{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_39653/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_39653","id":"gutenberg_39653","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/39653","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Economics","Category: History - Other","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Historical materialism","Marxian economics"],"text":"Produced by Adrian Mastronardi and the Online Distributed\nProofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was\nproduced from images generously made available by The\nInternet Archive/Canadian Libraries)\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n    +-----------------------------------------------------------+\n    | Transcriber's Note:                                       |\n    |                                                           |\n    | Inconsistent hyphenation and spelling in the original     |\n    | document have been preserved. Superscripts are            |\n    | represented like so: 1^a and Greek words +like so+        |\n    |                                                           |\n    | Obvious typographical errors have been corrected. For     |\n    | a complete list, please see the end of this document.     |\n    |                                                           |\n    +-----------------------------------------------------------+\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n\n\nHISTORICAL MATERIALISM\n\n\n\n\n  HISTORICAL MATERIALISM\n\n  AND THE\n\n  ECONOMICS OF KARL MARX\n\n  BY BENEDETTO CROCE\n\n\n  TRANSLATED BY C.M. MEREDITH\n  WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY A.D. LINDSAY\n  _Fellow and Lecturer of Balliol College, Oxford_\n\n\n  [Illustration]\n\n\n  LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD.\n  RUSKIN HOUSE, MUSEUM STREET, W.C.\n  NEW YORK        THE MACMILLAN CO.\n\n\n\n\n  _First published by Howard Latimer Ltd._          _1914_\n  _Transferred to George Allen & Unwin Ltd._        _1915_\n\n  [ALL RIGHTS RESERVED]\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n  INTRODUCTION                                                 ix\n\n\n  CHAPTER I\n\n  CONCERNING THE SCIENTIFIC FORM OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM\n\n  1. Scope of essay: Labriola's book implies that historical\n  materialism is not a philosophy of history: Distinction\n  between a philosophy of history and philosophising about\n  history: Reason why two have been confused: Materialistic\n  theory of History as stated by Labriola not an attempt to\n  establish a law of history: This contrasted with theories\n  of monists, and teleologists: Engels' statement that it is\n  a new method erroneous: New content not new method            2\n\n  2. Historical materialism a mass of new data of which\n  historian becomes conscious: Does not state that history\n  is nothing more than economic history, nor does it provide\n  a theory of history: Is simply investigation of influence\n  economic needs have exercised in history: This view does\n  not detract from its importance                              12\n\n  3. Questions as to relations between historical\n  materialism and socialism; Only possible connection lies\n  in special historical application: Bearing of historical\n  materialism upon intellectual and moral truth: Throws\n  light on influence of material conditions on their\n  development, but does not demonstrate their relativity:\n  Absolute morality a necessary postulate of socialism         21\n\n\n  CHAPTER II\n\n  CONCERNING HISTORICAL MATERIALISM VIEWED AS A SCIENCE OF\n  SOCIAL ECONOMICS\n\n  1. Relation between Professor Stammler's book on\n  historical materialism and Marxism: Distinction between\n  pure economics and general historical economics: Socialism\n  not dependent on abstract sociological theory: Stammler's\n  classification of the social sciences: His definition of\n  society: Of social economics: Of social teleology: Nature\n  of Stammler's social science does not provide abstract\n  sociology: Social economics must be either pure economics\n  applied to society or a form of history                      25\n\n\n  CHAPTER III\n\n  CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION AND CRITICISM OF SOME\n  CONCEPTS OF MARXISM\n\n  I. OF THE SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM IN MARX'S 'DAS KAPITAL'\n\n  _Das Kapital_ an abstract investigation: His society is\n  not this or that society: Treats only of capitalist\n  society: Assumption of equivalence between value and\n  labour: Varying views about meaning of this law: Is a\n  postulate or standard of comparison: Question as to value\n  of this standard: Is not a moral ideal: Treats of economic\n  society in so far as is a working society: Shows special\n  way in which problem is solved in capitalist society:\n  Marx's deductions from it                                    48\n\n  II. MARX'S PROBLEM AND PURE ECONOMICS (GENERAL ECONOMIC\n  SCIENCE)\n\n  Marxian economics not general economic science and\n  labour-value not a general concept of value: Engels'\n  rejection of general economic law: abstract concepts used\n  by Marx are concepts of pure economics: relation of\n  economic psychology to pure economics: pure economics does\n  not destroy history or progress                              66\n\n  III. CONCERNING THE LIMITATION OF THE MATERIALISTIC THEORY\n  OF HISTORY\n\n  Historical materialism a canon of historical\n  interpretation: Canon does not imply anticipation of\n  results: Question as to how Marx and Engels understood it:\n  Difficulty of ascertaining correctly and method of doing\n  so: How Marxians understand it: Their metaphysical\n  tendency: Instances of confusion of concepts in their\n  writings: Historical materialism has not a special\n  philosophy immanent within it                                77\n\n  IV. OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE IN FACE OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS\n\n  Socialism and free trade not scientific deductions:\n  Obsolete metaphysics of old theory of free trade: Basis of\n  modern free trade theories not strictly scientific though\n  only possible one: The desirable is not science nor the\n  practicable: Scientific law only applicable under certain\n  conditions: Element of daring in all action                  93\n\n  V. OF ETHICAL JUDGMENT IN FACE OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS\n\n  Meaning of Marx's phrase the 'impotence of morality' and\n  his remark that morality condemns what has been condemned\n  by history: Profundity of Marx's philosophy immaterial:\n  Kant's position not surpassed                               106\n\n  VI. CONCLUSION\n\n  Recapitulation: 1. Justification of Marxian economics as\n  comparative sociological economics: 2. Historical\n  materialism simply a canon of historical interpretation:\n  3. Marxian social programme not a pure science: 4. Marxism\n  neither intrinsically moral nor anti-moral                  115\n\n\n  CHAPTER IV\n\n  RECENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MARXIAN THEORY OF VALUE\n  AND CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING THEM\n\n  I\n\n  Labriola's criticism of method and conclusions of\n  preceeding essays answered: His criticism merely\n  destructive: Tendency of other thinkers to arrive at like\n  conclusions                                                 120\n\n  II\n\n  Meaning of phrase crisis in Marxianism: Sorel's view of\n  equivalence of value and labour mostly in agreement with\n  view put forward above: An attempt to examine profits\n  independently of theory of value: Is not possible: Surplus\n  product same as surplus value                               131\n\n\n  CHAPTER V\n\n  A CRITICISM OF THE MARXIAN LAW OF THE FALL IN THE RATE OF\n  PROFITS\n\n  Interpretation here given assumes acceptance of Marx's\n  main principles: Necessary decline in rate of profit on\n  hypothesis of technical improvement: Two successive stages\n  confused by Marx: More accurately a decline in amount of\n  profit: Marx assumes that would be an increase of capital:\n  Would be same capital and increase in rate of profits:\n  Decline in rate of profits due to other reasons             142\n\n\n  CHAPTER VI\n\n  ON THE ECONOMIC PRINCIPLE\n\n  TWO LETTERS TO PROFESSOR V. PARETO\n\n  I\n\n  Need for more comprehensive definition of the economic\n  principle: Reasons why the mechanical conception\n  erroneous, economic fact capable of appraisement: Cannot\n  be scale of values for particular action: Economic datum a\n  fact of human activity: Distinction and connection between\n  pleasure and choice: Economic datum a fact of will:\n  Knowledge a necessary presupposition of will: Distinction\n  between technical and economic: Analogy of logic and\n  \u00e6sthetic: Complete definition of economic datum             159\n\n  II\n\n  Disagreement (1) about method (2) postulates: (1) Nothing\n  arbitrary in economic method, analogy of classificatory\n  sciences erroneous: (2) Metaphysical postulate that facts\n  of human activity same as physical facts erroneous:\n  Definition of practical activity in so far as admits of\n  definition: Moral and economic activity and approval:\n  Economic and moral remorse: Economic scale of values        174\n\n  INDEX OF NAMES                                     187\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nThe Essays in this volume, as will be apparent, have all of them had\nan occasional origin. They bear evident traces of particular\ncontroversy and contain much criticism of authors who are hardly, if\nat all, known in this country. Their author thought it worth while to\ncollect them in one volume and it has been, I am sure, worth while to\nhave them translated into English, because though written on different\noccasions and in different controversies they have all the same\npurpose. They are an attempt to make clear by philosophical criticism\nthe real purpose and value of Marx's work.\n\nIt is often said that it is the business of philosophy to examine and\ncriticise the assumptions of the sciences and philosophy claims that\nin this work it is not an unnecessary meddler stepping in where it is\nnot wanted. For time and again for want of philosophical criticism the\nsciences have overstepped their bounds and produced confusion and\ncontradiction. The distinction between the proper spheres of science\nand history and moral judgment is not the work of either science or\nhistory or moral judgment but can only be accomplished by\nphilosophical reflection, and the philosopher will justify his work,\nif he can show the various contending parties that his distinctions\nwill disentangle the puzzles into which they have fallen and help them\nto understand one another.\n\nThe present state of the controversy about the value of the writings\nof Karl Marx obviously calls for some such work of disentangling. No\nhonest student can deny that his work has been of great historic\nimportance and it is hard to believe that a book like _Das Kapital_\nwhich has been the inspiration of a great movement can be nothing but\na tissue of false reasoning as some of its critics have affirmed. The\ndoctrine of the economic interpretation of history has revivified and\ninfluenced almost all modern historical research. In a great part of\nhis analysis of the nature and natural development of a capitalist\nsociety Marx has shown himself a prophet of extraordinary insight. The\nmore debatable doctrine of the class war has at least shown the\nsterility of the earlier political theory which thought only in terms\nof the individual and his state. The wonderful vitality of the Marxian\ntheory of labour value in spite of all the apparent refutations it has\nsuffered at the hands of orthodox political economists is an insoluble\npuzzle if it had no more in it than the obvious fallacy which these\nrefutations expose. Only a great book could become 'the Bible of the\nworking classes.'\n\nBut the process of becoming a Bible is a fatal process. No one can\nread much current Marxian literature or discuss politics or economics\nwith those who style themselves orthodox Marxians without coming to\nthe conclusion that the spirit of ecclesiastical dogmatism daily\ngrowing weaker in its own home has been transplanted into the religion\nof revolutionary socialism. Many of those whose eyes have been opened\nto the truth as expounded by Marx seem to have been thereby granted\nthat faith which is the faculty of believing what we should otherwise\nknow to be untrue, and with them the economic interpretation of\nhistory is transformed into a metaphysical dogma of deterministic\nmaterialism. The philosopher naturally finds a stumbling-block in a\ndoctrine which is proclaimed but not argued. The historian however\ngrateful he may be for the light which economic interpretation has\ngiven him, is up in arms against a theory which denies the\nindividuality and uniqueness of history and reduces it to an automatic\nrepetition of abstract formul\u00e6. The politician when he is told of the\nuniversal nature of the class war points triumphantly to the fact that\nit is a war which those who should be the chief combatants are slow to\nrecognise or we should not find the working classes more ready to vote\nfor a Liberal or a Conservative than for a Socialist. The Socialist\nmust on consideration become impatient with a doctrine that by its\nfatalistic determinism makes all effort unnecessary. If Socialism must\ncome inevitably by the automatic working out of economic law, why all\nthis striving to bring it about? The answer that political efforts can\nmake no difference, but may bring about the revolution sooner, is too\ntransparently inadequate a solution of the difficulty to deceive\nanyone for long. Lastly the economist can hardly tolerate a theory of\nvalue that seems to ignore entirely the law of supply and demand, and\nconcludes with some justice that either the theory of labour value is\nnonsense or that Marx was talking about something quite apart in its\nnature from the value which economics discusses. All these objections\nare continually being made to Marxianism, and are met by no adequate\nanswer. And just as the sceptical lecturer of the street corner argues\nthat a religion which can make men believe in the story of Balaam's\nass must be as nonsensical as that story, so with as little justice\nthe academic critic or the anti-socialist politician concludes that\nSocialism or at least Marxianism is a tissue of nonsensical statements\nif these ridiculous dogmas are its fruit.\n\nA disentangler of true and false in so-called Marxianism is obviously\nneeded, and Senatore Croce is eminently fitted for the work. Much of\nthe difficulty of Marx comes from his relation to Hegel. He was\ngreatly influenced by and yet had reacted from Hegel's philosophy\nwithout making clear to others or possibly to himself what his final\nposition in regard to Hegel really was. Senatore Croce is a Hegelian,\nbut a critical one. His chief criticism of Hegel is that his\nphilosophy tends to obscure the individuality and uniqueness of\nhistory, and Croce seeks to avoid that obscurity by distinguishing\nclearly the methods of history, of science and of philosophy. He holds\nthat all science deals with abstractions, with what he has elsewhere\ncalled pseudo-concepts. These abstractions have no real existence, and\nit is fatal to confuse the system of abstraction which science builds\nup with the concrete living reality. 'All scientific laws are abstract\nlaws,' as he says in one of these essays, (III p. 57), 'and there is\nno bridge over which to pass from the concrete to the abstract; just\nbecause the abstract is not a reality but a form of thought, one of\nour, so to speak, abbreviated ways of thinking. And although a\nknowledge of the laws may _light up_ our perception of reality, it\ncannot become that perception itself.'\n\nThe application to the doctrine of historic materialism is obvious. It\ncalls attention to one of the factors of the historical process, the\neconomic. This factor it quite rightly treats in abstraction and\nisolation. A knowledge of the laws of economic forces so obtained may\n'light up our perception' of the real historical process, but only\ndarkness and confusion can result from mistaking the abstraction for\nreality and from the production of those _a priori_ histories of the\nstages of civilisation or the development of the family which have\ndiscredited Marxianism in the eyes of historians. In the first essay\nand the third part of the third Croce explains this distinction\nbetween economic science and history and their proper relation to one\nanother. The second essay reinforces the distinction by criticism of\nanother attempt to construct a science which shall take the place of\nhistory. A science in the strict sense history is not and never can\nbe.\n\nOnce this is clearly understood it is possible to appreciate the\nservices rendered to history by Marx. For Croce holds that economics\nis a real science. The economic factors in history can be isolated and\ntreated by themselves. Without such isolated treatment they cannot be\nunderstood, and if they are not understood, our view of history is\nbound to be unnecessarily narrow and onesided. _On the relative\nimportance_ of the economic and the political and the religious\nfactors in history he has nothing to say. There is no _a priori_\nanswer to the question whether any school of writers has unduly\ndiminished or exaggerated the importance of any one of these factors.\nTheir importance has varied at different times, and can at any time\nonly be estimated empirically. It remains a service of great value to\nhave distinguished a factor of such importance which had been\npreviously neglected.\n\nIf then the economic factor in history should be isolated and treated\nseparately, how is it to be distinguished? For it is essential to\nCroce's view of science that each science has its own concepts which\ncan be distinguished clearly from those of other sciences. This\nquestion is discussed in Essay III Q. 5 and more specifically in Essay\nVI. Croce is specially anxious to distinguish between the spheres of\neconomics and ethics. Much confusion has been caused in political\neconomy in the past by the assumption that economics takes for granted\nthat men behave egoistically, _i.e._ in an immoral way. As a result of\nthis assumption men have had to choose between the condemnation of\neconomics or of mankind. The believer in humanity has been full of\ndenunciation of that monstrosity the economic man, while the\nthorough-going believer in economics has assumed that the success of\nthe economic interpretation of history proves that men are always\nselfish. The only alternative view seemed to be the rather cynical\ncompromise that though men were sometimes unselfish, their actions\nwere so prevailingly selfish that for political purposes the unselfish\nactions might be ignored. Croce insists, and surely with justice, that\neconomic actions are not moral or immoral, but in so far as they are\neconomic, nonmoral. The moral worth of actions cannot be determined by\ntheir success or failure in giving men satisfaction. For there are\nsome things in which men find satisfaction which they yet judge to be\nbad. We must distinguish therefore the moral question whether such and\nsuch an action is good or bad from the economic whether it is or is\nnot useful, whether it is a way by which men get what they, rightly\nor wrongly want. In economics then we are merely discussing the\nefficiency or utility of actions. We can ask of any action whether it\nought or ought not to be done at all. That is a moral question. We may\nalso ask whether it is done competently or efficiently: that is an\neconomic question. It might be contended that it is immoral to keep a\npublic house, but it would also have to be allowed that the discussion\nof the most efficient way by keeping a public house was outside the\nscope of the moral enquiry. Mrs Weir of Hermiston was confusing\neconomics with ethics when she answered Lord Braxfield's complaints of\nhis ill-cooked dinner by saying that the cook was a very pious woman.\nEconomic action according to Croce is the condition of moral action.\nIf action has no economic value, it is merely aimless, but it may have\neconomic value without being moral, and the consideration of economic\nvalue must therefore be independent of ethics.\n\nMarx, Croce holds was an economist and not a moralist, and the moral\njudgments of socialists are not and cannot be derived from any\nscientific examination of economic processes.\n\nSo much for criticisms of Marx or rather of exaggerated developments\nof Marxianism, which though just and important, are comparatively\nobvious. The most interesting part of Signor Croce's criticism is his\ninterpretation of the shibboleth of orthodox Marxians and the\nstumbling-block of economists, the Marxian theory of labour value\nwith its corollary of surplus value. Marx's exposition of the doctrine\nin _Das Kapital_ is the extreme of abstract reasoning. Yet it is found\nin a book full of concrete descriptions of the evils of the factory\nsystem and of moral denunciation and satire. If Marx's theory be taken\nas an account of what determines the actual value of concrete things\nit is obviously untrue. The very use of the term surplus value is\nsufficient to show that it might be and sometimes is taken to be the\nvalue which commodities ought to have, but none can read Marx's\narguments and think that he was concerned with a value which should\nbut did not exist. He is clearly engaged on a scientific not a Utopian\nquestion.\n\nCroce attempts to find a solution by pointing out that the society\nwhich Marx is describing is not this or that actual society, but an\nideal, in the sense of a hypothetical society, capitalist society as\nsuch. Marx has much to say of the development of capitalism in\nEngland, but he is not primarily concerned to give an industrial\nhistory of England or of any other existing society. He is a scientist\nand deals with abstractions or types and considers England only in so\nfar as in it the characteristics of the abstract capitalist society\nare manifested. The capitalism which he is analysing does not exist\nbecause no society is completely capitalist. Further it is to be\nnoticed that in his analysis of value Marx is dealing with objects\nonly in so far as they are commodities produced by labour. This is\nevident enough in his argument. The basis of his contention that all\nvalue is 'congealed labour time' is that all things which have\neconomic value have in common only the fact that labour has been\nexpended on them, and yet afterwards he admits that there are things\nin which no labour has been expended which yet have economic value. He\nseems to regard this as an incidental unimportant fact. Yet obviously\nit is a contradiction which vitiates his whole argument. If all things\nwhich have economic value have not had labour expended on them, we\nmust look elsewhere for their common characteristic. We should\nprobably say that they all have in common the fact that they are\ndesired and that there is not an unlimited supply of them. The pure\neconomist finds the key to this analysis of value in the consideration\nof the laws of supply and demand, which alone affect all things that\nhave economic value, and finds little difficulty in refuting Marx's\ntheory, on the basis which his investigation assumes.\n\nA consideration of Marx's own argument forces us therefore to the\nconclusion that either Marx was an incapable bungler or that he\nthought the fact that some things have economic value and are yet not\nthe product of labour irrelevant to his argument because he was\ntalking of economic value in two senses, firstly in the sense of\nprice, and secondly in a peculiar sense of his own. This indeed is\nborne out by his distinction of value and price. Croce developing this\nhint, suggests that the importance of Marx's theory lies in a\ncomparison between a capitalist society and another abstract economic\nsociety in which there are no commodities on which labour is not\nexpended, and no monopoly. We thus have two abstract societies, the\ncapitalist society which though abstract is very largely actualised in\nmodern civilisation, and another quite imaginary economic society of\nunfettered competition, which is continually assumed by the classical\neconomist, but which, as Marx said, could only exist where there was\nno private property in capital, _i.e._ in the collectivist state.\n\nNow in a society of that kind in which there was no monopoly and\ncapital was at everyone's disposal equally, the value of commodities\nwould represent the value of the labour put into them, and that value\nmight be represented in units of socially necessary labour time. It\nwould still have to be admitted that an hour of one man's labour might\nbe of much greater value to the community than two hours of another\nman, but that Marx has already allowed for. The unit of socially\nnecessary labour time is an abstraction, and the hour of one man might\ncontain two or any number of such abstract units of labour time. What\nMarx has done is to take the individualist economist at his word: he\nhas accepted the notion of an economic society as a number of\ncompeting individuals. Only he has insisted that they shall start fair\nand therefore that they shall have nothing to buy or sell but their\nlabour. The discrepancy between the values which would exist in such\na society and actual prices represent the disturbance created by the\nfact that actual society is not a society of equal competitors, but\none in which certain competitors start with some kind of advantage or\nmonopoly.\n\nIf this is really the kernel of Marx's doctrine, it bears a close\nrelation to a simpler and more familiar contention, that in a society\nwhere free economic competition holds sway, each man gets what he\ndeserves, for his income represents the sum that society is prepared\nto pay for his services, the social value of his work. In this form\nthe hours worked are supposed to be uniform, and the differences in\nvalue are taken to represent different amounts of social service. In\nMarx's argument the social necessity is taken as uniform, and the\ndifference in value taken to represent differences in hours of work.\nWhile the main abstract contention remains the same, most of those who\nargue that in a system of unfettered economic competition most men get\nwhat they deserve, rather readily ignore the existence of monopoly,\nand assume that this argument justifies the existing distribution of\nwealth. The chief purpose of Marx's argument is to emphasise the\ndifference between such an economic system and a capitalist society.\nHe is here, as so often, turning the logic of the classical economists\nagainst themselves, and arguing that the conditions under which a\npurely economic distribution of wealth could take place, could only\nexist in a community where monopoly had been completely abolished and\nall capital collectivised.\n\nCroce maintains that Marx's theory of value is economic and not moral.\nYet it is hard to read Marx and certainly Marxians without finding in\nthem the implication that the values produced in such an economic\nsociety would be just. If that implication be examined, we come on an\nimportant difficulty still remaining in this theory. The contention\nthat in a system of unfettered economic competition, men get the\nreward they deserve, assumes that it is just that if one man has a\ngreater power of serving society than another he should be more highly\nrewarded for his work. This the individualist argument with which we\ncompared Marx's assumes without question. But the Marxian theory of\nvalue is frequently interpreted to imply that amount of work is the\nonly claim to reward. For differences in value it is held are created\nby differences in the amount of labour. But the word amount may here\nbe used in two senses. When men say that the amount of work a man does\n_should_ determine a man's reward; they commonly mean that if one man\nworks two hours and another one, the first ought to get twice the\nreward of the second. 'Amount' here means the actual time spent in\nlabour. But in Marx's theory of value amount means something quite\ndifferent, for an hour of one man's work may, he admits, be equal to\ntwo of another man's. He means by amount a sum of abstract labour time\nunits. Marx's scientific theory of value is quite consistent with\ndifferent abilities getting different rewards, the moral contention\nthat men should get more reward if they work more and for no other\nreason is not. The equation of work done by men of different abilities\nby expressing them in abstract labour time units is essential to\nMarx's theory but fatal to the moral claim sometimes founded upon it.\n\nFurther the great difficulty in allowing that it is just that men of\ndifferent abilities should have different rewards, comes from the fact\nthat differences of ability are of the nature of monopolies. In a pure\neconomic society high rewards would be given to rare ability and\nalthough it is possible to equate work of rare ability with work of\nordinary ability by expressing both as amounts of abstract labour time\nunits, it surely remains true that the value is determined not by the\namount of abstract labour time congealed in it but by the law of\nsupply and demand. Where there are differences of ability there is\nsome kind of monopoly, and where there is monopoly, you cannot\neliminate the influence of the relation of supply and demand in the\ndetermination of value. What you imagine you have eliminated by the\nelimination of capital, which you can collectivise, remains\nobstinately in individual differences of ability which cannot be\ncollectivised.\n\nBut here I have entered beyond the limits of Croce's argument. His\ncritical appraisement of Marx's work must be left to others to judge\nwho have more knowledge of Marx and of economics than I can lay claim\nto. I am confident only that all students of Marx whether they be\ndisciples or critics, will find in these essays illumination in a\nfield where much bitter controversy has resulted in little but\nconfusion and obscurity.\n\n                                                   A.D. LINDSAY.\n\n\n\n\n_CHAPTER I._ CONCERNING THE SCIENTIFIC FORM OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM\n\n\nHistorical materialism is what is called a fashionable subject. The\ntheory came into being fifty years ago, and for a time remained\nobscure and limited; but during the last six or seven years it has\nrapidly attained great fame and an extensive literature, which is\ndaily increasing, has grown up around it. It is not my intention to\nwrite once again the account, already given many times, of the origin\nof this doctrine; nor to restate and criticise the now well-known\npassages in which Marx and Engels asserted the theory, nor the\ndifferent views of its opponents, its supporters, its exponents, and\nits correctors and corruptors. My object is merely to submit to my\ncolleagues some few remarks concerning the doctrine, taking it in the\nform in which it appears in a recent book by Professor Antonio\nLabriola, of the University of Rome[1].\n\nFor many reasons, it does not come within my province to praise\nLabriola's book. But I cannot help saying as a needful explanation,\nthat it appears to me to be the fullest and most adequate treatment of\nthe question. The book is free from pedantry and learned tattle,\nwhilst it shows in every line signs of the author's complete knowledge\nof all that has been written on the subject: a book, in short, which\nsaves the annoyance of controversy with erroneous and exaggerated\nopinions, which in it appear as superseded. It has a grand opportunity\nin Italy, where the materialistic theory of history is known almost\nsolely in the spurious form bestowed on it by an ingenious professor\nof economics, who even pretends to be its inventor[2].\n\n\nI\n\n    _1. Scope of essay: Labriola's book implies that historical\n        materialism is not a philosophy of history: Distinction\n        between a philosophy of history and philosophising about\n        history: Reason why two have been confused: Materialistic\n        theory of history as stated by Labriola not an attempt to\n        establish a law of history: This contrasted with theories\n        of monists, and teleologists: Engels' statement that it\n        is a new method erroneous: New content not new method._\n\nAny reader of Labriola's book who tries to obtain from it a precise\nconcept of the new theory of history, will reach in the first instance\na conclusion which must appear to him evident and incontestable, and\nwhich I sum up in the following statement: 'historical materialism,\nso-called, _is not a philosophy of history_.' Labriola does not state\nthis denial explicitly; it may even be granted that, in words, he\nsometimes says exactly the opposite.[3] But, if I am not mistaken, the\ndenial is contained implicitly in the restrictions which he places on\nthe meaning of the theory.\n\nThe philosophical reaction of realism overthrew the systems built up\nby teleology and metaphysical dogmatism, which had limited the field\nof the historian. The old philosophy of history was destroyed. And, as\nif in contempt and depreciation, the phrase, 'to construct a\nphilosophy of history,' came to be used with the meaning: 'to\nconstruct a fanciful and artificial and perhaps prejudiced history.'\n\nIt is true that of late books have begun to re-appear actually having\nas their title the 'philosophy of history.' This might seem to be a\nrevival, but it is not. In fact their subject is a very different one.\nThese recent productions do not aim at supplying a _new philosophy of\nhistory_, they simply offer _some philosophising about history_. The\ndistinction deserves to be explained.\n\nThe possibility of a philosophy of history presupposes the possibility\nof reducing the sequence of history to general concepts. Now, whilst\nit is possible to reduce to general concepts the particular factors of\nreality which appear in history and hence to construct a philosophy\nof morality or of law, of science or of art, and a general philosophy,\nit is not possible to work up into general concepts the single complex\nwhole formed by these factors, _i.e._ the _concrete fact_, in which\nthe historical sequence consists. To divide it into its factors is to\ndestroy it, to annihilate it. In its complex totality, historical\nchange is incapable of reduction except to one concept, that of\n_development_: a concept empty of everything that forms the peculiar\ncontent of history. The old philosophy of history regarded a\nconceptual working out of history as possible; either because by\nintroducing the idea of God or of Providence, it read into the facts\nthe aims of a divine intelligence; or because it treated the formal\nconcept of development as including within itself, logically, the\ncontingent determinations. The case of positivism is strange in that,\nbeing neither so boldly imaginative as to yield to the conceptions of\nteleology and rational philosophy, nor so strictly realistic and\nintellectually disciplined as to attack the error at its roots, it has\nhalted halfway, _i.e._ at the actual concept of development and of\nevolution, and has announced the philosophy of evolution as the true\nphilosophy of history: development itself--as the law which explains\ndevelopment! Were this tautology only in question little harm would\nresult; but the misfortune is that, by a too easy confusion, the\nconcept of evolution often emerges, in the hands of the positivists,\nfrom the formal emptiness which belongs to it in truth, and acquires\na meaning or rather a pretended meaning, very like the meanings of\nteleology and metaphysics. The almost religious unction and reverence\nwith which one hears the sacred mystery of _evolution_ spoken of gives\nsufficient proof of this.\n\nFrom such realistic standpoints, now as always, any and every\nphilosophy of history has been criticised. But the very reservations\nand criticisms of the old mistaken constructions demand a discussion\nof concepts, that is a process of philosophising: although it may be a\nphilosophising which leads properly to the denial of a philosophy of\nhistory. Disputes about method, arising out of the needs of the\nhistorian, are added. The works published in recent years embody\ndifferent investigations of this kind, and in a plainly realistic\nsense, under the title of _philosophy of history_. Amongst these I\nwill mention as an example a German pamphlet by Simmel, and, amongst\nourselves a compendious introduction by Labriola himself. There are,\nundoubtedly, still philosophies of history which continue to be\nproduced in the old way: voices _clamantium in deserto_, to whom may\nbe granted the consolation of believing themselves the only apostles\nof an unrecognised truth.\n\nNow the materialistic theory of history, in the form in which Labriola\nstates it, involves an entire abandonment of all attempt to establish\na law of history, to discover a general concept under which all the\ncomplex facts of history can be included.\n\nI say 'in the form in which he states it,' because Labriola is aware\nthat several sections of the materialistic school of history tend to\napproximate to these obsolete ideas.\n\nOne of these sections, which might be called that of the _monists_, or\n_abstract materialists_, is characterised by the introduction of\nmetaphysical materialism into the conception of history.\n\nAs the reader knows, Marx, when discussing the relation between his\nopinions and Hegelianism employed a pointed phrase which has been\ntaken too often beside the point. He said that with Hegel history was\nstanding on its head and that it must be turned right side up again in\norder to replace it on its feet. For Hegel the idea is the real world,\nwhereas for him (Marx) 'the ideal is nothing else than the material\nworld' reflected and translated by the human mind. Hence the statement\nso often repeated, that the materialistic view of history is the\nnegation or antithesis of the idealistic view. It would perhaps be\nconvenient to study once again, accurately and critically, these\nasserted relations between scientific socialism and Hegelianism. To\nstate the opinion which I have formed on the matter; the link between\nthe two views seems to me to be, in the main, simply _psychological_.\nHegelianism was the _early inspiration_ of the youthful Marx, and it\nis natural that everyone should link up the new ideas with the old as\na development, an amendment, an antithesis. In fact, Hegel's\n_Ideas_--and Marx knew this perfectly well--are not human _ideas_,\nand to turn the Hegelian philosophy of history upside down cannot give\nus the statement that ideas arise as reflections of material\nconditions. The inverted form would logically be this: history is not\na process of the _Idea_, _i.e._ of a rational reality, but a system of\nforces: to the rational view is opposed the dynamic view. As to the\nHegelian dialectic of concepts it seems to me to bear a purely\nexternal and approximate resemblance to the historical notion of\neconomic eras and of the antithetical conditions of society. Whatever\nmay be the value of this suggestion, which I express with hesitation,\nrecognising the difficulty of the problems connected with the\ninterpretation and origin of history;--this much is evident, that\nmetaphysical materialism, at which Marx and Engels, starting from the\nextreme Hegelian left, easily arrived, supplied the name and some of\nthe components of their view of history. But both the name and these\ncomponents are really extraneous to the true character of their\nconception. This can be neither materialistic nor spiritualistic, nor\ndualistic nor monadistic: within its limited field the elements of\nthings are not presented in such a way as to admit of a philosophical\ndiscussion whether they are reducible one to another, and are united\nin one ultimate source. What we have before us are concrete objects,\nthe earth, natural production, animals; we have before us man, in whom\nthe so-called psychical processes appear as differentiated from the\nso-called physiological processes. To talk in this case of monism and\nmaterialism is to talk nonsense. Some socialist writers have expressed\nsurprise because Lange, in his classic _History of Materialism_, does\nnot discuss historical materialism. It is needless to remark that\nLange was familiar with Marxian socialism. He was, however, too\ncautious to confuse the metaphysical materialism with which he was\nconcerned, with historical materialism which has no essential\nconnection with it, and is merely a _way of speaking_.\n\nBut the metaphysical materialism of the authors of the new historical\ndoctrine, and the name given to the latter, have been not a little\nmisleading. I will refer as an example to a recent and bad little\nbook, which seems to me symptomatic, by a sufficiently accredited\nsocialist writer, Plechanow.[4] The author, designing to study\nhistorical materialism, thinks it needful to go back to Holbach and\nHelvetius. And he waxes indignant at metaphysical dualism and\npluralism, declaring that 'the most important philosophical systems\nwere always _monistic_, that is they interpreted matter and spirit as\nmerely two classes of phenomena having a single and indivisible\ncause.' And in reference to those who maintain the distinction between\nthe factors in history, he exclaims: 'We see here the old story,\nalways recurring, of the struggle between eclecticism and monism, the\nstory of the dividing walls; here nature, there spirit, etc.' Many\nwill be amazed at this unexpected leap from the materialistic study\nof history into the arms of monism, in which they were unaware that\nthey ought to have such confidence.\n\nLabriola is most careful to avoid this confusion: 'Society is a\ndatum,' he says, 'history is nothing more than the history of\nsociety.' And he controverts with equal energy and success the\n_naturalists_, who wish to reduce the history of man to the history of\nnature, and the _verbalists_, who claim to deduce from the name\nmaterialism the real nature of the new view of history. But it must\nappear, even to him, that the name might have been more happily\nchosen, and that the confusion lies, so to speak, inherent in it. It\nis true that old words can be bent to new meanings, but within limits\nand after due consideration.\n\nIn regard to the tendency to reconstruct a materialistic philosophy of\nhistory, substituting an omnipresent Matter for an omnipresent Idea,\nit suffices to re-assert the impossibility of any such construction,\nwhich must become merely superfluous and tautologous unless it\nabandoned itself to dogmatism. But there is another error, which is\nremarked among the followers of the materialistic school of history,\nand which is connected with the former, viz., to anticipate harm not\nonly in the interpretation of history but also in the guidance of\npractical activities. I refer to the teleological tendencies (abstract\nteleology), which also Labriola opposes with a cutting attack. The\nvery idea of _progress_, which has seemed to many the only law of\nhistory worth saving out of the many devised by philosophical and\nnon-philosophical thinkers, is by him deprived of the dignity of a\nlaw, and reduced to a sufficiently narrow significance. The idea of\nit, says Labriola, is 'not only empirical, but always incidental and\nhence limited': progress 'does not influence the sequence of human\naffairs like destiny or fate, nor like the command of a law.' History\nteaches us that man is capable of progress; and we can look at all the\ndifferent series of events from this point of view: that is all. No\nless incidental and empirical is the idea of _historical necessity_,\nwhich must be freed from all remnants of rationalism and of\ntranscendentalism, so that we see in it the mere recognition of the\nvery small share left in the sequence of events, to individuals and\npersonal free will.\n\nIt must be admitted that a little of the blame for the teleological\nand fatalistic misunderstandings fall on Marx himself. Marx, as he\nonce had to explain, liked to 'coquette' with the Hegelian\nterminology: a dangerous weapon, with which it would have been better\nnot to trifle. Hence it is now thought necessary to give to several of\nhis statements a somewhat broad interpretation in agreement with the\ngeneral trend of his theories.[5] Another excuse lies in the impetuous\nconfidence which, as in the case of any practical work, accompanies\nthe practical activities of socialism, and engenders beliefs and\nexpectations which do not always agree with prudent critical and\nscientific thought. It is strange to see how the positivists, newly\nconverted to socialism, exceed all the others (see the effect of a\ngood school!) in their teleological beliefs, and their facile\npredeterminations. They swallow again what is worst in Hegelianism,\nwhich they once so violently opposed without recognising it. Labriola\nhas finely said that the very forecasts of socialism are merely\n_morphological_ in nature; and, in fact, neither Marx nor Engels would\never have asserted in the abstract that communism must come about by\nan unavoidable necessity, in the manner in which they foresaw it. If\nhistory is always accidental, why in this western Europe of ours,\nmight not a new barbarism arise owing to the effect of incalculable\ncircumstances? Why should not the coming of communism be either\nrendered superfluous or hastened by some of those technical\ndiscoveries, which, as Marx himself has proved, have hitherto produced\nthe greatest revolutions in the course of history?\n\nI think then that better homage would be rendered to the materialistic\nview of history, not by calling it the _final and definite philosophy\nof history_ but rather by declaring that properly speaking _it is not\na philosophy of history_. This intrinsic nature which is evident to\nthose who understand it properly, explains the difficulty which exists\nin finding for it a satisfactory theoretical statement; and why to\nLabriola it appears to be only in its beginnings and yet to need much\ndevelopment. It explains too why Engels said (and Labriola accepts the\nremark), that it is nothing more than a new _method_; which means a\ndenial that it is a new _theory_. But is it indeed a new method? I\nmust acknowledge that this name _method_ does not seem to me\naltogether accurate. When the philosophical idealists tried to arrive\nat the facts of history by inference, this was truly a new method; and\nthere may still exist some fossil of those blessed times, who makes\nsuch attempts at history. But the historians of the materialistic\nschool employ the same intellectual weapons and follow the same paths\nas, let us say, the philological historians. They only introduce into\ntheir work some new _data_, some new _experiences_. The content is\ndifferent, not the nature of the method.\n\n\nII\n\n    _2. Historical materialism a mass of new data of which\n        historian becomes conscious: Does not state that history\n        is nothing more than economic history, nor does it\n        provide a theory of history: Is simply investigation of\n        influence economic needs have exercised in history: This\n        view does not detract from its importance._\n\nI have now reached the point which for me is fundamental. Historical\nmaterialism is not and cannot be a new philosophy of history or a new\nmethod; but it is properly this; a _mass of new data_, _of new\nexperiences_, of which the historian becomes conscious.\n\nIt is hardly necessary to mention the overthrow a short time ago of\nthe na\u00efve opinion of the ordinary man regarding the objectivity of\nhistory; almost as though events spoke, and the historian was there to\nhear and to record their statements. Anyone who sets out to write\nhistory has before him documents and narratives, _i.e._ small\nfragments and traces of what has actually happened. In order to\nattempt to reconstruct the complete process, he must fall back on a\nseries of assumptions, which are in fact the ideas and information\nwhich he possesses concerning the affairs of nature, of man, of\nsociety. The pieces needed to complete the whole, of which he has only\nthe fragments before him, he must find within himself. His worth and\nskill as a historian is shown by the accuracy of his adaptation.\nWhence it clearly follows that the enrichment of these views and\nexperiences is essential to progress in historical narration.\n\nWhat are these points of view and experiences which are offered by the\nmaterialistic theory of history?\n\nThat section of Labriola's book which discusses this appears to me\nexcellent and sufficient. Labriola points out how historical narration\nin the course of its development, might have arrived at the theory of\n_historical factors_; _i.e._, the notion that the sequence of history\nis the result of a number of forces, known as physical conditions,\nsocial organisations, political institutions, personal influences.\nHistorical materialism goes beyond, to investigate the interaction of\nthese factors; or rather it studies them all together as parts of a\nsingle process. According to this theory--as is now well known, and as\nMarx expressed it in a classical passage--the foundations of history\nare the methods of production, _i.e._ the economic conditions which\ngive rise to class distinctions, to the constitution of rank and of\nlaw, and to those beliefs which make up social and moral customs and\nsentiments, the reflection whereof is found in art, science and\nreligion.\n\nTo understand this point of view accurately is not easy, and it is\nmisunderstood by all those who, rather than take it in the concrete,\nstate it absolutely after the manner of an absolute philosophical\ntruth. The theory cannot be maintained in the abstract without\ndestroying it, _i.e._ without turning it into the _theory of the\nfactors_, which is according to my view, the final word in abstract\nanalysis.[6] Some have supposed that historical materialism asserts\nthat history is nothing more than economic history, and all the rest\nis simply a mask, an appearance without reality. And then they labour\nto discover the true god of history, whether it be the productive tool\nor the earth, using arguments which call to mind the proverbial\ndiscussion about the egg and the hen. Friedrich Engels was attacked by\nsomeone who applied to him to ask how the influence of such and such\nother historical factors ought to be understood in reference to the\neconomic factor. In the numerous letters which he wrote in reply, and\nwhich now, since his death, are coming out in the reviews, he let it\nbe understood that, when together with Marx, upon the prompting of the\nfacts, he conceived this new view of history, he had not meant to\nstate an exact theory. In one of these letters he apologises for\nwhatever exaggeration he and Marx may have put into the controversial\nstatements of their ideas, and begs that attention may be paid to the\npractical applications made of them rather than to the theoretical\nexpressions employed. It would be a fine thing, he exclaims, if a\nformula could be given for the interpretation of all the facts of\nhistory! By applying this formula, it would be as easy to understand\nany period of history as to solve a simple equation.[7]\n\nLabriola grants that the supposed reduction of history to the economic\nfactor is a ridiculous notion, which may have occurred to one of the\ntoo hasty defenders of the theory, or to one of its no less hasty\nopponents.[8] He acknowledges the complexity of history, how the\nproducts of the first degree first establish themselves, and then\nisolate themselves and become independent; the ideals which harden\ninto traditions, the persistent survivals, the elasticity of the\npsychical mechanism which makes the individual irreducible to a type\nof his class or social position, the unconsciousness and ignorance of\ntheir own situations often observed in men, the stupidity and\nunintelligibility of the beliefs and superstitions arising out of\nunusual accidents and complexities. And since man lives a natural as\nwell as a social existence, he admits the influence of race, of\ntemperament and of the promptings of nature. And, finally, he does not\noverlook the influence of the individual, _i.e._ of the work of those\nwho are called _great men_, who if they are not the creators, are\ncertainly collaborators of history.\n\nWith all these concessions he realises, if I am not mistaken, that it\nis useless to look for a theory, in any strict sense of the word, in\nhistorical materialism; and even that it is not what can properly be\ncalled a _theory_ at all. He confirms us in this view by his fine\naccount of its origin, under the stimulus of the French Revolution,\nthat great school of sociology--as he calls it. The materialistic\nview of history arose out of the need to account for a definite\nsocial phenomenon, not from an abstract inquiry into the factors of\nhistorical life. It was created in the minds of politicians and\nrevolutionists, not of cold and calculating _savants_ of the library.\n\nAt this stage someone will say:--But if the theory, in the strict\nsense, is not true, wherein then lies the discovery? In what does the\nnovelty consist? To speak in this way is to betray a belief that\nintellectual progress consists solely in the perfecting of the forms\nand abstract categories of thought.\n\nHave approximate observations no value in addition to theories? The\nknowledge of what has usually happened, everything in short that is\ncalled experience of life, and which can be expressed in general but\nnot in strictly accurate terms? Granting this limitation and\nunderstanding always an _almost_ and an _about_, there are discoveries\nto be made which are fruitful in the interpretation of life and of\nhistory. Such are the assertions of the dependence of all parts of\nlife upon each other, and of their origin in the economic subsoil, so\nthat it can be said that there is but one single history; the\ndiscovery of the true nature of the State (as it appears in the\nempirical world), regarded as an institution for the defence of the\nruling class; the proved dependence of ideals upon class interests;\nthe coincidence of the great epochs of history with the great economic\neras; and the many other observations by which the school of\nhistorical materialism is enriched. Always with the aforesaid\nlimitations, it may be said with Engels: 'that men make their history\nthemselves, but within a given limited range, on a basis of conditions\nactually pre-existent, amongst which the economic conditions, although\nthey may be influenced by the others, the political and ideal, are\nyet, in the final analysis, decisive, and form the red thread which\nruns through the whole of history and guides us to an understanding\nthereof.\n\nFrom this point of view too, I entirely agree with Labriola in\nregarding as somewhat strange the inquiries made concerning the\nsupposed forerunners and remote authors of historical materialism, and\nas quite mistaken the inferences that these inquiries will detract\nfrom the importance and originality of the theory. The Italian\nprofessor of economics to whom I referred at the beginning, when\nconvicted of a plagiarism, thought to defend himself by saying that,\nat bottom, Marx's idea was not peculiar to Marx; hence, at worst, he\nhad robbed a thief. He gave a list of forerunners, reaching back as\nfar as Aristotle. Just lately, another Italian professor reproved a\ncolleague with much less justice for having forgotten that the\neconomic interpretation had been explained by Lorenzo Stein before\nMarx, I could multiply such examples. All this reminds me of one of\nJean Paul Richter's sayings: that we hoard our thoughts as a miser\ndoes his money; and only slowly do we exchange the money for\npossessions, and thoughts for experiences and feelings. Mental\nobservations attain real importance through the realisation in thought\nand an insight into the fulness of their possibilities. This\nrealisation and insight have been granted to the modern socialist\nmovement and to its intellectual leaders Marx and Engels. We may read\neven in Thomas More that the State is a conspiracy of the rich who\nmake plots for their own convenience: _quaedam conspiratio divitum, de\nsuis commodis reipublicae nomine tituloque tractantium_, and call\ntheir intrigues laws: _machinamenta jam leges fiunt_.[9] And, leaving\nSir Thomas More--who, after all, it will be said, was a communist--who\ndoes not know by heart Marzoni's lines: _Un' odiosa Forza il mondo\npossiede e fa nomarsi Dritto_....[10] But the materialist and\nsocialist interpretation of the State is not therefore any the less\nnew. The common proverb, indeed, tells us that interest is the most\npowerful motive for human actions and conceals itself under the most\nvaried forms; but it is none the less true that the student of history\nwho has previously examined the teachings of socialist criticism, is\nlike a short-sighted man who has provided himself with a good pair of\nspectacles: he sees quite differently and many mysterious shadows\nreveal their exact shape.\n\nIn regard to historical narrative then, the materialistic view of\nhistory resolves itself into a warning to keep its observations in\nmind as a new aid to the understanding of history. Few problems are\nharder than that which the historian has to solve. In one particular\nit resembles the problem of the statesman, and consists in\n_understanding the conditions of a given nation at a given time in\nrespect to their causes and functioning_; but with this difference:\nthe historian confines himself to exposition, the statesman proceeds\nfurther to modification; the former pays no penalty for\nmisunderstanding, whereas the latter is subjected to the severe\ncorrection of facts. Confronted by such a problem, the majority of\nhistorians--I refer in particular to the conditions of the study in\nItaly--proceed at a disadvantage, almost like the savants of the old\nschool who constructed philology and researched into etymology. Aids\nto a closer and deeper understanding, have come at length from\ndifferent sides, and frequently. But the one which is now offered by\nthe materialistic view of history is great, and suited to the\nimportance of the modern socialist movement. It is true that the\nhistorian must render exact and definite in each particular instance,\nthat co-ordination and subordination of factors which is indicated by\nhistorical materialism, in general, for the greater number of cases,\nand approximately; herein lies his task and his difficulties, which\nmay sometimes be insurmountable. But now the road has been pointed\nout, along which the solution must be sought, of some of the greatest\nproblems of history apart from those which have been already\nelucidated.\n\nI will say nothing of the recent attempts at an historical application\nof the materialistic conception, because it is not a subject to hurry\nover in passing, and I intend to deal with it on another occasion. I\nwill content myself with echoing Labriola, who gives a warning against\na mistake, common to many of these attempts. This consists in\nretranslating, as he says, into economic phraseology, the old\nhistorical perspective which of late has so often been translated into\nDarwinian phraseology. Certainly it would not be worth while to create\na new movement in historical studies in order to attain such a result.\n\n\nIII\n\n    _3. Questions as to relation between historical materialism\n        and socialism: Only possible connection lies in special\n        historical application: Bearing of historical materialism\n        upon intellectual and moral truth: Throws light on\n        influence of material conditions on their development,\n        but does not demonstrate their relativity: Absolute\n        morality a necessary postulate of socialism._\n\nTwo things seem to me to deserve some further explanation. What is the\nrelation between historical materialism and socialism? Labriola, if I\nam not mistaken, is inclined to connect closely and almost to identify\nthe two things. The whole of socialism lies in the materialistic\ninterpretation of history, which is the truth itself of socialism; to\naccept one and reject the other is to understand neither. I consider\nthis statement to be somewhat exaggerated, or, at least, to need\nexplanation. If historical materialism is stripped of every survival\nof finality and of the benignities of providence, it can afford no\napology for either socialism or any other practical guidance for life.\nOn the other hand, in its special historical application, _in the\nassertion which can be made by its means_, its real and close\nconnection with socialism is to be found. This assertion is as\nfollows:--Society is now so constituted that socialism is the only\npossible solution which it contains within itself. An assertion and\nforecast of this kind moreover will need to be filled out before it\ncan be a basis for practical action. It must be completed by motives\nof interest, or by ethical and sentimental motives, moral judgments\nand the enthusiasms of faith. The assertion in itself is cold and\npowerless. It will be insufficient to move the cynic, the sceptic, the\npessimist. But it will suffice to put on their guard all those classes\nof society who see their ruin in the sequence of history and to pledge\nthem to a long struggle, although the final outcome may be useless.\nAmongst these classes is the proletariat, which indeed aims at the\nextinction of its class. Moral conviction and the force of sentiment\nmust be added to give positive guidance and to supply an imperative\nideal for those who neither feel the blind impulse of class interest,\nnor allow themselves to be swept along by the whirling current of the\ntimes.\n\nThe final point which I think demands explanation, although in this\ncase also the difference between myself and Labriola does not appear\nto be serious, is this: to what conclusions does historical\nmaterialism lead in regard to the ideal values of man, in regard that\nis to intellectual truth and to what is called moral truth?\n\nThe history of the origin of intellectual truth is undoubtedly made\nclearer by historical materialism, which aims at showing the influence\nof actual material conditions upon the opening out, and the very\ndevelopment of the human intellect. Thus the history of opinions, like\nthat of science, needs to be for the most part re-written from this\npoint of view. But those who, on account of such considerations\nconcerning historical origins, return in triumph to the old relativity\nand scepticism, are confusing two quite distinct classes of problem.\nGeometry owes its origin no doubt to given conditions which are worth\ndetermining; but it does not follow that geometrical truth is\nsomething merely historical and relative. The warning seems\nsuperfluous, but even here misunderstandings are frequent and\nremarkable. Have I not read in some socialist author that Marx's\n_discoveries_ themselves are of merely historical _importance_ and\nmust necessarily be _disowned_. I do not know what meaning this can\nhave unless it has the very trivial one of a recognition of the\nlimitation of all human work, or unless it resolves itself into the no\nless idle remark that Marx's thought is the offspring of his age. This\nonesided history is still more dangerous in reference to moral truth.\nThe science of morality is evidently now in a transformation stage.\nThe ethical imperative, whose classics are Kant's _Kritik der reinen\nVernunft_, and Herbart's _Allgemeine praktische Philosophie_, appears\nno longer adequate. In addition to it an historical and a formal\nscience of morality are making their appearance, which regard morality\nas a fact, and study its universal nature apart from all\npreoccupations as to creeds and rules. This tendency shows itself not\nonly in socialistic circles, but also elsewhere, and it will be\nsufficient for me to refer to Simmel's clever writings. Labriola is\nthus justified in his defence of new methods of regarding morality.\n'Ethics,--he says,--for us resolves itself into an historical study of\nthe subjective and objective conditions according to which morality\ndevelops or finds hindrances to its development.' But he adds\ncautiously, 'in this way alone, _i.e._, within these limits, is there\nvalue in the statement that morality corresponds to the social\nsituation, _i.e._, _in the final analysis_ to the economic\nconditions,' The question of the intrinsic and absolute worth of the\nmoral ideal, of its reducibility or irreducibility to intellectual\ntruth, remains untouched.\n\nIt would perhaps have been well if Labriola had dwelt a little more on\nthis point. A strong tendency is found in socialistic literature\ntowards a moral relativity, not indeed historical, but substantial,\nwhich regards morality as a vain imagination. This tendency is chiefly\ndue to the necessity in which Marx and Engels found themselves, in\nface of the various types of Utopians, of asserting that the so-called\nsocial question is not a moral question,--_i.e._ as this must be\ninterpreted, it cannot be solved by sermons and so-called moral\nmethods--and to their bitter criticism of class ideals and\nhypocrisies.[11] This result was helped on, as it seems to me, by the\nHegelian source of the views of Marx and Engels; it being obvious that\nin the Hegelian philosophy ethics loses the rigidity given to it by\nKant and preserved by Herbart. And lastly the name _materialism_ is\nperhaps not without influence here, since it brings to mind at once\nwell-understood interests and the calculating comparison of pleasures.\nIt is, however, evident that idealism or absolute morality is a\nnecessary postulate of socialism. Is not the interest which prompts\nthe formation of a concept of _surplus-value_ a moral interest, or\nsocial if it is preferred? Can surplus value be spoken of in pure\neconomics? Does not the labourer sell his labour-power for exactly\nwhat it is worth, given his position in existing society? And, without\nthe moral postulate, how could we ever explain Marx's political\nactivity, and that note of violent indignation and bitter satire which\nis felt in every page of _Das Kapital_? But enough of this, for I find\nmyself making quite elementary statements such as can only be\noverlooked owing to ambiguous or exaggerated phraseology.\n\nAnd in conclusion, I repeat my regret, already expressed, concerning\nthis name _materialism_, which is not justified in this case, gives\nrise to numerous misunderstandings, and is a cause of derision to\nopponents. So far as history is concerned, I would gladly keep to the\nname _realistic view of history_, which denotes the opposition to all\nteleology and metaphysics within the sphere of history, and combines\nboth the contribution made by socialism to historical knowledge and\nthose contributions which may subsequently be brought from elsewhere.\nHence my friend Labriola ought not to attach too much importance, in\nhis serious thoughts, to the adjectives _final and definite_, which\nhave slipped from his pen. Did he not once tell me himself that Engels\nstill hoped for other discoveries which might help us to understand\nthat mystery, made by ourselves, and which is _History_?\n\n_May, 1896._\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] _Del materialismo storico, dilucidazione preliminare_, Rome, E.\nLoescher, 1896. See the earlier work by the same author: _In memoria\ndel 'Manifesto dei communisti,'_ 2nd ed. Rome, E. Loescher, 1895.\n\n[2] I refer to the works of Professor Achille Loria.\n\n[3] He calls it on one occasion: 'the final and definite philosophy of\nhistory.'\n\n[4] _Beitr\u00e4ge zur Geschichte des Materialismus_, Stuttgart, 1896.\n\n[5] See, for example, the comments upon some of Marx's statements, in\nthe article _Progr\u00e8s et d\u00e9veloppement_ in the _Devenir Social_ for\nMarch, 1896.\n\n[6] For this reason I do not, like Labriola, call the theory of the\nfactors a _half-theory_; nor do I like the comparison with the ancient\ndoctrine, now abandoned in physics, physiology and psychology, of\nphysical forces, vital forces and mental faculties.\n\n[7] See a letter dated 21st September 1890, published in the Berlin\nreview, _Der Socialistische Akademiker_, No 19, 1st October 1895.\nAnother, dated 25th January 1894, is printed in No 20, 16th October,\nof the same review.\n\n[8] He even distinguishes between the _economic interpretation_ and\nthe _materialistic view of history_. By the first term he means 'those\nattempts at analysis, which taking separately on the one hand the\neconomic forms and categories, and on the other for example, law,\nlegislation, politics, custom, proceed to study the mutual influences\nof the different sides of life, thus abstractly and subjectively\ndistinguished.' By the second, on the contrary, 'the organic view of\nhistory' of the 'totality and unity of social life,' where economics\nitself 'is melted into the tide of a process, to appear afterwards in\nso many morphological stages, in each of which it forms the basis\nrelatively to the rest which corresponds to and agrees with it.'\n\n[9] _Utopia_, L. ii (THOM\u00c6 MORI angli _Opera_, Louvain 1566, _f._ 18.)\n\n[10] 'Hateful Force rules the world and calls itself Justice.'\n\n[11] From this point of view it is worth while to note the antipathy\nwhich leaks out in socialist writings towards Schiller, the poet of\nthe Kantian morality \u00e6sthetically modified, who has become the\nfavourite poet of the German middle classes.\n\n\n\n\n_CHAPTER II._ CONCERNING HISTORICAL MATERIALISM VIEWED AS A SCIENCE OF\nSOCIAL ECONOMICS\n\n    _1. Relation between Professor Stammler's book on historical\n        materialism and Marxism: Distinction between pure\n        economics and general historical economics: Socialism not\n        dependent on abstract sociological theory: Stammler's\n        classification of the social sciences: His definition of\n        society: Of social economics: Of social teleology: Nature\n        of Stammler's social science does not provide abstract\n        sociology: Social economics must be either pure economics\n        applied to society or a form of history._\n\n\nThe attentive reader of Professor Stammler's book,[12] realises at the\noutset that it treats of the materialistic theory of history not as a\nfruitful guide to the interpretation of historical fact, but as a\n_science_ or _philosophy of society_.\n\nA number of attempts have been made, based in the first instance on\nMarx's statements, to build up on these statements a general theory of\nhistory or of society. It is on these attempts then, and not on the\nleast bold amongst them, that Stammler bases his work, making them the\nstarting point of his criticism and reconstruction. It may be\nprecisely on this account that he chooses to discuss historical\nmaterialism in the form given to it by Engels,--which he calls the\nmost complete, the _authentic_(!) statement of the principles of\nsocial materialism. He prefers this form to that of Marx, which he\nthinks too disconnected; and which is, indeed, less easily reduced to\nabstract generalities; whereas Engels was one of the first to give to\nhistorical materialism a meaning more important than its original one.\nTo Engels, also, as is well known, is due the very name _materialism_\nas applied to this view of history.\n\nWe cannot, indeed, deny that the materialistic view of history has in\nfact developed in two directions, distinct _in kind_ if not _in\npractice_, viz.: (1) _a movement relating to the writing of history_,\nand (2) _a science_ and _philosophy of society_. Hence there is no\nground for objecting to Stammler's procedure, when he confines himself\nto this second problem, and takes it up at the point to which he\nthinks that the followers of historical materialism have brought it.\nBut it should be clearly pointed out that he does not concern himself\nat all with the problems of historical method. He leaves out of\naccount that is, what, for some people--and for me amongst them--is\nthe side of this movement of thought which is of living and scientific\ninterest.\n\nProfessor Stammler remarks how in the propositions employed by the\nbelievers in historical materialism: '_the economic factor dominates\nthe other factors of social life_,' '_the economic factor is\nfundamental and the others are dependent_,' and the like, the concept\neconomic has never been defined. He is justified in making this\nremark, and in attaching the greatest importance to it, if he regards\nand interprets those propositions as assertions of _laws_, as strict\npropositions of social science. To use as essential in statements of\nthis kind, a concept which could neither be defined nor explained, and\nwhich therefore remained a mere word, would indeed be somewhat odd.\nBut his remark is entirely irrelevant when these propositions are\nunderstood as: 'summaries of empirical observations, by the help of\nwhich concrete social facts may be explained.' I do not think that any\nsensible person has ever expected to find in those expressions an\naccurate and philosophical definition of concepts; yet all sensible\npeople readily understand to what class of facts they refer. The word\n_economic_ here, as in ordinary language, corresponds, not to a\nconcept, but to a _group_ of rather diverse representations, some of\nwhich are not even qualitative in content, but quantitative. When it\nis asserted, that in interpreting history we must look chiefly at the\n_economic factors_, we think at once of technical conditions, of the\ndistribution of wealth, of classes and sub-classes bound together by\ndefinite common interests, and so on. It is true these different\nrepresentations cannot be reduced to a single concept, but no matter,\nthere is no question of that: here we are in an entirely different\n_sphere_ from that in which abstract questions are discussed.\n\nThis point is not without interest and may be explained more in\ndetail. If _economic_ be understood in its strict sense, for example,\nin the sense in which it is employed in pure economics, _i.e._, if by\nit be meant the axiom according to which all men seek the greatest\nsatisfaction with the least possible effort, it is plain that to say\nthat this _factor_ plays a part (essential, dominant, or equal to that\nof the others) in social life, would tell us nothing concrete. The\neconomic axiom is a very general and purely a formal principle of\nconduct. It is inconceivable that anyone should act without applying,\nwell or ill, the very principle of every action, _i.e._, the economic\nprinciple. Worse still it _economic_ be taken in the sense which, as\nwe shall see, Professor Stammler gives to it. He understands by this\nword: 'all concrete social facts'; in which sense it would at once\nbecome absurd to assert that the economic factor, _i.e._, _all social\nfacts in the concrete_ dominated, a part of these facts! Thus in order\nto give a meaning to the word _economic_ in this proposition, it is\nnecessary to leave the abstract and formal; to assign definite ends to\nhuman action; to have in mind an 'historical man,' or rather the\naverage man of history, or of a longer or shorter period of history;\nto think, for example, of the need for _bread_, for _clothes_, for\n_sexual relations_, for the so-called _moral satisfactions_, esteem,\nvanity, power and so on. The phrase _economic factor_ now refers to\ngroups of concrete facts, which are built up in common speech, and\nwhich have been better defined from the actual application made of the\nabove-mentioned propositions in historical narrative and in the\npractical programmes of Marx and his followers.\n\nIn the main, this is recognised by Professor Stammler himself when he\ngives an admirable explanation of the current meaning of the\nexpressions: _economic facts_ and _political facts_, revolutions _more\npolitical than economic_ and vice versa. Such distinctions, he says,\ncan only be understood in the concrete, in reference to the aims\npursued by the different sections of society, and to the special\nproblems of social life. According to him, however, Marx's work does\nnot deal with such _trifling matters_: as, for instance, that\nso-called economic life influences ideas, science, art and so on: old\nlumber of little consequence. Just as philosophical materialism does\nnot consist in the assertion that bodily facts have an influence over\nspiritual, but rather in the making of these latter a mere appearance,\nwithout reality, of the former: so historical materialism must consist\nin asserting that economics is the true _reality_ and that law is a\nfallacious _appearance_.\n\nBut, with all deference to Professor Stammler, we believe that these\n_trifling matters_, to which he contemptuously refers, are precisely\nwhat are dealt with in Marx's propositions; and, moreover, we think\nthem neither so trifling nor of such little consequence. Hence\nProfessor Stammler's book does not appear to us a criticism of the\nmost vital part of historical materialism, viz., of a movement or\nschool of historians. The criticism of history is made by history; and\nhistorical materialism is history made or _in the making_.\n\nNor does it provide the starting point for a criticism of _socialism_,\nas the programme of a definite social movement. Stammler deceives\nhimself when he thinks that socialism is based on the materialistic\nphilosophy of history as he expounds it: on which philosophy are\nbased, on the contrary, the illusions and caprices of some or of many\nsocialists. Socialism cannot depend on an abstract sociological\ntheory, since the basis would be inadequate precisely because it was\nabstract; nor can it depend on a philosophy of history as rhythmical\nor of little stability, because the basis would be transitory. On the\ncontrary, it is a complex fact and results from different elements;\nand, so far as concerns history, socialism does not presuppose a\n_philosophy of history_, but _an historical conception determined by\nthe existing conditions of society and the manner in which this has\ncome about_. If we put on one side the doctrines superimposed\nsubsequently, and read again Marx's pages without prejudice, we shall\nthen see that he had, at bottom, no other meaning when he referred to\nhistory as one of the factors justifying socialism.\n\n'The necessity for the socialisation of the means of production is not\nproved scientifically.' Stammler means that the concept of _necessity_\nas employed by many Marxians, is erroneous; that the denial of\nteleology is absurd, and that hence the assertion of the socialisation\nof the means of production as the social programme is not logically\naccounted for. This does not hinder this assertion from being possibly\nquite true. Either because, in addition to logical demonstrations\nthere are fortunate intuitions, or because a conclusion can be true\nalthough derived from a false premiss: it suffices, obviously, that\nthere should be two errors which cancel one another. And this would be\nso in our case. The denial of teleology; the tacit acceptance of this\nsame teleology: here is a method scientifically incorrect with a\nconclusion that may be valid. It remains to examine the whole tissue\nof experiences, deductions, aspirations and forecasts in which\nsocialism really consists; and over which Stammler passes\nindifferently, content to have brought to light an error in the\nphilosophical statement of a remote postulate, an error which some, or\nit may be many, of the supporters and politicians of socialism commit.\n\nAll these reservations are needed in order to fix the scope of\nStammler's investigation; but it would be a mistake to infer from them\nthat we reject the starting point of the inquiry itself. Historical\nmaterialism--says Professor Stammler--has proved unable to give us a\nvalid _science of society_: we, however, believe that this was not its\nmain or original object. The two statements come practically to the\nsame thing: the science of society is not contained in the literature\nof the materialistic theory. Professor Stammler adds that although\nhistorical materialism does not offer an acceptable social theory, it\nnevertheless gives a _stimulus of the utmost intensity_ towards the\nformation of such a theory. This seems to us a matter of merely\nindividual psychology: suggestions and stimuli, as everyone knows,\ndiffer according to the mind that receives them. The literature of\nhistorical materialism has always aroused in us a desire to study\nhistory in the concrete, _i.e._, to reconstruct the actual historical\nprocess. In Professor Stammler, on the contrary, it arouses a desire\nto throw aside this meagre empirical history, and to work with\nabstractions in order to establish concepts and general points of\nview. The problems which he sets before himself, might be arrived at\npsychologically by many other paths.\n\nThere is a tendency, at present, to enlarge unduly the boundaries of\nsocial studies. But Stammler rightly claims a definite and special\nsubject for what ought to be called _social science_; that is\n_definite social data_. Social science must include nothing which has\nnot _sociability_ as its determining cause. How can ethics ever be\nsocial science, since it is based on cases of conscience which evade\nall social rules? _Custom_ is the social fact, not _morality_. How can\n_pure economics_ or _technology_ ever be social science, since those\nconcepts are equally applicable to the isolated individual and to\nsocieties? Thus in studying _social data_ we shall see that,\nconsidered in general, they give rise to two distinct theories. The\nfirst theory regards the concept _society_ from the _causal_\nstandpoint; the second regards it from the _teleological_ standpoint.\nCausality and teleology cannot be substituted the one for the other;\nbut one forms the complement of the other.\n\nIf, then, we pass from the general and abstract to the concrete, we\nhave society as existing in history. The study of the facts which\ndevelop in concrete society Stammler consigns to a science which he\ncalls _social (or political, or national) economics_. From such facts\nmay still be abstracted the mere form, _i.e._, the collection of rules\nsupplied by history by which they are governed; and this may be\nstudied independently of the matter. Thus we get _jurisprudence_, or\nthe technical science of law; which is always bound up inseparably\nwith a given actual historical material, which it works up by\nscientific method, endeavouring to give it unity and coherence.\nFinally, amongst social studies are also included those investigations\nwhich aim at judging and determining whether a given social order is\nas it ought to be; and whether attempts to preserve or change it are\nobjectively justified. This section may be called that of practical\nsocial problems. By such definitions and divisions Professor Stammler\nexhausts every possible form of social study. Thus we should have the\nfollowing scheme:\n\n                 { General Study      { Causal.\n                 {  of Society.       { Teleological.\n                 {                    { of the form\n                 {                    {   (technical science\n                 {                    {   of law).\n                 {                    {\nSOCIAL SCIENCE.  {                    {\n                 { Study of Concrete  { of the matter\n                 { Society.           {   (social economics).\n                 {                    { of the possible,\n                 {                    {   (practical problems).\n\nWe believe that this table correctly represents his views, although\ngiven in our own way, and in words somewhat different from those used\nby him. A new treatment of the social sciences, the work of serious\nand keen ability, such as Stammler seems to possess, cannot fail to\nreceive the earnest attention of all students of a subject which is\nstill so vague and controversial. Let us examine it then section by\nsection.\n\nThe first investigation relating to society, that concerned with\ncausality, would be directed to solving the problem of the _nature_ of\nsociety. Many definitions have been given of this up to the present:\nand none of them can be said to be generally accepted, or even to\nclaim wide support. Stammler indeed, rejects, after criticism, the\ndefinitions of Spencer or R\u00fcmelin, which appear to him to be the most\nimportant and to be representative of all the others. Society is not\nan _organism_ (Spencer), nor is it merely something opposed to\n_legalised society_ (R\u00fcmelin): Society, says Stammler, is '_life lived\nby men in common, subject to rules which are externally binding_.'\nThese rules must be understood in a very wide sense, as all those\nwhich bind men living together to something which is satisfied by\noutward performance. They are divided, however, into two large\nclasses: rules properly speaking _legal_, and rules of _convention_.\nThe second class includes the precepts of propriety and of custom, the\ncode of knightly honour, and so on. The distinctive test lies in the\nfact that the latter class are merely _hypothetical_, while the\nformer are imposed without being desired by those subjected to them.\nThe whole assemblage of rules, legal and conventional, Stammler calls\nsocial _form_. Under these rules, obeying them, limiting them and even\nbreaking them men act in order to satisfy their desires; in this, and\nin this alone, human life consists. The assemblage of concrete facts\nwhich men produce when working together in society, _i.e._, under the\nassumption of social rules, Stammler calls _social matter_, or _social\neconomics_. Rules, and actions under rules; these are the two elements\nof which every social datum consists. If the rules were lacking, we\nshould be outside society; we should be animals or gods, as says the\nold proverb: if the actions were lacking there would remain only an\nempty form, built up hypothetically by thought, and no portion of\nwhich was actually real. Thus social life appears as a single fact: to\nseparate its two constituent factors means either to destroy it, or to\nreduce it to empty form. The law governing changes within society\ncannot be found in something which is extra social; not in technique\nand discovery, nor in the workings of supposed natural laws, nor in\nthe influence of great men, of mysterious racial and national spirit;\nbut it must be sought in the very centre of the social fact itself.\nHence it is wrong to speak of a causal bond between law and economics\nor vice versa: the relation between law and economics is that between\nthe rule and the things ruled, not one of cause and effect. The\ndetermining cause of social movements and changes is then ultimately\nto be found in the actual working out of social rules, which precede\nsuch changes. This concrete working out, these actions accomplished\nunder rules, may produce (1) social mutations which are entirely\n_quantitative_ (in the number of social facts of one or another kind);\n(2) mutations which are also _qualitative_ consisting that is in\nchanges in the rules themselves. Hence the _circle of social life_:\nrules, social facts arising under them; ideas, opinions, desires,\nefforts resulting from the facts; changes in the rules. When and how\nthis circle originated, that is to say when and how social life arose\non the earth, is a question for history, which does not concern the\ntheorist. Between social life and non-social life there are no\ngradations, theoretically there is a gulf. But as long as social life\nexists, there is no escape from the circle described above.\n\nThe form and matter of social life thus come into conflict, and from\nthis conflict arises change. By what test can the issue of the\nconflict be decided? To appeal to facts, to invent a causal necessity\nwhich may agree with some ideal necessity is absurd. In addition to\nthe law of social _causality_, which has been expounded, there must be\na law of ends and ideals, _i.e._, a _social teleology_. According to\nStammler, historical materialism identifies, nor would it be the only\ntheory to attempt such an identification, _causality_ and _teleology_;\nbut it, too, cannot escape from the logical contradictions which such\nassertions contain. Much praise has been given to that section of\nProfessor Stammler's book in which he shows how teleological\nassumptions are constantly implied by historical materialism in all\nits assertions of a practical nature. But we confess that the\ndiscovery seems to us exceedingly easy, not to be compared to that of\nColumbus about the egg. Here again we must point out that the _pivot_\nof the Marxian doctrine lies in the _practical problem_ and not in the\n_abstract theory_. The denial of finality is, at bottom, the denial of\na merely subjective and peculiar finality. And here, too, although the\ncriticism as applied to historical materialism seems to us hardly\naccurate, we agree with Stammler's conclusion, _i.e._, that it is\nnecessary to construct, or better to reconstruct, with fresh material,\na theory of social teleology.\n\nLet us omit, for the present, an examination of Stammler's\nconstruction of teleology, which includes some very fine passages\n(_e.g._ the criticism of the anarchist doctrine) and ask instead: What\nis this social science of Stammler, of which we have stated the\nstriking and characteristic features? The reader will have little\ndifficulty in discovering that the second investigation, that\nconcerning social teleology, is nothing but a modernised _philosophy\nof law_. And the first? Is it that long desired and hitherto vainly\nsought _general sociology_? Does it give us a new and acceptable\nconcept of society? To us it appears evident that the first\ninvestigation is nothing but a _formal science of law_. In it\nProfessor Stammler studies _law as a fact_, and hence he cannot find\nit except in _society subjected to rules imposed from without_. In the\nsecond, he studies law as an _ideal_ and constructs the philosophy\n(imperative) of law. We are not here questioning the _value_ of the\ninvestigation, but its _nature_. The present writer is convinced that\nsocial data leave no place for an abstract independent science.\nSociety is a _living together_; the kind of phenomena which appear in\nthis life together is the concern of descriptive history. But it is\nperfectly possible to study this life together from a given point of\nview, _e.g._, from the legal point of view, or, in general, from that\nof the legal and non-legal rules to which it can be subjected; and\nthis Stammler has done. And, in so doing, he has examined the nature\nof law, separating the concrete individual laws and the ideal type of\nlaw; which he has then studied apart. This is the reason why\nStammler's investigation seems to us a truly scientific investigation\nand very well carried out, but not an abstract and general science _of\nsociety_. Such a science is for us inconceivable, just as a formal\nscience of law is, on the contrary, perfectly conceivable.\n\nAs to the second investigation, that concerning teleology, there would\nbe some difficulty in including it in the number of sciences if it be\nadmitted that ideals are not subjects for science. But here Professor\nStammler himself comes to our assistance by assigning the foundation\nof social teleology to philosophy, which he defines as the science of\nthe True and of the Good, the science of the Absolute, and understands\nin a non-formal sense.\n\nProfessor Stammler speaks readily of a _monism_ of the social life,\nand accepts as suitable and accurate the name _materialism_ as applied\nto Marx's conception of history, and connects this _materialism_ with\nmetaphysical materialism, applying to it also Lange's statement, viz.,\nthat 'materialism may be the first and lowest step of philosophy, but\nit is also the most substantial and solid.' For him historical\nmaterialism offers truth, but not the whole truth, since it regards as\nreal the _matter_ only and not the _form_ of social life; hence the\nnecessity of completing it by restoring the _form_ to its place, and\nfixing the relation between _form_ and _matter_, combining the two in\nthe unity of _social life_. We doubt whether Engels and his followers\never understood the phrase _social materialism_ in the sense which\nStammler assigns to it. The parallel drawn between it and metaphysical\nmaterialism seems to us somewhat arbitrary.\n\nWe come to the group of concrete sciences, _i.e._, those which have\nfor their subject society as given in history. No one who has had\noccasion to consider the problem of the classification of the\nsciences, will be inclined to give the character of independent and\nautonomous sciences to studies of the practical problems of this or\nthat society, and to jurisprudence, and the technical study of law.\nThis latter is only an interpretation or explanation of a given\nexisting legal system, made either for practical reasons, or as simple\nhistorical knowledge. But what we think merits attention more than\nthese questions of terminology and classification, is the conception\nof _social economics_, advanced by Stammler; of the second, that is,\nof the concrete social sciences, enumerated above. The difficulties\narising out of this conception are more serious, and centre on the\nfollowing points; whether it is a new and valid conception, or whether\nit should be reduced to something already known; or finally whether it\nis not actually erroneous.\n\nStammler holds forth at length against economics regarded as a science\nin itself, which has its own laws and which has its source in an\noriginal and irreducible economic principle. It is a mistake, he says,\nto put forward an abstract economic science and subdivide it into\neconomic science relating to the individual and social economic\nscience. There is no ground of union between these two sciences,\nbecause the economics of the isolated individual offers us only\nconcepts which are dealt with by the natural sciences and by\ntechnology, and is nothing but an assemblage of simple natural\nobservations, explained by means of physiology and individual\npsychology. Social economics, on the other hand, offers the peculiar\nand characteristic conditions of the _externally binding rules_, under\nwhich activities develop. And what can an economic principle be if not\na hypothetical maxim: the man who wishes to secure this or that object\nof subjective satisfaction must employ these or those means, 'a maxim\nwhich is more or less generally obeyed, and sometimes violated'? The\ndilemma lies then between the natural and technological consideration\nand the social one: _there is no third thing_. '_Ein Drittes ist nicht\nda!_' This Stammler frequently reiterates, and always in the same\nwords. But the dilemma (whose unfortunate inspiration he owes to Kant)\ndoes not hold, it is a case of a trilemma. Besides the concrete social\nfacts, and besides the technological and natural knowledge, there is a\nthird thing, viz., the economic principle, or hedonistic postulate, as\nit is preferred to call it. Stammler asserts that this third thing is\nnot _equal in value_ to the two first ones, that it comes as a\n_secondary_ consideration, and we confess that we do not clearly\nunderstand what this means. What he ought to prove is that this\nprinciple _can be reduced_ to the two former ones, viz., to the\ntechnical or to the social conditions. This he has not done, and\nindeed we do not know how it could be done. That economics, thus\nunderstood, is not social science, we are so much the more inclined to\nagree since he himself says as much in calling it _pure_ economics,\n_i.e._, something built up by abstraction from particular facts and\nhence also from the social fact. But this does not mean that it is not\napplicable to society, and cannot give rise to inferences in _social\neconomics_. The social factor is then assumed as a medium through\nwhich the economic principle displays its influence and produces\ndefinite results. Granted the economic principle, and granted, for\nexample, the legal regulation of private property in land, and the\nexistence of land differing in quality, and granted other conditions,\nthen the fact of rent of land arises of necessity. In this and other\nlike examples, which could easily be brought forward, we have laws of\nsocial and political economics, _i.e._, deductions from the economic\nprinciple acting under given legal conditions. It is true that, under\nother legal conditions, the effects would be different; but none of\nthe effects would occur were it not for the economic nature of man,\nwhich is a necessary postulate, and not to be identified with the\npostulate of technical knowledge, or with any other of the social\nrules. _To know_ is not to _will_; and _to will in accordance with\nobjective rules_ is not _to will in accordance with ideals which are\nmerely subjective and individual_ (economic).\n\nStammler might say that if the science of economics thus interpreted\nis not properly a social science, he leaves it on one side, because\nhis object is to construct a science which may be fully entitled to\nthe name of _social economics_. But--let us, too, construct a\ndilemma!--this social economics, to which he aspires, will either be\njust economic science applied to definite social conditions, in the\nsense now indicated, or it will be a form of historical knowledge. No\nthird thing exists. _Ein Drittes ist nicht da!_\n\nAnd indeed, for Stammler an _economic phenomenon_ is not any single\nsocial fact whatever, but a group of homogeneous facts, which offer\nthe marks of _necessity_. The number of economic facts required to\nform the group and give rise to an economic phenomenon cannot be\ndetermined in general; but can be seen in each case. By the formation\nof these groups, he says, social economics does not degenerate into a\nregister of data concerning fact, nor does it become purely mechanical\nstatistics of material already given which it has merely to enumerate.\nSocial economics should not merely examine into the change in the\nactual working out of one and the same social order, but remains, now\nas formerly, the seat of all knowledge of actual social life. It must\nstart from the knowledge of a given social existence, both in regard\nto its form and in regard to its content; and enlarge and deepen it up\nto the most minute peculiarity of its actual working out, with the\naccuracy of a technical science, the conditions and concrete objects\nof which are clearly indicated; and thus free the reality of social\nlife from every obscurity. Hence it must make for itself a series of\nconcepts, which will serve the purpose of such an explanation.\n\nNow this account of the concept of _social economics_ is capable of\ntwo interpretations. The first is that it is intended to describe a\nscience, which has indeed for its object (as is proper for sciences)\n_necessary_ connections, in the strict sense of the word. But how\nestablish this _necessity_? How make the concepts suitable to _social\neconomics_? Evidently by allowing ourselves to be guided by a\nprinciple, by abstracting a single side from concrete reality; and if\nit is to be for economics this principle can be none other than the\n_economic principle_, and social economics will consider only the\neconomic side of a given social life. Profits, rent, interest, labour\nvalue, usury, wages, crises, will then appear as economic phenomena\nnecessary under given conditions of the social order, through which\nthe economic principle exerts its influence.\n\nThe other interpretation is that Stammler's social economics does not\nindeed accomplish the dissolving work of analysis but considers this\nor that social life in the concrete. In this case it could do nothing\nbut _describe_ a given society. To _describe_ does not mean to\n_describe in externals and superficially_; but, more accurately, to\nfree that group of facts from every obscurity, showing what it\nactually is, and describing it, as far as possible in its naked\nreality. But this is, in fact, historical knowledge, which may assume\nvaried forms, or rather may define in various ways its own subject. It\nmay study a _society_--in all its aspects during a given period of\ntime, or at a given moment of its existence, or it may even take up\none or more aspects of social life and study them as they present\nthemselves in different societies and at different times, and so on.\nIt is history always, even when it avails itself of _comparison_ as an\ninstrument of research. And such a study will not have to make\n_concepts_, but will take them as it needs them from those sciences,\nwhich do, in fact, elaborate concepts.\n\nThus it would have been to great interest to see the working out of\nthis new _social economics_ of Stammler a little more clearly, so that\nwe might determine exactly in which of the aforesaid two classes it\nought to be placed. Whether it is merely political economy in the\nordinary sense, or whether it is the concrete study of single\nsocieties and of groups of them. In the latter case Stammler has added\nanother name or rather two names; _science of the matter of social\nlife_ and _social economics_, to the many phrases by which of late the\nold _History_ has been disguised (social history, history of\ncivilisation, concrete sociology, comparative sociology, psychology of\nthe populace and of the classes, etc.). And the gain, if we may be\nallowed to say so, will not be great.\n\n_September 1898._\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[12] _Wirthschaft und Recht nach der materialistischen\nGeschichtsauffassung_, eine socialphilophische Untersuchung, DR\nRUDOLPH STAMMLER, Professor at the University of Halle, A.S., Leipzig,\nVeit U.C., 1896, pp. viii-668.\n\n\n\n\n_CHAPTER III._ CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION AND CRITICISM OF SOME\nCONCEPTS OF MARXISM\n\n\nI\n\nOF THE SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM IN MARX'S 'DAS KAPITAL'\n\n    _Das Kapital an abstract investigation: His society is not\n        this or that society: Treats only of capitalist society:\n        Assumption of equivalence between value and labour:\n        Varying views about meaning of this law: Is a postulate\n        or standard of comparison: Question as to value of this\n        standard: Is not a moral ideal: Treats of economic\n        society in so far as is a working society: Shows special\n        way in which problem is solved in capitalist society;\n        Marx's deductions from it._\n\nNotwithstanding the many expositions, criticisms, summaries and even\nabbreviated extracts in little works of popular propaganda, which have\nbeen made of Karl Marx's work, it is far from easy, and demands no\nsmall effort of philosophical and abstract thought, to understand the\nexact _nature_ of the investigation which Marx carried out. In\naddition to the intrinsic difficulty of the subject, it does not\nappear that the author himself always realised fully the peculiar\ncharacter of his investigation, that is to say its theoretical\ndistinctness from all other investigations which may be made with his\neconomic material; and, throughout, he despised and neglected all such\npreliminary and exact explanations as might have made his task plain.\nThen, moreover, account must be taken of the strange composition of\nthe book, a mixture of general theory, of bitter controversy and\nsatire, and of historical illustrations or digressions, and so\narranged that only Loria, (fortunate man!), can declare _Das Kapital_\nto be the _finest and most symmetrical_ of existing books; it being,\nin reality, un-symmetrical, badly arranged and out of proportion,\nsinning against all the laws of good taste; resembling in some\nparticulars Vico's _Scienza nuova_. Then too there is the Hegelian\nphraseology beloved by Marx, of which the tradition is now lost, and\nwhich, even within that tradition he adapted with a freedom that at\ntimes seems not to lack an element of mockery. Hence it is not\nsurprising that _Das Kapital_ has been regarded, at one time or\nanother, as an economic treatise, as a philosophy of history, as a\ncollection of sociological laws, so-called, as a moral and political\nbook of reference, and even, by some, as a bit of narrative history.\n\nNevertheless the inquirer who asks himself what is the _method_ and\nwhat the _scope_ of Marx's investigation, and puts on one side, of\ncourse, all the historical, controversial and descriptive portions\n(which certainly form an organic part of the book but not of the\nfundamental investigation), can at once reject most of the\nabove-mentioned definitions, and decide clearly these two points:\n\n(1) As regards _method, Das Kapital_ is without doubt an _abstract_\ninvestigation; the capitalist society studied by Marx, is not this or\nthat society, historically existing, in France or in England, nor the\nmodern society of the most civilised nations, that of Western Europe\nand America. It is an ideal and formal society, deduced from certain\nhypotheses, which could indeed never have occurred as actual facts in\nthe course of history. It is true that these hypotheses correspond to\na great extent to the historical conditions of the modern civilised\nworld; but this, although it may establish the importance and interest\nof Marx's investigation because the latter helps us to an\nunderstanding of the workings of the social organisms which closely\nconcern us, does not alter its nature. Nowhere in the world will\nMarx's categories be met with as living and real existences, simply\nbecause they are abstract categories, which, in order to live must\nlose some of their qualities and acquire others.\n\n(2) As regards _scope_, Marx's investigation does not cover the whole\nfield of economic fact, nor even that one ultimate and dominant\nportion, whence all economic facts have their source, like rivers\nflowing from a mountain. It limits itself, on the contrary, to one\nspecial economic system, that which occurs in a society with private\nproperty in capital, or, as Marx says, in the phrase peculiar to him,\n_capitalist_. There remained untouched, not only the other systems\nwhich have existed in history and are possible in theory, such as\nmonopolist society, or society with collective capital, but also the\nseries of economic phenomena common to the different societies and to\nindividual economics. To sum up, as regards _method, Das Kapital_ is\nnot an historical description, and as regards _scope_, it is not an\neconomic _treatise_, much less an _encyclopedia_.\n\nBut, even when these two points are settled, the real essence of\nMarx's investigation is not yet explained. Were _Das Kapital_ nothing\nbut what we have so far defined, it would be merely an _economic\nmonograph on the laws of capitalist society_.[13] Such a monograph\nMarx could only have made in one way: by deciding on these laws, and\nexplaining them by general laws, or by the fundamental concepts of\neconomics; by reducing, in short, the complex to the simple, or\npassing, by deductive reasoning, and with the addition of fresh\nhypotheses, from the simple to the complex. He would thus have shown,\nby precise exposition, how the apparently most diverse facts of the\neconomic world are ultimately governed by one and the same law; or,\nwhat is the same thing, how this law is differently refracted as it\ntakes effect through different organisations, without changing itself,\nsince otherwise the means and indeed the test of the explanation would\nbe lacking. Work of this nature had been already carried out, to a\ngreat extent, in Marx's time, and since then it has been developed yet\nfurther by economists, and has attained a high degree of perfection,\nas may be seen, for instance, in the economic treatises of our Italian\nwriters, Pantaleoni and Pareto. But I much doubt whether Marx would\nhave become an economist in order to devote himself to a species of\nresearch of almost solely theoretical, or even scholastic, interest.\nHis whole personality as a practical man and a revolutionist,\nimpatient of abstract investigation which had no close connection with\nthe interests of actual life, would have recoiled from such a course.\nIf _Das Kapital_ was to have been merely an economic monograph, it\nwould be safe to wager that it would never have come into existence.\n\nWhat then did Marx accomplish, and to what treatment did he subject\nthe phenomena of capitalist society, if not to that of pure economic\ntheory? _Marx assumed, outside the field of pure economic theory, a\nproposition; the famous equivalence between value and labour; i.e. the\nproposition that the value of the commodities produced by labour is\nequal to the quantity of labour socially necessary to produce them._\nIt is only with this assumption that his special investigation\nbegins.\n\nBut what connection has this proposition with the laws of capitalist\nsociety? or what part does it play in the investigation? This Marx\nnever explicitly states; and it is on this point that the greatest\nconfusions have arisen, and that the interpreters and critics have\nbeen most at a loss.\n\nSome of them have explained the law of labour-value as an _historical_\nlaw, peculiar to capitalist society, all of whose manifestations it\ndetermines;[14] others rightly seeing that the manifestations of\ncapitalist society are by no means determined by such a law, but\ncomply with the general economic motives characteristic of the\neconomic nature of man, have rejected the law as an absurdity at which\nMarx arrived by pressing to its extreme consequences an unfortunate\nconcept of Ricardo.\n\nCriticism was thus bewildered between entire acceptance, combined with\na clearly erroneous interpretation, and entire and summary rejection\nof Marx's treatment; until, in recent years, and especially after the\nappearance of the third and posthumous volume of _Das Kapital_, it\nbegan to seek out and follow a better path. In truth, despite its\neager defenders, the Marxian doctrine has always remained obscure;\nand, despite contemptuous and summary condemnation, it has always\ndisplayed also an obstinate vitality not usually possessed by nonsense\nand sophistry. For this reason it is to the credit of Professor Werner\nSombart, of Breslau University, that he has declared, in one of his\nlucid writings, that Marx's practical conclusions may be refuted from\na political standpoint, but that, scientifically, it is above all\nimportant to _understand_ his ideas.[15]\n\nSombart, then, breaking openly with the interpretation of Marx's law\nof value as a _real_ law of economic phenomena, and giving a fuller,\nand I may say, a bolder expression to the timid opinions already\nstated by another (C. Schmidt), says, that _Marx's law of value_ is\nnot _an empirical but a conceptual fact_ (Keine empirische, sondern\neine gedankliche Thatsache); that Marx's value is a _logical fact_\n(eine logische Thatsache), which aids our thought in understanding the\nactual realities of economic life.[16]\n\nThis interpretation, in its general sense, was accepted by Engels, in\nan article written some months before his death and published\nposthumously. To Engels it appeared that 'it could not be condemned as\ninaccurate, but that, nevertheless, it was too vague and might be\nexpressed with greater precision.'[17]\n\nThe acute and courteous remarks on the theory of value, published\nlately in an article in the _Journal des Economistes_ by an able\nFrench Marxian, Sorel, indicate a movement in the same direction. In\nthese remarks he acknowledges that there is no way of passing from\nMarx's theory to actual phenomena of economic life, and that, although\nit may offer elucidation, in a somewhat limited sense, it does not\nappear further that it could ever _explain_, in the scientific meaning\nof the word.[18]\n\nAnd now too Professor Labriola, in a hasty glance at the same subject,\nreferring clearly to Sombart, and partly agreeing and partly\ncriticising, writes: 'the theory of value does not denote an empirical\n_factum_ nor does it express a merely _logical proposition_, as some\nhave imagined; but it is the _typical premise_ without which all the\nrest would be unthinkable.'[19]\n\nLabriola's phrase appears to me, in fact, somewhat more accurate than\nSombart's; who, moreover, shows himself dissatisfied with his own\nterm, like someone who has not yet a quite definite concept in view,\nand hence cannot find a satisfactory phrase. '_Conceptual fact_,'\n'_logical fact_' expresses much too little since it is evident that\nall sciences are interwoven from logical facts, that is from concepts.\nMarx's labour-value is not only a logical generalisation, it is also\n_a fact conceived and postulated as typical_, _i.e._ something more\nthan a mere logical concept. Indeed it has not the inertia of the\nabstract but the force of a concrete fact,[20] which has in regard to\ncapitalist society, in Marx's investigation, the function of a term of\ncomparison, of a standard, of a _type_.[21]\n\nThis standard or type being postulated, the investigation, for Marx,\ntakes the following form. Granted that value is equal to the labour\nsocially necessary, it is required to show _with what divergencies\nfrom this standard_ the prices of commodities are fixed in capitalist\nsociety, and how labour-power itself acquires a price and becomes a\ncommodity. To speak plainly, Marx stated the problem in unappropriate\nlanguage; he represented this typical value itself, postulated by him\nas a standard, as being the _law_ governing the economic phenomena of\ncapitalist society. And it is the law, if he likes, but in the\n_sphere of his conceptions_, not _in economic reality_. We may\nconceive the divergencies from a standard as the revolt of reality\nwhen confronted by this standard which we have endowed with the\ndignity of law.\n\nFrom a formal point of view there is nothing absurd about the\ninvestigation undertaken by Marx. It is a usual method of scientific\nanalysis to regard a phenomenon not only as it exists, but also as it\nwould be if one of its factors were altered, and, in comparing the\nhypothetical with the real phenomenon, to conceive the first as\ndiverging from the second, which is postulated as fundamental, or the\nsecond as diverging from the first, which is postulated in the same\nmanner. If I build up by deductive reasoning the moral rules which\ndevelop in two social groups which are at war one against another, and\nif I show how they differ from the moral rules which develop in a\nstate of peace, I should be making something _analogous_ to the\ncomparison worked out by Marx. Nor would there be great harm (although\nthe expression would be neither fortunate nor accurate) in saying, in\na figurative sense, that the _law_ of the moral rules in time of war\nis the same as that of the rules in time of peace, modified to the new\nconditions, and altered in a way which seems, ultimately, inconsistent\nwith itself. As long as he confines himself to the limits of his\nhypothesis Marx proceeds quite correctly. Error could come in only\nwhen he or others confuse the hypothetical with the real, and the\nmanner of conceiving and of judging with that of existing. As long as\nthis mistake is avoided, the method is unassailable.\n\nBut the formal justification is insufficient: we need another. With a\nformally correct method results may be obtained which are meaningless\nand unimportant, or mere mental tricks may be performed. To set up an\narbitrary standard of comparison, to compare, and deduce, and to end\nby establishing a series of divergencies from this standard; to what\nwill this lead? It is then, the _standard itself_ which needs\njustification: _i.e._ we need to decide what meaning and importance it\nmay have for us.\n\nThis question too, although not stated exactly in this way, has\noccurred to Marx's critics; and an answer to it has been already given\nsome time ago and by many, by saying that the equivalence of value and\nlabour is an ideal of social ethics, a _moral ideal_. But nothing\ncould be imagined more mistaken in itself and farther from Marx's\nthought than this interpretation. What moral inference can ever be\ndrawn from the premiss that value is equal to the labour socially\nnecessary? It we reflect a little, _absolutely none_. The\nestablishment of this fact tells us nothing about the needs of the\nsociety, which needs will make necessary one or another ethical-legal\nsystem of property and of methods of distribution. Value may certainly\nequal labour, nevertheless special historical conditions will make\nnecessary society organised in castes or in classes, divided into\ngoverning and governed, rulers and ruled; with a resulting unequal\ndistribution of the products of labour. Value may certainly equal\nlabour; but even supposing that fresh historical conditions ever make\npossible the disappearance of society organised in classes and the\nadvent of a communistic society, and even supposing that in this\nsociety distribution could take place according to the quantity of\nlabour contributed by each person, this distribution would still not\nbe a deduction from the established equivalence between value and\nlabour, but a standard adopted for special reasons of social\nconvenience.[22] Nor can it be said that such an equivalence supplies\nin itself an idea of perfect justice (even though unrealisable), since\nthe criterion of justice has no relation to the difference often due\nto purely natural causes, in the ability to do more or less social\nlabour and to produce a greater or smaller value. Thus neither a rule\nof abstract justice nor one of convenience and social utility can be\nderived from the equivalence between value and labour. Rules of either\nkind can only be based on consideration of a quite different grade\nfrom that of a simple economic equation.\n\nSombart, avoiding this vulgar confusion, has been better advised in\nlooking for the meaning of the standard set up by Marx in the nature\nof society itself, and apart from our moral judgments. Thus he says\nthat labour is _the economic fact of greater objective importance_,\nand that value, in Marx's view, is nothing 'if not the economic\nexpression of the fact of the socially productive power of labour, as\nthe basis of economic existence.'\n\nBut this investigation appears to me to be merely begun and not yet\nworked out to a conclusion; and if I might suggest wherein it needs\ncompletion, I should remark that it is necessary to attempt to give\nclearness and precision to this word _objective_, which is either\nambiguous or metaphorical. What is meant by an economically objective\nfact? Do not these words suggest rather a mere _presentiment of a\nconcept_ instead of the distinct vision of this concept itself?\n\nI will add, merely tentatively, that the word _objective_ (whose\ncorrelative term is _subjective_) does not seem to be in place here.\nLet us, instead, take account, in a society, only of what is properly\neconomic life, _i.e._ out of the whole society, only of _economic\nsociety_. Let us abstract from this latter all goods which cannot be\nincreased by labour. Let us abstract further all class distinctions,\nwhich may be regarded as accidental in reference to the general\nconcept of economic society. Let us leave out of account all modes of\ndistributing the wealth produced, which, as we have said, can only be\ndetermined on grounds of convenience or perhaps of justice, but in\nanycase upon considerations belonging to society as a whole, and never\nfrom considerations belonging exclusively to economic society. What is\nleft after these successive abstractions have been made? Nothing but\n_economic society in so far as it is a working society_.[23] And in\nthis society without class distinctions, _i.e._ in an economic society\nas such and whose only commodities are the products of labour, what\ncan value be? Obviously the sum of the efforts, _i.e._ the quantity of\nlabour, which the production of the various kinds of commodities\ndemands. And, since we are here speaking of the economic social\norganism, and not of the individual persons living in it, it follows\nthat this labour cannot be reckoned except by averages, and hence as\nlabour _socially_ (it is with society, I repeat, that we are here\ndealing) _necessary_.\n\nThus labour-value would appear as that determination of value peculiar\nto economic society as such, when regarded only in so far as it\nproduces commodities capable of being increased by labour.\n\nFrom this definition the following corollary may be drawn: the\ndetermination of labour value _will have a positive conformity with\nfacts as long as a society exists, which produces goods by means of\nlabour_. It is evident that in the imaginary county of Cocaigne this\ndetermination would have no conformity with facts, since all goods\nwould exist in quantities exceeding the demand; similarly it is also\nevident that the same determination could not take effect in a society\nin which goods were inadequate to the demand, but could not be\nincreased by labour.\n\nBut hitherto history has shown us only societies which, in addition to\nthe enjoyment of goods not increasable by labour, have satisfied their\nneeds by labour. Hence this equivalence between value and labour has\nhitherto had and will continue for an indefinite time to have, a\nconformity with facts; but, of what kind is this conformity? Having\nruled out (1) that it is a question of a moral ideal, and (2) that it\nis a question of scientific law; and having nevertheless concluded\nthat this equivalence is a _fact_ (which Marx uses as a type), we are\nobliged to say, as the only alternative, that _it is a fact, but a\nfact which exists in the midst of other facts; i.e. a fact that\nappears to us empirically as opposed, limited, distorted by other\nfacts_, almost like a force amongst other forces, which produces a\nresultant different from what it would produce if the other forces\nceased to act. _It is not a completely dominant fact but neither is it\nnon-existent and merely imaginary._[24]\n\nIt is still necessary to remark that in the course of history this\n_fact_ has undergone various alterations, _i.e._, has been more or\nless obscured; and here it is proper to do justice to Engels' remark\nin reference to Sombart; that as regards the way in which the latter\ndefines the law of value 'he does not bring out the full importance\nwhich this law possesses during the stages of economic development in\nwhich it is supreme.' Engels makes a digression into the field of\neconomic history to show that Marx's law of value, _i.e._ the\nequivalence between value and the labour socially necessary, has been\nsupreme for several thousand years.[25] Supreme is too strong a term;\nbut it is true that the opposed influences of other facts to this law\nhave been fewer in number and less intense under primitive communism\nand under medi\u00e6val and domestic economic conditions, whilst they have\nreached a maximum in the society based on privately owned capital and\nmore or less free universal competition, _i.e._ in the society which\nproduces almost exclusively _commodities_.[26]\n\nMarx, then, in postulating as _typical_ the equivalence between value\nand labour and in applying it to capitalist society, was, as it were,\nmaking a comparison between capitalist society and a part of itself,\nisolated and raised up to an independent existence: _i.e._ a\ncomparison between capitalist society and economic society as such\n(but only in so far as it is a working society). In other words, he\nwas studying the social problem of labour and was showing by the test\nimplicitly established by him, _the special way in which this problem\nis solved in capitalist society_. This is the justification, no longer\n_formal_ but _real_, of his method.\n\nIt was in virtue of this method, and by the light thrown by the type\nwhich he postulated, that Marx was able to discover and define the\nsocial origin of _profit_, _i.e._ of _surplus value_. Surplus value in\npure economics is a meaningless word, as is evident from the term\nitself; since a _surplus value_ is an _extra value_, and thus falls\noutside the sphere of pure economics. But it rightly has meaning and\nis no absurdity, as a _concept of difference_, in comparing one\neconomic society with another, one fact with another, or two\nhypotheses with one another.\n\nIt is also in virtue of the same premise that he was able to arrive at\nthe proposition: that the products of labour in a capitalist society\ndo not sell, unless by exception, for their value, but usually for\nmore or less, and sometimes with great deviations from their value;\nwhich is to say, to put it shortly, _value_ does not coincide with\n_price_. Suppose, by hypothesis the organisation of production were\nsuddenly changed from a capitalist to a communistic system, we should\nsee at once, not only that alteration in the fortunes of men which\nappeals so much to popular imagination, but also a more remarkable\nchange: a change in the fortunes of things. A scale of valuation of\ngoods would then fashion itself, very different for the most part,\nfrom that which now exists. The way in which Marx proves this\nproposition, by an analysis of the different components of the capital\nemployed in different industries, _i.e._ of the proportion of fixed\ncapital (machines, etc.) and of floating capital (wages), need not be\nexplained here in detail.\n\nAnd, in the same way, _i.e._ by proving that fixed capital increases\ncontinually in comparison with floating capital, Marx tries to\nestablish another law of capitalist society, the law of the _tendency\nof the rate of profits to fall_. Technical improvement, which in an\nabstract economic society would show itself in the decreased labour\nrequired to produce the same wealth, shows itself in capitalist\nsociety in a gradual decline in the rate of profits.[27] But this\nsection of Volume III of _Das Kapital_ is one of the least developed\nin this little worked-out posthumous book; and it seems to me to be\nworth a special critical essay, which I hope to write at another time,\nnot wishing to treat the subject here incidentally.[28]\n\n\nII\n\nMARX'S PROBLEM AND PURE ECONOMICS (GENERAL ECONOMIC SCIENCE)\n\n    _Marxian economics not general economic science and\n        labour-value not a general concept of value: Engel's\n        rejection of general economic law: abstract concepts used\n        by Marx are concepts of pure economics: relation of\n        economic psychology to pure economics: pure economics\n        does not destroy history or progress._\n\nMarxian economics is thus a study of abstract working society showing\nthe variations which this undergoes in the different social economic\norganisations. This investigation Marx carried out only in reference\nto one of these organisations, _i.e._ the capitalist; contenting\nhimself with mere hints in regard to the slave and serf organisations,\nprimitive communism, the domestic system and to savage conditions.[29]\n\nIn this sense he and Engels declared that economics (the economics\nstudied by them), was an historical science.[30] But here, too, their\ndefinition has been less happy than the investigation itself; we know\nthat Marx's researches are not historical, but hypothetical and\nabstract, _i.e._ theoretical.[31] They might better be called\nresearches into _sociological economics_, if the word _sociological_\nwere not one which is employed most variously and arbitrarily.\n\nIf Marx's investigation is thus limited, if the law of value\npostulated by him is the special law of an abstract working society,\nwhich only partially takes effect in economic society as given in\nhistory, and in other hypothetical or possible economic societies, the\nfollowing results seem to follow evidently and readily: (1) That\nMarxian economics _is not general economic science_; (2) that\nlabour-value _is not a general concept of value_. Alongside, then, of\nthe Marxian investigation, there can, or rather must, exist and\nflourish a general economic science, which may determine a concept of\nvalue, deducing it from quite different and more comprehensive\nprinciples than the special ones of Marx. And, if the pure economists,\nconfined to their own special province, have been wrong to show an\nungenerous intellectual dislike for Marx's investigations, his\nfollowers, in their turn, have been wrong to regard ungratefully a\nbranch of research which was alien to them, calling it now useless,\nand now frankly absurd.\n\nSuch is, in effect, my opinion, and I freely acknowledge that I have\nnever been able to discover other antithesis or enmity between these\ntwo branches of research except the purely accidental one of the\nmutual antipathy to and mental ignorance of each other, of two groups\nof students. Some have resorted to a political explanation; but, with\nno wish to deny that political prepossessions are often the causes of\ntheoretical errors, I do not consider an explanation as adequate and\nappropriate, which resolves itself into accusing a large number of\nstudents of allowing themselves blindly and foolishly to be overcome\nby passions alien to science; or, what is worse, of knowingly\nfalsifying their thought and constructing a whole economic system from\nmotives of practical opportunism.\n\nIndeed Marx himself had not the time or means to adopt an attitude, so\nto speak, towards the _purists_, or the _hedonists_, or the\n_utilitarians_, or the _deductive_ or _Austrian_ school, or whatever\nelse they may call themselves. But he had the greatest contempt for\nthe _oeconomia vulgaris_, under which term he was wont to include also\nthe researches of general economics, which explain what needs no\nexplanation and is intuitively evident, and leave unexplained what is\nmore difficult and of genuine interest. Nor has Engels discussed the\nsubject; but an indication of his opinion may be found in his attack\non D\u00fchring. D\u00fchring was struggling to find a general law of value,\nwhich should govern all possible types of economic organisation; and\nEngels refuted him: 'Anyone who wishes to bring under the same law the\npolitical economy of Terra del Fuoco and that of modern England, can\nproduce nothing but the vulgarest commonplaces.' He scorns the truth\nof ultimate instance, the eternal laws of value, the tautologous and\nempty axioms which Herr D\u00fchring would have produced by his method.[32]\nFixed and eternal laws are non-existent: there is then no possibility\nof constructing a general science of economics, valid for all times\nand in all places. If Engels had meant to refer to those who affirm\nthe eternity and inevitability of the laws characteristic of\ncapitalist society, he would have been justified; and would have been\naiming his blows at a prejudice which history alone suffices to\nrefute, by showing as it does, how capitalism has appeared at\ndifferent times, replacing other types of economic organisation, and\nhas also disappeared, replaced by other types. But in D\u00fchring's case\nthe criticism was much beside the mark; since D\u00fchring did not indeed\nmean to set up the laws of capitalist society as fixed and eternal;\nbut to determine _a general concept of value_, which is quite another\nmatter: or, in other words, to show how, _from a purely economic point\nof view_, capitalist society is explained by the same general concepts\nas explain the other types of organisation. No effort, not even that\nof Engels, will suffice to stop such a problem from being stated and\nsolved; unless it were possible to destroy the human intellect, which,\nin addition to particular facts, recognises universal concepts.\n\nIt would be instructive to examine the references which there are in\nMarx's _Das Kapital_ to unfinished analyses, extraneous to his special\nmethod; for in this dependence on analysis the researches of pure\neconomics have their origin. What is, for instance, _abstract human\nlabour_ (_abstrakt menschliche Arbeit_), a concept which Marx uses\nlike a postulate? By what _method_ is that reduction of _complex_ to\n_simple_ labour accomplished, to which he refers as to an obvious and\nordinary matter? And if, in Marx's hypothesis, _commodities_ appear as\n_congealed labour_, or _crystalised labour_, why by another\nhypothesis, should not all economic goods and not only commodities,\nappear as _congealed methods of satisfying needs_ or as _crystalised\nneeds_? I read at one point in _Das Kapital_: 'Things which in\nthemselves are not commodities, _e.g._ knowledge, honour, etc., may be\nsold by their owners; and thus, by means of their price, acquire the\nform of commodities. A thing may formally have a price without having\na value. The expression of the price here becomes _imaginary_ like\ncertain quantities in mathematics.'[33] Here is yet another\ndifficulty, indicated but not overcome. Where are these _formal_ or\n_imaginary_ prices to be found? And what are they? By what laws are\nthey governed? Or are they perhaps like the Greek words in Latin\nprosody, which according to the school rule, _per Ausoniae fines sine\nlege vagantur_?--Questions of this kind are answered by the researches\nof pure economics.\n\nThe philosopher Lange also, who rejected Marx's law of value, which he\nregarded as an _extravagant production_, _a child of sorrow_, thinking\nit unsuitable--and in this he was justified, as a general law of\nvalue, arrived at the solutions which have since been given of the\nlatter, a long time before the researches of the purists came into\nblossom. 'Some years ago,' he wrote in his book on labour problems,\n'I too worked at a new theory of value, _which should be of such a\ncharacter as to show the most extreme cases of variation in value as\nspecial cases of the same formula_.' And, whilst adding that he had\nnot completed it, he intimated that the course which he attempted was\nthe same as that hastily glanced at by Jevons in his _Theory of\npolitical economy_, published in 1871.[34]\n\nTo any of the more cautious and moderate Marxians it is plainly\nevident that the researches of the Hedonists are not merely to be\nrejected as erroneous or unfounded; and hence an attempt has been made\nto vindicate them in reference to the Marxian doctrine as an _economic\npsychology_, having its place alongside of true economics itself. But\nthis definition contains a curious equivocation. Pure economics is\nquite apart from psychology. Indeed, to begin with, it is hard to fix\nthe meaning of the words _economic psychology_. The science of\npsychology is divided into _formal_ and _descriptive_. In formal\npsychology there is no place either for economic fact nor for any\nother fact which may represent a particular content. In descriptive\npsychology, it is true, are included representations, sentiments and\ndesires of an economic content, but included as they appear in\nreality, mixed with the other psychical phenomena of different\ncontent, and inseparable from them. Thus _descriptive economic\npsychology_ can be, at most, an approximate limitation, by which we\ntake as a subject of special description the way in which men (at a\ngiven time and place, or even in the mass as hitherto they have\nappeared in history) think, feel and desire in respect to a certain\nclass of goods which are usually called material or economic, and\nwhich, however, stand in need of specification and definition.\nSubject-matter, in truth, better suited to history than to science,\nwhich regards such matters only as empty and unimportant\ngeneralisations. This may be seen in the long discussion of the matter\nby that most weighty of pedants, Wagner, in his manual, which, of all\nthat has been written on the question, I think the most worthy of\nnotice, and which is yet, in itself, a thing very little worthy of\nnotice or conclusive.[35] An enumeration and description of the\nvarious tendencies which exist in men as they appear in ordinary life:\negoistical and altruistic tendencies, love of self-advantage and fear\nof disadvantage, fear of punishment and hope of reward, sense of\nhonour and fear of disgrace and public contempt, love of activity and\ndislike of idleness, feeling of reverence for the moral code, etc.,\nthis is what Wagner calls _economic psychology_; and which might\nbetter be called: _various observations in descriptive psychology, to\nbe kept in mind whilst studying the practical questions of\neconomics_.[36]\n\nBut what, pray, has pure economics in common with psychology? The\npurists start from the hedonistic postulate, _i.e._ from the economic\nnature itself of man, and deduce from it the concepts of _utility_\n(_economic_ utility which Pareto has proposed to call by a special\nname, _ofelimita_, from the Greek +\u00f4phelimos+]) of _value_, and\ndirectly, all the other special laws in accordance with which man\nbehaves in so far as he is an abstract _homo oeconomicus_. They do\nexactly what the science of ethics does with the moral nature; and the\nscience of logic with the logical nature; and so on. At this rate then\nwould ethics be a _psychology of ethics_ and logic a _psychology of\nlogic_? And, since all that we know passes through the human mind,\nontology would be a _psychology of existence_, mathematics a\n_psychology of mathematics_, and we should thus have confused the most\ndiverse things, ending in a disorder the aim of which would be no\nlonger comprehensible. Hence we conclude, that with care and the\nexercise of a little thought, it will necessarily be agreed that pure\neconomics is not a psychology, but is the true and essential _general\nscience of economic facts_.\n\nProfessor Labriola, too, shows a certain ill-humour which does not\nseem to me entirely justified, towards the pure economists, 'who', he\nsays, 'translate into _psychological conceptualism_ the influence of\n_risk_ and other analogous considerations of ordinary commercial\npractice! And they do well--I answer--because the mind desires to give\nan account even of the influences of risk and of commercial practice,\nand to explain their mechanism and character. And then, _psychological\nconceptualism_; is not this an unfortunate connection between what\nyour intellect shows you that pure economics really is (science which\ntakes as its starting point an irreducible concept), and that\nhazardous definition of _psychology_ which has been criticised above?\nAre not the noun and adjective in opposition to one another? And\nfurther, Labriola speaks contemptuously of the '_abstract atomism_' of\nthe hedonists, in which, 'one no longer knows what history is, and\nprogress is reduced to mere appearance.'[37] Here too, it does not\nseem to me that his contempt is justified; for Labriola is well aware\nthat in all abstract sciences, concrete and individual things\ndisappear and that their _elements_ alone remain as objects to be\nconsidered: hence this cannot be made a ground for special complaint\nagainst economic science. But _history_ and _progress_, even if they\nare alien to the study of abstract economics, do not therefore cease\nto exist and to form the subject of other studies of the human mind;\nand this is what matters.\n\nFor my part I hold firmly to the economic notion of the hedonistic\nguide, to utility-ophelimity, to final utility, and even to the\nexplanation (economic) of interest on capital as arising from the\ndifferent degrees of utility possessed by present and future goods.\nBut this does not satisfy the desire for a _sociological_, so to\nspeak, elucidation of interest on capital; and this elucidation, with\nothers of the same kind, can only be obtained from the comparative\nconsiderations put before us by Marx.[38]\n\n\nIII\n\nCONCERNING THE LIMITATION OF THE MATERIALISTIC THEORY OF HISTORY\n\n    _Historical materialism a canon of historical interpretation:\n        Canon does not imply anticipation of results: Question as\n        to how Marx and Engels understood it: Difficulty of\n        ascertaining correctly and method of doing so: How\n        Marxians understand it: Their metaphysical tendency:\n        Instances of confusion of concepts in their writings:\n        Historical materialism has not a special philosophy\n        immanent within it._\n\nHistorical materialism if it is to express something critically\nacceptable, can, as I have had occasion to state elsewhere,[39] be\nneither a new _a priori_ notion of the philosophy of history, nor a\nnew method of historical thought; it must be simply a _canon_ of\nhistorical interpretation. This canon recommends that attention be\ndirected to the so-called economic basis of society, in order that the\nforms and mutations of the latter may be better understood.\n\nThe concept canon ought not to raise difficulty, especially when it is\nremembered that _it implies no anticipation of results_, but only an\naid in seeking for them; and is entirely of empirical origin. When\nthe critic of the text of Dante's _Comedia_ uses Witte's well-known\ncanon, which runs: '_the difficult reading is to be preferred to the\neasy one_,' he is quite aware that he possesses a mere instrument,\nwhich may be useful to him in many cases, useless in others, and whose\ncorrect and advantageous employment depends entirely on his caution.\nIn like manner and with like meaning it must be said that historical\nmaterialism is a mere _canon_; although it be in truth a canon _most\nrich in suggestion_.\n\nBut was it in this way that Marx and Engels understood it? and is it\nin this way that Marx's followers usually understand it?\n\nLet us begin with the first question. Truly a difficult one, and\noffering a multiplicity of difficulties. The first of these arises so\nto speak, from the _nature of the sources_. The doctrine of historical\nmaterialism is not embodied in a classical and definite book by those\nauthors, with whom it is as it were identified; so that, to discuss\nthat book and to discuss the doctrine might seem all one thing. On the\ncontrary it is scattered through a series of writings, composed in the\ncourse of half a century, at long intervals, where only the most\ncasual mention is made of it, and where it is sometimes merely\nunderstood or implied. Anyone who desired to reconcile all the forms\nwith which Marx's and Engels have endowed it, would stumble upon\ncontradictory expressions, which would make it impossible for the\ncareful and methodical interpreter to decide what, on the whole,\nhistorical materialism meant for them.\n\nAnother difficulty arises in regard to the weight to be attached to\ntheir expressions. I do not think that there has yet been a study of\nwhat might be called Marx's _forma mentis_; with which Engels had\nsomething in common, partly owing to congeniality, partly owing to\nimitation or influence. Marx, as has been already remarked, had a kind\nof abhorrence for researches of purely scholastic interest. Eager for\nknowledge of _things_ (I say, of concrete and individual things) he\nattached little weight to discussions of _concepts_ and the _forms of\nconcepts_; this sometimes degenerated into an exaggeration in his own\nconcepts. Thus we find in him a curious opposition between statements\nwhich, interpreted strictly, are erroneous; and yet appear to us, and\nindeed are, loaded and pregnant with truth. Marx was addicted, in\nshort, to a kind of _concrete logic_.[40] Is it best then to interpret\nhis expressions literally, running the risk of giving them a meaning\ndifferent from what they actually bore in the writer's inmost\nthoughts? Or is it best to interpret them broadly, running the\nopposite risk of giving them a meaning, theoretically perhaps more\nacceptable, but historically less true?\n\nThe same difficulty certainly occurs in regard to the writings of\nnumerous thinkers; but it is especially great in regard to those of\nMarx. And the interpreter must proceed with caution: he must do his\nwork bit by bit, book by book, statement by statement, connecting\nindeed these various indications one with another, but taking account\nof differences of time, of actual circumstances, of fleeting\nimpressions, of mental and literary habits; and he must submit to\nacknowledge ambiguities and incompleteness where either exists,\nresisting the temptation to confirm and complete by his own judgment.\nIt may be allowed for instance, as it appears to me for various\nreasons, that the way in which historical materialism is stated above\nis the same as that in which Marx and Engels understood it in their\ninmost thoughts; or at least that which they would have agreed to as\ncorrect if they had had more time available for such labours of\nscientific elaboration, and if criticism had reached them less\ntardily. And all this is of importance up to a certain point, for the\ninterpreter and historian of ideas; since for the history of science,\nMarx and Engels are neither more nor less than they appear in their\nbooks and works; real, and not hypothetical or possible persons.[41]\n\nBut even for science itself, apart from the history of it, the\nhypothetical or possible Marx and Engels have their value. What\nconcerns us theoretically is to understand the various possible ways\nof interpreting the problems proposed and the solutions thought out by\nMarx and Engels, and to select from the latter by criticism those\nwhich appear theoretically true and welcome. What was Marx's\nintellectual standpoint with reference to the Hegelian philosophy of\nhistory? In what consisted the criticism which he gave of it? Is the\npurport of this criticism always the same for instance in the article\npublished in the _Deutsch-franz\u00f6sische Jahrb\u00fccher_, for 1844, in the\n_Heilige Familie_ of 1845, in the _Mis\u00e8re de la philosophie_ of 1847,\nin the appendix to _Das Komnunistische Manifest_ of 1848, in the\npreface to the _Zur Kritik_ of 1859, and in the preface to the 2nd\nedition of _Das Kapital_ of 1873? Is it again in Engels' works in the\n_Antid\u00fchring_, in the article on _Feuerbach_, etc.? Did Marx ever\nreally think of substituting, as some have believed, _Matter_ or\nmaterial fact for the Hegelian _Idea_? And what connection was there\nin his mind between the concepts _material_ and _economic_? Again, can\nthe explanation given by him, of his position with regard to Hegel:\n'the ideas determined by facts and not the facts by the ideas,' be\ncalled an inversion of Hegel's view, or is it not rather the inversion\nof that of the ideologists and doctrinaires?[42] These are some of the\nquestions pertaining to the _history of ideas_, which will be\nanswered some time or other: perhaps at present the time has not yet\narrived to write the history of ideas which are still in the process\nof development.[43]\n\nBut, putting aside this historical curiosity, it concerns us now to\nwork at these ideas in order to advance in theoretical knowledge. How\ncan historical materialism justify itself scientifically? This is the\nquestion I have proposed to myself, and to which the answer is given\nby the critical researches referred to at the beginning of this\nparagraph. Without returning to them I will give other examples, taken\nfrom the same source, that of the Marxian literature. How ought we to\nunderstand scientifically Marx's _neodialectic_? The final opinion\nexpressed by Engels on the subject seems to be this: the dialect is\nthe rhythm of the development of things, _i.e._ the inner law of\nthings in their development. This rhythm is not determined _a priori_,\nand by metaphysical deduction, but is rather observed and gathered _a\nposteriori_, and only through the repeated observations and\nverifications that are made of it in various fields of reality, can it\nbe presupposed that all facts develop through negations, and negations\nof negations.[44] Thus the dialect would be the discovery of a great\nnatural law, less empty and formal than the so-called _law of\nevolution_ and it would have nothing in common with the old Hegelian\ndialect except the name, which would preserve for us an historical\nrecord of the way in which Marx arrived at it. But does this natural\nrhythm of development exist? This could only be stated from\nobservation, to which indeed, Engels appealed in order to assert its\nexistence. And what kind of a law is one which is revealed to us by\nobservation? Can it ever be a law which governs things absolutely, or\nis it not one of those which are now called tendencies, or rather is\nit not merely a simple and limited generalisation? And this\nrecognition of rhythm through negations of negations, it is not some\nrag of the old metaphysics, from which it may be well to free\nourselves.[45] This is the investigation needed for the progress of\nscience. In like manner should other statements of Marx and Engels be\ncriticised. What for example shall we think of Engels' controversy\nwith D\u00fchring concerning the basis of history: whether this is\n_political force_ or _economic fact_? Will it not seem to us that this\ncontroversy can perhaps retain any value in face of D\u00fchring's\nassertion that political fact is that _which is essential\nhistorically_, but in itself has not that general importance which it\nis proposed to ascribe to it? We may reflect for a moment that Engels'\nthesis: 'force protects (_sch\u00fctzt_) but does not cause (_verursacht_)\nusurpation,' might be directly inverted into another that: 'force\n_causes_ usurpation, but economic interest _protects_ it,' and this by\nthe well known principle of the inter-dependence and competition of\nthe social factors.\n\nAnd the class war? In what sense is the general statement true that\n_history is a class war_? I should be inclined to say that history is\na class war (1) when there are classes, (2) when they have\nantagonistic interests, (3) when they are aware of this antagonism,\nwhich would give us, in the main, the humourous equivalence that\nhistory is a class war only when it is a class war. In fact sometimes\nclasses have not had antagonistic interests, and very often they are\nnot conscious of them; of which the socialists are well aware when\nthey endeavour, by efforts not always crowned with success (with the\npeasantry, for example, they have not yet succeeded), to arouse this\nconsciousness in the modern proletariat. As to the possibility of the\nnon-existence of classes, the socialists who prophesy this\nnon-existence for the society of the future, must at least admit that\nit is not a matter intrinsically necessary to historical development,\nsince in the future, and without classes, history, it may well be\nhoped will continue. In short even the particular statement that\n'history is a class war,' has that limited value of a canon and of a\npoint of view, which we have allowed in general to the materialist\nconception.[46]\n\nThe second of the two questions proposed at the beginning is: How do\nthe Marxians understand historical materialism? To me it seems\nundeniable that in the Marxian literature, _i.e._ the writings of the\nfollowers and interpreters of Marx, there exists in truth a\n_metaphysical danger_ of which it is necessary to beware. Even in the\nwritings of Professor Labriola some statements are met with which have\nrecently led a careful and accurate critic to conclude that Labriola\nunderstands historical materialism in the genuine and original sense\nof a metaphysic, and that of the worst kind, a metaphysic of the\ncontingent.[47] But although I have myself, on another occasion,\npointed out those statements and formulae which seem to me doubtful in\nLabriola's writings, I still think, as I thought then, that they are\nsuperficial outgrowths on a system of thought essentially sound; or to\nspeak in a manner agreeing with the considerations developed above,\nthat Labriola, having educated himself in Marxism, may have borrowed\nfrom it also some of its over-absolute style, and at times a certain\ncarelessness about the working out of concepts, which are somewhat\nsurprising in an old Herbartian like himself,[48] but which he then\ncorrects by observations and limitations always useful, even if\nslightly contradictory, because they bring us back to the ground of\nreality.\n\nLabriola, moreover, has a special merit, which marks him off from the\nordinary exponents and adapters of historical materialism. Although\nhis theoretical formulae may here and there expose him to criticism,\nwhen he turns to history, _i.e._ to concrete facts, he changes his\nattitude, throws off as it were, the burden of theory and becomes\ncautious and circumspect: _he possesses, in a high degree, respect for\nhistory_. He shows unceasingly his dislike for formulae of every kind,\nwhen concerned to establish and scrutinise definite processes, nor\ndoes he forget to give the warning that there exists 'no theory,\nhowever good and excellent in itself, which will help us to a summary\nknowledge of every historical detail.'[49]\n\nIn his last book we may note especially a full inquiry into what could\npossibly be the nature of a _history of Christianity_. Labriola\ncriticises those who set up as an historical subject the _essence_ of\nChristianity, of which it is unknown where or when it has existed;\nsince the history of the last centuries of the Roman Empire shows us\nmerely the origin and growth of what constituted the Christian\nsociety, or the church, a varying group of facts amidst varied\nhistorical conditions. This critical opinion held by Labriola seems to\nme perfectly correct; since it is not meant to deny, (what I myself,\ndo not deny) the justification of that method of historical\nexposition, which for lack of another phrase, I once called _histories\nby concepts_,[50] thus distinguishing it from the historical\nexposition of the life of a given social group in a given place and\nduring a given period of time. He who writes the _history of\nChristianity_, claims in truth, to accomplish a task somewhat similar\nto the tasks of the historians of _literature_, of _philosophy_, of\n_art_: _i.e._ to isolate a body of facts which enter into a fixed\nconcept, and to arrange them in a chronological series, without\nhowever denying or ignoring the source which these facts have in the\nother facts of life, but keeping them apart for the convenience of\nmore detailed consideration. The worst of it is that whereas\nliterature, philosophy, art and so on are determined or determinable\nconcepts, Christianity is almost solely a bond, which unites beliefs\noften intrinsically very diverse; and, in writing the history of\nChristianity, there is often a danger of writing in reality the\nhistory of a _name, void without substance_.[51]\n\nBut what would Labriola say if his cautious criticism were turned\nagainst that _history of the origin of the family, of private property\nand of class distinctions_, which is one of the most extensive\nhistorical applications made by the followers of Marx: desired by\nMarx, sketched out by Engels on the lines of Morgan's investigations,\ncarried on by others. Alas, in this matter, the aim was not merely to\nwrite, as could, perhaps, have been done, a useful manual of the\nhistorical facts which enter into these three concepts, but actually\nan _additional history_ was produced: A history, to use Labriola's own\nphrase, of the _essence_ family, of the _essence_ class and of the\n_essence_ private property, with a predetermined cadence. A 'history\nof the family,' to confine ourselves to one of the three groups of\nfacts,--can only be an enumeration and description of the particular\nforms taken by the _family_ amongst different races and in the course\nof time: a series of particular histories, which unite themselves into\na general concept. It is this which is offered by Morgan's theories,\nexpounded by Engels, which theories modern criticism have cut away on\nall sides.[52] Have they not allowed themselves to presuppose, as an\nhistorical stage, through which all races are fated to pass, that\nchimerical matriarchate, in which the mere reckoning of descent\nthrough the mother is confused with the predominance of woman in the\nfamily and that of woman in society? Have we not seen the reproofs and\neven the jeers directed by some Marxians against those cautious\nhistorians who deny that it is possible to assert, in the present\ncondition of the criticism of sources, the existence of a primitive\ncommunism, or a matriarchate, amongst the Hellenic races? Indeed, I do\nnot think that throughout this investigation proof has been given of\nmuch critical foresight.\n\nI should also like to call Labriola's attention to another confusion,\nvery common in Marxian writings, between _economic forms of\norganisation_ and _economic epochs_. Under the influence of\nevolutionist positivism, those divisions which Marx expressed in\ngeneral: the _Asiatic_, the _antique_, the _feudal_ and the\n_bourgeois_ economic organisation, have become four historical\n_epochs_: _communism_, _slave organisation_, _serf organisation_, and\n_wage-earning organisation_. But the modern historian, who is indeed\nnot such a superficial person as the ordinary Marxians are accustomed\nto say, thus sparing themselves the trouble of taking a share in his\nlaborious procedure, is well aware that there are four _forms_ of\neconomic organisation, which succeed and intersect one another in\nactual history, often forming the oddest mixtures and sequences. He\nrecognises an Egyptian medi\u00e6valism or feudalism, as he recognises an\nHellenic medi\u00e6valism or feudalism; he knows too of a German\n_neo-medi\u00e6valism_ which followed the flourishing bourgeois\norganisation of the German cities before the Reformation and the\ndiscovery of the New World; and he willingly compares the general\neconomic conditions of the Greco-Roman world at its zenith with those\nof Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.\n\nConnected with this arbitrary conception of historical epochs, is the\nother of the inquiry into _the cause_ (note carefully; into the cause)\nof the transition from one form to another. Inquiry is made, for\ninstance, into the _cause_ of the abolition of slavery, which must be\nthe _same_, whether we are considering the decline of the Greco-Roman\nworld or modern America; and so for serfdom, and for primitive\ncommunism and the capitalist system: amongst ourselves the famous\nLoria has occupied himself with these absurd investigations, the\nperpetual revelation of a single cause, of which he himself does not\nknow exactly whether it be the earth, or population or something\nelse--yet it should not take much to convince us, (it would suffice\nfor the purpose to read, with a little care, some books of narrative\nhistory), that the transition from one form of economic, or more\ngenerally, social, organisation, to another, is not the result of a\n_single cause_, nor even of _a group of causes which are always the\nsame_; but is due to causes and circumstances which need examination\nfor each case since they usually vary for each case. Death is death;\nbut people die of many diseases.\n\nBut enough of this; and I may be allowed to conclude this paragraph by\nreference to a question which Labriola also brings forward in his\nrecent work, and which he connects with the criticism of historical\nmaterialism.\n\nLabriola distinguishes between historical materialism as an\ninterpretation of history, and as a general conception of life and of\nthe universe (_Lebens-und-Weltanschauung_), and he inquires what is\nthe nature of the _philosophy immanent_ in historical materialism; and\nafter some remarks, he concludes that this philosophy is the _tendency\nto monism_, and is a _formal_ tendency.\n\nHere I take leave to point out that if into the term _historical\nmaterialism two different things_ are intruded, _i.e._: (1) a method\nof interpretation; (2) a definite conception of life and of the\nuniverse; it is natural to find a philosophy in it, and moreover with\na tendency to monism, because it was included therein at the outset.\nWhat close connection is there between these two orders of thought?\nPerhaps a logical connection of _mental coherence_? For my part, I\nconfess that I am unable to see it. I believe, on the contrary, that\nLabriola, this time, is simply stating _\u00e0 propos_ of historical\nmaterialism what he thinks to be the necessary attitude of modern\nthought with regard to the problems of ontology; or what, according to\nhim, should be the standpoint of the socialist opinion in regard to\nthe conceptions of optimism and pessimism; and so on. I believe, in\nshort, that he is not making an _investigation_ which will reveal the\nphilosophical conceptions underlying historical materialism; but\nmerely a _digression_, even if a digression of interest and\nimportance. And how many other most noteworthy opinions and\nimpressions and sentiments are welcomed by socialist opinion! But why\nchristen this assemblage of new facts by the name of historical\nmaterialism, which has hitherto expressed the well-defined meaning of\na way of interpreting history? Is it not the task of the scientist to\ndistinguish and analyse what in empirical reality and to ordinary\nknowledge appears mingled into one?\n\n\nIV\n\nOF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE IN FACE OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS\n\n    _Socialism and free trade not scientific deductions: Obsolete\n        metaphysics of old theory of free trade: Basis of modern\n        free trade theories not strictly scientific though only\n        possible one: The desirable is not science nor the\n        practicable: Scientific law only applicable under certain\n        conditions: Element of daring in all action._\n\n\nIt has become a commonplace that, owing to Marx's work, socialism has\npassed _from utopia to science_, as the title of a popular booklet by\nEngels expresses it; and _scientific socialism_ is a current term.\nProfessor Labriola does not conceal his doubts of such a term; and he\nis right.\n\nOn the other hand, we hear the followers of other leaders, for\ninstance the extreme free traders (to whom I refer by preference\n_honoris causa_, because they, too, are amongst the _idealists_ of our\ntimes), in the name of science itself, condemn socialism as\n_anti-scientific_ and declare that free trade is the only scientific\nopinion.\n\nWould it not be convenient if both sides retraced their steps and\nmortified their pride a little, and acknowledged that _socialism and\nfree trade_ may certainly be called _scientific_ in metaphor or\nhyperbole; but that neither of them are, or ever can be, scientific\ndeductions? And that thus the problem of socialism, of free trade and\nof any other practical social programme, may be transferred to another\nregion; which is not that of pure science, but which nevertheless is\nthe only one suited to them?\n\nLet us pause for an instant at free trade. It presents itself to us\nfrom two points of view, _i.e._ with a two-fold justification. In the\nolder aspect it undeniably has a metaphysical basis, consisting in\nthat conviction of the goodness of natural laws and that concept of\n_nature_ (natural law, state of nature, etc.) which, proceeding from\nthe philosophy of the 17th century, was predominant in the 18th\ncentury.[53] 'Do not hinder Nature in her work and all will be for the\nbest.' A similar note is struck, only indirectly, by a criticism like\nthat of Marx; who, when analysing the concept of _nature_, showed that\nit was the ideological complement of the historical development of the\nmiddle class, a powerful weapon of which this class availed itself\nagainst the privileges and oppressions which it intended to\noverthrow.[54] Now this concept may indeed have originated as a weapon\nmade occasional use of historically, and nevertheless be intrinsically\ntrue. _Natural law_ in this case, is equivalent to _rational law_; it\nis necessary to deny both the rationality and the excellence of this\nlaw. Now, just because of its metaphysical origin, this concept can be\nrejected altogether, but cannot be refuted in detail--it disappears\nwith the metaphysic of which it was a part, and it seems at length to\nhave really disappeared. Peace to the _sublime goodness_ of natural\nlaws.\n\nBut free trade presents itself to us, among its more recent\nsupporters, in a very different aspect--the free traders, abandoning\nmetaphysical postulates, assert two theses of practical importance:\n(_a_) that of an _economic hedonistic maximum_, which they suppose\nidentical with the maximum of social desirability;[55] and (_b_) the\nother, that this hedonistic maximum can only be completely secured by\nmeans of the fullest economic liberty. These two theses certainly take\nus outside metaphysics and into the region of reality; but not\nactually into the region of science. Indeed the first of them contains\na statement of the ends of social life, which may perhaps be welcome,\nbut is not a deduction from any scientific proposition. The second\nthesis cannot be proved except by reference to experience, _i.e._ to\nwhat we know of human psychology, and to what, by approximate\ncalculation, we may suppose that psychology will still probably be in\nthe future. A calculation which can be made, and has been made with\ngreat acumen, with great erudition and with great caution and which\nhence may even be called scientific, but only in a metaphorical and\nhyperbolical sense, as we have already remarked: hence the knowledge\nwhich it affords us, can never have the value of strictly scientific\nknowledge.[56] Pareto, who is both one of the most intelligent and\nalso one of the most trustworthy and sincere, of the recent exponents\nand supporters of free trade,[57] does not deny the limited and\napproximate nature of its conclusions; which appears to him so much\nthe more clearly in that he uses mathematical formulae, which show at\nonce the degree of certainty to which statements of this kind may lay\nclaim.\n\nAnd, in effect, communism (which has also had its metaphysical period,\nand earlier still a theological period) may, with entire justice, set\nagainst the two theses of free trade, two others of its own which\nconsist: (_a_) in a different and not purely economic estimate of the\nmaximum of social desirability; (_b_) in the assertion that this\nmaximum can be attained, not through extreme free trade, but rather\nthrough the organisation of economic forces; which is the meaning of\nthe famous saying concerning the _leap from the reign of necessity_\n(=free competition or anarchy) _into that of liberty_ (=the command of\nman over the forces of nature even in the sphere of the social natural\nlife). But neither can these two theses be proved; and for the same\nreasons. Ideals cannot be proved; and empirical calculations and\npractical convictions are not science. Pareto clearly recognises this\nquality in modern socialism; and agrees that the communistic system,\nas a system, is perfectly conceivable, _i.e._ theoretically it offers\nno internal contradictions (\u00a7 446). According to him it clashes, not\nwith scientific laws, but with _immense practical difficulties_\n(_l.c._) such as the difficulty of adopting technical improvements\nwithout the trial and selection secured by free competition; the lack\nof stimuli to work; the choice of officials, which in a communistic\nsociety would be guided, still according to him, not by wholly\ntechnical reasons, as in modern industry, but on political and social\ngrounds (837). He admits the socialist criticism of the waste due to\nfree competition; but thinks this inevitable as a practical way of\nsecuring equilibrium of production. The real problem--he says--is:\nwhether without the experiments of free competition it is possible to\narrive at a knowledge of the line (the line which he calls _mn_) of\nthe complete adaptation of production to demand, and whether the\nexpense of making a unified (communistic) organisation of work, would\nnot be greater than that needed to solve the equations of production\nby experiments (718, 867). He also acknowledged that there is\nsomething parasitical in the capitalist (Marx's _sad-faced knight_);\nbut, at the same time, he maintains that the capitalist renders social\nservices, for which we do not know how otherwise to provide.[58] If it\nbe desired to state briefly the contrasts in the two different points\nof view, it may be said that human psychology is regarded by the free\ntraders as for the most part, determined, and by the socialists, as\nfor the most part changeable and adaptable. Now it is certain that\nhuman psychology does change and adapt itself; but the extent and\nrapidity of these changes are incapable of exact determination and are\nleft to conjecture and opinion. Can they ever become the subject of\nexact calculation?\n\nIf now we pass to considerations of another kind, not of what is\ndesirable, that is of the ends and means admired and thought good by\nus; but of what under present circumstances, history promises us;\n_i.e._ of the objective tendencies of modern society, I really do not\nknow with what meaning many free traders cast on socialism the\nreproach of being Utopian. For quite another reason socialists might\ncast back the same reproach upon free trade, if it were considered as\nit is at present, and not as it was fifty years ago when Marx composed\nhis criticism upon it. Free Trade and its recommendations turn upon an\nentity which _now at least_, does not exist: _i.e._ the national or\ngeneral interest of society; since existing society is divided into\nantagonistic groups and recognises the interest of each of these\ngroups, but not, or only very feebly, a general interest. Upon which\ndoes free trade reckon? On the landed proprietors or on the industrial\nclasses, on the workmen or on the holders of public dignities?\nSocialism, on the contrary, from Marx onwards, has placed little\nreliance on the good sense and good intentions of men, and has\ndeclared that the social revolution must be accomplished chiefly by\nthe effort of a class directly interested, _i.e._ the proletariat. And\nsocialism has made such advances that history must inquire whether the\nexperience that we have of the past justifies the supposition that a\nsocial movement, so widespread and intense, can be reabsorbed or\ndispersed without fully testing itself in the sphere of facts. On this\nmatter too I gladly refer to Pareto, who acknowledges that even in\nthat country of free traders' dreams, in England, the system is\nsupported not owing to people's conviction of its intrinsic\nexcellence, but because it is in the interests of certain\n_entrepreneurs_.[59] And he recognises, with political acumen, that\nsince social movement takes place in the same manner as all other\nmovements, along the line of least resistance, it is very likely that\nit may be necessary to pass through a socialistic state,--in order to\nreach a state of free competition (\u00a7 791).\n\nI have said that the extreme free traders, much more than the\nsocialists, are _idealists_, or if one prefers it, _ideologists_.\nHence in Italy we are witnesses of this strange phenomenon, a sort of\nfraternising and spiritual sympathy between socialists and free\ntraders, in so far as both are bitter and searching critics of the\nsame thing, which the former call the _bourgeois tyranny_ and the\nlatter _bourgeois socialism_. But in the field of practical activity\nthe socialists (and here I no longer refer especially to Italy)\nundoubtedly make progress whilst the free traders have to limit\nthemselves to the barrenness of evil-speaking and of aspirations,\nforming a little group of well-meaning people of select intelligence,\nwho make audience for one another.[60] By this I mean no reproach to\nthese sincere and thoroughly consistent free-traders: rather I\nsincerely admire them; their lack of success is not their own fault.\nI wish merely to remark that if ideals, as the philosopher says, have\nshort legs, those of the free traders' ideals are indeed of the\nshortest.\n\nI could continue this exemplification, bringing forward various other\nsocial programmes, such as that of state socialism, which consists in\naccepting the socialist ideal, but as an ultimate end perhaps never\nfully attainable, and extending its partial attainment over a long\ncourse of centuries; and in relying for the effective force, not in a\nrevolutionary class, nor simply in the views of right thinkers, but in\nthe state, conceived as a creative power, independent of and superior\nto individual wills. It is certainly undeniable that the function of\nthe state, like all social functions, owing to a complication of\ncircumstances, amongst which are tradition, reverence, the\nconsciousness of something which surpasses individuals, and other\nimpressions and sentiments which are analysed by collective\npsychology, acquires a certain independence and develops a certain\npeculiar force; but in the estimation of this force great mistakes are\nmade, as socialist criticism has clearly shown: and, in any case,\nwhether it be great or small, we are always faced by a calculation;\nand one moreover, in the region of opinion, which region science may,\nin part, yet bring under its power, but which in a great degree will\nalways be rebellious to it.\n\nOh the misuses which are made of this word _science_! Once these\nmisuses were the monopoly of metaphysics, to whose despotic nature\nthey appeared suitable. And the strangest instances could be quoted,\neven from great philosophers, from Hegel, from Schopenhauer, from\nRosmini, which would show how the humblest practical conclusions, made\nby the passions and interests of men, have often been metaphysically\ntransformed into inferences from the Spirit, from the Divine Being,\nfrom the Nature of things, from the finality of the universe.\nMetaphysics hypostatised what it then triumphantly inferred. The\nyouthful Marx wittily discovered in the Hegelianism of Bruno Bauer,\nthe _pre-established harmony of critical analysis_ (Kritische Kritik)\nunder German _censorship_. Those who most frequently have the word in\ntheir mouths make a sort of Sibyl or Pythia of a limited intellectual\nfunction. But the _desirable_ is not science, nor is the\npracticable.[61]\n\nIs scientific knowledge then in fact superfluous in practical\nquestions? Are we to assent to this absurdity? The attentive reader\nwill be well aware that we are not here discussing the _utility_ of\nscience, but the possibility of _inferring_, as some claim to do,\n_practical programmes from scientific prepositions_; and it is this\npossibility only which is denied.\n\nScience, in so far as it consists in knowledge of the laws governing\nactual facts, may be a legitimate means of simplifying problems,\nmaking it possible to distinguish in them what can be scientifically\nascertained from what can only be partially known. A great number of\nthings which are commonly disputed, may be cleared up and accurately\ndecided by this method. To give an example, when Marx in opposition to\nProudhon and his English predecessors (Bray, Gray, etc.) showed the\nabsurdity of creating _labour bonds_, _i.e._ labour-money; and when\nEngels directed similar criticisms against D\u00fchring, and then again,\nperhaps with less justification, against Rodbertus[62] or when both\nestablished the close connection between the method of production and\nthe method of distribution, they were working in the field proper to\nscientific demonstration, trying to prove an inconsistency between the\nconclusions and the premisses, _i.e._ an internal contradiction in the\nconcepts criticised. The same may be said of the proof, carefully\nworked out by the free traders, of the proposition: that protection of\nevery kind is equivalent to a destruction of wealth. And if it were\npossible to establish accurately that law of the tendency of the rate\nof profits to decline, with which Marx meant to correct and widen the\nRicardian law deduced from the continuous encroachments of the rent of\nland, it could be said, _under certain conditions_, that the end of\nthe bourgeois capitalist organisation was a scientific certainty,\nthough it would remain doubtful what could take its place.\n\nThis limitation '_under certain conditions_' is the point to be\nnoticed. All scientific laws are abstract laws; and there is no bridge\nover which to pass from the concrete to the abstract; just because the\nabstract is not a reality, but a form of thought, one of our, so to\nspeak, abbreviated ways of thinking. And, although a knowledge of the\nlaws may _light up_ our perception of reality, it cannot become _this\nperception itself_.\n\nHere we may agree with what Labriola justly felt, when, showing his\ndissatisfaction with the term _scientific socialism_, he suggested,\nthough without giving any reasons, that that of _critical communism_\nmight be substituted.[63]\n\nIf then from abstract laws and concepts we pass to observations of\nhistorical fact, we find, it is true, points of agreement between our\nideals and real things, but at the same time we enter upon those\ndifficult calculations and conjectures, from which it is always\nimpossible to eliminate, as was remarked above, the diversity of\nopinions and propensities.\n\nIn face of the future of society, in face of the path to be pursued,\nwe have occasion to say with Faust--Who can say I believe? Who can say\nI do not believe?\n\nNot indeed that we wish to advocate or in any way justify a vulgar\nscepticism. But at the same time we need to be sensible of the\nrelativity of our beliefs, and to come to a determination in practice\nwhere indetermination is an error. This is the point; and herein lie\nall the troubles of men of thought; and hence arises their practical\nimpotence, which art has depicted in Hamlet. Neither shall we wish, in\ntruth, to imitate that magistrate, famous for miles around the\ndistrict where he officiated for the justice of his decisions, of whom\nRabelais tells us, that he used the very simple method, when about to\nmake up his mind, of offering a prayer to God and settling his\ndecision by a game of odd and even.[64] But we must strive to attain\npersonal conviction, and then bear always in mind that great\ncharacters in history have had the courage to _dare_. '_Alea jacta\nest_,' said C\u00e6sar; '_Gott helfe mir, amen!_' said Luther. The brave\ndeeds of history would not be brave if they had been accompanied by a\nclear foresight of the consequences, as in the case of the prophets\nand those inspired by God.\n\nFortunately, logic is not life, and man is not intellect alone. And,\nwhilst those same men whose critical faculty is warped, are the men of\nimagination and passion, in the life of society the intellect plays a\nvery small part, and with a little exaggeration it may even be said\nthat things go their way independent of our actions. Let us leave them\nto their romances, let them preach, I will not say in the market\nplaces where they would not be believed, but in the university lecture\nrooms, or the halls of congresses and conferences--the doctrine that\nscience (_i.e._ their science) is the ruling queen of life. And we\nwill content ourselves by repeating with Labriola that 'History is the\ntrue mistress of all us men, and we are as it were _vitalised_ by\nHistory.'\n\n\nV\n\nOF ETHICAL JUDGMENT IN FACE OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS\n\n    _Meaning of Marx's phrase the 'impotence of morality' and his\n        remark that morality condemns what has been condemned by\n        history: Profundity of Marx's philosophy immaterial:\n        Kant's position not surpassed._\n\nLabriola, with his usual piquancy, lashes those who reduce history to\na _case of conscience_ or to an _error in bookkeeping_.\n\nWith this he recalls us to the two-fold consideration (1) that for\nMarx the social question was not a moral question, and (2) that the\nanalysis made by Marx of capitalism amounts to a proof of the laws\nwhich govern a given society, and not indeed to a proof of _theft_, as\nsome have understood it, as though it would suffice to restore to the\nworkman the amount of his wrongfully exacted surplus labour, so that\nthe accounts may turn out in order, and the social question be\nsatisfactorily solved.[65]\n\nLeaving the second consideration, which yet gives us an instance of\nthe ludicrous travesties which may be made of a scientific theory, let\nus pause for a moment over the first formula, which usually gives the\ngreatest offence to non-socialists; so much so that many of them wish\nto put a little salt in the broth and complete socialism by morality.\n\nIn actual fact, offence and moral indignation have never been caused\nless appropriately.\n\nThose remarks in Marx's writings which savour of moral indifference,\nbear a very limited and trivial meaning. Consider a moment, as indeed\nhas been considered many times, that no social order of any kind can\nexist without a basis of slavery, or serfdom, or hired service; that\nis to say that slavery, or serfdom, or hired service are natural\nconditions of social order, and that without them a thing cannot\nexist, which is so necessary to man that, at least since he was man,\nhe has never done without it, viz., society. Faced by such a fact,\nwhat meaning would our moral judgment have, directed against these\ngoverning human beings who call themselves slave owners, feudal lords\nand bourgeois capitalists, and in favour of these governed human\nbeings who call themselves slaves, serfs, free labourers; neither of\nwhom could be different from what they are, nor could otherwise fulfil\nthe function assigned to them by the very nature of things.[66] Our\ncondemnation would be a condemnation of the inevitable; a Leopardian\ncurse directed against the _brutal power which rules in secret to the\ngeneral harm_. But moral praise or blame has reference always to an\nact of will, good or bad; and such judgments would on the contrary be\ndirected against a fact, which has not been willed by anyone, but is\nendured by every one because it cannot be different. You, indeed, may\nlament it; but by lamenting it, you not only do not destroy it, you do\nnot even touch it, _i.e._, you waste your time.\n\nThis is what Marx calls the impotence of morality, which is as much as\nto say that it is useless to propound questions which no effort can\nanswer and which are therefore absurd.\n\nBut when, on the other hand, these conditions of subjection are not\nconceived as necessary for the social order in general, but only as\nnecessary for a stage in its history; and when new conditions make\ntheir appearance which render it possible to destroy them (as was the\ncase in the industrial advance toward serfdom, and as the socialists\nreckon will happen in the final phase of modern civilisation in regard\nto wage earners and capitalism); then moral condemnation is justified,\nand, up to a certain point, is also effective in quickening the\nprocess of destruction and in sweeping away the last remnants of the\npast.\n\nThis is the meaning of Marx's other saying: that morality condemns\nwhat has already been condemned by history.[67]\n\nI cannot manage to see any difficulty in agreeing to remarks of this\nkind, even from the standpoint of the strictest ethical theories.\nThere is here no question of misunderstanding the nature of morality,\nand of wishing to make it into something fortuitous or relative; but\nsimply of determining the conditions of human progress, turning the\nattention from the inevitable effects to the fundamental causes, and\nseeking remedies in the nature of things and not in our caprices and\npious wishes. It must needs be thought that the opposition proceeds,\nnot from intellectual error, but rather from human pride, or vanity it\nmay be, owing to which many desire to retain for their wretched words\na little of the virtue of the divine word, which created light by its\ndecree.[68]\n\nThe same feeling must perhaps be present as the basis of the horror\nwhich usually greets the other practical maxim of the socialists; that\nthe workman educates himself by the political struggle. But Labriola\nis fully justified in admiring in the advance of German socialism 'the\ntruly new and imposing instance of social pedagogy; viz. that, amongst\nsuch an enormous number of men, particularly of workmen of the lower\nmiddle class, a new consciousness is developing, within which compete\nin equal degree, a direct sense of the economic situation, which\nincites to the struggle, and the socialist propaganda understood as\nthe goal or point of arrival.' What means have the preachers of moral\nmaxims at their disposal, to secure a result equal to this? Who are\nthese workmen who combine in associations, who read their newspapers,\ndiscuss the acts of their delegates and accept the decisions of their\ncongresses, if not _men who are educating themselves morally_?\n\nBut there is not only a question of vanity and pride in that feeling\nof aversion, which animates many with regard to the practical maxims\nof the socialists, and in the desire, which people also show, of\nundertaking in the name of morality or religion, the spiritual\ndirection of the education of the working man; nor shall we wish to be\nso ingenuous and complacent as to confine ourselves to such a partial\nexplanation. There is more, there is, I might almost say, an\n_apprehension_ and a _fear_. An apprehension, little justified, lest\nthe political organisation of the proletariat may lead to a brutal and\nunrestrained outbreak of the masses and to I know not what kind of\nsocial ruin; as if such outbreaks were not recorded by history in\nprecisely those periods in which it is usual to suppose that the\ndominion of religion over conscience was greatest,--as in the\n_jacqueries_ of the fourteenth century in France, and again in the\n_peasants' wars_ in Germany,--and in which there was no organisation\nand political culture amongst the common people.[69] A _fear_, which\nis on the contrary thoroughly justified and arises from the knowledge\nthat instinctive and blind proletariat movements are conquered by\nforce; whereas organisation combined with an enlightened\nconsciousness, is not conquered or only suffers temporary reverses.\nDoes not Mommsen remark, in reference to the slave revolts in ancient\nRome; that _states_ would be very fortunate if they were in no other\ndangers besides those which might come to them from the revolts of\nthe proletariat, _which are no greater than the dangers arising from\nthe claws of hungry bears or wolves_?\n\nThese statements concerning ethics and socialist pedagogy having been\nexplained, someone might yet ask:--But what was the philosophical\nopinion of Marx and Engels in regard to morality? Were they\nrelativists, utilitarians, hedonists, or idealists, absolutists, or\nwhat else?\n\nI may be allowed to point out that this question is of no great\nimportance, and is even somewhat inopportune, since neither Marx nor\nEngels were philosophers of ethics, nor bestowed much of their\nvigorous ability on such questions. It is indeed of consequence to\ndetermine that their conclusions in regard to the function of morality\nin social movements and to the method for the education of the\nproletariat, contain no contradiction of general ethical principles,\neven if here and there they clash with the prejudices of current\npseudo-morality. Their personal opinions upon the principles of ethics\ndid not take an elaborate scientific form in their books; and some wit\nand some sarcasm are not adequate grounds upon which to base a\ndiscussion of the subject.\n\nAnd I will say yet more; in ethical matters, I have not yet succeeded\nin freeing myself from the prison of the Kantian Critique, and do not\nyet see the position taken up by Kant surpassed; on the contrary, I\nsee it strengthened by some of the most modern tendencies, and to me\nthe way in which Engels attacks D\u00fchring with regard to the principles\nof morality in his well-known book, does not in truth appear very\nexhaustive.[70] Here again the procedure is repeated which we have\nalready criticised in connection with the discussions upon the general\nconcept of value. Where D\u00fchring, owing to the exigencies of scientific\nabstraction, takes for consideration the isolated individual and\nexplicitly states that he is dealing with an abstract illustration\n(_Denkschema_), Engels remarks, wittily but erroneously--that the\nisolated man is nothing but a new edition of the first Adam in the\nGarden of Eden. It is true that in that criticism are contained many\nwell-directed blows; and it might even be called just, if it refers\nonly to ethical conceptions in the sense of assemblages of special\nrules and moral judgments, relative to definite social situations,\nwhich assemblages and constructions cannot claim absolute truth for\nall times, and all places, precisely because they are always made for\nparticular times and particular places. But apart from these special\nconstructions, analysis offers us the essential and ruling principles\nof morality, which give opportunity for questions which may, truly, be\ndifferently answered, but which most certainly are not taken into\naccount by Marx and Engels. And, in truth, even if some may be able to\nwrite on the _theory of knowledge according to_ _Marx_,[71] to write\non the principles of ethics according to Marx seems to me a somewhat\nhopeless undertaking.\n\n\nVI\n\nCONCLUSION\n\n    _Recapitulation: 1. Justification of Marxian economics as\n        comparative sociological economics: 2. Historical\n        materialism simply a canon of historical interpretation:\n        3. Marxian social programme not a pure science: 4.\n        Marxism neither intrinsically moral nor antimoral._\n\nThe preceding remarks are partly attempts at interpretation, and\npartly critical emendations of some of the concepts and opinions\nexpressed by Marx and in the Marxian literature. But how many other\npoints deserve to undergo revision! Beginning with that _concentration\nof private property in a few hands_, which threatens to become\nsomething like the discredited _iron law of wages_, and ending with\nthat strange statement in the history of philosophy that _the labour\nmovement is the heir of German classical philosophy_. And attention\ncould thus be given to another group of questions which we have not\ndiscussed (_e.g._ to the conception of future society) in regard to\ntheir detailed elucidation and their practical and historical\napplications.[72] If that _decomposition of Marxism_, which some have\npredicted,[73] meant a careful critical revision, it would indeed be\nwelcome.\n\nTo sum up, in the meantime, the chief results which are suggested in\nthe preceding remarks: they maintain.\n\n1. In regard to economic science, the _justification_ of Marxian\neconomics, understood not as general economic science, but as\ncomparative sociological economics, which is concerned with a problem\nof primary interest for historical and social life.\n\n2. In regard to the philosophy of history, the _purification_ of\nhistorical materialism from all traces of any _a priori_ standpoint\n(whether inherited from Hegelianism or an infection from ordinary\nevolutionism) and the understanding of the theory as a simple, albeit\na fruitful, _canon_ of historical interpretation.\n\n3. In regard to practical matters, the _impossibility of inferring_\nthe Marxian social programme (or, indeed, any other social programme)\nfrom the propositions of pure science, since the appraisement of\nsocial programmes must be a matter of empirical observations and\npractical convictions; in which connection the Marxian programme\ncannot but appear one of the noblest and boldest and also one of those\nwhich obtain most support from the objective conditions of existing\nsociety.\n\n4. In regard to ethics, the _abandonment of the legend_ of the\nintrinsic _immorality_ or of the intrinsic _anti-ethical_ character of\nMarxism.\n\nI will add a remark on the second point. Many will think that if\nhistorical materialism is reduced to the limits within which we have\nconfined it, it will not only no longer be a legitimate and real\nscientific theory (which we are indeed prepared to grant) but will\nactually lose all importance whatever, and against this second\nconclusion we once more, as we have done already on another occasion,\nmake vigorous protest. Undoubtedly the horror expressed by some for\npure science and for abstractions is inane, since these intellectual\nmethods are indispensable for the very knowledge of concrete reality;\nbut no less inane is the complete and exclusive worship of abstract\npropositions, of _definitions_, of _theorems_, of _corollaries_:\nalmost as if these constituted a sort of aristocracy of human thought.\nWell! the economic purists (not to draw examples from other fields,\nthough numbers could be found in pure mathematics) prove to us, in\nfact, that the discovery of scientific theorems,--strictly,\nunimpeachably scientific,--is frequently neither an over-important nor\nover-difficult matter. To be convinced thereof we need only remark how\nmany _eponimi_ of new theorems issue from every corner of the German\nor English schools. And concrete reality, _i.e._ the very world in\nwhich we live and move, and which it concerns us somewhat to know,\nslips out, unseizable, from the broad-meshed net of abstractions and\nhypotheses. Marx, as a sociologist, has in truth not given us\ncarefully worked out definitions of _social phenomena_, such as may be\nfound in the books of so many contemporary sociologists, of the\nGermans Simmel and Stammler, or of the Frenchman Durckheim; but he\nteaches us, although it is with statements approximate in content and\nparadoxical in form, to penetrate to what society is in its _actual\ntruth_. Nay, from this point of view, I am surprised that no one has\nthought of calling him 'the most notable _successor_ of the Italian\nNiccolo Machiavelli'; a Machiavelli of the labour movement.\n\nAnd I will also add a remark on the third point--if the social\nprogramme of Marxism cannot be _wholly included_ in Marxian science,\nor in any other science, no more can the daily practice of socialist\npolitics be, in its turn, _wholly included_ in the general principles\nof the programme, which programme, if we analyse it, determines (1)\n_an ultimate end_, (the technical organisation of society); (2) _an\nimpulse, based on history_, towards this end, found in the objective\ntendencies of modern society (the necessity for the abolition of\ncapitalism and for a communistic organisation, as the one possible\n_form of progress_); (3) _a method_ (to accelerate the final phases of\nthe bourgeoisie, and to educate politically the class destined to\nsucceed them). Marx, owing to his political insight, has for many\nyears in a striking manner, joined with, and guided by his advice and\nhis work, the international socialist movement; but he could not give\n_precepts_ and _dogmas_ for every contingency and complication that\nhistory might produce. Now _the continuation of Marx's political work\nis much more difficult than the continuation of his scientific work_.\nAnd, if, in continuing the latter, the so-called Marxians have\nsometimes fallen into a _scientific dogmatism_ little to be admired,\nsome recent occurrences remind us of the danger, that the continuation\nof the former may also degenerate into a dogmatism with the worst\neffects, _i.e._ a _political dogmatism_. This gives food for thought\nto all the more cautious Marxians, amongst whom are Kautsky and\nBernstein in Germany, and Sorel in France; Labriola's new book, too,\ncontains serious warnings on the matter.\n\n_November, 1897._\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[13] 'An immense monograph' (of economics understood) it is called by\nProfessor Antonio Labriola, the most notable of the Italian Marxians,\nin his recent book (_Discorrendo di filosophia e socialismo_, Rome,\nLoescher, 1898). But in an earlier work (_In Memoria del 'Manifesto\ndei Comunisti'_, 2nd ed. Rome, 1895, p. 36) he defined it as '_a\nphilosophy of history_'.\n\n[14] I leave out those who regard the law of labour-value as the\n_general_ law of value. The refutation is obvious. How could it ever\nbe 'general' when it leaves out of account a whole category of\neconomic goods, that is the goods which cannot be increased by labour?\n\n[15] WERNER SOMBART: _Zur Kritik des oekonomischen Systems von Karl\nMarx_ (in the _Archiv f\u00fcr soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik_ Vol.\nVII, 1894, pp. 555-594). I have not by me the criticism (from the\nHedonistic point of view) of this article by Sombart--on the third\nvolume of _Das Kapital_--made last year by BOHM BAWERK in the\n_Miscellany_ in honour of Knies.\n\n[16] _Loc. cit._, p. 571, _et seq._\n\n[17] In the _Neue Zeit_ xiv. vol. 1, pp. 4-11, 37-44, I quote from the\nItalian translation: _Dal terzo volume del 'Capitale,'_ preface and\nnotes by F. Engels, Rome 1896, p. 39.\n\n[18] _Sur la th\u00e9orie Marxiste de la valeur_ (in the _Journal des\nEconomistes_, number for March 1897, pp. 222-31, see p. 228).\n\n[19] _Discorrendo di socialismo e di filosophia_, p. 21.\n\n[20] It must be carefully noticed that what I call a _concrete fact_\nmay still not be a fact which is empirically real, but a fact made by\nus hypothetically and _entirely imaginary_ or a fact _partially\nempirical_, _i.e._ existing partially in empirical reality. We shall\nsee later on that Marx's typical premise belongs properly to this\nsecond class.\n\n[21] I accept the term employed by Labriola so much the more readily\nsince it is the same as that used by me a year ago. See Essay on Loria\n(_Materialismio Storico_, pp. 48-50).\n\n[22] In making an hypothesis of this nature, Marx distinguished\nclearly that, in such a case, 'labour-time would serve a _double_\npurpose: on the one hand as standard of value, on the other as a\nstandard of the individual share reckoned to each producer in the\ncommon labour' (_andrerseits dient die Arbeitzeit zugleich als Mass\ndes individuellen Antheils des Producenten an der Gemeinarbeit, und\ndaher auch an dem individuell verzehrbaren Theil des Gemein\nproducts_): See _Das Kapital_ I, p. 45.\n\n[23] This is a different thing from the workmen or operatives in our\ncapitalist society, who form a _class_, _i.e._ a portion of economic\nsociety and not economic society in general and in the abstract,\nproducing goods which can be increased by labour.\n\n[24] It may be doubted whether this general application of\nlabour-value to every working economic society was included in the\nideas of Marx and Engels, when the numerous passages are recalled in\nwhich one or other has declared many times that _in the future\ncommunistic society the criterion of value will disappear and\nproduction will be based on social utility, cf._ Engels as early as in\nthe _Umrisse_ 1844, (Italian translation in _Critica sociale_ a. v.\n1895) _Marx_, _Mis\u00e8re de la philosophie_, 2nd ed. Paris, Giard et\nBri\u00e8re. 1896, p. 83; Engels _Antid\u00fchring_, p. 335. But this must be\nunderstood in the sense that, not being a hypothetical communistic\nsociety based on exchange, the function of value (in exchange) would\nlose, according to them, its practical importance; but not in the\nother sense that in the opinion of the communistic society the value\nof goods would no longer equal the labour which they cost to society.\nBecause even in such a system of economic organisation, value-labour\nwould be the economic law which entirely governed the valuation of\nindividual commodities, produced by labour. There would be that\nclearness of valuation which Marx describes in his _Robinsonia, cf.\nDas Kapital_, p. 43.\n\n[25] _Dal terzo volume del 'Capitale,'_ pp. 42-55.\n\n[26] Hence also Marx in \u00a74 of Chap. I.: _Der Fetischcharakter der\nWaare und sein Geheimniss_ (I. pp. 37-50) gave a brief outline of the\nother economic systems of medi\u00e6val society, and of the domestic\nsystem: 'Aller Mysticismus der Waarenwelt, all der Zauber und Spuk,\nwelcher Arbeitsprodukte auf grundlage der Waarenproduktion umnebelt,\nverschwindet daher sofort, sobal wir zu anderen Producktions formen\nfl\u00fcchten' (p. 42). The relation between value and labour appears more\nclearly in the less complex economic systems, because less opposed and\nobscured by other facts.\n\n[27] _Das Kapital_, Book III., sec. III., Chaps. XIII., XIV., XV.,\n_Gesetz des tendentiellen Falls der Profitrate_ (vol. iii., Part I,\npp. 191-249).\n\n[28] The task of Marx's followers ought to be to free his thought from\nthe literary form which he adopts, to study again the questions which\nhe propounds, and to work them out with new and more accurate\nstatements, and with fresh historical illustrations. In this alone can\nscientific progress consist. The _expositions_ made hitherto of Marx's\nsystem, are merely _materials_; and some (like Aveling's) consist\nentirely in a series of little summaries, which follow the original\nchapter by chapter and prove even more obscure. For the law of the\nfall in the rate of profits, see below, chap. V.\n\n[29] 'To follow out completely this criticism of bourgeois economics a\nknowledge of the capitalist form of production, exchange and\ndistribution is not alone adequate. We ought similarly to study at\nleast in their essential features and taken as terms of comparison,\nthe other forms which have preceded it in time, or exist alongside of\nit in less developed countries. Such an investigation and comparison\nhas hitherto been briefly expounded only by Marx; and we owe almost\nentirely to his researches what we know about pre-bourgeois\ntheoretical economics.' (ENGELS, _Antid\u00fchring_, p. 154). This was\nwritten by Engels twenty years ago; and since then the literature of\neconomic history has grown remarkably, but historical research has\nbeen seldom accompanied by theoretical research.\n\n[30] 'Political economy is essentially an historical science.'\n(ENGELS, _l.c._, p. 150).\n\n[31] What is strange is that ENGELS (in the passage quoted in the\npenultimate note) says himself most truly that Marx has written\n_theoretical economics_, nevertheless in the sentence quoted in the\nlast note (which appears in the same book and on the same page) he\nstates definitely that economics in the Marxian sense is nothing but\nan _historical science_.\n\n[32] _Antid\u00fchring_, pp. 150, 155.\n\n[33] _Das Kapital_, I, p. 67.\n\n[34] F.A. LANGE, _Die Arbeiterfrage_, 5th ed., Winterthur, 1894, (the\nauthor's last revision was in 1874) see p. 332; _cf._ p. 248 and on p.\n124, the quotation from Gossen's book, then very little known.\n\n[35] ADOLF WAGNER, _Grundlegung der politischen oekonomie_, 3rd Ed.,\nLeipzig, 1892, vol. I, pt. I; Bk. I, ch. i. _Die Wirthschaftliche\nNatur des Menschen_, pp. 70-137.\n\n[36] I may be allowed to remark that in similar discussions,\neconomists usually make the serious mistake _of making the concept\neconomic coincide with the concept egoistic_. But the economic is an\nindependent sphere of human activity, in addition to all the others,\nsuch as the spheres of ethics, \u00e6sthetics, logic, etc. The moral\n_goods_ and the satisfaction of the higher moral _needs_ of man, just\nbecause they are _goods_, and _needs_, are taken into account in\neconomics, but still _only as goods and needs_, not as _moral_ or\n_immoral_, _egoistic_ or _altruistic_. In like manner, a\n_manifestation_ (by words or by any other means of expression) is\ntaken into account in \u00e6sthetics; but only _as a manifestation _not_ as\ntrue, false, moral, immoral, useful, harmful, etc._ Economists are\nstill impressed by the fact that Adam Smith wrote one book of theory\nand of ethics, and another of economic theory; which may interpret to\nmean that one dealt with a theory of _altruistic_ facts and the other\nwith one of _egoistic_ facts. But if this had been so, Adam Smith\nwould have discussed, in both of his chief works, facts of an ethical\ncharacter, estimable or reprehensible; and would not have been an\neconomist at all; a ridiculous conclusion which is a _reductio ad\nabsurdum_ of the identification of economic action with egoism.\n\n[37] _Discorrendo di socialismo e di filesophia_, l. vi.\n\n[38] It is strange how among the students of pure economics also this\nneed for a different treatment makes itself felt, leading them to\ncontradictory statements and to insuperable perplexities. PANTALEONI,\n_Princip\u00ee di economia pura_, Florence, Barbara, 1889, p. 3, Ch. iii \u00a7\n3 (pp. 299-302), contradicts B\u00f6hm-Bawerk, inquiring whence the\nborrower of capital at interest is able to find the wherewithal to pay\nthe interest. PARETO, _Introd. critica agli Estratti del Capitale del\nMarx_, Ital. trans. Palermo, Sandron, 1894, p. xxx, n.: 'The phenomena\nof _surplus value_ contradicts Marx's theory which determines values\nsolely by labour. _But, on the other hand, there is an expropriation\nof the kind which Marx condemns._ It is not at all proved that this\nexpropriation helps to secure the hedonistic maximum. _But it is a_\n_difficult problem how to avoid this expropriation._' A learned and\naccurate Italian work which attempts to reconcile the opinions of the\nhedonistic school with those of the followers of Ricardo and Marx, is\nthe memorandum of Prof. G. RICCA SALERMO, _La theoria del valore nella\nstoria delle dottrine e dei fatti economici_, Rome 1894. (extr. from\nthe _Memorie dei Lincei_, s. v. vol. I., pt. i.)\n\n[39] See above, chap. I.\n\n[40] The over-abused D\u00fchring was not mistaken when he remarked that in\nMarx's works expressions occur frequently 'which appear to be\nuniversal without being actually so' (Allgemein aussehen ohne es zu\nsein). _Kritische Geschichte der National\u00f6konomie und des\nSocialismus_, Berlin, 1871, p. 527.\n\n[41] GENTILE, _Una critica del materialismo storico_ in the _Stud\u00ee\nstorici_ of Crivellucci, vol. VI, 1897, pp. 379-423, throws doubt on\nthe interpretation offered by me of the opinions of Marx and Engels,\nand on the method of interpretation itself. I gladly acknowledge that\nin my two earlier essays I do not clearly point out where precisely\nthe textual interpretation ends and the really theoretical part\nbegins; which theoretical exposition, only by conjecture and in the\nmanner described above, can be said to agree with the inmost thoughts\nof Marx and Engels. In his recent book, _La filosofia di Marx_, Pisa,\nSpoerri, 1899 (in which the essay referred to is reprinted), Gentile\nremarks (p. 104), that, although it is a very convenient practice, and\nin some cases legitimate and necessary 'to interpret doctrines, by\ncalling a part of their statement worthless or accidental in form and\nexternal and weak, and a part the real substance and essential and\nvital, it is yet necessary to justify it in some way.' He means\ncertainly, 'justify it as historical interpretation,' since its\njustification as correction of theory cannot be doubtful. It seems to\nme that even historically the interpretation can be justified without\ndifficulty when it is remembered that Marx _did not insist_, (as\nGentile himself says) on his metaphysical notions; and did certainly\ninsist on his historical opinions and on the political policy which he\ndefended. Marx's personality as a sociological observer and the\nteacher of a social movement, certainly outweighs Marx as a\nmetaphysician which he was almost solely as a young man. That it is\nworth the trouble to study Marx from all sides is not denied, and\nGentile has now admirably expounded and criticised his youthful\nmetaphysical ideas.\n\n[42] I confess that I have never been able to _understand_--however\nmuch I have considered the matter--the meaning of this passage (which\nought however to be very evident, since it is quoted so often without\nany comment), in the preface to the second edition of _Das Kapital_:\n'Meine dialektische Methode ist der Grundlage nach von der Hegel'schen\nnicht nur verschieden, sondern ihr direktes Gegentheil. F\u00fcr Hegel is\n_der Denkprocess_, den er sogar unter dem Namen _Idee_ in ein\nselbst\u00e4ndiger subjeckt verwandelt, der Demjurg des Wirklichen, das nur\nseine \u00e4ussere Erscheinung bildet. Bei mir ist umgekehrt _das Ideelle_\nnichts Andres als das im Menschenkopf umgesetzte und ubersetzte\nMaterielle.' (_Das Kapital_ I, p. xvii.) Now it seems to me that the\n_Ideelle_ of the last phrase has _no relation_ to the _Denkprocess_\nand to the Hegelian _Idea_ of the preceding phrase, _cf._ above pp.\n17. Some have thought that by the objections there stated, I intended\nto deny Marx's Hegelian _inspiration_. It is well to repeat that I\nmerely deny the _logical relation_ affirmed between the two\nphilosophical theories. To deny Marx's Hegelian inspiration would be\nto contradict the evidence.\n\n[43] Answers to several of the questions suggested above are now\nsupplied in the book already referred to, by GENTILE: _La Filosofia di\nMarx_.\n\n[44] _Antid\u00fchring_, pt. I. ch. xlii., especially pp. 138-145, which\npassage is translated into Italian in the appendix to the book by\nLabriola referred to above: _Discorrendo di socialismo e di\nfilosophia_, _cf._ _Das Kapital_, I. p. xvii, 'Gelingt dies und\nspiegelt sich nun das Leben des stoffs ideell wieder, _so mag es\naussehen_, als habe man es mit einer Konstruction a priori zu thun.'\n\n[45] LANGE, indeed, in reference to Marx's _Das Kapital_, remarked\nthat the Hegelian dialectic, 'the development by antithesis and\nsynthesis, might almost be called an _anthropological discovery_. Only\nin history, as in the life of the individual, development by\nantithesis _certainly does not accomplish itself so easily and\nradically, nor with so much precision and symmetry as in speculative\nthought_.' (_Die Arbeiterfrage_, pp. 248-9.)\n\n[46] With regard to the _abstract_ classes of Marxian economics and\nthe _real_ or _historical_ classes, see some remarks by SOREL in the\narticle referred to in the _Journal des Economistes_, p. 229.\n\n[47] G. GENTILE, _o.c._ in _Stud\u00ee storici_, p. 421. _cf._ 400-401.\n\n[48] Labriola has indeed an exaggerated dislike for what he calls the\n_scholastic_: but even this exaggeration will not appear wholly\nunsuitable as a reaction against the method of study which usually\nprevails among the mere men of letters, the niggardly scholars, the\nempty talkers and jugglers with abstract thought, and all those who\nlose their sense of close connection between science and life.\n\n[49] _Discorrendo di socialismo e di filosophia_, l. ix.\n\n[50] _In torno alla storia della cultura_ (Kulturgeschichtein _Atti_\ndell Accad. Pont.; vol. xxv. 1895, p. 8.)\n\n[51] 'If by Christianity is meant merely the sum of the beliefs and\nexpectations concerning human destiny, these beliefs'--writes\nLabriola--'vary as much, in truth, as in the difference, to mention\nonly one instance, between the free will of the Catholics after the\nCouncil of Trent, and the absolute determination of Calvin!' (_L.c._\nix.)\n\n[52] Without referring to the somewhat unmethodical work of\nWestermarck, _History cf Human Marriage_, see especially Ernst\nGrosse's book, _Die Formen der Familie und die Formen der\nWirthschaft_, Freiburg in B., 1896.\n\n[53] This connection is shortly but carefully dealt with by INGRAM,\n_History of Political Economy_, Edinburgh, A. & C. Black, 1888, p. 62.\n\n[54] See, amongst many passages, MARX, _Mis\u00e8re de la philosophie_, p.\n167, _et seq._ ENGELS, _Antid\u00fchring_, p. 1, _et seq._\n\n[55] On the hedonistic maxima, _cf._ Bertolini-Pantaleoni, _Cenni sul\nconcetto di massimi edonistici individuali e collectivi_ (_in Giorn,\ndegli Econ._, s II vol. iv.) and Coletti, in the same _Giornale_, vol.\nv.\n\n[56] In regard to this metaphysical use of the word science; there\neven exists in Italy a _Rivista di polizia scientifica_! And the\nmetaphor may pass here also.\n\n[57] _Cours d'\u00e9conomie politique_, Lausanne, 1896-7.\n\n[58] _Cf._ also his criticism of Marx already referred to: p. xviii.\n\n[59] Sauf l'Angleterre, o\u00f9 r\u00e8gne le libre \u00e9change _principalement\nparcequ'il est favourable aux int\u00e9r\u00eats de certains entrepreneurs_, le\nreste des pays civilis\u00e9s verse de plus en plus dans le protectionnisme\n(\u00a7. 964.)\n\n[60] See the _Giornale degli economisti_, excellent in all its\ncritical sections; and especially Pareto's _chronicles_ therein.\n\n[61] It may be remarked that in the difficulty of distinguishing the\npurely scientific from the practical lies the chief cause of the\ndangers and poverty of the social and political sciences. And we may\neven smile at those scientists or their ingenious admirers, who claim\nto accomplish the salvation of the social and political sciences, by\napplying to them the methods, as they say, of the natural sciences.\n(An Italian astronomer, ingenuous as clever, has suggested the\nformation of sociological observatories which, in a few years would\nmake sociology something like astronomy!) Alas! the matter is not so\nsimple; all sociologists intend indeed to apply exact methods; but how\ncan this application succeed when one advances _per ignes_ or over\nground which moves; _d'una e d'altra parte s\u00ec come l'onda chefugge e\ns'appressa_? (From both sides like the wave which ebbs and flows.)\n\n[62] See the preface of the German translation of _Mis\u00e8re de la\nphilosophie_, 2nd ed. Stuttgart, 1892, and now also in French in the\nreprint of the original text of the same work (Paris, Giard et Bri\u00e8re,\n1896.)\n\n[63] The word _communism_ is also more appropriate, since there are so\nmany _socialisms_ (democratic state, catholic, etc.). On the relation\nbetween the materialistic theory of history and socialism, see\nGENTILE, _op. cit._, _passim_.\n\n[64] _Pantagruel_, III, 39-43.\n\n[65] The absurdity of this interpretation will come out clearly if it\nis merely remembered that there are many cases in which the capitalist\nmanufacturer pays for the labour of his workman, _a price higher than\nwhat he then realises on the market_; cases, it is true, where the\ncapitalist is proceeding towards ruin and bankruptcy; but which he\ncannot, on this account, always avoid. 'Marx part des recherches\nfaites par cette \u00e9cole Anglaise, dont il avait fait une \u00e9tude\napprofondie; et il veut _expliquer le profit sans admettre aucun\nbrigandage_.' (SOREL, _art. cit._, p. 227.)\n\n[66] See in _Antid\u00fchring_, p. 303, the historical justification of\nclass divisions.\n\n[67] From among the many passages which support this interpretation,\n_cf. Antid\u00fchring_, pp. 152-3, 206 and especially pp. 61-2, and the\npreface to the German translation of _Mis\u00e8re de la Philosophie_, 2nd\ned. Stuttgart, 1892 pp. ix-x, _cf._ also Labriola, _o.c._ _Lett.\nVIII._\n\n[68] See LABRIOLA, _o.c. l. cit._, the remarks on the difficulty with\nwhich the theory of historical materialism meets owing to mental\ndispositions, and amongst those who wish _to moralise socialism_.\n\nOne instance, in some respects analogous to this which arises from the\ndiscussions on Marx's ethics, is the traditional criticism of\nMachiavelli's ethics: which was refuted by De Sanctis (in the\nremarkable chapter devoted to Machiavelli, in his _Storia della\nletteratura_), but which continually recurs and is inserted even in\nProfessor Villari's book, who finds this defect in Machiavelli: that\nhe did not consider the _moral question_.\n\nI have always asked myself for what reason, by what obligation, by\nwhat agreement, Machiavelli was bound to discuss all kinds of\nquestions, even those for which he had neither preparation nor\nsympathy. Can it be said, by way of example, to some one who is\nresearching in chemistry:--Your weak and erroneous spot is that you\nhave not gone back from your detailed investigations to the general\nmetaphysical enquiries into the principles of reality?--Machiavelli\nstarts from the establishment of a fact: the condition of war in which\nsociety found itself; and gives rules suited to this state of affairs.\nWhy should he, who was not cut out for a moral philosopher, discuss\nthe ethics of war? He goes straight to practical conclusions. Men are\nwicked--he says--and to the wicked it is needful to behave wickedly.\nYou will deceive him who would certainly deceive you. You will do\nviolence to him who would do violence to you. These maxims are neither\nmoral nor immoral, neither beneficial nor harmful; they become one of\nthe two according to the subjective aims and the objective effects of\nthe action, _i.e._ according to the _intentions_ and the _results_.\nWhat is evident is that a morality which desired to introduce into war\nthe maxims of peace would be a morality for lambs fit for the\nslaughter, not for men who wish to repel injustice and to maintain\ntheir rights. 'And if men were all good, this precept would not be\ngood, etc., etc.' says Machiavelli himself. (_Principe_, ch. xviii).\nVillari is also troubled by the old formula concerning the 'end which\njustifies the means' and the 'moral end' and the 'immoral means'. It\nis however sufficient to consider that the _means_, just because they\nare _means_, cannot be divided into _moral_ and _immoral_, but merely\ninto _suitable_ and _unsuitable_. _Immoral means_, unless as an\nexpression in current speech, is a contradiction in terms. The\nqualification moral or immoral can only belong to the end. And, in the\nexamples usually given, an analysis made with a little accuracy shows\nat once, that it is never a question of immoral _means_ but of immoral\nends. The height of the confusion is reached by those who introduce\ninto the question the absurd distinction of _private_ and _public_\nmorality.\n\nI may be pardoned the digression; but, as I said, questions which are\nreally analogous re-appear now in connection with the ethical maxims\nof Marxism.\n\n[69] And it would be to the point to draw a comparison between the\npeasants' rebellions, with which modern Italy has supplied us with\nanother example in recent years, and the political struggles of the\nGerman workmen, or the economic struggles of the Trade Unions in\nEngland.\n\n[70] See in particular P.I. ch. ix., _Moral und Recht, Ewige\nWahrheiten_.\n\n[71] See, in particular, MARX'S ideas: _Ueber Feuerbach_, in 1845, in\nthe appendix to Engels' book, _Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der\nKlassischen deutschen Philosophie_, 2nd ed. Stuttgart, 1895, pp.\n59-62; and _cf._ ANDLER in _Revue de metaphysique_, 1897, LABRIOLA,\n_o.c. passim_ and GENTILE, _l.c._, p. 319. From this point of view\n(_i.e._ limiting the statement to the theory of knowledge) we might\nspeak like Labriola of historical materialism as a philosophy of\npractice, _i.e._ as a particular way of conceiving and solving, or\nrather of over-coming, the problem of thought and of existence. The\nphilosophy of practice has now been designedly studied by Gentile in\nthe volume referred to.\n\n[72] Some interpretations would be merely verbal explanations. To some\nit will appear a very hard statement that socialism aims at abolishing\nthe State. Yet it suffices to consider that the State, among\nsocialists, is synonymous with difference of classes and the existence\nof governing classes, to understand that as in such a case, we can\nspeak of the _origin_ of the State, so we can speak of its _end_;\nwhich does not mean the end of organised society (_cf. Antid\u00fchring_,\np. 302). The conception of _the way in which capitalist society will\ncome to an end_ demands no little critical working out; on this point\nthe thought of Marx and Engels is not without obscurities and\ninconsistencies (_cf. Antid\u00fchring_, pp. 287 _et seq._ and p. 297).\n\n[73] See CH. ANDLER, _Les origines du socialisme d'\u00e9tat en Allemagne_,\nParis, Alcan, 1897. Andler promises a book, and is now giving a course\nof lectures on the _decomposition of Marxism_.\n\n\n\n\n_CHAPTER IV._ RECENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MARXIAN THEORY OF VALUE\nAND CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING THEM\n\n\nI\n\n    _Labriola's criticism of method and conclusions of preceeding\n        essays answered: His criticism merely destructive:\n        Tendency of ether thinkers to arrive at like\n        conclusions._\n\nI have always discussed frankly the views expressed in the writings of\nmy eminent friend Professor Antonio Labriola. I am therefore glad that\nhe has taken the same liberty with me, and has subjected to a vigorous\ncriticism (in the French edition of his book on _Socialismo e la\nfilosofia_),[74] my interpretation of the Marxian theory of value.[75]\nLabriola has been impelled to this also from a wish to prevent my\nopinions from appearing, 'to the reader's eyes,' as a supplement,\napproved by him, of his own personal ones. And though I do not think\nthat 'to the reader's eyes' (I will however add _intelligent_\nreaders), this would be possible, since, I have always carefully\nindicated the points, and they are neither few nor unimportant, where\nwe disagree: yet being convinced that clearness is never superfluous,\nI welcome his intention to make it still plainer that I am not he,\nand that he thinks with his mind whilst I think with mine.\n\nLabriola rejects entirely the method adopted by me, which he describes\nvariously as _scholastic_, _metaphysical_, _metaphorical_, _abstract_,\n_formal logic_. When I take pains to point out the differences between\n_homo oeconomicus_ and man, moral or immoral, between personal\ninterest and egoism,[76] he shrugs his shoulders, he does not refuse a\ncertain indulgence to this _traditional scholasticism_, and compares\nme to the man in the street who speaks of the rising or setting of the\nsun, or of _shining light_ and _warm heat_. When I firmly maintain the\ntheoretical necessity for a _general economics_ in addition to the\nheterogeneous considerations of sociological economics, he taxes me\nwith creating, _in addition to all the visible and tangible animals,\nan animal as such_. And he charges me, moreover, with wishing to\nattack history, comparative philology and physiology in order to\nsubstitute for all these the plain _Logic_ of Port Royal, so that\ninstead of studying examples of epigenesis which have actually\noccurred, such as the transitions from invertebrates to vertebrates,\nfrom primitive communism to private property in land, from\nundifferentiated roots to the systematic differentiation of nouns and\nverbs in the Ariosemitic group, it might suffice to register these\nfacts in concepts passing from the more general to the more\nparticular, in the series A a^1 a^2 a^3 etc.\n\nBut I hardly know how to defend myself seriously from such\naccusations, because it obliges me to repeat what is too obvious,\n_i.e._, that to make concepts does not mean to _create entities_; that\nto employ metaphors (and language is all metaphor), does not mean to\n_believe mythology_; that to construct experiences in thought, and\nscientific abstractions, does not mean to substitute either one or the\nother for _concrete reality_; that to make use, when needful, of\nformal logic, does not mean to ignore _fact_, _growth_, _history_.\nWhen Marx expounds historical facts I know no way of approaching him\nexcept that of historical criticism, and when he defines concepts and\nformulates laws, I can only proceed to recognise the content of his\nconcepts, and to test the correctness of his inferences and\ndeductions. Thus I have followed this second method in studying his\ntheory of value. If Labriola knows another and better one, let him\nstate it. But what could this _other_ one possibly be? Real logic? In\nthat case let us boldly re-establish Hegel, it will be the lesser\nevil, at least we shall understand one another. Or a still worse\nalternative, what monstrous empirical-dialectic or evolutionist method\nmay it be, which confuses together and abuses two distinct procedures,\nand lends itself so readily to the lovers of prophecy? Or is it merely\na question of new phraseology by which we shall go on humbly working,\nmore or less well, with the old methods, whilst detesting the old\nwords? Or again, is this dislike for formal logic nothing but a\nconvenient pretext for dispensing with any vindication of the concepts\nwhich are employed?\n\nMarx has stated his concept of _value_; has expounded a process of\ntransformation of _value_ into _price_; has reconstructed the nature\nof profit as _surplus value_. For me the whole problem of Marxian\ncriticism is confined within these limits:--Is Marx's conception\nsubstantially erroneous (entirely, owing to false premisses, and\npartially, owing to false deductions)? or, is Marx's conception\nsubstantially correct, but has it been subsumed under a category to\nwhich it does not belong, and has search been made in it for what it\ncannot supply, whilst what it actually offers has been ignored? Having\ncome to this second conclusion I have asked myself: Under what\nconditions and assumptions is Marx's theory _thinkable_? And this\nquestion I have tried to answer in my essay.\n\nWhat Marx wished to do, or mistakenly thought himself to be doing is,\nI think, of interest to criticism up to a certain point; although the\nhistory of science shows that thinkers have not always had the\nclearest and plainest knowledge of the whole of their thought; and\nthat it is one thing to discover a truth, and another to define and\nclassify the discovery when made. It may be allowed that he who\nconfuses ideological with historical research thus best reproduces\nMarx's _spirit_; but in this case the work will be an artistic\nrecasting or a psychological reproduction, not a criticism; and will\ngather up with the sound also the unsound portion of Marx's thought.\n\nTo go into details. Labriola tries to prove the emptiness or vagueness\nof some of my definitions and the falsity of some of my reasoning. I\nhaving asserted that capitalist economics is a special case of general\neconomics, Labriola remarks, '_en passant_,' that it is nevertheless\nthe only case which has given rise to a theory and to divisions of\nschools; and I acknowledge that I do not understand the point of this\nremark, although it is said to be made '_en passant_.' Both Marx and\nEngels lamented that the ancient and medieval economic systems had not\nbeen studied in the same way as the modern. Thus there are conceivable\nat least three economic theories, ancient, medieval and modern, and is\nit not lawful to construct a general economics; _i.e._ to study in\nisolation that common _element_ which causes these three groups of\nfacts to be all three denoted by a common name? Labriola then asks\nwhat this general and extra-historical economics can consist of, and\nwhether it can never be of service to the conjectural psychology of\nprimitive man: he jests after the manner of Engels, who in truth has\nsometimes joked too much during a discussion on serious matters. Is it\nincredible that I too should jest? But I do not think there is\noccasion to do so! He wonders at my _insatiability_, because having\naccepted the hedonistic theories, I wish to accept Marx's theories\ntoo: as though my entire proof was not intended to make it plain that\nthe antithesis between these theories exists only in imagination; and\nthat Marx's theory is not an economic system entirely opposed to other\nsystems ('_quelque chose de tout-\u00e0-fait oppos\u00e9_' are Labriola's own\nwords), but a special and partial inquiry; and as though by hedonism I\nmeant all the personal convictions, philosophical, historical and\npolitical, of those who follow, or say that they follow, its guidance,\nand not indeed _only what follows legitimately from its axiom_. When I\ncall the explanation of the nature of profits, offered by the\nhedonistic school, an _economic explanation_, he inquires\nsarcastically: 'Could it possibly be _non-economic_?' But my statement\ncontains no pleonasm: the adjective _economic_ is added to mark off\nthe hedonistic explanation from that of Marx, which, to my thinking,\nis not purely economic, but historical and comparative, or\nsociological, if it is preferred. He wonders that I speak of a\n_working society_, and asks: 'As opposed to what?' 'Perhaps to the\nsaints in paradise?' But I have pointed out the opposition between a\nhypothetical _working society_,--_i.e._ such that all its goods are\nproduced by labour,--and a society, economic certainly, but not\nexclusively working, because it enjoys goods given by nature, as well\nas the products of labour. The saints in paradise form another\nirrelevant jest.\n\nI called Marx's concept of _surplus-value a concept of difference_;\nand Labriola reproaches me for not being able 'to say exactly what I\nunderstand by these words.' And yet I am not in the habit of speaking\nor writing when I do not exactly know what I want to say; and here I\nbelieve that I have clearly expressed a thought which I had\nexceedingly clearly in my mind. Let us take two types of society: type\nA consisting of 100 persons, who, with capital held in common and\nequal labour, produce goods which are divided in equal proportions;\ntype B consisting of 100 persons, 50 of whom own the land and the\nmeans of production, _i.e._ are capitalists, and 50 are shut out from\nthis ownership, _i.e._ are proletarians and workmen; in the\ndistribution, the former receive, in proportion to the capital which\nthey employ, a share in the products of the labour of the latter. It\nis evident that in type A there is no place for _surplus value_. But\nneither in type B are you justified in giving the name _surplus-value_\nto that portion of the products which is swallowed up by the\ncapitalists, except when _you are comparing_ type B with type A, and\n_are considering the former as a contrast to the latter_. If type B is\nconsidered by itself, which is precisely what the pure economists do\nand ought to do, the product which the 50 capitalists appropriate,\n_i.e._ their profits, is a result of mutual agreement, arising out of\ndifferent comparative degrees of utility. Turn in every direction and\nin pure economics you will find nothing more. The expropriatory\ncharacter of profit can be asserted only when to the second society,\nwe apply, almost like a chemical reagent, the standard, which, on the\nother hand, is characteristic of a type of society founded on human\nequality, a type 'which has attained the solidity of a popular\nconviction' (Marx). Profit 'is surplus-labour _not paid for_', says\nMarx, and it may be so; but _not paid for_ in reference to what? In\nexisting society it is certainly paid for, by the price which it\nactually secures. It is a question then, of determining in what\nsociety _it would have that price_ which in existing society _is\ndenied it_. And then, indeed, it is a question of _comparison_.\n\nThe following of Labriola's assertions is not original, but is\nnevertheless quite gratuitous: 'Pure economics is so little\nextra-historical, that it has borrowed the data from real history, of\nwhich it makes two absolute postulates: the freedom of labour and the\nfreedom of competition, pushed to their extreme by hypothesis.' If I\nopen Pantaleoni's well-known treatise, I read in the very first\nparagraph of the _Teoria del valore_, Ferrara's fundamental theory\nthat: 'value is above all a phenomenon of the _economics of the\nindividual or isolated person_.' So little do the legal conditions of\nsociety enter into the necessary postulates of pure economics.\n\nAfter which, Labriola ought not to be horrified if I have written:\n'that Marx has taken his celebrated equivalence[77] \"between value and\nlabour from outside the field of pure economics.\" He will ask me:\nfrom whence then has he taken it? And I reply: _from a special and\ndefinite type of society_, in which the legal organisation and the\npre-supposed conditions of fact make value correspond to the quantity\nof labour.\n\nLabriola does not consider justified the comparison which I have\ndrawn, (metaphor for metaphor), between the commodities which in\nMarxian economics are presented as the _crystallisations of labour_\nand the goods which in pure economics might well be called _quantities\nof possible satisfactions for crystallised wants_. 'Hitherto--he\nexclaims--only sorcerers have been able to believe, or to cause it to\nbe believed, that by desires alone a part of ourselves might be\nglutinised into any goods whatsoever.' But what does _glutinise_ mean?\nTo obtain the commodity _a_ costs us _x_ labour of a given kind, this\nis Marx's _congealed labour_. Pure economics, using a more general\nformula, states that it costs us that body of wants which we must\nleave unsatisfied: this is the form of _congealment_ which pure\neconomics might supply. There is no question, in the one case, of an\nobjective reality, as Labriola seems to think, or in the other of an\nimagined sorcery; but in both cases it is a matter of the literary use\nof imaginative expressions to denote mental attitudes and\nelaborations. In this connection Labriola, as if to limit their range,\nsays that Marx, as an author, belonged to the seventeenth century. May\nI be allowed, as a humble student of literature, and the author of\nseveral investigations into the character and origin of seventeenth\ncentury style,[78] to protest. Seventeenth century style consists in\ningenuity, _i.e._ in putting cold intellectuality into an \u00e6sthetic\nform; hence the forced comparison, the lengthy metaphor, the play on\nwords and the equivocations. But Marx, on the contrary, misuses poetic\nexpressions, which give the content of his thought with unrestrained\nvigour. We find in him just the opposite of seventeenth century style:\nnot a lack of connection between the form and the thought, but such a\nviolent embrace of the former by the latter that the unlucky form\nsometimes runs the risk of being left suffocated.[79]\n\nThe reader will be tired of these replies to a negative criticism; but\nnegative criticism is nevertheless all that Labriola offers us. What\nis his interpretation of Marx's thought? Or which does he accept, out\nof those offered? Here Labriola is silent. It is true that on another\noccasion I believed that I discerned in his statement that\n'labour-value is the _typical premiss_ in Marx, without which all the\nrest would be unthinkable,' an agreement with my thesis. But I see now\nthat I must have been deceived, and that the words must have another\nmeaning; which, however, warned by the unlucky attempt already made, I\nshall not attempt further to specify. In the meantime Sombart has\n_built castles in the air_; Sorel has made _hasty_ or _premature\nelaborations_; the present writer _has not understood_ (see p. 224).\nAre we then faced by a mystery? Our friend, Labriola, relates (p. 50)\na story of Hegel who is said to have declared that _one only of his\npupils had understood him_. (The anecdote, I may add, is recounted by\nHeinrich Heine in a much wittier manner).[80] Is the same thing to be\nrepeated with regard to Marx's theory of value?\n\nIn truth, though without wishing to deny the difficulty of Marx's\nthought and of the form in which he expresses it, I think that the\nmystery may be at length cleared up. And I say this, not only on\naccount of my inward conviction of the truth of my own interpretation,\nbut also on account of the agreement in which I find myself with\nseveral critics, who, almost at the same moment, and by independent\nmethods, have arrived at results nearly similar to my own.\n\n    'Or, se im mostra la mia carta il vero,\n    Non \u00e8 lontano a discoprirsi il porto....'[81]\n\nA similar tendency shows itself in what has been written on the\nsubject by Sombart, in 1894, by Engels in 1895, by myself in 1896, by\nSorel in 1897, by myself more at length in 1897, and again by Sorel in\nJune of last year (1898).[82] Certainly truth and falsehood cannot be\ndecided by external signs, the intellect being the only judge of them,\nand a judge who allows scope for infinite appeals. But nevertheless it\nis natural that under the circumstances pointed out above, a feeling\nof hope and confidence must arise that the discussion is about to be\nclosed, that the problem is at length _ripe for solution_.\n\n\nII\n\n    _Meaning of phrase crisis In Marxianism: Sorel's view of\n        equivalence of value and labour mostly in agreement with\n        view put forward above: An attempt to examine profits\n        independently of theory of value: Is not possible:\n        Surplus product same as surplus value._\n\nI think it opportune, however, to return to those _elaborations_ of\nSorel, which Labriola summarily judges with such severity, in order\nto make some remarks about them, not in refutation but in support, and\nto explain a certain point where there may seem to be disagreement\nbetween us, which perhaps has no reason to exist.\n\nBut here I may be allowed to make a remark. Labriola is also waging\nwar with Sorel: his book _Discorrendo_, etc., arising out of a series\nof friendly letters to Sorel, which I undertook to edit in Italy, is\npublished in French with an appendix directed against me, and a\npreface directed against Sorel. The ground of the quarrel is\nespecially in connection with the so-called _crisis in Marxism_.\n\nNow if the _crisis in Marxism_ be understood as the assertion of the\nneed for a revision and correction of the scientific ideas, of the\nhistorical beliefs, of the material of observed facts, which are\ncurrent in Marxian literature, well and good: in such a crisis I too\nbelieve. If it means also a change in the programmes and practical\nmethods, I neither agree nor disagree, having never concerned myself\nwith the subject in dispute. If the danger is really existent the\napprehension of which seems to obsess and disturb Labriola, that a\ncrisis in Marxism of whatever kind, or the commencement of it, may be\nneutralised by those to whose interest it is to lead astray and\nscatter the labour movement, then _provideant consules_. But whether\nthere be crisis or no crisis, whether purely scientific or also\npractical, whether apprehensions are well-founded or imagined and\nexaggerated, all these things have no connection with the questions\nraised by me, which relate to the erroneousness of this or that\ntheoretical or historical statement of Marxism, and the way in which\nthis or that must be understood in order to be regarded as true. This\nis my standpoint and on this ground alone I admit discussion. I may be\nmistaken, but this must be proved to me. But if, on the contrary, the\nonly answer vouchsafed to me is that the crisis in Marxism results\nfrom the international reaction, of which ingenious critics are taking\nadvantage, I shall be left it is true, somewhat bewildered; but I\nshall not on this account be convinced that the theory of value is\ntrue, in the burlesque sense, for example, in which it is expounded by\nStern in his well-known propagandist booklet.\n\nSorel at first supposes,[83] wittily enough, that Marx had built up\ndifferent economic spheres, the first of which (that of labour-value)\nis the simplest; the second, including the phenomenon of an average\nrate of profit, and the creation of cost of production, is more\ncomplex, and the third, in which is observed the effect of rent of\nland, is still more complex. In passing from the simple to the more\ncomplex sphere, we should find again the laws of the preceding one,\nmodified by the new data introduced, which would have given rise to\nnew phenomena.\n\nIn his second article he abandons this interpretation, being convinced\nthat Marx's ideal construction does not aim at supplying a complete\nexplanation of the phenomena of economics by means of the increasing\ncomplexity of his combinations. And, in my opinion, he did well to\nabandon it; not only for the excellent reason stated by him, that\nMarx's inquiry does not include an entire system of economics, but\nalso because the process suggested by him does not explain why Marx,\nin analysing the economic phenomena of the second or third sphere,\never _used concepts whose place was only in the first one_. It does\nnot explain what I have called the _eliptical comparison_, and herein\nlies the difficulty of Marx's work, or rather of the literary\nstatement of his thought. If the correspondence between labour and\nvalue is only realized in the simplified society of the first sphere,\nwhy insist on translating the phenomena of the second _into terms of\nthe first_? Why give the name transformation of surplus value to what\nmakes its appearance as the natural economic result of capital which\nmust have (from its very nature as capital) a profit? Does Marx offer\nan explanation connecting ground and consequence, or does he not\nrather draw a _parallel between two different phenomena_, by which the\ndiversities illuminating the origins of society are set in relief?\n\nBut Sorel now advances to precisely this conclusion, borrowing a happy\nphrase from his first article: that Marx's work is not intended to\nexplain by means of laws analogous to physical laws, but only to throw\npartial and indirect light on economic reality.\n\nThe method which Marx employs in his inquiry, says Sorel, is a\n_metaphysical instrument_; he makes a _metaphysics of economics_. This\nexpression may be satisfactory or not, according to the different\nmeanings given to the word _metaphysics_; but the idea is accurate and\ntrue. Marx builds an ideal construction which helps him to explain the\nconditions of labour in capitalist society.\n\nWhat are the limits of Marx's ideal construction, and in what do his\nhypotheses consist? I have said that the concept of labour-value is\ntrue for an ideal society, whose only goods consist in the products of\nlabour, and in which there are no class distinctions. Sorel does not\nthink it necessary to eliminate as I have done, the divisions of\nclasses. But, since he writes: 'Marx, like Ricardo, conceived a\nmechanical society, perfectly automatic, in which competition is\nalways at its maximum efficiency, and exchanges are effected by means\nof universal information; and he supposed that the various\nsociological conditions are measurable in intensity, and that the\nnumbers resulting can be connected by mathematical formul\u00e6; hence in\nsuch a society, utility, demand, and commerce in commodities _are\nresults of the divisions of classes_; _value will not in consequence\nbe a function of this condition_, although it is truly a function of\nthe conditions of production; utility, demand, can only appear in the\nforms of the function, _in the parameters referring to the social\ndivisions_.' Since he, I repeat, does not in his hypothesis, make\nlabour-value dependent on the division of classes, it seems to me\nthat this is practically to _leave out_ the fact of the division. And\nit is perhaps clearer to omit it explicitly.\n\nWe should have then: (1) a working economic society without\ndifferences of classes, law of labour-value; (2) Social divisions of\nclasses, origin of profit, which, _but only in comparison with the\npreceding type and in so far as the concepts of the former are carried\nover into the latter_, may be defined as surplus-value; (3) Technical\ndistinction between the different industries requiring different\ncombinations of capital (different proportions of fixed and floating\ncapital). Origin of the average rate of profits, which in relation to\nthe preceding type, may be regarded as a change in, and equalisation\nof, surplus-values; (4) Appropriation of the land by part of a social\nclass. Pure rent; (5) Qualitative differences in land. Differential\nrent. Which rents, pure and differential, present themselves, but only\nin comparison with the preceding types, as cut off from the amounts of\nsurplus-value and of profits. Sorel agrees with me that the concept of\nlabour-value, obtained in the manner described, is not only not a law\nin the same sense as a physical law, but is also not a law in the\nethical sense, _i.e._ one that could be understood as a rule of what\nought to exist. It is a law, he says, _in an entirely Marxian sense_.\nThis I too tried to express when I wrote in my essay: 'It is a _law_\nin Marx's _conception_, but not _in economic reality_. It is clear\nthat we may conceive the divergencies in relation to a standard as the\nrebellion of reality in opposition to that standard, to which we have\ngiven the dignity of law.'\n\nIt seems to me that the jurist Professor Stammler in his book\n_Wirthschaft und Recht nach der materialistischen\nGeschichtsauffassung_,[84] has also made the mistake of interpreting\nMarx's concept as an _ideal_ law. He is absolutely correct when, in\nrejecting Kautsky's comparison between the concept of labour-value and\nthe law of gravity--which takes effect fully on a vacuum--whilst the\nresistance made by air leads to special results, he maintains that\nthis has nothing analogous to a physical law. For him, on the other\nhand, Marx's law is justified (at least formally) as an attempt at\ninvestigation into what in the judgment of economists, granted the\ncapitalist organisation of society, may be _objectively accurate_.\nSubjective judgments may differ, but that does not affect what ought\nto be an objective criterion, to divide the true from the false. But\ncan an _objective criterion_ ever be found within the sphere of\neconomics? Anyone who has rightly understood the principle of\nhedonistic economics must answer no. And if Stammler brings forward\nsuch an idea, it is because in his work he expressly intends to deny\nthe originality of economic material and the independence of economics\nas a science.[85]\n\nSorel believes that Marx's method has rendered all the assistance of\nwhich it is capable, and cannot aid the study, which it is needful to\nmake, of modern economic conditions. If I am not mistaken he means\nthat the hopes of the Marxians in regard to the fruitfulness of Marx's\nmethod are futile, and that the pages which he has written in the\nhistory of economics are practically all that can be produced by it. A\ngood part of the third volume, in which Marx shows himself a simple\nclassical economist, and the miserable and scanty output of Marxian\neconomic writings subsequent to Marx, would suggest that Stammler's\nopinion is justified by the facts.\n\nBut, whilst Sorel's book seems to me welcome in the endeavour to\nunderstand and define the score of Marx's economic inquiries, I cannot\nform the same judgment of another attempt made to reform the basis of\nMarx's system by rejecting his method, and a part of his results. I\nrefer to a recent book by Dr Antonio Graziadei,[86] which has been\nmuch discussed during these last months. Graziadei's object is to\nexamine profits independently of the theory of value: a course already\nindicated by Professor Loria, and the fallacy of which ought to be\nclearly evident at a glance, without its being necessary to wait for\nproof from the results of the attempt. A system of economics from\nwhich _value_ is omitted, is like logic without the _concept_, ethics\nwithout _duty_, \u00e6sthetics without _expression_. It is economics ...\ncut off from its proper sphere. But let us see for a moment how\nGraziadei manages the working out of his idea.\n\nIn the first place he tries to prove that in Marx's own work the\ntheory of profits is in itself independent of that of value. Profits\nhe says, consist in surplus-value, _i.e._ in the difference between\ntotal labour and necessary labour. Hence it can be made to originate\nin surplus-value without starting from the form value itself. But he\nhimself destroys the argument when further on (p. 10) he objects that\nif labour is not productive labour it does not give rise to profits.\nPrecisely for that reason--we answer--in order to be in a position to\nspeak of labour which is productive, Marx must start from value, and\nprecisely for that reason, in Marx's thought, the theory of profits\nand the theory of value are inseparably connected.\n\nAs to the construction, on his own account, of a theory of profits\nwhich is independent of that of value, Graziadei accomplishes this in\na very curious way: viz. by carefully avoiding the words _value_ and\n_labour_, and by speaking instead only of _product_. Profits,\naccording to him, do not arise out of surplus-labour or surplus-value,\nbut out of surplus-product; hence we can, and ought, in theory, to\nstart from the concept of product and not concern ourselves with\nvalue, which is a superficial growth of the final stage of the market.\n\nSurplus product! But surplus-product, in so far as it is an _economic_\nsurplus-product, is _value_. Certainly, the capitalist who pays wages\nin kind, and in getting back again the goods advanced by him, also\nappropriates the other part of the product (surplus-product), can,\ninstead of taking this to market, consume it himself directly (as in\nGraziadei's hypothesis). But this does not alter the matter at all,\nbecause the fact that the product is not taken to market does not mean\nthat it has no value in exchange: since it is true that the capitalist\nhas obtained it by means of an exchange between himself and the\nlabourer; which means that he has always assessed its value in some\nmanner.\n\nAnd here we are again at the theory of value, from which we have\nvainly attempted to escape. Moreover, since Graziadei is essentially\nconcerned with the economics of labour, here we are again at Marx's\nexact concept of labour value. _Tamen usque recurrit!_[87]\n\nGraziadei's book includes also some _corrections_ of Marx's special\ntheories on profits and wages. But I may be allowed to remark that the\ncorrections to be called such ought to refer to the governing\nprinciples. New facts do not weaken a theory firmly established on\nfundamentals; and it is natural that, with a change in the actual\nconditions, a new casuistry will arise which Marx could not discuss.\nWhatever forecasts he may have made in his long career as author and\npolitician, which the event has proved fallacious--I do not believe he\never pretended:\n\n      'Sguaiato Giosu\u00e9 ...\n          Fermare il sole.'[88]\n\n_April, 1899._\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[74] _Socialisme et philosophie_ by ANTONIO LABRIOLA. Paris, Giard et\nBri\u00e8re, 1899, see pp. 207-224. Postscript to the French edition.\n\n[75] See chap. III.\n\n[76] Like an impenitent sinner I shall come back to this distinction,\nwhich is essential for the solid foundation of the principles of\neconomics, and the evil effects of whose neglect are apparent in the\ndiscourses of economists.\n\n[77] I write _equivalence_ because Marx writes thus, and because for\nthe present question this other is quite irrelevant: viz. whether the\nrelation of value can be expressed in the mathematical form of a\nrelation of equivalence. But, for my part, and I follow the hedonists\nin this; I deny entirely that the relation of value is a relation of\nequivalence. The proof of this has already been supplied by others,\nand there is no occasion to repeat it.\n\n[78] See CROCE _Giambattista Basile e il 'Cunto de li Cunti_,' Naples,\n1891; _Ricerche ispano-italiane_, series I, last paragraph, (_Atti\ndell' Acc. Pontan_; vol. xxviii, 1898); _I predicatori italiani del\nseicento e il gusto spagnuolo_, Naples, Pierro, 1899; _I trattatisti\nitaliani del 'concettismo' e Baltasar Gracian_ (_Atti dell' Acc.\nPontan_; vol. xxix, 1899).\n\n[79] LABRIOLA--who reproduces Marx's style very well here and there in\nhis own--writes in his essay on '_Das Kommunistische Manifest_,' 2nd\nEd., p. 79. 'The _Manifesto_ ... does not shed tears over nothing. The\ntears of things have already risen on their feet of themselves, like a\nspontaneously vengeful force.' The _tears_ which rise _on their feet_\nmay make the hair rise _on the head_ of a man of moderate taste; but\nthe expression, although violently imaginative, is not in seventeenth\ncentury style.\n\n[80] Als Hegel auf dem Todbette lag, sagte er:--Nur einer hat mich\nverstanden! Aber gleich darauf f\u00fcgte er verdriesslich hinzu. Und der\nhat mich auch nicht verstanden!' (_Heine. Zur Geschichte der Religion\nund Philosophie in Deutschland._ Bk. III).\n\n[81] 'Now, if my map shows me true, we are not far from the sight of\nour haven....' (Ariosto, _Orlando Furioso_.)\n\n[82] SOMBART, in the _Archiv f\u00fcr soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik_,\nvol. vii., 1894, pp. 555-594; ENGELS in _Neue Zeit_ xiv., vol. i.,\n4-11, 37-44; CROCE, _Le teorie storiche del prof. Loria_; SOREL in the\n_Journal des \u00e9conomistes_, no. for May 15th, 1897; CROCE, _Per la\ninterpretazione e la critica di alcuni concetti del marxism_, see in\nthis volume chap. III.; SOREL, _Nuovi contributi alla teoria\nmarxistica del valore_, in the _Giornale degli economisti_, June 1898.\n\n[83] In the article referred to, in the _Journal des Economistes_.\n\n[84] See pp. 266-8, 658-9.\n\n[85] See chap. II.\n\n[86] _La produzione capitalistica_, Turin, Bocca, 1899.\n\n[87] Graziadei will allow me to point out to him that it is not the\nfirst time that he has made discoveries that turn out to be equivocal.\nSome years ago when carrying on a controversy, in the review _Critica\nsociale_, on the theory of the origin of profits in Marx's system,\nGraziadei (vol. IV., n. 22, 16th Nov. 1894, p. 348) wrote; 'We can\nvery readily imagine a society, in which profits exist, not indeed\nwith surplus-labour, but with _no labour_. If, in fact, for all _the\nlabour_ now accomplished by man was substituted the work of machines,\nthese latter, with a relatively small quantity of commodities would\nproduce an enormously greater quantity. Now, given a capitalist\norganisation of society, this technical phenomenon would afford a\nbasis for a social phenomenon, viz.: that the ruling class being able\nto enjoy by itself alone the difference between the product and the\nconsumption of the machine, would see at their disposal an excess of\nproducts over the consumption of the _labourers_, _i.e._, a\nsurplus-product, much larger than when the feeble muscular force of\nman still co-operated in production.' But here Graziadei neglects to\nexplain how _labourers_ could ever exist, and _profits_ of labour, in\na hypothetical society, based on _non-labour_, and in which _all the\nlabour_ actually done by man would be done by machines. What would the\nlabourers be doing there? The work of Sisyphus or the Danaides? In his\nhypothesis the proletariat would either be maintained by the charity\nof the ruling class, or would end by rapidly disappearing, destroyed\nby starvation. For if he supposed that the machines would produce\nautomatically a superfluity of goods for the whole of that society,\nthen he was simply constructing by hypothesis a land of _Cocaigne_.\n\n[88] 'As follower of Joshua ... to stop the sun.'\n\n\n\n\n_CHAPTER V._ A CRITICISM OF THE MARXIAN LAW OF THE FALL IN THE RATE OF\nPROFITS\n\n    _Interpretation here given assumes acceptance of Marx's main\n        principles: Necessary decline in rate of profit on\n        hypothesis of technical improvement: Two successive\n        stages confused by Marx: More accurately a decline in\n        amount of profit: Marx assumes that would be an increase\n        of capital: Would be same capital and increase in rate of\n        profits: Decline in rate of profits due to other\n        reasons._\n\nThis law is set forth in the third section of the third book\n(posthumous) of _Das Kapital_. A few criticisms have been made of it,\nwhich vary from that of Sombart, who says that it is developed _in the\nmost striking manner_ (in gl\u00e4nzendster Weise), to that of Loria, who\ndefines it as 'a metaphysical pistol shot (_sic_) from beyond the\nRhine,' and thinks that he refutes it by an objection which is in fact\nquite inappropriate. Others have thought the law certainly true, but\nthat it explained only partially the fact of the decline in the rate\nof profits and required to be combined with other laws already known\nto classical economics. But most of those who have studied Marx's\neconomic theories have not examined it at all; his opponents (like\nB\u00f6hm Bawerk) reject it by implication, when they reject Marx's\nfundamental principles; the Marxians welcome it, German fashion,\nhumbly and submissively, without discussion, with that lack of freedom\nand intellectual originality which is noticeable in all their\nwritings.\n\nThe examination of it attempted here, rests on the same basis as\nMarx's theories, _i.e._ it is made from the standpoint of those who\naccept the essentials of these theories, and hence the premiss of\n_labour-value_, the distinction between _fixed_ and _floating_\ncapital, the view of profits as arising from _surplus-value_, and of\nthe _average rate_ of profits as arising from the equalisation, owing\nto competition, of the various rates of surplus-value. It is true that\nI accept all these things _in a certain sense_, which is not the sense\nof the ordinary Marxian, inasmuch as they are not looked upon as _laws\nactually working in the economic world_, but as _the results of\ncomparative investigations into different possible forms of economic\nsociety_. But such a reservation, which relates to a question\ndiscussed by me at length elsewhere,[89] has practically no effect on\nthe present study, whose results would be almost the same, even if\nthese theories of Marx were interpreted in the sense which I consider\nerroneous. The object here is no longer to determine and define\naccurately Marx's fundamental concepts, but to see whether, from these\nconcepts, even when interpreted in the current manner, it is ever\npossible in any way to deduce the _law of the fall in the rate of\nprofits_. This task I think impossible.\n\nThe law was derived by Marx from the study of the effects of technical\nimprovement. Marx states that technical improvement increases the\namount and changes the form of the total capital, increasing the\nproportion of fixed as compared with floating capital, so that by this\nmeans the rate of profit is decreased; the latter arises, as is\nwell-known, out of the surplus-value, the product of the floating\ncapital divided by the total capital. He illustrates the matter thus.\nSome technical improvement occurs; new machines are made, which\nformerly did not exist. The capital employed in production has been\nhitherto, we will suppose, a total of 1,000, divided into 500 fixed\nand 500 floating, and employing 100 labourers: the surplus-value =\n500, _i.e._ the rate of it is 100 per cent.; and hence the rate of\nprofit is 500/1000 = 50 per cent. In consequence of the technical\nimprovement, and of the construction of new machines, the 100\nlabourers who are maintained by the variable capital of 500, continue\nstill to be employed in production; but, in order that this may be\npossible, it is necessary to use a larger fixed capital, which we may\nsuppose 200 larger than before. Hence, as the result of the technical\nimprovement, there will now be a total capital of 1,200, _i.e._ 700\nfixed and 500 floating; and the rate of surplus-value remaining\nunchanged at 100 per cent., the rate of profit will be 500/1200 =\nabout 41 per cent., _i.e._ will have decreased from 50 per cent. to 41\nper cent. Hence the necessary decline in the rate of profit on the\n_hypothesis_ of technical improvement. But this _hypothesis_ is an\nactual everyday _fact_ in modern capitalist society. Hence, the\n_actual_ decline of the average rate of profits in modern capitalist\nsociety. But this law is more or less counteracted by other facts,\nwhich act in a contrary sense more or less transitorily. Thus the fall\nis only _a tendency_.\n\nIn order that our study may be clear, it is above all necessary to\ndistinguish the two groups of facts, or the two stages in the same\ncapitalist society which Marx confused and embraced in a single\nsomewhat obscure view.\n\nThe first stage is marked by the fact, pure and simple, of a technical\nimprovement. Now technical improvement, among its logical, or what is\nthe same thing, its necessary effects, in no way includes that of an\nincrease in the amount of total capital employed, nor that of leaving\nthe quantity of total capital unchanged. It has rather exactly the\nopposite as its necessary and immediate effect: _i.e._ that of\n_limiting the capital employed_. It is unnecessary to warn the reader\nthat we are here treating of economic science and that increase and\ndecrease refer always to _economic values_. In its simplest form,\nsupposing the quantity of objects produced to be constant (200 shoes\nare required, and there is no reason to increase the production),\ntechnical progress will consist, purely and simply, in a saving of\nsocial expense: the same production at less expense. And since all\ncost, in Marx's hypothesis resolves itself into social labour, there\nwill be the same production with less social labour. If it were not\nso, it would not be worth while to introduce this technical\ninnovation; there would be, economically, no improvement but either\nthe _status quo ante_ or a regression. We must not take into account\nthe other effects which would arise to increase production, greater\nconsumption, increase of population, etc: additional and extraneous\nfacts which are not considered here, since we are concerned with the\nsingle fact of technical improvement, all other conditions remaining\nunchanged. And, in such a case, we cannot represent technical\nimprovement with the increasing series of total capital which Marx\nemploys, viz. 150, 200, 300, 400, 500, etc., but with this decreasing\none, 150, 140, 130, 120, 110, etc. And to keep to the illustration\nused above, if we suppose that the given technical improvement has\ncaused a decrease of 1/10 in the total social labour required, we\nshall have in place of the original capital of 1,000 a capital of 900,\nno longer made up of 500 fixed and 500 floating, but of 450 fixed and\n450 floating. The decrease must affect proportionally every part of\nthe capital since all of it is, in the final analysis, a product of\nlabour. Of the 100 original labourers, 1/10, _i.e._ 10 of them will\nremain unemployed: a fraction of the original capital will remain\nunemployed; the quantity (or utility) of the goods produced will\nremain the same.[90]\n\nWhen the description of the facts is thus corrected, there is no doubt\nthat the smaller total capital employed, supposing on the one hand,\nthe rate of surplus-value to remain unchanged, and, on the other, 10\nof the original labourers to be working no longer, would absorb an\namount of surplus-value of 450. But the rate of profit would not on\nthis account be changed; or rather, just for this reason the rate of\nprofit could not be altered and would be expressed by 450/900 (as at\nfirst 500/1000), _i.e._ it would be as at first, 50 per cent.\n\nThis simplest case does not then give us Marx's law, but this other\nlaw; 'Technical improvement, supposing all the other conditions remain\nunchanged, causes a decrease in the _amount_ (not the _rate_) of\nsurplus-value and of profits.' This law assumes that the 1/10 of the\nlabourers left unemployed become entirely superfluous. These ten\nlabourers are henceforth to be a dead weight supported by the charity\nof others, or to die of starvation, or to emigrate--to a new world.\nLet them be left to their fate. Social production will remain at its\nformer level, thanks to the technical improvement, but accomplished\nwithout their help. This is the hypothesis; but given this hypothesis,\nof what importance is the law? To see this clearly it will suffice to\npush the hypothesis yet further, as we are entitled to do, and suppose\nthat the technical improvements continuing, the employment gradually\nbecomes superfluous, not only of 1/10, but of 1/4, 1/3, 1/2 of the\nlabourers, _i.e._ that the employment of labourers tends to become =\n0. In this case capitalist society as such would come entirely to an\nend, since the utility of labour, on which it is based, would come to\nan end. Where there is nothing the King loses his rights; and where\nlabour has no utility the capitalist loses his. The ex-capitalists\nwould have no more workmen to impoverish, but would be changed into\nthe owners of automatic fountains of wealth; like those fortunate\nmortals in the fable enriched by charmed knives, by wonderful lamps,\nby gardens producing with instantaneous and spontaneous energy all\nGod's gifts. In other words the law here resolves itself into a\n_truism_.\n\nBut Marx did not think of this _truism_. He wished to determine\nexactly the organic law of the variations in the rate of profits. In\nfact--as is seen in the illustration given--he does not at all suppose\nthat the energy of labour may become superfluous; but rather that the\nlabourers will find fresh employment with an increase in the original\nfixed capital. Given technical improvement and production also will be\nincreased; this is the second stage which he considers. The 100\nlabourers are still all working, the fixed capital with which they\nwork must be increased from 500 to 700, and the total has hence become\n1200. The law which he deduces, of the fall in the rate of profits\n(in the illustration, from 50 per cent. to 41 per cent.) is not a\n_truism_; on the contrary it presents itself with all the importance\nand originality of a scientific discovery. All den ends on seeing\nwhether in the scientific discovery we have indeed--the truth.\n\nThe crux of Marx's proof lies in the statement; that the labourers who\nwould have had to remain unemployed, find on the contrary employment,\nbut with a capital _increased by so much_ (= 200) over the original.\nIs this statement correct? On what does Marx base it?\n\nTo this fundamental proposition my _criticism_ refers, itself equally\nfundamental. If it is admitted it amounts to _a most complete denial\nof the truth of the Marxian law_. Nevertheless I state my idea in the\nform of a _criticism_ and _doubtfully_, because, in dealing with a\nthinker of Marx's rank, it is necessary to proceed cautiously, and to\nremember (which I do not forget) that several times errors ascribed to\nhim have been explained as mistakes of his opponents.\n\nFor what reason, I ask myself, do the ten un-occupied labourers, in\norder to be employed afresh, require a constant capital larger than\nthe original?\n\nThe technical improvement has not diminished the natural _utility_ of\nthe production (also in our hypothesis it has not increased it either,\nbut has left it unchanged); but it has only diminished its _value_.\nThere will be then, with the improved technical organisation, raw\nmaterials, tools, clothing, foodstuffs, etc., of the same total\nnatural utility as at first. The economic value of all these products\nis diminished, because in them (to employ the metaphor chosen by\nMarx), is congealed a smaller quantity of labour, _i.e._ less by the\nwork of ten labourers. But from the point of view of power to satisfy\nwants, the raw materials, the tools, the clothing, the means of\nsustenance, etc., remain, in virtue of the technical improvement, of\nthe same rank as at first. If then capitalists and workpeople have\nremained as temperate as before, and their standard of life has not\nrisen (and this is in the hypothesis), the production will offer as at\nfirst means of employment and means of sustenance for the ten\nlabourers left unoccupied. By re-employing them, _i.e._ maintaining\nthem with the original means of subsistence, and setting them to work\non the original raw materials or their new products, the capitalists\nwill increase their production, or--what is the same thing--will\nimprove its quality. But since we know that, economically, the value\nof that capital has _diminished_, it will come about that a capital\n_economically smaller_ will absorb the same energy of labour as\nformerly, _i.e._ _the same amount of profits_; and an equal amount of\nprofits with a smaller total capital means an _increased rate of\nprofits_. Exactly the opposite to what Marx thought it possible to\nprove.\n\nTurning to our illustration, the ten labourers will find employment\nwith a capital which, like the utility, has remained the same, but\neconomically has decreased to 900. This means that the rate of\nprofits has increased from 500/1000 to 500/900, _i.e._ from 50 per\ncent. to about 55 per cent. As to the rate of surplus-value, since the\nentire value of the total capital is reduced, it must no longer be\ncalculated, as before the technical improvement, as 500/500, nor as in\nthe first stage we considered (in which the technical improvement had\nmade a portion of the labour entirely superfluous) as 450/450, but as\n500/450, _i.e._ it will no longer be 100 per cent., but will have\nrisen to about 111 per cent.\n\nTo this criticism of mine I have found no answer, either explicit or\nimplicit, in Marx's work. Only in one passage, where he speaks of the\ncounteracting causes, and in particular of surplus population (Chap,\nXIV., \u00a7 iv.), he hints at the case where labour power may be\nre-employed with a minimum capital. It may be said that here Marx\npassed close to the difficulty, without striking upon it, _i.e._\nwithout becoming aware of its importance. And, if he had struck on it,\nI doubt whether he would have overcome it and passed on; I think\nrather that his theory would have gone to pieces.\n\nI foresee that it may be said: you have assumed that, owing to the\ntechnical improvement, not only would a number of labourers remain\nunemployed, but also a fraction of the original total capital, _i.e._\nof means of production and means of subsistence; and when the\nlabourers are re-employed, it is true that during the new cycle of\nproduction, other fractions of unoccupied capital will not unite with\nthe original fractions, but precisely for this reason the quantity of\nproduction which will result will be increased, and in the next cycle\nof production a still greater fraction of unoccupied capital will add\nitself, unless the ten labourers do not continue to be re-employed, in\nwhich case the un-occupied fraction will be smaller, but the increase\nwill become constant. Now all these means of production and of\nsustenance will not be consumed (or will be partially consumed and\npartially saved), by the capitalist class, and hence there will be an\nincreasing accumulation. The quantities of goods saved, owing to the\nimpulsion of economic interest will not remain un-used in warehouses\nor strong boxes, but will be thrown on the market as capital seeking\nemployment. This will increase the rate of wages, and hence will have\na depressing effect on the rate of profits. Very good, but in such a\ncase we are outside the Marxian law. The _factor_ here considered, is\nno longer technical improvement taken by itself, but _saving_, which\nmay be, as stated, encouraged by technical progress, but cannot be\n_inferred_ from it. For it is true that, if we suppose the case of\nextravagant capitalists, saving, in spite of technical improvement\nwill not take place. And as technical improvement encourages saving,\nso the latter, in its turn, by increasing wages, encourages the\nincrease of population, and hence the reduction of wages, and once\nagain a rise in the rate of profits. But, when saving and the increase\nof population come upon the scene we are already within the sphere of\nthe law of demand and supply, _i.e._ of ordinary, accredited\neconomics, which Marx despised as vulgar, and out of dislike of which\nhe devised his law of the fall in the rate of profits yielded by the\nabove combination of capital owing to the effect of technical\nimprovement. I, indeed, believe that only the ordinary law of demand\nand supply can explain the variations in the rate of profit: but to\nreturn to it is not indeed to defend Marx's thesis, but rather to\nratify its condemnation.\n\nHowever it is regarded, this thesis seems to me indefensible; and even\nmore indefensible if, leaving aside for a moment logical trains of\nreasoning and arithmetical calculations, we look at it with the clear\nintuition of common sense. See here--to follow the strict hypothesis\nset forth by Marx--on one side a capitalist class, and on the other a\nproletarian class. What effect does technical improvement have? It\nincreases the wealth in the hands of the capitalist class. Is it not\nintuitively evident that, as a result of technical improvement, the\ncapitalists can, by anticipating commodities _whose value is\ncontinually decreasing_, obtain _the same services_ which they\nobtained at first from the proletariat? And that hence the relation\nbetween value of services and value of capital will change in favour\nof the former, _i.e._ that the rate of profits will increase? When\ncommodities (capital) are anticipated, which formerly were reproduced\nby five hours of labour and now are reproduced by four, the workman\nwill continue to work ten hours. Formerly with five there were ten;\nnow with four there is similarly ten. The sponge costs less, but the\nquantity of water with which it is saturated is the same. How could\nMarx suppose that after technical improvement, the expenses of the\ncapitalists would always increase, so that proportionally profits\nwould be in a state of perpetual decline, and would end by making, in\nface of the total costs, a most wretched figure?\n\nMarx's mistake has been that he has inadvertently attributed a\n_greater value_ to the fixed capital, which after the technical\nimprovement is worked by the same labourers as before. Certainly\nanyone who looks at a society in two successive stages of technical\ndevelopment, will find in the second stage a greater number of\nmachines and of tools of every kind. _This is a question of\nstatistics, not of economics._ Capital (and Marx appears to have\nneglected this point for the moment) is not estimated by its physical\nextension, but by its economic value. And economically that capital\n(supposing all the other conditions remain constant) _must be worth\nless_; otherwise no technical improvement would have taken place.\n\nAn external circumstance which might serve to explain Marx's error is\nthe fact that the third book of _Das Kapital_ is a posthumous work,\nsome parts of which are hardly sketched out, and amongst these that of\nthe _law of the rate of profits_, which, moreover, does not relate to\nthe _establishment of principles_, but, being a consequence and an\napplication or these, was perhaps not worked out to the same extent\nas the fundamental or central part of the theory.[91] It is probable\nthat the author, if he could have gone over his rough draft again,\nwould have materially modified it or entirely discarded it. But\nperhaps some internal reason could also be found for this strange\nmistake, in that Marx always misused the comparative method without\ndisclosing any distinct knowledge of his procedure. And it might be\nthat, as already in his earlier investigations, he perpetually\ntransferred labour-value from a hypothetical society to the actual\ncapitalist society, so in this new problem he has been led to estimate\nthe worth of the technical capital in a more advanced society at the\nrate of value of that in a less advanced society. In this impossible\nattempt his method has here broken in his hands.\n\nAs we have disputed the actual basis of the Marxian law, it seems\nindeed superfluous to follow out its further developments, which are\nadvanced in a form worked out with but little care. It is enough to\nremark that in these developments, as in general, throughout _Das\nKapital_, there is a continuous medley of theoretical deductions and\nhistorical descriptions, of logical and of material connections. The\ndefect, however, becomes in this instance an advantage, because many\nof the observations made by Marx, understood as historical\ndescriptions of what usually happens in modern society, will be found\nto be true and can be saved from the shipwreck, as regards the theory\nof the law, with which by chance they are feebly connected. And it\nwould even be possible to make such an investigation in respect to\nthat very portion which we have disputed, _i.e._ to enquire what\n_facts_, actually observed by him, could have impelled Marx to\nconstruct his law, _i.e._ to give of these facts an explanation which\nis theoretically unjustifiable.\n\nMarx attributed the greatest importance to the discovery of the _law\nof the fall in the rate of profits_. Herein lay for him 'the mystery\nover which all economists from Adam Smith onwards have toiled'; and in\nthe different attempts to solve the problem he saw the explanation of\nthe divergence between the various schools of economists. Ricardo's\nbewilderment in face of the phenomenon of the progressive decrease in\nthe rate of profits seemed to him fresh evidence of the earnestness of\nmind of that writer, who discerned the vital importance of the problem\nfor capitalist society. That the solution had not been found before\nhis, Marx's, time, appeared to him easily explicable, when it was\nremembered that until then political economy had sought gropingly for\nthe distinction between fixed and floating capital without succeeding\nin formulating it, and had not been able to explain surplus-value in\ndistinction from profits, nor profit itself in its purity,\nindependently of the separate fractions of it in competition amongst\nthemselves; and that, in the end, it had been unable to analyse\ncompletely the difference in the organic composition of capital, and\nmuch less, the formation of the general rate of profits.\n\nHis explanation being now rejected, a double problem presents itself.\nThe first question relates to fact. It is needful to ask: does the\nfact spoken of actually exist, and how does it exist? Has a gradual\ndecline in the rate of profits been ascertained? And in which\ncountries, and in what circumstances? The second question relates to\nthe cause: since, whilst we have seen that there could only be one\neconomic reason for the phenomenon, (the law of demand and supply),\nthere may be several historical causes, and these may vary in\ndifferent cases. The decline in the rate of profits may happen owing\nto a nominal increase in wages due to an increase in the rent of land,\nor it may happen owing to a real increase in wages due to stronger\norganisation among the workpeople, or it may happen owing to an\nincrease, also real, in wages resulting from saving and from growing\naccumulations, which increase the capital in search of employment.\nThis investigation must be made without prejudices, whether optimistic\nor pessimistic, apologetic or controversial; and economists have\nsinned but too often in all these ways. The listeners have seized upon\nthe result of limited and qualified investigations, now in order to\nsing a hymn to the spontaneous force of progress, which will gradually\ncause the disappearance of capitalists or reduce interest to 1/2 per\ncent.; now in order to terrify their audience by a spectacle no less\nfantastic, of landed proprietors as the sole owners of all the goods\nof society![92]\n\nMay 1899.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[89] See chaps. III. and IV.\n\n[90] We here suppose a series of productive periods already rapidly\npassed through, which may suffice to replace the whole of the total\ncapital by the new technical processes. It is evident however, that as\nfixed capital is replaced in successive portions, in a first stage,\ngoods are used as capital, whose cost of _reproduction_ no longer\ncorresponds to their original cost of _production_, _i.e._ whose\nactual social value no longer corresponds to the original one. But to\nconsider the separate stages would here cause a useless complication.\n\n[91] The explanation of the way in which the average rate of profit\narises belongs to the fundamental part of the third book of _Das\nKapital_, and Marx must have thought it out together with the\nfundamental chapters in the first book.\n\n[92] This is the case contemplated by Ricardo in the celebrated \u00a7 44\nof chapter vi, _On Profits_: Marx appears to attach little importance\nto this case, having complete faith in the continued technical\nprogress of agriculture, not to speak of other counteracting causes.\nIt is necessary to add that Marx in conformity with his law, maintains\nthat the rent of land also has a tendency to fall, although it may\nincrease its total amount, or its proportion in reference to\nindustrial profits: see vol. iii, 223-4.\n\n\n\n\n_CHAPTER VI._ ON THE ECONOMIC PRINCIPLE\n\nTWO LETTERS TO PROFESSOR V. PARETO\n\n\nI\n\n    _Need for more comprehensive definition of the economic\n        principle: Reasons why the mechanical conception\n        erroneous, economic fact capable of appraisement: Cannot\n        be scale of values for particular action: Economic datum\n        a fact of human activity: Distinction and connection\n        between pleasure and choice: Economic datum a fact of\n        will: Knowledge a necessary presupposition of will:\n        Distinction between technical and economic: Analogy of\n        logic and \u00e6sthetic: Complete definition of economic\n        datum._\n\n_Esteemed Friend_,\n\nOn reading the little paper, which you were courteous enough to send\nme, on how to state the problem of pure economics,[93] I at once felt\na desire to discuss the subject with you. Other occupations have\nobliged me to defer the satisfaction of this wish until now; and this\nhas been fortunate. The extracts from your new and still unpublished\ntreatise on pure economics, which came out in the March number of this\nReview,[94] have obliged me to abandon in part the scheme of thought\nwhich I had in mind; for I saw from them that you had modified some of\nthose points in your thesis, which seemed to me most open to dispute.\n\nI have on several occasions heard something like a feeling of distaste\nexpressed for the endless discussions about value and the economic\nprinciple which absorb the energies of economic science. It is said\nthat if this splitting of hairs over the scholastic accuracy of its\nprinciple were abandoned, the science might throw light on historical\nand practical questions which concern the welfare of human society.\nApparently you have not allowed yourself to be alarmed by the\nthreatened distaste of readers; nor indeed am I. Can we silence the\ndoubts which disturb us? Could we have assurance whilst silencing\nthese doubts that we were not endangering just those _practical_\nissues which the majority have at heart? Issues which we ourselves\nhave at heart since we are certainly not able, like the monks of old,\nto free ourselves from interest in _the affairs of the age_. May not\nscience be, as Leibniz said, _quo magis speculativa, magis practica_?\nWe must then go our way, and endeavour to satisfy our doubts, with all\nthe caution and self-criticism of which we are capable; since they\ncannot be suppressed. On the other hand we should endeavour also not\nto offer our solutions to the public except when our knowledge,--wide\nif it may be so (yet necessarily imperfect)--of the literature on the\nsubject, gives us some confidence that we are not repeating things\nalready stated. Unless indeed, other considerations make us think it\nopportune to repeat and to impress things which have been stated, but\nwithout sufficient emphasis.\n\nThe new school of economic thought, of which you are such a worthy\nrepresentative, has a merit of no small significance. It has reacted\nagainst the anti-scientific tendencies of the historical and empirical\nschools, and has restored the concept of a science of _pure_\neconomics. This means indeed nothing more than a science which is\nscience; the word pure, unless tautologous, is an explanation added\nfor those who are ignorant or unmindful of what a science is.\nEconomics is neither history nor discussion of practical issues: it is\na science possessing its own principle, which is indeed called the\n_economic principle_.\n\nBut, as I had occasion to remark at another time,[95] I do not\nconsider that this principle whose fundamental character is asserted,\nhas hitherto been grasped in its individuality, nor conveniently\ndefined in relation to other groups of facts, that is to the\nprinciples of other sciences. Of those conceptions of it which seem to\nme _erroneous_, the chief ones can be reduced to four which I will\ncall the _mechanical_, the _hedonistic_, the _technological_ and the\n_egoistic_.\n\nYou have now rejected the first two, because you think that mechanical\nand hedonistic considerations belong to metaphysics and psychology.\nBut I acknowledge that I am dissatisfied with your method of arriving\nat this praiseworthy rejection.\n\nYou no longer say, indeed, as in your previous essay: 'L'\u00e9conomie pure\nn'est pas seulement semblable \u00e0 la m\u00e9chanique: c'est, \u00e0 proprement\nparler, un genre de m\u00e9chanique.' But you still say that 'Pure\neconomics employs the same methods as rational mechanics, and has many\npoints of contact with this science.' Although you do not pause over\nthe mechanical considerations, it is not from a clear conviction that\na datum in economics, as such, is quite different from a datum in\nmechanics; but merely because it seems to you _convenient_ to omit\nsuch considerations, of which you do not deny, but rather admit, the\npossibility.\n\nNow I on the contrary, say decisively that the data of economics is\nnot that of mechanics, or that there is no transition from the\nmechanical aspect of a fact to the economic aspect; and that the very\npossibility of the mechanical point of view is excluded, not as a\nthing which may or may not be abstracted from, but as a contradiction\nin terms, which it is needful to shun.\n\nDo you wish for the simplest and clearest proof of the non-mechanical\nnature of the economic principle? Note, then, that in the data of\neconomics a quality appears which is on the contrary repugnant to that\nof mechanics. _To an economic fact words can be applied which express\napproval or disapproval._ Man behaves economically _well_ or _ill_,\nwith _gain_ or _loss_, _suitably_ or _unsuitably_: he behaves, in\nshort, _economically_ or _uneconomically_. A fact in economics is,\ntherefore, capable of _appraisement_ (positive or negative); whilst a\nfact in mechanics is a mere fact, to which praise or blame can only be\nattached metaphorically.\n\nIt seems to me that on this point we ought easily to be agreed. To\nascertain it, it is sufficient to appeal to internal observation. This\nshows us the fundamental distinction between the mechanical and the\nteleological, between mere fact and value. If I am not mistaken, you\nassign to metaphysics the problem of reducing the teleological to the\nmechanical, value to mere fact. But observe that metaphysics cannot\nget rid of the distinction; and will only labour, with greater or less\ngood luck, at its old business of _reconciling_ opposites, or of\n_deriving two contraries from one unity_.\n\nI foresee what may be advanced against this assertion of the\nnon-mechanical nature of the economic principle. It may be said: What\nis not mechanical, is not measurable; and economic values, on the\ncontrary, _are measured_. Although hitherto the unit of measurement\nhas not been found, it is yet a fact that we distinguish very readily\n_larger_ and _smaller_, _greater_ and least _values_ and construct\nscales of values. This suffices to establish the _measurability_ and\nhence the essentially mechanical nature of economic value. Look at the\n_economic man_, who has before him a series of possible actions _a_,\n_b_, _c_, _d_, _e_, _f_, ...; which have for him a decreasing value,\nindicated by the numbers 10, 9, 8, 7, 6 ... just because he _measures_\nvalue, he decides on the action a=10, and not on c=8 or f=6.\n\nAnd there is no fault in the deduction granted the existence of the\n_scale of values_, which we have just illustrated by an example.\n_Granted the existence_: but, supposing this to be an _illusion_ of\nours? If the man in the example, instead of being the _homo\noeconomicus_ were the _homo utopicus_ or _heterocosmicus_, not to be\nfound even in imaginative constructions?\n\nThis is precisely my opinion. The supposed _scale of values_ is an\nabsurdity. When the _homo oeconomicus_ in the given example, selects\n_a_, all the other actions (_b_, _c_, _d_, _e_, _f_, ...) are not for\nhim _values smaller than a_; they are merely _non-a_; they are what he\nrejects; they are _non-values_.\n\nIf then the _homo oeconomicus_ could not have _a_, he would be acting\n_under different conditions_: under conditions without _a_. Change the\nconditions and the economic action--as is well known--changes also.\nAnd let us suppose that the conditions are such that, for the\nindividual acting, _b_ represents the action selected by him; and _c_,\n_d_, _e_, _f_, ... those which he omits to do, and which are all\n_non-b_, _i.e._ have no value.\n\nIf the conditions change again and it is supposed that the individual\ndecides on _c_, and then on _d_, and then on _e_, and so on. These\ndifferent economic actions, each _arising under particular\nconditions_, are _incommensurable_ amongst themselves. They are\n_different_; but each is perfectly adapted to the given conditions,\nand can only be judged _in reference to these conditions_.\n\nBut then what are these numbers, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6 ...? They are\n_symbols_, symbols of what? What is the _reality_ beneath the\nnumerical symbol? The reality is the _alteration in the actual\nconditions_; and these numbers show a succession of changes: neither\nmore nor less than is indicated by the alphabetic series, for which\nthey are substituted.\n\nThe absurdity involved in the notion of greater or smaller values is,\nin short, the assumption that an individual may be _at the same\nmoment_ under different conditions. The _homo oeconomicus_ is not at\nthe same moment in _a_, _b_, _c_, _d_, _e_, _f_ ... but when he is in\n_b_, he is no longer in _a_; when he is in _c_ he is no longer in _b_.\nHe has before him only one action, approved by him; this action rules\nout all the others which are infinite, and which for him are only\n_actions not preferred_ (non-values).\n\nCertainly physical objects form part of the data of economics; and\nthese, just because they are _physical_, are _measurable_. But\neconomics does not consider physical things and objects, but\n_actions_. The physical object is merely the brute matter of an\neconomic act: in measuring it we remain in the physical world, we do\nnot pass over to that of economics, or else, when measured, the\neconomic fact has become volatile. You say that 'political economy\nonly concerns itself with choices, which fall on things that are\nvariable in quantity and capable of measurement'; but pardon me, dear\nfriend, you would be much perplexed if you had to justify this wholly\narbitrary limitation; and if you had to show that the attribute\nmeasurabilility influences in any way the attribute of belonging to\neconomics.\n\nI think that I have explained, shortly, but adequately for a wise man\nlike yourself, the reasons why the mechanical conception of the\neconomic principle is untenable. If calculations and measurements come\ninto problems that are called economic they do so just in so far as\nthese are not problems in _pure_ economics.\n\nThis non-mechanical datum, which is an economic datum, you call\n_choice_. And this is all right. But _to choose_ means to _choose\nconsciously_. A choice made unconsciously, is either not a choice or\nnot unconscious. You speak of the _unconscious actions_ of man; but\nthese cannot be the _actions_ of the man _in so far as he is man_ but\nmovements of man _in so far as he is also animal_. They are\n_instinctive_ movements; and instinct is not choice _except\nmetaphorically_. Hence the examples you bring forward of dogs, of\ncats, of sparrows, of rats, and of asses from _Buridano_, are not\nfacts of _choice_; and hence are not economic facts. You consider\nanimal economics as an unfruitful science, which exhausts itself in\ndescriptions. Look more closely and you will see that this science\ndoes not exist. An economics of the animals, understood in the sense\nof the naturalists, has not been written, not because it is not worth\nwhile, but because _it is impossible to write it_. Whence could it be\nobtained unless from books such as the _Roman de Renart_ and the\n_Animali parlanti_?\n\nThis analysis ought to lead us to conceive of an economic datum as an\nact of man; _i.e._ as a _fact of human activity_.\n\nAnd from this recognition is inferred in its turn the true criticism\nof the _hedonistic_ conception of the economic principle. You say that\n'the equations of pure economics express merely the fact of a choice,\nand can be drawn up independently of the ideas of pleasure and pain,'\nbut you admit at the same time that the fact of the _choice_ 'can be\nexpressed equally well as a fact of _pleasure_.'\n\nIt is true that every case of economic choice is at the same time, a\ncase of _feeling_: of agreeable feeling if the economic choice is\nrightly made, of disagreeable feeling, if it is ill made. Man's\nactivity develops itself in the human mind, not under a pneumatic\nbell, and an activity which develops rightly, brings as its reflex, a\nfeeling of pleasure, that which develops badly, one of displeasure.\nWhat is economically useful, is, at the same time _pleasurable_.\n\nBut this judgment cannot be converted. The pleasurable is not always\neconomically useful. The mistake in the hedonist theory consists in\nmaking this conversion. Pleasure may appear unaccompanied by man's\nactivity, or may be accompanied by a human activity which is not\neconomic. Herein lies the fundamental distinction between _pleasure_\nand _choice_. A choice, is in the concrete, inseparable from the\nfeeling of pleasure and displeasure; but this feeling is separable\nfrom _choice_, and may in fact exist independently of it.\n\nIf psychology be understood (as it is usually understood) as the\nscience of psychical mechanism, economics is not a psychological\nscience; this Herr von Ehrenfels fails to grasp. I do not know whether\nyou have read the two volumes hitherto published on the _System der\nWerttheorie_.[96] After devoting some hundred pages to psychological\ndisquisitions--which I do not mean to discuss here--he wishes,\nfinally, to prove that his definitions of value remain sound, from\nwhatever theory of psychology you start. He does this as he asserts (\u00a7\n87), not because he is doubtful of himself, but to safeguard his\neconomic conclusions, which are so important for the practical\nproblems of life, from unjustified attacks based on the standpoints of\nschools of psychology other than his own, the method of the barrister,\nwho composes an apparent conclusion, and makes several demands that\nare connected therewith _subordinately_. It is true that there is no\nneed for economists to spend their time on details of theoretical\npsychology; so true that Professor Ehrenfels might spare us his: but\nis it not true that economics remains the same _whatever psychological\ntheory is accepted_. The unity of science means that a modification\nat one point is never without some reaction on the others; and the\nreaction is greatest when it is a question of the way of conceiving\ntwo facts, distinct but inseparable, like the economic and the\npsychical fact.\n\nAn economic datum is not then a hedonistic datum, nor, in general, a\nmechanical datum. But as the fact of man's _activity_, it still\nremains to determine whether it is a fact of _knowledge_ or of _will_:\nwhether it is theoretical or practical.\n\nYou, who conceive it as choice, can have no doubt that it is a fact of\npractical activity, _i.e._ of _will_. This is also my own conclusion.\n_To choose_ something can only mean _to will it_.\n\nBut you somewhat obscure the conclusion now indicated when you speak\nof _logical_ and _illogical_ actions, and place actions properly\neconomic amongst the former. Logical and illogical bring us back to\ntheoretical activity. A _logical_ or _illogical_ action is a common\nway of speaking; but it is not a way of speaking exactly or\naccurately. The logical work of thought is quite distinct from the\naction of the will. To reason is not to will.\n\nNor is to will to reason; but the will _presupposes_ thought and hence\nlogic. He who does not think, cannot even will. I mean by willing,\nwhat is known to us by the evidence of our consciousness; not\nSchopenhauer's metaphysical _will_.\n\nIn _knowledge_, in so far as it is a necessary presupposition of\neconomic action, is found, if not a justification, an explanation of\nyour phrases about _logical and illogical actions_. Economic actions\nare always (we say so, at any rate) _logical_ actions, _i.e._ preceded\nby logical acts. But it is necessary to distinguish carefully the two\nstages: the phenomenon and its presupposition, since _from lack of\ndistinction between the two stages has arisen the erroneous conception\nof the economic principle as a technological fact_. I have criticised\nat length in other essays this confusion between _technical_ and\n_economic_, and I may be allowed to refer both to what I have written\nin my review of Stammler's book _Wirthschaft und Recht_, and to the\nmore exact analyses in my recent memorandum on the _Estetica_.\nStammler maintains precisely that the economic principle can be\nnothing but a technical concept. I would advise anyone who wishes to\nsee at a glance, the difference between the technical and the economic\nto consider carefully in what a _technical error_ and in what an\n_economic error_ respectively consist. A technical error is ignorance\nof the laws of the material on which we wish to work: for instance the\nbelief that it is possible to put very heavy beams of iron on a\ndelicate wall, without the latter falling into ruins. An _economic_\nerror is the not aiming directly at one's own object; to wish this and\nthat, _i.e._ not really to wish either this or that. A technical error\nis an error of knowledge: an economic error is an error of will. He\nwho makes a technical mistake will be called, if the mistake is a\nstupid one, an ignoramus; he who makes an economic mistake, is a man\nwho does not know how to behave in life: a weak and inconclusive\nperson. And, as is well known and proverbial, people can be _learned_\nwithout being _men_ (_practical_ or _complete_).\n\nThus an economic fact is a fact of _practical activity_. Have we\nattained our object in this definition? Not yet. The definition is\nstill incomplete and to complete it we must not only cross another\nexpanse of sea, but avoid another rock: viz. that of the conception of\neconomic data as _egoistic_ data.\n\nThis error arises as follows: if an economic fact is a practical\nactivity, it is still necessary to say how this activity is\ndistinguished from moral activity. But moral activity is defined as\n_altruistic_; then, it is inferred, economic data will be _egoistic_.\nInto this mistake has fallen, amongst others, our able Professor\nPantaleoni, in his _Princip\u00ee d'economia pura_, and in other writings.\n\nThe _egoistic_ is not something merely _different_ from a moral fact;\nit is the _antithesis_ of it; it is the _immoral_. In this way, by\nmaking the economic principle equivalent to an egoistic fact, instead\nof distinguishing economics from morality, we should be subordinating\nthe former to the latter, or rather should deny it any right to exist,\nrecognising it as something merely negative, as a deviation from moral\nactivity.\n\nA datum in economics is quite different. It does not form an\nantithesis to a moral datum; but is in the peaceable relation of\ncondition to conditioned. It is the general condition which makes the\nrise of ethical activity possible. In the concrete, every action\n(volition) of man is either moral or immoral, since no actions are\n_morally indifferent_. But both the moral and the immoral are economic\nactions; which means that the economic action, taken by itself, is\nneither moral nor immoral. Strength of character, for example, is\nneeded both by the honest man and by the cheat.\n\nIt seems to me that you approach gropingly to this conception of the\neconomic principle, as relating to practical actions, which taken in\nthe abstract, are neither moral nor immoral; when at one point in your\nlast essay, you exclude from economic consideration _choices_, which\nhave an _altruistic motive_; and further on, exclude also those which\nare _immoral_. Now, since choices are necessarily either altruistic or\negoistic, either moral or immoral, you have no way of escaping from\nthe difficulty except the one which I suggest; to regard economics as\nconcerned with practical activity in so far as it is (abstractly)\n_emptied_ of all _content, moral or immoral_.\n\nI might enlarge further on this distinction and show how it has an\nanalogy in the sphere of theoretical activity, where the relation of\neconomics to ethics is repeated in the relation of \u00e6sthetics to logic.\nAnd I might point out the reason why scientific and \u00e6sthetic\nproductions cannot be subjects of economic science, _i.e._ are not\neconomic products. The reason given, in this connection, by Professor\nEhrenfels, is, to say the least of it, curious: he remarks that: 'the\nrelations of value upon which the data of logic and \u00e6sthetics rest,\nare so simple that they do not demand a special economic theory.' It\nshould not be difficult to see that logical and \u00e6sthetic values are\ntheoretical and not practical values, whereas economic value is a\npractical value, and that it is impossible to unite an _economics_ of\nthe _theoretical_ as such. When, some years ago, the lamented Mazzola\nsent me the introduction in which he had discussed _Economics_ and\n_Art_, I had occasion to write to him and afterwards to say to him by\nword of mouth, that much more fundamental relations might be\ndiscovered between the two groups of phenomena; and he urged me to\nexpound my observations and inquiries. This I have done in the essay\non _Estetica_, referred to above. I am sorry to be obliged to _refer_\nso many times in writing to you and to the public. But here the need\nfor brevity and clearness constrains me.\n\nThis, then, is a rapid statement of how I arrive at the definition of\nthe data of economics, which I should like to see at the beginning of\nevery economic treatise. _The data of economics are the practical\nactivities of men in so far as they are considered as such,\nindependent of any moral or immoral determination._\n\nGranted this definition, and it will be seen also that the concept of\n_utility_, or of _value_ or of _ofelimity_, is nothing but the\neconomic action itself, _in so far as it is rightly managed_, _i.e._\nin so far as it is really economic. In the same way as _the true_ is\n_thinking_ activity itself, and _the good_ is _moral_ activity itself.\n\nAnd to speak of things (physical objects) as having or not having\nvalue, will appear simply a metaphorical usage to express those\n_causes which we think efficacious to produce the effects_ which we\n_desire_, and which are therefore our _ends_. _A_ is worth _b_, the\nvalue of _a_ is _b_, does not mean (the economists of the new school\nknew it well) _a=b_; nor even as is said _a>b_; but that _a_ has\n_value_ for us, and _b_ has not. And value--as you know--exists only\nat _the moment of exchange_, _i.e._ of _choice_.\n\nTo connect with these general propositions the different problems\nwhich are said to belong to economic science, is the task of the\nwriter of a special treatise on economics. It is your task, esteemed\nfriend, if after having studied these general propositions, they seem\nto you acceptable. To me it seems that they alone are able to\nsafeguard the independence of economics, not only as distinct from\n_History_ and _Practice_ but as distinct from _Mechanics_,\n_Psychology_, _Theory of Knowledge_, and _Ethics_.\n\nNaples, 15th May 1900.[97]\n\n\nII\n\n    _Disagreement (1) about method (2) postulates: (1) Nothing\n        arbitrary in economic method, analogy of classificatory\n        sciences erroneous: (2) Metaphysical postulate that facts\n        of human activity same as physical facts erroneous:\n        Definition of practical activity in so far as admits of\n        definition: Moral and economic activity and approval:\n        Economic and moral remorse: Economic scale of values._\n\n_Esteemed Friend_,\n\nOur disagreement concerning the nature of economic data has two chief\nsources: disagreement on a question of _method_ and disagreement on a\nquestion of _postulates_. I acknowledge that one object of my first\nletter was to obtain from you such explanations as might set clearly\nin relief our disagreement on the two points indicated.--To reduce\ncontroversies to their simplest terms, to expose ultimate oppositions,\nis, you will agree, an approach to truth. I will explain briefly the\ntwo points at issue. In regard to that of method, although I agree\nwith you in upholding the claims of a procedure that is logical,\nabstract and scientific, as compared with one that is historical (or\nsynthetic, as you say), I cannot in addition allow that the former\nprocedure involves something of the nature of an arbitrary choice, or\nthat it can be worked out equally well in either of two ways. You talk\nof _cutting away_ a _slice_ from a concrete phenomenon, and examining\nthis by itself; but I inquire how you manage to cut away that slice?\nfor it is no question here of a piece of bread or of cheese into which\nwe can actually put the knife, but of a series of representations\nwhich we have in our consciousness, and into which we can insert\nnothing except the light of our mental analysis. In order to cut off\nyour slice you would thus have to carry out a logical analysis; _i.e._\nto do at the outset what you propose to do subsequently. Your _cutting\noff of the slice_ is indeed an answer to the problem of the _quid_ in\nwhich an economic fact consists. You assume the existence of a test to\ndistinguish what you take for the subject of your exposition from what\nyou leave aside. But the test or guiding concept must be supplied by\nthe very nature of the theory, and must be in conformity with it.\n\nWould it for instance be in conformity with the nature of the thing,\nto cut away, as you wish to do, only that group of economic facts\nwhich relates to objects capable of measurement? What intrinsic\nconnection is there between this merely accidental attribute,\nmeasurability, of the objects which enter into an economic action, and\nthe economic action itself? Does measurability lead to a modification\nin the economic fact by changing its nature, _i.e._ by giving rise to\n_another_ fact? If so, you must prove it. I, for my part, cannot see\nthat an economic action changes its nature whether it relates to a\nsack of potatoes, or consists in an exchange of protestations of\naffection!\n\nIn your reply you refer to the need of avoiding waste of time over\nmatters that are too simple, for which 'it is not worth while to set\nin motion the great machine of mathematical reasoning.' But this need\nrelates to the pedagogy of the professional chair or of the book, not\nto the science in itself, which alone we are now discussing. It is\nquite evident that anybody who speaks or writes lays more stress on\nthose portions which he thinks harder for his hearers and readers to\ngrasp, or more useful to be told. But he who thinks, _i.e._ speaks\nwith himself, pays attention to all portions without preferences and\nwithout omissions. We are now concerned with thought, that is with the\n_growth_ of science; not with the manner of _communicating_ it. And\nin thought, we cannot admit arbitrary judgments.\n\nNor need we be turned aside by an analogy with the _classes_ of facts,\nmade by zoology and other natural sciences. The classifications of\nzoology and botany are not scientific operations, but merely views in\nperspective; and, considered in relation to really scientific\nknowledge, they are arbitrary. He who investigates the nature of\neconomic data, does not, however, aim at putting together, in\nperspective and roughly, groups of economic cases, as the zoologist or\nthe botanist do, mutilating and manipulating the inexhaustible,\ninfinite varieties of living creatures.\n\nUpon the confusion between _a science_ and the _exposition of a\nscience_ is based also the belief that we can follow different paths\nin order to arrive at a demonstration of the same truth. Unless in\nyour case, since you are a mathematician, it arose from a false\nanalogy with calculation. Now, calculation is not a science, because\nit does not give us the reasons of things; and hence _mathematical_\nlogic is logic in a manner of speaking, a variety of formal logic, and\nhas nothing to do with _scientific_ or inventive logic.\n\nWhen we pass to the question of the postulates, you will certainly be\nsurprised if I tell you that the disagreement between us consists in\nyour wish to introduce a _metaphysical_ postulate into economic\nscience; whereas I wish here to rule out every metaphysical postulate\nand to confine myself entirely to the analysis of the given facts. The\naccusation of being _metaphysical_ will seem to you the last that\ncould ever be brought against you. Your implied metaphysical postulate\nis, however, this; that the facts of man's activity are of the same\nnature as physical facts; that in the one case as in the other we can\nonly observe regularity and deduce consequences therefrom, without\never penetrating into the inner nature of the facts; that these facts\nare all alike _phenomena_ (meaning that they would presuppose a\n_noumena_, which evades us, and of which they are manifestations).\nHence whereas I have called my essay 'On the economic _principle_,'\nyours is entitled 'On the economic _phenomenon_.'\n\nHow could you defend this postulate of yours except by a\n_metaphysical_ monism; for example that of Spencer? But, whilst\nSpencer was anti-metaphysical and positivist in words, I claim the\nnecessity of being so in deeds; and hence I cannot accept either _his_\nmetaphysics or _his_ monism, and I hold to experience. This testifies\nto me the fundamental distinction between external and internal,\nbetween physical and mental, between mechanics and teleology, between\npassivity and activity, and secondary distinctions involved in this\nfundamental one. What metaphysics unites philosophy distinguishes (and\njoins together); the abstract contemplation of unity is the death of\nphilosophy. Let us confine ourselves to the distinction between\nphysical and mental. Whilst the external facts of nature, admitted by\nempirical physical science, are always phenomena, since their source\nis by definition outside themselves, the internal facts or activities\nof man, cannot be called phenomena, since they are their own source.\n\nBy this appeal to experience and by this rejection of all metaphysical\nintrusion, I place myself in a position to meet the objection which\nyou bring forward to my conception of economic data. You think that\nthe ambiguity of the term _value_ comes from this, that it denotes a\nvery complex fact, a collection of facts included under a single word.\nFor me, on the contrary, the difficulty in it arises from its denoting\na very simple fact, a _summum genus_, _i.e._ the fact of the very\n_activity_ of man. Activity is value. For us nothing is valuable\nexcept what is an effort of imagination, of thought, of will, of our\nactivity in any of its forms. As Kant said that there was nothing in\nthe universe that could be called _good_ except the _good will_; so,\nif we generalise, it may be said that there is nothing in the universe\nthat is valuable, except the _value of human activity_. Of value as of\nactivity you cannot demand a so-called genetic definition. The simple\nand the original is genetically indefinable. Value is observed\nimmediately in ourselves, in our consciousness.[98]\n\nThis observation shows us also that the _summum genus_ 'value,' or\n'mental activity' gives place to irreducible forms, which are in the\nfirst instance those of theoretical activity and practical activity,\nof theoretical values and practical values. But what does _practical_\nmean?--you now ask me. I believe that I have already answered by\nexplaining that the theoretical is everything which is a work of\n_contemplation_, and the practical everything that is the work of\n_will_. Is will an obscure term? We may rather call the terms _light_,\n_warmth_ and so on, obscure; not that of _will_. What will is, I know\nwell. I find myself face to face with it throughout my life as a man.\nEven in writing this letter, today, in a room in an inn, and in\nshaking off the laziness of country life, I have _willed_; and if I\nhave delayed the answer for two months, it is because I have been so\nfeeble as not to know how to _will_.\n\nYou see from this that the question raised by me, whether by _choice_\nyou meant _conscious_ or _unconscious_ choice, is not a _careless_\nquestion. It is equivalent to this other one; whether the economic\nfact is or is not a fact of _will_. 'This does not alter the fact of\nthe choice,' you say. But indeed it does alter it! If we speak of\n_conscious_ choice, we have before us a mental fact, if of\n_unconscious_ choice, a natural fact; and the laws of the former are\nnot those of the latter. I welcome your discovery that economic fact\nis the fact of choice; but I am _forced_ to mean by _choice_,\n_voluntary_ choice. Otherwise we should end by talking not only of the\n_choices_ of a man who is _asleep_ (when he moves from side to side)\nbut of those of _animals_, and why not? of _plants_ and why not again?\nof _minerals_; passing rapidly along the steep slope down which my\nfriend Professor C. Trivero has slipped in his recently published\n_Teoria dei bisogni_, for which may he be forgiven![99]\n\nWhen I defined economic data as 'the practical activities of man, in\nso far as they are considered as such, independently of any moral or\nimmoral determination,' I did not make an arbitrary judgment, which\nmight authorise others to do likewise, in a science which does not\ntolerate arbitrary judgments; but I merely _distinguished_ further\nwithin the species _practical activity_, two _sub-species_ or grades:\n_pure_ practical activity, (economic), and _moral_ practical activity,\n(ethical); will that is merely economic, and moral will. There is\nambiguity in your reproach that when I speak of approval or\ndisapproval as aroused by economic activity, I am considering the\nmatter from a _synthetic_ instead of an analytic point of view, and\nthat approval or disapproval are _extraneous_ factors. I did not\nhowever speak (and I believed that I had explained myself clearly), of\n_moral_, _intellectual_ or _\u00e6sthetic_ approval or disapproval. No, I\nsaid, and I repeat, that a judgment of approval or reprobation was\nnecessarily bound up with economic activity: but a _merely_ ECONOMIC\njudgment of approval or reprobation. '_By saying_ that Rhenish wine is\n_useful_ to me, has a _value_ for me, is _ofelimo_ to me, I mean only\nto say that I like it; and I do not see how this simplest of relations\ncan be well or ill-managed.' You will forgive me if in this sentence\nof yours I have italicised the words _by saying_. Here is the point.\nCertainly the mere _saying_ does not give rise to an internal judgment\nof economic approval or disapproval. It will give rise to a\ngrammatical or linguistic, _i.e._ \u00e6sthetic, approval or disapproval,\naccording to whether the saying is clear or confused, well or ill\nexpressed. But it is no question of _saying_: it is a question of\n_doing_, _i.e._ of the action willed carried out by the movement that\nis willed, of a _choice_ of movement. And do you think that the\nacquisition and consumption of a bottle of Rhenish wine involves no\njudgment of approval or disapproval? If I am very rich, if my aim in\nlife is to obtain momentary sensual pleasures, and I know that Rhenish\nwine will secure me one of them, I buy and drink Rhenish wine and\napprove my act. I am satisfied with myself. But if I do not _wish_ to\nindulge in gluttony, and if my money is all devoted to other purposes,\nfor which I _wish_ as preferable, and if, in spite of this, yielding\nto the temptation of the moment, I buy and drink Rhenish wine, I have\nput myself into contradiction with myself, and the sensual pleasure\nwill be followed by a judgment of disapproval, by a legitimate and\nfitting ECONOMIC REMORSE.\n\nTo prove to you how, in all this, I omit every _moral_ consideration,\nI will give you another example: that of a knave who thinks it\n_ofelimo_ to himself to murder a man in order to rob him of a sum of\nmoney. At the moment of assassination, and although remaining a knave\nat heart, he yields to an emotion of fear or to a pathological feeling\nof compassion, and does not kill the man. Note carefully the terms of\nthe hypothesis. The knave will call himself an ass and an imbecile,\nand will feel _remorse_ for his contradictory and inconclusive\nconduct; but not indeed a _moral_ remorse (of that he is, by\nhypothesis, incapable), but, precisely, a remorse that is merely\n_economic_.\n\nIt seems to me that there is another confusion, easy to dispel, in\nyour counter criticism to my criticism of the _scale of values_\n(economic) you say that 'there is no need for one person to find\nhimself at the same moment under different conditions; it is enough\nthat he can _picture to himself_ these different conditions.' Can you\nin truth _picture yourself_ being _at the same moment_ under\n_different_ conditions? Fancy has its laws; and does not allow the\nimagination of what is unimaginable. You can easily say that you\n_picture_ it to yourself: words are docile; but, to picture it _in\nreality_, is, pardon me, another matter altogether. You will not\nsucceed in it any more than I. Ask me to imagine a lion with the head\nof a donkey, and I will comply at once; but ask me to imagine a lion\nstanding _at the same moment_ in two different places, and I cannot\nsucceed. I will picture to myself, if you like, two similar lions, two\nexactly alike, but not the same in two different positions. Fancy\nreconstructs reality, but possible reality, not the impossible or what\nis contradictory. Thus my demonstration of the absurdity of the _scale\nof values_ applies both to actual and to possible reality. Nay, in\ndiscussing science in the abstract it was framed precisely on the mere\nconsideration of the possible.\n\nI do not know whether I have answered all your objections, but I have\nendeavoured to answer all those which seem to me fundamental. A\ndispute, in which questions of method and of principle are at stake\nneed not be carried on pedantically into minute details; we must\ndepend to some extent on the assistance of the readers, who, putting\nthemselves mentally in the position of the two disputants, work out\nfor themselves the final application. I wish merely to add that it is\nmy strongest conviction that the reaction against metaphysics (a\nfar-sighted reaction in that it has freed scientific procedure from\nadmixture with the arbitrary judgments of feeling and belief) has been\npushed forward by many so far as to destroy science itself. The\nmathematicians who have a quick feeling for scientific procedure, have\ndone much for economic science by reviving in it the dignity of\nabstract analysis, darkened and overwhelmed by the mass of anecdotes\nof the historical school. But, as it happens, they have also\nintroduced into it the prejudice of their profession, and, being\nthemselves students of the general conditions of the physical world,\nthe particular prejudice that mathematics can take up in relation to\neconomics--which is the science of _man_, of a form of the conscious\nactivity of man--the same attitude which it rightly takes up in\nrelation to the empirical natural sciences.\n\nFrom what I have now stated you will easily discover exactly how far\nwe are in agreement in the establishment of the principles of\n_Economics_ and how far we disagree. If my new observations should\nassist in further reducing the extent of the disagreement, I shall\nindeed be glad.\n\nPerugia, _20th October, 1900_.[100]\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[93] _Comment se pose le probl\u00e8me de l'economie pure._ Paper read in\nDecember 1898 to the _Societ\u00e9 Stella_.\n\n[94] _Giornale degli economisti_, March 1900, pp. 216-235.\n\n[95] _Rivista di sociologia_, III. no. vi., pp. 746-8, see\n_Materialismo Storico_, pp. 193-208.\n\n[96] DR CHRISTIAN V. EHRENFELS (Professor at Prague University):\n_System der Werttheorie_, vol. I, _Allgemeine Werttheorie, Psychologie\ndes Begehrens_, Leipzig, Reisland, 1897; vol. II, _Grundz\u00fcge einer\nEthik_, the same, 1898.\n\n[97] PARETO answered this letter in the same journal, _Giornale degli\neconomisti_, August, 1900, pp. 139-162.\n\n[98] I have before me Professor A. GRAZIADEI's article _Intorno alla\nteoria edonistica del valore_. (In _Riforma Sociale_, September 15th,\n1900); in which A. fails to see how the purist theory of value\ndovetails in with the doctrines of Psychophysics and Psychology. I can\nwell believe it! Psychophysics and Psychology are natural sciences and\ncannot throw light on economic fact which is mental and of value. I\nmay be allowed to point out, that, even three years ago, I gave a\nwarning against the confusion of economics with psychology. (See in\nthis volume pp. 72-75.) He who appeals to psychology (naturalistic) in\norder to understand economic fact, will always meet with the delusion,\nopportunely shown up by Graziadei. I have stated the reasons owing to\nwhich economics cannot dwell where the psychologists and hedonists\nsay; now Graziedei has questioned the door-keepers (Fechner, Wundt,\netc.), and has learnt that it does not dwell there. Well and good!\n\n[99] CAMILLO TRIVERO, _La teoria dei bisogni_, Turin, Bocca, 1900, pp.\n198. Trivero means by _need_ 'the condition of a being, either\nconscious or unconscious (man, animal, plant, thing), in which it\ncannot remain': so that it can be said 'that all needs are ultimately\ncondensed into the supreme _need_ or _end_ of being or becoming.'\n_Need_ for him is hence actual reality itself. But since, on the other\nhand, he declares that he does not wish to solve nor even to consider\nthe philosophical problem, it is hard to understand what a _theory of\nneeds_ (_i.e._ of reality) can be, and for what reason he goes back to\nsuch generalities.\n\nIt is true that Trivero believes that, by going back to the general\nconcept of _need_, he can establish the _parent theory_ on which rest\nthe particular doctrines of needs; and amongst them economics, which\nconcerns itself with _economic_ needs. If there are _species_--he\nsays--we ought to determine of what _genus_ they are species. But he\nwill allow me to remark that the genus to look for is, as logic\nteaches, the _proximate_ genus. To jump to such a great distance as to\nreality or to fact, would only lead to the noble discovery: that\neconomic needs are part of reality, are a group of facts.\n\nAnd what he does is to make an equally valuable discovery: that the\ntrue theory of history is the theory of needs, which, granted his\ndefinition of _needs_, is as much as to say that history is history of\nreality and the theory of it is--the theory.\n\nI have then no objection to make to the meaning which Trivero wishes\nto give to the word _need_; but I must assert that, having given it\nthis meaning, he has not afterwards constructed the theory of\nanything, nor thrown light on any special group of facts.\n\nFor real economic theory his book is quite useless. Economists do not\nrecognise the needs of things and plants and animals, but only human\nneeds, or those of man in so far as he is _homo oeconomicus_ and hence\na conscious being. I too believe that it is right to work out\nphilosophically the principle of economics; but in order to do this,\nTrivero should have studied economic science. He declares that 'he\ndoes not want to hold fast to anyone's petticoats.' This statement is\nsuperfluous if it means that each individual ought to base his own\nscientific convictions on reason and not on authority. It is dangerous\nif it signifies, on the contrary, an intention to spare himself the\ntrouble of studying other people's books, and of reconstructing\neverything from the beginning by his own personal efforts and by the\naid of general culture alone. The result obtained--being far from\nsatisfactory--should deter the author (who will not grumble at my\nplain speaking), from returning to this unfruitful method in the\nfuture.\n\n[100] PARETO answers this second letter in the _Giornale degli\neconomisti_, February, 1901, pp. 131-138.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX OF NAMES*\n\n*Marx's name is omitted. The Asterisks indicate notes.\n\n\nAristotle, 18\n\nAveling, E., 66*\n\n\nBauer, B., 102\n\nBernstein, E., 119\n\nBertolini, A., 96\n\nB\u00f6hm-Bawerk, 54, 76,* 142\n\nBray, 103\n\n\nColetti, F., 115*\n\nCroce, B., 129,* 131*\n\n\nD\u00fchring, E. 69, 79,* 84, 103, 114\n\nDurckheim, E., 118\n\n\nEhrenfels, Christian Von, 168, 172\n\nEngels, F., 7, 11, 14, 18, 19, 25, 26, 28, 41, 55, 63, 67, 69, 78-81,\n  83, 84, 89, 95,* 103, 114-116, 124, 131*\n\n\nFechner, 180\n\nFerrara, F., 127\n\n\nGentile, G., 80,* 83,* 86,* 104,* 115*\n\nGray, A., 103\n\nGraziadei, A., 138-140, 179*\n\nGrosse, E., 90*\n\n\nHegel, G.F., 6, 11, 81-82, 102, 122, 130\n\nHeine, H., 130\n\nHelvetius, 8\n\nHerbart, 24, 25\n\nHolbach, 8\n\n\nKant, E., 24, 25, 43, 113-114, 179\n\nKautsky, K., 119, 137\n\n\nIngram, 95*\n\n\nJevons, 72\n\n\nLabriola, Antonio, 1, 5, 9, 10-15, 18, 21-26, 51,* 55, 76, 84,* 86-93,\n  106, 109,* 110, 111, 114, 119, 120-132\n\nLange, A.F., 8, 41, 71, 72*\n\nLeibniz, 160\n\nLoria, A., 49, 91, 138, 142\n\n\nMachiavelli, N., 110,* 118\n\nManzoni, A., 19\n\nMommsen, T., 122\n\nMorgan, 89\n\nMore, Thomas, 19*\n\n\nPantaleoni, M., 76,* 96, 127, 171\n\nParrto, V., 74, 76,* 96-101, 159-186\n\nPlechanow, G., 8\n\nProudhon, P.G., 103\n\n\nRabelais, 105\n\nRicardo, D., 53, 135, 156, 157*\n\nRicca, Salermo G., 77*\n\nRichter, G.P., 18\n\nRodbertus, K., 103*\n\nRosmini, 102\n\nR\u00fcmalin, 36\n\n\nSanctis (de), F., 110*\n\nSchiller, 25*\n\nSchmidt, C., 54\n\nSchopenhauer, A., 102\n\nSimmel, G., 5, 24, 118\n\nSmith, A., 74*\n\nSombart, W., 54,* 55, 60, 63, 131,* 142\n\nSorel, G., 55, 86,* 119, 131-138\n\nSpencer, H., 36, 178\n\nStammler, R., 27-47, 118, 137,* 138, 170\n\nStein, L., 18\n\nStern, G., 133\n\n\nTrivero, C, 181,* 182\n\n\nVillari, P., 110*\n\n\nWagner, A., 73*\n\nWestermarck, E., 90*\n\nWitte, 78\n\nWundt, 180*\n\n\n  EDINBURGH; J.C. THOMSON\n  AT THE MERCAT PRESS\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n    +-----------------------------------------------------------+\n    | Typographical errors corrected in text:                   |\n    |                                                           |\n    | Page    ix: philosopy replaced with philosophy            |\n    | Page xxiii: knowlege replaced with knowledge              |\n    | Page  53: manifestions replaced with manifestations       |\n    | Page  55: acknowleges replaced with acknowledges          |\n    | Page  60: necesary replaced with necessary                |\n    | Page  61: corrollary replaced with corollary              |\n    | Page  85: schutzt replaced with sch\u00fctzt                   |\n    | Page  86: contigent replaced with contingent              |\n    | Page  86: idealogical replaced with ideological           |\n    | Page 104: abreviated replaced with abbreviated            |\n    | Page 122: empirical-dialetic replaced with                |\n    |           empirical-dialectic                             |\n    | Page 124: sytems replaced with systems                    |\n    | Page 149: Mark's replaced with Marx's                     |\n    | Page 187: Duhring replaced with D\u00fchring                   |\n    | Page 187: Colatti replaced with Coletti                   |\n    | Page 187: Kantsky replaced with Kautsky                   |\n    | Page 187: Leibnitz replaced with Leibniz                  |\n    | Page 188: Parrto replaced with Pareto                     |\n    | Page 188: Plechanov replaced with Plechanow               |\n    | Page 188: R\u00fcmalin replaced with R\u00fcmelin                   |\n    | Footnote 15: oekonomischer replaced with oekonomischen    |\n    | Footnote 15: Bohm replaced with B\u00f6hm                      |\n    | Footnote 15: fur replaced with f\u00fcr                        |\n    | Footnote 22: verzehbaren replaced with verzehrbaren       |\n    | Footnote 42: a\u00fcssere replaced with \u00e4ussere                |\n    | Footnote 59: entrepeneurs replaced with entrepreneurs     |\n    | Footnote 74: Briere replaced with Bri\u00e8re                  |\n    | Footnote 80: fugte replaced with f\u00fcgte                    |\n    | Footnote 82: fur replaced with f\u00fcr                        |\n    | Footnote 92: ittle replaced with little                   |\n    | Footnote 95: \"Materialismio Storico\" replaced with        |\n    |              \"Materialismo Storico\"                       |\n    |                                                           |\n    | Note that on page 166 that the word 'measurabilility'     |\n    | is likely to be a typo either for 'measurability' or      |\n    | 'measurably'                                              |\n    |                                                           |\n    +-----------------------------------------------------------+\n\n       *       *       *       *       *","title":"Historical materialism and the economics of Karl Marx","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":53154}