{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_39964/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_39964","id":"gutenberg_39964","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/39964","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","Knowledge, Theory of","Logic","Philosophy"],"text":"Produced by Odessa Paige Turner, Martin Pettit and the\nOnline Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net\n(This file was produced from images generously made\navailable by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.)\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTHE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF PHILOSOPHY\n\nThe Nature of Human Brain Work\nLetters on Logic.\nThe Positive Outcome of Philosophy\n\nBY\nJOSEPH DIETZGEN\n\n_TRANSLATED BY ERNEST UNTERMANN_\n\nWITH AN INTRODUCTION BY DR. ANTON PANNEKOEK\nTRANSLATED BY ERNEST UNTERMANN\n\nEDITED BY EUGENE DIETZGEN AND JOSEPH DIETZGEN, JR.\n\nCHICAGO\nCHARLES H. KERR & COMPANY\n1906\n\n\nCOPYRIGHT 1906\nBY EUGENE DIETZGEN\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n                                                            PAGE\nINTRODUCTION BY ANTON PANNEKOEK                                7\n\nTHE NATURE OF HUMAN BRAIN WORK\n  Preface                                                     41\n  I. Introduction                                             47\n  II. Pure Reason or the Faculty of Thought in General        61\n  III. The Nature of Things                                   80\n  IV. The Practice of Reason in Physical Science             104\n      _a_ Cause and Effect                                   108\n      _b_ Matter and Mind                                    119\n      _c_ Force and Matter                                   124\n  V. \"Practical Reason\" or Morality                          133\n      _a_ The Wise and Reasonable                            133\n      _b_ Morality and Right                                 143\n      _c_ The Holy                                           156\n\nLETTERS ON LOGIC\n  First Letter                                               177\n  Second Letter                                              181\n  Third Letter                                               186\n  Fourth Letter                                              191\n  Fifth Letter                                               198\n  Sixth Letter                                               205\n  Seventh Letter                                             212\n  Eighth Letter                                              217\n  Ninth Letter                                               225\n  Tenth Letter                                               230\n  Eleventh Letter                                            236\n  Twelfth Letter                                             242\n  Thirteenth Letter                                          248\n  Fourteenth Letter                                          255\n  Fifteenth Letter                                           260\n  Sixteenth Letter                                           265\n  Seventeenth Letter                                         271\n  Eighteenth Letter                                          277\n  Nineteenth Letter                                          283\n  Twentieth Letter                                           289\n  Twenty-first Letter                                        296\n  Twenty-second Letter                                       301\n  Twenty-third Letter (a)                                    307\n  Twenty-third Letter (b)                                    312\n  Twenty-fourth Letter                                       318\n\nTHE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF PHILOSOPHY\n  Preface                                                    327\n  I. Positive Knowledge as a Special Object                  333\n  II. The Power of Perception Is Kin to the Universe         337\n  III. As to How the Intellect Is Limited and Unlimited      342\n  IV. The Universality of Nature                             348\n  V. The Understanding as a Part of the Human Soul           354\n  VI. Consciousness Is Endowed With the Faculty of Knowing\n      as Well as With the Feeling of the Universality\n      of All Nature                                          363\n  VII. The Relationship or Identity of Spirit and Nature     369\n  VIII. Understanding Is Material                            376\n  IX. The Four Principles of Logic                           381\n  X. The Function of Understanding on the Religious Field    393\n  XI. The Distinction Between Cause and Effect Is only\n      One of the Means to Facilitate Understanding           401\n  XII. Mind and Matter: Which Is Primary, Which Is\n      Secondary?                                             409\n  XIII. The Extent to Which the Doubts of the Possibility\n      of Clear and Accurate Understanding Have Been\n      Overcome                                               418\n  XIV. Continuation of the Discussion on the Difference\n      Between Doubtful and Evident Understanding             428\n  XV. Conclusion                                             436\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\nTHE POSITION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF J. DIETZGEN'S PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS\n\nBY DR. ANTON PANNEKOEK\n\n\nIn the history of philosophy we see before us the consecutive forms of\nthe thoughts of the ruling classes of society on life and on the world\nat large. This class thought appears after the primitive communism has\ngiven way to a society with class antagonisms, at a stage when the\nwealth of the members of the ruling class gave them leisure time and\nthus stimulated them to turn their attention to the productions of the\nmind. The beginning of this thought is found in classic Greece. But it\nassumed its clearest and best developed form when the modern bourgeoisie\nhad become the ruling class in capitalistic Europe and the thinkers gave\nexpression to the ideas of this class. The characteristic mark of these\nideas is dualism, that is to say the misunderstood contrast between\nthinking and being, between nature and spirit, the result of the mental\nunclearness of this class and of its incapacity to see the things of the\nworld in their true interconnection. This mental state is but the\nexpression of the division of mankind into classes and of the\nuncomprehended nature of social production ever since it became a\nproduction of goods for exchange.\n\nIn times of primitive communism, the conditions of production were clear\nand easily understood. Things were produced jointly for use and consumed\nin common. Man was master of his mode of production and thus master of\nhis own fate as far as the superior forces of nature admitted it. Under\nsuch conditions, social ideas could not help being simple and clear.\nThere being no clash between personal and social interests, men had no\nconception of a deep chasm between good and bad. Only the uncontrolled\nforces of nature stood like unintelligible and mysterious powers, that\nappeared to them either as well meaning or as evil spirits, above these\nprimitive little societies.\n\nBut with the advent of the production of commodities the picture\nchanges. Civilized humanity begins to feel itself somewhat relieved from\nthe hard and ungovernable pressure of fickle natural forces. But now new\ndemons arise out of social conditions. \"No sooner did the producers give\ntheir products away in exchange instead of consuming them as heretofore,\nthan they lost control of them. They no longer knew what became of their\nproducts, and there was a possibility that these products might some day\nbe used for the exploitation and oppression of the producers--The\nproducts rule the producers.\" (Engels) In the production of commodities,\nit is not the purpose of the individual producer which is accomplished,\nbut rather that which the productive forces back of him are aiming at.\nMan proposes, but a social power, stronger than himself, disposes; he is\nno longer master of his fate. The inter-relations of production become\ncomplicated and difficult to grasp. While it is true that the individual\nis the producing unit, yet his individual labor is only a subordinate\npart of the whole process of social production, of which he remains a\ntool. The fruits of the labor of many are enjoyed by a few individuals.\nThe social co-operation is concealed behind a violent competitive\nstruggle of the producers against one another. The interests of the\nindividuals are at war with those of society. Good, that is to say the\nconsideration of the common welfare, is opposed to bad, that is to say\nthe sacrifice of everything to private interests. The passions of men as\nwell as their mental gifts, after they have been aroused, developed,\ntrained, strengthened, and refined in this struggle, henceforth become\nso many weapons which a superior power turns against their helpless\npossessors.\n\nSuch were the impressions out of which thinking men were obliged to\nfashion their world-philosophy, while, at the same time, they were\nmembers of the possessing classes and had thus an opportunity to employ\ntheir leisure for a certain self-study, without, however, being in touch\nwith the source of their impressions, viz., the process of social labor\nwhich alone could have enabled them to see through the social origin of\ntheir ideas. Men of this class, therefore, were led to the assumption\nthat their ideas emanated from some supernatural and spiritual power or\nthat they were themselves independent supernatural powers. This dualist\nmetaphysical mode of thought has gone through various transformations in\nthe course of time, adapting itself to the evolution of production\nbeginning with ancient slavery, on through the serfdom of the Middle\nAges and of medi\u00e6val commodity production, to modern capitalism. These\nsuccessive changes of form are embodied in Grecian philosophy, in the\nvarious phases of the Christian religion, and in the modern systems of\nphilosophy.\n\nBut we must not regard these systems and religions for what they\ngenerally pass, that is to say, we must not think them to be only\nrepeated unsuccessful attempts to formulate absolute truth. They are\nmerely the incarnations of progressive stages of better knowledge\nacquired by the human mind about itself and about the universe. It was\nthe aim of philosophical thought to find satisfaction in understanding.\nAnd as long as understanding could not wholly be gotten by natural\nmeans, there remained always a field for the supernatural and\nincomprehensible. But by the painstaking mental work of the deepest\nthinkers, the material of science was ceaselessly increased, and the\nfield of the supernatural and incomprehensible was ever more narrowed.\nAnd this is especially the case since the progress of capitalist\nproduction has promoted the persistent study of nature. For through this\nstudy the human mind was enabled to test its powers by simple, quiet,\npersistent and fruitful labor in the search for successive parts of\ntruth; and thus to rid itself from the overirritation of hopeless quest\nafter absolute truth. The desire to ascertain the value of these new\ntruths gave rise to the problems of the theory of understanding. The\nattempts to solve these problems form a permanent part of modern systems\nof philosophy, which represent a graduated evolution of the theory of\nunderstanding. But the supernatural element in these systems prevented\ntheir perfection.\n\nUnder the impulse of the technical requirements of capitalism, the\nevolution of natural sciences became a triumphal march of the human\nmind. Nature was subjugated first through the discovery of its laws by\nthe human mind, and then by the material subordination of the known\nforces of nature to the human will in the service of our main object,\nthe production of the necessaries of life with a minimum expenditure of\nenergy. But this bright shining light rendered, by contrast, the gloom\nwhich surrounded the phenomena of human society only the darker, and\ncapitalism in its development still accentuates this contrast, as it\naccentuates and thus renders more easily visible and intelligible all\ncontrasts. While the natural sciences dispensed with all mysterious\nsecrecy within their narrower domain, the darkness shrouding the origin\nof ideas still offered a welcome refuge to the belief in miracles on the\nspiritual field.\n\nCapitalism is now approaching its decline. Socialism is near. And the\nvital importance of this transition in human history cannot be stated\nmore strongly than in the words of Marx and Engels: \"This concludes the\nprimary history of man. He thereby passes definitely out of the animal\nkingdom.\" The social regulation of production makes man fully the master\nof his own fate. No longer does any mysterious social power then thwart\nhis plans or jeopardise his success. Nor does any mysterious natural\nforce control him henceforth. He is no longer the slave, but the master\nof nature. He has investigated its effects, understands them, and\npresses them into his service. For the first time in his history he will\nthen be the ruler of the earth.\n\nWe now see that the many centuries that filled the history of\ncivilization were a necessary preparation for socialism, a slow struggle\nto escape from nature's slavery, a gradual increase of the productivity\nof labor, up to the point where the necessaries of life for all may be\nobtained almost without exertion. This is the prime merit of capitalism\nand its justification, that after so many centuries of hardly\nperceptible progress it taught man to conquer nature by a rapid assault.\nAt the same time it set loose the forces of production and finally\ntransformed and bared the springs of the productive process to such a\ndegree that they easily could be perceived and grasped by the human\nmind; this was the indispensable condition for the control of this\nprocess.\n\nAs never since the first advent of production of commodities there has\nbeen such a fundamental revolution, it must necessarily be accompanied\nby an equally fundamental spiritual revolution. This economic revolution\nis the conclusion of the long period of class antagonisms and of\nproduction of commodities; it carries with it the end of the dualist and\nsupernatural thoughts arising from this source. The mystery of social\nprocesses passes away with this period, and the spiritual expression of\nthese mysteries must necessarily disappear with it. The slow development\nof human thought from ignorance to an ever increased understanding\nthereby ends its first chapter. This signifies the completion and\nconclusion of philosophy, which is equivalent to saying that philosophy\nas such passes out of existence, while its place is taken by the science\nof the human mind, a part of natural science.\n\nA new system of production sheds its light into the minds of men already\nbefore it has fully materialized. The same science which teaches us to\nunderstand and thereby to control the social forces, also unfetters the\nmind from the bewitching effects of those forces. It enables him even\nnow already to emancipate himself from traditional superstitions and\nideas which were formerly the expression of things unknown. We may\nanticipate with our mind the coming time. And thus the ideas which will\nthen dominate are already even now growing within us in a rudimentary\nform corresponding to the present actual economic development. By this\nmeans we are even now enabled to overcome the capitalist philosophy in\nthought and to soberly and clearly grasp the matter-dependent nature of\nour spirit.\n\nThe completion and the end of philosophy need not wait for the\nrealization of socialist production. The new understanding does not fall\nfrom heaven like a meteor. It develops with the social-economic\ndevelopment, first imperfectly and imperceptibly, in a few thinkers who\nmost strongly feel the breath of the approaching time. With the growth\nof the science of sociology and with that of its practical application,\nthe socialist labor movement, the new understanding simultaneously\nspreads and gains ground step by step, waging a relentless battle\nagainst the traditional ideas to which the ruling classes are clinging.\nThis struggle is the mental companion of the social class struggle.\n\n      ************\n\nThe methods of the new natural science had already been practiced for a\nfew centuries before the new theory was formulated. It first found vent\nin the expression of surprise at the great confidence with which men\nassumed to predict certain phenomena and to point out their connections.\nOur experience is limited to a few successive observations of the\nregularity or coincidence of events. But we attribute to natural laws,\nin which are expressed causal relations of phenomena, a general and\nnecessary applicability which far exceeds our experience. The English\nthinker Hume was the first who clearly expressed and formulated the\nquestion--since called the problem of causality--why men always act in\nthis manner. But as he believed the reason for such action should be\nsought in the nature of experience alone, experience being the only\nsource of knowledge, and as he did not further investigate the special\nand distinct part played by the nature of the human mind in this\nexperiential connection, he could not find any satisfactory answer.\n\nKant, who made the first important step toward the solution of this\nquestion, had been trained in the school of rationalism which then\ndominated in Germany and which represented an adaptation of medi\u00e6val\nscholasticism to the requirements of increased knowledge. Starting from\nthe thesis that things which are logical in the mind must be real in\nnature, the rationalists formulated by mere deduction general truths\nabout god, infinity and immortality. Under the influence of Hume, Kant\nbecame the critic of rationalism and thus the reformer of philosophy.\n\nThe question, how it is that we have knowledge of generally applicable\nlaws in which we have implicit confidence--such as mathematical theses,\nor the maxim that every change has a cause--was answered by Kant in this\nway: Experience and science are as much conditioned on properties\ninherent in the organization of our mind as on the impressions of the\nouter world. The former properties must necessarily be contained in all\nexperience and science. Therefore everything dependent on this common\nmental part of science must be perfectly certain and independent of\nspecial sense impressions. Common to all experience, and inseparable\nfrom it, are the pure sense-conceptions (reine Anschauungsformen), such\nas space and time, while the many experiences, in order to succeed in\nforming understanding and science, must be connected by the pure\nmind-conceptions (reine Verstandesbegriffe), the so-called categories;\namong the latter also belongs causality.\n\nNow Kant explains the necessity and general applicability of the pure\nsense and mind conceptions by the fact that they arise from the\norganization of our mind. Accordingly, the world appears to the senses\nas a succession of phenomena in time and space. Our reason transforms\nthese phenomena into things which are welded into one aggregate nature\nby laws of cause and effect. On the things as they really are in\nthemselves, in the opinion of Kant, these pure conceptions cannot be\napplied. We know nothing of them and can neither perceive nor\nreconstruct them by reason, because \"in themselves\" they are wholly\nbeyond reason and knowledge.\n\nThe result of this investigation, which was the first valuable\ncontribution to a scientific theory of understanding and forms, from our\nstandpoint, the most important part of Kant's philosophy, served him\nmainly as a means of answering the following questions: What is the\nvalue of knowledge which exceeds experience? Can we, by mere deduction\nthrough concepts which go beyond experience, arrive at truths? His\nanswer was: No, and it was a crushing blow to rationalism. We cannot\nexceed the boundaries of experience. By experience alone can we arrive\nat science. All supposed knowledge about the unlimited and infinite,\nabout concepts of pure reason, called Ideas by Kant, (as the soul, the\nworld, and God) is nothing but illusions. The contradictions in which\nthe human mind becomes involved whenever it applies the categories\noutside of experience to such subjects, are manifested in the fruitless\nstrife between the philosophical systems. Metaphysics as a science is\nimpossible.\n\nThis did not give the deathblow to rationalism alone, but also to\nbourgeois materialism which reigned among the French radical thinkers.\nKant's researches refuted the negative as well as the positive\nassertions anent the supernatural and infinite. This cleared the field\nfor faith, for intuitive conviction. God, freedom and immortality are\nconcepts the truth of which cannot be proved by reason, like the natural\ntruths derived from experience. But nevertheless their reality is no\nless certain, only it is of a different nature, being subjective and,\ntherefore, necessarily a matter of personal conviction. The freedom of\nthe will, for instance, is not a knowledge gained by experience, because\nexperience never teaches us anything but lack of freedom and dependence\non the laws of nature. But nevertheless freedom of will is a necessary\nconviction of every one who feels it in the categorical imperative: Thou\nshalt! of every one possessed by a sense of duty and of the knowledge\nthat he can act accordingly: therefore freedom of will is\nunconditionally certain and requires no proof by experience. And from\nthis premise there follows in same way the assurance of the immortality\nof the soul and of the existence of God. It gives the same kind of\ncertainty to all ideas which were left in a state of uncertainty by the\ncritique of pure reason. At the same time freedom of will determines the\nform of the theory of understanding. In the entire world of phenomena\nthere was no room for freedom, for these phenomena follow strict rules\nof causality, as demanded by the organization of our mind. Therefore it\nwas necessary to make room for freedom of will somewhere else, and so\n\"things in themselves,\" hitherto a phrase without value and meaning,\nassumed a higher importance. They were not bound to space, time or\ncategories, they were free: they formed so to say a second world, the\nworld of noumena, which stood behind the world of phenomena and which\nsolved the contradiction between the lawful dependence of things in\nnature and between the personal conviction of freedom of will.\n\nThese opinions and reasonings were fully in accord with the conditions\nof science and the economic development of Kant's time. The field of\nnature was left entirely to the inductive method of science which based\nitself on strictly materialist experience and observation, classifying\nthings systematically in their causal order and excluding all\nsupernatural interference. But while faith was banished from the natural\nsciences forever, it could not be dispensed with. The ignorance as to\nthe origin of the human will left room for a supernatural ethic. The\nattempts of the materialists to exclude the supernatural also from this\nfield failed. The time had not come as yet for a materialist and natural\nethics, for science was not yet able to demonstrate as an indisputable\ntruth, founded on experience, in what manner ethical codes and moral\nideas in general had a material origin.\n\nThis state of things shows that the Kantian philosophy is the purest\nexpression of bourgeois thought, and this is still more emphasized by\nthe fact that freedom is the center of his system and controls it.\nRising capitalism required freedom for the producers of commodities in\norder to expand its productive forces, it required freedom of\ncompetition and freedom of unlimited exploitation. The producers of\ncommodities should be free from all fetters and restrictions, and\nunhampered by any coercion, in order that they could go, under the sole\ndirection of their own intelligence, into free competition with their\nfellow citizens. For this reason, freedom became the slogan of the young\nbourgeoisie aspiring to political power, and Kant's doctrine of the free\nwill, the basis of his ethics, was the echo of the approaching French\nRevolution. But freedom was not absolute; it was to be dependent on the\nmoral law. It was not to be used in the quest for happiness, but in\naccord with the moral law, in the service of duty. If the bourgeois\nsociety was to exist, the private interest of the individual must not\nbe paramount, the welfare of the entire class had to be superior to that\nof the individual, and the commandments of this class had to be\nrecognized as moral laws taking precedence over the quest for happiness.\nBut for this very reason, these moral laws could never be fully obeyed,\nand every one found himself compelled to violate them in his own\ninterest. Hence the moral law existed only as a code which could never\nbe fulfilled. And so it stood outside of experience.\n\nIn Kant's ethics the internal antagonism of bourgeois society is\nreflected, that antagonism which is the compelling force of the ever\nincreasing economic development. The foundation of this antagonism is\nthe antagonism, already mentioned, between the individual and social\ncharacter of production that gives rise to omnipotent, but unconceived\nsocial forces ruling the destiny of man. In capitalistic production it\nis still intensified by the antithesis of the wealthy ruling class and\nthe poor producing class that is continuously augmented by those who are\nexpropriated by competition. This antagonism gives rise to the\ncontradiction between the aims of men and the results achieved, between\nthe desire of happiness and the misery of the great mass. It is the\nbasis of the contradiction between virtue and vice, between freedom and\ndependence, between faith and science, between phenomenon and \"thing\nitself.\" It is at the bottom of all contradictions and of the entire\npronounced dualism of the Kantian philosophy. These contradictions are\nto blame for the downfall of the system, and the work of disintegration\nwas unavoidable from the moment that the contradictions of the bourgeois\nproduction became apparent, that is to say immediately after the\npolitical victory of the bourgeoisie. The system of Kant could, however,\nnot be overcome, unless the material origin of morality could be\nuncovered. Then these contradictions could be understood and solved by\nshowing that they were relative and not absolute as they appeared. And\nnot until then could a materialist ethics, a science of morality, drive\nfaith from its last retreat. This was at last accomplished by the\ndiscovery of social class struggles and of the nature of capitalist\nproduction, by the pioneer work of Karl Marx.\n\nThe practice of developed capitalism about the middle of the 19th\ncentury directly challenged proletarian thinkers to criticise Kant's\ndoctrine of practical reason. Bourgeois ethics and freedom manifested\nthemselves in the form of freedom of exploitation in the interest of the\nbourgeoisie, as slavery for the working class. The maintenance of human\ndignity appeared in reality as the brutalization and degradation of the\nproletarians, and the state founded on justice proved to be nothing but\nthe class state of the bourgeoisie. And so it was seen that Kant's\nsublime ethics, instead of being the basis in all eternity of human\nactivity in general, was merely the expression of the narrow class\ninterests of the bourgeoisie. This proletarian criticism was the first\nmaterial for a general theory, and once it had been stated, its\ncorrectness was demonstrated more and more by the study of previous\nhistorical events, and these events were thereby shown in their proper\nlight. It was then understood by this theory that the social classes,\ndistinguished by their position in the process of production, had\ndifferent and antagonistic economic interests, and that each class did\nnecessarily regard its own interest as good and sacred. These general\nclass interests were not recognized in their true character but appeared\nto men in the guise of superior moral motives; in this form they crowded\nthe special individual interests into the background, and since the\nclass interests were generally felt, all the members of the same class\nrecognized them. Moreover, a ruling class could temporarily compel a\ndefeated or suppressed class to recognize the class interests of the\nrulers as a moral law, so long as the inevitability of the mode of\nproduction in which that class ruled was acknowledged. Owing to the fact\nthat the nature and significance of the productive process was not\nunderstood, the origin of human motives could not be discovered. They\nwere not traced back to experience, but simply felt directly and\nintuitively. And consequently they were thought to be of a supernatural\norigin and eternal duration.\n\nNot only the moral codes, but also other products of the human mind,\nsuch as religion, science, arts, philosophy, were then understood to be\nintimately connected with the actual material conditions of society. The\nhuman mind is influenced in all its products by the entire world outside\nof it. And thus the mind is seen to be a part of nature, and the science\nof the mind becomes a natural science. The impressions of the outer\nworld determine the experience of man, his wants determine his will, and\nhis general wants his moral will. The world around him determines man's\nwants and impressions, but these, on the other hand, determine his will\nand activity by which he changes the world; this will-directed activity\nappears in the process of social production. In this manner man by his\nwork is a part, a link in the great chain of natural and social\ndevelopment.\n\nThis conception overturns the foundations of philosophy. Since the human\nmind is seen now to be a part of nature and interacts with the rest of\nthe world according to laws which are more or less known, it is classed\namong Kant's phenomena. There is no longer any need of talking about\nnoumena. Thus they do not longer exist for us. Philosophy then reduces\nitself to the theory of experience, to the science of the human mind. It\nis at this point that the beginning made by Kant had to be farther\ndeveloped. Kant had always separated mind and nature very sharply. But\nthe understanding that this separation should only be made temporarily\nfor the purpose of better investigation, and that there is no absolute\ndifference between matter and mind made it possible to advance the\nscience of thought processes. However, this could be accomplished only\nby a thinker who had fully digested the teachings of socialism. This\nproblem was solved by Joseph Dietzgen in his work on \"THE NATURE OF\nHUMAN BRAIN WORK,\" the first edition of which appeared in 1869, and by\nthis work he won for himself the name of philosopher of the proletariat.\nThis problem could be solved only by the help of the dialectic method.\nTherefore, the idealist philosophical systems from Kant to Hegel which\nconsist chiefly in the development of the dialectic method, must be\nregarded as the indispensable pioneers and precursors of Dietzgen's\nproletarian philosophy.\n\n      ************\n\nThe philosophy of Kant necessarily broke down on account of its dualism.\nIt had shown that there is safety only in finite and material\nexperience, and that the mind becomes involved in contradictions\nwhenever it ventures beyond that line. The mind's reason calls for\nabsolute truth which cannot be gotten. Hence the mind is groping in the\ndark and critique may perhaps explain why it is in the dark, but it\ncannot show the way out. What is called with Kant dialectics is in\nreality resignation. True, the mind finds knowledge about things outside\nof experience by some other way, viz., by means of its moral\nconsciousness, but this intuitive knowledge in the form of faith remains\nsharply separated from scientific understanding. It was the task of the\nphilosophical development immediately after Kant, to do away with this\nsharp separation, this unreconciled contradiction. This development\nended with Hegel; its result was the understanding that contradiction is\nthe true nature of everything. But this contradiction cannot be left to\nstand undisturbed, it must be solved and still retained in a higher\nform, and thus be reconciled. Therefore the world of phenomena cannot be\nunderstood as being at rest. It can be understood only as a thing in\nmotion, as activity, as a continuous change. Action is always the\nreconciliation of contradiction in some higher form, and contradiction\nappears in this way as the lever of progressive development. That which\naccomplishes this dialectic self-development does not appear in the\nidealistic systems as the material world itself, but as the spiritual,\nthe idea. In Hegel's philosophy, this conception assumes the form of a\ncomprehensive system outlining the self-development of the Absolute\nwhich is spiritual and is identical with God. The development of this\nAbsolute takes place in three stages; in its primitive pure spiritual\nform it develops out of its undifferentiated being the conceptions of\nlogic; then it expresses itself in another, an external form, opposite\nto itself, as Nature. In nature all forms develop by way of\ncontradictions which are eliminated by the development of some higher\nform. Finally the Absolute awakens to consciousness in nature in the\nform of the human mind and reaches thus its third stage, at which the\nopposite elements, matter and spirit, are reconciled into a unity. The\nhuman mind evolves in the same way to ever higher stages, until it\narrives, at the end of its development by understanding itself, that is\nto say, by knowing intuitively the Absolute. This is what happens\nunconsciously in religion. Religion, which in the form of faith must be\nsatisfied with a modest corner in the system of Kant, appears in the\nsystem of Hegel very proudly as a higher sort of understanding superior\nto all other knowledge, as an intuitive knowledge of absolute truth\n(God). In philosophy this is done consciously. And the historical\ndevelopment which finds its conclusion and climax in the Hegelian\nphilosophy corresponds to the logical development of the human mind.\n\nThus Hegel unites all sciences and all parts of the world into one\nmasterly system in which the revolutionary dialectics, the theory of\nevolution, that considers all finite things as perishable and\ntransitory, is given a conservative conclusion by putting an end to all\nfurther development when the absolute truth is reached. All the\nknowledge of that period was assigned to its place somewhere in this\nsystem, on one of the steps of the dialectic development. Many of the\nconceptions of the natural sciences of that day, which later on were\nfound to be erroneous, are there presented as necessary truths resting\non deduction, not on experience. This could give the impression that the\nHegelian philosophy made empirical research superfluous as a source of\nconcrete truths. This appearance is to blame for the slight recognition\nof Hegel among naturalists; in natural sciences, this philosophy\ntherefore has won much less importance than it deserved and than it\nmight have won, if its actual significance, which consists in the\nharmonious connection between widely separated events and sciences, had\nbeen better understood under its deceptive guise.\n\nOn the abstract sciences the influence of Hegel was greater, and here he\nheld an exceptionally prominent position in the scientific world of that\ntime. On one hand, his conception of history as a progressive evolution\nin which every imperfect previous condition is regarded as a necessary\nphase and preparation for subsequent conditions and thus appears natural\nand reasonable, was a great gain for science. On the other hand, his\nstatements on the philosophy of law and religion met the requirements\nand conceptions of his time. In his philosophy of law, the human mind is\ntaken in that stage in which it steps into reality, having as its\nprincipal characteristic a free will. It is first considered as a single\nindividual which finds its freedom incorporated in its property. This\npersonality enters into relations with others like it. Its freedom of\nwill is thereby expressed in moral laws. By combining all individuals\ninto one aggregate whole, their contradictory relations are merged into\nthe social units, viz., the family, the bourgeois society (b\u00fcrgerliche\nGesellschaft) and the state. There the moral rules are carried from the\ninner to the outer reality. As the expressions of a superior, common and\nmore general will, they stand forth in the generally accepted moral\ncodes, in the natural laws of bourgeois society and in the authoritative\nlaws of the state. In the state, the highest form of which is the\nmonarchy, the mind finds itself at its highest stage of objective\nrealization as the idea of the state.\n\nThe reactionary character of Hegelian philosophy is not merely a\nsuperficial appearance that rests on the glorification of state and\nroyalty, thanks to which this philosophy was raised to the position of\nPrussian state philosophy after the restauration. It was in its very\nessence a product of reaction which in those days represented the only\npossible advance after the revolution. This reaction was the first\npractical critique of bourgeois society. After this society had been\nfirmly established, the relative amenities of the old time appeared in a\nbetter light, because the shortcomings of the new society made\nthemselves soon felt. The bourgeoisie had recoiled before the\nconsequences of its revolution, when it recognized that the proletariat\nwas its barrier. It arrested the revolution as soon as its bourgeois\naims had been accomplished, and it was willing to acknowledge again the\nmastery of the feudal state and monarchy, provided they would protect it\nand serve its interests. The feudal powers that previously had been\novercome by the weight of their own sins and by the unconditional\nsuperiority of the new social order, again lifted their heads when the\nnew order in its turn gave cause for well founded criticisms. But they\ncould not keep the revolution in check, unless they recognized it in a\nlimited degree. They could once more rule over the bourgeoisie, provided\nthey compromised with it so far as it was inevitable. They could no\nlonger prevail against capitalism, but they could govern for it. Thus,\nby their rule, the imperfectness of capitalism was revealed.\n\nThe theory of restauration, therefore, had to consist first of all of a\nthorough critique of the revolutionary bourgeois philosophy. But this\nphilosophy could not be thrown aside entirely. So far as a critique of\nthe old order was concerned, the truth of bourgeois philosophy had to be\nadmitted. On the other hand, the sharp distinction it made between the\nfalsity of the old and the truth of the new order was found to be beside\nthe mark. So the correctness of the bourgeois philosophy itself proved\nto be relative and limited, like that of a herald of some higher truth\nwhich in its turn would acknowledge that which was temporarily and\npartially true in its vanquished precursor. In this way the\ncontradictions became moments in the evolution of absolute truth, in\nthis way, furthermore, the dialectics became the main feature and method\nof post-Kantian philosophy; and in this way, finally, the theorists of\nthe reaction were the men who steered philosophy over new courses and\nwho thereby became the harbingers of socialism. Scepticism and a\ncritique of all traditional things, yet a careful protection of\nendangered faith, had characterized the tendencies of bourgeois thought\nduring its revolutionary period. In the reactionary stage, the bourgeois\nimplicitly accepted the belief in absolute truth and cultivated a\nself-righteous faith. The practice of Metternich and of the Holy\nAlliance corresponded to the theory of Hegelian philosophy.\n\nThe practice of the Prussian police state, which embodied the\nshortcomings of capitalism without its advantages and thus represented a\nhigher degree of reaction, destroyed the Hegelian philosophy, as soon as\nthe practices of maturing capitalism began to rebel against the fetters\nby which reaction endeavored to bind it. Feuerbach returned in his\ncritique of religion from the fantastical heights of abstraction to\nphysical man. Marx demonstrated that the reality of bourgeois society\nexpresses itself in its class antagonisms which herald its imperfectness\nand approaching downfall, and he discovered that the actual historical\ndevelopment rested on the development of the process of material\nproduction. The absolute spirit that was supposed to be embodied in the\nconstitution of the despotic state before the March revolution now\nrevealed itself as the narrow bourgeois spirit which regards bourgeois\nsociety as the final aim of all historical development. The Hegelian\nstatement that all finite things carry within themselves the germ of\ntheir own dissolution came home to his own philosophy, as soon as its\nfiniteness and limitations had been grasped. Its conservative form was\nabandoned, but its revolutionary content, the dialectics, was preserved.\nThe Hegelian philosophy was finally superseded by dialectic materialism\nwhich declares that absolute truth is realized only in the infinite\nprogress of society and of scientific understanding.\n\nThis does not imply a wholesale rejection of Hegelian philosophy. It\nmerely means that the relative validity of that philosophy has been\nrecognized. The vicissitudes of the absolute spirit in the course of its\nself-development are but a fantastical description of the process which\nthe real human mind experiences in its acquaintance with the world and\nits active participation in life. Instead of the evolution of the\nabsolute idea, the dialectics henceforth becomes the sole correct method\nof thought to be employed by the real human mind in the study of the\nactual world and for the purpose of understanding social development.\nThe great and lasting importance of Hegel's philosophy, even for our own\ntime, is that it is an excellent theory of the human mind and of its\nworking methods, provided we strip off its transcendental character, and\nthat it far excels the first laborious contributions of Kant to the\ntheory of understanding.\n\nBut this quality of the Hegelian philosophy could not be appreciated,\nuntil Dietzgen had created the basis for a dialectic and materialistic\ntheory of understanding. The indispensable character of dialectic\nthought, which is illustrated by the monumental works of Marx and\nEngels, has been first demonstrated in a perfectly convincing manner by\nDietzgen's critical analysis of the human force of thinking. It was only\nby means of this method of thought--of which he was according to Engels'\ntestimony an independent discoverer--that he could succeed in completing\nthe theory of understanding and bringing it to a close for the time\nbeing.\n\n      ************\n\nIf we refer to the ideas laid down by Dietzgen in this work as \"his\nphilosophy,\" we say too much, because it does not assume to be a new\nsystem of philosophy. Yet, on the other hand, we should not say enough,\nbecause it would mean that his work is as passing as the systems before\nit. It is the merit of Dietzgen to have raised philosophy to the\nposition of a natural science, the same as Marx did with history. The\nhuman faculty of thought is thereby stripped of its fantastic garb. It\nis regarded as a part of nature, and by means of experience a\nprogressive understanding of its concrete and ever changing historical\nnature must be gained. Dietzgen's work refers to itself as a finite and\ntemporary realization of this aim, just as every new theory in natural\nscience is a finite and temporary realization of its aims. This\nrealization must be further improved and perfected by successive\ninvestigations. This is the method of natural science; philosophical\nsystems, on the contrary, pretended to give absolute truth, that could\nnot be improved upon. Dietzgen's work is fundamentally different from\nthese former philosophies, and more than they, because it wishes to be\nless. It presents itself as the positive outcome of philosophy toward\nwhich all great thinkers have contributed, seen by the sober eyes of a\nsocialist and analyzed, recounted and further developed by him. At the\nsame time, it attributes to previous systems the same character of\npartial truths and shows that they were not entirely useless\nspeculations, but ascending stages of understanding naturally related,\nwhich contain ever more truth and ever less error. Hegel had likewise\nentertained this broader view, but with him this development came to a\nself-contradictory end in his own system. Dietzgen also calls his own\nconception the highest then existing, and its distinctive step in the\nevolution is that it for the first time adopts and professes this\nnatural and scientific view, instead of the supernatural point of view\nof the former systems. The new understanding that the human mind is a\ncommon and natural thing is a decisive step in the progressive\ninvestigation of the mind, and this step places Dietzgen at the head of\nthis evolution. And it is a step which cannot be retraced, because it\nsignifies a sober awakening after centuries of vain imaginings. Since\nthis system does not pretend to be absolute truth, but rather a finite\nand temporal one, it cannot fall as its predecessors did. It represents\na scientific continuation of former philosophies, just as astronomy is\nthe continuation of astrology and of the Pythagorean fantasies, and\nchemistry the continuation of alchemy. It takes the place that formerly\nwas held by its unscientific predecessors and has this in common with\nthem, apart from its essential theory of understanding, that it is the\nbasis of a new world-philosophy, of a methodical conception of the\nuniverse.\n\nThis modern world-philosophy (Weltanschauung), being a socialist or\nproletarian one, takes issue with the bourgeois conceptions; it was\nfirst conceived as a new view of the world, entirely opposite to the\nruling bourgeois conceptions, by Marx and Engels, who developed its\nsociological and historical contents; its philosophical basis is here\ndeveloped by Dietzgen; its real character is indicated by the terms\ndialectic and materialist. By its core, historical materialism, it gains\na wholly new theory of social evolution that forms its chief content.\nThis theory was for the first time sketched in its main outlines in the\nCommunist Manifesto, and later on fully developed in a number of other\nworks and thoroughly vindicated by innumerable facts. It gives us the\nscientific assurance that the misery and imperfectness of present\nsociety, which bourgeois philosophy regards as inevitable and natural,\nis but a transitory condition, and that man will within measurable time\nemancipate himself from the slavery of his material wants by the\nregulation of social production. By this certainty socialism is put on\nan eminence so far above all bourgeois conceptions that these appear\nbarbarous in comparison with it. And what is more significant, our\nworld-philosophy may justly claim to have for the first time thrown the\nlight of an indisputable science on society and man; combined with the\nmaturest products of natural sciences it forms a complete science of the\nworld, making all superstitions superfluous, and thus involving the\ntheoretical emancipation, that is to say the emancipation of the mind.\nThe science treating of the human mind forms the essence and foundation\nof this theory of society and man, not only because it gives us the\nsame as the natural sciences a scientific or experience-proven theory of\nthe function of human thinking, but also, because this theory of\ncognition can alone assure us that such sciences are able to furnish us\nan adequate picture of the world, and that anything outside of them is\nmere fantasy. For this reason we owe to Dietzgen's theory of cognition\nthe firm foundation of our world-philosophy.\n\nIts character is primarily materialistic. In contradistinction to the\nidealist systems of the most flourishing time of German philosophy which\nconsidered the Mind as the basis of all existence, it starts from\nconcrete materialist being. Not that it regards mere physical matter as\nits basis; it is rather opposed to the crude bourgeois materialism, and\nmatter to it means everything which exists and furnishes material for\nthought, including thoughts and imaginations. Its foundation is the\nunity of all concrete being. Thus it assigns to the human mind an equal\nplace among the other parts of the universe; it shows that the mind is\nas closely connected with all the other parts of the universe as those\nparts are among themselves; that is to say, the mind exists only as a\npart of the entire universe so that its content is only the effect of\nthe other parts. Thus our philosophy forms the theoretical basis of\nhistorical materialism. While the statement that \"the consciousness of\nman is determined by his social life\" could hitherto at best be regarded\nas a generalization of many historical facts and thus seemed imperfect\nand open to criticism, capable of improvement by later discoveries, the\nsame as all other scientific theories, henceforth the complete\ndependence of the mind on the rest of the world becomes as impregnable\nand immutable a requirement of thought as causality. This signifies the\nthorough refutation of the belief in miracles. After having been\nbanished long ago from the field of natural science, miracles were now\nbanished from the domain of thought.\n\nThe enlightening effect of this proletarian philosophy consists\nfurthermore in its opposition to all superstition and its demonstration\nof the senselessness of all idol worship. Socialist understanding\naccomplished something which the bourgeois reformers could not do,\nbecause they were limited to natural science in a narrow sense and could\nnot solve the mystery of the mind; for in explaining all the mental,\nspiritual phenomena as natural phenomena our proletarian philosophy\nfurnishes the means for a trenchant critique of Christian faith which\nconsists in the belief in a supernatural spiritual being. In his\ndialectic discussions of mind and matter, finiteness and infinity, god\nand the world, Dietzgen has thoroughly clarified the confused mystery\nwhich surrounded these conceptions and has definitely refuted all\ntranscendental beliefs. And this critique is no less destructive for the\nbourgeois idols: Freedom, Right, Spirit, Force, which are shown to be\nbut fantastic images of abstract conceptions with a limited validity.\n\nThis could be accomplished in no other way than by simultaneously\ndetermining, in its capacity as a theory of understanding, the relation\nof the world around us to the image which our mind forms of it. In this\nrespect Dietzgen completed the work begun by Hume and Kant. As a theory\nof understanding, his conceptions are not only the philosophical basis\nof historical materialism, but also of all other sciences as well. The\nthorough critique directed by Dietzgen against the works of prominent\nnatural scientists, shows that he was well aware of the importance of\nhis own work. But, as might be expected, the voice of a socialist\nartisan did not penetrate to the lecture hall of the academies. It was\nnot until much later that similar views appeared among the natural\nscientists. And now at last the most prominent theorists of natural\nscience have adopted the view that explaining signifies nothing else but\nsimply and completely describing the processes of nature.\n\nBy this theory of understanding Dietzgen has made it plainly perceptible\nwhy the dialectic method is an indispensable auxiliary in the quest for\nan explanation of the nature of understanding. The mind is the faculty\nof generalization. It forms out of concrete realities, which are a\ncontinuous and unbounded stream in perpetual motion, abstract\nconceptions that are essentially rigid, bounded, stable, and\nunchangeable. This gives rise to the contradiction that our conceptions\nmust always adapt themselves to new realities without ever fully\nsucceeding; the contradiction that they represent the living by what is\ndead, the infinite by what is finite, and that they are themselves\nfinite though partaking of the nature of the infinite. This\ncontradiction is understood and reconciled by the insight into the\nnature of the faculty of understanding, which is simultaneously a\nfaculty of combination and of distinction, which forms a limited part of\nthe universe and yet encompasses everything, and it is furthermore\nsolved by the resulting penetration of the nature of the world. The\nworld is a unity of the infinitely numerous multitude of phenomena and\ncomprises within itself all contradictions, makes them relative and\nequalizes them. Within its circle there are no absolute opposites. The\nmind merely constructs them, because it has not only the faculty of\ngeneralization but also of distinguishing. The practical solution of all\ncontradictions is the revolutionary practice of infinitely progressing\nscience which moulds old conceptions into new ones, rejects some,\nsubstitutes others in their place, improves, connects and dissects,\nstill striving for an always greater unity and an always wider\ndifferentiation.\n\nBy means of this theory of understanding, dialectic materialism also\nfurnishes the means for the solution of the riddles of the world\n(Weltr\u00e4tsel). Not that it solves all these riddles; on the contrary, it\nsays explicitly that this solution can be but the work of an ever\nadvancing scientific research. But it solves them in so far as it\ndeprives them of the character of a mysterious enigma and transforms\nthem into a practical problem, the solution of which we are approaching\nby an infinite progression. Bourgeois thought cannot solve the riddles\nof the world. A few years after the first publication of Dietzgen's\nwork, natural science in the person of Du Bois-Reymond acknowledged its\nincapacity by his \"Ignorabimus:\" \"We shall never know.\" Proletarian\nphilosophy, in solving the riddle of the human mind, gives us the\nassurance that there are no insoluble riddles before us.\n\nIn conclusion, Dietzgen in this work indicates the principles of a new\nethics. Starting with the understanding that the origin of the ideas of\ngood and bad is found in the needs of man, and designating as really\nmoral that which is generally useful, he logically discovers that the\nessence of modern morality rests in its class interests. At the same\ntime, a relative justification is accorded to these temporary ethics,\nsince they are the necessary products of definite social requirements.\nThe link between man and nature is formed by the process of social\nproduction carried on for the satisfaction of man's material wants. So\nlong as this link was a fetter, it bound man by a misapprehended\nsupernatural ethics. But once the process of social labor is understood,\nregulated and controlled, then this fetter is dropped and the place of\nethics is taken by a reasonable understanding of the general wants.\n\n      ************\n\nThe philosophical works of Dietzgen do not seem to have, until now,\nexerted any perceptible influence on the socialist movement. While they\nmay have found many a silent admirer and contributed much toward a\nclearing up of their thoughts, yet the importance of his writings for\nthe theory of our movement has not been realized. But this is not a\nmatter for great surprise. In the first decade after their publication,\neven the economic works of Marx, the value of which was much more\napparent, were little appreciated. The movement developed spontaneously,\nand the Marxian theory could exert a useful and determining influence\nonly by means of the clear foresight of a few leaders. Hence it is no\nwonder that the philosophy of the proletariat, which is less easily and\ndirectly applicable than our economics, did not receive much attention.\nThe political maturity of the German working class, which was farthest\nadvanced in the theories of the international movement, did not develop\nto the point of adopting Marxian theses as party principles, until after\nthe abolition of the anti-socialist laws. But even then they were for\nmost of the spokesmen of the party rather concise formulations of a few\npractical convictions than the outcome of a thorough scientific training\nand understanding. It was no doubt the great expansion of the party and\nof its activity which demanded all their powers for its organization and\nmanagement, that led the younger intellectuals of the party to devote\nthemselves to practical work and to neglect the theoretical studies.\nThis neglect has bitterly avenged itself in the theoretical schisms of\nthe subsequent years.\n\nThe decrepit condition of capitalism is now evidenced very plainly by\nthe decay of the bourgeois parties, so that the practical work of the\nsocialist party is in itself sufficient to attract every one who has an\nindependent turn of mind and a capacity for deep feeling. But under the\npresent circumstances, such a transition was not accompanied by a\nproletarian world-philosophy acquired by painstaking study. Instead of\nsuch a philosophy, we are confronted by a critique of socialist science\nfrom the bourgeois standpoint. Marxism is measured by the standard of\nthe immature bourgeois theory of understanding, and the Neokantians,\nunconscious of the positive outcome of philosophy of the past century,\nare trying to connect socialism with Kantian ethics. Some even speak of\na reconciliation with Christianity and a renunciation of materialism.\n\nThis bourgeois method of thought, which, being anti-dialectic and\nanti-materialistic, is opposed to Marxism, has acquired some practical\nimportance in the socialistic movement of countries where by lack of\neconomical development the class-consciousness of the workers is\nhindered by relics of the narrow-minded views of the class of little\nproducers--as in France and Italy under the name of reformism. In\nGermany where it could not obtain much practical importance it\npresented itself mostly as a theoretical struggle against Marxism under\nthe name of revisionism. It combines bourgeois philosophy and\nanti-capitalist disposition and takes the place formerly occupied by\nanarchism, and, like anarchism, it again represents in many respects the\nlittle bourgeois tendencies in the fight against capitalism. Under these\ncircumstances, a closer study of Dietzgen's philosophical works becomes\na necessity.\n\nMarx has disclosed the nature of the social process of production, and\nits fundamental significance as a lever of social development. But he\nhas not fully explained, by what means the nature of the human mind is\ninvolved in this material process. Owing to the great traditional\ninfluence exerted by bourgeois thought, this weak spot in Marxism is one\nof the main reasons for the incomplete and erroneous understanding of\nMarxian theories. This shortcoming of Marxism is cured by Dietzgen, who\nmade the nature of the mind the special object of his investigations.\nFor this reason, a thorough study of Dietzgen's philosophical writings\nis an important and indispensable auxiliary for the understanding of the\nfundamental works of Marx and Engels. Dietzgen's work demonstrates that\nthe proletariat has a mighty weapon not only in proletarian economics,\nbut also in proletarian philosophy. Let us learn to wield these weapons!\n\nANTON PANNEKOEK.\n\nLeyden, Holland, December, 1902.\n\n\n\n\nThe Nature of Human Brain Work\n\nA Renewed Critique of Pure and Practical Reason\n\nBY A MANUAL WORKER\n\nTranslated by Ernest Untermann\n\n\n\n\nTHE NATURE OF HUMAN BRAIN WORK\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nIt may not be amiss here to say a few words to the kind reader and the\nunkind critic in regard to the personal relation of the author to the\npresent work. The first objection which I anticipate will be aimed at my\nlack of scientific learning which is shown indirectly rather, between\nthe lines, than in the work itself. \"How dare you,\" I ask myself, \"come\nbefore the public with your statements on a subject, which has been\ntreated by such heroes of science as Aristotle, Kant, Fichte, Hegel,\netc., without being thoroughly familiar with all the works of your\nfamous predecessors?\"\n\nAt best, will you not merely repeat what has long since been\naccomplished?\n\nIn reply, I wish to say that the seeds sown by philosophy in the soil of\nscience have long since blossomed and borne fruit. The product of\nhistory develops historically, grows and passes away, in order to live\neternally in another form. The original deed, the original work, is\nfertile only in the contact with the conditions and relations of the\ntime in which it is born. But it finally becomes an empty shell, when it\nhas yielded its kernel to history. Whatever of a positive nature was\nproduced by the science of the past, lives no longer in the words of\nthe author, but has become more than spirit, has become flesh and blood\nin present science. In order, e. g., to know the products of physics and\nproduce something new in its field, it is not necessary to first study\nthe history of this science, nor derive the hitherto discovered laws\nfrom their fundamental source. On the contrary, historical research\nmight only be an obstacle to the solution of a definite physical\nproblem, for concentrated strength will naturally accomplish more than\ndivided strength. In this sense, I consider my lack of other knowledge\nan advantage, because I am thus enabled to devote myself so much more\nintensely to my special object. I have striven hard to study this object\nand to learn everything which is known about it in my time. The history\nof philosophy has in a certain sense been repeated in the development of\nmy individuality, since I speculated from my earliest youth on the means\nof satisfying my longing for a consistent and systematic conception of\nthe world, and I believe I have finally found this satisfaction in the\ninductive understanding of the human faculty of thought.\n\nNote that it is not the faculty of thought in its various\nmanifestations, not the different forms of it, but its general form, its\ngeneral nature, that satisfied me and that I propose to discuss. My\nobject is then very plain and circumscribed, indeed it is so simple,\nthat I had difficulties in showing its nature from different points of\nview and was compelled to resort to numerous repetitions. At the same\ntime, the question concerning the nature of the mind is a popular one,\nwhich is not limited to professional philosophy, but concerns all\nsciences. And whatever the history of science has contributed towards\nthe solution of this question, must be generally alive in the\nscientific conceptions of the present. I could well be satisfied with\nthis source.\n\nI may, then, confess in spite of my authorship, that I am not a\nprofessor of philosophy, but a mechanic by profession. If any one should\nfeel justified in telling me: \"Shoemaker, stick to your last!\" I would\nreply to him with Karl Marx: \"Your non plus ultra professional wisdom\nbecame enormously foolish from the moment when the watchmaker Watt\ninvented the steam engine, the barber Arkwright the loom, the jeweler\nFulton the steamship.\" Without classing myself among these great men, I\ncan strive to emulate them. Besides, the nature of my object is\nespecially pertinent to the class, a member of which I have the\npleasure, if not the honor, of being.\n\nI treat in this work of the faculty of thought as the organ of the\ngeneral. The oppressed fourth estate, the working class, is the true\nexponent of this organ, the ruling classes being prevented by their\nspecial class interests from recognizing the demands of general reason.\nOur first consideration is, of course, the relation of our object to\nhuman conditions. However, so long as conditions are not equalized for\nmen in general, but vitiated by class interests, our view of things is\ninfluenced by these class limitations. A truly objective understanding\nrequires a subjective theoretical freedom. Before Copernicus saw the\nEarth was moving and the Sun stationary, he had to place himself outside\nof his terrestrial standpoint. The faculty of thought, having all\nrelations for its object, must abstract from all of them in order to\ngrasp its own real nature. Since we can understand things only by means\nof thought, we must abstract from everything in order to understand\nthought in general. This task was too difficult, so long as man was\nbound to some limited class standpoint. Not until historical development\nhas proceeded to the point of striving at dissolution of the last\nsociety based on a ruling and a serving class, can prejudices be\novercome to the extent of enabling the faculty of understanding to grasp\nthe nature of human brain activity in the abstract. It is only a\nhistorical movement aiming at the direct and general liberty of the\nmasses, the new era of the fourth estate based on much misunderstood\npremises, which can dispense with the spirit cult sufficiently to be\nenabled to expose the real author of every spook, the \"pure\" mind. The\nman of the fourth estate represents at last the \"pure\" man. His\ninterests are no longer mere class interests, but mass interests,\ninterests of humanity. This indicates that we are now approaching the\nend of a development in which the interests of the mass were dependent\non the interests of a ruling class and in which humanity made progress\nnot so much in spite of as by means of continuous oppression by Jewish\npatriarchs, Asiatic conquerors, antique slaveholders, feudal barons,\nguildmasters, modern capitalists and even capitalist C\u00e6sars. The class\nconditions of the past were inevitable in the general development. Now\nthis development has arrived at a point where the mass becomes conscious\nof itself. Man has hitherto developed by class antagonism. By this means\nhe has now arrived at the point where he wants to develop himself\nconsciously. Class antagonisms were _phenomena_ of humanity. The working\nclass strives to abolish class antagonism in order that humanity itself\nmay be a _truth_.\n\nJust as the Reformation was conditioned on the actual environment of the\nsixteenth century, so, like the discovery of the electric telegraph, the\nresearch of the theory of human understanding is based on the actual\nconditions of the nineteenth century. To this extent the contents of\nthis little work are not an individual, but a historical product. In\nwriting it, I feel myself, if I may use this mystic phrase, as a mere\norgan of the idea. Only the form of presenting the subject is mine, and\nI beg the kind reader to judge it leniently. I ask that the reader may\ndirect his or her silent or loud objections, not against the form, but\nagainst the substance of my remarks, not to cling to the letter, but to\nunderstand the spirit of my words.\n\nIf I should not succeed in developing the idea, and if my voice should\nthus be drowned in the hubbub of our overstocked book market, I am\nnevertheless certain that the cause itself will find a more talented\nchampion.\n\nJOSEPH DIETZGEN, _Tanner_.\n\nSIEGBURG, May 15, 1869.\n\n\n\n\nTHE NATURE OF HUMAN BRAIN WORK\n\n\n\n\nI.\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nSystematization is the essence and the general expression of the\naggregate activity of science. Science seeks to classify and systematize\nthe objects of the world for the understanding of our brain. The\nscientific understanding of a certain language, e. g., requires an\norderly arrangement of that language in general categories and rules.\nThe science of agriculture does not simply wish to produce a good crop\nof potatoes, but to find a system for the methods of cultivation and\nthus to furnish the knowledge by which success in cultivation can be\ndetermined beforehand. The practical result of all theory is to acquaint\nus with the system and method of its practice and thus to enable us to\nact in this world with a reasonable certainty of success. Experience is,\nof course, an indispensable condition for this purpose; but it alone is\nnot sufficient. Only by means of empirically developed theories, by\nscience, do we overcome the play of accident. Science gives us the\nconscious domination over things and unconditional security in handling\nthem.\n\nNo one individual can know everything. The capacity of the individual\nbrain is no more adequate for the knowledge of everything that is\nnecessary than the skill and strength of the individual's hands are\nsufficient to produce all he needs. Faith is indispensable to man, but\nonly faith in that which others know, not in what they believe. Science\nis as much a social matter as material production. \"One for all and all\nfor one.\"\n\nBut just as there are some wants of the body which every one has to\nsatisfy by himself, so every one has to know certain scientific facts\nwhich are not the prerogative of any special science.\n\nThis is true of the faculty of human understanding. The knowledge and\nstudy of this theory cannot be left to any particular guild. Lassalle\njustly says: \"Thinking itself has become a special trade in these days\nof division of labor, and it has fallen into the worst hands, those of\nour newspaper writers.\" He thus urges us not to acquiesce in this\nappropriation any longer, not to submit any more to the harangues of\npublic opinion, but to resume thinking for ourselves. We may leave\ncertain objects of scientific research to professionals, but general\nthought is a public matter which every one should be required to attend\nto himself.\n\nIf we could place this general work of thinking on a scientific basis,\nif we could find a theory of general thought, if we were able to\ndiscover the means by which reason arrives at understanding, if we could\ndevelop a method by which truth is produced scientifically, then we\nshould acquire for science in general and for our individual faculty of\njudgment the same certainty of success which we already possess in\nspecial fields of science.\n\nKant says: \"If it is not possible to harmonize the various co-operators\non the question of the means by which their common aim is to be\naccomplished, then we may safely infer that such a study is not yet on\nthe secure road of science, but will continue to grope in the dark.\"\n\nNow, if we take a look at the sciences, we find that there are many,\nespecially among the natural sciences, which fulfill the requirements of\nKant, agreeing unanimously and consciously on certain empirical\nknowledge and building further understanding on that. \"There we know,\"\nas Liebig says, \"what is to be called a certain fact, a conclusion, a\nrule, a law. We have touchstones for all this, and every one makes use\nof them before making known the fruits of his labors. The attempt to\nmaintain any proposition by lawyer's tricks, or the intention to make\nothers believe anything that cannot be proven, are immediately wrecked\nby the ethics of science.\"\n\nNot so in other fields, where concrete and material things are left\nbehind and abstract, so-called philosophical, matters are taken up, as,\nfor instance, questions of general conceptions of the world and of life,\nof beginning and end, of the semblance and the essence of things, of\ncause and effect, of matter and force, of might and right, of wisdom of\nlife, of morality, religion, and politics. Here we find, instead of\nirrefutable proofs, mere \"lawyer's tricks,\" an absence of reliable\nknowledge, a mere groping amid contradictory opinions.\n\nAnd it is precisely the prominent authorities of natural science who\nshow by their disagreements on such matters that they are mere tyros in\nphilosophy. It follows, then, that the socalled ethics of science, the\ntouchstones of which the boast is made that they never fail in\ndetermining what is knowledge and what is mere conjecture, are based on\na purely instinctive practice, not on a conscious theory of\nunderstanding. Although our time excels in diligent scientific research,\nyet the numerous differences among scientists show that they are not\ncapable of using their knowledge with a predetermined certainty of\nsuccess. Otherwise, how could misunderstandings arise? Whoever\nunderstands understanding, cannot misunderstand. It is only the absolute\naccuracy of astronomical computations which entitles astronomy to the\nname of a science. A man who can figure is at least enabled to test\nwhether his computation is right or wrong. In the same way, the general\nunderstanding of the process of thought must furnish us with the\ntouchstone by which we can distinguish between understanding and\nmisunderstanding, knowledge and conjecture, truth and error, by general\nand irrefutable rules. Erring is human, but not scientific. Science\nbeing a human matter, errors may exist eternally, but the understanding\nof the process of thought will enable us quite as well to prevent errors\nfrom being offered and accepted as scientific truths as an understanding\nof mathematics enables us to eliminate errors from our computations.\n\nIt sounds paradoxical and yet it is true: Whoever knows the general rule\nby which error may be distinguished from truth, and knows it as well as\nthe rule in grammar by which a noun is distinguished from a verb, will\nbe able to distinguish in both cases with equal certainty. Scientists as\nwell as scribes have ever embarrassed one another by the question: What\nis truth? This question has been an essential object of philosophy for\nthousands of years. This question, like philosophy itself, is finally\nsettled by the understanding of the faculty of human thought. In other\nwords, the question of what constitutes truth is identical with the\nquestion of the distinction between truth and error. Philosophy is the\nscience which has been engaged in solving this riddle, and the final\nsolution of the riddle by the clear understanding of the process of\nthought also solves the question of the nature of philosophy. Hence a\nshort glance at the nature and development of philosophy may well serve\nas an introduction to our study.\n\nAs the word philosophy is connected with various meanings, I state at\nthe outset that I am referring only to socalled speculative philosophy.\nI dispense with frequent quotations and notes of the sources of my\nknowledge, as anything that I may say in this respect is so well\nestablished that we can afford to discard all scientific by-work.\n\nIf we apply the above-named test of Kant to speculative philosophy it\nappears to be more the playground of different opinions than of science.\nThe philosophical celebrities and classic authorities are not even in\naccord on the question: What is philosophy and what is its aim? For this\nreason, and in order not to increase the difference by adding my own\nopinion, I regard everything as philosophy that calls itself by that\nname, and we select from the voluminous literature of philosophy that\nwhich is common and general in all philosophers, without taking any\nnotice of their special peculiarities.\n\nBy this empirical method we find first of all that philosophy is\noriginally not a specialized science working with other sciences, but a\ngeneric name for all knowledge, the essence of all science, just as art\nis the essence of the various arts. Whoever made knowledge, whoever made\nbrain work his essential occupation, every thinker without regard to the\ncontents of his thoughts, was originally a philosopher.\n\nBut when with the progressive increase of human knowledge, the various\ndepartments detached themselves from the mother of all wisdom,\nespecially since the origin of natural sciences, philosophy became\nknown, not so much by its content as by its form. All other sciences are\ndistinguished by their various objects, while philosophy is marked by\nits own method. Of course, it also has its object and purpose. It\ndesires to understand the universal whole, the cosmos. But it is not\nthis object, this aim, by which philosophy is characterized; it is\nrather the manner in which this object is accomplished.\n\nAll other sciences occupy themselves with special things, and if they\nconsider the universe at all, they do so only in its bearing on the\nspecial objects of their study, the parts of which the universe is\ncomposed. Alexander von Humboldt says in his introduction to his\n\"Cosmos\" that he is limiting himself to an empirical consideration, to a\nphysical research, which seeks to elucidate the uniformity and unity by\nmeans of the great variety. And all inductive sciences arrive at general\nconclusions and conceptions only by way of their occupation with special\nand concrete things. For this reason they claim that their conclusions\nare based on facts.\n\nSpeculative philosophy proceeds by the opposite method. Thought, the\nobject of its study, may be some special question, yet it does not\nfollow this up in the concrete. It rejects as fallacious the evidence of\nthe senses, the physical experience gained by means of the eye and ear,\nhand and brain, and limits itself to \"pure\" and absolutely abstract\nthought, in order to understand thus by the unit of human reason the\nmultiplicity of the universe. In seeking for an answer to the question:\nWhat is philosophy? which question we are specially discussing just now,\nspeculative philosophy would not start out from its actual material\nform, from its wooden and pigskin volumes, from its great and small\nessays, in order to arrive at a conception of its object. On the\ncontrary, the speculative philosopher turns to introspection and looks\nin the depths of his own mind for the true concept of philosophy. And by\nthis standard he separates the impression of his senses into true or\nerroneous. This speculative method has hardly ever dealt in tangible\nthings, unless we recognize this philosophical method in every\nunscientific concept of nature which populated the world with spooks.\nThe rudiments of scientific speculation occasionally dealt with the\ncourse of the sun and the globe. But since inductive astronomy\ncultivates these fields with greater success, speculative philosophy\nlimits itself entirely to abstract discussions. And in this line of\nresearch as well as in all others it is characterized by the production\nof its results out of the idea or the concept.\n\nFor empirical science, for the inductive method, the multiplicity of\nexperiences is the first basis, and thought the second. Speculative\nphilosophy, on the other hand, seeks to arrive at scientific truth\nwithout the help of experience. It rejects the socalled transient facts\nas a foundation of philosophical understanding, and declares that it\nshould be absolute, exalted above time and space. Speculative philosophy\ndoes not wish to be scientific physics, but metaphysics. It regards it\nas its task to find by \"pure\" reason, and without the assistance of\nexperience, a system, a logic, or a theory of science, by which\neverything worth knowing is supposed to be reeled off logically and\nsystematically, in about the same way in which we derive grammatically\nthe various forms of a word from its root. But the physical sciences\noperate on the assumption that our faculty of understanding, to use a\nfamiliar illustration, resembles a piece of soft wax which receives\nimpressions from outside, or a clean slate on which experience writes\nits lines. Speculative philosophy, on the other hand, assumes that\ncertain ideas are innate and may be dipped and produced from the depths\nof the mind by means of thought.\n\nThe difference between speculative and inductive science is that between\nfantasy and sound common sense. The latter produces its ideas by means\nof the outer world, by the help of experience, while fantasy gets its\nproduct from the depth of the mind, out of itself. But this method of\nproduction is only seemingly one-sided. A thinker can no more think\ntranscendental thoughts which are beyond the reach of experience, than a\npainter can invent transcendental pictures, transcendental forms. Just\nas fantasy creates angels by a combination of man and bird, or mermaids\nby a composition of woman and fish, so all other products of fantasy,\nthough seemingly derived out of itself, are in fact only arbitrarily\narranged impressions of the outer world. Reason operates with numbers\nand orders, time and measures, and other means of experience, while\nfantasy reproduces the experiences without regard to law and in an\narbitrary form.\n\nThe longing for knowledge has been the cause of speculative attempts to\nexplain the phenomena of life and nature at a time when lack of\nexperience and observation made inductive understanding impossible.\nExperience was then supplemented by speculation. In later times, when\nexperience had grown, previous speculation was generally recognized as\nerroneous. But it nevertheless required thousands of years of repeated\ndisappointments on one side and numerous brilliant successes of the\ninductive method on the other, before these speculative hobbies came\ninto disfavor.\n\nFantasy has certainly a positive power, and speculative intuition,\nderived from analogy, very often precedes empirical and inductive\nunderstanding. But we must remain aware of the fact that so much is\nassumption and so much actual scientific knowledge. Conscious intuition\nstimulates scientific research, while pseudo-science closes the door to\ninductive research. The acquisition of the clear understanding of the\ndistinction between speculation and knowledge is a historical process,\nthe beginning and end of which coincides with the beginning and end of\nspeculative philosophy.\n\nIn ancient times, common sense operated in common with fantasy, the\ninductive with the speculative method. The discussion of their\ndifferences begins only with the understanding of the numerous\ndisappointments caused by the still inexperienced judgment which have\nprevented an unobstructed view of the question up to modern times. But\ninstead of attributing these disappointments to lack of understanding,\nthey were charged to the account of the imperfection of the senses. The\nsenses were called impostors and material phenomena untrue images. Who\nhas not heard the lament about the unreliability of the senses? The\nmisunderstanding of nature and of its phenomena led to a serious rupture\nwith sense perceptions. The philosophers had deceived themselves and\nthought they had been deceived by the senses. In their anger they turned\ndisdainfully away from the world of sensations. With the same uncritical\nfaith with which the semblance had hitherto been accepted as truth, now\nuncritical doubt rejected the truth of sensations altogether. Research\nabandoned nature and experience, and began the work of speculative\nphilosophy by \"pure\" thought.\n\nBut no! Science did not permit itself to be entirely led astray from the\npath of common sense, from the way of truth of sense perceptions.\nNatural science soon stepped into the breach, and its brilliant\nsuccesses gained for the inductive method the consciousness of its\nfertility, while on the other hand philosophy searched for a system by\nwhich all the great general truths might be opened up without\nspecialized study, without sense perception and observation, by mere\nreason alone.\n\nNow we have a more than sufficient quantity of such speculative systems.\nIf we measure them with the aforementioned standard of unanimousness, we\nfind that philosophy agrees only on its disagreements. In consequence,\nthe history of speculative philosophy, unlike the history of other\nsciences, consists less of a gradual accumulation of knowledge, than of\na series of unsuccessful attempts to solve the general riddles of nature\nand life by \"pure\" thought, without the help of the objects and\nexperience of the outer world. The most daring attempt in this line, the\nmost artificial structure of thought, was completed by Hegel in the\nbeginning of the nineteenth century. To use a common expression, he\nbecame as famous in the world of science as Napoleon I did in the world\nof politics. But Hegelian philosophy has not stood the test of time.\nHaym, in his work entitled \"Hegel and His Time,\" says of Hegelian\nphilosophy that \"it was pushed aside by the progress of the world and by\nliving history.\"\n\nThe outcome of philosophy up to that time, then, was a declaration of\nits own impotence. Nevertheless, we do not underestimate the fact that a\nwork occupying the best brains for thousands of years surely contained\nsome positive element. And in fact, speculative philosophy has a\nhistory, which is not merely a series of unsuccessful attempts, but also\na living development. However, it is less the object of its study, less\nthe logical world system, which developed, than its method.\n\nEvery positive science has a material object, a beginning in the outer\nworld, a premise on which its understanding is based. Every empirical\nscience has for its fundament some material of the senses, some given\nobject, on which its understanding is dependent, and thus it becomes\n\"impure.\" Speculative philosophy seeks a \"pure, absolute,\"\nunderstanding. It wishes to understand by \"pure\" reason, without any\nmaterial, without any experience. It takes its departure from the\nenthusiastic conviction of the superiority of understanding and\nknowledge over experience gained by sense perceptions. For this reason\nit wishes to leave experience entirely aside in favor of absolutely\n\"pure\" understanding. Its object is truth; not concrete truth, not the\ntruth of this or that thing, but truth in general, truth \"in itself.\"\nThe speculative systems seek after an absolute beginning, an indubitably\nself-supporting starting point, from which they may determine the\nabsolutely indubitable. The speculative systems are thus by their own\nmentality perfectly complete and selfsufficient systems. Every\nspeculative system found its end in the subsequent knowledge that its\ntotality, its selfsufficiency, its absoluteness, was imaginary, that it\ncould be determined empirically and externally like all other knowledge,\nthat it was not a philosophical system, but a relative and empirical\nattempt at understanding. Speculation finally dissolved into the\nknowledge that understanding is by its very nature \"impure,\" that the\norgan of philosophy, the faculty of understanding cannot begin its\nstudies without a given point of departure, that science is not\nabsolutely superior to experience, but only so far as it can organize\nnumerous experiences. It followed from these premises that the object of\nphilosophy can be a general and objective understanding, or \"truth in\nitself,\" only in so far as understanding or truth in general can be\nderived from given concrete objects. In plain words, speculative\nphilosophy was reduced to the unphilosophical science of the empirical\nfaculty of understanding, to the critique of reason.\n\nModern conscious speculation takes its departure from the experienced\ndifference between semblance and truth. It denies all sense phenomena in\norder to find truth by thinking, without being deceived by any\nsemblance. The subsequent philosophers, however, found every time that\nthe truths of their predecessors, gained by this method, were not what\nthey pretended to be, but that their positive result consisted simply in\nhaving advanced the science of the thought process to a certain extent.\nBy denying the actuality of the senses, by endeavoring to separate\nthought from all sense perceptions, by isolating it, so to say, from its\nsensory cover, speculative philosophy, more than any other science, laid\nbare the structure of the mind. The more this philosophy advanced in\ntime, the more it developed in its historical course, the more\nclassically and strikingly did this kernel of its work spring into view.\nAfter the repeated creation of giant fantasmagorias, it found its\nsolution in the positive knowledge that socalled pure philosophical\nthought, abstracting from all concrete contents, is nothing but\nthoughtless thought, thought without any real object back of it, and\nproduces mere fantasmagorias. This process of speculative deception and\nscientific exposure was continued up to recent times. Finally the\nsolution of the main question, and the solution of speculation, was\nintroduced with the following words of Feuerbach: \"My philosophy is no\nphilosophy.\"\n\nThe long story of speculative work was finally reduced to the\nunderstanding of reason, of the intellect, the mind, to the exposure of\nthose mysterious operations which we call thinking.\n\nThe secret of the processes by which the truths of understanding are\nproduced, the ignorance of the fact that every thought requires an\nobject, a premise, was the cause of the idle speculative wanderings\nwhich we find registered in the history of philosophy. The same secret\nis today the cause of those numerous speculative mistakes which we\nobserve in passing over the words and works of naturalists. Their\nknowledge and understanding is far developed, but only so far as it\nrefers to tangible objects. The moment they touch upon abstract\ndiscussions, they offer \"lawyers' proofs\" in place of \"objective facts.\"\nFor although they know intuitively and in a concrete case that this is a\ntruth, that a conclusion, and that a rule, they do not apply this\nknowledge in general with consciousness and theoretical consistency. The\nsuccesses of natural science have taught them to operate the instrument\nof thought, the mind, instinctively. But they lack the systematic\nunderstanding which operates with conscious and predetermined certainty.\nThey ignore the outcome of speculative philosophy.\n\nIt will be our task to set forth in a short summary what speculative\nphilosophy has unconsciously produced of a positive nature by a tedious\nprocess, in other words, to explain the general nature of the thought\nprocess. We shall see that the understanding of this process will\nfurnish us with the means of solving scientifically the general riddles\nof nature and of life. And thus we shall learn how that fundamental and\nsystematic world conception is developed which was the long coveted goal\nof speculative philosophy.\n\n\n\n\nII\n\nPURE REASON OR THE FACULTY OF THOUGHT IN GENERAL\n\n\nWhen speaking of food in general, we may mention fruits, cereals,\nvegetables, meat and bread and classify them all, in spite of their\ndifference, under this one head. In the same way, we use, in this work,\nthe terms reason, consciousness, intellect, knowledge, discernment,\nunderstanding, as referring to the same general thing. For we are\ndiscussing the general nature of the thought process rather than its\nspecial forms.\n\n\"No intelligent thinker of our day,\" says a modern physiologist,\n\"pretends to look for the seat of the intellectual powers in the blood,\nas did the ancient Greeks, or in the pineal gland, as was the case in\nthe middle ages. Instead we have all become convinced that the central\nnerve system is the organic center of the intellectual functions of the\nbrain.\" Yes, true enough, thinking is a function of the brain and nerve\ncenter, just as writing is a function of the hand. But the study of the\nanatomy of the hand can no more solve the question: What is writing?\nthan the physiological study of the brain can bring us nearer to the\nsolution of the question: What is thought? With the dissecting knife, we\nmay kill, but we cannot discover the mind. The understanding that\nthought is a product of the brain takes us closer to the solution of\nour problem, in as much as it draws it into the bright light of reality\nand out of the domain of fantasy in which the ghosts dwell. Mind thereby\nloses the character of a transcendental incomprehensible being and\nappears as a bodily function.\n\nThinking is a function of the brain just as walking is a function of the\nlegs. We perceive thought and mind just as clearly with our senses as we\ndo pain and other feelings. Thought is felt by us as a subjective\nprocess taking place inside of us. According to its contents this\nprocess varies every moment and with each person, but according to its\nform it is the same everywhere. In other words, in the thought process,\nas in all processes, we make a distinction between the special or\nconcrete and the general or abstract. The general purpose of thought is\nunderstanding. We shall see later that the simplest conception, or any\nidea for that matter, is of the same general nature as the most perfect\nunderstanding.\n\nThought and understanding cannot be without subjective contents any more\nthan without an object which suggests individual reflection. Thought is\nwork, and like every other work it requires an object to which it is\napplied. The statements: I do, I work, I think, must be completed by an\nanswer to the question: What are you doing, working, thinking?\n\nEvery definite idea, all actual thought, is identical with its content,\nbut not with its object. My desk as a picture in my mind is identical\nwith my idea of it. But my desk outside of my brain is a separate object\nand distinct from my idea. The idea is to be distinguished from thinking\nonly as a part of the thought process, while the object of my thought\nexists as a separate entity.\n\nWe make a distinction between thinking and being. We distinguish between\nthe object of sense perception and its mental image. Nevertheless the\nintangible idea is also material and real. I perceive my idea of a desk\njust as plainly as the desk itself. True, if I choose to call only\ntangible things material, then ideas are not material. But in that case\nthe scent of a rose and the heat of a stove are not material. It would\nbe better to call thoughts sense perceptions. But if it is objected that\nthis would be an incorrect use of the word, because language\ndistinguishes material and mental things, then we dispense with the word\nmaterial and call thought real. Mind is as real as the tangible table,\nas the visible light, as the audible sound. While the idea of these\nthings is different from the things themselves, yet it has that in\ncommon with them that it is as real as they. Mind is not any more\ndifferent from a table, a light, a sound, than these things differ among\nthemselves. We do not deny that there is a difference. We merely\nemphasize that they have the same general nature in common. I hope the\nreader will not misunderstand me henceforth, when I call the faculty of\nthought a material quality, a phenomenon of sense perception.\n\nEvery perception of the senses is based on some object. In order that\nheat may be real, there must be an object, something else which is\nheated. The active cannot exist without the passive. The visible cannot\nexist without the faculty of sight, nor the faculty of sight without\nvisible things. So is the faculty of thought a phenomenon, but it can\nnever exist in itself, it must always be based on some sense\nperception. Thought appears, like all other phenomena, in connection\nwith an object. The function of the brain is no more a \"pure\" process\nthan the function of the eye, the scent of a flower, the heat of a\nstove, or the touch of a table. The fact that a table may be seen,\nheard, or felt, is due as much to its own nature as to that of another\nobject with which it enters into some relation.\n\nBut while each function is limited by its own separate line of objects,\nwhile the function of the eye serves only for the perception of the\nvisible, the hand for the tangible, while walking finds an object in the\nspace it crosses, thought, on the other hand, has everything for its\nobject. Everything may be the object of understanding. Thought is not\nlimited to any special object. Every phenomenon may be the object and\nthe content of thought. More than this, we can only perceive anything\nwhen it becomes the object of our brain activity. Everything is\ntherefore the object and content of thought. The faculty of thought may\nbe exerted quite generally on all objects.\n\nWe said a moment ago that everything may be perceived, but we now modify\nthis to the effect that only perceivable things may be perceived. Only\nthe knowable can be the object of knowledge, only the thinkable the\nobject of thought. To this extent the faculty of thought is limited, for\nit cannot replace reading, hearing, feeling, and all other innumerable\nactivities of the world of sensations. We do, indeed, perceive all\nobjects, but no object may be exhaustively perceived, known, or\nunderstood. In other words, the objects are not wholly dissolved in the\nunderstanding. Seeing requires something that is visible, something\nwhich is, therefore, more than seeing. In the same way, hearing requires\nsomething that can be heard, thinking an object that can be thought of,\nsomething which is more than our thoughts, something still outside of\nour consciousness. We shall learn later on how we arrive at the\nknowledge that we see, hear, feel, and think of objects, and not merely\nof subjective impressions.\n\nBy means of thought we become aware of all things in a twofold manner,\nviz., outside in reality and inside in thought, in conception. It is\neasy to demonstrate that the things outside are different from the\nthings in our thoughts. In their actual form, in their real dimensions,\nthey cannot enter into our heads. Our brain does not assimilate the\nthings themselves, but only their images, their general outlines. The\nimagined tree is only a general object. The real tree is different from\nany other. And though I may have a picture of some special tree in my\nhead, yet the real tree is still as different from its conception as the\nspecial is different from the general. The infinite variety of things,\nthe innumerable wealth of their properties, has no room in our heads.\n\nI repeat, then, that we become aware of the outer world in a twofold\nway, viz., in a concrete, tangible, manifold form, and in an abstract\nform, which is mental and unitary. To our senses the world appears as a\nvariety of forms. Our brains combine them as a unit. And what is true of\nthe world, holds good of every one of its parts. A sense-perceived unit\nis a nonentity. Even the atom of a drop of water or the atom of any\nchemical element, is divisible, so long as it exists at all, and its\nparts are different and distinct. A is not B. But the concept, the\nfaculty of thought, makes of every tangible or sense-perceived part an\nabstract whole and conceives of every whole or quantity as a part of the\nabstract world unit. In order to understand the things in their\nentirety, we must take them practically and theoretically, with body and\nmind. With the body we can grasp only the bodily, the tangible, with the\nmind only the mental, the thinkable. Things also possess mental quality.\nMind is material and things are mental. Mind and matter are real only in\ntheir inter-relations.\n\nCan we see the things themselves? No, we see only the effects of things\non our eyes. We do not taste the vinegar, but the relation of the\nvinegar to our tongue. The result is the sensation of acidity. The\nvinegar is acid only in relation to our tongue. In relation to iron it\nacts as a solvent. In the cold it becomes hard, in the heat liquid. It\nacts differently on different objects with which it enters into\nrelations of time and space. Vinegar is a phenomenon, just as all things\nare. But it never appears as vinegar by itself. It always appears in\nconnection with other phenomena. Every phenomenon is a product of a\nsubject and an object.\n\nIn order that a thought may appear, the brain or the faculty of thought\nis not sufficient in itself. It requires, besides, an object which\nsuggests the thought. From this relative nature of our topic it follows\nthat in its treatment we cannot confine ourselves \"purely\" to it. Since\nreason, or the faculty of thought, never appears by itself, but always\nin connection with other things, we are continually compelled to pass\nfrom the faculty of thought to other things, which are its objects, and\nto treat of their connections.\n\nJust as the sight does not see the tree, but only that which is visible\nof the tree, so does the faculty of thought assimilate only the\nperceivable image of an object, not the object itself. A thought is a\nchild begotten by the function of the brain in communion with some\nobject. In a thought is crystalized on one side the subjective faculty\nof thought, and on the other the perceivable nature of an object. Every\nfunction of the mind presupposes some object by which it is caused and\nthe spiritual image of which it is. Or vice versa, the spiritual content\nof the mind is derived from some object which has its own existence and\nwhich is either seen or heard, or smelled, or tasted, or felt, in short,\nexperienced.\n\nReferring back to the statement that seeing is limited to the visible\nqualities of some object, hearing to its audible qualities, etc., while\nthe faculty of thought has everything for its object, we now understand\nthis to mean that all objects have certain innumerable, but concrete,\nqualities which are perceptible by our senses, and in addition thereto\nthe general spiritual quality of being thought of, understood, in short,\nof being the object of our faculty of thought.\n\nThis mode of classifying all objects applies also to the faculty of\nthought itself. The spirit, or mind, is a bodily function connected with\nthe senses which appear in various forms. Mind is thought generated at\ndifferent times in different brains by different objects through the\ninstrumentality of the senses. We may choose this mind as the object of\nspecial thought the same as all other things. Considered as an object,\nmind is a manysided and sense-perceived fact which in connection with a\nspecial function of the brain generates the general concept of \"Mind\" as\nthe content of this special thought process. The object of thought is\ndistinguished from its contents in the same way in which every object is\ndistinguished from its mental image. The different kinds of motion\nperceived by the help of the senses are the object of a certain thought\nprocess and supply to it the idea of \"motion.\" It is easier to\nunderstand that the mental image of some object perceived by the senses\nhas a father and a mother, being begotten by our faculty of thought by\nmeans of some sense-perceived object, than it is to grasp the existence\nof that trinity which is born when our present thought experiences its\nown existence and thus creates a conception of its own self. This has\nthe appearance of moving around in a circle. The object, the content and\nthe function of thought apparently coincide. Reason deals with itself,\nconsiders itself as an object and is its own content. But nevertheless\nthe distinction between an object and its concept, though less evident,\nis just as actual as in other cases. It is only the habit of regarding\nmatter and mind as fundamentally different things which conceals this\ntruth. The necessity to make a distinction compels us everywhere to\ndiscriminate between the object of sense perception and its mental\nconcept. We are forced to do the same in the case of the faculty of\nthought, and thus we find it necessary to give the name of \"Mind\" to\nthis special object of our sense perceptions. Such an ambiguity of terms\ncannot be entirely avoided in any science. A reader who does not cling\nto words, but rather seeks to grasp the meaning, will easily realize\nthat the difference between being and thinking applies also to the\nfaculty of thought, that the fact of understanding is different from the\nunderstanding of understanding. And since the understanding of\nunderstanding is again another fact, it will be permitted to call all\nspiritual things facts or sense perceptions.\n\nReason, or the faculty of thought, is therefore not a mystical object\nwhich produces the individual thought. On the contrary, it is a fact\nthat certain individual thoughts are the product of perception gained in\ncontact with certain objects and that these in connection with a certain\nbrain operation produce the concept of reason. Reason as well as all\nother things of which we become aware has a two-fold existence: one as a\nphenomenon or sense-perception, the other as a concept. The concept of\nany thing presupposes a certain sense-perception of that thing, and so\ndoes the concept of reason. Since all men think as a matter of fact,\nevery one has himself perceived reason as a part of reality, as a\nphenomenon, sense-perception or fact.\n\nOur object, reason, by virtue of the fact that it partakes of the nature\nof the senses, has the faculty of transforming the speculative method,\nwhich tries to dip understanding out of the depths of the spirit without\nthe help of sense-perception, into the inductive method, and vice versa\nof transforming the inductive method, which desires to arrive at\nconclusions, concepts, or understanding exclusively by means of\nsense-perception, into the speculative method, by virtue of its\nsimultaneous spiritual nature. Our problem is to analyze the concept of\nthought, or of the faculty of thought, or of reason, of knowing, of\nscience, by means of thought.\n\nTo produce thoughts and to analyze them is the same thing inasmuch as\nboth actions are functions of the brain. Both have the same nature. But\nthey are different to the same extent that instinct differs from\nconsciousness. Man does not think originally because he wants to, but\nbecause he must. Ideas are produced instinctively, involuntarily. In\norder to become fully aware of them, to place them within the grasp of\nknowing and willing, we must analyze them. From the experience of\nwalking, for instance, we derive the idea of walking. To analyze this\nidea means to solve the question, what is walking generally considered,\nwhat is the general nature of walking? We may answer: Walking is a\nrythmical motion from one place to another, and thus we raise the\ninstinctive idea to the position of a conscious analyzed idea. An object\nis not consciously, theoretically, understood, until it has been\nanalyzed. In examining what elements constitute the concept of walking,\nwe find that the general attribute of that experience which we agree in\ncalling \"walking\" is a rythmical motion. In actual experience steps may\nbe long or short, may be taken by two feet or by more, in brief may be\nvaried. But as a concept walking is simply a rythmical motion, and the\nanalysis of this concept furnishes us with the conscious understanding\nof this fact. The concept of light existed long before science analyzed\nit, before it was understood that undulations of the ether form the\nelements which constitute the concept of light. Instinctive and\nanalytical ideas differ in the same way in which the thoughts of every\nday life differ from the thoughts of science.\n\nThe analysis of any idea and the theoretical analysis of any object, or\nof the thing which suggested the idea, is one and the same. Every idea\ncorresponds to some real object. Ludwig Feuerbach has demonstrated that\neven the concepts of God and immortality are reflections of real objects\nwhich can be perceived by the senses. For the purpose of analyzing such\nideas as animal, light, friendship, man, etc., the phenomena, the\nobjects, such as animals, friendships, men, and lights, are analyzed.\nThe object which serves for the analysis of the concept \"animal\" is no\nmore any single animal, than the object of the concept \"light\" is any\nsingle light. These concepts comprise classes, things in general, and\ntherefore the question, or the analysis, of what constitutes the animal,\nthe light, friendship, must not deal with any concrete, but with the\nabstract elements of the whole class.\n\nThe fact that the analysis of a concept and the analysis of its object\nappear as two different things is due to our faculty of being able to\nseparate things into two parts, viz., into a practical, tangible,\nperceptible, concrete thing and into a theoretical mental, thinkable,\ngeneral thing. The practical analysis is the premise of the theoretical\nanalysis. The individually perceptible animals serve us as a basis for\nthe analysis of the animal concept, the individually experienced\nfriendships as the basis for the analysis of the concept of friendship.\n\nEvery idea corresponds to an object which may be practically separated\ninto its component parts. To analyze a concept is equivalent, therefore,\nto analyzing a previously experienced object by theoretical means. The\nanalysis of a concept consists in the understanding of the common or\ngeneral faculties of the concrete parts of the analyzed object. That\nwhich is common to the various modes of walking, the rythmical motion,\nconstitutes the concept of walking, that which is common to the various\nmanifestations of light constitutes the concept of light. A chemical\nfactory analyzes objects for the purpose of obtaining chemicals, while\nscience analyzes them for the purpose of obtaining their concepts.\n\nThe special object of our analysis, the faculty of thought, is likewise\ndistinguished from its concept. But in order to be able to analyze this\nconcept, we must analyze the object. It cannot be analyzed chemically,\nfor not everything is a matter of chemistry, but it may be analyzed\ntheoretically or scientifically. As we have already stated, the science\nof understanding deals with all objects. But all objects which this\nscience may wish to analyze theoretically, must first be handled\npractically. According to their special natures, they must either be\nhandled in various ways, or carefully inspected, or scrutinized by\nintent listening, in short they must be thoroughly experienced in some\nway.\n\nIt is a fact of experience that men think. The object or suggestion is\nfurnished by facts, and we then derive the concept instinctively. Thus,\nto analyze the faculty of thought means to find that which is common or\ngeneral to the various personal and temporary processes of thought. In\norder to follow this study by the methods of natural science, we require\nneither physical instruments nor chemical reagents. The sense\nperception which is indispensable for every scientific understanding, is\nso to say present in this case _a priori_, without further experience.\nEvery one possesses the object of our study, the fact of thought faculty\nand its experience, in the memories of himself or herself.\n\nWe have seen that thought like any other activity as well as its\nscientific analysis is everywhere developing the general or abstract out\nof particular and concrete sense perceptions. We now express this in the\nfollowing words: The common feature of all separate thought-processes\nconsists in their seeking the general character or unity which is common\nto all objects experienced in their manifold variety by sense\nperceptions. The general element which is common to the different\nanimals, or to the different manifestations of light, is that which\nconstitutes the general animal or light concept. The general is the\nnature of all concepts, of all understanding, all science, all thought\nprocesses. Thus we arrive at the understanding that the analysis of the\nfaculty of thought reveals its nature of finding that which is general\nand common to concrete and distinct things. The eye studies the visible,\nthe ear the audible, and our brain that which is generally conceivable.\n\nWe have seen that thought like any other activity requires an object;\nthat it is unlimited in the choice of its objects, because all things\nmay become the objects of thought; that these objects are perceived in\nmanifold forms by various senses; and that they are transformed into\nsimple ideas by extricating that which they possess in common, which is\nsimilar, which is general in them. If we apply this experienced\nunderstanding of the general method of thought processes to our special\nobject, the faculty of thought, we realize that we have thus solved our\nproblem, because all we were looking for was the general method of the\nthought process.\n\n_If the development of the general out of the concrete constitutes the\ngeneral method by which reason arrives at understanding, then we have\nfully grasped reason as the faculty of deriving the general out of the\nconcrete._\n\nThinking is a physical process and it cannot exist or produce anything\nwithout materials any more than any other process of labor. My thought\nrequires some material which can be thought of. This material is\nfurnished by the phenomena of nature and life. These are the concrete\nthings. In claiming that the universe, or all things, may be the object\nof thought, we simply mean that the materials of the thought process,\nthe objects of the mind, are infinite in quantity and quality. The\nmaterials which the universe furnishes for our thought are as infinite\nas space, as eternal as time, and as absolutely manifold as the nature\nof these two forms of being. The faculty of thought is a universal\nfaculty in so far as it enters into relations with all things, all\nsubstances, all phenomena, and thus generates thought. But it is not\nabsolute, since it requires for its existence and action the previous\npresence of matter. Matter is the boundary, beyond which the mind cannot\npass. Matter furnishes the background for the illumination of the mind,\nbut is not consumed in this illumination. Mind is a product of matter,\nbut matter is more than a product of mind, being perceived also through\nthe five senses and thus brought to our notice. We call real, objective\nproducts, or \"things themselves\" only such products as are revealed to\nus simultaneously by the senses and the mind.\n\nReason is a real thing only in so far as it is perceived by the senses.\nThe perceptible actions of reason are revealed in the brain of man as\nwell as in the world outside of it. For are not the effects tangible by\nwhich reason transforms nature and life? We see the successes of science\nwith our eyes and grasp them with our hands. It is true that science or\nreason cannot produce such material effects out of themselves. The world\nof sense perceptions, the objects outside of the human brain, must be\ngiven. But what thing is there that has any effects \"in itself?\" In\norder that light may shine, that the sun may warm, and revolve in its\ncourse, there must be space and other things which may be lighted and\nwarmed and passed. In order that my table may have color, there must be\nlight and eyes. And everything else which my table is besides, it can be\nonly in contact with other things. Its being is just as manifold as\nthose various contacts or relations. In short, the world consists only\nin its interrelations. Any thing that is torn out of its relations with\nthe world ceases to exist. A thing is anything \"in itself\" only because\nit is something for other things, by acting or appearing in connection\nwith something else.\n\nIf we wish to regard the world in the light of the \"thing itself,\" we\nshall easily see that the world \"itself\" and the world as it appears,\nthe world of phenomena, differ only in the same way in which the whole\ndiffers from its component parts. The world \"itself\" is nothing else but\nthe sum total of its phenomena. The same holds good of that part of the\nworld phenomena which we call reason, spirit, faculty of thought.\nAlthough we distinguish between the faculty of thought and its phenomena\nor manifestations, yet the faculty of thought \"itself,\" or \"pure\"\nreason, exists in reality only in the sum total of its manifestations.\nSeeing is the physical existence of the faculty of sight. We possess the\nwhole only by means of its parts, and we can possess reason, like all\nother things, only by the help of its effects, by its various thoughts.\nBut we repeat that reason does not precede thought in the order of time.\nOn the contrary thoughts generated by perceptible objects serve as a\nbasis for the development of the concept of the faculty of thought. Just\nas the understanding of the world movements has taught us that the sun\nis not revolving around the earth, so the understanding of the thought\nprocess tells us that it is not the faculty of thought which creates\nthought, but vice versa, that the concept of this faculty is created out\nof a series of concrete thoughts. Hence the faculty of thought\npractically exists only as the sum total of our thoughts, just as the\nfaculty of sight exists only through the sum of the things that we see.\n\nThese thoughts, this practical reason, serve as the material out of\nwhich our brain manufactures the concept of \"pure\" reason. Reason is\nnecessarily impure in practice, which means that it must connect itself\nwith some object. Pure reason, or abstract reason without any special\ncontent, cannot be anything else but the general characteristic of all\nconcrete reasoning processes. We possess this general nature of reason\nin two ways: In an impure state, that is as practical and concrete\nphenomenon, consisting of the sum of our real perceptions, and in a pure\nstate, that is theoretically or abstractly, in the concept. The\nphenomenon of reason is distinguished from reason \"itself\" just as the\nreal animals are distinguished from the concept of the animal.\n\nEvery actual reasoning process is based on some real object which has\nmany qualities like all things in nature. The faculty of thought\nextracts from this many-sided object those properties which are general\nor common with it. A mouse and an elephant, as the objects of our\nreasoning activity, lose their differences in the general animal\nconcept. Such a concept combines many things under one uniform point of\nview, it develops one general idea out of many concrete things. Since\nunderstanding is the general or common quality of all reasoning\nprocesses, it follows that reason in general, or the general nature of\nthe reasoning process, consists in abstracting the general ideal\ncharacter from any concrete thing perceptible by the help of the senses.\n\nReason being unable to exist without some objects outside of itself, it\nis understood that we can perceive \"pure\" reason, or reason \"itself,\"\nonly by its practical manifestations. We cannot find reason without\nobjects outside of it with which it comes in contact and produces\nthought, any more than we can find any eyes without light. And the\nmanifestations of reason are as varied as the objects which supply its\nmaterial. It is plain, then, that reason has no separate existence \"in\nitself,\" but that on the contrary the concept of reason is formed out of\nthe material supplied by the senses.\n\nMental processes appear only in connection with perceptible phenomena.\nThese processes are themselves phenomena of sense perception which, in\nconnection with a brain process, produce the concept of the faculty of\nthought \"itself.\" If we analyze this concept, we find that \"pure\" reason\nconsists in the activity of producing general ideas out of concrete\nmaterials, which include so-called immaterial thoughts. In other words,\nreason may be characterized as an activity which seeks for unity in\nevery multiplicity and equalizes all contrasts whether it deals with the\nmany different sides and parts of one or of more objects. All these\ndifferent statements describe the same thing in different words, so that\nthe reader may not cling to the empty word, but grasp the living\nconcept, the manifold object, in its general nature.\n\nReason, we said, exists in a \"pure\" state as the development of the\ngeneral out of the special, of the abstract out of concrete sense\nperceptions. This is the whole content of pure reason, of scientific\nunderstanding, of consciousness. And by the terms \"pure\" and \"whole\" we\nsimply indicate that we mean the general content of the various thought\nprocesses, the general form of reason. Apart from this general abstract\nform, reason, like all other things, has also its concrete, special,\nsense form which we perceive directly through our experience. Hence our\nentire process of consciousness consists in the experience of the\nsenses, that is in the physical process, and its understanding.\nUnderstanding is the general reflection of any object.\n\nConsciousness, as the Latin root of the word indicates, is the knowledge\nof being in existence. It is a form, or a quality, of existence which\ndiffers from other forms of being in that it is aware of its existence.\nQuality cannot be explained, but must be experienced. We know by\nexperience that consciousness includes along with the knowledge of being\nin existence the difference and contradiction between subject and\nobject, thinking and being, between form and content, between phenomenon\nand essential thing, between attribute and substance, between the\ngeneral and the concrete. This innate contradiction explains the various\nterms applied to consciousness, such as the organ of abstraction, the\nfaculty of generalization or unification, or in contradistinction\nthereto the faculty of differentiation. For consciousness generalizes\ndifferences and differentiates generalities. Contradiction is innate in\nconsciousness, and its nature is so contradictory that it is at the same\ntime a differentiating, a generalizing, and an understanding nature.\nConsciousness generalizes contradiction. It recognizes that all nature,\nall being, lives in contradictions, that everything is what it is only\nin co-operation with its opposite. Just as visible things are not\nvisible without the faculty of sight, and vice versa the faculty of\nsight cannot see anything but what is visible, so contradiction must be\nrecognized as something general which pervades all thought and being.\nThe science of understanding, by generalizing contradiction, solves all\nconcrete contradictions.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\nTHE NATURE OF THINGS\n\n\nIn so far as the faculty of understanding is a physical object, the\nknowledge of its nature is a matter of physical science. But in so far\nas we understand all things by the help of this faculty, the science of\nunderstanding becomes metaphysics. Inasmuch as the scientific analysis\nof reason reverses the current conception of its nature, this specific\nunderstanding necessarily reverses our entire world philosophy. With the\nunderstanding of the nature of reason, we arrive at the long sought\nunderstanding of the \"nature of things.\"\n\nWe wish to know, understand, conceive, recognize all things in their\nvery nature, not in their outward appearance. Science seeks to\nunderstand the nature of things, or their true essence, by means of\ntheir manifestations. Every thing has its own special nature, and this\nnature is not seen, or felt, or heard, but solely perceived by the\nfaculty of thought. This faculty explores the nature of all things just\nas the eye explores all that is visible in things. Just as the nature of\nsight is understood by the theory of vision, so the nature of things in\ngeneral is understood by the theory of understanding.\n\nIt is true that it sounds contradictory to say that the nature of a\nthing does not appear to the eye, but to the faculty of thought, and at\nthe same time to imply that the opposite of appearance, nature, should\nappear. But we here refer to the nature of a thing as a phenomenon in\nthe same way in which we referred to the mind as a perception of the\nsenses, and we shall demonstrate further on that every being is a\nphenomenon, and every phenomenon is more or less of an essential thing.\n\nWe have seen that the faculty of thought requires for its vital activity\nan object, or raw material. The effect of reasoning is seen in science,\nno matter whether we understand the term science in its narrow classical\nsense or in its broadest meaning of any kind of knowledge. The phenomena\nof sense perception constitute the general object or material of\nscience. Sense perceptions arise from infinite circulation of matter.\nThe universe and all things in it consist of transformations of matter\nwhich take place simultaneously and consecutively in space and time. The\nuniverse is in every place and at any time itself, new, and present for\nthe first time. It arises and passes away, passes and arises under our\nvery hands. Nothing remains the same, only the infinite change is\nconstant, and even the change varies. Every particle of time and space\nbrings new changes. It is true that the materialist believes in the\npermanency, eternity, indestructibility of matter. He teaches us that\nnot the smallest particle of matter has ever been lost in the world,\nthat matter simply changes its forms eternally, but that its nature\nlasts indestructibly through all eternity. And yet, in spite of all\ndistinctions between matter itself and its perishable form, the\nmaterialist is on the other hand more inclined than any one else to\ndwell on the identity of matter and its forms. Inasmuch as the\nmaterialist speaks ironically of formless matter and matterless forms,\nin the same breath with perishable forms of imperishable matter, it is\nplain that materialism is not informed any more than idealism as to the\nrelation of content to form, of a phenomenon to the essential nature of\nits subject. Where do we find such eternal, imperishable, formless\nmatter? In the world of sense perceptions we never meet anything but\nforms of perishable matter. It is true that there is matter everywhere.\nWherever anything passes away, something new instantly arises. But\nnowhere has any homogeneous, unchangeable matter enduring without any\nform, ever been discovered. Even a chemically indivisible element is\nonly a relative unit in its actual existence, and in extension of time\nas well as in extension through space it varies simultaneously and\nconsecutively as much as any organic individual which also changes only\nits concrete forms, but remains the same in its general nature from\nbeginning to end. My body changes continually its fleshy tissue, bones,\nand every other particle belonging to it, and yet it always remains the\nsame. What constitutes, then, this body which is distinguished from its\ntransient form? It is the sum total, in a generalized way, of all its\nvaried concrete forms. Eternal and imperishable matter exists in reality\nonly as the sum total of its perishable forms. The statement that matter\nis imperishable cannot mean anything but that there will always and\neverywhere be matter. It is just as true to say that matter is\nimperishable and merely changes its forms, as it is to say that matter\nexists only in its changing forms, that it is matter which changes and\nthat only the change is eternal. The terms \"changeable matter\" and\n\"material change\" are after all only different expressions for the same\nthing.\n\nIn the practical world of sense perceptions, there is nothing permanent,\nnothing homogeneous, nothing beyond nature, nothing like a \"thing\nitself.\" Everything is changing, passing, phantomlike, so to say. One\nphantom is chased by another. \"Nevertheless,\" says Kant, \"things are\nalso something in themselves,\" for otherwise we should have the absurd\ncontradiction that there could be phenomena without things that produce\nthem. But no! A phenomena is no more and no less different from the\nthing which produces it than the stretch of a twenty-mile road is\ndifferent from the road itself. Or we may distinguish between a knife\nand its blade and handle, but we know that there would be no knife if\nthere were no blade and no handle. The essential nature of the universe\nis change. Phenomena appear, that is all.\n\nThe contradiction between the \"thing itself,\" or its essence, and its\noutward appearance is fully solved by a complete critique of reason\nwhich arrives at the understanding that the human faculty of thought may\ngeneralize any number of varied sense perceptions under one uniform\npoint of view, by singling out the general and equivalent forms and thus\nregarding everything it may meet as a concrete part of one and the same\nwhole.\n\nIn other words, the relative and transient forms perceived by our senses\nserve as raw material for our brain activity, which abstracts the\ngeneral likeness out of the concrete forms and systematizes or\nclassifies them for our consciousness. The infinite variety of sense\nperceptions passes in review before our subjective mind, and it\nconstructs out of the multiplicity the unity, out of the parts the\nwhole, out of the phenomena the essential nature, out of the perishable\nthe imperishable, out of the attributes the subject. The essence, the\nnature of things, the \"thing itself\" is an ideal, a spiritual\nconception. Consciousness knows how to make sums out of different units.\nIt can take any number of units for its sums. The entire multiplicity of\nthe universe is theoretically conceived as one unit. On the other hand,\nevery abstract sum consists in reality of an infinite number of sense\nperceptions. Where do we find any indivisible unit outside of our\nabstract conceptions? Two halves, four fourths, eight eighths, or an\ninfinite number of separate parts form the raw material out of which the\nmind fashions the mathematical unit. This book, its leaves, its letters,\nor their parts, are they units? Where do I begin, where do I stop? In\nthe same way, I may call a library with many volumes, a house, a farm,\nand finally the whole universe, a unit. Is not everything a part, is not\nevery part a thing? Is the color of a leaf less of a thing than that\nleaf itself? Perhaps some would call the color simply an attribute and\nthe leaf its substance, because there might be a leaf without color, but\nno color without a leaf. But as surely as we exhaust a heap of sand by\nscattering it, just as surely do we remove all the substance of a leaf\nwhen we take away its attributes one after the other. Color is only the\nsum of reactions of leaf, light, and eye, and so is all the rest of the\nmatter of a leaf an aggregate of interactions. In the same way in which\nour reason deprives a leaf of its color attributes and sets it apart as\na \"thing itself,\" may we continue to deprive that leaf of all its other\nattributes, and in so doing we finally take away everything that makes\nthe leaf. Color is in its nature no less a substance than the leaf\nitself, and the leaf is no less an attribute than its color. As the\ncolor is an attribute of a leaf, so a leaf is an attribute of a tree, a\ntree an attribute of the earth, the earth an attribute of the universe.\nThe universe is the substance, substance in general, and all other\nsubstances are but its attributes. And this world-substance reveals the\nfact that the nature of things, the \"thing itself\" as distinguished from\nits manifestations, is only a concept of the mind.\n\nIn its universal search from the attribute to the substance, from the\nrelative to the absolute, from the appearance of things to the true\nthings, the mind finally arrives at the understanding that the substance\nis nothing but a sum of attributes collected by brain activity, and that\nthe mind itself, or reason, is a substantial being which creates\nabstract mental units out of a multitude of sense perceptions and\nconceives of the universe as an absolute whole, as an independent \"thing\nitself,\" by adding all its transient manifestations. In turning away\nfull of dissatisfaction from attributes, searching restlessly after the\nsubstance, throwing aside phenomena, and forever groping for truth, for\nthe nature of things, for the \"thing itself,\" and in finally realizing\nthat this substantial truth is merely the sum of all socalled untruths,\nthe totality of all phenomena, the mind proves itself to be the creator\nof the abstract concept of substance. But it did not create this\nconcept out of nothing. On the contrary, it generated the concept of a\nworld substance out of attributes, it derived truth out of\nmanifestations of things.\n\nThe idealist conception that there is an abstract nature behind\nphenomena which materialises itself in them, is refuted by the\nunderstanding that this hidden nature does not dwell in the world\noutside of the human mind, but in the brain of man. But since the brain\ndifferentiates between phenomena and their nature, between the concrete\nand the general, only by means of sense perception, it cannot be denied\nthat the distinction between phenomena and their nature is well founded;\nonly the essential nature of things is not found back of phenomena, but\nby means of phenomena. This nature is materially existent and our\nfaculty of thought is a real and natural one.\n\nIt is true of spiritual things as well as of physical ones, in fact it\nis true of all things, metaphysically speaking, that they are what they\nare, not \"in themselves,\" not in their abstract nature, but in contact\nwith other things, in reality. In this sense one might say that things\nare not what they seem, but manifest themselves because they are\nexistent, and they manifest themselves in as many different ways as\nthere are other things with which they enter into relations of time and\nspace. But the statement that things are not what they seem requires, in\norder to be rightly understood, the modification that whatever manifests\nitself, exists in nature, and its existence is limited by its\nmanifestations. \"We cannot perceive heat itself,\" says a book on physics\nwritten by Professor Koppe, \"we merely conclude from its manifestations\nthat it is present in nature.\" Thus reasons a naturalist who seeks to\nunderstand a thing by practical and diligent study of its\nmanifestations, but who seeks refuge in the speculative belief in a\nhidden \"thing itself\" whenever a lack of understanding of the\nfundamentals of logic embarrasses him. We, on the contrary, conclude\nthat there is no such thing as \"heat itself,\" since it cannot be found,\nin nature, and we conceive of heat as effects of matter which the human\nbrain translated into the conception of \"heat itself.\" Because science\nwas, perhaps, as yet unable to analyse this conception, the professor\nsays we cannot perceive the natural object which gives rise to this\nconception. \"Heat itself\" is simply composed of the sum total of its\nmanifold effects, and there is nothing else to it. The faculty of\nthought generalizes this variety of effects under the concept of heat in\ngeneral. The analysis of this conception, the discovery of the general\ncharacter of the various manifestations of heat, is the function of\ninductive science. But the conception of heat separated from its effects\nis a speculative idea, similar to Lichtenberg's knife without handle and\nblade.\n\nThe faculty of thought in touch with sense perceptions produces the\nnature of things. But it produces them no more independently of things\noutside than do the eye, the ear, or any other sense of man. It is not\nthe \"things themselves\" which we see or feel, but their effects on our\neyes, hands, etc. The faculty of reason to generalize different\nperceptions of the eye permits us to distinguish between concrete sights\nand sight in general. The faculty of thought conceives of any concrete\nsight as an object of sight in general. It furthermore distinguishes\nbetween subjective and objective sight perceptions, the latter being\nsights which are visible not alone to the individual eye, but to\neyesight in general. Even the visions of a spiritualist, or such\nsubjective impressions as forked lightning, circles of fire, caused by\nexcited blood of closed eyes, serve as objects for the critical\nconsciousness. A glittering object revealed by bright sunlight miles\naway is no more and no less tangible in substance, no more and no less\ntrue, than any optical illusion. A man whose ear is tingling hears\nsomething, though it is not the tinkling of bells. Every sense\nperception is an object, and every object is a sense perception. The\nobject of any subjective mind is a passing manifestation, and every\nobjective perception is but a perishable subject. The object of\nobservation may exist in a more tangible, less approachable, more\nstable, or more general form, but it is not a \"thing itself.\" It may be\nperceived not alone by my eyes, but also by those of others, not by the\neyes, but also by the feeling, the hearing, the taste, etc. And it may\nbe noticed not alone by men, but also by other objects. But nevertheless\nit appears only as a manifestation, it is different in different places,\nit is not today what it is tomorrow. Every existence is relative, in\ntouch with other things, and entering into different relations of time\nand space with them.\n\nEvery sense perception is an actual and natural object. Truth exists in\nthe form of natural phenomena, and whatever is, is true. Substance and\nattribute are only terms for certain relations. They are not\ncontradictions, and, as a matter of fact, all contradictions disappear\nbefore our faculty of generalization and differentiation. For this\nfaculty reconciles all contradictions by finding a general quality in\nall differences. Existence, or universal truth, is the general object,\nthe raw material, of the faculty of thought. This material is of the\nutmost variety and supplied by the senses. The senses reveal to us the\nsubstance of the universe in the forms of concrete qualities, in other\nwords, the nature of perceptible matter is revealed to the faculty of\nthought through a variety of concrete forms. It is not perceived as a\ngeneral essence, but only through interdependent phenomena. Out of the\ninterdependence of the sense perceptions with our faculty of thought\nthere arise quantities, general concepts, things, true perceptions, or\nunderstood truths.\n\nEssence and truth are two terms for the same thing. Truth, or the\nessence and nature of things, is a theoretical concept. As we have seen,\nwe receive impressions of things in two ways, viz., a sense impression\nand a mental impression, the one practical, the other theoretical.\nPractice furnishes us with the sense impression, theory with the mental\nnature of things.\n\nPractice is the premise of theory, sense perception the premise of the\nnature which is also called the truth. The same truth manifests itself\nin practice either simultaneously or consecutively in the same place or\nin different places. It exists theoretically as a homogeneous\nconception.\n\nPractice, phenomena, sense perceptions, are absolute qualities, that is\nto say they have no quantitative limitation, they are not restricted by\ntime or space. They are absolute and infinite qualities. The qualities\nof a thing are as infinite as its parts. On the other hand, the work of\nthe faculty of thought, of theory, creates at will an infinite number of\nquantities, and it conceives every quality of sense _perceptions_ in the\nform of quantities, as the essential nature of things, as truths. Every\nconception has a quality of some sense perception for its object. Every\nobject can be conceived by the faculty of thought only as a quantitative\nunit, as true nature, as truth.\n\nThe faculty of thought produces in contact with sense perceptions that\nwhich manifests itself as true nature, as a general truth. A primitive\nconcept accomplishes this at first only instinctively, while a\nscientific concept is a conscious and voluntary repetition of this\nprimitive act. Scientific understanding wanting to know an object, such\nas for instance heat, is not hunting after the phenomena themselves. It\ndoes not aim to see or hear how heat melts iron or wax, how it benefits\nin one case or injures in another, how it makes eggs solid or ice\nliquid, nor does it concern itself with the difference between the heat\nof an animal, of the sun, or of a stove. All these things are from the\npoint of view of the faculty of understanding, only effects, phenomena,\nqualities. It desires to get at the essence, the true nature of things,\nit strives to find a general law, a concise scientific extract, of\nthings seen, heard, and felt. The abstract nature of things cannot be a\ntangible object. It is a concept of theory, of science, of the faculty\nof thought. The understanding of heat consists in singling out that\nwhich is common to all phenomena of heat, which is essential or true for\nall heat. _Practically the nature of heat consists of the sum total of\nall its manifestations, theoretically in its concept, scientifically in\nthe analysis of this concept. To analyze the concept of heat means to\nascertain that which is common to all manifestations of heat._\n\nThe general nature of the thing is its true nature, the general quality\nits true quality. We define rain more truly as being wet than as being\nfertilizing, because it gives moisture wherever it falls, while it\nfertilizes only under certain circumstances and in certain places. My\ntrue friend is one who is constant and loyal to me all my life under all\ncircumstances. Of course, we must not believe in any absolute and\nunconditional friendship any more than in any absolute and eternal\ntruth. Perfectly true, perfectly universal, is only the general\nexistence, the universe, the absolute quantity. But the real world is\nabsolutely relative, absolutely perishable, an infinity of\nmanifestations, an infinity of qualities. All truths are simply parts of\nthis world, partial truths. Semblance and truth flow dialectically into\none another like hard and soft, good and bad, right and wrong, but at\nthe same time they remain different. Even though I know that there is no\nrain which is \"fertile in itself,\" and no friend who is true in an\nabsolute sense, I may nevertheless refer to a certain rain as fertile in\nrelation to certain crops, and I may distinguish between my more or less\ntrue friends.\n\nThe universe is the truth. The universe is that which is universal, that\nis, things which exist and are perceived. The general mark of truth is\nexistence, because universal existence is truth. Now, existence is not a\ngeneral abstraction, but a reality in the concrete form of sense\nperceptions. The world of sense perceptions has its true and perceptible\nexistence in the passing and manifold manifestations of nature and life.\nTherefore all manifestations are recognized as relative truths, all\ntruths as concrete and temporal manifestations. The manifestation of\npractice is considered as a truth in theory, and vice versa, the truth\nof theory is manifested in practice. Opposites are mutually relative.\nTruth and error differ only comparatively, in volume of degree, like\nbeing and seeming, life and death, light and dark, like all other\nopposites in the world. It is a matter of course that all things of this\nworld are worldly, consequently are of the same matter, the same nature,\nthe same family, the same quality. In other words, every volume of\nperceptible manifestation forms in contact with the human faculty of\nthought a being, a truth, a general thing. For our consciousness, every\nparticle of dust as well as every dust cloud, or any other mass of\nmaterial manifestations, is on the one hand an abstract \"thing in\nitself,\" and on the other a passing phenomenon of the absolute object,\nthe universe. Inside of this universe the various manifestations are\nsystematized or generalized at will and on purpose by means of our mind.\nThe chemical element is as much a manysided system as the organic cell\nor the whole vegetable kingdom. The smallest and the largest being is\ndivided into individuals, species, families, classes, etc. This\nsystematization, this generalization, this generation of beings is\ncontinued in an ascending scale up to the infinity of the universe, and\nin the descending scale down to the infinity of the parts. In the eyes\nof the faculty of thought all qualities become abstract things, all\nthings relative qualities.\n\nEvery thing, every sense perception, no matter how subjective or\nshortlived it may be, is true, is a certain part of truth. In other\nwords, the truth exists, not only in the general existence, but every\nconcrete existence has also its own distinct generality or truth. Every\nobject, whether it be a mere passing idea, or a volatile scent, or some\ntangible matter, constitutes a sum of manifold phenomena. The faculty of\nthought turns various quantities into one, discerns the equality in\ndifferent things, seeks the unity in the multiplicity. Mind and matter\nhave at least actual existence in common. Organic nature agrees with\ninorganic nature in being material. It is true that there are wide\ndivergences between man, monkey, elephant, and plants attached to the\nsoil, but even greater differences are reconciled under the term\n\"organism.\" However much a stone may differ from a human heart, thinking\nreason will discover innumerable similarities in them. They at least\nagree in being matter, they are both visible, tangible, and may be\nweighed, etc. Their differences are as manifold as their likenesses.\nSolomon truly says that there is nothing new under the sun, and Schiller\nalso says truly that the world grows old and again grows young. What\nabstract thing, being, existence, generality is there that is not\nmanifold in its sense manifestations, and individually different from\nall other things? There are no two drops of water alike. I am now in\nmany respects different from what I was an hour ago, and the likeness\nbetween my brother and myself is only relatively greater than the\nlikeness between a watch and an oyster. In short, the faculty of thought\nis a faculty of absolute generalization, it classes all things without\nexception under one head, it comprises and understands everything\nuniformly, while sense perceptions show absolutely everything in a\ndifferent, new and individual light.\n\nIf we apply this metaphysics[1] to our study, the faculty of thought,\nwe see that its functions, like all other things, are material\nmanifestations, which are all equally true. All manifestations of the\nmind, all ideas, opinions, errors, partake of a certain truth, all of\nthem have a kernel of truth. Just as inevitably as a painter derives all\nforms of his creation from perceptible objects around him, so are all\nideas, images of true things, theories of true objects. So far as\nperceptions are perceptions, it is a matter of course that all\nperceptions perceive something. So far as knowledge is knowledge, it\nrequires no explanation that all knowledge knows something. This follows\nfrom the rule of identity, according to which a equals a, or from the\nrule of contradiction, according to which 100 is not 1,000.\n\nAll perceptions are thoughts. One might claim, on the other hand, that\nall thoughts are not perceptions. One might define \"perceiving\" as a\nspecial kind of thought, as real objective thought in distinction from\nsupposing, believing, or imagining. But it cannot be denied that all\nthoughts have a common nature, in spite of their many differences.\nThought is treated in the court of the faculty of thought like all other\nthings, it is made uniform. No matter how different the thoughts I had\nyesterday may be from those I have to-day, no matter how much the\nthoughts of different human beings may vary at different times, no\nmatter how clearly we may distinguish between such thoughts as those\nexpressed by the terms idea, conception, judgment, conclusion,\nimpression, etc., they each and all possess the same common and\nuniversal nature, because all of them are manifestations of mind.\n\nIt follows, then, that the difference between true and erroneous\nthoughts, between understanding and misunderstanding, like all other\ndifferences, is only relative. A thought \"in itself\" is neither false\nnor true, it is either of these only in relation to some other object.\nThoughts, conceptions, theories, natures, truths, all have this in\ncommon that they belong to some object. We have seen that any object is\na part of the multiplicity of sense perceptions in the world outside of\nour brains. After as much of the universal being as constitutes the\nobject which is to be understood has been defined by some customary term\nof language, truth is to be found in the discovery of the general nature\nof this perceptible part of being.\n\nThe perceptible parts of being which constitute the things of this world\nhave not only a semblance and manifestation, but also a true nature\nwhich is given by means of their manifestation. The nature of things is\nas infinite in number as the world of sense perceptions is infinitely\ndivisible in space and time. Every part of any phenomenon has its own\nnature, every special phenomenon has its general truth. A phenomenon is\nperceived in touch with the senses, while the true or essential nature\nof things is perceived in contact with our faculty of thought. In this\nway we find ourselves face to face with the necessity of speaking here,\nwhere the nature of things is up for discussion, simultaneously of the\nfaculty of thought, and on the other hand of dealing with the nature of\nthings when the faculty of thought is our main subject.\n\nWe said at the outset: The criterion of truth includes the criterion of\nreason. Truth, like reason, consists in developing a general concept,\nor an abstract theory, from a given sum of sense perceptions. Therefore\nit is not abstract truth which is the criterion of true understanding,\nbut we rather refer to that understanding as being true which produces\nthe truth, or the general hall-mark of any concrete object. Truth must\nbe objective, that is to say it must be the truth about some concrete\nobject. Perceptions cannot be true to themselves, they are true only in\nrelation to some definite object, and to some outside facts. The work of\nunderstanding consists in the abstraction of the general hall-mark from\nconcrete objects. The concrete is the measure of the general, the\nstandard of truth. Whatever is, is true, no matter how much or how\nlittle true it may be. Once we have found existence, its general nature\nfollows as truth itself. The difference between that which is more or\nless general, between being and seeming, between truth and error, is\nlimited to definite conditions, for it presupposes the relation to some\nspecial object. Whether a perception is true or false will, therefore,\ndepend not so much on perception as on the scope of the question which\nperception tries to solve of its own accord or which it is called upon\nto solve by external circumstances. A perfect understanding is possible\nonly within definite limits. A perfect truth is one which is always\naware of its imperfection. For instance, it is perfectly true that all\nbodies have weight only because the concept of \"body\" has previously\nbeen limited to things which have weight. After reason has assigned the\nconception of \"body in general\" to things of various weights, it is no\nlonger a matter for surprise to find that bodies must inevitably have\nweight. Once it is assumed that the term \"bird\" was abstracted\nexclusively from flying animals, we may be sure that all birds fly,\nwhether they are in heaven, on earth, or in any other place. And to\nexplain this we do not require the belief in _a priori_ conceptions\nwhich are supposed to differ from empirical conceptions by their strict\nnecessity and generality. Truths are valid only under certain\nconditions, and under certain conditions errors may be true. It is a\ntrue perception that the sun is shining, provided we understand that the\nsky is not covered by clouds. And it is no less true that a straight\nstick becomes crooked in flowing water, provided we understand that this\ntruth is an optical one. _Truth is that which is common or general to\nour reasoning faculty within a given circle of sense perceptions. To\ncall within a definite circle of sense perceptions that which is\nexceptional or special the rule or the general, is error._ Error, the\nopposite of truth, arises when the faculty of thought, or consciousness,\ninadvertently or shortsightedly and without previous experience concedes\nto certain phenomena a more general scope than is supported by the\nsenses, for instance when it hastily attributes to what is in fact only\nan optical existence, a supposed plastic existence also.\n\nThe judgment of error is a prejudice. Truth and error, understanding and\nmisunderstanding, knowing and not knowing, have their common habitation\nin the faculty of thought which is the organ of science. Thought at\nlarge is the general expression of experienced facts perceived by the\nsenses, and it includes errors as well. Error is distinguished from\ntruth in that the former assigns to any definite fact of which it is a\nmanifestation, a wider and more general existence than is supported by\nsense perceptions and experience. Unwarranted assumption is the nature\nof error. A glass bead does not become a counterfeit, until it pretends\nto be a genuine pearl.\n\nSchleiden says of the eye: \"When the excited blood expands the veins and\npresses on the nerves, we feel it in the fingers as pain, we see it in\nthe eyes as forked lightning. And thus we obtain the irrefutable proof\nthat our conceptions are free creations of the mind, that we do not\nperceive the external world as it really is, but that its reflex actions\non us simply give rise to a peculiar brain activity, on our part. The\nproducts of this activity are frequently connected with certain\nprocesses of the external world, but frequently they are not. We close\nour eyes and we see a circle of light, but there is in reality no\nshining body. It is easy to see that this may be a great and dangerous\nsource of errors of all kinds. From the teasing forms of a misty\nmoonlight night to the threatening and insanity-producing visions of the\nbeliever in ghosts we meet a series of illusions which are not derived\nfrom any direct processes of external nature, but belong to the field of\nthe free activity of the mind which is subject to error. It requires\ngreat judgment and wide education, before the mind learns to break away\nfrom all its own errors and to control them. Reading in general seems so\neasy, and yet it is a difficult art. It is only by degrees that the mind\nlearns to understand which of the messages of the nerves may be trusted\nand used as a basis for conceptions. The light, if we consider it\nentirely by itself, is not clear, not yellow, nor blue nor red. The\nlight is a movement of a very fine and everywhere diffused substance,\nthe ether.\"\n\nThe beautiful world of light and splendor, of color and form, is\nsupposed not to be a perception of something which really is. \"Through\nthe thick covering of the grape arbor, a ray of sunlight undulates into\nthe cooling shadows. You think you see the ray of light itself, but what\nyou really see is nothing but a flock of dust particles.\" The truth\nabout light and color is said to be that they are \"waves rushing through\nether in restless succession at the rate of 160,000 miles per second.\"\nThis true physical nature of light and color is supposed to be so\nillusive, that \"it required the sharp intellects of the greatest\nthinkers to reveal to us this true nature of light. We find that every\none of our senses is susceptible only to definite external influences,\nand that the stimulation of different senses produces different\nconceptions in our mind. Thus the sense organs are the mediators between\nthe external soulless world (undulations of the ether), which is\nrevealed to us by science, and the beautiful world of sense perceptions\nin which we find ourselves with our minds.\"\n\nSchleiden thus gives an illustration of the fact that there is still a\ngreat deal of embarrassment, even in our times, when the understanding\nof these two worlds is under discussion, that there is still much\nhelpless groping to explain the connection between the world of thought,\nof knowledge or science, which is in this case represented by\nundulations of the ether, and between the world of our five senses,\nrepresented by the bright and colored lights of the eyes or of reality.\nAt the same time this illustration shows how queer the traditional\nsurvivals of speculative philosophy sound in the mouth of a modern\nscientist. The confused condition of this mode of thought is seen in the\ndistinction between \"an external sense-perceived world of science\" and\nanother one, \"in which we find ourselves with our minds.\" The\ndistinction between the senses and the mind, between theory and\npractice, between the special and the general, between truth and error,\nhas been noticed by such thinkers, but they have no solution for it.\nThey know there is something missing, but they do not know where to look\nfor it, and therefore they are confused.\n\nThe great scientific achievement of the XIXth century consists in the\nvictory over speculation, over knowledge without sense perception, in\nthe delivery of the senses from the thraldom of such knowledge, and in\nthe foundation of empirical investigation. To acknowledge the\ntheoretical value of this achievement means to come to an understanding\nabout the source of error. Contrary to a philosophy that tries to\ndiscover truth with the mind, and error with the senses, we seek for\ntruth with the senses and regard the mind as the source of errors. The\nbelief in certain messages of the nerves which are alone worthy of\nconfidence and which can be understood only by degrees without any\nspecific mark of distinction, is a superstition. Let us have confidence\nin all testimonials of the senses. There is nothing false to be\nseparated from the genuine. The supernatural mind idea is the only\ndeceiver whenever it undertakes to disregard the sense perceptions, and,\ninstead of being the interpreter of the senses, tries to enlarge their\nstatements and repeat what has not been dictated. The eye, in seeing\nforked lightning or radiant circles when the blood is excited or a\npressure exerted on it, perceives no more errors than it does in\nperceiving any other manifestation of the external world. It is our\nfaculty of thought which makes a mistake, by regarding without further\ninquiry such subjective events as objective bodies. One who sees ghosts\ndoes not commit any mistake, until he claims that his personal\napparition is a general phenomenon, until he prematurely takes something\nfor an experience which he has not experienced. Error is an offense\nagainst the law of truth which prescribes to our consciousness that it\nmust remember the limits within which a perception is true, or general.\nError makes out of something special a generality, out of a predicate a\nsubject, and takes the part for the whole. Error makes _a priori_\nconclusions, while truth, its opposite, arrives at understanding by _a\nposteriori_ reasoning.\n\n_A priori_ and _a posteriori_ understanding are related in the same way\nas philosophy and natural science, taking the latter in the widest\nmeaning of the term, that of science in general. The contrast between\nbelieving and knowing is duplicated in that between philosophy and\nnatural science. Speculative philosophy, like religion, lives on faith.\nThe modern world has transformed faith into science. The reactionists in\npolitics who demand that science retrace its steps desire its return to\nfaith. The content of faith is acquired without exertion. Faith makes _a\npriori_ perceptions, while science arrives at its knowledge by hard _a\nposteriori_ study. To give up faith means to give up taking things easy.\nAnd to confine science to _a posteriori_ knowledge means to decorate it\nwith the characteristic mark of modern times, work.\n\nIt is not a result of scientific study, but merely a freak of\nphilosophy on the part of Schleiden to deny the reality and truth of\nlight phenomena, to call them fantasmagoria created by the free play of\nthe mind. His superstitious belief in philosophical speculation misleads\nhim into abandoning the scientific method of induction and speaking of\n\"waves rushing through ether in restless succession at the rate of\n160,000 miles per hour\" as being the real and true nature of light and\ncolor, in contradistinction to the color phenomena of light. The\nperversion of this mode of procedure becomes evident by his referring to\nthe material world of the eyes as a \"creation of the mind\" and to the\nundulations of the ether, revealed by the \"sharp intellect of the\ngreatest thinkers\" as \"physical nature.\"\n\nThe truth of science maintains the same relation to the sense perception\nthat the general does to the special. Waves of light, the so-called\ntruth of light and color, represent the \"true\" nature of light only in\nso far as they represent what is common to all light phenomena, whether\nthey are white, yellow, blue, or any other color. The world of the mind,\nor of science finds its raw material, its premise, its proof, its\nbeginning, and its boundary in sense perception.\n\nWhen we have learned that the nature, or the truth, of things is not\nback of their phenomena, but can be perceived only by the help of\nphenomena, and that it does not exist \"in itself,\" but only in\nconnection with the faculty of understanding, that the nature is\nseparated from the phenomena only by thought; and when we see on the\nother hand, that the faculty of understanding does not derive\nconceptions out of itself, but only out of their relations with some\nphenomenon; then this discussion of the \"nature of things\" is an\nevidence that the nature of the faculty of thought is a conception which\nwe have obtained from its sense manifestations. To understand that the\nfaculty of thought, although universal in the choice of its objects, is\nnevertheless limited in that it requires some object; to recognize that\nthe true thought process, that is to say the thought with a scientific\nresult, differs from unscientific thinking by consciously attaching\nitself to some external object; to realize that truth, or universality,\nis not perceived \"in itself,\" but can be perceived only by means of some\ngiven object; this frequently varied statement reveals the nature of the\nfaculty of thought. This statement re-appears at the end of every\nchapter, because all special truths, all special chapters, serve only to\ndemonstrate the general chapter of universal truth.\n\nFOOTNOTE:\n\n[1] E. g., this all-embracing physics.--EDITOR.\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\nTHE PRACTICE OF REASON IN PHYSICAL SCIENCE\n\n\nAlthough we know that reason is attached to perceptible matter, to\nphysical objects, so that science can never be anything else but the\nscience of the physical, still we may, according to the prevailing ideas\nand usage of language, separate physics from logic and ethics, and thus\ndistinguish them as different forms of science. The problem is then to\ndemonstrate that in physics as well as in logic, as also in ethics, the\ngeneral or intellectual perceptions can be practically obtained only on\nthe basis of concrete perceptible facts.\n\nThis practice of reason, to generate thought from matter, to arrive at\nunderstanding by sense perceptions, to produce the general out of the\nconcrete, has been universally accepted in physical investigation, but\nonly in practice. The inductive method is employed, and one is aware of\nthis fact, but it is not understood that the nature of inductive science\nis the nature of science in general, of reason. The process of thought\nis misunderstood. Physical science lacks the theory of understanding and\nfor this reason often falls out of its practical step. The faculty of\nthought is still an unknown, mysterious, mystical being for natural\nscience. Either it confounds the function with the organ, the mind with\nthe brain, as do the materialists, or it thinks with the idealists that\nthe faculty of thought is an imperceptible object outside of its field.\nWe see modern investigators marching toward their goal with firm and\nuniform steps, so far as physical matters are concerned. But they\naimlessly grope around in the abstract relations of these things. The\ninductive method has been practically adopted by natural science and its\nsuccesses have secured a great reputation for it. On the other hand, the\nspeculative method has become discredited by its failures. There is,\nhowever, no conscious understanding of these various methods of thought.\nWe see the men of physical research, when they are outside of their\nspecial field, offer lawyer-like speculations in lieu of scientific\nfacts. While they arrive at the special truths of their chosen fields by\nsense perceptions, they still pretend to derive speculative truths out\nof the depths of their own minds.\n\nListen to the following statements of Alexander von Humboldt, which he\nmakes in the initial argument of his \"Cosmos\" in regard to speculation:\n\"The most important result of physical research by sense perception is\nthis: that it finds the element of unity in a multitude of forms; that\nit grasps all the individual manifestations offered by the discoveries\nof recent times, carefully scrutinizes and distinguishes them; yet does\nnot succumb under their mass; that it fulfills the sublime mission of\nthe human being, of understanding the nature of things which is hidden\nunder the cover of phenomena. In this way our aim reaches beyond the\nnarrow limits of the senses, and we may succeed in grasping the nature\nby controlling the raw material of empirical observation through ideas.\nIn my observations of the scientific treatment of general cosmic\nphenomena, I am not deriving unity out of a few fundamental principles\nfound by speculative reason. My work is the expression of a thoughtful\nobservation of empirical phenomena seen as one and the same nature. I am\nnot going to venture into a field which is foreign to me. What I call\nphysical cosmology does not, therefore, aspire to the rank of a rational\nscience of nature.... True to the character of my former occupation and\nwritings, which were devoted to experiments, measurements, and\ninvestigations of facts, I confine myself in this work to empirical\nobservations. It is the only ground on which I can move with a measure\nof security.\" In the same breath Humboldt says that \"without the earnest\ndesire for the knowledge of concrete facts any great and universal world\nphilosophy would be merely a castle in the air\" and in another place\nthat \"an understanding of the universe by speculative and introspective\nreason would represent a still more sublime aim\" than understanding by\nempirical thought. And on page 68 of volume I. he says: \"I am far from\nfinding fault with endeavors of others the success of which still\nremains in doubt, when I have had no practical experience with them.\"\n\nNow natural science shares with Humboldt the consciousness that the\npractice of reason in physical research consists exclusively in\n\"perceiving the element of unity in a multitude of forms.\" But on the\nother hand, though it does not always admit its belief in speculative\nintrospection as frankly as Humboldt does, it nevertheless proves that\nit does not fully understand the practice of science and that it\nbelieves in a metaphysical as well as a physical science by using the\nspeculative method in the treatment of so-called philosophical topics,\nin which the element of unity is supposed to be discovered by\nintrospective reason instead of an analysis of multiform sense\nperceptions, and it demonstrates its lack of unity by being unaware of\nthe unscientific character of disagreements, by believing in a\nmetaphysical science outside of the physical domain. The relations\nbetween phenomenon and its nature, cause and effect, matter and force,\nsubstance and spirit, are certainly physical ones. But what is there of\nunity that science teaches about them? Plainly then, the work of\nscience, like that of the farmer, has so far been done only practically,\nbut not scientifically, not with a predetermination of success.\nUnderstanding, that is to say the practice of understanding, is well\napplied in science, I readily admit. But the instrument of this\nunderstanding, the faculty of thought, is misunderstood. We find that\nnatural science, instead of applying this faculty scientifically, simply\nexperiments with it. What is the reason for this? Natural science has\nneglected the critique of reason, the theory of science, logic.\n\nJust as the handle and the blade of a knife constitute its general\ncontent, so we found that the general content of reason was the\nuniversal, the general \"itself.\" We know that it does not produce this\ncontent out of itself, but out of given objects, and these objects are\nthe sum of all natural or physical things. The object of reason is,\ntherefore, an infinite, unlimited, absolute quantity. This infinite\nquantity manifests itself in finite quantities. In the treatment of\nrelatively small quantities of nature the true essence of reason, the\ntrue method of understanding, is well recognized. It remains to be\ndemonstrated that the great relations of the world, the treatment of\nwhich is still doubtful, are likewise intelligible by the same method.\nCause and effect, mind and matter, matter and force, are such great\nworld problems, and they are of a physical character. We shall\ndemonstrate that the most general distinction between reason and its\nobject furnishes the key to the solution of the great world problems.\n\n\n+(a) Cause and Effect.+\n\n\"The nature of natural history,\" says F. W. Bessell, \"lies in the fact\nthat it does not consider phenomena as facts in themselves, but looks\nfor their causes. The knowledge of nature is thus reduced to the minimum\nnumber of facts.\" But the causes of the phenomena of nature had been\ninvestigated even before the age of natural history. The characteristic\nmark of natural history is not so much that it investigates causes, but\nthat the causes which it investigates have a peculiar nature and a\nparticular quality.\n\nInductive science has materially changed the conception of causes. It\nhas retained the term, but uses it in a different sense from that\nemployed by speculation. The naturalist conceives of causes differently\nwithin his special field and outside of it; here, outside of his\nspecialty, he frequently indulges in introspective speculation, because\nhe understands science and its cause in a concrete, but not in a general\nway. The unscientific forces are of a supernatural make-up, they are\ntranscendental spirits, gods, forces, little and big goblins. The\noriginal conception of causes is an anthropomorphic one. In a state of\ninexperience, man measures the objective by a subjective standard,\njudges the world by himself. Just as he creates things with conscious\nintent, so he attributes to nature his human manner, imagines the\nexistence of an external and creative cause of the phenomena of sense\nperception, similar to himself who is the special cause of his own\ncreations. This subjective mood is to blame for the fact that the\nstruggle for objective understanding has so long been in vain. The\nunscientifically conceived cause is a speculation of the _a priori_\nkind.\n\nIf the term understanding is retained for subjective understanding, then\nobjective science differs from it in that such a science penetrates to\nthe causes of its objects not by faith or introspective speculation, but\nby experience and induction, not _a priori_, but _a posteriori_. Natural\nscience looks for causes not outside or back of nature's phenomena, but\nwithin or by means of them. Modern research seeks no external creator of\ncauses, but rather the immanent system, the method or general mode of\nthe various phenomena as they are given by succession in time. The\nunscientifically conceived cause is a \"thing in itself,\" a little god\nwho generates his effects independently and hides behind them. The\nscientific conception of causes, on the other hand, looks only for the\ntheory of effects, the general element of phenomena. To investigate a\ncause means then to generalize a variety of phenomena, to arrange the\nmultiplicity of experienced facts under one scientific rule. \"The\nknowledge of nature is thus reduced to the minimum number of facts.\"\n\nThe commonplace and inept knowledge differs from the most exalted,\nrarest, and newly discovered science in the same way in which a petty\nand childish superstition differs from the historical superstition of a\nwhole period. For this reason we may well choose our illustrations from\nour daily circle, instead of looking for them in the so-called higher\nregions of a remote science. Human common sense had long practiced the\ninvestigation of causes by inductive and scientific methods, before\nscience realized that it would have to pursue its higher aims in the\nsame way. Common sense does arrive at the faith in a mysterious cause of\nspeculative reason, just like the naturalist, as soon as it leaves the\nfield of its immediate environment. In order to stand firmly on the\nground of real science, every one requires the understanding of the\nmanner in which inductive reason investigates its causes.\n\nTo this end let us glance briefly at the outcome of the study of the\nnature of reason. We know that the faculty of understanding is not a\n\"thing in and by itself,\" because it becomes real only in contact with\nsome object. But whatever we know of any object, is known not alone\nthrough the object, but also through the faculty of reason.\nConsciousness, like all other being, is relative. Understanding is\ncontact with a variety of objects. To knowledge there is attached\ndistinction, subject and object, variety in unity. Thus things become\nmutual causes and mutual effects. The entire world of phenomena, of\nwhich thought is but a part, a form, is an absolute circle, in which the\nbeginning and end is everywhere and nowhere, in which everything is at\nthe same time essence and semblance, cause and effect, general and\nconcrete. Just as all nature is in the last instance one sole general\nunity, in view of which all other unities become a multitude, so this\nsame nature, or objectivity, or world of sense perceptions, or whatever\nelse we may call the sum of all phenomena or effects, is the final cause\nof all things, compared to which all other causes become effects. But we\nmust remember that this cause of all causes is only the sum of all\neffects, not a transcendental or superior being. Every cause has its\neffect, every effect causes something.\n\nA cause cannot be physically separated from its effect any more than the\nvisible can be separated from the eye, the taste from the tongue, in\nbrief the general from the concrete. Nevertheless, the faculty of\nthought may separate the one from the other. We must keep in mind that\nthis separation is a mere formality of thought, although it is a\nformality which is necessary in order to be reasonable or conscious, in\norder to act scientifically. The practice of understanding, or\nscientific practice, derives the concrete from the general, the natural\nthings from nature. But whoever has been behind the scenes, and has\nlooked at the faculty of thought at work, knows that, conversely the\ngeneral is derived from the concrete, the concept of nature from natural\nthings. The theory of understanding or science teaches us that the\nantecedent is understood by its consequent, the cause by its effect,\nwhile our practical understanding regards the after as a consequence of\nthe before, the effect as a result of the cause. The faculty of\nunderstanding, the organ of generalization, regards its opposite, the\nconcrete, as secondary, while the faculty of thought which understands\nitself regards it as primary. However, the practice of understanding is\nnot to be changed by its theory, nor can it be; the theory intends\nsimply to render the steps of consciousness firm. The scientific farmer\ndiffers from the practical farmer, not because he employs theory and\nmethod, for both do that, but because he understands the theory, while\nthe practical man theorizes instinctively.\n\nTo continue: From a given multitude of facts, reason generates truth in\ngeneral, and out of a succession of forms and transformations it\nabstracts the true cause, just as absolute multiplicity is the nature of\nspace, so absolute variability is the nature of time. Every particle of\ntime and space is new, original, and has never been there before. The\nfaculty of thought enables us to find our way through this absolute\nmedley by abstracting general concepts out of the multitude of things in\nspace, and tracing the variations of time to general causes. The entire\nnature of reason consists in generalizing sense perceptions, in\nabstracting the common elements out of concrete things. Whoever does not\nfully understand reason by understanding that it is the organ of\ngeneralization forgets that understanding requires an object which must\nremain something outside of its conception, since such object cannot be\ndissolved by its conception. The being of the reasoning faculty cannot\nbe understood any more than being in general. Or rather, being is\nunderstood when we take it in its generality. Not being itself, but the\ngeneral element of being, is understood by the faculty of thought.\n\nLet us realize, for instance, the process which takes place when reason\nunderstands something it did not know before. Think of some peculiar,\nunexpected and unknown chemical transformation which takes place\nsuddenly and without apparent cause in some mixture. Assume furthermore\nthat the same reaction takes place more frequently after that, until\nexperience demonstrates that this inexplicable change occurs whenever\nsunlight touches the mixture. This already constitutes a certain\nunderstanding of the process. Assume furthermore that subsequent\nexperience teaches us that several other substances have the faculty of\nproducing the same reaction in connection with sunlight. We have then\narranged the new reaction in line with a number of phenomena of the same\nclass, that is to say we have enlarged, deepened, completed our\nunderstanding of it still more. And if we finally discover that a\nspecial part of the sunlight unites with a special element of the\nmixture and thereby produces this new reaction, we have generalized this\nexperience, or experienced this generalization, in a \"pure\" state, in\nother words, the theory of this reaction is complete, reason has solved\nits problem, and yet it has done nothing more than it did when it\nclassified the animal and vegetable kingdoms in families, genera,\nspecies, etc. To find the species, the genus, the sex, etc., of anything\nmeans to understand it.\n\nReason proceeds in the same way when it investigates the causes of\ncertain transformations. Causes are, in the last instance, not noticed\nand furnished by means of sight, hearing, feeling, not by means of the\nsense perceptions. They are rather supplied by the faculty of thought.\nIt is true, causes are not the \"pure\" products of the faculty of\nthought, but are produced by it in connection with sense perceptions and\ntheir material objects. This raw material gives the objective existence\nto the causes produced by the mind. Just as we demand that a truth\nshould be the truth about some objective phenomenon, so we also demand\nthat a cause should be real, that it should be the cause of some\nobjective effect.\n\nThe understanding of any concrete cause is conditioned on the empirical\nstudy of its material, while the understanding of any general cause is\nbased on the study of the faculty of reason. In the understanding of\nconcrete causes, the material of study varies, but reason maintains a\nconstant or general attitude. The cause, as a general cause, is a pure\nconception, and it is based on the study of the multiformity of concrete\nunderstandings of causes, or on the multiplied study of concrete causes.\nHence we are compelled to return to the concrete material of the general\nconcept, to the understanding of concrete causes, if we wish to analyze\nthe concept of a general cause.\n\nWhen a stone falls into the water and causes ripples on the surface, the\nstone is no more the cause of the ripples than the liquid condition of\nthe water. If the stone falls on solid substances, it causes no ripples.\nIt is the contact of the falling stone with liquid substances which\ncauses the ripples. The cause is itself an effect, and the effect, the\nripples, become a cause when they carry a piece of cork ashore. But in\neither case the cause is based on a mutual effect, on the interaction of\nthe waves with the light condition of the cork.\n\nA stone falling into the water is not a cause \"in itself,\" not a cause\nin general. We arrive at such a cause only, when the faculty of thought\nuses concrete causes for its raw material and constructs out of them\nthe \"pure\" concept of the cause in general. A stone falling into the\nwater is only the cause of the subsequent ripples, and it becomes a\ngeneral cause only through the experience that ripples always follow the\nfalling of a stone into water.\n\nWe call cause that which generally precedes a certain manifestation, and\neffect that which generally follows it. We refer to the stone as the\ncause of ripples merely because we know that it always causes them when\nfalling into water. But since ripples sometimes appear without being\npreceded by the fall of a stone, ripples have another general cause. So\nfar as there is anything general in ripples which precedes them, it is\nthe elasticity of the water itself which is the general cause of\nripples. Circular ripples, which are a special form of ripples, are\ngenerally preceded by the falling of some body into the water, and this\nbody is then considered as their cause. The cause is always different in\nproportion and to the extent of the phenomena under consideration.\n\nWe cannot ascertain causes by mere introspective reasoning, we cannot\nderive them out of our head. Matter, materials, sense perceptions are\nrequired for this purpose. A definite cause requires a definite\nmaterial, a definite amount of sense perceptions. In the abstract unity\nof nature, the variations of matter are represented by the variations of\nconcrete quantities. Every quantity is given in time before and after a\ncertain other quantity, as antecedent and subsequent. The general\nelement of the antecedent is called cause, the general element of the\nsubsequent, effect.\n\nWhen the wind sways a forest, the yielding character of the forest is as\nmuch instrumental in producing this effect as the bending power of the\nwind. The cause of a thing is its connection with other things. The fact\nthat the same wind leaves rocks and walls standing shows that the cause\nis not qualitatively different from the effect, but that it is a matter\nof aggregate effects. If nevertheless science or knowledge determines\nany special fact to be the cause of any change, that is to say of any\nsuccession of phenomena, this cause is no longer regarded as the\nexternal creator, but merely as the general mode, the immanent method of\nsuccession. A definite cause can be ascertained only when we have under\nconsideration a definite circle, series, or number of changes, the cause\nof which is to be determined. And within a definite circle of succeeding\nphenomena, that which generally precedes is their cause.\n\nThe wind which sways a forest differs from wind as a general cause only\nin that the latter has other general effects, inasmuch as it howls in\none place, stirs up dust in another, or acts in many different ways. In\nthe special case of the forest, the wind is a cause only in so far as it\nprecedes the swaying of the trees. But in the case of rocks and walls,\nthe solidity precedes the wind and is therefore the general cause of\ntheir resistance to the swaying power of the wind. In a still wider\ncircle of hurricane phenomena, a gentle wind may be regarded as a cause\nof the stability of the objects last mentioned.\n\nThe _quantity_ or _number_ of given objects varies the name of their\ncause. If a certain company of people return from a walk in a tired\ncondition, this change of condition is just as much due to the physical\nweakness of the people as to the walk. In other words, a manifestation\nhas in itself no cause which can be separated from it. Everything which\nwas connected with a phenomenon has contributed toward its appearance.\nIn the case of the promenaders, the physical constitution of their\nbodies has to be considered as well as the physical constitution and\nlength of the road and duration of the walk. If reason is nevertheless\ncalled upon to determine the special cause of some concrete change, for\ninstance, of a tired feeling, it is simply a question of determining\nwhich one of the various factors has contributed most to that feeling.\nIn this case as well as in all others, the work of reason consists in\ndeveloping the general from the concrete, that is to say in this case,\nsingling out from a given number of tired sensations that which\ngenerally precedes the tired feeling. If most of the promenaders or all\nof them are found to be tired, the walk will be considered as the cause.\nBut if only a few are tired, the weak constitution of these people will\nbe considered as the general cause of their tired condition.\n\nTo use another illustration: If the discharge of a shot frightens some\nbirds, this effect is due to the combined action of the shot and the\ntimidity of the birds. If the majority of the birds fly away, the shot\nwill be considered as the cause. But if the minority fly away, their\ntimidity will be regarded as the cause.\n\nEffects are subsequences. Since all things in nature follow other things\nand all things have an antecedent and a subsequent, we may call the\nnatural, the real, the sense perceptions absolute effects, having no\ncause unless we find one with our faculty of thought by systematizing\nthe given material. Causes are mental generalizations of perceptible\nchanges. The supposed relation of cause and effect is a miracle, a\ncreation of something out of nothing. For this reason this relation has\nbeen and still is an object of speculative reasoning. The speculative\ncause creates its effects. But in reality the effects are the material\nout of which the brain, or science, forms its causes. The cause concept\nis a product of reason; not of \"pure\" reason, but of reason married to\nthe world of sense perceptions.\n\nIf Kant maintains that the statement: \"Every change has its cause\" is an\n_a priori truth_ which we cannot experience because no one can possibly\nexperience all changes, although every one has the irrefutable feeling\nof the correctness of this statement, we know now that this statement\nexpresses merely the experience that the phenomenon which we call reason\nrecognizes the uniform element in all multiformity. Or in other words,\nwe now know that the development of the general element out of the\nconcrete facts is called reason, thought, or mind. The secure knowledge\nthat every change has its cause is nothing else but the conviction that\nwe are thinking human beings. _Cogito, ergo sum._ I think, therefore I\nam. We have experienced the nature of our reason instinctively even if\nwe have not analyzed it scientifically. We are as well aware of the\nfaculty of our reason to abstract a cause out of every given change, as\nwe are that every circle is round, that a is equal to a. We know that\nthe general is the product of reason, and reason produces this general\nthing in contact with every given object. And since all objects before\nand after a certain other object are temporal changes, it follows that\nall changes which we as thinking beings experience must have a general\nantecedent, a cause.\n\nAlready the English sceptic Hume felt that true causes are different\nfrom assumed causes. According to him the concept of a cause contains\nnothing but the experience of that which generally precedes a certain\nphenomenon. Kant rightfully remarks on the other hand that the\nconception of cause and effect expresses a far more intimate relation\nthan that indicated by a loose and accidental succession, and that the\nconcept of a cause rather comprises that of a certain effect as a\nnecessity and strict general result. Therefore he claimed that there\nmust be something _a priori_ in reason which cannot be experienced and\nwhich extends beyond experience.\n\nWe reply to the materialists who deny all autonomy of the mind and hope\nto detect causes by experience alone that the general necessity which\npresupposes the relation of cause and effect represents an impossible\nexperience. And we reply to the idealists: Although reason explores\ncauses which cannot be experienced, this research cannot take place _a\npriori_, but only _a posteriori_, only on the basis of empirically given\neffects. It is true that the mind alone discovers the imperceptible and\nabstract generality, but it does so only within the circle of certain\ngiven sense perceptions.\n\n\n+(b) Matter and Mind.+\n\nThe understanding of the general dependence of the faculty of thought on\nmaterial sense perceptions will restore to objective reality that right\nwhich has long been denied to it by ideas and opinions. Nature with its\nvaried concrete phenomena which had been crowded out of human\nconsiderations by philosophical and religious imaginings, and which has\nbeen scientifically re-established again on special fields by the\ndevelopment of natural sciences, gains general theoretical recognition\nby the understanding of the functions of the brain. Hitherto natural\nscience has chosen for its object only special matters, special causes,\nspecial forces, but has remained ignorant in general questions of\nso-called natural philosophy regarding the cause of all things, of\nmatter, of force in general. The actual existence of this ignorance is\nrevealed by that great contradiction between idealism and materialism\nwhich pervades all works of science like a red thread.\n\n\"May I succeed in this letter in strengthening the conviction that\nchemistry as an independent science represents one of the most powerful\nmeans for the higher cultivation of the mind, that its study is useful\nnot alone for the promotion of the material interests of mankind, but\nbecause it permits a deeper penetration of the wonders of creation, with\nwhich our existence, our welfare, and our development are intimately\nconnected.\"\n\nIn these words Liebig expresses the prevalent views which have\naccustomed themselves to look upon material and spiritual differences as\nabsolute opposites. But the untenability of such a distinction is\nvaguely felt even by the just quoted advocate of this view, who speaks\nof material interests and of a mental penetration which is the condition\nfor our existence, welfare, and development. But what else does the term\nmaterial interests mean but the abstract expression of our existence,\nwelfare, and development? Are not these the concrete content of our\nmaterial interests? Does he not say explicitly that the penetration of\nthe wonders of creation promotes our material interests? And on the\nother hand, does not the promotion of our material interests require a\npenetration on our part of the wonders of creation? In what respect are\nour material interests different from our mental penetration of things?\n\nThe superior, spiritual, ideal, which Liebig in conformity with the\nviews of the world of naturalists opposes to our material interests, is\nonly a special part of those interests. Mental penetration and material\ninterests differ no more than the circle differs from the square.\nCircles and squares are contrasts, but at the same time they are but\ndifferent and special classes of form in general.\n\nIt has been the custom, especially since the advent of Christian times,\nto speak contemptuously of material, perceptible, fleshly things which\nare destroyed by rust and moths. And nowadays people continue on this\nconservative track, although their antipathy against perceptible reality\nhas long disappeared from their minds and actions. The Christian\nseparation of mind and body has been practically abandoned in the age of\nnatural science. But the theoretical solution of the contradiction, the\ndemonstration that the spiritual is material and the material at the\nsame time spiritual, by which the material interests would be freed from\nthe stigma of inferiority, has not yet been forthcoming.\n\nModern science is natural science. Science is deemed worthy of its name\nonly in so far as it is natural science. In other words, only that\nthought is scientific which consciously has real, perceptible, natural\nthings for its object. For this reason representatives and friends of\nscience can not be enemies of nature or of matter. Indeed they are not.\nBut the very existence of science shows that this nature, this world of\nsense perceptions, this matter or substance, does alone and by itself\nnot satisfy us. Science, or thought, which has material practice or\nbeing for its object, does not strive to reproduce nature in its\nintegrity, in its entire perceptible substance, for these are already\npresent. If science were to aim at nothing new, it would be superfluous.\nIt is entitled to special recognition only to the extent that it carries\na new element into matter. Science is not so much concerned in the\nmaterial of its study as in understanding. Of course it is the\nunderstanding of this material which is desired, the understanding of\nits general character, of the fixed pole in the succession of phenomena.\nThat which religion supernaturally separates from the material, which\nscience opposes to the material as something higher, diviner, more\nspiritual, is in reality nothing but the faculty of rising above\nmultiformity, of proceeding from the concrete to the general.\n\nThe nobler spiritual interests are not absolutely different from the\nmaterial interests, they are not qualitatively different. The positive\nside of modern idealism does not consist in belittling eating and\ndrinking, the pleasure in earthly possessions and in intercourse with\nthe other sex, but rather in pleading for the recognition of other\nmaterial enjoyments besides these, as for instance those of the eye, the\near, of art and science, in short of the whole man. You shall not\nindulge in the material revelries of passion, that is to say you shall\nnot direct your thought one-sidedly to any concrete lust, but rather\nconsider your entire development, take into account the total general\nextension of your existence. The bare materialist principle is\ninadequate in that it does not appreciate the difference between the\nconcrete and the general, because it makes the individual synonymous\nwith the general. It refuses to recognize the quantitative superiority\nof the mind over the world of sense perceptions. Idealism, on the other\nhand, forgets the qualitative unity in the quantitative difference. It\nis transcendental and makes an absolute difference out of the relative\none. The contradiction between these two camps is due to the\nmisunderstood relation of our reason to its given object or material.\nThe idealist regards reason alone as the source of all understanding,\nwhile the materialist looks upon the world of sense perceptions in the\nsame way. Nothing is required for a solution of this contradiction but\nthe comprehension of the relative interdependence of these two sources\nof understanding. Idealism sees only the difference, materialism sees\nonly the uniformity of matter and mind, content and form, force and\nsubstance, sense perception and moral interpretation. But all these\ndistinctions belong to the one common genus which constitutes the\ndistinction between the special and the general.\n\nConsistent materialists act like purely practical men without any\nscience. But, since knowing and thinking are real attributes of man\nregardless of his party affiliation, purely practical men do not exist\nin reality. Even the merest attempt at practical experiment on the basis\nof experienced facts differs only in degree from scientific practice\nbased on theoretical principles. On the other hand, consistent\nidealists are just as impossible as purely practical men. They would\nlike to have the general without the special, the spirit without matter,\nforce without substance, science without experience or material, the\nabsolute without the relative. How can thinkers who search for truth,\nbeing, relative causes, such as naturalists, be idealists? They are so\nonly outside of their specialties, never inside of them. The modern\nmind, the mind of natural science, is immaterial only so far as it\nembraces all matters. But men like the astronomer Madler find so little\nof the ridiculous in the current expectation of the materially increased\nspiritual power after our \"emancipation from the bonds of matter,\" that\nhe has nothing better to substitute for it and flatters himself with\nhaving defined the \"bonds of matter\" as material attraction. Truly, so\nlong as mind is still conceived in the form of a religious ghost, the\nexpectation of an increased mental power after the emancipation from the\nbonds of matter is not so much an object for ridicule as for compassion.\nBut if we regard mind as the expression of modern science, we offer the\nbetter scientific explanation for the traditional faith. By bonds of\nmatter we do not mean, in that case, the bond of gravitation, but the\nmultiplicity of sense perceptions. And matter holds the mind in bondage\nonly so long as the faculty of thought has not overcome the multiplicity\nof things. The emancipation of the mind from the bonds of matter\nconsists in developing the general element out of the concrete\nmultiplicity.\n\n\n+(c) Force and Matter.+\n\nThe reader who has closely followed our main idea, which will be\nfurther illustrated, will anticipate that the question of matter and\nforce finds its solution in the understanding of the relation between\nthe general and the special. What is the relation of the concrete to the\nabstract? This is the common problem of those who see the active impulse\nof the world either in the spiritual force or in the material substance,\nwho think to find the nature of things, the _non plus ultra_ of science,\nin either of these facts.\n\nLiebig, who is especially fond of straying from his inductive science\ninto the field of speculative thought, says in an idealist sense: \"Force\ncannot be seen, we cannot grasp it with our hands; in order to\nunderstand its nature and peculiarities, we must investigate its\neffects.\" And if a materialist replies to him: \"Matter is force, force\nis matter, no matter without force, no force without matter,\" it is\nplain that either has determined this relation only negatively. In\ncertain shows, the clown is asked by the manager: \"Clown, where have you\nbeen?\" \"With the others,\" answers the clown. \"And where were the\nothers?\"--\"With me.\"\n\nIn this case we have two answers with the same content, in the other we\nhave two camps which quarrel with different words about an indisputable\nfact. And this dispute is so much more ridiculous because it is taken so\nseriously. If the idealist makes a distinction between matter and force,\nhe does not mean to deny that the real phenomenon of force is\ninseparably linked with matter. And if the materialist claims that there\nis no matter without force and no force without matter, he does not mean\nto deny that matter and force are different, as his opponent claims.\n\nThe dispute exists for a good reason and has its object, but this\nobject is not revealed in the dispute. It is instinctively kept under\ncover by both parties, so that they may not be in a position where they\nwould have to acknowledge their own ignorance. Each wants to prove to\nthe other that the other's explanations are inadequate, and both\ndemonstrate this sufficiently. B\u00fcchner admits in the closing statements\nof his \"Matter and Force\" that the empirical material is insufficient to\npermit of definite answers to transcendental questions, and that\ntherefore no positive answer can be given to them. And he furthermore\nsays that the empirical material \"is fully sufficient to answer them\nnegatively and to do away with hypothesis.\" This is saying in so many\nwords that the science of the materialist is adequate for the proof that\nhis opponent knows nothing.\n\nThe spiritualist or idealist believes in a spiritual, which means in a\nghostlike and inexplicable, nature of force. The materialist thinkers,\non the other hand, are skeptical. A scientific proof of faith or of\nskepticism does not exist. The materialist has only this advantage over\nhis idealist opponent, that he looks for the transcendental, the nature,\nthe cause, the force, not back of the phenomenon, not outside of matter.\nBut he remains behind the idealist when he ignores the difference\nbetween matter and force. The materialist dwells on the actual\ninseparability of matter and force and does not admit any other reason\nfor a distinction between the two than \"an external reason derived from\nthe demand of our mind for systematization.\" B\u00fcchner says in \"Nature and\nMind,\" page 66: \"Force and matter, separated from one another, are for\nme nothing but thoughts, fantasies, ideas without any substance,\nhypotheses which do not exist for any healthy study of nature, because\nall phenomena of nature are rendered obscure and unintelligible by such\na separation.\" But if B\u00fcchner deals with any special department of\nnatural science in a productive way, instead of handling phrases of\nnatural philosophy, his own practice will show him that the separation\nof forces from matter is not an \"external,\" but an internal, an imminent\nnecessity, by which alone we are enabled to elucidate and understand the\nphenomena of nature. Although the author of \"Force and Matter\" chose for\nhis motto: \"Now, what I want is--facts,\" we assure the reader that this\ndevice is more a thoughtless word than a serious opinion. Materialism is\nnot so coarse-grained that it wants purely facts. Those facts which\nB\u00fcchner is looking for are by themselves not specifics for his desires.\nThe idealist likewise wants such facts. No student of nature wants mere\nhypotheses. What all cultivators of the field of science want is not so\nmuch facts as explanations or an understanding of facts. Even the\nmaterialist will not deny that science, the \"natural philosophy\" of\nB\u00fcchner not excepted, is more concerned with mental forces than with\nbodily matter, that it cares more for force than for matter. The\nseparation of force and matter is derived from \"the demand of our mind\nfor systematization.\" Very true! But so does all science emanate from\nthe demand of our reason for systematization.\n\nThe contradistinction between force and matter is as old as that between\nidealism and materialism. The first conciliation between the two was\nattempted by imagination which, through the belief in spirits,\nsuggested a secret nature as the cause of all natural phenomena. Science\nhas of late expelled many of these special spirits by replacing the\nfantastic demons with scientific, or general, explanations. And after we\nhave succeeded in explaining the demon of \"pure\" reason, it is not\ndifficult to expel the special spirit of force by the general\nexplanation of its nature and thus to reconcile scientifically the\ncontradiction between spiritualism and materialism.\n\nIn the universe which constitutes the object of science and of the\nfaculty of reason, both force and matter are unseparated. In the world\nof sense perceptions force is matter and matter is force. \"Force cannot\nbe seen.\" Oh, yes! Seeing itself is pure force. Seeing is as much an\neffect of its object as an effect of the eye, and this double effect and\nother effects are forces. We do not see the things themselves, but their\neffects on our eyes. We see their forces. And force cannot alone be\nseen, it can also be heard, smelled, tasted, felt. Who will deny that he\ncan feel the force of heat, of cold, of gravitation? We have already\nquoted the words of Professor Koppe to the effect that we \"cannot\nperceive heat itself, we merely conclude from its effects that this\nforce exists in nature.\" This is saying in other words that we do not\nsee, hear, or feel the things themselves, but their effects or forces.\n\nIt is just as true to say that we feel matter and not its force as it is\nto say that we feel force and not matter. Indeed, both are inseparable\nfrom the object, as we have already remarked. But by means of the\nfaculty of thought we separate from the simultaneously and successively\noccurring phenomena the general and the concrete. For instance, we\nabstract the general concept of sight from the various phenomena of our\nsight and distinguish it by the name of power of vision from the\nconcrete objects, or substances, of our eyes. From a multitude of sense\nperceptions we develop by means of reason the general element. The\ngeneral element of different water phenomena, for instance, is the water\npower distinguished from the substance of the water. If levers of\ndifferent materials but of the same length have the same power, it is\nplain that in this case force is different from matter only in so far as\nit represents the general element of various substances. A horse does\nnot pull without force, and this force does not pull without the horse.\nIndeed, in practice the horse is force and force is the horse. But\nnevertheless we may distinguish the power of pulling from other\nqualities of the horse, or we may refer to the common element in\ndifferent services of horses as general horse power, without thereby\nstarting from any other hypothesis than we do in distinguishing the sun\nfrom the earth. For in reality the sun does not exist without the earth,\nnor the earth without the sun.\n\nThe world of sense perceptions is made known to us only by our\nconsciousness, but consciousness is conditioned on the world of sense\nperceptions. Nature is infinitely united or infinitely separated,\naccording to whether we regard it from the standpoint of consciousness\nas an unconditional unit or from the standpoint of sense perceptions as\nan unconditional multiplicity. There is truth in both unity and\nmultiplicity, but it is truth only relatively speaking, under certain\nconditions. It matters a great deal whether we look about with the eyes\nof the body or with the eyes of the mind. For the eyes of the mind,\nmatter is force. For the eyes of the body, force is matter. The abstract\nmatter is force, the concrete force is matter. Matter is represented by\nthe objects of the hand, of practice, while force is an object of\nunderstanding, of science.\n\nScience is not limited to the so-called scientific world. It reaches\nbeyond all classes, it belongs to the full depth and width of life.\nScience belongs to thinking humanity in its entirety. And so it is with\nthe separation of matter and force. Only a stultified fanaticism can\nignore the practical distinction. The miser who accumulates money\nwithout adding any wealth to his life process forgets that the valuable\nelement of money resides in its force, which is different from, its\nsubstance. He forgets that not mere wealth as such, not the paltry gold\nsubstance, lends a reasonableness to the quest for its possession, but\nits spiritual content, its inherent exchange value, which buys the\nnecessities of life. Every scientific practice, which means every action\ncarried on with a predetermined success and with understood substances,\nproves that the separation of matter and force, though only performed in\nthought and existing in thought, is nevertheless not an empty phrase,\nnot a mere hypothesis, but a very fertile idea. A farmer manuring his\nfield is handling \"pure\" manuring force, in so far as it is immaterial\nfor the abstract conception whether he is handling cow dung, bone dust,\nor guano. And in weighing bundles of merchandise, it is not the iron,\ncopper, stone, etc., which is handled by the pound, but their gravity.\n\nTrue, there is no force without matter, no matter without force.\nForceless matter and matterless force are nonentities. If idealist\nnaturalists believe in an immaterial existence of forces which, so to\nsay, carry on their goblin-pranks in matter, forces which we cannot see,\ncannot perceive by the senses and yet are asked to believe in, then we\nsay that such men are to that extent that naturists, but mere\nspeculators, in other words spiritualists. And the word of the\nmaterialists who refer to the intellectual separation of matter and\nforce as a mere hypothesis, is quite as brainless.\n\nIn order that this separation may be appreciated according to its\nmerits, in order that our consciousness may neither etherealize force in\na spiritualist sense nor deny it in a materialist sense, and in order to\ncomprehend it scientifically, we have only to understand the faculty of\nthought in general or \"in itself,\" that is to say its abstract form. The\nintellect can not operate without some perceptible material. In order to\ndistinguish between matter and force, these things must exist and be\nexperienced by sense perception. By means of this experience we refer to\nmatter as the expression of force and to force as the expression of\nmatter. The perceptible object which is to be studied is therefore\nmatter and force in one, and since all objects are in their tangible\nreality such matter and force-things, the distinction made by the mind\nconsists in the general method of brain work, in the derivation of the\ngeneral unity, from the special multiplicity in any one and in all given\nobjects. The distinction between matter and force is summarized in the\nuniversal distinction between the concrete and the abstract. To deny the\nvalue of this distinction is equivalent to denying the value of any and\nall distinction, equivalent to ignoring the function of the intellect\naltogether.\n\nIf we refer to phenomena of sense perception as forces of matter in\ngeneral, then this generalized matter is nothing but an abstract\nconception. But if we mean by the term sense perception the various\nconcrete substances, then the general element which embraces the\ndifferences of things and pervades and controls them is force producing\nconcrete effects. And whether we say matter or force, the mental which\nscience is studying, not with its hands, but with its brain, the\nso-called essence, nature, cause, ideal, superior or spiritual, is the\ngenerality comprising the special things.\n\n\n\n\nV\n\n\"PRACTICAL REASON\" OR MORALITY\n\n\n+(a) The Wise and Reasonable.+\n\nThe understanding of the method of science, the understanding of the\nmind, is destined to solve all the problems of religion and philosophy,\nto explain thoroughly all the great and small riddles, and thus fully to\nrestore research to its mission of empirically studying details. If we\nare aware that it is a law of reason to require some perceptible\nmaterial, some cause, for its operation, then the question regarding the\nfirst or general cause becomes superfluous. Human understanding is then\nseen to be first and last cause of all concrete causes. If we understand\nthat it is a law of reason to require for its operation some given\nobject, some beginning at which to start, then the question of the first\nbeginning must necessarily become inane. If we understand that reason\nderives abstract units out of concrete multiplicities, that it\nconstructs truth out of phenomena, substance out of attributes, that it\nperceives all things as parts of a whole, as individuals of some genus,\nas qualities of some object, then the question regarding a \"thing\nitself,\" a something which in reality is back of all things, must needs\nbecome irrelevant. In brief, the understanding of the interdependence of\nreason reveals the unreasonableness of the demand for independent\nreason.\n\nNow, although the main object of metaphysics, the cause of all causes,\nthe beginning of all beginnings, the nature of things, causes little\ninconvenience to modern science, and even though the needs of the\npresent have overcome the leaning for speculation, this practical\ndownfall of speculation does not suffice for the solution of its\nproblems. So long as the theoretical law is not understood, according to\nwhich reason requires some concrete object for its operation, there is\nno hope of abandoning objectless thought, this malpractice of\nspeculative philosophy, which pretends to generate knowledge without\nintercourse with objective reality. Our naturalists demonstrate this\nvery clearly as soon as they turn from their tangible specialties to\nabstract things. The dispute over questions of life's wisdom, of\nmorality, or the quarrel over the wise, good, right, or bad, reveals\nthat here is the boundary of scientific agreement. The scientific\nexplorers of the exact sciences abandon every day their inductive method\nwhen dealing with social problems, and stray off into the regions of\nspeculative philosophy. Just as in physics they believe in imperceptible\nphysical truths, in \"things themselves,\" so in social matters they\nbelieve in the reasonable, wise, right, or bad, in the sense of \"things\nthemselves,\" of absolute phases of life, of unconditional conditions. It\nis here where the outcome of our studies, of the critique of pure\nreason, must be applied.\n\nIn recognizing that consciousness, the nature of understanding, the\nmental activity in its general form, consists in developing general\nconcepts out of concrete objects, we circumscribe this insight by\nstating that reason develops its understanding out of contradictions.\nIt is the nature of the mind to perceive, in given phenomena of\ndifferent dimensions and different duration, the nature of things by\ntheir semblance, and their semblance by their nature; to distinguish in\nwants of various degrees the most essential and necessary from the less\npressing; to measure within a certain circle of magnitudes the large by\nthe small and the small by the large, or in other words to compare the\ncontrasts of the world with one another, to harmonize them by\nexplanation. Common parlance instinctively calls understanding judging;\njudging requires a certain standard. Just as surely as we cannot\nperceive any objects which are \"in themselves\" great or small, hard or\nsoft, clear or dark, just as surely as these terms denote certain\nrelations and require a certain standard by which their relations can be\ndetermined, even so does reason require a certain standard for the\ndetermination of that which is reasonable.\n\nThe fact that we consider certain actions, institutions, conceptions,\nmaxims of other periods, nations, or persons unreasonable is simply due\nto the application of a different standard, because we ignore the\npremises, the conditions, which cause another's reason to differ from\nour own. Men who differ in their mental estimates, in their\nunderstanding of things, may be likened to the thermometers of Reaumur\nand Celsius, one of which designates the boiling point by 80 and the\nother by 100. A different standard is the cause of this different\nresult. On the so-called moral field there is no scientific agreement,\nsuch as we enjoy in some physical matters, because we lack the uniform\nstandard which natural science has long since found. It is still\nattempted to perceive the reasonable, good, right, etc., without\nempirical data, by speculative reasoning without experience. Speculation\nseeks the cause of all causes, the immeasurable cause; truth \"itself,\"\nthe unconditional and standardless truth; the unlimited good, the\nunboundedly reasonable, etc. The absence of a standard is the essence of\nspeculation, and its practice is characterized by unlimited\ninconsistency and disagreement. If there are followers of certain\npositive religions who agree in the matter of morals, they owe this to\nthe positive standard which certain dogmas, doctrines and commandments\nhave given them. But if any one tries to perceive things by \"pure\"\nreason, the dependence of this reason on some standard will be\ndemonstrated by its \"impure,\" that is to say individual, perceptions.\n\nSense perception is the standard of truth, or of science in general. The\nphenomena of the outside world are the standard of physical truths, and\nman with his many wants is the standard of moral truth. The actions of\nman are determined by his wants. Thirst teaches him to drink, need to\npray. Wants are regulated in the South by southern conditions, in the\nNorth by northern conditions. Wants rule time and space, nations and\nindividuals. They induce the savage to hunt and the gourmand to indulge.\nHuman wants give to reason a standard for judging what is good, right,\nbad, reasonable, etc. Whatever satisfies our need is good, the opposite\nis bad. The physical feeling of man is the object of moral standards,\nthe object of \"practical reason.\" The contradictory variety of human\nneeds is the basis for the contradictory variety of moral standards.\nBecause a member of a feudal guild prospered in a restricted\ncompetition, and a modern knight of industry in free competition,\nbecause their interests differ, therefore their views differ, and the\none justly considers an institution as unreasonable which the other\nregards as reasonable. If the intellect of some person attempts to\ndefine by mere introspection the standard of reasonableness as a general\nthing, this person makes himself or herself the standard of humanity. If\nreason is credited with the faculty of finding within itself the source\nof moral truth, it commits the speculative mistake of attempting to\nproduce understanding without perceptible objects. The same mistake is\nto blame for the idea that man is subordinate to the authority of\nreason, for the demand that man submit to the dictates of reason. This\nidea transforms man into an attribute of reason, while in reality reason\nis an attribute of man.\n\nThe question whether man depends on reason or reason on man is similar\nto the one whether the citizen exists for the state or the state for the\ncitizen. In the last and highest instance, the citizen is the primary\nfact and the state is modified according to the requirements of the\ncitizen. But whenever the dominant interests of the citizenship have\nacquired the authority in the state, then the citizen is indeed\ndependent on the state. This is saying in so many words that man is\nguided in minor matters by more important ones. He sacrifices the less\nimportant, minor, particular things to the great, essential, general\nthings. He subordinates his desire for more individual indulgence to his\nfundamental social needs. It is not pure reason, but the reason of a\nweak body or of a limited purse which teaches man to renounce the\npleasures of dissipation for the benefit of the general welfare. The\nwants of the senses are the material out of which reason fashions moral\ntruths. To single out the essential need among different physical needs\nof various degrees of intensity or extension, to separate the true from\nthe individual, to develop general concepts, that is the mission of\nreason. The difference between the apparently and the truly reasonable\nreduces itself to the difference between the special and the general.\n\nWe recall that reason requires sense perceptions for its existence and\noperation, that it needs some object which it can perceive. Existence is\nthe condition or premise of all understanding. Just as the understanding\nof true existence is the function of natural science, so the\nunderstanding of reasonable existence is the function of wisdom. Reason\nin general has the mission of understanding things as they are. As\nphysical science it has to understand what is true, as wisdom, what is\nreasonable. And just as true may be translated by general, so reasonable\nmay be translated by generally appropriate to need. We saw a while ago\nthat a sense perception is not true \"in itself,\" but only relatively\ntrue, that it is called true or general only in relation to other\nperceptions of lesser importance. In the same way, no human action can\nbe reasonable or appropriate \"in itself,\" it can be reasonable only in\ncomparison with some other action which attempts to accomplish the same\npurpose in a less practicable, that is an impracticable, form. Just as\nthe true, the general, is conditioned on the relation to some other\nobject, on a definite quantity of phenomena, on definite limits, so the\nreasonable or practicable is based on definite conditions which make it\nreasonable or unreasonable. The end in view is the measure of the\npracticable. The practicable can be determined only by some definite\nobject that is wanted. Once this object is known, then that action is\ncalled reasonable which accomplishes it in the fullest, most general\nway, and all other actions appear unreasonable compared to it.\n\nIn view of the law which we evolved by our analysis of pure reason and\nwhich showed that all understanding, all thought, is based on some\nperceptible object, on some quantity of sense perceptions, it is evident\nthat everything distinguished by our faculty of distinction is a certain\nquantity and that, therefore, all distinctions are only quantitative,\nnot absolute, only graduated, not irreconcilable. Even the difference\nbetween the reasonable and the unreasonable, or in other words between\nthat which is momentarily or individually reasonable and that which is\ngenerally reasonable, is merely a quantitative distinction, like all\nothers, so that the unreasonable may be conditionally reasonable, and\nnothing is unreasonable but that which is supposed to be unconditionally\nreasonable.\n\nIf we understand that reason requires some perceptible object, some\nperceptible standard, then we shall no longer try to understand the\nabsolutely reasonable, the purely reasonable. We shall then limit\nourselves to look for the reasonable, as for all other things, in\nconcrete objects. The definite, accurate, certain, uniform result of\nsome understanding depends on the definite formulation of the task, on\nthe accurate limitation of the perceptible quantity which is to be\nunderstood. If a certain moment, a certain person, a certain class, a\ncertain nation are given and at the same time an essential need, a\ngeneral and predominating purpose, then the question regarding the\nreasonable or suitable is easily answered. It is true that we may also\nknow something of things which are generally reasonable for mankind in\nthe aggregate, but in that case our standard must be abstract mankind\ninstead of some concrete part of it. Science may study the anatomical\nstructure of some concrete body as well as the general type of the human\nbody, but this again it can do only when it supplies the faculty of\nunderstanding with general instead of individual material. If science\ndivides the whole human race into four or five races, by establishing a\ncertain standard of physiognomy, and later on discovers some individuals\nor tribes whose characters are so peculiar and rare that they cannot be\nclassed under any of the established races, the existence of such\nexceptions is not a crime against the physical order of the world, but\nmerely a proof of the inadequacy of our scientific classification. If,\non the other hand, some conventional mode of thought considers a certain\naction as universally reasonable or unreasonable and then encounters\nopposition in actual life, convention fancies itself exempt from the\nwork of understanding and assumes to deny civic rights in the moral\norder of the world to its opponents. Instead of realizing the limited\napplicability of its rules by the existence of opposing practices,\nconvention seeks to establish an absolute applicability of its rules by\nsimply ignoring the cause of the opposition. This is a dogmatic\nprocedure, a negative practice, which ignores facts on the pretense\nthat they are irrational, but it is not a positive understanding, not an\nintelligent knowledge, such as manifests itself by the conciliation of\ncontradictions.\n\nIf our study aims to ascertain what is universally human and reasonable,\nand if these predicates are given only to actions which are reasonable\nand practicable for all men, at all times, and under all conditions,\nthen such concepts are absolute, indeterminate, and to that extent\nmeaningless, indefinite generalities. We are stating such universal and\nindeterminate, and therefore unimportant and unpractical concepts, when\nwe say that physically the whole is greater than a part, or that morally\nthe good is preferable to the bad. The object of reason is that which is\ngeneral, but it is the generality of some concrete object. The practice\nof reason deals with individual and concrete objects, with the things\nwhich are the opposite of the general, with special and concrete\nknowledge. In order to perceive in physics whether we are dealing with a\npart or with the whole object, we must handle definite and concrete\nobjects or phenomena. If we desire to ascertain what is morally\npreferable as good or bad, we must start out with a definite quantity of\nhuman needs. Abstract and general reason, with its socalled eternal and\nabsolute truths, is a phantasmagoria of ignorance which binds the rights\nof the individual with crushing chains. Real and true reason is\nindividual, it cannot produce any other but individual perceptions, and\nthese perceptions cannot be generalized to any greater extent than the\ngeneral material with which they operate. Only that is universally\nreasonable which is acknowledged to be so by all reasons. If the reason\nof some time, class, or person is referred to as rational, and if some\nother time, class or person considers it irrational; if, for instance,\nthe Russian noble considers serfdom a rational institution and the\nEnglish bourgeois the so-called liberty of his wage worker, both of\nthese institutions are not absolutely rational, but only relatively,\nonly in a more or less limited circle.\n\nIt is not necessary to state that I do not mean to question the great\nimportance of our reason by the foregoing remarks. Even though reason\ncannot independently, or absolutely, discern the objects of the\nspeculative introspection, such as the objects of the moral world, the\ntrue, the beautiful, the right, the bad, the reasonable, etc., it\nnevertheless is well fitted to distinguish relatively, by means of\nconcrete sense perceptions, between general and concrete things, between\nthe object and its manifestation, between fundamental needs and fanciful\nappetites. Although we may dispense with the belief in absolute reason\nand consequently realize that there can be no absolute peace, still we\nmay call war an unmitigated evil when comparing it with the peaceful\ninterests of our time or of our class. Not until we abandon our\nfruitless exploring trip after absolute truth, shall we learn to find\nthat which is true in space and time. It is precisely the consciousness\nof the relative applicability of our knowledge which is the strongest\nlever of progress. The believers in absolute truth have adopted the\nmonotonous diagram of \"good\" men and \"rational\" institutions as a basis\nfor their views of life. For this reason they oppose all human and\nhistorical institutions which do not fit into their pattern, but which\nreality nevertheless produces without regard to their brains. Absolute\ntruth is the arch foundation of intolerance. On the other hand tolerance\nproceeds from the consciousness of the relative applicability of\n\"eternal truths.\" The understanding of pure reason leads to the\nrealization that the consciousness of the universal interdependence of\nreason is the true road toward practical reason.\n\n\n+(b) Morality and Right.+\n\nThe nature of our task limits us to the demonstration that pure reason\nis a nonentity, that reason is the sum of all acts of individual\nunderstanding, that it deals only seemingly with pure and general, but\nin reality with practical, or concrete, perceptions. We have been\ndiscussing that philosophy which pretends to be the science of pure or\nabsolute understanding. We found its aim to be idle, inasmuch as the\ndevelopment of speculative philosophy represents a succession of\ndisappointments, because its unconditional or absolute systems proved to\nbe limited in space and time. Our presentation of the matter has\nrevealed the relative character of so-called eternal truths. We\nperceived that reason was dependent on sense perceptions, we found that\nany truth required definite limits for its determination. As regards\nmore especially life's wisdom, we saw that the acquired knowledge of\n\"pure\" reason manifested itself in practice by the dependence of the\nwise or the rational upon concrete sense perceptions. If we now apply\nthis theory to morality as such, we must be able to establish harmony\nalso in this field, where there is some doubt as to what is right and\nwrong, by means of the scientific method.\n\nPagan morality is different from Christian morality. Feudal morality\ndiffers from modern bourgeois morality as does bravery from solvency. In\nbrief, we need no detailed illustration to show that different times and\nnations have different moralities. We have but to understand that this\nchange is necessary, a special characteristic of the human race and of\nits historical development, and we shall then exchange the belief in\n\"eternal truths,\" which every ruling class claims to be identical with\nits own selfish laws, for the scientific knowledge that absolute right\nis purely a concept which we derive by means of the faculty of thought\nfrom the various successive rights. Right as an absolute concept means\nno more and no less than any other general concept, for instance, the\nhead in general. Every real head is a concrete one and belongs either to\nman or to some other animal, it is either long or broad, narrow or wide,\nin other words it has special peculiarities. But at the same time, every\nconcrete head has certain general qualities which are universal in all\nheads, for instance the quality of being the superintendent of the body.\nMoreover, every head has as many general as individual traits, it is no\nmore personal than it is common. The faculty of thought abstracts the\ngeneral traits from the actual concrete heads and in this way creates\nthe concept of the absolute head. Just as the absolute head, or _the_\nhead, is composed of the general qualities of all heads, so the absolute\nright stands merely for the general characters of all rights. Both of\nthese concepts exist merely as ideas, not as objects.\n\nEvery real right is a concrete right, it is right only under certain\nconditions, at definite periods, for this or that nation. \"Thou shalt\nnot kill,\" is right in peace, but wrong in war; it is right for the\nmajority of bourgeois society that wishes to see the outbursts of\npassion controlled in the interest of its own predominant needs, but\nwrong for the savage who has not arrived at the period where a peaceful\nand social life is appreciated, and who therefore would consider the\nabove commandment as an immoral restriction of his liberty. For the love\nof life, murder is a detestable abomination, for revenge it is a sweet\nsatisfaction. In the same way robbery seems right to the robber, wrong\nto the robbed. There can be no question of any absolute wrong in such\ncases, only of wrong in a relative sense. An action is wrong in a\ngeneral sense only in so far as it is generally disliked. Plain robbery\nis wrong in the opinion of the great majority today because our\ngeneration takes more interest in bourgeois affairs of commerce and\nindustry than in the adventures of the knights of the road.\n\nIf there were such a thing as an absolutely right law, dogma, or action,\nit would have to serve the welfare of all mankind under all conditions\nand at all times. But human welfare is as different as men,\ncircumstances, and time. What is good for me is bad for another, and the\nthing which may be beneficial as a rule may be injurious as an\nexception. What promotes some interests in one period may interfere with\nthem in another. A law which would presume to be absolutely right would\nhave to be right for every one and at all times. No absolute morality,\nno duty, no categorical imperative, no idea of _the_ good, can teach\nman what is good, bad, right, or wrong. That is good which corresponds\nto our needs, that is bad which is contrary to them. But is there\nanything which is absolutely good? Everything and nothing. It is not the\nstraight timber which is good, nor the crooked. Neither is good, or\neither is good, according to whether I need it or not. And since we need\nall things, we can see some good in all of them. We are not limited to\nany one thing. We are unlimited, universal, and need everything. Our\ninterests are therefore innumerable, inexpressibly great, and therefore\nevery law is inadequate, because it always considers only some special\nwelfare, some special interest. And for this reason no right is right,\nor all of them are right, and it is as right to say \"Thou shalt not\nkill\" as it is to say \"Thou shalt kill.\"\n\nThe difference between good needs and bad needs, right wants and wrong\nwants, like that between truth and error, reasonable and unreasonable,\nfinds its conciliation in the difference between the concrete and the\ngeneral. Reason cannot discover within itself any positive rights or\nabsolutely moral codes any more than any other speculative truth. It\ncannot estimate how essential or unessential a thing is, or classify the\nquantity of concrete and general characters, until it has some\nperceptible material to work upon. The understanding of the right, or of\nthe moral, like all understanding, strives to single out the general\ncharacteristics of its object. But the general is only possible within\ncertain defined limits, it exists only as the general qualities of some\nconcrete and determined perceptible object. And if any one tries to\nrepresent some maxim, some law, some right in the light of an absolute\nmaxim, law or right, he forgets this necessary limitation. Absolute\nright is merely a meaningless concept, and it does not assume even a\nvague meaning until it is understood to stand for the right of mankind\nin general. But morality, or the determination of that which is right,\nhas a practical purpose. Yet, if we accept the general and unconditional\nright of mankind as a moral right, we necessarily miss our practical\naim. An act or a line of action which is universally or everywhere right\nrequires no law for its enforcement, for it will recommend itself. It is\nonly the determined and limited law, adapted to certain persons,\nclasses, nations, times, or circumstances, which has any practical\nvalue, and it is so much more practical the more defined, exact, precise\nand the less general it is.\n\nThe most universal and most widely recognized right or need is in its\nquality no more rightful, better, or valuable than the most\ninsignificant right of the moment, than the momentary need of some\nindividual. Although we know that the sun is hundreds of thousands of\nmiles in diameter, we are nevertheless free to see it no larger than a\nplate. And though we may acknowledge that some moral law is\ntheoretically or universally good or holy, we are free in practice to\nreject it momentarily, in parts, or individually, as bad and useless.\nEven the most sacred right of the most universal extent is valid only\nwithin certain definite limits, and within particular limits an\notherwise very great wrong may be a valid right. It is true that there\nis an eternal difference between assumed and true interests, between\npassion and reason, between essential, predominating, general,\nwell-founded needs and inclinations, and accidental, subordinate,\nspecial appetites. But this difference is not one of two separated\nworlds, a world of the good and a world of the bad. It is not a\npositive, general, continuous, absolute difference, but merely a\nrelative one. Like the difference between beautiful and homely, it\ndepends on the individuality of the person who distinguishes. That which\nis a true and fundamental need in one case, is a secondary, subordinate,\nand wrong desire in another.\n\n_Morality is the aggregate of the most contradictory ethical laws which\nserve the common purpose of regulating the conduct of man toward himself\nand others in such a way that the future is considered as well as the\npresent, the one as well as the other, the individual as well as the\ngenus. The individual man finds himself lacking, inadequate, limited in\nmany ways. He requires for his complement other people, society, and\nmust therefore live and let live. The mutual concessions which arise out\nof these relative needs are called morality._\n\nThe inadequacy of the single individual, the need of association, is the\nbasis and cause of man's consideration for his neighbor, of morality.\nNow since the one who feels this need, man, is necessarily an\nindividual, it follows that his need must likewise be individual and\nmore or less intensive. And since my neighbors are necessarily different\nfrom me, it requires different considerations to meet their needs.\nConcrete man needs a concrete morality. Just as abstract and meaningless\nas the concept of mankind in general is that of absolute morality, and\nthe ethical laws derived from this vague idea are quite as unpractical\nand unsuccessful. Man is a living personality, whose welfare and\npurpose is embodied within himself, who has between himself and the\nworld nothing but his needs as a mediator, who owes no allegiance to any\nlaw whatever from the moment that it contravenes his needs. The moral\nduty of an individual never exceeds his interests. The only thing which\nexceeds those interests is the _material power_ of the generality over\nthe individuality.\n\nIf we regard it as the function of reason to ascertain that which is\nmorally right, a uniform scientific result may be produced if we agree\nat the outset on the persons, conditions, or limits within which the\nuniversal moral right is to be determined; in other words, we may\naccomplish something practical if we drop the idea of absolute right and\nsearch for definite rights applicable to well-defined purposes by\nclearly stating our problem. The contradiction in the various standards\nof morality, and the many opposing solutions of this contradiction, are\ndue to a misunderstanding of the problem. To look for right without a\ngiven quantity of sense perceptions, without some definite working\nmaterial, is an act of speculative reason which pretends to explore\nnature without the use of senses. The attempt to arrive at a positive\ndetermination of morality by pure perception and pure reason is a\nmanifestation of the philosophical faith in understanding _a priori_.\n\n\"It is true,\" said Macaulay in his History of England, in speaking of\nthe rebellion against the lawless and cruel government of James II.,\n\"that to trace the exact boundary between rightful and wrongful\nresistance is impossible: but this impossibility arises from the nature\nof right and wrong, and is found in every part of ethical science. A\ngood action is not distinguished from a bad action by marks so plain as\nthose which distinguish a hexagon from a square. There is a frontier\nwhere virtue and vice fade into each other. Who has ever been able to\ndefine the exact boundary between courage and rashness, between prudence\nand cowardice, between frugality and avarice, between liberality and\nprodigality? Who has ever been able to say how far mercy to offenders\nought to be carried, and where it ceases to deserve the name of mercy\nand becomes a pernicious weakness?\"\n\nIt is not the impossibility of accurately determining this limit to\nwhich the nature of the difference between right and wrong, in the sense\nof Macaulay, is due. It is rather due to the vague thought which\nbelieves in an unlimited right, in absolute virtues and faults, which\nhas not risen to the understanding that the terms good, brave, right,\nand bad are valid always and everywhere only in relation to some\nconcrete individual who reasons, and that they have no validity in\nthemselves. Courage is foolhardiness in the eyes of the cautious, and\ncaution is cowardice in the opinion of the daring. The revolt against\nexisting governments is always right in the eyes of the rebels, always\nwrong in the opinion of the attacked. No action can be absolutely right\nor wrong.\n\nThe same qualities of man are good or bad, according to his needs and\ntheir uses, according to time and place. Here trickery, slyness, and bad\nfaith prevail, there loyally, frankness and straightforwardness. Here\ncompassion and charity serve their purpose and promote welfare, there\nruthless and bloody severity. The quantity, the more or less beneficial\neffect of a human quality, determines the difference between virtue and\nvice.\n\nReason can distinguish between right and wrong, virtue and vice, only to\nthe extent that it can measure the relative quantity of right in any\nfaculty, rule, or action. No categorical imperative, no ethical code,\ncan serve as a basis for the real practical right. On the contrary,\nethics finds its justification in the actual righteousness of\nperceptible objects. For general reason, frankness is not a better\nquality than slyness. Frankness is preferable to slyness only inasmuch\nas it is quantitatively, that is to say, more frequently, better, and\nmore generally appreciated than slyness. It follows that a science of\nright can serve as a guide in practice only to the extent that practice\nhas served as a basis for science. Reason cannot determine the action of\nman beforehand, because it can only experience, but not anticipate\nreality, because every man, every situation, is new, original, exists\nfor the first time, and because the possibilities of reason are confined\nto understanding _a posteriori_.\n\nAbsolute right, or right in itself, is an imagined right, is a\nspeculative desire. A scientifically universal right requires certain\ndefinite and perceptible premises which form the basis of the\ndetermination of the general. Science is not a dogmatic infallibility\nwhich may say: This or that is right, because it is so understood.\nScience requires for its perceptions some external object. It can\nperceive right only if it rightly exists. The universal existence is the\nmaterial, premise, condition, and cause of science.\n\nFrom the foregoing follows the postulate that morality must be studied\ninductively or scientifically, not speculatively by the method of\ntraditional philosophy. We must not attempt to study absolute, but only\nrelative rights, only rights based on certain premises, and only this\ncan be the moral problem of reason. Thus the belief in a moral order of\nthe world is dissolved in the consciousness of human freedom. The\nunderstanding of reason, of knowledge, of science, includes the\nunderstanding of the limited validity of all ethical maxims.\n\nWhatever impressed man as salutary, valuable, divine, was exhibited by\nhim in the tabernacle of faith as the most venerable thing. The Egyptian\nworshipped the cat, the Christian venerates the divine providence. So,\nwhen his needs led him to live a well-regulated life, the benefits of\nthe law inspired him with such a high opinion of its noble origin that\nhe adopted his own handiwork as a gift of heaven. The invention of the\nmouse-trap or other useful appliances pushed the cat out of its exalted\nposition. Whenever man becomes his own master, takes care of himself,\nand provides for himself, then all other providences become useless, and\nhis own mastership makes all superior tutelage unbearable. Man is a\njealous creature. Ruthlessly he subordinates everything to his own\ninterests, even God and His commandments. No matter how great or\nvenerable an authority any code may have acquired by long and faithful\nservice, as soon as new needs oppose it, they degrade the divine\nauthority to the ranks of human law and transform ancient right into\nmodern wrong. The Christian frivolity refused to respect the threat of\nphysical retribution which the Hebrew had anointed as an authority in\nmoral questions and revered under the maxim: Eye for eye, tooth for\ntooth. The Christian had learned to cherish the blessings of\npeacefulness; he carried submissive tolerance into the holy land, and\ndecorated the vacant tabernacle with the gentle injunction to offer the\nleft cheek when the right was tired of cuffs. In our times which are\nChristian in name, but very anti-Christian in deeds, the long venerated\ntolerance has long gone out of use.\n\nJust as every religion has its own peculiar God, so every time has its\nown peculiar right. To this extent, religion and morality are in harmony\nwith the worship of their sanctum. But they become arrogant upstarts\nwhenever they assume to exceed their natural boundaries, whenever they\nattempt to saddle upon all circumstances, under the pretense of offering\nsomething incomparable, absolute, permanent, that which is divine and\nright at certain times and under definite conditions; whenever they\nproclaim a successful remedy for their own peculiar disease as a\nuniversal patent medicine for all diseases; whenever they overbearingly\nforget their descent. A law is originally dictated by some individual\nneed, and then mankind with its universal needs is supposed to balance\nitself on the thin rope of this one rule. Originally that which is\nreally good is right, and thereafter only some decreed right is supposed\nto be really good. That is the unbearable arrogance. Ordained right is\nnot satisfied to serve as the right of this time, this nation or\ncountry, this class or caste. It wants to dominate the whole world,\nwants to be absolute right, just as if a certain pill could be absolute\nmedicine, could be good for everything. It is the mission of progress to\nrepulse this assumption, to pluck this peacock feather out of the tail\nof the rooster, by leading mankind on beyond the boundaries prescribed\nby ordained law, by extending the world for him, by conquering for his\ncramped interests a wider liberty. The migration from Palestine to\nEurope where the consumption of pork does not cause leprosy emancipates\nour natural freedom from a once divine restriction by making it\nirrelevant. But progress does not deprive one God of his shoulder straps\nfor the purpose of decorating some other God with them. That would\nmerely be an exchange, not an acquirement. Evolution does not drive the\nsaints of tradition out of the country; it simply retires them from the\nwrongfully occupied field of universality into their peculiar\nboundaries. Progress picks up the child and then pours the water out of\nthe bath tub. Though the cat may have lost its aureole and ceased to be\na God, it does not give up catching mice; and though the Jewish rules\nfor bodily cleanliness at certain definite times have long been\nforgotten, a clean body is still highly respected. The present wealth of\ncivilization is due only to the economical administration of the\nacquirements of the past. Evolution is as much conservative as it is\nrevolutionary, and it finds as much wrong as right in every law.\n\nIt is true that the believers in absolute duty scent a difference\nbetween moral and legal right. But their self-interested narrowness does\nnot permit them to realize that every law is originally moral and that\nevery special morality is gradually reduced to the level of a mere law.\nTheir understanding reaches into other times and other classes, but does\nnot reach their own time and class. The laws of the Chinese and\nSamoyeds are understood to refer to the peculiar requirements of those\npeople. But the rules of bourgeois society are supposed to be far more\nsublime. Our present day institutions and moral codes are either\nregarded as eternal truths of nature or reason, or as permanent oracular\nexpressions of a pure conscience. Just as if the barbarian did not have\na barbarian reason; as if the Turk did not have a Turkish conscience and\nthe Hebrew a Hebrew one; as if man could follow the dictates of some\nabsolute conscience, instead of the conscience being conditioned on the\nman.\n\nWhoever limits the purpose of man to the love and service of God, and to\neternal blessedness hereafter, may devoutly recognize the traditions of\nabstract morality as authoritative and guide himself accordingly. But\nwhoever regards development, education, and blessedness on earth as\nman's life purpose, will not think that the questioning of the assumed\nsuperiority of traditional morals is irrelevant. It is only the\nconsciousness of individual freedom which creates sufficient unconcern\nfor the rules made by others to permit a brave advance, which\nemancipates us from the striving for an illusory absolute ideal, for\nsome \"best world,\" and which restores us to the definite practical\ninterests of our time and personality. At the same time we are thus\nreconciled with the world as it really is, because we no longer regard\nit as the unsuccessful realization of that which ought to be, but rather\nas the systematization of that which cannot but be. The world is always\nright. Whatever exists, is right and is not fated to be otherwise until\nit changes. Wherever there is existence, which is power, there is also\nright without any further condition, because it is right in a formative\nstage. Weakness has no other right than that of striving for supremacy\nand then enforcing a recognition of its long denied needs. The study of\nhistory shows us not only the negative and ridiculous side of the\nreligions, customs, institutions and ideas of the past, but also their\npositive, reasonable and necessary side. It explains to us, for\ninstance, that the deification of animals was due to an enthusiastic\nrecognition of their usefulness. And so the study of history shows not\nalone the inadequacy of the things of the present, but also demonstrates\nthat they are the reasonable and necessary conclusions from the premises\nof previous stages.\n\n\n+(c) The Holy.+\n\nIn the well-known statement: The end sanctifies the means, the developed\ntheory of morality finds its practical expression. This maxim, used in\nan ambiguous sense, may stand as a common reproach for us and for the\nJesuits. The defenders of the society of Jesus make efforts to prove\nthat it is a malignant attempt to discredit their clients. We shall not\ntry to speak for either party to this dispute, but will devote ourselves\nto the subject matter itself, and seek to substantiate the truth and\nreasonableness of this maxim, to rehabilitate it in the public opinion.\n\nIt will be sufficient for the refutation of the most general opposition\nto understand that end and means are very relative terms, that all\nconcrete ends are means and all means are ends. There is no more of a\npositive difference between great and small, right and wrong, virtue\nand vice, than there is between end and means. Considered as something\nintegral by itself, every action has its own end and its means are the\nvarious moments of which even the shortest action is composed. Every\nconcrete action is a means in relation to other actions which aim at the\nsame common effect. But in themselves actions are neither ends nor\nmeans. Nothing is anything by itself. All being is relative. Things are\nwhat they are only within and by their interrelations. Circumstances\nalter cases. In so far as every action is accompanied by other actions,\nit is a means, and serves a common end which exceeds its own special\nend; but inasmuch as every action is complete in itself it is an end\nwhich includes its own means. We eat in order to live; but so far as we\nare living while we are eating, we are living in order to eat. As life\nto its functions, so the end is related to its means. Just as life is\nsimply the sum of all life's functions, so the end is the sum of all its\nmeans. The difference between means and end reduces itself to that\nbetween the concrete and the general. And all abstract differences\nreduce themselves to this difference, because the faculty of abstraction\nor distinction reduces itself to the faculty of distinguishing between\nthe concrete and the general. But this distinction presupposes the\nexistence of some material, some given objects, some circle of sense\nperceptions by which it manifests itself. If this circle is found in the\nfield of actions or functions, in other words, if a previously defined\nnumber of different actions is the object of our study, then we refer to\nthe general character of these objects as the general end and to every\nmore or less extended part of them, or to every function, as a means.\nWhether any definite action is considered as an end or as a means,\ndepends on the question whether we consider it as a whole in relation to\nits own parts, or as a part of some whole in which it is connected with\nother parts, with other actions. From a general point of view which has\nall human actions for the object of its study, and encompasses them all,\nthere exists only one end, viz., the human welfare. This welfare is the\nend of all ends, is the final end, is the real, true, universal end\ncompared to which all special ends are but means.\n\nNow, our claim that the end sanctifies the means can have absolute\nvalidity only in regard to some absolute end. But all concrete ends are\nrelative and finite. The one and sole absolute end is human welfare, and\nit is an end which sanctifies all rules and actions, all means, so long\nas they are subservient to it, but which reviles them as soon as they go\ntheir own way without serving it. The human weal is literally and\nhistorically the origin of the holy. That which is hale is holy. At the\nsame time we must not ignore the fact that the weal, or hale, in\ngeneral, the hale which sanctifies all means, is but an abstraction, the\nreal content of which is as different as are the times, the nations, or\npersons which are seeking for their welfare. It must be remembered that\nthe determination of that which is holy or for the human weal requires\ndefinite conditions, that no action, no means, is holy in itself, that\neach one of them is sanctified only by definite relations. It is not\nevery end which sanctifies the means, but the holy end which sanctifies\nits own means. But since every real and concrete end is only relatively\nholy, it can sanctify its own means only relatively.\n\nThe opposition against our maxim is not so much directed against it, as\nagainst the wrong application of it. Recognition is denied and the\nsocalled sanctified ends are accorded only limited means, because there\nis lurking in the background the consciousness that these ends have only\na relative holiness. On the other hand our defense of the maxim does not\nimply that the various nominally holy means and ends are sanctified\nbecause some authority, some scriptural statement, some reason or\nconscience, has declared them to be so, but only in so far as they\nanswer the common end of all ends, the human welfare. Our maxim of ends\ndoes not at all teach that we should sacrifice love and truths to\nsanctified faith, but neither does it demand that we should sacrifice\nfaith for love and truth. It merely states the fact that, whenever some\nsuperior end has been determined by sense perceptions or circumstances,\nall means contrary to that end are unholy, and that on the other hand\nmeans which are generally unholy may become temporarily and individually\nsanctioned by their relation to some momentary or individual welfare.\nWherever peacefulness is actually in favor as a sanctified means, war is\nunholy. When, on the other hand, man seeks his salvation in war, then\nmurder and incendiarism are holy means. In other words, our reason\nrequires for a valid determination of that which is sanctified certain\ndefinite material conditions or facts as premises; it cannot determine\n_the_ holy in general, not _a priori_, not philosophically in the old\nspeculative way, but only in concrete cases, _a posteriori_, only\nempirically.\n\nIf we understand that human welfare is the end of all ends, the ideal\nof all means; if we furthermore dispense with all special determinations\nof this welfare, with all personal ideas of it, and recognize that it is\ndifferent under different circumstances, then we understand at the same\ntime that no means is sanctified beyond the sanctity of its end. No\nmeans, no action, is positively sanctified or makes for human welfare\nunder all circumstances. According to circumstances and relations one\nand the same means may be good or bad. A thing is good only to the\nextent that its results are good, only to the extent that there is good\nin its end. Lying and cheating are bad only because they result\ninjuriously for ourselves, because we do not wish to be lied to or\ncheated. But whenever a sanctified end is in question, the deceptive\nmeans used in lying and cheating are called tricks of war. If any one is\nfirmly rooted in the goodness of chastity because he thinks it was\nordained by God, we cannot discuss the matter with him. But if one\nhonors virtue for the sake of virtue and abhors vice for the sake of\nvice, in other words, for their consequences, he admits that he\nsacrifices the lust of the flesh to the end of good health. In short, he\nadmits that the means are sanctified by the end.\n\nIn the Christian conception of the world, the commandments of its\nreligion are absolutely good for all time, they are considered good\nbecause Christian revelation declares them to be so. This conception\ndoes not know that, for instance, its acme of virtue, the specifically\nChristian virtue of abstemiousness, received its value only by contrast\nwith corrupt heathenish licentiousness, but that it is not a virtue\nwhen compared to reasonable and normal satisfaction of material needs.\nIt deals with certain means which it calls indiscriminately good without\nany relation to their ends, and others which it calls indiscriminately\nbad in the same absolute way. And for this reason, it opposes the above\nnamed maxim.\n\nBut modern Christianity, modern civilization, has practically long done\naway with this faith. It does indeed call the soul the likeness of God\nand the body a putrid food for worms; but its deeds prove that it does\nnot take its religious phrases seriously. It cares little for the better\npart of man and directs all its thoughts and actions toward the\nsatisfaction of the despised body. It employs science and art, and the\nproducts of all climates, for the glorification of the body, clothing it\nsumptuously, feeding it luxuriously, caring for it tenderly, resting it\non soft cushions. Although they speak slightingly of this earthly life\nin comparison to the eternal life beyond, yet in practice they cling for\nsix days of the week to the uninterrupted pleasures of this body, while\nheaven is hardly considered worthy of careless attention for more than\none short hour on Sundays. With the same thoughtless inconsistency the\nsocalled Christian world also attacks our maxim with words, while in\npractical life it sanctifies the despised means by the end of its own\nwelfare, going even so far as to demonstrate its inconsistency in its\nown life by subsidizing prostitution with state funds. The fact that the\nlegislative bodies of our representative states keep down the enemies of\ntheir bourgeois order by courtmartials and exile, that they justify this\ncourse by the proverb, \"Do unto others as you would that they should do\nunto you,\" in the interest of \"public\" welfare, or that they defend\ntheir divorce codes by the plea of individual welfare, proves that the\nbourgeoisie also believes in the motto: The end sanctifies the means.\nAnd even though the citizens delegate rights to the state which they\ndeny to themselves, also our opponents cannot but admit that in so doing\nthe citizens are simply delegating their own rights to the superior\nauthority of the state.\n\nTrue, whoever employs lying and cheating in the bourgeois world for the\nend of gaining wealth, even though he may make it one of his ends to\ngive to charity, or whoever steals leather, like Saint Chispinus, for\nthe purpose of making shoes for poor people, does not sanctify his means\nby his end, because the end in that case is not sanctified, or only\nnominally so, only in general, but not in the concrete case quoted. For\ncharity is an end of but inferior holiness which must not be more than a\nmeans compared to the main end of maintaining bourgeois society, and\nwhenever it contravenes this main purpose, charity loses its character\nof a good end. And we have already seen that an end which is sanctified\nonly under certain circumstances cannot sanctify its means beyond them.\nThe indispensable condition of all good ends is that they must be\nsubservient to human welfare, and whether this welfare is secured by\nChristian or pagan, by feudal or bourgeois means, it always demands that\nthe things which are considered unessential and of lesser importance\nshould be subordinated to the essential and necessary things, while in\nthe above quoted cases the more salutary honesty and bourgeois\nrespectability would be sacrificed to the less salutary charity. \"The\nend sanctifies the means\" signifies in other words that in ethics as\nwell as in economics, the profit must justify the investment of the\ncapital. Again, if we call the forcible conversion of infidels a good\nend, and an arbitrary police measure a bad means, this does not prove\nanything against the truth of the maxim, but only testifies to its wrong\napplication. The means is not sanctified in the case, because the end is\nnot, because a forced conversion is not a good end, but rather an evil\none resulting in hypocrisy, and because such a conversion does not\ndeserve this name, or because force is a means which is unworthy of this\nterm. If it is true that a forcible conversion or wooden iron are\nsenseless ideas, how is it that people will persist in fighting against\nuniversally recognized truths with such inconsistencies, such inane word\nplays, such tricks of rhetoric and sophistry? The means of the Jesuits,\nsly tricks and intrigues, poison and murder, appear unholy to us only\nbecause the Jesuitic purpose, for instance that of extending the wealth\nand influence and glorifying power of the order, is an inferior end\nwhich may make use of the innocent language of the pulpit, but is not an\nabsolutely sanctified end, no supreme end, to which we would grant means\nthat would deprive us of some essential end, for instance of our\npersonal and public safety. Murder and manslaughter are considered\nimmoral as individual actions because they are not means to accomplish\nour main end, because we incline not toward revenge or\nblood-thirstiness, nor toward arbitrariness and the wilful dispensation\nof justice by some judge, but toward lawful decisions and the more or\nless impartial decrees of the state. But do we not explicitly declare in\nfavor of the maxim \"The end sanctifies the means,\" when we constitute\nourselves into juries and render dangerous criminals powerless by the\nrope and the ax of the executioner?\n\nThe same people who boast of having dropped Aristotle, that is to say\nthe belief in authority, for centuries, and who therefore replaced the\ndead traditional truth by living self-gained truth, are found to be\ncompletely at odds with their own development in the above cited cases.\nIf we listen to the recital of some funny story, which may be told by\neven a reliable witness, we nevertheless remain loyal to the principles\nof free reason, that is to say we are free to regard as serious and\nregrettable any incident which the narrator may consider funny and\nridiculous. People know how to distinguish between a story and the\nsubjective impression its incidents created on the mind of the narrator,\nand which depends more on the personality of the witness than on the\nactual facts. But in the matter of good ends and bad means it is\nproposed to neglect the distinction between an object and its subjective\nend which is otherwise the point of all critique. Such ends as charity,\nthe conversion of infidels, etc., are thoughtlessly, a priori, called\ngood and holy, because they once were so under particular conditions,\nwhile now their effect in the cases above cited is just the opposite,\nand then people wonder that the unrighteous title carries with it\nunrighteous privileges.\n\nOnly that end is worthy of the predicate good or holy in practice which\nis itself a means, a servant, of the end of all purposes, of welfare.\nWhenever man seeks his welfare in bourgeois life, in production and\ncommerce of commodities, and in the undisturbed enjoyment of his private\nproperty, he clips his long fingers by the commandment: \"Thou shalt not\nsteal.\" But wherever, as among the Spartans, war is regarded as the\nsupreme end and craftiness as a necessary quality of a warrior, there\nthieving is used as a means of acquiring craftiness and sanctioned as a\nmeans for the main end. To blame the Spartan for being a warrior instead\nof a sedate bourgeois would be to ignore the facts of reality, would be\nequivalent to overlooking that our brain is not designed to substitute\nimaginary pictures for the actual conditions of the world, but is\norganized to understand that a period, a nation, an individual is always\nthat which it can and must be under given circumstances.\n\nIt is not from mere individual and unpraiseworthy fondness for the\nparadox that we subvert current views by defending the maxim \"The end\nsanctifies the means,\" but from a consistent application of the science\nof philosophy. Philosophy originated out of the belief in a dualist\ncontrast between God and the world, between body and soul, between the\nflesh and the spirit, between brain and senses, between thinking and\nbeing, between the general and the concrete. The conciliation of this\ncontrast represents the end, or the aggregate result, of philosophical\nresearch. Philosophy found its dissolution in the understanding that the\ndivine is worldly and the worldly divine, that the soul is related to\nthe body, the spirit to the flesh, thinking to being, the intellect to\nthe senses, in the same way in which the unity is related to the\nmultiplicity or the general to the concrete. Philosophy began with the\nerroneous supposition that the one, as the first thing, was the basis\non which developed the two, three, four, and the entire multiplicity of\nthings by succession. It has now arrived at the understanding that\ntruth, or reality, turns this supposition upside down, that the reality\nwith its multiplicity of forms, perceivable by the senses, is the first\nand foremost thing out of which the human brain gradually derived the\nconception of unity or generality.\n\nNo achievement of science can be compared with the amount of talent and\nintellectual energy consumed in harvesting this one little fruit from\nthe field of speculative philosophy. But neither does any scientific\nnovelty encounter so many deep-rooted obstacles to its recognition. All\nbrains unfamiliar with the outcome of philosophy are dominated by the\nold belief in the reality of some genuine, true, absolutely universal\npanacea, the discovery of which would make all sham, false individual\npanaceas impossible. But we, on the other hand, have been taught by the\nunderstanding of the thought process that this coveted panacea is a\nproduct of the brain and that, since it is supposed to be a general and\nabstract panacea, it cannot be any real, perceptible, concrete panacea.\nIn the belief in an absolute difference between true and false welfare,\nthere is manifested an ignorance of the actual operations of brain work.\nPythagoras made numbers the basis of things. If this Grecian philosopher\ncould have realized that this basic nature was a thing of the mind, of\nthe intellect,[2] and that numbers were the basis of reason, the common\nor abstract content of all intellectual activity, then we should have\nbeen spared all the disputes which have raged around the various forms\nof absolute truth, about \"things in themselves.\"\n\nSpace and time are the general forms of reality, or reality exists in\ntime and space. Consequently all real welfare must be attached to space\nand time, and every welfare which exists in these dimensions must be\nreal. The different welfares, in so far as their beneficent qualities\nare concerned, are to be distinguished only by their height and breadth,\nby the quantity of their dimensions, by their numeral relations. Every\nwelfare, whether true or seeming, is perceived by the senses, by\npractices of life, not by abstract reason. But practice assigns the most\ncontradictory things to different people at different times as means to\ntheir welfare. What is welfare in one place, is disaster in another, and\nvice versa. Understanding, or reason, has nothing else to do in the\nmatter than to number these various welfares as they are made real by\nsense perceptions in various persons and times, and degrees of\nintensity, in the order in which they appear, and thus to distinguish\nthe small from the great, the essential from the unessential, the\nconcrete from the general. Reason cannot dictate to us autocratically in\nmatters of some absolutely true welfare, it can only indicate the most\nfrequent, most essential, and most universal welfare in a certain\nperceived number of welfares. But it must not be forgotten that the\ntruth of such an understanding, or enumeration, depends on certain\ndefinite premises. It is therefore a vain endeavor to search for the\ntrue and absolute welfare. This search becomes practical and successful\nonly when it limits itself to the understanding of a definite amount of\nwelfare of some particular objects. The general welfare can be found\nonly within definite boundaries. But the various determinations of\nwelfare agree in this respect, that they all consider it well to\nsacrifice the little for the great, the unessential for the essential,\nand not vice versa. In so far as this principle is right, it is also\nright for us to employ for the good end of a great welfare some small\nmeans in the shape of a small evil and to endure it, and thus we see\nonce more that the end sanctifies the means.\n\nIf people were liberal enough to permit every one to go to heaven in his\nor her own way, the opponents of our maxim would be easily convinced of\nits truth. But instead of doing this, people follow the usual course of\nshortsightedness and make their private standpoint a universal one. They\ncall their own private welfare the only true welfare, and regard the\nwelfare of other nations, times and conditions a mistake. So does every\nschool of art declare its own subjective taste to be objective beauty,\nignoring the fact that unity is but a matter of ideas, of thought, while\nreality is full of the most varied forms. The real welfare is manifold\nand the true welfare but a subjective choice which, like a funny story,\nmay make an entirely different impression on others, and be a false\nwelfare. Even though Kant, or Fichte, or some other particular\nphilosopher, may discuss at length the purpose of mankind and solve the\nproblem to his full satisfaction and to that of his audience, we\nnevertheless have learned enough today to know that one can define one's\nown personal idea of the purpose of mankind by means of abstract\nspeculation, but that one cannot discover any unknown and hidden object\nin this way. Thought, or reason, requires some object, and its work is\nthat of measuring, of criticising. It may distinguish between true and\nfalse welfare, but will also remember that they have their limits,\nremember that it is itself personal and that its distinctions are\nlikewise personal and cannot be generalized beyond the point where\nothers receive the same impression of the same object.\n\nHumanity is an idea, while man is always some special person who has his\nor her peculiar life in a definite environment and is therefore\nsubservient to general principles only from motives of self-interest.\nThe sacrifice of ethics, like that of religion, is only seemingly a\nself-denial and serves the ends of reasonable self-interest, an\nexpenditure with a view to greater gains. A morality worthy of that name\nwhich is not better defined by the term obedience can be exercised only\nthrough the understanding of its worth, of its value for our welfare, of\nits usefulness. The variety of political parties is conditioned on the\nvarieties of the interests concerned, and the difference in the means is\nconditioned on the difference in ends. In questions of less importance\neven the champions of absolute morality testify to this fact.\n\nThiers in his history of the French Revolution tells of a peculiar\nsituation in the year 1796, when the patriots held the public power and\nthe royalists carried on a revolutionary propaganda. It was then that\nthe partisans of the revolution, who should have been the champions of\nunlimited liberty, demanded coercive measures, while the opposition, who\nsecretly cared more for a monarchy than for a republic, voted for\nunlimited liberty. \"To such an extent are parties governed by their\nself-interests,\" comments Thiers, just as if this were an anomaly\ninstead of being the natural, necessary and inevitable course of the\nworld. When, on the other hand, it is a question of the fundamental laws\nof bourgeois order, then the moral representatives of the ruling classes\nare egotistic enough to deny the connection of their material interests\nwith these laws and to claim that theirs are eternal, metaphysical world\nlaws, that the pillars of their special class rule are the eternal\npillars of humanity, and that their own means alone are holy ones and\ntheir end the final end of the universe.\n\nIt is a disastrous deception, a robbing of human liberty, an attempt to\ncause the stagnation of the historical development, if any age or class\nthus proclaims its own peculiar purposes and means to be for the\nabsolute welfare of humanity. Morality originally reflects one's\ninterests just as fashion reflects one's taste, and finally the action\nis moulded after the conceived pattern like the coat in dressing. In\nthis process, force naturally is exerted for the maintenance and\nprotection of one's own life and those who resist are subdued. Interest\nand duty, though perhaps not entirely synonymous, are certainly closely\nrelated. Both of them are merged in the term welfare. Self-interest\nrepresents more nearly the concrete, immediate, tangible welfare, while\nduty concerns itself with the more remote and general welfare of the\nfuture also. While self-interest considers the present tangible metallic\nwelfare of the purse, duty demands that we keep not only a part of\nwelfare, but all welfare in mind, that we consider the future as well as\nthe present, that we remember the spiritual welfare as well as the\nphysical. Duty thinks also of the heart, of social needs, of the\nfuture, of the spiritual weal, in brief of interest in general and urges\nus to renounce the superfluous in order to secure and retain the\nnecessary. Thus your duty is your self-interest and your self-interest\nyour duty.\n\nIf our ideas are to adapt themselves to truth, or to reality, instead of\nreality or truth adapting itself to our notions or thoughts, we must\nunderstand that the mutability of that which is right, holy, moral, is a\nnatural, necessary and true fact. And we must grant to an individual the\ntheoretical freedom which cannot be taken from it in practice, we must\nadmit that it is as free now as it has ever been, that laws must be\nadapted to the needs of the social individual and not to the vague,\nunreal, and impossible abstractions, such as justice or morality. What\nis justice? The embodiment of all that is considered right, an\nindividual conception, which assumes different forms in different\npersons. In reality only individual, definite, concrete rights exist,\nand man simply comes along and abstracts from them the idea of justice,\njust as he abstracted from different kinds of wood the conception of\nwood in general, or from material things the conception of matter. It is\njust as far from the truth, to think that material things consist of, or\nare by virtue of, abstract matter, although this view is widely spread,\nas it is to believe that the moral or bourgeois laws were derived from\nthe idea of justice.\n\nThe ethical loss caused by our realistic, or if you prefer,\nmaterialistic, conception of morality is not so great as it appears. We\nneed not fear that through this conception social beings will become\nlawless cannibals or hermits. Freedom and lawfulness are closely allied\nby the need for association which compels us to permit others to live\ntogether with us. If a man is prevented by his conscience or by other\nspiritualistic or bourgeois ethics from committing unlawful\nactions--unlawful in the wider meaning of the term--he is either not\nexposed to very grave temptations, or he has a nature so tame that the\nnatural or legal punishments fully suffice to keep him within prescribed\nbounds. But where these checks are ineffective, morality is likewise\npowerless. If it were otherwise, we should have to assume that morality\nexerts in secret the same influence on the faithful which is exerted by\npublic opinion on the faithless. But we know from actual experience that\nthere are more pious thieves than infidel robbers. That the world, which\nattributes so much value for social welfare to morality by word of\nmouth, actually shares this view of ours, is proven by the fact that\nbourgeois society gives more attention to the penal code and to the\npolice than to the influence of morality.\n\nMoreover, our fight is not directed against morality, not even against\nany special form of it, but only against the arrogance which assumes to\nstamp some concrete form of morality with the trade mark of absolute\nmorality. We recognize that morality is eternally sacred, in so far as\nit refers to considerations which a man owes to himself and to his\nfellowmen in the interest of their common welfare. But the freedom of\nthe individual demands that each one should be at liberty to determine\nthe degree of consideration and the manner of giving it expression.\nUnder these circumstances it is as inevitable that the ruling powers,\nclasses or majorities should enforce their special needs under the form\nof a prescribed right, as it is that a man's shirt should be closer to\nhis skin than his coat. But it appears to us not merely very\nsuperfluous, but even detrimental to the energies required for the\nprogress of the future, that some decreed right should be elevated to\nthe position of absolute right and transformed into an insuperable\nbarrier to the advance of humanity.\n\nFOOTNOTE:\n\n[2] Which was gained by the mind's contact with its sense-perceived\nmultiplicity of the world.--Editor.\n\n\n\n\nLetters on Logic\n\nEspecially Democratic-Proletarian Logic\n\nBY JOSEPH DIETZGEN\n\nTranslated by Ernest Untermann\n\n\n\n\nEditorial Remark.\n\nThe \"Letters on Logic,\" treating on the same subjects as \"The Positive\nOutcome of Philosophy,\" were intended by the author to be replaced by\nthis subsequent work.\n\nWe publish, however, both these works in hopes that the reader will\npardon the frequent repetitions on account of the additional light that\nother parts of the \"Letters on Logic\" are apt to impart.\n\n\n\n\nLETTERS ON LOGIC\n\n\n\n\nFIRST LETTER\n\n\nDear Eugene:\n\nYou have now reached the age at which the students go to the university.\nThere, according to custom, they register first of all for a course in\nlogic, whether they choose the study of law, medicine, or theology.\nLogic is, so to say, the elementary study in all branches of learning.\nNow you know, my dear, that school and life are regarded as two separate\nthings. I should like to call your attention to their connection. We\nlive also in school, we are schooled also by life. I should like to\nconsider your trip across the Atlantic ocean as your first venture in\nthe high school of life, and assume the role of your professor of logic.\n\nI feel well qualified for this office. Although I am not well up in\nLatin and Greek, still I feel competent to guide you to the depths of\nlogical science better than a German professor trained and installed\naccording to the most approved pattern. You will admit the possibility\nof such a thing. For one who knows little may explain that little with\nmore ease and efficacy than one who has his head stuffed full of the\nprescribed bunch of official wisdom.\n\nYou, my son, have been so fortunate as to enjoy a seven years' course in\na German college. And since your teachers, at your departure, gave you\nthe highest certificate, I may well consider you as qualified not only\nto enter the school of life in the United States, but also to listen\nintelligently to my lectures on logic.\n\nBut in order that my well trained pupil may not look down upon his\nself-taught teacher, I appeal to the fact that even the man with the\nbest all-around education will be a tyro in specialties; and that, on\nthe other hand, ignorance in many things does not exclude the\npossibility of knowing more about a certain specialty than science has\nheretofore grasped. Now I claim in this case to have acquired a\nknowledge of the subject with which I intend to deal here that surpasses\nanything I have been able to find in the professional literature. I\nmention this, my dear Eugene, with all due modesty, not for the purpose\nof throwing a halo around my personality, but in order to give a certain\nauthority to my office as teacher and to inspire my pupil with\nconfidence.\n\nYes, I value confidence. Although you know me as a democrat who cares\nnothing for authority, you shall also learn to know me as a graduate in\ndialectics who, though he may empty the bath, still retains his hold on\nthe child and does not permit it to float off with the water. Children,\nand one may say nations in their childhood, cannot do without authority,\nand a teacher, whether he instruct children or nations, cannot dispense\nwith a certain confidence-inspiring air. The pupil must believe in the\nwisdom of his teacher, in order that he may approach the master with the\nnecessary attention and willingness to learn. Later on the understanding\nof the subject makes all authority superfluous. Thus a thing so sublime\nas authority is subject to the destructive tendencies of time, to the\nhistorical process.\n\nHitherto mankind has often been tempted by preconceived notions to\nidolize vain things. It has been attempted to shield not only authority\nin general, but, what is still worse, this or that throne or altar,\nagainst the attacks of time. The relation between the perishable and the\nimperishable has always been subject to much misunderstanding. Now since\nlogic is that science which aims to set the intellect aright, we shall\nhave to touch occasionally on the general misconception of time and\neternity.\n\nThe most famous expounders of logic are reproached for their cumbrous\nstyle and their obscure mode of explanation. Even masters of languages\nhave complained in my hearing about the foreign terms used by that\nbranch of science, terms which even they could not understand. Much of\nthe blame for this condition of things may fall on the difficulties of\nthe subject, which have baffled all elucidation for thousands of years.\nSome of the blame also falls on the bad habit of using learned\nvernacular. But the greatest fault lies with the mental laziness of the\nstudents. Nothing can be learned without mental exertion. If you are\nconcerned in your further development, you will recognize the Christian\nword as to the curse of work as untrue. Work cannot be descended from\nsin, for it is a blessing. You will have experienced in yourself how\nelated one feels after successful physical or mental work.\n\nThe things which science yields without exertion can be at most\naxiomatic commonplaces.\n\nI assume that you are quite willing to perform the necessary mental\nlabor, and I promise you that I shall do my best to make this study easy\nfor you. I do this so much more readily, as I frankly confess that these\nletters to my son are written with the intention of making them\naccessible to a wider circle of readers by means of the press.\n\nBefore concluding, let me say a word about my aim of speaking especially\nof democratic-proletarian logic. You will think or say: Logic may be a\nsubject worthy of study, but a special democratic-proletarian logic can\nsurely treat of nothing but party matters. But just as the special\naccomplishments in this or that line, the special advances of this or\nthat nation, are at the same time general advances, progress of\ncivilization, so the ideas of proletarian logic are not party ideas, but\nconclusions of logic in general. You may reply: Even though the special\nthought of a Chinaman may be quite consistent and logical, still we\nwould not call it Chinese logic. That would be quite true, but it does\nnot meet my point.\n\nThe thought on which the proletarian demands are based, the idea of the\nequality of all human beings, this ultimate proletarian idea, if I may\nsay so, is fully backed up by the deeper insight into the tortuous\nproblem of logic. Now, since this idea dominates mankind, it certainly\nhas more right than any Chinese idea. Furthermore, industrial\ndevelopment has leveled, simplified, cleared all social conditions to\nsuch an extent that it becomes ever easier to penetrate with sober eyes\ninto the secrets of logic. Finally, my logic deserves its proletarian\nqualification for the reason that it requires for its understanding the\novercoming of all prejudices by which the capitalist world is held\ntogether.\n\nThe cause of the people is not a party matter, but the general object of\nall science.\n\nThe people's cause as the ultimate object, and logic as the most\nelementary and most abstract science, as ultimate science, are as\nintimately connected as plants and botany, or as laws and the legal\nprofession. So are the interests of democracy and the proletariat\nintimately connected. The fact that this has not been well recognized in\nthe United States so far, is more a proof of the lucky condition of that\ncountry than of the scientific knowledge of its democracy. The spreading\nprimeval forests and prairies offered innumerable homesteads to the poor\nand they obscured the antagonism between capitalists and wage workers,\nbetween capitalist and proletarian democracy. But you still lack the\nknowledge of proletarian economics which would enable you to recognize\nwithout a doubt that it is precisely on the republican ground of America\nthat capitalism makes giant strides and reveals ever more clearly its\ntwofold task of first enslaving the people for the purpose of freeing\nthem in due time.\n\n\n\n\nSECOND LETTER\n\n\nDear Eugene:\n\nHaving written the first letter by way of introduction, I now am ready\nfor a gradual approach to my subject.\n\nLogic aims to instruct the human mind as to its own nature and\nprocesses; it will lay bare the interior working of our mind for our\nguidance. The object of the study of logic is thought, its nature, and\nits proper classification.\n\nThe human brain performs the function of thinking as involuntarily as\nthe chest the function of breathing. However, we can, by our will, stop\nbreathing for a while, and accelerate or retard the breathing movements.\nIn the same way, the will can control the thoughts. We may choose any\nobject as the subject matter of our thought, and yet we may quickly\nconvince ourselves that the power of our will and the freedom of the\nmind are not any greater than the freedom of the chest in breathing.\n\nWhile logic undertakes to assign the proper position to our brain, still\nit has to remember that nature has already assigned that position.\n\nIt is with logic as it is with other sciences. They draw wisdom from the\nmysterious source of plain experience. Agriculture, e. g., aims to teach\nthe farmer how to cultivate the soil; but fields were tilled long before\nany agricultural college had begun its lectures. In the same way human\nbeings think without ever having heard of logic. But by practice they\nimprove their innate faculty of thought, they make progress, they\ngradually learn to make better use of it. Finally, just as the farmer\narrives at the science of agriculture, so the thinker arrives at logic,\nacquires a clear consciousness of his faculty of thought and a\nprofessional dexterity in applying it.\n\nI have two purposes in mind in saying this. Firstly, you must not expect\ntoo much from this science, for you cannot set contrary brains to rights\nby any logic. Secondly, you must not think too little of it, by\nregarding the matter as mere scholastic word-mongery and useless\nhairsplitting. In daily life, as well as in all sciences, we never\noperate without the help of thought, but only with it, hence an\nunderstanding of the nature of the processes of thought is of eminent\nvalue.\n\nLogic has its history like all sciences. Aristotle, whom Marx calls the\n\"Grecian giant of thought,\" is universally recognized as its founder.\n\nAfter the classic culture of antiquity had been buried by barbarism, the\nname of Bacon of Verulam rose with the beginning of modern times as a\nphilosophical light of the first order. His most famous work is entitled\n\"Novum Organon.\" By the new organ he meant a new method of research\nwhich should be founded on experience, instead of the subtleties of the\npurely introspective method hitherto in vogue. After him, Descartes, or\nCartesius, as he called himself in literature, wrote his still famous\nwork, \"About Methods.\" I furthermore recall Immanuel Kant's \"Critique of\nReason,\" Johann Gottlieb Fichte's \"Theory of Science,\" and finally\nHegel, of whom the biographer said that he was as famous in the\nscientific world as Napoleon in the political.\n\nHegel calls his chief work \"Logic,\" and bases his whole system on the\n\"dialectic method.\" You have only to look at the titles of these\nphilosophical masterpieces in order to recognize that they all treat of\nthe same subject which we are making our special study, viz., the light\nof understanding. The great philosophers of all times have searched for\nthe true method, the method of truth, for the way in which understanding\nand reason arrive at science.\n\nI merely wish to indicate that this subject has its famous history, but\nI do not care to enter more deeply into it. I will not speak of the\noppression and persecution, which was inaugurated by religious\nfanaticism. I will not enumerate the various events that led to a\ngreater and greater light from generation to generation. The attempt to\ntrace this history would entangle us in many disputed questions and\nerrors which would only increase the difficulties of this study for the\nbeginner.\n\nIf a teacher of technology were to instruct you on steam engines and, to\nexplain their first incomplete invention, trace their further\ndevelopment historically from improvement to improvement, until he\nshould arrive at the height of perfection attained in their present day\nconstruction, he would also be advancing on a path, but on a tedious\none. I shall endeavor to show my subject at the outset in the very\nclearest light which has ever been thrown on it by the help of the\nnations of all times. If I succeed in this, it will be easy in the\nfuture, in the reading of any author, to separate the chaff from the\nwheat.\n\nI can afford to dispense with quotations and proofs from others in\ntrying to make my case and demonstrating the positive product of social\nculture, for we are dealing with the most universal and omnipresent\nobject,--one which enters into every spoken or written sentence with its\nown body. If anybody tells of far off times or wonderful things, he must\nquote witnesses. Now, much of what I have to say for my case may sound\nwonderful, because it runs counter to the popular prejudice, but the\nonly witness required to prove the truth of my statements is the clear\nbrain of my pupil, who has only to examine his own experience without\npreconceived notions, in order to find proofs on every hand.\n\nIt is surprising in the first place, that such a near at hand object has\nnot been understood long ago and that so much still remains to be\nexplained and to be taught after thousands of years of study. But you\nknow that just as the small things are often great, and great things\nsmall, so the nearest things are often hidden and the hidden things\nnearest.\n\nI promised you in the first sentences of this letter, dear Eugene, that\nI would now pass from introduction to subject matter. But since I have\nreally continued to move around the outer edge of the subject instead of\nentering into its midst, you might become impatient, and so I will\njustify my method. It is a peculiarity of this subject matter that it\nexposes me to this charge. It is a peculiarity of thought that it never\nstays with itself, but always digresses to other things. The thought is\nthe plank to which I should stick, but it is the nature of this plank\nnever to stick. Thinking is a thing full of contradictions, a\ndialectical secret.\n\nNow I know that here I am saying something which it is very hard for you\nto understand. But look here, has it not always been so? When you began\ndeclining Latin words in the sixth class, you were unable at once to\ngrasp the full meaning of declension. You knew what you were doing, and\nyet you did not entirely understand it. Only after penetrating more\ndeeply into the construction of the language did the meaning and purpose\nof the beginning become clear to you. In the same way, you now must try\nto digest as much as you can of what I say, and after you have gone more\ndeeply into this matter, you will fully understand me from beginning to\nend. In taking lessons from an author, on an unknown subject, I have\nalways followed the method of first getting a superficial view of the\nsubject, of glancing over its many pages and chapters, in order to\nreturn to the beginning and acquire a thorough knowledge by repeated\nstudy. With the growing familiarity with the subject the ability to\nunderstand it grew, and at the conclusion the thing became clear to me.\nThis is the only correct method I can recommend to you.\n\nIn conclusion let me say for to-day in passing that the recommendation\nof the correct method for studying logic is not only an introduction,\nbut, as I have already said, the subject matter of science itself.\n\n\n\n\nTHIRD LETTER\n\n\nDear Eugene:\n\nMy task of teaching logic requires two things: a logician and a teacher.\n\nThe last named capacity requires that I should clothe the subject in an\nattractive way. Permit me, therefore, to combine the didactic style with\nthat of the story teller, and to relate at this point an episode from a\nnovel of Gustav zu Putlitz:\n\nThe organist of a certain village is lying on his deathbed. His last\nstrength has been spent on the previous day in playing a hymn, and after\nits conclusion he was carried from the church in an unconscious state.\nHe had played his masterpiece, but at the same time his last piece. A\ndespised stage girl had accompanied him with a voice like that of a\nnightingale. But neither she nor the organ player had earned any\napplause from the stupid villagers.\n\nThe old man looked around in his room, his eyes were first riveted on\nhis faithful piano, his friend and companion through life. He extended\nhis hand, but it sank down exhausted. He had not had the intention to\ntouch the piano anyway. It was only like stretching out one's hand for a\nfriend far away. Then he looked through the window trying to recollect\nwhat time of the day it was. And when he had taken in the situation, he\nturned to the girl kneeling at his feet.\n\n\"Poor child,\" he began, \"you were deeply disappointed yesterday. I felt\nvery much hurt, when I first heard of it, but after that everything\nbecame clear to me while I heard the music all night, until a short\nwhile ago. Rejoice, my girl, at being reviled, for it is done for the\nsake of that sacred music, and it is an ecstasy, a blessing, to be\nmartyred for one's music which is well worth all injuries. I did not\nfare any better all my life, and if I thank God for all the good he has\ndone me until this hour, I also thank him first and most fervently for\nthe gift of music which he bestowed on the world, and which he revealed\nto me most wonderfully in my most painful hours.\n\n\"For my music I have starved and suffered all my life, and my gain was\ndelicious, my reward celestial for this poor perishable stake.\n\n\"My father was an organist in a little town of Eastern Frisia. His\nfather had held the same position in the same church, and, I think, so\ndid the father of his father follow music for a profession. Music has\nbeen the heirloom of our family for generations. True, it was the only\nheirloom, but I have cherished it and held its flag aloft all my life.\nWhen God calls me away, I shall leave nothing behind but that old piano\nand the sheet music which I wrote myself, for in all other respects I\nhave always been poor. I might have done differently, and my wife has\noften upbraided me for it, but she does not understand the blessing of\nmusic. I do not blame her for that, for it was not her fault that God\nclosed her ear to music as he did the ears of many others. Poor people,\nhow cold and dreary must be their lives when music does not scatter\nblossoms in their path and bathe their temples in light. But there will\ncome a time when their ears will be opened, and God will compensate them\nin heaven for what they missed here below.\n\n\"We who love music have tasted a part of eternal bliss here below, for\nharmony which dissolves all chords is eternal life and its wings are\nfanning us in this terrestrial life----\n\n\"Do you see, I know it well, and no one besides me, how it is when the\nsoul prepares to leave the perishable body and enter the song of the\nspheres--\n\n\"You do not understand me, my girl, but do not worry, you also will\nunderstand some day. I will only tell you this much, and it shall be a\nconsolation to you when the world treats you roughly hereafter. All of\nus, whether rich or poor, whether reclining on soft silken cushions or\non hard straw, all of us enter life with the celestial melodies in our\nhearts. The beating of time goes with us as long as we are breathing. It\nis the beating of the heart in our breast. We may seem to lose the\nmelody, even the measured step of time seems to become confused by our\npassion, but in the blessed hours we always find our melody anew, and\nthen we feel at home in the path of our life.\"\n\nThus the old organist idolized his music.\n\nBut it is not alone the harmony of music which has such a power over the\nmind. The harmony of colors, every art and science, has the same power.\nEven the most common craft, and the most prosaic of all prose, the chase\nafter the dollar, may take possession of a man's soul and prostrate him\nin adoration before its idol. True, not every one is so sentimentally\ninclined, and even the sentimentalist is so only in especially\nsentimental moments. Furthermore it cannot be denied that artists,\ninventors, and explorers are worshipping the most worthy and most\nadorable objects. And I admit that no great success can be accomplished\nwithout putting your whole soul into some great aim.\n\nNevertheless you should know that anything which may take possession of\none's soul shares its sublimity with all other things, and is for this\nreason at the same time something ordinary. Without such a dialectic\nclarification of our consciousness all adoration is idol worship.\n\nThe actual experience, then, that anything and everything may serve as\nan idol should clearly convince you that no one thing, but only the\nuniverse is the true God, is truth and life.\n\nNow, is this logic or is it theology?\n\nIt is both. At closer range you will notice that all great logicians\noccupy themselves a great deal with God and deity, and that on the other\nhand all honest theologians are trying to base their faith on some\nlogical order. Logic is by its whole nature metaphysical.[3]\n\nThere exists a class of logicians who attempt to deny the inevitable\nconnection between the celestial region and the tangible universe. Some\nof them do so from excessive religious delicacy of feeling, in order to\nprotect the sublime from the disintegrating effects of critique. Others\nhave such an antipathy against the religious abuses that they do not\nwish to hear any more about religion. Both classes adhere to the\nso-called formal logic.\n\nThese adherents of formal logic may be compared to a maker of porcelain\ndishes who would contend that he was simply paying attention to the form\nof his dishes, pots, and vases, but that he did not have anything to do\nwith the raw material, while it is evident that he is compelled to form\nthe body in trying to embody forms. These things can be separated by\nwords only, but not by actions. In the same way as body and form, the\nfinite and infinite or so-called celestial spheres, the physical and the\nmetaphysical, are inseparable.\n\nLogic analyzes thought. But it analyzes thought as it is in reality, and\ntherefore it unavoidably searches for truth. And whether this truth is\nfound above or below, or anywhere, is a question which just as\ninevitably brings the logician into contact with the theologian. To\nthink of avoiding such a meeting from considerations of sympathy or\nantipathy, would be a rude lack of consideration for science.\n\nMetaphysical logic which aims to extend its field to eternity, which\nlooks for logical order even in heaven, and seeks to solve even the\nso-called last questions of all knowledge, differs in a distinct way\nfrom formal logic, which selects a restricted field for its research and\nconfines itself to investigating the logical order of the socalled\nphysical world. This difference is worthy of your special attention,\nbecause in it there is hidden the kernel of our whole correspondence.\n\nIt is quite a practical method to set a limit for one's investigations,\nnot to fly into clouds, not to undertake anything that cannot be\naccomplished. Yet you must not forget that practical boundaries are not\ntheoretical boundaries, that they are not invariable boundaries for you,\nor for others. Although you cannot fly to heaven and will give up the\nidea of flying machines from considerations of practical expediency, yet\nyou will not wish to deny to man the theoretical freedom of infinite\nstriving even in the matter of airships, and you will not be so small as\nto give up the idea of the capacity for our race for metaphysical, or in\nother words, infinite development.\n\nFOOTNOTE:\n\n[3] In the sense of: mental and physical world embracing,\nall-embracing.--Editor.\n\n\n\n\nFOURTH LETTER\n\n\nDear Eugene:\n\nIn my first letter I acquainted you with my purpose, in the second I\nlifted the subject on my finger tips, so to say, to show it for a brief\nmoment; in the third I showed that its color had inevitably a religious\nshade. Now, to continue, permit me to introduce another point to your\nconsideration.\n\nThe great cause of the working class has hitherto always been the beast\nof burden of a small and exclusive minority. This is most evident in the\nslave states of antiquity, in Egypt, Greece, Rome. Likewise in the\nfeudal and guild systems of the middle ages the oppression of the mass\nof the people is sufficiently apparent. At present this condition of\nthings is more visible in Eastern Europe, in Russia, Turkey, Bulgaria,\nHungary, Eastern Prussia, etc., than in the industrial countries of the\nWest. In the United States of America it is most obscured, so that there\nthe people hardly realize their enslaved condition. In America, many of\nthe upper ten thousand have made their way from the bottom up, and it\nhappens more frequently than in Europe that the captains of industry\nlaid their foundation by hard work. The shortsighted observers then\neasily forget out of sympathy for the hard beginning that there is\nsharper's practice at the end, and they indulge in the idle hope that\nevery hard working beast of burden might transform itself into a happy\nmillionaire by thrift and smartness.\n\nYou will probably ask: What has that to do with logic or the art of\nreasoning? Patience! You will admit that the emancipation of the nations\nfrom beastly toil, misery and suffering is the highest goal of the human\nmind. Nor will you deny that the thought is the most essential\ninstrument for reaching this high goal. The accomplishments of thought\nare visible in the results of civilization. The proletariat of the\npresent, also that of Russia, Turkey, East Prussia, participates in\nthese accomplishments of thought. It participates not alone in the sense\nthat its brains are better educated and cultured, but also that its\nfood, clothing, and shelter have become more civilized through the\nprogressive deeds of intellect.\n\nYou see, then, that the people's cause is connected with the faculty of\nthought, and the nature of the latter may be illustrated as well by the\nexample of the development of civilization. The complicated network of\nwheels in a watch may also serve to demonstrate the nature of that which\nlanguage designates by many names, such as spirit, intellect, faculty of\nknowledge, reason, etc. Only it must be remembered that this mysterious\nsomething cannot be shown by itself, but only in connection with other\nthings, whether they be the history of civilization or a watch. There\nwill then be no contradiction in finding that the intellectual life\nappears more powerful and magnificent through the clockwork of the\nhistory of civilization than through any miniature product of thought.\n\nIn searching for the connection of things, one generally seeks to\nrecognize the manner or the degree of the connection. But we, in this\ncase, disregard the question as to how the things of this world are\nrelated to one another and to thought, and we simply make a note of the\nfact of the interdependence of thought and being, of nature and mind.\nThis fact of the universal interconnection of things contradicts the\nuntrained prejudice. The uncultivated brain nurses the illusion that the\nearth, the trees on it, and the clouds and the sun above them are\nseparate things. But it requires a better training of reason to\nunderstand that the earth, the tree, the clouds, and the sun, can be\nwhat they are only in the universal interconnection. I remember reading\nan article from Fichte, in a German school reader, which clearly showed\nthat the disarrangement of an insignificant object during the process of\nthinking causes us to disarrange the whole history of the world in our\nthoughts. It is well known that one unfamiliar with political economy\noverlooks the fact that the business men not only carry on their trading\nfor their private benefit, but are also members of the process of social\nproduction. It is overlooked that all labor, aside from being individual\nactivity, is at the same time an organic part of social labor. And just\nas ignorance of economics overlooks the industrial interdependence, so\nignorance of logic overlooks the cosmic interrelations.\n\nHere is a drop of water. Look how different it is according to the\ndifferent things with which it is connected. It cannot be what it is\nwithout a certain temperature. According to changes in temperature, it\nwill assume either the form of ice or of steam. In fat the drop remains\ncompact, in salt it divides infinitely, runs downhill in general and\nuphill in a loaf of sugar. According to the specific gravity of a\ncertain fluid, with which it may come into contact, it either floats on\nthe surface or sinks. Without a connection with the earth, its\ntemperature and gravitation, this drop and all others would disappear in\nthe fathomless abyss and have no existence. Thus the forms of things\nchange according to their connections, and they are what they are only\nas parts of the universal interrelation.\n\nWhat is true of a drop of water, is true of all things, all forces and\nsubstances, even of our thoughts. The human mind lives and works only in\nconnection with the rest of the material universe--and the recognition\nof the organic unity of all things is the fulcrum of my logic.\n\nOld line metaphysical logic was so enamored of its object that the\ndescent, the kinship, and the connection with the common things of this\nworld seemed too ordinary for the exquisite spirit. That logic was\ntranscendental, and therefore its chosen object likewise had to be in\ntouch with a transcendental world. And though it was scientific enough\nto regard the tale of the creation of the first soul by the breath of\nGod as a fable, it was nevertheless so prejudiced in favor of the\nextraordinary nature of the intellect that it did not abandon, for\nthousands of years, the hope of finding in that intellect a source which\nwould reveal transcendental matters. Formal logic now entirely discards\nthis hope of a fantastical world, but at the same time it misunderstands\nthe natural connection between the spirit and the common world. It\nisolates the instrument of thought and leaves the question undecided\nwhether this instrument has a natural, supernatural, or no connection at\nall. It overlooks that just as logic is real, so reality is logical, and\ndoes not see that the back door which leads to illogical heaven by way\nof faith deserves the disdain of science.\n\nThought, intellect, are really existing, and their existence is a\nuniform part of the universal existence. That is the cardinal point of\nsober logic.\n\nThe fact that the thoughts are of the same worldly substance as the\nother parts of the universe, that they are parts of common nature and\nnot a transcendental essence, has already been expressed by Cartesius in\nthe famous words: \"_Cogito, ergo sum_,\" I think, therefore I am.\n\nThe fact of my thinking, says the philosopher, proves my existence. In\norder to come to an absolute conviction on the nature of truth and\nerror, he sets out by doubting everything. And then he says that he\ncannot doubt the existence of his thoughts. He thus placed the spirit on\nthe basis of real life, delivered it of its transcendentalism, and that\nconstitutes his everlasting merit.\n\nHowever, not alone Cartesius, but also your own experience testifies to\nthe inseparable connection between thinking and being. Have not your\nthoughts been connected always and everywhere with some worldly or real\nobject? If you attempt to isolate thought in order to ponder over it,\nyou can only do so because that thought has been experienced by you and\ntherefore was in every instance attached to some worldly object. True,\nyou have thought of Greek gods, brownies, and mermaids. But you, an\namateur in painting, are familiar enough with that part of the mind\nwhich is called imagination in order to admit that even this eccentric\npart of the mind does not only act, and therefore, exist in reality, but\nalso derives all its products from reality, so that even its most\nfantastical vagaries and illusions are still real pictures, reflections\nof reality.\n\nBut how is it that I require such a multitude of words in order to state\nover and over again that the thought has a real existence and is a\nuniform part of the universe? Simply because from time immemorial the\nconfusion in matters of logic is so great that the human spirit is in\nthe same breath exalted to heaven, and yet its thoughts regarded as\nnothing real, nothing true. This is made plain by the fact that a sharp\ndistinction is commonly made between that which is real and that which\nis only imagined, and this difference is exaggerated to such an extent\nthat it appears as if the idea, which indeed is only in the brain, has\nno real existence at all.\n\nIn order that you may understand the interrelations of the things of the\nuniverse, I must warn you against this exaggeration and prove that the\nintellect has a real existence which is connected with the universe or\nreality. Botany, which occupies itself with plants, does not only teach\nus to divide them into classes, orders, and families, but it also does\nmore by showing us what place in the entire realm of nature is occupied\nby the vegetable kingdom, by pointing out the differences which\ndistinguish the plants from the inorganic mineral kingdom or the organic\nanimal kingdom. Formal logic similarly dissects the spirit into its\nparts, makes distinctions between conceptions, ideas, judgments,\nconclusions, divides these into subdivisions, classifies conceptions\naccording to species, separates abstract and concrete thought, knows\nmany varieties of judgments, registers three, four, or more modes of\nconclusion. But at the same time this formal logic recoils from touching\non the question as to how the universal spirit is related to the\nuniverse, what role it plays in the general existence, whether it is\npart and parcel of nature or transcendental. And yet this is the most\ninteresting part, the part which logically connects the intellect and\nthe science of the intellect with all other sciences and things.\n\nLogic must teach us how to distinguish. It is not a question, however,\nof distinguishing sheet iron from gold, or a greyhound from a pug-dog,\nfor this is done by special lines of knowledge. Logic must rather\nenlighten us about that part of the faculty of distinguishing which is\ngenerally required in all branches of knowledge, whereby truth and\nerror, imagination and reality are recognized. To this end I feel\nimpelled to advise you not to overlook that even error and imagination\nbelong to the one infinite and absolutely coherent reality. For the\npurpose of distinguishing true imagination from actual reality, it must\nbe remembered that just as rye bread and cream puffs agree in belonging\nto the general category of baker's products, so imagination and truth,\nthought and reality, are two different kinds of the same nature.\n\nTo sum up the contents of this letter, let me point out that its\nbeginning shows the connection of the intellect with the development of\nthe people, while its conclusion explains the wider connection of the\nmind with the universal existence.\n\n\n\n\nFIFTH LETTER\n\n\nA man not trained in logical thinking is handicapped by the absence of a\nmonistic method of thought. Monistic is synonymous with systematic,\nlogical, or uniform.\n\nIf we call a cream puff a tidbit and rye bread a food without\nremembering that every food is a tidbit and every tidbit food, and if we\nignore the fact that both of them, in spite of their difference, belong\nto the same category and are, therefore, related, then we lack logic.\nAnd logic is lacking whenever the fact is ignored that all things\nwithout exception: substances, forces, or qualities of the world, are\nchips of the same block, finite parts of the infinite, which is the only\ntruth and reality.\n\nThat insects, fishes, birds, and mammals form one and the same animal\nkingdom, is an old story which has long been patched up by the logical\ninstinct. Darwin did not only enrich the natural sciences, but also\nperform an invaluable service for logic. In proving how amphibia\ndeveloped into birds, he bored a hole into the hitherto fixed order of\nclassification. He brought motion, life, spirit into the zoological\nswamp.\n\nIn case you should not be familiar enough with Darwin's work to\nunderstand my allusions, I will enter a little more deeply into the\nmatter in a few sentences. The zoologists knew well enough that all\nspecies of animals belonged to the animal kingdom; but this\nclassification was a mechanical affair. Now the \"Origin of Species,\"\nwhich demonstrates that the zoological classification is not constant\nbut variable, which outlines the actual transition from one species of\nanimals to another, reveals at the same time that this alignment of all\nanimal species in one kingdom is not only a logical mechanism, but also\na fact of actual existence. This classification of all animals from the\nminutest to the most gigantic in one kingdom appeared before the time of\nDarwin as an order which had been accomplished by thought alone, while\nafter him it was known as an order of nature.\n\nWhat the zoologists did to the animal kingdom, must be done by the\nlogician to existence in general, to the cosmos. It must be shown that\nthe whole world, all forms of its existence, including the spirit, are\nlogically or monistically connected, related, welded together.\n\nA certain narrow materialism thinks that everything is done and said\nwhen the inter-connection between thought and brain is pointed out. A\ngood many things may still be discovered by the help of the dissecting\nknife, microscope, and experiment; but this does not make the function\nof logic superfluous. True, thought and brain are connected, just as\nintimately as the brain is related to the blood, the blood with oxygen,\netc.; but moreover thought is connected quite as intimately with all\nother things as all physical objects are.\n\nThat the apple is not alone dependent on the stem which attaches it to\nthe tree, but also on sunshine and rain, that these things are not\none-sidedly but universally connected, this is what logic wants to teach\nyou particularly in regard to the spirit, the thought.\n\nIf a traveler in Africa had to report a new animal species, he would not\nmake special mention of the fact of its existence, because that is\nobvious. And though he were to relate things about the most abnormal\nexistence, we should still know that this abnormality is only a\ndeviation in degree which does not overstep the bounds of existence in\ngeneral. But the human intellect is a greater novelty than the most\nwonderful animal species of the interior of Africa.\n\nYou know my sharpwitted friend Engl\u00e4nder. When I told him that I was\nwriting articles on the human mind, he advised me not to bother my head\nabout it. He said that this was a subject no man knew anything about.\nAnd when the learned Mr. Hinze, whom you also know, wanted to prove the\ninevitability of religious faith and the inadequacy of all science, he\nalways asked the pathetic question: What is consciousness? And he used\nto take on an expression, as if he had presented a book with seven\nseals. Now I don't want to class the professors of logic with such men.\nBut it is a fact that the great multitude, among them many scientists,\nare quite unfamiliar with the truth that the existence of the blue sky\nand of the green trees is a uniform part of the same generality with the\nexistence of our intellect.\n\nFor this reason it is necessary to prove that the intellect exists in\nthe same way that all other things do. For it is denied and\nmisunderstood, not only by those who regard the spirit as a being of a\ntranscendental nature, but also by those who admit the existence of the\ntrue contents of an ideological concept, but not of thought itself. In\nshort, the matter is so obscure that I feel sure that you will likewise\nbe as yet in doubt whether there are not two kinds of ideological\nconcepts, one of them real, the other unreal.\n\nFor two thousand years logic has proclaimed the sentence that thought is\na form to be filled with real contents. True thought \"must coincide with\nreality.\" It is true that there is a germ of sense in this statement,\nbut it is misunderstood. The central point of logic is overlooked. Every\nthought must not only have a real content, but it is also necessary, in\norder to distinguish true thoughts or perceptions from untrue, to\nrealize that thought is always and everywhere a part of reality and\ntruth, even when it contains the most singular imaginations and errors.\n\nJust as the domestic cat and the panther are different species of cats\nand yet belong to the same genus of cats, so true and false thoughts, in\nspite of all their differences, are of the same genus. For truth is so\ngreat that it comprises absolutely everything. Truth, reality, the\nworld, the all, the infinite and the absolute are synonymous\nexpressions. A clear conception of truth is indispensable for the\nunderstanding of logic. And in the last analysis it is simply using\ndifferent words for the same thing, when I base the quintessence of\nlogic, its fulcrum, cardinal, salient, or distinctive point on the\nspirit intimately united to nature or on the concept of a uniform world,\ntruth, or reality. I cannot give you a clearer view of truth than by\nquoting at this place the famous words of Lessing: \"If God were to offer\nme the ever active striving for truth in his left hand and truth in his\nright hand, I should grasp his left and say: Father, keep truth, it is\nfor you alone.\" This statement is somewhat highflown and mystical, and\nLessing was no doubt somewhat embarrassed by mystical thinking. Still\nthere is a sober truth in these words, which is quite clear and to the\npoint.\n\n\"Truth itself\" is the universe, the infinite and inexhaustible. Every\npart of it is a finite part of the infinite and is, therefore, finite\nand infinite, perishable and imperishable at the same time. Every part\nis a separate part and connected inseparably with the whole. The human\nmind, among others, is such a part.\n\nThe universal existence, or truth, is the inexhaustible object of the\nhuman mind. The fact that in the study of logic the human mind has\nitself for an object must be explained to the student by pointing out\nthat in this case the subject and the object are both things like all\nother things, in other words, are a part of truth, a part of natural\nexistence.\n\n\"Truth itself\" cannot be wholly conceived by the human brain, but in\nparts. For this reason we possess only the ever active striving for\ntruth; for this reason, furthermore, the conception or knowledge can\nnever be completely identical with reality, but can be only a part of\nit.\n\nNow permit me to say a few words which do not sound as would those\nspoken on the throne of logic, but which are expressed in popular\nlanguage. If you conceive some real object, whether a church steeple or\na thimble, then this object exists twice, viz., in reality and in\nconception. On the other hand, a certain creation of imagination has\nonly a simple fantastical existence. Such a popular way of thinking is\nundoubtedly correct. It is incorrect only when the fact is universally\nignored that all modes of existence belong to the same genus, the same\nas a domestic cat and a panther, so that the existence of a thing in our\nbrains, and outside of them in the heavens, on earth, and in all places\nhas a logical meaning only when it is the same existence in spite of all\nmultiplicity. An existence not partaking of the general nature of all\nexistence would be an illogical, nonsensical, thing.\n\nNow, I think you will have no difficulty in understanding me when I say\nthat a church steeple in imagination and the same church steeple in\nreality are not two church steeples, but that imagination and reality\nare forms of the same existence.\n\nAncient logic ordered a medal and had stamped on its face: The thought\nmust be identical with the reality. We now stamp on its reverse side:\n(1) The thought is itself a part of reality and (2) the reality outside\nof thought is too voluminous and cannot enter thought even with its\nsmallest particle. What good, under these circumstances, is the old\ninscription, especially since it does not teach us at all how the\nidentity between thought and its real object is to be attained, known,\nor measured?\n\nIf you, my dear Eugene, should become confused by these statements\ninstead of enlightened, you should have patience and consider that a\nthing which is to be illuminated by logic must, of course, be first\nobscure. I believe that I have served you in some way by simply raising\na doubt in your mind as to the soundness of the popular way of speaking\nand if I thus have convinced you of the confusion and inadequacy of the\nplausible idea of the identity of thought and reality.\n\nTrue, a thought must agree with its object just as a portrait should.\nBut what good will it do a painter to have his special attention called\nto this fact?\n\nHave you ever seen a portrait or a copy that did not agree in some\nrespect with the original? I am convinced that this has never been your\nexperience any more than a portrait which was a complete likeness of its\nobject. Your experience will be sufficiently cultivated to know that it\ncan always be a question only of a more or less. I would seriously\nrecommend to you to reflect on the relativeness of all equality,\nsimilarity, and identity. By far the greater part of humanity is in this\nrespect barbarously thoughtless. It is very difficult to grasp for the\nlogically untrained brain that two drops of water or twins are only\nrelatively alike or unlike, just as are man and woman, negro and white\nman, and that all existence is just as alike as it is unlike.\n\nIt is with the thinker as it is with the painter. They both search for a\nlikeness of reality and truth. In painting as in understanding there are\nexcellent pictures and bad ones. In this respect one may make a\ndistinction between true and false thoughts, but you must also know that\neven the unsuccessful portrait has some likeness, and that even the most\naccurate likeness is yet far from being in perfect harmony and identical\nwith its object.\n\nReality, truth, universal nature, stands in the pulpit and preaches: \"I\nam the Lord, thy God. Thou shalt not make any graven image to worship\nit.\" You must have a far too sublime conception of truth to entertain\nthe idea that any painter or thinker might encompass it fully within the\nlimit of a picture, no matter how good a likeness it may be.\n\nNow, that we have recognized the human mind as a part of actual reality\nand truth, we see at the same time that undivided reality, the sum of\nall that is, represents absolute truth which comprises everything. In\ntheir capacity of parts of the universe, true and false thoughts, good\nand bad men, heaven and hell, and all other things, are all pieces of\nthe same cloth, bombs of the same caliber.\n\n\n\n\nSIXTH LETTER\n\n\nMy Dear Son:\n\nAfter the third letter had acquainted you with the fact that the subject\nof logic has a certain religious flavor, the two subsequent letters\nendeavored to show that the logical subject is interconnected with the\nuniversal existence of the world, that the faculty of thought is an\ninseparable part of actual truth. In the vernacular of theology my last\ntwo letters have represented the human mind as a part of the living true\nGod.\n\nChristianity teaches: God is a spirit and who would worship him must\nworship in spirit and in truth.\n\nAnd logic teaches: The spirit is a part of universal existence. Whoever\nworships the spirit, is an idolator, for he worships a part and\nmisunderstands the whole truth. Truth itself is identical with the\nuniversal existence, with the world, and all things are simply forms,\nphenomena, predicates, attributes, passing expressions of it. The\nuniversal existence may be called divine because it is infinite, being\nthe alpha and omega which comprises all things as special truths. The\nintellect is such a limited part among other special parts of divine\ntruth, and the latter is frequently called world without any bombastic\nemphasis.\n\nUndoubtedly, every science, profession and trade can say the same thing\nof its object. The blue sky and the green trees are divine parts.\nEverything is interrelated and connected. If that were a good reason for\nnot making any subdivisions, every part and description would become\nendlessly tiresome.\n\nHowever, the specialty of logic is the cosmic sum of all truths, because\nit aims at a general elucidation of the nature of the human brain. This\npurpose is not so well served by an accumulation of other knowledge as\nby the general understanding of truth.\n\nLogic, which seeks to enlighten the mind for the purpose of scientific\nthinking, does not so much treat of true conceptions as of the general\nand absolute conception of truth which is inseparably linked to the\ninfinite universal life.\n\nIf you wish to think scientifically, you will first of all strive after\nclear ideas. And yet your head may be quite clear in regard to everyday\nthings, without getting any nearer to general clearness. Nor is such\nclearness obtainable by the accumulation of mere special knowledge, for\neven if you were to grow in wisdom to the end of your days, nevertheless\nthe fountain of wisdom, the universe, is inexhaustible and your brain\nwill remain imperfectly informed or unclear as before. Yea, even the\nsmallest part of the world is so inexhaustible that the most talented\ncan never acquire all the knowledge necessary to understand entirely\neven the most minute object. The strongest microscope cannot see all\nthere is to see in a drop of water, and the wisest man can never learn\nall there is to shoemaking.\n\nYou can see by all this that the scientific use of our intellect is\nfurthered by special knowledge only in the corresponding details. For\nthis reason it does not satisfy us to have some logicians tell us how\nmany kinds of concepts, judgments and conclusions are contained in our\nintellect. These are special details of logic. But the thing of first\nimportance for the student of logic is the elucidation of the universal\nconcept of truth, not the accumulation of special truths.\n\nSpecial truths enlighten the intellect. But the understanding that all\nspecialties are connected with one another by one monad or unit which is\ntruth itself gives us a certain general enlightenment which certainly\ndoes not render any special research unnecessary, or take the place of\nit, but which may well serve as the foundation of all research, which\nmay therefore be called a fundamental assistance.\n\nI may remark in passing that the understanding of logical science is\nrendered especially difficult by the fact that the unpracticed\nunderstands all terms and concepts only in their narrow popular meaning,\nwhile the subject matter leads up continually into the widest fields.\n\nWhen I speak of parts of the world, you must not think merely of\ngeographical parts, but you must think farther until you arrive at the\ninsight that stars and bricks, matter and force, in short all parts of\nthe world are world parts.\n\nThe logical difficulty may be principally traced to the lack of\nfamiliarity with the comprehensive categories. It will be clear to you\nthat thinking and being, phenomenon and truth, etc., are conceptions of\nthe widest scope. So you may have some difficulty in distinguishing\nbetween concepts of truth, and true concepts. And yet this is the same\nas making a distinction between the general class of herbs and its\nindividual species. The mere intercourse with such comprehensive\nconcepts as truth, existence, universe, is an excellent school of\nintellectual enlightenment.\n\nPerhaps you may object to the deviation of a science devoted to the\nspecial study of the faculty of thought into such fields as existence or\ntruth. But a logic confined to an analysis of the faculty of\nunderstanding would be narrow compared to one representing this faculty\nof understanding at work in real life. If the science of the eye were to\ntreat only of the various parts of the eye without considering the\nthings outside connected with its function, the light, the objects, in\nshort, the vision of the eye, it would be more an anatomy of the eye\nthan a general science of the eye. At all events a science which\nrepresents not alone the subjective faculty of vision, but also the\nliving activity of the eye, the objective field of vision inseparable\nfrom the subjective faculty, is a far more comprehensive instruction, a\nhigher enlightenment of the human brain.\n\nIn my opinion, logic should not so much treat of the analysis of the\nintellectual subject as of the purpose and object of the faculty of\nthought, its culture, which is not accomplished by the intellect itself,\nbut by its connection with the world of truth, its interrelation with\nthe universal existence.\n\nWhat can a logic accomplish which divides thought into analytical and\nsynthetical thoughts, which speaks of inductive and deductive\nunderstanding and of a dozen other kinds, but which finally declines to\nmeet the question of the relation of thought and understanding to truth,\nand fails to indicate what and where is divine truth and how we may\narrive at it?\n\nPilate, the typical sceptic, shrugs his shoulders; the clergymen make a\nmystery of divine truth; the natural sciences care only for the true\nconceptions, but naught for the concept of truth; and then the special\nscience of understanding, formal logic, tries to refer its task to\nphilosophy or world wisdom.\n\nI have already pointed out that the titles of the principal works on\nphilosophy indicate that the whole world wisdom turns around the\nquestion: How can our brain be enlightened, how can it arrive at truth?\nThe naturalists answer that this can be accomplished by special studies,\nand they are frequently opposed to philosophical research which makes\ngeneral truth its main object, and belittle it. You will readily see\nthat this is a mistake when you consider that, to illustrate, a machine\nor an organism as a whole is still something more than a mere sum of its\nparts.\n\nNo matter how well you may know each single part, yet you will not\nunderstand the whole machine or organism by this means alone. The\nuniverse is not an aggregation of unorganized parts, but a living\nprocess which must be understood not only in its parts but also as a\nwhole. We may pass for the moment the question whether the Milky Way may\nbe dissolved into stars, and whether the stars may become globes like\nour Earth which may develop plants, animals, and intelligent beings. The\nthing which is evident is that there is a process of development, that\nall nature takes part in this movement, that the universe is a whole\nwithout end, composed of an infinite number of parts; a coming and\ngoing, an eternal transformation, which is always identical with itself\nand always the same world. What all this would be without our eyes and\nears and without the intellect by means of which we use eyes and ears,\nwhat the world \"in itself\" is, that is a senseless and transcendental\nspeculation.\n\nThe science of logic must deal only with the actual world which is\ninseparable from us and from our thoughts.\n\nThis world which we hear, see, smell, in which we live and breathe, is\nthe world of truth or the true world. That is a fact. Must I prove this?\nAnd how is a fact proven? How do we prove that a peach is a delicious\nfruit? One goes and eats it. In the same way, you may now go and enjoy\nlife, of course in a rational manner, and I am convinced that your own\nlove of life will tell you that it is proof positive of the truth of the\nworld, of its actuality.\n\nBut even in the midst of this actual world there is present an\ninconsistent element, a human race with a confused logic. This race has\nbeen led by various depressing and saddening circumstances to blacken\nthe delicious truth of this world and to look for a transcendental truth\nin philosophical metaphysics or religious fantasmagorias, both of which\nare parts of the same stew. The philosophers of misery who make of the\nworld of truth a vain shadow and a miserable vale of sorrow must needs\nbe convinced by logic that the living world is the only true one.\n\nWell, that is not so difficult. But there is a danger of getting into a\nvicious circle of errors, imitating a snake biting its own tail. I have\nto prove logically that the world and truth are one and the same thing,\nbefore we have come to an agreement as to what is logical truth or true\nlogic. Nevertheless, nature has assisted us. The logic of nature is the\ntrue logic by the help of which we can agree. Nothing more is required\nthan a somewhat trained brain.\n\nTake two men having a dispute about truth. One of them says it is one\nthing, the other that it is something else. So they are arguing about\nthat which is. This last word is a form of the verb to be. Hence in\narguing whether the remote nebula in the heavens is a brick or a star, a\nmale or a female, one is always discussing some form of existence. All\ndisputes turn around forms of existence, but existence itself is an\nundisputable truth.\n\nHave I now still to prove that all existence is of the same category?\nAre there any stones that do not belong to the category of stones, or\nany kind of wood which is iron? What would become of reason and\nlanguage, if such a thing were to be considered? And yet, much that is\nbeing said by opponents is of such a nature.\n\nIf I have succeeded in convincing you that the universe is the truth,\nthere still remains the special question: What place shall we assign to\nfantastic ideas, error, and untruth? If the universe is the truth, then\neverything would be true, and hence it seems contradictory that error\nand untruth should have a place in truth or in the world. Of this more\nanon. I shall only point out in passing that untruth may without any\ncontradiction belong to truth, just as weeds are a negation of herbs and\nstill at the same time herbs.\n\nIn conclusion I call your attention to the eminently proletarian\ncharacter of the science of truth. It gives to the working class the\nlogical justification to renounce all clerical and mystic control and to\nlook for salvation in this same world in which divine truth is living.\n\n\n\n\nSEVENTH LETTER\n\n\nThe philologists distinguish carefully between a science of language and\na science of languages. The latter teaches Egyptian, Assyrian, Hebrew,\nGreek, Latin, English, French, etc., while the former treats of the\ngeneral characteristics common to all languages, of language itself.\n\nPhilosophical logic stands in the same relation to other sciences. The\nlatter make us acquainted with special truths, while logic treats of\ntruth in general. Those overintelligent people who claim that truth is\nmerely a collective term for many truths do not see the woods for trees.\nHerder, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Max M\u00fcller, Steinthal, etc., have many\nthings to say about the science of language of which the linguists with\nmany languages never dream.\n\nThe science of language, aside from its many amenities, is also burdened\nwith a difficult problem which it cannot solve without the help of\nlogic. This problem is the point of differentiation where babbling and\nword-mongery cease and intelligent speech begins. For human speech has a\ncertain meaning, and even the cries of the animals are not without\nsense. The sparrows know how to converse together, the rooster calls\nhis flock together, the dog knows how to announce that a stranger\nenters his master's home. Not alone the jokers, but serious thinkers\nspeak of animal language, of a sign language, and maintain that speech\ndoes not alone consist of words, but also of inarticulate sounds and\ngestures. Poets endow even the storm, the thunder and the winds with\nspeech. We wish to clear this confusion and ascertain what language is\nand where it begins. Languages, as is well known, have their beginning\nat the Tower of Babel. But in order to get close to language, we must\nlook for a beginning of things either in God or in logic.\n\nYou know the old question: Which was first, the egg or the hen? But only\na frivolous mind overlooks the serious side of this question and turns\nit into a mere joke. The question of beginning and end is an eminently\nlogical one, and an unequivocal and clear answer to it would bring light\nnot alone into the science of language, but also into the human brain.\n\nLet us, therefore, follow up the problem of the \"origin of language\" a\nlittle farther. When our forefathers dealt with this question, they\nthought that a God had given speech to man or some genius had invented\nit. They thought of a beginning in time. The modern thinkers speculate\nmore deeply. They have found out that language is not a fixed thing, but\nfluid, and has risen from low beginnings to a great perfection. We can\nno more find its temporal beginning by looking backward than we can see\nits end by looking ahead. For this reason we no longer look for its\ntemporal, but for its ideological beginning. (Steinthal.) We should like\nto have a fixed mark where we might say: Up to this point that which\nresembles speech is only roaring, exclamation, noise, and here is the\nbeginning of the well articulated sound which deserves the name of\n\"spoken word.\"\n\nBut there is still another factor which complicates the question\nfurther. Some say: It is not only the sound, the word, which constitutes\nspeech, but the connected sentence; there must be sense and reason mixed\nwith it. And this applies to the speaker and to the listener. Language\npresupposes reason.\n\nThen, again, intellect is not a fixed thing, but a fluid process which\ndevelops in, from, and by speech. So it appears on one side as if the\nmind produces language, and on the other, as if language produces the\nmind, the reason. Where, then, is the beginning and end, and how can we\nbring order into these relations?\n\nFor us, who are studying the mind, not the language, the conclusion\nfollows that it is not alone the word, but also the sound, the tone, the\ngesture, that all things have a meaning and speak a language. We find\nmind wherever we penetrate with our mind. Not alone language, but the\nworld is connected with the mind, with the thought. But the connection\nwith language may well serve as an illustration by which the connection\nof the cosmic mind may be demonstrated and the human brain illuminated.\n\nLanguage shares the honor with the mind of being extolled, even in this\nsober century, if not to the skies, at least far out of the general\nconnection of common things. For this reason, we must emphasize in the\ncase of language as in that of the mind, that they exist, that they are\npart and parcel of the universal existence. At this point I wish to give\nyou a vivid illustration of the unity of all being by pointing out that\nit is indubitably established by the existence of one single name which\nis sufficient to designate _All_. True, language employs many names for\nthis unity of the world, but that is a luxury. It is logical and\nnecessary for the intellect to have _one_ name for the _All_, because\neverything is not only infinitely variegated, but also infinitely one,\nor a unit. There are many different waters, but all water partakes of\nthe general nature of water. Unless that nature is present, there is no\nwater and the name of water does not apply. In the same way there are\nmany kinds of oil; olive oil, kerosene oil, castor oil, etc., and each\nkind has its own subdivisions. But everything that has a common name is\na unit.\n\nKindly observe, now, that the names of things form just such circles as\nthe water does after being struck by a stone. Just as the name water, so\nthe name oil indicates a ring. Then the name fluid constitutes another\nand wider ring which includes both oil and water. Then the name matter\ndraws a still wider circle and includes solids as well as fluids, and\nfinally the name being, or _All_, includes mind and matter, all matter\nand force, including heaven and hell, in one sole ring, in one unit.\n\nOn the basis of this universal unity, from which it becomes apparent\nthat high and low, dry and fluid, in short the whole universe is made of\nthe same substance, any fantastic thinker can prove that human and\nanimal language is one, for otherwise one could not refer to both of\nthem as language. He may then justly contend that speech, producing a\nsound, is a noise, that speech and noise are one. Speech is sound and\nsound speaks. In this way language would have no beginning and no end.\nIn the last analysis it would be one with all things, and all things\nwould be one with it. In this way the whole universe would become an\ninexplicable, incomprehensible, inexpressible mixture of speech.\n\nAnd yet it is an old story that man's insight grows the more he\nmagnifies a thing. The more excessively we exaggerate a thing, the\nplainer become its boundaries. Language indeed requires one single name\nfor _All_, but it also requires an infinite number of names in order to\nspecify the parts of _All_. Inasmuch as language claims to be only a\npart of existence, this part has to be bounded, and you should in this\nconnection remember the unlimited freedom of man in drawing such\nboundaries. Words are not merely empty words, but names of cosmic parts,\nof cosmic rings of undulation. Language, or rather the mind connected\nwith language, wishes to bound the infinite by the help of language. The\ninstinctive popular use of language does this in a haphazard way.\nConscious science proceeds in an exact manner. Just as it has determined\non the field of temperature what should be called hot and what warm, so\nit is at liberty on the field of sounds to determine where the name of\nlanguage begins or ceases. The end of the discussion of language is\ntherefore this: That which has already been done to horse power has not\nyet been done to the concept of language; it has been somewhat fixed by\ncommon usage, but only insufficiently. And so the moral of this tale is\nthat the things of this world, even mind and language, are connected and\nintermingling undulations of the same stream, which has neither\nbeginning nor end.\n\nLet me say it once more clearly and without circumlocution: The logic\nwhich I teach and the thought which is its object are parts of the\nworld, of the infinite, and every part being a piece of the infinite is\nlikewise infinite. Every part partakes of the nature of the infinite.\nHence you must not expect that I should exhaust my infinite subject. I\nconfine myself to the logical chapter of \"the One and the Many.\" I\nsimply wish to make it plain that without any contradiction the whole\nmultiplicity of existence is of the same nature, and that this oneness\nof nature subdivides into manifold forms. The world is interconnected\nand this interconnection is subdivided into departments. It adds to the\ngeneral enlightenment of the human brain to recognize this in regard to\nlanguage, to mind, to all parts of the universe.\n\nI repeat, then: One may think logically without having attended any\nlectures on logic, just as one may raise potatoes without a scientific\nknowledge of agriculture. It was possible to invent the thermometer, to\nclearly distinguish between sounds and colors, and a hundred other\nthings, without having explained the faculty of discrimination. But the\nmost abstract distinctions, such as beginning and end, word and meaning,\nbody and soul, man and animal, matter and force, truth and error,\npresuppose for their explanation a logical explanation of their\ninterconnection with our intellect.\n\n\n\n\nEIGHTH LETTER\n\n\nDear Eugene:\n\nLogic is going through the same experience as economics. The economists\nof the capitalist era talk solely of the means and ways by which profit\nand surplus value may be increased. They discuss only its relative size,\nits increase or decrease. But the thing itself, its origin and descent,\nis not discussed. It is passed in silence that profit is extracted from\nlabor power by paying less for a day's work than is produced by it. The\ngentlemen talk only of the \"wealth of nations,\" but not of their\npoverty. And though this was due to ignorance in the beginning, it has\nlater become sheer roguery.\n\nThe formal logicians are as ignorant as they are roguish, when they\npersist in discussing the intellect or thought in the traditional manner\nas if they were isolated things, while ignoring the necessary connection\nof the object of the logical study with the world of experiences. This\ninterconnection leads to an explanation of truth and error, of sense and\nnonsense, of god and idols, and this is very inopportune for the\nprofessors. For this reason this unwelcome problem is handed over to the\nmystical departments, to metaphysics and religion, so that these\nvenerable pillars of official wisdom may continue their services to the\nruling classes.\n\nI have already stated in my letters that the kernel of my discussion\nturns on the distinction between formal and what I call proletarian\nlogic. The formal logicians treat the intellect as a thing \"in itself,\"\nwhile I express in many different ways the fact that the intellect does\nnot exist by itself, but is interconnected with all things and with the\nuniverse.\n\nThat intellect has indeed a transcendental leaning, which seeks vent by\ntrying to exclude now music, now language, now itself, now some other\nfetich from the universal interrelation. But the science of the mind\nteaches that the brain watching its own activity finds out that all\naffirmations and negations, assertions and contradictions, belong to the\none omnipotent world mechanism, which keeps them stored within itself\nand which is actually truth and life. Inasmuch as the human brain is of\nthe same nature as this automatic universal being and interconnected\nwith it, logic is at the same time religion, metaphysics, and world\nwisdom.[4]\n\nFormal logic teaches that our intellect must keep all things apart, but\ndoes not teach that it must also connect them. This logic is right in\none way and yet does not arrive at the goal of a clear world philosophy,\nbecause it permits the transcendental leaning to exaggerate the\ndifferences and distinctions. It overlooks the paradoxical or\ndialectical nature of things which are not only separated but also\nconnected. What must be understood is that, generally speaking, the\nclassification of the universe is only a formality. We are, indeed,\njustified in distinguishing between above and Below, right and left,\nbeginning and end, gold and sheet metal, good and bad, but we must also\nenlighten ourselves as to how multiplicity can be a unity, the variable\nconstant, and the constant variable. Formal logic has a wrong name. It\nis not formal, but transcendental. It shares the common prejudice that\nthere are absolutely contradictory things or irreconcilable opposites,\nthat there are essential differences which have no connection, no bridge\nbetween them, nothing in common. It teaches that contradictions cannot\nexist, and contradicts itself by clinging to the belief that there are\nirreconcilable contradictions. It teaches that a thing which contradicts\nitself is inconceivable, is not true, and thus reveals that it is not\nwell informed on the formality of contradictions, on the true\nconciliation of contradictions, and on universal truth. Gold is not\nsheet iron, that is true enough. Whoever calls gold sheet metal or\nsheet metal gold, contradicts himself. In the actual world both things\nare separated. Yet they are not separated to such extent that gold and\nsheet iron do not partake of the same nature, of the nature of all\nmetal. Gold and sheet iron are unlike metals, but they have the same\nmetallic likeness. That like things are different and different things\nalike, that it is everywhere only a question of the degree of\ndifference, of formal differences, this is overlooked by \"formal\" logic\nand by all who seek truth in any logical diagram or fetich, instead of\nin the eternal, omnipresent existence of the inseparable universe.\n\nOur logic deals with truth or with the universe, which contains the most\nsublime gods and the meanest deviltry, in other words, which contains\neverything. In the world truth there is contained error, pretense, lies,\njust as death also lives in it. In other words, error, pretense, lies,\ndeath are only phenomena, formalities, passing trifles or things which\nare nothing compared to the one thing, that thing of all things, which\nis being, truth, life.\n\nThe understanding of the one living world truth is so greatly aggravated\nby the so-called contradictions which it contains. We find for instance\nthat where one thing ends another begins. The end of the one is the\nbeginning of another. Every beginning is at the same time an end. Both\nare contained in one another, and yet in our minds beginning and end are\nseparated. We find the beginning and the end everywhere and nowhere. Or\nlook into space. You do not see any boundary, and yet your vision\nreaches only a certain distance. Your vision is bounded and yet there is\nno boundary to be seen. Or look at life. Death soon arrives, and yet a\ncloser look shows that death is not really death, for \"a new life arises\nfrom the ruins.\" The world proves to be the eternal life which does not\nknow death. It is a contradiction to say that death lives, but this\ncontradiction can be solved by the understanding that the difference\nbetween life and death, however great, is still a formal one, a\ndifference which like all other differences is reduced to relative\ninsignificance by the infinite cosmic life.\n\nThere exists a widely diffused school, if this term may be applied to\nthe unschooled, that preaches patience in the matter of the\nsystematization of our thoughts or the enlightenment of our intellect,\nand though it no longer hopes for a mysterious revelation, yet founds\nits faith on natural science which has explained so many things to us\nand which is finally supposed to throw light on the \"last questions of\nall knowledge.\" But I can easily convince you that the new countries,\nplants, animals. Esquimaux, that may be discovered on polar expeditions,\nor the inventions which Edison may perhaps make on the field of\nelectricity, or the experiences which future astronomers may gather in\nregard to suns, moons, and comets, while they may add valuable\ncontributions to science and life, will yet do little toward a correct\ngeneral employment of our intellect or to a universal enlightenment of\nthe human brain. On the other hand, an enlightenment as to the nature\nand meaning of contradictions will spread light to the remotest corners\nof imagination, into the heavens and eternity, into the existence of the\nwhole, the unity and difference of all things.\n\nThe most drastic, and perhaps the most instructive, illustration of the\ncorrect meaning of contradictions is given by the contrast between\ntruth and untruth. These two poles are perhaps more widely separated\nthan the North Pole and the South Pole, and yet they are as intimately\nconnected as these two. The commonplace logic will hardly listen to the\ndemonstration of the unity of such apparently wide opposites as truth\nand untruth. Therefore you will pardon me, if I illustrate this example\nby others, for instance by the contrast between day and night. Take it\nthat the day lasts twelve hours and the night likewise. Day and night\nare opposites. Where there is day cannot be any night, and yet day and\nnight constitute one single day of twenty-four hours, in which they both\ndwell harmoniously. It is the same with truth and untruth. The world is\nthe truth, and error, pretense, and lies are embodied in it, are parts\nof the actual world, just as night is a part of day without confusing\nlogic. We may honestly speak of genuine pretense and true lies, without\nany contradiction. Just as unreason has still some reason left, so\nuntruth still lives inevitably in truth, because the latter is\nall-embracing, is the universe.\n\n\"Contradictions cannot exist.\" But confused brains full of\ncontradictions nevertheless exist. Knives without handles and blades,\ntwo mountains without a valley between them, and other nonsense, exist\nas a phrase. There are two kinds of contradictions: Senseless ones and\nvery sensible ones. Yea, the whole world[5] is an infinite and\ninexhaustible contradiction, which contains innumerable sensible\nstatements and misstatements, which never disappear and yet may be\nsolved harmoniously by the help of time and reason.\n\nFrom this it follows that the formal criteria of truth which are on\neverybody's tongue, such as the identity of thought with its object, and\nthe absence of all contradictions, do not furnish a basis at all for the\nanalysis of truth and cannot define it, except in an ignorant and\nroguish way.\n\nSince the prophet Daniel scattered ashes in the temple and unmasked the\nservants of Baal, other idol worshippers have continued to stimulate the\npeople to daily sacrifices, in order to steal the victuals at night.\nThis continual rascality and its repeated exposure has blunted the\ndesire of the people to serve truth, so that a great many have become\nfrivolous and indifferent. This rascally logic, not to mention\nignorance, encourages the frivolous and indifferent in their godless\ndeparture from truth. In the pulpit and in the garb of science it\npreaches the vanity and inadequacy of research. This is preached not as\na dogma, but as a logical science, and thus the senseless contradiction\nis committed of trying to prove truly by the help of the intellect that\nthe intellect is too limited to grasp the truth and prove it.\n\nIn its historical course logical research once arrived at such a result\nin good faith. This happened in the famous \"Critique of Reason\" of\nImmanuel Kant. Our shrewd friends of darkness now seek to utilize the\nfame of this work, to which it is entitled on account of its great\ncontribution toward the elucidation of cosmic truth, for the purpose of\npreventing on the strength of it a progress of enlightenment beyond the\nstandpoint of Kant.\n\nBy the way, Kant has demonstrated that the truth in general is as much a\nmatter of experience as the brain with which we search for it. He has\nshown beyond a doubt that our eyes and ears are inseparably connected\nwith our mind and with the whole cosmic truth. But the persistent spirit\nof transcendentalism, or what is the same thing, the traditional belief\nin the transcendental spirit, has led him to grant a mysterious\nexistence alongside of or above the human mind, alongside of or above\nthe cosmic truth, to an incomprehensible monster spirit and to a\nfantastical hyper-truth.\n\nThe Kantian critique of reason did not understand the universality of\ntruth. It still affirmed the existence of two worlds and two truths\nwithout any unity. And as it is the curse of the evil deed to generate\nmore evil, it produced two intellects. (1) The poor little subservient\nintellect of man, and (2) the enormous and abnormal intellect of the\n_Lord_, who is supposed to understand the incomprehensible and to untie\nthe most senseless contradictions like so many knots.\n\nThe truth which is the universe, the cosmic or universal truth, will\nreveal to you the absurdity of abnormal humility which is contained in\nthe dualistic doctrine of the two minds. Of course, the philosopher Kant\nhad a greater intellect than Peter Simple. But nevertheless all\nintellects partake of the nature of the general intellect, and no\nintellect can step above or below this general nature without losing\nsense or reason. One cannot speak of another, higher, faculty of thought\nthan that acquired by man through experience without dropping from logic\nto absurdity. No doubt the animal world possesses something similar to\nintellect. No doubt, also, the animal mind may be separated from the\nhuman mind by some special name, for instance \"instinct.\" No doubt,\nfurthermore, our reason is strengthened by culture from generation to\ngeneration. But that anywhere and at any time there should come into\nexistence a faculty of thought which would stand outside of the cosmic\ninterconnection, that is an absurd conception and a senseless thing.\nJust as necessarily as all water has one and the same nature, that of\nbeing wet, just so necessarily every intelligence and every thought\npartakes of the general nature of thought and must logically be a part,\na particular part, of the one universal and empirical world.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[4] Religion denotes here as much as conception of the world and\nexplanation of its last questions; and metaphysics stands here for\neverything conceivable, which meaning embraces more than the mere\ntangible.--EDITOR.\n\n[5] When we consider its many parts as such.--EDITOR.\n\n\n\n\nNINTH LETTER\n\n\nRepetition, my dear Eugene, is the mother of all study.\n\nLogic aims to teach you the proper use of the intellect, not only in\nthis or that branch of study, but in the general branch of truth. Its\nresult is the following precept: In all things always remember the\nuniversal interrelation.\n\nIn order to illustrate this statement a little, let me point out that in\nthe period of scholasticism thinking was practiced without any\ninterconnection with the rest of the world, merely by brown study. The\npresent age of natural sciences then cultivated a better method. But the\nmethod of the natural sciences has not succeeded so far in being applied\nto the field of law, morals, politics, psychology, and philosophy,\nbecause the logical understanding of the total interrelation of the\nindivisible world truth was lacking, because the concept of truth was\nenveloped in darkness, and because the privileged classes have a great\ninterest in maintaining darkness.\n\nFor this reason, the true method of reasoning still requires many\nexplanations. The socialist, for instance, is charged with inciting the\npeople, with promising more than he can keep and with sowing strife in\nthe hearts of men. Those who make this charge in the commonplace sense,\ntear two things, viz., peace and strife, out of their due connection. As\na matter of fact, peace and strife must always dwell together. A nation\nwhose peace were not intermingled with a certain strife, would be a\nnation of sluggards. Thanks to the strife in their breasts, the nations\nare progressive and stirring. Motion is the essence of the world, and\nnational motion is inconceivable without the striving of men. For the\nsake of development and culture, nations must always demand more than\nthey can immediately attain. On the other hand, striving of this sort is\nnot sufficient. One must not demand more than one can obtain, nor\npromise more than one can give. For this reason the logical socialist\nmust know that even in the future society the trees will not grow into\nthe clouds, and that the peace for which we hope and strive will always\nbe mixed with strife. The music of the future, although more harmonious\nthan the music of the present, will nevertheless be eternally marred by\ndisharmony. There is nothing perfect in the world, because only the\nwhole universe is perfect, because the universe alone is perfectness\nitself.\n\nEternal peace, as the warriors may justly claim, is an illusion, so long\nas we think of peace in a transcendental way and as being separated from\nstrife. But the sons of the war god who would like to continue the\nthunder of cannons and the rattle of sabers eternally, are no less the\nvictims of illusion, if not something worse. Eternal is only war in\npeace and peace in war, although that may seem senseless to the\nlogicians of the old school. Thus even the inevitable war will become\nmore peaceful and humane in the course of time. The barbarian form of\nwar, of which the Prussians are masters, is not destined to last\nforever, unless we speak of the illogical eternity of the preacher which\nopens its doors by leaving the temporal world. In defending the social\nwar, I wish to have it understood that neither the conceptions nor the\nthings called war and peace are separated by a Chinese wall.\n\nEverything is interconnected and interdependent. It is true that strife\nand animosities may be exaggerated, and so may peace. But whatever blame\nattaches to this, refers only to the exaggeration. It is not the\nanimosity, but the excessive animosity which deserves censure. By\nrecognizing the logical interconnection between peace and strife, the\ndispute of the parties is rendered saner. There is then no longer a\nquestion of a yawning chasm between satisfaction and dissatisfaction,\nbut of something about which an agreement is possible, viz., how much\nthere is of either.\n\nAs peace and war in the human breast, so all variety intermingles in the\ncosmic unit. In the novel \"_Homo Sum_,\" by Ebers, the monk Paulus, who\ntasted the delights of the preliminary celestial ecstasy when\ncastigating his body, says: \"I truly believe that it is just as\ndifficult on this globe to find pain without joy as joy without pain.\"\nAnd Till Eulenspiegel, that type of a practical joker, showed an\nunderstanding of dialectics when he lightened the difficulty of\nascending a mountain by the reflection that the descent on the other\nside would be so much easier. Logic is no more senseless in teaching\nthat all things, even the most opposite, are of the same substance than\nit is in showing that night belongs to day and weeds to herbs.\n\nIn order that these petty illustrations may not confuse your mind, it\nshould be remembered that the essential point is the elucidation of the\ngreat contradiction between mind and matter, between thinking and being,\nwhich includes all petty contradictions.\n\nIn order to think in accordance with logical consistency, you must not\nregard a thing as something independent, but consider everything as\nfluid particles of the same substance, which is the thing of all things,\nthe world, the truth, and life.\n\nOur logic is therefore the science of truth. This truth is neither above\nnor below, neither in Jerusalem nor in Jericho, neither in the spirit\nnor in the flesh, but everywhere.\n\nOur logic is the science of understanding. It teaches that you must not\nsearch for understanding by cudgeling your brain, but only in connection\nwith experience, with the interrelation of things.\n\nSince man in his experience also meets errors, science was dominated for\ncenturies by the question whether truth and experience are not two\ndifferent things, whether all our experience is only an illusion of our\nsenses. Cartesius replied to this: \"No; the belief in a perfect, true\nbeing cannot admit of such a delusion.\" By substituting the concept of\ntruth for the concept of God, we are certain that the world of\nexperience is not a ghost, but the most actual reality.\n\nAlthough the great Kant called the cosmic truth a phenomenon, because he\ncould not divest his mind of transcendental faith, of the faith in a\ntranscendental truth, still we know today that all distinctions which\nare ever made constitute but a nibbling at the universal unit. As\nnecessarily as all variety in baking produces bakery wares, just as\nnecessarily heaven and earth, and everything connected with them, are\nparts of the indivisible truth which is also called nature, cosmos,\nuniverse, God, and experience. Language gives to its darling truth many\ndifferent pet names, just as a happy mother calls her heart's treasure\nby a thousand endearing terms.\n\nFeuerbach reasons in this fashion: \"If God is not a personal being\ndifferent from nature and man, then he is an entirely superfluous\nbeing.... The use of the word God which is always combined with the\nconception of a separate being, is a disturbing and confusing abuse. Why\ndo you want to be a theist, if you are a naturalist, or a naturalist if\nyou are a theist? Away with this contradiction! Where God is confounded\nwith nature, or nature with God, there is neither God nor nature, but a\nmystical amphibious hermaphrodite.\"\n\nFeuerbach is right. The name of God is much abused. But truth is also\nblasphemed by negation and frivolousness. The sober understanding that\nGod, truth, nature, are various names for the same thing permits us to\nplay with them without despairing of the matter. Indeed, this play of\nwords serves to make the subject clear.\n\nBut logic demands that we recognize truth as the absolute, as the power,\nthe force, and the glory, which comprises all logical and illogical\ndistinctions, together with the things to be distinguished, even the\nfaculty of distinguishing itself.\n\nSuch an understanding of the absolute, such world wisdom, will not make\nyou conceited, because it makes you conscious of the fact that your\nunderstanding has grasped celestial truth which at the same time is\nterrestrial, only in a very general way. You possess nothing but a\ndefinition of truth. And without denying that definitions are valuable\nand instructive, I, at the same time, point out that you know very\nlittle about astronomy when you know that it is the science of the\nstars. No matter, therefore, how clearly I may have defined truth, we\nrequire for its complete understanding all the details of science, and\nthat is too much for me, for you, and for any individual human being.\n\nJust as our vision never exhausts the visible, because the eye sees an\nobject but does not fully penetrate it, just so can the intellect never\nfully understand and fathom the absolute all, the truth, or God. But we\ncan understand and fathom individual truths, parts of the universal\ntruth. What understanding grasps is not the truth itself, but yet it is\ntrue understanding.\n\n\n\n\nTENTH LETTER\n\n\nDear Eugene:\n\nMy previous lectures instructed you as to the very trivial fact that the\nthought is a part of the world. In proceeding from the part to the\nwhole, I passed logically from the mouth of the river to its source. The\nuniverse is the maternal womb of the intellect as of all things.\n\nIt occurs to me that you or some teacher of logic might accuse my\nletters of lack of logic. It may seem that these lectures fail to\npresent the subject matter in a strictly systematized form. You will,\nplease, excuse this in part with the fact that they appear in the form\nof letters. This form demands that the contents should be logically\narranged and rounded off in each letter. It should furthermore serve as\nan excuse for any defect, that my subject is not a finished one, not\nperfectly elaborated by others before me. I am here not merely a\nlecturer, but also an explorer on a field which, though much\ninvestigated, yet is still rather obscure.\n\nThe conclusion of my last letter explained that the use of the term God\nfor the universe has much to recommend it and much to disqualify it. But\nit is easily apparent that the universe with its absolute qualities is\nclosely related to that infinite being of whom Jakob B\u00f6hme, the\nphilosophical shoemaker, said: \"He is neither the light nor the\ndarkness, neither love nor anger, but the eternal One.... Hence all\nforces are merely one sole force.\"\n\nThat nothing exists outside of the universe, that everything is\ncontained in the All, that the All, with all real and imagined beings,\nis everything, that it is neither sweet nor sour, neither great nor\nsmall, but just everything and all, this statement is as obvious as the\noften and long repeated statement of identity: A equals A.\n\nThe All is omnipotent, omnipresent, all-wise. This last term might be\nquestioned, since the universe is not a dummy with a monster head and\ngiant brain. For this very reason it was considered inappropriate to\napply the name of God to the universe, because that creates the\nimpression of a personal being. The All thinks only by means of human\nbrains, and for this reason omniscience cannot be anything but common\nhuman knowledge. Of course, you, I, and every other man, are very\nlimited in our knowledge. But still we may indulge in the hope that the\nthings which we do not know are known by other men or will be discovered\nby future generations, so that the collective human mind will know\neverything that is knowable. We cannot see everything that is visible;\nthere are animals that can see even better than we can. But since even\nthe most intelligent animal is supposed to lack the highest degree of\nintelligence, reason and science, there is no one who knows anything\nexcept the human race. Mankind is omniscient. But since all our science\nis derived only from the world, mankind is only the formal bearer of\nintelligence, and it belongs to the fountain of all things, to eternal\nnature. Our wisdom is the wisdom of nature, is world wisdom. Although\nthere may be inhabitants of the moon and of other stars who may know\nthings which are unknown to us, still that is in the first place a mere\nspeculation of little value, and in the second place universal\nomniscience or the omniscient universe would not in the least be\naffected thereby. It is a reasonable use of the language to regard human\nwisdom as the only and omniscient wisdom, just as all natural and wet\nwater is called water without any further modification. I believe in the\nstatement of Protagoras: \"Man is the measure of all things.\" Whoever\nuses a different measure, uses a superhuman, transcendental measure.[6]\n\nHence, when I call the cosmic essence of all existence omnipotent, you\nwill not think of a senseless magic power which forges knives without\nhandles and blades, nor will you read any transcendental meaning into my\nuse of the term omniscience.\n\nOmniscience belongs obviously under the head of logic, because the organ\nof science and wisdom is the object of the study of logic. And it must\nnow be stated that the human mind does not only exceed the animal mind\nby far, but is also the _non plus ultra_ of all minds. But it must be\nretained that this mind can only be whatever it is in connection with\nthe divine universe which I may also be permitted to call worldly deity.\nThis name is fitting because it is a means of understanding that in the\nfirst place no monster mind rules the world, and in the second place the\nnatural universe is not a mere sum of all things, but truth and life.\n\nOf course, the identification of the universe with the religious God is\nonly a comparison, and comparisons are lame. Still we may compare the\nsun with an eternal lamp or the moon with a candle, or the German prime\nminister with a butler.\n\nLogic shall teach you that everything which may be distinguished by the\nfaculty of understanding is of the same kind, everything is of common\nclay, but the whole is sublimely elevated above all that is commonplace.\nMere frivolous atheism, as created by the free-thinkers, is not\nsufficient. A bare denial of God always creates some other idol worship.\nThe positive understanding of the divine world truth is an indispensable\nrequirement for the radical extermination of all idol worship.\n\nLogic must begin with the sublime, infinite, absolute. All logical,\nconsistent or interconnected thinking must take its departure from it.\nThe so-called scientific research after temporal causes, after the egg\nfrom which the chicken was hatched, after the hen from which the egg\ncame, after the kindred organisms which developed the hen by natural\nselection and adaption according to Darwin, this is a very valuable\nresearch without which we can never understand the world process. But\nnevertheless, such research must not satisfy the thinking man. Logic\ndemands from everybody that he or she should search for the highest, for\nthe cause of all causes. Whoever feels the desire to bring logical order\ninto his consciousness, must know that the finite and infinite, the\nrelative and the absolute, the special truths and the one general truth,\nare contained in one another.\n\nLogical thought as demanded by science means nothing but to be aware of\nthe final cause, the absolute foundation of all thought. This foundation\nis the universe, an attribute of which is the external and internal\nhuman head. The thousand year old dispute between the materialists and\nthe idealists turns on the question whether the spirit is material or\nthe world spiritual. Our answer is plain and clear: They both belong\ntogether, they together make up the one thing, the thing of all things.\nMind and matter are two attributes of the same substance. They may be\ncompared the same as fish and flesh, the former being called very\nappropriately by some African tribes \"water flesh.\" In this way, matter\nand mind are two kinds of meat of a different and yet of the same\nnature.\n\nI remember reading in a satirical paper the question: \"What is a\ngentleman? Answer: A gentleman is a loafer with money, and a loafer is a\ngentleman without money.\" Just as these two types of men are essentially\nalike and differ only in the small matter of money, so you should\nremember that there are no essential differences, that all differences\nare merely matters of attributes and qualities of the same absolute\nworld substance. To distinguish correctly and logically, that is the\npoint which logic is aiming to teach us. To make distinctions is the\nfunction which is also called perceiving, knowing, understanding,\ncomprehending. When you consider that this function is innate in man,\nand that man together with his faculty of understanding is innate in\nnature, then you recognize all distinctions and the distinguished\nobjects as attributes of the undistinguished One, of the absolute,\ncompared to which all things are only relative things, in other words,\nattributes.\n\nI am endeavoring to make clear to you that logical thinking requires the\nawakening of the consciousness of the one supreme general nature. And\nyou must not think of this sum of all existence in the stupid way in\nwhich people used to think of the animal kingdom before Darwin, but\nregard the world as a living organic unit, from which the faculty of\nunderstanding has blossomed the same as all other things. In the logic\nof the narrow-minded, all animal species are widely separated, without\nany living interconnection, while Darwin has demonstrated the uniform\nprocess, the intermingling life in multiform creation. The illustration\nof this famous zoologist of the transition from one species to another\nmay serve as an example of the logical transitions in the world process,\nin which all differences are but undulations. All our classifications\nmust always remember the undivided basis on which they are resting.\n\nWe have shown that the intellect divides the universal nature,\nclassifies and analyzes it, and we have learned of the universal nature\nthat it not only furnishes to the intellect the material for its work,\nbut also that the world comprises within its general process the\nintellectual process, that the intellectual movement is a specialization\nof the natural movement.\n\nThe world is not only the object, but also the subject of understanding,\nit understands, it dissects its own multiplicity by means of the human\nintellect. Our wisdom is world wisdom in a two-fold sense: The world is\nthat which is being understood, classified, analyzed, and at the same\ntime it is that which, by the help of our intellect, practices\nunderstanding, classification, etc. When I call the human mind the\ncosmic mind, the mind of the supreme being, I wish to have it understood\nthat there is nothing mysterious about this, that I merely intend to\nshow that thought or intelligence can only operate in the universal\ncosmic interconnection, that it is not an abnormal and transcendental\nthing, but a thing like all other things.\n\nYou must not conceive of the spirit as the producer of truth, as a\nlittle god, but only as a means. The true god, the divine truth, has our\nintellect for an attribute. The latter does not produce truth, but only\nthe understanding of truth. It produces only pictures of truth which are\nall more or less perfect. Of course, it is not at all immaterial whether\nwe produce a more or less faithful, a true or a false picture of truth,\nbut still this is, at present and for us here, a secondary matter. The\nmain thing is to know that truth, or nature, is far above all pictures,\nand still consists of parts, of forms, which together constitute the\nwhole.\n\nFOOTNOTE:\n\n[6] Please note the additional explanation on page 77.--EDITOR.\n\n\n\n\nELEVENTH LETTER\n\n\nDear Eugene:\n\nJohannes Scherr relates in the \"Gartenlaube,\" a German family paper, in\nan article entitled \"Mahomet and His Work,\" that insane doctrinarians\nare searching for people without religion. This has not succeeded, it is\nsaid, although the spark of religious feeling is glowing very dimly in\npeoples that are close to the animal. But nevertheless, he continues,\nthe expressions of religious feeling mark the boundary line where the\nbeast ceases and man begins. For just as in the higher stages of\ncivilization religion means the consciousness of the finite of being one\nwith the infinite, so in the lower stages of civilization the indefinite\nimpulse is felt by man to connect his special nature with the universal\nnature and bring them into harmony. This is idealism, the idealistic\nneed. It is obvious that, and why, the people have always and everywhere\nsought and found satisfaction for their idealistic longings in religion.\nBut, adds the shrewd observer, I must remark that I do not refer to the\nshifting population when I say \"people,\" for sad to relate, that\npopulation is torn away from all connection with natural conditions. I\nrefer to the \"settled, the permanent, the true people.\"\n\nThis quotation shows that a champion of the \"true people\" is in conflict\nwith true logic. In dividing a population into shifting and settled\npeople, one should retain as a basis the logical consciousness that all\nclasses of people are embraced by one class; furthermore, that human,\nmonkey, ant, and other nations are parts of the one and the same nation;\nuntil finally man and animal, real and imaginary, with all religious and\ngodless things, are ultimately fused in the world unit and can never be\n\"torn away from all connection with natural conditions.\"\n\nAll distinctions must logically be based on the consciousness of the\nabsolute and universal unity, of the interconnection of all things. For\nthis reason some pious people, with their God in whom everything is\nliving and has its being, have more logic than some freethinkers of the\nclass of Johannes Scherr who have no coherence in their method of\nthought. The faithful think more logically than the narrowly skeptical,\nfor they begin and end with God. But still they cannot think quite\nlogically, because they cannot establish any logical connection between\ntheir eternally perfect Lord and evil, the devil, disease, misery, sin,\nin short all the sufferings and vanities here below.\n\nThe unit of nature, the infinite, is the quintessence of logic. Neither\nnatural science in the narrow sense of the word, nor metaphysics, nor\nformal logic, can give any clue as to the nature of this thing of\nthings. This can be done only by a science of understanding which\nrecognizes matter and mind and all opposites and contradictions as\nformalities of the universe. How can a man who is out of touch with the\nmass of the shifting population feel that he is one with the universe?\nWhoever regards any special class as the true people, has no\nunderstanding either of the common people or of the absolute universe.\n\nProletarian logic teaches not only the equality of all human beings, but\nuniversal equality. And mark well, this universal equality does not\nconflict with variety any more than a variety of pots and jugs conflicts\nwith the unity of vessels, or the manifold forms of bretzels and rolls\nwith the unity of bakery ware.\n\nThe enemies of democratic development, in attacking the idea of freedom\nand equality, point to the manifoldness of nature, the individual\ndifferences of men, the distinctions between weak and strong, wise and\nfools, men and women, and consider it tyranny to attempt to equalize\nthat which nature has made different. They cannot understand that like\nthings may be different and different things alike. They are blinded by\ntheir class logic which sees only the differences, but not the unity,\nnot the transfusion of all classes.\n\nClass logic teaches that contradictory things cannot exist. According to\nit, a thing cannot be genuine and false at the same time. This class\nlogic has a narrow conception of existence. It has only observed that\nthere are many different things in nature, but has overlooked the fact\nthat all these things have also a general nature. We, on the other hand,\nrecognize that every thing, every person, is a part of the infinite\nworld and partakes of its general nature, is eternal and perishable,\ntrue and untrue, great and small, one sided and manyfold, in short\ncontradictory.\n\nBefore and after Socrates, philosophy and religion have searched for the\ngenuine, right, good, true, and beautiful, but have reached no\nharmonious results. But it cannot be denied that in the course of the\ncenturies the problem has become clearer and clearer. The great names of\nPythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Bacon, Cartesius, Spinoza,\nLeibniz, Kant, Hegel, are milestones on the highway of this progress.\nThe evolution is apparent, but the interrelation between the\nintellectual and physical, and especially between intellectual and\neconomic evolution, is much ignored. The bridge between mind and body\nwas not found, and philosophical evolution has been regarded up to our\nday as a purely mental process accomplished by one or two dozen of\nfamous brains. I wish to point out to you now, that proletarian logic is\nthe continuation of the preceding research after the genuine, true,\ngood, and beautiful. It teaches how to conceive of these ideals\nlogically, and it has not so much proceeded from any one talented\nbrain, but is rather the product of the entire cosmic process.\n\nPhilosophical brains have developed the science of logical thought only\nto the extent that the material development of the world has stimulated\nthem to do so. You must regard the human brains only as secondary levers\nof the universal lever which is not only genuine, true, good, and\nbeautiful, but truth, goodness, and beauty itself, or the world and the\nabsolute.\n\nThe understanding of the absolute which is called \"good Lord,\" and then\nagain \"the bad world,\" in other words the selfsufficient cosmos, is very\ninconvenient to the wisdom of the professors, and they are attempting to\nassign it to a special study which they call \"metaphysics.\" This\ndivision of labor is not introduced for the purpose of making research\nmore productive, but of surrounding this study by mysterious darkness.\nThe professors who lecture to the young people on formal logic set aside\nthe ancient research after the true, the good, the beautiful, and try to\nplace these ideals outside of the light of science in order to be able\nto preserve them unchanged in the tabernacle of faith.\n\nThis charge may seem unjust, because the learned gentlemen reserved a\ncorner for the true, the good, and the beautiful in their metaphysical\ndepartment. But there is something peculiar about this. The great Kant\nhas asked the plain question: \"Is metaphysics practicable as a science?\"\nAnswer: No! The transcendental truth, etc., sought by metaphysics, and\nnamed God, freedom, immortality in Christian language, cannot be found\nby any reason. But being a child of his time, the great philosopher\nmakes a small concession to the transcendental.\n\nHe teaches: Although transcendental truth cannot be located\nscientifically, still the religious faith in its existence is wholesome.\nWe, in our time, think more soberly about this theory of salvation and\naccept the elimination of all transcendentalism from science. While the\nspokesmen of the \"true people\" would like to hide their exalted truth,\nfreedom, and immortality behind the curtains of temples, we throw the\nfull daylight of logic on the absolute truth, goodness, and beauty of\nthe material world.\n\nLogic as the science of correct thought cannot be restricted to any one\nobject, it cannot exclude any object, whether terrestrial or heavenly,\nfrom its sphere. The great lights of present day learning do not wish to\nsubordinate the intellect as the object of the logical department, and\nabsolute truth as the object of the metaphysical department, to one\nanother, but to co-ordinate them side by side.\n\nBut two co-ordinated things which are not subordinated to a third higher\nthing lack logic, and the brain which is satisfied by such a condition\nsuffers from disorder. Logical truth must inevitably be a part of\nabsolute truth, and it is our duty to remove absolute truth from the\nfield of metaphysics, of transcendentalism, and to transfer it to the\nsober world which forms an inseparable unit with the human mind.\n\nSo much for the proletarian duty to continue the research after the\ntrue, the good, and the beautiful which was the object of the\nphilosophers before and after Socrates. But remember that I am referring\nonly to the truly good, beautiful, etc., which is contained in the\nuniversal truth of all true specifications. The question of the\nethically good, the esthetically beautiful and the absolutely perfect is\nas necessarily contained in the question of the universal truth as red,\nblue, and green in the rainbow, of course only in an abstract sense.\n\nOur logic which has for its object the truth of the universe, is the\nscience of the understanding of the universe, a science of universal\nunderstanding or conception of the world. It teaches that the\ninterrelation of all things is truth and life, is the genuine, right,\ngood, and beautiful. All the sublime moving the heart of man, all the\nsweet stirring his breast, is the universal nature or the universe. But\nthe vexing question still remains: What about the negative, the ugly,\nthe evil, what about error, pretense, standstill, disease, death, and\nthe devil?\n\nTrue, the world is vain, evil, ugly. But these are merely accidental\nphenomena, only forms and appendages of the world. Its eternity, truth,\ngoodness, beauty, is substantial, existing, positive. Its negative is\nlike the darkness which serves to make the light more brilliant, so that\nit may overcome the dark and shine so much more brightly.\n\nThe spokesmen of the ruling classes are not open for such a sublime\noptimism, because they have the pessimistic duty of perpetuating misery\nand servitude.\n\n\n\n\nTWELFTH LETTER\n\n\nLogic, the science of correct thought, demands in the first place true,\nor in other words, reasonable thought. Logic deals with reason and\ntruth.\n\nThese two things have been endowed with a mysterious nature, while they\nobviously belong to the entire universe and its tangible nature. Reason\nand truth are not separated from the other things, are not things in\nthemselves. There is no such thing. Philosophers who have looked for\nthem in the depths of the human brain with their hands over their eyes\nand engaged in brown study, were on the wrong road. Proletarian logic\ndiffers from conventional logic in that it does not look for reason and\ntruth behind the curtains of temples, nor in the brains of the learned,\nbut it discovers them in the actual interconnection of all things and\nprocesses of nature.\n\nPreachers, professors, judges, and politicians are the leaders of \"the\nwise men of Gotham,\" and since we have all passed our youth among them,\nwe find it difficult to get rid of their confused logic.\n\nWe owe much of our better insight to the famous philosophers. These men\nhad many an eccentric notion, but on the whole they were reasonable\nfellows who followed the doctrine of the unreliability of the senses and\nthe faith in the hidden truth and reason more in a theoretical than in a\npractical way. In practice they operated with open eyes and ears. Thus\ncorrect logic, although confused by queer notions, has been handed down\nto us from generation to generation. Preachers, professors, judges, and\npoliticians cling to the confused notions, while we take the liberty to\ndiscard them.\n\nNow we recognize not only that reason and truth are connected with the\nworld, but also that the universe is the supreme reason and truth, is\nthat being which religion and philosophy have long been looking for, the\nmost perfect being, which Plato called the true, good and beautiful,\nKant God, freedom, and immortality, and Hegel the absolute.\n\nIf he is an atheist who denies that perfection can be found in any\nindividual, then I am an atheist. And if he is a believer in God who has\nthe faith in the \"most perfect being\" with which not alone the\ntheologists, but also Cartesius and Spinoza have occupied themselves so\nmuch, then I am one of the true children of God.\n\nThe abuse of sublime feelings and exalted ideas has filled many hearts\nwith disgust, so that they care no longer for any unctuous sermons. The\nmere flavor of religion is odious to them. Nevertheless I assure you\nthat we shall never get rid of idol worship, unless we understand the\nsupreme being, reason or truth, in its true nature.\n\n\"Understand\" is a mysterious word. To bring light into the mystery of\nunderstanding by a clear theory of understanding, is an integral part of\nthe science of thought, of logic.\n\nPermit me to compare the faculty of understanding with a photographic\napparatus, by the help of which you strive to obtain a picture of the\ncosmic truth. Then you will see at a glance that in this way we can\nobtain but a dim picture of the whole. The object appears boundless, too\ninfinitely great and sublime to permit of copying. And yet we can\napproach it. Although we cannot get a true picture of universal truth,\nyet we can obtain clear pictures of individual truths, in other words,\nwe can picture the infinite in its parts. By the help of your\nintellect, you can grasp the infinite by means of limitation.\n\nAbsolute truth appears to us in relative phenomena. The perfect being is\ncomposed of imperfect parts. A \"wise man of Gotham\" may regard this as a\nsenseless contradiction. But we can separate the arms, legs, head, and\ntrunk from one another, and so separated they will be mere parts of a\ncorpse, while connected they certainly possess the chance of vitality.\nLife is composed of the dead, the most perfect being is composed of\nimperfect parts. In the universal truth everything is contained. It is\nthe perfect being, it includes the whole existence, even the imperfect.\nThe false, the ugly, the evil, the nasty are involved in the true, the\ngood, the beautiful. The universal existence is the absolute truth, the\nwhole is composed of relativities, of parts, of phenomena. Our\nunderstanding, our instrument of thought, is likewise an imperfect part\nof the perfect being. Our intellect produces only a dim, imperfect\npicture of the absolute, but it reproduces true pictures of its parts,\nalthough pictures only.\n\nThere are good and bad, adequate and inadequate, true and false thoughts\nand understanding. But there are no absolutely true thoughts. All our\nconceptions and ideas are imperfect pictures of the most perfect being\nwhich is inexhaustible in great things as in small things, as a whole\nand in parts. Every part of nature is a natural part of the infinite.\n\nI repeat: All parts or things of this world have, apart from their\nimperfect nature as parts, also the world nature of the absolute being.\nThey are imperfect perfections. Our intellect is no exception. The human\nmind is the only mind having the name of reason, and is the most\nperfect reason which can possibly exist. In the same way, the water of\nthis earth is the non plus ultra of all water. The belief in another and\ndifferent mind, in a monster mind, belongs to the same transcendental\ncategory as the belief in a celestial river without the nature of water\nflowing around the castle of Zion. Even the most perfect mind is nothing\nelse, and cannot be anything else, but an imperfect part of the absolute\nworld being.\n\nThe first thing a student of correct thought has to learn is to\ndistinguish true thought from false thought, and for this purpose he\nmust know above all that distinction must not be exaggerated. All\ndifferences can only be relative. The bad and the good pictures belong\nto the same family, and all families finally belong to the absolute, are\nindividuals of the universe.\n\nFor the purpose of distinguishing true thoughts from false, it should be\nremembered that the true thought is only a part of the truth, a part\nwhich does not exaggerate its own importance, but subordinates itself to\nthe absolute.\n\nThe following illustration may explain this. Although astronomy teaches\nthat the earth revolves daily around its axis and that the sun is\nstanding still, it nevertheless knows that the fixed state of the sun is\nonly a relative truth, so that from a higher point of view both the\nearth and the sun are revolving. The consciousness of its relative truth\nalone makes the statement of the sun's standstill true. Again, when the\nfarmer sees that the earth is fixed and that the sun is moving every day\nfrom East to West, he is mistaken only so far as he regards his\nstandpoint as the whole truth, his farmers' knowledge for absolute\nknowledge. The knowledge of the absolute alone enables you to\ndistinguish correctly between truth and error. Whoever sees the sun\nturning around the earth with the consciousness that this revolution is\nbut a partial truth is not in error, but sees truly. The knowledge of\nthe absolute truth clears up error and instructs us as to the method of\ncorrect thought. This thought makes us apt, humble, and tolerant in\njudging.\n\nThe \"wisest of men\" was very proud of his modesty in knowing that he\nknew nothing. His example may well be recommended to-day. Although we\nhave learned a great deal, we know very little compared to the\ninexhaustible fountain of all wisdom, good mother nature. We learn every\nday, but we never learn all there is to learn. What was to the credit of\nSocrates, was his firm faith in the truth, his conviction of its\nexistence, and his faith in the mission of the human intellect to search\nfor truth.\n\nOn the contrary, the sophists confused and disputed everything. They\nfrivolously flouted all truth and research. This same frivolousness now\nrelies upon Kant who, misled by the prejudice of his time, removed truth\nto a transcendental world and therefore deprecatingly called our actual\nworld the \"world of phenomena.\" In distinction from him, our logic\nteaches that the phenomena of this world without exception are parts of\nthe one truth, and that the true art of understanding consists in\nstudying the parts.\n\nThe doctrine of the sophists to the effect that everything may be denied\nand disputed has a certain similarity with ours in that we declare that\nthe universe is the truth and all parts of it true parts, that smoke and\nfog, reason and imagination, dreams and realities, subject and object,\nare true parts of the world. They are not the whole truth, but still\ntrue. For this reason it is well to call your attention to the\ndifference between the sophistical and the logical method of thought.\nThe contemporaries of Socrates are still alive to-day. They are teaching\nin the name of God and believe in nothing, while to us truth, every day\nnaked and sober truth, is sacred.\n\n\n\n\nTHIRTEENTH LETTER\n\n\nIn his \"Three Books On The Soul,\" Aristotle discussed at length the\nquestion whether the human soul has five senses or one. The commentator,\nJ. H. von Kirchmann, the publisher of the \"Philosophical Library,\"\nremarks in his footnote 172 that man has six senses. He divides feeling\ninto pure and active feeling. According to this, the phrase of the five\nsenses belongs to the old iron the same as that of the four elements.\nNow neither you, nor I, nor any reader should worry about the question\nwhether all sensation may be summed up in the one sense of feeling,\nwhether there are five senses according to Aristotle, or six according\nto Kirchmann, or whether there is even a seventh sense for the\ntranscendental, the organ of which, as some optimists hope, will\ngradually be developed with the growing perfection of man. We are\nconcerned in this matter only so far as it is connected with the\ncardinal question, whether the world is only one thing or a mere\ncollection of an infinite number of disconnected things; whether the\nso-called things are independent subjects and objects, or whether they\nare only predicates of the one world subject.\n\nLooking through the window I see the river, the street, the bridge,\nhouses, and trees. Everything is a thing in itself and yet is connected\ninseparably with all others. The qualities of the world are regarded by\nthe intellect as subjects; but the intelligent subject should also know\nthat its actions, its distinguishing and understanding, are formalities,\na formal dismemberment of the absolute, which in spite of all division\nalways remains the undivided whole.\n\nIn order to master this method of thought, you must understand above all\nthat the things are only so-called things, but are in reality qualities\nof the universe, in other words, relative things or predicates of the\nabsolute. You will then understand, that our thought has a right to make\none thing as well as six of a chair, its back, its seat, and its four\nlegs. You will recognize that the five senses of Aristotle are not an\neternal truth, but a classification, which is eternally variable.\nDistinguishing means classifying.\n\nI know very well that I am making a bold statement here, and that it is\nnot easy to justify it. For this reason you must not expect that I can\nmake my meaning clear in a few sentences. It is not only the general\nprejudice which prevents this by making a most mysterious and miraculous\nthing of the intellectual function, but also the fact that this thing is\nstill very obscure, although it has become clearer and clearer in the\ncourse of time.\n\nThe freethinking pastor Hironymi writes on this point: \"The most\nprominent naturalists of the present, such as Dubois-Reymond, who are at\nthe same time thinkers, admit that they do not know what feeling, life,\nconsciousness, are, and how they arise. And this ignorance is far more\nvaluable for truth and religion than the alleged knowledge. Let us,\ntherefore, continue in the devotion with which we have hitherto admired\nthe universe without understanding it. The higher existence, the\nconsciousness, has not been explained, it has remained a miracle, the\nonly lasting, absolute, miracle.\"\n\nThus speaks the preacher who is a know-nothing by nature and makes a\nbusiness of admiring and wondering, while we are interested in\nunderstanding and knowing. We wish to fathom the mystery, and hence I\nmay write still more letters on logic and you may study some more.\n\nI shall try to demonstrate by a trivial example, how it is that\nunderstanding or distinguishing is based on classification.\n\nTake it that you awake at early dawn and notice in a corner of your bed\nroom something uncouth and moving which you cannot clearly distinguish.\nTo know that a phenomenon appears is not enough because the term\nphenomenon applies to everything, natural and unnatural things, good and\nevil spirits. Even if you are sufficiently enlightened to know that the\nthing in question must be something natural, still this explains very\nlittle, for the term \"nature\" again means everything. But you understand\nor recognize more when you ascertain that the uncouth thing is dead or\nalive, wall paper or garment, man or animal. You will notice that in\nthis intellectual enlightenment it is simply a matter of classification,\nof the head under which the mystery should be classed. To classify the\nphenomena of truth and life, means to understand, to use the intellect,\nto enlighten the brain.\n\nBut we must well consider how far we shall have to go in our\nclassification in order to find the place in the system which will fully\nclarify and determine understanding. Suppose that in the above mentioned\ncase you have ascertained that the motion is due to a cat, then the\ninquiring faculty of understanding has not yet reached the end of its\ntether. The next question is then, whether it is your cat or that of\nyour neighbor, whether it is black, white, or grey, young or old. And\nwhen you finally recognize that it is your tomcat Peter, you must\nremember that the subject which understands as well as the object to be\nrecognized, being parts of the absolute, are absolutely and infinitely\ndivisible parts, which are never fully understood and never fully\nexhausted.\n\nPlease remember that in speaking of something uncouth, we are not so\nmuch concerned in Peter or Tabby, but in the intellect which we desire\nto understand so that we may make a correct use of it. And I refer to it\nas uncouth merely because its understanding is beset with so many\ndifficulties. When I compared it in the preceding letter with a\nphotographic apparatus which should furnish us with pictures, and in\nlikening it now to an instrument designed to distinguish things by\nclassification, I warn you not to be confused thereby. Classification is\nmost essential as a means of producing intellectual pictures. In this\nconnection I emphasize once more that the faculty of understanding, the\nsame as other things, is not independent by itself, but can accomplish\nsomething only in the universal interconnection. The understanding that\nthe phenomenon quoted above belongs to the category of tomcats, and more\nespecially into the column labeled Peter, would not be any\nunderstanding at all, if you had not become previously acquainted with\nthe mouse-devouring race and individual in question. Only in connection\nwith your previous experience is the understanding that this tomcat and\nthe uncouth motion are one and the same thing, or belong to the same\ncategory, a true understanding.\n\nLudwig Feuerbach says: A talented writer is recognized by the fact that\nhe assumes talent on the part of the reader also and does not chew up\nhis subject into minute parts like a petty schoolmaster. On the other\nhand, it seems to me that it is possible to assume too much, and I\npursued a schoolmasterly course in this case, because the subject is new\nto you and still leaves plenty of room for reflection.\n\nI wanted to show by a commonplace example what I mean by insight and\nunderstanding and how by means of it the unknown and uncouth becomes\nknown and familiar. True, the understanding in this case was illumined\nby previous experience, while you are after new knowledge. You want to\nknow how enlightenment arises in order to acquire new insight. Now, all\nnovelty has the dialectic quality of being at the same time something\nantiquated. New understanding can be acquired only by the help of old\nunderstanding. In other words, old and new understanding, which I define\nhere as the faculty of classification, have their existence only in the\ntotal interdependence of the universal existence.\n\nYou must discard the old prejudice that knowledge can be collected like\ncents. Although this is well enough, it does not suffice for the purpose\nof logical thinking. One science belongs to another, and all of them\ntogether belong to one class with the entire universe. It will be\napparent to you, then, that at the beginning of your young days your\nknowledge has not sprouted all at once, but has come out of the unknown.\nAnd what is true of you, is true of the whole human race. In its cradle\nit was without intellect. It had, indeed, the germ. But do not beasts,\nworms, and sensitive plants have that also? In short, the light of\nperception and understanding is nothing new in the radical sense of the\nword, but connected with the old and with the world in general, and of\nthe same kind. All our knowledge must be connected and combined into one\nunderstanding, one system, one realm, and this is the realm of reality,\nof truth, of life.\n\nSystematic classification is the task of logic. The first requirement\nfor this purpose is the awakened consciousness of the indivisibility of\nthe universe, of its universal unity. This consciousness is, in other\nwords, at the same time the recognition of the merely formal\nsignificance of all scientific classification.\n\nThe unity of the universe is true, and is the sole and innate truth.\nThat this sole world truth is full of differences, is just as absolutely\ndifferent as absolutely the same, does no more contradict a reasonable\nunity and equality than there is any contradiction in the fact that the\nvarious owls have different faces and still the same owl face.\n\nAristotle divided the sense into five parts, anthropologists the race of\nman into five races, natural philosophers the space into three\ndimensions. It is now a question of showing to you that such a division,\nhowever true and just, is nevertheless far from being truth and justice,\nbut is merely classification. The fundamental requirement of logic is to\ndesignate scientific classifications as that which they are, viz.,\nmental operations. It is the business of the intellect to make\nclassifications. That is its characteristic quality and does not\ncontradict the indivisible truth in the least.\n\nOld wiseacres teach that a reasonable man must not contradict himself,\nand this is a wise, though very narrow, lesson. Hegel maintains that\neverything in the world is reasonable, hence the contradictions are\nalso. Under this conservative exterior there is hidden a very\nrevolutionary perception of which the \"destructive\" minds take advantage\nin order to flatly contradict the wiseacres and their stable, dead,\ndisordered order which cannot stand any contradiction.\n\nReason dissolves all contradictions and opposition into harmony by\nlogical classification. \"Everything in its own time and place.\" If it\ndoes not wish to be called unreason, reason must rise to the\nunderstanding that its opposite is only a formal antagonism. It must\nknow that God and the world, body and soul, life and death, motion and\nrest, and whatever else the dualists may distinguish, are two and yet\none. Then it becomes clear that the conservatives are the real\nrevolutionaries, because by their senseless adherence to the \"good old\norder\" they drive the proletariat to desperation, until it upsets that\norder. On the other hand, the maligned revolutionaries are conservative,\nbecause they subordinate themselves to the world's evolutionary process\nwhich was, is, and will be eternal.\n\nThe red thread winding through all these letters deals with the\nfollowing points: The instrument of thought is a thing like all other\ncommon things, a part or attribute of the universe. It belongs\nparticularly to the general category of being and is an apparatus which\nproduces a detailed picture of human experience by categorical\nclassification or distinction. In order to use this apparatus\ncorrectly, one must fully grasp the fact that the world unit is\nmultiform and that all multiformity is a unit.\n\nIt is the solution of the riddle of the ancient Eleatic philosophy: How\ncan the one be contained in the many, and the many in one?\n\n\n\n\nFOURTEENTH LETTER\n\n\nShoemaking and beet culture are as much sciences as physics, chemistry,\nand astronomy. Reading, writing, and reckoning are called elementary\nknowledge, and though I do not deny that they have an elementary value\nfor the culture of the mind, yet I can truly say that I have met\nwell-informed people who could neither read nor write. I wish to\nindicate by this that there are indeed high and low degrees of knowledge\nand science, but that such graduations have only a temporary, local,\nrelative, subjective significance, while in the absolute all things are\nthe same.\n\nThe scorn with which you may hear some people speak of the night of the\nabsolute in which all cats are grey and all women beautiful Helenas\nshall not prevent us from repeatedly studying the absolute which I have\nagain and again praised as the main topic of logic. Only remember,\nplease, that you must not have any mystic idea of it. The absolute is\nthe sum total of all that was, is, and will be.\n\nThe subjects as well as the objects of all science belong to the\nabsolute, which is commonly called \"world.\"\n\nAll other sciences have for their object limited parts, relative\nmatters, while the science of the mind treats of all things, of the\ninfinite. This is a point to which I refer frequently because it tends\nto make my lessons obscure. I am lecturing on the science of the\nintellect, but I speak of all things, of the universe, because I am\nobliged to demonstrate, not the relation of the mind to shoemaking or\nastronomy, but its general interrelations. I have to make plain its\ngeneral conduct, and this leads necessarily to the all-embracing\ngenerality, to the absolute. We wish to learn the art of thinking, not\non this or that subject, but the art of general world thought.\n\nThe intellect is a special part, the same as every other scientific or\npractical object. But it is that part which is not satisfied with piece\nwork, which knows that it itself and all special things are attributes\nor predicates of the absolute subject, that it itself and all things are\nuniversally interrelated.\n\nThe human mind is sometimes called self-consciousness. But this name is\ntoo limited for such an unlimited thing, for the pathfinder of the\ninfinite, for your, my, and every other consciousness of the world and\nof existence in general.\n\nFor centuries the question has been discussed whether there are innate\nideas hidden in the intellect or whether it may be likened to a blank\npaper which experience impregnates with knowledge. This is the question\nafter the origin and source of understanding. Whence comes reason, where\ndo we get our ideas, judgments, conclusions? By the help of brown-study\nfrom the interior of our brain, from revelation, or from experience? It\nseems to me that you will quickly decide this matter when I ask you to\nconsider that everything we experience, together with the intellect\ngoing through experiences, is a revelation of the absolute. Everything\nwe know is experience. We may consider the mind as a sheet of blank\npaper, but in order that it may receive writing on its surface this\ninternal paper is as necessary as the external world which produces the\nhand, the pen and the ink for this process of writing. In other words,\nall experience originates from the world organism. Not knowledge, but\nconsciousness, world consciousness, is innate in the intellect. It has\nnot the consciousness of this or that in itself, but it knows of itself\nthe general, the existence as such, the absolute.\n\nThe science of the intellect has ever wrestled with one peculiar fact.\nIt found knowledge which the mind had received from the outside,\nso-called empirical knowledge. But it also found knowledge which was\ninnate, so-called _a priori_ knowledge. That there is always a valley\nbetween two mountains, that gold is not sheet iron, that the part is\nsmaller than the whole, that the angles of a triangle are together equal\nto two right angles, that circles are round, that water is wet, that\nfire is hot, etc., these are things of which we know that they are true\nin heaven and in hell, and in all time to come, although we have never\nbeen there with our experience. This plainly shows that we harbor a\nsecret in our brains which the lovers of the mystical seek to exploit by\nmaking believe that their self-interested wisdom of God and high\nauthority likewise belongs to the eternally innate truths. For this\nreason it is especially important for the proletariat to bring the\ncontroversy of the origin and source of understanding to a close.\n\nOur logic asks: Does wisdom descend mysteriously from the interior of\nthe human brain, or does it come from the outer world like all\nexperience? We shall leave its descent from heaven out of the question.\n\nThe answer is: Science, perception, understanding, thought, require\ninternal and external things, subject and object, brain and world.\nTruth is here and truth is there. Truth is so divine that it is\neverywhere and absolute.\n\nBut how to explain that wonderful _a priori_ knowledge which exceeds all\nexperience? For it is a fact that the intellect has not alone the\nfaculty of knowing things in general, but also that of separating them\ninto their parts and from one another and to name them. It cuts off\nslices, so to say. But not like the butcher who sees everything merely\nfrom the standpoint of his trade. You will remember from your own\nexperience as well as from my repeated statements that the world is not\na monotonous, but a multiform unit. This confused knot is dissolved and\nexplained by intellectual separation, by classification. In the absolute\neverything is alike and unlike. But the intellect makes abstractions\nfrom the unlike. For instance, in conceiving of the term minerals, we\npass over the distinction between gold and sheet iron. Then, when we\ncontinue the classification by subordinating gold and sheet iron as\nseparate species to the general term of minerals, we know very well that\ngold and sheet iron are different kinds of the same general mineral\nnature. We know what the names indicate, and so long as they retain\ntheir meaning, we know that neither in heaven nor in hell can gold be\nsheet iron or sheet iron be gold. Water and fire are specialties taken\nfrom the universe and named. Is it a wonder, then, that these names have\na special meaning and that we have the settled conviction that wherever\nsense instead of nonsense is master, fire burns, water wets, circles are\nround, and the sum of the angles of every triangle is equal to two right\nangles?\n\nThese illustrations are commonplace enough, indeed, but it seems to me\nthat they clearly show the mere formality of the distinction between\ninnate and experienced knowledge. You will recognize that both of these\nkinds of knowledge are different and yet of the same kind, that both are\nmixtures of the internal and external. Knowledge _a priori_ ceases to be\na miracle when we understand that it comes out of the same fountain of\nexperience as _a posteriori_ knowledge, and in either case knowledge is\nacquired only by means of the intellect. Hence intellect connected with\nthe world is the sole source of all wisdom, and external nature as well\nas our internal faculty of understanding are parts of the one general\nnature, which is the truth and the absolute.\n\n\"Only a gradual, slow, gapless development,\" says Noir\u00e9, \"can free the\nthinking mind from the philosophical disease of wondering.\"\n\nThe art of dialectics or logic which teaches that the universe, or the\nwhole world, is one being, is the science of absolute evolution. \"In the\nwhole constitution of all natural things,\" writes Lazare Geiger, \"there\nis hardly anything more miraculous than the way in which the miracle\navoids our glance and continuously withdraws into the distance to escape\nobservation. In the place of the abrupt and strange things produced by\nimagination, reason puts uniformity and transition.\"\n\nAnd we add that the science of reason, or logic, teaches simultaneously\nwith the unity of the whole world, also that all things are alike\nmiraculous, or that there is only one miracle, which is existence in\ngeneral, the absolute. In other words, everything and nothing is\nmiraculous.\n\nIn demonstrating that the most different things, such as heat and cold,\nand all radical distinctions, are only relative forms of universal\nnature, I prove the uninterrupted and matter of fact transition and the\nabsolute graduality, the fusion, of all things.\n\nI have tried to establish this proof in regard to the two kinds of\nknowledge and illustrated it with commonplace examples, because these\nhave a popularizing effect. In order to meet the demands of more\nexacting minds, I shall presently take up the miracle of causality. The\nindubitable statement that everything must have its cause is regarded as\nthe most miraculous innate knowledge, and is much misused for the\npurpose of bringing confusion into logic.\n\n\n\n\nFIFTEENTH LETTER\n\n\nMy Son:\n\nIf on my return from some voyage I were to tell you of all the things I\nhave _not_ seen, you would justly doubt the order of my senses. Sane\nreason demands that the description of unfamiliar things be given in a\npositive, not in a negative manner. If that is so, is it not wrong to\nproceed negatively by trying to prove in explaining the nature of the\nintellect that it is not a miracle and no mysterious charm of wisdom? I\nanswer: No. For the present, the intellect is still a sort of _ignis\nfatuus_ which is magnified into a fiery man. In order to understand the\n_ignis fatuus_, it is necessary to remove the fiery man. Logic must show\nthat human reason is not a miracle, not a mystical receptacle of wisdom.\nThe negative process is in such a case positively in order. Wherever a\nthing is obscured by prejudices, these must first be removed, in order\nthat room may be made for the bare fact.\n\nIt was the famous Kant who posed the question: \"How is _a priori_\nknowledge possible?\" How do we arrive at the knowledge of things which\nare not accessible to experience? The answer is that the intellect\ncannot accomplish such a miracle, and Kant substantiates this in a\nlong-winded way and with admirable penetration. But he left a nasty hair\nin the soup.\n\nHe found that by the help of our reason we can explain only phenomena.\nThe confusion between truth and phenomena had been handed down to him as\nan infirmity of ancient times. He worked diligently on its solution, but\nleft some work for those coming after him. Originally the study of\nsupernatural and the profane study of natural things were closely\nintermingled. Not until the obvious results of natural science became\nknown, did thinkers accommodate themselves to the habit of leaving\nsupernatural things to faith and limiting science to the study of\nnatural phenomena. Science had so to say passed on to the practical\norder of business, not paying any further attention to the contrast\nbetween phenomena and truth. But the logic, which is innate in the human\nmind, cannot content itself with the dualistic split between faith and\nscience. It demands a monistic system and does not desist until the\nprimeval forests of faith are completely put under cultivation.\n\nThe logical impulse of culture caused Kant to continue what was begun by\nSocrates. Philosophy before Socrates searched for truth externally.\nWhile our logic teaches that everything is true, and truth is the\nuniverse, the Ionic philosophers made a sort of fetish out of the\nmatter. Thales idolized the water as the thing of things, another the\nfire, a third numbers. This worship of the fetish was the worship of\ntruth. The search for understanding starts out with misunderstanding.\nFrom religious to scientific culture, it is a step, not a leap. When\nSocrates turned to introspection and started out, with his \"Know\nthyself,\" in submitting the prodigy of the human soul to critique, he\nmade another important step.\n\nYou know that the \"wisest of men\" was not interested in air and water,\nin natural science of the strict order, but rather in the good, the\ntrue, and the beautiful, in the human in the narrower sense, in the\nrealm of the spirit, in the soul. It was indeed unwise that he was\ninterested to the verge of idolization, since in consequence of this\ninterest in a special part, the other, the material part was being\nneglected. According to Goethe's statement that one thing is not fit for\nall, Socrates did right. He and all philosophical lights after him\nstudied the intellect. What they missed was the now dawning\nunderstanding that the faculty of thought is not a prodigy but a\nspecial, and at the same time common, part of universal nature. While\nthese philosophers looked for truth in any one special form of\nexcellence, you are now invited to look for it in the total\ninterrelation of things.\n\nScience has ever endeavored to do away with miracles and prodigies. This\ncould be accomplished only gradually, and the logicians have, therefore,\nremained more or less biased and confused. The great Kant was no\nexception. He looked for supreme truth, and for its sake he investigated\nthe intellect. He is celebrated because he explained so well that this\nintellect feels no mission for anything transcendental, and cannot\nunderstand anything but phenomena. Still he permitted something\ntranscendental to remain.\n\nKant is of the opinion that we perceive things as they appear, but not\nas they are \"in themselves.\" Nevertheless we should believe that a\nmysterious truth is at the bottom of those phenomena, because we should\notherwise arrive at the irreconcilable contradiction that there are\nphenomena without anything which could appear. The intellect, he holds,\ncan operate only on the field of phenomena, and for this reason we\nshould give up the endless grubbing after the transcendental. But we\nshould leave one little room in the house of reason, one little chamber\nof faith, which points beyond experience up to the point where a\nmysterious truth guards God and His commands.\n\nThe subsequent philosophers, especially the Hegelian philosophy, opposed\nthis separation which assigned to the intellect only the study of\nphenomena and to faith the absolute and infinite for veneration. But\nthey did not yet succeed in completely mastering the matter, they did\nnot fully arrive at an indubitably clear exposition of the fountain of\nunderstanding and of the unity of truth, so that reaction nowadays can\nagain sound the retreat after the melody: \"Back to Kant.\" You know that\nLessing complained about the treatment of \"a dead dog\" accorded to\nSpinoza, and Marx added pointedly: \"Hegel is more of a dead dog to-day\nthan Spinoza was at Lessing's time.\" The enemies of the working class\nare the enemies of evolution. They wish to preserve the existing order\nof things and the good old time in which they feel at home. For this\nreason it is the mission of the proletariat to continue the work of\nlogic. It is our duty to show clearly that the metaphysical truth which\nKant opposed to the phenomena of nature and could not eliminate from the\nintellect, is nothing but just a metaphysical, a fantastically\nexaggerated, thing.\n\nAccording to our logic, the universe is the truth and everything\npartakes of it. That such a truth is logical and such a logic true, is\nshown by the interconnection of things, so that this science is\napplicable to everything which the sciences respect as reasonable and\ntrue.\n\nIn order to help you in the understanding of the absolute and liberate\nyour thought from all special miracles, I refer to Kant's critique of\nreason. It teaches that our intellect becomes a source of understanding\nonly in connection with other phenomena of nature. Only his critique\nstuck fast in the mysterious fountain of causality. Thus he showed that\nhe was only a seeker after logic, not its master. The conclusion that\nthere must be _something_ that does appear where there are phenomena is\ncertainly correct. But that which Kant was thinking of, something of a\ntranscendental or metaphysical nature, led him to the radically wrong\nconclusion that there must be something different, peculiar, miraculous,\nmysterious, wherever there are phenomena.\n\nThe Kantian conclusion that there must be an absolute truth by itself\nbehind a phenomenon, an absolute truth that exists independent of and\ndisconnected with such phenomenon, was due to his fetish-like conception\nof truth. It is the first requirement for a correct use of the faculty\nof logical reasoning to know that truth is the common nature of the\nuniverse.\n\nThat a phenomenon must be based on nature, or an effect on a cause, is a\nfact identical with \"causality\" which I already promised to discuss in\nthe preceding letter. This same problem may also be expressed in the\nwords: Where there are predicates, there must be a subject that carries\nthem. In order to make quite sure that I will not be misunderstood, I\nemphasize once more the fact that I am not raising any doubt as to the\ncorrectness of this conclusion, but only to the metaphysical application\nof this conclusion after the Kantian manner which consists in making\nthe same use of it as a clergyman who tries to prove that his theology\nis innate in reason.\n\nOur conception of logic wishes to show that all causes and effects are\nmatter of the same kind, and that our faculty of reasoning is a matter\nof fact thing which brooks no mysteries or metaphysical dreams.\n\n\n\n\nSIXTEENTH LETTER\n\n\nNow let me illustrate the interconnection of all things, or the\nworld-unit, by discussing the question of causality. We know that\neverything has its cause. We know that this is also true on the Moon or\non Uranus, although we have not acquired this knowledge by experience on\nthose world bodies. Thus it seemed that the intellect was a mysterious\nreceptacle containing innate wisdom. The same receptacle also contains,\nfor instance, the truth that all white horses are white and all black\nhorses black. We do not know anything about the color of other horses in\nother countries, but the color of black and white horses we know even if\nwe have never seen them in other countries. It is thus apparent that our\nintellect is an instrument which reaches beyond experience. For this\nreason there would seem to be no telling where the supply of such\nmiraculous revelations would stop and into what mysterious worlds the\nintellect passing beyond the limits of experience would lead us.\n\nIn order that the human intellect may not appear transcendental, in\norder to give it its place in the general classification of natural\nforces, we must investigate the nature of causality and so-called _a\npriori_ knowledge.\n\nKindly observe in the first place that a thing is just as wonderful\n_after_ it is explained as it was before its explanation. A scientific\nexplanation of a thing ought not to do away with our admiration, but\nonly to reduce it to reasonable bounds. The intellect may very well be\nregarded as something wonderful, but its wondrous quality should be\nreduced to the measure of all things which are none of them any less\nwonderful. After you have explained what water is, after you have\nlearned that it is composed of two chemical elements, after you have\nrealized all its qualities thoroughly, it still remains a wonderful,\ndivine, fluid.\n\n\"All things have their causes.\" What are all things? They are\nattributes, qualities of the universe. It is innate in the intellect to\nknow that the world is _one_ thing, that all things belong, not to any\ndifferent thing, but to one and the same subject. The intellect is by\nnature the absolute feeling of unity. It knows of itself that everything\nis interrelated and that the consciousness of causality is nothing else\nbut the consciousness of cosmic interrelation. And I maintain that the\ninnateness of the consciousness of cosmic interrelation in our brain is\nexplained when we realize that it is an actual thing like all others, a\nphenomenon which has the same general nature as every other\nphenomenon.[7]\n\nThe fact is undeniable that a certain knowledge is innate in our\nconsciousness. The only difficulty has been to explain this fact. At\nthis point I call your attention to the exaggerated notion entertained\nin regard to explaining, and understanding, things. By explanations, a\nthing is not dissolved, but only classified.\n\nThe hatching of an egg is explained when you perceive that this process\nis part and parcel of a whole class of similar processes. If you modify\nthe exalted idea of the effect of explanations in this sense, you must\nrealize that the innate consciousness of the general interrelation of\nthings is natural and intelligible and requires no other explanation\nthan the humidity of the water, the gravity of bodies, or the color of\nblack horses.\n\nEven after it has been explained and understood, the intellect with its\nlogic remains a wonderful thing. Just as clay is by its nature\nuntransparent and pliable, or glass transparent and brittle, so\nconsciousness has its peculiar innate qualities. In this way knowledge\ncomes to the intellect not only by experience, but it is also a sort of\nreceptacle full of wisdom. Still this receptacle would no more contain\nwisdom without experience than the eye would have impressions without\nlight.\n\nIn order to straighten out the intricate windings of our subject, I\nrecapitulate them. We wish to learn the proper use of our intellect, the\nconscious application of consciousness. To this end we analyze its\nhitherto hidden mystical nature. So long as we exalt this nature\ntranscendentally to the clouds, we do not acquire its proper use.\nTherefore the first paragraph of our lesson reads: The intellect belongs\nin the same category with all things of the universe. And the second\nparagraph says: If we distinguish two classes of thought radiated by the\nhuman intellect, viz., innate thoughts, such as causality, and on the\nother hand thoughts which come through experience, we must remember that\nsuch a distinction is correct only when we realize that in spite of this\nclassification in two kinds they really belong to the same kind. Innate\nand acquired wisdom, though served on two different plates, still are\ntaken from the same general world dish.\n\nFrom this it follows that the science of causality, though applicable\nto all the phenomena of the world, does not apply to the universe. If it\nis a fact that all wisdom is worldly, then one must not fly outside of\nthe world with the concept of causality.\n\nThis is the salient point at issue.\n\nAll things are one thing, are interdependent, stand in the relation of\ncause and effect toward one another, or of genus and species. To say\nthat all things have a cause means that they have a mother. The fact\nthat every mother has a mother finds its final ending in the world\nmother or mother world, which is absolute and motherless and contains\nall mothers in its womb.\n\nCauses are mothers, effects are daughters. Every daughter has not only a\nmother, grand-mother, and great-grand-mother, but also a father,\ngrand-father, and great-grand-father. The origin, or the family\nrelationship, of a daughter is not one-sided, but all-sided. In the same\nway all things have not one, but many causes which flow together in the\ngeneral cause.\n\nThe intellect which has the innate knowledge that everything has its\ncause will accept the teaching that all causes in the world are founded\nin the absolute world cause and must return to it. It is the\nquintessence of logic not only to ascertain the true nature of the\nintellect, but also to elucidate the nature of the universe by the help\nof the intellect.\n\nAll things have a mother, but to expect that the world mother should\nlogically have a mother is to carry logic to extremities and to\nmisunderstand the intellect and its art of reasoning.\n\nIf you have recognized the faculty of understanding as a part of\nexistence, you will not wonder at its miraculousness. Existence is\nwonderful. Its parts arise one out of the other, out of the universal\ninterrelations of the one world. They all have their predecessors and\ncauses. But what is true of the relative parts, is not true of the\nabsolute whole.\n\nI am the son of my father and the father of my son. I am at the same\ntime father and son. In the same way all things are simultaneously cause\nand effect. Although father and son are two different persons, still the\ncapacity of being father and son rest in the same person, and although\ncause and effect are to be distinguished as two things, still they are\ntwo relations of the same thing. Persons and things, causes and effects,\nare not independent entities, but relative entities, are\ninterconnections or relations of the absolute.\n\nThe intellect is innate in us, and with it and through it also the\nconsciousness of being, although it is innate in us only as the teeth of\nthe child which grow after birth. Everything that we become aware of is\nknown only as a part of the universe. In so far as this is wonderful,\nthe consciousness of causality is miraculous. But, in fact, the\nknowledge of the causality of all things is innate wisdom the same as\nthat of the color of all white and black horses. At the same time it\nmust be observed that every innate knowledge is in part acquired, and\nevery acquired knowledge in part innate, so that both kinds intermingle\nand form one category.\n\nMy whole argument aims to convince you that all things are worldly\nthings, and their causality is only another name for the same thing,\njust as the German _brot_ is called _pain_ in French and _bread_ in\nEnglish. Thus we derive the firm conviction that if there is _pain_ in\nheaven there will be bread, and if there are things, there will be\ncauses and effects, or interrelation with the unit of existence.\n\nThe mystery of causality is sometimes expressed by the statement that we\npossess the indubitable knowledge which extends beyond all experience\nthat wherever a change takes place there must have preceded another\nchange. Indeed, we have the faculty of recognizing the unity in the\ninfinite multiplicity, and infinite multiplicity in the unity.\nMultiplicity, change, motion--who is to split hairs about them, who will\nmake fine distinctions? The intellect is the photographic organ of the\ninfinite motion and transformations called the \"world.\" It is and\npossesses the consciousness of cosmic changes. Is it a wonder that it\nknows that there is interrelation in its things, that no part of the\nworld, not a particle of its motion and transformations, stands alone by\nitself, that everything is connected and mutually dependent in and with\nthe universe? Because this understanding is in a way innate in the\nintellect, therefore it understands that there is nothing but change,\ninfinitely proceeding transformations. And if it detaches any single\nthing from this process, it knows that changes preceded it and changes\nwill follow.\n\nIn short, we must not marvel at any single part of nature, not even at\nthe intellect, but admire the whole universe. Then fetishism will at\nlast end and a true cult, the cult of world truth, can begin.\n\nThe art of thinking, my dear Eugene, is not so easy. For this reason I\nkeep on warning you against misunderstanding. I do not mean to advise\nyou with the foregoing against admiring any single part of nature, or of\nart, a landscape or a statue. My teaching merely tends to moderate\nadmiration by the reflection that the whole world is wonderful, that\neverything is beautiful, so that nothing ugly remains. The distinction\nbetween beautiful and ugly is only relative. Even when I say that the\ntrue worship of God, the cult of truth, cannot begin until idol worship\nceases, you will appreciate the phrase and will not insinuate that I do\nnot value the cultivation of science in the past, or that I hate idol\nworship to the extent of forgetting what I have emphasized repeatedly,\nviz., that idol worship is also worship of God, and error a paving stone\non the way toward truth. The most minute thing is a magnitude.\nEverything is true, good, and beautiful, for the universe is absolute\ntruth, beauty and goodness. I conclude with the words of Fr. von Sallet:\n\n\n     A sunny view of world and life\n       Is balm for brain and heart,\n     It is with health and beauty rife,\n       With noblest works of art.\n     But do not for a moment think\n     That it is captured in a wink.\n     The golden harvest does not grow,\n     Unless the early tempests blow.\n     And only bitter woe and strain\n     Will bright and lofty wisdom gain.\n\n\nFOOTNOTE:\n\n[7] E. g. That of natural existence.--EDITOR.\n\n\n\n\nSEVENTEENTH LETTER.\n\n\nMy subject, dear Eugene, is the simplest in the world, but it requires\nthorough treatment for all its full understanding. So every letter is in\na way but a repetition of the same argument. \"It is remarkable,\" says\nSchopenhauer, \"that we find the few main theses of pre-socratic\nphilosophy repeated innumerable times. Also in the works of modern\nthinkers, such as Cartesius, Spinoza, Leibniz, and even Kant, we find\nthat their few main theses are repeated over and over.\"\n\nNow I ask you to consider what I said in my first letters, viz., that\nthe titles of the principal philosophical works reveal that philosophy\nis engaged in the study of logic, in the analysis of the intellect and\nthe art of its use. You will then recognize that in the very nature of\nthe subject my presentation of the matter lacks systematization. It has\nno real beginning and end, because its object, the intellect, is\ninterconnected with the whole universe, which is without beginning and\nend, which has neither before nor after, neither above nor below.\n\nYou may venture that the relation of the intellect to the universe does\nnot concern the intellect especially, but is a universal matter. That\nwould be true.\n\nBut it is easy to show that the art of thinking and wisdom of the world\nare identical. And although the universal interrelation of things is\ngermain to all things and subjects, yet its consideration is a special\ntask of logic which treats all objects of thought summarily.\n\nMy subject therefore begins everywhere, even though it is a specialty.\nHence I take the liberty to take my departure from any literature which\nI happen to study. In the present letter, I deal with \"logical\ninvestigations\" of the prominent Professor Trendelenburg. His is a bulky\nvolume, but you need not fear that I shall weary you with its\nsubtleties. As a rule I read only the preface of philosophical works of\nthe second and third order, their introduction and perhaps the first few\nchapters. Then I am approximately informed as to what I may expect from\nthem further on. One frequently finds statements which, if they do not\nthrow new light on the subject, still bring out in bolder relief some of\nthe accomplishments of historical research in our field. And in order\nthat the son may not trust to the father alone, which might lead to\ndistrust, I connect my argument with some statements of Trendelenburg.\n\nIn the preface to the second edition the author complains of the \"dull\nheadache\" which the Hegelian intoxication has left in Germany and says:\n\"Philosophy will not resume its old power until it becomes consistent,\nand it will not become consistent until it grows in the same way that\nall other sciences do. In other words, it must not take a new departure\nin every brain and then quit, but it must approach its problems\nhistorically and develop them. The German prejudice must be abandoned,\naccording to which the philosophy of the future is supposed to look for\na new principle. This principle has already been found. It consists in\nthe organic world conception, the fundaments of which are resting in\nPlato and Aristotle.\"\n\nThe Professor is right, but he overlooks that the philosophers, even of\nmodern times, do not begin \"each on his own account,\" do not have \"each\nhis own principle,\" or if they have, such a \"false originality\" is but\nthe indifferent attribute of historical development which has handed the\nobject of logic, the true art of thought, from generation to generation\nin an ever brighter condition.\n\nI repeat this emphatically for pedagogic reasons, because I consider it\nessential to convince you and the reader that the apparent paradoxes\nwhich I state are the objects of discussion since time immemorial. I\nalso wish to stimulate you to a study of the master works of philosophy\nwhich show the cheering spectacle, in the persons of the most brilliant\nspecimens of the human mind, of the onward march of this mind from\ndarkness to light.\n\nIn order that the wheat contained in this human treasure box may not be\nconcealed by the tares, I am endeavoring to throw light on the outcome\nof the historical development of philosophy, and for this purpose I\ncontinue to discuss the question by taking my departure in this instance\nfrom some further statements of Trendelenburg.\n\n\"It is a peculiarity of philosophical methods of reasoning to recognize\na part in the whole, and it is tacitly assumed that the whole is\ndescended from a thought which determines the parts. On the other hand,\nit is peculiar to empirical methods of analysis to study the parts\nwithout regard to their interrelation, or at best to collect them and\nput them together, and it is tacitly assumed that every point is\nsomething peculiar in itself which must be studied apart from all the\nrest.\"\n\n\"The aim of all human understanding is always to solve the miracle of\ndivine creation by further creative thought. When this task is\nundertaken in detail, the detail study forces one on to other things:\nfor things must go backwards toward their dissolution by the same force\nthrough which they arose out of the depths.\"\n\nThese sentences state the problem before us. Shall we use the intellect\nphilosophically, or shall we use it empirically? We are striving to\nunderstand the parts and the whole, and this is identical with the\nresearch after a systematical world philosophy, or with the art of\ndialectics. Now we must state in the first place that thinking of any\nkind, whether it be philosophical or empirical, is of the same species,\nthat the same kernel is contained in both forms. Roses are different\nflowers from carnations, but the flower nature is in both of them. Thus\nthe nature of thought is contained in both philosophical and empirical\nthinking. The distinction is well enough, but their unity must not be\nlost sight of.\n\nThe philosophers, he says, seek to understand the detail by the whole;\nthe empirical thinkers analyze the details without regard to\ninterrelations. But both methods of research are different specimens of\nthe same genus, and both of them are one-sided when their\ninterconnection is overlooked. The empirical thinker who seeks to\nunderstand the details in their isolation, thinks philosophically, when\nhe regards his special research as a contribution to the whole, and the\nphilosopher, who seeks to understand the detail by the whole, thinks\nempirically when he rightly regards all details as attributes of the\nwhole.\n\nTrendelenburg, then, has expressed his case very obscurely. Both methods\nof study, if employed one-sidedly, entirely misconceive the art of\nthinking. The philosophers err when they regard the intellect as the\nonly source of understanding and truth; it is only a part of truth and\nmust be supplemented by all the rest of the world. On the other hand,\nthe empirical thinkers err when they look for understanding and truth\nexclusively in the outer world, without taking into account the\nintellectual instrument by the help of which they lift their treasures.\nIn fact, such one-sided philosophers exist only in theory; I mean there\nare some who imagine that truth could be one-sided. But in practice they\nall testify, much against their will, to the inevitable interconnection\nof matter and mind, of inside and outside. In the practical use of the\nintellect everybody shows that the part operates in the whole, and that\nthe whole is active in its parts.\n\nWe know _a priori_ that the universe is a whole. The universal existence\ncan be conceived only as of one kind or nature. The mere thought that\nthere might be something which does not partake of the nature of the\nuniverse is no thought, because it is a thought without sense or reason.\nThe whole world is the supreme being, though I grant that we have but a\nvague conception of it. We have as yet no detailed, true, conception of\nthe universe, but it is gradually acquired in the course of science.\nStill, our conception will never be perfect because details are\ninfinitesimal and the absolute being is infinite growth.\n\nAs to details, we know them more or less accurately and yet not\naccurately, because even the most minute part of the infinite is\ninfinite. All science has searched in vain for atoms. What our\nunderstanding knows, has always been nothing but predicates or\nattributes of truth, although they are true attributes and are truly\nunderstood by us.\n\nI emphasize the inadequacy of all modes of thought and of all\nunderstanding in opposition to those who make an idol of science. I\nemphasize the truth of all perceptions in opposition to those\nknownothings who claim that truth cannot be understood, but can only be\nadmired and worshipped. Hence it follows for our theory of understanding\nthat intellect and reason and the art of thought are no independent\ntreasure boxes which make any revelations to us. They are theoretical\nclassifications which in practice are operative only in the universal\ninterconnection of things. Understanding, perceiving, judging,\ndistinguishing and concluding, etc., are unable to produce any truths.\nThey can only enlighten and clarify experience by logical classification\nand distinction. Because man produces works which are preceded by\nplanning, therefore the philosophical mode of research has \"assumed that\nthe whole is descended from a thought.\" But this is an assumption of\nhuman origin, which is shown to be without foundation on closer\nanalysis. The plans of our works are copies of natural originals and are\n\"free creations of the mind\" only in a limited sense. The artists are\nwell aware of the natural descent of their thoughts and fictions. To\nregard the world as the outcome of thought is a perverse logic. It is\nthe first condition of rational, proletarian, thought to recognize the\nintellect and its products as attributes of the world subject.\n\n\n\n\nEIGHTEENTH LETTER\n\n\nJust as in political history action and reaction follow one another,\njust as periods of economic prosperity are alternated by periods of\ndepression, so we find in literature a periodical fluctuation between\nphilosophical and anti-philosophical tendencies.\n\nAfter Hegel had for a time thoroughly aroused the spirits, a time of\napathy followed, so that this hero of thought who shortly before had\nbeen almost idolized could be attacked and reviled. For about a decade,\na philosophical breeze has now once more been blowing. The subject of\nlogic, the theory of understanding, is again the object of universal\nattention. This movement is stimulated by important discoveries in\nscience, such as the heat equivalent of Robert Mayer, the origin of\nspecies by Darwin, etc., and natural science and philosophy may be\ncompared to two miners who are digging a tunnel, so that sharp ears on\nboth sides can hear the blows of the hammers and the clanging of the\ntools.\n\nThere is much truth in this picture, but it may also lead to\nmisunderstandings. By the vivisection of frogs and rabbits, by boring\ninto the brain, physiology will not discover the mind. No microscope, no\ntelescope, will reveal the nature of reason and truth or the art of\nlogical discernment.\n\nNeither will Lazarre Geiger, Max M\u00fcller, Steinthal, and Noir\u00e9 succeed in\nphilology in solving the \"last questions of all knowledge\" by the help\nof any primitive arch-language.\n\nAt the same time, the value of the co-operation of these gentlemen is\nnot denied, only I desire to point out that the comparison with the\ntunnel is not quite accurate. What Marx said of economic formulas, is\ntrue of logical formulas: \"In their analysis neither the microscope nor\nchemical reagents are of any service. The power of abstraction must\nreplace them both.\"\n\nThe two sciences will finally meet, not because each one of them digs\naway in its own one-sided fashion, but because the miners meet after\nworking hours and exchange their experiences. And the philosophers may\nbe the dominant party, because they are specialists in logic and\ntherefore prepared to utilize anything which may serve their purpose, no\nmatter from what side it comes. The other party, on the other hand, has\nits own specialties and promotes the cause of logic in a secondary and\ninvoluntary fashion.\n\nNatural science has its own monism which is distinguished from\nphilosophical proletarian monism in that it does not appreciate the\nhistorical outcome of philosophical research. One of the most prominent\nrepresentatives of the former is Noir\u00e9. He entitles one of his little\nworks \"Monistic Thought,\" but shows himself on its pages as a very\nunclear dualist. He speaks of the \"dual nature of causality\" and relates\nthat the mind operates with a different causality than the mere\nmechanical one. He calls this other \"sensory causality.\"\n\nAccording to him the world has only two attributes: \"Motion and\nsensation are the only true and objective qualities of the world....\nMotion is the truly objective ... though it is admitted that it gives us\nonly the phenomenon.... Sensation makes up the internal nature of\nthings. Every subject, whether man or atom, is endowed with the two\nqualities of all beings, viz., motion and sensation.\"\n\nThereupon I have carefully looked for an explanation in Noir\u00e9's works,\nwhy he regards the nature of things as composed of an external and an\ninternal quality, and why sensation should not be regarded as a sort of\nmotion, but the only reason I could find was the dualistic nature of his\n\"monistic\" reasoning.\n\nAs Schopenhauer provided the whole world with a \"will,\" so Noir\u00e9\nprovides it with \"sensation.\"\n\nKant and his \"Critical Philosophy\" held in their time that our intellect\nperceives only the phenomena of nature, while the mystic law of\ncausality, according to him, points to a hidden being, which cannot be\nperceived but must be believed, which we may venerate but must leave\nundisturbed by science. Schopenhauer, his brilliant successor, who in\nspite of his brilliancy did not materially advance the cause of\nphilosophy, mystified the problem of causality by his discovery that the\nnature of the world is will power. These teachings of Kant and\nSchopenhauer are dressed up anew and mixed with the recent discoveries\nof science by Noir\u00e9. But he entirely ignores the work of Schelling and\nHegel, who by their criticisms have made evident the lack of logic in\nthe Kantian separation of phenomenon (apparition) from noumenon\n(essence), of cause from effect.\n\nYou are familiar with the silly question whether Goethe or Schiller,\nShakespeare or Byron, is the greater poet, and you will not think that I\nam trying to elevate Hegel above Kant or Kant above Hegel. They are just\ntwo cogs on the spinning wheel of history. If the second crushes what\nthe first has cracked, such is the result of their succession.\n\nNatural science is also a valuable co-operator in the solution of the\nworld problem, not so much by digging in the logical tunnel itself, or\nmaking amateur excursions into the fields of philosophy or metaphysics,\nbut because it elucidates and renders tangible the special object of\nlogic in such far-embracing objects as the unity of natural forces or of\nanimal species. The scientific presentation of this special object,\nhowever, requires a brain armed with the full equipment of the\nhistorical outcome of philosophy.\n\nNow you must not believe that I am conceited enough to place my own\nlittle personality on the pedestal as the only true philosopher. I am\ntoo well aware of my shortcomings as a self-educated man. But seeing\nthat I have striven earnestly and without prejudice since my young days\nto understand the high object of my studies, I feel in my heart a\ncertain confidence in my qualification to deal with it. On the other\nhand, I know my lack of that sort of learning which is required in order\nto be able to present the scientifically much-courted nature of the\nhuman mind in such a form and with such emphasis as its sublime\ncharacter deserves. And if I, nevertheless, come before the public on\nvarious occasions with my tentative works, I offer as an excuse that\nhitherto the Messiah has not appeared who will come after me and whose\nJohn the Baptist I should like to be.\n\nYou, my dear Eugene, will take me soberly and reduce my resounding words\nto their proper measure, when I, in the intoxication of enthusiasm, flow\nover like that now and then. You know that I am no hero worshipper.\nThough all research is but the product of individual minds, the mind of\neach man is a part of the universal mind which produces science. Now\nfollows the point which forms the conclusion of all my letters: The\nintellect which produces science is indeed a part of man, but still more\na part of the world, it is the universal world intellect, the reason of\nthe absolute, the absolute reason.\n\nThe study of this intellect at work, not merely in shoemaking, in\nanatomy, or in astronomy, but in all fields, in the infinite, of its\nlife in the absolute, is the means by which the art of logic is\nacquired. It is true that the infinite exists only in finite parts, and\nyou cannot conceive of the infinite directly, you can perceive it only\nin its parts. And in perceiving them you must always remember that every\npart is an infinite piece of the infinite universe.\n\nIn his \"Introduction and Proofs of a Monistic Theory of Understanding,\"\nNoir\u00e9, after enumerating the new points contained in his work, adds\nsneeringly that he is \"not in a position to give any new clews as to the\nnature of the absolute.\" For this very reason I want to denounce his\n\"Monism\" as a shallow piece of work, which offers only the name instead\nof the essence.\n\nThe well-known Ernst H\u00e6ckel knows a great deal more about this subject.\nIn a lecture given at the twenty-fifth convention of natural scientists\nin Eisenach, he calls the monistic view of nature \"a grand pantheistic\none.\" The essence of all religion, according to him, consists in the\n\"conviction of a final and unmistakably common cause of all things.\" And\nhe continues: \"In the admission that with the present day organization\nof our brain, we are unable to penetrate to the final cause of all\nthings, the critical natural philosophy and dogmatic religion agree.\"\nWhether the professor is one of those natural philosophers who regard\nthe human mind as too narrow for the understanding of the \"unmistakably\n(hence somewhat understood) common cause of all things,\" is not quite\nclear to me, nor probably to the famous scientist himself. For he adds:\n\"The more we progress in the understanding of nature, the more we\napproach that unattainable final cause.\" And further on: \"The purest\nform of monistic faith culminates in the conviction of the unity of God\nand nature.\"\n\nNow I ask: If nature, God, and absolute truth are one and the same\nthing, have we not learned something about the \"final cause of all\nthings?\" What necessity is there in that case for speaking in such an\nabjectedly humble tone of human understanding, or to assign nothing but\nstraw and husks to it, in the language of Hegel?\n\nYou see, then, that H\u00e6ckel has a higher estimate of absolute nature than\nNoir\u00e9 who does not care to have anything to do with the nature of the\nabsolute. But my object at this moment is to convince you that neither\nthe one nor the other of these two, nor natural science, so-called, is\ndirectly digging in the tunnel which will give us light on the question\nof the limits of our understanding and the final cause of things. Our\nlogic, on the other hand, which treats the intellect as a part of\nnature, cultivates a natural science that includes the mere empirical\nnatural science in the same way in which the day of twenty-four hours\nincludes the day of twelve hours and the night.\n\nNatural science proper deals mainly with tangible things. Light and\nsound, the objects of eye and ear, are still included in its studies.\nThe objects of smell and taste stand on the dividing line. But the\nsocalled sciences of the mind, such as grammar and politics, political\neconomy and history, morals and law, and most decidedly logic, are\nentirely excluded.\n\nSuch a limitation is well enough, if we remember that it is purely\nformal. However, it must not overlook the bridge which leads from\nlimited nature to universal, infinite, nature.\n\nThe monism of natural science has a far too narrow view of the universe.\nWhen it says that \"all is motion,\" it says just as little or as much as\nSolomon with his \"all is vain.\" Everything is crooked and straight,\neverything great and small, everything temporal and eternal, everything\ntruth and life. But nothing is thus said to show the meaning of\ndistinction in this world, to explain how rest exists in motion, and\nsense in nonsense.\n\nIn order to differentiate logically we must know that everything is\neverything, that the universe or absolute is its own cause and the final\ncause of all things, which embraces all distinctions, even that of\ncausality and that between matter and mind.\n\n\n\n\nNINETEENTH LETTER\n\n\n\"Philosophy should not try to be edifying,\" said Hegel. This means that\nreligious feeling is far below scientific thought. But there is a\nreverse side to this sentence, viz., that thoughts which do not rise to\nthe edifying interconnection of all things, no matter whether they\nremain stuck in some specialty on account of frivolousness or of\nnarrowmindedness, are far below a wise world philosophy.\n\nIn a former letter I have already emphasized, and I hope to prove it\nmore convincingly, that the conception of \"God,\" or of the absolute, is\nindispensable for a logical world philosophy.\n\nYou know that in my dictionary the gods and divinities of all religions\nand denominations are \"idols,\" and justly so, since they are all\nmanufactured images. Instead of the entire universe, they worship a more\nor less unessential part of it.\n\nThe religions show by their idolatry, the sciences frequently by their\nlittle creditable indifference, that they have no conception of the\nintellect and its art of reasoning.\n\nThe universe is a familiar conception. Everybody uses it, and there is\napparently little to say about it. But in fact it is the conception of\nall conceptions, the being of all beings, the cause of itself which has\nno other cause and no other being beside itself. That the whole world is\ncontained in the universe is so obvious that you may wonder at my waste\nof words over such a matter-of-fact thing. But when you consider that\nthe people have always searched for a world cause outside of the world,\ntogether with a beginning of the world and a transcendental truth, then\nyou will see that they have not grasped the conception of the world as a\nwhole, as a universe. And if that is admitted, then the proof that it is\nthe cause of all causes, the beginning of all beginnings, and the truth\nof all truths, is not such a superfluous undertaking.\n\nNow you may say that it is presumptuous to try to understand the whole\nuniverse at once. This objection is justified in a way, according to the\ninterpretation of the words. Still I hope that it will be my\njustification to declare that it is not a question of understanding the\nuniverse in detail, but only in general, not each and everything in its\ndifferentiation, but only in a summary way. And it is only the edifying\nconception of the universe as a whole which will open for you the door\nto the understanding of the human mind, of thought, and the art of using\nit. We wish to understand _the_ conception; not this or that conception,\nbut the whole conception, the conception of the whole. You will no\nlonger indulge in the superstition that the faculty of thought or\nunderstanding is a thing apart from the world's interconnection. I\npresume that you have now learned enough about the art of thought to be\nsure not to think of anything without its worldwide interrelation. For\nso long as one imagines that a piece of wood or a stone is a thing in\nitself, without connection with light and air, with Earth, Moon, and\nSun, he has a very barbarian conception of the things of this world.\n\nI maintain that the understanding of the human faculty of reason and the\nart of its use are inseparable from the world concept. And I want this\nunderstood in the sense, that it is not a mistake to distinguish between\nthe internal mind and the outside world, but that these are merely\nformal distinctions of the essentially indivisible and absolute\nuniverse.\n\nThe concept of this true God or divine, because universal, Truth shows\non close analysis that it includes the special truth of the art of\nthought as well as all other sciences, and pre-eminently the science of\nthought, because this science must not limit itself to any special\nthing, but must be world wisdom by its very will and nature.\n\nTo understand the universe, then, means to become aware that this being\nof all beings has no beginning, no cause, no truth nor reason outside\nand beside itself, but has everything in and by itself. To understand\nthe universe means to recognize that one is rushing beyond the worldly\ninfinity into the realm of fantastic transcendentalism and abusing the\nintellect, when illogically applying such terms as beginning and end,\ncause and effect, being and not being, to the absolute universe. Such an\nillogical use of the faculty of thought is well illustrated and rebuked\nby the poet who questions and answers:\n\n\n     \"And when my life has passed away,\n       What will become of me?\n     The world has one eternal day,\n       'Thereafter' cannot be.\"\n\n\nIn order to acquire the universal sense, you will strive to understand\nthat the universe includes all relative things, while as a whole it\nembodies the absolute or the edifying deity.\n\nIf you would become world-wise, you must learn that the things called\nopposites and contradictions have a different meaning than is ordinarily\napplied to them by the logic of the idolators. They say that God and the\nworld, body and soul, truth and error, life and death, etc., are\nirreconcilable antipodes; that they exclude one another; that they\ncannot be brought under the same roof, but must be kept wide apart by\nthe laws of eternal reason. But this doctrine of contradiction is merely\nnarrow dogmatism, which confuses the minds instead of enlightening them.\nCertainly, death differs from life, the perishable from the\nimperishable, black from white, crooked from straight, large from small.\nWho would be silly enough to deny that? But even the apparently most\ncontradictory and opposite things may be classified under the same\ngenus, family, or species, as twins in a mother's womb. The same thing\nthat does not prevent male and female from sitting in the same nest,\ndoes not prevent the most widely different things, in spite of their\nseparate characters, from being one and the same, from being two pieces\nof the same caliber. You are certainly still the same Eugene that you\nwere as a little baby, and yet you are at the same time another. The\nexperts in physiology even claim that they can compute how often a man\nof sixty has changed his flesh, bones, skin, and hair. Although the old\nman is the same individual that he was when first born, yet he never\nremained the same.\n\nYou will see by this illustration that all difference is of the same\nnature, a general, supreme, universal being, absolute and divine, and\nthis absolute world being is highly edifying, because it comprises all\nother beings and is the Alpha and Omega of all things.\n\nIs this world-god a mere idea? No, it is the truth and life itself. And\nit is very interesting to note that the so-called \"ontological proof of\nthe existence of God\" agrees very well with the world truth which I\nproclaim in the tabernacle of logic. This proof is originally attributed\nto the learned Anselmo of Canterbury. However that may be, it is certain\nthat Descartes and Spinoza support him with their famous names. They\nhold that the \"most perfect being\" must necessarily have existence,\nbecause otherwise it would not be the most perfect.\n\n\"I understood very well,\" writes Descartes in the fourth section of his\n\"Method of Correct Thought,\" \"that in accepting the hypothesis of a\ntriangle I would have to accept the fact that the sum of its three\nangles is equal to two right angles. But nothing convinced me of the\npresence of such a triangle, while I found that my conception of the\nmost perfect being was as inseparably linked to existence as my\nconception of a triangle is to the identity of the sum of its angles\nwith two right angles.... Hence it is certainly as undeniable as any\ngeometrical proof can be that God exists as this most perfect being.\"\n\nThis argument appears to me as clear as daylight and ought to convince\nyou, not of the existence of a transcendental idol, but of the truth of\nthe absolute and most perfect world being. If you were to remark that\nthis perfectness is not so very great, considering its many obvious\nimperfections, I should ask you not to split hairs and to recognize with\nsane senses that these imperfections of the world belong as logically to\nthe perfect world as the evil desires belong to virtue which becomes\nvirtue only by the test of overcoming them. The conception of a\nperfection which has no imperfections to overcome would be a silly idea.\n\nNow in conclusion let me say a few words of apology for continually\ninterchanging the universe and the concept of the universe. I frequently\nspeak of the idea of a thing as if it were the thing itself. But see\nhere! Do you not ask on seeing the portrait of some person unknown to\nyou: Who is this? And do you not interchange the portrait for the person\nitself, without difficulty and misunderstanding? The idea stands in the\nsame relation to the thing, as the portrait to the person it represents.\nThis remark is directed against that unsound logic which knows only the\nseparation of the idea from the thing, of reason from its objects, but\ndoes not grasp the mere formality of such a distinction, does not\nappreciate the unity of the world, the edifying and supreme truth, the\ntruth of the supreme being.\n\nThis letter, my dear Eugene, pleads for edification, but only for that\nkind of edification which includes the unedifying, whereby edification\nis sobered down. If you would give the name of pantheism to this world\nphilosophy, you should remember that it is not a sentimental and\nexalted, but a common sense pantheism, a deification which has the taste\nof the godless.\n\n\n\n\nTWENTIETH LETTER\n\n\nDear Eugene:\n\nToday I am going to present my case with the precision of a\nschoolmaster.\n\nThe concept of white cabbage embraces all white cabbage heads that ever\nwere and ever will be.\n\nThe concept of cabbage embraces red, white, and many other kinds of\ncabbage. The concept of vegetable embraces a still wider range. The\norganic field is still more comprehensive. And finally the world concept\nembraces everything which we know and don't know, the end of which we\ncannot conceive, and which therefore is called infinite.\n\nWhen we trace our steps backward over the same reasoning, we find at\nonce that the universal concept is divided into two parts, viz., the\nuniverse and the conception of it. We thus find the world in the concept\nand the concept in the world, so that both of these parts are\ninterconnected, each is the predicate of the other, and whether we turn\nthe thing to the right or to the left, the concept is in the world and\nthe world in the concept.\n\nNow it is true that the concept, or the faculty of understanding, is the\nobject of our study rather than the world outside of it. The faculty of\nunderstanding, by the way, is nothing but a collective noun for all\nconcepts, hence simply another name for concept in general. But what I\neternally repeat is this: We cannot make a concept separated from all\nthe rest of the world the object of our study, because that would be an\nempty abstraction which does not take on any meaning until we connect it\nwith the world, for instance the special concept of cabbage with\nsense-perceived cabbage and so forth.\n\nThe concepts of white cabbage, cabbage in general, vegetables, or\nplants, etc., are all of them special concepts and at the same time\ngeneral concepts. The one and the other is relative. Compared to the\nvarious species it includes, the general concept of cabbage is abstract,\nwhile compared to the general concept of vegetables it is concrete. And\nso it is with all concepts. They are abstract and concrete at the same\ntime. Only the final concept, the world concept, is neither concrete nor\nabstract, but absolute. It is the concept of the absolute, which is\nindispensable for an understanding of logic.\n\nWe found a while ago that the absolute world concept consisted of two\nparts, viz., the concept and the world. In the same way, the chemists\nteach us that water consists of two elements, each of which by itself\ndoes not make any water, while their compound makes pure water. But we\ndo not need such distant illustrations. My table in its present\ncomposition is something different from what it would be if the same\npieces were put together in some other way and without a plan.\n\nTherefore the world concept is a far more sublime concept than all the\nparts of which it consists. And in order to make this quite clear, I may\nhonor this compound of the world and its concept by a special name, say\n\"universe,\" so as to distinguish it from its component parts.\n\nNow I declare, without fear of having the word turned in my mouth by any\nsophist, that the world embracing the thought, or the universe, is the\nabsolute which includes everything, while the world and the thought of\nit, each by itself, are but classifications or relative things.\n\nWe wish to understand thought, not empty abstract thought, but the\nuniversal world-embracing thought, the thought in a philosophical sense.\nThis is not mere thought, but living truth, the universe, the absolute,\nthe supreme being.\n\nIt is with the universe and its parts as it is with a telescope and its\nconcentric rings. Our intellect is a special ring which gives us a\npicture of the whole concentric thing. This photographer, as I have\ncalled it in a former letter, is not the object of our study for its own\nsake, nor for the sake of its pictures, but rather for the sake of the\noriginal, of the universe. It is as if somebody were to buy a portrait\nof some historically renowned person. No matter how much concerned the\nbuyer would be with the picture, in the last analysis he is concerned\nwith that person itself. So it is with the art of understanding the\nabsolute, with world wisdom, which we study not for the sake of the\nwisdom, but of the world itself.\n\nThis lengthy discussion might have been cut short by simply speaking of\nthe world instead of going to so much trouble on account of the world\nconcept. But I should then miss my point, which is that the human\nintellect is a part of the world, and that the ideological distinction\nwhich separates this intellect from the rest of the world, requires for\nthe whole an embracing term.\n\nThe absolute concept is the concept of the absolute, of the supreme\nbeing. To it applies all the true, good, and beautiful ever attributed\nto God, and it is also that being which lends logic, consistency, and\nform to all thought.\n\nPlato is a philosopher who has thrown a wonderful light on the faculty\nof understanding, though he has not fully explained it. In his dialogue\nentitled \"Gorgias,\" he makes Socrates say the following: \"Does it seem\nto you that men want that with which they occupy themselves at any time,\nor that for the sake of which they undertake whatever they may be\nengaged in? Do those, for instance, who take some medicine prescribed by\nthe physicians seem to want that which they do ... or to want that for\nthe sake of which they take medicine, viz., health?... In the same way\nthose who go on board of ships and trade do not want that which they are\ndoing; for who would care to go to sea and face danger or conquer\nobstacles? That for which they go to sea is that which they want, viz.,\nto become rich; they are going to sea for the sake of acquiring wealth.\"\n\nPlato thus says that the immediate purposes of men are not their real\npurposes, but means to an end, means to welfare or for \"good.\" He\ntherefore continues: \"It is in pursuit of good, then, that we go when we\ngo, because we are after something better, and we stand still for the\nsake of the same good.\"\n\nNow let us go a step farther than Socrates and Plato. Just as men's\nactions are truly done, not for the sake of some immediate purpose, but\nof the ulterior, of welfare, and just as their socalled ethical actions\nare justified only by the general wellbeing, so all things of the world\nare not substantiated by their immediate environment, but by the\ninfinite universe. It is not the seed planted in the soil which is the\ncause of the growing plant, as the farmer thinks, but the Earth, the\nSun, the winds, and the weather, in short, the whole of nature, and that\nincludes the seed germ.\n\nIf we apply this reasoning to our special object, the faculty of\nunderstanding, we find that it is not a narrowly human, nor a\ntranscendental, but a universal cosmic faculty. According to Homer, the\nimmortal gods call things by other names than mortal men. But once you\nhave grasped the concept of the absolute, you understand the language of\nthe gods, you understand that the intellect by itself is but a minute\nparticle, while in the interrelation with the universe it is an absolute\nand integral part of the universal absolute.\n\nAll things have a dual nature, all of them are limited parts of the\nunlimited, the inexhaustible, the unknowable. Just as all things are\nsmall and great, temporal and eternal, so all of them including the\nhuman mind are knowable and unknowable at the same time. We must not\nidolize the faculty of thought nor forget its divine nature. Man should\nbe humble, but without bowing in doglike submission to a transcendental\nspirit, and he should be sustained by the sublime consciousness that his\nspirit is the true one, the spirit of universal truth.\n\nEverything can be seen by eyes, including those of a hawk. Just as the\neye is the instrument of vision, so the intellect is the instrument of\nthought. And just as spectacles and glasses are means of assisting the\neye in seeing, so senses, experience, and experiments are means of\nassisting the intellect in understanding. With this equipment the\nintellect can assimilate everything in its conceptions. It understands\n\"all,\" but \"all\" only in a relative sense. We understand all, just as we\nbuy everything for money. We can buy only what is for sale. Reason and\nsunshine cannot be valued in money. We can see everything with eyes, and\nyet not everything. Sounds and smells cannot be seen. Just as everything\nis great and small, so everything is knowable and unknowable, according\nto the meaning given to \"everything\" in the language of men or gods.\nThat word has the dual meaning of applying to any particle and to the\nwhole universe. So is the human mind universal, but only a universal\nspecialty.\n\nLook at that magnificently colored carnation. You see the whole flower,\nand yet you do not see all of it. You do not see its scent nor its\nweight. In the human language \"whole\" means a relative whole, which is\nat the same time a part. Every particle of the universe is such a dual\nthing. But in the language of the gods, which is spoken by philosophy,\nonly the absolute universe is whole.\n\nWhen the subject under discussion is not the intellect, but some other\npart of the world, for instance the eyes, the universal concept of the\nabsolute is not so important, because the faculty of seeing, like the\nfaculty of wealth, is in little danger of being metaphysically abused.\n\nOne knows that eyes which can see around a corner, or through a block of\niron, or which can perceive the scent of a carnation, are as meaningless\nas a white sorrel. Even though our eyes cannot see the invisible, that\ndoes not prevent them from being a universal instrument which can see\neverything, that is everything visible.\n\nIf you understand this, you will also see through the miserable wisdom\nof the professors which wallows on its belly in the dust and cries with\nthe faithful: O Lord, O Lord! similarly to Du Bois-Reymond, who cries\nout: _Ignorabimus_! It is true that the human mind is an ignoramus in\nthe sense that it is ever learning, because there is inexhaustible\nmaterial in nature. There is also something unknowable in every particle\nof nature, just as there is something invisible in every carnation. But\nthe unknowable in the sense used by those ignorant people who cannot\nunderstand the human mind because they have a transcendental monster in\ntheir mind, such a monstrous unknowable exists only in the imagination\nof the idolators to whom the true spirit reveals itself as little as the\nspirit of truth.\n\nJust as surely as we know that there cannot be in heaven any knife\nwithout a blade and a handle, nor any black horses that are white, just\nso surely do we know that the faculty of understanding can never and\nnowhere be the absolute, but must always be a special faculty. The\nconcept of understanding, like the concept of a knife, is limited to a\ndefinite instrument. There may be all kinds of knives and intellects,\nbut nothing exists that has escaped from its own skin or from the\nlimitation of its own particular concept.\n\nBy this standard you may measure the silly thought of those who speak\ntranscendentally of an unlimited faculty of understanding. They haven't\nany right idea of the mind nor of the universe, of the conceivable nor\nof the inconceivable, otherwise they would not speak in such a\nnonsensical sense of the \"Limits of Understanding.\" In short, you see\nthat the relative limitation or absoluteness of reason can only be\nunderstood by means of the concept of the absolute.\n\n\n\n\nTWENTY-FIRST LETTER\n\n\nThe proletarian logic of the working class searches after the supreme\nbeing. The working class knows that it must serve but it wants to know\nwhom to serve. Shall it be an idol or a king? Where, who, what, is the\nsupreme being to which everything else is subordinate, which brings\nsystem, consistency, logic, into our thought and actions? The next\nquestion is then: By what road do we arrive at its understanding? Any\ntranscendental revelation being of no use to us, there are only two ways\nopen: Reason and experience.\n\nNow it is a mistake of common logic to regard these two roads as\nseparate, while, in fact, they are one and the same common road, which\nby the help of empirical reason or reasonable experience leads us to the\npoint where we recognize that the supreme being to which everything is\nsubordinate, is nothing special, not a part or a particle, but the\nuniverse itself with all its parts.\n\nWe take medicine for the sake of health, we make efforts for the sake of\nwealth. But neither health nor wealth are an end in themselves. What\ngood is health to us, when we have nothing to bite? What good are all\nthe treasures of Croesus, if health is lacking? Therefore health and\nwealth must be combined. Nor is that enough. There is a spirit in us\nthat drives us farther ahead. There are still other treasures and\nrequirements, for instance contentment is surely one of them. But the\nmotive power of the world spirit is so infinite, that it is not\nsatisfied until it has everything. Everything, then, in other words the\nwhole world, that is the true end.\n\nSocrates and his school, to whom I alluded in the preceding letter,\nwandered the way of separate reason for the purpose of finding the\nsupreme being, the true, the good, the beautiful. The platonic dialogues\npaint a very magnificent picture of the truth that neither health nor\nwealth, neither bravery nor devotion, are \"the greatest good,\" but that\nit is mainly a question of the understanding and use to which mankind\nput these things. Accordingly they are good or bad, they are but\nrelative \"goods.\" Love and faith, honesty and veracity, are good enough,\nbut not _the_ good; they only partake of the good. What is sought is\nthat which is under all circumstances absolutely good, true, and\nbeautiful.\n\nWhen Socrates asked his disciples to define the good or reasonable, they\nenumerated as a rule a series of good and reasonable specialties, while\nthe master was continually compelled to instruct them, that his research\nwas not aimed at those objects. They name important virtues, and he\nwants to know what absolute virtue is. They name good things, and he is\nlooking for _the_ good, for pure goodness, while the good things have\nthe bad quality of being good only under certain circumstances.\n\nThe Socratic school then finds out that only the understanding or the\nintellect can find the circumstances under which we may arrive at the\nabsolute. Understanding, the human mind, philosophy, is to them the\ndivine. Thus they arrive at their famous \"Know thyself,\" which in their\nlanguage means: Hold introspection and rack your brain. But they did not\nsucceed in thus using the intellect as an oracle. Nor did the Christian\nphilosophers of later times fare any better with that method, when they\nchanged the title of the object of their studies and substituted God,\nLiberty, and Immortality, for the good, the true, and the beautiful.\n\nIn order to get out of the confusion resulting from the many names given\nto the object of logic in the course of history, it must be remembered\nthat pagan as well as Christian research founded their quest for the\nabsolute on the innate need of understanding the supreme being which was\nto be the pivot of all thought and action. Polytheism had to have a\nsupreme god, no matter whether his name was Zeus or Jupiter. In\nconsequence of this longing for unity it was very natural that the place\nof the many immortals was finally taken by one eternal father of all.\nThe philosophers are distinguished from the theologians only in so far\nas the former seek for the fulcrum of the world more on real than on\nimaginary ground.\n\nAfter more than two thousand years of mediation by intermediary links,\nancient philosophy has at last been transformed into modern\ndemocratic-proletarian logic which recognizes that the intellect is an\ninstrument which leads to the supreme being on condition that it does\nnot rack the brain but goes outside of itself and consciously connects\nitself with the world outside. This connection constitutes the supreme\nbeing, the imperishable, eternal, truth, goodness, beauty, and reason.\nAll other things only \"partake of it,\" to use Platonic language.\n\nAlthough the Socratic school were handicapped by many fantastical\nattributes, still they were on the road towards true logic, as neither\nhealth nor wealth, nor any other treasure or virtue satisfied them. They\ndid not care for true phenomena, but for truth itself. But truth is the\nuniverse, and man must understand that this is the only truth, in order\nto be able to use his intellect logically, to be reasonable in the\nhighest and classical sense of this word.\n\nAll the world speaks of logic and logical thought. But when you, my son,\nas a thinking man feel the need of getting out of phraseology and\nknowing exactly what words should mean, you will hardly find one book\nthat will give you sufficient light on the subject of logic. The best\nbook would be the Bible, perhaps. I mean that, when you inquire after\nbeginning and end, purpose and destination, in short, after that which\nwould give you and all things a definite support, when you search for\nthe vortex around which everything revolves, then the Bible does not\ntell you about the beginning of this or that part of history, but speaks\nof the absolute beginning and end of all history, of the general purpose\nand general destination of all existence. That is what I call logic.\n\nThe free thinkers were not satisfied with religious mythology, they\nwanted to bring consistency and logic into their brains by their own\nstudies. Plato and Aristotle have done good work along this line. So\nhave the subsequent philosophers, Cartesius, Spinoza, Kant. The main\nimpediment for all of them was the obstinate prejudice that man could\nhave reason in his own brain. Of course, that is where he has it, but it\nis not reasonable reason. The intellect shut up in the skull has not\nwisdom in its keeping, as the ancients thought. Wisdom cannot be\nacquired by racking your brain. Hegel is right: Reason is in the brain,\nit is in all things, \"everything is reasonable.\" I merely repeat, then,\nthat the universe is the true reason.\n\nYou will not misunderstand the term \"racking your brain.\" I am not an\nopponent of introspective thought, but only desire to call your\nattention to the fact that it has led to the wrong habit of separating\nthought from sight, hearing, feeling, of divesting the mind of the body.\nJust as the Christian looked for salvation outside of the flesh, so the\nphilosophers looked for reason or understanding outside of the\nconnection with the rest of the world, outside of experience. It was\nespecially the research after the nature of the intellect which imagined\nit had to creep inside of itself.\n\nWhen studying the stars, we look at the heavens; when endeavoring to\nenrich our knowledge of plants, we gather flowers. But if we attempt to\nunderstand the mind, we must not rack our brain, nor dissect it with an\nanatomical knife. We shall indeed find the brain, but not the mind, not\nreason.\n\nAnd even the brain is not so easily cut out, as many an overzealous\nmaterialist may think. The student of anatomy who pries into the nature\nof the brain substance knows very well that this substance is not\ncontained in the head of this or that fellow, but must be sought in many\nheads before the average brain is found, which differs materially from\nthat of Peter or Paul. This will show that your brain is not only your\nown, but also \"partakes\" of the universal brain, and you will easily\nconclude from this how much less your reason is yours alone. Hegel is\nright: Not only men, but everything is reasonable.\n\nTrue, the most rotten conditions may be defended by such maxims. Hence\nthe great logician Hegel has the bad name of having been, not a\nphilosopher of the people, but a royal state philosopher of Prussia. I\nwill neither blacken nor whitewash him, nor will I overlook that he left\nthe great cause in a state of mystical obscurity. But I recognize that\neven the worst prejudices, the most perverted morals, laws and\ninstitutions, have their reasonable justification in the times and\nconditions of their origin. Such an understanding is immediately\nfollowed by the further insight, that the most reasonable things,\ncrushed by the wheel of time, will become rotten and unreasonable. In\nshort, the \"good\" is not any special institutions, but is found in the\ninterrelations of the universe. Only the absolute is absolutely good.\nAnd for this reason not only some conservative editors of capitalist\npapers, but also the revolutionary authors of the \"Communist Manifesto,\"\nare genuine Hegelians.\n\n\n\n\nTWENTY-SECOND LETTER\n\n\nDear Eugene:\n\nSocrates teaches: When we walk, it is not walking, when we stand still,\nit is not standing which is our purpose. We always have something\nulterior in view, until finally the general welfare is the true end of\nour actions, in other words, the \"good.\" And on closer analysis you will\nfind that your individual welfare, the socalled egoistic good, is not\nenough in itself.\n\nYou are not only related to your father, mother, brothers, sisters,\nrelatives and friends, but also to your community, state, and finally to\nthe entire population of the globe. Your welfare is dependent on their\nwelfare, on the welfare of the whole.\n\nI know very well that the horizon of the everyday capitalist minds does\nnot reach farther than they can see from the steeple of their church.\nThey think according to the bad maxim: The shirt is closer to the skin\nthan the coat. If I had to choose between the shirt and the coat, I\nshould prefer to wear the coat without a shirt rather than to run\naround in shirt sleeves as the object of universal ridicule. The old man\nwho plants a tree the fruits of which he will perhaps never see is not\nsuch a capitalist mind, otherwise he would sow seeds that would ripen\nduring this year's summer.\n\nAt this juncture we must remember that the disciples of Socrates who\nlooked for the absolute under the name of the \"good,\" were in so far\nnarrow as they conceived of it only from the moral, specifically human,\nstandpoint, instead of at the same time considering its cosmic side.\nJust as health and wealth belong together, and even these are not\nsufficient for human welfare which further requires all social and\npolitical virtues, so the good is not comprised in the interrelations of\nall mankind, but passes beyond them and connects itself with the entire\nuniverse. Without the universe man is nothing. He has no eyes without\nlight, no ears without sound, no morals without physics. Man is not so\nmuch the measure of all things; his more or less intimate connection\nwith all things is rather the measure of all humanity. Not narrow\nmorality, but the universe, the supreme being, is the good in the very\nhighest meaning of the word, is absolute good, right, truth, beauty, and\nreason.\n\nIn my preceding letter I spoke of universal reason and said that not\nalone men, but also mountains, valleys, forests and fields, and even\nfools and knaves were reasonable. Now you are familiar with that\nstudent's song: \"What's Coming from the Heights?\" and you know that it\nmakes everything leathern. It speaks of a leathern hill, a leathern\ncoach-driver, a leathern letter, even father, mother, and sister are of\nleather. And I mention this simply for the purpose of showing that I\nunderstand that we cannot call leather reasonable and reasonable\nleathern without brewing a mixture of language which is lacking the mark\nby which all reasonable language is distinguished from chattering,\nhowling, and roaring. Language is only reasonable when it classifies the\nworld and distinguishes things by different names.\n\nThis is easily understood. But it is more difficult to see that those\nwho use their intellect without logical training exaggerate distinctions\nto such an extent that they ignore the connection between them. All\nthings are not only distinct, but also connected. But logic so far must\nbe blamed for not rising to the recognition of the interrelation of all\nthings. The science of understanding frequently treats reason and\nexperience as if they were two different things without a common nature.\nTherefore, I make it a point to insist that there is no experience\nwithout reason and no reason without experience.\n\nThe linguists who dispute about the question whether reason has\ndeveloped after language or language after reason agree that both belong\ntogether. One cannot speak without the use of reason, or talk without\nsense, because chattering, or babbling, or whatever one may wish to call\nit, are everything else but language. On the other hand, there can be no\nreason without naming the things of this world, so as to distinguish\nbetween leather and lady, between reason and experience.\n\nOf course, the idea of a leathern lady is only a youthful prank. Still\nit is calculated to illustrate the dialectic transfusion of all names\nand things, of all subjects and predicates. It shows indirectly that\naccording to common sense thought, reason has its home only in the brain\nof man, and that this reason is nevertheless unsound when it does not\nknow and remember that the individual human brain is connected with all\nbrains, and reasons with the whole world, so that only all existence and\nthe entire universe is reasonable in the highest meaning of the word.\n\nIn order to be able to use your reason in all research and on all\nobjects in a reasonable manner, you must know that the whole world has\none nature, even leather and your sister. Apparently there is a wide\ngulf between these two, and yet in both of them the same forces are\nactive, just as a black horse has the same horse nature as a white\nhorse, so that from this point of view your sister is indeed leathern\nand leather sisterly. Such statements sound paradoxical enough, yet I\ninsist on making them in this extreme manner in order to fully reveal\nthe absolute oneness of all existence, since it is the indispensable\nbasis of a reasonable understanding of logic.\n\nTake one of the questions of the day now agitating the public mind, for\na further illustration. Two tendencies are now observed in the most\nradical political movement of the nations. One of them is called\npropaganda of the deed. It works in Russia and Ireland with dynamite,\npowder, and lead. The other recommends the propaganda of the word, of\nthe vote, and of lawful agitation. And the difference between these two\nis not discussed reasonably with a view to ascertaining for whom, when,\nwhere, and why, this or that propaganda is fitting, but every one tries\nto present his relative truth with the fanatical sectarianism of those\nwho claim absolute truth. But if you have grasped the method of getting\nat truth, the true method of using your reasoning faculty, you will take\nsides for one thing today and for another thing tomorrow, because you\nwill understand that all roads are leading toward Rome. And if some of\nthe comrades outvote you occasionally, you will still value these\nantagonists as friends, and if you combat them, even in a war to the\nknife, this will still be a relative war, a use of the knife with\nreason.\n\nOur proletarian logic is tolerant, not fanatical. This logic does not\nwant to be reasonable without passion, nor passionate without reason. It\ndoes not abolish the difference between friend and foe, between truth\nand falsehood, between reason and nonsense, but calms the fanaticism\nwhich exaggerates those distinctions. Its fundamental maxim is: There is\nonly one absolute, the universe.\n\nRemember well that the conception of a universe which has anything\noutside or beside itself is still more senseless, if possible, than the\nidea of wooden iron. You thus see that all differences have one common\nnature which does not permit a transcendentally wide difference between\nthings or opinions. Because the universe is the supreme being, therefore\nall differences, even those of opinion, are unessential.\n\nFor the purpose of studying logic, I entreat you to pay special\nattention to the question of essential differences and to test it by\nyour own experience which will come to you from day to day.\n\nBy means of our logic we learn the language of the gods. In the\ndictionary of this language, there is only one essential being, the\nuniversal or supreme being. On the other hand, the language of the\nmortals calls every particle a \"being,\" but such being can be relative\nbeings only.\n\nEvery ear of a cornfield, every hair of an ox skin, and even every one\nof their particles, is such a being. But these relative beings are at\nthe same time unessential attributes. Thus all differences between the\nparticles of the world are simultaneously essential and unessential; in\nother words, they have a relative existence, they merely partake of the\nsupreme being, compared to whom they are absolutely unessential. Whether\nyou are a good or a bad man, whether your country is happy or unhappy,\nfree or oppressed, is very essential to you or me, but compared with the\ngreat absolute whole it is very unessential. In the universal history\nthe fate of any single nation has no more significance than one hair on\nmy head, although none of my hairs is there by mere chance and all of\nthem have been counted. Hence everything is in its particular and\nisolated self an unessential thing, but in the general interrelation\neverything is a necessary, reasonable, essential and divine particle.\n\nAnd now we come to the moral of it all. The human reason, the special\nobject of logical research, partakes of the nature of the universe. It\nis nothing in itself. As an isolated being, it is wholly void and\nincapable of producing any understanding or knowledge. Only in\nconnection, not merely with the material brain, but with the entire\nuniverse, is the intellect capable of existing and acting. It is not the\nmere brain which thinks, but the whole man is required for that purpose;\nand not man alone, but the total interrelation with the universe is\nnecessary for the purpose of thinking. Reason itself reveals no truths.\nThe truths which are revealed to us by means of reason, are revelations\nof the general nature of the absolute universe.\n\nIf you think of reason in this way, then, my son, you are thinking\nreasonably, are world-wise, logical, and true.\n\n\n\n\nTWENTY-THIRD LETTER\n\n\n\n\n(A)\n\nAlthough we know that there is no actual beginning, because we are\nliving in the universe without beginning and end, still we mortals must\nalways begin at a certain point. So I have begun one of my retrospects\nover the history of my subject with Plato, and at another time I have\nended with Hegel, although before and after them there has been much\nphilosophical thought. These two names are luminant points which throw\ntheir light over everything which is situated between them.\n\nThe errors of our predecessors are just as useful for the purpose of\nillustration as their positive achievements. More even: the errors form\nthe steps of a ladder which leads toward a universal world philosophy.\nWe clamber up and down on it, perhaps a little irregularly, but nowadays\nthe crooked roads of an English park are preferred to the straight\nFrench avenues.\n\nIt was an achievement on the part of the Socratic and Platonic schools\nto seek the good not in good specialties, but in general good, as a\n\"pure\" or absolute thing, to search for virtue in general instead of\nvirtues. But it was a mistake which prevented their success, to\nexaggerate the distinction between the special and the general.\nAccording to Plato, the black and white horses canter over terrestrial\npavements, but the horse in general, which is neither brown, black, nor\nwhite, neither as slender as a race horse nor as clumsy as a draft\nhorse, cantered along in the Platonic \"idea,\" in the ideal mists.\nPlatonic logic lacked what is taught by our present, or if you prefer,\nfuture proletarian logic, viz., the general understanding of the\ninterrelation of all things, the truth that in spite of their\nindividual differences all things belong together as individuals of the\nsame genus. The logical relation between individual and genus stuck\nupside down in the brain of the noble Plato.\n\nHe lived in a time which is similar to our own time in that the world of\nthe gods of the ancients was in the same state of dissolution in which\nthe Christian religions are today. Plato was as little satisfied with\nGrecian mythology as a basis for a reasonable explanation of the world,\nas we are with Christian mythology. He wanted to ascend to the universal\ntruth, not by way of little traditional stories, but by scientific\nphilosophy. His intention was good, but his weak flesh wrestled with a\ntask which required thousands of years for its solution.\n\nA while ago I said that it was that topsy-turvy view of religion as to\nthe relation between the special and the general which thwarted Plato.\nLet me illustrate a little more in detail in what this religious\ntopsy-turvydom consisted.\n\nHere we have wind, the waters of the seas, the rays of the sun, chemical\nand physical forces, forces of nature. These are specimens of the\nuniversal force of nature. These specimens were regarded with sober\nenough eyes by the Greeks, but the general nature sat high upon Olympus\nin the form of Zeus. In the same way, the Greeks were familiar with\nbeautiful things, but beauty was an unapproachable goddess, Aphrodite.\nTrue, the philosopher no longer believed in the gods, but he was\nnevertheless still under the influence of transcendental concepts and\nthus he mystified the general under the name of the \"idea.\" The Platonic\nideas, like the gods of the heathen, are mystifications of the general.\nPlato furthermore shows himself as a descendant of polytheism in this:\nAlthough he clearly distinguished between virtue and virtuous things,\nbetween beauty and beautiful things, between truth and true things, yet\nhe did not rise to the understanding that all generalities are\namalgamated and unified in the absolute generality, that, in so far, the\ngood, the true, and the beautiful are identical. The research for the\nabsolute did not become monistic until Christian monotheism lent a hand.\nYou will see from this that religion and philosophy form a common\nchapter which has the genus of all genera for its object. Faith is\ndistinguished from science in that the latter no longer bows to the\ndictates of imagination and of its organs, the priests, but seeks to\nfathom the object of its studies by the exact use of the intellect. A\npartial amalgamation of the two is, therefore, quite natural.\n\n\"When a woman is strong, isn't she strong after the same conception and\nthe same strength? By the term _same_,\" says the Platonic Socrates, \"I\nmean that it makes no difference whether the strength is in the man or\nin the woman.\"\n\nThis quotation, taken from Plato's \"Menon,\" shows that Platonic research\ndeals with the general, in this case the general concept of strength\nwhich is the _same_ in man or woman, ox or mule, Tom and Jerry. It is\nthe genus by means of which black and white horses are known as horses,\ndogs and monkeys as animals, animals and plants as organisms, and\nfinally the variations of the whole world as the universe, as the\n_same_. Plato has grasped this _same-ness_ in a limited way, for\ninstance in regard to strength, reason, virtue, etc. But that in an\ninfinite sense everything is the _same_, that things as well as ideas,\nbodies, and souls, are the same, remained for radical proletarian logic\nto discover.\n\nHand in hand with the narrow Platonic conception of the general went a\nnarrow theory of understanding or science, a wrong conception of the\nintellect and its functions. The Socratic Plato and the Platonic\nSocrates both call understanding by the name of \"remembering.\" By\npraising understanding, they teach us that we must not believe the\npriests, but study by the help of our senses. But, nevertheless, they\nstill teach a wrong method, a narrow art of thought.\n\nIn \"Menon,\" the object of study is virtue. Socrates does not exactly\npose as a schoolmaster. He knows that he is called the wisest of men,\nbut explains that this is so, because others have a conceited opinion of\ntheir wisdom, while his wisdom consists in humbly knowing that he knows\nnothing. He does not so much try to teach what virtue is, as to\nstimulate his disciples to search for it. But his idea of research is\ndistorted.\n\nAmong the immortal things which he transcendentally separates from\nmortal things, he also classifies the soul, \"the immortal soul\" which\ndies and lives again, and has always lived, knows everything, but must\n\"remember.\" Thus his research becomes a cudgeling of the brain, an\nintrospective speculation. He is not looking for understanding by way of\nnatural science, through the interrelations of the world, but\nspeculatively through the inside of the human skull.\n\nIn order to make his theory of memory plain, Socrates in \"Menon\" calls\nan ignorant slave and instructs him in the fundamentals of geometry. He\nquickly succeeds in getting from the ignorant fellow, who at first gives\nwrong answers, the correct statements by recalling the connections of\nthought by clever questioning. He thus demonstrates to his satisfaction\nthat man has wisdom _a priori_ in his head. But the Socratic-Platonic\nart of logic has overlooked that such wisdom requires concepts which are\nfixed in memory by internal _and_ external interrelations. The socalled\nimmortal soul with its innate wisdom has troubled the world a good while\nthereafter.\n\nYou must not think that I have a poor opinion of Plato, because I\ncriticize him in this way. On the contrary, I am highly delighted with\nhis divine and immortal writings. \"Honor to Socrates, honor to Plato,\nbut still more honor to truth.\" I also assure you that I am a great\nadmirer of natural science, but nevertheless I should like to show you\nthat it indulges in narrow reasoning.\n\nRobert Mayer, the talented discoverer of the equivalent of heat, has\nproven that the force of gravitation, of electricity, of steam, of heat,\netc., represents different modes of expression of the same force, of the\nforce of nature in general. But no, not quite so! He has ascertained the\nnumerical relation by which the transformations of one force into\nanother is accomplished. Thus a logical understanding sees that the\nvarious forces and force in general are distinguished in detail but\nidentical in general. Darwin in his \"Origin of Species\" has accomplished\na similar demonstration. But neither Mayer nor Darwin have given that\ngeneral expression to world unity which is required by the art of logic.\nIn order to become an adept at this art, you must rise to the\nunderstanding that all forces are various modes of expression of the one\nforce, all animals and species transformations of animaldom, that on the\nmoon a part is smaller than the whole, the same as on earth, that there\nas well as here fire burns, and that as surely as you have no doubt of\nyour being, just as surely is there only one being, the infinite,\ndivine universe which has no other gods beside it, but contains all\nforces, materials, and transformations.\n\nThis is an innate science which is the cause of all other science, an\ninnate science which, indeed, must first be awakened in you by \"memory.\"\n\nHence our proletarian logic instructs you not to rack your brain by mere\nintrospection, as the ancient philosophers used to do, not to call the\nsenses impostors nor to search for truth without eyes, nose, and ears,\nnor on the other hand to start out with the idea of certain natural\nscientists who try to see, hear, and smell understanding without the\nhelp of the intellect.\n\nThe mistake committed in making a wrong use of the intellect is a \"sin\nagainst the holy ghost.\" The Socratic-Platonic doctrine of memory is one\nextreme side of this sin; the other extreme side is represented by that\nmodern science which tries to find truth by mere external means and\nrejects everything as untrue which is not ponderable or tangible.\n\nAs this letter is more intimately connected with the following one than\nis ordinarily the case, I take the liberty to unite them under the same\nnumber and mark them with the letters A and B.\n\n\n\n\n(B)\n\nWe are still the guests of Plato today, my son, and I should like to\nshow you that this philosopher, in whose time natural science had barely\ndeveloped its first downy feathers, already suspected its stubborn\nnarrowness, although in a certain sense the Platonic logic was no less\nnarrow than that of the so-called exact sciences still is to-day, at\nleast in part. Still Platonic logic had at least the advantage of its\noutlook toward the Supreme Being, the absolute, while modern naturalism\nis still stuck in the narrow land of specialties. Therefore, I hope that\nyou will find it interesting to note with me the way in which universal\ntruth is peeping forth beneath the wings of Platonic speculation.\n\n\"Listen, then, to what I am going to say,\" remarks Socrates in \"Phaedo,\"\nparagraph 45. \"In my youth, O Cebes, I had a great interest in natural\nscience, for it seemed to me a magnificent thing to know the cause of\neverything, to learn how everything begins, exists, and passes. A\nhundred times I turned to one thing and then to another, reflecting\nabout these matters by myself. Do animals arise when the hot and the\ncold begin to disintegrate, as some claim? Is it the blood, which\nenables us to think, or the air or the fire? Or is it none of these, but\nrather the brain which produces all perceptions, such as seeing,\nhearing, smelling, and does memory and thought then arise by these, and\nfrom thought and memory, when they become adjusted, understanding? And\nagain, when I considered that all this passes away, and the changes in\nheaven and on earth, I finally felt myself poorly qualified for this\nwhole investigation. Let this be sufficient proof to you: In the things\nwhich formerly were familiar and known to me, I became so doubtful by\nthis investigation, that I forgot even that which I thought I knew of\nmany other things, as for instance the question as to how man grows. I\nthought that everybody knew that this was caused by eating and drinking.\nFor when through the food flesh comes to flesh and bone to bone, and in\nthe same way that which is akin to all the rest of the things which\nconstitute man, it seemed natural that a small mass would become larger,\nand thus a small man grow tall. Does not this appear reasonable to\nyou?... Consider furthermore this. It seemed enough to me that a man\nappeared large when standing by the side of something small, that he\nlooked taller by one head, and in the same way one horse by the side of\nanother; or what is still plainer, ten seemed to me more than eight,\nbecause it is more by two, and a thing of two feet longer than that\nwhich measures only one foot, because it exceeds it by one.\"\n\nThereupon Cebes asks: \"Well, and what do you think of this now?\"\n\n\"I think, by Zeus,\" says Socrates, \"that I am far removed from knowing\nthe cause of any of these things. I do not even admit that by adding one\nto one I obtain two, by such an addition. For I wonder how it is that\neach was supposed to be one when by itself, while now, that they have\nbeen added to one another, they have become two. Neither can I convince\nmyself that if one thing divides a thing in two, that this division is\nthe cause of it becoming two. For this would be the opposite way of\nmaking two. But when I heard somebody reading something from a book,\nwritten by Anaxagoras as he said, to the effect that it is reason which\nhad arranged everything and was the cause of everything, I rejoiced at\nthis cause.... Now if one were to search for the cause of all things, of\ntheir origin, existence and passing, he should only find out what is the\nbest way to maintain their existence.... Hence it is not meet that man\nshould care for anything else in regard to himself as well as to all\nother things, but for that which is best and most excellent, and then he\nwould also know the worst about things, for the understanding of both\nis the same. Considering this, I was glad to have found a teacher who\nknows about the cause of all things, who suited me, I mean Anaxagoras,\nand who would now tell me, first whether the earth is round or flat, and\nafter telling me that, would also explain to me the necessity for it and\nthe cause, by pointing to the fact that it was better that it should be\nso. And when he claimed that the earth was the center of things, I hoped\nhe would explain why it was better that it should be the center, and\nwhen he had explained that, I was resolved that I would not ask for any\nother cause. In the same way I was going to inquire after the cause of\nthe sun, the moon, and the other stars, etc.... For I did not believe\nthat after claiming all this to have been arranged by reason, he would\nbe dragging in any other cause than that of being best to have it just\nso. And this wonderful hope I had to abandon, my friends, when I\ncontinued to read and saw that the man accomplished nothing by reason\nand adduces no other reasons relating to the arrangement of things, but\nquotes air, and water, and ether, and many other astonishing things.\n\n\"And it seemed that it was as if some one said Socrates accomplishes all\nthings by reason, and then, when he began to enumerate the cause of\neverything I do, were to say first that I am sitting here because my\nbody consists of bones and sinews, and that the bones are hard and are\ndifferentiated by joints, and the sinews so constructed that they can be\nextended and shortened, etc. And further, if he tried to name the causes\nof our discussion, he would refer to other similar things, such as\nsound, and air and hearing, and a thousand and one other things, quite\nneglecting the true cause, viz., that it suited the Athenians better to\ncondemn me, and that it suited me for this reason to stay here and\nseemed more just to me to bear patiently the punishment which they have\nordered. For I believe that my bones and sinews would have gone long ago\nto the dogs or been carried to the Boeotians, had I not considered it\nmore just and beautiful to atone to the state than to flee.\n\n\"It is very illogical, then, to name such causes. But if any one were to\nsay that I should not be able to do what I please without these things\n(sinews and bones, and whatever else I may have), he would be right. But\nit would be a very thoughtless contention to say that these things are\nthe cause of my actions, instead of my free choice to do the best. That\nwould show an inability to distinguish the fact that in all things the\ncause is one thing, and another thing that without which the cause could\nnot be cause. And it seems to me that it is precisely this which some\ncall by a wrong name in considering it as the cause. For this reason\nsome put a whirlwind from heaven round the earth and others rest it on\nair as they would a wide trough on a footstool.\"\n\nSo far Socrates, whose words I ask you to read repeatedly and carefully,\nthough they may look a little old-fashioned. This quotation is somewhat\nlengthy, but I thought best not to cut it too short and to present it in\nits main outlines.\n\nThis quotation says on the whole the same thing which I have said in my\nproceeding letters. According to Socrates, all our thoughts and actions\nhave a wider and more general purpose, which he calls the \"good,\" so\nthat we even do evil for the sake of good. A crime always aims at some\nparticular good. Evil is misunderstood good. Applied to natural science,\nthis means that it misunderstands the interrelation of all its fine\ndiscoveries. And this charge is true even to-day. Although the natural\ninterrelations are more and more recognized from day to day, still the\nunderstanding of the absolute inter-connection continues to be\noverlooked, especially that of the intellect with material things, or of\nthe ideal with the real. Natural science teaches after the manner of the\ngospel of John: Abraham begot Isaac, Isaac begot Jacob. But it forgets\nto teach that all these genitors were not genitors in the last analysis,\nbut begotten by old Jehovah himself. The uncultivated condition of\nGrecian natural sciences may have been ground enough for Socrates to\nthink little of it. We, on the other hand, have to-day good reasons for\nthinking highly of natural science, and for this very reason I take\npains to illustrate by its prominent example in what respect the neglect\nof the universal world thought results in a narrow conception of the\nworld.\n\nWe may well rejoice more lastingly than Socrates when natural science\nteaches us how it happens that everything has its origin, life, and end,\nbecause the knowledge of natural science has been far more enriched by\nmodern experiences than it was at the time of Anaxagoras. Nevertheless\nyou must not stop learning furthermore from logic that all growing,\ncoming into existence, living, and passing away is but a change of form.\nThe causes of natural science are indeed not causes, but effects of the\nuniverse. They are reasonable effects of reason in so far as the latter\nis not an isolated part, but interconnected with the universe. To\nrepeat: Our intellect is not ours, it does not belong to man, but it\ntogether with man belongs to the universe. Reason and the world, the\ntrue, the good, and the beautiful, together with Godhood which you\nshall not idolize but understand in the spirit and in the world, in\ntruth and in reality, are all one thing, one being, and everywhere\neternal and the _same_.\n\nSocrates shows that he has as yet only a narrow anthropomorphic, not a\ncosmic conception of the \"best and good\" and of reason. He was dominated\nby the prejudice which still holds sway over the uncultured believers in\nGod, that reason is older than all the rest of the world, that it is the\nruling and antecedent creator. Our conception of logic, on the other\nhand, teaches that the spirit which we have in our brain is but the\nemanation of the world spirit. And this latter must not be conceived as\na nebulous world monster, not as an enormous spirit, but as the actual\nuniverse, which in spite of all change and all variation is eternally\none, true, good, reasonable, real, and supreme.\n\n\n\n\nTWENTY-FOURTH LETTER\n\n\nThe art of thought, my son, for which we are striving, is not pure and\nabstract, but connected with practice, a practical theory, a theoretical\npractice. It is not a separate and isolated thing, not a \"thing in\nitself,\" but is connected with all things; it has a universal\ninterrelation. Hence our logic, as we have repeatedly stated, is a\nphilosophy, world wisdom, and metaphysics. I include the latter, because\nour logic excludes nothing, not even the transcendental. It teaches that\neverything, even transcendentalism, if practiced with consciousness and\nthe necessary moderation, and at the right time and place, for instance\nat the carnival, is a reasonable and sublime pleasure.\n\nAll prominent philosophers were explorers and users of the same art of\nthought, of living, of viewing the world, although many of them retired\nto the solitude and were ascetics. Can the world be understood in a\nhermitage? Yes and no. After you have been traveling and seeing many\nlands, it is well to retire and classify the impressions received, and\nthus to reflect about a true philosophy of life. In this way, secluded\nthought, in the relative meaning of the word, that is, in connection\nwith observation and experience, with enjoyment and life, is a veritable\nsavior. Body and soul belong together, and if they are separated, it\nmust be remembered that such a separation is a mere matter of form, that\nthey are in fact one thing, attributes of the same being which is\ninfinitely great, so great that all other beings are but its fringes.\n\nThe art of distinction distinguishes the infinite infinitely with the\nconsciousness that in reality everything is interrelated without\ndistinction and is one.\n\nThis truth, and thus absolute truth, is ignored by laymen and\nprofessional authorities alike. The thousand year dualism between body\nand soul has been especially instrumental in preventing the\nunderstanding of the universal interrelation. The whole history of\nphilosophy is but a wrestling with the dualism between matter and mind.\nIt was only by degrees that it moved towards its monistic goal.\n\nAfter the brilliant triple star Socrates-Plato-Aristotle was\nextinguished, the philosophical sky was covered with dark clouds. The\nheathens stepped from the stage, and Christianity and the dogmas of its\nchurch predominated the logic of men, until at last a new scientific\nlight arose in the beginning of modern times. It was especially\nCartesius and Spinoza who were most brilliant among the early thinkers\nthat emancipated their minds slowly and under great difficulties.\nSpinoza, of Jewish descent, is especially interesting in his fight\nagainst narrowmindedness and for a universal philosophy. He wrote an\n\"Essay on the Improvement of the Intellect and on the Way by which it is\nbest led to a true Understanding of Things.\" He, as well as we, was\nlooking for the best way, the true way, the way of truth. He, as well as\nwe, seeks to study and practice the fundamentals of the art of thought.\n\nHe begins: \"After experience has taught me that everything which the\nordinary life offers is vain, and I have seen that everything which I\nfeared is only good or bad in so far as the mind is moved by it, I\nfinally resolved to investigate whether there is any true good--whether\nthere is anything the discovery of which will forever secure continuous\nand supreme joy. What is most generally found in life, and what mankind\nregards as the highest good, may be reduced to three things, viz.,\nwealth, honor, and sensual pleasure.\"\n\nAfter Spinoza has then uncovered the shadowy side and the vanity of\nthese popular ideals, he calls them \"unsafe by their very nature,\" while\nhe is looking for \"permanent good,\" which is \"insecure only as regards\nits possession, but not in its nature.\"\n\nBut how is that to be found?\n\n\"Here I shall say shortly what I mean by true good, and what is at the\nsame time the highest good. In order to grasp this fully, we must\nremember that good or bad are only relative terms, and thus the same\nthing may be called good or bad according to its relations, or on the\nother hand perfect or imperfect.\"\n\nSpinoza, forestalling the object of his research, discovers that the\ntrue, supreme and permanent good is the \"understanding of the unity\" of\nthe soul with the entire nature. \"This then,\" he says, \"is the goal\nwhich I am coveting.\"\n\n\"To this end, we must study morals, philosophy, and the education of\nboys, and combine with this study the entire science of medicine,\nbecause health materially assists us in reaching our ideal. Neither must\nmechanics be neglected, because many difficult things are made easy by\nart. Above all we must strive to find a way for the improvement of the\nintellect.\"\n\nHere we have once more arrived at the pivotal point of our subject, my\ndear disciple. Who or what is the intellect, whence does it come from,\nwhither does it lead? Answer: It is a light which does not shine within\nitself, but throws rays outside of itself for the illumination of the\nworld. For this reason the science which has the faculty of\nunderstanding for its object, though a limited, is at the same time a\nuniversal science, a universal world wisdom.\n\nBut isn't it a contradiction that a special science wants to be general\nworld wisdom? Is not general wisdom that which comprises all knowledge,\nall special science? Must I not know everything in order to be world\nwise? And how can any single brain assume to acquire all knowledge, to\nknow everything? Answer: It is impossible for you to know everything;\nbut you can rise to the understanding that your special wisdom and that\nof all others is a part of universal wisdom and form together a relative\nwhole which in connection with all the rest of the world constitute the\nabsolute being. This understanding represents pure logic and is\nuniversal understanding, understanding of the universal being.\n\nDo not be troubled by the fact that Socrates was looking for virtue and\nthe \"best,\" or Spinoza for permanent and supreme joy, and that their\nwisdom aimed only at the narrow circle of human life, without rising to\nthe cosmic interrelation. The means and the instrument by the help of\nwhich they strive for their ideal is the intellect. It is quite natural\nthat intellectual research led to the study of the intellect, to the\n\"improvement of the intellect,\" to the \"critique of reason,\" to \"logic,\"\nand finally to the understanding that the faculty of thought is an\ninseparable part of the monistic whole, of the absolute which lends\nsupport, consistency, reason and sense to all thought.\n\nOn his exploring tour for the improvement of the intellect, Spinoza\npicks up a remark which seems to me worthy of closer attention. He says\nin so many words: If we are looking for a way to improve the intellect,\nis it not necessary for the purpose of finding such a way to first\nimprove the intellect, in order to be at all able to discern the way\nwhich leads to an improvement of the intellect, and so on without end?\n\"We must have a hammer to forge the iron, and in order to have a hammer,\nit must be made; but for this purpose we need another hammer and other\ninstruments, and so forth without end. In this way it must not be proven\nthat men have no power to forge iron. Men have rather accomplished only\nthe easiest tasks with difficulty and imperfectly by the help of the\nnatural tools of their bodies. Gradually they accomplished more\ndifficult things with less labor and better. And thus they slowly\nproceeded from the simplest tasks to the instruments.\"\n\nI admire in this process of reasoning the brilliant understanding that\nthe hammer is not such a limited instrument as the untrained human brain\nthinks. It thinks that a hammer is not a pair of tongs. But Spinoza says\nthat the bare fist is a hammer when used for striking, much more a stone\nor a club. A pair of tongs used to drive a nail becomes a hammer; a\nhammer which I use to draw a nail becomes a pair of tongs. Fist or club,\nsense or nonsense, all is one. In other words, things are separated, but\nnever so far as the fantastical dreamers think. Just as hammer and\ntongs, saw and file, are parts of the class of tools, so all things are\nparts of the one and absolute universe. Recognize, then, dear Eugene,\nthat the relative and the absolute are not separated by such a\nbridgeless chasm, that the one should be praised to the skies and the\nother damned to the lowest pit. Understand that everything is\ndialectically interrelated, that the infinite, eternal, divine, can live\nonly in the finite, special things, and that on the other hand the parts\nof the world can exist only in the absolute. In short, raise your\nconception to the universal conception, and at the same time, understand\nthe supreme being in all its parts instead of idolizing it.\n\n\n\n\nThe Positive Outcome of Philosophy\n\nBY JOSEPH DIETZGEN\n\nTranslated by Ernest Untermann\n\n\n\n\nTHE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF PHILOSOPHY\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nAs a father cares for his child, so an author cares for his product. I\nmay be able to give a little additional zest to the contents of this\nwork by adding an explanation how I came to write it.\n\nAlthough born by my mother in 1828, I did not enter my own world until\n\"the mad year,\" 1848. I was learning the trade of my father in my\npaternal shop, when I saw in the \"K\u00f6lnische Zeitung,\" how the people of\nBerlin had overcome the King of Prussia and conquered \"liberty.\" This\n\"liberty\" now became the first object of my musings. The parties of that\nperiod, the disturbers and howlers, made a great deal of fuss about it.\nBut the more I heard about it, and hence became enthusiastic over it,\nthe duller, hazier and more indistinct became the meaning of it, so that\nit turned things upside down in my head. The psychologists have long\nknown that enthusiasm for a cause and understanding of that cause are\ntwo different things. Mark, for instance, the zeal displayed by Catholic\npeasants in singing their mass, although they do not understand a word\nof Latin.\n\nWhat is meant by political freedom? What is its beginning, what its end?\nWhere and how are we to find a positive and definite knowledge of it? In\nthe parties of the middle, the so-called \"constitutionals,\" as well as\namong the bourgeois democrats, there was no end of dissension. Nothing\ncould be learned there. Among them, as among the Protestants, every one\nwas a chosen interpreter of the gospel.\n\nHowever, the papers of the extremes, that is, the \"Neue Preussische\"\nwith its \"For God, King and Fatherland,\" and the \"Neue Rheinische,\" the\norgan of \"Democracy,\" gave me a hint that liberty had some sort of a\nmaterial basis. During the following years, my life in rural\nsurroundings gave me leisure to follow this scent. On one side, it was\nthe work of men like Gerlach, Stahl, and Leo, on the other of Marx and\nEngels, that gave me a foothold.\n\nThough the communists and the ultra-conservatives came to widely\ndifferent conclusions, still I felt and read between the lines that both\nof these extreme parties based their demands on one fundamental premise.\nThey knew what they wanted; they both had a definite beginning and end.\nAnd that permitted the assumption that both had a common philosophy. The\nPrussian landholding aristocracy based the cross, which they wore as an\nemblem on their hats, on the historically acquired royal military power\nand on the positive divine revelation of the Bible printed in black and\nsupported by the ecclesiastical police force dressed in black. And the\nCommunist point of departure was quite as positive, unquestionable and\nmaterial, viz., the growing supremacy of the mass of the people with\ntheir proletarian interests based on the historically acquired\nproductive power of the working class. The spirit of both of these\nhostile camps was descending from the results of philosophy, primarily\nfrom the Hegelian school. Both of them were armed with the\nphilosophical achievements of the century, which they had not only\nmechanically assimilated, but rather continually provided with fresh\nfood like a living being.\n\nIn the beginning of the fifties, a pamphlet was published by one of the\ncross bearers, Stahl, entitled \"Against Bunsen.\" This Bunsen was at the\ntime the Prussian Embassador at London, a crony of the ruling Prussian\nKing Frederic William IV., and, apart from this, nothing but a liberal\nmuddle head who was interested in political and religious tolerance.\n\nThe pamphlet of the cross bearer Stahl attacked this tolerance and\ndemonstrated valiantly that tolerance could be preached only by a\nmuddled free lance to whom religion and fatherland were indifferent\nconceptions. Religious faith, so far as it is truth, so he said, has a\ntrue power and can transpose mountains. Such a faith could not be\ntolerant and indifferent, but must push its propaganda with fire and\nsword.\n\nIn the same way in which Stahl defended the interests of the landed\naristocracy, the philosopher Feuerbach spoke in the interest of the\ninfidel revolutionaries. Both of them were to that extent in accord with\nthe \"Communist Manifesto\" that they no longer regarded Liberty as a\nphantasmagoria, but as a being of flesh and blood.\n\nWhen I had realized this, it dawned upon me that any conception\nelucidated by philosophy, in this case the idea of liberty, had this\npeculiarity: Liberty is as yet an abstract idea. In order to become\nreal, it must assume a concrete, special form.\n\nPolitical freedom as a glittering generality is a thing of no reality.\nUnder such fantastic ideal the constitutionalists or the liberals\nconceal the liberty of the money bag. Under these circumstances, they\nare quite right in demanding German unity with Prussia as a head, or a\nrepublic with a grand duke at the top. The landed aristocracy also are\nright in demanding the liberty of that aristocracy. And the Communists\nare still more right, for they demand the liberty that will guarantee\nbread and butter for the mass of the people and will fully set free all\nthe forces of production.\n\nFrom this experience and conclusion it follows that true liberty and the\nhighest right are composed of individual liberties and rights, that are\nopposed to one another without being inconceivable. It is easy to\nproceed from this premise to the rule of thought laid down in this work,\nthat the brain need not make any excursions into the transcendental in\norder to find his way through the contradictions of the real world.\n\nIn this way I passed from politics to philosophy, and from philosophy to\nthe theory of positive knowledge which I presented to the public in 1869\nin my little work \"The Nature of Human Brain Work.\" Further studies on\nthe general powers of understanding have added to my special knowledge\nof this subject, so that I am now enabled to fill the old wine into a\nnew bottle instead of publishing a new edition of my old work.\n\nThe science which I present in the following pages is very limited in\nits circumference, but all the better founded and important in its\nconsequences. This, I trust, will be accepted as a sufficient excuse for\nthe recurring repetition of the same statements in a different form. My\nremaining confined to a single point requires no apology. What is left\nundone by one, is bequeathed as a problem to others.\n\nThere might be some dispute over the question, how much of this positive\nachievement of philosophy is due to the author and to his predecessors.\nBut that is an interminable task of small concern. No matter who hoisted\nthe calf out of the well, so long as it is out. Anyway, this whole work\ntreats of the concatenation and interdependence of things, and this also\nthrows a bright light on the question of mine and thine.\n\nJ. DIETZGEN.\n\nCHICAGO, March 30, 1887.\n\n\n\n\nTHE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF PHILOSOPHY\n\n\n\n\nI\n\nPOSITIVE KNOWLEDGE AS A SPECIAL OBJECT\n\n\nThat which we call science nowadays was known to our ancestors by a name\nwhich then sounded very respectable and distinguished, but which has in\nthe meantime acquired a somewhat ludicrous taste, the name of wisdom.\nThis gradual transition of wisdom into science is a positive achievement\nof philosophy which well deserves our attention.\n\nThe term \"ancestors\" is very indefinite. It comprises people who lived\nmore than three thousand years ago as well as those who died less than a\nhundred years ago. And a wise man was still respected a hundred years\nago, while to-day that title always implies a little ridicule and\ndisrespect.\n\nThe wisdom of our ancestors is so old that it has not even a date. It\nreaches back, the same as the origin of language, to the period when man\ndeveloped from the animal world. But if we call a wise man, in the\nlanguage of our day, a philosopher, then it is at once plain that wisdom\nis descended from the ancient Greeks. This wonderful nation produced the\nfirst philosophers.\n\nWhether this term indicates a man who loves wisdom or one who loves\nscience, is of little moment to-day, and there was no such distinction\nin ancient times. We remember that it was entirely undecided among the\nGreeks whether a mathematician, an astronomer, a physician, an orator,\nor a student of the art of living deserved the title of a philosopher.\nThese professions were not clearly distinguished. They were wrapped up\none in another like the embryo in a mother's womb. While humanity had\nstill little knowledge, a man might well be wise. But to-day it is\nnecessary to specialize, to devote one's self to a special science,\nbecause the field of exploration has grown so extended. The philosopher\nof to-day is no longer a wise man, but a specialist.\n\nThe stars are the objects of astronomy, the animals of zoology, the\nplants of botany. Who and what are now the objects of philosophy? This\nmay be explained in one word to an expert. But if we try to give\ninformation to the general public, the matter becomes difficult.\n\nWhat do I know about the shoe industry, if I know that it produces\nshoes? I know something general about it, but I have no knowledge of its\ndetails. It is impossible to give sufficient information on the details\nof shoemaking to any one in a few words, not even to an educated person.\nNeither is it possible to explain the object of philosophy in such a\nway. The object may be stated, but not explained, for it cannot be made\nplain and brought home to the understanding in a few words.\n\nThat is the word, understanding. The understanding is the object of\nphilosophy.\n\nWe must at once call the reader's attention to the ambiguity of this\nterm. Understanding, knowledge, is the object of all science. That is\nnothing special. Every study seeks to enlighten the brain. But\nphilosophy wishes to be a science and does not desire to relapse into\nantiquity by becoming universal wisdom. To say that understanding is the\nobject of philosophy is to give merely the same reply which Thales,\nPythagoras, or Plato would have given. Has proud philosophy gained\nnothing since? What is its positive achievement? That is the question.\n\nPhilosophy to-day still has understanding for its object. But it is no\nlonger indefinite understanding which tries to embrace everything, but\nrather the understanding of the method by which knowledge may be gained.\nPhilosophy now wishes to learn _how it comes to pass_ that other objects\nmay be illumined by the mind. To speak plainly, it is no longer the\nunderstanding which seeks to know everything as it did at the time of\nSocrates that is now the special study of philosophy, but rather the\nmind itself, its method and the perceptive powers of thought and\nunderstanding.\n\nIf this were all, if the world's wise men had done nothing but to at\nlast find the object of philosophy, it would be a very scanty\nachievement. No, the harvest is much richer. The present day theory of\nhuman understanding is a real science, which well deserves to be\npopularized. Our ancestors sought understanding after the manner of\nSocrates and Plato in the entrails of the human brain, while at the same\ntime despising the experience outside of it. They hoped to find truth by\ncudgeling their brain. \"Honor to Socrates, honor to Plato; but still\nmore honor to Truth!\"\n\nAristotle showed a little more interest in the outer world. With the\ndownfall of the old social stage the old philosophy naturally succumbed\nalso. It did not revive until a few hundred years ago, at the beginning\nof modern times.\n\nA short while ago, Shakespeare attracted much attention, when some one\nclaimed to have discovered that it was not he who wrote those famous\ndramas and tragedies, but his contemporary Bacon of Verulam, Lord\nChancellor of England. Whether Shakespeare keeps his laurels or not,\nBacon's name is still great enough, for it is generally accepted as the\nmile stone of modern philosophy.\n\nOne might say that philosophy was asleep from the time of Aristotle to\nthat of Bacon. At least it produced no remarkable results during that\nperiod, and it cannot be denied that philosophy from ancient Greek days\nto the present times moved in a mystic fog which detracted much from its\nstudy in the eyes of educated and honest men. But the philosophers\nthemselves are less to blame for this than the concealment of the\nobject. Only after the entire social development has furthered the human\nunderstanding to the point where it can benefit from the light spread by\nthe various branches of science, does philosophy become conscious of its\nspecial object and able to separate its positive achievements from the\nrubbish of the past.\n\nIf we compare the old Grecian wisdom with modern science, the outcome of\nphilosophy looks insignificant by the side of the achievements of\nscience. Nevertheless, great as the value of the aggregate product of\nscience may be, it is composed of individual values, and every one of\nits parts is worthy of consideration. The method, the way, the form, in\nwhich the mind arrives at its practical creations is one of these parts.\nThe mind, on its march from ignorance to its present wealth has not only\ngathered a treasury of knowledge, but also improved its methods, so that\nthe further constructive work of science proceeds faster now. Who will\nfail to recognize that material production has accumulated a treasure in\nthe methods by which it produces to-day, which is by no means of less\nvalue than the accumulated national wealth itself? The positive outcome\nof philosophy bears the same relation to the wealth of science.\n\n\n\n\nII\n\nTHE POWER OF COGNITION IS KIN TO THE UNIVERSE\n\n\nThe way of Truth, or the true way, is not musing, but the conscious\nconnection of our thoughts with the actual life--that is the\nquintessence of the teachings of philosophy produced by evolution. But\nthis is not everything. If I know that a tanner makes leather, I do not\nby any means know everything he does, because there still remains the\nmanner and method of his manipulations. In the same way, the doctrine of\nthe interrelation of mind and matter, which is the product of the entire\nsocial development, requires a better and more specific substantiation,\nso that its true quality as a positive achievement of philosophy, or of\nthe theory of knowledge may be better understood. If the matter is\nrepresented in this bare manner--it does, indeed, resemble the egg of\nColumbus--one does not see why so much should be made of it. But if we\nenter into the details that have produced the result, we do not only\nlearn to better respect the prominent philosophers, but their works also\nreveal a rich mine of special and comprehensive knowledge.\n\nAll sciences are closely related, for advances in one branch are\npreparations for advances in others. Astronomy is unthinkable without\nmathematics and optics. Every science has begun unscientifically, and in\nthe course of the accumulation of individual knowledge a more or less\nexact systematic organization of this knowledge has resulted. No science\nhas as yet arrived at completeness and perfectness. We have as yet more\nthe results of experimental effort than accomplished perfection.\nPhilosophy is no better off in this respect. We rather believe we are\ndoing something to overcome a deeply rooted prejudice when we state that\nphilosophy is no worse off than other sciences, so long as we succeed in\nascertaining that it has accomplished positive results and in pointing\nthem out.\n\nIt is a positive accomplishment of philosophy that mankind to-day has a\nclear and unequivocal conception of the necessity of the division of\nlabor as a means of being successful. Our present day philosophers no\nlonger make excursions into dreamland in the quest of the True, the\nBeautiful, and the Good, as did the ancients. The True, the Beautiful,\nand the Good, are nevertheless the objects of all modern science, only,\nthanks to evolution, these objects are now sought by special means. And\nthe clear consciousness of this condition of things is a philosophical\nconsciousness.\n\nIt is a part of the theory of understanding to know that in order to\naccomplish something one must limit oneself to a specialty. That is a\nfundamental demand for the use of common sense, which the primitive\nmusing brain did not realize. Thinking must be done with wide open and\nactive eyes, with alert senses, not with closed eyes or fixed gaze. This\nis a part of logic. We do not deny that men have always done their\nthinking by means of the senses. We only claim that they did not do so\nfrom principle, otherwise the old complaint about the unreliability of\nthe senses as a means of knowledge would not have lived so long. Neither\nwould the inner man have been so excessively overestimated, nor abstract\nthought so much celebrated, just as if it alone were the child of nobler\nbirth. I do not wish to detract from the merits of the power of\nabstraction, but I simply claim that the clay of which Adam was made was\nno less divine than the spiritual breath that gave him his life. Nor do\nI mean that it is due to philosophy alone that mankind learned not to\nstrain \"understanding\" in abstract vaporings, but instead to introduce\nthe division of labor and to take up the various specialties with open\nsenses. The technique of understanding is the product of the entire\nmovement of civilization, and as such a positive accomplishment of\nphilosophy. The total process of evolution has placed the philosophers\non their feet.\n\nThere is no doubt that up to the present time, philosophy partook more\nof the character of a desire and love of science than of world wisdom.\nThis wisdom does not amount to much, even to-day. This is plainly\ndemonstrated by the dissensions of the educated and uneducated on all\nquestions pertaining to wisdom of life. Socrates in the market of\nAthens, and Plato in his dialogues, have probably said better things\nabout the questions: \"What is virtue? What is justice? What is moral and\nreasonable?\" than the professors of philosophy would know how to say\nto-day. Kant has well said that the unanimity of the experts is the test\nby which one may decide what is a scientific fact and what is mere\ndispute. From this it is easy to judge that wisdom of life is still in\na bad way and will have to wait for its scientific transformation.\n\nWe declared understanding itself to be the special object of philosophy\nand shall now attempt to outline the results so far obtained by it.\n\nOne of the first requirements for the education of the object of\nphilosophy is to recall its various names. The understanding, or the\npower of knowledge, is also called intelligence, intellect, mind,\nspirit, reason, power of cognition, of conception, of distinction, of\nimagination, of judgment, and of drawing conclusions. The attempt has\nfrequently been made to analyze understanding or to dissect it into its\nvarious parts and to specialize them by the help of those names.\nEspecially logic knows how to give particular explanations of what is\nimagination, a conception, a judgment, and a conclusion. It has even\ndivided these sections into subsections, so that a trained logician\nmight reproach me with being ignorant for applying various names to\nintelligence, because only the common people confound those names and\nuse them as synonyms, while science has long used them in their proper\norder for designating special parts of intelligence.\n\nTo such a reproach, I answer that Aristotle and the subsequent formal\nlogicians have made some pretty pointed observations and excellent\narrangements in this field. But these proved to be premature or\ninadequate, because the observations on which the ancient intellectual\nexplorers relied were too scanty. This scantiness of the observations\nmade in regard to intelligence, and by intelligence, has kept the human\nrace in the mazes of intellectual bondage and by this mysticism has even\nprevented the most advanced minds from penetrating deeper into this\nobscure question. The history of philosophy is not the history of a\nuseless struggle, but yet a history of a hard struggle with the\nquestion: What is, what does, of what parts consists, and of what nature\nis understanding, intelligence, reason, intellect, etc.? So long as this\nquestion is unsettled, the questioner is entitled to dispense with any\nand all sections and subsections of the intellectual object and to\nregard the various names as synonymous.\n\nThe main accomplishment in the solution of this question is the ever\nclearer and preciser knowledge of our days that the nature of the human\nintellect is of the same kind, genus or quality as the whole of nature.\nIn order that the theory of understanding may be able to elucidate this\npoint, it must divest itself, more or less, of the character of a\nspeciality and occupy itself with all of nature, assume the character of\ncosmogony.\n\nIt is principally an achievement of philosophy that we now know\ndefinitely and down to the minutest detail that the human mind is a\ndefinite and limited part of the unlimited universe.\n\nJust as a piece of oak wood has the twofold quality of partaking not\nalone, with its oaken nature, of the general nature of wood, but also of\nthe unlimited generality of all nature, so is the intellect a limited\nspecialty, which has the quality of being universal as a part of the\nuniverse and of being conscious of its own and of all universality. The\nboundless universal cosmic nature is embodied in the intellect, in the\nanimal as well as in man, the same as it is embodied in the oak wood, in\nall other wood, in all matter and force. The worldly monistic nature\nwhich is mortal and immortal, limited and unlimited, special and\ngeneral, all in one, is found in everything, and everything is found in\nnature--understanding or the power of knowledge is no exception.\n\nIt is this twofold nature of the universe, this being at the same time\nlimited and unlimited, this reflection of its eternal essence and\neternal truth in changing phenomena, which has rendered its\nunderstanding very difficult for the human mind. This intricate quality\nhas been represented by religion in the fantastic picture of two worlds,\nseparating the temporal from the eternal, the limited from the\nunlimited, too unreasonably far. But nowadays the indestructibility of\nmatter and the eternity of material forces is a matter of fact accepted\nby natural science.\n\nThe positive outcome of philosophy, then, is the knowledge of the\nmonistic way in which the seeming duality of the universe is active in\nthe human understanding.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\nAS TO HOW THE INTELLECT IS LIMITED AND UNLIMITED\n\n\nUnderstanding taught by experience no longer muses about universal\nnature, but acquires a knowledge of it by special studies. By degrees\nphilosophy, first unconsciously and lately clearly and plainly, has\ntaken up the problem of ascertaining the limits of understanding.\n\nThis philosophical problem first assumed the form of polemics. It became\nopposed to the religious dogma which represented the human mind as a\nsmall, subservient, limited and restricted emanation of the unlimited\ndivine spirit. This terrestrial emanation was regarded as too limited\nto understand and find its divine source. The study of the limits of the\nunderstanding has now emancipated itself from this dogma, but not to\nsuch an extent that there is no longer any mysterious obscurity floating\naround the understanding and intelligence, and especially around the\nquestion whether the human mind can penetrate only into some things\nwhile others will remain in the unscrutable darkness of faith and\nintuition, or whether it may penetrate boldly and without hindrance into\nthe infinity of the physical and chemical universe.\n\nWe here desire to claim as a positive outcome of philosophy that it has\nat last acquired the clear and exact knowledge that a socalled infinite\nspirit, in the religious sense, is a fantastic, unscientific conception.\nIn the natural sense of the word, the human powers of understanding are\nuniversal and yet in spite of their universality they are, quite\nnaturally, limited. The human understanding has its limits, why should\nit not? Only drop the illusion that a dark mystery is concealed beyond\nthese limits.\n\nThe understanding is a force among others, and everything that is\nlocated alongside of other things is limited and restricted by them. We\ncan understand everything, but we can also touch, see, hear, feel, and\ntaste everything. We also have the power of moving about, and other\nqualities. One art limits another, and yet each is unlimited in its own\nfield. The various human powers belong together and constitute together\nthe human wealth. Be careful not to separate the power of understanding\nfrom other natural powers. In a certain sense it must be separated,\nbecause it is the special object of our study, but it must always be\nremembered that such a separation has only a theoretical value.\n\nJust as our power of vision can see everything, so our understanding can\ngrasp everything.\n\nLet us look a little closer at this statement.\n\nHow can we see everything? Not from any single standpoint. In that sense\nour powers of vision are limited. But what is not visible in the\ndistance, becomes so on approaching nearer to it. What one eye cannot\nsee, that of others can, and what is invisible to the naked eye, is\nrevealed by the telescope and microscope. Nevertheless the vision\nremains limited, even though it may be the sharpest, and armed with the\nbest artificial means. Even if we regard all the eyes of the past and\nfuture generations of humanity as organs of the universal human vision,\nthis vision still remains limited. Nevertheless, no one will complain\nabout the limits of human power, because we cannot see sounds with our\neyes or hear the light with our ears.\n\nThe understanding of man is limited, just as his vision is. The eye can\nlook through a glass pane, but not through a plate of iron. Yet no one\nwill call any eye limited, because it cannot see through a block of\nmetal. These drastic examples are very opportune, because there are\ncertain wise men who reflectively lay their finger on their nose and\ncall attention to the limits of our intellect in that sense, just as if\nthe knowledge gained on earth by scientific means were only a nominal,\nnot a real, understanding and knowing. The human intellect is thus\ndegraded to the position of a substitute of some \"higher\" intellect\nwhich is not discovered, but must be \"believed\" to exist in the small\nhead of a fairy or in the large head of an almighty being above the\nclouds. Would any one try to make us believe that there is a great and\nalmighty eye that can look through blocks of metal the same as through\nglass? The idea of a spiritual organ with an infinite understanding is\njust as senseless. An unlimited single thing, an unlimited single being,\nis impossible, unless we regard the whole world, the world without\nbeginning and without end, the infinite world, as a unit. Within this\nworld everything is subject to change, but nothing can go beyond its\ngenus without losing its name and character. There are various kinds of\nfire, but none that does not burn, none which has not the general nature\nof fire. Neither is there any water without the general nature of water,\nnor a spirit that is elevated above the general nature of spirits. In\nour days of clear conceptions the tendency toward the transcendental is\nmere fantastic vaporing.\n\nIt is not alone unscientific, it is fantastic, to think even afar of a\nhigher power of thought or understanding than the human one. One might\nas well think of a higher horse which runs with eight, sixteen, or\nsixteen hundred legs and carries away his rider in a higher air at a\nhigher speed than that of the wind or the light.\n\nIt is a part of the achievements of philosophy, of correct methods of\nthought, of the art of thought or dialectics, to know that we must use\nall conceptions, without exception, in a limited, rational, commonplace\nway, unless we wish to stray into that region where there are mountains\nwithout valleys and where every theory of understanding loses its mind.\n\nIt is true that all things, including our understanding, may be\nimproved. Everything develops, why should not our intellects do so? At\nthe same time we may know _a priori_ that our intellect must remain\nlimited, of course not limited in the sense of the dunce, just as our\neyes will never become so sharp that they can see through metal blocks.\nEvery individual has its limited brain, but humanity, so the positive\nachievements of philosophy have shown, has an intellect of as universal\na power as any that can be imagined, required, or found, in heaven or on\nearth.\n\nWe maintain that philosophy so far has acquired something positive, has\nleft us a legacy, and that this consists in a clear revelation of the\nmethod of using our intellect in order to produce excellent pictures of\nnature and its phenomena.\n\nFor the purpose of making the reader familiar with this method, with\nthis legacy of philosophy, we must enter more closely into the essence\nof the instrument which lifts all the treasures of science. We are\nespecially interested in the question, whether it is a finite or\ninfinite and universal instrument with which we go fishing for truth. It\nis the custom to belittle the faculties of the human understanding, in\norder to keep it under the supremacy of the divine metaphysical augurs.\nIt is quite easy to see, therefore, that the question of the essence of\nour powers of understanding is intimately related to, or even identical\nwith, the question of how we may be permitted to use them, whether they\nshould be used only for the investigation of the limited, finite, or\nalso for the study of the eternal, infinite, and immeasurable.\n\nWe object here to the tendency of belittling the human mind. About a\nhundred years ago, the philosopher Kant found it appropriate to draw the\nsword against those who played fast and loose with the human mind,\nagainst the socalled metaphysicians. They had made a miraculous thing of\nthe instrument of thought, a matter for effusions. In order to be able\nclearly to state the outcome of philosophy, we must acquaint the reader\nwith the fact that this instrument of thought, in its way, is one of the\nbest and most magnificent things in existence, but that, at the same\ntime, it is bound to its general kind or genus. The human understanding\nperceives quite perfectly, but we must not have an exaggerated idea of\nits perfection, any more than we would of a perfect eye or ear, that, be\nthey ever so perfect, cannot see the grass grow or hear the fleas cough.\n\nGod is a spirit, says the bible, and God is infinite. If he is a spirit,\nan intellect, such as man, then it would be fair to assume that man's\nintellect is also infinite, or even is the divine spirit itself which\nhas taken up its abode in the human brains. People cudgeled their brains\nwith such confused conceptions, so long as the object of modern\nphilosophy, the intellect, was a mystery. Now it is recognized as a\nfinite, natural phenomenon, an energy or a force which is not the\ninfinite, though it is, like all other matter and force, a part of the\ninfinite, eternal, immeasurable.\n\nLeaving all religious notions aside, the infinite, immeasurable,\neternal, is not personal, but objective; it is no longer referred to as\na masculine, but as a neuter. It may be called by many names, such as\nthe universe, the cosmos, or the world. In order to understand clearly\nthat the spirit which we have in our minds, is a finite part of the\nworld, we must get a little better acquainted with this infinite,\neternal world. Our physical world cannot have any other world beside it,\nbecause it is the universe. Within the universe there are many worlds,\nwhich all of them make out the cosmos, which has neither a beginning nor\nan end in time and space. The cosmos reaches across all time and space,\n\"in heaven and on earth, and everywhere.\"\n\nBut how do I know what I state in such an offhand manner? Well, the\nknowledge of the universe, of the infinite, is given to us partly by\nbirth and partly by experience. This knowledge is inherent in man just\nas language is, viz., in the germ, and experience gives us a proof of\nthe infinite in a negative way, for we never learn the beginning or the\nend of anything. On the contrary, experience has shown us positively\nthat all socalled beginnings and ends are only interconnections of the\ninfinite, immeasurable, inexhaustible, and unfathomable universe.\nCompared to the wealth of the cosmos the intellect is only a poor\nfellow. However, this does not prevent it from being the most perfect\ninstrument for clearly and plainly reflecting the finite phenomena of\nthe infinite universe.\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\nTHE UNIVERSALITY OF NATURE\n\n\nThe positive outcome of philosophy concerns itself with specifying the\nnature of the human mind. It shows that this special nature of mind does\nnot occupy an exceptional position, but belongs with the whole of nature\nin the same organization. In order to show this, philosophy must not\ndiscuss the human mind as if it were something separate from nature, but\nmust rather deal with its general nature. And since this general nature\nof our intellect is the same of which every other thing partakes, it\nfollows that nature in general, or the universe, or the cosmos, all of\nwhich is the same thing, are an indispensable object in the special\nstudy of the nature of the human mind.\n\nWe have already said that the experienced understanding of the present\nday no longer muses over nature in general in the fantastic and mere\nintrospective manner as of old, but rather seeks to obtain a knowledge\nof it by special study. In so doing we do not forget that the study of\nspecialties at the same time throws a light on the general relation of\nthings, of which every species is but a part.\n\nSince the human mind is a part of the whole of nature, viz., that part\nwhich has the desire and longing to obtain a conception of all the other\nparts, and more than that, to understand the interconnection between the\nparts and the undivided and infinite whole, it is easy to comprehend the\nfact that the philosophers have occupied themselves so much with the\nmost real and most perfect being. Whether this being was called God, or\nsubstance, or idea, or the absolute, or nature, or matter, all of these\nterms cannot prevent us today from approaching infinite nature with\nsober senses, in order to gain, by its help, a lifelike picture of the\nhuman intellect, which is not a mystical being, but a reasonable part of\nthe same nature that lives reasonably and intelligibly in all other\nparts of nature.\n\nThe inexperienced powers of distinction which did not understand their\nfunction, magnified the difference between the infinite and its finite\nphenomena out of all proportion. Now that we have made the philosophical\nexperience that the general as well as the special nature of the human\nintellect admits only of moderate and bounded distinctions, we arrive at\nthe conclusion that the immeasurable, all-perfect, and eternal being is\ncomposed of finite, commensurable, imperfect, and transient things in\nsuch a way that the universal being combines in itself all perfections\nas well as all imperfections. This contradictory universal being, this\nnature to which all contradictory attributes may be simultaneously\nassigned, in a certain sense puts the old rule to shame that you cannot\nat the same time affirm and deny the predicate of any subject.\n\nNature comprises all and is all. Reason and unreason, being and not\nbeing, all these contradictions are contained in it. Outside of it there\nare no affirmations and no contradictions. Since the human mind\neternally moves in affirmations and negations, in order to obtain a\nclear picture of things, it has an interminable task in understanding\nthe interminable object.\n\nOur brain is supposed to solve the contradictions of nature. If it knows\nenough about itself to realize that it is not an exception from general\nnature, but a natural part of the same whole--although it calls itself\n\"spirit\"--then it also knows and must know that its clearness can differ\nbut moderately from the general confusion, that the solution of the\nproblem cannot differ materially from the problem itself. The\ncontradictions are solved only by reasonable differentiation, only by\nthe science of understanding which shows that extravagant differences\nare nothing but extravagant speculations. The human understanding\ninclines to exaggerations in its untrained state, and it is a relic of\nuntrained habits to differentiate in an absolute manner the spiritual\nfrom the rest of nature, to make a too extravagant distinction between\nit and the physical body. It is the merit of philosophy to have given us\na clear doctrine of the use of the intellect, and this doctrine\nculminates in the rule not to make exaggerated, but only graduated\ndistinctions. For this purpose it is necessary to realize that there is\nonly one being and that all other socalled beings are but minor\nexpressions of the same general being, which we designate by the name of\nnature or universe.\n\nIn consequence of the human bent to exaggeration, the human\nunderstanding has been regarded as a being of a different nature from\nthat of natural beings which exist outside of the intellect. But it must\nbe remembered that every part of nature is \"another\" individual piece of\nit, and, furthermore, that every other and different part is really\nnothing different but a uniform piece of the same general nature. The\nthing is mutual: The general nature exists only in its many individual\nparts, and these in their turn exist only in, with and by the general\ncosmic being.\n\nNature which is divided by the human understanding into East and West,\nSouth and North, and into a hundred thousand other named parts, is yet\nan undivided whole of which we may say with certainty that it has as\nmany innumerable beginnings and ends as it is without beginning and end,\nas it is the infinite itself. It is well known that there is nothing new\nunder the sun. Nothing is created, nothing disappears, and yet there is\na continuous change.\n\nThe brain of man has a right and a left side, a top and a bottom, a\nfront and a back part, an interior and an exterior. And the innermost of\nthe brain again has two sides or qualities, a physical and a spiritual.\nThey are so little divided that the term brain has two meanings,\ndesignating now the physical brain, now its mental functions. In\nspeaking here exclusively of the mind, we tacitly assume its inseparable\nconnection with the physical body.\n\nThe material brain and the mental brain are two brains that together\nmake one. Thus two, three, four, or innumerable things are yet one\nthing. The human understanding was endowed by nature with the faculty of\nembracing the infinite variety of the universe as a unit, as a single\nconception. The unity of nature is as true and real as its multiplicity.\nTo say that many are one and one many is not nonsense, but simply a\ntruism which becomes clear when understanding the positive outcome of\nphilosophy.\n\nA reader unfamiliar with this our product of philosophy still follows\nthe habit of regarding the physical body as something different from the\nmind. A distinction between these two is quite justified, but this\nmanner of classification must not be overdone. The reader should\nremember that he also is in the habit of regarding such heterogeneous\nthings as axes, scissors, and knives as children of the same family by\nreferring to them collectively as cutting tools. The outcome of\nphilosophy now demands that we apply the same method to the object of\nour special study, the human brain. We must henceforth eschew all\neffervescent flights of imagination and regard the powers of the human\nmind as children of the same family as all other physical powers, whose\nimmortal mother is the universe.\n\nThe universe is infinite not alone in the matter of time and space, but\nalso in that of the variety of its products. The human brains which it\nproduces are likewise internally and externally of an infinite\ndifferentiation, although this does not prevent them from forming a\ncommon group uniform in its way.\n\nTo group the phenomena of nature, the children of the universe, in such\na way by classes, families, and species that they may be easily grasped,\nthat is the task of the science of understanding, the work and\nconstitution of the perceiving human brain. To understand simply means\nto obtain a general and at the same time a detailed view of the\nprocesses and products of the universe by grouping them in a fashion\nsimilar to that used for the vegetable kingdom by botany and for the\nanimal kingdom by zoology. It goes without argument that we, the limited\nchildren of the unlimited universe, are able to solve this problem only\nin a limited way.\n\nHowever, this natural physical limitation of the human understanding\nmust not be confounded with the abject misery which slavish and\nsentimental metaphysics attribute to it. The infinite universe is by no\nmeans niggardly in its gifts to the human understanding. It opens its\nwhole depths to our intellectual understanding and perception. Our\nintellect is a part of the inexhaustible universe and therefore partakes\nof its inexhaustible nature. That part of nature which is known by the\nname of intellect is limited only to the extent that the part is smaller\nthan the whole.\n\n\n\n\nV\n\nTHE UNDERSTANDING AS A PART OF THE HUMAN SOUL\n\n\nThe human intellect or understanding, the special object of all\nphilosophy, is a part, and in our case the most prominent part, of the\nhuman soul. Gustav Theodore Fechner, a forgotten star on the literary\nfirmament, posed the question of the soul in his time and attempted to\nanswer it. In so doing he clothed the result of past philosophies in a\npeculiar garb which looked fantastic enough at first sight. He regards\nthe outcome of philosophy merely as an individual product and he is so\nfull of veneration for the ancient terms, such as _immortal souls_,\n_God_, _Christianity_, that he does not care to dismiss them, no matter\nhow roughly he handles their essence.\n\nFechner extends the possession of a soul to human beings, animals,\nplants, stones, planets; in short, to the whole world.\n\nThis is simply saying that the human soul is of the same nature as all\nthe rest of the world, or vice versa, that all natural things have the\nsame nature as the human soul. Not only animals, but also stones and\nplanets have something analogous to our human soul.\n\nFechner is not fantastic at bottom, and yet how fantastical it sounds to\nhear him say: \"I went out walking on a spring morning. The fields were\ngreen, the birds were singing, the dew sparkled, the smoke rose toward\nthe clouds. Here and there a human being stirred. A glory of light was\ndiffused over it all. It was only a small piece of the Earth. It was\nonly a short moment of its existence. And yet, as I took all this in\nwith an ever-widening understanding, I felt not alone the beauty, but\nalso the truth that it is an angel who is thus passing through the sky\nwith his rich, fresh and blooming nature, his living face upturned to\nthe heavens. And I asked myself how it is that man can ever become so\nstunted that he sees nothing but a dry clod in the Earth and looks for\nangels above and beyond it, never finding them anywhere. But people call\nthis sentimental dreaming.\"\n\n\"The Earth is a globe, and what it is besides may be found in the\nmuseums of natural history.\" Thus writes Fechner.\n\nNow there can be no objection to comparing the beautiful Earth and the\nstars around it with angels, any more than there can be to the lover\ncalling his sweetheart an angel of God. The Earth, the Moon, and the\nstars are according to Fechner's terminology angelic beings with souls;\nmediators between man and God. He knows very well that this is nothing\nbut a matter of analogy and terminology, he is as atheistic as the most\natheistic, but his fondness and reverence for the traditional terms lead\nhim to attribute a soul to the material world and to give to this great\nand infinite soul a divine name.\n\nIf we waive this religious hobby of Fechner's, there still remains his\npeculiarity of using words and names in a symbolical sense. It is\nnothing but the old poetic way of calling a sweetheart's eyes heavenly\nstars and the stars of the blue heavens lovely eyes, which makes a snowy\nhill of a woman's breast, a zephyr of the wind, a nymph of a spring of\nwater, and an erlking of an old willow tree. This poetic license has\nfilled the whole world with good and evil spirits, mermaids, fairies,\nelfs, and goblins.\n\nThis is not a bad way of speaking, so long as we keep in mind, like a\npoet, what we are doing and that we are consciously using symbolical\nterms. Fechner does this only to a certain extent. A little spleen\nremains in his brain. It is this spleen which I intend to deal with in\nthe proper light, in order to thus demonstrate the outcome of\nphilosophy.\n\nFechner is not aware that his universal soul reflects only one half of\nour present outcome of philosophical study. The other half, which\nrenders an understanding of the whole possible, consists in the\nperception that not only are all material things endowed with a soul,\nbut that all souls, including the human ones, are ordinary things.\n\nPhilosophy has not only deified the world and inspired it with a soul,\nbut has also secularized God and the souls. This is the whole truth, and\neach by itself is only a part.\n\nApart from psychology, which treats of the individual human soul, there\nhas lately arisen a \"psychology of nations\" which regards the individual\nsouls as parts of the universal human soul, as individual pieces\nconstituting an aggregate soul which, decidedly, is more than a simple\naggregation of numbers. The soul of the psychology of nations has the\nsame relation to the individual souls that modern political economy has\nto private economy. Prosperity in general is a different question and\ndeals with different matters than the amassing of wealth for your\nindividual pocket. Granted that the national soul is essentially\ndifferent from the individual soul, what would be the nature of the\nuniversal animal soul, including the souls of lions, tigers, flies,\nelephants, mice, etc.? If we now extend the generalization farther and\ninclude in our psychology the vegetable and the mineral kingdom, the\nvarious world bodies, our solar system, and finally the whole universe,\nwhat else could that signify than a mere rhetorical climax?\n\nMere generalization is one-sided and leads to fantastical dreams. By\nthis method one can transform anything into everything. It is necessary\nto supplement generalization by specialization. We wish to have the\nelephants separated from the fleas, the mice from the lice, at the same\ntime never forgetting the unity of the special and the general. This sin\nof omission has often been committed by the zoologists in the museums\nand the botanists in their plant collections, and philosophical\ninvestigators of the soul like Fechner have drifted into the other\nextreme of generalization without specialization.\n\nThe positive outcome of philosophy, then, in its abstract outline, is at\npresent the doctrine that the general must be conceived in its relation\nto its special forms, and these forms in their universal\ninterconnection, in their qualities as parts of nature in general. True,\nsuch an abstract outline reveals very little. In order to grasp its\nconcrete significance, we must penetrate into its details, into the\nspecial aspects of this doctrine.\n\nThe title of \"Critique of Reason,\" which Kant gave to his special study,\nis at the same time a fitting term for all philosophical research.\nReason, the essential part of the human soul, raises the critique of\nreason, the science of philosophy, to the position of the most\nessential part of psychology.\n\nBut why do we call this the most essential part? Is not the material\nworld and its understanding as essential as reason, as intellect, which\nbends to the task of exploring this world? Surely, it is, and I do not\nuse the word essential in this sense. I call the intellect the most\nessential part of the soul, and the soul the most essential part of the\nworld, only in so far as these parts are the special condition of all\nscientific study and because the investigation of the general nature of\nscientific study is my special object and purpose. Whether I endeavor to\nexplain the general nature of scientific study, whether I investigate\nthe intellect or the theory of understanding, it all amounts to the same\nthing.\n\nLet us approach our task once more from the side of Fechner's universal\nsoul. With his extravagant animation of all things, with his plant,\nstone, and star souls, he can help us to prove that the general nature\nof that particle of soul which is called reason, intellect, spirit, or\nunderstanding, is not so extraordinarily different from the general\nnature of stones or trees as the old time idealists and materialists\nwere wont to think.\n\nAs I said before, Fechner is a poet, and a poet sees similarities which\na matter-of-fact brain cannot perceive. But at the same time we must\nadmit that the matter of fact brain which cannot see anything but mere\ndistinctions is a very poor brain. The philosophers before me have\ntaught me that a good brain sees the similarities and the differences at\nthe same time and knows how to discriminate between them. A sober poetry\nand the combination of poetic qualities with a comprehensive and\nuniversal levelheadedness and discrimination, these are the marks of a\ngood head. Still the poorest as well as the most talented brains partake\nof the general brain nature, which consists in the understanding that\nlike and unlike, general and special, are interrelated. The one is never\nwithout the other, but both are always together.\n\nIf the distinction between men and stones is so trifling that a talented\nbrain like Fechner's can justly speak of them both as being animated,\nsurely the difference between the body and soul cannot be so great that\nthere is not the least similarity and community between them. However,\nthis escaped Fechner's notice. Is not the air or the scent of flowers an\nethereal body?\n\nReason is also called understanding, and it is a positive achievement of\nphilosophy to have arrived at the knowledge that this understanding does\nnot admit of any exaggerated distinctions. In other words, all things\nare so closely related that a good poet may transform anything into\neverything. Can natural science do as much? Ah, the gentlemen of that\nscience are also progressing well. They transform dry substance into\nliquid, and liquid into gas; they change gravity into heat and heat into\nmechanical power. And they are doing this without forgetting to\ndiscriminate, as happened to our Fechner.\n\nIt is not enough to know that the body has a soul and the soul a body,\nnot enough to know that everything has a soul. It is also necessary to\ndiscriminate between the peculiarities and details of the human, animal,\nplant, and other souls, taking care not to exaggerate their differences\nto the extreme of making them senseless.\n\nWe do not intend to follow this theory of a universal soul any further.\nFechner declares himself that \"it must be admitted at the outset that\nthe whole question of a soul is a question of faith.\"... \"Analogy is\nnot a convincing proof.\"... \"We can no more prove the existence of a\nsoul than we can disprove it.\"\n\nHowever, from the time of Cartesius it has been an accepted fact in the\nworld of philosophers that the consciousness of the human soul is the\nbest proof of its existence. The most positive science in the world is\nthe empirical self-observation of the thinking soul. This subject is the\nmost conspicuous object imaginable, and it is the positive outcome of\nphilosophy to have given an excellent description of the life and\nactions of this soul particle called consciousness or understanding.\n\nIf the understanding is a part of the human soul and this soul an\nevident and positive part of the universal life, then, clearly,\neverything partaking of this life, such as pieces of wood and stones\nscattered around, is related to this soul. Individual human souls,\nnational souls, animal souls, pieces of wood, lumps of stone, world\nbodies, are all children of the same common universal nature. But there\nare so many children that they must be classified into orders, classes,\nfamilies, etc., in order to know them apart. On account of their\nlikeness, the souls belong together in one class and the bodies in\nanother, and each requires more detailed classification. Thus we finally\narrive at the class of human souls forming a department by themselves,\nbecause they all have a common general character.\n\nThe manufacturers know that the work of ten laborers produces more and\nis of a different quality than the work of a single laborer multiplied\nby ten. Likewise the general human soul, or any national soul, expresses\nitself differently from the sum of the various individual souls\ncomposing it. More even, the very individual soul differs at various\ntimes and places, so that the individual soul is as manifold as any\nnational soul.\n\n\"Has the plant a soul? Has the earth a soul? Have they a soul analogous\nto that of man? That is the question.\" Thus asks Fechner.\n\nJust as my soul of today has something analogous to my soul of\nyesterday, so it has also with the soul of my brother, and finally with\nthe souls of animals, plants, stones, etc., proving that everything is\nmore or less analogous. A herd of sheep is analogous to yonder flock of\nsmall, white clouds in the sky, and a poet has the license to call those\nsmall clouds little sheep. In the same way Fechner is justified in\npropounding his theory of a universal soul.\n\nIs it not necessary, however, to make a distinction between poetry and\ntruth? My brother's soul and my own are souls in the true sense of the\nword, but the souls of stones--they are only so figuratively speaking.\n\nAt this point I want to call the reader's attention to the fact that we\nmust not pass lightly over the valuation of the difference between the\ntrue and the figurative sense of a word.\n\nWords are names which do not, and cannot, have any other function than\nthat of symbolic illustration. My soul, yours, or any other, are only\nin conception the same souls.\n\nWhen I say that John Flathead has the same soul as you and I, my\nintention is simply to indicate that he has something which is common to\nyou and me and to all men. His soul is made in the image of our souls.\nBut where shall we draw the line in this comparison of images? What is\nnot an image in the abstract, and what is more than an image in the\nconcrete?\n\nTruth and fiction are not totally different. The poet speaks the truth\nand true understanding partakes largely of the nature of poetry.\n\nPhilosophy has truly perceived the nature of the soul, and especially\nthat part of it with which we are dealing, that is, reason or\nunderstanding. This instrument has the function of furnishing to our\nhead a picture of the processes of the world outside of it, to describe\neverything that is around us and to analyze the universe, itself a\nphenomenon, with all its phenomena as a process of infinite variety in\ntime and space.\n\nIf this could be accomplished with the theory of a universal soul, then\nFechner would be the greatest philosopher that ever was. But he lacks\nthe understanding that the intellect which has to combine all things\nwithin a general wrapper, must also consider the other side of the\nquestion, that of specification. That, of course, cannot be achieved by\nany philosopher. It must be the work of all science, and philosophy as a\ndoctrine of science must acknowledge that.\n\n\n\n\nVI\n\nCONSCIOUSNESS IS ENDOWED WITH THE FACULTY OF KNOWING AS WELL AS WITH THE\nFEELING OF THE UNIVERSALITY OF ALL NATURE\n\n\nIn the historical course of philosophy, there has been much discussion\nas to where our knowledge comes from, whether any of it, or how much of\nit, is innate, and how much acquired by experience. Without any innate\nfaculties no knowledge could have been gathered with any amount of\nexperience, and without any experience even the best faculties would\nremain barren. The results of science in all departments are due to the\ninteraction of subject and object.\n\nThere could be no subjective faculty of vision unless there were\nsomething objective to be seen. The possession of a faculty of vision\ncarries with it the practical performance of seeing. One cannot have the\nfaculty of vision without seeing things. Of course, the two may be\nseparated, but only in theory, not in practice, and this theoretical\nseparation must be accompanied by the recollection that the separated\nfaculty is only a conception derived from the practical function.\nFaculty and function are combined and belong together.\n\nMan does not acquire consciousness, the faculty of understanding, until\nhe knows something, and his power grows with the performance of this\nfunction.\n\nThe reader will remember that we have mentioned as an achievement of\nphilosophy the understanding of the fact that we must not make any\nexaggerated distinctions. Hence we must not make any such distinction\nbetween the innate faculty of understanding and the acquired knowledge.\n\nIt is an established universal rule that the human intellect knows of no\nabsolute separation of any two things, although it is free to separate\nthe universe into its parts for the purpose of understanding.\n\nNow, if I claim that the conception of the universe is innate in us, the\nreader must not conclude that I believe in the old prejudice of the\nhuman intellect being like a receptacle filled with ideas of the true,\nthe beautiful, the good, and so forth. No, the intellect can create its\nideas and concepts only by self-production and the world around it must\nfurnish the materials for this purpose. But such a production\npresupposes an innate faculty. Consciousness, the knowledge of being,\nmust be present, before any special knowledge can be acquired.\nConsciousness signifies the knowledge of being. It means having at least\na faint inkling of the fact that being is _The_ universal idea. Being is\neverything; it is the essence of everything. Without it there cannot be\nanything, because it is the universe, the infinite.\n\nConsciousness is in itself the consciousness of the infinite. The innate\nconsciousness of man is the knowledge of infinite existence. When I know\nthat I exist, then I know myself as a part of existence. That this\nexistence, this world, of which I am but a particle with all others,\nmust be an infinite world, does indeed not dawn on me until I begin to\nanalyze the conception of being with an experienced instrument of\nthought. The reader, in undertaking this work with such an instrument,\nwill at once discover that the conception of the infinite is innate to\nhis consciousness,[8] and that no faculty of conception is possible\nwithout this conception. The faculty of conception, understanding,\nthought, means above all the faculty of grasping the universal concept.\nThe intellect cannot have any conception which is not more or less\nclearly or faintly based on the concept of the universe. _Cogito, ergo\nsum._ I think, therefore, I am. Whatever I imagine is there, at least in\nimagination. Of course, the imagined and the real thing are different,\nyet this difference does not exceed the limits of the universal\nexistence. Creatures of fiction and real creatures are not so radically\ndifferent that they would not all of them fit into the general gender of\nbeing. The manner, the form of being, are different. Goblins exist in\nfiction and Polish Jews exist in a tangible form, but they both exist.\nThe general existence comprises the body and the soul, fiction and\ntruth, goblins and Polish Jews.\n\nIt is no more inconceivable that the faculty of universal understanding\nshould be innate in us than that circles come into this world round, two\nmountains have a valley between them, water is liquid and fire burns.\nAll things have a certain composition in themselves, they are born with\nit. Does that require any explanation? The flowers which gradually grow\non plants, the powers and wisdom that grow in men in the course of\nyears, are no more easily explained than such innate faculties, and the\nlatter are no more wonderful than those acquired later. The best\nexplanation cannot deprive the wonders of nature of their natural\nmarvelousness. It is a mistake to assume that the faculty of\nexplanation which is located in the human brain, is a destroyer of the\nbelief in natural marvels. Philosophy which makes this faculty of\nexplanation and the nature of its explanations the object of its special\nstudy gives us a new and much better understanding of this old miracle\nmaker. It destroys the belief in metaphysical miracles by showing that\nphysical nature is so universal that it absolutely excludes every other\nform of existence than the natural one from this world of wonders.\n\nI and many of my readers find in our brains the actual consciousness\nthat this general nature of which the intellect is a part is an infinite\nnature. I call this consciousness innate, although it is acquired. The\npoint that I wish to impress on the reader is that the difference\ngenerally made between innate and acquired qualities is not so\nextraordinary that the innate need not to be acquired and the acquired\ndoes not presuppose something innate. The one contradicts the other only\nin those brains who do not understand the positive outcome of\nphilosophy. Such thinkers do not know how to make reasonable\ndistinctions and exaggerate in consequence. They have not grasped the\nconciliation of all differences and contradictions in universal nature\nby which all contradictions are solved.\n\nPhilosophy has endeavored to understand the intellect. In demonstrating\nthe positive outcome of philosophy, we must explain that philosophical\nunderstanding as well as any other does not rise out of the isolated\nfaculty of understanding, but out of the universal nature. The womb of\nour knowledge and understanding must not be sought in the human brain,\nbut in all nature which is not only called the universe, but is\nactually universal. In order to prove this latter assertion, I refer to\nthe fact that this conception, this consciousness of the infinite in the\ndeveloped intellect, is in a manner innate. If the reader wishes to\nobject to my indiscriminately mixing the innate faculty with the\nacquired understanding, I beg him to consider that I am endeavoring to\nprove that any and all distinction made by the intellect refers in\nreality to the inseparable parts of the one undivided universe. From\nthis it follows that the admired and mysterious intellect is not a\nmiracle, or at least no greater marvel than any other part of the\ngeneral marvel which is identical with the infinitely wonderful general\nnature.\n\nSome people love to represent consciousness as something supernatural,\nto draw an unduly sharp line of separation between thinking and being,\nthought and reality. But philosophy, which occupies itself particularly\nwith consciousness, has ascertained that such a sharp contrast is\nunwarranted, not in harmony with the reality, and not a faithful\nlikeness of reality and truth.\n\nIn order to understand what philosophy has accomplished in the way of\ninsight into the function of the discriminating intellect, we must never\nlose sight of the fact that there is only a moderate distinction of\ndegree between purely imaginary things and socalled real things.\n\nNeither the natural condition of our faculty of thought, nor the\nuniversality of general nature, permit of an exaggerated distinction\nbetween the reality of creations of imagination and of really tangible\nthings. At the same time the exigencies of science demand clear\nillustrations and so we must distinguish between these two kinds of\nreality. It is true that in common usage the mere thought and the purely\nimaginary things are set apart from nature and reality as something\ndifferent and antagonistic. Yet the rules of language heretofore in\nvogue cannot prevent the spread of the additional knowledge that the\nuniverse, or general nature, is so unlimited that it can establish a\nconciliation between these limited antagonisms. The cat and the dog, for\ninstance, are pronounced enemies, but nevertheless zoology recognizes\nthem as being legitimate domestic companions.\n\nHuman consciousness is, in the first place, individual. Every human\nindividual has its own. But the peculiarity of my consciousness, of\nyours, and that of others, is that of being not alone the consciousness\nof the individual in question, but also the general consciousness of the\nuniverse, at least that is its possibility and mission. Not every\nindividual is conscious of the universality of general nature, otherwise\nthere would be none of that distracting dualism. Nor would there be any\nnecessity for volumes and volumes of philosophy to teach us that a\nlimit, a thing, or a world outside of the universal, is a nonsensical\nidea, an idea which is contrary to sense and reason. We may well say,\nfor this reason, that our consciousness, our intellect, is only in a\nmanner of speaking our own, while it is in fact a consciousness, an\nintellect belonging to universal nature.\n\nIt can no more be denied that our consciousness is an attribute of the\ninfinite universe than it can be denied that the sun, the moon and the\nstars are. Since this intellectual faculty belongs to the infinite and\nis its child, we must not wonder that this universal faculty of thought\nis born with the capability of grasping the conception of a universe.\nAnd whoever does no longer wonder at this, must find it explicable, must\nrealize that the fact of universal consciousness is thus explained.\n\nTo explain the mysterious may be regarded as the whole function of\nunderstanding, of intellect. If we succeed in divesting of its mysteries\nthe fact that the concept of an infinite universe is found in the\nlimited human mind, we have then explained this fact itself and\nsubstantiated our contention that the things around us are explained by\ntheir accurate reflection in our brain.\n\nWe summarize the nature of consciousness, its actions, life, and aims in\nthese words: It is the science of infinite being; it seeks to obtain an\naccurate conception of this being and to explain its marvelousness. But\nwe have by no means exhausted its life and aims in these words. With all\nthe power of language, we can convey but a vague idea of the immensity\nof the object under discussion. Whoever desires to know more about it,\nmust work for his own progress by observation and study. This much may\nbe safely said: This question is no more mysterious than any other part\nof the general mystery.\n\nFOOTNOTE:\n\n[8] E. g., given with his consciousness.--EDITOR.\n\n\n\n\nVII\n\nTHE RELATIONSHIP OR IDENTITY OF SPIRIT AND NATURE\n\n\n\"There is a natural law of analogy which explains that all things\nbelonging to the universe are members of the same family, that they are\nrelated to one another by bonds which permit of the greatest variety in\nindividual differences and are not nullified even by the distance\nbetween extremes.\" If we grasp the meaning of these words in their full\nbearing, we recognize the outcome of philosophy up to date. They teach\nus how to use our intellect in order to obtain an accurate picture of\nthe universe.\n\nThe intellect is also called by the name of faculty of discrimination.\nIf in the science of the powers of this faculty we place ourselves on\nthe standpoint of present-day natural knowledge, we possess the clear\nand plain insight that there are no exaggerated distinctions, no\nunrelated extremes, in the universe. The infinite is related to the\nfinite. For all developed and perishable things are the direct offspring\nof the imperishable, of the eternal universe. General nature and its\nspecial parts are inseparably interlaced. There is nothing among all\nthat has a name which is fundamentally different from other things known\nby name.\n\nThere will hardly be any objection against these sentences, until we\nproceed to draw their last consequences. If all things are related and\nwithout exception children of the universe, it follows that mind and\nmatter must also be two yards of cloth from the same piece. Hence the\ndifference between human understanding and other natural human faculties\nmust not be magnified into that of irreconcilable extremes.\n\nIn order to become accustomed to scientific distinctions, the reader\nshould consider that a man can remain under the sway of a belief in\nghosts only so long as he ignores the relationship of all existing\nthings. He believes in real ghosts whose reality is supposed to be\nradically different from his own. Such a distinction is exaggerated and\nillogical, and whoever believes in it does not know how to discriminate\nscientifically and has not the full use of his critical faculties.\n\nJust as common parlance opposes art to nature and then forgets that art\nis a part of nature, similarly as night is a part of day, so the\nlanguage of the believer in ghosts does not know that reason and wood,\nmind and matter, in spite of all their differences, are two parts of the\nsame whole, two expressions of the same universal reality. Everything is\nreal and true, because in the last instance the universe is all, is the\nonly truth and reality. So I call it a slip of the tongue to speak of\nnatural nature as opposed to natural art or artificial nature, of\nimaginary reality as distinct from real reality. There ought to be a\ndifferent name for the day of twelve hours than for the day of\ntwenty-four hours, so that it might be better understood that day and\nnight are not fundamentally different, but two prongs of the same fork.\n\nJust as the faculty of thinking is innate in the child, and grows with\nits development, so mankind's faculty of thought grows and has hitherto\nexpressed itself in a language which gave only instinctive conceptions\nof the composition of the human brain and of its functions. The\nconstruction of languages explains in a way the condition of the human\nmind which had only inadequate knowledge of itself so far. Those\nshortcomings of speech which I called slips of the tongue were not\nunderstood until sufficient progress had been made in the explanation of\nthe process of thinking, and now these same shortcomings offer an\nexcellent means of representing and demonstrating the results of\nenlightenment.\n\nThe mind is to give to man a picture of the world, the language is the\nbrush of the mind. It paints by its construction the universal\nrelationship of all things referred to in the beginning of this chapter,\nand it does so in the following manner: It gives to each thing not only\nits own name, but also adds to it another indicating its family, and\nanother indicating its race, another for the species, the genus, and\nfinally a general name which proclaims that all things are parts of the\none indivisible unit which is called world, existence, universe, cosmos.\n\nThis diagrammatic construction of language furnishes us with an\nillustration of the graduated relationship of things and of the way in\nwhich the human race arrives at its knowledge, its perceptions or\npictures.\n\nWe said that philosophy is that endeavor which seeks to throw light on\nthe process of human thought. This work has been rendered very difficult\nby the unavoidable misunderstanding of the universal relationship just\nmentioned. The transcendentalists insist above all that the process of\nthinking and its product, thought, should not be classed among ordinary\nphysics, not as a part of physical nature, but as the creature of\nanother nature which carries the mysterious name of metaphysics. That\nsuch a nature and such a science is neither possible nor real is proven\nby the construction of language which normally describes everything as\nbeing closely related and corroborates this by its abnormal shortcomings\nwhich we called slips of the tongue.\n\nThe shortcomings of language which demonstrate the positive outcome of\nphilosophy consist in occasionally giving insufficiently significant\nnames to things belonging to a group in which the distinction between\nindividuals, species, genera, and families is not clearly defined. It is\nnot discernible, for instance, whether the term \"cat\" applies to a\ndomestic cat or to a tiger, because that term is used for a large class\nof animals of which the domestic cat is the arch-type.\n\nBut it may be that this illustration is not well chosen for the purpose\nof demonstrating that slip of the tongue which is supposed to give us an\nexact appreciation of the positive outcome of philosophy. Let us find\nanother and better illustration which will be a transition from the\ninadequate to the adequate and thus throw so much more light on the\nobscurities of language.\n\nAnother and better example of the inadequacies of language is the\ndistinction between fish and meat. In this case, we entirely lack a\ngeneral term for meat, one kind of which is furnished by aquatic animals\nand the other by terrestrial animals.\n\nNow let the reader apply this shortcoming of language to the distinction\nbetween physics and metaphysics, or between thought and reality. We lack\na term which will fully indicate the relation between these two.\nThoughts are indeed real things. True, there is a difference whether I\nhave one hundred dollars in imagination or in reality in my pocket.\nStill we must not exaggerate this difference into something\ntranscendental. Painted money or imagined money are in a way also real,\nthat is in imagination. In other words, language lacks a term which will\nclearly express the different realities within the compass of the unit.\n\nThe understanding of these peculiarities of language is calculated to\npromote the insight and enlightenment in regard to that secret lamp\nwhich man is carrying in his brain and with which he lights up the\nthings of this world. The cultivation of the theory of understanding,\nthe critique of reason, has an elementary significance for the\nelucidation of all things. This is not saying that philosophy, that\nspecial science with which we are here dealing, is a universal science\nin the sense in which antiquity conceived of it. But it is universal\nnevertheless in the sense in which the alphabet and other primary topics\nare universal. Every one must use his brains and should therefore take\npains to understand its processes. Though the knowledge of these does\nnot make other efforts unnecessary, still it explains many ideas, it\nelucidates the nature of thinking which every one is doing and which is\nfrequently used in a more ruthless manner than a dog would treat a rag.\n\nThe inertia which has prevented the one-sided idealists on the one hand\nand the one-sided materialists on the other from coming to a peaceful\nunderstanding may be traced to one of those slips of the tongue. We lack\nthe right terms for designating the relationship between spiritual\nphenomena, such as our ideas, conceptions, judgments and conclusions and\nmany other things on one side and the tangible, ponderable,\ncommensurable things on the other. True, the reason for this lack of\nterms is the absence of understanding, and for this reason the dispute\nis not one of mere words, although it can be allayed only by an\nimprovement of our terminology.\n\nB\u00fcchner, in his well-known work on \"_Force and Matter_,\" likewise\noverlooks this point, the same as all prior materialists, because they\nare as onesidedly insistent on their _matter_ as the idealists are on\ntheir _idea_. Quarrel and strife mean confusion, only peace will bring\nlight. The contrast between matter and mind finds its conciliation in\nthe positive outcome of philosophy which teaches that all distinctions\nmust be reasonable, because neither our instrument of thought nor the\nrest of nature justify any exaggerated distinctions. In order to\nelucidate the moot question, nothing is required but the insight that\nideas which nature develops in the human brain are materials for the\nwork of our understanding, though not materials for the work of our\nhands. Philosophy has made material efforts to grasp the understanding\nand its conceptions and is still making them in the same way in which\nchemistry is working for the understanding of substances and physics for\nthe understanding of forces.\n\nSubstances, forces, ideas, conceptions, judgments, conclusions,\nknowledge and perceptions, according to the positive outcome of\nphilosophy, must be regarded as differences or varieties of the same\nmonistic genus. The differentiation of things no more contradicts their\nunity than their unity contradicts their differentiation. Darwin\nexpanded the conception of \"species\" and thus contributed to a better\nunderstanding of zoology. Philosophy expands the conception of species\nstill far beyond the Darwinian definition in teaching us to consider the\nspecies as little generalities and the largest genus, the absolute or\nthe cosmos as the all in one, the all-embracing species.\n\nIn order to closely connect the worm and the elephant, the lowest and\nthe highest animal, the vegetable and the animal kingdom, the inorganic\nand the organic, as members of the same species or genus in a reasonable\nway, we must keep account of the gradations in nature, the transitions,\nthe connecting links and connecting ideas. Embryology, which shows that\nthe life of the highest animal develops through the stages of the animal\ngenus, has greatly promoted the understanding of the common nature of\nall animals.\n\n\"The continuity in the natural gradation of things is perfect, because\nthere are no gradations which are not represented, because there are no\ndifferences between the various grades which nature does not fill by an\nintermediary form.... There is no abrupt difference in nature, no\nmetaphysical jump, no vacuum, no gap in the order of the world,\" says a\nwell-known author of our times whose name I shall not mention, because I\nwish to base my argument on the acknowledged facts rather than on names\nof authorities.\n\nWhat Darwin taught us in relation to animal life, viz., that there are\nno fundamental differences between species, that is taught by philosophy\nin regard to the universe. The understanding of the latter is rendered\ndifficult by the habit of making a transcendental distinction between\nmatter and mind.\n\n\n\n\nVIII\n\nUNDERSTANDING IS MATERIAL\n\n\nWhether we say that philosophy has the understanding for the object of\nits study, or whether we say that philosophy investigates the method of\nutilizing subjective understanding in order to arrive at genuine,\ncorrect, excellent, objective knowledge, that is only a matter of using\ndifferent terms for the same process. It makes no difference whether we\ndesignate the object of our special science as a thing or as a process.\nIt is much more essential to understand that the distinction between the\nthing and its action is in this instance of little consequence.\n\nAccording to modern natural science all existence is resolved into\nmotion. It is well known now that even rocks do not stand still, but are\ncontinuously active, growing and decaying.\n\nThe understanding, the intellect, is an active object, or an objective\naction, the same as sunshine, the flow of waters, growing of trees,\ndisintegration of rocks, or any other natural phenomenon. Also the\nunderstanding, the thinking which takes place consciously or\nunconsciously in the human brain, is a phenomenon of as indubitable\nactuality as the most material of them. It cannot in the least shake our\ncontention of the materially perceptible nature of intellectual activity\nthat we become aware of this activity by an internal, not by an\nexternal, sense. Whether a stone is externally perceptible or thought\ninternally, what difference does this slight distinction make in the\nincontestable fact that both perceptions are of equal material, natural\nand sense-perceptible kind? Why should not the action of the brain\nbelong in the same category as the action of the heart? And though the\nmovement of the heart be internal and that of the tongue of the\nnightingale external, what is to prevent us from considering these two\nmovements from the higher viewpoint of natural or material processes?\nIf the function of the heart may be referred to as material, why not the\nfunction of the brain? True, the present usages of language are in\nconflict with this mode of thought. But it must be remembered that every\nscience comes into conflict with usages of language by progressive\ndevelopment. The discovery of every new thing in plant and animal life\ncompels the discoverer to invent a new term or change the meaning of an\nold one. The term material has not had a well defined, but rather an\nindefinite meaning so far. Now, since it is necessary, in order to\nunderstand the function of the brain to remove it from the class of\ntranscendental or metaphysical conceptions and assign to it a place\namong the material things, the question arises: What will be the most\nappropriate term for it? The material and the spiritual are both two\nspecies of the same genus. How are we to designate the species, how the\ngenus? For the sake of complete clearness, we require three different\nnames, one for each species and a common general name. But since we are\nmuch less concerned about the name than about the understanding of these\nfacts which cannot be well explained without terms, we do not insist\ndogmatically on calling the understanding material. It is sufficient to\npoint out that the function of the heart and of the brain both belong to\nthe same class, no matter whether this class be called material, real,\nphysical, or what not. So long as language has not established a\ndefinite meaning for these terms, all of them serve equally well and are\nequally deceptive.\n\nThe positive outcome of philosophy which culminates in placing the\ntheory of understanding in the same class with all other theories,\ncannot be easily demonstrated on account of a natural confusion of\nthought which arises from an equally natural confusion of language. In\nthe special department of handicraft as well as in that of scientific\nbrain work the terminology is well systematized, while in the general\naffairs of life and science there is a confusion which is as great in\nthe matter of conceptions as in that of applying the terms by which\nthose awkward conceptions are expressed.\n\nWherever understanding is clear, there the language is also clear. The\nman who does not understand shoemaking does not understand its\nterminology. This is not saying that the understanding of a trade and\nthe understanding of its terminology are identical, but only indicating\ntheir actual connection.\n\nIf the reader has had a glimpse of the enormity of the work of more than\ntwo thousand years of philosophy in order to state what little we know\ntoday of its achievement in the science of understanding, he will not be\nvery much surprised at the difficulties we here meet with in finding\nterms for its demonstration.\n\nThe function of the brain is as material as that of the heart. The heart\nand its function are two things, but they are dependent one upon the\nother so that one cannot exist without the other. The function may\npartly be felt. We feel the heart beating, the brain working. The\nworking of the heart may even be felt by touch, which is not the case\nwith the working of the brain. But it would be a mistake to imagine that\nour knowledge of the function of the heart is exhausted by our\nperception of it through the touch. Once we have overcome the habit of\nmaking exaggerated distinctions between things, and have learned to\nconsider the differences of things as well as their interconnection, we\ncan easily understand that the science of the function of the heart is\nan infinite science which is connected with all others. The heart cannot\nwork without the blood, the blood cannot exist without food, and this is\nconnected with the air, the plants, the animals, the sun, and the moon.\n\nThe function of the brain and its product, the understanding, is\nlikewise inseparable from the universal interdependence of things. The\nhealth of the blood which is produced by the action of the heart is no\nmore and no less a material phenomenon than the total knowledge of\nscience which appears as a product of brain life.\n\nAlthough we represent the doctrine of the material nature of\nunderstanding as the positive outcome of philosophy, this is not\nproclaiming the victory of that narrow materialism which has been\nspreading itself particularly since the eighteenth century. On the\ncontrary, this mechanical materialism wholly misunderstands the nature\nof the problem. It teaches that the faculty of thought is a function of\nthe brain, the brain is the object of study and its function, the\nfaculty of thought, is fully explained as a brain quality or function.\nThis materialism is enamored of mechanics, idolizes it, does not regard\nit as a part of the world, but as the sole substance which comprises the\nwhole universe. Because it misunderstands the relation of thing and\nfunction, of subject and predicate, it has no inkling of the fact that\nthis relation which it handles in such a matter-of-fact way, but not at\nall scientifically, may be an object worthy of study. The materialist\nof the old school is too horny-handed to consider the function or\nquality of understanding as an object worthy of a separate scientific\ndepartment. We, on the other hand, follow the suggestion of Spinoza, who\nrequired of the philosophers that they should consider everything in the\nlight of eternity. In so doing we find that the tangible things, such as\nthe brain, are qualities of nature, and that in the same way the\nsocalled functions are natural things, substantial parts of the\nuniverse.\n\nNot only tangible objects are \"things,\" but also the rays of the sun and\nthe scent of flowers belong to this category, and perceptions are no\nexception to the rule. But all these \"things\" are only relative things,\nsince they are qualities of the one and absolute which is the only\nthing, the \"thing itself,\" well known to every one by the name of the\nuniverse, or cosmos.\n\n\n\n\nIX\n\nTHE FOUR PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC\n\n\nSince this work wishes to demonstrate the positive outcome of\nphilosophy, the reader may ask the author what are his proofs that\ninstead of the quintessence of thousands of years of philosophical work\nhe is not offered the elaboration of any individual philosopher, or even\nthat of the author himself.\n\nIn reply I wish to say that my work would be rendered uselessly\nvoluminous by quotations from the works of the most prominent\nphilosophical writers, without proving anything, since the words of one\noften contradict those of another.\n\nWhat is said by Kant, Fichte, Schelling, or Hegel, in one place of any\nof their works, is at least considerably modified, if not contradicted,\nin another place of the same work. It is of little consequence, how and\nby whose help I have arrived at the positive outcome of philosophy as\nhere rendered. Whether it is the actual outcome or not can be judged\nonly by the expert, and every opinion is necessarily very subjective.\n\nUnder the circumstances I, as author, claim that my opinion is worth as\nmuch as any other, and the reader may therefore accept my assurance. As\nto the further value of that which I offer, it is a peculiarity of the\nsubject under discussion that every reader carries it and its\nexperiences within himself and may, without consulting any other author,\nat once draw his own conclusions about my views, provided he has\nacquired the necessary training in thought. What a traveler tells us\nabout the interior of Africa must either be believed to the letter or\nverified by the accounts of other travelers. But what I say about logic\nwill, I hope, find its corroboration in the logic of every reading\nbrain.\n\nThe theory of understanding which has become the special object of\nphilosophy, is nothing else, and cannot be anything else, but expanded\nlogic. Many practical rules and laws of this department are known and\nrecognized since the time of Aristotle. But the question whether there\nis one world or two, a natural and unnatural, or supernatural as it is\ncalled with preference, that is the point which has given much trouble\nto philosophy and which will influence the health of logic so long as\nit is undecided.\n\nDr. Friedrich Dittes, director of the institute of pedagogy in Vienna,\nhas published a _School of Pedagogy_, several editions of which have\nappeared, in which he gives much attention to logic. Dittes is a\nprominent pedagogue, well known through his writings. He confines\nhimself in his _School_ to teaching only that which is well established\nand accepted without a doubt. As a practical man who addresses himself\nmainly to teachers of primary grades, he would not place himself on the\npinnacle of the outcome of philosophy, even if he could. He must confine\nhimself to that which is well established, which is far removed from the\ndisputes of the day. But it may here serve as a whetstone by the help of\nwhich we may give to the positive product of philosophy its latest and\ngreatest sharpness.\n\nHe writes right in the beginning of the first part: \"Our ideas are as\nmanifold as the objects to which they refer. Several things may have\nmany or few, or at least one quality, in common. Still they may also be\ntotally different.\"\n\nThis last point, viz., that there may be things which are \"totally\"\ndifferent from one another, is the one which is decidedly rejected by\nthat science which has risen to the eminence of the positive acquisition\nof philosophy. There can be no natural things which are \"totally\"\ndifferent from one another, because they must all of them have in common\nthe quality of being natural.\n\nIt sounds very commonplace to say that there are no unnatural things in\nnature. Since the last witch was burnt, everybody is sufficiently\nenlightened to know that. But the logical conclusions of natural monism\nhave not yet been drawn. True, natural science, properly socalled, is\nbusily engaged in arriving at them. But so much more strife is there in\nthe \"science of mind\" and there is no other remedy but a well founded\ntheory of understanding which teaches that nature is not alone absolute\nnature, but also the nature of the absolute. From this doctrine it\nnecessarily follows that all things are not individually independent,\nbut related by sex, dependent children, \"predicates\" of the monistic\nunity of the world.\n\n\"The arch fountain of the human spirit,\" says Dittes, \"is perception....\nWhether perception as such discloses to us the true nature of things, or\nwhether it makes us familiar only with their phenomena, this is not to\nbe discussed by logic.\" The practical pedagogue who confines himself to\nthe education of children's brains or who wishes at most to influence\nsuch teachers as educate children's brains, is quite right in being\nsatisfied with the old traditional Aristotlean logic. But in the school\nof the human race, this logic has not been sufficient. For this reason\nthe philosophers have broached the question whether perception, \"the\narch fountain of the human spirit,\" is a true or a deceptive fountain.\nThe product of the philosophical investigation which we here offer\namounts to the declaration that the logicians are greatly mistaken about\nthe \"arch fountain.\" It is a cardinal error of ancient logic to regard\nperception as the ultimate source from which the human mind dips its\nknowledge. It is nature which is the ultimate source, and our perception\nis but the mediator of understanding. And its product, recognized\ntruth, is not truth itself, but merely a formal picture of it. Universal\nnature is the arch fountain, is the eternal and imperishable truth\nitself, and our perception, like every other part of universal\nexistence, is only an attribute, a particle of absolute nature. The\nhuman mind, with whose nature logic is dealing, is no more an\nindependent thing than any other, but simply a phenomenon, a reflex or\npredicate of nature.\n\nTo confound true perceptions or perceived truths with general truth,\nwith the _non plus ultra_ of all truths, is equivalent to regarding a\nsparrow as _the_ bird in general, or a period of civilization as\ncivilization itself, which would mean the closing of the door to all\nfurther development.\n\nModern philosophy, beginning with Bacon of Verulam and closing with\nHegel, carries on a constant struggle with the Aristotlean logic. The\nproduct of this struggle, the outcome of philosophy, does not deny the\nold rules of traditional logic, but adds a new and decidedly higher\ncircle of logical perception to the former ones. For the sake of better\nunderstanding it may be well to give to this circle a special title, the\nspecial name of \"theory of understanding,\" which is sometimes called\n\"dialectics.\"\n\nIn order to demonstrate the essential contents of this philosophical\nproduct by an investigation of the fundamental laws of traditional logic\nand to explain it thereby, I refer once more to the teacher of\nelementary logic, Dittes.\n\nUnder the caption of \"Principles of Judgment\" he teaches: \"Since\njudging, like all thinking, aims at the perception of truth, the rules\nhave been sought after by which this purpose might be accomplished. As\nuniversally applicable rules, as principles or laws of thought, the\nfollowing four have been named:\n\n\n     (1) The law of uniformity (identity).\n\n     (2) The law of contradiction.\n\n     (3) The law of the excluded third.\n\n     (4) The law of adequate cause.\"\n\n\nSo much scholastic talk has been indulged in over these four\n\"principles,\" that I can hardly bring myself to discuss them further.\nBut since my purpose, the demonstration of the positive outcome of\nphilosophy, consists in throwing a new light on the logic contained in\nthese four so-called principles or laws, I am compelled to lay bare\ntheir inmost kernel.\n\nThe first principle, then, declares that A is A, or to speak\nmathematically, every quantity is equal to itself. In plain English: a\nthing is what it is; no thing is what it is not. \"Characters which are\nexcluded by any conception must not be attributed to it.\" The square is\nexcluded from the conception of a circle, therefore the predicate\n\"square\" must not be given to a circle. For the same reason a straight\nline must not be crooked, and a lie must not be true.\n\nNow this so-called law of thought may be well enough for household use,\nwhere nothing but known quantities are under consideration. A thing is\nwhat it is. Right is not left and one hundred is not one thousand.\nWhoever is named Peter or Paul remains Peter or Paul all his life. This,\nI say, is all right for household use.\n\nBut when we consider matters from the wider point of view of cosmic\nuniversal life, then this famous law of thought proves to be nothing but\nan expedient in logic which is not adequate to the nature of things, but\nmerely a means of mutual understanding for us human beings. Hence the\nleft bank of the Rhine is not the right, because we have agreed that in\nnaming the banks of a river we will turn our backs to the source and our\nfaces to the mouth of the river and then designate the banks as right\nand left. Such a way of distinguishing, thinking, and judging is good\nand practical, so long as this narrow standpoint is accompanied by the\nconsciousness of its narrowness. Hitherto this has not been the case.\nThis determined logic has overlooked that the perception which is\nproduced by its rules is not truth, not the real world, but only gives\nan ideal, more or less accurate, reflection of it. Peter and Paul, who\naccording to the law of identity are the same all their lives, are in\nfact different fellows every minute and every day of their lives, and\nall things of this world are, like those two, not constant, but very\nvariable quantities. The mathematical points, the straight lines, the\nround circles, are ideals. In reality every point has a certain\ndimension, every straight line, when seen through a magnifying glass, is\nfull of many crooked turns, and even the roundest circle, according to\nthe mathematicians, consists of an infinite number of straight lines.\n\nThe traditional logic, then, declares with its law of identity, or in\nthe words of Dittes \"law of uniformity,\" that Peter and Paul are the\nsame fellows from beginning to end, or that the western mountains remain\nthe same western mountains so long as they exist. The product of modern\nphilosophy, on the other hand, declares that the identity of people,\nwoods, and rocks is inseparably linked to their opposite, their\nincessant transformation. The old school logic treats things, the\nobjects of perception, like stereotyped moulds, while the\nphilosophically expanded logic considers such treatment adequate for\nhousehold use only. The logical household use of stereotyped\nconceptions extends, and should extend, to all of science. The\nconsideration of things as remaining \"the same\" is indispensable, and\nyet it is very salubrious to know and remember that the things are not\nonly the same permanent and stereotyped, but at the same time variable\nand in flow. That is a contradiction, but not a senseless one. This\ncontradiction has confused the minds and given much trouble to the\nphilosophers. The solution of this problem, the elucidation of this\nsimple fact, is the positive product of philosophy.\n\nI have just declared that logic so far did not know that the perception\nproduced by its principles does not offer us truth itself, but only a\nmore or less accurate picture of it. I have furthermore contended that\nthe positive outcome of philosophy has materially added to the clearness\nof the portrait of the human mind. Logic claims to be \"the doctrine of\nthe forms and laws of thought.\" Dialectics, the product of philosophy,\naims to be the same, and its first paragraph declares: Not thought\nproduces truth, but being, of which thought is only that part which is\nengaged in securing a picture of truth. The fact resulting from this\nstatement may easily confuse the reader, viz., that the philosophy which\nhas been bequeathed to us by logical dialectics, or dialectic logic,\nmust explain not alone thought, but also the original of which thought\nis a reflex.\n\nWhile, therefore, traditional logic teaches in its first law that all\nthings are equal to themselves, the new dialectics teaches not only that\nthings are equal to themselves and identical from start to finish, but\nalso that these same things have the contradictory quality of being the\nsame and yet widely variable. If it is a law of thought that we gain as\naccurate as possible a conception of things by the help of thought, it\nis at the same time a law of thought that all things, processes, and\nproceedings are not things but resemble the color of that silk which,\nalthough equal to itself and identical throughout, still plays from one\ncolor into another. The things of which the thinking thing or human\nintellect is one are so far from being one and the same from beginning\nto end that they are in truth and fact without beginning and end. And as\nphenomena of nature, as parts of infinite nature, they only seem to have\na beginning and end, while they are in reality but natural\ntransformations arising temporarily from the infinite and returning into\nit after a while.\n\nNatural truth or true nature, without beginning and end, is so\ncontradictory that it only expresses itself by shifting phenomena which\nare nevertheless quite true. To old line logic this contradiction\nappears senseless. It insists on its first, second, and third law, on\nits identity, its law of contradiction and excluded third, which must be\neither straight or crooked, cold or warm, and excludes all intermediary\nconceptions. And in a way it is right. For every-day use it is all right\nto deal in this summary fashion with thoughts and words. But it is at\nthe same time judicious to learn from the positive outcome of philosophy\nthat in reality and truth things do not come to pass so ideally. The\nlogical laws think quite correctly of thoughts and their forms and\napplications. But they do not exhaust thinking and its thoughts. They\noverlook the consciousness of the inexhaustibleness of all natural\ncreations, of which the object of logic, human understanding, is a part.\nThis object did not fall from heaven, but is a finite part of the\ninfinite which actually has the contradictory quality of possessing in\nand with its logical nature that universal nature which is superior to\nall logic.\n\nFrom this critique of the three first \"fundamental laws of logic\" it is\napparent that the human understanding is not only everywhere identical,\nbut also different in each individual and has a historical development.\nWe are, of course, logically entitled to consider this faculty like all\nothers by itself and give it a birthday. Wherever man begins, there\nunderstanding, the faculty of thought, begins. But we are\nphilosophically and dialectically no less entitled, and it is even our\nduty, to know that the faculty of understanding, the same as its human\nbearer, has no beginning, in spite of the fact that we ascribe a\nbeginning to them. When we trace the historical development of these\ntwo, of man and understanding, backward to their origin, we arrive at a\ntransition to the animal and see their special nature merging into\ngeneral nature. The same is found in tracing the development of the\nindividual mind. Where does consciousness begin in the child? Before,\nat, or after birth? Consciousness arises from its opposite,\nunconsciousness, and returns to it. In consequence we regard the\nunconscious as the substance and the conscious as its predicate or\nattribute. And the fixed conceptions which we make for ourselves of the\nunits or phenomena of the natural substance are recognized by us as\nnecessary means in explaining nature, but at the same time it is\nnecessary to learn from dialectics that all fixed conceptions are\nfloating in a liquid element. The infinite substance of nature is a very\nmobile element, in which all fixed things appear and sink, thus being\ntemporarily fixed and yet not fixed.\n\nNow let us briefly review the fourth fundamental law of logic, according\nto which everything must have an adequate cause. This law is likewise\nvery well worthy of attention, yet it is very inadequate, because the\nquestion what should be our conception of the world and what is the\nconstitution of the most highly developed thinking faculty of the world\nrequires the answer: the world, in which everything has its adequate\ncause, is nevertheless, including consciousness and the faculty of\nthought, without beginning, end, and cause, that is, a thing justified\nin itself and by itself. The law of the adequate cause applies only to\npictures made by the human mind. In our logical pictures of the world\neverything must have its adequate cause. But the original, the universal\ncosmos, has no cause, it is its own cause and effect. To understand that\nall causes rest on the causeless is an important dialectic knowledge\nwhich first throws the requisite light on the law of the necessity of an\nadequate cause.\n\nFormally everything must have its cause. But really everything has not\nonly one cause, but innumerable causes. Not alone father and mother are\nthe cause of my existence, but also the grand parents and great grand\nparents, together with the air they breathed, the food they ate, the\nearth on which they walked, the sun which warmed the earth, etc. Not a\nthing, not a process, not a change is the adequate cause of another, but\neverything is rather caused by the universe which is absolute.\n\nWhen philosophy began its career with the intention of understanding the\nworld, it soon discovered that this purpose could be accomplished only\nby special study. When it chose understanding, or the faculty of\nthought, as the special object of its study, it separated its specific\nobject too far from the general existence. Its logic, in opposing\nthought to the rest of existence, forgot the interconnection of the\nopposites, forgot that thought is a form, a species, an individuality\nwhich belongs to the genus of existence, the same as fish to the genus\nof meat, night to the genus of day, art to nature, word to action, and\ndeath to life. It does not attempt to explore the essence of thought for\nits own sake, but for the purpose of discovering the rules of exploring\nand thinking correctly. It could not very well arrive at those coveted\nrules, so long as it idealized truth transcendentally and elevated it\nfar above the phenomena. All phenomena of nature are true parts of\ntruth. Even error and lies are not opposed to truth in that exaggerated\nsense in which the old style logic represents them, which teaches that\ntwo contradictory predicates must not be simultaneously applied to the\nsame subject, that any one subject is either true or false, and that any\nthird alternative is out of the question. Such statements are due to an\nentire misconception of truth. Truth is the absolute, universal sum of\nall existing things, of all phenomena of the past, present, and future.\nTruth is the real universe from which errors and lies are not excluded.\nIn so far as stray thoughts, giants and brownies, lies and errors are\nreally existing, though only in the imagination of men, to that extent\nthey are true. They belong to the sum of all phenomena, but they are not\nthe whole truth, not the infinite sum. And even the most positive\nknowledge is nothing but an excellent picture of a certain part. The\npictures in our minds have this in common with their originals that they\nare true. All errors and lies are true errors and true lies, hence are\nnot so far removed from truth that one should belong to heaven and the\nother to eternal damnation. Let us remain human.\n\nSince old line logic with its four principles was too narrowminded, its\ndevelopment had to produce that dialectics which is the positive\noutcome of philosophy. This science of thought so expanded regards the\nuniverse as the truly universal or infinite, in which all contradictions\nslumber as in the womb of conciliation. Whether the new logic shall have\nthe same name as the old, or assume the separate title of theory of\nunderstanding or dialectics, is simply a question of terms which must be\ndecided by considerations of expediency.\n\n\n\n\nX\n\nTHE FUNCTION OF UNDERSTANDING ON THE RELIGIOUS FIELD\n\n\nWe took our departure from the fact that philosophy is searching for\n\"understanding.\" The first and principal acquisition of philosophy was\nthe perception that its object is not to be found in a transcendental\ngenerality. Whoever wishes to obtain understanding, must confine himself\nto something special, without, however, through this limitation losing\nsight of all measure and aim to such an extent that he forgets the\ninfinite generality.\n\nA modern psychologist who occupies himself with \"Thoughts on\nEnlightenment,\" which topic is evidently related to ours, says: \"Real\nand genuine enlightenment can proceed only from religious motives.\"\nExpressed in our language, this would mean: Every genuine understanding,\nevery true conception or knowledge, must be based on the clear\nconsciousness that the infinite universe is the arch fundament of all\nthings.\n\nUnderstanding and true enlightenment are identical. \"It is true,\" say\nthe \"Thoughts on Enlightenment,\" \"that all enlightenment takes the form\nof struggles on account of the nature of him who is to be enlightened\nand of the object about which he is to be informed. But it is a struggle\nfor religion, not against it.\" The author, Professor Lazarus, says in\nhis preface that he does not wish the reader to base his opinion on any\nsingle detached sentence. \"Every single sentence,\" he says, \"may be\ntested as to its value, but the whole of my views on religion and\nenlightenment cannot be recognized from any single one of them.\"\n\nAs this wish is entirely justified and as our position is somewhat\nsupported by his psychological treatment of enlightenment, we shall\ncomply with his wish and seek to grasp the meaning of his statements on\nthe religious nature of enlightenment in their entirety, not as isolated\nsentences.\n\nWe even go a step farther than Professor Lazarus, by extending to\nunderstanding what he says about enlightenment, viz., that genuine\nknowledge and enlightenment must, so to say, take their departure from\nreligious motives. But we differ a little as to what motives are\nreligious. Lazarus refers, so far as I can see, to ideas and the ideal,\nwhile we, thanks to the positive outcome of philosophy, understand the\nterms _religion_ and _religious_ to refer to the universal\ninterdependence of things.\n\nObviously the dividing line between heat and cold is drawn by the human\nmind. The point selected for this purpose is the freezing point of\nwater. One might just as well have selected any other point. Evidently\nthe dividing line between that which is religious and that which is\nirreligious is as indeterminate as that between hot and cold. Neither\nany university nor any usage of language can decide that, nor is the\npope a scientific authority in the matter.\n\nIt is mainly due to the socalled historical school that a thing is\nconsidered not alone by its present condition, but by its origin and\ndecline. What, then, is religion and religious? The fetish cult, the\nanimal cult, the cult of the ideal and spiritual creator, or the cult of\nthe real human mind? Where are we to begin and where to end? If the\nancient Germans regarded the great oak as sacred and religious, why\nshould not art and science become religious among the modern Germans? In\nthis sense, Lazarus is correct. The \"enlightenment\" which was headed in\nFrance by Voltaire and the encyclopedists, in Germany by Lessing and\nKant, the \"enlightenment\" which came as a struggle for reason and\nagainst religion, was then in fact a struggle for religion, not against\nit. By this means one may make everything out of anything. But this has\nto be learned first in order to recognize how our mind ought to be\nadjusted, so that it may perceive that not only everything is\neverything, but that each thing also has its own place.\n\nWe wish to become clear in our minds how it is possible, and\nreconcilable with sound conception, that such an anti-religious struggle\nas that carried on during that period of \"enlightenment\" can\nnevertheless be a struggle for and in the interest of religion. We wish\nto find out how one may abolish religion and at the same time maintain\nit.\n\nThis is easily understood, if we remember the repeatedly quoted\ndialectic rule according to which our understanding must never\nexaggerate the distinctions between two things. We must not too widely\nseparate the religious from the secular field. Of course, the religious\nfield is in heaven, while the secular is naturally in the profane\nuniverse. Having become aware that even religious imagination, together\nwith its heaven and spirit creator, are profane conceptions in spite of\ntheir alleged transcendentalism, we find religion in the secular field,\nand thus this field has in a way become religious. The religious and the\nprofane infinite have something in common, at least this that the\nindefinite religious name may also be applied to the secular or profane\ninfinity.\n\n\"All culture, every condition of humanity or of a nation, has its roots\nas well as its bounds in history,\" says our Professor of psychology.\nShould not religion, which according to the words of a German emperor\n\"must be preserved for the people,\" also have its bounds in history? Or\ndoes it belong to the infinite and must it exist forever? In order to\nfree history of its bounds, it is necessary to avail ourselves of the\npositive outcome of philosophy and to demonstrate that nothing is\ninfinite but the infinite itself, which has the double nature of being\ninfinite and inseparable from the finite phenomena of nature. The whole\nof nature is eternal, but none of its individual phenomena is, although\neven the imperishable whole is composed of perishable parts.\n\nThe relation of the constant whole of nature to its variable parts, the\nrelation of the general to the specialties composing it, includes, if we\nfully grasp it, a perfect conception of the human mind as well as of the\nunderstanding and enlightenment which it acquires. This mind cannot\nenlighten itself as to its special nature without observing how it came\nto enlighten itself as to the nature of other specialties. We then find\nthat it has likewise enlightened itself on religious phenomena by\nrecognizing them as a part, as a variation, of the general phenomenon of\nthe constant, eternal, natural universe. Hence secular nature, which is\nat the same time eternal and temporal, is the mother of religious\nnature. Of course, the child partakes of the nature of the mother.\nReligion, historically considered, arises from nature, but the\ndetermination of the date of the beginning of this specialty is left as\nmuch to the choice of man as that of the point where the cold and the\nwarm meet. The general movement of nature, from which arise its\nspecialties, proceeds in infinite time. Its transformations are so\ngradual that every determined point constitutes an arbitrary act which\nis at the same time arbitrary and necessary; necessary for the human\nbeing who wishes to gain a conception of it. A perfect conception of\nreligion, therefore, goes right to the center of the question, to the\npoint where the religious specialty reaches a characteristic stage, to\nits freezing point, so to say. From this standpoint, heat and cold may\nbe sharply defined; likewise religion. If we say, for instance, that\nreligion is the conception of a supernatural spirit who rules nature,\nand the reader thinks this definition somewhat appropriate, the simple\ndemonstration of the achievements of philosophy in the field of\nunderstanding or dialectics proves that this religious conception is\nuntenable in this world of the human mind which knows how to obtain a\nlogical picture of its experiences.\n\nTo desire to preserve religion for the people as a sharply defined and\nfinite thing is contrary to all logic and equivalent to swimming against\nthe tide. On the other hand, it is equally illogical to identify\nreligion after the manner of Lazarus with the conception of natural\ninfinity or infinite nature, because that promotes mental haziness.\n\nThe laws of thought obtained by philosophical research give us\nconsiderable enlightenment about the infinite material process, the\nnature of which is sublime enough to be worthy of religious devotion,\nand yet special and matter-of-fact enough to wash the dim eyes with\nnatural clearness.\n\nWe have already seen in preceding chapters that we must first define our\nstandpoint before we can decide which is the right or left bank of a\nriver. So it is also in the matter of abolishing and maintaining\nreligion for the people. It can be done the moment we extend the\ndiscussion to the realm of infinity. The conception of infinity, called\nsubstance by Spinoza, monad by Leibniz, thing itself by Kant, the\nabsolute by Hegel, is indeed necessary in order to explain anything, not\nonly by the fourth root, but by the infinite root of the adequate\nreason. To that extent we are agreed that enlightenment, or\nunderstanding as we say, is not alone a struggle against religion, but\nalso for it. In the theory of understanding acquired by philosophy,\nthere is contained a decisive repeal of religion. Nevertheless we say\nwith Lazarus: \"The power of enlightenment and its aim are not expressed\nin negation, not in that which is not believed, but in that which is\nbelieved, venerated, and preserved.\" And yet every enlightening\nperception, every understanding resulting from enlightenment, is a\nnegation. In seeking enlightenment, for instance, on understanding, it\nis necessary, in order to prove that it is a natural phenomenon, to deny\nthe religious element in so far as it assumes the existence of a divine\nchief spirit whose secondary copy the human spirit is supposed to be.\nOr, in order to gain enlightenment on the nature of the universe, in\norder to realize that it is a truly universal universe, we are compelled\nto deny the existence of every \"higher\" world, including the religious.\nBut if we desire to become enlightened as to how it is that religion\nmay not alone be denied, but also preserved, we must transfer its origin\nfrom an illogical other world into the natural and logical universe.\nThus religion becomes natural and nature religious.\n\nIf worship is confined to the idolization of the sun or the cat, every\none realizes the temporality of the matter. And if we restrict worship\nto the adoration of the great omnipotent spirit, every one realizes the\ntemporality of this adoration who has acquired an accurate conception of\nthe small human spirit. If, on the other hand, we extend religious\nworship to everything which has ever been venerated, or will ever be\nvenerated, by human beings, in other words, if we extend the conception\nof religion to the entire universe, then it assumes a very far-reaching\nsignificance.\n\nThis is the essence of enlightenment on religion: That we may at will\nexpand or contract our conceptions, that all things are alike to the\nextent of representing only one nature, that all fantastical ideas, all\ngood and evil spirits and ghosts, no matter how \"supernaturally\"\nconceived, are all natural.\n\nThe essential thing in the enlightenment acquired by philosophical study\nis the appreciation of the fact that understanding, enlightenment,\nscience, etc., are not cultivated for their own sake, but must serve the\npurpose of human development, the material interests of which demand a\ncorrect mental picture of the natural processes.\n\nWe have chosen the religious idea for discussion in this chapter so that\nit may serve as a means of illustrating the nature of thought in\ngeneral. We regard it as the merit of philosophy to have unveiled this\nnature.\n\nProfessor Lazarus is quite a pleasing companion. He is a fine thinker,\nsaturated with the teachings of the philosophers, not overfond of any\nparticular school, and only about two hands' breadth removed from our\nposition. But this is just enough to demonstrate by his shortcomings the\nadvantages of our position which proves that the part of the human soul\nperforming the work of thinking is understood by us at least two hands'\nbreadth better than by this prominent psychologist.\n\n\"The function of enlightenment is to recognize that no phenomenon can be\nan effect which has not another phenomenon as its cause, and to search\nfor the sole cause of every effect, noting all its parts and their\nconsecutive divisions.\"\n\nThese words describe the mental work performed by the human brain fairly\nwell, but still they require a little addition, to the effect that the\nmental work is no exception from any other phenomena, all of which have\nnot alone their special, but also one general cause. The cause of all\ncauses, of which religion is making an idol, must be profaned, so to\nspeak, by the cult of science, so that the above definition of Lazarus\nregarding enlightenment would read as follows: The sole and true cause\nof all effects is the universe, or the general interdependence of all\nthings. But this is not by far the full scope of enlightenment. It is\nfurther necessary, as Lazarus well says, to note \"all its parts and\ntheir consecutive divisions.\" We further add: The universal cause must\nbe understood not alone in its consecutive parts, but also in its\nco-ordinate parts. It is only then that understanding, enlightenment,\nbecome perfect. We then find that after all the relation between cause\nand effect, or the relation between the universal truth and its natural\nphenomena, is not a very trenchant one, but a relative one.\n\n\"Enlightenment advances in various, in all, fields of mental life.\nReligious enlightenment has long been recognized as the most essential,\njustly so, and for many reasons, the chief of them being that religious\nenlightenment is the most important and hence the most bitterly\ncontested.\"\n\nThus religious enlightenment is a part of universal, cosmic,\nenlightenment. It is a confusing expression to say that it is confined\nto \"all fields of mental life.\" We believe to be shedding more light on\nthe question by saying that there is enlightenment in all fields, not\nalone in the mental, but also in the cosmic, which unites both the\nmaterial and mental. To classify this field, that is the exhaustive task\nof our understanding, that its exhaustive definition.\n\n\n\n\nXI\n\nTHE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CAUSE AND EFFECT IS ONE OF THE MEANS OF\nUNDERSTANDING\n\n\nThe processes of the human mind and their subjective composition cannot\nbe analyzed in a _pure_ state and without regard to their objective\neffects any more than handiwork can be explained without the raw\nmaterial to be handled and the products derived therefrom, any more than\nany work can be described in a _pure_ state without regard to the\nproduct.\n\nThat is the sad defect of old time logic which is an obstacle to its\nfurther advance: it literally tears things out of their connections and\nforgets the necessity of interdependence over the need of special study.\n\nThe instrument which produces thought and knowledge in the human brain\nis not an isolated thing, nor an isolated quality. It is connected not\nonly with the brain and the nervous system, but also with all qualities\nof the soul. True, thinking is different from feeling, but it is\nnevertheless a feeling the same as gladness and sorrow. Thought is\ncalled incomprehensible and the heart unfathomable. It is the function\nof science, of thinking and thought, to fathom and comprehend what as\nyet is not fathomed and not comprehended.\n\nJust as thinking and understanding are parts of the human soul, so the\nlatter is a part of physical and intellectual man. Together with the\nphysical development of man, of the species as well as of the\nindividual, the soul also develops and with it that part which is the\nspecial object of the theory of understanding, viz., thought and\nthinking. Not alone does physical development produce intellectual\ndevelopment, but, vice versa, the understanding reacts on the physical\nworld. The one is not merely a cause, nor the other merely an effect.\nThis obsolete distinction does not suffice for the full understanding of\ntheir interrelations. We pay a tribute to the \"thoughts on\nenlightenment\" of Professor Lazarus quoted in the previous chapter by\nacknowledging that they throw so much light on a certain point that\nlittle more than the dot over the \"i\" is required in order to clear up a\nbad misunderstanding about the relation of cause and effect.\n\nSince the time of Aristotle this relation has been called a category. We\nhave already noted the statement which characterizes the age of\nenlightenment as one in which the causal category, or let us say the\ndistinction between cause and effect, became the dominant issue. Other\nperiods live with their understanding, with their thoughts, in other\ncategories. Though the ancient Greeks knew the distinction between\ncause and effect, yet it was far from being the dominant point of view\nin their search after scientific understanding. Instead of regarding, as\nwe do today, everything as effects which were produced by preceding\ncauses, they saw in every process, in every phenomenon, a means which\nhad a purpose. The category of means and purpose dominated the Greeks.\nSocrates admired the knowledge of nature displayed by Anaxagoras, the\nstories he could tell of sun, moon, and stars. But as Anaxagoras had\nomitted to disclose the _reasonable purpose_ of the processes of nature,\nSocrates did not think much of such a natural science. At that period\nthe means and the purpose were the measure of reason, the handle of the\nmind, the category of understanding; today causes and effects have taken\ntheir places.\n\nBetween the golden age of Greece and the era of modern science, the\nsocalled night of the Middle Ages, the epoch of superstition, extends.\nIf then you started out on a voyage and first met an old woman, it meant\nmisfortune for you. Wallenstein cast the horoscope before he directed\nhis troops. \"Understanding\" was gathered from the flight of a bird, the\ncry of an animal, the constellations of stars, the meeting with an old\nwoman. The category of that period was the _sign_ and its\n_consequences_.\n\nAnd according to Lazarus, these things were believed by brains which\nwere by no means dull. \"I refer to a name which fills us all with\nveneration: Kepler believed in astrology, in the _category of the sign\nand its consequence_, together with the thinkers of the thousand years\nbefore him and of his own century. Astrology was a science for many\ncenturies, promoted together with astronomy ... and by the same people.\"\n\nThe peculiar thing in this statement is the reference to the category\nof sign and consequence as a _science_. This category has no longer a\nplace in modern science.\n\nMay not our modern viewpoint, the category in which our present day\nscience thinks, the category of cause and effect, be equally transitory?\n\nThe ancients have accomplished lasting scientific results in spite of\ntheir \"purposes.\" Medi\u00e6val superstition with its \"signs,\" its astrology\nand alchemy, has likewise bequeathed to us a few valuable scientific\nproducts. And, on the other hand, even the greatest partisans of modern\nscience do not deny that it is marred by various adventurous vagaries.\n\nThe categories of means and purposes, of signs and consequences, are\nstill in vogue today and will be preserved together with that of causes\nand effects. The knowledge that this latter category is likewise but a\nhistorical one and exerts but temporarily a dominating influence on\nscience belongs to the positive outcome of philosophy, and Professor\nLazarus, with all his advanced standpoint, has remained behind this\nresult by about a yard.\n\nKindly note that it is not the extinction of the relation between cause\nand effect which we predict, but merely that of its dominance.\n\nWhoever skips lightly over the current of life, will be greatly shocked\nwhen reading that we place the fundamental pillar of all perception, the\ncategory of cause and effect, in the same passing boat in which the\nprophets and astrologers rode. One is very prone to belittle the faith\nof others by the name of \"superstition\" and honor one's own superstition\nby the title of \"science.\"\n\nOnce we have grasped the fact that our intellect has no other purpose\nthan that of tracing a human picture of cosmic processes, and that its\npenetration of the interior of nature, its understanding, explaining,\nperceiving, knowing, etc., is nothing else, and cannot be anything else,\nthat moment it loses its mysterious, transcendental metaphysical\ncharacter. We also understand then, that the great spirit above the\nclouds who is supposed to create the world out of nothing, could very\nwell serve the mind as a means of explaining things. And it is the same\nwith the category of cause and effect, which is a splendid means of\nassisting explanation, but still will not suffice for the requirements\nof all time to come.\n\nThe perception that the great spirit above the clouds is a free\ninvention of the small human mind has become so widely spread that we\nmay well pass on over it to other things.\n\nAmong the questions now on the order of business is the one whether the\n\"causes\" with which modern science operates so widely are not in a way\ncreators in miniature which produce their effects in a sleight-of-hand\nway. And this erroneous notion is, indeed, the current conception.\n\nIf a stone falls into the water, it is the cause of the undulations, but\nnot their creator. It is only a co-operator, for the liquid and elastic\nqualities of the water also act as a cause. If the stone falls into\nbutter, it creates at best but one undulation, and if this stony creator\nfalls on the hard ground, it is all up with the creation of undulations.\nThis shows that causes are not creators, but rather effects which are\nnot effected, but effect themselves.\n\nThe category of cause and effect is a good help in explanation, so long\nas it is accompanied by the philosophical consciousness that the whole\nof nature is an infinite sea of transformations, which are not created\nby one great or many small creators, but which create themselves.\n\nA well-known philosophical author expresses himself in the following\nmanner: \"During the first weeks of its existence, the child has no\nperception either of the world without, or of its own body, or of its\nsoul. Hence its feeling is not accompanied by the consciousness of an\ninteraction between these three factors. It does not suspect its\ncauses.\" We see that soul, body, and outer world are called the three\nfactors of feeling. Now note how each one of these three causes or\nfactors is, so to say, the store house of innumerable factors or causes,\nall of which cause the feeling of the child. The soul consists of many\nsoul parts, the body of many bodily parts, and the outer world consists\nof so many parts that it would consist of ten times more parts, if there\nwere any more than innumerable.\n\nThere is no doubt that the child's feeling, or any other, does not exist\nindependently, but is dependent on the soul, the body, and the outer\nworld. This constitutes the indubitable interrelation of all things. In\nthe winding processes of the self-agitated universe, the category of\ncause and effect serves as a means of enlightenment, by giving our mind\nits help in the systematization of processes. If the drop of a stone\nprecedes, the undulations of the water follow; if soul, body, and outer\nworld are present, feeling follows.\n\nThe positive outcome of philosophy does not reject the services of the\ncategory of cause and effect. It only rejects the mystical element in\nthat category in which many people, even among those with a \"scientific\neducation,\" still believe. There is no witchcraft in this matter, but\nsimply a mechanical systematization and classification of natural\nphenomena in the order of their appearance. So long as water remains\nwater and retains its liquid and elastic properties, and so long as a\nstone is a stone, a ponderous fellow striking the water heavily, just\nso long will the splash of the stone be surely and inevitably followed\nby undulations of the water. So long as soul, body, and outer world\nretain their known properties, they will with unfailing precision\nproduce feeling. It is no more surprising that we can affirm this on the\nstrength of our experience than that we have a category of cause and\neffect. There exists nothing extraordinary but the condition of things,\nand in this respect all things are alike, so that human understanding,\ncause and effect, or any other category, are no more extraordinary than\nany other condition. The only wonder is the universe, but this, being a\nuniversal wonder, is at the same time trivial, for nothing is so\nfamiliar as that which is common to all.\n\nBy the help of the viewpoint of cause and effect, man throws light on\nthe phenomena of nature. Cause and effect serve to enlighten us about\nthe world.\n\nThe way, the method, by which this enlightenment is produced, is the\nspecial object of our study. We do not deny that cause and effect serve\nus as a means, but only as one of many. We honor the category of cause\nand effect far too much when we regard it as _the_ panacea. We have seen\nthat formerly other viewpoints served the same purpose and still others\nexist today, some of which have a prospect of being valued more highly\nin the future than cause and effect. This category serves very well for\nthe explanation of processes which follow one another. But there are\nother phenomena which occur side by side, and these must also be\nelucidated. For such a purpose, the category of genus and species is\nquite as serviceable. Haeckel speaks somewhat slightingly of \"museum\nzoologists and herbarium botanists,\" because they merely classify\nanimals and plants according to genera and species. The modern\nzoologists and botanists do not simply consider the multiplicity of\nanimals and plants which exist simultaneously, but also the\nchronological order of the changes and transformations, and in this way\nthey have gained much more of a life-picture of the zoological and\nbotanical world, a picture not alone of its being, but also of its\ngrowing, of arising and declining. Undoubtedly the knowledge of the\nmuseum zoologists and herbarium botanists was meager, narrow,\nmechanical, and modern science offers a far better portrait of truth and\nlife. Still this is no reason for overestimating the value of analysis\nby cause and effect. This method supplements the category of genus and\nspecies. It assists in enlightening, it helps in the process of thought,\nbut it does not render other forms of thought superfluous.\n\nIt is essential for the theory of understanding, to recognize the\nspecial forms of thought of old and new times as peculiarities which\nhave a common nature. This common nature of the process of thought,\nunderstanding, enlightenment, is a part of the universal world process,\nand not greatly different from it.\n\nThe conception of a cause partly explains the phenomena of the universe;\nbut so does the conception of a purpose and of a species, in fact, so do\nall conceptions.\n\nIn the universe all parts are causes, all of them caused, produced,\ncreated, and yet there is no creator, no producer, no cause. The general\nproduces the special, and the latter in turn produces by reaction the\ngeneral.\n\nThe category of the general and the special, of the universe and its\nparts, contains all other categories in the germ. In order to explain\nthe process of thought, we must explain it as a part of the universal\nprocess. It has not caused the creation of the world, neither in a\ntheological nor in an idealist sense, nor is it a mere effect of the\nbrain substance, as the materialists of the eighteenth century\nrepresented it. The process of thought and its understanding is a\npeculiarity of the universal cosmos. The relation of the general to the\nspecial is the clear and typical category underlying all other\ncategories.\n\nOne might also apply other names to this category, for instance, the one\nand the many; the essence and the form; the substance and its\nattributes; truth and its phenomena, etc. However, a name is but a\nbreath and a sound; understanding and comprehension are what we want in\nthe first place.\n\n\n\n\nXII\n\nMIND AND MATTER: WHICH IS PRIMARY, WHICH SECONDARY?\n\n\nIt is the merit of the philosophical outcome to have delivered the\nprocess of understanding from its mystic elements. So long as cause and\neffect are not recognized as a form of thought belonging to the same\nspecies with many other forms of thought, all of which serve the common\npurpose of illuminating the cosmic processes for the human mind by a\nsymbolized picture composed of various conceptions, just so long will\nsomething mysterious adhere to the category of cause and effect.\n\nPhilosophy is particularly engaged in illuminating the understanding. It\nhas learned enough of its specialty to know that it is a part of the\nuniverse performing the special function of arranging the world of\nphenomena and its smaller circles according to relations of\nconsanguinity and chronology. Such an arrangement presents a scientific\npicture of the world. The well-known diagram of conceptions used by\nlogicians, consisting of a large circle symbolizing the general, inside\nof which smaller circles crossing and encircling one another represent\nthe specialties, is a fitting aid in explaining the method by which the\nfaculty of understanding arrives at its scientific results. Science in\ngeneral is the sum of all special kinds of knowledge, differing from\nthem in no greater degree than the human body from the various organs of\nwhich it is composed. A bodily organ can no more exist outside of the\nbody than any particular knowledge can exist outside of the generality\nof all sciences. No metaphysics is possible under this condition.\n\nAs surely as we know that two mountains cannot be without a valley\nbetween them, just so surely do we know that nothing in heaven, on\nearth, or in any other place can lie outside of the general circle of\nthings. Outside of the worldly world there can be no other little world.\nA logically constituted human mind cannot think differently. And it is\nlikewise impossible to discover such an outside world by the help of and\nwithin the limits of experience, because thought is inseparable from\nexperience and there can be no experience without thought. A man who has\na head upon his shoulders--and there can be no man without a\nhead--cannot experience any unworldly metaphysical world. The faculty of\nexperience, which includes the faculty of understanding or perception,\nis merely empirical. Our settled conviction of the unity of the universe\nis an inborn logic. The unity of the world is the supreme and most\nuniversal category. A closer look at it at once reveals the fact that it\ncarries its opposite, the infinite multiplicity, under its heart or in\nits womb. The general is pregnant with specialties.\n\nThis is a comparison, and comparisons limp. A mother has other qualities\nbeside that of motherhood, while the universe, or the absolute\ngenerality, is nothing but the bearer, the cause, of all special and\nseparate things. It is \"pure\" motherhood which can no more be without\nchildren than the children without a mother. In this way, no cause can\nbe without effects. A cause without an effect--let us dismiss it. The\nchild is as much a cause in motherhood as it is its effect and product.\nIn the same way the universe has never been, and could not be conceived,\nwithout the many special children which it carries in its womb.\n\nIf thought wishes to make for itself a picture, a conception of the\ncause of all causes, it must necessarily take cognizance of the effects.\nThought may very well separate one from the other, but cannot think\ncorrectly without the consciousness that its separating and\ndistinguishing is only a formality. Imagining, conceiving, knowing,\nperceiving, are so many formalities.[9]\n\nBut philosophy took its departure from the opposite, the wrong, view. It\nregarded perceiving, understanding, as the main thing. It did not use\nscience as a formality, as something secondary, as something serving a\nnature, a cause, a purpose, a higher reason, but it started with the\nillogical and irrelevant assumption that the specialty of mind,\nunderstanding, conceiving, judging, distinguishing, is the primary,\nsupreme, self-constituted cause and purpose, instead of being an element\nin logic. Even in Hegel's logic, which, by the way, has given us much\nlight on the process of thought, this confounding of the original with\nthe copy is the cause of an almost impenetrable mysticism.\n\nNot nature, but science is to those idealist philosophers the source of\ntruth. The \"true idea\" surpassed everything with them. This \"idea\" is\nforced by Hegel to roll about, and wind, and twist as if it were not a\nnatural child, but a metaphysical dragon. But we cannot deny that in\nthese twistings and windings of the Hegelian dragon the condition of the\nmind is exposed in all its peculiarities and nakedness.\n\nAccording to Hegel's theosophical opinion I do not become aware of my\nfriend in material intercourse and bodily touch. Hegel's mark of a true\nfriend is not that he proves true in life, but that he corresponds \"to\nhis idea.\" The \"idea\" of true friendship is for the idealist the measure\nof friendly truth, just as Plato measures the ideal or true condition of\nstates and cooking pots of this valley of sorrows by the standard of an\n\"idea\" of the state, or an \"idea\" of the cooking pot, supposed to be\nderived from some other world.\n\nIt is surely a valuable gift of nature that the human mind can form its\nideals. But it is a gift that has also caused much trouble and which\nrequires for its higher development the clear understanding that ideals\nare constructed out of real materials. Without this understanding the\nhuman race will never succeed in making a reasonable use of its ideal\nfaculty. The beautiful ideal of true friendship may stimulate us to\nemulation. But the knowledge that it is nothing but an ideal which in\nreality is always mixed with a little falseness serves as no mean\nantidote against sentimental transcendentalism. And the same holds true\nof truth, liberty, justice, equality, brotherhood, etc.\n\nThe striving after an ideal is very good, but it does no harm to be\nconscious of the fact and clearly see that any ideal can never be\nrealized without some admixture of its opposite. What is it that Lessing\nsays? \"If God were to offer me the search for truth in his left hand,\nand truth in his right, I should grasp his left hand and say: Father,\nkeep truth, it is for you alone.\"\n\nIt has not been the task of philosophy to give us a true mind picture of\nthe world. This it cannot do, this cannot be done by any scientific\nspecialty. It may be done by the totality of sciences, and even by them\nonly approximately. Even with them striving is a higher truth and of\nhigher value than knowing. I repeat, then: It is not the particular task\nof philosophy to furnish a true picture of the world, but rather to\ninvestigate the method by which the human mind arrives at its world\npictures. That is its work, and it is the object of this book to sketch\nits outline.\n\nA sketch is in itself an inexact piece of work. I may be blamed for\njumbling together such terms as world, cosmos, universe, nature, or such\nothers as ideas, judgment, conclusion, thought, mind, intellect, etc.,\nand for using them as synonyms when many of them have already been\nassigned their fixed meaning in the classification of science. But this\nis the point which I emphasize, that the method of science, of thought,\nhas the twofold nature of making fixed terms and still remaining\npliable.\n\nScience not only defines what this or that is, but also how it moves,\nhow it originates, passes away, and still remains; how it is fixed and\nyet at the same time moving. The real being of which science treats,\nviz., the universe, is not alone present, but also past and future, and\nit is not alone this or that, but it is everything. Even nothing is\nsomething belonging to the aggregate life.\n\nThis dialectic statement is rather incomprehensible to the\nunphilosophical brain. Nothing and something are conceptions so widely\ndiverging from one another in the unphilosophical mind that they seem\nfar more apart than heavenly bliss is supposed to be separated from\nearthly misery, according to the declarations of clergymen. Clergymen\nare transcendental logicians, and it is likewise transcendental to\nregard nothing as an absolute nothing. It cannot be denied that it is at\nleast a conception or a term. Therefore, whether little or much, it is\nsomething. We cannot get out of existence, out of the universe, any more\nthan M\u00fcnchhausen can pull himself out of a swamp by his pigtail.\n\nThere can be no absolute nothing, because the absolute is synonymous\nwith the universe, and everything else is relative. So it is also with\nnothing. It simply has the significance of not being the main thing. To\nsay: This is nothing means it is not that which is essential at this\ntime and place. This man is nothing simply means that he is not a man\nout of the ordinary, and it does not at all signify that he is nothing\nat all.\n\nThe category of being and not being, like all categories,[10] which\nappear as something fixed to the sound but ill-informed mind, is really\nsomething shifting. Its poles fuse and flow into one another, its\ndifferences are not perfectly radical. These categories give us an\nillustration of the mobile universe, which is a unit composed of its\nopposite, multiplicity.\n\nThe positive outcome of philosophy has for its climax the understanding\nthat the world is multifarious, and that this multiplicity is uniform in\npossessing the universal nature in common. The sciences must represent\nthese objects in such a contradictory way, because all things live in\nreality in this contradiction. What the museum zoologists and the\nherbarium botanists have accomplished on the field of zoology and botany\nin the category of space, has been accepted by the Darwinians with the\naddition of the variety of those subjects in the category of time.\nEither class of scientists categorizes, classifies, systematizes. The\nchemists do the same with substances and forces, and so does Hegel with\nhis categories of being and not being, quantity and quality, substance\nand attribute, thing and quality, cause and effect, etc. He makes all\nthings flow into one another, rise, pass, move, and he is right in doing\nso. Everything moves and belongs together.\n\nBut that which Hegel missed and which is added by us consists in the\nfurther perception that the flow and the variability of the categories\njust quoted is only an illustration of the necessary variability and\ninteraction of all thoughts and conceptions, which are, and must be,\nnothing but illustrations and reflexes of the universal life.\n\nHowever, the idealist philosophers who have all of them contributed\nmaterially toward this ultimate special knowledge, are still more or\nless under the mistaken impression that the process of thinking is the\ntrue process and the true original, and that the true original, nature\nor the material universe, is only a secondary phenomenon. We now insist\non having it understood that the cosmic interaction of phenomena, the\nuniversal living world, is the truth and life.\n\nIs the world a concept? Is it an idea? It may be conceived and grasped\nby the mind, but it does and is more than that. It surpasses our\nunderstanding in the past, the present, and the future. It is infinite\nin quantity and quality. How do we know that? We say in the same breath\nthat we do not know everything which is passing, has passed, and will\npass in the world; we do not understand the whole, and yet we claim to\nhave fully understood that this whole universe is not a mere idea, but\nsomething absolute, something more than a conception or an intuitive\nknowledge, something real and true, something infinite. How do we solve\nthis contradiction?\n\nThe science of the limitation of the individual and of the collective\nhuman intellect is identical with the universal concept; in other words,\nit is innate in the human intellect to know that it is a limited part of\nthe absolute universe. This intellectual faculty of ours is no less\nnatural and aboriginal than the faculty of trees to become green in\nsummer and that of the spiders to spread their nets. Although the\nintellect is a limited part of the unlimited and aware of this fact, yet\nits faculty of knowing, understanding, judging, is a universal one. No\nintellect is possible or conceivable which can do more than the\ninstrument of thought given by nature to the human race. We may indeed\nconceive of a mental giant. But when we take a closer look, every one\nwill perceive that this mental giant cannot get outside of the\ntraditional race of thinkers, unless he is supposed to be the creature\nof imagination.\n\nThinking, knowing, understanding, are universal. I can perceive all\nthings in about the same way that I can see all cobble stones. I can see\nthem all, but I cannot see everything that they are composed of, I\ncannot see, for instance, that they are heavy and ponderable. In the\nsame way all things may be perceived, but not everything that belongs\nto them. They do not dissolve in understanding, in other words,\nunderstanding is only a part of the universe, all of which may be\nperceived, but the understanding of which is not the whole, since our\nintellect is but a part of the universe.\n\nEverything may be understood, but understanding is not everything. Every\npug-dog is a dog, but every dog is not a pug-dog. The conflict of\nidealism and materialism rests on this same conflict between genus and\nsubordinate species. The idealist incarnate contends that all things are\nideas, while we strive to make him see that ideal things and material\nthings are two species of the same genus, and that they should be given\na common family or general name beside their special name, on account of\ntheir common nature and for the purpose of a sound logic. Wherever this\nunderstanding has been acquired, the quarrel between idealists and\nmaterialists appears in the light of a mere bandying of words.\n\nEverything is large, everything is small, everything extended through\nspace and time, everything cause and everything effect, everything a\nwhole and a part, because everything is the essence of everything,\nbecause everything is contained in the all, everything related,\neverything connected, everything interdependent. The conception of all\nas the absolute, the content of which consists of innumerable\nrelativities, the concept of the all as the universal truth which\nreflects many phenomena, that is the basis of the science of\nunderstanding.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[9] A By means of which we picture and explain the monistic\ninterrelation of all things, called universe, nature and\ncosmos.--EDITOR.\n\n[10] That is, like all categories that are subdivisions of the absolute\nbeing, of general existence, pertaining only to the phenomena or\nspecialties which, however, in their entirety constitute the absolute\nbeing or monistic nature.--EDITOR.\n\n\n\n\nXIII\n\nTHE EXTENT TO WHICH THE DOUBTS OF THE POSSIBILITY OF CLEAR AND ACCURATE\nUNDERSTANDING HAVE BEEN OVERCOME\n\n\nA contemporaneous professor of philosophy, Kuno Fischer, of Jena, says:\n\"The problem of modern philosophy is the understanding of things.\" But\nthis problem does not occupy modern philosophy alone; it was also\nconsidered by ancient philosophy. Even more, it belongs to the whole\nworld. All the world, I mean the whole human world, and especially the\nsciences, search after understanding. I do not say this for the purpose\nof setting the Professor right, for I acknowledge that he is a fairly\ndeserving philosopher. If I cared to go through his works, I should\nsurely find other passages which state the problem of philosophy more\naccurately and concretely, to the effect that philosophy does not strive\nmerely for the indefinite \"understanding of things,\" but rather for the\nspecial understanding of that particular thing which bears the name of\n\"understanding.\" Philosophy at the climax of its development seeks to\nunderstand \"understanding.\" It has seriously attempted the solution of\nthis problem so long as men think, so far as our historical records go.\n\nAfter that which we have already said about the beginning and the end of\nthings and about their immortality, it will be easily understood that\nthe thing called understanding has no more historical beginning than all\nthe rest. The known grows out of the unknown, the conscious out of the\nunconscious. Our modern consciousness, though agreeably cultivated, is\nstill an undeveloped, unconscious consciousness. Nevertheless,\ndevelopment has gone far enough to make it plain that understanding is\nanti-religious. Especially the understanding of understanding, the\noutcome of positive philosophy, has a pronounced anti-religious, and to\nthat extent \"destructive,\" tendency. But one should not have an\nexaggerated idea of this destruction. Here, under this sun, nothing is\ndestroyed without leaving the basis for the growth of new life from the\nruins. It belongs to the conception of the universe to understand that\nit is the main conception required for the conception of conception, for\nthe understanding of understanding.\n\nThe history of philosophy begins with the decay of heathen religion, and\nthe history of modern philosophy with the decay of Christian religion.\nSince religion must be preserved for the people according to the\nofficial declarations of the rulers, the official professors are not\nclear and accurate expounders of the positive outcome of philosophy. No\nmatter how great the work of Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel may be,\nyet the followers of Kant and Hegel have no freedom of research, and\nKuno Fischer, although very close to the root of the subject, is\nnevertheless doomed to remain in the mystification of the function of\nconceiving and of understanding. His profession clouds his judgment.\n\n\"Nature,\" says this professor, \"is regarded as the first object of\nunderstanding, as the principle from which everything else follows. In\nthis respect modern philosophy is naturalistic. It is taken for granted\nthat nature can be understood, or that the possibility of understanding\nthings is given. Modern philosophy makes this assumption\ndogmatically.... The Kantian philosophy, on the other hand, assumes a\ncritical, not a dogmatic, attitude toward the possibility of\nunderstanding.\" (System of Logic and Metaphysics, by Kuno Fischer,\nsecond edition, pages 104 and 109.) In this latter, critical, stage,\nthe subject is kept rather hot by the professors of philosophy. The\ncritics are still engaged in exclaiming: Be amazed, oh world! How is\nunderstanding possible?\n\nIn the first place, there is nothing to be amazed at. Why is not the\n\"naturalistic\" philosopher consistent by recognizing his special object,\nunderstanding, as a natural object?\n\nThe \"supposition\" that an understanding of things is possible, is\nneither a supposition nor anything \"dogmatic.\"\n\nThe philosophers should abandon their old hobby of trying to prove\nanything by syllogisms. Nowadays, a case is not substantiated by words,\nbut by facts, by deeds. The sciences are sufficiently equipped, and thus\nthe \"possibility of understanding\" is demonstrated beyond a doubt.\n\n\"But,\" say the critics who are so wise that they hear the grass growing,\n\"are those perceptions which are produced by the exact sciences really\nperceptions? Are they not simply substitutes? Those sciences recognize\nonly the phenomena of things; but where is the understanding which\nperceives the truth?\"\n\nWe shall offer it to them. You are naturalists. Well, then, nature is\nthe truth. Or are you spiritualists who make a metaphysical distinction\nbetween the truth and the phenomenon? To understand means to distinguish\nand judge. The semblance must be distinguished from the truth, but not\nin an excessive manner. It must be remembered that even the most evil\nsemblance is a natural phenomenon, and the sublimest truth is only\nrevealed by phenomena, just because it is natural.\n\nBut the old logic cannot stand any contradictions. Semblance and truth\nare contradictions for it and they cannot be reconciled by it. But the\nirreconcilable simply consists in entertaining, in this monistic world,\nthoughts which are supposed to be totally different. Hence old style\nlogic lacks entirely the mediating manner of thought which does not\nelevate understanding and its faculty of thought to the skies, but is\nsatisfied to regard it as a very valuable, but still natural, quality.\n\nThe old logic could not construct any valid rules of thought, because it\nthought too transcendentally of thinking itself. It was not satisfied\nthat thought is only a faculty, a mode of doing, a part of true nature,\nbut the nature of truth was spiritualized by it into a transcendental\nbeing. Instead of grasping the conception of spirit with blood and\nflesh, it tries to dissolve blood and flesh into ideas. That would be\nwell enough, if such a solution of the riddles were meant to have no\nother significance than that of symbols.\n\nThe old logic contains long chapters about the proofs of truth. It is\nsupposed to be \"identical\" with the idea and to be proven by ideas. This\nwould be all right, if we remained conscious of the secondary relation\nin which the idea and understanding stand to truth. But old line logic\nis not conscious of this relation. On the contrary. Its consciousness\ndistorts that relation. It elevates the mind to the first place and\nrelegates blood and flesh to the last.\n\n\"The necessity of a conception is proven by the impossibility of its\nopposite. An idea is contradicted by proving its impossibility. This\nimpossibility is demonstrated when it can be proven that a thing is at\nthe same time A and not-A, or when it can be shown that a thing is\nneither A nor not-A. The first mode of proof is called _antinomy_, the\nsecond, _dilemma_.\"\n\nIn this representation of the logical proof much is said of the \"thing,\"\nfor instance this: A thing cannot be at the same time straight and\ncrooked, true and untrue, light and dark. The excellence of this\ndoctrine is easily apparent, because it is overlooked that the concept\n\"thing\" is not a fixed, but a variable one. If a straight line is a\nthing, and a crooked line another thing, and if these two things are\nheld to be opposed to one another, then the above logic is the most\njustified in the world. But who claims that there are not many straight\nlines which are crooked at one end, which run straight on for a certain\ndistance and then turn? Who will define to us what a line is? A line may\nbe composed of 10, 20, 30, etc., parts, and each part is a line.\n\nBefore anything to the point can be said about the logical laws, it is\nnecessary to say above all how it stands with the relation of the whole\nto its parts, of the universe to its subdivisions. The old theological\nquestion of God and his creatures, the old metaphysical question of the\nunity and the multiplicity, of truth and its phenomena, reason and\nconsequence, etc., in one word, the question of metaphysical categories\nmust be solved and settled before the definition of the minor factors of\nunderstanding, the questions of formal logic, can be attempted.\n\nWhat is a \"thing?\" A clergyman would answer: Only God is something,\neverything else is nothing! And we say: Only the universe is something,\nand everything in it consists of vacillating, changing, precarious,\nvaricolored, fluid, variable phenomena or relativities.\n\nIn our times, up to which the theologians have speculated so much and\ncontributed so little to understanding, one can hardly touch on the God\nconcept without annoying the reader. Yet it is very essential for a\nthorough understanding of the human mind to point out that the God\nconcept and the universe concept are analogous concepts. Not in vain\nhave the first minds of modern philosophy, such as Cartesius, Spinoza,\nLeibniz, occupied themselves so closely with the God concept. They\ninvented the socalled ontological proof of the existence of God. This\nproof if applied to the universe, testifies to its divinity. A\nmetaphysical cloud pusher as well as the physical cosmos are\nfundamentally concepts of the most perfect being. It makes little\ndifference whether we say that the concept of the universe, or of the\ncosmos, or of the most perfect being is innate in man. If this concept\nwere not existing, it would lack the main thing required for its\nperfection. Hence the most perfect being must exist. And it does. It is\nthe universe, and everything belongs to its existence. Nothing is\nexcluded from it, least of all understanding. The latter is, therefore,\nnot only possible, but a fact, which is proven by the very concept of\nthe most perfect being.\n\nThis ought to be sufficient to help us over the doubts of the critics,\nespecially over Kantian criticism, or rather dualism. Kant did not care\nto accept the dogma of the possibility of understanding without\nexamination; he wished to investigate first. He then discovered that we\nmay understand correctly, provided we remain with our understanding on\nthe field of common experience; in other words, in the physical\nuniverse, and refrain from digressing into the metaphysical heaven. But\nhe did not understand that the metaphysical heaven against which he\nwarns us would be an obsolete standpoint in our days.\n\nHe still permits that transcendental possibility to remain and while he\nwarns us not to stray into it with our understanding he omits to tell us\nto also keep away from it with our intuition. Kant struggles about\nbetween the \"thing as phenomenon\" and the \"thing itself.\" The former is\nmaterial and may be understood, the latter is supernatural and may be\nbelieved or divined. With this doctrine, he again made understanding,\nthe object of modern philosophy, problematical, thus inviting us to\ninvestigate further.\n\nThis we have done, and it is now the positive outcome of philosophy to\nknow clearly and definitely and understand that understanding is not\nonly a part of this world of phenomena, but a true part of the general\ntruth, beside which there is no other truth, and which is the most\nperfect being.\n\nPhilosophy took its departure from confused wrangling about that which\nis and that which is not, especially from the religious disappointments\nmet by the Greek nation when its world of deities dissolved into\nphantasms. Humanity demands a positive, strong, unequivocal, reliable\nunderstanding. Now, in this world of ours, the solid is so mixed with\nthe fluid, the imperishable with the perishable, that a total separation\nis impossible. Nevertheless our intellect catches itself continually\nmaking separations and distinctions. Should not that appear mysterious\nto it? The necessary and natural result was the problem of the theory of\nunderstanding, the special question of philosophy: Which is the way to\nan indubitably clear and positive understanding?\n\nThe summit of Grecian philosophy bears the name of Aristotle. He was a\npractical man who did not like to stray into the distance when he could\nfind good things near by, and he did not concern himself about the\ndescent of understanding. Its platonic origin from an ideal world went\ninstinctively against his grain. He, therefore, took hold of the\nquestion at the nearest end and analyzed the positive knowledge\navailable at that time. But since Grecian science and the knowledge of\nAristotlean times were rather slim, his attempt to demonstrate logic\ndid not produce any decisive results. But it had been discovered that it\nwas possible to make positive deductions from fixed premises.\n\nAristotle clung to this. He showed clearly and definitely, excellently\nand substantially, how logical deductions should be made in order to\narrive at positive understanding. All dogs are watchful. My pug-dog is a\ndog, therefore it is watchful. What can be more evident? Why, then,\nspeculate about God, freedom, and immortality, when indubitable\nknowledge may be obtained by the formal method of exact deductions?\n\nBut Aristotle had overlooked something, or, being a practical man,\nperhaps overlooked it intentionally. The premise from which he deducted\nthe watchfulness of dogs in general, was handed down by tradition and\nhad been accepted on faith. But was it founded on fact? Could there not\nbe some dogs who lacked the quality of watchfulness, and might not our\npug-dog be very unreliable, in spite of all exact deductions? In the\ncase of the pug-dog this would not be of very great moment. But what\nabout the question of the beginning and end of the world, or the\nquestion of the existence of God? The Grecian gods had been outgrown by\nAristotle.\n\nThe history of logic, and of philosophy in general, is interrupted by\nChristianity and by the decline of the antique world, until the\nreformation opens a new era. The Catholic church had, in its own way,\nthoroughly settled the great questions of the true nature of things, of\nbeginning and end, reason and consequence. But when it, and with it\nChristianity, began to disintegrate, disbelief once more posed in the\nbrains of the philosophers the old question: How do we obtain reliable\nand true understanding? Reliability and truth were at that time still\nidentical.\n\nBacon and Descartes are the men who started the investigation. Both of\nthem were disgusted with Aristotle and with his formal logic,\nparticularly with the subtleties of scholasticism. It did not satisfy\nthis new epoch to found positive understanding on traditional\ncontentions and exact deductions therefrom. It is a radical epoch and,\ntherefore, epoch-making. The new philosophers have the aim of\nunequivocal understanding in common with the ancient philosophers. Bacon\nstill connects himself with the stock in trade of the past. His\nhistorian says of him that one should not reiterate that Bacon took his\ndeparture from experience, for this means nothing or nothing more than\nthat Columbus was a mariner while the main thing is that he discovered\nAmerica.... He wanted to find a new logic corresponding to the new\nlife.... The inventive human mind has created the new time, the compass,\nthe powder, the art of typography.... He wanted a new logic which\ncorresponded to the spirit of invention. He, the philosopher of\ninvention, was Lord Chancellor of England, was a man of the world. Not\nonly himself, but also his science, was too ambitious, too full of\nenergy, too world-embracing, for him to bury himself in solitude. That\nis a glory for a philosopher, but at the same time an obstacle for his\nspecial task, for the new logic. He recognized the import of his task\nonly in its general outlines. But his contemporary and successor\nDescartes approached the matter more radically and pointedly.\n\nAlthough in recent times the human mind had demonstrated its positive\nfaculty of understanding in natural sciences, especially by inventions,\nstill it was prejudiced by religious improbabilities in its great\npremises dealing with the essence of things and men, with the \"good,\ntrue, and beautiful,\" as the ancients called it. In order to end his\ndoubts, Descartes elevates radical doubt to the position of a principle\nand of a starting point for all understanding. Then he cannot doubt that\nhe is at least searching for truth. He who does not believe in any\nunderstanding, any science, any inventions, cannot doubt at all events\nthat the impulse for understanding is there. It, at least, is\nundeniable. _Cogito, ergo sum_--I think, therefore I am--that is a\npremise which cannot be shaken. The rest, thinks Descartes, may be\ndeducted by Aristotlean methods.\n\nWith this thought, the philosopher of modern times relapsed into the old\nerror that anything positively true could be ascertained with logical\nformulas. His consciousness of the thoughts stirring in his brain, I\nmight say his flesh and blood, convinced him by matter-of-fact evidence\nof the reality of their existence.\n\nThis fact had hitherto been misunderstood. It is claimed that Descartes\ncould convince himself only of the existence of his soul, of his\nthought, by evidence. No, my feeling, my sight, my hearing, etc., are\njust as evident to me as my thinking, and simultaneously with sight and\nhearing that which is heard and seen. The separation of subject and\nobject can and must be merely a formality.\n\nThe Descartian thesis has been distorted into the statement that nothing\nis evident to man but his own subjective conception. And the ideology\nhas been carried to the extreme of calling the whole world an idea, a\nphantasmagoria. True, Descartes needed God in order to be sure that his\nconceptions did not cheat him.\n\nIn order to prove that we no longer need such extravagant means in our\ntimes, I shall devote another chapter to this subject.\n\n\n\n\nXIV\n\nCONTINUATION OF THE DISCUSSION ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DOUBTFUL AND\nEVIDENT UNDERSTANDING\n\n\nLet us divide the history of civilization into two periods. In the\nfirst, the less civilized period, the doubtful perceptions predominate,\nin the second period the evident ones. Our special investigation of the\ncorrect way of evident understanding began in the first period in which\nthe doubtful perceptions, commonly called errors, predominated. In this\nperiod, the gods rule in heaven and imagination on earth.\n\nTo get rid of errors meant originally to lose gods and heaven. The ideal\nworld was the cause of metaphysics. Metaphysics which drew the\ninvestigation of the supernatural into the circle of its activity, did\nso for the purpose of enlightening the human mind. Thus its problem was\nfrom the outset of a twofold nature. It desires to throw light on the\nnatural process of thought, which was temporarily unbalanced by a bent\nfor the supernatural, and for this reason it first loses itself in the\nclouds.\n\nWhile human reason has now become soberer, the meaning of the term\n\"metaphysics\" has also been sobered down. Our contemporaneous\nmetaphysicians speak no longer of such transcendental things as the\nancients did. Present day metaphysics occupies itself with such abstract\nideas as the thing and nothing, being and coming into being, matter and\nforce, truth and error.\n\nParticularly the investigation of doubtful, erroneous, and evident or\ntrue understanding, which we here discuss, is a part of metaphysics.\n\nThe term metaphysics, then, has a double meaning, one of them\ntranscendental and extravagant, the other natural and within sober\nlimits. Our sober task of demonstrating the positive outcome of\nphilosophy that acquired sober methods in dealing with understanding\nalso compels us to face transcendental metaphysics, which sobers down in\nthe course of time and develops into its opposite, into pure, bare,\nnaked physics.\n\nThe divine has become human, the transcendental sober, and so\nunderstanding grows ever more unequivocal and evident in the progress of\nhistory.\n\nIn order to become clear on the problem of understanding, we must cease\nto turn our eyes to any one individual opinion, thought, knowledge, or\nperception. We must rather consider the process of understanding in its\nentirety. We then notice the development from doubt to evidence, from\nerrors to true understanding. At the same time we become aware how\nunwise it was to entertain such an exaggerated idea of the contrast\nbetween truth and error.\n\nWhoever searches for true and evident understanding will not find it in\nJerusalem, nor in Jericho, nor in the spirit; not in any single thing,\nbut in the universe. There the known emerges from the unknown so\ngradually that no beginning can be traced. Understanding comes into\nbeing and grows, is partly erroneous and partly accurate, becomes more\nand more evident. But there is never an absolutely true understanding\nany more than there can be an absolutely faulty one. Only the universe,\nbut not any single thing, is absolute, imperishable, and impregnable.\n\nIn order to accurately define understanding, we must separate it from\nmisunderstanding, but not too far, not excessively, otherwise the thing\nbecomes extravagant. The limited formal logic teaches, indeed, that the\nsame thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time, affirmation\nand denial being contradictions. But such a logic is very narrow. Herbs\nare not weeds. Weeds are the negation of herbs, and still weeds are\nherbs. An erroneous understanding is a negation of a true understanding,\nerror is not truth, and still it exists in truth. There is no absolute\nerror any more than perceptions are the truth itself. All perceptions\nare and remain nothing but symbols or reflections of truth.\n\nWe do not wish to confound error with truth and make a stew of them, but\nrather understand them both. The mixing is done by the man who opposes\nthem as irreconcilable contradictions. Let us first note the mistake\ncommitted in so doing. By so opposing error and truth something is done\nwhich is not intended, not known. The intention is to confront the\nerroneous understanding with truth. For this purpose, error is assumed\nto be the same as erroneous understanding, which may be admitted; but\ntrue understanding and truth are two different things and must be kept\nseparate, if we wish to arrive at clear and unmistakable results. If we\nformulate the question in this way: How do erroneous and true\nunderstanding differ, we are nearer to the desired clarity by two solar\ndistances. We then find that error and understanding do not exclude one\nanother, but are two species of the same genus, two individuals of the\nsame family.\n\nTwo times two is not alone four; this is only a part of the truth; it is\nalso four times one, or eight times one-half, or one plus three, or\nsixteen times one-quarter, etc. The man who first observed that the sun\ncircled around the earth once a day, committed a mistake, yet he made a\ntrue perception. The apparent circulation of the sun in twenty-four\nhours around the earth is a substantial part of the understanding which\nillumines the relation of the motion of the sun and of the earth. No\ntruth is merely simple, but it is at the same time composed of an\ninfinite number of partial truths. The semblance must not be\ncontradictorily separated from truth, in an extravagant sense, but is\npart of truth, just as all errors contribute toward true understanding.\nIn so far as all perceptions are limited, they are errors, partial\ntruths. True understanding requires above all the backing of the\nconscious recognition that it is a limited part of the unlimited\nuniverse.\n\nThe cosmic relation of the whole to its parts, of the general to the\nspecial, must be considered in order to get a clear conception of the\nnature of the human understanding.\n\nUnderstanding or knowledge, thinking, perceiving, reasoning, must, for\nthe purpose of investigation, not be excessively separated from other\nphenomena. In a way, every object which is chosen for special study is\nisolated. In saying, \"in a way,\" I mean that the separation of the\nobjects of study from other world objects must be consciously moderate,\nnot exaggerated. The separation of the intellect from other objects or\nsubjects when investigating them, must be accompanied by the recognition\nthat such a separation is not excessive, but only formal. In separating\na board, for the purpose of studying its condition, from other boards or\nthings and finding that it is black, I must still remember that this\nboard is black only on account of its interdependence with the whole\nworld process; that the blackness which it possesses is not of its own\nmaking, but that light, and eyes, and the whole cosmic connection belong\nto it. In this way every special perception becomes a proportionate part\nin the chain of universal perceptions, and this again a proportionate\npart of the universal life.\n\nThat this evident universal life is not a mere semblance, not a ghost,\nnot a baseless imagination, but the truth, is made evident to the\nthinking man by his consciousness, reason, common sense. True, he has\nbeen deceived by them, sometimes. But it requires no logic, no\nsyllogistic proof, to know that they are telling the truth in this\nrespect.\n\nIt is nevertheless important to give this proof, because by it the\npeculiar nature of our intellect is revealed, of the object the study of\nwhich is the special concern of philosophy.\n\nThis proof, that the universe is the universal truth, was first\nattempted by philosophy in an indirect way, by casting about in vain for\na metaphysical truth.\n\nThe philosopher Kant was no doubt the thinker who confined the use of\nunderstanding most strictly to the domain of experience. Now, if we\nrecognize that this field is universal, we become aware that the assumed\nKantian limitation is not a limitation at all. The human mind is a\nuniversal instrument, the special productions of which all belong to\ngeneral truth. Though we make a distinction between the doubtful and the\npositive, the outcome of philosophy teaches us that it must be no\nexcessive distinction, but must be backed up by the consciousness that\nall evidence is composed of probabilities, of phenomena of truth, of\nparts of truth.\n\nThe thinking understanding--this is the result of philosophy--is no more\nevident than anything else and derives its existence not from itself,\nbut from the universal life. This universal life from which thought\nderives its perceptions, from which understanding derives its\nenlightenment, does not only exist as a general thing, but also in the\nform of infinitely varied individualities. And generalization, the\nrelation of things, their number and extension, are no more, and no\nless, infinite than individualization and specialization. Every tree in\nthe forest, every grain of a pile of sand, are individual, separate,\ndistinct. Every particle of every grain of sand is distinctly\nindividual. And the infinite individualization of nature goes so far\nthat, just as the human individual is different every day, every hour,\nevery moment, so is the individual grain of sand, even though its\ntransformations were not to become noticeable until after thousands of\nyears, by accumulated changes. By classifying this contradictory,\ninfinitely general and infinitely individual nature in groups according\nto time and space, in classes, genera, families, species, orders, and\nother subdivisions, we are discerning and understanding.\n\nIn the universe, every group is an individual and every individual is a\ngroup. The uniformity of nature is not greater than its variety. Both of\nthem are infinite. We distinguish between time and space. Every moment\nis composed of little moments. The smallest division of time cannot be\ndenominated any more than the largest, just because there is no smallest\nand no largest in the universe, neither in time nor in space. Atoms are\ngroups. As smallest parts they exist only in our thoughts and thus give\nexcellent service in chemistry. The consciousness that they are not\ntangible, but only mental things, does not detract from their\nusefulness, but heightens it still more.\n\nIt is the nature of human intelligence to divide, classify, group. We\ndivide the world into four cardinal points; we also divide it into two\nkingdoms, the kingdom of the mind and the kingdom of nature; the latter\nwe again subdivide into the organic and the inorganic, or perhaps into\nthe mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms. In short, science seeks to\nillumine the universe by division. The question then arises: Which is\nthe genuine and true division? Where does the variety of science, its\nundecided vacillation end, and when does understanding become stable?\n\nThe reader should remember that the things, the objects of\nunderstanding, are not fixed, but also variable objects, and that the\nwhole universe is moving, progressing; that especially the human mind\nbecomes more and more affluent from century to century, from year to\nyear, and that for this reason science is not alone compelled to fix\nthings, but also to remain in flow. The fixed and the fluid are not so\nwidely separated in science any more, that the evidence could not be\nevident and yet at the same time a little doubtful.\n\nMan and his understanding are progressive, and for this reason he must\nprogress by experience in his classifications, conceptions, and\nsciences.\n\nThe fixed, impregnable, socalled apodictical facts are nothing but\ntautologies, if seen at close range. After it has become common usage to\ncall only heavy and tangible things bodies, it is an apodictical fact\nthat all bodies are heavy and tangible. If the conceptions of vapor,\nwater and ice are restricted by common usage and by science to the three\nstages of aggregation of the same substance, then we need not wonder at\nour firm assurance that the water will always remain fluid in all time\nto come, also above the stars. This signifies nothing more than that we\nconceive of the things as solid which we call solid, and of those as\nfluid which we call fluid, but it does not change the fact that our\nfaculty of understanding or perceiving gives us only an approximate\npicture of natural processes, in which the solid and the fluid are\nneither wholly opposed nor different, but where the positive and the\nnegative gradually flow into one another.\n\nThe philosophers produced a very good conception of understanding by\ndeveloping the concept of truth step by step and finally coming to quite\nexact results. But this \"quite exact\" must only be accepted in a\nreasonable sense, not in an extravagant one. Truth as the infinite, as\nthe sum total of all things and qualities, is \"in itself\" quite right,\nbut it cannot be accurately reproduced, not even by means of the mind,\nof reason, or understanding. The means is smaller than the purpose, is\nsubordinate to purpose. So is our faculty of understanding only a\nsubordinate servant of truth, of the universe. The latter is absolutely\nevident, true, indubitable, and positive. It does not vitiate the\nsublimity of this world in the least that it is veiled by appearances,\nby error, by untruth. On the contrary. Without sin there is no virtue,\nand without error there is no understanding, no truth. The negative, the\nweakness, the sin and error, are overcome, and thereby truth shines in\nfull splendor. The universe, the general truth, is a progressive thing.\nIt is absolute, but not at any fixed time or place, but only in the\ncombined unity of all time and space.\n\nIt is sometimes said that this is too much for our intellect, that we\ncannot understand this. It is true that we cannot squeeze this into any\nof our categories, of our fundamental conceptions, unless we place the\ncategory of illimited and indeterminable and infinite truth at the\nbeginning of them. If that is not quite clear and plain, it should\nserve to teach us that the category of clear and plain human\nunderstanding is destined to recognize its function as a subordinate\nfactor of nature.\n\nSuch an understanding of understanding, such a higher consciousness\nstanding ever behind us, promotes a meek pride or a proud meekness which\nis well distinguished from the mental poverty of theologians, from the\ntranscendental distinction between God and the world, between creator\nand creature. To us the perishable soul is not a narrow-minded servant\nfor whom the plans of the imperishable monster soul are\nincomprehensible. A philosophically educated and self-understanding mind\nis a part of absolute nature. This mind is not only a limited human\nmind, but the mind of the infinite eternal, omnipotent universe from\nwhich it derived the faculty of knowing everything knowable. But when\nthis mind demands the ability to absolutely know everything, it demands\nthat knowledge should be everything, it becomes transcendental and\ninsolent, it misconceives the relation of science to infinity. The\nlatter is more than science, it is the object of science.\n\n\n\n\nXV\n\nCONCLUSION\n\n\nThe philosopher Herbart declares: \"If the meaning of a word were\ndetermined by the use to which it is put by this or that person, then\nthe term _metaphysics_ would be ambiguous and scarcely comprehensible.\nIf one wishes to know what meaning of this term has been handed down to\nus by tradition, he should read the ancient metaphysicians and their\nfollowers, from Aristotle to Wolff and his school. It will then be found\nthat the concepts of being, of its quality, of cause and effect, of\nspace and time, have been the objects of this science everywhere ...\nthat it has been attempted to analyze them logically and that this has\nled to all sorts of disputes. These disputes ... determined the concept\nof metaphysics.\"\n\nSuch a declaration is right enough to furnish, by the help of a little\ncriticism on our part, a sketch of the positive outcome of philosophy.\n\nMetaphysics has always been the principal part of philosophy. In the\nfirst sentence of his \"Handbook for the Elements of Philosophy,\" Herbart\ndefines philosophy as the \"analysis of ideas.\" According to this,\nmetaphysics would have to analyze the special ideas of being, etc. Now\nit must be remembered that the idea of being is not so much a special\nconcept as the general idea which comprises all ideas and all things.\nEverything belongs to being, and to understand that is too much for\nmetaphysics. Hence it came into difficulties. Now our authority has just\nexplained to us that the concept of metaphysics was not so much\ndetermined by the work it accomplished as by disputes. It did not work,\nbut only made the logical attempt to analyze the concept of being. In so\ndoing it led to disputes and did not distinguish itself very much as a\nscience. The latter, Kant has told us in his preface to his \"Critique of\nPure Reason,\" is recognized by its agreements, not by its disputes.\n\nThe metaphysical disputes were overcome by philosophic science, which is\nthe study of ideas or understanding, by arriving at a clear and plain\ntheory of understanding, the demonstration of which I have here\nattempted.\n\nThe faculty of understanding had been transmitted to us by our\nsuperstitious ancestors as a thing of another world. But the illusion of\nanother world is a metaphysical one and led to disputes about the idea\nof being.\n\nThe positive outcome of philosophy assures us and demonstrates that\nthere is only one world, that this world is the essence of all being,\nthat there are many modes of being, but that they all belong to the same\ncommon nature. Thus philosophy has unified the concept of being and\novercome metaphysics and its disputes.\n\nUniversal being has only one quality, the natural one of general\nexistence. At the same time this quality is the essence of all special\nqualities. Just as the concept of herbs includes all herbs, even weeds,\nso the concept of being comprises not only that which is, but also that\nwhich is not, which was once upon a time and which will be in the\nfuture.\n\nTo free the concept of being from its metaphysical disputes, is a very\ndifficult thing for those who attribute an extravagant meaning to the\nfirst principle of logic which says: \"Any subject can have only one of\ntwo radically different predicates, because it cannot be at the same\ntime A and not-A.\"\n\nAll previous science of understanding has really revolved around this\nstatement. It is based on something plausible, but still more on\nmisunderstanding. Only when we have become aware of what has finally\nbeen the outcome of the science of understanding, only when this\nstatement is backed up by the positive product of philosophy, does this\nstubbornly maintained and much contested statement receive a lasting\nvalue by its just modification.\n\nIn the first place, a \"subject\" is not a fixed, but a variable concept.\nIn the last analysis, as we have sufficiently explained in this work,\nthere is only one sole universal subject which is nowhere radically\ndifferent.\n\nThe first principle of the old and tried Aristotlean logic tells us that\na man, a subject, who is lame cannot move about with alacrity. But I\nhave a friend who was totally lame and who today jumps about briskly;\nthere is no contradiction in this. But if I tell another man about my\nlame friend and in the course of my story have this lame subject all of\na sudden jumping over chairs and tables, then such a thing is\n_inconceivable_ and I contradict myself. Such a contradiction is a\nviolation of all logic, but not because agility and lameness are totally\ndifferent predicates which cannot be attributed to the same subject, nor\nbecause the contradiction cannot exist. Being is full of contradictions,\nbut they are not simultaneous or without mediation. A logical speech or\nstory must not forget to mediate. By mediation, all contradictions are\nsolved. And this is the outcome of philosophy.\n\nIn discordant metaphysics, being and not being are irreconcilable and\nmutually exclusive contradictions. Metaphysics is in doubt whether this\ncommon existence is real or only apparent, or whether there is not\nsomewhere in a heaven above the clouds an entirely different life. But\nphilosophy is now fully aware that even the most fictitious being is so\npositively real that any negation which appearances may attribute to it\nis outclassed by affirmation to the utter discomfiture of the former.\nBeing and its affirmation is absolute, negation and not being are only\nrelative. Being is everywhere and always dominant, so that there is no\nnon-existence. Though we may say that this or that is nothing, yet we\nmust remain conscious that anything we may call nothing is still\nsomething very positive. There cannot be any ignorance which does not at\nleast know a little. There is no evil which cannot be transformed into\ngood. The things that have been, will be, and are, all of them are.\nThere is no non-existence. It is at least a word, though it does not\nconvey any meaning. The world and our language are of so positive a\ncharacter that even a meaningless word still means something. Nothing\ncannot be expressed.\n\nThe superstition of another \"true\" world which floats above this world\nof phenomena or is secretly hidden behind it has so vitiated logic that\nit is now difficult to remove the discordant metaphysical \"concept of\nbeing\" from the human mind. The belief in something absolutely different\nwill not easily disappear. It is especially difficult to demonstrate\nthat conceived things are of the same nature as real things, that both\nof them really belong to true nature.\n\nConceived things are pictures, real pictures, pictures of reality. All\nthe limbs of an imaginary dragon are copied from nature. Such creations\nof imagination are distinguished from truths only by their fanciful\ncomposition. To connect nature and human life according to the given\norder, that is the whole function of understanding. Knowing, thinking,\nunderstanding, explaining, has not, and cannot have, any other function\nbut that of describing the processes of experience by division or\nclassification. The famous scientist Haeckel may call this\ncontemptuously \"museum zoology\" and \"herbarium botany,\" but he simply\nshows that he has not grasped the secret of the intellect, but still\nwonders at it in a metaphysical way, the same as his predecessors.\n\nWhat Darwin ascertained about the \"origin of species\" and about the\ntransitions and evolutions in organic life is a very valuable expansion\nof museum zoology. Whoever expects anything else from the nature of\nintellectual faculties, shows that he is not familiar with the outcome\nof philosophy, that he has not emancipated himself from the vain\nwondering and its accompanying edification, which the wonder of human\nintelligence caused to primitive ignorance.\n\nUnderstanding has hitherto been in error about itself and was,\ntherefore, inadequately equipped for the task of giving a true account\nof its relatives, of the phenomena of nature and life. Nevertheless it\nhas acquired training in the course of culture and has progressively\naccomplished better things. Its errors have never been valueless, and\nits truths will never be sufficient. That this is so, is not due to the\ndefective condition of our intelligence, but to the inexhaustibleness of\nbeing, the indescribable wealth of nature.\n\nThe self-conscious, philosophically trained understanding and\nintelligence has now the means of knowing that the accuracy of all\ninvestigation is limited, that for this reason all its future results\nwill be affected by error. But a science which is backed up by such an\nenlightened understanding, is reconciled to its limitations and\ntransforms them into a hall of glory. Self-conscious limitation is aware\nof its partnership in the absolute perfection of the universe.\n\nThe self-conscious intellect improved by the positive product of\nphilosophy knows that it can understand, describe, the whole world in a\nnatural, sensible way. There is nothing that can resist it. But in the\nsense of a transcendental metaphysics, our understanding is not worthy\nof that name. In return, this metaphysics is pure vagary in the eyes of\ncritical reason.\n\nTaking its departure from fantastical ideals, from contradictions,\nespecially between being and not being, metaphysics has gradually\ntransformed itself in the course of civilization and become philosophy,\nwhich in its turn has progressed step by step the same as all other\nscience.\n\nPhilosophy was at first impelled by the nebulous desire for universal\nworld wisdom and has finally assumed the form of a lucid special\ninvestigation of the theory of understanding.\n\nThis theory is part, and the most essential part at that, of psychology\nor the science of the soul. Modern psychologists have at least divined,\nif not recognized, that the human soul is not a metaphysical thing, but\na phenomenon. Like Professor Haeckel, they also complain about the dead\nclassification in their specialty. The human soul is presented to them\nas a multitude of _faculties_. There is the faculty of understanding, of\nfeeling, of perceiving, etc., without number and end. But how is life\ninfused into them? Where is the consistent connection?\n\nThere is, for instance, the conception and feeling of beauty in the\nhuman soul. The beautiful again is divided into the artistically\nbeautiful and the ethically beautiful, and each of these into other\nsubdivisions. There is beside the beautiful also the pretty, the\ncharming, the graceful, the dignified, the noble, the solemn, the\nsplendid, the pathetic, the touching. Psychology also treats of the\nridiculous, of the joke, the wit, the satire, the irony, the humor, of a\nthousand subtleties and distinctions, the ideological separation of\nwhich it attempts just as do botany, zoology, and every other science in\ntheir field.\n\nTo all of them, being is the object of study. What is the use of\nmetaphysics under these circumstances? Only because it had in mind a\ndifferent being, a transcendental one, could it induce Kant to sum up\nall his studies in the question: How is metaphysics possible as a\nscience?\n\nIt is the merit of philosophy to have demonstrated that metaphysics is\npossible only as fantastical speculation.\n\nIt is the business of metaphysics to treat being transcendentally. It is\nthe business of special sciences to classify being after the manner of\nherbarium botany. Classical order is already present in the vegetable\nkingdom, otherwise no specialist in botany could classify it.\n\nBut the objective arrangement of the vegetable kingdom in infinitely\nmore multiform than the subjective arrangement of botany. The latter is\nalways excellent, if it corresponds to the scientific progress of its\nperiod. Whoever is looking for absolute botany or psychology, or for any\nother absolute science, misunderstands the universally natural character\nof the absolute as well as the relative special character of the human\nfaculty of understanding.\n\nPhilosophy familiar with its historical achievement understands being as\nthe infinite material of life and science which is taken up by the\nspecial sciences and classified by them. It teaches the specialists to\nremember throughout all their classifications according to departments\nand concepts that all specialties are connected by life and not so\nseparated in life as they are in science, but that they are flowing and\npassing into one another.\n\nThus our science of understanding finally culminates in the rule: Thou\nshalt sharply divide and subdivide and farther subdivide to the utmost\nthe universal concept, the concept of the universe, but thou shalt be\nbacked up by the consciousness that this mental classification is a\nformality by which man seeks for the sake of his information to register\nand to place his experience; thou shalt furthermore remain aware of thy\nliberty to progressively improve the experience acquired by thyself in\nthe course of time, by modifying thy classification.\n\nThings are ideas, ideas are names, and things, ideas, and names are\nsubject to continuous perfection.\n\nStable motion and mobile stability constitute the reconciling\ncontradiction which enables us to reconcile all contradictions.\n\n\nTHE END","title":"The positive outcome of philosophy","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":121380}