.\n _h_ Libraries.\n _i_ Museums.\n _j_ Publications.\n\n 24. Practical \u00c6sthetic Sciences:\n _a_ Architecture.\n _b_ Fine Arts.\n _c_ Music.\n _d_ Landscape Architecture.\n\n 25. Practical Religious Sciences:\n _a_ Religious Education.\n _b_ Training for Religious Service.\n _c_ Missions.\n _d_ Religious Influence.\n\nThe programme was again thoroughly revised at the meeting of the\nOrganizing Committee on April 9, 1903, at Hotel Manhattan, and as thus\namended was submitted to the Administrative Board at a meeting held in\nNew York on April 11. A careful consideration of the programme at this\nmeeting, and a final revision made at the meeting of the Administrative\nBoard at the St. Louis Club April 30, 1903, brought it practically into\nits final shape, with such minor changes as were found necessary in the\nlatter days of the Congress due to the unexpected declinations of\nforeign speakers at the last moment. The continuous and exacting work\ndone in perfecting the programme by each member of the Organizing\nCommittee and by the Chairman of the Administrative Board deserves\nspecial mention, and was productive of the best results by its logical\nappeal to the scientific world. The programme as finally worked out in\norderly detail, shortened in many departments by various exigencies, may\nbe found on pages 47 to 49 of this volume.\n\n\nPARTICIPATION AND SUPPORT\n\nThe general plan of the Congress having been determined and the\nprogramme practically perfected by May 1, 1903, two most important\nquestions demanded the attention of the Administrative Board: first, the\nparticipation in the Congress, both foreign and domestic; second, the\nsupport of the scientific public. At a meeting of the Board held in New\nYork City April 11, 1903, these points were given full consideration. It\nwas determined that the list of speakers both foreign and domestic\nshould be made up on the advice of men of letters and of scientific\nthought in this country, and accordingly there was sent to the officers\nof the various scientific societies in the United States, to heads of\nuniversity departments and to every prominent exponent of science and\nart in this country, a printed announcement and tentative programme of\nthe Congress, and a letter asking advice as to the scientists best\nfitted in view of the object of the Congress to prepare an address. From\nthe hundreds of replies received in response to this appeal were made up\nthe original lists of invited speakers, and only those were placed\nthereon who were the choice of a fair majority of the representatives of\nthe particular science under selection. The Administrative Board\nreserved to itself the full right to reject any of these names or to\nchange them so as to promote the best interests of the Congress, but in\nnearly every instance it would be safe to say that the person selected\nwas highly satisfactory to the great majority of his fellow scientists\nin this country. Many changes were unavoidably made at the last moment\nto meet the situation caused by withdrawals and declinations, but the\nlist of second choices was so complete, and in many cases there was such\na delicate balance between the first and second choice, that there was\nno difficulty in keeping the standard of the programme to its original\nhigh plane.\n\nIt was early determined that the seven Division speakers and the\nforty-eight Department speakers, which occupied the first two days of\nthe programme, should be Americans, and that these Division and\nDepartment addresses should be a contribution of American scholarship to\nthe general scientific thought of the world. This decision commended\nitself to the scientific public both at home and abroad, and it was so\ncarried out. It was further determined that the Division and Department\nspeakers and the foreign speakers should be selected during the summer\nof 1903, and that the American participation in the Section addresses\nshould be determined after it was definitely known what the foreign\nparticipation would be. In view of the importance of the Congress, it\nwas deemed inadvisable to attempt to interest foreign scientific circles\nby correspondence, and it was further decided to pay a special\ncompliment to each invited speaker by sending an invitation at the hands\nof special delegates. Arrangements were therefore made for Dr. Newcomb\nand Professors M\u00fcnsterberg and Small to proceed to Europe during the\nsummer of 1903, and to present in person to the scientific circles of\nEurope and to the scientists specially desired to deliver addresses the\ncomplete plan and scope of the Congress and an invitation to\nparticipate.\n\n\nINVITATIONS TO FOREIGN SPEAKERS\n\nThe members of the Organizing Committee, armed with very strong\ncredentials from the State Department to the diplomatic service abroad,\nsailed in the early summer of 1903 to present the invitation of the\nExposition to the selected scientists. Dr. Newcomb sailed May 6,\nProfessor M\u00fcnsterberg May 30, and Professor Small June 6. A general\ninterest in the project had at this time become aroused, and there was\nassured a respectful hearing. Both the President of the United States\nand the Emperor of Germany expressed their warm interest in the plan,\nand the State Department at Washington gave to the Congress both on this\noccasion and on succeeding occasions its effective aid. The Director of\nCongresses wishes to express his obligations both to the late Secretary\nHay and to Assistant-Secretary Loomis for their valuable suggestions and\ncourteous co\u00f6peration in all matters relating to the foreign\nparticipation. Strong support was also given the Committee and the plan\nof the Congress by Commissioner-General Lewald of Germany, and\nCommissioner-General Lagrave of France. Throughout the entire Congress\nperiod, both of these energetic Commissioners-General placed themselves\nactively at the disposition of the Department in promoting the\nattendance of scientists from their respective countries.\n\nGeographically the division between the three members of the Organizing\nCommittee gave to Dr. Newcomb, France; to Professor M\u00fcnsterberg,\nGermany, Austria, and Switzerland; and to Professor Small, England,\nRussia, Italy, and a part of Austria. It was also agreed that Dr.\nNewcomb should have special oversight of the departments of Mathematics,\nPhysics, Astronomy, Biology, and Technology; Professor M\u00fcnsterberg,\nspecial charge of Philosophy, Philology, Art, Education, Psychology, and\nMedicine; and that Professor Small should look after Politics, Law,\nEconomics, Theology, Sociology, and Religion. The Committee worked\nindependently of each other, but met once during the summer at Munich to\ncompare results and to determine their closing movements.\n\nThe public and even the Exposition authorities have probably never\nrealized the delicacy and the extremely careful adjustment exercised by\nthe Organizing Committee in their summer's campaign. Scientists are as a\nclass sensitive, jealous of their reputations, and loath to undertake\nlong journeys to a distant country for congress purposes. The amount of\nlabor devolving upon the Committee to find the scientists scattered over\nall Europe; the careful and painstaking presentation to each of the plan\nof the Congress; the appeal to their scientific pride; the hearing of a\nthousand objections, and the answering of each; the disappointments\nincurred; the substitutions made necessary at the last moment;--all sum\nup a task of the greatest difficulty and of enormous labor. The\nremarkable success with which the mission was crowned stands out the\nmore prominently in view of these conditions. When the Committee\nreturned in the latter part of September, they had visited every\nimportant country of Europe, delivered more than one hundred fifty\npersonal invitations, and for the one hundred twenty-eight sections had\nsecured one hundred seventeen acceptances.\n\nAt a meeting of the Administrative Board, which met with the Organizing\nCommittee on October 13, 1903, a full report of the European trip was\nreceived and ways and means considered for insuring the attendance from\nabroad. A list of the foreign acceptances was ordered printed at once\nfor general distribution, and the Chairman of the Administrative Board\nwas requested to address a letter to each of the foreign scientists\nconfirming the action of the special delegates and giving additional\ninformation as to the length of addresses, and rules and details\ngoverning the administration of the Congress.\n\n\nDEATH OF FREDERICK W. HOLLS\n\nThe number of the Administrative Board was decreased during the summer\nby the sudden death of the Hon. Frederick W. Holls, on July 23, 1903.\nMr. Holls had been intensely interested in the development of the\nCongress from its earliest days, and was very instrumental in\ndetermining the form in which it was finally promoted. His great\ninfluence abroad as a member of the Hague Conference, and his high\nstanding in legal and literary circles in this country, rendered him one\nof the most prominent members of the Board. A resolution of regret at\nhis untimely death was spread upon the minutes of the Administrative\nBoard at the meeting in October, and it was decided that his place upon\nthe Board should remain unfilled.\n\n\nDOMESTIC PARTICIPATION\n\nAt this same meeting of October 13, active measures were taken to\nforward the American participation in the Congress. The necessity was\nnow very evident that our strongest men of science must be induced to\ntake part, in order to compare favorably with the leading minds which\nEurope was sending. The Organizing Committee were instructed to consult\nthe American scientific societies and associations regarding the\nselection of American speakers, and also in reference to presiding\nofficials for each section. Six weeks was considered sufficient for this\ntask, and the Committee were asked to submit to the Administrative Board\nat a meeting in New York, on December 3 and 4, their recommendations for\nAmerican speakers.\n\nAn immense amount of detailed labor, in the way of correspondence, now\ndevolved upon the Organizing Committee as well as upon the Director of\nCongresses, and a branch office was established in Washington equipped\nwith clerks and stenographers under the charge of Dr. Newcomb, who\ndevoted the greater portion of his time for the next six months to the\nmany details connected with the selection of foreign and American\nspeakers and chairmen. The meeting of the Administrative Board in New\nYork in December, and a similar meeting with the Organizing Committee\nheld at the St. Louis Club on December 28, were given over entirely to\nperfecting the personnel of the programme. Great care was exerted in\nselecting the chairmen of the departments and sections, inasmuch as they\nmust be men of international reputation and conceded strength. For the\nsecretaryships younger men of promise and ability were selected, chiefly\nfrom university circles. Both the chairmen and secretaries served\nwithout compensation.\n\nThe work of the late winter was a continuance of the perfecting of\ndetails, and at a meeting of the Administrative Board held in New York\nin February, 1904, a final approval was given to the programme and the\nspeakers. The imminent approach of the Exposition and the work of the\ncollege commencement season made it impossible for further general\nmeetings, and on June 1 the Organizing Committee was constituted a\ncommittee with power to fill vacancies in the programme or to amend the\nprogramme as circumstances might demand. All suggestions with reference\nto details were to be made directly to the Director of Congresses, upon\nwhom devolved from this time forward the entire executive control of the\nCongress.\n\n\nASSEMBLY HALLS\n\nThe highly diversified nature of the Congress and the holding of one\nhundred twenty-eight section meetings in four days' time rendered\nnecessary a large number of meeting-places centrally located. The\nExposition was fortunate in having the use of the new plant of the\nWashington University, nine large buildings of which had been erected.\nMany of these buildings contained lecture halls and assembly rooms,\nseating from one hundred fifty to fifteen hundred people. Sixteen halls\nwere necessary to accommodate the full number of sections running at any\none time, and of this number twelve were available in the group of\nUniversity Buildings; the other four were found in the lecture halls of\nthe Education Building, Mines and Metallurgy Building, Agriculture\nBuilding, and the Transportation Building. The opening exercises, at\nwhich the entire Congress was assembled, was held in Festival Hall,\ncapable of seating three thousand people. In the assignment of halls\ncare was taken so far as possible to assign the larger halls to the more\npopular subjects, but it often happened that a great speaker was of\nnecessity assigned to a smaller hall. Two of the halls also proved bad\nfor speaking owing to the traffic of the Intramural Railway, and there\nwas lacking in nearly all of the halls that academic peace and quiet\nwhich usually surrounds gatherings of a scientific nature. This,\nhowever, was to be expected in an exposition atmosphere, and was readily\nacquiesced in by the speakers themselves, and very little objection was\nheard to the halls as assigned. Every one seemed to recognize the fact\nthat the immediate value of the meeting lay in the commingling and\nfellowship, and that the addresses, of which one could hear at most only\none in sixteen, could not be judged in the proper light until their\npublication.\n\n\nSUPPORT OF THE SCIENTIFIC PUBLIC\n\nA strong effort was made by the Organizing Committee to secure the\nattendance of an audience which should not only in its proportions be\ncomplimentary to the eminence of the speakers, but also be thoroughly\nappreciative of the addresses and conversant with the topic under\ndiscussion. Letters were therefore sent to all of the prominent\nscientific societies in the United States, asking that wherever possible\nthe meetings of the society be set for the Congress week in St. Louis,\nand wherever this was not possible that the societies send special\ndelegates to attend the Congress, and urge their membership to make an\neffort to be present. Personal letters were also sent to the leading\nmembers of the different professions and sciences, to the faculties of\nuniversities and colleges, urging them to attend, and pointing out the\nnecessity of the support of the American scientific public.\n\nSpecial invitations were also sent in the name of the Organizing\nCommittee to the leading authorities of the various subjects under\ndiscussion in the Congress, asking them to contribute a ten-minute paper\nto any section in which they were particularly interested. The result of\nthis careful campaign, in addition to the general exploitation which the\nCongress received, was such a flattering attendance of American\nscientists, as to be both a compliment to the European speakers and a\nbenefit to scientific thought. Many societies, such as the American\nNeurological Association, American Philological Association, American\nMathematical Society, Physical and Chemical Societies of America,\nAmerican Astronomical Society, Germanic Congress, American\nElectro-Therapeutic Association, held their annual meetings during the\nweek of the Congress, although the date rendered it impossible for the\nmajority of the associations to meet at that time. The eighth\nInternational Geographic Congress adjourned from Washington to St. Louis\nto meet with the Congress of Arts and Science. In response to the\nspecial invitations, two hundred forty-seven ten-minute addresses were\npromised and one hundred two actually read.\n\n\nRECEPTION OF FOREIGN GUESTS\n\nEvery effort was made by the Department of Congresses to assist the\nforeign speakers in their traveling arrangements and to make matters as\neasy and comfortable as possible. A letter of advice was mailed to each\nspeaker prior to his departure, carefully setting forth the conditions\nof American travel, routes to be followed, reception committees to be\nmet, and other essential details. The official badge of the Congress was\nalso mailed, so that those wearing them might be easily identified by\nthe reception committees both in New York and St. Louis. Nine tenths of\nthe speakers came by the way of New York, and in order to facilitate the\nclearance of their baggage and to provide for their fitting\nentertainment in New York, a special reception committee was formed\ncomposed of the following members:--\n\n F. P. Keppel, Columbia University, New York City, Chairman.\n Prof. Herbert V. Abbott, New York.\n R. Arrowsmith, New York.\n C. William Beebe, New York.\n George Bendelari, New York.\n Edward W. Berry, Passaic.\n J. Fuller Berry, Old Forge.\n Rev. H. C. Birckhead, New York.\n Dr. James H. Canfield, New York.\n Rev. G. A. Carstenson, New York.\n Prof. H. S. Crampton, New York.\n Sanford L. Cutler, New York.\n Dr. Israel Davidson, New York.\n William H. Davis, New York.\n Prof. James C. Egbert, New York.\n Dr. Haven Emerson, New York.\n Prof. T. S. Fiske, New York.\n J. D. Fitz-Gerald, II, Newark.\n W. D. Forbes, Hoboken.\n Clyde Furst, Yonkers.\n William K. Gregory, New York.\n George C. O. Haas, New York.\n Prof. W. A. Hervey, New York.\n Carl Herzog, New York.\n Robert Hoguet, New York.\n Dr. Percy Hughes, Brooklyn.\n Prof. A. V. W. Jackson, New York.\n Albert J. W. Kern, New York.\n Prof. Charles F. Kroh, Orange.\n Dr. George F. Kunz, New York.\n Prof. L. A. Lousseaux, New York.\n Frederic L. Luqueer, Brooklyn.\n R. A. V. Minckwitz, New York.\n Charles A. Nelson, New York.\n Dr. Harry B. Penhollow, New York.\n Prof. E. D. Perry, New York.\n John Pohlman, New York.\n Dr. Ernest Richard, New York.\n Dr. K. E. Richter, New York.\n Edward Russ, Hoboken.\n Prof. C. L. Speranza, Oak Ridge.\n Prof. Francis H. Stoddard, New York.\n Dr. Anthony Spitzka, Goodground.\n Harvey W. Thayer, Brooklyn.\n Prof. H. A. Todd, New York.\n Dr. E. M. Wahl, New York.\n Prof. F. H. Wilkens, New York.\n\nTo each foreign speaker was extended the courtesies of the Century and\nthe University clubs while remaining in New York City. Mention should\nalso be made of the assistance of the Treasury Department and of the\ncourtesy of Collector of the Port, Hon. N. N. Stranahan, through whom\nspecial privileges of the Port were extended to the members of the\nCongress. The work of the reception committee was most satisfactorily\nand efficiently performed, and was highly appreciated by the foreign\nguests. Special acknowledgment is due Mr. F. P. Keppel, of Columbia\nUniversity, for his painstaking and efficient management of the affairs\nof the committee in New York. Many of the speakers proceeded singly to\nSt. Louis, stopping at various places, but the great majority went\ndirectly to the University of Chicago, where they were entertained\nduring the week preceding the Congress by President Harper and Professor\nSmall, of the University of Chicago. The arrivals at St. Louis were made\non Saturday the 17th and Sunday the 18th of September. Many of the\nparticipants had arrived at earlier dates, and fully twenty of the\nspeakers were members of the International Jury of Awards for their\nrespective countries, and had been in St. Louis since September 1, the\nbeginning of the Jury work.\n\nA reception committee similar to that in New York was also formed at St.\nLouis from the members of the University Club, and their duties were to\nmeet all incoming trains and conduct the members of the Congress\npersonally to their stopping-places, and assist them in all matters of\ndetail. This committee was comprised of the following members, nearly\nall of the University Club, who performed their work efficiently and\nenthusiastically to the great satisfaction of the Exposition and to the\nthorough appreciation of the foreign guests:--\n\n V. M. Porter, Chairman, St. Louis.\n E. H. Angert, St. Louis.\n Gouverneur Calhoun, St. Louis.\n W. M. Chauvenet, St. Louis.\n H. G. Cleveland, St. Louis.\n Mr. M. B. Clopton, St. Louis.\n Walter Fischel, St. Louis.\n W. L. R. Gifford, St. Louis.\n E. M. Grossman, St. Louis.\n L. W. Hagerman, St. Louis.\n Louis La Beaume, St. Louis.\n Carl H. Lagenburg, St. Louis.\n Sears Lehmann, St. Louis.\n G. F. Paddock, St. Louis.\n T. G. Rutledge, St. Louis.\n Luther Ely Smith, St. Louis.\n J. Clarence Taussig, St. Louis.\n C. E. L. Thomas, St. Louis.\n W. M. Tompkins, St. Louis.\n G. T. Weitzel, St. Louis.\n Tyrrell Williams, St. Louis.\n\nThe itinerary of the foreign speakers after leaving St. Louis at the end\nof the Congress took them on appointed trains to Washington, where they\nwere given an official reception by President Roosevelt and a reception\nby Dr. Simon Newcomb, President of the Congress. From here they\nproceeded to Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., where they were given\na reception by Prof. Hugo M\u00fcnsterberg, and were entertained as guests of\nHarvard University. Thence the great majority of the speakers returned\nto New York, where they were the guests of Columbia University, and were\ngiven a farewell dinner by the Association of Old German Students. Many\nof the speakers, however, visited other portions of the country before\nreturning to Europe.\n\nThe foreign speakers while in St. Louis were considered the guests of\nthe Exposition Company, and were relieved from all care and expense for\nrooms and entertainment. Those who were accompanied by their wives and\ndaughters were entertained by prominent St. Louis families, and those\nwho came singly were quartered in the dormitory of the Washington\nUniversity, which was set aside for this purpose during the week of the\nCongress. The dormitory arrangement proved a very happy circumstance, as\nnearly one hundred foreign and American scientists of the highest rank\nwere thrown in contact, much after the fashion of their student days,\nand thoroughly enjoyed the novelty and fellowship of the plan. The\ndormitory contained ninety-six rooms newly fitted up with much care and\nwith all modern conveniences. Light breakfasts were served in the rooms,\nand special service provided at the call of the occupants. The situation\nof the dormitory also in the Exposition grounds in close proximity to\nthe assembly halls was highly appreciated, and although at times there\nwere minor matters which did not run so smoothly, the almost unanimous\nexpression of the guests of the Exposition was one of delight and\nappreciation of the arrangements. Special mention ought in justice to be\nmade to those residents of St. Louis who sustained the time-honored name\nof the city for hospitality and courtesy by entertaining those foreign\nmembers of the Congress who were accompanied by the immediate members of\ntheir family. They were as follows:--\n\n Dr. C. Barek\n Dr. William Bartlett\n Judge W. F. Boyle\n Mr. Robert Brookings\n Mrs. J. T. Davis\n Dr. Samuel Dodd\n Mr. L. D. Dozier\n Dr. W. E. Fischel\n Mr. Louis Fusz\n Mr. August Gehner\n Dr. M. A. Goldstein\n Mr. Charles H. Huttig\n Dr. Ernest Jonas\n Mr. R. McKittrick Jones\n Mr. F. W. Lehmann\n Dr. Robert Luedeking\n Mr. Edward Mallinckrodt\n Mr. George D. Markham\n Mr. Thomas McKittrick\n Mr. Theodore Meier\n Dr. S. J. Niccolls\n Dr. W. F. Nolker\n Dr. S. J. Schwab\n Dr. Henry Schwartz\n Mr. Corwin H. Spencer\n Dr. William Taussig\n Mr. G. H. Tenbroek\n Dr. Herman Tuholske\n Hon. Rolla Wells\n Mr. Edwards Whitaker\n Mr. Charles Wuelfing\n Mr. Max Wuelfing.\n\n\nDETAIL OF THE CONGRESS\n\nThe immense amount of detail work which devolved upon the Department in\nthe matter of preparing halls for the meetings, receiving guests,\nproviding for their comfort, issuing the programmes, managing the detail\nof the receptions, banquets, invitations, etc., providing for\nregistration, payment of honorariums, and furnishing information on\nevery conceivable topic, rendered necessary the formation of a special\nbureau which was placed in charge of Dr. L. O. Howard of Washington, D.\nC., as Executive Secretary. Dr. Howard's long experience as Secretary of\nthe American Association for the Advancement of Science rendered him\nparticularly well qualified to assume this laborious and thankless task.\nBy mutual arrangement the Director of Congresses and the Executive\nSecretary divided the field of labor. The Director had, in addition to\nthe general oversight of the Congress, special supervision of the local\nreception committee, the entertainment of the guests, official banquets\nand entertainments, and all financial details. The Executive Secretary\ntook entire charge of the programme, assignment of rooms in the\ndormitory, care and supervision of the dormitory, assignment of halls\nfor speakers, registration books and bureau of information. Dr. Howard\narrived on September 1 to begin his duties, and remained until September\n30.\n\n\nWEEK OF THE CONGRESS\n\nThe opening session of the Congress was set for Monday afternoon.\nSeptember 19, at 2.30 o'clock in Festival Hall. The main programme of\nthe Congress began Tuesday morning. The sessions were held in the\nmornings and afternoons, the evenings being left free for social\naffairs. The list of functions authorized in honor of the Congress of\nArts and Science were as follows:--\n\nMonday evening, September 19, grand f\u00eate night in honor of the guests of\nthe Congress, with special musical programme about the Grand Basin and\nlagoons, boat rides and lagoon f\u00eate; this function was unfortunately\nsomewhat marred by inclement weather. It was the only evening free in\nthe entire week, however, for members of the Congress to witness the\nilluminations and decorative evening effects.\n\nBanquet given by the St. Louis Chemical Society at the Southern Hotel to\nmembers of the chemical sections of the Congress.\n\nTuesday evening, September 20, general reception by the Board of Lady\nManagers to the officers and speakers of the Congress and Officials of\nthe Exposition.\n\nWednesday afternoon, September 21, garden f\u00eate given to the members of\nthe Congress at the French National Pavilion by the Commissioner-General\nfrom France. The gardens of the miniature Grand Trianon were never more\nbeautiful than on this brilliant afternoon, and the presence of the\nGarde R\u00e9publicaine band and the entire official representation of the\nExposition, lent a color and spirit to the affair unsurpassed during the\nExposition period.\n\nWednesday evening, reception by the Imperial German Commissioner-General\nto the officers and speakers of the Congress and the officials of the\nExposition, at the German State House. The magnificent hospitality which\ncharacterized this building during the entire Exposition period was\nfairly outdone on this occasion, and the function stands prominent as\none of the brilliant successes of the Exposition period.\n\nThursday evening, September 22, Shaw banquet at the Buckingham Club to\nthe foreign delegates and officers of the Congress. Through the courtesy\nof the trustees of Shaw's Garden and of the officers of Washington\nUniversity, the annual banquet provided for men of science, letters, and\naffairs, by the will of Henry B. Shaw, founder of the Missouri Botanical\nGardens, was given during this week as a compliment to the noted foreign\nscientists who were the guests of the city of St. Louis.\n\nFriday evening, September 23, official banquet given by the Exposition\nto the speakers and officials of the Congress and the officials of the\nExposition, in the banquet hall of the Tyrolean Alps.\n\nSaturday evening, September 24, banquet at the St. Louis Club given by\nthe Round Table of St. Louis, to the foreign members of the Congress.\nThe Round Table is a literary club which meets at banquet six times\nannually for discussion of topics of interest to the literary and\nscientific world.\n\nBanquet given by the Imperial Commissioner-General from Japan to the\nJapanese delegation to the Congress and to the Exposition officials and\nChiefs of Departments.\n\nDinner given by Commissioner-General from Great Britain to the English\nmembers of the Congress.\n\n\nOPENING OF THE CONGRESS\n\nThe assembling of the Congress on the afternoon of September 19, in the\nmagnificent auditorium of Festival Hall which crowned Cascade Hill and\nthe Terrace of States, was marked with simple ceremonies and impressive\ndignity. The great organ pealed the national hymns of the countries\nparticipating and closed with the national anthem of the United States.\nIn the audience were the members of the Congress representing the\nselected talent of the world in their field of scientific endeavor, and\nabout them were grouped an audience drawn from every part of the United\nStates to promote by their presence the success of the Congress and to\ndo honor to the noted personages who were the guests of the Exposition\nand of the Nation. On the stage were seated the officials of the\nCongress, the honorary vice-presidents from foreign nations, and the\nofficials of the Exposition.\n\nAt the appointed hour the Director of Congresses, Dr. Howard J. Rogers,\ncalled the meeting to order, and outlined in a few words the object of\nthe Congress, welcomed the foreign delegates, and presented the members,\nboth foreign and American, to the President of the Exposition, Hon.\nDavid R. Francis.\n\nThe President spoke as follows:--\n\n What an ambitious undertaking is a universal exposition! But\n how worthy it is of the highest effort! And, if successful,\n how far-reaching are its results, how lasting its benefits!\n Who shall pass judgment on that success? On what evidence,\n by what standards shall their verdicts be formed? The\n development of society, the advancement of civilization,\n involve many problems, encounter many and serious\n difficulties, and have met with deplorable reactions which\n decades and centuries were required to repair. The proper\n study of mankind is man, and any progress in science that\n ignores or loses sight of his welfare and happiness, however\n admirable and wonderful such progress may be, disturbs the\n equilibrium of society.\n\n The tendency of the times toward centralization or\n unification is, from an economic standpoint, a drifting in\n the right direction, but the piloting must be done by\n skillful hands, under the supervision and control of\n far-seeing minds, who will remember that the masses are\n human beings whose education and expanding intelligence are\n constantly broadening and emphasizing their individuality. A\n universal exposition affords to its visitors, and these who\n systematically study its exhibits and its phases, an\n unequaled opportunity to view the general progress and\n development of all countries and all races. Every line of\n human endeavor is here represented.\n\n The conventions heretofore held on these grounds and many\n planned to be held--aggregating over three hundred--have\n been confined in their deliberations to special lines of\n thought or activity. This international congress of arts and\n sciences is the most comprehensive in its plan and scope of\n any ever held, and is the first of its kind. The lines of\n its organization, I shall leave the Director of Exhibits,\n who is also a member of the administrative board of this\n congress, to explain. You who are members are already\n advised as to its scope, and your almost universal and\n prompt acceptance of the invitations extended to you to\n participate, implies an approval which we appreciate, and\n indicates a willingness and a desire to co\u00f6perate in an\n effort to bring into intelligent and beneficial correlation\n all branches of science, all lines of thought. You need no\n argument to convince you of the eminent fitness of making\n such a congress a prominent feature of a universal\n exposition in which education is the dominant feature.\n\n The administrative board and the organizing committee have\n discharged their onerous and responsible tasks with signal\n fidelity and ability, and the success that has rewarded\n their efforts is a lasting monument to their wisdom. The\n management of the Exposition tenders to them, collectively\n and individually, its grateful acknowledgments. The\n membership in this congress represents the world's elect in\n research and in thought. The participants were selected\n after a careful survey of the entire field; no limitations\n of national boundaries or racial affiliations have been\n observed. The Universal Exposition of 1904, the city of St.\n Louis, the Louisiana territory whose acquisition we are\n celebrating, the entire country, and all participating in or\n visiting this Exposition are grateful for your coming, and\n feel honored by your presence.\n\n We are proud to welcome you to a scene where are presented\n the best and highest material products of all countries and\n of every civilization, participated in by all peoples, from\n the most primitive to the most highly cultured--a marker in\n the progress of the world, and of which the International\n Congress of Arts and Science is the crowning feature.\n\n May the atmosphere of this universal exposition, charged as\n it is with the restless energies of every phase of human\n activity and permeated by that ineffable sentiment of\n universal brotherhood engendered by the intelligent sons of\n God, congregating for the friendly rivalries of peace,\n inspire you with even higher thoughts--imbue you with still\n broader sympathies, to the end that by your future labors\n you may be still more helpful to the human race and place\n your fellow men under yet deeper obligations.\n\nDirector Frederick J. V. Skiff was then introduced by the President as\nrepresenting the Division of Exhibits, whose untiring labors had filled\nthe magnificent Exposition palaces surrounding the Festival Hall with\nthe visible products of those sciences and arts, the theory, progress,\nand problems of which the Congress was assembled to consider.\n\nMr. Skiff spoke as follows:--\n\n The division of exhibits of the Universal Exposition of 1904\n has looked forward to this time, when the work it has\n performed is to be reviewed and discussed by this\n distinguished body. I do not, of course, intend to convey\n the idea that the international congress is to inspect or\n criticise the exhibitions, but I do mean to say that the\n deliberations of this organization are contemporaneous with\n and share the responsibility for the accomplishments of\n which the exhibitions made are the visible evidences.\n\n The great educational yield of a universal exposition comes\n from the intellectual more than from the mechanical\n processes. It is the material condition of the times. It is\n as well the duty of the responsible authorities to go yet\n further and record the thoughts and theories, the\n investigations, experiments, and observations of which these\n material things are the tangible results.\n\n A congress of arts and science, whose membership is drawn\n from all educational as well as geographical zones, not only\n accounts for and analyzes the philosophy of conditions, but\n points the way for further advance along the lines\n consistent with demonstration. Its contribution to the hour\n is at once a history and a prophecy.\n\n The extent to which the deliberations and utterances of this\n congress may regulate the development of society or give\n impulse to succeeding generations, it is impossible to\n estimate, but not unreasonable to anticipate. The plans of\n the congress matured in the minds of the best scholars; the\n classification of its purpose, the scope, the selection of\n its distinguished participants, gave to the hopes and\n ambitions of the management of the Exposition inspiration of\n a most exalted degree. At first these ambitions were--not\n without reason--regarded as too high. The plane upon which\n the congress had been inaugurated, the aim, the broad\n intent, seemed beyond the merits, if not beyond the\n capacity, of this hitherto not widely recognized\n intellectual centre. But the courage of the inception, the\n loftiness of the purpose, appealed so profoundly to the\n toilers for truth and the apostles of fact, that we find\n gathered here to-day in the heart of the new Western\n continent the great minds whose impress on society has\n rendered possible the intellectual heights to which this age\n has ascended and now beckon forward the students of the\n world to limitless possibilities.\n\n While international congresses of literature, science, art,\n and industry have been accomplished by previous expositions,\n yet to classify and select the topics in sympathy with the\n classification and installation of the exhibits material is\n a step considerably in advance of the custom. The men who\n build an exposition must by temperament, if not by\n characteristic, be educators. They must be in sympathy with\n the welfare of humanity and its higher destiny. The\n exhibitions at this Exposition are not the haphazard\n gatherings of convenient material, but the outline of a plan\n to illustrate the productiveness of mankind at this\n particular time, carefully digested, thoroughly thought out,\n and conscientiously executed. The exhibit, therefore, in\n each of the departments of the classification, as well as in\n the groups of the different departments, are of such\n character, and so arranged as to reflect the best that the\n world can do along departmental lines, and the best that\n different peoples can do along group lines. The congresses\n accord with the exhibits, and the exhibits give expression\n to the congresses.\n\n Education has been the keynote of this Exposition. Were it\n not for the educational idea, the acts of government\n providing vast sums of money for the up-building of this\n Exposition would have been impossible. This congress\n reflects one idea vastly outstripping others, and that is,\n in the unity of thought in the universal concert of purpose.\n It is the first time, I believe, that there has been an\n international gathering of the authorities of all the\n sciences, and in that respect the congress initiates and\n establishes the universal brotherhood of scholars.\n\n A thought uncommunicated is of little value. An unrecorded\n achievement is not an asset of society. The real lasting\n value of this congress will consist of the printed record of\n its proceedings. The delivery of the addresses, reaching and\n appealing to, as must necessarily be the case, a very\n limited number of people, can be considered as only a method\n of reaching the lasting and perpetual good of civilization.\n\n In just the degree that this Exposition in its various\n divisions shall make a record of accomplishments, and lead\n the way to further advance, this enterprise has reached the\n expectations of its contributors and the hopes of its\n promoters. This congress is the peak of the mountain that\n this Exposition has builded on the highway of progress. From\n its heights we contemplate the past, record the present, and\n gaze into the future.\n\n This universal exposition is a world's university. The\n International Congress of Arts and Science constitutes the\n faculty; the material on exhibition are the laboratories and\n the museums; the students are mankind.\n\n That in response to invitation of the splendid committee of\n patriotic men, to whom all praise is due for their efforts\n in this crowning glory of the Exposition, so eminent a\n gathering of the scholars and savants of the world has\n resulted, speaks unmistakably for the fraternity of the\n world, for the sympathy of its citizenship, and for the\n patriotism of its people.\n\nIn reply to these addresses of the officials of the Exposition, the\nhonorary Vice-Presidents for Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia,\nAustria, Italy, and Japan made brief responses in behalf of their\nrespective countries.\n\nSir William Ramsay of London spoke in the place of Hon. James Bryce,\nextending England's thanks for the courtesy which had been shown her\nrepresentatives and declaring that England, particularly in the\nscientific field, looked upon America as a relative and not as a foreign\ncountry.\n\nFrance was represented by Professor Jean Gaston Darboux, Perpetual\nSecretary of the Academy of Sciences of Paris, who spoke as follows:--\n\n MR. PRESIDENT, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,--My first word will be\n to thank you for the honor which you have been so courteous\n as to pay my country in reserving for her one of the\n vice-presidencies of the Congress. Since the time of\n Franklin, who received at the hands of France the welcome\n which justice and his own personal genius and worth\n demanded, most affectionate relations have not ceased to\n unite the scientists of France and the scientists of\n America. The distinction which you have here accorded to us\n will contribute still further to render these relations more\n intimate and more fraternal. In choosing me among so many of\n the better fitted delegates sent by my country, you have\n without doubt wished to pay special honor to the Acad\u00e9mie\n des Sciences and to the Institut de France, which I have the\n honor of representing in the position of Perpetual\n Secretary. Permit me therefore to thank you in the name of\n these great societies, which are happy to count in the\n number of their foreign associates and of their\n correspondents so many of the scholars of America. In like\n manner as the Institut de France, so the Congress which\n opens to-day seeks to unite at the same time letters,\n science, and arts. We shall be happy and proud to take part\n in this work and contribute to its success.\n\nGermany was represented by Professor Wilhelm Waldeyer, of the University\nof Berlin, who replied as follows:--\n\n MR. PRESIDENT, HONORED ASSEMBLAGE,--The esteemed invitation\n which has been offered to me in this significant hour of the\n opening of the Congress of Arts and Science to greet the\n members of this congress, and particularly my esteemed\n compatriots, I have had no desire to decline. I have been\n for a fortnight under the free sky of this mighty city--so I\n must express myself, since enclosing walls are unknown in\n the United States--and this fact, together with the\n hospitality offered me in such delightful manner by the\n Chairman of the Committee on Congresses, Mr. Frederick W.\n Lehmann, has almost made me a St. Louis man. Therefore I may\n perhaps take it upon myself to greet you here.\n\n I confess that I arrived here with some misgiving--some\n doubts as to whether the great task which was here\n undertaken under most difficult circumstances could be\n accomplished with even creditable success. These doubts\n entirely disappeared the first time I entered the grounds of\n the World's Fair and obtained a general view of the method,\n beautiful as well as practical, by which the treasures\n gathered from the whole world were arranged and displayed. I\n trust you, too, will have a like experience; and will soon\n recognize that a most earnest and good work is here\n accomplished.\n\n And I must remark at this time that we Germans may indeed be\n well satisfied here; the unanimous and complete recognition\n which our co\u00f6peration in this great work has received is\n almost disconcerting.\n\n What can be said of the whole Exposition with reference to\n its extent and the order in which everything is arranged, I\n may well say concerning the departments of science,\n especially interesting to us. In this hour in which the\n Congress of Arts and Science is being opened, we shall not\n express any thanks to those who took this part of the work\n upon their shoulders--a more difficult task indeed than all\n the others, for here the problem is not to manage materials,\n but heads and minds. And as I see here assembled a large\n number of German professors--I, too, belong to the\n profession--of whom it is said, I know not with how much\n justice, that they are hard to lead, the labors of the\n Directors and Presidents of the Congress could not have\n been, and are not now, small. Neither shall we to-day\n prophesy into what the Congress may develop. The greater\n number of speakers cannot expect to have large audiences,\n but even to-day we can safely say this: the imposing row of\n volumes in which shall be given to posterity the reviews\n here to be presented concerning the present condition, and\n future problems of the sciences and arts as they appear to\n the scientific world at the beginning of the twentieth\n century, will provide a monumental work of lasting value.\n This we may confidently expect. The thanks which we to-day\n do not wish to anticipate in words, let us show by our\n actions to our kind American hosts, and especially to the\n directors of the World's Fair and of this Congress. With\n exalted mind, forgetting all little annoyances which may and\n will come, let us go forward courageously to the work, and\n let us do our best. Let us grasp heartily the open hand\n honestly extended to us.\n\n May this Congress of Arts and Science worthily take part in\n the great and undisputed success which even to-day we must\n acknowledge the World's Fair at St. Louis.\n\nFor Austria Dr. Theodore Escherich, of the University of Vienna,\nresponded as follows:--\n\n In the name of the many Austrians present at the Congress I\n express the thanks of my compatriots to the Committee which\n summoned us, for their invitation and the hospitality so\n cordially extended....\n\n I congratulate the authorities upon the idea of opening this\n Congress. How many world-expositions have already been held\n without an attempt having been made to exhibit the spirit\n that has created this world of beautiful and useful things?\n It was reserved for these to find the form in which the\n highest results of human thought--Science--presented in the\n persons of her representatives, could be incorporated in the\n compass of the World's Fair. The conception of this\n International Congress of all Sciences in its originality\n and audacity, in its universality and comprehensive\n organization, is truly a child of the \"young-American\n spirit.\"...\n\n After this Congress has come to a close and the collection\n of the lectures delivered, an unparalleled encyclopedia of\n human knowledge, both in extent and content, will have\n appeared. We may say that this Fair has become of epochal\n importance, not alone for trade and manufactures, but also\n for science. These proud palaces will long have disappeared\n and been forgotten when this work, a _monumentum aere\n perennius_, shall still testify to future generations the\n standard of scientific attainment at the beginning of the\n twentieth century.\n\nShort acknowledgments were then made for Russia by Dr. Oscar Backlund,\nof the Astronomical Observatory at Pulkowa, Russia, and for Japan by\nProf. Nobushige Hozumi, of the Imperial University at Tokio, Japan.\n\nThe last of the Vice-Presidents to respond to the addresses of welcome\nwas Signor Attilio Brunialti, Councilor of State for Italy, who after a\nfew formal words in English broke into impassioned eloquence in his\nnative tongue, and in brilliant diction and graceful periods expressed\nthe deep feeling and profound joy which Italy, the mother of arts, felt\nin participating in an occasion so historic and so magnificent. Signor\nBrunialti said in part:\n\n I thank you, gentlemen, for the honor you have paid both to\n my country and myself by electing me a Vice-President of\n this great scientific assembly. Would that I could thank you\n in words in which vibrate the heart of Rome, the scientific\n spirit of my land, and all that it has given to the world\n for the progress of science, literature, and art. You know\n Italy, gentlemen, you admire her, and therefore it is for\n this also that my thanks are due to you. What ancient Rome\n has contributed to the common patrimony of civilization is\n also reflected here in a thousand ways, and a classical\n education, held in such honor, by a young and practical\n people such as yours, excites our admiration and also our\n astonishment. By giant strides you are reviving the activity\n of Italy at the epoch of the Communes, when all were\n animated by unwearying activity and our manufactures and\n arts held the first place in Europe. I have already praised\n here the courageous spirit which has suggested the meeting\n of this Congress--a Congress that will remain famous in the\n annals of science. Many things in your country have aroused\n in me growing surprise, but nothing has struck me more, I\n assure you, than this homage to science which is pushing all\n the wealthy classes to a noble rivalry for the increase of\n education and mental cultivation.\n\n You have already large libraries and richly endowed\n universities, and every kind of school, where the works of\n Greece and Rome are perhaps even more appreciated and\n adapted to modern improvements than with us old classical\n nations. Full of energy, activity, and wealth, you have\n before you perpetual progress, and what, up to this, your\n youth has not allowed you to give to the world, you will\n surely be able to give in the future. Use freely all the\n treasures of civilization, art, and science that centuries\n have accumulated in the old world, and especially in my\n beloved Italy; fructify them with your youthful initiation\n and with your powerful energy. By so doing you will\n contribute to peace, and then we may say with truth that we\n have prepared your route by the work of centuries; and like\n unto those who from old age are prevented from following the\n bold young man of Longfellow in his course, we will\n accompany you with our greetings and our alterable\n affection.\n\n By my voice, the native country of Columbus, of Galileo, of\n Michelangelo and Raphael, of Macchiavelli and Volta, salutes\n and with open arms hails as her hopeful daughter young\n America,--thanking and blessing her for the road she has\n opened to the sons of Italy, workmen and artists, to\n civilization, to science, and to modern research and\n thought.\n\nThe Chairman of the Administrative Board, President Nicholas Murray\nButler, of Columbia University, was prevented by illness in his family\nfrom being present at the Congress, and in place of the address to have\nbeen delivered by him on the idea and development of the Congress and\nthe work of the Administrative Board, President William R. Harper, of\nthe University of Chicago, spoke on the same subject as follows:\n\n I have been asked within a few hours by those in authority\n to present to you on behalf of the Administrative Board of\n this International Congress a statement concerning the\n origin and purpose of the congress. It is surely a source of\n great disappointment to all concerned that the chairman of\n the board, President Butler, is prevented from being\n present.\n\n Many of us recall the fact that at the Paris Exposition of\n 1889 the first attempt was made to do something systematic\n in the way of congresses. This attempt was the natural\n outcome of the opinion which had come to exist that so\n splendid an opportunity as was afforded by the coming\n together of leaders in every department of activity should\n not be suffered to pass by unimproved. What could be more\n natural in the stimulating and thought-provoking atmosphere\n of an exposition than the proposal to make provision for a\n consideration and discussion of some of the problems so\n closely related to the interests represented by the\n exposition?\n\n The results achieved at the Paris Exposition of 1889 were so\n striking as to lead those in charge of the World's Columbian\n Exposition in Chicago, 1893, to organize what was called the\n World's Congress Auxiliary, including a series of\n congresses, in which, to use the language of the original\n decree, \"the best workers in general science, philosophy,\n literature, art, agriculture, trade, and labor were to meet\n to present their experiences and results obtained in all\n those various lines of thought up to the present time.\"\n Seven years later, in connection with the Paris Exposition\n of 1900, there was held another similar series of\n international congresses. The general idea had in this way\n slowly but surely gained recognition.\n\n The authorities of the Universal Exposition at St. Louis,\n from the first, recognized the desirability of providing for\n a congress which should exceed in its scope those that had\n before been attempted. In the earliest days of the\n preparation for this Exposition Mr. Frederick J. V. Skiff,\n the Director of the Field Columbian Museum, my nearest\n neighbor in the city of Chicago, took occasion to present\n this idea, and particularly to emphasize the specific point\n that something should be undertaken which not only might add\n dignity and glory to the great name of the Exposition, but\n also constitute a permanent and valuable contribution to the\n sum of human knowledge. After a consideration of the whole\n question, which extended over many months, the committee on\n international congresses resolved to establish an\n administrative board of seven members, to which should be\n committed the responsibility of suggesting a plan in detail\n for the attainment of the ends desired. This Board was\n appointed in November, 1902, and consisted of President\n Nicholas Murray Butler, of Columbia University, New York;\n President R. H. Jesse, of the University of Missouri;\n President Henry S. Pritchett, of the Massachusetts Institute\n of Technology; Dr. Herbert Putnam, Librarian of Congress;\n Mr. Frederick J. V. Skiff, of the Field Columbian Museum,\n Chicago; Frederick G. Holls, of New York City, and the\n present speaker.\n\n This Board held several meetings for the study of the\n questions and problems involved in the great undertaking.\n Much valuable counsel was received and considered. The Board\n was especially indebted, however, to Prof. Hugo M\u00fcnsterberg\n of Harvard University for specific material which he placed\n at their disposal--material which, with modification, served\n as the basis of the plans adopted by the Board, and\n recommended to the members of the Exposition.\n\n At the same time the Administrative Board recommended the\n appointment of Dr. Howard J. Rogers as the Director of\n Congresses, and nominated Prof. Simon Newcomb of the United\n States Navy to be President of the Congress, and Professors\n Hugo M\u00fcnsterberg of Harvard University and Albion W. Small\n of the University of Chicago to be Vice-Presidents of the\n Congress; the three to constitute the Organizing Committee\n of the Congress. This Organizing Committee was later\n empowered to visit foreign countries and to extend personal\n invitations to men distinguished in the arts and sciences to\n participate in the Congress. The reception accorded to\n these, our representatives, was most cordial. Of the 150\n invitations thus extended, 117 were accepted; and of the 117\n learned savants who accepted the invitation, 96 are here in\n person this afternoon to testify by their presence the\n interest they have felt in this great concourse of the\n world's leaders. I am compelled by necessity this afternoon\n to omit many points of interest in relation to the origin\n and history of the undertaking, all of which will be\n published in due time.\n\n After many months of expectancy we have at last come\n together from all the nations of the world. But for what\n purpose? I do not know that to the statement already\n published in the programme of the Congress anything can be\n added which will really improve that statement. The purpose,\n as it has seemed to some of us, is threefold:\n\n In the first place, to secure such a general survey of the\n various fields of learning, with all their \"subdivisions and\n multiplication of specialties,\" as will at the same time set\n forth their mutual relations and connections, and likewise\n constitute an effort toward the unification of knowledge.\n This idea of unity has perhaps been uppermost in the minds\n of all concerned with the work of organizing the Congress.\n\n In the second place, to provide a platform from which might\n be presented the various problems, a solution of which will\n be expected of the scholarship of the future. This includes\n a recognition of the fundamental principles and conception\n that underlie these mutual relations, and therefore serve\n necessarily as the basis of all such future work. Here again\n the controlling idea is that of unity and law, in other\n words, universal law.\n\n In the third place, to bring together in person and spirit\n distinguished investigators and scholars from all the\n countries of the world, in order that by contact of one with\n another a mutual sympathy may be promoted, and a practical\n co\u00f6peration may be effected among those whose lifework leads\n them far apart. Here, still again, unity of result is sought\n for.\n\n As we now take up the work of this convention, which already\n gives sure promise of being notable among the conventions\n that have called together men of different nations, let us\n confidently assure ourselves that the great purpose which\n has throughout controlled in the different stages of its\n organization will be realized; that because the Congress has\n been held, the nations of the earth will find themselves\n drawn more closely together; that human thought will possess\n a more unified organization and human life a more unified\n expression.\n\nFollowing these addresses of welcome and of response came the first\npaper of the specific programme, designed to be introductory to the\ndivision, department, and section addresses of the week. This address,\nwhich will be found in full in its proper place, on pages 135 to 147 of\nthis volume, was given by Dr. Simon Newcomb, President of the Congress\nand Chairman of the Organizing Committee, whose labors for fifteen\nmonths were thus brought to a brilliant conclusion.\n\nAt the close of Dr. Newcomb's address the assembly was dismissed by a\nfew words of President Francis, in which he placed at the disposition of\nthe members of the Congress the courtesies and privileges of the\nExposition, and expressed the hope and belief that their presence and\nthe purpose for which they were assembled, would be the crowning glory\nof the Universal Exposition of 1904.\n\nOn Tuesday, September 20, the seven division addresses and the\ntwenty-four department addresses were given, all the speakers being\nAmericans: Royce, in Normative Science; Wilson, in Historical Science;\nWoodward, in Physical Science; Hall, in Mental Science; Jordan, in\nUtilitarian Science; Lowell, in Social Regulation; and Harris, in Social\nCulture, treating the main divisions of science and their applications,\neach dwelling particularly on the scope of the great field included in\nhis address and the unification of the work therein. The forty-eight\ndepartment speakers divided the field of knowledge, one address in each\ndepartment giving the fundamental conceptions and methods, the other the\nhistory and development of the work of the department during the last\ncentury.\n\nWith Wednesday the international participation began, and in the one\nhundred twenty-eight sections into which the departments were divided\none half of the speakers were drawn, so far as circumstances permitted,\nfrom foreign scientific circles. With the exception of the last two\nsections, Religious Influence Personal, and Religious Influence Social,\nthe work of the Congress closed on Saturday afternoon. These two\nsections having four speakers each were placed, one on Sunday morning\nand one on Sunday afternoon, in Festival Hall, and passes to the grounds\ngiven upon application to any one desiring to attend. Large numbers\navailed themselves of the privilege, and the closing hours of the\nCongress were eminently suitable and worthy of its high success. At the\nend of the afternoon session in Festival Hall, Vice-President of the\nCongress, Dr. Albion W. Small, reviewed in a few words the work of the\nweek, its meaning to science, its possible effect upon American thought,\nand then formally announced the Congress closed.\n\n\nOFFICIAL BANQUET\n\nThe official banquet given by the Exposition to all participants,\nmembers, and officials of the Congress, on Friday evening, at the\nTyrolean Alps banquet hall, proved a charming conclusion to the labors\nof the week. No better place could be imagined for holding it, within\nthe grounds of an exposition, than the magnificently proportioned music\nand dining hall of the \"Alps.\" A room 160 feet by 105 feet, capable of\nseating fifteen hundred banqueters; the spacious, oval, orchestral stage\nat the south end; the galleries and boxes along the sides of the hall\ndone in solid German oak; the beautiful and impressive mural\ndecorations, the work of the best painters of Germany; the excellence of\nthe cuisine, and the thoroughly drilled corps of waiters, rendered the\nphysical accessories of a banquet as nearly perfect as possible in a\nfunction so extensive.\n\nThe banquet was the largest held during the Exposition period, eight\nhundred invitations being issued and nearly seven hundred persons\npresent. The music was furnished by the famous Garde R\u00e9publicaine Band\nof France, as the Exposition orchestra was obliged to fill its regular\nweekly assignment at Festival Hall. The decorations of the hall, the\nlights and flowers, the musical programme, the galleries and boxes\nfilled with ladies representing the official and social life of the\nExposition, and the distinguished body of the Congress, formed a picture\nwhich appealed to the admiration and enthusiasm of every one alike. No\nattempt was made to assign seats to the banqueters outside the speakers'\ntable, and little coteries and clusters of scientists, many of whom were\nmaking acquaintances and intellectual alliances during this week which\nwould endure for a lifetime, were scattered about the hall, giving an\ninterest and an animation to the scene quite beyond the powers of\ndescription. In one corner were Harnack, Budde, Jean R\u00e9ville, and\nCuthbert Hall, chatting as animatedly as though their religious theories\nwere not as far apart as the poles; in another, Waldeyer, Escherich,\nJacobi, Allbutt, and Kitasato formed a medical group, the counterpart of\nwhich would be hard to find unless in another part of this same hall;\nstill again were Erdmann, Sorley, Ladd, Royce, and Creighton as the\ncentre of a group of philosophers of world renown. So in every part of\nthe picture which met the eye were focused the leaders of thought and\naction in their respective fields. The _tout ensemble_ of the Congress\nwas here brought out in its strongest effect, as, with the exception of\nthe opening exercises at Festival Hall at which time many had not\narrived, it was the only time when the entire membership was together.\nThe banquet coming at the close of the week was also fortunate, as by\nthis time the acquaintances made, and the common incidents and anecdotes\nexperienced, heightened the enjoyment of all.\n\nThe toastmaster of the banquet and presiding officer, Hon. David R.\nFrancis, was never in a happier vein than when he assumed the gavel and\nproposed the health of the President of the United States and the rulers\nof all nations represented at the board.\n\nPresident Francis said:--\n\n MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF ARTS AND SCIENCE:\n\n On the fa\u00e7ade at the base of the Louisiana Monument, which\n is the central feature of this Exposition picture, is a\n group of Livingston, Monroe, and Marbois. It represents the\n signing of the treaty, which by peaceful negotiation\n transferred an empire from France to the United States. Upon\n the inscription are the words of Livingston, \"We have lived\n long and accomplished much, but this is the crowning act of\n our lives.\"\n\n It is that transfer of an empire which this Exposition is\n held to commemorate. And paraphrasing the words of\n Livingston, permit me to say that I have presided over many\n dinners, but this is the crowning act of my career.\n\n In opening the deliberations of the International Congress\n of Arts and Science, I made the statement that a Universal\n Exposition is an ambitious undertaking. I stated also that\n the International Congress of Arts and Science is the\n crowning feature of this Exposition. I did not venture the\n assertion then which I have the presumption to make now,\n that the most difficult task in connection with this\n Universal Exposition was the assembling of an International\n Congress of Arts and Science. I venture to make the\n statement now, because I feel that I am justified in doing\n so by the success which up to the present has attended your\n deliberations. Any congregation of the leaders of thought in\n the world is a memorable occasion. This is the first\n systematic one that has ever been attempted. Whether it\n proves successful or not, it will be long remembered in the\n history of the civilized countries that have participated in\n it. If it be but the precursor of other like assemblages it\n will still be long remembered, and in that event it will be\n entitled to unspeakable credit if it accomplishes anything\n toward the realization of the very laudable objects which\n prompted its assembling.\n\n The effort to unify all human knowledge and to establish the\n inter-relations thereof is a bold conception, and requires\n the courage that characterizes the people who live in the\n western section of the United States. If it be the last\n effort of the kind it will still be remembered, and this\n Universal Exposition, if it had done nothing else to endear\n it to cultured people of this and other countries, will not\n be forgotten. The savants assembled by the call of this\n Exposition have pursued their respective lines of thought\n and research, prompted by no desire other than one to find a\n solution of the problem which confronts humanity. By\n bringing you together and making an effort to determine and\n establish the relations between all lines of human\n knowledge, we have certainly made an advance in the right\n direction. If your researches, if the results of your\n studies, can be utilized by the human race, then we who have\n been the instruments of that great blessing will be entitled\n to credit secondary only to the men who are the discoverers\n of the scientific knowledge whose relations we are\n endeavoring to establish. The Management of the Universal\n Exposition of 1904 salutes the International Congress of\n Arts and Science. We drink to the perpetuation of that\n organization, and I shall call upon its distinguished\n President, Professor Newcomb, to respond to the Sentiment.\n\nDr. Newcomb in a few words thanked the members of the Congress for their\nparticipation, which had made possible the brilliant success of the\nenterprise, portrayed its effect and the influence of its perpetuation,\nand then extended to all the invitation from the President of the United\nStates to attend the reception at the White House on the following\nTuesday.\n\nIn responding to these toasts the senior Honorary Vice-President, Hon.\nJames Bryce, of Great Britain, spoke in matchless form and held the\nattention of the vast hall closely while he portrayed in a few words the\nchief glories of England in the field of science, and the pride the\nEnglish nation felt in the glorious record made by her eldest daughter,\nthe United States. Mr. Bryce spoke extemporaneously, and his remarks\ncannot be given in full.\n\nFor Germany, Commissioner-General Lewald responded in an eloquent\naddress, in which, after thanking the Exposition and the American\nGovernment for the high honor done the German nation in selecting so\nlarge a percentage of the speakers from German scientific circles, he\nenlarged upon the close relations which had existed between German\nuniversity thought and methods and American thought and practice, due to\nthe vast number of American students who had pursued their post-graduate\ncourses in the universities of Germany. He dwelt upon the pride that\nGermany felt in this sincerest form of tribute to German supremacy in\nscientific thought, and of the satisfaction which the influence in this\ncountry of German-trained students afforded. He described at length the\ngreat exhibit made by German universities in the education department of\nthe Exposition, and pointed to it as demonstrating the supremacy of\nGerman scientific thought and accurate methods. Dr. Lewald closed with a\nbrilliant peroration, in which he referred to the immense service done\nfor the cause of science in the last fifty years of German history and\nto the patronage and support of the Emperor, not only to science in\ngeneral, but to this great international gathering of scientific\nexperts, and drank to the continued cordial relations of Germany and\nAmerica through its university circles and scientific endeavors.\n\nFor the response from France, Prof. Gaston Darboux was delegated by\nCommissioner-General Gerald, who was unable to be present on account of\nsickness. In one of the most beautiful and polished addresses of the\nevening, Professor Darboux spoke in French, of which the following is a\ntranslation:--\n\n GENTLEMEN,--Graciously invited to respond in the name of the\n delegates of France who have accept the invitation of the\n American Government, I consider it my duty in the first\n place to thank this great nation for the honor which it has\n paid to us, and for the welcome, which it has extended to\n us. Those of you who are doing me the honor to listen, know\n of that disagreeable feeling of isolation which at times the\n traveler in the midst of a strange people experiences;--that\n feeling I know only from hearsay. We have not had a moment\n of time to experience it. They are accustomed in Europe to\n portray the Americans as exclusively occupied with business\n affairs. They throw in our faces the famous proverb,\n 'Business is Business,' and give it to us as the rule of\n conduct for Americans. We are able to testify entirely to\n the contrary, since the inhabitants of this beautiful\n country are always seeking to extend to strangers a thousand\n courtesies. Above all, we have encountered no one who has\n not been anxious to go out of his way to give to us, even\n before we had asked it, such information as it was necessary\n for us to have. And what shall I say of the welcome which we\n have received here at the hands of our American\n confr\u00e8res,--Monsieur the President of the Exposition,\n Monsieur the Director of Congresses and other worthy\n co-laborers? The authorities of the Exposition and the\n inhabitants of St. Louis have rivaled each other in making\n our stay agreeable and our ways pleasant in the heart of\n this magnificent Exposition, of which we shall ever preserve\n the most enchanting memory.\n\n We should have wished to see in a more leisurely manner, and\n to make acquaintance with the attractions without number\n with which the Exposition literally swarms (men of letters\n and men of science love at times to disport themselves) and\n to study the exhibits classified in a method so exact in the\n palaces of an architecture so original and so impressive.\n But Monsieur Newcomb has not permitted this. The Congress of\n which he is the illustrious President offers so much in the\n way of attractions,--of a kind a little rigorous it is\n true,--and so much of work to be accomplished, that to our\n very great regret we have had to refuse many invitations\n which it would have been most agreeable to accept. The\n Americans will pardon us for this, I am sure; they know\n better than any one else the value of time, but they know\n also that human strength has some limits, especially among\n us poor Europeans, for I doubt whether an American ever\n knows the meaning of fatigue.\n\n Messieurs, the Congress which is about to terminate\n to-morrow has been truly a very great event. It is the first\n time, I believe, that there has been seen assembled in one\n grand international reunion that which our great minister,\n Colbert, had in mind, and that which we have realized for\n the first time in our Institut de France,--the union of\n letters, science, and arts. That this union shall maintain\n itself in the future is the dearest wish of my heart.\n\n Science is a unit, even as the Universe. The aspects which\n it presents know neither boundaries of states nor the\n political divisions established between peoples. In all\n civilized countries they calculate with the same figures,\n they measure with the same instruments, they employ the same\n classifications, they study the same historic facts,\n economics, and morals. If there exists among the different\n nations some differences in methods, these difference are\n slight. They are a benefit at the same time as well as a\n necessity. For the doing of the immense amount of work of\n research imposed on that part of humanity which thinks, it\n is necessary that the subjects of study should not be\n identically the same, or better, if they are identical, that\n the difference between the points of view from which they\n are considered in the different countries contribute to our\n better knowledge of their nature, their results, and their\n applications. It is necessary then that each people preserve\n their distinctive genius, their particular methods which\n they use to develop the qualities they have inherited. In\n exactly the same way that it is important in an orchestra\n that each instrument play in the most perfect manner, and\n with the timbre which accords with its nature, the part\n which is given to it, so in science as in music, the harmony\n between the players is a necessary condition, which each one\n ought to exert himself to realize. Let us endeavor then in\n scientific research to execute in the most perfect manner\n that part of the task which fate has devolved upon us, but\n let us endeavor also to maintain that accord which is a\n necessary condition to the harmony which will alone be able\n in the future to assure the progress of humanity.\n\n Gentlemen, in this international reunion it would not be\n fitting that I dwell upon the services which my country has\n been able to render to science; and on the other hand it\n would be difficult for me to say to you exactly what part\n America is called upon to take in this concert of civilized\n nations; but I am certain that the part will be worthy of\n the great nation which has given to itself a constitution so\n liberal and which in so short a space of time has known how\n to conquer, and measure in value, a territory so immense\n that it extends from ocean to ocean. I lift my glass to the\n honor of American science; I drink to the future of that\n great nation, for which we, as well as all other Frenchmen,\n hold so much of common remembrance, so much of close and\n living sympathy, and so much of profound admiration. I am\n the more happy to do this in this most beautiful territory\n of Louisiana, which France in a former age ceded freely to\n America.\n\nPerhaps the treat of the evening was the response made in behalf of the\nEmpire of Japan by Professor Hozumi, of the Faculty of Law of the\nUniversity of Tokio.\n\nUnfortunately this response was not preserved in full, but Professor\nHozumi dwelt with much feeling on the world-wide significance of the\nCongress and the common plane upon which all nations might meet in the\npursuit of science and the manifold applications of scientific\nprinciples. He paid a beautiful tribute to the educational system of the\nUnited States and to the great debt which Japan owed to American\nscholars and to American teachers for their aid in establishing modern\neducational principles and methods in the Empire of Japan. The impetus\ngiven to scientific study in Japan by the Japanese students trained in\nAmerican universities was also earnestly dwelt upon, and the close\nrelations which had always existed between Japanese and American\nstudents and instructors feelingly described. In the field of science\nJapan was yet young, but she had shown herself a close and apt pupil,\nand her period of initiative and original research was at hand. In\nbacteriology, in medicine, in seismology, oceanography, and other\nfields, Japan has made valuable contributions to science and established\nthe right to recognition in an international gathering of this nature.\nIt was with peculiar and grateful pride and pleasure that the Japanese\nGovernment had sent its delegation to this Congress of selected experts\nin response to the invitation of the American Government. Near the close\nof his address Professor Hozumi made a gracious and happy allusion,\nbased upon the conflict with Russia, in which he said that of all places\nwhere men meet, and of all places sunned by the light of heaven, this\ngreat Congress, built on the high plane of the brotherhood of science\nand the fellowship of scholars, was the only place where a Japanese and\na Russian could meet in mutual accord, with a common purpose, and clasp\nhands in unity of thought. This chivalrous and beautiful idea, given\nhere so imperfectly from memory, brought the great assembly to its feet\nin rounds of cheers. In closing, Professor Hozumi expressed the earnest\nbelief that the benefits of science from a gathering of this nature\nwould quickly be felt, by a closer co\u00f6peration in the application of\ntheory and practical principles and a simultaneous advance in all parts\nof the world.\n\nThe closing response of the evening for the foreign members was made for\nItaly by Signor Attilio Brunialti, whose brilliant eloquence at many\ntimes during the week had won the admiration of the members of the\nCongress. Under the inspiration of this assemblage he fairly surpassed\nhimself, and the following translation of his remarks but poorly\nindicates the grace and brilliant diction of the original:--\n\n I have had the good fortune to be present in this wonderful\n country at three international Congresses, that of science,\n the peace parliament, and the geographic. I wish to record\n the impression they have excited in my mind, already so\n favorably inclined by your never-to-be-forgotten and\n gracious reception. You must, please, allow me to address\n you in my own language, because the Latin tongue inspires\n me, because I wish to affirm more solemnly my nationality,\n and also, because I cannot express my feelings well in a\n language not familiar to me. My country, the land of\n Columbus, of Galileo, the nation that more than all others\n in Europe is an element of peace, is already in itself the\n synthesis of the three Congresses. And I can call to mind\n that this land is indebted to geography for the fact of its\n being made known to the world, because the immortal Genoese\n pointed it out to people fighting in the old world for a\n small territory, and opened to mortals new and extensive\n countries destined to receive the valiant and the audacious\n of the entire world and to rise like yours to immortal\n glory.\n\n Thus the poet can sing,--\n\n L'avanza, l'avanza\n Divino straniero,\n Conosci la stanza\n Che i fati ti diero;\n Se lutti, se lagrime\n Ancora rinterra\n L'giovin la terra.\n\n Thus Columbus of old could point out to men--who run down\n each other, disputing even love for fear that man may become\n a wolf for man--the vast and endless wastes awaiting\n laborers, and give to man the treasures of the fruitful\n land. 'Tis in the name of peace that I greet modern science\n in all its forms, and I say to you chemists: \"Invent new\n means of destruction;\" and to you mechanics and\n shipbuilders: \"Give us invulnerable men-of-war and such\n perfect cannons, that your own progress may contribute to\n make war rarer in the world.\" Then will men, amazed at their\n own destructive progress, be drawn together by brotherly\n love, by the development of common knowledge and sympathy,\n and by the study of geography be led to know that there is\n plenty of room for every one in the world to contribute to\n progress and civilization.\n\n Americans! these sentiments are graven in your country; in\n point of fact, it is a proof of the harmony that reigns in\n this Congress between guests come from all parts of the\n world, that I, an Italian, am allowed to address you in my\n own language on American ground, near the Tyrolean Alps,\n greeted by the music of the R\u00e9publicaine French Garde,\n united in eternal bonds of friendship by the two great\n goddesses of the modern world,--Science and Peace.\n\nThe last speaker of the evening was Hon. Frederick W. Lehmann, Chairman\nof the Exposition Committee on Congresses, who in eloquent periods set\nforth the ambition of the city of St. Louis and the Exposition of 1904\nin creating a Congress of intellect on the same high plane that had\ncharacterized the educational ideals of the Exposition, and the intense\nsatisfaction which the officials of the Congress felt in its brilliant\noutcome, and the possibilities which it promised for an unequaled\ncontribution to scientific literature.\n\nAt the close of these addresses the members of the Congress and the\nspectators in the gallery sang, in full chorus and under the lead of the\nGarde R\u00e9publicaine Band, the various national anthems, closing with \"The\nStar Spangled Banner.\"\n\n\nPUBLICATION OF THE REPORT\n\nIn accordance with the recommendation of the Administrative Board to the\nCommittee on Congresses, the Executive Committee appointed Dr. Howard J.\nRogers, Director of Congresses, editor of the proceedings of the\nCongress of Arts and Science. The Congress records were removed from St.\nLouis to Albany, New York, the home of the Director, from which place\nthe publication has been prepared. Upon collecting the papers it was\nfound that they could be divided logically, and with a fair degree of\nsimilarity in size, into eight volumes, each of which should cover a\ndefinite and distinct portion of the programme. These are as follows:--\n\n Volume 1. History of the Congress, Scientific Plan of the Congress,\n Philosophy, Mathematics.\n Volume 2. Political and Economic History, History of Law, History\n of Religion.\n Volume 3. History of Language, History of Literature, History of\n Art.\n Volume 4. Physics, Chemistry, Astronomy, Sciences of the Earth.\n Volume 5. Biology, Anthropology, Psychology, Sociology.\n Volume 6. Medicine, Technology.\n Volume 7. Economics, Politics, Jurisprudence, Social Science.\n Volume 8. Education, Religion.\n\nThe details and specifications of the volumes were prepared for\ncompetitive bids and submitted to twelve of the prominent publishers of\nthe country. The most advantageous bid was received from Houghton,\nMifflin & Company of Boston, Mass., and was accepted by the Exposition\nCompany. The Administrative Board and the authorities Of the Exposition\nfeel deeply pleased at the result, inasmuch as the imprint of this firm\nguarantees a work in full accord with the high plane upon which the\nCongress has been conducted.\n\nIt was determined to print the entire proceedings in the English\nlanguage, inasmuch as the Congress was held in an English-speaking\ncountry and the vast majority of the papers were read in that language.\nThe consent of every foreign speaker was obtained for this procedure. It\nwas found, after collecting, that the number of addresses to be\ntranslated was forty-four. The translators were selected by the editor\nupon the advice of the members of the Administrative Board and\nOrganizing Committee, and great care was taken to find persons not only\nthoroughly trained in the two languages and possessing a good English\nstyle, but also persons who were thoroughly conversant with the subject\non which the paper treated. Many of the translators were suggested by\nthe foreign speakers themselves. As a result of this careful selection,\nthe editor feels confident that the original value of the papers has\nbeen in no wise detracted from, and that both in form and content the\ntranslations are thoroughly satisfactory.\n\nIt will be found that some addresses are not closely related to the\nscheme of the Congress. Either through some misunderstanding of the\nexact purpose of the Congress, or through too close devotion to their\nown particular phase of investigation, some half-dozen speakers\nsubmitted papers dealing with special lines of work. These, while\nvaluable and scholarly from their standpoint, do not accord with a\nseries of papers prepared with a view to general relations and\nhistorical perspective. The exceptions are so few, however, as not\nseriously to interfere with the unity of the plan.\n\nIn the arrangement of the papers the order of the official programme is\nfollowed exactly, with the exception that, under Historical Science,\nDepartments 3, 4, and 8, covering History of Politics, Law, and\nReligion, are combined in one volume; and Departments 5, 6, and 7,\ncovering History of Language, Literature, and Art, are combined in the\nsucceeding volume. In volume one, the first chapter is devoted to the\nhistory of the Congress, written by the editor, in which is set forth\nthe plain narrative of the growth and development of the Congress, as\nmuch for the benefit of similar undertakings in the future as for the\ninterest of those participating in this Congress. The second chapter\ncontains the scientific introduction, written by Prof. Hugo M\u00fcnsterberg\nof Harvard University, First Vice-President of the Congress and Member\nof the Organizing Committee. This is written for the purpose of giving\nin detail the principles upon which the classification was based, and\nthe relations which the different sections and departments held to each\nother.\n\nEach paper is prefaced by a very short biographical note in categorical\nform, for the purpose of insuring the identity of the speaker as long in\nthe future as the volumes may exist. Appended to the addresses of each\ndepartment is a short bibliography, which is essential for a general\nstudy of the subject in question. These are in no wise exhaustive or\ncomplete, but are rather designed to be a small, valuable, working\nreference library for students. The bibliographies have been prepared by\neminent experts in the departments of the Congress, but are necessarily\nsomewhat uneven, as some of the writers have gone into the subject more\nthoroughly than others. The general arrangement of the bibliographies\nis: 1. Historical books and standard works dealing with the subject. 2.\nGeneral books for the whole department. 3. Books for sections of\ndepartments.\n\nAppended also to the addresses of each department and sections are\nr\u00e9sum\u00e9s of the ten-minute addresses delivered by invitation at the\nmeeting of the department or section. Many of these papers are of high\nvalue; but inasmuch as very few of them were written in accord with the\nplan of the Congress, and with the main thought to be developed by the\nCongress, but deal rather with some interesting and detached phase of\nthe subject, it has been deemed best not to print them in full, but to\nindicate in brief the subject and the treatment given it by the writer.\nThose which do accord with the plan of the Congress are given more\nextensive treatment.\n\n\nCONCLUSION\n\nWhat the results of the Congress will be; what influence it may have;\nwas it worth the work and cost, are questions often fairly asked.\n\nThe lasting results and influences are of course problematical. They\ndepend upon the character and soundness of the addresses, and whether\nthe uniform strength of the publication will make the work as a whole,\nwhat it undoubtedly is in parts, a source-book for the future on the\nbases of scientific theory at the beginning of the twentieth century,\nand a reliable sketch of the growth of science during the nineteenth\ncentury. Critical study of the addresses will alone determine this, but\nfrom the favorable reception of those already published in reviews, and\nfrom editorial acquaintance with the others, it seems assured. That\nportion of the section addresses which deals with the inter-relations of\nscience and demonstrates both its unity and variety of processes is new\nand authoritative thought, and will be the basis of much discussion and\nremodeling of theories in the future. The immediate results of the\nCongress are highly satisfactory, and fully repay the work and the cost\nboth from a scientific and an exposition standpoint. As an\nacknowledgment of the prominence of scientific methods, as a public\nrecognition of the work of scientists, as the means of bringing to one\nplace the most noted assemblage of thinkers the world has ever seen, as\nan opportunity for scholars to meet and know each other better, the\nCongress was an unqualified success and of enduring reputation. From the\nExposition point of view, it was equally a success; not financially, nor\nwas there ever a thought that it would be. Probably not more than seven\nthousand persons outside of St. Louis came primarily to attend the\nCongress, and their admission fees were a bagatelle; the revenue derived\nfrom the sale of the _Proceedings_ will not meet the cost of printing.\nThere has been no money value sought for in the Congress,--none\nreceived. Its value to the Exposition lies solely in the fact that it is\nthe final argument to the world of the initial claims of the officials\nof the Exposition that its purpose was purely educational. Co\u00f6rdinate\nwith the material exhibits, sought, classified, and installed on a\nrigidly scientific classification, the Congress, which relates,\nillumines, and defends the principles upon which the material portion\nwas founded, has triumphantly vindicated the good faith, the wisdom, and\nthe foresight of the Universal Exposition of 1904. This printed record\nof its proceedings will be a monument not only to the spirit of Science,\nbut to the spirit of the Exposition, which will endure as long as the\nrecords of man are preserved.\n\n * * * * *\n\nIn conclusion, the editor wishes to express his obligations to the many\nspeakers and officers of the Congress, who have evinced great interest\nin the publication and assisted by valuable suggestions and advice. In\nparticular, he acknowledges the help of President Butler of Columbia\nUniversity, Professor M\u00fcnsterberg of Harvard University, and Professor\nSmall of the University of Chicago. Acknowledgments are with justice and\npleasure made to the Committee on Congresses of the Exposition, and the\nable chairman, Hon. Frederick W. Lehmann, for their unwavering and\nprompt support on all matters of policy and detail, without which the\nfull measure of success could not have been achieved. To the efficient\nsecretary of the Department of Congresses, Mr. James Green Cotchett, an\nexpression of obligation is due for his indefatigable labors during the\nCongress period, and for his able and painstaking work in compiling the\ndetailed records of this publication.\n\nAt a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Exposition on January 3,\n1905, there was unanimously voted the following resolution, recommended\nby the Administrative Board and approved by the Committee on\nCongresses:--\n\nMOVED: that a vote of thanks and an expression of deepest obligation be\ntendered to Dr. Simon Newcomb, President of the Congress, Prof. Hugo\nM\u00fcnsterberg, vice-president of the Congress, and Prof. Albion W. Small,\nvice-president of the Congress, for their efficient, thorough, and\ncomprehensive work in connection with the programme of the Congress, the\nselection and invitation of speakers, and the attention to detail in its\nexecution. That, in view of the enormous amount of labor devolving upon\nthese three gentlemen for the past eighteen months, to the exclusion of\nall opportunities for literary and other work outside their college\ndepartments, an honorarium of twenty-five hundred dollars be tendered to\neach of them.\n\nAt a subsequent meeting the following resolution was also passed:--\n\nMOVED: that the Directors of the Louisiana Purchase Exposition Company\nplace upon the record an expression of their appreciation of the\ninvaluable aid so freely given by the Administrative Board of the\nCongress of Arts and Science. In organization, guidance, and results the\nCongress was the most notable of its kind in history. For the important\npart performed wisely and zealously by the Administrative Board the\nExposition Management extends this acknowledgment.\n\n\n SUMMARY OF EXPENSES OF THE CONGRESS\n\n Office expenses $7,025 82\n Travel 3,847 24\n Exploitation, Organizing Committee abroad 8,663 16\n Traveling expenses, American Speakers 31,350\n Traveling expenses, Foreign Speakers 49,000\n Honorariums 7,500\n Banquet 3,500\n Expenses for editing proceedings 5,875\n Estimated cost of printing proceedings 22,000 $138,761 22\n\n\n\n\n INTERNATIONAL\n\n CONGRESS OF ARTS AND SCIENCE\n\n UNIVERSAL EXPOSITION ST. LOUIS\n\n SEPTEMBER 19-25 1904\n\n * * * * *\n\n PROGRAMME AND LIST OF SPEAKERS\n\n\n\n\n PROGRAMME\n\n\n Purpose and Plan of the Congress\n Organization of the Congress\n Speakers and Chairmen\n Chronological Order of Proceedings\n Programme of Social Events\n List of Ten-minute Speakers\n List of Chairmen and Principal Speakers\n\n\n INDEX SUBJECTS\n\n\n Division A. Normative Science\n\n Department 1. Philosophy\n\n Sec. A. Metaphysics\n B. Philosophy of Religion\n C. Logic\n D. Methodology of Science\n E. Ethics\n F. \u00c6sthetics\n\n Department 2. Mathematics\n\n Sec. A. Algebra and Analysis\n B. Geometry\n C. Applied Mathematics\n\n\n Division B. Historical Science\n\n Department 3. Political and Economic History\n\n Sec. A. History of Asia\n B. History of Greece and Rome\n C. Medi\u00e6val History\n D. Modern History of Europe\n E. History of America\n F. History of Economic Institutions\n\n Department 4. History of Law\n\n Sec. A. History of Roman Law\n B. History of Common Law\n C. Comparative Law\n\n Department 5. History of Language\n\n Sec. A. Comparative Language\n B. Semitic Language\n C. Indo-Iranian Languages\n D. Greek Language\n E. Latin Language\n F. English Language\n G. Romance Languages\n H. Germanic Languages\n\n Department 6. History of Literature\n\n Sec. A. Indo-Iranian Literature\n B. Classical Literature\n C. English Literature\n D. Romance Literature\n E. Germanic Literature\n F. Slavic Literature\n G. Belles-Lettres\n\n Department 7. History of Art\n\n Sec. A. Classical Art\n B. Modern Architecture\n C. Modern Painting\n\n Department 8. History of Religion\n\n Sec. A. Brahminism and Buddhism\n B. Mohammedism\n C. Old Testament\n D. New Testament\n E. History of the Christian Church\n\n\n Division C. Physical Science\n\n Department 9. Physics\n\n Sec. A. Physics of Matter\n B. Physics of Ether\n C. Physics of the Electron\n\n Department 10. Chemistry\n\n Sec. A. Inorganic Chemistry\n B. Organic Chemistry\n C. Physical Chemistry\n D. Physiological Chemistry\n\n Department 11. Astronomy\n\n Sec. A. Astrometry\n B. Astrophysics\n\n Department 12. Sciences of the Earth\n\n Sec. A. Geophysics\n B. Geology\n C. Pal\u00e6ontology\n D. Petrology and Mineralogy\n E. Physiography\n F. Geography\n G. Oceanography\n H. Cosmical Physics\n\n Department 13. Biology\n\n Sec. A. Phylogeny\n B. Plant Morphology\n C. Plant Physiology\n D. Plant Pathology\n E. Ecology\n F. Bacteriology\n G. Animal Morphology\n H. Embryology\n I. Comparative Anatomy\n J. Human Anatomy\n K. Physiology\n\n Department 14. Anthropology\n\n Sec. A. Somatology\n B. Arch\u00e6ology\n C. Ethnology\n\n\n Division D. Mental Science\n\n Department 15. Psychology\n\n Sec. A. General Psychology\n B. Experimental Psychology\n C. Comparative and Genetic Psychology\n D. Abnormal Psychology\n\n Department 16. Sociology\n\n Sec. A. Social Structure\n B. Social Psychology\n\n\n Division E. Utilitarian Sciences\n\n Department 17. Medicine\n\n Sec. A. Public Health\n B. Preventive Medicine\n C. Pathology\n D. Therapeutics and Pharmacology\n E. Internal Medicine\n F. Neurology\n G. Psychiatry\n H. Surgery\n I. Gynecology\n J. Ophthalmology\n K. Otology and Laryngology\n L. Pediatrics\n\n Department 18. Technology\n\n Sec. A. Civil Engineering\n B. Mechanical Engineering\n C. Electrical Engineering\n D. Mining Engineering\n E. Technical Chemistry\n F. Agriculture\n\n Department 19. Economic\n\n Sec. A. Economic Theory\n B. Transportation\n C. Commerce and Exchange\n D. Money and Credit\n E. Public Finance\n F. Insurance\n\n\n Division F. Social Regulation\n\n Department 20. Politics\n\n Sec. A. Political Theory\n B. Diplomacy\n C. National Administration\n D. Colonial Administration\n E. Municipal Administration\n\n Department 21. Jurisprudence\n\n Sec. A. International Law\n B. Constitutional Law\n C. Private Law\n\n Department 22. Social Science\n\n Sec. A. The Family\n B. The Rural Community\n C. The Urban Community\n D. The Industrial Group\n E. The Dependent Group\n F. The Criminal Group\n\n\n Division G. Social Culture\n\n Department 23. Education\n\n Sec. A. Educational Theory\n B. The School\n C. The College\n D. The University\n E. The Library\n\n Department 24. Religion\n\n Sec. A. General Religious Education\n B. Professional Religious Education\n C. Religious Agencies\n D. Religious Work\n E. Religious Influence: Personal\n F. Religious Influence: Social\n\n\n\n\nPURPOSE AND PLAN OF THE CONGRESS\n\n\nThe idea of the Congress grows out of the thought that the subdivision\nand multiplication of specialties in science has reached a stage at\nwhich investigators and scholars may derive both inspiration and profit\nfrom a general survey of the various fields of learning, planned with a\nview of bringing the scattered sciences into closer mutual relations.\nThe central purpose is the unification of knowledge, an effort toward\nwhich seems appropriate on an occasion when the nations bring together\nan exhibit of their arts and industries. An assemblage is therefore to\nbe convened at which leading representatives of theoretical and applied\nsciences shall set forth those general principles and fundamental\nconceptions which connect groups of sciences, review the historical\ndevelopment of special sciences, show their mutual relations and discuss\ntheir present problems.\n\nThe speakers to treat the various themes are selected in advance from\nthe European and American continents. The discussions will be arranged\non the following general plan:--\n\nAfter the opening of the Congress on Monday afternoon, September 19,\nwill follow, on Tuesday forenoon, addresses on main divisions of science\nand its applications, the general theme being the unification of each of\nthe fields treated. These will be followed by two addresses on each of\nthe twenty-four great departments of knowledge. The theme of one address\nin each case will be the Fundamental Conceptions and Methods, while the\nother will set forth the progress during the last century. The preceding\naddresses will be delivered by Americans, making the work of the first\ntwo days the contribution of American scholars.\n\nOn the third day, with the opening of the sections, the international\nwork will begin. One hundred twenty-eight sectional meetings will be\nheld on the four remaining days of the Congress, at each of which two\npapers will be read, the theme of one being suggested by the relations\nof the special branch treated to other branches; the other by its\npresent problems. Three hours will be devoted to each sectional meeting,\nthus enabling each hearer to attend eight such meetings, if he so\ndesires. The programme is so arranged that related subjects will be\ntreated, as far as possible, at different times. The length of the\nprincipal addresses being limited to forty-five minutes each, there will\nremain at least one hour for five or six brief communications in each\nsection. The addresses in each department will be collected and\npublished in a special volume.\n\nIt is hoped that the living influence of this meeting will be yet more\nimportant than the formal addresses, and that the scholars whose names\nare announced in the following programme of speakers and chairmen will\nform only a nucleus for the gathering of thousands who feel in sympathy\nwith the efforts to bring unity into the world of knowledge.\n\n\n\n\n ORGANIZATION OF THE CONGRESS\n\n * * * * *\n\n PRESIDENT OF THE EXPOSITION:\n HON. DAVID R. FRANCIS, A.M., LL.D.\n\n DIRECTOR OF CONGRESSES,\n HOWARD J. ROGERS, A.M., LL.D.\n _Universal Exposition, 1904._\n\n * * * * *\n\n\n ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD\n\n NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER, PH.D., LL.D.\n _President of Columbia University, Chairman._\n\n WILLIAM R. HARPER, PH.D., LL.D.\n _President of the University of Chicago._\n\n R. H. JESSE, PH.D., LL.D.\n _President of the University of Missouri._\n\n HENRY S. PRITCHETT, PH.D., LL.D.\n _President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology._\n\n HERBERT PUTNAM, LITT.D., LL.D.\n _Librarian of Congress._\n\n FREDERICK J. V. SKIFF, A.M.\n _Director of the Field Columbian Museum._\n\n * * * * *\n\n\n OFFICERS OF THE CONGRESS\n\n PRESIDENT:\n SIMON NEWCOMB, PH.D., LL.D.\n _Retired Professor U. S. N._\n\n VICE-PRESIDENTS:\n HUGO M\u00dcNSTERBERG, PH.D., LL.D.\n _Professor of Psychology in Harvard University._\n\n ALBION W. SMALL, PH.D., LL.D.\n _Professor of Sociology in The University of Chicago._\n\n HONORARY VICE-PRESIDENTS:\n RIGHT HONORABLE JAMES BRYCE, M.P.\n GREAT BRITAIN.\n\n M. GASTON DARBOUX,\n FRANCE.\n\n PROFESSOR WILHELM WALDEYER,\n GERMANY.\n\n DR. OSKAR BACKLUND,\n RUSSIA.\n\n PROFESSOR THEODORE ESCHERICH,\n AUSTRIA.\n\n SIGNOR ATTILIO BRUNIALTI,\n ITALY.\n\n PROFESSOR N. HOZUMI,\n JAPAN.\n\n EXECUTIVE SECRETARY:\n DR. L. O. HOWARD,\n _Permanent Secretary American Association\n for the Advancement of Science_.\n\n\n\n\n SPEAKERS AND CHAIRMEN\n\n * * * * *\n\n\n DIVISION A--NORMATIVE SCIENCE\n\n SPEAKER: PROFESSOR JOSIAH ROYCE, Harvard University.\n\n (_Hall 6, September 20, 10 a. m._)\n\n * * * * *\n\n\n DEPARTMENT 1--PHILOSOPHY\n (_Hall 6, September 20, 11.15 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR BORDEN P. BOWNE, Boston University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR GEORGE H. HOWISON, University of California.\n PROFESSOR GEORGE T. LADD, Yale University.\n\n\n SECTION A. METAPHYSICS. (_Hall 6, September 21, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR A. C. ARMSTRONG, Wesleyan University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR A. E. TAYLOR, McGill University, Montreal.\n PROFESSOR ALEXANDER T. ORMOND, Princeton University.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR A. O. LOVEJOY, Washington University,\n\n\n SECTION B. PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. (_Hall 1, September 21, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR THOMAS C. HALL, Union Theological Seminary, N. Y.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR OTTO PFLEIDERER, University of Berlin.\n PROFESSOR ERNST TROELTSCH, University of Heidelberg.\n SECRETARY: DR. W. P. MONTAGUE, Columbia University.\n\n\n SECTION C. LOGIC. (_Hall 6, September 22, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR GEORGE M. DUNCAN, Yale University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR WILLIAM A. HAMMOND, Cornell University.\n PROFESSOR FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE, Columbia University.\n SECRETARY: DR. W. H. SHELDON, Columbia University.\n\n\n SECTION D. METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCE. (_Hall 6, September 22, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR JAMES E. CREIGHTON, Cornell University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR WILHELM OSTWALD, University of Leipzig.\n PROFESSOR BENNO ERDMANN, University of Bonn.\n SECRETARY: DR. R. B. PERRY, Harvard University.\n\n\n SECTION E. ETHICS. (_Hall 6, September 23, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR GEORGE H. PALMER, Harvard University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR WILLIAM R. SORLEY, University of Cambridge.\n PROFESSOR PAUL HENSEL, University of Erlangen.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR F. C. SHARP, University of Wisconsin.\n\n\n SECTION F. AESTHETICS. (_Hall 4, September 23, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR JAMES H. TUFTS, University of Chicago.\n SPEAKERS: DR. HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL, New York City.\n PROFESSOR MAX DESSOIR, University of Berlin.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR MAX MEYER, University of Missouri.\n\n\n DEPARTMENT 2--MATHEMATICS\n (_Hall 7, September 20, 11.15 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR HENRY S. WHITE, Northwestern University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR MAXIME BOCHER, Harvard University.\n PROFESSOR JAMES P. PIERPONT, Yale University.\n\n\n SECTION A. ALGEBRA AND ANALYSIS. (_Hall 9, September 22, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR E. H. MOORE, University of Chicago.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR EMILE PICARD, the Sorbonne; Member of the Institute\n of France.\n PROFESSOR HEINRICH MASCHKE, University of Chicago.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR G. A. BLISS, University of Chicago.\n\n\n SECTION B. GEOMETRY. (_Hall 9, September 24, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR M. W. HASKELL, University of California.\n SPEAKERS: M. GASTON DARBOUX, Perpetual Secretary of The Academy of\n Sciences, Paris.\n DR. EDWARD KASNER, Columbia University.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR THOMAS J. HOLGATE, Northwestern University.\n\n\n SECTION C. APPLIED MATHEMATICS. (_Hall 7, September 24, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR ARTHUR G. WEBSTER, Clark University, Worcester,\n Mass.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR LUDWIG BOLTZMANN, University of Vienna.\n PROFESSOR HENRI POINCAR\u00c9, the Sorbonne; Member of the\n Institute of France.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR HENRY T. EDDY, University of Minnesota.\n\n\n\n\n DIVISION B--HISTORICAL SCIENCE\n\n (_Hall 3, September 20, 10 a. m._)\n\n SPEAKER: PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON, Princeton University.\n\n\n DEPARTMENT 3--POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY\n (_Hall 4, September 20, 11.15 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN:\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR WILLIAM M. SLOANE, Columbia University.\n PROFESSOR JAMES H. ROBINSON, Columbia University.\n\n\n SECTIONS A AND B. HISTORY OF GREECE, ROME, AND ASIA. (_Hall 3,\n September 21, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR THOMAS D. SEYMOUR, Yale University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR JOHN P. MAHAFFY, University of Dublin.\n PROFESSOR ETTORE PAIS, University of Naples. Director\n of the National Museum of Antiquities, Naples.\n PROFESSOR HENRI CORDIER, Ecole Des Langues Vivantes\n Orientales, Paris.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR EDWARD CAPPS, University of Chicago.\n\n\n SECTION C. MEDIAEVAL HISTORY. (_Hall 6, September 21, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR CHARLES H. HASKINS, Harvard University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR KARL LAMPRECHT, University of Leipzig.\n PROFESSOR GEORGE B. ADAMS, Yale University.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR EARLE W. DOW, University of Michigan.\n\n\n SECTION D. MODERN HISTORY OF EUROPE. (_Hall 3, September 22,\n 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: HONORABLE JAMES B. PERKINS, Rochester, N. Y.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR J. B. BURY, University of Cambridge.\n PROFESSOR CHARLES W. COLBY, Mcgill University, Montreal.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR FERDINAND SCHWILL, University of Chicago.\n\n\n SECTION E. HISTORY OF AMERICA. (_Hall 1, September 24, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: DR. JAMES SCHOULER, Boston.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR FREDERIC J. TURNER, University of Wisconsin.\n PROFESSOR EDWARD G. BOURNE, Yale University.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR EVARTS B. GREENE, University of Illinois.\n\n\n SECTION F. HISTORY OF ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS. (_Hall 2, September 23,\n 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR FRANK A. FETTER, Cornell University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR J. E. CONRAD, University of Halle.\n PROFESSOR SIMON N. PATTEN, University of Pennsylvania.\n SECRETARY: DR. J. PEASE NORTON, Yale University.\n\n\n DEPARTMENT 4--HISTORY OF LAW\n (_Hall 5, September 20, 11.15 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: HONORABLE DAVID J. BREWER, Associate Justice of the Supreme\n Court of the United States.\n SPEAKERS: HONORABLE EMLIN MCCLAIN, Judge of the Supreme Court of Iowa,\n Iowa City.\n PROFESSOR NATHAN ABBOTT, Leland Stanford Jr. University.\n\n\n SECTION A. HISTORY OF ROMAN LAW. (_Hall 11, September 21, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN:\n SPEAKERS: MR. W. H. BUCKLER, Baltimore, Md.\n PROFESSOR MUNROE SMITH, Columbia University.\n\n\n SECTION B. HISTORY OF COMMON LAW. (_Hall 11, September 21, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR JOHN D. LAWSON, University of Missouri.\n SPEAKERS: HONORABLE SIMEON E. BALDWIN, Judge of the Supreme Court of\n Errors, New Haven, Conn.\n PROFESSOR JOHN H. WIGMORE, Northwestern University.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR C. H. HUBERICH, University of Texas.\n\n\n SECTION C. COMPARATIVE LAW. (_Hall 14, September 24, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: HONORABLE JACOB M. DICKINSON, Chicago.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR NOBUSHIGE HOZUMI, University of Tokio.\n PROFESSOR ALFRED NERINCX, University of Louvain.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n DEPARTMENT 5--HISTORY OF LANGUAGE\n (_Hall 4, September 20, 2 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR GEORGE HEMPL, University of Michigan.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR T. R. LOUNSBURY, Yale University.\n PRESIDENT BENJAMIN IDE WHEELER, University of California.\n\n\n SECTION A. COMPARATIVE LANGUAGE. (_Hall 4, September 21, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR FRANCIS A. MARCH, Lafayette College.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR CARL D. BUCK, University of Chicago.\n PROFESSOR HANS OERTEL, Yale University.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR E. W. FAY, University of Texas, Austin, Texas.\n\n\n SECTION B. SEMITIC LANGUAGES. (_Hall 4, September 21, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR G. F. MOORE, Harvard University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR JAMES A. CRAIG, University of Michigan.\n PROFESSOR CRAWFORD H. TOY, Harvard University.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n SECTION C. INDO-IRANIAN LANGUAGES. (_Hall 8, September 22, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN:\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR SYLVAIN L\u00c9VI, Coll\u00e8ge de France, Paris.\n PROFESSOR ARTHUR A. MACDONELL, University of Oxford.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n SECTION D. GREEK LANGUAGE. (_Hall 3, September 22, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR MARTIN L. D'OOGE, University of Michigan.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR HERBERT W. SMYTH, Harvard University.\n PROFESSOR MILTON W. HUMPHREYS, University of Virginia.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR J. E. HARRY, University of Cincinnati.\n\n\n SECTION E. LATIN LANGUAGE. (_Hall 9, September 23, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR MAURICE HUTTON, University of Toronto.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR E. A. SONNENSCHEIN, University of Birmingham.\n PROFESSOR WILLIAM G. HALE, University of Chicago.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR F. W. SHIPLEY, Washington University.\n\n\n SECTION F. ENGLISH LANGUAGE. (_Hall 3, September 23, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR CHARLES M. GAYLEY, University of California.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR OTTO JESPERSEN, University of Copenhagen.\n PROFESSOR GEORGE L. KITTREDGE, Harvard University.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n SECTION G. ROMANCE LANGUAGES. (_Hall 5, September 24, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN:\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR PAUL MEYER, Coll\u00e8ge de France, Paris.\n PROFESSOR HENRY A. TODD, Columbia University.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR E. E. BRANDON, Miami University.\n\n\n SECTION H. GERMANIC LANGUAGES. (_Hall 3, September 24, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR GUSTAF E. KARSTEN, Cornell University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR EDUARD SIEVERS, University of Leipzig.\n PROFESSOR HERMAN COLLITZ, Bryn Mawr College.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n DEPARTMENT 6--HISTORY OF LITERATURE\n (_Hall 6, September 20, 4.15 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN:\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR JAMES A. HARRISON, University of Virginia.\n PROFESSOR CHARLES M. GAYLEY, University of California.\n\n\n SECTION A. INDO-IRANIAN LITERATURE. (_Hall 8, September 24, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR MAURICE BLOOMFIELD, Johns Hopkins University.\n SPEAKER: PROFESSOR A. V. W. JACKSON, Columbia University.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n SECTION B. CLASSICAL LITERATURE. (_Hall 3, September 21, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR ANDREW F. WEST, Princeton University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR PAUL SHOREY, University of Chicago.\n PROFESSOR JOHN H. WRIGHT, Harvard University.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR F. G. MOORE, Dartmouth College.\n\n\n SECTION C. ENGLISH LITERATURE. (_Hall 1, September 22, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN:\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR FRANCIS B. GUMMERE, Haverford College.\n PROFESSOR JOHN HOOPS, University of Heidelberg.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n SECTION D. ROMANCE LITERATURE. (_Hall 8, September 22, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR ADOLPHE COHN, Columbia University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR PIO RAJNA, Institute of Higher Studies, Florence,\n Italy.\n PROFESSOR ALC\u00c9E FORTIER, Tulane University, New Orleans.\n SECRETARY: DR. COMFORT, Haverford College.\n\n\n SECTION E. GERMANIC LITERATURE. (_Hall 3, September 23, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR KUNO FRANCKE, Harvard University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR AUGUST SAUER, University of Prague.\n PROFESSOR J. MINOR, University of Vienna.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR D. K. JESSEN, Bryn Mawr College.\n\n\n SECTION F. SLAVIC LITERATURE. (_Hall 8, September 21, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: MR. CHARLES R. CRANE, Chicago.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR LEO WIENER, Harvard University.\n PROFESSOR PAUL BOYER, Ecole Des Langues Vivantes\n Orientales, Paris.\n SECRETARY: MR. S. N. HARPER, University of Chicago.\n\n\n SECTION G. BELLES-LETTRES. (_Hall 3, September 24, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR ROBERT HERRICK, University of Chicago.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR HENRY SCHOFIELD, Harvard University.\n PROFESSOR BRANDER MATTHEWS, Columbia University.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n DEPARTMENT 7--HISTORY OF ART\n (_Hall 8, September 20, 11.15 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR HALSEY C. IVES, Washington University, St. Louis.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR RUFUS B. RICHARDSON, New York, N. Y.\n PROFESSOR JOHN C. VAN DYKE, Rutgers College.\n\n\n SECTION A. CLASSICAL ART. (_Hall 12, September 22, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR RUFUS B. RICHARDSON, New York City.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR ADOLPH FURTWANGLER, University Of Munich.\n PROFESSOR FRANK B. TARBELL, University of Chicago.\n SECRETARY: DR. P. BAUR, Yale University.\n\n\n SECTION B. MODERN ARCHITECTURE. (_Hall 7, September 22, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: MR. CHARLES F. MCKIM, New York City.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR C. ENLART, University of Paris.\n PROFESSOR ALFRED D. F. HAMLIN, Columbia University.\n SECRETARY: MR. GUY LOWELL, Boston, Mass.\n\n\n SECTION C. MODERN PAINTING. (_Hall 4, September 24, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN:\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR RICHARD MUTHER, University of Breslau.\n MR. OKAKURA KAKUZO, Japan.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n DEPARTMENT 8--HISTORY OF RELIGION\n (_Hall 5, September 20, 2 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: REV. WM. ELIOT GRIFFIS, Ithaca, N. Y.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR GEORGE F. MOORE, Harvard University.\n PROFESSOR NATHANIEL SCHMIDT, Cornell University.\n\n\n SECTION A. BRAHMANISM AND BUDDHISM. (_Hall 8, September 23, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN:\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR HERMANN OLDENBERG, University of Kiel.\n PROFESSOR MAURICE BLOOMFIELD, Johns Hopkins University.\n SECRETARY: DR. REGINALD C. ROBBINS, Harvard University.\n\n\n SECTION B. MOHAMMEDISM. (_Hall 8, September 23, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR JAMES R. JEWETT, University of Chicago.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR IGNAZ GOLDZIHER, University of Budapest.\n PROFESSOR DUNCAN B. MACDONALD, Hartford Theological Seminary.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n SECTION C. OLD TESTAMENT. (_Hall 4, September 22, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR A. S. CARRIER, McCormick Theological Seminary.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR JAMES F. MCCURDY, University College of Toronto.\n PROFESSOR KARL BUDDE, University of Marburg.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR JAMES A. KELSO, Western Theological Seminary,\n Allegheny, Pa.\n\n\n SECTION D. NEW TESTAMENT. (_Hall 1, September 23, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR ANDREW C. ZENOS, McCormick Theological Seminary.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR BENJAMIN W. BACON, Yale University.\n PROFESSOR ERNEST D. BURTON, University of Chicago.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR CLYDE W. VOTAW, University of Chicago.\n\n\n SECTION E. HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. (_Hall 2, September 24,\n 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: DR. ERI BAKER HULBERT, University of Chicago.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR ADOLF HARNACK, University of Berlin.\n PROFESSOR JEAN R\u00c9VILLE, Faculty of Protestant Theology,\n Paris.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n\n\n DIVISION C--PHYSICAL SCIENCE\n\n (_Hall 4, September 20, 10 a. m._)\n\n SPEAKER: PROFESSOR ROBERT S. WOODWARD, Columbia University.\n\n\n DEPARTMENT 9--PHYSICS\n (_Hall 6, September 20, 2 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR HENRY CREW, Northwestern University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR EDWARD L. NICHOLS, Cornell University.\n PROFESSOR CARL BARUS, Brown University.\n\n\n SECTION A. PHYSICS OF MATTER. (_Hall 11, September 23, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR SAMUEL W. STRATTON, Director of The National\n Bureau of Standards, Washington.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR ARTHUR L. KIMBALL, Amherst College.\n PROFESSOR FRANCIS E. NIPHER, Washington University.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR R. A. MILLIKEN, University of Chicago.\n\n\n SECTION B. PHYSICS OF ETHER. (_Hall 11, September 23, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR HENRY CREW, Northwestern University.\n SPEAKER: PROFESSOR DEWITT B. BRACE, University of Nebraska.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR AUGUSTUS TROWBRIDGE, University of Wisconsin.\n\n\n SECTION C. PHYSICS OF THE ELECTRON. (_Hall 5, September 22, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR A. G. WEBSTERr, Clark University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR P. LANGEVIN, Coll\u00e8ge de France.\n PROFESSOR ERNEST RUTHERFURD, McGill University, Montreal.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR W. J. HUMPHREYS, University of Virginia.\n\n\n DEPARTMENT 10--CHEMISTRY\n (_Hall 5, September 20, 4.15 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR JAMES M. CRAFTS, Massachusetts Institute of\n Technology.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR JOHN U. NEF, University of Chicago.\n PROFESSOR FRANK W. CLARKE, Chief Chemist, U. S. Geological\n Survey.\n\n\n SECTION A. INORGANIC CHEMISTRY. (_Hall 16, September 21, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR JOHN W. MALLET, University of Virginia.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR HENRI MOISSAN, the Sorbonne; Member of the\n Institute of France.\n SIR WILLIAM RAMSAY, K.C.B., Royal Institution, London.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR WILLIAM L. DUDLEY, Vanderbilt University.\n\n\n SECTION B. ORGANIC CHEMISTRY. (_Hall 16, September 21, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR ALBERT B. PRESCOTT, University of Michigan.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR JULIUS STIEGLITZ, University of Chicago.\n PROFESSOR WILLIAM A. NOYES, National Bureau of Standards.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n SECTION C. PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY. (_Hall 16, September 22, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR WILDER D. BANCROFT, Cornell University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR J. H. VAN T'HOFF, University of Berlin.\n PROFESSOR ARTHUR A. NOYES, Massachusetts Institute of\n Technology.\n SECRETARY: MR. W. R. WHITNEY, Schenectady, N. Y.\n\n\n SECTION D. PHYSIOLOGICAL CHEMISTRY. (_Hall 16, September 22, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR WILDER O. ATWATER, Wesleyan University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR O. COHNHEIM, University of Heidelberg.\n PROFESSOR RUSSELL H. CHITTENDEN, Yale University.\n SECRETARY: DR. C. L. ALSBERG, Harvard University.\n\n\n DEPARTMENT 11--ASTRONOMY\n (_Hall 8, September 20, 4.15 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR GEORGE C. COMSTOCK, Director of the Observatory,\n Madison, Wisconsin.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR LEWIS BOSS, Director of Dudley Observatory.\n PROFESSOR EDWARD C. PICKERING, Director of Harvard\n Observatory.\n\n\n SECTION A. ASTROMETRY. (_Hall 9, September 21, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR ORMOND STONE, University of Virginia.\n SPEAKERS: DR. OSKAR BACKLUND, Director of the Observatory, Pulkowa,\n Russia.\n PROFESSOR JOHN C. KAPTEYN, University of Groningen, Holland.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR W. S. EICHELBERGER, U. S. Naval Observatory.\n\n\n SECTION B. ASTROPHYSICS. (_Hall 9, September 21, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR GEORGE E. HALE, Director of the Yerkes Observatory.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR HERBERT H. TURNER, F.R.S., University of Oxford.\n PROFESSOR WILLIAM W. CAMPBELL, Director of The Lick\n Observatory, Mt. Hamilton, California.\n SECRETARY: MR. W. S. ADAMS, Yerkes Observatory.\n\n\n DEPARTMENT 12--SCIENCES OF THE EARTH\n (_Hall 3, September 20, 11.15 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: DR. G. K. GILBERT, U. S. Geological Survey.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR THOMAS C. CHAMBERLIN, University of Chicago.\n PROFESSOR WILLIAM M. DAVIS, Harvard University.\n\n\n SECTION A. GEOPHYSICS. (_Hall 14, September 21, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER W. HALL, University of Minnesota.\n SPEAKER: DR. GEORGE F. BECKER, Geologist, U. S. Geological Survey.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR E. M. LEHNERTS, Minnesota State Normal School.\n\n\n SECTION B. GEOLOGY. (_Hall 14, September 21, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR T. C. CHAMBERLIN, University of Chicago.\n SPEAKERS: PRESIDENT CHARLES R. VAN HISE, University of Wisconsin.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR R. D. SALISBURY, University of Chicago.\n\n\n SECTION C. PALAEONTOLOGY. (_Hall 11, September 22, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR WILLIAM B. SCOTT, Princeton University.\n SPEAKERS: DR. A. S. WOODWARD, F.R.S., British Museum Of Natural\n History, London.\n PROFESSOR HENRY F. OSBORN, Columbia University.\n SECRETARY: DR. JOHN M. CLARKE, Albany, N. Y.\n\n\n SECTION D. PETROLOGY AND MINERALOGY. (_Hall 9, September 22, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: DR. OLIVER C. FARRINGTON, Field Columbian Museum, Chicago.\n SPEAKER: PROFESSOR F. ZIRKEL, University of Leipzig.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n SECTION E. PHYSIOGRAPHY. (_Hall 12, September 21, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: MR. HENRY GANNETT, United States Geological Survey.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR ALBRECHT PENCK, University of Vienna.\n PROFESSOR ISRAEL C. RUSSELL, University of Michigan.\n SECRETARY: DR. JOHN M. CLARKE, Albany, N. Y.\n\n\n SECTION F. GEOGRAPHY. (_Hall 11, September 22, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR ISRAEL C. RUSSELL, University of Michigan.\n SPEAKERS: DR. HUGH R. MILL, Director British Rainfall Organization,\n London.\n PROFESSOR H. YULE OLDHAM, Cambridge, England.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR R. D. SALISBURY, University of Chicago.\n\n\n SECTION G. OCEANOGRAPHY. (_Hall 8, September 21, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: REAR-ADMIRAL JOHN R. BARTLETT, United States Navy.\n SPEAKERS: SIR JOHN MURRAY, K.C.B., F.R.S., Edinburgh.\n PROFESSOR K. MITSUKURI, University of Tokio.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n SECTION H. COSMICAL PHYSICS. (_Hall 10, September 22, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR FRANCIS E. NIPHER, Washington University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR SVANTE ARRHENIUS, University of Stockholm,\n Stockholm.\n DR. ABBOTT L. ROTCH, Blue Hill Observatory.\n DR. L. A. BAUER, Washington, D. C.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n DEPARTMENT 13--BIOLOGY\n (_Hall 2, September 20, 11.15 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR WILLIAM G. FARLOW, Harvard University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR JOHN M. COULTER, University of Chicago.\n PROFESSOR JACQUES LOEB, University of California.\n\n\n SECTION A. PHYLOGENY. (_Hall 2, September 21, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR T. H. MORGAN, Columbia University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR HUGO DE VRIES, University of Amsterdam.\n PROFESSOR CHARLES O. WHITMAN, University of Chicago.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n SECTION B. PLANT MORPHOLOGY. (_Hall 2, September 22, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR WILLIAM TRELEASE, Washington University, St. Louis.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR FREDERICK O. BOWER, University of Glasgow.\n PROFESSOR KARL F. GOEBEL, University of Munich.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR F. E. LLOYD, Columbia University.\n\n\n SECTION C. PLANT PHYSIOLOGY. (_Hall 4, September 22, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR CHARLES R. BARNES, University of Chicago.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR JULIUS WIESNER, University of Vienna.\n PROFESSOR BENJAMIN M. DUGGAR, University of Missouri.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR F. C. NEWCOMB, University of Michigan.\n\n\n SECTION D. PLANT PATHOLOGY. (_Hall 7, September 23, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR CHAS. E. BESSEY, University of Nebraska.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR JOSEPH C. ARTHUR, Purdue University.\n MERTON B. WAITE, U. S. Department of Agriculture.\n SECRETARY: DR. C. S. SHEAR, U. S. Department of Agriculture.\n\n\n SECTION E. ECOLOGY. (_Hall 7, September 23, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN:\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR OSKAR DRUDE, K\u00f6n. Technische Hochschule, Dresden.\n PROFESSOR BENJAMIN ROBINSON, Harvard University.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR F. E. CLEMENTS, University of Nebraska.\n\n\n SECTION F. BACTERIOLOGY. (_Hall 15, September 24, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR HAROLD C. ERNST, Harvard University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR EDWIN O. JORDAN, University of Chicago.\n PROFESSOR THEOBALD SMITH, Harvard University.\n SECRETARY: DR. P. H. HISS, JR., Columbia University.\n\n\n SECTION G. ANIMAL MORPHOLOGY. (_Hall 2, September 21, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: DR. LELAND O. HOWARD, Department of Agriculture,\n Washington, D. C.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR CHARLES B. DAVENPORT, University of Chicago.\n PROFESSOR ALFRED GIARD, the Sorbonne; Member of the\n Institute of France.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR C. H. HERRICK, Dennison University.\n\n\n SECTION H. EMBRYOLOGY. (_Hall 9, September 23, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR SIMON H. GAGE, Cornell University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR OSKAR HERTWIG, University of Berlin.\n PROFESSOR WILLIAM K. BROOKS, Johns Hopkins University.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR T. G. LEE, University of Minnesota.\n\n\n SECTION I. COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. (_Hall 2, September 24, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR JAMES P. MCMURRICH, University of Michigan.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR WILLIAM E. RITTER, University of California.\n PROFESSOR YVES DELAGE, the Sorbonne; Member of the Institute\n of France.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR HENRY B. WARD, University of Nebraska.\n\n\n SECTION J. HUMAN ANATOMY. (_Hall 2, September 22, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR GEORGE A. PIERSOL, University of Pennsylvania.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR WILHELM WALDEYER, University of Berlin.\n PROFESSOR H. H. DONALDSON, University of Chicago.\n SECRETARY: DR. R. J. TERRY, Washington University.\n\n\n SECTION K. PHYSIOLOGY. (_Hall 4, September 23, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: DR. S. J. MELTZER, New York.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR MAX VERWORN, University of G\u00f6ttingen.\n PROFESSOR WILLIAM H. HOWELL, Johns Hopkins University.\n SECRETARY: DR. REID HUNT, Washington.\n\n\n DEPARTMENT 14--ANTHROPOLOGY\n (_Hall 8, September 20, 2 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR FREDERIC W. PUTNAM, Harvard University.\n SPEAKERS: DR. W. J. MCGEE, President American Anthropological\n Association, Washington, D. C.\n PROFESSOR FRANZ BOAS, Columbia University.\n\n\n SECTION A. SOMATOLOGY. (_Hall 16, September 23, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: DR. EDWARD C. SPITZKA, New York City.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR L. MANOUVRIER, School of Anthropology, Paris.\n DR. GEORGE A. DORSEY, Field Columbian Museum, Chicago.\n SECRETARY: DR. E. A. SPITZKA, New York City.\n\n\n SECTION B. ARCHAEOLOGY. (_Hall 16, September 24, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: MR. M. H. SAVILLE, American Museum of Natural History,\n New York.\n SPEAKERS: SE\u00d1OR ALFREDO CHAVERO, Inspector of the National Museum,\n Mexico.\n PROFESSOR EDOUARD SELER, University of Berlin.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR WILLIAM C. MILLS, Ohio State University.\n\n\n SECTION C. ETHNOLOGY. (_Hall 16, September 24, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: MISS ALICE C. FLETCHER, President of the Washington\n Anthropological Society.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR FREDERICK STARR, University of Chicago.\n PROFESSOR A. C. HADDON, University of Cambridge.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR F. W. SHIPLEY, Washington University.\n\n\n\n\n DIVISION D--MENTAL SCIENCE\n\n (_Hall 7, September 20, 10 a. m._)\n\n SPEAKER: PRESIDENT G. STANLEY HALL, Clark University, Worcester, Mass.\n\n\n DEPARTMENT 15--PSYCHOLOGY\n (_Hall 7, September 20, 2 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN:\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR JAMES MCK. CATTELL, Columbia University.\n PROFESSOR J. MARK BALDWIN, Johns Hopkins University.\n\n\n SECTION A. GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY. (_Hall 6, September 23, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR JOS. ROYCE, Harvard University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR HARALD HOEFFDING, University of Copenhagen.\n PROFESSOR JAMES WARD, University of Cambridge, England.\n SECRETARY: DR. W. H. DAVIS, Lehigh University.\n\n\n SECTION B. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. (_Hall 2, September 23, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR EDWARD A. PACE, Catholic University of America.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR ROBERT MACDOUGAL, New York University.\n PROFESSOR EDWARD B. TITCHENER, Cornell University.\n SECRETARY: DR. R. S. WOODWORTH, Columbia University.\n\n\n SECTION C. COMPARATIVE AND GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY. (_Hall 6, September 24,\n 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR EDMUND C. SANFORD, Clark University, Worcester,\n Mass.\n SPEAKERS: PRINCIPAL C. LLOYD MORGAN, University College, Bristol.\n PROFESSOR MARY W. CALKINS, Wellesley College.\n SECRETARY: DR. R. M. YERKES, Harvard University.\n\n\n SECTION D. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY. (_Hall 6, September 24, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: DR. EDWARD COWLES, Waverley, Mass.\n SPEAKERS: DR. PIERRE JANET, Coll\u00e8ge de France, Paris.\n DR. MORTON PRINCE, Boston.\n SECRETARY: DR. ADOLPH MEYER, New York City.\n\n\n DEPARTMENT 16--SOCIOLOGY\n (_Hall 7, September 20, 4.15 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR FRANK W. BLACKMAR, University of Kansas.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS, Columbia University.\n PROFESSOR GEORGE E. VINCENT, University of Chicago.\n\n\n SECTION A. SOCIAL STRUCTURE. (_Hall 15, September 21, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR FREDERICK W. MOORE, Vanderbilt University.\n SPEAKERS: FIELD MARSHAL GUSTAV RATZENHOFER, Vienna.\n PROFESSOR F. TOENNIES, University of Kiel.\n PROFESSOR LESTER F. WARD, U. S. National Museum.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR JEROME DOWD, University of Wisconsin.\n\n\n SECTION B. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. (_Hall 15, September 23, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR CHARLES A. ELLWOOD, University of Missouri.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR WM. I. THOMAS, University of Chicago.\n PROFESSOR EDWARD A. ROSS, University of Nebraska.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR E. C. HAYES, Miami University.\n\n\n\n\n DIVISION E--UTILITARIAN SCIENCES\n\n (_Hall 1, September 20, 10 a. m._)\n\n SPEAKER: PRESIDENT DAVID STARR JORDAN, Leland Stanford Jr. University.\n\n\n DEPARTMENT 17--MEDICINE\n (_Hall 1, September 20, 4.15 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: DR. WILLIAM OSLER, Johns Hopkins University.\n SPEAKERS: DR. WILLIAM T. COUNCILMAN, Harvard University.\n DR. FRANK BILLINGS, University of Chicago.\n\n\n SECTION A. PUBLIC HEALTH. (_Hall 13, September 21, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: DR. WALTER WYMAN, Surgeon-General of the U. S. Marine\n Hospital Service.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR WILLIAM T. SEDGWICK, Massachusetts Institute of\n Technology.\n DR. ERNST J. LEDERLE, Former Commissioner of Health, New\n York City.\n SECRETARY: DR. H. M. BRACKEN, St. Paul, Minn.\n\n\n SECTION B. PREVENTIVE MEDICINE. (_Hall 13, September 21, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: DR. JOSEPH M. MATHEWS, President of the State Board of\n Health, Louisville, Ky.\n SPEAKER: PROFESSOR RONALD ROSS, F.R.S., School of Tropical Medicine,\n University College, Liverpool.\n SECRETARY: DR. J. N. HURTY, Indianapolis, Ind.\n\n\n SECTION C. PATHOLOGY. (_Hall 13, September 22, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR SIMON FLEXNER, Director of the Rockefeller\n Institute.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR LUDWIG HEKTOEN, University of Chicago.\n PROFESSOR JOHANNES ORTH, University of Berlin.\n PROFESSOR SHIBASABURO KITASATO, University of Tokio.\n SECRETARY: DR. W. MCN. MILLER, University of Missouri.\n\n\n SECTION D. THERAPEUTICS AND PHARMACOLOGY. (_Hall 13, September 24,\n 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: DR. HOBART A. HARE, Jefferson Medical College.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR OSCAR LIEBREICH, University of Berlin.\n SIR LAUDER BRUNTON, F.R.S., London.\n SECRETARY: DR. H. B. FAVILL, Chicago, Ill.\n\n\n SECTION E. INTERNAL MEDICINE. (_Hall 13, September 23, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR FREDERICK C. SHATTUCK, Harvard University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR T. CLIFFORD ALLBUTT, F.R.S., University of\n Cambridge.\n PROFESSOR WILLIAM S. THAYER, Johns Hopkins University.\n SECRETARY: DR. R. C. CABOT, Boston, Mass.\n\n\n SECTION F. NEUROLOGY. (_Hall 13, September 22, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR LEWELLYN F. BARKER, University of Chicago.\n SPEAKER: PROFESSOR JAMES J. PUTNAM, Harvard University.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n SECTION G. PSYCHIATRY. (_Hall 7, September 22, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN:\n SPEAKERS: DR. CHARLES L. DANA, Cornell University, New York.\n DR. EDWARD COWLES, Boston.\n SECRETARY: DR. C. G. CHADDDOCK, St. Louis, Mo.\n\n\n SECTION H. SURGERY. (_Hall 13, September 23, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR CARL BECK, Post-Graduate Medical School, New York.\n SPEAKERS: DR. FREDERIC S. DENNIS, F.R.C.S., Cornell Medical College,\n New York City.\n PROFESSOR JOHANNES ORTH, University of Berlin.\n SECRETARY: DR. J. F. BINNIE, Kansas City, Mo.\n\n\n SECTION I. GYNECOLOGY. (_Hall 13, September 24, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR HOWARD A. KELLY, Johns Hopkins University.\n SPEAKER: PROFESSOR J. CLARENCE WEBSTER, Rush Medical College, Chicago.\n SECRETARY: DR. G. H. NOBLE, Atlanta, Ga.\n\n\n SECTION J. OPHTHALMOLOGY. (_Hall 7, September 24, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: DR. GEORGE C. HARLAN, Philadelphia, Pa.\n SPEAKERS: DR. EDWARD JACKSON, Denver, Col.\n DR. GEORGE M. GOULD, Philadelphia, Pa.\n SECRETARY: DR. WM. M. SWEET, Jefferson Medical College, Philadelphia,\n Pa.\n\n\n SECTION K. OTOLOGY AND LARYNGOLOGY. (_Hall 7, September 21, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR WILLIAM C. GLASGOW, Washington University,\n St. Louis.\n SPEAKER: SIR FELIX SEMON, C.V.O., Physician Extraordinary to His\n Majesty, the King, London.\n SECRETARY: DR. S. SPENCER, Allenhurst, N. J.\n\n\n SECTION L. PEDIATRICS. (_Hall 7, September 21, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR THOMAS M. ROTCH, Harvard University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR THEODORE ESCHERICH, University of Vienna.\n PROFESSOR ABRAHAM JACOBI, Columbia University.\n SECRETARY: DR. SAMUEL S. ADAMS, Washington, D. C.\n\n\n DEPARTMENT 18--TECHNOLOGY.\n (_Hall 3, September 20, 2 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: CHANCELLOR WINFIELD S. CHAPLIN, Washington University,\n St. Louis.\n SPEAKER: PROFESSOR HENRY T. BOVEY, F.R.S., McGill University,\n Montreal.\n\n\n SECTION A. CIVIL ENGINEERING. (_Hall 10, September 21, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR WILLIAM H. BURR, Columbia University.\n SPEAKERS: DR. J. A. L. WADDELL, Consulting Engineer, Kansas City.\n MR. LEWIS M. HAUPT, Consulting Engineer, Philadelphia.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n SECTION B. MECHANICAL ENGINEERING. (_Hall 10, September 23, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR JAMES E. DENTON, Stevens Institute of Technology.\n SPEAKER: PROFESSOR ALBERT W. SMITH, Leland Stanford Jr. University.\n SECRETARY: MR. GEORGE DINKEL, JR., Jersey City.\n\n\n SECTION C. ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING. (_Hall 10, September 22, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN:\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR ARTHUR E. KENNELLY, Harvard University.\n PROFESSOR MICHAEL I. PUPIN, Columbia University.\n SECRETARY: MR. CARL HERING, Philadelphia, Pa.\n\n\n SECTION D. MINING ENGINEERING. (_Hall 11, September 24, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: MR. JOHN HAYS HAMMOND, New York City.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR ROBERT H. RICHARDS, Massachusetts Institute of\n Technology.\n PROFESSOR SAMUEL B. CHRISTY, University of California.\n SECRETARY: DR. JOSEPH STRUTHERS, New York City.\n\n\n SECTION E. TECHNICAL CHEMISTRY. (_Hall 16, September 23, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: DR. H. W. WILEY, Department of Agriculture.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR CHARLES E. MUNROE, George Washington University.\n PROFESSOR WILLIAM H. WALKER, Massachusetts Institute of\n Technology.\n SECRETARY: DR. MARCUS BENJAMIN, U. S. National Museum.\n\n\n SECTION F. AGRICULTURE. (_Hall 10, September 24, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR H. J. WHEELER, Kingston, R. I.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR CHARLES W. DABNEY, JR., University of Cincinnati.\n PROFESSOR LIBERTY H. BAILEY, Cornell University.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR WILLIAM HILL, University of Chicago.\n\n\n DEPARTMENT 19--ECONOMICS\n (_Hall 1, September 20, 11.15 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR EMORY R. JOHNSON, University of Pennsylvania.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR FRANK A. FETTER, Cornell University.\n PROFESSOR ADOLPH C. MILLER, University of California.\n\n\n SECTION A. ECONOMIC THEORY. (_Hall 15, September 22, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN:\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR JOHN B. CLARK, Columbia University.\n PROFESSOR JACOB H. HOLLANDER, Johns Hopkins University.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR JESSE E. POPE, University of Missouri.\n\n\n SECTION B. TRANSPORTATION. (_Hall 10, September 23, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR J. LAWRENCE LAUGHLIN, University of Chicago.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR EUGENE VON PHILIPPOVICH, University of Vienna.\n PROFESSOR WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, Harvard University.\n SECRETARY: MR. GEORGE G. TUNELL, Chicago.\n\n\n SECTION C. COMMERCE AND EXCHANGE. (_Hall 10, September 24, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN:\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR E. D. JONES, University of Michigan.\n PROFESSOR CARL PLEHN, University of California.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n SECTION D. MONEY AND CREDIT. (_Hall 5, September 24, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: MR. B. E. WALKER, Canadian Bank of Commerce, Toronto.\n SPEAKERS: MR. HORACE WHITE, New York City.\n PROFESSOR J. LAWRENCE LAUGHLIN, University of Chicago.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR JOHN CUMMINGS, University of Chicago.\n\n\n SECTION E. PUBLIC FINANCE. (_Hall 1, September 21, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN:\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR HENRY C. ADAMS, University of Michigan.\n PROFESSOR EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, Columbia University.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n SECTION F. INSURANCE. (_Hall 10, September 21, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: DR. EMORY MCCLINTOCK, Actuary, Mutual Life Insurance\n Company, New York.\n SPEAKERS: MR. FREDERICK L. HOFFMAN, Statistician, Prudential\n Insurance Company, Newark.\n PROFESSOR BALTHASAR H. MEYER, University of Wisconsin.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n\n\n DIVISION F--SOCIAL REGULATION\n\n (_Hall 2, September 20, 10 a. m._)\n\n SPEAKER: PROFESSOR ABBOTT L. LOWELL, Harvard University.\n\n\n DEPARTMENT 20--POLITICS\n (_Hall 2, September 20, 2 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN:\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR WILLIAM A. DUNNING, Columbia University.\n CHANCELLOR E. BENJAMIN ANDREWS, University of Nebraska.\n\n\n SECTIONS A AND C. POLITICAL THEORY AND NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION.\n (_Hall 15, September 22, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN:\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR W. W. WILLOUGHBY, Johns Hopkins University.\n PROFESSOR GEORGE G. WILSON, Brown University.\n RIGHT HON. JAMES BRYCE, London, England.\n SECRETARY: DR. CHARLES E. MERRIAM, University of Chicago.\n\n\n SECTION B. DIPLOMACY. (_Hall 1, September 23, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN:\n SPEAKERS: HONORABLE JOHN W. FOSTER, Ex-Secretary of State.\n HONORABLE DAVID JAYNE HILL, Minister of the United States\n to Switzerland.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n SECTION D. COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION. (_Hall 4, September 24, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR HARRY P. JUDSON, University of Chicago.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR BERNARD J. MOSES, University of California.\n PROFESSOR PAUL S. REINSCH, University of Wisconsin.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n SECTION E. MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION. (_Hall 15, September 24, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN:\n SPEAKERS: MR. ALBERT SHAW, Editor American Monthly Review of Reviews.\n MISS JANE ADDAMS, Hull House, Chicago.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR JOHN A. FAIRLIE, University of Michigan.\n\n\n DEPARTMENT 21--JURISPRUDENCE\n (_Hall 3, September 20, 4.15 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR GEORGE W. KIRCHWEY, Columbia University.\n SPEAKERS: PRESIDENT CHARLES W. NEEDHAM, Columbian University,\n Washington.\n PROFESSOR JOSEPH H. BEALE, Harvard University.\n\n\n SECTION A. INTERNATIONAL LAW. (_Hall 14, September 22, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR JAMES B. SCOTT, Columbia University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR H. LAFONTAINE, Member of the Senate, Brussels,\n Belgium.\n PROFESSOR CHARLES NOBLE GREGORY, University of Iowa.\n COUNT ALBERT APPONYI, Hungary.\n SECRETARY: DR. W. C. DENNIS, Leland Stanford Jr. University.\n\n\n SECTION B. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (_Hall 14, September 24, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, George Washington\n University, Washington.\n SPEAKERS: SIGNOR ATTILIO BRUNIALTI, Councilor of State, Rome.\n PROFESSOR JOHN W. BURGESS, Columbia University.\n PROFESSOR FERDINAND LARNAUDE, University of Paris.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n SECTION C. PRIVATE LAW. (_Hall 14, September 23, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR JAMES B. AMES, Dean, Harvard Law School.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR ERNST FREUND, University of Chicago.\n HONORABLE EDWARD B. WHITNEY, New York.\n SECRETARY: DEAN WILLIAM DRAPER LEWIS, University of Pennsylvania.\n\n\n DEPARTMENT 22--SOCIAL SCIENCE\n (_Hall 1, September 20, 2 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: MR. WALTER L. SHELDON, Ethical Society, St. Louis.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR FELIX ADLER, Columbia University.\n PROFESSOR GRAHAM TAYLOR, Chicago Theological Seminary.\n\n\n SECTION A. THE FAMILY. (_Hall 5, September 21, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR SAMUEL G. SMITH, University of Minnesota.\n SPEAKERS: DR. SAMUEL W. DIKE, Auburndale, Mass.\n PROFESSOR GEORGE ELLIOTT HOWARD, University of Nebraska.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n SECTION B. THE RURAL COMMUNITY. (_Hall 5, September 21, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: HON. AARON JONES, Master of National Grange, South Bend, Ind.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR MAX WEBER, University of Heidelberg.\n PRESIDENT KENYON L. BUTTERFIELD, Rhode Island State\n Agricultural College.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR WILLIAM HILL, University of Chicago.\n\n\n SECTION C. THE URBAN COMMUNITY. (_Hall 5, September 22, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN:\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR T. JASTROW, University of Berlin.\n PROFESSOR LOUIS WUARIN, University of Geneva.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n SECTION D. THE INDUSTRIAL GROUP. (_Hall 14, September 22, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN:\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR WERNER SOMBART, University of Breslau.\n PROFESSOR RICHARD T. ELY, University of Wisconsin.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR THOMAS S. ADAMS, Madison, Wis.\n\n\n SECTION E. THE DEPENDENT GROUP. (_Hall 5, September 23, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: MR. ROBERT W. DEFOREST, New York City.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR CHARLES R. HENDERSON, University of Chicago.\n DR. EMIL M\u00dcNSTERBERG, President City Charities, Berlin.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n SECTION F. THE CRIMINAL GROUP. (_Hall 5, September 23, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN:\n SPEAKER: MR. FREDERICK H. WINES, Secretary State Charities Aid\n Association, Upper Montclair, N. J.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n\n\n DIVISION G--SOCIAL CULTURE\n\n (_Hall 5, September 20, 10 a. m._)\n\n SPEAKER: HONORABLE WILLIAM T. HARRIS, United States Commissioner of\n Education.\n\n\n DEPARTMENT 23--EDUCATION\n (_Hall 2, September 20, 4.15 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN:\n SPEAKERS: PRESIDENT ARTHUR T. HADLEY, Yale University.\n THE RIGHT REV. JOHN L. SPALDING, Bishop of Peoria.\n\n\n SECTION A. EDUCATIONAL THEORY. (_Hall 12, September 24, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR CHARLES DEGARMO, Cornell University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR WILHELM REIN, University of Jena.\n PROFESSOR ELMER E. BROWN, University of California.\n SECRETARY: DR. G. M. WHITTLE, Cornell University.\n\n\n SECTION B. THE SCHOOL. (_Hall 12, September 23, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: DR. F. LOUIS SOLDAN, Superintendent Public Schools,\n St. Louis.\n SPEAKERS: DR. MICHAEL E. SADLER, University of Manchester.\n DR. WILLIAM H. MAXWELL, Superintendent Public Schools,\n New York City.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR A. S. LANGSDORF, Washington University.\n\n\n SECTION C. THE COLLEGE. (_Hall 12, September 23, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PRESIDENT W. S. CHAPLIN, Washington University.\n SPEAKERS: PRESIDENT WILLIAM DEWITT HYDE, Bowdoin College.\n PRESIDENT M. CAREY THOMAS, Bryn Mawr College.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR H. H. HORNE, Dartmouth College.\n\n\n SECTION D. THE UNIVERSITY. (_Hall 12, September 24, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN:\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR C. CHABOT, University of Lyons.\n PROFESSOR EDWARD DELAVAN PERRY, Columbia University.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n SECTION E. THE LIBRARY. (_Hall 12, September 22, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: MR. FREDERICK M. CRUNDEN, Librarian St. Louis Public Library.\n SPEAKERS: MR. WILLIAM A. E. AXON, Manchester, England.\n PROFESSOR GUIDO BIAGI, Royal Librarian, Florence.\n SECRETARY: MR. C. P. PETTUS, Washington University.\n\n\n DEPARTMENT 24--RELIGION\n (_Hall 4, September 20, 4.15 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: BISHOP JOHN H. VINCENT, Chautauqua, N. Y.\n SPEAKERS: PRESIDENT HENRY C. KING, Oberlin College.\n PROFESSOR FRANCIS G. PEABODY, Harvard University.\n\n\n SECTION A. GENERAL RELIGIOUS EDUCATION. (_Hall 11, September 24,\n 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR EDWIN D. STARBUCK, Earlham College, Richmond, Ind.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR GEORGE A. COE, Northwestern University.\n DR. WALTER L. HERVEY, Examiner Board of Education,\n New York City.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n SECTION B. PROFESSIONAL RELIGIOUS EDUCATION. (_Hall 1, September 22,\n 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN:\n SPEAKERS: PRESIDENT CHARLES CUTHBERT HALL, Union Theological Seminary.\n PROFESSOR FRANK K. SANDERS, Yale University.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR HERBERT L. WILLETT, Disciples Divinity House,\n Chicago, Ill.\n\n\n SECTION C. RELIGIOUS AGENCIES. (_Hall 15, September 23, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PRESIDENT EDGAR C. MULLINS, Southern Baptist Theological\n Seminary, Louisville, Ky.\n SPEAKERS: REV. WASHINGTON GLADDEN, Columbus, Ohio.\n REV. JAMES M. BUCKLEY, Editor The Christian Advocate,\n New York.\n SECRETARY: DR. IRA LANDRITH, General Secretary Religious Education\n Association, Chicago, Ill.\n\n\n SECTION D. RELIGIOUS WORK. (_Hall 1, September 24, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: RT. REV. THOMAS F. GAILOR, Memphis.\n SPEAKERS: REV. FLOYD W. TOMKINS, Church of the Holy Trinity,\n Philadelphia.\n REV. HENRY C. MABIE, Corresponding Secretary, American\n Baptist Missionary Union.\n SECRETARY:\n\n\n SECTION E. RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE: PERSONAL. (_Festival Hall,\n September 25, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: CHANCELLOR J. H. KIRKLAND, Vanderbilt University.\n SPEAKERS: REV. HUGH BLACK, Edinburgh, Scotland.\n PROFESSOR JOHN E. MCFADYEN, Knox College.\n REV. SAMUEL ELIOT, Boston, Mass.\n REV. EDWARD B. POLLARD, Georgetown, Ky.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR CLYDE W. VOTAW, University of Chicago.\n\n\n SECTION F. RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE: SOCIAL. (_Festival Hall, September 25,\n 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: DR. J. H. GARRISON, St. Louis.\n SPEAKERS: PRESIDENT JOSEPH SWAIN, Swarthmore College.\n DR. EMIL G. HIRSCH, Chicago, Ill.\n PROFESSOR EDWARD C. MOORE, Harvard University.\n DR. JOSIAH STRONG, League for Social Service, New York.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR CLYDE W. VOTAW, University of Chicago.\n\n\n\n\nCHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF PROCEEDINGS\n\n * * * * *\n\nMONDAY, SEPTEMBER 19.\n\n3 P. M. Opening exercises of the Congress. Festival Hall (Hall 17).\n\nThe Congress will be called to order by the Director of Congresses, who\nwill introduce the President of the Exposition.\n\nWelcoming addresses will be delivered by the President of the Exposition\nand other officials.\n\nA reply to these addresses of welcome will be made on behalf of the\nCongress by the Honorary Vice-President for Great Britain.\n\nThe Chairman of the Administrative Board will give an account of the\norigin and purpose of the Congress.\n\nThe President of the Congress will then be introduced and will deliver\nan introductory address, after which adjournment will follow.\n\n * * * * *\n\nTUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20.\n\n10.00 A. M. Meetings of the seven Divisions. The Divisional addresses\nwill be given as follows:--\n\n Hall 1, Utilitarian Sciences.\n Hall 2, Social Regulation.\n Hall 3, Historical Science.\n Hall 4, Physical Science.\n Hall 5, Social Culture.\n Hall 6, Normative Science.\n Hall 7, Mental Science.\n\n11.15 to 6.00 P. M. Meetings of the Departments, with addresses:--\n\nMeeting at 11.15 A. M.\n\nDEPARTMENTS.\n\n Hall 1, Economics.\n Hall 2, Biology.\n Hall 3, Sciences of the Earth.\n Hall 4, Political History.\n Hall 5, History of Law.\n Hall 6, Philosophy.\n Hall 7, Mathematics.\n Hall 8, History of Art.\n\n Adjournment at 1 P. M.\n\nMeeting at 2 P. M.\n\nDEPARTMENTS.\n\n Hall 1, Social Science.\n Hall 2, Politics.\n Hall 3, Technology.\n Hall 4, History of Language.\n Hall 5, History of Religion.\n Hall 6, Physics.\n Hall 7, Psychology.\n Hall 8, Anthropology.\n\n Adjournment at 3.45 P. M.\n\nMeeting at 4.15 P. M.\n\nDEPARTMENTS.\n\n Hall 1, Medicine.\n Hall 2, Education.\n Hall 3, Jurisprudence.\n Hall 4, Religion.\n Hall 5, Chemistry.\n Hall 6, History of Literature.\n Hall 7, Sociology.\n Hall 8, Astronomy.\n\n Adjournment at 6. P. M.\n\nOn the four days following, the Sectional meetings will be held. The\nduration of each session will be three hours. The morning sessions will\nextend from 10 A. M. until 1 P. M.; the afternoon sessions from 3 P. M.\nto 6 P. M.\n\nThe meetings of some of the religious sections will be held on Sunday,\nSeptember 25, in Festival Hall. Further announcements concerning these\nSunday Meetings will be made in Registration Hall, in the daily press of\nSt. Louis, and in the World's Fair Official Programme.\n\n * * * * *\n\nWEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21.\n\nMeeting at 10 A. M.\n\n Hall 1, Public Finance.\n Hall 2, Animal Morphology.\n Hall 3, History of Greece, Rome, and Asia.\n Hall 4, Comparative Language.\n Hall 5, The Family.\n Hall 6, Metaphysics.\n Hall 7, Otology and Laryngology.\n Hall 8, Slavic Literature.\n Hall 9, Astrometry.\n Hall 10, Civil Engineering.\n Hall 11, History of Common Law.\n Hall 12, Physiography.\n Hall 13, Public Health.\n Hall 14, Geophysics.\n Hall 15, Social Structure.\n Hall 16, Inorganic Chemistry.\n\n Adjournment at 1 P. M.\n\nMeeting at 3 P. M.\n\n Hall 1, Philosophy of Religion.\n Hall 2, Phylogeny.\n Hall 3, Classical Literature.\n Hall 4, Semitic Languages.\n Hall 5, The Rural Community.\n Hall 6, Medieval History.\n Hall 7, Pediatrics.\n Hall 8, Oceanography.\n Hall 9, Astrophysics.\n Hall 10, Insurance.\n Hall 11, History of Roman Law.\n Hall 13, Preventive Medicine.\n Hall 14, Geology.\n Hall 16, Organic Chemistry.\n\n Adjournment at 6 P. M.\n\n * * * * *\n\nImmediately following the Section of Geophysics in the morning, and the\nSection of Geology in the afternoon, in Room 14, the Eighth\nInternational Geographic Congress will hold sessions in the same room,\nHall 14, Mines and Metallurgy Building.\n\nTHURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 22.\n\nMeeting at 10 A. M.\n\n Hall 1, English Literature.\n Hall 2, Plant Morphology.\n Hall 3, Modern History of Europe.\n Hall 4, Old Testament.\n Hall 5, The Urban Community.\n Hall 6, Logic.\n Hall 7, Psychiatry.\n Hall 8, Indo-Iranian Languages.\n Hall 9, Algebra and Analysis.\n Hall 10, Cosmical Physics.\n Hall 11, Pal\u00e6ontology.\n Hall 12, Classical Art.\n Hall 13, Pathology.\n Hall 14, International Law.\n Hall 15, Economic Theory.\n Hall 16, Physical Chemistry.\n\n Adjournment at 1 P. M.\n\nMeeting at 3 P. M.\n\n Hall 1, Professional Religious Education.\n Hall 2, Human Anatomy.\n Hall 3, Greek Language.\n Hall 4, Plant Physiology.\n Hall 5, Physics of the Electron.\n Hall 6, Methodology of Science.\n Hall 7, Modern Architecture.\n Hall 8, Romance Literature.\n Hall 9, Petrology and Mineralogy.\n Hall 10, Electrical Engineering.\n Hall 11, Geography.\n Hall 12, The Library.\n Hall 13, Neurology.\n Hall 14, The Industrial Group.\n Hall 15, Political Theory and\n National Administration.\n Hall 16, Physiological Chemistry.\n\n Adjournment at 6 P. M.\n\n * * * * *\n\nFRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 23.\n\nMeeting at 10 A. M.\n\n Hall 1, New Testament.\n Hall 2, Experimental Psychology.\n Hall 3, Germanic Literature.\n Hall 4, Physiology.\n Hall 5, The Dependent Group.\n Hall 6, Ethics.\n Hall 7, Plant Pathology.\n Hall 8, Brahmanism and Buddhism.\n Hall 9, Latin Language.\n Hall 10, Transportation.\n Hall 11, Physics of Matter.\n Hall 12, The School.\n Hall 13, Surgery.\n Hall 15, Social Psychology.\n Hall 16, Technical Chemistry.\n\n Adjournment at 1 P. M.\n\nMeeting at 3 P. M.\n\n Hall 1, Diplomacy.\n Hall 2, History of Economic Institutions.\n Hall 3, English Language.\n Hall 4, \u00c6sthetics.\n Hall 5, The Criminal Group.\n Hall 6, General Psychology.\n Hall 7, Ecology.\n Hall 8, Mohammedism.\n Hall 9, Embryology.\n Hall 10, Mechanical Engineering.\n Hall 11, Physics of Ether.\n Hall 12, The College.\n Hall 13, Internal Medicine.\n Hall 14, Private Law.\n Hall 15, Religious Agencies.\n Hall 16, Somatology.\n\n Adjournment at 6 P. M.\n\n * * * * *\n\nSATURDAY. SEPTEMBER 24.\n\nMeeting at 10 A. M.\n\n Hall 1, History of America.\n Hall 2, History of the Christian Church.\n Hall 3, Belles-Lettres.\n Hall 4, Colonial Administration.\n Hall 5, Romance Languages.\n Hall 6, Comparative and Genetic Psychology.\n Hall 7, Ophthalmology.\n Hall 8, History of Asia.\n Hall 9, Geometry.\n Hall 10, Commerce and Exchange.\n Hall 11, Mining Engineering.\n Hall 12, The University.\n Hall 13, Gynecology.\n Hall 14, Constitutional Law.\n Hall 15, Bacteriology.\n Hall 16, Arch\u00e6ology.\n\n Adjournment at 1 P. M.\n\nMeeting at 3 P. M.\n\n Hall 1, Religious Work.\n Hall 2, Comparative Anatomy.\n Hall 3, Germanic Languages.\n Hall 4, Modern Painting.\n Hall 5, Money and Credit.\n Hall 6, Abnormal Psychology.\n Hall 7, Applied Mathematics.\n Hall 8, Indo-Iranian Literature.\n Hall 10, Agriculture.\n Hall 11, . . . . . . . . .\n Hall 12, Educational Theory.\n Hall 13, Therapeutics and Pharmacology.\n Hall 14, Comparative Law.\n Hall 15, Municipal Administration.\n Hall 16, Ethnology.\n\n Adjournment at 6 P. M.\n\n * * * * *\n\nSUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 25.\n\n_Festival Hall._\n\nMeeting at 10 A. M.\n\n Religious Influence: Personal.\n\nMeeting at 3 P. M.\n\n Religious Influence: Social.\n\n\n\n\nPROGRAMME OF SOCIAL EVENTS\n\n * * * * *\n\n\nMONDAY EVENING, SEPTEMBER 19.--Grand F\u00eate night in honor of the Congress\nof Arts and Science. Special illuminations about the Grand Basin. Lagoon\nf\u00eate.\n\nBanquet by the St. Louis Chemical Society, at the Southern Hotel, to the\nmembers of the Chemical Sections.\n\nTUESDAY EVENING, SEPTEMBER 20.--General Reception by Board of Lady\nManagers to the officers and speakers of the Congress and officials of\nthe Exposition.\n\nWEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, SEPTEMBER 21.--Garden f\u00eate to be given to the\nmembers of the Congress of Arts and Science, at the French Pavilion, by\nthe Commissioner-General from France.\n\nWEDNESDAY EVENING, SEPTEMBER 21.--General reception by the German\nImperial Commissioner-General to the members of the Congress of Arts and\nScience, at the German State House.\n\nTHURSDAY EVENING.--Shaw banquet at the Buckingham Club to the foreign\ndelegates.\n\nFRIDAY EVENING, SEPTEMBER 23.--General banquet to the speakers and\nofficials of the Congress of Arts and Science in the banquet hall of the\nTyrolean Alps. 8 P. M.\n\nSATURDAY EVENING, SEPTEMBER 24.--Banquet at St. Louis Club by Round\nTable of St. Louis, to the foreign members of the Congress.\n\nBanquet given by Imperial Commissioner-General from Japan to the\nJapanese delegation to the Congress and Exposition officials.\n\nDinner given by Commissioner-General from Great Britain to the English\nmembers of the Congress.\n\n\n\n\nALPHABETICAL LIST OF MEMBERS WHO MADE 10-MINUTE ADDRESSES\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe following list differs from the original programme, in that it\ncontains the names only of those who actually read addresses. It was\nplanned that each Section should meet for three hours. When authors of\nten-minute papers were not present, and where not enough of these\nshorter papers were offered to fill out the time, the Chairmen invited\ndiscussions from the floor until the time was filled.\n\n\n Professor R. G. Aitken Lick Observatory Astronomy\n James W. Alexander, Esq. New York City Insurance\n Frederick Almy Buffalo, N. Y. Social Science\n Professor S. G. Ashmore Union College Latin Language\n Professor L. A. Bauer Carnegie Institute Cosmical Physics\n Dr. Marcus Benjamin National Museum Technical Chemistry\n Professor H. T. Blickfeldt Leland Stanford Univ. Geometry\n Professor Ernest W. Brown Haverford College Lunar Theory\n Dr. Henry Dickson Bruns New Orleans Municipal\n Administration\n Dr. F. K. Cameron Dep't of Agriculture Physical Chemistry\n Rear-Admiral C. M. Chester, United States Naval Astronomy\n U. S. N. Observatory\n H. H. Clayton, Esq. Blue Hill Observatory Cosmical Physics\n Professor Charles A. Coffin New York City Modern Painting\n Dr. George Coronilas Athens, Greece Tuberculosis\n Professor J. E. Denton Stevens Institute Mechanical\n Engineering\n Professor L. W. Dowling Univ. of Wisconsin Geometry\n Professor H. C. Elmer Cornell Univ. Latin Language\n Professor A. Emch Univ. of Colorado Geometry\n Professor H. R. Fanclough Leland Stanford Univ. Classical Literature\n Professor W. S. Ferguson Univ. of California History of Greece,\n Rome, and Asia\n Dr. Carlos Finley Havana Pathology\n Dr. C. E. Fisk Centralia, Ill. History of America\n Homer Folks, Esq. New York City Social Science\n Professor F. C. French Univ. of Nebraska Philosophy of\n Religion\n H. L. Gannt, Esq. Schenectady, N. Y. Mechanical\n Engineering\n Dr. F. P. Gorham Brown Univ. Bacteriology\n Professor Evarts B. Greene Univ. of Illinois History of America\n Stansbury Hagar, Esq. Brooklyn, N.Y. Ethnology\n J. D. Hague, Esq. New York City Mining Engineering\n Professor G. B. Halstead Kenyon College Geometry\n Professor A. D. F. Hamlin Columbia Univ. \u00c6sthetics\n Professor H. Hancock Univ. of Cincinnati Geometry\n Professor J. A. Harris St. Louis, Mo. Plant Morphology\n Professor M. W. Haskell Univ. of California Algebra and Analysis\n Professor J. T. Hatfield Northwestern Univ. Germanic Language\n Professor E. C. Hayes Miami Univ. Social Psychology\n Professor W. E. Heidel Iowa College Greek Language\n Dr. C. L. Herrick Granville, Ohio Neurology\n Dr. C. Judson Herrick Granville, Ohio Animal Morphology\n Professor W. H. Hobbs Univ. of Wisconsin Petrology and\n Mineralogy\n Professor A. R. Hohlfeld Univ. of Wisconsin Germanic Literature\n Professor H. H. Horne Dartmouth College Educational Theory\n Dr. E. V. Huntington Harvard Univ. Algebra and Analysis\n Dr. Reid Hunt U. S. Marine Hospital Alcohol, etc.\n Dr. J. N. Hurty Indianapolis, Ind. Public Health\n Professor J. J. Hutchinson Cornell Univ. Algebra and Analysis\n Rev. Thomas E. Judge Catholic Review of General Religious\n Reviews Education\n Professor L. Kahlenburg Univ. of Wisconsin Physical Chemistry\n Professor Albert G. Keller Yale University Municipal\n Administration\n Professor George Lefevre Univ. of Missouri Comparative Anatomy\n President Henry C. King Oberlin College Education, The\n College\n Dr. Ira Landrith Belmont College Religious Agencies\n Professor M. D. Learned Univ. of Pennsylvania Germanic Literature\n Professor A. O. Leuschner Univ. of California Astronomy\n Dr. E. P. Lyon St. Louis Univ. Physiology\n Dr. Duncan B. Macdonald Hartford Theological Semitic Languages\n Seminary\n Professor A. MacFarlane Chatham, Ontario Applied Mathematics\n Professor James McMahon Cornell Univ. Applied Mathematics\n Mr. Edward Mallinckrodt St. Louis, Mo. Chemistry\n Professor H. P. Manning Brown Univ. Geometry\n Professor G. A. Miller Leland Stanford Univ. Algebra and\n Analysis.\n Dr. W. C. Mills Ohio State Univ. Arch\u00e6ology\n Professor W. S. Milner Univ. of Toronto Classical Literature\n Professor F. G. Moore Dartmouth College Classical Literature\n Dr. W. P. Montague Columbia Univ. Metaphysics\n Clarence B. Moore, Esq. Philadelphia Arch\u00e6ology.\n Professor F. R. Moulton Univ. of Chicago Astronomy.\n Dr. J. G. Needham Lake Forest Univ. Animal Morphology\n Professor Alex. T. Ormond Princeton Univ. Philosophy of\n Religion\n Professor Frederic L. Paxton Univ. of Colorado History of America\n Dr. Carl Pfister St. Mark's Hospital, Surgery\n New York City\n Professor M. B. Porter Univ. of Texas Algebra and Analysis\n Dr. A. J. Reynolds Chicago Public Health\n Professor S. P. Sadtler Philadelphia College Technical Chemistry\n of Pharmacy\n Dr. John A. Sampson Albany, N. Y. Gyn\u00e6cology\n Oswald Schreiner, Esq. U. S. Dep't of Chemistry\n Agriculture\n Rev. Frank Sewall Washington, D. C. Social Science, The\n Family\n Professor H. C. Sheldon Boston Univ. History of the\n Christian Church\n Professor Frank C. Sharp Univ. of Wisconsin Ethics\n Professor J. B. Shaw Milliken Univ. Algebra and Analysis\n Professor W. B. Smith Tulane Univ. New Testament\n Professor Marshall S. Snow Washington Univ History of America\n Professor Henry Snyder Univ. of Minnesota Social Science\n Professor Edwain D. Starbuck Earlham College General Religious\n Professor George B. Stewart Auburn Theological Professional\n Seminary Religious Education\n John M. Stahl Quincy, Ill. The Rural Community\n Professor J. Stieglitz Univ. of Chicago Chemistry\n Professor Robert Stein U. S. Geological\n Survey Comparative Language\n Mr. Teitaro Suzuki La Salle, Ill. Brahmanism and\n Buddhism\n Col. T. W. Symonds, U. S. A. Washington, D. C. Civil Engineering\n Professor Teissier Lyons, France Pathology\n Judge W. H. Thomas Montgomery, Ala. Private Law\n Professor O. H. Tittmann U. S. C. and G. Survey Astronomy\n Professor Alfred M. Tozzer Peabody Museum Anthropology\n Dr. Benjamin F. Trueblood Univ. of Missouri Medieval History\n Professor Clyde W. Votaw Univ. of Chicago New Testament\n Professor John B. Watson Univ. of Chicago Psychology\n Professor H. L. Willett Disciples Divinity Professional\n House, Chicago Religious Education\n President Mary E. Woolley Mt. Holyoke College Education, The\n College\n H. Zwaarddemaker Utrecht Otology and\n Laryngology\n\n\n\n\nTHE SCIENTIFIC PLAN OF THE CONGRESS\n\nBY PROF. HUGO M\u00dcNSTERBERG\n\n\n\n\nI\n\nTHE PURPOSE OF THE CONGRESS\n\n\n1. _The Centralization of the Congress_\n\nThe history of the Congress has been told. It remains to set forth the\nprinciples which controlled the work of the Congress week, and thus\nscientifically to introduce the scholarly undertaking, the results of\nwhich are to speak for themselves in the eight volumes of this\npublication. Yet in a certain way this scientific introduction has once\nmore to use the language of history. It does not deal with the external\ndevelopment of the Congress, and the story which it has to tell is thus\nnot one of dates and names and events. But the principles which shaped\nthe whole undertaking have themselves a claim to historical treatment;\nthey do not lie before us simply as the subject for a logical\ndisputation or as a plea for a future work. That was the situation of\nthree years ago. At that time various ideas and opposing principles\nentered into the arena of discussion; but now, since the work is\ncompleted, the question can be only of what principles, right or wrong,\nhave really determined the programme. We have thus to interpret that\nstate of mind out of which the purposes and the scientific arrangement\nof the Congress resulted; and no after-thought of to-day would be a\ndesirable addition. Whatever possible improvements of the plan may\nsuggest themselves in the retrospect can be given only a closing word.\nIt was certainly easy to learn from experience, but first the experience\nhad to be passed through. We have here to interpret the view from that\nstandpoint from which the experience of the Congress was still a matter\nof the future, and of an uncertain future indeed, full of doubts and\nfears, and yet full of hopes and possibilities.\n\nThe St. Louis World's Fair promised, through the vast extent of its\ngrounds, through the beautiful plans of the buildings, through the\neagerness of the United States, through the participation of all\ncountries on earth, and through the gigantic outlines of the internal\nplans, to become the most monumental expression of the energies with\nwhich the twentieth century entered on its course. Commerce and\nindustry, art and social work, politics and education, war and peace,\ncountry and city. Orient and Occident, were all to be focussed for a few\nsummer months in the ivory city of the Mississippi Valley. It seemed\nmost natural that science and productive scholarship should also find\nits characteristic place among the factors of our modern civilization.\nOf course the scientist had his word to say on almost every square foot\nof the Exposition. Whether the building was devoted to electricity or to\nchemistry, to anthropology or to metallurgy, to civic administration or\nto medicine, to transportation or to industrial arts, it was everywhere\nthe work of the scientist which was to win the triumph; and the Palace\nof Education, the first in any universal exposition, was to combine\nunder its roof not only the school work of all countries, but the\nvisible record of the world's universities and technical schools as\nwell. And yet it seemed not enough to gather the products and records of\nscience and to make science serve with its tools and inventions. Modern\nart, too, was to reign over every hall and to beautify every palace, and\nyet demanded its own unfolding in the gallery of paintings and\nsculptures. In the same way it was not enough for science to penetrate a\nhundred exhibitions and turn the wheels in every hall, but it must also\nseek to concentrate all its energies in one spot and show the\ncross-section of human knowledge in our time, and, above all, its own\nmethods.\n\nAn exhibition of scholarship cannot be arranged for the eyes. The great\nwork which grows day by day in quiet libraries and laboratories, and on\na thousand university platforms, can express itself only through words.\nYet heaped up printed volumes would be dead to a World's Fair spectator;\nhow to make such words living was the problem. Above all, scholarship\ndoes not really exhibit its methods, if it does not show itself in\nproduction. It is no longer scholarship which speaks of a truth-seeking\nthat has been performed instead of going on with the search for further\ntruth. If the world's science was to be exhibited, a form had to be\nsought in which the scholarly work on the spot would serve the ideals of\nknowledge, would add to the storehouse of truth, and would thus work in\nthe service of human progress at the same moment in which it contributed\nto the completeness of the exhibition.\n\nThe effort was not without precedent. Scholarly production had been\nconnected with earlier expositions, and the large gatherings of scholars\nat the Paris Exposition were still in vivid memory. A large number of\nscientific congresses of specialists had been held there, and many\nhundred scholarly papers had been read. Yet the results hardly suggested\nthe repetition of such an experiment. Every one felt too strongly that\nthe outcome of such disconnected congresses of specialists is hardly\ncomparable with the glorious showing which the arts and industries have\nmade and were to make again. In every other department of the World's\nFair the most careful preparation secured an harmonious effect. The\nscholarly meetings alone failed even to aim at harmony and unity. Not\nonly did the congresses themselves stand apart without any inner\nrelation, grouped together by calendar dates or by their alphabetical\norder from Anthropology to Zo\u00f6logy; but in every congress, again, the\npapers read and the manuscripts presented were disconnected pieces\nwithout any programme or correlation. Worse than that, they could not\neven be expected in their isolatedness to add anything which would not\nhave been worked out and communicated to the world just as well without\nany congress. The speaker at such a meeting is asked to contribute\nanything he has at hand, and he accepts the invitation because he has by\nchance a completed paper or a research ready for publication. In the\nbest case it would have appeared in the next number of the specialistic\nmagazine, in not infrequent cases it has appeared already in the last\nnumber. Such a congress is then only an accident and does not itself\nserve the progress of knowledge.\n\nEven that would be acceptable if at least the best scholars would come\nout with their latest investigations, or, still more delightful, if they\nwould enter into an important discussion. But experience has too often\nshown that the conditions are most favorable for the opposite outcome.\nThe leading scholars stay away partly to give beginners the chance to be\nheard, partly not to be grouped with those who habitually have the floor\nat such gatherings. These are either the men whose day has gone by or\nthose whose day has not yet come; and both groups tyrannize alike an\nunwilling audience. Yet it may be said that in scientific meetings of\nspecialists the reading of papers is non-essential and no harm is done\neven if they do not contribute anything to the status of scholarship;\ntheir great value lies in the personal contact of fellow workers and in\nthe discussions and informal exchange of opinions. All that is true, and\ncompletely justifies the yearly meetings of scholarly associations. But\nthese advantages are much diminished whenever such gatherings take on an\ninternational character, and thus introduce the confusion of tongues.\nAnd hardly any one can doubt that the turmoil of a world's fair is about\nthe worst possible background for such exchange of thought, which\ndemands repose and quietude. Yet even with the certainty of all these\ndisadvantages the city of Paris, with its large body of scholars, with\nits venerable scholarly traditions, and with its incomparable\nattractions, could overcome every resistance, and its convenient\nlocation made it natural that in vacation time, in an exposition summer,\nthe scholars should gather there, not on account of, but in spite of,\nthe hundred congresses. With this the city of St. Louis could make no\nclaim to rivalry. Its recent growth, its minimum of scholarly tradition,\nits great distance from the old centres of knowledge even in the New\nWorld, the apathy of the East and the climatic fears of Europe, all\ntogether made it clear that a mere repetition of unrelated congresses\nwould be not only useless, but a disastrous failure. These very fears,\nhowever, themselves suggested the remedy.\n\nIf the scholarly work of our time was to be represented at St. Louis,\nsomething had to be attempted which should be not simply an imitation of\nthe branch-congresses which every scientific specialty in every country\nis calling every year. Scholarship was to be asked to show itself really\nin process, and to produce for the World's Fair meeting something which\nwithout it would remain undone. To invite the scholars of the world for\ntheir leisurely enjoyment and reposeful discussion of work done\nelsewhere is one thing; to call them together for work which they would\nnot do otherwise, and which ought to be done, is a very different thing.\nThe first had in St. Louis all odds against it; it seemed worth while to\ntry the second. And it seemed not only worth while in the interest of\nscholarship, it seemed, above all, the only way to give to the\nscholarship of our time a chance for the complete demonstration of its\nproductive energies.\n\nThe plan of unrelated congresses, with chance combinations of papers\nprepared at random, was therefore definitively replaced by the plan of\nonly one representative gathering, bound together by one underlying\nthought, given thus the unity of one scholarly aim, whose fulfillment is\ndemanded by the scientific needs of our time, and is hardly to be\nreached by other methods. Every arbitrary and individual choice was then\nto be eliminated and every effort was to be controlled by the one\ncentral purpose; the work thus to be organized and prepared with the\nsame carefulness of adjustment and elaboration which was doubtless to be\napplied in the admirable exhibitions of the United States Government or\nin the art exhibition. The open question was, of course, what topic\ncould fulfill these various demands most completely; wherein lay the\ngreatest scholarly need of our time; what task could be least realized\nby the casual efforts of scholarship at random; where was the unity of a\nworld organization most needed?\n\nOne thought was very naturally suggested by the external circumstances.\nSt. Louis had asked the nations of the world to a celebration of the\nLouisiana Purchase. Historical thoughts thus gave meaning and importance\nto the whole undertaking. The pride of one century's development had\nstimulated the gigantic work from its inception. An immense territory\nhad been transformed from a half wilderness into a land with a rich\ncivilization, and with a central city in which eight thousand factories\nare at work. No thought lay nearer than to ask how far this century was\nof similar importance for the changes in the world of thought. How have\nthe sciences developed themselves since the days of the Louisiana\nPurchase? That is a topic which with complete uniformity might be asked\nfrom every special science, and which might thus offer a certain unity\nof aim to scholars of all scientific denominations. There was indeed no\ndoubt that such an historical question would have to be raised if we\nwere to live up to the commemorative idea of the whole Fair. And yet it\nseemed still more certain that the retrospective problem did not justify\nitself as a central topic for a World's Congress. There were sciences\nfor which the story of the last hundred years was merely the last\nchapter of a history of three thousand years and other sciences whose\nlife history did not begin until one or two decades ago. It would thus\nbe a very external uniformity; the question would have a very different\nmeaning for the various branches of knowledge, and the treatment would\nbe of very unequal interest and importance. More than that, it would not\nabolish the unrelated character of the endeavors; while the same topic\nmight be given everywhere, yet every science would remain isolated;\nthere would be no internal unity, and thus no inner reason for bringing\ntogether the best workers of all spheres. And finally the mere\nretrospective attitude brings with it the depressing mood of perfunctory\nactivity. Certainly to look back on the advance of a century can be most\nsuggestive for a better understanding of the way which lies before us;\nand we felt indeed that the occasion for such a backward glance ought\nnot to be missed. Yet there would be something lifeless if the whole\nmeeting were devoted to the consideration of work that had been\ncompleted; a kind of necrological sentiment would pervade the whole\nceremony, while our chief aim was to serve the progress of knowledge and\nthus to stimulate living interests.\n\nThis language of life spoke indeed in the programme of another plan\nwhich seemed also to be suggested by the character of the Exposition.\nThe St. Louis Fair desired not merely to look backward and to revive the\nhistorical interest in the Louisiana purchase, but its first aim seemed\nto be to bring into sharp relief the factors which serve to-day the\npractical welfare and the achievements of human society. If all the\nscholars of all sciences were to convene under one flag, would it not\nthus seem most harmonious with the occasion, if, as the one controlling\ntopic, the question were proposed, \"What does your science contribute to\nthe practical progress of mankind?\" No one can deny that such a\nformulation would fit in well with the lingering thoughts of every\nWorld's Fair visitor. Whoever wanders through the aisles of exhibition\npalaces and sees amassed the marvelous achievements of industry and\ncommerce, and the thousand practical arts of modern society, may indeed\nturn most naturally to a gathering of scholars with the question, \"What\nhave you to offer of similar import?\" All your thinking and speaking and\nwriting, are they merely words on words, or do you also turn the wheels\nof this gigantic civilization?\n\nSuch a question would give a noble opening indeed to almost every\nscience. Who would say that the opportunity is confined to the man of\ntechnical science? Does not the biologist also prepare the achievements\nof modern medicine, does not the mathematician play his most important\nr\u00f4le in our mastery over stubborn nature, do we not need language for\nour social intercourse, and law and religion for our practical social\nimprovement? Yes, is there any science which has not directly or\nindirectly something to contribute to the practical development of the\nmodern man and his civilization? All this is true, and yet the\nperspective of this truth, too, appears at once utterly distorted if we\ntake the standpoint of science itself. The one end of knowledge is to\nreach the truth. The belief in the absolute value of truth gives to it\nmeaning and significance. This value remains the controlling influence\neven where the problem to be solved is itself a practical one, and the\nspirit of science remains thus essentially theoretical even in the\nso-called applied sciences. But incomparably more intense in that\nrespect is the spirit of all theoretical disciplines. Philosophy and\nmathematics, history and philology, chemistry and biology, astronomy and\ngeology, may be and ought to be helpful to practical civilization\neverywhere; and every step forward which they take will be an advance\nfor man's practical life too. And yet their real meaning never lies in\ntheir technical by-product. It is not the scholar who peers in the\ndirection of practical use who is most loyal to the deepest demand of\nscholarship, and every relation to practical achievement is more or less\naccidental or even artificial for the real life interests of productive\nscholarship.\n\nBut if the contrast between his real intention and his social technical\nsuccesses may not appear striking to the physicist or chemist, it would\nappear at least embarrassing to the scholars in many other departments\nand directly bewildering to not a few. Perhaps two thirds of the\nsciences to which the best thinkers of our time are faithfully devoted\nwould then be grouped together and relegated to a distant corner, their\nonly practical technical function would be to contribute material to the\neducation of the cultured man. For what else do we study Sanscrit or\nmedieval history or epistemology? And finally even the uniform topic of\npractical use would not have brought the different sciences nearer to\neach other; the Congress would still have remained a budget of\ndisconnected records of scholarship. If the practical side of the\nExposition was to suggest anything, it should then not be more than an\nappeal not to overlook the importance of the applied sciences which too\noften play the r\u00f4le of a mere appendix to the system of knowledge. The\nlogical one-sidedness which considers practical needs as below the\ndignity of pure science was indeed to be excluded, but to choose\npractical service as the one controlling topic would be far more\nanti-scientific.\n\n\n2. _The Unity of Knowledge_\n\nThere was another side of the Exposition plan which suggested a stronger\ntopic. The World's Fair was not only an historical memorial work, and\nwas not only a show of the practical tools of technical civilization;\nits deepest aim was after all the effort to bring the energies of our\ntime into inner relation. The peoples of the whole globe, separated by\noceans and mountains, by language and custom, by politics and prejudice,\nwere here to come in contact and to be brought into correlation by\nbetter mutual understanding of the best features of their respective\ncultures. The various industries and arts, the most antagonistic efforts\nof commerce and production, separated by the rivalry of the market and\nby the diversity of economic interests were here to be brought together\nin harmony, were to be correlated for the eye of the spectator. It was a\nnear-lying thought to choose correlation as the controlling thought of a\nscientific World's Congress too. That was the topic which was finally\nagreed upon: the inner relation of the sciences of our day.\n\nThe fitness and the external advantages of such a scheme are evident.\nFirst of all, the danger of disconnectedness now disappears completely.\nIf the sciences are to examine what binds them together, their usual\nisolation must be given up for the time being and a concerted effort\nmust control the day. The bringing together of scholars of all\nscientific specialties is then no longer a doubtful accidental feature,\nbut becomes a condition of the whole undertaking. More than that, such a\ntopic, with all that it involves, makes it a matter of course that the\ncall goes out to the really leading scholars of the time. To aim at a\ncorrelation of sciences means to seek for the fundamental principles in\neach territory of knowledge and to look with far-seeing eye beyond the\nlimits of its field; but just this excludes from the outset those who\nlike to be the self-appointed speakers in routine gatherings. It\nexcludes from the first the narrow specialist who does not care for\nanything but for his latest research, and ought to exclude not less the\nvague spirits who generalize about facts of which they have no concrete\nsubstantial knowledge, as their suggestions towards correlation would\nlack inner productiveness and outer authority. Such a plan has room only\nfor those men who stand high enough to see the whole field and who have\nyet the full authority of the specialistic investigator; they must\ncombine the concentration on specialized productive work with the\ninspiration that comes from looking over vast regions. With such a topic\nthe usual question does not come up whether one or another strong man\nwould feel attracted to take part in the gathering, but it would be\njustified and necessary to confine the active participation from the\noutset to those who are leaders, and thus to guarantee from the\nbeginning a representation of science equal in dignity to the best\nefforts of the exhibiting countries in all other departments. In this\nway such a plan had the advantage of justifying through its topic the\nadministrative desire to bring all sciences to the same spot, and at the\nsame time of excluding all participants but the best scholars: with\nisolated gatherings or with second-rate men, this subject would have\nbeen simply impossible.\n\nYet all these halfway external advantages count little compared with the\nsignificance and importance of the topic for the inner life of\nscientific thought of our time. We all felt it was the one topic which\nthe beginning of the twentieth century demanded and which could not be\ndealt with otherwise than by the combined labors of all nations and of\nall sciences. The World's Fair was the one great opportunity to make a\nfirst effort in this direction; we had no right to miss this\nopportunity. Thus it was decided to have a congress with the definite\npurpose of working towards the unity of human knowledge, and with the\none mission, in this time of scattered specializing work, of bringing to\nthe consciousness of the world the too much neglected idea of the unity\nof truth. To quote from our first tentative programme: \"Let the rush of\nthe world's work stop for one moment for us to consider what are the\nunderlying principles, what are their relations to one another and to\nthe whole, what are their values and purposes; in short, let us for once\ngive to the world's sciences a holiday. The workaday functions are much\nbetter fulfilled in separation, when each scholar works in his own\nlaboratory or in his library; but this holiday task of bringing out the\nunderlying unity, this synthetic work, this demands really the\nco\u00f6peration of all, this demands that once at least all sciences come\ntogether in one place at one time.\"\n\nYet if our work stands for the unity of knowledge, aims to consider the\nfundamental conceptions which bind together all the specialistic\nresults, and seeks to inquire into the methods which are common to\nvarious fields, all this is after all merely a symptom of the whole\nspirit of our times. A reaction against the narrowness of mere\nfact-diggers has set in. A mere heaping up of disconnected, unshaped\nfacts begins to disappoint the world; it is felt too vividly that a mere\ndictionary of phenomena, of events and laws, makes our knowledge larger\nbut not deeper, makes our life more complex but not more valuable, makes\nour science more difficult but not more harmonious. Our time longs for a\nnew synthesis and looks towards science no longer merely with a desire\nfor technical prescriptions and new inventions in the interest of\ncomfort and exchange. It waits for knowledge to fulfill its higher\nmission, it waits for science to satisfy our higher needs for a view of\nthe world which shall give unity to our scattered experience. The\nindications of this change are visible to every one who observes the\ngradual turning to philosophical discussion in the most different fields\nof scientific life.\n\nWhen after the first third of the nineteenth century the great\nphilosophic movement which found its climax in Hegelianism came to\ndisaster in consequence of its absurd neglect of hard solid facts, the\nera of naturalism began its triumph with contempt for all philosophy and\nfor all deeper unity. Idealism and philosophy were stigmatized as the\nenemies of true science and natural science had its great day. The rapid\nprogress of physics and chemistry fascinated the world and produced\nmodern technique; the sciences of life, physiology, biology, medicine,\nfollowed; and the scientific method was carried over from body to mind,\nand gave us at the end of the nineteenth century modern psychology and\nsociology. The lifeless and the living, the physical and the mental, the\nindividual and the social, all had been conquered by analytical methods.\nBut just when the climax was reached and all had been analyzed and\nexplained, the time was ripe for disillusion, and the lack of deeper\nunity began to be felt with alarm in every quarter. For seventy years\nthere had been nowhere so much philosophizing going on as suddenly\nsprung up among the scientists of the last decade. The physicists and\nthe mathematicians, the chemists and the biologists, the geologists and\nthe astronomers, and, on the other side, the historians and the\neconomists, the psychologists and the sociologists, the jurists and the\ntheologians--all suddenly found themselves again in the midst of\ndiscussions on fundamental principles and methods, on general categories\nand conditions of knowledge, in short, in the midst of the despised\nphilosophy. And with those discussions has come the demand for\ncorrelation. Everywhere have arisen leaders who have brought unconnected\nsciences together and emphasized the unity of large divisions. The time\nseems to have come again when the wave of naturalism and realism is\nebbing, and a new idealistic philosophical tide is swelling, just as\nthey have always alternated in the civilization of two thousand years.\n\nNo one dreams, of course, that the great synthetic apperception, for\nwhich our modern time seems ripe, will come through the delivery of some\nhundred addresses, or the discussions of some hundred audiences. An\nultimate unity demands the gigantic thought of a single genius, and the\nwork of the many can, after all, be merely the preparation for the final\nwork of the one. And yet history shows that the one will never come if\nthe many have not done their share. What is needed is to fill the\nsciences of our time with the growing consciousness of belonging\ntogether, with the longing for fundamental principles, with the\nconviction that the desire for correlation is not the fancy of dreamers,\nbut the immediate need of the leaders of thought. And in this\npreparatory work the St. Louis Congress of Arts and Science seemed\nindeed called for an important part when it was committed to this topic\nof correlation.\n\nTo call the scholars of the world together for concerted action towards\nthe correlation of knowledge meant, of course, first of all, to work out\na detailed programme, and to select the best authorities for every\nspecial part of the whole scheme. Nothing could be left to chance\nmethods and to casual contributions. The preparation needed the same\nadministrative strictness which would be demanded for an encyclopedia,\nand the same scholarly thoroughness which would be demanded for the most\nscientific research. A plan was to be devised in which every possible\nstriving for truth would find its place, and in which every section\nwould have its definite position in the system. And such a ground-plan\ngiven, topics were to be assigned to every department and\nsub-department, the treatment of which would bring out the fundamental\nprinciples and the inner relations in such a way that the papers would\nfinally form a close-woven intellectual fabric. There would be plenty of\nroom for a retrospective glance at the historical development of the\nsciences and plenty of room for emphasis on their practical\nachievements; but the central place would always belong to the effort\ntowards unity and internal harmonization.\n\nWe thus divided human knowledge into large parts, and the parts into\ndivisions, and the divisions into departments, and the departments into\nsections. As the topic of the general divisions--we proposed seven of\nthem--it was decided to discuss the Unity of the whole field. As topic\nfor the departments--we had twenty-four of them--the addresses were to\ndiscuss the fundamental Conceptions and Methods and the Progress during\nthe last century; and in the sections, finally--our plan provided for\none hundred and twenty-eight of them--the topics were in every one the\nRelation of the special branch to other branches, and those most\nimportant Present Problems which are essential for the deeper principles\nof the special field. In this way the ground-plan itself suggested the\nunity of the practically separated sciences; and, moreover, our plan\nprovided from the first that this logical relation should express itself\nexternally in the time order of the work. We were to begin with the\nmeetings of the large divisions, the meetings of the departments were to\nfollow, and the meetings of the sections and their ramifications would\nfollow the departmental gatherings.\n\n\n3. _The Objections to the Plan_\n\nIt was evident that even the most modest success of that gigantic\nundertaking depended upon the right choice of speakers, upon the value\nof the ground-plan, and upon many external conditions; thus no one was\nin doubt as to the difficulty in realizing such a scheme. Yet there were\nfrom the scholarly side itself objections to the principles involved,\nobjections which might hold even if those other conditions were\nsuccessfully met. The most immediate reason for reluctance lies in the\nspecializing tendencies of our time. Those who devote all their working\nenergy as loyal sons of our analyzing period of science to the minute\ndetail of research come easily into the habit of a nervous fear with\nregard to any wider general outlook. The man of research sees too often\nhow ignorance hides itself behind generalities. He knows too well how\nmuch easier it is to formulate vague generalities than to contribute a\nnew fact to human knowledge, and how often untrained youngsters succeed\nwith popular text-books which are rightly forgotten the next day.\nMethodical science must thus almost encourage this aversion to any\ndeviation from the path of painstaking specialistic labor. Then, of\ncourse, it seems almost a scientific duty to declare war against an\nundertaking which explicitly asks everywhere for the wide perspectives\nand the last principles, and does not aim at adding at this moment to\nthe mere treasury of information.\n\nBut such a view is utterly one-sided, and to fight against such\none-sidedness and to overcome the specializing narrowness of the\nscattered sciences was the one central idea of the plan. If there\nexisted no scholars who despise the philosophizing connection, there\nwould have hardly been any need for this whole undertaking; but to yield\nto such philosophy-phobia means to declare the analytic movement of\nscience permanent, and to postpone a synthetic movement indefinitely.\nOur time has just to emphasize, and the leaders of thought daily\nemphasize it more, that a mere heaping up of information can be merely a\npreparation for knowledge, and that the final aim is a _Weltanschauung_,\na unified view of the whole of reality. All that our Congress had to\nsecure was thus merely that the generalizing discussion of principles\nshould not be left to men who generalized because they lacked the\nsubstantial knowledge which is necessary to specialize. The thinkers we\nneeded were those who through specialistic work were themselves led to a\npoint where the discussion of general principles becomes unavoidable.\nOur plan was by no means antagonistic to the patient labors of analysis;\nthe aim was merely to overcome its one-sidedness and to stimulate the\nsynthesis as a necessary supplement.\n\nBut the objections against a generalizing plan were not confined to the\nmistaken fear that we sought to antagonize the productive work of the\nspecialist. They not seldom took the form of a general aversion to the\nlogical side of the ground-plan. It was often said that such a scheme\nhas after all interest only for the logician, for whom science as such\nis an object of study, and who must thus indeed classify the sciences\nand determine their logical relation. The real scientist, it was said,\ndoes not care for such methodological operations, and should be\nsuspicious from the first of such philosophical high-handedness. The\nscientist cannot forget how often in the history of civilization science\nwas the loser when it trusted its problems to the metaphysical thinker\nwho substituted his lofty speculations for the hard work of the\ninvestigator. The true scholar will thus not only object to generalizing\n\"commonplaces\" as against solid information, but he will object as well\nto logical demarcation lines and systematization as against the\npractical scientific work which does not want to be hampered by such\nphilosophical subtleties. Yet all these fears and suspicions were still\nmore mistaken.\n\nNothing was further from our intentions than a substitution of\nmetaphysics for concrete science. It was not by chance that we took such\npains to find the best specialists for every section. No one was invited\nto enter into logical discussions and to consider the relations of\nscience merely from a dialectic point of view. The topic was everywhere\nthe whole living manifoldness of actual relations, and the logician had\nnothing else to do than to prepare the programme. The outlines of the\nprogramme demanded, of course, a certain logical scheme. If hundreds of\nsciences are to take part, they have to be grouped somehow, if a merely\nalphabetical order is not adopted; and even if we were to proceed\nalphabetically, we should have to decide beforehand what part of\nknowledge is to be recognized as a special science. But the logical\norder of the ground-plan refers, of course, merely to the simple\nrelation of co\u00f6rdination, subordination, and superordination, and the\nlogician is satisfied with such a classification. But the endless\nvariety of internal relations is no longer to be dealt with from the\npoint of view of mere logic. We may work out the ground-plan in such a\nway that we understand that logically zo\u00f6logy is co\u00f6rdinated to botany\nand subordinated to mechanics and superordinated to ichthyology; but\nthis minimum of determination gives, of course, not even a hint of that\nworld of relations which exists from the standpoint of the biologist\nbetween the science of zo\u00f6logy and the science of botany, or between the\nbiological and the mechanical studies. To discuss these relations of\nreal scientific life is the work of the biologist and not at all of the\nlogician.\n\nThe foregoing answers also at once an objection which might seem more\njustified at the first glance. It has been said that we were undertaking\nthe work of bringing about a synthesis of scientific endeavors, and that\nwe yet had that synthesis already completed in the programme on which\nthe work was to be based. The scholars to be invited would be bound by\nthe programme, and would therefore have no other possibility than to say\nwith more words what the programme had settled beforehand. The whole\neffort would then seem determined from the start by the arbitrariness of\nthe proposed ground-plan. Now it cannot be denied indeed that a certain\nfactor of arbitrariness has to enter into a programme. We have already\nreferred to the fact that some one must decide beforehand what fraction\nof science is to be acknowledged as a self-dependent discipline. If a\nbiologist were to work out the scheme, he might decide that the whole of\nphilosophy was just one science; while the philosopher might claim a\nlarge number of sections for logic and ethics and philosophy of\nreligion, and so on. And the philosopher, on the other hand, might treat\nthe whole of medicine as one part in itself, while the physician might\nhold that even otology has to be separated from rhinology. A certain\nsubjectivity of standpoint is unavoidable, and we know very well that\ninstead of the one hundred and twenty-eight sections of our programme we\nmight have been satisfied with half that number or might have indulged\nin double that number. And yet there was no possible plan which would\nhave allowed us to invite the speakers without defining beforehand the\nsectional field which each was to represent. A certain courage of\nopinion was then necessary, and sometimes also a certain adjustment to\nexternal conditions.\n\nQuite similar was the question of classification. Just as we had to take\nthe responsibility for the staking-out of every section, we had also to\ndecide in favor of a certain grouping, if we desired to organize the\nCongress and not simply to bring out haphazard results. The principles\nwhich are sufficient for a mere directory would never allow the shaping\nof a programme which can be the basis for synthetic work. Even a\nuniversity catalogue begins with a certain classification, and yet no\none fancies that such catalogue grouping inhibits the freedom of the\nuniversity lecturer. It is easy to say, as has been said, that the\nessential trait of the scientific life of to-day is its\nlive-and-let-live character. Certainly it is. In the regular work in our\nlibraries and laboratories the year round, everything depends upon this\ndemocratic freedom in which every one goes his own way, hardly asking\nwhat his neighbor is doing. It is that which has made the specialistic\nsciences of our day as strong as they are. But it has brought about at\nthe same time this extreme tendency to unrelated specialization with its\ndiscouraging lack of unity; this heaping up of information without an\nouter harmonious view of the world; and if we were really at least once\nto satisfy the desire for unity, then we had not the right to yield\nfully to this live-and-let-live tendency. Therefore some principle of\ngrouping had to be accepted, and whatever principle had been chosen, it\nwould certainly have been open to the criticism that it was a product of\narbitrary decision, inasmuch as other principles might have been\npossible.\n\nA classification which in itself expresses all the practical relations\nin which sciences stand to each other is, of course, absolutely\nimpossible. A programme which should try to arrange the place of a\nspecial discipline in such a way that it would become the neighbor of\nall those other sciences with which it has internal relation is\nunthinkable. On the other hand, only if we had tried to construct a\nscheme of such exaggerated ambitions should we have been really guilty\nof anticipating a part of that which the specialistic scholars were to\ntell us. The Congress had to leave it to the invited participants to\ndiscuss the totality of relations which practically exist between their\nfields and others, and the organizers confined themselves to that\nminimum of classification which just indicates the pure logical\nrelations, a minimum which every editor of encyclopedic work would be\nasked to initiate without awakening suspicions of interference with the\nideas of his contributors.\n\nThe only justified demand which could be met was that a system of\ndivision and classification should be proposed which should give fair\nplay to every existing scientific tendency. The minimum of\nclassification was to be combined with the maximum of freedom, and to\nsecure that a careful consideration of principles was indeed necessary.\nTo bring logical order into the sciences which stand out clearly with\ntraditional rights is not difficult; but the chances are too great that\ncertain tendencies of thought might fail to find recognition or might be\nsuppressed by scientific prejudice. Any serious omission would indeed\nhave necessarily inhibited the freedom of expression. To secure thus the\ngreatest inner fullness of the programme, seemed indeed the most\nimportant task in the elaboration of the ground-plan. The fears that we\nmight offer empty generalization instead of scholarly facts, or that we\nmight simply heap up encyclopedic information instead of gaining wide\nperspectives, or that we might interfere with the living connections of\nsciences by the logical demarcation lines, or that we might disturb the\nscholar in his freedom by determining beforehand his place in the\nclassification,--all these fears and objections, which were repeatedly\nraised when the plan was first proposed, seemed indeed unimportant\ncompared with the fear that the programme might be unable to include all\nscientific tendencies of the time.\n\nThat would have been, indeed, the one fundamental mistake, as the whole\nCongress work was planned in the service of the great synthetic movement\nwhich pervades the intellectual life of to-day. The undertaking would be\nuseless and even hindering if it were not just the newer and deeper\ntendencies that came to most complete expression in it. Everything\ndepended, therefore, upon the fullest possible representation of\nscientific endeavors in the plan. But no one can become aware of this\nmanifoldness and of the logical relations who does not go back to the\nultimate principles of the human search for truth. We have, therefore,\nto enter now into a full discussion of the principles which have\ncontrolled the classification and subdivision of the whole work. The\ndiscussion is necessarily in its essence a philosophical one, as it was\nearlier made plain that philosophy must lay out the plan, while in the\nrealization of the plan through concrete work the scientist alone, and\nnot the logician, has to speak. Yet here again it may be said that while\nour discussion of principles in its essence is logical, in another\nrespect it is a merely historical account. The question is not what\nprinciples of classification are to be acknowledged as valuable now that\nthe work of the Congress lies behind us, but what principles were\naccepted and really led to the organization of the work in that form in\nwhich it presents itself in the records of the following volumes.\n\n\n\n\nII\n\nTHE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES\n\n\n1. _The Development of Classification_\n\nThe problem of dividing and subdividing the whole of human knowledge and\nof thus bringing order into the manifoldness of scientific efforts has\nfascinated the leading thinkers of all ages. It may often be difficult\nto say how far the new principles of classification themselves open the\nway for new scientific progress and how far the great forward movements\nof thought in the special sciences have in turn influenced the\nprinciples of classification. In any case every productive age has\ndemanded the expression of its deepest energy in a new ordering of human\nscience. The history of these efforts leads from Plato and Aristotle to\nBacon and Locke, to Bentham and Amp\u00e8re, to Kant and Hegel, to Comte and\nSpencer, to Wundt and Windelband. And yet we can hardly speak of a real\nhistorical continuity. In a certain way every period took up the problem\nanew, and the new aspects resulted not only from the development of the\nsciences themselves which were to be classified, but still more from the\ndifferences of logical interest. Sometimes the classification referred\nto the material, sometimes to the method of treatment, sometimes to the\nmental energies involved, and sometimes to the ends to be reached. The\nreference to the mental faculties was certainly the earliest method of\nbringing order into human knowledge, for the distinction of the Platonic\nphilosophy between dialectics, physics, and ethics pointed to the\nthreefold character of the mind, to reason, perception, and desire; and\nit was on the threshold of the modern time, again, when Bacon divided\nthe intellectual globe into three large parts according to three\nfundamental psychical faculties: memory, imagination, and reason. The\nmemory gives us history; the imagination, poetry; the reason,\nphilosophy, or the sciences. History was further divided into natural\nand civil history; natural history into normal, abnormal, and artificial\nphenomena; civil history into political, literary, and ecclesiastical\nhistory. The field of reason was subdivided into man, nature, and God;\nthe domain of man gives, first, civil philosophy, parted off into\nintercourse, business, and government, and secondly, the philosophy of\nhumanity, divided into that of body and of soul, wherein medicine and\nathletics belong to the body, logic and ethics to the soul. Nature, on\nthe other hand, was divided into speculative and applied science,--the\nspeculative containing both physics and metaphysics; the applied,\nmechanics and magic. All this was full of artificial constructions, and\nyet still more marked by deep insight into the needs of Bacon's time,\nand not every modification of later classifiers was logically a step\nforward.\n\nYet modern efforts had to seek quite different methods, and the energies\nwhich have been most effective for the ordering of knowledge in the last\ndecades spring unquestionably from the system of Comte and his\nsuccessors. He did not aim at a system of ramifications; his problem was\nto show how the fundamental sciences depend on each other. A series was\nto be constructed in which each member should presuppose the foregoing.\nThe result was a simplicity which is certainly tempting, but this\nsimplicity was reached only by an artificial emphasis which corresponded\ncompletely to the one-sidedness of naturalistic thought. It was a\nphilosophy of positivism, the background for the gigantic work of\nnatural science and technique in the last two thirds of the nineteenth\ncentury. Comte's fundamental thought is that the science of Morals, in\nwhich we study human nature for the government of human life, is\ndependent on sociology. Sociology, however, depends on biology; this on\nchemistry; this on physics; this on astronomy; and this finally on\nmathematics. In this way, all mental and moral sciences, history and\nphilology, jurisprudence and theology, economics and politics, are\nconsidered as sociological phenomena, as dealing with functions of the\nhuman being. But as man is a living organism, and thus certainly falls\nunder biology, all the branches of knowledge from history to ethics,\nfrom jurisprudence to \u00e6sthetics, can be nothing but subdivisions of\nbiology. The living organism, on the other hand, is merely one type of\nthe physical bodies on earth, and biology is thus itself merely a\ndepartment of physics. But as the earthly bodies are merely a part of\nthe cosmic totality, physics is thus a part of astronomy; and as the\nwhole universe is controlled by mathematical laws, mathematics must be\nsuperordinated to all sciences.\n\nBut there followed a time which overcame this thinly disguised example\nof materialism. It was a time when the categories of the physiologist\nlost slightly in credit and the categories of the psychologist won\nrepute. This newer movement held that it is artificial to consider\nethical and logical life, historic and legal action, literary and\nreligious emotions, merely as physiological functions of the living\norganism. The mental life, however necessarily connected with brain\nprocesses, has a positive reality of its own. The psychical facts\nrepresent a world of phenomena which in its nature is absolutely\ndifferent from that of material phenomena, and, while it is true that\nevery ethical action and every logical thought can, from the standpoint\nof the biologist, be considered as a property of matter, it is not less\ntrue that the sciences of mental phenomena, considered impartially, form\na sphere of knowledge closed in itself, and must thus be co\u00f6rdinated,\nnot subordinated, to the knowledge of the physical world. We should say\nthus: all knowledge falls into two classes, the physical sciences and\nthe mental sciences. In the circle of physical sciences we have the\ngeneral sciences, like physics and chemistry, the particular sciences of\nspecial objects, like astronomy, geology, mineralogy, biology, and the\nformal sciences, like mathematics. In the circle of mental sciences we\nhave correspondingly, as a general science, psychology, and as the\nparticular sciences all those special mental and moral sciences which\ndeal with man's inner life, like history or jurisprudence, logic or\nethics, and all the rest. Such a classification, which had its\nphilosophical defenders about twenty years ago, penetrated the popular\nthought as fully as the positivism of the foregoing generation, and was\ncertainly superior to its materialistic forerunner.\n\nOf course it was not the first time in the history of civilization that\nmaterialism was replaced by dualism, that biologism was replaced by\npsychologism; and it was also not the first time that the development of\ncivilization led again beyond this point: that is, led beyond the\npsychologizing period. There is no doubt that our time presses on, with\nall its powerful internal energies, away from this _Weltanschauung_ of\nyesterday. The materialism was anti-philosophic, the psychological\ndualism was unphilosophic. To-day the philosophical movement has set in.\nThe one-sidedness of the nineteenth century creed is felt in the deeper\nthought all over the world: popular movements and scholarly efforts\nalike show the signs of a coming idealism, which has something better\nand deeper to say than merely that our life is a series of causal\nphenomena. Our time longs for a new interpretation of reality; from the\ndepths of every science wherein for decades philosophizing was despised,\nthe best scholars turn again to a discussion of fundamental conceptions\nand general principles. Historical thinking begins again to take the\nleadership which for half a century belonged to naturalistic thinking;\nspecialistic research demands increasingly from day to day the\nreadjustment toward higher unities, and the technical progress which\ncharmed the world becomes more and more simply a factor in an ideal\nprogress. The appearance of this unifying congress itself is merely one\nof a thousand symptoms of this change appearing in our public life, and\nif the scientific philosophy is producing to-day book upon book to prove\nthat the world of phenomena must be supplemented by the world of values,\nthat description must yield to interpretation, and that explanation must\nbe harmonized with appreciation: it is but echoing in technical terms\nthe one great emotion of our time.\n\nThis certainly does not mean that any step of the gigantic\nmaterialistic, technical, and psychological development will be\nreversed, or that progress in any one of these directions ought to\ncease. On the contrary, no time was ever more ready to put its immense\nenergies into the service of naturalistic work; but it does mean that\nour time recognizes the one-sidedness of these movements, recognizes\nthat they belong only to one aspect of reality, and that another aspect\nis possible; yes, that the other aspect is that of our immediate life,\nwith its purposes and its ideals, its historical relations and its\nlogical aims. The claim of materialism, that all psychical facts are\nmerely functions of the organism, was no argument against psychology,\nbecause, though the biological view was possible, yet the other aspect\nis certainly a necessary supplement. In the same way it is no argument\nagainst the newer view that all purposes and ideals, all historical\nactions and logical thoughts, can be considered as psychological\nphenomena. Of course we can consider them as such, and we must go on\ndoing so in the service of the psychological and sociological sciences;\nbut we ought not to imagine that we have expressed and understood the\nreal character of our historical or moral, our logical or religious life\nwhen we have described and explained it as a series of phenomena. Its\nimmediate reality expresses itself above all in the fact that it has a\nmeaning, that it is a purpose which we want to understand, not by\nconsidering its causes and effects, but by interpreting its aims and\nappreciating its ideals.\n\nWe should say, therefore, to-day that it is most interesting and\nimportant for the scientist to consider human life with all its\nstrivings and creations from a biological, psychological, sociological\npoint of view; that is, to consider it as a system of causal phenomena;\nand many problems worthy of the highest energies have still to be solved\nin these sciences. But that which the jurist or the theologian, the\nstudent of art or of history, of literature or of politics, of education\nor of morality, is dealing with, refers to the other aspect in which\ninner life is not a phenomenon but a system of purposes, not to be\nexplained but to be interpreted, to be approached not by causal but by\nteleological methods. In this case the historical sciences are no longer\nsub-sections of psychological or of sociological sciences; the\nconception of science is no longer identical with the conception of the\nscience of phenomena. There exist sciences which do not deal with the\ndescription or explanation of phenomena at all, but with the internal\nrelation and connection, the interpretation and appreciation of purpose.\nIn this way modern thought demands that sciences of purpose be\nco\u00f6rdinated with sciences of phenomena. Only if all these tendencies of\nour time are fully acknowledged can the outer framework of our\nclassification offer a fair field to every scientific thought, while a\npositivistic system would cripple the most promising tendencies of the\ntwentieth century.\n\n\n2. _The Four Theoretical Divisions_\n\nWe have first to determine the underlying structure of the\nclassification, that is, we have to seek the chief Divisions, of which\nour plan shows seven; four theoretical and three practical ones. It will\nbe a secondary task to subdivide them later into the 24 Departments and\n128 Sections. We desire to divide the whole of knowledge in a\nfundamental way, and we must therefore start with the question of\nprinciple:--what is knowledge? This question belongs to epistemology,\nand thus falls, indeed, into the domain of philosophy. The positivist is\neasily inclined to substitute for the philosophical problem the\nempirical question: how did that which we call knowledge grow and\ndevelop itself in our individual mind, or in the mind of the nations?\nThe question becomes, then, of course, one which must be answered by\npsychology, by sociology, and perhaps by biology. Such genetic inquiries\nare certainly very important, and the problem of how the processes of\njudging and conceiving and thinking are produced in the individual or\nsocial consciousness, and how they are to be explained through physical\nand psychical causes, deserves fullest attention. But its solution\ncannot even help us as regards the fundamental problem, what we mean by\nknowledge, and what the ultimate value of knowledge may be, and why we\nseek it. This deeper logical inquiry must be answered somehow before\nthose genetic studies of the psychological and the sociological\npositivists can claim any truth at all, and thus any value, for their\noutcome. To explain our present knowledge genetically from its foregoing\ncauses means merely to connect the present experience, which we know,\nwith a past experience, which we remember, or with earlier phenomena\nwhich we construct on the basis of theories and hypotheses; but in any\ncase with facts which we value as parts of our knowledge and which thus\npresuppose the acknowledgment of the value of knowledge. We cannot\ndetermine by linking one part of knowledge with another part of\nknowledge whether we have a right to speak of knowledge at all and to\nrely on it.\n\nWe can thus not start from the childhood of man, or from the beginning\nof humanity, or from any other object of knowledge, but we must begin\nwith the state which logically precedes all knowledge; that is, with our\nimmediate experience of real life. Here, in the na\u00efve experience in\nwhich we do not know ourselves as objects which we perceive, but where\nwe feel ourselves in our subjective attitudes as agents of will, as\npersonalities, here we find the original reality not yet shaped and\nremoulded by scientific conceptions and by the demands of knowledge. And\nfrom this basis of primary, na\u00efve reality we must ask ourselves what we\nmean by seeking knowledge, and how this demand of ours is different from\nthe other activities in which we work out the meaning and the ideals of\nour life.\n\nOne thing is certain, we cannot go back to the old dogmatic standpoint,\nwhether rationalistic or sensualistic. In both cases dogmatism took for\ngranted that there is a real world of things which exist in themselves\nindependent of our subjective attitudes, and that our knowledge has to\ngive us a mirror picture of that self-dependent world. Sensualism\naverred that we get this knowledge through our perceptions; rationalism,\nthat we get it by reasoning. The one asserted that experience gives us\nthe data which mere abstract reasoning can never supply; the other\nasserted that our knowledge speaks of necessity which no mere perception\ncan find out. Our modern time has gone through the school of\nphilosophical criticism, and the dogmatic ideas have lost for us their\nmeaning. We know that the world which we think as independent cannot be\nindependent of the forms of our thinking, and that no science has\nreference to any other world than the world which is determined by the\ncategories of our apperception. There cannot be anything more real than\nthe immediate pure experience, and if we seek the truth of knowledge, we\ndo not set out to discover something which is hidden behind our\nexperience, but we set out simply to make something out of our\nexperience which satisfies certain demands. Our immediate experience\ndoes not contain an objective thing and a subjective picture of it, but\nthey are completely one and the same piece of experience. We have the\nobject of our immediate knowledge not in the double form of an outer\nobject independent of ourselves and an idea in us, but we have it as our\nobject there in the practical world before science for its special\npurposes has broken up that bit of reality into the physical material\nthing and the psychical content of consciousness. And if this doubleness\ndoes not hold for the immediate reality of pure experience, it cannot\nenter through that reshaping and reconstructing and connecting and\ninterpreting of pure experience which we call our knowledge. All that\nscience gives to us is just such an endlessly enlarged experience, of\nwhich every particle remains objective and independent, inasmuch as it\nis not in us as psychical individuals, while yet completely dependent\nupon the forms of our subjective experience. The ideal of truth is thus\nnot to gain by reason or by observation ideas in ourselves which\ncorrespond as well as possible to absolute things, but to reconstruct\nthe given experience in the service of certain purposes. Everything\nwhich completely fulfills the purposes of this intentional\nreconstruction is true.\n\nWhat are these purposes? One thing is clear from the first: There cannot\nbe a purpose where there is not a will. If we come from pure experience\nto knowledge by a purposive transformation, we must acknowledge the\nreality of will in ourselves, or rather, we must find ourselves as will\nin the midst of pure experience before we reach any knowledge. And so it\nis indeed. We can abstract from all those reconstructions which the\nsciences suggest to us and go back to the most immediate na\u00efve\nexperience; but we can never reach an experience which does not contain\nthe doubleness of subject and object, of will and world. That doubleness\nhas nothing whatever to do with the difference of physical and\npsychical; both the physical thing and the psychical idea are objects.\nThe antithesis is not that between two kinds of objects, since we have\nseen that in the immediate experience the objects are not at all split\nup into the two groups of material and mental things; it is rather the\nantithesis between the object in its undifferentiated state on the one\nside and the subject in its will-attitude on the other side. Yes, even\nif we speak of the subject which stands as a unity behind the\nwill-attitudes, we are already reconstructing the real experience in the\ninterest of the purposes of knowledge. In the immediate experience, we\nhave the will-attitudes themselves, and not a subject which wills them.\n\nIf we ask ourselves finally what is then the ultimate difference between\nthose two elements of our pure experience, between the object and the\nwill-attitude, we stand before the ultimate data: we call that element\nwhich exists merely through a reference to its opposite, the object, and\nwe call that element of our experience which is complete in itself, the\nattitude of the will. If we experienced liking or disliking, affirming\nor denying, approving or disapproving in the same way in which we\nexperience the red and the green, the sweet and the sour, the rock and\nthe tree and the moon, we should know objects only. But we do experience\nthem in quite a different way. The rock and the tree do not point to\nanything else, but the approval has no reality if it does not point to\nits opposition in disapproval, and the denial has no meaning if it is\nnot meant in relation to the affirmative. This doubleness of our primary\nexperience, this having of objects and of antagonistic attitudes must be\nacknowledged wherever we speak of experience at all. We know no object\nwithout attitude, and no attitude without object. The two are one state;\nobject and attitude form a unity which we resolve by the different way\nin which we experience these two features of the one state: we find the\nobject and we live through the attitude. It is a different kind of\nawareness, the having of the object and the taking of the attitude. In\nreal life our will is never an object which we simply perceive. The\npsychologist may treat the will as such, but in the immediate experience\nof real life, we are certain of our action by doing it and not by\nperceiving our doing; and this our performing and rejecting is really\nour self which we posit as absolute reality, not by knowing it, but by\nwilling it. This corner-stone of the Fichtean philosophy was forgotten\nthroughout the uncritical and unphilosophical decades of a mere\nnaturalistic age. But our time has finally come to give attention to it\nagain.\n\nOur pure experience thus contains will-attitudes and objects of will,\nand the different attitudes of the will give the fundamental classes of\nhuman activity. We can easily recognize four different types of\nwill-relation towards the world. Our will submits itself to the world;\nour will approves the world as it is; our will approves the changes in\nthe world; our will transcends the world. Yet we must make at once one\nmore most important discrimination. We have up to this point simplified\nour pure experience too much. It is not true that we experience only\nobjects and our own will-attitudes. Our will reaches out not only to\nobjects, but also to other subjects. In our most immediate experience,\nnot reshaped at all by theoretical science, our will is in agreement or\ndisagreement with other wills; tries to influence them, and receives\ninfluences and suggestions from them. The pseudo-philosophy of\nnaturalism must say of course that the will does not stand in any direct\nrelation to another will, but that the other persons are for us simply\nmaterial objects which we perceive, like other objects, and into which\nwe project mental phenomena like those which we find in ourselves by the\nmere conclusion of analogy. But the complex reconstructions of\nphysiological psychology are therein substituted for the primary\nexperience. If we have to express the agreement or disagreement of wills\nin the terms of causal science, we may indeed be obliged to transform\nthe real experience into such artificial constructions; but in our\nimmediate consciousness, and thus at the starting-point of our theory of\nknowledge, we have certainly to acknowledge that we understand the other\nperson, accept or do not accept his suggestion, agree or disagree with\nhim, before we know anything of a difference between physical and mental\nobjects.\n\nWe cannot agree with an object. We agree directly with a will, which\ndoes not come to us as a foreign phenomenon, but as a proposition which\nwe accept or decline. In our immediate experience will thus reaches\nwill, and we are aware of the difference between our will-attitude as\nmerely individual and our will-attitude as act of agreement with the\nwill-attitude of other individuals. We can go still further. The circle\nof other individuals whose will we express in our own will-act may be\nnarrow or wide, may be our friends or the nation, and this relation\nclearly constitutes the historical significance of our attitude. In the\none case our act is a merely personal choice for personal purposes\nwithout any general meaning; in the other case it is the expression of\ngeneral tendencies and historical movements. Yet our will-decisions can\nhave connections still wider than those with our social community or our\nnation, or even with all living men of to-day. It can seek a relation to\nthe totality of those whom we aim to acknowledge as real subjects. It\nthus becomes independent of the chance experience of this or that man,\nor this or that movement, which appeals to us, but involves in an\nindependent way the reference to every one who is to be acknowledged as\na subject at all. Such reference, which is no longer bound to any\nspecial group of historical individuals, thus becomes strictly\nover-individual. We can then discriminate three stages: our merely\nindividual will; secondly, our will as bound by other historical\nindividuals; and thirdly, our over-individual will, which is not\ninfluenced by any special individual, but by the general demands for the\nidea of a personality.\n\nEach of those four great types of will-attitude which we insisted\non--that is, of submitting, of approving the given, of approving change,\nand of transcending--can be carried out on these three stages, that is,\nas individual act, as historical act, and as over-individual act. And we\nmay say at once that only if we submit and approve and change and\ntranscend in an over-individual act, do we have Truth and Beauty and\nMorality and Conviction. If we approve, for instance, a given experience\nin an individual will-act, we have simply personal enjoyment and its\nobject is simply agreeable; if we approve it in harmony with other\nindividuals, we reach a higher attitude, yet one which cannot claim\nabsolute value, as it is dependent on historical considerations and on\nthe tastes and desires of a special group or a school or a nation or an\nage. But if we approve the given object just as it is in an\nover-individual will-act, then we have before us a thing of beauty,\nwhose value is not dependent upon our personal enjoyment as individuals,\nbut is demanded as a joy forever, by every one whom we acknowledge at\nall as a complete subject. In exactly the same way, we may approve a\nchange in the world from any individual point of view: we have then to\ndo with technical, practical achievements; or we may approve it in\nagreement with others: we then enter into the historical interests of\nour time. Or we may approve it, finally, in an over-individual way,\nwithout any reference to any special personality: then only is it\nvaluable for all time, then only is it morally good. And if our will is\ntranscending experience in an individual way, it can again claim no more\nthan a subjective satisfaction furnished by any superstition or hope.\nBut if the transcending will is over-individual, it reaches the absolute\nvalues of religion and metaphysics.\n\nExactly the same differences, finally, must occur when our will submits\nitself to experience. This submission may be, again, an individual\ndecision for individual purposes; no absolute value belongs to it. Or it\nmay be again a yielding to the suggestions of other individuals; or it\nmay, finally, again be an over-individual submission, which seeks no\nlonger a personal interest. This submission is not to the authority of\nothers, and is without reference to any individual; we assume that every\none who is to share with us our world of experience has to share this\nsubmission too. That alone is a submission to truth, and experience,\nconsidered in so far as we submit ourselves to it over-individually,\nconstitutes our knowledge.\n\nThe system of knowledge is thus the system of experience with all that\nis involved in it in so far as it demands submission from our\nover-individual will, and the classification which we are seeking must\nbe thus a division and subdivision of our over-individual submissions.\nBut the submission itself can be of very different characters and these\nvarious types must give the deepest logical principles of scientific\nclassification. To point at once to the fundamental differences: our\nwill acknowledges the demands of other wills and of objects. We cannot\nlive our life--and this is not meant in a biological sense, but, first\nof all, in a teleological sense--our life becomes meaningless, if our\nwill does not respect the reality of will-demands and of objects of\nwill. Now we have seen that the will which demands our decision may be\neither the individual will of other subjects or the over-individual\nwill, which belongs to every subject as such and is independent of any\nindividuality. We can say at once that in the same way we are led to\nacknowledge that the object has partly an over-individual character,\nthat is, necessarily belongs to the world of objects of every possible\nsubject, and partly an individual character, as our personal object. We\nhave thus four large groups of experiences to which we submit ourselves:\nover-individual will-acts, individual will-acts, over-individual\nobjects, individual objects. They constitute the first four large\ndivisions of our system.\n\nThe over-individual will-acts, which are as such teleologically binding\nfor every subject and therefore norms for his will, give us the\nNormative Sciences. The individual will-acts in the world of historical\nmanifoldness give us the Historical Sciences. The objects, in so far as\nthey belong to every individual, make up the physical world, and thus\ngive us the Physical Sciences; and finally the objects, in so far as\nthey belong to the individual, are the contents of consciousness, and\nthus give us the Mental Sciences. We have then the demarcation lines of\nour first four large divisions: the Normative, the Historical, the\nPhysical, and the Mental Sciences. Yet their meaning and method and\ndifference must be characterized more fully. We must understand why we\nhave here to deal with four absolutely different types of scientific\nsystems, why the over-individual objects lead us to general laws and to\nthe determination of the future, while the study of the individual\nwill-acts, for instance, gives us the system of history, which turns\nmerely to the past and does not seek natural laws; and why the study of\nthe norms gives us another kind of system in which neither a causal nor\nan historical, but a purely logical connection prevails. Yet all these\nmethodological differences result necessarily from the material with\nwhich these four different groups of sciences are working.\n\nLet us start again from the consideration of our original logical\npurpose. We feel ourselves bound and limited in our will by physical\nthings, by psychical contents, by the demands of other subjects, and by\nnorms. The purpose of all our knowledge is to develop completely all\nthat is involved in this bondage. We want to develop in an\nover-individual way all the obligations for our submission which are\nnecessarily included in the given objects and the given demands of\nsubjects. We start of course everywhere and in every direction from the\nactual experience, but we expand the experience by seeking those objects\nand those demands to which, as necessarily following from the\nimmediately given experience, we must also submit. And in thus\ndeveloping the whole system of submissions, the interpretation of the\nexperience itself becomes transformed: the physicist may perhaps\nsubstitute imperceptible atoms for the physical object and the\npsychologist may substitute sensations for the real idea, and the\nhistorian may substitute combinations of influences for the real\npersonality, and the student of norms may substitute combinations of\nconflicting demands for the one complete duty; yet in every case the\nsubstitution is logically necessary and furnishes us what we call truth\ninasmuch as it is needed to develop the concrete system of our\nsubmissions and thus to express our confidence in the order-lines of\nreality. And each of these substitutions and supplementations becomes,\nas material of knowledge, itself a part of the world of experience.\n\n\n3. _The Physical and the Mental Sciences_\n\nThe physicist, we said, speaks of the world of objects in so far as they\nbelong to every possible subject, and are material for a merely passive\nspectator. Of course the pure experience does not offer us anything of\nthat kind. We insisted that the objects of our real life are objects of\nour will and of our attitudes, and are at the same time undifferentiated\ninto the physical things outside of us and the psychical ideas in us. To\nreach the abstraction of the physicist, we have thus to cut loose the\nobjects from our will and to separate the over-individual elements from\nthe individual elements. Both transformations are clearly demanded by\nour logical aims. As to the cutting loose from our will, it means\nconsidering the object as if it existed for itself, as if it were a mere\npassively given material and not a material of our personal interests.\nBut just that is needed. We want to find out how far we have to submit\nourselves to the object. If we want to live our life, we must adjust our\nattitudes to things, and, as we know our will, we must seek to\nunderstand the other factor in the complex experience, the object of our\nwill, and we must find out what it involves in itself. But we do not\nunderstand the object and the submission which it demands if we do not\ncompletely understand its relation to our desires. Our total submission\nto the thing thus involves our acknowledgment of all that we have to\nexpect from it. And although the real experience is a unity of will and\nthing, we have thus the most immediate interest in considering what we\nhave to expect from the thing in itself, without reference to our will.\nThat means finding out the effects of the given object with a subject as\nthe passive spectator. We eliminate artificially, therefore, the\nactivity of the subject and construct as presupposition for this circle\nof knowledge a nowhere existing subject without activity, for which the\nthing exists merely as a cause of the effects which it produces.\n\nThe first step towards natural science is, therefore, to dissolve the\nreal experience into thing and personality; that is, into object and\nactive subject, and to eliminate in an artificial abstraction the\nactivity of the subject, making the object material of merely passive\nawareness, and related no longer to the will but merely to other\nobjects. It may be more difficult to understand the second step which\nnaturalism has to take before a natural science is possible. It must\ndissolve the object of will into an over-individual and an individual\npart and must eliminate the individual. That part of my objects which\nbelongs to me alone is their psychical side; that which belongs to all\nof us and is the object of ever new experience is the physical object.\nAs a physicist, in the widest sense of the word, I have to ignore the\nobjects in so far as they are my ideas and have to consider the stones\nand the stars, the inorganic and the organic objects, as they are\noutside of me, material for every one. The logical purpose of this\nsecond abstraction may be perhaps formulated in the following way.\n\nWe have seen that the purpose of the study of the objects is to find out\nwhat we have to expect from them; that is, to what effects of the given\nthing we have to submit ourselves in anticipation. The ideal aim is thus\nto understand completely how present objects and future objects--that\nis, how causes and effects--are connected. The first stage in such\nknowledge of causal connections is, of course, the observation of\nempirical consequences. Our feeling of expectation grows with the\nregularity of observed succession; yet the ideal aim can never be\nfulfilled in that way. The mere observation of regularities can help us\nto reduce a particular case to a frequently observed type, but what we\nseek to understand is the necessity of the process. Of course we have to\nformulate laws, and as soon as we acknowledge a special law to be\nexpressive of a necessity, the subsumption of the particular case under\nthe law will satisfy us even if the necessity of the connection is not\nrecognized in the particular case. We are satisfied because the\nacknowledgment of the law involved all possible cases. But we do not at\nall feel that we have furnished a real explanation if the law means to\nus merely a generalization of routine experiences, and if thus no\nabsolute validity is attached to the law. This necessity between cause\nand effect must thus have its ultimate reason in our own understanding.\nWe must be logically obliged to connect the objects in such a way, and\nwherever observation seems to contradict that which is logically\nnecessary, we must reshape our idea of the object till the demands of\nreason are fulfilled. That is, we must substitute for the given object\nan abstraction which serves the purpose of a logically necessary\nconnection. That demand is clearly not satisfied if we simply group the\ntotality of such causal judgments under the single name, Causality, and\ndesignate thus all these judgments as results of a special disposition\nof the understanding. We never understand why just this cause demands\njust this effect so long as we rely on such vague and mystical power of\nour reason to link the world by causality.\n\nBut the situation changes at once if we go still further back in the\ncategories of our understanding. While a mere demand for causality never\nexplains what cause is to be linked with what effect, the vagueness\ndisappears when we understand this demand for causality itself as the\nproduct of a more fundamental demand for identity. That an object\nremains identical with itself does not need for us any further\ninterpretation. That is the ultimate presupposition of our thought, and\nwhere a complete identity is found nothing demands further explanation.\nAll scientific effort aims at so rethinking different experiences that\nthey can be regarded as partially identical, and every discovery of\nnecessary connection is ultimately a demonstration of identity. If we\nseek connections with the final aim to understand them as necessary, we\nmust conceive the world of our objects in such a way that it is possible\nto consider the successive experiences as parts of a self-identical\nworld; that is, as parts of a world in which no substance and no energy\ncan disappear or appear anew. To reach this end it is obviously needed\nthat we eliminate from the world of objects all that cannot be conceived\nas identically returning in a new experience; that is, all that belongs\nto the present experience only. We do eliminate this by taking it up\nconceptually into the subject and calling it psychical, and thus leaving\nto the object merely that which is conceived as belonging to the world\nof everybody's experience, that is, of over-individual experience. The\nwhole history of natural science is first of all the gigantic\ndevelopment of this transformation, resolution, and reconstruction. The\nobjects of experience are re-thought till everything is eliminated which\ncannot be conceived as identical with itself in the experiences of all\nindividuals and thus as belonging to the over-individual world. All the\nsubstitutions of atoms for the real thing, and of energies for the real\nchanges, are merely conceptional schemes to satisfy this demand.\n\nThe logically primary step is thus not the separation of the physical\nand the psychical things plus the secondary demand to connect the\nphysical things causally; the order is exactly opposite. The primary\ndesire is to connect the real objects and to understand them as causes\nand effects. This understanding demands not only empirical observation,\nbut insight into the necessary connection. Necessary connection, on the\nother hand, exists merely for identical objects and identical qualities.\nBut in the various experiences only that is identical which is\nindependent of the momentary individual experiences, and therefore we\nneed as the ultimate aim a reconstruction of the object into the two\nparts, the one perceptional, which refers to our individual experience;\nand the other conceptional, which expresses that which can be conceived\nas identical in every new experience. The ideal of this constructed\nworld is the mechanical universe in which every atom moves by causal\nnecessity because there is nothing in that universe, no element of\nsubstance and no element of energy, which will not remain identical in\nall changes of the universe which are possibly to be expected. It\nbecomes completely determinable by anticipation and the system of our\nsubmissions to the object can be completely constructed. The totality of\nintellectual efforts to reconstruct such a causally connected\nover-individual world of objects clearly represents a unity of its own.\nIt is the system of physical sciences.\n\nThe physical universe is thus not the totality of our objects. It is a\nsubstitution for our real objects, constructed by eliminating the\nindividual parts of our objects of experience. These individual parts\nare the psychical aspects of our objective experience, and they clearly\nawake our scientific interest too. The physical sciences need thus as\ncounterpart a division of mental sciences. Their aim must be the same.\nWe want to foresee the psychical results and to understand causally the\npsychical experience. Yet it is clear that the plan of the mental\nsciences must be quite different in principle from that of the sciences\nof nature. The causal connection of the physical universe was ultimately\nanchored in the identity of the object through various experiences;\nwhile the object of experience was psychical for us just in so far as it\ncould never be conceived as identical in different phases of reality.\nThe psychical object is an ever new creation; my idea can never be your\nidea. Their meaning may be identical, but the psychical stuff, the\ncontent of my consciousness, can never be object for any one else, and\neven in myself the idea of to-day is never the idea of yesterday or\nto-morrow. But if there cannot be identity in different psychical\nexperiences, it is logically impossible to connect them directly by\nnecessity. If we yet want to master their successive appearance, we must\nsubstitute an indirect connection for the direct one, and must describe\nand explain the psychical phenomena through reference to the physical\nworld. It is in this way that modern psychology has substituted\nelementary sensations for the real contents of consciousness and has\nconstructed relations between these elementary mental states on the\nbasis of processes in the organism, especially brain processes. Here,\nagain, reality is left behind and a mere conceptional construction is\nput in its place. But this construction fulfills its purpose and thus\ngives us truth; and if the basis is once given, the psychological\nsciences can build up a causal system of the conscious processes in the\nindividual man and in society.\n\n\n4. _The Historical and the Normative Sciences_\n\nThe two divisions of the physical and mental sciences represent our\nsystematized submission to objects. But we saw from the first that it is\nan artificial abstraction to consider in our real experience the object\nalone. We saw clearly that we, as acting personalities, in our will and\nin our attitudes, do not feel ourselves in relation to objects, merely,\nbut to will-acts; and that these will-acts were the individual ones of\nother subjects or the over-individual ones which come to us in our\nconsciousness of norms. The sciences which deal with our submissions to\nthe individual will-acts of others are the Historical Sciences. Their\nstarting-point is the same as that of the object sciences, the immediate\nexperience. But the other subjects reach our individuality from the\nstart in a different way from the objects. The wills of other subjects\ncome to us as propositions with which we have to agree or disagree; as\nsuggestions, which we are to imitate or to resist; and they carry in\nthemselves that reference to an opposite which, as we saw, characterizes\nall will-activity. The rock or the tree in our surroundings may\nstimulate our reactions, but does not claim to be in itself a decision\nwith an alternative. But the political or legal or artistic or social or\nreligious will of my neighbors not only demands my agreement or\ndisagreement, but presents itself to me in its own meaning as a free\ndecision which rejects the opposite, and its whole meaning is destroyed\nif I consider it like the tree or the rock as a mere phenomenon, as an\nobject in the world of objects. Whoever has clearly understood that\npolitics and religion and knowledge and art and law come to me from the\nfirst quite differently from objects, can never doubt that their\nsystematic connection must be most sharply separated from all the\nsciences which connect impressions of objects, and is falsified if the\nhistorical disciplines are treated simply as parts of the sciences of\nphenomena--for instance, as parts of sociology, the science of society\nas a psycho-physical object.\n\nJust as natural science transcends the immediately experienced object\nand works out the whole system of our necessary submissions to the world\nof objects, so the historical sciences transcend the social will-acts\nwhich approach us in our immediate experience, and again seek to find\nwhat we are really submitting to if we accept the suggestions of our\nsocial surroundings. And yet this similar demand has most dissimilar\nconsequences. We submit to an object and want to find out what we are\nreally submitting to. That cannot mean anything else, as we have seen,\nthan to seek the effects of the object and thus to look forward to what\nwe have to expect from the object. On the other hand, if we want to find\nout what we are really submitting to if we agree with the decision of\nour neighbor, the only meaning of the question can be to ask what our\nneighbor really is deciding on, what is contained in his decision; and\nas his decision must mean an agreement or disagreement with the will-act\nof another subject, we cannot understand the suggestion which comes to\nus without understanding in respect to what propositions of others it\ntakes a stand. Our interest is in this case thus led from those subjects\nof will which enter into our immediate experience to other subjects\nwhose purposes stand in the relation of suggestion and demand to the\npresent ones. And if we try to develop the system of these relations, we\ncome to an endless chain of will-relations, in which one individual will\nalways points back in its decisions to another individual will with\nwhich it agrees or disagrees, which it imitates or overcomes by a new\nattitude of will; and the whole network of these will-relations is the\npolitical or religious or artistic or social history of mankind. This\nsystem of history as a system of teleologically connected will-attitudes\nis elaborated from the will-propositions which reach us in immediate\nexperience, with the same necessity with which the mechanical universe\nof natural science is worked out from the objects of our immediate\nexperience.\n\nThe historical system of will-connections is similar to the system of\nobject-connections, not only in its starting in the immediate\nexperience, but further in its also seeking identities. Without this\nfeature history would not offer to our understanding real connections.\nWe must link the will-attitudes of men by showing the identity of the\nalternatives. Just as the physical thing is substituted by a large\nnumber of atoms which remain identical in the causal changes, in the\nsame way the personality is substituted by an endless manifoldness of\ndecisions and becomes linked with the historical community by the\nthought that each of these partial decisions refers to an alternative\nwhich is identical with that of other persons. And yet there remains a\nmost essential difference between the historical and the causal\nconnection. In a world of things the mere identical continuity is\nsufficient to determine the phenomena of any given moment. In a world of\nwill the identity of alternatives cannot determine beforehand the actual\ndecision; that belongs to the free activity of the subject. If this\nfactor of freedom were left out, man would be made an object and history\na mere appendix of natural science. The connection of the historian can\ntherefore never be a necessary one, however much we may observe\nempirical regularities. If there were no identities, our reason could\nnot find connection in history; but if the historical connections were\nnecessary, like the causal ones, it would not be history. The historian\nis, therefore, unable and without the ambition to look into the future\nlike the naturalist; his domain is the past.\n\nYet will-attitudes and will-acts can also be brought into necessary\nconnection; that is, we can conceive will-acts as teleologically\nidentical with each other and exempt from the freedom of the individual.\nThat is clearly possible only if they are conceived as beyond the\nfreedom of individual decision and related to the over-individual\nsubject. The question is then no longer how this special man wills and\ndecides, but how far a certain will-decision binds every possible\nindividual who performs this act if he is to share our common world of\nwill and meaning. Such an over-individual connection of will-acts is\nwhat we call the logical connection. It shares with all other\nconnections the dependence upon the category of identity. The logical\nconnection shows how far one act or combination of acts involves, and\nthus is partially identical with, a new combination. This logical\nconnection has, in common with the causal connection, necessity; and in\ncommon with the historical connection, teleological character. Any\nindividual will-act of historical life may be treated for certain\npurposes as such a starting-point of over-individual relations; it would\nthen lead to that scientific treatment which gives us an interpretation,\nfor instance, of law. Such interpretative sciences belong to the system\nof history in the widest sense of the word.\n\nThe chief interest, however, must belong to the logical connections of\nthose will-acts which themselves have over-individual character. A\nmerely individual proposition can lead to necessary logical connection,\nbut cannot claim that scientific importance which belongs to the logical\nconnection of those propositions which are necessary for the\nconstitution of every real experience: the science of chess cannot stand\non the same level with the science of geometry, the science of local\nlegal statutes not on the same level with the system of ethics. The\nlogical connections of the over-individual attitudes thus constitute the\nfourth large division besides the physical, the mental, and the\nhistorical sciences. It must thus comprise the systems of all those\npropositions which are presuppositions of our common reality,\nindependent of the free individual decision. Here belong the acts of\napproval--the ethical approval of changes and achievements, as well as\nthe \u00e6sthetic approval of the given world; the acts of conviction--the\nreligious convictions of a superstructure of the world as well as the\nmetaphysical convictions of a substructure; and above all, the acts of\naffirmation and submission, the logical as well as the mathematical. But\nto be consistent we must really demand that merely the over-individual\nlogical connections are treated in this division. If we deal, for\ninstance, with the \u00e6sthetical or ethical acts as psychological\nexperiences, or as historical propositions, they belong to the psychical\nor historical division. Only the philosophical system of ethics or\n\u00e6sthetics finds its place in this division. It is difficult to find a\nsuitable name for this whole system of logical connections of\nover-individual attitudes. Perhaps it would be most correct to call it\nthe Sciences of Values, inasmuch as every one of these over-individual\ndecisions constitutes a value in our world which our individual will\nfinds as an absolute datum like the objects of experience. Seen from\nanother point of view, these values appear as norms which bind our\npractical will inasmuch as these absolute values demand of our will to\nrealize them, and it may thus be permitted to designate this whole group\nof sciences as a Division of Normative Sciences.\n\nOur logical explanation of the meaning of these four divisions naturally\nbegan with the interpretation of that science which usually takes\nprecedence in popular thought--with the science of nature, that is, and\npassed then to those groups whose methodological situation is seen\nrather vaguely by our positivistic age. But as soon as we have once\ndefined and worked out the boundary lines of each of these four\ndivisions, it would appear more logical to change their order and to\nbegin with that division whose material is those over-individual\nwill-acts on which all possible knowledge must depend, and then to turn\nto those individual will-acts which determine the formulation of our\npresent-day knowledge, and then only to go to the objects of knowledge,\nthe over-individual and the individual ones. In short, we must begin\nwith the normative sciences, consider in the second place the historical\nsciences, in the third place the physical sciences, and in the fourth\nplace the psychical sciences. There cannot be a scientific judgment\nwhich must not find its place somewhere in one of these four groups. And\nyet can we really say that these four great divisions complete the\ntotality of scientific efforts? The plan of our Congress contains three\nimportant divisions besides these.\n\n\n5. _The Three Divisions of Practical Sciences_\n\nThe three divisions which still lie before us represent Practical\nKnowledge. Have we a logical right to put them on an equal level with\nthe four large divisions which we have considered so far? Might it not\nrather be said that all that is knowledge in those practical sciences\nmust find its place somewhere in the theoretical field, and that\neverything outside of it is not knowledge, but art? It cannot be denied\nindeed that the logical position of the practical sciences presents\nserious problems. That the function of the engineer or of the physician,\nof the lawyer or of the minister, of the diplomat or of the teacher,\ncontains elements of an art cannot be doubted. They all need not only\nknowledge, but a certain instinct and power and skill, and their\nschooling thus demands a training and discipline through imitation which\ncannot be substituted by mere learning. Yet when it comes to the\nclassification of sciences, it seems very doubtful whether practical\nsciences have to be acknowledged as special divisions, inasmuch as the\nfactor of art must have been eliminated at the moment they are presented\nas sciences. The auscultation of the physician certainly demands skill\nand training, yet this practical activity itself does not enter into the\nscience of medicine as presented in medical writings. As soon as the\nphysician begins to deal with it scientifically, he needs, as does any\nscholar, not the stethoscope, but the pen. He must formulate judgments;\nand as soon as he simply describes and analyzes and explains and\ninterprets his stethoscopic experiences, his statements become a system\nof theoretical ideas.\n\nWe can say in general that the science of medicine or of engineering, of\njurisprudence or of education, contains, as science, no element of art,\nbut merely theoretical judgments which, as such, can find their place\nsomewhere in the complete systems of the theoretical sciences. If the\nphysician describes a disease, its symptoms, the means of examining\nthem, the remedies, their therapeutical effects, and the prophylaxis, in\nshort, everything which the physician needs for his art, he does not\nrecord anything which would not belong to an ideally complete\ndescription and explanation of the processes in the human body. In the\nsame way it can be said that if the engineer characterizes the\nconditions under which an iron bridge will be safe, it is evident that\nhe cannot introduce any facts which would not find their logical place\nin an ideally complete description of the properties of inorganic\nnature; and finally, the same is true for the statements of the\npolitician, the jurist, the pedagogue, or the minister. Whatever is said\nabout their art is a theoretical judgment which connects facts of the\nideally complete system of theoretical science; in their case the facts\nof course belong in first line to the realm of the psychological,\nhistorical, and normative sciences. There never has been or can be\npractical advice in the form of words, which is not in principle a\nstatement of facts which belong to the absolute totality of theoretical\nknowledge. Seen from this point of view, it is evident that all our\nknowledge is fundamentally theoretical, and that the conception of\npractical knowledge is logically unprecise.\n\nBut the opposite point of view might also be taken. It might be said\nthat after all every kind of knowledge is practical, and our own\ndeduction of the meaning of science might be said to suggest such\ninterpretation. We acknowledged at the outset that the so-called\ntheoretical knowledge is by no means a passive mirror picture of an\nindependent outside world; but that in every judgment real experience is\nremoulded and reshaped in the service of certain purposes of will. Here\nlies the true core of that growing popular philosophy of to-day which,\nunder the name of pragmatism, or under other titles, mingles the\npurposive character of our knowledge and the evolutionary theories of\nmodern biology in the vague notion that men created knowledge because\nthe biological struggle for existence led to such views of the world;\nand that we call true that correlation of our experiences which has\napproved itself through its harmony with the phylogenetic development.\nCertainly we must reject such circle philosophies. We must see clearly\nthat the whole conception of a biological development and of a struggle\nof organisms is itself only a part of our construction of causal\nknowledge. We must have knowledge to conceive ourselves as products of a\nphylogenetic history, and thus cannot deduce from it the fact, and,\nstill less, the justification of knowledge. Yet one element of this\ntheory remains valuable: knowledge is indeed a purposive activity, a\nreconstruction of the world in the service of ideals of the will. We\nhave thus from one side the suggestion that all knowledge is merely\ntheoretical, from the other side the claim that all knowledge is\npractical activity. It seems as if both sides might agree that it is\nsuperfluous and unjustified to make a demarcation line through the field\nof knowledge and to separate two sorts of knowledge, theoretical and\npractical. For both theories demand that all knowledge be of one kind,\nand they disagree only as to whether we ought to call it all theoretical\nor all practical.\n\nYet the true situation is not characterized by such an antithesis. If we\nsay that all knowledge is ultimately practical, we are speaking from an\nepistemological point of view, inasmuch as we take it then as a\nreconstruction of the world through the purposive activity of the\nover-individual subject. On the other hand it is an empirical point of\nview from which ultimately all knowledge, that of the physician and\nengineer and lawyer, as well as that of the astronomer, appears\ntheoretical. But this antithesis can, therefore, not decide the further\nempirical question, whether or not in the midst of theoretical knowledge\ntwo kinds of sciences may be discriminated, of which the one refers to\nempirical practical purposes and the other not. Such an inquiry would\nhave nothing to do with the epistemological problem of pragmatism; it\nwould be strictly non-philosophical, just as the separation of chemistry\ninto organic and inorganic chemistry. This empirical question is indeed\nto be answered in the affirmative. If we ask what causes bring about a\ncertain effect, for the sake of a practical purpose of ours,--for\ninstance, the curing a patient of disease,--no one can state facts which\nare not in principle to be included in the complete system of physical\ncauses and effects and thus in the system of physical sciences. And yet\nit may well be that the physical sciences, as such, have not the\nslightest reason to mention the effect of that special drug on that\nspecial pathological alteration of the tissues of the organism. The\ndescriptions and explanations of science are not a mere heaping up of\nmaterial, but a steady selection in the interest of the special aim of\nthe science. No physical science describes every special pebble on the\nbeach; no historical science deals with the chance happenings in the\ndaily life of any member of the crowd. And we already well know the\npoint of view from which the selection is to be performed. We want to\nknow in the physical and psychical sciences whatever is involved in the\nobject of our experience, and in the historical and normative sciences\nwhatever is involved in the demands which reach our will. But whether we\nhave to do with the objects or with the demands, in both cases we have\nsystems before us which are determined only by the objects or demands\nthemselves, without any relation to our individual will and our own\npractical activity. Theoretically, of course, our will, our activity,\nour organism, our personality is included in the complete system; and if\nwe knew absolutely everything of the empirical effects of the object or\nof the consequences of these demands, we should find among them their\nrelation to our individual interests; but that relation would be but one\nchance case among innumerable others, and the sciences would not have\nthe slightest interest in giving any attention to that particular case.\nThus if our knowledge of chemical substances were complete, we should\ncertainly have to know theoretically that a few grains of antipyrine\nintroduced into the organism have an influence on those brain centres\nwhich regulate the temperature of the human body. Yet if the chemist\ndoes not share the interest of the physician who wants to fight a fever,\nhe would have hardly any reason for examining this particular relation,\nas it hardly throws light on the chemical constitution as such. In this\nway we might say in general that the relation of the world to us as\nacting individuals is in principle contained in the total system of the\nrelations of our world of experience, but has a strictly accidental\nplace there and can never be in itself a centre around which the\nscientific data are clustered, and science will hardly have an interest\nin giving any attention to its details.\n\nThis relation of the world, the physical, the psychical, the historical,\nand the normative world, to our individual, practical purposes can,\nhowever, indeed become the centre of scientific interest, and it is\nevident that the whole inquiry receives thereupon a perfectly new\ndirection which demands not only a completely new grouping of facts and\nrelations, but also a very different shading in elaboration. As long as\nthe purpose was to understand the world without relation to our\nindividual aims, science had to gather endless details which are for us\nnow quite indifferent, as they do not touch our aims; and in other\nrespects science was satisfied with broad generalizations and\nabstractions where we have now to examine the most minute details. In\nshort, the shifting of the centre of gravity creates perfectly new\nsciences which must be distinguished; and if we call them again\ntheoretical and practical sciences, it is clear that this difference has\nthen no longer anything to do with the philosophical problems from which\nwe started.\n\nThe term practical may be preferable to the other term which is\nsometimes used: Applied Science. If we construct the antithesis of\ntheoretical and applied science, the underlying idea is clearly that we\nhave to do on the practical side with a discipline which teaches how to\napply a science which logically exists as such beforehand. Engineering,\nfor instance, is an applied science because it applies the science of\nphysics; but this is not really our deepest meaning here. Our practical\nsciences are not meant as mere applications of theoretical sciences.\nThey are logically somewhat degraded if they are treated in such a way.\nTheir real logical meaning comes out only if they are acknowledged as\nself-dependent sciences whose material is differentiated from that of\nthe theoretical sciences by the different point of view and purpose.\nThey are methodologically perfectly independent, and the fact that a\nlarge part or theoretically even everything of their teaching overlaps\nthe teaching of certain theoretical sciences ought not to have any\ninfluence on their logical standing. The practical sciences could be\nconceived as completely self-dependent, without the existence of any\nso-called theoretical sciences; that is, the relations of the world of\nexperience to our individual aims might be brought into complete systems\nwithout working out in principle the system of independent experience.\nWe might have a science of engineering without acknowledging an\nindependent science of theoretical physics besides it. To be sure, such\na science of engineering would finally develop itself into a system\nwhich would contain very much that might just as well be called\ntheoretical physics; yet all would be held together by the point of view\nof the engineer, and that part of theoretical physics which the engineer\napplies might just as well be considered as depracticalized engineering.\nIf this logical self-dependence of the practical science holds true even\nfor such technological disciplines, it is still more evident that it\nwould cripple the meaning and independent character of jurisprudence and\nsocial science, or of pedagogy and theology, to treat them simply as\napplied sciences, that is, as applications of theoretical science.\n\nThis point of view determines, also, of course, the classification of\nthe Practical Sciences. If they were really merely applied sciences it\nwould be most natural to group them according to the classification of\nthe theoretical sciences which are to be applied. We should then have\napplied physical sciences, applied psychological sciences, applied\nhistorical sciences, and applied normative sciences. Yet even from the\nstandpoint of practice, we should come at once into difficulties, and\nindeed much of the superficiality of practical sciences to-day results\nfrom the hasty tendency to consider them as applied sciences only, and\nthus to be determined by the points of view of the theoretical\ndiscipline which is to be applied. Then, for instance, pedagogy becomes\nsimply applied psychology, and the psychological point of view is\nsubstituted for the educational one. Pedagogy then becomes simply a\nselection of those chapters in psychology which deal with the mental\nfunctions of the child. Yet as soon as we really take the teachers'\npoint of view, we understand at once that it is utterly artificial to\nsubstitute the categories of the psychologist for those of immediate\npractical will-relations and to consider the child in the class-room as\na causal system of psycho-physical elements instead of a personality\nwhich is teleologically to be interpreted, and whose aims are not to be\nconnected with causal effects but with over-individual attitudes. In\nthis way the historical relation and the normative relation have to play\nat least as important a r\u00f4le in the pedagogical system as the\npsycho-physical relation, and we might quite as well call education\napplied history and applied ethics.\n\nAlmost every practical science can be shown in this way to apply a\nnumber of theoretical sciences; it synthesizes them to a new unity. But\nbetter, we ought to say, that it is a unity in itself from the start,\nand that it only overlaps with a number of theoretical sciences. If we\nwant to classify the practical sciences, we have thus only the one\nlogical principle at our disposal: we must classify them in accordance\nwith the group of human individual aims which control those different\ndisciplines. If all practical sciences deal with the relation of the\nworld of experience to our individual practical ends, the classes of\nthose ends are the classes of our practical sciences, whatever\ncombinations of applied theoretical sciences may enter into the group.\nOf course a special classification of these aims must remain somewhat\narbitrary; yet it may seem most natural to separate three large\ndivisions. We called them the Utilitarian Sciences, the Sciences of\nSocial Regulation, and the Sciences of Social Culture. Utilitarian we\nmay call those sciences in which our practical aim refers to the world\nof things; it may be the technical mastery of nature or the treatment of\nthe body, or the production, distribution, and consumption of the means\nof support. The second division contains everything in which our aim\ndoes not refer to the thing, but to the other subjects; here naturally\nbelong the sciences which deal with the political, legal, and social\npurposes. And finally the sciences of culture refer to those aims in\nwhich not the individual relations to things or to other subjects are in\nthe foreground, but the purposes of the teleological development of the\nsubject himself; education, art, and religion here find their place. It\nis, of course, evident that the material of these sciences frequently\nallows the emphasis of different aspects. For instance, education, which\naims primarily at self-development, might quite well be considered also\nfrom the point of view of social regulation; and still more naturally\ncould the utilitarian sciences of the economic distribution of the means\nof support be considered from this point of view. Yet a classification\nof sciences nowhere suggests by its boundary lines that there are no\nrelations and connections between the different parts; on the contrary,\nit is just the manifoldness of these given connections which makes it so\ndesirable to become conscious of the principles involved, and thus to\nemphasize logical demarcation lines, which of course must be obliterated\nas soon as any material is to be treated from every possible point of\nview. It may thus well be that, for instance, a certain industrial\nproblem could be treated in the Normative Sciences from the point of\nview of ethics; in the Historical Sciences, from the point of view of\nthe history of economic institutions; in the Physical Sciences, from the\npoint of view of physics or chemistry; in the Mental Sciences, from the\npoint of view of sociology; in the Utilitarian Sciences, from the point\nof view of medicine or of engineering, or of commerce and\ntransportation; and finally in the Regulative Sciences, from the point\nof view of political administration, or in the Social Sciences, from the\nstandpoint of the urban community, and so on. The more complex the\nrelations are, the more necessary is it to make clean distinctions\nbetween the different logical purposes with which the scientific\ninquiries start. Practical life may demand a combination of historical,\nsociological, psychological, economical, social, and ethical\nconsiderations; but not one of these sciences can contribute its best if\nthe consciousness of these differences is lost and the deliberate\ncombination is replaced by a vague mixture of the problems.\n\n\n6. _The Subdivisions_\n\nWe have now before us the ground-plan of the scheme, the four\ntheoretical divisions, and the three practical divisions; every\nadditional comment on the classification must be of secondary\nimportance, as it has to refer to the smaller subdivisions, which cannot\nchange the principles of the plan, and which have not seldom, indeed,\nbeen a result of practical considerations. If, for instance, our\nDivision of Cultural Sciences shows in the final plan merely the\ndepartments of Education and of Religion, while the originally planned\nDepartment of Art is left out, there was no logical reason for it, but\nmerely the practical ground that it seemed difficult to bring such a\npractical art section to a desirable scientific level; we confine art,\ntherefore, to the normative \u00e6sthetic and historical points of view. Or,\nto choose another illustration, if it happened that the normative\nsciences were finally organized without a section for the philosophy of\nlaw, this resulted from the fact that the American jurists, in contrast\nwith their Continental European colleagues, showed a general lack of\nappreciation for such a section. A few sections had to be left out even\nfor the chance reason that the leading speakers were obliged to withdraw\nat a time when it was too late to ask substitutes to work up addresses.\nAnd almost everywhere there had to be something arbitrary in the\nlimitation of the special sections. Though Otology and Laryngology were\nbrought together into one section, they might just as well have been\nplaced in two; and Rhinology, which was left out, might have been added\nas a third in that company. As to this subtler ramification, the plan\nhas been changed several times during the period of the practical\npreparation of the plan, and much is the result of adjustment to\nquestions of personalities. No one claims, thus, any special logical\nvalue for the final formulation of the sectional details, for which our\nchief aim was not to go beyond eight times sixteen, that is 128,\nsections, inasmuch as it was planned to have the meetings at eight\ndifferent time-periods in sixteen different halls. If we had fulfilled\nall the wishes which were expressed by specialists, the number would\nhave been quickly doubled.\n\nYet a few remarks may be devoted to the branching off within the seven\ndivisions, as a short discussion of some of these details may throw\nadditional light on the general principles of the whole plan. If we thus\nbegin with the Normative Sciences, we stand at once before one feature\nof the plan which has been in an especially high degree a matter of both\napproval and criticism: the fact that Mathematics is grouped with\nPhilosophy. The Division was to contain, as we have seen, the systems of\nlogically connected will-acts of the over-individual subject. That\nEthics or Logic or \u00c6sthetics or Philosophy of Religion deals with such\nover-individual attitudes cannot be doubted; but have we a right to\nco\u00f6rdinate the mathematical sciences with these philosophical sciences?\nHas Mathematics not a more natural place among the physical sciences\nco\u00f6rdinated with and introductory to Mechanics, Physics, and Astronomy?\nThe mathematicians themselves would often be inclined to accept without\nhesitation this neighborhood of the physical sciences. They would say\nthat the mathematical objects are independent realities whose properties\nwe study like those of nature, whose relations we \"observe,\" whose\nexistence we \"discover,\" and in which we are interested because they\nbelong to the real world. All this is true, and yet the objects of the\nmathematician are objects made by the logical will only, and thus\ndifferent from all phenomena into which sensation enters. The\nmathematician, of course, does not reflect on the purely logical origin\nof the objects which he studies, but the system of knowledge must give\nto the study of the mathematical objects its place in the group where\nthe functions and products of the over-individual attitudes are\nclassified. The mathematical object is a free creation, and a creation\nnot only as to the combination of elements--that would be the case with\nmany laboratory substances of the chemist too--but a creation as to the\nelements themselves, and the value of that creation, its \"mathematical\ninterest,\" is to be judged by ideals of thought; that is, by logical\npurposes. No doubt this logical purpose is its application in the world\nof objects and the mathematical concepts must thus fit the objective\nworld so absolutely that mathematics can be conceived as a description\nof the world after abstracting not only from the will-relations, as\nphysics does, but also from the content. Mathematics would, then, be the\nphenomenalistic science of the form and order of the world. In this way,\nmathematics has indeed a claim to places in both divisions: among the\nphysical sciences if we emphasize its applicability to the world, and\namong the teleological sciences if we emphasize the free creation of the\nobjects by the logical will. But if we really go back to epistemological\nprinciples, our system has to prefer the latter emphasis; that is, we\nmust co\u00f6rdinate mathematics with logic and not with physics.\n\nAs to the subdivision of philosophy, it is most essential for us to\npoint to the negative fact that of course psychology cannot have a place\nin the philosophical department, as part of the Normative Division.\nThere is perhaps no science whose position in the system of knowledge\noffers so many methodological difficulties as psychology. Historical\ntradition of course links it with philosophy; throughout a great part of\nits present endeavors it is, on the other hand, linked with physiology.\nThus we find it sometimes co\u00f6rdinated with logic and ethics, and\nsometimes, especially in the classical positivistic systems, co\u00f6rdinated\nwith the sciences of the organic functions. We have seen why a really\nlogical treatment has to disregard those historical and practical\nrelations and has to separate the psychological sciences from the\nphilosophical and the biological sciences. Yet even this does not\ncomplete the list of problems which must be settled, inasmuch as modern\nthinkers have frequently insisted that psychology itself allows a\ntwofold aspect. We can have a psychology which describes and explains\nthe mental life by analyzing it into its elements and by connecting\nthese elements through causality. But there may be another psychology\nwhich treats inner life in that immediate unity in which we experience\nit and seeks to interpret it as the free function of personality. This\nlatter kind of psychology has been called voluntaristic psychology as\nagainst the phenomenalistic psychology which seeks description and\nexplanation. Such voluntaristic psychology would clearly belong again to\na different division. It would be a theory of individual life as a\nfunction of will, and would thus be introductory to the historical\nsciences and to the normative sciences too. Yet we left out this\nteleological psychology from our programme, as such a science is as yet\na programme only. Wherever an effort is made to realize it, it becomes\nan odd mixture of an inconsistent phenomenalistic psychology on the one\nside, and philosophy of history, logic, ethics, and \u00e6sthetics on the\nother side. The only science which really has a right to call itself\npsychology is the one which seeks to describe and to explain inner life\nand treats it therefore as a system of psychical objects, that is, as\ncontents of consciousness, that is, as phenomena. Psychology belongs,\nthen, in the general division of psychical sciences as over against\nphysical sciences, and both deal with objects as over against philosophy\nand history, which deal with subjects of will.\n\nThe subdivision of the Historical Sciences offers no methodological\ndifficulty as soon as those epistemological arguments are acknowledged\nby which we sharply distinguish history from the Physical and Mental\nSciences. If history is a system of will-relations which is in\nteleological connection with the will-demands that surround us, then\npolitical history loses its predominant r\u00f4le, and the history of law and\nof literature, of language and of economy, of art and religion, become\nco\u00f6rdinated with political development, while the mere anthropological\naspect of man is relegated to the physical sciences. The more complete\noriginal scheme was here again finally condensed for practical reasons;\nfor instance, the planned departments on the History of Education, on\nthe History of Science, and on the History of Philosophy were\nsacrificed, and the department of Economic History was joined to that of\nPolitical History. In the same way we felt obliged to omit in the end\nmany important sections in the departments; we had, for instance, in the\nHistory of Language at first a section on Slavic Languages; yet the\nnumber of scholars interested was too small to justify its existence\nbeside a section on Slavic Literature. Also the History of Music was\nomitted from the History of Art; and the History of Law was planned at\nfirst with a fuller ramification.\n\nThe division of Physical Sciences naturally suggested that kind of\nsubdivision which the positivistic classification presents as a complete\nsystem of sciences. Considering physics and chemistry as the two\nfundamental sciences of general laws, we turn first to astronomy, then\nfrom the science of the whole universe to the one planet, to the\nsciences of the earth; thence to the living organisms on the earth; and\nfrom biology to the still narrower circle of anthropology. The special\nclassification of physics offers a certain difficulty. To divide it in\ntext-book fashion into sound, light, electricity, etc., seems hardly in\nharmony with the effort to seek logical principles in the other parts of\nthe classification. The three groups which we finally formed, Physics of\nMatter, Physics of Ether, and Physics of Electron, may appear somewhat\ntoo much influenced by the latest theories of to-day, yet it seemed\npreferable to other principles. In the biological department, criticism\nseems justified in view of the fact that we constructed a special\nsection, Human Anatomy. A strictly logical scheme might have\nacknowledged that human anatomy is to-day not a separate science, and\nthat it has resolved itself into comparative anatomy. Sections of\nInvertebrate and Vertebrate Anatomy might have been more satisfactory.\nThe final arrangement was a concession to the practical interests of the\nphysicians, who have naturally to emphasize the anatomy of the human\norganism.\n\nIn the division of Mental Sciences, we have the Department of Sociology.\nWe were, of course, aware that the sociological interest includes not\nonly the psychological, but also the physiological life of society, and\nthat it thus has relations to the physical sciences too. Yet these\nrelations are logically not more fundamental than those of the\nindividual mental life to the functions of the individual organism. Much\nof the physiological side was further to be handed over to the\nDepartment of Anthropology, and thus we felt justified in grouping\nsociology with psychology under the Mental Sciences, as the psychology\nof the social organism. Here, too, a larger number of sections was\nintended and only the two most essential ones, Social Structure and\nSocial Psychology, were finally admitted.\n\nThe ramifications of the practical sciences had to follow the general\nprinciple that their character is determined by purpose and not by\nmaterial. The difficulty was here merely in the extreme specialization\nof the practical disciplines, which suggests on the whole the forming of\nvery small units, while our plan was to provide for fifty practical\nsections only. It seemed, therefore, incongruous to have the whole of\nInternal Medicine or the whole of Private Law condensed into one\nsection. Yet as the purpose of the scheme was a theoretical and not a\npractical one, even where the theory of practical sciences was in\nquestion, we felt justified in constructing co\u00f6rdinated sections, even\nwhere the practical importance was very unequal. On the other hand, some\nglaring defects just here are due merely to chance circumstances. That\nthere were, for instance, no sections on Criminal Law or Ecclesiastical\nLaw in the Department of Jurisprudence, nor on Legal Procedure, resulted\nfrom the unfortunate accident that in these cases the speakers who were\nto come from Europe were withheld by illness or public duties. The\nabsence of the Department of Art in the Division of Social Culture, and\nthus of the Sections on the theory and practice of the different arts,\nhas been explained before. It is evident that also in the Economical\nDepartment the practical development has interfered with the original\nsymmetrical arrangement of the sections. This is not true of the\nReligious Department, whose six sections express the tendencies of the\noriginal plan. The frequently expressed criticism that the different\nreligions and their denominations ought to have found place there shows\na misconception of our purpose; a Parliament of Religion did not belong\nto this plan.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\nTHE RESULTS OF THE CONGRESS\n\n\nThe programme of the Congress, as outlined in the previous pages, was in\nthis case somewhat more than a mere programme. It not only invited to do\na piece of work, but it sought to contribute to the work itself. Yet the\nchief work had to be done by others, and their part needed careful\npreparation. Yet very little of the preparation showed itself to the\neyes of the larger public, and few were fully aware what a complex\norganization was growing up and how many persons of mark were\nco\u00f6perating.\n\nIt was essential to find for every address the best man. Specialists\nonly could suggest to the committees where to find him. It has been told\nbefore how our invitations were brought to the foreigners first till the\ndesired number of foreign participants was secured, and how the\nAmericans followed. As could not be otherwise expected, interferences of\nall kinds disturbed the ideal configuration of the first list of\nacceptances; substitutes had sometimes to be relied on; and yet, when on\nthe nineteenth of September President Francis welcomed the Congress of\nArts and Science in the gigantic Festival Hall of the St. Louis\nExposition, the Committee knew that almost four hundred speakers had\ncompleted their manuscripts, and that it was a galaxy which far\nsurpassed in importance that of any previous international congress. And\nthe list of those who stood for the success of the work was not confined\nto the official speakers. Each Department and each Section had its own\nhonorary President, who was also chosen by the consent of leading\nspecialists and whose introductory remarks were to give additional\nimportance to the gathering. At their side stood the hundred and thirty\nSecretaries, carefully chosen from among the productive scholars of the\nyounger generation. And a large number of informal, yet officially\ninvited contributors, had announced valuable discussions and addresses\nfor almost every Section. Invitations to membership finally had been\nsent to the universities and scholarly societies of all countries.\n\nThat the turmoil of a world's fair is out of harmony with the scholar's\nlonging for repose and quietude is a natural presupposition, which has\nnot been disproved by the experience of St. Louis. When Professor\nNewcomb, our President, spoke to the opening assembly on the dignity of\nscholarship, the scholar's peaceful address was accentuated by the\nthunder of the cannons with which Boer and British forces were playing\nat war near by. The roaring of the Pike overpowered many a quiet\nsession, and the patient speaker had not seldom to fight heroically with\na brass band on the next lawn. The trains were delayed, trunks were\nmixed up, and the sultry St. Louis weather stirred much secret longing\nfor the seashore and the mountains, which most had to leave too early\nfor that pilgrimage to the Mississippi Valley. Yet all this could have\nbeen easily foreseen, and every one knew that all this would soon be\nforgotten. These slight discomforts were many times made up for by the\noverwhelming beauty of that ivory city in which the civilization of the\nworld was focused by the united energy of the nations, and it seemed\nwell worth while to cross the ocean for the delight of that enchantment\nwhich came with every evening's myriad illumination. And every day\nbrought interesting festivities. No one will forget the receptions of\nthe foreign commissioners, or the charming hospitality of the leading\ncitizens of St. Louis, or the enthusiastic banquet which brought one\nthousand speakers and presidents and official members of the Congress\ntogether as guests of the master mind of the Exposition, President\nFrancis.\n\nWhile the discomfort of external shortcomings was thus easily balanced,\nit is more doubtful whether the internal shortcomings of the work can be\nconsidered as fully compensated for. It would be impossible to overlook\nthese defects in the realization of our plans, even if it may be\nacknowledged that they were unavoidable under the given conditions. The\nprincipal difficulty has been that many speakers have not really treated\nthe topic for the discussion of which they were invited. This deviation\nfrom the plan took various forms. There was in some cases a fundamental\nattitude taken which did not harmonize with those logical principles\nwhich had led to the classification; for instance, we had sharply\nseparated, for reasons fully stated above, the Division of History from\nthe Division of Mental Sciences, including sociology; yet some papers\nfor the Division of History clearly indicated sympathy with the\ntraditional positivistic view, according to which history becomes simply\na part of sociology. And similar variations of the general plan occur in\nalmost every division. But there cannot be any objection to this\nsecondary variety as long as the whole framework gives the primary\nuniformity. Certainly no one of the contributors is to be blamed for it;\nno one was pledged to the philosophy of the general plan, and probably\nfew would have agreed if any one had had the idea of demanding from\nevery contributor an identical background of general convictions. Such\nmonotony would have been even harmful, as the work would have become\ninexpressive of the richness of tendencies in the scholarly life of our\ntime. This was not an occasion where educated clerks were to work up in\na secondhand way a report whose general trend was determined beforehand;\nthe work demanded original thinkers, with whom every word grows out of a\nrich individual view of the totality. If every paper had been meant\nmerely as a detailed amplification of the logical principles on which\nthe whole plan was based, it would have been wiser to set young Doctor\ncandidates to work, who might have elaborated the hint of the general\nscheme. To invite the leaders of knowledge meant to give them complete\nfreedom and to confine the demands of the plan to a most general\ndirection.\n\nThe same freedom, which every one was to have as to the general\nstandpoint, was intended also for all with regard to the arrangement and\nlimitation of the topic. All the sectional addresses were supposed to\ndeal either with relations or with fundamental problems of to-day. It\nwould have been absurd to demand that in every case the totality of\nrelations or of problems should be covered or even touched. The result\nwould have become perfunctory and insignificant. No one intended to\nproduce a cyclopedia. It was essential everywhere to select that which\nwas most characteristic of the tendencies of the age and most promising\nfor the science of the twentieth century. Those problems were to be\nemphasized whose solution is most demanded for the immediate progress of\nknowledge, and those relations had to be selected through which new\nconnections, new synthetic thoughts prepare themselves to-day. That this\nselection had to be left to the speaker was a matter of course.\n\nYet it may be said that in all these directions, with reference to the\ngeneral standpoint and with reference to problems and relations, the\nOrganizing Committee had somewhat prepared the choice through the\nselection of the speakers themselves. As the standpoints of the leading\nspeakers were well known, it was not difficult to invite as far as\npossible for every place a scholar whose general views would be least\nout of harmony with the principles of the plan. For instance, when we\nhad the task before us of selecting the divisional speakers for the\nNormative and for the Mental Sciences, it was only natural to invite for\nthe first a philosopher of idealistic type and for the latter a\nphilosopher of positivistic stamp, inasmuch as the whole scheme gave to\nthe mental sciences the same place which they would have had in a\npositivistic scheme, while the normative sciences would have lost the\nmeaning which they had in our plan if a positivist had simply\npsychologized them. In the same way we gave preference as far as\npossible, for the addresses on relations, to those scholars whose\nprevious work was concerned with new synthetic movements, and as\nspeakers on problems those were invited who were in any case engaged in\nthe solution of those problems which seemed central in the present state\nof science. Thus it was that on the whole the expectation was justified\nthat the most characteristic relations and the most characteristic\nproblems would be selected if every invited speaker spoke essentially on\nthose relations and on those problems with which his own special work\nwas engaged.\n\nYet there is no doubt that this expectation was sometimes fulfilled\nbeyond our anticipation, in an amount of specialization which was no\nlonger entirely in harmony with the general character of the\nundertaking. The general problem has become sometimes only the\nstarting-point or almost the pretext for speaking on some relation or\nproblem so detailed that it can hardly stand as a representative symbol\nof the whole movement in that sectional field. Especially in the\npractical sciences more room was sometimes taken for particular hobbies\nand chance aspects than in the eyes of the originators the occasion may\nhave called for. Yet on the whole this was the exception. The\noverwhelming majority of the addresses fulfilled nobly the high hopes of\nthe Boards, and even in those exceptional cases where the speaker went\nhis own way, it was usually such an original and stimulating expression\nof a strong personality that no one would care to miss this tone in the\nsymphony of science.\n\nEven now of course, though the Congress days have passed, and only\ntypewritten manuscripts are left from all those September meetings, it\nwould be easy to provide, by editorial efforts, for a greater uniformity\nand a smoother harmonization. Most of the authors would have been quite\nwilling to retouch their addresses in the interest of greater objective\nuniformity and to accept the hint of an editorial committee in\nelaborating more fully some points and in condensing or eliminating\nothers. Much was written in the desire to bring a certain thought for\ndiscussion before such an eminent audience, while the speaker would be\nready to substitute other features of the subject for the permanent form\nof the printed volume. Yet such editorial supervision and transformation\nwould be not only immodest but dangerous. We might risk gaining some\nexternal uniformity, but only to lose much of the freshness and\nimmediacy and brilliancy of the first presentation. And who would dare\nto play the critical judge when the international contributors are the\nleaders of thought? There was therefore not the slightest effort made to\nsuggest revision of the manuscripts, for which the whole responsibility\nmust thus fall to the particular author. The reduction to a uniform\nlanguage seemed, on the other hand, most natural, and those who had\ndelivered their addresses in French, German, or Italian themselves\nwelcomed the idea that their papers should be translated into English by\ncompetent specialists. The short bibliographies, selected mostly through\nthe chairman of the departments, and the very full index with references\nmay add to the general usefulness of the eight volumes in which the work\nis to be presented.\n\nBut the significance of the Congress of Arts and Science ought not to be\nmeasured and valued only by reference to this printed result. Its less\nvisible side-effects seem in no way less important for scholarship, and\nthey are fourfold. There was, first, the personal contact between the\nscholarly public and the leaders of thought; there was, secondly, the\nfirst academic alliance between the United States and Europe; there was,\nthirdly, the first demonstration of a world congress crystallized about\none problem; there was, fourthly, the unique accentuation of the thought\nof unity in all human science; and each of these four movements will be\ncontinued and reinforced by the publication of these proceedings.\n\nThe first of these four features, the contact of the scholarly public\nwith the best thinkers of our time, had, to be sure, its limitations. It\nwas not sought to create a really popular congress. Neither the level of\nthe addresses, nor the size of the halls, nor the number of invitations\nsent out, nor the general conditions of a world's fair at which the\nexpense of living is high and the distractions thousandfold, favored the\nattendance of crowds. It was planned from the first that on the whole\nscholars and specialists should attend and that the army should be made\nup essentially of officers. If in an astronomical section perhaps thirty\nmen were present, among whom practically every one was among the best\nknown directors of observatories or professors of mathematics,\nastronomy, or physics, from all countries of the globe, much more was\ngained than if three thousand had been in the audience, brought together\nby an interest of curiosity in moon and stars. For the most part there\nmust have been between a hundred and two hundred in each of the 128\nsectional meetings, and that was more than the organizers expected. This\ndirect influence on the interested public is now to be expanded a\nthousandfold by the mission work of these volumes. The concentration of\nthese hundreds of addresses into a few days made it in any case\nimpossible to listen to more than to a small fraction; these volumes\nwill bring at last all speakers to co\u00f6rdinated effectiveness; and while\none hall suffered from bad acoustics, another from bad ventilation, and\na third from the passing of the intermural trains, here at least is an\naudience in which nothing will disturb the sensitive nerves of the\nwilling follower.\n\nBut much more emphasis is due to the second feature. The Congress was an\nepoch-making event for the international world of scholarship from the\nfact that it was the first great undertaking in which the Old and the\nNew Worlds stood on equal levels and in which Europe really became\nacquainted with the scientific life of these United States. The contact\nof scholarship between America and Europe has, indeed, grown in\nimportance through many decades. Many American students had studied in\nEuropean and especially in German universities and had come back to fill\nthe professorial chairs of the leading academic institutions. The spirit\nof the Graduate School and the work towards the Doctor's degree, yes,\nthe whole productive scholarship of recent decades had been influenced\nby European ideals, and the results were no longer ignored at the seats\nof learning throughout the whole world. European scholars had here and\nthere come as visiting lecturers or as assimilated instructors, and a\nfew American scholars belonged to the leading European Academies. Yet,\nwhoever knew the real development of American post-graduate university\nlife, the rapid advance of genuine American scholarship, the\nincomparable progress of the scientific institutions of the New World,\nof their libraries and laboratories, museums and associations, was well\naware that Europe had hardly noticed and certainly not fully understood\nthe gigantic strides of the country which seemed a rival only on\ncommercial and industrial ground. Europe was satisfied with the\ntraditional ideas of America's scientific standing which reflected the\nsituation of thirty years ago, and did not understand that the changes\nof a few lustres mean in the New World more than under the firmer\ntraditions of Europe. American scientific literature was still\nneglected; American universities treated in a condescending and\npatronizing spirit and with hardly any awareness of the fundamental\ndifferences in the institutions of the two sides. Those European\nscholars who crossed the ocean did it with missionary, or perhaps with\nless unselfish, intentions, and the Americans who attended European\ncongresses were mostly treated with the friendliness which the\nself-satisfied teacher shows to a promising pupil. The time had really\ncome when the contrast between the real situation and the traditional\nconstruction became a danger for the scientific life of the time. Both\nsides had to suffer from it. The Americans felt that their serious and\nimportant achievements did not come to their fullest effectiveness\nthrough the insistent neglect of those who by the tradition of centuries\nhad become the habitual guardians of scientific thought. A kind of\nfeeling of dependency as it usually develops in weak colonies too often\ndepressed the conscientious scholarship on American soil as the result\nof this undue condescension. Yet the greater harm was to the other side.\nOnce before Europe had had the experience of surprise when American\nsuccesses presented themselves where nothing of that kind was\nanticipated in the Old World. It was in the field of economic life that\nEurope looked down patronizingly on America's industrial efforts, and\nyet before she was fully aware how the change resulted, suddenly the\nwarning signal of the \"American danger\" was heard everywhere. The\nsurprise in the intellectual field will not be less. The unpreparedness\nwas certainly the same. Of course, there cannot be any danger of rivalry\nin the scientific field, inasmuch as science knows no competition but\nonly co\u00f6peration. And yet it cannot be without danger for European\nscience if it willfully neglects and recklessly ignores this eager\nworking of the modern America. For both sides a change in the situation\nwas thus not only desirable, but necessary; and to prepare this change,\nto substitute knowledge for ignorance, nothing could have been more\neffective than this Congress of Arts and Science.\n\nEven if we abstract from the not inconsiderable number of those European\nscholars who followed naturally in the path of the invited guests, and\nif we consider merely the function of these invited participants, the\nimportance of the procedure is evident. More than a hundred leading\nscholars from all European countries came under conditions where\nacademic fellowship on an equal footing was a necessary part of the\nwork. There was not the slightest premium held out which might have\nattracted them had not real inter-academic interest brought them over\nthe ocean, and no missionary spirit was appealed to, as everything was\nequally divided between American and foreign contributors. It was a real\nfeast of international scholarship, in which the importance and the\nnumber of foreigners stamped it as the first significant alliance of the\nspirit of learning in the New and the Old Worlds. And it was essentially\nfor this purpose that the week of personal intermingling in St. Louis\nitself was preceded and followed by happy weeks of visits to leading\nuniversities. Almost every one of those one hundred European scholars\nvisited Harvard and Yale, Chicago and Johns Hopkins, Columbia and\nPennsylvania, saw the treasures of Washington and examined the\nexhibitions of American scholarship in the World's Fair itself. The\nchange of opinion, the disappearance of prejudice, the growth of\nconfidence, the personal intercollegiate ties which resulted from all\nthat, have been evident since those days all over Europe. And it is not\nsurprising that it is just the most famous and most important of the\nvisitors, famous and important through their width and depth of view,\nwhose expression of appreciation and admiration for the new achievements\nhas been loudest.\n\nWe insisted that the effectiveness of the Congress showed itself in two\nother directions still: on the one side, there was at last a congress\nwith a unified programme, a congress which stood for a definite thought,\nand which brought all its efforts to bear on the solution of one\nproblem. There seemed a far-reaching agreement of opinion that this new\nprinciple of congress administration had successfully withstood the test\nof practical realization. Mere conglomerations of unconnected meetings\nwith casual programmes and unrelated papers cannot claim any longer to\nrepresent the only possible form of international gatherings of\nscholars. More than that, their superfluous and disheartening character\nwill be felt in future more strongly than before. No congress will\nappear fully justified whose printed proceedings do not show a real plan\nin its programme. And the consciousness of this mission of the Congress\nwill certainly be again reinforced by the publication of these volumes,\ninasmuch as it is evident that they represent a substantial contribution\nto the knowledge of our time which would not have been made without the\nspecial stimulating occasion of the Congress.\n\nAnd, finally, whether such a congress is held again or not, the impulse\nof this one cannot be lost on account of the special end to which all\nits efforts have been directed: the unity of scientific knowledge. We\nhad emphasized from the first that here was the centre of our purposes\nin a time whose scientific specialization necessarily involves a\nscattering of scholarly work and which yet in its deepest meaning\nstrives for a new synthesis, for a new unity, which is to give to all\nthis scattered labor a real dignity and significance; truly nothing was\nmore needed than an intense accentuation of the internal harmony of all\nhuman knowledge. But for that it is not enough that the masses feel\ninstinctively the deep need of such unifying movements, nor is it enough\nthat the philosophers point with logical arguments towards the new\nsynthesis. The philosopher can only stand by and point the way; the\nspecialists themselves must go the way. And here at last they have done\nso. Leaders of thought have interrupted their specialistic work and have\nleft their detailed inquiries to seek the fundamental conceptions and\nmethods and principles which bind all knowledge together, and thus to\nwork towards that unity from which all special work derives its meaning.\nWhether or not their co\u00f6peration has produced anything which is final is\na question almost insignificant compared with the fundamental fact that\nthey co\u00f6perated at all for this ideal synthetic purpose. This fact can\nnever lose its influence on the scholarly effort of our age, and will\ncertainly find its strongest reinforcement in this unified publication.\nIt has fulfilled its noblest purpose if it adds strength to the deepest\nmovement of our time, the movement towards unity of meaning in the\nscattered manifoldness of scientific endeavor with which the twentieth\ncentury has opened.\n\n\n\n\n[Illustration: _Simon Newcomb, Ph.D., LL.D._\n\nDr. Newcomb, the famous Astronomer, is conceded to be the Dean of\nAmerican scientists. His eminent services to the Government of the\nUnited States, and his recognized position in foreign and domestic\nscientific circles, made him peculiarly fitted to deliver the\nintroductory address, and to officiate as President of an International\nCongress of the leading scientists of the world.\n\nHe has been the recipient of honorary degrees from six American and ten\nEuropean Universities, and he is a member of almost every important\nAcademy of Science in Europe and America. He is an officer of the Legion\nof Honour, and is the only native American besides Benjamin Franklin who\nhas been elected an Associate of the Institute de France. From 1861 to\n1897 he was Professor of Mathematics in the United States Navy. He also\nlectured on Mathematics and Astronomy at Johns Hopkins, and is now a\nProfessor Emeritus in the Faculty of Arts of that university. Dr.\nNewcomb is the author of numerous works on Astronomy and other\nscientific subjects.]\n\n\n\n\nPROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS\n\n\nINTRODUCTORY ADDRESS\n\n\nDELIVERED AT THE OPENING EXERCISES AT FESTIVAL HALL BY PROFESSOR SIMON\nNEWCOMB, PRESIDENT OF THE CONGRESS\n\n\nTHE EVOLUTION OF THE SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATOR\n\n\nAs we look at the assemblage gathered in this hall, comprising so many\nnames of widest renown in every branch of learning,--we might almost say\nin every field of human endeavor,--the first inquiry suggested must be\nafter the object of our meeting. The answer is, that our purpose\ncorresponds to the eminence of the assemblage. We aim at nothing less\nthan a survey of the realm of knowledge, as comprehensive as is\npermitted by the limitations of time and space. The organizers of our\nCongress have honored me with the charge of presenting such preliminary\nview of its field as may make clear the spirit of our undertaking.\n\nCertain tendencies characteristic of the science of our day clearly\nsuggest the direction of our thoughts most appropriate to the occasion.\nAmong the strongest of these is one toward laying greater stress on\nquestions of the beginning of things, and regarding a knowledge of the\nlaws of development of any object of study as necessary to the\nunderstanding of its present form. It may be conceded that the principle\nhere involved is as applicable in the broad field before us as in a\nspecial research into the properties of the minutest organism. It\ntherefore seems meet that we should begin by inquiring what agency has\nbrought about the remarkable development of science to which the world\nof to-day bears witness. This view is recognized in the plan of our\nproceedings, by providing for each great department of knowledge a\nreview of its progress during the century that has elapsed since the\ngreat event commemorated by the scenes outside this hall. But such\nreviews do not make up that general survey of science at large which is\nnecessary to the development of our theme, and which must include the\naction of causes that had their origin long before our time. The\nmovement which culminated in making the nineteenth century ever\nmemorable in history is the outcome of a long series of causes, acting\nthrough many centuries, which are worthy of especial attention on such\nan occasion as this. In setting them forth we should avoid laying stress\non those visible manifestations which, striking the eye of every\nbeholder, are in no danger of being overlooked, and search rather for\nthose agencies whose activities underlie the whole visible scene, but\nwhich are liable to be blotted out of sight by the very brilliancy of\nthe results to which they have given rise. It is easy to draw attention\nto the wonderful qualities of the oak; but from that very fact, it may\nbe needful to point out that the real wonder lies concealed in the acorn\nfrom which it grew.\n\nOur inquiry into the logical order of the causes which have made our\ncivilization what it is to-day will be facilitated by bringing to mind\ncertain elementary considerations--ideas so familiar that setting them\nforth may seem like citing a body of truisms--and yet so frequently\noverlooked, not only individually, but in their relation to each other,\nthat the conclusion to which they lead may be lost to sight. One of\nthese propositions is that psychical rather than material causes are\nthose which we should regard as fundamental in directing the development\nof the social organism. The human intellect is the really active agent\nin every branch of endeavor,--the _primum mobile_ of civilization,--and\nall those material manifestations to which our attention is so often\ndirected are to be regarded as secondary to this first agency. If it be\ntrue that \"in the world is nothing great but man; in man is nothing\ngreat but mind,\" then should the keynote of our discourse be the\nrecognition of this first and greatest of powers.\n\nAnother well-known fact is that those applications of the forces of\nnature to the promotion of human welfare which have made our age what it\nis, are of such comparatively recent origin that we need go back only a\nsingle century to antedate their most important features, and scarcely\nmore than four centuries to find their beginning. It follows that the\nsubject of our inquiry should be the commencement, not many centuries\nago, of a certain new form of intellectual activity.\n\nHaving gained this point of view, our next inquiry will be into the\nnature of that activity, and its relation to the stages of progress\nwhich preceded and followed its beginning. The superficial observer, who\nsees the oak but forgets the acorn, might tell us that the special\nqualities which have brought out such great results are expert\nscientific knowledge and rare ingenuity, directed to the application of\nthe powers of steam and electricity. From this point of view the great\ninventors and the great captains of industry were the first agents in\nbringing about the modern era. But the more careful inquirer will see\nthat the work of these men was possible only through a knowledge of the\nlaws of nature, which had been gained by men whose work took precedence\nof theirs in logical order, and that success in invention has been\nmeasured by completeness in such knowledge. While giving all due honor\nto the great inventors, let us remember that the first place is that of\nthe great investigators, whose forceful intellects opened the way to\nsecrets previously hidden from men. Let it be an honor and not a\nreproach to these men, that they were not actuated by the love of gain,\nand did not keep utilitarian ends in view in the pursuit of their\nresearches. If it seems that in neglecting such ends they were leaving\nundone the most important part of their work, let us remember that\nnature turns a forbidding face to those who pay her court with the hope\nof gain, and is responsive only to those suitors whose love for her is\npure and undefiled. Not only is the special genius required in the\ninvestigator not that generally best adapted to applying the discoveries\nwhich he makes, but the result of his having sordid ends in view would\nbe to narrow the field of his efforts, and exercise a depressing effect\nupon his activities. The true man of science has no such expression in\nhis vocabulary as \"useful knowledge.\" His domain is as wide as nature\nitself, and he best fulfills his mission when he leaves to others the\ntask of applying the knowledge he gives to the world.\n\nWe have here the explanation of the well-known fact that the functions\nof the investigator of the laws of nature, and of the inventor who\napplies these laws to utilitarian purposes, are rarely united in the\nsame person. If the one conspicuous exception which the past century\npresents to this rule is not unique, we should probably have to go back\nto Watt to find another.\n\nFrom this viewpoint it is clear that the primary agent in the movement\nwhich has elevated man to the masterful position he now occupies, is the\nscientific investigator. He it is whose work has deprived plague and\npestilence of their terrors, alleviated human suffering, girdled the\nearth with the electric wire, bound the continent with the iron way, and\nmade neighbors of the most distant nations. As the first agent which has\nmade possible this meeting of his representatives, let his evolution be\nthis day our worthy theme. As we follow the evolution of an organism by\nstudying the stages of its growth, so we have to show how the work of\nthe scientific investigator is related to the ineffectual efforts of his\npredecessors.\n\nIn our time we think of the process of development in nature as one\ngoing continuously forward through the combination of the opposite\nprocesses of evolution and dissolution. The tendency of our thought has\nbeen in the direction of banishing cataclysms to the theological limbo,\nand viewing nature as a sleepless plodder, endowed with infinite\npatience, waiting through long ages for results. I do not contest the\ntruth of the principle of continuity on which this view is based. But it\nfails to make known to us the whole truth. The building of a ship from\nthe time that her keel is laid until she is making her way across the\nocean is a slow and gradual process; yet there is a cataclysmic epoch\nopening up a new era in her history. It is the moment when, after lying\nfor months or years a dead, inert, immovable mass, she is suddenly\nendowed with the power of motion, and, as if imbued with life, glides\ninto the stream, eager to begin the career for which she was designed.\n\nI think it is thus in the development of humanity. Long ages may pass\nduring which a race, to all external observation, appears to be making\nno real progress. Additions may be made to learning, and the records of\nhistory may constantly grow, but there is nothing in its sphere of\nthought, or in the features of its life, that can be called essentially\nnew. Yet, nature may have been all along slowly working in a way which\nevades our scrutiny until the result of her operations suddenly appears\nin a new and revolutionary movement, carrying the race to a higher plane\nof civilization.\n\nIt is not difficult to point out such epochs in human progress. The\ngreatest of all, because it was the first, is one of which we find no\nrecord either in written or geological history. It was the epoch when\nour progenitors first took conscious thought of the morrow, first used\nthe crude weapons which nature had placed within their reach to kill\ntheir prey, first built a fire to warm their bodies and cook their food.\nI love to fancy that there was some one first man, the Adam of\nevolution, who did all this, and who used the power thus acquired to\nshow his fellows how they might profit by his example. When the members\nof the tribe or community which he gathered around him began to conceive\nof life as a whole,--to include yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow in the\nsame mental grasp--to think how they might apply the gifts of nature to\ntheir own uses,--a movement was begun which should ultimately lead to\ncivilization.\n\nLong indeed must have been the ages required for the development of this\nrudest primitive community into the civilization revealed to us by the\nmost ancient tablets of Egypt and Assyria. After spoken language was\ndeveloped, and after the rude representation of ideas by visible marks\ndrawn to resemble them had long been practiced, some Cadmus must have\ninvented an alphabet. When the use of written language was thus\nintroduced, the word of command ceased to be confined to the range of\nthe human voice, and it became possible for master minds to extend their\ninfluence as far as a written message could be carried. Then were\ncommunities gathered into provinces; provinces into kingdoms; kingdoms\ninto the great empires of antiquity. Then arose a stage of civilization\nwhich we find pictured in the most ancient records,--a stage in which\nmen were governed by laws that were perhaps as wisely adapted to their\nconditions as our laws are to ours,--in which the phenomena of nature\nwere rudely observed, and striking occurrences in the earth or in the\nheavens recorded in the annals of the nation.\n\nVast was the progress of knowledge during the interval between these\nempires and the century in which modern science began. Yet, if I am\nright in making a distinction between the slow and regular steps of\nprogress, each growing naturally out of that which preceded it, and the\nentrance of the mind at some fairly definite epoch into an entirely new\nsphere of activity, it would appear that there was only one such epoch\nduring the entire interval. This was when abstract geometrical reasoning\ncommenced, and astronomical observations aiming at precision were\nrecorded, compared, and discussed. Closely associated with it must have\nbeen the construction of the forms of logic. The radical difference\nbetween the demonstration of a theorem of geometry and the reasoning of\nevery-day life which the masses of men must have practiced from the\nbeginning, and which few even to-day ever get beyond, is so evident at a\nglance that I need not dwell upon it. The principal feature of this\nadvance is that, by one of those antinomies of the human intellect of\nwhich examples are not wanting even in our own time, the development of\nabstract ideas preceded the concrete knowledge of natural phenomena.\nWhen we reflect that in the geometry of Euclid the science of space was\nbrought to such logical perfection that even to-day its teachers are not\nagreed as to the practicability of any great improvement upon it, we\ncannot avoid the feeling that a very slight change in the direction of\nthe intellectual activity of the Greeks would have led to the beginning\nof natural science. But it would seem that the very purity and\nperfection which was aimed at in their system of geometry stood in the\nway of any extension or application of its methods and spirit to the\nfield of nature. One example of this is worthy of attention. In modern\nteaching the idea of magnitude as generated by motion is freely\nintroduced. A line is described by a moving point; a plane by a moving\nline; a solid by a moving plane. It may, at first sight, seem singular\nthat this conception finds no place in the Euclidian system. But we may\nregard the omission as a mark of logical purity and rigor. Had the real\nor supposed advantages of introducing motion into geometrical\nconceptions been suggested to Euclid, we may suppose him to have replied\nthat the theorems of space are independent of time; that the idea of\nmotion necessarily implies time, and that, in consequence, to avail\nourselves of it would be to introduce an extraneous element into\ngeometry.\n\nIt is quite possible that the contempt of the ancient philosophers for\nthe practical application of their science, which has continued in some\nform to our own time, and which is not altogether unwholesome, was a\npowerful factor in the same direction. The result was that, in keeping\ngeometry pure from ideas which did not belong to it, it failed to form\nwhat might otherwise have been the basis of physical science. Its\nfounders missed the discovery that methods similar to those of geometric\ndemonstration could be extended into other and wider fields than that of\nspace. Thus not only the development of applied geometry, but the\nreduction of other conceptions to a rigorous mathematical form was\nindefinitely postponed.\n\nAstronomy is necessarily a science of observation pure and simple, in\nwhich experiment can have no place except as an auxiliary. The vague\naccounts of striking celestial phenomena handed down by the priests and\nastrologers of antiquity were followed in the time of the Greeks by\nobservations having, in form at least, a rude approach to precision,\nthough nothing like the degree of precision that the astronomer of\nto-day would reach with the naked eye, aided by such instruments as he\ncould fashion from the tools at the command of the ancients.\n\nThe rude observations commenced by the Babylonians were continued with\ngradually improving instruments,--first by the Greeks and afterward by\nthe Arabs,--but the results failed to afford any insight into the true\nrelation of the earth to the heavens. What was most remarkable in this\nfailure is that, to take a first step forward which would have led on to\nsuccess, no more was necessary than a course of abstract thinking vastly\neasier than that required for working out the problems of geometry. That\nspace is infinite is an unexpressed axiom, tacitly assumed by Euclid and\nhis successors. Combining this with the most elementary consideration of\nthe properties of the triangle, it would be seen that a body of any\ngiven size could be placed at such a distance in space as to appear to\nus like a point. Hence a body as large as our earth, which was known to\nbe a globe from the time that the ancient Phoenicians navigated the\nMediterranean, if placed in the heavens at a sufficient distance, would\nlook like a star. The obvious conclusion that the stars might be bodies\nlike our globe, shining either by their own light or by that of the sun,\nwould have been a first step to the understanding of the true system of\nthe world.\n\nThere is historic evidence that this deduction did not wholly escape the\nGreek thinkers. It is true that the critical student will assign little\nweight to the current belief that the vague theory of Pythagoras--that\nfire was at the centre of all things--implies a conception of the\nheliocentric theory of the solar system. But the testimony of\nArchimedes, confused though it is in form, leaves no serious doubt that\nAristarchus of Samos not only propounded the view that the earth\nrevolves both on its own axis and around the sun, but that he correctly\nremoved the great stumbling-block in the way of this theory by adding\nthat the distance of the fixed stars was infinitely greater than the\ndimensions of the earth's orbit. Even the world of philosophy was not\nyet ready for this conception, and, so far from seeing the\nreasonableness of the explanation, we find Ptolemy arguing against the\nrotation of the earth on grounds which careful observations of the\nphenomena around him would have shown to be ill-founded.\n\nPhysical science, if we can apply that term to an unco\u00f6rdinated body of\nfacts, was successfully cultivated from the earliest times. Something\nmust have been known of the properties of metals, and the art of\nextracting them from their ores must have been practiced, from the time\nthat coins and medals were first stamped. The properties of the most\ncommon compounds were discovered by alchemists in their vain search for\nthe philosopher's stone, but no actual progress worthy of the name\nrewarded the practitioners of the black art.\n\nPerhaps the first approach to a correct method was that of Archimedes,\nwho by much thinking worked out the law of the lever, reached the\nconception of the centre of gravity, and demonstrated the first\nprinciples of hydrostatics. It is remarkable that he did not extend his\nresearches into the phenomena of motion, whether spontaneous or produced\nby force. The stationary condition of the human intellect is most\nstrikingly illustrated by the fact that not until the time of Leonardo\nwas any substantial advance made on his discovery. To sum up in one\nsentence the most characteristic feature of ancient and medieval\nscience, we see a notable contrast between the precision of thought\nimplied in the construction and demonstration of geometrical theorems\nand the vague indefinite character of the ideas of natural phenomena\ngenerally, a contrast which did not disappear until the foundations of\nmodern science began to be laid.\n\nWe should miss the most essential point of the difference between\nmedieval and modern learning if we looked upon it as mainly a difference\neither in the precision or the amount of knowledge. The development of\nboth of these qualities would, under any circumstances, have been slow\nand gradual, but sure. We can hardly suppose that any one generation, or\neven any one century, would have seen the complete substitution of exact\nfor inexact ideas. Slowness of growth is as inevitable in the case of\nknowledge as in that of a growing organism. The most essential point of\ndifference is one of those seemingly slight ones, the importance of\nwhich we are too apt to overlook. It was like the drop of blood in the\nwrong place, which some one has told us makes all the difference between\na philosopher and a maniac. It was all the difference between a living\ntree and a dead one, between an inert mass and a growing organism. The\ntransition of knowledge from the dead to the living form must, in any\ncomplete review of the subject, be looked upon as the really great event\nof modern times. Before this event the intellect was bound down by a\nscholasticism which regarded knowledge as a rounded whole, the parts of\nwhich were written in books and carried in the minds of learned men. The\nstudent was taught from the beginning of his work to look upon authority\nas the foundation of his beliefs. The older the authority the greater\nthe weight it carried. So effective was this teaching that it seems\nnever to have occurred to individual men that they had all the\nopportunities ever enjoyed by Aristotle of discovering truth, with the\nadded advantage of all his knowledge to begin with. Advanced as was the\ndevelopment of formal logic, that practical logic was wanting which\ncould see that the last of a series of authorities, every one of which\nrested on those which preceded it, could never form a surer foundation\nfor any doctrine than that supplied by its original propounder.\n\nThe result of this view of knowledge was that, although during the\nfifteen centuries following the death of the geometer of Syracuse great\nuniversities were founded at which generations of professors expounded\nall the learning of their time, neither professor nor student ever\nsuspected what latent possibilities of good were concealed in the most\nfamiliar operations of nature. Every one felt the wind blow, saw water\nboil, and heard the thunder crash, but never thought of investigating\nthe forces here at play. Up to the middle of the fifteenth century the\nmost acute observer could scarcely have seen the dawn of a new era.\n\nIn view of this state of things, it must be regarded as one of the most\nremarkable facts in evolutionary history that four or five men, whose\nmental constitution was either typical of the new order of things or who\nwere powerful agents in bringing it about, were all born during the\nfifteenth century, four of them at least at so nearly the same time as\nto be contemporaries.\n\nLeonardo da Vinci, whose artistic genius has charmed succeeding\ngenerations, was also the first practical engineer of his time, and the\nfirst man after Archimedes to make a substantial advance in developing\nthe laws of motion. That the world was not prepared to make use of his\nscientific discoveries does not detract from the significance which must\nattach to the period of his birth.\n\nShortly after him was born the great navigator whose bold spirit was to\nmake known a new world, thus giving to commercial enterprise that\nimpetus which was so powerful an agent in bringing about a revolution in\nthe thoughts of men.\n\nThe birth of Columbus was soon followed by that of Copernicus, the first\nafter Aristarchus to demonstrate the true system of the world. In him\nmore than in any of his contemporaries do we see the struggle between\nthe old forms of thought and the new. It seems almost pathetic and is\ncertainly most suggestive of the general view of knowledge taken at that\ntime that, instead of claiming credit for bringing to light great truths\nbefore unknown, he made a labored attempt to show that, after all, there\nwas nothing really new in his system, which he claimed to date from\nPythagoras and Philolaus. In this connection it is curious that he makes\nno mention of Aristarchus, who I think will be regarded by conservative\nhistorians as his only demonstrated predecessor. To the hold of the\nolder ideas upon his mind we must attribute the fact that in\nconstructing his system he took great pains to make as little change as\npossible in ancient conceptions.\n\nLuther, the greatest thought-stirrer of them all, practically of the\nsame generation with Copernicus, Leonardo, and Columbus, does not come\nin as a scientific investigator, but as the great loosener of chains\nwhich had so fettered the intellect of men that they dared not think\notherwise than as the authorities thought.\n\nAlmost coeval with the advent of these intellects was the invention of\nprinting with movable type. Gutenberg was born during the first decade\nof the century, and his associates and others credited with the\ninvention not many years afterward. If we accept the principle on which\nI am basing my argument, that we should assign the first place to the\nbirth of those psychic agencies which started men on new lines of\nthought, then surely was the fifteenth the wonderful century.\n\nLet us not forget that, in assigning the actors then born to their\nplaces, we are not narrating history, but studying a special phase of\nevolution. It matters not for us that no university invited Leonardo to\nits halls, and that his science was valued by his contemporaries only as\nan adjunct to the art of engineering. The great fact still is that he\nwas the first of mankind to propound laws of motion. It is not for\nanything in Luther's doctrines that he finds a place in our scheme. No\nmatter for us whether they were sound or not. What he did toward the\nevolution of the scientific investigator was to show by his example that\na man might question the best-established and most venerable authority\nand still live--still preserve his intellectual integrity--still command\na hearing from nations and their rulers. It matters not for us whether\nColumbus ever knew that he had discovered a new continent. His work was\nto teach that neither hydra, chimera, nor abyss--neither divine\ninjunction nor infernal machination--was in the way of men visiting\nevery part of the globe, and that the problem of conquering the world\nreduced itself to one of sails and rigging, hull and compass. The better\npart of Copernicus was to direct man to a viewpoint whence he should see\nthat the heavens were of like matter with the earth. All this done, the\nacorn was planted from which the oak of our civilization should spring.\nThe mad quest for gold which followed the discovery of Columbus, the\nquestionings which absorbed the attention of the learned, the\nindignation excited by the seeming vagaries of a Paracelsus, the fear\nand trembling lest the strange doctrine of Copernicus should undermine\nthe faith of centuries, were all helps to the germination of the\nseed--stimuli to thought which urged it on to explore the new fields\nopened up to its occupation. This given, all that has since followed\ncame out in regular order of development, and need be here considered\nonly in those phases having a special relation to the purpose of our\npresent meeting.\n\nSo slow was the growth at first that the sixteenth century may scarcely\nhave recognized the inauguration of a new era. Torricelli and Benedetti\nwere of the third generation after Leonardo, and Galileo, the first to\nmake a substantial advance upon his theory, was born more than a century\nafter him. Only two or three men appeared in a generation who, working\nalone, could make real progress in discovery, and even these could do\nlittle in leavening the minds of their fellow men with the new ideas.\n\nUp to the middle of the seventeenth century an agent which all\nexperience since that time shows to be necessary to the most productive\nintellectual activity was wanting. This was the attraction of like\nminds, making suggestions to each other, criticising, comparing, and\nreasoning. This element was introduced by the organization of the Royal\nSociety of London and the Academy of Sciences of Paris.\n\nThe members of these two bodies seem like ingenious youth suddenly\nthrown into a new world of interesting objects, the purposes and\nrelations of which they had to discover. The novelty of the situation is\nstrikingly shown in the questions which occupied the minds of the\nincipient investigators. One natural result of British maritime\nenterprise was that the aspirations of the Fellows of the Royal Society\nwere not confined to any continent or hemisphere. Inquiries were sent\nall the way to Batavia to know \"whether there be a hill in Sumatra which\nburneth continually, and a fountain which runneth pure balsam.\" The\nastronomical precision with which it seemed possible that physiological\noperations might go on was evinced by the inquiry whether the Indians\ncan so prepare that stupefying herb Datura that \"they make it lie\nseveral days, months, years, according as they will, in a man's body\nwithout doing him any harm, and at the end kill him without missing an\nhour's time.\" Of this continent one of the inquiries was whether there\nbe a tree in Mexico that yields water, wine, vinegar, milk, honey, wax,\nthread, and needles.\n\nAmong the problems before the Paris Academy of Sciences those of\nphysiology and biology took a prominent place. The distillation of\ncompounds had long been practiced, and the fact that the more spirituous\nelements of certain substances were thus separated naturally led to the\nquestion whether the essential essences of life might not be\ndiscoverable in the same way. In order that all might participate in the\nexperiments, they were conducted in open session of the Academy, thus\nguarding against the danger of any one member obtaining for his\nexclusive personal use a possible elixir of life. A wide range of the\nanimal and vegetable kingdom, including cats, dogs, and birds of various\nspecies, were thus analyzed. The practice of dissection was introduced\non a large scale. That of the cadaver of an elephant occupied several\nsessions, and was of such interest that the monarch himself was a\nspectator.\n\nTo the same epoch with the formation and first work of these two bodies\nbelongs the invention of a mathematical method which in its importance\nto the advance of exact science may be classed with the invention of the\nalphabet in its relation to the progress of society at large. The use of\nalgebraic symbols to represent quantities had its origin before the\ncommencement of the new era, and gradually grew into a highly developed\nform during the first two centuries of that era. But this method could\nrepresent quantities only as fixed. It is true that the elasticity\ninherent in the use of such symbols permitted of their being applied to\nany and every quantity; yet, in any one application, the quantity was\nconsidered as fixed and definite. But most of the magnitudes of nature\nare in a state of continual variation; indeed, since all motion is\nvariation, the latter is a universal characteristic of all phenomena. No\nserious advance could be made in the application of algebraic language\nto the expression of physical phenomena until it could be so extended as\nto express variation in quantities, as well as the quantities\nthemselves. This extension, worked out independently by Newton and\nLeibnitz, may be classed as the most fruitful of conceptions in exact\nscience. With it the way was opened for the unimpeded and continually\naccelerated progress of the last two centuries.\n\nThe feature of this period which has the closest relation to the purpose\nof our coming together is the seemingly unending subdivision of\nknowledge into specialties, many of which are becoming so minute and so\nisolated that they seem to have no interest for any but their few\npursuers. Happily science itself has afforded a corrective for its own\ntendency in this direction. The careful thinker will see that in these\nseemingly diverging branches common elements and common principles are\ncoming more and more to light. There is an increasing recognition of\nmethods of research, and of deduction, which are common to large\nbranches, or to the whole of science. We are more and more recognizing\nthe principle that progress in knowledge implies its reduction to more\nexact forms, and the expression of its ideas in language more or less\nmathematical. The problem before the organizers of this Congress was,\ntherefore, to bring the sciences together, and seek for the unity which\nwe believe underlies their infinite diversity.\n\nThe assembling of such a body as now fills this hall was scarcely\npossible in any preceding generation, and is made possible now only\nthrough the agency of science itself. It differs from all preceding\ninternational meetings by the universality of its scope, which aims to\ninclude the whole of knowledge. It is also unique in that none but\nleaders have been sought out as members. It is unique in that so many\nlands have delegated their choicest intellects to carry on its work.\nThey come from the country to which our republic is indebted for a third\nof its territory, including the ground on which we stand; from the land\nwhich has taught us that the most scholarly devotion to the languages\nand learning of the cloistered past is compatible with leadership in the\npractical application of modern science to the arts of life; from the\nisland whose language and literature have found a new field and a\nvigorous growth in this region; from the last seat of the holy Roman\nEmpire; from the country which, remembering a monarch who made an\nastronomical observation at the Greenwich Observatory, has enthroned\nscience in one of the highest places in its government; from the\npeninsula so learned that we have invited one of its scholars to come\nand tell us of our own language; from the land which gave birth to\nLeonardo, Galileo, Torricelli, Columbus, Volta--what an array of\nimmortal names!--from the little republic of glorious history which,\nbreeding men rugged as its eternal snow-peaks, has yet been the seat of\nscientific investigation since the day of the Bernoullis; from the land\nwhose heroic dwellers did not hesitate to use the ocean itself to\nprotect it against invaders, and which now makes us marvel at the amount\nof erudition compressed within its little area; from the nation across\nthe Pacific, which, by half a century of unequaled progress in the arts\nof life, has made an important contribution to evolutionary science\nthrough demonstrating the falsity of the theory that the most ancient\nraces are doomed to be left in the rear of the advancing age--in a word,\nfrom every great centre of intellectual activity on the globe I see\nbefore me eminent representatives of that world-advance in knowledge\nwhich we have met to celebrate. May we not confidently hope that the\ndiscussions of such an assemblage will prove pregnant of a future for\nscience which shall outshine even its brilliant past?\n\nGentlemen and scholars all! You do not visit our shores to find great\ncollections in which centuries of humanity have given expression on\ncanvas and in marble to their hopes, fears, and aspirations. Nor do you\nexpect institutions and buildings hoary with age. But as you feel the\nvigor latent in the fresh air of these expansive prairies, which has\ncollected the products of human genius by which we are here surrounded,\nand, I may add, brought us together; as you study the institutions which\nwe have founded for the benefit, not only of our own people, but of\nhumanity at large; as you meet the men who, in the short space of one\ncentury, have transformed this valley from a savage wilderness into what\nit is to-day--then may you find compensation for the want of a past like\nyours by seeing with prophetic eye a future world-power of which this\nregion shall be the seat. If such is to be the outcome of the\ninstitutions which we are now building up, then may your present visit\nbe a blessing both to your posterity and ours by making that power one\nfor good to all mankind. Your deliberations will help to demonstrate to\nus and to the world at large that the reign of law must supplant that of\nbrute force in the relations of the nations, just as it has supplanted\nit in the relations of individuals. You will help to show that the war\nwhich science is now waging against the sources of diseases, pain, and\nmisery offers an even nobler field for the exercise of heroic qualities\nthan can that of battle. We hope that when, after your all too fleeting\nsojourn in our midst, you return to your own shores, you will long feel\nthe influence of the new air you have breathed in an infusion of\nincreased vigor in pursuing your varied labors. And if a new impetus is\nthus given to the great intellectual movement of the past century,\nresulting not only in promoting the unification of knowledge, but in\nwidening its field through new combinations of effort on the part of its\nvotaries, the projectors, organizers, and supporters of this Congress of\nArts and Science will be justified of their labors.\n\n\n\n\nDIVISION A--NORMATIVE SCIENCE\n\n\n\n\nDIVISION A--NORMATIVE SCIENCE\n\nSPEAKER: PROFESSOR JOSIAH ROYCE, Harvard University\n\n(_Hall 6, September 20, 10 a. m._)\n\nTHE SCIENCES OF THE IDEAL\n\nBY JOSIAH ROYCE\n\n [Josiah Royce, Professor of History of Philosophy, Harvard\n University, since 1892. b. Grass Valley, Nevada County,\n California, November 20, 1855. A.B. University of\n California, 1875; Ph.D. Johns Hopkins 1878; LL.D. University\n of Aberdeen, Scotland; LL.D. Johns Hopkins. Instructor in\n English Literature and Logic, University of California,\n 1878-82. Instructor and Assistant Professor, Harvard\n University, 1882-92. Author of _Religious Aspect of\n Philosophy_; _History of California_; _The Feud of Oakfield\n Creek_; _The Spirit of Modern Philosophy_; _Studies of Good\n and Evil_; _The World and the Individual_; _Gifford\n Lectures_; and numerous other works and memoirs.]\n\n\nI shall not attempt, in this address, either to justify or to criticise\nthe name, normative science, under which the doctrines which constitute\nthis division are grouped. It is enough for my purpose to recognize at\nthe outset that I am required, by the plans of this Congress, to explain\nwhat scientific interests seem to me to be common to the work of the\nphilosophers and of the mathematicians. The task is one which makes\nsevere demands upon the indulgence of the listener, and upon the\nexpository powers of the speaker, but it is a task for which the present\nage has well prepared the way. The spirit which Descartes and Leibnitz\nillustrated seems likely soon to become, in a new and higher sense,\nprominent in science. The mathematicians are becoming more and more\nphilosophical. The philosophers, in the near future, will become, I\nbelieve, more and more mathematical. It is my office to indicate, as\nwell as the brief time and my poor powers may permit, why this ought to\nbe so.\n\nTo this end I shall first point out what is that most general community\nof interest which unites all the sciences that belong to our division.\nThen I shall indicate what type of recent and special scientific work\nmost obviously bears upon the tasks of all of us alike. Thirdly, I shall\nstate some results and problems to which this type of scientific work\nhas given rise, and shall try to show what promise we have of an early\nincrease of insight regarding our common interests.\n\n\nI\n\nThe most general community of interest which unites the various\nscientific activities that belong to our division is this: We are all\nconcerned with what may be called ideal truth, as distinct from physical\ntruth. Some of us also have a strong interest in physical truth; but\nnone of us lack a notable and scientific concern for the realm of ideas,\nviewed as ideas.\n\nLet me explain what I mean by these terms. Whoever studies physical\ntruth (taking that term in its most general sense) seeks to observe, to\ncollate, and, in the end, to control, facts which he regards as external\nto his own thought. But instead of thus looking mainly without, it is\npossible for a man chiefly to take account, let us say, of the\nconsequences of his own hypothetical assumptions--assumptions which may\npossess but a very remote relation to the physical world. Or again, it\nis possible for such a student to be mainly devoted to reflecting upon\nthe formal validity of his own inferences, or upon the meaning of his\nown presuppositions, or upon the value and the interrelation of human\nideals. Any such scientific work, reflective, considerate principally of\nthe thinker's own constructions and purposes, or of the constructions\nand purposes of humanity in general, is a pursuit of ideal truth. The\nsearcher who is mainly devoted to the inquiry into what he regards as\nexternal facts, is indeed active; but his activity is moulded by an\norder of existence which he conceives as complete apart from his\nactivity. He is thoughtful; but a power not himself assigns to him the\nproblems about which he thinks. He is guided by ideals; but his\nprincipal ideal takes the form of an acceptance of the world as it is,\nindependently of his ideals. His dealings are with nature. His aim is\nthe conquest of a foreign realm. But the student of what may be called,\nin general terms, ideal truth, while he is devoted as his fellow, the\nobserver of outer nature, to the general purpose of being faithful to\nthe verity as he finds it, is still aware that his own way of finding,\nor his own creative activity as an inventor of hypotheses, or his own\npowers of inference, or his conscious ideals, constitute in the main the\nobject into which he is inquiring, and so form an essential aspect of\nthe sort of verity which he is endeavoring to discover. The guide, then,\nof such a student is, in a peculiar sense, his own reason. His goal is\nthe comprehension of his own meaning, the conscious and thoughtful\nconquest of himself. His great enemy is not the mystery of outer nature,\nbut the imperfection of his reflective powers. He is, indeed, as\nunwilling as is any scientific worker to trust private caprices. He\nfeels as little as does the observer of outer facts, that he is merely\nnoting down, as they pass, the chance products of his arbitrary fantasy.\nFor him, as for any scientific student, truth is indeed objective; and\nthe standards to which he conforms are eternal. But his method is that\nof an inner considerateness rather than of a curiosity about external\nphenomena. His objective world is at the same time an essentially ideal\nworld, and the eternal verity in whose light he seeks to live has,\nthroughout his undertakings, a peculiarly intimate relation to the\npurposes of his own constructive will.\n\nOne may then sum up the difference of attitude which is here in question\nby saying that, while the student of outer nature is explicitly\nconforming his plans of action, his ideas, his ideals, to an order of\ntruth which he takes to be foreign to himself--the student of the other\nsort of truth, here especially in question, is attempting to understand\nhis own plans of action, that is, to develop his ideas, or to define his\nideals, or else to do both these things.\n\nNow it is not hard to see that this search for some sort of ideal truth\nis indeed characteristic of every one of the investigations which have\nbeen grouped together in our division of the normative sciences. Pure\nmathematics shares in common with philosophy this type of scientific\ninterest in ideal, as distinct from physical or phenomenal truth. There\nis, to be sure, a marked contrast between the ways in which the\nmathematician and the philosopher approach, select, and elaborate their\nrespective sorts of problems. But there is also a close relation between\nthe two types of investigation in question. Let us next consider both\nthe contrast and the analogy in some of their other most general\nfeatures.\n\nPure mathematics is concerned with the investigation of the logical\nconsequences of certain exactly stateable postulates or\nhypotheses--such, for instance, as the postulates upon which arithmetic\nand analysis are founded, or such as the postulates that lie at the\nbasis of any type of geometry. For the pure mathematician, the truth of\nthese hypotheses or postulates depends, not upon the fact that physical\nnature contains phenomena answering to the postulates, but solely upon\nthe fact that the mathematician is able, with rational consistency, to\nstate these assumed first principles, and to develop their consequences.\nDedekind, in his famous essay, \"Was Sind und Was Sollen die Zahlen,\"\ncalled the whole numbers \"freie Sch\u00f6pfungen des Menschlichen Geistes;\"\nand, in fact, we need not enter into any discussion of the psychology of\nour number concept in order to be able to assert that, however we men\nfirst came by our conception of the whole numbers, for the mathematician\nthe theory of numerical truth must appear simply as the logical\ndevelopment of the consequences of a few fundamental first principles,\nsuch as those which Dedekind himself, or Peano, or other recent writers\nupon this topic, have, in various forms, stated. A similar formal\nfreedom marks the development of any other theory in the realm of pure\nmathematics. Pure geometry, from the modern point of view, is neither a\ndoctrine forced upon the human mind by the constitution of any primal\nform of intuition, nor yet a branch of physical science, limited to\ndescribing the spatial arrangement of phenomena in the external world.\nPure geometry is the theory of the consequences of certain postulates\nwhich the geometer is at liberty consistently to make; so that there are\nas many types of geometry as there are consistent systems of postulates\nof that generic type of which the geometer takes account. As is also now\nwell known, it has long been impossible to define pure mathematics as\nthe science of quantity, or to limit the range of the exactly stateable\nhypotheses or postulates with which the mathematician deals to the world\nof those objects which, ideally speaking, can be viewed as measurable.\nFor the ideally defined measurable objects are by no means the only ones\nwhose properties can be stated in the form of exact postulates or\nhypotheses; and the possible range of pure mathematics, if taken in the\nabstract, and viewed apart from any question as to the value of given\nlines of research, appears to be identical with the whole realm of the\nconsequences of exactly stateable ideal hypotheses of every type.\n\nOne limitation must, however, be mentioned, to which the assertion just\nmade is, in practice, obviously subject. And this is, indeed, a\nmomentous limitation. The exactly stated ideal hypotheses whose\nconsequences the mathematician develops must possess, as is sometimes\nsaid, sufficient intrinsic importance to be worthy of scientific\ntreatment. They must not be trivial hypotheses. The mathematician is\nnot, like the solver of chess problems, merely displaying his skill in\ndealing with the arbitrary fictions of an ideal game. His truth is,\nindeed, ideal; his world is, indeed, treated by his science as if this\nworld were the creation of his postulates a \"freie Sch\u00f6pfung.\" But he\ndoes not thus create for mere sport. On the contrary, he reports a\nsignificant order of truth. As a fact, the ideal systems of the pure\nmathematician are customarily defined with an obvious, even though often\nhighly abstract and remote, relation to the structure of our ordinary\nempirical world. Thus the various algebras which have been actually\ndeveloped have, in the main, definite relations to the structure of the\nspace world of our physical experience. The different systems of ideal\ngeometry, even in all their ideality, still cluster, so to speak, about\nthe suggestions which our daily experience of space and of matter give\nus. Yet I suppose that no mathematician would be disposed, at the\npresent time, to accept any brief definition of the degree of closeness\nor remoteness of relation to ordinary experience which shall serve to\ndistinguish a trivial from a genuinely significant branch of\nmathematical theory. In general, a mathematician who is devoted to the\ntheory of functions, or to group theory, appears to spend little time in\nattempting to show why the development of the consequences of his\npostulates is a significant enterprise. The concrete mathematical\ninterest of his inquiry sustains him in his labors, and wins for him the\nsympathy of his fellows. To the questions, \"Why consider the ideal\nstructure of just this system of object at all?\" \"Why study various\nsorts of numbers, or the properties of functions, or of groups, or the\nsystem of points in projective geometry?\"--the pure mathematician in\ngeneral, cares to reply only, that the topic of his special\ninvestigation appears to him to possess sufficient mathematical\ninterest. The freedom of his science thus justifies his enterprise. Yet,\nas I just pointed out, this freedom is never mere caprice. This ideal\ninterest is not without a general relation to the concerns even of\ncommon sense. In brief, as it seems at once fair to say, the pure\nmathematician is working under the influence of more or less clearly\nconscious philosophical motives. He does not usually attempt to define\nwhat distinguishes a significant from a trivial system of postulates, or\nwhat constitutes a problem worth attacking from the point of view of\npure mathematics. But he practically recognizes such a distinction\nbetween the trivial and the significant regions of the world of ideal\ntruth, and since philosophy is concerned with the significance of ideas,\nthis recognition brings the mathematician near in spirit to the\nphilosopher.\n\nSuch, then, is the position of the pure mathematician. What, by way of\ncontrast, is that of the philosopher? We may reply that to state the\nformal consequences of exact assumptions is one thing; to reflect upon\nthe mutual relations, and the whole significance of such assumptions,\ndoes indeed involve other interests; and these other interests are the\nones which directly carry us over to the realm of philosophy. If the\ntheory of numbers belongs to pure mathematics, the study of the place of\nthe number concept in the system of human ideas belongs to philosophy.\nLike the mathematician, the philosopher deals directly with a realm of\nideal truth. But to unify our knowledge, to comprehend its sources, its\nmeaning, and its relations to the whole of human life, these aims\nconstitute the proper goal of the philosopher. In order, however, to\naccomplish his aims, the philosopher must, indeed, take account of the\nresults of the special physical science; but he must also turn from the\nworld of outer phenomena to an ideal world. For the unity of things is\nnever, for us mortals, anything that we find given in our experience.\nYou cannot see the unity of knowledge; you cannot describe it as a\nphenomenon. It is for us now, an ideal. And precisely so, the meaning of\nthings, the relation of knowledge to life, the significance of our\nideals, their bearing upon one another--these are never, for us men,\nphenomenally present data. Hence the philosopher, however much he ought,\nas indeed he ought, to take account of phenomena, and of the results of\nthe special physical sciences, is quite as deeply interested in his own\nway, as the mathematician is interested in his way, in the consideration\nof an ideal realm. Only, unlike the mathematician, the philosopher does\nnot first abstract from the empirical suggestions upon which his exact\nideas are actually based, and then content himself merely with\ndeveloping the logical consequences of these ideas. On the contrary, his\nmain interest is not in any idea or fact in so far as it is viewed by\nitself, but rather in the interrelations, in the common significance, in\nthe unity, of all fundamental ideas, and in their relations both to the\nphenomenal facts and to life! On the whole, he, therefore, neither\nconsents, like the student of a special science of experience, to seek\nhis freedom solely through conformity to the phenomena which are to be\ndescribed; nor is he content, like the pure mathematician, to win his\ntruth solely through the exact definition of the formal consequences of\nhis freely defined hypotheses. He is making an effort to discover the\nsense and the unity of the business of his own life.\n\nIt is no part of my purpose to attempt to show here how this general\nphilosophical interest differentiates into the various interests of\nmetaphysics, of the philosophy of religion, of ethics, of \u00e6sthetics, of\nlogic. Enough--I have tried to illustrate how, while both the\nphilosopher and the mathematician have an interest in the meaning of\nideas rather than in the description of external facts, still there is a\ncontrast which does, indeed, keep their work in large measure asunder,\nnamely, the contrast due to the fact that the mathematician is directly\nconcerned with developing the consequences of certain freely assumed\nsystems of postulates or hypotheses; while the philosopher is interested\nin the significance, in the unity, and in the relation to life, of all\nthe fundamental ideals and postulates of the human mind.\n\nYet not even thus do we sufficiently state how closely related the two\ntasks are. For this very contrast, as we have also suggested, is, even\nwithin its own limits, no final or perfectly sharp contrast. There is a\ndeep analogy between the two tasks. For the mathematician, as we have\njust seen, is not evenly interested in developing the consequences of\nany and every system of freely assumed postulates. He is no mere solver\nof arbitrary ideal puzzles in general. His systems of postulates are so\nchosen as to be not trivial, but significant. They are, therefore, in\nfact, but abstractly defined aspects of the very system of eternal truth\nwhose expression is the universe. In this sense the mathematician is as\ngenuinely interested as is the philosopher in the significant use of his\nscientific freedom. On the other hand, the philosopher, in reflecting\nupon the significance and the unity of fundamental ideas, can only do so\nwith success in case he makes due inquiry into the logical consequences\nof given ideas. And this he can accomplish only if, upon occasion, he\nemploys the exact methods of the mathematician, and develops his systems\nof ideal truth with the precision of which only mathematical research is\ncapable. As a fact, then, the mathematician and the philosopher deal\nwith ideal truth in ways which are not only contrasted, but profoundly\ninterconnected. The mathematician, in so far as he consciously\ndistinguishes significant from trivial problems, and ideal systems, is a\nphilosopher. The philosopher, in so far as he seeks exactness of logical\nmethod, in his reflection, must meanwhile aim to be, within his own\nlimits, a mathematician. He, indeed, will not in future, like Spinoza,\nseek to reduce philosophy to the mere development, in mathematical form,\nof the consequences of certain arbitrary hypotheses. He will distinguish\nbetween a reflection upon the unity of the system of truth and an\nabstract development of this or that selected aspect of the system. But\nhe will see more and more that, in so far as he undertakes to be exact,\nhe must aim to become, in his own way, and with due regard to his own\npurposes, mathematical; and thus the union of mathematical and\nphilosophical inquiries, in the future, will tend to become closer and\ncloser.\n\n\nII\n\nSo far, then, I have dwelt upon extremely general considerations\nrelating to the unity and the contrast of mathematical and philosophical\ninquiries. I can well conceive, however, that the individual worker in\nany one of the numerous branches of investigation which are represented\nby the body of students whom I am privileged to address, may at this\npoint mentally interpose the objection that all these considerations\nare, indeed, far too general to be of practical interest to any of us.\nOf course, all we who study these so-called normative sciences are,\nindeed, interested in ideas, for their own sakes--in ideas so distinct\nfrom, although of course also somehow related to, phenomena. Of course,\nsome of us are rather devoted to the development of the consequences of\nexactly stated ideal hypotheses, and others to reflecting as we can upon\nwhat certain ideas and ideals are good for, and upon what the unity is\nof all ideas and ideals. Of course, if we are wise enough to do so, we\nhave much to learn from one another. But, you will say, the assertion of\nall these things is a commonplace. The expression of the desire for\nfurther mutual co\u00f6peration is a pious wish. You will insist upon asking\nfurther: \"Is there just now any concrete instance in a modern type of\nresearch which furnishes results such as are of interest to all of us?\nAre we actually doing any productive work in common? Are the\nphilosophers contributing anything to human knowledge which has a\ngenuine bearing upon the interests of mathematical science? Are the\nmathematicians contributing anything to philosophy?\"\n\nThese questions are perfectly fair. Moreover, as it happens, they can be\ndistinctly answered in the affirmative. The present age is one of a\nrapid advance in the actual unification of the fields of investigation\nwhich are included within the scope of this present division. What\nlittle time remains to me must be devoted to indicating, as well as I\ncan, in what sense this is true. I shall have still to deal in very\nbroad generalities. I shall try to make these generalities definite\nenough to be not wholly unfruitful.\n\nWe have already emphasized one question which may be said to interest,\nin a very direct way, both the mathematician and the philosopher. The\nideal postulates, whose consequences mathematical science undertakes to\ndevelop, must be, we have said, significant postulates, involving ideas\nwhose exact definition and exposition repay the labor of scientific\nscrutiny. Number, space, continuity, functional correspondence or\ndependence, group-structure--these are examples of such significant\nideas; the postulates or ideal assumptions upon which the theory of such\nideas depends are significant postulates, and are not the mere\nconventions of an arbitrary game. But now what constitutes the\nsignificance of an idea, or of an abstract mathematical theory? What\ngives an idea a worthy place in the whole scheme of human ideas? Is it\nthe possibility of finding a physical application for a mathematical\ntheory which for us decides what is the value of the theory? No, the\ntheory of functions, the theory of numbers, group theory, have a\nsignificance which no mathematician would consent to measure in terms of\nthe present applicability or non-applicability of these theories in\nphysical science? In vain, then, does one attempt to use the test of\napplied mathematics as the main criticism of the value of a theory of\npure mathematics. The value of an idea, for the sciences which\nconstitute our division, is dependent upon the place which this idea\noccupies in the whole organized scheme or system of human ideas. The\nidea of number, for instance, familiar as its applications are, does not\nderive its main value from the fact that eggs and dollars and\nstar-clusters can be counted, but rather from the fact that the idea of\nnumbers has those relations to other fundamental ideas which recent\nlogical theory has made prominent--relations, for instance, to the\nconcept of order, to the theory of classes or collections of objects\nviewed in general, and to the metaphysical concept of the self.\nRelations of this sort, which the discussions of the number concept by\nDedekind, Cantor, Peano, and Russell have recently brought to\nlight--such relations, I say, constitute what truly justified Gauss in\ncalling the theory of numbers a \"divine science.\" As against such deeper\nrelations, the countless applications of the number concept in ordinary\nlife, and in science, are, from the truly philosophical point of view,\nof comparatively small moment. What we want, in the work of our division\nof the sciences, is to bring to light the unity of truth, either, as in\nmathematics, by developing systems of truth which are significant by\nvirtue of their actual relations to this unity, or, as in philosophy, by\nexplicitly seeking the central idea about which all the many ideas\ncluster.\n\nNow, an ancient and fundamental problem for the philosophers is that\nwhich has been called the problem of the categories. This problem of the\ncategories is simply the more formal aspect of the whole philosophical\nproblem just defined. The philosopher aims to comprehend the unity of\nthe system of human ideas and ideals. Well, then, what are the primal\nideas? Upon what group of concepts do the other concepts of human\nscience logically depend? About what central interests is the system of\nhuman ideals clustered? In ancient thought Aristotle already approached\nthis problem in one way. Kant, in the eighteenth century, dealt with it\nin another. We students of philosophy are accustomed to regret what we\ncall the excessive formalism of Kant, to lament that Kant was so much\nthe slave of his own relatively superficial and accidental table of\ncategories, and that he made the treatment of every sort of\nphilosophical problem turn upon his own schematism. Yet we cannot doubt\nthat Kant was right in maintaining that philosophy needs, for the\nsuccessful development of every one of its departments, a well-devised\nand substantially complete system of categories. Our objection to Kant's\nover-confidence in the virtues of his own schematism is due to the fact\nthat we do not now accept his table of categories as an adequate view of\nthe fundamental concepts. The efforts of philosophers since Kant have\nbeen repeatedly devoted to the task of replacing his scheme of\ncategories by a more adequate one. I am far from regarding these purely\nphilosophical efforts made since Kant as fruitless, but they have\nremained, so far, very incomplete, and they have been held back from\ntheir due fullness of success by the lack of a sufficiently careful\nsurvey and analysis of the processes of thought as these have come to be\nembodied in the living sciences. Such concepts as number, quantity,\nspace, time, cause, continuity, have been dealt with by the pure\nphilosophers far too summarily and superficially. A more thoroughgoing\nanalysis has been needed. But now, in comparatively recent times, there\nhas developed a region of inquiry which one may call by the general name\nof modern logic. To the constitution of this new region of inquiry men\nhave principally contributed who began as mathematicians, but who, in\nthe course of their work, have been led to become more and more\nphilosophers. Of late, however, various philosophers, who were\noriginally in no sense mathematicians, becoming aware of the importance\nof the new type of research, are in their turn attempting both to\nassimilate and to supplement the undertakings which were begun from the\nmathematical side. As a result, the logical problem of the categories\nhas to-day become almost equally a problem for the logicians of\nmathematics and for those students of philosophy who take any serious\ninterest in exactness of method in their own branch of work. The result\nof this actual co\u00f6peration of men from both sides is that, as I think,\nwe are to-day, for the first time, in sight of what is still, as I\nfreely admit, a somewhat distant goal, namely, the relatively complete\nrational analysis and tabulation of the fundamental categories of human\nthought. That the student of ethics is as much interested in such an\ninvestigation as is the metaphysician, that the philosopher of religion\nneeds a well-completed table of categories quite as much as does the\npure logician, every competent student of such topics ought to admit.\nAnd that the enterprise in question keenly interests the mathematicians\nis shown by the prominent part which some of them have taken in the\nresearches in question. Here, then, is the type of recent scientific\nwork whose results most obviously bear upon the tasks of all of us\nalike.\n\nA catalogue of the names of the workers in this wide field of modern\nlogic would be out of place here. Yet one must, indeed, indicate what\nlines of research are especially in question. From the purely\nmathematical side, the investigations of the type to which I now refer\nmay be viewed (somewhat arbitrarily) as beginning with that famous\nexamination into one of the postulates of Euclid's geometry which gave\nrise to the so-called non-Euclidean geometry. The question here\noriginally at issue was one of a comparatively limited scope, namely,\nthe question whether Euclid's parallel-line postulate was a logical\nconsequence of the other geometrical principles. But the investigation\nrapidly develops into a general study of the foundations of geometry--a\nstudy to which contributions are still almost constantly appearing.\nSomewhat independently of this line of inquiry there grew up, during the\nlatter half of the nineteenth century, that re\u00ebxamination of the bases\nof arithmetic and analysis which is associated with the names of\nDedekind, Weierstrass, and George Cantor. At the present time, the\nlabors of a number of other inquirers (amongst whom we may mention the\nschool of Peano and Pieri in Italy, and men such as Poincar\u00e9 and\nCouturat in France, Hilbert in Germany, Bertrand Russell and Whitehead\nin England, and an energetic group of our American mathematicians--men\nsuch as Professor Moore, Professor Halsted, Dr. Huntington, Dr. Veblen,\nand a considerable number of others) have been added to the earlier\nresearches. The result is that we have recently come for the first time\nto be able to see, with some completeness, what the assumed first\nprinciples of pure mathematics actually are. As was to be expected,\nthese principles are capable of more than one formulation, according as\nthey are approached from one side or from another. As was also to be\nexpected, the entire edifice of pure mathematics, so far as it has yet\nbeen erected, actually rests upon a very few fundamental concepts and\npostulates, however you may formulate them. What was not observed,\nhowever, by the earlier, and especially by the philosophical, students\nof the categories, is the form which these postulates tend to assume\nwhen they are rigidly analyzed.\n\nThis form depends upon the precise definition and classification of\ncertain types of relations. The whole of geometry, for instance,\nincluding metrical geometry, can be developed from a set of postulates\nwhich demand the existence of points that stand in certain ordinal\nrelationships. The ordinal relationships can be reduced, according as\nthe series of points considered is open or closed, either to the\nwell-known relationship in which three points stand when one is between\nthe other two upon a right line, or else to the ordinal relationship in\nwhich four points stand when they are separated by pairs; and these two\nordinal relationships, by means of various logical devices, can be\nregarded as variations of a single fundamental form. Cayley and Klein\nfounded the logical theory of geometry here in question. Russell, and in\nanother way Dr. Veblen, have given it its most recent expressions. In\nthe same way, the theory of whole numbers can be reduced to sets of\nprinciples which demand the existence of certain ideal objects in\ncertain simple ordinal relations. Dedekind and Peano have worked out\nsuch ordinal theories of the number concept. In another development of\nthe theory of the cardinal whole numbers, which Russell and Whitehead\nhave worked out, ordinal concepts are introduced only secondarily, and\nthe theory depends upon the fundamental relation of the equivalence or\nnonequivalence of collections of objects. But here also a certain simple\ntype of relation determines the definitions and the development of the\nwhole theory.\n\nTwo results follow from such a fashion of logically analyzing the first\nprinciples of mathematical science. In the first place, as just pointed\nout, we learn _how few and simple are the conceptions and postulates_\nupon which the actual edifice of exact science rests. Pure mathematics,\nwe have said, is free to assume what it chooses. Yet the assumptions\nwhose presence as the foundation principles of the actually existent\npure mathematics an exhaustive examination thus reveals, show by their\nfewness that the ideal freedom of the mathematician to assume and to\nconstruct what he pleases, is indeed, in practice, a very decidedly\nlimited freedom. The limitation is, as we have already seen, a\nlimitation which has to do with the essential significance of the\nfundamental concepts in question. And so the result of this analysis of\nthe bases of the actually developed and significant branches of\nmathematics, constitutes a sort of empirical revelation of what\ncategories the exact sciences have practically found to be of such\nsignificance as to be worthy of exhaustive treatment. Thus the\ninstinctive sense for significant truth, which has all along been\nguiding the development of mathematics, comes at least to a clear and\nphilosophical consciousness. And meanwhile the essential categories of\nthought are seen in a new light.\n\nThe second result still more directly concerns a philosophical logic. It\nis this: Since the few types of relations which this sort of analysis\nreveals as the fundamental ones in exact science are of such importance,\nthe logic of the present day is especially required to face the\nquestions: _What is the nature of our concept of relations?_ What are\nthe various possible types of relations? Upon what does the variety of\nthese types depend? What unity lies beneath the variety?\n\nAs a fact, logic, in its modern forms, namely, first that symbolic logic\nwhich Boole first formulated, which Mr. Charles S. Peirce and his pupils\nhave in this country already so highly developed, and which Schroeder in\nGermany, Peano's school in Italy, and a number of recent English writers\nhave so effectively furthered--and secondly, the logic of scientific\nmethod, which is now so actively pursued, in France, in Germany, and in\nthe English-speaking countries--this whole movement in modern logic, as\nI hold, is rapidly approaching _new solutions of the problem of the\nfundamental nature and the logic of relations_. The problem is one in\nwhich we are all equally interested. To De Morgan in England, in an\nearlier generation, and, in our time, to Charles Peirce in this country,\nvery important stages in the growth of these problems are due. Russell,\nin his work on the _Principles of Mathematics_ has very lately\nundertaken to sum up the results of the logic of relations, as thus far\ndeveloped, and to add his own interpretations. Yet I think that Russell\nhas failed to get as near to the foundations of the theory of relations\nas the present state of the discussion permits. For Russell has failed\nto take account of what I hold to be the most fundamentally important\ngeneralization yet reached in the general theory of relations. This is\nthe generalization set forth as early as 1890, by Mr. A. B. Kempe, of\nLondon, in a pair of wonderful but too much neglected, papers, entitled,\nrespectively, _The Theory of Mathematical Form_, and _The Analogy\nbetween the Logical Theory of Classes and the Geometrical Theory of\nPoints_. A mere hint first as to the more precise formulation of the\nproblem at issue, and then later as to Kempe's special contribution to\nthat problem, may be in order here, despite the impossibility of any\nadequate statement.\n\n\nIII\n\nThe two most obviously and universally important kinds of relations\nknown to the exact sciences, as these sciences at present exist, are:\n(1) The relations of the type of equality or equivalence; and (2) the\nrelations of the type of before and after, or greater and less. The\nfirst of these two classes of relations, namely, the class represented,\nalthough by no means exhausted, by the various relations actually\ncalled, in different branches of science by the one name equality, this\nclass I say, might well be named, as I myself have proposed, the\nleveling relations. A collection of objects between any two of which\nsome one relation of this type holds, may be said to be a collection\nwhose members, in some defined sense or other, are on the same level.\nThe second of these two classes of relations, namely, those of the type\nof before and after, or greater and less--this class of relations, I\nsay, consists of what are nowadays often called the serial relations.\nAnd a collection of objects such that, if any pair of these objects be\nchosen, a determinate one of this pair stands to the other one of the\nsame pair in some determinate relation of this second type, and in a\nrelation which remains constant for all the pairs that can be thus\nformed out of the members of this collection--any such collection, I\nsay, constitutes a one-dimensional open series. Thus, in case of a file\nof men, if you choose any pair of men belonging to the file, a\ndeterminate one of them is, in the file, before the other. In the number\nseries, of any two numbers, a determinate one is greater than the other.\nWherever such a state of affairs exists, one has a series.\n\nNow these two classes of relations, the leveling relations and the\nserial relations, agree with one another, and differ from one another in\nvery momentous ways. They _agree_ with one another in that both the\nleveling and the serial relations are what is technically called\n_transitive_; that is, both classes conform to what Professor James has\ncalled the law of \"skipped intermediaries.\" Thus, if _A_ is equal to\n_B_, and _B_ is equal to _C_, it follows that _A_ is equal to _C_. If\n_A_ is before _B_, and _B_ is before _C_, then _A_ is before _C_. And\nthis property, which enables you in your reasonings about these\nrelations to skip middle terms, and so to perform some operation of\nelimination, is the property which is meant when one calls relations of\nthis type transitive. But, on the other hand, these two classes of\nrelations _differ_ from each other in that the leveling relations are,\nwhile the serial relations are not, _symmetrical_ or reciprocal. Thus,\nif _A_ is equal to _B_, _B_ is equal to _A_. But if _X_ is greater than\n_Y_, then _Y_ is not greater than _X_, but less than _X_. So the\nleveling relations are symmetrical transitive relations. But the serial\nrelations are transitive relations which are not symmetrical.\n\nAll this is now well known. It is notable, however, that nearly all the\nprocesses of our exact sciences, as at present developed, can be said to\nbe essentially such as lead either to the placing of sets or classes of\nobjects on the same level, by means of the use of symmetrical transitive\nrelations, or else to the arranging of objects in orderly rows or\nseries, by means of the use of transitive relations which are not\nsymmetrical. This holds also of all the applications of the exact\nsciences. Whatever else you do in science (or, for that matter, in art),\nyou always lead, in the end, either to the arranging of objects, or of\nideas, or of acts, or of movements, in rows or series, or else to the\nplacing of objects or ideas of some sort on the same level, by virtue of\nsome equivalence, or of some invariant character. Thus numbers,\nfunctions, lines in geometry, give you examples of serial relations.\nEquations in mathematics are classic instances of leveling relations.\nSo, of course, are invariants. Thus, again, the whole modern theory of\nenergy consists of two parts, one of which has to do with levels of\nenergy, in so far as the quantity of energy of a closed system remains\ninvariant through all the transformations of the system, while the other\npart has to do with the irreversible serial order of the transformations\nof energy themselves, which follow a set of unsymmetrical relations, in\nso far as energy tends to fall from higher to lower levels of intensity\nwithin the same system.\n\nThe entire conceivable universe then, and all of our present exact\nscience, can be viewed, if you choose, as a collection of objects or of\nideas that, whatever other types of relations may exist, are at least\nlargely characterized either by the leveling relations, or by the serial\nrelations, or by complexes of both sorts of relations. Here, then, we\nare plainly dealing with very fundamental categories. The \"between\"\nrelations of geometry can of course be defined, if you choose, in terms\nof transitive relations that are not symmetrical. There are, to be sure,\nsome other relations present in exact science, but the two types, the\nserial and leveling relations, are especially notable.\n\nSo far the modern logicians have for some time been in substantial\nagreement. Russell's brilliant book is a development of the logic of\nmathematics very largely in terms of the two types of relations which,\nin my own way, I have just characterized; although Russell gives due\nregard, of course, to certain other types of relations.\n\nBut hereupon the question arises, \"Are these two types of relations what\nRussell holds them to be, namely, ultimate and irreducible logical\nfacts, unanalyzable categories--mere data for the thinker?\" Or can we\nreduce them still further, and thus simplify yet again our view of the\ncategories?\n\nHere is where Kempe's generalization begins to come into sight. These\ntwo categories, in at least one very fundamental realm of exact thought,\ncan be reduced to one. There is, namely, a world of ideal objects which\nespecially interest the logician. It is the world of a _totality of\npossible logical classes_, or again, it is the ideal world, equivalent\nin formal structure to the foregoing, but composed of a _totality of\npossible statements_, or thirdly, it is the world, equivalent once more,\nin formal structure, to the foregoing, but consisting of a _totality of\npossible acts of will_, of possible decisions. When we proceed to\nconsider the relational structure of such a world, taken merely in the\nabstract as such a structure, a relation comes into sight which at once\nappears to be peculiarly general in its nature. It is the so-called\nillative relation, the relation which obtains between two classes when\none is subsumed under the other, or between two statements, or two\ndecisions, when one implies or entails the other. This relation is\ntransitive, but may be either symmetrical or not symmetrical; so that,\naccording as it is symmetrical or not, it may be used either to\nestablish levels or to generate series. In the order system of the\nlogician's world, the relational structure is thus, in any case, a\nhighly general and fundamental one.\n\nBut this is not all. In this the logician's world of classes, or of\nstatements, or of decisions, there is also another relation observable.\nThis is the relation of exclusion or mutual opposition. This is a purely\nsymmetrical or reciprocal relation. It has two forms--obverse or\ncontradictory opposition, that is, negation proper, and contrary\nopposition. But both these forms are purely symmetrical. And by proper\ndevices each of them can be stated in terms of the other, or reduced to\nthe other. And further, as Kempe incidentally shows, and as Mrs. Ladd\nFranklin has also substantially shown in her important theory of the\nsyllogism, _it is possible to state every proposition, or complex of\npropositions involving the illative relation, in terms of this purely\nsymmetrical relation of opposition_. Hence, so far as mere relational\nform is concerned, the illative relation itself may be wholly reduced to\nthe symmetrical relation of opposition. This is our first result as to\nthe relational structure of the realm of pure logic, that is, the realm\nof classes, of statements, or of decisions.\n\nIt follows that, in describing the logician's world of possible classes\nor of possible decisions, _all unsymmetrical, and so all serial,\nrelations can be stated solely in terms of symmetrical relations, and\ncan be entirely reduced to such relations_. Moreover, as Kempe has also\nvery prettily shown, the relation of opposition, in its two forms, just\nmentioned, need not be interpreted as obtaining merely between pairs of\nobjects. It may and does obtain between triads, tetrads, _n_-ads of\nlogical entities; and so all that is true of the relations of logical\nclasses may consequently be stated merely by ascribing certain perfectly\nsymmetrical and homogeneous predicates to pairs, triads, tetrads, n-ads\nof logical objects. The essential contrast between symmetrical and\nunsymmetrical relations thus, in this ideal realm of the logician,\nsimply vanishes. The categories of the logician's world of classes, of\nstatements, or of decisions, are marvelously simple. All the relations\npresent may be viewed as variations of the mere conception of opposition\nas distinct from non-opposition.\n\nAll this holds, of course, so far, merely for the logician's world of\nclasses or of decisions. There, at least, all serial order can actually\nbe derived from wholly symmetrical relations. But Kempe now very\nbeautifully shows (and here lies his great and original contribution to\nour topic)--he shows, I say, that the ordinal relations of geometry, as\nwell as of the number system, can all be regarded as indistinguishable\nfrom _mere variations of those relations which, in pure logic, one finds\nto be the symmetrical relations obtaining within pairs or triads of\nclasses or of statements_. The formal identity of the geometrical\nrelation called \"between\" with a purely logical relation which one can\ndefine as existing or as not existing amongst the members of a given\ntriad of logical classes, or of logical statements, is shown by Kempe in\na fashion that I cannot here attempt to expound. But Kempe's result thus\nenables one, as I believe, to simplify the theory of relations far\nbeyond the point which Russell in his brilliant book has reached. For\nKempe's triadic relation in question can be stated, in what he calls its\nobverse form, in perfectly symmetrical terms. And he proves very exactly\nthat the resulting logical relation is precisely identical, in all its\nproperties, with the fundamental ordinal relation of geometry.\n\nThus the order-systems of geometry and analysis appear simply as special\ncases of the more general order-system of pure logic. The whole, both of\nanalysis and of geometry, can be regarded as a description of certain\nselected groups of entities, which are chosen, according to special\nrules, from a single ideal world. This general and inclusive ideal world\nconsists simply of _all the objects which can stand to one another in\nthose symmetrical relations wherein the pure logician finds various\nstatements, or various decisions inevitably standing_. \"Let me,\" says in\nsubstance Kempe, \"choose from the logician's ideal world of classes or\ndecisions, what entities I will; and I will show you a collection of\nobjects that are in their relational structure, precisely identical with\nthe points of a geometer's space of _n_ dimensions.\" In other words, all\nof the geometer's figures and relations can be precisely pictured by the\nrelational structure of a selected system of classes or of statements,\nwhose relations are wholly and explicitly logical relations, such as\nopposition, and whose relations may all be regarded, accordingly, as\nreducible to a single type of purely symmetrical relation.\n\nThus, for _all_ exact science, and not merely for the logician's special\nrealm, the contrast between symmetrical and unsymmetrical relations\nproves to be, after all, superficial and derived. The purely logical\ncategories, such as opposition, and such as hold within the calculus of\nstatements, are, apparently, the basal categories of all the exact\nscience that has yet been developed. Series and levels are relational\nstructures that, sharply as they are contrasted, can be derived from a\nsingle root.\n\nI have restated Kempe's generalization in my own way. I think it the\nmost promising step towards new light as to the categories that we have\nmade for some generations.\n\nIn the field of modern logic, I say, then, work is doing which is\nrapidly tending towards the unification of the tasks of our entire\ndivision. For this problem of the categories, in all its abstractness,\nis still a common problem for all of us. Do you ask, however, what such\nresearches can do to furnish more special aid to the workers in\nmetaphysics, in the philosophy of religion, in ethics, or in \u00e6sthetics,\nbeyond merely helping towards the formulation of a table of\ncategories--then I reply that we are already not without evidence that\nsuch general researches, abstract though they may seem, are bearing\nfruits which have much more than a merely special interest. Apart from\nits most general problems, that analysis of mathematical concepts to\nwhich I have referred has in any case revealed numerous unexpected\nconnections between departments of thought which had seemed to be very\nwidely sundered. One instance of such a connection I myself have\nelsewhere discussed at length, in its general metaphysical bearings. I\nrefer to the logical identity which Dedekind first pointed out between\nthe mathematical concept of the ordinal number of series and the\nphilosophical concept of the formal structure of an ideally completed\nself. I have maintained that this formal identity throws light upon\nproblems which have as genuine an interest for the student of the\nphilosophy of religion as for the logician of arithmetic. In the same\nconnection it may be remarked that, as Couturat and Russell, amongst\nother writers, have very clearly and beautifully shown, the argument of\nthe Kantian mathematical antinomies needs to be explicitly and totally\nrevised in the light of Cantor's modern theory of infinite collections.\nTo pass at once to another, and a very different instance: The modern\nmathematical conceptions of what is called group theory have already\nreceived very wide and significant applications, and promise to bring\ninto unity regions of research which, until recently, appeared to have\nlittle or nothing to do with one another. Quite lately, however, there\nare signs that group theory will soon prove to be of importance for the\ndefinition of some of the fundamental concepts of that most refractory\nbranch of philosophical inquiry, \u00e6sthetics. Dr. Emch, in an important\npaper in the _Monist_, called attention, some time since, to the\nsymmetry groups to which certain \u00e6sthetically pleasing forms belong, and\nendeavored to point out the empirical relations between these groups and\nthe \u00e6sthetic effects in question. The grounds for such a connection\nbetween the groups in question and the observed \u00e6sthetic effects,\nseemed, in the paper of Dr. Emch to be left largely in the dark. But\ncertain papers recently published in the country by Miss Ethel Puffer,\nbearing upon the psychology of the beautiful (although the author has\napproached the subject without being in the least consciously\ninfluenced, as I understand, by the conceptions of the mathematical\ngroup theory), still actually lead, if I correctly grasp the writer's\nmeaning, to the doctrine that the \u00e6sthetic object, viewed as a\npsychological whole, must possess a structure closely, if not precisely,\nequivalent to the ideal structure of what the mathematician calls a\ngroup. I myself have no authority regarding \u00e6sthetic concepts, and speak\nsubject to correction. But the unexpected, and in case of Miss Puffer's\nresearch, quite unintended, appearance of group theory in recent\n\u00e6sthetic analysis is to me an impressive instance of the use of\nrelatively new mathematical conceptions in philosophical regions which\n_seem_, at first sight, very remote from mathematics.\n\nThat both the group concept and the concept of the self just suggested\nare sure to have also a wide application in the ethics of the future, I\nam myself well convinced. In fact, no branch of philosophy is without\nclose relations to all such studies of fundamental categories.\n\nThese are but hints and examples. They suffice, I hope, to show that the\nworkers in this division have deep common interests, and will do well,\nin future, to study the arts of co\u00f6peration, and to regard one another's\nprogress with a watchful and cordial sympathy. In a word: Our common\nproblem is the theory of the categories. That problem can be solved only\nby the co\u00f6peration of the mathematicians and of the philosophers.\n\n\n\n\n[Illustration: THE UNIVERSITY OF PARIS IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY\n\n_Hand-painted Photogravure from a Painting by Otto Knille. Reproduced\nfrom a Photograph of the Painting by permission of the Berlin Photograph\nCo._\n\nThis famous painting is now in the University of Berlin. Thomas Aquinas,\none of the greatest of the scholastic philosophers, surnamed the\n\"Angelic Doctor,\" is delivering a learned discourse before King Louis\nIX. To the right of the King stands Joinville, the French chronicler.\nThe Dominican monk with his hand to his face is Guillaume de Saint\nAmour, and Vincent de Beauvais, and another Dominican are seated with\ntheir backs to the platform desk from which Thomas Aquinas is making his\nanimated address. The picture is thoroughly characteristic of a\nUniversity disputation at the close of the Middle Ages.]\n\n\n\n\nDEPARTMENT I--PHILOSOPHY\n\n\n\n\nDEPARTMENT I--PHILOSOPHY\n\n(_Hall 6, September 20, 11.15 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR BORDEN P. BOWNE, Boston University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR GEORGE H. HOWISON, University of California.\n PROFESSOR GEORGE T. LADD, Yale University.\n\n\nIn opening the Department of Philosophy, the Chairman, Professor Borden\nP. Bowne, LL.D., of Boston University, made an interesting address on\nthe Philosophical Outlook. Professor Bowne said in part:--\n\n I congratulate the members of the Philosophical Section on\n the improved outlook in philosophy. In the generation just\n passed, philosophy was somewhat at a discount. The great and\n rapid development of physical science and invention,\n together with the profound changes in biological thought,\n produced for a time a kind of chaos. New facts were showered\n upon us in great abundance, and we had no adequate\n philosophical preparation for dealing with them. Such a\n condition is always disturbing. The old mental equilibrium\n is overthrown and readjustment is a slow process. Besides,\n the shallow sense philosophy of that time readily lent\n itself to mechanical and materialistic interpretations, and\n for a while it seemed as if all the higher faiths of\n humanity were permanently discredited. All this has passed\n away. Philosophical criticism began its work and the na\u00efve\n dogmatism of materialistic naturalism was soon disposed of.\n It quickly appeared that our trouble was not due to the new\n facts, but to the superficial philosophy by which they had\n been interpreted. Now that we have a better philosophy, we\n have come to live in perfect peace with the facts once\n thought disturbing, and even to welcome them as valuable\n additions to knowledge....\n\n The brief naturalistic episode was not without instruction\n for us. It showed conclusively the great practical\n importance of philosophy. Had we had thirty years ago the\n current philosophical insight, the great development of the\n physical and biological sciences would have made no\n disturbance whatever. But being interpreted by a crude\n scheme of thought, it produced somewhat of a storm.\n Philosophy may not contribute much of positive value, but it\n certainly has an important negative function in the way of\n suppressing pretentious dogmatism and fictitious knowledge,\n which often lead men astray. It is these things which\n produce conflicts of science and religion or which find in\n evolution the solvent of all mysteries and the source of all\n knowledge.\n\n Concerning the partition of territory between science and\n philosophy, there are two distinct questions respecting the\n facts of experience. First, we need to know the facts in\n their temporal and spatial order, and the way they hang\n together in a system of law. To get this knowledge is the\n function of science, and in this work science has\n inalienable rights and a most important practical function.\n This work cannot be done by speculation nor interfered with\n by authority of any kind. It is not surprising, then, that\n scientists in their sense of contact with reality should be\n indignant with, or feel contempt for, any who seek to limit\n or proscribe their research. But supposing this work all\n done, there remains another question respecting the\n causality and interpretation of the facts. This question\n belongs to philosophy. Science describes and registers the\n facts with their temporal and spatial laws; philosophy\n studies their causality and significance. And while the\n scientist justly ignores the philosopher who interferes with\n his inquiries, so the philosopher may justly reproach the\n scientist who fails to see that the scientific question does\n not touch the philosophic one....\n\n In the field of metaphysics proper I note a strong tendency\n toward personal idealism, or as it might be called,\n Personalism; that is, the doctrine that substantial reality\n can be conceived only under the personal form and that all\n else is phenomenal. This is quite distinct from the\n traditional idealisms of mere conceptionism. It holds the\n essential fact to be a community of persons with a Supreme\n Person at their head while the phenomenal world is only\n expression and means of communication. And to this view we\n are led by the failure of philosophizing on the impersonal\n plane, which is sure to lose itself in contradiction and\n impossibility. Under the form of mechanical naturalism, with\n its tendencies to materialism and atheism, impersonalism has\n once more been judged and found wanting. We are not likely\n to have a recurrence of this view unless there be a return\n to philosophical barbarism. But impersonalism at the\n opposite pole in the form of abstract categories of being,\n causality, unity, identity, continuity, sufficient reason,\n etc., is equally untenable. Criticism shows that these\n categories when abstractly and impersonally taken cancel\n themselves. On the impersonal plane we can never reach unity\n from plurality, or plurality from unity; and we can never\n find change in identity, or identity in change. Continuity\n in time becomes mere succession without the notion of\n potentiality, and this in turn is empty. Existence itself is\n dispersed into nothingness through the infinite divisibility\n of space and time, while the law of the sufficient reason\n loses itself in barren tautology and the infinite regress.\n The necessary logical equivalence of cause and effect in any\n impersonal scheme makes all real explanation and progress\n impossible, and shuts us up to an unintelligible oscillation\n between potentiality and actuality, to which there is no\n corresponding thought....\n\n Philosophy is still militant and has much work before it,\n but the omens are auspicious, the problems are better\n understood, and we are coming to a synthesis of the results\n of past generations of thinking which will be a very\n distinct progress. Philosophy has already done good service,\n and never better than in recent times, by destroying\n pretended knowledge and making room for the higher faiths of\n humanity. It has also done good service in helping these\n faiths to better rational form, and thus securing them\n against the defilements of superstition and the cavilings of\n hostile critics. With all its aberrations and shortcomings,\n philosophy deserves well of humanity.\n\n\n\n\nPHILOSOPHY: ITS FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTIONS AND ITS METHODS\n\nBY GEORGE HOLMES HOWISON\n\n [George Holmes Howison, Mills Professor of Intellectual and\n Moral Philosophy and Civil Polity, University of California.\n b. Montgomery County, Maryland, 1834. A.B. Marietta College,\n 1852; M.A. 1855; LL.D. _ibid._ 1883. Post-graduate, Lane\n Theological Seminary, University of Berlin, and Oxford.\n Headmaster High School, Salem, Mass., 1862-64; Assistant\n Professor of Mathematics, Washington University, St. Louis,\n 1864-66; Tileston Professor of Political Economy, _ibid._\n 1866-69; Professor of Logic and the Philosophy of Science,\n Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1871-79; Lecturer on\n Ethics, Harvard University, 1879-80; Lecturer on Logic and\n Speculative Philosophy, University of Michigan, 1883-84.\n Member and vice-president St. Louis Philosophical Society;\n member California Historical Society; American Historical\n Association; American Association for the Advancement of\n Science; National Geographic Society, etc. Author of\n _Treatise on Analytic Geometry_, 1869; _The Limits of\n Evolution_, 1901, 2d edition, 1904; joint author and editor\n of _The Conception of God_, 1897, etc. Editor Philosophical\n Publications of University of California; American Editorial\n Representative _Hibbert Journal_, London.]\n\n\nThe duty has been assigned me, honored colleagues, of addressing you on\nthe Fundamental Conceptions and the Methods of our common\npursuit--philosophy. In endeavoring to deal with the subject in a way\nnot unworthy of its depth and its extent, I have found it impossible to\nbring the essential material within less compass than would occupy, in\nreading, at least four times the period granted by our programme. I have\ntherefore complied with the rule of the Congress which directs that, if\na more extended writing be left with the authorities for publication,\nthe reading must be restricted to such a portion of it as will not\nexceed the allotted time. I will accordingly read to you, first, a brief\nsummary of my entire discussion, by way of introduction, and then an\nexcerpt from the larger document, which may serve for a _specimen_, as\nour scholastic predecessors used to say, of the whole inquiry I have\ncarried out. The impression will, of course, be fragmentary, and I must\nask beforehand for your most benevolent allowances, to prevent a\njudgment too unfavorable.\n\nThe discussion naturally falls into two main parts: the first dealing\nwith the Fundamental Conceptions; and the second, with the Methods.\n\nIn the former, after presenting the conception of philosophy itself, as\n_the consideration of things in the light of the whole_, I take up the\ninvolved Fundamental Concepts in the following order:--\n\n I. Whole and Part;\n\n II. Subject and Object (Knowing and Being, Mind and Matter; Dualism,\n Materialism, Idealism);\n\n III. Reality and Appearance (Noumenon and Phenomenon);\n\n IV. Cause and Effect (Ground and Consequence; Causal System);\n\n V. One and Many (Number System; Monism and Pluralism);\n\n VI. Time and Space (their relation to Number; their Origin and\n Real Meaning);\n\n VII. Unconditioned and Conditioned (Soul, World, God; their\n Reinterpretation in terms of Pluralism);\n\n VIII. The True, the Beautiful, the Good (their relation to the\n question between Monism and Pluralism).\n\nThese are successively dealt with as they rise one out of the other in\nthe process of interpreting them and applying them in the actual\ncreation of philosophy, as this goes on in the historic schools. The\ntheoretic progress of philosophy is in this way explained by them, in\nits movement from natural dualism, or realism, through the successive\nforms of monism, materialistic, agnostic, and idealistic, until it\nreaches the issue, now coming so strongly forward within the school of\nidealism, between the adherents of monism and those of pluralism.\n\nThe importance of the Fundamental Concepts is shown to increase as we\npass along the list, till on reaching Cause and Effect, and entering\nupon its full interpretation into the complete System of Causes, we\narrive at the very significant conception of the RECIPROCITY OF FIRST\nCAUSES, and through it come to the PRIMACY OF FINAL CAUSE, and the\nderivative position of the other forms of cause, Material, Formal,\nEfficient. The philosophic strength of idealism, but especially of\nidealistic pluralism, comes into clear light as the result of this stage\nof the inquiry. But it appears yet more decidedly when One and Many,\nTime and Space, and their interrelations, are subjected to analysis. So\nthe discussion next passes to the higher conceptions, Soul, World, God,\nby the pathway of the correlation Unconditioned and Conditioned, and its\nkindred contrasts Absolute and Relative, Necessary and Contingent,\nInfinite and Finite, corroborating and reinforcing the import of\nidealism, and, still more decidedly, that of its plural form. Finally,\nthe strong and favorable bearing of this last on the dissolution of\nagnosticism and the habilitation of the ideals, the True, the Beautiful,\nand the Good, in a heightened meaning, is brought out.\n\nThis carries the inquiry to the second part of it, that of the\nPhilosophical Methods. Here I recount these in a series of six: the\nDogmatic, the Skeptical, the Critical, the Pragmatic, the Genetic, the\nDialectic. These, I show, in spite of the tendency of the earlier\nmembers in the series to over-emphasis, all have their place and\nfunction in the development of a complete philosophy, and in fact form\nan ascending series in methodic effectiveness, all that precede the last\nbeing taken up into the comprehensive Critical Rationalism of the last.\nMethodology thus passes upward, over the ascending and widening roadways\nof (1) Intuition and Deduction; (2) Experience and Induction; (3)\nIntuition and Experience adjusted by Critical Limits; (4) Skepticism\nreinforced and made _quasi_-affirmative by Desire and Will; (5)\nEmpiricism enlarged by substitution of cosmic and psychic history for\nsubjective consciousness; (6) Enlightened return to a Rationalism\ncritically established by the inclusion of the preceding elements, and\nby the sifting and the grading of the Fundamental Concepts through their\nbehavior when tested by the effort to make them universal. In this way,\nthe methods fall into a System, the organic principle of which is this\nprinciple of Dialectic, which proves itself alone able to establish\n_necessary_ truths; that is, _truths indeed_,--judgments that are seen\nto exclude their opposites, because, in the attempt to substitute the\nopposite, the place of it is still filled by the judgment which it aims\nto dislodge.\n\nAnd now, with your favoring leave, I will read the excerpt from my\nlarger text.\n\nThe task to which, in an especial sense, the cultivators of philosophy\nare summoned by the plans of the present Congress of Arts and Science,\nis certainly such as to stir an ambition to achieve it. At the same\ntime, it tempers eagerness by its vast difficulty, and the apprehension\nlest this may prove insuperable. The task, the officers of the Congress\ntell us, is no less than to promote the unification of all human\nknowledge. It requires, then, the reduction of the enormous detail in\nour present miscellany of sciences and arts, which to a general glance,\nor even to a more intimate view, presents a confusion of differences\nthat seems overwhelming, to a system nevertheless clearly\nharmonious,--founded, that is to say, upon universal principles which\ncontrol all differences by explaining them, and which therefore, in the\nlast resort, themselves flow lucidly from a single supreme principle.\nSimply to state this meaning of the task set us, is enough to awaken the\ndoubt of its practicability.\n\nThis doubt, we are bound to confess, has more and more impressed itself\nupon the general mind, the farther this has advanced in the experience\nof scientific discovery. The very increase in the multiplicity and\ncomplexity of facts and their causal groupings increases the feeling\nthat at the root of things there is \"a final inexplicability\"--total\nreality seems, more and more, too vast, too profound, for us to grasp or\nto fathom. And yet, strangely enough, this increasing sense of\nmysterious vastness has not in the least prevented the modern mind from\nmore and more asserting, with a steadily increasing insistence, the\nessential and unchangeable unity of that whole of things which to our\nordinary experience, and even to all our sciences, appears such an\nendless and impenetrable complex of differences,--yes, of\ncontradictions. In fact, this assertion of the unity of all things,\nunder the favorite name of the Unity of Nature, is the pet dogma of\nmodern science; or, rather, to speak with right accuracy, it is the\nstock-in-trade of a _philosophy_ of science, current among many of the\nleaders of modern science; for every such assertion, covering, as it\ntacitly and unavoidably does, a view about the absolute whole, is an\nassertion belonging to the province of philosophy, before whose tribunal\nit must come for the assessment of its value. The presuppositions of all\nthe special sciences, and, above all, this presupposition of the Unity\nand Uniformity of Nature, common to all of them, must thus come back for\njustification and requisite definition to philosophy--that uppermost and\nall-inclusive form of cognition which addresses itself to the whole as\nwhole. In their common assertion of the Unity of Nature, the exponents\nof modern science come unawares out of their own province into quite\nanother and a higher; and in doing so they show how unawares they come,\nby presenting in most instances the curious spectacle of proclaiming at\nonce their increasing belief in the unity of things, and their\nincreasing disbelief in its penetrability by our intelligence:--\n\n _In's Innere der Natur,\n Dringt kein erschaffner Geist,_\n\nis their chosen poet's expression of their philosophic mood. Curious we\nhave the right to call this state of the scientific mind, because it is\nto critical reflection so certainly self-contradictory. How can there be\na real unity belonging to what is inscrutable?--what evidence of unity\ncan there be, except in intelligible and explanatory continuity?\n\nBut, at all events, this very mood of agnostic self-contradiction, into\nwhich the development of the sciences casts such a multitude of minds,\nbrings them,--brings all of us,--as already indicated, into that court\nof philosophy where alone such issues lawfully belong, and where alone\nthey can be adjudicated. If the unification of the sciences can be made\nout to be real by making out its sole sufficient condition, namely, that\nthere is a genuine, and not a merely nominal, unity in the whole of\nreality itself,--a unity that explains because it is itself, not simply\nintelligible, but the only completely intelligible of things,--this\ndesirable result must be the work of philosophy. However difficult the\ntask may be, it is rightly put upon us who belong to the Department\nlisted first among the twenty-four in the programme of this\nrepresentative Congress.\n\nI cannot but express my own satisfaction, as a member of this\nDepartment, nor fail to extend my congratulations to you who are my\ncolleagues in it, that the Congress, in its programme, takes openly the\naffirmative on this question of the possible unification of knowledge.\nThe Congress has thus declared beforehand for the practicability of the\ntask it sets. It has even declared for its not distant accomplishment;\nindeed, not impossibly, its accomplishment through the transactions of\nthe Congress itself; and it indicates, by no uncertain signs, the\nleading, the determining part that philosophy must have in the\nachievement. In fact, the authorities of the Congress themselves suggest\na solution of their own for their problem. In their programme we see a\nrenewed Hierarchy of the Sciences, and at the summit of this appears now\nagain, after so long a period of humiliating obscuration, the figure of\nPhilosophy, raised anew to that supremacy, as Queen of the Sciences,\nwhich had been hers from the days of Plato to those of Copernicus, but\nwhich she began to lose when modern physical and historical research\nentered upon its course of sudden development, and which, until\nrecently, she has continued more and more to lose as the sciences have\nadvanced in their career of discoveries,--ever more unexpected, more\nastonishing, yet more convincing and more helpful to the welfare of\nmankind. May this sign of her recovered empire not fail! If we rejoice\nat the token, the Congress has made it our part to see that the title is\nvindicated. It is ours to show this normative function of philosophy,\nthis power to reign as the unifying discipline in the entire realm of\nour possible knowledge; to show it by showing that the very nature of\nphilosophy--its elemental concepts and its directing ideals, its methods\ntaken in their systematic succession--is such as must result in a view\nof universal reality that will supply the principle at once giving rise\nto all the sciences and connecting them all into one harmonious whole.\n\nSuch, and so grave, my honored colleagues, is the duty assigned to this\nhour. Sincerely can I say, Would it had fallen to stronger hands than\nmine! But since to mine it has been committed, I will undertake it in no\ndisheartened spirit; rather, in that temper of animated hope in which\nthe whole Congress has been conceived and planned. And I draw\nencouragement from the place, and its associations, where we are\nassembled--from its historic connections not only with the external\nexpansion of our country, but with its growth in culture, and especially\nwith its growth in the cultivation of philosophy. For your speaker, at\nleast, can never forget that here in St. Louis, the metropolis of the\nregion by which our national domain was in the Louisiana Purchase so\nenlarged,--here was the centre of a movement in philosophic study that\nhas proved to be of national import. It is fitting that we all, here\nto-day, near to the scene itself, commemorate the public service done by\nour present National Commissioner of Education and his group of\nenthusiastic associates, in beginning here, in the middle years of the\npreceding century, those studies of Kant and his great idealistic\nsuccessors that unexpectedly became the nucleus of a wider and more\npenetrating study of philosophy in all parts of our country. It is with\nquickened memories belonging to the spot where, more than\nfive-and-thirty years ago, it was my happy fortune to take some part\nwith Dr. Harris and his companions, that I begin the task assigned me.\nThe undertaking seems less hopeless when I can here recall the names and\nthe congenial labors of Harris, of Davidson, of Brockmeyer, of Snider,\nof Watters, of Jones,--half of them now gone from life. They \"builded\nbetter than they knew;\" and, humbly as they may themselves have\nestimated their ingenuous efforts to gain acquaintance with the greatest\nthoughts, history will not fail to take note of what they did, as\nmarking one of the turning-points in the culture of our nation. The\npublication of the _Journal of Speculative Philosophy_, granting all the\nsubtractions claimed by its critics on the score of defects (of which\nits conductors were perhaps only too sensible), was an influence that\ntold in all our circles of philosophical study, and thence in the whole\nof our social as well as our academic life.\n\n * * * * *\n\n[Here I enter upon the discussion of the subject proper, beginning, as\nabove indicated, with the Fundamental Conceptions. Having followed these\nthrough the contrasts Whole and Part, Subject and Object, Reality and\nAppearance (or Noumenon and Phenomenon), and developed the bearing of\nthese on the procedure of thought from the dualism of natural realism to\nmaterialism and thence to idealism, with the issue now coming on, in\nthis last, between monism and pluralism, I strike into the contrast\nCause and Effect, and, noting its unfolding into the more comprehensive\nform of Ground and Consequence, go on thence as follows:]\n\n * * * * *\n\nIt is plain that the contrast Ground and Consequence will enable us to\nstate the new issue with closer precision and pertinence than Reality\nand Appearance, Noumenon and Phenomenon, can supply; while, at the same\ntime, Ground and Consequence exhibits Cause and Effect as presenting a\ncontrast that only fulfills what Noumenon and Phenomenon foretold and\nstrove towards; in fact, what was more remotely, but not less surely,\nalso indicated by Whole and Part, Knowing and Being, Subject and Object.\nFor in penetrating to the coherent meaning of these conceptions, the\nphilosophic movement, as we saw, advanced steadily to the fuller and\nfuller translating of each of them into the reality that unifies _by\nexplanation_, instead of pretending to explain by merely unifying; and\nthis, of course, will now be put forward explicitly, in the clarified\ncategory of Cause and Effect, transfigured from a physical into a purely\nlogical relation. What idealism now says, in terms of this, is that the\nCause (or, as we now read it, the Ground) of all that exists is the\nSubject; is Mind, the intelligently Self-conscious; and that all things\nelse, the mere objects, material things, are its Consequence, its\nOutcome,--in that sense its Effect. And what the new pluralistic\nidealism says, is that the _assemblage of individual minds_--intelligence\nbeing essentially personal and individual, and never merely universal\nand collective--is the true total Cause of all, and that every mind thus\nbelongs to the order of First Causes; nevertheless, that part, and the\nmost significant part, of the nature of every mind, essential to its\npersonality and its reason, is _its recognition of other minds in the\nvery act of its own self-definition_. That is to say, a mind by its\nspontaneous nature as intelligence, by its intrinsic rational or logical\ngenius, puts itself as member of a _system_ of minds; all minds are put\nby each other as Ends--completely standard and sacred Objects, as much\nparts of the system of true Causes as each is, in its capacity of\nSubject; and we have a noumenal Reality that is properly to be described\nas the eternal Federal Republic of Spirits.\n\nConsequently, the relation of Cause and Effect now expands and heightens\ninto a system of the RECIPROCITY OF FIRST CAUSES; causes, that is,\nwhich, while all coefficients in the existence and explanation of that\nnatural world of experience which forms their passive effect, their\nobjects of mere perception, are themselves related only in the higher\nway of Final Causes--that is, Defining-Bases and Ends--of each other,\nmaking them the logical Complements, and the Objects of conduct, all for\neach, and each for all. Hence, the system of causation undergoes a\nsignal transformation, and proves to be organized by Final Cause as its\nbasis and root, instead of by Efficient Cause, or Originating Ground, as\nthe earlier stages of thinking had always assumed.\n\nThe causal relation between the absolute or primary realities being\npurely Final, or Defining and Purposive; that is to say, the uncoercive\ninfluence of recognition and ideality; all the other forms of cause, as\ngrouped by Aristotle,--Material, Formal, and Efficient,--are seen to be\nthe derivatives of Final Cause, as being supplied by the action of the\nminds that, as absolute or underived realities, exist only in the\nrelation of mutual Complements and Ends. Accordingly, Efficient Cause\noperates only from minds, as noumena, to matter, as their phenomenon,\ntheir presented contents of experience; or, in a secondary and\nderivative sense, from one phenomenon to another, or from one group of\nphenomena to another group, these playing the part of transmitters, or\n(as some logicians would say) Instrumental Causes, or Means. Cause, as\nMaterial, is hence defined as the elementary phenomenon, and the\ncombinations of this; and therefore, strictly taken, is merely Effect\n(or Outcome) of the self-active consciousness, whose spontaneous forms\nof conception and perception become the Formal Cause that organizes the\nsum of phenomena into cosmic harmony or unity.\n\nHere, accordingly, comes into view the further and in some respects\ndeeper conceptual pair, Many and One. The history of philosophic thought\nproves that this antithesis is darkly obscure and deeply ambiguous; for\nabout it have centred a large part of the conflicts of doctrine. This\npair has already been used, implicitly, in exhibiting the development of\nthe preceding group, Cause and Effect; and in so using it we have\nsupplied ourselves with a partial clarification of it, and with one\npossible solution of its ambiguity. We have seen, namely, how our strong\nnatural persuasion that philosophy guided by the fundamental concept\nCause must become the search for the One amid the wilderness of the\nMany, and that this search cannot be satisfied and ended except in an\nall-inclusive Unit, in which the Many is embraced as the integral and\noriginated parts, completely determined, subjected, and controlled, may\ngive way to another and less oppressive conception of unity; a\nconception of it as the harmony among many free and independent primary\nrealities, a harmony founded on their intelligent and reasonable mutual\nrecognition. This conception casts at least _some_ clearing light upon\nthe long and dreary disputes over the Many and the One; for it exposes,\nplainly, the main source of them. They have arisen out of two chief\nambiguities,--the ambiguity of the concept One, and the ambiguity of the\nconcept Cause in its supreme meaning. The normal contrast between the\nOne and the Many is a clear and simple contrast: the One is the single\nunit, and the Many is the repetition of the unit, or is the collection\nof the several units. But if we go on to suppose that there is a\ncollection or sum of all possible units, and call this the Whole, then,\nsince there can be no second such, we call it also \"one\" (or the One, by\nway of pre\u00ebminence), overlooking the fact that it differs from the\nsimple one, or unit, _in genere_; that it is in fact not a unit at all,\nnot an elementary member of a series, but the annulment of all series;\nthat our name \"one\" has profoundly changed its meaning, and now stands\nfor the Sole, the Only. Thus, by our forgetfulness of differences, we\nfall into deep water, and, with the confused illusions of the drowning,\ndream of the One and All as the single _punctum originationis_ of all\nthings, the Source and Begetter of the very units of which it is in\nreality only the resultant and the derivative. Or, from another point of\nview, and in another mood, we rightly enough take the One to mean the\ncoherent, the intelligible, the consistent, the harmonious; and putting\nthe Many, on the misleading hint of its contrast to the unit, in\nantithesis to this One of harmony, we fall into the belief that the Many\ncannot be harmonious, is intrinsically a cluster of repulsions or of\ncollisions, incapable of giving rise to accord; indeed, essentially\nhostile to it. So, as accord is the aim and the essence of our reason,\nwe are caught in the snare of monism, pluralism having apparently become\nthe equivalent of chaos, and thus the _b\u00eate noir_ of rational\nmetaphysics. Nay, in the opposed camp itself, some of the most ardent\nadherents of pluralism, the liveliest of wit, the most exuberant in\nliterary resources, are the abjectest believers in the hopeless\ndisjunction and capriciousness of the plural, and hold there is a rift\nin the texture of reality that no intelligence, \"even though you dub it\n'the Absolute,'\" can mend or reach across. Yet surely there is nothing\nin the Many, as a sum of units, the least at war with the One as a\nsystem of harmony. On the contrary, even in the pure form of the Number\nSeries, the Many is impossible except on the principle of harmony,--the\nunits can be collected and summed (that is, constitute the Many), only\nif they cohere in a community of intrinsic kindred. Consequently the\nwhole question of the chaotic or the harmonic nature of a plural world\nturns on the nature of the genus which we find characteristic of the\nabsolutely (_i. e._, the unreservedly) real, and which is to be taken as\nthe common denomination enabling us to count them and to sum them. When\nminds are seen to be necessarily the primary realities, but _also\nnecessarily federal_ as well as individual, the illusion about the\nessential disjunction and non-coherence of the plurally real dissolves\naway, and a primordial world of manifold persons is seen to involve no\nfundamental or hopeless anarchy of individualism, irreducible in\ncaprice, but an indwelling principle of harmony, rather, that from the\nsprings of individual being intends the control and composure of all the\ndisorders that mark the world of experiential appearance, and so must\ntend perpetually to effect this.\n\nThe other main source of our confusions over the Many and the One is the\nvariety of meaning hidden in the concept Cause, and our propensity to\ntake its most obvious but least significant sense for its supreme\nintent. Closest at hand, in experience, is our productive causation of\nchanges in our sense-world, and hence most obvious is that reading of\nCause which takes it as the producer of changes and, with a deeper\ncomprehension of it, of the inalterable linkage between changes, whereby\none follows regularly and surely upon another. Thus what we have in\nphilosophy agreed to call Efficient Cause comes to be mistaken for the\nprofoundest and the supreme form of cause, and all the other modes of\ncause, the Material (or Stuff), the Form (or Conception), and the End\n(or Purpose), its consequent and derivative auxiliaries. Under the\ninfluence of this strong impression, we either assume total reality to\nbe One Whole, all-embracing and all-producing of its manifold modes, or\nelse view it as a duality, consisting of One Creator and his manifold\ncreatures. So it has come about that metaphysics has hitherto been\nchiefly a contention between pantheism and monotheism, or, as the latter\nshould for greater accuracy be called, monarchotheism; and, it must be\nacknowledged, this struggle has been attended by a continued (though not\ncontinual) decline of this later dualistic theory before the steadfast\nfront and unyielding advance of the older monism. Thus persistent has\nbeen the assumption that harmony can only be assured by the unity given\nin some single productive causation: the only serious uncertainty has\nbeen about the most rational way of conceiving the operation of this\nSole Cause; and this doubt has thus far, on the whole, declined in favor\nof the Elder Oriental or monistic conception, as against the Hebraic\nconception of extraneous creation by fiat. The frankly confessed mystery\nof the latter, its open appeal to miracle, places it at a fatal\ndisadvantage with the Elder Orientalism, when the appeal is to reason\nand intelligibility. It is therefore no occasion for wonder that,\nespecially since the rise of the scientific doctrine of Evolution, with\nits postulate of a universal unity, self-varying yet self-fulfilling,\neven the leaders of theology are more and more falling into the monistic\nline and swelling the ever-growing ranks of pantheism. If it be asked\nhere, _And why not?_--_where is the harm of it?_--_is not the whole\nquestion simply of what is true_? the answer is, _The mortal harm of the\ndestruction of personality, which lives or dies with the preservation or\ndestruction of individual responsibility; while the completer truth is,\nthat there are other and profounder (or, if you please, higher) truths\nthan this of explanation by Efficient Cause_. In fact, there is a higher\nconception of Cause itself than this of production, or efficiency; for,\nof course, as we well might say, that alone can be the supreme\nconception of Cause which can subsist between absolute or unreserved\nrealities, and such must exclude their production or their necessitating\ncontrol by others. So that we ought long since to have realized that\nFinal Cause, the recognized presence to each other as unconditioned\nrealities, or Defining Auxiliaries and Ends, is the sole causal relation\nthat can hold among primary realities; though among such it _can_ hold,\nand in fact must.\n\nFor the absolute reality of personal intelligences, at once individual\nand universally recognizant of others, is called for by other\nconceptions fundamental to philosophy. These other fundamental concepts\ncan no more be counted out or ignored than those we have hitherto\nconsidered; and when we take them up, we shall see how vastly more\nsignificant they are. They alone will prove supreme, truly organizing,\nnormative; they alone can introduce gradation in truths, for they alone\nintroduce the judgment of worth, of valuation; they alone can give us\ncounsels of perfection, for they alone rise from those elements in our\nbeing which deal with ideals and with veritable Ideas. So let us proceed\nto them.\n\n * * * * *\n\nOur path into their presence, however, is through another pair, not so\nplainly antithetic as those we have thus far considered. This pair that\nI now mean is Time and Space, which, though not obviously antinomic, yet\nowes its existence, as can now be shown, to that profoundest of\nconcept-contrasts which we earlier considered under the head of Subject\nand Object, when the Object takes on its only adequate form of Other\nSubject. But in passing from the contrast One and Many towards its\nrational transformation into the moral society of Mind and Companion\nMinds, we break into this pair of Time and Space, and must make our way\nthrough it by taking in its full meaning.\n\nTime and Space play an enormous part in all our empirical thinking, our\nactual use of thought in our sense-perceptive life. And no wonder; for,\nin co\u00f6peration, they form the postulate and condition of all our\npossible sensuous consciousness. Only on them as backgrounds can thought\ntake on the peculiar clearness of an image or a picture; only on the\nscreens which they supply can we literally _depict_ an object. And this\nclarity of outline and boundary is so dear to our ordinary\nconsciousness, that we are prone to say there is no sufficient, no real\nclearness, unless we can clarify by the bounds either of place or of\ndate, or of both. In this mood, we are led to deny the reality and\nvalidity of thought altogether, when it cannot be defined in the metes\nand bounds afforded by Time or by Space: that which has no date nor\nplace, we say,--no extent and no duration,--cannot be real; it is but a\npseudo-thought, a pretense and a delusion. Here is the extremely\nplausible foundation of the philosophy known as sensationism, the\nrefined or second-thought form of materialism, in which it begins its\neuthanasia into idealism.\n\nWithout delaying here to criticise this, let us notice the part that\nTime and Space play in reference to the conceptual pair we last\nconsidered, the One and the Many; for not otherwise shall we find our\nway beyond them to the still more fundamental conceptions which we are\nnow aiming to reach. Indeed, it is through our surface-apprehension of\nthe pair One and Many, as this illumines experience, that we most\nnaturally come at the pair Time and Space; so that these are at first\ntaken for mere generalizations and abstractions, the purely nominal\nrepresentatives of the actual distinctions between the members of the\nMany by our sense perception of this from that, of here from there, of\nnow from then. It is not till our reflective attention is fixed on the\nfact that _there_ and _here_, _now_ and _then_, are _peculiar_\ndistinctions, wholly different from other contrasts of this with\nthat,--which may be made in all sorts of ways, by difference of quality,\nor of quantity, or of relations quite other than place and date,--it is\nnot till we realize this _peculiar_ character of the Time-contrast and\nthe Space-contrast, that we see these singular differential _qualia_\ncannot be derived from others, not even from the contrast One and Many,\nbut are independent, are themselves underived and spontaneous utterances\nof our intelligent, our percipient nature. But when Kant first helped\nmankind to the realization of this spontaneous (or _a priori_) character\nof this pair of perceptive conditions, or Sense-Forms, he fell into the\npersuasion, and led the philosophic world into it, that though Time and\nSpace are not derivatives of the One and the Many read as the numerical\naspect of our perceptive experiences, yet there _is_ between the two\npairs a connection of dependence as intimate as that first supposed, but\nin exactly the opposite sense; namely, that the One and the Many are\nconditioned by Time and Space, or, when it comes to the last resort, are\nat any rate completely dependent upon Time. By a series of units, this\nview means, we really understand a set of items discriminated and\nrelated either as points or as instants: in the last analysis, as\ninstants: that is, it is impossible to apprehend a unit, or to count and\nsum units, unless the unit is taken as an instant, and the units as so\nmany instants. Numbers, Kant holds, are no doubt pure (or quite\nunsensuous) percepts,--discerned particulars,--therefore spontaneous\nproducts of the mind _a priori_, but made possible only by the primary\npure percept Time, or, again, through the mediation of this, by the\nconjoined pure percept Space; so that the numbers, in their own pure\ncharacter, are simply the instants in their series. As the instants, and\ntherefore the numbers, are pure percepts,--particulars discerned without\nthe help of sense,--so pure percepts, in a primal and comprehensive\nsense, argues Kant, must their conditioning postulates Time and Space\nbe, to supply the \"element,\" or \"medium,\" that will render such pure\npercepts possible.\n\nThis doctrine of Kant's is certainly plausible; indeed, it is\nimpressively so; and it has taken a vast hold in the world of science,\nand has reinforced the popular belief in the unreality of thought apart\nfrom Time and Space; an unreality which it is an essential part of\nKant's system to establish critically. But as a graver result, it has\ncertainly tended to discredit the belief in personal identity as an\nabiding and immutable reality, enthroned over the mutations of things in\nTime and Space; since all that is in these is numbered and is mutable,\nand is rather many than one, yet nothing is believed real except as it\nfalls under them, at any rate under Time. And with this decline of the\nbelief in a changeless self, has declined, almost as rapidly and\nextensively, the belief in immortality. Or, rather, the permanence and\nthe identity of the person has faded into a question regarded as\nunanswerable; though none the less does this agnostic state of belief\ntend to take personality, in any responsible sense of the word, out of\nthe region of practical concern. With what is unknowable, even if\nexisting, we can have no active traffic; 't is for our conduct as if it\nwere not.\n\nSo it behooves us to search if this prevalent view about the relation of\nOne and Many to Time and Space is trustworthy and exact. What place and\nfunction in philosophy must Space and Time be given?--for they certainly\nhave a place and function; they certainly are among the inexpugnable\nconceptions with which thought has to concern itself when it undertakes\nto gain a view of the whole. But it may be easy to give them a larger\nplace and function than belong to them by right. Is it true, then, that\nthe One and the Many--that the system of Numbers, in short--are\nunthinkable except as in Space and Time, or, at any rate, in Time? Or,\nto put the question more exactly, as well as more gravely and more\npertinently, Are Space and Time the true _principia individui_, and is\nTime pre\u00ebminently the ultimate _principium individuationis_? Is there\naccordingly no individuality, and no society, no associative assemblage,\nexcept in the fleeting world of phenomena, dated and placed? Simply to\nask the question, and thus bring out the full drift of this Kantian\ndoctrine, is almost to expose the absurdity of it. Such a doctrine,\nthough it may be wisely refusing to confound personality, true\nindividuality, with the mere logical singular; nay, worse, with a\nlimited and special illustration of the singular, the one _here_ or the\none _there_, the one _now_ or the one _then_; nevertheless, by confining\nnumerability to things material and sensible, makes personal identity\nsomething unmeaning or impossible, and destroys part of the foundation\nfor the relations of moral responsibility. Though the vital trait of the\nperson, his genuine individuality, doubtless lies, not in his being\nexactly numerable, but in his being aboriginal and originative; in a\nword, in his self-activity, in his being a centre of autonomous social\nrecognition; yet exactly numerable he indeed is, and must be, not\nconfusable with any other, else his professed autonomy, his claim of\nrights and his sense of duty, can have no significance, must vanish in\nthe universal confusion belonging to the indefinite. Nor, on the other\nhand, is it at all true that a number has to be a point or an instant,\nnor that things when numbered and counted are implicitly pinned upon\npoints or, at all events, upon instants. It may well enough be the fact\nthat in our empirical use of number we have to employ Time, or even\nSpace, but it is a gaping _non sequitur_ to conclude that we therefore\ncan count nothing but the placed and the dated. Certainly we count\nwhenever we _distinguish_,--by whatever means, on whatever ground. To\nthink is, in general, at least to \"distinguish the things that differ;\"\nbut this will not avail except we keep account of the differences; hence\nthe One and the Many lie in the very bosom of intelligence, and this\nfundamental and spontaneous contrast can not only rive Time and Space\ninto expressions of it, in instants and in points, but travels with\nthought from its start to its goal, and as organic factor in\nmathematical science does indeed, as Plato in the _Republic_ said, deal\nwith absolute being, if yet dreamwise; so that One and Many, and Many as\nthe sum of the ones, makes part of the measure of that primally real\nworld which the world of minds alone can be. If the contrast One and\nMany can pass the bounds of the merely phenomenal, by passing the\ntemporal and the spatial; if it applies to universal being, to the\nnoumenal as well as to the phenomenal; then the absolutely real world,\nso far as concerns this essential condition, can be a world of genuine\nindividuals, identifiable, free, abiding, responsible, and there can be\na real moral order; if not, then there can be no such moral world, and\nthe deeper thought-conceptions to which we now approach must be\nregarded, at the best, as fair illusions, bare ideals, which the serious\ndevotee of truth must shun, except in such moments of vacancy and\nleisure as he may venture to surrender, at intervals, to purely hedonic\nuses. But if the One and the Many are not dependent on Time and Space,\ntheir universal validity is possible; and it has already been shown that\nthey are not so dependent, are not thus restricted.\n\nAnd now it remains to show their actual universality, by exhibiting\ntheir place in the structure of the absolutely real; since nobody calls\nin question their pertinence to the world of phenomena. But their\nnoumenal applicability follows from their essential implication with all\nand every difference: no difference, no distinction, that does not carry\ncounting; and this is quite as true as that there can be no counting\nwithout difference. The One and the Many thus root in Identity and\nDifference, pass up into fuller expression in Universal and Particular,\nhold forward into Cause and Effect, attain their commanding presentation\nin the Reciprocity of First Causes, and so keep record of the contrast\nbetween Necessity and Contingency. In short, they are founded in, and in\ntheir turn help (indispensably) to express, _all_ the categories,--Quality,\nQuantity, Relation, Modality. Nor do they suffer arrest there; they hold\nin the ideals, the True, the Beautiful, the Good, and in the primary\nIdeas, the Self, the World, and God. For all of these differ, however\nclose their logical linkage may be; and in so far as they differ, each\nof them is a counted unit, and so they are many. And, most profoundly of\nall, One and Many take footing in absolute reality so soon as we realize\nthat nothing short of intelligent being can be primordially real,\nunderived, and truly causal, and that intelligence is, by its idea, at\nonce an _I_-thinking and a universal recognizant outlook upon others\nthat think _I_.\n\nHence Number, so far from being the derivative of Time and Space,\nfounds, at the bottom, in the self-definition and social recognition of\nintelligent beings, and so finds _a priori_ a valid expression in Time\nand in Space, as well as in every other primitive and spontaneous form\nin which intelligence utters itself. The Pythagorean doctrine of the\nrank of Number in the scale of realities is only one remove from the\ntruth: though the numbers are indeed not the Prime Beings, they do enter\ninto the essential nature of the Prime Beings; are, so to speak, the\norgan of their definite reality and identity, and for that reason go\nforward into the entire defining procedure by which these intelligences\norganize their world of experiences. And the popular impression that\nTime and Space are derivatives from Number, is in one aspect the truth,\nrather than the doctrine of Kant is; for though they are not mere\ngeneralizations and abstractions from numbered dates and durations,\nplaces and extents, they do exist as relating-principles which minds\nsimply _put_, as the conditions _of perceptive experiences_; which by\nthe nature of intelligence they must number in order to have and to\nmaster; while Number itself, the contrast of One and Many, enters into\nthe very being of minds, and therefore still holds in Time and in Space,\nwhich are the organs, or _media_, not of the whole being of the mind,\nbut only of that region of it constituted by sensation,--the material,\nthe disjunct, the empirical. Besides, the logical priority of Number is\nimplied in the fact that minds in putting Time and Space _a priori_ must\ncount them as two, since they discriminate them with complete clearness,\nso that it is impossible to work up Space out of Time (as Berkeley and\nStuart Mill so adroitly, but so vainly, attempted to do), or Time out of\nSpace (as Hegel, with so little adroitness and such patent failure,\nattempted to do). No; there Time and Space stand, fixed and\ninconfusable, incapable of mutual transmutation, and thus the ground of\nan abiding difference between the inner or psychic sense-world and the\nouter or physical, between the subjective and the (sensibly) objective.\nBy means of them, the world of minds discerns and bounds securely\nbetween the privacy of each and the publicity, the life \"out of doors,\"\nwhich is common to all; between the cohering isolation of the individual\nand the communicating action of the society. Indeed, as from this\nattained point of view we can now clearly see, the real ground of the\ndifference between Time and Space, and hence between subjective\nperception and the objective existence of physical things, is in the\nfact that a mind, in _being_ such,--in its very act of\nself-definition,--correlates itself with a _society_ of minds, and so,\nto fulfill its nature, in so far as this includes a world of\nexperiences, must form its experience socially as well as privately, and\nhence will put forth a condition of sensuous communication, as well as a\ncondition of inner sensation. Thus the dualization of the sense-world\ninto inner and outer, psychic and physical, subjective and objective,\nrests at last on the intrinsically social nature of conscious being;\nrests on the twofold structure, logically dichotomous, of the\nself-defining act; and we get the explanation, from the nature of\nintelligence as such, why the Sense-Forms are necessarily two, and only\ntwo. It is no accident that we experience all things sensible in Time or\nin Space, or in both together; it is the natural expression of our\nprimally intelligent being, concerned as that is, directly and only,\nwith our self and its logically necessary complement, the other selves;\nand so the natural order, in its two discriminated but complemental\nportions, the inner and the outer, is founded in that moral order which\nis given in the fundamental act of our intelligence. It is this resting\nof Space upon our veritable Objects, the Other Subjects, that imparts to\nit its externalizing quality, so that things in it are referred to the\ntesting of all minds, not to ours only, and are reckoned external\nbecause measured by that which is alone indeed other than we.\n\nIn this way we may burst the restricting limit which so much of\nphilosophy, and so much more of ordinary opinion, has drawn about our\nmental powers in view of this contrast Time and Space, especially with\nreference to the One and the Many, and to the persuasion that plural\ndistinctions, at any rate, cannot belong in the region of absolute\nreality. Ordinary opinion either inclines to support a philosophy that\nis skeptical of either Unity or Plurality being pertinent beyond Time\nand Space, and thus to hold by agnosticism, or, if it affects\naffirmative metaphysics, tends to prefer monism to pluralism, when the\nnumber-category is carried up into immutable regions: to represent the\nabsolutely real as One, somehow seems less contradictory of the \"fitness\nof things\" than to represent it as Many; moreover, carrying the Many\ninto that supreme region, by implying the belonging there of mortals\nsuch as we, seems shocking to customary piety, and full of extravagant\npresumption. Still, nothing short of this can really satisfy our deep\ndemand for a moral order, a personal responsibility, nay, an adequate\nlogical fulfillment of our conception of a self as an _intelligence_;\nwhile the clarification which a rational pluralism supplies for such\ningrained puzzles in the theory of knowledge as that of the source and\nfinality of the contrast Time and Space, to mention no others, should\nafford a strong corroborative evidence in its behalf. And, as already\nsaid, this view enables us to pass the limit which Time and Space are so\noften supposed to put, hopelessly, upon our concepts of the ideal grade,\nthe springs of all our aspiration. To these, then, we may now pass.\n\n * * * * *\n\nWe reach them through the doorways of the Necessary _vs._ the\nContingent, the Unconditioned _vs._ the Conditioned, the Infinite _vs._\nthe Finite, the Absolute _vs._ the Relative; and we recognize them as\nour profoundest foundation-concepts, alone deserving, as Kant so\npertinently said, the name of IDEAS,--the Soul, the World, and God.\nAssociated with them are what we may call our three Forms of the\nIdeal,--the True, the Beautiful, the Good. These Ideas and their\naffiliated ideals have the highest directive and settling function in\nthe organization of philosophy; they determine its schools and its\nhistory, by forming the centre of all its controlling problems; they\nprescribe its great subdivisions, breaking it up into Metaphysics,\n\u00c6sthetics, and Ethics, and Metaphysics, again, into Psychology\nCosmology, and Ontology,--or Theology in the classic sense, which, in\nthe modern sense, becomes the Philosophy of Religion; they call into\nexistence, as essential preparatory and auxiliary disciplines, Logic and\nthe Theory of Knowledge, or Epistemology. They thus provide the true\ndistinctions between philosophy and the sciences of experience, and\npresent these sciences as the carrying out, upon experiential details,\nof the methodological principles which philosophy alone can supply;\nhence they lead us to view all the sciences as in fact the applied\nbranches, the completing organs of philosophy, instead of its hostile\ncompetitors.\n\nAs for the controlling questions which they start, these are such as\nfollow: Are the ideals but bare ideals, serving only to cast \"a light\nthat never was, on land or sea?\"--are the Ideas only bare ideas, without\nany objective being of their own, without any footing in the real,\nserving only to enhance the dull facts of experience with auroral\nillusions? The philosophic thinker answers affirmatively, or with\ncomplete skeptical dubiety, or with a convinced and uplifting negative,\naccording to his less or greater penetration into the real meaning of\nthese deepest concepts, and depending on his view into the nature and\nthought-effect of the Necessary and the Contingent, the Unconditioned\nand the Conditioned, the Infinite and the Finite, the Absolute and the\nRelative.\n\nAnd what, now, are the accurate, the adequate meanings of the three\nIdeas?--what _does_ our profoundest thought intend by the Soul, by the\nWorld, by God? We know how Kant construed them, in consequence of the\ncourse by which he came critically (as he supposed) upon them,--as\nrespectively the paramount Subject of experiences; the paramount Object\nof experiences, or the Causal Unity of the possible series of sensible\nobjects; and the complete Totality of Conditions for experience and its\nobjects, itself therefore the Unconditioned. It is worth our notice,\nthat especially by his construing the idea of God in this way, thus\nrehabilitating the classical and scholastic conception of God as the Sum\nof all Realities, he laid the foundation for that very transfiguration\nof mysticism, that idealistic monism, which he himself repudiated, but\nwhich his three noted successors in their several ways so ardently\naccepted, and which has since so pervaded the philosophic world. But\nsuppose Kant's alleged critical analysis of the three Ideas and their\nlogical basis is in fact far from critical, far from \"exactly\ndiscriminative,\"--and I believe there is the clearest warrant for\ndeclaring that it is,--then the assumed \"undeniable critical basis\" for\nidealistic monism will be dislodged, and it will be open to us to\ninterpret the Ideas with accuracy and consistency--an interpretation\nwhich may prove to establish, not at all any monism, but a rational\npluralism. And this will also reveal to us, I think, that our prevalent\nconstruing of the Unconditioned and the Conditioned, the Necessary and\nthe Contingent, the Infinite and the Finite, the Absolute and the\nRelative, suffers from an equal inaccuracy of analysis, and precisely\nfor this reason gives a plausible but in fact untrustworthy support to\nthe monistic interpretation of God, and Soul, and World; or, as Hegel\nand his chief adherents prefer to name them, God, Mind, and Nature. If\nthe Kantian analysis stands, then it seems to follow, clearly enough,\nthat God is the Inclusive Unit which at once embraces Mind and Nature,\nSoul and World, expresses itself in them, and imparts to them their\nmeaning; and the plain dictate then is, that Kant's personal prejudice,\nand the personal prejudices of others like him, in favor of a\ntranscendent God, must give way to that conception of the Divine, as\nimmanent and inclusive, which is alone consistent with its being indeed\nthe Totality of Conditions,--the Necessary Postulate, and the Sufficient\nReason, for both Subject and Object.\n\nBut will Kant's analysis stand? Have we not here another of his few but\nfatal slips,--like his doctrine of the dependence of Number upon Time\nand Space, and its consequent subjection to them? It surely seems so. If\nthe veritable postulate of categorical syllogizing be, as Kant thinks it\nis, merely the Subject, the self as experiencer of presented phenomena,\nin contrast to the Object, the causally united sum of possible\nphenomena; and if the true postulate of conditional syllogizing is this\ncosmic Object, as contrasted with the correlate Subject, then it would\nseem we cannot avoid certain pertinent questions. Is such a postulate\nSubject any fit and adequate account of the whole Self, of the Soul?--is\nthere not a vital difference between this subject-self and the Self as\nPerson?--does not Kant himself imply so, in his doctrine of the primacy\nof the Practical Reason? Again: Is not the World, as explained in Kant's\nanalysis, and as afterwards made by him the solution of the Cosmological\nAntinomies, simply the supplemental factor necessarily correlate to the\nsubjective aspect of the conscious life, and reduced from its uncritical\nr\u00f4le of thing-in-itself to the intelligible subordination required by\nKant's theory of Transcendental Idealism?--and can this be any adequate\naccount of the Idea that is to stand in sufficing contrast to the whole\nSelf, the Person?--what less than the Society of Persons can meet the\nWorld-Idea for that? Further: If with Kant we take the World to mean no\nmore than this object-factor in self-consciousness, must not the Soul,\nthe total Self, from which, according to Kant's Transcendental Idealism,\nboth Space and Time issue, supplying the basis for the immutable\ncontrast between the experiencing subject and the really experienced\nobjects,--must not this _whole_ Self be the real meaning of the\n\"Totality of Conditions, itself unconditioned,\" which comes into view as\nsimply the postulate of disjunctive syllogizing? How in the world can\ndisjunctive syllogizing, the confessed act of the _I_-thinking\nintelligence, really postulate anything as Totality of Conditions, in\nany other sense than the total of conditions for such syllogizing?--namely,\nthe conditioning _I_ that organizes and does the reasoning? There is\nsurely no warrant for calling this total, which simply transcends and\nconditions the subject and the object of sensible experiences, by any\nloftier name than that which Kant had already given it in the Deduction\nof the Categories, when he designated it the \"originally synthetic unity\nof apperception (self-consciousness),\" or \"the _I_-thinking (_das\nich-denke_) that must accompany all my mental presentations,\"--that is\nto say, the whole Self, or thinking Person, idealistically interpreted.\nThe use of the name God in this connection, where Kant is in fact only\nseeking the roots of the three orders of the syllogism _when reasoning\nhas by supposition been restricted to the subject-matter of experience_,\nis assuredly without warrant; yes, without excuse. In fact, it is\nbecause Kant sees that the third Idea, as reached through his analysis,\nis intrinsically immanent,--resident in the self that syllogizes\ndisjunctively, and, because so resident, incapable of passing the bounds\nof possible experience,--while he also sees that the idea of God should\nmean a Being transcendent of every other thinker, himself a distinct\nindividual consciousness, though not an empirically limited one,--it is,\nI say, precisely because he sees all this, that he pronounces the Idea,\nthough named with the name of God, utterly without pertinence to\nindicate God's existence, and so enters upon that part of his\nTranscendental Dialectic which is, in chief, directed to exposing the\ntranscendental illusion involved in the celebrated Ontological Proof.\nConsistently, Kant in this famous analytic of the syllogism should be\ntalking, not of the Soul, the World, and God, but of the Subject (as\nuniting-principle of its sense-_perceptions_), the Object (as\nuniting-principle of all possible sense-_percepts_), and the Self (the\nwhole _I_ presiding over experience in both its aspects, as these are\ndiscriminated in Time and Space). By what rational title--even granting\nfor the sake of argument that they are the genuine postulates of\ncategorical and of conditional syllogizing--can this Subject and this\nObject, these correlate factors in the Self, rank as Ideas with the Idea\nof their conditioning Whole--the Self, that in its still unaltered\nidentity fulfills, in Practical Reason, the high r\u00f4le of Person? If\n_this_ no more than meets the standard of Idea, how can _they_ meet it?\nHow can two somethings, neither of which is the Totality of Conditions,\nand both of which are therefore in fact conditioned, deserve the same\ntitle with that which is intrinsically the Totality of Conditions, and,\nas such, unconditioned? To call the conditioned and the unconditioned\nalike Ideas is a confounding of dignities that Pure Reason should not\ntolerate, whether the procedure be read as a leveling down or a leveling\nup. Distributing the titles conferred by Pure Reason in this democratic\nfashion reminds us too much, unhappily for Kant, of the Cartesian\nperformances with Substance; whereby God, mind, and matter became alike\n\"substances,\" though only God could in truth be said to \"require nothing\nfor his existence save himself,\" while mind and matter, though\nabsolutely dependent on God, and derivative from him, were still to be\ncalled substances in the \"modified\" and Pickwickian sense of being\nunderived from each other.\n\nBut if Kant's naming his third syllogistic postulate the Idea of God is\ninconsequent upon his analysis; or if, when the analysis is made\nconsequent by taking the third Idea to mean the whole Self, the first\nand second postulates sink in conceptual rank, so that they cannot with\nany pertinence be called Ideas, unless we are willing to keep the same\nname when its meaning must be changed _in genere_,--a procedure that can\nonly encumber philosophy instead of clearing its way,--these\ndifficulties do not close the account; we shall find other curious\nthings in this noted passage, upon which part of the characteristic\noutcome of Kant's philosophizing so much depends. Besides the misnaming\nof the third Idea, we have already had to question, in view of the path\nby which he reaches it, the fitness of his calling the first by the\ntitle of the Soul; and likewise, though for other and higher reasons, of\nhis calling the second by the name of the World. In fact, it comes home\nto us that all of the Ideas are, in one way or another, misnomers;\nKant's whole procedure with them, in fine, has already appeared inexact,\ninconsistent, and therefore uncritical. But now we shall become aware of\ncertain other inconsistencies. In coming to the Subject, as the\npostulate of categorical syllogizing, Kant, you remember, does so by the\npath of the relation Subject and Predicate, arguing that the chain of\ncategorical prosyllogisms has for its limiting concept and logical motor\nthe notion of an absolute subject that cannot be a predicate; and as no\nsubject of a judgment can of itself give assurance of fulfilling this\ncondition, he concludes this motor-limit of judgment-subjects to be\nidentical with the Subject as thinker, upon whom, at the last, all\njudgments depend, and who, therefore, and who alone, can never be a\npredicate merely. In similar fashion, he finds as the motor-limit of the\nseries of conditional prosyllogisms, which is governed by the relation\nCause and Effect, the notion of an absolute cause--a cause, that is,\nincapable of being an effect; and this, as undiscoverable in the chain\nof phenomenal causes, which are all in turn effects, he concludes is a\npure Idea, the reason's native conception of a necessary linkage among\nall changes in Space, or of a Cosmic Unity among physical phenomena. In\nboth conceptions, then, whether of the unity of the Subject or of the\nWorld, we seem to have a case of the unconditioned, as each, surely, is\na totality of conditions: the one, for all possible syllogisms by\nSubject and Predicate; the other, for all possible syllogisms from Cause\nand Effect. Until it can be shown that the syllogisms of the first sort\nand the syllogisms of the second are both conditioned by the system of\ndisjunctive syllogisms, so that the Idea alleged to be the totality of\nconditions for this system becomes the conditioning principle for both\nthe others, there appears to be no ground for contrasting the totality\nof conditions presented in it with those presented in the others, as if\nit were the absolute Totality of all Conditions, while the two others\nare only \"relative totalities,\"--which would be as much as to say they\nwere only pseudo-totalities, both being conditioned instead of being\nunconditioned. But there seems to be no evidence, not even an\nindication, that disjunctive reasoning conditions categorical or\nconditional--that it constitutes the whole kingdom, in which the other\ntwo orders of reasoning form dependent provinces, or that for final\nvalidation these must appeal to the disjunctive series and the Idea that\ncontrols it. On the contrary, any such relation seems disproved by the\nfact that the three types of syllogism apply alike in all\nsubject-matter, psychic or physical, subjective or objective, concerning\nthe Self or concerning the World,--yes, concerning other Selves or even\nconcerning God; whereas, if the relation were a fact, it would require\nthat only disjunctive reasoning can deal with the Unconditioned, and\nthat conditional must confine itself to cosmic material, while\ncategorical pertains only to the things of inner sense.\n\nSuch considerations cannot but shake our confidence in the inquisition\nto which Kant has submitted the Ideas of Reason, both as regards what\nthey really mean and how they are to be correlated. At all events, the\nanalysis of logical procedure and connection on which his account of\nthem is based is full of the confusions and oversights that have now\nbeen pointed out, and justifies us in saying that his case is not\nestablished. Hence we are not bound to follow when his three successors,\nor their later adherents, proceed in acceptance of his results, and\nadvance into various forms of idealism, all of the monistic type, as if\nthe general relation between the three Ideas had been demonstrably\nsettled by Kant in the monist sense, despite his not knowing this, and\nthat all we have to do is to disregard his recorded protests, and render\nhis results consistent, and our idealism \"absolute,\" by casting out from\nhis doctrine the distinction between the Theoretical and the Practical\nReason, with the \"primacy\" of the latter, through making an end of his\nassumed world of _Dinge an sich_, or \"things in themselves.\" This\nmovement, I repeat, we are not bound to follow: a rectification of view\nas to the meaning of the three Ideas becomes possible as soon as we are\nfreed from Kant's entangled method of discovering and defining them; and\nwhen this rectification is effected, we shall find that the question\nbetween monism and rational or harmonic pluralism is at least open, to\nsay no more. Nay, we are not to forget that by the results of our\nanalysis of the concepts One and Many, Time and Space, and the real\nrelation between them, plural metaphysics has already won a precedence\nin this contest.\n\n\n\n\nTHE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY\n\nBY GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD\n\n [George Trumbull Ladd, Professor of Philosophy, Yale\n University. b. January 19, 1842, Painesville, Ohio. B.A.\n Western Reserve College, 1864; B.D. Andover Theological\n Seminary, 1869; D.D. Western Reserve, 1879; M.A. Yale, 1881;\n LL.D. Western Reserve, 1895; LL.D. Princeton, 1896.\n Decorated with the 3d Degree of the Order of the Rising Sun\n of Japan, 1899; Pastor, Edinburg, Ohio, 1869-71; _ibid._,\n Milwaukee, Wis., 1871-79; Professor of Philosophy, Bowdoin\n College, 1879-81; _ibid._, Yale University, 1881--;\n Lecturer, Harvard, Tokio, Bombay, etc., 1885--, Member\n American Psychological Association, American Society of\n Naturalists, American Philosophical Association, American\n Oriental Society, Imperial Educational Society of Japan,\n Connecticut Academy. Author of _Elements of Physiological\n Psychology_; _Philosophy of Knowledge_; _Philosophy of\n Mind_; _A Theory of Reality_; and many other noted\n scientific works and papers.]\n\n\nThe history of man's critical and reflective thought upon the more\nultimate problems of nature and of his own life has, indeed, its period\nof quickened progress, relative stagnation, and apparent decline. Great\nthinkers are born and die, \"schools of philosophy,\" so-called, arise,\nflourish, and become discredited; and tendencies of various\ncharacteristics mark the national or more general Zeitgeist of the\nparticular centuries. And always, a certain deep undercurrent, or\npowerful stream of the rational evolution of humanity, flows silently\nonward. But these periods of philosophical development do not correspond\nto those which have been marked off for man by the rhythmic motion of\nthe heavenly bodies, or by himself for purposes of greater convenience\nin practical affairs. The proposal, therefore, to treat any century of\nphilosophical development as though it could be taken out of, and\nconsidered apart from, this constant unfolding of man's rational life\nis, of necessity, doomed to failure. And, indeed, the nineteenth century\nis no exception to the general truth.\n\nThere is, however, one important and historical fact which makes more\ndefinite, and more feasible, the attempt to present in outline the\nhistory of the philosophical development of the nineteenth century. This\nfact is the death of Immanuel Kant, February 12, 1804. In a very unusual\nway this event marks the close of the development of philosophy in the\neighteenth century. In a yet more unusual way the same event defines the\nbeginning of the philosophical development of the nineteenth century.\nThe proposal is, therefore, not artificial, but in accordance with the\ntruth of history, if we consider the problems, movements, results, and\npresent condition of this development, so far as the fulfillment of our\ngeneral purpose is concerned, in the light of the critical philosophy of\nKant. This purpose may then be further defined in the following way: to\ntrace the history of the evolution of critical and reflective thought\nover the more ultimate problems of Nature and of human life, in the\nWestern World during the last hundred years, and from the standpoint of\nthe conclusions, both negative and positive, which are best embodied in\nthe works of the philosopher of K\u00f6nigsberg. This purpose we shall try to\nfulfill in these four divisions of our theme: (1) A statement of the\nproblems of philosophy as they were given over to the nineteenth century\nby the Kantian Critique; (2) a brief description of the lines of\nmovement along which the attempts at the improved solution of these\nproblems have proceeded, and of the principal influences contributing to\nthese attempts; (3) a summary of the principal results of these\nmovements--the items, so to say, of progress in philosophy which may be\ncredited to the last century; and finally, (4) a survey of the present\nstate of these problems as they are now to be handed down by the\nnineteenth to the twentieth century. Truly an immensely difficult, if\nnot an impossible task, is involved in this purpose!\n\nI. The problems which the critical philosophy undertook definitively to\nsolve may be divided into three classes. The first is the\nepistemological problem, or the problem offered by human knowledge--its\nessential nature, its fixed limitations, if such there be, and its\nontological validity. It was this problem which Kant brought to the\nfront in such a manner that certain subsequent writers on philosophy\nhave claimed it to be, not only the primary and most important branch of\nphilosophical discipline, but to comprise the sum-total of what human\nreflection and critical thought can successfully compass. \"We call\nphilosophy self-knowledge,\" says one of these writers. \"The theory of\nknowledge is the true _prima philosophia_,\" says another. Kant himself\nregarded it as the most imperative demand of reason to establish a\nscience that shall \"determine _a priori_ the possibility, the\nprinciples, and the extent of all cognitions.\" The burden of the\nepistemological problem has pressed heavily upon the thought of the\nnineteenth century; the different attitudes toward this problem, and its\ndifferent alleged solutions, have been most influential factors in\ndetermining the philosophical discussions, divisions, schools, and\npermanent or transitory achievements of the century.\n\nIn the epistemological problem as offered by the Kantian philosophy of\ncognition there is involved the subordinate but highly important\nquestion as to the proper method of philosophy. Is the method of\ncriticism, as that method was employed in the three Critiques of Kant,\nthe exclusive, the sole appropriate and productive way of advancing\nhuman philosophical thought? I do not think that the experience of the\nnineteenth century warrants an affirmative answer to this question of\nmethod. This experience has certainly, however, resulted in\ndemonstrating the need of a more thorough, consistent, and fundamental\nuse of the critical method than that in which it was employed by Kant.\nAnd this improved use of the critical method has induced a more profound\nstudy of the psychology of cognition, and of the historical development\nof philosophy in the branch of epistemology. More especially, however,\nit has led to the reinstatement of the value-judgments, as means of\ncognition, in their right relations of harmony with the judgments of\nfact and of law.\n\nThe second of the greater problems which the critical philosophy of the\neighteenth handed on to the nineteenth century is the ontological\nproblem. This problem, even far more than the epistemological, has\nexcited the intensest interest, and called for the profoundest thought,\nof reflective minds during the last hundred years. This problem engages\nin the inquiry as to what Reality is; for to define philosophy from the\nontological point of view renders it \"the rational science of reality;\"\nor, at least, \"the science of the supreme and most important realities.\"\nIn spite of the fact that the period immediately following the\nconclusion of the Kantian criticism was the age when the people were\nsinging\n\n \"_Da die Metaphysik vor Kurzem unbeerbt abging,_\n _Werden die Dinge an sich jetzo sub hasta verkauft,_\"\n\nthe cultivation of the ontological problem, and the growth of systematic\nmetaphysics in the nineteenth century, had never previously been\nsurpassed. In spite of, or rather because of, the fact that Kant left\nthe ancient body of metaphysics so dismembered and discredited, and his\nown ontological structure, in such hopeless confusion, all the several\nbuildings both of Idealism and of Realism either rose quickly or were\nerected upon the foundations made bare by the critical philosophy.\n\nBut especially unsatisfactory to the thought of the first quarter of the\nnineteenth century was the Kantian position with reference to the\nproblem in which, after all, both the few who cultivate philosophy and\nthe multitude who share in its fruits are always most truly interested;\nand this is the ethico-religious problem. In the judgment of the\ngeneration which followed him, Kant had achieved for those who accepted\nhis points of view, his method of philosophizing, and his results, much\ngreater success in \"removing knowledge\" than in \"finding room for\nfaith.\" For he seemed to have left the positive truths of Ethics so\ninvolved in the negative positions of his critique of knowledge as\ngreatly to endanger them; and to have entangled the conceptions of\nreligion with those of morality in a manner to throw doubt upon them\nboth.\n\nThe breach between the human cognitive faculties and the ontological\ndoctrines and conceptions on which morality and religion had been\nsupposed to rest firmly, the elaborately argued distrust and skepticism\nwhich had been aimed against the ability of human reason to reach\nreality, and the consequent danger which threatened the most precious\njudgments of worth and the ontological value of ethical and \u00e6sthetical\nsentiments, could not remain unnoticed, or fail to promote ceaseless and\nearnest efforts to heal it. The hitherto accepted solutions of the\nproblems of cognition, of being, and of man's ethico-religious\nexperience, could not survive the critical philosophy. But the solutions\nwhich the critical philosophy itself offered could not fail to excite\nopposition and to stimulate further criticism. Moreover, certain factors\nin human nature, certain interests in human social life, and certain\nneeds of humanity, not fully recognized and indeed scarcely noticed by\ncriticism, could not fail to revive and to enforce their ancient,\nperennial, and valid claims.\n\nIn a word, Kant left the main problems of philosophy involved in\nnumerous contradictions. The result of his penetrating but excessive\nanalysis was unwarrantably to contrast sense with understanding; to\ndivide reason as constitutive from reason as regulative; to divorce the\nmoral law from our concrete experience of the results of good and bad\nconduct, true morality from many of the noblest desires and sentiments,\nand to set in opposition phenomena and noumena, order and freedom,\nknowledge and faith, science and religion. Now the highest aim of\nphilosophy is reconciliation. What wonder, then, that the beginning of\nthe last century felt the stimulus of the unreconciled condition of the\nproblems of philosophy at the end of the preceding century! The\ngreatest, most stimulating inheritance of the philosophy of the\nnineteenth century from the philosophy of the eighteenth century was the\n\"post-Kantian problems.\"\n\nII. The lines of the movement of philosophical thought and the principal\ncontributory influences which belong to the nineteenth century may be\nroughly divided into two classes; namely, (1) those which tended in the\ndirection of carrying to the utmost extreme the negative and destructive\ncriticism of Kant, and (2) those which, either mainly favoring or mainly\nantagonizing the conclusions of the Kantian criticism, endeavored to\nplace the positive answer to all three of these great problems of\nphilosophy upon more comprehensive, scientifically defensible, and\npermanently sure foundations. The one class so far completed the attempt\nto remove the knowledge at which philosophy aims as, by the end of the\nfirst half of the century, to have left no rational ground for any kind\nof faith. The other class had not, even by the end of the second half of\nthe century, as yet agreed upon any one scheme for harmonizing the\nvarious theories of knowledge, of reality, and of the ground of morality\nand religion. There appeared, however,--especially during the last two\ndecades of the century,--certain signs of convergence upon positions, to\noccupy which is favorable for agreement upon such a scheme, and which\nnow promise a new constructive era for philosophy. The terminus of the\ndestructive movement has been reached in our present-day positivism and\nphilosophical skepticism. For this movement there would appear to be no\nmore beyond in the same direction. The terminus of the other movement\ncan only be somewhat dimly descried. It may perhaps be predicted with a\nreasonable degree of confidence as some form of ontological Idealism (if\nwe may use such a phrase) that shall be at once more thoroughly grounded\nin man's total experience, as interpreted by modern science, and also\nmore satisfactory to human ethical, \u00e6sthetical, and religious ideals,\nthan any form of systematic philosophy has hitherto been. But to say\neven this much is perhaps unduly to anticipate.\n\nIf we attempt to fathom and estimate the force of the various streams of\ninfluence which have shaped the history of the philosophical development\nof the nineteenth century, I think there can be no doubt that the\nprofoundest and the most powerful is the one influence which must be\nrecognized and reckoned with in all the centuries. This influence is\nhumanity's undying interest in its moral, civil, and religious ideals,\nand in the civil and religious institutions which give a faithful but\ntemporary expression to these ideals. In the long run, every fragmentary\nor systematic attempt at the solution of the problem of philosophy must\nsustain the test of an ability to contribute something of value to the\nrealization of these ideals. The test which the past century has\nproposed for its own thinkers, and for its various schools of\nphilosophy, is by far the severest which has ever been proposed. For the\nmost part unostentatiously and in large measure silently, the thoughtful\nfew and the comparatively thoughtless multitude have been contributing,\neither destructively or constructively, to the effort at satisfaction\nfor the rising spiritual life of man. And if in some vague but\nimpressive manner we speak of this thirst for spiritual satisfaction as\ncharacteristic of any period of human history, we may say, I believe,\nthat it has been peculiarly characteristic and especially powerful as an\ninfluence during the last hundred years. The opinions, sentiments, and\nideals which shape the development of the institutions of the church and\nstate, and the freer activities of the same opinions, sentiments, and\nideals, have been in this century, as they have been in every century,\nthe principal factors in determining the character of its philosophical\ndevelopment.\n\nBut a more definite and visible kind of influence has constantly\nproceeded from the centres of the higher education. The\nuniversities--especially of Germany, next, perhaps of Scotland, but also\nof England and the United States, and even in less degree of France and\nItaly--have both fostered and shaped the evolution of critical and\nreflective thought, and of its product as philosophy. In Germany during\nthe eighteenth century the greater universities had been emancipating\nthemselves from the stricter forms of political and court favoritism and\nof ecclesiastical protection and control. This emancipation had already\noperated at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and it continued\nmore and more to operate throughout this century, for participation in\nthat free thought whose spirit is absolutely essential to the\nflourishing of true philosophy. All the other colleges and universities\ncan scarcely repay the debt which modern philosophy owes to the\nuniversities of Germany. The institutions of the higher education which\nare moulded after this spirit, and which have a generous share of this\nspirit, have everywhere been _schools of thought_ as well as schools of\nlearning and research. Without the increasing numbers and growing\nencouragement of such centres for the cultivation of the discipline of\ncritical and reflective thinking, it is difficult to conjecture how much\nthe philosophical development of the nineteenth century would have lost.\n_Libertas docendi_ and _Academische Freiheit_--without these philosophy\nhas one of its wings fatally wounded or severely clipped.\n\nNot all the philosophy of the last century, however, was born and\ndeveloped in academical centres and under academical influences. In\nGermany, Great Britain, and France, the various so-called \"Academies\" or\nother unacademical associations of men of scientific interests and\nattainments--notably, the Berlin Academy, which has been called \"the\nseat of an anti-scholastic popular philosophy\"--were during the first\nhalf of the nineteenth century contributing by their conspicuous\nfailures as well as by their less conspicuous successes, important\nfactors to the constructive new thought of the latter half of the\nnineteenth century. In general, although these men decried system and\nwere themselves inadequately prepared to treat the problems of\nphilosophy, whether from the historical or the speculative and critical\npoint of view, they cannot be wholly neglected in estimating its\ndevelopment. Clever reasoning, and witty and epigrammatic writing on\nscientific or other allied subjects, cannot indeed be called\n_philosophy_ in the stricter meaning of the word. But this so-called\n\"popular philosophy\" has greatly helped in a way to free thought from\nits too close bondage to scholastic tradition. And even the despite of\nphilosophy, and sneering references to its \"barrenness,\" which formerly\ncharacterized the meetings and the writings of this class of its\ncritics, but which now are happily much less frequent, have been on the\nwhole both a valuable check and a stimulus to her devotees. He would be\ntoo narrow and sour a disciple of scholastic metaphysics and systematic\nphilosophy, who, because of the levity or scorning of \"outsiders,\"\nshould refuse them all credit. Indeed, the lesson of the close of the\nnineteenth century may well enough be the motto for the beginning of the\ntwentieth century: _In philosophy--since to philosophize is natural and\ninevitable for all rational beings--there really are no outsiders._\n\nIn this connection it is most interesting to notice how men of the type\njust referred to, were at the end of the eighteenth century found\ngrouped around such thinkers as Mendelssohn, Lessing, F.\nNicolai,--representing a somewhat decided reaction from the French\nrealism to the German idealism. The work of the Academicians in the\ncriticism of Kant was carried forward by Jacobi, who, at the time of his\ndeath, was the pensioned president of the Academy at Munich. Some of\nthese same critics of the Kantian philosophy showed a rather decided\npreference for the \"commonsense\" philosophy of the Scottish School.\n\nBut both inside and outside of the Universities and Academies the\nscientific spirit and acquisitions of the nineteenth century have most\nprofoundly, and on the whole favorably, affected the development of its\nphilosophy. In the wider meaning of the word, \"science,\"--the meaning,\nnamely, in which science = _Wissenschaft_,--philosophy aims to be\nscientific; and science can never be indifferent to philosophy. In their\ncommon aim at a rational and unitary system of principles, which shall\nexplain and give its due significance to the totality of human\nexperience, science and philosophy can never remain long in antagonism;\nthey ought never even temporarily to be divided in interests, or in the\nspirit which leads each generously to recognize the importance of the\nother. The early part of the last century was, indeed, too much under\nthe influence of that almost exclusively speculative _Natur-philosophie_,\nof which Schelling and Hegel were the most prominent exponents. On the\nother hand, the conception of nature as a vast interconnected and\nunitary system of a rational order, unfolding itself in accordance with\nteleological principles,--however manifold and obscure,--is a noble\nconception and not destined to pass away.\n\nOn the continent--at least in France, where it had attained its highest\ndevelopment--the scientific spirit was, at the close of the eighteenth\ncentury, on the whole opposed to systematization. The impulse to both\nscience and philosophy during both the eighteenth and the nineteenth\ncenturies, over the entire continent of Europe, was chiefly due to the\nepoch-making work of that greatest of all titles in the modern\nscientific development of the Western World, the _Principia_ of Newton.\nIn mathematics and the physical sciences, during the early third or half\nof the last century, Great Britain also has a roll of distinguished\nnames which compares most favorably with that of either France or\nGermany. But in England, France, and the United States, during the whole\ncentury, science has lacked the breadth and philosophic spirit which it\nhad in Germany during the first three quarters of this period. During\nall that time the German man of science was, as a rule, a scholar, an\ninvestigator, a teacher, _and a philosopher_. Science and philosophy\nthrived better, however, in Scotland than elsewhere outside of Germany,\nso far as their relations in interdependence were concerned. Into the\nScottish universities Playfair introduced some of the continental\nsuggestions toward the end of the eighteenth century, so that there was\nless of exclusiveness and unfriendly rivalry between science and\nphilosophy; and both profited thereby. In the United States, during the\nfirst half or more of the century, so dominant were the theological and\npractical interests and influences that there was little free\ndevelopment of either science or philosophy,--if we interpret the one as\nthe equivalent of _Wissenschaft_ and understand the other in the\nstricter meaning of the word.\n\nThe history of the development of the scientific spirit and of the\nachievements of the particular sciences is not the theme of this paper.\nTo trace in detail, or even in its large outlines, the reciprocal\ninfluence of science and philosophy during the past hundred years, would\nitself require far more than the space allotted to me. It must suffice\nto say that the various advances in the efforts of the particular\nsciences to enlarge and to define the conceptions and principles\nemployed to portray the Being of the World in its totality, have\nsomewhat steadily grown more and more completely metaphysical, and more\nand more of positive importance for the reconstruction of systematic\nphilosophy. The latter has not simply been disciplined by science,\ncompelled to improve its method, and to examine all its previous claims.\nBut philosophy has also been greatly enriched by science with respect to\nits material awaiting synthesis, and it has been not a little profited\nby the unsuccessful attempts of the current scientific theories to give\nthemselves a truly satisfactory account of that Ultimate Reality which,\nto understand the better, is no unworthy aim of their combined efforts.\n\nDuring the nineteenth century science has seen many important additions\nto that Ideal of Nature and her processes, to form which in a unitary\nand harmonizing but comprehensive way is the philosophical goal of\nscience. The gross mechanical conception of nature which prevailed in\nthe earlier part of the eighteenth century has long since been\nabandoned, as quite inadequate to our experience with her facts, forces,\nand laws. The kinetic view, which began with Huygens, Euler, and Amp\u00e8re,\nand which was so amplified by Lord Kelvin and Clerk-Maxwell in England,\nand by Helmholtz and others in Germany, on account of its success in\nexplaining the phenomena of light, of gases, etc., very naturally led to\nthe attempt to develop a kinetic theory, a doctrine of energetics, which\nshould explain all phenomena. But the conception of \"that which moves,\"\nthe experience of important and persistent qualitative _differentiae_,\nand the need of assuming ends and purposes served by the movement, are\ntroublesome obstacles in the way of giving such a completeness to this\ntheory of the Being of the World. Yet again the amazing success which\nthe theory of evolution has shown in explaining the phenomena with which\nthe various biological sciences concern themselves, has lent favor\nduring the latter half of the century to the vitalistic and genetic view\nof nature. For all our most elaborate and advanced kinetic theories seem\nutterly to fail us as explanatory when we, through the higher powers of\nthe microscope, stand wondering and face to face with the evolution of a\nsingle living cell. But from such a view of the essential Being of the\nWorld as evolution suggests to the psycho-physical theory of nature is\nnot an impassable gulf. And thus, under its growing wealth of knowledge,\nscience may be leading up to an Ideal of the Ultimate Reality, in which\nphilosophy will gratefully and gladly coincide. At any rate, the modern\nconception of nature and the modern conception of God are not so far\napart from each other, as either of these conceptions is now removed\nfrom the conceptions covered by the same terms, some centuries gone by.\n\nThere is one of the positive sciences, however, with which the\ndevelopment of philosophy during the last century has been particularly\nallied. This science is psychology. To speak of its history is not the\ntheme of this paper. But it should be noted in passing how the\ndevelopment of psychology has brought into connection with the physical\nand biological sciences the development of philosophy. This union,\nwhether it be for better or for worse,--and, on the whole, I believe it\nto be for better rather than for worse,--has been in a very special way\nthe result of the last century. In tracing its details we should have to\nspeak of the dependence of certain branches of psychology on physiology,\nand upon Sir Charles Bell's discovery of the difference between the\nsensory and the motor nerves. This discovery was the contribution of the\nbeginning of the century to an entire line of discoveries, which have\nended at the close of the century with putting the localization of\ncerebral function upon a firm experimental basis. Of scarcely less\nimportance has been the cellular theory as applied (1838) by Matthias\nSchleiden, a pupil of Fries in philosophy, to plants, and by Theodor\nSchwann about the same time to animal organisms. To these must be added\nthe researches of Johannes M\u00fcller (1801-1858), the great biologist, a\nlistener to Hegel's lectures, whose law of _specific energies_ brings\nhim into connection with psychology and, through psychology, to\nphilosophy. Even more true is this of Helmholtz, whose _Lehre von den\nTonempfindungen_ (1862) and _Physiologische Optik_ (1867) placed him in\neven closer, though still mediate, relations to philosophy. But perhaps\nespecially Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801-1887), whose researches in\npsycho-physics laid the foundations of whatever, either as psychology or\nas philosophy, goes under this name; and whether the doctrine have\nreference to the relation of man's mind and body, or to the wider\nrelations of spirit and matter.\n\nIn my judgment it cannot be affirmed that the attempts of the latter\nhalf of the nineteenth century to develop an experimental science of\npsychology in independence of philosophical criticism and metaphysical\nassumption, or the claims of this science to have thrown any wholly new\nlight upon the statement, or upon the solution of philosophical\nproblems, have been largely successful. But certain more definitely\npsychological questions have been to a commendable degree better\nanalyzed and elucidated; the new experimental methods, where confined\nwithin their legitimate sphere, have been amply justified; and certain\n_quasi_-metaphysical views respecting the nature of the human mind, and\neven, if you will, the nature of the Spirit in general--have been placed\nin a more favorable and scientifically engaging attitude toward\nspeculative philosophy. This seems to me to be especially true with\nrespect to two problems in which both empirical psychology and\nphilosophy have a common and profound interest. These are (1) the\ncomplex synthesis of mental functions involved in every act of true\ncognition, together with the bearing which the psychology of cognition\nhas upon epistemological problems; and (2) the yet more complex and\nprofound analysis, from the psychological point of view, of what it is\nto be a self-conscious and self-determining Will, a true Self, together\nwith the bearing which the psychology of selfhood has upon all the\nproblems of ethics, \u00e6sthetics, and religion.\n\nThe more obvious and easily traceable influences which have operated to\nincite and direct the philosophical development of the nineteenth\ncentury are, of course, dependent upon the teachings and writings of\nphilosophers, and the schools of philosophy which they have founded. To\nspeak of these influences even in outline would be to write a manual of\nthe history of philosophy during that hundred of years, which has been\nof all others by far the most fruitful in material results, whatever\nestimate may be put upon the separate or combined values of the\nindividual thinkers and their so-called schools. No fewer than seven or\neight relatively independent or partially antagonistic movements, which\nmay be traced back either directly or more indirectly to the critical\nphilosophy, and to the form in which the problems of philosophy were\nleft by Kant, sprung up during the century. In Germany chiefly, there\narose the Faith-philosophy, the Romantic School, and Rational Idealism;\nin France, Eclecticism and Positivism (if, indeed, the latter can be\ncalled _a_ philosophy); in Scotland, a na\u00efve and crude form of Realism,\nwhich served well for the time as an antagonist of a skeptical idealism,\nbut which itself contributed to an improved form of Idealism; and in the\nUnited States, or rather in New England, a peculiar kind of\nTranscendentalism of the sentimental type. But all these movements of\nthought, and others lying somewhere midway between, in a pair composed\nof any two, together with a steadfast remainder of almost every sort of\nDogmatism, and all degrees and kinds of Skepticism, have been intermixed\nand contending with one another, in all these countries. Such has been\nthe varied, undefinable, and yet intensely stimulating and interesting\ncharacter of the development of systematic and scholastic philosophy,\nduring the nineteenth century.\n\nThe early opposition to Kant in Germany was, in the main, twofold:--both\nto his peculiar extreme analysis with its philosophical conclusions, and\nalso to all systematic as distinguished from a more popular and literary\nform of philosophizing. Toward the close of the eighteenth century a\ngroup of men had been writing upon philosophical questions in a spirit\nand method quite foreign to that held in respect by the critical\nphilosophy. It is not wholly without significance that Lessing, whose\naim had been to use common sense and literary skill in clearing up\nobscure ideas and improving and illumining the life of man, died in the\nvery year of the appearance of Kant's _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_. Of\nthis class of men an historian dealing with this period has said, \"There\nis hardly one who does not quote somewhere or other Pope's saying, 'The\nproper study of mankind is man.'\" To this class belong Hamann\n(1730-1788), the inspirer of Herder and Jacobi. The former, who was\nessentially a poet and a friend of Goethe, controverted Kant with regard\nto his doctrine of reason, his antithesis between the individual and the\nrace, and his schism between things as empirically known and the known\nunity in the Ground of their being and becoming. Herder's path to truth\nwas highly colored with flowers of rhetoric; but the promise was that he\nwould lead men back to the heavenly city. Jacobi, too, with due\nallowance made for the injury wrought by his divorce of the two\nphilosophies,--that of faith and that of science,--and his excessive\nestimate of the value-judgments which repose in the mist of a\nfeeling-faith, added something of worth by way of exposing the\nbarrenness of the Kantian doctrine of an unknowable \"Thing-in-itself.\"\n\nFrom men like Fr. Schlegel (1772-1829), whose valid protest against the\nsharp separation of speculative philosophy from the \u00e6sthetical, social,\nand ethical life, assumed the \"standpoint of irony,\" little real result\nin the discovery of truth could be expected. But Schleiermacher\n(1768-1834), in spite of that mixture of unfused elements which has made\nhis philosophy \"a rendezvous for the most diverse systems,\" contributed\nvaluable factors to the century's philosophical development, both of a\nnegative and of a positive character. This thinker was peculiarly\nfortunate in the enrichment of the conception of experience as\nwarranting a justifiable confidence in the ontological value of ethical,\n\u00e6sthetical, and religious sentiment and ideas; but he was most\nunfortunate in reviving and perpetuating the unjustifiable Kantian\ndistinction between cognition and faith in the field of experience. On\nthe whole, therefore, the Faith-philosophy and the Romantic School can\neasily be said to have contributed more than a negative and modifying\ninfluence to the development of the philosophy of the nineteenth\ncentury. Its more modern revival toward the close of the same century,\nand its continued hold upon certain minds of the present day, are\nevidences of the positive but partial truth which its tenets, however\nvaguely and unsystematically, continue to maintain in an \u00e6sthetically\nand practically attractive way.\n\nThe admirers of Kant strove earnestly and with varied success to remedy\nthe defects of his system. Among the earlier, less celebrated and yet\nimportant members of this group, were K. G. Reinhold (1758-1823), and\nMaimon (died, 1800). The former, like Descartes, in that he was educated\nby the Jesuits, began the attempt, after rejecting some of the arbitrary\ndistinctions of Kant and his barren and self-contradictory\n\"Thing-in-itself,\" to unify the critical philosophy by reducing it to\nsome one principle. The latter really transcended Kant in his\nphilosophical skepticism, and anticipated the Hamiltonian form of the\nso-called principle of relativity. Fries (1773-1843), and Hermes\n(1775-1831)--the latter of whom saw in empirical psychology the only\ntrue prop\u00e6deutic to philosophy--should be mentioned in this connection.\nIn the same group was another, both mathematician and philosopher, who\nstrove more successfully than others of this group to accept the\ncritical standpoint of Kant and yet to transcend his negative\nconclusions with regard to a theory of knowledge. I refer to Bolzano\n(Prague, 1781-1848), who stands in the same line of succession with\nFries and Hermes, and whose works on the _Science of Religion_ (4 vols.\n1834) and his _Science of Knowledge_ (4 vols. 1837) are noteworthy\ncontributions to epistemological doctrine. In the latter we have\ndeveloped at great length the important thought that the illative\ncharacter of propositional judgments implies an objective relation; and\nthat in all truths the subject-idea must be objective. In the work on\nreligion there is found as thoroughly dispassionate and rational a\ndefense of Catholic doctrine as exists anywhere in philosophical\nliterature. The limited influence of these works, due in part to their\nbulk and their technical character, is on the whole, I think, sincerely\nto be regretted.\n\nIt was, however, chiefly that remarkable series of philosophers which\nmay be grouped under the rubric of a \"rational Idealism,\" who filled so\nfull and made so rich the philosophical life of Germany during the first\nhalf of the last century; whose philosophical thoughts and systems have\nspread over the entire Western World, and who are most potent influences\nin shaping the development of philosophy down to the present hour. Of\nthese we need do little more than that we can do--mention their names.\nAt their head, in time, stands Fichte, who--although Kant is reported to\nhave complained of this disciple because he lied about him so\nmuch--really divined a truth which seems to be hovering in the clouds\nabove the master's head, but which, if the critical philosophy truly\nmeant to teach it, needed helpful deliverance in order to appear in\nperfectly clear light. Fichte, although he divined this truth, did not,\nhowever, free it from internal confusion and self-contradiction. It _is_\nhis truth, nevertheless, that in the Self, as a self-positing and\nself-determining activity, must somehow be found the Ground of all\nexperience and of all Reality.\n\nThe important note which Schelling sounded was the demand that\nphilosophy should recognize \"Nature\" as belonging to the sphere of\nReality, and as requiring a measure of reflective thought which should\nin some sort put it on equal terms with the Ego, for the construction of\nour conception of the Being of the World. To Schelling it seemed\nimpossible to deduce, as Fichte had done, all the rich concrete\ndevelopment of the world of things from the subjective needs and\nconstitutional forms of functioning which belong to the finite Self.\nAnd, indeed, the doctrine which limits the origin, existence, and value\nof all that is known about this sphere of experience to these needs, and\nwhich finds the sufficient account of all experience with nature in\nthese forms of functioning, must always seem inadequate and even\ngrotesque in the sight of the natural sciences. Both Nature and Spirit,\nthought Schelling, must be allowed to claim actual existence and equally\nreal value; while at the same time philosophy must reconcile the seeming\nopposition of their claims and unite them in an harmonious and\nself-explanatory way. In some common substratum, in which, to adopt\nHegel's sarcastic criticism, as in the darkness of the night \"all cows\nare black,\"--that is in the Absolute, as an Identical Basis of\nDifferences,--the reconciliation was to be accomplished.\n\nBut the constructive idealistic movement, in which Fichte and Schelling\nbore so important a part, could not be satisfied with the positions\nreached by either of these two philosophers. Neither the physical and\npsychological sciences, nor the speculative interests of religion,\nethics, art, and social life, permitted this movement to stop at this\npoint. In all the subsequent developments of philosophy during the first\nhalf or three quarters of the nineteenth century, undoubtedly the\ninfluence of Hegel was greatest of all individual thinkers. His _motif_\nand plan are revealed in his letter of November 2, 1800, to Schelling,\nnamely, to transform what had hitherto been an ideal into a thoroughly\nelaborate system. And in spite of his obvious obscurities of thought and\nstyle, there is real ground for his claim to be the champion of the\ncommon consciousness. It is undoubtedly in Hegel's _Ph\u00e4nomenologie des\nGeistes_ (1807), that the distinctive features of the philosophy of the\nfirst half of the last century most clearly define themselves. The\nforces of reflection now abandon the abstract analytic method and\npositions of the Kantian Critique, and concentrate themselves upon the\nstudy of man's spiritual life as an historical evolution, in a more\nconcrete, face-to-face manner. Two important and, in the main, valid\nassumptions underlie and guide this reflective study: (1) The Ultimate\nReality, or principle of all realities, is Mind or Spirit, which is to\nbe recognized and known in its essence, not by analysis into its formal\nelements (the categories), but as a living development; (2) those formal\nelements, or categories to which Kant gave validity merely as\nconstitutional forms of the functioning of the human understanding,\nrepresent, the rather, the essential structure of Reality.\n\nIn spite of these true thoughts, fault was justly found by the\nparticular sciences with both the speculative method of Hegel, which\nconsists in the smooth, harmonious, and systematic arrangement of\nconceptions in logical or ideal relations to one another; and also with\nthe result, which reduces the Being of the World to terms of thought and\ndialectical processes merely, and neglects or overlooks the other\naspects of racial experience. Therefore, the idealistic movement could\nnot remain satisfied with the Hegelian dialectic. Especially did both\nthe religious and the philosophical party revolt against the important\nthought underlying Hegel's philosophy of religion; namely, that \"the\nmore philosophy approximates to a complete development, the more it\nexhibits the same need, the same interest, and the same content, as\nreligion itself.\" This, as they interpreted it, meant the absorption of\nreligion in philosophy.\n\nNext after Hegel, among the great names of this period, stand the names\nof Herbart and Schopenhauer. The former contributes in an important way\nto the proper conception of the task and the method of philosophy, and\ninfluences greatly the development of psychology, both as a science that\nis pedagogic to philosophy, and as laying the basis for pedagogical\nprinciples and practice. But Herbart commits again the ancient fallacy,\nunder the spell of which so much of the Kantian criticism was bound; and\nwhich identifies contradictions that belong to the imperfect or illusory\nconceptions of individual thinkers with insoluble antinomies inherent in\nreason itself. In spite of the little worth and misleading character of\nhis view of perception, and the quite complete inadequacy of the method\nby which, at a single leap, he reaches the one all-explanatory principle\nof his philosophy, Schopenhauer made a most important contribution to\nthe reflective thought of the century. It is true, as Kuno Fischer has\nsaid, that it seems to have occurred to Schopenhauer only twenty-five\nyears after he had propounded his theory, that will, as it appears in\nconsciousness, is as truly phenomenal as is intellect. It is also true\nthat his theory of knowledge and his conception of Reality, as measured\nby their power to satisfy and explain our total experience, are\ninflicted with irreconcilable contradictions. Neither can we accord firm\nconfidence or high praise to the \"Way of Salvation\" which somehow Will\ncan attain to follow by \u00e6sthetic contemplation and ascetic self-denial.\nYet the philosophy of Schopenhauer rightly insists upon our Idealistic\nconstruction of Reality having regard to aspects of experience which his\npredecessors had quite too much neglected; and even its spiteful and\nexaggerated reminders of the facts which contradict the tendency of all\nIdealism to construct a smooth, regular, and altogether pleasing\nconception of the Being of the World, have been of great benefit to the\ndevelopment of the latter half of the nineteenth century.\n\nIn estimating the thoughts and the products of modern Idealism we ought\nnot to forget the larger multitude of thoughtful men, both in Germany\nand elsewhere, who have contributed toward shaping the course of\nreflection in the attempt to answer the problems which the critical\nphilosophy left to the nineteenth century. It is a singular comment upon\nthe caprices of fame that, in philosophy as in science, politics, and\nart, some of those who have really reasoned most soundly and acutely, if\nnot also effectively upon these problems, are little known even by name\nin the history of the philosophical development of the century. Among\nthe earlier members of this group, did space permit, we should wish to\nmention Berger, Solger, Steffens, and others, who strove to reconcile\nthe positions of a subjective idealism with a realistic but pantheistic\nconception of the Being of the World. There are others, who like Weisse,\nI. H. Fichte, C. P. Fischer, and Braniss, more or less bitterly or\nmoderately and reasonably, opposed the method and the conclusions of the\nHegelian dialectic. Still another group earned for themselves the\nsupposedly opprobrious but decidedly vague title of \"Dualists,\" by\nrejecting what they conceived to be the pantheism of Hegel. Still\nothers, like Fries and Beneke and their successors, strove to parallel\nphilosophy with the particular sciences by grounding it in an empirical\nbut scientific psychology; and thus they instituted a line of closely\nconnected development, to which reference has already been made.\n\nHegel himself believed that he had permanently effected that\nreconciliation of the orthodox creed with the cognition of Ultimate\nReality at which his dialectic aimed. In all such attempts at\nreconciliation three great questions are chiefly concerned: (1) the\nBeing of God; (2) the nature of man; (3) the actual and the ideally\nsatisfactory relations between the two. But, as might have been\nexpected, a period of wild, irregular, and confused contention met the\nattempt to establish this claim. In this conflict of more or less noisy\nand popular as well as of thoughtful and scholastic philosophy,\nHegelians of various degrees of fidelity, anti-Hegelians of various\ndegrees of hostility, and ultra-Hegelians of various degrees of\neccentricity, all took a valiant and conspicuous part. We cannot follow\nits history; but we can learn its lesson. Polemical philosophy, as\ndistinguished from quiet, reflective, and critical but constructive\nphilosophy involves a most uneconomical use of mental force. Yet out of\nthis period of conflict, and in a measure as its result, there came a\nperiod of improved relations between science and philosophy and between\nphilosophy and theology, which was the dawn, toward the close of the\nnineteenth century, of that better illumined day into the middle of\nwhich we hope that we are proceeding.\n\nBefore leaving this idealistic movement in Germany, and elsewhere as\ninfluenced largely by German philosophy, one other name deserves\nmention. This name is that of Lotze, who combined elements from many\nprevious thinkers with those derived from his own studies and\nthoughts,--the conceptions of mechanism as applied to physical\nexistences and to psychical life, with the search for some monistic\nPrinciple that shall satisfy the \u00e6sthetical and ethical, as well as the\nscientific demands of the human mind. This variety of interests and of\nculture led to the result of his making important contributions to\npsychology, logic, metaphysics, and \u00e6sthetics. If we find his system of\nthinking--as I think we must--lacking in certain important elements of\nconsistency and obscured in places by doubts as to his real meaning,\nthis does not prevent us from assigning to Lotze a position which, for\nversatility of interests, genial quality of reflection and criticism,\nsuggestiveness of thought and charm of style, is second to no other in\nthe history of nineteenth century philosophical development.\n\nIn France and in England the first quarter of the last century was far\nfrom being productive of great thinkers or great thoughts in the sphere\nof philosophy. De Biran (1766-1824), in several important respects the\nforerunner of modern psychology, after revolting from his earlier\ncomplacent acceptance of the vagaries of Condillac and Cabanis, made the\ndiscovery that the \"immediate consciousness of self-activity is the\nprimitive and fundamental principle of human cognition.\" Meantime it was\nonly a little group of Academicians who were being introduced, in a\nsomewhat superficial way, to the thoughts of the Scottish and the German\nidealistic Schools by Royer-Collard, Jouffroy, Cousin, and others. A\nmore independent and characteristic movement was that inaugurated by\nAuguste Comte (1798-1857), who, having felt the marked influence of\nSaint-Simon when he was only a boy of twenty, in a letter to his friend\nValat, in the year 1824, declares: \"I shall devote my whole life and all\nmy powers to the founding of positive philosophy.\" In spite of the\nimpossibility of harmonizing with this point of view the vague and\nmystical elements which characterize the later thought of Comte, or with\nits carrying into effect the not altogether intelligent recognition of\nthe synthetic activity of the mind (_tout se r\u00e9duit toujours \u00e0 lier_)\nand certain hints as to \"first principles;\" and in spite of the small\npositive contribution to philosophy which Comtism could claim to have\nmade; it has in a way represented the value of two ideas. These are (1)\nthe necessity for philosophy of studying the actual historical forces\nwhich have been at work and which are displayed in the facts of history;\nand (2) the determination not to go by mere unsupported speculation\nbeyond experience in order to discover knowable Reality. There is,\nhowever, a kind of subtle irony in the fact that the word \"Positivism\"\nshould have come to stand so largely for _negative_ conclusions, in the\nvery spheres of philosophy, morals, and religion where _affirmative_\nconclusions are so much desired and sought.\n\nThat philosophy in Great Britain was in a nearly complete condition of\ndecadence during the first half or three quarters of the nineteenth\ncentury was the combined testimony of writers from such different points\nof view as Carlyle, Sir William Hamilton, and John Stuart Mill. And yet\nthese very names are also witnesses to the fact that this decadence was\nnot quite complete. In the first quarter of the century Coleridge,\nalthough he had failed, on account of weakness both of mind and of\ncharacter, in his attempt to reconcile religion to the thought of his\nown age, on the basis of the Kantian distinction between reason and the\nintellect, had sowed certain seed-thoughts which became fertile in the\nsoil of minds more vigorous, logical, and practical than his own. This\nwas, perhaps, especially true in America, where inquirers after truth\nwere seeking for something more satisfactory than the French skepticism\nof the revolutionary and following period. Carlyle's mocking sarcasm was\nalso not without wholesome effect.\n\nBut it was Sir William Hamilton and John Stuart Mill whose thoughts\nexercised a more powerful formative influence over the minds of the\nyounger men. The one was the flower of the Scottish Realism, the other\nof the movement started by Bentham and the elder Mill.\n\nThat the Scottish Realism should end by such a combination with the\nskepticism of the critical philosophy as is implied in Hamilton's law of\nthe relativity of all knowledge, is one of the most curious and\ninteresting turns in the history of modern philosophy. And when this law\nwas so interpreted by Dean Mansel in its application to the fundamental\ncognitions of religion as to lay the foundations upon which the most\nimposing structure of agnosticism was built by Herbert Spencer, surely\nthe entire swing around the circle, from Kant to Kant again, has been\nmade complete. The attempt of Hamilton failed, as every similar attempt\nmust always fail. Neither speculative philosophy nor religious faith is\nsatisfied with an abstract conception, about the correlate of which in\nReality nothing is known or ever can be known. But every important\nattempt of this sort serves the double purpose of stimulating other\nefforts to reconstruct the answer to the problem of philosophy, on a\nbasis of positive experience of an enlarged type; and also of acting as\na real, if only temporary practical support to certain value-judgments\nwhich the faiths of morality, art, and religion both implicate and, in a\nmeasure, validate.\n\nThe influence of John Stuart Mill, as it was exerted not only in his\nconduct of life while a servant of the East India Company, but also in\nhis writings on Logic, Politics, and Philosophy, was, on the whole, a\nvaluable contribution to his generation. In the additions which he made\nto the Utilitarianism of Bentham we have done, I believe, all that ever\ncan be done in defense of this principle of ethics. And his posthumous\nconfessions of faith in the ontological value of certain great\nconceptions of religion are the more valuable because of the nature of\nthe man, and of the experience which is their source. Perhaps the most\npermanent contribution which Mill made to the development of philosophy\nproper, outside of the sphere of logic, ethics, and politics, was his\nvigorous polemical criticism of Hamilton's claim for the necessity of\nfaith in an \"Unconditioned\" whose conception is \"only a fasciculus of\nnegations of the Conditioned in its opposite extremes, and bound\ntogether merely by the aid of language and their common character of\nincomprehensibility.\"\n\nThe history of the development of philosophy in America during the\nnineteenth century, as during the preceding century, has been\ncharacterized in the main by three principal tendencies. These may be\ncalled the theological, the social, and the eclectic. From the beginning\ndown to the present time the religious influence and the interest in\npolitical and social problems have been dominant. And yet withal, the\nstudent of these problems in the atmosphere of this country likes, in a\nway, to do his own thinking and to make his own choices of the thoughts\nthat seem to him true and best fitted for the best form of life. In\nspite of the fact that the different streams of European thought have\nflowed in upon us somewhat freely, there has been comparatively little\neither of the adherence to schools of European philosophy or of the\nattempt to develop a national school. Doubtless the influence of English\nand Scottish thinking upon the academical circles of America was\ngreatest for more than one hundred and fifty years after the gift in\n1714 by Governor Yale of a copy of Locke's Essay to the college which\nbore his name,--and especially upon the reflections and published works\nof Jonathan Edwards touching the fundamental problems of epistemology,\nethics, and religion. During the early part of this century these views\nawakened antagonism from such writers as Dana, Whedon, Hazard, Nathaniel\nTaylor, Jeremiah Day, Henry P. Tappan, and other opponents of the\nEdwardean theology, and also from such advocates of so-called\n\"free-thinking,\" as had derived their _motifs_ and their views from\nEnglish deistical writers like Shaftesbury, or from the skepticism of\nHume.\n\nA more definite philosophical movement, however, which had established\nitself somewhat firmly in scholastic centres by the year 1825, and which\nmaintained itself for more than half a century, went back to the arrival\nin this country of John Witherspoon, in 1768, to be the president of\nPrinceton, bringing with him a library of three hundred books. It was\nthe appeal of the Scottish School to the \"plain man's consciousness\" and\nto so-called \"common sense,\" which was relied upon to controvert all\nforms of philosophy which seemed to threaten the foundations of religion\nand of the ethics of politics and sociology. But even during this\nperiod, which was characterized by relatively little independent\nthinking in scholastic circles, a more pronounced productivity was shown\nby such writers as Francis Wayland, and others; but, perhaps, especially\nby Laurens P. Hickok, whose works on psychology and cosmology deserve\nespecial recognition: while in psychology, as related to philosophical\nproblems, the principal names of this period are undoubtedly the\npresidents of Yale and Princeton,--Noah Porter and James McCosh,--both\nof whom (but especially the former) had their views modified by the more\nscientific psychology of Europe and the profounder thinking of Germany.\n\nIt was Germany's influence, however, both directly and indirectly\nthrough Coleridge and a few other English writers, that caused a ferment\nof impressions and ideas which, in their effort to work themselves\nclear, resulted in what is known as New England \"Transcendentalism.\" In\nAmerica this movement can scarcely be called definitely philosophical;\nmuch less can it be said to have resulted in a system, or even in a\nschool, of philosophy. It must also be said to have been \"inspired but\nnot borrowed\" from abroad. Its principal, if not sole, literary survival\nis to be found in the works of Emerson. As expounded by him, it is not\nprecisely Pantheism--certainly not a consistent and critical development\nof the pantheistic theory of the Being of the World; it is, rather, a\nvague, poetical, and pantheistical Idealism of a decidedly mystical\ntype.\n\nThe introduction of German philosophy proper, in its nature form, and\nessential being, to the few interested seriously in critical and\nreflective thinking upon the ultimate problems of nature and of human\nlife, began with the founding of the _Journal of Speculative\nPhilosophy_, in 1867, under the direction of William T. Harris, then\nSuperintendent of Schools in this city.\n\nWith the work of Darwin, and his predecessors and successors, there\nbegan a mighty movement of thought which, although it is primarily\nscientific and more definitely available in biological science, has\nalready exercised, and is doubtless destined to exercise in the future,\nan enormous influence upon philosophy. Indeed, we are already in the\nmidst of the preliminary confusions and contentions, but most fruitful\nconsiderations and discoveries belonging to a so-called philosophy of\nevolution.\n\nThis development has, in the sphere of systematic philosophy, reached\nits highest expression in the voluminous works produced through the\nlatter half of the nineteenth century by Mr. Herbert Spencer, whose\nrecent death seems to mark the close of the period we have under\nconsideration. The metaphysical assumptions and ontological value of the\nsystem of Spencer, as he wished it to be understood and interpreted,\nhave perhaps, though not unnaturally, been quite too much submerged in\nthe more obvious expressions of its agnostic positivism. In its\npsychology, however, the assumption of \"some underlying substance in\ncontrast to all changing forms,\" distinguishes it from a pure positivism\nin a very radical way. But more especially in philosophy, the\nmetaphysical postulate of a mysterious Unity of Force that somehow\nmanages to reveal itself, and the law of its operations, to the\ndeveloped cognition of the nineteenth century philosopher, however much\nit seems to involve the system in internal contradictions, certainly\nforbids that we should identify it with the positivism of Auguste Comte.\nIn our judgment, however, it is in his ethical good sense and integrity\nof judgment,--a good sense and integrity which commits to ethics rather\nthan to sociology the task of determining the highest type of human\nlife,--and in basing the conditions for the prevalence and the\ndevelopment of the highest type of life upon ethical principles and upon\nthe adherence to ethical ideas, that Herbert Spencer will be found most\nclearly entitled to a lasting honor.\n\nIII. The third number of our difficult tasks is to summarize the\nprincipal results, to inventory the net profits, as it were, of the\ndevelopment of philosophy during the nineteenth century. This task is\nmade the more difficult by the heterogeneous nature and as yet\nunclassified condition of the development. With the quickening and\ndiversifying of all kinds and means of intercourse, there has come the\nbreaking down of national schools and idiosyncrasies of method and of\nthought. In philosophy, Germany, France, Great Britain, and indeed,\nItaly, have come to intermingle their streams of influence; and from all\nthese countries these streams have been flowing in upon America. In\npsychology, especially, as well as in all the other sciences, but also\nto some degree in philosophy, returning streams of influence from\nAmerica have, during the last decade or two, been felt in Europe itself.\n\nIt must also be admitted that the attempts at a reconstruction of\nsystematic philosophy which have followed the rapid disintegration of\nthe Hegelian system, and the enormous accumulations of new material due\nto the extension of historical studies and of the particular\nsciences,--including especially the so-called \"new psychology,\"--have\nnot as yet been fruitful of large results. In philosophy, as in art,\npolitics, and even scientific theory, the spirit and the opportunity of\nthe time are more favorable to the gathering of material and to the\nprojecting of a bewildering variety of new opinions, or old opinions put\nforth under new names, than to that candid, patient, and prolonged\nreflection and balancing of judgment which a worthy system-building\ninexorably requires. The age of breaking up the old, without\nassimilating the new, has not yet passed away. And whatever is new,\nstartling, large, even monstrous, has in many quarters the seeming\npreference, in philosophy's building as in other architecture. To the\nconfusion which reigns even in scholastic circles, contributions have\nbeen arriving from the outside, from philosophers like Nietzsche, and\nfrom men great in literature like Tolstoi. Nor has the matter been\nhelped by the more recent extreme developments of positivism and\nskepticism, which often enough, without any consciousness of their\norigin and without the respect for morality and religion which Kant\nalways evinced, really go back to the critical philosophy.\n\nIn spite of all this, however, the last two decades or more have shown\ncertain hopeful tendencies and notable achievements, looking toward the\nreconstruction of systematic philosophy. In this attempt to bring order\nout of confusion, to enable calm, prolonged, and reflective thinking to\nbuild into its structure the riches of the new material which the\nevolution of the race has secured, a place of honor ought to be given to\nFrance, where so much has been done of late to blend with clearness of\nstyle and independence of thought that calm reflective and critical\njudgment which looks all sides of human experience sympathetically but\nbravely in the face. In psychology Ribot, and in philosophy, Fouill\u00e9e,\nRenouvier, Secr\u00e9tan, and others, deserve grateful recognition. No friend\nof philosophy can, I think, fail to recognize the probable benefits to\nbe derived from that movement with which such names as Mach and Ostwald\nin Germany are connected, and which is sounding the call to the men of\nscience to clear up the really distressing obscurity and confusion which\nhas so long clung to their fundamental conceptions; and to examine anew\nthe significance of their assumptions, with a view to the construction\nof a new and improved doctrine of the Being of the World. And if to\nthese names we add those of the numerous distinguished investigators of\npsychology as pedagogic to philosophy, and, in philosophy, of Deussen,\nEucken, von Hartmann, Riehl, Wundt, and others, we may well affirm that\nnew light will continue to break forth from that country which so\npowerfully aroused the whole Western World at the end of the eighteenth\nand beginning of the nineteenth centuries. In Great Britain the name and\nworks of Thomas Hill Green have influenced the attempts at a\nreconstruction of systematic philosophy in a manner to satisfy at one\nand the same time both the facts and laws of science and the \u00e6sthetical,\nethical, and religious ideals of the age, in a very considerable degree.\nAnd in this attempt, both as it expresses itself in theoretical\npsychology and in the various branches of philosophical discipline,\nwriters like Bradley, Fraser, Flint, Hodgson, Seth, Stout, Ward, and\nothers, have taken a conspicuous part. Nor are there wanting in Holland,\nItaly, and even in Sweden and Russia, thinkers equally worthy of\nrecognition, and recognized, in however limited and unworthy fashion, in\ntheir own land. The names of those in America who have labored most\nfaithfully, and succeeded best, in this enormous task of reconstructing\nphilosophy in a systematic way, and upon a basis of history and of\nmodern science, I do not need to mention; they are known, or they surely\nought to be known, to us all.\n\nIn attempting to summarize the gains of philosophy during the last\nhundred years, we should remind ourselves that progress in philosophy\ndoes not consist in the final settlement, and so in the \"solving\" of any\nof its great problems. Indeed, the relations of philosophy to its\ngrounds in experience, and the nature of its method and of its ideal,\nare such that its progress can never be expected to put an end to\nitself. But the content of the total experience of humanity has been\ngreatly enriched during the last century; and the critical and\nreflective thought of trained minds has been led toward a more profound\nand comprehensive theory of Reality, and toward a doctrine of values\nthat shall be more available for the improvement of man's political,\nsocial, and religious life.\n\nIn view of this truth respecting the limitations of systematic\nphilosophy, I think we may hold that certain negative results, which are\ncustomarily adduced as unfavorable to the claims of philosophical\nprogress, are really signs of improvement during the latter half of the\nnineteenth century. One is an increased spirit of reserve and caution,\nand an increased modesty of claims. This result is perhaps significant\nof riper wisdom and more trustworthy maturity. Kant believed himself to\nhave established for philosophy a system of apodeictic conclusions,\nwhich were as completely forever to have displaced the old dogmatism as\nCopernicus had displaced the Ptolemaic astronomy. But the steady\npressure of historical and scientific studies has made it increasingly\ndifficult for any sane thinker to claim for any system of thinking such\ndemonstrable validity. May we not hope that the students of the\nparticular sciences, to whom philosophy owes so much of its enforced\nsanity and sane modesty, will themselves soon share freely of the\nphilosophic spirit with regard to their own metaphysics and ethical and\nreligious standpoints, touching the Ultimate Reality? Even when the\nrecoil from the overweening self-satisfaction and crass complacency of\nthe earlier part of the last century takes the form of melancholy, or of\nacute sadness, or even of a mild despair of philosophy, I am not sure\nthat the last state of that man is not better than the first.\n\nIn connection with this improvement in spirit, we may also note an\nimprovement in the method of philosophy. The purely speculative method,\nwith its intensely interesting but indefensible disregard of concrete\nfacts, and of the conclusions of the particular sciences, is no longer\nin favor even among the most ardent devotees and advocates of the\nsuperiority of philosophy to those sciences. At the same time,\nphilosophy may quite properly continue to maintain its position of\nindependent critic, as well as of docile pupil, toward the particular\nsciences.\n\nIn the same connection must be mentioned the hopeful fact that the last\ntwo or three decades have shown a decided improvement in the relations\nof philosophy toward the positive sciences. There are plain signs of\nlate that the attitude of antagonism, or of neglect, which prevailed so\nlargely during the second and third quarters of the nineteenth century,\nis to be replaced by one of friendship and mutual helpfulness. And,\nindeed, science and philosophy cannot long or greatly flourish without\nreciprocal aid, if by science we mean a true _Wissenschaft_ and if we\nalso mean to base philosophy upon our total experience. For science and\nphilosophy are really engaged upon the same task,--to _understand and to\nappreciate the totality of man's_ _experience_. They, therefore, have\nessential and permanent relations of dependence for material, for\ninspiration and correction, and for other forms of helpfulness. While,\nthen, their respective spheres have been more clearly delimited during\nthe last century, their interdependence has been more forcefully\nexhibited. Both of them have been developing a systematic exposition of\nthe universe. Both of them desire to enlarge and deepen the conception\nof the Being of the World, as made known to the totality of human\nexperience, in its Unity of nature and significance. We cannot believe\nthat the end of the nineteenth century would sustain the charge which\nFontenelle made in the closing years of the seventeenth century:\n\"_L'Acad\u00e9mie des Sciences ne prend la nature que par petites\nparcelles_.\" Science itself now bids us regard the Universe as a\ndynamical Unity, teleologically conceived, because in a process of\nevolution under the control of immanent ideas. Philosophy assumes the\nsame point of view, rather at the beginning than at the end of defining\nits purpose; and so feels a certain glad leap at its heart-strings, and\nan impulse to hold out the hand to science, when it hears such an\nutterance as that of Poincar\u00e9: _Ce n'est pas le m\u00e9chanisme le vrai, le\nseul but; c'est l'unit\u00e9_.\n\nShall we not say, then, that this double-faced but wholly true lesson\nhas been learned: namely, that the so-called philosophy of nature has no\nsound foundation and no safeguard against vagaries of every sort, unless\nit follows the lead of the positive sciences of nature; but that the\nsciences themselves can never afford a full satisfaction to the\nlegitimate aspirations of human reason unless they, too, contribute to\nthe philosophy of nature--writ large and conceived of as a real-ideal\nUnity.\n\nThat nature, as known and knowable by man, is a great artist, and that\nman's \u00e6sthetical consciousness may be trusted as having a certain\nontological value, is the postulate properly derived from the\nconsiderations advanced in the latest, and in some respects the most\nsatisfactory, of the three Critiques of Kant. The ideal way of looking\nat natural phenomena which so delighted the mind of Goethe has now been\nplaced on broad and sound foundations by the fruitful industries of many\nworkmen,--such as Karl Ernst von Baer and Charles Darwin,--whose\nmorphological and evolutionary conceptions of the universe have\ntransformed the current conceptions of cosmic processes. But the world\nof physical and natural phenomena has thereby been rendered not less,\nbut more, of a Cosmos, an orderly totality.\n\nIn addition to these more general but somewhat vague evaluations of the\nprogress of philosophy during the nineteenth century, we are certainly\ncalled upon to face the question whether, after all, any advance has\nbeen made toward the more satisfactory solution of the definite problems\nwhich the Kantian criticism left unsolved. To this question I believe an\naffirmative answer may be given in accordance with the facts of history.\nIt will be remembered that the first of these problems was the\nepistemological. Certainly no little improvement has been made in the\npsychology of cognition. We can no longer repeat the mistakes of Kant,\neither with respect to the uncritical assumptions he makes regarding the\norigin of knowledge in the so-called \"faculties\" of the human mind or\nregarding the analysis of those faculties and their interdependent\nrelations. It is not the Scottish philosophy alone which has led to the\nconclusion that, in the word of the late Professor Adamson, \"What are\ncalled acts or states of consciousness are _not_ rightly conceived of as\nhaving for their objects their own modes of existence as ways in which a\nsubject is modified.\" And in the larger manner both science and\nphilosophy, in their negations and their affirmations, and even in their\npoints of view, have better grounds for the faith of human reason in its\npower progressively to master the knowledge of Reality than was the case\na hundred years ago. Nor has the skepticism of the same era, whether by\nshallow scoffing at repeated failures, or by pious sighs over the\nlimitations of human reason, or by critical analysis of the cognitive\nfaculties \"according to well-established principles,\" succeeded in\nlimiting our speculative pretensions to the sphere of possible\nexperience,--in the Kantian meaning both of \"principles\" and of\n\"experience.\" But what both science and philosophy are compelled to\nagree upon as a common underlying principle is this: The proof of the\nmost fundamental presuppositions, as well as of the latest more\nscientifically established conclusions, of both science and philosophy,\nis the assistance they afford in the satisfactory explanation of the\ntotality of racial experience.\n\nIn the evolution of the ontological problem, as compared with the form\nin which it was left by the critical philosophy, the past century has\nalso made some notable advances. To deny this would be to discredit the\ndevelopment of human knowledge so far as to say that we know no more\nabout what nature is, and man is, than was known a hundred years ago. To\nsay this, however, would not be to speak truth of fact. And here we may\nnot unnaturally grow somewhat impatient with that metaphysical fallacy\nwhich places an impassable gulf between Reality and Experience. No\nreality is, of course, cognizable or believable by man which does not\nsomehow show its presence in his total experience. But no growth of\nexperience is possible without involving increase of knowledge\nrepresenting Reality. For Reality is no absent and dead, or statical,\nDing-an-Sich. Cognition itself is a commerce of realities. And are there\nnot plain signs that the more thoughtful men of science are becoming\nless averse to the recognition of the truth of ontological philosophy;\nnamely, that the deeper meaning of their own studies is grasped only\nwhen they recognize that they are ever face to face with what they call\nEnergy and we call Will, and with what they call laws and we call Mind\nas significant of the progressive realization of immanent ideas. This\nUltimate Reality is so profound that neither science nor philosophy will\never sound all its depths, and so comprehensive as more than to justify\nall the categories of both.\n\nProbably, on the whole, there has been less progress made toward a\nsatisfactory solution of the problems offered by the value-judgments of\nethics and religion, in the form in which these problems were left by\nthe critical philosophy. The century has illustrated the truth of\nFalckenberg's statement: \"In periods which have given birth to a\nskeptical philosophy, one never looks in vain for the complementary\nphenomenon of mysticism.\" Twice during the century the so-called\n\"faith-philosophy,\" or philosophy of feeling, has been borne to the\nfront, to raise a bulwark against the advancing hosts of\nagnostics--occasioned in the first period by the negations of the\nKantian criticism, and in the second by the positive conclusions of the\nphysical and biological sciences. This form of protesting against the\nneglect or disparagement of important factors which belong to man's\n\u00e6sthetical, ethical, and religious experience, is reasonable and must be\nheard. But the extravagances with which these neglected factors have\nbeen posited and appraised, to the neglect of the more definitively\nscientific and strictly logical, is to be deplored. The great work\nbefore the philosophy of the present age is the reconciliation of the\nhistorical and scientific conceptions of the Universe with the\nlegitimate sentiments and ideals of art, morality, and religion. But\nsurely neither rationalism nor \"faith-philosophy\" is justified in\npouring out the living child with the muddy water of the bath.\n\nIV. The attempt to survey the present situation of philosophy, and to\npredict its immediate future, is embarrassed by the fact that we are all\nimmersed in it, are a part of its spirit and present form. But if\nnearness has its embarrassments, it has also its benefits. Those who are\namidst the tides of life may know better, in a way, how these tides are\ntending and what is their present strength, than do those who survey\nthem from distant, cool, and exalted heights. \"_F\u00fcr jeden einzelnen\nbildet der Vater und der Sohn eine greifbare Kette von Lebensereignungen\nund Erfahrungen._\" The very intensely vital and formative but unformed\ncondition of systematic philosophy--its protoplasmic character--contains\npromises of a new life. If we may believe the view of Hegel that the\nsystematizing of the thought of any age marks the time when the peculiar\nliving thought of that age is passing into a period of decay, we may\ncertainly claim for our present age the prospect of a prolonged\nvitality.\n\nThe nineteenth century has left us with a vast widening of the\nhorizon,--outward into space, backward in time, inward toward the\nsecrets of life, and downward into the depths of Reality. With this\nthere has been an increase in the profundity of the conviction of the\nspiritual unity of the race. In the consideration of all of its problems\nin the immediate future and in the coming century--so far as we can see\nforward into this century--philosophy will have to reckon with certain\nmarked characteristics of the human spirit which form at the same time\ninspiring stimuli and limiting conditions of its endeavors and\nachievements. Chief among these are the greater and more firmly\nestablished principles of the positive sciences, and the prevalence of\nthe historical spirit and method in the investigation of all manner of\nproblems. These influences have given shape to the conception which,\nalthough it is as yet by no means in its final or even in thoroughly\nself-consistent form, is destined powerfully to affect our philosophical\nas well as our scientific theories. This conception is that of\nDevelopment. But philosophy, considered as the product of critical and\nreflective thinking over the more ultimate problems of nature and of\nhuman life, is itself a development. And it is now, more than ever\nbefore, a development interdependently connected with all the other\ngreat developments.\n\nPhilosophy, in order to adapt itself to the spirit of the age, must\nwelcome and cultivate the freest critical inquiry into its own methods\nand results, and must cheerfully submit itself to the demand for\nevidences which has its roots in the common and essential experience of\nthe race. Moreover, the growth of the spirit of democracy, which, on the\none hand, is distinctly unfavorable to any system of philosophy whose\ntenets and formulas seem to have only an academic validity or a merely\nesoteric value, and which, on the other hand, requires for its\nsatisfaction a more tenable, helpful, and universally applicable theory\nof life and reality, cannot fail, in my judgment, to influence favorably\nthe development of philosophy. In the union of the speculative and the\npractical; in the harmonizing of the interests of the positive sciences,\nwith their judgments of fact and law, and the interests of art,\nmorality, and religion, with their value-judgments and ideals; in the\nsynthesis of the truths of Realism and Idealism, as they have existed\nhitherto and now exist in separateness or antagonism; in a union that is\nnot accomplished by a shallow eclecticism, but by a sincere attempt to\nbase philosophy upon the totality of human experience;--in such a union\nas this must we look for the real progress of philosophy in the coming\ncentury.\n\nJust now there seem to be two somewhat heterogeneous and not altogether\nwell-defined tendencies toward the reconstruction of systematic\nphilosophy, both of which are powerful and represent real truths\nconquered by ages of intellectual industry and conflict. These two,\nhowever, need to be internally harmonized, in order to obtain a\nsatisfactory statement of the development of the last century. They may\nbe called the evolutionary and the idealistic. The one tendency lays\nemphasis on mechanism, the other on spirit. Yet it is most interesting\nto notice how many of the early workmen in the investigation of the\nprinciple of the conservation and correlation of energy took their point\nof departure from distinctly teleological and spiritual conceptions. \"I\nwas led,\" said Colding,--to take an extreme case,--at the Natural\nScience Congress at Innsbruck, 1869, \"to the idea of the constancy of\nnational forces by the religious conception of life.\" And even\nMoleschott, in his _Autobiography_, posthumously published, declares: \"I\nmyself was well aware that the whole conception might be converted; for\nsince all matter is a bearer of force, endowed with force or penetrated\nwith spirit, it would be just as correct to call it a spiritualistic\nconception.\" On the other hand, the modern, better instructed Idealism\nis much inclined, both from the psychological and from the more purely\nphilosophical points of view, to regard with duly profound respect all\nthe facts and laws of that mechanism of Reality, which certainly is not\nmerely the dependent construction of the human mind functioning\naccording to a constitution that excludes it from Reality, but is rather\nthe ever increasingly more trustworthy revealer of Reality. This\ntendency to a union of the claims of both Realism and Idealism is\nprofoundly influencing the solution of each one of these problems which\nthe Kantian criticism left to the philosophy of the nineteenth century.\nIn respect of the epistemological problem, philosophy--as I have already\nsaid--is not likely again to repeat the mistakes either of Kant or of\nthe dogmatism which his criticism so effectually overthrew. It was a\nwise remark of the physician Johann Benjamin Erhard, in a letter dated\nMay 19, 1794, _\u00e0 propos_ of Fichte: \"The philosophy which _proceeds_\nfrom a _single_ fundamental principle, and pretends to deduce everything\nfrom it, is and always will remain a piece of artificial sophistry: only\nthat philosophy which _ascends_ to the highest principle and exhibits\neverything else in perfect harmony with it, is the true one.\" This at\nleast ought--one would say--to have been made clear by the century of\ndiscussion over the epistemological problem, since Kant. You cannot\n_deduce_ the Idea from the Reality, or the Reality from the Idea. The\nproblem of knowledge is not, as Fichte held in the form of a fundamental\nassumption, an alternative of this sort. The Idea _and_ Reality are, the\nrather already there, and to be recognized as in a living unity, in\nevery cognitive experience. Psychology is constantly adding something\ntoward the problem of cognition as a problem in synthesis; and is then\nin a way contributing to the better scientific understanding of the\nphilosophical postulate which is the confidence of human reason in its\nability, by the harmonious use of all its powers, progressively to reach\na better and fuller knowledge of Reality.\n\nThe ontological problem will necessarily always remain the unsolved, in\nthe sense of the very incompletely solved problem of philosophy. But as\nlong as human experience develops, and as long as philosophy bestows\nupon experience the earnest and candid efforts of reflecting minds, the\nsolution of the ontological problem will be approached, but never fully\nreached. That Being of the World which Kant, in the negative and\ncritical part of his work, left as an X, unknown and unknowable, the\nlast century has filled with a new and far richer content than it ever\nhad before. Especially has this century changed the conception of the\nUnity of the Universe in such manner that it can never return again to\nits ancient form. On the one hand, this Unity cannot be made\ncomprehensible in terms of any one scientific or philosophical principle\nor law. Science and philosophy are both moving farther and farther away\nfrom the hope of comprehending the variety and infinite manifoldness of\nthe Absolute in terms of any one side or aspect of man's complex\nexperience. But, on the other hand, the confidence in this essential\nUnity is not diminished, but is the rather confirmed. As humanity itself\ndevelops, as the Selfhood of man grows in the experience of the world\nwhich is its own environment, and of the world within which it is its\nown true Self, humanity may reasonably hope to win an increased, and\nincreasingly valid, cognition of the Being of the World as the Absolute\nSelf.\n\nClosely connected, and in a way essentially identical with the\nontological problem, is that of the origin, validity, and rational value\nof the ideas of humanity. May it not be said that the nineteenth century\ntransfers to the twentieth an increased interest in and a heightened\nappreciation of the so-called practical problems of philosophy. Science\nand philosophy certainly ought to combine--and are they not ready to\ncombine?--in the effort to secure a more nearly satisfactory\nunderstanding and solution of the problems afforded by the \u00e6sthetical,\nethical, and religious sentiments and ideals of the race. To philosophy\nthis combination means that it shall be more fruitful than ever before\nin promoting the uplift and betterment of mankind. The fulfillment of\nthe practical mission of philosophy involves the application of its\nconceptions and principles to education, politics, morals, as a matter\nof law and of custom, and to religion as matter both of rational faith\nand of the conduct of life.\n\nHow, then, can this brief and imperfect sketch of the outline of the\ndevelopment of philosophy in the nineteenth century better come to a\nclose than by words of encouragement and of exhortation as well. There\nare, in my judgment, the plainest signs that the somewhat too\ndestructive and even nihilistic tendencies of the second and third\nquarters of the nineteenth century have reached their limit; that the\nstrife of science and philosophy, and of both with religion, is\nlessening, and is being rapidly displaced by the spirit of mutual\nfairness and reciprocal helpfulness; and that reasonable hopes of a new\nand a splendid era of reconstruction in philosophy may be entertained.\nFor I cannot agree with the _dictum_ of a recent writer on the subject,\nthat \"the sciences are coming less and less to admit of a synthesis, and\nnot at all of a synthetic philosopher.\"\n\nOn the contrary, I hold that, with an increased confidence in the\ncapacity of human reason to discover and validate the most secret and\nprofound, as well as the most comprehensive, of truths, philosophy may\nwell put aside some of its shyness and hesitancy, and may resume more of\nthat audacity of imagination, sustained by ontological convictions,\nwhich characterized its work during the first half of the nineteenth\ncentury. And if the latter half of the twentieth century does for the\nconstructions of the first half of the same century, what the latter\nhalf of the nineteenth century did for the first half of that century,\nthis new criticism will only be to illustrate the way in which the human\nspirit makes every form of its progress.\n\nTherefore, a summons of all helpers, in critical but fraternal spirit,\nto this work of reconstruction, for which two generations of enormous\nadvance in the positive sciences has gathered new material, and for the\nbetter accomplishment of which both the successes and the failures of\nthe philosophy of the nineteenth century have prepared the men of the\ntwentieth century, is the winsome and imperative voice of the hour.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION A--METAPHYSICS\n\n\n\n\nSECTION A--METAPHYSICS\n\n(_Hall 6, September 21, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR A. C. ARMSTRONG, Wesleyan University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR A. E. TAYLOR, McGill University, Montreal.\n PROFESSOR ALEXANDER T. ORMOND, Princeton University.\n SECRETARY: PROFESSOR A. O. LOVEJOY, Washington University.\n\n\nThe Chairman of the Section, Professor A. C. Armstrong, of Wesleyan\nUniversity, in opening the meeting referred to the continued vitality of\nmetaphysics as shown by its repeated revivals after the many destructive\nattacks upon it in the later modern times: he congratulated the Section\non the fact that the principal speakers were scholars who had made\nnotable contributions to metaphysical theory.\n\n\n\n\nTHE RELATIONS BETWEEN METAPHYSICS AND THE OTHER SCIENCES\n\nBY PROFESSOR ALFRED EDWARD TAYLOR\n\n [Alfred Edward Taylor, Frothingham Professor of Philosophy,\n McGill University, Montreal, Canada. b. Oundle, England,\n December 22, 1869. M.A. Oxford. Fellow, Merton College,\n Oxford, 1891-98, 1902-; Lecturer in Greek and Philosophy,\n Owens College, Manchester, 1896-1903; Assistant Examiner to\n University of Wales, 1899-1903; Green Moral Philosophy\n Prizeman, Oxford, 1899; Frothingham Professor of Philosophy,\n McGill University, 1903-; Member Philosophical Society,\n Owens College, American Philosophical Association. Author of\n _The Problem of Conduct_; _Elements of Metaphysics_.]\n\n\nWhen we seek to determine the place of metaphysics in the general scheme\nof human knowledge, we are at once confronted by an initial difficulty\nof some magnitude. There seems, in fact, to be no one universally\naccepted definition of our study, and even no very general consensus\namong its votaries as to the problems with which the metaphysician ought\nto concern himself. This difficulty, serious as it is, does not,\nhowever, justify the suspicion that our science is, like alchemy or\nastrology, an illusion, and its high-sounding title a mere \"idol of the\nmarket-place,\" one of those _nomina rerum quae non sunt_ against which\nthe Chancellor Bacon has so eloquently warned mankind. If it is hard to\ndetermine precisely the scope of metaphysics, it is no less difficult to\ndo the same thing for the undoubtedly legitimate sciences of logic and\nmathematics. And in all three cases the absence of definition merely\nshows that we are dealing with branches of knowledge which are, so to\nsay, still in the making. It is not until the first principles of\nscience are already firmly laid beyond the possibility of cavil that we\nmust look for general agreement as to its boundary lines, though\nexcellent work may be done, long before this point has been reached, in\nthe establishment of individual principles and deduction of consequences\nfrom them. To revert to the parallel cases I have just cited, many\nmathematical principles of the highest importance are formulated in the\n_Elements_ of Euclid, and many logical principles in the _Organon_ of\nAristotle; yet it is only in our own time that it has become possible to\noffer a general definition either of logic or of mathematics, and even\nnow it would probably be true to say that the majority of logicians and\nmathematicians trouble themselves very little about the precise\ndefinition of their respective studies.\n\nThe state of our science then compels me to begin this address with a\nmore or less arbitrary, because provisional, definition of the term\nmetaphysics, for which I claim no more than that it may serve to\nindicate with approximate accuracy the class of problems which I shall\nhave in view in my subsequent use of the word. By metaphysics, then, I\npropose to understand the inquiry which used formerly to be known as\nontology, that is, the investigation into the general character which\nbelongs to real Being as such, the science, in Aristotelian phraseology,\nof onta h\u00ea onta. Or, if the term \"real\" be objected against as\nambiguous, I would suggest as an alternative account the statement that\nmetaphysics is the inquiry into the general character by which the\ncontent of _true_ assertions is distinguished from that of _false_\nassertions. The two definitions here offered will, I think, be found\nequivalent when it is borne in mind that what the second of them speaks\nof is exclusively the _content_ which is asserted as true in a true\nproposition, not the process of true assertion, which, like all other\nprocesses in the highest cerebral centres, falls under the consideration\nof the vastly different sciences of psychology and cerebral physiology.\nOf the two equivalent forms of statement, the former has perhaps the\nadvantage of making it most clear that it is ultimately upon the\nobjective distinction between the reality and the unreality of that\nwhich is asserted for truth, and not upon any psychological peculiarity\nin the process of assertion itself that the distinction between true and\nuntrue rests, while the second may be useful in guarding against\nmisconceptions that might be suggested by too narrow an interpretation\nof the term \"reality,\" such as, _e. g._, the identification of the\n\"real\" with what is revealed by sensuous perception.\n\nFrom the acceptance of such a definition two important consequences\nwould follow. (1) The first is that metaphysics is at once sharply\ndiscriminated from any study of the psychical _process_ of knowledge, if\nindeed, there can be any such study distinct from the psychology of\nconception and belief, which is clearly not itself the science we have\nin view. For the psychological laws of the formation of concepts and\nbeliefs are exemplified equally in the discovery and propagation of\ntruth and of error. And thus it is in vain to look to them for any\nexplanation of the difference between the two. Nor does the otherwise\npromising extension of Darwinian conceptions of the \"struggle for\nexistence\" and the \"survival of the fittest\" to the field of opinions\nand convictions appear to affect this conclusion. Such considerations\nmay indeed assist us to understand how true convictions in virtue of\ntheir \"usefulness\" gradually come to be established and extended, but\nthey require to presume the truth of these convictions as an antecedent\ncondition of their \"usefulness\" and consequent establishment. I should\ninfer, then, that it is a mistake in principle to seek to replace\nontology by a \"theory of knowledge,\" and should even be inclined to\nquestion the very possibility of such a theory as distinct from\nmetaphysics on the one hand and empirical psychology on the other. (2)\nThe second consequence is of even greater importance. The inquiry into\nthe general character by which the contents of true assertions are\ndiscriminated from the contents of false assertions must be carefully\ndistinguished from any investigation into the truth or falsehood of\nspecial assertions. To ask how in the end truth differs from falsehood\nis to raise an entirely different problem from that created by asking\nwhether a given statement is to be regarded as true or false. The\ndistinction becomes particularly important when we have to deal with\nwhat Locke would call assertions of \"real existence,\" _i. e._,\nassertions as to the occurrence of particular events in the temporal\norder. All such assertions depend, in part at least, upon the admission\nof what we may style \"empirical\" evidence, the immediate unanalyzed\nwitness of simple apprehension to the occurrence of an alleged matter of\nfact. Thus it would follow from our proposed conception of metaphysics\nthat metaphysics is in principle incapable either of establishing or\nrefuting any assertion as to the details of our immediate experience of\nempirical fact, though it may have important bearings upon any theory of\nthe general nature of true Being which we may seek to found upon our\nalleged experiences. In a word, if our conception be the correct one,\nthe functions of a science of metaphysics in respect of our knowledge of\nthe temporal sequence of events psychical and physical must be purely\ncritical, never constructive,--a point to which I shall presently have\nto recur.\n\nOne more general reflection, and we may pass to the consideration of the\nrelation of metaphysics to the various alreadyorganized branches of\nhuman knowledge more in detail. The admission that there is, or may be,\nsuch a study as we have described, seems of itself to involve the\nrecognition that definite knowledge about the character of what really\n\"is,\" is attainable, and thus to commit us to a position of sharp\nopposition both to consistent and thorough-going agnosticism and also to\nthe latent agnosticism of Kantian and neo-Kantian \"critical philosophy.\"\nIn recognizing ontology as a legitimate investigation, we revert in\nprinciple to the \"dogmatist\" position common, _e. g._, to Plato, to\nSpinoza and to Leibniz, that there is genuine truth which can be known,\nand that this genuine truth is not confined to statements about the\nprocess of knowing itself. In fact, the \"critical\" view that the only\ncertain truth is truth about the process of knowing seems to be\ninherently self-contradictory. For the knowledge that such a proposition\nas, _e. g._, \"I know only the laws of my own apprehending activity,\" is\ntrue, would itself be knowledge not about the process of knowing but\nabout the content known. Thus metaphysics, conceived as the science of\nthe general character which distinguishes truth from falsehood,\npresupposes throughout all knowledge the presence of what we may call a\n\"transcendent object,\" that is, a content which is never identical with\nthe process by which it is apprehended, though it may no doubt be\nmaintained that the two, the process and its content, if distinct, are\nyet not ultimately separable. That they are in point of fact not\nultimately separable would seem to be the doctrine which, under various\nforms of statement, is common to and characteristic of all the\n\"idealistic\" systems of metaphysics. So much then in defense of a\nmetaphysical point of view which seems to be closely akin to that of Mr.\nBradley and of Professor Royce, to mention only two names of\ncontemporary philosophers, and which might, I think, for the purpose of\nputting it in sharp opposition to the \"neo-Kantian\" view, not unfairly\nbe called, if it is held to need a name, \"neo-Leibnizian.\"\n\nIn passing on to discuss in brief the nature of the boundary lines which\ndivide metaphysics from other branches of study, it seems necessary to\nstart with a clear distinction between the \"pure\" or \"formal\" and the\n\"applied\" or \"empirical\" sciences, the more so as in the loose current\nemployment of language the name \"science\" is frequently given\nexclusively to the latter. In every-day life, when we are told that a\ncertain person is a \"man of science,\" or as the detestable jargon of our\ntime likes to say, a \"scientist,\" we expect to find that he is, _e. g._,\na geologist, a chemist, a biologist, or an electrician. We should be a\nlittle surprised to find on inquiry that our \"man of science\" was a pure\nmathematician, and probably more than a little to learn that he was a\nformal logician. The distinction between the pure and the empirical\nsciences may be roughly indicated by saying that the latter class\ncomprises all those sciences which yield information about the\nparticular details of the temporal order of events physical and\npsychical, whereas the pure sciences deal solely with the general\ncharacteristics either of all truths, or of all truths of some\nwell-defined class. More exactly we may say that the marks by which an\nempirical is distinguished from a pure science are two. (1) The\nempirical sciences one and all imply the presence among their premises\nof empirical propositions, that is, propositions which assert the actual\noccurrence of some temporal fact, and depend upon the witness of\nimmediate apprehension, either in the form of sense perception or in\nthat of what is commonly called self-consciousness. In the vague\nlanguage made current by Kant, they involve an appeal to some form of\nunanalyzed \"intuition.\" The pure sciences, on the other hand, contain no\nempirical propositions either among their premises or their conclusions.\nThe principles which form their premises are self-evidently true\npropositions, containing no reference to the actual occurrence of any\nevent in the temporal order, and thus involving no appeal to any form of\n\"intuition.\" And the conclusions established in a pure science are all\nrigidly logical deductions from such self-evident premises. That the\nuniversality of this distinction is still often overlooked even by\nprofessed writers on scientific method seems explicable by two simple\nconsiderations. On the one hand, it is easy to overlook the important\ndistinction between a principle which is self-evident, that is, which\ncannot be denied without explicit falsehood, and a proposition affirmed\non the warrant of the senses, because, though its denial cannot be seen\nto be obviously false, the senses appear on each fresh appeal to\nsubstantiate the assertion. Thus the Euclidean postulate about parallels\nwas long falsely supposed to possess exactly the same kind of\nself-evidence as the _dictum de omni_ and the principle of identity\nwhich are part of the foundations of all logic. And further Kant,\nwriting under the influence of this very confusion, has given wide\npopularity to the view that the best known of the pure sciences, that of\nmathematics, depends upon the admission of empirical premises in the\nform of an appeal to intuition of the kind just described. Fortunately\nthe recent developments of arithmetic at the hands of such men as\nWeierstrass, Cantor, and Dedekind seem to have definitely refuted the\nKantian view as far as general arithmetic, the pure science of number,\nis concerned, by proving that one and all of its propositions are\n_analytic_ in the strict sense of the word, that is, that they are\ncapable of rigid deduction from self-evident premises, so that, in what\nregards arithmetic, we may say with Schr\u00f6der that the famous Kantian\nquestion \"how are synthetic judgments _a priori_ possible?\" is now known\nto be meaningless. As regards geometry, the case appears to a\nnon-mathematician like myself more doubtful. Those who hold with\nSchr\u00f6der that geometry essentially involves, as Kant thought it did, an\nappeal to principles not self-evident and dependent upon an appeal to\nsensuous \"intuition,\" are logically bound to conclude with him that\ngeometry is an \"empirical,\" or as W. K. Clifford called it, a \"physical\"\nscience, different in no way from mechanics except in the relative\npaucity of the empirical premises presupposed, and to class it with the\napplied sciences. On the other hand, if Mr. Bertrand Russell should be\nsuccessful in his promised demonstration that all the principles of\ngeometry are deducible from a few premises which include nothing of the\nnature of an appeal to sensuous diagrams, geometry too would take its\nplace among the pure sciences, but only on condition of our recognizing\nthat its truths, like those of arithmetic, are one and all, as Leibniz\nheld, strictly analytical. Thus we obtain as a first distinction between\nthe pure and the empirical sciences the principle that the propositions\nof the former class are all analytical, those of the latter all\nsynthetic. It is not the least of the services which France is now\nrendering to the study of philosophy that we are at last being placed by\nthe labors of M. Couturat in a position to appreciate at their full\nworth the views of the first and greatest of German philosophers on this\ndistinction, and to understand how marvelously they have been confirmed\nby the subsequent history of mathematics and of logic.\n\n(2) A consequence of this distinction is that only the pure or formal\nsciences can be matter of rigid logical demonstration. Since the\nempirical or applied sciences one and all contain empirical premises,\n_i. e._, premises which we admit as true only because they have always\nappeared to be confirmed by the appeal to \"intuition,\" and not because\nthe denial of them can be shown to lead to falsehood, the conclusions to\nwhich they conduct us must one and all depend, in part at least, upon\ninduction from actual observation of particular temporal sequences. This\nis as much as to say that all propositions in the applied sciences\ninvolve somewhere in the course of the reasoning by which they are\nestablished the appeal to the calculus of Probabilities, which is our\none method of eliciting general results from the statistics supplied by\nobservation or experiment. That this is the case with the more concrete\namong such applied sciences has long been universally acknowledged. That\nit is no less true of sciences of such wide range as mechanics may be\nsaid, I think, to have been definitely established in our own day by the\nwork of such eminent physicists as Kirchhoff and Mach. In fact, the\nrecent developments of the science of pure number, to which reference\nhas been made in a preceding paragraph, combined with the creation of\nthe \"descriptive\" theory of mechanics, may fairly be said to have\nfinally vindicated the distinction drawn by Leibniz long ago between the\ntruths of reason and the truths of empirical fact, a distinction which\nthe Kantian trend of philosophical speculation tended during the greater\npart of the nineteenth century to obscure, while it was absolutely\nignored by the empiricist opponents of metaphysics both in England and\nin Germany. The philosophical consequences of a revival of the\ndistinction are, I conceive, of far-reaching importance. On the one\nside, recognition of the empirical and contingent character of all\ngeneral propositions established by induction appears absolutely fatal\nto the current mechanistic conception of the universe as a realm of\npurposeless sequences unequivocally determined by unalterable \"laws of\nnature,\" a result which has in recent years been admirably illustrated\nfor the English-speaking world by Professor Ward's well-known Gifford\nlectures on \"Naturalism and Agnosticism.\" Laws of physical nature, on\nthe empiristic view of applied science, can mean no more than observed\nregularities, obtained by the application of the doctrine of\nchances,--regularities which we are indeed justified in accepting with\nconfidence as the basis for calculation of the future course of temporal\nsequence, but which we have no logical warrant for treating as ultimate\ntruths about the final constitution of things. Thus, for example, take\nthe common assumption that our physical environment is composed of a\nmultitude of particles each in every respect the exact counterpart of\nevery other. Reflection upon the nature of the evidence by which this\nconclusion, if supported at all, has to be supported, should convince us\nthat at most all that the statement ought to mean is that individual\ndifferences between the elementary constituents of the physical world\nneed not be allowed for in devising practical formulae for the\nintelligent anticipation of events. When the proposition is put forward\nas an absolute truth and treated as a reason for denying the ultimate\nspirituality of the world, we are well within our rights in declining\nthe consequence on the logical ground that conclusions from an empirical\npremise must in their own nature be themselves empirical and contingent.\n\nOn the other hand, the extreme empiricism which treats all knowledge\nwhatsoever as merely relative to the total psychical state of the\nknower, and therefore in the end problematic, must, I apprehend, go down\nbefore any serious investigation into the nature of the analytic truths\nof arithmetic, a consequence which seems to be of some relevance in\nconnection with the philosophic view popularly known as Pragmatism. Thus\nI should look to the coming regeneration of metaphysics, of which there\nare so many signs at the moment, on the one hand, for emphatic\ninsistence on the right, _e. g._, of physics and biology and psychology\nto be treated as purely empirical sciences, and as such freed from the\nlast vestiges of any domination by metaphysical presuppositions and\nforegone conclusions, and on the other, for an equally salutary\npurgation of formal studies like logic and arithmetic from the taint of\ncorruption by the irrelevant intrusion of considerations of empirical\npsychology.\n\nWe cannot too persistently bear in mind that there is, corresponding to\nthe logical distinction between the analytic and the synthetic\nproposition, a deep and broad general difference between the wants of\nour nature ministered to by the formal and the applied sciences\nrespectively. The formal sciences, incapable of adding anything to our\ndetailed knowledge of the course of events, as we have seen, enlighten\nus solely as to the general laws of interconnection by which all\nconceivable systems of true assertions are permeated and bound together.\nIn a different connection it would be interesting to develop further the\nreflection that the necessity of appealing to such formal principles in\nall reasoning about empirical matters of fact contains the explanation\nof the famous Platonic assertion that the \"Idea of Good\" or supreme\nprinciple of organization and order in the universe, is itself not an\nexistent, but something eti epekeina t\u00eas ousias, \"transcending even\nexistence,\" and the very similar declaration of Hegel that the question\nwhether \"God\"--in the sense of such a supreme principle--exists is\nfrivolous, inasmuch as existence (_Dasein_) is a category entirely\ninadequate to express the Divine nature. For my present purpose it is\nenough to remark that the need to which the formal sciences minister is\nthe demand for that purely speculative satisfaction which arises from\ninsight into the order of interconnection between the various truths\nwhich compose the totality of true knowledge. Hence it seems a mistake\nto say, as some theorists have done, that were we born with a complete\nknowledge of the course of temporal sequences throughout the universe,\nand a faultless memory, we should have no need of logic or metaphysics,\nor in fact of inference. For even a mind already in possession of all\ntrue propositions concerning the course of events, would still lack one\nof the requisites for complete intellectual satisfaction unless it were\nalso aware, not only of the individual truths, but of the order of their\ninterdependence. What Aristotle said long ago with reference to a\nparticular instance may be equally said universally of all our empirical\nknowledge; \"even if we stood on the moon and saw the earth intercepting\nthe light of the sun, we should still have to ask for the reason _why_.\"\nThe purposes ministered to by the empirical sciences, on the other hand,\nalways include some reference to the actual manipulation in advance by\nhuman agency of the stream of events. We study mechanics, for instance,\nnot merely that we may perceive the interdependence of truths, but that\nwe may learn how to maintain a system of bodies in equilibrium, or how\nto move masses in a given direction with a given momentum. Hence it is\ntrue of applied science, though untrue of science as a whole, that it\nwould become useless if the whole past and future course of events were\nfrom the first familiar to us. And, incidentally it may be observed, it\nis for the same reason untrue of inference, though true of inductive\ninference, that it is essentially a passage from the known to the\nunknown.\n\nIn dealing with the relation of metaphysics to the formal sciences\ngenerally, the great difficulty which confronts us is that of\ndetermining exactly the boundaries which separate one from another.\nAmong such pure sciences we have by universal admission to include at\nleast two, pure formal logic and pure mathematics, as distinguished from\nthe special applications of logic and mathematics to an empirical\nmaterial. Whether we ought also to recognize ethics and \u00e6sthetics, in\nthe sense of the general determination of the nature of the good and the\nbeautiful, as non-empirical sciences, seems to be a more difficult\nquestion. It seems clear, for instance, that ethical discussions, such\nas bulk so largely in our contemporary literature, as to what is the\nright course of conduct under various conditions, are concerned\nthroughout with an empirical material, namely, the existing\npeculiarities of human nature as we find it, and must therefore be\nregarded as capable only of an empirical and therefore problematic\nsolution. Accordingly I was at one time myself tempted to regard ethics\nas a purely empirical science, and even published a lengthy treatise in\ndefense of that point of view and in opposition to the whole Kantian\nconception of the possibility of a constructive _Metaphysik der Sitten_.\nIt seems, however, possible to hold that in the question \"What do we\nmean by good?\" as distinguished from the question \"What in particular is\nit right to do?\" there is no more of a reference to the empirical facts\nof human psychology than in the question \"What do we mean by truth?\" and\nthat there must therefore be a non-empirical answer to the problem. The\nsame would of course hold equally true of the question \"What _is_\nbeauty?\" If there are, however, such a pure science of ethics and again\nof \u00e6sthetics, it must at least be allowed that for the most part these\nsciences are still undiscovered, and that the ethical and \u00e6sthetical\nresults hitherto established are in the main of an empirical nature, and\nthis must be my excuse for confining the remarks of the next two\nparagraphs to the two great pure sciences of which the general\nprinciples may be taken to be now in large measure known.\n\nThat metaphysics and logic should sometimes have been absolutely\nidentified, as for instance by Hegel, will not surprise us when we\nconsider how hard it becomes on the view here defended to draw any hard\nand fast boundary line between them. For metaphysics, according to this\nconception of its scope, deals with the formulation of the self-evident\nprinciples implied, in there being such a thing as truth and the\ndeductions which these principles warrant us in drawing. Thus it might\nbe fairly said to be the supreme science of _order_, and it would not be\nhard to show that all the special questions commonly included in its\nrange, as to the nature of space, time, causation, continuity, and so\nforth, are all branches of the general question, how many types of order\namong concepts are there, and what is their nature. A completed\nmetaphysics would thus appear as the realization of Plato's splendid\nconception of dialectic as the ultimate reduction of the contents of\nknowledge to order by their continuous deduction from a supreme\nprinciple (or, we may add, principles). Now such a view seems to make it\nalmost impossible to draw any ultimate distinction between logic and\nmetaphysics. For logic is strictly the science of the mutual implication\nof propositions, as we see as soon as we carefully exclude from it all\npsychological accretions. In the question what are the conditions under\nwhich one proposition or group of propositions imply another, we exhaust\nthe whole scope of logic pure and proper, as distinguished from its\nvarious empirical applications. This is the important point which is so\ncommonly forgotten when logic is defined as being in some way a study of\n\"psychical processes,\" or when the reference to the presence of \"minds\"\nin which propositions exist, is intended into logical science. We cannot\ntoo strongly insist that for logic the question so constantly raised in\na multitude of text-books, what processes actually take place when we\npass from the assertion of the premises to the assertion of the\nconclusion, is an irrelevant one, and that the only logical problem\nraised by inference is whether the assertion of the premises as true\n_warrants_ the further assertion of the conclusion, supposing it to be\nmade. (At the risk of a little digression I cannot help pointing out\nthat the confusion between a logical and a psychological problem is\ncommitted whenever we attempt, as is so often done, to make the\nself-evidence of a principle identical with our psychological inability\nto believe the contradictory. From the strictly logical point of view,\nall that is to be said about the two sides of such an ultimate\ncontradiction is that the one is true and the other is false. Whether it\nis or is not possible, as a matter of psychical fact for me to affirm\nwith equal conviction, both sides of a contradiction, knowing that I am\ndoing so, is a question of empirical psychology which is possibly\ninsoluble, and at any rate seems not to have received from the\npsychologists the attention it deserves. But the logician, so far as I\ncan see, has no interest as a logician in its solution. For him it would\nstill be the case even though all mankind should actually and\nconsciously affirm both sides of a given contradiction, that one of the\naffirmations would be true, and the other untrue.) Logic thus seems to\nbecome either the whole or an integral part of the science of order, and\nthere remain only two possible ways of distinguishing it from\nmetaphysics. It might be suggested that logical order, the order of\nimplication between truths, is only one species of a wider genus, order\nin general by the side, for example, of spatial, temporal, and numerical\norder, and thus that logic is one subordinate branch of the wider\nscience of metaphysics. Such a view, of course, implies that there are a\nplurality of ultimately independent forms of order irreducible to a\nsingle type. Whether this is the case, I must confess myself at present\nincompetent to decide, though the signal success with which the\nprinciples of number have already been deduced from the fundamental\ndefinitions and axioms of symbolic logic, and number itself defined, as\nby Mr. Russell, in terms of the purely logical concept of\nclass-relation, seems to afford some presumption to the contrary. Or it\nmay be held that the difference is purely one of the degree of\ncompleteness with which the inquiry into order is pursued. Thus the\nordinary symbolic logic of what Schr\u00f6der has called the \"identical\ncalculus,\" or \"calculus of domains,\" consists of a series of deductions\nfrom the fundamental concepts of class and number, identical equality,\ntotality or the \"logical 1,\" zero or the null-class, and the three\nprinciples of identity, subsumption, and negation. The moment you cease\nto accept these data in their totality as the given material for your\nscience, and to inquire into their mutual coherence, by asking for\ninstance whether any one of them could be denied, and yet a body of\nconsistent results deduced from the rest, your inquiry, it might be\nsaid, becomes metaphysics. So, again, the discussion of the well-known\ncontradictions which arise when we try to apply these principles in\ntheir entirety and without modification to classes of classes instead of\nclasses of individuals, or of the problem raised by Peano and Russell,\nwhether the assertions \"Socrates is a man\" and \"the Greeks are men\"\naffirm the same or a different relation between their subject and\npredicate (which seems indeed to be the same question differently\nstated), would generally be allowed to be metaphysical. And the same\nthing seems to be equally true of the introduction of time relations\ninto the interpretation of our symbols for predication employed by Boole\nin his treatment of hypotheticals, and subsequently adopted by his\nsuccessors as the foundation of the \"calculus of equivalent statements.\"\n\nHowever we may decide such questions, we seem at least driven by their\nexistence to the recognition of two important conclusions. (1) The\nrelation between logical and metaphysical problems is so close that you\ncannot in consistency deny the possibility of a science of metaphysics\nunless you are prepared with the absolute skeptic to go the length of\ndenying the possibility of logic also, and reducing the first principles\nof inference to the level of formulae which have happened hitherto to\nprove useful but are, for all we know, just as likely to fail us in\nfuture application as not. (Any appeal to the doctrine of chances would\nbe out of place here, as that doctrine is itself based on the very\nprinciples at stake.) (2) The existence of fundamental problems of this\nkind which remained almost or wholly unsuspected until revealed in our\nown time by the creation of a science of symbolic logic should console\nus if ever we are tempted to suspect that metaphysics is at any rate a\nscience in which all the main constructive work has already been\naccomplished by the great thinkers of the past. To me it appears, on the\ncontrary, that the recent enormous developments in the purely formal\nsciences of logic and mathematics, with the host of fundamental problems\nthey open up, give promise of an approaching era of fresh speculative\nconstruction which bids fair to be no less rich in results than any of\nthe great \"golden\" periods in the past history of our science. Indeed,\nbut that I would avoid the slightest suspicion of a desire to advertise\npersonal friends, I fancy I might even venture to name some of those to\nwhom we may reasonably look for the work to be done.\n\nOf the relation of metaphysics to pure mathematics it would be\nimpertinent for any but a trained mathematician to say very much. I must\ntherefore be content to point out that the same difficulty in drawing\nboundary lines meets us here as in the case of logic. Not so long ago\nthis difficulty might have been ignored, as it still is by too many\nwriters on the philosophy of science. Until recently mathematics would\nhave been thought to be adequately defined as the science of numerical\nand quantitative relations, and adequately distinguished from\nmetaphysics by the non-quantitative and non-numerical character of the\nlatter, though it would probably have been admitted that the problem of\nthe definition of quantity and number themselves is a metaphysical one.\nBut in the present state of our knowledge such an account seems doubly\nunsatisfactory. On the one hand, we have to recognize the existence of\nbranches of mathematics, such as the so-called descriptive geometry,\nwhich are neither quantitative nor numerical, and, on the other,\nquantity as distinct from number appears to play no part in mathematical\nscience, while number itself, thanks to the labors of such men as Cantor\nand Dedekind, seems, as I have said before, to be known now to be only a\nspecial type of order in a series. Thus there appears to be ground for\nregarding serial order as the fundamental category of mathematics, and\nwe are thrown back once more upon the difficult task of deciding how\nmany ultimately irreducible types of order there may be before we can\nundertake any precise discrimination between mathematical and\nmetaphysical science. However we may regard the problem, it is at least\ncertain that the recent researches of mathematicians into the meaning of\nsuch concepts as continuity and infinity have, besides opening up new\nmetaphysical problems, done much to transfigure the familiar ones, as\nall readers of Professor Royce must be aware. For instance I imagine all\nof us here present, even the youngest, were brought up on the\nAristotelian doctrine that there is and can be no such thing as an\nactually existing infinite collection, but which of us would care to\ndefend that time-honored position to-day? Similarly with continuity all\nof us were probably once on a time instructed that whereas \"quantity\" is\ncontinuous, number is essentially \"discrete,\" and is indeed the typical\ninstance of what we mean by the non-continuous. To-day we know that it\nis in the number series that we have our one certain and familiar\ninstance of a perfect continuum. Still a third illustration of the\ntransforming light which is thrown upon old standing metaphysical\npuzzles by the increasing formal development of mathematics may be found\nin the difficulties attendant upon the conception of the \"infinitely\nlittle,\" once regarded as the logical foundation of the so-called\nDifferential Calculus. With the demonstration, which maybe found in Mr.\nRussell's important work, that \"infinitesimal,\" unlike \"infinite,\" is a\npurely relative term, and that there are no infinitesimal real numbers,\nthe supposed logical significance of the concept seems simply to\ndisappear. Instances of this kind could easily be multiplied almost\nindefinitely, but those already cited should be sufficient to show how\nimportant are the metaphysical results which may be anticipated from\ncontemporary mathematical research, and how grave a mistake it would be\nto regard existing metaphysical construction, _e. g._, that of the\nHegelian system, as adequate in principle to the present state of our\norganized knowledge. In fact, all the materials for a new\n_Kategorienlehre_, which may be to the knowledge of our day what Hegel's\n_Logic_ was to that of eighty years ago, appear to lie ready to hand\nwhen it may please Providence to send us the metaphysician who knows how\nto avail himself of them. The proof, given since this address was\ndelivered, by E. Zermelo, that every assemblage can be well ordered, is\nan even more startling illustration of the remarks in the text.\n\nIt remains to say something of the relation of metaphysical speculation\nto the various sciences which make use of empirical premises. On this\ntopic I maybe allowed to be all the more brief, as I have quite recently\nexpressed my views at fair length in an extended treatise (_Elements of\nMetaphysics_, Bks. 3 and 4), and have nothing of consequence to add to\nwhat has been there said. The empirical sciences, as previously defined,\nappear to fall into two main classes, distinguished by a difference\nwhich corresponds to that often taken in the past as the criterion by\nwhich science is to be separated from philosophy. We may study the facts\nof temporal sequence either with a view to the actual control of future\nsequences or with a view to detecting under the sequence some coherent\npurpose. It is in the former way that we deal with facts in mechanics,\nfor instance, or in chemistry, in the latter that we treat them when we\nstudy history for the purpose of gaining insight into national aims and\ncharacter. We may, if we please, with Professor Royce, distinguish the\ntwo attitudes toward fact as the attitude respectively of description\nand of appreciation or evaluation. Now as regards the descriptive\nsciences, the position to which, as I believe, metaphysicians are more\nand more tending is that here metaphysics has, strictly speaking, no\nright at all to interfere. Just because of the absence from metaphysics\nitself of all empirical premises, it can be no business of the\nmetaphysician to determine what the course of events will be or to\nprescribe to the sciences what methods and hypotheses they shall employ\nin the work of such determination. Within these sciences any and every\nhypothesis is sufficiently justified, whatever its nature, so long as it\nenables us more efficiently than any other to perform the actual task of\ncalculation and prediction. And it was owing to neglect of this caution\nthat the _Naturphilosophie_ of the early nineteenth century speedily\nfell into a disrepute fully merited by its ignorant presumption. As\nregards the physical sciences, the metaphysician has indeed by this time\nprobably learned his lesson. We are not likely to-day to repeat the\nmistake of supposing that it is for us as metaphysicians to dictate what\nshall be the physicist's or chemist's definition of matter or mass or\nelementary substance or energy, or how he shall formulate the laws of\nmotion or of chemical composition. Here, at any rate, we can see that\nthe metaphysician's work is done when his analysis has made it clear\nthat we are dealing with no self-evident truths such as the laws of\nnumber, but with inductive, and therefore problematic and provisional\nresults of empirical assumptions as to the course of facts, assumptions\nmade not because of their inherent necessity, but because of their\npractical utility for the special task of calculation. It is only when\nsuch empirical assumptions are treated as self-evident axioms, in fact\nwhen mechanical science gives itself out as a mechanistic philosophy,\nthat the metaphysician obtains a right to speak, and then only for the\npurpose of showing by analysis that the presence of the empirical\npostulates which is characteristic of the natural sciences of itself\nexcludes their erection into a philosophy of first principles.\n\nWhat is important in this connection is that we should recognize quite\nclearly that psychology stands in this respect on precisely the same\nlogical footing as physics or chemistry. It is tempting to suppose that\nin psychology, at any rate, we are dealing throughout with absolute\ncertainties, realities which \"consciousness\" apprehends just as they are\nwithout any of that artificial selection and construction which, as we\nare beginning to see, is imposed upon the study of physical nature by\nthe limitations of our purpose of submitting the course of events to\ncalculation and manipulation. And it is a natural consequence of this\npoint of view to infer that since psychology deals directly with\nrealities, it must be taken as the foundation of the metaphysical\nconstructions which aim at understanding the general character of the\nreal as such. The consequence, indeed, disappears at once if the views\nmaintained in this address as to the intimate relation of metaphysics\nand logic, and the radical expulsion from logic of all discussion of\nmental processes as such, be admitted. But it is still important to note\nthat the premises from which the conclusion in question was drawn are\nthemselves false. We must never allow ourselves to forget that, as the\never-increasing domination of psychology by the highly artificial\nmethods of observation and experiment introduced by Fechner and Wundt is\ndaily making more apparent, psychology itself, like physics, deals not\ndirectly with the concrete realities of individual experience, but with\nan abstract selected from that experience, or rather a set of artificial\nsymbols only partially corresponding with the realities symbolized, and\ndevised for the special object of submitting the realm of mental\nsequences to mathematical calculation. We might, in fact, have based\nthis inference upon the single reflection that every psychological \"law\"\nis obtained, like physical laws, by the statistical method of\nelimination of individual peculiarities, and the taking of an average\nfrom an extended series of measurements. For this very reason, no\npsychological law can possibly describe the unique realities of\nindividual experience. We have in psychology, as in the physical\nsciences, the duty of suspecting _exact_ correspondence between the\nsingle case and the general \"law\" to be of itself proof of error\nsomewhere in the course of our computation. These views, which I suppose\nI learned in the first instance from Mr. F. H. Bradley's paper called _A\nDefence of Phenomenalism in Psychology_, may now, I think, be taken as\nfinally established beyond doubt by the exhaustive analysis of Professor\nM\u00fcnsterberg's _Grundz\u00fcge der Psychologie_. They possess the double\nadvantage of freeing the psychologist once for all from any interference\nby the metaphysician in the prosecution of his proper study, and\ndelivering metaphysics from the danger of having assumptions whose sole\njustification lies in their utility for the purpose of statistical\ncomputation thrust upon it as self-evident principles. For their full\ndiscussion I may perhaps be allowed to refer to the first three chapters\nof the concluding book of my _Elements of Metaphysics_.\n\nWhen we turn to the sciences which aim at the appreciation or evaluation\nof empirical fact, the case seems rather different. It may fairly be\nregarded as incumbent on the metaphysician to consider how far the\ngeneral conception he has formed of the character of reality can be\nsubstantiated and filled in by our empirical knowledge of the actual\ncourse of temporal sequence. And thus the way seems to lie open to the\nconstruction of what may fairly be called a Philosophy of Nature and\nHistory. For instance, a metaphysician who has rightly or wrongly\nconvinced himself that the universe can only be coherently conceived as\na society of souls or wills may reasonably go on to ask what views seem\nbest in accord with our knowledge of human character and animal\nintelligence as to the varying degrees of organized intelligence\nmanifested by the members of such a hierarchy of souls, and the nature\nand amount of mutual intercourse between them. And again, he may fairly\nask what general way of conceiving what we loosely call the inanimate\nworld would at once be true to fundamental metaphysical principles and\nfree from disagreement with the actual state of our physical hypotheses.\nOnly he will need to bear in mind that since conclusions on these points\ninvolve appeal to the present results of the inductive sciences, and\nthus to purely empirical postulates, any views he may adopt must of\nnecessity share in the problematic and provisional character of the\nempirical sciences themselves, and can have no claim to be regarded as\ndefinitely demonstrated in respect of their details. I will here only\nindicate very briefly two lines of inquiry to which these reflections\nappear applicable. The growth of evolutionary science, with the new\nlight it has thrown upon the processes by which useful variations may be\nestablished without the need for presupposing conscious pre\u00ebxisting\ndesign, naturally gives rise to the question whether such unconscious\nfactors are of themselves sufficient to account for the actual course of\ndevelopment so far as it can be traced, or whether the actual history of\nthe world offers instances of results which, so far as we can see, can\nonly have issued from deliberate design. And thus we seem justified in\nregarding the problem of the presence of ends in Nature as an\nintelligible and legitimate one for the philosophy of the future. I\nwould only suggest that such an inquiry must be prosecuted throughout by\nthe same empirical methods, and with the same consciousness of the\nprovisional character of any conclusions we may reach which would be\nrecognized as in place if we were called on to decide whether some\npeculiar characteristic of an animal group or some singular social\npractice in a recently discovered tribe does or does not indicate\ndefinite purpose on the part of breeders or legislators.\n\nThe same remarks, in my opinion, apply to the familiar problems of\nNatural Theology relative to the existence and activity of such\nnon-human intelligences as are commonly understood by the names \"God\" or\n\"gods.\" Hume and Kant, as it seems to me, have definitely shown between\nthem that the old-fashioned attempts to demonstrate from self-evident\nprinciples the existence of a supreme personal intelligence as a\ncondition of the very being of truth all involve unavoidable logical\nparalogisms. I should myself, indeed, be prepared to go further, and to\nsay that the conception of a single personality as the ground of truth\nand reality can be demonstrated to involve contradiction, but this I\nknow is a question upon which some philosophers for whom I entertain the\nprofoundest respect hold a contrary opinion. The more modest question,\nhowever, whether the actual course of human history affords probable\nground for believing in the activity of one or more non-human\npersonalities as agents in the development of our species I cannot but\nthink a perfectly proper subject for empirical investigation, if only it\nbe borne in mind that any conclusion upon such a point is inevitably\naffected by the provisional character of our information as to empirical\nfacts themselves, and can claim in consequence nothing more than a\ncertain grade of probability. With this proviso, I cannot but regard the\nquestion as to the existence of a God or of gods as one upon which we\nmay reasonably hope for greater certainty as our knowledge of the\nempirical facts of the world's history increases. And I should be\ninclined only to object to any attempt to foreclose examination by\nforcing a conclusion either in the theistic or in the atheistic sense on\nalleged grounds of _a priori_ metaphysics. In a word, I would maintain\nnot only with Kant that the \"physico-theological\" argument is specially\ndeserving of our regard, but with Boole that it is with it that Natural\nTheology must stand or fall.\n\n\nNOTE ON EXTENSION AND INTENSION OF TERMS\n\nAmong the numerous difficulties which beset the teaching of the elements\nof formal logic to beginners, one of the earliest is that of deciding\nwhether all names shall be considered to have meaning both in extension\nand intension. As we all know, the problem arises in connection with two\nclasses of names, (1) proper names of individuals, (2) abstract terms. I\nshould like to indicate what seems to me the true solution of the\ndifficulty, though I do not remember to have seen it advocated anywhere\nin just the form I should prefer.\n\n(1) As to proper names. It seems clear that those who regard the true\nproper name as a meaningless label are nearer the truth than those who\nassert with Jevons that a proper name has for its intension all the\npredicates which can be truly ascribed to the object named. As has often\nbeen observed, it is a sufficient proof that, for example, John does not\n_mean_ \"a human being of the male sex,\" to note that he who names his\ndaughter, his dog, or his canoe John, makes no false assertion, though\nhe may commit a solecism. So far the followers of Mill seem to have a\nsatisfactory answer to Jevons, when they say, for example, that he\nconfuses the intension of a term with its accidental or acquired\nassociations. (So, again, we can see that Socrates cannot _mean_ \"the\nwisest of the Greek philosophers,\" by considering that I may perfectly\nwell understand the statement \"there goes Socrates\" without being aware\nthat Socrates is wise or a Greek or a philosopher.) And if we objected\nthat no proper name actually in use is ever without some associations\nwhich in part determine its meaning by restricting its applicability, it\nwould be a valid rejoinder that in pure logic we have to consider not\nthe actual usages of language, but those that would prevail in an ideal\nlanguage purged of all elements of irrelevancy. In such an ideal\nscientific language, it might be said, the proper name would be reduced\nto the level of a mere mark serviceable for identification, but\nconveying no implication whatever as to the special nature of the thing\nidentified. Thus it would be indifferent _what_ mark we attach to any\nparticular individual, just as in mathematics it is indifferent what\nalphabetical symbol we appropriate to stand for a given class or number.\nI think, however, that even in such an ideal scientific language the\nproper name would have a certain intension. In the first place, the use\nof proper name seems to inform us that the thing named is not unique, is\nnot the only member of a class. To a monotheist, for instance, the name\n\"God\" is no true proper name, nor can he consistently give a proper name\nto his Deity. It is only where one member of a class has to be\ndistinguished from others that the bestowal of a proper name has a\nmeaning. And, further, to give a thing a proper name seems to imply that\nthe thing is itself not a class. In logic we have, of course, occasion\nto form the concept of classes which have other classes for their\nindividual members. But the classes which compose such classes of\nclasses could not themselves be identified by means of proper names.\nThus the employment of a proper name seems to indicate that the thing\nnamed is not the only member of its class, and further that it is not\nitself a class of individuals. Beyond this it seems to be a mere\nquestion of linguistic convention what information the use of a proper\nname shall convey. Hence it ought to be said, not that the proper name\nhas no intension, but that it represents a limiting case in which\nintension is at a minimum.\n\n(2) As to abstract terms. Ought we to say, with so many English formal\nlogicians, that an abstract term is always singular and non-intensional?\nThe case for asserting that such terms are all singular, I own, seems\nunanswerable. For it is clear that if the name of an attribute or\nrelation is equally the name of another attribute or relation, it is\nambiguous and thus not properly one term at all. To say, for example,\nthat whiteness means two or more distinct qualities seems to amount to\nsaying that it has no one definite meaning. Of course, it is true that\nmilk is white, paper is white, and snow is white, and yet the\ncolor-tones of the three are distinct. But what we assert here is, not\nthat there are different whitenesses, but only that there are different\ndegrees of approximation to a single ideal standard or type of\nwhiteness. It is just because the whiteness we have in view is one and\nnot many that we can intelligibly assert, for example, that newly fallen\nsnow is _whiter_ than any paper. All the instances produced by Mill to\nshow that abstract terms may be general seem to me either to involve\nconfusion between difference of kind and difference in degree of\napproximation to type, or else to depend upon treating as abstract a\nterm which is really concrete. Thus when we say red, blue, green, are\ndifferent kinds of color, surely what we mean is different kinds of\ncolored surface. Qu\u00e0 colored, they are not different; I mean just as\nmuch and no more when I say \"a red thing is colored,\" or \"has color,\" as\nwhen I say \"a green thing is colored.\" If Mill were right, the\nproposition \"red is a color\" ought to mean exactly the same as \"red is\nred.\" Or, to put it in another way, it would become impossible to form\nin thought any concept of a single class of colored things.\n\nBut need we infer because abstract terms are singular that therefore\nthey have no intension and are mere meaningless marks? Commonly as this\ninference is made, it seems to me clearly mistaken. It seems, in fact,\nto rest upon the vague and ill-defined principle that an attribute can\nhave no attributes of its own. That it is false is shown, I think, by\nthe simple reflection that scientific definitions are one and all\nstatements as to the meaning of abstract names of attributes and\nrelations. For example, the definition of a circle is a statement as to\nthe meaning of circularity, the legal definition of responsible persons\na statement as to the meaning of the abstraction \"responsibility,\" and\nso on. (We only evade the point if we argue that abstract terms when\nused as the subjects of propositions are really being employed\nconcretely. For \"cruelty is odious,\" for instance, does not merely mean\nthat cruel acts are odious acts, but that they are odious _because_ they\nare cruel.) In fact, the doctrine that abstract terms have no intension\nwould seem, if thought out, to lead to the view that there are only\nclasses of individuals, but no classes of classes. Thus to say \"cruel\nacts are odious because cruel\" implies, not only that I can form the\nconcept of a class of cruel acts, but also that of classes of odious\nacts of which the class of cruel acts in its turn is a member. And to\nadmit as much as this is to admit that the class of cruel acts,\nconsidered as a member of the class of odious acts, shares the common\npredicate of odiousness with the other classes of acts composing the\nhigher class. Hence the true account of abstract terms seems to me to be\nthat we have in them another limiting case, a case in which the\nextension and the intension are coincident. Incidentally, by\nillustrating the ambiguity of the principle that attributes have no\nattributes of their own, our discussion seems to indicate the advantage\nof taking the purely extensional view is opposed to the predicative view\nof the import of propositions as the basis of an elementary treatment of\nlogical doctrine.\n\n\n\n\nTHE PRESENT PROBLEMS OF METAPHYSICS\n\nBY ALEXANDER T. ORMOND\n\n [Alexander Thomas Ormond, McCosh Professor of Philosophy,\n Princeton University, since 1897. b. 1847, Punxsutawney,\n Pennsylvania. Mental Science Fellow, Princeton, 1877-78;\n Post-grad. Bonn and Berlin, 1884-85; Ph.D. Princeton, 1880;\n A.B. _ibid._ 1877; LL.D. Miami, 1899. Professor of\n Philosophy and History, University of Minnesota, 1880-83;\n Professor of Mental Science and Logic, Princeton University,\n 1883-97. Member American Philosophical Association, American\n Psychological Association.]\n\n\nI\n\nTHE PRELIMINARY QUESTION\n\n\nThe living problems of any science arise out of two sources: (1) out of\nwhat men may think of it, in view of its nature and claims, and (2) the\nproblems that at any period are vital to it, and in the solution of\nwhich it realizes the purpose of its existence. Now if we distinguish\nthe body of the sciences which deal with aspects of the world's\nphenomena--and here I would include both the psychic and the\nphysical--from metaphysics, which professes to go behind the phenomenon\nand determine the world in terms of its inner, and, therefore,\n_ultimate_ reality, it may be truly said of the body of the sciences\nthat they are in a position to disregard in a great measure questions\nthat arise out of the first source, inasmuch as the data from which they\nmake their departure are obvious to common observation. Our world is all\naround us, and its phenomena either press upon us or are patent to our\nobservation. Lying thus within the field of observation, it does not\noccur to the average mind to question either the legitimacy or the\npossibility of that effort of reflection which is devoted to their\ninvestigation and interpretation. Metaphysics, however, enjoys no such\nimmunity as this, but its claims are liable to be met with skepticism or\ndenial at the outset, and this is due partly to the nature of its\ninitial claims, and partly to the fact that its real data are less open\nto observation than are those of the sciences. I say partly to the\nnature of the initial claims of metaphysics, for it is characteristic of\nmetaphysics that it refuses to regard the distinction between phenomena\nand ground or inner nature, on which the sciences rest, as final, and is\ncommitted from the outset to the claim that the real is in its inner\nnature one and to be interpreted in the light of, or in terms of, its\ninner unity; whereas, science has so indoctrinated the modern mind with\nthe supposition that only the outer movements of things are open to\nknowledge, while their inner and real nature must forever remain\ninaccessible to our powers; I say that the modern mind has been so\nimbued with this pretension as to have almost completely forgotten the\nfact that the distinction of phenomenon and ground is one of science's\nown making. Neither the plain man nor the cultured man, if he happens\nnot to be tinctured with science, finds his world a duality. The things\nhe deals with are the realities, and it is only when his na\u00efve realism\nbegins to break down before the complex demands of his growing life,\nthat the thought occurs to him that his world may be more complex than\nhe has dreamed. It is clear, then, that the distinction of our world\ninto phenomena and ground, on which science so largely rests, is a first\nproduct of reflection, and not a fact of observation at all.\n\nIf this be the case, it may be possible and even necessary for\nreflection at some stage to transcend this distinction. At least, there\ncan be no reason except an arbitrary one for taking this first step of\nreflection to be a finality. And there would be the same justification\nfor a second step that would transcend this dualism, as for the initial\nstep out of which the distinction arose; provided, it should be found\nthat the initial distinction does not supply an adequate basis for a\nrational interpretation of the world that can be taken as final. Now, it\nis precisely because the dualistic distinction of the sciences does fail\nin this regard, that a further demand for a reflective transformation of\nthe data arises. Let us bear in mind that the data of the sciences are\nnot the simple facts of observation, but rather those facts transformed\nby an act of reflection by virtue of which they become phenomena\ndistinguished from a more fundamental nature on which they depend and\nwhich itself is not open to observation. The real data of science are\nfound only when the world of observation has been thus transformed by an\nact of reflection. If then at some stage in our effort to interpret our\nworld it should become clear that the sciences of phenomena, whatever\nvalue their results may possess, are not giving us an interpretation in\nterms that can be taken as final, and that in order to ground such an\ninterpretation a further transformation of our data becomes necessary, I\ndo not see why any of the sciences should feel that they have cause to\ndemur. In truth, it is out of just such a situation as this that the\nmetaphysical interpretation arises (as I propose very briefly here to\nshow), a situation that supplies a genuine demand in the light of which\nthe effort of metaphysics to understand its world seems to possess as\nhigh a claim to legitimacy as that of the sciences of phenomena. Let us\ntake our stand with the plain man or the child, within the world of\nunmodified observation. The things of observation, in this world, are\nthe realities, and at first we may suppose have undergone little\nreflective transformation. The first reflective effort to change this\nworld in any way will, no doubt, be an effort to _number_ or _count_ the\nthings that present themselves to observation, and out of this effort\nwill arise the transformation of the world that results from considering\nit under the concepts and categories of number. In short, to\nmathematical reflection of this simple sort, the things of observation\nwill resolve themselves into a plurality of countable things, which the\nnumbering reflection becoming explicit in its ordinal and cardinal\nmoments will translate into a system that will be regarded as a whole\nmade up of the sum of its parts. The very first step, then, in the\nreflective transformation of things resolves them into a dual system,\nthe world conceived as a cardinal whole that is made up of its ordinal\nparts, and exactly equal to them. This mathematical conception is\nmoreover purely quantitative; involving the exact and stable equivalence\nof its parts or units and that of the sum of the parts with the whole.\nNow it is with this purely quantitative transformation that mathematics\nand the mathematical sciences begin. We may ask, then, why should there\nbe any other than mathematical science,[1] and what ground can\nnon-mathematical science point to as substantiating its claims? I\nconfess I can see no other final reason than this, that mathematical\nscience does not meet the whole demand we feel obliged to make on our\nworld. If mathematics were asked to vindicate itself, it no doubt would\ndo so by claiming that things present quantitative aspects on which it\nfounds its procedure. In like manner non-mathematical, or, as we may\ncall it, physical or natural science, will seek to substantiate its\nclaims by pointing to certain ultra-quantitative or qualitative aspects\nof things. It is true that, so far as things are merely _numerable_,\nthey are purely quantitative; but mathematics abstracts from the content\nand character of its units and aggregates, which may and do change, so\nthat a relation of stable equivalence is not maintained among them. In\nfact, the basis of these sciences is found in the tendency of things to\nbe always changing and becoming different from what they were before.\nThe problem of these sciences is how to ground a rational scheme of\nknowledge in connection with a fickle world like that of qualitative\nchange. It is here that reflection finds its problem, and noticing that\nthe tendency of this world of change is for _a_ to pass into _b_ and\nthus to lose its own identity, the act of reflection that rationalizes\nthe situation is one that connects _a_ and _b_ by relating them to a\ncommon ground _x_ of which they stand as successive manifestations or\nsymbols. _X_ thus supplies the thread of identity that binds the two\nchanges _a_ and _b_ into a relation to which the name causation may be\napplied. And just as quantitative equivalence is the principle of\nrelationship among the parts of the simple mathematical world, so here\nin the world of the dynamic or natural sciences, the principle of\nrelation is natural causation.[2] We find, then, that the\nnon-mathematical sciences rest on a basis that is constituted by a\n_second act of reflection_; one that translates our world into a system\nof phenomena causally inter-related and connected with their underlying\ngrounds.\n\n [Footnote 1: I do not raise the question of qualitative\n mathematics at all. It is clear that the first mathematical\n reflection will be quantitative.]\n\n [Footnote 2: By natural causation I mean such a relationship\n between _a_ and _b_ in a phenomenal system as enables _a_\n through its connection with its ground to determine _b_.]\n\nWe have now reached a point where it will be possible in a few sentences\nto indicate the rise of the metaphysical reflection and the ground on\nwhich it rests. If we consider both the mathematical and the physical\nways of looking at things, we will find that they possess this feature\nin common,--they are purely external, having nothing to say respecting\nthe _inner_ and, therefore, _real_ nature of the things with which they\ndeal. Or, if we concede the latest claims of some of the physical\nspeculators and agree that the aim of physics is an ultimate physical\nexplanation of reality, it will still be true that the whole standpoint\nof this explanation will be external. Let me explain briefly what I mean\nsubstantially by the term _external_ as I use it here. Every\ninterpretation of a world is a function of some knowing consciousness,\nand consequently of some knowing self. This is too obvious to need\nproof. A system will be _external_ to such a knower just to the extent\nthat the knower finds it dominated and determined by categories that are\ndifferent from those of its own determination. A world physically\ninterpreted is one that is brought completely under the rubrics of\nphysics and mathematics; whose movements yield themselves completely,\ntherefore, to a mechanical calculus that gives rise to purely\ndescriptive formul\u00e6; _or_ to the control of a dynamic principle; that of\nnatural causation, by virtue of which everything is determined without\nthought of its own, by the impulse of another, which impulse itself is\nnot directly traceable to any thought or purpose. Now, the occasion for\nthe metaphysical reflection arises when this situation that brings us\nface to face, with, nay, makes us part and parcel of, an alien system of\nthings, becomes intolerable, and the knower begins to demand a closer\nkinship with his world. The knower finds the categories of his own\ncentral and characteristic activity in experience. Here he is conscious\nof being an agent going out in forms of activity for the realization of\nhis world. The determining categories of the activity he is most fully\nconscious of, are interest, idea, prevision, purpose, and that selective\nactivity which goes to its termination in some achieved end. The\nmetaphysical interpretation arises out of the demand that the world\nshall be brought into bonds of kinship with the knower. And this is\neffected by generalizing the categories of consciousness and applying\nthem as principles of interpretation to the world. The act of reflection\non which the metaphysical interpretation proceeds is one, then, in which\nthe world of science is further transformed by bringing the inner nature\nof things out of its isolation and translating the world-movements into\nprocess the terms of which are no longer _phenomena and hidden ground_,\nbut rather inception and realization, or, more specifically, _Idea_ and\n_Reality_. And the point to be noted here is the fact that these\nmetaphysical categories are led up to positivity by an act of reflection\nthat has for its guiding aim an interpretation of the world that will be\nmore ultimately satisfactory to the knower than that of the physical or\nnatural sciences; while negatively, it is led up to by the refusal of\nthe knowing consciousness to rest in a world alien to its own nature and\nin which it is subordinated to the physical and made a mere\nepiphenomenon.\n\n\nII\n\nQUESTIONS OF POINT OF VIEW, PRINCIPLE AND METHOD OF METAPHYSICS\n\n\nIt is clear from what has been said that the metaphysical interpretation\nproceeds on a presupposition radically different from that of\nmathematical and physical science. The presumption of these sciences is\nthat the world is physical, that the physical categories supply the\nnorms of reality, and that consciousness and the psychic, in general,\nare subordinate and phenomenal to the physical. On the contrary,\nmetaphysics arises out of a revolt from these presumptions toward the\nopposite presumption, namely, that _consciousness itself is the great\nreality_, and that the norms of an ultimate interpretation of things are\nto be sought in its categories. This is the great transformation that\nconditions the possibility and value of all metaphysics. It is the\nCopernican revolution which the mind must pass through, a revolution in\nwhich matter and the physical world yields the primacy to mind; a\nrevolution in which consciousness becomes central, its categories and\nanalogies supplying the principles of final world-interpretation. Let us\nconsider then, in the light of this great Copernican revolution, the\nquestions of the _point of view_, _principle_, and _method_ of\nmetaphysics. And here the utmost brevity must be observed. If\nconsciousness be the great reality, then its own central activity, that\neffort by which it realizes its world, will determine for us the _point\nof view_ or departure of which we are in quest. This will be _inner_\nrather than _outer_; it will be motived by _interest_, will shape itself\ninto interest-directed effort. This effort will be cognitive; dominated\nby an _idea_ which will be an anticipation of the _goal_ of the effort.\nIt will, therefore, become _directive_, _selective_, and will stand as\nthe _end_ or _aim_ of the completed effort. The whole movement will thus\ntake the form, genetically, of a developing _purpose informed by an\nidea_, or _teleologically_, of a _purpose going on to its fulfillment_\nin some _aim_ which is also its _motive_. Now, metaphysics determines\nits point of view in the following reasoning: if in consciousness we\nfind the type of the inner nature of things, then the point of view for\nthe interpretation of this inner nature will be to seek by generalizing\nthe standpoint of consciously determined effort and asserting that this\nis the true point of view from which the _meaning_ of the world is to be\nsought.\n\nHaving determined the metaphysical point of view, the next question of\nvital importance is that of its _principle_. And we may cut matters\nshort here by saying at once that the principle we are seeking is that\nof _sufficient reason_, and we may say that a reason will be sufficient\nwhen it adequately expresses the world-view or concept under which an\ninvestigation is being prosecuted. Let us suppose that this world-view\nis that of simple mathematics, the principle of sufficient reason here\nwill be that of _quantitative equivalence_ of parts; or, from the\nstandpoint of the whole, that of _infinite divisibility_. Whereas, if we\ntake the world of the ultra-mathematical science, which is determined by\nthe notion of _phenomena depending on underlying ground_, we will find\nthat the sufficient reason in this sphere takes the form of _adequate\ncause or condition_. The determining condition or causes of any physical\nphenomenon supply, from that point of view, the _ratio sufficiens_ of\nits existence. We have seen that the sufficiency of a reason in the\nabove cases has been determined in view of that notion which defines the\nkind of world the investigation is dealing with. Let us apply this\ninsight to the problem of the principle of metaphysics, and we will soon\nconclude that no reason can be metaphysically sufficient that does not\nsatisfy the requirements of a world conceived under the notion of\n_inception_ and _realization_; or, more specifically, _idea_ and\n_reality_. In short, the _reason_ of metaphysics will refuse to regard\nits world as a mechanism that is devoid of thought and intention; that\nlacks, in short, the motives of internal determination and movement, and\nwill in all cases insist that an explanation or interpretation can be\nmetaphysically adequate only when its ultimate reference is to an idea\nthat is in the process of _purposive_ fulfillment. Such an explanation\nwe call _teleological_ or _rational_, rather than merely mechanical, and\nsuch a principle is alone adequate to embody the _ratio sufficiens_ of\nmetaphysics.\n\nHaving determined the point of view and principle of metaphysics, the\nquestion of metaphysical _method_ will be divested of some of its\ngreatest difficulties. It will be clear to any one who reflects that the\nvery first problem in regard to the method of metaphysics will be that\nof its starting-point and the kind of results it is to look for. And\nlittle can be accomplished here until it has been settled that\nconsciousness is to have the primacy, and that its prerogative is to\nsupply both standpoint and principle of the investigation. We have gone\na long way toward mastering our method when we have settled these\npoints: (1) that the metaphysical world is a world of consciousness; (2)\nthat the conscious form of effort rather than the mechanical is the\nspecies of activity or movement with which we have to deal; and, (3)\nthat the world it is seeking to interpret is ultimately one of _idea_\nand _reality_ in which the processes take the _purposive_ form. In view\nof this, the important steps of method (and we use the term method here\nin the most fundamental sense) will be (1) the question of the _form_ of\nmetaphysical activity or agency as contrasted with that of the physical\nsciences. This may be brought out in the contrast of the two terms\n_finality_ and _mere efficiency_, in which by mere efficiency is meant\nan agency that is presumed to be thoughtless and purposeless, and\nconsequently without _foresight_. All this is embodied in the term\n_force_ or physical energy, and less explicitly in that of _natural\ncausation_. Contrasted with this, _finality_ is a term that involves the\nforward impulse of _idea_, _prevision_, and _purpose_. Anything that is\ncapable of any sort of _foretaste_ has in it a principle of prevision,\nselection, choice, and purpose. The impulse that motives and runs it,\nthat also stands out as the _end_ of its fulfillment, is a foretaste, an\n_Ahnung_, an anticipation, and the whole process or movement, as well as\nevery part of it, will take on this character. (2) The second question\nof method will be that of the nature of this category of which\n_finality_ is the form. What is its content, pure idea or pure will, or\na synthesis that includes both? We have here the three alternatives of\n_pure rationalism_, _voluntarism_, and a doctrine hard to characterize\nin a single word; that rests on a _synthesis_ of the norms of both\nrationalism and voluntarism. Without debating these alternatives, I\npropose here briefly to characterize the _synthetic_ concept as\nsupplying what I conceive to be the most satisfactory doctrine. The\nprinciple of _pure rationalism_ is one of insight but is lacking in\npractical energy, whereas, that of _voluntarism_ supplies practical\nenergy, but is lacking in insight. Pure voluntarism is _blind_, while\npure rationalism is _powerless_. But the synthesis of _idea_ and _will_,\nprovided we go a step further (as I think we must) and presuppose also a\ngerm of _feeling_ as _interest_, supplies both _insight_ and _energy_.\nSo that the spring out of which our world is to arise may be described\nas either the _idea informed with purposive energy_, or _purpose or will\ninformed and guided by the idea_. It makes no difference which form of\nconception we use. In either case if we include feeling as interest we\nare able to conceive movements originating in some species of\napprehension, taking the dynamic form of purpose, and motived and\nselected, so to speak, by interest; and in describing such activity we\nare simply describing these normal movements of consciousness with which\nour experience makes us most familiar. (3) The third question of method\ninvolves the relation or correlation of the metaphysical interpretation\nwith that of the natural or physical science. Two points are fundamental\nhere. In the first place, it must be borne in mind that it is the same\nworld with which the plain man, the man of science, and the\nmetaphysician are concerned. We cannot partition off the external world\nto the plain man, the atoms and ethers to the man of science, leaving\nthe metaphysician in exclusive and solitary possession of the world of\nconsciousness. It is the same world for all. The metaphysician cannot\nshift the physical world, with its oceans and icebergs, its vast\nplanetary systems and milky ways, on to the shoulders of the physicist.\nThis is the metaphysician's own recalcitrant world, which will doubtless\ntask all his resources to explain. In the _second_ place, though it is\nthe same world that is clamoring for interpretation, it is a world that\npasses through successive transformations, in order to adapt itself to\nprogressive modes of interpretation. The plain man is called to pass\nthrough a species of Copernican revolution that subordinates the\nphenomenon to its ground, before he can become a man of science. In\nturn, the man of science must go through the Copernican process, and\nlearn to subordinate his atoms and ethers to consciousness before he can\nbecome a metaphysician. And it is this transformation that marks one of\nthe most fundamental steps in the method of metaphysics. The world must\nexperience this transformation, and it must become habitual to the\nthinker to subordinate the physical to the mental before the\nmetaphysical point of view can be other than foreign to him. If, then,\nit be the same content with which the sciences and metaphysics are\ncalled on to deal, it is clear that we have on our hands another problem\non the answer to which the fate of metaphysics vitally depends; the\nquestion of the _correlation_ of its method with that of the sciences so\nthat it may stand vindicated as the final interpretation of things.\n\n\nIII\n\nQUESTION OF THE CORRELATION OF METAPHYSICS WITH THE SCIENCES\n\n\nWe have reached two conclusions that are vital here: (1) that the\nmetaphysical way of looking at the world involves a transformation of\nthe world of physical science; (2) that it is the same world that lies\nopen to both science and metaphysics. Out of this arises the problem of\nthe _correlation_ of the two views; the two interpretations of the\nworld. If science be right in conceiving the world under such categories\nas quantity and natural causation; if science be right in seeking a\nmechanical explanation of phenomena (that is, one that excludes\nprevision, purpose, and aim); and if metaphysics be right in refusing to\naccept this explanation as final and in insisting that the principle of\nultimate interpretation is teleological, that it falls under the\ncategories of prevision, purpose, and aim; then it is clear that the\nproblem of correlation is on our hands. In dealing with this problem, it\nwill be convenient to separate it into two questions: (1) that of the\nfact; (2) that of its rationale. The fact of the correlation is a thing\nof common experience. We have but to consider the way in which this\nCongress of Science has been brought about in order to have an\nexhibition of the method of correlation. Originating first in the sphere\nof thought and purpose, the design has been actualized through the\noperation of mechanical agencies which it has somehow contributed to\nliberate. On the scale of individual experience we have the classic\ninstance of the arm moving through space in obedience to a hidden will.\nThere can be no question as to the fact and the great difficulty of\nmetaphysics does not arise in the task of generalizing the fact and\nconceiving the world as a system of thought-purposes working out into\nforms of the actual through mechanical agencies. This generalization\nsomehow lies at the foundation of all metaphysical faith, and, this\nbeing the case, the real task here, aside from the profounder question\nof the _rationale_, is that of exhibiting the actual points of\ncorrelation; those points in the various stages of the sciences from\nphysics to ethics and religion, at which the last category or result of\nscience is found to hold as its immediate implication some first term of\nthe more ultimate construction of metaphysics. The working out of this\ntask is of the utmost importance, inasmuch as it makes clear to both the\nman of science and the metaphysician the intrinsic necessity of the\ncorrelation. It is a task analogous to the Kantian deduction of the\ncategories.\n\n\nIV\n\nQUESTIONS OF THE ULTIMATE NATURE OF REALITY\n\n\nWe come, then, to the question of the rationale of this correlation, and\nit is clear here that we are dealing with a phase of the problem of the\nultimate nature of reality. For the question of the correlation now is\nhow it is possible that our thoughts should affect things so that they\nmove in response; how mind influences body or the reverse, how, when we\nwill, the arm moves through space. And without going into details of\ndiscussion here, let us say at once, that whatever the situation may be\nfor any science,--and it may be that some form of _dualism_ is a\nnecessary presupposition of science,--for metaphysics it is clear that\nno dualism of substances or orders can be regarded as final. The life of\nmetaphysics depends on finding the one for the many; the one that when\nfound will also ground the many. If, then, the phenomenon of _mind and\nbody_ presents the appearance of a correspondence of two different and,\nso far as can be determined, mutually exclusive agencies, the problem of\nmetaphysics is the reduction of these agencies to one species. Here we\ncome upon the issue between materialism and immaterialism. But inasmuch\nas the notion of metaphysics itself seems to exclude materialism, the\nvital alternative is that of immaterialism. Again, if psycho-physics\npresents as its basal category a _parallelism_ between two orders of\nphenomena, psychic and physical, it is the business of metaphysics to\nseek the explanation of this dualism in some more ultimate and unitary\nconception. Now, since the very notion of metaphysics again excludes the\nphysical alternative from the category of finality, we are left with the\npsychic term as the one that, by virtue of the fact that it embodies a\nform of _conscious_ activity, promises to be most fruitful for\nmetaphysics. From one point of view, then, we have reduced our world to\nimmaterialism; from another, to some form or analogue of the psychic.\nNow it is not necessary here to carry the inquiry further in this\ndirection. For what metaphysics is interested in, specially, is the fact\nthat the world must be reduced to one kind of being and one type of\nagency. If this be done, it is clear that the dualism of _body and mind_\nand the _parallel orders_ of psycho-physics cannot be regarded as final,\nbut must take their places as phenomena that are relative and reducible\nto a more fundamental unity. The metaphysician will say that the arm\nmoves through space in response to the will, and that everywhere the\ncorrelation between mechanical and teleological agency takes place\nbecause in the last analysis _there is only one type of agency_; an\nagency that finds its initiative in interest, thought, purpose, design,\nand thus works out its results in the fields of space and mechanical\nactivities.\n\nFurthermore, on the question to which these considerations lead up; that\nof the ultimate interpretation we are to put on the reality of the\nworld, the issue is not so indeterminate as it might seem from some\npoints of view. Taking it that the very notion of metaphysics excludes\nthe material and the physical as ultimate types of the real, we are left\nwith the notions of the immaterial and the psychic; and while the former\nis indefinite, it is a fact that in the psychic and especially in the\nform of it which man realizes in his own experience, he finds an\nintelligible type and the only one that is available to him for the\ndefinition of the immaterial. He has his choice, then, either to regard\nthe world as _absolutely opaque_, showing nothing but its phenomenal\ndress which ceases to have any meaning; or to apply to the world's inner\nnature the intelligible types and analogies of his own form of being.\nThat this is the alternative that is embodied in the existence of\nmetaphysics is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the metaphysical\ninterpretation embodies itself in the categories of _reason_, _design_,\n_purpose_, and _aim_. Whatever difficulties we may encounter, then, in\nthe _use_ and application of the _psychic analogy_ in determining the\nnature of the real, it is clear that its employment is inevitable and\nindispensable. Let us, then, employ the term _rational_ to that\ncharacterization of the nature of things which to metaphysics is thus\ninevitable and indispensable. The world must in the last analysis be\n_rational_ in its constitution, and its agencies and forms of being must\nbe construed as _rational_ in their type.\n\nAnd here we come upon the last question in this field, that of the\n_ultimate being of the world_. We have already concluded that the _real_\nis in the last analysis rational. But we have not answered the question\nwhether there shall be one rational or many. Now it has become clear\nthat with metaphysics _unity_ is a cardinal interest; that, therefore,\nthe world must be _one_ in _thought_, _purpose_, _aim_. And it is on\nthis insight that the metaphysical doctrine of the _absolute_ rests.\nThere must be _one_ being whose thought and purpose are all-inclusive,\nin order that the world may be one and that it may have meaning as a\nwhole. But the world presents itself as a plurality of finite\n_existents_ which our metaphysics requires us to reduce in the last\nanalysis to the psychic type. What of this plurality of psychic\nexistents? It is on this basis that metaphysics constructs its doctrine\nof _individuality_. Allowing for latitude of opinion here, the trend of\nmetaphysical reflection sets strongly toward a doctrine of reality that\ngrounds the world in an Absolute whose all-comprehending thought and\npurpose utters or realizes itself in the plurality of finite individuals\nthat constitutes the world; the degree of reality that shall be ascribed\nto the plurality of individuals being a point in debate, giving rise to\nthe contemporary form of the issue between idealism and realism.\nAllowing for minor differences, however, there is among metaphysicians a\nfair degree of assent to the doctrine that in order to be completely\nrational the world of individual plurality must be regarded as implying\nan _Absolute_, which, whether it is to be conceived as an individual or\nnot, is the author and bearer of the thought and design of the world as\na whole.\n\n\nV\n\nQUESTIONS OF METAPHYSICAL KNOWLEDGE AND ULTIMATE CRITERIA OF TRUTH\n\n\nWe have only time to speak very briefly, in conclusion, of two vital\nproblems in metaphysics: (1) that of the nature and limits of\nmetaphysical knowledge; (2) that of the ultimate criteria of truth. In\nregard to the question of knowledge, we may either _identify thought\nwith reality_, or we may regard thought as _wholly inadequate to\nrepresent the real_; in one case we will be _gnostic_, in the other\n_agnostic_. Now whatever may be urged in favor of the gnostic\nalternative, it remains true that _our_ thought, in order to follow\nalong intelligible lines, must be guided by the categories and analogies\nof our own experience. This fixes a limit, so that the thought of man is\nnever in a position to grasp the real completely. Again, whatever may be\nurged in behalf of the agnostic alternative, it is to be borne in mind\nthat our experience does supply us with intelligible types and\ncategories; and that under the impulse of the _infinite_ and _absolute_,\nor the transcendent, to which our thought responds (to put it no\nstronger), a dialectical activity arises; on the one hand, the\napplication of the experience-analogies to determine the real; on the\nother, the incessant removal of limits by the impulse of transcendence\n(as we may call it). Thus arises a _movement of approximation_ which\nwhile it never completely compasses its goal, yet proceeds along\nintelligent lines; constitutes the mind's effort to know; and results in\nan _approximating series of intelligible and relatively adequate\nconceptions_. Metaphysically, we are ever approximating to ultimate\nknowledge; though it can never be said that we have attained it. The\ntype of metaphysical knowledge cannot be characterized, therefore, as\neither gnostic or agnostic.\n\nAs to the question of ultimate _criteria_, it is clear that we are here\ntouching one of the living issues of our present-day thought. Shall the\njudgment of truth, on which certitude must found, exclude practical\nconsiderations of value, or shall the consideration of value have weight\nin the balance of certitude? On this issue we have at the opposite\nextremes (1) the _pure rationalist_ who insists on the rigid exclusion\nfrom the epistemological scale of every consideration except that of\npure logic. The truth of a thing, he urges, is always a purely logical\nconsideration. On the other hand, we have (2) the _pure pragmatist_, who\ninsists on the \"_will to believe_\" as a legitimate datum or factor in\nthe determination of certitude. The pragmatic platform has two planks:\n(1) the _ontological_--we select our world that we call real at the\nbehest of our interests; (2) the _ethical_--in such a world practical\ninterest has the right of way in determining what we are to accept as\ntrue as well as what we are to choose as good. It is my purpose in thus\noutlining the extremes of doctrine to close with a suggestion or two\ntoward less ultra-conclusions. It is a sufficient criticism on the _pure\nrationalist's_ position to point out the fact that his separation of\npractical and theoretic interests is a pure fiction that is never\nrealized anywhere. The motives of science and the motives of practice\nare so blended that interest in the conclusion always enters as a factor\nin the process. A conclusion reached by the pure rationalist's method\nwould be one that would only interest the pure rationalist in so far as\nhe could divest himself of all motives except the bare love of fact for\nits own sake. The _pure pragmatist_ is, I think, still more vulnerable.\nHe must, to start with, be a pure subjective idealist, otherwise he\nwould find his world at many points recalcitrant to his ontology.\nFurthermore, the mere _will to believe_ is arbitrary and involves the\nsuppression of reason. In order that the will to believe may work _real_\nconviction, the point believed must at least amount to a postulate of\nthe practical reason; it must become somehow evident that the refusal to\nbelieve would create a situation that would be theoretically unsound or\nirrational; as, for instance, if we assume that the immortality of the\nsoul is a _real postulate_ of practical reason, it must be so because\nthe negative of it would involve the irrationality of our world; and\ntherefore a degree of theoretic imperfection or confusion. Personally I\nbelieve the lines here converge in such a way that the ideal of truth\nwill always be found to have practical value; and _conversely_, as to\npractical ideals, that a sound practical postulate will have weight in\nthe theoretic scales. And it is doubtless true, as Professor Royce urges\nin his presidential address on _The Eternal and The Practical_, that all\njudgments must find their final warrant at the Court of the Eternal\nwhere, so far as we can see, the theoretical and practical coalesce into\none.\n\n * * * * *\n\nAt the close of the work of this Section and upon the invitation of Dr.\nArmstrong, a number of distinguished members in attendance joined freely\nin the discussion, to the great pleasure of the many specialists who\nwere present. Among those participating were Professor Boltzmann of\nVienna, Professor Hoeffding of Copenhagen, Professor Calkins of\nWellesley, and Professor French of the University of Nebraska, to whom\nreplies were made by the principal speakers, Messrs. Taylor and Ormond.\n\n\n\n\nSHORT PAPERS\n\n\nA short paper was contributed to the work of the Section by Professor W.\nP. Montague of Columbia University, on the \"Physical Reality of\nSecondary Qualities.\" The speaker said that from the beginning of modern\nphilosophy there has existed a strong tendency among all schools of\nthought--monists of the idealistic or materialistic types, as well as\noutspoken dualists--to treat the distinction between primary and\nsecondary qualities as coincident, so far as it goes, with the\ndistinction between physical and psychical. Colors, sounds, odors, etc.,\nare regarded as purely subjective or mental in their nature, and as\nhaving no true membership in the physical order; while correlatively all\nspecial forms and relations have been in their turn extruded from the\nfield of the psychical. Let it be noted that introspection offers little\nor nothing in support of this view. There is nothing, for example, about\nthe color red that would make it appear more distinctively psychical or\nsubjective than a figure or a motion. The perception of a square or a\ntriangle is not a square or triangular perception; but neither is the\nperception of red or blue a red or blue perception. Now with the\naffective or emotional contents of experience the case is quite\ndifferent.\n\nA feeling of pain is a painful feeling, a consciousness of anger is an\nangry consciousness. Pains are more and less painful, according as we\nare more and less aware of them. With feelings and volitions _esse_ is\nindeed _percipi_. Colors and other secondary qualities, however, do not\nseem thus to increase or diminish in their reality concomitantly with\nour perceptions of them. Red is red, neither more nor less, regardless\nof the amount to which we attend to it. And yet it remains true that,\nnotwithstanding this seeming objectivity, the secondary qualities have\nlong been contrasted with the primary, and classed along with the\naffective and volitional states as purely subjective facts. It has\nalways seemed curious that a view so important as this in its\nconsequences, and so radically at variance, not only with Pre-Cartesian\nphilosophy, but also with our instinctive beliefs, should have won its\nway to the position of an accepted dogma; and the purpose of this paper\nwas first to examine the grounds upon which this belief rests, and\nsecond to show that the problem of the independent reality of the\nphysical world and the problem of the relation of physical and psychical\nappear in a clearer and more hopeful light when disentangled from the\nquite different problem of the relation of primary and secondary\nqualities.\n\nThere were two reasons why the older or Pre-Cartesian view of this\nquestion should give place to the modern doctrine. First, because of the\nrediscovery of the idea of mechanism, without which predictive science\nhad been virtually impossible. The second reason for reducing the\nsecondary qualities to a merely subjective status lay in the fact that\nthey are much more dependent than the primary qualities upon the bodily\norganism of the one who perceives them. In closing Professor Montague\nsaid:--\n\n\"I wish in closing to point out two consequences of the view which I\nhave been opposing. First, the present paradoxical status of the eternal\nworld; second, the equally paradoxical status of the relation of that\nworld to the world of mind. Berkeley was the first thinker clearly to\nperceive the unsubstantial nature of a world made up solely of primary\nqualities. Indeed, in the last analysis, a world of primary qualities,\nand nothing else, is a world of relations without terms, a geometrical\nfiction, the objective (or, for that matter, the subjective) existence\nof which the idealist would be right in denying. In Biology we have\nabandoned obscurantist methods, and no longer attribute the distinctive\nvital functions of growth and reproduction to a vital force or vital\nsubstance, but solely to the peculiar configuration of the material\nelements of a cell. Why may we not in psychology with equal propriety\nattribute the distinctively psychical functions of subjectivity or\nconsciousness, not to the action of a hyper-psychical soul-substance,\nnor to the presence of a transcendental ego, but simply to that peculiar\nconfiguration of sensory elements which constitutes a what we call\npsychosis?\"\n\n\n\n\nSECTION B--PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION\n\n\n\n\nSECTION B\n\nPHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION\n\n(_Hall 1, September 21, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR THOMAS C. HALL, Union Theological Seminary, N. Y.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR OTTO PFLEIDERER, University of Berlin.\n PROFESSOR ERNST TROELTSCH, University of Heidelberg.\n SECRETARY: DR. W. P. MONTAGUE, Columbia University.\n\n\n\n\nTHE RELATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION TO THE OTHER SCIENCES\n\nBY PROFESSOR OTTO PFLEIDERER\n\n [D. Otto Pfleiderer, Professor of Theology, University of\n Berlin since 1875. b. September 1, 1839, Stetten,\n W\u00fcrtemberg. Grad. T\u00fcbingen, 1857-61. Post-grad. _ibid._\n 1864-68. City Professor, Heilbronn, 1868-69; Superintendent,\n Jena, 1869-70; Professor of Theology, Jena, 1870-75. Author\n of _Religion and its Essential Characteristics_; _Religious\n Philosophy upon Historical Foundation_; and many other works\n and papers on Theology.]\n\n\nIn order to answer this question, we need to consider a preliminary\nquestion, namely, whether religion can be regarded as the object of\nscientific knowledge in the same manner as other processes of the\nintellectual life of the race, such as law, history, and art. It is well\nknown that this question has not always received an affirmative answer,\nand indeed it can never be answered in the affirmative so long as the\nposition is maintained that the only religion is that of the Christian\nChurch, whose doctrines and teachings rest upon an immediate divine\nrevelation, and that these must be accepted by men in blind belief.\nUnder the position of an authoritative ecclesiastical faith there can\nindeed exist a theoretical consideration of the doctrines of faith, as\nit was the case with the scholastic theology of the Middle Ages, which\nwith great earnestness sought to harmonize faith and knowledge;\nnevertheless, no one of the present day would give to the scholastic\ntheology the name of science with the modern meaning of the term\nscience. The scholastic theology used great formal acuteness and skill\nin the work of defining and defending ecclesiastical traditions, still\nthere was lacking that which for us is the essential condition of\nscientific knowledge, the free examination of tradition according to the\nlaws of human thought and the analogy of the general experience of\nhumanity. The great hindrance to the progress of the knowledge of\nreligion was the accepted position that the truth of the ecclesiastical\ndoctrines was beyond human reason and outside of human examination,\nsince their truth rested upon an immediate divine revelation. Whether\nthis supernatural authority was ascribed to the Church or the Bible\nmakes very little difference, for in either case the assumption of such\nan authority is a hindrance to the free examination of that which claims\nto be the divine revealed truth.\n\nBut is this assumption really justifiable in the nature of the case? Do\nthe doctrines of the Church rest upon a supernatural divine revelation?\nSo soon as this question was really earnestly considered, and the\nthinking mind could not always avoid the consideration, then there was\nrevealed the inadequacy of the assumption. Two ways of examination led\nto a common critical result, the philosophical analysis of the religious\nconsciousness and the historical comparison of various religions. The\nfirst to enter upon these ways and at the same time to become the\nfounder of the modern science of religion was the keen Scotch thinker\nDavid Hume. Truly the thought of Hume was still a one-sided,\ndisorganizing skepticism; even as his theory of knowledge disturbed the\ntruth of all our previous commonsense opinions and conceptions, so also\nhis philosophy of religion sought to demonstrate that all religion\ncannot be proved and is full of doubt, and that the origin of religion\nwas neither to be found in divine revelation nor in the reason of man,\nbut in the passions of the heart and in the illusions of imagination. As\nunsatisfactory as this result was, nevertheless it gave an important\nadvance to the rational study of religion in two directions, in that of\nreligion being an experience of the inner life of the soul and in that\nof religion being a fact of human history.\n\nKant added the positive criticism of reason to the negative skepticism\nof Hume; that is, Kant showed that the human intellect moved\nindependently in the formation of theoretical and practical judgments,\nand that the various materials of thought, desire, and feelings were\nregulated by the intellect according to innate original ideas of the\ntrue and good and beautiful. Thus as a natural result there came the\nconception that the doctrines of belief arose not as complete truths,\ngiven by divine revelation, but, like every other form of conscious\nknowledge, these came to us through the activity of our own mind, and\nthat therefore these doctrines cannot be regarded as of absolute\nauthority for all time, but that we are to seek to understand their\norigin in historical and psychical motives. So far as one looked at the\nceremonial forms of positive religion, these motives indeed were found\naccording to Kant in irrational conceptions, but as far as the essence\nof religion was concerned they were rather found to be rooted in the\nmoral nature of man. This is the consciousness of obligation of the\npractical reason or of the conscience, which raises man to a faith in\nthe moral government of the world, in immortality and God. With the\nreduction of religion from all external forms, doctrines, and ceremonies\nand the finding of the real essence of religion in the human mind and\nspirit, the way was opened to a knowledge of religion free from all\nexternal authority. Those philosophers who came after Kant followed\nessentially this course, though here and there they may separate in\ntheir opinions according to their thought of the psychological function\nof religion. When Kant had emphasized the close connection between\nreligion and the moral obligation, then came Schleiermacher, who\nemphasized the feeling of our dependence upon the Eternal, and who\nsought to find the explanation of all religious thoughts and conceptions\nin the many relations of the feeling to religious experience. Hegel on\nthe other hand sought the truth of religion in the thought of the\nabsolute spirit as found in the finite spirit. Thus Hegel made religion\na sort of popular philosophy.\n\nAt present all agree that all sides of the soul-life have part in\nreligion; now one side may be the more prominent, now another, according\nto the peculiarity of certain religions or the individual temperaments.\nThe philosophy of religion has, in common with scientific psychology,\nthe question of the relation of feeling to the intellect and the will,\nand as yet there may be many views of this question. Altogether the\nphilosophy of religion is looking for important solutions to many of its\nproblems from the realm of the present scientific psychology.\nExperiences, such as religious conversions, appear under this point of\nview as ethical changes in which the aim of a personal life is changed\nfrom a carnal and selfish end to that of a spiritual and altruistic\npurpose. These are extraordinary and seemingly supernatural processes;\nnevertheless in them there can still be found a certain development of\nthe soul-life according to law. Modern psychology especially has thrown\nlight upon the abnormal conditions of consciousness which have so often\nbeen made manifest in the religious experience of all times. That which\nreligious history records concerning inspiration, visions, ecstasy, and\nrevelation, we now classify with the well-known appearances of\nhypnotism, the induction of conceptions and motives of the will through\nforeign suggestion or through self-suggestion, of the division of\nconsciousness in different egos, and in the union of several\nconsciousnesses into one common mediumistic fusion of thought and will.\nThe explanation of these experiences may not yet be satisfactory, but\nnevertheless we do not doubt the possibility of a future explanation\nfrom the general laws controlling the life of the soul. The fact that we\ncan through psychological experiments produce such abnormal conditions\nof consciousness justifies us in taking the position, that certain\npsychical laws are at the foundation of these conditions which in their\nkind are as natural and regular in their functions as the physical laws\nwhich we observe in physical experiments. These solutions which modern\npsychology so far has given, and hopes still further to give, are of\ngreat importance to the philosophy of religion. They are an indorsement\nof the general principle which one hundred years ago had been advanced\nby critical speculation, namely, that in all experiences of the\nreligious life the same principles which control the human mind in all\nother intellectual and emotional fields shall hold sway. Nothing\ntherefore should hinder us in scientific research from following the\nwell-defined maxims of thought, and unreservedly applying the same\nmethods of scientific analysis in theology as is done generally in the\nother sciences.\n\nThe claim of the Church to infallibility and divine inspiration of its\ndogmas is weakened under this view of the work of the philosophy of\nreligion. Prophetical inspiration and ecstasy, which usually were\nthought to be supernatural revelations, are now declared by the present\npsychology to come under the category of other analogous experiences,\nsuch as the action of mental powers which, under definite conditions of\nindividual gifts and on historical occasions, have manifested themselves\nin extraordinary forms of consciousness. However, these enthusiastic\nforms of prophetical consciousness cannot be accepted for a higher form\nof knowledge or even as of divine origin and as an infallible\nproclamation of the truth; on the contrary, these forms are to be judged\nas pathological appearances, which may be more harmful than beneficent\nfor the ethical value of the prophetical intuition. At least, it has\ncome to pass that all forms of revelation must come under the\nexamination of a psychological analysis and of an analogical judgment.\nHence their traditional nimbus of unique, supernatural, and absolute\nauthority is for all time destroyed.\n\nWe are carried to the same result by the comparative study of the\nhistory of religions. The study shows us that the Christian Church, with\nits dogma of the divine inspiration of the Bible, does not stand alone;\nthat before and after Christianity other religions made exactly the same\nclaims for their sacred scriptures. By the pious Brahman the Veda is\nregarded as infallible and eternal; he believes the hymns of the old\nseers were not composed by the seers themselves, but were taken from an\noriginal copy in heaven. The Buddhist sees in the sayings of his sacred\nbook \"Dhammapadam\" the exact inheritance of the infallible words of his\nomniscient teacher Buddha. For the confessor of Ahuramazda the\nZendavesta contains the scriptural revelation of the good spirit unto\nthe prophet Zarathustra; according to the rabbis the laws revealed unto\nMoses on Mount Sinai were even before the creation of the world the\nobject of the observation of God; for the faithful Mohammedan the Koran\nis the copy of an ever-present original in heaven, the contents of which\nwere dictated word for word to Mohammed by the angel Gabriel. Whoever\nponders the similar claims of all these religions for the infallibility\nof their sacred books, to him it becomes difficult to hold the dogma of\nthe Christian Church concerning the inspiration and infallibility of the\nBible as alone true and the similar dogmas of other religions as being\nfalse. Rather he will accept the view that in all these examples there\nare found the same motives of the religious mind, that here is given an\nexpression to the same need common to all seeking for an absolute and\nabiding basis for their faith.\n\nThe study of the comparison of religions has discovered in religions\nother than that of Christianity many very striking parallels to many\nnarratives and teachings of the Bible. It may be well to recall very\nbriefly some of the important points. Owing to the fact that the\nAssyrian cuneiform writings have now been deciphered, there has been\nfound a story of the creation which has many characteristics in common\nwith those of the Bible. There is found a story of a flood, which in its\nvery details can be regarded as the forerunner of the story of the flood\nin the Bible. There have been found Assyrian penitential psalms, which,\nin consciousness of guilt and in earnestness of prayer for forgiveness,\ncan well be compared with many psalms of the Bible. Recently the Code of\nthe Assyrian King Hammurabi, who reigned two thousand three hundred\nyears before Christ, has been discovered. The similarity of this Code\nwith many of the early Mosaic Laws has called general attention to this\nfact. In the Persian religion there are found teachings of the Kingdom\nof God, of the good spirits who surround the throne of God, of the\nSpirit hostile to God and of an army of his demons, of the judgment of\neach soul after death, of a heaven with eternal light and of the dark\nabyss of hell, of the future struggle of the multitudes of good and bad\nspirits and the victory over the bad through a divine hero and saviour,\nof the general resurrection of the dead, of the awful destruction of the\nworld and the creation of a new and better world,--teachings which are\nalso found in the later Jewish theology and apocalypse, so that the\nacceptance of a dependence of Jewish upon corresponding Persian teaching\ncan hardly be avoided. Also Grecian influence is observed in later\nJewish literature, in proverbs, in the wisdom of Solomon and the Son of\nSirach; especially in the Alexandrian Jewish theology are found Platonic\nthoughts of an eternal, ideal world, of the heavenly home of the soul,\nand the Stoic conception of a world-ruling divine Logos.\n\nIt is from this source that the Logos to which Philo had already\nascribed the meaning of the Son of God and the Bringer of a divine\nrevelation crossed over into Christian theology and became the\nfoundation of the dogma of the Church concerning the person of Christ.\nOf still greater importance than even all this was the opening of the\nIndian and especially the Buddhistic religious writings. In these we\nhave, five hundred years before Christianity, the revelation of\nredemptive religion, resting upon the ethical foundation of the\nabnegation of self and the withdrawal from the world. In the centre of\nthis religion is Gautama Buddha, the ideal teacher of redeeming truth,\nwhose human life was adorned by the faith of his followers with a crown\nof wonderful legends; from an abode in heaven, out of mercy to the\nworld, he descended into the world, conceived and born of a virgin\nmother, greeted and entertained by heavenly spirits, recognized\nbeforehand by a pious seer as the future redeemer of the world; as a\nyouth he manifested a wisdom beyond that of his teachers. Then after the\nreception of an illuminating revelation, he victoriously overcomes the\ntemptation of the devil, who would cause him to become faithless to his\ncall to redemption. Then he begins to preach of the coming of the\nKingdom of Justice, and sends forth his disciples, two by two, as\nmessengers of his gospel to all people. Although he declares that it is\nnot his calling to perform miracles, nevertheless the legends indeed\ntell how many sick were healed, how with the contents of a small basket\nhundreds were fed, how possessed of all knowledge he reveals hidden\nthings; how overcoming the limitations of space and time, swaying in the\nair, being transfigured in a heavenly light, he reveals himself to his\ndisciples just before his death. And at last, in the faith of his\nfollowers, having passed from the position of a human teacher to that of\nan eternal heavenly spirit and lord of the world, he is exalted as the\nobject of prayer and reverence, to many millions of the human race in\nSouthern and Eastern Asia.\n\nIt is hardly possible that the knowledge of this parallel from India to\nthe New Testament, and of the Babylonian and Persian parallel to the Old\nTestament, can be without influence upon the religious thought of\nChristian people. Although we may be ever so much convinced concerning\nthe essential superiority of our religion over all other religions,\nnevertheless the dogmatic contrast between absolute truth on the one\nside and complete falsity on the other can no more be maintained. In\nplace of this view there must enter the view of a relative grade of\ndifferences between the higher and lower stages of development. No\nlonger can we see in other religions only mistakes and fiction, but\nunder the husk of their legends many precious kernels of truth must be\nseen, expressions of inner religious feelings and of noble ethical\nsentiments. One should therefore accept the position not to object to\nthe same discrimination between husk and kernel in the matter of one's\nown religion, and to recognize in its inherited traditions and dogmas\nlegendary elements, the explanation of which is to be found in psychical\nmotives and in historical surroundings, even as they are found in the\ncorresponding parts of religions other than the Christian religion.\nTherefore the historical comparison of religions takes us away from an\nabsolute dogmatic positivism to a relative evolutionary manner of study,\nplacing all religions without exception under the laws of time\nprogression and under the causal connection of the law of cause and\neffect. The isolation of religion therefore is no more. It is regarded\nas being a part of other human historical affairs, and must yield to the\ntest of a thorough unhindered research. The value of the Christian\nreligion can never suffer in the view of a reasonable man, when it is\nnot accepted in blind faith, but as the result of discriminating\ncomparison.\n\nAs the evolutionary philosophy of religion uses the method of science\nwithout exception in the case of all historical religions, so also it\ndoes not shrink from taking up the question of the beginning of\nreligion, but believes that here also is found the key in the\nanalytical, critical, and comparative method. And here is found the\nassistance of the comparative study of languages, ethnology, and\npaleontology.\n\nThe celebrated Sanscrit scholar, Max M\u00fcller, sought in the comparative\nstudy of mythology to prove the etymological relation of many of the\nGrecian gods and heroes with those of the mythology of India and to\ntrace the common origin of all these mythical beings and legends in the\npersonification of the movements of the heavenly bodies, the thunder and\nlightning, the tempest and the rain. All mythical belief in gods of the\nIndo-Germanic peoples seems to have arisen out of a poetical view and\ndramatic personification of the powers of nature. Suggestive as this\nhypothesis is, it is not by any means sufficient to give us a complete\nexplanation of the subject. In fact, others have shown that primitive\nreligion does not altogether consist in mythical conceptions, but mainly\nin reverential actions, sacrifices, sacraments, vows, and other similar\ncults, which have very little to do with the atmospherical powers of\nnature, but rather with the social life of primitive people. And when\nonce the sight was clearly directed to the social meaning of the\nreligious rites, it was then observed that even the earliest legends\nconcerning the gods were connected far more closely with the habits and\ncustoms of early society than with the facts of nature. Tyler's\ncelebrated book concerning \"Primitive Civilization\" is written from this\nstandpoint, an epoch-making book, showing the original close connection\nof religion with the entire civilization of humanity, with the views of\nlife and death, the social customs, the forms of law, their strivings in\nart and science; a book with a large amount of information, brought\ntogether from observation on all sides. In this channel are found all\nthe researches which to-day are classified under the name of Folklore;\nseeking to gather the still existing characteristic customs and forms,\nlegends, stories, and sayings, in order to compose these and to discover\nthe survivals of earliest religion, poetry, and civilization of\nhumanity. The gain of this study pursued with so great diligence is not\nto be underrated. These studies show that all that, which at one time\nexisted as faith in the spirit of humanity, possessed within its very\nnature the strongest power of continuance, so that in new and strange\nconditions and in other forms it continued to remain. Under all changes\nand progress of history there is still found an unbroken connection of\nconstant development.\n\nAs important, however, as the possession of a general knowledge of\nhistorical forms of development is to the philosophy of religion,\nnevertheless the possession of this knowledge is not wholly a\nfulfillment of the purpose of the philosophy of religion. To understand\na development means not merely to know how one thing follows as the\nresult of the other, but also to understand the law which lies at the\nfoundation of all empirical changes and at the same time controls the\nend of the development. If this principle holds good in the\nunderstanding of the development in the processes of nature, much more\ndoes the principle hold good in understanding the processes of\nintellectual development of humanity, which have for us not only a\ntheoretical, but at the same time an eminently practical interest. The\nphilosopher of religion sees in religious history not merely the coming\ntogether of similar forms, but an advance from the lowest stage of\nchildlike ignorance to an ever purer and richer realization of the idea\nof religion, a divinely ordained progress for the education of humanity\nfrom the slavery of nature to the freedom of the spirit. The question\nnow arises: where do we find the principle and law of this ever-rising\ndevelopment? Where do we find the measure of judgment for the relative\nvalue of religious appearances? It is clear that the general principle\nof the complete development cannot be found in a single fact which is\nonly one of the many manifestations of the general principle, and it is\njust as clear that the absolute norm of judgment is not found in a\nsingle fact always relative, presenting to us the object of judgment and\ntherefore being impossible to stand as the norm of judgment. Therefore\nthe principle of religious development and the norm of its judgment can\nonly be found in the inner being of the spirit of humanity, namely, in\nthe necessary striving of the mind into an harmonious arrangement of all\nour conceptions, or the idea of the truth, and into the complete order\nof all our purposes, or the idea of the good. These ideas unite in the\nhighest unity, in the Idea of God. Therefore the consciousness of God is\nthe revelation of the original innate longing of reason after complete\nunity as a principle of universal harmony and consistence in all our\nthinking and willing. Hence, in the first place, arises the result that\nthe development of the consciousness of God in the history of religion\nis always dependent upon the existing conditions of the two united\nsides, the theoretical perception of the truth and the moral standard of\nlife. In the second place the result arises that the judgment of the\nvalue of all appearances in the history of religion depends as to\nwhether and how far these appearances agree with the idea of the true\nand the good, and correspond with the demands of reason and conscience.\nThat science which is engaged with the idea of the good we name Ethics;\nthat which is engaged with the last principles of the perception of\ntruth, using the expression of Aristotle, we may name Metaphysics, or\nfollowing Plato--Dialectic. Recognizing then in the idea of God the\nsynthesis of the idea of the true and the good, the philosophy of\nreligion is closely related with both, Ethics and Metaphysics.\n\nAt present the relation of religion to morality is an object of much\ncontroversy. There are many who hold that morality without religion is\nnot only possible but also very desirable; since they are of the opinion\nthat moral strength is weakened, the will is without freedom, and its\nmotives corrupted on account of religious conceptions. On the other\nhand, the Church, considering the experience of history, finds that\nreligion has ever proved itself to be the strongest and most necessary\naid to morality. In this contest the philosophy of religion occupies the\nposition of a judge who is called upon to adjust the relative rights of\nthe parties. The philosophy of religion brings to light the historical\nfact that from the very beginnings of human civilization, social life\nand morality were closely connected with religious conceptions and\nusages, and indeed always so interchangeable in their influence that the\nposition of social civilization on the one side corresponded with the\nposition of religious civilization on the other, just as the water-level\nin two communicating pipes. Therefore it follows that it is unjust and\nnot historical to blame religion on account of the defects of a national\nand temporal morality; for these defects of morality, with the\ncorresponding errors of religion, find a common ground in a low stage of\ndevelopment of the entire civilization of the people of the time and\nage. Further, it becomes the task of the philosophy of religion to\nexamine whether this correspondence of religion and morality, recognized\nin history, is also found in the very nature of morality and religion.\nThis question in the main is answered without doubt in the affirmative,\nfor it is clear that the religious feeling of dependence upon one\nall-ruling power is well adapted not only to make keen the moral\nconsciousness of obligation and to deepen the feeling of responsibility,\nbut also to endow moral courage with power and to strengthen the hope of\nthe solution of moral purposes. The clearer religious faith comprehends\nthe relation of man to God, so much the more will that faith prove\nitself as a strong motive and a great incentive of the moral life. Such\na conception will not make the moral will unfree but truly free, not in\nthe sense of a selfish choice, but in the sense of a love that serves,\nknowing itself as an instrument of the divine will, who binds us all\ninto a social organism, the kingdom of God. And, on the other hand, the\nmore ideal the moral view of life, the higher and greater its aims, the\nmore it recognizes its great task to care for the welfare not only of\nthe individual but of all, to co\u00f6perate in the welfare and development\nof all forms of society, the more earnestly the moral mind will need a\nsincere faith that this is God's world, that above all the changes of\ntime an eternal will is on the throne, whose all-wise guidance causes\neverything to be for the best unto those who love him.\n\nA like middle position of arbitration falls to the philosophy of\nreligion in the matter of the relation of religion to science. The first\ndemand of science is freedom of thought, according to its own logical\nlaws, and its fundamental assumption is the possibility of the knowledge\nof the world on the basis of the unchangeable laws of all existence and\nevents. With this fundamental demand science places itself in opposition\nto the formal character of ecclesiastical doctrine so far as the\ndoctrine claims infallible authority resting upon a divine revelation.\nAnd the fundamental assumption of the regular law of the course of the\nworld is in opposition to the contents of ecclesiastical doctrine\nconcerning the miraculous interposition in the course of nature and of\nhistory. To the superficial observer there appears therefore to exist an\nirreconcilable conflict between science and religion. Here is the work\nof the philosophy of religion, to take away the appearance of an\nirreconcilable opposition between science and religion, in that the\nphilosophy of religion teaches first of all to distinguish between the\nessence of religion and the ecclesiastical doctrines of a certain\nreligion, and to comprehend the historical origin of these doctrines in\nthe forms of thought of past times. To this purpose the method of\npsychological analysis and of historical comparison mentioned above is\nof service. When, then, by this critical process religion is traced to\nits real essence in the emotional consciousness of God, to which the\ndogmatic doctrines stand as secondary products and varied symbols, then\nit remains to show that between the essence of religion and that which\nscience demands and presupposes, there exists not conflict but harmony.\nWhen the idea of God is recognized as the synthesis of the ideas of the\ntrue and the good, so then must all truth as sought by science, even as\nthe highest good, which the system of ethics places as the purpose of\nall action--these must be recognized as the revelation of God in his\neternal reason and goodness. The laws of our rational thinking then\ncannot be in conflict with divine revelation in history, and the laws of\nthe natural order of the world can no more stand in conflict with the\nworld-governing Omnipotence; but both, the laws of our thinking and\nthose of the real world, reveal themselves as the harmonious revelations\nof the creative reason of God, which, according to Plato's fitting word,\nis the efficient ground of being as well as of knowing. It is therefore\nnot merely a demand of religious belief that there is real truth in our\nGod-consciousness, that there should be an activity and revelation of\nGod himself in the human mind; it is also in the same manner a demand of\nscience considering its last principles, that the world, in order to be\nknown by us as a rational, regulated order, must have for its principle\nan eternal creative reason. Long ago the old master of thinking,\nAristotle, recognized this fact clearly, when he said that order in the\nworld without a principle of order could be as little thinkable as the\norder of an army without a commanding general.\n\nBut while it is true that science, as the ground of the possibility of\nits knowledge of the truth, must presuppose the same general principle\nof intellectual knowledge which religion has as the object of its\npractical belief, then by principle the apprehension is excluded that\nany possible progress on the part of science in its knowledge of the\nworld can ever destroy religion. We are rather the more justified in the\nhope that all true knowledge of science will be a help to religion, and\nwill serve as the means of purifying religion from the dross of\nsuperstition.\n\nTruly it can easily be shown that a divine government of the world\nbreaking through, and now and then suspending the regular order of\nnature through miraculous intervention, would not be more majestic, but\nfar more limited and human, than such a government which reveals itself\nas everywhere and always the same in and through its own ordained laws\nin the world. And again, that a revelation prescribing secret and\nincomprehensible doctrines and rites, demanding from humanity a blind\nfaith, would far less be in harmony with the guiding wisdom and love of\nGod, and far less could work for the intellectual liberty and perfection\nof humanity, than such a revelation which is working in and through the\nreason and conscience of humanity, and is realizing its purpose in the\nprogressive development of our intellectual and moral capacities and\npowers. When therefore science raises critical misgivings against the\nsupernatural and irrational doctrines of positive religion, then the\nreal and rightly understood interests of religion are not harmed but\nrather advanced; for this criticism serves religion in helping it to\nbecome free from the unintellectual inheritance of its early days, in\nhelping religion to consider its true intellectual and moral essence,\nand to bring to a full display all the blessed powers which are\nconcealed within its nature, to press through the narrow walls of an\necclesiasticism out into the full life of humanity, and to work as\nleaven for the ennoblement of humanity. Not in conflict with science and\nmoral culture, but only in harmony with these, can religion come nearer\nto the attainment of its ideal, which consists in the worship of God in\nspirit and in truth. Even though they may not be conscious of their\npurpose, but nevertheless in fact all honest work of science and all the\nendeavors of social and ethical humanity have part in the attainment of\nthis ideal.\n\nIt is the work of the philosophy of religion to make clear that all work\nof the thinking and striving spirit of humanity, in its deepest meaning,\nis a work in the kingdom of God, as service to God, who is truth and\ngoodness. It is the work of the philosophy of religion to explain\nvarious misunderstandings, to bring together opposing sides, and so to\nprepare the way for a more harmonious co\u00f6peration of all, and for an\nalways hopeful progress of all on the road to the high aims of a\nhumanity fraternally united in the divine spirit.\n\n\n\n\nMAIN PROBLEMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: PSYCHOLOGY AND THEORY OF\nKNOWLEDGE IN THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION\n\nBY PROFESSOR ERNST TROELTSCH\n\n(_Translated from the German by Dr. J. H. Woods, Harvard University._)\n\n [Ernst Troeltsch, Professor of Systematic Theology,\n University of Heidelberg, since 1894. b. February 17 1865,\n Augsburg, Bavaria. Doctor of Theology. Professor University\n of Bonn, 1892-94. Author of _John Gerhard and Melanchthon_;\n _Richard Rubbe_; _The Scientific Attitude and its Demands on\n Theology_; _The Absoluteness of Christianity, and of the\n History of Religion_; _Political Ethics and Christianity_;\n _The Historic Element in Kant's Religious Philosophy_.]\n\n\nThe philosophy of religion of to-day is philosophy of religion so far\nonly, and in such a sense, as this word means science of religion or\nphilosophy with reference to religion. The science of religion of former\ndays was first dogmatic theology, deriving its dogmas from the Bible and\nfrom Church tradition, expounding them apologetically with the\nmetaphysical speculation of the later period of antiquity, and regarding\nthe non-Christian religions as sinful derangements and obscure fragments\nof the primitive revelation. This lasted sixteen centuries, and is\nconfined to-day to strictly ecclesiastical circles. Next, science of\nreligion became natural theology, which proved the existence of God by\nthe nature of thought and by the constitution of reality, and also the\nimmortality of the soul by the concept of the soul and by moral demands,\nthus constructing natural or rational dogmas and putting these dogmas\ninto more or less friendly relations with traditional Christianity. This\nlasted about two centuries, and is to-day of the not strictly\necclesiastical or pietistic circles, which still wish to hold fast to\nreligion. Both kinds of science of religion exist no longer for the\nstrict science. The first was, in reality, supernaturalistic dogmatics,\nthe second was, in reality, a substitution of philosophy for religion.\nThe first was demolished by the criticism of miracles in the eighteenth\ncentury, the second by the criticism of knowledge in the nineteenth\ncentury, which, in its turn, rests upon Hume and Kant.\n\nThe science of religion of to-day keeps in touch with that which without\ndoubt factually exists and is an object of actual experience, _the\nsubjective religious consciousness_. The distrust of ecclesiastical and\nrationalistic dogmas has made, in the thought of the present, every\nother treatment impossible. So the spirit of empiricism has here as at\nother points completely prevailed. But empiricism in this field means\npsychological analysis. This analysis is pursued by the present to the\nwidest extent: on the one side by anthropologists and arch\u00e6ologists, who\ninvestigate the life of the soul in primitive peoples and thus indicate\nthe particular function and condition of religion in these states; on\nthe other side, by the modern experimental psychologists and\npsychological empiricists, who, by self-observation, and especially by\nthe collection of observations by others and of personal testimony,\nstudy religion, and then, from the point of view of the concepts of\nexperimental psychology, examine the main phenomena thus found.\n\nNow, such an empirical psychology of religion has been constructed with\nconsiderable success. In this German literature, it is true, has\nco\u00f6perated to a slight degree only. The German theologians have held to\nthe older statements of the psychology of Kant, of Schleiermacher, of\nHegel, and of Fries, alone, which, in principle, were on the right path,\nbut which combined the purely psychological with metaphysical and\nepistemological problems to such a degree that it was impossible to\nreach a really unprejudiced attitude. German psychologists remain,\nfurthermore, under the spell of psycho-physiology and of quantitative\nstatements of measure, and have, consequently, not liked to advance into\nthis field, which is inaccessible to such statements. More productive\nthan the German psychology for this subject is the French, which has\nattacked the complex facts far more courageously. Here, however, under\nthe predominance of positivism, there prevails, on the whole, the\ntendency to regard religion, in its essence, anthropologically or\nmedically and pathologically in connection with bodily conditions. This\nis the confusion of conditions and origins with the essence of the thing\nitself, which can be determined only by the thing, and is, by no means,\nbound exclusively to these conditions. Notwithstanding, the works of\nMarillier, Murisier, and Flournoy have considerably aided the problem.\nMore impartially than all of these, the English and American psychology\nhas investigated our subject. Here we have a masterpiece in the Gifford\nLectures of William James, which collects into a single reservoir\nsimilar investigations such as have been carried on by Coe and Starbuck.\nThere is here no tendency to a mechanism of consciousness, or to the\ndogma of the causal and necessary structure of consciousness. And to\njust this is due the freshness and impartiality of the analyses which\nJames gives out of his enviable knowledge of characteristic cases. James\nrightly emphasizes the endlessly different intensity of religious\nexperiences, and the great number of points of view and of judgments\nwhich thereby results. He also rightly emphasizes the connection of this\ndifferent intensity with irreducible typical constitutions of the soul's\nlife, with the optimistic and the melancholy disposition; hence there\narise constantly, even within the same religion, essentially different\ntypes of religiousness. Limiting himself, then, to the most intense\nexperiences, he decides that the characteristic of religious states is\nthe sense of presence of the divine, which one might perhaps describe in\nother terms, but which still continues the specifically divine, with the\nopposed emotional effects of a solemn sense of contrast and of\nenthusiastic exaltation. He pictures these senses of presence, and\nillustrates them by visionary and hallucinatory representations of the\nabstract. With this are connected impulsive and inhibitive conditions\nfor the appearance of these senses of presence and of reality,\ndescriptions of the effects upon the emotional life and action, and,\nabove all, the analysis of the event usually called conversion, in which\nthe religious experience out of subconscious antecedents becomes, in\nvarious ways, the centre of the soul's life. All this is description,\nbut it is based upon a mass of examples and explained by general\npsychological categories which, by the occurrence of the religious event\nonly, receive a thoroughly specific coloring. It is a description after\nthe manner of Kirchhoff's mechanics; permanent and similar types, and,\nlikewise, similar conditions for their relations to the rest of the\nsoul's life are sought out everywhere, without maintaining to have\nproven at the same time, in this way, an intellectual necessity for the\nconnection. But the characteristic peculiarity of religious phenomena is\nthus conceived as in no other previous analysis.\n\nAll this is still, however, nothing more than psychologic. For the\nscience of religion it accomplishes nothing more than the psychological\ndetermination of the peculiarity of the phenomenon, of its environment,\nits relations and consequences. It is evident that the phenomenon occurs\nin an indefinite number of varieties; and the chosen point of departure,\nin unusual and excessive cases, frequently diffuses over religion itself\nthe character of the bizarre and abnormal. Consequently nothing whatever\nis said about the amount of truth or of reality in these cases. This, by\nthe very principles of such a psychology, is impossible. It analyzes,\nproduces types and categories, points out comparatively constant\nconnections and interactions. But this cannot be the last word for the\nscience of religion. It demands, above all, empirical knowledge of the\nphenomenon; but it demands this only in order, on the basis of this\nknowledge, to be able to answer the question of the amount of truth. But\nthis leads to an entirely different problem, that of the _theory of\nknowledge_, which has its own conditions of solution. It is impossible\nto stop at a merely empirical psychology. The question is not merely of\ngiven facts, but of the amount of knowledge in these facts. But pure\nempiricism will not succeed in answering this question. The question\nwith regard to the amount of truth is always a question of validity. The\nquestion with regard to validity can, however, be decided only by\nlogical and by general, conceptual investigations. Thus we pass over\nfrom the ground of empiricism to that of rationalism, and the question\nis, what the theory of knowledge or rationalism signifies for the\nscience of religion.\n\nSuch a synthesis of the rational and irrational, of the psychological\nand the theory of knowledge, is the main problem raised by the teaching\nof Kant, and the significance of Kant is that he clearly and once for\nall raised the problem in this way. He had the same strong mind for the\nempirical and actual as for the rational and conceptual elements of\nhuman knowledge, and constructed science as a balance between the two.\n(He destroyed forever the _a priori_ speculative rationalism of the\nnecessary ideas of thought, and the analytical deductions from them,\nwhich undertakes to call reality out of the necessity of thought as\nsuch. He restricted regressive rationalism to metaphysical hypotheses\nand probabilities, the evidence for which rests upon the inevitability\nof the logical operations which leads to them, which, however, apply\ngeneral concepts without reference to experience, and therefore become\nempty, and thus afford no real knowledge.) On the other hand, he\nproclaimed the formal, immanent rationalism of experience, in attempting\nto unite Hume's truth with the truth of Leibnitz and of Plato. In this\nway he succeeded in grasping the great problem of thought by the root,\nand in putting attempts at solutions on the right basis. So it is not a\nmere national custom of German philosophizing, if we take our bearings,\nfor the most part, from this greatest of German thinkers, but it is,\nabsolutely, the most fruitful and keenest way of putting the problem. It\nis true, the solutions which Kant made, and which are closely connected\nwith the classical mechanics of that time, with the undeveloped\ncondition of the psychology of that time, and with the incompleteness of\nhistorical thinking then just beginning, have been, meantime, more than\nonce given up again. A simple return to him is therefore impossible. But\nthe problem was put by him in a fundamental way, and his solutions need\nnothing more than modification and completion.\n\nNow all this is especially true in the case of the science of religion.\nHere also Kant took the same course, which seemed to me right for the\ntheoretical knowledge of the natural sciences and for anthropology. In\npractical philosophy also, to which he rightly counts philosophy of\nreligion, he seeks laws of the practical reason analogous to the laws of\ntheoretical reason, axioms of the ethical, \u00e6sthetic, and religious\nconsciousness which are already contained _a priori_ in the elementary\nappearances in these fields, and, in application to concrete reality,\nproduce just these activities of the reason. Here also one should grasp\nreason only as contained in life itself, the _a priori_ law itself\nalready effective in the diversity of the appearances should make one's\nself clear-sighted and so competent for a criticism of the stream of the\nsoul's appearances. Seizing upon itself in the practical reality, the\npractical reason criticises the psychological complex, rejects as\nillusion and error that which cannot be comprehended in an _a priori_\nlaw, selects that part of the same which needs basis and centre and\nrequires only clearness with regard to itself, clears the way for\nrevelations of a life consciousness of its own legality and becomes\ncapable of the development of critically purified experience.\n\nIf this is, in principle, valid, the Kantian thought, in the further\ndetail, is maintained in principle only and as a whole. The elaboration\nitself will have to be quite different from that of his own. Even by\nKant himself, on this very point, the synthesis of empiricism and\nrationalism is far from being elaborated with the necessary rigor and\nconsistency. And to-day we have a quite differently developed psychology\nof religion, in contrast with which that presupposed by Kant is bare and\nthin. Finally, there remain in the whole method of the critical system\nunsolved problems; by failure to solve these, or by too hasty solution,\nscience of religion, especially, is affected.\n\nTo make clear the present condition of the problem, one ought, above\nall, to indicate the modifications to which the Kantian theory of\nreligion must submit,--must submit, especially, by reason of a more\ndelicate psychology, such as we have, with remarkable richness, in James\nand the American psychologists connected with him. There are _four_\npoints with regard to this question.\n\nThe first is the question of the relation of psychology and theory of\nknowledge in the very establishment of the laws of the theory of\nknowledge. Are not the search for and discovery of the laws of the\ntheory of knowledge themselves possible only by way of psychological\nascertainment of facts, itself then a psychological undertaking and\nconsequently dependent upon all its conditions? It is the much discussed\nquestion of the circle which itself lies at the outset of the critical\nsystem. The answer to this is that this circle lies in the very being of\nall knowledge, and must therefore be resolutely committed. It signifies\nnothing more than the presupposition of all thought, the trust in a\nreason which establishes itself only by making use of itself. The\nunmistakable elements of the logical assert themselves as logical in\ndistinction from the psychological, and from this point on reason must\nbe trusted in all its confusions and entanglements to recognize itself\nwithin the psychological. It is the courage of thought, as Hegel says,\nwhich may presuppose that the self-knowledge of reason may trust itself,\npresuppose that reason is contained within the psychological; or it is\nthe ethical and teleological presupposition of all thought, as Lotze\nsays, which believes in knowledge and the validity of its laws for the\nsake of a connected meaning for reality, and which, therefore, trusts to\nrecognize itself out of the psychological mass. The establishment,\ntherefore, of the laws of the theory of knowledge is not itself a\npsychological analysis, but a knowledge of self by the logical by virtue\nof which it extricates itself out of the psychological mass. Theory of\nknowledge, like every rationalism, includes, it is true, very real\npresuppositions with regard to the significant, rational, and\nteleologically connective character of reality, and without this\npresupposition it is untenable; in it lies its root. It is insight of\nformer days, the importance of which, however, must constantly be\nemphasized anew, that discusses the validity of the rational as opposed\nto the merely empirical. But still more important than this thesis are\nseveral _inferences_ which are given with it.\n\nThe establishment of the laws of consciousness, in which we produce\nexperience, is a selection of the laws out of experience itself, a\nknowledge of itself by the reason contained in the very experience by\nway of the analysis which extracts it. It is then an endless task,\ncompleted by constantly renewed attacks, and always only approximately\nsolvable. The complete separation of the merely psychological and actual\nand of the logical and necessary will never be completely accomplished,\nbut will always be open to doubt; one can only attempt always to limit\nmore vigorously the field of what is doubtful. And with this something\nfurther is connected.\n\nThe inexhaustible production of life becomes constantly, in the latent\namount of reason, richer than the analysis discerns, or, in other words,\nthe laws which are brought into the light of logic will always be less\nthe amount of reason not brought into consciousness, and conscious logic\nwill always be obliged to correct itself and enrich itself out of the\nunartificial logical operations arising in contact with the object. So a\nfinished system of _a priori_ principles, but this system will always be\nin growth, will be obliged unceasingly to correct itself, and to contain\nopen spaces.\n\nFinally, and above all, in case of this separation, there remains within\nthe psychologically conditioned appearance, a residuum, which is either\nnot conceived, but is later reduced to law and thereby a conceived\nphenomenon, or which never can be so, and is therefore illusion and\nerror. If the psychological and the theoretical for knowledge are to be\nseparated, then that can occur, not merely to show that both must always\nbe together, and form real experience only when together, but there must\nalso be a rejection of that which is merely psychological and not\nrational since it is illusion and error. The distinction between the\napparent and the real was the point of departure which made the whole\ntheory necessary, and, accordingly, the merely psychological must remain\nappearance and error side by side with that which is psychological and,\nat the same time, theoretical for knowledge. There always remains in\nconsciousness a residuum of the inconceivable, that is, inconceivable\nsince it is illusion and error. This amounts to saying that reality is\nnever fully rational, but is engaged in a struggle between the rational\nand anti-rational. The anti-rational or irrational, in the sense of\npsychological illusion and error, belongs also to the real, and strives\nagainst the rational. The true and rational reality to be attained by\nthought is always in conjunction with the untrue reality, the\npsychological, that containing illusion and error.\n\nAll this signifies that the rationalism of the theory of knowledge must\nbe conditional, partly owing to the corrective and enriching fecundation\nby primitive and na\u00efve thought, partly owing to never quite separable\nadmixture of illusion and error. So, long ago, the system of categorical\nforms, as Kant constructed it for theoretical and practical reason,\nbegan to change, and can never again acquire the rigidity which Kant's\nrationalism intended to give it forevermore. And thus the critical\nsystem's rational reality of law produced by reason always contains\nbelow itself and beside itself the merely psychological reality of the\nfactual, to which also illusion and error belong,--a reality which can\nnever be rationalized, but only set aside. This, too, is also true for\nthe philosophy of religion: the rational reduction of the psychological\nfacts of religion to the general laws of consciousness which prevail\namong them is a task constantly to be resumed anew by the study of\nreality, and follows the movements of primitive religion in order to\nfind there first the rational basis; the reduction is, however, always\napproximate, can comprehend the main points only, and must leave much\nopen, the rational ground for which is not or not yet evident; finally\nit has unceasingly to reckon with the irrational as illusion and error,\nwhich attaches to the rational, and yet is not explainable by it. The\ntwo realities, which the critical system must recognize at its very\nfoundation, continue in strife with each other, and this strife as the\nstrife of divine truth with human illusion is for the science of\nreligion of still more importance.\n\nThe second correction of the Kantian teaching is only a further\nconsequence from this state of things. If the attitude of psychology and\ntheory of knowledge requires a strict separation, it requires it only\nfor the purpose of more correct relation. The laws of the theory of\nknowledge are separated from the merely psychological actuality, but\nstill can be produced only out of it. Thus, as a matter of fact,\npsychological analysis is always the presupposition for the correct\nconception of all these laws. Psychology is the entrance gate to theory\nof knowledge. This is true for theoretical logic as well as for the\npractical logic of the moral, the \u00e6sthetical, and the religious. But\njust at this point the present, on the basis of its psychological\ninvestigation, presses far beyond the original form of the Kantian\nteaching. This is not the place to describe this, more closely, with\nreference to the first of the subjects just mentioned. But it is\nimportant to insist that this is especially true with respect to the\nKantian doctrine of religion. The Kantian doctrine of religion is\nfounded on the moral and religious psychology of Deism, which had made\nthe connection, frequent in experience, of moral feelings with religious\nemotion the sole basis of the philosophy of religion, and had, in the\nmanner of the psychology of the eighteenth century, immediately changed\nthis connection into intellectual reflections, in accord with which the\nmoral law demands its originator and guarantee. Kant accepted this\npsychology of religion without proof and built upon it his main law of\nthe religious consciousness, in accordance with which a synthetic\njudgment _a priori_ is operative in religion (arising in the moral\nexperience of freedom), which requires that the world be regarded as\nsubject to the purposes of freedom. It is, however, extremely one-sided,\nto give religion its place just between the elements, and a rather\nviolent translation of the religious constitution into reflection. The\nerror of this psychology of religion had been discovered and corrected\nalready by Schleiermacher. But Schleiermacher, for his part too, also\nfailed to deny himself an altogether too sudden metaphysical\ninterpretation of the religious _a priori_ which he had demonstrated,\nsince he not only described the _a priori_ judgment of things, from the\npoint of view of absolute dependence upon God, as a vague feeling, but\nraised this feeling, by reason of the supposed lack of difference, in\nit, between thought and will, reason and being, to a world-principle,\nand interpreted the idea of God contained in this feeling in the terms\nof his Spinozism, the lack of difference between God and Nature within\nthe Absolute. A real theory of knowledge of religion must keep itself\nmuch more independent of all metaphysical presuppositions and\ninferences, and must admit that the essence of the religious _a priori_\nis extorted from a thoroughly impartial psychological analysis. And this\nis always the place where works, such as those of James, come into play.\nReligion as a special category or form of psychical constitution, the\nresult of a more or less vague presence of the divine in the soul, the\nfeeling of presence and reality with reference to the superhuman or\ninfinite, that is without any doubt a much more correct point of\ndeparture for the analysis of the rational _a priori_ of religion, and\nit remains to make this new psychology fruitful for the theory of\nknowledge of religion. That will be one of the chief tasks of the\nfuture.\n\nThe third change relates to the distinction of the empirical and\nintelligible Ego, which Kant connected closely, almost indissolubly with\nhis main epistemological thought of the formal rationalisms immanent in\nexperience. Kant rationalized the whole outer and inner experience, by\nmeans of _a priori_ laws, into a totality, conforming to law, appearing\nin intuitive forms of space and time, causally and necessarily rigidly\nconnected. The freedom autonomously determining itself out of the\nlogical idea, and contrasting itself with the psychological stream,\nproduces out of the confused psycholican reality this scientific\nformation of the true reality. The product of thought, however, swallows\nits own maker. For the same acts of freedom, which autonomously produced\nthe formation of the reality of law, remain themselves in the temporal\nsequence of psychical events, and, therefore, themselves, with that\nformation, lapse into the sequence which is under mechanical law. The\nintelligible Ego creates the world of law, and finds itself therein,\nwith its activity, as empirical Ego, that is, as product of the great\nworld-mechanism and of its causal sequence. It is an intolerable,\nviolent contradiction, and it is no solution of this contradiction to\nrefer the empirical Ego to appearance, and the intelligible Ego to\nactuality existing in itself, if the operations of the intelligible Ego,\nalso a constituent part of what takes place in the soul, occur in time\nand so relapse irrecoverably into phenomenality and its mechanism. All\nthe ingenuity of modern interpretation of Kant has not succeeded in\nmaking this circle more tolerable, all shifting of one and the same\nthing to different points of view has only enriched scientific\nterminology with masterpieces of parenthetical caution, but not removed\nthe objection that two different points of view do not, as a matter of\nfact, exist side by side, but conflict within the same object.\n\nThis circle is especially intolerable for the psychology of religion and\nits application to the theory of knowledge. The psychology of religion\ncertainly shows us that the deeper feeling of all religion is not a\nproduct of the mechanical sequence, but an effect of the supersensuous\nitself as it is felt there; it believes that it arises in the\nintelligible Ego by way of some kind of connection with the\nsupersensuous world. This, however, becomes completely impossible for\nthe Kantian theory of the empirical Ego, and all distinctions of a\ndouble point of view in no wise change the fact that these points of\nview are mutually absolutely exclusive. Here we have the results of\npsychology which the expression of religious emotion confirms, in that\nreligion can be causally reduced to nothing else, totally opposed to the\nconsequences of such a theory of knowledge. Kant had himself often\nenough practically felt this, and spoke then of freedom as an experience\nof communion with the supersensuous as a possible but unprovable affair,\nwhile all that, in case of a strict adherence to the phenomenality of\ntime and of the theory of the empirical Ego, which is a consequence of\nit, is completely impossible. Nothing can be of any assistance here\nexcept a decisive renunciation of those epistemological positions which\ncontradict the results of psychology, and which are themselves only\ndoctrinaire consequences from other positions. Nothing else is possible\nbut the modification of the phenomenality of time, in such a way that by\nno means everything which belongs to time belongs also as a matter of\ncourse to phenomenality, but that the autonomous rational acts which\noccur in the time series of consciousness possess their own intelligible\ntime-form. At the same time the concept of causality closely connected\nwith the concept of time is to be modified so that there should be not\nonly an immanent and phenomenal causal connection, but also a regular\ninteraction between phenomenal and intelligible, psychological and\nrational, conscious reality. At the same time the conclusion is also\ngiven up, that the Ego submits unconditionally and directly to\nphenomenality and to causal necessity, while the same Ego, once more, in\nthe same way, as a whole, from another point of view, is subordinate to\nfreedom and autonomy, that is, self-constitutive through ideas. The two\nEgos must lie not side by side, but in and over one another. It must be\npossible that, within the phenomenal Ego by a creative act of the\nintelligible Ego in it, the personality should be formed and developed\nas a realization of the autonomous reason, so that the intelligible\nissues from the phenomenal, the rational from the psychological, the\nformer elaborates and shapes the latter, and between both a relation of\nregular interaction, but not of causal constraint, takes place. This\nrather deep, incisive modification is, in its turn, an approach of the\nKantian teaching to empiricism, but still at the same time, in the\ndestruction and subordination of the phenomenal and intelligible world,\nin the emphasis upon the single personality issuing from the act of\nreason, an adherence to rationalism. But since the distinction and the\ninterrelation between the rational and the empirical forms the point of\ndeparture for the critical system, and this point of departure requires\nat the same time the moulding and shaping of the empirical by the\nrational and the rejection of the psychological appearance; a mere\nparallelism is altogether impossible, but an interrelation is included,\nand a task set for the effort and labor which constantly makes the\nrational penetrate the empirical. At the very outset we have the\nexclusion of the parallelism and the assertion of the interrelation. The\ninterrelation, by its very nature, asserts the interruption of the\ncausal necessity and the penetration of autonomous reason in this\nsequence, without being itself produced by this sequence, although it\ncan be stimulated and helped or inhibited and weakened by it. Thus, in\nsuch a case as this, the irrational is recognized by the side of and in\nthe rational. In this case the irrational of the event without causal\ncompulsion by some antecedent, or of the self-determination by the\nautonomous idea alone, is the irrational of freedom. It is the\nirrational of the creative procedure which constitutes the idea out of\nitself and produces the consequences of the reason out of the\nconstituted idea. But this irrational plays everywhere in the whole life\nof the soul an essential part, and is not less than decisive in the case\nof religion, which must be quite different from what it is if it did not\nhave the right to maintain that which it declares to be true of itself,\nnamely, that it is an act of freedom and a gift of grace, an effect of\nthe supersensuous permeating the natural phenomenal life of the soul and\nan act of free devotion the natural motivation.\n\nThe fourth problem arises, when we examine the rational law of the\nreligious nature or of the having of religion which lies in the being\nand organization of the reason. The having of religion may be\ndemonstrated as a law of the normal consciousness from the immanent\nfeeling of necessity and obligation which properly belongs to religion,\nand from its organic place in the economy of consciousness, which\nreceives its concentration and its relation to an objective world-reason\nonly from religion. But precisely because religion is reduced to this,\nit is clear that this is only a reduction which abstracts from the\nempirical actuality just as the categories of pure reason do. This\nabstraction, then, should under no circumstances itself be regarded as\nthe real religion. It is only the rational _a priori_ of the psychical\nappearances, but not the replacement of appearances by the truth free\nfrom confusion. The psychical reality in which alone the truth is\neffective should never be forgotten out of regard for the truth. This\nis, however, the fact in the Kantian theory of religion in _two_\ndirections.\n\nIt is always noticeable that the _a priori_ of the practical reason is\ntreated by Kant quite differently from the theoretical. In case of the\nlatter the main idea of the synthesis, immanent in experience, of\nrationalism and empiricism, is retained, and the _a priori_ of the pure\nforms of intuition and of the pure categories is nothing without the\ncontents of concrete reality which become shaped in it. It may be very\ndifficult actually to grasp the co\u00f6peration of the _a priori_ and the\nempirical in the single case, and Kant's theory of the categories may\nhave to be entirely reshaped and approximated to _a priori_ hypotheses\nrequiring verification, but the principle itself is always the\ndisposition of the real and genuine problem of all knowledge. In case of\nthe practical _a priori_ Kant did, it is true, firmly emphasize the\nformal character of the ethical, \u00e6sthetical, and religious law, but, in\ndoing this, does not lose quite out of sight the psychical reality. They\nappear not as empty forms which attain to their reality only when filled\nwith the concrete ethical tasks, the artistic creations, and the\nreligious states, but as abstract truths of reason, which have to take\nthe place of the intricacies of usual consciousness. At this point one\nhas always been right in feeling a relapse on the part of Kant into the\nabstract, analytical, conceptual, rationalism, and for this very reason\nKant's statements about these things are of great sublimity and rigor of\nprinciple, but scanty in content. It is more important in case also of\nthis _a priori_ of the practical reason to keep in mind that it is a\npurely formal _a priori_ and in reality must constantly be in relation\nwith the psychical content, in order to give this content the firm core\nof the real and the principle of the critical regulation of self. So the\n_a priori_ of morals is not to be represented abstractly merely by\nitself, but it is to be conceived in its relation to all the tasks which\nwe feel as obligatory, and it extends itself from that point outwards\nover the total expanse of the activity of reason. Likewise the _a\npriori_ of art is not to be denoted in the abstract idea of the unity of\nfreedom and necessity, but to be shown in the whole expanse which is\npresent to the soul as artistic form or conception. Thus, in especial\ndegree, religion is not to be reduced to the belief of reason in a moral\nworld-order, and simply contrasted with all supposed religion of any\nother kind, but the religious _a priori_ should only serve in order to\nestablish the essential in the empirical appearance, but without\nstripping off this appearance altogether, and from this point of the\nessential to correct the intricacies and narrowness, the errors and\nfalse combinations of the psychical situation. Kant, by his original\nthought of the _a priori_, was urged in different ways to such a view,\nand construed epistemologically the empirical psychological religion as\nimaginary illustrations of the _a priori_. But that is occasional only\nand does not dominate Kant's real view of religion. This is and still\nremains only a translation of the usual moral and theological\nrationalism from the formula of Locke and Wolff into the formula of the\ncritical philosophy.\n\nThe same revision occurs in quite a different direction. If religion is\nan _a priori_ of reason, it is, once for all, established together with\nreason, and all religion is everywhere and always religious in the same\nproposition as it is in any way realized. Schleiermacher expressly\nstated this in his development of the Kantian theory, and, in so far as\nthe practical reason is always penetrated with freedom, and consequently\nreligion itself is established with the act of moral freedom, this was\nalso asserted by Kant himself. Such an assertion, however, contradicts\nevery psychological observation whatsoever. It is true such observation\ncan prove that religious emotions adjust themselves easily to all\nactivities of reason, but it must sharply distinguish what is nothing\nmore than the religiousness of vague feeling of supersensual\nregulations, which usually are joined with art and morals, from real and\ncharacteristic religiousness, in which, each single time, a purely\npersonal relation of presence to the supersensuous takes place. But this\nwhole problem signifies nothing else than the actualizing of the\nreligious _a priori_, which actualizing always occurs in quite specific\nand, in spite of all difference, essentially similar psychical\nexperiences and states. This problem of the actualizing of the religious\n_a priori_ and of its connection with concrete individual psychical\nphenomena, Kant completely overlooked in his abstract concept of\nreligion, or rather, deliberately ignored, because, as he wrote to\nJacobi, he saw all the dangers of mysticism lurking in it. This fear was\njustified; for, as a matter of fact, all the specific occurrences of\nmysticism, from conversion, prayer, and contemplation to enthusiasm,\nvision, and ecstasy, do lurk in it. But without this mysticism there is\nno real religion, and the psychology of religion shows most clearly how\nthe real pulse of religion beats in the mystical experiences. A religion\nwithout it is only a preliminary step, or a reverberation of real and\nactual religion. Moreover, the states are easily conceived in a theory\nof knowledge, if one sees in them the actualizing of the religious _a\npriori_, the production of actual religion in the fusion of the rational\nlaw with the concrete individual psychical fact. The mysticism\nrecognized as essential by the psychology of religion must find its\nplace in the theory of knowledge, and it finds it as the psychological\nactualizing of the religious _a priori_, in which alone that interlacing\nof the necessary, the rational, the conformable to law, and the factual\noccurs, which characterizes real religion. The dangers of such a\nmysticism, which are recognized a thousandfold in experience, cannot be\ndispelled altogether by the displacement of mysticism, for that would\nmean to displace religion itself. It would be the same, if one should\ntry to avoid the dangers of illusion and error, by keeping to the pure\ncategories alone, and ceasing to employ them in the actual thinking of\nexperience. Rather, they can be dispelled only in that the actualizing\nof the rational _a priori_ is recognized in the mystical occurrences,\nand thus the intricacies and one-sidedness of the mere psychological\nstream of religiousness be avoided. The psychological reality of\nreligion must always remember the rational substance of religion, and\nalways bring religion as central in the system of consciousness into\nfruitful and adjusted contact with the total life of the reason. Thus\nthe psychological reality corrects and purifies itself out of its own _a\npriori_, without, however, destroying itself; or rather, the actual\nreligion in the psychical category of the mystical occurrences will\nsubside to a more or less degree. Thus we have the irrational prevailing\nhere in its third form, which like the two others was contained in the\nvery outset of the critical system, in the form of the once-occurring,\nfactual, and individual, which, of course, has a rational basis or a\nrational element in itself, but is besides a pure fact and reality. Just\nthis is the excellence of the rationalism immanent in experience (the\ncritical system), that it makes room for this feature beside the general\nand conceptual rationality. It did not make room for it to the extent\nreally required, and it especially left no space for it in its abstract\nphilosophy of religion. This space must again be opened by the theory of\nthe actualizing of the religious _a priori_, and there again lies\nanother improvement of the critical system under the influence of modern\npsychology.\n\nIf we summarize all this, we have a quantity of concessions by the\nformal epistemological rationalism to the irrationality of the\npsychological facts and a repeated breaking down of the over-rigorous\nKantian rationalism. Contrariwise, however, the pure psychological\ninvestigation is also compelled to withdraw from the unlimited quantity\nand the absolute irrationality of the multifarious (and of the confusion\nof appearance and truth) to a rational criterium, which can be found in\nthe rational _a priori_ of the reason only, and in the organic position\nof this _a priori_ in the system of consciousness in general. By this\nrationalism alone may the true validity of religion be founded, and by\nthis alone the uncultivated psychical life may be critically regulated.\nReligion will be conceived in its concrete vitality and not mutilated;\nit will constantly be brought out of the jumble of its distortions,\nblendings, one-sidedness, narrowness, and exuberance back again to its\noriginal content, and to its organic relations to the totality of the\nlife of reason, to the scientific moral and artistic accomplishments.\nThat is everything that science can do for it, but is not this service\ngreat enough and indispensable enough to justify the work of such a\nscience? We do not stop with nothing more than \"varieties of religious\nexperience\" which is the result of James's method; but neither do we\nstop with nothing more than a rational idea of religion, which\noverpowers experience, as was still so in the case of Kant. But we must\nlearn how intimately to combine the empirical and psychological with the\ncritical and normative. The ideas of Hume and of Leibnitz must once more\nbe brought into relation with the continuations of Kant's work, and the\ncombination of the Anglo-Saxon sense for reality with the German spirit\nof speculation is still the task for the new century as well as for the\ncentury past.\n\n\n\n\nSHORT PAPERS\n\n\nA short paper was contributed to this Section by Professor Alexander T.\nOrmond, of Princeton University, on \"Some Roots and Factors of\nReligion.\" The speaker said that religion, like everything else human,\nhas its rise in man's experience. It has also doubtless had a history\nthat will present the outlines of a development, if but the course of\nthat development can be traced. \"But in the case of religion our theory\nof development will be largely qualified by our judgment as to its\norigin; while, regarding origin itself, we have to depend on hypotheses\nconstructed from our more or less imperfect acquaintance with the races,\nand especially the savage races, of the present. The primitive\npre-religious man is a construction from present data, and will always\nremain more or less hypothetical. This will partially explain, and at\nthe same time partially excuse, what we will agree is the unsatisfactory\ncharacter of the anthropological theories as accounts of the origin of\nreligion. But there are other reasons for this partial failure that are\nless excusable. One of these is the rather singular failure of the\nleading anthropologists, in dealing with the origin of religion, to\ndistinguish between _fundamental_ and merely tributary causes. For\ninstance, if we suppose that man has in some way come into possession of\na germ of religiousness, many things will become genuine tributaries to\nits development that when urged as explanations of the germ itself would\nbe obviously futile. There must be a cause for the pretty general\nfailure to note this distinction which is vital to religious theory, and\nI am convinced that the principal cause is a certain lack of\npsychological insight and of philosophical grasp in dealing with the\nproblem of the first data and primary roots of religion in man's nature.\n\n\"In the first place, it is needful in dealing with the religion of the\nhypothetical man that we should have some idea of what constitutes\nreligion in the actual man. Now, back of all the outward manifestations\nof religion, will stand the religious consciousness of the man and the\ncommunity, and it will be this that will determine the idea of religion\nin its most essential form. The developed idea of religion, therefore,\narising out of this germinal impression, would take the form of a sense\n(we may now call it concept) of relatedness to some being _akin_ to man\nhimself, and yet transcending him in some real though undetermined\nrespects. Anything short of this would, I think, leave religion in some\nrespects unaccounted for; while anything more would perhaps exclude some\ngenuine manifestations of religion.\n\n\"If the idea of religion arises out of an _impression_, then it will not\nbe possible to deny to it an intellectual root. I make this statement\nwith some diffidence, because if I do not misinterpret them, some recent\npsychologists have practically denied the intellectual root in their\ndoctrine that religion can have no original intellectual content. If I\nam not further misled, however, these writers would admit that a content\nis achieved by the symbolic use of experience. This is perhaps all I\nneed argue for here; since our epistemology is teaching us that the\ndistinction between symbolism and perception is only that between the\ndirect and the indirect; while here it is clear that its use in\ndeveloping the significance of the religious impression would have all\nthe directness and, therefore, all the cogency of an immediate\ninference.\n\n\"Let us now restore the intellectual and emotional elements of religion\nto their place in a synthesis; we will then have a concrete religious\nexperience out of which may be analyzed at least two fundamental\nfactors. The first of these is what we may call the _personal_ factor in\nreligion. We are treading in the footsteps of the anthropologists when\nwe find among the most undeveloped savages a tendency to personify the\nobjects of their worship. When it comes to the question of determining\nthe r\u00f4le that this personalizing tendency has actually played in the\ndevelopment of religion, the anthropologists divide into two camps, one\nof these, led by Max M\u00fcller, regarding it as a symbolic interpretation\nput upon the impression of some great natural or cosmic object or\nphenomenon; while others, including Herbert Spencer and Mr. Tylor,\nprefer to seek the originals of religion in ancestral dream-images and\nghostly apparitions. These writers thus start with completely\nanthropomorphic terms, and their problem is to de-anthropomorphize the\nelements to the extent necessary to constitute them data of religion.\nThe second factor standing over against the personal, as its opposite,\nis that of transcendence. By transcendence I mean that deifying,\ninfinitating process that is ever working contra to the anthropomorphic\ninfluence in the sphere of religious conceptions. The School of Spencer\nregard this as the only legitimate tendency in religion. We do not argue\nthis point here, but agree that it is as legitimate and real a factor as\nthat of personality. The root of this factor, if our diagnosis of the\nidea of religion be correct, is to be sought in the original impression\nof religion, and it no doubt has its origin in man's feeling-reaction\nfrom that impression. We have pointed to submission as one of the\nreligious emotions. Now submission rests on some deeper\nfeeling-attitude, which some have translated into the feeling or sense\nof dependence. This, however, is not adequate, since men have the sense\nof social dependence on finite beings, and we have it with reference to\nthe floor we are standing on. Rather, it seems to me, we must translate\nit into the stronger and more unconditional feeling of helplessness. One\nreal ground of our religious consciousness is the sense or feeling of\nhelplessness toward God; the sense that we have no standing in being as\nagainst the Deity. This radical feeling utters itself in every note of\nthe religious scale, from the lowest superstitious terror to the highest\nmystical self-annihilation.\n\n\"These two factors, the forces of personalization and transcendence, are\ninseparable. They constitute the terms of a dialectic within the\nreligious consciousness, by virtue of which in one phase our religious\nconceptions are becoming ever more adequate and satisfying, while from\nanother point of view their insufficiency grows more and more apparent.\nAnd, on the broader field of religious history, they embody themselves\nin a law of tendency, which Spencer has only half-expressed, by virtue\nof which the objects of religion are on one hand becoming ever more\nintelligible; on the other, ever more transcendent of our conceptions.\"\n\n * * * * *\n\nA short paper was read by Professor F. C. French, Professor of\nPhilosophy in the University of Nebraska, on \"The Bearing of Certain\nAspects of the Newer Psychology on the Philosophy of Religion.\" The\nspeaker said in part:\n\n\"The relation of science to religion has received, to be sure, much\nstudy, but to most minds hitherto this has meant the relation of only\nthe physical sciences to religion. The older psychology was largely\nspeculative and metaphysical in character. There were, of course, some\nwho employed the empirical method in psychology, but they were so far\nfrom comprehending the full scope of mental phenomena that, at best,\ntheir work gave the promise of a science rather than a science itself.\n\n\"It is not the fact that the newer psychology takes account of the\nphysiological conditions of mental life; it is not the fact that the\nsubject is now pursued in laboratories with instruments of precision,\nthat gives it its full standing as a science: it is much more the fact\nthat the psychology of to-day has found a place in the natural system of\nmental things for those strange and relatively unusual phenomena of\nconsciousness which to the scientifically minded seemed totally unreal\nand to the superstitious manifestations of the supernatural....\n\n\"In showing that the abnormal can be explained in terms of the normal,\npsychology does now for the phenomena of mind what the physical sciences\nhave long done for the phenomena of nature....\n\n\"Psychology as a science postulates the reign of natural law in the\nsubjective sphere just as rigorously as physics postulates the reign of\nlaw in the objective sphere....\n\n\"It is not in the unusual and the abnormal that the reflective mind is\nto see God. It is not through gaps in nature that we are to get glimpses\nof the supernatural. Rather is it in the very nature of nature,\nrational, harmonious, law-conforming, subject to scientific\ninterpretation, that we have the best evidence that the world is made\nmind-wise, that it is the work of an intelligent mind, that there is a\nrational spirit at the care of the universe.\n\n\"For science the transcendent does not enter into the perceptual realm\nexternal or internal. It is, indeed, hard for the religious mind to\nadmit this fact in all its fullness. Until it does, however, religion\nmust always stand more or less in fear of science. Once give up the\nperceptual, in all its bearings, to science, and religion will find that\nit has lost a weak support only to gain a stronger one. Ultimately, I\nbelieve, we shall find that the full acceptance of science in the mental\ndomain as well as in the physical will strengthen the rational grounds\nof theistic belief.\"\n\n\n\n\n\nSECTION C--LOGIC\n\n\n\n\nSECTION C--LOGIC\n\n(_Hall 6, September 22, 10 a. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR GEORGE M. DUNCAN, Yale University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR WILLIAM A. HAMMOND, Cornell University.\n PROFESSOR FREDRICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE, Columbia University.\n SECRETARY: DR. W. H. SHELDON, Columbia University.\n\n\nThe Chairman of this Section, Professor George M. Duncan, Professor of\nLogic and Mathematics at Yale University, in introducing the speakers\nspoke briefly of the scope and importance of the subject assigned to the\nSection; expressed, on behalf of those in attendance, regret at the\ninability of Professor Wilhelm Windelband to be present and take part in\nthe work of the Section, as had been expected; congratulated the Section\non the papers to be presented and the speakers who were to present them;\nand announced the final programme of the Section.\n\n\n\n\nTHE RELATIONS OF LOGIC TO OTHER DISCIPLINES\n\nBY PROFESSOR WILLIAM A. HAMMOND\n\n [William Alexander Hammond, Assistant Professor of Ancient\n and Medieval Philosophy and \u00c6sthetics, Cornell University.\n b. May 20, 1861, New Athens, Ohio. A.B. Harvard, 1885; Ph.D.\n Leipzig, 1891. Lecturer on Classics, King's College,\n Windsor, N. S., 1885-88; Secretary of the University\n Faculty, Cornell; Member American Psychological Association,\n American Philosophical Association. Author of _The\n Characters of Theophrastus_, translated with Introduction;\n _Aristotle's Psychology_, translated with Introduction.]\n\n\nIn 1787, in the preface to the second edition of the _Kr. d. r. V._,\nKant wrote the following words: \"That logic, from the earliest times,\nhas followed that secure method\" (namely, the secure method of a science\nwitnessed by the unanimity of its workers and the stability of its\nresults) \"may be seen from the fact that since Aristotle it has not had\nto retrace a single step, unless we choose to consider as improvements\nthe removal of some unnecessary subtleties, or the clearer definition of\nits matter, both of which refer to the elegance rather than to the\nsolidity of the science. It is remarkable, also, that to the present\nday, it has not been able to make one step in advance, so that to all\nappearances it may be considered as completed and perfect. If some\nmodern philosophers thought to enlarge it, by introducing\n_psychological_ chapters on the different faculties of knowledge\n(faculty of imagination, wit, etc.), or _metaphysical_ chapters on the\norigin of knowledge or different degrees of certainty according to the\ndifference of objects (idealism, skepticism, etc.), or, lastly,\n_anthropological_ chapters on prejudices, their causes and remedies,\nthis could only arise from their ignorance of the peculiar nature of\nlogical science. We do not enlarge, but we only disfigure the sciences,\nif we allow their respective limits to be confounded; and the limits of\nlogic are definitely fixed by the fact that it is a science which has\nnothing to do but fully to exhibit and strictly to prove the formal\nrules of all thought (whether it be _a priori_ or empirical, whatever be\nits origin or its object, and whatever be the impediments, accidental or\nnatural, which it has to encounter in the human mind).\"--[Translated by\nMax M\u00fcller.] Scarcely more than half a century after the publication of\nthis statement of Kant's, John Stuart Mill (Introduction to _System of\nLogic_) wrote: \"There is as great diversity among authors in the modes\nwhich they have adopted of defining logic, as in their treatment of the\ndetails of it. This is what might naturally be expected on any subject\non which writers have availed themselves of the same language as a means\nof delivering different ideas.... This diversity is not so much an evil\nto be complained of, as an inevitable, and in some degree a proper\nresult of the imperfect state of those sciences\" (that is, of logic,\njurisprudence, and ethics). \"It is not to be expected that there should\nbe agreement about the definition of anything, until there is agreement\nabout the thing itself.\" This remarkable disparity of opinion is due\npartly to the changes in the treatment of logic from Kant to Mill, and\npartly to the fact that both statements are extreme. That the science of\nlogic was \"completed and perfect\" in the time of Kant could only with\nany degree of accuracy be said of the treatment of syllogistic proof or\nthe deductive logic of Aristotle. That the diversity was so great as\npictured by Mill is not historically exact, but could be said only of\nthe new epistemological and psychological treatment of logic and not of\nthe traditional formal logic. The confusion in logic is no doubt largely\ndue to disagreement in the delimitation of its proper territory and to\nthe consequent variety of opinions as to its relations to other\ndisciplines. The rise of inductive logic, coincident with the rise and\ngrowth of physical science and empiricism, forced the consideration of\nthe question as to the relation of formal thought to reality, and the\nconsequent entanglement of logic in a triple alliance of logic,\npsychology, and metaphysics. How logic can maintain friendly relations\nwith both of these and yet avoid endangering its territorial integrity\nhas not been made clear by logicians or psychologists or metaphysicians,\nand that, too, in spite of persistent attempts justly to settle the\nissue as to their respective spheres of influence. Until modern logic\ndefinitely settles the question of its aims and legitimate problems, it\nis difficult to see how any agreement can be reached as to its relation\nto the other disciplines. The situation as it confronts one in the\ndiscussion of the relations of logic to allied subjects may be analyzed\nas follows:\n\n 1. The relation of logic as science to logic as art.\n 2. The relation of logic to psychology.\n 3. The relation of logic to metaphysics.\n\nThe development of nineteenth century logic has made an answer to the\nlast two of the foregoing problems exceedingly difficult. Indeed, one\nmay say that the evolution of modern epistemology has had a centrifugal\ninfluence on logic, and instead of growth towards unity of conception we\nhave a chaos of diverse and discordant theories. The apple of discord\nhas been the theory of knowledge. A score of years ago when Adamson\nwrote his admirable article in the _Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica_ (article\n\"Logic,\" 1882), he found the conditions much the same as I now find\nthem. \"Looking to the chaotic state of logical text-books at the present\ntime, one would be inclined to say that there does not exist anywhere a\nrecognized currently received body of speculations to which the title\nlogic can be unambiguously assigned, and that we must therefore resign\nthe hope of attaining by any empirical consideration of the received\ndoctrine a precise determination of the nature and limits of logical\ntheory.\" I do not, however, take quite so despondent a view of the\nlogical chaos as the late Professor Adamson; rather, I believe with\nProfessor Stratton (_Psy. Rev._ vol. III) that something is to be gained\nfor unity and consistency by more exact delimitation of the\nsubject-matter of the philosophical disciplines and their\ninterrelations, which precision, if secured, would assist in bringing\ninto clear relief the real problems of the several departments of\ninquiry, and facilitate the proper classification of the disciplines\nthemselves.\n\nThe attempt to delimit the spheres of the disciplines, to state their\ninterrelations and classify them, was made early in the history of\nphilosophy, at the very beginning of the development of logic as a\nscience by Aristotle. In Plato's philosophy, logic is not separated from\nepistemology and metaphysics. The key to his metaphysics is given\nessentially in his theory of the reality of the concept, which offers an\ninteresting analogy to the position of logic in modern idealism. Before\nPlato there was no formulation of logical theory, and in his dialogues\nit is only contained in solution. The nearest approach to any\nformulation is to be found in an applied logic set forth in the precepts\nand rules of the rhetoricians and sophists. Properly speaking, Aristotle\nmade the first attempt to define the subject of logic and to determine\nits relations to the other sciences. In a certain sense logic for\nAristotle is not a science at all. For science is concerned with some\n_ens_, some branch of reality, while logic is concerned with the\nmethodology of knowing, with the formal processes of thought whereby an\n_ens_ or a reality is ascertained and appropriated to knowledge. In the\nsense of a method whereby all scientific knowledge is secured, logic is\na prop\u00e6deutic to the sciences. In the idealism of the Eleatics and\nPlato, thought and being are ultimately identical, and the laws of\nthought are the laws of being. In Aristotle's conception, while the\nprocesses of thought furnish a knowledge of reality or being, their\nformal operation constitutes the technique of investigation, and their\nsystematic explanation and description constitute logic. Logic and\nmetaphysics are distinguished as the science of being and the doctrine\nof the thought processes whereby being is known. Logic is the doctrine\nof the organon of science, and when applied is the organon of science.\nThe logic of Aristotle is not a purely formal logic. He is not\ninterested in the merely schematic character of the thought processes,\nbut in their function as mediators of apodictic truth. He begins with\nthe assumption that in the conjunction and disjunction of correctly\nformed judgments the conjunction or disjunction of reality is mirrored.\nAristotle does not here examine into the powers of the mind as a whole;\nthat is done, though fragmentarily, in the _De Anima_ and _Parva\nNaturalia_, where the mental powers are regarded as phases of the\nprocesses of nature without reference to normation; but in his logic he\ninquires only into those forms and laws of thinking which mediate proof.\nScientific proof, in his conception, is furnished in the form of the\nsyllogism, whose component elements are terms and propositions. In the\nlittle tract _On Interpretation_ (_i. e._ on the judgment as\n_interpreter_ of thought), if it is genuine, the proposition is\nconsidered in its logical bearing. The treatise on the _Categories_,\nwhich discusses the nature of the most general terms, forms a connecting\nlink between logic and metaphysics. The categories are the most general\nconcepts or universal modes under which we have knowledge of the world.\nThey are not simply logical relations; they are existential forms, being\nnot only the modes under which thought regards being, but the modes\nunder which being exists. Aristotle's theory of the methodology of\nscience is intimately connected with his view of knowledge. Scientific\nknowledge in his opinion refers to the essence of things; for example,\nto those universal aspects of reality which are given in particulars,\nbut which remain self-identical amidst the variation and passing of\nparticulars. The universal, however, is known only through and after\nparticulars. There is no such thing as innate knowledge or Platonic\nreminiscence. Knowledge, if not entirely empirical, has its basis in\nempirical reality. Causes are known only through effects. The universals\nhave no existence apart from things, although they exist _realiter_ in\nthings. Empirical knowledge of particulars must, therefore, precede in\ntime the conceptual or scientific knowledge of universals. In the\nevolution of scientific knowledge in the individual mind, the body of\nparticulars or of sense-experience is to its conceptual transformation\nas potentiality is to actuality, matter to form, the completed end of\nthe former being realized in the latter. Only in the sense of this power\nto transform and conceptualize, does the mind have knowledge within\nitself. The genetic content is experiential; the developed concept,\njudgment, or inference is _in form_ no\u00ebtic. Knowledge is, therefore, not\na mere \"precipitate of experience,\" nor is Aristotle a complete\nempiricist. The conceptual form of knowledge is not immediately given in\nthings experienced, but is a product of no\u00ebtic discrimination and\ncombination. Of a sensible object as such there is no concept; the\nobject of a concept is the generic essence of a thing; and the concept\nitself is the thought of this generic essence. The individual is\ngeneralized; every concept does or can embrace several individuals. It\nis an \"aggregate of distinguishing marks,\" and is expressed in a\ndefinition. The concept as such is neither true nor false. Truth first\narises in the form of a judgment or proposition, wherein a subject is\ncoupled with a predicate, and something is said about something. A\njudgment is true when the thought (whose inward process is the judgment\nand the expression in vocal symbols is the proposition) regards as\nconjoined or divided that which is conjoined or divided in actuality; in\nother words, when the thought is congruous with the real. While\nAristotle does not ignore induction as a scientific method, (how could\nhe when he regards the self-subsistent individual as the only real?) yet\nhe says that, as a method, it labors under the defect of being only\nproximate; a complete induction from _all_ particulars is not possible,\nand therefore cannot furnish demonstration. Only the deductive process\nproceeding syllogistically from the universal (or essential truth) to\nthe particular is scientifically cogent or apodictic. Consequently\nAristotle developed the science of logic mainly as a syllogistic\ntechnique or instrument of demonstration. From this brief sketch of\nAristotle's logical views it will be seen that the epistemological and\nmetaphysical relations of logic which involve its greatest difficulty\nand cause the greatest diversity in its modern exponents, were present\nin undeveloped form to the mind of the first logician. It would require\na mighty optimism to suppose that this difficulty and diversity, which\nhas increased rather than diminished in the progress of historical\nphilosophy, should suddenly be made to vanish by some magic of\nrestatement of subject-matter, or theoretical delimitation of the\ndiscipline. As Fichte said of philosophy, \"The sort of a philosophy that\na man has, depends on the kind of man he is;\" so one might almost say of\nlogic, \"The sort of logic that a man has, depends on the kind of\nphilosopher he is.\" If the blight of discord is ever removed from\nepistemology, we may expect agreement as to the relations of logic to\nmetaphysics. Meanwhile logic has the great body of scientific results\ndeposited in the physical sciences on which to build and test, with some\nassurance, its doctrine of methodology; and as philosophy moves forward\npersistently to the final solution of its problems, logic may justly\nexpect to be a beneficiary in its established theories.\n\nAfter Aristotle's death logic lapsed into a formalism more and more\nremoved from any vital connection with reality and oblivious to the\nprofound epistemological and methodological questions that Aristotle had\nat least raised. In the Middle Ages it became a highly developed\nexercise in inference applied to the traditional dogmas of theology and\nscience as premises, with mainly apologetic or polemical functions. Its\nchief importance is found in its application to the problem of realism\nand nominalism, the question as to the nature of universals. At the\nheight of scholasticism realism gained its victory by syllogistically\nshowing the congruity of its premises with certain fundamental dogmas of\nthe Church, especially with the dogma of the unity and reality of the\nGodhead. The heretical conclusion involved in nominalism is equivalent\n(the accepted dogma of the Church being axiomatic) to _reductio ad\nabsurdum_. A use of logic such as this, tending to conserve rather than\nto increase the body of knowledge, was bound to meet with attack on the\nawakening of post-renaissance interest in the physical world, and the\nacquirement of a body of truth to which the scholastic formal logic had\nno relation. The anti-scholastic movement in logic was inaugurated by\nFrancis Bacon, who sought in his _Novum Organum_ to give science a real\ncontent through the application of induction to experience and the\ndiscovery of universal truths from particular instances. The syllogism\nis rejected as a scientific instrument, because it does not lead _to_\nprinciples, but proceeds only _from_ principles, and is therefore not\nuseful for discovery. It permits at most only refinements on knowledge\nalready possessed, but cannot be regarded as creative or productive. The\nBaconian theory of induction regarded the accumulation of facts and the\nderivation of general principles and laws from them as the true and\nfruitful method of science. In England this empirical view of logic has\nbeen altogether dominant, and the most illustrious English exponents of\nlogical theory, Herschel, Whewell, and Mill, have stood on that ground.\nSince the introduction of German idealism in the last half century a new\nlogic has grown up whose chief business is with the theory of knowledge.\n\nKant's departure in logic is based on an epistemological examination of\nthe nature of judgment, and on the answer to his own question, \"How are\nsynthetic judgments _a priori_ possible?\" The _a priori_ elements in\nknowledge make knowledge of the real nature of things impossible. Human\nknowledge extends to the phenomenal world, which is seen under the _a\npriori_ forms of the understanding. Logic for Kant is the science of the\nformal and necessary laws of thought, apart from any reference to\nobjects. Pure or universal logic aims to understand the forms of thought\nwithout regard to metaphysical or psychological relations, and this\nposition of Kant is the historical beginning of the subjective formal\nlogic.\n\nIn the metaphysical logic of Hegel, which rests on a panlogistic basis,\nbeing and thought, form and content, are identical. Logical necessity is\nthe measure and criterion of objective reality. The body of reality is\ndeveloped through the dialectic self-movement of the idea. In such an\nidealistic monism, formal and real logic are by the metaphysical\npostulate coincident.\n\nSchleiermacher in his dialectic regards logic from the standpoint of\nepistemological realism, in which the real deliverances of the senses\nare conceptually transformed by the spontaneous activity of reason. This\nspirit of realism is similar to that of Aristotle, in which the\none-sided _a priori_ view of knowledge is controverted. Space and time\nare forms of the existence of things, and not merely _a priori_ forms of\nknowing. Logic he divides into dialectic and technical logic. The former\nregards the idea of knowledge as such; the formal or technical regards\nknowledge in the process of becoming or the idea of knowledge in motion.\nThe forms of this process are induction and deduction. The Hegelian\ntheory of the generation of knowledge out of the processes of pure\nthought is emphatically rejected.\n\nLotze, who is undoubtedly one of the most influential and fruitful\nwriters on logic in the last century, attempts to bring logic into\ncloser relations with contemporary science, and is an antagonist of\none-sided formal logics. For him logic falls into the three parts of (1)\npure logic or the logic of thought; (2) applied logic or the logic of\ninvestigation; (3) the logic of knowledge or methodology; and this\nclassification of the matter and problems of logic has had an important\ninfluence on subsequent treatises on the discipline. His logic is\nformal, as he describes it himself, in the sense of setting forth the\nmodes of the operation of thought and its logical structure; it is real\nin the sense that these forms are dependent on the nature of things and\nnot something independently given in the mind. While he aims to maintain\nthe distinct separation of logic and metaphysics, he says (in the\ndiscussion of the relations between formal and real logical meaning) the\nquestion of meaning naturally raises a metaphysical problem: \"Ich thue\nbesser der Metaphysik die weitere Er\u00f6rterung dieses wichtigen Punktes zu\n\u00fcberlassen.\" (_Log._ 2d ed. p. 571.) How could it be otherwise when his\nwhole view of the relations and validity of knowledge is inseparable\nfrom his realism or teleological idealism, as he himself characterizes\nhis own standpoint?\n\nDrobisch, a follower of Herbart, is one of the most thoroughgoing\nformalists in modern logical theory. He attempts to maintain strictly\nthe distinction between thought and knowledge. Logic is the science of\nthought. He holds that there may be formal truth, for example, logically\nvalid truth, which is materially false. Logic, in other words, is purely\nformal; material truth is matter for metaphysics or science. Drobisch\nholds, therefore, that the falsity of the judgment expressed in the\npremise from which a formally correct syllogism may be deduced, is not\nsubject-matter for logic. The sphere of logic is limited to the region\nof inference and forms of procedure, his view of the nature and function\nof logic being determined largely by the bias of his mathematical\nstandpoint. The congruity of thought with itself, judgments,\nconclusions, analyses, etc., is the sole logical truth, as against\nTrendelenburg, who took the Aristotelian position that logical truth is\nthe \"agreement of thought with the object of thought.\"\n\nSigwart looks at logic mainly from the standpoint of the technology of\nscience, in which, however, he discovers the implications of a\nteleological metaphysic. Between the processes of consciousness and\nexternal changes he finds a causal relation and not parallelism.\nInasmuch as thought sometimes misses its aim, as is shown by the fact\nthat error and dispute exist, there is need of a discipline whose\npurpose is to show us how to attain and establish truth and avoid error.\nThis is the practical aim of logic, as distinguished from the\npsychological treatment of thought, where the distinction between true\nand false has no more place than the distinction between good and bad.\nLogic presupposes the impulse to discover truth, and it therefore sets\nforth the criteria of true thinking, and endeavors to describe those\nnormative operations whose aim is validity of judgment. Consequently\nlogic falls into the two parts of (1) critical, (2) technical, the\nformer having meaning only in reference to the latter; the main value of\nlogic is to be sought in its function as art. \"Methodology, therefore,\nwhich is generally made to take a subordinate place, should be regarded\nas the special, final, and chief aim of our science.\" (_Logic_, vol. i,\np. 21, Eng. Tr.) As an art, logic undertakes to determine under what\nconditions and prescriptions judgments are valid, but does not undertake\nto pass upon the validity of the content of given judgments. Its\nprescriptions have regard only to formal correctness and not to the\nmaterial truth of results. Logic is, therefore, a formal discipline. Its\nbusiness is with the due procedure of thought, and it attempts to show\nno more than how we may advance in the reasoning process in such way\nthat each step is valid and necessary. If logic were to tell us _what_\nto think or give us the content of thought, it would be commensurate\nwith the whole of science. Sigwart, however, does not mean by formal\nthought independence of content, for it is not possible to disregard the\nparticular manner in which the materials and content of thought are\ndelivered through sensation and formed into ideas. Further, logic having\nfor its chief business the methodology of science, the development of\nknowledge from empirical data, it ought to include a theory of\nknowledge, but it should not so far depart from its subjective limits as\nto include within its province the discussion of metaphysical\nimplications or a theory of being. For this reason, Sigwart relegates to\na postscript his discussion of teleology, but he gives an elaborate\ntreatment of epistemology extending through vol. I and develops his\naccount of methodology in vol. II. The question regarding the relation\nbetween necessity, the element in which logical thought moves, and\nfreedom, the postulate of the will, carries one beyond the confines of\nlogic and is, in his opinion, the profoundest problem of metaphysics,\nwhose function is to deal with the ultimate relation between \"subject\nand object, the world and the individual, and this is not only basal for\nlogic and all science, but is the crown and end of them all.\"\n\nWundt's psychological and methodological treatment of logic stands\nmidway between the purely formal treatises on the one hand, and the\nmetaphysical treatises on the other hand. The general standpoint of\nWundt is similar to that of Sigwart, in that he discovers the function\nof logic in the exposition of the formation and methods of scientific\nknowledge; for example, in epistemology and methodology. Logic must\nconform to the conditions under which scientific inquiry is actually\ncarried on; the forms of thought, therefore, cannot be separate from or\nindifferent to the content of knowledge; for it is a fundamental\nprinciple of science that its particular methods are determined by the\nnature of its particular subject-matter. Scientific logic must reject\nthe theory that identifies thought and being (Hegel) and the theory of\nparallelism between thought and reality (Schleiermacher, Trendelenburg,\nand Ueberweg), in which the ultimate identity of the two is only\nconcealed. Both of these theories base logic on a metaphysics, which\nmakes it necessary to construe the real in terms of thought, and logic,\nso divorced from empirical reality, is powerless to explain the methods\nof scientific procedure. One cannot, however, avoid the acceptance of\nthought as a competent organ for the interpretation of reality, unless\none abandons all question of validity and accepts agnosticism or\nskepticism. This interpretative power of thought or congruity with\nreality is translated by metaphysical logic into identity. Metaphysical\nlogic concerns itself fundamentally with the content of knowledge, not\nwith its evidential or formal logical aspects, but with being and the\nlaws of being. It is the business of metaphysics to construct its\nnotions and theories of reality out of the deliverances of the special\nsciences and inferences derived therefrom. The aim of metaphysics is the\ndevelopment of a world-view free from internal contradictions, a view\nthat shall unite all particular and plural knowledges into a whole.\nLogic stands in more intimate relation to the special sciences, for here\nthe relations are reciprocal and immediate; for example, from actual\nscientific procedure logic abstracts its general laws and results, and\nthese in turn it delivers to the sciences as their formulated\nmethodology. In the history of science the winning of knowledge precedes\nthe formulation of the rules employed, that is, precedes any scientific\nmethodology. Logic, as methodology, is not an _a priori_ construction,\nbut has its genesis in the growth of science itself and in the discovery\nof those tests and criteria of truth which are found to possess an\nactual heuristic or evidential value. It is not practicable to separate\nepistemology and logic, for such concepts as causality, analogy,\nvalidity, etc., are fundamental in logical method, and yet they belong\nto the territory of epistemology, are epistemological in nature, as one\nmay indeed say of all the general laws of thought. A formal logic that\nis merely prop\u00e6deutic, a logic that aims to free itself from the\nquarrels of epistemology, is scientifically useless. Its norms are\nvalueless, in so far as they can only teach the arrangement of knowledge\nalready possessed, and teach nothing as to how to secure it or test its\nreal validity. While formal logic aims to put itself outside of\nphilosophy, metaphysical logic would usurp the place of philosophy.\nFormal logic is inadequate, because it neither shows how the laws of\nthought originate, why they are valid, nor in what sense they are\napplicable to concrete investigation. Wundt, therefore, develops a logic\nwhich one may call epistemological methodological, and which stands\nbetween the extremes of formal logic and metaphysical logic. The laws of\nlogic must be derived from the processes of psychic experience and the\nprocedure of the sciences. \"Logic therefore needs,\" as he says,\n\"epistemology for its foundation and the doctrine of methods for its\ncompletion.\"\n\nLipps takes the view outright that logic is a branch of psychology;\nHusserl in his latest book goes to the other extreme of a purely formal\nand technical logic, and devotes almost his entire first volume to the\ncomplete sundering of psychology and logic.\n\nBradley bases his logic on the theory of the judgment. The logical\njudgment is entirely different from the psychological. The logical\njudgment is a qualification of reality by means of an idea. The\npredicate is an adjective or attribute which in the judgment is ascribed\nto reality. The aim of truth is to qualify reality by general notions.\nBut inasmuch as reality is individual and self-existent, whereas truth\nis universal, truth and reality are not coincident. Bradley's\nmetaphysical solution of the disparity between thought and reality is\nput forward in his theory of the unitary Absolute, whose concrete\ncontent is the totality of experience. But as thought is not the whole\nof experience, judgments cannot compass the whole of reality. Bosanquet\nobjects to this, and maintains that reality must not be regarded as an\nideal construction. The real world is the world to which our concepts\nand judgments refer. In the former we have a world of isolated\nindividuals of definite content; in the latter, we have a world of\ndefinitely systematized and organized content. Under the title of the\nMorphology of Knowledge Bosanquet considers the evolution of judgment\nand inference in their varied forms. \"Logic starts from the individual\nmind, as that within which we have the actual facts of intelligence,\nwhich we are attempting to interpret into a system\" (_Logic_, vol. i, p.\n247). The real world for every individual is _his_ world. \"The work of\nintellectually constituting that totality which we call the real world\nis the work of knowledge. The work of analyzing the process of this\nconstitution or determination is the work of logic, which might be\ndescribed ... as the reflection of knowledge upon itself\" (_Logic_, vol.\ni, p. 3). \"The relation of logic to truth consists in examining the\ncharacteristics by which the various phases of the one intellectual\nfunction are fitted for their place in the intellectual totality which\nconstitutes knowledge\" (_ibid._). The real world is the intelligible\nworld; reality is something to which we attain by a constructive\nprocess. We have here a type of logic which is essentially a metaphysic.\nIndeed, Bosanquet says in the course of his first volume: \"I entertain\nno doubt that in content logic is one with metaphysics, and differs, if\nat all, simply in mode of treatment--in tracing the evolution of\nknowledge in the light of its value and import, instead of attempting to\nsummarize its value and import apart from the details of its evolution\"\n(_Logic_, vol. i, 247).\n\nDewey (_Studies in Logical Theory_, p. 5) describes the essential\nfunction of logic as the inquiry into the relations of thought as such\nto reality as such. Although such an inquiry may involve the\ninvestigation of psychological processes and of the concrete methods of\nscience and verification, a description and analysis of the forms of\nthought, conception, judgment, and inference, yet its concern with these\nis subordinate to its main concern, namely, the relation of \"thought at\nlarge to reality at large.\" Logic is not reflection on thought, either\non its nature as such or on its forms, but on its relations to the real.\nIn Dewey's philosophy, logical theory is a description of thought as a\nmode of adaptation to its own conditions, and validity is judged in\nterms of the efficiency of thought in the solution of its own problems\nand difficulties. The problem of logic is more than epistemological.\nWherever there is striving there are obstacles; and wherever there is\nthinking there is a \"material-in-question.\" Dewey's logic is a theory of\nreflective experience regarded functionally, or a pragmatic view of the\ndiscipline. This logic of experience aims to evaluate the significance\nof social research, psychology, fine and industrial art, and religious\naspiration in the form of scientific statement, and to accomplish for\nsocial values in general what the physical sciences have done for the\nphysical world. In Dewey's teleological pragmatic logic the judgment is\nessentially instrumental, the whole of thinking is functional, and the\nmeaning of things is identical with valid meaning (_Studies in Logical\nTheory_, cf. pp. 48, 82, 128). The real world is not a self-existent\nworld outside of knowledge, but simply the totality of experience; and\nexperience is a complex of strains, tensions, checks, and attitudes. The\nfunction of logic is the redintegration of this experience. \"Thinking is\nadaptation _to_ an end _through_ the adjustment of particular objective\ncontents\" (_ibid._ p. 81). Logic here becomes a large part, if not the\nwhole, of a metaphysics of experience; its nature and function are\nentirely determined by the theory of reality.\n\nIn this brief and fragmentary _r\u00e9sum\u00e9_ are exhibited certain\ncharacteristic movements in the development of logical theory, the\nconstruction put upon its subject-matter and its relation to other\ndisciplines. The _r\u00e9sum\u00e9_ has had in view only the making of the\ndiversity of opinion on these questions historically salient. There are\nthree distinct types of logic noticed here: (1) formal, whose concern is\nmerely with the structural aspect of inferential thought, and its\nvalidity in terms of internal congruity; (2) metaphysical logic whose\nconcern is with the functional aspect of thought, its validity in terms\nof objective reference, and its relation to reality; (3) epistemological\nand methodological logic, whose concern is with the genesis, nature, and\nlaws of logical thinking as forms of scientific knowledge, and with\ntheir technological application to the sciences as methodology. I am not\nat present concerned with a criticism of these various viewpoints,\nexcepting in so far as they affect the problem of the interrelationship\nof logic and the allied disciplines.\n\nFor my present purpose I reject the extreme metaphysical and formal\npositions, and assume that logic is a discipline whose business is to\ndescribe and systematize the formal processes of inferential thought and\nto apply them as practical principles to the body of real knowledge.\n\nI wish now to take up _seriatim_ the several questions touching the\nvarious relations of logic enumerated above, and first of all the\nquestion of the relation of logic as science to logic as art.\n\n\nI. _Logic as science and logic as art._\n\nIt seems true that the founder of logic, Aristotle, regarded logic not\nas a science, but rather as prop\u00e6deutic to science, and not as an end in\nitself, but rather technically and heuristically as an instrument. In\nother words, logic was conceived by him rather in its application or as\nan art, than as a science, and so it continued to be regarded until the\nclose of the Middle Ages, being characterized indeed as the _ars\nartium_; for even the _logica docens_ of the Scholastics was merely the\nformulation of that body of precepts which are of practical service in\nthe syllogistic arrangement of premises, and the Port Royal Logic aims\nto furnish _l'art de penser_. This technical aspect of the science has\nclung to it down to the present day, and is no doubt a legitimate\ndescription of a part of its function. But no one would now say that\nlogic _is_ an art; rather it is a body of theory which may be\ntechnically applied. Mill, in his examination of Sir William Hamilton's\nPhilosophy (p. 391), says of logic that it \"is the art of thinking,\nwhich means of correct thinking, and the science of the conditions of\ncorrect thinking,\" and indeed, he goes so far as to say (_System of\nLogic_, Introd. \u00a7 7): \"The extension of logic as a science is determined\nby its necessities as an art.\" Strictly speaking, logic as a science is\npurely theoretical, for the function of science as such is merely to\nknow. It is an organized system of knowledge, namely, an organized\nsystem of the principles and conditions of correct thinking. But because\ncorrect thinking is an art, it does not follow that a knowledge of the\nmethods and conditions of correct thinking is art, which would be a\nglaring case of metabasis eis allo genos. The art-bearings of the\nscience are given in the normative character of its subject-matter. As a\nscience logic is descriptive and explanatory, that is, it describes and\nformulates the norms of valid thought, although as science it is not\nnormative, save in the sense that the principles formulated in it may be\nnormatively or regulatively applied, in which case they become precepts.\nWhat is principle in science becomes precept in application, and it is\nonly when technically applied that principles assume a mandatory\ncharacter. Validity is not created by logic. Logic merely investigates\nand states the conditions and criteria of validity, being in this\nreference a science of evidence. In the very fact, however, that logic\nis normative in the sense of describing and explaining the norms of\ncorrect thinking, its practical or applied character is given. Its\nprinciples as known are science; its principles as applied are art.\nThere is, therefore, no reason to sunder these two things or to call\nlogic an art merely or a science merely; for it is both when regarded\nfrom different viewpoints, although one must insist on the fact that the\nrules for practical guidance are, so far as the science is concerned,\nquite _ab extra_. Logic, ethics, and \u00e6sthetics are all commonly (and\nrightly) called normative disciplines: they are all concerned with\nvalues and standards; logic with validity and evidence, or values for\ncognition; ethics with motives and moral quality in conduct, or values\nfor volition; \u00e6sthetics with the standards of beauty, or values for\nappreciation and feeling. Yet none of them is or can be merely\nnormative, or indeed as science normative at all; if that were so, they\nwould not be bodies of organized knowledge, but bodies of rules. They\nmight be well-arranged codes of legislation on conduct, fine art, and\nevidence, but not sciences. Strictly regarded, it is the descriptive and\nexplanatory aspect of logic that constitutes its scientific character,\nwhile it is the specific normative aspect that constitutes its logical\ncharacter. Values, whether ethical or logical, without an examination\nand formulation of their ground, relations, origin, and interconnection,\nwould be merely rules of thumb, popular phrases, or pastoral precepts.\nThe actual methodology of the sciences or applied logic is logic as art.\n\n\nII. _Relation of logic to psychology._\n\nThe differentiation of logic and psychology in such way as to be of\npractical value in the discussion of the disciplines has always been a\ndifficult matter. John Stuart Mill was disposed to merge logic in\npsychology, and Hobhouse, his latest notable apologete, draws no fixed\ndistinction between psychology and logic, merely saying that they have\ndifferent centres of interest, and that their provinces overlap. Lipps,\nin his _Grundz\u00fcge der Logik_ (p. 2), goes the length of saying that\n\"Logic is a psychological discipline, as certainly as knowledge occurs\nonly in the Psyche, and thought, which is developed in knowledge, is a\npsychical event.\" Now, if we were to take such extreme ground as this,\ntheir ethics, \u00e6sthetics, and pure mathematics would become at once\nbranches of psychology and not co\u00f6rdinate disciplines with it, for\nvolitions, the feelings of appreciation, and the reasoning of pure\nmathematics are psychical events. Such a theory plainly carries us too\nfar and would involve us in confusion. That the demarcation between the\ntwo disciplines is not a chasmic cleavage, but a line, and that, too, an\nhistorically shifting line, is apparent from the foregoing historical\n_r\u00e9sum\u00e9_.\n\nThe four main phases of logical theory include: (1) the concept\n(although some logicians begin with the judgment as temporally prior in\nthe evolution of language), (2) judgment, (3) inference, (4) the\nmethodology of the sciences. The entire concern of logic is, indeed,\nwith psychical processes, but with psychical processes regarded from a\nspecific standpoint, a standpoint different from that of psychology. In\nthe first place psychology in a certain sense is much wider than logic,\nbeing concerned with the whole of psychosis as such, including the\nfeelings and will and the entire structure of cognition, whereas logic\nis concerned with the particular cognitive processes enumerated above\n(concept, judgment, inference), and that, too, merely from the point of\nview of validity and the grounds of validity. In another sense\npsychology is narrower than logic, being concerned purely with the\ndescription and explanation of a particular field of phenomena, whereas\nlogic is concerned with the procedure of all the sciences and is\npractically related to them as their formulated method. The compass and\naims of the two disciplines are different; for while psychology is in\ndifferent references both wider and narrower than logic, it is also\ndifferent in the problems it sets itself, its aim being to describe and\nexplain the phenomena of mind in the spirit of empirical science,\nwhereas the aim of logic is only to explain and establish the laws of\nevidence and standards of validity. Logic is, therefore, selective and\nparticular in the treatment of mental phenomena, whereas psychology is\nuniversal, that is, it covers the entire range of mental processes as a\nphenomenalistic science; logic dealing with definite elements as a\nnormative science. By this it is not meant that the territory of\njudgment and inference should be delivered from the psychologist into\nthe care of the logician; through such a division of labor both\ndisciplines would suffer. The two disciplines handle to some extent the\nsame subjects, so far as names are concerned; but the essence of the\nlogical problem is not touched by psychology, and should not be mixed up\nwith it, to the confusion and detriment of both disciplines. The field\nof psychology, as we have said, is the whole of psychical phenomena; the\naim of individual psychology in the investigation of its field is: (1)\nto give a genetic account of cognition, feeling, and will, or whatever\nbe the elements into which consciousness is analyzed; (2) to explain\ntheir interconnections causally; (3) as a chemistry of mental life to\nanalyze its complexes into their simplest elements; (4) to explain the\ntotality structurally (or functionally) out of the elements; (5) to\ncarry on its investigation and set forth its results as a purely\nempirical science; (6) psychology makes no attempt to evaluate the\nprocesses of mind either in terms of false and true, or good and bad.\nFrom this description of the field and function of psychology, based on\nthe expressions of its modern exponents, it will be found impossible to\nshelter logic under it as a subordinate discipline. If one were to\nenlarge the scope of psychology to mean rational psychology, in the\nsense which Professor Howison advocates (_Psychological Review_, vol.\niii, p. 652), such a subordination might be possible, but it would\nentail the loss of all that the new psychology has gained by the sharper\ndelimitation of its sphere and problems, and would carry us back to the\nposition of Mill, who appears to identify psychology with philosophy at\nlarge and with metaphysics.\n\nIn contradistinction to the aims of psychology as described in the\nforegoing, the sphere and problems of logic may be summarily\ncharacterized as follows: (1) All concepts and judgments are\npsychological complexes and processes and may be genetically and\nstructurally described; that is the business of psychology. They also\nhave a meaning value, or objective reference, that is, they may be\ncorrect or incorrect, congruous or incongruous with reality. The\nmeaning, aspect of thought, or its content as truth is the business of\nlogic. This subject-matter is got by regarding a single aspect in the\ntotal psychological complex. (2) Its aim is not to describe factual\nthought or the whole of thought, or the natural processes of thought,\nbut only certain ideals of thinking, namely, the norms of correct\nthinking. Its object is not a datum, but an ideal. (3) While psychology\nis concerned with the natural history of reasoning, logic is concerned\nwith the warrants of inferential reasoning. In the terminology of\nHamilton it is the nomology of discursive thought. To use an often\nemployed analogy, psychology is the physics of thought, logic an ethics\nof thought. (4) Logic implies an epistemology or theory of cognition in\nso far as epistemology discusses the concept and judgment and their\nrelations to the real world, and here is to be found its closest\nconnection with psychology. A purely formal logic, which is concerned\nmerely with the internal order of knowledge and does not undertake to\nshow how the laws of thought originate, why they hold good as the\nmeasures of evidence, or in what way they are applicable to concrete\nreality, would be as barren as scholasticism. (5) While logic thus goes\nback to epistemology for its bases and for the theoretical determination\nof the interrelation of knowledge and truth, it goes forward in its\napplication to the practical service of the sciences as their\nmethodology. Apart of its subject-matter is therefore the actual\nprocedure of the sciences, which it attempts to organize into systematic\nstatements as principles and formul\u00e6. This body of rules given\nimplicitly or explicitly in the workings and structure of the special\nsciences, consisting in classification, analysis, experiment, induction,\ndeduction, nomenclature, etc., logic regards as a concrete deposit of\ninferential experience. It abstracts these principles from the content\nand method of the sciences, describes and explains them, erects them\ninto a systematic methodology, and so creates the practical branch of\nreal logic. Formal logic, therefore, according to the foregoing account,\nwould embrace the questions of the internal congruity and\nself-consistency of thought and the schematic arrangement of judgments\nto insure formally valid conclusions; real logic would embrace the\nepistemological questions of how knowledge is related to reality, and\nhow it is built up out of experience, on the one hand, and the\nmethodological procedure of science, on the other. The importance of\nmathematical logic seems to be mainly in the facilitation of logical\nexpression through symbols. It is rather with the machinery of the\nscience than with its content and real problem that the logical\nalgorithm or calculus is concerned. In these condensed paragraphs\nsufficient has been said, I think, to show that logic and psychology\nshould be regarded as co\u00f6rdinate disciplines; for their aims and\nsubject-matter differ too widely to subordinate the former under the\nlatter without confusion to both.\n\nI wish now to add a brief note on the relation of logic to another\ndiscipline.\n\n\nIII. _Relation of logic to metaphysics._\n\nAs currently expounded, logic either abuts immediately on the territory\nof metaphysics at certain points or is entirely absorbed in it as an\nintegral part of the metaphysical subject-matter. I regard the former\nview as not only the more tenable theoretically, but as practically\nadvantageous for working purposes, and necessary for an intelligible\nclassification of the philosophical disciplines. The business of\nmetaphysics, as I understand it, is with the nature of reality; logic is\nconcerned with the nature of validity, or with the relations of the\nelements of thought within themselves (self-consistency) and with the\nrelations of thought to its object (real truth), but not with the nature\nof the objective world or reality as such. Further, metaphysics is\nconcerned with the unification of the totality of knowledge in the form\nof a scientific cosmology; logic is concerned merely with the\ninferential and methodological processes whereby this result is reached.\nThe former is a science of content; the latter is a science of procedure\nand relations. Now, inasmuch as procedure and relations apply to some\nreality and differ with different forms of reality, logic necessitates\nin its implications a theory of being, but such implications are in no\nwise to be identified with its subject-matter or with its own proper\nproblems. Their consideration falls within the sphere of metaphysics or\na broadly conceived epistemology, whose business it is to solve the\nultimate questions of subject and object, thought and thing, mind and\nmatter, that are implied and pointed to rather than formulated by logic.\nInasmuch as the logical judgment says something about something, the\nscientific impulse drives us to investigate what the latter something\nultimately is; but this is not necessary for logic, nor is it one of\nlogic's legitimate problems, any more than it is the proper business of\nthe physicist to investigate the mental implications of his scientific\njudgments and hypotheses or the ultimate nature of the theorizing and\nperceiving mind, or of causality to his world of matter and motion,\nalthough a general scientific interest may drive him to seek a solution\nof these ultimate metaphysical problems. Scientifically the end of logic\nand of every discipline is in itself; it is a territorial unity, and its\ngovernment is administered with a unitary aim. Logic is purely a science\nof evidential values, not a science of content (in the meaning of\nparticular reality, as in the special sciences, or of ultimate reality,\nas in metaphysics); its sole aim and purpose, as I conceive it, is to\nformulate the laws and grounds of evidence, the principles of method,\nand the conditions and forms of inferential thinking. When it has done\nthis, it has, as a single science, done its whole work. When one looks\nat the present tendencies of logical theory, one is inclined to believe\nthat the discipline is in danger of becoming an \"_Allerleiwissenschaft_,\"\nwhose vast undefined territory is the land of \"_Weissnichtwo_.\" The\nstrict delimitation of the field and problems of science is demanded in\nthe interest of a serviceable division of scientific labor and in the\ninterest of an intelligible classification of the accumulated products\nof research.\n\n\n\n\nTHE FIELD OF LOGIC\n\nBY FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE\n\n [Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, Johnsonian Professor of\n Philosophy in Columbia University, New York, N. Y., since\n 1902. b. Windsor, Ontario, Canada, March 26, 1867. A.B.\n Amherst College, 1889; Union Theological Seminary, 1892;\n A.M. 1898, LL.D. 1903, Amherst College. Post-grad. Berlin\n University. Instructor in Philosophy, University of\n Minnesota, 1894-95; Professor of Philosophy and head of\n department, 1895-1902. Member of American Association for\n the Advancement of Science, American Philosophical\n Association, American Psychological Association. Editor of\n the _Journal of Philosophy_, _Psychology and Scientific\n Methods_.]\n\n\nCurrent tendencies in logical theory make a determination of the field\nof logic fundamental to any statement of the general problems of the\nscience. In view of this fact, I propose in this paper to attempt such a\ndetermination by a general discussion of the relation of logic to\nmathematics, psychology, and biology, especially noting in connection\nwith biology the tendency known as pragmatism. In conclusion, I shall\nindicate what the resulting general problems appear to be.\n\n\nI\n\nThere may appear, at first, little to distinguish mathematics in its\nmost abstract, formal, and symbolic type from logic. Indeed, mathematics\nas the universal method of all knowledge has been the ideal of many\nphilosophers, and its right to be such has been claimed of late with\nrenewed force. The recent notable advances in the science have done much\nto make this claim plausible. A logician, a non-mathematical one, might\nbe tempted to say that, in so far as mathematics is the method of\nthought in general, it has ceased to be mathematics; but, I suppose, one\nought not to quarrel too much with a definition, but should let\nmathematics mean knowledge simply, if the mathematicians wish it. I\nshall not, therefore, enter the controversy regarding the proper limits\nof mathematical inquiry. I wish to note, however, a tendency in the\nidentification of logic and mathematics which seems to me to be\ninconsistent with the real significance of knowledge. I refer to the\nexaltation of the freedom of thought in the construction of conceptions,\ndefinitions, and hypotheses.\n\nThe assertion that mathematics is a \"pure\" science is often taken to\nmean that it is in no way dependent on experience in the construction of\nits basal concepts. The space with which geometry deals may be Euclidean\nor not, as we please; it may be the real space of experience or not; the\nproperties of it and the conclusions reached about it may hold in the\nreal world or they may not; for the mind is free to construct its\nconception and definition of space in accordance with its own aims.\nWhether geometry is to be ultimately a science of this type must be\nleft, I suppose, for the mathematicians to decide. A logician may\nsuggest, however, that the propriety of calling all these conceptions\n\"space\" is not as clear as it ought to be. Still further, there seems to\nunderlie all arbitrary spaces, as their foundation, a good deal of the\nsolid material of empirical knowledge, gained by human beings through\ncontact with an environing world, the environing character of which\nseems to be quite independent of the freedom of their thought. However\nthat may be, it is evident, I think, that the generalization of the\nprinciple involved in this idea of the freedom of thought in framing its\nconception of space, would, if extended to logic, give us a science of\nknowledge which would have no necessary relation to the real things of\nexperience, although these are the things with which all concrete\nknowledge is most evidently concerned. It would inform us about the\nconclusions which necessarily follow from accepted conceptions, but it\ncould not inform us in any way about the real truth of these\nconclusions. It would, thus, always leave a gap between our knowledge\nand its objects which logic itself would be quite impotent to close.\nTruth would thus become an entirely extra-logical matter. So far as the\nscience of knowledge is concerned, it would be an accident if knowledge\nfitted the world to which it refers. Such a conception of the science of\nknowledge is not the property of a few mathematicians exclusively,\nalthough they have, perhaps, done more than others to give it its\npresent revived vitality. It is the classic doctrine that logic is the\nscience of thought as thought, meaning thereby thought in independence\nof any specific object whatever.\n\nIn regard to this doctrine, I would not even admit that such a science\nof knowledge is possible. You cannot, by a process of generalization or\nfree construction, rid thought of connection with objects; and there is\nno such thing as a general content or as content-in-general.\nGeneralization simply reduces the richness of content and, consequently,\nof implication. It deals with concrete subject-matter as much and as\ndirectly as if the content were individual and specialized. \"Things\nequal to the same thing are equal to each other,\" is a truth, not about\nthought, but about things. The conclusions about a fourth dimension\nfollow, not from the fact that we have thought of one, but from the\nconception about it which we have framed. Neither generalization nor\nfree construction can reveal the operations of thought in transcendental\nindependence.\n\nIt may be urged, however, that nothing of this sort was ever claimed.\nThe bondage of thought to content must be admitted, but generalization\nand free construction, just because they give us the power to vary\nconditions as we please, give us thinking in a relative independence of\ncontent, and thus show us how thought operates irrespective of, although\nnot independent of, its content. The binomial theorem operates\nirrespective of the values substituted for its symbols. But I can find\nno gain in this restatement of the position. It is true, in a sense,\nthat we may determine the way thought operates irrespective of any\nspecific content by the processes of generalization and free\nconstruction; but it is important to know in what sense. Can we claim\nthat such irrespective operation means that we have discovered certain\nlogical constants, which now stand out as the distinctive tools of\nthought? Or does it rather mean that this process of varying the content\nof thought as we please reveals certain real constants, certain ultimate\ncharacters of reality, which no amount of generalization or free\nconstruction can possibly alter? The second alternative seems to me to\nbe the correct one. Whether it is or not may be left here undecided.\nWhat I wish to emphasize is the fact that the decision is one of the\nthings of vital interest for logic, and properly belongs in that\nscience. Clearly, we can never know the significance of ultimate\nconstants for our thinking until we know what their real character is.\nTo determine that character we must most certainly pass out of the realm\nof generalization and free construction; logic must become other than\nsimply mathematical or symbolic.\n\nThere is another sense in which the determination of the operations of\nthought irrespective of its specific content is interpreted in\nconnection with the exaltation of generalization and free construction.\nKnowledge, it is said, is solely a matter of implication, and logic,\ntherefore, is the science of implication simply. If this is so, it would\nappear possible to develop the whole doctrine of implication by the use\nof symbols, and thus free the doctrine from dependence on the question\nas to how far these symbols are themselves related to the real things of\nthe world. If, for instance, _a_ implies _b_, then, if _a_ is true, _b_\nis true, and this quite irrespective of the real truth of _a_ or _b_. It\nis to be urged, however, in opposition to this view, that knowledge is\nconcerned ultimately only with the real truth of _a_ and _b_, and that\nthe implication is of no significance whatever apart from this truth.\nThere is no virtue in the mere implication. Still further, the\nsupposition that there can be a doctrine of implication, simply, seems\nto be based on a misconception. For even so-called formal implication\ngets its significance only on the supposed truth of the terms with which\nit deals. We suppose that _a_ _does_ imply _b_, and that _a_ _is_ true.\nIn other words, we can state this law of implication only as we first\nhave valid instances of it given in specific, concrete cases. The law is\na generalization and nothing more. The formal statement gives only an\napparent freedom from experience. Moreover, there is no reason for\nsaying that _a_ implies _b_ unless it does so either really or by\nsupposition. If _a_ really implies _b_, then the implication is clearly\nnot a matter of thinking it; and to suppose the implication is to feign\na reality, the implications of which are equally free from the processes\nby which they are thought. Ultimately, therefore, logic must take\naccount of real implications. We cannot avoid this through the use of a\nsymbolism which virtually implies them. Implication can have a logical\ncharacter only because it has first a metaphysical one.\n\nThe supposition underlying the conception of logic I have been examining\nis, itself, open to doubt and seriously questioned. That supposition was\nthe so-called freedom of thought. The argument has already shown that\nthere is certainly a very definite limit to this freedom, even when\nlogic is conceived in a very abstract and formal way. The processes of\nknowledge are bound up with their contents, and have their character\nlargely determined thereby. When, moreover, we view knowledge in its\ngenesis, when we take into consideration the contributions which\npsychology and biology have made to our general view of what knowledge\nis, we seem forced to conclude that the conceptions which we frame are\nvery far from being our own free creations. They have, on the contrary,\nbeen laboriously worked out through the same processes of successful\nadaptation which have resulted in other products. Knowledge has grown up\nin connection with the unfolding processes of reality, and has, by no\nmeans, freely played over its surface. That is why even the most\nabstract of all mathematics is yet grounded in the evolution of human\nexperience.\n\nIn the remaining parts of this paper, I shall discuss further the claims\nof psychology and biology. The conclusion I would draw here is that the\nfield of logic cannot be restricted to a realm where the operations of\nthought are supposed to move freely, independent or irrespective of\ntheir contents and the objects of a real world; and that mathematics,\ninstead of giving us any support for the supposition that it can,\ncarries us, by the processes of symbolization and formal implication, to\nrecognize that logic must ultimately find its field where implications\nare real, independent of the processes by which they are thought, and\nirrespective of the conceptions we choose to frame.\n\n\nII\n\nThe processes involved in the acquisition and systematization of\nknowledge may, undoubtedly, be regarded as mental processes and fall\nthus within the province of psychology. It may be claimed, therefore,\nthat every logical process is also a psychological one. The important\nquestion is, however, is it nothing more? Do its logical and\npsychological characters simply coincide? Or, to put the question in\nstill another form, as a psychological process simply, does it also\nserve as a logical one? The answers to these questions can be determined\nonly by first noting what psychology can say about it as a mental\nprocess.\n\nIn the first place, psychology can analyze it, and so determine its\nelements and their connections. It can thus distinguish it from all\nother mental processes by pointing out its unique elements or their\nunique and characteristic connection. No one will deny that a judgment\nis different from an emotion, or that an act of reasoning is different\nfrom a volition; and no one will claim that these differences are\nentirely beyond the psychologist's power to ascertain accurately and\nprecisely. Still further, it appears possible for him to determine with\nthe same accuracy and precision the distinction in content and\nconnection between processes which are true and those which are false.\nFor, as mental processes, it is natural to suppose that they contain\ndistinct differences of character which are ascertainable. The states of\nmind called belief, certainty, conviction, correctness, truth, are thus,\ndoubtless, all distinguishable as mental states. It may be admitted,\ntherefore, that there can be a thoroughgoing psychology of logical\nprocesses.\n\nYet it is quite evident to me that the characterization of a mental\nprocess as logical is not a psychological characterization. In fact, I\nthink it may be claimed that the characterization of any mental process\nin a specific way, say as an emotion, is extra-psychological. Judgments\nand inferences are, in short, not judgments and inferences because they\nadmit of psychological analysis and explanation, any more than space is\nspace because the perception of it can be worked out by genetic\npsychology. In other words, knowledge is first _knowledge_, and only\nlater a set of processes for psychological analysis. That is why, as it\nseems to me, all psychological logicians, from Locke to our own day,\nhave signally failed in dealing with the problem of knowledge. The\nattempt to construct knowledge out of mental states, the relations\nbetween ideas, and the relation of ideas to things, has been, as I read\nthe history, decidedly without profit. Confusion and divergent opinion\nhave resulted instead of agreement and confidence. On precisely the same\npsychological foundation, we have such divergent views of knowledge as\nidealism, phenomenalism, and agnosticism, with many other strange\nmixtures of logic, psychology, and metaphysics. The lesson of these\nperplexing theories seems to be that logic, as logic, must be divorced\nfrom psychology.\n\nIt is also of importance to note, in this connection, that the\ndetermination of a process as mental and as thus falling within the\ndomain of psychology strictly, has by no means been worked out to the\ngeneral satisfaction of psychologists themselves. Recent literature\nabounds in elaborate discussion of the distinction between what is a\nmental fact and what not, with a prevailing tendency to draw the\nremarkable conclusion that all facts are somehow mental or experienced\nfacts. The situation would be worse for psychology than it is, if that\nvigorous science had not learned from other sciences the valuable knack\nof isolating concrete problems and attacking them directly, without the\nburden of previous logical or metaphysical speculation. Thus knowledge,\nwhich is the peculiar province of logic, is increased, while we wait for\nthe acceptable definition of a mental fact. But definitions, be it\nremembered, are themselves logical matters. Indeed, some psychologists\nhave gone so far as to claim that the distinction of a fact as mental is\na purely logical distinction. This is significant as indicating that the\ntime has not yet come for the identification of logic and psychology.\n\nIn refreshingly sharp contrast to the vagueness and uncertainty which\nbeset the definition of a mental fact are the palpable concreteness and\ndefiniteness of knowledge itself. Every science, even history and\nphilosophy, are instances of it. What constitutes a knowledge ought to\nbe as definite and precise a question as could be asked. That logic has\nmade no more progress than it has in the answer to it appears to be due\nto the fact that it has not sufficiently grasped the significance of its\nown simplicity. Knowledge has been the important business of thinking\nman, and he ought to be able to tell what he does in order to know, as\nreadily as he tells what he does in order to build a house. And that is\nwhy the Aristotelian logic has held its own so long. In that logic, \"the\nmaster of them that know\" simply rehearsed the way he had systematized\nhis own stores of knowledge. Naturally we, so far as we have followed\nhis methods, have had practically nothing to add. In our efforts to\nimprove on him, we have too often left the right way and followed the\nimpossible method inaugurated by Locke. Had we examined with greater\npersistence our own methods of making science, we should have profited\nmore. The introduction of psychology, instead of helping the situation,\nonly confuses it.\n\nLet it be granted, however, in spite of the vagueness of what is meant\nby a mental fact, that logical processes are also mental processes. This\nfact has, as I have already suggested, an important bearing on their\ngenesis, and sets very definite limits to the freedom of thought in\ncreating. It is not, however, as mental processes that they have the\nvalue of knowledge. A mental process which is knowledge purports to be\nconnected with something other than itself, something which may not be a\nmental process at all. This connection should be investigated, but the\ninvestigation of it belongs, not to psychology, but to logic.\n\nI am well aware that this conclusion runs counter to some metaphysical\ndoctrines, and especially to idealism in all its forms, with the\nepistemologies based thereon. It is, of course, impossible here to\ndefend my position by an elaborate analysis of these metaphysical\nsystems. But I will say this. I am in entire agreement with idealism in\nits claim that questions of knowledge and of the nature of reality\ncannot ultimately be separated, because we can know reality only as we\nknow it. But the general question as to how we know reality can still be\nraised. By this I do not mean the question, how is it possible for us to\nhave knowledge at all, or how it is possible for reality to be known at\nall, but how, as a matter of fact, we actually do know it? That we\nreally do know it, I would most emphatically claim. Still further, I\nwould claim that what we know about it is determined, not by the fact\nthat we can know in general, but by the way reality, as distinct from\nour knowledge, has determined. These ways appear to me to be\nascertainable, and form, thus, undoubtedly, a section of metaphysics.\nBut the metaphysics will naturally be realistic rather than idealistic.\n\n\nIII\n\nJust as logical processes may be regarded as, at the same time,\npsychological processes, so they may be regarded, with equal right, as\nvital processes, coming thus under the categories of evolution. The\ntendency so to regard them is very marked at the present day, especially\nin France and in this country. In France, the movement has perhaps\nreceived the clearer definition. In America the union of logic and\nbiology is complicated--and at times even lost sight of--by emphasis on\nthe idea of evolution generally. It is not my intention to trace the\nhistory of this movement, but I should like to call attention to its\nhistoric motive in order to get it in a clear light.\n\nThat the theory of evolution, even Darwinism itself, has radically\ntransformed our historical, scientific, and philosophical methods, is\nquite evident. Add to this the influence of the Hegelian philosophy,\nwith its own doctrine of development, and one finds the causes of the\nrather striking unanimity which is discoverable in many ways between\nHegelian idealists, on the one hand, and philosophers of evolution of\nSpencer's type, on the other. Although two men would, perhaps, not\nappear more radically different at first sight than Hegel and Spencer, I\nam inclined to believe that we shall come to recognize more and more in\nthem an identity of philosophical conception. The pragmatism of the day\nis a striking confirmation of this opinion, for it is often the\nexpression of Hegelian ideas in Darwinian and Spencerian terminology.\nThe claims of idealism and of evolutionary science and philosophy have\nthus sought reconciliation. Logic has been, naturally, the last of the\nsciences to yield to evolutionary and genetic treatment. It could not\nescape long, especially when the idea of evolution had been so\nsuccessful in its handling of ethics. If morality can be brought under\nthe categories of evolution, why not thinking also? In answer to that\nquestion we have the theory that thinking is an adaptation, judgment is\ninstrumental. But I would not leave the impression that this is true of\npragmatism alone, or that it has been developed only through pragmatic\ntendencies. It is naturally the result also of the extension of\nbiological philosophy. In the biological conception of logic, we have,\nthen, an interesting coincidence in the results of tendencies differing\nwidely in their genesis.\n\nIt would be hazardous to deny, without any qualifications, the\nimportance of genetic considerations. Indeed, the fact that evolution in\nthe hands of a thinker like Huxley, for instance, should make\nconsciousness and thinking apparently useless epiphenomena, in a\ndeveloping world, has seemed like a most contradictory evolutionary\nphilosophy. It was difficult to make consciousness a real function in\ndevelopment so long as it was regarded as only cognitive in character.\nEvolutionary philosophy, coupled with physics, had built up a sort of\nclosed system with which consciousness could not interfere, but which it\ncould know, and know with all the assurance of a traditional logic. If,\nhowever, we were to be consistent evolutionists, we could not abide by\nsuch a remarkable result. The whole process of thinking must be brought\nwithin evolution, so that knowledge, even the knowledge of the\nevolutionary hypothesis itself, must appear as an instance of\nadaptation. In order to do this, however, consciousness must not be\nconceived as only cognitive. Judgment, the core of logical processes,\nmust be regarded as an instrument and as a mode of adaptation.\n\nThe desire for completeness and consistency in an evolutionary\nphilosophy is not the only thing which makes the denial of genetic\nconsiderations hazardous. Strictly biological considerations furnish\nreasons of equal weight for caution. For instance, one will hardly deny\nthat the whole sensory apparatus is a striking instance of adaptation.\nOur perceptions of the world would thus appear to be determined by this\nadaptation, to be instances of adjustment. They might conceivably have\nbeen different, and in the case of many other creatures, the perceptions\nof the world are undoubtedly different. All our logical processes,\nreferring ultimately as they do to our perceptions, would thus appear\nfinally to depend on the adaptation exhibited in the development of our\nsensory apparatus. So-called laws of thought would seem to be but\nabstract statements or formulations of the results of this adjustment.\nIt would be absurd to suppose that a man thinks in a sense radically\ndifferent from that in which he digests, or a flower blossoms, or that\ntwo and two are four in a sense radically different from that in which a\nflower has a given number of petals. Thinking, like digesting and\nblossoming, is an effect, a product, possibly a structure.\n\nI am not at all interested in denying the force of these considerations.\nThey have, to my mind, the greatest importance, and due weight has, as\nyet, not been given to them. To one at all committed to a unitary and\nevolutionary view of the world, it must indeed seem strange if thinking\nitself should not be the result of evolution, or that, in thinking,\nparts of the world had not become adjusted in a new way. But while I am\nready to admit this, I am by no means ready to admit some of the\nconclusions for logic and metaphysics which are often drawn from the\nadmission. Just because thought, as a product of evolution, is\nfunctional and judgment instrumental, it by no means follows that logic\nis but a branch of biology, or that knowledge of the world is but a\ntemporary adjustment, which, as knowledge, might have been radically\ndifferent. In these conclusions, often drawn with Protagorean assurance,\ntwo considerations of crucial importance seem to be overlooked, first,\nthat adaptation is itself metaphysical in character, and secondly, that\nwhile knowledge may be functional and judgment instrumental, the\ncharacter of the functioning has the character of knowledge, which sets\nit off sharply from all other functions.\n\nIt seems strange to me that the admission that knowledge is a matter of\nadaptation, and thus a relative matter, should, in these days, be\nregarded as in any way destroying the claims of knowledge to\nmetaphysical certainty. Yet, somehow, the opinion widely prevails that\nthe doctrine of relativity necessarily involves the surrender of\nanything like absolute truth. \"All our knowledge is relative, and,\ntherefore, only partial, incomplete, and but practically trustworthy,\"\nis a statement repeatedly made. The fact that, if our development had\nbeen different, our knowledge would have been different, is taken to\ninvolve the conclusion that our knowledge cannot possibly disclose the\nreal constitution of things, that it is essentially conditional, that it\nis only a mental device for getting results, that any other system of\nknowledge which would get results equally well would be equally true; in\nshort, that there can be no such thing as metaphysical or\nepistemological truth. These conclusions do indeed seem strange, and\nespecially strange on the basis of evolution. For while the evolutionary\nprocess might, conceivably, have been different, its results are, in any\ncase, the results of the process. They are not arbitrary. We might have\ndigested without stomachs, but the fact that we use stomachs in this\nimportant process ought not to free us from metaphysical respect for the\norgan. As M. Rey suggests, in the _Revue Philosophique_ for June, 1904,\na creature without the sense of smell would have no geometry, but that\ndoes not make geometry essentially hypothetical, a mere mental\nconstruction; for we have geometry because of the working out of\nnature's laws. Indeed, instead of issuing in a relativistic metaphysics\nof knowledge, the doctrine of relativity should issue in the recognition\nof the finality of knowledge in every case of ascertainably complete\nadaptation. In other words, adaptation is itself metaphysical in\ncharacter. Adjustment is always adjustment between things, and yields\nonly what it does yield. The things or elements get into the state which\nis their adjustment, and this adjustment purports to be their actual and\nunequivocal ordering in relation to one another. Different conditions\nmight have produced a different ordering, but, again, this ordering\nwould be equally actual and unequivocal, equally the _one_ ordering to\nissue from them. To suppose or admit that the course of events might\nhave been and might be different is not at all to suppose or admit that\nit was or is different; it is, rather, to suppose and admit that we have\nreal knowledge of what that course really was and is. This seems to be\nvery obvious.\n\nYet the evolutionist often thinks that he is not a metaphysician, even\nwhen he brings all his conceptions systematically under the conception\nof evolution. This must be due to some temporary lack of clearness. If\nevolution is not a metaphysical doctrine when extended to apply to all\nscience, all morality, all logic, in short, all things, then it is quite\nmeaningless for evolutionists to pronounce a metaphysical sentence on\nlogical processes. But if evolution is a metaphysics, then its sentence\nis metaphysical, and in every case of adjustment or adaptation we have a\nrevelation of the nature of reality in a definite and unequivocal form.\nThis conclusion applies to logical processes as well as to others. The\nrecognition that they are vital processes can, therefore, have little\nsignificance for these processes in their distinctive character as\nlogical. They are like all other vital processes in that they are vital\nand subject to evolution. They are unlike all others in that thought is\nunlike digestion or breathing. To regard logical processes as vital\nprocesses does not in any way, therefore, invalidate them as logical\nprocesses or make it superfluous to consider their claim to give us real\nknowledge of a real world. Indeed, it makes such a consideration more\nnecessary and important.\n\nA second consideration overlooked by the Protagorean tendencies of the\nday is that judgment, even if it is instrumental, purports to give us\nknowledge, that is, it claims to reveal what is independent of the\njudging process. Perhaps I ought not to say that this consideration is\noverlooked, but rather that it is denied significance. It is even denied\nto be essential to judgment. It is claimed that, instead of revealing\nanything independent of the judging process, judgment is just the\nadjustment and no more. It is a reorganization of experience, an attempt\nat control. All this looks to me like a misstatement of the facts.\nJudgment _claims_ to be no such thing. It does not function as such a\nthing. When I make any judgment, even the simplest, I may make it as the\nresult of tension, because of a demand for reorganization, in order to\nsecure control of experience; but the judgment _means_ for me something\nquite different. It means decidedly and unequivocally that in reality,\napart from the judging process, things exist and operate just as the\njudgment declares. If it is claimed that this meaning is illusory, I\neagerly desire to know on what solid ground its illusoriness can be\nestablished. When the conclusion was reached that gravitation varies\ndirectly as the mass and inversely as the square of the distance, it was\ndoubtless reached in an evolutionary and pragmatic way; but it claimed\nto disclose a fact which prevailed before the conclusion was reached,\nand in spite of the conclusion. Knowledge has been born of the travail\nof living, but it has been born as knowledge.\n\nWhen the knowledge character of judgment is insisted on, it seems almost\nincredible that any one would think of denying or overlooking it.\nIndeed, current discussions are far from clear on the subject.\nPragmatists are constantly denying that they hold the conclusions that\ntheir critics almost unanimously draw. There is, therefore, a good deal\nof confusion of thought yet to be dispelled. Yet there seems to be\ncurrent a pronounced determination to banish the epistemological problem\nfrom logic. This is, to my mind, suspicious, even when epistemology is\ndefined in a way which most epistemologists would not approve. It is\nsuspicious just because we must always ask eventually that most\nepistemological and metaphysical question: \"Is knowledge true?\" To\nanswer, it is true when it functions in a way to satisfy the needs which\ngenerated its activity, is, no doubt, correct, but it is by no means\nadequate. The same answer can be made to the inquiry after the\nefficiency of any vital process whatever, and is, therefore, not\ndistinctive. We have still to inquire into the specific character of the\nneeds which originate judgments and of the consequent satisfaction. Just\nhere is where the uniqueness of the logical problem is disclosed. With\nconscious beings, the success of the things they do has become\nincreasingly dependent on their ability to discover what takes place in\nindependence of the knowing process. That is the need which generates\njudgment. The satisfaction is, of course, the attainment of the\ndiscovery. Now to make the judgment itself and not the consequent action\nthe instrumental factor seems to me to misstate the facts of the case.\nNothing is clearer than that there is no necessity for knowledge to\nissue in adjustment. And it is clear to me that increased control of\nexperience, while resulting from knowledge, does not give to it its\ncharacter. Omniscience could idly view the transformations of reality\nand yet remain omniscient. Knowledge works, but it is not, therefore,\nknowledge.\n\nThese considerations have peculiar force when applied to that branch of\nknowledge which is knowledge itself. Is the biological account of\nknowledge correct? That question we must evidently ask, especially when\nwe are urged to accept the account. Can we, to put the question in its\nmost general form, accept as an adequate account of the logical process\na theory which is bound up with some other specific department of human\nknowledge? It seems to me that we cannot. Here we must be\nepistemologists and metaphysicians, or give up the problem entirely.\nThis by no means involves the attempt to conceive pure thought set over\nagainst pure reality--the kind of epistemology and metaphysics justly\nridiculed by the pragmatist--for knowledge, as already stated, is given\nto us in concrete instances. How knowledge in general is possible is,\ntherefore, as useless and meaningless a question as how reality in\ngeneral is possible. The knowledge is given as a fact of life, and what\nwe have to determine is not its non-logical antecedents or its practical\nconsequences, but its constitution as knowledge and its validity. It may\nbe admitted that the question of validity is settled pragmatically. No\nknowledge is true unless it yields results which can be verified, unless\nit _can_ issue in increased control of experience. But I insist again\nthat that fact is not sufficient for an account of what knowledge claims\nto be. It claims to issue in control because it is true in independence\nof the control. And it is just this assurance that is needed to\ndistinguish knowledge from what is not knowledge. It is the necessity of\nexhibiting this assurance which makes it impossible to subordinate\nlogical problems, and forces us at last to questions of epistemology and\nmetaphysics.\n\nAs I am interested here primarily in determining the field of logic, it\nis somewhat outside my province to consider the details of logical\ntheory. Yet the point just raised is of so much importance in connection\nwith the main question that I venture the following general\nconsiderations. This is, perhaps, the more necessary because the\npragmatic doctrine finds in the concession made regarding the test of\nvalidity one of its strongest defenses.\n\nOf course a judgment is not true simply because it is a judgment. It may\nbe false. The only way to settle its validity is to discover whether\nexperience actually provides what the judgment promises, that is,\nwhether the conclusions drawn from it really enable us to control\nexperience. No mere speculation will yield the desired result, no matter\nwith how much formal validity the conclusions may be drawn. That merely\nformal validity is not the essential thing, I have pointed out in\ndiscussing the relation of logic to mathematics. The test of truth is\npragmatic. It is apparent, therefore, that the formal validity does not\ndetermine the actual validity. What is this but the statement that the\nprocess of judgment is not itself the determining factor in its real\nvalidity? It is, in short, only valid judgments that can really give us\ncontrol of experience. The implications taken up in the judgment must,\ntherefore, be real implications which, as such, have nothing to do with\nthe judging process, and which, most certainly, are not brought about by\nit. And what is this but the claim that judgment as such is never\ninstrumental? In other words, a judgment which effected its own content\nwould only by the merest accident function as valid knowledge. We have\nvalid knowledge, then, only when the implications of the judgment are\nfound to be independent of the judging process. We have knowledge only\nat the risk of error. The pragmatic test of validity, instead of proving\nthe instrumental character of judgment, would thus appear to prove just\nthe reverse.\n\nValid knowledge has, therefore, for its content a system of real, not\njudged or hypothetical implications. The central problem of logic which\nresults from this fact is not how a knowledge of real implications is\nthen possible, but what are the ascertainable types of real\nimplications. But, it may be urged, we need some criterion to determine\nwhat a real implication is. I venture to reply that we need none, if by\nsuch is meant anything else than the facts with which we are dealing. I\nneed no other criterion than the circle to determine whether its\ndiameters are really equal. And, in general, I need no other criterion\nthan the facts dealt with to determine whether they really imply what I\njudge them to imply. Logic appears to me to be really as simple as this.\nYet there can be profound problems involved in the working out of this\nsimple procedure. There is the problem already stated of the most\ngeneral types of real implication, or, in other words, the time-honored\ndoctrine of categories. Whether there are categories or basal types of\nexistence seems to me to be ascertainable. When ascertained, it is also\npossible to discover the types of inference or implication which they\nafford. This is by no means the whole of logic, but it appears to me to\nbe its central problem.\n\nThese considerations will, I hope, throw light on the statement that\nwhile knowledge works, it is not therefore knowledge. It works because\nits content existed before its discovery by the knowledge process, and\nbecause its content was not effected or brought about by that process.\nJudgment was the instrument of its discovery, not the instrument which\nfashioned it. While, therefore, willing to admit that logical processes\nare vital processes, I am not willing to admit that the problem of logic\nis radically changed thereby in its formulation or solution, for the\nvital processes in question have the unique character of knowledge, the\ncontent of which is what it claims to be, a system of real implications\nwhich existed prior to its discovery.\n\nIn the psychological and biological tendencies in logic, there is,\nhowever, I think, a distinct gain for logical theory. The insistence\nthat logical processes are both mental and vital has done much to take\nthem out of the transcendental aloofness from reality in which they have\noften been placed, especially since Kant. So long as thought and object\nwere so separated that they could never be brought together, and so long\nas logical processes were conceived wholly in terms of ideas set over\nagainst objects, there was no hope of escape from the realm of pure\nhypothesis and conjecture. Locke's axiom that \"the mind, in all its\nthoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own\nideas,\" an axiom which Kant did so much to sanctify, and which has been\nthe basal principle of the greater part of modern logic and metaphysics,\nis most certainly subversive of logical theory. The transition from\nideas to anything else is rendered impossible by it. Now it is just this\naxiom which the biological tendencies in logic have done so much to\ndestroy. They have insisted, with the greatest right, that logical\nprocesses are not set over against their content as idea against object,\nas appearance against reality, but are processes of reality itself. Just\nas reality can and does function in a physical or a physiological way,\nso also it functions in a logical way. The state we call knowledge\nbecomes, thus, as much a part of the system of things as the state we\ncall chemical combination. The problem how thought can know anything\nbecomes, therefore, as irrelevant as the problem how elements can\ncombine at all. The recognition of this is a great gain, and the promise\nof it most fruitful for both logic and metaphysics.\n\nBut, as I have tried to point out, all this surrendering of pure thought\nas opposed to pure reality, does not at all necessitate our regarding\njudgment as a process which makes reality different from what it was\nbefore. Of course there is one difference, namely, the logical one; for\nreality prior to logical processes is unknown. As a result of these\nprocesses it becomes known. These processes are, therefore, responsible\nfor a known as distinct from an unknown reality. But what is the\ntransformation which reality undergoes in becoming known? When it\nbecomes known that water seeks its own level, what change has taken\nplace in the water? It would appear that we must answer, none. The water\nwhich seeks its own level has not been transformed into ideas or even\ninto a human experience. It appears to remain, as water, precisely what\nit was before. The transformation which takes place, takes place in the\none who knows, a transformation from ignorance to knowledge. Psychology\nand biology can afford us the natural history of this transformation,\nbut they cannot inform us in the least as to why it should have its\nspecific character. That is given and not deduced. The attempts to\ndeduce it have, without exception, been futile. That is why we are\nforced to take it as ultimate in the same way we take as ultimate the\nspecific character of any definite transformation. To my mind, there is\nneeded a fuller and more cordial recognition of this fact. The\nconditions under which we, as individuals, know are certainly\ndiscoverable, just as much as the conditions under which we breathe or\ndigest. And what happens to things when we know them is also as\ndiscoverable as what happens to them when we breathe them or digest\nthem.\n\nBut here the idealist may interpose that we can never know what happens\nto things when we know them, because we can never know them before they\nbecome known. I suppose I ought to wrestle with this objection. It is an\nobvious one, but, to my mind, it is without force. The objection, if\npursued, can carry us only in a circle. The problem of knowledge is\nstill on our hands, and every logician of whatever school, the offerer\nof this objection also, has, nevertheless, attempted to show what the\ntransformation is that thought works, for all admit that it works some.\nAre we, therefore, engaged in a hopeless task? Or have we failed to\ngrasp the significance of our problem? I think the latter. We fail to\nrecognize that, in one way or other, we do solve the problem, and that\nour attempts to solve it show quite clearly that the objection under\nconsideration is without force. Take, for instance, any concrete case of\nknowledge, the water seeking its own level, again. Follow the process of\nknowledge to the fullest extent, we never find a single problem which is\nnot solvable by reference to the concrete things with which we are\ndealing, nor a single solution which is not forced upon us by these\nthings rather than by the fact that we deal with them. The\ntransformation wrought is thus discovered, in the progress of knowledge\nitself, to be wrought solely in the inquiring individual, and wrought by\nrepeated contact with the things with which he deals. In other words,\nall knowledge discloses the fact that its content is not created by\nitself, but by the things with which it is concerned.\n\nIt is quite possible, therefore, that knowledge should be what we call\ntranscendent and yet not involve us in a transcendental logic. That we\nshould be able to know without altering the things we know is no more\nand no less remarkable and mysterious than that we should be able to\ndigest by altering the things we digest. In other words, the fact that\ndigestion alters the things is no reason that knowledge should alter\nthem, even if we admit that logical processes are vital and subject to\nevolution. Indeed, if evolution teaches us anything on this point, it is\nthat knowledge processes are real just as they exist, as real as growth\nand digestion, and must have their character described in accordance\nwith what they are. The recognition that knowledge can be transcendent\nand yet its processes vital seems to throw light on the difficulty\nevolution has encountered in accounting for consciousness and knowledge.\nAll the reactions of the individual seem to be expressible in terms of\nchemistry and physics without calling in consciousness as an operating\nfactor. What is this but the recognition of its transcendence,\nespecially when the conditions of conscious activity are quite likely\nexpressible in chemical and physical terms? While, therefore, biological\nconsiderations result in the great gain of giving concrete reality to\nthe processes of knowledge, the gain is lost, if knowledge itself is\ndenied the transcendence which it so evidently discloses.\n\n\nIV\n\nThe argument advanced in this discussion has had the aim of emphasizing\nthe fact that in knowledge we have actually given, as content, reality\nas it is in independence of the act of knowing, that the real world is\nself-existent, independent of the judgments we make about it. This fact\nhas been emphasized in order to confine the field of logic to the field\nof knowledge as thus understood. In the course of the argument, I have\noccasionally indicated what some of the resulting problems of logic are.\nThese I wish now to state in a somewhat more systematic way.\n\nThe basal problem of logic becomes, undoubtedly, the metaphysics of\nknowledge, the determination of the nature of knowledge and its relation\nto reality. It is quite evident that this is just the problem which the\ncurrent tendencies criticised have sought, not to solve, but to avoid or\nset aside. Their motives for so doing have been mainly the difficulties\nwhich have arisen from the Kantian philosophy in its development into\ntranscendentalism, and the desire to extend the category of evolution to\nembrace the whole of reality, knowledge included. I confess to feeling\nthe force of these motives as strongly as any advocate of the criticised\nopinions. But I do not see my way clear to satisfying them by denying or\nexplaining away the evident character of knowledge itself. It appears\nfar better to admit that a metaphysics of knowledge is as yet hopeless,\nrather than so to transform knowledge as to get rid of the problem; for\nwe must ultimately ask after the truth of the transformation. But I am\nfar from believing that a metaphysics of knowledge is hopeless. The\nbiological tendencies themselves seem to furnish us with much material\nfor at least the beginnings of one. Reality known is to be set over\nagainst reality unknown or independent of knowledge, not as image to\noriginal, idea to thing, phenomena to noumena, appearance to reality;\nbut reality as known is a new stage in the development of reality\nitself. It is not an external mind which knows reality by means of its\nown ideas, but reality itself becomes known through its own expanding\nand readjusting processes. So far I am in entire agreement with the\ntendencies I have criticised. But what change is effected by this\nexpansion and readjustment? I can find no other answer than this simple\none: the change to knowledge. And by this I mean to assert unequivocally\nthat the addition of knowledge to a reality hitherto without it is\nsimply an addition to it and not a transformation of it. Such a view may\nappear to make knowledge a wholly useless addition, but I see no\ninherent necessity in such a conclusion. Nor do I see any inherent\nnecessity of supposing that knowledge must be a useful addition. Yet I\nwould not be so foolish as to deny the usefulness of knowledge. We have,\nof course, the most palpable evidences of its use. As we examine them, I\nthink we find, without exception, that knowledge is useful just in\nproportion as we find that reality is not transformed by being known. If\nit really were transformed in that process, could anything else than\nconfusion result from the multitude of knowing individuals?\n\nTo me, therefore, the metaphysics of the situation resolves itself into\nthe realistic position that a developing reality develops, under\nascertainable conditions, into a known reality without undergoing any\nother transformation, and that this new stage marks an advance in the\nefficiency of reality in its adaptations. My confidence steadily grows\nthat this whole process can be scientifically worked out. It is\nimpossible here to justify my confidence in detail, and I must leave the\nmatter with the following suggestion. The point from which knowledge\nstarts and to which it ultimately returns is always some portion of\nreality where there is consciousness, the things, namely, which, we are\nwont to say, are in consciousness. These things are not ideas\nrepresenting other things outside of consciousness, but real things,\nwhich, by being in consciousness, have the capacity of representing\n_each other_, of standing for or implying each other. Knowledge is not\nthe creation of these implications, but their successful\nsystematization. It will be found, I think, that this general statement\nis true of every concrete case of knowledge which we possess. Its\ndetailed working out would be a metaphysics of knowledge, an\nepistemology.\n\nSince knowledge is the successful systematization of the implications\nwhich are disclosed in things by virtue of consciousness, a second\nlogical problem of fundamental importance is the determination of the\nmost general types of implication with the categories which underlie\nthem. The execution of this problem would naturally involve, as\nsubsidiary, the greater part of formal and symbolic logic. Indeed, vital\ndoctrines of the syllogism, of definition, of formal inference, of the\ncalculus of classes and propositions, of the logic of relations, appear\nto be bound up ultimately with a doctrine of categories; for it is only\na recognition of basal types of existence with their implications that\ncan save these doctrines from mere formalism. These types of existence\nor categories are not to be regarded as free creations or as the\ncontributions of the mind to experience. There is no deduction of them\npossible. They must be discovered in the actual progress of knowledge\nitself, and I see no reason to suppose that their number is necessarily\nfixed, or that we should necessarily be in possession of all of them. It\nis requisite, however, that in every case categories should be incapable\nof reduction to each other.\n\nA doctrine of categories seems to me to be of the greatest importance in\nthe systematization of knowledge, for no problem of relation is even\nstateable correctly before the type of existence to which its terms\nbelong has been first determined. I submit one illustration to reinforce\nthis general statement, namely, the relation of mind to body. If mind\nand body belong to the same type of existence, we have one set of\nproblems on our hands; but if they do not, we have an entirely different\nset. Yet volumes of discussion written on this subject have abounded in\nconfusion, simply because they have regarded mind and body as belonging\nto radically different types of existence and yet related in terms of\nthe type to which one of them belongs. The doctrine of parallelism is,\nperhaps, the epitome of this confusion.\n\nThe doctrine of categories will involve not only the greater part of\nformal and symbolic logic, but will undoubtedly carry the logician into\nthe doctrine of method. Here it is to be hoped that recent tendencies\nwill result in effectively breaking down the artificial distinctions\nwhich have prevailed between deduction and induction. Differences in\nmethod do not result from differences in points of departure, or between\nthe universal and the particular, but from the categories, again, which\ngive the method direction and aim, and result in different types of\nsynthesis. In this direction, the logician may hope for an approximately\ncorrect classification of the various departments of knowledge. Such a\nclassification is, perhaps, the ideal of logical theory.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION D--METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCE\n\n\n\n\nSECTION D--METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCE\n\n(_Hall 6, September 22, 3 p. m._)\n\n CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR JAMES E. CREIGHTON, Cornell University.\n SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR WILHELM OSTWALD, University of Leipzig.\n PROFESSOR BENNO ERDMANN, University of Bonn.\n SECRETARY: DR. R. B. PERRY, Harvard University.\n\n\n\n\nON THE THEORY OF SCIENCE\n\nBY WILHELM OSTWALD\n\n(_Translated from the German by Dr. R. M. Yerkes, Harvard University_)\n\n [Wilhelm Ostwald, Professor of Physical Chemistry,\n University of Leipzig, since 1887. b. September 2, 1853,\n Riga, Russia. Grad. Candidate Chemistry, 1877; Master\n Chemistry, 1878; Doctor Chemistry, Dorpat. Dr. Hon. Halle\n and Cambridge; Privy Councilor; Assistant, Dorpat, 1875-81;\n Regular Professor, Riga 1881-87. Member various learned and\n scientific societies. Author of _Manual of General\n Chemistry_; _Electro Chemistry_; _Foundation of Inorganic\n Chemistry_; _Lectures on Philosophy of Nature_; _Artist's\n Letters_; _Essays and Lectures_; and many other noted works\n and papers on Chemistry and Philosophy.]\n\n\nOne of the few points on which the philosophy of to-day is united is the\nknowledge that the only thing completely certain and undoubted for each\none is the content of his own consciousness; and here the certainty is\nto be ascribed not to the content of consciousness in general, but only\nto the momentary content.\n\nThis momentary content we divide into two large groups, which we refer\nto the inner and outer world. If we call any kind of content of\nconsciousness an experience, then we ascribe to the outer world such\nexperiences as arise without the activity of our will and cannot be\ncalled forth by its activity alone. Such experiences never arise without\nthe activity of certain parts of our body, which we call sense organs.\nIn other words, the outer world is that which reaches our consciousness\nthrough the senses.\n\nOn the other hand, we ascribe to our inner world all experiences which\narise without the immediate assistance of a sense organ. Here, first of\nall, belong all experiences which we call remembering and thinking. An\nexact and complete differentiation of the two territories is not\nintended here, for our purpose does not demand that this task be\nundertaken. For this purpose the general orientation in which every one\nrecognizes familiar facts of his consciousness is sufficient.\n\nEach experience has the characteristic of uniqueness. None of us doubts\nthat the expression of the poet \"Everything is only repeated in life\" is\nreally just the opposite of the truth, and that in fact nothing is\nrepeated in life. But to express such a judgment we must be in position\nto compare different experiences with each other, and this possibility\nrests upon a fundamental phenomenon of our consciousness, memory. Memory\nalone enables us to put various experiences in relation to each other,\nso that the question as to their likeness or difference can be asked.\n\nWe find the simpler relations here in the inner experiences. A certain\nthought, such as twice two is four, I can bring up in my consciousness\nas often as I wish, and in addition to the content of the thought I\nexperience the further consciousness that I have already had this\nthought before, that it is familiar to me.\n\nA similar but somewhat more complex phenomenon appears in the\nexperiences in which the outer world takes part. After I have eaten an\napple, I can repeat the experience in two ways. First, as an inner\nexperience, I can remember that I have eaten the apple and by an effort\nof my will I can re-create in myself, although with diminished strength\nand intensity, a part of the former experience--the part which belonged\nto my inner world. Another part, the sense impression which belonged to\nthat experience, I cannot re-create by an effort of my will, but I must\nagain eat an apple in order to have a similar experience of this sort.\nThis is a complete repetition of the experience to which the external\nworld also contributes. Such a repetition does not depend altogether on\nmy own powers, for it is necessary that I have an apple, that is, that\ncertain conditions which are independent of me and belong to the outer\nworld be fulfilled.\n\nWhether the outer world takes part in the repetition of an experience or\nnot has no influence upon the possibility of the content of\nconsciousness which we call memory. From this it follows that this\ncontent depends upon the inner experience alone, and that we remember an\nexternal event only by means of its inner constituents. The mere\nrepetition of corresponding sense impressions is not sufficient for\nthis, for we can see the same person repeatedly without recognizing him,\nif the inner accompanying phenomena were so insignificant, as a result\nof lack of interest, that their repetition does not produce the content\nof consciousness known as memory. If we see him quite frequently, the\nfrequent repetition of the external impression finally causes the memory\nof the corresponding inner experience.\n\nFrom this it results that for the \"memory\"-reaction a certain intensity\nof the inner experience is necessary. This threshold can be attained\neither at once or by continued repetition. The repetitions are the more\neffective the more rapidly they follow each other. From this we may\nconclude that the memory-value of an experience, or its capacity for\ncalling forth the \"memory\"-reaction by repetition, decreases with the\nlapse of time. Further, we must consider the fact mentioned above, that\nan experience is never exactly repeated, and that therefore the\n\"memory\"-reaction occurs even where there is only resemblance or partial\nagreement in place of complete agreement. Here, too, there are different\ndegrees; memory takes place more easily the more perfectly the two\nexperiences agree, and _vice versa_.\n\nIf we look at these phenomena from the physiological side, we may say we\nhave two kinds of apparatus or organs, one of which does not depend upon\nour will, whereas the other does. The former are the sense organs. The\nlatter constitutes the organ of thought. Only the activities of the\nlatter constitute our experiences or the content of our consciousness.\n\nThe activities of the former may call forth the corresponding processes\nof the latter, but this is not always necessary. Our sense organs can be\ninfluenced without our \"noticing\" it, that is, without the thinking\napparatus being involved. An especially important reaction of the\nthinking apparatus is memory, that is, the consciousness that an\nexperience which we have just had possesses more or less agreement with\nformer experiences. With reference to the organ of thought, it is the\nexpression of the general physiological fact that every process\ninfluences the organ in such a way that it has a different relation to\nthe repetition of this process, from the first time, and moreover that\nthe repetition is rendered easier. This influence decreases with time.\n\nIt is chiefly upon these phenomena that experience rests. Experience\nresults from the fact that all events consist of a complete series of\nsimultaneous and successive components. When a connection between some\nof those parts has become familiar to us by the repetition of similar\noccurrences (for instance, the succession of day and night), we do not\nfeel such an occurrence as something completely new, but as something\npartially familiar, and the single parts or phases of it do not surprise\nus, but rather we anticipate their coming or expect them. From\nexpectation to prediction is only a short step, and so experience\nenables us to prophesy the future from the past and present.\n\nNow this is also the road to science: for science is nothing but\nsystematized experience, that is, experience reduced to its simplest and\nclearest forms. Its purposes to predict from a part of a phenomenon\nwhich is known another part which is not yet known. Here it may be a\nquestion of spatial as well as of temporal phenomena. Thus the\nscientific zo\u00f6logist knows how to \"determine,\" that is, to tell, from\nthe skull of an animal, the nature of the other parts of the animal to\nwhich the skull belongs; likewise the astronomer is able to indicate the\nfuture, situation of a planet from a few observations of its present\nsituation; and the more exact the first observations were, the more\ndistant the future for which he can predict. All such scientific\npredictions are limited, therefore, with reference to their number and\ntheir accuracy. If the skull shown to the zo\u00f6logist is that of a\nchicken, then he will probably be able to indicate the general\ncharacteristics of chickens, and also perhaps whether the chicken had a\ntop-knot or not; but not its color, and only uncertainly its age and its\nsize. Both facts, the possibility of prediction and its limitation in\ncontent and amount, are an expression for the two fundamental facts,\nthat among our experiences there is similarity, but not complete\nagreement.\n\nThe foregoing considerations deserve to be discussed and extended in\nseveral directions. First, the objection will be made that a chicken or\na planet is not an experience; we call them rather by the most general\nname of thing. But our knowledge of the chicken begins with the\nexperiencing of certain visual impressions, to which are added, perhaps,\ncertain impressions of hearing and touch. The sight impressions (to\ndiscuss these first) by no means completely agree. We see the chicken\nlarge or small, according to the distance; and according to its position\nand movement its outline is very different. As we have seen, however,\nthese differences are continually grading into one other and do not\nreach beyond certain limits; we neglect to observe them and rest\ncontented with the fact that certain other peculiarities (legs, wings,\neyes, bill, comb, etc.) remain and do not change. The constant\nproperties we group together as a thing, and the changing ones we call\nthe states of this thing. Among the changing properties, we distinguish\nfurther those which depend upon us (for example, the distance) and those\nupon which we have no immediate influence (for instance, the position or\nmotion): the first is called the subjective changeable part of our\nexperience, while the second is called the objective mutability of the\nthing.\n\nThis omission of both the subjectively and objectively changeable\nportion of the experience in connection with the retention of the\nconstant portion and the gathering together of the latter into a unity\nis one of the most important operations which we perform with our\nexperiences. We call it the process of abstraction, and its product, the\npermanent unity, we call a concept. Plainly this procedure contains\narbitrary as well as necessary factors. Arbitrary or accidental is the\ncircumstance that quite different phases of a given experience come to\nconsciousness according to our attention, the amount of practice we have\nhad, indeed according to our whole intellectual nature. We may overlook\nconstant factors and attend to changeable ones. The objective factors,\nhowever, become necessary as soon as we have noticed them; after we have\nseen that the chicken is black, it is not in our power to see it red.\nAccordingly, in general, our knowledge of that which agrees must be less\nthan it actually could be, since we have not been able to observe every\nagreement, and our concept is always poorer in constituents at any given\ntime than it might be. To seek out such elements of concepts as have\nbeen overlooked, and to prove that they are necessary factors of the\ncorresponding experiences, is one of the never-ending tasks of science.\nThe other case, namely, that elements have been received in the concept\nwhich do not prove to be constant, also happens, and leads to another\ntask. One can then leave that element out of the concept, if further\nexperiences show that the other elements are found in them, or one can\nform a new concept which contains the former elements, leaving out those\nthat have been recognized as unessential. For a long time the white\ncolor belonged to the concept swan. When the Dutch black swans became\nknown, it was possible either to drop the element white from the concept\nswan (as actually happened), or to make a new concept for the bird which\nis similar to the swan but black. Which choice is made in a given case\nis largely arbitrary, and is determined by considerations of expediency.\n\nInto the formation of concepts, therefore, two factors are operative, an\nobjective empirical factor, and a subjective or purposive factor. The\nfitness of a concept is seen in relation to its purpose, which we shall\nnow consider.\n\nThe purpose of a concept is its use for prediction. The old logic set up\nthe syllogism as the type of thought-activity, and its simplest example\nis the well-known\n\n All men are mortal,\n Caius is a man,\n Therefore Caius is mortal.\n\nIn general, the scheme runs\n\n To the concept M belongs the element B,\n C belongs under the concept M,\n Therefore the element B is found in C.\n\nOne can say that this method of reasoning is in regular use even to this\nday. It must be added, however, that this use is of a quite different\nnature from that of the ancients. Whereas formerly the setting up of the\nfirst proposition or the major premise was considered the most important\nthing, and the establishment of the second proposition or minor premise\nwas thought to be a rather trifling matter, now the relation is\nreversed. The major premise contains the description of a concept, the\nminor makes the assertion that a certain thing belongs under this\nconcept. What right exists for such an assertion? The most palpable\nreply would be, since all the elements of the concept M (including B)\nare found in C, C belongs under the concept M. Such a conclusion would\nindeed be binding, but at the same time quite worthless, for it only\nrepeats the minor premise. Actually the method of reasoning is\nessentially different, for the minor premise is not obtained by showing\nthat all the elements of the concept M are found in C, but only some of\nthem. The conclusion is not necessary, but only probable, and the whole\nprocess of reasoning runs: Certain elements are frequently found\ntogether, therefore they are united in the concept M. Certain of these\nelements are recognized in the thing C, therefore probably the other\nelements of the concept M will be found in C.\n\nThe old logic, also, was familiar with this kind of conclusion. It was\nbranded, however, as the worst of all, by the name of incomplete\ninduction, since the absolute certainty demanded of the syllogism did\nnot belong to its results. One must admit, however, that the whole of\nmodern science makes use of no other form of reasoning than incomplete\ninduction, for it alone admits of a prediction, that is, an indication\nof relations which have not been immediately observed.\n\nHow does science get along with the defective certainty of this process\nof reasoning? The answer is, that the probability of the conclusion can\nrun through all degrees from mere conjecture to the maximum probability,\nwhich is practically indistinguishable from certainty. The probability\nis the greater the more frequently an incomplete induction of this kind\nhas proven correct in later experience. Accordingly we have at our\ncommand a number of expressions which in their simplest and most general\nform have the appearance: If an element A is met within a thing, then\nthe element B is also found in it (in spatial or temporal relationship).\n\nIf the relation is temporal, this general statement is known by some\nsuch name as the law of causality. If it is spatial, one talks of the\nidea (in the Platonic sense), or the type of the thing, of substance,\netc.\n\nFrom the considerations here presented we get an easy answer to many\nquestions which are frequently discussed in very different senses.\nFirst, the question concerning the general validity of the law of\ncausality. All attempts to prove such a validity have failed, and there\nhas remained only the indication that without this law we should feel an\nunbearable uncertainty in reference to the world. From this, however, we\nsee very plainly that here it is merely a question of expediency. From\nthe continuous flux of our experiences we hunt out those groups which\ncan always be found again, in order to be able to conclude that if the\nelement A is given, the element B will be present. We do not find this\nrelationship as \"given,\" but we put it into our experiences, in that we\nconsider the parts which correspond to the relationship as belonging\ntogether.\n\nThe very same thing may be said of spatial complexes. Such factors as\nare always, or at any rate often, found together are taken by us as\n\"belonging together,\" and out of them a concept is formed which embraces\nthese factors. A question as to the why has here, as with the temporal\ncomplexes, no definite meaning. There are countless things that happen\ntogether once to which we pay no attention because they happen only once\nor but seldom. The knowledge of the fact that such a single concurrence\nexists amounts to nothing, since from the presence of one factor it does\nnot lead to a conclusion as to the presence of another, and therefore\ndoes not make possible prediction. Of all the possible, and even actual\ncombinations, only those interest us which are repeated, and this\narbitrary but expedient selection produces the impression that the world\nconsists only of combinations that can be repeated; that, in other\nwords, the law of causality or of the type is a general one. However\ngeneral or limited application those laws have, is more a question of\nour skill in finding the constant combinations among those that are\npresent than a question of objective natural fact.\n\nThus we see the development and pursuit of all sciences going on in such\na way that on the one hand more and more constant combinations are\ndiscovered, and on the other hand more inclusive relations of this kind\nare found out, by means of which elements are united with each other\nwhich before no one had even tried to bring together. So sciences are\nincreasing both in the sense of an increasing complication and in an\nincreasing unification.\n\nIf we consider from this standpoint the development and procedure of the\nvarious sciences, we find a rational division of the sum total of\nscience in the question as to the scope and multiplicity of the\ncombinations or groups treated of in them. These two properties are in a\ncertain sense antithetical. The simpler a complex is, that is, the fewer\nelements brought together in it, the more frequently it is met with, and\n_vice versa_. One can therefore arrange all the sciences in such a way\nthat one begins with the least multiplicity and the greatest scope, and\nends with the greatest multiplicity and the least scope. The first\nscience will be the most general, and will therefore contain the most\ngeneral and therefore the most barren concepts; the last will contain\nthe most specific and therefore the richest.\n\nWhat are these limiting concepts? The most general is the concept of\n_thing_, that is, any piece of experience, seized arbitrarily from the\nflux of our experiences, which can be repeated. The most specific and\nrichest is the concept of _human intercourse_. Between the science of\nthings and the science of human intercourse, all the other sciences are\nfound arranged in regular gradation. If one follows out the scheme the\nfollowing outline results:\n\n 1. Theory of order. }\n 2. Theory of numbers, or arithmetic. } Mathematics.\n 3. Theory of time. }\n 4. Theory of space, or geometry. }\n 5. Mechanics. }\n 6. Physics. } Energetics.\n 7. Chemistry. }\n 8. Physiology. }\n 9. Psychology. } Biology.\n 10. Sociology. }\n\nThis table is arbitrary in so far as the grades assumed can be increased\nor diminished according to need. For example, mechanics and physics\ncould be taken together; or between physics and chemistry, physical\nchemistry could be inserted. Likewise between physiology and psychology,\nanthropology might find a place; or the first five sciences might be\nunited under mathematics. How one makes these divisions is entirely a\npractical question, which will be answered at any time in accordance\nwith the purposes of division; and dispute concerning the matter is\nalmost useless.\n\nI should like, however, to call attention to the three great groups of\nmathematics, energetics, and biology (in the wider sense). They\nrepresent the decisive regulative thought which humanity has evolved,\ncontributed up to this time, toward the scientific mastery of its\nexperiences. Arrangement is the fundamental thought of mathematics. From\nmechanics to chemistry the concept of energy is the most important; and\nfor the last three sciences it is the concept of life. Mathematics,\nenergetics, and biology, therefore, embrace the totality of the\nsciences.\n\nBefore we enter upon the closer consideration of these sciences, it will\nbe well to anticipate another objection which can be raised on the basis\nof the following fact. Besides the sciences named (and those which lie\nbetween them) there are many others, as geology, history, medicine,\nphilology, which we find difficulty in arranging in the above scheme,\nwhich must, however, be taken into consideration in some way or other.\nThey are often characterized by the fact that they stand in relation\nwith several of the sciences named, but even more by the following\ncircumstance. Their task is not, as is true of the pure sciences above\nnamed, the discovery of general relationships, but they relate rather to\nexisting complex objects whose origin, scope, extent, etc., in short,\nwhose temporal and spatial relationships they have to discover or to\n\"explain.\" For this purpose they make use of relations which are placed\nat their disposal by the first-named pure sciences. These sciences,\ntherefore, had better be called applied sciences. However, in this\nconnection we should not think only or even chiefly of technical\napplications; rather the expression is used to indicate that the\nreciprocal relations of the parts of an object are to be called to mind\nby the application of the general rules found in pure science.\n\nWhile in such a task the abstraction process of pure science is not\napplicable (for the omission of certain parts and the concentration upon\nothers which is characteristic of these is excluded by the nature of the\ntask), yet in a given case usually the necessity of bringing in various\npure sciences for the purpose of explanation is evident.\n\nAstronomy is one of these applied sciences. Primarily it rests upon\nmechanics, and in its instrumental portion, upon optics; in its present\ndevelopment on the spectroscopic side, however, it borrows considerably\nof chemistry. In like manner history is applied sociology and\npsychology. Medicine makes use of all the sciences before mentioned, up\nto psychology, etc.\n\nIt is important to get clearly in mind the nature of these sciences,\nsince, on account of their compound nature, they resist arrangement\namongst the pure sciences, while, on account of their practical\nsignificance, they still demand consideration. The latter fact gives\nthem also a sort of arbitrary or accidental character, since their\ndevelopment is largely conditioned by the special needs of the time.\nTheir number, speaking in general, is very large, since each pure\nscience may be turned into an applied science in various ways; and since\nin addition we have combinations of two, three, or more sciences.\nMoreover, the method of procedure in the applied sciences is\nfundamentally different from that in the pure sciences. In the first it\nis a question of the greatest possible analysis of a single given\ncomplex into its scientifically comprehensible parts; while pure\nscience, on the other hand, considers many complexes together in order\nto separate out from them their common element, but expressly disclaims\nthe complete analysis of a single complex.\n\nIn scientific work, as it appears in practice, pure and applied science\nare by no means sharply separated. On the one hand the auxiliaries of\ninvestigations, such as apparatus, books, etc., demand of the pure\ninvestigator knowledge and application in applied science; and, on the\nother hand, the applied scientist is frequently unable to accomplish his\ntask unless he himself becomes for the time being a pure investigator\nand ascertains or discovers the missing general relationships which he\nneeds for his task. A separation and differentiation of the two forms of\nscience was necessary, however, since the method and the aim of each\npresent essential differences.\n\nIn order to consider the method of procedure of pure science more\ncarefully, let us turn back to the table on pages 339, 340, and attend\nto the single sciences separately. The theory of arrangement was\nmentioned first, although this place is usually assigned to mathematics.\nHowever, mathematics has to do with the concepts of number and magnitude\nas fundamentals, while the theory of arrangement does not make use of\nthese. Here the fundamental concept is rather the thing or object of\nwhich nothing more is demanded or considered than that it is a fragment\nof our experience which can be isolated and will remain so. It must not\nbe an arbitrary combination; such a thing would have only momentary\nduration, and the task of science, to learn the unknown from the given,\ncould not find application. Rather must this element have such a nature\nthat it can be characterized and recognized again, that is, it must\nalready have a conceptual nature. Therefore only parts of our experience\nwhich can be repeated (which alone can be objects of science) can be\ncharacterized as things or objects. But in saying this we have said all\nthat was demanded of them. In other respects they may be just as\ndifferent as is conceivable.\n\nIf the question is asked, What can be said scientifically about\nindefinite things of this sort? it is especially the relations of\narrangement and association which yield an answer. If we call any\ndefinite combination of such things a group, we can arrange such a group\nin different ways, that is, we can determine for each thing the relation\nin which it is to stand to the neighboring thing. From every such\narrangement result not only the relationships indicated, but a great\nnumber of new ones, and it appears that when the first relationships are\ngiven the others always follow in like manner. This, however, is the\ntype of the scientific proposition or natural law (page 335). From the\npresence of certain relations of arrangement we can deduce the presence\nof others which we have not yet demonstrated.\n\nTo illustrate this fact by an example, let us think of the things\narranged in a simple row, while we choose one thing as a first member\nand associate another with it as following it; with the latter another\nis associated, etc. Thereby the position of each thing in the row is\ndetermined only in relation to the immediately preceding thing.\nNevertheless, the position of every member in the whole row, and\ntherefore its relation to every other member, is determined by this.\nThis is seen in a number of special laws. If we differentiate former and\nlatter members we can formulate the proposition, among others, if B is a\nlater member with reference to A, and C with reference to B, then C is\nalso a later member with reference to A.\n\nThe correctness and validity of this proposition seems to us beyond all\ndoubt. But this is only a result of the fact that we are able to\ndemonstrate it very easily in countless single cases, and have so\ndemonstrated it. We know only cases which correspond to the proposition,\nand have never experienced a contradictory case. To call such a\nproposition, however, a necessity of thinking, does not appear to me\ncorrect. For the expression necessity of thinking can only rest upon the\nfact that every time the proposition is thought, that is, every time one\nremembers its demonstration, its confirmation always arises. But every\nsort of false proposition is also thinkable. An undeniable proof of this\nis the fact that so much which is false is actually thought. But to base\nthe proof for the correctness of a proposition upon the impossibility of\nthinking its opposite is an impossible undertaking, because every sort\nof nonsense can be thought: where the proof was thought to have been\ngiven, there has always been a confusion of thought and intuition, proof\nor inspection.\n\nWith this one proposition of course the theory of order is not\nexhausted, for here it is not a question of the development of this\ntheory, but of an example of the nature of the problems of science. Of\nthe further questions we shall briefly discuss the problem of\nassociation.\n\nIf we have two groups A and B given, one can associate with every member\nof A one of B; that is, we determine that certain operations which can\nbe carried on with the members of A are also to be carried on with those\nof B. Now we can begin by simply carrying out the association, member\nfor member. Then we shall have one of three results: A will be exhausted\nwhile there are still members of B left, or B will be exhausted first,\nor finally A and B will be exhausted at the same time. In the first case\nwe call A poorer than B; in the second B poorer than A; in the third\nboth quantities are alike.\n\nHere for the first time we come upon the scientific concept of equality,\nwhich calls for discussion. There can be no question of a complete\nidentity of the two groups which have been denominated equal, for we\nhave made the assumption that the members of both groups can be of any\nnature whatever. They can then be as different as possible, considered\nsingly, but they are alike as groups. However I may arrange the members\nof A, I can make a similar arrangement of the members of B, since every\nmember of A has one of B associated with it; and with reference to the\nproperty of arrangement there is no difference to be observed between A\nand B. If, however, A is poorer or richer than B, this possibility\nceases, for then one of the groups has members to which none of the\nmembers in the other group corresponds; so that the operations carried\nout with these members cannot be carried out with those of the other\ngroup.\n\nEquality in the scientific sense, therefore, means equivalence, or the\npossibility of substitution in quite definite operations or for quite\ndefinite relations. Beyond this the things which are called like may\nshow any differences whatever. The general scientific process of\nabstraction is again easily seen in this special case.\n\nOn the basis of the definitions just given, we can establish further\npropositions. If group A equals B, and B equals C, then A also equals C.\nThe proof of this is that we can relate every member of A to a\ncorresponding member of B and by hypothesis no member will be left. Then\nC is arranged with reference to B, and here also no member is left. By\nthis process every member of A, through the connecting link of a member\nof B, is associated with a member of C, and this association is\npreserved even if we cut out the group B. Therefore A and C are equal.\nThe same process of reasoning can be carried out for any number of\ngroups.\n\nLikewise it can be demonstrated that if A is poorer than B and B poorer\nthan C, then A is also poorer than C. For in the association of B with A\nsome members of B are left over by hypothesis, and likewise some members\nof C are left over if one associates C with B. Therefore in the\nassociation of C with A, not only those members are left over which\ncould not be associated with B, but also those members of C which extend\nbeyond B. This proposition can be extended to any number of groups, and\npermits the arrangement of a number of different groups in a simple\nseries by beginning with the poorest and choosing each following so that\nit is richer than the preceding but poorer than the following. From the\nproposition just established, it follows that every group is so arranged\nwith reference to all other groups that it is richer than all the\npreceding and poorer than all the following.[3]\n\n [Footnote 3: Equal groups cannot be distinguished here, and\n therefore represent only a group.]\n\nIn this derivation of scientific proposition or laws of the simplest\nkinds, the process of derivation and the nature of the result becomes\nparticularly clear. We arrive at such a proposition by performing an\noperation and expressing the result of it. This expression enables us to\navoid the repetition of the operation in the future, since in accordance\nwith the law we can indicate the result immediately. Thus an\nabbreviation and therefore, a facilitation of the problem is attained\nwhich is the more considerable the larger the number of operations\nsaved.\n\nIf we have a number of equal groups, we know by the process of\nassociation that all of the operations with reference to arrangement\nwhich we can perform with one of them can be performed with all the\nothers. It is sufficient, therefore, to determine the properties of\narrangement of one of these groups in order to know forthwith the\nproperties of all the others. This is an extremely important\nproposition, which is continually employed for the most various\npurposes. All speaking, writing, and reading rests upon the association\nof thoughts with sounds and symbols, and by arranging the signs in\naccordance with our thoughts we bring it to pass that our hearers or\nreaders think like thoughts in like order. In a similar fashion we make\nuse of various systems of formul\u00e6 in the different sciences, especially\nin the simpler sciences; and these formul\u00e6 we correlate with phenomena\nand use in place of the phenomena themselves, and can therefore derive\nfrom them certain characteristics of phenomena without being compelled\nto use the latter. The force of this process appears very strikingly in\nastronomy where, by the use of definite formul\u00e6 associated with the\ndifferent heavenly bodies, we can foretell the future positions of these\nbodies with a high degree of approximation.\n\nFrom the theory of order we come to the theory of number or arithmetic\nby the systematic arrangement or development of an operation just\nindicated (page 343). We can arrange any number of groups in such a way\nthat a richer always follows a poorer. But the complex obtained in this\nmanner is always accidental with reference to the number and the\nrichness of its members. A regular and complete structure of all\npossible groups is evidently obtained only if we start from a group of\none member or from a simple thing, and by the addition of one member at\na time make further groups out of those that we have. Thus we obtain\ndifferent groups arranged according to an increasing richness, and since\nwe have advanced one member at a time, that is, made the smallest step\nwhich is possible, we are certain that we have left out no possible\ngroup which is poorer than the richest to which the operation has been\ncarried.\n\nThis whole process is familiar; it gives the series of the positive\nwhole numbers, that is, the cardinal numbers. It is to be noted that the\nconcept of quantity has not yet been considered; what we have gained is\nthe concept of number. The single things or members in this number are\nquite arbitrary, and especially they do not need to be alike in any\nmanner. Every number forms a group-type, and arithmetic or the science\nof numbers has the task of investigating the properties of these\ndifferent types with reference to their division and combination. If\nthis is done in general form, without attention to the special amount of\nthe number, the corresponding science is called algebra. On the other\nhand, by the application of formal rules of formation, the number system\nhas had one extension after another beyond the territory of its original\nvalidity. Thus counting backward led to zero and to the negative\nnumbers; the inversion of involution to the imaginary numbers. For the\ngroup-type of the positive whole numbers is the simplest but by no means\nthe only possible one, and for the purpose of representing other\nmanifolds than those which are met with in experience, these new types\nhave proved themselves very useful.\n\nAt the same time the number series gives us an extremely useful type of\narrangement. In the process of arising it is already ordered, and we\nmake use of it for the purpose of arranging other groups. Thus, we are\naccustomed to furnish the pages in a book, the seats in a theatre, and\ncountless other groups which we wish to make use of in any kind of order\nwith the signs of the number series, and thereby we make the tacit\nassumption that the use of that corresponding group shall take place in\nthe same order as the natural numbers follow each other. The ordinal\nnumbers arising therefrom do not represent quantities, nor do they\nrepresent the only possible type of arrangement, but they are again the\nsimplest of all. We come to the concept of magnitude only in the theory\nof time and space. The theory of time has not been developed as a\nspecial science; on the contrary, what we have to say about time first\nappears in mechanics. Meantime we can present the fundamental concepts,\nwhich arise in this connection, with reference to such well-known\ncharacteristics of time that the lack of a special science of time is no\ndisadvantage.\n\nThe first and most important characteristic of time (and of space, too)\nis that it is a continuous manifold; that is, every portion of time\nchosen can be divided at any place whatever. In the number series this\nis not the case; it can be divided only between the single numbers. The\nseries one to ten has only nine places of division and no more. A\nminute, or a second, on the other hand, has an unlimited number of\nplaces of division. In other words, there is nothing in the lapse of any\ntime which hinders us from separating or distinguishing in thought at\nany given instant the time which has elapsed till then from the\nfollowing time. It is just the same with space, except that time is a\nsimple manifold and space a threefold, continuous manifold.\n\nNevertheless, when we measure them, we are accustomed to indicate times\nand spaces with numbers. If we first examine, for example, the process\nof measuring a length, it consists in our applying to the distance to be\nmeasured a length conceived as unchangeable, the unit of measure, until\nwe have passed over the distance. The number of these applications gives\nus the measure or magnitude of the distance. The result is that by the\nindication of arbitrarily chosen points upon the continuous distance, we\nplace upon it an artificial discontinuity which enables us to associate\nit with the discontinuous number series.\n\nA still further assumption, however, belongs to the concept of\nmeasuring, namely, that the parts of the distance cut off by the unit\nused as a measure be equal, and it is taken for granted that this\nrequirement will be fulfilled to whatever place the unit of measure is\nshifted. As may be seen, this is a definition of equality carried\nfurther than the former, for one cannot actually replace a part of the\ndistance by another in order to convince one's self that it has not\nchanged. Just as little can one assert or prove that the unit of measure\nin changing its place in space remains of the same length; we can only\nsay that such distances as are determined by the unit of measure in\ndifferent places are declared or defined as equal. Actually, for our\neye, the unit of measure becomes smaller in perspective the farther away\nfrom it we find ourselves.\n\nFrom this example we see again the great contribution which\narbitrariness or free choice has made to all our structure of science.\nWe could develop a geometry in which distances which seem subjectively\nequal to our eye are called equal, and upon this assumption we would be\nable to develop a self-consistent system or science. Such a geometry,\nhowever, would have an extremely complex and impractical structure for\nobjective purposes (as, for example, land measurement), and so we strive\nto develop a science as free as possible from subjective factors.\nHistorically, we have before us a process of this sort in the astronomy\nof Ptolemy and that of Copernicus. The former corresponded to the\nsubjective appearances in the assumption that all heavenly bodies\nrevolved around the earth, but proved to be very complicated when\nconfronted with the task of mastering these movements with figures. The\nlatter gave up the subjective standpoint of the observer, who looked\nupon himself as the centre, and attained a tremendous simplification by\nplacing the centre of revolution in the sun.\n\nA few words are to be said here about the application of arithmetic and\nalgebra to geometry. It is well known that under definite assumptions\n(co\u00f6rdinates), geometrical figures can be represented by means of\nalgebraic formul\u00e6, so that the geometrical properties of the figure can\nbe deduced from the arithmetical properties of the formul\u00e6, and _vice\nversa_. The question must be asked how such a close and univocal\nrelationship is possible between things of such different nature. The\nanswer is, that here is an especially clear case of association. The\nmanifold of numbers is much greater than that of surface or space, for\nwhile the latter are determined by two or three independent\nmeasurements, one can have any number of independent number series\nworking together. Therefore the manifold of numbers is arbitrarily\nlimited to two or three independent series, and in so far determines\ntheir mutual relations (by means of the laws of cosine) that there\nresults a manifold, corresponding to the spatial, which can be\ncompletely associated with the spatial manifold. Then we have two\nmanifolds of the same manifold character, and all characteristics of\narrangement and size of the one find their likeness in the other.\n\nThis again characterizes an extremely important scientific procedure\nwhich consists, namely, in constructing a formal manifold for the\ncontent of experience of a certain field, to which one attributes the\nsame manifold character which the former possesses. Every science\nreaches by this means a sort of formal language of corresponding\ncompleteness, which depends upon how accurately the manifold character\nof the object is recognized and how judiciously the formul\u00e6 have been\nchosen. While in arithmetic and algebra this task has been performed\nfairly well (though by no means absolutely perfectly), the chemical\nformul\u00e6, for instance, express only a relatively small part of the\nmanifold to be represented; and in biology as far as sociology, scarcely\nthe first attempts have been made in the accomplishment of this task.\n\nLanguage especially serves as such a universal manifold to represent the\nmanifolds of experience. As a result of its development from a time of\nless culture, it has by no means sufficient regularity and completeness\nto accomplish its purpose adequately and conveniently. Rather, it is\njust as unsystematic as the events in the lives of single peoples have\nbeen, and the necessity of expressing the endlessly different\nparticulars of daily life has only allowed it to develop so that the\ncorrespondence between word and concept is kept rather indefinite and\nchangeable, according to need within somewhat wide limits. Thus all work\nin those sciences which must make vital use of these means, as\nespecially psychology and sociology, or philosophy in general, is made\nextremely difficult by the ceaseless struggle with the indefiniteness\nand ambiguity of language. An improvement of this condition can be\neffected only by introducing signs in place of words for the\nrepresentation of concepts, as the progress of science allows it, and\nequipping these signs with the manifold which from experience belongs to\nthe concept.\n\nAn intermediate position in this respect is taken by the sciences which\nwere indicated above as parts of energetics. In this realm there is\nadded to the concepts order, number, size, space, and time, a new\nconcept, that of energy, which finds application to every single\nphenomenon in this whole field, just as do those more general concepts.\nThis is due to the fact that a certain quantity, which is known to us\nmost familiarly as mechanical work, on account of its qualitative\ntransformability and quantitative constancy, can be shown to be a\nconstituent of every physical phenomenon, that is, every phenomenon\nwhich belongs to the field of mechanics, physics, and chemistry. In\nother words, one can perfectly characterize every physical event by\nindicating what amounts and kinds of energy have been present in it and\ninto what energies they have been transformed. Accordingly, it is\nlogical to designate the so-called physical phenomena as energetical.\n\nThat such a conception is possible is now generally admitted. On the\nother hand, its expediency is frequently questioned, and there is at\npresent so much the more reason for this because a thorough presentation\nof the physical sciences in the energetical sense has not yet been made.\nIf one applies to this question the criterion of the scientific system\ngiven above, the completeness of the correspondence between the\nrepresenting manifold and that to be represented, there is no doubt that\nall previous systematizations in the form of hypotheses which have been\ntried in these sciences are defective in this respect. Formerly, for the\npurpose of representing experiences, manifolds whose character\ncorresponded to the character of the manifold to be represented only in\ncertain salient points without consideration of any rigid agreement,\nindeed, even without definite question as to such an agreement, have\nbeen employed.\n\nThe energetical conception admits of that definiteness of representation\nwhich the condition of science demands and renders possible. For each\nspecial manifold character of the field a special kind of energy\npresents itself: science has long distinguished mechanical, electric,\nthermal, chemical, etc., energies. All of these different kinds hold\ntogether by the law of transformation with the maintenance of the\nquantitative amount, and in so far are united. On the other hand, it has\nbeen possible to fix upon the corresponding energetical expression for\nevery empirically discovered manifold. As a future system of united\nenergetics, we have then a table of possible manifolds of which energy\nis capable. In this we must keep in mind the fact that, in accordance\nwith the law of the conservation, energy is a necessarily positive\nquantity which also is furnished with the property of unlimited\npossibility of addition; therefore, every particular kind of energy must\nhave this character.\n\nThe very small manifold which seems to lack this condition is much\nwidened by the fact that every kind of energy can be separated into two\nfactors, which are only subject to the limitation that their product,\nthe energy, fulfills the conditions mentioned while they themselves are\nmuch freer. For example, one factor of a kind of enemy can become\nnegative as well as positive; it is only necessary that at the same time\nthe other factor should become negative, viz., positive.\n\nThus it seems possible to make a table of all possible forms of energy,\nby attributing all thinkable manifold characteristics to the factors of\nthe energy and then combining them by pairs and cutting out those\nproducts which do not fulfill the above-mentioned conditions. For a\nnumber of years I have tried from time to time to carry out this\nprogramme, but I have not yet got far enough to justify publication of\nthe results obtained.\n\nIf we turn to the biological sciences, in them the phenomenon of life\nappears to us as new. If we stick to the observed facts, keeping\nourselves free from all hypotheses, we observe as the general\ncharacteristics of the phenomena of life the continuous stream of energy\nwhich courses through a relatively constant structure. Change of\nsubstance is only a part, although a very important part, of this\nstream. Especially in plants we can observe at first hand the great\nimportance of energy in its most incorporeal form, the sun's rays. Along\nwith this, self-preservation and development and reproduction, the\nbegetting of offspring of like nature, are characteristic. All of these\nproperties must be present in order that an organism may come into\nexistence; they must also be present if the reflecting man is to be able\nby repeated experience to form a concept of any definite organism,\nwhether of a lion or of a mushroom. Other organisms are met with which\ndo not fulfill these conditions; on account of their rarity, however,\nthey do not lead to a species concept, but are excluded from scientific\nconsideration (except for special purposes) as deformities or monsters.\n\nWhile organisms usually work with kinds of energy which we know well\nfrom the inorganic world, organs are found in the higher forms which\nwithout doubt cause or assist transfers of energy, but we cannot yet say\ndefinitely what particular kind of energy is active in them. These\norgans are called nerves, and their function is regularly that, after\ncertain forms of energy have acted upon one end of them, they should act\nat the other end and release the energies stored up there which then act\nin their special manner. That energetical transformations also take\nplace in the nerve during the process of nervous transmission can be\nlooked upon as demonstrated. We shall thus be justified in speaking of a\nnerve energy, while leaving it undecided whether there is here an energy\nof a particular kind, or perhaps chemical energy, or finally a\ncombination of several energies.\n\nWhile these processes can be shown objectively by the stimulation of the\nnerve and its corresponding releasing reaction in the end apparatus (for\ninstance, a muscle), we find in ourselves, connected with certain\nnervous processes, a phenomenon of a new sort which we call\nself-consciousness. From the agreement of our reactions with those of\nother people we conclude with scientific probability that they also have\nself-consciousness; and we are justified in making the same conclusion\nwith regard to some higher animals. How far down something similar to\nthis is present cannot be determined by the means at hand, since the\nanalogy of organization and of behavior diminishes very quickly; but the\nline is probably not very long, in view of the great leap from man to\nanimal. Moreover, there are many reasons for the view that the gray\ncortical substance in the brain, with its characteristic pyramidal cell,\nis the anatomical substratum of this kind of nervous activity.\n\nThe study of the processes of self-consciousness constitutes the chief\ntask of psychology. To this science belong those fields which are\ngenerally allotted to philosophy, especially logic and epistemology,\nwhile \u00e6sthetics, and still more ethics, are to be reckoned with the\nsocial sciences.\n\nThe latter have to do with living beings in so far as they can be united\nin groups with common functions. Here in place of the individual mind\nappears a collective mind, which owing to the adjustment of the\ndifferences of the members of society shows simpler conditions than\nthat. From this comes especially the task of the historical sciences.\nThe happenings in the world accessible to us are conditioned partly by\nphysical, partly by psychological factors, and both show a temporal\nmutability in one direction. Thus arises on the one hand a history of\nheaven and earth, on the other hand a history of organisms up to man.\n\nAll history has primarily the task of fixing past events through the\neffects which have remained from them. Where such are not accessible,\nonly analogy is left, a very doubtful means for gaining a conception of\nthose events. But it must be kept in mind that an event which has left\nno evident traces has no sort of interest for us, for our interest is\ndirectly proportional to the amount of change which that event has\ncaused in what we have before us. The task of historical science is just\nas little exhausted, however, with the fixing of former events as, for\ninstance, the task of physics with the establishment of a single fact,\nas the temperature of a given place at a given time. Rather the\nindividual facts must serve to bring out the general characteristics of\nthe collective mind, and the much discussed historical laws are laws of\ncollective psychology. Just as physical and chemical laws are deduced in\norder with their help to predict the course of future physical events\n(to be called forth either experimentally or technically), so should the\nhistorical laws contribute to the formation and control of social and\npolitical development. We see that the great statesmen of all time have\neagerly studied history for this purpose, and from that we derive the\nassurance that there are historical laws in spite of the objections of\nnumerous scholars.\n\nAfter this brief survey, if we look back over the road we have come, we\nobserve the following general facts. In every case the development of a\nscience consists in the formation of concepts by certain abstractions\nfrom experience, and setting of these concepts in relation with each\nother so that a systematical control of certain sides of our experience\nis made possible. These relations, according to their generality and\nreliability, are called rules or laws. A law is the more important the\nmore it definitely expresses concerning the greatest possible number of\nthings, and the more accurately, therefore, it enables us to predict the\nfuture. Every law rests upon an incomplete induction, and is therefore\nsubject to modification by experience. From this there results a double\nprocess in the development of science.\n\nFirst, the actual conditions are investigated to find out whether,\nbesides those already known, new rules or laws, that is, constant\nrelations between individual peculiarities, cannot be discovered between\nthem. This is the inductive process, and the induction is always an\nincomplete one on account of the limitlessness of all possible\nexperience.\n\nImmediately the relationship found inductively is applied to cases which\nhave not yet been investigated. Especially such cases are investigated\nas result from a combination of several inductive laws. If these are\nperfectly certain, and the combination is also properly made, the result\nhas claim to unconditional validity. This is the limit which all\nsciences are striving to reach. It has almost been reached in the\nsimpler sciences: in mathematics and in certain parts of mechanics. This\nis called the deductive process.\n\nIn the actual working of every science the two methods of investigation\nare continually changing. The best means of finding new successful\ninductions is in the making of a deduction on a very insufficient basis,\nperhaps, and subsequently testing it in experience. Sometimes the\nelements of his deductions do not come into the investigator's\nconsciousness; in such cases we speak of scientific instinct. On the\nother hand we have much evidence from great mathematicians that they\nwere accustomed to find their general laws by the method of induction,\nby trying and considering single cases; and that the deductive\nderivation from other known laws is an independent operation which\nsometimes does not succeed until much later. Indeed there is to-day a\nnumber of mathematical propositions which have not yet reached the\nsecond stage and therefore have at present a purely inductive empirical\ncharacter. The proportion of such laws in science increases very quickly\nwith the rise in the scale (page 339).\n\nAnother peculiarity which may be mentioned here is that in the scale all\nprevious sciences have the character of applied sciences (page 341) with\nreference to those which follow, since they are everywhere necessary in\nthe technique of the latter, yet do not serve to increase their own\nfield but are merely auxiliaries to the latter.\n\nIf we ask finally what influence upon the shaping of the future such\ninvestigations as those which have been sketched in outline above can\nhave, the following can be said. Up till now it has been considered a\ncompletely uncontrollable event whether and where a great and\ninfluential man of science has developed. It is obvious that such a man\nis among the most costly treasures which a people (and, indeed,\nhumanity) can possess. The conscious and regular breeding of such\nrarities has not been considered possible. While this is still the case\nfor the very exceptional genius, we see in the countries of the older\ncivilization, especially in Germany at present, a system of education in\nvogue in the universities by which a regular harvest of young scientific\nmen is gained who not only have a mastery of knowledge handed down, but\nalso of the technique of discovery. Thereby the growth of science is\nmade certain and regular, and its pursuit is raised to a higher plane.\nThese results were formerly attained chiefly by empirically and\noftentimes by accidental processes. It is a task of scientific theory to\nmake this activity also regular and systematic, so that success is no\nmore dependent solely upon a special capacity for the founding of a\n\"school\" but can also be attained by less original minds. By the mastery\nof methods the way to considerably higher performances than he could\notherwise attain will be open for the exceptionally gifted.\n\n\n\n\nTHE CONTENT AND VALIDITY OF THE CAUSAL LAW\n\nBY BENNO ERDMANN\n\n(_Translated from the German by Professor Walter T. Marvin, Western\nReserve University_)\n\n [Benno Erdmann, Professor of Philosophy, University of Bonn,\n since 1898. b. October 5, 1851, Glogau in Schlesien,\n Germany. Ph.D.; Privy Councilor. Academical Lecturer,\n Berlin, 1876- ; Special Professor, Kiel, 1878-79; Regular\n Professor, _ibid._ 1879-84; _ibid._ Breslau, 1884-90;\n _ibid._ Halle, 1890-98. Member various scientific and\n learned societies. Author of _The Axioms of Geometry_;\n _Kant's Criticism_; _Logic_; _Psychological Researches on\n Reading_ (together with Prof. Ramon Dodge); _The Psychology\n of the Child and the School_; _Historical Researches an\n Kant's Prolegomena_, and many other works and papers in\n Philosophy.]\n\n\nWe have learned to regard the real, which we endeavor to apprehend\nscientifically in universally valid judgments, as a whole that is\nconnected continuously in time and in space and by causation, and that\nis accordingly continuously self-evolving. This continuity of connection\nhas the following result, namely, every attempt to classify the sum\ntotal of the sciences on the basis of the difference of their objects\nleads merely to representative types, that is, to species which glide\ninto one another. We find no gaps by means of which we can separate\nsharply physics and chemistry, botany and zo\u00f6logy, political and\neconomic history and the histories of art and religion, or, again,\nhistory, philology, and the study of the prehistoric.\n\nAs are the objects, so also are the methods of science. They are\nseparable one from another only through a division into representative\ntypes; for the variety of these methods is dependent upon the variety of\nthe objects of our knowledge, and is, at the same time, determined by\nthe difference between the manifold forms of our thought, itself a part\nof the real, with its elements also gliding into One another.[4]\n\n [Footnote 4: Cf. the author's \"Theorie der\n Typeneinteilungen,\" _Philosophische Monatshefte_, vol. xxx,\n Berlin, 1894.]\n\nThe threads which join the general methodology of scientific thought\nwith neighboring fields of knowledge run in two main directions. In the\none direction they make up a closely packed cable, whereas in the other\ntheir course diverges into all the dimensions of scientific thought.\nThat is to say, first, methodology has its roots in logic, in the\nnarrower sense, namely, in the science of the elementary forms of our\nthought which enter into the make-up of all scientific methods.\nSecondly, methodology has its source in the methods themselves which\nactually, and therefore technically, develop in the various fields of\nour knowledge out of the problems peculiar to those fields.\n\nIt is the office of scientific thought to interpret validly the objects\nthat are presented to us in outer and inner perception, and that can be\nderived from both these sources. We accomplish this interpretation\nentirely through judgments and combinations of judgments of manifold\nsorts. The concepts, which the older logic regarded as the true\nelementary forms of our thinking, are only certain selected types of\njudgment, such stereotyped judgments as those which make up definitions\nand classifications, and which appear independent and fundamental\nbecause their subject-matter, that is, their intension or extension, is\nconnected through the act of naming with certain words. Scientific\nmethods, then, are the ways and means by which our thought can\naccomplish and set forth, in accordance with its ideal, this universally\nvalid interpretation.\n\nThere belongs, accordingly, to methodology a list of problems which we\ncan divide, to be sure only _in abstracto_, into three separate groups.\nFirst, methodology has to analyze the methods which have been\ntechnically developed in the different fields of knowledge into the\nelementary forms of our thinking from which they have been built up.\nNext to this work of _analyzing_, there comes a second task which may be\ncalled a _normative_ one; for it follows that we must set forth and\ndeduce systematically from their sources the nature of these manifold\nelements, their resulting connection, and their validity. To these two\noffices must be added a third that we may call _a potiori_ a _synthetic_\none; for finally we must reconstruct out of the elements of our\nthinking, as revealed by analysis, the methods belonging to the\ndifferent fields of knowledge and also determine their different scope\nand validity.\n\nThe beginning of another conception of the office of methodology can be\nfound in those thoughts which have become significant, especially in\nLeibnitz's fragments and drafts of a _calculus ratiocinator_ or a\n_sp\u00e9cieuse g\u00e9n\u00e9rale_. The foregoing discussion has set aside all hope\nthat these beginnings and their recent development may give, of the\npossibility of constructing the manifold possible methods _a priori_,\nthat is, before or independent of experience. However, it remains\nentirely undecided, as it should in this our preliminary account of the\noffice of general methodology, whether or not all methods of our\nscientific thought will prove to be ultimately but branches of one and\nthe same universal method, a thought contained in the undertakings just\nreferred to. Although modern empiricism, affiliated as it is with\nnatural science, tends to answer this question in the affirmative even\nmore definitely and dogmatically than any type of the older rationalism,\nstill the question is one that can be decided only in the course of\nmethodological research.\n\nThe conception of a methodology of scientific thought can be said to be\nalmost as old as scientific thought itself; for it is already contained\nessentially, though undifferentiated, in the Socratic challenge of\nknowledge. None the less, the history of methodology, as the history of\nevery other science, went through the course of which Kant has given a\nclassical description. \"No one attempts to construct a science unless he\ncan base it on some idea; but in the elaboration of it the schema, nay,\neven the definition which he gives in the beginning of his science,\ncorresponds very seldom to his idea, which, like a germ, lies hidden in\nthe reason, and all the parts of which are still enveloped and hardly\ndistinguishable even under microscopical observation.\"[5]\n\n [Footnote 5: Kant, _Kr. d. r. V._, 2d ed., p. 862.]\n\nWe are indebted to the Greek, and especially to the\nPlatonic-Aristotelian philosophy for important contributions to the\nunderstanding of the deductive method of mathematical thought. It was\nprecisely this trend of philosophic endeavor which, though furnishing\nfor the most part the foundation of methodological doctrine well on into\nthe seventeenth century, offered no means of differentiating the methods\nthat are authoritative for our knowledge of facts. What Socrates was\nperhaps the first to call \"induction,\" is essentially different, as\nregards its source and aim, from the inductive methods that direct our\nresearch in natural and mental science. For it is into these two fields\nthat we have to divide the totality of the sciences of facts, the\nmaterial sciences, let us call them, in opposition to the formal or\nmathematical sciences,--that is, if we are to do justice to the\ndifference between sense and self perception, or \"outer\" and \"inner\"\nperception.\n\nTwo closely connected forces especially led astray the methodological\nopinions regarding the material sciences till the end of the eighteenth\ncentury, and in part until the beginning of the nineteenth century. We\nrefer, in the first place, to that direction of thought which gives us\nthe right to characterize the Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy as a\n\"concept philosophy;\" namely, the circumstance that Aristotelian logic\ncaused the \"concept\" to be set before the \"judgment.\" In short, we refer\nto that tendency in thought which directs the attention not to the\npermanent in the world's occurrences, the uniform connections of events,\nbut rather to the seemingly permanent in the things, their essential\nattributes or essences. Thus the concept philosophy, as a result of its\ntendency to hypostasize, finds in the abstract general concepts of\nthings, the ideas, the eternal absolute reality that constitutes the\nfoundation of things and is contained in them beside the accidental and\nchanging properties.[6] Here we have at once the second force which\ninspired the ancient methodology. These ideas, like the fundamentally\nreal, constitute that which ultimately alone acts in all the coming into\nexistence and the going out of existence of the manifold things. In the\nAristotelian theory of causation, this thought is made a principle; and\nwe formulate only what is contained in it, when we say that, according\nto it, the efficient and at the same time final causes can be deduced\nthrough mere analysis from the essential content of the effects; that,\nin fact, the possible effects of every cause can be deduced from the\ncontent of its definition. The conceptual determination of the causal\nrelation, and with it in principle the sum total of the methods in the\nmaterial sciences, becomes a logical, analytical, and deductive one.\nThese sciences remain entirely independent of the particular content of\nexperience as this broadens, and so do also the methods under\ndiscussion.\n\n [Footnote 6: According to Plato, it is true, the ideas are\n separated from the sensible things; they must be thought in\n a conceptual place, for the space of sense perception is to\n be understood as non-being, matter. The things revealed to\n sense, however, occupy a middle position between being and\n non-being, so that they partake of the ideas. In this sense,\n the statement made above holds also of the older view of the\n concept philosophy.]\n\nAs a consequence, every essential difference between mathematical\nthought and the science of causes is done away with in favor of a\nrationalistic construction of the methods of material science.\nAccordingly, throughout the seventeenth century, the ideal of all\nscientific method becomes, not the inductive method that founded the new\nepoch of the science of to-day, but the deductive mathematical method\napplied to natural scientific research. The flourish of trumpets with\nwhich Francis Bacon hailed the onslaught of the inductive methods in the\nnatural science of the time, helped in no way; for he failed to remodel\nthe traditional, Aristotelian-Scholastic conception of cause, and,\naccordingly, failed to understand both the problem of induction and the\nmeaning of the inductive methods of the day.[7] Descartes, Hobbes,\nSpinoza, and related thinkers develop their _mathesis universalis_ after\nthe pattern of geometrical thinking. Leibnitz tries to adapt his\n_sp\u00e9cieuse g\u00e9n\u00e9rale_ to the thought of mathematical analysis. The old\nmethodological conviction gains its clear-cut expression in Spinoza's\ndoctrine: \"_Aliquid efficitur ab aliqua re_\" means \"_aliquid sequitur ex\nejus definitione_.\"\n\n [Footnote 7: Cf. the articles on Francis Bacon by Chr.\n Sigwart in the _Preussische Jahrb\u00fccher_, xii, 1863, and\n xiii, 1864.]\n\nThe logically straight path is seldom the one taken in the course of the\nhistory of thought. The new formulation and solution of problems\ninfluence us first through their evident significance and consequences,\nnot through the traditional presuppositions upon which they are founded.\nThus, in the middle of the seventeenth century, when insight into the\nprecise difference between mental and physical events gave rise to\npressing need for its definite formulation, no question arose concerning\nthe dogmatic presupposition of a purely logical (_analytisch_)\nrelationship between cause and effect; but, on the contrary, this\npresupposition was then for the first time brought clearly before\nconsciousness. It was necessary to take the roundabout way through\noccasionalism and the pre\u00ebstablished harmony, including the latter's\nretreat to the omnipotence of God, before it was possible to miss the\nquestion of the validity of the presupposition that the connection\nbetween cause and effect is analytic and rational.\n\nAmong the leading thinkers of the period this problem was recognized as\nthe cardinal problem of contemporaneous philosophy. It is further\nevidence how thoroughly established this problem must have been among\nthe more deeply conceived problems of the time in the middle of the\neighteenth century, that Hume and Kant were forced to face it, led on,\nseemingly independently of each other, and surely from quite different\npresuppositions and along entirely different ways. The historical\nevolution of that which from the beginning has seemed to philosophy the\nsolving of her true problem has come to pass in a way not essentially\ndifferent from that of the historical evolution in all other departments\nof human knowledge. Thus, in the last third of the seventeenth century,\nNewton and Leibnitz succeeded in setting forth the elements of the\ninfinitesimal calculus; and, in the fifth decade of the nineteenth\ncentury, Robert Mayer, Helmholtz, and perhaps Joule, formulated the law\nof the conservation of energy. In one essential respect Hume and Kant\nare agreed in the solution of the new, and hence contemporaneously\nmisunderstood, problem. Both realized that the connection between the\nvarious causes and effects is not a rational analytic, but an empirical\nsynthetic one. However, the difference in their presuppositions as well\nas method caused this common result to make its appearance in very\ndifferent light and surroundings. In Hume's empiricism the connection\nbetween cause and effect appears as the mere empirical result of\nassociation; whereas in Kant's rationalism this general relation between\ncause and effect becomes the fundamental condition of all possible\nexperience, and is, as a consequence, independent of all experience. It\nrests, as a means of connecting our ideas, upon an inborn uniformity of\nour thought.\n\nThus the way was opened for a fundamental separation of the inductive\nmaterial scientific from the deductive mathematical method. For Hume\nmathematics becomes the science of the relations of ideas, as opposed to\nthe sciences of facts. For Kant philosophical knowledge is the knowledge\nof the reason arising from concepts, whereas the mathematical is that\narising from the construction of concepts. The former, therefore,\nstudies the particular only in the universal; the latter, the universal\nin the particular, nay, rather in the individual.\n\nBoth solutions of the new problem which in the eighteenth century\nsupplant the old and seemingly self-evident presupposition, appear\naccordingly embedded in the opposition between the rationalistic and\nempiristic interpretation of the origin and validity of our knowledge,\nthe same opposition that from antiquity runs through the historical\ndevelopment of philosophy in ever new digressions.\n\nEven to-day the question regarding the meaning and the validity of the\ncausal connection stands between these contrary directions of\nepistemological research; and the ways leading to its answer separate\nmore sharply than ever before. It is therefore more pressing in our day\nthan it was in earlier times to find a basis upon which we may build\nfurther epistemologically and therefore methodologically. The purpose of\nthe present paper is to seek such a basis for the different methods\nemployed in the sciences of facts.\n\n * * * * *\n\nAs has already been said, the contents of our consciousness, which are\ngiven us immediately in outer and inner perception, constitute the raw\nmaterial of the sciences of facts. From these various facts of\nperception we derive the judgments through which we predict, guide, and\nshape our future perception in the course of possible experience. These\njudgments exist in the form of reproductive ideational processes, which,\nif logically explicit, become _inductive inferences_ in the broader\nsense. These inferences may be said to be of two sorts, though\nfundamentally only two sides of one and the same process of thought;\nthey are in part analogical inferences and in part _inductive inferences\nin the narrower sense_. The former infers from the particular in a\npresent perception, _which in previous perceptions was uniformly\nconnected with other particular contents of perception_, to a particular\nthat resembles _those other contents of perception_. In short, they are\ninferences from a particular to a particular. After the manner of such\ninferences we logically formulate, for example, the reproductive\nprocesses, whose conclusions run: \"This man whom I see before me, is\nattentive, feels pain, will die;\" \"this meteor will prove to have a\nchemical composition similar to known meteors, and also to have\ncorresponding changes on its surface as the result of its rapid passage\nthrough our atmosphere.\" The inductive inferences in the narrower sense\nargue, on the contrary, from the perceptions of a series of uniform\nphenomena to a universal, which includes the given and likewise all\npossible cases, in which a member of the particular content of the\nearlier perceptions is presupposed as given. In short, they are\nconclusions from a particular to a universal that is more extensive than\nthe sum of the given particulars. For example: \"All men have minds, will\ndie;\" \"all meteoric stones will prove to have this chemical composition\nand those changes of surface.\"\n\nThere is no controversy regarding the inner similarity of both these\ntypes of inference or regarding their outward structure; or, again,\nregarding their outward difference from the deductive inferences, which\nproceed not from a particular to a particular or general, but from a\ngeneral to a particular.\n\nThere is, however, difference of opinion regarding their inner structure\nand their inner relation to the deductive inferences. Both questions\ndepend upon the decision regarding the meaning and validity of the\ncausal relation. The contending parties are recruited essentially from\nthe positions of traditional empiricism and rationalism and from their\nmodern offshoots.\n\nWe maintain first of all:\n\n1. The _presupposition_ of all inductive inferences, from now on to be\ntaken in their more general sense, is, that the contents of perception\nare given to us _uniformly_ in repeated perceptions, that is, in uniform\ncomponents and uniform relations.\n\n2. The _condition_ of the validity of the inductive inferences lies in\nthe thoughts that _the same causes will be present_ in the unobserved\nrealities as in the observed ones, and that _these same causes will\nbring forth the same effects_.\n\n3. The _conclusions_ of all inductive inferences have, logically\nspeaking, purely _problematic_ validity, that is, their contradictory\nopposite remains equally thinkable. They are, accurately expressed,\nmerely _hypotheses_, whose validity needs verification through future\nexperience.\n\nThe first-mentioned _presupposition_ of inductive inference must not be\nmisunderstood. The paradox that nothing really repeats itself, that each\nstage in nature's process comes but once, is just as much and just as\nlittle justified as the assertion, everything has already existed. It\ndoes not deny the fact that we can discriminate in the contents of our\nperceptions the uniformities of their components and relations, in\nshort, that similar elements are present in these ever new complexes.\nThis fact makes it possible that our manifold perceptions combine to\nmake up one continuous experience. Even our paradox presupposes that the\ndifferent contents of our perceptions are comparable with one another,\nand reveal accordingly some sort of common nature. All this is not only\na matter of course for empiricism, which founds the whole constitution\nof our knowledge upon habits, but must also be granted by every\nrationalistic interpretation of the structure of knowledge. Every one\nthat is well informed knows that what we ordinarily refer to as facts\nalready includes a theory regarding them. Kant judges in this matter\nprecisely as Hume did before him and Stuart Mill after him. \"If cinnabar\nwere sometimes red and sometimes black, sometimes light and sometimes\nheavy, if a man could be changed now into this, now into another animal\nshape, if on the longest day the fields were sometimes covered with\nfruit, sometimes with ice and snow, the faculty of my empirical\nimagination would never be in a position, when representing red color,\nto think of heavy cinnabar.\"[8]\n\n [Footnote 8: Kant, _Kr. d. r. V._, 1st ed., pp. 100 f.]\n\nThe assumption that in recurring perceptions similar elements of\ncontent, as well as of relation, are given, is a necessary condition of\nthe possibility of experience itself, and accordingly of all those\nprocesses of thought which lead us, under the guidance of previous\nperceptions, from the contents of one given perception to the contents\nof possible perceptions.\n\nA tradition from Hume down has accustomed us to associate the relation\nof cause and effect not so much with the uniformity of coexistence as\nwith the uniformity of sequence. Let us for the present keep to this\ntradition. Its first corollary is that the relation of cause and effect\nis to be sought in the uninterrupted flow and connection of events and\nchanges. The cause becomes the uniformly preceding event, the constant\n_antecedens_, the effect the uniformly following, the constant\n_consequens_, in the course of the changes that are presented to\nconsciousness as a result of foregoing changes in our sensorium.\n\nAccording to this tradition that we have taken as our point of\ndeparture, the uniformity of the sequence of events is a necessary\npresupposition of the relation between cause and effect. This uniformity\nis given us as an element of our experience; for we actually find\nuniform successions in the course of the changing contents of\nperception. Further, as all our perceptions are in the first instance\nsense perceptions, we may call them the sensory presupposition of the\npossibility of the causal relation.\n\nIn this presupposition, however, there is much more involved than the\nname just chosen would indicate. The uniformity of sequence lies, as we\nsaw, not in the contents of perception as such, which are immediately\ngiven to us. It arises rather through the fact that, in the course of\nrepeated perceptions, we apprehend through abstraction the uniformities\nof their temporal relation. Moreover, there lie in the repeated\nperceptions not only uniformities of sequence, but also uniformities of\nthe qualitative content of the successive events themselves, and these\nuniformities also must be apprehended through abstraction. Thus these\nuniform contents of perception make up series of the following form:\n\n _a_1 --> _b_1\n _a_2 --> _b_2\n \" \"\n \" \"\n \" \"\n _a_n --> _b_n\n\nThe presupposition of the possibility of the causal relations includes,\ntherefore, more than mere perceptive elements. It involves the relation\nof different, if you will, of peculiar contents of perception, by virtue\nof which we recognize _a_2 --> _b_2 ... _a_n --> _b_n as events that\nresemble one another and the event _a_1 --> _b_1 qualitatively as well\nas in their sequence. There are accordingly involved in our\npresupposition _reproductive_ elements which indicate the action of\nmemory. In order that I may in the act of perceiving _a_3 --> _b_3\napprehend the uniformity of this present content with that of _a_2 -->\n_b_2 and _a_1 --> _b_1, these earlier perceptions must in some way,\nperhaps through memory,[9] be revived with the present perception.\n\n [Footnote 9: It is not our present concern to ascertain how\n this actually happens. The psychological presuppositions of\n the present paper are contained in the theory of\n reproduction that I have worked out in connection with the\n psychology of speech in the articles on \"Die psychologischen\n Grundlagen der Beziehungen zwischen Sprechen und Denken,\"\n _Archiv f\u00fcr systematische Philosophie_, II, III, und VII;\n cf. note 1, page 151.]\n\nIn this reproduction there is still a further element, which can be\nseparated, to be sure only _in abstracto_, from the one just pointed\nout. The present revived content, even if it is given in memory as an\nindependent mental state, is essentially different from the original\nperception. It differs in all the modifications in which the memory of\nlightning and thunder could differ from the perception of their\nsuccessive occurrence, or, again, the memory of a pain and the resulting\ndisturbance of attention could differ from the corresponding original\nexperience. However, as memory, the revived experience presents itself\nas a picture of that which has been previously perceived. Especially is\nthis the case in memory properly so called, where the peculiar space and\ntime relations individualize the revived experience. If we give to this\nidentifying element in the associative process a logical expression, we\nshall have to say that there is involved in revival, and especially in\nmemory, an awareness that the present ideas recall the same content that\nwas previously given us in perception. To be sure, the revival of the\ncontent of previous perceptions does not have to produce ideas, let\nalone memories. Rapid, transitory, or habitual revivals, stimulated by\nassociative processes, can remain unconscious, that is, they need not\nappear as ideas or states of consciousness. Stimulation takes place, but\nconsciousness does not arise, provided we mean by the term\n\"consciousness\" the genus of our thoughts, feelings, and volitions. None\nthe less it must not be forgotten that this awareness of the essential\nidentity of the present revived content with that of the previous\nperception can be brought about in every such case of reproduction. How\nall this takes place is not our present problem.\n\nWe can apply to this second element in the reproductive process, which\nwe have found to be essential to the causal relation, a Kantian term,\n\"Recognition.\" This term, however, is to be taken only in the sense\ncalled for by the foregoing statements; for the rationalistic\npresuppositions and consequences which mark Kant's \"Synthesis of\nRecognition\" are far removed from the present line of thought.\n\nWe may, then, sum up our results as follows: In the presupposition of a\nuniform sequence of events, which we have accepted from tradition as the\nnecessary condition of the possibility of the causal relation, there\nlies the thought that the contents of perception given us through\nrepeated sense stimulation are related to one another through a\nreproductive recognition.\n\nThe assumption of such reproductive recognition is not justified merely\nin the cases so far considered. It is already necessary in the course of\nthe individual perceptions _a_ and _b_, and hence in the apprehension of\nan occurrence. It makes the sequence itself in which _a_ and _b_ are\njoined possible; for in order to apprehend _b_ as following upon _a_, in\ncase the perception of _a_ has not persisted in its original form, _a_\nmust be as far revived and recognized upon _b_'s entrance into the field\nof perception as it has itself passed out of that field. Otherwise,\ninstead of _b_ following upon _a_ and being related to _a_, there would\nbe only the relationless change from _a_ to _b_. This holds generally\nand not merely in the cases where the perception of _a_ has disappeared\nbefore that of _b_ begins, for example, in the case of lightning and\nthunder, or where it has in part disappeared, for example, in the\nthrowing of a stone.\n\nWe have represented _a_ as an event or change, in order that uniform\nsequences of events may alone come into consideration as the\npresupposition of the causal relation. But every event has its course in\ntime, and is accordingly divisible into many, ultimately into infinitely\nmany, shorter events. Now if _b_ comes only an infinitely short interval\nlater than _a_, and by hypothesis it must come later than _a_, then a\ncorresponding part of _a_ must have disappeared by the time _b_ appears.\nBut the infinitesimal part of a perception is just as much out of all\nconsideration as would be an infinitely long perception; all which only\ngoes to show that we have to substitute intervals of finite length in\nplace of this purely conceptual analysis of a continuous time interval.\nThis leaves the foregoing discussion as it stands. If _b_ follows _a_\nafter a perceptible finite interval, then the flow or development of _a_\nby the time of _b_'s appearance must have covered a course corresponding\nto that interval; and all this is true even though the earlier stages of\n_a_ remain unchanged throughout the interval preceding _b_'s appearance.\nThe present instant of flow is distinct from the one that has passed,\neven though it takes place in precisely the same way. The former, not\nthe latter, gives the basis of relation which is here required, and\ntherefore the former must be reproduced and recognized. This thought\nalso is included in the foregoing summary of what critical analysis\nshows to be involved in the presupposition of a uniform sequence.\n\nIn all this we have already abandoned the field of mere perception which\ngave us the point of departure for our analysis of uniform sequence. We\nmay call the changing course of perception only in the narrower meaning\nthe sensory presupposition of the causal relation. In order that these\nchanging contents of perception may be known as like one another, as\nfollowing one another, and as following one another uniformly, they must\nbe related to one another through a recognitive reproduction.\n\nOur critical analysis of uniform sequence is, however, not yet complete.\nTo relate to one another the contents of two ideas always requires a\nprocess at once of identifying and of differentiating, which makes these\ncontents members of the relation, and which accordingly presupposes that\nour attention has been directed to each of the two members as well as to\nthe relation itself--in the present case, to the sequence. Here we come\nto another essential point. We should apply the name \"thought\" to every\nideational process in which attention is directed to the elements of the\nmental content and which leads us to identify with one another, or to\ndifferentiate from one another, the members of this content.[10] The act\nof relating, which knows two events as similar, as following one\nanother, indeed, as following one another uniformly, is therefore so far\nfrom being a sensation that it must be claimed to be an act of thinking.\nThe uniformity of sequence of _a_ and _b_ is therefore an act of\nrelating on the part of our thought, so far as this becomes possible\nsolely through the fact that we at one and the same time identify with\none another and differentiate from one another _a_ as cause and _b_ as\neffect. We say \"at one and the same time,\" because the terms identifying\nand differentiating are correlatives which denote two different and\nopposing sides of one and the same ideational process viewed logically.\nAccordingly, there is here on need of emphasizing that the act of\nrelating, which enables us to think _a_ as cause and _b_ as effect, is\nan act of thought also, because it presupposes on our part an act of\nnaming which raises it to being a component of our formulated and\ndiscursive thought. We therefore _think a_ as cause and _b_ as effect in\nthat we apprehend the former as uniform _antecedens_ and the latter as\nuniform _consequens_.\n\n [Footnote 10: Cf. the author's \"Umrisse zur Psychologie des\n Denkens,\" in _Philosophische Abhandlungen Chr. Sigwart ...\n gewidmet_, T\u00fcbingen, 1900.]\n\n * * * * *\n\nHave we not the right, after the foregoing analysis, to interpret the\nuniform sequence of events solely as the _necessary_ presupposition of\nthe causal relation? Is it not at the same time the _adequate_\npresupposition? Yes, is it not the causal relation itself? As we know,\nempiricism since Hume has answered the last question in the affirmative,\nand rationalism since Kant has answered it in the negative.\n\nWe, too, have seemingly followed in our discussion the course of\nempiricism. At least, I find nothing in that discussion which a\nconsistent empiricist might not be willing to concede; that is, if he is\nready to set aside the psychological investigation of the actual\nprocesses which we here presuppose and make room for a critical analysis\nof the content of the relation of cause and effect.[11] However, the\ndecision of the question, whether or not empiricism can determine\nexhaustively the content that we think in the causal relation, depends\nupon other considerations than those which we have until now been called\nupon to undertake. We have so far only made clear what every critical\nanalysis of the causal relation has to concede to empiricism. In reality\nthe empiristic hypothesis is inadequate. To be sure, the proof of this\ninadequacy is not to be taken from the obvious argument which Reid\nraised against the empiricism of Hume, and which compelled Stuart Mill\nin his criticism of that attack[12] to abandon his empiristic position\nat this point. No doubt the conclusion to which we also have come for\nthe time being, goes much too far, the conclusion that the cause is\nnothing but the uniform _antecedens_ and the effect merely the uniform\n_consequens_. Were it true, as we have hitherto assumed, that every\nuniformly preceding event is to be regarded as cause and every uniformly\nfollowing event as effect, then day must be looked upon as cause of\nnight and night as cause of day.\n\n [Footnote 11: The difference between the two points of view\n can be made clearer by an illustration. The case that we\n shall analyze is the dread of coming into contact with fire.\n The psychological analysis of this case has to make clear\n the mental content of the dread and its causes. Such dread\n becomes possible only when we are aware of the burning that\n results from contact with fire. We could have learned to be\n aware of this either immediately through our own experience,\n or mediately through the communication of others'\n experience. In both cases it is a matter of one or repeated\n experiences. In all cases the effects of earlier experiences\n equal association and recall, which, in turn, result in\n recognition. The recognition explaining the case under\n discussion arises thus. The present stimuli of visual\n perception arouse the retained impressions of previous\n visual perceptions of fire and give rise to the present\n perception (apperception) by fusing with them. By a process\n of interweaving, associations are joined to this perception.\n The apperceptively revived elements which lie at the basis\n of the content of the perception are interwoven by\n association with memory elements that retain the additional\n contents of previous perceptions of fire, viz., the burning,\n or, again, are interwoven with the memory elements of the\n communications regarding such burning. By means of this\n interweaving, the stimulation of the apperceptive element\n transmits itself to the remaining elements of the\n association complex. The character of the association is\n different under different conditions. If it be founded only\n upon one experience, then there can arise a memory or a\n recall, in the wider sense, of the foregoing content of the\n perception and feeling at the time of the burning, or,\n again, there can arise a revival wherein the stimulated\n elements of retention remain unconscious. Again, the words\n of the mother tongue that denote the previous mental\n content, and which likewise belong to the association\n complex (the apperceiving mass, in the wider sense), can be\n excited in one of these three forms and in addition as\n abstract verbal ideas. Each one of these forms of verbal\n discharge can lead to the innervations of the muscles\n involved in speech, which bring about some sort of oral\n expression of judgment. Each of these verbal reproductions\n can be connected with each of the foregoing sensory\n (_sachlichen_) revivals. Secondly, if the association be\n founded upon repeated perceptions on the part of the person\n himself, then all the afore-mentioned possibilities of\n reproduction become more complicated, and, in addition, the\n mental revivals contain, more or less, only the common\n elements of the previous perceptions, _i. e._, reappear in\n the form of abstract ideas or their corresponding\n unconscious modifications. In the third case the association\n is founded upon a communication of others' experience. For\n the sake of simplicity, let this case be confined to the\n following instance. The communication consisted in the\n assertion: \"All fire will burn upon contact.\" Moreover, this\n judgment was expressed upon occasion of imminent danger of\n burning. There can then arise, as is perhaps evident, all\n the possibilities mentioned in the second case, only that\n here there will be a stronger tendency toward verbal\n reproduction and the sensory reproduction will be less\n fixed.\n\n In the first two cases there was connected with the\n perception of the burning an intense feeling of pain. In the\n third the idea of such pain added itself to the visual\n perception of the moment. The associated elements of the\n earlier mental contents belong likewise to the apperceiving\n mass excited at the moment, in fact to that part of it\n excited by means of association processes, or, as we can\n again say, depending upon the point from which we take our\n view, the associative or apperceptive completion of the\n content of present perception. If these pain elements are\n revived as memories, _i. e._, as elements in consciousness,\n they give rise to a new disagreeable feeling, which is\n referred to the possible coming sensation of burning. If the\n mental modifications corresponding to these pain elements\n remain unconscious, as is often possible, there arises none\n the less the same result as regards our feeling, only with\n less intensity. This feeling tone we call the dread.\n\n As a result of the sum total of the revivals actual and\n possible, there is finally produced, according to the\n particular circumstances, either a motor reaction or an\n inhibitant of such reaction. Both innervations can take\n place involuntarily or voluntarily.\n\n The critical analysis of the fact that we dread contact with\n fire, even has another purpose and accordingly proceeds on\n other lines. It must make clear under what presuppositions\n the foresight that lies at the basis of such dread is valid\n for future experience. It must then formulate the actual\n process of revival that constitutes the foundation of this\n feeling as a series of judgments, from which the meaning and\n interconnection of the several judgments will become clear.\n Thus the critical analysis must give a logical presentation\n of the apperceptive and associative processes of revival.\n\n For this purpose the three cases of the psychological\n analysis reduce themselves to two: viz., first, to the case\n in which an immediate experience forms the basis, and\n secondly, to that in which a variety of similar mediately or\n immediately communicated experiences form such basis.\n\n In the first of these logically differentiated cases, the\n transformation into the speech of formulated thought leads\n to the following inference from analogy:\n\n Fire A burned.\n Fire B is similar to fire A.\n ----------------------------\n Fire B will burn.\n\n In the second case there arises a syllogism of some such\n form as:\n\n All fire causes burning upon contact.\n This present phenomenon is fire.\n --------------------------------------------------------\n This present phenomenon will cause burning upon contact.\n\n Both premises of this syllogism are inductive inferences,\n whose implicit meaning becomes clear when we formulate as\n follows:\n\n All heretofore investigated instances of fire have burned,\n therefore all fire burns.\n The present phenomenon manifests some properties of fire,\n will consequently have all the properties thereof.\n ---------------------------------------------------------\n The present phenomenon will, in case of contact, cause burning.\n\n The first syllogism goes from the particular to the\n particular. The second proves itself to be (contrary to the\n analysis of Stuart Mill) an inference that leads from the\n general to the particular. For the conclusion is the\n particular of the second parts of the major and minor\n premises; and these second parts of the premises are\n inferred from their first parts in the two possible ways of\n inductive inference. The latter do not contain the case\n referred to in the conclusion, but set forth the conditions\n of carrying a result of previous experience over to a new\n case with inductive probability, in other words, the\n conditions of making past experience a means of foreseeing\n future experience. It would be superfluous to give here the\n symbols of the two forms of inductive inference.\n\n We remain within the bounds of logical analysis, if we state\n under what conditions conclusions follow necessarily from\n their premises, viz., the conclusions of arguments from\n analogy and of syllogisms in the narrower sense, as well as\n those of the foregoing inductive arguments. For the\n inference from analogy and the two forms of inductive\n inference, these conditions are the presuppositions already\n set forth in the text of the present paper, that in the as\n yet unobserved portion of reality the like causes will be\n found and they will give rise to like effects. For the\n syllogism they are the thought that the predicate of a\n predicate is the (mediate) predicate of the subject. Only\n the further analysis of these presuppositions, which is\n undertaken in the text, leads to critical considerations in\n the narrower sense.]\n\n [Footnote 12: _A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and\n Inductive_, bk. III, ch. v, \u00a7 6.]\n\nEmpiricism can, however, meet this objection without giving up its\nposition; in fact, it can employ the objection as an argument in its\nfavor; for this objection affects only the manifestly imperfect\nformulation of the doctrine, not the essential arguments.\n\nIt should have been pointed out again and again in the foregoing\nexposition that only in the first indiscriminating view of things may we\nregard the events given us in perception as the basis of our concepts of\ncause and effect. All these events are intricately mixed, those that are\ngiven in self perception as well as those given in sense perception. The\nevents of both groups flow along continuously. Consequently, as regards\ntime, they permit a division into parts, which division proceeds, not\nindeed for our perception, but for our scientific thought, in short,\nconceptually, into infinity. The events of sense perception permit also\nconceptually of infinite division in their spatial relations.\n\nIt is sufficient for our present purpose, if we turn our attention to\nthe question of divisibility in time. This fact of divisibility shows\nthat the events of our perception, which alone we have until now brought\nunder consideration, must be regarded as systems of events. We are\ntherefore called upon to apportion the causal relations among the\nmembers of these systems. Only for the indiscriminating view of our\npractical _Weltanschauung_ is the perceived event _a_ the cause of the\nperceived event _b_. The more exact analysis of our theoretical\napprehension of the world compels us to dissect the events _a_ and _b_\ninto the parts _a_alpha , _a_beta, _a_gamma--_b_alpha, _b_beta,\n_b_gamma, and, where occasion\ncalls for it, to continue the same process in turn for these and further\ncomponents. We have accordingly to relate those parts to one another as\ncauses and effects which, from the present standpoint of analysis,\nfollow one another uniformly and _immediately_, viz., follow one another\nso that from this standpoint no other intervening event must be\npresupposed. In this way we come to have a _well-ordered experience_.\nThe dispositions to such experience which reveal themselves within the\nfield of practical thought taught man long before the beginning of\nscientific methods not to connect causally day and night with one\nanother, but the rising and setting of the sun with day and night. The\ntheoretical analysis, indeed, goes farther. It teaches that in what is\nhere summed up as rising of the sun and yonder as day, there lie again\nintricate elements requiring special attention, in our own day extending\nperhaps to the lines of thought contained in the electro-dynamic theory\nof light and of electrons. Still the ways of thought remain the same, on\nall the levels of penetrating analysis. We have throughout to relate to\none another as cause and effect those events which, in a well-ordered\nexperience, must be regarded as following one another immediately. The\ncause is then the _immediate_ uniform _antecedens_, the effect the\n_immediate_ uniform _consequens_. Otherwise stated, the perceived events\nthat we are accustomed, from the standpoint of the practical\n_Weltanschauung_, to regard as causes and effects, _e. g._, lightning\nand thunder, from the theoretical apprehension of the world prove to be\ninfinitely involved collections of events, whose elements must be\nrelated to one another as causes and effects in as far as they can be\nregarded as following one another immediately. No exception is formed by\nexpressions of our rough way of viewing and describing which lead us\nwithout hesitation to regard as cause one out of the very many causes of\nan event, and this, too, not necessarily the immediate uniformly\npreceding event. All this lies rather in the nature of such a hasty\nview.\n\nThe present limitation of uniform sequence to cases of immediate\nsequence sets aside, then, the objection from which we started, in that\nit adopts as its own the essential point in question.\n\nMoreover, the way that leads us to this necessary limitation goes\nfarther: it leads to a strengthening of the empiristic position. It\nbrings us to a point where we see that the most advanced analysis of\nintricate systems of events immediately given to us in perception as\nreal nowhere reveals more than the simple fact of uniform sequence.\nAgain where we come to regard the intervals between the events that\nfollow one another immediately as very short, there the uniformity of\nthe time relation makes, it would seem, the events for us merely causes\nand effects; and as often as we have occasion to proceed to the smaller\ntime differences of a higher order, the same process repeats itself; for\nwe dissect the events that make up our point of departure into ever more\ncomplex systems of component events, and the coarser relations of\nuniform sequence into ever finer immediate ones. Nowhere, seemingly, do\nwe get beyond the field of events in uniform sequence, which finally\nhave their foundation in the facts of perception from which they are\ndrawn. Thus there follows from this conceptual refinement of the point\nof departure only the truth that nothing connects the events as causes\nand effects except the immediate uniformity of sequence.\n\nNone the less, we have to think the empiristic doctrine to the bottom,\nif we desire to determine whether or not the hypothesis which it offers\nis really sufficient to enable us to deduce the causal relation. For\nthis purpose let us remind ourselves that the question at issue is,\nwhether or not this relation is merely a temporal connection of events\nthat are given to us in perception or that can be derived from the data\nof perception.\n\nBesides, let us grant that this relation is as thoroughly valid for the\ncontent of our experience as empiricism has always, and rationalism\nnearly always, maintained. We presuppose, therefore, as granted, that\nevery event is to be regarded as cause, and hence, in the opposite time\nrelation, as effect, mental events that are given to us in self\nperception no less than the physical whose source is our sense\nperception. In other words, we assume that the totality of events in our\npossible experience presents a closed system of causal series, that is,\nthat every member within each of the contemporary series is connected\nwith the subsequent ones, as well as with the subsequent members of all\nthe other series, backward and forward as cause and effect; and\ntherefore, finally, that every member of every series stands in causal\nrelationship with every member of every other series. We do not then,\nfor the present purpose, burden ourselves with the hypothesis which was\ntouched upon above, that this connection is to be thought of as a\ncontinuous one, namely, that other members can be inserted _ad\ninfinitum_ between any two members of the series.\n\nWe maintain at the same time that there is no justification for\nseparating from one another the concepts, causality and interaction.\nThis separation is only to be justified through the metaphysical\nhypothesis that reality consists in a multitude of independently\nexisting substances inherently subject to change, and that their mutual\ninterconnection is conditioned by a common dependence upon a first\ninfinite cause.[13] Every connection between cause and effect is mutual,\nif we assume with Newton that to every action there is an equal opposing\nreaction.\n\n [Footnote 13: This doctrine began in the theological\n evolution of the Christian concept of God. It was first\n fundamentally formulated by Leibnitz. It is retained in\n Kant's doctrine of the _harmonia generaliter stabilita_ and\n the latter's consequences for the critical doctrine of the\n _mundus intelligibilis_. Hence it permeates the metaphysical\n doctrines of the systems of the nineteenth century in\n various ways.]\n\nIn that we bring the totality of knowable reality, as far as it is\nanalyzable into events, under the causal relation, we may regard the\nstatement that every event requires us to seek among uniformly preceding\nevents for the sufficient causes of its own reality, namely, _the\ngeneral causal law_, as the principle of all material sciences. For all\nindividual instances of conformity to law which we can discover in the\ncourse of experience are from this point of view only special cases of\nthe general universal conformity to law which we have just formulated.\n\nFor the empiristic interpretation, the (general) causal law is only the\nhighest genus of the individual cases of empirically synthetic relations\nof uniform sequence. Starting from these presuppositions, it cannot be\nother than a generalization from experience, that is, a carrying over of\nobserved relations of uniform, or, as we may now also say, constant\nsequence to those which have not been or cannot be objects of\nobservation, as well as to those which we expect to appear in the\nfuture. Psychologically regarded, it is merely the most general\nexpression of an expectation, conditioned through associative\nreproduction, of uniform sequence. It is, therefore,--to bring Hume's\ndoctrine to a conclusion that the father of modern empiricism himself\ndid not draw,--a species of temporal contiguity.\n\nThe general validity which we ascribe to the causal law is accordingly a\nmerely empirical one. It can never attain apodeictic or even\nassertorical validity, but purely that type of problematic validity\nwhich we may call \"real\" in contradistinction to the other type of\nproblematic validity attained in judgments of objective as well as of\nsubjective and hypothetical possibility.[14] No possible progress of\nexperience can win for the empiristically interpreted causal law any\nother than this real problematic validity; for experience can never\nbecome complete _a parte post_, nor has it ever been complete _a parte\nante_. The causal law is valid assertorically only in so far as it sums\nup, purely in the way of an inventory, the preceding experiences. We\ncall such assumptions, drawn from well-ordered experience and of\ninductive origin, \"hypotheses,\" whether they rest upon generalizing\ninductive inferences in the narrower sense, or upon specializing\ninferences from analogy. They, and at the same time the empiristically\ninterpreted causal law, are not hypotheses in the sense in which Newton\nrightly rejected all formation of hypotheses,[15] but are such as are\nnecessarily part of all methods in the sciences of facts in so far as\nthe paths of research lead out beyond the content given immediately in\nperception to objects of only possible experience.\n\n [Footnote 14: Cf. the author's _Logik_, bd. I, \u00a7 61.]\n\n [Footnote 15: \"_Rationem_ vero harum gravitatis proprietatum\n ex phaenomenis nondum potui deducere, et hypotheses non\n fingo. _Quicquid enim ex phaenomenis non deducitur,\n hypothesis vocanda est_; et hypotheses seu metaphysicae, seu\n physicae, seu qualitatum occultarum, seu mechanicae, in\n philosophia experimentali locum non habent. In hac\n philosophia propositiones deducuntur ex phaenomenis, et\n redduntur generales per _inductionem_.\" Newton, at the end\n of his chief work.]\n\nThe assertion of Stuart Mill, in opposition to this conclusion, that the\ncause must be thought of as the \"invariable antecedent\" and,\ncorrespondingly, the effect is the \"invariable consequent,\"[16] does all\nhonor to the genius of the thinker; but it agrees by no means with the\nempiristic presuppositions which serve as the basis for his conclusions.\nFor, starting from these presuppositions, the \"invariable sequence\" can\nonly mean one that is uniform and constant according to past experience,\nand that we henceforth carry over to not yet observed events as far as\nthese prove in conformity with it, and in this way verify the\nanticipation contained in our general assertion. The same holds of the\nassertion through which Mill endeavors to meet the above-mentioned\nobjection of Reid, namely, that the unchanging sequence must at the same\ntime be demonstrably an \"unconditional\" one. The language in which\nexperience speaks to us knows the term \"the unconditioned\" as little as\nthe term \"the unchangeable,\" even though this have, as Mill explains,\nthe meaning that the effect \"will be, whatever supposition we may make\nin regard to all other things,\" or that the sequence will \"be subject to\nno other than negative conditions.\" For in these determinations there\ndoes not lie exclusively, according to Mill, a probable prediction of\nthe future. \"It is _necessary_ to our using the word cause, that we\nshould believe not only that the antecedent always _has_ been followed\nby the consequent, but that as long as the present constitution of\nthings endures, it always _will_ be so.\" Likewise, Mill, the man of\nresearch, not the empiristic logician, asserts that there belongs to the\ncausal law, besides this generality referring to all possible events of\nuniform sequence, also an \"undoubted assurance;\" although he could have\nhere referred to a casual remark of Hume.[17] Such an undoubted\nassurance, \"that for every event ... there is a law to be found, if we\nonly know where to find it,\" evidently does not know of a knowledge\nreferred exclusively to experience.\n\n [Footnote 16: _Logik_, bk. III, ch. v, \u00a7 2.]\n\n [Footnote 17: _Logic_, bk. III, ch. v, \u00a7 6, and end of \u00a7 2.\n Hume says in a note to section VI of his _Enquiry Concerning\n Human Understanding_: \"We ought to divide arguments into\n _demonstrations_, _proofs_, _and probabilities_. By proofs\n Meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for\n doubt or opposition.\" The note stands in evident contrast to\n the well-known remarks at the beginning of section IV, pt. I.]\n\nHence, if the causal law is, as empiricism to be consistent must\nmaintain, only a general hypothesis which is necessarily subject to\nverification as experience progresses, then it is not impossible that in\nthe course of experience events will appear that are not preceded or\nfollowed uniformly by others, and that accordingly cannot be regarded as\ncauses or effects. According to this interpretation of the causal law,\nsuch exceptional events, whether in individual or in repeated cases of\nperception, must be just as possible as those which in the course of\npreceding experience have proved themselves to be members of series of\nconstant sequence. On the basis of previous experience, we should only\nhave the right to say that such exceptional cases are less probable; and\nwe might from the same ground expect that, if they could be surely\ndetermined, they would only have to be regarded as exceptions to the\nrule and not, possibly, as signs of a misunderstood universal\nnon-uniformity of occurrence. No one wants to maintain an empirical\nnecessity, that is, a statement that so comprehends a present experience\nor an hypothesis developed on the basis of present experience that its\ncontradictory is rationally impossible. An event preceded by no other\nimmediately and uniformly as cause would, according to traditional\nusage, arise out of nothing. An event that was followed immediately and\nconstantly by no other would accordingly be an event that remained\nwithout effect, and, did it pass away, it must disappear into nothing.\nThe old thought, well known in its scholastic formulation, _ex nihilo\nnihil fit, in nihilum nihil potest reverti_, is only another expression\nfor the causal law as we have interpreted it above. The contradictories\nto each of the clauses of the thought just formulated, that something\ncan arise out of nothing and pass into nothing, remain therefore, as a\nconsequence of empiricism, an improbable thought, to be sure, but none\nthe less a thought to which a real possibility must be ascribed.\n\nIt was in all probability this that Stuart Mill wished to convey in the\nmuch-debated passage: \"I am convinced that anyone accustomed to\nabstraction and analysis, who will fairly exert his faculties for the\npurpose, will, when his imagination has once learnt to entertain the\nnotion, find no difficulty in conceiving that in some one, for instance,\nof the many firmaments into which sidereal astronomy now divides the\nuniverse, events may succeed one another at random without any fixed\nlaw; nor can anything in our experience, or in our mental nature,\nconstitute a sufficient, or indeed any, reason for believing that this\nis nowhere the case.\" For Mill immediately calls our attention to the\nfollowing: \"Were we to suppose (what it is perfectly possible to\nimagine) that the present order of the universe were brought to an end,\nand that a chaos succeeded in which there was no fixed succession of\nevents, and the past gave no assurance of the future; if a human being\nwere miraculously kept alive to witness this change, he surely would\nsoon cease to believe in any uniformity, the uniformity itself no longer\nexisting.\"[18]\n\n [Footnote 18: _Logic_, bk. III, ch. xxi, \u00a7 1.]\n\nWe can throw light from another side upon the thought that lies in this\noutcome of the empiristic interpretation of the causal law. If we still\ndesire to give the name \"effect\" to an event that is preceded uniformly\nby no other, and that we therefore have to regard as arising out of\nnothing, then we must say that it is the effect of itself, that is, its\ncause lies in its own reality, in short, that it is _causa sui_.\nTherefore the assumption that a _causa sui_ has just as much real\npossibility as have the causes of our experience which are followed\nuniformly by another event, is a necessary consequence of the empiristic\nview of causation. This much only remains sure, there is nothing\ncontained in our previous experience that in any way assures us of the\nvalidity of this possible theory.\n\nThe empiristic doctrine of causation requires, however, still further\nconclusions. Our scientific, no less than our practical thought has\nalways been accustomed to regard the relation between cause and effect\nnot as a matter of mere sequence, not therefore as a mere formal\ntemporal one. Rather it has always, in both forms of our thought, stood\nfor a _real_ relation, that is, for a relation of _dynamic dependence_\nof effect upon cause. Accordingly, the effect _arises out_ of the cause,\nis _engendered through_ it, or _brought forth by_ it.\n\nThe historical development of this dynamic conception of cause is well\nknown. The old anthropopathic interpretation, which interpolates\nanthropomorphic and yet superhuman intervention between the events that\nfollow one another uniformly, has maintained itself on into the modern\nmetaphysical hypotheses. It remains standing wherever God is assumed as\nthe first cause for the interaction between parts of reality. It is made\nobscure, but not eliminated, when, in other conceptions of the world,\nimpersonal nature, fate, necessity, the absolute identity, or an\nabstraction related to these, appears in the place of God. On the other\nhand, it comes out clearly wherever these two tendencies of thought\nunite themselves in an anthropopathic pantheism. That is, it rests only\nupon a difference in strength between the governing religious and\nscientific interests, whether or not the All-One which unfolds itself in\nthe interconnection and content of reality is thought of more as the\nimmanent God, or more as substance. Finally, we do not change our\nposition, if the absolute, self-active being (in all these theories a\nfirst cause is presupposed as _causa sui_) is degraded to a\nnon-intellectual will.\n\nHowever, the dynamic interpretation of cause has not remained confined\nto the field of these general speculations, just because it commanded\nthat field so early. There is a second branch, likewise early evolved\nfrom the stem of the anthropopathic interpretation, the doctrine that\nthe causal relations of dependence are effected through \"forces.\" These\nforces adhere to, or dwell in, the ultimate physical elements which are\nthought of as masses. Again, as spiritual forces they belong to the\n\"soul,\" which in turn is thought of as a substance. In the modern\ncontrast between attractive and repulsive forces, there lies a remnant\nof the Empedoklean opposition between Love and Hate. In the various old\nand new hylozoistic tendencies, the concepts of force and its correlate,\nmass, are eclectically united. In consistent materialism as well as\nspiritualism, and in the abstract dynamism of energetics, the one member\nis robbed of its independence or even rejected in favor of the\nother.[19]\n\n [Footnote 19: Alongside of these dynamic theories, there are\n to be found mechanical ones that arose just as early and\n from the same source, viz., the practical _Weltanschauung_.\n It is not part of our purpose to discuss them. Their first\n scientific expression is to be found in the doctrine of\n effluences and pores in Empedokles and in Atomism.]\n\nIt is evident in what light all these dynamic conceptions appear, when\nlooked at from the standpoint of consistent extreme empiricism. These\n\"forces,\" to consider here only this one of the dynamic hypotheses, help\nto explain nothing. The physical forces, or those which give rise to\nmovement, are evidently not given to us as contents of sense perception,\nand at the most they can be deduced as non-sensuous foundations, not as\ncontents of possible sense perception. The often and variously expressed\nbelief that self perception reveals to us here what our senses leave\nhidden has proved itself to be in all its forms a delusion. The forces\nwhose existence we assume have then an intuitable content only in so far\nas they get it through the uniformities present in repeated perceptions,\nwhich uniformities are to be \"explained\" through them. But right here\ntheir assumption proves itself to be not only superfluous but even\nmisleading; for it makes us believe that we have offered an explanation,\nwhereas in reality we have simply duplicated the given by means of a\nfiction, quite after the fashion of the Platonic doctrine of ideas. This\nendeavor to give the formal temporal relations between events, which we\ninterpret as causes and effects, a dynamic real substructure, shows\nitself thus to be worthless in its contributions to our thought. The\nsame holds true of every other dynamic hypothesis. The critique called\nforth by these contributions establishes therefore only the validity of\nthe empiristic interpretation.\n\nIf, however, we have once come so far, we may not hold ourselves back\nfrom the final step. Empiricism has long ago taken this step, and the\nmost consistent among its modern German representatives has aroused anew\nthe impulses that make it necessary. Indeed, if we start from the\nempiristic presuppositions, we must recognize that there lies not only\nin the assumption of forces, but even in the habit of speaking of causes\nand effects, \"a clear trace of fetishism.\" We are not then surprised\nwhen the statement is made: The natural science of the future, and\naccordingly science in general, will, it is to be hoped, set aside these\nconcepts also on account of their formal obscurity. For, so it is\nexplained, repetitions of like cases in which _a_ is always connected\nwith _b_, namely, in which like results are found under like\ncircumstances, in short, the essence of the connection of cause and\neffect, exists only in the abstraction that is necessary to enable us to\nrepicture the facts. In nature itself there are no causes and effects.\n_Die Natur ist nur einmal da._\n\nIt is, again, Stuart Mill, the man of research, not the empiricist, that\nopposes this conclusion, and indeed opposes it in the form that Auguste\nComte had given it in connection with thoughts that can be read into\nHume's doctrine. Comte's \"objection to the _word_ cause is a mere matter\nof nomenclature, in which, as a matter of nomenclature, I consider him\nto be entirely wrong.... By rejecting this form of expression, M. Comte\nleaves himself without any term for marking a distinction which, however\nincorrectly expressed, is not only real, but is one of the fundamental\ndistinctions in science.\"[20]\n\n [Footnote 20: _Logic_, bk. III, ch. v, \u00a7 6.]\n\nFor my own part, the right seems to be on the side of Comte and his\nrecent followers in showing the old nomenclature to be worn out, if\nviewed from the standpoint of empiricism. If the relation between cause\nand effect consists alone in the uniformity of sequence which is\nhypothetically warranted by experience, then it can be only misleading\nto employ words for the members of this purely formal relation that\nnecessarily have a strong tang of real dynamic dependence. In fact, they\ngive the connection in question a peculiarity that, according to\nconsistent empiricism, it does not possess. The question at issue in the\nempiristically interpreted causal relation is a formal functional one,\nwhich is not essentially different, as Ernst Mach incidentally\nacknowledges, from the interdependence of the sides and angles of a\ntriangle.\n\nHere two extremes meet. Spinoza, the most consistent of the dogmatic\nrationalists, finds himself compelled in his formulation of the analytic\ninterpretation of the causal relation handed down to him to transform it\ninto a mathematical one. Mach, the most consistent of recent German\nempiricists, finds himself compelled to recognize that the empirically\nsynthetic relation between cause and effect includes no other form of\ndependence than that which is present in the functional mathematical\nrelations. (In Germany empiricism steeped in natural science has\nsupplanted the na\u00efve materialism saturated with natural science.) That\nthe mathematical relations must likewise be subjected to a purely\nempirical interpretation, which even Hume denied them, is a matter of\ncourse.\n\nHowever, this agreement of two opposing views is no proof that\nempiricism is on the right road. The empiristic conclusions to which we\nhave given our attention do not succeed in defining adequately the\nspecific nature of the causal relation; on the contrary, they compel us\nto deny such a relation. Thus they cast aside the concept that we have\nendeavored to define, that is, the judgment in which we have to\ncomprehend whatever is peculiar to the causal connection. But one does\nnot untie a knot by denying that it exists.\n\nIt follows from this self-destruction of the empiristic causal\nhypothesis that an additional element of thought must be contained in\nthe relation of cause and effect besides the elements of reproductive\nrecognition and those of identification and discrimination, all of which\nare involved in the abstract comprehension of uniform sequence. The\ncharacteristics of the causal connection revealed by our previous\nanalysis constitute the necessary and perhaps adequate conditions for\ncombining the several factual perceptions into the abstract registering\nidea of uniform sequence. We may, therefore, expect to find that the\nelement sought for lies in the tendency to extend the demand for causal\nconnections over the entire field of possible experience; and perhaps we\nmay at the same time arrive at the condition which led Hume and Mill to\nrecognize the complete universality of the causal law in spite of the\nexclusively empirical content that they had ascribed to it. In this\nfurther analysis also we have to draw from the nature of our thought\nitself the means of guiding our investigation.\n\nIn the first place, all thought has a formal necessity which reveals\nitself in the general causal law no less than in every individual\nthought process, that is, in every valid judgment. The meaning of this\nformal necessity of thought is easily determined. If we presuppose, for\nexample, that I recognize a surface which lies before me as green, then\nthe perception judgment, \"This surface is green,\" that is, the\napprehension of the present perceptive content in the fundamental form\nof discursive thought, repeats with predicative necessity that which is\npresented to me in the content of perception. The necessity of thought\ncontained in this perception judgment, as _mutatis mutandis_ in every\naffirmative judgment meeting the logical conditions, is recognizable\nthrough the fact that the contradictory judgment, \"This surface is not\ngreen,\" is impossible for our thought under the presupposition of the\ngiven content of perception and of our nomenclature. It contradicts\nitself. I can express the contradictory proposition, for instance, in\norder to deceive; but I cannot really pass the judgment that is\ncontained in it. It lies in the very nature of our thought that the\npredicate of an assertive judgment call contain only whatever belongs as\nan element of some sort (characteristic, attribute, state, relation) to\nthe subject content in the wider sense. The same formal necessity of\nthought, to give a further instance, is present in the thought process\nof mediate syllogistic predication. The conclusion follows necessarily\nfrom the premises, for example, the judgment, \"All bodies are\ndivisible,\" from the propositions, \"All bodies are extended,\" and,\n\"Whatever is extended is divisible.\"\n\nThese elementary remarks are not superfluous; for they make clear that\nthe casually expressed assertion of modern natural scientific\nempiricism, declaring in effect that there is no such thing as necessity\nof thought, goes altogether too far. Such necessity can have an\nadmissible meaning only in so far as it denotes that in predicting or\nrecounting _the content_ of possible experience every hypothesis is\npossible for thought. Of course it is, but that is not the subject under\ndiscussion.\n\nThe recognition of the formal necessity of thought that must be\npresupposed helps us to define our present question; for it needs no\nproof that this formal necessity of thought, being valid for every\naffirmative judgment, is valid also for each particular induction, and\nagain for the general causal law. If in the course of our perceptions we\nmeet uniform sequences, then the judgment, \"These sequences are\nuniform,\" comprehends the common content of many judgments with formal\nnecessity of thought. Empiricism, too, does not seriously doubt that the\nhypothesis of a general functional, even though only temporal, relation\nbetween cause and effect is deduced as an expectation of possible\nexperience with necessity from our real experience. It questions only\nthe doctrine that the relation between the events regarded as cause and\neffect has any other than a purely empirical import. The reality of an\nevent that is preceded and followed uniformly by no other remains for\nthis view, as we have seen, a possibility of thought.\n\nIn opposition to empiricism, we now formulate the thesis to be\nestablished: Wherever two events _a_ and _b_ are known to follow one\nanother uniformly and immediately, there we must require with formal\nnecessity that some element in the preceding _a_ be thought of as\nfundamental, which will determine sufficiently _b_'s appearance or make\nthat appearance necessary. The necessity of the relation between the\nevents regarded as cause and effect is, therefore, the question at\nissue.\n\nWe must keep in mind from the very start that less is asserted in this\nformulation than we are apt to read into it. It states merely that\nsomething in _a_ must be thought of as fundamental, which makes _b_\nnecessary. On the other hand, it says nothing as to what this\nfundamental something is, or how it is constituted. It leaves entirely\nundecided whether or not this something that our thought must\nnecessarily postulate is a possible content of perception or can become\nsuch, accordingly whether or not it can become an object of our\nknowledge, or whether or not it lies beyond the bounds of all our\npossible experience and hence all our possible knowledge. It contains\nnothing whatsoever that tells us how the determination of _b_ takes\nplace through _a_. The word \"fundamental\" is intended to express all\nthis absence of determination.\n\nThus we hope to show a necessity of thought peculiar to the relation\nbetween cause and effect. This is the same as saying that our proof will\nestablish the logical impossibility of the contradictory assertion; for\nthe logical impossibility of the contradictory assertion is the only\ncriterion of logical necessity. Thus the proof that we seek can be given\nonly indirectly. In the course of this proof, we can disregard the\nimmediacy of the constant sequence and confine our attention to the\nuniformity of the sequence, not only for the sake of brevity, but also\nbecause, as we have seen, we have the right to speak of near and remote\ncauses. We may then proceed as follows.\n\nIf there is not something fundamental in a constant antecedent event\n_a_, which determines necessarily the constant subsequent appearance of\none and the same _b_,--that is, if there is nothing fundamental which\nmakes this appearance necessary,--then we must assume that also _c_ or\n_d_ ..., in short, any event you will, we dare not say \"follows upon,\"\nbut appears after _a_ in irregular alternation with _b_. This\nassumption, however, is impossible for our thought, because it is in\ncontradiction with our experience, on the basis of which our causal\nthought has been developed. Therefore the assumption of a something that\nis fundamental in _a_, and that determines sufficiently and necessarily\nthe appearance of _b_, is a necessity for our thought.\n\nThe assertion of this logical impossibility (_Denkunm\u00f6glichkeit_) will\nat once appear thoroughly paradoxical. The reader, merely recalling the\nresults of the empiristic interpretation given above, will immediately\nsay: \"The assumption that a _b_ does not follow constantly upon an _a_,\nbut that sometimes _b_, sometimes _c_, sometimes _d_ ... irregularly\nappears, is in contradiction only with all our previous experience, but\nit is not on this account a _logical_ impossibility. It is merely\nimprobable.\" The reader will appeal especially to the discussion of\nStuart Mill, already quoted, in which Mill pictures _in concreto_ such\nan improbable logical impossibility, and therefore at the same time\nestablishes it in fact. Again, the reader may bring forward the words in\nwhich Helmholtz introduces intellectual beings of only two dimensions.\n\"By the much misused expression, 'to be able to imagine to one's self,'\nor, 'to think how something happens,' I understand (and I do not see how\nanybody can understand anything else thereby without robbing the\nexpression of all meaning) that one can picture to one's self the series\nof sense impressions which one would have if such a thing actually took\nplace in an individual case.\"[21]\n\n [Footnote 21: _Vortr\u00e4ge und Reden_, bd. II, \"\u00dcber den\n Ursprung und die Bedeutung der geometrischen Axiome.\"]\n\nNevertheless, pertinent as are these and similar objections, they are\nnot able to stand the test. We ask: \"Is in fact a world, or even a\nportion of our world, possible for thought that displays through an\nabsolutely irregular alternation of events a chaos in the full sense; or\nis the attempt to picture such a chaos only a mere play of words to\nwhich not even our imagination, not to mention our thought, can give a\npossible meaning?\"\n\nPerhaps we shall reach a conclusion by the easiest way, if we subject\nMill's description to a test. If we reduce it to the several\npropositions it contains, we get the following: (1) Every one is able to\npicture to himself in his imagination a reality in which events follow\none another without rule, that is, so that after an event _a_ now _b_\nappears, now _c_, etc., in complete irregularity. (2) The idea of such a\nchaos accordingly contradicts neither the nature of our mind nor our\nexperience. (3) Neither the former nor the latter gives us sufficient\nreason to believe that such an irregular alternation does not actually\nexist somewhere in the observable world. (4) If such a chaos should be\npresented to us as fact, that is, if we were in a position to outlive\nsuch an alternation, then the belief in the uniformity of time relations\nwould soon cease.\n\nEvery one would subscribe to the last of these four theses, immediately\nupon such a chaos being admitted to be a possibility of thought; that\nis, he would unless he shared the rationalistic conviction that our\nthought constitutes an activity absolutely independent of all\nexperience. We must simply accept this conclusion on the ground of the\nprevious discussion and of a point still to be brought forward.\n\nIf we grant this conclusion, however, then it follows, on the ground of\nour previous demonstration of the reproductive and recognitive, as well\nas thought elements involved in the uniform sequence, that the\nirregularity in the appearance of the events, assumed in such a chaos,\ncan bring about an absolutely relationless alternation of impressions\nfor the subject that we should presuppose to be doing the perceiving. If\nwe still wish to call it perception, it would remain only a perception\nin which no component of its content could be related to the others, a\nperception, therefore, in which not even the synthesis of the several\nperception contents could be apprehended as such. That is, every\ncombination of the different perception contents, by which they become\ncomponents of one and the same perception, presupposes, as we have seen,\nthose reproductive and recognitive acts in revival which are possible\nonly where uniformities of succession (and of coexistence) exist. Again,\nevery act of attention involved in identifying and discriminating, which\nlikewise we have seen to be possible only if we presuppose uniformities\nin the given contents of perception, must necessarily disappear when we\npresuppose the chaotic content; and yet they remain essential to the\nvery idea of such a chaos. A relationless chaos is after all nothing\nelse than a system of relations thought of without relations! That the\nsame contradiction obtains also in the mere mental picturing of a\nmanifold of chaotic impressions needs no discussion; for the productive\nimagination as well as the reproductive is no less dependent than is our\nperceptive knowledge upon the reproductive recognition and upon the\nprocesses of identifying and discriminating.\n\nThus the mental image of a chaos could be formed only through an\nextended process of ideation, which itself presupposes as active in it\nall that must be denied through the very nature of the image. A\nrelationless knowledge, a relationless abstraction, a relationless\nreproduction or recognition, a relationless identification or\ndiscrimination, in short, a relationless thought, are, as phrases, one\nand all mere contradictions. We cannot picture \"through our relating\nthought,\" to use Helmholtz's expression, nor even in our imagination,\nthe sense impressions that we should have if our thought were\nrelationless, that is, were nullified in its very components and\npresuppositions. In the case of Helmholtz's two dimensional beings, the\nquestion at issue was not regarding the setting aside of the conditions\nof our thought and the substituting conditions contradictory to them,\nbut regarding the setting aside of a part of the content of our sense\nintuition, meanwhile retaining the conditions and forms peculiar to our\nthought. In this case, therefore, we have a permissible fiction, whereas\nin Mill's chaos we have an unthinkable thought.\n\nAgain, the sense impressions that must be presupposed in an inherently\nrelationless chaos have no possible relation to the world of our\nperception, whose components are universally related to each other\nthrough the uniformities of their coexistences and sequences.\nAccordingly, the remark with which Helmholtz concludes the passage above\nquoted holds, _mutatis mutandis_, here also. \"If there is no sense\nimpression known that stands in relation to an event which has never\nbeen observed (by us), as would be the case for us were there a motion\ntoward a fourth dimension, and for those two dimensional beings were\nthere a motion toward our third dimension; then it follows that such an\n'idea' is impossible, as much so as that a man completely blind from\nchildhood should be able to 'imagine' the colors, if we could give him\ntoo a conceptual description of them.\"\n\nHence the first of the theses in which we summed up Stuart Mill's\nassumptions must be rejected. With it go also the second and third. In\nthis case we need not answer the question: In how far do these theses\ncorrespond to Mill's own statements regarding the absolute surety and\nuniversality of the causal law?\n\nWe have now found what we sought, in order to establish as a valid\nassertion the seeming paradox in the proof of the necessity that we\nascribe to the relation between cause and effect. We have proved that\nthe assumption of a completely irregular and therefore relationless\nalternation of impressions contradicts not only our experience, but even\nthe conditions of our thought; for these presuppose the uniformities of\nthe impressions, and consequently our ability to relate them, all which\nwas eliminated from our hypothetical chaos. Hence we have also\nestablished that a necessary relation is implied in the thought of a\nconstant sequence of events, which makes the uniformly following _b_\nreally dependent upon the uniformly preceding _a_.\n\n * * * * *\n\nFrom still another side, we can make clear the necessity asserted in the\nrelation of cause and effect. We found that the connection between each\ndefinite cause and its effect is an empirically synthetic one and has as\nits warrant merely experience. We saw further that the necessity\ninherent in the causal connection contains merely the demand that there\nshall be something fundamental in the constantly preceding _a_ which\nmakes the appearance of _b_ necessary; not, however, that it informs us\nwhat this efficacy really is, and hence also not that it informs us how\nthis efficacy brings about its effect. Finally, we had to urge that\nevery induction, the most general no less than the most particular,\ndepends upon the presupposition that the same causes will be given in\nthe reality not yet observed as in that already observed. This\nexpectation is warranted by no necessity of thought, not even by that\ninvolved in the relation of cause and effect; for this relation begins\nfor future experience only when the presupposition that the same causes\nwill be found in it is assumed as fulfilled.[22] This expectation is\nthen dependent solely upon previous experience, whose servants we are,\nwhose lords we can never be. Therefore, every induction is an hypothesis\nrequiring the verification of a broader experience, since, in its work\nof widening and completing our knowledge, it leads us beyond the given\nexperience to a possible one. In this respect we can call all inductive\nthought empirical, that is, thought that begins with experience, is\ndirected to experience, and in its results is referred to experience.\nThe office of this progressing empirical thought is accordingly to form\nhypotheses from which the data of perception can be regressively\ndeduced, and by means of which they can be exhibited as cases of known\nrelations of our well-ordered experience, and thus can be explained.\n\n [Footnote 22: The only empiricism which can maintain that\n the same causes would, in conformity with the causal law, be\n given in the unobserved reality, is one which puts all\n events that can be regarded as causes in the immediately\n given content of perception as its members. Such a view is\n not to be found in Mill; and it stands so completely in the\n way of all further analysis required of us by every\n perception of events that no attention has been paid in the\n text to this extreme of extremes.]\n\nThe way of forming hypotheses can be divided logically into different\nsections which can readily be made clear by an example. The police\nmagistrate finds a human corpse under circumstances that eliminate the\npossibility of accident, natural death, or suicide; in short, that\nindicate an act of violence on the part of another man. The general\nhypothesis that he has here to do with a crime against life forms the\nguide of his investigation. The result of the circumstantial evidence,\nwhich we presuppose as necessary, furnishes then a special hypothesis as\nfollowing from the general hypothesis.\n\nIt is clear that this division holds for all cases of forming\nhypotheses. A general hypothesis serves every special hypothesis as a\nheuristic principle. In the former we comprehend the causal explanation\nindicated immediately by the facts revealed to our perception in the\nspecial case. It contains, as we might also express it, the genus to the\nspecific limitations of the more exact investigation. But each of these\ngeneral hypotheses is a modification of the most general form of\nbuilding hypotheses, which we have already come to know as the condition\nof the validity of all inductive inferences, that is, as the condition\nfor the necessity of their deduction, and, consequently, as the\ncondition for the thought that like causes will be given in the reality\nnot yet observed as in that already observed. We have further noticed\nthat in this most general form of building hypotheses there lie two\ndistinct and different valid assumptions: beside the empirical statement\nthat like causes will be given, which gives the inductive conclusion the\nhypothetical form, there stands the judgment that like causes bring\nforth like effects, a corollary of the causal law. The real dependence\nof the effect upon the cause, presupposed by this second proposition and\nthe underlying causal law, is not, as was the other assumption, an\nhypothesis, but a necessary requirement or _postulate_ of our thought.\nIts necessity arises out of our thought, because our experience reveals\nuniformity in the sequence of events. From this point of view,\ntherefore, the causal law appears as a postulate of our thought,\ngrounded upon the uniformity in the sequence of events. It underlies\nevery special case of constructing hypotheses as well as the expectation\nthat like causes will be given in the reality not yet observed.\n\nMill's logic of induction contains the same fault as that already\npresent in Hume's psychological theory of cause. Hume makes merely the\ncausal law itself responsible for our inductive inferences, and\naccordingly (as Mill likewise wrongly assumes) for our inferences in\ngeneral. But we recognize how rightly Mill came to assert, in\ncontradiction to his empiristic presuppositions, that the causal law\noffers \"an undoubted assurance of an invariable, universal, and\nunconditional,\" that is, necessary, sequence of events, from which no\nseeming irregularity of occurrence and no gap in our experience can lead\nus astray, as long as experience offers uniformities of sequence.\n\nRationalism is thus in the right, when it regards the necessary\nconnection as an essential characteristic of the relation between cause\nand effect, that is, recognizes in it a relation of real dependence. At\nthis point Kant and Schopenhauer have had a profounder insight than Hume\nand Stuart Mill. Especially am I glad to be in agreement with Lotze on a\npoint which he reached by a different route and from essentially\ndifferent presuppositions. Lotze distinguishes in pure logic between\npostulates, hypotheses, and fictions. He does not refer the term\n\"postulate\" exclusively to the causal law which governs our entire\nempirical thought in its formation of hypotheses, but gives the term a\nwider meaning. \"Postulates\" are only corollaries from the inductive\nfundamental form of all hypothesis construction, and correspond\nessentially to what we have called general or heuristic hypotheses. His\ndetermination of the validity of these postulates, however, implies the\nposition to be assigned to the causal law and therefore not to those\nheuristic hypotheses. \"The postulate is not an assumption that we can\nmake or refrain from making, or, again, in whose place we can substitute\nanother. It is rather an (absolutely) necessary assumption without which\nthe content of the view at issue would contradict the laws of our\nthought.\"[23]\n\n [Footnote 23: _Logic_, 1874, buch II, kap. viii.]\n\nStill the decision that we have reached is not on this account in favor\nof rationalism, as this is represented for instance by Kant and his\nsuccessors down to our own time, and professed by Lotze in the passage\nquoted, when he speaks of an absolute necessity for thought. We found\nthat the causal law requires a necessary connection between events given\nus in constant sequence. It is not, however, on that account a law of\nour thought or of a \"pure understanding\" which would be absolutely\nindependent of all experience. When we take into consideration the\nevolution of the organic world of which we are members, then we must say\nthat our intellect, that is, our ideation and with it our sense\nperception, has evolved in us in accordance with the influences to which\nwe have been subjected. The common elements in the different contents of\nperception which have arisen out of other psychical elements, seemingly\nfirst in the brute world, are not only an occasion, but also an\nefficient cause, for the evolution of our processes of reproduction, in\nwhich our memory and imagination as well as our knowledge and thought,\npsychologically considered, come to pass. The causal law, which the\ncritical analysis of the material scientific methods shows to be a\nfundamental condition of empirical thought, in its requirement that the\nevents stand as causes and effects in necessary connection, or real\ndependence, comprehends these uniform contents of perception only in the\nway peculiar to our thought.\n\nDoubtless our thought gives a connection to experience through this its\nrequirement which experience of itself could not offer. The necessary\nconnection of effect with cause, or the real dependence of the former\nupon the latter, is not a component of possible perception. This\nrequirement of our thought does not, however, become thereby independent\nof the perceptive elements in the presuppositions involved in the\nuniformity of sequence. The _a priori_ in the sense of \"innate ideas,\"\ndenoting either these themselves or an absolutely _a priori_ conformity\nto law that underlies them, for instance, our \"spontaneity,\" presupposes\nin principle that our \"soul\" is an independently existing substance in\nthe traditional metaphysical sense down to the time of Locke. Kant's\nrationalistic successors, for the most part, lost sight of the fact that\nKant had retained these old metaphysical assumptions in his\ninterpretation of the transcendental conditions of empirical interaction\nand in his cosmological doctrine of freedom. The common root of the\nsensibility and of the understanding as the higher faculty of knowledge\nremains for Kant the substantial force of the soul, which expresses\nitself (just as in Leibnitz) as _vis passiva_ and _vis activa_. The\nmodern doctrine of evolution has entirely removed the foundation from\nthis rationalism which had been undermined ever since Locke's criticism\nof the traditional concept of substance.\n\nTo refer again briefly to a second point in which the foregoing results\ndiffer from the Kantian rationalism as well as from empiricism since\nHume: The postulate of a necessary connection between cause and effect,\nas we have seen, in no way implies the consequence that the several\ninductions lose the character of hypotheses. This does not follow merely\nfrom the fact that all inductions besides the causal law include the\nhypothetical thought that the same causes will be given in the reality\nnot yet observed as appear in that already observed. The hypothetical\ncharacter of all inductive inferences is rather revealed through the\ncircumstance that in the causal postulate absolutely nothing is\ncontained regarding _what_ the efficacy in the causes is, and _how_ this\nefficacy arises.\n\n * * * * *\n\nOnly such consequences of the foregoing interpretation of the causal law\nand of its position as one of the bases of all scientific construction\nof hypotheses may be pointed out, in conclusion, as will help to make\neasier the understanding of the interpretation itself.\n\nThe requirement of a necessary connection, or dependence, is added by\nour thought to the reproductive and recognitive presuppositions that are\ncontained in the uniformity of the sequence of events. If this necessary\nconnection be taken objectively, then it reveals as its correlate the\nrequirement of a real dependence of effect upon cause. We come not only\nupon often and variously used rationalistic thoughts, but also upon old\nand unchangeable components of all empirical scientific thought, when we\ngive the name \"force\" to the efficacy that underlies causes. The old\npostulate of a dynamic intermediary between the events that follow one\nanother constantly retains for us, therefore, its proper meaning. We\nadmit without hesitation that the word \"force\" suggests fetishism more\nthan do the words \"cause\" and \"effect;\" but we do not see how this can\nto any degree be used as a counter-argument. All words that were coined\nin the olden time to express thoughts of the practical _Weltanschauung_\nhave an archaic tang. Likewise all of our science and the greater part\nof our nomenclature have arisen out of the sphere of thought contained\nin the practical _Weltanschauung_, which centred early in fetishism and\nrelated thoughts. If, then, we try to free our scientific terminology\nfrom such words, we must seek refuge in the Utopia of a _lingua\nuniversalis_, in short, we must endeavor to speak a language which would\nmake science a secret of the few. Or will any one seriously maintain\nthat a thought which belongs to an ancient sphere of mental life must be\nfalse for the very reason that it is ancient?\n\nIn any case, it is fitting that we define more closely the sense in\nwhich we are to regard forces as the dynamic intermediaries of uniform\noccurrence. Force cannot be given as a content of perception either\nthrough our senses or through our consciousness of self; in the case of\nthe former, not in our kinesthetic sensations, in the case of the\nlatter, not in our consciousness of volition. Volition would not include\na consciousness of force, even though we were justified in regarding it\nas a simple primitive psychosis, and were not compelled rather to regard\nit as an intricate collection of feelings and sensations as far as these\nelementary forms of consciousness are connected in thought with the\nphenomena of reaction. Again, forces cannot be taken as objects that are\nderived as _possible_ perceptions or after the analogy of possible\nperceptions. The postulate of our thought through which these forces are\nderived from the facts of the uniform sequence of events, reveals them\nas limiting notions (_Grenzbegriffe_), as specializations of the\nnecessary connection between cause and effect, or of the real dependence\nof the former upon the latter; for the manner of their causal\nintermediation is in no way given, rather they can be thought of only as\nunderlying our perceptions. They are then in fact _qualitates occultae_;\nbut they are such only because the concept of quality is taken from the\ncontents of our sense and self perception, which of course do not\ncontain the necessary connection required by our thought. Whoever,\ntherefore, requires from the introduction of forces new contents of\nperception, for instance, new and fuller mechanical pictures, expects\nthe impossible.\n\nThe contempt with which the assumption of forces meets, on the part of\nthose who make this demand, is accordingly easily understood, and still\nmore easily is it understood, if one takes into consideration what\nconfusion of concepts has arisen through the use of the term \"force\" and\nwhat obstacles the assumption of forces has put in the way of the\nmaterial sciences. It must be frankly admitted that this concept delayed\nfor centuries both in the natural and moral sciences the necessary\nanalysis of the complicated phenomena forming our data. Under the\ninfluence of the \"concept philosophy\" it caused, over and over again,\nthe setting aside of the problems of this analytical empirical thought\nas soon as their solution had been begun. This misuse cannot but make\nsuspicious from the very start every new form of maintaining that forces\nunderlie causation.\n\nHowever, misuse proves as little here against a proper use as it does in\nother cases. Moreover, the scruples that we found arising from the\nstandpoint of empiricism against the assumption of forces are not to the\npoint. In assuming a dynamic intermediary between cause and effect, we\nare not doubling the problems whose solution is incumbent upon the\nsciences of facts, and still less is it true that our assumption must\nlead to a logical circle. That is, a comparison with the ideas of the\nold concept philosophy, which even in the Aristotelian doctrine contain\nsuch a duplication, is not to the point. Those ideas are hypostasized\nabstractions which are taken from the uniformly coexisting\ncharacteristics of objects. Forces, on the other hand, are the\nimperceivable relations of dependence which we must presuppose between\nevents that follow one another uniformly, if the uniformity of this\nsequence is to become for us either thinkable or conceivable. The\nproblems of material scientific research are not doubled by this\npresupposition of a real dynamic dependence, because it introduces an\nelement not contained in the data of perception which give these\nproblems their point of departure. This presupposition does not renew\nthe thought of an analytic rational connection between cause and effect\nwhich the concept philosophy involves; on the contrary, it remains true\nto the principle made practical by Hume and Kant, that the real\nconnection between causes and their effects is determinable only through\nexperience, that is, empirically and synthetically through the actual\nindication of the events of uniform sequence. How these forces are\nconstituted and work, we cannot know, since our knowledge is confined to\nthe material of perception from which as a basis presentation has\ndeveloped into thought. The insight that we have won from the limiting\nnotion of force helps us rather to avoid the misuse which has been made\nof the concept of force. A fatal circle first arises, when we use the\nunknowable forces and not the knowable events for the purpose of\nexplanation, that is, when we cut off short the empirical analysis which\nleads _ad infinitum_. To explain does not mean to deduce the known from\nthe unknown, but the particular from the general. It was therefore no\narbitrary judgment, but an impulse conditioned by the very nature of our\nexperience and of our thought, that made man early regard the causal\nconnection as a dynamic one, even though his conception was of course\nindistinct and mixed with confusing additions.\n\nThe concept of force remains indispensable also for natural scientific\nthought. It is involved with the causal law in every attempt to form an\nhypothesis, and accordingly it is already present in every description\nof facts which goes by means of memory or abstraction beyond the\nimmediately given content of present perception. In introducing it we\nhave in mind, moreover, that the foundations of every possible\ninterpretation of nature possess a dynamic character, just because all\nempirical thought, in this field as well, is subordinate to the causal\nlaw. This must be admitted by any one who assumes as indispensable aids\nof natural science the mechanical figures through which we reduce the\nevents of sense perception to the motion of mass particles, that is,\nthrough which we associate these events with the elements of our visual\nand tactual perception. All formulations of the concept of mass, even\nwhen they are made so formal as in the definition given by Heinrich\nHertz, indicate dynamic interpretations. Whether the impelling forces\nare to be thought of in particular as forces acting at a distance or as\nforces acting through collision depends upon the answer to the question\nwhether we have to assume the dynamic mass particles as filling space\ndiscontinuously or continuously. The dynamic basis of our interpretation\nof nature will be seen at once by any one who is of the opinion that we\ncan make the connection of events intelligible without the aid of\nmechanical figures, for instance, in terms of energy.\n\nThus it results that we interpret the events following one another\nimmediately and uniformly as causes and effects, by presupposing as\nfundamental to them forces that are the necessary means of their\nuniformity of connection. What we call \"laws\" are the judgments in which\nwe formulate these causal connections.\n\nA second and a third consequence need only be mentioned here. The\nhypothesis that interprets the mutual connection of psychical and\nphysical vital phenomena as causal one is as old as it is natural. It is\nnatural, because even simple observations assure us that the mental\ncontent of perception _follows_ uniformly the instigating physical\nstimulus and the muscular movement the instigating mental content which\nwe apprehend as will. We know, however, that the physical events which,\nin raising the biological problem, we have to set beside the psychical,\ndo not take place in the periphery of our nervous system and in our\nmuscles, but in the central nervous system. But we must assume, in\naccordance with all the psycho-physiological data which at the present\ntime are at our disposal, that these events in our central nervous\nsystem do not follow the corresponding psychical events, but that both\nseries have their course simultaneously. We have here, therefore,\ninstead of the real relation of dependence involved in constant\nsequence, a real dependence of the simultaneity or correlative series of\nevents. This would not, of course, as should be at once remarked, tell\nas such against a causal connection between the two separate causal\nseries. But the contested parallelistic interpretation of this\ndependence is made far more probable through other grounds. These are in\npart corollaries of the law of the conservation of energy, rightly\ninterpreted, and in part epistemological considerations. Still it is not\nadvisable to burden methodological study, for instance, the theory of\ninduction, with these remote problems; and on that account it is better\nfor our present investigation to subordinate the psychological\ninterdependences, to the causal ones in the narrower sense.\n\nThe final consequence, too, that forces itself upon our attention is\nclose at hand in the preceding discussion. The tradition prevailing\nsince Hume, together with its inherent opposition to the interpretation\nof causal connection given by the concept philosophy, permitted us to\nmake the uniform sequences of events the basis of our discussion. In so\ndoing, however, our attention had to be called repeatedly to one\nreservation. In fact, only a moment ago, in alluding to the\npsychological interdependences, we had to emphasize the uniform\n_sequence_. Elsewhere the arguments depended upon the _uniformity_ that\ncharacterizes this sequence; and rightly, for the reduction of the\ncausal relation to the fundamental relation of the sequence of events is\nmerely a convenient one and not the only possible one. As soon as we\nregard the causal connection, along with the opposed and equal reaction,\nas an interconnection, then cause and effect become, is a matter of\nprinciple, simultaneous. The separation of interaction from causation is\nnot justifiable.\n\nIn other ways also we can so transform every causal relation that cause\nand effect must be regarded as simultaneous. Every stage, for instance,\nof the warming of a stone by the heat of the sun, or of the treaty\nconferences of two states, presents an effect that is simultaneous with\nthe totality of the acting causes. The analysis of a cause that was at\nfirst grasped as a whole into the multiplicity of its constituent causes\nand the comprehension of the constituent causes into a whole, which then\npresents itself as the effect, is a necessary condition of such a type\nof investigation. This conception, which is present already in Hobbes,\nbut especially in Herbart's \"method of relations,\" deserves preference\nalways where the purpose in view is not the shortest possible\nargumentation but the most exact analysis.\n\nIf we turn our attention to this way of viewing the problem,--not,\nhowever, in the form of Herbart's speculative method,--we shall find\nthat the results which we have gained will in no respect be altered. We\ndo, however, get a view beyond. From it we can find the way to\nsubordinate not only the uniform sequence of events, but also the\npersistent characteristics and states with their mutual relations, under\nthe extended causal law. In so doing, we do not fall back again into the\nintellectual world of the concept philosophy. We come only to regard the\n_persisting coexistences_--in the physical field, the bodies, in the\npsychical, the subjects of consciousness--as systems or modes of\nactivity. The thoughts to which such a doctrine leads are accordingly\nnot new or unheard of. The substances have always been regarded as\nsources of modes of activity. We have here merely new modifications of\nthoughts that have been variously developed, not only from the side of\nempiricism, but also from that of rationalism. They carry with them\nmethodologically the implication that it is possible to grasp the\ntotality of reality, as far as it reveals uniformities, as a causally\nconnected whole, as a cosmos. They give the research of the special\nsciences the conceptual bases for the wider prospects that the sciences\nof facts have through hard labor won for themselves. The subject of\nconsciousness is unitary as far as the processes of memory extend, but\nit is not simple. On the contrary, it is most intricately put together\nout of psychical complexes, themselves intricate and out of their\nrelations; all of which impress upon us, psychologically and, in their\nmechanical correlates, physiologically, an ever-recurring need for\nfurther empirical analysis. Among the mechanical images of physical\nreality that form the foundation of our interpretation of nature, there\ncan finally be but one that meets all the requirements of a general\nhypothesis of the continuity of kinetic connections. With this must be\nuniversally co\u00f6rdinated the persistent properties or sensible modes of\naction belonging to bodies. The mechanical constitution of the compound\nbodies, no matter at what stage of combination and formation, must be\nderivable from the mechanical constitution of the elements of this\ncombination. Thus our causal thought compels us to trace back the\npersistent coexistences of the so-called elements to combinations whose\nanalysis, as yet hardly begun, leads us on likewise to indefinitely\nmanifold problems. Epistemologically we come finally to a universal\nphenomenological dynamism as the fundamental basis of all theoretical\ninterpretation of the world, at least fundamental for our scientific\nthought, and we are here concerned with no other.\n\n\n\n\nADDENDA PAGES\n\nFOR LECTURE NOTES AND MEMORANDA OF COLLATERAL READING\n\n\n\n\n Transcriber's Notes:\n\n In the original book, ten blank pages follow the last text entry.\n On the title page, the copy number (337) is written in by hand.\n In the chronological order of proceedings for September 24, there\n is no listing for Hall 9 at 3 p.m.\n\n Alterations:\n\n Punctuation was standardized.\n Footnotes were moved directly after the paragraph to which they pertain\n and are indented.\n Greek phrases were transliterated. Stand-alone Greek letters were\n spelled out, i.e., 'alpha,' 'beta,' 'gamma.'\n Hyphens removed for consistency with remaining text:\n ... banquet hall of the Tyrolean Alps ...\n ... breaking down of national Schools ...\n ... analysis of the material scientific methods ...\n ... is by no means a passive mirror picture of an ...\n ... and the much discussed historical laws are ...\n ... it is in the number series that we have ...\n ... as well as of the number system, can all be ...\n ... by our sense perception of this ...\n ... in the form of sense perception ...\n ... for the space of sense perception is to ...\n ... are in the first instance sense perceptions,...\n ... doctrine of the thought processes,...\n ... character of the thought processes,...\n ... introduction of time relations into the ...\n ... the too much neglected idea of the ...\n ... in the main, twofold: ...\n ... sense and self perception,...\n Hyphen added for consistency with remaining text:\n ... of those will-acts which themselves have ...\n Changed:\n 'colaborers' to 'co-laborers' ... and other worthy co-laborers?...\n 'pyscho' to 'psycho' ... psycho-physical elements ...\n 'interacademic' to 'inter-academic' ... inter-academic interest ...\n 'organzied' to 'organized' ... already organized branches ...\n 'Pyschological' to 'Psychological' ... Psychological Association....\n 'B' to 'A' and 'C' to 'B' in the Programme, Department 16. Sociology\n Capitalized 'Admiral' ... Rear-Admiral John R. Bartlett ...\n Added period to 'LL.D.' ... Putnam, Litt.D., LL.D., ...","title":"International Congress of Arts and Science, Volume 1: Philosophy and Metaphysics","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":169273}