{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_38621/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_38621","id":"gutenberg_38621","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/38621","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Psychiatry/Psychology","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Free will and determinism","Will"],"text":"Produced by Keith G Richardson\n\n\n\n\nContents\nDedicatory Preface\nFootnotes\n\nDOCTRINE\n\nOF\n\nTHE WILL.\n\nBY REV. A. MAHAN,\n\nPRESIDENT OF THE OBERLIN COLLEGIATE INSTITUTE.\n\n   \"Not man alone, all rationals Heaven arms\n   With an illustrious, but tremendous power,\n   To counteract its own most gracious ends;\n   And this, of strict necessity, not choice;\n   That power denied, men, angels, were no more\n   But passive engines void of praise or blame.\n   A nature rational implies the power\n   Of being blest, or wretched, as we please.\n\n   Man falls by man, if finally he falls;\n   And fall he must, who learns from death alone,\n   The dreadful secret--That he lives for ever.\"\n                                             YOUNG.\n\nNEW YORK:\n\nMARK H. NEWMAN, 199 BROADWAY.\n\nOBERLIN; OHIO: R. E. GILLET.\n\n1845.\n\n\n\n\nEntered according to an Act of Congress, in the year 1844, by\n\nASA MAHAN,\n\nIn the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States, for\nthe Southern District of New York.\n\nS. W. BENEDICT & CO., STER. & PRINT.,\n\n16 Spruce street.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nINTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS.--Importance of the Subject--True and\nfalse Methods of Inquiry--Common Fault--Proper Method of Reasoning\nfrom Revelation to the System of Mental Philosophy therein\npre-supposed--Errors of Method\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nCLASSIFICATION OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES.--Classification verified\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nLIBERTY AND NECESSITY.--Terms defined--Characteristics of the\nabove Definitions--Motive defined--Liberty as opposed to Necessity,\nthe Characteristic of the Will--Objections to Doctrine of\nNecessity--Doctrine of Liberty, direct Argument--Objection to an Appeal\nto Consciousness--Doctrine of Liberty argued from the existence of the\nidea of Liberty in all Minds--The Doctrine of Liberty, the Doctrine of\nthe Bible--Necessity as held by Necessitarians--The term Certainty, as\nused by them--Doctrine of Ability, according to the Necessitarian\nScheme--Sinful inclinations--Necessitarian Doctrine of Liberty--Ground\nwhich Necessitarians are bound to take in respect to the Doctrine of\nAbility--Doctrine of Necessity, as regarded by Necessitarians of\ndifferent Schools\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nEXTENT AND LIMITS OF THE LIBERTY OF THE WILL.--Strongest\nMotive--Reasoning in a Circle\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nGREATEST APPARENT GOOD.--Phrase defined--Its meaning according to\nEdwards--The Will not always as the Dictates of the Intelligence--Not\nalways as the strongest desire--Nor as the Intelligence and Sensibility\ncombined--Necessitarian Argument--Motives cause acts of the Will, in\nwhat sense--Particular Volitions, how accounted for--Facts wrongly\naccounted for--Choosing between Objects known to be equal, how treated\nby Necessitarians--Palpable Mistake\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nDOCTRINE OF LIBERTY AND THE DIVINE PRESCIENCE.--Dangers to be\navoided--Mistake respecting Divine Prescience--Inconsistency of\nNecessitarians--Necessitarian Objection\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nDOCTRINE OF LIBERTY AND THE DIVINE PURPOSES AND AGENCY.--God's Purposes\nconsistent with the Liberty of Creatures--Senses in which God purposed\nmoral Good and Evil--Death of the Incorrigible preordained, but not\nwilled--God not responsible for their Death--Sin a Mystery--Conclusion\nfrom the above\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nOBLIGATION PREDICABLE ONLY OF THE WILL.--Men not responsible for the Sin\nof their progenitors--Constitutional Ill-desert--Present Impossibilities\nnot required\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\nSTANDARD OF MORAL CHARACTER.--Sincerity, and not Intensity, the true\nStandard\n\nCHAPTER X.\n\nMORAL ACTS NEVER OF A MIXED CHARACTER.--Acts of Will resulting from a\nvariety of Motives--Loving with a greater Intensity at one time than\nanother--Momentary Revolutions of Character\n\nCHAPTER XI.\n\nRELATIONS OF THE WILL TO THE INTELLIGENCE AND SENSIBILITY, IN STATES\nMORALLY RIGHT, OR WRONG.--Those who are and are not virtuous, how\ndistinguished--Selfishness and Benevolence--Common Mistake--Defective\nforms of Virtue--Test of Conformity to Moral Principle--Common\nMistake--Love as required by the Moral Law--Identity of Character among\nall Beings morally Virtuous\n\nCHAPTER XII.\n\nELEMENT OF THE WILL IN COMPLEX PHENOMENA.--Natural\nPropensities--Sensation, Emotion, Desire, and Wish defined--Anger,\nPride, Ambition, &c.--Religious Affections--Repentance--Love--Faith--\nConvictions, Feelings and external Actions, why required or prohibited--\nOur Responsibility in respect to such Phenomena--Feelings how controlled\nby the Will--Relation of Faith to other Exercises morally right\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\n\nINFLUENCE OF THE WILL IN INTELLECTUAL JUDGMENTS.--Men often voluntary in\ntheir Opinions--Error not from the Intelligence, but Will--Primary\nFaculties cannot err--So of the secondary Faculties--Assumptions--\nPre-judgments--Intellect not deceived in Pre-judgments--Mind, how\ninfluenced by them--Influences which induce false Assumptions--Cases\nin which we are apparently, though not really, misled by the Intelligence\n\nCHAPTER XIV.\n\nLIBERTY AND SERVITUDE.--Liberty as opposed to moral Servitude--Mistake\nof German Metaphysicians--Moral Servitude of the race\n\nCHAPTER XV.\n\nLIBERTY AND DEPENDENCE.--Common Impression--Spirit of\nDependence--Doctrine of Necessity tends not to induce this\nSpirit--Doctrine of Liberty does--God controls all Influences under\nwhich Creatures act--Dependence on account of moral Servitude\n\nCHAPTER XVI.\n\nFORMATION OF CHARACTER.--Commonly how accounted for--The voluntary\nelement to be taken into the account--Example in Illustration--\nDiversities of Character\n\nCHAPTER XVII.\n\nCONCLUDING REFLECTIONS.--Objection, The Will has its Laws--Objection,\nGod dethroned from his Supremacy if the Doctrine of Liberty is\ntrue--Great and good Men have held the doctrine of Necessity--Last\nResort--Willing and aiming to perform impossibilities--Thought at\nParting\n\n\n\n\nDEDICATORY PREFACE.\n\nTo one whose aim is, to \"serve his generation according to the Will of\nGod,\" but two reasons would seem to justify an individual in claiming\nthe attention of the public in the capacity of an author--the existence\nin the public mind of a want which needs to be met, and the full belief,\nthat the Work which he has produced is adapted to meet that want. Under\nthe influence of these two considerations, the following Treatise is\npresented to the public. Whether the author has judged rightly or not,\nit is not for him to decide. The decision of that question is left with\nthe public, to whom the Work is now presented. It is doubtful, whether\nany work, prepared with much thought and pains-taking, was ever\npublished with the conviction, on the part of the author, that it was\nunworthy of public regard. The community, however, may differ from him\nentirely on the subject; and, as a consequence, a work which he regards\nas so imperiously demanded by the public interest, falls dead from the\npress. Many an author, thus disappointed, has had occasion to be\nreminded of the admonition, \"Ye have need of patience.\" Whether the\nfollowing Treatise shall succeed in gaining the public ear, or not, one\nconsolation will remain with the writer, the publication of the work has\nsatisfied his sense of duty. To his respected Associates in the\nInstitution over which he presides, Associates with whose approbation\nand counsel the work was prepared, the Author would take this occasion\npublicly to express his grateful acknowledgments for the many important\nsuggestions which he received from them, during the progress of its\npreparation.\n\nHaving said thus much, he would simply add, that, TO THE LOVERS OF\nTRUTH, THE WORK IS NOW RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED, WITH THE KIND REGARDS OF\n\n      THE AUTHOR.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nINTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS.\n\nIMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT.\n\nTHE doctrine of the Will is a cardinal doctrine of theology, as well as\nof mental philosophy. This doctrine, to say the least, is one of the\ngreat central points, from which the various different and conflicting\nsystems of theological, mental, and moral science, take their departure.\nTo determine a man's sentiments in respect to the Will, is to determine\nhis position, in most important respects, as a theologian, and mental\nand moral philosopher. If we turn our thoughts inward, for the purpose\nof knowing what we are, what we ought to do, and to be, and what we\nshall become, as the result of being and doing what we ought or ought\nnot, this doctrine presents itself at once, as one of the great pivots\non which the resolution of all these questions turns.\n\nIf, on the other hand, we turn our thoughts from ourselves, to a study\nof the character of God, and of the nature and character of the\ngovernment which He exercises over rational beings, all our\napprehensions here, all our notions in respect to the nature and desert\nof sin and holiness, will, in many fundamental particulars, be\ndetermined by our notions in respect to the Will. In other words, our\napprehensions of the nature and character of the Divine government, must\nbe determined, in most important respects, by our conceptions of the\nnature and powers of the subjects of that government. I have no wish to\nconceal from the reader the true bearing of our present inquiries. I\nwish him distinctly to understand, that in fixing his notions in respect\nto the doctrine of the Will, he is determining a point of observation\nfrom which, and a medium through which, he shall contemplate his own\ncharacter and deserts as a moral agent, and the nature and character of\nthat Divine government, under which he must ever \"live, and move, and\nhave his being.\"\n\nTRUE AND FALSE METHODS OF INQUIRY.\n\nSuch being the bearing of our present inquiries, an important question\narises, to wit: What should be the influence of such considerations upon\nour investigations in this department of mental science It should not\nsurely induce us, as appears to be true in the case of many divines and\nphilosophers even, first to form our system of theology, and then, in\nthe light of that, to determine our theory of the Will. The true science\nof the Will, as well as that of all ether departments of mental\nphilosophy, \"does not come by observation,\" but by internal reflection.\nBecause our doctrine of the Will, whether true or false, will have a\ncontrolling influence in determining the character of our theology, and\nthe meaning which we shall attach to large portions of the Bible, that\ndoctrine does not, for that reason, lose its exclusively psychological\ncharacter. Every legitimate question pertaining to it, still remains\npurely and exclusively a psychological question. The mind has but one\neye by which it can see itself, and that is the eye of consciousness.\nThis, then, is the organ of vision to be exclusively employed in all our\ninquiries in every department of mental science, and in none more\nexclusively than in that of the Will. We know very well, for example,\nthat the science of optics has a fundamental bearing upon that of\nAstronomy. What if a philosopher, for that reason, should form his\ntheory of optics by looking at the stars? This would be perfectly\nanalogous to the conduct of a divine or philosopher who should determine\nhis theory of the Will, not by psychological reflection, but by a system\nof theology formed without such reflection. Suppose again, that the\nscience of Geometry had the same influence in theology, that that of the\nWill now has. This fact would not change at all the nature of that\nscience, nor the mode proper in conducting our investigations in respect\nto it. It would still remain a science of demonstration, with all its\nprinciples and rules of investigation unchanged. So with the doctrine of\nthe Will. Whatever its bearings upon other sciences may be, it still\nremains no less exclusively a psychological science. It has its own\nprinciples and laws of investigation, principles and laws as independent\nof systems of theology, as the principles and laws of the science of\noptics are of those of Astronomy. In pursuing our investigations in all\nother departments of mental science, we, for the time being, cease to be\ntheologians. We become mental philosophers. Why should the study of the\nWill be an exception?\n\nThe question now returns--what should be the bearing of the fact, that\nour theory of the Will, whether right or wrong, will have an important\ninfluence in determining our system of theology? This surely should be\nits influence. It should induce in us great care and caution in our\ninvestigations in this department of mental science. We are laying the\nfoundation of the most important edifice of which it ever entered into\nthe heart of man to conceive--an edifice, all the parts, dimensions, and\nproportions of which, we are required most sedulously to conform to the\n\"pattern shown us in the mount.\" Under such circumstances, who should\nnot be admonished, that he should \"dig deep, and lay his foundation upon\na rock?\" I will therefore, in view of what has been said above,\nearnestly bespeak four things of the reader of the following treatise.\n\n1. That he read it as an honest, earnest inquirer after truth.\n\n2. That he give that degree of attention to the work, that is requisite\nto an _understanding_ of it.\n\n3. That when he dissents from any of its fundamental principles, he will\ndistinctly state to his own mind the reason and ground of that dissent,\nand carefully investigate its validity. If these principles are wrong,\nsuch an investigation will render the truth more conspicuous to the\nmind, confirm the mind in the truth, and furnish it with means to\noverturn the opposite error.\n\n4. That he pursue his investigations with _implicit confidence in the\ndistinct affirmations of his own consciousness in respect to this\nsubject_. Such a suggestion would appear truly singular, if made in\nrespect to any other department of mental science but that of the Will.\nHere it is imperiously called for so long have philosophers and divines\nbeen accustomed to look without, to determine the characteristics of\nphenomena which appear exclusively within, and which are revealed to the\neye of consciousness only. Having been so long under the influence of\nthis pernicious habit, it will require somewhat of an effort for the\nmind to turn its organ of self-vision in upon itself, for the purpose of\ncorrectly reporting to itself, what is really passing in that inner\nsanctuary. Especially will it require an effort to do this, with a fixed\ndetermination to abandon all theories formed from external observation,\nand to follow implicitly the results of observations made internally.\nThis method we must adopt, however, or there is at once an end of all\nreal science, not only in respect to the Will, but to all other\ndepartments of the mind. Suppose an individual to commence a treatise on\n_colors_, for example, with a denial of the validity of all affirmations\nof the Intelligence through the eye, in respect to the phenomena about\nwhich he is to treat. What would be thought of such a treatise? The\nmoment we deny the validity of the affirmations of any of our faculties,\nin respect to the appropriate objects of those faculties, all reasoning\nabout those objects becomes the height of absurdity. So in respect to\nthe mind. If we doubt or deny the validity of the affirmations of\nconsciousness in respect to the nature and characteristics of all mental\noperations, mental philosophy becomes impossible, and all reasoning in\nrespect to the mind perfectly absurd. Implicit confidence in the\ndistinct affirmations of consciousness, is a fundamental law of all\ncorrect philosophizing in every department of mental science. Permit me\nmost earnestly to bespeak this confidence, as we pursue our\ninvestigations in respect to the Will.\n\nCOMMON FAULT.\n\nIt may be important here to notice a common fault in the method\nfrequently adopted by philosophers in their investigations in this\ndepartment of mental science. In the most celebrated treatise that has\never appeared upon this subject, the writer does not recollect to have\nmet with a single appeal to _consciousness_, the only adequate witness\nin the case. The whole treatise, almost, consists of a series of\nsyllogisms, linked together with apparent perfectness, syllogisms\npertaining to an abstract something called Will. Throughout the whole,\nthe facts of consciousness are never appealed to. In fact, in instances\nnot a few, among writers of the same school, the right to make such an\nappeal, on the ground of the total inadequacy of consciousness to give\ntestimony in the case, has been formally denied. Would it be at all\nstrange, if it should turn out that all the fundamental results of\ninvestigations conducted after such a method, should be wholly\ninapplicable to _the_ Will, the phenomena of which lie under the eye of\nconsciousness, or to stand in plain contradiction to the phenomena thus\naffirmed? What, from the method adopted, we see is very likely to take\nplace, we find, from experience, to be actually true of the treatise\nabove referred to. This is noticed by the distinguished author of The\nNatural History of Enthusiasm, in an Essay introductory to Edwards on\nthe Will. \"Even the reader,\" he says, \"who is scarcely at all familiar\nwith abstruse science, will, if he follow our author attentively, be\nperpetually conscious of a vague dissatisfaction, or latent suspicion,\nthat some fallacy has passed into the train of propositions, although\nthe linking of syllogisms seems perfect. This suspicion will increase in\nstrength as he proceeds, and will at length condense itself into the\nform of a protest against certain conclusions, notwithstanding their\napparently necessary connection with the premises.\" What should we\nexpect from a treatise on mental science, from which the affirmations of\nconsciousness should be formally excluded, as grounds of any important\nconclusions? Just what we find to be true, in fact, of the above named\ntreatise on the Will; to wit: all its fundamental conclusions positively\ncontradicted by such affirmations. What if the decisions of our courts\nof justice were based upon data from which the testimony of all material\nwitnesses has been formally excluded? Who would look to such decisions\nas the exponents of truth and justice? Yet all the elements in those\ndecisions may be the necessary logical consequents of the data actually\nassumed. Such decisions may be all wrong, however, from the fact that\nthe data which ought to be assumed in the case, were excluded. The same\nwill, almost of necessity, be true of all treatises, in every department\nof mental science, which are not based upon the facts of consciousness.\n\nPROPER METHOD OF REASONING FROM REVELATION TO THE SYSTEM OF MENTAL\nPHILOSOPHY THEREIN PRE-SUPPOSED.\n\nBy what has been said, the reader will not understand me as denying the\npropriety of comparing our conclusions in mental science with the Bible.\nThough no system of mental philosophy is directly revealed in the Bible,\nsome one system is therein pre-supposed, and assuming, as we do, that\nthe Scriptures are a revelation from God, we must suppose that the\nsystem of mental science assumed in the sacred writings, is the true\nsystem. If we could find the system pre-supposed in the Bible, we should\nhave an infallible standard by which to test the validity of any\nconclusions to which we have arrived, as the results of psychological\ninvestigation. It is therefore a very legitimate, interesting, and\nprofitable inquiry--what is the system of mental science assumed as true\nin the Bible? We may very properly turn our attention to the solution of\nsuch a question. In doing this, however, two things should be kept\ndistinctly in mind.\n\n1. In such inquiries, we leave the domain of mental philosophy entirely,\nand enter that of theology. In the latter we are to be guided by\nprinciples entirely distinct from those demanded in the former.\n\n2. In reasoning from the Bible to the system of mental philosophy\npre-supposed in the Scriptures, we are in danger of assuming wrong data\nas the basis of our conclusions that is, we are in danger of drawing our\ninferences from those truths of Scripture which have no legitimate\nbearing upon the subject, and of overlooking those which do have such a\nbearing. While there are truths of inspiration from which we may\nproperly reason to the theory of the Will, pre-supposed in the Bible,\nthere are other truths from which we cannot legitimately thus reason.\nNow suppose that we have drawn our conclusions from truths of\ninspiration which have no legitimate bearing upon the subject, truths\nwhich, if we do reason from them in the case, will lead us to wrong\nconclusions; suppose that in the light of such conclusions we have\nexplained the facts of consciousness, assuming that such must be their\ntrue character, else we deny the Bible. Shall we not then have almost\ninextricably lost ourselves in the labyrinth of error?\n\nThe following principles may be laid down as universally binding, if we\nwould reason correctly, as philosophers and theologians, on the subject\nunder consideration.\n\n1. In the domain of philosophy, we must confine ourselves strictly and\nexclusively to the laws of psychological investigation, without\nreference to any system of theology.\n\n2. In the domain of theology, when we would reason from the truths of\ninspiration to the theory of the Will pre-supposed in the Bible, we\nshould be exceedingly careful to reason from those truths only which\nhave a direct and decisive bearing upon the subject, and not from those\nwhich have no such bearing.\n\n3. We should carefully compare the conclusions to which we have arrived\nin each of these domains, assuming that if they do not harmonize, we\nhave erred either as philosophers or theologians.\n\n4. In case of disagreement, we should renew our independent\ninvestigations in each domain, for the purpose of detecting the error\ninto which we have fallen.\n\nIn conducting an investigation upon such principles, we shall, with\nalmost absolute certainty, find ourselves in each domain, following rays\nof light, which will converge together in the true theory of the Will.\n\nERRORS OF METHOD.\n\nTwo errors into which philosophers and divines of a certain class have\nfallen in their method of treating the department of our subject now\nunder consideration, here demand a passing notice.\n\n1. The two methods above referred to, the psychological and theological,\nwhich should at all times be kept entirely distinct and separate, have\nunhappily been mingled together. Thus the subject has failed to receive\na proper investigation in the domain, either of theology or of\nphilosophy.\n\n2. In reasoning from the Scriptures to the theory of the Will\npre-supposed in the same, _the wrong truth_ has been adduced as the\nbasis of such reasoning, to wit: _the fact of the Divine foreknowledge_.\nAs all events yet future are foreknown to God, they are in themselves,\nit is said, alike certain. This certainty necessitates the adoption of a\nparticular theory of the Will. Now before we can draw any such\nconclusion from the truth before us, the following things pertaining to\nit we need to know with absolute certainty, things which God has not\nrevealed, and which we never can know, until He has revealed them, to\nwit: the _mode_, the _nature_, and the _degree_ of the Divine\nforeknowledge. Suppose that God should impart to us apprehensions\nperfectly full and distinct, of the mode, nature and degree of His\nforeknowledge of human conduct. How do we know but that we should then\nsee with the most perfect clearness, that this foreknowledge is just as\nconsistent with the theory of the Will, denied by the philosophers and\ndivines under consideration, as with that which they suppose necessarily\nto result from the Divine foreknowledge? This, then, is not the truth\nfrom which we should reason to the theory of the Will pre-supposed in\nthe Bible.\n\nThere are truths of inspiration, however, which appear to me to have a\ndirect and decisive bearing upon this subject, and upon which we may\ntherefore safely base our conclusions. In the Scriptures, man is\naddressed as a moral agent, the subject of commands and prohibitions, of\nobligation, of merit and demerit, and consequently of reward and\npunishment. Now when we have determined the powers which an agent must\npossess, to render him a proper subject of command and prohibition, of\nobligation, of merit and demerit, and consequently of reward and\npunishment, we have determined the philosophy of the Will, really\npre-supposed in the Scriptures. Beneath these truths, therefore, and not\nbeneath that of the divine foreknowledge, that philosophy is to be\nsought for. This I argue--\n\n1. Because the former has a _direct_, while the latter has only an\n_indirect_ bearing upon the subject.\n\n2. Of the former our ideas are perfectly clear and distinct, while of\nthe mode, the degree, and the nature of the Divine foreknowledge we are\nprofoundly ignorant. To all eternity, our ideas of the nature of\ncommands and prohibitions, of obligations, of merit and demerit, and of\nreward and punishment grounded on moral desert, can never be more clear\nand distinct than they now are. From such truths, then, and not from\nthose that we do not understand, and which at the utmost have only an\nindirect bearing upon the subject, we ought to reason, if we reason at\nall, to the philosophy of the Will pre-supposed in the Scriptures. The\nreader is now put in possession of the _method_ that will be pursued in\nthe following treatise, and is consequently prepared to enter upon the\ninvestigation of the subject before us.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nCLASSIFICATION OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES.\n\nEVERY individual who has reflected with any degree of interest upon the\noperations of his own mind, cannot have failed to notice three classes\nof mental phenomena, each of which is entirely distinct from either of\nthe others. These phenomena, which comprehend the entire operations of\nthe mind, and which may be expressed by the terms _thinking_, _feeling_,\nand _willing_, clearly indicate in the mind three faculties equally\ndistinct from one another. These faculties are denominated the\nIntellect, the Sensibility or Sensitivity, and the Will. To the first,\nall intellectual operations, such as perceiving, thinking, judging,\nknowing, &c., are referred. To the second, we refer all sensitive\nstates, all feelings, such as sensations, emotions, desires, &c. To the\nWill, or the active voluntary faculty, are referred all mental\ndeterminations, such as purposes, intentions, resolutions, choices and\nvolitions.\n\nCLASSIFICATION VERIFIED.\n\n1. The classes of phenomena, by which this tri-unity of the mental\npowers is indicated, differ from one another, not in _degree_, but in\n_kind_. Thought, whether clear or obscure, in all degrees, remains\nequally distinct, in its nature, from feelings and determinations of\nevery class. So of feelings. Sensations, emotions, desires, all the\nphenomena of the Sensibility, in all degrees and modifications, remain,\nin their nature and essential characteristics, equally distinct from\nthought on the one hand, and the action of the Will on the other. The\nsame holds true of the phenomena of the Will. A resolution, for example,\nin one degree, is not a thought in another, a sensation, emotion, or\ndesire and in another a choice, purpose, intention, or volition. In all\ndegrees and modifications, the phenomena of the Will, in their nature\nand essential characteristics, remain equally distinct from the\noperations of the Intelligence on the one hand, and of the Sensibility\non the other.\n\n2. This distinction is recognized by universal consciousness. When, for\nexample, one speaks of _thinking_ of any particular object, then of\n_desiring_ it, and subsequently of _determining_ to obtain the object,\nfor the purpose of gratifying that desire, all mankind most clearly\nrecognize his meaning in each of the above-named affirmations, and\nunderstand him as speaking of three entirely distinct classes of mental\noperations. No person, under such circumstances, ever confounds one of\nthese states with either of the others. So clearly marked and\ndistinguished is the three-fold classification of mental phenomena under\nconsideration, in the spontaneous affirmations of universal\nconsciousness.\n\n3. In all languages, also, there are distinct _terms_ appropriated to\nthe expression of these three classes of phenomena, and of the mental\npower indicated by the same. In the English language, for example, we\nhave the terms _thinking_, _feeling_, and _willing_, each of which is\napplied to one particular class of these mental phenomena, and never to\neither of the others. We have also the terms Intellect, Sensibility, and\nWill, appropriated, in a similar manner, to designate the mental powers\nindicated by these phenomena. In all other languages, especially among\nnations of any considerable advancement in mental culture, we find terms\nof precisely similar designation. What do such facts indicate? They\nclearly show, that in the development of the universal Intelligence, the\ndifferent classes of phenomena under consideration have been distinctly\nmarked, and distinguished from one another, together with the three-fold\ndivision of the mental powers indicated by the same phenomena.\n\n4. The clearness and particularity with which the universal intelligence\nhas marked the distinction under consideration, is strikingly indicated\nby the fact, that there are _qualifying terms_ in common use which are\napplied to each of these classes of phenomena, and never to either of\nthe others. It is true that there are such terms which are promiscuously\napplied to all classes of mental phenomena. There are terms, however,\nwhich are never applied to but one class. Thus we speak of _clear\nthoughts_, but never of clear feelings or determinations. We speak of\n_irrepressible feelings and desires_, but never of irrepressible\nthoughts or resolutions. We also speak of _inflexible determinations_,\nbut never of inflexible feelings or conceptions. With what perfect\ndistinctness, then, must universal consciousness have marked thoughts,\nfeelings, and determinations of the Will, as phenomena entirely distinct\nfrom one another--phenomena differing not in _degree_, but in _kind_,\nand as most clearly indicating the three-fold division of the mental\npowers under consideration.\n\n5. So familiar are mankind with this distinction, so distinctly marked\nis it in their minds, that in familiar intercourse, when no particular\ntheory of the mental powers is in contemplation, they are accustomed to\nspeak of the Intellect, Sensibility, and Will, and of their respective\nphenomena, as entirely distinct from one another. Take a single example\nfrom Scripture. \"What I shall _choose_, I wot not--having a _desire_ to\ndepart.\" Here the Apostle evidently speaks of _desire_ and _choice_ as\nphenomena differing in kind, and not in degree. \"If you engage his\nheart\" [his feelings], says Lord Chesterfield, speaking of a foreign\nminister, \"you have a fair chance of imposing upon his _understanding_,\nand determining his Will.\" \"_His Will_,\" says another writer, speaking\nof the insane, \"is no longer restrained by his _Judgment_, but driven\nmadly on by his passions.\"\n\n   \"When wit is overruled by _Will_,\n   And Will is led by fond _Desire_,\n   Then _Reason_ may as well be still,\n   As speaking, kindle greater fire.\"[1]\n\nIn all the above extracts the tri-unity of the mental powers, as\nconsisting of the Intellect, Sensibility, and Will, is distinctly\nrecognized. Yet the writers had, at the time, no particular theory of\nmental philosophy in contemplation. They speak of a distinction of the\nmental faculties which all understand and recognize as real, as soon as\nsuggested to their minds.\n\nThe above considerations are abundantly sufficient to verify the\nthree-fold distinction above made, of mental phenomena and powers. Two\nsuggestions arise here which demand special attention.\n\n1. To confound either of these distinct powers of the mind with either\nof the others, as has been done by several philosophers of eminence, in\nrespect to the Will and Sensibility, is a capital error in mental\nscience. If one faculty is confounded with another, the fundamental\ncharacteristics of the former will of course be confounded with the same\ncharacteristics of the latter. Thus the worst forms of error will be\nintroduced not only into philosophy, but theology, too, as far as the\nlatter science is influenced by the former. What would be thought of a\ntreatise on mental science, in which the Will should be confounded with\nthe Intelligence, and in which _thinking_ and _willing_ would be\nconsequently represented as phenomena identical in kind? This would be\nan error no more capital, no more glaring, no more distinctly\ncontradicted by fundamental phenomena, than the confounding of the Will\nwith the Sensibility.\n\n2. We are now prepared to contemplate one of the great errors of Edwards\nin his immortal work on the Will--an error which we meet with in the\ncommencement of that work, and which lays a broad foundation for the\nfalse conclusions subsequently found in it. He has confounded the Will\nwith the Sensibility. Of course, we should expect to find that he has\nsubsequently confounded the fundamental characteristics of the phenomena\nof the former faculty, with the same characteristics of the latter.\n\n\"God has endowed the soul,\" he says, \"with two faculties: One is that by\nwhich it is capable of perception and speculation, or by which it\ndiscerns, and views, and judges of things; which is called the\n_understanding_. The other faculty is that by which the soul does not\nmerely perceive and view things, but is some way inclined _to_ them, or\nis disinclined and averse _from_ them; or is the faculty by which the\nsoul does not behold things as an indifferent, unaffected spectator; but\neither as liking or disliking, pleased or displeased, approving or\nrejecting. This faculty, as it has respect to the actions that are\ndetermined by it, is called the Will.\"\n\nFrom his work on the Affections, I cite the following to the same\nimport:\n\n\"The Affections of the soul,\" he observes, \"are not properly\ndistinguished from the Will, as though they were two faculties of the\nsoul. All acts of the Affections of the soul are, in some sense, acts of\nthe Will, and all acts of the Will are acts of the affections. All\nexercises of the Will are, in some degree or other, exercises of the\nsoul's appetition or aversion; or which is the same thing, of its love\nor hatred. The soul wills one thing rather than another, or chooses one\nthing rather than another, no otherwise than as it loves one thing more\nthan another.\" \"The Affections are only certain modes of the exercise of\nthe Will.\" \"The Affections are no other than the more vigorous and\nsensible exercises of the inclination and will of the soul.\"\n\nWhether he has or has not subsequently confounded the fundamental\ncharacteristics of the phenomena of the Will with those of the phenomena\nof the Sensibility will be seen in the progress of the present treatise.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nLIBERTY AND NECESSITY.\n\nWE come now to consider the great and fundamental characteristic of the\nWill, that by which it is, in a special sense, distinguished from each\nof the other mental faculties, to wit: that of Liberty.\n\nSEC. I. TERMS DEFINED.\n\nOur first inquiry respects the meaning of the term Liberty as\ndistinguished from that of Necessity. These terms do not differ, as\nexpressing genus and species; that is, Liberty does not designate a\nspecies of which Necessity expresses the genus. On the other hand, they\ndiffer by way of _opposition_. All correct definitions of terms thus\nrelated, will possess these two characteristics. 1. They will mutually\nexclude each other that is, what is affirmed of one, will, in reality,\nbe denied of the other. 2. They will be so defined as to be universal in\ntheir application. The terms _right_ and _wrong_, for example, thus\ndiffer from each other. In the light of all correct definitions of these\nterms, it will be seen with perfect distinctness, 1st, that to affirm of\nan action that it is right, is equivalent to an affirmation that it is\nnot wrong; and to affirm that it is wrong, is to affirm that it is not\nright; 2d, that all moral actions, actual and conceivable, must be\neither right or wrong. So of all other terms thus related.\n\nThe meaning of the terms Liberty and Necessity, as distinguished the one\nfrom the other, may be designated by a reference to two relations\nperfectly distinct and opposite, which may be supposed to exist between\nan _antecedent_ and its _consequent_.\n\n1. The antecedent being given, one, and only one, consequent can\npossibly arise, and that consequent _must_ arise. This relation we\ndesignate by the term Necessity. I place my finger, for example,\nconstituted as my physical system now is, in the flame of a burning\ncandle, and hold it there for a given time. The two substances in\ncontact is the antecedent. The feeling of intense pain which succeeds is\nthe consequent. Now such is universally believed to be the correlation\nbetween the nature of these substances, that under the circumstances\nsupposed, but one consequent can possibly arise, and that consequent\nmust arise; to wit--the feeling of pain referred to. The relation\nbetween such an antecedent and its consequent, therefore, we, in all\ninstances, designate by the term Necessity. When the relation of\nNecessity is pre-supposed, in the presence of a new consequent, we affirm\nabsolutely that of a new antecedent.\n\n2. The second relation is this. The antecedent being given, either of\ntwo or more consequents is equally possible, and therefore, when one\nconsequent does arise, we affirm that either of the others might have\narisen in its stead. When this relation is pre-supposed, from the\nappearance of a new consequent, we do not necessarily affirm the\npresence of a new antecedent. This relation we designate by the term\nLiberty.\n\nCHARACTERISTICS OF THE ABOVE DEFINITIONS.\n\nOn the above definitions I remark:\n\n1. That they mutually exclude each other. To predicate Liberty of any\nphenomenon is to affirm that it is not necessary. To predicate Necessity\nof it, is equivalent to an affirmation that it is not free.\n\n2. They are strictly and absolutely universal in their application. All\nantecedents and consequents, whatever the nature of the subjects thus\nconnected may be, must fall under one or the other of these relations.\nAs the terms right and wrong, when correctly defined, will express the\nnature of all moral actions, actual and conceivable, so the terms\nLiberty and Necessity, as above defined, clearly indicate the nature of\nthe relation between all antecedents and consequents, real and\nsupposable. Take any antecedent and consequent we please, real or\nconceivable, and we know absolutely, that they must sustain to each\nother one or the other of these relations. Either in connection with\nthis antecedent, but this one consequent is possible, and this must\narise, or in connection with the same antecedent, either this, or one or\nmore different consequents are possible, and consequently equally so:\nfor possibility has, in reality, no degrees.\n\n3. All the phenomena of the Will, sustaining, as they do, the relation\nof _consequents_ to motives considered as antecedents, must fall under\none or the other of these relations. If we say, that the relation\nbetween motives and acts of Will is that of _certainty_, still this\ncertainty must arise from a necessary relation between the antecedent\nand its consequent, or it must be of such a nature as consists with the\nrelation of Liberty, in the sense of the term Liberty as above defined.\n\n4. The above definitions have this great advantage in our present\ninvestigations. They at once free the subject from the obscurity and\nperplexity in which it is often involved by the definitions of\nphilosophers. They are accustomed, in many instances, to speak of moral\nnecessity and physical necessity, as if these are in reality different\nkinds of necessity: whereas the terms moral and physical, in such\nconnections, express the nature of the _subjects_ sustaining to each\nother the relations of antecedents and consequents, and not at all that\nof the _relation_ existing between them. This is exclusively expressed\nby the term Necessity--a term which designates a relation which is\nalways one and the same, whatever the nature of the subjects thus\nrelated may be. An individual in a treatise on natural science, might,\nif he should choose, in speaking of the relations of antecedents and\nconsequents among solid, fluid, and aeriform substances, use the words,\nsolid necessity, fluid necessity, and aeriform necessity. He might use\nas many qualifying terms as there are different subjects sustaining to\neach other the relation under consideration. In all such instances no\nerror will arise, if these qualifying terms are distinctly understood to\ndesignate, not the nature of the _relation_ of antecedent and consequent\nin any given case (as if there were as many different kinds of necessity\nas there are qualifying terms used), but to designate the nature of the\n_subjects_ sustaining this relation. If, on the other hand, the\nimpression should be made, that each of these qualifying terms\ndesignates a necessity of a peculiar kind, and if, as a consequence, the\nbelief should be induced, that there are in reality so many different\nkinds of necessity, errors of the gravest character would arise--errors\nno more important, however, than actually do arise from the impression\noften induced, that moral necessity differs in kind from physical\nnecessity.\n\n5. I mention another very decisive advantage which the above definitions\nhave in our present investigations. In the light of the terms Liberty\nand Necessity, as above defined, the two great schools in philosophy and\ntheology are obliged to join issue directly upon the real question in\ndifference between them, without the possibility on the part of either,\nof escaping under a fog of definitions about moral necessity, physical\nnecessity, moral certainty, &c., and then claiming a victory over their\nopponents. These terms, as above defined, stand out with perfect\nclearness and distinctness to all reflecting minds. Every one must see,\nthat the phenomena of the Will cannot but fall under the one or the\nother of the relations designated by these terms inasmuch as no third\nrelation differing in _kind_ from both of these, is conceivable. The\nquestion therefore may be fairly put to every individual, without the\npossibility of misapprehension or evasion--Do you believe, whenever a\nman puts forth an act of Will, that in those circumstances, this one act\nonly is possible, and that this act cannot but arise? In all prohibited\nacts, for example, do you believe that an individual, by the resistless\nprovidence of God, is placed in circumstances in which this one act only\nis possible, and this cannot but result, that in these identical\ncircumstances, another and a different act is required of him, and that\nfor not putting forth this last act, he is justly held as infinitely\nguilty in the sight of God, and of the moral universe? To these\nquestions every one must give an affirmative or negative answer. If he\ngives the former, he holds the doctrine of Necessity, and must take that\ndoctrine with all its consequences. If he gives the latter, he holds the\ndoctrine of Liberty in the sense of the term as above defined. He must\nhold, that in the identical circumstances in which a given act of Will\nis put forth, another and different act might have been put forth; and\nthat for this reason, in all prohibited acts, a moral agent is held\njustly responsible for different and opposite acts. Much is gained to\nthe cause of truth, when, as in the present instance, the different\nschools are obliged to join issue directly upon the real question in\ndifference between them, and that without the possibility of\nmisapprehension or evasion in respect to the nature of that question.\n\nMOTIVE DEFINED.\n\nHaving settled the meaning of the terms Liberty and Necessity, as\ndesignating two distinct and opposite relations, the only relations\nconceivable between an antecedent and its consequent, one other term\nwhich may not unfrequently be used in the following treatise, remains to\nbe defined; to wit--_motive_--a term which designates that which\nsustains to the phenomena of the Will, the relation of antecedent.\nVolition, choice, preference, intention, all the phenomena of the Will,\nare considered as the consequent. Whatever within the mind itself may be\nsupposed to influence its determinations, whether called\nsusceptibilities, biases, or anything else; and all influences acting\nupon it as incentives from without, are regarded as the antecedent. I\nuse the term motive as synonymous with antecedent as above defined. It\ndesignates _all the circumstances and influences_ from within or without\nthe mind, which operate upon it to produce any given act of Will.\n\nThe term antecedent in the case before us, in strictness of speech, has\nthis difference of meaning from that of motive as above defined: The\nformer includes all that is designated by the latter, together with the\n_Will_ itself. No difficulty or obscurity, however, will result from the\nuse of these terms as synonymous, in the sense explained.\n\nSEC. II. LIBERTY, AS OPPOSED TO NECESSITY, THE CHARACTERISTIC OF THE\nWILL.\n\nWe are now prepared to meet the question, To which of the relations\nabove defined shall we refer the phenomena of the Will? If these\nphenomena are subject to the law of necessity, then, whenever a\nparticular antecedent (motive) is given, but one consequent (act of\nWill) is possible, and that consequent must arise. It cannot possibly\nbut take place. If, on the other hand, these phenomena fall under the\nrelation of Liberty, whenever any particular motive is present, either\nof two or more acts of Will is equally possible; and when any particular\nconsequent (act of Will) does arise, either of the other consequents\nmight have arisen in its stead.\n\nBefore proceeding directly to argue the question before us, one\nconsideration of a general nature demands a passing notice. It is this.\nThe simple statement of the question, in the light of the above\nrelations, settles it, and must settle it, in the judgment of all\ncandid, uncommitted inquirers after the truth. Let any individual\ncontemplate the action of his voluntary powers in the light of the\nrelations of Liberty and Necessity as above defined, and he will\nspontaneously affirm the fact, that he is a free and not a necessary\nagent, and affirm it as absolutely as he affirms his own existence.\nWherever he is, while he retains the consciousness of rational being,\nthis conviction will and must be to him an omnipresent reality. To\nescape it, he must transcend the bounds of conscious existence.\n\nOBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY.\n\nSuch is the importance of the subject, however, that a more extended and\nparticular consideration of it is demanded. In the further prosecution\nof the argument upon the subject, we will--\n\nI. In the first place, contemplate the position, that the phenomena of\nthe Will are subject to the laws of Necessity. In taking this position\nwe are at once met with the following palpable and insuperable\ndifficulties.\n\n1. The conviction above referred to--a conviction which remains proof\nagainst all apparent demonstrations to the contrary. We may pile\ndemonstration upon demonstration in favor of the doctrine of Necessity,\nstill, as the mind falls back upon the spontaneous affirmations of its\nown Intelligence, it finds, in the depths of its inner being, a higher\ndemonstration of the fact, that that doctrine is and must be false--that\nman is not the agent which that doctrine affirms him to be. In the\npassage already cited, and which I will take occasion here to repeat,\nthe writer has, with singular correctness, mapped out the unvarying\nexperience of the readers of Edwards on the Will. \"Even the reader,\" he\nsays, \"who is scarcely at all familiar with abstruse science, will, if\nhe follow our author attentively, be perpetually conscious of a vague\ndissatisfaction, or latent suspicion, that some fallacy has passed into\nthe train of propositions, although the linking of syllogisms seems\nperfect. This suspicion will increase in strength as he proceeds, and\nwill at length condense itself into the form of a protest against\ncertain conclusions, notwithstanding their apparently necessary\nconnection with the premises.\" What higher evidence can we have that\nthat treatise gives a false interpretation of the facts of universal\nconsciousness pertaining to the Will, than is here presented? Any theory\nwhich gives a distinct and true explanation of the facts of\nconsciousness, will be met by the Intelligence with the response,\n\"That's true; I have found it.\" Any theory apparently supported by\nadequate evidence, but which still gives a false interpretation of such\nfacts, will induce the internal conflict above described--a conflict\nwhich, as the force of apparent demonstration increases, will, in the\nvery centre of the Intelligence, \"condense itself into the form of a\nprotest against the conclusions presented, notwithstanding their\napparently necessary connection with the premises.\" The falsity of the\ndoctrine of Necessity is a first truth of the universal Intelligence.\n\n2. If this doctrine is true, it is demonstrably evident, that in no\ninstance, real or supposable, have men any power whatever to will or to\nact differently from what they do. The connection between the\ndeterminations of the Will, and their consequents, external and\ninternal, is absolutely necessary. Constituted as I now am, if I will,\nfor example, a particular motion of my hand or arm, no other movement,\nin these circumstances, was possible, and this movement could not but\ntake place. The same holds true of all consequents, external and\ninternal, of all acts of Will. Let us now suppose that these acts\nthemselves are the necessary consequents of the circumstances in which\nthey originate. In what conceivable sense have men, in the circumstances\nin which Providence places them, power either to will or to act\ndifferently from what they do? The doctrine of ability to will or to do\ndifferently from what we do is, in every sense, false, if the doctrine\nof Necessity is true. Men, when they transgress the moral law, always\nsin, without the possibility of doing right. From this position the\nNecessitarian cannot escape.\n\n3. On this theory, God only is responsible for all human volitions\ntogether with their effects. The relation between all antecedents and\ntheir consequents was established by him. If that relation be in all\ninstances a necessary one, his Will surely is the sole responsible\nantecedent of all consequents.\n\n4. The idea of obligation, of merit and demerit, and of the consequent\npropriety of reward and punishment, are chimeras. To conceive of a being\ndeserving praise or blame, for volitions or actions which occurred under\ncircumstances in which none others were possible, and in which these\ncould not possibly but happen, is an absolute impossibility. To conceive\nhim under obligation to have given existence, under such circumstances,\nto different consequents, is equally impossible. It is to suppose an\nagent under obligation to perform that to which Omnipotence is\ninadequate. For Omnipotence cannot perform impossibilities. It cannot\nreverse the law of Necessity. Let any individual conceive of creatures\nplaced by Divine Providence in circumstances in which but one act, or\nseries of acts of Will, can arise, and these cannot but arise--let him,\nthen, attempt to conceive of these creatures as under obligation, in\nthese same circumstances, to give existence to different and opposite\nacts, and as deserving of punishment for not doing so. He will find it\nas impossible to pass such a judgment as to conceive of the annihilation\nof space, or of an event without a cause. To conceive of necessity and\nobligation as fundamental elements of the same act, is an absolute\nimpossibility. The human Intelligence is incapable of affirming such\ncontradictions.\n\n5. As an additional consideration, to show the absolute incompatibility\nof the idea of moral obligation with the doctrine of Necessity, permit\nme to direct the attention of the reader to this striking fact. While no\nman, holding the doctrine of Liberty as above defined, was ever known to\ndeny moral obligation, such denial has, without exception, in every age\nand nation, been avowedly based upon the assumption of the truth of the\ndoctrine of Necessity. In every age and nation, in every solitary mind\nin which the idea of obligation has been denied, this doctrine has been\nthe great maelstrom in which this idea has been swallowed up and lost.\nHow can the Necessitarian account for such facts in consistency with his\ntheory?\n\n6. The commands of God addressed to men as sinners and requiring them in\nall cases of transgression of the moral law, to choose and to act\ndifferently from what they do, are, if this doctrine is true, the\nperfection of tyranny. In all such cases men are required--\n\n(1.) To perform absolute impossibilities; to reverse the law of\nnecessity.\n\n(2.) To do that to which Omnipotence is inadequate. For Omnipotence, as\nwe have seen, cannot reverse the law of necessity. Not only so, but--\n\n(3.) Men in all such instances are required, as a matter of fact, to\nresist and overcome Omnipotence. To require us to reverse the relation\nestablished by Omnipotence, between antecedents and consequents, is\ncertainly to require us to resist and overcome Omnipotence, and that in\nthe absence of all power, even to attempt the accomplishment of that\nwhich we are required to accomplish.\n\n7. If this doctrine is true, at the final Judgment the conscience and\nintelligence of the universe will and must be on the side of the\ncondemned. Suppose that when the conduct of the wicked shall be revealed\nat that Day, another fact shall stand out with equal conspicuousness, to\nwit, that God himself had placed these beings where but one course of\nconduct was possible to them, and that course they could not but pursue,\nto wit, the course which they did pursue, and that for having pursued\nthis course, the only one possible, they are now to be \"punished with\neverlasting destruction from the presence of God and the glory of his\npower,\" must not the intelligence of the universe pronounce such a\nsentence unjust? All this must be true, or the doctrine of Necessity is\nfalse. Who can believe, that the pillars of God's eternal government\nrest upon such a doctrine?\n\n8. On this supposition, probation is an infinite absurdity. We might\nwith the same propriety represent the specimens in the laboratory of the\nchemist, as on probation, as men, if their actions are the necessary\nresult of the circumstances in which Omnipotence has placed them. What\nmust intelligent beings think of probation for a state of eternal\nretribution, probation based on such a principle?\n\n9. The doctrine of Necessity is, in all essential particulars, identical\nwith _Fatalism_ in its worst form. All that Fatalism ever has\nmaintained, or now maintains, is, that men, by a power which they cannot\ncontrol nor resist, are placed in circumstances in which they cannot but\npursue the course of conduct which they actually are pursuing. This\ndoctrine has never affirmed, that, in the Necessitarian sense, men\ncannot \"do as they please.\" All that it maintains is, that they cannot\nbut please to do as they do. Thus this doctrine differs not one \"jot or\ntittle,\" from Necessity. No man can show the want of perfect identity\nbetween them. Fatalists and Necessitarians may differ in regard to the\norigin of this Necessity. In regard to its nature, the only thing\nmaterial, as far as present inquiries are concerned, they do not differ\nat all.\n\n10. In maintaining the Necessity of all acts of the Will of _man_, we\nmust maintain, that the Will of _God_ is subject to the same law. This\nis universally admitted by Necessitarians themselves. Now in maintaining\nthe necessity of all acts of the Divine Will, the following conclusions\nforce themselves upon us:\n\n(1.) MOTIVES which necessitate the determinations of the Divine Will,\nare the sole originating and efficient causes in existence. God is not\nthe first cause of anything.\n\n(2.) To motives, which of course exist independently of the Divine Will,\nwe must ascribe the origin of all created existences. The glory of\noriginating \"all things visible and invisible,\" belongs not to Him, but\nto motives.\n\n(3.) In all cases in which creatures are required to act differently\nfrom what they do, as in all acts of sin, they are in reality required\nnot only to resist and overcome the omnipotent determinations of the\nDivine Will, but also the _motives_ by which the action of God's Will is\nnecessitated. We ask Necessitarians to look these consequences in the\nface, and then say, whether they are prepared to deny, or to meet them.\n\n11. Finally, if the doctrine under consideration is true, in all\ninstances of the transgression of the moral law, men are, in reality,\nrequired to produce an event which, when it does exist, shall exist\nwithout a cause. In circumstances where but one event is possible, and\nthat cannot but arise, if a different event should arise, it would\nundeniably be an event without a cause. To require such an event under\nsuch circumstances, is to require an event without a cause, the most\npalpable contradiction conceivable. Now just such a requirement as this\nis laid upon men, in all cases of disobedience of the moral law, if the\ndoctrine of Necessity is true. In all such cases, according to this\ndoctrine men are placed in circumstances in which but one act is\npossible, and that must arise, to wit: the act of disobedience which is\nput forth. If, in these circumstances, an act of obedience should be put\nforth, it would be an event without a cause, and in opposition also to\nthe action of a necessary cause. In these identical circumstances, the\nact of obedience is required, that is, an act is required of creatures,\nwhich, if it should be put forth, would be an event without a cause. Has\na God of truth and justice ever laid upon men such a requisition as\nthat? How, I ask, can the doctrine of Necessity be extricated from such\na difficulty?\n\nDOCTRINE OF LIBERTY--DIRECT ARGUMENT.\n\nII. We will now, as a second general argument, consider the position,\nthat the Will is subject in its determinations to the relation of\nLiberty, in opposition to that of Necessity. Here I would remark, that\nas the phenomena of the Will must fall under one or the other of these\nrelations, and as it has been shown, that they cannot fall under that of\nNecessity, but one supposition remains. They must fall under that of\nLiberty, as opposed to Necessity. The intrinsic absurdity of supposing\nthat a being, all of whose actions are necessary, is still accountable\nfor such actions, is sufficient to overthrow the doctrine of Necessity\nfor ever. A few additional considerations are deemed requisite, in order\nto present the evidence in favor of the Liberty of the Will.\n\n1. The first that I present is this. As soon as the doctrine of Liberty,\nas above defined, is distinctly apprehended, it is spontaneously\nrecognized by every mind, as the true, and only true exposition of the\nfacts of its own consciousness pertaining to the phenomena of the Will.\nThis doctrine is simply an announcement of the spontaneous affirmations\nof the universal Intelligence. This is the highest possible evidence of\nthe truth of the doctrine.\n\n2. The universal conviction of mankind, that their former course of\nconduct might have been different from what it was. I will venture to\naffirm, that there is not a person on earth, who has not this conviction\nresting upon his mind in respect to his own past life. It is important\nto analyze this conviction, in order to mark distinctly its bearing upon\nour present inquiries. This conviction is not the belief, that if our\ncircumstances had been different, we might have acted differently from\nwhat we did. A man, for example, says to himself--\"At such a time, and\nin such circumstances, I determined upon a particular course of conduct.\nI might have determined upon a different and opposite course. Why did I\nnot?\" These affirmations are not based upon the conviction, that, in\ndifferent circumstances, we might have done differently. In all such\naffirmations we take into account nothing but the particular\ncircumstances in which our determinations were formed. It is in view of\nthese circumstances exclusively, that we affirm that our determinations\nmight have been different from what they were. Let the appeal be made to\nany individual whatever, whose mind is not at the time under the\ninfluence of any particular theory of the Will. You say, that at such a\ntime, and under such circumstances, you determined upon a particular\ncourse, that you might then have resolved upon a different and opposite\ncourse, and that you blame yourself for not having done so. Is not this\nyour real meaning? \"If my circumstances had been different, I might have\nresolved upon a different course.\" No, he would reply. That is not my\nmeaning. I was not thinking at all of a change of circumstances, when I\nmade this affirmation. What I mean is, that in the circumstances in\nwhich I was, I might have done differently from what I did. This is the\nreason why I blame myself for not having done so. The same conviction,\nto wit: that without any change of circumstances our past course of life\nmight have been different from what it was, rests upon every mind on\nearth in which the remembrance of the past dwells. Now this universal\nconviction is totally false, if the doctrine of Necessity is true. The\ndoctrine of the Liberty of the Will must be true, or the universal\nIntelligence is a perpetual falsehood.\n\n3. In favor of the doctrine of Liberty, I next appeal to the direct,\ndeliberate, and universal testimony of consciousness. This testimony is\ngiven in three ways.\n\n(1.) In the general conviction above referred to, that without any\nchange of circumstances, our course of conduct might have been the\nopposite of what it was. Nothing but a universal consciousness of the\nLiberty of the Will, can account for this conviction.\n\n(2.) Whenever any object of choice is submitted to the mind,\nconsciousness affirms, directly and positively, that, under these\nidentical circumstances, either of two or more acts of Will is equally\npossible. Every man in such circumstances is as conscious of such power\nas he is of his own existence. In confirmation of these affirmations,\nlet any one make the appeal to his own consciousness, when about to put\nforth any act of Will. He will be just as conscious that either of two\nor more different determinations is, in the same circumstances, equally\npossible, as he is of any mental state whatever.\n\n(3.) In reference to all deliberate determinations of Will in time past,\nthe remembrance of them is attended with a consciousness the most\npositive, that, in the same identical circumstances, determinations\nprecisely opposite might have been originated. Let any one recall any\nsuch determination, and the consciousness of a power to have determined\ndifferently will be just as distinctly recalled as the act itself. He\ncannot be more sure that he acted at all, than he will be, that he might\nhave acted [determined] differently. All these affirmations of\nconsciousness are false, if the doctrine of Liberty is not true.\n\n4. A fundamental distinction which all mankind make between the\nphenomena of the Will, and those of the other faculties, the Sensibility\nfor example, is a full confirmation of the doctrine of Liberty, as a\ntruth of universal consciousness. A man is taken out of a burning\nfurnace, with his physical system greatly injured by the fire. As a\nconsequence, he subsequently experiences much suffering and\ninconvenience. For the injury done him by the fire, and for the pain\nsubsequently experienced, he never blames or reproaches himself. With\nself-reproach he never says, Why, instead of being thus injured, did I\nnot come out of the furnace as the three worthies did from that of\nNebuchadnezzar? Why do I not now experience pleasure instead of pain, as\na consequence of that injury? Suppose, now, that his fall into the\nfurnace was the result of a determination formed for the purpose of\nself-murder. For that determination, and for not having, in the same\ncircumstances, determined differently, he will ever after reproach\nhimself, as most guilty in the sight of God and man. How shall we\naccount for the absence of self-reproach in the former instance, and for\nits presence in the latter? If the appeal should be made to the subject,\nhis answer would be ready. In respect to the injury and pain, in the\ncircumstances supposed, they could not but be experienced. Such\nphenomena, therefore, can never be the occasion of self-reproach. In the\ncondition in which the determination referred to was formed, a different\nand opposite resolution might have been originated. That particular\ndetermination, therefore, is the occasion of self-reproach. How shall we\naccount for this distinction, which all mankind agree in making, between\nthe phenomena of the Sensibility on the one hand, and of the Will on the\nother? But one supposition accounts for this fact, the universal\nconsciousness, that the former are necessary, and the latter free that\nin the circumstances of their occurrence the former may not, and the\nlatter may, be different from what they are.\n\n5. On any other theory than that of Liberty, the words, obligation,\nmerit and demerit, &c., are words without meaning. A man is, we will\nsuppose, by Divine Providence, placed in circumstances in which he\ncannot possibly but pursue one given course, or, which is the same\nthing, put forth given determinations. When it is said that, in these\nidentical circumstances, he ought to pursue a different and opposite\ncourse, or to put forth different and opposite determinations, what\nconceivable meaning can we attach to the word _ought_, here? There is\nnothing, in the circumstances supposed, which the word, _ought_, or\nobligation, can represent. If we predicate merit or demerit of an\nindividual thus circumstanced, we use words equally without meaning.\nObligation and moral desert, in such a case, rest upon \"airy nothing,\"\nwithout a \"local habitation or a name.\"\n\nOn the other hand, if we suppose that the right and the wrong are at all\ntimes equally possible to an individual; that when he chooses the one,\nhe might, in the same identical circumstances, choose the other;\ninfinite meaning attaches to the words, ought, obligation, merit and\ndemerit, when it is said that an individual thus circumstanced ought to\ndo the right and avoid the wrong, and that he merits reward or\npunishment, when he does the one, or does not do the other. The ideas of\nobligation, merit and demerit, reward and punishment, and probation with\nreference to a state of moral retribution, are all chimeras, on any\nother supposition than that of the Liberty of the Will. With this\ndoctrine, they all perfectly harmonize.\n\n6. All moral government, all laws, human and Divine, have their basis in\nthe doctrine of Liberty; and are the perfection of tyranny, on any other\nsupposition. To place creatures in circumstances which necessitate a\ngiven course of conduct, and render every other course impossible, and\nthen to require of them, under the heaviest sanctions, a different and\nopposite course--what can be tyranny if this is not?\n\nOBJECTION IN BAR OF AN APPEAL TO CONSCIOUSNESS.\n\nAn objection which is brought by Necessitarians, in perpetual bar of an\nappeal to consciousness, to determine the fact whether the phenomena of\nthe Will fall under the relation of Liberty or Necessity, here demands\nspecial attention. Consciousness, it is said, simply affirms, that, in\ngiven circumstances, we do, in fact, put forth certain acts of Will. But\nwhether we can or cannot, in these circumstances, put forth other and\nopposite determinations, it does not and cannot make any affirmation at\nall. It does not, therefore, fall within the province of Consciousness\nto determine whether the phenomena of the Will are subject to the\nrelation of Liberty or Necessity; and it is unphilosophical to appeal to\nthat faculty to decide such a question. This objection, if valid,\nrenders null and void much of what has been said upon this subject; and\nas it constitutes a stronghold of the Necessitarian, it becomes us to\nexamine it with great care. In reply, I remark,\n\n1. That if this objection holds in respect to the phenomena of the Will,\nit must hold equally in respect of those of the other faculties the\nIntelligence, for example. We will, therefore, bring the objection to a\ntest, by applying it to certain intellectual phenomena. We will take, as\nan example, the universal and necessary affirmation, that \"it is\nimpossible for the same thing, at the same time, to be and not to be.\"\nEvery one is conscious, in certain circumstances, of making this and\nother kindred affirmations. Now, if the objection under consideration is\nvalid, all that we should be conscious of is the fact, that, under the\ncircumstances supposed, we do, in reality, make particular affirmations;\nwhile, in reference to the question, whether, in the same circumstances,\nwe can or cannot make different and opposite affirmations, we should\nhave no consciousness at all. Now, I appeal to every man, whether, when\nhe is conscious of making the affirmation, that it is impossible for the\nsame thing, at the same time, to be and not to be, he is not equally\nconscious of the fact, that it is impossible for him to make the\nopposite affirmation whether, when he affirms that three and two make\nfive, he is not conscious that it is impossible for him to affirm that\nthree and two are six? In other words, when we are conscious of making\ncertain intellectual affirmations, are we not equally conscious of an\nimpossibility of making different and opposite affirmations? Every man\nis just as conscious of the fact, that the phenomena of his Intelligence\nfall under the relation of Necessity, as he is of making any\naffirmations at all. If this is not so, we cannot know but that it is\npossible for us to affirm and believe perceived contradictions. All that\nwe could say is, that, as a matter of fact, we do not do it. But whether\nwe can or cannot do it, we can never know. Do we not know, however, as\nabsolutely as we know anything, that we _cannot_ affirm perceived\ncontradictions? In other words, we do and can know absolutely, that our\nIntelligence is subject to the law of Necessity. We do know by\nconsciousness, with absolute certainty, that the phenomena of the\nIntelligence, and I may add, of the Sensibility too, do fall under the\nrelation of Necessity. Why may we not know, with equal certainty,\nwhether the phenomena of the Will do or do not fall under the relation\nof Liberty? What then becomes of the objection under consideration?\n\n2. But while we are conscious of the fact, that the Intellect is under\nthe law of Necessity, we are equally conscious that Will is under that\nof Liberty. We make intellectual affirmations; such, for example, as the\npropositions, Things equal to the same things are equal to one another,\nThere can be no event without a cause, &c., with a consciousness of an\nutter impossibility of making different and opposite affirmations. We\nput forth acts of Will with a consciousness equally distinct and\nabsolute, of a possibility, in the same circumstances, of putting forth\ndifferent and opposite determinations. Even Necessitarians admit and\naffirm the validity of the testimony of consciousness in the former\ninstance. Why should we doubt or deny it in the latter?\n\n3. The question, whether Consciousness can or cannot give us not only\nmental phenomena, but also the fundamental characteristics of such\nphenomena, cannot be determined by any pre-formed theory, in respect to\nwhat Consciousness can or cannot affirm. If we wish to know to what a\nwitness is able to testify, we must not first determine what he can or\ncannot say, and then refuse to hear anything from him, except in\nconformity to such decisions. We must first give him a full and\nattentive hearing, and then judge of his capabilities. So in respect to\nConsciousness. If we wish to know what it does or does not, what it can\nor cannot affirm, we must let it give its full testimony, untrammelled\nby any pre-formed theories. Now, when the appeal is thus made, we find,\nthat, in the circumstances in which we do originate given\ndeterminations, it affirms distinctly and absolutely, that, in the same\nidentical circumstances, we might originate different and opposite\ndeterminations. From what Consciousness does affirm, we ought surely to\ndetermine the sphere of its legitimate affirmations.\n\n4. The universal solicitude of Necessitarians to take the question under\nconsideration from the bar of Consciousness is, in fact, a most decisive\nacknowledgment, on their part, that at that tribunal the cause will go\nagainst them. Let us suppose that all men were as conscious that their\nWill is subject to the law of Necessity, as they are that their\nIntelligence is. Can we conceive that Necessitarians would not be as\nsolicitous to carry the question directly to the tribunal of\nConsciousness, as they now are to take it from that tribunal? When all\nmen are as conscious that their Will is under the law of Liberty, as\nthey are that their other faculties are under the relation of Necessity,\nno wonder that Necessitarians anticipate the ruin of their cause, when\nthe question is to be submitted to the bar of Consciousness. No wonder\nthat they so solemnly protest against an appeal to that tribunal. Let\nthe reader remember, however, that the moment the validity of the\naffirmations of Consciousness is denied, in respect to any question in\nmental science, it becomes infinite folly in us to reason at all on the\nsubject; a folly just as great as it would be for a natural philosopher\nto reason about colors, after denying the validity of all affirmations\nof the eye, in respect to the phenomena about which he is to reason.\n\nDOCTRINE OF LIBERTY ARGUED FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THE IDEA OF LIBERTY IN\nALL MINDS.\n\nIII. I will present a third general argument in favor of the doctrine of\nLiberty; an argument, which, to my mind, is perfectly conclusive, but\nwhich differs somewhat from either of the forms of argumentation above\npresented. I argue the Liberty of the Will _from the existence of the\nidea of Liberty in the human mind, in the form in which it is there\nfound_.\n\nIf the Will is not free, the idea of Liberty is wholly inapplicable to\nany phenomenon in existence whatever. Yet this idea is in the mind. The\naction of the Will in conformity to it is just as conceivable as its\naction in conformity to the idea of Necessity. It remains with the\nNecessitarian to account for the existence of this idea in the human\nmind, in consistency with his own theory. Here the following\nconsiderations present themselves demanding special attention.\n\n1. The idea of Liberty, like that of Necessity, is a _simple_, and not a\n_complex_ idea. This all will admit.\n\n2. It could not have come into the mind from observation or reflection\nbecause all phenomena, external and internal, all the objects of\nobservation and reflection, are, according to the doctrine of Necessity,\nnot free, but necessary.\n\n3. It could not have originated, as _necessary_ ideas do, as the logical\nantecedents of the truths given by observation and reflection. For\nexample, the idea of space, time, substance, and cause, are given in the\nIntelligence, as the logical antecedents of the ideas of body,\nsuccession, phenomena, and events, all of which are truths derived from\nobservation or reflection. Now the idea of Liberty, if the doctrine of\nNecessity is true, cannot have arisen in this way because all the\nobjects of observation and reflection are, according to this doctrine,\nnecessary, and therefore their logical antecedents must be. How shall we\naccount, in consistency with this theory, for the existence of this idea\nin the mind? It came not from perception external, nor internal, nor as\nthe logical antecedent or consequent of any truth thus perceived. Now if\nwe admit the doctrine of Liberty as a truth of universal consciousness,\nwe can give a philosophical account of the existence of the idea of\nLiberty in all minds. If we deny this doctrine, and consequently affirm\nthat of Necessity, we may safely challenge any theologian or philosopher\nto give such an account of the existence of that idea in the mind. For\nall ideas, in the mind, do and must come from observation or reflection,\nor as the logical antecedents or consequents of ideas thus obtained. We\nhave here an event without a cause, if the doctrine of Necessity is\ntrue.\n\n4. All _simple_ ideas, with the exception of that of Liberty, have\nrealities within or around us, corresponding to them. If the doctrine of\nNecessity is true, we have one solitary idea of this character, that of\nLiberty, to which no reality corresponds. Whence this solitary intruder\nin the human mind?\n\nThe existence of this idea in the mind is proof demonstrative, that a\nreality corresponding to it does and must exist, and as this reality is\nfound nowhere but in the Will, there it must be found. Almost all\nNecessitarians are, in philosophy, the disciples of Locke. With him,\nthey maintain, that all ideas in the mind come from observation and\nreflection. Yet they maintain that there is in the mind one idea, that\nof Liberty, which never could thus have originated; because, according\nto their theory, no objects corresponding do or can exist, either as\nrealities, or as the objects of observation or reflection. We have again\nan event without a cause, if the doctrine of Liberty is not true.\n\n5. The relation of the ideas of Liberty and Necessity to those of\nobligation, merit and demerit, &c., next demand our attention. If the\ndoctrine of Necessity is true, the idea of Liberty is, as we have seen,\na chimera. With it the idea of obligation can have no connection or\nalliance; but must rest exclusively upon that of Necessity. Now, how\nhappens it, that no man holding the doctrine of Liberty was ever known\nto deny that of obligation, or of merit and demerit? How happens it,\nthat the validity of neither of these ideas has ever, in any age or\nnation, been denied, except on the avowed authority of the doctrine of\nNecessity? Sceptics of the class who deny moral obligation, are\nuniversally avowed Necessitarians. We may safely challenge the world to\nproduce a single exception to this statement. We may challenge the world\nto produce an individual in ancient or modern times who holds the\ndoctrine of Liberty, and denies moral obligation, or an individual who\ndenies moral obligation on any other ground than that of Necessity. Now,\nhow can this fact be accounted for, that the ideas of obligation, merit\nand demerit, &c., universally attach themselves to a chimera, the idea\nof Liberty, and stand in such irreconcilable hostility to the only idea\nby which, as Necessitarians will have it, their validity is affirmed?\n\n6. Finally, If the doctrine of Necessity is true, the phenomena of the\nIntelligence, Sensibility, and the Will, are given in Consciousness as\nalike necessary. The idea of Liberty, then, if it does exist in the\nmind, would not be likely to attach itself to either of these classes of\nphenomena; and if to either, it would be just as likely to attach itself\nto one class as to another. Now, how shall we account for the fact, that\nthis idea always attaches itself to one of these classes of phenomena,\nthose of the Will, and never to either of the others? How is it that all\nmen agree in holding, that, in the circumstances of their occurrence,\nthe phenomena of the Intelligence and Sensibility cannot but be what\nthey are, while those of the Will may be otherwise than they are? Why,\nif this chimera, the idea of Liberty, attaches itself to either of these\nclasses, does it not sometimes attach itself to the phenomena of the\nIntelligence or Sensibility, as well as to those of the Will? Here, once\nagain, we have an event without a cause, a distinction without a\ndifference, if the doctrine of Necessity is true. The facts before us\ncan be accounted for only on the supposition, that the phenomena of the\nIntelligence and Sensibility are given in Consciousness as necessary,\nwhile those of the Will are given as free.\n\nTHE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY, THE DOCTRINE OF THE BIBLE.\n\nIV. We will now, in the fourth place, raise the inquiry, an inquiry very\nappropriate in its place, and having an important bearing upon our\npresent investigations, whether the doctrine of the Will, above\nestablished, is the doctrine pre-supposed in the Bible? The following\nconsiderations will enable us to give a decisive answer to this inquiry.\n\n1. If the doctrine of the Will here maintained is not, and consequently\nthat of Necessity is, the doctrine pre-supposed in the Scriptures, then\nwe have two revelations from God, the external and internal, in palpable\ncontradiction to each other. As the _works_ of God (see Rom. 1: 19, 20)\nare as real a revelation from him as the Bible, so are the necessary\naffirmations of our Intelligence. Now, in our inner being, in the depths\nof our Intelligence, the fact is perpetually revealed and affirmed--a\nfact which we cannot disbelieve, if we would--that we are not\n_necessary_ but _free_ agents. Suppose that, in the external revelation,\nthe Scriptures, the fact is revealed and affirmed that we are _not free_\nbut _necessary_ agents. Has not God himself affirmed in one revelation\nwhat he has denied in another? Of what use can the internal revelation\nbe, but to render us necessarily sceptical in respect to the external?\nHas the Most High given two such revelations as this?\n\n2. In the Scriptures, man is presented as the subject, and, of course,\nas possessing those powers which render him the proper subject of\ncommand and prohibition, of obligation, of merit and demerit, and\nconsequently of reward and punishment. Let us suppose that God has\nimparted to a being a certain constitution, and then placed him in a\ncondition in which, in consequence of the necessary correlation between\nhis constitution and circumstances, but one series of determinations are\npossible to him, and that series cannot but result. Can we conceive it\nproper in the Most High to prohibit that creature from pursuing the\ncourse which God himself has rendered it impossible for him not to\npursue, and require him, under the heaviest sanctions, to pursue, under\nthese identical circumstances, a different and opposite course--a course\nwhich the Creator has rendered it impossible for him to pursue? Is this\nthe philosophy pre-supposed in the Bible? Does the Bible imply a system\nof mental philosophy which renders the terms, obligation, merit and\ndemerit, void of all conceivable meaning, and which lays no other\nfoundation for moral retributions but injustice and tyranny?\n\n3. Let us now contemplate the doings of the Great Day revealed in the\nScriptures, in the light of these two opposite theories. Let us suppose\nthat, as the righteous and the wicked stand in distinct and separate\nmasses before the Eternal One, the Most High says to the one class,\n\"You, I myself placed in circumstances in which nothing but obedience\nwas possible, and that you could not but render; and you, I placed in a\ncondition in which nothing but disobedience was possible to you, and\nthat you could not but perpetrate. In consequence of these distinct and\nopposite courses, each of which I myself rendered unavoidable, _you_\ndeserve and shall receive my eternal smiles; and _you_ as richly deserve\nand shall therefore endure my eternal frowns.\" What would be the\nresponse of an assembled universe to a division based upon such a\nprinciple? Is this the principle on which the decisions of that Day are\nbased? It must be so, if the doctrine of Liberty is not, and that of\nNecessity is, the doctrine of the Bible?\n\n4. We will now contemplate another class of passages which have a\nbearing equally decisive upon our present inquiries. I refer to that\nclass in which God expresses the deepest regret at the course which\ntransgressors have pursued, and are still pursuing, and the most\ndecisive unwillingness that they should pursue that course and perish.\nHe takes a solemn oath, that he is not willing that they should take the\ncourse of disobedience and death, but that they should pursue a\ndifferent and opposite course. God expresses no regret that they are in\nthe _circumstances_ in which they are, but that in those circumstances\nthey should take the path of disobedience, and not that of obedience.\nNow, can we suppose, what must be true, if the doctrine of Necessity is\nthe doctrine pre-supposed in the Bible, that God places his creatures in\ncircumstances in which obedience is to them an impossibility, and in\nwhich they cannot but disobey, and then takes a solemn oath that he is\nnot willing that they should disobey and perish, \"but that they should\nturn from their evil way and live?\" What is the meaning of the\nexclamation, \"O that thou hadst hearkened to my commandment,\" if God\nhimself had so conditioned the sinner as to render obedience an\nimpossibility to him? Is this the philosophy of the Will pre-supposed in\nthe Bible? On the other hand, how perfectly in place are all the\npassages under consideration, on the supposition that the doctrine of\nLiberty is the doctrine therein pre-supposed, and that consequently the\nobedience which God affirms Himself desirous that sinners should render,\nand his regret that they do not render, is always possible to them! One\nof the seven pillars of the Gospel is this very doctrine. Take it from\nthe Bible, and we have \"another Gospel.\"\n\n5. One other class of passages claims special attention here. In the\nScriptures, the Most High expresses the greatest _astonishment_ that men\nshould sin under the influences to which he has subjected them. He calls\nupon heaven and earth to unite with him in astonishment at the conduct\nof men under those influences. \"Hear, O heavens, and give ear, O earth,\"\nhe exclaims, \"for the Lord hath spoken; I have nourished and brought up\nchildren, and they have rebelled against me.\" Now, let us suppose, as\nthe doctrine of Necessity affirms, that God has placed sinners under\ninfluences under which they cannot but sin. What must we think of his\nconduct in calling upon the universe to unite with him in astonishment,\nthat under these influences they should sin--that is, take the only\ncourse possible to them, the course which they cannot but take? With the\nsame propriety, he might place a mass of water on an inclined plane, and\nthen call upon heaven and earth to unite with him in astonishment at the\ndownward flow of the fluid. Is this the philosophy pre-supposed in the\nBible?\n\nSEC. 3. VIEWS OF NECESSITARIANS.\n\nWe are now prepared for a consideration of certain miscellaneous\nquestions which have an important bearing upon our present inquiries.\n\nNECESSITY AS HELD BY NECESSITARIANS.\n\nI. The first inquiry that presents itself is this: Do Necessitarians\nhold the doctrine of Necessity as defined in this chapter? Do they\nreally hold, in respect to every act of will, that, in the circumstances\nof its occurrence, that one act only is possible, and that cannot but\narise? Is this, for example, the doctrine of Edwards? Is it the doctrine\nreally held by those who professedly agree with him? I argue that it is:\n\n1. Because they unanimously repudiate the doctrine of Liberty as here\ndefined. They must, therefore, hold that of Necessity; inasmuch as no\nthird relation is even conceivable or possible. If they deny that the\nphenomena of the Will fall under either of these relations, and still\ncall themselves Necessitarians, they most hold to an inconceivable\nsomething, which themselves even do not understand and cannot define,\nand which has and can have no real existence.\n\n2. Edwards has confounded the phenomena of the Will with those of the\nSensibility which are necessary in the sense here defined. He must,\ntherefore, hold that the characteristics of the latter class belong to\nthose of the former.\n\n3. Edwards represents the relation between motives and acts of Will, as\nbeing the same in _kind_ as that which exists between _causes_ and\n_effects_ among external material substances. The former relation he\ndesignates by the words _moral necessity_; the latter, by that of\nnatural, or _philosophical_, or _physical necessity_. Yet he says\nhimself, that the difference expressed by these words \"does not lie so\nmuch in the nature of the _connection_ as in the two terms _connected_.\"\nThe qualifying terms used, then, designate merely the nature of the\nantecedents and consequents, while the nature of the connection between\nthem is, in all instances, the same, that of naked necessity.\n\n4. Edwards himself represents moral necessity as just as absolute as\nphysical, or natural necessity. \"Moral necessity may be,\" he says, \"as\nabsolute as natural necessity. That is, the effect may be as perfectly\nconnected with its moral cause as a natural necessary effect is with its\nnatural cause.\"\n\n5. Necessitarians represent the relation between motives and acts of\nWill as that of _cause_ and _effect_; and for this reason necessary.\n\"If,\" says Edwards, \"every act of Will is excited by some motive, then\nthat motive is the _cause_ of that act of Will.\" \"And if volitions are\nproperly the effects of their motives, then they are _necessarily_\nconnected with their motives.\" Now as the relation of cause and effect\nis necessary, in the sense of the term Necessity as above defined,\nEdwards must hold, and design to teach, that all acts of Will are\nnecessary in this sense.\n\n6. Necessitarians represent the connection between motives and acts of\nWill as being, in all instances, the same in kind as that which exists\nbetween volitions and external actions. \"As external actions,\" says\nPresident Day, \"are directed by the Will, so the Will itself is directed\nby influence.\" Now all admit, that the connection between volitions and\nexternal actions is necessary in this sense, that when we will such\naction it cannot but take place. No other act is, in the circumstances,\npossible. In the same sense, according to Necessitarians, is every act\nof Will necessarily connected with influence, or motives. We do\nNecessitarians no wrong, therefore, when we impute to them the doctrine\nof Necessity as here defined. In all cases of sin, they hold, that an\nindividual is in circumstances in which none but sinful acts of Will are\npossible, and these he cannot but put forth; and that in these identical\ncircumstances the sinner is under obligation infinite to put forth\ndifferent and opposite acts.\n\nTHE TERM, CERTAINTY, AS USED BY NECESSITARIANS.\n\nII. We are prepared for another important inquiry, to wit: whether the\nwords, _certainty_, _moral certainty_, &c., as used by Necessitarians,\nare identical in their meaning with that of Necessity as above defined?\nThe doctrine of Necessity would never be received by the public at all,\nbut for the language in which it is clothed, language which prevents the\npublic seeing it as it is. At one time it is called Moral, in\ndistinction from Natural Necessity. At another, it is said to be nothing\nbut Certainty, or moral Certainty, &c. Now the question arises, what is\nthis Certainty? Is it or is it not, real Necessity, and nothing else?\nThat it is, I argue,\n\n1. From the fact, as shown above, that there can possibly be no\nCertainty, which does not fall either under the relation of Liberty or\nNecessity as above defined. The Certainty of Necessitarians does not,\naccording to their own showing, fall under the former relation: it must,\ntherefore, fall under the latter. It must be naked Necessity, and\nnothing else.\n\n2. While they have defined the term Necessity, and have not that of\nCertainty, they use the latter term as avowedly synonymous with the\nformer. The latter, therefore, must be explained by the former, and not\nthe former by the latter.\n\n3. The Certainty which they hold is a certainty which avowedly excludes\nthe possibility of different and opposite acts of Will under the\ninfluences, or motives, under which particular acts are put forth. The\nCertainty under consideration, therefore, is not necessity of a\nparticular kind, a necessity consistent with liberty and moral\nobligation. It is the Necessity above defined, in all its naked\ndeformity.\n\nIII. We are now prepared for a distinct statement of the doctrine of\nAbility, according to the Necessitarian scheme. Even the Necessitarians,\nwith very few exceptions, admit, that in the absence of all power to do\nright or wrong, we can be under no obligation to do the one or avoid the\nother. \"A man,\" says Pres. Day, \"is not responsible for remaining in his\nplace if he has no power to move. He is not culpable for omitting to\nwalk, if he has no strength to walk. He is not under obligation to do\nanything for which he has not what Edwards calls _natural_ power.\" It is\nvery important for us to understand the _nature_ of this ability, which\nlies at the foundation of moral obligation; to understand, I repeat,\nwhat this Ability is, according to the theory under consideration. This\nAbility, according to the doctrine of Liberty, has been well stated by\nCousin, to wit: \"The moment we take the resolution to do an action, we\ntake it with a consciousness of being able to take a contrary\nresolution;\" and by Dr. Dwight, who says of a man's sin, that it is\n\"chosen by him unnecessarily, _while possessed of a power to choose\notherwise_.\" The nature of this Ability, according to the Necessitarian\nscheme, has been stated with equal distinctness in the Christian\nSpectator. \"If we take this term [Ability or Power] in the absolute\nsense, as including _all_ the antecedents to a given volition, there is\nplainly no such thing as power to the contrary; for in this sense of the\nterm,\" as President Day states, \"a man never has power to do anything but\nwhat he actually performs.\" \"In this comprehensive, though rather\nunusual sense of the word,\" says President Day, \"a man has not power to\ndo anything which he does not do.\" The meaning of the above extracts\ncannot be mistaken. Nor can any one deny that they contain a true\nexposition of the doctrine of Necessity, to wit: that under the\ninfluences under which men do will, and consequently act, it is\nabsolutely impossible for them to will and act differently from what\nthey do. In what sense, then, have they power to will and act\ndifferently according to this doctrine? To this question President Day\nhas given a correct and definite answer. \"The man who wills in a\nparticular way, under the influence of particular feelings, might will\ndifferently under a different influence.\"\n\nNow, what is the doctrine of Ability, according to this scheme? A man,\nfor example, commits an act of sin. He ought, in the stead of that act,\nto have put forth an act of obedience. Without the power to render this\nobedience, as President Day admits, there can be no obligation to do it.\nWhen the Necessitarian says, that the creature, when he sins, has power\nto obey, he means, not that under the influence under which the act of\nsin is committed, the creature has power to obey; but that _under a\ndifferent influence he might obey_. But mark, it is under the identical\ninfluence under which a man does sin, and under which, according to the\ndoctrine of Necessity, he cannot but sin, that he is required not to\nsin. Now how can a man's ability, and obligation not to sin under a\ngiven influence, grow out of the fact, that, under a different\ninfluence, an influence under which he cannot but do right, he might not\nsin? This is all the ability and ground of obligation as far as Ability,\nNatural Ability as it is called, is concerned, which the doctrine of\nNecessity admits. A man is, by a power absolutely irresistible, placed\nin circumstances in which he cannot possibly but sin. In these\ncircumstances, it is said, that he has _natural ability_ not to sin, and\nconsequently ought not to do it. Why? Because, to his acting\ndifferently, no change in his nature or powers is required. These are\n\"perfect and entire, wanting nothing.\" All that is required is, that his\n_circumstances_ be changed, and then he might not sin. \"In what sense,\"\nasks President Day, \"is it true, that a man has power to will the\ncontrary of what he actually wills? He has such power that, with a\n_sufficient inducement_, he will make an opposite choice.\" Is not this\nthe strangest idea of Natural Ability as constituting the foundation of\nobligation, of which the human mind ever tried to conceive? In\nillustration, let us suppose that a man, placed in the city of New York,\ncannot but sin; placed in that of Boston, he cannot but be holy, and\nthat the fact whether he is in the one or the other city depends upon\nthe irresistible providence of God. He is placed in New York where he\ncannot but sin. He is told that he ought not to do it, and that he is\nhighly guilty for not being perfectly holy. It is also asserted that he\nhas all the powers of moral agency, all the ability requisite to lay the\nfoundation for the highest conceivable obligation to be holy. What is\nthe evidence? he asks. Is it possible for me, in my present\ncircumstances, to avoid sin? and in my present circumstances, you know,\nI cannot but be. I acknowledge, the Necessitarian says, that under\npresent influences, you cannot but sin, and that you cannot but be\nsubject to these influences. Still, I affirm, that you have all the\npowers of moral agency, all the natural ability requisite to obedience,\nand to the highest conceivable obligation to obedience. Because, in the\nfirst place, even in New York, you could obey if you chose. You have,\ntherefore, _natural_, though not _moral_, power to obey. But stop,\nfriend, right here. When you say that I might obey, if I chose, I would\nask, if choosing, as in the command, \"choose life,\" is not the very\nthing required of me? When, therefore, you affirm that I might obey, if\nI chose, does it not mean, in reality, that I might choose, if I should\nchoose? Is not your Natural Ability this, that I might obey if I did\nobey?[2] I cannot deny, the Necessitarian replies, that you have\ncorrectly stated this doctrine. Permit me to proceed in argument,\nhowever. In the next place, all that you need in order to be holy as\nrequired, is a change, not of your _powers_, but of the _influences_\nwhich control the _action_ of those powers. With no change in your\nconstitution or powers, you need only to be placed in Boston instead of\nNew York, and there you cannot but be holy. Is it not as clear as light,\ntherefore, that you have now all the powers of moral agency, all the\nability requisite to the highest conceivable obligation to be holy\ninstead of sinful?\n\nI fully understand you, the sinner replies. But remember, that it is not\nin Boston, where, as you acknowledge, I cannot be, that I am required\nnot to sin; but here, in New York, where I cannot but be, and cannot\npossibly but sin. It is here, and not somewhere else, that I am required\nnot to sin. How can the fact, that if I were in Boston, where I could\nnot but be holy, I might not sin, prove, that here, in New York, I have\nany ability, either natural or moral--am under any obligation\nwhatever--not to sin? These are the difficulties which press upon me.\nHow do you remove them according to your theory?\n\nI can give no other answer, the Necessitarian replies, than that already\ngiven. If that does not silence for ever every excuse for sin in your\nmind, it is wholly owing to the perverseness of your heart, to its\nbitter hostility to the truth. I may safely appeal to the Necessitarian\nhimself, whether I have not here given an uncaricatured expose of his\ntheory.\n\nSINFUL INCLINATIONS.\n\nIV. When pressed with such appalling difficulties as these, the\nNecessitarian falls back, in self-justification, upon the _reason why_\nthe sinner cannot be holy. The only reason, it is said, why the sinner\ndoes not do as he ought is, not the want of power, but the strength of\nhis sinful inclinations. Shall he plead these in excuse for sin? By no\nmeans. They constitute the very essence of the sinner's guilt. Let it be\nborne in mind, that, according to the doctrine of Necessity, such is the\nconnection between the nature, or constitution of the sinner's mind--a\nnature which God has given him, and the influences under which he is\nplaced by Divine Providence--that none but these very inclinations are\npossible to him, and these cannot but exist. From these inclinations,\nsinful acts of Will cannot but arise. How is the matter helped, as far\nas ability and obligation, on the part of the sinner, are concerned, by\nthrowing the guilt back from acts of Will upon inclinations equally\nnecessary?\n\nNECESSARIAN DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY.\n\nThe real liberty of the Will, according to the Necessitarian scheme,\nnext demands our attention. All admit that Liberty is an essential\ncondition of moral obligation. In what sense, then, is or is not, man\nfree, according to the doctrine of Necessity?\n\n\"The plain and obvious meaning of the words Freedom and Liberty,\" says\nPresident Edwards, \"is power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one\nhas to do as he pleases. Or, in other words, his being free from\nhinderance or impediment in the way of doing or conducting in any\nrespect as he wills. And the contrary to Liberty, whatever name we\nplease to call that by, is a person's being hindered, or unable to\nconduct as he will, or being necessitated to do otherwise.\" \"The only\nidea, indeed, that we can form of free-agency, or of freedom of Will,\"\nsays Abercrombie, \"is, that it consists in a man's being able to do what\nhe wills, or to abstain from doing what he will not. Necessary agency,\non the other hand, would consist in a man's being compelled, by a force\nfrom without, to do what he will not, or prevented from doing what he\nwills.\"\n\nWith these definitions all Necessitarians agree. This is all the Liberty\nknown, or conceivable, according to their theory. Liberty does not\nconsist in the power to choose in one or the other of two or more\ndifferent and opposite directions, under the same influence. It is found\nwholly and exclusively in the connection between the act of Will,\nconsidered as the antecedent, and the effort, external or internal,\nconsidered as the consequent. On this definition I remark,\n\n1. That it presents the idea of Liberty as distinguished from\n_Servitude_, rather than Liberty as distinguished from Necessity. A man\nis free, in the first sense of the term, when no external restraints\nhinder the carrying out of the choice within. This, however, has nothing\nto do with Liberty, as distinguished from Necessity.\n\n2. If this is the only sense in which a man is free, then, in the\nlanguage of a very distinguished philosopher, \"if you cut off a man's\nlittle finger, you thereby annihilate so much of his free agency;\"\nbecause, in that case, you abridge so much his power to do as he\nchooses. Is this Liberty, the only liberty of man, a liberty which may\nbe destroyed by chains, bolts, and bars? Is this Liberty as\ndistinguished from Necessity the liberty which lays the foundation of\nmoral obligation?\n\n3. If this is the only sense in which man is free, then dire Necessity\nreigns throughout the entire domain of human agency. If all acts of Will\nare the necessary consequents of the influences to which the mind is at\nthe time subjected, much more must a like necessity exist between all\nacts of Will and their consequents, external and internal. This has been\nalready shown. The mind, then, with all its acts and states, exists in a\nchain of antecedents and consequents, causes and effects, linked\ntogether in every part and department by a dire necessity. This is all\nthe Liberty that this doctrine knows or allows us; a Liberty to choose\nas influences necessitate us to choose, and to have such acts of Will\nfollowed by certain necessary consequents, external and internal. In\nthis scheme, the idea of Liberty, which all admit must have a location\nsomewhere, or obligation, is a chimera; this idea, I say, after\n\"wandering through dry places, seeking rest and finding none,\" at length\nis driven to a location where it finds its grave, and not a living\nhabitation.\n\n4. It is to me a very strange thing, that Liberty, as the foundation of\nmoral obligation, should be located here. Because that acts of Will are\nfollowed by certain corresponding necessary consequents external and\ninternal, therefore we are bound to put forth given acts of Will,\nwhatever the influences acting upon us may be, and however impossible it\nmay be to put forth those acts under those influences! Did ever a\ngreater absurdity dance in the brain of a philosopher or theologian?\n\n5. The public are entirely deceived by this definition, and because they\nare deceived as to the theory intended by it, do they admit it as true?\nSuppose any man in the common walks of life were asked what he means,\nwhen he says, he can do as he pleases, act as he chooses, &c. Does this\nexpress your meaning? When you will to walk, rather than sit, for\nexample, no other volition is at the time possible, and this you must\nput forth, and that when you have put forth this volition, you cannot\nbut walk. Is this your idea, when you say, you can do as you please? No,\nhe would say. That is not my idea at all. If that is true, man is not a\nfree agent at all. What men in general really mean when they say, they\ncan do as they please, and are therefore free, is, that when they put\nforth a given act of Will, and for this reason conduct in a given\nmanner, they may in the same circumstances put forth different and\nopposite determinations, and consequently act in a different and\nopposite manner from what they do.\n\nVI. The argument of Necessitarians in respect to the _practical\ntendencies_ of their doctrine demands a passing notice. All acts of the\nWill, they say, are indeed necessary under the circumstances in which\nthey occur; but then we should learn the practical lesson not to place\nourselves in the circumstances where we shall be liable to act wrong. To\nthis I reply:\n\n1. That on the hypothesis before us, our being in the circumstances\nwhich originate a given choice, is as necessary as the choice itself.\nFor I am in those circumstances either by an overruling Providence over\nwhich I have no control, or by previous acts of the Will rendered\nnecessary by such Providence. Hence the difficulty remains in all its\nforce.\n\n2. The solution assumes the very principle denied, that is, that our\nbeing in circumstances which originate particular acts of choice is not\nnecessary. Else why tell an individual he is to blame for being in such\ncircumstances, and not to place himself there again?\n\nGROUND WHICH NECESSITARIANS ARE BOUND TO TAKE IN RESPECT TO THE DOCTRINE\nOF ABILITY.\n\nVII. We are now fully prepared to state the ground which Necessitarians\nof every school are bound to take in respect to the doctrine of Ability.\nIt is to deny that doctrine wholly, to take the open and broad ground,\nthat, according to any appropriate signification of the words, it is\nabsolutely impossible for men to will, and consequently to act,\ndifferently from what they do; that when they do wrong, they always do\nit, with the absolute impossibility of doing right; and that when they\ndo right, there is always an equal impossibility of their doing wrong.\nIf men have not power to _will_ differently from what they do, it is\nundeniably evident that they have no power whatever to act differently:\nbecause there is an absolutely necessary connection between volitions\nand their consequents, external actions. The doctrine of Necessity takes\naway wholly all ability from the creature to will differently from what\nhe does. It therefore totally annihilates his ability to _act_\ndifferently. What, then, according to the theory of Necessity, becomes\nof the doctrine of Ability? It is annihilated. It is impossible for us\nto find for it a \"local habitation or a name.\" As honest men,\nNecessitarians are bound to proclaim the fact. They are bound to\nproclaim the doctrine, that, in requiring men to be holy, under\ninfluences under which they do sin, and cannot but sin (as it is true of\nall sinful acts according to their theory), God requires of them\nabsolute impossibilities, and then dooms them to perdition for not\nperforming such impossibilities.\n\nThe subterfuge to which Necessitarians resort here, will not avail them\nat all, to wit: that men are to blame for not doing right, because, they\nmight do it if they chose. To will right is the thing, and the only\nthing really required of them. The above maxim therefore amounts, as we\nhave already seen, to this: Men are bound to do, that is, to will, what\nis right, because if they should will what is right, they would will\nwhat is right.\n\nDOCTRINE OF NECESSITY, AS REGARDED BY NECESSITARIANS OF DIFFERENT\nSCHOOLS.\n\nVIII. Two schools divide the advocates of Necessity. According to one\nclass, God produces in men all their volitions and acts, both sinful and\nholy, by the direct exertion of his own omnipotence. Without the Divine\nagency, men, they hold, are wholly incapable of all volitions and\nactions of every kind. With it, none but those which God produces can\narise, and these cannot but arise. This is the scheme of Divine\nefficiency, as advocated by Dr. Emmons and others.\n\nAccording to the other school, God does not, in all instances, produce\nvolitions and actions by his own direct agency, but by creating in\ncreatures a certain nature or constitution, and then subjecting them to\ninfluences from which none but particular volitions and acts which they\ndo put forth can result, and these must result. According to a large\nportion of this school, God, either by his own direct agency, or by\nsustaining their laws of natural generation, produces in men the\npeculiar nature which they do possess, and then imputes to them infinite\nguilt, not only for this nature, but for its necessary results, sinful\nfeelings, volitions, and actions.\n\nSuch are these two schemes. In the two following particulars, they\nperfectly harmonize. 1. All acts of Will, together with their effects,\nexternal and internal, in the circumstances of their occurrence, cannot\nbut be what they are. 2. The ground of this necessity is the agency of\nGod, in the one instance producing these effects directly and\nimmediately, and in the other producing the same results, mediately, by\ngiving existence to a constitution and influences from which such\nresults cannot but arise. They differ only in respect to the _immediate_\nground of this necessity, the power of God, according to the former,\nproducing the effects directly, and according to the latter, indirectly.\nAccording to both, all our actions sustain the same essential relation\nto the Divine Will, that of Necessity.\n\nNow while these two theories so perfectly harmonize, in all essential\nparticulars, strange to tell, the advocates of one regard the other as\ninvolving the most monstrous absurdities conceivable. For God to\nproduce, through the energies of his own omnipotence, human volitions,\nand then to impute infinite guilt to men for what he himself has\nproduced in them, what a horrid sentiment that is, exclaims the advocate\nof constitutional depravity. For God to create in men a sinful nature,\nand then impute to them infinite guilt for what he has himself created,\ntogether with its unavoidable results, what horrid tyranny such a\nsentiment imputes to the Most High, exclaims the advocate of Divine\nefficiency, in his turn.\n\nThe impartial, uncommitted spectator, on the other hand, perceives most\ndistinctly the same identical absurdities in both these theories. He\nknows perfectly, that it can make no essential difference, whether God\nproduces a result directly, or by giving existence to a constitution and\ninfluences from which it cannot but arise. If one theory involves\ninjustice and tyranny, the other must involve the same. Let me here add,\nthat the reprobation with which each of the classes above named regards\nthe sentiments of the other, is a sentence of reprobation passed\n(unconsciously to be sure) upon the doctrine of Necessity itself which\nis common to both. For if this one element is taken out of either\ntheory, there is nothing left to render it abhorrent to any mind. It is\nthus that Necessitarians themselves, without exception, pass sentence of\ncondemnation upon their own theory, by condemning it, in every system in\nwhich they meet with it except their own. There is not a man on earth,\nthat has not in some form or other passed sentence of reprobation upon\nthis system. Let any man, whatever, contemplate any theory but the one\nhe has himself adopted, any theory that involves this element, and he\nwill instantly fasten upon this one feature as the characteristic which\nvitiates the whole theory, and renders it deserving of universal\nreprobation. It is thus that unsophisticated Nature expresses her\nuniversal horror at a system which\n\n   \"Binding nature fast in fate,\n   Enslaves the human Will.\"\n\nUnsophisticated Nature abhors this doctrine infinitely more than she was\never conceived to abhor a vacuum. Can a theory which the universal\nIntelligence thus agrees in reprobating, as involving the most horrid\nabsurdity and tyranny conceivable, be the only true one?\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nEXTENT AND LIMITS OF THE LIBERTY OF THE WILL.\n\nWHILE it is maintained, that, in the sense defined in the preceding\nchapter, the Will is free, it is also affirmed that, in other respects,\nit is not free at all. It should be borne distinctly in mind, that, in\nthe respects in which the Will is subject to the law of Liberty, its\nliberty is absolute. It is in no sense subject to the law of Necessity.\nSo far, also, as it is subject to the law of Necessity, it is in no\nsense free. What then are the extent and limits of the Liberty of the\nWill?\n\n1. In the absence of Motives, the Will cannot act at all. To suppose the\nopposite would involve a contradiction. It would suppose the action of\nthe Will in the direction of some object, in the absence of all objects\ntowards which such action can be directed.\n\n2. The Will is not free in regard to what the Motives presented shall\nbe, in view of which its determinations shall be formed. Motives exist\nwholly independent of the Will. Nor does it depend at all upon the Will,\nwhat Motives shall be presented for its election. It is free only in\nrespect to the particular determinations it shall put forth, in\nreference to the Motives actually presented.\n\n3. Whenever a Motive, or object of choice, is presented to the mind, the\nWill is necessitated, by the presentation of the object, to act in some\ndirection. It must yield or refuse to yield to the Motive. But such\nrefusal is itself a positive act. So far, therefore, the Will is wholly\nsubject to the law of Necessity. It is free, not in respect to whether\nit shall, or shall not, choose at all when a Motive is presented; but in\nrespect to _what_ it shall choose. I, for example, offer a merchant a\ncertain sum, for a piece of goods. Now while it is equally possible for\nhim to receive or reject the offer, one or the other determination he\n_must_ form. In the first respect, he is wholly free. In the latter, he\nis not free in any sense whatever. The same holds true in respect to all\nobjects of choice presented to the mind. Motive necessitates the Will to\nact in some direction; while, in all deliberate Moral Acts at least, it\nleaves either of two or more different and opposite determinations\nequally possible to the mind.\n\n4. Certain particular volitions may be rendered necessary by other, and\nwhat may be termed _general_, determinations. For example, a\ndetermination to pursue a particular course of conduct, may render\nnecessary all particular volitions requisite to carry this general\npurpose into accomplishment. It renders them necessary in this sense,\nthat if the former does exist, the latter must exist. A man, for\nexample, determines to pass from Boston to New York with all possible\nexpedition. This determination remaining unchanged, all the particular\nvolitions requisite to its accomplishment cannot but exist. The general\nand controlling determination, however, may, at any moment, be\nsuspended. To perpetuate or suspend it, is always in the power of the\nWill.\n\n5. I will here state a conjecture, viz.: that there are in the primitive\ndevelopments of mind, as well as in all primary acts of attention,\ncertain necessary spontaneities of the Will, as well as of other powers\nof the mind. Is it not in consequence of such actions, that the mind\nbecomes first conscious of the power of volition, and is it not now\nnecessary for us under certain circumstances to give a certain degree of\nattention to phenomena which appear within and around us? My own\nconvictions are, that such circumstances often do occur. Nor is such a\nsupposition inconsistent with the great principle maintained in this\nTreatise. This principle is, that Liberty and Accountability, in other\nwords, Free, and Moral Agency, are co-extensive.\n\n6. Nor does Liberty, as here defined, imply, that the mind, antecedently\nto all acts of Will, shall be in a state of _indifference_, unimpelled\nby feeling, or the affirmations of the Intelligence, more strongly in\none direction than another. The Will exists in a tri-unity with the\nIntelligence and Sensibility. Its determinations may be in harmony with\nthe Sensibility, in opposition to Intelligence, or with the Intelligence\nin opposition to the Sensibility. But while it follows either in\ndistinction from the other, under the same identical influences,\ndifferent and opposite determinations are equally possible. However the\nWill may be influenced, whether its determinations are in the direction\nof the strongest impulse, or opposed to it, it never, in deliberate\nmoral determination, puts forth particular acts, because, that in these\ncircumstances, no others are possible. In instances comparatively few,\ncan we suppose that the mind, antecedently to acts of Will, is in a\nstate of indifference, unimpelled in one direction in distinction from\nothers, or equally impelled in the direction of different and opposite\ndeterminations. Indifference is in no such sense an essential or\nmaterial condition of Liberty. How ever strongly the Will may be\nimpelled in the direction of particular determinations, it is still in\nthe possession of the highest conceivable freedom, if it is not thereby\n_necessitated_ to act in one direction in distinction from all others.\n\n7. I now refer to one other fixed law under the influence of which the\nWill is always necessitated to act. It is the law of _habit_. Action in\nany one direction always generates a tendency to subsequent action in\nthe same direction under similar influences. This tendency may be\nincreased, till it becomes so strong as to render action in the same\ndirection in all future time really, although contingently, certain. The\ncertainty thus granted will always be of such a nature as consists fully\nwith the relation of Liberty. It can never, while moral agency\ncontinues, come under the relation of Necessity. Still the certainty is\nreal. Thus the mind, by a continued course of well or ill doing, may\ngenerate such fixed habits, as to render subsequent action in the same\ndirection perfectly certain, during the entire progress of its future\nbeing. Every man, while conscious of freedom, should be fully aware of\nthe existence of this law, and it should surely lead him to walk\nthoughtfully along the borders of \"the undiscovered country,\" his\nlocation in which he is determining by the habits of thought, feeling,\nand action, he is now generating.\n\nSTRONGEST MOTIVE--REASONING IN A CIRCLE.\n\nA singular instance of reasoning in a circle on the part of\nNecessitarians, in respect to what they call the _strongest Motive_,\ndemands a passing notice here. One of their main arguments in support of\ntheir doctrine is based upon the assumption, that the action of the Will\nis always in the direction of the strongest Motive. When, however, we\nask them, which is the strongest Motive, their reply in reality is, that\nit is the Motive in the direction of which the Will does act. \"The\nstrength of a _Motive_,\" says President Day, \"is not its prevailing, but\nthe power by which it prevails. Yet we may very properly _measure_ this\npower by the actual result.\" Again, \"We may measure the comparative\nstrength of Motives of different kinds, from the results to which they\nlead; just as we learn the power of different causes, from the effects\nwhich they produce:\" that is, we are not to determine, _a priori_, nor\nby an appeal to consciousness, which of two or more Motives presented is\nthe strongest. We are to wait till the Will does act, and then assume\nthat the Motive, in the direction of which it acts, is the strongest.\nFrom the action of the Will in the direction of that particular Motive,\nwe are finally to infer the truth of the doctrine of Necessity. The\nstrongest Motive, according to the above definition, is the motive to\nwhich the Will does yield. The argument based upon the truism, that the\nWill always acts in the direction of this Motive, that is, the Motive\ntowards which it does act, the argument, I say, put into a logical form,\nwould stand thus. If the action of the Will is always in the direction\nof the strongest Motive, that is, if it always follows the Motive it\ndoes follow, it is governed by the law of Necessity. Its action is\nalways in the direction of this Motive, that is, it always follows the\nMotive it does follow. The Will is therefore governed by the law of\nNecessity. How many philosophers and theologians have become \"rooted and\ngrounded\" in the belief of this doctrine, under the influence of this\nsophism, a sophism which, in the first instance, assumes the doctrine as\ntrue, and then moves round in a vicious circle to demonstrate its truth.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nTHE GREATEST APPARENT GOOD.\n\nSECTION I.\n\nWE now come to a consideration of one of the great questions bearing\nupon our personal investigations--the proposition maintained by\nNecessitarians, as a chief pillar of their theory, that \"_the Will\nalways is as the greatest apparent good_.\"\n\nPHRASE DEFINED.\n\nThe first inquiry which naturally arises here is What is the proper\nmeaning of this proposition?\n\nIn reply, I answer, that it must mean one of these three things.\n\n1. That the Will is always, in all its determinations, conformed to the\ndictates of the Intelligence, choosing those things only which the\nIntelligence affirms to be best. Or,\n\n2. That the determinations of the Will are always in conformity to the\nimpulse of the Sensibility, that is, that its action is always in the\ndirection of the strongest feeling. Or,\n\n3. In conformity to the dictates of the Intelligence, and the impulse of\nthe Sensibility combined, that is that the Will never acts at all,\nexcept when impelled by the Intelligence and Sensibility both in the\nsame direction.\n\nMEANING OF THIS PHRASE ACCORDING TO EDWARDS.\n\nThe following passage leaves no room for doubt in respect to the meaning\nwhich Edwards attaches to the phrase, \"the greatest apparent good.\" \"I\nhave chosen,\" he says, \"rather to express myself thus, that the Will\nalways is as the greatest apparent good, or as what appears most\nagreeable, than to say, that the Will is _determined_ by the greatest\napparent good, or by what seems most agreeable; because an appearing\nmost agreeable or pleasing to the mind, and the mind's preferring and\nchoosing, seem hardly to be properly and perfectly distinct.\" Here\nundeniably, the words, choosing, preferring, \"appearing most agreeable\nor pleasing,\" and \"the greatest apparent good,\" are defined as identical\nin their meaning. Hence in another place, he adds, \"If strict propriety\nof speech be insisted on, it may more properly be said, that the\n_voluntary action_ which is the immediate consequence and fruit of the\nmind's volition and choice, is determined by that which appears most\nagreeable, than by the preference or choice itself.\" The reason is\nobvious. Appearing most agreeable or pleasing, and preference or choice,\nhad been defined as synonymous in their meaning. To say, therefore, that\npreference or choice is determined by \"what appears most agreeable or\npleasing,\" would be equivalent to the affirmation, that choice\ndetermines choice. \"The act of volition itself,\" he adds, \"is always\ndetermined by that in or about the mind's view of an object, which\ncauses it to appear most agreeable,\" or what is by definition the same\nthing, causes it to be chosen. The phrases, \"the greatest apparent\ngood,\" and \"appearing most agreeable or pleasing to the mind,\" and the\nwords, choosing, preferring, &c., are therefore, according to Edwards,\nidentical in their meaning. The proposition, \"the Will is always as the\ngreatest apparent good,\" really means nothing more nor less than this,\nthat Will always chooses as it chooses. The famous argument based upon\nthis proposition in favor of the doctrine of Necessity may be thus\nexpressed. If the Will always is as the greatest apparent good, that is,\nif the Will always chooses as it chooses, it is governed by the law of\nNecessity. The Will is as the greatest apparent good, that is, it always\nchooses as it chooses. Therefore it is governed by this law. By this\nvery syllogism, multitudes have supposed that the doctrine of Necessity\nhas been established with all the distinctness and force of\ndemonstration.\n\nThe question now returns, Is \"the Will always as the greatest apparent\ngood,\" in either of the senses of the phrase as above defined?\n\nTHE WILL NOT ALWAYS AS THE DICTATES OF THE INTELLIGENCE.\n\nI. Is the Will then as the greatest apparent good in this sense, that\nall its determinations are in conformity to the dictates of the\nIntelligence. Does the Will never harmonize with the Sensibility in\nopposition to the Intelligence? Has no intelligent being, whether sinful\nor holy, ever done that which his Intellect affirmed at the time, that\nhe ought not to do, and that it was best for him not to do? I answer,\n\n1. Every man who has ever violated moral obligation knows, that he has\nfollowed the impulse of desire, in opposition to the dictates of his\nIntelligence. What individual that has ever perpetrated such deeds has\nnot said, and cannot say with truth, \"I know the good, and approve it;\nyet follow the bad?\" Take a matter of fact. A Spanish nobleman during\nthe early progress of the Reformation, became fully convinced, that the\nfaith of the Reformers was true, and his own false, and that his\nsalvation depended upon his embracing the one and rejecting the other.\nYet martyrdom would be the result of such a change. While balancing this\nquestion, in the depths of his own mind, he trembled with the greatest\nagitation. His sovereign who was present, asked the cause. The reply\nwas, \"the martyr's crown is before me, and I have not Christian\nfortitude enough to take it.\" He died a few weeks subsequent, without\nconfessing the truth. Did he obey his Intelligence, or Sensibility\nthere? Was not the conflict between the two, and did not the latter\nprevail? In John 12: 42, 43, we have a fact revealed, in which men were\nconvinced of the truth, and yet, because \"they loved the praise of men\nmore than the praise of God,\" they did not confess, but denied the\ntruth, a case therefore in which they followed the impulse of desire, in\nopposition to the dictates of the Intelligence. The Will then is not\n\"always as the greatest apparent good,\" in this sense, that its action\nis always in the direction of the dictates of the Intelligence.\n\n2. If this is so, sin, in all instances, is a mere blunder, a necessary\nresult of a necessary misjudgment of the Intelligence? Is it so? Can the\nIntelligence affirm that a state of moral impurity is better than a\nstate of moral rectitude? How easy it would be, in every instance, to\n\"convert a sinner from the error of his way,\" if all that is requisite\nis to carry his Intellect in favor of truth and righteousness? Who does\nnot know, that the great difficulty lies in the enslavement of the Will\nto a depraved Sensibility?\n\n3. If the Will of all Intelligents is always in harmony with the\nIntellect, then I affirm that there is not, and never has been, any such\nthing as sin, or ill desert, in the universe. What more can be said of\nGod, or of any being ever so pure, than that he has always done what his\nIntellect affirmed to be best? What if the devil, and all creatures\ncalled sinners, had always done the same thing? Where is the conceivable\nground for the imputation of moral guilt to them?\n\n4. If all acts of Will are always in perfect harmony with the\nIntelligence, and in this sense, \"as the greatest apparent good,\" then,\nwhen the Intellect affirms absolutely that there can be no ground of\npreference between two objects, there can be no choice between them. But\nwe are, in fact, putting forth every day just such acts of Will,\nselecting one object in distinction from another, when the Intellect\naffirms their perfect equality, or affirms absolutely, that there is and\ncan be no perceived ground of preference between them. I receive a\nletter, I will suppose, from a friend, informing me that he has just\ntaken from a bank two notes, perfectly new and of the same value, that\none now lies in the east and the other in the west corner of his drawer,\nthat I may have one and only one of them, the one that I shall name by\nreturn of mail, and that I must designate one or the other, or have\nneither. Here are present to my Intelligence two objects absolutely\nequal. Their location is a matter of indifference, equally absolute. Now\nif as the proposition \"the Will is _always_ as the greatest apparent\ngood,\" affirms, I cannot select one object in distinction from another,\nwithout a perceived ground for such selection, I could not possibly, in\nthe case supposed, say which bill I would have. Yet I make the selection\nwithout the least conceivable embarrassment. I might mention numberless\ncases, of daily occurrence, of a nature precisely similar. Every child\nthat ever played at \"odd or even,\" knows perfectly the possibility of\nselecting between objects which are, to the Intelligence, absolutely\nequal.\n\nI will now select a case about which there can possibly be no mistake.\nSpace we know perfectly to be absolutely infinite. Space in itself is in\nall parts alike. So must it appear to the mind of God. Now when God\ndetermined to create the universe, he must have resolved to locate its\ncentre in some one point of space in distinction from all others. At\nthat moment, there was present to the Divine Intelligence an infinite\nnumber of points, all and each absolutely equally eligible. Neither\npoint could have been selected, because it was better than any other:\nfor all were equal. So they must have appeared to God. Now if the \"Will\nis always as the greatest apparent good,\" in the sense under\nconsideration, God could not in this case make the selection, and\nconsequently could not create the universe. He did make the selection,\nand did create. The Will, therefore, is not, in this sense, \"always as\nthe greatest apparent good.\"\n\nTHE WILL NOT ALWAYS AS THE STRONGEST DESIRE.\n\nII. Is the \"Will always as the greatest apparent good\" in this sense,\nthat it is always as the strongest desire, or as the strongest impulse\nof the Sensibility? Does the Will never harmonize with the Intelligence,\nin opposition to the Sensibility, as well as with the Sensibility in\nopposition to the Intelligence? If this is not so, then--\n\n1. It would be difficult to define self-denial according to the ordinary\nacceptation of the term. What is self-denial but placing the Will with\nthe Intelligence, in opposition to the Sensibility? How often in moral\nreformations do we find almost nothing else but this, an inflexible\npurpose placed directly before an almost crushing and overwhelming tide\nof feeling and desire?\n\n2. When the Will is impelled in different directions, by conflicting\nfeelings, it could not for a moment be in a state of indecision, unless\nwe suppose these conflicting feelings to be absolutely equal in strength\nup to the moment of decision. Who believes that? Who believes that his\nfeelings are in all instances in a state of perfect equilibrium up to\nthe moment of fixed determination between two distinct and opposite\ncourses? This _must_ be the case, if the action of the Will is always as\nthe strongest feeling, and in this sense as the \"greatest apparent\ngood.\" How can Necessitarians meet this argument? Will they pretend\nthat, in all instances, up to the moment of decisive action, the\nfeelings impelling the Will in different directions are always\nabsolutely equal in strength? This must be, if the Will is always as the\nstrongest feeling.\n\n3. When the feelings are in a state of perfect equilibrium, there can\npossibly, on this supposition, be no choice at all. The feelings often\nare, and must be, in this state, even when we are necessitated to act in\nsome direction. The case of the bank notes above referred to, presents\nan example of this kind. As the objects are in the mind's eye absolutely\nequal, to suppose that the feelings should, in such a case, impel the\nWill more strongly in the direction of the one than the other, is to\nsuppose an event without a cause, inasmuch as the Sensibility is\ngoverned by the law of Necessity. If A and B are to the Intelligence, in\nall respects, absolutely equal, how can the Sensibility impel the Will\ntowards A instead of B? What is an event without a cause, if this is\nnot? Contemplate the case in respect to the location of the universe\nabove supposed. Each point of space was equally present to God, and was\nin itself, and was perceived and affirmed to be, equally eligible with\nall the others. How could a stronger feeling arise in the direction of\none point in distinction from others, unless we suppose that God's\nSensibility is not subject to the law of Necessity, a position which\nnone will assume, or that here was an event without a cause? When,\ntherefore, God did select this one point in distinction from all the\nothers, that determination could not have been either in the direction\nof what the Intelligence affirmed to be best, nor of the strongest\nfeeling. The proposition, therefore, that \"the Will _always_ is as the\ngreatest apparent good,\" is in both the senses above defined\ndemonstrably false.\n\n4. Of the truth of this every one is aware when he appeals to his own\nConsciousness. In the amputation of a limb, for example, who does not\nknow that if an individual, at the moment when the operation commences,\nshould yield to the strongest feeling, he would refuse to endure it? He\ncan pass through the scene, only by placing an inflexible purpose\ndirectly across the current of feeling. How often do we hear individuals\naffirm, \"If I should follow my _feelings_, I should do this; if I should\nfollow my _judgment_, I should do that.\" In all such instances, we have\nthe direct testimony of consciousness, that the action of the Will is\nnot always in the direction of the strongest feeling: because its action\nis sometimes consciously in the direction of the Intelligence, in\nopposition to such feelings; and at others, in the conscious presence of\nsuch feelings, the Will remains, for periods longer or shorter,\nundecided in respect to the particular course which shall be pursued.\n\nTHE WILL NOT ALWAYS AS THE INTELLIGENCE AND SENSIBILITY COMBINED.\n\nIII. Is not the Will always as the greatest apparent good in this sense,\nthat its determinations are always as the affirmations of the\nIntelligence and the impulse of the Sensibility combined? That it is\nnot, I argue for two reasons.\n\n1. If this was the case, when the Intelligence and Sensibility are\nopposed to each other--a fact of very frequent occurrence,--there could\nbe no acts of Will in either direction. The Will must remain in a state\nof absolute inaction, till these belligerent powers settle their\ndifferences, and unite in impelling the Will in some particular\ndirection. But we know that the Will can, and often does, act in the\ndirection of the Intelligence or Sensibility, when the affirmations of\none and the impulses of the other are in direct opposition to each\nother.\n\n2. When both the Intellect and Sensibility, as in the cases above cited,\nare alike indifferent, there can be, on the present hypothesis, no acts\nof Will whatever. Under these identical circumstances, however, the Will\ndoes act. The hypothesis, therefore, falls to the ground.\n\nI conclude, then, that the proposition, \"the Will is always as the\ngreatest apparent good,\" is either a mere truism, having no bearing at\nall upon our present inquiries, or that it is false.\n\nIn the discussion of the above propositions, the doctrine of Liberty has\nreceived a full and distinct illustration. The action of the Will is\nsometimes in the direction of the Intelligence, in opposition to the\nSensibility, and sometimes in the direction of the Sensibility, in\nopposition to the Intelligence, and never in the direction of either,\nbecause it must be. Sometimes it acts where the Sensibility and\nIntelligence both harmonize, or are alike indifferent. When also the\nWill acts in the direction of the Intelligence or Sensibility, it is not\nnecessitated to follow, in all instances, the highest affirmation, nor\nthe strongest desire.\n\nSEC. II--MISCLLANEOUS TOPICS.\n\nNECESSITARIAN ARGUMENT.\n\nI. We are now prepared to appreciate the Necessitarian argument, based\nupon the assumption, that \"the Will always is as the greatest apparent\ngood.\" This assumption is the great pillar on which that doctrine rests.\nYet the whole argument based upon it is a perpetual reasoning in a\ncircle. Ask the Necessitarian to give the grand argument in favor of his\ndoctrine. His answer is, because \"the Will _always_ is as the greatest\napparent good.\" Cite now such facts as those stated above in\ncontradiction of his assumption, and his answer is ready. There must be,\nin all such cases, some perceived or felt ground of preference, or there\ncould be no act of Will in the case. There must have been, for example,\nsome point in space more eligible than any other for the location of the\nuniverse, and this must have been the reason why God selected the one he\ndid. Ask him why he makes this declaration? His reply is, because \"the\nWill is always as the greatest apparent good.\" Thus this assumption\nbecomes premise or conclusion, just as the exigence of the theory based\nupon it demands. Nothing is so convenient and serviceable as such an\nassumption, when one has a very difficult and false position to sustain.\nBut who does not see, that it is a most vicious reasoning in a circle?\nTo assume the proposition, \"the Will always is as the greatest apparent\ngood,\" in the first instance, as the basis of a universal theory, and\nthen to assume the truth of that proposition as the basis of the\nexplanation of particular facts, which contradict that theory, what is\nreasoning in a circle if this is not? No one has a right to assume this\nproposition as true at all, until he has first shown that it is affirmed\nby all the phenomena of the Will. On its authority he has no right to\nexplain a solitary phenomenon. To do it is not only to reason in a\ncircle, but to beg the question at issue.\n\nMOTIVES CAUSE ACTS OF WILL, IN WHAT SENSE.\n\nII. We are also prepared to notice another assumption of President\nEdwards, which, if admitted in the sense in which he assumes it as true,\nnecessitates the admission of the Necessitarian scheme, to wit: that the\ndetermination of the Will is always _caused_ by the Motive present to\nthe mind for putting forth that determination. \"It is that motive,\" he\nsays, \"which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest\nwhich determines the Will.\" Again, \"that every act of the Will has some\ncause, and consequently (by what has been already proved) has a\nnecessary connection with its cause, and so is necessary by a necessity\nof connection and consequence, is evident by this, that every act of\nWill, whatsoever, is excited by some motive.\" \"But if every act of the\nWill is excited by some motive, then that motive is the cause of that\nact of the Will.\" \"And if volitions are properly the effects of their\nmotives, then they are necessarily connected with their motives.\"\n\nIf we grant the principle here assumed, the conclusion follows of\nnecessity. But let us inquire in what sense motive and volition sustain\nto each other the relation of cause and effect. _The presence and action\nof one power causes the action of another, so far, and so far only, as\nit necessitates such action; and causes its action in a particular\ndirection, so far only as it necessitates its action in that direction,\nin opposition to every other_. Now the action of one power may cause the\naction of another, in one or both these ways.\n\n1. It may necessitate its action, and necessitate it in one direction in\nopposition to any and every other. In this sense, fire causes the\nsensation of pain. It necessitates the action of the Sensibility, and in\nthat one direction. Or,\n\n2. One power may necessitate the _action_ of another power, but not\nnecessitate its action in one direction in opposition to any or all\nothers. We have seen, in a former chapter, that the Motive causes the\naction of the Will in this sense only, that it necessitates the Will to\nact in some direction, but not in one direction in distinction from\nanother. Now the error of President Edwards lies in confounding these\ntwo senses of the word _cause_. He assumes that when one power causes\nthe action of another in any sense, it must in every sense. It is\nreadily admitted, that in one sense the Motive causes the action of the\nWill. But when we ask for the reason or cause of any one particular\nchoice in distinction from another, we find it, not in the motive, but\nin the power of willing itself.\n\nOBJECTION--PARTICULAR VOLITION, HOW ACCOUNTED FOR.\n\nIII. We are also prepared to notice the great objection of\nNecessitarians to the doctrine of Liberty as here maintained. How, it is\nasked, shall we account, on this theory, for _particular_ volitions? The\npower to will only accounts for acts of Will in _some_ direction, but\nnot for one act in distinction from another. This distinction must be\naccounted for, or we have an event without a cause. To this argument I\nreply,\n\n1. It assumes the position in debate, to wit: that there cannot be\nconsequents which are not necessarily connected with particular\nantecedents, which antecedents necessitate these particular consequents\nin distinction from all others.\n\n2. To account for any effect, all that can properly be required is, to\nassign the existence and operation of a cause adequate to the production\nof such effects. Free-agency itself is such a cause in the case now\nunder consideration. We have here given the existence and operation of a\ncause which must produce one of two effects, and is equally capable,\nunder the circumstances, of producing either. Such a cause accounts for\nthe existence of such an effect, just as much as the assignment of an\nantecedent necessarily producing certain consequents, accounts for those\nconsequents.\n\n3. If, as this objection affirms, an act of Will, when there is no\nperceived or felt reason for that act in distinction from every other,\nis equivalent to an event without a cause; then it would be as\nimpossible for us to _conceive_ of the former as of the latter. We\ncannot even conceive of an event without a cause. But we can conceive of\nan act of Will when no reason, but the power of willing, exists for that\nparticular act in distinction from others. We cannot conceive of an\nevent without a cause. But we _can_ conceive of the mind's selecting\nodd, for example, instead of even, without the Intellect or Sensibility\nimpelling the Will to that act in distinction from others. Such act,\ntherefore, is not equivalent to an event without a cause. The objection\nunder consideration is consequently wholly baseless.\n\nFACTS LIKE THE ABOVE WRONGLY ACCOUNTED FOR.\n\nIV. The manner in which Necessitarians sometimes endeavor to account for\nacts of Will in which a selection is made between objects perceived and\nfelt to be perfectly equal, requires attention. Suppose that A and B are\nbefore the mind. One or the other is to be selected, or no selection at\nall is to be made. These objects are present to the mind as perfectly\nequal. The Intelligence and Sensibility are in a state of entire\nequilibrium between them. Now when one of these objects is selected in\ndistinction from the other, this act of Will is to be accounted for, it\nis said, by referring back to the determination to make the selection\ninstead of not making it. The Will does not choose between A and B, at\nall. The choice is between choosing and not choosing. But mark: To\ndetermine to select A or B is one thing. To select one in distinction\nfrom the other, is quite another. The former act does not determine the\nWill towards either in distinction from the other. This last act remains\nto be accounted for. When we attempt to account for it, we cannot do it,\nby referring to the Intelligence or Sensibility for these are in a state\nof perfect equilibrium between the objects. We can account for it only\nby falling back upon the power of willing itself, and admitting that the\nWill is free, and not subject to the law of Necessity.\n\nCHOOSING BETWEEN OBJECTS KNOWN TO BE EQUAL--HOW TREATED BY\nNECESSITARIANS.\n\nV. The manner in which Necessitarians treat facts of this kind, to wit,\nchoosing between things perceived and felt to be equal, also demands a\npassing notice. Such facts are of very little importance, one way or the\nother, they say, in mental science. It is the height of folly to appeal\nto them to determine questions of such moment as the doctrine of Liberty\nand Necessity. I answer: Such facts are just as important in mental\nscience, as the fall of a piece of gold and a feather, in an exhausted\nreceiver, is in Natural Philosophy. The latter reveals with perfect\nclearness the great law of attraction in the material universe. The\nformer reveals with equal conspicuousness the great law of Liberty in\nthe realm of mind. The Necessitarian affirms, that no act of Will is\npossible, only in the direction of the dictates of the Intelligence, or\nof the strongest impulse of the Sensibility. Facts are adduced in which,\nfrom the necessity of the case, both Faculties must be in a state of\nperfect equilibrium. Neither can impel the Will in one direction, in\ndistinction from the other. In such circumstances, if the doctrine of\nNecessity is true, no acts of Will are possible. In precisely these\ncircumstances acts of Will do arise. The doctrine of Necessity therefore\nis overthrown, and the truth of that Liberty is demonstrated. So\nimportant are those facts which Necessitarians affect to despise. True\nphilosophy, it should be remembered, never looks contemptuously upon\nfacts of any kind.\n\nPALPABLE MISTAKE.\n\nVI. We are prepared to notice a palpable mistake into which\nNecessitarians have fallen in respect to the use which the advocates of\nthe doctrine of Liberty design to make of the fact, that the Will can\nand does select between objects perceived and felt to be equal.\n\n\"The reason why some metaphysical writers,\" says President Day, \"have\nlaid so much stress upon this apparently insignificant point, is\nprobably the _inference_ which they propose to draw from the position\nwhich they assume. If it be conceded that the mind decides one way or\nthe other indifferently, when the motives on each side are perfectly\nequal, they infer that this may be the fact, in all _other_ cases, even\nthough the motives to opposite choices may be ever so unequal. But on\nwhat ground is this conclusion warranted? If a man is entirely\nindifferent which of two barley-corns to take, does it follow that he\nwill be indifferent whether to accept of a guinea or a farthing; whether\nto possess an estate or a trinket?\" The advocates of the doctrine of\nLiberty design to make, and do make, no such use of the facts under\nconsideration, as is here attributed to them. They never argue that,\nbecause the Will can select between A and B, when they are perceived and\nfelt to be equal, therefore, when the Will acts in one direction, in\ndistinction from another, it is always, up to the moment of such action,\nimpelled in different directions by feelings and judgments equally\nstrong. What they do argue from such facts is, that the Will is subject\nto the law of Liberty and not to that of Necessity. If the Will is\nsubject to the latter, then, when impelled in different directions by\nMotives equally strong (as in the cases above cited), it could no more\nact in the direction of one in distinction from the other, than a heavy\nbody can move east instead of west, when drawn in each direction by\nforces perfectly equal. If the Will is subject to the law of Necessity,\nthen, in all instances of selection between objects known and felt to be\nequal, we have an event without a cause. Even the Necessitarians, many\nof them at least, dare not deny that, under these very circumstances,\nselection does take place. They must, therefore, abandon their theory,\nor admit the dogma, of events without causes.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nCONNECTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY WITH THE DIVINE PRESCIENCE.\n\nTHE argument on which Necessitarians chiefly rely, against the doctrine\nof Liberty, and in support of that of Necessity, is based upon the\nDivine prescience of human conduct. The argument runs thus: all acts of\nthe Will, however remote in the distant future, are foreknown to God.\nThis fact necessitates the conclusion, that such acts are in themselves\ncertain, and, consequently, not free, but necessary. Either God cannot\nforeknow acts of Will, or they are necessary. The reply to this argument\nhas already been anticipated in the Introduction. The Divine prescience\nis not the truth to which the appeal should be made, to determine the\nphilosophy of the Will pre-supposed in the Bible. This I argue, for the\nobvious reason, that of the _mode_, _nature_, and _degree_, of the\nDivine prescience of human conduct we are profoundly ignorant. These we\nmust know with perfect clearness, before we can affirm, with any\ncertainty, whether this prescience is or is not consistent with the\ndoctrine of Liberty. The Divine prescience is a truth of inspiration,\nand therefore a fact. The doctrine of Liberty is, as we have seen, a\ntruth of inspiration, and therefore a fact. It is also a fact, as\naffirmed by the universal consciousness of man. How do we know that\nthese two facts are not perfectly consistent with each other? How do we\nknow but that, if we understood the _mode_, to say nothing of the nature\nand degree of the Divine prescience, we should not perceive with the\nutmost clearness, that this truth consists as perfectly with the\ndoctrine of Liberty, as with that of Necessity.\n\nIf God foresees events, he foreknows them as they are, and not as they\nare not. If they are free and not necessary, as free and not necessary\nhe foresees them. Having ascertained by consciousness that the acts of\nthe Will are free, and having, from reason and revelation, determined,\nthat God foreknows such acts, the great truth stands revealed to our\nmind, that God does and can foreknow human conduct, and yet man in such\nconduct be free; and that the mode, nature, and degree, of the former\nare such as most perfectly to consist with the latter.\n\nI know with perfect distinctness, that I am now putting forth certain\nacts of Will. With equal distinctness I know, that such acts are not\nnecessary, but free. My present knowledge is perfectly consistent with\npresent freedom. How do I know but that God's foreknowledge of future\nacts is equally consistent with the most perfect freedom of such acts.\n\nPerhaps a better presentation of this whole subject cannot be found than\nin the following extract from Jouffroy's \"Introduction to Ethics.\" The\nextract, though somewhat lengthy, will well repay a most attentive\nperusal.\n\nDANGER IN REASONING FROM THE MANNER IN WHICH WE FOREKNOW EVENTS TO THAT\nOF DIVINE PRESCIENCE.\n\n\"To begin, then, with a very simple remark: if we conceive that\nforeknowledge in the Divine Being acts as it does in us, we run the risk\nof forming a most incorrect notion of it, and consequently, of seeing a\ncontradiction between it and liberty, that would disappear altogether\nhad we a truer notion. Let us consider that we have not the same faculty\nfor foreseeing the future as we have of reviewing the past; and even in\ncases where we do anticipate it, it is by an induction from the past.\nThis induction may amount either to certainty, or merely to probability.\nIt will amount to certainty when we are perfectly acquainted with\nnecessary causes, and their law of operation. The effects of such causes\nin given circumstances having been determined by experience, we can\npredict the return of similar effects under similar circumstances with\nentire certainty, so long at least as the present laws of nature remain\nin force. It is in this way that we foresee, in most cases, the physical\noccurrences, whose law of operation is known to us; and such foresight\nwould extend much further, were it not for unexpected circumstances\nwhich come in to modify the result. This induction can never go beyond\nprobability, however, when we consider the acts of free causes; and for\nthe very reason that they are free, and that the effects which arise\nfrom such causes are not of necessary occurrence, and do not invariably\nfollow the same antecedent circumstances. Where the question is, then,\nas to the acts of any free cause, we are never able to foresee it with\ncertainty, and induction is limited to conjectures of probability.\n\nSuch is the operation, and such are the limits of human foresight. Our\nminds foresee the future by induction from the past; this foresight can\nnever attain certainty except in the case of causes and effects\nconnected by necessary dependence; when the effects of free causes are\nto be anticipated, as all such effects are contingent, our foresight\nmust be merely conjecture.\"\n\nMISTAKE RESPECTING THE DIVINE PRESCIENCE.\n\n\"If, now, we attempt to attribute to the Deity the same mode of\nforesight of which human beings are capable, it will follow, as a strict\nconsequence, that, as God must know exactly and completely the laws to\nwhich all the necessary causes in nature are subject--laws which change\nonly according to his will,--he can foresee with absolute certainty all\nevents which will take place in future. The certain foresight of\neffects, therefore, which is to us possible only in particular cases,\nand which, even then, is always liable to the limitation that the actual\nlaws of nature are not modified,--this foresight, which, even when most\nsure, is limited and contingent, must be complete and absolute certainty\nin God, supposing his foreknowledge to be of like kind with ours.\n\nBut it is evident that, according to this hypothesis, the Deity cannot\nforesee with certainty the volitions of free causes any more than we\ncan; for, as his foresight is founded, as ours is, upon the knowledge of\nthe laws which govern causes, and as the law of free causes is precisely\nthis, that their volitions are not necessary, God cannot calculate, any\nmore than a human being can, the influence of motives, which, in any\ngiven case, may act upon such causes. Even his intelligence can lead no\nfurther than to conjectures, more probable, indeed, than ours, but never\namounting to certainty. According to this hypothesis, we must,\ntherefore, say either that God can foresee, certainly, the future\nvolitions of men, and that man, therefore, is not a free being, or that\nman is free, and that God, therefore, cannot, any more than we can,\nforesee his volitions with certainty; and thus Divine prescience and\nhuman free-will are brought into direct contradiction.\n\nBut, gentlemen, why must there be this contradiction? Merely because we\nsuppose that God foresees the future in the same way in which we foresee\nit; that his foreknowledge operates like our own. Now, is this, I ask,\nsuch an idea as we ought to form of Divine prescience, or such an idea\nas even the partisans of this system, which I am opposing, form? Have we\nany reason for thus imposing upon the Deity the limitation of our own\nfeebleness? I think not.\n\nUnendowed as we are, with any faculty of foreseeing the future, it may\nbe difficult for us to conceive of such a faculty in God. But yet can we\nnot from analogy form such an idea? We have now two faculties of\nperception--of the past by memory, of the present by observation; can we\nnot imagine a third to exist in God--the faculty of perceiving the\nfuture, as we perceive the past? What would be the consequence? This:\nthat God, instead of conjecturing, by induction, the acts of human\nbeings from the laws of the causes operating upon them, would see them\nsimply as the results of the free determinations of the will. Such\nperception of future acts no more implies the necessity of those\nactions, than the perception of similar acts in the past. To see that\neffects arise from certain causes is not to force causes to produce\nthem; neither is it to compel these effects to follow. It matters not\nwhether such a perception refers to the past, present, or future; it is\nmerely a perception; and, therefore, far from producing the effect\nperceived, it even presupposes this effect already produced.\n\nI do not pretend that this vision of what is to be is an operation of\nwhich our minds easily conceive. It is difficult to form an image of\nwhat we have never experienced; but I do assert, that the power of\nseeing what no longer exists is full as remarkable as that of seeing\nwhat has as yet no being, and that the reason of our readily conceiving\nof the former is only the fact that we are endowed with such a power: to\nmy reason, the mystery is the same.\n\nBut whatever may or may not be in reality the mode of Divine\nforeknowledge, or however exact may be the image which we attempt to\nform of it, it always, I say,--and this is the only point I am desirous\nof proving,--it always remains a matter of uncertainty, which cannot be\nremoved, whether the Divine foreknowledge is of a kind like our own, or\nnot; and as, in the one case, there would not be the same contradiction\nthat there is in the other, between our belief in Divine foreknowledge\nand human freedom, it is proved true, I think, that no one has a right\nto assert the existence of such a contradiction, and the necessity that\nhuman reason should choose between them.\"\n\nSINGULAR INCONSISTENCY OF NECESSITARIANS.\n\nThere is no class of men who dwell with more frequency and apparent\nreverence, upon the truth, that \"secret things belong to God,\" and those\nand those only, \"that are revealed to us;\" that \"none by searching can\nfind out God;\" that \"as the heavens are high above the earth, so are His\nways above our ways, and His thoughts above our thoughts;\" and that it\nis the height of presumption in us, to pretend to understand God's mode\nof knowing and acting. None are more ready to talk of mysteries in\nreligion than they. Yet, strange as it may appear, it is nevertheless\ntrue, that their whole argument, drawn from the Divine foreknowledge,\nagainst the doctrine of Liberty, and in favor of that of Necessity, is\nbased entirely upon the assumption that they have found out and fully\nunderstand the _mode_ of the Divine prescience of human conduct; that\nthey have so measured and determined the \"ways and thoughts\" of God,\nthat they _know_ that he cannot foresee any but _necessary_ events; that\namong many events, all in themselves equally possible, and none of them\nnecessary in distinction from others, he cannot foreknow which, in fact,\nwill arise. We may properly ask the Necessitarian whence he obtained\nthis knowledge, so vast and deep; whence he has thus \"found out the\nAlmighty to perfection?\" To me, the pretension to such knowledge appears\nmore like presumption than that deep self-distrust and humiliation which\nbecomes the Finite in the presence of the Infinite. This knowledge has\nnot been obtained from revelation. God has never told us that He can\nforesee none but necessary events. Whether He can or cannot foresee\nevents free as well as necessary, is certainly one of the \"secret\nthings\" which God has not revealed. If we admit ourselves ignorant of\nthe _mode_ of God's fore-knowledge of future events (and who will dare\ndeny the existence of such ignorance in his own case?), the entire\nargument of the Necessitarian, based upon that fore-knowledge, in favor\nof his doctrine, falls to the ground at once.\n\nNECESSITARIAN OBJECTION TO THE ABOVE ARGUMENT.\n\nTo all that has been said above, the Necessitarian brings an objection\nwhich he deems perfectly unanswerable. It is this: If actions are free\nin the sense maintained in this treatise, then in themselves they are\nuncertain. If they are still certainly known to God, they are both\ncertain and uncertain, at the same time. True, I answer, but not in the\nsame sense. As far as the _powers_ of the agent are concerned, the\naction may be uncertain, while God at the same time may know certainly\nhow he will exert his powers. In reference merely to the _powers_ of the\nagent, the event is uncertain. In reference to the mind of God, who\nknows instinctively how he will exert these powers, the event is\ncertain.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nBEARING OF THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY UPON THE PURPOSES AND AGENCY OF GOD,\nIN RESPECT TO HUMAN CONDUCT.\n\nALL truth is in harmony with itself. Every particular truth is, and must\nbe, in harmony with every other truth. If the doctrine of Necessity be\nassumed as true, we must take one view of the relation of God's purposes\nand agency in respect to the conduct of moral agents. If, on the other\nhand, we assume as true the doctrine of Liberty, quite another and a\ndifferent view, in respect to this whole subject, must be taken. In the\nremarks which I have to make upon this subject, I shall assume the truth\nof the doctrine of Liberty, together with those of the perfect Divine\nOmniscience, Wisdom, and Benevolence. The question now arises, in the\nlight of all these great truths, What relation do the Divine purposes\nand agency sustain to human action? In what sense does God purpose,\npreordain, and bring to pass, the voluntary conduct of moral agents? To\nthis question but one answer can be given, in the light of the truths\nbefore us. God purposes human action in this sense only: He determines\nhimself to act in a given manner, because it is wisest and best for him\nto act in that manner, and in that manner only. He determines this,\nknowing how intelligent beings will act under the influence brought to\nbear upon them by the Divine conduct. He purposes and brings about, or\ncauses human action in this sense only, that in the counsels of\neternity, He, in the exercise of infinite wisdom and goodness,\npreordains, and at the time appointed, gives existence to the _motives_\nand _influences_ under which moral agents do act, and in the light of\nwhich they voluntarily determine their own character and conduct.\n\nCONCLUSIONS FROM THE ABOVE.\n\nGODS PURPOSES CONSISTENT WITH THE LIBERTY OF CREATURES.\n\n1. We perceive the perfect consistency of God's purposes and agency with\nhuman liberty. If the motives and influences in view of which men do\nact, do not destroy their free agency,--a fact which must be true from\nthe nature of the Will,--then God's purposes to give existence, and his\nagency in giving existence, to these motives and influences, cannot in\nany sense destroy, or interfere with such agency. This is a self-evident\ntruth.\n\nSENSES IN WHICH GOD PURPOSED MORAL GOOD AND EVIL.\n\n2. We also perceive the senses in which God purposed the existence of\nmoral good and evil, in the universe. He purposed the existence of the\nmotives, in view of which He knew that a part of His subjects would\nrender themselves holy, and a part would render themselves sinful. But\nwhen we contemplate all the holiness and consequent happiness which do\nexist, we then perceive the reason why God gave existence to these\nmotives. The sin consequent, in the sense above explained, constitutes\nno part of the reason for their existence, but was always, in the Divine\nMind, a reason against their existence; which reason, however, was\noverpowered by infinitely more important reasons on the other side. The\ngood which results from creation and providence is the great and\nexclusive object of creation and providence. The evil, God always\nregretted, and would have prevented, if possible, i. e. if compatible\nwith the existence of the best possible system.\n\nDEATH OF THE INCORRIGIBLE PREORDAINED BUT NOT WILLED.\n\n3. We also perceive the perfect consistency of those Scriptures which\nrepresent God as, on the whole, _purposing_ the death of incorrigible\ntransgressors, and yet as not _willing_ it, but as willing the opposite.\nThe purpose to destroy is based upon the foreseen incorrigibleness of\nthe transgressor,--a purpose demanded by perfect wisdom and benevolence,\nin view of that foreseen incorrigibleness. The incorrigibleness itself,\nhowever, and the perdition consequent, are evils, the existence of which\nGod never willed; but are the opposite of what he willed, are evils\nwhich a being of perfect wisdom and goodness never could, and never can\nwill. It is with perfect consistency, therefore, that the Scriptures\nrepresent God, in view of incorrigibleness foreseen, as purposing the\ndeath of the transgressor, and at the same time, in view of the fact\nthat such incorrigibleness is the opposite of what He wills the creature\nto do, as affirming, that He is not \"willing that any should perish, but\nthat all should come to a knowledge of the truth.\"\n\nGOD NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE INCORRIGIBLE.\n\n4. We see, also, how it is, that, while God does that, and eternally\npurposed to do that, in view of which he eternally knew that certain of\nhis creatures would for ever destroy themselves, none but themselves are\nin fault for such destruction. The reasons are these:\n\n(1.) God never did anything in view of which men ought to act thus, nor\nwhich did not lay them under obligations infinite, to act differently,\nand which was not best adapted to secure that end.\n\n(2.) Their destruction constituted no part of the _object_ of God in\ncreation and providence, the opposite of this being true.\n\n(3.) The great object of God in creation and providence was and is, to\nproduce the greatest possible amount of holiness and consequent\nhappiness, and to prevent, in every possible way consistent with this\nend, the existence of sin, and consequently of misery.--Now if creatures\nperish under such an influence, they perish by their own fault.\n\nSIN A MYSTERY.\n\n5. I have a single remark to make upon those phenomena of the Will, in\nwhich evil is chosen instead of good, or sin instead of holiness. That\nall intelligent beings possess the power to make such a choice, is a\nfact affirmed by universal consciousness. But that any being, under any\ncircumstances, should make such a choice, and that he should for ever\nrefuse to return to the paths of virtue, notwithstanding his experience\nof the consequences of sin, is an abuse of human liberty, which must for\never remain an inexplicable mystery. When a being assigns the real\nreason in view of which right is chosen, we are always satisfied with\nsuch reason. But we are never satisfied with the reason for the opposite\ncourse.\n\nCONCLUSION FROM THE ABOVE.\n\nOne conclusion forces itself upon us, from that view of the Divine\ngovernment which consists with the doctrine of Liberty. The aspect of\nthat government which results from this view of the subject commends\nitself to the reason and conscience of the intelligent universe.\n_Mysteries_ we do and must find in it; but _absurdities_ and\n_contradictions_, never. Under such a Government, no being is condemned\nfor what he cannot avoid, nor rewarded for what he could but do. While\n\n   \"God sits on no precarious throne,\n   Nor borrows leave to be,\"\n\nthe destiny of the creature turns upon his own deserts, his own choice\nof good or evil. The elucidation of the principles of such a government\n\"commends itself to every man's conscience in the sight of God.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nOBLIGATION PREDICABLE ONLY OF THE WILL.\n\nSECTION I.\n\nTHE Will, as I have already said, exists in a trinity with the\nIntelligence and Sensibility. In respect to the operations of the\ndifferent departments of our mental being, I lay down the two following\npropositions:\n\n1. Obligation, moral desert, &c., are directly predicable only of the\naction of the Will.\n\n2. For the operations of the other faculties we are accountable so far\nforth only as the existence and character of such operations depend upon\nthe Will. In other words, it is for voluntary acts and states only that\nwe are accountable. This I argue because,\n\n1. Obligation, as we have seen, consists only with Liberty. All the\nphenomena of the Intelligence and Sensibility, in the circumstances of\ntheir occurrence, are not free, but necessary. Accountability,\ntherefore, cannot be predicated of such phenomena. We may be, and are,\naccountable for such phenomena, so far forth as their existence and\ncharacter depend upon the Will: in other words, so far forth as they are\nvoluntary, and not involuntary, states of mind.\n\n2. The truth of the above proposition, and of that only, really\ncorresponds with the universal conviction of the race. This conviction\nis expressed in two ways.\n\n(1.) When blame is affirmed of the operations of the Intelligence or\nSensibility, it is invariably thus affirmed: \"You have no right to\n_entertain_ such thoughts or sentiments. You have no right _indulge_\nsuch feeling's.\" In other words, praise or blame is never directly\npredicated of these operations themselves, but of the action of the Will\nrelatively to them.\n\n(2.) All men agree, that the moral character of all actions, of all\nstates of mind whatever; depends upon _intention_. In no point is there\na more universal harmony among moral philosophers than in respect to\nthis. But intention is undeniably a phenomenon of the Will, and of that\nexclusively. We must therefore admit, that moral obligation is\npredicable of the Will only, or deny the fundamental convictions of the\nrace.\n\n3. The truth of the above propositions is intuitively evident, the\nmoment the mind apprehends their real import. A man, as he steps out of\na warm room, amid the external frosts of winter, feels an involuntary\nchill over his whole system. We might with the same propriety attribute\nblame to him for such feelings, as for any other feelings, thoughts, or\nperceptions which exist alike independent of his Will, and especially in\nopposition to its determinations.\n\n4. If we suppose all the voluntary acts and states of a moral agent to\nbe, and always to have been, in perfect conformity to moral rectitude,\nit is impossible for us to impute moral guilt to him for any feelings or\nthoughts which may have risen in his mind independently of his Will. We\ncan no more conceive him to have incurred ill desert, than we can\nconceive of the annihilation of space. We may safely put it to the\nconsciousness of every man whether this is not the case. This renders\ndemonstrably evident the truth, that moral obligation is predicable only\nof the Will.\n\n5. With the above perfectly harmonize the positive teachings of\nInspiration. For example. \"Lust, when it is _conceived_, bringeth forth\nsin.\" The involuntary feeling does not constitute the sin, but the\naction of the Will in harmony with that feeling.\n\n6. A single supposition will place this whole subject in a light\nperfectly conspicuous before the mind. We can readily conceive that the\nWill, or voluntary states of the mind, are in perfect harmony with the\nmoral law, while the Sensibility, or involuntary states, are opposed to\nit. We can also with equal readiness make the opposite supposition, to\nwit, that the Sensibility, or involuntary states, are in harmony with\nthe law, while the determinations of the Will are all opposed to it.\nWhat shall we think of these two states? Let us suppose a case of no\nunfrequent occurrence, that the feelings, or involuntary state of the\nmind, are in perfect harmony with the law, while the action of this\nWill, or the voluntary states, are in determined opposition to the law,\nthe individual being inflexibly determined to quench such feelings, and\nact in opposition to them. Is there any virtue at all in such a state of\nmind? Who would dare to say that there is? Is not the guilt of the\nindividual aggravated in proportion to the depth and intensity of the\nfeeling which he is endeavoring to suppress? Now if, as all will admit,\nthere is no virtue at all, when the states of the Sensibility are in\nharmony with the law, and the determinations of the Will, or voluntary\nstates of the mind, are opposed to it, how can there be guilt when the\nWill, or voluntary states, are in perfect harmony with the law, and the\nSensibility or involuntary states, opposed to it? This renders it\ndemonstrably evident that obligation and moral desert of praise or blame\nare predicable only of the Will, or voluntary states of mind.\n\n7. We will make another supposition; one, if possible, still more to the\npoint. The tiger, we well know, has received from his Maker, either\ndirectly or through the laws of natural generation sustained by the Most\nHigh, a ferocious nature. Why do we not blame the animal for this\nnature? The answer, perhaps, would be, that he is not a rational being,\nand is therefore not responsible for anything.\n\nLet us suppose, then, that with this nature, God had associated\nIntelligence and Free-Will, such as man possesses. Why should the animal\nnow be held responsible for the bare existence of this nature, any more\nthan in the first instance, when the effect, in both instances, exists,\nalike independent of his knowledge, choice, and agency? A greater\nabsurdity than this never lay upon the brain of a Theologian, that the\nmere existence of rationality renders the subject properly responsible\nfor what God himself produces in connection with that rationality, and\nproduces wholly independent of the knowledge, choice, and agency of that\nsubject.\n\nLet us suppose, further, that the animal under consideration, as soon as\nhe becomes aware of the existence and tendencies of this nature, holds\nall its impulses in perfect subjection to the law of love, and never\nsuffers them, in a single instance, to induce a voluntary act contrary\nto that law. Is it in the power of the Intelligence to affirm guilt of\nthat creature? Do we not necessarily affirm his virtue to be great in\nproportion to the strength of the propensity thus perfectly subjected to\nthe Moral law? The above illustration renders two conclusions\ndemonstrably evident:\n\n1. For the mere _existence_ of any constitutional propensity whatever,\nthe creature is not and cannot be responsible.\n\n2. When all the actions of the Will, or voluntary power, are in perfect\nharmony with the moral law, and all the propensities are held in full\nsubjection to that law, the creature stands perfect and complete in the\ndischarge of his duty to God and Man. For the involuntary and necessary\nactings of those propensities, he cannot be responsible.\n\nIt is no part of my object to prove that men have not derived from their\nprogenitors, propensities which impel and induce them to sin; but that,\nfor the mere _existence_ of these propensities, together with their\nnecessary involuntary action, they are not guilty.\n\nSEC. II. DOGMAS IN THEOLOGY.\n\nCertain dogmas in Theology connected with the subject above illustrated\nhere claim our attention.\n\nMEN NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SIN OF THEIR PROGENITORS.\n\nI. The first that I notice is the position, that creatures are now held\nresponsible, even as \"deserving God's wrath and curse, not only in this\nlife, but in that which is to come,\" not merely for their own voluntary\nacts of disobedience, nor for their involuntary exercises, but for the\nact of a progenitor, performed when they had no existence. If God holds\ncreatures responsible for such an act, we may safely affirm that it is\nabsolutely impossible for them to conceive of the justice of such a\nprinciple; and that God has so constituted them, as to render it\nimpossible for them to form such a conception. Can a being who is not a\n_moral_ agent sin? Is not _existence_ necessary to moral agency? How\nthen can creatures \"sin _in_ and _through_ another\" six thousand years\nbefore their own existence commenced? We cannot conceive of creatures as\nguilty for the involuntary and necessary exercises of their own minds.\nHow can we conceive of them as guilty for the act of another being,--an\nact of which they had, and could have, no knowledge, choice, or agency\nwhatever? How can intelligent beings hold such a dogma, and hold it as a\nrevelation from Him who has declared with an oath, that the \"son shall\nnot bear the iniquity of the father,\" but that \"every man shall die for\nhis own sins?\"\n\nCONSTITUTIONAL ILL-DESERT.\n\nII. The next dogma deserving attention is the position, that mankind\nderive from our first progenitor a corrupt nature, which renders\nobedience to the commands of God impossible, and disobedience necessary,\nand that for the mere _existence_ of this nature, men \"deserve God's\nwrath and curse, not only in this world, but in that which is to come.\"\n\nIf the above dogma is true, it is demonstrably evident, that this\ncorrupt nature comes into existence without the knowledge, choice, or\nagency of the creature, who, for its existence, is pronounced deserving\nof, and \"bound over to the wrath of God.\" Equally evident is it, that\nthis corrupt nature exists as the result of the direct agency of God. He\nproclaims himself the Maker of \"every soul of man.\" As its Maker, He\nmust have imparted to that soul the constitution or nature which it\nactually possesses. It does not help the matter at all, to say, that\nthis nature is derived from our progenitor: for the laws of generation,\nby which this corrupt nature is derived from that progenitor, are\nsustained and continued by God himself. It is a truth of reason as well\nas of revelation, that, even in respect to plants, derived \"by ordinary\ngeneration\" from the seed of those previously existing, it is GOD who\n\"giveth them a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed its own\nbody.\" If this is true of plants, much more must it be so of the soul of\nman.\n\nIf, then, the above dogma is true, man, in the first place, is held as\ndeserving of eternal punishment for that which exists wholly independent\nof his knowledge, choice, or agency, in any sense, direct or indirect.\nHe is also held responsible for the result, not of his own agency, but\nfor that which results from the agency of God. On this dogma, I remark,\n\n1. It is impossible for the Intelligence to affirm, or even to conceive\nit to be true, that a creature deserves eternal punishment for that\nwhich exists wholly independent of his knowledge, choice, or agency; for\nthat which results, not from his own agency, but from that of another.\nThe Intelligence can no more affirm the truth of such propositions, than\nit can conceive of an event without a cause.\n\n2. This dogma is opposed to the intuitive convictions of the race.\nPresent the proposition to any mind, that, under the Divine government,\nthe creature is held responsible for his own voluntary acts and states\nof minds only, and such a principle \"commends itself to every man's\nconscience in the sight of God.\" Present the dogma, on the other hand,\nthat for a nature which renders actual obedience impossible, a nature\nwhich exists as the exclusive result of the agency of God himself,\nindependently of the knowledge, choice, or agency of the creature, such\ncreature is justly \"bound over to the wrath of God, and curse of the\nlaw, and so made subject to death, with all miseries, spiritual,\ntemporal, and eternal,\" and there is not a conscience in the universe\nwhich will not reprobate with perfect horror such a principle. The\nintuitive convictions of the race are irreconcilably opposed to it.\n\n3. If mankind, as this dogma affirms, have a nature from which voluntary\nacts of a given character necessarily result, to talk of real _growth_\nor _confirmation_ in holiness or sin, is to use words without meaning.\nAll that influence, or voluntary acts, can do in such a case, is to\ndevelope the nature already in existence. They can do nothing to confirm\nthe soul in its tendencies, one way or the other. What should we think\nof the proposition, that a certain tree had formed and confirmed the\nhabit of bearing particular kinds of fruits, when it commenced bearing,\nwith the necessity of bearing this kind only, and with the absolute\nimpossibility of bearing any other? So the soul, according to this\ndogma, commences action with the absolute impossibility of any but\nsinful acts, and with the equal necessity of putting forth sinful ones.\nNow, Necessity and Impossibility know and can know no degrees. How then\ncan a mind, thus constituted, generate and confirm the habit of sinning?\nWhat, on this supposition, is the meaning of the declaration, \"How can\nye, who are _accustomed_ to do evil, learn to do well?\" All such\ndeclarations are without meaning, if this dogma is true.\n\n4. If God imputes guilt to the creature, for the existence of the nature\nunder consideration, he must have required the creature to prevent its\nexistence. For it is a positive truth of reason and inspiration both,\nthat as \"sin is a transgression of the law;\" that \"where there is no law,\nthere is no transgression;\" and that \"sin is not imputed where there is\nno law,\" that is, where nothing is required, no obligation does or can\nexist, and consequently no guilt is imputed. The existence of the nature\nunder consideration, then, is not and cannot be sin to the creature,\nunless it is a transgression of the law; and it cannot be a\ntransgression of the law, unless the law required the creature to\nprevent its existence, and prevent it when that existence was the\nexclusive result of God's agency, and when the creature could have no\nknowledge, choice, or agency, in respect to what God was to produce. Can\nwe conceive of a greater absurdity than that? God is about to produce a\ncertain nature by his own creative act, or by sustaining the laws of\nnatural generation. He imputes infinite guilt to the creature for not\npreventing the result of that act, and inducing a result precisely\nopposite, and that in the absence of all knowledge of what was required\nof him, and of the possibility of any agency in respect to it. Is this a\ntrue exposition of the Government of God?\n\nPRESENT IMPOSSIBILITIES REQUIRED.\n\nIII. The last dogma that I notice is the position, that the Moral law\ndemands of us, as sinners, not what is now possible to us on the ground\nof natural powers and proffered grace, but what would be possible, had\nwe never sinned. It is admitted by all, that we have not now a capacity\nfor that degree of virtue which would be possible to us, had we always\ndeveloped our moral powers in harmony with the Divine law. Still it is\nmaintained, that this degree of virtue, notwithstanding our present\ntotal incapacity to exercise it, is demanded of us. For not rendering\nit, we are justly bound over to the wrath and curse of God. In reply, I\nremark:\n\n1. That this dogma, which is professedly founded on the express\nteachings of Inspiration, has not even the shadow of a foundation in any\ndirect or implied affirmation of the Bible. I may safely challenge the\nworld to adduce a single passage of Holy Writ, that either directly or\nindirectly asserts any such thing.\n\n2. This dogma is opposed not only to the _spirit_, but to the _letter_\nof the _law_. The law, addressing men, enfeebled as their powers now\nare, in consequence of sin previously committed, requires them to love\nGod with all their \"mind and strength,\" that is, not with the power they\nwould have possessed, had they never sinned, but with the power they now\nactually possess. On what authority does any Theologian affirm, when the\nlaw expressly makes one demand upon men, that it, in reality, makes\nanother, and different demand? In such an assertion, is he not wise, not\nonly _above_, but _against_ what is written?\n\n3. This dogma is opposed to the express and positive teachings of\nInspiration. The Scriptures expressly affirm, Rom. xiii. 8, that every\none that exercises love, \"hath fulfilled the law,\" hath done all that\nthe law requires of him. This would not be true, did the law require a\ndegree of love not now practicable to the creature. Again, in Deut. x.\n12, it is positively affirmed, that God requires nothing of his\ncreatures but to \"love him with all the heart and with all the soul,\"\nthat is, with all the powers they actually possess. This could not be\ntrue, if the dogma under consideration is true.\n\n4. If we conceive an individual to yield a voluntary conformity to moral\nobligations of every kind, to the full extent of his present capacities,\nit is impossible for us to conceive that he is not now doing all that he\nreally ought to do. No person would ever think of exhorting him to do\nmore, nor of charging him with guilt for not doing it. We may properly\nblame him for the past, but as far as the present is concerned, he\nstands guiltless in the eye of reason and revelation both.\n\n5. Let us suppose that an individual continues for fifty years in sin.\nHe is then truly converted, and immediately after dies. All admit that\nhe enters heaven in a state of perfect holiness. Yet no one supposes\nthat he now exercises, or has the capacity to exercise, as high a degree\nof holiness, as he would, had he spent those fifty years in obedience,\ninstead of disobedience to God. This shows that even those who\ntheoretically hold the dogma under consideration do not practically\nbelieve it themselves.\n\nThe conclusion to which our inquiries lead us is this: Holiness is a\nvoluntary conformity to all perceivable obligation. Sin is a similar\nviolation of such obligation. Nothing else is or can be holiness.\nNothing else is or can be sin.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\nTHE STANDARD BY WHICH THE MORAL CHARACTER OF VOLUNTARY STATES OF MIND,\nOR ACTS OF WILL, SHOULD BE DETERMINED.\n\nIN the remarks which I have to make in elucidation of this subject, I\nshall, on the authority of evidence already presented, take two\npositions for granted:\n\n1. Moral obligation and moral desert are predicable only of acts of\nWill.\n\n2. It is only of those acts of Will denominated _Intentions_, and of\ncourse ultimate intentions, that obligation, merit and demerit, are\npredicable.\n\nIn this last position, as I have already said, there is a universal\nagreement among moral philosophers. We may also safely assume the same\nas a first truth of the universal Intelligence. The child, the\nphilosopher, the peasant, men of all classes, ages, and conditions,\nagree in predicating obligation and moral desert of intention, and of\nultimate intention only. By ultimate intention, I, of course, refer to\nthose acts, choices, or determinations of the Will, to which all other\nmental determinations are subordinate, and by which they are controlled.\nThus, when an individual chooses, on the one hand, the Divine glory, and\nthe highest good of universal being, as the end of his existence; or, on\nthe other, his own personal gratification; and subordinates to one or\nthe other of these acts of choice all the law of his being, here we find\nhis ultimate intention. In this exclusively all mankind agree in finding\nthe moral character of all mental acts and states.\n\nNow an important question arises, By what _standard_ shall we judge of\nthe moral character of intentions? Of course, they are to be placed in\nthe light of the two great precepts of the Moral law by which we are\nrequired to love God with all our powers, and our neighbor as ourselves.\nBut two distinct and opposite explanations have been given of the above\nprecepts, presenting entirely different standards of moral judgment.\nAccording to one, the precept requiring us to love God with _all our\nheart and strength_, requires a certain degree of _intensity_ of\nintention and feeling. On no other condition, it is said, do we love God\nwith _all_ the heart.\n\nAccording to the other explanation, the precept requiring us to love God\nwith _all_ the heart, &c., means, that we devote our entire powers and\ninterests to the glory of God and the good of his creatures, with the\nsincere intention to employ these powers and interests for the\naccomplishment of these objects in the _best possible manner_. When all\nour powers are under the exclusive control of such an intention as this,\nwe then, it is affirmed, love God according to the letter and spirit of\nthe above precept, \"with all our heart, and with all our strength.\"\n\nSINCERITY, AND NOT INTENSITY, THE TRUE STANDARD.\n\nMy object now is to show, that this last is the right exposition, and\npresents the only true standard by which to judge of all moral acts and\nstates of mind. This I argue from the following considerations.\n\n1. If _intensity_ be fixed upon as the standard, no one can define it,\nso as to tell us what he means. The command requiring us to love with\n_all_ the heart, if understood as requiring a certain degree of\nintensity of intention, may mean the highest degree of tension of which\nour nature is susceptible. Or it may mean the highest possible degree,\nconsistent with our existence in this body; or the highest degree\nconsistent with the most perfect health; or some inconceivable\nindefinable degree, nobody knows what. It cannot include all, and may\nand must mean some one of the above-named dogmas. Yet no one would dare\nto tell us which. Has God given, or does our own reason give us, a\nstandard of moral judgment of which no one can form a conception, or\ngive us a definition?\n\n2. No one could practically apply this standard, if he could define it,\nas a test of moral action. The reason is obvious. No one, but\nOmniscience, can possibly know what degree of tensity our nature is\ncapable of; nor precisely what degree is compatible with life, or with\nthe most perfect health. If intensity, then, is the standard by which we\nare required to determine definitely the character of moral actions, we\nare in reality required to fix definitely the value of an unknown\nquantity, to wit: moral action, by a standard of which we are, and of\nnecessity must be, most profoundly ignorant. We are required to find the\ndefinite by means of the indefinite; the plain by means of the \"palpable\nobscure.\" Has God, or our own reason, placed us in such a predicament as\nthis, in respect to the most momentous of all questions, the\ndetermination of our true moral character and deserts?\n\n3. While the standard under consideration is, and must be, unknown to\nus, it is perpetually varying, and never fixed. The degree of intensity\nof mental effort of which we are capable at one moment, differs from\nthat which is possible to us at another. The same holds equally of that\nwhich is compatible with life and health. Can we believe that \"the judge\nof all the earth\" requires us to conform, and holds us responsible for\nnot conforming to a standard located we cannot possibly know where, and\nwhich is always movable, and never for a moment remaining fixed?\n\n4. The absurdity of attempting to act in conformity to this principle,\nin reference to particular duties, will show clearly that it cannot be\nthe standard of moral obligations in any instance. Suppose an individual\nbecomes convinced that it is his duty, that is, that God requires him to\nwalk or travel a given distance, or for a time to compose himself for\nthe purpose of sleeping. Now he must will with all his heart to perform\nthe duty before him. What if he should judge himself bound to will to\nsleep, for example, and to will it with all possible intensity, or with\nas great an intensity as consists with his health? How long would it\ntake him to compose himself to sleep in this manner? What if he should\nwith all possible intensity will to walk? What if, when with all\nsincerity, he had intended to perform, in the best manner, the duty\ndevolved upon him, he should inquire whether the intention possessed the\nrequisite intensity? It would be just as rational to apply this standard\nin the instances under consideration, as in any other.\n\n5. That _Sincerity_, and not intensity of intention, presents the true\nstandard of moral judgment, is evident from the fact, that the former\ncommends itself to every man's conscience as perfectly intelligible, of\nready definition in itself, and of consequently ready application, in\ndetermining the character and moral desert of all moral actions. We can\nreadily conceive what it is to yield all our powers and interests to the\nWill of God, and to do it with the sincere intention of employing them\nin the wisest and best manner for the accomplishment of the highest\ngood. We can conceive, too, what it is to employ our powers and\ninterests under the control of such an intention. We can also perceive\nwith perfect distinctness our obligation to live and act under the\nsupreme control of such an intention. If we are bound to yield to God at\nall, we are bound to yield our entire being to his supreme control. If\nwe are bound to will and employ our powers and resources to produce any\ngood at all, we are bound to will and aim to produce the highest good.\n\nThis principle also is equally applicable in, determining the character\nand deserts of all moral actions. Every honest mind can readily\ndetermine the fact, whether it is or is not acting under the supreme\ncontrol of the intention under consideration. If we adopt this\nprinciple, as expressing the meaning of the command requiring us to love\nwith _all_ the heart, perfect sunlight rests upon the Divine law. If we\nadopt any other standard, perfect midnight hangs over that law.\n\n6. If we conceive a moral agent really to live and act in full harmony\nwith the intention under consideration, it is impossible for us to\nconceive, or affirm, that he has not done his entire duty. What more\nought a moral agent to intend than the highest good he can accomplish?\nShould it be said, that he ought to intend this with a certain degree of\nintensity, the reply is, that Sincerity implies an intention to will and\nact, at all times, with that degree of intensity best adapted to the end\nto be accomplished. What more can properly or wisely be demanded? Is not\nthis loving with all the heart?\n\n7. On this principle, a much greater degree of intensity, and consequent\nenergy of action, will be secured, than on the other principle. Nothing\ntends more effectually to palsy the energies of the mind, than the\nattempt always to act with the greatest intensity. It is precisely like\nthe attempt of some orators, to speak, on all subjects alike, with the\ngreatest possible pathos and sublimity. On the other hand, let an\nindividual throw his whole being under the control of the grand\nprinciple of doing all the good he can, and his powers will energize\nwith the greatest freedom, intensity, and effect. If, therefore, the\nstandard of moral obligation and moral desert has been wisely fixed,\nSincerity, and nothing else, is that standard.\n\n8. I remark, once more, that Sincerity is the standard fixed in the\nScriptures of truth. In Jer. iii. 16, the Jews are accused of not\n\"turning to the Lord with _the whole heart_, but feignedly,\" that is,\nwith insincerity. If they had turned sincerely, they would, according to\nthis passage, have done it with the _whole heart_. The whole heart,\nthen, according to the express teachings of the Bible, is synonymous\nwith Sincerity and Sincerity according to the above definition of the\nterm. This is the true standard, according to revelation as well as\nreason. I have other arguments, equally conclusive as the above, to\npresent, but these are sufficient. The importance of the subject,\ntogether with its decisive bearing upon the momentous question to be\ndiscussed in the next Chapter, is my apology for dwelling thus long upon\nit.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X.\n\nINTUITIONS, OR MORAL ACTS, NEVER OF A MIXED CHARACTER; THAT IS, PARTLY\nRIGHT AND PARTLY WRONG.\n\nWE are now prepared to consider the question, whether each moral act, or\nexercise, is not always of a character purely unmixed? In other words,\nwhether every such act, or intention, is not always perfectly right or\nperfectly wrong I would here be understood to speak of single acts, or\nintuitions, in distinction from a series, which continues through some\ndefinite period, as an hour or a day. Such series of acts may, of\ncourse, be of a mixed character; that is, it may be made up of\nindividual acts, some of which are right and some wrong. But the\nquestion is, can distinct, opposite, and contradictory elements, such as\nsin and holiness, right and wrong, selfishness and benevolence, enter\ninto one and the same act No one will pretend that an individual is\nvirtuous at all, unless he _intends_ obedience to the moral law. The\nquestion is, can an individual intend to obey and to disobey the law, in\none and the same act? On this question I remark,\n\n1. That the principle established in the last Chapter really settles the\nquestion. No one, to my knowledge, pretends, that, as far as sincerity\nis concerned, the same moral act can be of a mixed character. Very few,\nif any, will be guilty of the folly of maintaining, that an individual\ncan sincerely intend to obey and to disobey the law at one and the same\ntime. When such act is contemplated in this point of light, it is almost\nuniversally admitted that it cannot be of a mixed character. But then\nanother test is applied--that of intensity. It is conceivable, at least,\nit is said, that the intention might possess a higher degree of\nintensity than it does possess. It is, therefore, pronounced defective.\nOn the same supposition, every moral act in existence might be\npronounced defective. For we can, at least, conceive, that it might\npossess a higher degree of intensity. It has been abundantly established\nin the last Chapter, however, that there is no such test of moral\nactions as this, a test authorized either by reason or revelation.\nSincerity is the only standard by which to determine the character and\ndeserts of all moral acts and states. In the light of this standard, it\nis intuitively evident, that no one act can combine such contradictory\nand opposite elements as sin and holiness, right and wrong, an intention\nto obey and to disobey the moral law.\n\n2. The opinions and reasonings of distinguished philosophers and\ntheologians on the subject may be adduced in confirmation of the\ndoctrine under consideration. Let it be borne in mind, that if the same\nact embraces such contradictory and opposite elements as sin and\nholiness, it must be, in reality, opposed to itself, one element\nconstituting the act, being in harmony with the law, and in opposition\nto the other element which is opposed to the law.\n\nNow the remark of Edwards upon this subject demands our special\nattention. \"It is absurd,\" he says, \"to suppose the same individual Will\nto oppose itself in its present act; or the present choice to be\nopposite to and resisting present choice; as absurd as it is to talk of\ntwo contrary motions in the same moving body at the same time.\" Does not\nthe common sense of the race affirm the truth of this statement Sin and\nholiness cannot enter into the same act, unless it embraces a serious\nintention to obey and not to obey the moral law at the same time. Is not\nthis, in the language of Edwards, as \"absurd as it is to talk of two\ncontrary motions in the same moving body at the same time.\"\n\nEqually conclusive is the argument of Kant upon the same subject. Having\nshown that mankind are divided into two classes, the morally good and\nthe morally evil; that the distinguishing characteristic of the former\nis, that they have adopted the Moral law as their maxim, that is, that\nit is their serious intention to comply with all the claims of the law;\nand of the latter, that they have not adopted the law as their maxim; he\nadds, \"The sentiment of mankind is, therefore, never indifferent\nrelatively to the law, and he never can be neither good nor evil.\" Then\nfollows the paragraph to which special attention is invited. \"In like\nmanner, mankind cannot be, in some points of character, morally good,\nwhile he is, at the same time, in others evil; for, is he in any point\ngood, then the moral law is his maxim (that is, it is his serious\nintention to obey the law in the length and breadth of its claims); but\nis he likewise, at the same time, in some points bad, then quoad [as to]\nthese, the Moral law is not his maxim, (that is, in these particulars,\nit is his intention not to obey the law). But since the law is one and\nuniversal, and as it commands in one act of life, so in all, then the\nmaxim referring to it would be, at the same time universal and\nparticular, which is a contradiction;\" (that is, it would be his\nintention to obey the law universally, and at the same time, not to obey\nit in certain particulars, one of the most palpable contradictions\nconceivable.) To my mind the above argument has all the force of\ndemonstration. Let it be borne in mind, that no man is morally good at\nall, unless it is his intention to obey the Moral law universally. This\nbeing his intention, the law has no higher claims upon him. Its full\ndemands are, and must be, met in that intention. For what can the law\nrequire more, than that the voluntary powers shall be in full harmony\nwith its demands, which is always true, when there is a sincere\nintention to obey the law universally. Now, with this intention, there\ncan be nothing in the individual morally evil; unless there is, at the\nsame time, an intention not to obey the law in certain particulars; that\nis, not to obey it universally. A mixed moral act, or intention,\ntherefore, is possible, only on this condition, that it shall embrace\nthese two contradictory elements--a serious determination to obey the\nlaw universally, and a determination equally decisive, at the same time,\nto disobey it in certain particulars; that is, not to obey it\nuniversally. I leave it with the advocates of the doctrine of Mixed\nMoral Action to dispose of this difficulty as they can.\n\n3. If we could conceive of a moral act of a mixed character, the Moral\nlaw could not recognize it as holy at all. It presents but one scale by\nwhich to determine the character of moral acts, the command requiring us\nto love with all the heart. It knows such acts only as conformed, or not\nconformed, to this command. The mixed action, if it could exist, would,\nin the light of the Moral law, be placed among the not-conformed, just\nas much as those which are exclusively sinful. The Moral law does not\npresent two scales, according to one of which actions are classed as\nconformed or not-conformed, and according to the other, as partly\nconformed and partly not-conformed. Such a scale as this last is unknown\nin the circle of revealed truth. The Moral law presents us but one\nscale. Those acts which are in full conformity to its demands, it puts\ndown as holy. Those not thus conformed, it puts down as sinful; as holy\nor sinful is the only light in which actions stand according to the law.\n\n4. Mixed actions, if they could exist, are as positively prohibited by\nthe law, and must therefore be placed under the category of total\ndisobedience, just as much as those which are in themselves entirely\nsinful. While the law requires us to love with _all_ the heart, it\npositively prohibits everything short of this. The individual,\ntherefore, who puts forth an act of a mixed character, puts forth an act\nas totally and positively prohibited as the man who puts forth a totally\nsinful one. Both alike must be placed under the category of total\ndisobedience. A father requires his two sons to go to the distance of\nten rods, and positively prohibits their stopping short of the distance\nrequired. One determines to go nine rods, and there to stop. The other\ndetermines not to move at all. One has put forth an act of total\ndisobedience just as much as the other. So of all moral acts which stop\nshort of loving with all the heart.\n\n5. A moral act of a mixed character cannot possibly proceed from that\nregard to moral obligation which is an essential condition of the\nexistence of any degree of virtue at all. Virtue, in no degree, can\nexist, except from a sacred regard to moral obligation. The individual\nwho thus regards moral obligation in one degree, will regard it equally\nin all degrees. The individual, therefore, who, from such regard, yields\nto the claims of the law at all, will and must conform to the full\nmeasure of its demands. He cannot be in voluntary opposition to any one\ndemand of that law. A mixed moral act, then, cannot possibly proceed\nfrom that regard to moral obligation which is the essential condition of\nholiness in any degree. This leads me to remark,\n\n6. That a moral act of a mixed character, if it could exist, could arise\nfrom none other than the most purely selfish and wicked intention\nconceivable. Three positions, we will suppose, are before the mind--a\nstate of perfect conformity to the law, a state of total disobedience,\nand a third state combining the elements of obedience and disobedience.\nBy a voluntary act of moral election, an individual places himself in\nthe last state, in distinction from each of the others. What must have\nbeen his intention in so doing? He cannot have acted from a regard to\nmoral rectitude. In that case, he would have elected the state of total\nobedience. His intention must have been to secure, at the same time, the\nreward of holiness and the \"pleasures of sin\"--a most selfish and wicked\nstate surely. The supposition of a moral act, that is, intention\ncombining the elements of holiness and sin--is as great an absurdity as\nthe supposition, that a circle has become a square, without losing any\nof its properties as a circle.\n\n7. I remark again that the doctrine of mixed moral action is\ncontradicted by the express teachings of inspiration. \"Whosoever cometh\nafter me,\" says Christ, \"and forsaketh not _all_ that he hath, he cannot\nbe my disciple.\" The Bible knows men only as the disciples, or not\ndisciples, of Christ. All who really comply with the condition above\nnamed are His disciples. All others, however near their compliance, are\nnot His disciples, any more than those who have not conformed in any\ndegree. If an individual has really conformed to this condition, he has\nsurely done his entire duty. He has loved with all his heart. What other\nmeaning can we attach to the phrase, \"forsaketh all that he hath?\" All\npersons who have not complied with this principle are declared to be\nwholly without the circle of discipleship. What is this, but a positive\nassertion, that a moral action of a mixed character is an impossibility?\n\nAgain. \"No man can serve two masters.\" \"Ye cannot serve God and mammon.\"\nLet us suppose that we can put forth intentions of a mixed\ncharacter--intentions partly sinful and partly holy. So far as they are\nin harmony with the law, we serve God. So far as they are not in harmony\nwith the law, we serve Mammon. Now, if all our moral exercises can be of\na mixed character, then it is true that, at every period of our lives,\nwe can serve God and Mammon. The service which we can render also to\neach, may be in every conceivable degree. We may render, for example,\nninety-nine degrees of service to God and one to Mammon, or ninety-nine\nto Mammon and one to God. Or our service may be equally divided between\nthe two. Can we conceive of a greater absurdity than this?\n\nWhat also is the meaning of such declarations as this, \"no fountain can\nsend forth both sweet water and bitter,\" if the heart of man may\nexercise intentions combining such elements as sin and holiness?\nDeclarations of a similar kind abound in the Bible. They are surely\nwithout meaning, if the doctrine of Mixed Moral Actions is true.\n\n8. Finally. It may be questioned whether the whole range of error\npresents a dogma of more pernicious tendency than the doctrine of Mixed\nMoral Actions. It teaches moral agents that they may be selfish in all\ntheir moral exercises, and yet have enough of moral purity mingled with\nthem to secure acceptance with the \"Judge of all the earth.\" A man who\nhas adopted such a principle will almost never, whatever his course of\nlife may be, seem to himself to be destitute of real virtue. He will\nalways seem to himself to possess enough of it, to render his acceptance\nwith God certain. The kind of virtue which can mingle itself with\nselfishness and sin in individual intentions or moral acts, may be\npossessed, in different degrees, by the worst men on earth. If this be\nassumed as real holiness--that holiness which will stand the ordeal of\neternity, who will, who should conceive himself destitute of a title to\nheaven? Here is the fatal rock on which myriads of minds are wrecked for\never. Let it ever be borne in mind, that the same fountain cannot, at\nthe same time and place, \"send forth both sweet water and bitter.\" \"Ye\ncannot serve God and Mammon.\"\n\nOBJECTIONS.\n\nTwo or three objections to the doctrine above established demand a\npassing notice here.\n\nAN ACT OF WILL MAY RESULT FROM A VARIETY OF MOTIVES.\n\n1. It is said that the mind may act under the influence of a great\nvariety of motives at one and the same time. The same intention,\ntherefore, may be the result of different and opposite motives, and as a\nconsequence, combine the elements of good and evil. In reply, I remark,\nthat when the Will is in harmony with the Moral law, it respects the\ngood and rejects the bad, alike in _all_ the motives presented. The\nopposite is true when it is not in harmony with the law. The same regard\nor disregard for moral obligation which will induce an individual to\nreject the evil and choose the good, or to make an opposite choice, in\nrespect to one motive, will induce the same in respect to all other\nmotives present at the same time. A mixed moral act can no more result\nfrom a combination of motives, than different and opposite motions can\nresult in the same body at the same time, from forces acting upon it\nfrom different directions.\n\nLOVING WITH GREATER INTENSITY AT ONE TIME THAN ANOTHER.\n\n2. It is said that we are conscious of loving our friends, and serving\nGod, with greater strength and intensity at one time than at another.\nYet our love, in all such instances, is real. Love, therefore, may be\nreal, and yet be greatly defective--that is, it may be real, and embrace\nelements morally wrong. It is true, that love may exist in different\ndegrees, as far as the action of the Sensibility is concerned. It is not\nso, however, with love in the form of intention--intention in harmony\nwith moral obligation, the only form of love demanded by the moral law.\nSuch intention, in view of the same degrees of light, and under the same\nidentical influences, cannot possess different degrees of intensity. The\nWill always yields, when it really does yield at all to moral\nobligation, with all the intensity it is, for the time being, capable\nof, or the nature of the case demands.\n\nMOMENTARY REVOLUTIONS OF CHARACTER.\n\n3. On this theory, it is said, an individual may become perfectly good\nand perfectly bad, for any indefinite number of instances, in any\ndefinite period of time. This consequence, to say nothing of what is\nlikely to take place in fact, does, as far as possibility is concerned,\nfollow from this theory. But let us contemplate it, for a moment, in the\nlight of an example or two. An individual, from regard to moral\nobligation, maintains perfect integrity of character, up to a given\nperiod of time. Then, under the influence of temptation, he tells a\ndeliberate falsehood. Did his previous integrity so fuse itself into\nthat lie, as to make it partly good and partly bad?--as to make it\nanything else than a _total_ falsehood? Did the prior goodness of David\nmake his acts of adultery and murder partly good and partly bad? Let the\nadvocate of mixed moral action extract the elements of moral goodness\nfrom these acts if he can. He can just as well find these elements here,\nas in any other acts of disobedience to the Moral law. \"The\nrighteousness of the righteous cannot save him\" from total sinfulness,\nany more than from condemnation \"in the day of his transgression.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI.\n\nRELATION OF THE WILL TO THE INTELLIGENCE AND SENSIBILITY, IN ALL ACTS OR\nSTATES, MORALLY RIGHT OR WRONG.\n\nTHE Will, sustaining the relation it does to the Intelligence and\nSensibility, must yield itself to the control of one or the other of\nthese departments of our nature. In all acts and states morally right,\nthe Will is in harmony with the Intelligence, from respect to moral\nobligation or duty; and all the desires and propensities, all the\nimpulses of the Sensibility, are held in strict subordination. In all\nacts morally wrong, the Will is controlled by the Sensibility,\nirrespective of the dictates of the Intelligence. Impulse, and not a\nregard to the just, the right, the true and the good, is the law of its\naction. In all such cases, as the impulses which control the Will are\nvarious, the external forms through which the internal acts, or\nintentions, will manifest themselves, will be equally diversified. Yet\nthe _spring_ of action is in all instances one and the same, impulse\ninstead of a regard to duty. Virtue does not consist in being controlled\nby _amiable_, instead of _dissocial_ and _malign_ impulses, and in a\nconsequent exterior of a corresponding beauty and loveliness. It\nconsists in a voluntary harmony of intention with the just, the right,\nthe true and the good from a sacred respect to moral obligation, instead\nof being controlled by mere impulse of any kind whatever. On the\nprinciple above illustrated, I remark:\n\nTHOSE WHO ARE OR ARE NOT TRULY VIRTUOUS, HOW DISTINGUISHED.\n\n1. That the real distinction between those who are truly virtuous, and\nthose who are not, now becomes apparent. It does not consist, in all\ninstances, in the mere exterior _form_ of action, but in the _spring_ or\n_intention_ from which all such action proceeds. In most persons, and in\nall, at different periods, the amiable and social propensities\npredominate over the dissocial and malign. Hence much of the exterior\nwill be characterized by much that is truly beautiful and lovely. In\nmany, also, the impulsive power of conscience--that department of the\nSensibility which is correlated to the idea of right and wrong, and\nimpels to obedience to the Moral law--is strongly developed, and may\nconsequently take its turn in controlling the Will. In all such\ninstances, there will be the external forms of real virtue. It is one\nthing, however, to put on the exterior of virtue from mere impulse, and\nquite another, to do the same thing from an internal respect and sacred\nregard for duty.\n\nHow many individuals, who may be now wearing the fairest forms of\nvirtue, will find within them, as soon as present impulses are\nsupplanted by the strong action of others, in opposition to rectitude,\nno maxims of Will, in harmony with the law of goodness, to resist and\nsubject such impulses. Their conduct is in conformity to the\nrequirements of virtue, not from any internal intention to be in\nuniversal harmony with moral obligation, but simply because, for the\ntime being, the strongest impulse happens to be in that direction. No\nindividual, it should ever be kept in mind, makes any approach to real\nvirtue, whatever impulses he may be controlled by, till, by a sealing\nact of moral election, the Will is placed in harmony with the universal\nlaw of duty, and all external action of a moral character proceeds from\nthis internal, all-controlling intention. Here we find the broad and\nfundamental distinction between those who are truly virtuous, and those\nwho are not.\n\nSELFISHNESS AND BENEVOLENCE.\n\n2. We are also prepared to explain the real difference between\n_Selfishness_ and _Benevolence_. The latter expresses and comprehends\nall the forms of real virtue of every kind and degree. The former\ncomprehends and expresses the forms of vice or sin. Benevolence consists\nin the full harmony of the Will or intention with the just, the right,\nthe true, and the good, from a regard to moral obligation. Selfishness\nconsists in voluntary subjection to _impulse_, irrespective of such\nobligation. Whenever self-gratification is the law of action, there is\npure selfishness, whatever the character or direction of the impulse may\nbe. Selfishness has sometimes been very incorrectly defined, as a\nsupreme regard to our own interest or happiness. If this is a correct\ndefinition, the drunkard is not selfish at all; for he sacrifices his\npresent and future happiness, to gratify a beastly appetite, and\ndestroys present peace in the act of self-gratification. If selfishness,\nhowever, consists in mere subjection to impulse, how supreme his\nselfishness at once appears! A mother who does not act from moral\nobligation, when under the strong influence of maternal affection,\nappears most distinguished in her assiduous care of her offspring. Now\nlet this affection be crossed by some plain question of duty, so that\nshe must violate the latter, or subject the former, and how soon will\nselfishness manifest itself, in the triumph of impulse over duty! A gift\nis not more effectual in blinding the eyes, than natural affection\nuncontrolled by a regard to moral obligation. Men are just as selfish,\nthat is, as perfectly subject to the law of self-gratification, when\nunder the influence of the social and amiable propensities, as when\nunder that of the dissocial and malign, when, in both instances alike,\nimpulse is the law of action. Moral agents were made, and are required\nto be, social and amiable, from higher principles than mere impulse.\n\nCOMMON MISTAKE.\n\n3. I notice a mistake of fundamental importance into which many appear\nto have fallen, in judging of the moral character of individuals. As we\nhave seen, when the Will is wholly controlled by the Sensibility\nirrespective of moral obligation, the impulsive department of conscience\ntakes its turn, among the other propensities, in controlling the action\nof the voluntary power. Now because, in all such instances, there are\nthe exterior forms of virtue, together with an apparently sincere\ninternal regard for the same, the presence of real virtue is\nconsequently inferred. Now before such a conclusion can be authorized,\none question needs to be determined, the _spring_ from which such\napparent virtues originate. They may arise from that regard to moral\nobligation which constitutes real virtue. Or they may be the result\npurely of excited Sensibility, which, in such instances happens to be in\nthe direction of the forms of virtue.\n\nDEFECTIVE FORMS OF VIRTUE.\n\n4. Another very frequent mistake bearing upon moral character deserves a\npassing notice here. Men sometimes manifest, and doubtless with a\nconsciousness of inward sincerity, a very high regard for some one or\nmore particular principles of virtue, while they manifest an equal\ndisregard of all other principles. Every real reform, for example, has\nits basis in some great principle of morality. Men often advocate, with\ngreat zeal, such reforms, together with the principle on which they\nrest. They talk of virtue, when called to defend that principle, of a\nregard to moral obligation, together with the necessity of\nself-sacrifice at the shrine of duty, as if respect for universal\nrectitude commanded the entire powers of their being. Yet but a slight\nobservation will most clearly evince, that their regard for the right,\nthe true, and the good, is wholly circumscribed by this one principle.\nStill, such persons are very likely to regard themselves as virtuous in\na very high degree. In reality, however, they have not made the first\napproach to real virtue. Their respect for this one principle, together\nwith its specific applications, has its spring in some other department\nof their nature, than a regard for what is right in itself. Otherwise\ntheir respect for what is right, would be co-extensive with the entire\nrange of moral obligation.\n\nSEC. II. TEST OF CONFORMITY TO MORAL PRINCIPLE.\n\nIn preceding chapters, the great truth has been fully established, that\nthe Moral law addresses its commands and prohibitions to the Will only,\nand that moral obligation is predicable only of the action of the\nvoluntary power, other states being required, only as their existence\nand character are conditioned on the right exercise of that power. From\nthis, it undeniably follows, that the Moral law, in all the length and\nbreadth of its requirements, finds its entire fulfilment within the\nsphere of the Will. A question of great importance here presents itself:\nBy what test shall we determine whether the Will is, or is not, in full\nharmony with the law? In the investigation of this question, we may\nperhaps be thought to be intruding somewhat into the domain of Moral\nPhilosophy. Reasons of great importance, in the judgment of the writer,\nhowever, demand its introduction here.\n\nThe Moral law is presented to us through two comprehensive precepts.\nYet, a moment's reflection will convince us that both these precepts\nhave their basis in one common principle, and are, in reality, the\nenunciation of that one principle. The identical reason why we are bound\nto love God with all the heart, requires us to love our neighbors as\nourselves. So the subject is presented by our Saviour himself. After\nspeaking of the first and great commandment, He adds, \"the second is\nlike unto it,\" that is, it rests upon the same principle as the first.\n\nNow the question is, What is this great principle, obedience to which\nimplies a full discharge of all obligation, actual and conceivable; the\nprinciple which comprehends all other principles of the Moral law, and\nof which each particular precept is only the enunciation of this one\ncommon principle in its endlessly diversified applications? This\nprinciple has been announced in forms somewhat different, by different\nphilosophers. I will present two or three of these forms. The first that\nI notice is this.\n\n_It shall be the serious intention of all moral agents to esteem and\ntreat all persons, interests, and objects according to their perceived\nintrinsic and relative importance, and out of respect for their\nintrinsic worth, or in obedience to the idea of duty, or moral\nobligation._\n\nEvery one will readily apprehend, that the above is a correct\nenunciation of the principle under consideration. It expresses the\nfundamental reason why obedience to each and every moral principle is\nbinding upon us. The reason and only reason why we are bound to love God\nwith _all the heart_, is the intrinsic and relative importance of the\nobject presented to the mind in the contemplation of the Infinite and\nPerfect. The reason why we are bound to love our neighbor as ourselves,\nis the fact, that his rights and interests are apprehended, as of the\nsame value and sacredness as our own. In the intention under\nconsideration, all obligation, actual and conceivable, is really met.\nGod will occupy his appropriate place in the heart, and the creature\nhis. No real right or interest will be dis-esteemed, and each will\nintentionally command that attention and regard which its intrinsic and\nrelative importance demands. Every moral agent is under obligation\ninfinite ever to be under the supreme control of such an intention, and\nno such agent can be under obligation to be or to do anything more than\nthis.\n\nThe same principle has been announced in a form somewhat different by\nKant, to wit: \"So act that thy maxim of Will (intention) might become\nlaw in a system of universal moral obligation\"--that is, let your\ncontrolling intention be always such, that all Intelligents may properly\nbe required ever to be under the supreme control of the same intention.\n\nBy Cousin, the same principle is thus announced: \"The moral principle\nbeing universal, the sign, the external type by which a resolution may\nbe recognized as conformed to this principle, is the impossibility of\nnot erecting the immediate motive (intention) of the particular act or\nresolution, into a maxim of universal legislation\"--that is, we cannot\nbut affirm that every moral agent in existence is bound to act from the\nsame motive or intention.\n\nIt will readily be perceived, that each of these forms is really\nidentical with that above announced and illustrated. It is only when we\nare conscious of the supreme control of the intention, to esteem and\ntreat all persons and interests according to their intrinsic and\nrelative importance, from respect to the idea of duty, that, in\nconformity with the principle as announced by Kant, our maxim of Will\nmight become law in a system of universal legislation. When we are\nconscious of the control of such an intention, it is impossible for us\nnot to affirm, according to the principle, as announced by Cousin, that\nall Intelligents are bound always to be under the control of the same\nintention. Two or three suggestions will close what I have to say on\nthis point.\n\nCOMMON MISTAKE.\n\n1. We notice the fundamental mistake of many philosophers and divines in\ntreating of moral exercises, or states of mind. Such exercises are very\ncommonly represented as consisting wholly in excited states of the\nSensibility. Thus Dr. Brown represents all moral exercises and states as\nconsisting in emotions of a given character. One of the most\ndistinguished Professors of Theology in this country laid down this\nproposition, as the basis of a course of lectures on Moral Philosophy,\nthat \"everything right or wrong in a moral agent, consists exclusively\nof right or wrong _feelings_\"--feelings as distinguished from volitions\nas phenomena of Will. Now precisely the reverse of the above proposition\nis true, to wit: that _nothing_ right or wrong, in a moral agent,\nconsists in any states of the Sensibility irrespective of the action of\nthe Will. Who would dare to say, when he has particular emotions,\ndesires, or involuntary feelings, that the Moral law has no further\nclaim upon him, that all its demands are fully met in those feelings?\nWho would dare to affirm, when he has any particular emotions, that all\nmoral agents in existence are bound to have those identical feelings? If\nthe demands of the Moral law are fully met in any states of the\nSensibility--which would be true, if everything right or wrong, in moral\nagents, consists of right or wrong feelings--then all moral agents, at\nall times, and under all circumstances, are bound to have these same\nfeelings. For what the law demands, at one time, it demands at all\ntimes. All the foundations of moral obligation are swept away by the\ntheory under consideration.\n\nLOVE AS REQUIRED BY THE MORAL LAW.\n\n2. We are now prepared to state distinctly the _nature_ of that _love_\nwhich is the \"fulfilling of the law.\" It does not, as all admit, consist\nin the mere external act. Nor does it consist, for reasons equally\nobvious and universally admitted, in any mere _convictions_ of the\nIntelligence. For reasons above assigned, it does not consist in any\nstates of the Sensibility. No man, when he is conscious of such\nfeelings, can affirm that all Intelligents are bound, under all\ncircumstances, to have the same feelings that he now has. This would be\ntrue, if the love under consideration consists of such feelings. But\nwhen, from, a regard to the idea of duty, the whole being is voluntarily\nconsecrated to the promotion, in the highest degree, of universal good\nand when, in the pursuit of this end, there is a serious intention to\nesteem and treat all beings and interests according to their intrinsic\nand relative importance; _here_ is the love which is the fulfilling of\nthe law. Here is the intention by which all intelligents, in reference\nto all interests and objects, are, at all times, bound to be controlled,\nand which must be imposed, as universal law, upon such Intelligents in\nevery system of righteous moral legislation. Here is the intention, in\nthe exercise of which all obligation is fully met. Here, consequently,\nis that love which is the fulfilling of the law. In a subsequent\nChapter, my design is to show that this is the view of the subject\npresented in the Scriptures of truth. I now present it merely as a\nnecessary truth of the universal Intelligence.\n\nIDENTITY OF CHARACTER AMONG ALL BEINGS MORALLY VIRTUOUS.\n\n3. We now perceive clearly in what consists the real identity of moral\ncharacter, in all Intelligents of true moral rectitude. Their\noccupations, forms of external deportment, and their internal\nconvictions and feelings, may be endlessly diversified. Yet one\nomnipresent, all-controlling intention, an intention which is ever one\nand identical, directs all their moral movements. It is the intention,\nin the promotion of the highest good of universal being, to esteem and\ntreat all persons and interests according to their intrinsic and\nrelative importance, from regard to moral obligation. Thus moral virtue,\nin all Intelligents possessed of it, is perfectly one and identical. In\nthis sense only are all moral agents capable of perfect identity of\ncharacter. They cannot all have, at all times, or perhaps at any time,\nprecisely the same thoughts and feelings. But they can all have, at all\ntimes, one and the same intention. The omnipresent influence and control\nof the intention above illustrated, constitutes a perfect identity of\ncharacter in God and all beings morally pure in existence. For this\nreason, the supreme control of this intention implies, in all moral\nagents alike, a perfect fulfilment of the law, a full discharge of all\nobligation of every kind.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII.\n\nTHE ELEMENT OF THE WILL IN COMPLEX PHENOMENA.\n\nSECTION I.\n\nEVERY perception, every judgment, every thought, which appears within\nthe entire sphere of the Intelligence; every sensation, every emotion,\nevery desire, all the states of the Sensibility, present objects for the\naction of the Will in one direction or another. The sphere of the Will's\nactivity, therefore, is as extensive as the vast and almost boundless\nrange of the Intelligence and Sensibility both. Now while all the\nphenomena of these two last named faculties are, in themselves, wholly\ndestitute of moral character, the action of the Will, in the direction\nof such phenomena, constitutes _complex_ states of mind, which have a\npositive moral character. In all instances, the _moral_ and _voluntary_\nelements are one and identical. As the distinction under consideration\nhas been overlooked by the great mass of philosophers and theologians,\nand as very great errors have thereby arisen, not only in philosophy,\nbut in theology and morals both, I will dwell at more length upon the\nsubject than I otherwise should have done. My remarks will be confined\nto the action of the Will in the direction of the _natural propensities_\nand _religious affections_.\n\nACTION OF THE WILL IN THE DIRECTION OF THE NATURAL\nPROPENSITIES.--EMOTION, DESIRE, AND WISH DEFINED.\n\n1. In respect to the action of the Will in the direction of the natural\npropensities, such as the appetites, the love of esteem, of power, &c.,\nI would remark, that the complex states thence resulting, are commonly\nexplained as simple feelings or states of the Sensibility. In presenting\nthis subject in a proper light, the following explanations are deemed\nnecessary. When any physical power operates upon any of the organs of\nsense, or when any thought is present in the Intelligence, the state of\nthe Sensibility immediately and necessarily resulting is called a\n_sensation_ or _emotion_. When any feeling arises impelling the Will to\nseek or avoid the object of that sensation or emotion, this impulsive\nstate of the Sensibility is called a _desire_. When the Will concurs\nwith the desire, a complex state of mind results, called a _wish_. Wish\nis distinguished from Desire in this, that in the former, the desire is\ncherished and perpetuated by the concurrence of the Will with the\ndesire. When the Desire impels the Will towards a prohibited object, the\naction of the Will, in concurrence with the desire, constitutes a wish\nmorally wrong. When the Desire impels the Will in a required direction,\nand the Will, from a respect to the idea of duty, concurs with the\ndesire, a wish arises which is morally virtuous. This principle holds\ntrue in regard to the action of all the propensities. The excitement of\nthe propensity, as a state of the Sensibility, constitutes desire--a\nfeeling in itself destitute of all moral qualities. The action of the\nWill in concurrence with, or opposition to, this feeling, constitutes a\ncomplex state of mind morally right or wrong.\n\nANGER, PRIDE, AMBITION, &c.\n\nAnger, for example, as prohibited by the moral law, is not a mere\n_feeling_ of displeasure awakened by some injury, real or supposed,\nperpetrated by another. This state, on the other hand, consists in the\nsurrendering of the Will to the control of that feeling, and thus acting\nfrom malign impulse. Pride also is not the mere _desire_ of esteem. It\nconsists in voluntary subjection to that propensity, seeking esteem and\nadmiration as the great end of existence. Ambition, too, is not mere\ndesire of power, but the voluntary surrendering of our being to the\ncontrol of that propensity. The same, I repeat, holds true in respect to\nall the propensities. No mere excitement of the Sensibility,\nirrespective of the action of the Will, has any moral character. In the\naction of the Will in respect to such states--action which must arise in\nsome direction under such circumstances--moral guilt, or\npraiseworthiness, arises.\n\nI might here adduce other cases in illustration of the same principle;\nas, for example, the fact that intemperance in food and drink does not\nconsist, as a moral act or state, in the mere strength of the\nappetite--that is, in the degree in which it is excited in the presence\nof its appropriate objects. Nor does it consist in mere excess in the\nquantity partaken of--excess considered as an external act. It consists,\non the other hand, in the surrendering of the voluntary power to the\ncontrol of the appetite. The excess referred to is the _consequent_ and\n_index_ of such voluntary subjection. The above examples, however, are\nabundantly sufficient to illustrate the principle.\n\nRELIGIOUS AFFECTIONS.\n\n2. We will now contemplate the element of the Will in those complex\nphenomena denominated _religious affections_. The position which I here\nassume is this, that whatever in such affections is morally right and\npraiseworthy, that which is directly referred to, where such affections\nare required of us, is the voluntary element to be found in them. The\nvoluntary element is directly required. Other elements are required only\non the ground that their existence is conditioned upon, and necessarily\nresults from, that of the voluntary element. This must be admitted, or\nwe must deny the position established in the last Chapter, to wit: that\nall the requirements of the Moral law are fully met in the right action\nof the Will.\n\nSCRIPTURE TESTIMONY.\n\nMy object now is to show, that this is the light in which the subject is\nreally presented in the Scriptures. I will cite, as examples, the three\ncardinal virtues of Christianity, Repentance, Love, and Faith. The\nquestion is, Are these virtues or affections, presented in the Bible as\nmere convictions of the Intelligence, or states of the Sensibility? Are\nthey not, on the other hand, presented as voluntary states of mind, or\nas acts of Will? Are not the commands requiring them fully met in such\nacts?\n\nREPENTANCE.\n\nIn regard to Repentance, I would remark, that the term is scarcely used\nat all in the Old Testament. Other terms and phrases are there employed\nto express the same thing; as for example, \"Turn ye;\" \"Let the wicked\nforsake his way;\" \"Let him turn unto the Lord;\" \"He that confesseth and\nforsaketh his sins shall find mercy,\" &c. In all such passages\nrepentance is most clearly presented as consisting exclusively of\nvoluntary acts or intentions. The commands requiring it are, therefore,\nfully met in such acts. In the New Testament this virtue is\ndistinguished from Godly Sorrow, the state of the Sensibility which\naccompanies its exercise. As distinguished from the action of the\nSensibility, what can it be, but a voluntary state, as presented in the\nOld Testament? When the mind places itself in voluntary harmony with\nthose convictions and feelings which attend a consciousness of sin as\ncommitted against God and man, this is the repentance recognized and\nrequired as such in the Bible. It does not consist in the mere\n_conviction_ of sin; for then the worst of men, and even devils, would\nbe truly repentant. Nor does it consist in the states of the Sensibility\nwhich attend such convictions; else Repentance would be Godly Sorrow,\nfrom which the Bible, as stated above, definitely distinguishes it. It\nmust consist in a voluntary act, in which, in accordance with those\nconvictions and feelings, the mind turns from sin to holiness, from\nselfishness to benevolence, from the paths of disobedience to the\nservice of God.\n\nLOVE.\n\nA single passage will distinctly set before us the nature of _Love_ as\nrequired in the Bible--that love which comprehends all other virtues,\nand the exercise of which is the \"fulfilling of the law.\" \"Hereby,\" says\nthe sacred writer, \"we perceive the love of God.\" The phrase \"_of God_\"\nis not found in the original. The passage, as it there stands, reads\nthus: \"By this we know _love;_\" that is, we know the nature of the love\nwhich the Scriptures require, when they affirm, that \"love is the\nfulfilling of the law.\" What is that in which, according to the express\nteaching of inspiration, we learn the nature of this love? \"Because he\nlaid down his life for us: and we ought to lay down our lives for the\nbrethren.\" In the act of \"laying down his life for us,\" we are here\ntold, that the love required of us is embodied and revealed. What is the\nnature of this love? I answer,\n\n1. It is not a conviction of the Intelligence, nor any excited state of\nthe Sensibility. No such thing is here referred to.\n\n2. It does and must consist exclusively in a voluntary act, or\nintention. \"He laid down his life for us.\" What is this but a voluntary\nact? Yet this is love, the \"love which is the fulfilling of the law.\"\n\n3. As an act of Will, love must consist exclusively in a voluntary\ndevotion of our entire powers to one end, the highest good of universal\nbeing, from a regard to the idea of duty. \"He laid down his life for\nus.\" \"We _ought_ to lay down our lives for the brethren.\" In each\nparticular here presented, a universal principle is expressed and\nrevealed. Christ \"laid down his life for us,\" because he was in a state\nof voluntary consecration to the good of universal being. The particular\nact was put forth, as a means to this end. In a voluntary consecration\nto the same end, and as a means to this end, it is declared, that \"we\nought to lay down our lives for the brethren.\" When, therefore, the\nScriptures require love of us, they do not demand the existence of\nparticular convictions of the Intelligence, nor certain states of the\nSensibility. They require the voluntary consecration of our entire being\nand interests to the great end of universal good. In this act of\nconsecration, and in the employment of all our powers and interests,\nunder the control of this one intention, we fulfil the Law. We fully\ndischarge all obligations, actual and conceivable, that are devolved\nupon us. The exercise of love, like that of repentance, is attended with\nparticular convictions and feelings. These feelings are indirectly\nrequired in the precepts demanding love, and required, because when the\nlatter does exist, the former will of course exist.\n\nOF FAITH.\n\nBut little need be said in explanation of the nature of Faith. It is\neverywhere presented in the Bible, as synonymous with _trust_, reposing\nconfidence, committing our interests to God as to a \"faithful Creator.\"\nNow Trust is undeniably a voluntary state of mind. \"I know,\" says Paul,\n\"in whom I have believed,\" that is, exercised faith, \"that he is able to\nkeep that which I have _committed_ to him against that day.\" Here the\nact of committing to the care of another, which can be nothing else than\nan act of Will, is presented as synonymous with Faith. Faith, then, does\nnot consist in conviction, nor in any excited feelings. It is a\nvoluntary act, _entrusting_ our interests to God as to a faithful\nCreator. The principle above established must apply to all religious\naffections of every kind.\n\nSEC. II. GENERAL TOPICS SUGGESTED BY THE TRUTH ILLUSTRATED IN THE\nPRECEDING SECTION.\n\nFew truths are of greater practical moment than that illustrated in the\npreceding section. My object, now, is to apply it to the elucidation of\ncertain important questions which require elucidation.\n\nCONVICTIONS, FEELINGS AND EXTERNAL ACTIONS--WHY REQUIRED, OR PROHIBITED.\n\n1. We see why it is, that, while no mere external action, no state of\nthe Intelligence or Sensibility, has any moral character in itself,\nirrespective of the action of the Will, still such acts and states are\nspecifically and formally required or prohibited in the Bible. In such\nprecepts the _effect_ is put for the _cause_. These acts and states are\nrequired, or prohibited, as the natural and necessary results of right\nor wrong intentions. The thing really referred to, in such commands and\nprohibitions, is not the acts or states specified, but the _cause_ of\nsuch acts and states, to wit: the right or wrong action of the Will.\nSuppose, that a certain loathsome disease of the body would necessarily\nresult from certain intentions, or acts of Will. Now God might prohibit\nthe intention which causes that disease, in either of two ways. He might\nspecify the intention and directly prohibit that; or he might prohibit\nthe same thing, in such a form as this: Thou shalt not have this\ndisease. Every one will perceive that, in both prohibitions, the same\nthing, precisely, would be referred to and intended, to wit: the\nintention which sustains to the evil designed to be prevented, the\nrelation of a cause. The same principle, precisely, holds true in\nrespect to all external actions and states of the Intelligence and\nSensibility, which are specifically required or prohibited.\n\nOUR RESPONSIBILITY IN RESPECT TO SUCH PHENOMENA.\n\n2. We also distinctly perceive the ground of our responsibility for the\nexistence of external actions, and internal convictions and feelings.\nWhatever effects, external or internal, necessarily result, and are or\nmay be known to result, from the right or wrong action of the Will, we\nmay properly be held responsible for. Now, all external actions and\ninternal convictions and feelings which are required of or prohibited to\nus, sustain precisely this relation to the right or wrong action of the\nWill. The intention being given, the effect follows as a consequence.\nFor this reason we are held responsible for the effect.\n\nFEELINGS HOW CONTROLLED BY THE WILL.\n\n3. We now notice the _power of control_ which the Will has over the\nfeelings.\n\n(1.) In one respect its control is unlimited. It may yield itself to the\ncontrol of the feelings, or wholly withhold its concurrence.\n\n(2.) In respect to all feelings, especially those which impel to violent\nor unlawful action, the Will may exert a direct influence which will\neither greatly modify, or totally suppress the feeling. For example,\nwhen there is an inflexible purpose of Will not to yield to angry\nfeelings, if they should arise, and to suppress them, as soon as they\nappear, feelings of a violent character will not result to any great\nextent, whatever provocations the mind may be subject to. The same holds\ntrue of almost all feelings of every kind. Whenever they appear, if they\nare directly and strongly willed down, they will either be greatly\nmodified, or totally disappear.\n\n(3.) Over the action and states of the Sensibility the Will may exert an\nindirect influence which is all-powerful. If, for example, the Will is\nin full harmony with the infinite, the eternal, the just, the right, the\ntrue and the good, the Intelligence will, of course, be occupied with\n\"whatsoever things are true, honest, just, pure, lovely and of good\nreport,\" and the Sensibility, continually acted upon by such objects,\nwill mirror forth, in pure emotions and desires, the pure thoughts of\nthe Intelligence, and the hallowed purposes of the Will. The Sensibility\nwill be wholly isolated from all feelings gross and sensual. On the\nother hand, let the Will be yielded to the control of impure and sensual\nimpulse, and how gross and impure the thoughts and feelings will become.\nIn yielding, or refusing to yield, to the supreme control of the law of\nGoodness, the Will really, though indirectly, determines the action of\nthe Intelligence and Sensibility both.\n\n(4.) To present the whole subject in a proper light, a fixed law of the\n_affections_ demands special attention. A husband, for example, has\npledged to his wife, not only kind intentions, but the exclusive control\nof those peculiar affections which constitute the basis of the marriage\nunion. Let him cherish a proper regard for the sacredness of that\npledge, and the wife will so completely and exclusively fill and command\nher appropriate sphere in the affections, that, under no circumstances\nwhatever, will there be a tendency towards any other individual. The\nsame holds true of every department of the affections, not only in\nrespect to those which connect us with the creature, but also with the\nCreator. The affections the Will may control by a fixed and changeless\nlaw.\n\nSuch being the relation of the Will to the Sensibility, while it is true\nthat there is nothing right or wrong in any feelings, irrespective of\nthe action of the Will, still the presence of feelings impure and\nsensual, may be a certain indication of the wrong action of the\nvoluntary power. In such a light their presence should always be\nregarded.\n\nRELATION OF FAITH TO OTHER EXERCISES MORALLY RIGHT.\n\n4. In the preceding Section it has been fully shown, that love,\nrepentance, faith, and all other religious exercises, are, in their\nfundamental and characteristic elements, phenomena of the Will. We will\nnow, for a few moments, contemplate the relations of these different\nexercises to one another, especially the relation of _Faith_ to other\nexercises of a kindred character. While it is true, as has been\ndemonstrated in a preceding Chapter, that the Will cannot at the same\ntime put forth intentions of a contradictory character, such as sin and\nholiness, it is equally true, that it may simultaneously put forth acts\nof a homogeneous character. In view of our obligations to yield implicit\nobedience to God, we may purpose such obedience. In view of the fact,\nthat, in the Gospel, grace is proffered to perfect us in our obedience,\nat the same time that we purpose obedience with all the heart, we may\nexercise implicit trust, or faith for \"grace whereby we may serve God\nacceptably with reverence and godly fear.\" Now, such is our condition as\nsinners, that without a revelation of this grace, we should never\npurpose obedience in the first instance. Without the continued influence\nof that grace, this purpose would not subsequently be perfected and\nperpetuated. The purpose is first formed in reliance upon Divine grace;\nand but for this grace and consequent reliance, would never have been\nformed. In consequence of the influence of this grace relied upon, and\nreceived by faith, this same purpose is afterwards perfected and\nperpetuated. Thus, we see, that the purpose of obedience is really\nconditioned for its existence and perpetuity upon the act of reliance\nupon Divine grace. The same holds true of the relation of Faith to all\nacts or intentions morally right or holy. One act of Will, in itself\nperfectly pure, is really conditioned upon another in itself equally\npure. This is the doctrine of Moral Purification, or Sanctification by\nfaith, a doctrine which is no less true, as a fact in philosophy, than\nas a revealed truth of inspiration.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\n\nINFLUENCE OF THE WILL IN INTELLECTUAL JUDGMENTS.\n\nMEN OFTEN VOLUNTARY IN THEIR OPINIONS.\n\nIT is an old maxim, that the Will governs the understanding. It becomes\na very important inquiry with us, To what extent, and in what sense, is\nthis maxim true? It is undeniable, that, in many important respects,\nmankind are voluntary in their opinions and judgments, and therefore,\nresponsible for them. We often hear the declaration, \"You ought, or\nought not, to entertain such and such opinions, to form such and such\njudgments.\" \"You are bound to admit, or have no right to admit, such and\nsuch things as true.\" Men often speak, also, of _pre-judging_ particular\ncases, and thus incurring guilt. A question may very properly be asked\nhere, what are these opinions, judgments, admissions, pre-judgments,\n&c.? Are they real affirmations of the Intelligence, or are they\nexclusively phenomena of the Will?\n\nERROR NOT FROM THE INTELLIGENCE, BUT THE WILL.\n\nThe proposition which I lay down is this, _that the Intelligence, in its\nappropriate exercise, can seldom if ever, make wrong affirmations; that\nwrong opinions, admissions, pre-judgments, &c., are in most, if not all\ninstances, nothing else than phenomena, or assumptions of Will_. If the\nIntelligence can make wrong affirmations, it is important to determine\nin what department of its action such affirmations may be found.\n\nPRIMARY FACULTIES CANNOT ERR.\n\nLet us first contemplate the action of the _primary_ intellectual\nfaculties--Sense, or the faculty of _external_ perception;\nConsciousness, the faculty of _internal_ observation; and Reason, the\nfaculty which gives us _necessary_ and _universal truths_. The two\nformer faculties give us phenomena external and internal. The latter\ngives us the logical antecedents of phenomena, thus perceived and\naffirmed, to wit: the ideas of substance, cause, space, time, &c. In the\naction of these faculties, surely, real error is impossible.\n\nSO OF THE SECONDARY FACULTIES.\n\nLet us now contemplate the action of the secondary faculties, the\nUnderstanding and Judgment. The former unites the elements given by the\nthree primary faculties into _notions_ of particular objects. The latter\nclassifies these notions according to qualities perceived. Here, also,\nwe find no place for wrong affirmations. The understanding can only\ncombine the elements actually given by the primary faculties. The\nJudgment can classify only according to qualities actually perceived.\nThus I might go over the entire range of the Intelligence, and show,\nthat seldom, if ever, in its appropriate action, it can make wrong\naffirmations.\n\nERROR, WHERE FOUND.--ASSUMPTION.\n\nWhere then is the place for error, for wrong opinions, and\npre-judgments? Let us suppose, that a number of individuals are\nobserving some object at a distance from them. No qualities are given\nbut those common to a variety of objects, such as a man, horse, ox, &c.\nThe perceptive faculty has deceived no one in this case. It has given\nnothing but real qualities. The Understanding can only form a notion of\nit, as an object possessing these particular qualities. The Judgment can\nonly affirm, that the qualities perceived are common to different\nclasses of objects, and consequently, that no affirmations can be made\nas to what class the object perceived does belong. The Intelligence,\ntherefore, makes no false affirmations. Still the inquiry goes round.\n\"What is it?\" One answers, \"It is a man.\" That is my opinion. Another:\n\"It is a horse.\" That is my judgment. Another still says, \"I differ from\nyou all. It is an ox.\" That is my notion. Now, what are these opinions,\njudgments, and notions? Are they real affirmations of the Intelligence?\nBy no means. The Intelligence cannot affirm at all, under such\ncircumstances. They are nothing in reality, but mere _assumptions_ of\nthe Will. A vast majority of the so called opinions, beliefs, judgments,\nand notions among men, and all where _error_ is found, are nothing but\nassumptions of the Will.\n\nAssumptions are sometimes based upon real affirmations of the\nIntelligence, and sometimes not. Suppose the individuals above referred\nto approach the object, till qualities are given which are peculiar to\nthe horse. The Judgment at once classifies the object accordingly. As\nsoon as this takes place, they all exclaim, \"well, it is a horse.\" Here\nare assumptions again, but assumptions based upon real affirmations of\nthe Intelligence. In the former instance we had assumptions based upon\nno such affirmations.\n\nFalse assumptions do not always imply moral guilt. Much of the necessary\nbusiness of life has no other basis than prudent or imprudent\n_guessing_. When the farmer, for example, casts any particular seed into\nthe ground, it is only by balance of probabilities that he often\ndetermines, as far as he does or can determine, what is best; and not\nunfrequently is he necessitated to assume and act, when all\nprobabilities are so perfectly balanced, that he can find no reasons at\nall for taking one course in distinction from another. Yet no moral\nguilt is incurred when one is necessitated to act in some direction, and\nwhen all available light has been sought and employed to determine the\ndirection which is best.\n\nAs false assumptions, however, often involve very great moral guilt, it\nmay be important to develope some of the distinguishing characteristics\nof assumptions of this class.\n\n1. All assumptions involve moral guilt, which are in opposition to the\nreal and positive affirmations of the Intelligence. As the Will may\nassume in the absence of such affirmations, and in the direction of\nthem, so it may in opposition to them. When you have carried a man's\nIntellect in favor of a given proposition, it is by no means certain\nthat you have gained his assent to its truth. He may still assume, that\nall the evidence presented is inadequate, and consequently refuse to\nadmit its truth. When the Will thus divorces itself from the\nIntelligence, guilt of no ordinary character is incurred. Men often\nexpress their convictions of the guilt thus incurred, by saying to\nindividuals, \"You are bound to admit that fact or proposition as true.\nYou are already convinced. What excuse have you for not yielding to that\nconviction?\" Yet individuals will often do fatal violence to their\nintellectual and moral nature, by holding on to assumptions, in reality\nknown to be false.\n\n2. Assumptions involve moral guilt which are formed without availing\nourselves of all the light within our reach as the basis of our\nassumptions. For us to assume any proposition, or statement, to be true\nor false, in the absence of affirmations of the Intelligence, as the\nbasis of such assumptions, when adequate light is available, involves\nthe same criminality, as assumptions in opposition to the Intelligence.\nHence we often have the expression in common life, \"You had no right to\nform a judgment under such circumstances. You were bound, before doing\nit, to avail yourself of all the light within your reach.\"\n\n3. _Positive_ assumptions, without intellectual affirmations as their\nbasis, equally positive, involve moral guilt of no ordinary character.\nAs remarked above, we are often placed in circumstances in which we are\nnecessitated to act in some direction, and to select some particular\ncourse without any perceived reasons in favor of that one course in\ndistinction from another. Now while _action_ is proper in such a\ncondition, it is not proper to make a positive assumption that the\ncourse selected is the best. Suppose, that all the facts before my mind\nbearing upon the character of a neighbor, are equally consistent with\nthe possession, on his part, of a character either good or bad. I do\nviolence to my intellectual and moral nature, if, under such\ncircumstances, I make the assumption that his character is either the\none or the other, and especially, that it is the latter instead of the\nformer. How often do flagrant transgressions of moral rectitude occur in\nsuch instances!\n\nPRE-JUDGMENTS.\n\nA few remarks are deemed requisite on this topic. A pre-judgment is an\nassumption, that a proposition or statement is true or false, before the\nfacts, bearing upon the case, have been heard. Such assumptions are\ngenerally classed under the term prejudice. Thus it is said of\nindividuals, that they are prejudiced in favor or against certain\npersons, sentiments, or causes. The real meaning of such statements is,\nthat individuals have made assumptions in one direction or another,\nprior to a hearing of the facts of the case, and irrespective of such\nfacts.\n\nINTELLECT NOT DECEIVED IN PRE-JUDGMENTS.\n\nIt is commonly said, that such prejudices, or pre-judgments, blind the\nmind to facts of one class, and render it quick to discern those of the\nother, and thus lead to a real mis-direction of the Intelligence. This I\nthink is not a correct statement of the case. Pre-judgments may, and\noften do, prevent all proper investigation of a subject. In this case,\nthe Intelligence is not deceived at all. In the absence of real data, it\ncan make no positive affirmations whatever.\n\nSo far also as pre-judgments direct attention from facts bearing upon\none side of a question, and to those bearing upon the other, the\nIntelligence is not thereby deceived. All that it can affirm is the true\nbearing of the facts actually presented. In respect to those not\npresented, and consequently in respect to the real merits of the whole\ncase, it makes no affirmations. If an individual forms an opinion from a\npartial hearing, that opinion is a mere assumption of Will, and nothing\nelse.\n\nTHE MIND HOW INFLUENCED BY PRE-JUDGMENTS.\n\nBut the manner in which pre-judgments chiefly affect the mind in the\nhearing of a cause, still remains to be stated. In such pre-judgments,\nor assumptions, an assumption of this kind is almost invariably\nincluded, to wit: that all facts of whatever character bearing upon one\nside of the question, are wholly indecisive, while all others bearing\nupon the other side are equally decisive. In pre-judging, individuals do\nnot merely pre-judge the real merits of the case, but the character of\nall the facts bearing upon it. They enter upon the investigation of a\ngiven subject, with an inflexible determination to treat all the facts\nand arguments they shall meet with, according to previous assumptions.\nLet the clearest light poured upon one side of the question, and the\nreply is, \"After all, I am not convinced,\" while the most trivial\ncircumstances conceivable bearing upon the other side, will be seized\nupon as perfectly decisive. In all this, we do not meet with the\noperations of a deceived Intelligence, but of a \"deceived heart,\" that\nis, of a depraved Will, stubbornly bent upon verifying its own\nunauthorized, pre-formed assumptions. Such assumptions can withstand any\ndegree of evidence whatever. The Intelligence did not give them\nexistence, and it cannot annihilate them. They are exclusively creatures\nof Will, and by an act of Will, they must be dissolved, or they will\nremain proof against all the evidence which the tide of time can roll\nagainst them.\n\nINFLUENCES WHICH INDUCE FALSE ASSUMPTIONS.\n\nThe influences which induce false and unauthorized assumptions, are\nfound in the strong action of the Sensibility, in the direction of the\nappetites, natural affections, and the different propensities, as the\nlove of gain, ambition, party spirit, pride of character, of opinion,\n&c. When the Will has long been habituated to act in the direction of a\nparticular propensity, how difficult it is to induce the admission, or\nassumption, that action in that direction is wrong! The difficulty, in\nsuch cases, does not, in most instances, lie in convincing the\nIntelligence, but in inducing the Will to admit as true what the\nIntelligence really affirms.\n\nCASES IN WHICH WE ARE APPARENTLY, THOUGH NOT REALLY, MISLED BY THE\nINTELLIGENCE.\n\nAs there are cases of this kind, it is important to mark some of their\ncharacteristics. Among these I cite the following:\n\n1. The qualities of a particular object, actually perceived, as in the\ncase above cited, may be common to a variety of classes which we know,\nand also to others which we do not know. On the perception of such\nqualities, the Intelligence will suggest those classes only which we\nknow, while the particular object perceived may belong to a class\nunknown. If, in such circumstances, a positive assumption, as to what\nclass it does belong, is made, a wrong assumption must of necessity be\nmade. The _Intelligence_ in this case is not deceived. It places the\nWill, however, in such a relation to the object, that if a positive\nassumption is made, it must necessarily be a wrong one. In this manner,\nmultitudes of wrong assumptions arise.\n\n2. When facts are before the mind, an _explanation_ of them is often\ndesired. In such circumstances, the Intelligence may suggest, in\nexplanation, a number of hypotheses, which hypotheses may be all alike\nfalse. If a positive assumption is made in such a case, it must of\nnecessity be a false one; because it must be in the direction of some\none hypothesis before the mind at the time. Here, also, the Intelligence\nnecessitates a wrong assumption, if any is made. Yet it is not itself\ndeceived; because it gives no positive affirmations as the basis of\npositive assumptions. In such circumstances, error very frequently\narises.\n\n3. _Experience_ often occasions wrong assumptions, which are attributed\nincorrectly to real affirmations of the Intelligence. A friend, for\nexample, saw an object which presented the external appearance of the\napple. He had never before seen those qualities, except in connection\nwith that class of objects. He assumed, at once, that it was a real\napple; but subsequently found that it was an artificial, and not a real\none. Was the Intelligence deceived in this instance? By no means. That\nfaculty had never affirmed, that those qualities which the apple\npresents to the eye, never exist in connection with any other object,\nand consequently, that the apple must have been present in the instance\ngiven. _Experience_, and not a positive affirmation of the Intelligence,\nled to the wrong assumption in this instance. The same principle holds\ntrue, in respect to a vast number of instances that might be named.\n\n4. Finally, the Intelligence may not only make positive affirmations in\nthe presence of qualities perceived, but it may affirm _hypothetically_,\nthat is, when a given proposition is _assumed_ as true, the Intelligence\nmay and will present the logical _antecedents_ and _consequents_ of that\nassumption. If the assumption is false, such will be the character of\nthe antecedents and consequents following from it. An individual, in\ntracing out these antecedents and consequents, however, may mistake the\nhypothetical, for the real, affirmations of the Intelligence. One wrong\nassumption in theology or philosophy, for example, may give an entire\nsystem, all of the leading principles of which are likewise false. In\ntracing out, and perfecting that system, how natural the assumption,\nthat one is following the _real_, and not the _hypothetical_,\naffirmations of the Intelligence! From this one source an infinity of\nerror exists among men.\n\nIn an enlarged Treatise on mental science, the subject of the present\nchapter should receive a much more extensive elucidation than could be\ngiven to it in this connection. Few subjects would throw more clear\nlight over the domains of truth and error than this, if fully and\ndistinctly elucidated.\n\nIn conclusion, I would simply remark, that one of the highest\nattainments in virtue which we can conceive an intelligent being to\nmake, consists in a continued and vigorous employment of the\nIntelligence in search of the right, the just, the true, and the good,\nin all departments of human investigation; and in a rigid discipline of\nthe Will, to receive and treat, as true and sacred, whatever the\nIntelligence may present, as possessed of such characteristics, to the\nfull subjection of all impulses in the direction of unauthorized\nassumptions.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV.\n\nLIBERTY AND SERVITUDE.\n\nLIBERTY OF WILL AS OPPOSED TO MORAL SERVITUDE.\n\nTHERE are, among others, two senses of the term Liberty, which ought to\nbe carefully distinguished from each other. In the first sense, it\nstands opposed to Necessity; in the second, to what is called Moral\nServitude. It is in the last sense that I propose to consider the\nsubject in the present Chapter. What, then, is Liberty as opposed to\nMoral Servitude? _It is that state in which the action of Will is in\nharmony with the Moral Law, with the idea of the right, the just, the\ntrue, and the good, while all the propensities are held in perfect\nsubordination--a state in which the mind may purpose obedience to the\nlaw of right with the rational hope of carrying that determination into\naccomplishment_. This state all mankind agree in calling a state of\nmoral freedom. The individual who has attained to it, is not in\nservitude to any propensity whatever. He \"rules his own spirit.\" He is\nthe master of himself. He purposes the good, and performs it. He\nresolves against the evil, and avoids it. \"Greater,\" says the maxim of\nancient wisdom, \"is such a man than he that taketh a city.\"\n\nMoral Servitude, on the other hand, is _a state in which the Will is so\nensnared by the Sensibility, so habituated to subjection to the\npropensities, that it has so lost the prerogative of self-control, that\nit cannot resolve upon action in the direction of the law of right, with\nany rational expectation of keeping that resolution_. The individual in\nthis condition \"knows the good, and approves of it, yet follows the\nbad.\" \"The good that he would (purposes to do), he does not, but the\nevil that he would not (purposes not to do), that he does.\" All men\nagree in denominating this a state of Moral Servitude. Whenever an\nindividual is manifestly governed by appetite, or any other propensity,\nby common consent, he is said to be a slave in respect to his\npropensities.\n\nThe reason why the former state is denominated Liberty, and the latter\nServitude, is obvious. Liberty, as opposed to Servitude, is universally\nregarded as a good in itself. As such, it is desired and chosen.\nServitude, on the other hand, may be submitted to, as the least of two\nevils. Yet it can never be desired and chosen, as a good in itself.\nEvery man who is in a state of servitude, is there, in an important\nsense, against his Will. The _state_ in which he is, is regarded as in\nitself the greatest of evils, excepting those which would arise from a\nvain attempt at a vindication of personal freedom.\n\nThe same principle holds true in respect to Moral Liberty and Servitude.\nWhen any individual contemplates the idea of the voluntary power rising\nto full dominion over impulse of every kind, and acting in sublime\nharmony with the pure and perfect law of rectitude, as revealed in the\nIntelligence, every one regards this as a state, of all others, the most\nto be desired and chosen as a good in itself. To enter upon this state,\nand to continue in it, is therefore regarded as a realization of the\nidea of Liberty in the highest and best sense of the term. Subjection to\nimpulse, in opposition to the pure dictates of the Intelligence, to the\nloss of the high prerogative of \"ruling our own spirits,\" on the other\nhand, is regarded by all men as in itself a state the most abject, and\nleast to be desired conceivable. The individual that is there, cannot\nbut despise his own image. He, of necessity, loathes and abhors himself.\nYet he submits to self-degradation rather than endure the pain and\neffort of self-emancipation. No term but Servitude, together with others\nof a kindred import, expresses the true conception of this state. No man\nis in a state of Moral Servitude from choice--that is, from choice of\nthe state as a good in itself. The _state_ he regards as an evil in\nitself. Yet, in the exercise of free choice, he is there, because he\nsubmits to self-degradation rather than vindicate his right to freedom.\n\nREMARKS.\n\nMISTAKE OF GERMAN METAPHYSICIANS.\n\n1. We notice a prominent and important mistake common to metaphysicians,\nespecially of the German school, in their Treatises on the Will. Liberty\nof Will with them is Liberty as distinguished from Moral Servitude, and\nnot as distinguished from Necessity. Hence, in all their works, very\nlittle light is thrown upon the great idea of Liberty, which lies at the\nfoundation of moral obligation, to wit: Liberty as distinguished from\nNecessity. \"A free Will,\" says Kant, \"and a Will subjected to the Moral\nLaw, are one and identical.\" A more capital error in philosophy is not\noften met with than this.\n\nMORAL SERVITUDE OF THE RACE.\n\n2. In the state of Moral Servitude above described, the Bible affirms\nall men to be, until they are emancipated by the influence of the\nRemedial System therein revealed--a truth affirmed by what every man\nexperiences in himself, and by the entire mass of facts which the\nhistory of the race presents. Where is the individual that, unaided by\nan influence out of himself, has ever attained to a dominion over his\nown spirit? Where is the individual that, without such an influence, can\nresolve upon acting in harmony with the law of pure benevolence, with\nany rational hope of success? To meet this great want of human nature;\nto provide an influence adequate to its redemption, from what the\nScriptures, with great propriety, call the \"bondage of corruption,\" is a\nfundamental design of the Remedial System.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV.\n\nLIBERTY AND DEPENDENCE.\n\nCOMMON IMPRESSION.\n\nA VERY common impression exists,--an impression universal among those\nwho hold the doctrine of Necessity,--that the doctrine of Liberty, as\nmaintained in this Treatise, renders man, really, in most important\nrespects, independent of his Creator, and therefore, tends to induce in\nthe mind, that spirit of haughty independence which is totally opposite\nand antagonistic to that spirit of humility and dependence which lies at\nthe basis of all true piety and virtue. If this is the real tendency of\nthis doctrine, it certainly constitutes an important objection against\nit. If, on the other hand, we find in the nature of this doctrine,\nessential elements totally destructive of the spirit of pride and\nself-confidence, and tending most strongly to induce the opposite\nspirit,--a spirit of humility and dependence upon the grace proffered in\nthe Remedial System; if we find, also, that the doctrine of Necessity,\nin many fundamental particulars, lacks these benign tendencies, we have,\nin such a case, the strongest evidence in favor of the former doctrine,\nand against the latter. The object of the present Chapter, therefore, is\nto _elucidate the tendency of the doctrine of Liberty to destroy the\nspirit of pride, haughtiness, and self-dependence, and to induce the\nspirit of humility and dependence upon Divine Grace_.\n\nSPIRIT OF DEPENDENCE DEFINED.\n\nBefore proceeding directly to argue this question, we need to settle\ndefinitely the meaning of the phrase _spirit of dependence_. The\n_conviction_ of our dependence is one thing. The _spirit_ of dependence\nis quite another. What is this spirit? In its exercise, the mind _rests\nin voluntary dependence upon the grace of God_. The heart is fully set\nupon doing the right, and avoiding the wrong, while the mind is in the\nvoluntary exercise of _trust_ in God for \"grace whereby we may serve Him\nacceptably.\" The _spirit_ of dependence, then, implies obedience\nactually commenced. The question is, does the belief of the doctrine of\nLiberty tend intrinsically to induce the exercise of this spirit? In\nthis respect, has it altogether a superiority over the doctrine of\nNecessity?\n\nDOCTRINE OF NECESSITY TENDS NOT TO INDUCE THE SPIRIT OF DEPENDENCE.\n\n1. In accomplishing my object, I will first consider the tendency, in\nthis one respect, of the doctrine of Necessity. An individual, we will\nsuppose, finds himself under influences which induce him to sin, and\nwhich consequently, if this doctrine is true, render it impossible for\nhim, without the interposition of Divine power, not to sin. A\nconsideration of his condition tends to _convince_ him, that is, to\ninduce the intellectual conviction, of his entire dependence upon Divine\ngrace. But the intellectual _conviction_ of our dependence, as above\nshown, is one thing. The _spirit_ of dependence, which, as there stated,\nconsists in actually trusting the Most High for grace to do what he\nrequires, and implies actual obedience already commenced, is quite\nanother thing. Now the doctrine of Necessity has a tendency to produce\nthis _conviction_, but none to induce the _spirit_ of dependence:\ninasmuch as with this conviction, it produces another equally strong, to\nwit: that the creature, without a Divine interposition, will not, and\ncannot, exercise the _spirit_ of dependence. In thus producing the\nconviction, that, under present influences, the subject does not, and\ncannot exercise that spirit, this doctrine tends exclusively to the\nannihilation of that Spirit.\n\nWhen an individual is in a state of actual obedience, the tendency of\nthis doctrine upon him is no better; since it produces the conviction,\nthat while a Divine influence, independently of ourselves, produces in\nus a spirit of dependence, we shall and must exercise it; and that while\nit does not produce that spirit, we do not and cannot exercise it. Where\nis the tendency to induce a spirit of dependence, in such a conviction?\nAccording to the doctrine of Necessity, nothing but the actual\ninterposition of Divine grace has any tendency to induce a spirit of\ndependence. The _belief_ of this doctrine has no such tendency whatever.\nThe grand mistake of the Necessitarian here, consists in the assumption,\nthat, because his _doctrine has a manifest tendency to produce the_\nCONVICTION _of dependence, it has a tendency equally manifest to induce\nthe_ SPIRIT _of dependence;_ when, in fact, it has no such tendency\nwhatever.\n\n2. We will now contemplate the intrinsic tendencies of the doctrine of\nLiberty to induce the spirit of humility and dependence. Every one will\nsee, at once, that the consciousness of Liberty cannot itself be a\nground of dependence, in respect to action, in favor of the right and in\nopposition to the wrong: for the possession of such Liberty, as far as\nthe power itself is concerned, leaves us, at all times, equally liable\nto do the one as the other. How can an equal liability to two distinct\nand opposite courses, be a ground of assurance, that we shall choose the\none, and avoid the other? Thus the consciousness of Liberty tends\ndirectly and intrinsically to a total annihilation of the spirit of\nself-dependence.\n\nLet us now contemplate our relation to the Most High. He knows perfectly\nin what direction we shall, in our self-determination, exert our powers\nunder any influence and system of influences brought to bear upon us. It\nis also in His power to subject us to any system of influences he\npleases. He has revealed to us the great truth, that if, in the exercise\nof the spirit of dependence, we will trust Him for grace to do the good\nand avoid the evil which He requires us to do and avoid, He will subject\nus to a Divine influence, which shall for ever secure us in the one, and\nagainst the other. The conviction, therefore, rises with full and\nperfect distinctness in the mind, that, in the exercise of the spirit of\ndependence, action in all future time, in the direction of purity and\nbliss, is secure; and that, in the absence of this spirit, action, in\nthe opposite direction, is equally certain. In the belief of the\ndoctrine of Liberty, another truth becomes an omnipresent reality to our\nminds, that the _exercise_ of this spirit, thus rendering our \"calling\nand election sure,\" is, at all times, practicable to us. What then is\nthe exclusive tendency of this doctrine? To destroy the spirit of\nself-dependence, on the one hand, and to induce the exercise of the\nopposite spirit, on the other. The doctrine of Necessity reveals the\n_fact_ of dependence, but destroys the _spirit_, by the production of\nthe annihilating conviction, that we neither shall nor can exercise that\nspirit, till God, in his sovereign dispensations, shall subject us to an\ninfluence which renders it impossible for us not to exercise it. The\ndoctrine of Liberty reveals, with equal distinctness, the _fact_ of\ndependence; and then, while it produces the hallowed conviction of the\nperfect practicability of the exercise of the _spirit_ of dependence,\npresents motives infinitely strong, not only to induce its exercise, but\nto empty the mind wholly of everything opposed to it.\n\nGOD CONTROLS ALL INFLUENCES UNDER WHICH CREATURES DO ACT.\n\n3. While the existence and continuance of our powers of moral agency\ndepend wholly upon the Divine Will, and while the Most High knows, with\nentire certainty, in what direction we shall exert our powers, under all\ninfluences, and systems of influences, brought to bear upon us, all\nthese influences are entirely at his disposal. What tendency have such\nconvictions, together with the consciousness of Liberty, and ability to\nexercise, or not to exercise, the spirit of dependence, but to induce\nus, in the exercise of that spirit, to throw our whole being into the\npetition, \"Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil?\" If\nGod knows perfectly under what influences action in us shall be in the\ndirection of the right, or the wrong, and holds all such influences at\nhis own control, what attitude becomes us in the presence of the \"High\nand lofty One,\" but dependence and prayer?\n\nDEPENDENCE ON ACCOUNT OF THE MORAL SERVITUDE OF THE WILL.\n\n4. Finally, a consciousness of a state of Moral Servitude, together with\nthe conviction, that in the exercise of the spirit of dependence, we can\nrise to the \"Glorious Liberty of the Sons of God;\" that in the absence\nof this spirit, our Moral Servitude is perfectly certain; all these,\ntogether with the conviction which the belief of the doctrine of Liberty\ninduces (to wit: that the exercise of the spirit of dependence is always\npracticable to us), tends only to one result, to induce the exercise of\nthat spirit, and to the total annihilation of the opposite spirit.\n\nWhile, therefore, the doctrine of Liberty sanctifies, in the mind, the\nfeeling of obligation to do the right and avoid the wrong, a feeling\nwhich the doctrine of Necessity tends to annihilate, the former (an\neffect which the latter cannot produce) tends only to the annihilation\nof the spirit of pride and self-confidence, and to induce that spirit of\nfilial dependence which cries \"Abba, Father!\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI.\n\nFORMATION OF CHARACTER.\n\nELEMENT OF WILL IN FORMATION OF CHARACTER.\n\nCHARACTER COMMONLY HOW ACCOUNTED FOR.\n\nIN accounting for the existence and formation of peculiarities of\ncharacter, individual, social, and national, two elements only are\ncommonly taken into consideration, the _natural propensities_, and the\n_circumstances and influences_ under which those propensities are\ndeveloped and controlled. The doctrine of Necessity permits us to take\nnothing else into the account. Undoubtedly, these elements have very\ngreat efficacy in determining character. In many instances, little else\nneed to be taken into consideration, in accounting for peculiarities of\ncharacter, as they exist around us, in individuals, communities, and\nnations.\n\nTHE VOLUNTARY ELEMENT TO BE TAKEN INTO THE ACCOUNT.\n\nIn a vast majority of cases, however, another, and altogether a\ndifferent element, that of the Will, or voluntary element, must be taken\ninto the reckoning, or we shall find ourselves wholly unable to account\nfor peculiarities of mental and moral development, everywhere visible\naround us. It is an old maxim, that \"every man is the arbiter of his own\ndestiny.\" As character determines destiny, so the Will determines\ncharacter; and man is the arbiter of his own destiny, only as he is the\narbiter of his own character. The element of Free Will, therefore, must\nbe taken into the reckoning, if we would adequately account for the\npeculiarities of character which the individual, social, and national\nhistory of the race presents. Even where mental and moral developments\nare as the propensities and external influences, still the voluntary\nelement must be reckoned in, if we would account for facts as they\nexist. In a majority of instances, however, if the two elements under\nconsideration, and these only, are taken into the account, we shall find\nour conclusions very wide from the truth.\n\nAN EXAMPLE IN ILLUSTRATION.\n\nI will take, in illustration of the above remarks, a single example--a\ncase with which I became so familiarly acquainted, that I feel perfectly\nsafe in vouching for the truth of the statements which I am about to\nmake. I knew a boy who, up to the age of ten or twelve years, was under\nthe influence of a most ungovernable temper--a temper easily and quickly\nexcited, and which, when excited, rendered him perfectly desperate.\nSeldom, if ever, was he known to yield in a conflict, however superior\nin strength his antagonist might be. Death was always deliberately\npreferred to submission. During this period, he often reflected upon his\ncondition, and frequently wished that it was otherwise. Still, with\nmelancholy deliberation, he as often said to himself, I never can and\nnever shall subdue this temper. At the close of this period, as he was\nreflecting upon the subject again, he made up his mind, with perfect\nfixedness of purpose, that, to the control of that temper, he would\nnever more yield. The Will rose up in the majesty of its power, and\nassumed the reins of self-government, in the respect under\nconsideration. From that moment, that temper almost never, even under\nthe highest provocations, obtained the control of the child. A total\nrevolution of mental developments resulted. He afterwards became as\ndistinguished for natural amiability and self-control, in respect to his\ntemper, as before he had been for the opposite spirit. This total\nrevolution took place from mere prudential considerations, without any\nrespect whatever to moral obligation.\n\nNow suppose we attempt to account for these distinct and opposite\ndevelopments of character--developments exhibited by the same\nindividual, in these two periods--by an exclusive reference to natural\npropensities and external influences. What a totally inadequate and\nfalse account should we give of the facts presented! That individual is\njust as conscious, that it was the element of Free Will that produced\nthis revolution, and that when he formed the determination which\nresulted in that revolution, he might have determined differently, as he\nis, or ever has been, of any mental states whatever. All the facts,\nalso, as they lie out before us, clearly indicate, that if we leave out\nof the account the voluntary element, those facts must remain wholly\nunexplained, or a totally wrong explanation of them must be given.\n\nThe same principle holds true in all other instances. Though natural\npropensities and external influences greatly _modify_ mental\ndevelopments, still, the _distinguishing_ peculiarities of character, in\nall instances, receive their form and coloring from the action of the\nvoluntary power. This is true, of the peculiarities of character\nexhibited, not only by individuals, but communities and nations. We can\nnever account for facts as they are, until we contemplate man, not only\nas possessed of Intelligence and Sensibility, but also of Free Will. All\nthe powers and susceptibilities must be taken into the account, if men\nwould know man as he is.\n\nDIVERSITIES OF CHARACTER.\n\nA few important definitions will close this Chapter.\n\nA _decisive_ character exists, where the Will acts in harmony with\npropensities strongly developed. When a number of propensities of this\nkind exist, action, and consequently character, may be changeable, and\nyet decisive.\n\n_Unity_ and _decision_ of character result, when the Will steadily acts\nin harmony with some one over-shadowing propensity.\n\nCharacter is _fluctuating_ and _changeable_, when the Will surrenders\nitself to the control of different propensities, each easily and highly\nexcited in the presence of its appropriate objects, and yet the\nexcitement but temporary. Thus, different propensities, in rapid\nsuccession, take their turn in controlling the Will.\n\n_Indecision_ and _feebleness_ of character result, when the Will\nuniformly acts under the influence of the principle of _fear_ and\n_caution_. To such a mind, in all important enterprises especially,\nthere is always \"a lion in the way.\" Such a mind, therefore, is\ncontinually in a state of distressing indecision when energetic action\nis necessary to success.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII.\n\nCONCLUDING REFLECTIONS.\n\nA FEW reflections of a general nature will conclude this Treatise.\n\nOBJECTION. THE WILL HAS ITS LAWS.\n\n1. An objection, often adduced, to the entire view of the subject\npresented in this Treatise, demands a passing notice here. All things in\nexistence, it is said, and the Will among the rest, are governed by\n_Laws_. It is readily admitted, that all things have their laws, and\nthat the Will is not without law. It is jumping a very long distance to\na conclusion, however, to infer from such a fact, that Necessity is the\nonly law throughout the entire domain of existence, physical and mental.\nWhat if, from the fact, that the Will has its law, it should be assumed\nthat Liberty is that law? This assumption would be just as legitimate as\nthe one under consideration.\n\nOBJECTION. GOD DETHRONED FROM HIS SUPREMACY, IF THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY\nIS TRUE.\n\n2. Another objection of a general nature, is the assumption, that the\ndoctrine of Liberty destroys the Divine supremacy in the realm of mind.\n\"If man,\" says Dr. Chalmers, \"is not a necessary agent, God is a\ndegraded sovereign.\" A sentiment more dishonorable to God, more fraught\nwith fatal error, more revolting to a virtuous mind, when unperverted by\na false theory, could scarcely be uttered. Let us, for a moment,\ncontemplate the question, whether the doctrine of Liberty admits a\nDivine government in the realm of mind. The existence and perpetuity, as\nstated in a former Chapter, of free and moral agency in creatures,\ndepend wholly upon the Divine Will. With a perfect knowledge of the\ndirection in which they will exert their powers, under every kind and\ndegree of influence to which they may be subjected, He holds all these\ninfluences at his sovereign disposal. With such knowledge and resources,\ncan God exercise no government, but that of a degraded sovereignty in\nthe realm of mind? Can He not exercise the very sovereignty which\ninfinite wisdom and love desire? Who would dare affirm the contrary? If\nthe doctrine of Liberty is true, God certainly does not sit upon the\nthrone of iron destiny, swaying the sceptre of stern fate over myriads\nof subjects, miscalled moral agents; subjects, all of whom are\ncommanded, under infinite sanctions, to do the right and avoid the\nwrong, while subjected to influences by the Most High himself, which\nrender obedience in some, and disobedience in others, absolute\nimpossibilities. Still, in the light of this doctrine, God has a\ngovernment in the domain of mind, a government wisely adapted to the\nnature of moral agents--agents capable of incurring the desert of praise\nor blame; a government which all approve, and under the benign influence\nof which, all who have not forfeited its protection by crime, may find\n\"quietness and assurance for ever.\"\n\nOBJECTION. GREAT AND GOOD MEN HAVE HELD THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY.\n\n3. In reply to what has been said in respect to the _tendencies_ of the\ndoctrine of Necessity, the fact will doubtless be adduced, that the\ngreatest and best of men have held this doctrine, without a development\nof these tendencies in their experience. My answer is, that the goodness\nof such men, their sense of moral obligation, &c., did not result from\ntheir theory, but existed in spite of its intrinsic tendencies. They\nheld this doctrine in theory, and yet, from a _consciousness_ of\nLiberty, they practically adopted the opposite doctrine. Here, we have\nthe source of the deep feeling of obligation in their minds, while the\nintrinsic and exclusive tendency of their _Theory_, even in them, was to\nweaken and annihilate this hallowed feeling. The difference between such\nmen and sceptics is this: The piety of the former prevents their\ncarrying out their theory to its legitimate results; while the impiety\nof the latter leads them to march boldly up to those results--a fearless\ndenial of moral obligation in every form.\n\nLAST RESORT.\n\n4. The final resort of certain Necessitarians, who may feel themselves\nwholly unable to meet the arguments adduced against their own and in\nfavor of the opposite theory, and are determined to remain fixed in\ntheir opinions, may be readily anticipated. It is an assumption which\nmay be expressed in language somewhat like the following: \"After all,\nthe immortal work of Edwards still lives, and will live, when those of\nhis opponents will be lost in oblivion. That work still remains\nunanswered.\" A sweeping assumption is a very easy and summary way of\ndisposing of a difficulty, which we might not otherwise know what to do\nwith. Let us for a moment contemplate some of the facts which have been\nundeniably established in reference to this immortal work.\n\n(1.) At the outset, Edwards stands convicted of a fundamental error in\nphilosophy, an error which gives form and character to his whole\nwork--the confounding of the Will with the Sensibility, and thus\nconfounding the characteristics of the phenomena of the former faculty\nwith those of the phenomena of the latter.\n\n(2.) His whole work is constructed without an appeal to Consciousness,\nthe only proper and authoritative tribunal of appeal in the case. Thus\nhis reasonings have only an accidental bearing upon his subject.\n\n(3.) All his fundamental conclusions have been shown to stand in direct\ncontradiction to the plainest and most positive testimony of universal\nConsciousness.\n\n(4.) His main arguments have been shown to be nothing else but reasoning\nin a circle. He defines, for example, the phrase \"Greatest apparent\ngood,\" as synonymous with _choosing_, and then argues, from the fact\nthat the \"Will always is as the greatest apparent good,\" that is, that\nit always chooses as it chooses, that it is subject to the law of\nNecessity.\n\nSo in respect to the argument from the Strongest Motive, which, by\ndefinition, is fixed upon as the Motive in the direction of which the\nWill, in each particular instance, acts. From the fact that the action\nof the Will is always in the direction of this Motive, that is, in the\ndirection of the Motive towards which it does act, the conclusion is\ngravely drawn, that the Will is and must be subject, in all its\ndeterminations, to the law of Necessity. I find my mind acted upon by\ntwo opposite Motives. I cannot tell which is the strongest, from a\ncontemplation of what is intrinsic in the Motives themselves, nor from\ntheir effects upon my Intelligence or Sensibility. I must wait till my\nWill has acted. From the fact of its action in the direction of one\nMotive, in distinction from the other, I must then draw two important\nconclusions. 1. The Motive, in the direction of which my Will did act,\nis the strongest. The evidence is, the _fact_ of its action in that\ndirection. 2. The Will must be subject to the law of Necessity. The\nproof is, the action of the Will in the direction of the Strongest\nMotive, that is, the Motive in the direction of which it did act. Sage\nargument to be regarded by Philosophers and Theologians of the 19th\ncentury, as possessing the elements of immortality!\n\n(5.) His argument from the Divine fore-knowledge has been shown to be\nwholly based upon an _assumption_ unauthorized by reason, or revelation\neither, to wit: that he understands the _mode_ of that Fore-knowledge,--\nan assumption which cannot be made except through ignorance, as was true\nin his case, without the greatest impiety and presumption.\n\n(6.) The theory which Edwards opposes has been shown to render sacred,\nin all minds that hold it, the great idea of _duty_, of moral\nobligation; while the validity of that idea has never, in any age or\nnation, been denied, excepting on the avowed authority of his Theory.\n\n(7.) All the arguments in proof of the doctrine of Necessity, with the\nsingle exception of that from the Divine Fore-knowledge--an argument\nresting, as we have seen, upon an assumption equally baseless,--involve\na begging of the question at issue. Take any argument we please, with\nthis one exception, and it will be seen at once that it has no force at\nall, unless the truth of the doctrine designed to be established by it,\nbe assumed as the basis of that argument. Shall we pretend that a\nTheory, that has been fully demonstrated to involve, fundamentally, the\nerrors, absurdities, and contradictions above named, has not been\nanswered?\n\nWILLING, AND AIMING TO PERFORM IMPOSSIBILITIES.\n\n5. We are now prepared to answer a question about which philosophers\nhave been somewhat divided in opinion--the question, whether the Will\ncan act in the direction of perceived and affirmed impossibilities? The\ntrue answer to this question, doubtless is, that the Mind may _will_ the\noccurrence of a known impossibility, but it can never _aim_ to produce\nsuch an occurrence.\n\nThe Mind, for example, while it regards the non-existence of God as that\nwhich cannot possibly occur, may come into such a relation to the Most\nHigh, that the _desire_ shall arise that God were not. With this desire,\nthe Will may concur, in the _wish_, that there were no God. Here the\nMind wills a known impossibility. In a similar manner, the Mind may will\nits own non-existence, while it regards its occurrence, on account of\nits relation to the Divine Will, as impossible.\n\nBut while the Mind may thus _will_ the occurrence of an impossibility,\nit never can, nor will aim, that is, intend, to produce what it regards\nas an impossibility. A creature may will the non-existence of God; but\neven a fallen Spirit, regarding the occurrence as an absolute\nimpossibility, never did, nor will aim to annihilate the Most High. To\nsuppose the Will to set itself to produce an occurrence regarded as\nimpossible, involves a contradiction.\n\nFor the same reason, the Will will never set itself upon the\naccomplishment of that which it is perfectly assured it never shall\naccomplish, however sincere its efforts towards the result may be. All\nsuch results are, to the Mind, _practical_ impossibilities. Extinguish\ntotally in the Mind the _hope_ of obtaining the Divine favor, and the\nDivine favor will never be sought. Produce in the Mind the conviction,\nthat should it aim at the attainment of a certain end, there is an\ninfallible certainty that it will not attain it, and the subject of that\nconviction will no more aim to attain that end, than he will aim to\ncause the same thing, at the same time, to be and not to be.\n\nIn reply, it is sometimes said, that men often aim at what they regard\neven as an impossible attainment. The painter, for example, aims to\nproduce a _perfect_ picture, while he knows well that he cannot produce\none. I answer, the painter is really aiming at no such thing. He is not\naiming to produce a perfect picture, which he knows he cannot, and will\nnot produce, but to produce one as _nearly_ perfect as he can. This is\nwhat he is really aiming at. Question the individual critically, and he\nwill confirm what is here affirmed. Remind him of the fact, that he\ncannot produce a perfect picture. I know that, he replies. I am\ndetermined, however, to produce one as _nearly_ perfect as possible.\nHere his real aim stands revealed. The same principle holds true in all\nother instances.\n\nTHOUGHT AT PARTING.\n\n6. In taking leave of the reader, I would simply say, that if he has\ndistinctly apprehended the great doctrine designed to be established in\nthis Work, and has happily come to an agreement with the author in\nrespect to it, the following hallowed impression has been left very\ndistinctly upon his mind. While he finds himself in a state of profound\nand most pleasing dependence upon the Author of his being, in the Holy\nof Holies of the inner sanctuary of his mind, one idea, the great\nover-shadowing idea of the human Intelligence, has been fully\nsanctified--the idea of _duty_, of _moral obligation_. With the\nconsciousness of Liberty, that idea must be to the mind an omnipresent\nreality. From it we can never escape and in all states, and in all\nworlds, it must and will be to us, as a guardian angel, or an avenging\nfiend. But one thing remains, and that is, through the grace proffered\nin the Remedial System, to \"live and move, and have our being,\" in\nharmony with that idea, thus securing everlasting \"quietness and\nassurance\" in the sanctuary of our minds, and ever enduring peace and\nprotection under, the over-shadowing perfections of the Author of our\nexistence, and amid all the arrangements and movements of his eternal\ngovernment.\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n[1] See Upham on the Will, pp. 32-35.\n\n[2] The above is a perfectly correct statement of the famous distinction\nbetween natural and moral ability made by Necessitarians. The sinner is\nunder obligation to do right, they say, because he might do what is\nrequired of him, if he chose to do it. He has, therefore, _natural_ but\nnot _moral_ power to obedience. But the choice which the sinner wants,\nthe absence of which constitutes his moral inability, is the very thing\nrequired of him. When, therefore, the Necessitarian says, that the\nsinner is under obligation to obey, because he might obey if he chose to\ndo it, the real meaning is, that the sinner is under obligation to\nobedience, because if he should choose to obey he would choose to obey.\nIn other words he is under obligation to obedience, because, if he did\nobey, he would obey.","title":"Doctrine of the Will","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":50441}