{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_38283/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_38283","id":"gutenberg_38283","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/38283","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Biographies","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Schopenhauer, Arthur, 1788-1860"],"text":"Produced by Albert Laszlo and the Online Distributed\nProofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was\nproduced from images generously made available by The\nInternet Archive)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPHILOSOPHIES ANCIENT AND MODERN\n\nSCHOPENHAUER\n\n\n\n\nNOTE\n\n\nAs a consequence of the success of the series of _Religions Ancient and\nModern_, Messrs. CONSTABLE have decided to issue a set of similar\nprimers, with brief introductions, lists of dates, and selected\nauthorities, presenting to the wider public the salient features of the\n_Philosophies_ of Greece and Rome and of the Middle Ages, as well as of\nmodern Europe. They will appear in the same handy Shilling volumes, with\nneat cloth bindings and paper envelopes, which have proved so attractive\nin the case of the _Religions_. The writing in each case will be\nconfided to an eminent authority, and one who has already proved himself\ncapable of scholarly yet popular exposition within a small compass.\n\nAmong the first volumes to appear will be:--\n\n  =Early Greek Philosophy.= By A. W. BENN, author of _The Philosophy\n    of Greece, Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century_.\n\n  =Stoicism.= By Professor ST. GEORGE STOCK, author of _Deductive\n    Logic_, editor of the _Apology of Plato_, etc.\n\n  =Plato.= By Professor A. E. TAYLOR, St. Andrews University, author\n    of _The Problem of Conduct_.\n\n  =Scholasticism.= By Father RICKABY, S.J.\n\n  =Hobbes.= By Professor A. E. TAYLOR.\n\n  =Locke.= By Professor ALEXANDER, of Owens College.\n\n  =Comte and Mill.= By T. WHITTAKER, author of _The Neoplatonists,\n    Apollonius of Tyana and other Essays_.\n\n  =Herbert Spencer.= By W. H. HUDSON, author of _An Introduction to\n    Spencer's Philosophy_.\n\n  =Schopenhauer.= By T. WHITTAKER.\n\n  =Berkeley.= By Professor CAMPBELL FRASER, D.C.L., LL.D.\n\n  =Bergsen.= By Father TYRRELL.\n\n\n\n\nSCHOPENHAUER\n\n\nBy\n\nTHOMAS WHITTAKER\n\nAUTHOR OF 'COMTE AND MILL,' ETC.\n\n\nLONDON\n\nARCHIBALD CONSTABLE & CO LTD\n\n1909\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n  CHAP.                             PAGE\n\n  I.   LIFE AND WRITINGS,              1\n  II.  THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE,           15\n  III. METAPHYSICS OF THE WILL,       29\n  IV.  AESTHETICS,                     49\n  V.   ETHICS,                        65\n  VI.  HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE,       86\n       SELECTED WORKS,                93\n\n\n\n\nSCHOPENHAUER\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nLIFE AND WRITINGS\n\n\nArthur Schopenhauer may be distinctively described as the greatest\nphilosophic writer of his century. So evident is this that he has\nsometimes been regarded as having more importance in literature than in\nphilosophy; but this is an error. As a metaphysician he is second to no\none since Kant. Others of his age have surpassed him in system and in\ncomprehensiveness; but no one has had a firmer grasp of the essential\nand fundamental problems of philosophy. On the theory of knowledge, the\nnature of reality, and the meaning of the beautiful and the good, he has\nsolutions to offer that are all results of a characteristic and original\nway of thinking.\n\nIn one respect, as critics have noted, his spirit is different from that\nof European philosophy in general. What preoccupies him in a special way\nis the question of evil in the world. Like the philosophies of the\nEast, emerging as they do without break from religion, Schopenhauer's\nphilosophy is in its outcome a doctrine of redemption from sin. The name\nof pessimism commonly applied to it is in some respects misleading,\nthough it was his own term; but it is correct if understood as he\nexplained it. As he was accustomed to insist, his final ethical doctrine\ncoincides with that of all the religions that aim, for their adepts or\ntheir elect, at deliverance from 'this evil world.' But, as the\n'world-fleeing' religions have their mitigations and accommodations, so\nalso has the philosophy of Schopenhauer. At various points indeed it\nseems as if a mere change of accent would turn it into optimism.\n\nThis preoccupation does not mean indifference to the theoretical\nproblems of philosophy. No one has insisted more strongly that the end\nof philosophy is pure truth, and that only the few who care about pure\ntruth have any concern with it. But for Schopenhauer the desire for\nspeculative truth does not by itself suffice to explain the impulse of\nphilosophical inquiries. On one side of his complex character, he had\nmore resemblance to the men who turn from the world to religion, like\nSt. Augustine, than to the normal type of European thinker, represented\npre-eminently by Aristotle. He was a temperamental pessimist, feeling\nfrom the first the trouble of existence; and here he finds the deepest\nmotive for the desire to become clear about it. He saw in the world,\nwhat he felt in himself, a vain effort after ever new objects of desire\nwhich give no permanent satisfaction; and this view, becoming\npredominant, determined, not indeed all the ideas of his philosophy, but\nits general complexion as a 'philosophy of redemption.'\n\nWith his pessimism, personal misfortunes had nothing to do. He was, and\nalways recognised that he was, among the most fortunately placed of\nmankind. He does not hesitate to speak sometimes of his own happiness in\ncomplete freedom from the need to apply himself to any compulsory\noccupation. This freedom, as he has put gratefully on record, he owed to\nhis father, Heinrich Floris Schopenhauer, who was a rich merchant of\nDanzig, where the philosopher was born on the 22nd of February 1788.\nBoth his parents were of Dutch ancestry. His mother, Johanna\nSchopenhauer, won celebrity as a novelist; and his sister, Adele, also\ndisplayed some literary talent. Generalising from his own case,\nSchopenhauer holds that men of intelligence derive their character from\ntheir father and their intellect from their mother. With his mother,\nhowever, he was not on sympathetic terms, as may be read in the\nbiographies. His father intended him for a mercantile career, and with\nthis view began to prepare him from the first to be a cosmopolitan man\nof the world. The name of Arthur was given to him because it is spelt\nalike in the leading European languages. He was taken early to France,\nwhere he resided from 1797 to 1799, learning French so well that on his\nreturn he had almost forgotten his German. Portions of the years 1803 to\n1804 were spent in England, France, Switzerland, and Austria. In England\nhe was three months at a Wimbledon boarding-school kept by a clergyman.\nThis experience he found extremely irksome. He afterwards became highly\nproficient in English: was always pleased to be taken for an Englishman,\nand regarded both the English character and intelligence as on the whole\nthe first in Europe; but all the more deplorable did he find the\noppressive pietism which was the special form taken in the England of\nthat period by the reaction against the French Revolution. He is never\ntired of denouncing that phase of 'cold superstition,' the dominance of\nwhich lasted during his lifetime; for the publication of Mill's\n_Liberty_ and of Darwin's _Origin of Species_, which may be considered\nas marking the close of it, came only the year before his death.\n\nThe only real break in the conformity of Schopenhauer's circumstances to\nhis future career came in 1805, when he was placed in a merchant's\noffice at Hamburg, whither his father had migrated in disgust at the\nannexation of his native Danzig, then under a republican constitution of\nits own, by Prussia in 1793. Soon afterwards his father died; but out of\nloyalty he tried for some time longer to reconcile himself to commercial\nlife. Finding this at length impossible, he gained permission from his\nmother, in 1807, to leave the office for the gymnasium. At this time he\nseems to have begun his classical studies, his education having hitherto\nbeen exclusively modern. They were carried on first at Gotha and then at\nWeimar. In 1809 he entered the university of Goettingen as a student of\nmedicine. This, however, was with a view only to scientific studies, not\nto practice; and he transferred himself to the philosophical faculty in\n1810. Generally he was little regardful of academical authority. His\nfather's deliberately adopted plan of letting him mix early with the\nworld had given him a certain independence of judgment. At Goettingen,\nhowever, he received an important influence from his teacher, G. E.\nSchulze (known by the revived scepticism of his _AEnesidemus_), who\nadvised him to study Plato and Kant before Aristotle and Spinoza. From\n1811 to 1813 he was at Berlin, where he heard Fichte, but was not\nimpressed. In 1813 the degree of Doctor of Philosophy was conferred on\nhim at Jena for the dissertation _On the Fourfold Root of the Principle\nof Sufficient Reason_ (_Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom\nzureichenden Grunde_, 2nd ed., 1847). This was the first result of his\nKantian studies. In the same year he began to be acquainted with Goethe\nat Weimar, where his mother and sister had gone to reside in 1806. A\nconsequence of this acquaintance was that he took up and further\ndeveloped Goethe's theory of colours. His dissertation _Ueber das Sehen\nund die Farben_ was published in 1816. A second edition did not appear\ntill 1854; but in the meantime he had published a restatement of his\ndoctrine in Latin, entitled _Theoria Colorum Physiologica_ (1830). This,\nhowever, was an outlying part of his work. He had already been seized by\nthe impulse to set forth the system of philosophy that took shape in\nhim, as he says, by some formative process of which he could give no\nconscious account. His great work, _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_,\nwas ready for publication before the end of 1818, and was published with\nthe date 1819. Thus he is one of the most precocious philosophers on\nrecord. For in that single volume, written before he was thirty, the\noutlines of his whole system are fixed. There is some development later,\nand there are endless new applications and essays towards confirmation\nfrom all sources. His mind never rested, and his literary power gained\nby exercise. Still, it has been said with truth, that there never was a\ngreater illusion than when he thought that he seldom repeated himself.\nIn reality he did little but repeat his fundamental positions with\ninfinite variations in expression.\n\nAfter completing his chief work, Schopenhauer wrote some verses in which\nhe predicted that posterity would erect a monument to him. This\nprediction was fulfilled in 1895; but, for the time, the work which he\nnever doubted would be his enduring title to fame seemed, like Hume's\n_Treatise_, to have fallen 'deadborn from the press.' This he attributed\nto the hostility of the academical philosophers; and, in his later\nworks, attacks on the university professors form a characteristic\nfeature. The official teachers of the Hegelian school, he declared, were\nbent only on obtaining positions for themselves by an appearance of\nsupporting Christian dogma; and they resented openness on the part of\nany one else. Yet on one side he maintained that his own pessimism was\nmore truly Christian than their optimism. The essential spirit of\nChristianity is that of Brahmanism and Buddhism, the great religions\nthat sprang from India, the first home of our race. He is even inclined\nto see in it traces of Indian influence. What vitiates it in his eyes is\nthe Jewish element, which finds its expression in the flat modern\n'Protestant-rationalistic optimism.' As optimistic religions, he groups\ntogether Judaism, Islam, and Graeco-Roman Polytheism. His antipathy,\nhowever, only extends to the two former. He was himself in great part a\nchild of Humanism and of the eighteenth century, rejoicing over the\napproaching downfall of all the faiths, and holding that a weak religion\n(entirely different from those he admires) is favourable to\ncivilisation. Nothing can exceed his scorn for nearly everything that\ncharacterised the Middle Ages. With Catholicism as a political system he\nhas no sympathy whatever; while on the religious side the Protestant\nare as sympathetic to him as the Catholic mystics. What is common to all\npriesthoods, he holds, is to exploit the metaphysical need of mankind\n(in which he also believes) for the sake of their own power.\nClericalism, 'Pfaffenthum,' whether Catholic or Protestant, is the\nobject of his unvarying hatred and contempt. If he had cared to\nappreciate Hegel, he would have found on this point much community of\nspirit; but of course there was a real antithesis between the two as\nphilosophers. No 'conspiracy' need be invoked to explain the failure of\nSchopenhauer to win early recognition. Belief in the State and in\nprogress was quite alien to him; and Germany was then full of political\nhopes, which found nourishment in optimistic pantheism. What at length\ngave his philosophy vogue was the collapse of this enthusiasm on the\nfailure of the revolutionary movement in 1848. Once known, it contained\nenough of permanent value to secure it from again passing out of sight\nwith the next change of fashion.\n\nThe rest of Schopenhauer's life in its external relations may be briefly\nsummed up. For a few years, it was diversified by travels in Italy and\nelsewhere, and by an unsuccessful attempt at academical teaching in\nBerlin. In 1831 he moved to Frankfort, where he finally settled in\n1833. He lived unmarried there till his death on the 21st of September\n1860. The monument, already spoken of, was unveiled at Frankfort on the\n6th of June 1895.\n\nThe almost unbroken silence with which his great work was received,\nthough it had a distempering effect on the man, did not discourage the\nthinker. The whole series of Schopenhauer's works, indeed, was completed\nbefore he attained anything that could be called fame. Constantly on the\nalert as he was to seize upon confirmations of his system, he published\nin 1836 his short work _On the Will in Nature_, pointing out\nverifications of his metaphysics by recent science. In 1839 his prize\nessay, _On the Freedom of the Human Will_ (finished in 1837), was\ncrowned by the Royal Scientific Society of Drontheim in Norway. This and\nanother essay, _On the Basis of Morality_, _not_ crowned by the Royal\nDanish Society of Copenhagen in 1840, he published in 1841, with the\ninclusive title, _Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik_. In 1844 appeared\nthe second edition of his principal work, to which there was added, in\nthe form of a second volume, a series of elucidations and extensions\nlarger in bulk than the first. This new volume contains much of his\nbest and most effective writing. His last work, _Parerga und\nParalipomena_, which appeared in 1851 (2 vols.), is from the literary\npoint of view the most brilliant. It was only from this time that he\nbegan to be well known among the general public; though the philosophic\n'apostolate' of Julius Frauenstaedt, who afterwards edited his works, had\nbegun in 1840. His activity was henceforth confined to modifying and\nextending his works for new editions; an employment in which he was\nalways assiduous. In consequence of this, all of them, as they stand,\ncontain references from one to another; but the development of his\nthinking, so far as there was such a process after 1818, can be easily\ntraced without reference to the earlier editions. There is some growth;\nbut, as has been said, it does not affect many of the chief points. A\nbrief exposition of his philosophy can on the whole take it as something\nfixed. The heads under which it must fall are those assigned to the\noriginal four books of _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_.\n\nAlthough Schopenhauer discountenanced the attempt to connect a\nphilosophers biography with his work, something has to be said about his\ncharacter, since this has been dwelt on to his disadvantage by\nopponents. There is abundant material for a personal estimate in the\ncorrespondence and reminiscences published after his death by his\ndisciples Julius Frauenstaedt and Wilhelm Gwinner. The apparent\ncontradiction is at once obvious between the ascetic consummation of his\nethics and his unascetic life, carefully occupied in its latter part\nwith rules for the preservation of his naturally robust health. He was\nquite aware of this, but holds it absurd to require that a moralist\nshould commend only the virtues which he possesses. It is as if the\nrequirement were set up that a sculptor is to be himself a model of\nbeauty. A saint need not be a philosopher, nor a philosopher a saint.\nThe science of morals is as theoretical as any other branch of\nphilosophy. Fundamentally character is unmodifiable, though knowledge,\nit is allowed, may change the mode of action within the limits of the\nparticular character. The passage to the state of asceticism cannot be\neffected by moral philosophy, but depends on a kind of 'grace.' After\nall, it might be replied, philosophers, whether they succeed or not, do\nusually make at least an attempt to live in accordance with the moral\nideal they set up. The best apology in Schopenhauer's case is that the\nfault may have been as much in his ideal as in his failure to conform\nto it. The eloquent pages he has devoted to the subject of holiness only\nmake manifest the inconsequence (which he admits) in the passage to it.\nFor, as we shall see, this has nothing in common with the essentially\nrational asceticism of the schools of later antiquity; which was a rule\nof self-limitation in view of the philosophic life. He did in a way of\nhis own practise something of this; and, on occasion, he sets forth the\ntheory of it; but he quite clearly sees the difference. His own ideal,\nwhich he never attempted to practise, is that of the self-torturing\nascetics of the Christian Middle Age. Within the range of properly human\nvirtue, he can in many respects hold his own, not only as a philosopher\nbut as a man. If his egoism and vanity are undeniable, he undoubtedly\npossessed the virtues of rectitude and compassion. What he would have\nespecially laid stress on was the conscientious devotion to his work.\nWith complete singleness of purpose he used for a disinterested end the\nleisure which he regarded as the most fortunate of endowments. As he\nsaid near the close of his life, his intellectual conscience was clear.\n\nOf Schopenhauer's expositions of his pessimism it would be true to say,\nas Spinoza says of the Book of Job, that the matter, like the style, is\nnot that of a man sitting among the ashes, but of one meditating in a\nlibrary. This of course does not prove that they are not a genuine, if\none-sided, rendering of human experience. All that can be said is that\nthey did not turn him away from appreciation of the apparent goods of\nlife. His own practical principle was furnished by what he regarded as a\nlower point of view; and this gives its direction to the semi-popular\nphilosophy of the _Parerga_. From what he takes to be the higher point\nof view, the belief that happiness is attainable by man on earth is an\nillusion; but he holds that, by keeping steadily in view a kind of\ntempered happiness as the end, many mistakes may be avoided in the\nconduct of life, provided that each recognises at once the strength and\nweakness of his own character, and does not attempt things that, with\nthe given limitations, are impossible. Of the highest truth, as he\nconceived it, he could therefore make no use. Only by means of a truth\nthat he was bound to hold half-illusory could a working scheme be\nconstructed for himself and others. This result may give us guidance in\nseeking to learn what we can from a thinker who is in reality no\nrepresentative of a decadence, but is fundamentally sane and rational,\neven in spite of himself.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nTHEORY OF KNOWLEDGE\n\n\nThe title of Schopenhauer's chief work is rendered in the English\ntranslation, _The World as Will and Idea_. Here the term 'idea' is used\nin the sense it had for Locke and Berkeley; namely, any object of mental\nactivity. Thus it includes not merely imagery, but also perception.\nSince Hume distinguished ideas' from 'impressions,' it has tended to be\nspecialised in the former sense. The German word, _Vorstellung_, which\nit is used to render, conveys the generalised meaning of the Lockian\n'idea,' now frequently expressed in English and French philosophical\nworks by the more technical term 'presentation' or 'representation.' By\nSchopenhauer himself the word 'Idea' was used exclusively in the sense\nof the Platonic Idea, which, as we shall see, plays an important part in\nhis philosophy. The distinction is preserved in the translation by the\nuse of a capital when Idea has the latter meaning; but in a brief\nexposition it seems convenient to adopt a more technical rendering of\n_Vorstellung_; and, from its common employment in psychological\ntext-books, I have selected 'presentation' as the most suitable.\n\nThe first proposition of Schopenhauer's philosophical system is, 'The\nworld is my presentation.' By this he means that it presents itself as\nappearance to the knowing subject. This appearance is in the forms of\ntime, space and causality. Under these forms every phenomenon\nnecessarily appears, because they are _a priori_ forms of the subject.\nThe world as it presents itself consists entirely of phenomena, that is,\nappearances, related according to these forms. The most fundamental form\nof all is the relation between object and subject, which is implied in\nall of them. Without a subject there can be no presented object.\n\nSchopenhauer is therefore an idealist in the sense in which we call\nBerkeley's theory of the external world idealism; though the expressions\nused are to some extent different. The difference proceeds from his\nfollowing of Kant. His Kantianism consists in the recognition of _a\npriori_ forms by which the subject constructs for itself an 'objective'\nworld of appearances. With Berkeley he agrees as against Kant in not\nadmitting any residue whatever, in the object as such, that is not\nwholly appearance. But while he allows that Berkeley, as regards the\ngeneral formulation of idealism, was more consistent than Kant, he finds\nhim, in working out the principle, altogether inadequate. For the modern\nmind there is henceforth no way in philosophy except through Kant, from\nwhom dates the revolution by which scholastic dualism was finally\noverthrown. Kant's systematic construction, however, he in effect\nreduces to very little. His is a much simplified 'Apriorism.' While\naccepting the 'forms of sensible intuition,' that is, time and space,\njust as Kant sets them forth, he clears away nearly all the superimposed\nmechanism. Kant's 'Transcendental AEsthetic,' he says, was a real\ndiscovery in metaphysics; but on the basis of this he for the most part\nonly gave free play to his architectonic impulse. Of the twelve\n'categories of the understanding,' which he professed to derive from the\nlogical forms of judgment, all except causality are mere 'blind\nwindows.' This alone, therefore, Schopenhauer adopts; placing it,\nhowever, not at a higher level but side by side with time and space,\nKant's forms of intuition. These three forms, according to Schopenhauer,\nmake up the understanding of men and animals. 'All intuition is\nintellectual.' It is not first mere appearance related in space and\ntime, and waiting for understanding to organise it; but, in animals as\nin man, it is put in order at once under the three forms that suffice to\nexplain the knowledge all have of the phenomenal world.\n\nTo Reason as distinguished from Understanding, Schopenhauer assigns no\nsuch exalted function as was attributed to it in portions of his system\nby Kant, and still more by some of his successors. The name of 'reason,'\nhe maintains, ought on etymological grounds to be restricted to the\nfaculty of abstract concepts. This, and not understanding, is what\ndistinguishes man from animals. It discovers and invents nothing, but it\nputs in a generalised and available form what the understanding has\ndiscovered in intuition.\n\nFor the historical estimation of Schopenhauer, it is necessary to place\nhim in relation to Kant, as he himself always insisted. Much also in his\nchief work is made clearer by knowledge of his dissertation _On the\nFourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason_, to which he is\nconstantly referring. Later, his manner of exposition became more\nindependent; so that he can be read by the general reader with profit\nsimply by himself, and without reference to antecedents. Still, it will\nalways be advisable for an expositor to follow his directions, at least\nto the extent of giving some short account of the dissertation. This I\nproceed to give approximately in the place to which he has assigned it\nin his system.\n\nThe name of the principle (_principium rationis sufficientis_) he took\nover from Leibniz and his successor Wolff, but gave it a new amplitude.\nWith him, it stands as an inclusive term for four modes of connection by\nwhich the thoroughgoing relativity of phenomena to one another is\nconstituted for our intelligence. The general statement adopted is,\n'Nothing is without a reason why it should be rather than not be.'\nIts four forms are the principles of becoming (_fiendi_), of knowing\n(_cognoscendi_), of being (_essendi_), and of acting (_agendi_).\n(1) Under the first head come 'causes.' These are divided into 'cause\nproper,' for inorganic things; 'stimulus,' for the vegetative life both\nof plants and animals, and 'motive,' for animals and men. The law of\ncausation is applicable only to changes; not to the forces of nature, to\nmatter, or to the world as a whole, which are perdurable. Cause precedes\neffect in time. Not one thing, but one state of a thing, is the cause of\nanother. From the law of causation there results an infinite series _a\nparte ante_ as well as _a parte post_. (2) The principle of sufficient\nreason of knowing is applicable to concepts, which are all derived from\nintuition, that is, from percepts. The laws of logic, which come under\nthis head, can yield nothing original, but can only render explicit what\nwas in the understanding. (3) Under the third head come arithmetical and\ngeometrical relations. These are peculiar relations of presentations,\ndistinct from all others, and only intelligible in virtue of a pure _a\npriori_ intuition. For geometry this is space; for arithmetic time, in\nwhich counting goes on. Scientifically, arithmetic is fundamental. (4)\nAs the third form of causality was enumerated 'motive' for the will; but\nin that classification it was viewed from without, as belonging to the\nworld of objects. Through the direct knowledge we have of our own will,\nwe know also from within this determination by the presentation we call\na motive. Hence emerges the fourth form of the principle of sufficient\nreason. This at a later stage makes possible the transition from physics\nto metaphysics.\n\nAll these forms alike are forms of necessary determination. Necessity\nhas no clear and true sense but certainty of the consequence when the\nground is posited. All necessity therefore is conditional. In accordance\nwith the four expressions of the principle of sufficient reason, it\ntakes the fourfold shape of physical, logical, mathematical, and moral\nnecessity.\n\nThe sharp distinction between logical and mathematical truth, with the\nassignment of the former to conceptual and of the latter to intuitive\nrelations, comes to Schopenhauer directly from Kant. So also does his\nview that the necessary form of causation is sequence; though here his\npoints of contact with English thinkers, earlier and later, are very\nmarked. Only in his statement of the 'law of motivation' as 'causality\nseen from within' does he hint at his own distinctive metaphysical\ndoctrine. Meanwhile, it is evident that he is to be numbered with the\ngroup of modern thinkers who have arrived in one way or another at a\ncomplete scientific phenomenism. Expositors have noted that in his\nearlier statements of this he tends to lay more stress on the character\nof the visible and tangible world as mere appearance. The impermanence,\nthe relativity, of all that exists in time and space, leads him to\ndescribe it, in a favourite term borrowed from Indian philosophy, as\nMaya, or illusion. Later, he dwells more on the relative reality of\nthings as they appear. His position, however, does not essentially\nalter, but only finds varying expression as he turns more to the\nscientific or to the metaphysical side. From Hume's view on causation he\ndiffers not by opposing its pure phenomenism, but only by recognising,\nas Kant does, an _a priori_ element in the form of its law. German\ncritics have seen in his own formulation an anticipation of Mill, and\nthis is certainly striking as regards the general conception of the\ncausal order, although there is no anticipation of Mill's inductive\nlogic. On the same side there is a close agreement with Malebranche and\nthe Occasionalists, pointed out by Schopenhauer himself. The causal\nexplanations of science, he is at one with them in insisting, give no\nultimate account of anything. All its causes are no more than\n'occasional causes,'--merely instances, as Mill expressed it afterwards,\nof 'invariable and unconditional sequence.' From Mill of course he\ndiffers in holding its form to be necessary and _a priori_, not\nultimately derived from a summation of experiences; and, with the\nOccasionalists, he goes on to metaphysics in its sense of ontology, as\nMill never did. The difference here is that he does not clothe his\nmetaphysics in a theological dress.\n\nIn the later development of his thought, Schopenhauer dealt more\nexpressly with the question, how this kind of phenomenism is\nreconcilable with a scientific cosmogony. On one side the proposition,\n'No object without subject,' makes materialism for ever impossible; for\nthe materialist tries to explain from relations among presentations what\nis the condition of all presentation. On the other side, we are all\ncompelled to agree with the materialists that knowledge of the object\ncomes late in a long series of material events. Inorganic things existed\nin time before life; vegetative life before animal life; and only with\nanimal life does knowledge emerge. Reasoned knowledge of the whole\nseries comes only at the end of it in the human mind. This apparent\ncontradiction he solves by leaving a place for metaphysics. Our\nrepresentation of the world as it existed before the appearance of life\nwas indeed non-existent at the time to which we assign it; but the real\nbeing of the world had a manifestation not imaginable by us. For this,\nwe substitute a picture of a world such as we should have been aware of\nhad our 'subject,' with its _a priori_ forms of time, space, and\ncausality, been then present. What the reality is, is the problem of the\nthing-in-itself (to use the Kantian term). This problem remains over;\nbut we know that the metaphysical reality cannot be matter; for matter,\nwith all its qualities, is phenomenal. It exists only 'for\nunderstanding, through understanding, in understanding.' These\ndiscriminations made, Schopenhauer offers us a scientific cosmogony\nbeginning with the nebular hypothesis and ending with an outline of\norganic evolution. This last differs from the Darwinian theory in\nsupposing a production of species by definite steps instead of by\naccumulation of small individual variations. At a certain time, a form\nthat has all the characters of a new species appears among the progeny\nof an existing species. Man is the last and highest form to be evolved.\nFrom Schopenhauer's metaphysics, as we shall see, it follows that no\nhigher form of life will ever appear.\n\nA word may be said here on a materialistic-sounding phrase which is\nvery prominent in Schopenhauer's later expositions, and has been\nremarked on as paradoxical for an idealist. The world as presentation,\nhe often says, is 'in the brain.' This, it must be allowed, is not fully\ndefensible from his own point of view, except with the aid of a later\ndistinction. The brain as we know it is of course only a part of the\nphenomenon of the subject,--a grouping of possible perceptions. How\nthen, since it is itself only appearance, can it be the bearer of the\nwhole universe as appearance? The answer is that Schopenhauer meant in\nreality 'the being of the brain,' and not the brain as phenomenon. He\nhad a growing sense of the importance of physiology for the\ninvestigation of mind; and his predilection led him to adopt a not quite\nsatisfactory shorthand expression for the correspondence we know\nscientifically to exist between our mental processes and changes capable\nof objective investigation in the matter of the brain.\n\nIn science his distinctive bent was to the borderland between psychology\nand physiology. Hence came the attraction exercised on him by Goethe's\ntheory of colours. To his own theory, though, unlike his philosophical\nsystem, it has always failed to gain the attention he predicted for it,\nthe merit must be allowed of treating the problem as essentially one of\npsychophysics. What he does is to attempt to ascertain the conditions in\nthe sensibility of the retina that account for our actual\ncolour-sensations. This problem was untouched by the Newtonian theory;\nbut Schopenhauer followed Goethe in the error of trying to overthrow\nthis on its own ground. He had no aptitude for the special inquiries of\nmathematics and physics, though he had gained a clear insight into their\ngeneral nature as sciences. On the psycho-physical side there is to-day\nno fully authorised theory. The problem indeed has become ever more\ncomplex. Schopenhauer's attempt, by combination of sensibilities to\n'light' and 'darkness,' to explain the phenomena of complementary\ncolours, deserves at least a record in the long series of essays of\nwhich the best known are the 'Young-Helmholtz theory' and that of\nHering. It marks an indubitable advance on Goethe in the clear\ndistinction drawn between the mixture, in the ordinary sense, that can\nonly result in dilution to different shades of grey, and the kinds of\nmixture from which, in their view, true colours arise.\n\nA characteristic position in Schopenhauer's theory of knowledge, and one\nthat is constantly finding new expression in his writings, is the\ndistinction between abstract and intuitive knowledge already touched on.\nIntuitive knowledge of the kind that is common to men and animals, as we\nhave seen, makes up, in his terminology, the 'understanding'; while\n'reason' is the distinctively human faculty of concepts. When he\ndepreciates this, as he often does, in comparison with 'intuition,' it\nmust be remembered that he does not limit this term to perception of\nparticulars, but ascribes to what he calls the 'Platonic Idea' a certain\nkind of union between reason and 'phantasy,' which gives it an intuitive\ncharacter of its own. Thus intuition can stand, though not in every case\nfor what is higher, yet always for that which is wider and greater and\nmore immediate. Whatever may be done with reflective reason and its\nabstractions, every effectual process of thought must end, alike for\nknowledge and art and virtue, in some intuitive presentation. The\nimportance of reason for practice is due to its generality. Its function\nis subordinate. It does not furnish the ground of virtuous action any\nmore than aesthetic precepts can enable any one to produce a work of art;\nbut it can help to preserve constancy to certain maxims, as also in art\na reasoned plan is necessary because the inspiration of genius is not\nevery moment at command. Virtue and artistic genius alike, however,\ndepend ultimately on intuition: and so also does every true discovery in\nscience. The nature of pedantry is to try to be guided everywhere by\nconcepts, and to trust nothing to perception in the particular case.\nPhilosophy also Schopenhauer regards as depending ultimately on a\ncertain intuitive view; but he allows that it has to translate this into\nabstractions. Its problem is to express the _what_ of the world in\nabstract form: science dealing only with the _why_ of phenomena related\nwithin the world. This character of philosophy as a system of abstract\nconcepts deprives it of the immediate attractiveness of art; so that, as\nhe says in one place, it is more fortunate to be a poet than a\nphilosopher.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nMETAPHYSICS OF THE WILL\n\n\nWe have seen that scientific explanation does not go beyond\npresentations ordered in space and time. This is just as true of the\nsciences of causation--the 'aetiological' sciences--as it is of\nmathematical science. All that we learn from Mechanics, Physics,\nChemistry and Physiology, is 'how, in accordance with an infallible\nrule, one determinate state of matter necessarily follows another: how a\ndeterminate change necessarily conditions and brings on another\ndeterminate change.' This knowledge does not satisfy us. We wish to\nlearn the significance of phenomena; but we find that from outside,\nwhile we view them as presentations, their inner meaning is for ever\ninaccessible.\n\nThe starting-point for the metaphysical knowledge we seek is given us in\nour own body. The animal body is 'the immediate object of the subject':\nin it as presentation the 'effects' of 'causes' in the order of\npresentations external to it are first recognised. Now in virtue of his\nbody the investigator is not pure knowing subject standing apart from\nthat which he knows. In the case of the particular system of\npresentations constituting his organism, he knows what these\npresentations signify, and that is his _will_ in a certain modification.\nThe subject appears as individual through its identity with the body,\nand this body is given to it in two different ways: on one side as\nobject among objects, and subjected to their laws; on the other side as\nthe will immediately known to each. The act of will and the movement of\nthe body are not two different states related as cause and effect; for\nthe relation of cause and effect belongs only to the object, the\nphenomenon, the presentation. They are one and the same act given in\ndifferent manners: the will, immediately to the subject; the movement,\nin sensible intuition for understanding. The action of the body is the\nobjectified act of will. Called at first the immediate object of\npresentation, the body may now, from the other side, be called 'the\nobjectivity of the will.'\n\nThus, as was said, the 'law of motivation' discloses the inner nature of\ncausality. In causality in general we know only relations of phenomena;\nbut in the case of our own body we know something else that those\nrelations express; namely, the act of will determined by motives. Now\nthere are in the world as presentation other systems like that which we\ncall our body. Unless all these are to be supposed mere phantoms without\ninner reality, we must infer by analogy, in correspondence with like\nphenomena, other individual wills similar to that which we know in\nourselves. This inference from analogy, universally admitted in the case\nof human and animal bodies, must be extended to the whole corporeal\nworld. The failure to take this step is where the purely intellectual\nforms of idealism have come short. Kant's 'thing-in-itself,' which is\nnot subject to the forms by which presentations become experience, but\nwhich experience and its forms indicate as the reality, has been wrongly\ncondemned by his successors as alien to idealism. It is true that Kant\ndid in some respects fail to maintain the idealistic position with the\nclearness of Berkeley; but his shortcoming was not in affirming a\nthing-in-itself beyond phenomena. Here, in Schopenhauer's view, is the\nmetaphysical problem that he left a place for but did not solve. The\nword of the riddle has now been pronounced. Beyond presentation, that\nis, in itself and according to its innermost essence, the world is that\nwhich we find in ourselves immediately as will. By this it is not meant\nthat a falling stone, for example, acts from a motive; knowledge and the\nconsequent action from motives belongs only to the determinate form that\nthe will has in animals and men; but the reality in the stone also is\nthe same in essence as that to which we apply the name of will in\nourselves. He who possesses this key to the knowledge of nature's\ninnermost being will interpret the forces of vegetation, of\ncrystallisation, of magnetism, of chemical affinity, even of weight\nitself, as different only in phenomenal manifestation but in essence the\nsame; namely, that which is better known to each than all else, and\nwhere it emerges most clearly is called will. Only the will is\nthing-in-itself. It is wholly different from presentation, and is that\nof which presentation is the phenomenon, the visibility, the\nobjectivity. Differences affect only the degree of the appearing, not\nthe essence of that which appears.\n\nWhile the reality everywhere present is not will as specifically known\nin man, the mode of indicating its essence by reference to this,\nSchopenhauer contends, is a gain in insight. The thing-in-itself ought\nto receive its name from that among all its manifestations which is the\nclearest, the most perfect, the most immediately illumined by knowledge;\nand this is man's will. When we say that every force in nature is to be\nthought of as Will, we are subsuming an unknown under a known. For the\nconception of Force is abstracted from the realm of cause and effect,\nand indicates the limit of scientific explanation. Having arrived at the\nforces of nature on the one side and the forms of the subject on the\nother, science can go no further. The conception of Will can make known\nthat which was so far concealed, because it proceeds from the most\nintimate consciousness that each has of himself, where the knower and\nthe known coincide.\n\nBy this consciousness, in which subject and object are not yet set\napart, we reach something universal. In itself the Will is not\nindividualised, but exists whole and undivided in every single thing in\nnature, as the Subject of contemplation exists whole and undivided in\neach cognitive being. It is entirely free from all forms of the\nphenomenon. What makes plurality possible is subjection to the forms of\ntime and space, by which only the phenomenon is affected. Time and space\nmay therefore be called, in scholastic terminology, the 'principle of\nindividuation.' While each of its phenomena is subject to the law of\nsufficient reason, which is the law of appearance in these forms, there\nis for the Will as thing-in-itself no rational ground: it is 'grundlos.'\nIt is free from all plurality, although its phenomena in space and time\nare innumerable. It is one, not with the unity of an object or of a\nconcept, but as that which lies outside of space and time, beyond the\n_principium individuationis_, that is, the possibility of plurality. The\nindividual, the person, is not will as thing-in-itself, but phenomenon\nof the will, and as such determined. The will is 'free' because there is\nnothing beyond itself to determine it. Further, it is in itself mere\nactivity without end, a blind striving. Knowledge appears only as the\naccompaniment of its ascending stages.\n\nHere we have arrived at the thought which, in its various expressions,\nconstitutes Schopenhauer's metaphysics. That this cannot be\nscientifically deduced he admits; but he regards it as furnishing such\nexplanation as is possible of science itself. For science there is in\neverything an inexplicable element to which it runs back, and which is\nreal, not merely phenomenal. From this reality we are most remote in\npure mathematics and in the pure _a priori_ science of nature as it was\nformulated by Kant. These owe their transparent clearness precisely to\ntheir absence of real content, or to the slightness of this. The attempt\nto reduce organic life to chemistry, this again to mechanism, and at\nlast everything to arithmetic, could it succeed, would leave mere form\nbehind, from which all the content of phenomena would have vanished. And\nthe form would in the end be form of the subject. But the enterprise is\nvain. 'For in everything in nature there is something of which no ground\ncan ever be given, of which no explanation is possible, no cause further\nis to be sought.' What for man is his inexplicable character,\npresupposed in every explanation of his deeds from motives, that for\nevery inorganic body is its inexplicable quality, the manner of its\nacting.\n\nThe basis of this too is will, and 'groundless,' inexplicable will; but\nevidently the conception here is not identical with that of the Will\nthat is one and all. How do we pass from the universal to that which has\na particular character or quality? For of the Will as thing-in-itself we\nare told that there is not a greater portion in a man and a less in a\nstone. The relation of part and whole belongs exclusively to space. The\nmore and less touches only the phenomenon, that is, the visibility, the\nobjectivation. A higher degree of this is in the plant than in the\nstone, in the animal than in the plant, and so forth; but the Will that\nis the essence of all is untouched by degree, as it is beyond plurality,\nspace and time, and the relation of cause and effect.\n\nThe answer to the question here raised is given in Schopenhauer's\ninterpretation of the Platonic Ideas. These he regards as stages of\nobjectivation of the Will. They are, as Plato called them, eternal forms\nrelated to particular things as models. The lowest stage of\nobjectivation of the Will is represented by the forces of inorganic\nnature. Some of these, such as weight and impenetrability, appear in all\nmatter. Some are divided among its different kinds, as rigidity,\nfluidity, elasticity, electricity, magnetism, chemical properties. They\nare not subject to the relation of cause and effect, but are presupposed\nby it. A force is neither cause of an effect nor effect of a cause.\nPhilosophically, it is immediate objectivity of the will; in aetiology,\n_qualitas occulta_. At the lowest stages of objectivation, there is no\nindividuality. This does not appear in inorganic things, nor even in\nmerely organic or vegetative life, but only as we ascend the scale of\nanimals. Even in the higher animals the specific enormously predominates\nover the individual character. Only in man is the Idea objectified in\nthe individual character as such. 'The character of each individual man,\nso far as it is thoroughly individual and not entirely comprehended in\nthat of the species, may be regarded as a particular Idea, corresponding\nto a peculiar act of objectivation of the Will.'\n\nSchopenhauer warns us against substituting this philosophical\nexplanation for scientific aetiology. The chain of causes and effects, he\npoints out, is not broken by the differences of the original,\nirreducible forces. The aetiology and the philosophy of nature go side by\nside, regarding the same object from different points of view. Yet he\nalso gives us in relation to his philosophy much that is not\nunsuggestive scientifically. His doctrine is not properly evolutionary,\nsince the Ideas are eternal; but he has guarded incidentally against our\nsupposing that all the natural kinds that manifest the Ideas\nphenomenally must be always represented in every world. For our\nparticular world, comprising the sun and planets of the solar system, he\nsets forth in the _Parerga_ an account of the process by which it\ndevelops from the nebula to man. This was referred to in the preceding\nchapter. In his fundamental work he describes a struggle, present\nthrough the whole of nature, in which the phenomenal manifestations of\nthe higher Ideas conquer and subjugate those of the lower, though they\nleave them still existent and ever striving to get loose. Here has been\nseen an adumbration of natural selection: he himself admits the\ndifficulty he has in making it clear. We must remember that it is\npre-Darwinian.\n\nKnowledge or intelligence he seeks to explain as an aid to the\nindividual organism in its struggle to subsist and to propagate its\nkind. It first appears in animal life. It is represented by the brain or\na large ganglion, as every endeavour of the Will in its\nself-objectivation is represented by some organ; that is, displays\nitself for presentation as such and such an appearance. Superinduced\nalong with this contrivance for aid in the struggle, the world as\npresentation, with all its forms, subject and object, time, space,\nplurality and causality, is all at once there. 'Hitherto only will, it\nis now at the same time presentation, object of the knowing subject.'\nThen in man, as a higher power beyond merely intuitive intelligence,\nappears reason as the power of abstract conception. For the most part,\nrational as well as intuitive knowledge, evolved originally as a mere\nmeans to higher objectivation of the Will, remains wholly in its\nservice. How, in exceptional cases, intellect emancipates itself, will\nbe discussed under the heads of AEsthetics and Ethics.\n\nThat this view implies a teleology Schopenhauer expressly recognises.\nIndeed he is a very decided teleologist on lines of his own, and, in\nphysiology, takes sides strongly with 'vitalism' as against pure\nmechanicism. True, the Will is 'endless' blind striving, and is\nessentially divided against itself. Everywhere in nature there is\nstrife, and this takes the most horrible forms. Yet somehow there is in\neach individual manifestation of will a principle by which first the\norganism with its vital processes, and then the portion of it called the\nbrain, in which is represented the intellect with its _a priori_ forms,\nare evolved as aids in the strife. And, adapting all the manifestations\nto one another, there is a teleology of the universe. The whole world,\nwith all its phenomena, is the objectivity of the one and indivisible\nWill; the Idea which is related to all other Ideas as the harmony to the\nsingle voices. The unity of the Will shows itself in the unison of all\nits phenomena as related to one another. Man, its clearest and\ncompletest objectivation, is the summit of a pyramid, and could not\nexist without this. Inorganic and organic nature, then, were adapted to\nthe future appearance of man, as man is adapted to the development that\npreceded him. But in thinking the reality, time is to be abstracted\nfrom. The earlier, we are obliged to say, is fitted to the later, as the\nlater is fitted to the earlier; but the relation of means to end, under\nwhich we cannot help figuring the adaptation, is only appearance for our\nmanner of knowledge. And the harmony described does not get rid of the\nconflict inherent in all will.\n\nIn this account of Schopenhauer's metaphysical doctrine, I have tried to\nmake the exposition as smooth as possible; but at two points the\ndiscontinuity can scarcely be concealed. First, the relation of the\nuniversal Will to the individual will is not made clear; and, secondly,\nthe emergence of the world of presentation, with the knowledge in which\nit culminates, is left unintelligible because the will is conceived as\nmere blind striving without an aim. As regards the first point,\ndisciples and expositors have been able to show that, by means of\ndistinctions in his later writings, apparent contradictions are to some\nextent cleared away; and, moreover, that he came to recognise more\nreality in the individual will. On the second point, I think it will be\nnecessary to admit that his system as such breaks down. But both points\nmust be considered in their connection.\n\nOne of the most noteworthy features of Schopenhauer's philosophy is, as\nhe himself thought, the acceptance from first to last of Kant's\ndistinction between the 'empirical' and the 'intelligible' character of\nthe individual. Every act of will of every human being follows with\nnecessity as phenomenon from its phenomenal causes; so that all the\nevents of each person's life are determined in accordance with\nscientific law. Nevertheless, the character empirically manifested in\nthe phenomenal world, while it is completely necessitated, is the\nexpression of something that is free from necessitation. This\n'intelligible character' is out of time, and, itself undetermined,\nmanifests itself through that which develops in time as a chain of\nnecessary causes and effects. That this doctrine had been taken up,\nwithout any ambiguity as regards the determinism, by Schelling as well\nas by himself, he expressly acknowledges; and he finds it, as he also\nfinds modern idealism, anticipated in various passages by the\nNeo-Platonists. His adaptation of it to his doctrine of the Ideas is\ndistinctly Neo-Platonic in so far as he recognises 'Ideas of\nindividuals'; but of course to make Will the essence belongs to his own\nsystem. 'The intelligible character,' he says, 'coincides with the Idea,\nor, yet more precisely, with the original act of will that manifests\nitself in it: in so far, not only is the empirical character of each\nman, but also of each animal species, nay, of each plant species, and\neven of each original force of inorganic nature, to be regarded as\nphenomenon of an intelligible character, that is, of an indivisible act\nof will out of time.' This is what he called the '_aseitas_' of the\nwill; borrowing a scholastic term to indicate its derivation (if we may\nspeak of it as derived) from itself (_a se_), and not from a supposed\ncreative act. Only if we adopt this view are we entitled to regard\nactions as worthy of moral approval or disapproval. They are such not\nbecause they are not necessitated, but because they necessarily show\nforth the nature of an essence the freedom of which consists in being\nwhat it is. Yet he could not but find a difficulty in reconciling this\nwith his position that the one universal Will is identical in all\nthings, and in each is 'individuated' only by space and time. For the\nIdeas, like the thing-in-itself, are eternal, that is, outside of time\nas well as space; and all the things now enumerated, forces of nature,\nplant and animal species, and individual characters of men, are declared\nto be in themselves Ideas.\n\nHe in part meets this difficulty by the subtlety that time and space do\nnot, strictly speaking, determine individuality, but arise along with\nit. The diremption of individualities becomes explicit in those forms.\nYet he must have perceived that this is not a complete answer, and\nvarious modifications can be seen going on. His first view clearly was\nthat the individual is wholly impermanent, and at death simply\ndisappears; nothing is left but the one Will and the universal Subject\nof contemplation identical in all. Metempsychosis is the best\nmythological rendering of what happens, but it is no more. Later, he\nputs forward the not very clearly defined theory of a 'palingenesia' by\nwhich a particular will, but not the intellect that formerly accompanied\nit, may reappear in the phenomenal world. And the hospitality he showed\nto stories of magic, clairvoyance, and ghost-seeing, is scarcely\ncompatible with the view that the individual will is no more than a\nphenomenal differentiation of the universal will. A speculation (not put\nforward as anything more) on the appearance of a special providence in\nthe destiny of the individual, points, as Professor Volkelt has noted,\nto the idea of a guidance, not from without, but by a kind of good\ndaemon or genius that is the ultimate reality of the person. On all this\nwe must not lay too much stress; but there is certainly one passage that\ncan only be described as a definite concession that the individual is\nreal in a sense not at first allowed. Individuality, it is said in so\nmany words (_Parerga_, ii. Sec. 117), does not rest only on the 'principle\nof individuation' (time and space), and is therefore not through and\nthrough phenomenon, but is rooted in the thing-in-itself. 'How deep its\nroots go belongs to the questions which I do not undertake to\nanswer.'[1]\n\n  [1] _Werke_, ed. Frauenstaedt, vol. vi. p. 243.\n\nThis tends to modify considerably, but does not overthrow,\nSchopenhauer's original system. In very general terms, he is in the\nnumber of the 'pantheistic' thinkers; and it is remarkable, on\nexamination, how these, in Europe at least, have nearly always\nrecognised in the end some permanent reality in the individual. This is\ncontrary to first impressions: but the great names may be cited of\nPlotinus, John Scotus Erigena, Giordano Bruno, Spinoza (in Part v. of\nthe _Ethics_), and finally of Schopenhauer's special aversion, Hegel,\nwho has been supposed most unfavourable of all to any recognition of\nindividuality as real. It is more true, Hegel maintains, that the\nindividuality determines its world than that it is determined by it; and\nthere is no explanation why the determination should be such and such\nexcept that the individuality was already what it is.[2] And, if\nSchopenhauer's more imaginative speculations seek countenance from the\nside of empiricism, there is nothing in them quite so audacious as a\nspeculation of J. S. Mill on disembodied mind, thrown out during the\ntime when he was writing his _Logic_.[3]\n\n  [2] _Phaenomenologie des Geistes_, Jubilaeumsausgabe, ed. G. Lasson, pp.\n  201-3.\n\n  [3] Letter to Robert Barclay Fox, May 10, 1842. Printed in Appendix to\n  _Letters and Journals of Caroline Fox_, third ed., vol. ii. pp. 331-2.\n  'To suppose that the eye is _necessary_ to sight,' says Mill, 'seems to\n  me the notion of one immersed in matter. What we call our bodily\n  sensations are all in the mind, and would not necessarily or probably\n  cease, because the body perishes.'\n\nThe association with pantheism Schopenhauer accepts in principle, though\nthe name is not congenial to him. In his system the Will is one and all,\nlike the 'Deus' of Spinoza. The difference is that, instead of ascribing\nperfection to the universe that is its manifestation, he regards the\nproduction of a world as a lapse from which redemption is to be sought.\nHis doctrine has been rightly described, in common with the predominant\nphilosophical doctrines of his period, as a resultant of the deepened\nsubjective analysis brought by Kant into modern philosophy on the one\nside, and of the return to Spinoza in the quest for unity of principle\non the other. Why, then, it may be asked, are Fichte, Schelling, and\nHegel the constant objects of his attack? The true explanation is not\nthe merely external one, that they were his successful rivals for public\nfavour, but is to be found in a real antithesis of thought. Within the\nlimits of the idealism they all hold in common, Schopenhauer is at the\nopposite pole. In spite of his attempt to incorporate the Platonic\nIdeas, and in spite of his following of Kant, whose 'intelligible world'\nwas in essence Platonic or neo-Platonic, he could find no place in his\nsystem for a rational order at the summit. Now this order was precisely\nwhat Fichte and Hegel aimed at demonstrating. If Schopenhauer is less\nunsympathetic in his references to Schelling, that is because\nSchelling's world-soul appeared to him to prefigure his own attempt to\ndiscover in nature the manifestation of a blindly striving will or\nfeeling rather than reason. Suspicious as he shows himself of possible\nplagiarisms by others, the charge cannot be retorted against himself.\nThe supreme principle of Fichte, it has been pointed out, has an\nactively volitional character and was formulated before Schopenhauer's:\nbut then it is essentially rational. For Hegel, what is supreme is the\nworld-reason. Hence they are at one with Plato in holding that in some\nsense 'mind is king.' For Schopenhauer, on the contrary, mind, or pure\nintellect, is an emancipated slave. Having reached its highest point,\nand seen through the work of the will, it does not turn back and\norganise it, but abolishes it as far as its insight extends.\n\nYet to say merely this is to give a wrong impression of Schopenhauer.\nStarting though he does with blind will, and ending with the flight of\nthe ascetic from the suffering inherent in the world that is the\nmanifestation of such a will, he nevertheless, in the intermediate\nstages, makes the world a cosmos and not a chaos. And the Platonists on\ntheir side have to admit that 'the world of all of us' does not present\nitself on the surface as a manifestation of pure reason, and that it\nis a serious task to 'rationalise' it. Where he completely fails\nis where the Platonic systems also fail, though from the opposite\nstarting-point. His attempt to derive presentation, intellect,\nknowledge, from blind striving, is undoubtedly a failure. But so also\nis the attempt of the Platonising thinkers to deduce a world of mixture\nfrom a principle of pure reason without aid from anything else\nempirically assumed. Not that in either case there is failure to give\nexplanations in detail; but in both cases much is taken from experience\nwithout reduction to the principles of the system. What we may say by\nway of comparison is this: that if Schopenhauer had in so many words\nrecognised an immanent Reason as well as Will in the reality of the\nuniverse, he would have formally renounced his pessimism; while it\ncannot be said that on the other side a more explicit empiricism in the\naccount of the self-manifestation of Reason would necessarily destroy\nthe optimism.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nAESTHETICS\n\n\nA portion of Schopenhauer's system by which its pessimism is\nconsiderably mitigated is his theory of the Beautiful and of Fine Art.\nThe characteristic of aesthetic contemplation is, he finds, that\nintellect throws off the yoke and subsists purely for itself as clear\nmirror of the world, free from all subjection to practical purposes of\nthe will. In this state of freedom, temporary painlessness is attained.\n\nThe theory starts from his adaptation of the Platonic Ideas. Regarded\npurely as an aesthetic theory, it departs from Plato, as he notes; for,\nwith the later Platonists, who took up the defence of poetic myths and\nof the imitative arts as against their master, he holds that Art\npenetrates to the general Idea through the particular, and hence that\nthe work of art is no mere 'copy of a copy.' The difference of the Idea\nfrom the Concept is that it is not merely abstract and general, but\ncombines with generality the characters of an intuition.\n\nThe Ideas, as we have seen, constitute the determinate stages of\nobjectivation of the Will. The innumerable individuals of which the\nIdeas are the patterns are subject to the law of sufficient reason. They\nappear, that is to say, under the forms of time, space, and causality.\nThe Idea is beyond these forms, and therefore is clear of plurality and\nchange. Since the law of sufficient reason is the common form under\nwhich stands all the subject's knowledge so far as the subject knows as\nindividual, the Ideas lie outside the sphere of knowledge of the\nindividual as such. If, therefore, the Ideas are to be the object of\nknowledge, this can only be by annulling individuality in the knowing\nsubject.\n\nAs thing-in-itself, the Will is exempt even from the first of the forms\nof knowledge, the form of being 'object for a subject.' The Platonic\nIdea, on the other hand, is necessarily an object, something known, a\npresentation. It has laid aside, or rather has not taken on, the\nsubordinate forms; but it has retained the first and most general form.\nIt is the immediate and most adequate possible objectivity of the Will;\nwhereas particular things are an objectivation troubled by the forms of\nwhich the law of sufficient reason is the common expression.\n\nWhen intellect breaks loose from the service of the will, for which it\nwas originally destined in the teleology of nature, then the subject\nceases to be merely individual and becomes pure will-less subject of\nknowledge. In this state the beholder no longer tracks out relations in\naccordance with the principle of sufficient reason--which is the mode of\nscientific as well as of common knowledge--but rests in fixed\ncontemplation of the given object apart from its connection with\nanything else. The contemplator thus 'lost' in the object, it is not the\nsingle thing as such that is known, but the Idea, the eternal form, the\nimmediate objectivity of the Will at this stage. The correlate of this\nobject--the pure Subject exempt from the principle of sufficient\nreason--is eternal, like the Idea.\n\nThe objectivation of the Will appears faintly in inorganic\nthings,--clouds, water, crystals,--more fully in the plant, yet more\nfully in the animal, most completely in man. Only the essential in these\nstages of objectivation constitutes the Idea. Its development into\nmanifold phenomena under the forms of the principle of sufficient\nreason, is unessential, lies merely in the mode of knowledge for the\nindividual, and has reality only for this. It is not otherwise with the\nunfolding of that Idea which is the completest objectivation of the\nWill. To the Idea of Man, the occurrences of human history are as\nunessential as the shapes they assume to the clouds, as the figures of\nits whirlpools and foam-drift to the stream, as its frost-flowers to the\nice. The same underlying passions and dispositions everlastingly recur\nin the same modes. It is idle to suppose that anything is gained. But\nalso nothing is lost: so the Earth-spirit might reply to one who\ncomplained of high endeavours frustrated, faculties wasted, promises of\nworld-enlightenment brought to nought; for there is infinite time to\ndispose of, and all possibilities are for ever renewed.\n\nThe kind of knowledge for which the Ideas are the object of\ncontemplation finds its expression in Art, the work of genius. Art\nrepeats in its various media the Ideas grasped by pure contemplation.\nIts only end is the communication of these. While Science, following the\nstream of events according to their determinate relations, never reaches\nan ultimate end, Art is always at the end. 'It stops the wheel of time;\nrelations vanish for it: only the essence, the Idea, is its object.' The\ncharacteristic of genius is a predominant capacity for thus\ncontemplating things independently of the principle of sufficient\nreason. Since this requires a forgetting of one's own person and the\nrelations between it and things, the attitude of genius is simply the\ncompletest 'objectivity.' The 'subjectivity' opposed to this, in\nSchopenhauer's phraseology, is preoccupation with the interests of one's\nown will. It is, he says, as if there fell to the share of genius a\nmeasure of intelligence far beyond the needs of the individual will: and\nthis makes possible the setting aside of individual interests, the\nstripping off of the particular personality, so that the subject becomes\n'pure knowing subject,' 'clear world-eye,' in a manner sufficiently\nsustained for that which has been grasped to be repeated in the work of\nart. A necessary element in genius is therefore Imagination. For without\nimagination to represent, in a shape not merely abstract, things that\nhave not come within personal experience, genius would remain limited to\nimmediate intuition, and could not make its vision apprehensible by\nothers. Nor without imagination could the particular things that express\nthe Idea be cleared of the imperfections by which their limited\nexpression of it falls short of what nature was aiming at in their\nproduction. 'Inspiration' is ascribed to genius because its\ncharacteristic attitude is intermittent. The man of genius cannot always\nremain on a height, but has to fall back to the level of the common man,\nwho can scarcely at all regard things except as they affect his\ninterests,--have a relation to his will, direct or indirect.\n\nThis is the statement in its first outline of a theory that became one\nof Schopenhauer's most fruitful topics. Many are the pages he has\ndevoted to the contrast between the man of genius and 'the wholesale\nware of nature, which she turns out daily by thousands.' The genius is\nfor him primarily the artist. Scientific genius as a distinctive thing\nhe does not fully recognise; and he regards men of action, and\nespecially statesmen, rather as men of highly competent ability\nendowed with an exceptionally good physical constitution than as men of\ngenius in the proper sense. Philosophers like himself, who, as he\nfrankly says, appear about once in a hundred years, he classes in the\nend with the artists; though this was left somewhat indeterminate in his\nfirst exposition. The weakness of the man of genius in dealing with the\nordinary circumstances of life he allows, and even insists on. Genius,\ngrasping the Idea in its perfection, fails to understand individuals. A\npoet may know man profoundly, and men very ill. He admits the proximity\nof genius to madness on one side, and explains it in this way. What\nmarks the stage of actual madness, as distinguished from illusion or\nhallucination, is complete disruption of the memory of past life, of the\nhistory of the personality as something continuous; so that the\nparticular thing is viewed by itself, out of relation. This gives a kind\nof resemblance to the attitude of genius, for which present intuition\nexcludes from view the relations of things to each other. Or, as we may\nperhaps sum up his thought in its most general form, 'alienation' or\ndissolution of personality has the resemblance often noted between\nextremes to the impersonality, or, as he calls it, 'objectivity,' that\nis super-personal.\n\nIn spite of his contempt for the crowd, he has to admit, of course, that\nthe capacity of genius to recognise the Ideas of things and to become\nmomentarily impersonal must in some measure belong to all men;\notherwise, they could not even enjoy a work of art when produced. Genius\nhas the advantage only in the much higher degree and the greater\nprolongation of the insight. Since, then, the actual achievement of the\nartist is to make us look into the world through his eyes, the feelings\nfor the beautiful and the sublime may be treated irrespectively of the\nquestion whether they are aroused by nature and human life directly or\nby means of art.\n\nAEsthetic pleasure in contemplation of the beautiful proceeds partly from\nrecognition of the individual object not as one particular thing but as\nPlatonic Idea, that is, as the enduring form of this whole kind of\nthings; partly from the consciousness the knower has of himself not as\nindividual, but as pure, will-less Subject of Knowledge. All volition\nsprings out of need, therefore out of want, therefore out of suffering.\nNo attained object of will can give permanent satisfaction. Thus, there\ncan be no durable happiness or rest for us as long as we are subjects of\nwill. 'The Subject of Will lies continually on the turning wheel of\nIxion, draws ever in the sieve of the Danaides, is the eternally\nthirsting Tantalus. But in the moment of pure objective contemplation,\nfree from all interest of the particular subjectivity, we enter a\npainless state: the wheel of Ixion stands still. The Flemish painters\nproduce this aesthetic effect by the sense of disinterested contemplation\nconveyed in their treatment of insignificant objects. There are certain\nnatural scenes that have power in themselves, apart from artistic\ntreatment, to put us in this state; but the slightest obtrusion of\nindividual interest destroys the magic. Past and distant objects,\nthrough their apparent detachment, have the same power. The essential\nthing aesthetically, whether we contemplate the present or the past, the\nnear or the distant, is that only the world of presentation remains; the\nworld as will has vanished.\n\nThe difference between the feelings of the Beautiful and of the Sublime\nis this. In the feeling of the beautiful, pure intelligence gains the\nvictory without a struggle, leaving in consciousness only the pure\nsubject of knowledge, so that no reminiscence of the will remains. In\nthe feeling of the sublime, on the other hand, the state of pure\nintelligence has to be won by a conscious breaking loose from relations\nin the object that suggest something threatening to the will; though\nthere must not be actual danger; for in that case the individual will\nitself would come into play, and aesthetic detachment would cease.\nElevation above the sense of terror has not only to be consciously won\nbut consciously maintained, and involves a continuous reminiscence, not\nindeed of any individual will, but of the will of man in general, so far\nas it is expressed through its objectivity, the human body, confronted\nby forces hostile to it. Pre-eminently this feeling arises from\ncontrast between the immensities of space and time and the apparent\ninsignificance of man. It means in the last resort that the beholder is\nupheld by the consciousness that as pure subject of knowledge (not as\nindividual subject) he himself bears within him all the worlds and all\nthe ages, and is eternal as the forces that vainly seem to threaten him\nwith annihilation.\n\nOn the objective side, and apart from the subjective distinction just\nset forth, the sublime and the beautiful are not essentially different.\nIn both cases alike, the object of aesthetic contemplation is not the\nsingle thing, but the Idea that is striving towards manifestation in it.\nWhatever is viewed aesthetically is viewed out of relation to time and\nspace: 'along with the law of sufficient reason the single thing and the\nknowing individual are taken away, and nothing remains over but the Idea\nand the pure Subject of Knowledge, which together make up the adequate\nobjectivity of the Will at this stage.' There is thus a sense in which\neverything is beautiful; since the Will appears in everything at some\nstage of objectivity, and this means that it is the expression of some\nIdea. But one thing can be more beautiful than another by facilitating\naesthetic contemplation. This facilitation proceeds either from the\ngreater clearness and perfection with which the particular thing shows\nforth the Idea of its kind, or from the higher stage of objectivation to\nwhich that Idea corresponds. Man being the highest stage of\nobjectivation of the Will, the revelation of his essence is the highest\naim of art. In aesthetic contemplation of inorganic nature and vegetative\nlife, whether in the reality or through the medium of art, and in\nappreciation of architecture, the subjective aspect, that is to say, the\nenjoyment of pure will-less knowledge, is predominant; the Ideas\nthemselves being here lower stages of objectivity. On the other hand,\nwhen animals and men are the object of aesthetic contemplation or\nrepresentation, the enjoyment consists more in the objective\napprehension of those Ideas in which the essence of the Will is most\nclearly and fully manifested.\n\nOf all Schopenhauer's work, its aesthetic part has met with the most\ngeneral appreciation. Here especially he abounds in observations drawn\ndirectly, in his own phrase, from intuition. To make a selection of\nthese, however, is not appropriate to a brief sketch like the present. I\npass on, therefore, to those portions of his theory of Art by which he\nmakes the transition, in terms of his system, to Morality.\n\nFrom Architecture onward the arts are obliged to represent the Will as\ndivided. Here, at the first stage, its division subsists only in a\nconflict of inorganic forces which have to be brought to equilibrium.\nThe conflict between weight and rigidity is in truth the only aesthetic\nmaterial of architecture as a fine art. When we come to animal and\nlastly to human life, which, in the Plastic Arts and in Poetry, as form,\nindividualised expression, and action, is the highest object of aesthetic\nrepresentation, the vehemence of divided will is fully revealed; and\nhere too is revealed the essential identity of every will with our own.\nIn the words of the Indian wisdom, 'Tat twam asi'; 'that thou art.'\nUnder the head of Ethics it will be shown expressly that by this\ninsight, when it reacts on the will, the will can deny itself. For the\ntemporary release from its striving, given in aesthetic contemplation, is\nthen substituted permanent release. To this 'resignation,' the innermost\nessence of all virtue and holiness, and the final redemption from the\nworld, Art itself, at its highest stages, points the way.\n\nThe summits of pictorial and poetic art Schopenhauer finds in the great\nItalian painters so far as they represent the ethical spirit of\nChristianity, and in the tragic poets, ancient and modern. It is true\nthat the poverty of their sacred history or mythology puts the Christian\nartists at a disadvantage; but events are merely the accidents of their\nart. Not in these, as related according to the law of sufficient reason,\nis the essence, but in the spirit we divine through the forms portrayed.\nIn their representation of men full of that spirit, and especially in\nthe eyes, we see mirrored the knowledge that has seized the whole\nessence of the world and of life, and that has reacted on the will, not\nso as to give it motives, but as a 'quietive'; whence proceeds complete\nresignation, and with it the annulling of the will and of the whole\nessence of this world. Of tragedy, the subject-matter is the conflict of\nthe will with itself at its highest stage of objectivity. Here also the\nend is the resignation brought on by complete knowledge of the essence\nof the world. The hero, on whom at last this knowledge has acted as a\nquietive, gives up, not merely life, but the whole will to live. 'The\ntrue meaning of tragedy is the deeper insight, that what the hero\nexpiates is not his particular sins, but original sin, that is, the\nguilt of existence itself.' To illustrate this position Schopenhauer is\nfond of quoting a passage from Calderon which declares that the greatest\nsin of man is to have been born.\n\nIt seems strange that, after deriding as he does the popular notion of\n'poetic justice' so detached a thinker should imagine an at least\nequally one-sided view to receive its final confirmation from the\nSpanish dramatist's poetic phrasing of a Christian dogma. The great\ntragic poets, for Schopenhauer also, are AEschylus, Sophocles and\nShakespeare. Now it is safe to say that by none of these was any such\ngeneral doctrine held either in conceptual or in intuitive form. The\nwhole effect of any kind of art, of course he would admit, cannot be\npacked into a formula; but if we seek one as an aid to understanding,\nsome adaptation of his own theory of the sublime would probably serve\nmuch better as applied to tragedy than his direct theory of the drama.\nIn the case of pictorial art, all that is proved by what he says about\nthe representation of ascetic saintliness, is that this, like many other\nthings, can be so brought within the scope of art as to make us\nmomentarily identify ourselves with its Idea in the impersonal manner he\nhas himself described. His purely aesthetic theory is quite adequate to\nthe case, without any assumption that this is the representation of what\nis best. Art, pictorial or poetic, can no more prove pessimism than\noptimism. We pick out expressions of one or the other for quotation\naccording to our moods or subjective preferences; but, if we have the\nfeeling for art itself, our sense of actual aesthetic value ought to be\nindependent of these.\n\nSchopenhauer's aesthetic theory, however, does not end here. There\nfollows the part of it by which he has had an influence on artists\nthemselves. For him, a position separate from all the other arts is held\nby music. While the rest objectify the Will mediately, that is to say,\nby means of the Ideas, Music is as immediate an objectivation of the\nwhole Will as the world itself, or as the Ideas, of which the pluralised\nphenomenon constitutes the sum of particular things. The other arts\nspeak of the shadow, music of the substance. There is indeed a\nparallelism, an analogy, between Music and the Ideas; yet Music never\nexpresses the phenomenon in which these are manifested, but only the\ninner essence behind the appearance, the Will itself. In a sense it\nrenders not feeling in its particularity, but feeling _in abstracto_;\njoy, sorrow, not a joy, a sorrow. The phenomenal world and music are to\nbe regarded as two different expressions of the same thing. The world\nmight be called embodied Music as well as embodied Will. 'Melodies are\nto a certain extent like general concepts, an abstract of reality.' A\ncomplete explanation of music, that is, a detailed repetition of it in\nconcepts, were this possible, would be a complete explanation of the\nworld (since both express the same thing) and therefore a true and final\nphilosophy. As music only reaches its perfection in the full harmony,\n'so the one Will out of time finds its perfect objectivation only in\ncomplete union of all the stages which in innumerable degrees of\nheightened distinctness reveal its essence.' But here, too, Schopenhauer\nadds, the Will is felt, and can be proved, to be a divided will; and the\ndeliverance wrought by this supreme art, as by all the others, is only\ntemporary.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nETHICS\n\n\nPermanent redemption from the suffering of the world is to be found only\nin the holiness of the ascetic; but to this there are many stages,\nconstituting the generally accepted human virtues. Of these Schopenhauer\nhas a rational account to give in terms of his philosophy; and if the\nlast stage does not seem to follow by logical sequence from the others,\nthis is only what is to be expected; for it is reached, in his view, by\na sort of miracle. To the highest kind of intuitive knowledge, from\nwhich the ascetic denial of the will proceeds, artistic contemplation\nought to prepare the way; and so also, on his principles, ought the\npractice of justice and goodness. Yet he is obliged to admit that few\nthus reach the goal. Of those that do reach it, the most arrive through\npersonal suffering, which may be deserved. A true miracle is often\nworked in the repentant criminal, by which final deliverance is\nachieved. Though the 'intelligible character' is unalterable, and the\nempirical character can only be the unfolding of this, as every great\ndramatist intuitively recognises, yet the 'convertites,' like Duke\nFrederick in _As You Like It_, are not to be regarded as hypocrites. The\n'second voyage' to the harbour, that of the disappointed egoist, on\ncondition of this miracle, brings the passenger to it as surely as the\nfirst, that of the true saints, which is only for the few. And in these\nequally a miraculous conversion of the will has to be finally worked.\n\nAt the entrance to his distinctive theory of ethics, Schopenhauer places\na restatement of his metaphysics as the possible basis of a mode of\ncontemplating life which, he admits, has some community with an\noptimistic pantheism. The Will, through the presentation and the\naccompanying intelligence developed in its service, becomes conscious\nthat that which it wills is precisely the world, life as it is. To call\nit 'the will to live' is therefore a pleonasm. 'Will' and 'will to live'\nare equivalent. For this will, life is everlastingly a certainty.\n'Neither the will, the thing-in-itself in all phenomena, nor the subject\nof knowledge, the spectator of all phenomena, is ever touched by birth\nand death.' It is true that the individual appears and disappears; but\nindividuality is illusory. Past and future exist only in conceptual\nthought. 'The form of life is a present without end, howsoever the\nindividuals, phenomena of the Idea, come into existence and vanish in\ntime, like fugitive dreams.' Only as phenomenon is each man different\nfrom the other things of the world: as thing-in-itself he is the Will,\nwhich appears in all, and death takes away the illusion that divides his\nconsciousness from the rest. 'Death is a sleep in which the\nindividuality is forgotten: everything else wakes again, or rather has\nremained awake.' It is, in the expression adopted by Schopenhauer later,\nan awakening from the dream of life: though this bears with it somewhat\ndifferent implications; and, as has been said, his theory of\nindividuality became modified.\n\nWith the doctrine of the eternal life of the Will are connected\nSchopenhauer's theories, developed later, of the immortality of the\nspecies and of individualised sexual love. The latter is by itself a\nremarkable achievement, and constitutes the one distinctly new\ndevelopment brought to completion in his later years; for the\nmodifications in his theory of individuality are only tentative. His\ntheory of love has a determinate conclusion, of great value for\nscience, and not really compatible, it seems to me, with his pessimism.\nIn its relation to ethics, on which he insisted, it is rightly placed in\nthe position it occupies, between the generalised statement of his\nmetaphysics just now set forth on the one side, and his theory of human\nvirtue on the other.\n\nThe teleology that manifests itself in individualised love is, in his\nview, not related in reality to the interests of the individual life,\nbut to those of the species. That this is immortal follows from the\neternity of the Idea it unfolds.[4] The end sought is aimed at\nunconsciously by the person. Fundamentally, for Schopenhauer, teleology\nmust of course be unconscious, since the will is blind, and will, not\nintelligence, is primordial. Its typical case is the instinct of\nanimals; but the 'instinctive' character belongs also to the\naccomplishment of the highest aims, as in art and virtue. What\ncharacterises individualised love internally is the aim, attributed to\n'nature' or 'the species,' at a certain typical beauty or perfection of\nthe offspring. The lover is therefore deluded in thinking that he is\nseeking his own happiness. What looks through the eyes of lovers is the\ngenius of the race, meditating on the composition of the next\ngeneration. It may, in the complexity of circumstances, be thwarted.\nWhen it reaches its end, often personal happiness is sacrificed.\nMarriages dictated by interest tend to be happier than love-matches.\nYet, though the sacrifice of the individual to the race is involuntary\nin these, egoism is after all overcome; hence they are quite rightly the\nobject of a certain admiration and sympathy, while the prudential ones\nare looked upon with a tinge of contempt. For here too that element\nappears which alone gives nobility to the life either of intellect or of\nart or of moral virtue, namely, the rising above a subjective interest\nof the individual will.\n\n  [4] The disappearance of species in time raises difficulties in more\n  than one way for his philosophy; but he formally escapes refutation by\n  the suggestion, already noted, that the Idea need not always be\n  manifested phenomenally in the same world. This, however, he did not\n  work out.\n\nNo doubt there are touches of pessimism in this statement; but the\ngeneral theory does not seem reconcilable finally with pessimism as\nSchopenhauer understands it. For it is a definitely stated position of\nhis that nature keeps up the process of the world by yielding just\nenough to prevent discontinuance of the striving for an illusory end.\nYet he admits here in the result something beyond bare continuance of\nlife; for this is already secured without the particular modification of\nfeeling described. What the feeling is brought in to secure is a better\nrealisation of the type in actual individuals; and such realisation is\ncertainly more than bare subsistence with the least possible expenditure\nof nature's resources.\n\nAs the immediate preliminary to his ethics proper, Schopenhauer restates\nhis doctrine on the intelligible and the empirical character in man, and\nlays down a generalised psychological position regarding the suffering\ninherent in life. Everything as phenomenon, we have seen already, is\ndetermined because it is subject to the law of sufficient reason. On the\nother hand, everything as thing-in-itself is free; for 'freedom' means\nonly non-subjection to that law. The intelligible character of each man\nis an indivisible, unalterable act of will out of time; the developed\nand explicit phenomenon of this in time and space is the empirical\ncharacter. Man is his own work, not in the light of knowledge, but\nbefore all knowledge; this is secondary and an instrument. Ultimately,\nfreedom is a mystery, and takes us beyond even will as the name for the\nthing-in-itself. In reality, that which is 'will to live' need not have\nbeen such (though we cannot see how this is so), but has become such\nfrom itself and from nothing else. This is its '_aseitas_.' Hence it is\nin its power to deny itself as will to live. When it does this, the\nredemption (like the fall) comes from itself. This denial does not mean\nannihilation, except relatively to all that we know under the forms of\nour understanding. For the will, though the nearest we can get to the\nthing-in-itself, is in truth a partially phenomenalised expression of\nthis. As the will to live expresses itself phenomenally, so also does\nthe denial of the will to live, when this, by special 'grace,' is\nachieved. Only in man does the freedom thus attained find phenomenal\nexpression. That man can attain to it proves that in him the will has\nreached its highest possible stage of objectivation; for, after it has\nturned back and denied itself, there is evidently nothing more that we\ncan call existence, that is to say, phenomenal existence, beyond. What\nthere is beyond in the truth of being is something that the mystics\nknow--or rather, possess, for it is beyond knowledge--but cannot\ncommunicate.\n\nThe psychological reason that can be assigned for the ascetic flight\nfrom the world is that all pleasure, happiness, satisfaction, is merely\nnegative. The will is a striving that has no ultimate aim. It is\nsustained only by hindrances. Hindrance means suffering; and every\nsatisfaction attained is only temporary, a mere liberation from need,\nwant, pain, which is positive. Suffering increases with the degree of\nconsciousness. The life of civilised man is an alternation between pain\nand _ennui_, which can itself become as intolerable a suffering as\nanything. The problem of moral philosophy, then, is ultimately how\nredemption from such a world is to be attained, but only so far as this\nis a matter of conceptual knowledge. For philosophy, being from\nbeginning to end theoretical, cannot work the practical miracle by which\nthe will denies itself.\n\nThe intuitive, as distinguished from merely conceptual, knowledge by\nwhich the return is made, consists essentially in a clear insight into\nthe identity of the suffering will in all things and the necessity of\nits suffering as long as it is will to live. This, then, is the true\nfoundation of morality. The universe as metaphysical thing-in-itself, as\nnoumenon, has an ethical meaning. All its stages of objectivation,\nthough in the process what seems to be aimed at is preservation of the\nwill as manifested, have in truth for their ultimate aim its redemption\nby suppression of the phenomenal world in which it manifests itself.\n\nAffirmation of the will is affirmation of the body, which is the\nobjectivity of the will. The sexual impulse, since it affirms life\nbeyond the death of the individual, is the strongest of\nself-affirmations. In it is found the meaning of the mythical\nrepresentation that has taken shape in the theological dogma of original\nsin. For by this affirmation going beyond the individual body, suffering\nand death, as the necessary accompaniment of the phenomenon of life, are\nreaffirmed, and the possibility of redemption this time declared\nfruitless. But through the whole process there runs eternal justice. The\njustification of suffering is that the will affirms itself; and the\nself-affirmation is justified by payment of the penalty.\n\nBefore the final redemption--which is not for the world but for the\nindividual--there are many stages of ethical progress. These consist in\nthe gradual overcoming of egoism by sympathy. And here Schopenhauer\nproceeds to set forth a practical scheme for the social life of man,\ndiffering from ordinary utilitarianism only by reducing all sympathy to\npity, in accordance with his view that there can be no such thing as\npositive happiness.\n\nHe begins with a theory of justice, legal and moral, very much on the\nlines of Hobbes, except that he regards it as up to a certain point _a\npriori_. Here he is consistent throughout. As in his philosophical\naccount of mathematics and physics, so also in his aesthetics and\nethics, he retained, side by side with a strong empirical tendency,\nbelief in certain irreducible _a priori_ forms without which our\nknowledge cannot be constituted. The pure ethical theory of justice, he\nsays, bears to the political theory the relation of pure to applied\nmathematics. Injustice he holds to be the positive conception. It means\nthe breaking into the sphere of another person's will to live. The\nself-affirmation of the will that appears in one individual body is\nextended to denial of the will that appears in other bodies. Justice\nconsists in non-encroachment. There is a 'natural right,' or 'moral\nright,' of resistance to injustice by infliction of what, apart from the\nattempted encroachment, would be wrong. Either force or deception may be\nused; as either may be the instrument of injustice. The purely ethical\ndoctrine of justice applies only to action; since only the not doing of\ninjustice depends on us. With the State and its laws, the relation is\nreversed. The object of these is to prevent the suffering of injustice.\nThe State is not directed against egoism, but has sprung out of a\nrationalised collective egoism. It has for its purpose only to avoid the\ninconvenient consequences of individual aggressions on others. Outside\nof the State, there is a right of self-defence against injustice, but no\nright of punishment. The punishment threatened by the State is\nessentially a motive against committing wrong, intended to supply the\nplace of ethical motives for those who are insufficiently accessible to\nthem. Actual infliction of it is the carrying out of the threat when it\nhas failed, so that in general the expectation of the penalty may be\ncertain. Revenge, which has a view to the past, cannot be justified\nethically: punishment is directed only to the future. There is no right\nin any one to set himself up as a moral judge and inflict pain; but man\nhas a right to do what is needful for social security. The criminal's\nacts are of course necessitated; but he cannot justly complain of being\npunished for them, since it is ultimately from himself, from what he is,\nthat they sprang.\n\nWith the doctrine of 'eternal justice,' touched on above, we pass into a\ndifferent region of thought. What is responsible for the guilt in the\nworld is the Will by which everything exists, and the suffering\neverlastingly falls where the guilt is. Take the case of apparently\nunpunished injustice (from the human point of view) expressing itself in\nthe extreme form of deliberate cruelty. Through this also, eternal\njustice, from which there is no escape, is fulfilled. 'The torturer and\nthe tortured are one. The former errs in thinking he has no share in the\ntorture; the latter in thinking he has no share in the guilt.' For all\nthe pain of the world is the expiation of the sin involved in the\nself-affirmation of will, and the Will as thing-in-itself is one and the\nsame in all.\n\nIf this could satisfy any one, there would be no need to go further. The\nwhole being as it ought to be, why try to rectify details that are\nabsolutely indifferent? But of course the implication is that\nindividuality is simply illusory; and this, as has been said, was a\nposition that Schopenhauer neither could nor did consistently maintain.\nIndeed, immediately after setting forth this theory of 'eternal\njustice,' he goes on to a relative justification of those acts of\ndisinterested vengeance by which a person knowingly sacrifices his own\nlife for the sake of retribution on some extraordinary criminal. This,\nhe says, is a form of punishment, not mere revenge, although it involves\nan error concerning the nature of eternal justice. Suicide involves a\nsimilar error, in so far as it supposes that the real being of the\nindividual can be assailed through its phenomenal manifestation. It is\nnot a denial of the will to live, but a strong affirmation of it, only\nnot in the given circumstances: different circumstances are desired with\nsuch intensity that the present cannot be borne. Therefore the\nindividual manifestation of the will is not suppressed. Yet, one might\nreply, if individuality is an illusion attached to the appearance in\ntime and space of a particular organism, it would seem that, with the\ndisappearance of this, all that distinguishes the individual must\ndisappear also.\n\nSchopenhauer had no will thus to escape from life; nor did he afterwards\ndevote himself to expounding further his theory of eternal justice. What\nhe wrote later, either positively or as mere speculation, implies both\ngreater reality in the individual and more of cosmic equity to\ncorrespond. His next step, even at his first stage, is to continue the\nexposition of a practicable ethics for human life. His procedure\nconsists in adding beneficence to justice, with the proviso already\nmentioned, which is required by his psychology, that all beneficence can\nconsist only in the relief of pain. For Schopenhauer, as for Comte,\nwhat is to be overcome is 'egoism,' an excessive degree of which is the\nmark of the character we call 'bad.' The 'good' is what Comte and\nSpencer call the 'altruistic' character. This difference between\ncharacters Schopenhauer goes on to explain in terms of his metaphysics.\nThe egoist is so deluded by the principle of individuation that he\nsupposes an absolute cleft between his own person and all others. The\nremorse of conscience from which he suffers proceeds in part from an\nobscure perception that the principle of individuation is illusory.\nGenuine virtue springs out of the intuitive (not merely abstract)\nknowledge that recognises in another individuality the same essence as\nin one's own. The characteristic of the good man is that he makes less\ndifference than is customary between himself and others. Justice is an\nintermediate stage between the encroaching egoism of the bad and\npositive goodness. In the renunciation of rights of property, and\nprovision for all personal needs without aid from others, practised by\nsome religious and philosophical ascetics, it is passing over into\nsomething more. There is, however, a certain misunderstanding involved\nin so interpreting strict justice; for there are many ways in which the\nrich and powerful can be positively beneficent. At the other extreme,\nwhen they simply live on their inherited wealth, without doing anything\nin return, their mode of life is morally, though not legally, unjust.\nRights of property Schopenhauer derived from labour spent on the things\nappropriated. The injustice, in many ways, of the present social order\nhe quite recognises. If he has no sympathy with revolutions, it is\nbecause he has no belief in the realisation of an ideal state. This\nfollows from his view of history. Human life, it is his conviction,\nnever has been and never will be different as a whole. Redemption from\nevil can be attained only by the individual. All that the State can do\nis to provide certain very general conditions of security under which\nthere will be no hindrance to those who desire to live in accordance\nwith a moral ideal.\n\nYet there are qualifications to make. Many passages in Schopenhauer's\nwritings prove his firm belief in the future triumph of reason over\nsuperstition. It is to the honour of humanity, he says, that so\ndetestable a form of evil as organised religious persecution has\nappeared only in one section of history. And, in his own personal case,\nhe has the most complete confidence that the truths he has put forth\ncannot fail sometime to gain a hearing. In all cases, error is only\ntemporary, and truth will prevail. His language on this subject, and\nindeed often on others, is indistinguishable from that of an optimist.\n\nIn the last resort, his pessimism entrenches itself behind the\npsychological proposition that every satisfaction is negative, being\nonly the removal of a pain. If this is unsustainable, there is nothing\nfinally in his Metaphysics of Will to necessitate the pessimistic\nconclusion drawn. The mode of deduction by which he proceeds is to argue\nfirst to the position already noticed: that all that love of others on\nwhich morality is based is fundamentally pity. True benevolence can only\nbe the desire to relieve others' pain, springing from the identification\nof this with our own. For that reason, moral virtue must finally pass\nover into asceticism--the denial of the will to live. In others, if we\nare able to see through the principle of individuation, we recognise the\nsame essence as in ourselves, and we perceive that as long as this wills\nit must necessarily suffer. The end then is to destroy the will to live.\nThis is to be done by _askesis_, self-mortification. The first step is\ncomplete chastity. If, says Schopenhauer, the highest phenomenon of\nwill, that is, man, were to disappear through a general refusal to\naffirm life beyond the individual body, man's weaker reflexion in the\nanimal world would disappear also, and the consciousness of the whole\nwould cease. Knowledge being taken away, the rest would vanish into\nnothingness, since there is 'no object without subject.' That this will\ncome to pass, however, he certainly did not believe. He has no\ncosmogony, like that of Hartmann, ending in a general redemption of the\nuniverse by such a collective act. Nor did he hold, like his later\nsuccessor Mainlaender, that through the conflict and gradual extinction\nof individualities, 'this great world shall so wear out to nought.' The\nworld for him is without beginning and without end. But the exceptional\nindividual can redeem himself. What he does when he has reached the\nheight of holiness is by voluntary poverty and all other privations,\ninflicted for their own sake, to break and kill the will, which he\nrecognises as the source of his own and of the world's suffering\nexistence. In his case not merely the phenomenon ends at death, as with\nothers, but the being is taken away. To be a 'world-overcomer' in this\nsense (as opposed to a 'world-conqueror') is the essence of sanctity\nwhen cleared of all the superstitious dogmas by which the saints try to\nexplain their mode of life to themselves.\n\nThe absolutely pure expression of this truth is to be found only in\nphilosophy; but of the religions Buddhism comes nearest to expressing it\nwithout admixture. For the Buddhist saint asks aid from no god. True\nChristianity, however,--the Christianity of the New Testament and of the\nChristian mystics,--agrees both with Buddhism and with Brahmanism in\nultimate aim. What spoils it for Schopenhauer is the Judaic element.\nThis, on one side, infects it with the optimism of the Biblical story of\ncreation, in which God 'saw everything that he had made, and, behold, it\nwas very good.' On the other side, it contaminates the myth of original\nsin, which bears in itself a profound philosophical truth, by this same\ndoctrine of a creative God; from which follows all the injustice and\nirrationality necessarily involved in the Augustinian theology, and not\nto be expelled except with its theism. Nevertheless, the story of the\nFall of Man, of which that theology, in its fundamentally true part, is\na reasoned expression, is the one thing, Schopenhauer avows, that\nreconciles him to the Old Testament. The truth that it clothes he finds\nalso among the Greeks; Empedocles, after the Orphics and Pythagoreans,\nhaving taught that the soul had been doomed to wander because of some\nantenatal sin. And the mysticism that accompanies all these more or less\npure expressions of one metaphysical truth he finds represented by the\nSufis even in optimistic Islam; so that he can claim for his philosophy\na world-wide consent.\n\nReligion, if we take this to include mysticism, at once rises above\nphilosophy and falls below it. As 'metaphysics of the people,' it is a\nmythological expression of philosophical truth: as mysticism, it is a\nkind of 'epi-philosophy.' Beyond pure philosophy Schopenhauer does not\nprofess to go; but he accepts what the mystics say as the description of\na positive experience which becomes accessible when supreme insight is\nattained intuitively. For the philosopher as such, insight into that\nwhich is beyond the forms of our knowledge and even beyond the will\nitself, remains only conceptual; though it is within the province of\nphilosophy to mark out the place for this. The 'something else' that is\nleft when the will has been denied, is indicated by the 'ecstasy,'\n'illumination,' 'union with God,' spoken of by the mystics.\nParadoxically, some of the mystics themselves even have identified it\nwith 'nothing'; but the result of the denial of the will to live is to\nbe called nothing only in relation to the world as we know it. 'On the\nother hand, to those in whom the will has turned back and denied itself,\nthis so very real world of ours with all its suns and milky ways\nis--nothing.'\n\nIn this terminus of his philosophy, Schopenhauer recognised his kinship\nwith Indian thought, of which he was a lifelong student. To call his\ndoctrine a kind of Buddhism is, however, in some ways a misapprehension.\nUndoubtedly he accepts as his ideal the ethical attitude that he finds\nto be common to Buddhism and the Christianity of the New Testament; but\nmetaphysical differences mark him off from both. We have seen that he\nrejects the extra-mundane God of Semitic derivation, adopted by\nhistorical Christianity. Indeed he is one of the most pronounced\nanti-Jehovists of all literature. But equally his belief in a positive\nmetaphysical doctrine marks him off from Buddhism, according to the\naccount given of it by its most recent students, who regard it either as\nultimately nihilistic or as having no metaphysics at all, but only a\npsychology and ethics. Nor can he be precisely identified with the\nVedantists of orthodox Hinduism. Their ultimate reality, if we are to\nfind an analogue for it in European metaphysics, seems to resemble the\nhypostasised _ego_ of Fichte, or the Kantian 'transcendental unity of\napperception', much more than it resembles Schopenhauer's blindly\nstriving will as thing-in-itself. Even in practical ethics, he does not\nfollow the Indian systems at all closely. Philosophical doctrines of\njustice are of course purely European; and Schopenhauer himself points\nout the sources of his own theory. In his extension of ethics to\nanimals, on which he lays much stress, he cites the teachings of Eastern\nnon-Semitic religions as superior to the rest; but he does not follow\nthe Indians, nor even the Pythagoreans, so far as to make abstinence\nfrom flesh part of the ideal. He condemns vivisection on the ground that\nanimals have rights: certain ways of treating them are unjust, not\nsimply uncompassionate. The discussion here again is of course wholly\nwithin European thought. Thus, in trying to determine his significance\nfor modern philosophy, we may consider his system in its immediate\nenvironment, leaving it to more special students to determine how far it\nreceived a peculiar colouring from the Oriental philosophies, of which,\nin his time, the more exact knowledge was just beginning to penetrate to\nthe West.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nHISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE\n\n\nSchopenhauer is not one of the philosophers who have founded a school,\nthough he has had many disciples and enthusiastic admirers. The\npessimism that was for a time a watchword with certain literary groups\nhas passed as a mode, and his true significance must be sought\nelsewhere. Of the thinkers who have followed him in his pessimism, two\nindeed stand out as the architects of distinct systems, Eduard von\nHartmann and Philipp Mainlaender (both already incidentally referred to);\nbut while they are to be classed unquestionably as philosophers, their\nsystems contain an element that their master would have regarded as\nmythological. Schopenhauer declared as clearly as any of the Greeks that\nthe phenomenal world is without beginning and without end. Kant's\npositing of an 'antinomy' on this point he regarded as wholly without\nrational justification. What Kant calls the 'antithesis,' namely, the\ninfinite series, can be logically proved for phenomena. The 'thesis,'\nwhich asserts a beginning in time, is defended by mere fallacies. Now\nHartmann and Mainlaender both hold, though in different fashions, that\nthere is a world-process from a beginning to an end, namely, the\nextinction of consciousness. This is the redemption of the world. Their\naffinity, therefore, seems to be with the Christian Gnostics rather than\nwith the pure philosophers of the Greek tradition, continued in modern\ntimes by Bruno, Spinoza, and Schopenhauer.\n\nWhatever may be thought of the pessimism by which Schopenhauer's mood is\ndistinguished from that of his precursors, few will fail to recognise\nthat special doctrines of his system contain at least a large portion of\ntruth. His theories of Art, of Genius, and of Love are enough to found\nan enduring reputation for any thinker, even if there were nothing else\nof value in his writings. But there is much else, both in systematic\nconstruction and in the illumination of detail. I have been inclined to\nput forward first of all the translation into idealistic terms of the\nuniversal sentiency held by the Ionian thinkers to be inherent in the\nprimordial elements of nature. While they viewed the world as an\nobjective thing having psychological qualities, Schopenhauer, after the\nlong intermediate process of thought, could treat it as phenomenal\nobject with a psychological or subjective essence. For both doctrines\nalike, however, mind or soul is immanent. Still, it must be allowed that\na difference remains by which Schopenhauer was even more remote than\nthey were from the later Greek idealism. As they were not materialists,\nso they did not exclude reason from the psychical properties of their\nsubstances. Schopenhauer, while he rejected the materialism of their\nancient and modern successors alike, took the step of formally\nderationalising the elements of mind. This, no doubt, is unsustainable\nultimately, if reason is ever to emerge from them. Yet the one-sidedness\nof the position has had a peculiar value in combating an equally\none-sided rationalistic idealism. This is recognised by clear-sighted\nopponents. And Schopenhauer's calling the non-rational or anti-rational\nelement in the world 'will' helps to make plainer the real problem of\nevil. There is truth in the Hegelian paradox that 'pessimism is an\nexcellent basis for optimism.' An optimist like Plotinus saw that, even\nif good comes of evil, the case of the optimist must fail unless evil\ncan be shown to be a necessary constituent of the world. The Platonic\nand Neo-Platonic 'matter,' a principle of diremption or individuation,\nlike time and space for Schopenhauer, was an attempt to solve this\nproblem; but something more positive seemed to be needed as the source\nof the stronger manifestations of evil. To the strength of these Plato\ndrew attention in a passage (_Republic_, x. 610[5]) where it is\nacknowledged that injustice confers a character of vitality and\nsleeplessness upon its possessor. In the notion of a blind and vehement\nstriving, Schopenhauer supplies something adequate; only, to maintain a\nrational optimism, it must be regarded as a necessary element in a\nmixture, not as the spring of the whole.\n\n  [5] Cited in one of the introductory essays to Jowett and Campbell's\n  edition, vol. ii.\n\nMuch might be said on the teleology by which he tries to educe\nintelligence from the primordial strife. Against his view, that it is\nevolved as a mere instrument for preserving races in a struggle, another\nmay be set that is ready to hand in a dialogue of Plutarch.[6] The\nstruggle among animals, it is there incidentally argued, has for its end\nto sharpen their intelligence. Both these theories are on the surface\ncompatible with evolution. If, leaving aside the problem of mechanism,\nwe try to verify them by the test of results, the latter undoubtedly\nseems the more plausible. For if the struggle was a means to the\nimprovement of intelligence, nature has succeeded more and more;\nwhereas, if her intention was to preserve races, she has continually\nfailed. This argument is at any rate perfectly valid against\nSchopenhauer himself; for he holds in common with the optimistic\nteleologists that 'nature does nothing in vain.'\n\n  [6] _De Sollertia Animalium_, 27.\n\nI will conclude with a few detached criticisms on the ethical doctrine\nwhich he regarded as the culmination of his system. The antithesis, it\nmay first be noted, between the temporary release from the vehemence of\nthe will that is gained through art, and the permanent release through\nasceticism, is not consistently maintained. Schopenhauer admits that the\nknowledge which for the ascetic is the 'quietive' of the will has to be\nwon anew in a perpetual conflict. 'No one can have enduring rest on\nearth.' Again, revision of his doctrine concerning the reality of the\nindividual would, I think, necessitate revision also of the position\nthat not only asceticism but 'all true and pure love, nay, even freely\nrendered justice, proceeds from seeing through the _principium\nindividuationis_.' If the individual is in some sense ultimately real,\nthen love must be to a certain extent literally altruism. We are brought\ndown to the elementary fact, in terms of the metaphysics of ethics, that\nthe object of love is a real being that is itself and not ourselves,\nthough having some resemblance to us and united in a larger whole. An\nobjection not merely verbal might indeed be taken to Schopenhauer's\nmetaphysics of ethics strictly on his own ground. If it is purely and\nsimply the essence of ourselves that we recognise in everything, does\nnot this reduce all love finally to a well-understood egoism? The\ngenuine fact of sympathy seems to escape his mode of formulation. And,\nin the end, we shall perhaps not find the ascetic to be the supreme\nethical type. Of the self-tormenting kind of asceticism, it is not\nenough to say with Schopenhauer that, since it is a world-wide\nphenomenon of human nature, it calls for some account from philosophy.\nThe account may be sufficiently rendered by historical psychology; the\nresult being to class it as an aberration born of the illusions incident\nto a certain type of mind at a certain stage. Indeed, that seems to be\nthe conclusion of the Buddhists, who claim to have transcended it by\nfinding it superfluous for the end it aims at. Let us then take, as our\nexample of the completed type, not the monks of the Thebaid, but the\nmild ascetics of the Buddhist communities. Does not this type, even in\nits most attractive form, represent a 'second best'? Is not the final\njudgment that of Plato, that to save oneself is something, but that\nthere is no full achievement unless for the life of the State also the\nideal has been brought nearer realisation? When there is nothing in the\nworld but irredeemable tyranny or anarchy, flight from it may be the\ngreatest success possible as far as the individual life is concerned;\nbut this is not the normal condition of humanity. Finally, may not some\nactual achievement, either practical or, like that of Schopenhauer,\nspeculative, even if accompanied by real imperfections of character,\npossess a higher human value than the sanctity that rests always in\nitself?\n\n\n\n\nSELECTED WORKS\n\n\n_English Translations_\n\n  _The World as Will and Idea._ Translated by R. B. HALDANE and J. KEMP. 3\n    vols. 1883-6.\n\n  _Two Essays_: I. _On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient\n    Reason_. II. _On the Will in Nature_. Bohn's Philosophical Library,\n    1889.\n\n  _Religion: A Dialogue, and other Essays._ Selected and translated by T.\n    BAILEY SAUNDERS. 3rd ed., 1891. [A series of other volumes of\n    selections excellently translated by Mr. Saunders has followed.]\n\n  _Selected Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer._ With a Biographical\n    Introduction and Sketch of his Philosophy. By E. BELFORT BAX. 1891.\n\n  _The Basis of Morality._ Translated with Introduction and Notes by A. B.\n    BULLOCK. 1903.\n\n\n_Biographical and Expository_\n\n  _Arthur Schopenhauer: His Life and Philosophy._ By HELEN ZIMMERN. 1876.\n\n  _Life of Arthur Schopenhauer._ By Professor W. WALLACE. 1890.\n\n  _La Philosophie de Schopenhauer._ Par TH. RIBOT. 2nd ed., 1885.\n\n  _Arthur Schopenhauer._ Seine Persoenlichkeit, seine Lehre, sein Glaube.\n    Von JOHANNAES VOLKELT. 3rd ed., 1907.\n\n  _Schopenhauer-Lexikon._ Von JULIUS FRADENSTAeDT. 2 vols., 1871.\n\n\nPrinted by T. and A. CONSTABLE, Printers to His Majesty at the Edinburgh\nUniversity Press","title":"Schopenhauer","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":19366}