{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_40043/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_40043","id":"gutenberg_40043","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40043","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - European","Category: History - Modern (1750+)","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Politics","Eastern question","Europe -- Politics and government -- 1918-1945","Great Britain -- Foreign relations"],"text":"THE PROBLEM OF FOREIGN POLICY\n\n\n\n\n                            THE PROBLEM OF\n                            FOREIGN POLICY\n\n                     A CONSIDERATION OF PRESENT\n                        DANGERS AND THE BEST\n                      METHODS FOR MEETING THEM\n\n                                 BY\n                           GILBERT MURRAY\n\n          AUTHOR OF \"THE FOREIGN POLICY OF SIR EDWARD GREY,\"\n                \"THE RELIGION OF A MAN OF LETTERS,\"\n                   \"FAITH, WAR, AND POLICY,\" ETC.\n\n\n                        BOSTON AND NEW YORK\n                     HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY\n                   The Riverside Press Cambridge\n                                1921\n\n\n\n\n                 COPYRIGHT, 1921, BY GILBERT MURRAY\n                        ALL RIGHTS RESERVED\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nThe publication of this little book was interrupted by an incident which\nmade me realize how easy it is for one who spends much time in trying to\nstudy sincerely a political problem to find himself out of touch with\naverage opinion. The discovery has made me re-read what I have written.\nBut re-reading has not led to any weakening of my expressions, rather\nthe reverse. I wish only to make a brief general statement about the\npoint of view from which I write.\n\nI start from the profound conviction that what the world needs is peace.\nThere has been too much war, and too much of many things that naturally\ngo with war; too much force and fraud, too much intrigue and lying, too\nmuch impatience, violence, avarice, unreasonableness, and lack of\nprinciple. Before the war I was a Liberal, and I believe now that\nnothing but the sincere practice of Liberal principles will save\nEuropean society from imminent revolution and collapse. But I am\nconscious of a certain change of emphasis in my feeling. Before the war\nI was eager for large and sweeping reforms, I was intolerant of\nConservatism and I laughed at risks. The social order had then such a\nmargin of strength that risks could safely be taken. Now I feel a need\nabove all things of the qualities that will preserve civilization. For\nthat preservation, of course, Liberality in the full sense is necessary,\nand constant progress and a great development of democracy.\n\nBut what is needed most is a return to a standard of public conduct\nwhich was practised, or at least recognized, by the best Governments of\nthe world before the war, and which now seems to have been shaken, if\nnot shattered. I am not demanding in any wild idealist spirit that\nGovernments should act according to the Sermon on the Mount--though they\nwell might study it a good deal more than they do. I am only saying that\nthey must get back to the standard of veracity, of consistency, of\nhonesty and economy, and of intellectual competence, that we had from\nPeel or Lord Salisbury or Gladstone.\n\nI do not say that is enough. It is emphatically not enough. We need in\nforeign policy and home policy a higher standard than we had before, the\nstandard implied by the League of Nations in international affairs and\nthe ideal of Co\u00f6peration in domestic affairs. But the first thing is to\nrecover our wholesome tradition.\n\nI think few serious students of public affairs will dispute that the\nlong strain of the war, confusing our ideas of good and evil, and at\ntimes centring our hopes upon things which a normal civilized man\nregards with loathing, has resulted in a widespread degradation of\npolitical conduct. Things are done now, in time of peace, which would\nhave been inconceivable before 1914. And they are done now because we\ngrew accustomed to worse things during the war. I do not wish to attack\nany individuals; but, as an instance of what I mean, one finds a\nMinisterial newspaper complacently remarking that certain country towns\nsacked by the police in Ireland were very small and poor places in any\ncase, and the sacking not nearly so complete as the sacking of Belgian\ntowns by the Germans on less provocation. I find to-day (November 4,\n1920) the Chief Secretary for Ireland announcing in the House of Commons\nthat he has had a court of inquiry into the alleged murder of John\nConway by the police, and presenting an official report that Conway\n\"died from natural causes\"; while at the same time the _Times_ special\ncorrespondent writes: \"I went to the cottage in Rock Street of John\nConway, who was shot on Monday evening, and saw him lying on his bed\nwith a bullet wound in the temple.\" This is one case out of dozens. It\nis not a slip or an isolated crime. I put it to any man who can remember\nthe years before the war that this represents a startling degradation of\nthe standard of government. Such things used to happen in Mexico; now\nthey happen in Great Britain.\n\nOf course I supported the war. I believe it was necessary. I make no\nself-righteous claim to throw the guilt of it upon others, who did the\nfighting by which I and mine were saved. Let me therefore try to make\nclear why certain things shock me profoundly, while I supported others\nwhich can loosely be called \"just as bad.\"\n\nOne of the worst things about war, as Thucydides has remarked, is that\nit takes away your freedom and puts you in a region of necessity. You\nmay choose whether or not to fight; but, once fighting, your power of\nchoice has gone.\n\nTake the treaty with Italy in 1915. Italy demanded a certain price, if\nshe was to come into the war on our side. Another party in Italy was\nnegotiating with the Germans, to see what inducement could be offered\nfor Italy to come in on the other side. (I make no complaint whatever of\nthe conduct of these Italian statesmen; they naturally consulted the\ninterests of their country.) The price was high, and involved the\ntransference to Italy of territory to which, on principles of\nself-determination, she had little claim. But who could refuse the\nprice? War \"is a violent master and teaches by compulsion.\"\n\nTake the blockade of Germany. It was a slow and somewhat cruel weapon to\nemploy, falling most severely on the most innocent classes. But Germany\nwas trying to blockade us, and only our superior strength and skill at\nsea caused her plan to fail. It was part of the normal means of war, and\nof course we used it.\n\nThen came an extension of it. Poland, most unhappy of European nations,\nwas swept by alternate armies, conquered by the Germans, devastated and\nlaid bare. The Poles were our allies. Our newspapers had accounts of the\nappalling distress in Poland--the roads strewn with skeletons, the\nalmost complete blotting-out of children under seven, and the like. The\nAmericans proposed to send food for the relief of the Poles. But we made\nobjection. We did not allow food to go into Poland, to save our own\nallies, who were starving. Why? Because the Germans were still taking\nfrom the miserable country all the food they could wring out of it. And\nif the Americans brought in more food, undoubtedly the enemy would take\nmore. There was no choice. We had to refuse the entry of the food ships.\nBut the man who had to sign that order may well have wished he had died\nbefore the need came to him.\n\nThese results and necessities of war, though I have chosen none of a\nsensational kind, are very horrible. It is not easy to think of actions\nmuch more horrible. But they are not exactly crimes, they are not marks\nof degradation in those who order them, because they are done under the\ncompulsion of war. The alternative in each case is something equivalent\nto helping the enemy.\n\nAt the end of the war, after the signing of an armistice on the basis of\nthe Fourteen Points, there came at last a moment of free choice. It came\nafter five years of unspeakable waste--five years during which the\nnations of Europe had become habituated to cruelty and \"all pity choked\nwith custom of fell deeds.\" I am anxious to avoid the faintest semblance\nof heat or exaggeration, but I think it can hardly be disputed that\npractically every economist agreed that Europe was on the brink of\neconomic ruin and could only be saved by a quick revival of trade; every\nman of conscience, irrespective of political party, knew that the first\ncondition for the recovery of civilization was a change from the war\nmind to the peace mind. Such a change could not happen in a night. It\nmust needs be gradual. It could only be brought about by a strong and\npersistent lead from those who possessed the ear of the world and the\nconfidence of their own people. Never in the whole course of modern\nhistory has there been a more magnificent opportunity than then lay\nbefore the British Prime Minister, never has there been a clearer call\nof plain duty. He was free, as men in public life are seldom free. Great\nBritain hung on his lips, and Europe was waiting for the lead of Great\nBritain. It was for him to choose plain good or plain evil. And he\nchose, deliberately, evil. He dissolved Parliament and appealed to the\ncountry in a General Election on a programme of frantic war passion,\ncoupled with promises which he knew to be false, and which were\nridiculed by every educated man among his surroundings. This man had\nbefore him a task and an opportunity so glorious that one can scarcely\nspeak of it except in the language of religion. Many ordinary men would\nwillingly give their lives if they could save their fellow creatures\nfrom sufferings and perils far less terrible than those which then\nthreatened. And he could have saved them without any sacrifice. It\nneeded only a little courage. For a week or ten days he hesitated. Then\non December 11 he proclaimed his programme: the Kaiser's head; the\npunishment of enemy war-criminals; Germany to pay the whole cost of the\nwar; Britain for the British; rehabilitation of those whom the war had\nbroken.\n\nAt the time when this programme was put forward I felt bewildered. I did\nnot realize that any one could be, I will not say so wicked, but so\ncuriously destitute of generous ambition, so incapable of thinking\ngreatly. And when I tried to find out what motive could lie at the back\nof a failure so incredible, I was told by his supporters that the Prime\nMinister was not thinking about the matters of which I was thinking. He\nwas trying to get a very large majority in the House of Commons and to\ncrush his old colleagues, and conceivable rivals, entirely out of\nexistence. Of course he succeeded.\n\nI hope I have put this statement forward without any malice or party\nfeeling. The state of the world is far too serious to permit of either.\nAnd I hope that the profound and burning indignation which I undoubtedly\nfeel has not biased my judgment. In any case, the conclusion that I wish\nto draw is not a personal but a general one. I doubt if such action\nwould have been possible before the war in any constitutional statesman,\nnot to speak of a clever and humane man like Mr. George. I doubt if the\npublic opinion of any nation would have endured it. A nation in which\nsuch conduct is tolerated, and even approved, ought surely to pause and\nbethink itself. For it is not a particular reckless or unfortunate act\nwhich is thus condoned; it is a way of behaviour. It is a way of\nbehaviour which has its origin in the methods of war, and of which the\ncharacteristic is that it gives the unscrupulous man the advantage over\nthe scrupulous man, the cheat over the honest player, the violent and\nthe criminal over those who obey the law. It fosters exactly those\nthings which it is the business of civilized society to prevent. There\nare always lawless and dishonest men in every large community, as there\nare criminals in every army. There are always men who make profit out of\ntheir neighbours' extremity, who use advertisement to stifle truth, who\njeer at all that is higher than themselves. But in a good social order\nthey are not influential. They acquire power only in a society which, in\nexternal conduct, is losing its traditional standards and inwardly, in\nthe words of Tolstoy's great condemnation, has forgotten God.\n\nMy criticism here is directed against my own country, and in particular\nagainst the British Prime Minister, not in the least because I have any\nanti-British bias. On the contrary, I think that in most of the\ninternational problems of Europe the influence of Great Britain, and in\nparticular of the British Prime Minister, is generally an influence for\ngood, though not nearly such a strong and clear influence as it might\nbe. I confine these criticisms to our own policy because the scolding of\nforeign countries is a notoriously profitless task. The only criticism\nthat has any chance of being useful is that of matters for which the\ncritic or his readers have some degree of responsibility.\n\nI believe profoundly in the traditions of Liberal England. As every one\nknows who has cared to read my writings, I look to the League of Nations\nas the main hope of the world, and to the British Commonwealth as the\nmainstay of the League of Nations. But, if it was ever doubtful, it is\nsurely clear in the present state of the world that the Commonwealth\ncannot rest upon any secure foundation except the good-will of its\nmembers. And that good-will in its turn depends upon equal law, good\ngovernment, and good faith.\n\nIt is not a new lesson that we have to learn: it is an old lesson that\ngood Englishmen once knew better than any rulers the world has ever\nseen, though five years of madness have made it largely forgotten. But,\nas Lord Grey has said, the choice now before us is absolute; we must\nlearn or perish.\n\nIt is in this belief and this spirit that I have written the following\npages, which I hope, except to those who still live in some\nunsubstantial paradise of war-bred delusions, will cause no permanent\noffence, nor leave the impression that where I think others have made\nmistakes I imagine that I should make none.\n\nReaders will see that I have aimed throughout at simplicity of outline.\nI have deliberately focused attention on the one central problem, how to\navoid the causes of international strife. And out of the many and\nmultifarious difficulties that confront our harassed Foreign Office\nto-day, I have concentrated on a few typical cases. I have omitted, for\ninstance, any discussion of Turkey, Armenia, Persia, Ireland, and the\nrelations between Great Britain and the United States. I have omitted\nAfrica, where, unless the white man's methods of administration are\nreconsidered, one of the gravest of the world's future dangers may soon\nbe in fermentation. And I have said nothing of the economic problem in\nEurope, especially in Austria. The International Financial Commission,\nsummoned at Brussels by the League of Nations, has issued a report on\nthis matter which no government can afford to neglect. Its first\nrecommendations are disarmament and freedom of trade, but they will not\nbe enough without some system of international credits by which\nproduction may be set going among those populations which at present\nhave neither food nor raw materials nor the means of buying them.\n\n    *    *    *    *    *\n\nSince an edition of this little book is asked for in America I feel\nconstrained to add a few words to the Preface. It will be seen that I\nhave said nothing about two subjects of the first importance, the Irish\nQuestion and the relations between Great Britain and the United States.\nThe Irish Question is, under present conditions, a domestic matter,\nsince Ireland forms by law part of the United Kingdom and has the right\nof full representation in the British Parliament. It only touches\nforeign policy through its effect on foreign opinion.\n\nI do not therefore propose to discuss the Irish Question here.\nPersonally I believe that a favourable prospect of settlement is to be\nfound in the policy advocated by Mr. Asquith and Lord Grey, and loosely\ncalled \"Dominion Home Rule.\" This would put Ireland roughly in the same\nposition as the self-governing British colonies, and would at once have\ntwo very important effects. It would put an end to the present\noppressions and would give Ireland the right to a seat at the Assembly\nof the League of Nations. But I fear that no settlement whatever is\npossible in Ireland until the present Government is replaced by some\nother with more sincerity in its purpose and less blood upon its hands.\nThe accounts of British misdeeds which I read in the Sinn Fein Bulletin\nand in some American newspapers appear to me to be both exaggerated and\none-sided. Men exasperated by persecution are not as a rule capable of\ngiving a perfectly fair and benevolent account of the behaviour of\ntheir persecutors. But in spite of the Government's policy of rigorous\nconcealment, the Irish can now appeal to the evidence of a witness as\nnearly unimpeachable as can be expected in human affairs, a County Court\nJudge appointed originally by the British Government itself. Judge\nBodkin, in a report submitted to the British Government on cases of\ncrime which came before his Court in Clare County at the Hilary Sessions\nof 1920, states: \"There were in all 139 cases in which it was proved\nthat the criminal injuries were committed by armed forces of the\nGovernment, and only in the five cases already mentioned were any\nwitnesses examined to justify, deny, or explain. In no case was there\nany evidence to suggest that the victims had been guilty of any\noffence.\"\n\nIn answer to a report like this the Government allows no public inquiry,\ninflicts, so far as is known, no punishment on the criminals, awards no\ncompensation to the victims, and yet does not take any legal steps\nagainst its accuser. Such conduct does not seem compatible with\ninnocence. Indeed the complicity of the Government, particularly of Mr.\nLloyd George and Sir Hamar Greenwood, in the system of illegal outrages\ncalled \"reprisals\" is no longer disputed, and has especially been\nbrought out in Parliament by a conservative member, Mr. Oswald Moseley.\nThe exact degree of complicity is, of course, open to doubt. If I may\ngive my own opinion for what it is worth, I suspect that at some time\nwhen the Irish police forces were disposed to resign or to strike owing\nto the constant danger of assassination in which the Government's policy\nrequired them to live, the Government gave their officers some assurance\nthat, if they would only stay on, their own conduct in dealing with Sinn\nFeiners would not be too closely scrutinized. That was the usual method\npursued by the Czar's Government when arranging pogroms.\n\nThe defence of the British Ministers is that they were faced from the\noutset by a very difficult situation, owing to the irreconcilable\ndifferences between the northeast corner of Ulster and the rest of\nIreland. Anxious for Tory support they gave pledges, the exact tenor of\nwhich has not been divulged, to Sir Edward Carson, the Ulster leader,\nand thus tied their own hands. The condition of Ireland became\nincreasingly embittered, till, shortly after Sir Hamar Greenwood's\nappointment, the extreme Sinn Fein party, refusing parliamentary action\nand unable to meet the English in battle, adopted a policy of\nassassination. The Government, much embarrassed, did just what most bad\ngovernments generally have done in other parts of the world. They tried\nto stamp out the Sinn Fein terror by organizing a terror of their own,\nmeeting crime by still more formidable crime, and recklessly confusing\nthe innocent with the guilty. At last they have succeeded in uniting all\nCatholic Ireland in such detestation of the British name that an\nIrishman will now never betray another Irishman, however guilty, to the\nBritish police, nor even feel that the killing of an Englishman is quite\nthe same thing as murder. \"Things being in this state,\" the Government\npleads, \"how can we be expected to govern Ireland according to\ncivilized standards?\" The answer is that they cannot, and had better\nmake room for another Government which can.\n\nI cannot tell how great an effect this Irish calamity has had in\nembittering the relations between America and Great Britain. I would\nonly venture to lay before Americans of moderate views my conviction\nthat the great mass of educated opinion in England joins with the Free\nLiberals and the Labour Party in utterly condemning the Government's\nIrish administration. This conclusion is derived from personal\nconversation with people of various parties, and from the overwhelming\nanti-Government votes in the bye-elections, and the increasing protests\nand rebellions among the Government's supporters in Parliament. I have\nto admit that this condemnation is not reflected in the House of Commons\nas a whole, an utterly abnormal House elected in a moment when not only\nthe fever of war, but many other fevers and corruptions of the body\npolitic were at their height. It is not even reflected adequately in the\npress. For the press in England, with a few most honourable exceptions,\nis in the hands of a small number of individuals who--to say the least\nof it--were not elected to their present position of power by the\nconfidence of their countrymen nor appointed thereto on grounds of\nintellect or character or public spirit. England is admittedly not in a\nvery healthy state of mind. But, even now, at her worst, she is a far\nbetter and more decent country than could be concluded from either the\nLondon press or the House of Commons.\n\nThe picture I have given of European affairs may, I can well see, be\ntaken in either of two ways by an American. It may well confirm his\ndetermination to keep absolutely clear of a world at once so\nill-directed and so miserable. The case for American isolation is very\neasy to state and to understand. What is there to attract America\ntowards further co\u00f6peration with any of the larger European nations?\nFrance? I can imagine no sane statesmen wishing to be drawn into the\norbit of France in her present mood or with her present prospects.\nGermany? The existing German Government seems good, but old enmities do\nnot so quickly die down, and Germany has still to prove that she is an\nhonest and a peaceful power. Russia? To ask the question is to answer\nit. England? Who would wish to co\u00f6perate with the British Government in\nholding down Ireland by \"competition in crime,\" in re\u00ebstablishing her\nslippery grasp on Mesopotamia, laboriously pacifying India and Egypt,\nand struggling indefinitely against Russian conspiracies to destroy her\ninfluence in the Moslem world? How can an American wish to remit\nEngland's debt to America when she is at this moment invading Germany in\norder to collect \"to the last farthing\" a claim which the American\ndelegates at the Peace Conference rejected as extortionate? And who\nwould wish to increase the wealth of a Government which, immediately\nafter the War to end War, is lavishing all it can afford, and more, on\narmaments and military expeditions? Other less plausible arguments could\neasily be added. The suggestion, for instance, that this country, or any\nparty or any fraction of a party in this country, intends or ever\nintended to use the Japanese Alliance for a war against the United\nStates is the merest moonshine, and has been repeatedly disproved by the\nterms of the old treaty and by the public statements of both parties.\nBut, taking only arguments that have some basis of truth, the case for\nAmerican isolation is very strong.\n\nAnd yet it is the wrong case. It is based, I venture to think, first on\na misunderstanding, and next on too narrow a point of view. A\nmisunderstanding; because it is not co\u00f6peration in that sense which is\nasked of her. She is not asked to support the policies of any European\nnation. The League of Nations is not an alliance. She is asked only to\nsit in council with the other nations--as free and unpledged as they,\nor, if she wishes, still more so--to help those who have suffered, and\nare in part still sick in body and brain with their suffering, to face\nthe vast problems which now confront mankind, and which the rest of us\nhave pledged ourselves to face in the spirit of peace and justice and\ncommon sense which we thought was characteristically American. It is\nbased on too narrow a view, because all summary judgments of foreign\nnations are that, whether they end in praise or blame. \"La noble,\nl'incomparable Angleterre\" of M. Briand is just as remote from fact as\nthe \"brutal and bloody Britain\" of Mr. Hearst. Nations are made up of\nmasses of individuals, who differ among themselves within each nation\njust about as much as the citizens of one nation differ from those of\nanother. In every nation there are numbers of criminals and numbers of\nfine men. In every nation's past there are black places and white. Only\nit so happens that just now, after a time of hideous suffering and\nwrong-doing, in the midst of a time of savage resentments and passions\nand great material difficulties, the nations of the world are from the\ndepth of their hearts longing for some way of avoiding war and treating\none another in future a little more openly and fairly than they have in\nthe past. They know they must have disputes, and that when the disputes\ncome it is one of two things; they must either talk them out or fight\nthem out. They are meeting to talk them out. But how can the talk be\nquite frank and free, or how can the promises of peace and fair dealing\ncarry full conviction, while the greatest and the least wounded of all\nthe nations refuses to join in them, but sits aloof in silence, from\ntime to time sharpening her sword?\n                                                             G. M.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nPREFACE                                              v\n\n  I. GERMANY AND FRANCE                              1\n       I. THE PREDICAMENT OF GERMANY                 1\n      II. THE POSITION OF FRANCE                    33\n     III. THE SOLUTION                              42\n\n II. THE EAST                                       58\n       I. SYRIA, MESOPOTAMIA, EGYPT, AND INDIA      58\n      II. AN EASTERN POLICY                         70\n\nIII. RUSSIA AND ITS BORDERS                         80\n       I. THE CIVIL WAR                             82\n      II. RUSSIA'S NEIGHBOURS                       90\n\n IV. PRE-WAR AND POST-WAR CAUSES OF STRIFE          98\n       I. ARMAMENTS                                100\n      II. MARKETS AND FOOD                         107\n\n  V. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS                         114\n\n     BOOKS FOR FURTHER READING                     125\n\n\n\n\nTHE PROBLEM\nOF FOREIGN POLICY\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nGERMANY AND FRANCE\n\n\nI. THE PREDICAMENT OF GERMANY\n\nA friend of mine was recently travelling in Germany in a third-class\nrailway carriage. The engine was slow and in lack of oil. The carriages,\nonce so clean, warm, and well lighted, were unlit, dirty, and bitterly\ncold. There was an air of broken nerves and misery among the passengers,\nand one woman was still sobbing from some indignity offered to her by a\nforeign official in the occupied area. Presently an old gentleman,\napparently a lawyer of some eminence, broke out: \"A reckoning must come.\nMy little grandchildren are drinking in revenge with their mother's\nmilk. In thirty years or thereabouts we shall settle accounts with\nFrance, and then we shall make\"--he swept the air with his\nhand--\"_tabula rasa!_\"\n\n\"Herr Justizrat,\" answered a younger man, \"did you take part in the war?\nI think not--you would be over the age. I was in the war for four years.\n. . . I agree with you that, in all probability, in thirty or forty\nyears we shall settle our account with France and make _tabula rasa_.\nAnd in thirty or forty years after that France will have her reckoning\nwith us and make _tabula rasa_ of Germany; and then we again, and so on.\nBut, if you will excuse me, Herr Justizrat, I do not find in the\nprospect any of the satisfaction which it appears to give you.\"\n\nAn incident of this sort may be significant or may not. It may be\ntypical or may be exceptional. But my friend's experience seems exactly\nto agree with the report made by Herr Simons to the Reichstag in the\nlast week of August, 1920, upon the attitude of the German Government\ntowards the war then proceeding between Poland and Russia. The Entente\nPowers had invited Germany to take certain unneutral steps on the side\nof Poland; the Government had, as a matter of course, refused. The\nSoviet Government had also invited Germany to join in the war on their\nside, holding out the hope that such action by Germany would precipitate\na Bolshevik revolution in Poland and other parts of eastern Europe and\nlead to an alliance capable of defying the Entente. The German\nGovernment, said Herr Simons, carefully considered these proposals, as\nit felt bound to consider any possible prospect of escape for Germany\nfrom the intolerable servitude imposed upon her by the Peace of\nVersailles, but decided that it was not in the public interest to accept\nthem.\n\nThus the German Foreign Minister, a man respected by all parties,\nexpresses in sober and thoughtful language much the same sentiment as\nthe Justizrat in his passion. The Peace of Versailles has, like most\nsettlements imposed by conquerors upon their beaten enemies, produced a\ncondition so intolerable that the vanquished must be expected to seize\nthe first favourable opportunity for fighting to free themselves. It has\nsown the seeds of future war.\n\nNow, it was the great hope of English Liberals and those who agreed\nwith them, that, contrary to almost all precedent, this war might be\nended by a peace so high-minded and statesmanlike and far-seeing, so\nscrupulously fair to the vanquished and so single-mindedly set upon the\nhealing of national wounds and the reconstruction of a shattered\nsociety, that the ordinary motives for a war of revenge would not exist,\nand the nations might really co\u00f6perate with one another to save all\nEurope from a common ruin. In 1914 and 1915, when war still seemed to\nEnglishmen an almost incredible horror, and it was still necessary to\nappeal to men's consciences if we wished them to fight, volunteers were\ninvited for a \"war to end war.\" The statesmen who, in those days, were\nstill the leaders of the country, were emphatic in stating that we were\nnot engaged in any attempt to destroy or oppress the German people, but\nonly \"the military domination of Prussia.\" Even later, when the Liberal\nand idealist elements in the country withered in the poisonous air or\nwere supplanted by more robust forces, it seemed as if President Wilson\nwas upholding, with even greater insistence and emphasis, the banner of\nultimate reconciliation as the goal of the war. For the war itself he\nprescribed \"Force, Force to the utmost, Force without stint or limit,\nrighteous and triumphant Force, which shall make Right the Law of the\nWorld and cast every selfish dominion down in the dust\" (April 6, 1918);\nbut, as soon as the Hohenzollerns were overthrown, he was for what he\ncalled \"peace without victory,\" a peace with no element of revenge, \"a\nnew international order based upon broad and universal principles of\nright and justice\" (February 11, 1918). Especial emphasis was laid on\nour good-will towards the German people. \"We have no quarrel with the\nGerman people. We have no feeling towards them but one of sympathy and\nfriendship\" (April 2, 1917). \"They did not originate or desire this\nhideous war . . . we are fighting their cause, as they will some day see\nit, as well as our own\" (Flag Day, 1917).\n\nIt is not clear that this ideal was an impossible one. The war of\nPrussia against Austria in 1866 was unscrupulous and aggressive in its\norigin; but Bismarck meant it to end in a reconciliation after victory,\nand so it did. He secured a peace which left no sting of injustice\nbehind it, Lincoln did not live to make the settlement with the South\nafter the American Civil War; but enough is known of his intentions to\nmake us sure that he intended to carry through at all costs a peace of\nreconciliation, extremely different from that which took place when he\nwas gone. The British war against the Boers in 1899-1902, though open to\nthe severest criticism in its origin, ended in a genuine peace of\nreconciliation in the settlement of 1906, for which the reward came\nrapidly and in full measure at the outbreak of the Great War. Had things\nbeen a little different in 1918, had President Wilson had the same\nsupport from his own people that he had from the best elements in\nEurope, had a Liberal or Labour Government been in power to make a\nsettlement of the Great War like the settlement which followed the Boer\nWar, had the popular influences of the time been better guided, Europe\nmight have had a genuinely Liberal peace. Indeed, it seemed at the last\nmoment almost certain that a Liberal peace had been secured. In an\naddress to Congress on January 8, 1918, President Wilson laid down his\nmemorable Fourteen Points to be observed in any treaty of peace with\nGermany. The first five may be especially noted:\n\n     1. Open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there\n     shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but\n     diplomacy shall always proceed frankly and in the public view.\n\n     2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas outside territorial\n     waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed\n     in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of\n     international covenants.\n\n     3. The removal as far as possible of all economic barriers, and the\n     establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all nations\n     consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its\n     maintenance.\n\n     4. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will\n     be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.\n\n     5. A free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all\n     colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle\n     that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests\n     of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the\n     equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be\n     determined.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: The other points were briefly: Evacuation of Russia:\nrestoration of Belgium; of France; transference of Alsace-Lorraine;\nterritorial settlement of Italy; autonomy of peoples of Austria-Hungary;\nsettlement of Balkan States; of Turkey; restoration of Poland; and\nlastly a League of Nations--though President Wilson never used that\nsomewhat inaccurate phrase. I should like to acknowledge here my\nindebtedness to the admirable and convenient series of publications\nissued by the American Association for International Conciliation, 407\nWest 117th Street, New York.]\n\nThe Fourteen Points were not only acclaimed by Liberal opinion in\nEngland: they were vigorously circulated by our Government propaganda in\nGermany and Austria, as were all other statements considered likely to\ninduce the enemy peoples to weaken or surrender. On October 5, 1918, the\nGerman Republican Government proposed peace on the basis of the Fourteen\nPoints. \"They requested President Wilson to take into his hands the task\nof establishing peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points contained in\nhis message to Congress of January 8, 1918, and on the basis of his\nsubsequent proclamations, especially his speech of September 27, 1918.\"\nLater on they asked the President to inquire if the Allied Governments\nalso agreed to them. In response to his inquiries the Allied Governments\nsent in to him an identical memorandum:\n\n     The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the\n     correspondence which has passed between the President of the United\n     States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications\n     which follow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the\n     Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the\n     President's address to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the\n     principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses.\n     They must point out, however, that what is usually described as the\n     Freedom of the Seas is open to various interpretations, some of\n     which they could not accept. They must therefore reserve to\n     themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the\n     Peace Conference.\n\nOne further \"qualification\" was made by the Allied Powers: by the\n\"restoration\" of the invaded territories they understood \"that\ncompensation would be made by Germany for all damage done to the\ncivilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression\nof Germany by land, by sea and from the air.\"\n\nThus the Fourteen Points were converted into a solemn international\nagreement. The Allies agreed that the treaty of peace should consist of\nthe application in detail of that fundamental document. On that\nunderstanding the Germans laid down their arms and surrendered their\nmeans of defence.\n\nIt is always difficult in the affairs of a democratic country to\ndetermine the exact point where mere inconsistency and laxity of\nthought, or even mere lack of co\u00f6rdination between the various organs of\ngovernment, merge into something like deliberate perfidy. It may so\neasily happen that one set of individuals give the promise and quite\nanother set act in breach of it. But an Englishman who wishes seriously\nto understand the present international situation must begin by\nrealizing clearly that the treaty imposed on the Germans at Versailles,\nafter they had surrendered their arms, appears to them and to a large\nnumber of neutral observers as a monstrous breach of faith. It\ncontravened in spirit and in detail much of what they understood by the\nFourteen Points. I confess that, after reading carefully the German\nProtest and the Allied Reply, it seems to me that the German reading of\nPresident Wilson's terms was in some points the natural one; and, apart\nfrom the treaty itself, that the action taken against the Germans when\nthey were disarmed was not consistent with the language and the pledges\naddressed to them while they were still in the field. As a matter of\nfact, certain of those responsible, or partly responsible, for the\nnegotiations on the Entente side, when they saw the way things were\ngoing, recalled bitterly the great historic perfidy by which Rome\ntrapped Carthage to her doom.\n\nA charge of this kind is, of course, very serious; and the results of\nthe action taken at Versailles have been more than serious. I will ask\nmy readers patiently to consider in broad outlines the causes,\npsychological and other, which seem to have been at work; for of course\nit is quite possible and even probable that, of the main actors\nconcerned, not one had any intention of trying to trap the Germans by\nperjury. Some of them doubtless were unscrupulous men, such as wars\nhabitually throw to the surface; but they were not men of the\nMachiavellian type.\n\nTwo broad facts stand out clearly to one who studies the documents.\nFirst, the Governments which accepted President Wilson's Fourteen Points\nas the basis of peace with Germany were from the start quite out of\nsympathy with his spirit. Why, then, did they accept them? Because they\nhad really no choice. To refuse would not have been only to reject a\nlong delayed and desperately needed peace. It would have been to confess\nto the world that, contrary to so many previous professions, their aims\nwere frankly what is now termed \"imperialistic.\" Above all, it would\nhave been to alienate Mr. Wilson, without whom victory was impossible.\nThey were bound to accept.\n\nBut Mr. Wilson's language was often rather lacking in definiteness. Who\nknows exactly what \"justice\" is, or what may be regarded as\nconsideration for \"the true interests\" of the German people? They\naccepted the terms; but they were free to use all permissible ingenuity\nin interpreting a document which they had not drawn up, and which had\nbeen forced upon them in a time of need.\n\nFurthermore, one who labours through the four hundred and forty articles\nof the treaty, with their innumerable subdivisions, will find not merely\nthat the treaty represents broadly the victory of the right side over\nthe wrong, and is a charter of emancipation to large parts of Europe. He\nwill find also that four hundred or more of the detailed articles are\nreasonable enough and many of them excellent. The injustice arises in\ntwo ways. First, that on every doubtful point, and there are many, the\ndecision is apt to be given against the enemy; and next, that behind the\nrespectable structure of the treaty there existed in fact a flood of\nwhite-hot war-passion--revenge, hate, terror, suspicion, and raging\ncovetousness--which poisoned the atmosphere and here and there made a\nbreach in the protecting wall.\n\nA great English military critic somewhat shocked public opinion by\nsaying at the time of the armistice, \"This armistice is wrong. We have\ngot them down, and now we ought to kick them till we have had enough.\"\nThe French, he said, ought to have continued the war and marched on to\nBerlin, plundering and ravaging till they had satisfied their revenge.\nThe words sound like insanity, but the speaker explained them later on.\nA war of revenge, he argued, is within the limits of pardonable human\nnature. And it comes to an end. But, being cheated of their decisive\ncampaign of victory, the French were making a peace of revenge; and that\nis a thing which is apt to admit of no forgiveness and no finish.\n\nI quote these words not because I agree with them in practical policy,\nbut because of the profound psychological truth that they express.\nBehind the statesmen who had pledged their words, however unwillingly,\nremained masses of ignorant, violent, and war-maddened people, many of\nthem with terrible wrongs to avenge and no guide or leader to help them\nagainst themselves. We need not recall, though few sensitive people will\never forget, the horrors of the propaganda of hate. It is only worth\nrealizing that the mob-inspired journalists and journalist-inspired\nmobs who clamoured for an utter and all-devouring peace of revenge,\nincluding the starvation and enslavement of half Europe for thirty or\nfifty or a hundred years, had never themselves signed the Fourteen\nPoints and felt no personal inconsistency or turpitude if they compelled\nthe Supreme Council of the Allies to break its faith.\n\nThe first step in this policy lay outside the treaty. The third of the\nFourteen Points established \"equality of trade conditions\" and the\n\"removal of economic barriers\" between all the nations consenting to the\npeace. Immediately after the armistice a proposal was made, and met with\nstrong American support, that the Allies should set themselves at once\nto attempting to cope with the threatened famine and the lack of raw\nmaterials in Central Europe, and thus get European trade on its legs\nagain as early as possible. This would relieve a vast amount of\ndistress, serve as a stepping-stone to reconciliation, save many nations\nfrom the danger of irremediable collapse, and also make far more\npossible the restoration of the invaded areas and the payment of large\nreparations by Germany. It was proposed to follow the analogy of the\npeace of 1871; to draw up a preliminary peace agreement, stating\nprinciples and limits but not details. For example, it might be agreed\nthat Germany must surrender some territory in the West and in Poland,\nbut not beyond certain geographical lines; must pay an indemnity to be\nfixed on certain principles, but not to exceed a certain sum, and the\nlike. The territorial agreement, again, might be based on the elaborate\nstatement of war aims issued by the British Government on January 10,\n1917. The Germans could have accepted this, and the work of\nreconstruction been begun immediately. Incalculable distress and\nsuffering would thus have been saved.\n\nBut another view prevailed. With the short-sightedness that so often\naccompanies brutality, the German High Command had, in the very last\nmonths of the war, when their defeat was certain, tried systematically\nto cripple the industry of Belgium and France by destroying mines,\nbreaking machinery, carrying off movable plant, and the like. Their own\nmanufacturing plant was undamaged, and they indulged in the fatuous\nexpectation that they might recapture their lost markets and spring into\nprosperity, while France and Belgium were still too crippled to commence\nwork. Of course, this could not be allowed. The obvious alternatives,\nsuch as allocating certain German factories to French or Belgian\ncompanies whose plant had been destroyed, or simply allocating the\nprofits to purposes of reparation, appear not to have been considered.\nThe blinder motives were too strong, and no statesman arose to give\nguidance. All Germany must be punished. She had not been invaded and\nravaged. She must be made to suffer the pains of invasion. She must be\nravaged in cold blood. The complete ruin of Germany, argued certain\nFrench journalists and politicians, was demanded by all considerations\nboth of justice and of safety, and it had not by any means been\nattained. Russia was paralyzed and wrecked by Bolshevism. But the German\nRevolution had been carried successfully through. The people were not\nyet demoralized, and the problem was how to demoralize them. Perhaps\nstarvation would do it. Hence was started the policy of deliberately\nruining Germany, after her surrender, by a long blockade in time of\nwhat, to the ordinary man, appeared to be peace, and immediately after a\npromise of \"the removal of economic barriers and the establishment of\nequality of trade conditions.\" This was not a technical breach of faith;\ntechnically we were still at war with Germany, and we had never promised\nnot to starve our enemies after their surrender. The promise of equality\nof trade conditions only applied to conditions after the peace.\nNevertheless, a historian will probably regard the establishment and\ncontinuance of this blockade of the enemy lands after their surrender as\none of those many acts of almost incredible inhumanity which have made\nthe recent Great War conspicuous in the annals of mankind and shaken\nthoughtful men's faith in the reality of modern civilization. Certain\narticles in the _Matin_ discussing the exact dose of famine desirable in\norder to create the maximum of individual suffering and public weakness\nin the Boche are difficult to parallel in the literature of morbid hate,\nexcept among some of the German war pamphlets.\n\nThus the Fourteen Points, besides a regrettable indefiniteness of\nphrasing, had the fatal fault of being utterly out of touch with the\nfeeling of most of the belligerents. As the time wore on this feeling\nasserted its influence on the terms of the treaty. The Boche had\ndeliberately and treacherously plunged Europe into war; he had waged the\nwar with revolting cruelty; he had inflicted unheard-of suffering on the\ninnocent, and, by a miracle, he had been beaten. Now let him pay the\npenalty! President Wilson had pledged the Allies \"to be just to the\nGerman people as to all others. . . . To propose anything but justice to\nGermany at any time would be to renounce our own cause.\" \"Very good,\"\nanswered the dominant voices of 1918; \"the criminal asks for justice,\nand so far as our power reaches, justice he shall have!\" The total of\nwrongs done by Germany, in plotting the war, in waging it, and in the\ndestruction of life and property, could easily be regarded as an almost\ninfinite sum, and \"Justice\" surely demanded for that an almost infinite\npunishment.\n\nThe first concession to this insistent pressure was on a point of form.\nThe language of the Fourteen Points and the accompanying documents\nimplied that the treaty would be a matter of discussion and negotiation.\nThe basis was agreed upon; it seemed natural to suppose that the next\nstep was to negotiate. But popular feeling had caught at the phrase\n\"unconditional surrender\"; and, though nothing could be clearer than the\nfact that the German army had surrendered on perfectly explicit\nconditions, signed and agreed to by every Government concerned, it was\ndecided that terms were not to be negotiated but \"imposed.\" Mr. Keynes\nhas shown in an interesting way how great was the effect of this\ndecision. Terms were drawn up with a view to bargaining, leaving a\nmargin for possible concessions; and then there was no bargaining. The\nwhole demand was suddenly enforced.\n\nQuestions of territory outside Europe were decided purely by conquest.\nImmense areas in Asia and Africa were seized as spoil by the strongest\nPowers, though the conditions of their tenure were, so it was hoped, to\nbe regulated by the League of Nations. In some cases there was a\npretence of consulting the wishes of the inhabitants; in most cases this\nwas not practicable. In Syria and South Tyrol the wishes of the\ninhabitants were notoriously overridden. In Europe as a whole, however,\nthe decisions were made on Wilsonian principles. True, they told heavily\nagainst Germany. But as a matter of fact the Germans and German\nAustrians, by reason of their great strength and high organizing power,\nhad an imperial position in Europe, and any liberation of subject or\nquasi-subject nationalities was bound to be at the expense of the\nGermans. The territorial settlement, in spite of the great and needless\ndistress produced by the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian system, is on\nprinciples of nationality juster than that which preceded it. The more\nextreme anti-German claims were successfully resisted. France was not\nallowed to annex Germany up to the Elbe, as M. Hanotaux wished; nor even\nup to the Rhine. No partition of Germany by force was permitted, though\nan agitation for that purpose still continues in France and the\nprohibition of any future union between German-Austria and the rest of\nGermany was actually embodied in the treaty. The treaty of Berlin had in\njust the same way attempted to forbid the unity of Bulgaria.\n\nAs regards the penal clauses, it may be convincingly argued that the\ngreat crimes and cruelties and breaches of law which have signalized\nthis war ought emphatically to meet with judgment and punishment from\nsome tribunal representing the conscience of civilized mankind. On\ngrounds of justice the presence of such penal clauses in the treaty\ncould be amply justified, though considerations of policy make it more\nquestionable. But all thoughts of equal justice disappeared in derision\nwhen it was found that only crimes committed by the enemies of the\nEntente were to be punished; crimes committed by British, French,\nItalian, Serbian or American criminals were privileged acts, to which\n\"Justice\" had nothing to say.\n\nThis absurd clause has, of course, given rise to suspicions, more absurd\nthan itself, of dark crimes committed by Entente generals which must be\nconcealed at any cost. Such suggestions are nonsense. Indefensible as it\nis, the clause was dictated by no more sinister passion than ordinary\nnational vanity. The economic clauses were open to graver suspicions. It\nwas whispered that trade interests of not quite unimpeachable character\nhad some influence with members of the French, the Italian, and even the\nEnglish Government; and the old German accusation that England entered\nthe war in order to destroy a trade rival, utterly untrue at the time,\nseemed to receive some colour by the terms of peace. Germany depended\nfor her prosperity on her industry and her overseas trade. Her industry\nwas wrecked by an immense demand upon her coal. The mines of Lorraine,\nthe Saar Valley, and, subject to plebiscite, of Silesia, were handed\nover to other states; and out of the remainder Germany was condemned to\npay an amount of coal which proved, on investigation at Spa, two years\nlater, to be beyond her powers. Her overseas trade was annihilated at a\nblow by the seizure of all the vessels of her mercantile marine\nexceeding 1600 tons gross and a large proportion of her small vessels\nand fishing-boats, combined with a demand upon such ships as she might\nbuild in future. Her voice was stifled by the seizure of all her\ntelegraphic cables: news henceforth was to be a monopoly of the\nconquerors. At the same time all her colonies were taken from her. She\nwas forbidden to set up any tariffs for her own protection. Her\nnavigable rivers were put under the control of international commissions\non which the Germans or Austrians were a small minority. And while it\nwas somewhat unctuously explained to Germany that in a virtuous world\ntrade would be free and untrammelled, and that the commissions only\nintended to see that she did not erect barriers against her innocent\nneighbours, there was no provision whatever made to debar the Allies\nfrom erecting what barriers they pleased against Germany. \"It would\nappear to be a fundamental fallacy,\" declared the Allied Reply, \"that\nthe political control of a country is essential in order to procure a\nreasonable share of its products. Such a proposal finds no foundation in\neconomic law or history.\" It has found some foundation in history since.\n\nThe triumph of penal ingenuity, however, was the indefinite indemnity.\nIt was agreed on both sides that Germany was to pay an indemnity. She\ndid not demur. Indeed, her mouth was closed by the monstrously\noppressive and inhuman proposals various Germans had themselves put\nforward when they expected to win the war. She had openly intended to\n\"bleed France and England white.\" Now that she was beaten she was\nprepared to pay. She accepted the duty of \"restoring\" the invaded\nterritories. This was defined as \"reparation for all damage done to the\ncivil population of the Allies by German aggression.\" The Germans\nprobably understood this to mean the damage done to civilian life and\nproperty by invasions or raids; but they were told that this view was\ntoo narrow. Every soldier killed or wounded had civilians dependent on\nhim; nay, he himself was really a civilian forced by German aggression\nto desert his business. All his business losses, the separation\nallowances to his wife, the pensions to ex-soldiers or to their\ndependents, all damage to any one's \"health or honour,\" were ultimately\n\"due to German aggression\" and should be paid by Germany. No such terms\nhad ever been heard of before, true; but the British electors had been\npromised that \"Germany should pay the whole cost of the war\"; and the\nsense of the solemn contract was distorted to suit the election cry.\nAfter 1871 the Germans had imposed on France what was then considered\nthe extremely severe indemnity of two hundred million pounds sterling.\nSome experts now proposed two thousand million sterling as an adequate\nindemnity to be paid by Germany, others three thousand million. That was\nemended by popular orators to ten thousand million; thirty thousand\nmillion; fifty thousand million. Absurd to say that Germany could not\npay! If all German property were confiscated and all Germans for\nseventy-five years were made to work for the Allies at a bare\nsubsistence wage, a well-known English public man was prepared to get\nmore than fifty thousand million out of them.\n\nThe Americans bluntly refused to endorse demands which they considered\nextortionate. The indemnity was left unspecified. It should depend on\nGermany's capacity to pay. Let the Germans get to work at once and do\ntheir best. The more they produced, the more the Allies would take; and\nif, after two years or so, it became necessary to fix the sum, the less\nthe Germans had produced in those two years the less they would\neventually have to pay. It is said that some of the British Ministers,\nsecretly anxious to be more reasonable than was consistent with\npopularity at the moment, wished to postpone the fixing of the indemnity\nuntil the rage of their own \"Khaki Election\" should have cooled down.\nBut their calculation was a bad one. As the German delegation observed:\n\"The German people would feel themselves condemned in slavery, because\neverything they accomplished would benefit neither themselves nor even\ntheir children, but merely strangers. But the system of slave labour has\nnever been successful.\"\n\nFor the purpose of raising money the proposal was merely fatuous. It\ntook away from the Germans every possible motive for producing wealth.\nBut its object in some minds was not money: its object was the permanent\nruin of Germany. It was feared in France that, though the Germans were\nnow exhausted and beggared, their notorious industry and ingenuity might\nin time enable them to pay off their indemnity and rise again to\naffluence and strength. So it was arranged that, for some years at\nleast, they should be deprived of every motive for industry.\n\nLastly, a new provision was made about private property. The rule\nhitherto observed in the land wars of civilized states was that enemy\nprivate property was respected, and if seized during the war was\nrestored at the conclusion of peace. This rule was, of course, enforced\nin favour of any property belonging to nationals of the Entente\ncountries situated in enemy lands; but reciprocity was not admitted. The\nprivate property of any German situate in any part of the world which\nwas under the control of the Ententes was _ipso facto_ confiscated. \"The\nAllied and Associated Powers reserve the right to retain and liquidate\nall\" such property. Every German, however innocent, who had settled in\nour territory before the war was thus exposed to be robbed of everything\nhe possessed. Nay, it seems almost incredible, but in the original form\nof the treaty which was put before the enemy for signature the\nstipulation seems actually to have been laid down that any property\nwhich a German might hereafter make or acquire in Entente territory\nshould be liable to confiscation at the will of the Entente Governments!\nThis clause was too much even for the atmosphere of Versailles, and in\nresponse to the German protest the stipulation about the future was\ndropped.[2] For the rest of the confiscation, the Entente Reply brazens\nit out with the remark that the property is not really taken from the\nindividual, as his own Government can always pay him back! And in case\nthe private property of Germans in neutral countries should have an\nunfair advantage, the Reparation Commission obtained special powers for\nconfiscating that too, up to the limit of \u00a3100,000,000.\n\n[Footnote 2: See Keynes, pp. 60-102. A provision was kept enabling all\nsuch private property to be confiscated in case the German Government\nshould \"voluntarily fail\" to fulfil its engagements. But this also was\ndropped by the British Government in October, 1920.]\n\nWe need not stop to consider whether there was any extraordinary\nexhibition of \"Teutonic insolence\" in the action of certain German\nofficials who resigned their offices rather than sign this treaty; nor\nneed we swell the chorus of English, French, Italian, and American\nnewspapers in expressing the natural horror of those refined nations at\nthe bad manners of Count Brockdorf-Rantzau in actually breaking a\npaper-knife in the stress of his emotion, when, under protest, he\nconsented to sign. There was one man among the British representatives\nwho had known what it was to be conquered after a desperate war.\nGeneral Smuts was a man of imagination as well as a soldier and a\nstatesman. He hesitated long before signing the treaty; and when, in the\nend, he decided that it was necessary to do so, he immediately published\na statement of protest. \"I have signed the peace treaty, not because I\nconsider it a satisfactory document, but because it is imperatively\nnecessary to close the war. . . . The six months since the armistice was\nsigned have perhaps been as upsetting, unsettling, and ruinous to Europe\nas the previous four years of war. I look upon the peace treaty as the\nclose of those two chapters of war and armistice, and only on that\nground do I sign it.\" Liberal opinion in England muttered assent. Some\nimportant officials resigned. But the fear of upsetting peace altogether\nprevented any open protest in Parliament. We need not lose ourselves in\nspeculations as to the strange devices to which public men can sink when\ntheir self-interest is clear and their responsibility can be denied or\nevaded; nor yet as to the infinite ramifications by which war spreads\nits poison through human society, a thing twice-cursed, cursing him that\nstrikes and him that suffers. The old German Government had committed a\nvast crime against humanity; its people had backed it up, as all\nEuropean peoples back up their own Governments, and could not expect to\nescape heavy punishment. The one question we need ask ourselves is this:\nIs it not as certain, as anything in human nature can be, that a treaty\nof such a character, imposed on a conquered nation by force, if not also\nby treachery, will, as a matter of course and without the faintest\nscruple, be broken as soon as there is a favourable opportunity for\nbreaking it? Of course the Germans will break it if they can; and of\ncourse they will make another war, call it a war of revenge or a war for\nfreedom as you please, as soon as there is any chance of winning it.\n\nSo said the Justizrat in the train. So, in effect, says Herr Simons; so\nalmost _ad nauseam_ repeat all the German Conservative and patriotic\nnewspapers. It is difficult to see how any German who is not a\nconvinced pacifist should do otherwise than prepare with all his\nenergies for the next war, unless some other way is made possible of\nescape from a tormenting servitude.\n\n\nII. THE POSITION OF FRANCE\n\nIf that is so, what is the position of France? France in 1914 was forced\ninto a war which she tried hard to avoid. The French suffered horribly\nand fought heroically. They sacrificed everything to the war. And we,\nwho know what our own people paid in broken nerve, in bitterness, and in\neconomic dislocation, cannot be surprised that France has paid a heavier\nprice. They escaped defeat by the help of England, Russia, Italy, and\nAmerica; without these powerful allies they would certainly have been\ndefeated. We need not try to estimate exactly what their fate would have\nbeen if they had lost the late war, because if they lose the next their\ntreatment will be infinitely worse. It will be, as far as possible,\n_tabula rasa_. It will be the passing of the horse-hoofs of Attila.\nMeantime France's allies are, naturally enough, going home and\nattending to their own businesses; her population is much smaller than\nGermany's and increases even more slowly.\n\nA French statesman of the type of M. Poincar\u00e9 or M. Hanotaux makes\nhimself no illusions. Germany is the enemy. Germany will fight again as\nsoon as she is strong enough. Therefore she must never be allowed to\nbecome strong enough. M. Hanotaux, who was Foreign Minister during the\nyears 1894-98, when French foreign policy was more ably managed than\nnow, has recently published a book in criticism of the Treaty of\nVersailles. He does not deal in any Wilsonian phrases about justice or\nhumanity; he considers the treaty solely with a view to the security of\nFrance, and he finds it sadly wanting. And a large mass of opinion,\nprobably the prevailing opinion, in France supports him.\n\nFirst of all, it must be remembered, France wanted, and thought she had\nreceived, a special guarantee against future German attacks in the form\nof a defensive Alliance between France, England, and America. The\nrepresentatives at Paris had agreed to this treaty, which definitely\npledged England and America to come again to the help of France in case\nof another unprovoked attack by Germany. The English Parliament, amid\nsome protests, ratified the treaty, but the United States Senate threw\nit out, and therewith the treaty ceased to be binding on England.\n\nI think, after considerable hesitation, that the rejection of the treaty\nwas a misfortune. Formally, no doubt, it was open to objection. It\nseemed like an unnecessary excrescence upon the Covenant of the League\nof Nations, which already gave guarantees against war. It contravened\none of Mr. Wilson's principles, and a very sound one, laid down on\nSeptember 27, 1918: \"Thirdly, there can be no leagues or alliances or\nspecial covenants and understandings within the general and common\nfamily of the League of Nations.\" Yet the practical importance of\nreassuring France was so urgent that a little formal incorrectness might\nhave been worth incurring; and even formal incorrectness could have been\navoided by the simple expedient of making this guarantee to France take\nthe form of a special rider to Article XVI of the Covenant.\n\nThat article provides: \"Should any member of the League resort to war in\ndisregard of its covenants under Articles XII, XIII, or XV, it shall\n_ipso facto_ be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other\nmembers of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to . . .\" To\ndo what? One expects that they will undertake to declare war, and this\nis what the French wanted. But no. They only undertake to apply an\neconomic boycott to the offending state, while the Council may\n\"recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military,\nnaval, or air force they shall severally contribute to the armed forces\nto be used to protect the covenants of the League.\" In case of a future\nattack by Germany on France, France's late allies are bound to boycott\nGerman trade, but are not explicitly bound to give military help to\nFrance. I suggest that it would have been possible for Great Britain and\nAmerica to add a rider stating specifically that in one of the cases\ncontemplated by this article, namely, an unprovoked attack on France by\nGermany, they would not merely proclaim a blockade and consider what to\ndo next, but would immediately and unconditionally declare war. Such an\nundertaking would involve some risk and be contrary to our usual policy;\nbut I am inclined to suggest that the risk would have been worth taking.\n\nHowever, this was not done. France was left with the impression that if\nattacked she could not count with confidence on the military support of\nher late allies or of the other Powers of the League. The result was\ndisastrous. While the rest of Europe, supported by a small but generous\nand brilliant band of French radicals and Socialists, considered the\nTreaty of Versailles intolerably harsh, the dominant French policy\ncomplained that it was inadequate for her protection. The line of\ncriticism was somewhat as follows:\n\n1. Germany should have been broken up. No peace should have been made\nwith Germany as a whole, but separate treaties of peace with Saxony,\nBavaria, Westphalia, Prussia, etc. These states should have been\nprovided with separate systems of coinage, postage, tariffs, laws, etc.,\nso as to make the diversity stable and permanent. They should be\nforbidden ever to unite. Also, France should have annexed a large part\nof Germany; not up to the Rhine--which was the view of Marshal Foch--but\nup to the Elbe. The occupation of this territory might impose a burden\non France, but burdens must be borne when such important purposes are\ninvolved. And after all the cost could be charged to the Germans! . . .\n\nAs this simple precaution was not taken, the next best thing is to keep\nGermany weak. Starve her by the blockade till sheer misery produces a\nBolshevik revolution and society collapses in common ruin. Then apply\nthe indefinite indemnity, not from the desire to get money, but to\nprevent Germany again raising her head.\n\n2. Since France's late allies cannot be relied upon, she must make by\ndiplomacy new allies whose hands she can force, and who occupy a\nconvenient geographical situation. Poland is in just the right place.\nLet France help Poland and stimulate Polish ambitions. She too is a\nnation maddened by suffering and now dazzled by success. A great\nimperialist Poland, on bad terms with her neighbours, but backed by\nFrance, will need a large and effective army, and will be ready to\nstrike at Germany's rear the moment she attempts to move westward.\nUnfortunately, Poland is apt to be on bad terms with Russia; and as\nthings now are Russia is so much the enemy of the Entente that she is\nthrown into the arms of Germany. That is deplorable and must not be\nallowed to continue. The Bolsheviks must be overthrown and a Government\nset up in Russia which is dependent for its existence on French support.\nAs an additional safeguard, perhaps it will be necessary to secure a\npro-French Hungary, to back up the pro-French Poland. But we must not\ndespair yet of overthrowing the Bolsheviks.\n\n3. Lastly, France herself needs more soldiers. And she knows where to\nget them! The late King Leopold of Belgium once said to M. Hanotaux,\n\"Qu'est-ce que vous cherchez en Afrique, vous autres Fran\u00e7ais?\" and M.\nHanotaux replied, \"Sire, des soldats!\" France during the war established\nconscription in her African territories and, in spite of a somewhat\nbloody rebellion by the ignorant savages, who thought the slave trade\nwas being re\u00ebstablished, succeeded in importing to France a black army\nwhich at one time numbered 600,000 fighting men. With a little more\nenergy and greatly increased territories, that number might be trebled.\nFrance is a smaller nation than Germany; but France plus Algeria, Tunis,\nMorocco, Senegambia, French Congo, and the new German territories is a\nmuch larger nation than Germany without colonies. And blacks fortunately\nhave not the same rights as white men!\n\nA permanently wrecked Germany, vast black armies for France, armed\nallies always ready on Germany's eastern frontier; with these conditions\nfulfilled, France, it is hoped by these politicians, may at last breathe\nfreely.\n\n    *    *    *    *    *\n\nWhat is wrong with this policy? You may call it devilish, if you will,\nsince it is based on the deliberate and artificial creation of human\nmisery; but is it bad policy? After all, air-bombs and poison gas and\nthe like may be called devilish. But, devilish or not, they have\nsometimes to be used. If Germany is certainly and confessedly looking\nout for the next opportunity of escaping from the consequences of the\ntreaty and retrieving her fortunes on the battlefield, is not France\nbound to take every precaution to see that Germany shall never be strong\nenough to do so with success? The next war will be far worse than the\nlast. The terms imposed on the beaten party will be even more desolating\nand destructive. France is probably a less vigorous plant than her\nenemy. She has failed to kill Germany, but Germany might succeed in\nkilling her.\n\nIt seems that Germany is absolutely bound to fight, if there is no other\nway of recovering her freedom and her right to live, while France is\nabsolutely bound to hold her enemy down mercilessly, if there is no\nother way of securing her own safety.\n\n\nIII. THE SOLUTION\n\nBut perhaps after all there is. Last among the Fourteen Points came the\nproposal to found \"A general Association of Nations under specific\ncovenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political\nindependence and territorial integrity to small and great states alike.\"\nThe Treaty of Versailles has after all two faces. It had to express two\ngreat waves of feeling and two international necessities. Mr. Wilson was\nnot so utterly \"bamboozled\" as Mr. Keynes would have us believe. General\nSmuts and Lord Robert Cecil were not so utterly without influence on the\nsettlement. The least depressing paragraphs in the Allied Reply to the\nGerman delegation are those in which they explain that the terrific\nseverity of the greater part of the treaty applies only to a \"transition\nperiod\" of punishment, of reparation and of trial, at the end of which\nthey see the realization of Mr. Wilson's promises. \"The conditions of\npeace contain some provisions for the future which may outlast the\ntransition period during which the economic balance\"--between Germany\nand the invaded countries--\"is to be restored; and a reciprocity is\nforeseen after that period which is very clearly that equality of trade\nconditions for which President Wilson has stipulated.\" The phrasing of\nthe paragraph is awkward, but the main drift is clear. The Fourteen\nPoints are accepted, but adjourned; when Germany has been punished and\nreparation made, they will come into force. \"The Allied and Associated\nPowers look forward to the time when the League of Nations established\nby this treaty shall extend its membership to all peoples.\" \"They see no\nreason why Germany should not become a member of the League in the early\nfuture,\" provided she satisfies certain tests. \"It has never been their\nintention that Germany or any other Power should be indefinitely\nexcluded from the League of Nations.\" They are convinced that the\nCovenant of the League \"introduces an element of progress into the\nrelations of peoples which will develop and strengthen to the advantage\nof justice and of peace.\"\n\nThis is as it should be; but the world does not stand still while\nGermany is making reparation and being taught gradually to love her\nchastisers. If the League \"introduces an element of progress,\" the\nsooner it gets to work the better. It is only too clear that every month\nwhich passes with the League entirely dominated by England, France, and\nItaly encourages and deepens the suspicion with which the League is\nregarded by its critics. I say nothing of American criticisms, in which\nmany factors co\u00f6perate. But the Swiss Federal Council, in the very able\nand persuasive message which it issued to the Assembly on February 17,\n1920, in favour of joining the League, has to deal with this suspicion.\n\"One has been tempted at times to consider the League as an alliance of\nthe conquerors against the conquered. The fact that Germany, Austria,\nand the former Russian Empire remain provisionally excluded from the\nLeague may have given a semblance of truth to this manner of thinking.\"\nThe suspicion is afterwards described as \"this apparently accurate\ncriticism.\" Switzerland as a whole has fortunately rejected the\nsuspicion and by a small majority joined the League. But in most of\nCentral Europe the League of Nations movement is strangled in its birth\nby the general feeling that the present League means merely the Entente\nPowers and their clients, and the elements for starting a counter-league\nare consolidating month by month. This counter-league would probably not\nbe an open and confessed alliance. But Russia, Germany, and the United\nStates are still outside, and there are many unpaid grudges amongst the\nMoslems of Asia. The test which is exacted by Article I from any new\nstate desiring to become a member of the League is that \"it shall give\neffective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its\ninternational obligations.\" Interpreted with theological strictness,\nthis would probably result in the rejection of all candidates, to say\nnothing of the expulsion of many of the original members. Perfect\nsincerity in observing unpleasant obligations is not a common\ncharacteristic of human societies. But in the ordinary sense of the\nwords the test is already satisfied by Germany and Austria and most of\nthe succession states. The Assembly of the League meets for the first\ntime on November 15, 1920. It ought not to dissolve without admitting to\nits membership Germany and Austria, as well as several other candidates\nwho have already applied. At the moment of writing (November, 1920),\nLord Grey, Lord Selborne, and Mr. Barnes have issued a joint appeal for\nthe immediate admission of Germany, which has long been the accepted\npolicy of the League of Nations Union. There are many obstacles, but the\nresult will doubtless be known before these words are in print.\nFortunately, the admission of new members is decided by a two-thirds\nmajority of the Assembly and does not require a unanimous vote. Once the\nLeague is established on a broad base, including the conquered nations\non equal terms with the victorious, the prospect of that war of revenge\nwhich has hitherto seemed almost inevitable will dwindle and become\nremote.\n\n    *    *    *    *    *\n\nThe hope expressed above has not been realized. Austria, Bulgaria, and\nmany less important states applied for admission to the League and were\naccepted, but French feeling was known to be very strong, and Germany\ndid not even apply. Had she done so she would probably have had a\nmajority in her favour, and it was considered until the beginning of\nMarch, 1921, that she was certain of admission at the next meeting of\nthe Assembly in September. But in the meantime untoward events have\ntaken place.\n\nThe French Government, like the English, obtained success at the\nelections by wild promises to make Germany pay all the costs of the war.\nAs M. Poincar\u00e9 has observed, \"the French people will not understand how\nthe victors in a great war can be on the verge of bankruptcy.\"\nConsequently they think their rulers are cheating them. Educated people,\nin France as in England, have long since ceased to expect much from\nGerman indemnities, but the Governments still depend on their appeal to\nmob-psychology; and it was believed that if M. Briand ventured to make\nany concessions in the direction of reason or moderation he would lose\nhis majority in the Chamber. The proposals made at the Inter-Allied\nConference at Brussels and drawn up by the French expert, M. Seydoux,\nhad been silently dropped as unsatisfying; the subsequent British\nproposals made at Boulogne had been rejected for the same reason. It was\nnecessary, however, to make some definite proposals to Germany without\nmuch further delay, since the treaty had laid down May 1, 1921, as the\ntime for a settlement. Germany was by that time to have paid a thousand\nmillion pounds on account, and was to learn the extent, finite or\ninfinite, of the total bill. Mr. Lloyd George, as might have been\nexpected, showed much sympathy with M. Briand in his awkward position,\nand agreed to a demand for reparations on a scale which was obviously\nfantastic. It began, reasonably enough, with a system of annuities,\nthough the first figure was probably too high and the last figures can\nscarcely have been meant seriously. Germany was to pay \u00a3150,000,000 a\nyear for the first five years; then the annual sum was to increase at\nintervals for the extraordinary period of forty-two years, towards the\nend of which time Germany was expected to pay annually \u00a3300,000,000, or\nhalf as much again every year as the total indemnity exacted from France\nafter the war of 1870. Even that was not enough for a population which\nhad been sedulously fed on lies by a class of politician who at times\nseem to possess among them no single sane and honest man. And an\nadditional payment was demanded of a yearly sum equivalent to a duty of\ntwelve per cent _ad valorem_ on all German exports.\n\nOpinion in Germany was sharply divided. All they had to pay with was an\nenormous deficit on the Budget, with the prospect of presently losing\nthe Silesian coal-mines and having prohibitive duties placed by the\nAllies upon their exports. One party insisted that the Government should\nmake no promise which it could not expect to perform; another, that what\nGermany wanted was peace, and that they had better sign anything\nrequired of them. The first party, on the whole, carried the day. The\nGerman delegation in London made a counter-proposal based, very\nsensibly, on the idea of finding the present value of the forty-two-year\nannuities and raising that sum by means of a loan; but as they worked\nout the idea they favoured Germany on every detailed calculation to an\nextent which they must have known to be unacceptable. Apparently they\nexpected a long and serious bargaining march. But, to most people's\nsurprise, Mr. George leapt with alacrity at the prospect of a rupture.\nThe proposal was rejected with every semblance of virtuous indignation.\nNo time was allowed for the delegation to consult the German Government.\nA hurried second proposal, to pay the terms demanded for five years and\nthen have the matter reconsidered, was tossed aside without\nconsideration, and French and British troops proceeded to invade\nGermany, occupy more territory, and set up a new and artificial\ncustoms-barrier in the most unsuitable places, at which they proceeded\nthemselves to collect the German customs.\n\nThe plan is very expensive, and utterly unprofitable. It involves a\nstraining if not a breach of the treaty,[3] and it is likely, if any\nuntoward event occurs, to provoke a war of the most humiliating and\nembittered kind--the war of a desperate and helpless population trying\nto rid themselves of foreign oppressors. But it has saved M. Briand's\nGovernment. If he had agreed to accept any German terms whatever, he\nwould have been upset for not exacting more. But if he marches French\nand British troops into the heart of Germany no one can accuse him of\nlack of spirit. So for the present all is well; and as for the future,\nit is conceivable that the Germans will give way and make some\nimpossible promise. That will increase M. Briand's prestige. It is more\nlikely that they will simply sit still and let the Allied armies do\ntheir worst. Then there will be a chance of carrying out one of the\ndarling aims of the French chauvinists, and annexing, or at least\nseparating from Germany, all the German provinces which they occupy.\n\n[Footnote 3: The Allies are apparently acting under Part VIII, clause\n18, of the treaty. This gives them the right to \"take such other\nmeasures as the respective Governments may determine to be necessary\" in\ncase of \"voluntary default\" by Germany in the payment of her dues under\nPart VIII (Reparations). A failure by Germany to disarm sufficiently\ngives the Allies no right to increase the area of their occupation,\nsince the present occupation is specifically laid down in the treaty\nnegotiations as the means of enforcing disarmament. Nor has Germany yet\nactually committed a voluntary default in the payment of her\nreparations, since the first payment, \u00a3100,000,000, is not to be\ncompleted until May 1, 1921. I am informed on high authority that the\nAllied case probably rests on the point that they judge by their\ndebtor's manner and by statements which she has made that she intends\nnot to pay by May 1; according to English law this would apparently give\nthem some right of taking immediate action.]\n\nIn face of these lunatic proceedings the German Government has behaved\nwith considerable dignity and good sense, though naturally the German\nnewspapers are running a little wild. It has announced its intention of\nappealing to the Assembly of the League of Nations, and although, not\nbeing a member, Germany cannot herself raise the subject, it may be\ntaken as certain that some member will take it up on her behalf. This\nproduces a most critical situation.\n\nAccording to the Covenant, Article III, the Assembly may be summoned to\nmeet \"from time to time as occasion may require.\" But presumably it is\nthe Council which decides whether occasion does require it or not, and\nno one can expect the Council to favour Germany's appeal. The appeal\nwill only be considered when the Assembly has its next regular meeting\nin September. We shall then see whether the Assembly possesses the force\nand courage necessary to discuss freely and, if necessary, to condemn\nthe actions of the two leading European Powers; or if the two can\nsuccessfully silence all criticism. For my own part I think the\ndiscussion will take place; and that, for the first time since the war,\nthe voice of an impartial third party wilt be heard in discussing the\nterms imposed on Germany by her conquerors. That does not mean the\nrealization of the \"enthronement of public right on the common law of\nnations,\" but it is one of the first steps toward it.\n\n    *    *    *    *    *\n\nThe League of Nations is in a position to say to France: \"You are afraid\nof another attack by Germany; and to avert that danger you propose in\nvarious ways to follow a policy which will plunge Europe into continued\ndistress. We hereby guarantee you against attack. Thirty-nine nations\nat present, who will shortly be increased to fifty-one, if not more,\nhave signed a definite and unqualified contract to preserve your\n'existing political independence and territorial integrity' against any\n'external aggression'; and further, if you are attacked in such a way as\nnot actually to threaten your territory or independence, all the States\nof the League will consider that an act of war has been committed\nagainst themselves, will apply the complete economic boycott to your\nenemy, and arrange plans for giving you immediate military support. We\noffer you here a far more effective guarantee of safety than you can\npossibly attain by your own diplomacy. But we demand in return that your\nforeign policy shall be frankly and sincerely a League of Nations\npolicy; that you shall not make secret treaties, not set up inequitable\ntariffs, not plot the ruin of your late enemies or any other people; but\nwork as a loyal member of the League with a view to the welfare of the\nwhole.\"\n\nThe League says to Germany: \"You complain of the undue severity of the\ntreaty and the impossibility of carrying out its economic provisions.\nCommissions already exist, and you have taken part in them, for\ndiscussing these latter and fixing the terms of the reparation which you\nowe. But, beyond that, if there is any clause in the treaty which\nappears to any member of the League as 'threatening to disturb\ninternational peace or the good understanding between nations upon which\npeace depends,' it will, under Article XI, be brought before the League\nand considered. Further, if any clause in the treaty appears to 'have\nbecome inapplicable' or to give rise to 'international conditions which\nmight endanger the peace of the world,' under Article XXIII the Assembly\nof the League may at any time 'advise their reconsideration.' You\ncomplain that the terms of the present treaty were imposed upon you,\nwithout discussion, by implacable enemies who had you at their mercy;\nthat you have been made a sort of outlaw nation, without freedom,\nwithout colonies, without ships, sitting apart while the world is\nadministered by your enemies. But at our Assembly table you will sit as\nan equal and free member, with the same rights as those who were lately\nyour conquerors. We submit to you that this gives you a far better\nchance of improving your condition than another war could. Your lot must\nbe for some time a hard one. That is inevitable, and we cannot think it\nunjust. You challenged the Entente to war, you staked all on victory,\nand you were beaten. Now you have to make reparation. But the\nrecuperative power of a great nation is immense; and wherever you have\nbeen subjected to a definitely unjust or dangerous condition, we offer\nyou a remedy. Wherever you may have a dispute with any other Power, we\noffer you a Court of Arbitration as impartially constituted as the wit\nof man could devise.\"\n\n    *    *    *    *    *\n\nAt present neither party quite believes this guarantee. If they did, it\nwould probably be enough for them. It used to be said of Sir Edward Grey\nin the Balkan Conferences that he was not only sincere; he had the power\nof making other people see that he was sincere. If Europe is to be saved\nfrom new Great Wars, the Powers of the League must first of all be\nsincere in their undertakings, and next, they must convince the world in\ngeneral of their sincerity. To that subject we must return later.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nTHE EAST\n\n\nBut the world is not merely threatened by the prospect of future wars.\nIt is filled with wars at the present moment. There are quarrels and\nbickerings between most of the newly liberated states in eastern Europe;\nthere is a war, sometimes avowed and sometimes underground, between\nCommunist Russia and all her neighbours and rivals, a war whose\ntentacles reach far throughout Europe and Asia; and there are wars\nagainst the British and French in various parts of the East. Let us\nbriefly touch upon a few sample cases.\n\n\nI. SYRIA, MESOPOTAMIA, EGYPT, AND INDIA\n\nThe simplest case is Syria. In 1915, during the war, a Syrian National\nCommittee, including representatives from Damascus and Mosul, negotiated\nwith us through Sherif Husein, and we signed a document promising to\n\"recognize and uphold Arab independence\" in an area including the whole\nof Arabia, Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia, except (1) Aden and (2)\nthe Syrian coast. Within the independent area we merely claimed for\nourselves \"a measure of administrative control\" in Bagdad and Bosra--not\nin Mosul--and reserved any special interests of France. The French were\ninformed of the negotiations immediately. They expressed themselves\ncontent with the possession of the Syrian coast, and agreed in our\npromises to Husein. On the strength of this agreement the Hejaz\nrevolted, and Feisul's army, consisting mainly of Syrian and\nMesopotamian soldiers who had formerly been in the Turkish service,\nfought as our allies to the end of the war. An attempted rising in Syria\nproper was crushed with great severity by the Turks.\n\nIn 1918 the Syrians welcomed the Entente armies as liberators, and were\nagain promised their national independence, though this time it was to\nbe under the guidance of one of the Entente Powers as mandatory. They\nasked that the mandatory should be England, but England had too much on\nher hands. The Syrians next asked for America; but America refused all\nmandates. France, meantime, had always claimed special rights in Syria,\nand England by a treaty made during the war had recognized Syria as a\nFrench interest. If they must be under France, the Syrian\nrepresentatives specially demanded pledges that the government should be\na civil government, that a certain degree of independence should be\nallowed to the natives, and that the country should not be occupied by\nFrench troops. How far these pledges were given and broken by the\nFrench; how far it was only we ourselves who gave assurances which we\nhad neither the right nor the power to carry out, and thus unconsciously\ndeceived Feisul, these are questions still in dispute. It seems\nunfortunately certain that the Syrians considered themselves betrayed.\nIn the end, Syria was occupied by French troops; the native government\nwas not recognized, but dispersed; there were raids and pitched battles,\nand the Emir Feisul, one of our most popular heroes during the Great\nWar, was expelled from his throne and country. He is now an exile, and\nwas for a time officially forbidden to land in England.\n\nFrance so far has neither accepted nor asked for any mandate from the\nLeague of Nations, and appears not fully to realize the obligations\nundertaken by her in signing the Covenant of the League, or the pledge\nrepeated in the Reply of the Allied Powers to Germany, \"that the\nMandatory Powers, in so far as they may be appointed trustees by the\nLeague of Nations, will derive no benefits from such trusteeship.\"\n\nIn Mesopotamia the British established themselves during the war after a\nlong and chequered campaign by defeating the Turks and capturing Bagdad.\nThe Indian soldiers and officials who were in command showed the most\npraiseworthy zeal and energy in proceeding at once to develop the\ncountry: to drain and irrigate, to plant crops, to establish order and\ngood government in regions which had not known such things since a\nremote antiquity. The English were welcomed as liberators and made\nexplicit promises to set up an independent Arab kingdom under a \"measure\nof British administrative control.\" So much propagandist literature was\npoured forth on the glories of the independent Arab nation which the\nEnglish were to create, that serious discontent was caused in Egypt. \"Is\na half-naked Arab to have independence, and am I not good enough to have\neven self-government?\" wrote a highly educated Egyptian to a British\nofficial. Meantime the actual government of Mesopotamia became more and\nmore severely effective, and remained entirely concentrated in the hands\nof the British. The expenses were enormous and the rate of taxation per\nhead appears to have risen to four times what it had been under the\nTurks. The productivity of the country, however, was so great as to hold\nout a prospect of almost making up the loss, and the important oil-wells\nat Mosul were expected to do so completely. The native cultivators\nprofited by the improved harvests and the increased area of cultivation,\nand the expenses of government were in part to be met out of the future\noil profits. And the best British administrators were certainly beloved\nby their people.\n\nThe educated classes in Bagdad, the sheikhs and the ex-Turkish\nofficials, became restive at the high taxation and the indefinite delay\nof \"Arab independence.\" The turbulent desert tribes and the disorderly\nelements in general were disgusted at the good policing. But there was\nno general discontent, because personal assurances were given to leading\nArabs that the Covenant of the League of Nations, which Great Britain\nhad signed, laid down definitely that Mesopotamia was to be recognized\nprovisionally as an independent nation and that the mandate was to be\ngiven to Great Britain. There would be, it was promised, a native\nGovernment with a British Resident to advise it, as in an Indian native\nstate. Doubtless the Government would also ask for other help from\nEngland, especially in the matter of public works, irrigation, and the\nengineering of the oil-wells.\n\nBut the League issued no mandate. According to rumour, it had offered a\nscheme of mandate to the Great Powers concerned, and one at least of\nthem had refused the terms. The precious oil, it was discovered, had\nalready been divided by a private treaty between France and England,\nwhich left only a small fraction for the Mesopotamians and none for the\nrest of the world. There was no attempt to set up an Arab Government.\nSome beginnings were occasionally made of associating Arab officials\nwith the Englishmen who did the real work of governing. But they were\nnot whole-hearted. A letter was accidentally divulged in which an\nEnglish soldier said of the high Arab official attached to him, \"I will\nsoon make him lick my boots.\" There were symptoms of disaffection,\nnon-payment of taxes, the resurgence of old discredited Turkish and\nGerman agents, open rebellions. And the Government replied by numerous\nexecutions and punitive expeditions. The bombing aeroplane, which had\nrevealed itself as a very convenient weapon of war, proved an utterly\ndisastrous instrument of police. The British liberators, who had come by\nthe special desire of the population to establish a free Arab nation\nhelped by friendly advice from British Residents, ended, according to\nColonel Lawrence's estimate, in killing ten thousand Arabs and setting\nthe whole country in a blaze of war. An army of over one hundred\nthousand men is now reconquering it. And at the same time, perhaps at\nthe eleventh hour and perhaps too late altogether, that section in the\nBritish Government which believed in the League of Nations and wished\nscrupulously to carry out in victory the pledges it had given in time of\ndistress, prevailed to bring about a definite change of policy. Sir\nPercy Cox and Mr. Philby were sent to Mesopotamia with instructions, so\nit was stated, to reverse the previous policy and try to set up that\nindependent Arab Government which we had promised in 1915 and again in\n1917, and ought to have set working before the end of 1919. The\n\"rebellion\" will doubtless be crushed, and the native Government may or\nnot be successfully organized. There is a strong desire among the Arab\nleaders to have it based on a treaty of alliance with Great Britain\nafter the Egyptian model, and not on Article XXII of the Covenant. In\nany case the task is infinitely more difficult than it was before so\nmuch blood was shed, and the original friendship of the Arabs turned to\nhatred. On simple men executive action makes a much deeper impression\nthan policy. In Mesopotamia our policy itself was bad because it was not\nconsistent. It was a muddle of two contradictory policies, resulting in\nconfusion and hypocrisy. But the executive action seems to have been\nsuch as to make the chances of even the best policy very precarious. A\ngovernment which multiplies the taxes by four and shoots and hangs its\nsubjects in batches is seldom excused because of its good drainage or\nits progressive ideas.\n\nThe story in Egypt is shorter and perhaps less unhappy, but essentially\nsimilar. Early in the war, when Turkey joined the enemy, we declared a\nBritish protectorate over Egypt, accompanied by a promise to give the\ncountry independence or free institutions at the end of the war. This in\nitself was a perfectly good and defensible policy, though, to be\ncorrect, it should have had the concurrence of Egypt. But in the course\nof the war Egypt became full of discontent. Experienced officials were\nwanted elsewhere, and inexperienced substitutes made mistakes. Labour in\ngreat quantities was required for the Army, and was obtained through\nnative contractors or headmen, who practised the ordinary Oriental\nmethods of extortion and corruption while professing to act by orders of\nthe English. The peasant who was dragged off to forced labour, or\ncompelled to buy his freedom by heavy bribes, blamed the British for\nboth. At one time Egypt was garrisoned by large numbers of Australian\ntroops, who had the habit of thinking of all Asiatics as \"blackfellows,\"\nand whose ways of dealing with \"blackfellows\" were not of the gentlest.\nThe seed was thus sown of a passionate hatred, partly just and partly\nunjust; and feeling was already ripe for explosion when it transpired at\nthe end of the war that the British Government had no apparent intention\nof fulfilling their promise to confer on Egypt \"free institutions.\" Open\nrebellion was impossible, owing to the presence of overpowering numbers\nof British troops; but a time of danger and infinite trouble, well\ncontrolled by Lord Allenby, led at last to the appointment of a\nCommission under Lord Milner, which grasped its almost desperate problem\nwith great courage and skill.\n\nAmong other curious misfortunes, it turned out that the word\n\"protectorate\" had been translated into Arabic by a term which denoted\nthe sort of protection that is extended to an outcast or a person with\nno national rights. The Commissioners were met on their arrival by a\nuniversal boycott, and by constant threats of assassination. They lived\nin considerable danger, and no Egyptian would be seen speaking to them.\nBut tact and patience gradually broke down the boycott; and a much\nlarger measure of agreement was obtained with Zaghlul and the moderate\nNationalists than had at the outset seemed possible. After inquiry, the\nCommission has taken the line of recommending, first, the cancellation\nof the Capitulations, or special privileges granted to European states,\nwhich have paralyzed the progress of Egypt for several generations; the\nseparation from Egypt of the Canal zone, as a special British interest\nand of vital importance to the Empire; the retention of British advisers\nin two posts, the ministries of Justice and of Finance--a safeguard\nwithout which the European Powers would not consent to forgo the special\nprotection of the Capitulations; and in other respects the establishment\nof Egypt as an independent national state. As far as is possible to\nforecast, it looks as if this settlement would succeed.\n\nThe history of recent events in India is too large and complicated a\nsubject to be dealt with here. But in its main outline it has been\ncuriously similar to that of the other regions of the East. A wonderful\nresponse from almost the whole continent to the need of Great Britain\nduring the war; blunders of the War Office and reactions of discontent;\nGerman propaganda; Turkish and Pan-Islamic intrigue; repressive Press\nActs and Conspiracy Acts; passive resistance, dangerous riots, and\nwidespread conspiracies; the severe and sometimes lawless coercion of\nthe Punjab; the savage massacre of Amritsar, and at last, amid great\nobstructions and hesitations, the passing of the Montagu-Chelmsford Act\nand the conferring of a new and liberal constitution upon India. It is\nthe same story as in Egypt and Mesopotamia. So much time was wasted in\ndoing the wrong thing, that when at last resort was had to the right\nthing the right time was past. The Indian Government was faced with\ngreat difficulties and very real dangers. Its errors have been so signal\nand notorious that public opinion is apt to forget or ignore the\nadmirable skill and patience with which most officials steered their\ndistricts through periods of extreme strain. But reforms long promised\nwere delayed until too late. The executive plunged into excesses which\nwill not be forgotten for centuries. And when the long-hoped-for reforms\nat last have come, it may be that they come to a people too exasperated\nto give them a fair trial.\n\n\nII. AN EASTERN POLICY\n\nThe policies here described have been so full of errors that it is hard\nto derive from them a very clear moral. Government without principle\nhas many conveniences; if life consisted of isolated moments it might be\nentirely successful. But life is continuous, and human beings have\nmemories and expectations. And almost any policy that is continuous and\nconsistent and true to itself is more likely to succeed in the end than\na mixture of momentary expedients and plunges for safety. It is\nconceivable that a perfectly resolute and unfaltering military coercion\nof India, Egypt, and Mesopotamia might have succeeded. But such a\npolicy, if it was ever possible, is certainly so no longer; and also it\nwould hardly be a policy for avoiding international strife. And that is\nthe subject we are considering.\n\nIf we look below the mistakes of policy and administration committed by\nthe British or French Governments, we find underneath the surface a\nprofound and instinctive resentment of the Moslem East against the\nWestern Powers. The Western Powers, which for convenience we term\nChristian, have been for some centuries far more efficient than any\nMoslem state. The West has increasingly taken charge of the East;\nbeaten it, managed it, \"run\" it, governed it, and in some cases\nexploited it. Western government, or at least British government, has\nbeen just, incorruptible, impartial, strong, intelligent, far beyond\nordinary Eastern standards. It may have been unsympathetic and grossly\nexpensive; it may, in spite of the unexampled personal integrity of the\nwhole governing class, have led to the presence in Eastern countries of\nundesirable money-seekers. But it has been, on the whole, essentially\nand undeniably good, efficient government, backed by a military power\nwhich committed few excesses, lived on its own pay, and never failed in\nan emergency. No one who studies even superficially the history of\naverage Oriental governments, from Morocco or Bokhara to Oudh, can be\nsurprised or sorry that they have been superseded by the better\ngovernments of the West. The peoples of the East themselves have gained\nby Western penetration; nay, more, they are conscious of their need of\nthe West. But they have had too much of it; they resent it, and they\nare frightened of it. The Moslem nations have lost their independence\none after another. At the beginning of the Great War only one Moslem\nPower remained free and powerful--the Turkish Empire. At the end of the\nwar there was not one.\n\nThe Turks were not popular in the East. The Syrians and Arabs hated them\nalmost as much as their Christian subjects did. The Turkish peasants of\nAnatolia suffered cruelly under the exactions of Constantinople,\nespecially in the matter of military service. But all through the Moslem\nEast ran the consciousness that the Sultan, with all his faults, was\ntheir own man. He was the acknowledged Head of the great majority of\nMoslems in the world. He was, above all, the last barrier that seemed to\nprotect them from the overwhelming flood of Western aggression, and the\nlast great Moslem figure which enabled them to preserve their\nself-respect.\n\nWhile the Turkish Empire stood, the Moslem peoples, though fallen on\nevil days, could think of Islam as an independent and even an imperial\nentity. In places, doubtless, they had to kiss the feet of dogs; but\ntheir Caliph still ruled masses of Christian subject populations and\nstill was master of the capital city of the world. With the fall of\nTurkey, the last free Moslem state was gone. Not here and there, but\neverywhere throughout the whole world, the faithful were set beneath the\nheel of these rich, drunken, pork-eating idolaters with their indecent\nwomen, their three Gods, and their terrific material civilization.\n\"Pan-Islamism,\" as Mr. Toynbee says, \"is only an extreme example of the\nfeeling at the back of almost any modern Oriental movement we may\nexamine. It may take aggressive forms, but the essence of it is a\ndefensive impulse. Its appeal is to fear, and if the fear of the West\ncould be lifted from off the minds of the Oriental peoples, its\nmainspring would be gone.\"\n\nThe problem of our Eastern policy is to remove that fear. And that ought\nnot to be so very difficult. The essential fact to grasp is that the\nEast needs us far more than we need the East. We need markets; but that\nidea is only suggested to us by the fact that Eastern peoples want our\ngoods. We do almost everything better than they do. They want our\ntextiles, our knives and tools, our engines and ploughs, our books, our\nlearning. They cannot make railways or ships without us. They cannot\nwork their mines or oil-wells except by Western help. They cannot really\ngovern their countries satisfactorily without European advisers. The\nlanguage of Article XXII of the League of Nations Covenant is quite\ncorrect when it says that \"Certain communities formerly belonging to the\nTurkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence\nas independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the\nrendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until\nsuch time as they are able to stand alone.\" At present \"they are not yet\nable to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern\nworld.\"\n\nThey ought to want us, and if left alone they would want us. We have\nfrightened them into fighting and hating us by forcing ourselves upon\nthem instead of waiting to be asked. We have conferred incalculable\nbenefits on India: the benefit of protection from invasion, of\ncomparative protection from plague and famine, of social order, of\nadministrative justice, to say nothing of roads and railways, and the\nenlivening force of Western knowledge. We have immensely increased the\nprosperity of Egypt, we have put down all kinds of Oriental abuses and\nprotected the fellaheen against _corv\u00e9es_ and extortions and tortures.\nWe were in process of beginning to perform the same services for\nMesopotamia. But in the latter regions at any rate--for in India our\nroots are far deeper and the problem is more complex--the people did not\nwant us. We only held them and did them good by force. And the chief\nreason why they did not want us was fear. We came to them with machine\nguns and bombing planes as conquerors and masters, having destroyed the\nonly free Moslem Power; and they found it difficult to believe in our\ngood intentions. We came to them, most unfortunately, also with\nspecious promises which we made in time of need and broke in the days\nof victory.\n\nThe right policy is something very easy to state and extremely difficult\nto carry out, even for a single-minded and clear-headed Government. It\nneeds first, perhaps, an effort of imaginative understanding more\nfar-reaching than has ever yet in history been demanded of an Imperial\nPower. Only those who understand the East can win the respect and\nconfidence of the East. But in the meantime, if we cannot fully\nunderstand, there is a way at least to make ourselves understood.\nJustice is the passport to confidence all the world over. And our first\nbusiness is to act quite simply and sincerely up to all our engagements.\nWe undertook certain obligations when we signed Article XXII of the\nCovenant. We should make the \"wishes of these communities a principal\nconsideration\" in deciding whether we should go to them at all. We\nshould really treat them \"as independent nations,\" and should honestly\ngive them \"administrative advice and assistance until they shall be able\nto stand alone.\" And we should not allow our minds to be confused by\nthoughts of gain, nor our advice to take the form of horse, foot, and\nartillery. Two illustrations may make this point clear. An experienced\nand very successful administrator was asked a few weeks ago whether he\nwould accept the post of adviser to a certain Moslem Government. He\nsaid, \"Yes, upon one condition. That there is no British army anywhere\nin the country.\" That is the right and wise spirit. The second is even\nsimpler. One of the most obvious and matter-of-course obligations laid\nupon imperial administrators and civil servants is that they shall not\nembark in trade or in any way make a profit out of the administration of\ntheir office. That is the right rule. The Empire should set an example\nof the behaviour that it expects from its best servants.\n\nWhen we apportioned to ourselves the German colonies, we specially\ndeclined to take over their public debts. And when protest was raised\nagainst this proceeding, we stated definitely in our official Reply: \"It\nwould be unjust to make this responsibility rest on the Mandatory\nPowers, which, in so far as they may be appointed trustees by the League\nof Nations, will derive no benefit from such trusteeship.\" Is it\nentirely quixotic and idealist to hope that, even in post-war\nconditions, a great nation may remain true to her word?\n\nIt seems at least as if the only alternative was to hold these Eastern\nterritories by armed force, and that is no longer possible. It might be\npossible to hold by force India alone, or Egypt alone, or Mesopotamia\nalone. It is not possible so to hold all three. We must govern by\nconsent of the governed or not all.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nRUSSIA AND ITS BORDERS\n\n\nAnother group of wars and threats of war has its centre in Moscow. All\nthe States on the borders of Russia--Finland, Lithuania, Poland, the\nUkraine, Hungary, Rumania, the new republics of Georgia, Armenia, and\nAzerbaijan, and the kingdom of Persia--are either at war or in fear of\nwar or just recovering from war with Russia, or from civil war fomented\nby Russian agents and propagandists. Inside Russia itself, civil war has\nnever ceased since the first outbreak of the Revolution in 1917. It is\ntrue that the civil war has been largely helped by foreign munitions and\nstirred up by foreign intrigues. But that only shows that--as the world\nis now organized--there is something in the present Russian Government\nwhich makes foreigners as well as Russians wish to take up arms against\nit. It may have been--I think strongly that it was--exceedingly unwise\nfor the foreign Governments to intervene in the domestic troubles of\nRussia, but no one can pretend that the civil war was entirely created\nby foreigners. The rebellions were there before the foreigners joined\nin, and it is even thought by good judges that the opposition to the\nBolsheviks might by this time have been successful if it had not been\ndamned in Russian eyes by its foreign alliances.\n\nFor us the question is how the Russian Revolution has become such a\nplenteous and intense cause of strife. It is, of course, impossible to\npass judgment on the whole of a vast movement with the very inadequate\ninformation that is now accessible to an average Englishman about\nRussia. Even the French Revolution, which has been studied by thousands\nof observers and historians, is not yet judged. The sum of infamies and\nhigh achievements is too complicated to add up. And the Russian\nRevolution is probably even harder to value than the French.\n\n\nI. THE CIVIL WAR\n\nIt would be a mistake to forget the elements of simple early-Christian\nbrotherhood which seem to characterize the Russian peasant. It was well\nknown before the war how the members of a workmen's _artel_, or trade\ncommunity, when trade was bad, would divide their earnings equally and\nall starve, if need be, together, without any attempt by the luckier\nworkmen to save themselves at the expense of the others. The glowing\ndescriptions of Mr. Stephen Graham cannot be entirely without any basis\nin fact. And the people of Tolstoy and Dostoievsky have evidently a most\nrare capacity for sainthood and martyrdom, as well as for aberration of\nmind. Present-day Russia has been described by an eminent Socialist as\n\"a nation of artists governed by brutes,\" and the phrase is probably\ntrue of the old Russia also, and the Russia of centuries back. Communism\ncomes easily in Russia, and so does submission to tyranny.\n\nIt must also be remembered that the Great War, among its many aspects,\ninvolved the most frightful and bewildering oppression of the poor and\nweak. As was said quite truly: \"Millions of poor men in divers regions\nof the world have been dragged suddenly and without any previous action\nof their own into a quarrel which they neither made nor desired nor\nunderstood, and in the course of that quarrel have been subjected again\nand again to the very extremity of possible human suffering.\" The war\nnaturally and inevitably created in Europe a passionate wish for some\nrevolutionary transformation of a world in which rich and clever people\nin parliaments and governments had the power of inflicting such pains\nupon the poor. The peculiarity of the Bolshevik movement was, as one of\nits rare English admirers puts it, not so much that it wanted a\nparticular kind of Socialism or Communism, but that it wanted it _now_.\nThe world has seen many revolutions and many Socialist governments; but\nthey have never really established that paradise of the poor which was\nadvertised in their prospectuses and doubtless nursed in their hopes.\nMost failed altogether. And those which succeeded went wrong. They\nco\u00f6perated with \"bourgeois Liberals.\" They extended the franchise, they\nimproved the condition of the working classes, they established\nwell-to-do workmen and peasants with a stake in the country and a\nconservative bias; but they never really did what was wanted. They\nalways stopped short. They developed the middle-class virtues. They left\nstill in existence a capitalist class which preached the merits of\nthrift and hard work and was interested in trade; and of course they\nleft always somewhere an oppressed class. The under dog was still under.\n\nThe Bolshevik remedy was very direct and simple. It was to disarm\neverybody who had any share in prosperity, and distribute firearms to\nthose who had nothing else. Only when he was armed and the rest of the\npeople unarmed could the real proletarian--the man who had no savings,\nno talent, no education, no notable good qualities, nothing that makes\nfor success in life--hope to beat the men who always outstripped him. It\nis strange that even in a moment of extreme misery such a theory could\nhave established itself in any country as a principle of government. But\nthe military collapse of Russia gave it a unique chance. The common\nsoldiers, anxious to fight no more, already possessed arms. They had\nmerely to murder their officers and the thing was done. The rest of the\npopulation was unarmed and helpless. And meantime the peasants, though\nalmost untouched by revolutionary ideas, were amenable to one particular\nbribe. The revolutionaries offered all the peasants of Russia their\nmasters' land without any payment. They could simply take the land, and\nkill or not kill the owner as they pleased. There was no punishment for\nsuch killing. According to strict Communist principles, the land was not\nto remain in the peasants' possession. It was to be the property of the\nState. But this principle had to be dropped in order to induce the\npeasants to co\u00f6perate with the revolutionary town workmen. Whatever may\nbe said in favour of this revolution, there can at least be no surprise\nat what Lenin calls \"the frantic resistance\" of the upper and middle\nclasses of Russia. The policy of the Government was announced on January\n23, 1919: \"The present is the period of destruction and crushing of the\ncapitalist system of the whole world. . . . In order to establish the\ndictatorship of the proletariate it is necessary to disarm the\nbourgeoisie and its agents and to arm the proletariate.\" It is to be\ndictatorship in the strict sense: the power of a man with a gun to do\nwhat he likes with those who have no guns. There is to be no democracy\nor representation of the dispossessed classes. If they were represented\nthey might recover power. Only those known to be faithful to the new\nGovernment are to vote. All persons of property must be dispossessed,\nfrom landlords to small shop-keepers. Rich peasants must go; even\n\"middle peasants\" at one time had to go; only the poorest peasants and\nthe poorest town workmen should rule, assisted, of course, by those\neducated people who would accept the new r\u00e9gime and establish by deeds\nbeyond doubt their hatred of the bourgeoisie.\n\nThe control of a country by a small minority is always difficult. It\nneeds methods of \"terror.\" But this minority had first to acquire the\ncontrol and then to maintain it. Its task was more difficult and its\nmethods had to be more violent than those of its predecessors. The\n\"terror\" of the old Czarist Government or of the French Revolution must\nbe superseded by the more drastic method of what was called \"mass\nterror.\" The secret police, whose activities had made hideous the record\nof the Czarist Government, and who had fled for their lives at the first\noutbreak of the Lvof and Kerensky Revolution, returned from their\nlurking-places to put themselves at the disposal of the Bolsheviks. This\nlegion of devils had something to sell which the new Government badly\nneeded. On the analogy of the _Comit\u00e9 de Salut Public_ there was\nestablished the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for stamping out\nall trace of resistance to the new order. Spies were placed everywhere\n(Proclamation, October 17, 1918). No distinction was to be made between\nCzarist reactionaries and unorthodox Socialists, such as the Mensheviks\nand Social Revolutionaries (_Russkaya Zhizn_, May 10, 1919). Enormous\nnumbers of \"hostages\" were arrested. At any sign of conspiracy outside,\nlarge numbers of these were shot. The assassination of the Bolshevik\nUritzky was repaid by the execution of five hundred citizens. Yet, just\nas in the most furious days of the French Revolution, the terrorists\nwere always complaining that there was not enough terror. \"The continual\ndiscovery of conspiracies in our rear . . . the insignificant extent of\nserious repressions and mass shootings of White Guards and bourgeoisie\non the part of the Soviets, show that notwithstanding frequent\npronouncements urging mass terror against the Social Revolutionaries,\nWhite Guards, and bourgeoisie, no real terror exists\" (Official Weekly\nof the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, No. 1, Moscow, September\n21, 1918).\n\nTrotzky in comforting language explained that the object of the mass\nterror was not really the extermination of all non-communists, or all\nRussians who did not attain the full standard of poverty and orthodoxy.\n\"The proletariate says: 'I shall break your will because my will is\nstronger than yours, and I shall force you to serve me.' . . . Terror as\nthe demonstration of the will and strength of the working class is\nhistorically justified\" (Trotzky in _Izvestia_, January 10, 1919).\nEventually, of course, when all Russia was submissive and all Europe\nCommunist, there would be a gentler r\u00e9gime, and the proletariate would\nshow their true beauty of character. And it would be a mistake to ignore\nthe real reforms which seem to have been carried through in certain\nsocial services, notably in the care of children, the attempt to develop\npopular education and the putting down of drink. But in the meantime\nterror was re\u00ebnforced by ingenious petty persecutions and indignities,\nre\u00ebnforced by starvation. Those who joined the Red Army had three times\nthe ration of food allowed to several categories of the civil\npopulation. No one can wonder that suicide--that last irrefutable\nevidence of unbearable oppression--became extraordinarily common,\nespecially among the educated classes,[4] and that \"frantic resistance\"\nbroke out where it had any prospect of success.\n\n[Footnote 4: The remnants of the more distinguished \"intellectuals\" are\nnow gathered into two or three \"salvage houses\" and looked after by\nMaxim Gorky. [He has now fled.]]\n\n\nII. RUSSIA'S NEIGHBOURS\n\nBut what of the war outside Russia? Why could not the Russians be\nallowed to conduct their revolution and settle their form of government\nby themselves? It would be very desirable if they could. And doubtless\nit is the aim to be striven for. But the trouble is that Bolshevism is\nto its adherents a revelation and a new gospel, and they have the same\nzeal for converting the rest of the world as had the French\nRevolutionaries or the followers of Mohammed. \"The program of the\nCommunist Party is not merely a program of liberating the proletariate\nof one country; it is the program of liberating the proletariate of the\nworld\" (authorized pamphlet by N. Bukharin, July 24, 1918). This is to\nbe achieved by \"a bloody torturing and heroic fight.\" The methods are to\ninclude every known form of intrigue, corruption, forgery, and the\nlike, and the plan is to be the same in all countries. Revolutionary\nworkmen are to be armed, including common soldiers, tramps, prisoners,\nand all the utterly dispossessed of the earth, except, of course, those\nwho have Conservative, Liberal, or Labour Party views; and then are to\nwork their proletarian will on the rest of the community. The \"national\nwill\" is to be disregarded: \"The interests of Socialism stand far above\nthe interest of the right of nations to self-determination\" (Trotzky,\n_Izvestia_, March 8, 1918). \"All our hopes for the definitive triumph of\nSocialism are based on this conviction and on this scientific prevision,\ni.e. that a revolution like the Russian can be produced in all the\nnations of Europe\" (_ib._). In the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk the\nBolsheviks were compelled to sign a clause promising not to conduct \"any\nagitation against the State and military institutions of Germany.\" \"But\nboth the Russian Government as a whole and its accredited representative\nin Berlin never concealed the fact that they were not observing this\narticle, and did not intend to do so\" (Joffe, _Izvestia_, January 1,\n1919).\n\nThe belief that by some single violent change in social, political, or\neconomic conditions human life as a whole can be suddenly transfigured\nis one that clings to many minds, and by no means the stupidest minds,\nof the present age, in spite of much disillusioning experience. It does\nseem to them at moments as if only some one thing was wrong with the\nworld, and as if that one flaw must surely be definite and remediable:\nsome one bold step is all that is needed--say, the abolition of the\nfamily, or of property, or of competition, or of wages, or of interest,\nor of compulsory law, or some other of the fundamental institutions of\nsociety.\n\nTo our ancestors it was the abolition of heresy. To the Turks, the\nabolition of all Christians in Turkey. To such people at such times the\nnormal method of trying to correct the worst abuses by persuading the\nmajority that they ought to be corrected, and of seeking individually to\nlive a better life and to help one's neighbours, seems tedious and\nineffective, if not hypocritical. But one thing that is clear is that\nrevolution means \"frantic resistance,\" and the stronger the faith and\nenergy behind the revolution the more deep-reaching is the resistance\nlikely to be.\n\nRussia's neighbours see what seems to them the infinite misery and\nimpoverishment and retardation inflicted by Bolshevism; and they are\nnaturally indignant and alarmed at the secret propaganda of Bolshevism\nwithin their own borders. In normal times perhaps they need not have\nbeen afraid. But since the war every state is unstable; every state has\na large discontented class. The small republics in the Caucasus, barely\nable to support themselves in freedom, are maddened to find their\nconstitution threatened by Russian bribes, their malcontents and bad\ncharacters armed with Russian rifles and machine guns, and their public\nmen assassinated. Georgia and Armenia are probably doomed. Hungary and\nFinland have gone Bolshevik and returned, each process being accompanied\nby hideous persecutions and murders, the reprisals being naturally the\nworst. Germany, in spite of all treaties, has been exposed to constant\npropaganda and has had one or two bad outbreaks of violence. Poland has\nbeen and still is--whether through her own bad policy or otherwise--on\nthe brink of compulsory Bolshevism. Human nature being what it is, and\nhuman politics a little worse than private human nature, it is\ninevitable that Russia's neighbours should be constantly afraid of her\nand intensely anxious to see her again under some more normal\ngovernment; some government which, whatever its political bias, would\nleave its neighbours to govern themselves and accept the ordinary\nconventions of civilized society.\n\nNay, one can even understand anti-Russian policies that seem at first\nsight intolerably aggressive. The Poles, among other demands, are\nanxious for the independence of White Russia, the region north of the\nPripet, of which Minsk is the chief town. They wish it either annexed to\nPoland or else made independent, but at any rate cut off from Russia.\nThe claim seems monstrous. But it has its excuse. The White Russian\npeasantry are said to be peculiarly ignorant and devoid of national\nfeeling; the land-owners and well-to-do classes are mostly Poles. Is it\nsurprising that the Poles of Poland hate the idea of handing their\ncountrymen over to a Russia which will, as a matter of course, set the\npeasants to burn their houses, destroy their cattle, and hunt them\nthemselves down like vermin? And when that is done, they reflect,\nBolshevism will only be nearer to Warsaw.\n\nLike the early Moslems, the true Bolsheviks care more for their faith\nthan for territory. In dealing with Lithuania, which is at present a\ncomparatively quiet little peasant republic, the Russians offered her a\nlarge slice of territory beyond what she was entitled to or wanted. Why?\nBecause it was a thoroughly Bolshevized area, and might be expected to\nspread the faith--or the poison--into all Lithuania. A nation, or a\ngovernment, in that state of mind cannot be surprised if its neighbours\nregard it with anxiety.\n\n    *    *    *    *    *\n\nIt is a curious fact that revolutionists so often regard themselves as\npacifists. Many were even conscientious objectors during the war, and\nthere is no reason to doubt that they were sincere. But they do seem to\nbe confused thinkers. To hate your neighbours, whom you know, and love\nyour neighbours' enemies, whom you do not know, is a consistent and not\nuncommon frame of mind; though the element of love in it seems less\nimportant and prominent than the hate. But to expect European peace and\ngood-will by means of a revolution in all countries argues a lack of\nunderstanding not far removed from madness. Every revolutionary outburst\nsince the war has been marked by ferocious cruelties and followed by\nstill more ferocious reprisals. Revolution leads not to peace, but to\nreciprocal reigns of terror, first Red and then White, till the\nexhaustion of suffering produces some sort of equilibrium.\n\nThe war, among its many evil lessons, has inculcated the gospel of\nimpatience and of force. \"When you want a thing, take it from some one,\nand if he resists, knock him down.\" It is the doctrine which destroys\nhuman societies as it destroys the peace in men's own hearts. If we\nwant peace, we must simply unlearn that creed and go back to the old\nLiberal doctrine that is at the root of sound politics everywhere: \"If\nyou think something is right, try to persuade your fellow citizens of\nit; try your hardest, but remember that you may be wrong, and until you\nsucceed, have patience.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nPRE-WAR AND POST-WAR CAUSES OF STRIFE\n\n\nThe war has left behind it a great number of small wars or guerrillas.\nMost of them have their explanation in some ordinary excess of\nnationalism or revenge or greed. The Serbs, intoxicated with their new\ngreatness, are still causing war in Albania and Montenegro. The\nRumanians recently invaded Hungary, in spite of all the thunders of the\nPeace Conference, because they had been robbed by Austria-Hungary and\nwanted revenge and reparation. The Hungarians have alarmed all their\nneighbours and forced them into a defensive alliance, which now calls\nitself the \"Little Entente.\" The Lithuanians and Poles have fought, but\nbeen reconciled by the mediation of the League of Nations. The Armenians\nhave been massacred again, under the eyes of the French army of\noccupation in Cilicia, where they had gathered under a repeated\nguarantee of safety given by France and England. The Turkish\nNationalists are holding out very unsuccessfully in the centre of\nAnatolia against a Greek army carrying out the directions of the Supreme\nCouncil. The Turkish peasants are increasingly reluctant to take arms\nagain. The Koreans have helplessly declared their right to independence\nfrom Japan, and are apparently being reduced by a terrible persecution.\n\nThese are the mere belated effervescence of the passions of the Great\nWar. The hate and pride which are the basis of nationalism and which\nwere so violently stimulated by the events of the war cannot be expected\nto die out at once. It was calculated a short time ago that there were\ntwenty-seven \"wars\" of one sort or another in progress. But they will\npresumably simmer down as social conditions become more normal.\n\nIt is interesting to observe that two of the greatest causes of war,\naccording to the judgment of normal times, are now not actively\noperating. Before 1914, if one was asked to name the main causes of\nwar, the answer would have been, first, competitive armaments, and,\nsecond, protective tariffs and the competition for markets. These causes\nwill remain fully as dangerous for the future, but it so happens that\nnone of the existing wars is directly due to either.\n\n\nI. ARMAMENTS\n\nIn one sense, indeed, armaments are actually operating now as a cause of\nwar. There are far too many firearms lying about. America, England, and\nFrance have made very lavish gifts or sales of lethal weapons to various\nbodies with whom they sympathized. And the arms have by no means always\nstayed in the place for which they were intended. Guns which we sent to\nDenikin were sold by corrupt officials to the Bolsheviks, and passed on\nby them to the Afghans to use against us on the Indian frontier. Such\nthings cause some deaths and some laughter, but are not permanent evils.\n\nNo European nation, except those actually compelled, has made much\nprogress towards disarmament. It is said that Great Britain has\nactually made the greatest reduction, but both in numbers of men and in\nexpenditure our standard is fantastically higher than what was forced\nupon us by German competition in 1914. It is impossible to reduce our\nforces in a really drastic way as long as our commitments are so large\nand--perhaps we must add--our policy so inconsistent and provocative.\nPeace with Russia, a settlement with Mesopotamia and Egypt on the lines\nlaid down by the Covenant and the Milner Report, the evacuation of\nIreland, the execution of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms in India, and\nthe extension of similar reforms to Burmah and the much-suffering\nCeylon, will permit us really to envisage for the first time a\nsatisfactory measure of disarmament. The air force is already greatly\nreduced. The vast size of the navy appears to be utterly unjustified, at\nany rate by conditions in Europe. The French army is far beyond the\neconomic powers of France to support. The same seems to be true of\nItaly, and is certainly true of Serbia, which is still calling\nconscripts to the colours. Greece is vastly overarmed; but Greek\npolicy, though erring on the ambitious side, has probably been more\nsagaciously guided under M. Venizelos than any in Europe. The fall of\nthat great man, due mainly to the prolonged economic distresses of\nGreece, will probably cause a resurgence of Mustapha Kemal and the\nTurkish nationalists. Meantime the Russian conscript army, though\napparently ill-armed and ill-supplied, is overwhelming in numbers and is\nled by officers of the old r\u00e9gime, experienced and not absolutely\nincompetent. The Russian army is far the greatest and, in a political\nsense, the most dangerous, in the world.\n\nBut it is not the actual armaments, ruinous as they are, that are the\nessential poison to civilized society. It is the competition in\narmaments. That has now been abolished throughout Europe. Slowly,\nunequally, reluctantly, the armaments which, in Lord Grey's words, went\nuphill under the lead of Germany, are now, under the same lead, groping\ntheir way downhill. There is only one great nation which, if words are\nto be believed, thinks seriously of starting a competition in armaments.\nIt has been announced, more than once, by the American Government that,\nlike Germany in the years before 1914, they have arranged a naval\nprogramme which will effectually put an end to the British command of\nthe seas and give the United States \"world primacy\" (see speech of Mr.\nDaniels, Secretary of the Navy, in the _Times_ of September 1, 1920).\nSince the British Empire is a scattered series of communities dependent\nfor their communications upon the sea, and in particular since the\npopulation of Great Britain is absolutely dependent for its food on the\nfree use of sea transport, it has been generally acknowledged in Europe\nthat the sea-power of Great Britain was necessary to its existence.\nBritish sea-power has never been challenged except by definite enemies\nin pursuit of a definite war policy. If the United States were seriously\nto embark on the same policy as the late German Government, it seems as\nif all other causes of war must sink into insignificance beside this\ngigantic and deliberate one. But, in spite of some bewildering\nsymptoms, it can hardly be believed that this conclusion is possible, at\nany rate until America has definitely and finally refused to be a member\nof the League of Nations.\n\nRelations between Great Britain and America have of late been\ndangerously strained, partly owing to causes outside our Government's\ncontrol, but in part owing to the scandal caused in America by certain\ndevelopments of the Peace Treaty, and by the excesses of the Government\nforces in Ireland. A wise policy may help to heal this growing breach,\nand if America accepts in some form or other membership of the League of\nNations, it ought to be possible in friendly discussion to arrive at\nsome understanding on the question of naval armaments.\n\nThe problem of armaments is put in the very forefront of the Covenant of\nthe League, immediately after the constitution of the League itself. By\nArticle VIII--\n\n     The members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace\n     requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point\n     consistent with (_a_) national safety and (_b_) the enforcement by\n     common action of national obligations.\n\n     The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and\n     circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such\n     reduction for the consideration and action of the several\n     Governments.\n\n     Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at\n     least every ten years.\n\n     After these plans shall have been adopted by the several\n     Governments the limits of armament therein fixed shall not be\n     exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.\n\nThe article goes on to recognize that private munition factories are\nobjectionable, and must somehow be dealt with, and to lay down that all\nmembers must interchange \"full and frank information\" about their\narmaments and programmes. And the next article constitutes a permanent\nCommission to advise the Council on the execution of the provisions of\nArticle VIII and other similar matters.\n\nThe cautious language of the Covenant on this subject is due to the\ninherent difficulty of the subject itself. It would be absurd to lay\ndown that every member of the League must disband its forces forthwith;\nthe League could hardly undertake to go to war in order to compel some\nstrong Power to disarm. And it is obvious that different nations need\ndifferent degrees of armament. The chief difficulty is that disarmament\nought in justice and prudence to be simultaneous all round. It is only\nby the compulsion of a lost war that Germany has been compelled to\ndisarm while her enemies stand round her with large armies, and even in\nGermany the process is evidently very difficult to enforce. Too many\nrifles and machine guns have got loose in private hands. No League could\ncompel Poland or Rumania to disarm while the Red Army of Russia stood\nwaiting across the frontier; or compel Great Britain to disarm while the\nnorthwest frontier of India is constantly attacked, while the Bolsheviks\nare in Persia and British officials are besieged in Mesopotamia. This\ndifficulty will remain even when the world begins to settle down and the\ncountries of Europe are no longer governed by their War Offices. On the\nother hand, economic pressure, as well as Liberal feeling, will make for\nthe reduction of armies and navies. It may be difficult to get\nvolunteers for military service, and it will certainly be dangerous to\nimpress conscripts. There will be a stronger and more genuine popular\ndemand for disarmament than for most of the desirable provisions of the\nLeague Covenant, and Governments dependent on the popular will may find\ntheir hands forced. But in the main disarmament must depend on the\nrestoration of confidence; though probably it is true in most cases that\nif the disarmament comes first the confidence will follow.\n\n\nII. MARKETS AND FOOD\n\nThe second of these great causes of war, protection and the competition\nfor markets, has somewhat changed its aspect since the comparative\nexhaustion of the world supplies of food and raw material. Before the\nwar, nations chiefly wanted to sell. Markets were the great object of\nambition, and tariff walls the great means of offence. Great Britain, of\ncourse, kept her doors everywhere open to the trade of the world. It is\none of the decisive marks to her credit in the apportionment of the\ncomparative guilt of the nations in preparing that international\natmosphere which made the war of 1914 possible. But if she had chosen at\nany moment to close her doors, she could have injured grievously every\nother great nation throughout the globe; and the British Tariff Reform\nCampaign was one of the excuses used by the German Government to\nfrighten their people into a war spirit. When Austria wished to ruin\nSerbia she simply put a prohibitive duty on the import of pigs.\n\nNow, since the war, what most nations want is not in the first place\nmarkets; it is food and raw materials. They have not, of course,\nabolished their tariffs, but their first anxiety is to be able to buy\nfood. Austria does not want to keep out Serbian pigs. She begs for them,\nand Serbia will not let her have them. The most consistently and\nnarrowly protectionist nations, like France or Australia, no longer\nconcentrate on forbidding their neighbours to sell to them. On the\ncontrary, they refuse to sell food and raw material to their neighbours.\nThe policy of keeping the food and raw materials of the British Empire\nfor British consumption is already widely advocated and has powerful\nchampions in the Government. As long as it is confined to palm kernels,\nthis policy, though bad from almost every point of view, is not fatal.\nBut if ever it were to be carried consistently through, it would mean\nwar. The British Empire holds such a vast extent of the earth's surface\nthat it has inevitably given hostages to fortune. So huge an empire can\nonly be tolerated if it behaves tolerably. If we keep to ourselves and\nuse for our own profit all the overwhelmingly large stores of food and\nraw material which by our vast annexations of territory we now control,\nthereby reducing other nations first to a stagnation of trade and then\nto starvation, the natural and inevitable answer to such a proceeding\nwould seem to be a world crusade for our destruction.\n\nThis is the chief point, apparently, in which the influence of what is\ncalled \"capitalism\" seems to be a direct cause of war. Great\ncapitalists, or those impersonal organizations of capital which seem\nlikely now to supersede the individual capitalist, are normally strong\ninfluences for peace. They need peace for the success of their\nundertakings and are in danger of ruin if war breaks out. But they do at\ntimes stand to gain enormous sums by concessions and monopolies and by\ncontrol over materials which are the subject of an intense demand from\ngreat masses of people. And no doubt one way in which they will seek to\nget these monopolies and controls is by putting pressure on Governments\nfor so-called patriotic reasons to exclude foreign competition. This is\na very real danger.\n\nThe Covenant of the League of Nations has not dared to insist on free\ntrade. Obviously it could not, since the majority of the member nations\nare against free trade. But it does lay down certain rules to check\naggressive protection.\n\nAll the territories transferred by the war from the possession of\nGermany and Turkey to their conquerors are subjected to the principle of\nmandate. They are not held as possessions. They are held \"as a sacred\ntrust for civilization\" with the express purpose of securing the\n\"well-being and development\" of the native populations. In particular,\nthe mandatories agree to guarantee \"equal opportunities for the trade\nand commerce of other members of the League.\" As the membership of the\nLeague is increased, this will practically ensure the \"open door\" to all\nnations in the mandated areas. It seems also clearly to forbid the\nestablishment of national monopolies. If a mandatory finds copper-mines\nor oil-wells in its territory, it is bound to develop them as \"a trust\nfor civilization.\" Any profit it receives must be in the nature of wages\nfor work done. A mandatory may not exclude or hamper the trade of\nanother member of the League by tariffs,[5] much less keep the oil for\nthe exclusive use of itself and its friends, as is at present proposed\nby England and France in Mesopotamia. The condemnation of this proposal\nby the Assembly of the League in November, 1920, backed by a vigorous\nprotest from the United States, has, it may be hoped, made such a\nviolation of the Covenant impossible.\n\n[Footnote 5: Except in Mandates C (Pacific Islands, etc.), where\nAustralia successfully refused to submit to any economic restrictions.\nSee, however, the definite pledge given by the Allied Reply, p. 78,\nabove.]\n\nIn territories not mandated as a result of the war, but otherwise\nsimilar to the mandated areas, such as the pre-war colonies of the\nvarious Powers, these rules, of course, do not hold. Yet it may be hoped\nthat at least they will be recognized as good rules, to which\napproximation should be made as circumstances permit.\n\nIn all their dealings, moreover, members of the League agree (Article\nXXIII) to \"secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit,\nand equitable treatment for the commerce of all members of the League.\"\nThe language of this article is a little vague. One can trace in it the\ninfluence of a struggle. But at least it forbids tariff wars, and it\ngives the League a handle for interference in case of any very great\niniquity. It does not forbid national monopolies; but a monopoly in\nfoodstuffs which came near to inflicting famine on other members of the\nLeague would, under it, at least give cause for remark. And no clause,\nhowever strong, could in practice be sure of attaining more. The League\nhas to be built out of nations as they already exist, and the rules of\nthe League out of their public opinion. The real danger here, as in so\nmany other cases, lies not in the caution and moderation of the language\nused in the Covenant, but first in the questionable sincerity of the\nnations in carrying out the pledges signed by their representatives, and\nsecondly in the possibility that, through ill-will, or fear, or\nself-interest, or mob-passion, or some other disastrous influence, the\nex-enemy Powers be not quickly included in the League. Not until all\nCentral Europe is in the League can the world begin to breathe freely.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nTHE LEAGUE OF NATIONS\n\n\nWe have considered many parts of the world and many aspects of the\npresent world settlement to see what seeds of future war may now be\ngerminating and what means we have of making them harmless. And in every\ncase we are brought back to the one great creative idea which this war\nhas produced, the League of Nations. The earlier notions of the League,\nas issued, for example, about the year 1909 by certain American bodies,\ncentred upon the development of compulsory mediation or arbitration and\nthe setting up of a recognized permanent Court of International Law. The\nflaw in this conception, operating alone, is a certain rigidity and\nbarrenness. It left states to work separately until they quarrelled or\nsaw a quarrel approaching, and only then, when the atmosphere was\nalready bad, it expected them to meet and accept arbitration. A great\naddition to this was Sir Edward Grey's conception, already put in\npractice during the Balkan Wars, of an extended _entente cordiale_\nembracing all Europe and America. In his time France and England,\nEngland and America, England and Italy, had formed a habit of cordiality\nand frank dealing. When any trouble arose, the ambassadors had the habit\nof meeting freely and discussing the trouble with perfect frankness,\nalmost as members of the same Ministry might do. This tendency was\nhelped by the enormous increase in international conferences,\ncommissions, and bureaux. And during the Balkan crisis of 1912-13 it was\nin process of being extended to include Germany. Thus there was the\nhabit of frequent co\u00f6peration and mutual confidence. Unfortunately, this\nfriendly spirit depended on all parties being generally content with the\npresent condition of affairs; Germany was not content, and so the\n_entente_ idea was balked. Under the League the nations are already\nforming a habit of consultation and co\u00f6peration on non-controversial\nmatters which should be of immense help in dealing with differences\nwhen they arise. Another great formative idea was contributed by General\nSmuts, the principle of the mandate. He foresaw that there would be at\nthe end of the war an immense appropriation of tropical colonies; he\nknew that the rivalry of the Great Powers for the possession of such\ncolonies was one of the chief sources of international strife; and he\nsaw that the right outlet was to put an end to the treatment of colonies\nas \"possessions\" or mere sources of wealth to the colonizing Power. The\npopulations that are not able to stand alone should be taken in trust by\nthe whole League of Nations, which should appoint a particular Power in\neach particular case to carry out the trust. Again, the great stirring\nof discontent among the labouring classes in almost all parts of the\nworld led to the formation of a special International Commission on\nLabour, which has so far met with great success. It will in general have\nthe effect of raising the conditions of the most backward peoples to\nsomething like the level of the best.\n\nAnd lastly, when all these things were in train, the policy for which\nboth Great Britain and the late Czar of Russia had striven so long and\nvainly would at last become feasible, and the nations might consent to\ndisarm.\n\nThus the Covenant of the League, an unpretentious but well-considered\ndocument, the result of repeated criticism and study by many of the best\nminds in Europe and America, attempts to meet and check all the visible\nand predictable causes of war.\n\nThere should be no wars of ambition. They are to be met by absolute\ncoercion. The League can make it certain that deliberate war undertaken\nfor national aggrandizement will end, not in profit, but in ruinous\nloss.\n\nThere should be no wars caused by the irresistible desire to escape from\nforeign oppression or intolerable conditions. They are made unnecessary\nby provisions enabling any oppressed nation to lay its case before the\nAssembly or Council and obtain such redress as the most disinterested\ntribunal can give.\n\nA war which is caused by the emergence of some clash of interest or\nunforeseen dispute between two states cannot, in the nature of things,\nbe made absolutely impossible. The League opposes to that danger, not a\nblank wall, but, as it were, a series of springs calculated to exhaust\nits force; a court for points of law, mediation for points of policy,\ncompulsory delay and reconsideration for all disputes whatsoever. It\nwill be a strange dispute which, given honest intentions on both sides,\nlasts through all the checks provided by Articles XII to XVII and\nplunges nations into war at the end of them.\n\nWars caused by rivalry for the possession of colonies and rebellions\ncaused in colonies by unjust exploitation are, as far as regards\nmandated areas, provided against by Article XXII; for the other colonial\nterritories, which do not come under a mandate, at least the way of\nsafety is shown.\n\nWars caused, or made more likely, by the mutual prejudices of nations,\nby their habit of working always apart and in secrecy, are met by the\nimmense field of international co\u00f6peration which the League proposes,\nand its absolute insistence upon frank interchange of information.\n\nWars caused by exclusive tariffs or national monopolies of material are\nin part provided against by Articles XXII and XXIII and in part by XI.\n\nWars which might be caused by domestic revolutions, as in Russia, are\nmade less likely by the Labour Commission, which assures a remedy for\nany labour conditions in a particular country which are so bad as to\nincur the active condemnation of the world.\n\nBut it is impossible by mere enumeration to be sure of meeting all the\ncauses from which some new war may start. The League, in the last\nresort, falls back on the mutual trust and good-will of its members, and\nparticularly of its members' representatives, secured partly by the\ncommon interest in peace and partly by the habit of co\u00f6peration for\nordinary affairs. The _esprit de corps_ of the League's permanent\nSecretariat, with a professional interest in the preservation of peace\nand good-will, is a new and important factor in the world's life. Any\nmember of the League has the right to bring to the attention of the\nAssembly or Council \"any circumstance whatever affecting international\nrelations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good\nunderstanding between nations upon which peace depends.\"\n\nIn America the Covenant of the League is apt to be represented as a\nterribly drastic and tyrannical document. Cartoons show John Bull, or\nsome equally repulsive abstraction, dressed in khaki, dragging away\nAmerican youths to fight enemies of the League in remote parts of Asia\nor Africa. But on this side of the Atlantic it is generally criticized\nfor not being drastic enough. It does not make war formally impossible.\nIt does not bind all its members to make war on any Covenant-breaker. It\ndoes not even bind any member of the League to accept the decision of\nthe majority. It leaves its members almost as free as if they were\noutside. They are pledged to accept, if they ask for it, a decision of\nthe International Court; they are pledged to the principle of mandate;\nthey are pledged to boycott any deliberate war-maker. But that is\npractically all. The League's true weapon is not force, but publicity.\n\nThe truth is, and it is a truth of fundamental importance in political\nmatters, that no structure can be more rigid than the material of which\nit is made. Engagements between human beings must needs be as elastic as\nhuman nature itself. Had the Covenant laid down that every member of the\nLeague was to make war or peace, or change its foreign policy, in\nobedience to the majority of the Council or Assembly and in disregard of\nthe wishes of its own parliament, the result would have been either that\nno nations would join such a League or that, if they did, the League\nwould break at the first strain.\n\nThe principles laid down in the Covenant are, in the judgment of the\npresent writer, principles long recognized and absolutely right. If\ngenerally acted on, they will prevent war. If generally neglected and\nbroken, they will allow wars to ensue. This fact seems to be pretty\ngenerally recognized among the more reputable statesmen of Europe. But\nit remains unfortunately true that they are principles implying a\nconsiderably higher standard of international morality than has\nhitherto been consistently observed by any nations, even the best. If\nabsolute fidelity to the Covenant by all its signatories were necessary\nfor the peace of the world, the world would have a very poor prospect\nbefore it. What we must aim at is as much fidelity as possible. There\nare great difficulties. America is absent. Germany and Russia are\nabsent. France cannot yet quite escape from her war psychology. But if\nGreat Britain is faithful, it will be hard for other nations to be\nobviously and grossly false. The European neutrals, like Switzerland,\nHolland, and Norway, will be clear voices for justice and fair dealing.\nThe beaten nations, when once admitted, will probably be on the same\nside, since when wrong-doing begins it is the weak who are first to\nsuffer. And, after all, all human beings have a strong dislike of\ninjustice, when they do not directly gain by it. The great majority of\nthe fifty-one members of the League will be disinterested on most\nquestions of dispute, and will therefore form a good tribunal of\nopinion.\n\nBut the mere clash of contrary selfishnesses produces no sound\nequilibrium. The League will not succeed unless in some of the great\nnations, above all in Great Britain, there are at the head of affairs\nstatesmen who believe firmly in the principles of the League and are\ncapable both of effort and of self-sacrifice for the sake of them, and\nbehind the statesmen a strong and intelligent determination in the mass\nof the people to see that the League is made genuinely the leading force\nin international politics.\n\nThe present disorder of the world is one of those in which the remedy is\nnot obscure, but perfectly ascertained. The only difficulty lies in\napplying it. The nations of the world must co\u00f6perate; and for that they\nmust trust one another; and for that the only way is for each Government\nseparately to be worthy of trust.\n\nIt will be long, no doubt, before this end is consummated or even\napproached. The foregoing pages have shown how far from perfect is the\npractice of even the most stable and advanced nations. And the\ntendencies set up by the war, with its infinite reactions and\nramifications, are almost all such as to make vastly more difficult in\neach case the necessary effort towards good faith and good-will. Yet, if\nthe difficulties are greater, the necessity is greater also; and after\nall the war has brought its inspirations as well as its corruptions. The\ncraving for this Peace which has not come is, I believe, still the\nunspoken and often unconscious motive of millions who seem, at first\nglance, to be only brawling for revenges or revolutions; it lies, like a\nmysterious torment, at the heart of this storm-tossed and embittered\nworld, crying for it knows not what.\n\n\nTHE END\n\n\n\n\nBOOKS FOR FURTHER READING\n\n\nThe Series published by the American Association for International\nConciliation, 1-150, comprising the text of all the most important\nofficial statements, treaties, agreements, etc., dealing with\nInternational Affairs.\n\nThe League of Nations Union pamphlets for Study Circles: _The League and\nits Guarantees_, by Gilbert Murray; _The League in the East_ by Arnold\nToynbee; _The League and Labour_, by Delisle Burns; _Economic Functions\nof the League_, by Norman Angell; _Mandates and Empire_, by Leonard\nWoolf; _The Future of the Covenant_, by G. Lowes Dickinson.\n\n_The League of Nations, Nine Essays_, by Viscount Grey and others.\nOxford University Press, 1919.\n\n_The Idea of a League of Nations_, H. G. Wells and others, for the\nResearch Committee of the League of Nations Union. Oxford Press, 1917.\n\n_Economic Foundations of Peace_, J. L. Garvin. Macmillan, 1917.\n\nReport of the International Financial Conference, printed for the League\nof Nations. Brussels, 1920.\n\nComplete Official Proceedings of the same, 3 vols. London and Brussels.\n\nReport of the Economic Conference summoned by the Fight the Famine\nCouncil.\n\n_Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey_, Gilbert Murray. Clarendon Press,\nOxford.\n\n_A Century of British Foreign Policy_, G. P. Gooch and Canon Masterman.\nAllen and Unwin.\n\n_Economic Consequences of the Peace Treaty_, J. Maynard Keynes.\nMacmillan, 1919.\n\n_The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty_, B.\nM. Baruch. Harpers, 1920.\n\n_The Choice Before Us_, G. Lowes Dickinson. Allen and Unwin, 1918.\n\n_Causes of International War_, G. Lowes Dickinson. Swarthmore Press.\n\n_International Politics_, Delisle Burns. Methuen, 1920.\n\n_International Government_, L. S. Woolf. Allen and Unwin.\n\n_Empire and Commerce in Africa_, L. S. Woolf. Allen and Unwin.\n\n_The War of Steel and Gold_, H. N. Brailsford. 1913.\n\n_After the Peace_, by H. N. Brailsford. 1920.\n\n_The Eastern Question_, J. A. R. Marriott. Oxford Press, 1917.\n\nThe Official Reports of the First Meeting of the Assembly of the League\nof Nations, Nov. 15-Dec. 18, 1920, are most instructive, and will\nprobably be published in book form.\n\n\n\n\n                     The Riverside Press\n                  CAMBRIDGE . MASSACHUSETTS\n                           U.S.A.\n\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber's Notes\n\nOriginal spelling, including that of proper names retained.\n\nMinor punctuation errors and omissions corrected.\n\nPage 105 \"for the conside ation\" ==> \"for the consideration\"","title":"The Problem of Foreign Policy: A Consideration of Present Dangers and the Best Methods for Meeting Them","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":26550}