{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_39064/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_39064","id":"gutenberg_39064","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/39064","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Philosophy"],"text":"Hegel\u2019s Philosophy of Mind\n\n                                    By\n\n                      Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel\n\n                             Translated From\n\n             The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences\n\n                                   With\n\n                         Five Introductory Essays\n\n                                    By\n\n                       William Wallace, M.A., LL.D.\n\nFellow of Merton College, and Whyte\u2019s Professor of Moral Philosophy in the\n                           University of Oxford\n\n                                  Oxford\n\n                             Clarendon Press\n\n                                   1894\n\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nPreface.\nFive Introductory Essays In Psychology And Ethics.\n   Essay I. On The Scope Of A Philosophy Of Mind.\n   Essay II. Aims And Methods Of Psychology.\n   Essay III. On Some Psychological Aspects Of Ethics.\n   Essay IV. Psycho-Genesis.\n   Essay V. Ethics And Politics.\nIntroduction.\nSection I. Mind Subjective.\n   Sub-Section A. Anthropology. The Soul.\n   Sub-Section B. Phenomenology Of Mind. Consciousness.\n   Sub-Section C. Psychology. Mind.\nSection II. Mind Objective.\n   Distribution.\n   Sub-Section A. Law.\n   Sub-Section B. The Morality Of Conscience.\n   Sub-Section C. The Moral Life, Or Social Ethics.\nSection III. Absolute Mind.\n   Sub-Section A. Art.\n   Sub-Section B. Revealed Religion.\n   Sub-Section C. Philosophy.\nIndex.\nFootnotes\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n\nI here offer a translation of the third or last part of Hegel\u2019s\nencyclopaedic sketch of philosophy,\u2014the _Philosophy of Mind_. The volume,\nlike its subject, stands complete in itself. But it may also be regarded\nas a supplement or continuation of the work begun in my version of his\n_Logic_. I have not ventured upon the _Philosophy of Nature_ which lies\nbetween these two. That is a province, to penetrate into which would\nrequire an equipment of learning I make no claim to,\u2014a province, also, of\nwhich the present-day interest would be largely historical, or at least\nbound up with historical circumstances.\n\nThe translation is made from the German text given in the Second Part of\nthe Seventh Volume of Hegel\u2019s Collected Works, occasionally corrected by\ncomparison with that found in the second and third editions (of 1827 and\n1830) published by the author. I have reproduced only Hegel\u2019s own\nparagraphs, and entirely omitted the _Zus\u00e4tze_ of the editors. These\naddenda\u2014which are in origin lecture-notes\u2014to the paragraphs are, in the\ntext of the Collected Works, given for the first section only. The\npsychological part which they accompany has been barely treated elsewhere\nby Hegel: but a good popular exposition of it will be found in Erdmann\u2019s\n_Psychologische Briefe_. The second section was dealt with at greater\nlength by Hegel himself in his _Philosophy of Law_ (1820). The topics of\nthe third section are largely covered by his lectures on Art, Religion,\nand History of Philosophy.\n\nI do not conceal from myself that the text offers a hard nut to crack. Yet\nhere and there, even through the medium of the translation, I think some\nlight cannot fail to come to an earnest student. Occasionally, too, as,\nfor instance, in \u00a7\u00a7 406, 459, 549, and still more in \u00a7\u00a7 552, 573, at the\nclose of which might stand the words _Liberavi animam meam_, the writer\nreally \u201clets himself go,\u201d and gives his mind freely on questions where\nspeculation comes closely in touch with life.\n\nIn the _Five Introductory Essays_ I have tried sometimes to put together,\nand sometimes to provide with collateral elucidation, some points in the\nMental Philosophy. I shall not attempt to justify the selection of\nsubjects for special treatment further than to hope that they form a more\nor less connected group, and to refer for a study of some general\nquestions of system and method to my _Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel\u2019s\nPhilosophy_ which appear almost simultaneously with this volume.\n\nOXFORD,\n_December, 1893_.\n\n\n\n\n\nFIVE INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND ETHICS.\n\n\n\n\nEssay I. On The Scope Of A Philosophy Of Mind.\n\n\nThe art of finding titles, and of striking out headings which catch the\neye or ear, and lead the mind by easy paths of association to the subject\nunder exposition, was not one of Hegel\u2019s gifts. A stirring phrase, a vivid\nor picturesque turn of words, he often has. But his lists of contents,\nwhen they cease to be commonplace, are apt to run into the bizarre and the\ngrotesque. Generally, indeed, his rubrics are the old and (as we may be\ntempted to call them) insignificant terms of the text-books. But, in\nHegel\u2019s use of them, these conventional designations are charged with a\nhighly individualised meaning. They may mean more\u2014they may mean less\u2014than\nthey habitually pass for: but they unquestionably specify their meaning\nwith a unique and almost personal flavour. And this can hardly fail to\ncreate and to disappoint undue expectations.\n\n\n\n(i.) Philosophy and its Parts.\n\n\nEven the main divisions of his system show this conservatism in\nterminology. The names of the three parts of the Encyclopaedia are, we may\nsay, non-significant of their peculiar contents. And that for a good\nreason. What Hegel proposes to give is no novel or special doctrine, but\nthe universal philosophy which has passed on from age to age, here\nnarrowed and there widened, but still essentially the same. It is\nconscious of its continuity and proud of its identity with the teachings\nof Plato and Aristotle.\n\nThe earliest attempts of the Greek philosophers to present philosophy in a\ncomplete and articulated order\u2014attempts generally attributed to the\nStoics, the schoolmen of antiquity\u2014made it a tripartite whole. These three\nparts were Logic, Physics, and Ethics. In their entirety they were meant\nto form a cycle of unified knowledge, satisfying the needs of theory as\nwell as practice. As time went on, however, the situation changed: and if\nthe old names remained, their scope and value suffered many changes. New\ninterests and curiosities, due to altered circumstances, brought other\ndepartments of reality under the focus of investigation besides those\nwhich had been primarily discussed under the old names. Inquiries became\nmore specialised, and each tended to segregate itself from the rest as an\nindependent field of science. The result was that in modern times the\nterritory still marked by the ancient titles had shrunk to a mere phantom\nof its former bulk. Almost indeed things had come to such a pass that the\ntime-honoured figures had sunk into the misery of _rois fain\u00e9ants_; while\nthe real business of knowledge was discharged by the younger and less\nconventional lines of research which the needs and fashions of the time\nhad called up. Thus Logic, in the narrow formal sense, was turned into an\n\u201cart\u201d of argumentation and a system of technical rules for the analysis\nand synthesis of academical discussion. Physics or Natural Philosophy\nrestricted itself to the elaboration of some metaphysical postulates or\nhypotheses regarding the general modes of physical operation. And Ethics\ncame to be a very unpractical discussion of subtleties regarding moral\nfaculty and moral standard. Meanwhile a theory of scientific method and of\nthe laws governing the growth of intelligence and formation of ideas grew\nup, and left the older logic to perish of formality and inanition. The\nsuccessive departments of physical science, each in turn asserting its\nindependence, finally left Natural Philosophy no alternative between\nclinging to its outworn hypotheses and abstract generalities, or\nidentifying itself (as Newton in his great book put it) with the\n_Principia Mathematica_ of the physical sciences. Ethics, in its turn, saw\nitself, on one hand, replaced by psychological inquiries into the\nrelations between the feelings and the will and the intelligence; while,\non the other hand, a host of social, historical, economical, and other\nresearches cut it off from the real facts of human life, and left it no\nmore than the endless debates on the logical and metaphysical issues\ninvolved in free-will and conscience, duty and merit.\n\nIt has sometimes been said that Kant settled this controversy between the\nold departments of philosophy and the new branches of science. And the\nsettlement, it is implied, consisted in assigning to the philosopher a\nsort of police and patrol duty in the commonwealth of science. He was to\nsee that boundaries were duly respected, and that each science kept\nstrictly to its own business. For this purpose each branch of philosophy\nwas bound to convert itself into a department of criticism\u2014an examination\nof first principles in the several provinces of reality or experience\u2014with\na view to get a distinct conception of what they were, and thus define\nexactly the lines on which the structures of more detailed science could\nbe put up solidly and safely. This plan offered tempting lines to\nresearch, and sounded well. But on further reflection there emerge one or\ntwo difficulties, hard to get over. Paradoxical though it may seem, one\ncannot rightly estimate the capacity and range of foundations, before one\nhas had some familiarity with the buildings erected upon them. Thus you\nare involved in a circle: a circle which is probably inevitable, but which\nfor that reason it is well to recognise at once. Then\u2014what is only another\nway of saying the same thing\u2014it is impossible to draw an inflexible line\nbetween premises of principle and conclusions of detail. There is no spot\nat which criticism can stop, and, having done its business well, hand on\nthe remaining task to dogmatic system. It was an instinctive feeling of\nthis implication of system in what professed only to be criticism which\nled the aged Kant to ignore his own previous professions that he offered\nas yet no system, and when Fichte maintained himself to be erecting the\nfabric for which Kant had prepared the ground, to reply by the\ncounter-declaration that the criticism was the system\u2014that \u201cthe curtain\nwas the picture.\u201d\n\nThe Hegelian philosophy is an attempt to combine criticism with system,\nand thus realise what Kant had at least foretold. It is a system which is\nself-critical, and systematic only through the absoluteness of its\ncriticism. In Hegel\u2019s own phrase, it is an immanent and an incessant\ndialectic, which from first to last allows finality to no dogmatic rest,\nbut carries out Kant\u2019s description of an Age of Criticism, in which\nnothing, however majestic and sacred its authority, can plead for\nexception from the all-testing _Elenchus_. Then, on the other hand, Hegel\nrefuses to restrict philosophy and its branches to anything short of the\ntotality. He takes in its full sense that often-used phrase\u2014the Unity of\nKnowledge. Logic becomes the all-embracing research of \u201cfirst\nprinciples,\u201d\u2014the principles which regulate physics and ethics. The old\ndivisions between logic and metaphysic, between induction and deduction,\nbetween theory of reasoning and theory of knowledge,\u2014divisions which those\nwho most employed them were never able to show the reason and purpose\nof\u2014because indeed they had grown up at various times and by \u201cnatural\nselection\u201d through a vast mass of incidents: these are superseded and\nmerged in one continuous theory of real knowledge considered under its\nabstract or formal aspect,\u2014of organised and known reality in its\nunderlying thought-system. But these first principles were only an\nabstraction from complete reality\u2014the reality which nature has when\nunified by mind\u2014and they presuppose the total from which they are derived.\nThe realm of pure thought is only the ghost of the Idea\u2014of the unity and\nreality of knowledge, and it must be reindued with its flesh and blood.\nThe logical world is (in Kantian phrase) only the _possibility_ of Nature\nand Mind. It comes first\u2014because it is a system of First Principles: but\nthese first principles could only be elicited by a philosophy which has\nrealised the meaning of a mental experience, gathered by interpreting the\nfacts of Nature.\n\nNatural Philosophy is no longer\u2014according to Hegel\u2019s view of it\u2014merely a\nscheme of mathematical ground-work. That may be its first step. But its\nscope is a complete unity (which is not a mere aggregate) of the branches\nof natural knowledge, exploring both the inorganic and the organic world.\nIn dealing with this endless problem, philosophy seems to be baulked by an\nimpregnable obstacle to its progress. Every day the advance of\nspecialisation renders any comprehensive or synoptic view of the totality\nof science more and more impossible. No doubt we talk readily enough of\nScience. But here, if anywhere, we may say there is no Science, but only\nsciences. The generality of science is a proud fiction or a gorgeous\ndream, variously told and interpreted according to the varying interest\nand proclivity of the scientist. The sciences, or those who specially\nexpound them, know of no unity, no philosophy of science. They are content\nto remark that in these days the thing is impossible, and to pick out the\nfaults in any attempts in that direction that are made outside their pale.\nUnfortunately for this contention, the thing is done by us all, and,\nindeed, has to be done. If not as men of science, yet as men\u2014as human\nbeings\u2014we have to put together things and form some total estimate of the\ndrift of development, of the unity of nature. To get a notion, not merely\nof the general methods and principles of the sciences, but of their\nresults and teachings, and to get this not as a mere lot of fragments, but\nwith a systematic unity, is indispensable in some degree for all rational\nlife. The life not founded on science is not the life of man. But he will\nnot find what he wants in the text-books of the specialist, who is obliged\nto treat his subject, as Plato says, \u201cunder the pressure of necessity,\u201d\nand who dare not look on it in its quality \u201cto draw the soul towards\ntruth, and to form the philosophic intellect so as to uplift what we now\nunduly keep down(1).\u201d If the philosopher in this province does his work\nbut badly, he may plead the novelty of the task to which he comes as a\npioneer or even an architect. He finds little that he can directly\nutilise. The materials have been gathered and prepared for very special\naims; and the great aim of science\u2014that human life may be made a higher,\nan ampler, and happier thing,\u2014has hardly been kept in view at all, except\nin its more materialistic aspects. To the philosopher the supreme interest\nof the physical sciences is that man also belongs to the physical\nuniverse, or that Mind and Matter as we know them are (in Mr. Spencer\u2019s\nlanguage) \u201cat once antithetical and inseparable.\u201d He wants to find the\nplace of Man,\u2014but of Man as Mind\u2014in Nature.\n\nIf the scope of Natural Philosophy be thus expanded to make it the unity\nand more than the synthetic aggregate of the several physical sciences\u2014to\nmake it the whole which surpasses the addition of all their fragments, the\npurpose of Ethics has not less to be deepened and widened. Ethics, under\nthat title, Hegel knows not. And for those who cannot recognise anything\nunless it be clearly labelled, it comes natural to record their censure of\nHegelianism for ignoring or disparaging ethical studies. But if we take\nthe word in that wide sense which common usage rather justifies than\nadopts, we may say that the whole philosophy of Mind is a moral\nphilosophy. Its subject is the moral as opposed to the physical aspect of\nreality: the inner and ideal life as opposed to the merely external and\nreal materials of it: the world of intelligence and of humanity. It\ndisplays Man in the several stages of that process by which he expresses\nthe full meaning of nature, or discharges the burden of that task which is\nimplicit in him from the first. It traces the steps of that growth by\nwhich what was no better than a fragment of nature\u2014an intelligence located\n(as it seemed) in one piece of matter\u2014comes to realise the truth of it and\nof himself. That truth is his ideal and his obligation: but it is\nalso\u2014such is the mystery of his birthright\u2014his idea and possession.\nHe\u2014like the natural universe\u2014is (as the _Logic_ has shown) a principle of\nunification, organisation, idealisation: and his history (in its ideal\ncompleteness) is the history of the process by which he, the typical man,\nworks the fragments of reality (and such mere reality must be always a\ncollection of fragments) into the perfect unity of a many-sided character.\nThus the philosophy of mind, beginning with man as a sentient organism,\nthe focus in which the universe gets its first dim confused expression\nthrough mere feeling, shows how he \u201cerects himself above himself\u201d and\nrealises what ancient thinkers called his kindred with the divine.\n\nIn that total process of the mind\u2019s liberation and self-realisation the\nportion specially called Morals is but one, though a necessary, stage.\nThere are, said Porphyry and the later Platonists, four degrees in the\npath of perfection and self-accomplishment. And first, there is the career\nof honesty and worldly prudence, which makes the duty of the citizen.\nSecondly, there is the progress in purity which casts earthly things\nbehind, and reaches the angelic height of passionless serenity. And the\nthird step is the divine life which by intellectual energy is turned to\nbehold the truth of things. Lastly, in the fourth grade, the mind, free\nand sublime in self-sustaining wisdom, makes itself an \u201cexemplar\u201d of\nvirtue, and is even a \u201cfather of Gods.\u201d Even so, it may be said, the human\nmind is the subject of a complicated Teleology,\u2014the field ruled by a\nmultifarious Ought, psychological, aesthetical, social and religious. To\nadjust their several claims cannot be the object of any science, if\nadjustment means to supply a guide in practice. But it is the purpose of\nsuch a teleology to show that social requirements and moral duty as\nordinarily conceived do not exhaust the range of obligation,\u2014of the\nsupreme ethical Ought. How that can best be done is however a question of\nsome difficulty. For the ends under examination do not fall completely\ninto a serial order, nor does one involve others in such a way as to\ndestroy their independence. You cannot absolve psychology as if it stood\nindependent of ethics or religion, nor can aesthetic considerations merely\nsupervene on moral. Still, it may be said, the order followed by Hegel\nseems on the whole liable to fewer objections than others.\n\nMr. Herbert Spencer, the only English philosopher who has even attempted a\n_System_ of Philosophy, may in this point be compared with Hegel. He also\nbegins with a _First Principles_,\u2014a work which, like Hegel\u2019s _Logic_,\nstarts by presenting Philosophy as the supreme arbiter between the\nsubordinate principles of Religion and Science, which are in it \u201cnecessary\ncorrelatives.\u201d The positive task of philosophy is (with some inconsistency\nor vagueness) presented, in the next place, as a \u201cunification of\nknowledge.\u201d Such a unification has to make explicit the implicit unity of\nknown reality: because \u201cevery thought involves a whole system of\nthoughts.\u201d And such a programme might again suggest the Logic. But\nunfortunately Mr. Spencer does not (and he has Francis Bacon to justify\nhim here) think it worth his while to toil up the weary, but necessary,\nmount of Purgatory which is known to us as Logic. With a na\u00efve realism, he\nbuilds on Cause and Power, and above all on Force, that \u201cUltimate of\nUltimates,\u201d which seems to be, however marvellously, a denizen both of the\nKnown and the Unknowable world. In the known world this Ultimate appears\nunder two forms, matter and motion, and the problem of science and\nphilosophy is to lay down in detail and in general the law of their\ncontinuous redistribution, of the segregation of motion from matter, and\nthe inclusion of motion into matter.\n\nOf this process, which has no beginning and no end,\u2014the rhythm of\ngeneration and corruption, attraction and repulsion, it may be said that\nit is properly not a first principle of all knowledge, but the general or\nfundamental portion of Natural Philosophy to which Mr. Spencer next\nproceeds. Such a philosophy, however, he gives only in part: viz. as a\nBiology, dealing with organic (and at a further stage and under other\nnames, with supra-organic) life. And that the Philosophy of Nature should\ntake this form, and carry both the First Principles and the later portions\nof the system with it, as parts of a philosophy of evolution, is what we\nshould have expected from the contemporaneous interests of science(2).\nEven a one-sided attempt to give speculative unity to those researches,\nwhich get\u2014for reasons the scientific specialist seldom asks\u2014the title of\nbiological, is however worth noting as a recognition of the necessity of a\n_Natur-philosophie_,\u2014a speculative science of Nature.\n\nThe third part of the Hegelian System corresponds to what in the\n_Synthetic Philosophy_ is known as Psychology, Ethics, and Sociology. And\nhere Mr. Spencer recognises that something new has turned up. Psychology\nis \u201cunique\u201d as a science: it is a \u201cdouble science,\u201d and as a whole quite\n_sui generis_. Whether perhaps all these epithets would not, _mutatis\nmutandis_, have to be applied also to Ethics and Sociology, if these are\nto do their full work, he does not say. In what this doubleness consists\nhe even finds it somewhat difficult to show. For, as his fundamental\nphilosophy does not on this point go beyond noting some pairs of verbal\nantitheses, and has no sense of unity except in the imperfect shape of a\n\u201crelation(3)\u201d between two things which are \u201cantithetical and inseparable,\u201d\nhe is perplexed by phrases such as \u201cin\u201d and \u201cout of\u201d consciousness, and\nstumbles over the equivocal use of \u201cinner\u201d to denote both mental (or\nnon-spatial) in general, and locally sub-cuticular in special. Still, he\ngets so far as to see that the law of consciousness is that in it neither\nfeelings nor relations have independent subsistence, and that the unit of\nmind does not begin till what he calls two feelings are made one. The\nphraseology may be faulty, but it shows an inkling of the _a priori_.\nUnfortunately it is apparently forgotten; and the language too often\nreverts into the habit of what he calls the \u201cobjective,\u201d i.e. purely\nphysical, sciences.\n\nMr. Spencer\u2019s conception of Psychology restricts it to the more general\nphysics of the mind. For its more concrete life he refers us to Sociology.\nBut his Sociology is yet unfinished: and from the plan of its inception,\nand the imperfect conception of the ends and means of its investigation,\nhardly admits of completion in any systematic sense. To that incipiency is\nno doubt due its excess in historical or anecdotal detail\u2014detail, however,\ntoo much segregated from its social context, and in general its tendency\nto neglect normal and central theory for incidental and peripheral facts.\nHere, too, there is a weakness in First Principles and a love of\ncatchwords, which goes along with the fallacy that illustration is proof.\nAbove all, it is evident that the great fact of religion overhangs Mr.\nSpencer with the attraction of an unsolved and unacceptable problem. He\ncannot get the religious ideas of men into co-ordination with their\nscientific, aesthetic, and moral doctrines; and only betrays his sense of\nthe high importance of the former by placing them in the forefront of\ninquiry, as due to the inexperience and limitations of the so-called\nprimitive man. That is hardly adequate recognition of the religious\nprinciple: and the defect will make itself seriously felt, should he ever\ncome to carry out the further stage of his prospectus dealing with \u201cthe\ngrowth and correlation of language, knowledge, morals, and aesthetics.\u201d\n\n\n\n(ii.) Mind and Morals.\n\n\nA Mental Philosophy\u2014if we so put what might also be rendered a Spiritual\nPhilosophy, or Philosophy of Spirit\u2014may to an English reader suggest\nsomething much narrower than it actually contains. A Philosophy of the\nHuman Mind\u2014if we consult English specimens\u2014would not imply much more than\na psychology, and probably what is called an inductive psychology. But as\nHegel understands it, it covers an unexpectedly wide range of topics, the\nwhole range from Nature to Spirit. Besides Subjective Mind, which would\nseem on first thoughts to exhaust the topics of psychology, it goes on to\nMind as Objective, and finally to Absolute mind. And such combinations of\nwords may sound either self-contradictory or meaningless.\n\nThe first Section deals with the range of what is usually termed\nPsychology. That term indeed is employed by Hegel, in a restricted sense,\nto denote the last of the three sub-sections in the discussion of\nSubjective Mind. The Mind, which is the topic of psychology proper, cannot\nbe assumed as a ready-made object, or datum. A Self, a self-consciousness,\nan intelligent and volitional agent, if it be the birthright of man, is a\nbirthright which he has to realise for himself, to earn and to make his\nown. To trace the steps by which mind in its stricter acceptation, as will\nand intelligence, emerges from the general animal sensibility which is the\ncrowning phase of organic life, and the final problem of biology, is the\nwork of two preliminary sub-sections\u2014the first entitled _Anthropology_,\nthe second the _Phenomenology of Mind_.\n\nThe subject of Anthropology, as Hegel understands it, is the Soul\u2014the raw\nmaterial of consciousness, the basis of all higher mental life. This is a\nborderland, where the ground is still debateable between Nature and Mind:\nit is the region of feeling, where the sensibility has not yet been\ndifferentiated to intelligence. Soul and body are here, as the phrase\ngoes, in communion: the inward life is still imperfectly disengaged from\nits natural co-physical setting. Still one with nature, it submits to\nnatural influences and natural vicissitudes: is not as yet master of\nitself, but the half-passive receptacle of a foreign life, of a general\nvitality, of a common soul not yet fully differentiated into\nindividuality. But it is awaking to self-activity: it is emerging to\nConsciousness,\u2014to distinguish itself, as aware and conscious, from the\nfacts of life and sentiency of which it is aware.\n\nFrom this region of psychical physiology or physiological psychology,\nHegel in the second sub-section of his first part takes us to the\n\u201cPhenomenology of Mind,\u201d\u2014to Consciousness. The sentient soul is also\nconscious\u2014but in a looser sense of that word(4): it has feelings, but can\nscarcely be said _itself_ to know that it has them. As consciousness, the\nSoul has come to separate what it is from what it feels. The distinction\nemerges of a subject which is conscious, and an object _of_ which it is\nconscious. And the main thing is obviously the relationship between the\ntwo, or the Consciousness itself, as tending to distinguish itself alike\nfrom its subject and its object. Hence, perhaps, may be gathered why it is\ncalled Phenomenology of Mind. Mind as yet is not yet more than emergent or\napparent: nor yet self-possessed and self-certified. No longer, however,\none with the circumambient nature which it feels, it sees itself set\nagainst it, but only as a passive recipient of it, a _tabula rasa_ on\nwhich external nature is reflected, or to which phenomena are presented.\nNo longer, on the other hand, a mere passive instrument of suggestion from\nwithout, its instinct of life, its _nisus_ of self-assertion is developed,\nthrough antagonism to a like _nisus_, into the consciousness of self-hood,\nof a Me and Mine as set against a Thee and Thine. But just in proportion\nas it is so developed in opposition to and recognition of other equally\nself-centred selves, it has passed beyond the narrower characteristic of\nConsciousness proper. It is no longer mere intelligent perception or\nreproduction of a world, but it is life, with perception (or apperception)\nof that life. It has returned in a way to its original unity with nature,\nbut it is now the sense of its self-hood\u2014the consciousness of itself as\nthe focus in which subjective and objective are at one. Or, to put it in\nthe language of the great champion of Realism(5), the standpoint of Reason\nor full-grown Mind is this: \u201cThe world which appears to us is our percept,\ntherefore in us. The real world, out of which we explain the phenomenon,\nis our thought: therefore in us.\u201d\n\nThe third sub-section of the theory of Subjective Mind\u2014the Psychology\nproper\u2014deals with Mind. This is the real, independent Psych\u00e9\u2014hence the\nspecial appropriation of the term Psychology. \u201cThe Soul,\u201d says Herbart,\n\u201cno doubt dwells in a body: there are, moreover, corresponding states of\nthe one and the other: but nothing corporeal occurs in the Soul, nothing\npurely mental, which we could reckon to our Ego, occurs in the body: the\naffections of the body are no representations of the Ego, and our pleasant\nand unpleasant feelings do not immediately lie in the organic life they\nfavour or hinder.\u201d Such a Soul, so conceived, is an intelligent and\nvolitional self, a being of intellectual and \u201cactive\u201d powers or phenomena:\nit is a Mind. And \u201cMind,\u201d adds Hegel(6), \u201cis just this elevation above\nNature and physical modes and above the complication with an external\nobject.\u201d Nothing is _external_ to it: it is rather the internalising of\nall externality. In this psychology proper, we are out of any immediate\nconnexion with physiology. \u201cPsychology as such,\u201d remarks Herbart, \u201chas its\nquestions common to it with Idealism\u201d\u2014with the doctrine that all reality\nis mental reality. It traces, in Hegel\u2019s exposition of it, the steps of\nthe way by which mind realises that independence which is its\ncharacteristic stand-point. On the intellectual side that independence is\nassured in language,\u2014the system of signs by which the intelligence stamps\nexternal objects as its own, made part of its inner world. A science, some\none has said, is after all only _une langue bien faite_. So, reversing the\nsaying, we may note that a language is an inwardised and mind-appropriated\nworld. On the active side, the independence of mind is seen in\nself-enjoyment, in happiness, or self-content, where impulse and volition\nhave attained satisfaction in equilibrium, and the soul possesses itself\nin fullness. Such a mind(7), which has made the world its certified\npossession in language, and which enjoys itself in self-possession of\nsoul, called happiness, is a free Mind. And that is the highest which\nSubjective Mind can reach.\n\nAt this point, perhaps, having rounded off by a liberal sweep the scope of\npsychology, the ordinary mental philosophy would stop. Hegel, instead of\nfinishing, now goes on to the field of what he calls Objective Mind. For\nas yet it has been only the story of a preparation, an inward adorning and\nequipment, and we have yet to see what is to come of it in actuality. Or\nrather, we have yet to consider the social forms on which this preparation\nrests. The mind, self-possessed and sure of itself or free, is so only\nthrough the objective shape which its main development runs parallel with.\nAn intelligent Will, or a practical reason, was the last word of the\npsychological development. But a reason which is practical, or a volition\nwhich is intelligent, is realised by action which takes regular shapes,\nand by practice which transforms the world. The theory of Objective Mind\ndelineates the new form which nature assumes under the sway of\nintelligence and will. That intellectual world realises itself by\ntransforming the physical into a social and political world, the given\nnatural conditions of existence into a freely-instituted system of life,\nthe primitive struggle of kinds for subsistence into the ordinances of the\nsocial state. Given man as a being possessed of will and intelligence,\nthis inward faculty, whatever be its degree, will try to impress itself on\nnature and to reproduce itself in a legal, a moral, and social world. The\nkingdom of deed replaces, or rises on the foundation of, the kingdom of\nword: and instead of the equilibrium of a well-adjusted soul comes the\nharmonious life of a social organism. We are, in short, in the sphere of\nEthics and Politics, of Jurisprudence and Morals, of Law and Conscience.\n\nHere,\u2014as always in Hegel\u2019s system\u2014there is a triad of steps. First the\nprovince of Law or Right. But if we call it Law, we must keep out of sight\nthe idea of a special law-giver, of a conscious imposition of laws, above\nall by a political superior. And if we call it Right, we must remember\nthat it is neutral, inhuman, abstract right: the right whose principle is\nimpartial and impassive uniformity, equality, order;\u2014not moral right, or\nthe equity which takes cognisance of circumstances, of personal claims,\nand provides against its own hardness. The intelligent will of Man,\nthrowing itself upon the mere gifts of nature as their appointed master,\ncreates the world of Property\u2014of things instrumental, and regarded as\nadjectival, to the human personality. But the autonomy of Reason (which is\nlatent in the will) carries with it certain consequences. As it acts, it\nalso, by its inherent quality of uniformity or universality, enacts for\nitself a law and laws, and creates the realm of formal equality or\norder-giving law. But this is a _mere_ equality: which is not inconsistent\nwith what in other respects may be excess of inequality. What one does, if\nit is really to be treated as done, others may or even must do: each act\ncreates an expectation of continuance and uniformity of behaviour. The\ndoer is bound by it, and others are entitled to do the like. The material\nwhich the person appropriates creates a system of obligation. Thus is\nconstituted\u2014in the natural give and take of rational Wills\u2014in the\ninevitable course of human action and reaction,\u2014a system of rights and\nduties. This law of equality\u2014the basis of justice, and the seed of\nbenevolence\u2014is the scaffolding or perhaps rather the rudimentary framework\nof society and moral life. Or it is the bare skeleton which is to be\nclothed upon by the softer and fuller outlines of the social tissues and\nthe ethical organs.\n\nAnd thus the first range of Objective Mind postulates the second, which\nHegel calls \u201cMorality.\u201d The word is to be taken in its strict sense as a\nprotest against the quasi-physical order of law. It is the morality of\nconscience and of the good will, of the inner rectitude of soul and\npurpose, as all-sufficient and supreme. Here is brought out the\ncomplementary factor in social life: the element of liberty, spontaneity,\nself-consciousness. The motto of mere inward morality (as opposed to the\nspirit of legality) is (in Kant\u2019s words): \u201cThere is nothing without\nqualification good, in heaven or earth, but only a good will.\u201d The\nessential condition of goodness is that the action be done with purpose\nand intelligence, and in full persuasion of its goodness by the conscience\nof the agent. The characteristic of Morality thus described is its\nessential inwardness, and the sovereignty of the conscience over all\nheteronomy. Its justification is that it protests against the authority of\na mere external or objective order, subsisting and ruling in separation\nfrom the subjectivity. Its defect is the turn it gives to this assertion\nof the rights of subjective conscience: briefly in the circumstance that\nit tends to set up a mere individualism against a mere universalism,\ninstead of realising the unity and essential interdependence of the two.\n\nThe third sub-section of the theory of Objective Mind describes a state of\naffairs in which this antithesis is explicitly overcome. This is the moral\nlife in a social community. Here law and usage prevail and provide the\nfixed permanent scheme of life: but the law and the usage are, in their\ntrue or ideal conception, only the unforced expression of the mind and\nwill of those who live under them. And, on the other hand, the mind and\nwill of the individual members of such a community are pervaded and\nanimated by its universal spirit. In such a community, and so constituting\nit, the individual is at once free and equal, and that because of the\nspirit of fraternity, which forms its spiritual link. In the world\nsupposed to be governed by mere legality the idea of right is exclusively\nprominent; and when that is the case, it may often happen that _summum jus\nsumma injuria_. In mere morality, the stress falls exclusively on the idea\nof inward freedom, or the necessity of the harmony of the judgment and the\nwill, or the dependence of conduct upon conscience. In the union of the\ntwo, in the moral community as normally constituted, the mere idea of\nright is replaced, or controlled and modified, by the idea of equity\u2014a\nbalance as it were between the two preceding, inasmuch as motive and\npurpose are employed to modify and interpret strict right. But this\neffect\u2014this harmonisation\u2014is brought about by the predominance of a new\nidea\u2014the principle of benevolence,\u2014a principle however which is itself\nmodified by the fundamental idea of right or law(8) into a wise or\nregulated kindliness.\n\nBut what Hegel chiefly deals with under this head is the interdependence\nof form and content, of social order and personal progress. In the picture\nof an ethical organisation or harmoniously-alive moral community he shows\nus partly the underlying idea which gave room for the antithesis between\nlaw and conscience, and partly the outlines of the ideal in which that\nconflict becomes only the instrument of progress. This organisation has\nthree grades or three typical aspects. These are the Family, Civil\nSociety, and the State. The first of these, the Family, must be taken to\ninclude those primary unities of human life where the natural affinity of\nsex and the natural ties of parentage are the preponderant influence in\nforming and maintaining the social group. This, as it were, is the\nsoul-nucleus of social organisation: where the principle of unity is an\ninstinct, a feeling, an absorbing solidarity. Next comes what Hegel has\ncalled Civil Society,\u2014meaning however by civil the antithesis to\npolitical, the society of those who may be styled _bourgeois_, not\n_citoyens_:\u2014and meaning by society the antithesis to community. There are\nother natural influences binding men together besides those which form the\nclose unities of the family, gens, tribe, or clan. Economical needs\nassociate human beings within a much larger radius\u2014in ways capable of\nalmost indefinite expansion\u2014but also in a way much less intense and deep.\nCivil Society is the more or less loosely organised aggregate of such\nassociations, which, if, on one hand, they keep human life from stagnating\nin the mere family, on another, accentuate more sharply the tendency to\ncompetition and the struggle for life. Lastly, in the Political State\ncomes the synthesis of family and society. Of the family; in so far as the\nState tends to develope itself on the nature-given unit of the Nation (an\nextended family, supplementing as need arises real descent by fictitious\nincorporations), and has apparently never permanently maintained itself\nexcept on the basis of a predominant common nationality. Of society; in so\nfar as the extension and dispersion of family ties have left free room for\nthe differentiation of many other sides of human interest and action, and\ngiven ground for the full development of individuality. In consequence of\nthis, the State (and such a state as Hegel describes is essentially the\nidea or ideal of the modern State)(9) has a certain artificial air about\nit. It can only be maintained by the free action of intelligence: it must\nmake its laws public: it must bring to consciousness the principles of its\nconstitution, and create agencies for keeping up unity of organisation\nthrough the several separate provinces or contending social interests,\neach of which is inclined to insist on the right of home mis-rule.\n\nThe State\u2014which in its actuality must always be a quasi-national state\u2014is\nthus the supreme unity of Nature and Mind. Its natural basis in land,\nlanguage, blood, and the many ties which spring therefrom, has to be\nconstantly raised into an intelligent unity through universal interests.\nBut the elements of race and of culture have no essential connexion, and\nthey perpetually incline to wrench themselves asunder. Blood and judgment\nare for ever at war in the state as in the individual(10): the\ncosmopolitan interest, to which the maxim is _Ubi bene, ibi patria_,\nresists the national, which adopts the patriotic watchword of Hector(11).\nThe State however has another source of danger in the very principle that\ngave it birth. It arose through antagonism: it was baptised on the\nbattlefield, and it only lives as it is able to assert itself against a\nforeign foe. And this circumstance tends to intensify and even pervert its\nnatural basis of nationality:\u2014tends to give the very conception of the\npolitical a negative and superficial look. But, notwithstanding all these\ndrawbacks, the State in its Idea is entitled to the name Hobbes gave\nit,\u2014the Mortal God. Here in a way culminates the obviously objective,\u2014we\nmay almost say, visible and tangible\u2014development of Man and Mind. Here it\nattains a certain completeness\u2014a union of reality and of ideality: a\nquasi-immortality, a quasi-universality. What the individual person could\nnot do unaided, he can do in the strength of his commonwealth. Much that\nin the solitary was but implicit or potential, is in the State actualised.\n\nBut the God of the State is a mortal God. It is but a national and a\nlimited mind. To be actual, one must at least begin by restricting\noneself. Or, rather actuality is rational, but always with a conditioned\nand a relative rationality(12): it is in the realm of action and\nre-action,\u2014in the realm of change and nature. It has warring forces\noutside it,\u2014warring forces inside it. Its unity is never perfect: because\nit never produces a true identity of interests within, or maintains an\nabsolute independence without. Thus the true and real State\u2014the State in\nits Idea\u2014the realisation of concrete humanity,\u2014of Mind as the fullness and\nunity of nature\u2014is not reached in any single or historical State: but\nfloats away, when we try to seize it, into the endless progress of\nhistory. Always indeed the State, the historical and objective, points\nbeyond itself. It does so first in the succession of times. _Die\nWeltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht._(13) And in that doom of the world the\neternal blast sweeps along the successive generations of the temporal, one\nexpelling another from the stage of time\u2014each because it is inadequate to\nthe Idea which it tried to express, and has succumbed to an enemy from\nwithout because it was not a real and true unity within.\n\nBut if temporal flees away before another temporal, it abides in so far as\nit has, however inadequately, given expression and visible reality\u2014as it\npoints inward and upward\u2014to the eternal. The earthly state is also the\ncity of God; and if the republic of Plato seems to find scant admission\ninto the reality of flesh and blood, it stands eternal as a witness in the\nheaven of idea. Behind the fleeting succession of consulates and\ndictatures, of aristocracy and empire, feuds of plebeian with patrician,\nin that apparent anarchy of powers which the so-called Roman constitution\nis to the superficial observer, there is the eternal Rome, one, strong,\nvictorious, _semper eadem_: the Rome of Virgil and Justinian, the ghost\nwhereof still haunts with memories the seven-hilled city, but which with\nfull spiritual presence lives in the law, the literature, the manners of\nthe modern world. To find fitter expression for this Absolute Mind than it\nhas in the Ethical community\u2014to reach that reality of which the moral\nworld is but one-sidedly representative\u2014is the work of Art, Religion, and\nPhilosophy. And to deal with these efforts to find the truth and the unity\nof Mind and Nature is the subject of Hegel\u2019s third Section.\n\n\n\n(iii.) Religion and Philosophy.\n\n\nIt may be well at this point to guard against a misconception of this\nserial order of exposition(14). As stage is seen to follow stage, the\nhistorical imagination, which governs our ordinary current of ideas, turns\nthe logical dependence into a time-sequence. But it is of course not meant\nthat the later stage follows the earlier in history. The later is the more\nreal, and therefore the more fundamental. But we can only understand by\nabstracting and then transcending our abstractions, or rather by showing\nhow the abstraction implies relations which force us to go further and\nbeyond our arbitrary arrest. Each stage therefore either stands to that\npreceding it as an antithesis, which inevitably dogs its steps as an\naccusing spirit, or it is the conjunction of the original thesis with the\nantithesis, in a union which should not be called synthesis because it is\na closer fusion and true marriage of minds. A truth and reality, though\nfundamental, is only appreciated at its true value and seen in all its\nforce where it appears as the reconciliation and reunion of partial and\nopposing points of view. Thus, e.g., the full significance of the State\ndoes not emerge so long as we view it in isolation as a supposed single\nstate, but only as it is seen in the conflict of history, in its actual\n\u201cenergy\u201d as a world-power among powers, always pointing beyond itself to a\nsomething universal which it fain would be, and yet cannot be. Or, again,\nthere never was a civil or economic society which existed save under the\nwing of a state, or in one-sided assumption of state powers to itself: and\na family is no isolated and independent unit belonging to a supposed\npatriarchal age, but was always mixed up with, and in manifold dependence\nupon, political and civil combinations. The true family, indeed, far from\npreceding the state in time, presupposes the political power to give it\nits precise sphere and its social stability: as is well illustrated by\nthat typical form of it presented in the Roman state.\n\nSo, again, religion does not supervene upon an already existing political\nand moral system and invest it with an additional sanction. The true order\nwould be better described as the reverse. The real basis of social life,\nand even of intelligence, is religion. As some thinkers quaintly put it,\nthe known rests and lives on the bosom of the Unknowable. But when we say\nthat, we must at once guard against a misconception. There are religions\nof all sorts; and some of them which are most heard of in the modern world\nonly exist or survive in the shape of a traditional name and venerated\ncreed which has lost its power. Nor is a religion necessarily committed to\na definite conception of a supernatural\u2014of a personal power outside the\norder of Nature. But in all cases, religion is a faith and a theory which\ngives unity to the facts of life, and gives it, not because the unity is\nin detail proved or detected, but because life and experience in their\ndeepest reality inexorably demand and evince such a unity to the heart.\nThe religion of a time is not its nominal creed, but its dominant\nconviction of the meaning of reality, the principle which animates all its\nbeing and all its striving, the faith it has in the laws of nature and the\npurpose of life. Dimly or clearly felt and perceived, religion has for its\nprinciple (one cannot well say, its object) not the unknowable, but the\ninner unity of life and knowledge, of act and consciousness, a unity which\nis certified in its every knowledge, but is never fully demonstrable by\nthe summation of all its ascertained items. As such a felt and believed\nsynthesis of the world and life, religion is the unity which gives\nstability and harmony to the social sphere; just as morality in its turn\ngives a partial and practical realisation to the ideal of religion. But\nreligion does not merely establish and sanction morality; it also frees it\nfrom a certain narrowness it always has, as of the earth. Or, otherwise\nput, morality has to the keener inspection something in it which is more\nthan the mere moral injunction at first indicates. Beyond the moral, in\nits stricter sense, as the obligatory duty and the obedience to law, rises\nand expands the beautiful and the good: a beautiful which is\ndisinterestedly loved, and a goodness which has thrown off all utilitarian\nrelativity, and become a free self-enhancing joy. The true spirit of\nreligion sees in the divine judgment not a mere final sanction to human\nmorality which has failed of its earthly close, not the re-adjustment of\nsocial and political judgments in accordance with our more conscientious\ninner standards, but a certain, though, for our part-by-part vision,\nincalculable proportion between what is done and suffered. And in this\nliberation of the moral from its restrictions, Art renders no slight aid.\nThus in different ways, religion presupposes morality to fill up its\nvacant form, and morality presupposes religion to give its laws an\nultimate sanction, which at the same time points beyond their limitations.\n\nBut art, religion, and philosophy still rest on the national culture and\non the individual mind. However much they rise in the heights of the ideal\nworld, they never leave the reality of life and circumstance behind, and\nfloat in the free empyrean. Yet there are degrees of universality, degrees\nin which they reach what they promised. As the various psychical _nuclei_\nof an individual consciousness tend through the course of experience to\ngather round a central idea and by fusion and assimilation form a complete\nmental organisation; so, through the march of history, there grows up a\ncomplication and a fusion of national ideas and aspirations, which, though\nstill retaining the individuality and restriction of a concrete national\nlife, ultimately present an organisation social, aesthetic, and religious\nwhich is a type of humanity in its universality and completeness. Always\nmoving in the measure and on the lines of the real development of its\nsocial organisation, the art and religion of a nation tend to give\nexpression to what social and political actuality at its best but\nimperfectly sets in existence. They come more and more to be, not mere\ncompeting fragments as set side by side with those of others, but\ncomparatively equal and complete representations of the many-sided and\nmany-voiced reality of man and the world. Yet always they live and\nflourish in reciprocity with the fullness of practical institutions and\nindividual character. An abstractly universal art and religion is a\ndelusion\u2014until all diversities of geography and climate, of language and\ntemperament, have been made to disappear. If these energies are in power\nand reality and not merely in name, they cannot be applied like a panacea\nor put on like a suit of ready-made clothes. If alive, they grow with\nindividualised type out of the social situation: and they can only attain\na vulgar and visible universality, so far as they attach themselves to\nsome simple and uniform aspects,\u2014a part tolerably identical everywhere\u2014in\nhuman nature in all times and races.\n\nArt, according to Hegel\u2019s account, is the first of the three expressions\nof Absolute Mind. But the key-note to the whole is to be found in\nReligion(15): or Religion is the generic description of that phase of mind\nwhich has found rest in the fullness of attainment and is no longer a\nstruggle and a warfare, but a fruition. \u201cIt is the conviction of all\nnations,\u201d he says(16), \u201cthat in the religious consciousness they hold\ntheir truth; and they have always regarded religion as their dignity and\nas the Sunday of their life. Whatever excites our doubts and alarms, all\ngrief and all anxiety, all that the petty fields of finitude can offer to\nattract us, we leave behind on the shoals of time: and as the traveller on\nthe highest peak of a mountain range, removed from every distinct view of\nthe earth\u2019s surface, quietly lets his vision neglect all the restrictions\nof the landscape and the world; so in this pure region of faith man,\nlifted above the hard and inflexible reality, sees it with his mind\u2019s eye\nreflected in the rays of the mental sun to an image where its discords,\nits lights and shades, are softened to eternal calm. In this region of\nmind flow the waters of forgetfulness, from which Psyche drinks, and in\nwhich she drowns all her pain: and the darknesses of this life are here\nsoftened to a dream-image, and transfigured into a mere setting for the\nsplendours of the Eternal.\u2019\u201d\n\nIf we take Religion, in this extended sense, we find it is the sense, the\nvision, the faith, the certainty of the eternal in the changeable, of the\ninfinite in the finite, of the reality in appearance, of the truth in\nerror. It is freedom from the distractions and pre-occupations of the\nparticular details of life; it is the sense of permanence, repose,\ncertainty, rounding off, toning down and absorbing the vicissitude, the\nrestlessness, the doubts of actual life. Such a victory over palpable\nreality has no doubt its origin\u2014its embryology\u2014in phases of mind which\nhave been already discussed in the first section. Religion will vary\nenormously according to the grade of national mood of mind and social\ndevelopment in which it emerges. But whatever be the peculiarities of its\noriginal swaddling-clothes, its cardinal note will be a sense of\ndependence on, and independence in, something more permanent, more august,\nmore of a surety and stay than visible and variable nature and\nman,\u2014something also which whether God or devil, or both in one, holds the\nkeys of life and death, of weal and woe, and holds them from some safe\nvantage-ground above the lower realms of change. By this central being the\noutward and the inward, past and present and to come, are made one. And as\nalready indicated, Religion, emerging, as it does, from social man, from\nmind ethical, will retain traces of the two _foci_ in society: the\nindividual subjectivity and the objective community. Retain them however\nonly as traces, which still show in the actually envisaged reconciliation.\nFor that is what religion does to morality. It carries a step higher the\nunity or rather combination gained in the State: it is the fuller harmony\nof the individual and the collectivity. The moral conscience rests in\ncertainty and fixity on the religious.\n\nBut Religion (thus widely understood as the faith in sempiternal and\nall-explaining reality) at first appears under a guise of Art. The poem\nand the pyramid, the temple-image and the painting, the drama and the\nfairy legend, these are religion: but they are, perhaps, religion as Art.\nAnd that means that they present the eternal under sensible\nrepresentations, the work of an artist, and in a perishable material of\nlimited range. Yet even the carvers of a long-past day whose works have\nbeen disinterred from the plateaux of Auvergne knew that they gave to the\nperishable life around them a quasi-immortality: and the myth-teller of a\nsavage tribe elevated the incident of a season into a perennial power of\nlove and fear. The cynic may remind us that from the finest picture of the\nartist, readily\n\n\n                              \u201cWe turn\n    To yonder girl that fords the burn.\u201d\n\n\nAnd yet it may be said in reply to the cynic that, had it not been for the\ndeep-imprinted lesson of the artist, it would have been but a brutal\ninstinct that would have drawn our eyes. The artist, the poet, the\nmusician, reveal the meaning, the truth, the reality of the world: they\nteach us, they help us, backward younger brothers, to see, to hear, to\nfeel what our rude senses had failed to detect. They enact the miracle of\nthe loaves and fishes, again and again: out of the common limited things\nof every day they produce a bread of life in which the generations\ncontinue to find nourishment.\n\nBut if Art embodies for us the unseen and the eternal, it embodies it in\nthe stone, the colour, the tone, and the word: and these are by themselves\nonly dead matter. To the untutored eye and taste the finest\npicture-gallery is only a weariness: when the national life has drifted\naway, the sacred book and the image are but idols and enigmas. \u201cThe\nstatues are now corpses from which the vivifying soul has fled, and the\nhymns are words whence faith has departed: the tables of the Gods are\nwithout spiritual meat and drink, and games and feasts no longer afford\nthe mind its joyful union with the being of being. The works of the Muse\nlack that intellectual force which knew itself strong and real by crushing\ngods and men in its winepress. They are now (in this iron age) what they\nare for us,\u2014fair fruits broken from the tree, and handed to us by a kindly\ndestiny. But the gift is like the fruits which the girl in the picture\npresents: she does not give the real life of their existence, not the tree\nwhich bore them, not the earth and the elements which entered into their\nsubstance, nor the climate which formed their quality, nor the change of\nseasons which governed the process of their growth. Like her, Destiny in\ngiving us the works of ancient art does not give us their world, not the\nspring and summer of the ethical life in which they blossomed and ripened,\nbut solely a memory and a suggestion of this actuality. Our act in\nenjoying them, therefore, is not a Divine service: were it so, our mind\nwould achieve its perfect and satisfying truth. All that we do is a mere\nexternalism, which from these fruits wipes off some rain-drop, some speck\nof dust, and which, in place of the inward elements of moral actuality\nthat created and inspired them, tries from the dead elements of their\nexternal reality, such as language and historical allusion, to set up a\ntedious mass of scaffolding, not in order to live ourselves into them, but\nonly to form a picture of them in our minds. But as the girl who proffers\nthe plucked fruits is more and nobler than the natural element with all\nits details of tree, air, light, &c. which first yielded them, because she\ngathers all this together, in a nobler way, into the glance of the\nconscious eye and the gesture which proffers them; so the spirit of\ndestiny which offers us those works of art is more than the ethical life\nand actuality of the ancient people: for it is the inwardising of that\nmind which in them was still self-estranged and self-dispossessed:\u2014it is\nthe spirit of tragic destiny, the destiny which collects all those\nindividualised gods and attributes of substance into the one Pantheon. And\nthat temple of all the gods is Mind conscious of itself as mind(17).\u201d\n\nReligion enters into its more adequate form when it ceases to appear in\nthe guise of Art and realises that the kingdom of God is within, that the\ntruth must be _felt_, the eternal _inwardly_ revealed, the holy one\napprehended by _faith_(18), not by outward vision. Eye hath not seen, nor\near heard, the things of God. They cannot be presented, or delineated:\nthey come only in the witness of the spirit. The human soul itself is the\nonly worthy temple of the Most High, whom heaven, and the heaven of\nheavens, cannot contain. Here in truth God has come down to dwell with\nmen; and the Son of Man, caught up in the effusion of the Spirit, can in\nall assurance and all humility claim that he is divinified. Here\napparently Absolute Mind is reached: the soul knows no limitation, no\nstruggle: in time it is already eternal. Yet, there is, according to\nHegel, a flaw,\u2014not in the essence and the matter, but in the manner and\nmode in which the ordinary religious consciousness represents to itself,\nor pictures that unification which it feels and experiences.\n\n\u201cIn religion then this unification of ultimate Being with the Self is\nimplicitly reached. But the religious consciousness, if it has this\nsymbolic idea of its reconciliation, still has it as a mere symbol or\nrepresentation. It attains the satisfaction by tacking on to its pure\nnegativity, and that externally, the positive signification of its unity\nwith the ultimate Being: its satisfaction remains therefore tainted by the\nantithesis of another world. Its own reconciliation, therefore, is\npresented to its consciousness as something far away, something far away\nin the future: just as the reconciliation which the other Self\naccomplished appears as a far-away thing in the past. The one Divine Man\nhad but an implicit father and only an actual mother; conversely the\nuniversal divine man, the community, has its own deed and knowledge for\nits father, but for its mother only the eternal Love, which it only\n_feels_, but does not _behold_ in its consciousness as an actual immediate\nobject. Its reconciliation therefore is in its heart, but still at\nvariance with its consciousness, and its actuality still has a flaw. In\nits field of consciousness the place of implicit reality or side of pure\nmediation is taken by the reconciliation that lies far away behind: the\nplace of the actually present, or the side of immediacy and existence, is\nfilled by the world which has still to wait for its transfiguration to\nglory. Implicitly no doubt the world is reconciled with the eternal Being;\nand that Being, it is well known, no longer looks upon the object as alien\nto it, but in its love sees it as like itself. But for self-consciousness\nthis immediate presence is not yet set in the full light of mind. In its\nimmediate consciousness accordingly the spirit of the community is parted\nfrom its religious: for while the religious consciousness declares that\nthey are implicitly not parted, this implicitness is not raised to reality\nand not yet grown to absolute self-certainty(19).\u201d\n\nReligion therefore, which as it first appeared in art-worship had yet to\nrealise its essential inwardness or spirituality, so has now to overcome\nthe antithesis in which its (the religious) consciousness stands to the\nsecular. For the peculiarly religious type of mind is distinguished by an\nindifference and even hostility, more or less veiled, to art, to morality\nand the civil state, to science and to nature. Strong in the certainty of\nfaith, or of its implicit rest in God, it resents too curious inquiry into\nthe central mystery of its union, and in its distincter consciousness sets\nthe foundation of faith on the evidence of a fact, which, however, it in\nthe same breath declares to be unique and miraculous, the central event of\nthe ages, pointing back in its reference to the first days of humanity,\nand forward in the future to the winding-up of the business of terrestrial\nlife. Philosophy, according to Hegel\u2019s conception of it, does but draw the\nconclusion supplied by the premisses of religion: it supplements and\nrounds off into coherence the religious implications. The unique events in\nJudea nearly nineteen centuries ago are for it also the first step in a\nnew revelation of man\u2019s relationship to God: but while it acknowledges the\ntranscendent interest of that age, it lays main stress on the permanent\ntruth then revealed, and it insists on the duty of carrying out the\nprinciple there awakened to all the depth and breadth of its explication.\nIts task\u2014its supreme task\u2014is to _explicate religion_. But to do so is to\nshow that religion is no exotic, and no _mere_ revelation from an external\nsource. It is to show that religion is the truth, the complete reality, of\nthe mind that lived in Art, that founded the state and sought to be\ndutiful and upright: the truth, the crowning fruit of all scientific\nknowledge, of all human affections, of all secular consciousness. Its\nlesson ultimately is that there is nothing essentially common or unclean:\nthat the holy is not parted off from the true and the good and the\nbeautiful.\n\nReligion thus expanded descends from its abstract or \u201cintelligible\u201d world,\nto which it had retired from art and science, and the affairs of ordinary\nlife. Its God\u2014as a true God\u2014is not of the dead alone, but also of the\nliving: not a far-off supreme and ultimate Being, but also a man among\nmen. Philosophy thus has to break down the middle partition-wall of life,\nthe fence between secular and sacred. It is but religion come to its\nmaturity, made at home in the world, and no longer a stranger and a\nwonder. Religion has pronounced in its inmost heart and faith of faith,\nthat the earth is the Lord\u2019s, and that day unto day shows forth the divine\nhandiwork. But the heart of unbelief, of little faith, has hardly uttered\nthe word, than it forgets its assurance and leans to the conviction that\nthe prince of this world is the Spirit of Evil. The mood of Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e is\nalso\u2014but with a difference\u2014the mood of philosophy. It asserts the ways of\nProvidence: but its providence is not the God of the Moralist, or the\nideal of the Artist, or rather is not these only, but also the Law of\nNature, and more than that. Its aim is the Unity of History. The words\nhave sometimes been lightly used to mean that events run on in one\ncontinuous flow, and that there are no abrupt, no ultimate beginnings,\nparting age from age. But the Unity of History in its full sense is beyond\nhistory: it is history \u201creduced\u201d from the expanses of time to the eternal\npresent: its thousand years made one day,\u2014made even the glance of a\nmoment. The theme of the Unity of History\u2014in the full depth of unity and\nthe full expanse of history\u2014is the theme of Hegelian philosophy. It traces\nthe process in which Mind has to be all-inclusive, self-upholding, one\nwith the Eternal reality.\n\n\u201cThat process of the mind\u2019s self-realisation\u201d says Hegel in the close of\nhis _Phenomenology_, \u201cexhibits a lingering movement and succession of\nminds, a gallery of images, each of which, equipped with the complete\nwealth of mind, only seems to linger because the Self has to penetrate and\nto digest this wealth of its Substance. As its perfection consists in\ncoming completely to _know_ what it _is_ (its substance), this knowledge\nis its self-involution in which it deserts its outward existence and\nsurrenders its shape to recollection. Thus self-involved, it is sunk in\nthe night of its self-consciousness: but in that night its vanished being\nis preserved, and that being, thus in idea preserved,\u2014old, but now\nnew-born of the spirit,\u2014is the new sphere of being, a new world, a new\nphase of mind. In this new phase it has again to begin afresh and from the\nbeginning, and again nurture itself to maturity from its own resources, as\nif for it all that preceded were lost, and it had learned nothing from the\nexperience of the earlier minds. Yet is that recollection a preservation\nof experience: it is the quintessence, and in fact a higher form, of the\nsubstance. If therefore this new mind appears only to count on its own\nresources, and to start quite fresh and blank, it is at the same time on a\nhigher grade that it starts. The intellectual and spiritual realm, which\nis thus constructed in actuality, forms a succession in time, where one\nmind relieved another of its watch, and each took over the kingdom of the\nworld from the preceding. The purpose of that succession is to reveal the\ndepth, and that depth is the absolute comprehension of mind: this\nrevelation is therefore to uplift its depth, to spread it out in breadth,\nso negativing this self-involved Ego, wherein it is self-dispossessed or\nreduced to substance. But it is also its time: the course of time shows\nthis dispossession itself dispossessed, and thus in its extension it is no\nless in its depth, the self. The way to that goal,\u2014absolute\nself-certainty\u2014or the mind knowing itself as mind\u2014is the inwardising of\nthe minds, as they severally are in themselves, and as they accomplish the\norganisation of their realm. Their conservation,\u2014regarded on the side of\nits free and apparently contingent succession of fact\u2014is history: on the\nside of their comprehended organisation, again, it is the science of\nmental phenomenology: the two together, comprehended history, form at once\nthe recollection and the grave-yard of the absolute Mind, the actuality,\ntruth, and certitude of his throne, apart from which he were lifeless and\nalone.\u201d\n\nSuch in brief outline\u2014lingering most on the points where Hegel has here\nbeen briefest\u2014is the range of the Philosophy of Mind. Its aim is to\ncomprehend, not to explain: to put together in intelligent unity, not to\nanalyse into a series of elements. For it psychology is not an analysis or\ndescription of mental phenomena, of laws of association, of the growth of\ncertain powers and ideas, but a \u201ccomprehended history\u201d of the formation of\nsubjective mind, of the intelligent, feeling, willing self or ego. For it\nEthics is part and only part of the great scheme or system of\nself-development; but continuing into greater concreteness the normal\nendowment of the individual mind, and but preparing the ground on which\nreligion may be most effectively cultivated. And finally Religion itself,\nreleased from its isolation and other-world sacrosanctity, is shown to be\nonly the crown of life, the ripest growth of actuality, and shown to be so\nby philosophy, whilst it is made clear that religion is the basis of\nphilosophy, or that a philosophy can only go as far as the religious\nstand-point allows. The hierarchy, if so it be called, of the spiritual\nforces is one where none can stand alone, or claim an abstract and\nindependent supremacy. The truth of egoism is the truth of altruism: the\ntruly moral is the truly religious: and each is not what it professes to\nbe unless it anticipate the later, or include the earlier.\n\n\n\n(iv.) Mind or Spirit.\n\n\nIt may be said, however, that for such a range of subjects the term Mind\nis wretchedly inadequate and common-place, and that the better rendering\nof the title would be Philosophy of Spirit. It may be admitted that Mind\nis not all that could be wished. But neither is Spirit blameless. And, it\nmay be added, Hegel\u2019s own term _Geist_ has to be unduly strained to cover\nso wide a region. It serves\u2014and was no doubt meant to serve\u2014as a sign of\nthe conformity of his system with the religion which sees in God no\nother-world being, but our very self and mind, and which worships him in\nspirit and in truth. And if the use of a word like this could allay the\n\u201cancient variance\u201d between the religious and the philosophic mood, it\nwould be but churlish perhaps to refuse the sign of compliance and\ncompromise. But whatever may be the case in German,\u2014and even there the new\nwine was dangerous to the old wine-skin\u2014it is certain that to average\nEnglish ears the word Spiritual would carry us over the medium line into\nthe proper land of religiosity. And to do that, as we have seen, is to sin\nagainst the central idea: the idea that religion is of one blood with the\nwhole mental family, though the most graciously complete of all the\nsisters. Yet, however the word may be chosen, the philosophy of Hegel,\nlike the august lady who appeared in vision to the emprisoned Bo\u00ebthius,\nhas on her garment a sign which \u201csignifies the life which is on earth,\u201d as\nalso a sign which signifies the \u201cright law of heaven\u201d; if her right-hand\nholds the \u201cbook of the justice of the King omnipotent,\u201d the sceptre in her\nleft is \u201ccorporal judgment against sin(20).\u201d\n\nThere is indeed no sufficient reason for contemning the term Mind. If\nInductive Philosophy of the Human Mind has\u2014perhaps to a dainty taste\u2014made\nthe word unsavoury, that is no reason for refusing to give it all the\nwealth of soul and heart, of intellect and will. The _mens aeterna_ which,\nif we hear Tacitus, expressed the Hebrew conception of the spirituality of\nGod, and the \u039d\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 which Aristotelianism set supreme in the Soul, are not\nthe mere or abstract intelligence, which late-acquired habits of\nabstraction have made out of them. If the reader will adopt the term (in\nwant of a better) in its widest scope, we may shelter ourselves under the\nexample of Wordsworth. His theme is\u2014as he describes it in the\n_Recluse_\u2014\u201cthe Mind and Man\u201d: his\n\n\n                        \u201cvoice proclaims\n    How exquisitely the individual Mind\n    (And the progressive powers perhaps no less\n    Of the whole species) to the external World\n    Is fitted;\u2014and how exquisitely too\n    The external World is fitted to the Mind;\n    And the creation (by no lower name\n    Can it be called) which they with blended might\n    Accomplish.\u201d\n\n\nThe verse which expounds that \u201chigh argument\u201d speaks\n\n\n    \u201cOf Truth, of Grandeur, Beauty, Love and Hope\n    And melancholy Fear subdued by Faith.\u201d\n\n\nAnd the poet adds:\n\n\n                              \u201cAs we look\n    Into our Minds, into the Mind of Man\u2014\n    My haunt, and the main region of my song;\n    Beauty\u2014a living Presence of the earth\n    Surpassing the most fair ideal forms\n    ... waits upon my steps.\u201d\n\n\nThe reality duly seen in the spiritual vision\n\n\n                    \u201cThat inspires\n    The human Soul of universal earth\n    Dreaming of things to come\u201d\n\n\nwill be a greater glory than the ideals of imaginative fiction ever\nfancied:\n\n\n    \u201cFor the discerning intellect of Man,\n    When wedded to this goodly universe\n    In love and holy passion, shall find these\n    A simple produce of the common day.\u201d\n\n\nIf Wordsworth, thus, as it were, echoing the great conception of Francis\nBacon,\n\n\n    \u201cWould chant, in lonely peace, the spousal verse\n    Of this great consummation,\u201d\n\n\nperhaps the poet and the essayist may help us with Hegel to rate the\nMind\u2014the Mind of Man\u2014at its highest value.\n\n\n\n\nEssay II. Aims And Methods Of Psychology.\n\n\nIt is not going too far to say that in common estimation psychology has as\nyet hardly reached what Kant has called the steady walk of science\u2014_der\nsichere Gang der Wissenschaft_. To assert this is not, of course, to throw\nany doubts on the importance of the problems, or on the intrinsic value of\nthe results, in the studies which have been prosecuted under that name. It\nis only to note the obvious fact that a number of inquiries of somewhat\ndiscrepant tone, method, and tendency have all at different times covered\nthemselves under the common title of psychological, and that the work of\norientation is as yet incomplete. Such a destiny seems inevitable, when a\nname is coined rather as the title of an unexplored territory, than fixed\non to describe an accomplished fact.\n\n\n\n(i.) Psychology as a Science and as a Part of Philosophy.\n\n\nThe _De Anima_ of Aristotle, gathering up into one the work of Plato and\nhis predecessors, may be said to lay the foundation of psychology. But\neven in it, we can already see that there are two elements or aspects\nstruggling for mastery: two elements not unrelated or independent, but\nhard to keep fairly and fully in unity. On one hand there is the\nconception of Soul as a part of Nature, as a grade of existence in the\nphysical or natural universe,\u2014in the universe of things which suffer\ngrowth and change, which are never entirely \u201cwithout matter,\u201d and are\nalways attached to or present in body. From this point of view Aristotle\nurged that a sound and realistic psychology must, e.g. in its definition\nof a passion, give the prominent place to its physical (or material)\nexpression, and not to its mental form or significance. It must remember,\nhe said, that the phenomena or \u201caccidents\u201d are what really throw light on\nthe nature or the \u201csubstance\u201d of the Soul. On the other hand, there are\ntwo points to be considered. There is, first of all, the counterpoising\nremark that the conception of Soul as such, as a unity and common\ncharacteristic, will be determinative of the phenomena or\n\u201caccidents,\u201d\u2014will settle, as it were, what we are to observe and look for,\nand how we are to describe our observations. And by the _conception_ of\nSoul, is meant not _a_ soul, as a thing or agent (subject) which has\nproperties attaching to it; but soul, as the generic feature, the\nuniversal, which is set as a stamp on everything that claims to be\npsychical. In other words, Soul is one, not as a single thing contrasted\nwith its attributes, activities, or exercises of force (such single thing\nwill be shown by logic to be a metaphysical fiction); but as the unity of\nform and character, the comprehensive and identical feature, which is\npresent in all its manifestations and exercises. But there is a second\nconsideration. The question is asked by Aristotle whether it is completely\nand strictly accurate to put Soul under the category of natural objects.\nThere is in it, or of it, perhaps, something, and something essential to\nit, which belongs to the order of the eternal and self-active: something\nwhich is \u201cform\u201d and \u201cenergy\u201d quite unaffected by and separate from\n\u201cmatter.\u201d How this is related to the realm of the perishable and\nchangeable is a problem on which Aristotle has been often (and with some\nreason) believed to be obscure, if not even inconsistent(21).\n\nIn these divergent elements which come to the fore in Aristotle\u2019s\ntreatment we have the appearance of a radical difference of conception and\npurpose as to psychology. He himself does a good deal to keep them both in\nview. But it is evident that here already we have the contrast between a\npurely physical or (in the narrower sense) \u201cscientific\u201d psychology,\nempirical and realistic in treatment, and a more philosophical\u2014what in\ncertain quarters would be called a speculative or metaphysical\u2014conception\nof the problem. There is also in Aristotle the antithesis of a popular or\nsuperficial, and an accurate or analytic, psychology. The former is of a\ncertain use in dealing, say, with questions of practical ethics and\neducation: the latter is of more strictly scientific interest. Both of\nthese distinctions\u2014that between a speculative and an empirical, and that\nbetween a scientific and a popular treatment\u2014affect the subsequent history\nof the study. Psychology is sometimes understood to mean the results of\ncasual observation of our own minds by what is termed introspection, and\nby the interpretation of what we may observe in others. Such observations\nare in the first place carried on under the guidance of distinctions or\npoints of view supplied by the names in common use. We interrogate our own\nconsciousness as to what facts or relations of facts correspond to the\nterms of our national language. Or we attempt\u2014what is really an\ninexhaustible quest\u2014to get definite divisions between them, and clear-cut\ndefinitions. Inquiries like these which start from popular distinctions\nfall a long way short of science: and the inquirer will find that\naccidental and essential properties are given in the same handful of\nconclusions. Yet there is always much value in these attempts to get our\nminds cleared: and it is indispensable for all inquiries that all alleged\nor reported facts of mind should be realised and reproduced in our own\nmental experience. And this is especially the case in psychology, just\nbecause here we cannot get the object outside us, we cannot get or make a\ndiagram, and unless we give it reality by re-constructing it,\u2014by\nre-interrogating our own experience, our knowledge of it will be but\nwooden and mechanical. And the term introspection need not be too\nseriously taken: it means much more than watching passively an internal\ndrama; and is quite as well describable as mental projection, setting out\nwhat was within, and so as it were hidden and involved, before ourselves\nin the field of mental vision. Here, as always, the essential point is to\nget ourselves well out of the way of the object observed, and to stand,\nfiguratively speaking, quite on one side.\n\nBut even at the best, such a popular or empirical psychology has no\nspecial claim to be ranked as science. It may no doubt be said that at\nleast it collects, describes, or notes down facts. But even this is not so\ncertain as it seems. Its so-called facts are very largely fictions, or so\nlargely interpolated with error, that they cannot be safely used for\nconstruction. If psychology is to accomplish anything valuable, it must go\nmore radically to work. It must\u2014at least in a measure\u2014discard from its\npreliminary view the data of common and current distinctions, and try to\nget at something more primary or ultimate as its starting-point. And this\nit may do in two ways. It may, in the one case, follow the example of the\nphysical sciences. In these it is the universal practice to assume that\nthe explanation of complex and concrete facts is to be attained by (_a_)\npostulating certain simple elements (which we may call atoms, molecules,\nand perhaps units or monads), which are supposed to be clearly conceivable\nand to justify themselves by intrinsic intelligibility, and by (_b_)\nassuming that these elements are compounded and combined according to laws\nwhich again are in the last resort self-evident, or such that they seem to\nhave an obvious and palpable lucidity. Further, such laws being always\naxioms or plain postulates of mechanics (for these alone possess this\nfeature of self-evident intelligibility), they are subject to and invite\nall the aids and refinements of the higher mathematical calculus. What the\nprimary and self-explicative bits of psychical reality may be, is a\nfurther question on which there may be some dispute. They may be, so to\nsay, taken in a more physical or in a more metaphysical way: i.e. more as\nunits of nerve-function or more as elements of ideative-function. And\nthere may be differences as to how far and in what provinces the\nmathematical calculus may be applicable. But, in any case, there will be a\nstrong tendency in psychology, worked on this plan, to follow, _mutatis\nmutandis_, and at some distance perhaps, the analogy of material physics.\nIn both the justification of the postulated units and laws will be their\nability to describe and systematise the observed phenomena in a uniform\nand consistent way.\n\nThe other way in which psychology gets a foundation and ulterior certainty\nis different, and goes deeper. After all, the \u201cscientific\u201d method is only\na way in which the facts of a given sphere are presented in thoroughgoing\ninterconnexion, each reduced to an exact multiple or fraction of some\nother, by an inimitably continued subtraction and addition of an assumed\nhomogeneous element, found or assumed to be perfectly imaginable\n(conceivable). But we may also consider the province in relation to the\nwhole sphere of reality, may ask what is its place and meaning in the\nwhole, what reality is in the end driving at or coming to be, and how far\nthis special province contributes to that end. If we do this, we attach\npsychology to philosophy, or, if we prefer so to call it, to metaphysics,\nas in the former way we established it on the principles generally\nreceived as governing the method of the physical sciences.\n\nThis\u2014the relation of psychology to fundamental philosophy\u2014is a question\nwhich also turns up in dealing with Ethics. There is on the part of those\nengaged in either of these inquiries a certain impatience against the\nintermeddling (which is held to be only muddling) of metaphysics with\nthem. It is clear that in a very decided way both psychology and ethics\ncan, up to some extent at least, be treated as what is called empirical\n(or, to use the more English phrase, inductive) sciences. On many hands\nthey are actually so treated: and not without result. Considering the\ntendency of metaphysical inquiries, it may be urged that it is well to\navoid preliminary criticism of the current conceptions and beliefs about\nreality which these sciences imply. Yet such beliefs are undoubtedly\npresent and effective. Schopenhauer has popularised the principle that the\npure empiricist is a fiction, that man is a radically metaphysical animal,\nand that he inevitably turns what he receives into a part of a dogmatic\ncreed\u2014a conviction how things ought to be. Almost without effort there\ngrows up in him, or flows in upon him, a belief and a system of beliefs as\nto the order and values of things. Every judgment, even in logic, rests on\nsuch an order of truth. He need not be able to formulate his creed: it\nwill influence him none the less: nay, his faith will probably seem more a\npart of the solid earth and common reality, the less it has been reduced\nto a determinate creed or to a code of principles. For such formulation\npresupposes doubt and scepticism, which it beats back by mere assertion.\nEach human being has such a background of convictions which govern his\nactions and conceptions, and of which it so startles him to suggest the\npossibility of a doubt, that he turns away in dogmatic horror. Such ruling\nideas vary, from man to man, and from man to woman\u2014if we consider them in\nall their minuteness. But above all they constitute themselves in a\ndifferently organised system or aggregate according to the social and\neducational stratum to which an individual belongs. Each group, engaged in\na common task, it may be in the study of a part of nature, is ideally\nbound and obliged by a common language, and special standards of truth and\nreality for its own. Such a group of ideas is what Bacon would have called\na scientific fetich or _idolum theatri_. A scientific _idolum_ is a\ntraditional belief or dogma as to principles, values, and methods, which\nhas so thoroughly pervaded the minds of those engaged in a branch of\ninquiry, that they no longer recognise its hypothetical character,\u2014its\nrelation of means to the main end of their function.\n\nSuch a collected and united theory of reality (it is what Hegel has\ndesignated the Idea) is what is understood by a natural metaphysic. It has\nnothing necessarily to do with a supersensible or a supernatural, if these\nwords mean a ghostly, materialised, but super-finely-materialised nature,\nabove and beyond the present. But that there is a persistent tendency to\nconceive the unity and coherence, the theoretic idea of reality, in this\npseudo-sensuous (i.e. super-sensuous) form, is of course a well-known\nfact. For the present, however, this aberration\u2014this idol of the tribe\u2014may\nbe left out of sight. By a metaphysic or fundamental philosophy, is, in\nthe present instance, meant a system of first principles\u2014a secular and\ncosmic creed: a belief in ends and values, a belief in truth\u2014again\npremising that the system in question is, for most, a rudely organised and\nalmost inarticulate mass of belief and hope, conviction and impression. It\nis, in short, a _natural_ metaphysic: a metaphysic, that is, which has but\nan imperfect coherence, which imperfectly realises both its nature and its\nlimits.\n\nIn certain parts, however, it is more and better than this crude\nbackground of belief. Each science\u2014or at least every group of sciences\u2014has\na more definite system or aggregate of first principles, axioms, and\nconceptions belonging to it. It has, that is,\u2014and here in a much\ndistincter way\u2014its special standard of reality, its peculiar forms of\nconceiving things, its distinctions between the actual and the apparent,\n&c. Here again it will probably be found that the scientific specialist is\nhardly conscious that these are principles and concepts: on the contrary,\nthey will be supposed self-evident and ultimate facts, foundations of\nbeing. Instead of being treated as modes of conception, more or less\njustified by their use and their results, these categories will be\nregarded as fundamental facts, essential conditions of all reality. Like\npopular thought in its ingrained categories, the specialist cannot\nunderstand the possibility of any limitation to his radical ideas of\nreality. To him they are not hypotheses, but principles. The scientific\nspecialist may be as convinced of the universal application of his\npeculiar categories, as the Chinese or the Eskimo that his standards are\nnatural and final.\n\nUnder such metaphysical or extra-empirical presuppositions all\ninvestigation, whether it be crudely empirical or (in the physical sense)\nscientific, is carried on. And when so carried on, it is said to be\nprosecuted apart from any interference from metaphysic. Such a na\u00efve or\nnatural metaphysic, not raised to explicit consciousness, not followed as\nan imposed rule, but governing with the strength of an immanent faith,\ndoes not count for those who live under it as a metaphysic at all. M.\nJourdain was amazed suddenly to learn he had been speaking prose for forty\nyears without knowing it. But in the present case there is something worse\nthan amazement sure to be excited by the news. For the critic who thus\nreveals the secrets of the scientist\u2019s heart is pretty sure to go on to\nsay that a good deal of this na\u00efve unconscious metaphysic is incoherent,\ncontradictory, even bad: that it requires correction, revision, and\nreadjustment, and has by criticism to be made one and harmonious. That\nreadjustment or criticism which shall eliminate contradiction and produce\nunity, is the aim of the _science_ of metaphysic\u2014the science of the\nmeta-physical element in physical knowledge: what Hegel has chosen to call\nthe Science of Logic (in the wide sense of the term). This higher Logic,\nthis _science_ of metaphysic, is the process to revise and harmonise in\nsystematic completeness the imperfect or misleading and partial estimates\nof reality which are to be found in popular and scientific thought.\n\nIn the case of the run of physical sciences this revision is less\nnecessary; and for no very recondite reason. Every science by its very\nnature deals with a special, a limited topic. It is confined to a part or\naspect of reality. Its propositions are not complete truths; they apply to\nan artificial world, to a part expressly cut off from the concrete\nreality. Its principles are generally cut according to their\ncloth,\u2014according to the range in which they apply. The only danger that\ncan well arise is if these categories are transplanted without due\nreservations, and made of universal application, i.e. if the scientist\nelects on his speciality to pronounce _de omnibus rebus_. But in the case\nof psychology and ethics the harmlessness of natural metaphysics will be\nless certain. Here a general human or universal interest is almost an\ninevitable coefficient: especially if they really rise to the full sweep\nof the subject. For as such they both seem to deal not with a part of\nreality, but with the very centre and purpose of all reality. In them we\nare not dealing with topics of secondary interest, but with the very heart\nof the human problem. Here the questions of reality and ideals, of unity\nand diversity, and of the evaluation of existence, come distinctly to the\nfore. If psychology is to answer the question, What am I? and ethics the\nquestion, What ought I to do? they can hardly work without some formulated\ncreed of metaphysical character, without some preliminary criticisms of\ncurrent first principles.\n\n\n\n(ii.) Herbart.\n\n\nThe German thinker, who has given perhaps the most fruitful stimulus to\nthe scientific study of psychology in modern times\u2014Johann Friedrich\nHerbart\u2014is after all essentially a philosopher, and not a mere scientist,\neven in his psychology. His psychological inquiry, that is, stands in\nintimate connexion with the last questions of all intelligence, with\nmetaphysics and ethics. The business of philosophy, says Herbart, is to\ntouch up and finish off conceptions (_Bearbeitung der Begriffe_)(22). It\nfinds, as it supervenes upon the unphilosophical world, that mere and pure\nfacts (if there ever are or were such purisms) have been enveloped in a\ncloud of theory, have been construed into some form of unity, but have\nbeen imperfectly, inadequately construed: and that the existing concepts\nin current use need to be corrected, supplemented and readjusted. It has,\naccordingly, for its work to \u201creconcile experience with itself(23),\u201d and\nto elicit \u201cthe hidden pre-suppositions without which the fact of\nexperience is unthinkable.\u201d Psychology, then, as a branch of this\nphilosophic enterprise, has to readjust the facts discovered in inner\nexperience. For mere uncritical experience or merely empirical knowledge\nonly offers _problems_; it suggests gaps, which indeed further reflection\nserves at first only to deepen into contradictions. Such a psychology is\n\u201cspeculative\u201d: i.e. it is not content to accept the mere given, but goes\nforward and backward to find something that will make the fact\nintelligible. It employs totally different methods from the\n\u201cclassification, induction, analogy\u201d familiar to the logic of the\nempirical sciences. Its \u201cprinciples,\u201d therefore, are not given facts: but\nfacts which have been manipulated and adjusted so as to lose their\nself-contradictory quality: they are facts \u201creduced,\u201d by introducing the\nomitted relationships which they postulate if they are to be true and\nself-consistent(24). While it is far from rejecting or ignoring\nexperience, therefore, psychology cannot strictly be said to build upon it\nalone. It uses experimental fact as an unfinished datum,\u2014or it sees in\nexperience a torso which betrays its imperfection, and suggests\ncompleting.\n\nThe starting-point, it may be said, of Herbart\u2019s psychology is a question\nwhich to the ordinary psychologist (and to the so-called scientific\npsychologist) has a secondary, if it have any interest. It was, he says,\nthe problem of Personality, the problem of the Self or Ego, which first\nled to his characteristic conception of psychological method. \u201cMy first\ndiscovery,\u201d he tells us(25), \u201cwas that the Self was neither primitive nor\nindependent, but must be the most dependent and most conditioned thing one\ncan imagine. The second was that the elementary ideas of an intelligent\nbeing, if they were ever to reach the pitch of self-consciousness, must be\neither all, or at least in part, opposed to each other, and that they must\ncheck or block one another in consequence of this opposition. Though held\nin check, however, these ideas were not to be supposed lost: they subsist\nas endeavours or tendencies to return into the position of actual idea, as\nsoon as the check became, for any reason, either in whole or in part\ninoperative. This check could and must be calculated, and thus it was\nclear that psychology required a mathematical as well as a metaphysical\nfoundation.\u201d\n\nThe place of the conception of the Ego in Kant\u2019s and Fichte\u2019s theory of\nknowledge is well known. Equally well known is Kant\u2019s treatment of the\nsoul-reality or soul-substance in his examination of Rational Psychology.\nWhereas the (logical) unity of consciousness, or \u201csynthetic unity of\napperception,\u201d is assumed as a fundamental starting-point in explanation\nof our objective judgments, or of our knowledge of objective existence,\nits real (as opposed to its formal) foundation in a \u201csubstantial\u201d soul is\nset aside as an illegitimate interpretation of, or inference from, the\nfacts of inner experience. The belief in the separate unity and\npersistence of the soul, said Kant, is not a scientifically-warranted\nconclusion. Its true place is as an ineffaceable postulate of the faith\nwhich inspires human life and action. Herbart did not rest content with\neither of these\u2014as he believed\u2014dogmatic assumptions of his master. He did\nnot fall in cheerfully with the idealism which seemed ready to dispense\nwith a soul, or which justified its acceptance of empirical reality by\nreferring to the fundamental unity of the function of judgment. With a\nstrong bent towards fully-differentiated and individualised experience\nHerbart conjoined a conviction of the need of logical analysis to prevent\nus being carried away by the first-come and inadequate generalities. The\nEgo which, in its extremest abstraction, he found defined as the unity of\nsubject and object, did not seem to him to offer the proper guarantees of\nreality: it was itself a problem, full of contradictions, waiting for\nsolution. On the other hand, the real Ego, or self of concrete experience,\nis very much more than this logical abstract, and differs widely from\nindividual to individual, and apparently from time to time even in the\nsame individual. Our self, of which we talk so fluently, as one and the\nself-same\u2014how far does it really possess the continuity and identity with\nwhich we credit it? Does it not rather seem to be an ideal which we\ngradually form and set before ourselves as the standard for measuring our\nattainments of the moment,\u2014the perfect fulfilment of that oneness of being\nand purpose and knowledge which we never reach? Sometimes even it seems no\nbetter than a name which we move along the varying phenomena of our inner\nlife, at one time identifying it with the power which has gained the\nvictory in a moral struggle, at another with that which has been\ndefeated(26), according as the attitude of the moment makes us throw now\none, now another, aspect of mental activity in the foreground.\n\nThe other\u2014or logical Ego\u2014the mere identity of subject and object,\u2014when\ntaken in its utter abstractness and simplicity, shrivels up to something\nvery small indeed\u2014to a something which is little better than nothing. The\nmere _I_ which is not contra-distinguished by a _Thou_ and a _He_\u2014which is\nwithout all definiteness of predication (the I=I of Fichte and\nSchelling)\u2014is only as it were a point of being cut off from all its\nconnexions in reality, and treated as if it were or could be entirely\nindependent. It is an identity in which subject and object have not yet\nappeared: it is not a real I, though we may still retain the name. It\nis\u2014as Hegel\u2019s _Logic_ will tell us\u2014exactly definable as Being, which is as\nyet Nothing: the impossible edge of abstraction on which we try\u2014and in\nvain\u2014to steady ourselves at the initial point of thought. And to reach or\nstand at that intangible, ungraspable point, which slips away as we\napproach, and transmutes itself as we hold it, is not the natural\nbeginning, but the result of introspection and reflection on the concrete\nself. But with this aspect of the question we are not now concerned.\n\nThat the unity of the Self as an intelligent and moral being, that the Ego\nof self-consciousness was an ideal and a product of development, was what\nHerbart soon became convinced of. The unity of Self is even as given in\nmature experience an imperfect fact. It is a fact, that is, which does not\ncome up to what it promised, and which requires to be supplemented, or\nphilosophically justified. Here and everywhere the custom of life carries\nus over gaps which yawn deep to the eye of philosophic reflection: even\nthough accident and illness force them not unfrequently even upon the\nblindest. To trace the process of unification towards this unity\u2014to trace,\nif you like, even the formation of the concept of such unity, as a\ngoverning and guiding principle in life and conduct, comes to be the\nproblem of the psychologist, in the largest sense of that problem. From\nSoul (_Seele_) to Mind or Spirit (_Geist_) is for Herbart, as for Hegel,\nthe course of psychology(27). The growth and development of mind, the\nformation of a self, the realisation of a personality, is for both the\ntheme which psychology has to expound. And Herbart, not less than Hegel,\nhad to bear the censure that such a conception of mental reality as a\ngrowth would destroy personality(28).\n\nBut with so much common in the general plan, the two thinkers differ\nprofoundly in their special mode of carrying out the task. Or, rather,\nthey turn their strength on different departments of the whole. Herbart\u2019s\ngreat practical interest had been the theory of education: \u201cpaedagogic\u201d is\nthe subject of his first important writings. The inner history of\nideas\u2014the processes which are based on the interaction of elements in the\nindividual soul\u2014are what he specially traces. Hegel\u2019s interests, on the\ncontrary, are more towards the greater process, the unities of historical\nlife, and the correlations of the powers of art, religion, and philosophy\nthat work therein. He turns to the macrocosm, almost as naturally as\nHerbart does to the microcosm. Thus, even in Ethics, while Herbart gives a\ndelicate analysis of the distinct aspects or elements in the Ethical\nidea,\u2014the diverse headings under which the disinterested spectator within\nthe breast measures with purely aesthetic eye his approach to unity and\nstrength of purpose, Hegel seems to hurry away from the field of moral\nsense or conscience to throw himself on the social and political\norganisation of the moral life. The General Paedagogic of Herbart has its\npendant in Hegel\u2019s Philosophy of Law and of History.\n\nAt an early period Herbart had become impressed with the necessity of\napplying mathematics to psychology(29). To the usual objection, that\npsychical facts do not admit of measurement, he had a ready reply. We can\ncalculate even on hypothetical assumptions: indeed, could we measure, we\nshould scarcely take the trouble to calculate(30). To calculate (i.e. to\ndeduce mathematically) is to perform a general experiment, and to perform\nit in the medium where there is least likelihood of error or disturbance.\nThere may be anomalies enough apparent in the mental life: there may be\nthe great anomalies of Genius and of Freedom of Will; but the Newton and\nthe Kepler of psychology will show by calculation on assumed conditions of\npsychic nature that these aberrations can be explained by mechanical laws.\n\u201cThe human Soul is no puppet-theatre: our wishes and resolutions are no\nmarionettes: no juggler stands behind; but our true and proper life lies\nin our volition, and this life has its rule not outside, but in itself: it\nhas its own purely mental rule, by no means borrowed from the material\nworld. But this rule is in it sure and fixed; and on account of this its\nfixed quality it has more similarity to (what is otherwise heterogeneous)\nthe laws of impact and pressure than to the marvels of an alleged\ninexplicable freedom(31).\u201d\n\nPsychology then deals with a real, which exhibits phenomena analogous in\nseveral respects to those discussed by statics and mechanics. Its\nfoundation is a statics and mechanics of the Soul,\u2014as this real is called.\nWe begin by presupposing as the ultimate reality, underlying the\nfactitious and generally imperfect unity of self-consciousness and mind,\nan essential and primary unity\u2014the unity of an absolutely simple or\nindividual point of being\u2014a real point which amongst other points asserts\nitself, maintains itself. It has a character of its own, but that\ncharacter it only shows in and through a development conditioned by\nexternal influences. The specific nature of the soul-reality is to be\nrepresentative, to produce, or manifest itself in, ideas\n(_Vorstellungen_). But the character only emerges into actuality in the\nconflict of the soul-atom with other ultimate realities in the\ncongregation of things. A soul _per se_ or isolated is not possessed of\nideas. It is merely blank, undeveloped, formal unity, of which nothing can\nbe said. But like other realities it defines and characterises itself by\nantithesis, by resistance: it shows what it is by its behaviour in the\nstruggle for existence. It acts in self-defence: and its peculiar style or\nweapon of self-defence is an idea or representation. The way the Soul\nmaintains itself is by turning the assailant into an idea(32): and each\nidea is therefore a _Selbsterhaltung_ of the Soul. The Soul is thus\nenriched\u2014to appearance or incidentally: and the assailant is annexed. In\nthis way the one Soul may develop or evolve or express an innumerable\nvariety of ideas: for in response to whatever it meets, the living and\nactive Soul ideates, or gives rise to a representation. Thus, while the\nsoul is one, its ideas or representations are many. Taken separately, they\neach express the psychic self-conservation. But brought in relation with\neach other, as so many acts or self-affirmations of the one soul, they\nbehave as forces, and tend to thwart or check each other. It is as forces,\nas reciprocally arresting or fostering each other, that ideas are objects\nof science. When a representation is thus held in check, it is reduced to\na mere endeavour or active tendency to represent. Thus there arises a\ndistinction between representations proper, and those imperfect states or\nacts which are partly or wholly held in abeyance. But the latent phase of\nan idea is as essential to a thorough understanding of it as what appears.\nIt is the great blunder of empirical psychology to ignore what is sunk\nbelow the surface of consciousness. And to Herbart consciousness is not\nthe condition but rather the product of ideas, which are primarily forces.\n\nBut representations are not merely in opposition,\u2014impinging and resisting.\nThe same reason which makes them resist, viz. that they are or would fain\nbe acts of the one soul, but are more or less incompatible, leads them in\nother circumstances to form combinations with each other. These\ncombinations are of two sorts. They are, first, complications, or\n\u201ccomplexions\u201d: a number of ideas combine by quasi-addition and\njuxtaposition to form a total. Second, there is fusion: ideas presenting\ncertain degrees of contrast enter into a union where the parts are no\nlonger separately perceptible. It is easy to see how the problems of\npsychology now assume the form of a statics and mechanics of the mind.\nQuantitative data are to be sought in the strength of each separate single\nidea, and the degree in which two or more ideas block each other: in the\ndegree of combination between ideas, and the number of ideas in a\ncombination: and in the terms of relation between the members of a series\nof ideas. A statical theory has to show the conditions required for what\nwe may call the ideal state of equilibrium of the \u201cidea-forces\u201d: to\ndetermine, that is, the ultimate degree of obscuration suffered by any two\nideas of different strength, and the conditions of their permanent\ncombination or fusion. A mechanics of the mind will, on the contrary, deal\nwith the rate at which these processes are brought about, the velocity\nwith which in the movement of mind ideas are obscured or reawakened, &c.\n\nIt is fortunately unnecessary, here, to go further into details. What\nHerbart proposes is not a method for the mathematical measurement of\npsychic facts: it is a theory of mechanics and statics specially adapted\nto the peculiarities of psychical phenomena, where the forces are given\nwith no sine or cosine, where instead of gravitation we have the constant\neffort (as it were elasticity) of each idea to revert to its unchecked\nstate. He claims\u2014in short\u2014practically to be a Kepler and Newton of the\nmind, and in so doing to justify the vague professions of more than one\nwriter on mind\u2014above all, perhaps of David Hume, who goes beyond mere\nprofessions\u2014to make mental science follow the example of physics. And a\nmain argument in favour of his enterprise is the declaration of Kant that\nno body of knowledge can claim to be a science except in such proportion\nas it is mathematical. And the peculiarity of this enterprise is that\nself-consciousness, the Ego, is not allowed to interfere with the free\nplay of psychic forces. The Ego is\u2014psychologically\u2014the result, the\nproduct, and the varying product of that play. The play of forces is no\ndoubt a unity: but its unity lies not in the synthesis of consciousness,\nbut in the essential unity of Soul. And Soul is in its essence neither\nconsciousness, nor self-consciousness, nor mind: but something on the\nbasis of whose unity these are built up and developed(33). The mere\n\u201crepresentation\u201d does not include the further supervenience of\nconsciousness: it represents, but it is not as yet necessary that we\nshould also be conscious that there is representation. It is, in the\nphrase of Leibniz, perception: but not apperception. It is mere\nstraight-out, not as yet reflected, representation. Gradually there\nemerges through the operation of mechanical psychics a nucleus, a floating\nunity, a fixed or definite central aggregate.\n\nThe suggestion of mathematical method has been taken up by subsequent\ninquirers (as it was pursued even before Herbart\u2019s time), but not in the\nsense he meant. Experimentation has now taken a prominent place in\npsychology. But in proportion as it has done so, psychology has lost its\nnative character, and thrown itself into the arms of physiology. What\nHerbart calculated were actions and reactions of idea-forces: what the\nmodern experimental school proposes to measure are to a large extent the\nvelocities of certain physiological processes, the numerical specification\nof certain facts. Such ascertainments are unquestionably useful; as\nnumerical precision is in other departments. But, taken in themselves,\nthey do not carry us one bit further on the way to science. As\nexperiments, further,\u2014to note a point discussed elsewhere(34)\u2014their value\ndepends on the point of view, on the theory which has led to them, on the\nvalue of the general scheme for which they are intended to provide a\nspecial new determination. In many cases they serve to give a vivid\nreality to what was veiled under a general phrase. The truth looks so much\nmore real when it is put in figures: as the size of a huge tree when set\nagainst a rock; or as when Milton bodies out his fallen angel by setting\nforth the ratio between his spear and the tallest Norway pine. But until\nthe general relationship between soul and body is more clearly formulated,\nsuch statistics will have but a value of curiosity.\n\n\n\n(iii.) The Faculty-Psychology and its Critics.\n\n\nWhat Herbart (as well as Hegel) finds perpetual ground for objecting to is\nthe talk about mental faculties. This objection is part of a general\ncharacteristic of all the higher philosophy; and the recurrence of it\ngives an illustration of how hard it is for any class of men to see\nthemselves as others see them. If there be anything the vulgar believe to\nbe true of philosophy, it is that it deals in distant and abstruse\ngeneralities, that it neglects the shades of individuality and reality,\nand launches out into unsubstantial general ideas. But it would be easy to\ngather from the great thinkers an anthology of passages in which they hold\nit forth as the great work of philosophy to rescue our conceptions from\nthe indefiniteness and generality of popular conception, and to give them\nreal, as opposed to a merely nominal, individuality.\n\nThe Wolffian school, which Herbart (not less than Kant) found in\npossession of the field, and which in Germany may be taken to represent\nonly a slight variant of the half-and-half attitude of vulgar thought, was\nentrenched in the psychology of faculties. Empirical psychology, said\nWolff(35), tells the number and character of the soul\u2019s faculties:\nrational psychology will tell what they \u201cproperly\u201d are, and how they\nsubsist in soul. It is assumed that there are general receptacles or\ntendencies of mental operation which in course of time get filled or\nqualified in a certain way: and that when this question is disposed of, it\nstill remains to fix on the metaphysical bases of these facts.\n\nThat a doctrine of faculties should fix itself in psychology is not so\nwonderful. In the non-psychical world objects are easily discriminated in\nspace, and the individual thing lasts through a time. But a phase of mind\nis as such fleeting and indeterminate: its individual features which come\nfrom its \u201cobject\u201d tend soon to vanish in memory: all freshness of definite\ncharacters wears off, and there is left behind only a vague \u201crecept\u201d of\nthe one and same in many, a sort of hypostatised representative, faint but\npersistent, of what in experience was an ever-varying succession. We\ngeneralise here as elsewhere: but elsewhere the many singulars remain to\nconfront us more effectually. But in Mind the immense variety of real\nimagination, memory, judgment is forgotten, and the name in each case\nreduced to a meagre abstract. Thus the identity in character and\noperation, having been cut off from the changing elements in its real\naction, is transmuted into a substantial somewhat, a subsistent faculty.\nThe relationship of one to another of the powers thus by abstraction and\nfancy created becomes a problem of considerable moment, their causal\nrelations in particular: till in the end they stand outside and\nindependent of each other, engaged, as Herbart says, in a veritable\n_bellum omnium contra omnes_.\n\nBut this hypostatising of faculties becomes a source of still further\ndifficulties when it is taken in connexion with the hypostasis of the Soul\nor Self or Ego. To Aristotle the Soul in its general aspect is Energy or\nEssence; and its individual phases are energies. But in the hands of the\nuntrained these conceptions came to be considerably displaced. Essence or\nSubstance came to be understood (as may be seen in Locke, and still more\nin loose talk) as a something,\u2014a substratum,\u2014or peculiar nature\u2014(of which\n_in itself_ nothing further could be said(36) but which notwithstanding\nwas permanent and perhaps imperishable): this something subsistent\nexhibited certain properties or activities. There thus arose, on one hand,\nthe Soul-thing,\u2014a substance misunderstood and sensualised with a\nsupernatural sensuousness,\u2014a denizen of the transcendental or even of the\ntranscendent world: and, on the other hand, stood the actual\nmanifestations, the several exhibitions of this force, the assignable and\ndescribable psychic facts. We are accordingly brought before the problem\nof how this one substance or essence stands to the several entities or\nhypostases known as faculties. And we still have in the rear the further\nproblem of how these abstract entities stand to the real and concrete\nsingle acts and states of soul and mind.\n\nThis hypostatising of faculties, and this distinction of the \u201cSubstantial\u201d\nsoul from its \u201caccidentia\u201d or phenomena, had grown\u2014through the\nmaterialistic proclivities of popular conception\u2014from the indications\nfound in Aristotle. It attained its climax, perhaps in the Wolffian school\nin Germany, but it has been the resort of superficial psychology in all\nages. For while it, on one hand, seemed to save the substantial Soul on\nwhose incorruptibility great issues were believed to hinge, it held out,\non the other, an open hand to the experimental inquirer, whom it bade\nfreely to search amongst the phenomena. But if it was the refuge of\npusillanimity, it was also the perpetual object of censure from all the\ngreater and bolder spirits. Thus, the psychology of Hobbes may be hasty\nand crude, but it is at least animated by a belief that the mental life is\ncontinuous, and not cut off by abrupt divisions severing the mental\nfaculties. The \u201cimage\u201d (according to his materialistically coloured\npsychology) which, when it is a strong motion, is called sense, passes, as\nit becomes weaker or decays, into imagination, and gives rise, by its\nvarious complications and associations with others, to reminiscence,\nexperience, expectation. Similarly, the voluntary motion which is an\neffect or a phase of imagination, beginning at first in small\nmotions\u2014called by themselves \u201cendeavours,\u201d and in relation to their cause\n\u201cappetites\u201d or \u201cdesires(37)\u201d\u2014leads on cumulatively to Will, which is the\n\u201clast appetite in deliberating.\u201d Spinoza, his contemporary, speaks in the\nsame strain(38). \u201cFaculties of intellect, desire, love, &c., are either\nutterly fictitious, or nothing but metaphysical entities, or universals\nwhich we are in the habit of forming from particulars. Will and intellect\nare thus supposed to stand to this or that idea, this or that volition, in\nthe same way as stoniness to this or that stone, or as man to Peter or\nPaul.\u201d They are supposed to be a general something which gets defined and\ndetached. But, in the mind, or in the cogitant soul, there are no such\nthings. There are only ideas: and by an \u201cidea\u201d we are to understand not an\nimage on the retina or in the brain, not a \u201cdumb something, like a\npainting on a panel(39),\u201d but a mode of thinking, or even the act of\nintellection itself. The ideas _are_ the mind: mind does not _have_ ideas.\nFurther, every \u201cidea,\u201d as such, \u201cinvolves affirmation or negation,\u201d\u2014is not\nan image, but an act of judgment\u2014contains, as we should say, an implicit\nreference to actuality,\u2014a reference which in volition is made explicit.\nThus (concludes the corollary of Eth. ii. 49) \u201cWill and Intellect are one\nand the same.\u201d But in any case the \u201cfaculties\u201d as such are no better than\n_entia rationis_ (i.e. auxiliary modes of representing facts).\n\nLeibniz speaks no less distinctly and sanely in this direction. \u201cTrue\npowers are never mere possibilities: they are always tendency and action.\u201d\nThe \u201cMonad\u201d\u2014that is the quasi-intelligent unit of existence,\u2014is\nessentially activity, and its actions are perceptions and appetitions,\ni.e. tendencies to pass from one perceptive state or act to another. It is\nout of the variety, the complication, and relations of these miniature or\nlittle perceptions and appetitions, that the conspicuous phenomena of\nconsciousness are to be explained, and not by supposing them due to one or\nother faculty. The soul is a unity, a self-developing unity, a unity which\nat each stage of its existence shows itself in a perception or idea,\u2014each\nsuch perception however being, to repeat the oft quoted phrase, _plein de\nl\u2019avenir et charg\u00e9 du pass\u00e9_:\u2014each, in other words, is not stationary, but\nactive and urgent, a progressive force, as well as a representative\nelement. Above all, Leibniz has the view that the soul gives rise to all\nits ideas from itself: that its life is its own production, not a mere\ninheritance of ideas which it has from birth and nature, nor a mere\nimportation into an empty room from without, but a necessary result of its\nown constitution acting in necessary (predetermined) reciprocity and\nharmony with the rest of the universe.\n\nBut Hobbes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, were most attentively heard in the\npassages where they favoured or combatted the dominant social and\ntheological prepossessions. Their glimpses of truer insight and even their\npalpable contributions in the line of a true psychology were ignored or\nforgotten. More attention, perhaps, was attracted by an attempt of a very\ndifferent style. This was the system of Condillac, who, as Hegel says (p.\n61), made an unmistakable attempt to show the necessary interconnexion of\nthe several modes of mental activity. In his _Trait\u00e9 des Sensations_\n(1754), following on his _Essai sur l\u2019origine des connaissances humaines_\n(1746), he tried to carry out systematically the deduction or derivation\nof all our ideas from sense, or to trace the filiation of all our\nfaculties from sensation. Given a mind with no other power than\nsensibility, the problem is to show how it acquires all its other\nfaculties. Let us then suppose a sentient animal to which is offered a\nsingle sensation, or one sensation standing out above the others. In such\ncircumstances the sensation \u201cbecomes\u201d (_devient_) attention: or a\nsensation \u201cis\u201d (_est_) attention, either because it is alone, or because\nit is more lively than all the rest. Again: before such a being, let us\nset two sensations: to perceive or feel (_apercevoir ou sentir_) the two\nsensations is the same thing (_c\u2019est la m\u00eame chose_). If one of the\nsensations is not present, but a sensation made already, then to perceive\nit is memory. Memory, then, is only \u201ctransformed sensation\u201d (_sensation\ntransform\u00e9e_). Further, suppose we attend to both ideas, this is \u201cthe same\nthing\u201d as to compare them. And to compare them we must see difference or\nresemblance. This is judgment. \u201cThus sensation becomes successively\nattention, comparison, judgment.\u201d And\u2014by further steps of the equating\nprocess\u2014it appears that sensation again \u201cbecomes\u201d an act of reflection.\nAnd the same may be said of imagination and reasoning: all are transformed\nsensations.\n\nIf this is so with the intelligence, it is equally the case with the Will.\nTo feel and not feel well or ill is impossible. Coupling then this feeling\nof pleasure or pain with the sensation and its transformations, we get the\nseries of phases ranging from desire, to passion, hope, will. \u201cDesire is\nonly the action of the same faculties as are attributed to the\nunderstanding.\u201d A lively desire is a passion: a desire, accompanied with a\nbelief that nothing stands in its way, is a volition. But combine these\naffective with the intellectual processes already noticed, and you have\nthinking (_penser_)(40). Thus thought in its entirety is, only and always,\ntransformed sensation.\n\nSomething not unlike this, though scarcely so simply and directly\ndoctrinaire, is familiar to us in some English psychology, notably James\nMill\u2019s(41). Taken in their literal baldness, these identifications may\nsound strained,\u2014or trifling. But if we look beyond the words, we can\ndetect a genuine instinct for maintaining and displaying the unity and\ncontinuity of mental life through all its modifications,\u2014coupled\nunfortunately with a bias sometimes in favour of reducing higher or more\ncomplex states of mind to a mere prolongation of lower and beggarly\nrudiments. But otherwise such analyses are useful as aids against the\ntendency of inert thought to take every name in this department as a\ndistinguishable reality: the tendency to part will from thought\u2014ideas from\nemotion\u2014and even imagination from reason, as if either could be what it\nprofessed without the other.\n\n\n\n(iv.) Methods and Problems of Psychology.\n\n\nThe difficulties of modern psychology perhaps lie in other directions, but\nthey are not less worth guarding against. They proceed mainly from failure\nor inability to grasp the central problem of psychology, and a disposition\nto let the pen (if it be a book on the subject) wander freely through the\nalmost illimitable range of instance, illustration, and application.\nThough it is true that the proper study of mankind is man, it is hardly\npossible to say what might not be brought under this head. _Homo sum,\nnihil a me alienum puto_, it might be urged. Placed in a sort of middle\nground between physiology (summing up all the results of physical science)\nand general history (including the contributions of all the branches of\nsociology), the psychologist need not want for material. He can wander\ninto ethics, aesthetic, and logic, into epistemology and metaphysics. And\nit cannot be said with any conviction that he is actually trespassing, so\nlong as the ground remains so ill-fenced and vaguely enclosed. A desultory\ncollection of observations on traits of character, anecdotes of mental\nevents, mixed up with hypothetical descriptions of how a normal human\nbeing may be supposed to develop his so-called faculties, and including\nsome dictionary-like verbal distinctions, may make a not uninteresting and\npossibly bulky work entitled Psychology.\n\nIt is partly a desire of keeping up to date which is responsible for the\ncopious extracts or abstracts from treatises on the anatomy and functions\nof the nerve-system, which, accompanied perhaps by a diagram of the brain,\noften form the opening chapter of a work on psychology. Even if these\nresearches had achieved a larger number of authenticated results than they\nas yet have, they would only form an appendix and an illustration to the\nproper subject(42). As they stand, and so long as they remain largely\nhypothetical, the use of them in psychology only fosters the common\ndelusion that, when we can picture out in material outlines a theory\notherwise unsupported, it has gained some further witness in its favour.\nIt is quite arguable indeed that it may be useful to cut out a section\nfrom general human biology which should include the parts of it that were\nspecially interesting in connexion with the expression or generation of\nthought, emotion, and desire. But in that case, there is a blunder in\nsingling out the brain alone, and especially the organs of sense and\nvoluntary motion,\u2014except for the reason that this province of\npsycho-physics alone has been fairly mapped out. The preponderant half of\nthe soul\u2019s life is linked to other parts of the physical system. Emotion\nand volition, and the general tone of the train of ideas, if they are to\nbe connected with their expression and physical accompaniment (or aspect),\nwould require a sketch of the heart and lungs, as well as the digestive\nsystem in general. Nor these alone. Nerve analysis (especially confined to\nthe larger system), though most modern, is not alone important, as Plato\nand Aristotle well saw. So that if biology is to be adapted for\npsychological use (and if psychology deals with more than cognitive\nprocesses), a liberal amount of physiological information seems required.\n\nExperimental psychology is a term used with a considerable laxity of\ncontent; and so too is that of physiological psychology, or\npsycho-physics. And the laxity mainly arises because there is an\nuncertainty as to what is principal and what secondary in the inquiry.\nExperiment is obviously a help to observation: and so far as the latter is\npracticable, the former would seem to have a chance of introduction. But\nin any case, experiment is only a means to an end and only practicable\nunder the guidance of hypothesis and theory. Its main value would be in\ncase the sphere of psychology were completely paralleled with one province\nof physiology. It was long ago maintained by Spinoza and (in a way by)\nLeibniz, that there is no mental phenomenon without its bodily equivalent,\npendant, or correspondent. The _ordo rerum_ (the molecular system of\nmovements) is, he held, the same as the order of ideas. But it is only at\nintervals, under special conditions, or when they reach a certain\nmagnitude, that ideas emerge into full consciousness. As consciousness\npresents them, they are often discontinuous, and abrupt: and they do not\nalways carry with them their own explanation. Hence if we are confined to\nthe larger phenomena of consciousness alone, our science is imperfect:\nmany things seem anomalous; above all, perhaps, will, attention, and the\nlike. We have seen how Herbart (partly following the hints of Leibniz),\nattempted to get over this difficulty by the hypothesis of idea-forces\nwhich generate the forms and matter of consciousness by their mutual\nimpact and resistance. Physiological psychology substitutes for Herbart\u2019s\nreals and his idea-forces a more materialistic sort of reality; perhaps\nfunctions of nerve-cells, or other analogous entities. There, it hopes one\nday to discover the underlying continuity of event which in the upper\nrange of consciousness is often obscured, and then the process would be,\nas the phrase goes, explained: we should be able to picture it out without\na gap.\n\nThese large hopes may have a certain fulfilment. They may lead to the\nwithdrawal of some of the fictitious mental processes which are still\ndescribed in works of psychology. But on the whole they can only have a\nnegative and auxiliary value. The value, that is, of helping to confute\nfeigned connexions and to suggest truer. They will be valid against the\nmode of thought which, when Psych\u00e9 fails us for an explanation, turns to\nbody, and interpolates soul between the states of body: the mode which, in\nan older phraseology, jumps from final causes to physical, and from\nphysical (or efficient) to final. Here, as elsewhere, the physical has its\nplace: and here, more than in many places, the physical has been unfairly\ntreated. But the whole subject requires a discussion of the so-called\n\u201crelations\u201d of soul and body: a subject on which popular conceptions and\nso-called science are radically obscure.\n\n\u201cBut the danger which threatens experimental psychology,\u201d says\nM\u00fcnsterberg, \u201cis that, in investigating details, the connexion with\nquestions of principle may be so lost sight of that the investigation\nfinally lands at objects scientifically quite worthless(43). Psychology\nforgets only too easily that all those numerical statistics which\nexperiment allows us to form are only means for psychological analysis and\ninterpretation, not ends in themselves. It piles up numbers and numbers,\nand fails to ask whether the results so formed have any theoretical value\nwhatever: it seeks answers before a question has been clearly and\ndistinctly framed; whereas the value of experimental answers always\ndepends on the exactitude with which the question is put. Let me remind\nthe reader, how one inquirer after another made many thousand experiments\non the estimation of small intervals of time, without a single one of them\nraising the question what the precise point was which these experiments\nsought to measure, what was the psychological occurrence in the case, or\nwhat psychological phenomena were employed as the standard of\ntime-intervals. And so each had his own arbitrary standard of measurement,\neach of them piled up mountains of numbers, each demonstrated that his\npredecessor was wrong; but neither Estel nor Mehner have carried the\nproblem of the time-sense a single step further.\n\n\u201cThis must be all changed, if we are not to drift into the barrenest\nscholastic.... Everywhere out of the correct perception that problems of\nprinciple demand the investigation of detailed phenomena, and that the\nlatter investigation must proceed in comparative independence of the\nquestion of principles, there has grown the false belief that the\ndescription of detail phenomena is the ultimate aim of science. And so,\nside by side with details which are of importance to principles, we have\nothers, utterly indifferent and theoretically worthless, treated with the\nsame zeal. To the solution of their barren problems the old Schoolmen\napplied a certain acuteness; but in order to turn out masses of numbers\nfrom barren experiments, all that is needed is a certain insensibility to\nfits of ennui. Let numbers be less collected for their own sake: and\ninstead, let the problems be so brought to a point that the answers may\npossess the character of principles. Let each experiment be founded on far\nmore theoretical considerations, then the number of the experiments may be\nlargely diminished(44).\u201d\n\nWhat is thus said of a special group of inquiries by one of the foremost\nof the younger psychologists, is not without its bearings on all the\ndepartments in which psychology can learn. For physiological, or what is\ntechnically called psychological, experiment, is co-ordinate with many\nother sources of information. Much, for instance, is to be learnt by a\ncareful study of language by those who combine sound linguistic knowledge\nwith psychological training. It is in language, spoken and written, that\nwe find at once the great instrument and the great document of the\ndistinctively human progress from a mere _Psyche_ to a mature _Nous_, from\nSoul to Mind. Whether we look at the varieties of its structure under\ndifferent ethnological influences, or at the stages of its growth in a\nnation and an individual, we get light from language on the\ndifferentiation and consolidation of ideas. But here again it is easy to\nlose oneself in the world of etymology, or to be carried away into the\nenticing questions of real and ideal philology.\n\n\u201cThe human being of the psychologist,\u201d says Herbart(45), \u201cis the social\nand civilised human being who stands on the apex of the whole history\nthrough which his race has passed. In him is found visibly together all\nthe multiplicity of elements, which, under the name of mental faculties,\nare regarded as a universal inheritance of humanity. Whether they are\noriginally in conjunction, whether they are originally a multiplicity, is\na point on which the facts are silent. The savage and the new-born child\ngive us far less occasion to admire the range of their mind than do the\nnobler animals. But the psychologists get out of this difficulty by the\nunwarranted assumption that all the higher mental activities exist\npotentially in children and savages\u2014though not in the animals\u2014as a\nrudimentary predisposition or psychical endowment. Of such a nascent\nintellect, a nascent reason, and nascent moral sense, they find\nrecognisable traces in the scanty similarities which the behaviour of\nchild or savage offers to those of civilised man. We cannot fail to note\nthat in their descriptions they have before them a special state of man,\nand one which, far from accurately defined, merely follows the general\nimpression made upon us by those beings we name civilised. An extremely\nfluctuating character inevitably marks this total impression. For there\nare no general facts:\u2014the genuine psychological documents lie in the\nmomentary states of individuals: and there is an immeasurably long way\nfrom these to the height of the universal concept of man in general.\u201d\n\nAnd yet Man in general,\u2014Man as man and therefore as mind\u2014the concept of\nMan\u2014normal and ideal man\u2014the complete and adequate Idea of man\u2014is the true\nterminus of the psychological process; and whatever be the difficulties in\nthe way, it is the only proper goal of the science. Only it has to be\nbuilt up, constructed, evolved, developed,\u2014and not assumed as a datum of\npopular imagination. We want a concept, concrete and real, of Man and of\nMind, which shall give its proper place to each of the elements that, in\nthe several examples open to detailed observation, are presented with\nunfair or exaggerated prominence. The savage and the child are not to be\nleft out as free from contributing to form the ideal: virtues here are not\nmore important than vices, and are certainly not likely to be so\ninforming: even the insane and the idiot show us what human intelligence\nis and requires: and the animals are also within the sweep of psychology.\nMan is not its theatre to the exclusion of woman; if it records the\nresults of introspection of the Me, it will find vast and copious quarries\nin the various modes in which an individual identifies himself with others\nas We. And even the social and civilised man gets his designation, as\nusual, _a potiori_. He is more civilised and social than others: perhaps\nrather more civilised than not. But always, in some measure, he is at the\nsame time unsocial or anti-social, and uncivilised. Each unit in the\nsociety of civilisation has to the outside observer\u2014and sometimes even to\nhis own self-detached and impartial survey\u2014a certain oddity or fixity, a\ngleam of irrationality, which shows him to fall short of complete sanity\nor limpid and mobile intelligence. He has not wholly put off the\nsavage,\u2014least of all, says the cynic, in his relations with the other sex.\nHe carries with him even to the grave some grains of the recklessness and\npetulance of childhood. And rarely, if ever, can it be said of him that he\nhas completely let the ape and tiger die.\n\nBut that is only one way of looking at the matter\u2014and one which, perhaps,\nis more becoming to the pathologist and the cynic, than to the\npsychologist. Each of these stages of psychical development, even if that\ndevelopment be obviously describable as degeneration, has something which,\nduly adjusted, has its place and function in the theory of the\nnormally-complete human mind. The animal, the savage, and the child,\u2014each\nhas its part there. It is a mutilated, one-sided and superficial advance\nin socialisation which cuts off the civilised creature from the natural\nstem of his ancestry, from the large freedom, the immense _insouciance_,\nthe childlikeness of his first estate. There is something, again, wanting\nin the man who utterly lacks the individualising realism and tenderness of\nthe woman, as in the woman who can show no comprehension of view or\nbravery of enterprise. Even pathological states of mind are not mere\nanomalies and mere degenerations. Nature perhaps knows no proper\ndegenerations, but only by-ways and intricacies in the course of\ndevelopment. Still less is the vast enormity or irregularity of genius to\nbe ignored. It is all\u2014to the philosophic mind\u2014a question of degree and\nproportion,\u2014though often the proportion seems to exceed the scale of our\ncustomary denominators. If an element is latent or quiescent (in arrest),\nthat is no index to its absolute amount: \u201cwe know not what\u2019s resisted.\u201d\nLet us by all means keep proudly to our happy mediocrity of faculty, and\nstep clear of insanity or idiotcy on one hand, and from genius or heroism\non the other. But the careful observer will notwithstanding note how\ndelicately graded and how intricately combined are the steps which connect\nextremes so terribly disparate. It is only vulgar ignorance which turns\naway in hostility or contempt from the imbecile and the deranged, and only\na worse than vulgar sciolism which sees in genius and the hero nothing but\nan aberration from its much-prized average. Criminalistic anthropology, or\nthe psychology of the criminal, may have indulged in much frantic\nexaggeration as to the doom which nature and heredity have pronounced over\nthe fruit of the womb even before it entered the shores of light: yet they\nhave at least served to discredit the free and easy assumption of the\nabstract averagist, and shown how little the penalties of an unbending law\nmeet the requirements of social well-being.\n\nYet, if psychology be willing to learn in all these and other provinces of\nthe estate of man, it must remember that, once it goes beyond the narrow\nrange in which the interpretations of symbol and expression have become\nfamiliar, it is constantly liable to blunder in the inevitable effort to\ntranslate observation into theory. The happy mean between making too much\nof palpable differences and hurrying on to a similar rendering of similar\nsigns is the rarest of gifts. Or, perhaps, it were truer to say it is the\nlatest and most hardly won of acquirements. To learn to observe\u2014observe\nwith mind\u2014is not a small thing. There are rules for it\u2014both rules of\ngeneral scope and, above all, rules in each special department. But like\nall \u201cmajor premisses\u201d in practice, everything depends on the power of\njudgment, the tact, the skill, the \u201cgift\u201d of applying them. They work not\nas mere rules to be conned by rote, but as principles assimilated into\nconstituents of the mental life-blood: rules which serve only as condensed\nreminders and hints of habits of thought and methods of research which\nhave grown up in action and reflection. To observe we must comprehend: yet\nwe can only comprehend by observing. We all know how unintelligible\u2014save\nfor epochs of ampler reciprocity, and it may be even of acquired unity of\ninterest\u2014the two sexes are for each other. Parents can remember how\nmysteriously minded they found their own elders; and in most cases they\nhave to experience the depth of the gulf which in certain directions parts\nthem from their children\u2019s hearts. Even in civilised Europe, the ordinary\nmember of each nation has an underlying conviction (which at moments of\npassion or surprise will rise and find harsh utterance) that the foreigner\nis queer, irrational, and absurd. If the foreigner, further, be so far\nremoved as a Chinaman (or an Australian \u201cblack\u201d), there is hardly anything\ntoo vile, meaningless, or inhuman which the European will not readily\nbelieve in the case of one who, it may be, in turn describes him as a\n\u201cforeign devil.\u201d It can only be in a fit of noble chivalry that the\nBritish rank and file can so far temporise with its insular prejudice as\nto admit of \u201cFuzzy-wuzzy\u201d that\n\n\n    \u201cHe\u2019s a poor benighted \u2019eathen\u2014but a first-class fightin\u2019 man.\u201d\n\n\nNot every one is an observer who chooses to dub himself so, nor is it in a\nshort lapse of time and with condescension for foreign habits, that any\nobserver whatever can become a trustworthy reporter of the ideas some\nbarbarian tribe holds concerning the things of earth and air, and the\nhidden things of spirits and gods. The \u201cinterviewer\u201d no doubt is a useful\nbeing when it is necessary to find \u201ccopy,\u201d or when sharp-drawn characters\nand picturesque incidents are needed to stimulate an inert public, ever\nopen to be interested in some new thing. But he is a poor contributor to\nthe stored materials of science.\n\nIt is of other stuff that true science is made. And if even years of\nnominal intercourse and spatial juxtaposition sometimes leave human\nbeings, as regards their inner selves, in the position of strangers still,\nwhat shall be said of the attempt to discern the psychic life of animals?\nWill the touch of curiosity which prompts us to watch the proceedings of\nthe strange creatures,\u2014will a course of experimentation on their behaviour\nunder artificial conditions,\u2014justify us in drawing liberal conclusions as\nto why they so behaved, and what they thought and felt about it? It is\nnecessary in the first place to know what to observe, and how, and above\nall what for. But that presumed, we must further live with the animals not\nonly as their masters and their examiners, but as their friends and\nfellow-creatures; we must be able\u2014and so lightly that no effort is\ndiscernable\u2014to lay aside the burden and garb of civilisation; we must\npossess that stamp of sympathy and similarity which invites confidence,\nand breaks down the reserve which our poor relations, whether human or\nothers, offer to the first approaches of a strange superior. It is\nprobable that in that case we should have less occasion to wonder at their\noddities or to admire their sagacity. But a higher and more philosophical\nwonder might, as in other cases when we get inside the heart of our\nsubject, take the place of the cheap and childish love of marvels, or of\nthe vulgar straining after comic traits.\n\nOf all this mass of materials the psychologist proper can directly make\nonly a sparing use. Even as illustrations, his data must not be presented\ntoo often in all their crude and undigested individuality, or he runs the\nrisk of leaving one-sided impressions. Every single instance,\nindividualised and historical,\u2014unless it be exhibited by that true art of\ngenius which we cannot expect in the average psychologist\u2014narrows, even\nthough it be but slightly, the complete and all-sided truth. Anecdotes are\ngood, and to the wise they convey a world of meaning, but to lesser minds\nthey sometimes suggest anything but the points they should accentuate.\nWithout the detail of individual realistic study there is no psychology\nworth the name. History, story, we must have: but at the same time, with\nthe philosopher, we must say, I don\u2019t give much weight to stories. And\nthis is what will always\u2014except in rare instances where something like\ngenius is conjoined with it\u2014make esoteric science hard and unpopular. It\ndare not\u2014if it is true to its idea\u2014rest on any amount of mere instances,\nas isolated, unreduced facts. Yet it can only have real power so far as it\nconcentrates into itself the life-blood of many instances, and indeed\nextracts the pith and unity of all instances.\n\nNor, on the other hand, can it turn itself too directly and intently\ntowards practical applications. All this theory of mental progress from\nthe animate soul to the fullness of religion and science deals solely with\nthe universal process of education: \u201cthe education of humanity\u201d we may\ncall it: the way in which mind is made true and real(46). It is therefore\na question of intricacy and of time how to carry over this general theory\ninto the arena of education as artificially directed and planned. To try\nto do so at a single step would be to repeat the mistake of Plato, if\nPlato may be taken to suppose (which seems incredible) that a theoretical\nstudy of the dialectics of truth and goodness would enable his rulers,\nwithout the training of special experience, to undertake the supreme tasks\nof legislation or administration. All politics, like all education, rests\non these principles of the means and conditions of mental growth: but the\nschooling of concrete life, though it may not develop the faculty of\nformulating general laws, will often train better for the management of\nthe relative than a mere logical Scholastic in first or absolute\nprinciples.\n\nIn conclusion, there are one or two points which seem of cardinal\nimportance for the progress of psychology. (1) Its difference from the\nphysical sciences has to be set out: in other words, the peculiarity of\npsychical fact. It will not do merely to say that experience marks out\nthese boundaries with sufficient clearness. On the contrary, the terms\nconsciousness, feeling, mind, &c., are evidently to many psychologists\nmere names. In particular, the habits of physical research when introduced\ninto mental study lead to a good deal of what can only be called\nmythology. (2) There should be a clearer recognition of the problem of the\nrelations of mental unity to mental elements. But to get that, a more\nthorough logical and metaphysical preparation is needed than is usually\nsupposed necessary. The doctrine of identity and necessity, of universal\nand individual, has to be faced, however tedious. (3) The distinction\nbetween first-grade and second-grade elements and factors in the mental\nlife has to be realised. The mere idea as presentative or immediate has to\nbe kept clear of the more logico-reflective, or normative ideas, which\nbelong to judgment and reasoning. And the number of these grades in mental\ndevelopment seems endless. (4) But, also, a separation is required\u2014were it\nbut temporary\u2014between what may be called principles, and what is detail.\nAt present, in psychology, \u201cprinciples\u201d is a word almost without meaning.\nA complete all-explaining system is of course impossible at present and\nmay always be so. Yet if an effort of thought could be concentrated on\ncardinal issues, and less padding of conventional and traditional detail\nwere foisted in, much might thereby be done to make detailed research\nfruitful. (5) And finally, perhaps, if psychology be a philosophical\nstudy, some hint as to its purpose and problem would be desirable. If it\nis only an abstract branch of science, of course, no such hint is in\nplace.\n\n\n\n\nEssay III. On Some Psychological Aspects Of Ethics.\n\n\nAllusion has already been made to the question of the boundaries between\nlogic and psychology, between logic and ethics, ethics and psychology, and\npsychology and epistemology. Each of these occasionally comes to cover\nground that seems more appropriate to the others. Logic is sometimes\nrestricted to denote the study of the conditions of derivative knowledge,\nof the canons of inference and the modes of proof. If taken more widely as\nthe science of thought-form, it is supposed to imply a world of fixed or\nstereotyped relations between ideas, a system of stable thoughts governed\nby inflexible laws in an absolute order of immemorial or eternal truth. As\nagainst such fixity, psychology is supposed to deal with these same ideas\nas products\u2014as growing out of a living process of thought\u2014having a history\nbehind them and perhaps a prospect of further change. The genesis so given\nmay be either a mere chronicle-history, or it may be a philosophical\ndevelopment. In the former case, it would note the occasions of incident\nand circumstance, the reactions of mind and environment, under which the\nideas were formed. Such a psychological genesis of several ideas is found\nin the Second Book of Locke\u2019s Essay. In the latter case, the account would\nbe more concerned with the inner movement, the action and reaction in\nideas themselves, considered not as due to casual occurrences, but as\nself-developing by an organic growth. But in either case, ideas would be\nshown not to be ready-made and independently existing kinds in a world of\nidea-things, and not to form an unchanging diagram or framework, but to be\na growth, to have a history, and a development. Psychology in this sense\nwould be a dynamical, as opposed to the supposed statical, treatment of\nideas and concepts in logic. But it may be doubted how far it is well to\ncall this psychology: unless psychology deals with the contents of the\nmental life, in their meaning and purpose, instead of, as seems proper,\nmerely in their character of psychic events. Such psychology is rather an\nevolutionist logic,\u2014a dialectic process more than an analytic of a datum.\n\nIn the same way, ethics may be brought into one kind of contact with\npsychology. Ethics, like logic, may be supposed to presuppose and to deal\nwith a certain inflexible scheme of requirements, a world of moral order\ngoverned by invariable or universal law; an eternal kingdom of right,\nexisting independently of human wills, but to be learned and followed out\nin uncompromising obedience. As against this supposed absolute order,\npsychology may be said to show the genesis of the idea of obligation and\nduty, the growth of the authority of conscience, the formation of ideals,\nthe relativity of moral ideas. Here also it may reach this conclusion, by\na more external or a more internal mode of argument. It may try to show,\nin other words, that circumstances give rise to these forms of estimating\nconduct, or it may argue that they are a necessary development in the\nhuman being, constituted as he is. It may again be doubted whether this is\nproperly called psychology. Yet its purport seems ultimately to be that\nthe objective order is misconceived when it is regarded as an external or\nquasi-physical order: as a law written up and sanctioned with an external\nauthority\u2014as, in Kant\u2019s words, a heteronomy. If that order is objective,\nit is so because it is also in a sense subjective: if it is above the mere\nindividuality of the individual, it is still in a way identical with his\ntrue or universal self-hood. Thus \u201cpsychological\u201d here means the\nrecognition that the logical and the moral law is an autonomy: that it is\nnot given, but though necessary, necessary by the inward movement of the\nmind. The metaphor of law is, in brief, misleading. For, according to a\ncommon, though probably an erroneous, analysis of that term, the essence\nof a law in the political sphere is to be a species of command. And that\nis rather a one-sidedly practical or aesthetic way of looking at it. The\nessence of law in general, and the precondition of every law in special,\nis rather uniformity and universality, self-consistency and absence of\ncontradiction: or, in other words, rationality. Its essential opposite\u2014or\nits contradiction in essence\u2014is a privilege, an attempt at isolating a\ncase from others. It need not indeed always require bare\nuniformity\u2014require i.e. the same act to be done by different people: but\nit must always require that every thing within its operation shall be\ntreated on principles of utter and thorough harmony and consistency. It\nrequires each thing to be treated on public principles and with publicity:\nnothing apart and mere singular, as a mere incident or as a world by\nitself. Differently it may be treated, but always on grounds of common\nwell-being, as part of an embracing system.\n\nThere is probably another sense, however, in which psychology comes into\nclose relation with ethics. If we look on man as a microcosm, his inner\nsystem will more or less reproduce the system of the larger world. The\nolder psychology used to distinguish an upper or superior order of\nfaculties from a lower or inferior. Thus in the intellectual sphere, the\nintellect, judgment, and reason were set above the senses, imagination,\nand memory. Among the active powers, reasonable will, practical reason and\nconscience were ranked as paramount over the appetites and desires and\nemotions. And this use of the word \u201cfaculty\u201d is as old as Plato, who\nregards science as a superior faculty to opinion or imagination. But this\napplication\u2014which seems a perfectly legitimate one\u2014does not, in the first\ninstance, belong to psychology at all. No doubt it is psychically\npresented: but it has an other source. It springs from an appreciation, a\njudgment of the comparative truth or reality of what the so-called\npsychical act means or expresses. Such faculties are powers in a hierarchy\nof means and ends and presuppose a normative or critical function which\nhas classified reality. Psychically, the elements which enter into\nknowledge are not other than those which belong to opinion: but they are\nnearer an adequate rendering of reality, they are truer, or nearer the\nIdea. And in the main we may say, that is truer or more real which\nsucceeds in more completely organising and unifying elements\u2014which rises\nmore and more above the selfish or isolated part into the thorough unity\nof all parts.\n\nThe superior faculty is therefore the more thorough organisation of that\nwhich is elsewhere less harmoniously systematised. Opinion is fragmentary\nand partial: it begins abruptly and casually from the unknown, and runs\noff no less abruptly into the unknown. Knowledge, on the contrary, is\nunified: and its unity gives it its strength and superiority. The powers\nwhich thus exist are the subjective counterparts of objectively valuable\nproducts. Thus, reason is the subjective counterpart of a world in which\nall the constituents are harmonised and fall into due relationship. It is\na product or result, which is not psychologically, but logically or\nmorally important. It is a faculty, because it means that actually its\npossessor has ordered and systematised his life or his ideas of things.\nPsychologically, it, like unreason, is a compound of elements: but in the\ncase of reason the composition is unendingly and infinitely consistent; it\nis knowledge completely unified. The distinction then is not in the\nstrictest sense psychological: for it has an aesthetic or normative\ncharacter; it is logical or ethical: it denotes that the idea or the act\nis an approach to truth or goodness. And so, when Butler or Plato\ndistinguishes reason or reflection from appetites and affections, and even\nfrom self-love or from the heart which loves and hates, this is not\nexactly a psychological division in the narrower sense. That is to say:\nthese are, in Plato\u2019s words, not merely \u201cparts,\u201d but quite as much \u201ckinds\u201d\nand \u201cforms\u201d of soul. They denote degrees in that harmonisation of mind and\nsoul which reproduces the permanent and complete truth of things. For\nexample, self-love, as Butler describes it, has but a partial and narrowed\nview of the worth of acts: it is engrossing and self-involved: it cannot\ntake in the full dependence of the narrower interest on the larger and\neternal self. So, in Plato, the man of heart is but a nature which by fits\nand starts, or with steady but limited vision, realises the larger life.\nThese parts or kinds are not separate and co-existent faculties: but\ngrades in the co-ordination and unification of the same one human nature.\n\n\n\n(i.) Psychology and Epistemology.\n\n\nPsychology however in the strict sense is extremely difficult to define.\nThose who describe it as the \u201cscience of mind,\u201d the \u201cphenomenology of\nconsciousness,\u201d seem to give it a wider scope than they really mean. The\npsychologist of the straiter sect tends, on the other hand, to carry us\nbeyond mind and consciousness altogether. His, it has been said, is a\npsychology without a Psych\u00e9. For him Mind, Soul, and Consciousness are\nonly current and convenient names to designate the field, the ground on\nwhich the phenomena he observes are supposed to transact themselves. But\nthey must not on any account interfere with the operations; any more than\nNature in general may interfere with strictly physical inquiries, or Life\nand vital force with the theories of biology. The so-called Mind is only\nto be regarded as a stage on which certain events represent themselves. In\nthis field, or on this stage, there are certain relatively ultimate\nelements, variously called ideas, presentations, feelings, or states of\nconsciousness. But these elements, though called ideas, must not be\nsupposed more than mechanical or dynamical elements; consciousness is\nrather their product, a product which presupposes certain operations and\nrelations between them. If we are to be strictly scientific, we must, it\nis urged, treat the factors of consciousness as not themselves conscious:\nwe must regard them as quasi-objective, or in abstraction from the\nconsciousness which surveys them. The Ego must sink into a mere receptacle\nor arena of psychic event; its independent meaning or purport is to be\nignored, as beside the question.\n\nWhen this line is once fixed upon, it seems inevitable to go farther.\nComte was inclined to treat psychology as falling between two stools: it\nmust, he thought, draw all its content either from physiology on the one\nhand, or from social factors on the other. The dominant or experimental\npsychology of the present day seems inclined, without however formulating\nany very definite statement, to pronounce for the former alternative. It\ndoes not indeed adopt the materialistic view that mind is only a function\nof matter. Its standpoint rather is that the psychical presents itself\neven to unskilled observation as dependent on (i.e. not independent of) or\nas concomitant with certain physical or corporeal facts. It adds that the\nmore accurately trained the observer becomes, the more he comes to\ndiscover a corporeal aspect even where originally he had not surmised its\nexistence, and to conclude that the two cycles of psychical and physical\nevent never interfere with each other: that soul does not intervene in\nbodily process, nor body take up and carry on psychical. If it is said\nthat the will moves the limbs, he replies that the will which moves is\nreally certain formerly unnoticed movements of nerve and muscle which are\nfelt or interpreted as a discharge of power. If the ocular impression is\nsaid to cause an impression on the mind, he replies that any fact hidden\nunder that phrase refers to a change in the molecules of the brain. He\nwill therefore conclude that for the study of psychical phenomena the\nphysical basis, as it may be called, is all important. Only so can\nobservation really deal with fact capable of description and measurement.\nThus psychology, it may be said, tends to become a department of\nphysiology. From another standpoint, biology may be said to receive its\ncompletion in psychology. How much either phrase means, however, will\ndepend on the estimate we form of biology. If biology is only the study of\nmechanical and chemical phenomena on the peculiar field known as an\norganism, and if that organism is only treated as an environment which may\nbe ignored, then psychology, put on the same level, is not the full\nscience of mind, any more than the other is the full study of life. They\nboth have narrowed their subject to suit the abstract scheme of the\nlaboratory, where the victim of experiment is either altered by mutilation\nand artificial restrictions, or is dead. If, on the contrary, biology has\na substantial unity of its own to which mechanical and chemical\nconsiderations are subordinate and instrumental, psychology may even take\npart with physiology without losing its essential rank. But in that case,\nwe must, as Spinoza said(47), think less mechanically of the animal frame,\nand recognise (after the example of Schelling) something truly inward\n(i.e. not merely locally inside the skin) as the supreme phase or\ncharacteristic of life. We must, in short, recognise sensibility as the\nculmination of the physiological and the beginning of the psychological.\n\nTo the strictly scientific psychologist, as has been noted\u2014or to the\npsychology which imitates optical and electrical science\u2014ideas are only\npsychical events: they are not ideas _of_ anything, relative, i.e. to\nsomething else; they have no meaning, and no reference to a reality beyond\nthemselves. They are presentations;\u2014not representations of something\noutside consciousness. They are appearances: but not appearances of\nsomething: they do not reveal anything beyond themselves. They are, we may\nalmost say, a unique kind of physical phenomena. If we say they are\npresentations of something, we only mean that in the presented something,\nin the felt something, the wished something, we separate the quality or\nform or aspect of presentativeness, of feltness, of wishedness, and\nconsider this aspect by itself. There are grades, relations,\ncomplications, of such presentations or in such presentedness: and with\nthe description and explanation of these, psychology is concerned. They\nare fainter or stronger, more or less correlated and antithetical.\nPresentation (or ideation), in short, is the name of a train of event,\nwhich has its peculiarities, its laws, its systems, its history.\n\nAll reality, it may be said, subsists in such presentation; it is for a\nconsciousness, or in a consciousness. All _esse_, in its widest sense, is\n_percipi_. And yet, it seems but the commonest of experiences to say that\nall that is presented is not reality. It _is_, it has a sort of being,\u2014is\nsomehow presumed to exist: but it is not reality. And this reference and\nantithesis to _what_ is presented is implied in all such terms as \u201cideas,\u201d\n\u201cfeelings,\u201d \u201cstates of consciousness\u201d: they are distinguished from and\nrelated to objects of sense or external facts, to something, as it is\ncalled, outside consciousness. Thoughts and ideas are set against things\nand realities. In their primitive stage both the child and the savage seem\nto recognise no such difference. What they imagine is, as we might say, on\nthe same plane with what they touch and feel. They do not, as we\nreproachfully remark, recognise the difference between fact and fiction.\nAll of us indeed are liable to lapses into the same condition. A strong\npassion, a keen hope or fear, as we say, invests its objects with reality:\neven a sanguine moment presents as fact what calmer reflection disallows\nas fancy. With natural and sane intelligences, however, the recrudescence\nof barbarous imagination is soon dispelled, and the difference between\nhallucinations and realities is established. With the utterly wrecked in\nmind, the reality of hallucinations becomes a permanent or habitual state.\nWith the child and the untrained it is a recurrent and a disturbing\ninfluence: and it need hardly be added that the circle of these _decepti\ndeceptores_\u2014people with the \u201clie in the Soul\u201d\u2014is a large one. There thus\nemerges a distinction of vast importance, that of truth and falsehood, of\nreality and unreality, or between representation and reality. There arise\ntwo worlds, the world of ideas, and the world of reality which it is\nsupposed to represent, and, in many cases, to represent badly.\n\nWith this distinction we are brought across the problem sometimes called\nEpistemological. Strictly speaking, it is really part of a larger problem:\nthe problem of what\u2014if Greek compounds must be used\u2014may be styled\nAletheiology\u2014the theory of truth and reality: what Hegel called Logic, and\nwhat many others have called Metaphysics. As it is ordinarily taken up,\n\u201cideas\u201d are believed to be something _in us_ which is representative or\nsymbolical of something truly real _outside us_. This inward something is\nsaid to be the first and immediate object of knowledge(48), and gives\nus\u2014in a mysterious way we need not here discuss\u2014the mediate knowledge of\nthe reality, which is sometimes said to cause it. Ideas in the Mind, or in\nthe Subject, or in us, bear witness to something outside the\nmind,\u2014trans-subjective\u2014beyond us. The Mind, Subject, or Ego, in this\nparallelism is evidently in some way identified with our corporeal\norganism: perhaps even located, and provided with a \u201cseat,\u201d in some\ndefined space of that organism. It is, however, the starting-point of the\nwhole distinction that ideas _do not_, no less than they do, conform or\ncorrespond to this supra-conscious or extra-conscious world of real\nthings. Truth or falsehood arises, according to these assumptions,\naccording as psychical image or idea corresponds or not to physical fact.\nBut how, unless by some miraculous second-sight, where the supreme\nconsciousness, directly contemplating by intuition the true and\nindependent reality, turns to compare with this immediate vision the\nresults of the mediate processes conducted along the organs of sense,\u2014how\nthis agreement or disagreement of copy and original, of idea and reality,\ncan be detected, it is impossible to say.\n\nAs has been already noted, the mischief lies in the hypostatisation of\nideas as something existing in abstraction from things\u2014and, of things, in\nabstraction from ideas. They are two abstractions, the first by the\nrealist, the second by the idealist called subjective and psychological.\nTo the realist, things exist by themselves, and they manage to produce a\ncopy of themselves (more or less exact, or symbolical) in _our_ mind, i.e.\nin a materialistically-spiritual or a spiritualistically-material locus\nwhich holds \u201cimages\u201d and ideas. To the psychological idealist, ideas have\na substantive and primary right to existence, them alone do we really\nknow, and from them we more or less legitimately are said (but probably no\none takes this seriously) to infer or postulate a world of permanent\nthings. Now ideas have no substantive existence as a sort of things, or\neven images of things anywhere. All this is pure mythology. It is said by\ncomparative mythologists that in some cases the epithet or quality of some\ndeity has been substantialised (hypostatised) into a separate god, who,\nhowever (so still to keep up the unity), is regarded as a relative, a son,\nor daughter, of the original. So the phrase \u201cideas of things\u201d has been\ntaken literally as if it was double. But to have an idea of a thing merely\nmeans that we know it, or think it. An idea is not given: it is a thing\nwhich is given in the idea. An idea is not an additional and intervening\nobject of our knowledge or supposed knowledge. That a thing is our object\nof thought is another word for its being our idea, and that means we know\nit.\n\nThe distinction between truth and falsehood, between reality and\nappearance, is not arrived at by comparing what we have before us in our\nmind with some inaccessible reality beyond. It is a distinction that grows\nup with the growth and organisation of our presentations\u2014with their\ngradual systematisation and unification in one consciousness. But this\nconsciousness which thinks, i.e. judges and reasons, is something superior\nto the contrast of physical and psychical: superior, i.e. in so far as it\nincludes and surveys the antithesis, without superseding it. It is the\n\u201ctranscendental unity of consciousness\u201d of Kant\u2014his synthetic unity of\napperception. It means that all ideas ultimately derive their reality from\ntheir coherence with each other in an all-embracing or infinite idea. Real\nin a sense ideas always are, but with an imperfect reality. Thus the\neducation to truth is not\u2014such a thing would be meaningless\u2014ended by a\nrough and ready recommendation to compare our ideas with facts: it must\nteach the art which discovers facts. And the teaching may have to go\nthrough many grades or provinces: in each of which it is possible to\nacquire a certain virtuosoship without being necessarily an adept in\nanother. It is through what is called the development of intellect,\njudgment, and reasoning that the faculty of truth-detecting or\ntruth-selecting comes. And the common feature of all of these is, so to\nsay, their superiority to the psychological mechanism, not in the sense of\nworking without it and directly, but of being the organising unity or\nunifier and controller and judge of that mechanism. The certainty and\nnecessity of truth and knowledge do not come from a constraint from the\nexternal thing which forces the inner idea into submission; they come from\nthe inner necessity of conformity and coherence in the organism of\nexperience. We in fact had better speak of ideas as experience\u2014as felt\nreality: a reality however which has its degrees and perhaps even its\nprovinces. All truth comes with the reasoned judgment, i.e. the\nsyllogism\u2014i.e. with the institution or discovery of relations of fact or\nelement to fact or element, immediate or derivative, partial and less\npartial, up to its ideal coherence in one Idea. It is because this\ncoherence is so imperfectly established in many human beings that their\nknowledge is so indistinguishable from opinion, and that they separate so\nloosely truth from error. They have not worked their way into a definitely\narticulated system, where there are no gaps, no abrupt transitions: their\nmental order is so loosely put together that divergences and\ncontradictions which vex another drop off ineffectual from them.\n\n\n\n(ii.) Kant, Fichte, and Hegel.\n\n\nThis was the idealism which Kant taught and Fichte promoted. Of the other\nidealism there are no doubt abundant traces in the language of Kant: and\nthey were greedily fastened on by Schopenhauer. To him the doctrine, that\nthe world is my idea, is adequately represented when it is translated into\nthe phrase that the world is a phantasmagoria of my brain; and escape from\nthe subjective idealism thus initiated is found by him only through a\nsupposed revelation of immediate being communicated in the experience of\nwill. But according to the more consistently interpreted Kant, the problem\nof philosophy consists in laying bare the supreme law or conditions of\nconsciousness on which depend the validity of our knowledge, our estimates\nof conduct, and our aesthetic standards. And these roots of reality are\nfor Kant in the mind\u2014or, should we rather say\u2014in mind\u2014in \u201cConsciousness in\nGeneral.\u201d In the _Criticism of Pure Reason_ the general drift of his\nexamination is to show that the great things or final realities which are\npopularly supposed to stand in self-subsistent being, as ultimate and\nall-comprehensive objects set up for knowledge, are not \u201cthings\u201d as\npopularly supposed, but imperative and inevitable ideas. They are not\nobjects to be known\u2014(these are always finite): but rather the unification,\nthe basis, or condition, and the completion of all knowledge. To know\nthem\u2014in the ordinary petty sense of knowledge\u2014is as absurd and impossible\nas it would be, in the Platonic scheme of reality, to know the idea of\ngood which is \u201con the further side of knowledge and being.\u201d God and the\nSoul\u2014and the same would be true of the World (though modern speculators\nsometimes talk as if they had it at least within their grasp)\u2014are not mere\n_objects_ of knowledge. It would be truer to say they are that by which we\nknow, and they are what in us knows: they make knowledge possible, and\nactual. Kant has sometimes spoken of them as the objects of a faith of\nreason. What he means is that reason only issues in knowledge because of\nand through this inevitable law of reason bidding us go on for ever in our\nsearch, because there can be nothing isolated and nowhere any _ne plus\nultra_ in science, which is infinite and yet only justified as it\npostulates or commands unity.\n\nKant\u2019s central idea is that truth, beauty, goodness, are not dependent on\nsome qualities of the object, but on the universal nature or law of\nconsciousness. Beauty is not an attribute of things in their abstractness:\nbut of things as ideas of a subject, and depends on the proportion and\nsymmetry in the play of human faculty. Goodness is not conformity to an\noutward law, but is obligatory on us through that higher nature which is\nour truer being. Truth is not conformity of ideas with supposed\ntrans-subjective things, but coherence and stability in the system of\nideas. The really infinite world is not out there, but in here\u2014in\nconsciousness in general, which is the denial of all limitation, of all\nfinality, of all isolation. God is the essential and inherent unity and\nunifier of spirit and nature\u2014the surety that the world in all its\ndifferentiations is one. The Soul is not an essential entity, but the\ninfinite fruitfulness and freshness of mental life, which forbids us\nstopping at anything short of complete continuity and unity. The Kingdom\nof God\u2014the Soul\u2014the moral law\u2014is within us: within us, as supreme,\nsupra-personal and infinite intelligences, even amid all our littleness\nand finitude. Even happiness which we stretch our arms after is not really\nbeyond us, but is the essential self which indeed we can only reach in\ndetail. It is so both in knowledge and in action. Each knowledge and\nenjoyment in reality is limited and partial, but it is made stable, and it\ngets a touch of infinitude, by the larger idea which it helps to realise.\nOnly indeed in that antithesis between the finite and the infinite does\nthe real live. Every piece of knowledge is real, only because it assumes\n_pro tempore_ certain premisses which are given: every actual beauty is\nset in some defect of aesthetic completeness: every actually good deed has\nto get its foil in surrounding badness. The real is always partial and\nincomplete. But it has the basis or condition of its reality in an idea\u2014in\na transcendental unity of consciousness, which is so to say a law, or a\nsystem and an order, which imposes upon it the condition of conformity and\ncoherence; but a conformity which is essential and implicit in it.\n\nFichte has called his system a _Wissenschaftslehre_\u2014a theory of knowledge.\nModern German used the word _Wissenschaft_, as modern English uses the\nword Science, to denote the certified knowledge of piecemeal fact, the\npartial unification of elements still kept asunder. But by _Wissen_, as\nopposed to _Erkennen_, is meant the I know, am aware and sure, am in\ncontact with reality, as opposed to the derivative and conditional\nreference of something to something else which explains it. The former is\na wider term: it denotes all consciousness of objective truth, the\ncertainty which claims to be necessary and universal, which pledges its\nwhole self for its assertion. Fichte thus unifies and accentuates the\ncommon element in the Kantian criticisms. In the first of these Kant had\nbegun by explaining the nature and limitation of empirical science. It was\nessentially conditioned by the given sensation\u2014dependent i.e. on an\nunexplained and preliminary element. This is what makes it science in the\nstrict or narrow sense of the term: its being set, as it were, in the\nunknown, the felt, the sense-datum. The side of reality is thus the side\nof limitation and of presupposition. But what makes it truth and knowledge\nin general, on the other hand,\u2014as distinct from _a_ truth (i.e. partial\ntruth) and a knowledge,\u2014is the ideal element\u2014the mathematical, the\nlogical, the rational law,\u2014or in one word, the universal and formal\ncharacter. So too every real action is on one hand the product of an\nimpulse, a dark, merely given, immediate tendency to be, and without that\nwould be nothing: but on the other hand it is only an intelligent and\nmoral action in so far as it has its constitution from an intelligence, a\nformal system, which determine its place and function.\n\nIt is on the latter or ideal element that Kant makes the emphasis\nincreasingly turn. Not truths, duties, beauties, but truth, duty, beauty,\nform his theme. The formal element\u2014the logical or epistemological\ncondition of knowledge and morality and of beauty\u2014is what he (and still\nmore Fichte) considers the prime question of fundamental philosophy. His\nphilosophy is an attempt to get at the organism of our fundamental\nbelief\u2014the construction, from the very base, of our conception of reality,\nof our primary certainty. In technical language, he describes our\nessential nature as a Subject-object. It is the unity of an I am which is\nalso I know that I am: an I will which is also I am conscious of my\nwill(49). Here there is a radical disunion and a supersession of that\ndisunion. Action and contemplation are continually outrunning each other.\nThe I will rests upon one I know, and works up to another: the I know\nreflects upon an I will, and includes it as an element in its idea.\n\nKant had brought into use the term Deduction, and Fichte follows him. The\nterm leads to some confusion: for in English, by its modern antithesis to\ninduction, it suggests _a priori_ methods in all their iniquity. It means\na kind of jugglery which brings an endless series out of one small term.\nKant has explained that he uses it in the lawyer\u2019s sense in which a claim\nis justified by being traced step by step back to some acknowledged and\naccepted right(50). It is a regressive method which shows us that if the\noriginal datum is to be accepted it carries along with it the legitimation\nof the consequence. This method Fichte applies to psychology. Begin, he\nsays like Condillac, with the barest nucleus of soul-life; the mere\nsentiency, or feeling: the contact, as it were, with being, at a single\npoint. But such a mere point is unthinkable. You find, as Mr. Spencer\nsays, that \u201cThought\u201d (or Consciousness) \u201ccannot be framed out of one term\nonly.\u201d \u201cEvery sensation to be known as one must be perceived.\u201d Such is the\nnature of the Ego\u2014a subject which insists on each part being qualified by\nthe whole and so transformed. As Mr. Spencer, again, puts it, the mind not\nmerely tends to revive, to associate, to assimilate, to represent its own\npresentations, but it carries on this process infinitely and in ever\nhigher multiples. Ideas as it were are growing in complexity by\nre-presenting: i.e. by embracing and enveloping elements which cannot be\nfound existing in separation. In the mind there is no mere presentation,\nno bare sensation. Such a unit is a fiction or hypothesis we employ, like\nthe atom, for purposes of explanation. The pure sensation therefore\u2014which\nyou admit because you must have something to begin with, not a mere\nnothing, but something so simple that it seems to stand out clear and\nindisputable\u2014this pure sensation, when you think of it, forces you to go a\ngood deal further. Even to be itself, it must be more than itself. It is\nlike the pure or mere being of the logicians. Admit the simple\nsensation\u2014and you have admitted everything which is required to make\nsensation a possible reality. But you do not\u2014in the sense of vulgar\nlogic\u2014deduce what follows out of the beginning. From that, taken by\nitself, you will get only itself: mere being will give you only nothing,\nto the end of the chapter. But, as the phrase is, sensation is an element\nin a consciousness: it is, when you think of it, always more than you\ncalled it: there is a curious \u201ccontinuity\u201d about the phenomena, which\nmakes real isolation impossible.\n\nOf course this \u201cdeduction\u201d is not history: it is logic. It says, if you\nposit sensation, then in doing so, you posit a good deal more. You have\nimagination, reason, and many more, all involved in your original\nassumption. And there is a further point to be noted. You cannot really\nstop even at reason, at intelligence and will, if you take these in the\nfull sense. You must realise that these only exist as part and parcel of a\nreasonable world. An individual intelligence presupposes a society of\nintelligences. The successive steps in this argument are presented by\nFichte in the chief works of his earlier period (1794-98). The works of\nthat period form a kind of trilogy of philosophy, by which the faint\noutlines of the absolute selfhood is shown acquiring definite consistency\nin the moral organisation of society. First comes the \u201cFoundation for the\ncollective philosophy.\u201d It shows how our conception of reality and our\npsychical organisation are inevitably presupposed in the barest function\nof intelligence, in the abstractest forms of logical law. Begin where you\nlike, with the most abstract and formal point of consciousness, you are\nforced, as you dwell upon it (you identifying yourself with the thought\nyou realise), to go step by step on till you accept as a self-consistent\nand self-explanatory unity all that your cognitive and volitional nature\nclaims to own as its birthright. Only in such an intelligent will is\nperception and sensation possible. Next came the \u201cFoundation of Natural\nLaw, on the principles of the general theory.\u201d Here the process of\ndeduction is carried a step further. If man is to realise himself as an\nintelligence with an inherent bent to action, then he must be conceived as\na person among persons, as possessed of rights, as incapable of acting\nwithout at the same moment claiming for his acts recognition, generality,\nand logical consecution. The reference, which in the conception of a\npractical intelligence was implicit,\u2014the reference to fellow-agents, to a\nworld in which law rules\u2014is thus, by the explicit recognition of these\nreferences, made a fact patent and positive\u2014_gesetzt_,\u2014expressly\ninstituted in the way that the nature and condition of things postulates.\nBut this is not all: we step from the formal and absolute into the\nmaterial and relative. If man is to be a real intelligence, he must be an\nintelligence served by organs. \u201cThe rational being cannot realise its\nefficient individuality, unless it ascribes to itself a material body\u201d: a\nbody, moreover, in which Fichte believes he can show that the details of\nstructure and organs are equally with the general corporeity predetermined\nby reason(51). In the same way it is shown that the social and political\norganisation is required for the realisation\u2014the making positive and yet\ncoherent\u2014of the rights of all individuals. You deduce society by showing\nit is required to make a genuine individual man. Thirdly came the \u201cSystem\nof Ethics.\u201d Here it is further argued that, at least in a certain\nrespect(52), in spite of my absolute reason and my absolute freedom, I can\nonly be fully real as a part of Nature: that my reason is realised in a\ncreature of appetite and impulse. From first to last this deduction is one\nprocess which may be said to have for its object to determine \u201cthe\nconditions of self-hood or egoity.\u201d It is the deduction of the concrete\nand empirical moral agent\u2014the actual ego of actual life\u2014from the abstract,\nunconditioned ego, which in order to be actual must condescend to be at\nonce determining and determined.\n\nIn all of this Fichte makes\u2014especially formally\u2014a decided advance upon\nKant. In Ethics Kant in particular, (\u2014especially for readers who never got\nbeyond the beginning of his moral treatise and were overpowered by the\ncategorical imperative of duty) had found the moral initiative or dynamic\napparently in the other world. The voice of duty seemed to speak from a\nregion outside and beyond the individual conscience. In a sense it must do\nso: but it comes from a consciousness which is, and yet is more than, the\nindividual. It is indeed true that appearances here are deceptive: and\nthat the idea of autonomy, the self-legislation of reason, is trying to\nbecome the central conception of Kant\u2019s Ethics. Still it is Fichte\u2019s merit\nto have seen this clearly, to have held it in view unfalteringly, and to\nhave carried it out in undeviating system or deduction. Man, intelligent,\nsocial, ethical, is a being all of one piece and to be explained entirely\nimmanently, or from himself. Law and ethics are no accident either to\nsense or to intelligence\u2014nothing imposed by mere external or supernal\nauthority(53). Society is not a brand-new order of things supervening upon\nand superseding a state of nature, where the individual was entirely\nself-supporting. Morals, law, society, are all necessary steps (necessary\ni.e. in logic, and hence in the long run also inevitable in course of\ntime) to complete the full evolution or realisation of a human being. The\nsame conditions as make man intelligent make him social and moral. He does\nnot proceed so far as to become intelligent and practical, under terms of\nnatural and logical development, then to fall into the hands of a foreign\ninfluence, an accident _ab extra_, which causes him to become social and\nmoral. Rather he is intelligent, because he is a social agent.\n\nHence, in Fichte, the absence of the ascetic element so often stamping its\ncharacter on ethics, and representing the moral life as the enemy of the\nnatural, or as mainly a struggle to subdue the sensibility and the flesh.\nWith Kant,\u2014as becomes his position of mere inquirer\u2014the sensibility has\nthe place of a predominant and permanent foreground. Reason, to his way of\ntalking, is always something of an intruder, a stranger from a far-off\nworld, to be feared even when obeyed: sublime, rather than beautiful. From\nthe land of sense which we habitually occupy, the land of reason is a\ncountry we can only behold from afar: or if we can be said to have a\nstandpoint in it, that is only a figurative way of saying that though it\nis really over the border, we can act\u2014it would sometimes seem by a sort of\nmake-believe\u2014as if we were already there. But these moments of high\nenthusiasm are rare; and Kant commends sobriety and warns against\nhigh-minded _Schw\u00e4rmerei_, or over-strained Mysticism. For us it is\nreserved to struggle with a recalcitrant selfhood, a grovelling\nsensibility: it were only fantastic extravagance, fit for \u201cfair souls\u201d who\nunfortunately often lapse into \u201cfair sinners,\u201d should we fancy ourselves\nalready anchored in the haven of untempted rest and peace.\n\nWhen we come to Fichte, we find another spirit breathing. We have passed\nfrom the age of Frederick the Great to the age of the French Revolution;\nand the breeze that burst in the War of Liberation is already beginning to\nfreshen the air. Boldly he pronounces the primacy of that faith of reason\nwhereby not merely the just but all shall live. Your will shall show you\nwhat you really are. You are essentially a rational will, or a\nwill-reason. Your sensuous nature, of impulse and appetite, far from being\nthe given and found obstacle to the realisation of reason,\u2014which Kant\nstrictly interpreted might sometimes seem to imply\u2014(and in this point\nSchopenhauer carries out the implications of Kant)\u2014is really the condition\nor mode of being which reason assumes, or rises up to, in order to be a\npractical or moral being. Far from the body and the sensible needs being a\nstumbling-block to hamper the free fullness of rationality and morality,\nthe truth rather is that it is only by body and sense, by flesh and blood,\nthat the full moral and rational life can be realised(54). Or, to put it\notherwise, if human reason (intelligence and will) is to be more than a\nmere and empty inner possibility, if man is to be a real and concrete\ncognitive and volitional being, he must be a member of an ethical and\nactual society, which lives by bread, and which marries and has children.\n\n\n\n(iii.) Psychology in Ethics.\n\n\nIn this way, for Fichte, and through Fichte still more decidedly for\nHegel, both psychology and ethics breathe an opener and ampler air than\nthey often enjoy. Psychology ceases to be a mere description of psychic\nevents, and becomes the history of the self-organising process of human\nreason. Ethics loses its cloistered, negative, unnatural aspect, and\nbecomes a name for some further conditions of the same development,\nessentially postulated to complete or supplement its shortcomings.\nPsychology\u2014taken in this high philosophical acceptation\u2014thus leads on to\nEthics; and Ethics is parted by no impassable line from Psychology. That,\nat least, is what must happen if they are still to retain a place in\nphilosophy: for, as Kant says(55), \u201cunder the government of reason our\ncognitions cannot form a rhapsody, but must constitute a system, in which\nalone can they support and further its essential aims.\u201d As parts of such a\nsystem, they carry out their special work in subordination to, and in the\nrealisation of, a single Idea\u2014and therefore in essential interconnexion.\nFrom that interconnecting band we may however in detail-enquiry dispense\nourselves; and then we have the empirical or inductive sciences of\npsychology and ethics. But even with these, the necessity of the situation\nis such that it is only a question of degree how far we lose sight of the\nphilosophical horizon, and entrench ourselves in special enquiry.\nSomething of the philosophic largeness must always guide us; even when, to\nfurther the interests of the whole, it is necessary for the special\nenquirer to bury himself entirely in his part. So long as each part is\nsincerely and thoroughly pursued, and no part is neglected, there is an\nindwelling reason in the parts which will in the long run tend to\nconstitute the total.\n\nA philosophical psychology will show us how the sane intelligence and the\nrational will are, at least approximately, built up out of elements, and\nthrough stages and processes, which modify and complement, as they may\nalso arrest and perplex, each other. The unity, coherence, and\ncompleteness of the intelligent self is not, as vulgar irreflectiveness\nsupposes and somewhat angrily maintains, a full-grown thing or agent, of\nwhose actions and modes of behaviour the psychologist has to narrate the\nhistory,\u2014a history which is too apt to degenerate into the anecdotal and\nthe merely interesting. This unity of self has to be \u201cdeduced,\u201d as Fichte\nwould say: it has to be shown as the necessary result which certain\nelements in a certain order will lead to(56). A normal mind,\nself-possessed, developed and articulated, yet thoroughly one, a real\nmicrocosm, or true and full monad, which under the mode of its\nindividuality still represents the universe: that is, what psychology has\nto show as the product of factors and processes. And it is clearly\nsomething great and good, something valuable, and already possessing, by\nimplication we may say, an ethical character.\n\nIn philosophy, at least, it is difficult, or rather impossible to draw a\nhard and fast line which shall demarcate ethical from non-ethical\ncharacters,\u2014to separate them from other intellectual and reasonable\nmotives. Kant, as we know, attempted to do so: but with the result that he\nwas forced to add a doubt whether a purely moral act could ever be said to\nexist(57); or rather to express the certainty that if it did it was for\never inaccessible to observation. All such designations of the several\n\u201cfactors\u201d or \u201cmoments\u201d in reality, as has been hinted, are only _a\npotiori_. But they are misused when it is supposed that they connote\nabrupt and total discontinuity. And Kant, after all, only repeated in his\nown terminology an old and inveterate habit of thought:\u2014the habit which in\nStoicism seemed to see sage and foolish utterly separated, and which in\nthe straiter sects of Christendom fenced off saint absolutely from sinner.\nIt is a habit to which Hegel, and even his immediate predecessors, are\nradically opposed. With Herder, he might say, \u201cEthics is only a higher\nphysics of the mind(58).\u201d This\u2014the truth in Spinozism\u2014no doubt demands\nsome emphasis on the word \u201chigher\u201d: and it requires us to read ethics (or\nsomething like it) into physics; but it is a step on the right road,\u2014the\nstep which Utilitarianism and Evolutionism had (however awkwardly) got\ntheir foot upon, and which \u201ctranscendent\u201d ethics seems unduly afraid of\ncommitting itself to. Let us say, if we like, that the mind is more than\nmere nature, and that it is no proper object of a merely natural science.\nBut let us remember that a merely natural science is only a fragment of\nscience: let us add that the _merely_ natural is an abstraction which in\npart denaturalises and mutilates the larger nature\u2014a nature which includes\nthe natural mind, and cannot altogether exclude the ethical.\n\nWhat have been called \u201cformal duties(59)\u201d seem to fall under this\nrange\u2014the province of a philosophical psychology which unveils the\nconditions of personality. Under that heading may be put self-control,\nconsistency, resolution, energy, forethought, prudence, and the like. The\ndue proportion of faculty, the correspondence of head and heart, the\nvivacity and quickness of sympathy, the ease and simplicity of mental\ntone, the due vigour of memory and the grace of imagination, sweetness of\ntemper, and the like, are parts of the same group(60). They are lovely,\nand of good report: they are praise and virtue. If it be urged that they\nare only natural gifts and graces, that objection cuts two ways. The\nobjector may of course be reminded that religion tones down the\nself-complacency of morality. Yet, first, even apart from that, it may be\nsaid that of virtues, which stand independent of natural conditions\u2014of\nexternal supply of means (as Aristotle would say)\u2014nothing can be known and\nnothing need be said. And secondly, none of these qualities are mere\ngifts;\u2014all require exercise, habituation, energising, to get and keep\nthem. How much and how little in each case is nature\u2019s and how much ours\nis a problem which has some personal interest\u2014due perhaps to a rather\nselfish and envious curiosity. But on the broad field of experience and\nhistory we may perhaps accept the\u2014apparently one-sided\u2014proverb that \u201cEach\nman is the architect of his own fortune.\u201d Be this as it may, it will not\ndo to deny the ethical character of these \u201cformal duties\u201d on the ground\ne.g. that self-control, prudence, and even sweetness of temper may be used\nfor evil ends,\u2014that one may smile and smile, and yet be a villain.\nThat\u2014let us reply,\u2014on one hand, is a fault (if fault it be) incidental to\nall virtues in detail (for every single quality has its defect): nay it\nmay be a limitation attaching to the whole ethical sphere: and, secondly,\nits inevitable limitation does not render the virtue in any case one whit\nless genuine so far as it goes. And yet of such virtues it may be said, as\nHume(61) would say (who calls them \u201cnatural,\u201d as opposed to the more\nartificial merits of justice and its kin), that they please in themselves,\nor in the mere contemplation, and without any regard to their social\neffects. But they please as entering into our idea of complete human\nnature, of mind and spirit as will and intellect.\n\nThe moralists of last century sometimes divided the field of ethics by\nassigning to man three grades or kinds of duty: duties to himself, duties\nto society, and duties to God. For the distinction there is a good deal to\nbe said: there are also faults to be found with it. It may be said,\namongst other things, that to speak of duties to self is a metaphorical\nway of talking, and that God lies out of the range of human duty\naltogether, except in so far as religious service forms a part of social\nobligation. It may be urged that man is essentially a social being, and\nthat it is only in his relations to other such beings that his morality\ncan find a sphere. The sphere of morality, according to Dr. Bain, embraces\nwhatever \u201csociety has seen fit to enforce with all the rigour of positive\ninflictions. Positive good deeds and self-sacrifice ... transcend the\nregion of morality proper and occupy a sphere of their own(62).\u201d And there\nis little doubt that this restriction is in accordance with a main current\nof usage. It may even be said that there are tendencies towards a narrower\nusage still, which would restrict the term to questions affecting the\nrelations of the sexes. But, without going so far, we may accept the\nstandpoint which finds in the phrase \u201cpopular or social\u201d sanction, as\nequivalent to the moral sanction, a description of the average level of\ncommon opinion on the topic. The morality of an age or country thus\ndenotes, first, the average requirement in act and behaviour imposed by\ngeneral consent on the members of a community, and secondly, the average\nperformance of the members in response to these requirements. Generally\nspeaking the two will be pretty much the same. If the society is in a\nstate of equilibrium, there will be a palpable agreement between what all\nseverally expect and what all severally perform. On the other hand, as no\nsociety is ever in complete equilibrium, this harmony will never be\nperfect and may often be widely departed from. In what is called a single\ncommunity, if it reach a considerable bulk, there are (in other words)\noften a number of minor societies, more or less thwarting and modifying\neach other; and different observers, who belong in the main to one or\nother of these subordinate groups, may elicit from the facts before them a\nsomewhat different social code, and a different grade of social\nobservance. Still, with whatever diversity of detail, the important\nfeature of such social ethics is that the stress is laid on the\nperformance of certain acts, in accordance with the organisation of\nsociety. So long as the required compliance is given, public opinion is\nsatisfied, and morality has got its due.\n\nBut in two directions this conception of morality needs to be\nsupplementing. There is, on one hand, what is called duty to God. The\nphrase is not altogether appropriate: for it follows too closely the\nanalogy of social requirement, and treats Deity as an additional and\nsocial authority,\u2014a lord paramount over merely human sovereigns. But\nthough there may be some use in the analogy, to press the conception is\nseriously to narrow the divine character and the scope of religion. As in\nsimilar cases, we cannot change one term without altering its correlative.\nAnd therefore to describe our relation to God under the name of duty is to\nnarrow and falsify that relation. The word is no longer applicable in this\nconnexion without a strain, and where it exists it indicates the survival\nof a conception of theocracy: of God regarded as a glorification of the\nmagistrate, as king of kings and lord of lords. It is the social world\u2014and\nindeed we may say the outside of the social world\u2014that is the sphere of\nduties. Duty is still with these reductions a great august name: but in\nliteral strictness it only rules over the medial sphere of life, the\nsphere which lies between the individual as such and his universal\nhumanity(63). Beyond duty, lies the sphere of conscience and of religion.\nAnd that is not the mere insistence by the individual to have a voice and\na vote in determining the social order. It is the sense that the social\norder, however omnipotent it may seem, is limited and finite, and that man\nhas in him a kindred with the Eternal.\n\nIt is not very satisfactory, either, as Aristotle and others have pointed\nout, to speak of man\u2019s duties to himself. The phrase is analogical, like\nthe other. But it has the merit, like that of duty to God, of reminding us\nthat the ordinary latitude occupied by morality is not all that comes\nunder the larger scope of ethics. The \u201cethics of individual life\u201d is a\nsubject which Mr. Spencer has touched upon: and by this title, he means\nthat, besides his general relationship to others, a human being has to\nmind his own health, food, and amusement, and has duties as husband and\nparent. But, after all, these are not matters of peculiarly individual\ninterest. They rather refer to points which society at certain epochs\nleaves to the common sense of the agent,\u2014apparently on an assumption that\nhe is the person chiefly interested. And these points\u2014as the Greeks taught\nlong ago\u2014are of fundamental importance: they are the very bases of life.\nYet the comparative neglect in which so-called civilised societies(64)\nhold the precepts of wisdom in relation to bodily health and vigour, in\nregard to marriage and progeny, serve to illustrate the doctrine of the\nancient Stoics that \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f51\u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03c2, or the modern idealist utterance that\nthe World is my idea. More and more as civilisation succeeds in its\ndisruption of man from nature, it shows him governed not by bare facts and\nisolated experiences, but by the systematic idea under which all things\nare subsumed. He loses the na\u00efvet\u00e9 of the natural man, which takes each\nfact as it came, all alike good: he becomes sentimental, and artificial,\nsees things under a conventional point of view, and would rather die than\nnot be in the fashion. And this tendency is apparently irresistible. Yet\nthe mistake lies in the one-sidedness of sentiment and convention. Not the\ndomination of the idea is evil; but the domination of a partial and\nfragmentary idea: and this is what constitutes the evil of artificiality.\nAnd the correction must lie not in a return to nature, but in the\nreconstruction of a wider and more comprehensive idea: an idea which shall\nbe the unity and system of all nature; not a fantastic idealism, but an\nattempt to do justice to the more realist as well as the idealist sides of\nlife.\n\nThere is however another side of individualist ethics which needs even\nmore especial enforcement. It is the formation of\n\n\n    \u201cThe reason firm, the temperate will,\n    Endurance, foresight, strength and skill:\u201d\n\n\nthe healthy mind in a healthy body. Ethics is only too apt to suppose that\nwill and intelligence are assumptions which need no special justification.\nBut the truth is that they vary from individual to individual in degree\nand structure. It is the business of ethical psychology to give to these\nvague attributions the definiteness of a normal standard: to show what\nproportions are required to justify the proper title of reason and will\u2014to\nshow what reason and will really are if they do what they are encouraged\nor expected to do. It talks of the diseases of will and personality: it\nmust also set forth their educational ideal. The first problem of Ethics,\nit may be said, is the question of the will and its freedom. But to say\nthis is of course not to say that, unless freedom of will be understood in\nsome special sense, ethics becomes impossible. If the moral law is the\n_ratio cognoscendi_ of freedom, then must our conception of morality and\nof freedom hang together. And it will clearly be indispensable to begin by\nsome attempt to discover in what sense man may be in the most general way\ndescribed as a moral agent\u2014as an intelligent will, or (more briefly, yet\nsynonymously) as a will. \u201cThe soil of law and morality,\u201d says Hegel(65),\n\u201cis the intelligent life: and its more precise place and starting-point\nthe will, which is free, in the sense that freedom is its substance and\ncharacteristic, and the system of law the realm of freedom realised, the\nworld of intelligence produced out of itself as a second nature.\u201d Such a\nfreedom is a freedom made and acquired, the work of the mind\u2019s\nself-realisation, not to be taken as a given fact of consciousness which\nmust be believed(66). To have a will\u2014in other words, to have freedom, is\nthe consummation\u2014and let us add, only the formal or ideal consummation\u2014of\na process by which man raises himself out of his absorption in sensation\nand impulse, establishes within himself a mental realm, an organism of\nideas, a self-consciousness, and a self.\n\nThe vulgar apprehension of these things seems to assume that we have by\nnature, or are born with, a general faculty or set of general faculties,\nwhich we subsequently fill up and embody by the aid of experience. We\npossess\u2014they seem to imply\u2014so many \u201cforms\u201d and \u201ccategories\u201d latent in our\nminds ready to hold and contain the raw materials supplied from without.\nAccording to this view we have all a will and an intelligence: the\ndifference only is that some put more into them, and some put less. But\nsuch a separation of the general form from its contents is a piece of pure\nmythology. It is perhaps true and safe to say that the human being is of\nsuch a character that will and intelligence are in the ordinary course\ninevitably produced. But the forms which grow up are the more and more\ndefinite and systematic organisation of a graded experience, of series of\nideas, working themselves up again and again in representative and\nre-representative degree, till they constitute a mental or inner world of\ntheir own. The will is thus the title appropriate to the final stage of a\nprocess, by which sensation and impulse have polished and perfected\nthemselves by union and opposition, by differentiation and accompanying\nredintegration, till they assume characters quite unsurmised in their\nearliest aspects, and yet only the consolidation or self-realisation of\nimplications. Thus the mental faculties are essentially acquired\npowers,\u2014acquired not from without, but by action which generates the\nfaculties it seems to imply. The process of mind is a process which\ncreates individual centres, raises them to completer independence;\u2014which\nproduces an inner life more and more self-centered and also more and more\nequal to the universe which it has embodied. And will and intelligence are\nan important stage in that process.\n\nHerbart (as was briefly hinted at in the first essay) has analysed ethical\nappreciation (which may or may not be accompanied by approbation) into\nfive distinct standard ideas. These are the ideas of inward liberty, of\nperfection, of right, benevolence, and equity. Like Hume, he regards the\nmoral judgment as in its purity a kind of aesthetic pronouncement on the\nagreement or proportion of certain activities in relations to each other.\nTwo of these standard ideas,\u2014that of inward liberty and of perfection\u2014seem\nto belong to the sphere at present under review. They emerge as conditions\ndetermining the normal development of human nature to an intelligent and\nmatured personality. By inward freedom Herbart means the harmony between\nthe will and the intellect: what Aristotle has named \u201cpractical truth or\nreality,\u201d and what he describes in his conception of wisdom or moral\nintelligence,\u2014the power of discerning the right path and of pursuing it\nwith will and temper: the unity, clear but indissoluble, of will and\ndiscernment. By the idea of perfection Herbart means the sense of\nproportion and of propriety which is awakened by comparing a progress in\ndevelopment or an increase in strength with its earlier stages of promise\nand imperfection. The pleasure such perception affords works in two ways:\nit is a satisfaction in achievement past, and a stimulus to achievement\nyet to come.\n\nSuch ideas of inward liberty and of growth in ability or in performance\ngovern (at least in part) our judgment of the individual, and have an\nethical significance. Indeed, if the cardinal feature of the ethical\nsentiment be the inwardness and independence of its approbation and\nobligation, these ideas lie at the root of all true morality. Inward\nharmony and inward progress, lucidity of conscience and the resolution\nwhich knows no finality of effort, are the very essence of moral life.\nYet, if ethics is to include in the first instance social relationships\nand external utilities and sanctions, these conditions of true life must\nrather be described as pre-ethical. The truth seems to be that here we get\nto a range of ethics which is far wider than what is ordinarily called\npractice and conduct. At this stage logic, aesthetic, and ethic, are yet\none: the true, the good, and the beautiful are still held in their\nfundamental unity. An ethics of wide principle precedes its narrower\nsocial application; and whereas in ordinary usage the social provinciality\nis allowed to prevail, here the higher ethics emerge clear and imperial\nabove the limitations of local and temporal duty.\n\nAnd though it is easy to step into exaggeration, it is still well to\nemphasise this larger conception of ethics. The moral principle of the\n\u201cmaximising of life,\u201d as it has been called(67), may be open to\nmisconception (\u2014so, unfortunately are all moral principles when stated in\nthe effrontery of isolation): but it has its truth in the conviction that\nall moral evil is marked by a tendency to lower or lessen the total\nvitality. So too Friedrich Nietzsche\u2019s maxim, _Sei vornehm_(68), ensue\ndistinction, and above all things be not common or vulgar (_gemein_), will\neasily lend itself to distortion. But it is good advice for all that, even\nthough it may be difficult to define in a general formula wherein\ndistinction consists, to mark the boundary between self-respect and vanity\nor obstinacy, or to say wherein lies the beauty and dignity of human\nnature. Kant has laid it down as the principle of duty to ask ourselves if\nin our act we are prepared to universalise the maxim implied by our\nconduct. And that this\u2014which essentially bids us look at an act in the\nwhole of its relations and context\u2014is a safeguard against some forms of\nmoral evil, is certain. But there is an opposite\u2014or rather an apparently\nopposite\u2014principle which bids us be individual, be true to our own selves,\nand never allow ourselves to be dismayed from our own unique\nresponsibility. Perhaps the two principles are not so far apart as they\nseem. In any case true individuality is the last word and the first word\nin ethics; though, it may be added, there is a good deal to be said\nbetween the two termini.\n\n\n\n(iv.) An Excursus on Greek Ethics.\n\n\nIt is in these regions that Greek ethics loves to linger; on the duty of\nthe individual to himself, to be perfectly lucid and true, and to rise to\never higher heights of achievement. _Ceteris paribus_, there is felt to be\nsomething meritorious in superiority, something good:\u2014even were it that\nyou are master, and another is slave. Thus na\u00efvely speaks Aristotle(69).\nTo a modern, set amid so many conflicting ideals, perhaps, the immense\npossibilities of yet further growth might suggest themselves with\noverpowering force. To him the idea of perfection takes the form of an\nidea of perfectibility: and sometimes it smites down his conceit in what\nhe has actually done, and impresses a sense of humility in comparison with\nwhat yet remains unaccomplished. An ancient Greek apparently was little\nhaunted by these vistas of possibilities of progress through worlds beyond\nworlds. A comparatively simple environment, a fixed and definite mental\nhorizon, had its plain and definite standards, or at least seemed to have\nsuch. There were fewer cases of the man, unattached or faintly attached to\nany definite profession\u2014moving about in worlds half realised\u2014who has grown\nso common in a more developed civilisation. The ideals of the Greek were\nclearly descried: each man had his definite function or work to perform:\nand to do it better than the average, or than he himself habitually had\ndone, that was perfection, excellence, virtue. For virtue to the Greek is\nessentially ability and respectability: promise of excellent performance:\ncapacity to do better than others. Virtue is praiseworthy or meritorious\ncharacter and quality: it is achievement at a higher rate, as set against\none\u2019s past and against others\u2019 average.\n\nThe Greek moralists sometimes distinguish and sometimes combine moral\nvirtue and wisdom, \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae and \u03c6\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2: capacity to perform, and wisdom to\nguide that capacity. To the ordinary Greek perhaps the emphasis fell on\nthe former, on the attainment of all recognised good quality which became\na man, all that was beautiful and honourable, all that was appropriate,\nglorious, and fame-giving; and that not for any special reference to its\nutilitarian qualities. Useful, of course, such qualities were: but that\nwas not in question at the time. In the more liberal commonwealths of\nancient Greece there was little or no anxious care to control the\neducation of its citizens, so as to get direct service, overt contribution\nto the public good. A suspicious Spartan legislation might claim to do\nthat. But in the free air of Athens all that was required was loyalty,\ngood-will\u2014\u03b5\u1f54\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u2014to the common weal; it might be even a sentiment of human\nkindliness, of fraternity of spirit and purpose. Everything beyond and\nupon that basis was left to free development. Let each carry out to the\nfull the development of his powers in the line which national estimation\npoints out. He is\u2014nature and history alike emphasise that fact beyond the\nreach of doubt, for all except the outlaw and the casual stranger\u2014a member\nof a community, and as such has a governing instinct and ideal which\nanimates him. But he is also a self-centered individual, with special\nendowments of nature, in his own person and in the material objects which\nare his. A purely individualist or selfish use of them is not\u2014to the\nnormal Greek\u2014even dreamed of. He is too deeply rooted in the substance of\nhis community for that: or it is on the ground and in the atmosphere of an\nassured community that his individuality is to be made to flourish. Nature\nhas secured that his individuality shall rest securely in the\npresupposition of his citizenship. It seems, therefore, as if he were left\nfree and independent in his personal search for perfection, for\ndistinction. His place is fixed for him: _Spartam nactus es; hanc orna_:\nhis duty is his virtue. That duty, as Plato expresses it, is to do his own\ndeeds\u2014and not meddle with others. Nature and history have arranged that\nothers, in other posts, shall do theirs: that all severally shall energise\ntheir function. The very word \u201cduty\u201d seems out of place; if, at least,\nduty suggests external obligation, an order imposed and a debt to be\ndischarged. If there be a task-master and a creditor, it is the inflexible\norder of nature and history:\u2014or, to be more accurate, of nature, the\nindwelling and permanent reality of things. But the obligation to follow\nnature is scarcely felt as a yoke of constraint. A man\u2019s virtue is to\nperform his work and to perform it well: to do what he is specially\ncapable of doing, and therefore specially charged to do.\n\nNowhere has this character of Greek ethics received more classical\nexpression than in the Republic of Plato. In the prelude to his\nsubject\u2014which is the nature of Right and Morality\u2014Plato has touched\nbriefly on certain popular and inadequate views. There is the view that\nRight has its province in performance of certain single and external\nacts\u2014in business honesty and commercial straightforwardness. There is the\nview that it is rendering to each what is due to him; that it consists in\nthe proper reciprocity of services, in the balance of social give and\ntake. There is the critical or hyper-critical view which, from seeing so\nmuch that is called justice to be in harmony with the interest of the\npredominant social order, bluntly identifies mere force or strength as the\nground of right. And there are views which regard it as due to social\nconventions and artifices, to the influence of education, to political\narrangements and the operation of irrational prejudices. To all these\nviews Plato objects: not because they are false\u2014for they are all in part,\noften in large part, true\u2014but because they are inadequate and do not go to\nthe root of the matter. The foundations of right lie, he says, not in\nexternal act, but in the inner man: not in convention, but in nature: not\nin relation to others, but in the constitution of the soul itself. That\nethical idea\u2014the idea of right\u2014which seems most obviously to have its\ncentre outside the individual, to live and grow only in the relations\nbetween individuals, Plato selects in order to show the independent\nroyalty of the single human soul. The world, as Hume afterwards, called\njustice artificial: Plato will prove it natural. In a way he joins company\nwith those who bid us drive out the spectre of duty, of obligation coming\nupon the soul from social authority, from traditional idea, from religious\nsanctions. He preaches\u2014or he is about to preach\u2014the autonomy of the will.\n\nThe four cardinal virtues of Plato\u2019s list are the qualities which go to\nmake a healthy, normal, natural human soul, fit for all activity, equipped\nwith all arms for the battle of life. They tell us what such a soul is,\nnot what it does. They are the qualities which unless a soul has, and has\nthem each perfect, yet all co-operant, its mere outward and single acts\nhave no virtue or merit, but are only lucky accidents at the best. On the\nother hand, if a man has these constitutive qualities, he will act in the\nsocial world, and act well. Plato has said scornful things of mere outward\nand verbal truthfulness, and has set at the very lowest pitch of\ndegradation the \u201clie in the soul.\u201d His \u201ctemperance\u201d or \u201cself-restraint,\u201d\nif it be far from breathing any suggestion of self-suppression or\nself-assertion, is still farther from any suspicion of asceticism, or war\nagainst the flesh. It is the noble harmony of the ruling and the ruled,\nwhich makes the latter a partner of the sovereign, and takes from the\ndictates of the ruler any touch of coercion. It is literally sanity of\nsoul, integrity and purity of spirit; it is what has been sometimes called\nthe beautiful soul\u2014the indiscerptible unity of reason and impulse. Plato\u2019s\nbravery, again, is fortitude and consistency of soul, the full-blooded\nheart which is fixed in reason, the zeal which is according to knowledge,\nunflinching loyalty to the idea, the spirit which burns in the martyrs to\ntruth and humanity: yet withal with gentleness and courtesy and noble\nurbanity in its immediate train. And his truthfulness is that inner\nlucidity which cannot be self-deceived, the spirit which is a safeguard\nagainst fanaticism and hypocrisy, the sunlike warmth of intelligence\nwithout which the heart is a darkness full of unclean things.\n\nThe full development and crowning grace of such a manly nature Aristotle\nhas tried to present in the character of the Great-souled man\u2014him whom\nPlato has called the true king by divine right, or the autocrat by the\npatent of nature. Like all such attempts to delineate a type in the terms\nnecessarily single and successive of abstract analysis, it tends\noccasionally to run into caricature, and to give partial aspects an absurd\nprominency. Only the greatest of artists could cope with such a task,\nthough that artist may be found perhaps classed among the historians. Yet\nit is possible to form some conception of the ideal which Aristotle would\nset before us. The Great-souled man _is_ great, and he dare not deny the\nwitness of his spirit. He is one who does not quail before the anger and\nseek the applause of popular opinion: he holds his head as his own, and as\nhigh as his undimmed self-consciousness shows it is worth. There has been\nsaid to him by the reason within him the word that Virgil erewhile\naddressed to Dante:\n\n\n    \u201cLibero, dritto, e sano \u00e8 il tuo arbitrio\n    E fallo fora non fare a suo cenno;\n    Per ch\u2019 io te sopra te corono e mitrio.\u201d\n\n\nHe is his own Emperor and his own Pope. He is the perfected man, in whom\nis no darkness, whose soul is utter clearness, and complete harmony. Calm\nin self-possessed majesty, he stands, if need be, _contra mundum_: but\nrather, with the world beneath his feet. The chatter of personality has no\ninterest for him. Bent upon the best, lesser competitions for distinction\nhave no attraction for him. To the vulgar he will seem cold,\nself-confined: in his apartness and distinction they will see the signs of\na \u201cprig.\u201d His look will be that of one who pities men\u2014rather than loves\nthem: and should he speak ill of a foe, it is rather out of pride of heart\nand unbroken spirit than because these things touch him. Such an one, in\nmany ways, was the Florentine poet himself.\n\nIf the Greek world in general thus conceived \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae as the full bloom of\nmanly excellence (we all know how slightly\u2014witness the remarks in the\nPericlean oration\u2014Greeks, in their public and official utterances, rated\nwomanliness), the philosophers had a further point to emphasise. That was\nwhat they variously called knowledge, prudence, reason, insight,\nintelligence, wisdom, truth. From Socrates to Aristotle, from Aristotle to\nthe Stoics and Epicureans, and from the Stoics to the Neo-Platonists, this\nis the common theme: the supremacy of knowledge, its central and essential\nrelation to virtue. They may differ\u2014perhaps not so widely as current\nprejudice would suppose\u2014as to how this knowledge is to be defined, what\nkind of knowledge it is, how acquired and maintained, and so on. But in\nessentials they are at one. None of them, of course, mean that in order to\nright conduct nothing more is needed than to learn and remember what is\nright, the precepts and commandments of ordinary morality. Memory is not\nknowledge, especially when it is out of mind. Even an ancient philosopher\nwas not wholly devoid of common sense. They held\u2014what they supposed was a\nfact of observation and reflection\u2014that all action was prompted by\nfeelings of the values of things, by a desire of something good or\npleasing to self, and aimed at self-satisfaction and self-realisation, but\nthat there was great mistake in what thus afforded satisfaction. People\nchose to act wrongly or erroneously, because they were, first, mistaken\nabout themselves and what they wanted, and, secondly, mistaken in the\nmeans which would give them satisfaction. But this second point was\nsecondary. The main thing was to know yourself, what you really were; in\nPlato\u2019s words, to \u201csee the soul as it is, and know whether it have one\nform only or many, or what its nature is; to look upon it with the eye of\nreason in its original purity.\u201d Self-deception, confusion, that worst\nignorance which is unaware of itself, false estimation\u2014these are the\nradical evils of the natural man. To these critics the testimony of\nconsciousness was worthless, unless corroborated. To cure this mental\nconfusion, this blindness of will and judgment, is the task set for\nphilosophy: to give inward light, to teach true self-measurement. In one\npassage, much misunderstood, Plato has called this philosophic art the due\nmeasurement of pleasures and pains. It should scarcely have been possible\nto mistake the meaning. But, with the catchwords of Utilitarianism ringing\nin their ears, the commentators ran straight contrary to the true teaching\nof the _Protagoras_, consentient as it is with that of the _Phaedo_ and\nthe _Philebus_. To measure, one must have a standard: and if Plato has one\nlesson always for us, it is that a sure standard the multitude have not,\nbut only confusion. The so-called pleasures and pains of the world\u2019s\nexperiences are so entitled for different reasons, for contrary aims, and\nwith no unity or harmony of judgment. They are\u2014not a fact to be accepted,\nbut\u2014a problem for investigation: their reality is in question, their\ngenuineness, solidity and purity: and till you have settled that, you\ncannot measure, for you may be measuring vacuity under the idea that there\nis substance. You have still to get at the unit\u2014i.e. the reality of\npleasure. It was not Plato\u2019s view that pleasure was a separate and\nindependent entity: that it was exactly as it was felt. Each pleasure is\ndependent for its pleasurable quality on the consciousness it belongs to,\nand has only a relative truth and reality. Bentham has written about\ncomputing the value of a \u201clot\u201d of pleasures and pains. But Plato had his\nmind on an earlier and more fundamental problem, what is the truth and\nreality of pleasure; and his fullest but not his only essay towards\ndetermining the value or estimating the meaning of pleasure in the scale\nof being is that given in the _Philebus_.\n\nThis then is the knowledge which Greek philosophy meant: not mere\nintellect\u2014though, of course, there is always a danger of theoretical\ninquiry degenerating into abstract and formal dogma. But of the meaning\nthere can be no serious doubt. It is a knowledge, says Plato, to which the\nmethod of mathematical science\u2014the most perfect he can find\nacknowledged\u2014is only an _ouverture_, or perhaps, only the preliminary\ntuning of the strings. It is a knowledge not eternally hypothetical\u2014a\nsystem of sequences which have no sure foundation. It is a knowledge which\nrests upon the conviction and belief of the \u201cidea of good\u201d: a kind of\nknowledge which does not come by direct teaching, which is not mere\ntheory, but implies a lively conviction, a personal apprehension, a crisis\nwhich is a kind of \u201cconversion,\u201d or \u201cinspiration.\u201d It is as it were the\nprize of a great contest, in which the sword that conquers is the sword of\ndialectic: a sword whereof the property is, like that of Ithuriel\u2019s spear,\nto lay bare all deceptions and illusions of life. Or, to vary the\nmetaphor: the son of man is like the prince in the fairy tale who goes\nforth to win the true queen; but there are many false pretenders decked\nout to deceive his unwary eyes and foolish heart. Yet in himself there is\na power of discernment: there is something kindred with the truth:\u2014the\nwitness of the Spirit\u2014and all that education and discipline can do is to\nremove obstacles, especially the obstacles within the self which perturb\nthe sight and mislead the judgment. Were not the soul originally possessed\nof and dominated by the idea of good, it could never discern it elsewhere.\nOn this original kindred depends all the process of education; the\ninfluence of which therefore is primarily negative or auxiliary. Thus the\nprocess of history and experience,\u2014which the work of education only\nreproduces in an accelerated _tempo_\u2014serves but to bring out the implicit\nreason within into explicit conformity with the rationality of the world.\n\nKnowledge, then, in this ethical sphere means the harmony of will,\nemotion, intellect: it means the clear light which has no illusions and no\ndeceptions. And to those who feel that much of their life and of the\ncommon life is founded on prejudice and illusion, such white light will\noccasionally seem hard and steely. At its approach they fear the loss of\nthe charm of that twilight hour ere the day has yet begun, or before the\ndarkness has fully settled down. Thus the heart and feelings look upon the\nintellect as an enemy of sentiment. And Plato himself is not without\nanticipations of such an issue. Yet perhaps we may add that the danger is\nin part an imaginary one, and only arises because intelligence takes its\ntask too lightly, and encroaches beyond its proper ground. Philosophy, in\nother words, mistakes its place when it sets itself up as a dogmatic\nsystem of life. Its function is to comprehend, and from comprehension to\ncriticise, and through criticising to unify. It has no positive and\nadditional teaching of its own: no addition to the burden of life and\nexperience. And experience it must respect. Its work is to maintain the\norganic or super-organic interconnexion between all the spheres of life\nand all the forms of reality. It has to prevent stagnation and absorption\nof departments\u2014to keep each in its proper place, but not more than its\nplace, and yet to show how each is not independent of the others. And this\nis what the philosopher or ancient sage would be. If he is passionless, it\nis not that he has no passions, but that they no longer perturb and\nmislead. If his controlling spirit be reason, it is not the reason of the\nso-called \u201crationalist,\u201d but the reason which seeks in patience to\ncomprehend, and to be at home in, a world it at first finds strange. And\nif he is critical of others, he is still more critical of himself:\ncritical however not for criticism\u2019s sake (which is but a poor thing), but\nbecause through criticism the faith of reason may be more fully justified.\nTo the last, if he is true to his mission and faithful to his loyalty to\nreality, he will have the simplicity of the child.\n\nWhether therefore we agree or not with Plato\u2019s reduction of Right and Duty\nto self-actualisation, we may at least admit that in the idea of\nperfection or excellence, combined with the idea of knowledge or inward\nlucidity, he has got the fundamental ideas on which further ethical\ndevelopment must build. Self-control, self-knowledge, internal harmony,\nare good: and so are the development of our several faculties and of the\ntotality of them to the fullest pitch of excellence. But their value does\nnot lie entirely in themselves, or rather there is implicit in them a\nreference to something beyond themselves. They take for granted something\nwhich, because it is so taken, may also be ignored and neglected, just\nbecause it seems so obvious. And that implication is the social humanity\nin which they are the spirits of light and leading.\n\nTo lay the stress on \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae or excellence tends to leave out of sight the\nforce of duty; and to emphasise knowledge is allowed to disparage the\nheart and feelings. The mind\u2014even of a philosopher\u2014finds a difficulty in\nholding very different points of view in one, and where it is forced from\none to another, tends to forget the earlier altogether. Thus when the\nethical philosopher, presupposing as an absolute or unquestionable fact\nthat man the individual was rooted in the community, proceeded to discuss\nthe problem of the best and completest individual estate, he was easily\nled to lose sight of the fundamental and governing condition altogether.\nFrom the moment that Aristotle lays down the thesis that man is naturally\nsocial, to the moment when he asks how the bare ideal of excellence in\ncharacter and life can become an actuality, the community in which man\nlives has retired out of sight away into the background. And it only comes\nin, as it first appears, as the paedagogue to bring us to morality. And\nPlato, though professedly he is speaking of the community, and is well\naware that the individual can only be saved by the salvation of the\ncommunity, is constantly falling back into another problem\u2014the development\nof an individual soul. He feels the strength of the egoistic effort after\nperfection, and his essay in the end tends to lose sight altogether of its\nsecond theme. Instead of a man he gives us a mere philosopher, a man, that\nis, not living with his country\u2019s life, instinct with the heart and\nfeeling of humanity, inspired by art and religion, but a being set apart\nand exalted above his fellows,\u2014charged no doubt in theory with the duty of\nsaving them, of acting vicariously as the mediator between them and the\nabsolute truth\u2014but really tending more and more to seclude himself on the\n_edita templa_ of the world, on the high-towers of speculation.\n\nAnd what Plato and Aristotle did, so to speak, against their express\npurpose and effort, yet did, because the force of contemporary tendency\nwas irresistible\u2014that the Stoa and Epicurus did more openly and\nprofessedly. With a difference in theory, it is true, owing to the\ndifference in the surroundings. Virtue in the older day of the free and\nglorious commonwealth had meant physical and intellectual achievement,\nacts done in the public eye, and of course for the public good\u2014a good with\nwhich the agent was identified at least in heart and soul, if not in his\nexplicit consciousness. In later and worse days, when the political world,\nwith the world divine, had withdrawn from actual identity with the central\nheart of the individual, and stood over-against him as a strange power and\nlittle better than a nuisance, virtue came to be counted as endurance,\nindifference, negative independence against a cold and a perplexing world.\nBut even still, virtue is excellence: it is to rise above the ignoble\nlevel: to assert self-liberty against accident and circumstance\u2014to attain\nself-controlled, self-satisfying independence\u2014and to become God-like in\nits seclusion. Yet in two directions even it had to acknowledge something\nbeyond the individual. The Epicurean\u2014following out a suggestion of\nAristotle\u2014recognised the help which the free society of friends gave to\nthe full development of the single seeker after a self-satisfying and\ncomplete life. The Stoic, not altogether refusing such help, tended rather\nto rest his single self on a fellowship of ideal sort, on the great city\nof gods and men, the _civitas Dei_. Thus, in separate halves, the two\nschools, into which Greek ethics was divided, gave expression to the sense\nthat a new and higher community was needed\u2014to the sense that the visible\nactual community no longer realised its latent idea. The Stoic emphasised\nthe all-embracing necessity, the absolute comprehensiveness of the moral\nkingdom. The Epicurean saw more clearly that, if the everlasting city came\nfrom heaven, it could only visibly arise by initiation upon the earth.\nChristianity\u2014in its best work\u2014was a conjunction of the liberty with the\nnecessity, of the human with the divine.\n\nMore interesting, perhaps, it is to note the misconception of reason and\nknowledge which grew up. Knowledge came more and more to be identified\nwith the reflective and critical consciousness, which is outside reality\nand life, and judges it from a standpoint of its own. It came to be\nesteemed only in its formal and abstract shape, and at the expense of the\nheart and feelings. The antithesis of philosophy (or knowledge strictly so\ncalled) according to Plato was mere opinion, accidental and imperfect\nknowledge. The knowledge which is truly valuable is a knowledge which\npresupposes the full reality of life, and is the more and more completely\narticulated theory of it as a whole. It is\u2014abstractly taken\u2014a mere form of\nunity which has no value except in uniting: it is\u2014taken concretely\u2014the\nmatter, we may say, in complete unity. It is ideal and perfect harmony of\nthought, appetite, and emotion: or putting it otherwise, the philosopher\nis one who is not merely a creature of appetite and production, not merely\na creature of feeling and practical energy, but a creature, who to both of\nthese superadds an intelligence which sets eyes in the blind forehead of\nthese other powers, and thus, far from superseding them altogether, only\nraises them into completeness, and realises all that is worthy in their\nimplicit natures. Always these two impulsive tendencies of our nature are\nguided by some sort of ideas and intelligence, by beliefs and opinions.\nBut they, like their guides, are sporadically emergent, unconnected, and\ntherefore apt to be contradictory. It is to such erratic and occasional\nideas, half-truths and deceptions, that philosophy is opposed.\nUnfortunately for all parties, the antithesis is carried farther.\nPhilosophy and the philosopher are further set in opposition to the faith\nof the heart, the intimacy and intensity of feeling, the depth of love and\ntrust, which in practice often go along with imperfect ideas. The\nphilosopher is made one who has emancipated himself from the heart and\nfeelings,\u2014a pure intelligence, who is set above all creeds, contemplating\nall, and holding none. Consistency and clearness become his idol, to be\nworshipped at any cost, save one sacrifice: and that one sacrifice is the\nsacrifice of his own self-conceit. For consistency generally means that\nall is made to harmonise with one assumed standpoint, and that whatever\npresents discrepancies with this alleged standard is ruthlessly thrown\naway. Such a philosophy mistakes its function, which is not, as Heine\nscoffs, to make an intelligible system by rejecting the discordant\nfragments of life, but to follow reverently, if slowly, in the wake of\nexperience. Such a \u201cperfect sage,\u201d with his parade of reasonableness, may\noften assume the post of a dictator.\n\nAnd, above all, intelligence is only half itself when it is not also will.\nAnd both are more than mere consciousness. Plato\u2014whom we refer to, because\nhe is the coryphaeus of all the diverse host of Greek philosophy\u2014seems to\noverestimate or rather to misconceive the place of knowledge. That it is\nthe supreme and crowning grace of the soul, he sees. But he tends to\nidentify it with the supreme or higher soul:\u2014as Aristotle did after him,\nto be followed by the Stoics and Neo-Platonists. For them the supreme, or\nalmost supreme reality is the intelligence or reason: the soul is only on\na second grade of reality, on the borders of the natural or physical\nworld. When Plato takes that line, he turns towards the path of\nasceticism, and treats the philosophic life as a preparation for that\ntruer life when intelligence shall be all in all, for that better land\nwhere \u201cdivine dialogues\u201d shall form the staple and substance of spiritual\nexistence. Aristotle,\u2014who less often treads these solitudes,\u2014still extols\nthe theoretic life, when the body and its needs trouble no more, when the\nactivity of reason\u2014the theory of theory\u2014is attained at least as entirely\nas mortal conditions allow man to be deified. Of the \u201capathy\u201d and the\nreasonable conformity of the Stoics, or of the purely negative character\nof Epicurean happiness (the excision of all that pained) we need not here\nspeak. And in Plotinus and Proclus the deification of mere reason is at\nany rate the dominant note; whatever protests the larger Greek nature in\nthe former may from time to time offer. The truth which philosophy should\nhave taught was that Mind or intelligence was the element where the inner\nlife culminated and expanded and flourished: the error which it often\ntended to spread was that intelligence was the higher life of which all\nother was a degenerate shortcoming, and something valuable on its own\naccount.\n\nIt may be that thus to interpret Plato is to do him an injustice. It has\nbeen sometimes said that his division of parts or kinds of soul\u2014or his\ndistinction between its fighting horses\u2014tends to destroy the unity of\nmental life. But perhaps this was exactly what he wanted to convey. There\nare\u2014we may paraphrase his meaning\u2014three kinds of human being, three types\nof human life. There is the man or the life of appetite and the flesh:\nthere is the man of noble emotion and energetic depth of soul: there is\nthe life of reasonable pursuits and organised principle. Or, we may take\nhis meaning to be that there are three elements or provinces of mental\nlife, which in all except a few are but imperfectly coherent and do not\nreach a true or complete unity. Some unity there always is: but in the\nlife of mere appetite and impulse, even when these impulses are our nobler\nsentiments of love and hatred, the unity falls very far short. Or, as he\nputs the theme elsewhere, the soul has a passion for self-completion, a\nlove of beauty, which in most is but a misleading lust. It is the business\nof the philosophic life to re-create or to foster this unity: or\nphilosophy is the persistent search of the soul for its lost unity, the\nsearch to see that unity which is always its animating principle, its\ninner faith. When the soul has reached this ideal\u2014if it can be supposed to\nattain it (and of this the strong-souled ancient philosophers feel no\ndoubt),\u2014then a change must take place. The love of beauty is not\nsuppressed; it is only made self-assured and its object freed from all\nimperfection. It is not that passion has ceased; but its nature is so\ntransfigured, that it seems worthy of a nobler name, which yet we cannot\ngive. To such a life, where battle and conflict are as such unknown, we\ncannot longer give the title of life: and we say that philosophy is in\nlife a rehearsal of death(70). And yet if there be no battle, there is not\nfor that reason mere inaction. Hence, as the Republic concludes, the true\nphilosopher is the complete man. He is the truth and reality which the\nappetitive and emotional man were seeking after and failed to realise. It\nis true they at first will not see this. But the whole long process of\nphilosophy is the means to induce this conviction. And for Plato it\nremains clear that through experience, through wisdom, and through\nabstract deduction, the philosopher will justify his claim to him who hath\nears to hear and heart to understand. If that be so, the asceticism of\nPlato is not a mere war upon flesh and sense as such, but upon flesh and\nsense as imperfect truth, fragmentary reality, which suppose themselves\ncomplete, though they are again and again confuted by experience, by\nwisdom, and by mere calculation,\u2014a war against their blindness and\nshortsightedness.\n\n\n\n\nEssay IV. Psycho-Genesis.\n\n\n\u201cThe key,\u201d says Carus, \u201cfor the ascertainment of the nature of the\nconscious psychical life lies in the region of the unconscious(71).\u201d The\nview which these words take is at least as old as the days of Leibniz. It\nmeans that the mental world does not abruptly emerge a full-grown\nintelligence, but has a genesis, and follows a law of development: that\nits life may be described as the differentiation (with integration) of a\nsimple or indifferentiated mass. The terms conscious and unconscious,\nindeed, with their lax popular uses, leave the door wide open for\nmisconception. But they may serve to mark that the mind is to be\nunderstood only in a certain relation (partly of antithesis) to nature,\nand the soul only in reference to the body. The so-called \u201csuperior\nfaculties\u201d\u2014specially characteristic of humanity\u2014are founded upon, and do\nnot abruptly supersede, the lower powers which are supposed to be\nspecially obvious in the animals(72). The individual and specific\nphenomena of consciousness, which the psychologist is generally supposed\nto study, rest upon a deeper, less explicated, more indefinite, life of\nsensibility, which in its turn fades away by immeasurable gradations into\nsomething irresponsive to the ordinary tests for sensation and life.\n\nAnd yet the moment we attempt to leave the daylight of consciousness for\nthe darker sides of sub-conscious life, the risks of misinterpretation\nmultiply. The problem is to some extent the same as confronts the student\nof the ideas and principles of primitive races. There, the temptation of\nseeing things through the \u201cspectacles of civilisation\u201d is almost\nirresistible. So in psychology we are apt to import into the life of\nsensation and feeling the distinctions and relations of subsequent\nintellection. Nor is the difficulty lessened by Hegel\u2019s method which deals\nwith soul, sentiency, and consciousness as grades or general\ncharacteristics in a developmental advance. He borrows his illustrations\nfrom many quarters, from morbid and anomalous states of\nconsciousness,\u2014less from the cases of savages, children and animals. These\nillustrations may be called a loose induction. But it requires a much more\npowerful instrument than mere induction to build up a scientific system; a\nframework of general principle or theory is the only basis on which to\nbuild theory by the allegation of facts, however numerous. Yet in\nphilosophic science, which is systematised knowledge, all facts strictly\nso described will find their place and be estimated at their proper value.\n\n\n\n(i.) Primitive Sensibility.\n\n\nPsychology (with Hegel) takes up the work of science from biology. The\nmind comes before it as the supreme product of the natural world, the\nfinest flower of organic life, the \u201ctruth\u201d of the physical process. As\nsuch it is called by the time-honoured name of Soul. If we further go on\nto say that the soul is the principle of life, we must not understand this\nvital principle to be something over and above the life of which it is the\nprinciple. Such a locally-separable principle is an addition which is due\nto the analogy of mechanical movement, where a detached agent sets in\nmotion and directs the machinery. But in the organism the principle is not\nthus detachable as a thing or agent. By calling Soul the principle of life\nwe rather mean that in the vital organism, so far as it _lives_, all the\nreal variety, separation, and discontinuity of parts must be reduced to\nunity and identity, or as Hegel would say, to _ideality_. To live is thus\nto keep all differences fluid and permeable in the fire of the\nlife-process. Or to use a familiar term of logic, the Soul is the concept\nor intelligible unity of the organic body. But to call it a concept might\nsuggest that it is only the conception through which _we_ represent to\nourselves the variety in unity of the organism. The soul, however, is more\nthan a mere concept: and life is more than a mere mode of description for\na group of movements forming an objective unity. It is a unity, subjective\nand objective. The organism is one life, controlling difference: and it is\nalso one by our effort to comprehend it. The Soul therefore is in Hegelian\nlanguage described as the Idea rather than the concept of the organic\nbody. Life is the generic title for this subject-object: but the life may\nbe merely physical, or it may be intellectual and practical, or it may be\nabsolute, i.e. will and know all that it is, and be all that it knows and\nwills.\n\nUp to this point the world is what is called an external, which is here\ntaken to mean (not a world external to the individual, but) a\nself-externalised world. That is to say, it is the observer who has\nhitherto by his interpretation of his perceptions supplied the \u201cSpirit in\nNature.\u201d In itself the external world has no inside, no centre: it is we\nwho read into it the conception of a life-history. We are led to believe\nthat a principle of unity is always at work throughout the physical\nworld\u2014even in the mathematical laws of natural operation. It is only\nintelligible and credible to us as a system, a continuous and regular\ndevelopment. But that system is only a hypothetical idea, though it is\nheld to be a conclusion to which all the evidence seems unequivocally to\npoint. And, even in organic life, the unity, though more perfect and\npalpable than in the mechanical and inorganic world, is only a perception,\na vision,\u2014a necessary mode of realising the unity of the facts. The\nphenomenon of life reveals as in a picture and an ocular demonstration the\nconformity of inward and outward, the identity of whole and parts, of\npower and utterance. But it is still outside the observer. In the function\nof sensibility and sentiency, however, we stand as it were on the\nborder-line between biology and psychology. At one step we have been\nbrought within the harmony, and are no longer mere observers and\nreflecters. The sentient not merely is, but is aware that it is. Hitherto\nas life, it only is the unity in diversity, and diversity in unity, for\nthe outsider, i.e. only implicitly: now it is so for itself, or\nconsciously. And in the first stage it does not know, but feels or is\nsentient. Here, for the first time, is created the distinction of inward\nand outward. Loosely indeed we may, like Mr. Spencer, speak of outward and\ninward in physiology: but strictly speaking, what Goethe says is true,\n_Natur hat weder Kern noch Schaale_(73). Nature in the narrower sense\nknows no distinction of the inward and outward in its phenomena: it is a\npurely superficial order and succession of appearance and event. The Idea\nwhich has been visible to an intelligent percipient in the types and laws\nof the natural world, now _is_, actually is\u2014is in and for itself\u2014but at\nfirst in a minimum of content, a mere point of light, or rather the dawn\nwhich has yet to expand into the full day.\n\nSpinoza has asserted that \u201call individual bodies are animate, though in\ndifferent degrees(74).\u201d Now it is to a great extent this diversity of\ndegree on which the main interest turns. Yet it is well to remember that\nthe abrupt and trenchant separations which popular practice loves are\noverridden to a deeper view by an essential unity of idea, reducing them\nto indifference. If, that is, we take seriously the Spinozist unity of\nSubstance, and the continual correlation (to call it no more) of extension\nand consciousness therein, we cannot avoid the conclusion which even Bacon\nwould admit of something describable as attraction and perception,\nsomething subduing diversity to unity. But whether it be well to name this\nsoul or life is a different matter. It may indeed only be taken to mean\nthat all true being must be looked on as a real unity and individuality,\nmust, that is, be conceived as manifesting itself in organisation, must be\nreferred to a self-centred and self-developing activity. But this\u2014which is\nthe fundamental thesis of idealism\u2014is hardly all that is meant. Rather\nSpinoza would imply that all things which form a real unity must have\nlife\u2014must have inner principle and unifying reality: and what he teaches\nis closely akin to the Leibnitian doctrine that every substantial\nexistence reposes upon a monad, a unity which is at once both a force and\na cognition, a \u201crepresentation\u201d and an appetite or _nisus_ to act. When\nFechner in a series of works(75) expounds and defends the hypothesis that\nplants and planets are not destitute of soul, any more than man and\nanimals, he only gives a more pronounced expression to this idealisation\nor spiritualisation of the natural world. But for the moment the point to\nbe noted is that all of this idealistic doctrine is an inference, or a\ndevelopment which finds its _point d\u2019appui_ in the fact of sensation. And\nthe problem of the Philosophy of Mind is just to trace the process whereby\na mere shock of sensation has grown into a conception and a faith in the\ngoodness, beauty and intelligence of the world.\n\nSchopenhauer has put the point with his usual picturesqueness. Outward\nnature presents nothing but a play of forces. At first, however, this\nforce shows merely the mechanical phenomena of pressure and impact, and\nits theory is sufficiently described by mathematical physics. But in the\nprocess of nature force assumes higher types, types where it loses a\ncertain amount of its externality(76), till in the organic world it\nacquires a peculiar phase which Schopenhauer calls _Will_, meaning by\nthat, however, an organising and controlling power, a tendency or _nisus_\nto be and live, which is persistent and potent, but without consciousness.\nThis blind force, which however has a certain coherence and purposiveness,\nis in the animal organism endowed with a new character, in consequence of\nthe emergence of a new organ. This organ, the brain and nervous system,\ncauses the evolution into clear day of an element which has been growing\nmore and more urgent. The gathering tendency of force to return into\nitself is now complete: the cycle of operation is formed: and the junction\nof the two currents issues in the spark of sensation. The blind force now\nbecomes seeing.\n\nBut at first\u2014and this is the point we have to emphasise\u2014its powers of\nvision are limited. Sensibility is either a local and restricted\nphenomenon: or, in so far as it is not local, it is vague and indefinite,\nand hardly entitled to the name of sensibility. Either it is a dim, but\nfar-reaching, sympathy with environing existence, and in that case only\nso-called blind will or feeling: or if it is clear, is locally confined,\nand at first within very narrow limits. Neither of these points must be\nlost sight of. On the one hand feeling has to be regarded as the dull and\nconfused stirring of an almost infinite sympathy with the world\u2014a pulse\nwhich has come from the far-distant movements of the universe, and bears\nwith it, if but as a possibility, the wealth of an infinite message. On\nthe other hand, feeling at first only becomes real, in this boundless\nideality to which its possibilities extend, by restricting itself to one\nlittle point and from several points organising itself to a unity of\nbodily feeling, till it can go on from thence to embrace the universe in\ndistinct and articulate comprehension.\n\nSoul, says Hegel, is not a separate and additional something over and\nabove the rest of nature: it is rather nature\u2019s \u201c\u2019universal immaterialism,\nand simple ideal life(77).\u201d There were ancient philosophers who spoke of\nthe soul as a self-adjusting number,\u2014as a harmony, or equilibrium(78)\u2014and\nthe moderns have added considerably to the list of these analogical\ndefinitions. As definitions they obviously fall short. Yet these things\ngive, as it were, by anticipation, an image of soul, as the \u201cideality,\u201d\nwhich reduces the manifold to unity. The adhesions and cohesions of\nmatter, its gravitating attractions, its chemical affinities and\nelectrical polarities, the intricate out-and-in of organic structure, are\nall preludes to the true incorporating unity which is the ever-immanent\nsupersession of the endless self-externalism and successionalism of\nphysical reality. But in sentiency, feeling, or sensibility, the unity\nwhich all of these imply without reaching, is explicitly present. It is\nimplicitly an all-embracing unity: an infinite,\u2014which has no doors and no\nwindows, for the good reason that it needs none, because it has nothing\noutside it, because it \u201cexpresses\u201d and \u201cenvelopes\u201d (however confusedly at\nfirst) the whole universe. Thus, even if, with localising phraseology, we\nmay describe mind, where it _appears_ emerging in the natural world, as a\nmere feeble and incidental outburst,\u2014a rebellion breaking out as in some\npetty province or isolated region against the great law of the physical\nrealm\u2014we are in so speaking taking only an external standpoint. But with\nthe rise of mind in nature the bond of externalism is implicitly overcome.\nTo it, and where it really is, there is nothing outside, nothing\ntranscendent. Everything which is said to be outside mind is only outside\na localised and limited mind\u2014outside a mind which is imperfectly and\nabstractly realised\u2014not outside mind absolutely. Mind is the absolute\nnegation of externality: not a mere relative negative, as the organism may\nbe biologically described as inner in respect of the environment. To\naccomplish this negation in actuality, to bring the multiplicity and\nexternality of things into the unity and identity of one Idea, is the\nprocess of development of mind from animal sensibility to philosophic\nknowledge, from appetite to art,\u2014the process of culture through the social\nstate under the influence of religion.\n\nSentiency or psychic matter (mind-stuff), to begin with, is in some\nrespects like the _tabula rasa_ of the empiricists. It is the\npossibility\u2014but the real possibility\u2014of intelligence rather than\nintelligence itself. It is the monotonous undifferentiated inwardness\u2014a\nfaint self-awareness and self-realisation of the material world, but at\nfirst a mere vague _psychical protoplasm_ and without defined nucleus,\nwithout perceptible organisation or separation of structures. If there is\nself-awareness, it is not yet discriminated into a distinct and unified\nself, not yet differentiated and integrated,\u2014soul in the condition of a\nmere \u201cIs,\u201d which, however, is nothing determinate. It is very much in the\nsituation of Condillac\u2019s statue-man\u2014_une statue organis\u00e9e int\u00e9rieurement\ncomme nous, et anim\u00e9e d\u2019un esprit priv\u00e9 de toute esp\u00e8ce d\u2019id\u00e9es_: alike at\nleast so far that the rigid uniformity of the latter\u2019s envelope prevents\nall articulated organisation of its faculties. The foundation under all\nthe diversity and individuality in the concrete intelligent and volitional\nlife is a common feeling,\u2014a _sensus communis_\u2014a general and indeterminate\nsusceptibility to influence, a sympathy responsive, but responsive vaguely\nand equivocally, to all the stimuli of the physical environment. There was\nonce a time, according to primitive legend, when man understood the\nlanguage of beast and bird, and even surprised the secret converse of\ntrees and flowers. Such fancies are but the exaggeration of a solidarity\nof conscious life which seems to spread far in the sub-conscious realm,\nand to narrow the individual\u2019s soul into limited channels as it rises into\nclear self-perception,\n\n\n    \u201cAs thro\u2019 the frame that binds him in\n    His isolation grows defined.\u201d\n\n\nIt may be a mere dream that, as Goethe feigns of Makaria in his\nromance(79), there are men and women in sympathy with the vicissitudes of\nthe starry regions: and hypotheses of lunar influence, or dogmas of\nastrological destiny, may count to the present guardians of the sciences\nas visionary superstitions. Yet science in these regions has no reason to\nbe dogmatic; her function hitherto can only be critical; and even for\nthat, her data are scanty and her principles extremely general. The\ninfluences on the mental mood and faculty, produced by climate and\nseasons, by local environment and national type, by individual\npeculiarities, by the differences of age and sex, and by the alternation\nof night and day, of sleep and waking, are less questionable. It is easy\nno doubt to ignore or forget them: easy to remark how indefinable and\nincalculable they are. But that does not lessen their radical and\ninevitable impress in the determination of the whole character. \u201cThe sum\nof our existence, divided by reason, never comes out exact, but always\nleaves a marvellous remainder(80).\u201d Irrational this residue is, in the\nsense that it is inexplicable, and incommensurable with the well-known\nquantities of conscious and voluntarily organised life. But a scientific\npsychology, which is adequate to the real and concrete mind, should never\nlose sight of the fact that every one of its propositions in regard to the\nmore advanced phases of intellectual development is thoroughly and in\nindefinable ways modified by these preconditions. When that is remembered,\nit will be obvious how complicated is the problem of adapting psychology\nfor the application to education, and how dependent the solution of that\nproblem is upon an experiential familiarity with the data of individual\nand national temperament and character.\n\nThe first stage in mental development is the establishment of regular and\nuniform relations between soul and body: it is the differentiation of\norgans and the integration of function: the balance between sensation and\nmovement, between the afferent and efferent processes of sensitivity.\nGiven a potential soul, the problem is to make it actual in an individual\nbody. It is the business of a physical psychology to describe in detail\nthe steps by which the body we are attached to is made inward as our idea\nthrough the several organs and their nervous appurtenances: whereas a\npsychical physiology would conversely explain the corresponding processes\nfor the expression of the emotions and for the objectification of the\nvolitions. Thus soul inwardises (_erinnert_) or envelops body: which body\n\u201cexpresses\u201d or develops soul. The actual soul is the unity of both, is the\npercipient individual. The solidarity or \u201ccommunion\u201d of body and soul is\nhere the dominant fact: the soul sentient of changes in its peripheral\norgans, and transmitting emotion and volition into physical effect. It is\non this psychical unity,\u2014the unity which is the soul of the diversity of\nbody\u2014that all the subsequent developments of mind rest. Sensation is thus\nthe _prius_\u2014or basis\u2014of all mental life: the organisation of soul in body\nand of body in soul. It is the process which historically has been\nprepared in the evolution of animal life from those undifferentiated forms\nwhere specialised organs are yet unknown, and which each individual has\nfurther to realise and complete for himself, by learning to see and hear,\nand use his limbs. At first, moreover, it begins from many separate\ncentres and only through much collision and mutual compliance arrives at\ncomparative uniformity and centralisation. The common basis of united\nsensibility supplied by the one organism has to be made real and\neffective, and it is so at first by sporadic and comparatively independent\ndevelopments. If self-hood means reference to self of what is prima facie\nnot self, and projection of self therein, there is in primitive\nsensibility only the germ or possibility of self-hood. In the early phases\nof psychic development the centre is fluctuating and ill-defined, and it\ntakes time and trouble to co-ordinate or unify the various starting-points\nof sensibility(81).\n\nThis consolidation of inward life may be looked at either formally or\nconcretely. Under the first head, it means the growth of a central unity\nof apperception. In the second case, it means a peculiar aggregate of\nideas and sentiments. There is growing up within him what we may call the\nindividuality of the individual,\u2014an irrational, i.e. not consciously\nintelligent, nether-self or inner soul, a firm aggregation of hopes and\nwishes, of views and feelings, or rather of tendencies and temperament, of\ncharacter hereditary and acquired. It is the law of the natural will or\ncharacter which from an inaccessible background dominates our\naction,\u2014which, because it is not realised and formulated in consciousness,\nbehaves like a guardian spirit, or genius, or destiny within us. This\ngenius is the sub-conscious unity of the sensitive life\u2014the manner of man\nwhich unknown to ourselves we are,\u2014and which influences us against our\nnominal or formal purposes. So far as this predominates, our ends, rough\nhew them how we will, are given by a force which is not really, i.e. with\nfull consciousness, ours: by a mass of ingrained prejudice and unreasoned\nsympathies, of instincts and passions, of fancies and feelings, which have\ncondensed and organised themselves into a natural power. As the child in\nthe mother\u2019s womb is responsive to her psychic influences, so the\ndevelopment of a man\u2019s psychic life is guided by feelings centred in\nobjects and agents external to him, who form the genius presiding over his\ndevelopment. His soul, to that extent, is really in another: he himself is\nselfless, and when his stay is removed the principle of his life is\ngone(82). He is but a bundle of impressions, held together by influences\nand ties which in years before consciousness proper began made him what he\nis. Such is the involuntary adaptation to example and environment, which\nestablishes in the depths below personality a self which becomes hereafter\nthe determinant of action. Early years, in which the human being is\nnaturally susceptible, build up by imitation, by pliant obedience, an\nimage, a system, reproducing the immediate surroundings. The soul, as yet\nselfless, and ready to accept any imprint, readily moulds itself into the\nlikeness of an authoritative influence.\n\nThe step by which the universality or unity of the self is realised in the\nvariety of its sensation is Habit. Habit gives us a definite\nstanding-ground in the flux of single impressions: it is the\nidentification of ourselves with what is most customary and familiar: an\nidentification which takes place by practice and repetition. If it\ncircumscribes us to one little province of being, it on the other frees us\nfrom the vague indeterminateness where we are at the mercy of every\npassing mood. It makes thus much of our potential selves our very own, our\nacquisition and permanent possession. It, above all, makes us free and at\none with our bodily part, so that henceforth we start as a subjective unit\nof body and soul. We have now as the result of the anthropological process\na self or ego, an individual consciousness able to reflect and compare,\nsetting itself on one side (a soul in bodily organisation), and on the\nother setting an object of consciousness, or external world, a world of\nother things. All this presupposes that the soul has actualised itself by\nappropriating and acquiring as its expression and organ the physical\nsensibility which is its body. By restricting and establishing itself, it\nhas gained a fixed standpoint. No doubt it has localised and confined\nitself, but it is no longer at the disposal of externals and accident: it\nhas laid the foundation for higher developments.\n\n\n\n(ii.) Anomalies of Psychical Life.\n\n\nPsychology, as we have seen, goes for information regarding the earlier\nstages of mental growth to the child and the animal,\u2014perhaps also to the\nsavage. So too sociology founds certain conclusions upon the observations\nof savage customs and institutions, or on the earlier records of the race.\nIn both cases with a limitation caused by the externality and\nfragmentariness of the facts and the need of interpreting them through our\nown conscious experiences. There is however another direction in which\ncorresponding inquiries may be pursued; and where the danger of the\nconclusions arrived at, though not perhaps less real, is certainly of a\ndifferent kind. In sociology we can observe\u2014and almost experiment upon\u2014the\nphenomena of the lapsed, degenerate and criminal classes. The advantage of\nsuch observation is that the object of study can be made to throw greater\nlight on his own inner states. He is a little of the child and a little of\nthe savage, but these aspects co-exist with other features which put him\nmore on a level with the intelligent observer. Similar pathological\nregions are open to us in the case of psychology. There the anomalous and\nmorbid conditions of mind co-exist with a certain amount of mature\nconsciousness. So presented, they are thrown out into relief. They form\nthe negative instances which serve to corroborate our positive inductions.\nThe regularly concatenated and solid structure of normal mind is under\nabnormal and deranged conditions thrown into disorder, and its\nconstituents are presented in their several isolation. Such phenomena are\nrelapses into more rudimentary grades: but with the difference that they\nare set in the midst of a more advanced phase of intellectual life.\n\nEven amongst candid and honest-minded students of psychology there is a\ncertain reluctance to dabble in researches into the night-side of the\nmental range. Herbart is an instance of this shrinking. The region of the\nUnconscious seemed\u2014and to many still seems\u2014a region in which the charlatan\nand the dupe can and must play into each other\u2019s hands. Once in the whirl\nof spiritualist and crypto-psychical inquiry you could not tell how far\nyou might be carried. The facts moreover were of a peculiar type.\nDependent as they seemed to be on the frame of mind of observers and\nobserved, they defied the ordinary criteria of detached and abstract\nobservation. You can only observe them, it is urged, when you believe;\nscepticism destroys them. Now there is a widespread natural impatience\nagainst what Bacon has called \u201cmonodical\u201d phenomena, phenomena i.e. which\nclaim to come under a special law of their own, or to have a private and\nprivileged sphere. And this impatience cuts the Gordian knot by a\ndetermination to treat all instances which oppose its hitherto ascertained\nlaws as due to deception and fraud, or, at the best, to incompetent\nobservation, confusions of memory, and superstitions of ignorance. Above\nall, great interests of religion and personality seemed to connect\nthemselves with these revelations\u2014interests, at any rate, to which our\ncommon humanity thrills; it seemed as if, in this region beyond the\ncustomary range of the conscious and the seen, one might learn something\nof the deeper realities which lie in the unseen. But to feel that so much\nwas at stake was naturally unfavourable to purely dispassionate\nobservation.\n\nThe philosophers were found\u2014as might have been expected\u2014amongst those most\nstrongly attracted by these problems. Even Kant had been fascinated by the\nspiritualism of Swedenborg, though he finally turned away sceptical. At\nleast as early as 1806 Schelling had been interested by Ritter\u2019s\nresearches into the question of telepathy, or the power of the human will\nto produce without mechanical means of conveyance an effect at a distance.\nHe was looking forward to the rise of a _Physica coelestis_, or New\nCelestial Physics, which should justify the old magic. About the same date\nhis brother Karl published an essay on Animal Magnetism. The novel\nphenomena of galvanism and its congeners suggested vast possibilities in\nthe range of the physical powers, especially of the physical powers of the\nhuman psyche as a natural agent. The divining-rod was revived.\nClairvoyance and somnambulism were carefully studied, and the curative\npowers of animal magnetism found many advocates(83).\n\nInterest in these questions went naturally with the new conception of the\nplace of Man in Nature, and of Nature as the matrix of mind(84). But it\nhad been acutely stimulated by the performances and professions of Mesmer\nat Vienna and Paris in the last quarter of the eighteenth century.\nThese\u2014though by no means really novel\u2014had forced the artificial world of\nscience and fashion to discuss the claim advanced for a new force which,\namongst other things, could cure ailments that baffled the ordinary\npractitioner. This new force\u2014mainly because of the recent interest in the\nremarkable advances of magnetic and electrical research\u2014was conceived as a\nfluid, and called Animal Magnetism. At one time indeed Mesmer actually\nemployed a magnet in the manipulation by which he induced the peculiar\ncondition in his patients. The accompaniments of his procedure were in\nmany respects those of the quack-doctor; and with the quack indeed he was\noften classed. A French commission of inquiry appointed to examine into\nhis performances reported in 1784 that, while there was no doubt as to the\nreality of many of the phenomena, and even of the cures, there was no\nevidence for the alleged new physical force, and declared the effects to\nbe mainly attributable to the influence of imagination. And with the\nmention of this familiar phrase, further explanation was supposed to be\nrendered superfluous.\n\nIn France political excitement allowed the mesmeric theory and practice to\ndrop out of notice till the fall of the first Empire. But in Germany there\nwas a considerable amount of investigations and hypotheses into these\nmystical phenomena, though rarely by the ordinary routine workers in the\nscientific field. The phenomena where they were discussed were studied and\ninterpreted in two directions. Some theorists, like Jung-Stilling,\nEschenmayer, Schubert, and Kerner, took the more metaphysicist and\nspiritualistic view: they saw in them the witness to a higher truth, to\nthe presence and operation in this lower world of a higher and spiritual\nmatter, a so-called ether. Thus Animal Magnetism supplied a sort of\nphysical theory of the other world and the other life. Jung-Stilling, e.g.\nin his \u201cTheory of Spirit-lore.\u201d (1808), regarded the spiritualistic\nphenomena as a justification of\u2014what he believed to be\u2014the Kantian\ndoctrine that in the truly real and persistent world space and time are no\nmore. The other direction of inquiry kept more to the physical field.\nRitter (whose researches interested both Schelling and Hegel) supposed he\nhad detected the new force underlying mesmerism and the like, and gave to\nit the name of Siderism (1808); while Amoretti of Milan named the object\nof his experiments Animal Electrometry (1816). Kieser(85), again (1826)\nspoke of Tellurism, and connected animal magnetism with the play of\ngeneral terrestrial forces in the human being.\n\nAt a later date (1857) Schindler, in his \u201cMagical Spirit-life,\u201d expounded\na theory of mental polarity. The psychical life has two poles or\ncentres,\u2014its day-pole, around which revolves our ordinary and superficial\ncurrent of ideas, and its night-pole, round which gathers the\nsub-conscious and deeper group of beliefs and sentiments. Either life has\na memory, a consciousness, a world of its own: and they flourish to a\nlarge extent inversely to each other. The day-world has for its organs of\nreceiving information the ordinary senses. But the magical or night-world\nof the soul has its feelers also, which set men directly in telepathic\nrapport with influences, however distant, exerted by the whole world: and\nthrough this \u201cinner sense\u201d which serves to concentrate in itself all the\ntelluric forces (\u2014a sense which in its various aspects we name instinct,\npresentiment, conscience) is constructed the fabric of our sub-conscious\nsystem. Through it man is a sort of r\u00e9sum\u00e9 of all the cosmic life, in\nsecret affinity and sympathy with all natural processes; and by the will\nwhich stands in response therewith he can exercise a directly creative\naction on external nature. In normal and healthy conditions the two\ncurrents of psychic life run on harmonious but independent. But in the\nphenomena of somnambulism, clairvoyance, and delirium, the magic region\nbecomes preponderant, and comes into collision with the other. The\ndark-world emerges into the realm of day as a portentous power: and there\nis the feeling of a double personality, or of an indwelling genius,\nfamiliar spirit, or demon.\n\nTo the ordinary physicist the so-called _Actio in distans_ was a hopeless\nstumbling-block. If he did not comprehend the transmission (as it is\ncalled) of force where there was immediate contact, he was at least\nperfectly familiar with the outer aspect of it as a condition of his\nlimited experience. It needed one beyond the mere hodman of science to say\nwith Laplace: \u201cWe are so far from knowing all the agents of nature, that\nit would be very unphilosophical to deny the existence of phenomena solely\nbecause they are inexplicable in the present state of our knowledge.\u201d\nAccordingly mesmerism and its allied manifestations were generally\nabandoned to the bohemians of science, and to investigators with dogmatic\nbias. It was still employed as a treatment for certain ailments: and\nphilosophers, as different as Fichte and Schopenhauer(86), watched its\nfate with attention. But the herd of professional scientists fought shy of\nit. The experiments of Braid at Manchester in 1841 gradually helped to\ngive research into the subject a new character. Under the name of\nHypnotism (or, rather at first Neuro-hypnotism) he described the phenomena\nof the magnetic sleep (induced through prolonged staring at a bright\nobject), such as abnormal rigidity of body, perverted sensibility, and the\nremarkable obedience of the subject to the command or suggestions of the\noperator. Thirty years afterwards, the matter became an object of\nconsiderable experimental and theoretic work in France, at the rival\nschools of Paris and Nancy; and the question, mainly under the title of\nhypnotism, though the older name is still occasionally heard, has been for\nseveral years brought prominently under public notice.\n\nIt cannot be said that the net results of these observations and\nhypotheses are of a very definitive character. While a large amount of\ncontroversy has been waged on the comparative importance of the several\nmethods and instruments by which the hypnotic or mesmeric trance may be\ninduced, and a scarcely less wide range of divergence prevails with regard\nto the physiological and pathological conditions in connexion with which\nit has been most conspicuously manifested, there has been less anxiety\nshown to determine its precise psychical nature, or its significance in\nmental development. And yet the better understanding of these aspects may\nthrow light on several points connected with primitive religion and the\nhistory of early civilisation, indeed over the whole range of what is\ncalled _V\u00f6lkerpsychologie_. Indeed this is one of the points which may be\nsaid to emerge out of the confusion of dispute. Phenomena at least\nanalogous to those styled hypnotic have a wide range in the\nanthropological sphere(87): and the proper characters which belong to them\nwill only be caught by an observer who examines them in the widest variety\nof examples. Another feature which has been put in prominence is what has\nbeen called \u201cpsychological automatism.\u201d And in this name two points seem\nto deserve note. The first is the spontaneous and as it were mechanical\nconsecution of mental states in the soul whence the interfering effect of\nvoluntary consciousness has been removed. And the second is the unfailing\nor accurate regularity, so contrary to the hesitating and uncertain\nprocedure of our conscious and reasoned action, which so often is seen in\nthe unreflecting and unreasoned movements. To this invariable sequence of\npsychical movement the superior control and direction by the intelligent\nself has to adapt itself, just as it respects the order of physical laws.\n\nBut, perhaps, the chief conclusion to be derived from hypnotic experience\nis the value of suggestion or suggestibility. Even cool thinkers like Kant\nhave recognised how much mere mental control has to do with bodily\nstate,\u2014how each of us, in this way, is often for good or for ill his own\nphysician. An idea is a force, and is only inactive in so far as it is\nheld in check by other ideas. \u201cThere is no such thing as hypnotism,\u201d says\none: \u201cthere are only different degrees of suggestibility.\u201d This may be to\nexaggerate: yet it serves to impress the comparatively secondary character\nof many of the circumstances on which the specially mesmeric or hypnotic\nexperimentalist is apt to lay exclusive stress. The methods may probably\nvary according to circumstances. But the essence of them all is to get the\npatient out of the general frame and system of ideas and perceptions in\nwhich his ordinary individuality is encased. Considering how for all of us\nthe reality of concrete life is bound up with our visual perceptions, how\nlargely our sanity depends upon the spatial idea, and how that depends on\nfree ocular range, we can understand that darkness and temporary loss of\nvision are powerful auxiliaries in the hypnotic process, as in magical and\nsuperstitious rites. But a great deal short of this may serve to establish\ninfluence. The mind of the majority of human beings, but especially of the\nyoung, may be compared to a vacant seat waiting for some one to fill it.\n\nIn Hegel\u2019s view hypnotic phenomena produce a kind of temporary and\nartificial atavism. Mechanical or chemical means, or morbid conditions of\nbody, may cause even for the intelligent adult a relapse into states of\nmind closely resembling those exhibited by the primitive or the infantile\nsensibility. The intelligent personality, where powers are bound up with\nlimitations and operate through a chain of means and ends, is reduced to\nits primitively undifferentiated condition. Not that it is restored to its\ninfantile simplicity; but that all subsequent acquirements operate only as\na concentrated individuality, or mass of will and character, released from\nthe control of the self-possessed mind, and invested (by the latter\u2019s\nwithdrawal) with a new quasi-personality of their own. With the loss of\nthe world of outward things, there may go, it is supposed, a clearer\nperception of the inward and particularly of the organic life. The Soul\ncontains the form of unity which other experiences had impressed upon it:\nbut this form avails in its subterranean existence where it creates a sort\nof inner self. And this inner self is no longer, like the embodied self of\nordinary consciousness, an intelligence served by organs, and proceeding\nby induction and inference. Its knowledge is not mediated or carried along\nspecific channels: it does not build up, piecemeal, by successive steps of\nsynthesis and analysis, by gradual idealisation, the organised totality of\nits intellectual world. The somnambulist and the clairvoyant see without\neyes, and carry their vision directly into regions where the waking\nconsciousness of orderly intelligence cannot enter. But that region is not\nthe world of our higher ideas,\u2014of art, religion, and philosophy. It is\nstill the sensitivity\u2014that realm of sensitivity which is ordinarily\ncovered by unconsciousness. Such sensitive clairvoyants may, as it were,\nhear themselves growing; they may discern the hidden quivers and pulses of\nblood and tissue, the seats of secret pain and all the unrevealed workings\nin the dark chambers of the flesh. But always their vision seems confined\nto that region, and will fall short of the world of light and ideal truth.\nIt is towards the nature-bond of sensitive solidarity with earth, and\nflowers, and trees, the life that \u201crolls through all things,\u201d not towards\nthe spiritual unity which broods over the world and \u201cimpels all thinking\nthings,\u201d that these immersions in the selfless universe lead us.\n\nWhat Hegel chiefly sees in these phenomena is their indication, even on\nthe natural side of man, of that ideality of the material, which it is the\nwork of intelligence to produce in the more spiritual life, in the\nfully-developed mind. The latter is the supreme over-soul, that Absolute\nMind which in our highest moods, aesthetic and religious, we approximate\nto. But mind, as it tends towards the higher end to \u201cmerge itself in\nlight,\u201d to identify itself yet not wholly lost, but retained, in the\nfullness of undivided intellectual being, so at the lower end it springs\nfrom a natural and underlying unity, the immense solidarity of\nnether-soul, the great Soul of Nature\u2014the \u201cSubstance\u201d which is to be\nraised into the \u201cSubject\u201d which is true divinity. Between these two\nunities, the nature-given nether-soul and the spirit-won over-soul, lies\nthe conscious life of man: a process of differentiation which narrows and\nof redintegration which enlarges,\u2014which alternately builds up an isolated\npersonality and dissolves it in a common intelligence and sympathy. It is\nbecause mental or tacit \u201csuggestion\u201d(88) (i.e. will-influence exercised\nwithout word or sign, or other sensible mode of connexion),\nthought-transference, or thought-reading (which is more than dexterous\napprehension of delicate muscular signs), exteriorisation or transposition\nof sensibility into objects primarily non-sensitive, clairvoyance (i.e.\nthe power of describing, as if from direct perception, objects or events\nremoved in space beyond the recognised limits of sensation), and\nsomnambulism, so far as it implies lucid vision with sealed eyes,\u2014it is\nbecause these things seem to show the essential ideality of matter, that\nHegel is interested in them. The ordinary conditions of consciousness and\neven of practical life in society are a derivative and secondary state; a\nproduct of processes of individualism, which however are never completed,\nand leave a large margin for idealising intelligence to fulfil. From a\nstate which is not yet personality to a state which is more than can be\ndescribed as personality\u2014lies the mental movement. So Fichte, too, had\nregarded the power of the somnambulist as laying open a world underlying\nthe development of egoity and self-consciousness(89): \u201cthe merely sensuous\nman is still in somnambulism,\u201d only a somnambulism of waking hours: \u201cthe\ntrue waking is the life in God, to be free in him, all else is sleep and\ndream.\u201d \u201cEgoity,\u201d he adds, \u201cis a merely _formal_ principle, utterly, and\nnever qualitative (i.e. the essence and universal force).\u201d For\nSchopenhauer, too, the experiences of animal magnetism had seemed to prove\nthe absolute supernatural power of the radical will in its superiority to\nthe intellectual categories of space, time, and causal sequence: to prove\nthe reality of the metaphysical which is at the basis of all conscious\ndivisions.\n\n\n\n(iii.) The Development of Inner Freedom.\n\n\nThe result of the first range in the process of psycho-genesis was to make\nthe body a sign and utterance of the Soul, with a fixed and determinate\ntype. The \u201canthropological process\u201d has defined and settled the mere\ngeneral sentiency of soul into an individualised shape, a localised and\nlimited self, a bundle of habits. It has made the soul an Ego or self: a\npower which looks out upon the world as a spectator, lifted above\nimmanence in the general tide of being, but only so lifted because it has\nmade itself one in the world of objects, a thing among things. The Mind\nhas reached the point of view of reflection. Instead of a general\nidentifiability with all nature, it has encased itself in a limited range,\nfrom which it looks forth on what is now other than itself. If previously\nit was mere inward sensibility, it is now sense, perceptive of an object\nhere and now, of an external world. The step has involved some price: and\nthat price is, that it has attained independence and self-hood at the cost\nof surrendering the content it had hitherto held in one with itself. It is\nnow a blank receptivity, open to the impressions of an outside world: and\nthe changes which take place in its process of apprehension seem to it to\nbe given from outside. The world it perceives is a world of isolated and\nindependent objects: and it takes them as they are given. But a closer\ninsistance on the perception develops the implicit intelligence, which\nmakes it possible. The percipient mind is no mere recipiency or\nsusceptibility with its forms of time and space: it is spontaneously\nactive, it is the source of categories, or is an apperceptive power,\u2014an\nunderstanding. Consciousness, thus discovered to be a creative or\nconstructive faculty, is strictly speaking self-consciousness(90).\n\nSelf-consciousness appears at first in the selfish or narrowly egoistic\nform of appetite and impulse. The intelligence which claims to mould and\nconstrue the world of objects\u2014which, in Kant\u2019s phrase, professes to give\nus nature\u2014is implicitly the lord of that world. And that supremacy it\ncarries out as appetite\u2014as destruction. The self is but a bundle of\nwants\u2014its supremacy over things is really subjection to them: the\nsatisfaction of appetite is baffled by a new desire which leaves it as it\nwas before. The development of self-consciousness to a more adequate shape\nis represented by Hegel as taking place through the social struggle for\nexistence. Human beings, too, are in the first instance to the\nuninstructed appetite or the primitive self-consciousness (which is simply\na succession of individual desires for satisfaction of natural want) only\nthings,\u2014adjectival to that self\u2019s individual existence. To them, too, his\nprimary relation is to appropriate and master them. Might precedes right.\nBut the social struggle for existence forces him to recognise something\nother which is kindred to himself,\u2014a limiting principle, another self\nwhich has to form an element in his calculations, not to be neglected. And\ngradually, we may suppose, the result is the division of humanity into two\nlevels, a ruling lordly class, and a class of slaves,\u2014a state of\ninequality in which each knows that his appetite is in some measure\nchecked by a more or less permanent other. Lastly, perhaps soonest in the\ninferior order, there is fashioned the perception that its self-seeking in\nits isolated appetites is subject to an abiding authority, a continuing\nconsciousness. There grows up a social self\u2014a sense of general humanity\nand solidarity with other beings\u2014a larger self with which each identifies\nhimself, a common ground. Understanding was selfish intelligence:\npractical in the egoistic sense. In the altruistic or universal sense\npractical, a principle social and unifying character, intelligence is\nReason.\n\nThus, Man, beginning as a percipient consciousness, apprehending single\nobjects in space and time, and as an appetitive self bent upon single\ngratifications, has ended as a rational being,\u2014a consciousness purged of\nits selfishness and isolation, looking forward openly and impartially on\nthe universe of things and beings. He has ceased to be a mere animal,\nswallowed up in the moment and the individual, using his intelligence only\nin selfish satisfactions. He is no longer bound down by the struggle for\nexistence, looking on everything as a mere thing, a mere means. He has\nerected himself above himself and above his environment, but that because\nhe occupies a point of view at which he and his environment are no longer\npurely antithetical and exclusive(91). He has reached what is really the\nmoral standpoint: the point i.e. at which he is inspired by a universal\nself-consciousness, and lives in that peaceful world where the antitheses\nof individualities and of outward and inward have ceased to trouble. \u201cThe\nnatural man,\u201d says Hegel(92), \u201csees in the woman flesh of his flesh: the\nmoral and spiritual man sees spirit of his spirit in the moral and\nspiritual being and by its means.\u201d Hitherto we have been dealing with\nsomething falling below the full truth of mind: the region of immediate\nsensibility with its thorough immersion of mind in body, first of all, and\nsecondly its gradual progress to a general standpoint. It is only in the\nthird part of Subjective mind that we are dealing with the psychology of a\nbeing who in the human sense knows and wills, i.e. apprehends general\ntruth, and carries out ideal purposes.\n\nThus, for the third time, but now on a higher plane, that of intelligence\nand rationality, is traced the process of development or realisation by\nwhich reason becomes reasoned knowledge and rational will, a free or\nautonomous intelligence. And, as before, the starting-point, alike in\ntheoretical and practical mind, is feeling\u2014or immediate knowledge and\nimmediate sense of Ought. The basis of thought is an immediate\nperception\u2014a sensuous affection or given something, and the basis of the\nidea of a general satisfaction is the natural claim to determine the\noutward existence conformably to individual feeling. In intelligent\nperception or intuition the important factor is attention, which raises it\nabove mere passive acceptance and awareness of a given fact. Attention\nthus involves on one hand the externality of its object, and on the other\naffirms its dependence on the act of the subject: it sets the objects\nbefore and out of itself, in space and time, but yet in so doing it shows\nitself master of the objects. If perception presuppose attention, in\nshort, they cease to be wholly outward: we make them ours, and the space\nand time they fill are projected by us. So attended to, they are\nappropriated, inwardised and recollected: they take their place in a\nmental place and mental time: they receive a general or de-individualised\ncharacter in the memory-image. These are retained as mental property, but\nretained actually only in so far they are revivable and revived. Such\nrevival is the work of imagination working by the so-called laws of\nassociation. But the possession of its ideas thus inwardised and\nrecollected by the mind is largely a matter of chance. The mind is not\nreally fully master of them until it has been able to give them a certain\nobjectivity, by replacing the mental image by a vocal, i.e. a sensible\nsign. By means of words, intelligence turns its ideas or representations\ninto quasi-realities: it creates a sort of superior sense-world, the world\nof language, where ideas live a potential, which is also an actual, life.\nWords are sensibles, but they are sensibles which completely lose\nthemselves in their meaning. As sensibles, they render possible that\nverbal memory which is the handmaid of thought: but which also as merely\nmechanical can leave thought altogether out of account. It is through\nwords that thought is made possible: for it alone permits the movement\nthrough ideas without being distracted through a multitude of\nassociations. In them thought has an instrument completely at its own\nlevel, but still only a machine, and in memory the working of that\nmachine. We think in names, not in general images, but in terms which only\nserve as vehicles for mental synthesis and analysis.\n\nIt is as such a thinking being\u2014a being who can use language, and\nmanipulate general concepts or take comprehensive views, that man is a\nrational will. A concept of something to be done\u2014a feeling even of some\nend more or less comprehensive in its quality, is the implication of what\ncan be called will. At first indeed its material may be found as\nimmediately given and all its volitionality may lie in the circumstance\nthat the intelligent being sets this forward as a governing and\ncontrolling Ought. Its vehicle, in short, may be mere impulse, or\ninclination, and even passion: but it is the choice and the purposive\nadoption of means to the given end. Gradually it attains to the idea of a\ngeneral satisfaction, or of happiness. And this end seems positive and\ndefinite. It soon turns out however to be little but a prudent and\nself-denying superiority to particular passions and inclinations in the\ninterest of a comprehensive ideal. The free will or intelligence has so\nfar only a negative and formal value: it is the perfection of an\nautonomous and freely self-developing mind. Such a mind, which in language\nhas acquired the means of realising an intellectual system of things\nsuperior to the restrictions of sense, and which has emancipated reason\nfrom the position of slave to inclination, is endued with the formal\nconditions of moral conduct. Such a mind will transform its own primarily\nphysical dependence into an image of the law of reason and create the\nethical life: and in the strength of that establishment will go forth to\nconquer the world into a more and more adequate realisation of the eternal\nIdea.\n\n\n\n\nEssay V. Ethics And Politics.\n\n\n\u201cIn dealing,\u201d says Hegel, \u201cwith the Idea of the State, we must not have\nbefore our eyes a particular state, or a particular institution: we must\nrather study the Idea, this actual God, on his own account. Every State,\nhowever bad we may find it according to our principles, however defective\nwe may discover this or that feature to be, still contains, particularly\nif it belongs to the mature states of our time, all the essential factors\nof its existence. But as it is easier to discover faults than to\ncomprehend the affirmative, people easily fall into the mistake of letting\nindividual aspects obscure the intrinsic organism of the State itself. The\nState is no ideal work of art: it stands in the everyday world, in the\nsphere, that is, of arbitrary act, accident, and error, and a variety of\nfaults may mar the regularity of its traits. But the ugliest man, the\ncriminal, a sick man and a cripple, is after all a living man; the\naffirmative, Life, subsists in spite of the defect: and this affirmative\nis here the theme(93).\u201d \u201cIt is the theme of philosophy,\u201d he adds, \u201cto\nascertain the substance which is immanent in the show of the temporal and\ntransient, and the eternal which is present.\u201d\n\n\n\n(i.) Hegel as a Political Critic.\n\n\nBut if this is true, it is also to be remembered that the philosopher is,\nlike other men, the son of his age, and estimates the value of reality\nfrom preconceptions and aspirations due to his generation. The historical\ncircumstances of his nation as well as the personal experiences of his\nlife help to determine his horizon, even in the effort to discover the\nhidden pulse and movement of the social organism. This is specially\nobvious in political philosophy. The conception of ethics and politics\nwhich is presented in the _Encyclopaedia_ was in 1820 produced with more\ndetail as the _Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts_. Appearing, as it\ndid, two years after his appointment to a professorship at Berlin, and in\nthe midst of a political struggle between the various revolutionary and\nconservative powers and parties of Germany, the book became, and long\nremained, a target for embittered criticism. The so-called War of\nLiberation or national movement to shake off the French yoke was due to a\ncoalition of parties, and had naturally been in part supported by\ntendencies and aims which went far beyond the ostensive purpose either of\nleaders or of combatants. Aspirations after a freer state were entwined\nwith radical and socialistic designs to reform the political hierarchy of\nthe Fatherland: high ideals and low vulgarities were closely intermixed:\nand the noble enthusiasm of youth was occasionally played on by criminal\nand anarchic intriguers. In a strong and wise and united Germany some of\nthese schemes might have been tolerated. But strength, wisdom, and unity\nwere absent. In the existing tension between Austria and Prussia for the\nleadership, in the ill-adapted and effete constitutions of the several\nprincipalities which were yet expected to realise the advance which had\ntaken place in society and ideas during the last thirty years, the outlook\non every hand seemed darker and more threatening than it might have\notherwise done. Governments, which had lost touch with their peoples,\nsuspected conspiracy and treason: and a party in the nation credited their\nrulers with gratuitous designs against private liberty and rights. There\nwas a vast but ill-defined enthusiasm in the breasts of the younger world,\nand it was shared by many of their teachers. It seemed to their immense\naspirations that the war of liberation had failed of its true object and\nleft things much as they were. The volunteers had not fought for the\npolitical systems of Austria or Prussia, or for the three-and-thirty\nprinces of Germany: but for ideas, vague, beautiful, stimulating. To such\na mood the continuance of the old system was felt as a cruel deception and\na reaction. The governments on their part had not realised the full\nimportance of the spirit that had been aroused, and could not at a\nmoment\u2019s notice set their house in order, even had there been a clearer\noutlook for reform than was offered. They too had suffered, and had\nrealised their insecurity: and were hardly in a mood to open their gates\nto the enemy.\n\nComing on such a situation of affairs, Hegel\u2019s book would have been likely\nin any case to provoke criticism. For it took up a line of political\ntheory which was little in accord with the temper of the age. The\nconception of the state which it expounded is not far removed in\nessentials from the conception which now dominates the political life of\nthe chief European nations. But in his own time it came upon ears which\nwere naturally disposed to misconceive it. It was unacceptable to the\nadherents of the _ancien r\u00e9gime_, as much as to the liberals. It was\ndeclared by one party to be a glorification of the Prussian state: by\nanother to rationalise the sanctities of authority. It was pointed out\nthat the new professor was a favourite of the leading minister, that his\ninfluence was dominant in scholastic appointments, and that occasional\ngratuities from the crown proved his acceptability. A contemporary\nprofessor, Fries, remarked that Hegel\u2019s theory of the state had grown \u201cnot\nin the gardens of science but on the dung-hill of servility.\u201d Hegel\nhimself was aware that he had planted a blow in the face of a \u201cshallow and\npretentious sect,\u201d and that his book had \u201cgiven great offence to the\ndemagogic folk.\u201d Alike in religious and political life he was impatient of\nsentimentalism, of rhetorical feeling, of wordy enthusiasm. A positive\nstorm of scorn burst from him at much-promising and little-containing\ndeclamation that appealed to the pathos of ideas, without sense of the\ncomplex work of construction and the system of principles which were\nneeded to give them reality. His impatience of demagogic gush led him (in\nthe preface) into a tactless attack on Fries, who was at the moment in\ndisgrace for his participation in the demonstration at the Wartburg. It\nled him to an attack on the bumptiousness of those who held that\nconscientious conviction was ample justification for any proceeding:\u2014an\nattack which opponents were not unwilling to represent as directed against\nthe principle of conscience itself.\n\nYet Hegel\u2019s views on the nature of political unity were not new. Their\nnucleus had been formed nearly twenty years before. In the years that\nimmediately followed the French revolution he had gone through the usual\nanarchic stage of intelligent youth. He had wondered whether humanity\nmight not have had a nobler destiny, had fate given supremacy to some\nheresy rather than the orthodox creed of Christendom. He had seen religion\nin the past \u201cteaching what despotism wished,\u2014contempt of the human race,\nits incapacity for anything good(94).\u201d But his earliest reflections on\npolitical power belong to a later date, and are inspired, not so much by\nthe vague ideals of humanitarianism, as by the spirit of national\npatriotism. They are found in a \u201cCriticism of the German Constitution\u201d\napparently dating from the year 1802(95). It is written after the peace of\nLun\u00e9ville had sealed for Germany the loss of her provinces west of the\nRhine, and subsequent to the disasters of the German arms at Hohenlinden\nand Marengo. It is almost contemporaneous with the measures of 1803 and\n1804, which affirmed the dissolution of the \u201cHoly Roman Empire\u201d of German\nname. The writer of this unpublished pamphlet sees his country in a\nsituation almost identical with that which Macchiavelli saw around him in\nItaly. It is abused by petty despots, distracted by mean particularist\nambitions, at the mercy of every foreign power. It was such a scene which,\nas Hegel recalls, had prompted and justified the drastic measures proposed\nin the _Prince_,\u2014measures which have been ill-judged by the closet\nmoralist, but evince the high statesmanship of the Florentine. In the\n_Prince_, an intelligent reader can see \u201cthe enthusiasm of patriotism\nunderlying the cold and dispassionate doctrines.\u201d Macchiavelli dared to\ndeclare that Italy must become a state, and to assert that \u201cthere is no\nhigher duty for a state than to maintain itself, and to punish\nrelentlessly every author of anarchy,\u2014the supreme, and perhaps sole\npolitical crime.\u201d And like teaching, Hegel adds, is needed for Germany.\nOnly, he concludes, no mere demonstration of the insanity of utter\nseparation of the particular from his kin will ever succeed in converting\nthe particularists from their conviction of the absoluteness of personal\nand private rights. \u201cInsight and intelligence always excite so much\ndistrust that force alone avails to justify them; then man yields them\nobedience(96).\u201d\n\n\u201cThe German political edifice,\u201d says the writer, \u201cis nothing else but the\nsum of the rights which the single parts have withdrawn from the whole;\nand this justice, which is ever on the watch to prevent the state having\nany power left, is the essence of the constitution.\u201d The Peace of\nWestphalia had but served to constitute or stereotype anarchy: the German\nempire had by that instrument divested itself of all rights of political\nunity, and thrown itself on the goodwill of its members. What then, it may\nbe asked, is, in Hegel\u2019s view, the indispensable minimum essential to a\nstate? And the answer will be, organised strength,\u2014a central and united\nforce. \u201cThe strength of a country lies neither in the multitude of its\ninhabitants and fighting men, nor in its fertility, nor in its size, but\nsolely in the way its parts are by reasonable combination made a single\npolitical force enabling everything to be used for the common defence.\u201d\nHegel speaks scornfully of \u201cthe philanthropists and moralists who decry\npolitics as an endeavour and an art to seek private utility at the cost of\nright\u201d: he tells them that \u201cit is foolish to oppose the interest or (as it\nis expressed by the more morally-obnoxious word) the utility of the state\nto its right\u201d: that the \u201crights of a state are the utility of the state as\nestablished and recognised by compacts\u201d: and that \u201cwar\u201d (which they would\nfain abolish or moralise) \u201chas to decide not which of the rights asserted\nby either party is the true right (\u2014for both parties have a true right),\nbut which right has to give way to the other.\u201d\n\nIt is evident from these propositions that Hegel takes that view of\npolitical supremacy which has been associated with the name of Hobbes. But\nhis views also reproduce the Platonic king of men, \u201cwho can rule and dare\nnot lie.\u201d \u201cAll states,\u201d he declares, \u201care founded by the sublime force of\ngreat men, not by physical strength. The great man has something in his\nfeatures which others would gladly call their lord. They obey him against\ntheir will. Their immediate will is his will, but their conscious will is\notherwise.... This is the prerogative of the great man to ascertain and to\nexpress the absolute will. All gather round his banner. He is their God.\u201d\n\u201cThe state,\u201d he says again, \u201cis the self-certain absolute mind which\nrecognises no definite authority but its own: which acknowledges no\nabstract rules of good and bad, shameful and mean, craft and deception.\u201d\nSo also Hobbes describes the prerogatives of the sovereign Leviathan. But\nthe Hegelian God immanent in the state is a higher power than Hobbes\nknows: he is no mortal, but in his truth an immortal God. He speaks by\n(what in this early essay is called) the Absolute Government(97): the\ngovernment of the Law\u2014the true impersonal sovereign,\u2014distinct alike from\nthe single ruler and the multitude of the ruled. \u201cIt is absolutely only\nuniversality as against particular. As this absolute, ideal, universal,\ncompared to which everything else is a particular, it is the phenomenon of\nGod. Its words are his decision, and it can appear and exist under no\nother form.... The Absolute government is divine, self-sanctioned and not\nmade(98).\u201d The real strength\u2014the real connecting-mean which gives life to\nsovereign and to subject\u2014is intelligence free and entire, independent both\nof what individuals feel and believe and of the quality of the ruler. \u201cThe\nspiritual bond,\u201d he says in a lower form of speech, \u201cis public opinion: it\nis the true legislative body, national assembly, declaration of the\nuniversal will which lives in the execution of all commands.\u201d This still\nsmall voice of public opinion is the true and real parliament: not\nliterally making laws, but revealing them. If we ask, where does this\npublic opinion appear and how does it disengage itself from the masses of\npartisan judgment? Hegel answers,\u2014and to the surprise of those who have\nnot entered into the spirit of his age(99)\u2014it is embodied in the Aged and\nthe Priests. Both of these have ceased to live in the real world: they are\nby nature and function disengaged from the struggles of particular\nexistence, have risen above the divergencies of social classes. They\nbreathe the ether of pure contemplation. \u201cThe sunset of life gives them\nmystical lore,\u201d or at least removes from old age the distraction of\nselfishness: while the priest is by function set apart from the divisions\nof human interest. Understood in a large sense, Hegel\u2019s view is that the\nreal voice of experience is elicited through those who have attained\nindifference to the distorting influence of human parties, and who see\nlife steadily and whole.\n\nIf this utterance shows the little belief Hegel had in the ordinary\nmethods of legislation through \u201crepresentative\u201d bodies, and hints that the\nreal _substance_ of political life is deeper than the overt machinery of\npolitical operation, it is evident that this theory of \u201cdivine right\u201d is\nof a different stamp from what used to go under that name. And, again,\nthough the power of the central state is indispensable, he is far from\nagreeing with the so-called bureaucratic view that \u201ca state is a machine\nwith a single spring which sets in motion all the rest of the machinery.\u201d\n\u201cEverything,\u201d he says, \u201cwhich is not directly required to organise and\nmaintain the force for giving security without and within must be left by\nthe central government to the freedom of the citizens. Nothing ought to be\nso sacred in the eyes of a government as to leave alone and to protect,\nwithout regard to utilities, the free action of the citizens in such\nmatters as do not affect its fundamental aim: for this freedom is itself\nsacred(100).\u201d He is no friend of paternal bureaucracy. \u201cThe pedantic\ncraving to settle every detail, the mean jealousy against estates and\ncorporations administrating and directing their own affairs, the base\nfault-finding with all independent action on the part of the citizens,\neven when it has no immediate bearing on the main political interest, has\nbeen decked out with reasons to show that no penny of public expenditure,\nmade for a country of twenty or thirty millions\u2019 population, can be laid\nout, without first being, not permitted, but commanded, controlled and\nrevised by the supreme government.\u201d You can see, he remarks, in the first\nvillage after you enter Prussian territory the lifeless and wooden routine\nwhich prevails. The whole country suffers also from the way religion has\nbeen mixed up with political rights, and a particular creed pronounced by\nlaw indispensable both for sovereign and full-privileged subject. In a\nword, the unity and vigour of the state is quite compatible with\nconsiderable latitude and divergence in laws and judicature, in the\nimposition and levying of taxes, in language, manners, civilisation and\nreligion. Equality in all these points is desirable for social unity: but\nit is not indispensable for political strength.\n\nThis decided preference for the unity of the state against the system of\nchecks and counterchecks, which sometimes goes by the name of a\nconstitution, came out clearly in Hegel\u2019s attitude in discussing the\ndispute between the W\u00fcrtembergers and their sovereign in 1815-16.\nW\u00fcrtemberg, with its complicated aggregation of local laws, had always\nbeen a paradise of lawyers, and the feudal rights or privileges of the\nlocal oligarchies\u2014the so-called \u201cgood old law\u201d\u2014were the boast of the\ncountry. All this had however been aggravated by the increase of territory\nreceived in 1805: and the king, following the examples set by France and\neven by Bavaria, promulgated of his own grace a \u201cconstitution\u201d remodelling\nthe electoral system of the country. Immediately an outcry burst out\nagainst the attempt to destroy the ancient liberties. Uhland tuned his\nlyre to the popular cry: R\u00fcckert sang on the king\u2019s side. To Hegel the\ncontest presented itself as a struggle between the attachment to\ntraditional rights, merely because they are old, and the resolution to\ncarry out reasonable reform whether it be agreeable to the reformed or\nnot: or rather he saw in it resistance of particularism, of separation,\nclinging to use and wont, and basing itself on formal pettifogging\nobjections, against the spirit of organisation. Anything more he declined\nto see. And probably he was right in ascribing a large part of the\nopposition to inertia, to vanity and self-interest, combined with the want\nof political perception of the needs of W\u00fcrtemberg and Germany. But on the\nother hand, he failed to remember the insecurity and danger of such \u201cgifts\nof the Danai\u201d: he forgot the sense of free-born men that a constitution is\nnot something to be granted (_octroy\u00e9_) as a grace, but something that\nmust come by the spontaneous act of the innermost self of the community.\nHe dealt rather with the formal arguments which were used to refuse\nprogress, than with the underlying spirit which prompted the\nopposition(101).\n\nThe philosopher lives (as Plato has well reminded us) too exclusively\nwithin the ideal. Bent on the essential nucleus of institutions, he\nattaches but slight importance to the variety of externals, and fails to\nrealise the practice of the law-courts. He forgets that what weighs\nlightly in logic, may turn the scale in real life and experience. For\nfeeling and sentiment he has but scant respect: he is brusque and\nuncompromising: and cannot realise all the difficulties and dangers that\nbeset the Idea in the mazes of the world, and may ultimately quite alter a\nplan which at first seemed independent of petty details. Better than other\nmen perhaps he recognises in theory how the mere universal only exists\ncomplete in an individual shape: but more than other men he forgets these\ntruths of insight, when the business of life calls for action or for\njudgment. He cannot at a moment\u2019s notice remember that he is, if not, as\nCicero says, _in faece Romuli_, the member of a degenerate commonwealth,\nat least living in a world where good and evil are not, as logic\npresupposes, sharply divided but intricately intertwined.\n\n\n\n(ii.) The Ethics and Religion of the State.\n\n\nThis idealism of political theory is illustrated by the sketch of the\nEthical Life which he drew up about 1802. Under the name of \u201cEthical\nSystem\u201d it presents in concentrated or undeveloped shape the doctrine\nwhich subsequently swelled into the \u201cPhilosophy of Mind.\u201d At a later date\nhe worked out more carefully as introduction the psychological genesis of\nmoral and intelligent man, and he separated out more distinctly as a\nsequel the universal powers which give to social life its higher\ncharacters. In the earlier sketch the Ethical Part stands by itself, with\nthe consequence that Ethics bears a meaning far exceeding all that had\nbeen lately called moral. The word \u201cmoral\u201d itself he avoids(102). It\nsavours of excessive subjectivity, of struggle, of duty and conscience. It\nhas an ascetic ring about it\u2014an aspect of negation, which seeks for\nabstract holiness, and turns its back on human nature. Kant\u2019s words\nopposing duty to inclination, and implying that moral goodness involves a\nstruggle, an antagonism, a victory, seem to him (and to his time)\none-sided. That aspect of negation accordingly which Kant certainly began\nwith, and which Schopenhauer magnified until it became the all-in-all of\nEthics, Hegel entirely subordinates. Equally little does he like the\nemphasis on the supremacy of insight, intention, conscience: they lead, he\nthinks, to a view which holds the mere fact of conviction to be\nall-important, as if it mattered not what we thought and believed and did,\nso long as we were sincere in our belief. All this emphasis on the\ngood-will, on the imperative of duty, on the rights of conscience, has, he\nadmits, its justification in certain circumstances, as against mere\nlegality, or mere natural instinctive goodness; but it has been overdone.\nAbove all, it errs by an excess of individualism. It springs from an\nattitude of reflection,\u2014in which the individual, isolated in his conscious\nand superficial individuality, yet tries\u2014but probably tries in vain\u2014to get\nsomewhat in touch with a universal which he has allowed to slip outside\nhim, forgetting that it is the heart and substance of his life. Kant,\nindeed, hardly falls under this condemnation. For he aims at showing that\nthe rational will inevitably creates as rational a law or universal; that\nthe individual act becomes self-regulative, and takes its part in\nconstituting a system or realm of duty.\n\nStill, on the whole, \u201cmorality\u201d in this narrower sense belongs to an age\nof reflection, and is formal or nominal goodness rather than the genuine\nand full reality. It is the protest against mere instinctive or customary\nvirtue, which is but compliance with traditional authority, and compliance\nwith it as if it were a sort of quasi-natural law. Moralising reflection\nis the awakening of subjectivity and of a deeper personality. The age\nwhich thus precedes morality is not an age in which kindness, or love, or\ngenerosity is unknown. And if Hegel says that \u201cMorality,\u201d strictly so\ncalled, began with Socrates, he does not thereby accuse the pre-Socratic\nGreeks of inhumanity. But what he does say is that such ethical life as\nexisted was in the main a thing of custom and law: of law, moreover, which\nwas not set objectively forward, but left still in the stage of\nuncontradicted usage, a custom which was a second nature, part of the\nessential and quasi-physical ordinance of life. The individual had not yet\nlearned to set his self-consciousness against these usages and ask for\ntheir justification. These are like the so-called law of the Medes and\nPersians which alters not: customs of immemorial antiquity and\nunquestionable sway. They are part of a system of things with which for\ngood or evil the individual is utterly identified, bound as it were hand\nand foot. These are, as a traveller says(103), \u201coral and unwritten\ntraditions which teach that certain rules of conduct are to be observed\nunder certain penalties; and without the aid of fixed records, or the\nintervention of a succession of authorised depositaries and expounders,\nthese laws have been transmitted to father and son, through unknown\ngenerations, and are fixed in the minds of the people as sacred and\nunalterable.\u201d\n\nThe antithesis then in Hegel, as in Kant, is between Law and Morality, or\nrather Legality and Morality,\u2014two abstractions to which human development\nis alternately prone to attach supreme importance. The first stage in the\nobjectivation of intelligence or in the evolution of personality is the\nconstitution of mere, abstract, or strict right. It is the creation of\ninstitutions and uniformities, i.e. of laws, or rights, which express\ndefinite and stereotyped modes of behaviour. Or, if we look at it from the\nindividual\u2019s standpoint, we may say his consciousness awakes to find the\nworld parcelled out under certain rules and divisions, which have\nobjective validity, and govern him with the same absolute authority as do\nthe circumstances of physical nature. Under their influence every rank and\nindividual is alike forced to bow: to each his place and function is\nassigned by an order or system which claims an inviolable and eternal\nsupremacy. It is not the same place and function for each: but for each\nthe position and duties are predetermined in this metaphysically-physical\norder. The situation and its duties have been created by super-human and\nnatural ordinance. As the Platonic myth puts it, each order in the social\nhierarchy has been framed underground by powers that turned out men of\ngold, and silver, and baser metal: or as the Norse legend tells, they are\nthe successive offspring of the white God, Heimdal, in his dealings with\nwomankind.\n\nThe central idea of the earlier social world is the supremacy of\nrights\u2014but not of right. The sum (for it cannot be properly called a\nsystem) of rights is a self-subsistent world, to which man is but a\nservant; and a second peculiarity of it is its inequality. If all are\nequal before the laws, this only means here that the laws, with their\nabsolute and thorough inequality, are indifferent to the real and personal\ndiversities of individuals. Even the so-called equality of primitive law\nis of the \u201cEye-for-eye, Tooth-for-tooth\u201d kind; it takes no note of special\ncircumstances; it looks abstractly and rudely at facts, and maintains a\nhard and fast uniformity, which seems the height of unfairness. Rule\nstands by rule, usage beside usage,\u2014a mere aggregate or multitude of petty\ntyrants, reduced to no unity or system, and each pressing with all the\nweight of an absolute mandate. The pettiest bit of ceremonial law is here\nof equal dignity with the most far-reaching principle of political\nobligation.\n\nIn the essay already referred to, Hegel has designated something analogous\nto this as Natural or Physical Ethics, or as Ethics in its relative or\ncomparative stage. Here Man first shows his superiority to nature, or\nenters on his properly ethical function, by transforming the physical\nworld into his possession. He makes himself the lord of natural\nobjects\u2014stamping them as his, and not their own, making them his permanent\nproperty, his tools, his instruments of exchange and production. The\nfundamental ethical act is appropriation by labour, and the first ethical\nworld is the creation of an economic system, the institution of property.\nFor property, or at least possession and appropriation, is the dominant\nidea, with its collateral and sequent principles. And at first, even human\nbeings are treated on the same method as other things: as objects in a\nworld of objects or aggregate of things: as things to be used and\nacquired, as means and instruments,\u2014not in any sense as ends in\nthemselves. It is a world in which the relation of master and slave is\ndominant,\u2014where owner and employer is set in antithesis against his tools\nand chattels. But the Nemesis of his act issues in making the individual\nthe servant of his so-called property. He has become an objective power by\nsubmitting himself to objectivity: he has literally put himself into the\nobject he has wrought, and is now a thing among things: for what he owns,\nwhat he has appropriated, determines what he is. The real powers in the\nworld thus established are the laws of possession-holding: the laws\ndominate man: and he is only freed from dependence on casual externals, by\nmaking himself thoroughly the servant of his possessions.\n\nThe only salvation, and it is but imperfect, that can be reached on this\nstage is by the family union. The sexual tie, is at first entirely on a\nlevel with the other arrangements of the sphere. The man or woman is but a\nchattel and a tool; a casual appropriation which gradually is transformed\ninto a permanent possession and a permanent bond(104). But, as the family\nconstituted itself, it helped to afford a promise of better things. An\nideal interest\u2014the religion of the household\u2014extending beyond the\nindividual, and beyond the moment,\u2014binding past and present, and parents\nto offspring, gave a new character to the relation of property. Parents\nand children form a unity, which overrides and essentially permeates their\n\u201cdifference\u201d from each other: there is no exchange, no contract, nor, in\nthe stricter sense, property between the members. In the property-idea\nthey are lifted out of their isolation, and in the continuity of family\nlife there is a certain analogue of immortality. But, says Hegel, \u201cthough\nthe family be the highest totality of which Nature is capable, the\nabsolute identity is in it still inward, and is not instituted in absolute\nform; and hence, too, the reproduction of the totality is an appearance,\nthe appearance of the children(105).\u201d \u201cThe power and the intelligence, the\n\u2018difference\u2019 of the parents, stands in inverse proportion to the youth and\nvigour of the child: and these two sides of life flee from and are sequent\non each other, and are reciprocally external(106).\u201d Or, as we may put it,\nthe god of the family is a departed ancestor, a ghost in the land of the\ndead: it has not really a continuous and unified life. In such a state of\nsociety\u2014a state of nature\u2014and in its supreme form, the family, there is no\nadequate principle which though real shall still give ideality and unity\nto the self-isolating aspects of life. There is wanted something which\nshall give expression to its \u201cindifference,\u201d which shall control the\ntendency of this partial moralisation to sink at every moment into\nindividuality, and lift it from its immersion in nature. Family life and\neconomic groups (\u2014for these two, which Hegel subsequently separates, are\nhere kept close together) need an ampler and wider life to keep them from\nstagnating in their several selfishnesses.\n\nThis freshening and corrective influence they get in the first instance\nfrom deeds of violence and crime. Here is the \u201cnegative unsettling\u201d of the\nnarrow fixities, of the determinate conditions or relationships into which\nthe preceding processes of labour and acquisition have tended to\nstereotype life. The harsh restriction brings about its own undoing. Man\nmay subject natural objects to his formative power, but the wild rage of\nsenseless devastation again and again bursts forth to restore the original\nformlessness. He may build up his own pile of wealth, store up his private\ngoods, but the thief and the robber with the instincts of barbarian\nsocialism tread on his steps: and every stage of appropriation has for its\nsequel a crop of acts of dispossession. He may secure by accumulation his\nfuture life; but the murderer for gain\u2019s sake cuts it short. And out of\nall this as a necessary consequence stands avenging justice. And in the\nnatural world of ethics\u2014where true moral life has not yet arisen\u2014this is\nmere retaliation or the _lex talionis_;\u2014the beginning of an endless series\nof vengeance and counter-vengeance, the blood-feud. Punishment, in the\nstricter sense of the term,\u2014which looks both to antecedents and effects in\ncharacter\u2014cannot yet come into existence; for to punish there must be\nsomething superior to individualities, an ethical idea embodied in an\ninstitution, to which the injurer and the injured alike belong. But as yet\npunishment is only vengeance, the personal and natural equivalent, the\nphysical reaction against injury, perhaps regulated and formulated by\ncustom and usage, but not essentially altered from its purely retaliatory\ncharacter. These crimes\u2014or transgressions\u2014are thus by Hegel quaintly\nconceived as storms which clear the air\u2014which shake the individualist out\nof his slumber. The scene in which transgression thus acts is that of the\nso-called state of nature, where particularism was rampant: where moral\nright was not, but only the right of nature, of pre-occupation, of the\nstronger, of the first maker and discoverer. Crime is thus the \u201cdialectic\u201d\nwhich shakes the fixity of practical arrangements, and calls for something\nin which the idea of a higher unity, a permanent substance of life, shall\nfind realisation.\n\nThe \u201cpositive supersession(107)\u201d of individualism and naturalism in ethics\nis by Hegel called \u201cAbsolute Ethics.\u201d Under this title he describes the\nethics and religion of the state\u2014a religion which is immanent in the\ncommunity, and an ethics which rises superior to particularity. The\npicture he draws is a romance fashioned upon the model of the Greek\ncommonwealth as that had been idealised by Greek literature and by the\nlongings of later ages for a freer life. It is but one of the many modes\nin which Helena\u2014to quote Goethe\u2014has fascinated the German Faust. He dreams\nhimself away from the prosaic worldliness of a German municipality to the\nunfading splendour of the Greek city with its imagined coincidence of\nindividual will with universal purpose. There is in such a commonwealth no\npain of surrender and of sacrifice, and no subsequent compensation: for,\nat the very moment of resigning self-will to common aims, he enjoys it\nretained with the added zest of self-expansion. He is not so left to\nhimself as to feel from beyond the restraint of a law which controls\u2014even\nif it wisely and well controls\u2014individual effort. There is for his happy\ncircumstances no possibility of doing otherwise. Or, it may be, Hegel has\nreminiscences from the ideals of other nations than the Greek. He recalls\nthe Israelite depicted by the Law-adoring psalmist, whose delight is to do\nthe will of the Lord, whom the zeal of God\u2019s house has consumed, whose\nwhole being runs on in one pellucid stream with the universal and eternal\nstream of divine commandment. Such a frame of spirit, where the empirical\nconsciousness with all its soul and strength and mind identifies its\nmission into conformity with the absolute order, is the mood of absolute\nEthics. It is what some have spoken of as the True life, as the Eternal\nlife; in it, says Hegel, the individual exists _auf ewige Weise_(108), as\nit were _sub specie aeternitatis_: his life is hid with his fellows in the\ncommon life of his people. His every act, and thought, and will, get their\nbeing and significance from a reality which is established in him as a\npermanent spirit. It is there that he, in the fuller sense, attains\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03ac\u03c1\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1, or finds himself no longer a mere part, but an ideal totality.\nThis totality is realised under the particular form of a Nation (_Volk_),\nwhich in the visible sphere represents (or rather is, as a particular) the\nabsolute and infinite. Such a unity is neither the mere sum of isolated\nindividuals, nor a mere majority ruling by numbers: but the fraternal and\norganic commonwealth which brings all classes and all rights from their\nparticularistic independence into an ideal identity and indifference(109).\nHere all are not merely equal before the laws: but the law itself is a\nliving and organic unity, self-correcting, subordinating and organising,\nand no longer merely defining individual privileges and so-called\nliberties. \u201cIn such conjunction of the universal with the particularity\nlies the divinity of a nation: or, if we give this universal a separate\nplace in our ideas, it is the God of the nation.\u201d But in this complete\naccordance between concept and intuition, between visible and invisible,\nwhere symbol and significate are one, religion and ethics are\nindistinguishable. It is the old conception (and in its highest sense) of\nTheocracy(110). God is the national head and the national life: and in him\nall individuals have their \u201cdifference\u201d rendered \u201cindifferent.\u201d \u201cSuch an\nethical life is absolute truth, for untruth is only in the fixture of a\nsingle mode: but in the everlasting being of the nation all singleness is\nsuperseded. It is absolute culture; for in the eternal is the real and\nempirical annihilation and prescription of all limited modality. It is\nabsolute disinterestedness: for in the eternal there is nothing private\nand personal. It, and each of its movements, is the highest beauty: for\nbeauty is but the eternal made actual and given concrete shape. It is\nwithout pain, and blessed: for in it all difference and all pain is\nsuperseded. It is the divine, absolute, real, existing and being, under no\nveil; nor need one first raise it up into the ideality of divinity, and\nextract it from the appearance and empirical intuition; but it is, and\nimmediately, absolute intuition(111).\u201d\n\nIf we compare this language with the statement of the Encyclopaedia we can\nsee how for the moment Hegel\u2019s eye is engrossed with the glory of the\nideal nation. In it, the moral life embraces and is co-extensive with\nreligion, art and science: practice and theory are at one: life in the\nidea knows none of those differences which, in the un-ideal world, make\nart and morality often antithetical, and set religion at variance with\nscience. It is, as we have said, a memory of Greek and perhaps Hebrew\nideals. Or rather it is by the help of such memories the affirmation of\nthe essential unity of life\u2014the true, complete, many-sided life\u2014which is\nthe presupposition and idea that culture and morals rest upon and from\nwhich they get their supreme sanction, i.e. their constitutive principle\nand unity. Even in the Encyclopaedia(112) Hegel endeavours to guard\nagainst the severance of morality and art and philosophy which may be\nrashly inferred in consequence of his serial order of treatment.\n\u201cReligion,\u201d he remarks, \u201cis the very substance of the moral life itself\nand of the state.... The ethical life is the divine spirit indwelling in\nconsciousness, as it is actually present in a nation and its individual\nmembers.\u201d Yet, as we see, there is a distinction. The process of history\ncarries out a judgment on nation after nation, and reveals the divine as\nnot only immanent in the ethical life but as ever expanding the limited\nnational spirit till it become a spirit of universal humanity. Still\u2014and\nthis is perhaps for each time always the more important\u2014the national\nunity\u2014not indeed as a multitude, nor as a majority\u2014is the supreme real\nappearance of the Eternal and Absolute.\n\nHaving thus described the nation as an organic totality, he goes on to\npoint out that the political constitution shows this character by forming\na triplicity of political orders. In one of these there is but a silent,\npractical identity, in faith and trust, with the totality: in the second\nthere is a thorough disruption of interest into particularity: and in the\nthird, there is a living and intellectual identity or indifference, which\ncombines the widest range of individual development with the completest\nunity of political loyalty. This last order is that which lives in\nconscious identification of private with public duty: all that it does has\na universal and public function. Such a body is the ideal Nobility\u2014the\nnobility which is the _servus servorum Dei_, the supreme servant of\nhumanity. Its function is to maintain general interests, to give the other\norders (peasantry and industrials) security,\u2014receiving in return from\nthese others the means of subsistence. _Noblesse oblige_ gives the\ndeath-blow to particular interests, and imposes the duty of exhibiting, in\nthe clearest form, the supreme reality of absolute morality, and of being\nto the rest an unperturbed ideal of aesthetic, ethical, religious, and\nphilosophical completeness.\n\nIt is here alone, in this estate which is absolutely disinterested, that\nthe virtues appear in their true light. To the ordinary moralising\nstandpoint they seem severally to be, in their separation, charged with\nindependent value. But from the higher point of view the existence, and\nstill more the accentuation of single virtues, is a mark of\nincompleteness. Even quality, it has been said, involves its defects: it\ncan only shine by eclipsing or reflecting something else. The completely\nmoral is not the sum of the several virtues, but the reduction of them to\nindifference. It is thus that when Plato tries to get at the unity of\nvirtue, their aspect of difference tends to be subordinated. \u201cThe movement\nof absolute morality runs through all the virtues, but settles fixedly in\nnone.\u201d It is more than love _to_ fatherland, and nation, and laws:\u2014that\nstill implies a relation to something and involves a difference. For\nlove\u2014the mortal passion, where \u201cself is not annulled\u201d\u2014is the process of\napproximation, while unity is not yet attained, but wished and aimed at:\nand when it is complete\u2014and become \u201csuch love as spirits know(113)\u201d\u2014it\ngives place to a calmer rest and an active immanence. The absolute\nmorality is _life in_ the fatherland and for the nation. In the individual\nhowever it is the process upward and inward that we see, not the\nconsummation. Then the identity appears as an ideal, as a tendency not yet\naccomplished to its end, a possibility not yet made fully actual. At\nbottom\u2014in the divine substance in which the individual inheres\u2014the\nidentity is present: but in the appearance, we have only the passage from\npossible to actual, a passage which has the aspect of a struggle. Hence\nthe moral act appears as a virtue, with merit or desert. It is accordingly\nthe very characteristic of virtue to signalise its own incompleteness: it\nemerges into actuality only through antagonism, and with a taint of\nimperfection clinging to it. Thus, in the field of absolute morality, if\nthe virtues appear, it is only in their transiency. If they were\nundisputedly real in morality, they would not separately show. To feel\nthat you have done well implies that you have not done wholly well:\nself-gratulation in meritorious deed is the re-action from the shudder at\nfeeling that the self was not wholly good.\n\nThe essential unity of virtue\u2014its negative character as regards all the\nempirical variety of virtues\u2014is seen in the excellences required by the\nneeds of war. These military requirements demonstrate the mere relativity\nand therefore non-virtuousness of the special virtues. They equally\nprotest against the common beliefs in the supreme dignity of labour and\nits utilities. But if bravery or soldierlike virtue be essentially a\nvirtue of virtues, it is only a negative virtue after all. It is the blast\nof the universal sweeping away all the habitations and fixed structures of\nparticularist life. If it is a unity of virtue, it is only a negative\nunity\u2014an indifference. If it avoid the parcelling of virtue into a number\nof imperfect and sometimes contradictory parts, it does so only to present\na bare negation. The soldier, therefore, if in potentiality the unity of\nall the virtues, may tend in practice to represent the ability to do\nwithout any of them(114).\n\nThe home of these \u201crelative\u201d virtues\u2014of morality in the ordinary sense\u2014is\nthe life of the second order in the commonwealth: the order of industry\nand commerce. In this sphere the idea of the universal is gradually lost\nto view: it becomes, says Hegel, only a thought or a creature of the mind,\nwhich does not affect practice. The materialistic worker of civilisation\ndoes not see further than the empirical existence of individuals: his\nhorizon is limited by the family, and his final ideal is a competency of\ncomfort in possessions and revenues. The supreme universal to which he\nattains as the climax of his evolution is only money. But it is only with\nthe vaster development of commerce that this terrible consequence ensues.\nAt first as a mere individual, he has higher aims, though not the highest.\nHe has a limited ideal determined by his special sphere of work. To win\nrespect\u2014the character for a limited truthfulness and honesty and skilful\nwork\u2014is his ambition. He lives in a conceit of his performance\u2014his\nutility\u2014the esteem of his special circle. To his commercial soul the\nmilitary order is a scarecrow and a nuisance: military honour is but\ntrash. Yet if his range of idea is narrow and engrossing in details, his\naim is to get worship, to be recognised as the best in his little sphere.\nBut with the growth of the trading spirit his character changes: he\nbecomes the mere capitalist, is denationalised, has no definite work and\ncan claim no individualised function. Money now measures all things: it is\nthe sole ultimate reality. It transforms everything into a relation of\ncontract: even vengeance is equated in terms of money. Its motto is, The\nExchanges must be honoured, though honour and morality may go to the dogs.\nSo far as it is concerned, there is no nation, but a federation of\nshopkeepers. Such an one is the _bourgeois_ (the _B\u00fcrger_, as distinct\nfrom the peasant or _Bauer_ and the _Adel_). As an artisan\u2014i.e. a mere\nindustrial, he knows no country, but at best the reputation and interest\nof his own guild-union with its partial object. He is narrow, but honest\nand respectable. As a mere commercial agent, he knows no country: his\nfield is the world, but the world not in its concreteness and variety, but\nin the abstract aspect of a money-bag and an exchange. The larger totality\nis indeed not altogether out of sight. But if he contribute to the needy,\neither his sacrifice is lifeless in proportion as it becomes general, or\nloses generality as it becomes lively. As regards his general services to\nthe great life of his national state(115), they are unintelligently and\nperhaps grudgingly rendered.\n\nOf the peasant order Hegel has less to say. On one side the \u201ccountry\u201d as\nopposed to the \u201ctown\u201d has a closer natural sympathy with the common and\ngeneral interest: and the peasantry is the undifferentiated, solid and\nsound, basis of the national life. It forms the submerged mass, out of\nwhich the best soldiers are made, and which out of the depths of earth\nbrings forward nourishment as well as all the materials of elementary\nnecessity. Faithfulness and loyalty are its virtues: but it is personal\nallegiance to a commanding superior,\u2014not to a law or a general view\u2014for\nthe peasant is weak in comprehensive intelligence, though shrewd in\ndetailed observation.\n\nOf the purely political function of the state Hegel in this sketch says\nalmost nothing. But under the head of the general government of the state\nhe deals with its social functions. For a moment he refers to the\nwell-known distinction of the legislative, judicial and executive powers.\nBut it is only to remark that \u201cin every governmental act all three are\nconjoined. They are abstractions, none of which can get a reality of its\nown,\u2014which, in other words, cannot be constituted and organised as powers.\nLegislation, judicature, and executive are something completely formal,\nempty, and contentless.... Whether the others are or are not bare\nabstractions, empty activities, depends entirely on the executive power;\nand this is absolutely the government(116).\u201d Treating government as the\norganic movement by which the universal and the particular in the\ncommonwealth come into relations, he finds that it presents three forms,\nor gives rise to three systems. The highest and last of these is the\n\u201ceducational\u201d system. By this he understands all that activity by which\nthe intelligence of the state tries directly to mould and guide the\ncharacter and fortunes of its members: all the means of culture and\ndiscipline, whether in general or for individuals, all training to public\nfunction, to truthfulness, to good manners. Under the same head come\nconquest and colonisation as state agencies. The second system is the\njudicial, which instead of, like the former, aiming at the formation or\nreformation of its members is satisfied by subjecting individual\ntransgression to a process of rectification by the general principle. With\nregard to the system of judicature, Hegel argues for a variety of\nprocedure to suit different ranks, and for a corresponding modification of\npenalties. \u201cFormal rigid equality is just what does not spare the\ncharacter. The same penalty which in one estate brings no infamy causes in\nanother a deep and irremediable hurt.\u201d And with regard to the after life\nof the transgressor who has borne his penalty: \u201cPunishment is the\nreconciliation of the law with itself. No further reproach for his crime\ncan be addressed to the person who has undergone his punishment. He is\nrestored to membership of his estate(117).\u201d\n\nIn the first of the three systems, the economic system, or \u201cSystem of\nwants,\u201d the state seems at first hardly to appear in its universal and\ncontrolling function at all. Here the individual depends for the\nsatisfaction of his physical needs on a blind, unconscious destiny, on the\nobscure and incalculable properties of supply and demand in the whole\ninterconnexion of commodities. But even this is not all. With the\naccumulation of wealth in inequality, and the growth of vast capitals,\nthere is substituted for the dependence of the individual on the general\nresultant of a vast number of agencies a dependence on one enormously rich\nindividual, who can control the physical destinies of a nation. But a\nnation, truly speaking, is there no more. The industrial order has parted\ninto a mere abstract workman on one hand, and the _grande richesse_ on the\nother. \u201cIt has lost its capacity of an organic absolute intuition and of\nrespect for the divine\u2014external though its divinity be: and there sets in\nthe bestiality of contempt for all that is noble. The mere wisdomless\nuniversal, the mass of wealth, is the essential: and the ethical\nprinciple, the absolute bond of the nation, is vanished; and the nation is\ndissolved(118).\u201d\n\nIt would be a long and complicated task to sift, in these ill-digested but\nprofound suggestions, the real meaning from the formal statement. They\nare, like Utopia, beyond the range of practical politics. The modern\nreader, whose political conceptions are limited by contemporary\ncircumstance, may find them archaic, medieval, quixotic. But for those who\nbehind the words and forms can see the substance and the idea, they will\nperhaps come nearer the conception of ideal commonwealth than many\nreforming programmes. Compared with the maturer statements of the\n_Philosophy of Law_, they have the faults of the Romantic age to which\ntheir inception belongs. Yet even in that later exposition there is upheld\nthe doctrine of the supremacy of the eternal State against everything\nparticular, class-like, and temporary; a doctrine which has made Hegel\u2014as\nit made Fichte\u2014a voice in that \u201cprofessorial socialism\u201d which is at least\nas old as Plato.\n\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\n\n\u00a7 377. The knowledge of Mind is the highest and hardest, just because it\nis the most \u201cconcrete\u201d of sciences. The significance of that \u201cabsolute\u201d\ncommandment, _Know thyself_\u2014whether we look at it in itself or under the\nhistorical circumstances of its first utterance\u2014is not to promote mere\nself-knowledge in respect of the _particular_ capacities, character,\npropensities, and foibles of the single self. The knowledge it commands\nmeans that of man\u2019s genuine reality\u2014of what is essentially and ultimately\ntrue and real\u2014of mind as the true and essential being. Equally little is\nit the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called _knowledge of\nmen_\u2014the knowledge whose aim is to detect the _peculiarities_, passions,\nand foibles of other men, and lay bare what are called the recesses of the\nhuman heart. Information of this kind is, for one thing, meaningless,\nunless on the assumption that we know the _universal_\u2014man as man, and,\nthat always must be, as mind. And for another, being only engaged with\ncasual, insignificant and _untrue_ aspects of mental life, it fails to\nreach the underlying essence of them all\u2014the mind itself.\n\n\u00a7 378. Pneumatology, or, as it was also called, Rational Psychology, has\nbeen already alluded to in the Introduction to the Logic as an _abstract_\nand generalising metaphysic of the subject. _Empirical_ (or inductive)\npsychology, on the other hand, deals with the \u201cconcrete\u201d mind: and, after\nthe revival of the sciences, when observation and experience had been made\nthe distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality, such psychology\nwas worked on the same lines as other sciences. In this way it came about\nthat the metaphysical theory was kept outside the inductive science, and\nso prevented from getting any concrete embodiment or detail: whilst at the\nsame time the inductive science clung to the conventional common-sense\nmetaphysic, with its analysis into forces, various activities, &c., and\nrejected any attempt at a \u201cspeculative\u201d treatment.\n\nThe books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its\nspecial aspects and states, are for this reason still by far the most\nadmirable, perhaps even the sole, work of philosophical value on this\ntopic. The main aim of a philosophy of mind can only be to re-introduce\nunity of idea and principle into the theory of mind, and so re-interpret\nthe lesson of those Aristotelian books.\n\n\u00a7 379. Even our own sense of the mind\u2019s _living_ unity naturally protests\nagainst any attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or,\nwhat comes to the same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each\nother. But the craving for a _comprehension_ of the unity is still further\nstimulated, as we soon come across distinctions between mental freedom and\nmental determinism, antitheses between free _psychic_ agency and the\ncorporeity that lies external to it, whilst we equally note the intimate\ninterdependence of the one upon the other. In modern times especially the\nphenomena of _animal magnetism_ have given, even in experience, a lively\nand visible confirmation of the underlying unity of soul, and of the power\nof its \u201cideality.\u201d Before these facts, the rigid distinctions of practical\ncommon sense were struck with confusion; and the necessity of a\n\u201cspeculative\u201d examination with a view to the removal of difficulties was\nmore directly forced upon the student.\n\n\u00a7 380. The \u201cconcrete\u201d nature of mind involves for the observer the\npeculiar difficulty that the several grades and special types which\ndevelop its intelligible unity in detail are not left standing as so many\nseparate existences confronting its more advanced aspects. It is otherwise\nin external nature. There, matter and movement, for example, have a\nmanifestation all their own\u2014it is the solar system; and similarly the\n_differentiae_ of sense-perception have a sort of earlier existence in the\nproperties of _bodies_, and still more independently in the four elements.\nThe species and grades of mental evolution, on the contrary, lose their\nseparate existence and become factors, states and features in the higher\ngrades of development. As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract\naspect of mind betrays the presence in it, even to experience, of a higher\ngrade. Under the guise of sensation, e.g., we may find the very highest\nmental life as its modification or its embodiment. And so sensation, which\nis but a mere form and vehicle, may to the superficial glance seem to be\nthe proper seat and, as it were, the source of those moral and religious\nprinciples with which it is charged; and the moral and religious\nprinciples thus modified may seem to call for treatment as species of\nsensation. But at the same time, when lower grades of mental life are\nunder examination, it becomes necessary, if we desire to point to actual\ncases of them in experience, to direct attention to more advanced grades\nfor which they are mere forms. In this way subjects will be treated of by\nanticipation which properly belong to later stages of development (e.g. in\ndealing with natural awaking from sleep we speak by anticipation of\nconsciousness, or in dealing with mental derangement we must speak of\nintellect).\n\n\n\n\nWhat Mind (or Spirit) is.\n\n\n\u00a7 381. From our point of view Mind has for its _presupposition_ Nature, of\nwhich it is the truth, and for that reason its _absolute prius_. In this\nits truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the \u201cIdea\u201d entered\non possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are\none\u2014either is the intelligent unity, the notion. This identity is\n_absolute negativity_\u2014for whereas in Nature the intelligent unity has its\nobjectivity perfect but externalised, this self-externalisation has been\nnullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with\nitself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a\nreturn out of nature.\n\n\u00a7 382. For this reason the essential, but formally essential, feature of\nmind is Liberty: i.e. it is the notion\u2019s absolute negativity or\nself-identity. Considered as this formal aspect, it _may_ withdraw itself\nfrom everything external and from its own externality, its very existence;\nit can thus submit to infinite _pain_, the negation of its individual\nimmediacy: in other words, it can keep itself affirmative in this\nnegativity and possess its own identity. All this is possible so long as\nit is considered in its abstract self-contained universality.\n\n\u00a7 383. This universality is also its determinate sphere of being. Having a\nbeing of its own, the universal is self-particularising, whilst it still\nremains self-identical. Hence the special mode of mental being is\n\u201c_manifestation_.\u201d The spirit is not some one mode or meaning which finds\nutterance or externality only in a form distinct from itself: it does not\nmanifest or reveal _something_, but its very mode and meaning is this\nrevelation. And thus in its mere possibility Mind is at the same moment an\ninfinite, \u201cabsolute,\u201d _actuality_.\n\n\u00a7 384. _Revelation_, taken to mean the revelation of the _abstract_ Idea,\nis an unmediated transition to Nature which _comes_ to be. As Mind is\nfree, its manifestation is to _set forth_ Nature as _its_ world; but\nbecause it is reflection, it, in thus setting forth its world, at the same\ntime _presupposes_ the world as a nature independently existing. In the\nintellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being\u2014a\nbeing in which the mind procures the _affirmation_ and _truth_ of its\nfreedom.\n\n_The Absolute is Mind_ (Spirit)\u2014this is the supreme definition of the\nAbsolute. To find this definition and to grasp its meaning and burthen\nwas, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy:\nit was the point to which turned the impulse of all religion and science:\nand it is this impulse that must explain the history of the world. The\nword \u201cMind\u201d (Spirit)\u2014and some glimpse of its meaning\u2014was found at an early\nperiod: and the spirituality of God is the lesson of Christianity. It\nremains for philosophy in its own element of intelligible unity to get\nhold of what was thus given as a mental image, and what implicitly is the\nultimate reality: and that problem is not genuinely, and by rational\nmethods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the theme\nand the soul of philosophy.\n\n\n\n\nSubdivision.\n\n\n\u00a7 385. The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three stages:\u2014\n\n(1) In the form of self-relation: within it it has the _ideal_ totality of\nthe Idea\u2014i.e. it has before it all that its notion contains: its being is\nto be self-contained and free. This is _Mind Subjective_.\n\n(2) In the form of _reality_: realised, i.e. in a _world_ produced and to\nbe produced by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape\nof necessity. This is _Mind Objective_.\n\n(3) In that unity of mind as objectivity and, of mind as ideality and\nconcept, which essentially and actually is and for ever produces itself,\nmind in its absolute truth. This is _Mind Absolute_.\n\n\u00a7 386. The two first parts of the doctrine of Mind embrace the finite\nmind. Mind is the infinite Idea; thus finitude here means the\ndisproportion between the concept and the reality\u2014but with the\nqualification that it is a shadow cast by the mind\u2019s own light\u2014a show or\nillusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barrier to itself, in\norder, by its removal, actually to realise and become conscious of freedom\nas _its_ very being, i.e. to be fully _manifested_. The several steps of\nthis activity, on each of which, with their semblance of being, it is the\nfunction of the finite mind to linger, and through which it has to pass,\nare steps in its liberation. In the full truth of that liberation is given\nthe identification of the three stages\u2014finding a world presupposed before\nus, generating a world as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it\nand in it. To the infinite form of this truth the show purifies itself\ntill it becomes a consciousness of it.\n\nA rigid application of the category of finitude by the abstract logician\nis chiefly seen in dealing with Mind and reason: it is held not a mere\nmatter of strict logic, but treated also as a moral and religious concern,\nto adhere to the point of view of finitude, and the wish to go further is\nreckoned a mark of audacity, if not of insanity, of thought. Whereas in\nfact such a _modesty_ of thought, as treats the finite as something\naltogether fixed and _absolute_, is the worst of virtues; and to stick to\na post which has no sound ground in itself is the most unsound sort of\ntheory. The category of finitude was at a much earlier period elucidated\nand explained at its place in the Logic: an elucidation which, as in logic\nfor the more specific though still simple thought-forms of finitude, so in\nthe rest of philosophy for the concrete forms, has merely to show that the\nfinite _is not_, i.e. is not the truth, but merely a transition and an\nemergence to something higher. This finitude of the spheres so far\nexamined is the dialectic that makes a thing have its cessation by another\nand in another: but Spirit, the intelligent unity and the _implicit_\nEternal, is itself just the consummation of that internal act by which\nnullity is nullified and vanity is made vain. And so, the modesty alluded\nto is a retention of this vanity\u2014the finite\u2014in opposition to the true: it\nis itself therefore vanity. In the course of the mind\u2019s development we\nshall see this vanity appear as _wickedness_ at that turning-point at\nwhich mind has reached its extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its\nmost central contradiction.\n\n\n\n\n\nSECTION I. MIND SUBJECTIVE.\n\n\n\u00a7 387. Mind, on the ideal stage of its development, is mind as\n_cognitive_: Cognition, however, being taken here not as a merely logical\ncategory of the Idea (\u00a7 223), but in the sense appropriate to the\n_concrete_ mind.\n\nSubjective mind is:\u2014\n\n(A) Immediate or implicit: a soul\u2014the Spirit in _Nature_\u2014the object\ntreated by _Anthropology_.\n\n(B) Mediate or explicit: still as identical reflection into itself and\ninto other things: mind in correlation or particularisation:\nconsciousness\u2014the object treated by the _Phenomenology of Mind_.\n\n(C) Mind defining itself in itself, as an independent subject\u2014the object\ntreated by _Psychology_.\n\nIn the Soul is the _awaking of Consciousness_: Consciousness sets itself\nup as Reason, awaking at one bound to the sense of its rationality: and\nthis Reason by its activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the\nconsciousness of its intelligent unity.\n\nFor an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension each modification\nit presents is an advance of _development_: and so in mind every character\nunder which it appears is a stage in a process of specification and\ndevelopment, a step forward towards its goal, in order to make itself\ninto, and to realise in itself, what it implicitly is. Each step, again,\nis itself such a process, and its product is that what the mind was\nimplicitly at the beginning (and so for the observer) it is _for\nitself_\u2014for the special form, viz. which the mind has in that step. The\nordinary method of psychology is to narrate what the mind or soul is, what\nhappens to it, what it does. The soul is presupposed as a ready-made\nagent, which displays such features as its acts and utterances, from which\nwe can learn what it is, what sort of faculties and powers it\npossesses\u2014all without being aware that the act and utterance of what the\nsoul is really invests it with that character in our conception and makes\nit reach a higher stage of being than it explicitly had before.\n\nWe must, however, distinguish and keep apart from the progress here\nstudied what we call education and instruction. The sphere of education is\nthe individual\u2019s only: and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist\nin them. But in the philosophic theory of mind, mind is studied as\nself-instruction and self-education in very essence; and its acts and\nutterances are stages in the process which brings it forward to itself,\nlinks it in unity with itself, and so makes it actual mind.\n\n\n\n\nSub-Section A. Anthropology. The Soul.\n\n\n\u00a7 388. Spirit (Mind) _came into_ being as the truth of Nature. But not\nmerely is it, as such a result, to be held the true and real first of what\nwent before: this becoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion\nthe special meaning of \u201c_free judgment_.\u201d Mind, thus come into being,\nmeans therefore that Nature in its own self realises its untruth and sets\nitself aside: it means that Mind presupposes itself no longer as the\nuniversality which in corporal individuality is always self-externalised,\nbut as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and\nsimple. At such a stage it is not yet mind, but _soul_.\n\n\u00a7 389. The soul is no separate immaterial entity. Wherever there is\nNature, the soul is its universal immaterialism, its simple \u201cideal\u201d life.\nSoul is the _substance_ or \u201cabsolute\u201d basis of all the particularising and\nindividualising of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on\nwhich its character is wrought, and the soul remains the pervading,\nidentical ideality of it all. But as it is still conceived thus\nabstractly, the soul is only the _sleep_ of mind\u2014the passive \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 of\nAristotle, which is potentially all things.\n\nThe question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest, except\nwhere, on the one hand, matter is regarded as something _true_, and mind\nconceived as a _thing_, on the other. But in modern times even the\nphysicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands: they have come\nupon _imponderable_ matters, like heat, light, &c., to which they might\nperhaps add space and time. These \u201cimponderables,\u201d which have lost the\nproperty (peculiar to matter) of gravity and, in a sense, even the\ncapacity of offering resistance, have still, however, a sensible existence\nand outness of part to part; whereas the \u201cvital\u201d_ matter_, which may also\nbe found enumerated among them, not merely lacks gravity, but even every\nother aspect of existence which might lead us to treat it as material. The\nfact is that in the Idea of Life the self-externalism of nature is\n_implicitly_ at an end: subjectivity is the very substance and conception\nof life\u2014with this proviso, however, that its existence or objectivity is\nstill at the same time forfeited to the sway of self-externalism. It is\notherwise with Mind. There, in the intelligible unity which exists as\nfreedom, as absolute negativity, and not as the immediate or natural\nindividual, the object or the reality of the intelligible unity is the\nunity itself; and so the self-externalism, which is the fundamental\nfeature of matter, has been completely dissipated and transmuted into\nuniversality, or the subjective ideality of the conceptual unity. Mind is\nthe existent truth of matter\u2014the truth that matter itself has no truth.\n\nA cognate question is that of the _community of soul and body_. This\ncommunity (interdependence) was assumed as a _fact_, and the only problem\nwas how to _comprehend_ it. The usual answer, perhaps, was to call it an\n_incomprehensible_ mystery; and, indeed, if we take them to be absolutely\nantithetical and absolutely independent, they are as impenetrable to each\nother as one piece of matter to another, each being supposed to be found\nonly in the pores of the other, i.e. where the other is not: whence\nEpicurus, when attributing to the gods a residence in the pores, was\nconsistent in not imposing on them any connexion with the world. A\nsomewhat different answer has been given by all philosophers since this\nrelation came to be expressly discussed. Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza,\nand Leibnitz have all indicated God as this _nexus_. They meant that the\nfinitude of soul and matter were only ideal and unreal distinctions; and,\nso holding, these philosophers took God, not, as so often is done, merely\nas another word for the incomprehensible, but rather as the sole true\nidentity of finite mind and matter. But either this identity, as in the\ncase of Spinoza, is too abstract, or, as in the case of Leibnitz, though\nhis Monad of monads brings things into being, it does so only by an act of\njudgment or choice. Hence, with Leibnitz, the result is a distinction\nbetween soul and the corporeal (or material), and the identity is only\nlike the _copula_ of a judgment, and does not rise or develop into system,\ninto the absolute syllogism.\n\n\u00a7 390. The Soul is at first\u2014\n\n(_a_) In its immediate natural mode\u2014the natural soul, which only _is_.\n\n(_b_) Secondly, it is a soul which _feels_, as individualised, enters into\ncorrelation with its immediate being, and, in the modes of that being,\nretains an abstract independence.\n\n(_c_) Thirdly, its immediate being\u2014or corporeity\u2014is moulded into it, and\nwith that corporeity it exists as _actual_ soul.\n\n\n\n(a) The Physical Soul(119).\n\n\n\u00a7 391. The soul universal, described, it may be, as an _anima mundi_, a\nworld-soul, must not be fixed on that account as a single subject; it is\nrather the universal _substance_ which has its actual truth only in\nindividuals and single subjects. Thus, when it presents itself as a single\nsoul, it is a single soul which _is_ merely: its only modes are modes of\nnatural life. These have, so to speak, behind its ideality a free\nexistence: i.e. they are natural objects for consciousness, but objects to\nwhich the soul as such does not behave as to something external. These\nfeatures rather are _physical qualities_ of which it finds itself\npossessed.\n\n\n(\u03b1) Physical Qualities(120).\n\n\n\u00a7 392. While still a \u201csubstance\u201d (i.e. a physical soul) the mind (1) takes\npart in the general planetary life, feels the difference of climates, the\nchanges of the seasons and the periods of the day, &c. This life of nature\nfor the main shows itself only in occasional strain or disturbance of\nmental tone.\n\nIn recent times a good deal has been said of the cosmical, sidereal, and\ntelluric life of man. In such a sympathy with nature the animals\nessentially live: their specific characters and their particular phases of\ngrowth depend, in many cases completely, and always more or less, upon it.\nIn the case of man these points of dependence lose importance, just in\nproportion to his civilisation, and the more his whole frame of soul is\nbased upon a substructure of mental freedom. The history of the world is\nnot bound up with revolutions in the solar system, any more than the\ndestinies of individuals with the positions of the planets.\n\nThe difference of climate has a more solid and vigorous influence. But the\nresponse to the changes of the seasons and hours of the day is found only\nin faint changes of mood, which come expressly to the fore only in morbid\nstates (including insanity) and at periods when the self-conscious life\nsuffers depression.\n\nIn nations less intellectually emancipated, which therefore live more in\nharmony with nature, we find amid their superstitions and aberrations of\nimbecility _a few_ real cases of such sympathy, and on that foundation\nwhat seems to be marvellous prophetic vision of coming conditions and of\nevents arising therefrom. But as mental freedom gets a deeper hold, even\nthese few and slight susceptibilities, based upon participation in the\ncommon life of nature, disappear. Animals and plants, on the contrary,\nremain for ever subject to such influences.\n\n\u00a7 393. (2) According to the concrete differences of the terrestrial globe,\nthe general planetary life of the nature-governed mind specialises itself\nand breaks up into the several nature-governed minds which, on the whole,\ngive expression to the nature of the geographical continents and\nconstitute the diversities of _race_.\n\nThe contrast between the earth\u2019s poles, the land towards the north pole\nbeing more aggregated and preponderant over sea, whereas in the southern\nhemisphere it runs out in sharp points, widely distant from each other,\nintroduces into the differences of continents a further modification which\nTreviranus (_Biology_, Part II) has exhibited in the case of the flora and\nfauna.\n\n\u00a7 394. This diversity descends into specialities, that may be termed\n_local_ minds\u2014shown in the outward modes of life and occupation, bodily\nstructure and disposition, but still more in the inner tendency and\ncapacity of the intellectual and moral character of the several peoples.\n\nBack to the very beginnings of national history we see the several nations\neach possessing a persistent type of its own.\n\n\u00a7 395. (3) The soul is further de-universalised into the individualised\nsubject. But this subjectivity is here only considered as a\ndifferentiation and singling out of the modes which nature gives; we find\nit as the special temperament, talent, character, physiognomy, or other\ndisposition and idiosyncrasy, of families or single individuals.\n\n\n(\u03b2) Physical Alterations.\n\n\n\u00a7 396. Taking the soul as an individual, we find its diversities, as\nalterations in it, the one permanent subject, and as stages in its\ndevelopment. As they are at once physical and mental diversities, a more\nconcrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate\nan acquaintance with the formed and matured mind.\n\nThe (1) first of these is the natural lapse of the ages in man\u2019s life. He\nbegins with _Childhood_\u2014mind wrapt up in itself. His next step is the\nfully-developed antithesis, the strain and struggle of a universality\nwhich is still subjective (as seen in ideals, fancies, hopes, ambitions)\nagainst his immediate individuality. And that individuality marks both the\nworld which, as it exists, fails to meet his ideal requirements, and the\nposition of the individual himself, who is still short of independence and\nnot fully equipped for the part he has to play (_Youth_). Thirdly, we see\nman in his true relation to his environment, recognising the objective\nnecessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it,\u2014a world no\nlonger incomplete, but able in the work which it collectively achieves to\nafford the individual a place and a security for his performance. By his\nshare in this collective work he first is really _somebody_, gaining an\neffective existence and an objective value (_Manhood_). Last of all comes\nthe finishing touch to this unity with objectivity: a unity which, while\non its realist side it passes into the _inertia_ of deadening habit, on\nits idealist side gains freedom from the limited interests and\nentanglements of the outward present (_Old Age_).\n\n\u00a7 397. (2) Next we find the individual subject to a _real_ antithesis,\nleading it to seek and find _itself_ in _another_ individual. This\u2014the\n_sexual relation_\u2014on a physical basis, shows, on its one side,\nsubjectivity remaining in an instinctive and emotional harmony of moral\nlife and love, and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme _universal_\nphase, in purposes political, scientific or artistic; and on the other,\nshows an active half, where the individual is the vehicle of a struggle of\nuniversal and objective interests with the given conditions (both of his\nown existence and of that of the external world), carrying out these\nuniversal principles into a unity with the world which is his own work.\nThe sexual tie acquires its moral and spiritual significance and function\nin the _family_.\n\n\u00a7 398. (3) When the individuality, or self-centralised being,\ndistinguishes itself from its _mere_ being, this immediate judgment is the\n_waking_ of the soul, which confronts its self-absorbed natural life, in\nthe first instance, as one natural quality and state confronts another\nstate, viz. _sleep_.\u2014The waking is not merely for the observer, or\nexternally distinct from the sleep: it is itself the _judgment_ (primary\npartition) of the individual soul\u2014which is self-existing only as it\nrelates its self-existence to its mere existence, distinguishing itself\nfrom its still undifferentiated universality. The waking state includes\ngenerally all self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind\nrealises its own distinct self.\u2014Sleep is an invigoration of this\nactivity\u2014not as a merely negative rest from it, but as a return back from\nthe world of specialisation, from dispersion into phases where it has\ngrown hard and stiff,\u2014a return into the general nature of subjectivity,\nwhich is the substance of those specialised energies and their absolute\nmaster.\n\nThe distinction between sleep and waking is one of those _posers_, as they\nmay be called, which are often addressed to philosophy:\u2014Napoleon, e.g., on\na visit to the University of Pavia, put this question to the class of\nideology. The characterisation given in the section is abstract; it\nprimarily treats waking merely as a natural fact, containing the mental\nelement _implicite_ but not yet as invested with a special being of its\nown. If we are to speak more concretely of this distinction (in\nfundamentals it remains the same), we must take the self-existence of the\nindividual soul in its higher aspects as the Ego of consciousness and as\nintelligent mind. The difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two\nstates properly arises, only when we also take into account the dreams in\nsleep and describe these dreams, as well as the mental representations in\nthe sober waking consciousness, under one and the same title of mental\nrepresentations. Thus superficially classified as states of mental\nrepresentation the two coincide, because we have lost sight of the\ndifference; and in the case of any assignable distinction of waking\nconsciousness, we can always return to the trivial remark that all this is\nnothing more than mental idea. But the concrete theory of the waking soul\nin its realised being views it as _consciousness_ and _intellect_: and the\nworld of intelligent consciousness is something quite different from a\npicture of mere ideas and images. The latter are in the main only\nexternally conjoined, in an unintelligent way, by the laws of the\nso-called _Association of Ideas_; though here and there of course logical\nprinciples may also be operative. But in the waking state man behaves\nessentially as a concrete ego, an intelligence: and because of this\nintelligence his sense-perception stands before him as a concrete totality\nof features in which each member, each point, takes up its place as at the\nsame time determined through and with all the rest. Thus the facts\nembodied in his sensation are authenticated, not by his mere subjective\nrepresentation and distinction of the facts as something external from the\nperson, but by virtue of the concrete interconnexion in which each part\nstands with all parts of this complex. The waking state is the concrete\nconsciousness of this mutual corroboration of each single factor of its\ncontent by all the others in the picture as perceived. The consciousness\nof this interdependence need not be explicit and distinct. Still this\ngeneral setting to all sensations is implicitly present in the concrete\nfeeling of self.\u2014In order to see the difference of dreaming and waking we\nneed only keep in view the Kantian distinction between subjectivity and\nobjectivity of mental representation (the latter depending upon\ndetermination through categories): remembering, as already noted, that\nwhat is actually present in mind need not be therefore explicitly realised\nin consciousness, just as little as the exaltation of the intellectual\nsense to God need stand before consciousness in the shape of proofs of\nGod\u2019s existence, although, as before explained, these proofs only serve to\nexpress the net worth and content of that feeling.\n\n\n(\u03b3) Sensibility(121).\n\n\n\u00a7 399. Sleep and waking are, primarily, it is true, not mere alterations,\nbut _alternating_ conditions (a progression _in infinitum_). This is their\nformal and negative relationship: but in it the _affirmative_ relationship\nis also involved. In the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere\nexistence is implicit as an \u201cideal\u201d factor: the features which make up its\nsleeping nature, where they are implicitly as in their substance, are\n_found_ by the waking soul, in its own self, and, be it noted, for itself.\nThe fact that these particulars, though as a mode of mind they are\ndistinguished from the self-identity of our self-centred being, are yet\nsimply contained in its simplicity, is what we call sensibility.\n\n\u00a7 400. Sensibility (feeling) is the form of the dull stirring, the\ninarticulate breathing, of the spirit through its unconscious and\nunintelligent individuality, where every definite feature is still\n\u201cimmediate,\u201d\u2014neither specially developed in its content nor set in\ndistinction as objective to subject, but treated as belonging to its most\nspecial, its natural peculiarity. The content of sensation is thus limited\nand transient, belonging as it does to natural, immediate being,\u2014to what\nis therefore qualitative and finite.\n\n_Everything is in sensation_ (feeling): if you will, everything that\nemerges in conscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin\nin sensation; for source and origin just means the first immediate manner\nin which a thing appears. Let it not be enough to have principles and\nreligion only in the head: they must also be in the heart, in the feeling.\nWhat we merely have in the head is in consciousness, in a general way: the\nfacts of it are objective\u2014set over against consciousness, so that as it is\nput in me (my abstract ego) it can also be kept away and apart from me\n(from my concrete subjectivity). But if put in the feeling, the fact is a\nmode of my individuality, however crude that individuality be in such a\nform: it is thus treated as my _very own_. My own is something inseparate\nfrom the actual concrete self: and this immediate unity of the soul with\nits underlying self in all its definite content is just this\ninseparability; which however yet falls short of the ego of developed\nconsciousness, and still more of the freedom of rational mind-life. It is\nwith a quite different intensity and permanency that the will, the\nconscience, and the character, are our very own, than can ever be true of\nfeeling and of the group of feelings (the heart): and this we need no\nphilosophy to tell us. No doubt it is correct to say that above everything\nthe _heart_ must be good. But feeling and heart is not the form by which\nanything is legitimated as religious, moral, true, just, &c., and an\nappeal to heart and feeling either means nothing or means something bad.\nThis should hardly need enforcing. Can any experience be more trite than\nthat feelings and hearts are also bad, evil, godless, mean, &c.? That the\nheart is the source only of such feelings is stated in the words: \u201cFrom\nthe heart proceed evil thoughts, murder, adultery, fornication, blasphemy,\n&c.\u201d In such times when \u201cscientific\u201d theology and philosophy make the\nheart and feeling the criterion of what is good, moral, and religious, it\nis necessary to remind them of these trite experiences; just as it is\nnowadays necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic property\nby which man is distinguished from the beasts, and that he has feeling in\ncommon with them.\n\n\u00a7 401. What the sentient soul finds within it is, on one hand, the\nnaturally immediate, as \u201cideally\u201d in it and made its own. On the other\nhand and conversely, what originally belongs to the central individuality\n(which as further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and free\nmind) get the features of the natural corporeity, and is so felt. In this\nway we have two spheres of feeling. One, where what at first is a\ncorporeal affection (e.g. of the eye or of any bodily part whatever) is\nmade feeling (sensation) by being driven inward, memorised in the soul\u2019s\nself-centred part. Another, where affections originating in the mind and\nbelonging to it, are in order to be felt, and to be as if found, invested\nwith corporeity. Thus the mode or affection gets a place in the subject:\nit is felt in the soul. The detailed specification of the former branch of\nsensibility is seen in the system of the senses. But the other or inwardly\noriginated modes of feeling no less necessarily systematise themselves;\nand their corporisation, as put in the living and concretely developed\nnatural being, works itself out, following the special character of the\nmental mode, in a special system of bodily organs.\n\nSensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the individual mind in\nthe life of its bodily part. The senses form the simple system of\ncorporeity specified. (_a_) The \u201cideal\u201d side of physical things breaks up\ninto two\u2014because in it, as immediate and not yet subjective ideality,\ndistinction appears as mere variety\u2014the senses of definite _light_, \u00a7\n287\u2014and of _sound_, \u00a7 300. The \u201creal\u201d aspect similarly is with its\ndifference double: (_b_) the senses of smell and taste, \u00a7\u00a7 321, 322; (_c_)\nthe sense of solid reality, of heavy matter, of heat and shape. Around the\ncentre of the sentient individuality these specifications arrange\nthemselves more simply than when they are developed in the natural\ncorporeity.\n\nThe system by which the internal sensation comes to give itself specific\nbodily forms would deserve to be treated in detail in a peculiar science\u2014a\n_psychical physiology_. Somewhat pointing to such a system is implied in\nthe feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate\nsensation to the persistent tone of internal sensibility (the pleasant and\nunpleasant): as also in the distinct parallelism which underlies the\nsymbolical employment of sensations, e.g. of colours, tones, smells. But\nthe most interesting side of a psychical physiology would lie in studying\nnot the mere sympathy, but more definitely the bodily form adopted by\ncertain mental modifications, especially the passions or emotions. We\nshould have, e.g., to explain the line of connexion by which anger and\ncourage are felt in the breast, the blood, the \u201cirritable\u201d system, just as\nthinking and mental occupation are felt in the head, the centre of the\n\u2019sensible\u2019 system. We should want a more satisfactory explanation than\nhitherto of the most familiar connexions by which tears, and voice in\ngeneral, with its varieties of language, laughter, sighs, with many other\nspecialisations lying in the line of pathognomy and physiognomy, are\nformed from their mental source. In physiology the viscera and the organs\nare treated merely as parts subservient to the animal organism; but they\nform at the same time a physical system for the expression of mental\nstates, and in this way they get quite another interpretation.\n\n\u00a7 402. Sensations, just because they are immediate and are found existing,\nare single and transient aspects of psychic life,\u2014alterations in the\nsubstantiality of the soul, set in its self-centred life, with which that\nsubstance is one. But this self-centred being is not merely a formal\nfactor of sensation: the soul is virtually a reflected totality of\nsensations\u2014it feels _in itself_ the total substantiality which it\n_virtually_ is\u2014it is a soul which feels.\n\nIn the usage of ordinary language, sensation and feeling are not clearly\ndistinguished: still we do not speak of the sensation,\u2014but of the feeling\n(sense) of right, of self; sentimentality (sensibility) is connected with\nsensation: we may therefore say sensation emphasises rather the side of\npassivity\u2014the fact that we find ourselves feeling, i.e. the immediacy of\nmode in feeling\u2014whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact\nthat it is _we ourselves_ who feel.\n\n\n\n(b) The Feeling Soul.\u2014(Soul as Sentiency.)(122)\n\n\n\u00a7 403. The feeling or sentient individual is the simple \u201cideality\u201d or\nsubjective side of sensation. What it has to do, therefore, is to raise\nits substantiality, its merely virtual filling-up, to the character of\nsubjectivity, to take possession of it, to realise its mastery over its\nown. As sentient, the soul is no longer a mere natural, but an inward,\nindividuality: the individuality which in the merely substantial totality\nwas only formal to it has to be liberated and made independent.\n\nNowhere so much as in the case of the soul (and still more of the mind) if\nwe are to understand it, must that feature of \u201cideality\u201d be kept in view,\nwhich represents it as the _negation_ of the real, but a negation, where\nthe real is put past, virtually retained, although it does not _exist_.\nThe feature is one with which we are familiar in regard to our mental\nideas or to memory. Every individual is an infinite treasury of\nsensations, ideas, acquired lore, thoughts, &c.; and yet the ego is one\nand uncompounded, a deep featureless characterless mine, in which all this\nis stored up, without existing. It is only when _I_ call to mind _an_\nidea, that I bring it out of that interior to existence before\nconsciousness. Sometimes, in sickness, ideas and information, supposed to\nhave been forgotten years ago, because for so long they had not been\nbrought into consciousness, once more come to light. They were not in our\npossession, nor by such reproduction as occurs in sickness do they for the\nfuture come into our possession; and yet they were in us and continue to\nbe in us still. Thus a person can never know how much of things he once\nlearned he really has in him, should he have once forgotten them: they\nbelong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such, but only to his\nimplicit self. And under all the superstructure of specialised and\ninstrumental consciousness that may subsequently be added to it, the\nindividuality always remains this single-souled inner life. At the present\nstage this singleness is, primarily, to be defined as one of feeling\u2014as\nembracing the corporeal in itself: thus denying the view that this body is\nsomething material, with parts outside parts and outside the soul. Just as\nthe number and variety of mental representations is no argument for an\nextended and real multeity in the ego; so the \u201creal\u201d outness of parts in\nthe body has no truth for the sentient soul. As sentient, the soul is\ncharacterised as immediate, and so as natural and corporeal: but the\noutness of parts and sensible multiplicity of this corporeal counts for\nthe soul (as it counts for the intelligible unity) not as anything real,\nand therefore not as a barrier: the soul is this intelligible unity _in\nexistence_,\u2014the existent speculative principle. Thus in the body it is one\nsimple, omnipresent unity. As to the representative faculty the body is\nbut _one_ representation, and the infinite variety of its material\nstructure and organisation is reduced to the _simplicity_ of one definite\nconception: so in the sentient soul, the corporeity, and all that outness\nof parts to parts which belongs to it, is reduced to _ideality_ (the\n_truth_ of the natural multiplicity). The soul is virtually the totality\nof nature: as an individual soul it is a monad: it is itself the\nexplicitly put totality of its particular world,\u2014that world being included\nin it and filling it up; and to that world it stands but as to itself.\n\n\u00a7 404. As _individual_, the soul is exclusive and always exclusive: any\ndifference there is, it brings within itself. What is differentiated from\nit is as yet no external object (as in consciousness), but only the\naspects of its own sentient totality, &c. In this partition (judgment) of\nitself it is always subject: its object is its substance, which is at the\nsame time its predicate. This _substance_ is still the content of its\nnatural life, but turned into the content of the individual\nsensation-laden soul; yet as the soul is in that content still particular,\nthe content is its particular world, so far as that is, in an implicit\nmode, included in the ideality of the subject.\n\nBy itself, this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: its features\nare not developed to conscious and intelligent content: so far it is\nformal and only formal. It acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it\nis as a _form_ and appears as a special _state_ of mind (\u00a7 350), to which\nthe soul, which has already advanced to consciousness and intelligence,\nmay again sink down. But when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more\nsubordinate and abstract one, it implies a want of adaptation, which is\n_disease_. In the present stage we must treat, first, of the abstract\npsychical modifications by themselves, secondly, as morbid states of mind:\nthe latter being only explicable by means of the former.\n\n\n(\u03b1) The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy.\n\n\n\u00a7 405. (\u03b1\u03b1) Though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic\nindividual, it is because immediate, not yet as _its self_ not a true\nsubject reflected into itself, and is therefore passive. Hence the\nindividuality of its true self is a different subject from it\u2014a subject\nwhich may even exist as another individual. By the self-hood of the latter\nit\u2014a substance, which is only a non-independent predicate\u2014is then set in\nvibration and controlled without the least resistance on its part. This\nother subject by which it is so controlled may be called its _genius_.\n\nIn the ordinary course of nature this is the condition of the child in its\nmother\u2019s womb:\u2014a condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental, but\npsychical\u2014a correlation of soul to soul. Here are two individuals, yet in\nundivided psychic unity: the one as yet no _self_, as yet nothing\nimpenetrable, incapable of resistance: the other is its actuating subject,\nthe _single_ self of the two. The mother is the _genius_ of the child; for\nby genius we commonly mean the total mental self-hood, as it has existence\nof its own, and constitutes the subjective substantiality of some one else\nwho is only externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal\nindependence. The underlying essence of the genius is the sum total of\nexistence, of life, and of character, not as a mere possibility, or\ncapacity, or virtuality, but as efficiency and realised activity, as\nconcrete subjectivity.\n\nIf we look only to the spatial and material aspects of the child\u2019s\nexistence as an embryo in its special integuments, and as connected with\nthe mother by means of umbilical cord, placenta, &c., all that is\npresented to the senses and reflection are certain anatomical and\nphysiological facts\u2014externalities and instrumentalities in the sensible\nand material which are insignificant as regards the main point, the\npsychical relationship. What ought to be noted as regards this psychical\ntie are not merely the striking effects communicated to and stamped upon\nthe child by violent emotions, injuries, &c. of the mother, but the whole\npsychical _judgment_ (partition) of the underlying nature, by which the\nfemale (like the monocotyledons among vegetables) can suffer disruption in\ntwain, so that the child has not merely got _communicated_ to it, but has\noriginally received morbid dispositions as well as other pre-dispositions\nof shape, temper, character, talent, idiosyncrasies, &c.\n\nSporadic examples and traces of this _magic_ tie appear elsewhere in the\nrange of self-possessed conscious life, say between friends, especially\nfemale friends with delicate nerves (a tie which may go so far as to show\n\u201cmagnetic\u201d phenomena), between husband and wife and between members of the\nsame family.\n\nThe total sensitivity has its self here in a separate subjectivity, which,\nin the case cited of this sentient life in the ordinary course of nature,\nis visibly present as another and a different individual. But this\nsensitive totality is meant to elevate its self-hood out of itself to\nsubjectivity in one and the same individual: which is then its indwelling\nconsciousness, self-possessed, intelligent, and reasonable. For such a\nconsciousness the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and only\nimplicitly existent material; and the self-possessed subjectivity is the\nrational, self-conscious, controlling genius thereof. But this sensitive\nnucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious, congenital disposition\nand temperament, but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and\nretains also (in habit, as to which see later) all further ties and\nessential relationships, fortunes, principles\u2014everything in short\nbelonging to the character, and in whose elaboration self-conscious\nactivity has most effectively participated. The sensitivity is thus a soul\nin which the whole mental life is condensed. The total individual under\nthis concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing and actual play of\nhis consciousness, his secular ideas, developed interests, inclinations,\n&c. As contrasted with this looser aggregate of means and methods the more\nintensive form of individuality is termed the genius, whose decision is\nultimate whatever may be the show of reasons, intentions, means, of which\nthe more public consciousness is so liberal. This concentrated\nindividuality also reveals itself under the aspect of what is called the\nheart and soul of feeling. A man is said to be heartless and unfeeling\nwhen he looks at things with self-possession and acts according to his\npermanent purposes, be they great substantial aims or petty and unjust\ninterests: a good-hearted man, on the other hand, means rather one who is\nat the mercy of his individual sentiment, even when it is of narrow range\nand is wholly made up of particularities. Of such good nature or goodness\nof heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself than the\n_indulgere genio_.\n\n\u00a7 406. (\u03b2\u03b2) The sensitive life, when it becomes a _form_ or _state_ of the\nself-conscious, educated, self-possessed human being is a disease. The\nindividual in such a morbid state stands in direct contact with the\nconcrete contents of his own self, whilst he keeps his self-possessed\nconsciousness of self and of the causal order of things apart as a\ndistinct state of mind. This morbid condition is seen in _magnetic\nsomnambulism_ and cognate states.\n\nIn this summary encyclopaedic account it is impossible to supply a\ndemonstration of what the paragraph states as the nature of the remarkable\ncondition produced chiefly by animal magnetism\u2014to show, in other words,\nthat it is in harmony with the facts. To that end the phenomena, so\ncomplex in their nature and so very different one from another, would have\nfirst of all to be brought under their general points of view. The facts,\nit might seem, first of all call for verification. But such a verification\nwould, it must be added, be superfluous for those on whose account it was\ncalled for: for they facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring\nthe narratives\u2014infinitely numerous though they be and accredited by the\neducation and character of the witnesses\u2014to be mere deception and\nimposture. The _a priori_ conceptions of these inquirers are so rooted\nthat no testimony can avail against them, and they have even denied what\nthey had seen with their own eyes. In order to believe in this department\neven what one sees with these eyes, and still more to understand it, the\nfirst requisite is not to be in bondage to the hard and fast categories of\nthe practical intellect. The chief points on which the discussion turns\nmay here be given:\n\n(\u03b1) To the _concrete_ existence of the individual belongs the aggregate of\nhis fundamental _interests_, both the essential and the particular\nempirical ties which connect him with other men and the world at large.\nThis totality forms _his_ actuality, in the sense that it lies in fact\nimmanent in him; it has already been called his _genius_. This genius is\nnot the free mind which wills and thinks: the form of sensitivity, in\nwhich the individual here appears immersed, is, on the contrary, a\nsurrender of his self-possessed intelligent existence. The first\nconclusion to which these considerations lead, with reference to the\ncontents of consciousness in the somnambulist stage, is that it is only\nthe range of his individually moulded world (of his private interests and\nnarrow relationships) which appear there. Scientific theories and\nphilosophic conceptions or general truths require a different\nsoil,\u2014require an intelligence which has risen out of the inarticulate mass\nof mere sensitivity to free consciousness. It is foolish therefore to\nexpect revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist state.\n\n(\u03b2) Where a human being\u2019s senses and intellect are sound, he is fully and\nintelligently alive to that reality of his which gives concrete filling to\nhis individuality: but he is awake to it in the form of interconnexion\nbetween himself and the features of that reality conceived as an external\nand a separate world, and he is aware that this world is in itself also a\ncomplex of interconnexions of a practically intelligible kind. In his\nsubjective ideas and plans he has also before him this causally connected\nscheme of things he calls his world and the series of means which bring\nhis ideas and his purposes into adjustment with the objective existences,\nwhich are also means and ends to each other. At the same time, this world\nwhich is outside him has its threads in him to such a degree that it is\nthese threads which make him what he really is: he too would become\nextinct if these externalities were to disappear, unless by the aid of\nreligion, subjective reason, and character, he is in a remarkable degree\nself-supporting and independent of them. But, then, in the latter case he\nis less susceptible of the psychical state here spoken of.\u2014As an\nillustration of that identity with the surroundings may be noted the\neffect produced by the death of beloved relatives, friends, &c. on those\nleft behind, so that the one dies or pines away with the loss of the\nother. (Thus Cato, after the downfall of the Roman republic, could live no\nlonger: his inner reality was neither wider than higher than it.) Compare\nhome-sickness, and the like.\n\n(\u03b3) But when all that occupies the waking consciousness, the world outside\nit and its relationship to that world is under a veil, and the soul is\nthus sunk in sleep (in magnetic sleep, in catalepsy, and other diseases,\ne.g. those connected with female development, or at the approach of death,\n&c.), then that _immanent actuality_ of the individual remains the same\nsubstantial total as before, but now as a purely sensitive life with an\ninward vision and an inward consciousness. And because it is the adult,\nformed, and developed consciousness which is degraded into this state of\nsensitivity, it retains along with its content a certain nominal\nself-hood, a formal vision and awareness, which however does not go so far\nas the conscious judgment or discernment by which its contents, when it is\nhealthy and awake, exist for it as an outward objectivity. The individual\nis thus a monad which is inwardly aware of its actuality\u2014a genius which\nbeholds itself. The characteristic point in such knowledge is that the\nvery same facts (which for the healthy consciousness are an objective\npractical reality, and to know which, in its sober moods, it needs the\nintelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion) are\nnow immediately known and perceived in this immanence. This perception is\na sort of _clairvoyance_; for it is a consciousness living in the\nundivided substantiality of the genius, and finding itself in the very\nheart of the interconnexion, and so can dispense with the series of\nconditions, external one to another, which lead up to the\nresult,\u2014conditions which cool reflection has in succession to traverse and\nin so doing feels the limits of its own individual externality. But such\nclairvoyance\u2014just because its dim and turbid vision does not present the\nfacts in a rational interconnexion\u2014is for that very reason at the mercy of\nevery private contingency of feeling and fancy, &c.\u2014not to mention that\nforeign _suggestions_ (see later) intrude into its vision. It is thus\nimpossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants really see\npreponderates over what they deceive themselves in.\u2014But it is absurd to\ntreat this visionary state as a sublime mental phase and as a truer state,\ncapable of conveying general truths(123).\n\n(\u03b4) An essential feature of this sensitivity, with its absence of\nintelligent and volitional personality, is this, that it is a state of\npassivity, like that of the child in the womb. The patient in this\ncondition is accordingly made, and continues to be, subject to the power\nof another person, the magnetiser; so that when the two are thus in\npsychical _rapport_, the selfless individual, not really a \u201cperson,\u201d has\nfor his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other. This\nlatter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of\nthe former, and the genius which may even supply him with a train of\nideas. That the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which\nare present in the person with whom he stands _en rapport_, and that he is\naware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if\nthey were his own, shows the substantial identity which the soul (which\neven in its concreteness is also truly immaterial) is capable of holding\nwith another. When the substance of both is thus made one, there is only\none subjectivity of consciousness: the patient has a sort of\nindividuality, but it is empty, not on the spot, not actual: and this\nnominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the\nsensations and ideas of the other, in whom it sees, smells, tastes, reads,\nand hears. It is further to be noted on this point that the somnambulist\nis thus brought into _rapport_ with two genii and a twofold set of ideas,\nhis own and that of the magnetiser. But it is impossible to say precisely\nwhich sensations and which visions he, in this nominal perception,\nreceives, beholds and brings to knowledge from his own inward self, and\nwhich from the suggestions of the person with whom he stands in relation.\nThis uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions, and accounts among\nother things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among\nsomnambulists from different countries and under _rapport_ with persons of\ndifferent education, as regards their views on morbid states and the\nmethods of cure, or medicines for them, as well as on scientific and\nintellectual topics.\n\n(\u03b5) As in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external\nobjectivity, so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all\nvarieties of sensation have disappeared, and hence, when the activity of\nthe sense-organs is asleep, the \u201ccommon sense,\u201d or \u201cgeneral feeling\u201d\nspecifies itself to several functions; one sees and hears with the\nfingers, and especially with the pit of the stomach, &c.\n\nTo comprehend a thing means in the language of practical intelligence to\nbe able to trace the series of means intervening between a phenomenon and\nsome other existence on which it depends,\u2014to discover what is called the\nordinary course of nature, in compliance with the laws and relations of\nthe intellect, e.g. causality, reasons, &c. The purely sensitive life, on\nthe contrary, even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness, as in\nthe morbid state alluded to, is just this form of immediacy, without any\ndistinctions between subjective and objective, between intelligent\npersonality and objective world, and without the aforementioned finite\nties between them. Hence to understand this intimate conjunction, which,\nthough all-embracing, is without any definite points of attachment, is\nimpossible, so long as we assume independent personalities, independent\none of another and of the objective world which is their content\u2014so long\nas we assume the absolute spatial and material externality of one part of\nbeing to another.\n\n\n(\u03b2) Self-feeling (Sense of Self)(124).\n\n\n\u00a7 407. (\u03b1\u03b1) The sensitive totality is, in its capacity of individual,\nessentially the tendency to distinguish itself in itself, and to wake up\nto the _judgment in itself_, in virtue of which it has _particular_\nfeelings and stands as a _subject_ in respect of these aspects of itself.\nThe subject as such gives these feelings a place as _its own_ in itself.\nIn these private and personal sensations it is immersed, and at the same\ntime, because of the \u201cideality\u201d of the particulars, it combines itself in\nthem with itself as a subjective unit. In this way it is _self-feeling_,\nand is so at the same time only in the _particular feeling_.\n\n\u00a7 408. (\u03b2\u03b2) In consequence of the immediacy, which still marks the\nself-feeling, i.e. in consequence of the element of corporeality which is\nstill undetached from the mental life, and as the feeling too is itself\nparticular and bound up with a special corporeal form, it follows that\nalthough the subject has been brought to acquire intelligent\nconsciousness, it is still susceptible of disease, so far as to remain\nfast in a _special_ phase of its self-feeling, unable to refine it to\n\u201cideality\u201d and get the better of it. The fully-furnished self of\nintelligent consciousness is a conscious subject, which is consistent in\nitself according to an order and behaviour which follows from its\nindividual position and its connexion with the external world, which is no\nless a world of law. But when it is engrossed with a single phase of\nfeeling, it fails to assign that phase its proper place and due\nsubordination in the individual system of the world which a conscious\nsubject is. In this way the subject finds itself in contradiction between\nthe totality systematised in its consciousness, and the single phase or\nfixed idea which is not reduced to its proper place and rank. This is\nInsanity or mental Derangement.\n\nIn considering insanity we must, as in other cases, anticipate the\nfull-grown and intelligent conscious subject, which is at the same time\nthe _natural_ self of _self-feeling_. In such a phase the self can be\nliable to the contradiction between its own free subjectivity and a\nparticularity which, instead of being \u201cidealised\u201d in the former, remains\nas a fixed element in self-feeling. Mind as such is free, and therefore\nnot susceptible of this malady. But in older metaphysics mind was treated\nas a soul, as a thing; and it is only as a thing, i.e. as something\nnatural and existent, that it is liable to insanity\u2014the settled fixture of\nsome finite element in it. Insanity is therefore a psychical disease, i.e.\na disease of body and mind alike: the commencement may appear to start\nfrom one more than other, and so also may the cure.\n\nThe self-possessed and healthy subject has an active and present\nconsciousness of the ordered whole of his individual world, into the\nsystem of which he subsumes each special content of sensation, idea,\ndesire, inclination, &c., as it arises, so as to insert them in their\nproper place. He is the _dominant genius_ over these particularities.\nBetween this and insanity the difference is like that between waking and\ndreaming: only that in insanity the dream falls within the waking limits,\nand so makes part of the actual self-feeling. Error and that sort of thing\nis a proposition consistently admitted to a place in the objective\ninterconnexion of things. In the concrete, however, it is often difficult\nto say where it begins to become derangement. A violent, but groundless\nand senseless outburst of hatred, &c., may, in contrast to a presupposed\nhigher self-possession and stability of character, make its victim seem to\nbe beside himself with frenzy. But the main point in derangement is the\ncontradiction which a feeling with a fixed corporeal embodiment sets up\nagainst the whole mass of adjustments forming the concrete consciousness.\nThe mind which is in a condition of mere _being_, and where such being is\nnot rendered fluid in its consciousness, is diseased. The contents which\nare set free in this reversion to mere nature are the self-seeking\naffections of the heart, such as vanity, pride, and the rest of the\npassions\u2014fancies and hopes\u2014merely personal love and hatred. When the\ninfluence of self-possession and of general principles, moral and\ntheoretical, is relaxed, and ceases to keep the natural temper under lock\nand key, the earthly elements are set free\u2014that evil which is always\nlatent in the heart, because the heart as immediate is natural and\nselfish. It is the evil genius of man which gains the upper hand in\ninsanity, but in distinction from and contrast to the better and more\nintelligent part, which is there also. Hence this state is mental\nderangement and distress. The right psychical treatment therefore keeps in\nview the truth that insanity is not an abstract _loss_ of reason (neither\nin the point of intelligence nor of will and its responsibility), but only\nderangement, only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason;\u2014just as\nphysical disease is not an abstract, i.e. mere and total, loss of health\n(if it were that, it would be death), but a contradiction in it. This\nhumane treatment, no less benevolent than reasonable (the services of\nPinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgment), presupposes the\npatient\u2019s rationality, and in that assumption has the sound basis for\ndealing with him on this side\u2014just as in the case of bodily disease the\nphysician bases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains\nhealth.\n\n\n(\u03b3) Habit(125).\n\n\n\u00a7 409. Self-feeling, immersed in the detail of the feelings (in simple\nsensations, and also desires, instincts, passions, and their\ngratification), is undistinguished from them. But in the self there is\nlatent a simple self-relation of ideality, a nominal universality (which\nis the truth of these details): and as so universal, the self is to be\nstamped upon, and made appear in, this life of feeling, yet so as to\ndistinguish itself from the particular details, and be a realised\nuniversality. But this universality is not the full and sterling truth of\nthe specific feelings and desires; what they specifically contain is as\nyet left out of account. And so too the particularity is, as now regarded,\nequally formal; it counts only as the _particular being_ or immediacy of\nthe soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract realisation.\nThis particular being of the soul is the factor of its corporeity; here we\nhave it breaking with this corporeity, distinguishing it from\nitself,\u2014itself a _simple_ being,\u2014and becoming the \u201cideal,\u201d subjective\nsubstantiality of it,\u2014just as in its latent notion (\u00a7 359) it was the\nsubstance, and the mere substance, of it.\n\nBut this abstract realisation of the soul in its corporeal vehicle is not\nyet the self\u2014not the existence of the universal which is for the\nuniversal. It is the corporeity reduced to its mere _ideality_; and so far\nonly does corporeity belong to the soul as such. That is to say, as space\nand time\u2014the abstract one-outside-another, as, in short, empty space and\nempty time\u2014are only subjective form\u2014pure act of intuition; so that pure\nbeing (which through the supersession in it of the particularity of the\ncorporeity, or of the immediate corporeity as such has realised itself) is\nmere intuition and no more, lacking consciousness, but the basis of\nconsciousness. And consciousness it becomes, when the corporeity, of which\nit is the subjective substance, and which still continues to exist, and\nthat as a barrier for it, has been absorbed by it, and it has been\ninvested with the character of self-centred subject.\n\n\u00a7 410. The soul\u2019s making itself an abstract universal being, and reducing\nthe particulars of feelings (and of consciousness) to a mere feature of\nits being is Habit. In this manner the soul has the contents in\npossession, and contains them in such manner that in these features it is\nnot as sentient, nor does it stand in relationship with them as\ndistinguishing itself from them, nor is absorbed in them, but has them and\nmoves in them, without feeling or consciousness of the fact. The soul is\nfreed from them, so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them:\nand whilst existing in these forms as its possession, it is at the same\ntime open to be otherwise occupied and engaged\u2014say with feeling and with\nmental consciousness in general.\n\nThis process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of\nfeeling into the being of the soul appears as a _repetition_ of them, and\nthe generation of habit as _practice_. For, this being of the soul, if in\nrespect of the natural particular phase it be called an abstract\nuniversality to which the former is transmuted, is a reflexive\nuniversality (\u00a7 175); i.e. the one and the same, that recurs in a series\nof units of sensation, is reduced to unity, and this abstract unity\nexpressly stated.\n\nHabit, like memory, is a difficult point in mental organisation: habit is\nthe mechanism of self-feeling, as memory is the mechanism of intelligence.\nThe natural qualities and alterations of age, sleep and waking, are\n\u201cimmediately\u201d natural: habit, on the contrary, is the mode of feeling (as\nwell as intelligence, will, &c., so far as they belong to self-feeling)\nmade into a natural and mechanical existence. Habit is rightly called a\nsecond nature; nature, because it is an immediate being of the soul; a\nsecond nature, because it is an immediacy created by the soul, impressing\nand moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as\nsuch and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken\ncorporeal form (\u00a7 401).\n\nIn habit the human being\u2019s mode of existence is \u201cnatural,\u201d and for that\nreason not free; but still free, so far as the merely natural phase of\nfeeling is by habit reduced to a mere being of _his_, and he is no longer\ninvoluntarily attracted or repelled by it, and so no longer interested,\noccupied, or dependent in regard to it. The want of freedom in habit is\npartly merely formal, as habit merely attaches to the being of the soul;\npartly only relative, so far as it strictly speaking arises only in the\ncase of bad habits, or so far as a habit is opposed by another purpose:\nwhereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of liberty. The\nmain point about Habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from the\nfeelings, even in being affected by them. The different forms of this may\nbe described as follows: (\u03b1) The _immediate_ feeling is negated and\ntreated as indifferent. One who gets inured against external sensations\n(frost, heat, weariness of the limbs, &c., sweet tastes, &c.), and who\nhardens the heart against misfortune, acquires a strength which consists\nin this, that although the frost, &c.\u2014or the misfortune\u2014is felt, the\naffection is deposed to a mere externality and immediacy; the universal\npsychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it, and the\nself-feeling as such, consciousness, reflection, and any other purposes\nand activity, are no longer bothered with it. (\u03b2) There is indifference\ntowards the satisfaction: the desires and impulses are by the _habit_ of\ntheir satisfaction deadened. This is the rational liberation from them;\nwhereas monastic renunciation and forcible interference do not free from\nthem, nor are they in conception rational. Of course in all this it is\nassumed that the impulses are kept as the finite modes they naturally are,\nand that they, like their satisfaction, are subordinated as partial\nfactors to the reasonable will. (\u03b3) In habit regarded as _aptitude_, or\nskill, not merely has the abstract psychical life to be kept intact _per\nse_, but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim, to be made a power in\nthe bodily part, which is rendered subject and thoroughly pervious to it.\nConceived as having the inward purpose of the subjective soul thus imposed\nupon it, the body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier.\nThus comes out the more decided rupture between the soul as simple\nself-concentration, and its earlier naturalness and immediacy; it has lost\nits original and immediate identity with the bodily nature, and as\nexternal has first to be reduced to that position. Specific feelings can\nonly get bodily shape in a perfectly specific way (\u00a7 401); and the\nimmediate portion of body is a particular possibility for a specific aim\n(a particular aspect of its differentiated structure, a particular organ\nof its organic system). To mould such an aim in the organic body is to\nbring out and express the \u201cideality\u201d which is implicit in matter always,\nand especially so in the specific bodily part, and thus to enable the\nsoul, under its volitional and conceptual characters, to exist as\nsubstance in its corporeity. In this way an aptitude shows the corporeity\nrendered completely pervious, made into an instrument, so that when the\nconception (e.g. a series of musical notes) is in me, then without\nresistance and with ease the body gives them correct utterance.\n\nThe form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action. The\nmost external of them, i.e. the spatial direction of an individual, viz.\nhis upright posture, has been by will made a habit\u2014a position taken\nwithout adjustment and without consciousness\u2014which continues to be an\naffair of his persistent will; for the man stands only because and in so\nfar as he wills to stand, and only so long as he wills it without\nconsciousness. Similarly our eyesight is the concrete habit which, without\nan express adjustment, combines in a single act the several modifications\nof sensation, consciousness, intuition, intelligence, &c., which make it\nup. Thinking, too, however free and active in its own pure element it\nbecomes, no less requires habit and familiarity (this impromptuity or form\nof immediacy), by which it is the property of my single self where I can\nfreely and in all directions range. It is through this habit that I come\nto realise my _existence_ as a thinking being. Even here, in this\nspontaneity of self-centred thought, there is a partnership of soul and\nbody (hence, want of habit and too-long-continued thinking cause\nheadache); habit diminishes this feeling, by making the natural function\nan immediacy of the soul. Habit on an ampler scale, and carried out in the\nstrictly intellectual range, is recollection and memory, whereof we shall\nspeak later.\n\nHabit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless, casual and\nparticular. And it is true that the form of habit, like any other, is open\nto anything we chance to put into it; and it is habit of living which\nbrings on death, or, if quite abstract, is death itself: and yet habit is\nindispensable for the _existence_ of all intellectual life in the\nindividual, enabling the subject to be a concrete immediacy, an \u201cideality\u201d\nof soul\u2014enabling the matter of consciousness, religious, moral, &c., to be\nhis as _this_ self, _this_ soul, and no other, and be neither a mere\nlatent possibility, nor a transient emotion or idea, nor an abstract\ninwardness, cut off from action and reality, but part and parcel of his\nbeing. In scientific studies of the soul and the mind, habit is usually\npassed over\u2014either as something contemptible\u2014or rather for the further\nreason that it is one of the most difficult questions of psychology.\n\n\n\n(c) The Actual Soul.(126)\n\n\n\u00a7 411. The Soul, when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly\nits own, finds itself there a _single_ subject; and the corporeity is an\nexternality which stands as a predicate, in being related to which, it is\nrelated to itself. This externality, in other words, represents not\nitself, but the soul, of which it is the _sign_. In this identity of\ninterior and exterior, the latter subject to the former, the soul is\n_actual_: in its corporeity it has its free shape, in which it _feels\nitself_ and makes _itself felt_, and which as the Soul\u2019s work of art has\n_human_ pathognomic and physiognomic expression.\n\nUnder the head of human expression are included, e.g., the upright figure\nin general, and the formation of the limbs, especially the hand, as the\nabsolute instrument, of the mouth\u2014laughter, weeping, &c., and the note of\nmentality diffused over the whole, which at once announces the body at the\nexternality of a higher nature. This note is so slight, indefinite, and\ninexpressible a modification, because the figure in its externality is\nsomething immediate and natural, and can therefore only be an indefinite\nand quite imperfect sign for the mind, unable to represent it in its\nactual universality. Seen from the animal world, the human figure is the\nsupreme phase in which mind makes an appearance. But for the mind it is\nonly its first appearance, while language is its perfect expression. And\nthe human figure, though its proximate phase of existence, is at the same\ntime in its physiognomic and pathognomic quality something contingent to\nit. To try to raise physiognomy and above all cranioscopy (phrenology) to\nthe rank of sciences, was therefore one of the vainest fancies, still\nvainer than a _signatura rerum_, which supposed the shape of a plant to\nafford indication of its medicinal virtue.\n\n\u00a7 412. Implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter; for\nthe soul, in its concentrated self, cuts itself off from its immediate\nbeing, placing the latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of\noffering resistance to its moulding influence. The soul, thus setting in\nopposition its being to its (conscious) self, absorbing it, and making it\nits own, has lost the meaning of mere soul, or the \u201cimmediacy\u201d of mind.\nThe actual soul with its sensation and its concrete self-feeling turned\ninto habit, has implicitly realised the \u2019ideality\u2019 of its qualities; in\nthis externality it has recollected and inwardised itself, and is infinite\nself-relation. This free universality thus made explicit shows the soul\nawaking to the higher stage of the ego, or abstract universality in so far\nas it is _for_ the abstract universality. In this way it gains the\nposition of thinker and subject\u2014specially a subject of the judgment in\nwhich the ego excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural\nfeatures as an object, a world external to it,\u2014but with such respect to\nthat object that in it it is immediately reflected into itself. Thus soul\nrises to become _Consciousness_.\n\n\n\n\nSub-Section B. Phenomenology Of Mind. Consciousness.\n\n\n\u00a7 413. Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of\nmind: the grade of mind as _appearance_. _Ego_ is infinite self-relation\nof mind, but as subjective or as self-certainty. The immediate identity of\nthe natural soul has been raised to this pure \u201cideal\u201d self-identity; and\nwhat the former _contained_ is for this self-subsistent reflection set\nforth as an _object_. The pure abstract freedom of mind lets go from it\nits specific qualities,\u2014the soul\u2019s natural life\u2014to an equal freedom as an\nindependent _object_. It is of this latter, as external to it, that the\n_ego_ is in the first instance aware (conscious), and as such it is\nConsciousness. Ego, as this absolute negativity, is implicitly the\nidentity in the otherness: the _ego_ is itself that other and stretches\nover the object (as if that object were implicitly cancelled)\u2014it is one\nside of the relationship and the whole relationship\u2014the light, which\nmanifests itself and something else too.\n\n\u00a7 414. The self-identity of the mind, thus first made explicit as the Ego,\nis only its abstract formal identity. As _soul_ it was under the phase of\n_substantial_ universality; now, as subjective reflection in itself, it is\nreferred to this substantiality as to its negative, something dark and\nbeyond it. Hence consciousness, like reciprocal dependence in general, is\nthe contradiction between the independence of the two sides and their\nidentity in which they are merged into one. The mind as ego is _essence_;\nbut since reality, in the sphere of essence, is represented as in\nimmediate being and at the same time as \u201cideal,\u201d it is as consciousness\nonly the _appearance_ (phenomenon) of mind.\n\n\u00a7 415. As the ego is by itself only a formal identity, the dialectical\nmovement of its intelligible unity, i.e. the successive steps in further\nspecification of consciousness, does not to it seem to be its own\nactivity, but is implicit, and to the ego it seems an alteration of the\nobject. Consciousness consequently appears differently modified according\nto the difference of the given object; and the gradual specification of\nconsciousness appears as a variation in the characteristics of its\nobjects. Ego, the subject of consciousness, is thinking: the logical\nprocess of modifying the object is what is identical in subject and\nobject, their absolute interdependence, what makes the object the\nsubject\u2019s own.\n\nThe Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed\nthe mind as consciousness, and as containing the propositions only of a\n_phenomenology_ (not of a _philosophy_) of mind. The Ego Kant regards as\nreference to something away and beyond (which in its abstract description\nis termed the thing-at-itself); and it is only from this finite point of\nview that he treats both intellect and will. Though in the notion of a\npower of _reflective_ judgment he touches upon the _Idea_ of mind\u2014a\nsubject-objectivity, an _intuitive intellect_, &c., and even the Idea of\nNature, still this Idea is again deposed to an appearance, i.e. to a\nsubjective maxim (\u00a7 58). Reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly\nappreciated Kantism when he treated it as a theory of consciousness (under\nthe name of \u201cfaculty of ideation\u201d). Fichte kept to the same point of view:\nhis non-ego is only something set over against the ego, only defined as in\n_consciousness_: it is made no more than an infinite \u201cshock,\u201d i.e. a\nthing-in-itself. Both systems therefore have clearly not reached the\nintelligible unity or the mind as it actually and essentially is, but only\nas it is in reference to something else.\n\nAs against Spinozism, again, it is to be noted that the mind in the\njudgment by which it \u201cconstitutes\u201d itself an ego (a free subject\ncontrasted with its qualitative affection) has emerged from substance, and\nthat the philosophy, which gives this judgment as the absolute\ncharacteristic of mind, has emerged from Spinozism.\n\n\u00a7 416. The aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with\nits essence, to raise its _self-certainty to truth_. The _existence_ of\nmind in the stage of consciousness is finite, because it is merely a\nnominal self-relation, or mere certainty. The object is only abstractly\ncharacterised as _its_; in other words, in the object it is only as an\nabstract ego that the mind is reflected into itself: hence its existence\nthere has still a content, which is not as its own.\n\n\u00a7 417. The grades of this elevation of certainty to truth are three in\nnumber: first (_a_) consciousness in general, with an object set against\nit; (_b_) self-consciousness, for which _ego_ is the object; (_c_) unity\nof consciousness and self-consciousness, where the mind sees itself\nembodied in the object and sees itself as implicitly and explicitly\ndeterminate, as Reason, the _notion_ of mind.\n\n\n\n(a) Consciousness Proper(127).\n\n\n(\u03b1) Sensuous consciousness.\n\n\n\u00a7 418. Consciousness is, first, _immediate_ consciousness, and its\nreference to the object accordingly the simple and underived certainty of\nit. The object similarly, being immediate, an existent, reflected in\nitself, is further characterised as immediately singular. This is\nsense-consciousness.\n\nConsciousness\u2014as a case of correlation\u2014comprises only the categories\nbelonging to the abstract ego or formal thinking; and these it treats as\nfeatures of the object (\u00a7 415). Sense-consciousness therefore is aware of\nthe object as an existent, a something, an existing thing, a singular, and\nso on. It appears as wealthiest in matter, but as poorest in thought. That\nwealth of matter is made out of sensations: they are the _material_ of\nconsciousness (\u00a7 414), the substantial and qualitative, what the soul in\nits anthropological sphere is and finds _in itself_. This material the ego\n(the reflection of the soul in itself) separates from itself, and puts it\nfirst under the category of being. Spatial and temporal Singularness,\n_here_ and _now_ (the terms by which in the Phenomenology of the Mind (W.\nII. p. 73), I described the object of sense-consciousness) strictly\nbelongs to _intuition_. At present the object is at first to be viewed\nonly in its correlation to _consciousness_, i.e. a something _external_ to\nit, and not yet as external on its own part, or as being beside and out of\nitself.\n\n\u00a7 419. The _sensible_ as somewhat becomes an _other_: the reflection in\nitself of this _somewhat_, the _thing_, has _many_ properties; and as a\nsingle (thing) in its immediacy has several _predicates_. The muchness of\nthe sense-singular thus becomes a breadth\u2014a variety of relations,\nreflectional attributes, and universalities. These are logical terms\nintroduced by the thinking principle, i.e. in this case by the Ego, to\ndescribe the sensible. But the Ego as itself apparent sees in all this\ncharacterisation a change in the object; and self-consciousness, so\nconstruing the object, is sense-perception.\n\n\n(\u03b2) Sense-perception(128).\n\n\n\u00a7 420. Consciousness, having passed beyond the sensibility, wants to take\nthe object in its truth, not as merely immediate, but as mediated,\nreflected in itself, and universal. Such an object is a combination of\nsense qualities with attributes of wider range by which thought defines\nconcrete relations and connexions. Hence the identity of consciousness\nwith the object passes from the abstract identity of \u201cI am sure\u201d to the\ndefinite identity of \u201cI know, and am aware.\u201d\n\nThe particular grade of consciousness on which Kantism conceives the mind\nis perception: which is also the general point of view taken by ordinary\nconsciousness, and more or less by the sciences. The sensuous certitudes\nof single apperceptions or observations form the starting-point: these are\nsupposed to be elevated to truth, by being regarded in their bearings,\nreflected upon, and on the lines of definite categories turned at the same\ntime into something necessary and universal, viz. _experiences_.\n\n\u00a7 421. This conjunction of individual and universal is admixture\u2014the\nindividual remains at the bottom hard and unaffected by the universal, to\nwhich however it is related. It is therefore a tissue of\ncontradictions\u2014between the single things of sense apperception, which form\nthe alleged ground of general experience, and the universality which has a\nhigher claim to be the essence and ground\u2014between the individuality of a\nthing which, taken in its concrete content, constitutes its independence\nand the various properties which, free from this negative link and from\none another, are independent universal _matters_ (\u00a7 123). This\ncontradiction of the finite which runs through all forms of the logical\nspheres turns out most concrete, when the somewhat is defined as _object_\n(\u00a7 194 seqq.).\n\n\n(\u03b3) The Intellect(129).\n\n\n\u00a7 422. The proximate _truth_ of perception is that it is the object which\nis an _appearance_, and that the object\u2019s reflection in self is on the\ncontrary a self-subsistent inward and universal. The consciousness of such\nan object is _intellect_. This inward, as we called it, of the thing is on\none hand the suppression of the multiplicity of the sensible, and, in that\nmanner, an abstract identity: on the other hand, however, it also for that\nreason contains the multiplicity, but as an interior \u201csimple\u201d difference,\nwhich remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance. This\nsimple difference is the realm of _the laws_ of the phenomena\u2014a copy of\nthe phenomenon, but brought to rest and universality.\n\n\u00a7 423. The law, at first stating the mutual dependence of universal,\npermanent terms, has, in so far as its distinction is the inward one, its\nnecessity on its own part; the one of the terms, as not externally\ndifferent from the other, lies immediately in the other. But in this\nmanner the interior distinction is, what it is in truth, the distinction\non its own part, or the distinction which is none. With this new\nform-characteristic, on the whole, consciousness _implicitly_ vanishes:\nfor consciousness as such implies the reciprocal independence of subject\nand object. The ego in its judgment has an object which is not distinct\nfrom it,\u2014it has itself. Consciousness has passed into self-consciousness.\n\n\n\n(b) Self-consciousness(130).\n\n\n\u00a7 424. _Self-consciousness_ is the truth of consciousness: the latter is a\nconsequence of the former, all consciousness of an other object being as a\nmatter of fact also self-consciousness. The object is my idea: I am aware\nof the object as mine; and thus in it I am aware of me. The formula of\nself-consciousness is I = I:\u2014abstract freedom, pure \u201cideality.\u201d In so far\nit lacks \u201creality\u201d: for as it is its own object, there is strictly\nspeaking no object, because there is no distinction between it and the\nobject.\n\n\u00a7 425. Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness,\nand for that reason it is burdened with an external object, or, nominally,\nwith the negation of it. Thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage,\nconsciousness: it is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and\nas consciousness. But the latter aspect and the negation in general is in\nI = I potentially suppressed; and hence as this certitude of self against\nthe object it is the _impulse_ to realise its implicit nature, by giving\nits abstract self-awareness content and objectivity, and in the other\ndirection to free itself from its sensuousness, to set aside the given\nobjectivity and identify it with itself. The two processes are one and the\nsame, the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness.\n\n\n(\u03b1) Appetite or Instinctive Desire(131).\n\n\n\u00a7 426. Self-consciousness, in its immediacy, is a singular, and a desire\n(appetite),\u2014the contradiction implied in its abstraction which should yet\nbe objective,\u2014or in its immediacy which has the shape of an external\nobject and should be subjective. The certitude of one\u2019s self, which issues\nfrom the suppression of mere consciousness, pronounces the _object_ null:\nand the outlook of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies\nthe abstract ideality of such self-consciousness as null.\n\n\u00a7 427. Self-consciousness, therefore, knows itself implicit in the object,\nwhich in this outlook is conformable to the appetite. In the negation of\nthe two one-sided moments by the ego\u2019s own activity, this identity comes\nto be _for_ the ego. To this activity the object, which implicitly and for\nself-consciousness is self-less, can make no resistance: the dialectic,\nimplicit in it, towards self-suppression exists in this case as that\nactivity of the ego. Thus while the given object is rendered subjective,\nthe subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness and becomes objective\nto itself.\n\n\u00a7 428. The product of this process is the fast conjunction of the ego with\nitself, its satisfaction realised, and itself made actual. On the external\nside it continues, in this return upon itself, primarily describable as an\nindividual, and maintains itself as such; because its bearing upon the\nself-less object is purely negative, the latter, therefore, being merely\nconsumed. Thus appetite in its satisfaction is always destructive, and in\nits content selfish: and as the satisfaction has only happened in the\nindividual (and that is transient) the appetite is again generated in the\nvery act of satisfaction.\n\n\u00a7 429. But on the inner side, or implicitly, the sense of self which the\nego gets in the satisfaction does not remain in abstract\nself-concentration or in mere individuality; on the contrary,\u2014as negation\nof _immediacy_ and individuality the result involves a character of\nuniversality and of the identity of self-consciousness with its object.\nThe judgment or diremption of this self-consciousness is the consciousness\nof a \u201c_free_\u201d object, in which ego is aware of itself as an ego, which\nhowever is _also_ still outside it.\n\n\n(\u03b2) Self-consciousness Recognitive(132).\n\n\n\u00a7 430. Here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness, at\nfirst immediately as one of two things for another. In that other as ego I\nbehold myself, and yet also an immediately existing object, another ego\nabsolutely independent of me and opposed to me. (The suppression of the\nsingleness of self-consciousness was only a first step in the suppression,\nand it merely led to the characterisation of it as _particular_.) This\ncontradiction gives either self-consciousness the impulse to _show_ itself\nas a free self, and to exist as such for the other:\u2014the process of\n_recognition_.\n\n\u00a7 431. The process is a battle. I cannot be aware of me as myself in\nanother individual, so long as I see in that other an other and an\nimmediate existence: and I am consequently bent upon the suppression of\nthis immediacy of his. But in like measure _I_ cannot be recognised as\nimmediate, except so far as I overcome the mere immediacy on my own part,\nand thus give existence to my freedom. But this immediacy is at the same\ntime the corporeity of self-consciousness, in which as in its sign and\ntool the latter has its own _sense of self_, and its being _for others_,\nand the means for entering into relation with them.\n\n\u00a7 432. The fight of recognition is a life and death struggle: either\nself-consciousness imperils the other\u2019s like, and incurs a like peril for\nits own\u2014but only peril, for either is no less bent on maintaining his\nlife, as the existence of his freedom. Thus the death of one, though by\nthe abstract, therefore rude, negation of immediacy, it, from one point of\nview, solves the contradiction, is yet, from the essential point of view\n(i.e. the outward and visible recognition), a new contradiction (for that\nrecognition is at the same time undone by the other\u2019s death) and a greater\nthan the other.\n\n\u00a7 433. But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution, the\nfight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality.\nWhile the one combatant prefers life, retains his single\nself-consciousness, but surrenders his claim for recognition, the other\nholds fast to his self-assertion and is recognised by the former as his\nsuperior. Thus arises the status of _master and slave_.\n\nIn the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master, we see,\non their phenomenal side, the emergence of man\u2019s social life and the\ncommencement of political union. _Force_, which is the basis of this\nphenomenon, is not on that account a basis of right, but only the\nnecessary and legitimate factor in the passage from the state of\nself-consciousness sunk in appetite and selfish isolation into the state\nof universal self-consciousness. Force, then, is the external or\nphenomenal commencement of states, not their underlying and essential\nprinciple.\n\n\u00a7 434. This status, in the first place, implies _common_ wants and common\nconcern for their satisfaction,\u2014for the means of mastery, the slave, must\nlikewise be kept in life. In place of the rude destruction of the\nimmediate object there ensues acquisition, preservation, and formation of\nit, as the instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and\nnon-independence are welded together. The form of universality thus\narising in satisfying the want, creates a _permanent_ means and a\nprovision which takes care for and secures the future.\n\n\u00a7 435. But secondly, when we look to the distinction of the two, the\nmaster beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his\n_single_ self-hood, and that by the suppression of immediate self-hood, a\nsuppression, however, which falls on another. This other, the slave,\nhowever, in the service of the master, works off his individualist\nself-will, overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite, and in this\ndivestment of self and in \u201cthe fear of his lord\u201d makes \u201cthe beginning of\nwisdom\u201d\u2014the passage to universal self-consciousness.\n\n\n(\u03b3) Universal Self-consciousness.\n\n\n\u00a7 436. Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self\nin an other self: each self as a free individuality has his own \u201cabsolute\u201d\nindependence, yet in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite\nwithout distinguishing itself from that other. Each is thus universal\nself-conscious and objective; each has \u201creal\u201d universality in the shape of\nreciprocity, so far as each knows itself recognised in the other freeman,\nand is aware of this in so far as it recognises the other and knows him to\nbe free.\n\nThis universal re-appearance of self-consciousness\u2014the notion which is\naware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself\nand for that reason universal\u2014is the form of consciousness which lies at\nthe root of all true mental or spiritual life\u2014in family, fatherland,\nstate, and of all virtues, love, friendship, valour, honour, fame. But\nthis appearance of the underlying essence may be severed from that\nessential, and be maintained apart in worthless honour, idle fame, &c.\n\n\u00a7 437. This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness implies in the\nfirst instance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other.\nBut the difference between those who are thus identified is mere vague\ndiversity\u2014or rather it is a difference which is none. Hence its truth is\nthe fully and really existent universality and objectivity of\nself-consciousness,\u2014which is _Reason_.\n\nReason, as the _Idea_ (\u00a7 213) as it here appears, is to be taken as\nmeaning that the distinction between notion and reality which it unifies\nhas the special aspect of a distinction between the self-concentrated\nnotion or consciousness, and the object subsisting external and opposed to\nit.\n\n\n\n(c) Reason(133).\n\n\n\u00a7 438. The essential and actual truth which reason is, lies in the simple\nidentity of the subjectivity of the notion, with its objectivity and\nuniversality. The universality of reason, therefore, whilst it signifies\nthat the object, which was only given in consciousness _qu\u00e2_\nconsciousness, is now itself universal, permeating and encompassing the\nego, also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form which overlaps the\nobject, and encompasses it without it.\n\n\u00a7 439. Self-consciousness, thus certified that its determinations are no\nless objective, or determinations of the very being of things, than they\nare its own thoughts, is Reason, which as such an identity is not only the\nabsolute _substance_, but the _truth_ that knows it. For truth here has,\nas its peculiar mode and immanent form, the self-centred pure notion, ego,\nthe certitude of self as infinite universality. Truth, aware of what it\nis, is mind (spirit).\n\n\n\n\nSub-Section C. Psychology. Mind(134).\n\n\n\u00a7 440. Mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness,\u2014the\nformer a simple immediate totality, the latter now an infinite form which\nis not, like consciousness, restricted by that content, and does not stand\nin mere correlation to it as to its object, but is an awareness of this\nsubstantial totality, neither subjective nor objective. Mind, therefore,\nstarts only from its own being and is in correlation only with its own\nfeatures.\n\nPsychology accordingly studies the faculties or general modes of mental\nactivity _qu\u00e2_ mental\u2014mental vision, ideation, remembering, &c., desires,\n&c.\u2014apart both from the content, which on the phenomenal side is found in\nempirical ideation, in thinking also and in desire and will, and from the\ntwo forms in which these modes exist, viz. in the soul as a physical mode,\nand in consciousness itself as a separately existent object of that\nconsciousness. This, however, is not an arbitrary abstraction by the\npsychologist. Mind is just this elevation above nature and physical modes,\nand above the complication with an external object\u2014in one word, above the\nmaterial, as its concept has just shown. All it has now to do is to\nrealise this notion of its freedom, and get rid of the _form_ of immediacy\nwith which it once more begins. The content which is elevated to\nintuitions is _its_ sensations: it is _its_ intuitions also which are\ntransmuted into representations, and its representations which are\ntransmuted again into thoughts, &c.\n\n\u00a7 441. The soul is finite, so far as its features are immediate or\ncon-natural. Consciousness is finite, in so far as it has an object. Mind\nis finite, in so far as, though it no longer has an object, it has a mode\nin its knowledge; i.e., it is finite by means of its immediacy, or, what\nis the same thing, by being subjective or only a notion. And it is a\nmatter of no consequence, which is defined as its notion, and which as the\nreality of that notion. Say that its notion is the utterly infinite\nobjective reason, then its reality is knowledge or _intelligence_: say\nthat knowledge is its notion, then its reality is that reason, and the\nrealisation of knowledge consists in appropriating reason. Hence the\nfinitude of mind is to be placed in the (temporary) failure of knowledge\nto get hold of the full reality of its reason, or, equally, in the\n(temporary) failure of reason to attain full manifestation in knowledge.\nReason at the same time is only infinite so far as it is \u201cabsolute\u201d\nfreedom; so far, that is, as presupposing itself for its knowledge to work\nupon, it thereby reduces itself to finitude, and appears as everlasting\nmovement of superseding this immediacy, of comprehending itself, and being\na rational knowledge.\n\n\u00a7 442. The progress of mind is _development_, in so far as its existent\nphase, viz. knowledge, involves as its intrinsic purpose and burden that\nutter and complete autonomy which is rationality; in which case the action\nof translating this purpose into reality is strictly only a nominal\npassage over into manifestation, and is even there a return into itself.\nSo far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original quality of\n_mere_ knowledge is only abstract or formal, the goal of mind is to give\nit objective fulfilment, and thus at the same time produce its freedom.\n\nThe development here meant is not that of the individual (which has a\ncertain _anthropological_ character), where faculties and forces are\nregarded as successively emerging and presenting themselves in external\nexistence\u2014a series of steps, on the ascertainment on which there was for a\nlong time great stress laid (by the system of Condillac), as if a\nconjectural natural emergence could exhibit the origin of these faculties\nand _explain_ them. In Condillac\u2019s method there is an unmistakable\nintention to show how the _several_ modes of mental activity could be made\nintelligible without losing sight of mental unity, and to exhibit their\nnecessary interconnexion. But the categories employed in doing so are of a\nwretched sort. Their ruling principle is that the sensible is taken (and\nwith justice) as the _prius_ or the initial basis, but that the later\nphases that follow this starting-point present themselves as emerging in a\nsolely _affirmative_ manner, and the negative aspect of mental activity,\nby which this material is transmuted into mind and destroyed _as_ a\nsensible, is misconceived and overlooked. As the theory of Condillac\nstates it, the sensible is not merely the empirical first, but is left as\nif it were the true and essential foundation.\n\nSimilarly, if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations,\nforces, perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some\nother interest of head or heart, there is no indication of the true final\naim of the whole business. That can only be the intelligible unity of\nmind, and its activity can only have itself as aim; i.e. its aim can only\nbe to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity, to reach and get\nhold of itself, and to liberate itself to itself. In this way the\nso-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated\nas steps of this liberation. And this is the only _rational_ mode of\nstudying the mind and its various activities.\n\n\u00a7 443. As consciousness has for its object the stage which preceded it,\nviz. the natural soul (\u00a7 413), so mind has or rather makes consciousness\nits object: i.e. whereas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the\nego with its other (\u00a7 415), the mind realises that identity as the\nconcrete unity which it and it only knows. Its productions are governed by\nthe principle of all reason that the contents are at once potentially\nexistent, and are the mind\u2019s own, in freedom. Thus, if we consider the\ninitial aspect of mind, that aspect is twofold\u2014as _being_ and as _its\nown_: by the one, the mind finds in itself something which _is_, by the\nother it affirms it to be only _its own_. The way of mind is therefore\n\n(_a_) to be theoretical: it has to do with the rational as its immediate\naffection which it must render its own: or it has to free knowledge from\nits pre-supposedness and therefore from its abstractness, and make the\naffection subjective. When the affection has been rendered its own, and\nthe knowledge consequently characterised as free intelligence, i.e. as\nhaving its full and free characterisation in itself, it is\n\n(_b_) Will: _practical_ mind, which in the first place is likewise\nformal\u2014i.e. its content is at first _only_ its own, and is immediately\nwilled; and it proceeds next to liberate its volition from its\nsubjectivity, which is the one-sided form of its contents, so that it\n\n(_c_) confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of both its defects\nof one-sidedness.\n\n\u00a7 444. The theoretical as well as the practical mind still fall under the\ngeneral range of Mind Subjective. They are not to be distinguished as\nactive and passive. Subjective mind is productive: but it is a merely\nnominal productivity. Inwards, the theoretical mind produces only its\n\u201cideal\u201d world, and gains abstract autonomy within; while the practical,\nwhile it has to do with autonomous products, with a material which is its\nown, has a material which is only nominally such, and therefore a\nrestricted content, for which it gains the form of universality. Outwards,\nthe subjective mind (which as a unity of soul and consciousness, is thus\nalso a reality,\u2014a reality at once anthropological and conformable to\nconsciousness) has for its products, in the theoretical range, the _word_,\nand in the practical (not yet deed and action, but) _enjoyment_.\n\nPsychology, like logic, is one of those sciences which in modern times\nhave yet derived least profit from the more general mental culture and the\ndeeper conception of reason. It is still extremely ill off. The turn which\nthe Kantian philosophy has taken has given it greater importance: it has,\nand that in its empirical condition, been claimed as the basis of\nmetaphysics, which is to consist of nothing but the empirical apprehension\nand the analysis of the facts of human consciousness, merely as facts,\njust as they are given. This position of psychology, mixing it up with\nforms belonging to the range of consciousness and with anthropology, has\nled to no improvement in its own condition: but it has had the further\neffect that, both for the mind as such, and for metaphysics and philosophy\ngenerally, all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain the necessity of\nessential and actual reality, to get at the notion and the truth.\n\n\n\n(a) Theoretical mind.\n\n\n\u00a7 445. Intelligence(135) _finds_ itself determined: this is its apparent\naspect from which in its immediacy it starts. But as knowledge,\nintelligence consists in treating what is found as its own. Its activity\nhas to do with the empty form\u2014the pretence of _finding_ reason: and its\naim is to realise its concept or to be reason actual, along with which the\ncontent is realised as rational. This activity is _cognition_. The nominal\nknowledge, which is only certitude, elevates itself, as reason is\nconcrete, to definite and conceptual knowledge. The course of this\nelevation is itself rational, and consists in a necessary passage\n(governed by the concept) of one grade or term of intelligent activity (a\nso-called faculty of mind) into another. The refutation which such\ncognition gives of the semblance that the rational is _found_, starts from\nthe certitude or the faith of intelligence in its capability of rational\nknowledge, and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason,\nwhich it and the content virtually is.\n\nThe distinction of Intelligence from Will is often incorrectly taken to\nmean that each has a fixed and separate existence of its own, as if\nvolition could be without intelligence, or the activity of intelligence\ncould be without will. The possibility of a culture of the intellect which\nleaves the heart untouched, as it is said, and of the heart without the\nintellect\u2014of hearts which in one-sided way want intellect, and heartless\nintellects\u2014only proves at most that bad and radically untrue existences\noccur. But it is not philosophy which should take such untruths of\nexistence and of mere imagining for truth\u2014take the worthless for the\nessential nature. A host of other phrases used of intelligence, e.g. that\nit receives and accepts impressions from outside, that ideas arise through\nthe causal operations of external things upon it, &c., belong to a point\nof view utterly alien to the mental level or to the position of\nphilosophic study.\n\nA favourite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul,\nintelligence, or mind. Faculty, like power or force, is the fixed quality\nof any object of thought, conceived as reflected into self. Force (\u00a7 136)\nis no doubt the infinity of form\u2014of the inward and the outward: but its\nessential finitude involves the indifference of content to form (ib.\nnote). In this lies the want of organic unity which by this reflectional\nform, treating mind as a \u201clot\u201d of forces, is brought into mind, as it is\nby the same method brought into nature. Any aspect which can be\ndistinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity,\nand the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection. It makes\nabsolutely no difference if we substitute the expression \u201cactivities\u201d for\npowers and faculties. Isolate the activities and you similarly make the\nmind a mere aggregate, and treat their essential correlation as an\nexternal incident.\n\nThe action of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called _cognition_\n(knowledge). Yet this does not mean intelligence _inter alia_\nknows,\u2014besides which it also intuites, conceives, remembers, imagines, &c.\nTo take up such a position is in the first instance part and parcel of\nthat isolating of mental activity just censured; but it is also in\naddition connected with the great question of modern times, as to whether\ntrue knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible,\u2014which, if answered\nin the negative, must lead to abandoning the effort. The numerous aspects\nand reasons and modes of phrase with which external reflection swells the\nbulk of this question are cleared up in their place: the more external the\nattitude of understanding in the question, the more diffuse it makes a\nsimple object. At the present place the simple concept of cognition is\nwhat confronts the quite general assumption taken up by the question, viz.\nthe assumption that the possibility of true knowledge in general is in\ndispute, and the assumption that it is possible for us at our will either\nto prosecute or to abandon cognition. The concept or possibility of\ncognition has come out as intelligence itself, as the certitude of reason:\nthe act of cognition itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence. It\nfollows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligence and yet at\nthe same time of the possibility or choice of knowing or not. But\ncognition is genuine, just so far as it realises itself, or makes the\nconcept its own. This nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly\nwhere cognition has it. The stages of its realising activity are\nintuition, conception, memory, &c.: these activities have no other\nimmanent meaning: their aim is solely the concept of cognition (\u00a7 445\nnote). If they are isolated, however, then an impression is implied that\nthey are useful for something else than cognition, or that they severally\nprocure a cognitive satisfaction of their own; and that leads to a\nglorification of the delights of intuition, remembrance, imagination. It\nis true that even as isolated (i.e. as non-intelligent), intuition,\nimagination, &c. can afford a certain satisfaction: what physical nature\nsucceeds in doing by its fundamental quality\u2014its\nout-of-selfness,\u2014exhibiting the elements or factors of immanent reason\nexternal to each other,\u2014that the intelligence can do by voluntary act, but\nthe same result may happen where the intelligence is itself only natural\nand untrained. But the _true satisfaction_, it is admitted, is only\nafforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind, by rational\nconception, by products of imagination which are permeated by reason and\nexhibit ideas\u2014in a word, by _cognitive_ intuition, cognitive conception,\n&c. The truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this, that intuition,\nconception, &c. are not isolated, and exist only as \u201cmoments\u201d in the\ntotality of cognition itself.\n\n\n(\u03b1) Intuition (Intelligent Perception)(136).\n\n\n\u00a7 446. The mind which as soul is physically conditioned,\u2014which as\nconsciousness stands to this condition on the same terms as to an outward\nobject,\u2014but which as intelligence _finds itself_ so characterised\u2014is (1)\nan inarticulate embryonic life, in which it is to itself as it were\npalpable and has the whole _material_ of its knowledge. In consequence of\nthe immediacy in which it is thus originally, it is in this stage only as\nan individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity. It thus appears as mind\nin the guise of _feeling_.\n\nIf feeling formerly turned up (\u00a7 399) as a mode of the _soul\u2019s_ existence,\nthe finding of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be\nconceived as a congenital or corporeal condition; whereas at present it is\nonly to be taken abstractly in the general sense of immediacy.\n\n\u00a7 447. The characteristic form of feeling is that though it is a mode of\nsome \u201caffection,\u201d this mode is simple. Hence feeling, even should its\nimport be most sterling and true, has the form of casual\nparticularity,\u2014not to mention that its import may also be the most scanty\nand most untrue.\n\nIt is commonly enough assumed that mind has in its feeling the material of\nits ideas, but the statement is more usually understood in a sense the\nopposite of that which it has here. In contrast with the simplicity of\nfeeling it is usual rather to assume that the primary mental phase is\njudgment generally, or the distinction of consciousness into subject and\nobject; and the special quality of sensation is derived from an\nindependent _object_, external or internal. With us, in the truth of mind,\nthe mere consciousness point of view, as opposed to true mental\n\u201cidealism,\u201d is swallowed up, and the matter of feeling has rather been\nsupposed already as _immanent_ in the mind.\u2014It is commonly taken for\ngranted that as regards content there is more in feeling than in thought:\nthis being specially affirmed of moral and religious feelings. Now the\nmaterial, which the mind as it feels is to itself, is _here_ the result\nand the mature result of a fully organised reason: hence under the head of\nfeeling is comprised all rational and indeed all spiritual content\nwhatever. But the form of selfish singleness to which feeling reduces the\nmind is the lowest and worst vehicle it can have\u2014one in which it is not\nfound as a free and infinitely universal principle, but rather as\nsubjective and private, in content and value entirely contingent. Trained\nand sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind which has acquired\nthe consciousness of the true differences of things, of their essential\nrelationships and real characters; and it is with such a mind that this\nrectified material enters into its feeling and receives this form. Feeling\nis the immediate, as it were the closest, contact in which the thinking\nsubject can stand to a given content. Against that content the subject\nre-acts first of all with its particular self-feeling, which though it\n_may_ be of more sterling value and of wider range than a onesided\nintellectual standpoint, may just as likely be narrow and poor; and in any\ncase is the form of the particular and subjective. If a man on any topic\nappeals not to the nature and notion of the thing, or at least to\nreasons\u2014to the generalities of common sense\u2014but to his feeling, the only\nthing to do is to let him alone, because by his behaviour he refuses to\nhave any lot or part in common rationality, and shuts himself up in his\nown isolated subjectivity\u2014his private and particular self.\n\n\u00a7 448. (2) As this immediate finding is broken up into elements, we have\nthe one factor in _Attention_\u2014the abstract _identical_ direction of mind\n(in feeling, as also in all other more advanced developments of it)\u2014an\nactive self-collection\u2014the factor of fixing it as our own, but with an as\nyet only nominal autonomy of intelligence. Apart from such attention there\nis nothing for the mind. The other factor is to invest the special quality\nof feeling, as contrasted with this inwardness of mind, with the character\nof something existent, but as a _negative_ or as the abstract otherness of\nitself. Intelligence thus defines the content of sensation as something\nthat is out of itself, projects it into time and space, which are the\nforms in which it is intuitive. To the view of consciousness the material\nis only an object of consciousness, a relative other: from mind it\nreceives the rational characteristic of being _its very other_ (\u00a7\u00a7 147,\n254).\n\n\u00a7 449. (3) When intelligence reaches a concrete unity of the two factors,\nthat is to say, when it is at once self-collected in this externally\nexisting material, and yet in this self-collectedness sunk in the\nout-of-selfness, it is _Intuition_ or Mental Vision.\n\n\u00a7 450. At and towards this its own out-of-selfness, intelligence no less\nessentially directs its attention. In this its immediacy it is an awaking\nto itself, a recollection of itself. Thus intuition becomes a concretion\nof the material with the intelligence, which makes it its own, so that it\nno longer needs this immediacy, no longer needs to find the content.\n\n\n(\u03b2) Representation (or Mental Idea)(137).\n\n\n\u00a7 451. Representation is this recollected or inwardised intuition, and as\nsuch is the middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds\nitself immediately subject to modification and that where intelligence is\nin its freedom, or, as thought. The representation is the property of\nintelligence; with a preponderating subjectivity, however, as its right of\nproperty is still conditioned by contrast with the immediacy, and the\nrepresentation cannot as it stands be said to _be_. The path of\nintelligence in representations is to render the immediacy inward, to\ninvest itself with intuitive action in itself, and at the same time to get\nrid of the subjectivity of the inwardness, and inwardly divest itself of\nit; so as to be in itself in an externality of its own. But as\nrepresentation begins from intuition and the ready-found material of\nintuition, the intuitional contrast still continues to affect its\nactivity, and makes its concrete products still \u201csyntheses,\u201d which do not\ngrow to the concrete immanence of the notion till they reach the stage of\nthought.\n\n\n(\u03b1\u03b1) Recollection(138).\n\n\n\u00a7 452. Intelligence, as it at first recollects the intuition, places the\ncontent of feeling in its own inwardness\u2014in a space and a time of its own.\nIn this way that content is (1) an _image_ or picture, liberated from its\noriginal immediacy and abstract singleness amongst other things, and\nreceived into the universality of the ego. The image loses the full\ncomplement of features proper to intuition, and is arbitrary or\ncontingent, isolated, we may say, from the external place, time, and\nimmediate context in which the intuition stood.\n\n\u00a7 453. (2) The image is of itself transient, and intelligence itself is as\nattention its time and also its place, its when and where. But\nintelligence is not only consciousness and actual existence, but _qu\u00e2_\nintelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own\nspecialisations. The image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent,\nbut stored up out of consciousness.\n\nTo grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which is stored a\nworld of infinitely many images and representations, yet without being in\nconsciousness, is from the one point of view the universal postulate which\nbids us treat the notion as concrete, in the way we treat e.g. the germ as\naffirmatively containing, in virtual possibility, all the qualities that\ncome into existence in the subsequent development of the tree. Inability\nto grasp a universal like this, which, though intrinsically concrete,\nstill continues _simple_, is what has led people to talk about special\nfibres and areas as receptacles of particular ideas. It was felt that what\nwas diverse should in the nature of things have a local habitation\npeculiar to itself. But whereas the reversion of the germ from its\nexisting specialisations to its simplicity in a purely potential existence\ntakes place only in another germ,\u2014the germ of the fruit; intelligence\n_qu\u00e2_ intelligence shows the potential coming to free existence in its\ndevelopment, and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness.\nHence from the other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as this\nsub-conscious mine, i.e. as the _existent_ universal in which the\ndifferent has not yet been realised in its separations. And it is indeed\nthis potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in\nmental representation.\n\n\u00a7 454. (3) An image thus abstractly treasured up needs, if it is to exist,\nan actual intuition: and what is strictly called Remembrance is the\nreference of the image to an intuition,\u2014and that as a subsumption of the\nimmediate single intuition (impression) under what is in point of form\nuniversal, under the representation (idea) with the same content. Thus\nintelligence recognises the specific sensation and the intuition of it as\nwhat is already its own,\u2014in them it is still within itself: at the same\ntime it is aware that what is only its (primarily) internal image is also\nan immediate object of intuition, by which it is authenticated. The image,\nwhich in the mine of intelligence was only its _property_, now that it has\nbeen endued with externality, comes actually into its _possession_. And so\nthe image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and\nseparable from the blank night in which it was originally submerged.\nIntelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property, and\ndispense with external intuition for its existence in it. This \u201csynthesis\u201d\nof the internal image with the recollected existence is _representation_\nproper: by this synthesis the internal now has the qualification of being\nable to be presented before intelligence and to have its existence in it.\n\n\n(\u03b2\u03b2) Imagination(139).\n\n\n\u00a7 455. (1) The intelligence which is active in this possession is the\n_reproductive imagination_, where the images issue from the inward world\nbelonging to the ego, which is now the power over them. The images are in\nthe first instance referred to this external, immediate time and space\nwhich is treasured up along with them. But it is solely in the conscious\nsubject, where it is treasured up, that the image has the individuality in\nwhich the features composing it are conjoined: whereas their original\nconcretion, i.e. at first only in space and time, as a _unit_ of\nintuition, has been broken up. The content reproduced, belonging as it\ndoes to the self-identical unity of intelligence, and an out-put from its\nuniversal mine, has a general idea (representation) to supply the link of\nassociation for the images which according to circumstances are more\nabstract or more concrete ideas.\n\nThe so-called _laws of the association of ideas_ were objects of great\ninterest, especially during that outburst of empirical psychology which\nwas contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy. In the first place, it\nis not _Ideas_ (properly so called) which are associated. Secondly, these\nmodes of relation are not _laws_, just for the reason that there are so\nmany laws about the same thing, as to suggest a caprice and a contingency\nopposed to the very nature of law. It is a matter of chance whether the\nlink of association is something pictorial, or an intellectual category,\nsuch as likeness and contrast, reason and consequence. The train of images\nand representations suggested by association is the sport of vacant-minded\nideation, where, though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal\nuniversality, the matter is entirely pictorial.\u2014Image and idea, if we\nleave out of account the more precise definition of those forms given\nabove, present also a distinction in content. The former is the more\nconsciously-concrete idea, whereas the idea (representation), whatever be\nits content (from image, notion, or idea), has always the peculiarity,\nthough belonging to intelligence, of being in respect of its content given\nand immediate. It is still true of this idea or representation, as of all\nintelligence, that it finds its material, as a matter of fact, to _be_ so\nand so; and the universality which the aforesaid material receives by\nideation is still abstract. Mental representation is the mean in the\nsyllogism of the elevation of intelligence, the link between the two\nsignifications of self-relatedness\u2014viz. _being_ and _universality_, which\nin consciousness receive the title of object and subject. Intelligence\ncomplements what is merely found by the attribution of universality, and\nthe internal and its own by the attribution of being, but a being of its\nown institution. (On the distinction of representations and thoughts, see\nIntrod. to the Logic, \u00a7 20 note.)\n\nAbstraction, which occurs in the ideational activity by which general\nideas are produced (and ideas _qu\u00e2_ ideas virtually have the form of\ngenerality), is frequently explained as the incidence of many similar\nimages one upon another and is supposed to be thus made intelligible. If\nthis super-imposing is to be no mere accident and without principle, a\nforce of attraction in like images must be assumed, or something of the\nsort, which at the same time would have the negative power of rubbing off\nthe dissimilar elements against each other. This force is really\nintelligence itself,\u2014the self-identical ego which by its internalising\nrecollection gives the images _ipso facto_ generality, and subsumes the\nsingle intuition under the already internalised image (\u00a7 453).\n\n\u00a7 456. Thus even the association of ideas is to be treated as a\nsubsumption of the individual under the universal, which forms their\nconnecting link. But here intelligence is more than merely a general form:\nits inwardness is an internally definite, concrete subjectivity with a\nsubstance and value of its own, derived from some interest, some latent\nconcept or Ideal principle, so far as we may by anticipation speak of\nsuch. Intelligence is the power which wields the stores of images and\nideas belonging to it, and which thus (2) freely combines and subsumes\nthese stores in obedience to its peculiar tenor. Such is creative\nimagination(140)\u2014symbolic, allegoric, or poetical imagination\u2014where the\nintelligence gets a definite embodiment in this store of ideas and informs\nthem with its general tone. These more or less concrete, individualised\ncreations are still \u201csyntheses\u201d: for the material, in which the subjective\nprinciples and ideas get a mentally pictorial existence, is derived from\nthe data of intuition.\n\n\u00a7 457. In creative imagination intelligence has been so far perfected as\nto need no helps for intuition. Its self-sprung ideas have pictorial\nexistence. This pictorial creation of its intuitive spontaneity is\nsubjective\u2014still lacks the side of existence. But as the creation unites\nthe internal idea with the vehicle of materialisation, intelligence has\ntherein _implicitly_ returned both to identical self-relation and to\nimmediacy. As reason, its first start was to appropriate the immediate\ndatum in itself (\u00a7\u00a7 445, 455), i.e. to universalise it; and now its action\nas reason (\u00a7 458) is from the present point directed towards giving the\ncharacter of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete\nauto-intuition. In other words, it aims at making itself _be_ and be a\nfact. Acting on this view, it is self-uttering, intuition-producing: the\nimagination which creates signs.\n\nProductive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being,\none\u2019s own and what is picked up, internal and external, are completely\nwelded into one. The preceding \u201csyntheses\u201d of intuition, recollection,\n&c., are unifications of the same factors, but they are \u201csyntheses\u201d; it is\nnot till creative imagination that intelligence ceases to be the vague\nmine and the universal, and becomes an individuality, a concrete\nsubjectivity, in which the self-reference is defined both to being and to\nuniversality. The creations of imagination are on all hands recognised as\nsuch combinations of the mind\u2019s own and inward with the matter of\nintuition; what further and more definite aspects they have is a matter\nfor other departments. For the present this internal studio of\nintelligence is only to be looked at in these abstract\naspects.\u2014Imagination, when regarded as the agency of this unification, is\nreason, but only a nominal reason, because the matter or theme it embodies\nis to imagination _qu\u00e2_ imagination a matter of indifference; whilst\nreason _qu\u00e2_ reason also insists upon the _truth_ of its content.\n\nAnother point calling for special notice is that, when imagination\nelevates the internal meaning to an image and intuition, and this is\nexpressed by saying that it gives the former the character of an\n_existent_, the phrase must not seem surprising that intelligence makes\nitself _be_ as a _thing_; for its ideal import is itself, and so is the\naspect which it imposes upon it. The image produced by imagination of an\nobject is a bare mental or subjective intuition: in the sign or symbol it\nadds intuitability proper; and in mechanical memory it completes, so far\nas it is concerned, this form of _being_.\n\n\u00a7 458. In this unity (initiated by intelligence) of an independent\nrepresentation with an intuition, the matter of the latter is, in the\nfirst instance, something accepted, somewhat immediate or given (e.g. the\ncolour of the cockade, &c.). But in the fusion of the two elements, the\nintuition does not count positively or as representing itself, but as\nrepresentative of something else. It is an image, which has received as\nits soul and meaning an independent mental representation. This intuition\nis the _Sign_.\n\nThe sign is some immediate intuition, representing a totally different\nimport from what naturally belongs to it; it is the pyramid into which a\nforeign soul has been conveyed, and where it is conserved. The _sign_ is\ndifferent from the _symbol_: for in the symbol the original characters (in\nessence and conception) of the visible object are more or less identical\nwith the import which it bears as symbol; whereas in the sign, strictly\nso-called, the natural attributes of the intuition, and the connotation of\nwhich it is a sign, have nothing to do with each other. Intelligence\ntherefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in the use of\nintuitions when it treats them as designatory (significative) rather than\nas symbolical.\n\nIn logic and psychology, signs and language are usually foisted in\nsomewhere as an appendix, without any trouble being taken to display their\nnecessity and systematic place in the economy of intelligence. The right\nplace for the sign is that just given: where intelligence\u2014which as\nintuiting generates the form of time and space, but is apparently\nrecipient of sensible matter, out of which it forms ideas\u2014now gives its\nown original ideas a definite existence from itself, treating the\nintuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own property, deleting\nthe connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it, and conferring\non it an other connotation as its soul and import. This sign-creating\nactivity may be distinctively named \u201cproductive\u201d Memory (the primarily\nabstract \u201cMnemosyne\u201d); since memory, which in ordinary life is often used\nas interchangeable and synonymous with remembrance (recollection), and\neven with conception and imagination, has always to do with signs only.\n\n\u00a7 459. The intuition\u2014in its natural phase a something given and given in\nspace\u2014acquires, when employed as a sign, the peculiar characteristic of\nexisting only as superseded and sublimated. Such is the negativity of\nintelligence; and thus the truer phase of the intuition used as a sign is\nexistence in _time_ (but its existence vanishes in the moment of being),\nand if we consider the rest of its external psychical quality, its\n_institution_ by intelligence, but an institution growing out of its\n(anthropological) own naturalness. This institution of the natural is the\nvocal note, where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utterance.\nThe vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific\nideas\u2014speech and, its system, language\u2014gives to sensations, intuitions,\nconceptions, a second and higher existence than they naturally\npossess,\u2014invests them with the right of existence in the ideational realm.\n\nLanguage here comes under discussion only in the special aspect of a\nproduct of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium.\nIf language had to be treated in its concrete nature, it would be\nnecessary for its vocabulary or material part to recall the\nanthropological or psycho-physiological point of view (\u00a7 401), and for the\ngrammar or formal portion to anticipate the standpoint of analytic\nunderstanding. With regard to the elementary _material_ of language, while\non one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared, on the other the\nprinciple of imitation has been restricted to the slight range it actually\ncovers\u2014that of vocal objects. Yet one may still hear the German language\npraised for its wealth\u2014that wealth consisting in its special expression\nfor special sounds\u2014_Rauschen_, _Sausen_, _Knarren_, &c.;\u2014there have been\ncollected more than a hundred such words, perhaps: the humour of the\nmoment creates fresh ones when it pleases. Such superabundance in the\nrealm of sense and of triviality contributes nothing to form the real\nwealth of a cultivated language. The strictly raw material of language\nitself depends more upon an inward symbolism than a symbolism referring to\nexternal objects; it depends, i.e. on anthropological articulation, as it\nwere the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance. For each vowel\nand consonant accordingly, as well as for their more abstract elements\n(the posture of lips, palate, tongue in each) and for their combinations,\npeople have tried to find the appropriate signification. But these dull\nsub-conscious beginnings are deprived of their original importance and\nprominence by new influences, it may be by external agencies or by the\nneeds of civilisation. Having been originally sensuous intuitions, they\nare reduced to signs, and thus have only traces left of their original\nmeaning, if it be not altogether extinguished. As to the _formal_ element,\nagain, it is the work of analytic intellect which informs language with\nits categories: it is this logical instinct which gives rise to grammar.\nThe study of languages still in their original state, which we have first\nreally begun to make acquaintance with in modern times, has shown on this\npoint that they contain a very elaborate grammar and express distinctions\nwhich are lost or have been largely obliterated in the languages of more\ncivilised nations. It seems as if the language of the most civilised\nnations has the most imperfect grammar, and that the same language has a\nmore perfect grammar when the nation is in a more uncivilised state than\nwhen it reaches a higher civilisation. (Cf. W. von Humboldt\u2019s _Essay on\nthe Dual_.)\n\nIn speaking of vocal (which is the original) language, we may touch, only\nin passing, upon written language,\u2014a further development in the particular\nsphere of language which borrows the help of an externally practical\nactivity. It is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which\nwritten language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs (\u00a7 454). In\nparticular, hieroglyphics uses spatial figures to designate _ideas_;\nalphabetical writing, on the other hand, uses them to designate vocal\nnotes which are already signs. Alphabetical writing thus consists of signs\nof signs,\u2014the words or concrete signs of vocal language being analysed\ninto their simple elements, which severally receive\ndesignation.\u2014Leibnitz\u2019s practical mind misled him to exaggerate the\nadvantages which a complete written language, formed on the hieroglyphic\nmethod (and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic writing,\nas in our signs for the numbers, the planets, the chemical elements, &c.),\nwould have as a universal language for the intercourse of nations and\nespecially of scholars. But we may be sure that it was rather the\nintercourse of nations (as was probably the case in Phoenicia, and still\ntakes place in Canton\u2014see _Macartney\u2019s Travels_ by Staunton) which\noccasioned the need of alphabetical writing and led to its formation. At\nany rate a comprehensive hieroglyphic language for ever completed is\nimpracticable. Sensible objects no doubt admit of permanent signs; but, as\nregards signs for mental objects, the progress of thought and the\ncontinual development of logic lead to changes in the views of their\ninternal relations and thus also of their nature; and this would involve\nthe rise of a new hieroglyphical denotation. Even in the case of\nsense-objects it happens that their names, i.e. their signs in vocal\nlanguage, are frequently changed, as e.g. in chemistry and mineralogy. Now\nthat it has been forgotten what names properly are, viz. externalities\nwhich of themselves have no sense, and only get signification as signs,\nand now that, instead of names proper, people ask for terms expressing a\nsort of definition, which is frequently changed capriciously and\nfortuitously, the denomination, i.e. the composite name formed of signs of\ntheir generic characters or other supposed characteristic properties, is\naltered in accordance with the differences of view with regard to the\ngenus or other supposed specific property. It is only a stationary\ncivilisation, like the Chinese, which admits of the hieroglyphic language\nof that nation; and its method of writing moreover can only be the lot of\nthat small part of a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental\nculture.\u2014The progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the\nhabit of alphabetical writing; by means of which only does vocal language\nacquire the precision and purity of its articulation. The imperfection of\nthe Chinese vocal language is notorious: numbers of its words possess\nseveral utterly different meanings, as many as ten and twenty, so that, in\nspeaking, the distinction is made perceptible merely by accent and\nintensity, by speaking low and soft or crying out. The European, learning\nto speak Chinese, falls into the most ridiculous blunders before he has\nmastered these absurd refinements of accentuation. Perfection here\nconsists in the opposite of that _parler sans accent_ which in Europe is\njustly required of an educated speaker. The hieroglyphic mode of writing\nkeeps the Chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision\nwhich is gained in articulation by alphabetic writing.\n\nAlphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent: in it the\n_word_\u2014the mode, peculiar to the intellect, of uttering its ideas most\nworthily\u2014is brought to consciousness and made an object of reflection.\nEngaging the attention of intelligence, as it does, it is analysed; the\nwork of sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements (the primary\npostures of articulation) in which the sense-factor in speech is brought\nto the form of universality, at the same time that in this elementary\nphase it acquires complete precision and purity. Thus alphabetic writing\nretains at the same time the advantage of vocal language, that the ideas\nhave names strictly so called: the name is the simple sign for the exact\nidea, i.e. the simple plain idea, not decomposed into its features and\ncompounded out of them. Hieroglyphics, instead of springing from the\ndirect analysis of sensible signs, like alphabetic writing, arise from an\nantecedent analysis of ideas. Thus a theory readily arises that all ideas\nmay be reduced to their elements, or simple logical terms, so that from\nthe elementary signs chosen to express these (as, in the case of the\nChinese _Koua_, the simple straight stroke, and the stroke broken into two\nparts) a hieroglyphic system would be generated by their composition. This\nfeature of hieroglyphic\u2014the analytical designations of ideas\u2014which misled\nLeibnitz to regard it as preferable to alphabetic writing is rather in\nantagonism with the fundamental desideratum of language,\u2014the name. To want\na name means that for the immediate idea (which, however ample a\nconnotation it may include, is still for the mind simple in the name), we\nrequire a simple immediate sign which for its own sake does not suggest\nanything, and has for its sole function to signify and represent sensibly\nthe simple idea as such. It is not merely the image-loving and\nimage-limited intelligence that lingers over the simplicity of ideas and\nredintegrates them from the more abstract factors into which they have\nbeen analysed: thought too reduces to the form of a simple thought the\nconcrete connotation which it \u201cresumes\u201d and reunites from the mere\naggregate of attributes to which analysis has reduced it. Both alike\nrequire such signs, simple in respect of their meaning: signs, which\nthough consisting of several letters or syllables and even decomposed into\nsuch, yet do not exhibit a combination of several ideas.\u2014What has been\nstated is the principle for settling the value of these written languages.\nIt also follows that in hieroglyphics the relations of concrete mental\nideas to one another must necessarily be tangled and perplexed, and that\nthe analysis of these (and the proximate results of such analysis must\nagain be analysed) appears to be possible in the most various and\ndivergent ways. Every divergence in analysis would give rise to another\nformation of the written name; just as in modern times (as already noted,\neven in the region of sense) muriatic acid has undergone several changes\nof name. A hieroglyphic written language would require a philosophy as\nstationary as is the civilisation of the Chinese.\n\nWhat has been said shows the inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated\neducational value of learning to read and write an alphabetic character.\nIt leads the mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the more\nformal structure of the vocal word and its abstract elements, and\ncontributes much to give stability and independence to the inward realm of\nmental life. Acquired habit subsequently effaces the peculiarity by which\nalphabetic writing appears, in the interest of vision, as a roundabout way\nto ideas by means of audibility; it makes them a sort of hieroglyphic to\nus, so that in using them we need not consciously realise them by means of\ntones, whereas people unpractised in reading utter aloud what they read in\norder to catch its meaning in the sound. Thus, while (with the faculty\nwhich transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics) the capacity of\nabstraction gained by the first practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is\nof itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing. It is true that the audible\n(which is in time) and the visible (which is in space), each have their\nown basis, one no less authoritative than the other. But in the case of\nalphabetic writing there is only a _single_ basis: the two aspects occupy\ntheir rightful relation to each other: the visible language is related to\nthe vocal only as a sign, and intelligence expresses itself immediately\nand unconditionally by speaking.\u2014The instrumental function of the\ncomparatively non-sensuous element of tone for all ideational work shows\nitself further as peculiarly important in memory which forms the passage\nfrom representation to thought.\n\n\u00a7 460. The name, combining the intuition (an intellectual production) with\nits signification, is primarily a single transient product; and\nconjunction of the idea (which is inward) with the intuition (which is\noutward) is itself outward. The reduction of this outwardness to\ninwardness is (verbal) Memory.\n\n\n(\u03b3\u03b3) Memory(141).\n\n\n\u00a7 461. Under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through\nthe same inwardising (recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition of\nthe _word_, as representation in general does in dealing with the first\nimmediate intuition (\u00a7 451). (1) Making its own the synthesis achieved in\nthe sign, intelligence, by this inwardising (memorising) elevates the\n_single_ synthesis to a universal, i.e. permanent, synthesis, in which\nname and meaning are for it objectively united, and renders the intuition\n(which the name originally is) a representation. Thus the import\n(connotation) and sign, being identified, form one representation: the\nrepresentation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence\nfor its import: all this being the work of memory which retains names\n(retentive Memory).\n\n\u00a7 462. The name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the\nideational realm. (2) In the name, _Reproductive_ memory has and\nrecognises the thing, and with the thing it has the name, apart from\nintuition and image. The name, as giving an _existence_ to the content in\nintelligence, is the externality of intelligence to itself; and the\ninwardising or recollection of the name, i.e. of an intuition of\nintellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalisation to which\nintelligence reduces itself on its own ground. The association of the\nparticular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive,\nrepresentative, or cogitant,\u2014series of which the intelligence traverses as\nit feels, represents, or thinks.\n\nGiven the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor\nits image even: the name alone, if we _understand_ it, is the unimaged\nsimple representation. We _think_ in names.\n\nThe recent attempts\u2014already, as they deserved, forgotten\u2014to rehabilitate\nthe Mnemonic of the ancients, consist in transforming names into images,\nand thus again deposing memory to the level of imagination. The place of\nthe power of memory is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images,\nfixed in the imagination, to which is then attached the series of ideas\nforming the composition to be learned by rote. Considering the\nheterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent\nimages, and the speed with which the attachment has to be made, the\nattachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow, silly, and utterly\naccidental links. Not merely is the mind put to the torture of being\nworried by idiotic stuff, but what is thus learnt by rote is just as\nquickly forgotten, seeing that the same tableau is used for getting by\nrote every other series of ideas, and so those previously attached to it\nare effaced. What is mnemonically impressed is not like what is retained\nin memory really got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within\noutwards, from the deep pit of the ego, and thus recited, but is, so to\nspeak, read off the tableau of fancy.\u2014Mnemonic is connected with the\ncommon prepossession about memory, in comparison with fancy and\nimagination; as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual activity\nthan memory. On the contrary, memory has ceased to deal with an image\nderived from intuition,\u2014the immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence;\nit has rather to do with an object which is the product of intelligence\nitself,\u2014such a _without book_(142) as remains locked up in the\n_within-book_(143) of intelligence, and is, within intelligence, only its\noutward and existing side.\n\n\u00a7 463. (3) As the interconnexion of the names lies in the meaning, the\nconjunction of their meaning with the reality as names is still an\n(external) synthesis; and intelligence in this its externality has not\nmade a complete and simple return into self. But intelligence is the\nuniversal,\u2014the single plain truth of its particular self-divestments; and\nits consummated appropriation of them abolishes that distinction between\nmeaning and name. This extreme inwardising of representation is the\nsupreme self-divestment of intelligence, in which it renders itself the\nmere _being_, the universal space of names as such, i.e. of meaningless\nwords. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at\nthe same time the power over the different names,\u2014the link which, having\nnothing in itself, fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable\norder. So far as they merely _are_, and intelligence is here itself this\n_being_ of theirs, its power is a merely abstract subjectivity,\u2014memory;\nwhich, on account of the complete externality in which the members of such\nseries stand to one another, and because it is itself this externality\n(subjective though that be), is called mechanical (\u00a7 195).\n\nA composition is, as we know, not thoroughly conned by rote, until one\nattaches no meaning to the words. The recitation of what has been thus got\nby heart is therefore of course accentless. The correct accent, if it is\nintroduced, suggests the meaning: but this introduction of the\nsignification of an idea disturbs the mechanical nexus and therefore\neasily throws out the reciter. The faculty of conning by rote series of\nwords, with no principle governing their succession, or which are\nseparately meaningless, e.g. a series of proper names, is so supremely\nmarvellous, because it is the very essence of mind to have its wits about\nit; whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself, and its action\nis like machinery. But it is only as uniting subjectivity with objectivity\nthat the mind has its wits about it. Whereas in the case before us, after\nit has in intuition been at first so external as to pick up its facts\nready-made, and in representation inwardises or recollects this datum and\nmakes it its own,\u2014it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself,\nso that what is its own assumes the guise of something found. Thus one of\nthe two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is here put in\nintelligence itself as a quality of it.\u2014It is only a step further to treat\nmemory as mechanical\u2014the act implying no intelligence\u2014in which case it is\nonly justified by its uses, its indispensability perhaps for other\npurposes and functions of mind. But by so doing we overlook the proper\nsignification it has in the mind.\n\n\u00a7 464. If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the mere name as an\nexistent requires something else,\u2014to be interpreted by the representing\nintellect. Now in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once\nthat external objectivity and the meaning. In this way intelligence is\nexplicitly made an _existence_ of this identity, i.e. it is explicitly\nactive as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in\nthis manner the passage into the function of _thought_, which no longer\nhas a _meaning_, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed from the\nsubjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its\nexistence.\n\nThe German language has etymologically assigned memory (_Ged\u00e4chtni\u00df_), of\nwhich it has become a foregone conclusion to speak contemptuously, the\nhigh position of direct kindred with thought (_Gedanke_).\u2014It is not matter\nof chance that the young have a better memory than the old, nor is their\nmemory solely exercised for the sake of utility. The young have a good\nmemory because they have not yet reached the stage of reflection; their\nmemory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of\ntheir inner life to pure being or to pure space in which the fact, the\nimplicit content, may reign and unfold itself with no antithesis to a\nsubjective inwardness. Genuine ability is in youth generally combined with\na good memory. But empirical statements of this sort help little towards a\nknowledge of what memory intrinsically is. To comprehend the position and\nmeaning of memory and to understand its organic interconnexion with\nthought is one of the hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in\nthe theory of mind. Memory _qu\u00e2_ memory is itself the merely _external_\nmode, or merely _existential_ aspect of thought, and thus needs a\ncomplementary element. The passage from it to thought is to our view and\nimplicitly the identity of reason with this existential mode: an identity\nfrom which it follows that reason only exists in a subject, and as the\nfunction of that subject. Thus active reason is _Thinking_.\n\n\n(\u03b3) Thinking(144).\n\n\n\u00a7 465. Intelligence is recognitive: it cognises an intuition, but only\nbecause that intuition is already its own (\u00a7 454); and in the name it\nre-discovers the fact (\u00a7 462): but now it finds _its_ universal in the\ndouble signification of the universal as such, and of the universal as\nimmediate or as being,\u2014finds i.e. the genuine universal which is its own\nunity overlapping and including its other, viz. being. Thus intelligence\nis explicitly, and on its own part cognitive: _virtually_ it is the\nuniversal,\u2014its product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain identity\nof subjective and objective. It knows that what is _thought_, _is_, and\nthat what _is_, only _is_ in so far as it is a thought (\u00a7 521); the\nthinking of intelligence is to _have thoughts_: these are as its content\nand object.\n\n\u00a7 466. But cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal: the\nuniversality and its being is the plain subjectivity of intelligence. The\nthoughts therefore are not yet fully and freely determinate, and the\nrepresentations which have been inwardised to thoughts are so far still\nthe given content.\n\n\u00a7 467. As dealing with this given content, thought is (\u03b1) _understanding_\nwith its formal identity, working up the representations, that have been\nmemorised, into species, genera, laws, forces, &c., in short into\ncategories,\u2014thus indicating that the raw material does not get the truth\nof its being save in these thought-forms. As intrinsically infinite\nnegativity, thought is (\u03b2) essentially an act of partition,\u2014_judgment_,\nwhich however does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis\nof universality and being, but distinguishes on the lines supplied by the\ninterconnexions peculiar to the concept. Thirdly (\u03b3), thought supersedes\nthe formal distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the\ndifferences,\u2014thus being nominal _reason_ or inferential understanding.\nIntelligence, as the act of thought, cognises. And (\u03b1) understanding out\nof its generalities (the categories) _explains_ the individual, and is\nthen said to comprehend or understand itself: (\u03b2) in the judgment it\nexplains the individual to be an universal (species, genus). In these\nforms the _content_ appears as given: (\u03b3) but in inference (syllogism) it\ncharacterises a content from itself, by superseding that form-difference.\nWith the perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still attaching\nto formal thought has vanished.\n\nIn _Logic_ there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as reason\ndevelops itself in this distinction-lacking medium. So in _consciousness_\nthought occurs as a stage (\u00a7 437 note). Here reason is as the truth of the\nantithetical distinction, as it had taken shape within the mind\u2019s own\nlimits. Thought thus recurs again and again in these different parts of\nphilosophy, because these parts are different only through the medium they\nare in and the antithesis they imply; while thought is this one and the\nsame centre, to which as to their truth the antithesis return.\n\n\u00a7 468. Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode of\nbeing, is, now that it has completed _taking possession_, in its own\n_property_: the last negation of immediacy has implicitly required that\nthe intelligence shall itself determine its content. Thus thought, as free\nnotion, is now also free in point of _content_. But when intelligence is\naware that it is determinative of the content, which is _its_ mode no less\nthan it is a mode of being, it is Will.\n\n\n\n(b) Mind Practical(145).\n\n\n\u00a7 469. As will, the mind is aware that it is the author of its own\nconclusions, the origin of its self-fulfilment. Thus fulfilled, this\nindependency or individuality form the side of existence or of _reality_\nfor the Idea of mind. As will, the mind steps into actuality; whereas as\ncognition it is on the soil of notional generality. Supplying its own\ncontent, the will is self-possessed, and in the widest sense free: this is\nits characteristic trait. Its finitude lies in the formalism that the\nspontaneity of its self-fulfilment means no more than a general and\nabstract ownness, not yet identified with matured reason. It is the\nfunction of the essential will to bring liberty to exist in the formal\nwill, and it is therefore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with\nits essential nature, i.e. to make liberty its pervading character,\ncontent, and aim, as well as its sphere of existence. The essential\nfreedom of will is, and must always be, a thought: hence the way by which\nwill can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a thinking will,\u2014to\ngive itself the content which it can only have as it thinks itself.\n\nTrue liberty, in the shape of moral life, consists in the will finding its\npurpose in a universal content, not in subjective or selfish interests.\nBut such a content is only possible in thought and through thought: it is\nnothing short of absurd to seek to banish thought from the moral,\nreligious, and law-abiding life.\n\n\u00a7 470. Practical mind, considered at first as formal or immediate will,\ncontains a double ought\u2014(1) in the contrast which the new mode of being\nprojected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its\nold existence and condition,\u2014an antagonism which in consciousness grows to\ncorrelation with external objects. (2) That first self-determination,\nbeing itself immediate, is not at once elevated into a thinking\nuniversality: the latter, therefore, virtually constitutes an obligation\non the former in point of form, as it may also constitute it in point of\nmatter;\u2014a distinction which only exists for the observer.\n\n\n(\u03b1) Practical Sense or Feeling(146).\n\n\n\u00a7 471. The autonomy of the practical mind at first is immediate and\ntherefore formal, i.e. it _finds_ itself as an _individuality_ determined\nin _its_ inward _nature_. It is thus \u201cpractical feeling,\u201d or instinct of\naction. In this phase, as it is at bottom a subjectivity simply identical\nwith reason, it has no doubt a rational content, but a content which as it\nstands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent and\nsubjective,\u2014a content which may be determined quite as much by mere\npersonalities of want and opinion, &c., and by the subjectivity which\nselfishly sets itself against the universal, as it may be virtually in\nconformity with reason.\n\nAn appeal is sometimes made to the sense (feeling) of right and morality,\nas well as of religion, which man is alleged to possess,\u2014to his benevolent\ndispositions,\u2014and even to his heart generally,\u2014i.e. to the subject so far\nas the various practical feelings are in it all combined. So far as this\nappeal implies (1) that these ideas are immanent in his own self, and (2)\nthat when feeling is opposed to the logical understanding, it, and not the\npartial abstractions of the latter, _may_ be the _totality_\u2014the appeal has\na legitimate meaning. But on the other hand feeling too _may_ be onesided,\nunessential and bad. The rational, which exists in the shape of\nrationality when it is apprehended by thought, is the same content as the\n_good_ practical feeling has, but presented in its universality and\nnecessity, in its objectivity and truth.\n\nThus it is on the one hand _silly_ to suppose that in the passage from\nfeeling to law and duty there is any loss of import and excellence; it is\nthis passage which lets feeling first reach its truth. It is equally silly\nto consider intellect as superfluous or even harmful to feeling, heart,\nand will; the truth and, what is the same thing, the actual rationality of\nthe heart and will can only be at home in the universality of intellect,\nand not in the singleness of feeling as feeling. If feelings are of the\nright sort, it is because of their quality or content,\u2014which is right only\nso far as it is intrinsically universal or has its source in the thinking\nmind. The difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off\nthe separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the several faculties of\nfeeling and thinking mind, and coming to see that in the human being there\nis only _one_ reason, in feeling, volition, and thought. Another\ndifficulty connected with this is found in the fact that the Ideas which\nare the special property of the thinking mind, viz. God, law and morality,\ncan also be _felt_. But feeling is only the form of the immediate and\npeculiar individuality of the subject, in which these facts, like any\nother objective facts (which consciousness also sets over against itself),\nmay be placed.\n\nOn the other hand, it is _suspicious_ or even worse to cling to feeling\nand heart in place of the intelligent rationality of law, right and duty;\nbecause all that the former holds more than the latter is only the\nparticular subjectivity with its vanity and caprice. For the same reason\nit is out of place in a scientific treatment of the feelings to deal with\nanything beyond their form, and to discuss their content; for the latter,\nwhen thought, is precisely what constitutes, in their universality and\nnecessity, the rights and duties which are the true works of mental\nautonomy. So long as we study practical feelings and dispositions\nspecially, we have only to deal with the selfish, bad, and evil; it is\nthese alone which belong to the individuality which retains its opposition\nto the universal: their content is the reverse of rights and duties, and\nprecisely in that way do they\u2014but only in antithesis to the latter\u2014retain\na speciality of their own.\n\n\u00a7 472. The \u201cOught\u201d of practical feeling is the claim of its essential\nautonomy to control some existing mode of fact\u2014which is assumed to be\nworth nothing save as adapted to that claim. But as both, in their\nimmediacy, lack objective determination, this relation of the\n_requirement_ to existent fact is the utterly subjective and superficial\nfeeling of pleasant or unpleasant.\n\nDelight, joy, grief, &c., shame, repentance, contentment, &c., are partly\nonly modifications of the formal \u201cpractical feeling\u201d in _general_, but are\npartly different in the features that give the special tone and character\nmode to their \u201cOught.\u201d\n\nThe celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world, so far at\nleast as evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and painful\nmerely, arises on this stage of the formal practical feeling. Evil is\nnothing but the incompatibility between what is and what ought to be.\n\u201cOught\u201d is an ambiguous term,\u2014indeed infinitely so, considering that\ncasual aims may also come under the form of Ought. But where the objects\nsought are thus casual, evil only executes what is rightfully due to the\nvanity and nullity of their planning: for they themselves were radically\nevil. The finitude of life and mind is seen in their judgment: the\ncontrary which is separated from them they also have as a negative in\nthem, and thus they are the contradiction called evil. In the dead there\nis neither evil nor pain: for in inorganic nature the intelligible unity\n(concept) does not confront its existence and does not in the difference\nat the same time remain its permanent subject. Whereas in life, and still\nmore in mind, we have this immanent distinction present: hence arises the\nOught: and this negativity, subjectivity, ego, freedom are the principles\nof evil and pain. Jacob B\u00f6hme viewed egoity (selfhood) as pain and\ntorment, and as the fountain of nature and of spirit.\n\n\n(\u03b2) The Impulses and Choice(147).\n\n\n\u00a7 473. The practical ought is a \u201creal\u201d judgment. Will, which is\nessentially self-determination, finds in the conformity\u2014as immediate and\nmerely _found_ to hand\u2014of the existing mode to its requirement a negation,\nand something inappropriate to it. If the will is to satisfy itself, if\nthe implicit unity of the universality and the special mode is to be\nrealised, the conformity of its inner requirement and of the existent\nthing ought to be its act and institution. The will, as regards the form\nof its content, is at first still a natural will, directly identical with\nits specific mode:\u2014natural _impulse_ and _inclination_. Should, however,\nthe totality of the practical spirit throw itself into a single one of the\nmany restricted forms of impulse, each being always in conflict to\nanother, it is _passion_.\n\n\u00a7 474. Inclinations and passions embody the same constituent features as\nthe practical feeling. Thus, while on one hand they are based on the\nrational nature of the mind; they on the other, as part and parcel of the\nstill subjective and single will, are infected with contingency, and\nappear as particular to stand to the individual and to each other in an\nexternal relation and with a necessity which creates bondage.\n\nThe special note in _passion_ is its restriction to one special mode of\nvolition, in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged, be\nthe value of that mode what it may. In consequence of this formalism,\npassion is neither good nor bad; the title only states that a subject has\nthrown his whole soul,\u2014his interests of intellect, talent, character,\nenjoyment,\u2014on one aim and object. Nothing great has been and nothing great\ncan be accomplished without passion. It is only a dead, too often, indeed,\na hypocritical moralising which inveighs against the form of passion as\nsuch.\n\nBut with regard to the inclinations, the question is directly raised,\nWhich are good and bad?\u2014Up to what degree the good continue good;\u2014and (as\nthere are many, each with its private range) In what way have they, being\nall in one subject and hardly all, as experience shows, admitting of\ngratification, to suffer at least reciprocal restriction? And, first of\nall, as regards the numbers of these impulses and propensities, the case\nis much the same as with the psychical powers, whose aggregate is to form\nthe mind theoretical,\u2014an aggregate which is now increased by the host of\nimpulses. The nominal rationality of impulse and propensity lies merely in\ntheir general impulse not to be subjective merely, but to get realised,\novercoming the subjectivity by the subject\u2019s own agency. Their genuine\nrationality cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection which\npre-supposes a number of _independent_ innate tendencies and immediate\ninstincts, and therefore is wanting in a single principle and final\npurpose for them. But the immanent \u201creflection\u201d of mind itself carries it\nbeyond their particularity and their natural immediacy, and gives their\ncontents a rationality and objectivity, in which they exist as necessary\nties of social relation, as rights and duties. It is this objectification\nwhich evinces their real value, their mutual connexions, and their truth.\nAnd thus it was a true perception when Plato (especially including as he\ndid the mind\u2019s whole nature under its right) showed that the full reality\nof justice could be exhibited only in the _objective_ phase of justice,\nviz. in the construction of the State as the ethical life.\n\nThe answer to the question, therefore, What are the good and rational\npropensities, and how they are to be co-ordinated with each other?\nresolves itself into an exposition of the laws and forms of common life\nproduced by the mind when developing itself as _objective_ mind\u2014a\ndevelopment in which the _content_ of autonomous action loses its\ncontingency and optionality. The discussion of the true intrinsic worth of\nthe impulses, inclinations, and passions is thus essentially the theory of\nlegal, moral, and social _duties_.\n\n\u00a7 475. The subject is the act of satisfying impulses, an act of (at least)\nformal rationality, as it translates them from the subjectivity of content\n(which so far is _purpose_) into objectivity, where the subject is made to\nclose with itself. If the content of the impulse is distinguished as the\nthing or business from this act of carrying it out, and we regard the\nthing which has been brought to pass as containing the element of\nsubjective individuality and its action, this is what is called the\n_interest_. Nothing therefore is brought about without interest.\n\nAn action is an aim of the subject, and it is his agency too which\nexecutes this aim: unless the subject were in this way in the most\ndisinterested action, i.e. unless he had an interest in it, there would be\nno action at all.\u2014The impulses and inclinations are sometimes depreciated\nby being contrasted with the baseless chimera of a happiness, the free\ngift of nature, where wants are supposed to find their satisfaction\nwithout the agent doing anything to produce a conformity between immediate\nexistence and his own inner requirements. They are sometimes contrasted,\non the whole to their disadvantage, with the morality of duty for duty\u2019s\nsake. But impulse and passion are the very life-blood of all action: they\nare needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution\nthereof. The morality concerns the content of the aim, which as such is\nthe universal, an inactive thing, that finds its actualising in the agent;\nand finds it only when the aim is immanent in the agent, is his interest\nand\u2014should it claim to engross his whole efficient subjectivity\u2014his\npassion.\n\n\u00a7 476. The will, as thinking and implicitly free, distinguishes itself\nfrom the particularity of the impulses, and places itself as simple\nsubjectivity of thought above their diversified content. It is thus\n\u201creflecting\u201d will.\n\n\u00a7 477. Such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased to be a mere datum:\nthe reflective will now sees it as its own, because it closes with it and\nthus gives itself specific individuality and actuality. It is now on the\nstandpoint of _choosing_ between inclinations, and is option or _choice_.\n\n\u00a7 478. Will as choice claims to be free, reflected into itself as the\nnegativity of its merely immediate autonomy. However, as the content, in\nwhich its former universality concludes itself to actuality, is nothing\nbut the content of the impulses and appetites, it is actual only as a\nsubjective and contingent will. It realises itself in a particularity,\nwhich it regards at the same time as a nullity, and finds a satisfaction\nin what it has at the same time emerged from. As thus contradictory, it is\nthe process of distracting and suspending one desire or enjoyment by\nanother,\u2014and one satisfaction, which is just as much no satisfaction, by\nanother, without end. But the truth of the particular satisfactions is the\nuniversal, which under the name of _happiness_ the thinking will makes its\naim.\n\n\n(\u03b3) Happiness(148).\n\n\n\u00a7 479. In this idea, which reflection and comparison have educed, of a\nuniversal satisfaction, the impulses, so far as their particularity goes,\nare reduced to a mere negative; and it is held that in part they are to be\nsacrificed to each other for the behoof that aim, partly sacrificed to\nthat aim directly, either altogether or in part. Their mutual limitation,\non one hand, proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative\nconsiderations: on the other hand, as happiness has its sole _affirmative_\ncontents in the springs of action, it is on them that the decision turns,\nand it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which must have the\ncasting vote as to where happiness is to be placed.\n\n\u00a7 480. Happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of\nthings desired,\u2014a universality which only ought to be. But the\nparticularity of the satisfaction which just as much _is_ as it is\nabolished, and the abstract singleness, the option which gives or does not\ngive itself (as it pleases) an aim in happiness, find their truth in the\nintrinsic _universality_ of the will, i.e. its very autonomy or freedom.\nIn this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity, which is pure and\nconcrete at once, by having for its contents and aim only that infinite\nmode of being\u2014freedom itself. In this truth of its autonomy, where concept\nand object are one, the will is an _actually free will_.\n\n\n\nFree Mind(149).\n\n\n\u00a7 481. Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind: a\nfree will, which realises its own freedom of will now that the formalism,\nfortuitousness, and contractedness of the practical content up to this\npoint have been superseded. By superseding the adjustments of means\ntherein contained, the will is the _immediate individuality_\nself-instituted,\u2014an individuality, however, also purified of all that\ninterferes with its universalism, i.e. with freedom itself. This\nuniversalism the will has as its object and aim, only so far as it thinks\nitself, knows this its concept, and is _will_ as free _intelligence_.\n\n\u00a7 482. The mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its\nobject, i.e. which has its true being for characteristic and aim, is in\nthe first instance the rational will in general, or _implicit_ Idea, and\nbecause implicit only the _notion_ of absolute mind. As _abstract_ Idea\nagain, it is existent only in the _immediate_ will\u2014it is the _existential_\nside of reason,\u2014the _single_ will as aware of this its universality\nconstituting its contents and aim, and of which it is only the formal\nactivity. If the will, therefore, in which the Idea thus appears is only\nfinite, that will is also the act of developing the Idea, and of investing\nits self-unfolding content with an existence which, as realising the idea,\nis _actuality_. It is thus \u201cObjective\u201d Mind.\n\nNo Idea is so generally recognised as indefinite, ambiguous, and open to\nthe greatest misconceptions (to which therefore it actually falls a\nvictim) as the idea of Liberty: none in common currency with so little\nappreciation of its meaning. Remembering that free mind is _actual_ mind,\nwe can see how misconceptions about it are of tremendous consequence in\npractice. When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the\nabstract concept of full-blown liberty, there is nothing like it in its\nuncontrollable strength, just because it is the very essence of mind, and\nthat as its very actuality. Whole continents, Africa and the East, have\nnever had this idea, and are without it still. The Greeks and Romans,\nPlato and Aristotle, even the Stoics, did not have it. On the contrary,\nthey saw that it is only by birth (as e.g. an Athenian or Spartan\ncitizen), or by strength of character, education, or philosophy (\u2014the sage\nis free even as a slave and in chains) that the human being is actually\nfree. It was through Christianity that this idea came into the world.\nAccording to Christianity, the individual _as such_ has an infinite value\nas the object and aim of divine love, destined as mind to live in absolute\nrelationship with God himself, and have God\u2019s mind dwelling in him: i.e.\nman is implicitly destined to supreme freedom. If, in religion as such,\nman is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being,\nhe has also, even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence, the\ndivine mind present with him, as the substance of the state of the family,\n&c. These institutions are due to the guidance of that spirit, and are\nconstituted after its measure; whilst by their existence the moral temper\ncomes to be indwelling in the individual, so that in this sphere of\nparticular existence, of present sensation and volition, he is _actually_\nfree.\n\nIf to be aware of the idea\u2014to be aware, i.e. that men are aware of freedom\nas their essence, aim, and object\u2014is matter of _speculation_, still this\nvery idea itself is the actuality of men\u2014not something which they _have_,\nas men, but which they _are_. Christianity in its adherents has realised\nan ever-present sense that they are not and cannot be slaves; if they are\nmade slaves, if the decision as regards their property rests with an\narbitrary will, not with laws or courts of justice, they would find the\nvery substance of their life outraged. This will to liberty is no longer\nan _impulse_ which demands its satisfaction, but the permanent\ncharacter\u2014the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulsive nature.\nBut this freedom, which the content and aim of freedom has, is itself only\na notion\u2014a principle of the mind and heart, intended to develope into an\nobjective phase, into legal, moral, religious, and not less into\nscientific actuality.\n\n\n\n\n\nSECTION II. MIND OBJECTIVE.\n\n\n\u00a7 483. The objective Mind is the absolute Idea, but only existing _in\nposse_: and as it is thus on the territory of finitude, its actual\nrationality retains the aspect of external apparency. The free will finds\nitself immediately confronted by differences which arise from the\ncircumstance that freedom is its _inward_ function and aim, and is in\nrelation to an external and already subsisting objectivity, which splits\nup into different heads: viz. anthropological data (i.e. private and\npersonal needs), external things of nature which exist for consciousness,\nand the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of\ntheir own diversity and particularity. These aspects constitute the\nexternal material for the embodiment of the will.\n\n\u00a7 484. But the purposive action of this will is to realise its concept,\nLiberty, in these externally-objective aspects, making the latter a world\nmoulded by the former, which in it is thus at home with itself, locked\ntogether with it: the concept accordingly perfected to the Idea. Liberty,\nshaped into the actuality of a world, receives the _form of Necessity_ the\ndeeper substantial nexus of which is the system or organisation of the\nprinciples of liberty, whilst its phenomenal nexus is power or authority,\nand the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousness.\n\n\u00a7 485. This unity of the rational will with the single will (this being\nthe peculiar and immediate medium in which the former is actualised)\nconstitutes the simple actuality of liberty. As it (and its content)\nbelongs to thought, and is the virtual _universal_, the content has its\nright and true character only in the form of universality. When invested\nwith this character for the intelligent consciousness, or instituted as an\nauthoritative power, it is a _Law_(150). When, on the other hand, the\ncontent is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness, attaching to it in\nthe practical feeling and in impulse, and is set and grafted in the\nindividual will, not in the form of impulse, but in its universality, so\nas to become its habit, temper and character, it exists as manner and\ncustom, or _Usage_(151).\n\n\u00a7 486. This \u201creality,\u201d in general, where free will has _existence_, is the\n_Law_ (Right),\u2014the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as\nthe limited juristic law, but as the actual body of all the conditions of\nfreedom. These conditions, in relation to the _subjective_ will, where\nthey, being universal, ought to have and can only have their existence,\nare its _Duties_; whereas as its temper and habit they are _Manners_. What\nis a right is also a duty, and what is a duty, is also a right. For a mode\nof existence is a right, only as a consequence of the free substantial\nwill: and the same content of fact, when referred to the will\ndistinguished as subjective and individual, is a duty. It is the same\ncontent which the subjective consciousness recognises as a duty, and\nbrings into existence in these several wills. The finitude of the\nobjective will thus creates the semblance of a distinction between rights\nand duties.\n\nIn the phenomenal range right and duty are _correlata_, at least in the\nsense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in some one else. But,\nin the light of the concept, my right to a thing is not merely possession,\nbut as possession by a _person_ it is _property_, or legal possession, and\nit is a _duty_ to possess things as _property_, i.e. to be as a person.\nTranslated into the phenomenal relationship, viz. relation to another\nperson\u2014this grows into the duty of some one _else_ to respect _my_ right.\nIn the morality of the conscience, duty in general is in me\u2014a free\nsubject\u2014at the same time a right of my subjective will or disposition. But\nin this individualist moral sphere, there arises the division between what\nis only inward purpose (disposition or intention), which only has its\nbeing in me and is merely subjective duty, and the actualisation of that\npurpose: and with this division a contingency and imperfection which makes\nthe inadequacy of mere individualistic morality. In social ethics these\ntwo parts have reached their truth, their absolute unity; although even\nright and duty return to one another and combine by means of certain\nadjustments and under the guise of necessity. The rights of the father of\nthe family over its members are equally duties towards them; just as the\nchildren\u2019s duty of obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty\nof manhood. The penal judicature of a government, its rights of\nadministration, &c., are no less its duties to punish, to administer, &c.;\nas the services of the members of the State in dues, military services,\n&c., are duties and yet their right to the protection of their private\nproperty and of the general substantial life in which they have their\nroot. All the aims of society and the State are the private aim of the\nindividuals. But the set of adjustments, by which their duties come back\nto them as the exercise and enjoyment of right, produces an appearance of\ndiversity: and this diversity is increased by the variety of shapes which\nvalue assumes in the course of exchange, though it remains intrinsically\nthe same. Still it holds fundamentally good that he who has no rights has\nno duties and _vice versa_.\n\n\n\n\nDistribution.\n\n\n\u00a7 487. The free will is\n\nA. itself at first immediate, and hence as a single being\u2014the _person_:\nthe existence which the person gives to its liberty is _property_. The\n_Right as_ right (law) is _formal, abstract right_.\n\nB. When the will is reflected into self, so as to have its existence\ninside it, and to be thus at the same time characterised as a\n_particular_, it is the right of the _subjective_ will, _morality_ of the\nindividual conscience.\n\nC. When the free will is the substantial will, made actual in the subject\nand conformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity,\u2014it is\nthe ethics of actual life in family, civil society, and state.\n\n\n\n\nSub-Section A. Law.(152)\n\n\n\n(a) Property.\n\n\n\u00a7 488. Mind, in the immediacy of its self-secured liberty, is an\nindividual, but one that knows its individuality as an absolutely free\nwill: it is a _person_, in whom the inward sense of this freedom, as in\nitself still abstract and empty, has its particularity and fulfilment not\nyet on its own part, but on an external _thing_. This thing, as something\ndevoid of will, has no rights against the subjectivity of intelligence and\nvolition, and is by that subjectivity made adjectival to it, the external\nsphere of its liberty;\u2014_possession_.\n\n\u00a7 489. By the judgment of possession, at first in the outward\nappropriation, the thing acquires the predicate of \u201cmine.\u201d But this\npredicate, on its own account merely \u201cpractical,\u201d has here the\nsignification that I import my personal will into the thing. As so\ncharacterised, possession is _property_, which as possession is a _means_,\nbut as existence of the personality is an _end_.\n\n\u00a7 490. In his property the person is brought into union with itself. But\nthe thing is an abstractly external thing, and the I in it is abstractly\nexternal. The concrete return of me into me in the externality is that I,\nthe infinite self-relation, am as a person the repulsion of me from\nmyself, and have the existence of my personality in the _being of other\npersons_, in my relation to them and in my recognition by them, which is\nthus mutual.\n\n\u00a7 491. The thing is the _mean_ by which the extremes meet in one. These\nextremes are the persons who, in the knowledge of their identity as free,\nare simultaneously mutually independent. For them my will has its\n_definite recognisable existence_ in the thing by the immediate bodily act\nof taking possession, or by the formation of the thing or, it may be, by\nmere designation of it.\n\n\u00a7 492. The casual aspect of property is that I place my will in _this_\nthing: so far my will is _arbitrary_, I can just as well put it in it as\nnot,\u2014just as well withdraw it as not. But so far as my will lies in a\nthing, it is only I who can withdraw it: it is only with my will that the\nthing can pass to another, whose property it similarly becomes only with\nhis will:\u2014_Contract_.\n\n\n\n(b) Contract.\n\n\n\u00a7 493. The two wills and their agreement in the contract are as an\n_internal_ state of mind different from its realisation in the\n_performance_. The comparatively \u201cideal\u201d utterance (of contract) in the\n_stipulation_ contains the actual surrender of a property by the one, its\nchanging hands, and its acceptance by the other will. The contract is thus\nthoroughly binding: it does not need the performance of the one or the\nother to become so\u2014otherwise we should have an infinite regress or\ninfinite division of thing, labour, and time. The utterance in the\nstipulation is complete and exhaustive. The inwardness of the will which\nsurrenders and the will which accepts the property is in the realm of\nideation, and in that realm the word is deed and thing (\u00a7 462)\u2014the full\nand complete deed, since here the conscientiousness of the will does not\ncome under consideration (as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or\nis a deception), and the will refers only to the external thing.\n\n\u00a7 494. Thus in the stipulation we have the _substantial_ being of the\ncontract standing out in distinction from its real utterance in the\nperformance, which is brought down to a mere sequel. In this way there is\nput into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate\nspecific _quality_ and its substantial being or _value_, meaning by value\nthe quantitative terms into which that qualitative feature has been\ntranslated. One piece of property is thus made comparable with another,\nand may be made equivalent to a thing which is (in quality) wholly\nheterogeneous. It is thus treated in general as an abstract, universal\nthing or commodity.\n\n\u00a7 495. The contract, as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and\ndeals with a casual commodity, involves at the same time the giving to\nthis \u201caccidental\u201d will a positive fixity. This will may just as well not\nbe conformable to law (right), and, in that case, produces a _wrong_: by\nwhich however the absolute law (right) is not superseded, but only a\nrelationship originated of right to wrong.\n\n\n\n(c) Right versus Wrong.\n\n\n\u00a7 496. Law (right) considered as the realisation of liberty in externals,\nbreaks up into a multiplicity of relations to this external sphere and to\nother persons (\u00a7\u00a7 491, 493 seqq.). In this way there are (1) several\ntitles or grounds at law, of which (seeing that property both on the\npersonal and the real side is exclusively individual) only one is the\nright, but which, because they face each other, each and all are invested\nwith a _show_ of right, against which the former is defined as the\nintrinsically right.\n\n\u00a7 497. Now so long as (compared against this show) the one intrinsically\nright, still presumed identical with the several titles, is affirmed,\nwilled, and recognised, the only diversity lies in this, that the special\nthing is subsumed under the one law or right by the _particular_ will of\n_these_ several persons. This is na\u00efve, non-malicious wrong. Such wrong in\nthe several claimants is a simple _negative judgment_, expressing the\n_civil suit_. To settle it there is required a third judgment, which, as\nthe judgment of the intrinsically right, is disinterested, and a power of\ngiving the one right existence as against that semblance.\n\n\u00a7 498. But (2) if the semblance of right is willed as such _against_ right\nintrinsical by the particular will, which thus becomes _wicked_, then the\nexternal _recognition_ of right is separated from the right\u2019s true value;\nand while the former only is respected, the latter is violated. This gives\nthe wrong of _fraud_\u2014the infinite judgment as identical (\u00a7 173),\u2014where the\nnominal relation is retained, but the sterling value is let slip.\n\n\u00a7 499. (3) Finally, the particular will sets itself in opposition to the\nintrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its recognition\nor semblance. [Here there is a negatively infinite judgment (\u00a7 173) in\nwhich there is denied the class as a whole, and not merely the particular\nmode\u2014in this case the apparent recognition.] Thus the will is violently\nwicked, and commits a _crime_.\n\n\u00a7 500. As an outrage on right, such an action is essentially and actually\nnull. In it the agent, as a volitional and intelligent being, sets up a\nlaw\u2014a law however which is nominal and recognised by him only\u2014a universal\nwhich holds good _for him_, and under which he has at the same time\nsubsumed himself by his action. To display the nullity of such an act, to\ncarry out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic right, in the\nfirst instance by means of a subjective individual will, is the work of\n_Revenge_. But, revenge, starting from the interest of an immediate\nparticular personality, is at the same time only a new outrage; and so on\nwithout end. This progression, like the last, abolishes itself in a third\njudgment, which is disinterested\u2014_punishment_.\n\n\u00a7 501. The instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right\nis (\u03b1) that a particular will, that of the judge, being conformable to the\nright, has an interest to turn against the crime (\u2014which in the first\ninstance, in revenge, is a matter of chance), and (\u03b2) that an executive\npower (also in the first instance casual) negates the negation of right\nthat was created by the criminal. This negation of right has its existence\nin the will of the criminal; and consequently revenge or punishment\ndirects itself against the person or property of the criminal and\nexercises _coercion_ upon him. It is in this legal sphere that coercion in\ngeneral has possible scope,\u2014compulsion against the thing, in seizing and\nmaintaining it against another\u2019s seizure: for in this sphere the will has\nits existence immediately in externals as such, or in corporeity, and can\nbe seized only in this quarter. But more than _possible_ compulsion is\nnot, so long as I can withdraw myself as free from every mode of\nexistence, even from the range of all existence, i.e. from life. It is\nlegal only as abolishing a first and original compulsion.\n\n\u00a7 502. A distinction has thus emerged between the law (right) and the\nsubjective will. The \u201creality\u201d of right, which the personal will in the\nfirst instance gives itself in immediate wise, is seen to be due to the\ninstrumentality of the subjective will,\u2014whose influence as on one hand it\ngives existence to the essential right, so may on the other cut itself off\nfrom and oppose itself to it. Conversely, the claim of the subjective will\nto be in this abstraction a power over the law of right is null and empty\nof itself: it gets truth and reality essentially only so far as that will\nin itself realises the reasonable will. As such it is _morality_(153)\nproper.\n\nThe phrase \u201cLaw of Nature,\u201d or Natural Right(154), in use for the\nphilosophy of law involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as\nsomething existing ready-formed in nature, or right as governed by the\nnature of things, i.e. by the notion. The former used to be the common\nmeaning, accompanied with the fiction of a _state of nature_, in which the\nlaw of nature should hold sway; whereas the social and political state\nrather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of\nnatural rights. The real fact is that the whole law and its every article\nare based on free personality alone,\u2014on self-determination or autonomy,\nwhich is the very contrary of determination by nature. The law of\nnature\u2014strictly so called\u2014is for that reason the predominance of the\nstrong and the reign of force, and a state of nature a state of violence\nand wrong, of which nothing truer can be said than that one ought to\ndepart from it. The social state, on the other hand, is the condition in\nwhich alone right has its actuality: what is to be restricted and\nsacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the state of nature.\n\n\n\n\nSub-Section B. The Morality Of Conscience(155).\n\n\n\u00a7 503. The free individual, who, in mere law, counts only as a _person_,\nis now characterised as a _subject_, a will reflected into itself so that,\nbe its affection what it may, it is distinguished (as existing in it) as\n_its own_ from the existence of freedom in an external thing. Because the\naffection of the will is thus inwardised, the will is at the same time\nmade a particular, and there arise further particularisations of it and\nrelations of these to one another. This affection is partly the essential\nand implicit will, the reason of the will, the essential basis of law and\nmoral life: partly it is the existent volition, which is before us and\nthrows itself into actual deeds, and thus comes into relationship with the\nformer. The subjective will is _morally_ free, so far as these features\nare its inward institution, its own, and willed by it. Its utterance in\ndeed with this freedom is an _action_, in the externality of which it only\nadmits as its own, and allows to be imputed to it, so much as it has\nconsciously willed.\n\nThis subjective or \u201cmoral\u201d freedom is what a European especially calls\nfreedom. In virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a personal\nknowledge of the distinction between good and evil in general: ethical and\nreligious principles shall not merely lay their claim on him as external\nlaws and precepts of authority to be obeyed, but have their assent,\nrecognition, or even justification in his heart, sentiment, conscience,\nintelligence, &c. The subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme\naim and absolutely essential to it.\n\nThe \u201cmoral\u201d must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify\nthe morally good merely. In French _le moral_ is opposed to _le physique_,\nand means the mental or intellectual in general. But here the moral\nsignifies volitional mode, so far as it is in the interior of the will in\ngeneral; it thus includes purpose and intention,\u2014and also moral\nwickedness.\n\n\n\na. Purpose(156).\n\n\n\u00a7 504. So far as the action comes into immediate touch with _existence_,\n_my part_ in it is to this extent formal, that external existence is also\n_independent_ of the agent. This externality can pervert his action and\nbring to light something else than lay in it. Now, though any alteration\nas such, which is set on foot by the subject\u2019s action, is its _deed_(157),\nstill the subject does not for that reason recognise it as its\n_action_(158), but only admits as its own that existence in the deed which\nlay in its knowledge and will, which was its _purpose_. Only for that does\nit hold itself _responsible_.\n\n\n\nb. Intention and Welfare(159).\n\n\n\u00a7 505. As regards its empirically concrete _content_ (1) the action has a\nvariety of particular aspects and connexions. In point of _form_, the\nagent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature,\nembracing these individual points. This is the right of _intention_. While\n_purpose_ affects only the immediate fact of existence, _intention_\nregards the underlying essence and aim thereof. (2) The agent has no less\nthe right to see that the particularity of content in the action, in point\nof its matter, is not something external to him, but is a particularity of\nhis own,\u2014that it contains his needs, interests, and aims. These aims, when\nsimilarly comprehended in a single aim, as in happiness (\u00a7 479),\nconstitute his _well-being_. This is the right to well-being. Happiness\n(good fortune) is distinguished from well-being only in this, that\nhappiness implies no more than some sort of immediate existence, whereas\nwell-being regards it as also justified as regards morality.\n\n\u00a7 506. But the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the\nabstract form of generality. Reflection can put in this form this and that\nparticular aspect in the empirically-concrete action, thus making it\nessential to the intention or restricting the intention to it. In this way\nthe supposed essentiality of the intention and the real essentiality of\nthe action may be brought into the greatest contradiction\u2014e.g. a good\nintention in case of a crime. Similarly well-being is abstract and may be\nset on this or that: as appertaining to this single agent, it is always\nsomething particular.\n\n\n\nc. Goodness and Wickedness(160).\n\n\n\u00a7 507. The truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their\nformalism is the content of the universal, essential and actual, will,\u2014the\nlaw and underlying essence of every phase of volition, the essential and\nactual good. It is thus the absolute final aim of the world, and _duty_\nfor the agent who _ought_ to have _insight_ into the _good_, make it his\n_intention_ and bring it about by his activity.\n\n\u00a7 508. But though the good is the universal of will\u2014a universal determined\nin itself,\u2014and thus including in it particularity,\u2014still so far as this\nparticularity is in the first instance still abstract, there is no\nprinciple at hand to determine it. Such determination therefore starts up\nalso outside that universal; and as heteronomy or determinance of a will\nwhich is free and has rights of its own, there awakes here the deepest\ncontradiction. (\u03b1) In consequence of the indeterminate determinism of the\ngood, there are always _several sorts_ of good and _many kinds of duties_,\nthe variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them\ninto _collision_. At the same time because good is one, they _ought_ to\nstand in harmony; and yet each of them, though it is a particular duty, is\nas good and as duty absolute. It falls upon the agent to be the dialectic\nwhich, superseding this absolute claim of each, concludes such a\ncombination of them as excludes the rest.\n\n\u00a7 509. (\u03b2) To the agent, who in his existent sphere of liberty is\nessentially as a _particular_, his _interest and welfare_ must, on account\nof that existent sphere of liberty, be essentially an aim and therefore a\nduty. But at the same time in aiming at the good, which is the\nnot-particular but only universal of the will, the particular interest\n_ought not_ to be a constituent motive. On account of this independency of\nthe two principles of action, it is likewise an accident whether they\nharmonise. And yet they _ought_ to harmonise, because the agent, as\nindividual and universal, is always fundamentally one identity.\n\n(\u03b3) But the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence; it is\nalso a form of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty, an abstract\nreflection of freedom into himself. He is thus distinct from the reason in\nthe will, and capable of making the universal itself a particular and in\nthat way a semblance. The good is thus reduced to the level of a mere \u201cmay\nhappen\u201d for the agent, who can therefore resolve itself to somewhat\nopposite to the good, can be wicked.\n\n\u00a7 510. (\u03b4) The external objectivity, following the distinction which has\narisen in the subjective will (\u00a7 503), constitutes a peculiar world of its\nown,\u2014another extreme which stands in no rapport with the internal\nwill-determination. It is thus a matter of chance, whether it harmonises\nwith the subjective aims, whether the good is realised, and the wicked, an\naim essentially and actually null, nullified in it: it is no less matter\nof chance whether the agent finds in it his well-being, and more precisely\nwhether in the world the good agent is happy and the wicked unhappy. But\nat the same time the world _ought_ to allow the good action, the essential\nthing, to be carried out in it; it _ought_ to grant the good agent the\nsatisfaction of his particular interest, and refuse it to the wicked; just\nas it _ought_ also to make the wicked itself null and void.\n\n\u00a7 511. The all-round contradiction, expressed by this repeated _ought_,\nwith its absoluteness which yet at the same time is _not_\u2014contains the\nmost abstract \u2019analysis\u2019 of the mind in itself, its deepest descent into\nitself. The only relation the self-contradictory principles have to one\nanother is in the abstract certainty of self; and for this infinitude of\nsubjectivity the universal will, good, right, and duty, no more exist than\nnot. The subjectivity alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding.\nThis pure self-certitude, rising to its pitch, appears in the two directly\ninter-changing forms\u2014of _Conscience_ and _Wickedness_. The former is the\nwill of goodness; but a goodness which to this pure subjectivity is the\n_non-objective_, non-universal, the unutterable; and over which the agent\nis conscious that _he_ in his _individuality_ has the decision. Wickedness\nis the same awareness that the single self possesses the decision, so far\nas the single self does not merely remain in this abstraction, but takes\nup the content of a subjective interest contrary to the good.\n\n\u00a7 512. This supreme pitch of the \u201c_phenomenon_\u201d of will,\u2014sublimating\nitself to this absolute vanity\u2014to a goodness, which has no objectivity,\nbut is only sure of itself, and a self-assurance which involves the\nnullification of the universal\u2014collapses by its own force. Wickedness, as\nthe most intimate reflection of subjectivity itself, in opposition to the\nobjective and universal, (which it treats as mere sham,) is the same as\nthe good sentiment of abstract goodness, which reserves to the\nsubjectivity the determination thereof:\u2014the utterly abstract semblance,\nthe bare perversion and annihilation of itself. The result, the truth of\nthis semblance, is, on its negative side, the absolute nullity of this\nvolition which would fain hold its own against the good, and of the good,\nwhich would only be abstract. On the affirmative side, in the notion, this\nsemblance thus collapsing is the same simple universality of the will,\nwhich is the good. The subjectivity, in this its _identity_ with the good,\nis only the infinite form, which actualises and developes it. In this way\nthe standpoint of bare reciprocity between two independent sides,\u2014the\nstandpoint of the _ought_, is abandoned, and we have passed into the field\nof ethical life.\n\n\n\n\nSub-Section C. The Moral Life, Or Social Ethics(161).\n\n\n\u00a7 513. The moral life is the perfection of spirit objective\u2014the truth of\nthe subjective and objective spirit itself. The failure of the latter\nconsists\u2014partly in having its freedom _immediately_ in reality, in\nsomething external therefore, in a thing,\u2014partly in the abstract\nuniversality of its goodness. The failure of spirit subjective similarly\nconsists in this, that it is, as against the universal, abstractly\nself-determinant in its inward individuality. When these two imperfections\nare suppressed, subjective _freedom_ exists as the covertly and overtly\n_universal_ rational will, which is sensible of itself and actively\ndisposed in the consciousness of the individual subject, whilst its\npractical operation and immediate universal _actuality_ at the same time\nexist as moral usage, manner and custom,\u2014where self-conscious _liberty_\nhas become _nature_.\n\n\u00a7 514. The consciously free substance, in which the absolute \u201cought\u201d is no\nless an \u201cis,\u201d has actuality as the spirit of a nation. The abstract\ndisruption of this spirit singles it out into _persons_, whose\nindependence it however controls and entirely dominates from within. But\nthe person, as an intelligent being, feels that underlying essence to be\nhis own very being\u2014ceases when so minded to be a mere accident of it\u2014looks\nupon it as his absolute final aim. In its actuality he sees not less an\nachieved present, than somewhat he brings it about by his action,\u2014yet\nsomewhat which without all question _is_. Thus, without any selective\nreflection, the person performs its duty as _his own_ and as something\nwhich _is_; and in this necessity _he_ has himself and his actual freedom.\n\n\u00a7 515. Because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and\nuniversality of freedom, it follows that the actuality and action of each\nindividual to keep and to take care of his own being, while it is on one\nhand conditioned by the pre-supposed total in whose complex alone he\nexists, is on the other a transition into a universal product.\u2014The social\ndisposition of the individuals is their sense of the substance, and of the\nidentity of all their interests with the total; and that the other\nindividuals mutually know each other and are actual only in this identity,\nis confidence (trust)\u2014the genuine ethical temper.\n\n\u00a7 516. The relations between individuals in the several situations to\nwhich the substance is particularised form their _ethical duties_. The\nethical personality, i.e. the subjectivity which is permeated by the\nsubstantial life, is _virtue_. In relation to the bare facts of external\nbeing, to _destiny_, virtue does not treat them as a mere negation, and is\nthus a quiet repose in itself: in relation to substantial objectivity, to\nthe total of ethical actuality, it exists as confidence, as deliberate\nwork for the community, and the capacity of sacrificing self thereto;\nwhilst in relation to the incidental relations of social circumstance, it\nis in the first instance justice and then benevolence. In the latter\nsphere, and in its attitude to its own visible being and corporeity, the\nindividuality expresses its special character, temperament, &c. as\npersonal _virtues_.\n\n\u00a7 517. The ethical substance is\n\nAA. as \u201cimmediate\u201d or _natural_ mind,\u2014the _Family_.\n\nBB. The \u201crelative\u201d totality of the \u201crelative\u201d relations of the individuals\nas independent persons to one another in a formal universality\u2014_Civil\nSociety_.\n\nCC. The self-conscious substance, as the mind developed to an organic\nactuality\u2014the _Political Constitution_.\n\n\n\nAA. The Family.\n\n\n\u00a7 518. The ethical spirit, in its _immediacy_, contains the _natural_\nfactor that the individual has its substantial existence in its natural\nuniversal, i.e. in its kind. This is the sexual tie, elevated however to a\nspiritual significance,\u2014the unanimity of love and the temper of trust. In\nthe shape of the family, mind appears as feeling.\n\n\u00a7 519. (1) The physical difference of sex thus appears at the same time as\na difference of intellectual and moral type. With their exclusive\nindividualities these personalities combine to form a _single person_: the\nsubjective union of hearts, becoming a \u201csubstantial\u201d unity, makes this\nunion an ethical tie\u2014_Marriage_. The \u2019substantial\u2019 union of hearts makes\nmarriage an indivisible personal bond\u2014monogamic marriage: the bodily\nconjunction is a sequel to the moral attachment. A further sequel is\ncommunity of personal and private interests.\n\n\u00a7 520. (2) By the community in which the various members constituting the\nfamily stand in reference to property, that property of the one person\n(representing the family) acquires an ethical interest, as do also its\nindustry, labour, and care for the future.\n\n\u00a7 521. The ethical principle which is conjoined with the natural\ngeneration of the children, and which was assumed to have primary\nimportance in first forming the marriage union, is actually realised in\nthe second or spiritual birth of the children,\u2014in educating them to\nindependent personality.\n\n\u00a7 522. (3) The children, thus invested with independence, leave the\nconcrete life and action of the family to which they primarily belong,\nacquire an existence of their own, destined however to found anew such an\nactual family. Marriage is of course broken up by the _natural_ element\ncontained in it, the death of husband and wife: but even their union of\nhearts, as it is a mere \u201csubstantiality\u201d of feeling, contains the germ of\nliability to chance and decay. In virtue of such fortuitousness, the\nmembers of the family take up to each other the status of persons; and it\nis thus that the family finds introduced into it for the first time the\nelement, originally foreign to it, of _legal_ regulation.\n\n\n\nBB. Civil Society(162).\n\n\n\u00a7 523. As the substance, being an intelligent substance, particularises\nitself abstractly into many persons (the family is only a single person),\ninto families or individuals, who exist independent and free, as private\npersons, it loses its ethical character: for these persons as such have in\ntheir consciousness and as their aim not the absolute unity, but their own\npetty selves and particular interests. Thus arises the system of\n_atomistic_: by which the substance is reduced to a general system of\nadjustments to connect self-subsisting extremes and their particular\ninterests. The developed totality of this connective system is the state\nas civil society, or _state external_.\n\n\na. The System of Wants(163).\n\n\n\u00a7 524. (\u03b1) The particularity of the persons includes in the first instance\ntheir wants. The possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the\nsocial fabric, the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction.\nIn the condition of things in which this method of satisfaction by\nindirect adjustment is realised, immediate seizure (\u00a7 488) of external\nobjects as means thereto exists barely or not at all: the objects are\nalready property. To acquire them is only possible by the intervention, on\none hand, of the possessors\u2019 will, which as particular has in view the\nsatisfaction of their variously defined interests; while on the other hand\nit is conditioned by the ever continued production of fresh means of\nexchange by the exchangers\u2019 _own labour_. This instrument, by which the\nlabour of all facilitates satisfaction of wants, constitutes the general\nstock.\n\n\u00a7 525. (\u03b2) The glimmer of universal principle in this particularity of\nwants is found in the way intellect creates differences in them, and thus\ncauses an indefinite multiplication both of wants and of means for their\ndifferent phases. Both are thus rendered more and more abstract. This\n\u201cmorcellement\u201d of their content by abstraction gives rise to the _division\nof labour_. The habit of this abstraction in enjoyment, information,\nfeeling and demeanour, constitutes training in this sphere, or nominal\nculture in general.\n\n\u00a7 526. The labour which thus becomes more abstract tends on one hand by\nits uniformity to make labour easier and to increase production,\u2014on\nanother to limit each person to a single kind of technical skill, and thus\nproduce more unconditional dependence on the social system. The skill\nitself becomes in this way mechanical, and gets the capability of letting\nthe machine take the place of human labour.\n\n\u00a7 527. (\u03b3) But the concrete division of the general stock\u2014which is also a\ngeneral business (of the whole society)\u2014into particular masses determined\nby the factors of the notion,\u2014masses each of which possesses its own basis\nof subsistence, and a corresponding mode of labour, of needs, and of means\nfor satisfying them, besides of aims and interests, as well as of mental\nculture and habit\u2014constitutes the difference of Estates (orders or ranks).\nIndividuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent,\nskill, option and accident. As belonging to such a definite and stable\nsphere, they have their actual existence, which as existence is\nessentially a particular; and in it they have their social morality, which\nis _honesty_, their recognition and their _honour_.\n\nWhere civil society, and with it the State, exists, there arise the\nseveral estates in their difference: for the universal substance, as\nvital, _exists_ only so far as it organically _particularises_ itself. The\nhistory of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates, of\nthe legal relationships of individuals to them, and of these estates to\none another and to their centre.\n\n\u00a7 528. To the \u201csubstantial,\u201d natural estate the fruitful soil and ground\nsupply a natural and stable capital; its action gets direction and content\nthrough natural features, and its moral life is founded on faith and\ntrust. The second, the \u201creflected\u201d estate has as its allotment the social\ncapital, the medium created by the action of middlemen, of mere agents,\nand an ensemble of contingencies, where the individual has to depend on\nhis subjective skill, talent, intelligence and industry. The third,\n\u201cthinking\u201d estate has for its business the general interests; like the\nsecond it has a subsistence procured by means of its own skill, and like\nthe first a certain subsistence, certain however because guaranteed\nthrough the whole society.\n\n\nb. Administration of Justice(164).\n\n\n\u00a7 529. When matured through the operation of natural need and free option\ninto a system of universal relationships and a regular course of external\nnecessity, the principle of casual particularity gets that stable\narticulation which liberty requires in the shape of _formal right_. (1)\nThe actualisation which right gets in this sphere of mere practical\nintelligence is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable\nuniversal, that it be known and stated in its specificality with the voice\nof authority\u2014the _Law_(165).\n\nThe _positive_ element in laws concerns only their form of _publicity_ and\n_authority_\u2014which makes it possible for them to be known by all in a\ncustomary and external way. Their content _per se_ may be reasonable\u2014or it\nmay be unreasonable and so wrong. But when right, in the course of\ndefinite manifestation, is developed in detail, and its content analyses\nitself to gain definiteness, this analysis, because of the finitude of its\nmaterials, falls into the falsely infinite progress: the _final_\ndefiniteness, which is absolutely essential and causes a break in this\nprogress of unreality, can in this sphere of finitude be attained only in\na way that savours of contingency and arbitrariness. Thus whether three\nyears, ten thalers, or only 2-1/2, 2-3/4, 2-4/5 years, and so on _ad\ninfinitum_, be the right and just thing, can by no means be decided on\nintelligible principles,\u2014and yet it should be decided. Hence, though of\ncourse only at the final points of deciding, on the side of external\nexistence, the \u201cpositive\u201d principle naturally enters law as contingency\nand arbitrariness. This happens and has from of old happened in all\nlegislations: the only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of it, and not\nbe misled by the talk and the pretence as if the ideal of law were, or\ncould be, to be, at _every_ point, determined through reason or legal\nintelligence, on purely reasonable and intelligent grounds. It is a futile\nperfectionism to have such expectations and to make such requirements in\nthe sphere of the finite.\n\nThere are some who look upon laws as an evil and a profanity, and who\nregard governing and being governed from natural love, hereditary,\ndivinity or nobility, by faith and trust, as the genuine order of life,\nwhile the reign of law is held an order of corruption and injustice. These\npeople forget that the stars\u2014and the cattle too\u2014are governed and well\ngoverned too by laws;\u2014laws however which are only internally in these\nobjects, not _for them_, not as laws _set to_ them:\u2014whereas it is man\u2019s\nprivilege to _know_ his law. They forget therefore that he can truly obey\nonly such known law,\u2014even as his law can only be a just law, as it is a\n_known_ law;\u2014though in other respects it must be in its essential content\ncontingency and caprice, or at least be mixed and polluted with such\nelements.\n\nThe same empty requirement of perfection is employed for an opposite\nthesis\u2014viz. to support the opinion that a code is impossible or\nimpracticable. In this case there comes in the additional absurdity of\nputting essential and universal provisions in one class with the\nparticular detail. The finite material is definable on and on to the false\ninfinite: but this advance is not, as in the mental images of space, a\ngeneration of new spatial characteristics of the same quality as those\npreceding them, but an advance into greater and ever greater speciality by\nthe acumen of the analytic intellect, which discovers new distinctions,\nwhich again make new decisions necessary. To provisions of this sort one\nmay give the name of _new_ decisions or _new_ laws; but in proportion to\nthe gradual advance in specialisation the interest and value of these\nprovisions declines. They fall within the already subsisting\n\u201csubstantial,\u201d general laws, like improvements on a floor or a door,\nwithin the house\u2014which though something _new_, are not a new _house_. But\nthere is a contrary case. If the legislation of a rude age began with\nsingle provisos, which go on by their very nature always increasing their\nnumber, there arises, with the advance in multitude, the need of a simpler\ncode,\u2014the need i.e. of embracing that lot of singulars in their general\nfeatures. To find and be able to express these principles well beseems an\nintelligent and civilised nation. Such a gathering up of single rules into\ngeneral forms, first really deserving the name of laws, has lately been\nbegun in some directions by the English Minister Peel, who has by so doing\ngained the gratitude, even the admiration, of his countrymen.\n\n\u00a7 530. (2) The positive form of Laws\u2014to be _promulgated and made known_ as\nlaws\u2014is a condition of the _external obligation_ to obey them; inasmuch\nas, being laws of strict right, they touch only the abstract will,\u2014itself\nat bottom external\u2014not the moral or ethical will. The subjectivity to\nwhich the will has in this direction a right is here only publicity. This\nsubjective existence is as existence of the essential and developed truth\nin this sphere of Right at the same time an externally objective\nexistence, as universal authority and necessity.\n\nThe legality of property and of private transactions concerned\ntherewith\u2014in consideration of the principle that all law must be\npromulgated, recognised, and thus become authoritative\u2014gets its universal\nguarantee through _formalities_.\n\n\u00a7 531. (3) Legal forms get the necessity, to which objective existence\ndetermines itself, in the _judicial __ system_. Abstract right has to\nexhibit itself to the _court_\u2014to the individualised right\u2014as _proven_:\u2014a\nprocess in which there may be a difference between what is abstractly\nright and what is provably right. The court takes cognisance and action in\nthe interest of right as such, deprives the existence of right of its\ncontingency, and in particular transforms this existence,\u2014as this exists\nas revenge\u2014into _punishment_ (\u00a7 500).\n\nThe comparison of the two species, or rather two elements in the judicial\nconviction, bearing on the actual state of the case in relation to the\naccused,\u2014(1) according as that conviction is based on mere circumstances\nand other people\u2019s witness alone,\u2014or (2) in addition requires the\nconfession of the accused, constitutes the main point in the question of\nthe so-called jury-courts. It is an essential point that the two\ningredients of a judicial cognisance, the judgment as to the state of the\nfact, and the judgment as application of the law to it, should, as at\nbottom different sides, be exercised as _different functions_. By the said\ninstitution they are allotted even to bodies differently qualified,\u2014from\nthe one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are\nexpressly excluded. To carry this separation of functions up to this\nseparation in the courts rests rather on extra-essential considerations:\nthe main point remains only the separate performance of these essentially\ndifferent functions.\u2014It is a more important point whether the confession\nof the accused is or is not to be made a condition of penal judgment. The\ninstitution of the jury-court loses sight of this condition. The point is\nthat on this ground certainty is completely inseparable from truth: but\nthe confession is to be regarded as the very acm\u00e9 of certainty-giving\nwhich in its nature is subjective. The final decision therefore lies with\nthe confession. To this therefore the accused has an absolute right, if\nthe proof is to be made final and the judges to be convinced. No doubt\nthis factor is incomplete, because it is only one factor; but still more\nincomplete is the other when no less abstractly taken,\u2014viz. mere\ncircumstantial evidence. The jurors are essentially judges and pronounce a\njudgment. In so far, then, as all they have to go on are such objective\nproofs, whilst at the same time their defect of certainty (incomplete in\nso far as it is only _in them_) is admitted, the jury-court shows traces\nof its barbaric origin in a confusion and admixture between objective\nproofs and subjective or so-called \u201cmoral\u201d conviction.\u2014It is easy to call\n_extraordinary_ punishments an absurdity; but the fault lies rather with\nthe shallowness which takes offence at a mere name. Materially the\nprinciple involves the difference of objective probation according as it\ngoes with or without the factor of absolute certification which lies in\nconfession.\n\n\u00a7 532. The function of judicial administration is only to actualise to\nnecessity the abstract side of personal liberty in civil society. But this\nactualisation rests at first on the particular subjectivity of the judge,\nsince here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it with right\nin the abstract. Conversely, the blind necessity of the system of wants is\nnot lifted up into the consciousness of the universal, and worked from\nthat period of view.\n\n\nc. Police and Corporation(166).\n\n\n\u00a7 533. Judicial administration naturally has no concern with such part of\nactions and interests as belongs only to particularity, and leaves to\nchance not only the occurrence of crimes but also the care for public\nweal. In civil society the sole end is to satisfy want\u2014and that, because\nit is man\u2019s want, in a uniform general way, so as to _secure_ this\nsatisfaction. But the machinery of social necessity leaves in many ways a\ncasualness about this satisfaction. This is due to the variability of the\nwants themselves, in which opinion and subjective good-pleasure play a\ngreat part. It results also from circumstances of locality, from the\nconnexions between nation and nation, from errors and deceptions which can\nbe foisted upon single members of the social circulation and are capable\nof creating disorder in it,\u2014as also and especially from the unequal\ncapacity of individuals to take advantage of that general stock. The\nonward march of this necessity also sacrifices the very particularities by\nwhich it is brought about, and does not itself contain the affirmative aim\nof securing the satisfaction of individuals. So far as concerns them, it\n_may_ be far from beneficial: yet here the individuals are the\nmorally-justifiable end.\n\n\u00a7 534. To keep in view this general end, to ascertain the way in which the\npowers composing that social necessity act, and their variable\ningredients, and to maintain that end in them and against them, is the\nwork of an institution which assumes on _one_ hand, to the concrete of\ncivil society, the position of an external universality. Such an order\nacts with the power of an external state, which, in so far as it is rooted\nin the higher or substantial state, appears as state \u201cpolice.\u201d On the\n_other_ hand, in this sphere of particularity the only recognition of the\naim of substantial universality and the only carrying of it out is\nrestricted to the business of particular branches and interests. Thus we\nhave the _corporation_, in which the particular citizen in his private\ncapacity finds the securing of his stock, whilst at the same time he in it\nemerges from his single private interest, and has a conscious activity for\na comparatively universal end, just as in his legal and professional\nduties he has his social morality.\n\n\n\nCC. The State.\n\n\n\u00a7 535. The State is the _self-conscious_ ethical substance, the\nunification of the family principle with that of civil society. The same\nunity, which is in the family as a feeling of love, is its essence,\nreceiving however at the same time through the second principle of\nconscious and spontaneously active volition the _form_ of conscious\nuniversality. This universal principle, with all its evolution in detail,\nis the absolute aim and content of the knowing subject, which thus\nidentifies itself in its volition with the system of reasonableness.\n\n\u00a7 536. The state is (\u03b1) its inward structure as a self-relating\ndevelopment\u2014constitutional (inner-state) law: (\u03b2) a particular individual,\nand therefore in connexion with other particular\nindividuals,\u2014international (outer-state) law; (\u03b3) but these particular\nminds are only stages in the general development of mind in its actuality:\nuniversal history.\n\n\n\u03b1. Constitutional Law(167).\n\n\n\u00a7 537. The essence of the state is the universal, self-originated and\nself-developed,\u2014the reasonable spirit of will; but, as self-knowing and\nself-actualising, sheer subjectivity, and\u2014as an actuality\u2014one individual.\nIts _work_ generally\u2014in relation to the extreme of individuality as the\nmultitude of individuals\u2014consists in a double function. First it maintains\nthem as persons, thus making right a necessary actuality, then it promotes\ntheir welfare, which each originally takes care of for himself, but which\nhas a thoroughly general side; it protects the family and guides civil\nsociety. Secondly, it carries back both, and the whole disposition and\naction of the individual\u2014whose tendency is to become a centre of his\nown\u2014into the life of the universal substance; and, in this direction, as a\nfree power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and retains them\nin substantial immanence.\n\n\u00a7 538. The laws express the special provisions for objective freedom.\nFirst, to the immediate agent, his independent self-will and particular\ninterest, they are restrictions. But, secondly, they are an absolute final\nend and the universal work: hence they are a product of the \u201cfunctions\u201d of\nthe various orders which parcel themselves more and more out of the\ngeneral particularising, and are a fruit of all the acts and private\nconcerns of individuals. Thirdly, they are the substance of the volition\nof individuals\u2014which volition is thereby free\u2014and of their disposition:\nbeing as such exhibited as current usage.\n\n\u00a7 539. As a living mind, the state only is as an organised whole,\ndifferentiated into particular agencies, which, proceeding from the one\nnotion (though not known as notion) of the reasonable will, continually\nproduce it as their result. The _constitution_ is this articulation or\norganisation of state-power. It provides for the reasonable will,\u2014in so\nfar as it is in the individuals only _implicitly_ the universal\nwill,\u2014coming to a consciousness and an understanding of itself and being\n_found_; also for that will being put in actuality, through the action of\nthe government and its several branches, and not left to perish, but\nprotected both against _their_ casual subjectivity and against that of the\nindividuals. The constitution is existent _justice_,\u2014the actuality of\nliberty in the development all its reasonable provisions.\n\nLiberty and Equality are the simple rubrics into which is frequently\nconcentrated what should form the fundamental principle, the final aim and\nresult of the constitution. However true this is, the defect of these\nterms is their utter abstractness: if stuck to in this abstract form, they\nare principles which either prevent the rise of the concreteness of the\nstate, i.e. its articulation into a constitution and a government in\ngeneral, or destroy them. With the state there arises inequality, the\ndifference of governing powers and of governed, magistracies, authorities,\ndirectories, &c. The principle of equality, logically carried out, rejects\nall differences, and thus allows no sort of political condition to exist.\nLiberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the state, but as the\nmost abstract also the most superficial, and for that very reason\nnaturally the most familiar. It is important therefore to study them\ncloser.\n\nAs regards, first, Equality, the familiar proposition, All men are by\nnature equal, blunders by confusing the \u201cnatural\u201d with the \u201cnotion.\u201d It\nought rather to read: _By nature_ men are only unequal. But the notion of\nliberty, as it exists as such, without further specification and\ndevelopment, is abstract subjectivity, as a person capable of property (\u00a7\n488). This single abstract feature of personality constitutes the actual\n_equality_ of human beings. But that this freedom should exist, that it\nshould be _man_ (and not as in Greece, Rome, &c. _some_ men) that is\nrecognised and legally regarded as a person, is so little _by nature_,\nthat it is rather only a result and product of the consciousness of the\ndeepest principle of mind, and of the universality and expansion of this\nconsciousness. That the citizens are equal before the law contains a great\ntruth, but which so expressed is a tautology: it only states that the\nlegal status in general exists, that the laws rule. But, as regards the\nconcrete, the citizens\u2014besides their personality\u2014are equal before the law\nonly in these points when they are otherwise equal _outside the law_. Only\nthat equality which (in whatever way it be) they, as it happens, otherwise\nhave in property, age, physical strength, talent, skill, &c.\u2014or even in\ncrime, can and ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the\nlaw:\u2014only it can make them\u2014as regards taxation, military service,\neligibility to office, &c.\u2014punishment, &c.\u2014equal in the concrete. The laws\nthemselves, except in so far as they concern that narrow circle of\npersonality, presuppose unequal conditions, and provide for the unequal\nlegal duties and appurtenances resulting therefrom.\n\nAs regards Liberty, it is originally taken partly in a negative sense\nagainst arbitrary intolerance and lawless treatment, partly in the\naffirmative sense of subjective freedom; but this freedom is allowed great\nlatitude both as regards the agent\u2019s self-will and action for his\nparticular ends, and as regards his claim to have a personal intelligence\nand a personal share in general affairs. Formerly the legally defined\nrights, private as well as public rights of a nation, town, &c. were\ncalled its \u201cliberties.\u201d Really, every genuine law is a liberty: it\ncontains a reasonable principle of objective mind; in other words, it\nembodies a liberty. Nothing has become, on the contrary, more familiar\nthan the idea that each must _restrict_ his liberty in relation to the\nliberty of others: that the state is a condition of such reciprocal\nrestriction, and that the laws are restrictions. To such habits of mind\nliberty is viewed as only casual good-pleasure and self-will. Hence it has\nalso been said that \u201cmodern\u201d nations are only susceptible of equality, or\nof equality more than liberty: and that for no other reason than that,\nwith an assumed definition of liberty (chiefly the participation of all in\npolitical affairs and actions), it was impossible to make ends meet in\nactuality\u2014which is at once more reasonable and more powerful than abstract\npresuppositions. On the contrary, it should be said that it is just the\ngreat development and maturity of form in modern states which produces the\nsupreme concrete inequality of individuals in actuality: while, through\nthe deeper reasonableness of laws and the greater stability of the legal\nstate, it gives rise to greater and more stable liberty, which it can\nwithout incompatibility allow. Even the superficial distinction of the\nwords liberty and equality points to the fact that the former tends to\ninequality: whereas, on the contrary, the current notions of liberty only\ncarry us back to equality. But the more we fortify liberty,\u2014as security of\nproperty, as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his\ntalents and good qualities, the more it gets taken for granted: and then\nthe sense and appreciation of liberty especially turns in a _subjective_\ndirection. By this is meant the liberty to attempt action on every side,\nand to throw oneself at pleasure in action for particular and for general\nintellectual interests, the removal of all checks on the individual\nparticularity, as well as the inward liberty in which the subject has\nprinciples, has an insight and conviction of his own, and thus gains moral\nindependence. But this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme\ndifferentiation in which men are unequal and make themselves more unequal\nby education; and on another it only grows up under conditions of that\nobjective liberty, and is and could grow to such height only in modern\nstates. If, with this development of particularity, there be simultaneous\nand endless increase of the number of wants, and of the difficulty of\nsatisfying them, of the lust of argument and the fancy of detecting\nfaults, with its insatiate vanity, it is all but part of that\nindiscriminating relaxation of individuality in this sphere which\ngenerates all possible complications, and must deal with them as it can.\nSuch a sphere is of course also the field of restrictions, because liberty\nis there under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing, and has\ntherefore to restrict itself: and that, not merely with regard to the\nnaturalness, self-will and self-conceit, of others, but especially and\nessentially with regard to reasonable liberty.\n\nThe term political liberty, however, is often used to mean formal\nparticipation in the public affairs of state by the will and action even\nof those individuals who otherwise find their chief function in the\nparticular aims and business of civil society. And it has in part become\nusual to give the title constitution only to the side of the state which\nconcerns such participation of these individuals in general affairs, and\nto regard a state, in which this is not formally done, as a state without\na constitution. On this use of the term, the only thing to remark is that\nby constitution must be understood the determination of rights, i.e. of\nliberties in general, and the organisation of the actualisation of them;\nand that political freedom in the above sense can in any case only\nconstitute a part of it. Of it the following paragraphs will speak.\n\n\u00a7 540. The guarantee of a constitution (i.e. the necessity that the laws\nbe reasonable, and their actualisation secured) lies in the collective\nspirit of the nation,\u2014especially in the specific way in which it is itself\nconscious of its reason. (Religion is that consciousness in its absolute\nsubstantiality.) But the guarantee lies also at the same time in the\nactual organisation or development of that principle in suitable\ninstitutions. The constitution presupposes that consciousness of the\ncollective spirit, and conversely that spirit presupposes the\nconstitution: for the actual spirit only has a definite consciousness of\nits principles, in so far as it has them actually existent before it.\n\nThe question\u2014To whom (to what authority and how organised) belongs the\npower to make a constitution? is the same as the question, Who has to make\nthe spirit of a nation? Separate our idea of a constitution from that of\nthe collective spirit, as if the latter exists or has existed without a\nconstitution, and your fancy only proves how superficially you have\napprehended the nexus between the spirit in its self-consciousness and in\nits actuality. What is thus called \u201cmaking\u201d a \u201cconstitution,\u201d is\u2014just\nbecause of this inseparability\u2014a thing that has never happened in history,\njust as little as the making of a code of laws. A constitution only\ndevelops from the national spirit identically with that spirit\u2019s own\ndevelopment, and runs through at the same time with it the grades of\nformation and the alterations required by its concept. It is the\nindwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and, be it added, the\nhistory is only that spirit\u2019s history) by which constitutions have been\nand are made.\n\n\u00a7 541. The really living totality,\u2014that which preserves, in other words\ncontinually produces the state in general and its constitution, is the\n_government_. The organisation which natural necessity gives is seen in\nthe rise of the family and of the \u2019estates\u2019 of civil society. The\ngovernment is the _universal_ part of the constitution, i.e. the part\nwhich intentionally aims at preserving those parts, but at the same time\ngets hold of and carries out those general aims of the whole which rise\nabove the function of the family and of civil society. The organisation of\nthe government is likewise its differentiation into powers, as their\npeculiarities have a basis in principle; yet without that difference\nlosing touch with the _actual unity_ they have in the notion\u2019s\nsubjectivity.\n\nAs the most obvious categories of the notion are those of _universality_\nand _individuality_ and their relationship that of _subsumption_ of\nindividual under universal, it has come about that in the state the\nlegislative and executive power have been so distinguished as to make the\nformer exist apart as the absolute superior, and to subdivide the latter\nagain into administrative (government) power and judicial power, according\nas the laws are applied to public or private affairs. The _division_ of\nthese powers has been treated as _the_ condition of political equilibrium,\nmeaning by division their _independence_ one of another in\nexistence,\u2014subject always however to the above-mentioned subsumption of\nthe powers of the individual under the power of the general. The theory of\nsuch \u201cdivision\u201d unmistakably implies the elements of the notion, but so\ncombined by \u201cunderstanding\u201d as to result in an absurd collocation, instead\nof the self-redintegration of the living spirit. The one essential canon\nto make liberty deep and real is to give every business belonging to the\ngeneral interests of the state a separate organisation wherever they are\nessentially distinct. Such real division must be: for liberty is only deep\nwhen it is differentiated in all its fullness and these differences\nmanifested in existence. But to make the business of legislation an\nindependent power\u2014to make it the first power, with the further proviso\nthat all citizens shall have part therein, and the government be merely\nexecutive and dependent, presupposes ignorance that the true idea, and\ntherefore the living and spiritual actuality, is the self-redintegrating\nnotion, in other words, the subjectivity which contains in it universality\nas only one of its moments. (A mistake still greater, if it goes with the\nfancy that the constitution and the fundamental laws were still one day to\nmake,\u2014in a state of society, which includes an already existing\ndevelopment of differences.) Individuality is the first and supreme\nprinciple _which_ makes itself fall through the state\u2019s organisation. Only\nthrough the government, and by its embracing in itself the particular\nbusinesses (including the abstract legislative business, which taken apart\nis also particular), is the state _one_. These, as always, are the terms\non which the different elements essentially and alone truly stand towards\neach other in the logic of \u201creason,\u201d as opposed to the external footing\nthey stand on in \u2019understanding,\u2019 which never gets beyond subsuming the\nindividual and particular under the universal. What disorganises the unity\nof logical reason, equally disorganises actuality.\n\n\u00a7 542. In the government\u2014regarded as organic totality\u2014the sovereign power\n(principate) is (_a_) _subjectivity_ as the _infinite_ self-unity of the\nnotion in its development;\u2014the all-sustaining, all-decreeing will of the\nstate, its highest peak and all-pervasive unity. In the perfect form of\nthe state, in which each and every element of the notion has reached free\nexistence, this subjectivity is not a so-called \u201cmoral person,\u201d or a\ndecree issuing from a majority (forms in which the unity of the decreeing\nwill has not an _actual_ existence), but an actual individual,\u2014the will of\na decreeing individual,\u2014_monarchy_. The monarchical constitution is\ntherefore the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions\nbelong to lower grades of the development and realisation of reason.\n\nThe unification of all concrete state-powers into one existence, as in the\npatriarchal society,\u2014or, as in a democratic constitution, the\nparticipation of all in all affairs\u2014impugns the principle of the division\nof powers, i.e. the developed liberty of the constituent factors of the\nIdea. But no whit less must the division (the working out of these factors\neach to a free totality) be reduced to \u201cideal\u201d unity, i.e. to\n_subjectivity_. The mature differentiation or realisation of the Idea\nmeans, essentially, that this subjectivity should grow to be a _real_\n\u201cmoment,\u201d an _actual_ existence; and this actuality is not otherwise than\nas the individuality of the monarch\u2014the subjectivity of abstract and final\ndecision existent in _one_ person. All those forms of collective decreeing\nand willing,\u2014a common will which shall be the sum and the resultant (on\naristocratical or democratical principles) of the atomistic of single\nwills, have on them the mark of the unreality of an abstraction. Two\npoints only are all-important, first to see the necessity of each of the\nnotional factors, and secondly the form in which it is actualised. It is\nonly the nature of the speculative notion which can really give light on\nthe matter. That subjectivity\u2014being the \u201cmoment\u201d which emphasises the need\nof abstract deciding in general\u2014partly leads on to the proviso that the\nname of the monarch appear as the bond and sanction under which everything\nis done in the government;\u2014partly, being simple self-relation, has\nattached to it the characteristic of _immediacy_, and then of\n_nature_\u2014whereby the destination of individuals for the dignity of the\nprincely power is fixed by inheritance.\n\n\u00a7 543. (_b_) In the _particular_ government-power there emerges, first,\nthe division of state-business into its branches (otherwise defined),\nlegislative power, administration of justice or judicial power,\nadministration and police, and its consequent distribution between\nparticular boards or offices, which having their business appointed by\nlaw, to that end and for that reason, possess independence of action,\nwithout at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision.\nSecondly, too, there arises the participation of _several_ in\nstate-business, who together constitute the \u201cgeneral order\u201d (\u00a7 528) in so\nfar as they take on themselves the charge of universal ends as the\nessential function of their particular life;\u2014the further condition for\nbeing able to take individually part in this business being a certain\ntraining, aptitude, and skill for such ends.\n\n\u00a7 544. The estates-collegium or provincial council is an institution by\nwhich all such as belong to civil society in general, and are to that\ndegree private persons, participate in the governmental power, especially\nin legislation\u2014viz. such legislation as concerns the universal scope of\nthose interests which do not, like peace and war, involve the, as it were,\npersonal interference and action of the State as one man, and therefore do\nnot belong specially to the province of the sovereign power. By virtue of\nthis participation subjective liberty and conceit, with their general\nopinion, can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the\nsatisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something.\n\nThe division of constitutions into democracy, aristocracy and monarchy, is\nstill the most definite statement of their difference in relation to\nsovereignty. They must at the same time be regarded as necessary\nstructures in the path of development,\u2014in short, in the history of the\nState. Hence it is superficial and absurd to represent them as an object\nof _choice_. The pure forms\u2014necessary to the process of evolution\u2014are, in\nso far as they are finite and in course of change, conjoined both with\nforms of their degeneration,\u2014such as ochlocracy, &c., and with earlier\ntransition-forms. These two forms are not to be confused with those\nlegitimate structures. Thus, it may be\u2014if we look only to the fact that\nthe will of one individual stands at the head of the state\u2014oriental\ndespotism is included under the vague name monarchy,\u2014as also feudal\nmonarchy, to which indeed even the favourite name of \u201cconstitutional\nmonarchy\u201d cannot be refused. The true difference of these forms from\ngenuine monarchy depends on the true value of those principles of right\nwhich are in vogue and have their actuality and guarantee in the\nstate-power. These principles are those expounded earlier, liberty of\nproperty, and above all personal liberty, civil society, with its industry\nand its communities, and the regulated efficiency of the particular\nbureaux in subordination to the laws.\n\nThe question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to understand\nthe participation of private persons in state affairs. For it is as\nprivate persons that the members of bodies of estates are primarily to be\ntaken, be they treated as mere individuals, or as representatives of a\nnumber of people or of the nation. The aggregate of private persons is\noften spoken of as the _nation_: but as such an aggregate it is _vulgus_,\nnot _populus_: and in this direction, it is the one sole aim of the state\nthat a nation should _not_ come to existence, to power and action, _as\nsuch an aggregate_. Such a condition of a nation is a condition of\nlawlessness, demoralisation, brutishness: in it the nation would only be a\nshapeless, wild, blind force, like that of the stormy, elemental sea,\nwhich however is not self-destructive, as the nation\u2014a spiritual\nelement\u2014would be. Yet such a condition may be often heard described as\nthat of true freedom. If there is to be any sense in embarking upon the\nquestion of the participation of private persons in public affairs, it is\nnot a brutish mass, but an already organised nation\u2014one in which a\ngovernmental power exists\u2014which should be presupposed. The desirability of\nsuch participation however is not to be put in the superiority of\nparticular intelligence, which private persons are supposed to have over\nstate officials\u2014the contrary may be the case\u2014nor in the superiority of\ntheir good will for the general best. The members of civil society as such\nare rather people who find their nearest duty in their private interest\nand (as especially in the feudal society) in the interest of their\nprivileged corporation. Take the case of _England_ which, because private\npersons have a predominant share in public affairs, has been regarded as\nhaving the freest of all constitutions. Experience shows that that\ncountry\u2014as compared with the other civilised states of Europe\u2014is the most\nbackward in civil and criminal legislation, in the law and liberty of\nproperty, in arrangements for art and science, and that objective freedom\nor rational right is rather _sacrificed_ to formal right and particular\nprivate interest; and that this happens even in the institutions and\npossessions supposed to be dedicated to religion. The desirability of\nprivate persons taking part in public affairs is partly to be put in their\nconcrete, and therefore more urgent, sense of general wants. But the true\nmotive is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an _externally\nuniversal_ will, acting with orderly and express efficacy for the public\nconcerns. By this satisfaction of this right it gets its own life\nquickened, and at the same time breathes fresh life in the administrative\nofficials; who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they\nto enforce duties but also to have regard to rights. Private citizens are\nin the state the incomparably greater number, and form the multitude of\nsuch as are recognised as persons. Hence the will-reason exhibits its\nexistence in them as a preponderating majority of freemen, or in its\n\u201creflectional\u201d universality, which has its actuality vouchsafed it as a\nparticipation in the sovereignty. But it has already been noted as a\n\u201cmoment\u201d of civil society (\u00a7\u00a7 527, 534) that the individuals rise from\nexternal into substantial universality, and form a _particular_ kind,\u2014the\nEstates: and it is not in the inorganic form of mere individuals as such\n(after the _democratic_ fashion of election), but as organic factors, as\nestates, that they enter upon that participation. In the state a power or\nagency must never appear and act as a formless, inorganic shape, i.e.\nbasing itself on the principle of multeity and mere numbers.\n\nAssemblies of Estates have been wrongly designated as the _legislative\npower_, so far as they form only one branch of that power,\u2014a branch in\nwhich the special government-officials have an _ex officio_ share, while\nthe sovereign power has the privilege of final decision. In a civilised\nstate moreover legislation can only be a further modification of existing\nlaw, and so-called new laws can only deal with minutiae of detail and\nparticularities (cf. \u00a7 529, note), the main drift of which has been\nalready prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice of the\nlaw-courts. The so-called _financial law_, in so far as it requires the\nassent of the estates, is really a government affair: it is only\nimproperly called a law, in the general sense of embracing a wide, indeed\nthe whole, range of the external means of government. The finances deal\nwith what in their nature are only particular needs, ever newly recurring,\neven if they touch on the sum total of such needs. If the main part of the\nrequirement were\u2014as it very likely is\u2014regarded as permanent, the provision\nfor it would have more the nature of a law: but to be a law, it would have\nto be made once for all, and not be made yearly, or every few years,\nafresh. The part which varies according to time and circumstances concerns\nin reality the smallest part of the amount, and the provisions with regard\nto it have even less the character of a law: and yet it is and may be only\nthis slight variable part which is matter of dispute, and can be subjected\nto a varying yearly estimate. It is this last then which falsely bears the\nhigh-sounding name of the \u201c_Grant_\u201d of the _Budget_, i.e. of the whole of\nthe finances. A law for one year and made each year has even to the plain\nman something palpably absurd: for he distinguishes the essential and\ndeveloped universal, as content of a true law, from the reflectional\nuniversality which only externally embraces what in its nature is many. To\ngive the name of a law to the annual fixing of financial requirements only\nserves\u2014with the presupposed separation of legislative from executive\u2014to\nkeep up the illusion of that separation having real existence, and to\nconceal the fact that the legislative power, when it makes a decree about\nfinance, is really engaged with strict executive business. But the\nimportance attached to the power of from time to time granting \u201csupply,\u201d\non the ground that the assembly of estates possesses in it a _check_ on\nthe government, and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence,\u2014this\nimportance is in one way rather plausible than real. The financial\nmeasures necessary for the state\u2019s subsistence cannot be made conditional\non any other circumstances, nor can the state\u2019s subsistence be put yearly\nin doubt. It would be a parallel absurdity if the government were e.g. to\ngrant and arrange the judicial institutions always for a limited time\nmerely; and thus, by the threat of suspending the activity of such an\ninstitution and the fear of a consequent state of brigandage, reserve for\nitself a means of coercing private individuals. Then again, the pictures\nof a condition of affairs, in which it might be useful and necessary to\nhave in hand means of compulsion, are partly based on the false conception\nof a contract between rulers and ruled, and partly presuppose the\npossibility of such a divergence in spirit between these two parties as\nwould make constitution and government quite out of the question. If we\nsuppose the empty possibility of getting _help_ by such compulsive means\nbrought into existence, such help would rather be the derangement and\ndissolution of the state, in which there would no longer be a government,\nbut only parties, and the violence and oppression of one party would only\nbe helped away by the other. To fit together the several parts of the\nstate into a constitution after the fashion of mere understanding\u2014i.e. to\nadjust within it the machinery of a balance of powers external to each\nother\u2014is to contravene the fundamental idea of what a state is.\n\n\u00a7 545. The final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate actuality\nas a single nation marked by physical conditions. As a single individual\nit is exclusive against other like individuals. In their mutual relations,\nwaywardness and chance have a place; for each person in the aggregate is\nautonomous: the universal of law is only postulated between them, and not\nactually existent. This independence of a central authority reduces\ndisputes between them to terms of mutual violence, a _state of war_, to\nmeet which the general estate in the community assumes the particular\nfunction of maintaining the state\u2019s independence against other states, and\nbecomes the estate of bravery.\n\n\u00a7 546. This state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its\nindividuality\u2014an individuality that goes even to abstract negativity.\nCountry and fatherland then appear as the power by which the particular\nindependence of individuals and their absorption in the external existence\nof possession and in natural life is convicted of its own nullity,\u2014as the\npower which procures the maintenance of the general substance by the\npatriotic sacrifice on the part of these individuals of this natural and\nparticular existence,\u2014so making nugatory the nugatoriness that confronts\nit.\n\n\n\u03b2. External Public Law(168).\n\n\n\u00a7 547. In the game of war the independence of States is at stake. In one\ncase the result may be the mutual recognition of free national\nindividualities (\u00a7 430): and by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever,\nboth this general recognition, and the special claims of nations on one\nanother, are settled and fixed. External state-rights rest partly on these\npositive treaties, but to that extent contain only rights falling short of\ntrue actuality (\u00a7 545): partly on so-called _international_ law, the\ngeneral principle of which is its presupposed recognition by the several\nStates. It thus restricts their otherwise unchecked action against one\nanother in such a way that the possibility of peace is left; and\ndistinguishes individuals as private persons (non-belligerents) from the\nstate. In general, international law rests on social usage.\n\n\n\u03b3. Universal History(169).\n\n\n\u00a7 548. As the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under\nnatural conditions, it admits on this nature-side the influence of\ngeographical and climatic qualities. It is in time; and as regards its\nrange and scope, has essentially a _particular_ principle on the lines of\nwhich it must run through a development of its consciousness and its\nactuality. It has, in short, a history of its own. But as a restricted\nmind its independence is something secondary; it passes into universal\nworld-history, the events of which exhibit the dialectic of the several\nnational minds,\u2014the judgment of the world.\n\n\u00a7 549. This movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual\nsubstance, the deed by which the absolute final aim of the world is\nrealised in it, and the merely implicit mind achieves consciousness and\nself-consciousness. It is thus the revelation and actuality of its\nessential and completed essence, whereby it becomes to the outward eye a\nuniversal spirit\u2014a world-mind. As this development is in time and in real\nexistence, as it is a history, its several stages and steps are the\nnational minds, each of which, as single and endued by nature with a\nspecific character, is appointed to occupy only one grade, and accomplish\none task in the whole deed.\n\nThe presupposition that history has an essential and actual end, from the\nprinciples of which certain characteristic results logically flow, is\ncalled an _a priori_ view of it, and philosophy is reproached with _a\npriori_ history-writing. On this point, and on history-writing in general,\nthis note must go into further detail. That history, and above all\nuniversal history, is founded on an essential and actual aim, which\nactually is and will be realised in it\u2014the plan of Providence; that, in\nshort, there is Reason in history, must be decided on strictly\nphilosophical ground, and thus shown to be essentially and in fact\nnecessary. To presuppose such aim is blameworthy only when the assumed\nconceptions or thoughts are arbitrarily adopted, and when a determined\nattempt is made to force events and actions into conformity with such\nconceptions. For such _a priori_ methods of treatment at the present day,\nhowever, those are chiefly to blame who profess to be purely historical,\nand who at the same time take opportunity expressly to raise their voice\nagainst the habit of philosophising, first in general, and then in\nhistory. Philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbour: for it is an enemy\nof all arbitrariness and hasty suggestions. Such _a priori_\nhistory-writing has sometimes burst out in quarters where one would least\nhave expected it, especially on the philological side, and in Germany more\nthan in France and England, where the art of historical writing has gone\nthrough a process of purification to a firmer and maturer character.\nFictions, like that of a primitive age and its primitive people, possessed\nfrom the first of the true knowledge of God and all the sciences,\u2014of\nsacerdotal races,\u2014and, when we come to minutiae, of a Roman epic, supposed\nto be the source of the legends which pass current for the history of\nancient Rome, &c., have taken the place of the pragmatising which detected\npsychological motives and associations. There is a wide circle of persons\nwho seem to consider it incumbent on a _learned_ and _ingenious_ historian\ndrawing from the original sources to concoct such baseless fancies, and\nform bold combinations of them from a learned rubbish-heap of\nout-of-the-way and trivial facts, in defiance of the best-accredited\nhistory.\n\nSetting aside this subjective treatment of history, we find what is\nproperly the opposite view forbidding us to import into history an\n_objective purpose_. This is after all synonymous with what _seems_ to be\nthe still more legitimate demand that the historian should proceed with\n_impartiality_. This is a requirement often and especially made on the\n_history of philosophy_: where it is insisted there should be no\nprepossession in favour of an idea or opinion, just as a judge should have\nno special sympathy for one of the contending parties. In the case of the\njudge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office\nill and foolishly, if he had not an interest, and an exclusive interest in\njustice, if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim, or if he\ndeclined to judge at all. This requirement which we may make upon the\njudge may be called _partiality_ for justice; and there is no difficulty\nhere in distinguishing it from _subjective_ partiality. But in speaking of\nthe impartiality required from the historian, this self-satisfied insipid\nchatter lets the distinction disappear, and rejects both kinds of\ninterest. It demands that the historian shall bring with him no definite\naim and view by which he may sort out, state and criticise events, but\nshall narrate them exactly in the casual mode he finds them, in their\nincoherent and unintelligent particularity. Now it is at least admitted\nthat a history must have an object, e.g. Rome and its fortunes, or the\nDecline of the grandeur of the Roman empire. But little reflection is\nneeded to discover that this is the presupposed end which lies at the\nbasis of the events themselves, as of the critical examination into their\ncomparative importance, i.e. their nearer or more remote relation to it. A\nhistory without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbecile\nmental divagation, not as good as a fairy tale, for even children expect a\n_motif_ in their stories, a purpose at least dimly surmiseable with which\nevents and actions are put in relation.\n\nIn the existence of a _nation_ the substantial aim is to be a state and\npreserve itself as such. A nation with no state formation, (a _mere\nnation_), has strictly speaking no history,\u2014like the nations which existed\nbefore the rise of states and others which still exist in a condition of\nsavagery. What happens to a nation, and takes place within it, has its\nessential significance in relation to the state: whereas the mere\nparticularities of individuals are at the greatest distance from the true\nobject of history. It is true that the general spirit of an age leaves its\nimprint in the character of its celebrated individuals, and even their\nparticularities are but the very distant and the dim media through which\nthe collective light still plays in fainter colours. Ay, even such\nsingularities as a petty occurrence, a word, express not a subjective\nparticularity, but an age, a nation, a civilisation, in striking\nportraiture and brevity; and to select such trifles shows the hand of a\nhistorian of genius. But, on the other hand, the main mass of\nsingularities is a futile and useless mass, by the painstaking\naccumulation of which the objects of real historical value are overwhelmed\nand obscured. The essential characteristic of the spirit and its age is\nalways contained in the great events. It was a correct instinct which\nsought to banish such portraiture of the particular and the gleaning of\ninsignificant traits, into the _Novel_ (as in the celebrated romances of\nWalter Scott, &c.). Where the picture presents an unessential aspect of\nlife it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it with an unessential\nmaterial, such as the romance takes from private events and subjective\npassions. But to take the individual pettinesses of an age and of the\npersons in it, and, in the interest of so-called truth, weave them into\nthe picture of general interests, is not only against taste and judgment,\nbut violates the principles of objective truth. The only truth for mind is\nthe substantial and underlying essence, and not the trivialities of\nexternal existence and contingency. It is therefore completely indifferent\nwhether such insignificancies are duly vouched for by documents, or, as in\nthe romance, invented to suit the character and ascribed to this or that\nname and circumstances.\n\nThe point of interest of _Biography_\u2014to say a word on that here\u2014appears to\nrun directly counter to any universal scope and aim. But biography too has\nfor its background the historical world, with which the individual is\nintimately bound up: even purely personal originality, the freak of\nhumour, &c. suggests by allusion that central reality and has its interest\nheightened by the suggestion. The mere play of sentiment, on the contrary,\nhas another ground and interest than history.\n\nThe requirement of impartiality addressed to the history of philosophy\n(and also, we may add, to the history of religion, first in general, and\nsecondly, to church history) generally implies an even more decided bar\nagainst presupposition of any objective aim. As the State was already\ncalled the point to which in political history criticism had to refer all\nevents, so here the \u201c_Truth_\u201d must be the object to which the several\ndeeds and events of the spirit would have to be referred. What is actually\ndone is rather to make the contrary presupposition. Histories with such an\nobject as religion or philosophy are understood to have only subjective\naims for their theme, i.e. only opinions and mere ideas, not an essential\nand realised object like the truth. And that with the mere excuse that\nthere is no truth. On this assumption the sympathy with truth appears as\nonly a partiality of the usual sort, a partiality for opinion and mere\nideas, which all alike have no stuff in them, and are all treated as\nindifferent. In that way historical truth means but correctness\u2014an\naccurate report of externals, without critical treatment save as regards\nthis correctness\u2014admitting, in this case, only qualitative and\nquantitative judgments, no judgments of necessity or notion (cf. notes to\n\u00a7\u00a7 172 and 175). But, really, if Rome or the German empire, &c. are an\nactual and genuine object of political history, and the aim to which the\nphenomena are to be related and by which they are to be judged; then in\nuniversal history the genuine spirit, the consciousness of it and of its\nessence, is even in a higher degree a true and actual object and theme,\nand an aim to which all other phenomena are essentially and actually\nsubservient. Only therefore through their relationship to it, i.e. through\nthe judgment in which they are subsumed under it, while it inheres in\nthem, have they their value and even their existence. It is the spirit\nwhich not merely broods _over_ history as over the waters, but lives in it\nand is alone its principle of movement: and in the path of that spirit,\nliberty, i.e. a development determined by the notion of spirit, is the\nguiding principle and only its notion its final aim, i.e. truth. For\nSpirit is consciousness. Such a doctrine\u2014or in other words that Reason is\nin history\u2014will be partly at least a plausible faith, partly it is a\ncognition of philosophy.\n\n\u00a7 550. This liberation of mind, in which it proceeds to come to itself and\nto realise its truth, and the business of so doing, is the supreme right,\nthe absolute Law. The self-consciousness of a particular nation is a\nvehicle for the contemporary development of the collective spirit in its\nactual existence: it is the objective actuality in which that spirit for\nthe time invests its will. Against this absolute will the other particular\nnatural minds have no rights: _that_ nation dominates the world: but yet\nthe universal will steps onward over its property for the time being, as\nover a special grade, and then delivers it over to its chance and doom.\n\n\u00a7 551. To such extent as this business of actuality appears as an action,\nand therefore as a work of _individuals_, these individuals, as regards\nthe substantial issue of their labour, are _instruments_, and their\nsubjectivity, which is what is peculiar to them, is the empty form of\nactivity. What they personally have gained therefore through the\nindividual share they took in the substantial business (prepared and\nappointed independently of them) is a formal universality or subjective\nmental idea\u2014_Fame_, which is their reward.\n\n\u00a7 552. The national spirit contains nature-necessity, and stands in\nexternal existence (\u00a7 423): the ethical substance, potentially infinite,\nis actually a particular and limited substance (\u00a7\u00a7 549, 550); on its\nsubjective side it labours under contingency, in the shape of its\nunreflective natural usages, and its content is presented to it as\nsomething _existing_ in time and tied to an external nature and external\nworld. The spirit, however, (which _thinks_ in this moral organism)\noverrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to it as\nnational spirit in its state and the state\u2019s temporal interests, in the\nsystem of laws and usages. It rises to apprehend itself in its\nessentiality. Such apprehension, however, still has the immanent\nlimitedness of the national spirit. But the spirit which thinks in\nuniversal history, stripping off at the same time those limitations of the\nseveral national minds and its own temporal restrictions, lays hold of its\nconcrete universality, and rises to apprehend the absolute mind, as the\neternally actual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom,\nwhile the necessity of nature and the necessity of history are only\nministrant to its revelation and the vessels of its honour.\n\nThe strictly technical aspects of the Mind\u2019s elevation to God have been\nspoken of in the Introduction to the Logic (cf. especially \u00a7 51, note). As\nregards the starting-point of that elevation, Kant has on the whole\nadopted the most correct, when he treats belief in God as proceeding from\nthe practical Reason. For that starting-point contains the material or\ncontent which constitutes the content of the notion of God. But the true\nconcrete material is neither Being (as in the cosmological) nor mere\naction by design (as in the physico-theological proof) but the Mind, the\nabsolute characteristic and function of which is effective reason, i.e.\nthe self-determining and self-realising notion itself,\u2014Liberty. That the\nelevation of subjective mind to God which these considerations give is by\nKant again deposed to a _postulate_\u2014a mere \u201cought\u201d\u2014is the peculiar\nperversity, formerly noticed, of calmly and simply reinstating as true and\nvalid that very antithesis of finitude, the supersession of which into\ntruth is the essence of that elevation.\n\nAs regards the \u201cmediation\u201d which, as it has been already shown (\u00a7 192, cf.\n\u00a7 204 note), that elevation to God really involves, the point specially\ncalling for note is the \u201cmoment\u201d of negation through which the essential\ncontent of the starting-point is purged of its finitude so as to come\nforth free. This factor, abstract in the formal treatment of logic, now\ngets its most concrete interpretation. The finite, from which the start is\nnow made, is the real ethical self-consciousness. The negation through\nwhich that consciousness raises its spirit to its truth, is the\npurification, _actually_ accomplished in the ethical world, whereby its\nconscience is purged of subjective opinion and its will freed from the\nselfishness of desire. Genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue\nfrom the moral life: religion is that life rising to think, i.e. becoming\naware of the free universality of its concrete essence. Only from the\nmoral life and by the moral life is the Idea of God seen to be free\nspirit: outside the ethical spirit therefore it is vain to seek for true\nreligion and religiosity.\n\nBut\u2014as is the case with all speculative process\u2014this development of one\nthing out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is\nrather the absolute _prius_ of what it appears to be mediated by, and what\nis here in mind known as its truth.\n\nHere then is the place to go more deeply into the reciprocal relations\nbetween the state and religion, and in doing so to elucidate the\nterminology which is familiar and current on the topic. It is evident and\napparent from what has preceded that moral life is the state retracted\ninto its inner heart and substance, while the state is the organisation\nand actualisation of moral life; and that religion is the very substance\nof the moral life itself and of the state. At this rate, the state rests\non the ethical sentiment, and that on the religious. If religion then is\nthe consciousness of \u201cabsolute\u201d_ truth_, then whatever is to rank as right\nand justice, as law and duty, i.e. as _true_ in the world of free will,\ncan be so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth, as it is\nsubsumed under it and is its sequel. But if the truly moral life is to be\na sequel of religion, then perforce religion must have the _genuine_\ncontent; i.e. the idea of God it knows must be the true and real. The\nethical life is the divine spirit as indwelling in self-consciousness, as\nit is actually present in a nation and its individual members. This\nself-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical actuality and\nbringing its truth to consciousness, has in its _faith_ and in its\n_conscience_ only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual\nactuality. The two are inseparable: there cannot be two kinds of\nconscience, one religious and another ethical, differing from the former\nin body and value of truth. But in point of form, i.e. for thought and\nknowledge\u2014(and religion and ethical life belong to intelligence and are a\nthinking and knowing)\u2014the body of religious truth, as the pure\nself-subsisting and therefore supreme truth, exercises a sanction over the\nmoral life which lies in empirical actuality. Thus for self-consciousness\nreligion is the \u201cbasis\u201d of moral life and of the state. It has been the\nmonstrous blunder of our times to try to look upon these inseparables as\nseparable from one another, and even as mutually indifferent. The view\ntaken of the relationship of religion and the state has been that, whereas\nthe state had an independent existence of its own, springing from some\nforce and power, religion was a later addition, something desirable\nperhaps for strengthening the political bulwarks, but purely subjective in\nindividuals:\u2014or it may be, religion is treated as something without effect\non the moral life of the state, i.e. its reasonable law and constitution\nwhich are based on a ground of their own.\n\nAs the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated, it may be worth\nwhile to note the separation as it appears on the side of religion. It is\nprimarily a point of form: the attitude which self-consciousness takes to\nthe body of truth. So long as this body of truth is the very substance or\nindwelling spirit of self-consciousness in its actuality, then\nself-consciousness in this content has the certainty of itself and is\nfree. But if this present self-consciousness is lacking, then there may be\ncreated, in point of form, a condition of spiritual slavery, even though\nthe _implicit_ content of religion is absolute spirit. This great\ndifference (to cite a specific case) comes out within the Christian\nreligion itself, even though here it is not the nature-element in which\nthe idea of God is embodied, and though nothing of the sort even enters as\na factor into its central dogma and sole theme of a God who is known in\nspirit and in truth. And yet in Catholicism this spirit of all truth is in\nactuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit. And, first\nof all, God is in the \u201chost\u201d presented to religious adoration as an\n_external thing_. (In the Lutheran Church, on the contrary, the host as\nsuch is not at first consecrated, but in the moment of enjoyment, i.e. in\nthe annihilation of its externality, and in the act of faith, i.e. in the\nfree self-certain spirit: only then is it consecrated and exalted to be\npresent God.) From that first and supreme status of externalisation flows\nevery other phase of externality,\u2014of bondage, non-spirituality, and\nsuperstition. It leads to a laity, receiving its knowledge of divine\ntruth, as well as the direction of its will and conscience from without\nand from another order\u2014which order again does not get possession of that\nknowledge in a spiritual way only, but to that end essentially requires an\nexternal consecration. It leads to the non-spiritual style of\npraying\u2014partly as mere moving of the lips, partly in the way that the\nsubject foregoes his right of directly addressing God, and prays others to\npray\u2014addressing his devotion to miracle-working images, even to bones, and\nexpecting miracles from them. It leads, generally, to justification by\nexternal works, a merit which is supposed to be gained by acts, and even\nto be capable of being transferred to others. All this binds the spirit\nunder an externalism by which the very meaning of spirit is perverted and\nmisconceived at its source, and law and justice, morality and conscience,\nresponsibility and duty are corrupted at their root.\n\nAlong with this principle of spiritual bondage, and these applications of\nit in the religious life, there can only go in the legislative and\nconstitutional system a legal and moral bondage, and a state of\nlawlessness and immorality in political life. Catholicism has been loudly\npraised and is still often praised\u2014logically enough\u2014as the one religion\nwhich secures the stability of governments. But in reality this applies\nonly to governments which are bound up with institutions founded on the\nbondage of the spirit (of that spirit which should have legal and moral\nliberty), i.e. with institutions that embody injustice and with a morally\ncorrupt and barbaric state of society. But these governments are not aware\nthat in fanaticism they have a terrible power, which does not rise in\nhostility against them, only so long as and only on condition that they\nremain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and immorality. But in mind there\nis a very different power available against that externalism and\ndismemberment induced by a false religion. Mind collects itself into its\ninward free actuality. Philosophy awakes in the spirit of governments and\nnations the wisdom to discern what is essentially and actually right and\nreasonable in the real world. It was well to call these products of\nthought, and in a special sense Philosophy, the wisdom of the world(170);\nfor thought makes the spirit\u2019s truth an actual present, leads it into the\nreal world, and thus liberates it in its actuality and in its own self.\n\nThus set free, the content of religion assumes quite another shape. So\nlong as the form, i.e. our consciousness and subjectivity, lacked liberty,\nit followed necessarily that self-consciousness was conceived as not\nimmanent in the ethical principles which religion embodies, and these\nprinciples were set at such a distance as to seem to have true being only\nas negative to actual self-consciousness. In this unreality ethical\ncontent gets the name of _Holiness_. But once the divine spirit introduces\nitself into actuality, and actuality emancipates itself to spirit, then\nwhat in the world was a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the\nactuality of _moral_ life. Instead of the vow of chastity, _marriage_ now\nranks as the ethical relation; and, therefore, as the highest on this side\nof humanity stands the family. Instead of the vow of poverty (muddled up\ninto a contradiction of assigning merit to whosoever gives away goods to\nthe poor, i.e. whosoever enriches them) is the precept of action to\nacquire goods through one\u2019s own intelligence and industry,\u2014of honesty in\ncommercial dealing, and in the use of property,\u2014in short moral life in the\nsocio-economic sphere. And instead of the vow of obedience, true religion\nsanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state\u2014an\nobedience which is itself the true freedom, because the state is a\nself-possessed, self-realising reason\u2014in short, moral life in the state.\nThus, and thus only, can law and morality exist. The precept of religion,\n\u201cGive to Caesar what is Caesar\u2019s and to God what is God\u2019s\u201d is not enough:\nthe question is to settle what is Caesar\u2019s, what belongs to the secular\nauthority: and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than\nthe ecclesiastical authority have claimed almost everything as their own.\nThe divine spirit must interpenetrate the entire secular life: whereby\nwisdom is concrete within it, and it carries the terms of its own\njustification. But that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical\norganisations. It is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity of a\ncelibate order;\u2014the morality of economic and industrial action against the\nsanctity of poverty and its indolence;\u2014the morality of an obedience\ndedicated to the law of the state as against the sanctity of an obedience\nfrom which law and duty are absent and where conscience is enslaved. With\nthe growing need for law and morality and the sense of the spirit\u2019s\nessential liberty, there sets in a conflict of spirit with the religion of\nunfreedom. It is no use to organise political laws and arrangements on\nprinciples of equity and reason, so long as in religion the principle of\nunfreedom is not abandoned. A free state and a slavish religion are\nincompatible. It is silly to suppose that we may try to allot them\nseparate spheres, under the impression that their diverse natures will\nmaintain an attitude of tranquillity one to another and not break out in\ncontradiction and battle. Principles of civil freedom can be but abstract\nand superficial, and political institutions deduced from them must be, if\ntaken alone, untenable, so long as those principles in their wisdom\nmistake religion so much as not to know that the maxims of the reason in\nactuality have their last and supreme sanction in the religious conscience\nin subsumption under the consciousness of \u201cabsolute\u201d truth. Let us suppose\neven that, no matter how, a code of law should arise, so to speak _a\npriori_, founded on principles of reason, but in contradiction with an\nestablished religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom; still, as\nthe duty of carrying out the laws lies in the hands of individual members\nof the government, and of the various classes of the administrative\n_personnel_, it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty\nassumption that the individuals will act only according to the letter or\nmeaning of the law, and not in the spirit of their religion where their\ninmost conscience and supreme obligation lies. Opposed to what religion\npronounces holy, the laws appear something made by human hands: even\nthough backed by penalties and externally introduced, they could offer no\nlasting resistance to the contradiction and attacks of the religious\nspirit. Such laws, however sound their provisions may be, thus founder on\nthe conscience, whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and\nrefuses to sanction them. It is nothing but a modern folly to try to alter\na corrupt moral organisation by altering its political constitution and\ncode of laws without changing the religion,\u2014to make a revolution without\nhaving made a reformation, to suppose that a political constitution\nopposed to the old religion could live in peace and harmony with it and\nits sanctities, and that stability could be procured for the laws by\nexternal guarantees, e.g. so-called \u201cchambers,\u201d and the power given them\nto fix the budget, &c. (cf. \u00a7 544 note). At best it is only a temporary\nexpedient\u2014when it is obviously too great a task to descend into the depths\nof the religious spirit and to raise that same spirit to its truth\u2014to seek\nto separate law and justice from religion. Those guarantees are but rotten\nbulwarks against the consciences of the persons charged with administering\nthe laws\u2014among which laws these guarantees are included. It is indeed the\nheight and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and subject to the\nsecular code the religious conscience to which mere human law is a thing\nprofane.\n\nThe perception had dawned upon Plato with great clearness of the gulf\nwhich in his day had commenced to divide the established religion and the\npolitical constitution, on one hand, from those deeper requirements which,\non the other hand, were made upon religion and politics by liberty which\nhad learnt to recognise its inner life. Plato gets hold of the thought\nthat a genuine constitution and a sound political life have their deeper\nfoundation on the Idea,\u2014on the essentially and actually universal and\ngenuine principles of eternal righteousness. Now to see and ascertain what\nthese are is certainly the function and the business of _philosophy_. It\nis from this point of view that Plato breaks out into the celebrated or\nnotorious passage where he makes Socrates emphatically state that\nphilosophy and political power must coincide, that the Idea must be\nregent, if the distress of nations is to see its end. What Plato thus\ndefinitely set before his mind was that the Idea\u2014which implicitly indeed\nis the free self-determining thought\u2014could not get into consciousness save\nonly in the form of a thought; that the substance of the thought could\nonly be true when set forth as a universal, and as such brought to\nconsciousness under its most abstract form.\n\nTo compare the Platonic standpoint in all its definiteness with the point\nof view from which the relationship of state and religion is here\nregarded, the notional differences on which everything turns must be\nrecalled to mind. The first of these is that in natural things their\nsubstance or genus is different from their existence in which that\nsubstance is as subject: further that this subjective existence of the\ngenus is distinct from that which it gets, when specially set in relief as\ngenus, or, to put it simply, as the universal in a mental concept or idea.\nThis additional \u201cindividuality\u201d\u2014the soil on which the universal and\nunderlying principle _freely_ and expressly exists,\u2014is the intellectual\nand thinking _self_. In the case of _natural_ things their truth and\nreality does not get the form of universality and essentiality through\nthemselves, and their \u201cindividuality\u201d is not itself the form: the form is\nonly found in subjective thinking, which in philosophy gives that\nuniversal truth and reality an existence of its own. In man\u2019s case it is\notherwise: his truth and reality is the free mind itself, and it comes to\nexistence in his self-consciousness. This absolute nucleus of man\u2014mind\nintrinsically concrete\u2014is just this\u2014to have the form (to have thinking)\nitself for a content. To the height of the thinking consciousness of this\nprinciple Aristotle ascended in his notion of the entelechy of thought,\n(which is \u03bd\u03bf\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bd\u03bf\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2), thus surmounting the Platonic Idea (the\ngenus, or essential being). But thought always\u2014and that on account of this\nvery principle\u2014contains the immediate self-subsistence of subjectivity no\nless than it contains universality; the genuine Idea of the intrinsically\nconcrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its terms\n(subjective consciousness) as under the other (universality): and in the\none as in the other it is the same substantial content. Under the\nsubjective form, however, fall feeling, intuition, pictorial\nrepresentation: and it is in fact necessary that in point of time the\nconsciousness of the absolute Idea should be first reached and apprehended\nin this form: in other words, it must exist in its immediate reality as\nreligion, earlier than it does as philosophy. Philosophy is a later\ndevelopment from this basis (just as Greek philosophy itself is later than\nGreek religion), and in fact reaches its completion by catching and\ncomprehending in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit\nwhich first manifests itself in religion. But Greek philosophy could set\nitself up only in opposition to Greek religion: the unity of thought and\nthe substantiality of the Idea could take up none but a hostile attitude\nto an imaginative polytheism, and to the gladsome and frivolous humours of\nits poetic creations. The _form_ in its infinite truth, the _subjectivity_\nof mind, broke forth at first only as a subjective free _thinking_, which\nwas not yet identical with the _substantiality_ itself,\u2014and thus this\nunderlying principle was not yet apprehended as _absolute mind_. Thus\nreligion might appear as first purified only through philosophy,\u2014through\npure self-existent thought: but the form pervading this underlying\nprinciple\u2014the form which philosophy attacked\u2014was that creative\nimagination.\n\nPolitical power, which is developed similarly, but earlier than\nphilosophy, from religion, exhibits the onesidedness, which in the actual\nworld may infect its _implicitly_ true Idea, as demoralisation. Plato, in\ncommon with all his thinking contemporaries, perceived this demoralisation\nof democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle; he set in relief\naccordingly the underlying principle of the state, but could not work into\nhis idea of it the infinite form of subjectivity, which still escaped his\nintelligence. His state is therefore, on its own showing, wanting in\nsubjective liberty (\u00a7 503 note, \u00a7 513, &c.). The truth which should be\nimmanent in the state, should knit it together and control it, he, for\nthese reasons, got hold of only the form of thought-out truth, of\nphilosophy; and hence he makes that utterance that \u201cso long as\nphilosophers do not rule in the states, or those who are now called kings\nand rulers do not soundly and comprehensively philosophise, so long\nneither the state nor the race of men can be liberated from evils,\u2014so long\nwill the idea of the political constitution fall short of possibility and\nnot see the light of the sun.\u201d It was not vouchsafed to Plato to go on so\nfar as to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world\nand hold sway in political life, so long the genuine principle of the\nstate had not come into actuality. But so long too this principle could\nnot emerge even in thought, nor could thought lay hold of the genuine idea\nof the state,\u2014the idea of the substantial moral life, with which is\nidentical the liberty of an independent self-consciousness. Only in the\nprinciple of mind, which is aware of its own essence, is implicitly in\nabsolute liberty, and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation,\ndoes the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power,\nreligion, and the principles of philosophy coinciding in one, and for\naccomplishing the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mind, of\nthe state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical\nconsciousness. Self-realising subjectivity is in this case absolutely\nidentical with substantial universality. Hence religion as such, and the\nstate as such,\u2014both as forms in which the principle exists\u2014each contain\nthe absolute truth: so that the truth, in its philosophic phase, is after\nall only in one of its forms. But even religion, as it grows and expands,\nlets other aspects of the Idea of humanity grow and expand also (\u00a7 500\nsqq.). As it is left therefore behind, in its first immediate, and so also\none-sided phase, Religion may, or rather _must_, appear in its existence\ndegraded to sensuous externality, and thus in the sequel become an\ninfluence to oppress liberty of spirit and to deprave political life.\nStill the principle has in it the infinite \u201celasticity\u201d of the \u201cabsolute\u201d\nform, so as to overcome this depraving of the form-determination (and of\nthe content by these means), and to bring about the reconciliation of the\nspirit in itself. Thus ultimately, in the Protestant conscience the\nprinciples of the religious and of the ethical conscience come to be one\nand the same: the free spirit learning to see itself in its reasonableness\nand truth. In the Protestant state, the constitution and the code, as well\nas their several applications, embody the principle and the development of\nthe moral life, which proceeds and can only proceed from the truth of\nreligion, when reinstated in its original principle and in that way as\nsuch first become actual. The moral life of the state and the religious\nspirituality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength.\n\n\n\n\n\nSECTION III. ABSOLUTE MIND(171).\n\n\n\u00a7 553. The _notion_ of mind has its _reality_ in the mind. If this reality\nin identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the\nabsolute Idea, then the necessary aspect is that the _implicitly_ free\nintelligence be in its actuality liberated to its notion, if that\nactuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it. The subjective and the\nobjective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of\n_reality_ or existence rises to maturity.\n\n\u00a7 554. The absolute mind, while it is self-centred _identity_, is always\nalso identity returning and ever returned into itself: if it is the one\nand universal _substance_ it is so as a spirit, discerning itself into a\nself and a consciousness, for which it is as substance. _Religion_, as\nthis supreme sphere may be in general designated, if it has on one hand to\nbe studied as issuing from the subject and having its home in the subject,\nmust no less be regarded as objectively issuing from the absolute spirit\nwhich as spirit is in its community.\n\nThat here, as always, belief or faith is not opposite to consciousness or\nknowledge, but rather to a sort of knowledge, and that belief is only a\nparticular form of the latter, has been remarked already (\u00a7 63 note). If\nnowadays there is so little consciousness of God, and his objective\nessence is so little dwelt upon, while people speak so much more of the\nsubjective side of religion, i.e. of God\u2019s indwelling in us, and if that\nand not the truth as such is called for,\u2014in this there is at least the\ncorrect principle that God must be apprehended as spirit in his community.\n\n\u00a7 555. The subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially\nand intrinsically a process, the immediate and substantial unity of which\nis the _Belief_ in the witness of the spirit as the _certainty_ of\nobjective truth. Belief, at once this immediate unity and containing it as\na reciprocal dependence of these different terms, has in _devotion_\u2014the\nimplicit or more explicit act of worship (_cultus_)\u2014passed over into the\nprocess of superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual liberation,\nthe process of authenticating that first certainty by this intermediation,\nand of gaining its concrete determination, viz. reconciliation, the\nactuality of the spirit.\n\n\n\n\nSub-Section A. Art.\n\n\n\u00a7 556. As this consciousness of the Absolute first takes shape, its\nimmediacy produces the factor of finitude in Art. On one hand that is, it\nbreaks up into a work of external common existence, into the subject which\nproduces that work, and the subject which contemplates and worships it.\nBut, on the other hand, it is the concrete _contemplation_ and mental\npicture of implicitly absolute spirit as the _Ideal_. In this ideal, or\nthe concrete shape born of the subjective spirit, its natural immediacy,\nwhich is only a _sign_ of the Idea, is so transfigured by the informing\nspirit in order to express the Idea, that the figure shows it and it\nalone:\u2014the shape or form of _Beauty_.\n\n\u00a7 557. The sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful,\u2014the _form of\nimmediacy_ as such,\u2014at the same time _qualifies_ what it _embodies_: and\nthe God (of art) has with his spirituality at the same time the stamp upon\nhim of a natural medium or natural phase of existence\u2014He contains the\nso-called _unity_ of nature and spirit\u2014i.e. the immediate unity in\nsensuously intuitional form\u2014hence not the spiritual unity, in which the\nnatural would be put only as \u201cideal,\u201d as superseded in spirit, and the\nspiritual content would be only in self-relation. It is not the absolute\nspirit which enters this consciousness. On the subjective side the\ncommunity has of course an ethical life, aware, as it is, of the\nspirituality of its essence: and its self-consciousness and actuality are\nin it elevated to substantial liberty. But with the stigma of immediacy\nupon it, the subject\u2019s liberty is only a _manner of life_, without the\ninfinite self-reflection and the subjective inwardness of _conscience_.\nThese considerations govern in their further developments the devotion and\nthe worship in the religion of fine art.\n\n\u00a7 558. For the objects of contemplation it has to produce, Art requires\nnot only an external given material\u2014(under which are also included\nsubjective images and ideas), but\u2014for the expression of spiritual\ntruth\u2014must use the given forms of nature with a significance which art\nmust divine and possess (cf. \u00a7 411). Of all such forms the human is the\nhighest and the true, because only in it can the spirit have its\ncorporeity and thus its visible expression.\n\nThis disposes of the principle of the _imitation of nature_ in art: a\npoint on which it is impossible to come to an understanding while a\ndistinction is left thus abstract,\u2014in other words, so long as the natural\nis only taken in its externality, not as the \u201ccharacteristic\u201d meaningful\nnature-form which is significant of spirit.\n\n\u00a7 559. In such single shapes the \u201cabsolute\u201d mind cannot be made explicit:\nin and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit whose\nimplicit universality, when steps are taken to specify its fullness in\ndetail, breaks up into an indeterminate polytheism. With the essential\nrestrictedness of its content, Beauty in general goes no further than a\npenetration of the vision or image by the spiritual principle,\u2014something\nformal, so that the thought embodied, or the idea, can, like the material\nwhich it uses to work in, be of the most diverse and unessential kind, and\nstill the work be something beautiful and a work of art.\n\n\u00a7 560. The one-sidedness of _immediacy_ on the part of the Ideal involves\nthe opposite one-sidedness (\u00a7 556) that it is something _made_ by the\nartist. The subject or agent is the mere technical activity: and the work\nof art is only then an expression of the God, when there is no sign of\nsubjective particularity in it, and the net power of the indwelling spirit\nis conceived and born into the world, without admixture and unspotted from\nits contingency. But as liberty only goes as far as there is thought, the\naction inspired with the fullness of this indwelling power, the artist\u2019s\n_enthusiasm_, is like a foreign force under which he is bound and passive;\nthe artistic _production_ has on its part the form of natural immediacy,\nit belongs to the _genius_ or particular endowment of the artist,\u2014and is\nat the same time a labour concerned with technical cleverness and\nmechanical externalities. The work of art therefore is just as much a work\ndue to free option, and the artist is the master of the God.\n\n\u00a7 561. In work so inspired the reconciliation appears so obvious in its\ninitial stage that it is without more ado accomplished in the subjective\nself-consciousness, which is thus self-confident and of good cheer,\nwithout the depth and without the sense of its antithesis to the absolute\nessence. On the further side of the perfection (which is reached in such\nreconciliation, in the beauty of _classical art_) lies the art of\nsublimity,\u2014_symbolic art_, in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is\nnot yet found, and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the\nfigure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it, and yet all the while\ntoiling to work itself into it. The meaning or theme thus shows it has not\nyet reached the infinite form, is not yet known, not yet conscious of\nitself, as free spirit. The artist\u2019s theme only is as the abstract God of\npure thought, or an effort towards him,\u2014a restless and unappeased effort\nwhich throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its\ngoal.\n\n\u00a7 562. In another way the Idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are\nincompatible; and that is where the infinite form, subjectivity, is not as\nin the first extreme a mere superficial personality, but its inmost depth,\nand God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an\nexternal form, but as only finding himself in himself, and thus giving\nhimself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone. _Romantic art_\ngives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of\nbeauty: it presents him as only condescending to appearance, and the\ndivine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always\ndisengages itself. Thus the external can here appear as contingent towards\nits significance.\n\nThe Philosophy of Religion has to discover the logical necessity in the\nprogress by which the Being, known as the Absolute, assumes fuller and\nfirmer features; it has to note to what particular feature the kind of\ncultus corresponds,\u2014and then to see how the secular self-consciousness,\nthe consciousness of what is the supreme vocation of man,\u2014in short how the\nnature of a nation\u2019s moral life, the principle of its law, of its actual\nliberty, and of its constitution, as well as of its art and science,\ncorresponds to the principle which constitutes the substance of a\nreligion. That all these elements of a nation\u2019s actuality constitute one\nsystematic totality, that one spirit creates and informs them, is a truth\non which follows the further truth that the history of religions coincides\nwith the world-history.\n\nAs regards the close connexion of art with the various religions it may be\nspecially noted that _beautiful_ art can only belong to those religions in\nwhich the spiritual principle, though concrete and intrinsically free, is\nnot yet absolute. In religions where the Idea has not yet been revealed\nand known in its free character, though the craving for art is felt in\norder to bring in imaginative visibility to consciousness the idea of the\nsupreme being, and though art is the sole organ in which the abstract and\nradically indistinct content,\u2014a mixture from natural and spiritual\nsources,\u2014can try to bring itself to consciousness;\u2014still this art is\ndefective; its form is defective because its subject-matter and theme is\nso,\u2014for the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not being\nimmanent in it. The representations of this symbolic art keep a certain\ntastelessness and stolidity\u2014for the principle it embodies is itself stolid\nand dull, and hence has not the power freely to transmute the external to\nsignificance and shape. Beautiful art, on the contrary, has for its\ncondition the self-consciousness of the free spirit,\u2014the consciousness\nthat compared with it the natural and sensuous has no standing of its own:\nit makes the natural wholly into the mere expression of spirit, which is\nthus the inner form that gives utterance to itself alone.\n\nBut with a further and deeper study, we see that the advent of art, in a\nreligion still in the bonds of sensuous externality, shows that such\nreligion is on the decline. At the very time it seems to give religion the\nsupreme glorification, expression and brilliancy, it has lifted the\nreligion away over its limitation. In the sublime divinity to which the\nwork of art succeeds in giving expression the artistic genius and the\nspectator find themselves at home, with their personal sense and feeling,\nsatisfied and liberated: to them the vision and the consciousness of free\nspirit has been vouchsafed and attained. Beautiful art, from its side, has\nthus performed the same service as philosophy: it has purified the spirit\nfrom its thraldom. The older religion in which the need of fine art, and\njust for that reason, is first generated, looks up in its principle to an\nother-world which is sensuous and unmeaning: the images adored by its\ndevotees are hideous idols regarded as wonder-working talismans, which\npoint to the unspiritual objectivity of that other world,\u2014and bones\nperform a similar or even a better service than such images. But even fine\nart is only a grade of liberation, not the supreme liberation itself.\u2014The\ngenuine objectivity, which is only in the medium of thought,\u2014the medium in\nwhich alone the pure spirit is for the spirit, and where the liberation is\naccompanied with reverence,\u2014is still absent in the sensuous beauty of the\nwork of art, still more in that external, unbeautiful sensuousness.\n\n\u00a7 563. Beautiful Art, like the religion peculiar to it, has its future in\ntrue religion. The restricted value of the Idea passes utterly and\nnaturally into the universality identical with the infinite form;\u2014the\nvision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a\nself-mediating knowledge, into an existence which is itself\nknowledge,\u2014into _revelation_. Thus the principle which gives the Idea its\ncontent is that it embody free intelligence, and as \u201cabsolute\u201d _spirit it\nis for the spirit_.\n\n\n\n\nSub-Section B. Revealed Religion(172).\n\n\n\u00a7 564. It lies essentially in the notion of religion,\u2014the religion i.e.\nwhose content is absolute mind\u2014that it be _revealed_, and, what is more,\nrevealed _by God_. Knowledge (the principle by which the substance is\nmind) is a self-determining principle, as infinite self-realising form,\u2014it\ntherefore is manifestation out and out. The spirit is only spirit in so\nfar as it is for the spirit, and in the absolute religion it is the\nabsolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract elements of its being\nbut itself.\n\nThe old conception\u2014due to a one-sided survey of human life\u2014of Nemesis,\nwhich made the divinity and its action in the world only a levelling\npower, dashing to pieces everything high and great,\u2014was confronted by\nPlato and Aristotle with the doctrine that God is not _envious_. The same\nanswer may be given to the modern assertions that man cannot ascertain\nGod. These assertions (and more than assertions they are not) are the more\nillogical, because made within a religion which is expressly called the\nrevealed; for according to them it would rather be the religion in which\nnothing of God was revealed, in which he had not revealed himself, and\nthose belonging to it would be the heathen \u201cwho know not God.\u201d If the word\nof God is taken in earnest in religion at all, it is from Him, the theme\nand centre of religion, that the method of divine knowledge may and must\nbegin: and if self-revelation is refused Him, then the only thing left to\nconstitute His nature would be to ascribe envy to Him. But clearly if the\nword Mind is to have a meaning, it implies the revelation of Him.\n\nIf we recollect how intricate is the knowledge of the divine Mind for\nthose who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to\nthought,\u2014at first only \u201crationalising\u201d reflection, but afterwards, as in\nduty bound, to speculative comprehension, it may almost create surprise\nthat so many, and especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with\nthese Ideas, have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything\noffered them for this behoof. And nothing serves better to shirk it than\nto adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God. To know what God as\nspirit is\u2014to apprehend this accurately and distinctly in thoughts\u2014requires\ncareful and thorough speculation. It includes, in its fore-front, the\npropositions: God is God only so far as he knows himself: his\nself-knowledge is, further, his self-consciousness in man, and man\u2019s\nknowledge _of_ God, which proceeds to man\u2019s self-knowledge in God.\u2014See the\nprofound elucidation of these propositions in the work from which they are\ntaken: _Aphorisms on Knowing and Not-knowing, &c._, by C. F. G\u2014l.: Berlin\n1829.\n\n\u00a7 565. When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is\nsuperseded, God is, in point of content, the essential and actual spirit\nof nature and spirit, while in point of form he is, first of all,\npresented to consciousness as a mental representation. This\nquasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content, on\none hand, a separate being, making them presuppositions towards each\nother, and phenomena which succeed each other; their relationship it makes\na series of events according to finite reflective categories. But, on the\nother hand, such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and\nsuperseded in the faith which realises one spirit and in the devotion of\nworship.\n\n\u00a7 566. In this separating, the form parts from the content: and in the\nform the different functions of the notion part off into special spheres\nor media, in each of which the absolute spirit exhibits itself; (\u03b1) as\neternal content, abiding self-centred, even in its manifestation; (\u03b2) as\ndistinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation, which by this\ndifference becomes the phenomenal world into which the content enters; (\u03b3)\nas infinite return, and reconciliation with the eternal being, of the\nworld it gave away\u2014the withdrawal of the eternal from the phenomenal into\nthe unity of its fullness.\n\n\u00a7 567. (\u03b1) Under the \u201cmoment\u201d of _Universality_,\u2014the sphere of pure\nthought or the abstract medium of essence,\u2014it is therefore the absolute\nspirit, which is at first the presupposed principle, not however staying\naloof and inert, but (as underlying and essential power under the\nreflective category of causality) creator of heaven and earth: but yet in\nthis eternal sphere rather only begetting himself as his _son_, with whom,\nthough different, he still remains in original identity,\u2014just as, again,\nthis differentiation of him from the universal essence eternally\nsupersedes itself, and, though this mediating of a self-superseding\nmediation, the first substance is essentially as _concrete individuality_\nand subjectivity,\u2014is the _Spirit_.\n\n\u00a7 568. (\u03b2) Under the \u201cmoment\u201d of _particularity_, or of judgment, it is\nthis concrete eternal being which is presupposed: its movement is the\ncreation of the phenomenal world. The eternal \u201cmoment\u201d of mediation\u2014of the\nonly Son\u2014divides itself to become the antithesis of two separate worlds.\nOn one hand is heaven and earth, the elemental and the concrete nature,\u2014on\nthe other hand, standing in action and reaction with such nature, the\nspirit, which therefore is finite. That spirit, as the extreme of inherent\nnegativity, completes its independence till it becomes wickedness, and is\nthat extreme through its connexion with a confronting nature and through\nits own naturalness thereby investing it. Yet, amid that naturalness, it\nis, when it thinks, directed towards the Eternal, though, for that reason,\nonly standing to it in an external connexion.\n\n\u00a7 569. (\u03b3) Under the \u201cmoment\u201d of _individuality_ as such,\u2014of subjectivity\nand the notion itself, in which the contrast of universal and particular\nhas sunk to its identical ground, the place of presupposition (1) is taken\nby the _universal_ substance, as actualised out of its abstraction into an\n_individual_ self-consciousness. This individual, who as such is\nidentified with the essence,\u2014(in the Eternal sphere he is called the\nSon)\u2014is transplanted into the world of time, and in him wickedness is\nimplicitly overcome. Further, this immediate, and thus sensuous, existence\nof the absolutely concrete is represented as putting himself in judgment\nand expiring in the pain of _negativity_, in which he, as infinite\nsubjectivity, keeps himself unchanged, and thus, as absolute return from\nthat negativity and as universal unity of universal and individual\nessentiality, has realised his being as the Idea of the spirit, eternal,\nbut alive and present in the world.\n\n\u00a7 570. (2) This objective totality of the divine man who is the Idea of\nthe spirit is the implicit presupposition for the _finite_ immediacy of\nthe single subject. For such subject therefore it is at first an Other, an\nobject of contemplating vision,\u2014but the vision of implicit truth, through\nwhich witness of the spirit in him, he, on account of his immediate\nnature, at first characterised himself as nought and wicked. But,\nsecondly, after the example of his truth, by means of the faith on the\nunity (in that example implicitly accomplished) of universal and\nindividual essence, he is also the movement to throw off his immediacy,\nhis natural man and self-will, to close himself in unity with that example\n(who is his implicit life) in the pain of negativity, and thus to know\nhimself made one with the essential Being. Thus the Being of Beings (3)\nthrough this mediation brings about its own indwelling in\nself-consciousness, and is the actual presence of the essential and\nself-subsisting spirit who is all in all.\n\n\u00a7 571. These three syllogisms, constituting the one syllogism of the\nabsolute self-mediation of spirit, are the revelation of that spirit whose\nlife is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought. From\nthis its separation into parts, with a temporal and external sequence, the\nunfolding of the mediation contracts itself in the result,\u2014where the\nspirit closes in unity with itself,\u2014not merely to the simplicity of faith\nand devotional feeling, but even to thought. In the immanent simplicity of\nthought the unfolding still has its expansion, yet is all the while known\nas an indivisible coherence of the universal, simple, and eternal spirit\nin itself. In this form of truth, truth is the object of _philosophy_.\n\nIf the result\u2014the realised Spirit in which all meditation has superseded\nitself\u2014is taken in a merely formal, contentless sense, so that the spirit\nis not also at the same time known as _implicitly_ existent and\nobjectively self-unfolding;\u2014then that infinite subjectivity is the merely\nformal self-consciousness, knowing itself in itself as absolute,\u2014Irony.\nIrony, which can make every objective reality nought and vain, is itself\nthe emptiness and vanity, which from itself, and therefore by chance and\nits own good pleasure, gives itself direction and content, remains master\nover it, is not bound by it,\u2014and, with the assertion that it stands on the\nvery summit of religion and philosophy, falls rather back into the vanity\nof wilfulness. It is only in proportion as the pure infinite form, the\nself-centred manifestation, throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity\nin which it is the vanity of thought, that it is the free thought which\nhas its infinite characteristic at the same time as essential and actual\ncontent, and has that content as an object in which it is also free.\nThinking, so far, is only the formal aspect of the absolute content.\n\n\n\n\nSub-Section C. Philosophy.\n\n\n\u00a7 572. This science is the unity of Art and Religion. Whereas the\nvision-method of Art, external in point of form, is but subjective\nproduction and shivers the substantial content into many separate shapes,\nand whereas Religion, with its separation into parts, opens it out in\nmental picture, and mediates what is thus opened out; Philosophy not\nmerely keeps them together to make a total, but even unifies them into the\nsimple spiritual vision, and then in that raises them to self-conscious\nthought. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognised by\nthought) of art and religion, in which the diverse elements in the content\nare cognised as necessary, and this necessary as free.\n\n\u00a7 573. Philosophy thus characterises itself as a cognition of the\nnecessity in the content of the absolute picture-idea, as also of the\nnecessity in the two forms\u2014on one hand, immediate vision and its poetry,\nand the objective and external revelation presupposed by\nrepresentation,\u2014on the other hand, first the subjective retreat inwards,\nthen the subjective movement of faith and its final identification with\nthe presupposed object. This cognition is thus the _recognition_ of this\ncontent and its form; it is the liberation from the one-sidedness of the\nforms, elevation of them into the absolute form, which determines itself\nto content, remains identical with it, and is in that the cognition of\nthat essential and actual necessity. This movement, which philosophy is,\nfinds itself already accomplished, when at the close it seizes its own\nnotion,\u2014i.e. only _looks back_ on its knowledge.\n\nHere might seem to be the place to treat in a definite exposition of the\nreciprocal relations of philosophy and religion. The whole question turns\nentirely on the difference of the forms of speculative thought from the\nforms of mental representation and \u201creflecting\u201d intellect. But it is the\nwhole cycle of philosophy, and of logic in particular, which has not\nmerely taught and made known this difference, but also criticised it, or\nrather has let its nature develop and judge itself by these very\ncategories. It is only by an insight into the value of these forms that\nthe true and needful conviction can be gained, that the content of\nreligion and philosophy is the same,\u2014leaving out, of course, the further\ndetails of external nature and finite mind which fall outside the range of\nreligion. But religion is the truth _for all men_: faith rests on the\nwitness of the spirit, which as witnessing is the spirit in man. This\nwitness\u2014the underlying essence in all humanity\u2014takes, when driven to\nexpound itself, its first definite form under those acquired habits of\nthought which his secular consciousness and intellect otherwise employs.\nIn this way the truth becomes liable to the terms and conditions of\nfinitude in general. This does not prevent the spirit, even in employing\nsensuous ideas and finite categories of thought, from retaining its\ncontent (which as religion is essentially speculative,) with a tenacity\nwhich does violence to them, and acts _inconsistently_ towards them. By\nthis inconsistency it corrects their defects. Nothing easier therefore for\nthe \u201cRationalist\u201d than to point out contradictions in the exposition of\nthe faith, and then to prepare triumphs for its principle of formal\nidentity. If the spirit yields to this finite reflection, which has\nusurped the title of reason and philosophy\u2014(\u201cRationalism\u201d)\u2014it strips\nreligious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality nought. Religion\nin that case is completely in the right in guarding herself against such\nreason and philosophy and treating them as enemies. But it is another\nthing when religion sets herself against comprehending reason, and against\nphilosophy in general, and specially against a philosophy of which the\ndoctrine is speculative, and so religious. Such an opposition proceeds\nfrom failure to appreciate the difference indicated and the value of\nspiritual form in general, and particularly of the logical form; or, to be\nmore precise, still from failure to note the distinction of the\ncontent\u2014which may be in both the same\u2014from these forms. It is on the\nground of form that philosophy has been reproached and accused by the\nreligious party; just as conversely its speculative content has brought\nthe same charges upon it from a self-styled philosophy\u2014and from a pithless\northodoxy. It had too little of God in it for the former; too much for the\nlatter.\n\nThe charge of _Atheism_, which used often to be brought against philosophy\n(that it has _too little_ of God), has grown rare: the more wide-spread\ngrows the charge of Pantheism, that it has _too much_ of him:\u2014so much so,\nthat it is treated not so much as an imputation, but as a proved fact, or\na sheer fact which needs no proof. Piety, in particular, which with its\npious airs of superiority fancies itself free to dispense with proof, goes\nhand in hand with empty rationalism\u2014(which means to be so much opposed to\nit, though both repose really on the same habit of mind)\u2014in the wanton\nassertion, almost as if it merely mentioned a notorious fact, that\nPhilosophy is the All-one doctrine, or Pantheism. It must be said that it\nwas more to the credit of piety and theology when they accused a\nphilosophical system (e.g. Spinozism) of Atheism than of Pantheism, though\nthe former imputation at the first glance looks more cruel and insidious\n(cf. \u00a7 71 note). The imputation of Atheism presupposes a definite idea of\na full and real God, and arises because the popular idea does not detect\nin the philosophical notion the peculiar form to which it is attached.\nPhilosophy indeed can recognise its own forms in the categories of\nreligious consciousness, and even its own teaching in the doctrine of\nreligion\u2014which therefore it does not disparage. But the converse is not\ntrue: the religious consciousness does not apply the criticism of thought\nto itself, does not comprehend itself, and is therefore, as it stands,\nexclusive. To impute Pantheism instead of Atheism to Philosophy is part of\nthe modern habit of mind\u2014of the new piety and new theology. For them\nphilosophy has too much of God:\u2014so much so, that, if we believe them, it\nasserts that God is everything and everything is God. This new theology,\nwhich makes religion only a subjective feeling and denies the knowledge of\nthe divine nature, thus retains nothing more than a God in general without\nobjective characteristics. Without interest of its own for the concrete,\nfulfilled notion of God, it treats it only as an interest which _others_\nonce had, and hence treats what belongs to the doctrine of God\u2019s concrete\nnature as something merely historical. The indeterminate God is to be\nfound in all religions; every kind of piety (\u00a7 72)\u2014that of the Hindoo to\nasses, cows,\u2014or to dalai-lamas,\u2014that of the Egyptians to the ox\u2014is always\nadoration of an object which, with all its absurdities, also contains the\ngeneric abstract, God in General. If this theory needs no more than such a\nGod, so as to find God in everything called religion, it must at least\nfind such a God recognised even in philosophy, and can no longer accuse it\nof Atheism. The mitigation of the reproach of Atheism into that of\nPantheism has its ground therefore in the superficial idea to which this\nmildness has attenuated and emptied God. As that popular idea clings to\nits abstract universality, from which all definite quality is excluded,\nall such definiteness is only the non-divine, the secularity of things,\nthus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality. On such a\npresupposition, even after philosophy has maintained God\u2019s absolute\nuniversality, and the consequent untruth of the being of external things,\nthe hearer clings as he did before to his belief that secular things still\nkeep their being, and form all that is definite in the divine\nuniversality. He thus changes that universality into what he calls the\npantheistic:\u2014_Everything is_\u2014(empirical things, without distinction,\nwhether higher or lower in the scale, _are_)\u2014all possess substantiality;\nand so\u2014thus he understands philosophy\u2014each and every secular thing is God.\nIt is only his own stupidity, and the falsifications due to such\nmisconception, which generate the imagination and the allegation of such\npantheism.\n\nBut if those who give out that a certain philosophy is Pantheism, are\nunable and unwilling to see this\u2014for it is just to see the notion that\nthey refuse\u2014they should before everything have verified the alleged fact\nthat _any one philosopher, or any one man_, had really ascribed\nsubstantial or objective and inherent reality to _all_ things and regarded\nthem as God:\u2014that such an idea had ever come into the hand of any body but\nthemselves. This allegation I will further elucidate in this exoteric\ndiscussion: and the only way to do so is to set down the evidence. If we\nwant to take so-called Pantheism in its most poetical, most sublime, or if\nyou will, its grossest shape, we must, as is well known, consult the\noriental poets: and the most copious delineations of it are found in\nHindoo literature. Amongst the abundant resources open to our disposal on\nthis topic, I select\u2014as the most authentic statement accessible\u2014the\nBhagavat-Gita, and amongst its effusions, prolix and reiterative _ad\nnauseam_, some of the most telling passages. In the 10th Lesson (in\nSchlegel, p. 162) Krishna says of himself(173):\u2014\u201cI am the self, seated in\nthe hearts of all beings. I am the beginning and the middle and the end\nalso of all beings ... I am the beaming sun amongst the shining ones, and\nthe moon among the lunar mansions.... Amongst the Vedas I am the\nS\u00e2ma-Veda: I am mind amongst the senses: I am consciousness in living\nbeings. And I am Sankara (Siva) among the Rudras, ... Meru among the\nhigh-topped mountains, ... the Himalaya among the firmly-fixed\n(mountains).... Among beasts I am the lord of beasts.... Among letters I\nam the letter A.... I am the spring among the seasons.... I am also that\nwhich is the seed of all things: there is nothing moveable or immoveable\nwhich can exist without me.\u201d\n\nEven in these totally sensuous delineations, Krishna (and we must not\nsuppose there is, besides Krishna, still God, or a God besides; as he said\nbefore he was Siva, or Indra, so it is afterwards said that Brahma too is\nin him) makes himself out to be\u2014not everything, but only\u2014the most\nexcellent of everything. Everywhere there is a distinction drawn between\nexternal, unessential existences, and one essential amongst them, which he\nis. Even when, at the beginning of the passage, he is said to be the\nbeginning, middle, and end of living things, this totality is\ndistinguished from the living things themselves as single existences. Even\nsuch a picture which extends deity far and wide in its existence cannot be\ncalled pantheism: we must rather say that in the infinitely multiple\nempirical world, everything is reduced to a limited number of essential\nexistences, to a polytheism. But even what has been quoted shows that\nthese very substantialities of the externally-existent do not retain the\nindependence entitling them to be named Gods; even Siva, Indra, &c. melt\ninto the one Krishna.\n\nThis reduction is more expressly made in the following scene (7th Lesson,\np. 7 sqq.). Krishna says: \u201cI am the producer and the destroyer of the\nwhole universe. There is nothing else higher than myself; all this is\nwoven upon me, like numbers of pearls upon a thread. I am the taste in\nwater;... I am the light of the sun and the moon; I am \u2018Om\u2019 in all the\nVedas.... I am life in all beings.... I am the discernment of the\ndiscerning ones.... I am also the strength of the strong.\u201d Then he adds:\n\u201cThe whole universe deluded by these three states of mind developed from\nthe qualities [sc. goodness, passion, darkness] does not know me who am\nbeyond them and inexhaustible: for this delusion of mine,\u201d [even the Maya\nis _his_, nothing independent], \u201cdeveloped from the qualities is divine\nand difficult to transcend. Those cross beyond this delusion who resort to\nme alone.\u201d Then the picture gathers itself up in a simple expression: \u201cAt\nthe end of many lives, the man possessed of knowledge approaches me,\n(believing) that Vasudeva is everything. Such a high-souled mind is very\nhard to find. Those who are deprived of knowledge by various desires\napproach other divinities... Whichever form of deity one worships with\nfaith, from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires really given by\nme. But the fruit thus obtained by those of little judgment is\nperishable.... The undiscerning ones, not knowing my transcendent and\ninexhaustible essence, than which there is nothing higher, think me who am\nunperceived to have become perceptible.\u201d\n\nThis \u201cAll,\u201d which Krishna calls himself, is not, any more than the Eleatic\nOne, and the Spinozan Substance, the Every-thing. This every-thing,\nrather, the infinitely-manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in all\nthese pictures, but defined as the \u201caccidental,\u201d without essential being\nof its very own, but having its truth in the substance, the One which, as\ndifferent from that accidental, is alone the divine and God. Hindooism\nhowever has the higher conception of Brahma, the pure unity of thought in\nitself, where the empirical everything of the world, as also those\nproximate substantialities, called Gods, vanish. On that account\nColebrooke and many others have described the Hindoo religion as at bottom\na Monotheism. That this description is not incorrect is clear from these\nshort citations. But so little concrete is this divine unity\u2014spiritual as\nits idea of God is\u2014so powerless its grip, so to speak\u2014that Hindooism, with\na monstrous inconsistency, is also the maddest of polytheisms. But the\nidolatry of the wretched Hindoo, when he adores the ape, or other\ncreature, is still a long way from that wretched fancy of a Pantheism, to\nwhich everything is God, and God everything. Hindoo monotheism moreover is\nitself an example how little comes of mere monotheism, if the Idea of God\nis not deeply determinate in itself. For that unity, if it be\nintrinsically abstract and therefore empty, tends of itself to let\nwhatever is concrete, outside it\u2014be it as a lot of Gods or as secular,\nempirical individuals\u2014keep its independence. That pantheism indeed\u2014on the\nshallow conception of it\u2014might with a show of logic as well be called a\nmonotheism: for if God, as it says, is identical with the world, then as\nthere is only one world there would be in that pantheism only one God.\nPerhaps the empty numerical unity must be predicated of the world: but\nsuch abstract predication of it has no further special interest; on the\ncontrary, a mere numerical unity just means that its _content_ is an\ninfinite multeity and variety of finitudes. But it is that delusion with\nthe empty unity, which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea of\npantheism. It is only the picture\u2014floating in the indefinite blue\u2014of the\nworld as _one thing_, _the all_, that could ever be considered capable of\ncombining with God: only on that assumption could philosophy be supposed\nto teach that God is the world: for if the world were taken as it is, as\neverything, as the endless lot of empirical existence, then it would\nhardly have been even held possible to suppose a pantheism which asserted\nof such stuff that it is God.\n\nBut to go back again to the question of fact. If we want to see the\nconsciousness of the One\u2014not as with the Hindoos split between the\nfeatureless unity of abstract thought, on one hand, and on the other, the\nlong-winded weary story of its particular detail, but\u2014in its finest purity\nand sublimity, we must consult the Mohammedans. If e.g. in the excellent\nJelaleddin-Rumi in particular, we find the unity of the soul with the One\nset forth, and that unity described as love, this spiritual unity is an\nexaltation above the finite and vulgar, a transfiguration of the natural\nand the spiritual, in which the externalism and transitoriness of\nimmediate nature, and of empirical secular spirit, is discarded and\nabsorbed(174).\n\nI refrain from accumulating further examples of the religious and poetic\nconceptions which it is customary to call pantheistic. Of the philosophies\nto which that name is given, the Eleatic, or Spinozist, it has been\nremarked earlier (\u00a7 50, note) that so far are they from identifying God\nwith the world and making him finite, that in these systems this\n\u201ceverything\u201d has no truth, and that we should rather call them\nmonotheistic, or, in relation to the popular idea of the world, acosmical.\nThey are most accurately called systems which apprehend the Absolute only\nas substance. Of the oriental, especially the Mohammedan, modes of\nenvisaging God, we may rather say that they represent the Absolute as the\nutterly universal genus which dwells in the species or existences, but\ndwells so potently that these existences have no actual reality. The fault\nof all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of\ndefining substance as subject and as mind.\n\nThese systems and modes of pictorial conception originate from the one\nneed common to all philosophies and all religions of getting an idea of\nGod, and, secondly, of the relationship of God and the world. (In\nphilosophy it is specially made out that the determination of God\u2019s nature\ndetermines his relations with the world.) The \u201creflective\u201d understanding\nbegins by rejecting all systems and modes of conception, which, whether\nthey spring from heart, imagination or speculation, express the\ninterconnexion of God and the world: and in order to have God pure in\nfaith or consciousness, he is as essence parted from appearance, as\ninfinite from the finite. But, after this partition, the conviction arises\nalso that the appearance has a relation to the essence, the finite to the\ninfinite, and so on: and thus arises the question of reflection as to the\nnature of this relation. It is in the reflective form that the whole\ndifficulty of the affair lies, and that causes this relation to be called\nincomprehensible by the agnostic. The close of philosophy is not the\nplace, even in a general exoteric discussion, to waste a word on what a\n\u201cnotion\u201d means. But as the view taken of this relation is closely\nconnected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all\nimputations against it, we may still add the remark that though philosophy\ncertainly has to do with unity in general, it is not however with abstract\nunity, mere identity, and the empty absolute, but with concrete unity (the\nnotion), and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else;\u2014that\neach step in its advance is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete\nunity, and that the deepest and last expression of unity is the unity of\nabsolute mind itself. Would-be judges and critics of philosophy might be\nrecommended to familiarise themselves with these phases of unity and to\ntake the trouble to get acquainted with them, at least to know so much\nthat of these terms there are a great many, and that amongst them there is\ngreat variety. But they show so little acquaintance with them\u2014and still\nless take trouble about it\u2014that, when they hear of unity\u2014and relation\n_ipso facto_ implies unity\u2014they rather stick fast at quite abstract\nindeterminate unity, and lose sight of the chief point of interest\u2014the\nspecial mode in which the unity is qualified. Hence all they can say about\nphilosophy is that dry identity is its principle and result, and that it\nis the system of identity. Sticking fast to the undigested thought of\nidentity, they have laid hands on, not the concrete unity, the notion and\ncontent of philosophy, but rather its reverse. In the philosophical field\nthey proceed, as in the physical field the physicist; who also is well\naware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties and\nmatters\u2014or usually matters alone, (for the properties get transformed into\nmatters also for the physicist)\u2014and that these matters (elements) _also_\nstand in _relation_ to one another. But the question is, Of what kind is\nthis relation? Every peculiarity and the whole difference of natural\nthings, inorganic and living, depend solely on the different modes of this\nunity. But instead of ascertaining these different modes, the ordinary\nphysicist (chemist included) takes up only one, the most external and the\nworst, viz. _composition_, applies only it in the whole range of natural\nstructures, which he thus renders for ever inexplicable.\n\nThe aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this\nshallow identity. All that those who employ this invention of their own to\naccuse philosophy gather from the study of God\u2019s _relation_ to the world\nis that the one, but only the one factor of this category of relation\u2014and\nthat the factor of indeterminateness\u2014is identity. Thereupon they stick\nfast in this half-perception, and assert\u2014falsely as a fact\u2014that philosophy\nteaches the identity of God and the world. And as in their judgment either\nof the two,\u2014the world as much as God\u2014has the same solid substantiality as\nthe other, they infer that in the philosophic Idea God is _composed_ of\nGod and the world. Such then is the idea they form of pantheism, and which\nthey ascribe to philosophy. Unaccustomed in their own thinking and\napprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories, they import them\ninto philosophy, where they are utterly unknown; they thus infect it with\nthe disease against which they subsequently raise an outcry. If any\ndifficulty emerge in comprehending God\u2019s relation to the world, they at\nonce and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains\nfor them an inexplicable contradiction; and that hence, they must stop at\nthe vague conception of such relation, perhaps under the more familiar\nnames of, e.g. omnipresence, providence, &c. Faith in their use of the\nterm means no more than a refusal to define the conception, or to enter on\na closer discussion of the problem. That men and classes of untrained\nintellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness, is what one expects; but\nwhen a trained intellect and an interest for reflective study is\nsatisfied, in matters admitted to be of superior, if not even of supreme\ninterest, with indefinite ideas, it is hard to decide whether the thinker\nis really in earnest with the subject. But if those who cling to this\ncrude \u201crationalism\u201d were in earnest, e.g. with God\u2019s omnipresence, so far\nas to realise their faith thereon in a definite mental idea, in what\ndifficulties would they be involved by their belief in the true reality of\nthe things of sense! They would hardly like, as Epicurus does, to let God\ndwell in the interspaces of things, i.e. in the pores of the\nphysicists,\u2014said pores being the negative, something supposed to exist\n_beside_ the material reality. This very \u201cBeside\u201d would give their\npantheism its spatiality,\u2014their everything, conceived as the mutual\nexclusion of parts in space. But in ascribing to God, in his relation to\nthe world, an action on and in the space thus filled on the world and in\nit, they would endlessly split up the divine actuality into infinite\nmateriality. They would really thus have the misconception they call\npantheism or all-one-doctrine, only as the necessary sequel of their\nmisconceptions of God and the world. But to put that sort of thing, this\nstale gossip of oneness or identity, on the shoulders of philosophy, shows\nsuch recklessness about justice and truth that it can only be explained\nthrough the difficulty of getting into the head thoughts and notions, i.e.\nnot abstract unity, but the many-shaped modes specified. If statements as\nto facts are put forward, and the facts in question are thoughts and\nnotions, it is indispensable to get hold of their meaning. But even the\nfulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous, now that it\nhas long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is pantheism, a system\nof identity, an All-one doctrine, and that the person therefore who might\nbe unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a matter of\ncommon notoriety, or as prevaricating for a purpose. On account of this\nchorus of assertions, then, I have believed myself obliged to speak at\nmore length and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this\nalleged fact: for exoteric discussion is the only method available in\ndealing with the external apprehension of notions as mere facts,\u2014by which\nnotions are perverted into their opposite. The esoteric study of God and\nidentity, as of cognitions and notions, is philosophy itself.\n\n\u00a7 574. This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea, the truth\naware of itself (\u00a7 236),\u2014the logical system, but with the signification\nthat it is universality approved and certified in concrete content as in\nits actuality. In this way the science has gone back to its beginning: its\nresult is the logical system but as a spiritual principle: out of the\npresupposing judgment, in which the notion was only implicit and the\nbeginning an immediate,\u2014and thus out of the _appearance_ which it had\nthere\u2014it has risen into its pure principle and thus also into its proper\nmedium.\n\n\u00a7 575. It is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the\nfurther development. The first appearance is formed by the syllogism,\nwhich is based on the Logical system as starting-point, with Nature for\nthe middle term which couples the Mind with it. The Logical principle\nturns to Nature and Nature to Mind. Nature, standing between the Mind and\nits essence, sunders itself, not indeed to extremes of finite abstraction,\nnor itself to something away from them and independent,\u2014which, as other\nthan they, only serves as a link between them: for the syllogism is _in\nthe Idea_ and Nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and\nnegative factor, and as implicitly the Idea. Still the mediation of the\nnotion has the external form of _transition_, and the science of Nature\npresents itself as the course of necessity, so that it is only in the one\nextreme that the liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation.\n\n\u00a7 576. In the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded, that\nthat syllogism is the standpoint of the Mind itself, which\u2014as the\nmediating agent in the process\u2014presupposes Nature and couples it with the\nLogical principle. It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in\nthe Idea: philosophy appears as a subjective cognition, of which liberty\nis the aim, and which is itself the way to produce it.\n\n\u00a7 577. The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy, which has\nself-knowing reason, the absolutely-universal, for its middle term: a\nmiddle, which divides itself into Mind and Nature, making the former its\npresupposition, as process of the Idea\u2019s subjective activity, and the\nlatter its universal extreme, as process of the objectively and implicitly\nexisting Idea. The self-judging of the Idea into its two appearances (\u00a7\u00a7\n575, 576) characterises both as its (the self-knowing reason\u2019s)\nmanifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects:\u2014it is\nthe nature of the fact, the notion, which causes the movement and\ndevelopment, yet this same movement is equally the action of cognition.\nThe eternal Idea, in full fruition of its essence, eternally sets itself\nto work, engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind.\n\n\n    \u1f29 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f21 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fbd \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fbd \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n    \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1. \u0391\u1f51\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u1fd6 \u1f41 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1\n    \u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b9\u03b3\u03b3\u03ac\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u1ff6\u03bd, \u1f65\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd. \u03a4\u1f78 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1\n    \u03b4\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2. \u1f18\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f14\u03c7\u03c9\u03bd. \u1f6d\u03c3\u03c4\u1fbd\n    \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f42 \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6 \u1f41 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 \u03b8\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f78\n    \u1f25\u03b4\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f04\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd. \u0395\u1f30 \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f56 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9, \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad, \u1f41 \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03c2\n    \u1f00\u03b5\u03af, \u03b8\u03b1\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd; \u03b5\u1f30 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f14\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b8\u03b1\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03ce\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd. \u1f1c\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f61\u03b4\u03af. \u039a\u03b1\u1f76\n    \u03b6\u03c9\u1f74 \u03b4\u03ad \u03b3\u03b5 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9; \u1f21 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 \u03b6\u03c9\u03ae, \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f21 \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1;\n    \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f21 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fbd \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b6\u03c9\u1f74 \u1f00\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u0390\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2. \u03a6\u03b1\u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72\n    \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b6\u1ff7\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u0390\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f04\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f65\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b6\u03c9\u1f74 \u03b1\u1f30\u1f7c\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c7\u1f74\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n    \u1f00\u0390\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff7; \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f41 \u03b8\u03b5\u03cc\u03c2. (ARIST. _Met._ XI. 7.)\n\n\n\n\n\nINDEX.\n\n\nAbsolute (the), xlviii, 7.\n\nAbstraction, 74.\n\nAccent, 81, 87.\n\nAges of man, 17.\n\nAlphabets, 81.\n\nAltruism, 57.\n\nAnimal magnetism, clxi, 5, 29 seqq.\n\nAnthropology, xxv, lxxxviii, 12 seqq.\n\nAppetite, 53.\n\n_Aristotle_, liii, cxxxiii, 4, 63, 163.\n\nArt, xxxix seqq., 169 seqq.\n\nAsceticism, cxv, cxliii, clxxxvii, 159.\n\nAssociation of ideas, 73.\n\nAtheism, 183.\n\nAthens, cxxx.\n\nAttention, clxxiii, 69.\n\nAutomatism (psychological), clxv.\n\n_Bacon_ (Fr.), xxi, lii, lix, clx.\n\n_Bain_ (A.), cxxi.\n\nBeauty, 169.\n\nBhagavat-Gita, 186 seqq.\n\nBiography, 151.\n\nBody and Soul (relations of), lxxxii, cxvi, clvi, 13.\n\n_Bo\u00ebthius_, l.\n\n_B\u00f6hme_ (J.), 95.\n\n_Braid_ (J.), clxiv.\n\nBravery, cxcix.\n\nBudget, 144.\n\nCapitalism, cci seqq.\n\nCardinal virtues, cxxxii.\n\nCategories, lx.\n\nCatholicism, 157.\n\nChildren, lxxxvii, cii.\n\nChinese language, 81 seqq.\n\nChoice, 98.\n\nChristianity, xliv, cxli, clxxix, 7, 101, 157.\n\nClairvoyance, clviii, clxi, 33.\n\nCognition, 64.\n\nCommercial morality, cci.\n\n_Comte_ (C.), xcix.\n\n_Condillac_, lxxviii, 61.\n\nConscience, xxx, cxxii, clxxxvii, 117, 156, 161.\n\nConsciousness, xxv, xcix, 47 seqq.\n\nConstitution of the State, 132.\n\nContract, 108.\n\nCorporation, 130.\n\nCrime, cxciii, 109.\n\nCriticism, xvi, cxxxviii, 149.\n\nCustom, clxxxix, 104.\n\n_Dante_, cxxxiv.\n\nDeduction (Kantian and Fichtean), cx seqq.\n\nDemocracy, 141.\n\nDevelopment, 60.\n\nDisease (mental), 27, 37.\n\nDuty, cxiv, cxix, cxxi seqq., cxxxi, cxxxix, 97, 104, 116.\n\nEconomics, 122.\n\nEducation, xcii, cxxxvii, 11.\n\nEgo (the), lxiv seqq., 47 seqq.\n\nEgoism, 55.\n\nEleaticism, 190.\n\nEngland, 143.\n\nEpicureanism, cxli, 195.\n\nEpistemology, ciii.\n\nEquality (political and social), cxc, 133.\n\nEquity, xxxi.\n\nEstates, 123.\n\nEthics, xv, xix, xxx seqq., xcv, cxiii seqq., cxc seqq., 113 seqq.\n\nExperience, 51.\n\nExperimental psychology, lxxxi seqq., c.\n\nExpression (mental), 23, 45.\n\nFaculties of Mind, lxxiii seqq., xcvii, cxxvi, 58, 65.\n\nFaith, cvii.\n\nFaith-cure, clxi, 35.\n\nFame, 153.\n\nFamily, xxxii, cxcii, 121.\n\n_Fechner_ (G. T.), cli.\n\nFeeling, 22, 68, 92.\n\n_Fichte_ (J. G.), cvi, cix seqq., clxiv, clxix, 49.\n\nFinance, 144.\n\nFinitude, 8.\n\nFraud, 110.\n\nFreedom, cxxv seqq., clxxv, 6, 99, 113, 133 seqq.\n\n_Fries_, clxxix.\n\nGenius (the), clvii, 28.\n\nGerman language, 78, 88:\n  politics, clxxvii;\n  empire, clxxxi.\n\nGod, xxxiv, xli, cxxii, 20, 154, 176.\n\n_Goethe_, cliv, clxix.\n\nGoodness, 115.\n\nGovernment, 137;\n  forms of, 141.\n\nGreek ethics, cxxix seqq., cxciv;\n  religion, 164.\n\nHabit, clviii, 39.\n\nHappiness, 99.\n\n_Herbart_, lxii seqq., lxxxv, cxxvii.\n\nHieroglyphics, 80.\n\nHistory, xxxiv, xlvii, xci, 147 seqq.\n\n_Hobbes_, lxxvi, clxxxii.\n\nHoliness, 159.\n\nHonour, 124.\n\n_Humboldt_ (W. v.), 79.\n\n_Hume_, lxxi, cxx.\n\nHypnotism, clxiv seqq., 31 seqq.\n\nIdea (Platonic), 163.\n\nIdealism, civ; political, clxxxvi.\n\nIdeality, clxviii, 25.\n\nIdeas, lxix seqq., ci seqq.\n\nImagination, 72.\n\nImmaterialism, clii, 12, 45.\n\nImpulse, 95.\n\nIndividualist ethics, cxx seqq.\n\nIndividuality in the State, 139.\n\nIndustrialism, cc, 123.\n\nInsanity, 37.\n\nIntention, 114.\n\nInternational Law, 147.\n\nIntuition, 67.\n\nIrony, 179.\n\n_Jelaleddin-Rumi_, 189.\n\nJudgment, 89.\n\nJudicial system, 127.\n\n_Jung-Stilling_, clxii.\n\nJuries, 128.\n\n_Kant_ (I.), xv, lxiv, lxxi, xcvi, cvii, cxxviii, clxxxviii, 20, 48, 51,\n            63, 154.\n\n_Kieser_, clxiii.\n\nKnowledge, cv, cxxxv, cxli, 64.\n\nKrishna, 186 seqq.\n\nLabour, 123.\n\nLanguage, clxxiv, 79 seqq.\n\n_Laplace_, clxiv.\n\nLaw, xxix, xcvi, cxc, 104, 125.\n\nLegality, xxx, clxxxix.\n\nLegislation, 125.\n\n_Leibniz_, lxxii, lxxvii, cxlvi, 14, 80, 82.\n\nLiberty, see Freedom.\n\nLife, 13.\n\nLogic, xiv, xvii, lxi, xcv, 196.\n\nLutheranism, 157.\n\n_Macchiavelli_, clxxx.\n\nMagic, clxi, 29.\n\nManifestation, 7.\n\nManners, 104.\n\nMarriage, 121, 159.\n\nMaster and slave, 56.\n\nMathematics in psychology, lxviii.\n\nMedium, 34.\n\nMemory, clxxiv, 70, 84.\n\n_Mesmer_, clxi.\n\nMetaphysic, lviii seqq.\n\n_Mill_ (James), lxxix.\n\nMind (= Spirit), xlix seqq., 58, 196.\n\nMnemonics, 85.\n\nMonarchy, 139.\n\nMonasticism, 159.\n\nMonotheism, 188.\n\nMorality, xxx, xxxviii, cxxi, clxxxviii seqq., cxcviii, 113 seqq.\n\n_M\u00fcnsterberg_ (H.), lxxxiii.\n\n_Napoleon_, 19.\n\nNationality, 142, 150, 154, cxcv.\n\nNatural Philosophy, xv, xvii, xxii.\n\nNatural rights, 112.\n\nNature, cxx, cxxiv, 12, 133, 196.\n\nNemesis, 174.\n\n_Nietzsche_ (F.), cxxviii.\n\nNobility, cxcvii.\n\nObservation, lxxxix.\n\nOrders (social), cxcvii seqq., 124.\n\nOught, clxxv, 94, 116.\n\nPain, 6, 94.\n\nPantheism, 184, 194.\n\nParliament, 142.\n\nPassion, 95.\n\nPeasantry, cci.\n\n_Peel_ (Sir R.), 127.\n\nPerception, 67.\n\nPerfection, cxxvii, cxxix.\n\nPerson, 107, 119.\n\nPersonality, lxiv, clxvii.\n\nPhilosophy, xiv, cxvii, cxxxviii, 159 seqq., 179 seqq.\n\nPhrenology, 35.\n\nPhysiology, lxxxi, c.\n\n_Pinel_, 39.\n\n_Plato_, xcviii, cxxxi, cxxxv, 33, 97, 102, 162.\n\nPleasure, cxxxvi, 94.\n\n_Plotinus_, cxliv.\n\nPolice, 130.\n\n_Porphyry_, xx.\n\nPositivity of laws, 125.\n\nPowers (political), ccii, 138.\n\nPractice, 92.\n\nProperty, xxix, cxcii, 107.\n\nProtestantism, 166.\n\nPrussia, clxxviii, clxxxiv.\n\nPsychiatry, 33.\n\nPsychology, xxii, xxiv, lii seqq., lxiii, lxxxvi, xcv, cxvii, 4, 58, 63.\n\nPsycho-physics, clvi, 23.\n\nPunishment, cxciii, cciii, 111.\n\nPurpose, 97, 114.\n\nRaces, 16.\n\nRationalism, clxv, 183.\n\nReason, cxv, cxliii, clxxii, 58.\n\nRecollection, 70.\n\n_Reinhold_, 49.\n\nReligion, xxxvii seqq., cxcvi, 155 seqq., 167 seqq.\n\nRepresentation, cxi, 70;\n  political, clxxxiii, 142.\n\nResponsibility, 114.\n\nRevelation, 7, 175.\n\nRight, xxix, 104 (see Law).\n\n_Ritter_, clxi, clxiii.\n\nRomances, 151:\n  romantic art, 172.\n\nSavages, lxxxvii, cii.\n\n_Schelling_, clxi.\n\n_Schindler_, clxiii.\n\n_Schopenhauer_, cvi, cxvi, cli, clxiv, clxix, clxxxvii.\n\nScience, xviii.\n\n_Scott_ (Sir W.), 151.\n\nSelf-consciousness, clxxi, 53 seqq.\n\nSensibility and sensation, 20, 50.\n\nSex, 18.\n\nSiderism, clxiii, 15.\n\nSigns (in language), 76.\n\nSkill (acquired), 42.\n\nSlavery, 56, 101.\n\nSleep, 18.\n\nSociety, xxxii, 56.\n\nSociology, xxiii.\n\nSomnambulism, 30.\n\nSoul, liv, lxix, lxxv, 26.\n\n_Spencer_ (H.), xxi seqq., cxi, cxxiii, cxliv.\n\n_Spinoza_, lxxvi, ci, cxix, cl, 14, 49, 188.\n\nSpiritualism, clxii.\n\nState, xxxii seqq., clxxvi, clxxxiii, 131 seqq.\n\nStoicism, cxix, cxxiv, cxi, cxliii.\n\nSuggestion, clxv seqq., 33.\n\nSuperstition, 158.\n\nSyllogism, 90.\n\nSymbol, 77, 171.\n\nSympathy, clv.\n\nTelepathy, clxi, 34.\n\nTellurism, clxiii, 15.\n\nTheology, 155.\n\nThinking, clxxiv, 89.\n\n_Tholuck_, 191.\n\nTrinity, 177 seqq.\n\nTruth, cv, 182.\n\nUnconscious (the), cxlvi.\n\nUnderstanding, 52, 89.\n\nUniversalising, cxxviii.\n\nUtilitarianism, cxxxvi.\n\nValue, 109.\n\nVirtues, cxxxi, cxcviii, 120.\n\nWar, cxcix, 146.\n\nWartburg, clxxix.\n\nWelfare, 114.\n\nWickedness, 9, 94, 117.\n\nWill, xxviii, cxxv, clxxv, 62, 90.\n\n_Wolff_, lxxiii.\n\nWords, clxxiv, 79.\n\n_Wordsworth_, li, clxviii.\n\nWritten language, 81 seqq.\n\nWrong, 109.\n\nW\u00fcrtemberg, clxxxv.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n\n    1 Plato, _Rep._ 527.\n\n    2 The prospectus of the _System of Synthetic Philosophy_ is dated\n      1860. Darwin\u2019s _Origin of Species_ is 1859. But such ideas, both in\n      Mr. Spencer and others, are earlier than Darwin\u2019s book.\n\n    3 Hegel\u2019s _Verh\u00e4ltniss_, the supreme category of what is called\n      actuality: where object is necessitated by outside object.\n\n    4 Cf. Herbart, _Werke_ (ed. Kehrbach), iv. 372. This consciousness\n      proper is what Leibniz called _\u00ab __Apperception,__ \u00bb__ la\n      connaissance r\u00e9flexive de l\u2019\u00e9tat int\u00e9rieur (Nouveaux Essais)_.\n\n    5 Herbart, _Werke_, vi. 55 (ed. Kehrbach).\n\n    6 p. 59 (\u00a7 440).\n\n    7 p. 63 (\u00a7 440).\n\n    8 These remarks refer to four out of the five Herbartian ethical\n      ideas. See also Leibniz, who (in 1693, _De Notionibus juris et\n      justitiae_) had given the following definitions: \u201cCaritas est\n      benevolentia universalis. Justitia est caritas sapientis. Sapientia\n      est scientia felicitatis.\u201d The jus naturae has three grades: the\n      lowest, jus strictum; the second, aequitas (or caritas, in the\n      narrower sense); and the highest, pietas, which is honeste, i.e. pie\n      vivere.\n\n    9 To which the Greek \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b9\u03c2, the Latin civitas or respublica, were only\n      approximations. Hegel _is not writing a history_. If he were, it\n      would be necessary for him to point out how far the individual\n      instance, e.g. Rome, or Prussia, corresponded to its Idea.\n\n   10 Shakespeare\u2019s phrase, as in _Othello_, iii. 2; _Lover\u2019s Complaint_,\n      v. 24.\n\n_   11 Iliad_, xii. 243.\n\n   12 See Hegel\u2019s _Logic_, pp. 257 seq.\n\n   13 See p. 153 (\u00a7 550).\n\n   14 Cf. _Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel_, chaps. xviii, xxvi.\n\n   15 As stated in p. 167 (_Encycl._ \u00a7 554). Cf. _Phenom. d. Geistes_,\n      cap. vii, which includes the Religion of Art, and the same point of\n      view is explicit in the first edition of the _Encyclopaedia_.\n\n_   16 Philosophie der Religion_ (_Werke_, xi. 5).\n\n   17 Hegel, _Phenomenologie des Geistes_ (_Werke_, ii. 545). The\n      meeting-ground of the Greek spirit, as it passed through Rome, with\n      Christianity.\n\n   18 Ib., p. 584.\n\n_   19 Phenomenologie des Geistes_ (_Werke_, ii. 572). Thus Hegelian\n      idealism claims to be the philosophical counterpart of the central\n      dogma of Christianity.\n\n   20 From the old Proven\u00e7al _Lay of Bo\u00ebthius_.\n\n   21 It is the doctrine of the _intellectus agens_, or _in actu_; the\n      _actus purus_ of the Schoolmen.\n\n_   22 Einleitung in die Philosophie_, \u00a7\u00a7 1, 2.\n\n_   23 Psychologie als Wissenschaft_, Vorrede.\n\n_   24 Einleitung in die Philosophie_, \u00a7\u00a7 11, 12.\n\n_   25 Einleitung in die Philosophie_, \u00a7 18: cf. _Werke_, ed. Kehrbach, v.\n      108.\n\n   26 Cf. Plato\u2019s remarks on the problem in the word Self-control.\n      _Republ._ 430-1.\n\n_   27 Lehrbuch der Psychologie_, \u00a7\u00a7 202, 203.\n\n_   28 Allgemeine Metaphysik_, Vorrede.\n\n_   29 Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik_ (1806), \u00a7 13.\n\n_   30 Werke_, ed. Kehrbach (_Ueber die M\u00f6glichkeit_, &c), v. 96.\n\n_   31 Ibid._, p. 100.\n\n   32 One might almost fancy Herbart was translating into a general\n      philosophic thesis the words in which Goethe has described how he\n      overcame a real trouble by transmuting it into an ideal shape, e.g.\n      _Wahrheit und Dichtung_, cap. xii.\n\n   33 Herbart\u2019s language is almost identical with Hegel\u2019s: _Encycl._ \u00a7 389\n      (p. 12). Cf. Spencer, _Psychology_, i. 192. \u201cFeelings are in all\n      cases the materials out of which the superior tracts of\n      consciousness and intellect are evolved.\u201d\n\n_   34 Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel_, ch. xvii.\n\n_   35 Psychologia Empirica_, \u00a7 29.\n\n   36 As is also the case with Herbart\u2019s metaphysical reality of the Soul.\n\n_   37 Human Nature_, vii. 2. \u201cPleasure, Love, and appetite, which is also\n      called desire, are divers names for divers considerations of the\n      same thing....\u201d Deliberation is (ch. xii. 1) the \u201calternate\n      succession of appetite and fears.\u201d\n\n_   38 Eth._ ii. 48 Schol.\n\n_   39 Eth._ ii. 43 Schol.: cf. 49 Schol.\n\n   40 This wide scope of thinking (_cogitatio_, _penser_) is at least as\n      old as the Cartesian school: and should be kept in view, as against\n      a tendency to narrow its range to the mere intellect.\n\n   41 e.g. _Analysis of the Human Mind_, ch. xxiv. \u201cAttention is but\n      another name for the interesting character of the idea;\u201d ch. xix.\n      \u201cDesire and the idea of a pleasurable sensation are convertible\n      terms.\u201d\n\n   42 As Mr. Spencer says (_Psychology_, i. 141), \u201cObjective psychology\n      can have no existence as such without borrowing its data from\n      subjective psychology.\u201d\n\n   43 The same failure to note that experiment is valuable only where\n      general points of view are defined, is a common fault in biology.\n\n   44 M\u00fcnsterberg, _Aufgaben und Methoden der Psychologie_, p. 144.\n\n_   45 Lehrbuch der Psychologie_, \u00a7 54 (2nd ed.), or \u00a7 11 (1st ed.).\n\n   46 See p. 11 (\u00a7 387).\n\n   47 Cf. Nietzsche, _Also sprach Zarathustra_, i. 43. \u201cThere is more\n      reason in thy body than in thy best wisdom.\u201d\n\n   48 This language is very characteristic of the physicists who dabble in\n      psychology and imagine they are treading in the steps of Kant, if\n      not even verifying what they call his guesswork: cf. Ziehen,\n      _Physiol. Psychologie_, 2nd ed. p. 212. \u201cIn every case there is\n      given us only the psychical series of sensations and their\n      memory-images, and it is only a universal hypothesis if we assume\n      beside this psychical series a material series standing in causal\n      relation to it.... The material series is not given equally\n      originally with the psychical.\u201d\n\n   49 It is the same radical feature of consciousness which is thus noted\n      by Mr. Spencer, _Psychology_, i. 475. \u201cPerception and sensation are\n      ever tending to exclude each other but never succeed.\u201d \u201cCognition\n      and feeling are antithetical and inseparable.\u201d \u201cConsciousness\n      continues only in virtue of this conflict.\u201d Cf. Plato\u2019s resolution\n      in the _Philebus_ of the contest between intelligence and feeling\n      (pleasure).\n\n   50 It is the quasi-Aristotelian \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03ae, defined as the step from one\n      proposition to another, the knowledge of which will set the first\n      proposition in a full light.\n\n_   51 Grundlage des Naturrechts_, \u00a7 5.\n\n_   52 System der Sittenlehre_, \u00a7 8, iv.\n\n   53 Even though religion (according to Kant) conceive them as divine\n      commands.\n\n   54 Cf. Hegel\u2019s _Werke_, vii. 2, p. 236 (Lecture-note on \u00a7 410). \u201cWe\n      must treat as utterly empty the fancy of those who suppose that\n      properly man should have no organic body,\u201d &c.; and see p. 159 of\n      the present work.\n\n_   55 Criticism of Pure Reason_, Architectonic.\n\n   56 Spencer, _Psychology_, i. 291: \u201cMind can be understood only by\n      observing how mind is evolved.\u201d\n\n   57 Cf. Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_, i. 339: \u201cThe ethical sentiment\n      proper is, in the great mass of cases, scarcely discernible.\u201d\n\n_   58 Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel_, p. 143.\n\n   59 Windelband (W.), _Pr\u00e4ludien_ (1884), p. 288.\n\n   60 Cf. Plato, _Republic_, p. 486.\n\n_   61 Human Nature: Morals_, Part III.\n\n_   62 Emotion and Will_, ch. xv. \u00a7 23.\n\n   63 It is characteristic of the Kantian doctrine to absolutise the\n      conception of Duty and make it express the essence of the whole\n      ethical idea.\n\n   64 Which are still, as the Socialist Fourier says, states of social\n      incoherence, specially favourable to falsehood.\n\n_   65 Rechtsphilosophie_, \u00a7 4.\n\n   66 Cf. Schelling, ii. 12: \u201cThere are no _born_ sons of freedom.\u201d\n\n   67 Simmel (G.), _Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft_, i. 184.\n\n_   68 Jenseits von Gut und B\u00f6se_, p. 225.\n\n   69 Aristot. _Polit._ i. 6.\n\n   70 Plato, _Phaedo_.\n\n   71 Carus, _Psyche_, p. 1.\n\n   72 See Arist., _Anal. Post._ ii. 19 (ed. Berl. 100, a. 10).\n\n   73 Cf. _The Logic of Hegel_, notes &c., p. 421.\n\n   74 \u201cOmnia individua corpora quamvis diversis gradibus animata sunt.\u201d\n      _Eth._ ii. 13. schol.\n\n_   75 Nanna_ (1848): _Zendavesta_ (1851): _Ueber die Seelenfrage_ (1861).\n\n   76 Described by S. as the rise from mere physical _cause_ to\n      physiological _stimulus_ (Reiz), to psychical _motive_.\n\n   77 Infra, p. 12.\n\n   78 Aristot., _De Anima_, i. c. 4, 5.\n\n_   79 Wilhelm Meister\u2019s Wanderjahre_, i. 10.\n\n_   80 Wilhelm Meister\u2019s Wanderjahre_, iv. 18.\n\n   81 Works like Preyer\u2019s _Seele des Kindes_ illustrate this aspect of\n      mental evolution; its acquirement of definite and correlated\n      functions.\n\n   82 Cf. the end of Caleb Balderstone (in _The Bride of Lammermoor_):\n      \u201cWith a fidelity sometimes displayed by the canine race, but seldom\n      by human beings, he pined and died.\u201d\n\n   83 See Windischmann\u2019s letters in _Briefe von und an Hegel_.\n\n   84 Cf. _Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel_, chaps. xii-xiv.\n\n   85 Kieser\u2019s _Tellurismus_ is, according to Schopenhauer, \u201cthe fullest\n      and most thorough text-book of Animal Magnetism.\u201d\n\n   86 Cf. Fichte, _Nachgelassene Werke_, iii. 295 (_Tagebuch \u00fcber den\n      animalischen Magnetismus_, 1813), and Schopenhauer, _Der Wille in\n      der Natur_.\n\n   87 Bernheim: _La suggestion domine toute l\u2019histoire de l\u2019humanit\u00e9_.\n\n   88 An instance from an unexpected quarter, in Eckermann\u2019s conversations\n      with Goethe: \u201cIn my young days I have experienced cases enough,\n      where on lonely walks there came over me a powerful yearning for a\n      beloved girl, and I thought of her so long till she actually came to\n      meet me.\u201d (Conversation of Oct. 7, 1827.)\n\n_   89 Gleichsam in einer Vorwelt, einer diese Welt schaffenden Welt_\n      (_Nachgelassene Werke_, iii. 321).\n\n_   90 Selbst-bewusstsein_ is not self-consciousness, in the vulgar sense\n      of brooding over feelings and self: but consciousness which is\n      active and outgoing, rather than receptive and passive. It is\n      practical, as opposed to theoretical.\n\n   91 The more detailed exposition of this Phenomenology of Mind is given\n      in the book with that title: Hegel\u2019s _Werke_, ii. pp. 71-316.\n\n_   92 System der Sittlichkeit_, p. 15 (see Essay V).\n\n   93 Hegel\u2019s _Werke_, viii. 313, and cf. the passage quoted in my _Logic\n      of Hegel_, notes, pp. 384, 385.\n\n   94 Hegel\u2019s _Briefe_, i. 15.\n\n_   95 Kritik der Verfassung Deutschlands_, edited by G. Mollat (1893).\n      Parts of this were already given by Haym and Rosenkranz. The same\n      editor has also in this year published, though not quite in full,\n      Hegel\u2019s _System der Sittlichkeit_, to which reference is made in\n      what follows.\n\n   96 In which some may find a prophecy of the effects of \u201cblood and iron\u201d\n      in 1866.\n\n_   97 Die Absolute Regierung_: in the _System der Sittlichkeit_, p. 32:\n      cf. p. 55. Hegel himself compares it to Fichte\u2019s _Ephorate_.\n\n_   98 Die Absolute Regierung_, l.c. pp. 37, 38.\n\n   99 Some idea of his meaning may perhaps be gathered by comparison with\n      passages in _Wilhelm Meister\u2019s Wanderjahre_, ii. 1, 2.\n\n_  100 Kritik der Verfassung_, p. 20.\n\n  101 In some respects Bacon\u2019s attitude in the struggle between royalty\n      and parliament may be compared.\n\n  102 Just as Schopenhauer, on the contrary, always says _moralisch_\u2014never\n      _sittlich_.\n\n  103 Grey (G.), _Journals of two Expeditions of Discovery in North-West\n      and Western Australia_, ii. 220.\n\n  104 With some variation of ownership, perhaps, according to the\n      prevalence of so-called matriarchal or patriarchal households.\n\n  105 Cf. the custom in certain tribes which names the father after his\n      child: as if the son first gave his father legitimate position in\n      society.\n\n_  106 System der Sittlichkeit_, p. 8.\n\n_  107 Aufhebung_ (_positive_) as given in _absolute Sittlichkeit_.\n\n_  108 System der Sittlichkeit_, p. 15.\n\n  109 This phraseology shows the influence of Schelling, with whom he was\n      at this epoch associated. See _Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel_,\n      ch. xiv.\n\n  110 Cf. the intermediate function assigned (see above, p. clxxxiii) to\n      the priests and the aged.\n\n_  111 System der Sittlichkeit_, p. 19.\n\n  112 See _infra_, p. 156.\n\n  113 Wordsworth\u2019s _Laodamia_.\n\n  114 \u201cFor it\u2019s Tommy this, an\u2019 Tommy that, an\u2019 \u2018Chuck him out, the\n      brute!\u2019\n      But it\u2019s \u2018Saviour of \u2019is country\u2019 when the guns begin to shoot.\u201d\n\n  115 \u201cI can assure you,\u201d said Werner (the merchant), \u201cthat I never\n      reflected on the State in my life. My tolls, charges and dues I have\n      paid for no other reason than that it was established usage.\u201d\n      (_Wilh. Meisters Lehrjahre_, viii. 2.)\n\n_  116 System der Sittlichkeit_, p. 40.\n\n_  117 System der Sittlichkeit_, p. 65.\n\n_  118 Ibid._ p. 46.\n\n_  119 Nat\u00fcrliche Seele._\n\n_  120 Nat\u00fcrliche Qualit\u00e4ten._\n\n_  121 Empfindung._\n\n_  122 Die f\u00fchlende Seele._\n\n  123 Plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the\n      state of sober consciousness than many moderns, who supposed that\n      the Platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorised their\n      belief in the sublimity of the revelations of somnambulistic vision.\n      Plato says in the _Timaeus_ (p. 71), \u201cThe author of our being so\n      ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measure of\n      truth, and in the liver placed their oracle (the power of divination\n      by dreams). And herein is a proof that God has given the art of\n      divination, not to the wisdom, but, to the foolishness of man; for\n      no man when in his wits attains prophetic truth and inspiration; but\n      when he receives the inspired word, either his intelligence is\n      enthralled by sleep, or he is demented by some distemper or\n      possession (enthusiasm).\u201d Plato very correctly notes not merely the\n      bodily conditions on which such visionary knowledge depends, and the\n      possibility of the truth of the dreams, but also the inferiority of\n      them to the reasonable frame of mind.\n\n_  124 Selbstgef\u00fchl._\n\n_  125 Gewohnheit._\n\n_  126 Die wirkliche Seele._\n\n_  127 Das Bewu\u00dftsein als solches_: (a) _Das sinnliche Bewu\u00dftsein._\n\n_  128 Wahrnehmung._\n\n_  129 Der Verstand._\n\n_  130 Selbstbewu\u00dftsein._\n\n_  131 Die Begierde._\n\n_  132 Das anerkennende Selbstbewu\u00dftsein._\n\n_  133 Die Vernunft._\n\n_  134 Der Geist._\n\n_  135 Die Intelligenz._\n\n_  136 Anschauung._\n\n_  137 Vorstellung._\n\n_  138 Die Erinnerung._\n\n_  139 Die Einbildungskraft._\n\n_  140 Phantasie._\n\n_  141 Ged\u00e4chtni\u00df._\n\n_  142 Auswendiges._\n\n_  143 Inwendiges._\n\n_  144 Das Denken._\n\n_  145 Der praktische Geist._\n\n_  146 Der praktische Gef\u00fchl._\n\n_  147 Der Triebe und die Willk\u00fchr._\n\n_  148 Die Gl\u00fcckseligkeit._\n\n_  149 Der freie Geist._\n\n_  150 Gesess._\n\n_  151 Sitte._\n\n_  152 Das Recht._\n\n_  153 Moralit\u00e4t._\n\n_  154 Naturrecht._\n\n_  155 Moralit\u00e4t._\n\n_  156 Der Vorsatz._\n\n_  157 That._\n\n_  158 Handlung._\n\n_  159 Die Absicht und das Wohl._\n\n_  160 Das Gute und das B\u00f6se._\n\n_  161 Die Sittlichkeit._\n\n_  162 Die b\u00fcrgerliche Gesellschaft._\n\n_  163 Das System der Bed\u00fcrfnisse._\n\n_  164 Die Rechtspflege._\n\n_  165 Gese\u00df._\n\n_  166 Die Polizei und die Corporation._\n\n_  167 Inneres Staatsrecht._\n\n_  168 Das \u00e4u\u00dfere Staatsrecht._\n\n_  169 Die Weltgeschichte._\n\n_  170 Weltweisheit._\n\n_  171 Der absolute Geist._\n\n_  172 Die geoffenbarte Religion._\n\n  173 [The citation given by Hegel from Schlegel\u2019s translation is here\n      replaced by the version (in one or two points different) in the\n      _Sacred Books of the East_, vol. viii.]\n\n  174 In order to give a clearer impression of it, I cannot refrain from\n      quoting a few passages, which may at the same time give some\n      indication of the marvellous skill of R\u00fcckert, from whom they are\n      taken, as a translator. [For R\u00fcckert\u2019s verses a version is here\n      substituted in which I have been kindly helped by Miss May Kendall.]\n\n      III.\n\n      I saw but One through all heaven\u2019s starry spaces gleaming:\n      I saw but One in all sea billows wildly streaming.\n      I looked into the heart, a waste of worlds, a sea,\u2014\n      I saw a thousand dreams,\u2014yet One amid all dreaming.\n      And earth, air, water, fire, when thy decree is given,\n      Are molten into One: against thee none hath striven.\n      There is no living heart but beats unfailingly\n      In the one song of praise to thee, from earth and heaven.\n\n      V.\n\n      As one ray of thy light appears the noonday sun,\n      But yet thy light and mine eternally are one.\n      As dust beneath thy feet the heaven that rolls on high:\n      Yet only one, and one for ever, thou and I.\n      The dust may turn to heaven, and heaven to dust decay;\n      Yet art thou one with me, and shalt be one for aye.\n      How may the words of life that fill heaven\u2019s utmost part\n      Rest in the narrow casket of one poor human heart?\n      How can the sun\u2019s own rays, a fairer gleam to fling,\n      Hide in a lowly husk, the jewel\u2019s covering?\n      How may the rose-grove all its glorious bloom unfold,\n      Drinking in mire and slime, and feeding on the mould?\n      How can the darksome shell that sips the salt sea stream\n      Fashion a shining pearl, the sunlight\u2019s joyous beam?\n      Oh, heart! should warm winds fan thee, should\u2019st thou floods\n      endure,\n      One element are wind and flood; but be thou pure.\n\n      IX.\n\n      I\u2019ll tell thee how from out the dust God moulded man,\u2014\n      Because the breath of Love He breathed into his clay:\n      I\u2019ll tell thee why the spheres their whirling paths began,\u2014\n      They mirror to God\u2019s throne Love\u2019s glory day by day:\n      I\u2019ll tell thee why the morning winds blow o\u2019er the grove,\u2014\n      It is to bid Love\u2019s roses bloom abundantly:\n      I\u2019ll tell thee why the night broods deep the earth above,\u2014\n      Love\u2019s bridal tent to deck with sacred canopy:\n      All riddles of the earth dost thou desire to prove?\u2014\n      To every earthly riddle is Love alone the key.\n\n      XV.\n\n      Life shrinks from Death in woe and fear,\n      Though Death ends well Life\u2019s bitter need:\n      So shrinks the heart when Love draws near,\n      As though \u2019twere Death in very deed:\n      For wheresoever Love finds room,\n      There Self, the sullen tyrant, dies.\n      So let him perish in the gloom,\u2014\n      Thou to the dawn of freedom rise.\n\n      In this poetry, which soars over all that is external and sensuous,\n      who would recognise the prosaic ideas current about so-called\n      pantheism\u2014ideas which let the divine sink to the external and the\n      sensuous? The copious extracts which Tholuck, in his work _Anthology\n      from the Eastern Mystics_, gives us from the poems of Jelaleddin and\n      others, are made from the very point of view now under discussion.\n      In his Introduction, Herr Tholuck proves how profoundly his soul has\n      caught the note of mysticism; and there, too, he points out the\n      characteristic traits of its oriental phase, in distinction from\n      that of the West and Christendom. With all their divergence,\n      however, they have in common the mystical character. The conjunction\n      of Mysticism with so-called Pantheism, as he says (p. 53), implies\n      that inward quickening of soul and spirit which inevitably tends to\n      annihilate that external _Everything_, which Pantheism is usually\n      held to adore. But beyond that, Herr Tholuck leaves matters standing\n      at the usual indistinct conception of Pantheism; a profounder\n      discussion of it would have had, for the author\u2019s emotional\n      Christianity, no direct interest; but we see that personally he is\n      carried away by remarkable enthusiasm for a mysticism which, in the\n      ordinary phrase, entirely deserves the epithet Pantheistic. Where,\n      however, he tries philosophising (p. 12), he does not get beyond the\n      standpoint of the \u201crationalist\u201d metaphysic with its uncritical\n      categories.","title":"Hegel's Philosophy of Mind","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":116467}