{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_40097/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_40097","id":"gutenberg_40097","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40097","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Idea (Philosophy)","Knowledge, Theory of","Philosophy","Will"],"text":"The World As Will And Idea\n\n                                    By\n\n                           Arthur Schopenhauer\n\n                      Translated From The German By\n\n                           R. B. Haldane, M.A.\n\n                                   And\n\n                              J. Kemp, M.A.\n\n                                 Vol. II.\n\nContaining the Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy, and the Supplements to\n             the First and Part of the Second Book of Vol. I.\n\n         \u201cPaucis natus est, qui populum \u00e6tatis su\u00e6 cogitat.\u201d\u2014SEN.\n\n                              Sixth Edition\n\n                                  London\n\n                    Kegan Paul, Trench, Tr\u00fcbner & Co.\n\n                                   1909\n\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nAppendix: Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy.\nSupplements to the First Book.\n   First Half. The Doctrine Of The Idea Of Perception. (To \u00a7 1-7 of the\n   First Volume.)\n      Chapter I. The Standpoint of Idealism.\n      Chapter II. The Doctrine of Perception or Knowledge Of The\n      Understanding.\n      Chapter III. On The Senses.\n      Chapter IV. On Knowledge _A Priori_.\n   Second Half. The Doctrine of the Abstract Idea, or Thinking.\n      Chapter V. On The Irrational Intellect.\n      Chapter VI. On The Doctrine of Abstract or Rational Knowledge.\n      Chapter VII. On The Relation of the Concrete Knowledge of Perception\n      to Abstract Knowledge.\n      Chapter VIII. On The Theory Of The Ludicrous.\n      Chapter IX. On Logic In General.\n      Chapter X. On The Syllogism.\n      Chapter XI. On Rhetoric.\n      Chapter XII. On The Doctrine Of Science.\n      Chapter XIII. On The Methods Of Mathematics.\n      Chapter XIV. On The Association Of Ideas.\n      Chapter XV. On The Essential Imperfections Of The Intellect.\n      Chapter XVI. On The Practical Use Of Reason And On Stoicism.\n      Chapter XVII. On Man\u2019s Need Of Metaphysics.\nSupplements to the Second Book.\n   Chapter XVIII. On The Possibility Of Knowing The Thing In Itself.\n   Chapter XIX. On The Primacy Of The Will In Self-Consciousness.\n   Chapter XX. Objectification Of The Will In The Animal Organism.\n   Note On What Has Been Said About Bichat.\nFootnotes\n\n\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX: CRITICISM OF THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\n\n\n    C\u2019est le privil\u00e8ge du vrai g\u00e9nie, et surtout du g\u00e9nie qui ouvre\n                une carri\u00e8re,\n    de faire impun\u00e9ment de grandes fautes.\u2014_Voltaire._\n\n\nIt is much easier to point out the faults and errors in the work of a\ngreat mind than to give a distinct and full exposition of its value. For\nthe faults are particular and finite, and can therefore be fully\ncomprehended; while, on the contrary, the very stamp which genius\nimpresses upon its works is that their excellence is unfathomable and\ninexhaustible. Therefore they do not grow old, but become the instructor\nof many succeeding centuries. The perfected masterpiece of a truly great\nmind will always produce a deep and powerful effect upon the whole human\nrace, so much so that it is impossible to calculate to what distant\ncenturies and lands its enlightening influence may extend. This is always\nthe case; for however cultivated and rich the age may be in which such a\nmasterpiece appears, genius always rises like a palm-tree above the soil\nin which it is rooted.\n\nBut a deep-reaching and widespread effect of this kind cannot take place\nsuddenly, because of the great difference between the genius and ordinary\nmen. The knowledge which that one man in one lifetime drew directly from\nlife and the world, won and presented to others as won and arranged,\ncannot yet at once become the possession of mankind; for mankind has not\nso much power to receive as the genius has power to give. But even after a\nsuccessful battle with unworthy opponents, who at its very birth contest\nthe life of what is immortal and desire to nip in the bud the salvation of\nman (like the serpents in the cradle of Hercules), that knowledge must\nthen traverse the circuitous paths of innumerable false constructions and\ndistorted applications, must overcome the attempts to unite it with old\nerrors, and so live in conflict till a new and unprejudiced generation\ngrows up to meet it. Little by little, even in youth, this new generation\npartially receives the contents of that spring through a thousand indirect\nchannels, gradually assimilates it, and so participates in the benefit\nwhich was destined to flow to mankind from that great mind. So slowly does\nthe education of the human race, the weak yet refractory pupil of genius,\nadvance. Thus with Kant\u2019s teaching also; its full strength and importance\nwill only be revealed through time, when the spirit of the age, itself\ngradually transformed and altered in the most important and essential\nrespects by the influence of that teaching, will afford convincing\nevidence of the power of that giant mind. I have, however, no intention of\npresumptuously anticipating the spirit of the age and assuming here the\nthankless _r\u00f4le_ of Calchas and Cassandra. Only I must be allowed, in\naccordance with what has been said, to regard Kant\u2019s works as still very\nnew, while many at the present day look upon them as already antiquated,\nand indeed have laid them aside as done with, or, as they express it, have\nleft them behind; and others, emboldened by this, ignore them altogether,\nand with brazen face go on philosophising about God and the soul on the\nassumption of the old realistic dogmatism and its scholastic teaching,\nwhich is as if one sought to introduce the doctrines of the alchemists\ninto modern chemistry. For the rest, the works of Kant do not stand in\nneed of my feeble eulogy, but will themselves for ever praise their\nauthor, and though perhaps not in the letter, yet in the spirit they will\nlive for ever upon earth.\n\nCertainly, however, if we look back at the first result of his teaching,\nat the efforts and events in the sphere of philosophy during the period\nthat has elapsed since he wrote, a very depressing saying of Goethe\nobtains confirmation: \u201cAs the water that is displaced by a ship\nimmediately flows in again behind it, so when great minds have driven\nerror aside and made room for themselves, it very quickly closes in behind\nthem again by the law of its nature\u201d (_Wahrheit und Dichtung_, Theil 3, s.\n521). Yet this period has been only an episode, which is to be reckoned as\npart of the lot referred to above that befalls all new and great\nknowledge; an episode which is now unmistakably near its end, for the\nbubble so long blown out yet bursts at last. Men generally are beginning\nto be conscious that true and serious philosophy still stands where Kant\nleft it. At any rate, I cannot see that between Kant and myself anything\nhas been done in philosophy; therefore I regard myself as his immediate\nsuccessor.\n\nWhat I have in view in this Appendix to my work is really only a defence\nof the doctrine I have set forth in it, inasmuch as in many points that\ndoctrine does not agree with the Kantian philosophy, but indeed\ncontradicts it. A discussion of this philosophy is, however, necessary,\nfor it is clear that my train of thought, different as its content is from\nthat of Kant, is yet throughout under its influence, necessarily\npresupposes it, starts from it; and I confess that, next to the impression\nof the world of perception, I owe what is best in my own system to the\nimpression made upon me by the works of Kant, by the sacred writings of\nthe Hindus, and by Plato. But I can only justify the contradictions of\nKant which are nevertheless present in my work by accusing him of error in\nthese points, and exposing mistakes which he committed. Therefore in this\nAppendix I must proceed against Kant in a thoroughly polemical manner, and\nindeed seriously and with every effort; for it is only thus that his\ndoctrine can be freed from the error that clings to it, and its truth\nshine out the more clearly and stand the more firmly. It must not,\ntherefore, be expected that the sincere reverence for Kant which I\ncertainly feel shall extend to his weaknesses and errors also, and that I\nshall consequently refrain from exposing these except with the most\ncareful indulgence, whereby my language would necessarily become weak and\ninsipid through circumlocution. Towards a living writer such indulgence is\nneeded, for human frailty cannot endure even the most just refutation of\nan error, unless tempered by soothing and flattery, and hardly even then;\nand a teacher of the age and benefactor of mankind deserves at least that\nthe human weakness he also has should be indulged, so that he may not be\ncaused pain. But he who is dead has thrown off this weakness; his merit\nstands firm; time will purify it more and more from all exaggeration and\ndetraction. His mistakes must be separated from it, rendered harmless, and\nthen given over to oblivion. Therefore in the polemic against Kant I am\nabout to begin, I have only his mistakes and weak points in view. I oppose\nthem with hostility, and wage a relentless war of extermination against\nthem, always mindful not to conceal them indulgently, but rather to place\nthem in the clearest light, in order to extirpate them the more surely.\nFor the reasons given above, I am not conscious either of injustice or\ningratitude towards Kant in doing this. However, in order that, in the\neyes of others also, I may remove every appearance of malice, I wish first\nto bring out clearly my sincere reverence for Kant and gratitude to him,\nby expressing shortly what in my eyes appears to be his chief merit; and I\nshall do this from a standpoint so general that I shall not require to\ntouch upon the points in which I must afterwards controvert him.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\n_Kant\u2019s greatest merit is the distinction of the phenomenon from the thing\nin itself_, based upon the proof that between things and us there still\nalways stands the _intellect_, so that they cannot be known as they may be\nin themselves. He was led into this path through Locke (see _Prolegomena\nzu jeder Metaph._, \u00a7 13, Anm. 2). The latter had shown that the secondary\nqualities of things, such as sound, smell, colour, hardness, softness,\nsmoothness, and the like, as founded on the affections of the senses, do\nnot belong to the objective body, to the thing in itself. To this he\nattributed only the primary qualities, _i.e._, such as only presuppose\nspace and impenetrability; thus extension, figure, solidity, number,\nmobility. But this easily discovered Lockeian distinction was, as it were,\nonly a youthful introduction to the distinction of Kant. The latter,\nstarting from an incomparably higher standpoint, explains all that Locke\nhad accepted as _primary qualities_, _i.e._, qualities of the thing in\nitself, as also belonging only to its phenomenal appearance in our faculty\nof apprehension, and this just because the conditions of this faculty,\nspace, time, and causality, are known by us _a priori_. Thus Locke had\nabstracted from the thing in itself the share which the organs of sense\nhave in its phenomenal appearance; Kant, however, further abstracted the\nshare of the brain-functions (though not under that name). Thus the\ndistinction between the phenomenon and the thing in itself now received an\ninfinitely greater significance, and a very much deeper meaning. For this\nend he was obliged to take in hand the important separation of our _a\npriori_ from our _a posteriori_ knowledge, which before him had never been\ncarried out with adequate strictness and completeness, nor with distinct\nconsciousness. Accordingly this now became the principal subject of his\nprofound investigations. Now here we would at once remark that Kant\u2019s\nphilosophy has a threefold relation to that of his predecessors. First, as\nwe have just seen, to the philosophy of Locke, confirming and extending\nit; secondly, to that of Hume, correcting and making use of it, a relation\nwhich is most distinctly expressed in the \u201c_Prolegomena_\u201d (that most\nbeautiful and comprehensible of all Kant\u2019s important writings, which is\nfar too little read, for it facilitates immensely the study of his\nphilosophy); thirdly, a decidedly polemical and destructive relation to\nthe Leibnitz-Wolfian philosophy. All three systems ought to be known\nbefore one proceeds to the study of the Kantian philosophy. If now,\naccording to the above, the distinction of the phenomenon from the thing\nin itself, thus the doctrine of the complete diversity of the ideal and\nthe real, is the fundamental characteristic of the Kantian philosophy,\nthen the assertion of the absolute identity of these two which appeared\nsoon afterwards is a sad proof of the saying of Goethe quoted above; all\nthe more so as it rested upon nothing but the empty boast of intellectual\nintuition, and accordingly was only a return to the crudeness of the\nvulgar opinion, masked under bombast and nonsense, and the imposing\nimpression of an air of importance. It became the fitting starting-point\nfor the still grosser nonsense of the clumsy and stupid Hegel. Now as\nKant\u2019s separation of the phenomenon from the thing in itself, arrived at\nin the manner explained above, far surpassed all that preceded it in the\ndepth and thoughtfulness of its conception, it was also exceedingly\nimportant in its results. For in it he propounded, quite originally, in a\nperfectly new way, found from a new side and on a new path, the same truth\nwhich Plato never wearies of repeating, and in his language generally\nexpresses thus: This world which appears to the senses has no true being,\nbut only a ceaseless becoming; it is, and it is not, and its comprehension\nis not so much knowledge as illusion. This is also what he expresses\nmythically at the beginning of the seventh book of the Republic, the most\nimportant passage in all his writings, which has already been referred to\nin the third book of the present work. He says: Men, firmly chained in a\ndark cave, see neither the true original light nor real things, but only\nthe meagre light of the fire in the cave and the shadows of real things\nwhich pass by the fire behind their backs; yet they think the shadows are\nthe reality, and the determining of the succession of these shadows is\ntrue wisdom. The same truth, again quite differently presented, is also a\nleading doctrine of the Vedas and Puranas, the doctrine of M\u00e2y\u00e2, by which\nreally nothing else is understood than what Kant calls the phenomenon in\nopposition to the thing in itself; for the work of M\u00e2y\u00e2 is said to be just\nthis visible world in which we are, a summoned enchantment, an inconstant\nappearance without true being, like an optical illusion or a dream, a veil\nwhich surrounds human consciousness, something of which it is equally\nfalse and true to say that it is and that it is not. But Kant not only\nexpressed the same doctrine in a completely new and original way, but\nraised it to the position of proved and indisputable truth by means of the\ncalmest and most temperate exposition; while both Plato and the Indian\nphilosophers had founded their assertions merely upon a general perception\nof the world, had advanced them as the direct utterance of their\nconsciousness, and presented them rather mythically and poetically than\nphilosophically and distinctly. In this respect they stand to Kant in the\nsame relation as the Pythagoreans Hicetas, Philolaus, and Aristarchus, who\nalready asserted the movement of the earth round the fixed sun, stand to\nCopernicus. Such distinct knowledge and calm, thoughtful exposition of\nthis dream-like nature of the whole world is really the basis of the whole\nKantian philosophy; it is its soul and its greatest merit. He accomplished\nthis by taking to pieces the whole machinery of our intellect by means of\nwhich the phantasmagoria of the objective world is brought about, and\npresenting it in detail with marvellous insight and ability. All earlier\nWestern philosophy, appearing in comparison with the Kantian unspeakably\nclumsy, had failed to recognise that truth, and had therefore always\nspoken just as if in a dream. Kant first awakened it suddenly out of this\ndream; therefore the last sleepers (Mendelssohn) called him the\n\u201call-destroyer.\u201d He showed that the laws which reign with inviolable\nnecessity in existence, _i.e._, in experience generally, are not to be\napplied to deduce and explain _existence itself_ that thus the validity of\nthese laws is only relative, _i.e._, only arises after existence; the\nworld of experience in general is already established and present; that\nconsequently these laws cannot be our guide when we come to the\nexplanation of the existence of the world and of ourselves. All earlier\nWestern philosophers had imagined that these laws, according to which the\nphenomena are combined, and all of which\u2014time and space, as well as\ncausality and inference\u2014I comprehend under the expression \u201cthe principle\nof sufficient reason,\u201d were absolute laws conditioned by nothing, _\u00e6tern\u00e6\nveritates_; that the world itself existed only in consequence of and in\nconformity with them; and therefore that under their guidance the whole\nriddle of the world must be capable of solution. The assumptions made for\nthis purpose, which Kant criticises under the name of the Ideas of the\nreason, only served to raise the mere phenomenon, the work of M\u00e2y\u00e2, the\nshadow world of Plato, to the one highest reality, to put it in the place\nof the inmost and true being of things, and thereby to make the real\nknowledge of this impossible; that is, in a word, to send the dreamers\nstill more soundly to sleep. Kant exhibited these laws, and therefore the\nwhole world, as conditioned by the form of knowledge belonging to the\nsubject; from which it followed, that however far one carried\ninvestigation and reasoning under the guidance of these laws, yet in the\nprincipal matter, _i.e._, in knowledge of the nature of the world in\nitself and outside the idea, no step in advance was made, but one only\nmoved like a squirrel in its wheel. Thus, all the dogmatists may be\ncompared to persons who supposed that if they only went straight on long\nenough they would come to the end of the world; but Kant then\ncircumnavigated the world and showed that, because it is round, one cannot\nget out of it by horizontal movement, but that yet by perpendicular\nmovement this is perhaps not impossible. We may also say that Kant\u2019s\ndoctrine affords the insight that we must seek the end and beginning of\nthe world, not without, but within us.\n\nAll this, however, rests on the fundamental distinction between dogmatic\nand _critical_ or _transcendental philosophy_. Whoever wishes to make this\nquite clear to himself, and realise it by means of an example, may do so\nvery briefly by reading, as a specimen of dogmatic philosophy, an essay of\nLeibnitz entitled \u201c_De Rerum Originatione Radicali_,\u201d and printed for the\nfirst time in the edition of the philosophical works of Leibnitz by\nErdmann (vol. i. p. 147). Here the origin and excellence of the world is\ndemonstrated _a priori_, so thoroughly in the manner of\nrealistic-dogmatism, on the ground of the _veritates \u00e6tern\u00e6_ and with the\nassistance of the ontological and cosmological proofs. It is indeed once\nadmitted, by the way, that experience shows the exact opposite of the\nexcellence of the world here demonstrated; but experience is therefore\ngiven to understand that it knows nothing of the matter, and ought to hold\nits tongue when philosophy has spoken a priori. Now, with Kant, the\n_critical philosophy_ appeared as the opponent of this whole method. It\ntakes for its problem just these _veritates \u00e6tern\u00e6_, which serve as the\nfoundation of every such dogmatic structure, investigates their origin,\nand finds it in the human mind, where they spring from the peculiar forms\nwhich belong to it, and which it carries in itself for the purpose of\ncomprehending an objective world. Thus, here, in the brain, is the quarry\nwhich supplies the material for that proud dogmatic edifice. But because\nthe critical philosophy, in order to attain to this result, was obliged to\ngo beyond the _veritates \u00e6tern\u00e6_ upon which all the preceding dogmatism\nwas founded, and make these truths themselves the objects of\ninvestigation, it became _transcendental_ philosophy. From this, then, it\nalso follows that the objective world, as we know it, does not belong to\nthe true being of the thing in itself, but is merely its phenomenal\nappearance conditioned by those very forms which lie _a priori_ in the\nintellect (_i.e._, the brain), therefore it cannot contain anything but\nphenomena.\n\nKant, indeed, did not attain to the knowledge that the phenomenon is the\nworld as idea, and the thing in itself is the will. But he showed that the\nphenomenal world is conditioned just as much through the subject as\nthrough the object, and because he isolated the most universal forms of\nits phenomenal appearance, _i.e._, of the idea, he proved that we may know\nthese forms and consider them in their whole constitution, not only by\nstarting from the object, but also just as well by starting from the\nsubject, because they are really the limits between object and subject\nwhich are common to them both; and he concluded that by following these\nlimits we never penetrate to the inner nature either of the object or of\nthe subject, consequently never know the true nature of the world, the\nthing in itself.\n\nHe did not deduce the thing in itself in the right way, as I shall show\npresently, but by means of an inconsistency, and he had to pay the penalty\nof this in frequent and irresistible attacks upon this important part of\nhis teaching. He did not recognise the thing in itself directly in the\nwill; but he made a great initial step towards this knowledge in that he\nexplained the undeniable moral significance of human action as quite\ndifferent from and not dependent upon the laws of the phenomenon, nor even\nexplicable in accordance with them, but as something which touches the\nthing in itself directly: this is the second important point of view for\nestimating his services.\n\nWe may regard as the third the complete overthrow of the Scholastic\nphilosophy, a name by which I wish here to denote generally the whole\nperiod beginning with Augustine, the Church Father, and ending just before\nKant. For the chief characteristic of Scholasticism is, indeed, that which\nis very correctly stated by Tennemann, the guardianship of the prevailing\nnational religion over philosophy, which had really nothing left for it to\ndo but to prove and embellish the cardinal dogmas prescribed to it by\nreligion. The Schoolmen proper, down to Suarez, confess this openly; the\nsucceeding philosophers do it more unconsciously, or at least unavowedly.\nIt is held that Scholastic philosophy only extends to about a hundred\nyears before Descartes, and that then with him there begins an entirely\nnew epoch of free investigation independent of all positive theological\ndoctrine. Such investigation, however, is in fact not to be attributed to\nDescartes and his successors,(1) but only an appearance of it, and in any\ncase an effort after it. Descartes was a man of supreme ability, and if we\ntake account of the age he lived in, he accomplished a great deal. But if\nwe set aside this consideration and measure him with reference to the\nfreeing of thought from all fetters and the commencement of a new period\nof untrammelled original investigation with which he is credited, we are\nobliged to find that with his doubt still wanting in true seriousness, and\ntherefore surrendering so quickly and so entirely, he has, indeed, the\nappearance of wishing to throw off at once all the early implanted\nopinions belonging to his age and nation, but does so only apparently and\nfor a moment, to assume them again immediately and hold them all the more\nfirmly; and so is it with all his successors down to Kant. Goethe\u2019s lines\nare, therefore, very applicable to a free independent thinker of this\nkind:\n\n\n    \u201cSaving Thy gracious presence, he to me\n    A long-legged grasshopper appears to be,\n    That springing flies, and flying springs,\n    And in the grass the same old ditty sings.\u201d(2)\n\n\nKant had reasons for assuming the air of also intending nothing more. But\nthe pretended spring, which was permitted because it was known that it\nleads back to the grass, this time became a flight, and now those who\nremain below can only look after him, and can never catch him again.\n\nKant, then, ventured to show by his teaching that all those dogmas which\nhad been so often professedly proved were incapable of proof. Speculative\ntheology, and the rational psychology connected with it, received from him\ntheir deathblow. Since then they have vanished from German philosophy, and\none must not allow oneself to be misled by the fact that here and there\nthe word is retained after the thing has been given up, or some wretched\nprofessor of philosophy has the fear of his master in view, and lets truth\ntake care of itself. Only he who has observed the pernicious influence of\nthese conceptions upon natural science, and upon philosophy in all, even\nthe best writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, can estimate\nthe extent of this service of Kant\u2019s. The change of tone and of\nmetaphysical background which has appeared in German writing upon natural\nscience since Kant is remarkable; before him it was in the same position\nas it still occupies in England. This merit of Kant\u2019s is connected with\nthe fact that the unreflecting pursuit of the laws of the phenomenon, the\nelevation of these to the position of eternal truths, and thus the raising\nof the fleeting appearance to the position of the real being of the world,\nin short, _realism_ undisturbed in its illusion by any reflection, had\nreigned throughout all preceding philosophy, ancient, medi\u00e6val, and\nmodern. Berkeley, who, like Malebranche before him, recognised its\none-sidedness, and indeed falseness, was unable to overthrow it, for his\nattack was confined to _one_ point. Thus it was reserved for Kant to\nenable the idealistic point of view to obtain the ascendancy in Europe, at\nleast in philosophy; the point of view which throughout all non-Mohammedan\nAsia, and indeed essentially, is that of religion. Before Kant, then, we\nwere in time; now time is in us, and so on.\n\nEthics also were treated by that realistic philosophy according to the\nlaws of the phenomenon, which it regarded as absolute and valid also for\nthe thing in itself. They were therefore based now upon a doctrine of\nhappiness, now upon the will of the Creator, and finally upon the\nconception of perfection; a conception which, taken by itself, is entirely\nempty and void of content, for it denotes a mere relation that only\nreceives significance from the things to which it is applied. \u201cTo be\nperfect\u201d means nothing more than \u201cto correspond to some conception which\nis presupposed and given,\u201d a conception which must therefore be previously\nframed, and without which the perfection is an unknown quantity, and\nconsequently has no meaning when expressed alone. If, however, it is\nintended tacitly to presuppose the conception \u201chumanity,\u201d and accordingly\nto make it the principle of morality to strive after human perfection,\nthis is only saying: \u201cMen ought to be as they ought to be,\u201d\u2014and we are\njust as wise as before. In fact \u201cperfect\u201d is very nearly a mere synonym of\n\u201ccomplete,\u201d for it signifies that in one given case or individual, all the\npredicates which lie in the conception of its species appear, thus are\nactually present. Therefore the conception \u201cperfection,\u201d if used\nabsolutely and in the abstract, is a word void of significance, and this\nis also the case with the talk about the \u201cmost perfect being,\u201d and other\nsimilar expressions. All this is a mere jingle of words. Nevertheless last\ncentury this conception of perfection and imperfection had become current\ncoin; indeed it was the hinge upon which almost all speculation upon\nethics, and even theology, turned. It was in every one\u2019s mouth, so that at\nlast it became a simple nuisance. We see even the best writers of the\ntime, for example Lessing, entangled in the most deplorable manner in\nperfections and imperfections, and struggling with them. At the same time,\nevery thinking man must at least dimly have felt that this conception is\nvoid of all positive content, because, like an algebraical symbol, it\ndenotes a mere relation _in abstracto_. Kant, as we have already said,\nentirely separated the undeniably great ethical significance of actions\nfrom the phenomenon and its laws, and showed that the former directly\nconcerned the thing in itself, the inner nature of the world, while the\nlatter, _i.e._, time, space, and all that fills them, and disposes itself\nin them according to the law of causality, is to be regarded as a changing\nand unsubstantial dream.\n\nThe little I have said, which by no means exhausts the subject, may\nsuffice as evidence of my recognition of the great merits of Kant,\u2014a\nrecognition expressed here both for my own satisfaction, and because\njustice demands that those merits should be recalled to the memory of\nevery one who desires to follow me in the unsparing exposure of his errors\nto which I now proceed.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nIt may be inferred, upon purely historical grounds, that Kant\u2019s great\nachievements must have been accompanied by great errors. For although he\neffected the greatest revolution in philosophy and made an end of\nScholasticism, which, understood in the wider sense we have indicated, had\nlasted for fourteen centuries, in order to begin what was really the third\nentirely new epoch in philosophy which the world has seen, yet the direct\nresult of his appearance was only negative, not positive. For since he did\nnot set up a completely new system, to which his disciples could only have\nadhered for a period, all indeed observed that something very great had\nhappened, but yet no one rightly knew what. They certainly saw that all\nprevious philosophy had been fruitless dreaming, from which the new age\nhad now awakened, but what they ought to hold to now they did not know. A\ngreat void was felt; a great need had arisen; the universal attention even\nof the general public was aroused. Induced by this, but not urged by\ninward inclination and sense of power (which find utterance even at\nunfavourable times, as in the case of Spinoza), men without any\nexceptional talent made various weak, absurd, and indeed sometimes insane,\nattempts, to which, however, the now interested public gave its attention,\nand with great patience, such as is only found in Germany, long lent its\near.\n\nThe same thing must once have happened in Nature, when a great revolution\nhad altered the whole surface of the earth, land and sea had changed\nplaces, and the scene was cleared for a new creation. It was then a long\ntime before Nature could produce a new series of lasting forms all in\nharmony with themselves and with each other. Strange and monstrous\norganisations appeared which did not harmonise either with themselves or\nwith each other, and therefore could not endure long, but whose still\nexisting remains have brought down to us the tokens of that wavering and\ntentative procedure of Nature forming itself anew.\n\nSince, now, in philosophy, a crisis precisely similar to this, and an age\nof fearful abortions, was, as we all know, introduced by Kant, it may be\nconcluded that the services he rendered were not complete, but must have\nbeen negative and one-sided, and burdened with great defects. These\ndefects we now desire to search out.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nFirst of all we shall present to ourselves clearly and examine the\nfundamental thought in which the aim of the whole \u201cCritique of Pure\nReason\u201d lies. Kant placed himself at the standpoint of his predecessors,\nthe dogmatic philosophers, and accordingly he started with them from the\nfollowing assumptions:\u2014(1.) Metaphysics is the science of that which lies\nbeyond the possibility of all experience. (2.) Such a science can never be\nattained by applying principles which must first themselves be drawn from\nexperience (_Prolegomena_, \u00a7 1); but only what we know _before_, and thus\n_independently of_ all experience, can reach further than possible\nexperience. (3.) In our reason certain principles of this kind are\nactually to be found: they are comprehended under the name of Knowledge of\npure reason. So far Kant goes with his predecessors, but here he separates\nfrom them. They say: \u201cThese principles, or this knowledge of pure reason,\nare expressions of the absolute possibility of things, _\u00e6tern\u00e6 veritates_,\nsources of ontology; they stand above the system of the world, as fate\nstood above the gods of the ancients.\u201d Kant says, they are mere forms of\nour intellect, laws, not of the existence of things, but of our idea of\nthem; they are therefore valid merely for our apprehension of things, and\nhence they cannot extend beyond the possibility of experience, which,\naccording to assumption 1, is what was aimed at; for the _a priori_ nature\nof these forms of knowledge, since it can only rest on their subjective\norigin, is just what cuts us off for ever from the knowledge of the nature\nof things in themselves, and confines us to a world of mere phenomena, so\nthat we cannot know things as they may be in themselves, even _a\nposteriori_, not to speak of _a priori_. Accordingly metaphysics is\nimpossible, and criticism of pure reason takes its place. As opposed to\nthe old dogmatism, Kant is here completely victorious; therefore all\ndogmatic attempts which have since appeared have been obliged to pursue an\nentirely different path from the earlier systems; and I shall now go on to\nthe justification of my own system, according to the expressed intention\nof this criticism. A more careful examination, then, of the reasoning\ngiven above will oblige one to confess that its first fundamental\nassumption is a _petitio principii_. It lies in the proposition (stated\nwith particular clearness in the _Prolegomena_, \u00a7 1): \u201cThe source of\nmetaphysics must throughout be non-empirical; its fundamental principles\nand conceptions must never be taken from either inner or outer\nexperience.\u201d Yet absolutely nothing is advanced in proof of this cardinal\nassertion except the etymological argument from the word metaphysic. In\ntruth, however, the matter stands thus: The world and our own existence\npresents itself to us necessarily as a riddle. It is now assumed, without\nmore ado, that the solution of this riddle cannot be arrived at from a\nthorough understanding of the world itself, but must be sought in\nsomething entirely different from the world (for that is the meaning of\n\u201cbeyond the possibility of all experience\u201d); and that everything must be\nexcluded from that solution of which we can in any way have _immediate_\nknowledge (for that is the meaning of possible experience, both inner and\nouter); the solution must rather be sought only in that at which we can\narrive merely indirectly, that is, by means of inferences from universal\nprinciples _a priori_. After the principal source of all knowledge has in\nthis way been excluded, and the direct way to truth has been closed, we\nmust not wonder that the dogmatic systems failed, and that Kant was able\nto show the necessity of this failure; for metaphysics and knowledge _a\npriori_ had been assumed beforehand to be identical. But for this it was\nfirst necessary to prove that the material for the solution of the riddle\nabsolutely cannot be contained in the world itself, but must be sought for\nonly outside the world in something we can only attain to under the\nguidance of those forms of which we are conscious _a priori_. But so long\nas this is not proved, we have no grounds for shutting ourselves off, in\nthe case of the most important and most difficult of all questions, from\nthe richest of all sources of knowledge, inner and outer experience, in\norder to work only with empty forms. I therefore say that the solution of\nthe riddle of the world must proceed from the understanding of the world\nitself; that thus the task of metaphysics is not to pass beyond the\nexperience in which the world exists, but to understand it thoroughly,\nbecause outer and inner experience is at any rate the principal source of\nall knowledge; that therefore the solution of the riddle of the world is\nonly possible through the proper connection of outer with inner\nexperience, effected at the right point, and the combination thereby\nproduced of these two very different sources of knowledge. Yet this\nsolution is only possible within certain limits which are inseparable from\nour finite nature, so that we attain to a right understanding of the world\nitself without reaching a final explanation of its existence abolishing\nall further problems. Therefore _est quadam prodire tenus_, and my path\nlies midway between the omniscience of the earlier dogmatists and the\ndespair of the Kantian Critique. The important truths, however, which Kant\ndiscovered, and through which the earlier metaphysical systems were\noverthrown, have supplied my system with data and materials. Compare what\nI have said concerning my method in chap. xvii. of the Supplements. So\nmuch for the fundamental thought of Kant; we shall now consider his\nworking out of it and its details.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nKant\u2019s style bears throughout the stamp of a pre-eminent mind, genuine\nstrong individuality, and quite exceptional power of thought. Its\ncharacteristic quality may perhaps be aptly described as a _brilliant\ndryness_, by virtue of which he was able to grasp firmly and select the\nconceptions with great certainty, and then to turn them about with the\ngreatest freedom, to the astonishment of the reader. I find the same\nbrilliant dryness in the style of Aristotle, though it is much simpler.\nNevertheless Kant\u2019s language is often indistinct, indefinite, inadequate,\nand sometimes obscure. Its obscurity, certainly, is partly excusable on\naccount of the difficulty of the subject and the depth of the thought; but\nhe who is himself clear to the bottom, and knows with perfect distinctness\nwhat he thinks and wishes, will never write indistinctly, will never set\nup wavering and indefinite conceptions, compose most difficult and\ncomplicated expressions from foreign languages to denote them, and use\nthese expressions constantly afterwards, as Kant took words and formulas\nfrom earlier philosophy, especially Scholasticism, which he combined with\neach other to suit his purposes; as, for example, \u201ctranscendental\nsynthetic unity of apperception,\u201d and in general \u201cunity of synthesis\u201d\n(_Einheit der Synthesis_), always used where \u201cunion\u201d (_Vereinigung_) would\nbe quite sufficient by itself. Moreover, a man who is himself quite clear\nwill not be always explaining anew what has once been explained, as Kant\ndoes, for example, in the case of the understanding, the categories,\nexperience, and other leading conceptions. In general, such a man will not\nincessantly repeat himself, and yet in every new exposition of the thought\nalready expressed a hundred times leave it in just the same obscure\ncondition, but he will express his meaning once distinctly, thoroughly,\nand exhaustively, and then let it alone. \u201c_Quo enim melius rem aliquam\nconcipimus eo magis determinati sumus ad eam unico modo exprimendam_,\u201d\nsays Descartes in his fifth letter. But the most injurious result of\nKant\u2019s occasionally obscure language is, that it acted as _exemplar vitiis\nimitabile_; indeed, it was misconstrued as a pernicious authorisation. The\npublic was compelled to see that what is obscure is not always without\nsignificance; consequently, what was without significance took refuge\nbehind obscure language. Fichte was the first to seize this new privilege\nand use it vigorously; Schelling at least equalled him; and a host of\nhungry scribblers, without talent and without honesty, soon outbade them\nboth. But the height of audacity, in serving up pure nonsense, in\nstringing together senseless and extravagant mazes of words, such as had\npreviously only been heard in madhouses, was finally reached in Hegel, and\nbecame the instrument of the most barefaced general mystification that has\never taken place, with a result which will appear fabulous to posterity,\nand will remain as a monument of German stupidity. In vain, meanwhile,\nJean Paul wrote his beautiful paragraph, \u201cHigher criticism of\nphilosophical madness in the professorial chair, and poetical madness in\nthe theatre\u201d (_\u00c6sthetische Nachschule_); for in vain Goethe had already\nsaid\u2014\n\n\n    \u201cThey prate and teach, and no one interferes;\n    All from the fellowship of fools are shrinking;\n    Man usually believes, if only words he hears,\n    That also with them goes material for thinking.\u201d(3)\n\n\nBut let us return to Kant. We are compelled to admit that he entirely\nlacks grand, classical simplicity, _na\u00efvet\u00e9_, _ing\u00e9nuit\u00e9_, _candeur_. His\nphilosophy has no analogy with Grecian architecture, which presents large\nsimple proportions revealing themselves at once to the glance; on the\ncontrary, it reminds us strongly of the Gothic style of building. For a\npurely individual characteristic of Kant\u2019s mind is a remarkable love of\n_symmetry_, which delights in a varied multiplicity, so that it may reduce\nit to order, and repeat this order in subordinate orders, and so on\nindefinitely, just as happens in Gothic churches. Indeed, he sometimes\ncarries this to the extent of trifling, and from love of this tendency he\ngoes so far as to do open violence to truth, and to deal with it as Nature\nwas dealt with by the old-fashioned gardeners, whose work we see in\nsymmetrical alleys, squares, and triangles, trees shaped like pyramids and\nspheres, and hedges winding in regular curves. I will support this with\nfacts.\n\nAfter he has treated space and time isolated from everything else, and has\nthen dismissed this whole world of perception which fills space and time,\nand in which we live and are, with the meaningless words \u201cthe empirical\ncontent of perception is given us,\u201d he immediately arrives with one spring\nat _the logical basis of his whole philosophy, the table of judgments_.\nFrom this table he deduces an exact dozen of categories, symmetrically\narranged under four heads, which afterwards become the fearful procrustean\nbed into which he violently forces all things in the world and all that\ngoes on in man, shrinking from no violence and disdaining no sophistry if\nonly he is able to repeat everywhere the symmetry of that table. The first\nthat is symmetrically deduced from it is the pure physiological table of\nthe general principles of natural science\u2014the axioms of intuition,\nanticipations of perception, analogies of experience, and postulates of\nempirical thought in general. Of these fundamental principles, the first\ntwo are simple; but each of the last two sends out symmetrically three\nshoots. The mere categories were what he calls _conceptions_; but these\nprinciples of natural science are _judgments_. In accordance with his\nhighest guide to all wisdom, symmetry, the series must now prove itself\nfruitful in the syllogisms, and this, indeed, is done symmetrically and\nregularly. For, as by the application of the categories to sensibility,\nexperience with all its _a priori_ principles arose for the understanding,\nso by the application of _syllogisms_ to the categories, a task performed\nby the _reason_ in accordance with its pretended principle of seeking the\nunconditioned, the _Ideas_ of the reason arise. Now this takes place in\nthe following manner: The three categories of relation supply to\nsyllogistic reasoning the three only possible kinds of major premisses,\nand syllogistic reasoning accordingly falls into three kinds, each of\nwhich is to be regarded as an egg out of which the reason hatches an Idea;\nout of the categorical syllogism the Idea of the _soul_, out of the\nhypothetical the Idea of the _world_, and out of the disjunctive the Idea\nof _God_. In the second of these, the Idea of the world, the symmetry of\nthe table of the categories now repeats itself again, for its four heads\nproduce four theses, each of which has its antithesis as a symmetrical\npendant.\n\nWe pay the tribute of our admiration to the really exceedingly acute\ncombination which produced this elegant structure, but we shall none the\nless proceed to a thorough examination of its foundation and its parts.\nBut the following remarks must come first.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nIt is astonishing how Kant, without further reflection, pursues his way,\nfollowing his symmetry, ordering everything in accordance with it, without\never taking one of the subjects so handled into consideration on its own\naccount. I will explain myself more fully. After he has considered\nintuitive knowledge in a mathematical reference only, he neglects\naltogether the rest of knowledge of perception in which the world lies\nbefore us, and confines himself entirely to abstract thinking, although\nthis receives the whole of its significance and value from the world of\nperception alone, which is infinitely more significant, generally present,\nand rich in content than the abstract part of our knowledge. Indeed, and\nthis is an important point, he has nowhere clearly distinguished\nperception from abstract knowledge, and just on this account, as we shall\nafterwards see, he becomes involved in irresolvable contradictions with\nhimself. After he has disposed of the whole sensible world with the\nmeaningless \u201cit is given,\u201d he makes, as we have said, the logical table of\njudgments the foundation-stone of his building. But here again he does not\nreflect for a moment upon that which really lies before him. These forms\nof judgment are indeed _words_ and _combinations of words_; yet it ought\nfirst to have been asked what these directly denote: it would have been\nfound that they denote _conceptions_. The next question would then have\nbeen as to the nature of _conceptions_. It would have appeared from the\nanswer what relation these have to the ideas of perception in which the\nworld exists; for perception and reflection would have been distinguished.\nIt would now have become necessary to examine, not merely how pure and\nmerely formal intuition or perception _a priori_, but also how its\ncontent, the empirical perception, comes into consciousness. But then it\nwould have become apparent what part the _understanding_ has in this, and\nthus also in general what the _understanding_ is, and, on the other hand,\nwhat the _reason_ properly is, the critique of which is being written. It\nis most remarkable that he does not once properly and adequately define\nthe latter, but merely gives incidentally, and as the context in each case\ndemands, incomplete and inaccurate explanations of it, in direct\ncontradiction to the rule of Descartes given above.(4) For example, at p.\n11; V. 24, of the \u201cCritique of Pure Reason,\u201d it is the faculty of\nprinciples _a priori_; but at p. 299; V. 356, it is said that reason is\nthe faculty of _principles_, and it is opposed to the understanding, which\nis the faculty of _rules_! One would now think that there must be a very\nwide difference between principles and rules, since it entitles us to\nassume a special faculty of knowledge for each of them. But this great\ndistinction is made to lie merely in this, that what is known _a priori_\nthrough pure perception or through the forms of the understanding is a\nrule, and only what results from mere conceptions is a principle. We shall\nreturn to this arbitrary and inadmissible distinction later, when we come\nto the Dialectic. On p. 330; V. 386, reason is the faculty of inference;\nmere judging (p. 69; V. 94) he often explains as the work of the\nunderstanding. Now, this really amounts to saying: Judging is the work of\nthe understanding so long as the ground of the judgment is empirical,\ntranscendental, or metalogical (Essay on the Principle of Sufficient\nReason, \u00a7 31, 32, 33); but if it is logical, as is the case with the\nsyllogism, then we are here concerned with a quite special and much more\nimportant faculty of knowledge\u2014the reason. Nay, what is more, on p. 303;\nV. 360, it is explained that what follows directly from a proposition is\nstill a matter of the understanding, and that only those conclusions which\nare arrived at by the use of a mediating conception are the work of the\nreason, and the example given is this: From the proposition, \u201cAll men are\nmortal,\u201d the inference, \u201cSome mortals are men,\u201d may be drawn by the mere\nunderstanding. On the other hand, to draw the conclusion, \u201cAll the learned\nare mortal,\u201d demands an entirely different and far more important\nfaculty\u2014the reason. How was it possible for a great thinker to write the\nlike of this! On p. 553; V. 581, reason is all at once the constant\ncondition of all voluntary action. On p. 614; V. 642, it consists in the\nfact that we can give an account of our assertions; on pp. 643, 644; V.\n671, 672, in the circumstance that it brings unity into the conceptions of\nthe understanding by means of Ideas, as the understanding brings unity\ninto the multiplicity of objects by means of conceptions. On p. 646; V.\n674, it is nothing else than the faculty which deduces the particular from\nthe general.\n\nThe understanding also is constantly being explained anew. In seven\npassages of the \u201cCritique of Pure Reason\u201d it is explained in the following\nterms. On p. 51; V. 75, it is the faculty which of itself produces ideas\nof perception. On p. 69; V. 94, it is the faculty of judging, _i.e._, of\nthinking, _i.e._, of knowing through conceptions. On p. 137 of the fifth\nedition, it is the faculty of knowledge generally. On p. 132; V. 171, it\nis the faculty of rules. On p. 158; V. 197, however, it is said: \u201cIt is\nnot only the faculty of rules, but the source of principles (_Grunds\u00e4tze_)\naccording to which everything comes under rules;\u201d and yet above it was\nopposed to the reason because the latter alone was the faculty of\nprinciples (_Principien_). On p. 160; V. 199, the understanding is the\nfaculty of conceptions; but on p. 302; V. 359, it is the faculty of the\nunity of phenomena by means of rules.\n\nAgainst such really confused and groundless language on the subject (even\nthough it comes from Kant) I shall have no need to defend the explanation\nwhich I have given of these two faculties of knowledge\u2014an explanation\nwhich is fixed, clearly defined, definite, simple, and in full agreement\nwith the language of all nations and all ages. I have only quoted this\nlanguage as a proof of my charge that Kant follows his symmetrical,\nlogical system without sufficiently reflecting upon the subject he is thus\nhandling.\n\nNow, as I have said above, if Kant had seriously examined how far two such\ndifferent faculties of knowledge, one of which is the specific difference\nof man, may be known, and what, in accordance with the language of all\nnations and all philosophers, reason and understanding are, he would\nnever, without further authority than the _intellectus theoreticus_ and\n_practicus_ of the Schoolmen, which is used in an entirely different\nsense, have divided the reason into theoretical and practical, and made\nthe latter the source of virtuous conduct. In the same way, before Kant\nseparated so carefully conceptions of the understanding (by which he\nsometimes means his categories, sometimes all general conceptions) and\nconceptions of the reason (his so-called Ideas), and made them both the\nmaterial of his philosophy, which for the most part deals only with the\nvalidity, application, and origin of all these conceptions;\u2014first, I say,\nhe ought to have really examined what in general a _conception_ is. But\nthis very necessary investigation has unfortunately been also neglected,\nand has contributed much to the irremediable confusion of intuitive and\nabstract knowledge which I shall soon refer to. The same want of adequate\nreflection with which he passed over the questions: what is perception?\nwhat is reflection? what is conception? what is reason? what is\nunderstanding? allowed him to pass over the following investigations,\nwhich were just as inevitably necessary: what is it that I call the\n_object_, which I distinguish from the _idea_? what is existence? what is\nobject? what is subject? what is truth, illusion, error? But he follows\nhis logical schema and his symmetry without reflecting or looking about\nhim. The table of judgments ought to, and must, be the key to all wisdom.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nI have given it above as the chief merit of Kant that he distinguished the\nphenomenon from the thing in itself, explained the whole visible world as\nphenomenon, and therefore denied all validity to its laws beyond the\nphenomenon. It is certainly remarkable that he did not deduce this merely\nrelative existence of the phenomenon from the simple undeniable truth\nwhich lay so near him, \u201c_No object without a subject_,\u201d in order thus at\nthe very root to show that the object, because it always exists merely in\nrelation to a subject, is dependent upon it, conditioned by it, and\ntherefore conditioned as mere phenomenon, which does not exist in itself\nnor unconditioned. Berkeley, to whose merits Kant did not do justice, had\nalready made this important principle the foundation-stone of his\nphilosophy, and thereby established an immortal reputation. Yet he himself\ndid not draw the proper conclusions from this principle, and so he was\nboth misunderstood and insufficiently attended to. In my first edition I\nexplained Kant\u2019s avoidance of this Berkeleian principle as arising from an\nevident shrinking from decided idealism; while, on the other hand, I found\nidealism distinctly expressed in many passages of the \u201cCritique of Pure\nReason,\u201d and accordingly I charged Kant with contradicting himself. And\nthis charge was well founded, if, as was then my case, one only knew the\n\u201cCritique of Pure Reason\u201d in the second or any of the five subsequent\neditions printed from it. But when later I read Kant\u2019s great work in the\nfirst edition, which is already so rare, I saw, to my great pleasure, all\nthese contradictions disappear, and found that although Kant does not use\nthe formula, \u201cNo object without a subject,\u201d he yet explains, with just as\nmuch decision as Berkeley and I do, the outer world lying before us in\nspace and time as the mere idea of the subject that knows it. Therefore,\nfor example, he says there without reserve (p. 383): \u201cIf I take away the\nthinking subject, the whole material world must disappear, for it is\nnothing but a phenomenon in the sensibility of our subject, and a class of\nits ideas.\u201d But the whole passage from p. 348-392, in which Kant expounded\nhis pronounced idealism with peculiar beauty and clearness, was suppressed\nby him in the second edition, and instead of it a number of remarks\ncontroverting it were introduced. In this way then the text of the\n\u201cCritique of Pure Reason,\u201d as it has circulated from the year 1787 to the\nyear 1838, was disfigured and spoilt, and it became a self-contradictory\nbook, the sense of which could not therefore be thoroughly clear and\ncomprehensible to any one. The particulars about this, and also my\nconjectures as to the reasons and the weaknesses which may have influenced\nKant so to disfigure his immortal work, I have given in a letter to\nProfessor Rosenkranz, and he has quoted the principal passage of it in his\npreface to the second volume of the edition of Kant\u2019s collected works\nedited by him, to which I therefore refer. In consequence of my\nrepresentations, Professor Rosenkranz was induced in the year 1838 to\nrestore the \u201cCritique of Pure Reason\u201d to its original form, for in the\nsecond volume referred to he had it printed according to the _first_\nedition of 1781, by which he has rendered an inestimable service to\nphilosophy; indeed, he has perhaps saved from destruction the most\nimportant work of German literature; and this should always be remembered\nto his credit. But let no one imagine that he knows the \u201cCritique of Pure\nReason\u201d and has a distinct conception of Kant\u2019s teaching if he has only\nread the second or one of the later editions. That is altogether\nimpossible, for he has only read a mutilated, spoilt, and to a certain\nextent ungenuine text. It is my duty to say this here decidedly and for\nevery one\u2019s warning.\n\nYet the way in which Kant introduces the _thing in itself_ stands in\nundeniable contradiction with the distinctly idealistic point of view so\nclearly expressed in the first edition of the \u201cCritique of Pure Reason,\u201d\nand without doubt this is the chief reason why, in the second edition, he\nsuppressed the principal idealistic passage we have referred to, and\ndirectly declared himself opposed to the Berkeleian idealism, though by\ndoing so he only introduced inconsistencies into his work, without being\nable to remedy its principal defect. This defect, as is known, is the\nintroduction of the _thing in itself_ in the way chosen by him, the\ninadmissibleness of which was exposed at length by G. E. Schulze in\n\u201c_\u00c6nesidemus_,\u201d and was soon recognised as the untenable point of his\nsystem. The matter may be made clear in a very few words. Kant based the\nassumption of the thing in itself, though concealed under various modes of\nexpression, upon an inference from the law of causality\u2014an inference that\nthe empirical perception, or more accurately the _sensation_, in our\norgans of sense, from which it proceeds, must have an external cause. But\naccording to his own account, which is correct, the law of causality is\nknown to us _a priori_, consequently is a function of our intellect, and\nis thus of _subjective_ origin; further, sensation itself, to which we\nhere apply the law of causality, is undeniably _subjective_; and finally,\neven space, in which, by means of this application, we place the cause of\nthis sensation as object, is a form of our intellect given _a priori_, and\nis consequently _subjective_. Therefore the whole empirical perception\nremains always upon a _subjective_ foundation, as a mere process in us,\nand nothing entirely different from it and independent of it can be\nbrought in as a _thing in itself_, or shown to be a necessary assumption.\nThe empirical perception actually is and remains merely our idea: it is\nthe world as idea. An inner nature of this we can only arrive at on the\nentirely different path followed by me, by means of calling in the aid of\nself-consciousness, which proclaims the will as the inner nature of our\nown phenomenon; but then the thing in itself will be one which is _toto\ngenere_ different from the idea and its elements, as I have explained.\n\nThe great defect of the Kantian system in this point, which, as has been\nsaid, was soon pointed out, is an illustration of the truth of the\nbeautiful Indian proverb: \u201cNo lotus without a stem.\u201d The erroneous\ndeduction of the thing in itself is here the stem; yet only the method of\nthe deduction, not the recognition of a thing in itself belonging to the\ngiven phenomenon. But this last was Fichte\u2019s misunderstanding of it, which\ncould only happen because he was not concerned with truth, but with making\na sensation for the furtherance of his individual ends. Accordingly he was\nbold and thoughtless enough to deny the thing in itself altogether, and to\nset up a system in which, not, as with Kant, the mere form of the idea,\nbut also the matter, its whole content, was professedly deduced _a priori_\nfrom the subject. In doing this, he counted with perfect correctness upon\nthe want of judgment and the stupidity of the public, which accepted\nmiserable sophisms, mere hocus-pocus and senseless babble, for proofs; so\nthat he succeeded in turning its attention from Kant to himself, and gave\nthe direction to German philosophy in which it was afterwards carried\nfurther by Schelling, and ultimately reached its goal in the mad sophistry\nof Hegel.\n\nI now return to the great mistake of Kant, already touched on above, that\nhe has not properly separated perceptible and abstract knowledge, whereby\nan inextricable confusion has arisen which we have now to consider more\nclosely. If he had sharply separated ideas of perception from conceptions\nmerely thought _in abstracto_, he would have held these two apart, and in\nevery case would have known with which of the two he had to do. This,\nhowever, was unfortunately not the case, although this accusation has not\nyet been openly made, and may thus perhaps be unexpected. His \u201cobject of\nexperience,\u201d of which he is constantly speaking, the proper object of the\ncategories, is not the idea of perception; neither is it the abstract\nconception, but it is different from both, and yet both at once, and is a\nperfect chimera. For, incredible as it may seem, he lacked either the\nwisdom or the honesty to come to an understanding with himself about this,\nand to explain distinctly to himself and others whether his \u201cobject of\nexperience, _i.e._, the knowledge produced by the application of the\ncategories,\u201d is the idea of perception in space and time (my first class\nof ideas), or merely the abstract conception. Strange as it is, there\nalways runs in his mind something between the two, and hence arises the\nunfortunate confusion which I must now bring to light. For this end I must\ngo through the whole theory of elements in a general way.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nThe \u201cTranscendental \u00c6sthetic\u201d is a work of such extraordinary merit that\nit alone would have been sufficient to immortalise the name of Kant. Its\nproofs carry such perfect conviction, that I number its propositions among\nincontestable truths, and without doubt they are also among those that are\nrichest in results, and are, therefore, to be regarded as the rarest thing\nin the world, a real and great discovery in metaphysics. The fact,\nstrictly proved by him, that a part of our knowledge is known to us _a\npriori_, admits of no other explanation than that this constitutes the\nforms of our intellect; indeed, this is less an explanation than merely\nthe distinct expression of the fact itself. For _a priori_ means nothing\nelse than \u201cnot gained on the path of experience, thus not come into us\nfrom without.\u201d But what is present in the intellect, and has not come from\nwithout, is just what belongs originally to the intellect itself, its own\nnature. Now if what is thus present in the intellect itself consists of\nthe general mode or manner in which it must present all its objects to\nitself, this is just saying that what is thus present is the intellect\u2019s\nforms of knowing, _i.e._, the mode, fixed once for all, in which it\nfulfils this its function. Accordingly, \u201cknowledge _a priori_\u201d and \u201cthe\nintellect\u2019s own forms\u201d are at bottom only two expressions for the same\nthings thus to a certain extent synonyms.\n\nTherefore from the doctrine of the Transcendental \u00c6sthetic I knew of\nnothing to take away, only of something to add. Kant did not carry out his\nthought to the end, especially in this respect, that he did not reject\nEuclid\u2019s whole method of demonstration, even after having said on p. 87;\nV. 120, that all geometrical knowledge has direct evidence from\nperception. It is most remarkable that one of Kant\u2019s opponents, and indeed\nthe acutest of them, G. E. Schulze (_Kritik der theoretischen\nPhilosophie_, ii. 241), draws the conclusion that from his doctrine an\nentirely different treatment of geometry from that which is actually in\nuse would arise; and thus he thought to bring an apagogical argument\nagainst Kant, but, in fact, without knowing it, he only began the war\nagainst the method of Euclid. Let me refer to \u00a7 15 of the first book of\nthis work.\n\nAfter the full exposition of the universal _forms_ of perception given in\nthe Transcendental \u00c6sthetic, one necessarily expects to receive some\nexplanation as to its _content_, as to the way in which the _empirical_\nperception comes into our consciousness, how the knowledge of this whole\nworld, which is for us so real and so important, arises in us. But the\nwhole teaching of Kant contains really nothing more about this than the\noft-repeated meaningless expression: \u201cThe empirical element in perception\nis _given_ from without.\u201d Consequently here also from the _pure forms of\nperception_ Kant arrives with one spring at _thinking_ at the\n_Transcendental Logic_. Just at the beginning of the Transcendental Logic\n(Critique of Pure Reason, p. 50; V. 74), where Kant cannot avoid touching\nupon the content of the empirical perception, he takes the first false\nstep; he is guilty of the \u03c0\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c8\u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2. \u201cOur knowledge,\u201d he says, \u201chas\ntwo sources, receptivity of impressions and spontaneity of conceptions:\nthe first is the capacity for receiving ideas, the second that of knowing\nan object through these ideas: through the first an _object_ is given us,\nthrough the second it is thought.\u201d This is false; for according to it the\n_impression_, for which alone we have mere receptivity, which thus comes\nfrom without and alone is properly \u201cgiven,\u201d would be already an _idea_,\nand indeed an _object_. But it is nothing more than a mere _sensation_ in\nthe organ of sense, and only by the application of the _understanding_\n(_i.e._, of the law of causality) and the forms of perception, space and\ntime, does our _intellect_ change this mere _sensation_ into an _idea_,\nwhich now exists as an object in space and time, and cannot be\ndistinguished from the latter (the object) except in so far as we ask\nafter the thing in itself, but apart from this is identical with it. I\nhave explained this point fully in the essay on the principle of\nsufficient reason, \u00a7 21. With this, however, the work of the understanding\nand of the faculty of perception is completed, and no conceptions and no\nthinking are required in addition; therefore the brute also has these\n_ideas_. If conceptions are added, if thinking is added, to which\nspontaneity may certainly be attributed, then knowledge of _perception_ is\nentirely abandoned, and a completely different class of ideas comes into\nconsciousness, non-perceptible abstract conceptions. This is the activity\nof the _reason_, which yet obtains the whole content of its thinking only\nfrom the previous perception, and the comparison of it with other\nperceptions and conceptions. But thus Kant brings thinking into the\nperception, and lays the foundation for the inextricable confusion of\nintuitive and abstract knowledge which I am now engaged in condemning. He\nallows the perception, taken by itself, to be without understanding,\npurely sensuous, and thus quite passive, and only through thinking\n(category of the understanding) does he allow an _object_ to be\napprehended: thus he brings _thought into the perception_. But then,\nagain, the object of thinking is an individual real object; and in this\nway thinking loses its essential character of universality and\nabstraction, and instead of general conceptions receives individual things\nas its object: thus again he _brings perception into thinking_. From this\nsprings the inextricable confusion referred to, and the consequences of\nthis first false step extend over his whole theory of knowledge. Through\nthe whole of his theory the utter confusion of the idea of perception with\nthe abstract idea tends towards a something between the two which he\nexpounds as the object of knowledge through the understanding and its\ncategories, and calls this knowledge _experience_. It is hard to believe\nthat Kant really figured to himself something fully determined and really\ndistinct in this object of the understanding; I shall now prove this\nthrough the tremendous contradiction which runs through the whole\nTranscendental Logic, and is the real source of the obscurity in which it\nis involved.\n\nIn the \u201cCritique of Pure Reason,\u201d p. 67-69; V. 92-94; p. 89, 90; V. 122,\n123; further, V. 135, 139, 153, he repeats and insists: the understanding\nis no faculty of perception, its knowledge is not intuitive but\ndiscursive; the understanding is the faculty of judging (p. 69; V. 94),\nand a judgment is indirect knowledge, an idea of an idea (p. 68; V. 93);\nthe understanding is the faculty of thinking, and thinking is knowledge\nthrough conceptions (p. 69; V. 94); the categories of the understanding\nare by no means the conditions under which objects are given in perception\n(p. 89; V. 122), and perception in no way requires the functions of\nthinking (p. 91; V. 123); our understanding can only think, not perceive\n(V. pp. 135, 139). Further, in the \u201cProlegomena,\u201d \u00a7 20, he says that\nperception, sensation, _perceptio_, belongs merely to the senses; judgment\nto the understanding alone; and in \u00a7 22, that the work of the senses is to\nperceive, that of the understanding to think, _i.e._, to judge. Finally,\nin the \u201cCritique of Practical Reason,\u201d fourth edition, p. 247;\nRosenkranz\u2019s edition, p. 281, he says that the understanding is\ndiscursive; its ideas are thoughts, not perceptions. All this is in Kant\u2019s\nown words.\n\nFrom this it follows that this perceptible world would exist for us even\nif we had no understanding at all; that it comes into our head in a quite\ninexplicable manner, which he constantly indicates by his strange\nexpression the perception is _given_, without ever explaining this\nindefinite and metaphorical expression further.\n\nNow all that has been quoted is contradicted in the most glaring manner by\nthe whole of the rest of his doctrine of the understanding, of its\ncategories, and of the possibility of experience as he explains it in the\nTranscendental Logic. Thus (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 79; V. 105), the\nunderstanding through its categories brings unity into the manifold of\n_perception_, and the pure conceptions of the understanding refer _a\npriori_ to objects of _perception_. P. 94; V. 126, the \u201ccategories are the\ncondition of experience, whether of perception, which is found in it, or\nof thought.\u201d V. p. 127, the understanding is the originator of experience.\nV. p. 128, the categories determine the _perception_ of objects. V. p.\n130, all that we present to ourselves as connected in the object (which is\nyet certainly something perceptible and not an abstraction), has been so\nconnected by an act of the understanding. V. p. 135, the understanding is\nexplained anew as the faculty of combining _a priori_, and of bringing the\nmultiplicity of given ideas under the unity of apperception; but according\nto all ordinary use of words, apperception is not the thinking of a\nconception, but is _perception_. V. p. 136, we find a first principle of\nthe possibility of all perception in connection with the understanding. V.\np. 143, it stands as the heading, that all sense perception is conditioned\nby the categories. At the same place the _logical function of the\njudgment_ also brings the manifold of given perceptions under an\napperception in general, and the manifold of a given perception stands\nnecessarily under the categories. V. p. 144, unity comes into perception,\nby means of the categories, through the understanding. V. p. 145, the\nthinking of the understanding is very strangely explained as synthetically\ncombining, connecting, and arranging the manifold of perception. V. p.\n161, experience is only possible through the categories, and consists in\nthe connection of _sensations_, which, however, are just perceptions. V.\np. 159, the categories are _a priori_ knowledge of the objects of\nperception in general. Further, here and at V. p. 163 and 165, a chief\ndoctrine of Kant\u2019s is given, this: _that the understanding first makes\nNature possible_, because it prescribes laws for it _a priori_, and Nature\nadapts itself to the system of the understanding, and so on. Nature,\nhowever, is certainly perceptible and not an abstraction; therefore, the\nunderstanding must be a faculty of perception. V. p. 168, it is said, the\nconceptions of the understanding are the principles of the possibility of\nexperience, and the latter is the condition of phenomena in space and time\nin general; phenomena which, however, certainly exist in perception.\nFinally, p. 189-211; V. 232-265, the long proof is given (the\nincorrectness of which is shown in detail in my essay on the principle of\nsufficient reason, \u00a7 23) that the objective succession and also the\ncoexistence of objects of experience are not sensuously apprehended, but\nare only brought into Nature by the understanding, and that Nature itself\nfirst becomes possible in this way. Yet it is certain that Nature, the\ncourse of events, and the coexistence of states, is purely perceptible,\nand no mere abstract thought.\n\nI challenge every one who shares my respect towards Kant to reconcile\nthese contradictions and to show that in his doctrine of the object of\nexperience and the way it is determined by the activity of the\nunderstanding and its twelve functions, Kant thought something quite\ndistinct and definite. I am convinced that the contradiction I have\npointed out, which extends through the whole Transcendental Logic, is the\nreal reason of the great obscurity of its language. Kant himself, in fact,\nwas dimly conscious of the contradiction, inwardly combated it, but yet\neither would not or could not bring it to distinct consciousness, and\ntherefore veiled it from himself and others, and avoided it by all kinds\nof subterfuges. This is perhaps also the reason why he made out of the\nfaculties of knowledge such a strange complicated machine, with so many\nwheels, as the twelve categories, the transcendental synthesis of\nimagination, of the inner sense, of the transcendental unity of\napperception, also the schematism of the pure conceptions of the\nunderstanding, &c., &c. And notwithstanding this great apparatus, not even\nan attempt is made to explain the perception of the external world, which\nis after all the principal fact in our knowledge; but this pressing claim\nis very meanly rejected, always through the same meaningless metaphorical\nexpression: \u201cThe empirical perception is given us.\u201d On p. 145 of the fifth\nedition, we learn further that the perception is given through the object;\ntherefore the object must be something different from the perception.\n\nIf, now, we endeavour to investigate Kant\u2019s inmost meaning, not clearly\nexpressed by himself, we find that in reality such an object, different\nfrom the perception, but which is by no means a conception, is for him the\nproper object for the understanding; indeed that it must be by means of\nthe strange assumption of such an object, which cannot be presented in\nperception, that the perception first becomes experience. I believe that\nan old deeply-rooted prejudice in Kant, dead to all investigation, is the\nultimate reason of the assumption of such an _absolute object_, which is\nan object in itself, _i.e._, without a subject. It is certainly not the\n_perceived object_, but through the conception it is added to the\nperception by thought, as something corresponding to it; and now the\nperception is experience, and has value and truth, which it thus only\nreceives through the relation to a conception (in diametrical opposition\nto my exposition, according to which the conception only receives value\nand truth from the perception). It is then the proper function of the\ncategories to add on in thought to the perception this directly\nnon-perceptible object. \u201cThe object is given only through perception, and\nis afterwards thought in accordance with the category\u201d (Critique of Pure\nReason, first edition, p. 399). This is made specially clear by a passage\non p. 125 of the fifth edition: \u201cNow the question arises whether\nconceptions _a priori_ do not also come first as conditions under which\nalone a thing can be, not perceived certainly, but yet _thought_ as an\n_object_ in general,\u201d which he answers in the affirmative. Here the source\nof the error and the confusion in which it is involved shows itself\ndistinctly. For the _object_ as such exists always only for _perception_\nand in it; it may now be completed through the senses, or, when it is\nabsent, through the imagination. What is thought, on the contrary, is\nalways an universal non-perceptible _conception_, which certainly can be\nthe conception of an object in general; but only indirectly by means of\nconceptions does thought relate itself to _objects_, which always are and\nremain _perceptible_. For our thinking is not able to impart reality to\nperceptions; this they have, so far as they are capable of it (empirical\nreality) of themselves; but it serves to bring together the common element\nand the results of perceptions, in order to preserve them, and to be able\nto use them more easily. But Kant ascribes the objects themselves to\nthought, in order to make experience and the objective world dependent\nupon _understanding_, yet without allowing understanding to be a faculty\nof _perception_. In this relation he certainly distinguishes perception\nfrom thought, but he makes particular things sometimes the object of\nperception and sometimes the object of thought. In reality, however, they\nare only the object of the former; our empirical perception is at once\n_objective_, just because it proceeds from the causal nexus. Things, not\nideas different from them, are directly its object. Particular things as\nsuch are perceived in the understanding and through the senses; the\none-sided impression upon the latter is at once completed by the\nimagination. But, on the contrary, as soon as we pass over to thought, we\nleave the particular things, and have to do with general conceptions,\nwhich cannot be presented in perception, although we afterwards apply the\nresults of our thought to particular things. If we hold firmly to this,\nthe inadmissibleness of the assumption becomes evident that the perception\nof things only obtains reality and becomes experience through the thought\nof these very things applying its twelve categories. Rather in perception\nitself the empirical reality, and consequently experience, is already\ngiven; but the perception itself can only come into existence by the\napplication to sensation of the knowledge of the causal nexus, which is\nthe one function of the understanding. Perception is accordingly in\nreality intellectual, which is just what Kant denies.\n\nBesides in the passages quoted, the assumption of Kant here criticised\nwill be found expressed with admirable clearness in the \u201cCritique of\nJudgment,\u201d \u00a7 36, just at the beginning; also in the \u201cMetaphysical\nPrinciples of Natural Science,\u201d in the note to the first explanation of\n\u201cPhenomenology.\u201d But with a _na\u00efvet\u00e9_ which Kant ventured upon least of\nall with reference to this doubtful point, it is to be found most\ndistinctly laid down in the book of a Kantian, Kiesewetter\u2019s \u201c_Grundriss\neiner algemeinen Logik_,\u201d third edition, part i., p. 434 of the\nexposition, and part ii., \u00a7 52 and 53 of the exposition; similarly in\nTieftrunk\u2019s \u201c_Denklehre in rein Deutschem Gewande_\u201d (1825). It there\nappears so clearly how those disciples who do not themselves think become\na magnifying mirror of the errors of every thinker. Once having determined\nhis doctrine of the categories, Kant was always cautious when expounding\nit, but his disciples on the contrary were quite bold, and thus exposed\nits falseness.\n\nAccording to what has been said, the object of the categories is for Kant,\nnot indeed the thing in itself, but yet most closely akin to it. It is the\n_object in itself_; it is an object that requires no subject; it is a\nparticular thing, and yet not in space and time, because not perceptible;\nit is an object of thought, and yet not an abstract conception.\nAccordingly Kant really makes a triple division: (1.) the idea; (2.) the\nobject of the idea; (3.) the thing in itself. The first belongs to the\nsensibility, which in its case, as in that of sensation, includes the pure\nforms of perception, space and time. The second belongs to the\nunderstanding, which thinks it through its twelve categories. The third\nlies beyond the possibility of all knowledge. (In support of this, _cf._\nCritique of Pure Reason, first edition, p. 108 and 109.) The distinction\nof the idea from the object of the idea is however unfounded; this had\nalready been proved by Berkeley, and it appears from my whole exposition\nin the first book, especially chap. i. of the supplements; nay, even from\nKant\u2019s own completely idealistic point of view in the first edition. But\nif we should not wish to count the object of the idea as belonging to the\nidea and identify it with the idea, it would be necessary to attribute it\nto the thing in itself: this ultimately depends on the sense which is\nattached to the word object. This, however, always remains certain, that,\nwhen we think clearly, nothing more can be found than idea and thing in\nitself. The illicit introduction of that hybrid, the object of the idea,\nis the source of Kant\u2019s errors; yet when it is taken away, the doctrine of\nthe categories as conceptions _a priori_ also falls to the ground; for\nthey bring nothing to the perception, and are not supposed to hold good of\nthe thing in itself, but by means of them we only think those \u201cobjects of\nthe ideas,\u201d and thereby change ideas into experience. For every empirical\nperception is already experience; but every perception which proceeds from\nsensation is empirical: this sensation is related by the understanding, by\nmeans of its sole function (knowledge _a priori_ of the law of causality),\nto its cause, which just on this account presents itself in space and time\n(forms of pure perception) as object of experience, material object,\nenduring in space through all time, yet as such always remains idea, as do\nspace and time themselves. If we desire to go beyond this idea, then we\narrive at the question as to the thing in itself, the answer to which is\nthe theme of my whole work, as of all metaphysics in general. Kant\u2019s error\nhere explained is connected with his mistake, which we condemned before,\nthat he gives no theory of the origin of empirical perception, but,\nwithout saying more, treats it as _given_, identifying it with the mere\nsensation, to which he only adds the forms of intuition or perception,\nspace and time, comprehending both under the name sensibility. But from\nthese materials no objective idea arises: this absolutely demands the\nrelation of the idea to its cause, thus the application of the law of\ncausality, and thus understanding; for without this the sensation still\nremains always subjective, and does not take the form of an object in\nspace, even if space is given with it. But according to Kant, the\nunderstanding must not be assigned to perception; it is supposed merely to\n_think_, so as to remain within the transcendental logic. With this again\nis connected another mistake of Kant\u2019s: that he left it to me to adduce\nthe only valid proof of the _a priori_ nature of the law of causality\nwhich he rightly recognised, the proof from the possibility of objective\nempirical perception itself, and instead of it gives a palpably false one,\nas I have already shown in my essay on the principle of sufficient reason,\n\u00a7 23. From the above it is clear that Kant\u2019s \u201cobject of the idea\u201d (2) is\nmade up of what he has stolen partly from the idea (1), and partly from\nthe thing in itself (3). If, in reality, experience were only brought\nabout by the understanding applying its twelve different functions in\norder to _think_ through as many conceptions _a priori_, the objects which\nwere previously merely perceived, then every real thing would necessarily\nas such have a number of determinations, which, as given _a priori_,\nabsolutely could not be thought away, just like space and time, but would\nbelong quite essentially to the existence of the thing, and yet could not\nbe deduced from the properties of space and time. But only one such\ndetermination is to be found\u2014that of causality. Upon this rests\nmateriality, for the essence of matter consists in action, and it is\nthrough and through causality (_cf._ Bk. II. ch. iv.) But it is\nmateriality alone that distinguishes the real thing from the picture of\nthe imagination, which is then only idea. For matter, as permanent, gives\nto the thing permanence through all time, in respect of its matter, while\nthe forms change in conformity with causality. Everything else in the\nthing consists either of determinations of space or of time, or of its\nempirical properties, which are all referable to its activity, and are\nthus fuller determinations of causality. But causality enters already as a\ncondition into the empirical perception, and this is accordingly a thing\nof the understanding, which makes even perception possible, and yet apart\nfrom the law of causality contributes nothing to experience and its\npossibility. What fills the old ontologies is, with the exception of what\nis given here, nothing more than relations of things to each other, or to\nour reflection, and a farrago of nonsense.\n\nThe language in which the doctrine of the categories is expressed affords\nan evidence of its baselessness. What a difference in this respect between\nthe Transcendental \u00c6sthetic and the Transcendental Analytic! In the\nformer, what clearness, definiteness, certainty, firm conviction which is\nfreely expressed and infallibly communicates itself! All is full of light,\nno dark lurking-places are left: Kant knows what he wants and knows that\nhe is right. In the latter, on the other hand, all is obscure, confused,\nindefinite, wavering, uncertain, the language anxious, full of excuses and\nappeals to what is coming, or indeed of suppression. Moreover, the whole\nsecond and third sections of the Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of the\nUnderstanding are completely changed in the second edition, because they\ndid not satisfy Kant himself, and they have become quite different from\nthe first edition, though not clearer. We actually see Kant in conflict\nwith the truth in order to carry out his hypothesis which he has once\nfixed upon. In the Transcendental \u00c6sthetic all his propositions are really\nproved from undeniable facts of consciousness, in the Transcendental\nAnalytic, on the contrary, we find, if we consider it closely, mere\nassertions that thus it is and must be. Here, then, as everywhere, the\nlanguage bears the stamp of the thought from which it has proceeded, for\nstyle is the physiognomy of the mind. We have still to remark, that\nwhenever Kant wishes to give an example for the purpose of fuller\nexplanation, he almost always takes for this end the category of\ncausality, and then what he has said turns out correct; for the law of\ncausality is indeed the real form of the understanding, but it is also its\nonly form, and the remaining eleven categories are merely blind windows.\nThe deduction of the categories is simpler and less involved in the first\nedition than in the second. He labours to explain how, according to the\nperception given by sensibility, the understanding produces experience by\nmeans of thinking the categories. In doing so, the words recognition,\nreproduction, association, apprehension, transcendental unity of\napperception, are repeated to weariness, and yet no distinctness is\nattained. It is well worth noticing, however, that in this explanation he\ndoes not once touch upon what must nevertheless first occur to every\none\u2014the relation of the sensation to its external cause. If he did not\nintend this relation to hold good, he ought to have expressly denied it;\nbut neither does he do this. Thus in this way he evades the point, and all\nthe Kantians have in like manner evaded it. The secret motive of this is,\nthat he reserves the causal nexus, under the name \u201cground of the\nphenomenon,\u201d for his false deduction of the thing in itself; and also that\nperception would become intellectual through the relation to the cause,\nwhich he dare not admit. Besides this, he seems to have been afraid that\nif the causal nexus were allowed to hold good between sensation and\nobject, the latter would at once become the thing in itself, and introduce\nthe empiricism of Locke. But this difficulty is removed by reflection,\nwhich shows us that the law of causality is of subjective origin, as well\nas the sensation itself; and besides this, our own body also, inasmuch as\nit appears in space, already belongs to ideas. But Kant was hindered from\nconfessing this by his fear of the Berkeleian idealism.\n\n\u201cThe combination of the manifold of perception\u201d is repeatedly given as the\nessential operation of the understanding, by means of its twelve\ncategories. Yet this is never adequately explained, nor is it shown what\nthis manifold of perception is before it is combined by the understanding.\nBut time and space, the latter in all its three dimensions, are\n_continua_, _i.e._, all their parts are originally not separate but\ncombined. Thus, then, everything that exhibits itself in them (is given)\nappears originally as a _continuum_, _i.e._, its parts appear already\ncombined and require no adventitious combination of a manifold. If,\nhowever, some one should seek to interpret that combining of the manifold\nof perception by saying that I refer the different sense-impressions of\none object to this one only\u2014thus, for example, perceiving a bell, I\nrecognise that what affects my eye as yellow, my hand as smooth and hard,\nmy ear as sounding, is yet only one and the same body,\u2014then I reply that\nthis is rather a consequence of the knowledge _a priori_ of the causal\nnexus (this actual and only function of the understanding), by virtue of\nwhich all those different effects upon my different organs of sense yet\nlead me only to one common cause of them, the nature of the body standing\nbefore me, so that my understanding, in spite of the difference and\nmultiplicity of the effects, still apprehends the unity of the cause as a\nsingle object, which just on that account exhibits itself in perception.\nIn the beautiful recapitulation of his doctrine which Kant gives at p.\n719-726 or V. 747-754 of the \u201cCritique of Pure Reason,\u201d he explains the\ncategories, perhaps more distinctly than anywhere else, as \u201cthe mere rule\nof the synthesis of that which empirical apprehension has given _a\nposteriori_.\u201d It seems as if here he had something in his mind, such as\nthat, in the construction of the triangle, the angles give the rule for\nthe composition of the lines; at least by this image one can best explain\nto oneself what he says of the function of the categories. The preface to\nthe \u201cMetaphysical First Principles of Natural Science\u201d contains a long\nnote which likewise gives an explanation of the categories, and says that\nthey \u201cdiffer in no respect from the formal acts of the understanding in\njudging,\u201d except that in the latter subject and predicate can always\nchange places; then the judgment in general is defined in the same passage\nas \u201can act through which given ideas first become knowledge of an object.\u201d\nAccording to this, the brutes, since they do not judge, must also have no\nknowledge of objects. In general, according to Kant, there are only\nconceptions of objects, no perceptions. I, on the contrary, say: Objects\nexist primarily only for perception, and conceptions are always\nabstractions from this perception. Therefore abstract thinking must be\nconducted exactly according to the world present in perception, for it is\nonly their relation to this that gives content to conceptions; and we must\nassume for the conceptions no other _a priori_ determined form than the\nfaculty of reflection in general, the nature of which is the construction\nof conceptions, _i.e._, of abstract non-perceptible ideas, which\nconstitutes the sole function of the _reason_, as I have shown in the\nfirst book. I therefore require that we should reject eleven of the\ncategories, and only retain that of causality, and yet that we should see\nclearly that its activity is indeed the condition of empirical perception,\nwhich accordingly is not merely sensuous but intellectual, and that the\nobject so perceived, the object of experience, is one with the idea, from\nwhich there remains nothing to distinguish except the thing in itself.\n\nAfter repeated study of the \u201cCritique of Pure Reason\u201d at different periods\nof my life, a conviction has forced itself upon me with regard to the\norigin of the Transcendental Logic, which I now impart as very helpful to\nan understanding of it. Kant\u2019s only discovery, which is based upon\nobjective comprehension and the highest human thought, is the _apper\u00e7u_\nthat time and space are known by us _a priori_. Gratified by this happy\nhit, he wished to pursue the same vein further, and his love of\narchitectonic symmetry afforded him the clue. As he had found that a pure\nintuition or perception _a priori_ underlay the empirical _perception_ as\nits condition, he thought that in the same way certain _pure conceptions_\nas presuppositions in our faculty of knowledge must lie at the foundation\nof the empirically obtained _conceptions_, and that real empirical thought\nmust be only possible through a pure thought _a priori_, which, however,\nwould have no objects in itself, but would be obliged to take them from\nperception. So that as the _Transcendental \u00c6sthetic_ establishes an _a\npriori_ basis of mathematics, there must, he supposed, also be a similar\nbasis for logic; and thus, then for the sake of symmetry, the former\nreceived a pendant in a _Transcendental Logic_. From this point onwards\nKant was no more free, no more in the position of purely, investigating\nand observing what is present in consciousness; but he was guided by an\nassumption and pursued a purpose\u2014the purpose of finding what he assumed,\nin order to add to the Transcendental \u00c6sthetic so happily discovered a\nTranscendental Logic analogous to it, and thus symmetrically corresponding\nto it, as a second storey. Now for this purpose he hit upon the table of\njudgments, out of which he constructed, as well as he could, the table of\ncategories, the doctrine of twelve pure _a priori_ conceptions, which are\nsupposed to be the conditions of our _thinking_ those very _things_ the\n_perception_ of which is conditioned by the two _a priori_ forms of\nsensibility: thus a _pure understanding_ now corresponded symmetrically to\na _pure sensibility_. Then another consideration occurred to him, which\noffered a means of increasing the plausibility of the thing, by the\nassumption of the _schematism_ of the pure conceptions of the\nunderstanding. But just through this the way in which his procedure had,\nunconsciously indeed, originated betrayed itself most distinctly. For\nbecause he aimed at finding something _a priori_ analogous to every\nempirical function of the faculty of knowledge, he remarked that between\nour empirical perception and our empirical thinking, conducted in abstract\nnon-perceptible conceptions, a connection very frequently, though not\nalways, takes place, because every now and then we try to go back from\nabstract thinking to perception; but try to do so merely in order really\nto convince ourselves that our abstract thought has not strayed far from\nthe safe ground of perception, and perhaps become exaggeration, or, it may\nbe, mere empty talk; much in the same way as, when we are walking in the\ndark, we stretch out our hand every now and then to the guiding wall. We\ngo back, then, to the perception only tentatively and for the moment, by\ncalling up in imagination a perception corresponding to the conceptions\nwhich are occupying us at the time\u2014a perception which can yet never be\nquite adequate to the conception, but is merely a temporary\n_representative_ of it. I have already adduced what is needful on this\npoint in my essay on the principle of sufficient reason, \u00a7 28. Kant calls\na fleeting phantasy of this kind a schema, in opposition to the perfected\npicture of the imagination. He says it is like a monogram of the\nimagination, and asserts that just as such a schema stands midway between\nour abstract thinking of empirically obtained conceptions, and our clear\nperception which comes to us through the senses, so there are _a priori\nschemata of the pure conceptions of the understanding_ between the faculty\nof perception _a priori_ of pure sensibility and the faculty of thinking\n_a priori_ of the pure understanding (thus the categories). These\nschemata, as monograms of the pure imagination _a priori_, he describes\none by one, and assigns to each of them its corresponding category, in the\nwonderful \u201cChapter on the Schematism of the Pure Conceptions of the\nUnderstanding,\u201d which is noted as exceedingly obscure, because no man has\never been able to make anything out of it. Its obscurity, however,\nvanishes if it is considered from the point of view here indicated, but\nthere also comes out more clearly in it than anywhere else the intentional\nnature of Kant\u2019s procedure, and of the determination formed beforehand of\nfinding what would correspond to the analogy, and could assist the\narchitectonic symmetry; indeed this is here the case to such a degree as\nto be almost comical. For when he assumes schemata of the pure (empty) _a\npriori_ conceptions of the understanding (categories) analogous to the\nempirical schemata (or representatives through the fancy of our actual\nconceptions), he overlooks the fact that the end of such schemata is here\nentirely wanting, For the end of the schemata in the case of empirical\n(real) thinking is entirely connected with the _material content_ of such\nconceptions. For since these conceptions are drawn from empirical\nperception, we assist and guide ourselves when engaged in abstract\nthinking by now and then casting a momentary glance back at the perception\nout of which the conceptions are framed, in order to assure ourselves that\nour thought has still real content. This, however, necessarily presupposes\nthat the conceptions which occupy us are sprung from perception, and it is\nmerely a glance back at their material content, indeed a mere aid to our\nweakness. But in the case of _a priori_ conceptions which as yet have no\ncontent at all, clearly this is necessarily omitted. For these conceptions\nare not sprung from perception, but come to it from within, in order to\nreceive a content first from it. Thus they have as yet nothing on which\nthey could look back. I speak fully upon this point, because it is just\nthis that throws light upon the secret origin of the Kantian\nphilosophising, which accordingly consists in this, that Kant, after the\nhappy discovery of the two forms of intuition or perception _a priori_,\nexerted himself, under the guidance of the analogy, to prove that for\nevery determination of our empirical knowledge there is an _a priori_\nanalogue, and this finally extended, in the schemata, even to a mere\npsychological fact. Here the apparent depth and the difficulty of the\nexposition just serve to conceal from the reader that its content remains\na wholly undemonstrable and merely arbitrary assumption. But he who has\npenetrated at last to the meaning of such an exposition is then easily\ninduced to mistake this understanding so painfully attained for a\nconviction of the truth of the matter. If, on the contrary, Kant had kept\nhimself here as unprejudiced and purely observant as in the discovery of\n_a priori_ intuition or perception, he must have found that what is added\nto the pure intuition or perception of space and time, if an empirical\nperception arises from it, is on the one hand the sensation, and on the\nother hand the knowledge of causality, which changes the mere sensation\ninto objective empirical perception, but just on this account is not first\nderived and learned from sensation, but exists _a priori_, and is indeed\nthe form and function of the pure understanding. It is also, however, its\nsole form and function, yet one so rich in results that all our empirical\nknowledge rests upon it. If, as has often been said, the refutation of an\nerror is only complete when the way it originated has been psychologically\ndemonstrated, I believe I have achieved this, with regard to Kant\u2019s\ndoctrine of the categories and their schemata, in what I have said above.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nAfter Kant had thus introduced such great errors into the first simple\noutlines of a theory of the faculty of perception, he adopted a variety of\nvery complicated assumptions. To these belongs first of all the synthetic\nunity of apperception: a very strange thing, very strangely explained.\n\u201cThe _I think_ must be able to accompany all my ideas.\u201d Must\u2014be able: this\nis a problematic-apodictic enunciation; in plain English, a proposition\nwhich takes with one hand what it gives with the other. And what is the\nmeaning of this carefully balanced proposition? That all knowledge of\nideas is thinking? That is not the case: and it would be dreadful; there\nwould then be nothing but abstract conceptions, or at any rate a pure\nperception free from reflection and will, such as that of the beautiful,\nthe deepest comprehension of the true nature of things, _i.e._, of their\nPlatonic Ideas. And besides, the brutes would then either think also, or\nelse they would not even have ideas. Or is the proposition perhaps\nintended to mean: no object without a subject? That would be very badly\nexpressed by it, and would come too late. If we collect Kant\u2019s utterances\non the subject, we shall find that what he understands by the synthetic\nunity of apperception is, as it were, the extensionless centre of the\nsphere of all our ideas, whose radii converge to it. It is what I call the\nsubject of knowing, the correlative of all ideas, and it is also that\nwhich I have fully described and explained in the 22d chapter of the\nSupplements, as the focus in which the rays of the activity of the brain\nconverge. Therefore, to avoid repetition, I now refer to that chapter.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nThat I reject the whole doctrine of the categories, and reckon it among\nthe groundless assumptions with which Kant burdened the theory of\nknowledge, results from the criticism given above; and also from the proof\nof the contradictions in the Transcendental Logic, which had their ground\nin the confusion of perception and abstract knowledge; also further from\nthe proof of the want of a distinct and definite conception of the nature\nof the understanding and of the reason, instead of which we found in\nKant\u2019s writings only incoherent, inconsistent, insufficient, and incorrect\nutterances with regard to these two faculties of the mind. Finally, it\nresults from the explanations which I myself have given of these faculties\nof the mind in the first book and its Supplements, and more fully in the\nessay on the principle of sufficient reason, \u00a7 21, 26, and\n34,\u2014explanations which are very definite and distinct, which clearly\nfollow from the consideration of the nature of our knowledge, and which\ncompletely agree with the conceptions of those two faculties of knowledge\nthat appear in the language and writings of all ages and all nations, but\nwere not brought to distinctness. Their defence against the very different\nexposition of Kant has, for the most part, been given already along with\nthe exposure of the errors of that exposition. Since, however, the table\nof judgments, which Kant makes the foundation of his theory of thinking,\nand indeed of his whole philosophy, has, in itself, as a whole, its\ncorrectness, it is still incumbent upon me to show how these universal\nforms of all judgment arise in our faculty of knowledge, and to reconcile\nthem with my exposition of it. In this discussion I shall always attach to\nthe concepts understanding and reason the sense given them in my\nexplanation, which I therefore assume the reader is familiar with.\n\nAn essential difference between Kant\u2019s method and that which I follow lies\nin this, that he starts from indirect, reflected knowledge, while I start\nfrom direct or intuitive knowledge. He may be compared to a man who\nmeasures the height of a tower by its shadow, while I am like him who\napplies the measuring-rule directly to the tower itself. Therefore, for\nhim philosophy is a science _of_ conceptions, but for me it is a science\n_in_ conceptions, drawn from knowledge of perception, the one source of\nall evidence, and comprehended and made permanent in general conceptions.\nHe passes over this whole world of perception which surrounds us, so\nmultifarious and rich in significance, and confines himself to the forms\nof abstract thinking; and, although he never expressly says so, this\nprocedure is founded on the assumption that reflection is the ectype of\nall perception, that, therefore, all that is essential in perception must\nbe expressed in reflection, and expressed in very contracted forms and\noutlines, which are thus easily surveyed. According to this, what is\nessential and conformable to law in abstract knowledge would, as it were,\nplace in our hands all the threads by which the varied puppet-show of the\nworld of perception is set in motion before our eyes. If Kant had only\ndistinctly expressed this first principle of his method, and then followed\nit consistently, he would at least have been obliged to separate clearly\nthe intuitive from the abstract, and we would not have had to contend with\ninextricable contradictions and confusions. But from the way in which he\nsolves his problem we see that that fundamental principle of his method\nwas only very indistinctly present to his mind, and thus we have still to\narrive at it by conjecture even after a thorough study of his philosophy.\n\nNow as concerns the specified method and fundamental maxim itself, there\nis much to be said for it, and it is a brilliant thought. The nature of\nall science indeed consists in this, that we comprehend the endless\nmanifold of perceptible phenomena under comparatively few abstract\nconceptions, and out of these construct a system by means of which we have\nall those phenomena completely in the power of our knowledge, can explain\nthe past and determine the future. The sciences, however, divide the wide\nsphere of phenomena among them according to the special and manifold\nclasses of the latter. Now it was a bold and happy thought to isolate what\nis absolutely essential to the conceptions as such and apart from their\ncontent, in order to discover from these forms of all thought found in\nthis way what is essential to all intuitive knowledge also, and\nconsequently to the world as phenomenon in general; and because this would\nbe found _a priori_ on account of the necessity of those forms of thought,\nit would be of subjective origin, and would just lead to the ends Kant had\nin view. Here, however, before going further, the relation of reflection\nto knowledge of perception ought to have been investigated (which\ncertainly presupposes the clear separation of the two, which was neglected\nby Kant). He ought to have inquired in what way the former really repeats\nand represents the latter, whether quite pure, or changed and to some\nextent disguised by being taken up into its special forms (forms of\nreflection); whether the form of abstract reflective knowledge becomes\nmore determined through the form of knowledge of perception, or through\nthe nature or constitution which unalterably belongs to itself, _i.e._, to\nreflective knowledge, so that even what is very heterogeneous in intuitive\nknowledge can no longer be distinguished when it has entered reflective\nknowledge, and conversely many distinctions of which we are conscious in\nthe reflective method of knowledge have also sprung from this knowledge\nitself, and by no means point to corresponding differences in intuitive\nknowledge. As the result of this investigation, however, it would have\nappeared that knowledge of perception suffers very nearly as much change\nwhen it is taken up into reflection as food when it is taken into the\nanimal organism whose forms and compounds are determined by itself, so\nthat the nature of the food can no longer be recognised from the result\nthey produce. Or (for this is going a little too far) at least it would\nhave appeared that reflection is by no means related to knowledge of\nperception as the reflection in water is related to the reflected objects,\nbut scarcely even as the mere shadow of these objects stands to the\nobjects themselves; which shadow repeats only a few external outlines, but\nalso unites the most manifold in the same form and presents the most\ndiverse through the same outline; so that it is by no means possible,\nstarting from it, to construe the forms of things with completeness and\ncertainty.\n\nThe whole of reflective knowledge, or the reason, has only one chief form,\nand that is the abstract conception. It is proper to the reason itself,\nand has no direct necessary connection with the world of perception, which\ntherefore exists for the brutes entirely without conceptions, and indeed,\neven if it were quite another world from what it is, that form of\nreflection would suit it just as well. But the combination of conceptions\nfor the purpose of judging has certain definite and normal forms, which\nhave been found by induction, and constitute the table of judgments. These\nforms are for the most part deducible from the nature of reflective\nknowledge itself, thus directly from the reason, because they spring from\nthe four laws of thought (called by me metalogical truths) and the _dictum\nde omni et nullo_. Certain others of these forms, however, have their\nground in the nature of knowledge of perception, thus in the\nunderstanding; yet they by no means point to a like number of special\nforms of the understanding, but can all be fully deduced from the sole\nfunction which the understanding has\u2014the direct knowledge of cause and\neffect. Lastly, still others of these forms have sprung from the\nconcurrence and combination of the reflective and intuitive modes of\nknowledge, or more properly from the assumption of the latter into the\nformer. I shall now go through the moments of the judgment one by one, and\npoint out the origin of each of them in the sources referred to; and from\nthis it follows of itself that a deduction of categories from them is\nwanting, and the assumption of this is just as groundless as its\nexposition was found to be entangled and self-conflicting.\n\n1. The so-called _Quantity_ of judgments springs from the nature of\nconcepts as such. It thus has its ground in the reason alone, and has\nabsolutely no direct connection with the understanding and with knowledge\nof perception. It is indeed, as is explained at length in the first book,\nessential to concepts, as such, that they should have an extent, a sphere,\nand the wider, less determined concept includes the narrower and more\ndetermined. The latter can therefore be separated from the former, and\nthis may happen in two ways,\u2014either the narrower concept may be indicated\nas an indefinite part of the wider concept in general, or it may be\ndefined and completely separated by means of the addition of a special\nname. The judgment which carries out this operation is in the first case\ncalled a particular, and in the second case an universal judgment. For\nexample, one and the same part of the sphere of the concept tree may be\nisolated through a particular and through an universal judgment,\nthus\u2014\u201cSome trees bear gall-nuts,\u201d or \u201cAll oaks bear gall-nuts.\u201d One sees\nthat the difference of the two operations is very slight; indeed, that the\npossibility of it depends upon the richness of the language. Nevertheless,\nKant has explained this difference as disclosing two fundamentally\ndifferent actions, functions, categories of the pure understanding which\ndetermines experience _a priori_ through them.\n\nFinally, a concept may also be used in order to arrive by means of it at a\ndefinite particular idea of perception, from which, as well as from many\nothers, this concept itself is drawn; this happens in the singular\njudgment. Such a judgment merely indicates the boundary-line between\nabstract knowledge and knowledge of perception, and passes directly to the\nlatter, \u201cThis tree here bears gall-nuts.\u201d Kant has made of this also a\nspecial category.\n\nAfter all that has been said there is no need of further polemic here.\n\n2. In the same way the _Quality_ of the judgment lies entirely within the\nprovince of reason, and is not an adumbration of any law of that\nunderstanding which makes perception possible, _i.e._, it does not point\nto it. The nature of abstract concepts, which is just the nature of the\nreason itself objectively comprehended, carries with it the possibility of\nuniting and separating their spheres, as was already explained in the\nfirst book, and upon this possibility, as their presupposition, rest the\nuniversal laws of thought of identity and contradiction, to which I have\ngiven the name of _metalogical_ truths, because they spring purely from\nthe reason, and cannot be further explained. They determine that what is\nunited must remain united, and what is separated must remain separate,\nthus that what is established cannot at the same time be also abolished,\nand thus they presuppose the possibility of the combination and separation\nof spheres, _i.e._, of judgment. This, however, lies, according to its\n_form_, simply and solely in the reason, and this _form_ has not, like the\n_content_ of the judgments, been brought over from the perceptible\nknowledge of the understanding, and therefore there is no correlative or\nanalogue of it to be looked for there. After the perception has been\nbrought about through the understanding and for the understanding, it\nexists complete, subject to no doubt nor error, and therefore knows\nneither assertion nor denial; for it expresses itself, and has not, like\nthe abstract knowledge of the reason, its value and content in its mere\nrelation to something outside of it, according to the principle of the\nground of knowing. It is, therefore, pure reality; all negation is foreign\nto its nature, can only be added on through reflection, and just on this\naccount remains always in the province of abstract thought.\n\nTo the affirmative and negative Kant adds the infinite judgment, making\nuse of a crotchet of the old scholastics, an ingeniously invented\nstop-gap, which does not even require to be explained, a blind window,\nsuch as many others he made for the sake of his architectonic symmetry.\n\n3. Under the very wide conception of _Relation_ Kant has brought three\nentirely different properties of judgments, which we must, therefore,\nexamine singly, in order to recognise their origin.\n\n(_a._) The _hypothetical judgment_ in general is the abstract expression\nof that most universal form of all our knowledge, the principle of\nsufficient reason. In my essay on this principle, I already showed in 1813\nthat it has four entirely different meanings, and in each of these\noriginally originates in a different faculty of knowledge, and also\nconcerns a different class of ideas. It clearly follows from this, that\nthe source of the hypothetical judgment in general, of that universal form\nof thought, cannot be, as Kant wishes to make it, merely the understanding\nand its category of causality; but that the law of causality which,\naccording to my exposition, is the one form of knowledge of the pure\nunderstanding, is only one of the forms of that principle which embraces\nall pure or _a priori_ knowledge\u2014the principle of sufficient reason\u2014which,\non the other hand, in each of its meanings has this hypothetical form of\njudgment as its expression. We see here, however, very distinctly how\nkinds of knowledge which are quite different in their origin and\nsignificance yet appear, if thought _in abstracto_ by the reason, in one\nand the same form of combination of concepts and judgments, and then in\nthis form can no longer be distinguished, but, in order to distinguish\nthem, we must go back to knowledge of perception, leaving abstract\nknowledge altogether. Therefore the path which was followed by Kant,\nstarting from the point of view of abstract knowledge, to find the\nelements and the inmost spring of intuitive knowledge also, was quite a\nwrong one. For the rest, my whole introductory essay on the principle of\nsufficient reason is, to a certain extent, to be regarded merely as a\nthorough exposition of the significance of the hypothetical form of\njudgment; therefore I do not dwell upon it longer here.\n\n(_b._) The form of the _categorical judgment_ is nothing but the form of\njudgment in general, in its strictest sense. For, strictly speaking,\njudging merely means thinking, the combination of, or the impossibility of\ncombining, the spheres of the concepts. Therefore the hypothetical and the\ndisjunctive combination are properly no special forms of the judgment; for\nthey are only applied to already completed judgments, in which the\ncombination of the concepts remains unchanged the categorical. But they\nagain connect these judgments, for the hypothetical form expresses their\ndependence upon each other, and the disjunctive their incompatibility.\nMere concepts, however, have only _one_ class of relations to each other,\nthose which are expressed in the categorical judgment. The fuller\ndetermination, or the sub-species of this relation, are the intersection\nand the complete separateness of the concept-spheres, _i.e._, thus\naffirmation and negation; out of which Kant has made special categories,\nunder quite a different title, that of _quality_. Intersection and\nseparateness have again sub-species, according as the spheres lie within\neach other entirely, or only in part, a determination which constitutes\nthe _quantity_ of the judgments; out of which Kant has again made a quite\nspecial class of categories. Thus he separates what is very closely\nrelated, and even identical, the easily surveyed modifications of the one\npossible relation of mere concepts to each other, and, on the other hand,\nunites what is very different under this title of relation.\n\nCategorical judgments have as their metalogical principle the laws of\nthought of identity and contradiction. But the _ground_ of the connection\nof the concept-spheres which gives _truth_ to the judgment, which is\nnothing but this connection, may be of very different kinds; and,\naccording to this, the truth of the judgment is either logical, or\nempirical, or metaphysical, or metalogical, as is explained in the\nintroductory essay, \u00a7 30-33, and does not require to be repeated here. But\nit is apparent from this how very various the direct cognitions may be,\nall of which exhibit themselves in the abstract, through the combination\nof the spheres of two concepts, as subject and predicate, and that we can\nby no means set up the sole function of the understanding as corresponding\nto them and producing them. For example, the judgments, \u201cWater boils, the\nsine measures the angle, the will resolves, business distracts,\ndistinction is difficult,\u201d express through the same logical form the most\ndifferent kinds of relations; but from this we obtain the right, however\nirregular the beginning may be, of placing ourselves at the standpoint of\nabstract knowledge to analyse direct intuitive knowledge. For the rest,\nthe categorical judgment springs from knowledge of the understanding\nproper, in my sense, only when causation is expressed by it; this is,\nhowever, the case in all judgments which refer to a physical quality. For\nif I say, \u201cThis body is heavy, hard, fluid, green, sour, alkaline,\norganic, &c., &c.,\u201d this always refers to its effect, and thus is\nknowledge which is only possible through the pure understanding. Now,\nafter this, like much which is quite different from it (for example, the\nsubordination of very abstract concepts), has been expressed in the\nabstract through subject and predicate, these mere relations of concepts\nhave been transferred back to knowledge of perception, and it has been\nsupposed that the subject and predicate of the judgment must have a\npeculiar and special correlative in perception, substance and accident.\nBut I shall show clearly further on that the conception substance has no\nother true content than that of the conception matter. Accidents, however,\nare quite synonymous with kinds of effects, so that the supposed knowledge\nof substance and accident is never anything more than the knowledge of\ncause and effect by the understanding. But the special manner in which the\nidea of matter arises is explained partly in \u00a7 4 of the first book, and\nstill more clearly in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason at\nthe end of \u00a7 21, p. 77 (3d ed., p. 82), and in some respects we shall see\nit still more closely when we investigate the principle of the permanence\nof substance.\n\n(_c._) _Disjunctive judgments_ spring from the law of thought of excluded\nthird, which is a metalogical truth; they are, therefore, entirely the\nproperty of the reason, and have not their origin in the understanding.\nThe deduction of the category of community or _reciprocity_ from them is,\nhowever, a glaring example of the violence which Kant sometimes allowed to\nbe done to truth, merely in order to satisfy his love of architectonic\nsymmetry. The illegitimacy of that deduction has already often been justly\ncondemned and proved upon various grounds, especially by G. E. Schulze in\nhis \u201c_Kritik der theoretischen Philosophie_,\u201d and by Berg in his\n\u201c_Epikritik der Philosophie_.\u201d What real analogy is there, indeed, between\nthe problematical determination of a concept by disjunctive predicates and\nthe thought of reciprocity? The two are indeed absolutely opposed, for in\nthe disjunctive judgment the actual affirmation of one of the two\nalternative propositions is also necessarily the negation of the other;\nif, on the other hand, we think two things in the relation of reciprocity,\nthe affirmation of one is also necessarily the affirmation of the other,\nand _vice versa_. Therefore, unquestionably, the real logical analogue of\nreciprocity is the vicious circle, for in it, as nominally in the case of\nreciprocity, what is proved is also the proof, and conversely. And just as\nlogic rejects the vicious circle, so the conception of reciprocity ought\nto be banished from metaphysics. For I now intend, quite seriously, to\nprove that there is no reciprocity in the strict sense, and this\nconception, which people are so fond of using, just on account of the\nindefiniteness of the thought, is seen, if more closely considered, to be\nempty, false, and invalid. First of all, the reader must call to mind what\ncausality really is, and to assist my exposition, see upon this subject \u00a7\n20 of the introductory essay, also my prize-essay on the freedom of the\nwill, chap. iii. p. 27 _seq._, and lastly the fourth chapter of the second\nbook of this work. Causality is the law according to which the conditions\nor states of matter which appear determine their position in time.\nCausality has to do merely with conditions or states, indeed, properly,\nonly with _changes_, and neither with matter as such, nor with permanence\nwithout change. _Matter_, as such, does not come under the law of\ncausality, for it neither comes into being nor passes away; thus neither\ndoes the whole _thing_, as we commonly express ourselves, come under this\nlaw, but only the _conditions_ or _states_ of matter. Further, the law of\ncausality has nothing to do with _permanence_, for where nothing changes\nthere is no producing of _effects_ and no causality, but a continuing\nquiet condition or state. But if, now, such a state is changed, then the\nnew state is either again permanent or it is not, but immediately\nintroduces a third state, and the necessity with which this happens is\njust the law of causality, which is a form of the principle of sufficient\nreason, and therefore cannot be further explained, because the principle\nof sufficient reason is the principle of all explanation and of all\nnecessity. From this it is clear that cause and effect stand in intimate\nconnection with, and necessary relation to, the _course of time_. Only\nbecause the state A. precedes in time the state B., and their succession\nis necessary and not accidental, _i.e._, no mere sequence but a\nconsequence\u2014only because of this is the state A. cause and the state B.\neffect. The conception _reciprocity_, however, contains this, that both\nare cause and both are effect of each other; but this really amounts to\nsaying that each of the two is the earlier and also the later; thus it is\nan absurdity. For that both states are simultaneous, and indeed\nnecessarily simultaneous, cannot be admitted, because, as necessarily\nbelonging to each other and existing at the same time, they constitute\nonly _one_ state. For the permanence of this state there is certainly\nrequired the continued existence of all its determinations, but we are\nthen no longer concerned with change and causality, but with duration and\nrest, and nothing further is said than that if _one_ determination of the\nwhole state be changed, the new state which then appears cannot continue,\nbut becomes the cause of the change of all the other determinations of the\nfirst state, so that a new third state appears; which all happens merely\nin accordance with the simple law of causality, and does not establish a\n_new_ law, that of reciprocity.\n\nI also definitely assert that the conception _reciprocity_ cannot be\nsupported by a single example. Everything that one seeks to pass off as\nsuch is either a state of rest, to which the conception of causality,\nwhich has only significance with reference to changes, finds no\napplication at all, or else it is an alternating succession of states of\nthe same name which condition each other, for the explanation of which\nsimple causality is quite sufficient. An example of the first class is\nafforded by a pair of scales brought to rest by equal weights. Here there\nis no effect produced, for there is no change; it is a state of rest;\ngravity acts, equally divided, as in every body which is supported at its\ncentre of gravity, but it cannot show its force by any effect. That the\ntaking away of one weight produces a second state, which at once becomes\nthe cause of the third, the sinking of the other scale, happens according\nto the simple law of cause and effect, and requires no special category of\nthe understanding, and not even a special name. An example of the second\nclass is the continuous burning of a fire. The combination of oxygen with\nthe combustible body is the cause of heat, and heat, again, is the cause\nof the renewed occurrence of the chemical combination. But this is nothing\nmore than a chain of causes and effects, the links of which have\nalternately _the same name_. The burning, A., produces free heat, B., this\nproduces new burning, C. (_i.e._, a new effect which has the same name as\nthe cause A., but is not individually identical with it), this produces\nnew heat, D. (which is not really identical with the effect B., but only\naccording to the concept, _i.e._, it has the same name), and so on\nindefinitely. A good example of what in ordinary life is called\nreciprocity is afforded by a theory about deserts given by Humboldt\n(_Ansichten der Natur_, 2d ed., vol. ii. p. 79). In the sandy deserts it\ndoes not rain, but it rains upon the wooded mountains surrounding them.\nThe cause is not the attraction of the clouds by the mountains; but it is\nthe column of heated air rising from the sandy plain which prevents the\nparticles of vapour from condensing, and drives the clouds high into the\nheavens. On the mountains the perpendicular rising stream of air is\nweaker, the clouds descend, and the rainfall ensues in the cooler air.\nThus, want of rain and the absence of plants in the desert stand in the\nrelation of reciprocity; it does not rain because the heated sand-plain\nsends out more heat; the desert does not become a steppe or prairie\nbecause it does not rain. But clearly we have here again, as in the\nexample given above, only a succession of causes and effects of the same\nnames, and throughout nothing essentially different from simple causality.\nThis is also the case with the swinging of the pendulum, and indeed also\nwith the self-conservation of the organised body, in which case likewise\nevery state introduces a new one, which is of the same kind as that by\nwhich it was itself brought about, but individually is new. Only here the\nmatter is complicated, because the chain no longer consists of links of\ntwo kinds, but of many kinds, so that a link of the same name only recurs\nafter several others have intervened. But we always see before us only an\napplication of the single and simple law of causality which gives the rule\nto the sequence of states, but never anything which must be comprehended\nby means of a new and special function of the understanding.\n\nOr is it perhaps advanced in support of the conception of reciprocity that\naction and reaction are equal? But the reason of this is what I urge so\nstrongly and have fully explained in the essay on the principle of\nsufficient reason, that the cause and the effect are not two bodies, but\ntwo successive states of bodies, consequently each of the two states\nimplicates all bodies concerned; thus the effect, _i.e._, the newly\nappearing state, for example, in the case of an impulse, extends to both\nbodies in the same proportion; therefore the body impelled produces just\nas great a change in the body impelling as it itself sustains (each in\nproportion to its mass and velocity). If one pleases to call this\nreciprocity, then absolutely every effect is a reciprocal effect, and no\nnew conception is introduced on this account, still less does it require a\nnew function of the understanding, but we only have a superfluous synonym\nfor causality. But Kant himself, in a moment of thoughtlessness, exactly\nexpressed this view in the \u201cMetaphysical First Principles of Natural\nScience\u201d at the beginning of the proof of the fourth principle of\nmechanics: \u201cAll external effect in the world is reciprocal effect.\u201d How\nthen should different functions lie _a priori_ in the understanding for\nsimple causality and for reciprocity, and, indeed, how should the real\nsuccession of things only be possible and knowable by means of the first,\nand their co-existence by means of the second? According to this, if all\neffect is reciprocal effect, succession and simultaneity would be the same\nthing, and therefore everything in the world would take place at the same\nmoment. If there were true reciprocity, then perpetual motion would also\nbe possible, and indeed _a priori_ certain; but it is rather the case that\nthe _a priori_ conviction that there is no true reciprocity, and no\ncorresponding form of the understanding, is the ground of the assertion\nthat perpetual motion is impossible.\n\nAristotle also denies reciprocity in the strict sense; for he remarks that\ntwo things may certainly be reciprocal causes of each other, but only if\nthis is understood in a different sense of each of them; for example, that\none acts upon the other as the motive, but the latter acts upon the former\nas the cause of its movement. We find in two passages the same words:\nPhysic., lib. ii. c. 3, and Metaph., lib. v. c. 2. \u0395\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03b1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03b1; \u03bf\u1f31\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf \u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b5\u03c5\u03b5\u03be\u03b9\u03b1\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u03b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd;\n\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u1fbd \u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd, \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf \u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u1f61\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2, \u03c4\u03bf \u03b4\u03b5 \u1f61\u03c2 \u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2.\n(_Sunt pr\u00e6terea qu\u00e6 sibi sunt mutuo caus\u00e6, ut exercitium bon\u00e6 habitudinis,\net h\u00e6c exercitii: at non eodem modo, sed h\u00e6c ut finis, aliud ut principium\nmotus._) If, besides this, he had accepted a reciprocity proper, he would\nhave introduced it here, for in both passages he is concerned with\nenumerating all the possible kinds of causes. In the _Analyt. post._, lib.\nii. c. 11, he speaks of a circle of causes and effects, but not of\nreciprocity.\n\n4. The categories of _Modality_ have this advantage over all others, that\nwhat is expressed through each of them really corresponds to the form of\njudgment from which it is derived; which with the other categories is\nscarcely ever the case, because for the most part they are deduced from\nthe forms of judgment with the most capricious violence.\n\nThus that it is the conceptions of the possible, the actual, and the\nnecessary which occasion the problematic, assertatory, and apodictic forms\nof judgment, is perfectly true; but that those conceptions are special,\noriginal forms of knowledge of the understanding which cannot be further\ndeduced is not true. On the contrary, they spring from the single original\nform of all knowledge, which is, therefore, known to us _a priori_, the\nprinciple of sufficient reason; and indeed out of this the knowledge of\n_necessity_ springs directly. On the other hand, it is only because\nreflection is applied to this that the conceptions of contingency,\npossibility, impossibility, and actuality arise. Therefore all these do\nnot by any means spring from _one_ faculty of the mind, the understanding,\nbut arise through the conflict of abstract and intuitive knowledge, as\nwill be seen directly.\n\nI hold that to be necessary and to be the consequent of a given reason are\nabsolutely interchangeable notions, and completely identical. We can never\nknow, nor even think, anything as necessary, except so far as we regard it\nas the consequent of a given reason; and the conception of necessity\ncontains absolutely nothing more than this dependence, this being\nestablished through something else, and this inevitable following from it.\nThus it arises and exists simply and solely through the application of the\nprinciple of sufficient reason. Therefore, there is, according to the\ndifferent forms of this principle, a physical necessity (the effect from\nthe cause), a logical (through the ground of knowing, in analytical\njudgments, syllogisms, &c.), a mathematical (according to the ground of\nbeing in time and space), and finally a practical necessity, by which we\nintend to signify not determination through a pretended categorical\nimperative, but the necessary occurrence of an action according to the\nmotives presented, in the case of a given empirical character. But\neverything necessary is only so relatively, that is, under the\npresupposition of the reason from which it follows; therefore absolute\nnecessity is a contradiction. With regard to the rest, I refer to \u00a7 49 of\nthe essay on the principle of sufficient reason.\n\nThe contradictory opposite, _i.e._, the denial of necessity, is\n_contingency_. The content of this conception is, therefore,\nnegative\u2014nothing more than this: absence of the connection expressed by\nthe principle of sufficient reason. Consequently the contingent is also\nalways merely relative. It is contingent in relation to something which is\nnot its reason. Every object, of whatever kind it may be\u2014for example,\nevery event in the actual world\u2014is always at once necessary and\ncontingent, _necessary_ in relation to the _one_ condition which is its\ncause: _contingent_ in relation to everything else. For its contact in\ntime and space with everything else is a mere coincidence without\nnecessary connection: hence also the words chance, \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c0\u03c4\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1, _contingens_.\nTherefore an absolute contingency is just as inconceivable as an absolute\nnecessity. For the former would be simply an object which stood to no\nother in the relation of consequent to its reason. But the\ninconceivability of such a thing is just the content of the principle of\nsufficient reason negatively expressed, and therefore this principle must\nfirst be upset before we can think an absolute contingency; and even then\nit itself would have lost all significance, for the conception of\ncontingency has meaning only in relation to that principle, and signifies\nthat two objects do not stand to each other in the relation of reason and\nconsequent.\n\nIn nature, which consists of ideas of perception, everything that happens\nis necessary; for it proceeds from its cause. If, however, we consider\nthis individual with reference to everything else which is not its cause,\nwe know it as contingent; but this is already an abstract reflection. Now,\nfurther, let us abstract entirely from a natural object its causal\nrelation to everything else, thus its necessity and its contingency; then\nthis kind of knowledge comprehends the conception of the _actual_, in\nwhich one only considers the _effect_, without looking for the cause, in\nrelation to which one would otherwise have to call it _necessary_, and in\nrelation to everything else _contingent_. All this rests ultimately upon\nthe fact that the _modality_ of the judgment does not indicate so much the\nobjective nature of things as the relation of our knowledge to them.\nSince, however, in nature everything proceeds from a cause, everything\n_actual_ is also _necessary_, yet only so far as it is _at this time, in\nthis place;_ for only so far does determination by the law of causality\nextend. Let us leave, however, concrete nature and pass over to abstract\nthinking; then we can present to ourselves in reflection all the natural\nlaws which are known to us partly _a priori_, partly only _a posteriori_,\nand this abstract idea contains all that is in nature at _any_ time, in\n_any_ place, but with abstraction from every definite time and place; and\njust in this way, through such reflection, we have entered the wide\nkingdom of _the possible_. But what finds no place even here is the\n_impossible_. It is clear that possibility and impossibility exist only\nfor reflection, for abstract knowledge of the reason, not for knowledge of\nperception; although it is the pure forms of perception which supply the\nreason with the determination of the possible and impossible. According as\nthe laws of nature, from which we start in the thought of the possible and\nimpossible, are known _a priori_ or _a posteriori_, is the possibility or\nimpossibility metaphysical or physical.\n\nFrom this exposition, which requires no proof because it rests directly\nupon the knowledge of the principle of sufficient reason and upon the\ndevelopment of the conceptions of the necessary, the actual, and the\npossible, it is sufficiently evident how entirely groundless is Kant\u2019s\nassumption of three special functions of the understanding for these three\nconceptions, and that here again he has allowed himself to be disturbed by\nno reflection in the carrying out of his architectonic symmetry.\n\nTo this, however, we have to add the other great mistake, that, certainly\naccording to the procedure of earlier philosophy, he has confounded the\nconceptions of necessity and contingency with each other. That earlier\nphilosophy has applied abstraction to the following mistaken use. It was\nclear that that of which the reason is given inevitably follows, _i.e._,\ncannot not be, and thus necessarily is. But that philosophy held to this\nlast determination alone, and said that is necessary which cannot be\notherwise, or the opposite of which is impossible. It left, however, the\nground and root of such necessity out of account, overlooked the\nrelativity of all necessity which follows from it, and thereby made the\nquite unthinkable fiction of an _absolute necessity_, _i.e._, of something\nthe existence of which would be as inevitable as the consequent of a\nreason, but which yet was not the consequent of a reason, and therefore\ndepended upon nothing; an addition which is an absurd _petitio_, for it\nconflicts with the principle of sufficient reason. Now, starting from this\nfiction, it explained, in diametrical opposition to the truth, all that is\nestablished by a reason as contingent, because it looked at the relative\nnature of its necessity and compared this with that entirely imaginary\n_absolute_ necessity, which is self-contradictory in its conception.(5)\nNow Kant adheres to this fundamentally perverse definition of the\ncontingent and gives it as explanation. (Critique of Pure Reason, V. p.\n289-291, 243. V. 301, 419. V. 447, 486, 488.) He falls indeed into the\nmost evident contradiction with himself upon this point, for on p. 301 he\nsays: \u201cEverything contingent has a cause,\u201d and adds, \u201cThat is contingent\nwhich might possibly not be.\u201d But whatever has a cause cannot possibly not\nbe: thus it is necessary. For the rest, the source of the whole of this\nfalse explanation of the necessary and the contingent is to be found in\nAristotle in \u201c_De Generatione et Corruptione_,\u201d lib. ii. c. 9 et 11, where\nthe necessary is explained as that which cannot possibly not be: there\nstands in opposition to it that which cannot possibly be, and between\nthese two lies that which can both be and not be,\u2014thus that which comes\ninto being and passes away, and this would then be the contingent. In\naccordance with what has been said above, it is clear that this\nexplanation, like so many of Aristotle\u2019s, has resulted from sticking to\nabstract conceptions without going back to the concrete and perceptible,\nin which, however, the source of all abstract conceptions lies, and by\nwhich therefore they must always be controlled. \u201cSomething which cannot\npossibly not be\u201d can certainly be thought in the abstract, but if we go\nwith it to the concrete, the real, the perceptible, we find nothing to\nsupport the thought, even as possible,\u2014as even merely the asserted\nconsequent of a given reason, whose necessity is yet relative and\nconditioned.\n\nI take this opportunity of adding a few further remarks on these\nconceptions of modality. Since all necessity rests upon the principle of\nsufficient reason, and is on this account relative, all _apodictic_\njudgments are originally, and according to their ultimate significance,\n_hypothetical_. They become _categorical_ only through the addition of an\n_assertatory_ minor, thus in the conclusion. If this minor is still\nundecided, and this indecision is expressed, this gives the problematical\njudgment.\n\nWhat in general (as a rule) is apodictic (a law of nature), is in\nreference to a particular case only problematical, because the condition\nmust actually appear which brings the case under the rule. And conversely,\nwhat in the particular as such is necessary (apodictic) (every particular\nchange necessary through the cause), is again in general, and predicated\nuniversally, only problematical; because the causes which appear only\nconcern the particular case, and the apodictic, always hypothetical\njudgment, always expresses merely the general law, not the particular case\ndirectly. All this has its ground in the fact that possibility exists only\nin the province of reflection and for the reason; the actual, in the\nprovince of perception and for the understanding; the necessary, for both.\nIndeed, the distinction between necessary, actual, and possible really\nexists only in the abstract and according to the conception; in the real\nworld, on the other hand, all three fall into one. For all that happens,\nhappens _necessarily_, because it happens from causes; but these\nthemselves have again causes, so that the whole of the events of the\nworld, great and small, are a strict concatenation of necessary\noccurrences. Accordingly everything actual is also necessary, and in the\nreal world there is no difference between actuality and necessity, and in\nthe same way no difference between actuality and possibility; for what has\nnot happened, _i.e._, has not become actual, was also not possible,\nbecause the causes without which it could never appear have not themselves\nappeared, nor could appear, in the great concatenation of causes; thus it\nwas an impossibility. Every event is therefore either necessary or\nimpossible. All this holds good only of the empirically real world,\n_i.e._, the complex of individual things, thus of the whole particular as\nsuch. If, on the other hand, we consider things generally, comprehending\nthem _in abstracto_, necessity, actuality, and possibility are again\nseparated; we then know everything which is in accordance with the _a\npriori_ laws which belong to our intellect as possible in general; that\nwhich corresponds to the empirical laws of nature as possible in this\nworld, even if it has never become actual; thus we distinguish clearly the\npossible from the actual. The actual is in itself always also necessary,\nbut is only comprehended as such by him who knows its cause; regarded\napart from this, it is and is called contingent. This consideration also\ngives us the key to that _contentio_ \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd between the Megaric\nDiodorus and Chrysippus the Stoic which Cicero refers to in his book _De\nFato_. Diodorus says: \u201cOnly what becomes actual was possible, and all that\nis actual is also necessary.\u201d Chrysippus on the other hand says: \u201cMuch\nthat is possible never becomes actual; for only the necessary becomes\nactual.\u201d We may explain this thus: Actuality is the conclusion of a\nsyllogism to which possibility gives the premises. But for this is\nrequired not only the major but also the minor; only the two give complete\npossibility. The major gives a merely theoretical, general possibility _in\nabstracto_, but this of itself does not make anything possible, _i.e._,\ncapable of becoming actual. For this the minor also is needed, which gives\nthe possibility for the particular case, because it brings it under the\nrule, and thereby it becomes at once actual. For example:\n\n_Maj._ All houses (consequently also my house) can be destroyed by fire.\n\n_Min._ My house is on fire.\n\n_Concl._ My house is being destroyed by fire.\n\nFor every general proposition, thus every major, always determines things\nwith reference to actuality only under a presupposition, therefore\nhypothetically; for example, the capability of being burnt down has as a\npresupposition the catching fire. This presupposition is produced in the\nminor. The major always loads the cannon, but only if the minor brings the\nmatch does the shot, _i.e._, the conclusion, follow. This holds good\nthroughout of the relation of possibility to actuality. Since now the\nconclusion, which is the assertion of actuality, always follows\n_necessarily_, it is evident from this that all that is actual is also\nnecessary, which can also be seen from the fact that necessity only means\nbeing the consequent of a given reason: this is in the case of the actual\na cause: thus everything actual is necessary. Accordingly, we see here the\nconceptions of the possible, the actual, and the necessary unite, and not\nmerely the last presuppose the first, but also the converse. What keeps\nthem apart is the limitation of our intellect through the form of time;\nfor time is the mediator between possibility and actuality. The necessity\nof the particular event may be fully seen from the knowledge of all its\ncauses; but the concurrence of the whole of these different and\nindependent causes seems to us _contingent_; indeed their independence of\neach other is just the conception of contingency. Since, however, each of\nthem was the necessary effect of _its_ causes, the chain of which has no\nbeginning, it is evident that contingency is merely a subjective\nphenomenon, arising from the limitation of the horizon of our\nunderstanding, and just as subjective as the optical horizon at which the\nheavens touch the earth.\n\nSince necessity is the same thing as following from given grounds, it must\nappear in a special way in the case of every form of the principle of\nsufficient reason, and also have its opposite in the possibility and\nimpossibility which always arises only through the application of the\nabstract reflection of the reason to the object. Therefore the four kinds\nof necessity mentioned above stand opposed to as many kinds of\nimpossibility, physical, logical, mathematical and practical. It may\nfurther be remarked that if one remains entirely within the province of\nabstract concepts, possibility is always connected with the more general,\nand necessity with the more limited concept; for example, \u201cAn animal _may_\nbe a bird, a fish, an amphibious creature, &c.\u201d \u201cA nightingale _must_ be a\nbird, a bird _must_ be an animal, an animal _must_ be an organism, an\norganism _must_ be a body.\u201d This is because logical necessity, the\nexpression of which is the syllogism, proceeds from the general to the\nparticular, and never conversely. In the concrete world of nature (ideas\nof the first class), on the contrary, everything is really necessary\nthrough the law of causality; only added reflection can conceive it as\nalso contingent, comparing it with that which is not its cause, and also\nas merely and purely actual, by disregarding all causal connection. Only\nin this class of ideas does the conception of the _actual_ properly occur,\nas is also shown by the derivation of the word from the conception of\ncausality. In the third class of ideas, that of pure mathematical\nperception or intuition, if we confine ourselves strictly to it, there is\nonly necessity. Possibility occurs here also only through relation to the\nconcepts of reflection: for example, \u201cA triangle _may_ be right-angled,\nobtuse-angled, or equiangular; its three angles _must_ be equal to two\nright-angles.\u201d Thus here we only arrive at the possible through the\ntransition from the perceptible to the abstract.\n\nAfter this exposition, which presupposes the recollection of what was said\nboth in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason and in the first\nbook of the present work, there will, it is hoped, be no further doubt as\nto the true and very heterogeneous source of those forms which the table\nof judgments lays before us, nor as to the inadmissibility and utter\ngroundlessness of the assumption of twelve special functions of the\nunderstanding for the explanation of them. The latter point is also\nsupported by a number of special circumstances very easily noted. Thus,\nfor example, it requires great love of symmetry and much trust in a clue\nderived from it, to lead one to assume that an affirmative, a categorical,\nand an assertatory judgment are three such different things that they\njustify the assumption of an entirely special function of the\nunderstanding for each of them.\n\nKant himself betrays his consciousness of the untenable nature of his\ndoctrine of the categories by the fact that in the third chapter of the\nAnalytic of Principles (_ph\u00e6nomena et noumena_) several long passages of\nthe first edition (p. 241, 242, 244-246, 248-253) are omitted in the\nsecond\u2014passages which displayed the weakness of that doctrine too openly.\nSo, for example, he says there (p. 241) that he has not defined the\nindividual categories, because he could not define them even if he had\nwished to do so, inasmuch as they were susceptible of no definition. In\nsaying this he forgot that at p. 82 of the same first edition he had said:\n\u201cI purposely dispense with the definition of the categories although I may\nbe in possession of it.\u201d This then was, _sit venia verbo_, wind. But this\nlast passage he has allowed to stand. And so all those passages wisely\nomitted afterwards betray the fact that nothing distinct can be thought in\nconnection with the categories, and this whole doctrine stands upon a weak\nfoundation.\n\nThis table of the categories is now made the guiding clue according to\nwhich every metaphysical, and indeed every scientific inquiry is to be\nconducted (Prolegomena, \u00a7 39). And, in fact, it is not only the foundation\nof the whole Kantian philosophy and the type according to which its\nsymmetry is everywhere carried out, as I have already shown above, but it\nhas also really become the procrustean bed into which Kant forces every\npossible inquiry, by means of a violence which I shall now consider\nsomewhat more closely. But with such an opportunity what must not the\n_imitatores servum pecus_ have done! We have seen. That violence then is\napplied in this way. The meaning of the expressions denoted by the titles,\nforms of judgment and categories, is entirely set aside and forgotten, and\nthe expressions alone are retained. These have their source partly in\nAristotle\u2019s _Analyt. priora_, i. 23 (\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f41\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd: _de qualitate et quantitate terminorum syllogismi_), but\nare arbitrarily chosen; for the extent of the concepts might certainly\nhave been otherwise expressed than through the word _quantity_, though\nthis word is more suited to its object than the rest of the titles of the\ncategories. Even the word _quality_ has obviously been chosen on account\nof the custom of opposing quality to quantity; for the name quality is\ncertainly taken arbitrarily enough for affirmation and negation. But now\nin every inquiry instituted by Kant, every quantity in time and space, and\nevery possible quality of things, physical, moral, &c., is brought by him\nunder those category titles, although between these things and those\ntitles of the forms of judgment and of thought there is absolutely nothing\nin common except the accidental and arbitrary nomenclature. It is needful\nto keep in mind all the respect which in other regards is due to Kant to\nenable one to refrain from expressing in hard terms one\u2019s repugnance to\nthis procedure. The nearest example is afforded us at once by the pure\nphysiological table of the general principles of natural science. What in\nall the world has the quantity of judgments to do with the fact that every\nperception has an extensive magnitude? What has the quality of judgments\nto do with the fact that every sensation has a degree? The former rests\nrather on the fact that space is the form of our external perception, and\nthe latter is nothing more than an empirical, and, moreover, entirely\nsubjective feeling, drawn merely from the consideration of the nature of\nour organs of sense. Further, in the table which gives the basis of\nrational psychology (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 344; V. 402), the\n_simplicity_ of the soul is cited under quality; but this is just a\nquantitative property, and has absolutely no relation to the affirmation\nor negation in the judgment. But quantity had to be completed by the\n_unity_ of the soul, which is, however, already included in its\nsimplicity. Then modality is forced in in an absurd way; the soul stands\nin connection with _possible_ objects; but connection belongs to relation,\nonly this is already taken possession of by substance. Then the four\ncosmological Ideas, which are the material of the antinomies, are referred\nto the titles of the categories; but of this we shall speak more fully\nfurther on, when we come to the examination of these antinomies. Several,\nif possible, still more glaring examples are to be found in the table of\nthe _Categories of Freedom!_ in the \u201cCritique of Practical Reason;\u201d also\nin the first book of the \u201cCritique of Judgment,\u201d which goes through the\njudgment of taste according to the four titles of the categories; and,\nfinally, in the \u201cMetaphysical First Principles of Natural Science,\u201d which\nare entirely adapted to the table of the categories, whereby the false\nthat is mingled here and there with what is true and excellent in this\nimportant work is for the most part introduced. See, for example, at the\nend of the first chapter how the unity, the multiplicity, and the totality\nof the directions of lines are supposed to correspond to the categories,\nwhich are so named according to the quantity of judgments.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nThe principle of the _Permanence of Substance_ is deduced from the\ncategory of subsistence and inherence. This, however, we know only from\nthe form of the categorical judgment, _i.e._, from the connection of two\nconcepts as subject and predicate. With what violence then is that great\nmetaphysical principle made dependent upon this simple, purely logical\nform! Yet this is only done _pro forma_, and for the sake of symmetry. The\nproof of this principle, which is given here, sets entirely aside its\nsupposed origin in the understanding and in the category, and is based\nupon the pure intuition or perception of time. But this proof also is\nquite incorrect. It is false that in mere time there is _simultaneity_ and\n_duration_; these ideas only arise from the union of _space_ with time, as\nI have already shown in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, \u00a7\n18, and worked out more fully in \u00a7 4 of the present work. I must assume a\nknowledge of both these expositions for the understanding of what follows.\nIt is false that time _remains_ the same through all change; on the\ncontrary, it is just time itself that is fleeting; a permanent time is a\ncontradiction. Kant\u2019s proof is untenable, strenuously as he has supported\nit with sophisms; indeed, he falls into the most palpable contradictions.\nThus, after he has falsely set up co-existence as a mode of time (p. 177;\nV. 219), he says, quite rightly (p. 183; V. 226), \u201cCo-existence is not a\nmode of time, for in time there are absolutely no parts together, but all\nin succession.\u201d In truth, space is quite as much implicated in\nco-existence as time. For if two things are co-existent and yet not one,\nthey are different in respect of space; if two states of one thing are\nco-existent (_e.g._, the glow and the heat of iron), then they are two\ncontemporaneous effects of _one_ thing, therefore presuppose matter, and\nmatter presupposes space. Strictly speaking, co-existence is a negative\ndetermination, which merely signifies that two things or states are not\ndifferent in respect of time; thus their difference is to be sought for\nelsewhere. But in any case, our knowledge of the permanence of substance,\n_i.e._, of matter, must be based upon insight _a priori_; for it is raised\nabove all doubt, and therefore cannot be drawn from experience. I deduce\nit from the fact that the principle of all becoming and passing away, the\nlaw of causality, of which we are conscious _a priori_, is essentially\nconcerned only with the _changes_, _i.e._, the successive _states_ of\nmatter, is thus limited to the form, and leaves the matter untouched,\nwhich therefore exists in our consciousness as the foundation of all\nthings, which is not subject to becoming or passing away, which has\ntherefore always been and will always continue to be. A deeper proof of\nthe permanence of substance, drawn from the analysis of our perception of\nthe empirical world in general, is to be found in the first book of this\nwork, \u00a7 4, where it is shown that the nature of matter consists in the\nabsolute _union of space and time_, a union which is only possible by\nmeans of the idea of causality, consequently only for the understanding,\nwhich is nothing but the subjective correlative of causality. Hence, also,\nmatter is never known otherwise than as producing effects, _i.e._, as\nthrough and through causality; to be and to act are with it one, which is\nindeed signified by the word _actuality_. Intimate union of space and\ntime\u2014causality, matter, actuality\u2014are thus one, and the subjective\ncorrelative of this one is the understanding. Matter must bear in itself\nthe conflicting properties of both factors from which it proceeds, and it\nis the idea of causality which abolishes what is contradictory in both,\nand makes their co-existence conceivable by the understanding, through\nwhich and for which alone matter is, and whose whole faculty consists in\nthe knowledge of cause and effect. Thus for the understanding there is\nunited in matter the inconstant flux of time, appearing as change of the\naccidents, with the rigid immobility of space, which exhibits itself as\nthe permanence of substance. For if the substance passed away like the\naccidents, the phenomenon would be torn away from space altogether, and\nwould only belong to time; the world of experience would be destroyed by\nthe abolition of matter, annihilation. Thus from the share which space has\nin matter, _i.e._, in all phenomena of the actual\u2014in that it is the\nopposite and counterpart of time, and therefore in itself and apart from\nthe union with the latter knows absolutely no change\u2014the principle of the\npermanence of substance, which recognises everything as _a priori_\ncertain, had to be deduced and explained; but not from mere time, to which\nfor this purpose and quite erroneously Kant has attributed _permanence_.\n\nIn the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, \u00a7 23, I have fully\nexplained the incorrectness of the following proof of the _a priori_\nnature and of the necessity of the law of causality from the mere\nsuccession of events in time; I must, therefore, content myself here by\nreferring to that passage.(6) This is precisely the case with the proof of\nreciprocity also, the concept of which I was obliged to explain above as\ninvalid. What is necessary has also been said of modality, the working out\nof the principles of which now follows.\n\nThere are still a few points in the further course of the transcendental\nanalytic which I should have to refute were it not that I am afraid of\ntrying the patience of the reader; I therefore leave them to his own\nreflection. But ever anew in the \u201cCritique of Pure Reason\u201d we meet that\nprincipal and fundamental error of Kant\u2019s, which I have copiously\ndenounced above, the complete failure to distinguish abstract, discursive\nknowledge from intuitive. It is this that throws a constant obscurity over\nKant\u2019s whole theory of the faculty of knowledge, and never allows the\nreader to know what he is really speaking about at any time, so that\ninstead of understanding, he always merely conjectures, for he alternately\ntries to understand what is said as referring to thought and to\nperception, and remains always in suspense. In the chapter \u201cOn the\nDivision of all Objects into Phenomena and Noumena,\u201d Kant carries that\nincredible want of reflection as to the nature of the idea of perception\nand the abstract idea, as I shall explain more fully immediately, so far\nas to make the monstrous assertion that without thought, that is, without\nabstract conceptions, there is no knowledge of an object; and that\nperception, because it is not thought, is also not knowledge, and, in\ngeneral, is nothing but a mere affection of sensibility, mere sensation!\nNay, more, that perception without conception is absolutely void; but\nconception without perception is yet always something (p. 253; V. 309).\nNow this is exactly the opposite of the truth; for concepts obtain all\nsignificance, all content, only from their relation to ideas of\nperception, from which they have been abstracted, derived, that is,\nconstructed through the omission of all that is unessential: therefore if\nthe foundation of perception is taken away from them, they are empty and\nvoid. Perceptions, on the contrary, have in themselves immediate and very\ngreat significance (in them, indeed, the thing in itself objectifies\nitself); they represent themselves, express themselves, have no mere\nborrowed content like concepts. For the principle of sufficient reason\ngoverns them only as the law of causality, and determines as such only\ntheir position in space and time; it does not, however, condition their\ncontent and their significance, as is the case with concepts, in which it\nappears as the principle of the ground of knowing. For the rest, it looks\nas if Kant really wished here to set about distinguishing the idea of\nperception and the abstract idea. He objects to Leibnitz and Locke that\nthe former reduced everything to abstract ideas, and the latter everything\nto ideas of perception. But yet he arrives at no distinction; and although\nLocke and Leibnitz really committed these errors, Kant himself is burdened\nwith a third error which includes them both\u2014the error of having so mixed\nup knowledge of perception and abstract knowledge that a monstrous hybrid\nof the two resulted, a chimera of which no distinct idea is possible, and\nwhich therefore necessarily only confused and stupefied students, and set\nthem at variance.\n\nCertainly thought and perception are separated more in the chapter\nreferred to \u201cOn the Division of all Objects into Phenomena and Noumena\u201d\nthan anywhere else, but the nature of this distinction is here a\nfundamentally false one. On p. 253; V. 309, it is said: \u201cIf I take away\nall thought (through the categories) from empirical knowledge, there\nremains absolutely no knowledge of an object, for through mere perception\nnothing at all is thought, and that this affection of sensibility is in me\nestablishes really no relation of such ideas to any object.\u201d This sentence\ncontains, in some degree, all the errors of Kant in a nutshell; for it\nbrings out clearly that he has falsely conceived the relation between\nsensation, perception, and thought, and accordingly identifies the\nperception, whose form he yet supposes to be space, and indeed space in\nall its three dimensions, with the mere subjective sensation in the organs\nof sense, but only allows the knowledge of an object to be given through\nthought, which is different from perception. I, on the contrary, say:\nObjects are first of all objects of perception, not of thought, and all\nknowledge of _objects_ is originally and in itself perception. Perception,\nhowever, is by no means mere sensation, but the understanding is already\nactive in it. The thought, which is added only in the case of men, not in\nthe case of the brutes, is mere abstraction from perception, gives no\nfundamentally new knowledge, does not itself establish objects which were\nnot before, but merely changes the form of the knowledge already won\nthrough perception, makes it abstract knowledge in concepts, whereby its\nconcrete or perceptible character is lost, but, on the other hand,\ncombination of it becomes possible, which immeasurably extends the range\nof its applicability. The material of our thought is, on the other hand,\nnothing else than our perceptions themselves, and not something which the\nperceptions did not contain, and which was added by the thought; therefore\nthe material of everything that appears in our thought must be capable of\nverification in our perception, for otherwise it would be an empty\nthought. Although this material is variously manipulated and transformed\nby thought, it must yet be capable of being reduced to perception, and the\nthought traced back to this\u2014just as a piece of gold can be reduced from\nall its solutions, oxides, sublimates, and combinations, and presented\npure and undiminished. This could not happen if thought itself had added\nsomething, and, indeed, the principal thing, to the object.\n\nThe whole of the chapter on the Amphiboly, which follows this, is merely a\ncriticism of the Leibnitzian philosophy, and as such is on the whole\ncorrect, though the form or pattern on which it is constructed is chosen\nmerely for the sake of architectonic symmetry, which here also is the\nguiding clue. Thus, to carry out the analogy with the Aristotelian\nOrganon, a transcendental Topic is set up, which consists in this, that\nevery conception is to be considered from four points of view, in order to\nmake out to which faculty of knowledge it belongs. But these four points\nof view are quite arbitrarily selected, and ten others might be added to\nthem with just as much right; but their fourfold number corresponds to the\ntitles of the categories, and therefore the chief doctrine of Leibnitz is\ndivided among them as best it may be. By this critique, also, to some\nextent, certain errors are stamped as natural to the reason, whereas they\nwere merely false abstractions of Leibnitz\u2019s, who, rather than learn from\nhis great philosophical contemporaries, Spinoza and Locke, preferred to\nserve up his own strange inventions. In the chapter on the Amphiboly of\nReflection it is finally said that there may possibly be a kind of\nperception entirely different from ours, to which, however, our categories\nare applicable; therefore the objects of that supposed perception would be\n_noumena_, things which can only be _thought_ by us; but since the\nperception which would give that thought meaning is wanting to us, and\nindeed is altogether quite problematical, the object of that thought would\nalso merely be a wholly indefinite possibility. I have shown above by\nquotations that Kant, in utter contradiction with himself, sets up the\ncategories now as the condition of knowledge of perception, now as the\nfunction of merely abstract thought. Here they appear exclusively in the\nlatter sense, and it seems quite as if he wished to attribute them merely\nto discursive thought. But if this is really his opinion, then necessarily\nat the beginning of the Transcendental Logic, before specifying the\ndifferent functions of thought at such length, he was necessarily bound to\ncharacterise thought in general, and consequently to distinguish it from\nperception; he ought to have shown what knowledge is given by mere\nperception, and what that is new is added by thought. Then we would have\nknown what he was really speaking about; or rather, he would then have\nspoken quite differently, first of perception, and then of thought;\ninstead of which, as it is, he is always dealing with something between\nthe two, which is a mere delusion. There would not then be that great gap\nbetween the transcendental \u00c6sthetic and the transcendental Logic, where,\nafter the exposition of the mere form of perception, he simply dismisses\nits content, all that is empirically apprehended, with the phrase \u201cIt is\ngiven,\u201d and does not ask how it came about, _whether with or without\nunderstanding_; but, with one spring, passes over to abstract thought; and\nnot even to thought in general, but at once to certain forms of thought,\nand does not say a word about what thought is, what the concept is, what\nis the relation of abstract and discursive to concrete and intuitive, what\nis the difference between the knowledge of men and that of brutes, and\nwhat is reason.\n\nYet it was just this distinction between abstract knowledge and knowledge\nof perception, entirely overlooked by Kant, which the ancients denoted by\n\u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 and \u03bd\u03bf\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1,(7) and whose opposition and incommensurability\noccupied them so much in the philosophemes of the Eleatics, in Plato\u2019s\ndoctrine of Ideas, in the dialectic of the Megarics, and later the\nScholastics in the controversy between Nominalism and Realism, the seed of\nwhich, so late in developing, was already contained in the opposite mental\ntendencies of Plato and Aristotle. But Kant, who, in an inexcusable\nmanner, entirely neglected the thing to denote which the words \u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\nand \u03bd\u03bf\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 had already been taken, took possession of the words, as if\nthey were still unappropriated, in order to denote by them his thing in\nitself and his phenomenon.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nSince I have been obliged to reject Kant\u2019s doctrine of the categories,\njust as he rejected that of Aristotle, I wish here to indicate as a\nsuggestion a third way of reaching what is aimed at. What both Kant and\nAristotle sought for under the name of the categories were the most\ngeneral conceptions under which all things, however different, must be\nsubsumed, and through which therefore everything that exists would\nultimately be thought. Just on this account Kant conceived them as the\n_forms_ of all thought.\n\nGrammar is related to logic as clothes to the body. Should not, therefore,\nthese primary conceptions, the ground-bass of the reason, which is the\nfoundation of all special thought, without whose application, therefore,\nno thought can take place, ultimately lie in those conceptions which just\non account of their exceeding generality (transcendentalism) have their\nexpression not in single words, but in whole classes of words, because one\nof them is thought along with every word whatever it may be, whose\ndesignation would therefore have to be looked for, not in the lexicon but\nin the grammar? In fact, should they not be those distinctions of\nconceptions on account of which the word which expresses them is either a\nsubstantive or an adjective, a verb or an adverb, a pronoun, a\npreposition, or some other particle\u2014in short, the parts of speech? For\nundoubtedly these denote the forms which all thought primarily assumes,\nand in which it directly moves; accordingly they are the essential forms\nof speech, the fundamental constituent elements of every language, so that\nwe cannot imagine any language which would not consist of at least\nsubstantives, adjectives, and verbs. These fundamental forms would then\nhave subordinated to them those forms of thought which are expressed\nthrough their inflections, that is, through declension and conjugation,\nand it is unessential to the chief concern whether in denoting them we\ncall in the assistance of the article and the pronoun. We will examine the\nthing, however, somewhat more closely, and ask the question anew: What are\nthe forms of thought?\n\n(1.) Thought consists throughout of judging; judgments are the threads of\nits whole web, for without making use of a verb our thought does not move,\nand as often as we use a verb we judge.\n\n(2.) Every judgment consists in the recognition of the relation between\nsubject and predicate, which it separates or unites with various\nrestrictions. It unites them from the recognition of the actual identity\nof the two, which can only happen in the case of synonyms; then in the\nrecognition that the one is always thought along with the other, though\nthe converse does not hold\u2014in the universal affirmative proposition; up to\nthe recognition that the one is sometimes thought along with the other, in\nthe particular affirmative proposition. The negative propositions take the\nopposite course. Accordingly in every judgment the subject, the predicate,\nand the copula, the latter affirmative or negative, must be to be found;\neven although each of these is not denoted by a word of its own, as is\nhowever generally the case. The predicate and the copula are often denoted\nby _one_ word, as \u201cCaius ages;\u201d sometimes one word denotes all three, as\n_concurritur_, _i.e._, \u201cthe armies engage.\u201d From this it is evident that\nthe forms of thought are not to be sought for precisely and directly in\nwords, nor even in the parts of speech, for even in the same language the\nsame judgment may be expressed in different words, and indeed in different\nparts of speech, yet the thought remains the same, and consequently also\nits form; for the thought could not be the same if the form of thought\nitself were different. But with the same thought and the same form of\nthought the form of words may very well be different, for it is merely the\noutward clothing of the thought, which, on the other hand, is inseparable\nfrom _its_ form. Thus grammar only explains the clothing of the forms of\nthought. The parts of speech can therefore be deduced from the original\nforms of thought themselves which are independent of all language; their\nwork is to express these forms of thought in all their modifications. They\nare the instrument and the clothing of the forms of thought, and must be\naccurately adapted to the structure of the latter, so that it may be\nrecognised in them.\n\n(3.) These real, unalterable, original forms of thought are certainly\n_those of Kant\u2019s logical table of judgments_; only that in this table are\nto be found blind windows for the sake of symmetry and the table of the\ncategories; these must all be omitted, and also a false arrangement.\nThus:\u2014\n\n(_a._) _Quality_: affirmation and negation, _i.e._, combination and\nseparation of concepts: two forms. It depends on the copula.\n\n(_b._) _Quantity_: the subject-concept is taken either in whole or in\npart: totality or multiplicity. To the first belong also individual\nsubjects: Socrates means \u201call Socrateses.\u201d Thus two forms. It depends on\nthe subject.\n\n(_c._) _Modality_: has really three forms. It determines the quality as\nnecessary, actual, or contingent. It consequently depends also on the\ncopula.\n\nThese three forms of thought spring from the laws of thought of\ncontradiction and identity. But from the principle of sufficient reason\nand the law of excluded middle springs\u2014\n\n(_d._) _Relation._ It only appears if we judge concerning completed\njudgments, and can only consist in this, that it either asserts the\ndependence of one judgment upon another (also in the plurality of both),\nand therefore combines them in the _hypothetical_ proposition; or else\nasserts that judgments exclude each other, and therefore separates them in\nthe _disjunctive_ proposition. It depends on the copula, which here\nseparates or combines the completed judgments.\n\nThe _parts of speech_ and grammatical forms are ways of expressing the\nthree constituent parts of the judgment, the subject, the predicate, and\nthe copula, and also of the possible relations of these; thus of the forms\nof thought just enumerated, and the fuller determinations and\nmodifications of these. Substantive, adjective, and verb are therefore\nessential fundamental constituent elements of language in general;\ntherefore they must be found in all languages. Yet it is possible to\nconceive a language in which adjective and verb would always be fused\ntogether, as is sometimes the case in all languages. Provisionally it may\nbe said, for the expression of the _subject_ are intended the substantive,\nthe article, and the pronoun; for the expression of the _predicate_, the\nadjective, the adverb, and the preposition; for the expression of the\n_copula_, the verb, which, however, with the exception of the verb to be,\nalso contains the predicate. It is the task of the philosophy of grammar\nto teach the precise mechanism of the expression of the forms of thought,\nas it is the task of logic to teach the operations with the forms of\nthought themselves.\n\n_Note._\u2014As a warning against a false path and to illustrate the above, I\nmention S. Stern\u2019s \u201c_Vorl\u00e4ufige Grundlage zur Sprachphilosophie_,\u201d 1835,\nwhich is an utterly abortive attempt to construct the categories out of\nthe grammatical forms. He has entirely confused thought with perception,\nand therefore, instead of the categories of thought, he has tried to\ndeduce the supposed categories of perception from the grammatical forms,\nand consequently has placed the grammatical forms in direct relation to\nperception. He is involved in the great error that _language_ is\nimmediately related to _perception_, instead of being directly related\nonly to thought as such, thus to the _abstract concepts_, and only by\nmeans of these to perception, to which they, however, have a relation\nwhich introduces an entire change of the form. What exists in perception,\nthus also the relations which proceed from time and space, certainly\nbecomes an object of thought; thus there must also be forms of speech to\nexpress it, yet always merely in the abstract, as concepts. Concepts are\nalways the primary material of thought, and the forms of logic are always\nrelated to these, never _directly_ to perception. Perception always\ndetermines only the material, never the formal truth of the proposition,\nfor the formal truth is determined according to the logical rules alone.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nI return to the Kantian philosophy, and come now to the _Transcendental\nDialectic_. Kant opens it with the explanation of _reason_, the faculty\nwhich is to play the principal part in it, for hitherto only sensibility\nand understanding were on the scene. When considering his different\nexplanations of reason, I have already spoken above of the explanation he\ngives here that \u201cit is the faculty of principles.\u201d It is now taught here\nthat all the _a priori_ knowledge hitherto considered, which makes pure\nmathematics and pure natural science possible, affords only _rules_, and\nno _principles_; because it proceeds from perceptions and forms of\nknowledge, and not from mere conceptions, which is demanded if it is to be\ncalled a principle. Such a principle must accordingly be knowledge _from\npure conceptions_ and yet _synthetical_. But this is absolutely\nimpossible. From pure conceptions nothing but _analytical_ propositions\ncan ever proceed. If conceptions are to be synthetically and yet _a\npriori_ combined, this combination must necessarily be accomplished by\nsome third thing, through a pure perception of the formal possibility of\nexperience, just as synthetic judgments _a posteriori_ are brought about\nthrough empirical perception; consequently a synthetic proposition _a\npriori_ can never proceed from pure conceptions. In general, however, we\nare _a priori_ conscious of nothing more than the principle of sufficient\nreason in its different forms, and therefore no other synthetic judgments\n_a priori_ are possible than those which proceed from that which receives\nits content from that principle.\n\nHowever, Kant finally comes forward with a pretended principle of the\nreason answering to his demand, yet only with this _one_, from which\nothers afterwards follow as corollaries. It is the principle which Chr.\nWolf set up and explained in his \u201c_Cosmologia_,\u201d sect. i. c. 2, \u00a7 93, and\nin his \u201c_Ontologia_,\u201d \u00a7 178. As now above, under the title of the\nAmphiboly, mere Leibnitzian philosophemes were taken for natural and\nnecessary aberrations of the reason, and were criticised as such, so here\nprecisely the same thing happens with the philosophemes of Wolf. Kant\nstill presents this principle of the reason in an obscure light, through\nindistinctness, indefiniteness, and breaking of it up (p. 307; V. 361, and\n322; V. 379). Clearly expressed, however, it is as follows: \u201cIf the\nconditioned is given, the totality of its conditions must also be given,\nand therefore also the _unconditioned_, through which alone that totality\nbecomes complete.\u201d We become most vividly aware of the apparent truth of\nthis proposition if we imagine the conditions and the conditioned as the\nlinks of a suspended chain, the upper end of which, however, is not\nvisible, so that it might extend _ad infinitum_; since, however, the chain\ndoes not fall, but hangs, there must be above _one_ link which is the\nfirst, and in some way is fixed. Or, more briefly: the reason desires to\nhave a point of attachment for the causal chain which reaches back to\ninfinity; it would be convenient for it. But we will examine the\nproposition, not in figures, but in itself. Synthetic it certainly is;\nfor, analytically, nothing more follows from the conception of the\nconditioned than that of the condition. It has not, however, _a priori_\ntruth, nor even _a posteriori_, but it surreptitiously obtains its\nappearance of truth in a very subtle way, which I must now point out.\nImmediately, and _a priori_, we have the knowledge which the principle of\nsufficient reason in its four forms expresses. From this immediate\nknowledge all abstract expressions of the principle of sufficient reason\nare derived, and they are thus indirect; still more, however, is this the\ncase with inferences or corollaries from them. I have already explained\nabove how _abstract_ knowledge often unites a variety of _intuitive_\ncognitions in _one_ form or _one_ concept in such a way that they can no\nlonger be distinguished; therefore abstract knowledge stands to intuitive\nknowledge as the shadow to the real objects, the great multiplicity of\nwhich it presents through one outline comprehending them all. Now the\npretended principle of the reason makes use of this shadow. In order to\ndeduce from the principle of sufficient reason the unconditioned, which\ndirectly contradicts it, it prudently abandons the immediate concrete\nknowledge of the content of the principle of sufficient reason in its\nparticular forms, and only makes use of abstract concepts which are\nderived from it, and have value and significance only through it, in order\nto smuggle its unconditioned somehow or other into the wide sphere of\nthose concepts. Its procedure becomes most distinct when clothed in\ndialectical form; for example, thus: \u201cIf the conditioned exists, its\ncondition must also be given, and indeed all given, thus completely, thus\nthe totality of its conditions; consequently, if they constitute a series,\nthe whole series, consequently also its first beginning, thus the\nunconditioned.\u201d Here it is false that the conditions of a conditioned can\nconstitute a _series_. Rather must the totality of the conditions of\neverything conditioned be contained in its _nearest_ ground or reason from\nwhich it directly proceeds, and which is only thus a _sufficient_ ground\nor reason. For example, the different determinations of the state which is\nthe cause, all of which must be present together before the effect can\ntake place. But the series, for example, the chain of causes, arises\nmerely from the fact that we regard what immediately before was the\ncondition as now a conditioned; but then at once the whole operation\nbegins again from the beginning, and the principle of sufficient reason\nappears anew with its claim. But there can never be for a conditioned a\nproperly successive _series_ of conditions, which exist merely as such,\nand on account of that which is at last conditioned; it is always an\nalternating series of conditioneds and conditions; as each link is laid\naside the chain is broken, and the claim of the principle of sufficient\nreason entirely satisfied, it arises anew because the condition becomes\nthe conditioned. Thus the principle of _sufficient_ reason always demands\nonly the completeness of the _immediate or next condition_, never the\ncompleteness of a _series_. But just this conception of the completeness\nof the condition leaves it undetermined whether this completeness should\nbe simultaneous or successive; and since the latter is chosen, the demand\nnow arises for a complete series of conditions following each other. Only\nthrough an arbitrary abstraction is a series of causes and effects\nregarded as a series of causes alone, which exists merely on account of\nthe last effect, and is therefore demanded as its _sufficient_ reason.\nFrom closer and more intelligent consideration, and by rising from the\nindefinite generality of abstraction to the particular definite reality,\nit appears, on the contrary, that the demand for a _sufficient_ reason\nextends only to the completeness of the determinations of the _immediate_\ncause, not to the completeness of a series. The demand of the principle of\nsufficient reason is completely extinguished in each sufficient reason\ngiven. It arises, however, immediately anew, because this reason is again\nregarded as a consequent; but it never demands directly a series of\nreasons. If, on the other hand, instead of going to the thing itself, we\nconfine ourselves to the abstract concepts, these distinctions vanish.\nThen a chain of alternating causes and effects, or of alternating logical\nreasons and consequents, is given out as simply a chain of causes of the\nlast effect, or reasons of the last consequent, and the _completeness of\nthe conditions_, through which alone a reason becomes _sufficient_,\nappears as the completeness of that assumed _series_ of reasons alone,\nwhich only exist on account of the last consequent. There then appears the\nabstract principle of the reason very boldly with its demand for the\nunconditioned. But, in order to recognise the invalidity of this claim,\nthere is no need of a critique of reason by means of antinomies and their\nsolution, but only of a critique of reason understood in my sense, an\nexamination of the relation of abstract knowledge to direct intuitive\nknowledge, by means of ascending from the indefinite generality of the\nformer to the fixed definiteness of the latter. From such a critique,\nthen, it here appears that the nature of the reason by no means consists\nin the demand for an unconditioned; for, whenever it proceeds with full\ndeliberation, it must itself find that an unconditioned is an absurdity.\nThe reason as a faculty of knowledge can always have to do only with\nobjects; but every object for the subject is necessarily and irrevocably\nsubordinated to the principle of sufficient reason, both _a parte ante_\nand _a parte post_. The validity of the principle of sufficient reason is\nso involved in the form of consciousness that we absolutely cannot imagine\nanything objective of which no _why_ could further be demanded; thus we\ncannot imagine an absolute absolute, like a blind wall in front of us.\nThat his convenience should lead this or that person to stop at some\npoint, and assume such an absolute at pleasure, is of no avail against\nthat incontestable certainty _a priori_, even if he should put on an air\nof great importance in doing so. In fact, the whole talk about the\nabsolute, almost the sole theme of philosophies since Kant, is nothing but\nthe cosmological proof _incognito_. This proof, in consequence of the case\nbrought against it by Kant, deprived of all right and declared outlawed,\ndare no longer show itself in its true form, and therefore appears in all\nkinds of disguises\u2014now in distinguished form, concealed under intellectual\nintuition or pure thought; now as a suspicious vagabond, half begging,\nhalf demanding what it wants in more unpretending philosophemes. If an\nabsolute must absolutely be had, then I will give one which is far better\nfitted to meet all the demands which are made on such a thing than these\nvisionary phantoms; it is matter. It has no beginning, and it is\nimperishable; thus it is really independent, and _quod per se est et per\nse concipitur_; from its womb all proceeds, and to it all returns; what\nmore can be desired of an absolute? But to those with whom no critique of\nreason has succeeded, we should rather say\u2014\n\n\n    \u201cAre not ye like unto women, who ever\n    Return to the point from which they set out,\n    Though reason should have been talked by the hour?\u201d\n\n\nThat the return to an unconditioned cause, to a first beginning, by no\nmeans lies in the nature of reason, is, moreover, practically proved by\nthe fact that the primitive religions of our race, which even yet have the\ngreatest number of followers upon earth, Brahmanism and Buddhaism, neither\nknow nor admit such assumptions, but carry the series of phenomena\nconditioning each other into infinity. Upon this point, I refer to the\nnote appended to the criticism of the first antinomy, which occurs further\non; and the reader may also see Upham\u2019s \u201cDoctrine of Buddhaism\u201d (p. 9),\nand in general all genuine accounts of the religions of Asia. Judaism and\nreason ought not to be identified.\n\nKant, who by no means desires to maintain his pretended principle of\nreason as objectively valid, but merely as subjectively necessary, deduces\nit even as such only by means of a shallow sophism, p. 307; V. 364. He\nsays that because we seek to subsume every truth known to us under a more\ngeneral truth, as far as this process can be carried, this is nothing else\nthan the pursuit of the unconditioned, which we already presuppose. But,\nin truth, in this endeavour we do nothing more than apply reason, and\nintentionally make use of it to simplify our knowledge by enabling us to\nsurvey it\u2014reason, which is that faculty of abstract, general knowledge\nthat distinguishes the reflective, thinking man, endowed with speech, from\nthe brute, which is the slave of the present. For the use of reason just\nconsists in this, that we know the particular through the universal, the\ncase through the rule, the rule through the more general rule; thus that\nwe seek the most general points of view. Through such survey or general\nview our knowledge is so facilitated and perfected that from it arises the\ngreat difference between the life of the brutes and that of men, and again\nbetween the life of educated and that of uneducated men. Now, certainly\nthe series of _grounds of knowledge_, which exist only in the sphere of\nthe abstract, thus of reason, always finds an end in what is\nindemonstrable, _i.e._, in an idea which is not further conditioned\naccording to this form of the principle of sufficient reason, thus in the\n_a priori_ or _a posteriori_ directly perceptible ground of the first\nproposition of the train of reasoning. I have already shown in the essay\non the principle of sufficient reason, \u00a7 50, that here the series of\ngrounds of knowledge really passes over into grounds of becoming or of\nbeing. But one can only desire to make this circumstance hold good as a\nproof of an unconditioned according to the law of causality, or even of\nthe mere demand for such an unconditioned, if one has not yet\ndistinguished the forms of the principle of sufficient reason at all, but,\nholding to the abstract expression, has confounded them all. Kant,\nhowever, seeks to establish that confusion, through a mere play upon\nwords, with _Universalitas_ and _Universitas_, p. 322; V. 379. Thus it is\nfundamentally false that our search for higher grounds of knowledge, more\ngeneral truths, springs from the presupposition of an object unconditioned\nin its being, or has anything whatever in common with this. Moreover, how\nshould it be essential to the reason to presuppose something which it must\nknow to be an absurdity as soon as it reflects? The source of that\nconception of the unconditioned is rather to be found only in the\nindolence of the individual who wishes by means of it to get rid of all\nfurther questions, whether his own or of others, though entirely without\njustification.\n\nNow Kant himself denies objective validity to this pretended principle of\nreason; he gives it, however, as a necessary subjective assumption, and\nthus introduces an irremediable split into our knowledge, which he soon\nallows to appear more clearly. With this purpose he unfolds that principle\nof reason further, p. 322; V. 379, in accordance with the method of\narchitectonic symmetry of which he is so fond. From the three categories\nof relation spring three kinds of syllogisms, each of which gives the clue\nfor the discovery of a special unconditioned, of which again there are\nthree: the soul, the world (as an object in itself and absolute totality),\nand God. Now here we must at once note a great contradiction, of which\nKant, however, takes no notice, because it would be very dangerous to the\nsymmetry. Two of these unconditioneds are themselves conditioned by the\nthird, the soul and the world by God, who is the cause of their existence.\nThus the two former have by no means the predicate of unconditionedness in\ncommon with the latter, though this is really the point here, but only\nthat of inferred being according to the principles of experience, beyond\nthe sphere of the possibility of experience.\n\nSetting this aside, we recognise in the three unconditioneds, to which,\naccording to Kant, reason, following its essential laws, must come, the\nthree principal subjects round which the whole of philosophy under the\ninfluence of Christianity, from the Scholastics down to Christian Wolf,\nhas turned. Accessible and familiar as these conceptions have become\nthrough all these philosophers, and now also through the philosophers of\npure reason, this by no means shows that, without revelation, they would\nnecessarily have proceeded from the development of all reason as a\nproduction peculiar to its very nature. In order to prove this it would be\nnecessary to call in the aid of historical criticism, and to examine\nwhether the ancient and non-European nations, especially the peoples of\nHindostan and many of the oldest Greek philosophers, really attained to\nthose conceptions, or whether it is only we who, by quite falsely\ntranslating the Brahma of the Hindus and the Tien of the Chinese as \u201cGod,\u201d\ngood-naturedly attribute such conceptions to them, just as the Greeks\nrecognised their gods everywhere; whether it is not rather the case that\ntheism proper is only to be found in the religion of the Jews, and in the\ntwo religions which have proceeded from it, whose followers just on this\naccount comprise the adherents of all other religions on earth under the\nname of heathen, which, by the way, is a most absurd and crude expression,\nand ought to be banished at least from the writings of the learned,\nbecause it identifies and jumbles together Brahmanists, Buddhists,\nEgyptians, Greeks, Romans, Germans, Gauls, Iroquois, Patagonians,\nCaribbeans, Otaheiteans, Australians, and many others. Such an expression\nis all very well for priests, but in the learned world it must at once be\nshown the door: it can go to England and take up its abode at Oxford. It\nis a thoroughly established fact that Buddhism, the religion which numbers\nmore followers than any other on earth, contains absolutely no theism,\nindeed rejects it. As regards Plato, it is my opinion that he owes to the\nJews the theism with which he is periodically seized. On this account\nNumenius (according to Clem. Alex., _Strom._, i. c. 22, Euseb. _pr\u00e6p.\nevang._, xiii. 12, and Suidas under Numenius) called him the _Moses\ngr\u00e6cisans_: \u03a4\u03b9 \u03b3\u03b1\u03c1 \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03a0\u03bb\u03b1\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u03b7 \u039c\u03c9\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b1\u03c4\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b9\u03b6\u03c9\u03bd; and he accuses him of\nhaving stolen (\u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03c3\u03c5\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2) his doctrine of God and the creation from the\nMosaical writings. Clemens often repeats that Plato knew and made use of\nMoses, _e.g._, _Strom._, i. 25.\u2014v. c. 14, \u00a7 90, &c., &c.; _P\u00e6dagog._, ii.\n10, and iii. 11; also in the _Cohortatio ad gentes_, c. 6, where, after he\nhas bitterly censured and derided the whole of the Greek philosophers in\nthe preceding chapter because they were not Jews, he bestows on Plato\nnothing but praise, and breaks out into pure exultation that as Plato had\nlearnt his geometry from the Egyptians, his astronomy from the\nBabylonians, magic from the Thracians, and much also from the Assyrians,\nso he had learnt his theism from the Jews: \u039f\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03bd\n\u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03c1\u03c5\u03c0\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u03b8\u03b5\u03bb\u1fc7\u03c2, ... \u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1fbd \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c9\u03c6\u03b5\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u0395\u03b2\u03c1\u03b1\u03b9\u03c9\u03bd\n(_Tuos magistros novi, licet eos celare velis, ... illa de Deo sententia\nsuppeditata tibi est ab Hebr\u00e6is_). A pathetic scene of recognition. But I\nsee a remarkable confirmation of the matter in what follows. According to\nPlutarch (_in Mario_), and, better, according to Lactantius (i. 3, 19),\nPlato thanked Nature that he had been born a human being and not a brute,\na man and not a woman, a Greek and not a barbarian. Now in Isaac Euchel\u2019s\n\u201cPrayers of the Jews,\u201d from the Hebrew, second edition, 1799, p. 7, there\nis a morning prayer in which God is thanked and praised that the\nworshipper was born a Jew and not a heathen, a free man and not a slave, a\nman and not a woman. Such an historical investigation would have spared\nKant an unfortunate necessity in which he now becomes involved, in that he\nmakes these three conceptions spring necessarily from the nature of\nreason, and yet explains that they are untenable and unverifiable by the\nreason, and thus makes the reason itself a sophisticator; for he says, p.\n339; V. 397: \u201cThere are sophistications, not of man, but of pure reason\nitself, from which even the wisest cannot free himself, and although after\nmuch trouble he may be able to avoid error, yet he never can escape from\nthe illusion which unceasingly torments and mocks him.\u201d Therefore these\nKantian \u201cIdeas of the Reason\u201d might be compared to the focus in which the\nconverging reflected rays from a concave mirror meet several inches before\nits surface, in consequence of which, by an inevitable process of the\nunderstanding, an object presents itself to us there which is a thing\nwithout reality.\n\nBut the name \u201cIdea\u201d is very unfortunately chosen for these pretended\nnecessary productions of the pure theoretical reason, and violently\nappropriated from Plato, who used it to denote the eternal forms which,\nmultiplied through space and time, become partially visible in the\ninnumerable individual fleeting things. Plato\u2019s \u201cIdeas\u201d are accordingly\nthroughout perceptible, as indeed the word which he chose so definitely\nsignifies, for it could only be adequately translated by means of\nperceptible or visible things; and Kant has appropriated it to denote that\nwhich lies so far from all possibility of perception that even abstract\nthought can only half attain to it. The word \u201cIdea,\u201d which Plato first\nintroduced, has, moreover, since then, through two-and-twenty centuries,\nalways retained the significance in which he used it; for not only all\nancient philosophers, but also all the Scholastics, and indeed the Church\nFathers and the theologians of the Middle Ages, used it only in that\nPlatonic sense, the sense of the Latin word _exemplar_, as Suarez\nexpressly mentions in his twenty-fifth Disputation, sect. 1. That\nEnglishmen and Frenchmen were later induced by the poverty of their\nlanguages to misuse this word is bad enough, but not of importance. Kant\u2019s\nmisuse of the word idea, by the substitution of a new significance\nintroduced by means of the slender clue of not being object of experience,\nwhich it has in common with Plato\u2019s ideas, but also in common with every\npossible chimera, is thus altogether unjustifiable. Now, since the misuse\nof a few years is not to be considered against the authority of many\ncenturies, I have always used the word in its old, original, Platonic\nsignificance.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nThe refutation of _rational psychology_ is much fuller and more thorough\nin the first edition of the \u201cCritique of Pure Reason\u201d than in the second\nand following editions, and therefore upon this point we must make use of\nthe first edition exclusively. This refutation has as a whole very great\nmerit and much truth. Yet I am clearly of the opinion that it was merely\nfrom his love of symmetry that Kant deduced as necessary the conception of\nthe soul from the paralogism of substantiality by applying the demand for\nthe unconditioned to the conception _substance_, which is the first\ncategory of relation, and accordingly maintained that the conception of a\nsoul arose in this way in every speculative reason. If this conception\nreally had its origin in the presupposition of a final subject of all\npredicates of a thing, one would have assumed a soul not in men alone, but\nalso just as necessarily in every lifeless thing, for such a thing also\nrequires a final subject of all its predicates. Speaking generally,\nhowever, Kant makes use of a quite inadmissible expression when he talks\nof something which can exist only as subject and not as predicate (_e.g._,\nCritique of Pure Reason, p. 323; V. 412; Prolegomena, \u00a7 4 and 47); though\na precedent for this is to be found in Aristotle\u2019s \u201cMetaphysics,\u201d iv. ch.\n8. Nothing whatever exists as subject and predicate, for these expressions\nbelong exclusively to logic, and denote the relations of abstract\nconceptions to each other. Now their correlative or representative in the\nworld of perception must be substance and accident. But then we need not\nlook further for that which exists always as substance and never as\naccident, but have it directly in matter. It is the substance\ncorresponding to all properties of things which are their accidents. It\nis, in fact, if one wishes to retain the expression of Kant which has just\nbeen condemned, the final subject of all predicates of that empirically\ngiven thing, that which remains after the abstraction of all its\nproperties of every kind. And this holds good of man as of a brute, a\nplant, or a stone, and is so evident, that in order not to see it a\ndetermined desire not to see is required. That it is really the prototype\nof the conception substance, I will show soon. But subject and predicate\nare related to substance and accident rather as the principle of\nsufficient reason in logic to the law of causality in nature, and the\nsubstitution or identification of the former is just as inadmissible as\nthat of the latter. Yet in the \u201cProlegomena,\u201d \u00a7 46, Kant carries this\nsubstitution and identification to its fullest extent in order to make the\nconception of the soul arise from that of the final subject of all\npredicates and from the form of the categorical syllogism. In order to\ndiscover the sophistical nature of this paragraph, one only needs to\nreflect that subject and predicate are purely logical determinations,\nwhich concern abstract conceptions solely and alone, and that according to\ntheir relation in the judgment. Substance and accident, on the other hand,\nbelong to the world of perception and its apprehension in the\nunderstanding, and are even there only as identical with matter and form\nor quality. Of this more shortly.\n\nThe antithesis which has given occasion for the assumption of two\nfundamentally different substances, body and soul, is in truth that of\nobjective and subjective. If a man apprehends himself objectively in\nexternal perception, he finds a being extended in space and in general\nmerely corporeal; but if, on the other hand, he apprehends himself in mere\nself-consciousness, thus purely subjectively, he finds himself a merely\nwilling and perceiving being, free from all forms of perception, thus also\nwithout a single one of the properties which belong to bodies. Now he\nforms the conception of the soul, like all the transcendental conceptions\ncalled by Kant Ideas, by applying the principle of sufficient reason, the\nform of all objects, to that which is not an object, and in this case\nindeed to the subject of knowing and willing. He treats, in fact, knowing,\nthinking, and willing as effects of which he seeks the cause, and as he\ncannot accept the body as their cause, he assumes a cause of them entirely\ndifferent from the body. In this manner the first and the last of the\ndogmatists proves the existence of the soul: Plato in the \u201cPh\u00e6drus\u201d and\nalso Wolf: from thinking and willing as the effects which lead to that\ncause. Only after in this way, by hypostatising a cause corresponding to\nthe effect, the conception of an immaterial, simple, indestructible being\nhad arisen, the school developed and demonstrated this from the conception\nof _substance_. But this conception itself they had previously constructed\nspecially for this purpose by the following artifice, which is worthy of\nnotice.\n\nWith the first class of ideas, _i.e._, the real world of perception, the\nidea of matter is also given; because the law governing this class of\nideas, the law of causality, determines the change of the states or\nconditions, and these conditions themselves presuppose something\npermanent, whose changes they are. When speaking above of the principle of\nthe permanence of substance, I showed, by reference to earlier passages,\nthat this idea of matter arises because in the understanding, for which\nalone it exists, time and space are intimately united, and the share of\nspace in this product exhibits itself as the permanence of matter, while\nthe share of time appears as the change of states. Purely in itself,\nmatter can only be thought _in abstracto_, and not perceived; for to\nperception it always appears already in form and quality. From this\nconception of _matter_, _substance_ is again an abstraction, consequently\na higher _genus_, and arose in this way. Of the conception of matter, only\nthe predicate of permanence was allowed to remain, while all its other\nessential properties, extension, impenetrability, divisibility, &c., were\nthought away. Like every higher _genus_, then, the concept _substance_\ncontains _less in itself_ than the concept _matter_, but, unlike every\nother higher _genus_, it does not contain _more under it_, because it does\nnot include several lower _genera_ besides matter; but this remains the\none true species of the concept substance, the only assignable thing by\nwhich its content is realised and receives a proof. Thus the aim with\nwhich in other cases the reason produces by abstraction a higher\nconception, in order that in it several subordinate species may be thought\nat once through common determinations, has here no place; consequently\nthat abstraction is either undertaken idly and entirely without aim, or it\nhas a secret secondary purpose. This secret purpose is now brought to\nlight; for under the conception substance, along with its true sub-species\nmatter, a second species is co-ordinated\u2014the immaterial, simple,\nindestructible substance, soul. But the surreptitious introduction of this\nlast concept arose from the fact that the higher concept _substance_ was\nframed illogically, and in a manner contrary to law. In its legitimate\nprocedure the reason always frames the concept of a higher genus by\nplacing together the concepts of several species, and now comparing them,\nproceeds discursively, and by omitting their differences and retaining the\nqualities in which they agree, obtains the generic concept which includes\nthem all but has a smaller content. From this it follows that the concepts\nof the species must always precede the concept of the genus. But, in the\npresent case, the converse is true. Only the concept matter existed before\nthe generic concept _substance_. The latter was without occasion, and\nconsequently without justification, as it were aimlessly framed from the\nformer by the arbitrary omission of all its determinations except one. Not\ntill afterwards was the second ungenuine species placed beside the concept\nmatter, and so foisted in. But for the framing of this second concept\nnothing more was now required than an express denial of what had already\nbeen tacitly omitted in the higher generic concept, extension,\nimpenetrability, and divisibility. Thus the concept _substance_ was framed\nmerely to be the vehicle for the surreptitious introduction of the concept\nof the immaterial substance. Consequently, it is very far from being\ncapable of holding good as a category or necessary function of the\nunderstanding; rather is it an exceedingly superfluous concept, because\nits only true content lies already in the concept of matter, besides which\nit contains only a great void, which can be filled up by nothing but the\nillicitly introduced species _immaterial substance_; and, indeed, it was\nsolely for the purpose of containing this that it was framed. Accordingly,\nin strictness, the concept substance must be entirely rejected, and the\nconcept matter everywhere put in its place.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nThe categories were a procrustean bed for every possible thing, but the\nthree kinds of syllogisms are so only for the three so-called Ideas. The\nIdea of the soul was compelled to find its origin in the form of the\ncategorical syllogism. It is now the turn of the dogmatic ideas concerning\nthe universe, so far as it is thought as an object in itself, between two\nlimits\u2014that of the smallest (atom), and that of the largest (limits of the\nuniverse in time and space). These must now proceed from the form of the\nhypothetical syllogism. Nor for this in itself is any special violence\nnecessary. For the hypothetical judgment has its form from the principle\nof sufficient reason, and not the cosmological alone but all those\nso-called Ideas really have their origin in the inconsiderate and\nunrestricted application of that principle, and the laying aside of it at\npleasure. For, in accordance with that principle, the mere dependence of\nan object upon another is ever sought for, till finally the exhaustion of\nthe imagination puts an end to the journey; and thus it is lost sight of\nthat every object, and indeed the whole chain of objects and the principle\nof sufficient reason itself, stand in a far closer and greater dependence,\nthe dependence upon the knowing subject, for whose objects alone, _i.e._,\nideas, that principle is valid, for their mere position in space and time\nis determined by it. Thus, since the form of knowledge from which here\nmerely the cosmological Ideas are derived, the principle of sufficient\nreason, is the source of all subtle hypostases, in this case no sophisms\nneed be resorted to; but so much the more is sophistry required in order\nto classify those Ideas according to the four titles of the categories.\n\n(1.) The cosmological Ideas with regard to time and space, thus of the\nlimits of the world in both, are boldly regarded as determined through the\ncategory of _quantity_, with which they clearly have nothing in common,\nexcept the accidental denotation in logic of the extent of the concept of\nthe subject in the judgment by the word _quantity_, a pictorial expression\ninstead of which some other might just as well have been chosen. But for\nKant\u2019s love of symmetry this is enough. He takes advantage of the\nfortunate accident of this nomenclature, and links to it the transcendent\ndogmas of the world\u2019s extension.\n\n(2.) Yet more boldly does Kant link to _quality_, _i.e._, the affirmation\nor negation in a judgment, the transcendent Ideas concerning matter; a\nprocedure which has not even an accidental similarity of words as a basis.\nFor it is just to the _quantity_, and not to the _quality_ of matter that\nits mechanical (not chemical) divisibility is related. But, what is more,\nthis whole idea of divisibility by no means belongs to those inferences\naccording to the principle of sufficient reason, from which, however, as\nthe content of the hypothetical form, all cosmological Ideas ought to\nflow. For the assertion upon which Kant there relies, that the relation of\nthe parts to the whole is that of the condition to the conditioned, thus a\nrelation according to the principle of sufficient reason, is certainly an\ningenious but yet a groundless sophism. That relation is rather based upon\nthe principle of contradiction; for the whole is not through the part, nor\nthe parts through the whole, but both are necessarily together because\nthey are one, and their separation is only an arbitrary act. It depends\nupon this, according to the principle of contradiction, that if the parts\nare thought away, the whole is also thought away, and conversely; and by\nno means upon the fact that the parts as the _reason_ conditioned the\nwhole as the _consequent_, and that therefore, in accordance with the\nprinciple of sufficient reason, we were necessarily led to seek the\nultimate parts, in order, as its reason, to understand from them the\nwhole. Such great difficulties are here overcome by the love of symmetry.\n\n(3.) The Idea of the first cause of the world would now quite properly\ncome under the title of _relation_; but Kant must reserve this for the\nfourth title, that of _modality_, for which otherwise nothing would\nremain, and under which he forces this idea to come by saying that the\ncontingent (_i.e._, according to his explanation, which is diametrically\nopposed to the truth, every consequent of its reason) becomes the\nnecessary through the first cause. Therefore, for the sake of symmetry,\nthe conception of _freedom_ appears here as the third Idea. By this\nconception, however, as is distinctly stated in the observations on the\nthesis of the third conflict, what is really meant is only that Idea of\nthe cause of the world which alone is admissible here. The third and\nfourth conflicts are at bottom tautological.\n\nAbout all this, however, I find and assert that the whole antinomy is a\nmere delusion, a sham fight. Only the assertions of the antitheses really\nrest upon the forms of our faculty of knowledge, _i.e._, if we express it\nobjectively, on the necessary, _a priori_ certain, most universal laws of\nnature. Their proofs alone are therefore drawn from objective grounds. On\nthe other hand, the assertions and proofs of the theses have no other than\na subjective ground, rest solely on the weakness of the reasoning\nindividual; for his imagination becomes tired with an endless regression,\nand therefore he puts an end to it by arbitrary assumptions, which he\ntries to smooth over as well as he can; and his judgment, moreover, is in\nthis case paralysed by early and deeply imprinted prejudices. On this\naccount the proof of the thesis in all the four conflicts is throughout a\nmere sophism, while that of the antithesis is a necessary inference of the\nreason from the laws of the world as idea known to us _a priori_. It is,\nmoreover, only with great pains and skill that Kant is able to sustain the\nthesis, and make it appear to attack its opponent, which is endowed with\nnative power. Now in this regard his first and constant artifice is, that\nhe does not render prominent the _nervus argumentationis_, and thus\npresent it in as isolated, naked, and distinct a manner as he possibly\ncan; but rather introduces the same argument on both sides, concealed\nunder and mixed up with a mass of superfluous and prolix sentences.\n\nThe theses and antitheses which here appear in such conflict remind one of\nthe \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 and \u03b1\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 which Socrates, in the \u201cClouds\u201d of\nAristophanes, brings forward as contending. Yet this resemblance extends\nonly to the form and not to the content, though this would gladly be\nasserted by those who ascribe to these most speculative of all questions\nof theoretical philosophy an influence upon morality, and therefore\nseriously regard the thesis as the \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2, and the antithesis as the\n\u03b1\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2. I shall not, however, accommodate myself here with reference\nto such small, narrow, and perverse minds; and, giving honour not to them,\nbut to the truth, I shall show that the proofs which Kant adduced of the\nindividual theses are sophisms, while those of the antitheses are quite\nfairly and correctly drawn from objective grounds. I assume that in this\nexamination the reader has always before him the Kantian antinomy itself.\n\nIf the proof of the thesis in the first conflict is to be held as valid,\nthen it proves too much, for it would be just as applicable to time itself\nas to change in time, and would therefore prove that time itself must have\nhad a beginning, which is absurd. Besides, the sophism consists in this,\nthat instead of the beginninglessness of the series of states, which was\nat first the question, suddenly the endlessness (infinity) of the series\nis substituted; and now it is proved that this is logically contradicted\nby completeness, and yet every present is the end of the past, which no\none doubted. The end of a beginningless series can, however, always be\n_thought_, without prejudice to the fact that it has no beginning; just\nas, conversely, the beginning of an endless series can also be _thought_.\nBut against the real, true argument of the antithesis, that the changes of\nthe world necessarily presuppose an infinite series of changes\n_backwards_, absolutely nothing is advanced. We can think the possibility\nthat the causal chain will some day end in an absolute standstill, but we\ncan by no means think the possibility of an absolute beginning.(8)\n\nWith reference to the spatial limits of the world, it is proved that, if\nit is to be regarded as a _given whole_, it must necessarily have limits.\nThe reasoning is correct, only it was just the first link of it that was\nto be proved, and that remains unproved. Totality presupposes limits, and\nlimits presuppose totality; but here both together are arbitrarily\npresupposed. For this second point, however, the antithesis affords no\nsuch satisfactory proof as for the first, because the law of causality\nprovides us with necessary determinations only with reference to time, not\nto space, and affords us _a priori_ the certainty that no occupied time\ncan ever be bounded by a previous empty time, and that no change can be\nthe first change, but not that an occupied space can have no empty space\nbeside it. So far no _a priori_ decision on the latter point would be\npossible; yet the difficulty of conceiving the world in space as limited\nlies in the fact that space itself is necessarily infinite, and therefore\na limited finite world in space, however large it may be, becomes an\ninfinitely small magnitude; and in this incongruity the imagination finds\nan insuperable stumbling-block, because there remains for it only the\nchoice of thinking the world either as infinitely large or infinitely\nsmall. This was already seen by the ancient philosophers: \u039c\u03b7\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03b4\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f41\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b7\u03b3\u03b7\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u0395\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5, \u03c6\u03b7\u03b4\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b5\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03b1\u03bb\u1ff3 \u03c0\u03b5\u03b4\u03b9\u1ff3 \u1f11\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c7\u03c5\u03bd\n\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bd\u03b7\u03b8\u03b7\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f11\u03bd\u03b1 \u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff3 \u03b1\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u1ff3 (_Metrodorus, caput schol\u00e6\nEpicuri, absurdum ait, in magno campo spicam unam produci, et unum in\ninfinito mundum_) Stob. Ecl., i. c. 23. Therefore many of them taught (as\nimmediately follows), \u03b1\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b5\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff3 \u03b1\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u1ff3 (_infinitos mundos in\ninfinito_). This is also the sense of the Kantian argument for the\nantithesis, only he has disfigured it by a scholastic and ambiguous\nexpression. The same argument might be used against the limitation of the\nworld in time, only we have a far better one under the guidance of\ncausality. In the case of the assumption of a world limited in space,\nthere arises further the unanswerable question, What advantage has the\nfilled part of space enjoyed over the infinite space that has remained\nempty? In the fifth dialogue of his book, \u201c_Del Infinito, Universo e\nMondi_,\u201d Giordano Bruno gives a full account of the arguments for and\nagainst the finiteness of the world, which is very well worth reading. For\nthe rest, Kant himself asserts seriously, and upon objective grounds, the\ninfinity of the world in space in his \u201cNatural History of the Theory of\nthe Heavens,\u201d part ii. ch. 7. Aristotle also acknowledges the same,\n\u201cPhys.,\u201d iii. ch. 4, a chapter which, together with the following one, is\nvery well worth reading with reference to this antinomy.\n\nIn the second conflict the thesis is at once guilty of a very palpable\n_petitio principii_, for it commences, \u201cEvery _compound_ substance\nconsists of simple parts.\u201d From the compoundness here arbitrarily assumed,\nno doubt it afterwards very easily proves the simple parts. But the\nproposition, \u201cAll matter is compound,\u201d which is just the point, remains\nunproved, because it is simply a groundless assumption. The opposite of\nsimple is not compound, but extended, that which has parts and is\ndivisible. Here, however, it is really tacitly assumed that the parts\nexisted before the whole, and were brought together, whence the whole has\narisen; for this is the meaning of the word \u201ccompound.\u201d Yet this can just\nas little be asserted as the opposite. Divisibility means merely the\npossibility of separating the whole into parts, and not that the whole is\ncompounded out of parts and thus came into being. Divisibility merely\nasserts the parts _a parte post_; compoundness asserts them _a parte\nante_. For there is essentially no temporal relation between the parts and\nthe whole; they rather condition each other reciprocally, and thus always\nexist at the same time, for only so far as both are there is there\nanything extended in space. Therefore what Kant says in the observations\non the thesis, \u201cSpace ought not to be called a _compositum_, but a\n_totum_,\u201d &c., holds good absolutely of matter also, which is simply space\nbecome perceptible. On the other hand, the infinite divisibility of\nmatter, which the antithesis asserts, follows _a priori_ and\nincontrovertibly from that of space, which it fills. This proposition has\nabsolutely nothing against it; and therefore Kant also (p. 513; V. 541),\nwhen he speaks seriously and in his own person, no longer as the\nmouthpiece of the \u03b1\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, presents it as objective truth; and also\nin the \u201cMetaphysical First Principles of Natural Science\u201d (p. 108, first\nedition), the proposition, \u201cMatter is infinitely divisible,\u201d is placed at\nthe beginning of the proof of the first proposition of mechanics as\nestablished truth, having appeared and been proved as the fourth\nproposition in the Dynamics. But here Kant spoils the proof of the\nantithesis by the greatest obscurity of style and useless accumulation of\nwords, with the cunning intention that the evidence of the antithesis\nshall not throw the sophisms of the thesis too much into the shade. Atoms\nare no necessary thought of the reason, but merely an hypothesis for the\nexplanation of the difference of the specific gravity of bodies. But Kant\nhimself has shown, in the dynamics of his \u201cMetaphysical First Principles\nof Natural Science,\u201d that this can be otherwise, and indeed better and\nmore simply explained than by atomism. In this, however, he was\nanticipated by Priestley, \u201cOn Matter and Spirit,\u201d sect. i. Indeed, even in\nAristotle, \u201cPhys.\u201d iv. 9, the fundamental thought of this is to be found.\n\nThe argument for the third thesis is a very fine sophism, and is really\nKant\u2019s pretended principle of pure reason itself entirely unadulterated\nand unchanged. It tries to prove the finiteness of the series of causes by\nsaying that, in order to be _sufficient_, a cause must contain the\ncomplete sum of the conditions from which the succeeding state, the\neffect, proceeds. For the completeness of the determinations present\n_together_ in the state which is the cause, the argument now substitutes\nthe completeness of the series of causes by which that state itself was\nbrought to actuality; and because completeness presupposes the condition\nof being rounded off or closed in, and this again presupposes finiteness,\nthe argument infers from this a first cause, closing the series and\ntherefore unconditioned. But the juggling is obvious. In order to conceive\nthe state A. as the sufficient cause of the state B., I assume that it\ncontains the sum of the necessary determinations from the co-existence of\nwhich the estate B. inevitably follows. Now by this my demand upon it as a\n_sufficient_ cause is entirely satisfied, and has no direct connection\nwith the question how the state A. itself came to be; this rather belongs\nto an entirely different consideration, in which I regard the said state\nA. no more as cause, but as itself an effect; in which case another state\nagain must be related to it, just as it was related to B. The assumption\nof the finiteness of the series of causes and effects, and accordingly of\na first beginning, appears nowhere in this as necessary, any more than the\npresentness of the present moment requires us to assume a beginning of\ntime itself. It only comes to be added on account of the laziness of the\nspeculating individual. That this assumption lies in the acceptance of a\ncause as a _sufficient reason_ is thus unfairly arrived at and false, as I\nhave shown at length above when considering the Kantian principle of pure\nreason which coincides with this thesis. In illustration of the assertion\nof this false thesis, Kant is bold enough in his observations upon it to\ngive as an example of an unconditioned beginning his rising from his\nchair; as if it were not just as impossible for him to rise without a\nmotive as for a ball to roll without a cause. I certainly do not need to\nprove the baselessness of the appeal which, induced by a sense of\nweakness, he makes to the philosophers of antiquity, by quoting from\nOcellus Lucanus, the Eleatics, &c., not to speak of the Hindus. Against\nthe proof of this antithesis, as in the case of the previous ones, there\nis nothing to advance.\n\nThe fourth conflict is, as I have already remarked, really tautological\nwith the third; and the proof of the thesis is also essentially the same\nas that of the preceding one. His assertion that every conditioned\npresupposes a complete series of conditions, and therefore a series which\nends with an unconditioned, is a _petitio principii_, which must simply be\ndenied. Everything conditioned presupposes nothing but its condition; that\nthis is again conditioned raises a new consideration which is not directly\ncontained in the first.\n\nA certain appearance of probability cannot be denied to the antinomy; yet\nit is remarkable that no part of the Kantian philosophy has met so little\ncontradiction, indeed has found so much acceptance, as this exceedingly\nparadoxical doctrine. Almost all philosophical parties and text-books have\nregarded it as valid, and have also repeatedly reconstructed it; while\nnearly all Kant\u2019s other doctrines have been contested, and indeed there\nhave never been wanting some perverse minds which rejected even the\ntranscendental \u00e6sthetic. The undivided assent which the antinomy, on the\nother hand, has met with may ultimately arise from the fact that certain\npersons regard with inward satisfaction the point at which the\nunderstanding is so thoroughly brought to a standstill, having hit upon\nsomething which at once is and is not, so that they actually have before\nthem here the sixth trick of Philadelphia in Lichtenberg\u2019s broadsheet.\n\nIf we examine the real meaning of Kant\u2019s _Critical Solution_ of the\ncosmological problem which now follows, we find that it is not what he\ngives it out to be, the solution of the problem by the disclosure that\nboth sides, starting from false assumptions, are wrong in the first and\nsecond conflicts, and that in the third and fourth both are right. It is\nreally the confirmation of the antitheses by the explanation of their\nassertions.\n\nFirst Kant asserts, in this solution, obviously wrongly, that both sides\nstarted from the assumption, as their first principle, that with the\nconditioned the completed (thus rounded off) _series_ of its conditions is\ngiven. Only the thesis laid down this proposition, Kant\u2019s principle of\npure reason, as the ground of its assertions; the antithesis, on the other\nhand, expressly denied it throughout, and asserted the contrary. Further,\nKant charges both sides with this assumption, that the world exists in\nitself, _i.e._, independently of being known and of the forms of this\nknowledge, but this assumption also is only made by the thesis; indeed, it\nis so far from forming the ground of the assertions of the antithesis that\nit is absolutely inconsistent with them. For that it should all be given\nis absolutely contradictory of the conception of an infinite series. It is\ntherefore essential to it that it should always exist only with reference\nto the process of going through it, and not independently of this. On the\nother hand, in the assumption of definite limits also lies that of a whole\nwhich exists absolutely and independently of the process of completely\nmeasuring it. Thus it is only the thesis that makes the false assumption\nof a self-existent universe, _i.e._, a universe given prior to all\nknowledge, and to which knowledge came as to something external to itself.\nThe antithesis from the outset combats this assumption absolutely; for the\ninfinity of the series which it asserts merely under the guidance of the\nprinciple of sufficient reason can only exist if the regressus is fully\ncarried out, but not independently of it. As the object in general\npresupposes the subject, so also the object which is determined as an\n_endless_ chain of conditions necessarily presupposes in the subject the\nkind of knowledge corresponding to this, that is, the _constant following_\nof the links of that chain. But this is just what Kant gives as the\nsolution of the problem, and so often repeats: \u201cThe infinity of the world\nis only _through_ the regressus, not _before_ it.\u201d This his solution of\nthe conflict is thus really only the decision in favour of the antithesis\nin the assertion of which this truth already lies, while it is altogether\ninconsistent with the assertions of the thesis. If the antithesis had\nasserted that the world consisted of infinite series of reasons and\nconsequents, and yet existed independently of the idea and its regressive\nseries, thus in itself, and therefore constituted a given whole, it would\nhave contradicted not only the thesis but also itself. For an infinite can\nnever be given as a whole, nor an _endless_ series exist, except as an\nendless progress; nor can what is boundless constitute a whole. Thus this\nassumption, of which Kant asserts that it led both sides into error,\nbelongs only to the thesis.\n\nIt is already a doctrine of Aristotle\u2019s that an infinity can never be\n_actu_, _i.e._, actual and given, but only _potenti\u00e2_. \u039f\u03c5\u03ba \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u1fb3\n\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf \u03b1\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd ... \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u1fbd \u03b1\u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf \u03b5\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u1fb3 \u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd (_infinitum\nnon potest esse actu: ... sed impossibile, actu esse infinitum_), Metaph.\nK. 10. Further: \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1fbd \u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03b3\u03b1\u03c1 \u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd, \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b5\u03c0\u03b9\n\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd (_nihil enim actu infinitum est, sed potentia tantum, nempe\ndivisione ipsa_). _De generat. et corrupt._, i., 3. He develops this fully\nin the \u201cPhysics,\u201d iii. 5 and 6, where to a certain extent he gives the\nperfectly correct solution of the whole of the antinomies. He expounds the\nantinomies in his short way, and then says, \u201cA mediator (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5) is\nrequired;\u201d upon which he gives the solution that the infinite, both of the\nworld in space and in time and in division, is never _before_ the\nregressus, or progressus, but in it. This truth lies then in the rightly\napprehended conception of the infinite. Thus one misunderstands himself if\nhe imagines that he can think the infinite, of whatever kind it may be, as\nsomething objectively present and complete, and independent of the\nregressus.\n\nIndeed if, reversing the procedure, we take as the starting-point what\nKant gives as the solution of the conflict, the assertion of the\nantithesis follows exactly from it. Thus: if the world is not an\nunconditioned whole and does not exist absolutely but only in the idea,\nand if its series of reasons and consequents do not exist _before_ the\nregressus of the ideas of them but only _through_ this regressus, then the\nworld cannot contain determined and finite series, because their\ndetermination and limitation would necessarily be independent of the idea,\nwhich would then only come afterwards; but all its series must be\ninfinite, _i.e._, inexhaustible by any idea.\n\nOn p. 506; V. 534, Kant tries to prove from the falseness of both sides\nthe transcendental ideality of the phenomenon, and begins, \u201cIf the world\nis a whole existing by itself, it is either finite or infinite.\u201d But this\nis false; a whole existing of itself cannot possibly be infinite. That\nideality may rather be concluded from the infinity of the series in the\nworld in the following manner:\u2014If the series of reasons and consequents in\nthe world are absolutely without end, the world cannot be a given whole\nindependent of the idea; for such a world always presupposes definite\nlimits, just as on the contrary infinite series presuppose an infinite\nregressus. Therefore, the presupposed infinity of the series must be\ndetermined through the form of reason and consequent, and this again\nthrough the form of knowledge of the subject; thus the world as it is\nknown must exist only in the idea of the subject.\n\nNow whether Kant himself was aware or not that his critical solution of\nthe problem is really a decision in favour of the antithesis, I am unable\nto decide. For it depends upon whether what Schelling has somewhere very\nhappily called Kant\u2019s system of accommodation extended so far; or whether\nKant\u2019s mind was here already involved in an unconscious accommodation to\nthe influence of his time and surroundings.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nThe solution of the third antinomy, the subject of which was the Idea of\nfreedom, deserves a special consideration, because it is for us very well\nworth notice that it is just here in connection with _the Idea of freedom_\nthat Kant is obliged to speak more fully of the _thing in itself_, which\nwas hitherto only seen in the background. This is very explicable to us\nsince we have recognised the thing in itself as the _will_. Speaking\ngenerally, this is the point at which the Kantian philosophy leads to\nmine, or at which mine springs out of his as its parent stem. One will be\nconvinced of this if one reads with attention pp. 536 and 537; V. 564 and\n565, of the \u201cCritique of Pure Reason,\u201d and, further, compares these\npassages with the introduction to the \u201cCritique of Judgment,\u201d pp. xviii.\nand xix. of the third edition, or p. 13 of Rosenkranz\u2019s edition, where\nindeed it is said: \u201cThe conception of freedom can in its object (that is\nthen the will) present to the mind a thing in itself, but not in\nperception; the conception of nature, on the other hand, can present its\nobject to the mind in perception, but not as a thing in itself.\u201d But\nspecially let any one read concerning the solution of the antinomies the\nfifty-third paragraph of the Prolegomena, and then honestly answer the\nquestion whether all that is said there does not sound like a riddle to\nwhich my doctrine is the answer. Kant never completed his thought; I have\nmerely carried out his work. Accordingly, what Kant says only of the human\nphenomenon I have extended to all phenomena in general, as differing from\nthe human phenomenon only in degree, that their true being is something\nabsolutely free, _i.e._, a will. It appears from my work how fruitful this\ninsight is in connection with Kant\u2019s doctrine of the ideality of space,\ntime, and causality.\n\nKant has nowhere made the thing in itself the subject of a special\nexposition or distinct deduction; but, whenever he wants it, he introduces\nit at once by means of the conclusion that the phenomenon, thus the\nvisible world, must have a reason, an intelligible cause, which is not a\nphenomenon, and therefore belongs to no possible experience. He does this\nafter having assiduously insisted that the categories, and thus causality\nalso, had a use which was absolutely confined to possible experience; that\nthey were merely forms of the understanding, which served to spell out the\nphenomena of the world of sense, beyond which, on the other hand, they had\nno significance, &c., &c. Therefore, he denies in the most uncompromising\nmanner their application to things beyond experience, and rightly explains\nand at once rejects all earlier dogmatism as based upon the neglect of\nthis law. The incredible inconsistency which Kant here fell into was soon\nnoticed, and used by his first opponents to make attacks on his philosophy\nto which it could offer no resistance. For certainly we apply the law of\ncausality entirely _a priori_ and before all experience to the changes\nfelt in our organs of sense. But, on this very account, this law is just\nas much of subjective origin as these sensations themselves, and thus does\nnot lead to a thing in itself. The truth is, that upon the path of the\nidea one can never get beyond the idea; it is a rounded-off whole, and has\nin its own resources no clue leading to the nature of the thing in itself,\nwhich is _toto genere_ different from it. If we were merely perceiving\nbeings, the way to the thing in itself would be absolutely cut off from\nus. Only the other side of our own being can disclose to us the other side\nof the inner being of things. This path I have followed. But Kant\u2019s\ninference to the thing in itself, contrary as it is to his own teaching,\nobtains some excuse from the following circumstance. He does not say, as\ntruth required, simply and absolutely that the object is conditioned by\nthe subject, and conversely; but only that the manner of the appearance of\nthe object is conditioned by the forms of knowledge of the subject, which,\ntherefore, also come _a priori_ to consciousness. But that now which in\nopposition to this is only known _a posteriori_ is for him the immediate\neffect of the thing in itself, which becomes phenomenon only in its\npassage through these forms which are given _a priori_. From this point of\nview it is to some extent explicable how it could escape him that\nobjectivity in general belongs to the form of the phenomenon, and is just\nas much conditioned by subjectivity in general as the mode of appearing of\nthe object is conditioned by the forms of knowledge of the subject; that\nthus if a thing in itself must be assumed, it absolutely cannot be an\nobject, which however he always assumes it to be, but such a thing in\nitself must necessarily lie in a sphere _toto genere_ different from the\nidea (from knowing and being known), and therefore could least of all be\narrived at through the laws of the combination of objects among\nthemselves.\n\nWith the proof of the thing in itself it has happened to Kant precisely as\nwith that of the _a priori_ nature of the law of causality. Both doctrines\nare true, but their proof is false. They thus belong to the class of true\nconclusions from false premises. I have retained them both, but have\nproved them in an entirely different way, and with certainty.\n\nThe thing in itself I have neither introduced surreptitiously nor inferred\naccording to laws which exclude it, because they really belong to its\nphenomenal appearance; nor, in general, have I arrived at it by roundabout\nways. On the contrary, I have shown it directly, there where it lies\nimmediately, in the will, which reveals itself to every one directly as\nthe in-itself of his own phenomenal being.\n\nAnd it is also this immediate knowledge of his own will out of which in\nhuman consciousness the conception of _freedom_ springs; for certainly the\nwill, as world-creating, as thing in itself, is free from the principle of\nsufficient reason, and therewith from all necessity, thus is completely\nindependent, free, and indeed almighty. Yet, in truth, this only holds\ngood of the will in itself, not of its manifestations, the individuals,\nwho, just through the will itself, are unalterably determined as its\nmanifestations in time. But in the ordinary consciousness, unenlightened\nby philosophy, the will is at once confused with its manifestation, and\nwhat belongs only to the former is attributed to the latter, whence arises\nthe illusion of the unconditioned freedom of the individual. Therefore\nSpinoza says rightly that if the projected stone had consciousness, it\nwould believe that it flew of its own free will. For certainly the\nin-itself of the stone also is the will, which alone is free; but, as in\nall its manifestations, here also, where it appears as a stone, it is\nalready fully determined. But of all this enough has already been said in\nthe text of this work.\n\nKant fails to understand and overlooks this immediate origin of the\nconception of freedom in every human consciousness, and therefore he now\nplaces (p. 533; V. 561) the source of that conception in a very subtle\nspeculation, through which the unconditioned, to which the reason must\nalways tend, leads us to hypostatise the conception of freedom, and it is\nonly upon this transcendent Idea of freedom that the practical conception\nof it is supposed to be founded. In the \u201cCritique of Practical Reason,\u201d \u00a7\n6, and p. 158 of the fourth and 235 of Rosenkranz\u2019s edition, he yet\ndeduces this last conception differently by saying that the categorical\nimperative presupposes it. The speculative Idea is accordingly only the\nprimary source of the conception of freedom for the sake of this\npresupposition, but here it obtains both significance and application.\nNeither, however, is the case. For the delusion of a perfect freedom of\nthe individual in his particular actions is most lively in the conviction\nof the least cultivated man who has never reflected, and it is thus\nfounded on no speculation, although often assumed by speculation from\nwithout. Thus only philosophers, and indeed only the most profound of\nthem, are free from it, and also the most thoughtful and enlightened of\nthe writers of the Church.\n\nIt follows, then, from all that has been said, that the true source of the\nconception of freedom is in no way essentially an inference, either from\nthe speculative Idea of an unconditioned cause, nor from the fact that it\nis presupposed by the categorical imperative. But it springs directly from\nthe consciousness in which each one recognises himself at once as the\n_will_, _i.e._, as that which, as the thing in itself, has not the\nprinciple of sufficient reason for its form, and which itself depends upon\nnothing, but on which everything else rather depends. Every one, however,\ndoes not recognise himself at once with the critical and reflective\ninsight of philosophy as a determined manifestation of this will which has\nalready entered time, as we might say, an act of will distinguished from\nthat will to live itself; and, therefore, instead of recognising his whole\nexistence as an act of his freedom, he rather seeks for freedom in his\nindividual actions. Upon this point I refer the reader to my prize-essay\non the freedom of the will.\n\nNow if Kant, as he here pretends, and also apparently did in earlier\ncases, had merely inferred the thing in itself, and that with the great\ninconsistency of an inference absolutely forbidden by himself, what a\nremarkable accident would it then be that here, where for the first time\nhe approaches the thing in itself more closely and explains it, he should\nrecognise in it at once the _will_, the free will showing itself in the\nworld only in temporal manifestations! I therefore really assume, though\nit cannot be proved, that whenever Kant spoke of the thing in itself, in\nthe obscure depths of his mind he already always indistinctly thought of\nthe will. This receives support from a passage in the preface to the\nsecond edition of the \u201cCritique of Pure Reason,\u201d pp. xxvii. and xxviii.,\nin Rosenkranz\u2019s edition, p. 677 of the Supplement.\n\nFor the rest, it is just this predetermined solution of the sham third\nconflict that affords Kant the opportunity of expressing very beautifully\nthe deepest thoughts of his whole philosophy. This is the case in the\nwhole of the \u201cSixth Section of the Antinomy of Pure Reason;\u201d but, above\nall, in the exposition of the opposition between the empirical and the\nintelligible character, p. 534-550; V. 562-578, which I number among the\nmost admirable things that have ever been said by man. (As a supplemental\nexplanation of this passage, compare a parallel passage in the Critique of\nPractical Reason, p. 169-179 of the fourth edition, or p. 224-231 of\nRosenkranz\u2019s edition.) It is yet all the more to be regretted that this is\nhere not in its right place, partly because it is not found in the way\nwhich the exposition states, and therefore could be otherwise deduced than\nit is, partly because it does not fulfil the end for which it is there\u2014the\nsolution of the sham antinomy. The intelligible character, the thing in\nitself, is inferred from the phenomenon by the inconsistent use of the\ncategory of causality beyond the sphere of all phenomena, which has\nalready been sufficiently condemned. In this case the will of man (which\nKant entitles reason, most improperly, and with an unpardonable breach of\nall use of language) is set up as the thing in itself, with an appeal to\nan unconditioned ought, the categorical imperative, which is postulated\nwithout more ado.\n\nNow, instead of all this, the plain open procedure would have been to\nstart directly from the will, and prove it to be the in-itself of our own\nphenomenal being, recognised without any mediation; and then to give that\nexposition of the empirical and the intelligible character to explain how\nall actions, although necessitated by motives, yet, both by their author\nand by the disinterested judge, are necessarily and absolutely ascribed to\nthe former himself and alone, as depending solely upon him, to whom\ntherefore guilt and merit are attributed in respect of them. This alone\nwas the straight path to the knowledge of that which is not phenomenon,\nand therefore will not be found by the help of the laws of the phenomenon,\nbut is that which reveals itself through the phenomenon, becomes knowable,\nobjectifies itself\u2014the will to live. It would then have had to be\nexhibited merely by analogy as the inner nature of every phenomenon. Then,\nhowever, it certainly could not have been said that in lifeless or even\nanimal nature no faculty can be thought except as sensuously conditioned\n(p. 546; V. 574), which in Kant\u2019s language is simply saying that the\nexplanation, according to the law of causality, exhausts the inner nature\nof these phenomena, and thus in their case, very inconsistently, the thing\nin itself disappears. Through the false position and the roundabout\ndeduction according with it which the exposition of the thing in itself\nhas received from Kant, the whole conception of it has also become\nfalsified. For the will or the thing in itself, found through the\ninvestigation of an unconditioned cause, appears here related to the\nphenomenon as cause to effect. But this relation exists only within the\nphenomenal world, therefore presupposes it, and cannot connect the\nphenomenal world itself with what lies outside it, and is _toto genere_\ndifferent from it.\n\nFurther, the intended end, the solution of the third antinomy by the\ndecision that both sides, each in a different sense, are right, is not\nreached at all. For neither the thesis nor the antithesis have anything to\ndo with the thing in itself, but entirely with the phenomenon, the\nobjective world, the world as idea. This it is, and absolutely nothing\nelse, of which the thesis tries to show, by means of the sophistry we have\nlaid bare, that it contains unconditioned causes, and it is also this of\nwhich the antithesis rightly denies that it contains such causes.\nTherefore the whole exposition of the transcendental freedom of the will,\nso far as it is a thing in itself, which is given here in justification of\nthe thesis, excellent as it is in itself, is yet here entirely a \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2. For the transcendental freedom of the will which is\nexpounded is by no means the unconditioned causality of a cause, which the\nthesis asserts, because it is of the essence of a cause that it must be a\nphenomenon, and not something which lies beyond all phenomena and is _toto\ngenere_ different.\n\nIf what is spoken of is cause and effect, the relation of the will to the\nmanifestation (or of the intelligible character to the empirical) must\nnever be introduced, as happens here: for it is entirely different from\ncausal relation. However, here also, in this solution of the antinomy, it\nis said with truth that the empirical character of man, like that of every\nother cause in nature, is unalterably determined, and therefore that his\nactions necessarily take place in accordance with the external influences;\ntherefore also, in spite of all transcendental freedom (_i.e._,\nindependence of the will in itself of the laws of the connection of its\nmanifestation), no man has the power of himself to begin a series of\nactions, which, however, was asserted by the thesis. Thus also freedom has\nno causality; for only the will is free, and it lies outside nature or the\nphenomenon, which is just its objectification, but does not stand in a\ncausal relation to it, for this relation is only found within the sphere\nof the phenomenon, thus presupposes it, and cannot embrace the phenomenon\nitself and connect it with what is expressly not a phenomenon. The world\nitself can only be explained through the will (for it is the will itself,\nso far as it manifests itself), and not through causality. But _in the\nworld_ causality is the sole principle of explanation, and everything\nhappens simply according to the laws of nature. Thus the right lies\nentirely on the side of the antithesis, which sticks to the question in\nhand, and uses that principle of explanation which is valid with regard to\nit; therefore it needs no apology. The thesis, on the other hand, is\nsupposed to be got out of the matter by an apology, which first passes\nover to something quite different from the question at issue, and then\nassumes a principle of explanation which is inapplicable to it.\n\nThe fourth conflict is, as has already been said, in its real meaning\ntautological with the third. In its solution Kant develops still more the\nuntenable nature of the thesis; while for its truth, on the other hand,\nand its pretended consistency with the antithesis, he advances no reason,\nas conversely he is able to bring no reason against the antithesis. The\nassumption of the thesis he introduces quite apologetically, and yet calls\nit himself (p. 562; V. 590) an arbitrary presupposition, the object of\nwhich might well in itself be impossible, and shows merely an utterly\nimpotent endeavour to find a corner for it somewhere where it will be safe\nfrom the prevailing might of the antithesis, only to avoid disclosing the\nemptiness of the whole of his once-loved assertion of the necessary\nantinomy in human reason.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nNow follows the chapter on the transcendental ideal, which carries us back\nat once to the rigid Scholasticism of the Middle Ages. One imagines one is\nlistening to Anselm of Canterbury himself. The _ens realissimum_, the\nessence of all realities, the content of all affirmative propositions,\nappears, and indeed claims to be a necessary thought of the reason. I for\nmy part must confess that to my reason such a thought is impossible, and\nthat I am not able to think anything definite in connection with the words\nwhich denote it.\n\nMoreover, I do not doubt that Kant was compelled to write this\nextraordinary chapter, so unworthy of him, simply by his fondness for\narchitectonic symmetry. The three principal objects of the Scholastic\nphilosophy (which, as we have said, if understood in the wider sense, may\nbe regarded as continuing down to Kant), the soul, the world, and God, are\nsupposed to be deduced from the three possible major propositions of\nsyllogisms, though it is plain that they have arisen, and can arise,\nsimply and solely through the unconditioned application of the principle\nof sufficient reason. Now, after the soul had been forced into the\ncategorical judgment, and the hypothetical was set apart for the world,\nthere remained for the third Idea nothing but the disjunctive major.\nFortunately there existed a previous work in this direction, the _ens\nrealissimum_ of the Scholastics, together with the ontological proof of\nthe existence of God set up in a rudimentary form by Anselm of Canterbury\nand then perfected by Descartes. This was joyfully made use of by Kant,\nwith some reminiscence also of an earlier Latin work of his youth.\nHowever, the sacrifice which Kant makes to his love of architectonic\nsymmetry in this chapter is exceedingly great. In defiance of all truth,\nwhat one must regard as the grotesque idea of an essence of all possible\nrealities is made an essential and necessary thought of the reason. For\nthe deduction of this Kant makes use of the false assertion that our\nknowledge of particular things arises from a progressive limitation of\ngeneral conceptions; thus also of a most general conception of all which\ncontains all reality _in itself_. In this he stands just as much in\ncontradiction with his own teaching as with the truth, for exactly the\nconverse is the case. Our knowledge starts with the particular and is\nextended to the general, and all general conceptions arise by abstraction\nfrom real, particular things known by perception, and this can be carried\non to the most general of all conceptions, which includes everything under\nit, but almost nothing _in it_. Thus Kant has here placed the procedure of\nour faculty of knowledge just upside down, and thus might well be accused\nof having given occasion to a philosophical charlatanism that has become\nfamous in our day, which, instead of recognising that conceptions are\nthoughts abstracted from things, makes, on the contrary the conceptions\nfirst, and sees in things only concrete conceptions, thus bringing to\nmarket the world turned upside down as a philosophical buffoonery, which\nof course necessarily found great acceptance.\n\nEven if we assume that every reason must, or at least can, attain to the\nconception of God, even without revelation, this clearly takes place only\nunder the guidance of causality. This is so evident that it requires no\nproof. Therefore Chr. Wolf says (_Cosmologia Generalis, pr\u0153f._, p. 1):\n_Sane in theologia naturali existentiam Numinis e principiis cosmologicis\ndemonstramus. Contingentia universi et ordinis natur\u00e6, una cum\nimpossibilitate casus, sunt scala, per quam a mundo hoc adspectabili ad\nDeum ascenditur._ And, before him, Leibnitz said, in connection with the\nlaw of causality: _Sans ce grand principe on ne saurait venir \u00e0 la preuve\nde l\u2019existence de Dieu_. On the other hand, the thought which is worked\nout in this chapter is so far from being essential and necessary to\nreason, that it is rather to be regarded as a veritable masterpiece of the\nmonstrous productions of an age which, through strange circumstances, fell\ninto the most singular aberrations and perversities, such as the age of\nthe Scholastics was\u2014an age which is unparalleled in the history of the\nworld, and can never return again. This Scholasticism, as it advanced to\nits final form, certainly derived the principal proof of the existence of\nGod from the conception of the _ens realissimum_, and only then used the\nother proofs as accessory. This, however, is mere methodology, and proves\nnothing as to the origin of theology in the human mind. Kant has here\ntaken the procedure of Scholasticism for that of reason\u2014a mistake which\nindeed he has made more than once. If it were true that according to the\nessential laws of reason the Idea of God proceeds from the disjunctive\nsyllogism under the form of an Idea of the most real being, this Idea\nwould also have existed in the philosophy of antiquity; but of the _ens\nrealissimum_ there is nowhere a trace in any of the ancient philosophers,\nalthough some of them certainly teach that there is a Creator of the\nworld, yet only as the giver of form to the matter which exists without\nhim, \u03b4\u03b5\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, a being whom they yet infer simply and solely in\naccordance with the law of causality. It is true that Sextus Empiricus\n(_adv. Math._, ix. \u00a7 88) quotes an argument of Cleanthes, which some have\nheld to be the ontological proof. This, however, it is not, but merely an\ninference from analogy; because experience teaches that upon earth one\nbeing is always better than another, and man, indeed, as the best, closes\nthe series, but yet has many faults; therefore there must exist beings who\nare still better, and finally one being who is best of all (\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd,\n\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd), and this would be God.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nOn the detailed refutation of speculative theology which now follows I\nhave only briefly to remark that it, and in general the whole criticism of\nthe three so-called Ideas of reason, thus the whole Dialectic of Pure\nReason, is indeed to a certain extent the goal and end of the whole work:\nyet this polemical part has not really an absolutely universal, permanent,\nand purely philosophical interest, such as is possessed by the preceding\ndoctrinal part, _i.e._, the \u00e6sthetic and analytic; but rather a temporary\nand local interest, because it stands in a special relation to the leading\npoints of the philosophy which prevailed in Europe up till the time of\nKant, the complete overthrow of which was yet, to his immortal credit,\nachieved by him through this polemic. He has eliminated theism from\nphilosophy; for in it, as a science and not a system of faith, only that\ncan find a place which is either empirically given or established by valid\nproofs. Naturally we only mean here the real seriously understood\nphilosophy which is concerned with the truth, and nothing else; and by no\nmeans the jest of philosophy taught in the universities, in which, after\nKant as before him, speculative theology plays the principal part, and\nwhere, also, after as before him, the soul appears without ceremony as a\nfamiliar person. For it is the philosophy endowed with salaries and fees,\nand, indeed, also with titles of Hofrath, which, looking proudly down from\nits height, remains for forty years entirely unaware of the existence of\nlittle people like me, and would be thoroughly glad to be rid of the old\nKant with his Critiques, that they might drink the health of Leibnitz with\nall their hearts. It is further to be remarked here, that as Kant was\nconfessedly led to his doctrine of the _a priori_ nature of the conception\nof causality by Hume\u2019s scepticism with regard to that conception, it may\nbe that in the same way Kant\u2019s criticism of all speculative theology had\nits occasion in Hume\u2019s criticism of all popular theology, which he had\ngiven in his \u201cNatural History of Religion,\u201d a book so well worth reading,\nand in the \u201cDialogues on Natural Religion.\u201d Indeed, it may be that Kant\nwished to a certain extent to supplement this. For the first-named work of\nHume is really a critique of popular theology, the pitiable condition of\nwhich it seeks to show; while, on the other hand, it points to rational or\nspeculative theology as the genuine, and that which is worthy of respect.\nBut Kant now discloses the groundlessness of the latter, and leaves, on\nthe other hand, popular theology untouched, nay, even establishes it in a\nnobler form as a faith based upon moral feeling. This was afterwards\ndistorted by the philosophasters into rational apprehensions,\nconsciousness of God, or intellectual intuitions of the supersensible, of\nthe divine, &c., &c.; while Kant, as he demolished old and revered errors,\nand knew the danger of doing so, rather wished through the moral theology\nmerely to substitute a few weak temporary supports, so that the ruin might\nnot fall on him, but that he might have time to escape.\n\nNow, as regards the performance of the task, no critique of reason was\nnecessary for the refutation of the _ontological_ proof of the existence\nof God; for without presupposing the \u00e6sthetic and analytic, it is quite\neasy to make clear that that ontological proof is nothing but a subtle\nplaying with conceptions which is quite powerless to produce conviction.\nThere is a chapter in the \u201c_Organon_\u201d of Aristotle which suffices as fully\nfor the refutation of the ontological proof as if it had been written\nintentionally with that purpose. It is the seventh chapter of the second\nbook of the \u201c_Analyt. Post._\u201d Among other things, it is expressly said\nthere: \u201c\u03c4\u03bf \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf\u03c5\u03ba \u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1 \u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03b9,\u201d _i.e._, _existentia nunquam ad\nessentiam rei pertinet_.\n\nThe refutation of the _cosmological_ proof is an application to a given\ncase of the doctrine of the Critique as expounded up to that point, and\nthere is nothing to be said against it. The _physico-theological_ proof is\na mere amplification of the cosmological, which it presupposes, and it\nfinds its full refutation only in the \u201cCritique of Judgment.\u201d I refer the\nreader in this connection to the rubric, \u201cComparative Anatomy,\u201d in my work\non the Will in Nature.\n\nIn the criticism of this proof Kant has only to do, as we have already\nsaid, with speculative theology, and limits himself to the School. If, on\nthe contrary, he had had life and popular theology also in view, he would\nhave been obliged to add a fourth proof to the three he has\nconsidered\u2014that proof which is really the effective one with the great\nmass of men, and which in Kant\u2019s technical language might best be called\nthe _keraunological_. It is the proof which is founded upon the needy,\nimpotent, and dependent condition of man as opposed to natural forces,\nwhich are infinitely superior, inscrutable, and for the most part\nthreatening evil; to which is added man\u2019s natural inclination to personify\neverything, and finally the hope of effecting something by prayers and\nflattery, and even by gifts. In every human undertaking there is something\nwhich is not in our power and does not come within our calculations; the\nwish to win this for oneself is the origin of the gods. \u201c_Primus in orbe\nDeos fecit timor_\u201d is an old and true saying of Petronius. It is\nprincipally this proof which is criticised by Hume, who throughout appears\nas Kant\u2019s forerunner in the writings referred to above. But those whom\nKant has placed in a position of permanent embarrassment by his criticism\nof speculative theology are the professors of philosophy. Salaried by\nChristian governments, they dare not give up the chief article of\nfaith.(9) Now, how do these gentlemen help themselves? They simply declare\nthat the existence of God is self-evident. Indeed! After the ancient\nworld, at the expense of its conscience, had worked miracles to prove it,\nand the modern world, at the expense of its understanding, had brought\ninto the field ontological, cosmological, and physico-theological\nproofs\u2014to these gentlemen it is self-evident. And from this self-evident\nGod they then explain the world: that is their philosophy.\n\nTill Kant came there was a real dilemma between materialism and theism,\n_i.e._, between the assumption that a blind chance, or that an\nintelligence working from without in accordance with purposes and\nconceptions, had brought about the world, _neque dabatur tertium_.\nTherefore atheism and materialism were the same; hence the doubt whether\nthere really could be an atheist, _i.e._, a man who really could attribute\nto blind chance the disposition of nature, so full of design, especially\norganised nature. See, for example, Bacon\u2019s Essays (_sermones fideles_),\nEssay 16, on Atheism. In the opinion of the great mass of men, and of the\nEnglish, who in such things belong entirely to the great mass (the mob),\nthis is still the case, even with their most celebrated men of learning.\nOne has only to look at Owen\u2019s \u201c_Ost\u00e9ologie Compar\u00e9e_,\u201d of 1855, preface,\np. 11, 12, where he stands always before the old dilemma between\nDemocritus and Epicurus on the one side, and an intelligence on the other,\nin which _la connaissance __ d\u2019un \u00eatre tel que l\u2019homme a exist\u00e9 avant que\nl\u2019homme fit son apparition_. All design must have proceeded from an\n_intelligence_; he has never even dreamt of doubting this. Yet in the\nlecture based upon this now modified preface, delivered in the _Acad\u00e9mie\ndes Sciences_ on the 5th September 1853, he says, with childish naivete:\n\u201c_La t\u00e9l\u00e9ologie, ou la th\u00e9ologie scientifique_\u201d (_Comptes Rendus_, Sept.\n1853), that is for him precisely the same thing! Is anything in nature\ndesigned? then it is a work of intention, of reflection, of intelligence.\nYet, certainly, what has such an Englishman and the _Acad\u00e9mie des\nSciences_ to do with the \u201cCritique of Judgment,\u201d or, indeed, with my book\nupon the Will in Nature? These gentlemen do not see so far below them.\nThese _illustres confr\u00e8res_ disdain metaphysics and the _philosophie\nallemande_: they confine themselves to the old woman\u2019s philosophy. The\nvalidity of that disjunctive major, that dilemma between materialism and\ntheism, rests, however, upon the assumption that the present given world\nis the world of things in themselves; that consequently there is no other\norder of things than the empirical. But after the world and its order had\nthrough Kant become mere phenomenon, the laws of which rest principally\nupon the forms of our intellect, the existence and nature of things and of\nthe world no longer required to be explained according to the analogy of\nthe changes perceived or effected by us in the world; nor must that which\nwe comprehend as means and end have necessarily arisen as the consequence\nof a similar knowledge. Thus, inasmuch as Kant, through his important\ndistinction between phenomenon and thing in itself, withdrew the\nfoundation from theism, he opened, on the other hand, the way to entirely\ndifferent and more profound explanations of existence.\n\nIn the chapter on the ultimate aim of the natural dialectic of reason it\nis asserted that the three transcendent Ideas are of value as regulative\nprinciples for the advancement of the knowledge of nature. But Kant can\nbarely have been serious in making this assertion. At least its opposite,\nthat these assumptions are restrictive and fatal to all investigation of\nnature, is to every natural philosopher beyond doubt. To test this by an\nexample, let any one consider whether the assumption of the soul as an\nimmaterial, simple, thinking substance would have been necessarily\nadvantageous or in the highest degree impeding to the truths which Cabanis\nhas so beautifully expounded, or to the discoveries of Flourens, Marshall\nHall, and Ch. Bell. Indeed Kant himself says (_Prolegomena_, \u00a7 44), \u201cThe\nIdeas of the reason are opposed and hindering to the maxims of the\nrational knowledge of nature.\u201d\n\nIt is certainly not the least merit of Frederick the Great, that under his\nGovernment Kant could develop himself, and dared to publish the \u201cCritique\nof Pure Reason.\u201d Hardly under any other Government would a salaried\nprofessor have ventured such a thing. Kant was obliged to promise the\nimmediate successor of the great king that he would write no more.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nI might consider that I could dispense with the criticism of the ethical\npart of the Kantian philosophy here because I have given a detailed and\nthorough criticism of it twenty-two years later than the present work in\nthe \u201c_Beiden Grundproblemen der Ethik_.\u201d However, what is here retained\nfrom the first edition, and for the sake of completeness must not be\nomitted, may serve as a suitable introduction to that later and much more\nthorough criticism, to which in the main I therefore refer the reader.\n\nOn account of Kant\u2019s love of architectonic symmetry, the theoretical\nreason had also to have a _pendant_. The _intellectus practicus_ of the\nScholastics, which again springs from the \u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2 of Aristotle (_De\nAnima_, iii. 10, and _Polit._, vii. c. 14: \u1f41 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03b3\u03b1\u03c1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2,\n\u1f41 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2), provides the word ready made. Yet here something quite\ndifferent is denoted by it\u2014not as there, the reason directed to technical\nskill. Here the practical reason appears as the source and origin of the\nundeniable ethical significance of human action, and of all virtue, all\nnobleness, and every attainable degree of holiness. All this accordingly\nshould come from mere _reason_, and demand nothing but this. To act\nrationally and to act virtuously, nobly, holily, would be one and the\nsame; and to act selfishly, wickedly, viciously, would be merely to act\nirrationally. However, all times and peoples and languages have\ndistinguished the two, and held them to be quite different things; and so\ndoes every one even at the present day who knows nothing of the language\nof the new school, _i.e._, the whole world, with the exception of a small\ncompany of German _savants_. Every one but these last understands by\nvirtuous conduct and a rational course of life two entirely different\nthings. To say that the sublime founder of the Christian religion, whose\nlife is presented to us as the pattern of all virtue, was _the most\nrational_ of all men would be called a very unbecoming and even a\nblasphemous way of speaking; and almost as much so if it were said that\nHis precepts contained all the best directions for a perfectly _rational\nlife_. Further, that he who, in accordance with these precepts, instead of\ntaking thought for his own future needs, always relieves the greater\npresent wants of others, without further motive, nay, gives all his goods\nto the poor, in order then, destitute of all means of subsistence, to go\nand preach to others also the virtue which he practises himself; this\nevery one rightly honours; but who ventures to extol it as the highest\npitch of _reasonableness_? And finally, who praises it as a _rational_\ndeed that Arnold von Winkelried, with surpassing courage, clasped the\nhostile spears against his own body in order to gain victory and\ndeliverance for his countrymen? On the other hand, if we see a man who\nfrom his youth upwards deliberates with exceptional foresight how he may\nprocure for himself an easy competence, the means for the support of wife\nand children, a good name among men, outward honour and distinction, and\nin doing so never allows himself to be led astray or induced to lose sight\nof his end by the charm of present pleasures or the satisfaction of\ndefying the arrogance of the powerful, or the desire of revenging insults\nand undeserved humiliations he has suffered, or the attractions of useless\naesthetic or philosophical occupations of the mind, or travels in\ninteresting lands, but with great consistency works towards his one\nend,\u2014who ventures to deny that such a philistine is in quite an\nextraordinary degree _rational_, even if he has made use of some means\nwhich are not praiseworthy but are yet without danger? Nay, more, if a bad\nman, with deliberate shrewdness, through a well-thought-out plan attains\nto riches and honours, and even to thrones and crowns, and then with the\nacutest cunning gets the better of neighbouring states, overcomes them one\nby one, and now becomes a conqueror of the world, and in doing so is not\nled astray by any respect for right, any sense of humanity, but with sharp\nconsistency tramples down and dashes to pieces everything that opposes his\nplan, without compassion plunges millions into misery of every kind,\ncondemns millions to bleed and die, yet royally rewards and always\nprotects his adherents and helpers, never forgetting anything, and thus\nreaches his end,\u2014who does not see that such a man must go to work in a\nmost rational manner?\u2014that, as a powerful understanding was needed to form\nthe plans, their execution demanded the complete command of the _reason_,\nand indeed properly of _practical reason_? Or are the precepts which the\nprudent and consistent, the thoughtful and far-seeing Machiavelli\nprescribes to the prince _irrational_?(10)\n\nAs wickedness is quite consistent with reason, and indeed only becomes\nreally terrible in this conjunction, so, conversely, nobleness is\nsometimes joined with want of reason. To this may be attributed the action\nof Coriolanus, who, after he had applied all his strength for years to the\naccomplishment of his revenge upon the Romans, when at length the time\ncame, allowed himself to be softened by the prayers of the Senate and the\ntears of his mother and wife, gave up the revenge he had so long and so\npainfully prepared, and indeed, by thus bringing on himself the just anger\nof the Volscians, died for those very Romans whose thanklessness he knew\nand desired so intensely to punish. Finally, for the sake of completeness,\nit may be mentioned that reason may very well exist along with want of\nunderstanding. This is the case when a foolish maxim is chosen, but is\nfollowed out consistently. An example of this is afforded by the case of\nthe Princess Isabella, daughter of Philip II., who vowed that she would\nnot put on a clean chemise so long as Ostend remained unconquered, and\nkept her word through three years. In general all vows are of this class,\nwhose origin is a want of insight as regards the law of causality, _i.e._,\nwant of understanding; nevertheless it is rational to fulfil them if one\nis of such narrow understanding as to make them.\n\nIn agreement with what we have said, we see the writers who appeared just\nbefore Kant place the conscience, as the seat of the moral impulses, in\nopposition to the reason. Thus Rousseau, in the fourth book of \u201c_Emile_,\u201d\nsays: \u201c_La raison nous trompe, mais la conscience ne trompe jamais_;\u201d and\nfurther on: \u201c_Il est impossible d\u2019expliquer par les cons\u00e9quences de notre\nnature le principe imm\u00e9diat de la conscience ind\u00e9pendant de la raison\nm\u00eame_.\u201d Still further: \u201c_Mes sentimens naturels parlaient pour l\u2019int\u00e9r\u00eat\ncommun, ma raison rapportait tout a moi.... On a beau vouloir etablir la\nvertu __ par la raison seul, quelle solide base peut-on lui donner_?\u201d In\nthe \u201c_R\u00eaveries du Promeneur_,\u201d prom. 4 \u00eame, he says: \u201c_Dans toutes les\nquestions de morale difficiles je me suis tojours bien trouv\u00e9 de les\nr\u00e9soudre par le dictamen de la conscience, plut\u00f4t que par les lumi\u00e8res de\nla raison_.\u201d Indeed Aristotle already says expressly (_Eth. Magna_, i. 5)\nthat the virtues have their seat in the \u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u1ff3 \u03bc\u03bf\u03c1\u03b9\u1ff3 \u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b7\u03c2 (_in parte\nirrationali animi_), and not in the \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 (_in parte rationali_).\nIn accordance with this, Stob\u00e6us says (Ecl., ii, c.7), speaking of the\nPeripatetics: \u201c\u03a4\u03b7\u03bd \u03b7\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u03b7\u03bd \u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf \u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b7\u03c2, \u03b5\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03b7 \u03b4\u03b9\u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03b7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03b5\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u03b7\u03bd\n\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b7\u03bd, \u03c4\u03bf \u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd, \u03c4\u03bf \u03b4\u1fbd \u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd. \u039a\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03b7\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03ba\u03b1\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03b1\u03b3\u03c7\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd,\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b5\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2; \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03bf \u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c3\u03c9\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd,\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b7\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2.\u201d (_Ethicam virtutem circa partem anim\u00e6 ratione carentem versari\nputant, cam duplicem, ad hanc disquisitionem, animam ponant, ratione\npr\u00e6ditam, et ea carentem. In parte vero ratione pr\u00e6dita collocant\ningenuitatem, prudentiam, perspicacitatem, sapientiam, docilitatem,\nmemoriam et reliqua; in parte vero ratione destituta temperantiam,\njustitiam, fortitadinem, et reliquas virtutes, quas ethicas vocant._) And\nCicero (_De Nat. Deor._, iii., c. 26-31) explains at length that reason is\nthe necessary means, the tool, of all crime.\n\nI have explained _reason_ to be the _faculty of framing concepts_. It is\nthis quite special class of general non-perceptible ideas, which are\nsymbolised and fixed only by words, that distinguishes man from the brutes\nand gives him the pre-eminence upon earth. While the brute is the slave of\nthe present, and knows only immediate sensible motives, and therefore when\nthey present themselves to it is necessarily attracted or repelled by\nthem, as iron is by the magnet, in man, on the contrary, deliberation has\nbeen introduced through the gift of reason.\n\nThis enables him easily to survey as a whole his life and the course of\nthe world, looking before and after; it makes him independent of the\npresent, enables him to go to work deliberately, systematically, and with\nforesight, to do evil as well as to do good. But what he does he does with\ncomplete self-consciousness; he knows exactly how his will decides, what\nin each case he chooses, and what other choice was in the nature of the\ncase possible; and from this self-conscious willing he comes to know\nhimself and mirrors himself in his actions. In all these relations to the\nconduct of men reason is to be called _practical_; it is only theoretical\nso far as the objects with which it is concerned have no relation to the\naction of the thinker, but have purely a theoretical interest, which very\nfew men are capable of feeling. What in this sense is called _practical\nreason_ is very nearly what is signified by the Latin word _prudentia_,\nwhich, according to Cicero (_De Nat. Deor._ ii., 22), is a contraction of\n_providentia_; while, on the other hand, _ratio_, if used of a faculty of\nthe mind, signifies for the most part theoretical reason proper, though\nthe ancients did not observe the distinction strictly. In nearly all men\nreason has an almost exclusively practical tendency; but if this also is\nabandoned thought loses the control of action, so that it is then said,\n\u201c_Scio meliora, proboque, deteriora sequor_,\u201d or \u201c_Le matin je fais des\nprojets, et le soir je fais des sottises_.\u201d Thus the man does not allow\nhis conduct to be guided by his thought, but by the impression of the\nmoment, after the manner of the brute; and so he is called irrational\n(without thereby imputing to him moral turpitude), although he is not\nreally wanting in reason, but in the power of applying it to his action;\nand one might to a certain extent say his reason is theoretical and not\npractical. He may at the same time be a really good man, like many a one\nwho can never see any one in misfortune without helping him, even making\nsacrifices to do so, and yet leaves his debts unpaid. Such an irrational\ncharacter is quite incapable of committing great crimes, because the\nsystematic planning, the discrimination and self-control, which this\nalways requires are quite impossible to him. Yet, on the other hand, he\nwill hardly attain to a very high degree of virtue, for, however much\ninclined to good he may be by nature, those single vicious and wicked\nemotions to which every one is subject cannot be wanting; and where reason\ndoes not manifest itself practically, and oppose to them unalterable\nmaxims and firm principles, they must become deeds.\n\nFinally, _reason_ manifests itself very specially as _practical_ in those\nexceedingly rational characters who on this account are called in ordinary\nlife practical philosophers, and who are distinguished by an unusual\nequanimity in disagreeable as in pleasing circumstances, an equable\ndisposition, and a determined perseverance in resolves once made. In fact,\nit is the predominance of reason in them, _i.e._, the more abstract than\nintuitive knowledge, and therefore the survey of life by means of\nconceptions, in general and as a whole, which has enabled them once for\nall to recognise the deception of the momentary impression, the fleeting\nnature of all things, the shortness of life, the emptiness of pleasures,\nthe fickleness of fortune, and the great and little tricks of chance.\nTherefore nothing comes to them unexpectedly, and what they know in the\nabstract does not surprise nor disturb them when it meets them in the\nactual and in the particular case, though it does so in the case of those\nless reasonable characters upon whom the present, the perceptible, the\nactual, exerts such an influence that the cold, colourless conceptions are\nthrown quite into the background of consciousness, and forgetting\nprinciples and maxims, they are abandoned to emotions and passions of\nevery kind. I have already explained at the end of the first book that in\nmy opinion the ethics of Stoicism were simply a guide to a truly\nreasonable life, in this sense. Such a life is also repeatedly praised by\nHorace in very many passages. This is the significance of his _nil\nadmirari_, and also of the Delphic \u039c\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd \u03b1\u03b3\u03b1\u03bd. To translate _nil admirari_\n\u201cto admire nothing\u201d is quite wrong. This Horatian maxim does not concern\nthe theoretical so much as the practical, and its real meaning is: \u201cPrize\nno object unconditionally. Do not fall in love with anything; do not\nbelieve that the possession of anything can give you happiness. Every\nintense longing for an object is only a delusive chimera, which one may\njust as well, and much more easily, get quit of by fuller knowledge as by\nattained possession.\u201d Cicero also uses _admirari_ in this sense (_De\nDivinatione_, ii. 2). What Horace means is thus the \u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03bc\u03b2\u03b9\u03b1 and\n\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03be\u03b9\u03c2, also \u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1, which Democritus before him prized as the\nhighest good (see _Clem. Alex. Strom._, ii. 21, and cf. _Strabo_, i. p. 98\nand 105). Such reasonableness of conduct has properly nothing to do with\nvirtue and vice; but this practical use of reason is what gives man his\npre-eminence over the brute, and only in this sense has it any meaning and\nis it permissible to speak of a dignity of man.\n\nIn all the cases given, and indeed in all conceivable cases, the\ndistinction between rational and irrational action runs back to the\nquestion whether the motives are abstract conceptions or ideas of\nperception. Therefore the explanation which I have given of reason agrees\nexactly with the use of language at all times and among all peoples\u2014a\ncircumstance which will not be regarded as merely accidental or arbitrary,\nbut will be seen to arise from the distinction of which every man is\nconscious, of the different faculties of the mind, in accordance with\nwhich consciousness he speaks, though certainly he does not raise it to\nthe distinctness of an abstract definition. Our ancestors did not make the\nwords without attaching to them a definite meaning, in order, perhaps,\nthat they might lie ready for philosophers who might possibly come\ncenturies after and determine what ought to be thought in connection with\nthem; but they denoted by them quite definite conceptions. Thus the words\nare no longer unclaimed, and to attribute to them an entirely different\nsense from that which they have hitherto had means to misuse them, means\nto introduce a licence in accordance with which every one might use any\nword in any sense he chose, and thus endless confusion would necessarily\narise. Locke has already shown at length that most disagreements in\nphilosophy arise from a false use of words. For the sake of illustration\njust glance for a moment at the shameful misuse which philosophers\ndestitute of thoughts make at the present day of the words substance,\nconsciousness, truth, and many others. Moreover, the utterances and\nexplanations concerning reason of all philosophers of all ages, with the\nexception of the most modern, agree no less with my explanation of it than\nthe conceptions which prevail among all nations of that prerogative of\nman. Observe what Plato, in the fourth book of the Republic, and in\ninnumerable scattered passages, calls the \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd, or \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03b7\u03c2\n\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b7\u03c2, what Cicero says (_De Nat. Deor._, iii. 26-31), what Leibnitz and\nLocke say upon this in the passages already quoted in the first book.\nThere would be no end to the quotations here if one sought to show how all\nphilosophers before Kant have spoken of reason in general in my sense,\nalthough they did not know how to explain its nature with complete\ndefiniteness and distinctness by reducing it to one point. What was\nunderstood by reason shortly before Kant\u2019s appearance is shown in general\nby two essays of Sulzer in the first volume of his miscellaneous\nphilosophical writings, the one entitled \u201cAnalysis of the Conception of\nReason,\u201d the other, \u201cOn the Reciprocal Influence of Reason and Language.\u201d\nIf, on the other hand, we read how reason is spoken about in the most\nrecent times, through the influence of the Kantian error, which after him\nincreased like an avalanche, we are obliged to assume that the whole of\nthe wise men of antiquity, and also all philosophers before Kant, had\nabsolutely no reason at all; for the immediate perceptions, intuitions,\napprehensions, presentiments of the reason now discovered were as utterly\nunknown to them as the sixth sense of the bat is to us. And as far as I am\nconcerned, I must confess that I also, in my weakness, cannot comprehend\nor imagine that reason which directly perceives or apprehends, or has an\nintellectual intuition of the super-sensible, the absolute, together with\nlong yarns that accompany it, in any other way than as the sixth sense of\nthe bat. This, however, must be said in favour of the invention or\ndiscovery of such a reason, which at once directly perceives whatever you\nchoose, that it is an incomparable expedient for withdrawing oneself from\nthe affair in the easiest manner in the world, along with one\u2019s favourite\nideas, in spite of all Kants, with their Critiques of Reason. The\ninvention and the reception it has met with do honour to the age.\n\nThus, although what is essential in reason (\u03c4\u03bf \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f21 \u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2,\n_ratio_, _raison_, Vernunft) was, on the whole and in general, rightly\nunderstood by all philosophers of all ages, though not sharply enough\ndefined nor reduced to one point, yet it was not so clear to them what the\nunderstanding (\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1, _intellectus_, _esprit_, Verstand) is.\nTherefore they often confuse it with reason, and just on this account they\ndid not attain to a thoroughly complete, pure, and simple explanation of\nthe nature of the latter. With the Christian philosophers the conception\nof reason received an entirely extraneous, subsidiary meaning through the\nopposition of it to revelation. Starting, then, from this, many are justly\nof opinion that the knowledge of the duty of virtue is possible from mere\nreason, _i.e._, without revelation. Indeed this aspect of the matter\ncertainly had influence upon Kant\u2019s exposition and language. But this\nopposition is properly of positive, historical significance, and is\ntherefore for philosophy a foreign element, from which it must keep itself\nfree.\n\nWe might have expected that in his critiques of theoretical and practical\nreason Kant would have started with an exposition of the nature of reason\nin general, and, after he had thus defined the _genus_, would have gone on\nto the explanation of the two _species_, showing how one and the same\nreason manifests itself in two such different ways, and yet, by retaining\nits principal characteristic, proves itself to be the same. But we find\nnothing of all this. I have already shown how inadequate, vacillating, and\ninconsistent are the explanations of the faculty he is criticising, which\nhe gives here and there by the way in the \u201cCritique of Pure Reason.\u201d The\n_practical_ reason appears in the \u201cCritique of Pure Reason\u201d without any\nintroduction, and afterwards stands in the \u201cCritique\u201d specially devoted to\nitself as something already established. No further account of it is\ngiven, and the use of language of all times and peoples, which is treated\nwith contempt, and the definitions of the conception given by the greatest\nof earlier philosophers, dare not lift up their voices. In general, we may\nconclude from particular passages that Kant\u2019s opinion amounts to this: the\nknowledge of principles _a priori_ is the essential characteristic of\nreason: since now the knowledge of the ethical significance of action is\nnot of empirical origin, it also is an _a priori_ principle, and\naccordingly proceeds from the reason, and therefore thus far the reason is\n_practical_. I have already spoken enough of the incorrectness of this\nexplanation of reason. But, independently of this, how superficial it is,\nand what a want of thoroughness it shows, to make use here of the single\nquality of being independent of experience in order to combine the most\nheterogeneous things, while overlooking their most essential and\nimmeasurable difference in other respects. For, even assuming, though we\ndo not admit it, that the knowledge of the ethical significance of action\nsprings from an imperative lying in us, an unconditioned _ought_, yet how\nfundamentally different would such an imperative be from those universal\n_forms of knowledge_ of which, in the \u201cCritique of Pure Reason,\u201d Kant\nproves that we are conscious _a priori_, and by virtue of which\nconsciousness we can assert beforehand an unconditioned _must_, valid for\nall experience possible for us. But the difference between this _must_,\nthis necessary form of all objects which is already determined in the\nsubject, and that _ought_ of morality is so infinitely great and palpable\nthat the mere fact that they agree in the one particular that neither of\nthem is empirically known may indeed be made use of for the purpose of a\nwitty comparison, but not as a philosophical justification for regarding\ntheir origin as the same.\n\nMoreover, the birthplace of this child of practical reason, the _absolute\nought_ or the categorical imperative, is not in the \u201cCritique of Practical\nReason,\u201d but in that of \u201cPure Reason,\u201d p. 802; V. 830. The birth is\nviolent, and is only accomplished by means of the forceps of a\n_therefore_, which stands boldly and audaciously, indeed one might say\nshamelessly, between two propositions which are utterly foreign to each\nother and have no connection, in order to combine them as reason and\nconsequent. Thus, that not merely perceptible but also abstract motives\ndetermine us, is the proposition from which Kant starts, expressing it in\nthe following manner: \u201cNot merely what excites, _i.e._, what affects the\nsenses directly, determines human will, but we have a power of overcoming\nthe impressions made upon our sensuous appetitive faculty through ideas of\nthat which is itself in a more remote manner useful or hurtful. These\ndeliberations as to what is worthy of desire, with reference to our whole\ncondition, _i.e._, as to what is good and useful, rest upon reason.\u201d\n(Perfectly right; would that he only always spoke so rationally of\nreason!) \u201cReason _therefore_ gives! also laws, which are imperatives,\n_i.e._, objective laws of freedom, and say what ought to take place,\nthough perhaps it never does take place\u201d! Thus, without further\nauthentication, the categorical imperative comes into the world, in order\nto rule there with its unconditioned _ought_\u2014a sceptre of wooden iron. For\nin the conception \u201c_ought_\u201d there lies always and essentially the\nreference to threatened punishment, or promised reward, as a necessary\ncondition, and cannot be separated from it without abolishing the\nconception itself and taking all meaning from it. Therefore an\n_unconditioned ought_ is a _contradictio in adjecto_. It was necessary to\ncensure this mistake, closely as it is otherwise connected with Kant\u2019s\ngreat service to ethics, which consists in this, that he has freed ethics\nfrom all principles of the world of experience, that is, from all direct\nor indirect doctrines of happiness, and has shown in a quite special\nmanner that the kingdom of virtue is not of this world. This service is\nall the greater because all ancient philosophers, with the single\nexception of Plato, thus the Peripatetics, the Stoics, and the Epicureans,\nsought by very different devices either to make virtue and happiness\ndependent on each other in accordance with the principle of sufficient\nreason, or to identify them in accordance with the principle of\ncontradiction. This charge applies with equal force to all modern\nphilosophers down to Kant. His merit in this respect is therefore very\ngreat; yet justice demands that we should also remember here first that\nhis exposition and elaboration often does not correspond with the tendency\nand spirit of his ethics, and secondly that, even so, he is not really the\nfirst who separated virtue from all principles of happiness. For Plato,\nespecially in the \u201cRepublic,\u201d the principal tendency of which is just\nthis, expressly teaches that virtue is to be chosen for itself alone, even\nif unhappiness and ignominy are inevitably connected with it. Still more,\nhowever, Christianity preaches a perfectly unselfish virtue, which is\npractised not on account of the reward in a life after death, but quite\ndisinterestedly from love to God, for works do not justify, but only\nfaith, which accompanies virtue, so to speak, as its symptom, and\ntherefore appears quite irrespective of reward and of its own accord. See\nLuther\u2019s \u201c_De Libertate Christiana_.\u201d I will not take into account at all\nthe Indians, in whose sacred books the hope of a reward for our works is\neverywhere described as the way of darkness, which can never lead to\nblessedness. Kant\u2019s doctrine of virtue, however, we do not find so pure;\nor rather the exposition remains far behind the spirit of it, and indeed\nfalls into inconsistency. In his _highest good_, which he afterwards\ndiscussed, we find virtue united to happiness. The ought originally so\nunconditioned does yet afterwards postulate one condition, in order to\nescape from the inner contradiction with which it is affected and with\nwhich it cannot live. Happiness in the highest good is not indeed really\nmeant to be the motive for virtue; yet there it is, like a secret article,\nthe existence of which reduces all the rest to a mere sham contract. It is\nnot really the reward of virtue, but yet it is a voluntary gift for which\nvirtue, after work accomplished, stealthily opens the hand. One may\nconvince oneself of this from the \u201cCritique of Practical Reason\u201d (p.\n223-266 of the fourth, or p. 264-295 of Rosenkranz\u2019s, edition). The whole\nof Kant\u2019s moral theology has also the same tendency, and just on this\naccount morality really destroys itself through moral theology. For I\nrepeat that all virtue which in any way is practised for the sake of a\nreward is based upon a prudent, methodical, far-seeing egoism.\n\nThe content of the absolute ought, the fundamental principle of the\npractical reason, is the famous: \u201cSo act that the maxim of your will might\nalways be also valid as the principle of a universal legislation.\u201d This\nprinciple presents to him who desires a rule for his own will the task of\nseeking such a rule for the wills of all. Then the question arises how\nsuch a rule is to be found. Clearly, in order to discover the rule of my\nconduct, I ought not to have regard to myself alone, but to the sum of all\nindividuals. Then, instead of my own well-being, the well-being of all\nwithout distinction becomes my aim. Yet the aim still always remains\nwell-being. I find, then, that all can be equally well off only if each\nlimits his own egoism by that of others. From this it certainly follows\nthat I must injure no one, because, since this principle is assumed to be\nuniversal, I also will not be injured. This, however, is the sole ground\non account of which I, who do not yet possess a moral principle, but am\nonly seeking one, can wish this to be a universal law. But clearly in this\nway the desire of well-being, _i.e._, egoism, remains the source of this\nethical principle. As the basis of politics it would be excellent, as the\nbasis of ethics it is worthless. For he who seeks to establish a rule for\nthe wills of all, as is demanded by that moral principle, necessarily\nstands in need of a rule himself; otherwise everything would be alike to\nhim. But this rule can only be his own egoism, since it is only this that\nis affected by the conduct of others; and therefore it is only by means of\nthis egoism, and with reference to it, that each one can have a will\nconcerning the conduct of others, and that it is not a matter of\nindifference to him. Kant himself very naively intimates this (p. 123 of\nthe \u201cCritique of Practical Reason;\u201d Rosenkranz\u2019s edition, p. 192), where\nhe thus prosecutes the search for maxims for the will: \u201cIf every one\nregarded the need of others with complete indifference, _and thou also\ndidst belong_ to such an order of things, wouldst thou consent thereto?\u201d\n_Quam temere in nosmet legem sancimus iniquam!_ would be the rule of the\nconsent inquired after. So also in the \u201cFundamental Principles of the\nMetaphysic of Morals\u201d (p. 56 of the third, and p. 50 of Rosenkranz\u2019s,\nedition): \u201cA will which resolved to assist no one in distress would\ncontradict itself, for cases might arise in which _it required the love\nand sympathy of others_,\u201d &c. &c. This principle of ethics, which when\nlight is thrown upon it is therefore nothing else than an indirect and\ndisguised expression of the old, simple principle, \u201c_Quod tibi fieri non\nvis, alteri ne feceris_,\u201d is related first and directly to passivity,\nsuffering, and then only by means of this to action. Therefore, as we have\nsaid, it would be thoroughly serviceable as a guide for the constitution\nof the State, which aims at the prevention of _the suffering of wrong_,\nand also desires to procure for all and each the greatest sum of\nwell-being. But in ethics, where the object of investigation is _action_\nas _action_, and in its direct significance for the _actor_\u2014not its\nconsequences, suffering, or its relation to others\u2014in this reference, I\nsay, it is altogether inadmissible, because at bottom it really amounts to\na principle of happiness, thus to egoism.\n\nWe cannot, therefore, share Kant\u2019s satisfaction that his principle of\nethics is not a material one, _i.e._, one which sets up an object as a\nmotive, but merely formal, whereby it corresponds symmetrically to the\nformal laws with which the \u201cCritique of Pure Reason\u201d has made us familiar.\nCertainly it is, instead of a law, merely a formula for finding such a\nlaw. But, in the first place, we had this formula already more briefly and\nclearly in the \u201c_Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris_;\u201d and,\nsecondly, the analysis of this formula shows that it is simply and solely\nthe reference to one\u2019s own happiness that gives it content, and therefore\nit can only be serviceable to a rational egoism, to which also every legal\nconstitution owes its origin.\n\nAnother mistake which, because it offends the feelings of every one, has\noften been condemned, and was satirised by Schiller in an epigram, is the\npedantic rule that for an act to be really good and meritorious it must be\ndone simply and solely out of respect for the known law and the conception\nof duty, and in accordance with a maxim known to the reason _in\nabstracto_, and not from any inclination, not from benevolence felt\ntowards others, not from tender-hearted compassion, sympathy, or emotion\nof the heart, which (according to the \u201cCritique of Practical Reason,\u201d p.\n213; Rosenkranz\u2019s edition, p. 257) to right-thinking persons are indeed\nvery burdensome, as confusing their deliberate maxims. The act must be\nperformed unwillingly and with self-compulsion. Remember that nevertheless\nthe hope of reward is not allowed to enter, and estimate the great\nabsurdity of the demand. But, what is saying more, this is directly\nopposed to the true spirit of virtue; not the act, but the willingness to\ndo it, the love from which it proceeds, and without which it is a dead\nwork, constitutes its merit. Therefore Christianity rightly teaches that\nall outward works are worthless if they do not proceed from that genuine\ndisposition which consists in true goodwill and pure love, and that what\nmakes blessed and saves is not the works done (_opera operata_), but the\nfaith, the genuine disposition, which is the gift of the Holy Ghost alone,\nand which the free, deliberative will, having only the law in view, does\nnot produce. This demand of Kant\u2019s, that all virtuous conduct shall\nproceed from pure, deliberate respect for the law and in accordance with\nits abstract maxims, coldly and without inclination, nay, opposed to all\ninclination, is just the same thing as if he asserted that every work of\nart must be accomplished by a well-considered application of \u00e6sthetical\nrules. The one is just as perverse as the other. The question, already\nhandled by Plato and Seneca, whether virtue can be taught, is to be\nanswered in the negative. We must finally make up our minds to see, what\nindeed was the source of the Christian doctrine of election by grace, that\nas regards its chief characteristic and its inner nature, virtue, like\ngenius, is to a certain extent inborn; and that just as little as all the\nprofessors of \u00e6sthetics could impart to any one the power of producing\nworks of genius, _i.e._, genuine works of art, so little could all the\nprofessors of ethics and preachers of virtue transform an ignoble into a\nvirtuous and noble character, the impossibility of which is very much more\napparent than that of turning lead into gold. The search for a system of\nethics and a first principle of the same, which would have practical\ninfluence and would actually transform and better the human race, is just\nlike the search for the philosopher\u2019s stone. Yet I have spoken at length\nat the end of the fourth book of the possibility of an entire change of\nmind or conversion of man (new birth), not by means of abstract (ethics)\nbut of intuitive knowledge (the work of grace). The contents of that book\nrelieve me generally of the necessity of dwelling longer upon this point.\n\nThat Kant by no means penetrated to the real significance of the ethical\ncontent of actions is shown finally by his doctrine of the highest good as\nthe necessary combination of virtue and happiness, a combination indeed in\nwhich virtue would be that which merits happiness. He is here involved in\nthe logical fallacy that the conception of merit, which is here the\nmeasure or test, already presupposes a theory of ethics as its own\nmeasure, and thus could not be deducible from it. It appeared in our\nfourth book that all genuine virtue, after it has attained to its highest\ngrade, at last leads to a complete renunciation in which all willing finds\nan end. Happiness, on the other hand, is a satisfied wish; thus the two\nare essentially incapable of being combined. He who has been enlightened\nby my exposition requires no further explanation of the complete\nperverseness of this Kantian view of the highest good. And, independent of\nmy positive exposition, I have no further negative exposition to give.\n\nKant\u2019s love of architectonic symmetry meets us also in the \u201cCritique of\nPractical Reason,\u201d for he has given it the shape of the \u201cCritique of Pure\nReason,\u201d and has again introduced the same titles and forms with manifest\nintention, which becomes specially apparent in the table of the categories\nof freedom.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nThe \u201cPhilosophy of Law\u201d is one of Kant\u2019s latest works, and is so poor\nthat, although I entirely disagree with it, I think a polemic against it\nis superfluous, since of its own weakness it must die a natural death,\njust as if it were not the work of this great man, but the production of\nan ordinary mortal. Therefore, as regards the \u201cPhilosophy of Law,\u201d I give\nup the negative mode of procedure and refer to the positive, that is, to\nthe short outline of it given in the fourth book. Just one or two general\nremarks on Kant\u2019s \u201cPhilosophy of Law\u201d may be made here. The errors which I\nhave condemned in considering the \u201cCritique of Pure Reason,\u201d as clinging\nto Kant throughout, appear in the \u201cPhilosophy of Law\u201d in such excess that\none often believes he is reading a satirical parody of the Kantian style,\nor at least that he is listening to a Kantian. Two principal errors,\nhowever, are these. He desires (and many have since then desired) to\nseparate the Philosophy of Law sharply from ethics, and yet not to make\nthe former dependent upon positive legislation, _i.e._, upon arbitrary\nsanction, but to let the conception of law exist for itself pure and _a\npriori_. But this is not possible; because conduct, apart from its ethical\nsignificance, and apart from the physical relation to others, and thereby\nfrom external sanction, does not admit even of the possibility of any\nthird view. Consequently, when he says, \u201cLegal obligation is that which\n_can_ be enforced,\u201d this _can_ is either to be understood physically, and\nthen all law is positive and arbitrary, and again all arbitrariness that\nachieves its end is law; or the _can_ is to be understood ethically, and\nwe are again in the province of ethics. With Kant the conception of legal\nright hovers between heaven and earth, and has no ground on which to\nstand; with me it belongs to ethics. Secondly, his definition of the\nconception law is entirely negative, and thereby inadequate.(11) Legal\nright is that which is consistent with the compatibility of the respective\nfreedom of individuals together, according to a general law. Freedom (here\nthe empirical, _i.e._, physical, not the moral freedom of the will)\nsignifies not being hindered or interfered with, and is thus a mere\nnegation; compatibility, again, has exactly the same significance. Thus we\nremain with mere negations and obtain no positive conception, indeed do\nnot learn at all, what is really being spoken about, unless we know it\nalready from some other source. In the course of the exposition the most\nperverse views afterwards develop themselves, such as that in the state of\nnature, _i.e._, outside the State, there is no right to property at all,\nwhich really means that all right or law is positive, and involves that\nnatural law is based upon positive law, instead of which the case ought to\nbe reversed. Further, the founding of legal acquisition on possession; the\nethical obligation to establish the civil constitution; the ground of the\nright of punishment, &c., &c., all of which, as I have said, I do not\nregard as worth a special refutation. However, these Kantian errors have\nexercised a very injurious influence. They have confused and obscured\ntruths long known and expressed, and have occasioned strange theories and\nmuch writing and controversy. This certainly cannot last, and we see\nalready how truth and sound reason again make way for themselves. Of the\nlatter, the \u201c_Naturrecht_\u201d of J. C. F. Meister specially bears evidence,\nand is thus a contrast to many a preposterous theory, though I do not\nregard it as on this account a pattern of perfection.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nOn the \u201cCritique of Judgment\u201d also, after what has been said, I must be\nvery short. We cannot but be surprised that Kant, to whom art certainly\nwas very foreign, and who to all appearance had little susceptibility for\nthe beautiful, indeed probably never had the opportunity of seeing an\nimportant work of art, and who seems, finally, to have had no knowledge of\nGoethe, the only man of his century and nation who was fit to be placed by\nhis side as his giant equal,\u2014it is, I say, surprising how, notwithstanding\nall this, Kant was able to render a great and permanent service to the\nphilosophical consideration of art and the beautiful. His merit lies in\nthis, that much as men had reflected upon the beautiful and upon art, they\nhad yet really always considered it only from the empirical point of view,\nand had investigated upon a basis of facts what quality distinguished the\nobject of any kind which was called beautiful from other objects of the\nsame kind. On this path they first arrived at quite special principles,\nand then at more general ones. They sought to separate true artistic\nbeauty from false, and to discover marks of this genuineness, which could\nthen serve again as rules. What gives pleasure as beautiful and what does\nnot, what therefore is to be imitated, what is to be striven against, what\nis to be avoided, what rules, at least negative rules, are to be\nestablished, in short, what are the means of exciting \u00e6sthetic\nsatisfaction, _i.e._, what are the conditions of this residing in the\nobject\u2014this was almost exclusively the theme of all treatises upon art.\nThis path was followed by Aristotle, and in the most recent times we find\nit chosen by Home, Burke, Winckelmann, Lessing, Herder, and many others.\nIt is true that the universality of the \u00e6sthetical principles discovered\nfinally led back to the subject, and it was observed that if the effect\nupon the subject were adequately known we would then also be able to\ndetermine _a priori_ the causes of this which lie in the object, and thus\nalone this method of treatment could attain to the certainty of a science.\nThis occasioned once and again psychological disquisitions. Specially\nhowever, Alexander Baumgarten produced with this intention a general\n\u00e6sthetic of all beauty, in which he started from the conception of the\nperfection of sensuous knowledge, that is, of knowledge of perception.\nWith him also, however, the subjective part is done with as soon as this\nconception has been established, and he passes on to the objective part\nand to the practical, which is connected with it. But here also the merit\nwas reserved for Kant of investigating seriously and profoundly _the\nfeeling itself_, in consequence of which we call the object occasioning it\nbeautiful, in order to discover, wherever it was possible, the constituent\nelements and conditions of it in our nature. His investigation, therefore,\ntook an entirely subjective direction. This path was clearly the right\none, for in order to explain a phenomenon which is given in its effects,\none must know accurately this effect itself, if one is to determine\nthoroughly the nature of the cause. Yet Kant\u2019s merit in this regard does\nnot really extend much further than this, that he has indicated the right\npath, and by a provisional attempt has given an example of how, more or\nless, it is to be followed. For what he gave cannot be regarded as\nobjective truth and as a real gain. He gave the method for this\ninvestigation, he broke ground in the right direction, but otherwise he\nmissed the mark.\n\nIn the \u201cCritique of \u00c6sthetical Judgment\u201d the observation first of all\nforces itself upon us that Kant retains the method which is peculiar to\nhis whole philosophy, and which I have considered at length above\u2014I mean\nthe method of starting from abstract knowledge in order to establish\nknowledge of perception, so that the former serves him, so to speak, as a\n_camera obscura_ in which to receive and survey the latter. As in the\n\u201cCritique of Pure Reason\u201d the forms of judgment are supposed to unfold to\nhim the knowledge of our whole world of perception, so in this \u201cCritique\nof \u00c6sthetical Judgment\u201d he does not start from the beautiful itself, from\nthe perceptible and immediately beautiful, but from the _judgment_ of the\nbeautiful, the so-called, and very badly so-called, judgment of taste.\nThis is his problem. His attention is especially aroused by the\ncircumstance that such a judgment is clearly the expression of something\nthat takes place in the subject, but yet is just as universally valid as\nif it concerned a quality of the object. It is this that struck him, not\nthe beautiful itself. He starts always merely from the assertions of\nothers, from the judgment of the beautiful, not from the beautiful itself.\nIt is therefore as if he knew it simply from hearsay, not directly. A\nblind man of high understanding could almost in the same way make up a\ntheory of colours from very accurate reports which he had heard concerning\nthem. And really we can only venture to regard Kant\u2019s philosophemes\nconcerning the beautiful as in almost the same position. Then we shall\nfind that his theory is very ingenious indeed, that here and there telling\nand true observations are made; but his real solution of the problem is so\nvery insufficient, remains so far below the dignity of the subject, that\nit can never occur to us to accept it as objective truth. Therefore I\nconsider myself relieved from the necessity of refuting it; and here also\nI refer to the positive part of my work.\n\nWith regard to the form of his whole book, it is to be observed that it\noriginated in the idea of finding in the teleological conception the key\nto the problem of the beautiful. This inspiration is deduced, which is\nalways a matter of no difficulty, as we have learnt from Kant\u2019s\nsuccessors. Thus there now arises the strange combination of the knowledge\nof the beautiful with that of the teleology of natural bodies in _one_\nfaculty of knowledge called _judgment_, and the treatment of these two\nheterogeneous subjects in one book. With these three powers of knowledge,\nreason, judgment, and understanding, a variety of\nsymmetrical-architectonic amusements are afterwards undertaken, the\ngeneral inclination to which shows itself in many ways in this book; for\nexample, in the forcible adaptation of the whole of it to the pattern of\nthe \u201cCritique of Pure Reason,\u201d and very specially in the antinomy of the\n\u00e6sthetical judgment, which is dragged in by the hair. One might also\nextract a charge of great inconsistency from the fact that after it has\nbeen incessantly repeated in the \u201cCritique of Pure Reason\u201d that the\nunderstanding is the faculty of judgment, and after the forms of its\njudgment have been made the foundation-stone of all philosophy, a quite\nspecial faculty of judgment now appears, which is completely different\nfrom the former. For the rest, what I call the faculty of judgment, the\ncapacity for translating knowledge of perception into abstract knowledge,\nand again of applying the latter correctly to the former, is explained in\nthe positive part of my work.\n\nBy far the best part of the \u201cCritique of \u00c6sthetical Judgment\u201d is the\ntheory of the sublime. It is incomparably more successful than that of the\nbeautiful, and does not only give, as that does, the general method of\ninvestigation, but also a part of the right way to it\u2014so much so that even\nthough it does not give the real solution of the problem, it yet touches\nvery closely upon it.\n\nIn the \u201cCritique of the Teleological Judgment,\u201d on account of the\nsimplicity of the matter, we can recognise perhaps more than anywhere else\nKant\u2019s rare talent of turning a thought this way and that way, and\nexpressing it in a multitude of different ways, until out of it there\ngrows a book. The whole book is intended to say this alone: although\norganised bodies necessarily appear to us as if they were constructed in\naccordance with a conceived design of an end which preceded them, yet we\nare not justified in assuming that this is objectively the case. For our\nintellect, to which things are given from without and indirectly, which\nthus never knows their inner nature through which they arise and exist,\nbut merely their outward side, cannot otherwise comprehend a certain\nquality peculiar to organised productions of nature than by analogy, for\nit compares it with the intentionally accomplished works of man, the\nnature of which is determined by a design and the conception of this\ndesign. This analogy is sufficient to enable us to comprehend the\nagreement of all the parts with the whole, and thus indeed to give us the\nclue to their investigation; but it must by no means on this account be\nmade the actual ground of explanation of the origin and existence of such\nbodies. For the necessity of so conceiving them is of subjective origin.\nSomewhat in this way I would epitomise Kant\u2019s doctrine on this question.\nIn its most important aspect he had expounded it already in the \u201cCritique\nof Pure Reason,\u201d p. 692-702; V., 720-730. But in the knowledge of _this_\ntruth also we find David Hume to be Kant\u2019s worthy forerunner. He also had\nkeenly controverted that assumption in the second part of his \u201cDialogues\nconcerning Natural Religion.\u201d The difference between Hume\u2019s criticism of\nthat assumption and Kant\u2019s is principally this, that Hume criticised it as\nan assumption based upon experience, while Kant, on the other hand,\ncriticised it as an _a priori_ assumption. Both are right, and their\nexpositions supplement each other. Indeed what is really essential in the\nKantian doctrine on this point we find already expressed in the commentary\nof Simplicius on Aristotle\u2019s Physics: \u201c\u1f21 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b1\u03bd\u03b7 \u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03bd \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b1\u03c0\u03bf \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\n\u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b1 \u1f11\u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b7 \u1f41\u03c5\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f41\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd \u03b3\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1.\u201d (_Error iis ortus est ex\neo, quod credebant, omnia, qu\u00e6 propter finem aliquem fierent, ex proposito\net ratiocinio fieri, dum videbant, natur\u00e6 opera non ita fieri._) _Schol.\nin Arist., ex edit. Berol._, p. 354. Kant is perfectly right in the\nmatter; and it was necessary that after it had been shown that the\nconception of cause and effect is inapplicable to the whole of nature in\ngeneral, in respect of its existence, it should also be shown that in\nrespect of its qualities it is not to be thought of as the effect of a\ncause guided by motives (designs). If we consider the great plausibility\nof the physico-theological proof, which even Voltaire held to be\nirrefragable, it was clearly of the greatest importance to show that what\nis subjective in our comprehension, to which Kant had relegated space,\ntime, and causality, extends also to our judgment of natural bodies; and\naccordingly the compulsion which we feel to think of them as having arisen\nas the result of premeditation, according to designs, thus in such a way\nthat _the idea of them preceded their existence_, is just as much of\nsubjective origin as the perception of space, which presents itself so\nobjectively, and that therefore it must not be set up as objective truth.\nKant\u2019s exposition of the matter, apart from its tedious prolixity and\nrepetitions, is excellent. He rightly asserts that we can never succeed in\nexplaining the nature of organised bodies from merely mechanical causes,\nby which he understands the undesigned and regular effect of all the\nuniversal forces of nature. Yet I find here another flaw. He denies the\npossibility of such an explanation merely with regard to the teleology and\napparent adaptation of _organised_ bodies. But we find that even where\nthere is no organisation the grounds of explanation which apply to _one_\nprovince of nature cannot be transferred to another, but forsake us as\nsoon as we enter a new province, and new fundamental laws appear instead\nof them, the explanation of which is by no means to be expected from the\nlaws of the former province. Thus in the province of the mechanical,\nproperly so called, the laws of gravitation, cohesion, rigidity, fluidity,\nand elasticity prevail, which in themselves (apart from my explanation of\nall natural forces as lower grades of the objectification of will) exist\nas manifestations of forces which cannot be further explained, but\nthemselves constitute the principles of all further explanation, which\nmerely consists in reduction to them. If we leave this province and come\nto the phenomena of chemistry, of electricity, magnetism, crystallisation,\nthe former principles are absolutely of no use, indeed the former laws are\nno longer valid, the former forces are overcome by others, and the\nphenomena take place in direct contradiction to them, according to new\nlaws, which, just like the former ones, are original and inexplicable,\n_i.e._, cannot be reduced to more general ones. Thus, for example, no one\nwill ever succeed in explaining even the dissolving of a salt in water in\naccordance with the laws proper to mechanics, much less the more\ncomplicated phenomena of chemistry. All this has already been explained at\nlength in the second book of the present work. An exposition of this kind\nwould, as it seems to me, have been of great use in the \u201cCritique of the\nTeleological Judgment,\u201d and would have thrown much light upon what is said\nthere. Such an exposition would have been especially favourable to his\nexcellent remark that a more profound knowledge of the real being, of\nwhich the things of nature are the manifestation, would recognise both in\nthe mechanical (according to law) and the apparently intentional effects\nof nature one and the same ultimate principle, which might serve as the\nmore general ground of explanation of them both. Such a principle I hope I\nhave given by establishing the will as the real thing in itself; and in\naccordance with it generally in the second book and the supplements to it,\nbut especially in my work \u201cOn the Will in Nature,\u201d the insight into the\ninner nature of the apparent design and of the harmony and agreement of\nthe whole of nature has perhaps become clearer and deeper. Therefore I\nhave nothing more to say about it here.\n\nThe reader whom this criticism of the Kantian philosophy interests should\nnot neglect to read the supplement to it which is given in the second\nessay of the first volume of my \u201cParerga and Paralipomena,\u201d under the\ntitle \u201c_Noch einige Erl\u00e4uterungen zur Kantischen Philosophie_\u201d (Some\nFurther Explanations of the Kantian Philosophy). For it must be borne in\nmind that my writings, few as they are, were not composed all at once, but\nsuccessively, in the course of a long life, and with long intervals\nbetween them. Accordingly, it must not be expected that all I have said\nupon one subject should stand together in one place.\n\n\n\n\n\nSUPPLEMENTS TO THE FIRST BOOK.\n\n\n    \u201c \u2018Warum willst du dich von uns Allen\n    Und unsrer Meinung entfernen?\u2019\n    Ich schreibe nicht euch zu gefallen,\n    Ihr sollt was lernen.\u201d\n\n    \u2014GOETHE.\n\n\n\n\nFirst Half. The Doctrine Of The Idea Of Perception. (To \u00a7 1-7 of the First\nVolume.)\n\n\n\nChapter I. The Standpoint of Idealism.\n\n\nIn boundless space countless shining spheres, about each of which, and\nilluminated by its light, there revolve a dozen or so of smaller ones, hot\nat the core and covered with a hard, cold crust, upon whose surface there\nhave been generated from a mouldy film beings which live and know\u2014this is\nwhat presents itself to us in experience as the truth, the real, the\nworld. Yet for a thinking being it is a precarious position to stand upon\none of those numberless spheres moving freely in boundless space without\nknowing whence or whither, and to be only one of innumerable similar\nbeings who throng and press and toil, ceaselessly and quickly arising and\npassing away in time, which has no beginning and no end; moreover, nothing\npermanent but matter alone and the recurrence of the same varied organised\nforms, by means of certain ways and channels which are there once for all.\nAll that empirical science can teach is only the more exact nature and law\nof these events. But now at last modern philosophy especially through\nBerkeley and Kant, has called to mind that all this is first of all merely\na _phenomenon of the brain_, and is affected with such great, so many, and\nsuch different _subjective_ conditions that its supposed absolute reality\nvanishes away, and leaves room for an entirely different scheme of the\nworld, which consists of what lies at the foundation of that phenomenon,\n_i.e._, what is related to it as the thing in itself is related to its\nmere manifestation.\n\n\u201cThe world is my idea\u201d is, like the axioms of Euclid, a proposition which\nevery one must recognise as true as soon as he understands it; although it\nis not a proposition which every one understands as soon as he hears it.\nTo have brought this proposition to clear consciousness, and in it the\nproblem of the relation of the ideal and the real, _i.e._, of the world in\nthe head to the world outside the head, together with the problem of moral\nfreedom, is the distinctive feature of modern philosophy. For it was only\nafter men had spent their labour for thousands of years upon a mere\nphilosophy of the object that they discovered that among the many things\nthat make the world so obscure and doubtful the first and chiefest is\nthis, that however immeasurable and massive it may be, its existence yet\nhangs by a single thread; and this is the actual consciousness in which it\nexists. This condition, to which the existence of the world is irrevocably\nsubject, marks it, in spite of all _empirical_ reality, with the stamp of\n_ideality_, and therefore of mere _phenomenal appearance_. Thus on one\nside at least the world must be recognised as akin to dreams, and indeed\nto be classified along with them. For the same function of the brain\nwhich, during sleep, conjures up before us a completely objective,\nperceptible, and even palpable world must have just as large a share in\nthe presentation of the objective world of waking life. Both worlds,\nalthough different as regards their matter, are yet clearly moulded in the\none form. This form is the intellect, the function of the brain. Descartes\nwas probably the first who attained to the degree of reflection which this\nfundamental truth demands, and consequently he made it the starting-point\nof his philosophy, though provisionally only in the form of a sceptical\ndoubt. When he took his _cogito ergo sum_ as alone certain, and\nprovisionally regarded the existence of the world as problematical, he\nreally discovered the essential and only right starting-point of all\nphilosophy, and at the same time its _true_ foundation. This foundation is\nessentially and inevitably the _subjective_, the _individual\nconsciousness_. For this alone is and remains immediate; everything else,\nwhatever it may be, is mediated and conditioned through it, and is\ntherefore dependent upon it. Therefore modern philosophy is rightly\nregarded as starting with Descartes, who was the father of it. Not long\nafterwards Berkeley followed the same path further, and attained to\n_idealism_ proper, _i.e._, to the knowledge that the world which is\nextended in space, thus the objective, material world in general, exists\nas such simply and solely in our _idea_, and that it is false, and indeed\nabsurd, to attribute to it, _as such_, an existence apart from all idea\nand independent of the knowing subject, thus to assume matter as something\nabsolute and possessed of real being in itself. But his correct and\nprofound insight into this truth really constitutes Berkeley\u2019s whole\nphilosophy; in it he had exhausted himself.\n\nThus true philosophy must always be idealistic; indeed, it must be so in\norder to be merely honest. For nothing is more certain than that no man\never came out of himself in order to identify himself directly with things\nwhich are different from him; but everything of which he has certain, and\ntherefore immediate, knowledge lies within his own consciousness. Beyond\nthis consciousness, therefore, there can be no _immediate_ certainty; but\nthe first principles of a science must have such certainty. For the\nempirical standpoint of the other sciences it is quite right to assume the\nobjective world as something absolutely given; but not so for the\nstandpoint of philosophy, which has to go back to what is first and\noriginal. Only consciousness is immediately given; therefore the basis of\nphilosophy is limited to facts of consciousness, _i.e._, it is essentially\n_idealistic_. Realism which commends itself to the crude understanding, by\nthe appearance which it assumes of being matter-of-fact, really starts\nfrom an arbitrary assumption, and is therefore an empty castle in the air,\nfor it ignores or denies the first of all facts, that all that we know\nlies within consciousness. For that the _objective existence_ of things is\nconditioned through a subject whose ideas they are, and consequently that\nthe objective world exists only as _idea_, is no hypothesis, and still\nless a dogma, or even a paradox set up for the sake of discussion; but it\nis the most certain and the simplest truth; and the knowledge of it is\nonly made difficult by the fact that it is indeed so simple, and that it\nis not every one who has sufficient power of reflection to go back to the\nfirst elements of his consciousness of things. There can never be an\nabsolute and independent objective existence; indeed such an existence is\nquite unintelligible. For the objective, as such, always and essentially\nhas its existence in the consciousness of a subject, is thus the idea of\nthis subject, and consequently is conditioned by it, and also by its\nforms, the forms of the idea, which depend upon the subject and not on the\nobject.\n\nThat _the objective world would exist_ even if there existed no conscious\nbeing certainly seems at the first blush to be unquestionable, because it\ncan be thought in the abstract, without bringing to light the\ncontradiction which it carries within it. But if we desire to _realise_\nthis abstract thought, that is, to reduce it to ideas of perception, from\nwhich alone (like everything abstract) it can have content and truth, and\nif accordingly we try _to imagine an objective world without a knowing\nsubject_, we become aware that what we then imagine is in truth the\nopposite of what we intended, is in fact nothing else than the process in\nthe intellect of a knowing subject who perceives an objective world, is\nthus exactly what we desired to exclude. For this perceptible and real\nworld is clearly a phenomenon of the brain; therefore there lies a\ncontradiction in the assumption that as such it ought also to exist\nindependently of all brains.\n\nThe principal objection to the inevitable and essential _ideality of all\nobjects_, the objection which, distinctly or indistinctly, arises in every\none, is certainly this: My own person also is an object for some one else,\nis thus his idea, and yet I know certainly that I would continue to exist\neven if he no longer perceived me. But all other objects also stand in the\nsame relation to his intellect as I do; consequently they also would\ncontinue to exist without being perceived by him. The answer to this is:\nThat other being as whose object I now regard my person is not absolutely\n_the subject_, but primarily is a knowing individual. Therefore, if he no\nlonger existed, nay, even if there existed no other conscious being except\nmyself, yet the subject, in whose idea alone all objects exist, would by\nno means be on that account abolished. For I myself indeed am this\nsubject, as every conscious being is. Consequently, in the case assumed,\nmy person would certainly continue to exist, but still as idea, in my own\nknowledge. For even by me myself it is always known only indirectly, never\nimmediately; because all existence as idea is indirect. As _object_,\n_i.e._, as extended, occupying space and acting, I know my body only in\nthe perception of my brain. This takes place by means of the senses, upon\ndata supplied by which the percipient understanding performs its function\nof passing from effect to cause, and thereby, in that the eye sees the\nbody or the hands touch it, it constructs that extended figure which\npresents itself in space as my body. By no means, however, is there\ndirectly given me, either in some general feeling of bodily existence or\nin inner self-consciousness, any extension, form, or activity, which would\nthen coincide with my nature itself, which accordingly, in order so to\nexist, would require no other being in whose knowledge it might exhibit\nitself. On the contrary, that general feeling of bodily existence, and\nalso self-consciousness, exists directly only in relation to the _will_,\nthat is, as agreeable or disagreeable, and as active in the acts of will,\nwhich for external perception exhibit themselves as actions of the body.\nFrom this it follows that the existence of my person or body as _something\nextended and acting_ always presupposes a _knowing being_ distinct from\nit; because it is essentially an existence in apprehension, in the idea,\nthus an existence _for another_. In fact, it is a phenomenon of brain,\njust as much whether the brain in which it exhibits itself is my own or\nbelongs to another person. In the first case one\u2019s own person divides\nitself into the knowing and the known, into object and subject, which here\nas everywhere stand opposed to each other, inseparable and irreconcilable.\nIf, then, my own person, in order to exist as such, always requires a\nknowing subject, this will at least as much hold good of the other objects\nfor which it was the aim of the above objection to vindicate an existence\nindependent of knowledge and its subject.\n\nHowever, it is evident that the existence which is conditioned through a\nknowing subject is only the existence in space, and therefore that of an\nextended and active being. This alone is always something known, and\nconsequently _an existence for another_. On the other hand, every being\nthat exists in this way may yet have _an existence for itself_, for which\nit requires no subject. Yet this existence for itself cannot be extension\nand activity (together space-occupation), but is necessarily a being of\nanother kind, that of a thing in itself, which, as such, can never be an\n_object_. This, then, would be the answer to the leading objection set\nforth above, which accordingly does not overthrow the fundamental truth\nthat the objectively given world can only exist in the idea, thus only for\na subject.\n\nWe have further to remark here that Kant also, so long at least as he\nremained consistent, can have thought no _objects_ among his things in\nthemselves. For this follows from the fact that he proves that space, and\nalso time, are mere forms of our perception, which consequently do not\nbelong to things in themselves. What is neither in space nor in time can\nbe no _object_; thus the being of _things in themselves_ cannot be\nobjective, but of quite a different kind, a metaphysical being.\nConsequently that Kantian principle already involves this principle also,\nthat the _objective_ world exists only as _idea_.\n\nIn spite of all that one may say, nothing is so persistently and ever anew\nmisunderstood as _Idealism_, because it is interpreted as meaning that one\ndenies the _empirical_ reality of the external world. Upon this rests the\nperpetual return to the appeal to common sense, which appears in many\nforms and guises; for example, as an \u201cirresistible conviction\u201d in the\nScotch school, or as Jacobi\u2019s _faith_ in the reality of the external\nworld. The external world by no means presents itself, as Jacobi declares,\nupon credit, and is accepted by us upon trust and faith. It presents\nitself as that which it is, and performs directly what it promises. It\nmust be remembered that Jacobi, who set up such a credit or faith theory\nof the world, and had the fortune to impose it upon a few professors of\nphilosophy, who for thirty years have philosophised upon the same lines\nlengthily and at their ease, is the same man who once denounced Lessing as\na Spinozist, and afterwards denounced Schelling as an atheist, and who\nreceived from the latter the well-known and well-deserved castigation. In\nkeeping with such zeal, when he reduced the external world to a mere\nmatter of faith he only wished to open the door to faith in general, and\nto prepare belief for that which was afterwards really to be made a matter\nof belief; as if, in order to introduce a paper currency, one should seek\nto appeal to the fact that the value of the ringing coin also depends\nmerely on the stamp which the State has set upon it. Jacobi, in his\ndoctrine that the reality of the external world is assumed upon faith, is\njust exactly \u201cthe transcendental realist who plays the empirical idealist\u201d\ncensured by Kant in the \u201cCritique of Pure Reason,\u201d first edition, p. 369.\n\nThe true idealism, on the contrary, is not the empirical but the\ntranscendental. This leaves the empirical reality of the world untouched,\nbut holds fast to the fact that every _object_, thus the empirically real\nin general, is conditioned in a twofold manner by the subject; in the\nfirst place _materially_ or as _object_ generally, because an objective\nexistence is only conceivable as opposed to a subject, and as its idea; in\nthe second place _formally_, because the mode of existence of an object,\n_i.e._, its being perceived (space, time, causality), proceeds from the\nsubject, is pre-arranged in the subject. Therefore with the simple or\nBerkeleian idealism, which concerns the object in general, there stands in\nimmediate connection the Kantian idealism, which concerns the specially\ngiven _mode or manner_ of objective existence. This proves that the whole\nmaterial world, with its bodies, which are extended in space and, by means\nof time, have causal relations to each other, and everything that depends\nupon this\u2014that all this is not something which is there _independently_ of\nour head, but essentially presupposes the functions of our brain _by means\nof which_ and _in_ which alone _such_ an objective arrangement of things\nis possible. For time, space, and causality, upon which all those real and\nobjective events rest, are themselves nothing more than functions of the\nbrain; so that thus the unchangeable _order_ of things which affords the\ncriterion and clue to their empirical reality itself proceeds only from\nthe brain, and has its credentials from this alone. All this Kant has\nexpounded fully and thoroughly; only he does not speak of the brain, but\ncalls it \u201cthe faculty of knowledge.\u201d Indeed he has attempted to prove that\nwhen that objective order in time, space, causality, matter, &c., upon\nwhich all the events of the real world ultimately rest, is properly\nconsidered, it cannot even be conceived as a self-existing order, _i.e._,\nan order of the thing in itself, or as something absolutely objective and\nunconditionally given, for if one tries to think this out it leads to\ncontradictions. To accomplish this was the object of the antinomies, but\nin the appendix to my work I have proved the failure of the attempt. On\nthe other hand, the Kantian doctrine, even without the antinomies, leads\nto the insight that things and the whole mode of their existence are\ninseparably bound up with our consciousness of them. Therefore whoever has\ndistinctly grasped this soon attains to the conviction that the assumption\nthat things also exist as such, apart from and independently of our\nconsciousness, is really absurd. That we are so deeply involved in time,\nspace, causality, and the whole regular process of experience which rests\nupon them, that we (and indeed the brutes) are so perfectly at home, and\nknow how to find our way from the first\u2014this would not be possible if our\nintellect were one thing and things another, but can only be explained\nfrom the fact that both constitute one whole, the intellect itself creates\nthat order, and exists only for things, while they, on the other hand,\nexist only for it.\n\nBut even apart from the deep insight, which only the Kantian philosophy\ngives, the inadmissibility of the assumption of absolute realism which is\nso obstinately clung to may be directly shown, or at least made capable of\nbeing felt, by the simple exhibition of its meaning in the light of such\nconsiderations as the following. According to realism, the world is\nsupposed to exist, as we know it, independently of this knowledge. Let us\nonce, then, remove all percipient beings from it, and leave only\nunorganised and vegetable nature. Rock, tree, and brook are there, and the\nblue heaven; sun, moon, and stars light this world, as before; yet\ncertainly in vain, for there is no eye to see it. Let us now in addition\nplace in it a percipient being. Now that world presents itself _again_ in\nhis brain, and repeats itself within it precisely as it was formerly\nwithout it. Thus to the _first_ world a _second_ has been added, which,\nalthough completely separated from it, resembles it to a nicety. And now\nthe _subjective_ world of this perception is precisely so constituted in\n_subjective_, known space as the _objective_ world in _objective_,\ninfinite space. But the subjective world has this advantage over the\nobjective, the knowledge that that space, outside there, is infinite;\nindeed it can also give beforehand most minutely and accurately the whole\nconstitution or necessary properties of all relations which are possible,\nthough not yet actual, in that space, and does not require to examine\nthem. It can tell just as much with regard to the course of time, and also\nwith regard to the relation of cause and effect which governs the changes\nin that external world. I think all this, when closely considered, turns\nout absurd enough, and hence leads to the conviction that that absolute\nobjective world outside the head, independent of it and prior to all\nknowledge, which at first we imagined ourselves to conceive, is really no\nother than the second, the world which is known _subjectively_, the world\nof idea, as which alone we are actually able to conceive it. Thus of its\nown accord the assumption forces itself upon us, that the world, as we\nknow it, exists also only for our knowledge, therefore in the _idea_\nalone, and not a second time outside of it.(12) In accordance, then, with\nthis assumption, the thing in itself, _i.e._, that which exists\nindependently of our knowledge and of every knowledge, is to be regarded\nas something completely different from the _idea_ and all its attributes,\nthus from objectivity in general. What this is will be the subject of our\nsecond book.\n\nOn the other hand, the controversy concerning the reality of the external\nworld considered in \u00a7 5 of the first volume rests upon the assumption,\nwhich has just been criticised, of an objective and a subjective world\nboth in _space_, and upon the impossibility which arises in connection\nwith this presupposition of a transition from one to the other, a bridge\nbetween the two. Upon this controversy I have still to add the following\nremarks.\n\nThe subjective and the objective do not constitute a continuous whole.\nThat of which we are immediately conscious is bounded by the skin, or\nrather by the extreme ends of the nerves which proceed from the cerebral\nsystem. Beyond this lies a world of which we have no knowledge except\nthrough pictures in our head. Now the question is, whether and how far\nthere is a world independent of us which corresponds to these pictures.\nThe relation between the two could only be brought about by means of the\nlaw of causality; for this law alone leads from what is given to something\nquite different from it. But this law itself has first of all to prove its\nvalidity. Now it must either be of _objective_ or of _subjective_ origin;\nbut in either case it lies upon one or the other side, and therefore\ncannot supply the bridge between them. If, as Locke and Hume assume, it is\n_a posteriori_, thus drawn from experience, it is of _objective_ origin,\nand belongs then itself to the external world which is in question.\nTherefore it cannot attest the reality of this world, for then, according\nto Locke\u2019s method, causality would be proved from experience, and the\nreality of experience from causality. If, on the contrary, it is given _a\npriori_, as Kant has more correctly taught us, then it is of _subjective_\norigin, and in that case it is clear that with it we remain always in the\n_subjective_ sphere. For all that is actually given _empirically_ in\nperception is the occurrence of a sensation in the organ of sense; and the\nassumption that this, even in general, must have a cause rests upon a law\nwhich is rooted in the form of our knowledge, _i.e._, in the functions of\nour brain. The origin of this law is therefore just as subjective as that\nof the sensation itself. The cause of the given sensation, which is\nassumed in consequence of this law, presents itself at once in perception\nas an _object_, which has space and time for the form of its\nmanifestation. But _these forms_ themselves again are entirely of\nsubjective origin; for they are the mode or method of our faculty of\nperception. That transition from the sensation to its cause which, as I\nhave repeatedly pointed out, lies at the foundation of all\nsense-perception is certainly sufficient to give us the empirical presence\nin space and time of an empirical object, and is therefore quite enough\nfor the practical purposes of life; but it is by no means sufficient to\nafford us any conclusion as to the existence and real nature, or rather as\nto the intelligible substratum, of the phenomena which in this way arise\nfor us. Thus that on the occasion of certain sensations occurring in my\norgans of sense there arises in my head a perception of things which are\nextended in space, permanent in time, and causally efficient by no means\njustifies the assumption that they also exist in themselves, _i.e._, that\nsuch things with these properties belonging absolutely to themselves exist\nindependently and outside of my head. This is the true outcome of the\nKantian philosophy. It coincides with an earlier result of Locke\u2019s, which\nis just as true, but far more easily understood. For although, as Locke\u2019s\ndoctrine permits, external things are absolutely assumed as the causes of\nsensations, yet there can be no _resemblance_ between the sensation in\nwhich the _effect_ consists and the objective nature of the _cause_ which\noccasions it. For the sensation, as organic function, is primarily\ndetermined by the highly artificial and complicated nature of our organs\nof sense. It is therefore merely excited by the external cause, but is\nthen perfected entirely in accordance with its own laws, and thus is\ncompletely subjective. Locke\u2019s philosophy was the criticism of the\nfunctions of sense; Kant has given us the criticism of the functions of\nthe brain. But to all this we have yet to add the Berkeleian result, which\nhas been revised by me, that every object, whatever its origin may be, is\n_as object_ already conditioned by the subject, is in fact merely its\n_idea_. The aim of realism is indeed the object without subject; but it is\nimpossible even to conceive such an object distinctly.\n\nFrom this whole inquiry it follows with certainty and distinctness that it\nis absolutely impossible to attain to the comprehension of the inner\nnature of things upon the path of mere _knowledge_ and _perception_. For\nknowledge always comes to things from without, and therefore must for ever\nremain outside them. This end would only be reached if we could find\n_ourselves_ in the inside of things, so that their inner nature would be\nknown to us directly. Now, how far this is actually the case is considered\nin my second book. But so long as we are concerned, as in this first book,\nwith objective comprehension, that is, with _knowledge_, the world is, and\nremains for us, a mere _idea_, for here there is no possible path by which\nwe can cross over to it.\n\nBut, besides this, a firm grasp of the point of view of _idealism_ is a\nnecessary counterpoise to that of _materialism_. The controversy\nconcerning the _real_ and the _ideal_ may also be regarded as a\ncontroversy concerning the existence of _matter_. For it is the reality or\nideality of this that is ultimately in question. Does matter, as such,\nexist only in our _idea_, or does it also exist independently of it? In\nthe latter case it would be the thing in itself; and whoever assumes a\nself-existent matter must also, consistently, be a materialist, _i.e._, he\nmust make matter the principle of explanation of all things. Whoever, on\nthe contrary, denies its existence as a thing in itself is _eo ipso_ an\nidealist. Among the moderns only Locke has definitely and without\nambiguity asserted the reality of matter; and therefore his teaching led,\nin the hands of Condillac, to the sensualism and materialism of the\nFrench. Only Berkeley directly and without modifications denies matter.\nThe complete antithesis is thus that of idealism and materialism,\nrepresented in its extremes by Berkeley and the French materialists\n(Hollbach). Fichte is not to be mentioned here: he deserves no place among\ntrue philosophers; among those elect of mankind who, with deep\nearnestness, seek not their own things but the _truth_, and therefore must\nnot be confused with those who, under this pretence, have only their\npersonal advancement in view. Fichte is the father of the _sham\nphilosophy_, of the _disingenuous_ method which, through ambiguity in the\nuse of words, incomprehensible language, and sophistry, seeks to deceive,\nand tries, moreover, to make a deep impression by assuming an air of\nimportance\u2014in a word, the philosophy which seeks to bamboozle and humbug\nthose who desire to learn. After this method had been applied by\nSchelling, it reached its height, as every one knows, in Hegel, in whose\nhands it developed into pure charlatanism. But whoever even names this\nFichte seriously along with Kant shows that he has not even a dim notion\nof what Kant is. On the other hand, materialism also has its warrant. It\nis just as true that the knower is a product of matter as that matter is\nmerely the idea of the knower; but it is also just as one-sided. For\nmaterialism is the philosophy of the subject that forgets to take account\nof itself. And, accordingly, as against the assertion that I am a mere\nmodification of matter, this must be insisted upon, that all matter exists\nmerely in my idea; and it is no less right. A knowledge, as yet obscure,\nof these relations seems to have been the origin of the saying of Plato,\n\u201c\u1f51\u03bb\u03b7 \u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c8\u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2\u201d (_materia mendacium verax_).\n\n_Realism_ necessarily leads, as we have said, to _materialism_. For if\nempirical perception gives us things in themselves, as they exist\nindependently of our knowledge, experience also gives us the _order_ of\nthings in themselves, _i.e._, the true and sole order of the world. But\nthis path leads to the assumption that there is only _one_ thing in\nitself, matter; of which all other things are modifications; for the\ncourse of nature is here the absolute and only order of the world. To\nescape from these consequences, while realism remained in undisputed\nacceptance, spiritualism was set up, that is, the assumption of a second\nsubstance outside of and along with matter, an _immaterial substance_.\nThis dualism and spiritualism, equally unsupported by experience and\ndestitute of proof and comprehensibility, was denied by Spinoza, and was\nproved to be false by Kant, who dared to do so because at the same time he\nestablished idealism in its rights. For with realism materialism, as the\ncounterpoise of which spiritualism had been devised, falls to the ground\nof its own accord, because then matter and the course of nature become\nmere phenomena, which are conditioned by the intellect, as they have their\nexistence only in its _idea_. Accordingly spiritualism is the delusive and\nfalse safeguard against materialism, while the real and true safeguard is\nidealism, which, by making the objective world dependent upon us, gives\nthe needed counterpoise to the position of dependence upon the objective\nworld, in which we are placed by the course of nature. The world from\nwhich I part at death is, in another aspect, only my idea. The centre of\ngravity of existence falls back into the _subject_. What is proved is not,\nas in spiritualism, that the knower is independent of matter, but that all\nmatter is dependent on him. Certainly this is not so easy to comprehend or\nso convenient to handle as spiritualism, with its two substances; but\n\u03c7\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03c0\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1.\n\nIn opposition to the _subjective_ starting-point, \u201cthe world is my idea,\u201d\nthere certainly stands provisionally with equal justification the\n_objective_ starting-point, \u201cthe world is matter,\u201d or \u201cmatter alone is\nabsolute\u201d (since it alone is not subject to becoming and passing away), or\n\u201call that exists is matter.\u201d This is the starting-point of Democritus,\nLeucippus, and Epicurus. But, more closely considered, the departure from\nthe subject retains a real advantage; it has the start by one perfectly\njustified step. For consciousness alone is the _immediate_: but we pass\nover this if we go at once to matter and make it our starting-point. On\nthe other hand, it would certainly be possible to construct the world from\nmatter and its properties if these were correctly, completely, and\nexhaustively known to us (which is far from being the case as yet). For\nall that has come to be has become actual through _causes_, which could\noperate and come together only by virtue of the _fundamental forces of\nmatter_. But these must be perfectly capable of demonstration at least\nobjectively, even if subjectively we never attain to a knowledge of them.\nBut such an explanation and construction of the world would not only have\nat its foundation the assumption of an existence in itself of matter\n(while in truth it is conditioned by the subject), but it would also be\nobliged to allow all the _original qualities_ in this matter to pass\ncurrent and remain absolutely inexplicable, thus as _qualitates occult\u00e6_.\n(Cf. \u00a7 26, 27 of the first volume.) For matter is only the vehicle of\nthese forces, just as the law of causality is only the arranger of their\nmanifestations. Therefore such an explanation of the world would always\nremain merely relative and conditioned, properly the work of a _physical\nscience_, which at every step longed for a _metaphysic_. On the other\nhand, there is also something inadequate about the subjective\nstarting-point and first principle, \u201cthe world is my idea,\u201d partly because\nit is one-sided, since the world is far more than that (the thing in\nitself, will), and indeed its existence as idea is to a certain extent\nonly accidental to it; but partly also because it merely expresses the\nfact that the object is conditioned by the subject, without at the same\ntime saying that the subject, as such, is also conditioned by the object.\nFor the assertion, \u201cthe subject would still remain a knowing being if it\nhad no object, _i.e._, if it had absolutely no idea,\u201d is just as false as\nthe assertion of the crude understanding, \u201cthe world, the object, would\nstill exist, even if there were no subject.\u201d A consciousness without an\nobject is no consciousness. A thinking subject has conceptions for its\nobject; a subject of sense perception has objects with the qualities\ncorresponding to its organisation. If we rob the subject of all special\ncharacteristics and forms of its knowledge, all the properties of the\nobject vanish also, and nothing remains but _matter without form and\nquality_, which can just as little occur in experience as a subject\nwithout the forms of its knowledge, but which remains opposed to the naked\nsubject as such, as its reflex, which can only disappear along with it.\nAlthough materialism pretends to postulate nothing more than this\nmatter\u2014for instance, atoms\u2014yet it unconsciously adds to it not only the\nsubject, but also space, time, and causality, which depend upon special\nproperties of the subject.\n\nThe world as idea, the objective world, has thus, as it were, two poles;\nthe simple knowing subject without the forms of its knowledge, and crude\nmatter without form and quality. Both are completely unknowable; the\nsubject because it is that which knows, matter because without form and\nquality it cannot be perceived. Yet both are fundamental conditions of all\nempirical perception. Thus the knowing subject, merely as such, which is a\npresupposition of all experience, stands opposed as its pure counterpart\nto the crude, formless, and utterly dead (_i.e._, will-less) matter, which\nis given in no experience, but which all experience presupposes. This\nsubject is not in time, for time is only the more definite form of all its\nideas. The matter which stands over against it is, like it, eternal and\nimperishable, endures through all time, but is, properly speaking, not\nextended, for extension gives form, thus it has no spatial properties.\nEverything else is involved in a constant process of coming into being and\npassing away, while these two represent the unmoved poles of the world as\nidea. The permanence of matter may therefore be regarded as the reflex of\nthe timelessness of the pure subject, which is simply assumed as the\ncondition of all objects. Both belong to phenomena, not to the thing in\nitself, but they are the framework of the phenomenon. Both are arrived at\nonly by abstraction, and are not given immediately, pure and for\nthemselves.\n\nThe fundamental error of all systems is the failure to understand this\ntruth. _Intelligence and matter are correlates_, _i.e._, the one exists\nonly for the other, both stand and fall together, the one is only the\nreflex of the other. Indeed they are really _one and the same thing_\nregarded from two opposite points of view; and this one thing, I am here\nanticipating, is the manifestation of the will, or the thing in itself.\nConsequently both are secondary, and therefore the origin of the world is\nnot to be sought in either of the two. But because of their failure to\nunderstand this, all systems (with the exception perhaps of that of\nSpinoza) sought the origin of all things in one of these two. Some of\nthem, on the one hand, suppose an intelligence, \u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, as the absolutely\nFirst and \u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, and accordingly in this allow an idea of things and\nof the world to precede their actual existence; consequently they\ndistinguish the real world from the world of idea; which is false.\nTherefore matter now appears as that through which the two are\ndistinguished, as the thing in itself. Hence arises the difficulty of\nprocuring this matter, the \u1f51\u03bb\u03b7, so that when added to the mere idea of the\nworld it may impart reality to it. That original intelligence must now\neither find it ready to hand, in which case it is just as much an absolute\nFirst as that intelligence itself, and we have then two absolute Firsts,\nthe \u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2 and the \u1f51\u03bb\u03b7; or the absolute intelligence must create this\nmatter out of nothing, an assumption which our understanding refuses to\nmake, for it is only capable of comprehending changes in matter, and not\nthat matter itself should come into being or pass away. This rests\nultimately upon the fact that matter is essential, the correlate of the\nunderstanding. On the other hand, the systems opposed to these, which make\nthe other of the two correlates, that is, matter, the absolute First,\nsuppose a matter which would exist without being perceived; and it has\nbeen made sufficiently clear by all that has been said above that this is\na direct contradiction, for by the existence of matter we always mean\nsimply its being perceived. But here they encounter the difficulty of\nbringing to this matter, which alone is their absolute First, the\nintelligence which is finally to experience it. I have shown this weak\nside of materialism in \u00a7 7 of the first volume. For me, on the contrary,\nmatter and intelligence are inseparable correlates, which exist only for\neach other, and therefore merely relatively. Matter is the idea of the\nintelligence; the intelligence is that in whose idea alone matter exists.\nThe two together constitute _the world as idea_, which is just Kant\u2019s\n_phenomenon_, and consequently something secondary. What is primary is\nthat which manifests itself, _the thing in itself_, which we shall\nafterwards discover is the will. This is in itself neither the perceiver\nnor the perceived, but is entirely different from the mode of its\nmanifestation.\n\nAs a forcible conclusion of this important and difficult discussion I\nshall now personify these two abstractions, and present them in a dialogue\nafter the fashion of Prabodha Tschandro Daya. It may also be compared with\na similar dialogue between matter and form in the \u201c_Duodecim Principia\nPhilosophi\u00e6_\u201d of Raymund Lully, c. 1 and 2.\n\n_The Subject._\n\nI am, and besides me there is nothing. For the world is my idea.\n\n_Matter._\n\nPresumptuous delusion! I, I am, and besides me there is nothing, for the\nworld is my fleeting form. Thou art a mere result of a part of this form\nand altogether accidental.\n\n_The Subject._\n\nWhat insane arrogance! Neither thou nor thy form would exist without me;\nye are conditioned by me. Whosoever thinks me away, and believes he can\nstill think ye there, is involved in gross delusion, for your existence\napart from my idea is a direct contradiction, a meaningless form of words.\n_Ye are_ simply means ye are perceived by me. My idea is the sphere of\nyour existence; therefore I am its first condition.\n\n_Matter._\n\nFortunately the audacity of your assertion will soon be put to silence in\nreality and not by mere words. Yet a few moments and thou actually art no\nmore. With all thy boasting thou hast sunk into nothing, vanished like a\nshadow, and shared the fate of all my transitory forms. But I, I remain,\nunscathed and undiminished, from age to age, through infinite time, and\nbehold unshaken the play of my changing form.\n\n_The Subject._\n\nThis infinite time through which thou boastest that thou livest, like the\ninfinite space which thou fillest, exists only in my idea. Indeed it is\nmerely the form of my idea which I bear complete in myself, and in which\nthou exhibitest thyself, which receives thee, and through which thou first\nof all existest. But the annihilation with which thou threatenest me\ntouches me not; were it so, then wouldst thou also be annihilated. It\nmerely affects the individual, which for a short time is my vehicle, and\nwhich, like everything else, is my idea.\n\n_Matter._\n\nAnd if I concede this, and go so far as to regard thy existence, which is\nyet inseparably linked to that of these fleeting individuals, as something\nabsolute, it yet remains dependent upon mine. For thou art subject only so\nfar as thou hast an object; and this object I am. I am its kernel and\ncontent, that which is permanent in it, that which holds it together, and\nwithout which it would be as disconnected, as wavering, and unsubstantial\nas the dreams and fancies of thy individuals, which have yet borrowed from\nme even the illusive content they possess.\n\n_The Subject._\n\nThou dost well to refrain from contesting my existence on the ground that\nit is linked to individuals; for, as inseparably as I am joined to them,\nthou art joined to thy sister, Form, and hast never appeared without her.\nNo eye hath yet seen either thee or me naked and isolated; for we are both\nmere abstractions. It is in reality _one_ being that perceives itself and\nis perceived by itself, but whose real being cannot consist either in\nperceiving or in being perceived, since these are divided between us two.\n\n_Both._\n\nWe are, then, inseparably joined together as necessary parts of one whole,\nwhich includes us both and exists through us. Only a misunderstanding can\noppose us two hostilely to each other, and hence draw the false conclusion\nthat the one contests the existence of the other, with which its own\nexistence stands or falls.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nThis whole, which comprehends both, is the world as idea, or the world of\nphenomena. When this is taken away there remains only what is purely\nmetaphysical, the thing in itself, which in the second book we shall\nrecognise as the will.\n\n\n\nChapter II. The Doctrine of Perception or Knowledge Of The Understanding.\n\n\nWith all _transcendental_ ideality the objective world retains _empirical_\nreality; the object is indeed not the thing in itself, but as an empirical\nobject it is real. It is true that space is only in my head; but\nempirically my head is in space. The law of causality can certainly never\nenable us to get quit of idealism by building a bridge between things in\nthemselves and our knowledge of them, and thus certifying the absolute\nreality of the world, which exhibits itself in consequence of its\napplication; but this by no means does away with the causal relation of\nobjects to each other, thus it does not abolish the causal relation which\nunquestionably exists between the body of each knowing person and all\nother material objects. But the law of causality binds together only\nphenomena, and does not lead beyond them. With that law we are and remain\nin the world of objects, _i.e._, the world of phenomena, or more properly\nthe world of ideas. Yet the whole of such a world of experience is\nprimarily conditioned by the knowledge of a subject in general as its\nnecessary presupposition, and then by the special forms of our perception\nand apprehension, thus necessarily belongs to the merely _phenomenal_, and\nhas no claim to pass for the world of things in themselves. Indeed the\nsubject itself (so far as it is merely the _knowing_ subject) belongs to\nthe merely phenomenal, of which it constitutes the complementary half.\n\nWithout application of the law of causality, however, perception of an\n_objective_ world could never be arrived at; for this perception is, as I\nhave often explained, essentially matter of the _intellect_, and not\nmerely of the _senses_. The senses afford us mere _sensation_, which is\nfar from being _perception_. The part played by sensations of the senses\nin perception was distinguished by Locke under the name _secondary\nqualities_, which he rightly refused to ascribe to things in themselves.\nBut Kant, carrying Locke\u2019s method further, distinguished also, and refused\nto ascribe to things in themselves what belongs to the working up of this\nmaterial (the sensations) by the brain. The result was, that in this was\nincluded all that Locke had left to things in themselves as _primary_\nqualities\u2014extension, form, solidity, &c.\u2014so that with Kant the thing in\nitself was reduced to a completely unknown quantity = _x_. With Locke\naccordingly the thing in itself is certainly without colour, sound, smell,\ntaste, neither warm nor cold, neither soft nor hard, neither smooth nor\nrough; yet it has still extension and form, it is impenetrable, at rest or\nin motion, and has mass and number. With Kant, on the other hand, it has\nlaid aside all these latter qualities also, because they are only possible\nby means of time, space, and causality, and these spring from an intellect\n(brain), just as colours, tones, smells, &c., originate in the nerves of\nthe organs of sense. The thing in itself has with Kant become spaceless,\nunextended, and incorporeal. Thus what the mere senses bring to the\nperception, in which the objective world exists, stands to what is\nsupplied by the _functions of the brain_ (space, time, causality) as the\nmass of the nerves of sense stand to the mass of the brain, after\nsubtracting that part of the latter which is further applied to thinking\nproper, _i.e._, to abstract ideas, and is therefore not possessed by the\nbrutes. For as the nerves of the organs of sense impart to the phenomenal\nobjects colour, sound, taste, smell, temperature, &c., so the brain\nimparts to them extension, form, impenetrability, the power of movement,\n&c., in short all that can only be presented in perception by means of\ntime, space, and causality. How small is the share of the senses in\nperception, compared with that of the intellect, is also shown by a\ncomparison of the nerve apparatus for receiving impressions with that for\nworking them up. The mass of the nerves of sensation of the whole of the\norgans of sense is very small compared with that of the brain, even in the\ncase of the brutes, whose brain, since they do not, properly speaking,\n_i.e._, in the abstract, think, is merely used for effecting perception,\nand yet when this is complete, thus in the case of mammals, has a very\nconsiderable mass, even after the cerebellum, whose function is the\nsystematic guidance of movements, has been taken away.\n\nThat excellent book by Thomas Reid, the \u201cInquiry into the Human Mind\u201d\n(first edition, 1764; 6th edition, 1810), as a _negative_ proof of the\nKantian truths, affords us a very thorough conviction of the inadequacy of\nthe senses to produce the objective perception of things, and also of the\nnon-empirical origin of the perception of space and time. Reid refutes\nLocke\u2019s doctrine that perception is a product of the senses, by a thorough\nand acute demonstration that the collective sensations of the senses do\nnot bear the least resemblance to the world as known in perception, and\nespecially that the five primary qualities of Locke (extension, form,\nsolidity, movement, and number) absolutely could not be afforded us by any\nsensation of the senses. Accordingly he gives up the question as to the\nmode of origination and the source of perception as completely insoluble;\nand although altogether unacquainted with Kant, he gives us, as it were,\naccording to the _regula falsi_, a thorough proof of the intellectual\nnature of perception (really first explained by me as a consequence of the\nKantian doctrine), and also of the _a priori_ source, discovered by Kant,\nof its constituent elements, space, time, and causality, from which those\nprimary qualities of Locke first proceed, but by means of which they are\neasily constructed. Thomas Reid\u2019s book is very instructive and well worth\nreading\u2014ten times more so than all the philosophy together that has been\nwritten since Kant. Another indirect proof of the same doctrine, though in\nthe way of error, is afforded by the French sensational philosophers, who,\nsince Condillac trod in the footsteps of Locke, have laboured to show once\nfor all that the whole of our perception and thinking can be referred to\nmere sensations (_penser c\u2019est sentir_), which, after Locke\u2019s example,\nthey call _id\u00e9es simples_, and through the mere coming together and\ncomparison of which the whole objective world is supposed to build itself\nup in our heads. These gentlemen certainly have _des id\u00e9es bien simples_.\nIt is amusing to see how, lacking alike the profundity of the German and\nthe honesty of the English philosopher, they turn the poor material of\nsensation this way and that way, and try to increase its importance, in\norder to construct out of it the deeply significant phenomena of the world\nof perception and thought. But the man constructed by them would\nnecessarily be an _Anencephalus_, a _T\u00eate de crapaud_, with only organs of\nsense and without a brain. To take only a couple of the better attempts of\nthis sort out of a multitude of others, I may mention as examples\nCondorcet at the beginning of his book, \u201c_Des Progr\u00e8s de l\u2019Esprit\nHumain_,\u201d and Tourtual on Sight, in the second volume of the\n_\u201c__Scriptures Ophthalmologici Minores,__\u201d__ edidit Justus Radius_ (1828).\n\nThe feeling of the insufficiency of a purely sensationalistic explanation\nof perception is in like manner shown in the assertion which was made\nshortly before the appearance of the Kantian philosophy, that we not only\nhave _ideas_ of things called forth by sensation, but apprehend the\n_things themselves_ directly, although they lie outside us\u2014which is\ncertainly inconceivable. And this was not meant in some idealistic sense,\nbut was said from the point of view of common realism. This assertion is\nwell and pointedly put by the celebrated Euler in his \u201cLetters to a German\nPrincess,\u201d vol. ii. p. 68. He says: \u201cI therefore believe that the\nsensations (of the senses) contain something more than philosophers\nimagine. They are not merely empty perceptions of certain impressions made\nin the brain. They do not give the soul mere _ideas_ of things, _but\nactually place before it objects_ which exist outside it, although we\ncannot conceive how this really happens.\u201d This opinion is explained by the\nfollowing facts. Although, as I have fully proved, perception is brought\nabout by application of the law of causality, of which we are conscious _a\npriori_, yet in sight the act of the understanding, by means of which we\npass from the effect to the cause, by no means appears distinctly in\nconsciousness; and therefore the sensation does not separate itself\nclearly from the idea which is constructed out of it, as the raw material,\nby the understanding. Still less can a distinction between object and\nidea, which in general does not exist, appear in consciousness; but we\nfeel the _things themselves_ quite directly, and indeed as lying _outside\nus_, although it is certain that what is immediate can only be the\nsensation, and this is confined to the sphere of the body enclosed by our\nskin. This can be explained from the fact that _outside us_ is exclusively\na _spatial_ determination. But space itself is a form of our faculty of\nperception, _i.e._, a function of our brain. Therefore that externality to\nus to which we refer objects, on the occasion of sensations of sight, is\nitself really within our heads; for that is its whole sphere of activity.\nMuch as in the theatre we see the mountains, the woods, and the sea, but\nyet everything is inside the house. From this it becomes intelligible that\nwe perceive things in the relation of externality, and yet in every\nrespect immediately, but have not within us an idea of the things which\nlie outside us, different from these things. For things are in space, and\nconsequently also external to us only in so far as we _perceive_ them.\nTherefore those things which to this extent we perceive directly, and not\nmere images of them, are themselves only _our ideas_, and as such exist\nonly in our heads. Therefore we do not, as Euler says, directly perceive\nthe things themselves which are external to us, but rather the things\nwhich are perceived by us as external to us are only our ideas, and\nconsequently are apprehended by us immediately. The whole observation\ngiven above in Euler\u2019s words, and which is quite correct, affords a fresh\nproof of Kant\u2019s Transcendental \u00c6sthetic, and of my theory of perception\nwhich is founded upon it, as also of idealism in general. The directness\nand unconsciousness referred to above, with which in perception we make\n_the transition from the sensation to its cause_, may be illustrated by an\nanalogous procedure in the use of abstract ideas or thinking. When we read\nor hear we receive mere words, but we pass from these so immediately to\nthe conceptions denoted by them, that it is as if we _received the\nconceptions directly_; for we are absolutely unconscious of the transition\nfrom the words to the conceptions. Therefore it sometimes happens that we\ndo not know in what language it was that we read something yesterday which\nwe now remember. Yet that such a transition always takes place becomes\napparent if it is once omitted, that is, if in a fit of abstraction we\nread without thinking, and then become aware that we certainly have taken\nin all the words but no conceptions. Only when we pass from abstract\nconceptions to pictures of the imagination do we become conscious of the\ntransposition we have made.\n\nFurther, it is really only in perception in the narrowest sense, that is,\nin _sight_, that in empirical apprehension the transition from the\nsensation to its cause takes place quite unconsciously. In every other\nkind of sense perception, on the contrary, the transition takes place with\nmore or less distinct consciousness; therefore, in the case of\napprehension through the four coarser senses, its reality is capable of\nbeing established as an immediate fact. Thus in the dark we feel a thing\nfor a long time on all sides until from the different effects upon our\nhands we are able to construct its definite form as their cause. Further,\nif something feels smooth we sometimes reflect whether we may not have fat\nor oil upon our hands; and again, if something feels cold we ask ourselves\nwhether it may not be that we have very warm hands. When we hear a sound\nwe sometimes doubt whether it was really an affection of our sense of\nhearing from without or merely an inner affection of it; then whether it\nsounded near and weak or far off and strong, then from what direction it\ncame, and finally whether it was the voice of a man or of a brute, or the\nsound of an instrument; thus we investigate the cause of each effect we\nexperience. In the case of smell and taste uncertainty as to the objective\nnature of the cause of the effect felt is of the commonest occurrence, so\ndistinctly are the two separated here. The fact that _in sight_ the\ntransition from the effect to the cause occurs quite unconsciously, and\nhence the illusion arises that this kind of perception is perfectly\ndirect, and consists simply in the sensation alone without any operation\nof the understanding\u2014this has its explanation partly in the great\nperfection of the organ of vision, and partly in the exclusively\nrectilineal action of light. On account of the latter circumstance the\nimpression itself leads directly to the place of the cause, and since the\neye is capable of perceiving with the greatest exactness and at a glance\nall the fine distinctions of light and shade, colour and outline, and also\nthe data in accordance with which the understanding estimates distance, it\nthus happens that in the case of impressions of this sense the operation\nof the understanding takes place with such rapidity and certainty that we\nare just as little conscious of it as of spelling when we read. Hence\narises the delusion that the sensation itself presents us directly with\nthe objects. Yet it is just in sight that the operation of the\n_understanding_, consisting in the knowledge of the cause from the effect,\nis most significant. By means of it what is felt doubly, with two eyes, is\nperceived as single; by means of it the impression which strikes the\nretina upside down, in consequence of the crossing of the rays in the\npupils, is put right by following back the cause of this in the same\ndirection, or as we express ourselves, we see things upright although\ntheir image in the eye is reversed; and finally by means of the operation\nof the understanding magnitude and distance are estimated by us in direct\nperception from five different data, which are very clearly and\nbeautifully described by Dr. Thomas Reid. I expounded all this, and also\nthe proofs which irrefutably establish the _intellectual nature of\nperception_, as long ago as 1816, in my essay \u201cOn Sight and Colour\u201d\n(second edition, 1854; third edition, 1870), and with important additions\nfifteen years later in the revised Latin version of it which is given\nunder the title, \u201c_Theoria Colorum Physiologica Eademque Primaria_,\u201d in\nthe third volume of the \u201c_Scriptores Ophthalmologici Minores_,\u201d published\nby Justus Radius in 1830; yet most fully and thoroughly in the second (and\nthird) edition of my essay \u201cOn the Principle of Sufficient Reason,\u201d \u00a7 21.\nTherefore on this important subject I refer to these works, so as not to\nextend unduly the present exposition.\n\nOn the other hand, an observation which trenches on the province of\n\u00e6sthetics may find its place here. It follows from the proved intellectual\nnature of perception that the sight of beautiful objects\u2014for example, of a\nbeautiful view\u2014is also a _phenomenon of the brain_. Its purity and\ncompleteness, therefore, depends not merely on the object, but also upon\nthe quality of the brain, its form and size, the fineness of its texture,\nand the stimulation of its activity by the strength of the pulse of the\narteries which supply it. Accordingly the same view appears in different\nheads, even when the eyes are equally acute, as different as, for example,\nthe first and last impressions of a copper plate that has been much used.\nThis is the explanation of the difference of capacity for enjoying natural\nbeauty, and consequently also for reproducing it, _i.e._, for occasioning\na similar phenomenon of the brain by means of an entirely different kind\nof cause, the arrangement of colours on a canvas.\n\nThe apparent immediacy of perception, depending on its entire\nintellectuality, by virtue of which, as Euler says, we apprehend the thing\nitself, and as external to us, finds an analogy in the way in which we\nfeel the parts of our own bodies, especially when they suffer pain, which\nwhen we do feel them is generally the case. Just as we imagine that we\nperceive things where they are, while the perception really takes place in\nthe brain, we believe that we feel the pain of a limb in the limb itself,\nwhile in reality it also is felt in the brain, to which it is conducted by\nthe nerve of the affected part. Therefore, only the affections of those\nparts whose nerves go to the brain are felt, and not those of the parts\nwhose nerves belong to the sympathetic system, unless it be that an\nunusually strong affection of these parts penetrates by some roundabout\nway to the brain, where yet for the most part it only makes itself known\nas a dull sense of discomfort, and always without definite determination\nof its locality. Hence, also, it is that we do not feel injuries to a limb\nwhose nerve-trunk has been severed or ligatured. And hence, finally, the\nman who has lost a limb still sometimes feels pain in it, because the\nnerves which go to the brain are still there. Thus, in the two phenomena\nhere compared, what goes on in the brain is apprehended as outside of it;\nin the case of perception, by means of the understanding, which extends\nits feelers into the outer world; in the case of the feeling of our limbs,\nby means of the nerves.\n\n\n\nChapter III. On The Senses.\n\n\nIt is not the object of my writings to repeat what has been said by\nothers, and therefore I only make here some special remarks of my own on\nthe subject of the senses.\n\nThe senses are merely the channels through which the brain receives from\nwithout (in the form of sensations) the materials which it works up into\nideas of perception. Those sensations which principally serve for the\nobjective comprehension of the external world must in themselves be\nneither agreeable nor disagreeable. This really means that they must leave\nthe will entirely unaffected. Otherwise the sensation _itself_ would\nattract our attention, and we would remain at the _effect_ instead of\npassing to the _cause_, which is what is aimed at here. For it would bring\nwith it that marked superiority, as regards our consideration, which the\nwill always has over the mere idea, to which we only turn when the will is\nsilent. Therefore colours and sounds are in themselves, and so long as\ntheir impression does not pass the normal degree, neither painful nor\npleasurable sensations, but appear with the indifference that fits them to\nbe the material of pure objective perception. This is as far the case as\nwas possible in a body which is in itself through and through will; and\njust in this respect it is worthy of admiration. Physiologically it rests\nupon the fact that in the organs of the nobler senses, thus in sight and\nhearing, the nerves which have to receive the specific outward impression\nare quite insusceptible to any sensation of pain, and know no other\nsensation than that which is specifically peculiar to them, and which\nserves the purpose of mere apprehension. Thus the retina, as also the\noptic nerve, is insensible to every injury; and this is also the case with\nthe nerve of hearing. In both organs pain is only felt in their other\nparts, the surroundings of the nerve of sense which is peculiar to them,\nnever in this nerve itself. In the case of the eye such pain is felt\nprincipally in the _conjunctiva_; in the case of the ear, in the _meatus\nauditorius_. Even with the brain this is the case, for if it is cut into\ndirectly, thus from above, it has no feeling. Thus only on account of this\nindifference with regard to the will which is peculiar to them are the\nsensations of the eye capable of supplying the understanding with such\nmultifarious and finely distinguished data, out of which it constructs in\nour head the marvellous objective world, by the application of the law of\ncausality upon the foundation of the pure perceptions of space and time.\nJust that freedom from affecting the will which is characteristic of\nsensations of colour enables them, when their energy is heightened by\ntransparency, as in the glow of an evening sky, in painted glass, and the\nlike, to raise us very easily into the state of pure objective will-less\nperception, which, as I have shown in my third book, is one of the chief\nconstituent elements of the \u00e6sthetic impression. Just this indifference\nwith regard to the will fits sounds to supply the material for denoting\nthe infinite multiplicity of the conceptions of the reason.\n\n_Outer sense_, that is, receptivity for external impressions as pure data\nfor the understanding, is divided into _five senses_, and these\naccommodate themselves to the four elements, _i.e._, the four states of\naggregation, together with that of imponderability. Thus the sense for\nwhat is firm (earth) is touch; for what is fluid (water), taste; for what\nis in the form of vapour, _i.e._, volatile (vapour, exhalation), smell;\nfor what is permanently elastic (air), hearing; for what is imponderable\n(fire, light), sight. The second imponderable, heat, is not properly an\nobject of the senses, but of general feeling, and therefore always affects\nthe _will_ directly, as agreeable or disagreeable. From this\nclassification there also follows the relative dignity of the senses.\nSight has the highest rank, because its sphere is the widest and its\nsusceptibility the finest. This rests upon the fact that what affects it\nis an imponderable, that is, something which is scarcely corporeal, but is\n_quasi_ spiritual. Hearing has the second place, corresponding to air.\nHowever, touch is a more thorough and well-informed sense. For while each\nof the other senses gives us only an entirely one-sided relation to the\nobject, as its sound, or its relation to light, touch, which is closely\nbound up with general feeling and muscular power, supplies the\nunderstanding with the data at once for the form, magnitude, hardness,\nsoftness, texture, firmness, temperature, and weight of bodies, and all\nthis with the least possibility of illusion and deception, to which all\nthe other senses are far more subject. The two lowest senses, smell and\ntaste, are no longer free from a direct affection of the will, that is,\nthey are always agreeably or disagreeably affected, and are therefore more\nsubjective than objective.\n\nSensations of hearing are exclusively in _time_, and therefore the whole\nnature of music consists in degrees of time, upon which depends both the\nquality or pitch of tones, by means of vibrations, and also their quantity\nor duration, by means of time. The sensations of sight, on the other hand,\nare primarily and principally in _space_; but secondarily, by reason of\ntheir duration, they are also in time.\n\nSight is the sense of the understanding which perceives; hearing is the\nsense of the reason which thinks and apprehends. Words are only\nimperfectly represented by visible signs; and therefore I doubt whether a\ndeaf and dumb man, who can read, but has no idea of the sound of the\nwords, works as quickly in thinking with the mere visible signs of\nconceptions as we do with the real, _i.e._, the audible words. If he\ncannot read, it is well known that he is almost like an irrational animal,\nwhile the man born blind is from the first a thoroughly rational being.\n\nSight is an _active_, hearing a _passive_ sense. Therefore sounds affect\nour mind in a disturbing and hostile manner, and indeed they do so the\nmore in proportion as the mind is active and developed; they distract all\nthoughts and instantly destroy the power of thinking. On the other hand,\nthere is no analogous disturbance through the eye, no direct effect of\nwhat is seen, _as such_, upon the activity of thought (for naturally we\nare not speaking here of the influence which the objects looked at have\nupon the will); but the most varied multitude of things before our eyes\nadmits of entirely unhindered and quiet thought. Therefore the thinking\nmind lives at peace with the eye, but is always at war with the ear. This\nopposition of the two senses is also confirmed by the fact that if deaf\nand dumb persons are cured by galvanism they become deadly pale with\nterror at the first sounds they hear (Gilbert\u2019s \u201c_Annalen der Physik_,\u201d\nvol. x. p. 382), while blind persons, on the contrary, who have been\noperated upon, behold with ecstasy the first light, and unwillingly allow\nthe bandages to be put over their eyes again. All that has been said,\nhowever, can be explained from the fact that hearing takes place by means\nof a mechanical vibration of the nerve of hearing which is at once\ntransmitted to the brain, while seeing, on the other hand, is a real\n_action_ of the retina which is merely stimulated and called forth by\nlight and its modifications; as I have shown at length in my physiological\ntheory of colours. But this whole opposition stands in direct conflict\nwith that coloured-ether, drum-beating theory which is now everywhere\nunblushingly served up, and which seeks to degrade the eye\u2019s sensation of\nlight to a mechanical vibration, such as primarily that of hearing\nactually is, while nothing can be more different than the still, gentle\neffect of light and the alarm-drum of hearing. If we add to this the\nremarkable circumstance that although we hear with two ears, the\nsensibility of which is often very different, yet we never hear a sound\ndouble, as we often see things double with our two eyes, we are led to the\nconjecture that the sensation of hearing does not arise in the labyrinth\nor in the cochlea, but deep in the brain where the two nerves of hearing\nmeet, and thus the impression becomes simple. But this is where the _pons\nVarolii_ encloses the _medulla oblongata_, thus at the absolutely lethal\nspot, by the injury of which every animal is instantly killed, and from\nwhich the nerve of hearing has only a short course to the labyrinth, the\nseat of acoustic vibration. Now it is just because its source is here, in\nthis dangerous place, in which also all movement of the limbs originates,\nthat we start at a sudden noise; which does not occur in the least degree\nwhen we suddenly see a light; for example, a flash of lightning. The optic\nnerve, on the contrary, proceeds from its _thalami_ much further forward\n(though perhaps its source lies behind them), and throughout its course is\ncovered by the anterior lobes of the brain, although always separated from\nthem till, having extended quite out of the brain, it is spread out in the\nretina, upon which, on stimulation by light, the sensation first arises,\nand where it is really localised. This is shown in my essay upon sight and\ncolour. This origin of the auditory nerve explains, then, the great\ndisturbance which the power of thinking suffers from sound, on account of\nwhich thinking men, and in general all people of much intellect, are\nwithout exception absolutely incapable of enduring any noise. For it\ndisturbs the constant stream of their thoughts, interrupts and paralyses\ntheir thinking, just because the vibration of the auditory nerve extends\nso deep into the brain, the whole mass of which feels the oscillations set\nup through this nerve, and vibrates along with them, and because the\nbrains of such persons are more easily moved than those of ordinary men.\nOn the same readiness to be set in motion, and capacity for transmission,\nwhich characterises their brains depends the fact that in the case of\npersons like these every thought calls forth so readily all those\nanalogous or related to it whereby the similarities, analogies, and\nrelations of things in general come so quickly and easily into their\nminds; that the same occasion which millions of ordinary minds have\nexperienced before brings them to _the_ thought, to _the_ discovery, that\nother people are subsequently surprised they did not reach themselves, for\nthey certainly can think afterwards, but they cannot think before. Thus\nthe sun shone on all statues, but only the statue of Memnon gave forth a\nsound. For this reason Kant, G\u0153the, and Jean Paul were highly sensitive to\nevery noise, as their biographers bear witness.(13) G\u0153the in his last\nyears bought a house which had fallen into disrepair close to his own,\nsimply in order that he might not have to endure the noise that would be\nmade in repairing it. Thus it was in vain that in his youth he followed\nthe drum in order to harden himself against noise. It is not a matter of\ncustom. On the other hand, the truly stoical indifference to noise of\nordinary minds is astonishing. No noise disturbs them in their thinking,\nreading, writing, or other occupations, while the finer mind is rendered\nquite incapable by it. But just that which makes them so insensible to\nnoise of every kind makes them also insensible to the beautiful in plastic\nart, and to deep thought or fine expression in literary art; in short, to\nall that does not touch their personal interests. The following remark of\nLichtenberg\u2019s applies to the paralysing effect which noise has upon highly\nintellectual persons: \u201cIt is always a good sign when an artist can be\nhindered by trifles from exercising his art. F\u2014\u2014 used to stick his fingers\ninto sulphur if he wished to play the piano.... Such things do not\ninterfere with the average mind;... it acts like a coarse sieve\u201d\n(_Vermischte Schriften_, vol. i. p. 398). I have long really held the\nopinion that the amount of noise which any one can bear undisturbed stands\nin inverse proportion to his mental capacity, and therefore may be\nregarded as a pretty fair measure of it. Therefore, if I hear the dogs\nbarking for hours together in the court of a house without being stopped,\nI know what to think of the intellectual capacity of the inhabitants. The\nman who habitually slams the door of a room, instead of shutting it with\nhis hand, or allows this to go on in his house, is not only ill-bred, but\nis also a coarse and dull-minded fellow. That in English \u201csensible\u201d also\nmeans gifted with understanding is based upon accurate and fine\nobservation. We shall only become quite civilised when the ears are no\nlonger unprotected, and when it shall no longer be the right of everybody\nto sever the consciousness of each thinking being, in its course of a\nthousand steps, with whistling, howling, bellowing, hammering,\nwhip-cracking, barking, &c. &c. The Sybarites banished all noisy trades\nwithout the town; the honourable sect of the Shakers in North America\npermit no unnecessary noise in their villages, and the Moravians have a\nsimilar rule. Something more is said upon this subject in the thirtieth\nchapter of the second volume of the \u201cParerga.\u201d\n\nThe effect of music upon the mind, so penetrating, so direct, so\nunfailing, may be explained from the _passive_ nature of hearing which has\nbeen discussed; also the after effect which sometimes follows it, and\nwhich consists in a specially elevated frame of mind. The vibrations of\nthe tones following in rationally combined numerical relations set the\nfibre of the brain itself in similar vibration. On the other hand, the\n_active_ nature of sight, opposed as it is to the passive nature of\nhearing, makes it intelligible why there can be nothing analogous to music\nfor the eye, and the piano of colours was an absurd mistake. Further, it\nis just on account of the active nature of the sense of sight that it is\nremarkably acute in the case of beasts that hunt, _i.e._, beasts of prey,\nwhile conversely the _passive_ sense of hearing is specially acute in\nthose beasts that are hunted, that flee, and are timid, so that it may\ngive them timely warning of the pursuer that is rushing or creeping upon\nthem.\n\nJust as we have recognised in sight the sense of the understanding, and in\nhearing the sense of the reason, so we might call smell the sense of the\nmemory, because it recalls to us more directly than any other the specific\nimpression of an event or a scene even from the most distant past.\n\n\n\nChapter IV. On Knowledge _A Priori_.\n\n\nFrom the fact that we are able spontaneously to assign and determine the\nlaws of relations in space without having recourse to experience, Plato\nconcludes (_Meno_, p. 353, Bip.) that all learning is mere recollection.\nKant, on the other hand, concludes that space is subjectively conditioned,\nand merely a form of the faculty of knowledge. How far, in this regard,\ndoes Kant stand above Plato!\n\n_Cogito, ergo sum_, is an analytical judgment. Indeed Parmenides held it\nto be an identical judgment: \u201c\u03c4\u03bf \u03b3\u03b1\u03c1 \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf \u03bd\u03bf\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u201d (_nam\nintelligere et esse idem est_, _Clem. Alex. Strom._, vi. 2, \u00a7 23). As\nsuch, however, or indeed even as an analytical judgment, it cannot contain\nany special wisdom; nor yet if, to go still deeper, we seek to deduce it\nas a conclusion from the major premise, _non-entis nulla sunt pr\u00e6dicata_.\nBut with this proposition what Descartes really wished to express was the\ngreat truth that immediate certainty belongs only to self-consciousness,\nto what is subjective. To what is objective, on the other hand, thus to\neverything else, only indirect certainty belongs; for it is arrived at\nthrough self-consciousness; and being thus merely at second hand, it is to\nbe regarded as problematical. Upon this depends the value of this\ncelebrated proposition. As its opposite we may set up, in the sense of the\nKantian philosophy, _cogito, ergo est_, that is, exactly as I think\ncertain relations in things (the mathematical), they must always occur in\nall possible experience;\u2014this was an important, profound, and a late\n_apper\u00e7u_, which appeared in the form of the problem as to the\n_possibility of synthetic judgments a priori_, and has actually opened up\nthe way to a deeper knowledge. This problem is the watchword of the\nKantian philosophy, as the former proposition is that of the Cartesian,\nand shows \u03b5\u03be \u03bf\u1f31\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u03b9\u03c3 \u03bf\u1f31\u03b1.\n\nKant very fitly places his investigations concerning time and space at the\nhead of all the rest. For to the speculative mind these questions present\nthemselves before all others: what is time?\u2014what is this that consists of\nmere movement, without anything that moves it?\u2014and what is space? this\nomnipresent nothing, out of which nothing that exists can escape without\nceasing to be anything at all?\n\nThat time and space depend on the subject, are the mode in which the\nprocess of objective apperception is brought about in the brain, has\nalready a sufficient proof in the absolute impossibility of thinking away\ntime and space, while we can very easily think away everything that is\npresented in them. The hand can leave go of everything except itself.\nHowever, I wish here to illustrate by a few examples and deductions the\nmore exact proofs of this truth which are given by Kant, not for the\npurpose of refuting stupid objections, but for the use of those who may\nhave to expound Kant\u2019s doctrine in future.\n\n\u201cA right-angled equilateral triangle\u201d contains no logical contradiction;\nfor the predicates do not by any means cancel the subject, nor are they\ninconsistent with each other. It is only when their object is constructed\nin pure perception that the impossibility of their union in it appears.\nNow if on this account we were to regard this as a contradiction, then so\nwould every physical impossibility, only discovered to be such after the\nlapse of centuries, be a contradiction; for example, the composition of a\nmetal from its elements, or a mammal with more or fewer than seven\ncervical vertebra,(14) or horns and upper incisors in the same animal. But\nonly _logical_ impossibility is a contradiction, not physical, and just as\nlittle mathematical. Equilateral and rectangled do not contradict each\nother (they coexist in the square), nor does either of them contradict a\ntriangle. Therefore the incompatibility of the above conceptions can never\nbe known by mere _thinking_, but is only discovered by perception\u2014merely\nmental perception, however, which requires no experience, no real object.\nWe should also refer here to the proposition of Giordano Bruno, which is\nalso found in Aristotle: \u201cAn infinitely large body is necessarily\nimmovable\u201d\u2014a proposition which cannot rest either upon experience or upon\nthe principle of contradiction, since it speaks of things which cannot\noccur in any experience, and the conceptions \u201cinfinitely large\u201d and\n\u201cmovable\u201d do not contradict each other; but it is only pure perception\nthat informs us that motion demands a space outside the body, while its\ninfinite size leaves no space over. Suppose, now, it should be objected to\nthe first mathematical example that it is only a question of how complete\na conception of a triangle the person judging has: if the conception is\nquite complete it will also contain the impossibility of a triangle being\nrectangular and also equilateral. The answer to this is: assume that his\nconception is not so complete, yet without recourse to experience he can,\nby the mere construction of the triangle in his imagination, extend his\nconception of it and convince himself for ever of the impossibility of\nthis combination of these conceptions. This process, however, is a\nsynthetic judgment _a priori_, that is, a judgment through which,\nindependently of all experience, and yet with validity for all experience,\nwe form and perfect our conceptions. For, in general, whether a given\njudgment is analytical or synthetical can only be determined in the\nparticular case according as the conception of the subject in the mind of\nthe person judging is more or less complete. The conception \u201ccat\u201d contains\nin the mind of a Cuvier a hundred times more than in that of his servant;\ntherefore the same judgments about it will be synthetical for the latter,\nand only analytical for the former. But if we take the conceptions\nobjectively, and now wish to decide whether a given judgment is analytical\nor synthetical, we must change the predicate into its contradictory\nopposite, and apply this to the subject without a copula. If this gives a\n_contradictio in adjecto_, then the judgment was analytical; otherwise it\nwas synthetical.\n\nThat Arithmetic rests on the pure intuition or perception of time is not\nso evident as that Geometry is based upon that of space.(15) It can be\nproved, however, in the following manner. All counting consists in the\nrepeated affirmation of unity. Only for the purpose of always knowing how\noften we have already affirmed unity do we mark it each time with another\nword: these are the numerals. Now repetition is only possible through\nsuccession. But succession, that is, being after one another, depends\ndirectly upon the intuition or perception of _time_. It is a conception\nwhich can only be understood by means of this; and thus counting also is\nonly possible by means of time. This dependence of all counting upon time\nis also betrayed by the fact that in all languages multiplication is\nexpressed by \u201ctime,\u201d thus by a time-concept: _sexies_, \u1f11\u03be\u03b1\u03ba\u03b9\u03c2, _six fois_,\n_sex mal_. But simple counting is already a multiplication by one, and for\nthis reason in Pestalozzi\u2019s educational establishment the children are\nalways made to multiply thus: \u201cTwo times two is four times one.\u201d Aristotle\nalready recognised the close relationship of number and time, and\nexpounded it in the fourteenth chapter of the fourth book of the\n\u201cPhysics.\u201d Time is for him \u201cthe number of motion\u201d (\u201c\u1f41 \u03c7\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03b8\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\n\u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2\u201d). He very profoundly suggests the question whether time could be\nif the soul were not, and answers it in the negative. If arithmetic had\nnot this pure intuition or perception of time at its foundation, it would\nbe no science _a priori_, and therefore its propositions would not have\ninfallible certainty.\n\nAlthough time, like space, is the form of knowledge of the subject, yet,\njust like space, it presents itself as independent of the subject and\ncompletely objective. Against our will, or without our knowledge, it goes\nfast or slow. We ask what o\u2019clock it is; we investigate time, as if it\nwere something quite objective. And what is this objective existence? Not\nthe progress of the stars, or of the clocks, which merely serve to measure\nthe course of time itself, but it is something different from all things,\nand yet, like them, independent of our will and knowledge. It exists only\nin the heads of percipient beings, but the uniformity of its course and\nits independence of the will give it the authority of objectivity.\n\nTime is primarily the form of inner sense. Anticipating the following\nbook, I remark that the only object of inner sense is the individual will\nof the knowing subject. Time is therefore the form by means of which\nself-consciousness becomes possible for the individual will, which\noriginally and in itself is without knowledge. In it the nature of the\nwill, which in itself is simple and identical, appears drawn out into a\ncourse of life. But just on account of this original simplicity and\nidentity of what thus exhibits itself, its _character_ remains always\nprecisely the same, and hence also the course of life itself retains\nthroughout the same key-note, indeed its multifarious events and scenes\nare at bottom just like variations of one and the same theme.\n\nThe _a priori nature of the law of causality_ has, by Englishmen and\nFrenchmen, sometimes not been seen at all, sometimes not rightly conceived\nof; and therefore some of them still prosecute the earlier attempts to\nfind for it an _empirical_ origin. Maine de Biran places this in the\nexperience that the act of will as cause is followed by the movement of\nthe body as effect. But this fact itself is untrue. We certainly do not\nrecognise the really immediate act of will as something different from the\naction of the body, and the two as connected by the bond of causality; but\nboth are one and indivisible. Between them there is no succession; they\nare simultaneous. They are one and the same thing, apprehended in a double\nmanner. That which makes itself known to inner apprehension\n(self-consciousness) as the real _act of will_ exhibits itself at once in\nexternal perception, in which the body exists objectively as an _action_\nof the body. That physiologically the action of the nerve precedes that of\nthe muscle is here immaterial, for it does not come within\nself-consciousness; and we are not speaking here of the relation between\nmuscle and nerve, but of that between the act of will and the action of\nthe body. Now this does not present itself as a causal relation. If these\ntwo presented themselves to us as cause and effect their connection would\nnot be so incomprehensible to us as it actually is; for what we understand\nfrom its cause we understand as far as there is an understanding of things\ngenerally. On the other hand, the movement of our limbs by means of mere\nacts of will is indeed a miracle of such common occurrence that we no\nlonger observe it; but if we once turn our attention to it we become\nkeenly conscious of the incomprehensibility of the matter, just because in\nthis we have something before us which we do _not_ understand as the\neffect of a cause. This apprehension, then, could never lead us to the\nidea of causality, for that never appears in it at all. Maine de Biran\nhimself recognises the perfect simultaneousness of the act of will and the\nmovement (_Nouvelles Consid\u00e9rations des Rapports du Physique au Moral_, p.\n377, 378). In England Thomas Reid (On the First Principles of Contingent\nTruths, Essay IV. c. 5) already asserted that the knowledge of the causal\nrelation has its ground in the nature of the faculty of knowledge itself.\nQuite recently Thomas Brown, in his very tediously composed book, \u201cInquiry\ninto the Relation of Cause and Effect,\u201d 4th edit., 1835, says much the\nsame thing, that that knowledge springs from an innate, intuitive, and\ninstinctive conviction; thus he is at bottom upon the right path. Quite\nunpardonable, however, is the crass ignorance on account of which in this\nbook of 476 pages, of which 130 are devoted to the refutation of Hume,\nabsolutely no mention is made of Kant, who cleared up the question more\nthan seventy years ago. If Latin had remained the exclusive language of\nscience such a thing would not have occurred. In spite of Brown\u2019s\nexposition, which in the main is correct, a modification of the doctrine\nset up by Maine de Biran, of the empirical origin of the fundamental\nknowledge of the causal relation, has yet found acceptance in England; for\nit is not without a certain degree of plausibility. It is this, that we\nabstract the law of causality from the perceived effect of our own body\nupon other bodies. This was already refuted by Hume. I, however, have\nshown that it is untenable in my work, \u201c_Ueber den Willen in der Natur_\u201d\n(p. 75 of the second edition, p. 82 of the third), from the fact that\nsince we apprehend both our own and other bodies objectively in spatial\nperception, the knowledge of causality must already be there, because it\nis a condition of such perception. The one genuine proof that we are\nconscious of the law of causality _before all experience_ lies in the\nnecessity of making a _transition_ from the sensation, which is only\nempirically given, to its _cause_, in order that it may become perception\nof the external world. Therefore I have substituted this proof for the\nKantian, the incorrectness of which I have shown. A most full and thorough\nexposition of the whole of this important subject, which is only touched\non here, the _a priori_ nature of the law of causality and the\nintellectual nature of empirical perception, will be found in my essay on\nthe principle of sufficient reason, \u00a7 21, to which I refer, in order to\navoid the necessity of repeating here what is said there. I have also\nshown there the enormous difference between the mere sensation of the\nsenses and the perception of an objective world, and discovered the wide\ngulf that lies between the two. The law of causality alone can bridge\nacross this gulf, and it presupposes for its application the two other\nforms which are related to it, space and time. Only by means of these\nthree combined is the objective idea attained to. Now whether the\nsensation from which we start to arrive at apprehension arises through the\nresistance which is suffered by our muscular exertion, or through the\nimpression of light upon the retina, or of sound upon the nerves of the\nbrain, &c. &c., is really a matter of indifference. The _sensation_ always\nremains a mere _datum_ for the _understanding_, which alone is capable of\napprehending it as the effect of a cause different from itself, which the\nunderstanding now perceives as external, _i.e._, as something occupying\nand filling space, which is also a form inherent in the intellect prior to\nall experience. Without this intellectual operation, for which the forms\nmust lie ready in us, the perception of an _objective, external world_\ncould never arise from a mere _sensation_ within our skin. How can it ever\nbe supposed that the mere feeling of being hindered in intended motion,\nwhich occurs also in lameness, could be sufficient for this? We may add to\nthis that before I attempt to affect external things _they_ must\nnecessarily have affected me as motives. But this almost presupposes the\napprehension of the external world. According to the theory in question\n(as I have remarked in the place referred to above), a man born without\narms and legs could never attain to the idea of causality, and\nconsequently could never arrive at the apprehension of the external world.\nBut that this is not the case is proved by a fact communicated in\nFroriep\u2019s _Notizen_, July 1838, No. 133\u2014the detailed account, accompanied\nby a likeness, of an Esthonian girl, Eva Lauk, then fourteen years old,\nwho was born entirely without arms or legs. The account concludes with\nthese words: \u201cAccording to the evidence of her mother, her mental\ndevelopment had been quite as quick as that of her brothers and sisters;\nshe attained just as soon as they did to a correct judgment of size and\ndistance, yet without the assistance of hands.\u2014Dorpat, 1st March 1838, Dr.\nA. Hueck.\u201d\n\nHume\u2019s doctrine also, that the conception of causality arises from the\ncustom of seeing two states constantly following each other, finds a\npractical refutation in the oldest of all successions, that of day and\nnight, which no one has ever held to be cause and effect of each other.\nAnd the same succession also refutes Kant\u2019s false assertion that the\n_objective_ reality of a succession is only known when we apprehend the\ntwo succeeding events as standing in the relation of cause and effect to\neach other. Indeed the converse of this doctrine of Kant\u2019s is true. We\nknow which of the two connected events is the cause and which the effect,\n_empirically_, only in the succession. Again, on the other hand, the\nabsurd assertion of several professors of philosophy in our own day that\ncause and effect are simultaneous can be refuted by the fact that in cases\nin which the succession cannot be perceived on account of its great\nrapidity, we yet assume it with certainty _a priori_, and with it the\nlapse of a certain time. Thus, for example, we know that a certain time\nmust elapse between the falling of the flint and the projection of the\nbullet, although we cannot perceive it, and that this time must further be\ndivided between several events that occur in a strictly determined\nsuccession\u2014the falling of the flint, the striking of the spark, ignition,\nthe spread of the fire, the explosion, and the projection of the bullet.\nNo man ever perceived this succession of events; but because we know which\nis the cause of the others, we thereby also know which must _precede the\nothers in time_, and consequently also that during the course of the whole\nseries a certain time must elapse, although it is so short that it escapes\nour empirical apprehension; for no one will assert that the projection of\nthe bullet is actually simultaneous with the falling of the flint. Thus\nnot only the law of causality, but also its relation to _time_, and the\nnecessity of the _succession_ of cause and effect, is known to us _a\npriori_. If we know which of two events is the cause and which is the\neffect, we also know which precedes the other in time; if, on the\ncontrary, we do not know which is cause and which effect, but only know in\ngeneral that they are causally connected, we seek to discover the\nsuccession empirically, and according to that we determine which is the\ncause and which the effect. The falseness of the assertion that cause and\neffect are simultaneous further appears from the following consideration.\nAn unbroken chain of causes and effects fills the whole of time. (For if\nthis chain were broken the world would stand still, or in order to set it\nin motion again an effect without a cause would have to appear.) Now if\nevery effect were simultaneous with its cause, then every effect would be\nmoved up into the time of its cause, and a chain of causes and effects\ncontaining as many links as before would fill no time at all, still less\nan infinite time, but would be all together in one moment. Thus, under the\nassumption that cause and effect are simultaneous, the course of the world\nshrinks up into an affair of a moment. This proof is analogous to the\nproof that every sheet of paper must have a certain thickness, because\notherwise the whole book would have none. To say _when_ the cause ceases\nand the effect begins is in almost all cases difficult, and often\nimpossible. For the _changes_ (_i.e._, the succession of states) are\ncontinuous, like the time which they fill, and therefore also, like it,\nthey are infinitely divisible. But their succession is as necessarily\ndetermined and as unmistakable as that of the moments of time itself, and\neach of them is called, with reference to the one which precedes it,\n\u201ceffect,\u201d and with reference to the one which follows it, \u201ccause.\u201d\n\n_Every change in the material world can only take place because another\nhas immediately preceded it_: this is the true and the whole content of\nthe law of causality. But no conception has been more misused in\nphilosophy than that of _cause_, by means of the favourite trick or\nblunder of conceiving it too widely, taking it too generally, through\nabstract thinking. Since Scholasticism, indeed properly since Plato and\nAristotle, philosophy has been for the most part a _systematic misuse of\ngeneral conceptions_. Such, for example, are substance, ground, cause, the\ngood, perfection, necessity, and very many others. A tendency of the mind\nto work with such abstract and too widely comprehended conceptions has\nshown itself almost at all times. It may ultimately rest upon a certain\nindolence of the intellect, which finds it too difficult a task to be\nconstantly controlling thought by perception. By degrees such unduly wide\nconceptions come to be used almost like algebraical symbols, and tossed\nabout like them, and thus philosophy is reduced to a mere process of\ncombination, a kind of reckoning which (like all calculations) employs and\ndemands only the lower faculties. Indeed there finally results from this a\nmere juggling with words, of which the most shocking example is afforded\nus by the mind-destroying Hegelism, in which it is carried to the extent\nof pure nonsense. But Scholasticism also often degenerated into\nword-juggling. Nay even the \u201cTopi\u201d of Aristotle\u2014very abstract principles,\nconceived with absolute generality, which one could apply to the most\ndifferent kinds of subjects, and always bring into the field in arguing\neither _pro_ or _contra_\u2014have also their origin in this misuse of general\nconceptions. We find innumerable examples of the way the Schoolmen worked\nwith such abstractions in their writings, especially in those of Thomas\nAquinas. But philosophy really pursued the path which was entered on by\nthe Schoolmen down to the time of Locke and Kant, who at last bethought\nthemselves as to the origin of conceptions. Indeed we find Kant himself,\nin his earlier years, still upon that path, in his \u201cProof of the Existence\nof God\u201d (p. 191 of the first volume of Rosenkranz\u2019s edition), where the\nconceptions substance, ground, reality, are used in such a way as would\nnever have been possible if he had gone back to the _source_ of these\nconceptions and to their _true content_ which is determined thereby. For\nthen he would have found as the source and content of _substance_ simply\nmatter, of ground (if things of the real world are in question) simply\ncause, that is, the prior change which brings about the later change, &c.\nIt is true that in this case such an investigation would not have led to\nthe intended result. But everywhere, as here, such unduly wide\nconceptions, under which, therefore, more was subsumed than their true\ncontent would have justified, there have arisen false principles, and from\nthese false systems. Spinoza\u2019s whole method of demonstration rests upon\nsuch uninvestigated and too widely comprehended conceptions. Now here lies\nthe great merit of Locke, who, in order to counteract all that dogmatic\nunreality, insisted upon the investigation of the _origin of the\nconceptions_, and thus led back to _perception and experience_. Bacon had\nworked in a similar frame of mind, yet more with reference to Physics than\nto Metaphysics. Kant followed the path entered upon by Locke, but in a\nhigher sense and much further, as has already been mentioned above. To the\nmen of mere show who succeeded in diverting the attention of the public\nfrom Kant to themselves the results obtained by Locke and Kant were\ninconvenient. But in such a case they know how to ignore both the dead and\nthe living. Thus without hesitation they forsook the only right path which\nhad at last been found by those wise men, and philosophised at random with\nall kinds of indiscriminately collected conceptions, unconcerned as to\ntheir origin and content, till at last the substance of the Hegelian\nphilosophy, wise beyond measure, was that the conceptions had no origin at\nall, but were rather themselves the origin and source of things. But Kant\nhas erred in this respect. He has too much neglected empirical perception\nfor the sake of _pure_ perception\u2014a point which I have fully discussed in\nmy criticism of his philosophy. With me perception is throughout the\nsource of all knowledge. I early recognised the misleading and insidious\nnature of abstractions, and in 1813, in my essay on the principle of\nsufficient reason, I pointed out the difference of the relations which are\nthought under _this_ conception. General conceptions must indeed be the\nmaterial in which philosophy deposits and stores up its knowledge, but not\nthe source from which it draws it; the _terminus ad quem_, not _a quo_. It\nis not, as Kant defines it, a science _drawn from_ conceptions, but a\nscience _in_ conceptions. Thus the conception of causality also, with\nwhich we are here concerned, has always been taken far too widely by\nphilosophers for the furtherance of their dogmatic ends, and much was\nimported into it which does not belong to it at all. Hence arose\npropositions such as the following: \u201cAll that is has its cause\u201d\u2014\u201cthe\neffect cannot contain more than the cause, thus nothing that was not also\nin the cause\u201d\u2014\u201c_causa est nobilior suo effectu_,\u201d and many others just as\nunwarranted. The following subtilty of that insipid gossip Proclus affords\nan elaborate and specially lucid example of this. It occurs in his\n\u201c_Institutio Theologica_,\u201d \u00a7 76: \u201c\u03a0\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf \u03b1\u03c0\u03bf \u03b1\u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c2,\n\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bb\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03be\u03b9\u03bd; \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd \u03b4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03bf \u03b1\u03c0\u03bf \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2, \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bb\u03b7\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd; \u03b5\u03b9 \u03b3\u03b1\u03c1\n\u03b1\u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u1fc3 \u03c4\u03bf \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03bd, \u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2, \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u1fbd \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c4\u1ff3 \u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\n\u03c4\u03bf \u03b4\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u03c6\u1fbd \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5.\u201d (_Quidquid ab immobili causa manat, immutabilem\nhabet essentiam [substantiam]. Quidquid vero a mobili causa manat,\nessentiam habet mutabilem. Si enim illud, quod aliquid facit, est prorsus\nimmobile, non per motum, sed per ipsum Esse producit ipsum secundum ex se\nipso._) Excellent! But just show me a cause which is not itself set in\nmotion: it is simply impossible. But here, as in so many cases,\nabstraction has thought away all determinations down to that one which it\nis desired to make use of without regard to the fact that the latter\ncannot exist without the former. The only correct expression of the law of\ncausality is this: _Every change has its cause in another change which\nimmediately precedes it_. If something _happens_, _i.e._, if a new state\nof things appears, _i.e._, if something is _changed_, then something else\nmust have _changed_ immediately before, and something else again before\nthis, and so on _ad infinitum_, for a _first_ cause is as impossible to\nconceive as a beginning of time or a limit of space. More than this the\nlaw of causality does not assert. Thus its claims only arise in the case\nof _changes_. So long as nothing changes there can be no question of a\ncause. For there is no _a priori_ ground for inferring from the existence\nof given things, _i.e._, states of matter, their previous non-existence,\nand from this again their coming into being, that is to say, there is no\n_a priori_ ground for inferring a change. Therefore the mere existence of\na thing does not justify us in inferring that it has a cause. Yet there\nmay be _a posteriori_ reasons, that is, reasons drawn from previous\nexperience, for the assumption that the present state or condition did not\nalways exist, but has only come into existence in consequence of another\nstate, and therefore by means of a change, the cause of which is then to\nbe sought, and also the cause of this cause. Here then we are involved in\nthe _infinite regressus_ to which the application of the law of causality\nalways leads. We said above: \u201c_Things_, _i.e._, _states or conditions of\nmatter,_\u201d for _change_ and _causality_ have only to do with states or\nconditions. It is these states which we understand by _form_, in the wider\nsense; and only the forms change, the matter is permanent. Thus it is only\nthe form which is subject to the law of causality. But the form\nconstitutes the _thing_, _i.e._, it is the ground of _the difference_ of\nthings; while matter must be thought as the same in all. Therefore the\nSchoolmen said, \u201c_Forma dat esse rei;_\u201d more accurately this proposition\nwould run: _Forma dat rei essentiam, materia existentiam_. Therefore the\nquestion as to the cause of a _thing_ always concerns merely its form,\n_i.e._, its state or quality, and not its matter, and indeed only the\nformer so far as we have grounds for assuming that it has not _always_\nexisted, but has come into being by means of a _change_. The union of\n_form_ and _matter_, or of _essentia_ and _existentia_, gives the\n_concrete_, which is always particular; thus, the _thing_. And it is the\n_forms_ whose union with _matter_, _i.e._, whose appearance in matter by\nmeans of a _change_, are subject to the law of causality. By taking the\nconception _too widely_ in the abstract the mistake slipped in of\nextending causality to the thing absolutely, that is, to its whole inner\nnature and existence, thus also to matter, and ultimately it was thought\njustifiable to ask for a cause of the world itself. This is the origin of\nthe _cosmological proof_. This proof begins by inferring from the\nexistence of the world its non-existence, which preceded its existence,\nand such an inference is quite unjustifiable; it ends, however, with the\nmost fearful inconsistency, for it does away altogether with the law of\ncausality, from which alone it derives all its evidencing power, for it\nstops at a first cause, and will not go further; thus ends, as it were, by\ncommitting parricide, as the bees kill the drones after they have served\ntheir end. All the talk about the _absolute_ is referable to a shamefast,\nand therefore disguised cosmological proof, which, in the face of the\n\u201cCritique of Pure Reason,\u201d has passed for philosophy in Germany for the\nlast sixty years. What does the absolute mean? Something that is, and of\nwhich (under pain of punishment) we dare not ask further whence and why it\nis. A precious rarity for professors of philosophy! In the case, however,\nof the honestly expressed cosmological proof, through the assumption of a\nfirst cause, and therefore of a first beginning in a time which has\nabsolutely no beginning, this beginning is always pushed further back by\nthe question: Why not earlier? And so far back indeed that one never gets\ndown from it to the present, but is always marvelling that the present\nitself did not occur already millions of years ago. In general, then, the\nlaw of causality applies to all things in the world, but not to the world\nitself, for it is _immanent_ in the world, not _transcendent; with_ it it\ncomes into action, and _with_ it it is abolished. This depends ultimately\nupon the fact that it belongs to the mere form of our understanding, like\nthe whole of the objective world, which accordingly is merely phenomenal,\nand is conditioned by the understanding. Thus the law of causality has\nfull application, without any exception, to all things in the world, of\ncourse in respect of their form, to the variation of these forms, and thus\nto their changes. It is valid for the actions of men as for the impact of\na stone, yet, as we have said always, merely with regard to events, to\n_changes_. But if we abstract from its origin in the understanding and try\nto look at it as purely objective, it will be found in ultimate analysis\nto depend upon the fact that everything that acts does so by virtue of its\noriginal, and therefore eternal or timeless, power; therefore its present\neffect would necessarily have occurred infinitely earlier, that is, before\nall conceivable time, but that it lacked the temporal condition. This\ntemporal condition is the occasion, _i.e._, the cause, on account of which\nalone the effect only takes place _now_, but now takes place necessarily;\nthe cause assigns it its place in time.\n\nBut in consequence of that unduly wide view in abstract thought of the\nconception _cause_, which was considered above, it has been confounded\nwith the conception of _force_. This is something completely different\nfrom the cause, but yet is that which imparts to every cause its\ncausality, _i.e._, the capability of producing an effect. I have explained\nthis fully and thoroughly in the second book of the first volume, also in\n\u201cThe Will in Nature,\u201d and finally also in the second edition of the essay\non the principle of sufficient reason, \u00a7 20, p. 44 (third edition, p. 45).\nThis confusion is to be found in its most aggravated form in Maine de\nBiran\u2019s book mentioned above, and this is dealt with more fully in the\nplace last referred to; but apart from this it is also very common; for\nexample, when people seek for the cause of any original force, such as\ngravitation. Kant himself (_\u00dcber den Einzig M\u00f6glichen Beweisgrund_, vol.\ni. p. 211-215 of Rosenkranz\u2019s edition) calls the forces of nature\n\u201cefficient causes,\u201d and says \u201cgravity is a cause.\u201d Yet it is impossible to\nsee to the bottom of his thought so long as force and cause are not\ndistinctly recognised as completely different. But the use of abstract\nconceptions leads very easily to their confusion if the consideration of\ntheir origin is set aside. The knowledge of causes and effects, always\n_perceptive_, which rests on the form of the understanding, is neglected\nin order to stick to the abstraction _cause_. In this way alone is the\nconception of causality, with all its simplicity, so very frequently\nwrongly apprehended. Therefore even in Aristotle (\u201cMetaph.,\u201d iv. 2) we\nfind causes divided into four classes which are utterly falsely, and\nindeed crudely conceived. Compare with it my classification of causes as\nset forth for the first time in my essay on sight and colour, chap. 1, and\ntouched upon briefly in the sixth paragraph of the first volume of the\npresent work, but expounded at full length in my prize essay on the\nfreedom of the will, p. 30-33. Two things in nature remain untouched by\nthat chain of causality which stretches into infinity in both directions;\nthese are matter and the forces of nature. They are both conditions of\ncausality, while everything else is conditioned by it. For the one\n(matter) is that _in_ which the states and their changes appear; the other\n(forces of nature) is that by virtue of which alone they can appear at\nall. Here, however, one must remember that in the second book, and later\nand more thoroughly in \u201cThe Will in Nature,\u201d the natural forces are shown\nto be identical with the will in us; but matter appears as the mere\n_visibility of the will_; so that ultimately it also may in a certain\nsense be regarded as identical with the will.\n\nOn the other hand, not less true and correct is what is explained in \u00a7 4\nof the first book, and still better in the second edition of the essay on\nthe principle of sufficient reason at the end of \u00a7 21, p. 77 (third\nedition, p. 82), that matter is causality itself objectively comprehended,\nfor its entire nature consists in _acting in general_, so that it itself\nis thus the activity (\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 = reality) of things generally, as it were\nthe abstraction of all their different kinds of acting. Accordingly, since\nthe essence, _essentia_, of matter consists in _action in general_, and\nthe reality, _existentia_, of things consists in their materiality, which\nthus again is one with action in general, it may be asserted of matter\nthat in it _existentia_ and _essentia_ unite and are one, for it has no\nother attribute than _existence itself_ in general and independent of all\nfuller definitions of it. On the other hand, all _empirically_ given\nmatter, thus all material or matter in the special sense (which our\nignorant materialists at the present day confound with matter), has\nalready entered the framework of the _forms_ and manifests itself only\nthrough their qualities and accidents, because in experience every action\nis of quite a definite and special kind, and is never merely general.\nTherefore pure matter is an object of _thought_ alone, not of\n_perception_, which led Plotinus (_Enneas II._, lib. iv., c. 8 & 9) and\nGiordano Bruno (_Della Causa_, dial. 4) to make the paradoxical assertion\nthat matter has no extension, for extension is inseparable from the form,\nand that therefore it is _incorporeal_. Yet Aristotle had already taught\nthat it is not a body although it is corporeal: \u201c\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03bf\u03c5\u03ba \u03b1\u03bd \u03b5\u03b9\u03b7,\n\u03c3\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b7 \u03b4\u03b5\u201d (_Stob. Ecl._, lib. i., c. 12, \u00a7 5). In reality we think\nunder _pure matter_ only action, in the abstract, quite independent of the\n_kind_ of action, thus _pure causality_ itself; and as such it is not an\n_object_ but a _condition_ of experience, just like space and time. This\nis the reason why in the accompanying table of our pure _a priori_\nknowledge matter is able to take the place of causality, and therefore\nappears along with space and time as the third pure form, and therefore as\ndependent on our intellect.\n\nThis table contains all the fundamental truths which are rooted in our\nperceptive or intuitive knowledge _a priori_, expressed as first\nprinciples independent of each other. What is special, however, what forms\nthe content of arithmetic and geometry, is not given here, nor yet what\nonly results from the union and application of those formal principles of\nknowledge. This is the subject of the \u201cMetaphysical First Principles of\nNatural Science\u201d expounded by Kant, to which this table in some measure\nforms the prop\u00e6dutic and introduction, and with which it therefore stands\nin direct connection. In this table I have primarily had in view the very\nremarkable _parallelism_ of those _a priori_ principles of knowledge which\nform the framework of all experience, but specially also the fact that, as\nI have explained in \u00a7 4 of the first volume, matter (and also causality)\nis to be regarded as a combination, or if it is preferred, an\namalgamation, of space and time. In agreement with this, we find that what\ngeometry is for the pure perception or intuition of space, and arithmetic\nfor that of time, Kant\u2019s _phoronomy_ is for the pure perception or\nintuition of the two _united_. For matter is primarily that which is\nmovable in space. The mathematical point cannot even be conceived as\nmovable, as Aristotle has shown (\u201cPhysics,\u201d vi. 10). This philosopher also\nhimself provided the first example of such a science, for in the fifth and\nsixth books of his \u201cPhysics\u201d he determined _a priori_ the laws of rest and\nmotion.\n\nNow this table may be regarded at pleasure either as a collection of the\neternal laws of the world, and therefore as the basis of our ontology, or\nas a chapter of the physiology of the brain, according as one assumes the\nrealistic or the idealistic point of view; but the second is in the last\ninstance right. On this point, indeed, we have already come to an\nunderstanding in the first chapter; yet I wish further to illustrate it\nspecially by an example. Aristotle\u2019s book \u201c_De Xenophane_,\u201d &c., commences\nwith these weighty words of Xenophanes: \u201c\u0391\u03ca\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c6\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b9 \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd,\n\u03b5\u03b9\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03bc\u03b7 \u03b5\u03bd\u03b4\u03b5\u03c7\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd \u03b5\u03ba \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2.\u201d (_\u00c6ternum esse, inquit,\nquicquid est, siquidem fieri non potest, ut ex nihilo quippiam existat._)\nHere, then, Xenophanes judges as to the origin of things, as regards its\npossibility, and of this origin he can have had no experience, even by\nanalogy; nor indeed does he appeal to experience, but judges\napodictically, and therefore _a priori_. How can he do this if as a\nstranger he looks from without into a world that exists purely\nobjectively, that is, independently of his knowledge? How can he, an\nephemeral being hurrying past, to whom only a hasty glance into such a\nworld is permitted, judge apodictically, _a priori_ and without experience\nconcerning that world, the possibility of its existence and origin? The\nsolution of this riddle is that the man has only to do with his own ideas,\nwhich as such are the work of his brain, and the constitution of which is\nmerely the manner or mode in which alone the function of his brain can be\nfulfilled, _i.e._, the form of his perception. He thus judges only as to\nthe _phenomena of his own brain_, and declares what enters into its forms,\ntime, space, and causality, and what does not. In this he is perfectly at\nhome and speaks apodictically. In a like sense, then, the following table\nof the _Pr\u00e6dicabilia a priori_ of time, space, and matter is to be taken:\u2014\n\nPr\u00e6dicabilia _A Priori_.\n\nOf Time.               Of Space.              Of Matter.\n(1) There is only      (1) There is only      (1) There is only\n_one_ Time, and all    _one_ Space, and all   _one_ Matter, and\ndifferent times are    different spaces are   all different\nparts of it.           parts of it.           materials are\n                                              different states of\n                                              matter; as such it\n                                              is called\n                                              _Substance_.\n(2) Different times    (2) Different spaces   (2) Different\nare not simultaneous   are not successive     matters (materials)\nbut successive.        but simultaneous.      are not so through\n                                              substance but\n                                              through accidents.\n(3) Time cannot be     (3) Space cannot be    (3) Annihilation of\nthought away, but      thought away, but      matter is\neverything can be      everything can be      inconceivable, but\nthought away from      thought away from      annihilation of all\nit.                    it.                    its forms and\n                                              qualities is\n                                              conceivable.\n(4) Time has three     (4) Space has three    (4) Matter exists,\ndivisions, the past,   dimensions\u2014height,     _i.e._, acts in all\nthe present, and the   breadth, and length.   the dimensions of\nfuture, which                                 space and throughout\nconstitute two                                the whole length of\ndirections and a                              time, and thus these\ncentre of                                     two are united and\nindifference.                                 thereby filled. In\n                                              this consists the\n                                              true nature of\n                                              matter; thus it is\n                                              through and through\n                                              causality.\n(5) Time is            (5) Space is           (5) Matter is\ninfinitely             infinitely             infinitely\ndivisible.             divisible.             divisible.\n(6) Time is            (6) Space is           (6) Matter is\nhomogeneous and a      homogeneous and a      homogeneous and a\n_Continuum_, _i.e._,   _Continuum_, _i.e._,   _Continuum_, _i.e._,\nno one of its parts    no one of its parts    it does not consist\nis different from      is different from      of originally\nthe rest, nor          the rest, nor          different\nseparated from it by   separated from it by   (_homoiomeria_) or\nanything that is not   anything that is not   originally separated\ntime.                  space.                 parts (atoms); it is\n                                              therefore not\n                                              composed of parts,\n                                              which would\n                                              necessarily be\n                                              separated by\n                                              something that was\n                                              not matter.\n(7) Time has no        (7) Space has no       (7) Matter has no\nbeginning and no       limits, but all        origin and no end,\nend, but all           limits are in it.      but all coming into\nbeginning and end is                          being and passing\nin it.                                        away are in it.\n(8) By reason of       (8) By reason of       (8) By reason of\ntime we count.         space we measure.      matter we weigh.\n(9) Rhythm is only     (9) Symmetry is only   (9) Equilibrium is\nin time.               in space.              only in matter.\n(10) We know the       (10) We know the       (10) We know the\nlaws of time _a        laws of space _a       laws of the\npriori_.               priori_.               substance of all\n                                              accidents _a\n                                              priori_.\n(11) Time can be       (11) Space is          (11) Matter can only\nperceived _a           immediately            be thought _a\npriori_, although      perceptible _a         priori_.\nonly in the form of    priori_.\na line.\n(12) Time has no       (12) Space can never   (12) The accidents\npermanence, but        pass away, but         change; the\npasses away as soon    endures through all    substance remains.\nas it is there.        time.\n(13) Time never        (13) Space is          (13) Matter is\nrests.                 immovable.             indifferent to rest\n                                              and motion, _i.e._,\n                                              it is originally\n                                              disposed towards\n                                              neither of the two.\n(14) Everything that   (14) Everything that   (14) Everything\nexists in time has     exists in space has    material has the\nduration.              a position.            capacity for action.\n(15) Time has no       (15) Space has no      (15) Matter is what\nduration, but all      motion, but all        is permanent in time\nduration is in it,     motion is in it, and   and movable in\nand is the             it is the change of    space; by the\npersistence of what    position of what is    comparison of what\nis permanent in        moved, in contrast     rests with what is\ncontrast with its      with its unbroken      moved we measure\nrestless course.       rest.                  duration.\n(16) All motion is     (16) All motion is     (16) All motion is\nonly possible in       only possible in       only possible to\ntime.                  space.                 matter.\n(17) Velocity is, in   (17) Velocity is, in   (17) The magnitude\nequal spaces, in       equal times, in        of the motion, the\ninverse proportion     direct proportion to   velocity being\nto the time.           the space.             equal, is in direct\n                                              geometrical\n                                              proportion to the\n                                              matter (mass).\n(18) Time is not       (18) Space is          (18) Matter as such\nmeasurable directly    measurable directly    (mass) is\nthrough itself, but    through itself, and    measurable, _i.e._,\nonly indirectly        indirectly through     determinable as\nthrough motion,        motion, which is in    regards its quantity\nwhich is in space      time and space         only indirectly,\nand time together:     together; hence, for   only through the\nthus the motion of     example, an hour\u2019s     amount of the motion\nthe sun and of the     journey, and the       which it receives\nclock measure time.    distance of the        and imparts when it\n                       fixed stars            is repelled or\n                       expressed as the       attracted.\n                       travelling of light\n                       for so many years.\n(19) Time is           (19) Space is          (19) Matter is\nomnipresent. Every     eternal. Every part    absolute. That is,\npart of time is        of it exists always.   it neither comes\neverywhere, _i.e._,                           into being nor\nin all space, at                              passes away, and\nonce.                                         thus its quantity\n                                              can neither be\n                                              increased nor\n                                              diminished.\n(20) In time taken     (20) In space taken    (20, 21) Matter\nby itself everything   by itself everything   unites the ceaseless\nwould be in            would be               flight of time with\nsuccession.            simultaneous.          the rigid immobility\n                                              of space; therefore\n                                              it is the permanent\n                                              substance of the\n                                              changing accidents.\n                                              Causality determines\n                                              this change for\n                                              every place at every\n                                              time, and thereby\n                                              combines time and\n                                              space, and\n                                              constitutes the\n                                              whole nature of\n                                              matter.\n(21) Time makes the    (21) Space makes the\nchange of accidents    permanence of\npossible.              substance possible.\n(22) Every part of     (22) No part of        (22) For matter is\ntime contains all      space contains the     both permanent and\nparts of matter.       same matter as         impenetrable.\n                       another.\n(23) Time is the       (23) Space is the      (23) Individuals are\n_principium            _principium            material.\nindividuationis_.      individuationis_.\n(24) The now has no    (24) The point has     (24) The atom has no\nduration.              no extension.          reality.\n(25) Time in itself    (25) Space in itself   (25) Matter in\nis empty and without   is empty and without   itself is without\nproperties.            properties.            form and quality,\n                                              and likewise inert,\n                                              _i.e._, indifferent\n                                              to rest or motion,\n                                              thus without\n                                              properties.\n(26) Every moment is   (26) By the position   (26) Every change in\nconditioned by the     of every limit in      matter can take\npreceding moment,      space with reference   place only on\nand is only because    to any other limit,    account of another\nthe latter has         its position with      change which\nceased to be.          reference to every     preceded it; and\n(Principle of          possible limit is      therefore a first\nsufficient reason of   precisely              change, and thus\nexistence in           determined.            also a first state\ntime.\u2014See my essay     (Principle of          of matter, is just\non the principle of    sufficient reason of   as inconceivable as\nsufficient reason.)    existence in space.)   a beginning of time\n                                              or a limit of space.\n                                              (Principle of\n                                              sufficient reason of\n                                              becoming.)\n(27) Time makes        (27) Space makes       (27) Matter, as that\narithmetic possible.   geometry possible.     which is movable in\n                                              space, makes\n                                              phoronomy possible.\n(28) The simple        (28) The simple        (28) The simple\nelement in             element in geometry    element in phoronomy\narithmetic is unity.   is the point.          is the atom.\n\n\nNotes to the Annexed Table.\n\n\n(1) To No. 4 of Matter.\n\n\nThe essence of matter is acting, it is acting itself, in the abstract,\nthus acting in general apart from all difference of the kind of action: it\nis through and through causality. On this account it is itself, as regards\nits existence, not subject to the law of causality, and thus has neither\ncome into being nor passes away, for otherwise the law of causality would\nbe applied to itself. Since now causality is known to us _a priori_, the\nconception of matter, as the indestructible basis of all that exists, can\nso far take its place in the knowledge we possess _a priori_, inasmuch as\nit is only the realisation of an _a priori_ form of our knowledge. For as\nsoon as we see anything that acts or is causally efficient it presents\nitself _eo ipso_ as material, and conversely anything material presents\nitself as necessarily active or causally efficient. They are in fact\ninterchangeable conceptions. Therefore the word \u201cactual\u201d is used as\nsynonymous with \u201cmaterial;\u201d and also the Greek \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1fbd \u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd, in\nopposition to \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03bd, reveals the same source, for \u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\nsignifies action in general; so also with _actu_ in opposition to\n_potentia_, and the English \u201cactually\u201d for \u201c_wirklich_.\u201d What is called\nspace-occupation, or impenetrability, and regarded as the essential\npredicate of body (_i.e._ of what is material), is merely that _kind of\naction_ which belongs to _all_ bodies without exception, the mechanical.\nIt is this universality alone, by virtue of which it belongs to the\nconception of body, and follows _a priori_ from this conception, and\ntherefore cannot be thought away from it without doing away with the\nconception itself\u2014it is this, I say, that distinguishes it from any other\nkind of action, such as that of electricity or chemistry, or light or\nheat. Kant has very accurately analysed this space-occupation of the\nmechanical mode of activity into repulsive and attractive force, just as a\ngiven mechanical force is analysed into two others by means of the\nparallelogram of forces. But this is really only the thoughtful analysis\nof the phenomenon into its two constituent parts. The two forces in\nconjunction exhibit the body within its own limits, that is, in a definite\nvolume, while the one alone would diffuse it into infinity, and the other\nalone would contract it to a point. Notwithstanding this reciprocal\nbalancing or neutralisation, the body still acts upon other bodies which\ncontest its space with the first force, repelling them, and with the other\nforce, in gravitation, attracting all bodies in general. So that the two\nforces are not extinguished in their product, as, for instance, two equal\nforces acting in different directions, or +E and -E, or oxygen and\nhydrogen in water. That impenetrability and gravity really exactly\ncoincide is shown by their empirical inseparableness, in that the one\nnever appears without the other, although we can separate them in thought.\n\nI must not, however, omit to mention that the doctrine of Kant referred\nto, which forms the fundamental thought of the second part of his\n\u201cMetaphysical First Principles of Natural Science,\u201d thus of the Dynamics,\nwas distinctly and fully expounded before Kant by Priestley, in his\nexcellent \u201cDisquisitions on Matter and Spirit,\u201d \u00a7 1 and 2, a book which\nappeared in 1777, and the second edition in 1782, while Kant\u2019s work was\npublished in 1786. Unconscious recollection may certainly be assumed in\nthe case of subsidiary thoughts, flashes of wit, comparisons, &c., but not\nin the case of the principal and fundamental thought. Shall we then\nbelieve that Kant silently appropriated such important thoughts of another\nman? and this from a book which at that time was new? Or that this book\nwas unknown to him, and that the same thoughts sprang up in two minds\nwithin a short time? The explanation, also, which Kant gives, in the\n\u201cMetaphysical First Principles of Natural Science\u201d (first edition, p. 88;\nRosenkranz\u2019s edition, p. 384), of the real difference between fluids and\nsolids, is in substance already to be found in Kaspar Freidr. Wolff\u2019s\n\u201cTheory of Generation,\u201d Berlin 1764, p. 132. But what are we to say if we\nfind Kant\u2019s most important and brilliant doctrine, that of the ideality of\nspace and the merely phenomenal existence of the corporeal world, already\nexpressed by Maupertuis thirty years earlier? This will be found more\nfully referred to in Frauenst\u00e4dt\u2019s letters on my philosophy, Letter 14.\nMaupertuis expresses this paradoxical doctrine so decidedly, and yet\nwithout adducing any proof of it, that one must suppose that he also took\nit from somewhere else. It is very desirable that the matter should be\nfurther investigated, and as this would demand tiresome and extensive\nresearches, some German Academy might very well make the question the\nsubject of a prize essay. Now in the same relation as that in which Kant\nhere stands to Priestley, and perhaps also to Kaspar Wolff, and Maupertuis\nor his predecessor, Laplace stands to Kant. For the principal and\nfundamental thought of Laplace\u2019s admirable and certainly correct theory of\nthe origin of the planetary system, which is set forth in his \u201c_Exposition\ndu Syst\u00e8me du Monde_,\u201d liv. v. c. 2, was expressed by Kant nearly fifty\nyears before, in 1755, in his \u201c_Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels_,\u201d\nand more fully in 1763 in his \u201c_Einzig m\u00f6glichen Beweisgrund des Daseyns\nGottes_,\u201d ch. 7. Moreover, in the later work he gives us to understand\nthat Lambert in his \u201c_Kosmologischen Briefen_,\u201d 1761, tacitly adopted that\ndoctrine from him, and these letters at the same time also appeared in\nFrench (_Lettres Cosmologiques sur la Constitution de l\u2019Univers_). We are\ntherefore obliged to assume that Laplace knew that Kantian doctrine.\nCertainly he expounds the matter more thoroughly, strikingly, and fully,\nand at the same time more simply than Kant, as is natural from his more\nprofound astronomical knowledge; yet in the main it is to be found clearly\nexpressed in Kant, and on account of the importance of the matter, would\nalone have been sufficient to make his name immortal. It cannot but\ndisturb us very much if we find minds of the first order under suspicion\nof dishonesty, which would be a scandal to those of the lowest order. For\nwe feel that theft is even more inexcusable in a rich man than in a poor\none. We dare not, however, be silent; for here we are posterity, and must\nbe just, as we hope that posterity will some day be just to us. Therefore,\nas a third example, I will add to these cases, that the fundamental\nthoughts of the \u201cMetamorphosis of Plants,\u201d by Goethe, were already\nexpressed by Kaspar Wolff in 1764 in his \u201cTheory of Generation,\u201d p. 148,\n229, 243, &c. Indeed, is it otherwise with the _system of gravitation_?\nthe discovery of which is on the Continent of Europe always ascribed to\nNewton, while in England the learned at least know very well that it\nbelongs to Robert Hooke, who in the year 1666, in a \u201cCommunication to the\nRoyal Society,\u201d expounds it quite distinctly, although only as an\nhypothesis and without proof. The principal passage of this communication\nis quoted in Dugald Stewart\u2019s \u201cPhilosophy of the Human Mind,\u201d and is\nprobably taken from Robert Hooke\u2019s Posthumous Works. The history of the\nmatter, and how Newton got into difficulty by it, is also to be found in\nthe \u201c_Biographie Universelle_,\u201d article Newton. Hooke\u2019s priority is\ntreated as an established fact in a short history of astronomy, _Quarterly\nReview_, August 1828. Further details on this subject are to be found in\nmy \u201c_Parerga_,\u201d vol. ii., \u00a7 86 (second edition, \u00a7 88). The story of the\nfall of an apple is a fable as groundless as it is popular, and is quite\nwithout authority.\n\n\n(2) To No. 18 of Matter.\n\n\n_The quantity of a motion_ (_quantitas motus_, already in Descartes) is\nthe product of the mass into the velocity.\n\nThis law is the basis not only of the doctrine of impact in mechanics, but\nalso of that of equilibrium in statics. From the force of impact which two\nbodies with the same velocity exert the relation of their masses to each\nother may be determined. Thus of two hammers striking with the same\nvelocity, the one which has the greater mass will drive the nail deeper\ninto the wall or the post deeper into the earth. For example, a hammer\nweighing six pounds with a velocity = 6 effects as much as a hammer\nweighing three pounds with a velocity = 12, for in both cases the quantity\nof motion or the momentum = 36. Of two balls rolling at the same pace, the\none which has the greater mass will impel a third ball at rest to a\ngreater distance than the ball of less mass can. For the mass of the first\nmultiplied by the same velocity gives a _greater quantity of motion_, or a\n_greater momentum_. The cannon carries further than the gun, because an\nequal velocity communicated to a much greater mass gives a much _greater\nquantity of motion_, which resists longer the retarding effect of gravity.\nFor the same reason, the same arm will throw a lead bullet further than a\nstone one of equal magnitude, or a large stone further than quite a small\none. And therefore also a case-shot does not carry so far as a ball-shot.\n\nThe same law lies at the foundation of the theory of the lever and of the\nbalance. For here also the smaller mass, on the longer arm of the lever or\nbeam of the balance, has a greater velocity in falling; and multiplied by\nthis it may be equal to, or indeed exceed, the _quantity of motion_ or the\n_momentum_ of the greater mass at the shorter arm of the lever. In the\nstate of rest brought about by _equilibrium_ this velocity exists merely\nin intention or virtually, _potenti\u00e2_, not _actu_; but it acts just as\nwell as _actu_, which is very remarkable.\n\nThe following explanation will be more easily understood now that these\ntruths have been called to mind.\n\nThe quantity of a given matter can only be estimated in general according\nto its force, and its force can only be known in its _expression_. Now\nwhen we are considering matter only as regards its quantity, not its\nquality, this expression can only be mechanical, _i.e._, it can only\nconsist in motion which it imparts to other matter. For only in motion\ndoes the force of matter become, so to speak, _alive_; hence the\nexpression _vis viva_ for the manifestation of force of matter in motion.\nAccordingly the only measure of the quantity of a given matter is the\n_quantity of its motion_, or its _momentum_. In this, however, if it is\ngiven, the _quantity_ of matter still appears in conjunction and\namalgamated with its other factor, _velocity_. Therefore if we want to\nknow the quantity of matter (the mass) this other factor must be\neliminated. Now the velocity is known directly; for it is _S/T_. But the\nother factor, which remains when this is eliminated, can always be known\nonly _relatively_ in comparison with other masses, which again can only be\nknown themselves by means of the _quantity of their motion_, or their\n_momentum_, thus in their combination with velocity. We must therefore\ncompare one _quantity of motion_ with the other, and then subtract the\nvelocity from both, in order to see how much each of them owed to its\nmass. This is done by weighing the masses against each other, in which\nthat _quantity of motion_ is compared which, in each of the two masses,\ncalls forth the attractive power of the earth that acts upon both only in\nproportion to their _quantity_. Therefore there are two kinds of weighing.\nEither we impart to the two masses to be compared _equal_ velocity, in\norder to find out which of the two now _communicates_ motion to the other,\nthus itself _has_ a greater quantity of motion, which, since the velocity\nis the same on both sides, is to be ascribed to the other factor of the\n_quantity of motion_ or the _momentum_, thus to the mass (common balance).\nOr we weigh, by investigating how much _more velocity_ the one mass must\nreceive than the other has, in order to be equal to the latter in\n_quantity of motion_ or _momentum_, and therefore allow no more motion to\nbe communicated to itself by the other; for then in proportion as its\nvelocity must exceed that of the other, its mass, _i.e._, the quantity of\nits matter, is less than that of the other (steelyard). This estimation of\nmasses by weighing depends upon the favourable circumstance that the\nmoving force, in itself, acts upon both quite equally, and each of the two\nis in a position to _communicate_ to the other directly its surplus\n_quantity of motion_ or _momentum_, so that it becomes visible.\n\nThe substance of these doctrines has long ago been expressed by Newton and\nKant, but through the connection and the clearness of this exposition I\nbelieve I have made it more intelligible, so that that insight is possible\nfor all which I regarded as necessary for the justification of proposition\nNo. 18.\n\n\n\n\nSecond Half. The Doctrine of the Abstract Idea, or Thinking.\n\n\n\nChapter V.(16) On The Irrational Intellect.\n\n\nIt must be possible to arrive at a complete knowledge of the consciousness\nof the brutes, for we can construct it by abstracting certain properties\nof our own consciousness. On the other hand, there enters into the\nconsciousness of the brute instinct, which is much more developed in all\nof them than in man, and in some of them extends to what we call\nmechanical instinct.\n\nThe brutes have understanding without having reason, and therefore they\nhave knowledge of perception but no abstract knowledge. They apprehend\ncorrectly, and also grasp the immediate causal connection, in the case of\nthe higher species even through several links of its chain, but they do\nnot, properly speaking, _think_. For they lack _conceptions_, that is,\nabstract ideas. The first consequence of this, however, is the want of a\nproper memory, which applies even to the most sagacious of the brutes, and\nit is just this which constitutes the principal difference between their\nconsciousness and that of men. Perfect intelligence depends upon the\ndistinct consciousness of the past and of the eventual future, _as such_,\nand in connection with the present. The special memory which this demands\nis therefore an orderly, connected, and thinking retrospective\nrecollection. This, however, is only possible by means of _general\nconceptions_, the assistance of which is required by what is entirely\nindividual, in order that it may be recalled in its order and connection.\nFor the boundless multitude of things and events of the same and similar\nkinds, in the course of our life, does not admit directly of a perceptible\nand individual recollection of each particular, for which neither the\npowers of the most comprehensive memory nor our time would be sufficient.\nTherefore all this can only be preserved by subsuming it under general\nconceptions, and the consequent reference to relatively few principles, by\nmeans of which we then have always at command an orderly and adequate\nsurvey of our past. We can only present to ourselves in perception\nparticular scenes of the past, but the time that has passed since then and\nits content we are conscious of only in the abstract by means of\nconceptions of things and numbers which now represent days and years,\ntogether with their content. The memory of the brutes, on the contrary,\nlike their whole intellect, is confined to what they _perceive_, and\nprimarily consists merely in the fact that a recurring impression presents\nitself as having already been experienced, for the present perception\nrevivifies the traces of an earlier one. Their memory is therefore always\ndependent upon what is now actually present. Just on this account,\nhowever, this excites anew the sensation and the mood which the earlier\nphenomenon produced. Thus the dog recognises acquaintances, distinguishes\nfriends from enemies, easily finds again the path it has once travelled,\nthe houses it has once visited, and at the sight of a plate or a stick is\nat once put into the mood associated with them. All kinds of training\ndepend upon the use of this perceptive memory and on the force of habit,\nwhich in the case of animals is specially strong. It is therefore just as\ndifferent from human education as perception is from thinking. We\nourselves are in certain cases, in which memory proper refuses us its\nservice, confined to that merely perceptive recollection, and thus we can\nmeasure the difference between the two from our own experience. For\nexample, at the sight of a person whom it appears to us we know, although\nwe are not able to remember when or where we saw him; or again, when we\nvisit a place where we once were in early childhood, that is, while our\nreason was yet undeveloped, and which we have therefore entirely\nforgotten, and yet feel that the present impression is one which we have\nalready experienced. This is the nature of all the recollections of the\nbrutes. We have only to add that in the case of the most sagacious this\nmerely perceptive memory rises to a certain degree of _phantasy_, which\nagain assists it, and by virtue of which, for example, the image of its\nabsent master floats before the mind of the dog and excites a longing\nafter him, so that when he remains away long it seeks for him everywhere.\nIts dreams also depend upon this phantasy. The consciousness of the brutes\nis accordingly a mere succession of presents, none of which, however,\nexist as future before they appear, nor as past after they have vanished;\nwhich is the specific difference of human consciousness. Hence the brutes\nhave infinitely less to _suffer_ than we have, because they know no other\npains but those which the _present_ directly brings. But the present is\nwithout extension, while the future and the past, which contain most of\nthe causes of our suffering, are widely extended, and to their actual\ncontent there is added that which is merely possible, which opens up an\nunlimited field for desire and aversion. The brutes, on the contrary,\nundisturbed by these, enjoy quietly and peacefully each present moment,\neven if it is only bearable. Human beings of very limited capacity perhaps\napproach them in this. Further, the sufferings which belong _purely_ to\nthe present can only be physical. Indeed the brutes do not properly\nspeaking feel death: they can only know it when it appears, and then they\nare already no more. Thus then the life of the brute is a continuous\npresent. It lives on without reflection, and exists wholly in the present;\neven the great majority of men live with very little reflection. Another\nconsequence of the special nature of the intellect of the brutes, which we\nhave explained is the perfect accordance of their consciousness with their\nenvironment. Between the brute and the external world there is nothing,\nbut between us and the external world there is always our thought about\nit, which makes us often inapproachable to it, and it to us. Only in the\ncase of children and very primitive men is this wall of partition so thin\nthat in order to see what goes on in them we only need to see what goes on\nround about them. Therefore the brutes are incapable alike of purpose and\ndissimulation; they reserve nothing. In this respect the dog stands to the\nman in the same relation as a glass goblet to a metal one, and this helps\ngreatly to endear the dog so much to us, for it affords us great pleasure\nto see all those inclinations and emotions which we so often conceal\ndisplayed simply and openly in him. In general, the brutes always play, as\nit were, with their hand exposed; and therefore we contemplate with so\nmuch pleasure their behaviour towards each other, both when they belong to\nthe same and to different species. It is characterised by a certain stamp\nof innocence, in contrast to the conduct of men, which is withdrawn from\nthe innocence of nature by the entrance of reason, and with it of prudence\nor deliberation. Hence human conduct has throughout the stamp of intention\nor deliberate purpose, the absence of which, and the consequent\ndetermination by the impulse of the moment, is the fundamental\ncharacteristic of all the action of the brutes. No brute is capable of a\npurpose properly so-called. To conceive and follow out a purpose is the\nprerogative of man, and it is a prerogative which is rich in consequences.\nCertainly an instinct like that of the bird of passage or the bee, still\nmore a permanent, persistent desire, a longing like that of the dog for\nits absent master, may present the appearance of a purpose, with which,\nhowever, it must not be confounded. Now all this has its ultimate ground\nin the relation between the human and the brute intellect, which may also\nbe thus expressed: The brutes have only _direct_ knowledge, while we, in\naddition to this, have _indirect_ knowledge; and the advantage which in\nmany things\u2014for example, in trigonometry and analysis, in machine work\ninstead of hand work, &c.\u2014indirect has over direct knowledge appears here\nalso. Thus again we may say: The brutes have only a _single_ intellect, we\na _double_ intellect, both perceptive and thinking, and the operation of\nthe two often go on independently of each other. We perceive one thing,\nand we think another. Often, again, they act upon each other. This way of\nputting the matter enables us specially to understand that natural\nopenness and naivete of the brutes, referred to above, as contrasted with\nthe concealment of man.\n\nHowever, the law _natura non facit saltus_ is not entirely suspended even\nwith regard to the intellect of the brutes, though certainly the step from\nthe brute to the human intelligence is the greatest which nature has made\nin the production of her creatures. In the most favoured individuals of\nthe highest species of the brutes there certainly sometimes appears,\nalways to our astonishment, a faint trace of reflection, reason, the\ncomprehension of words, of thought, purpose, and deliberation. The most\nstriking indications of this kind are afforded by the elephant, whose\nhighly developed intelligence is heightened and supported by an experience\nof a lifetime which sometimes extends to two hundred years. He has often\ngiven unmistakable signs, recorded in well-known anecdotes, of\npremeditation, which, in the case of brutes, always astonishes us more\nthan anything else. Such, for instance, is the story of the tailor on whom\nan elephant revenged himself for pricking him with a needle. I wish,\nhowever, to rescue from oblivion a parallel case to this, because it has\nthe advantage of being authenticated by judicial investigation. On the\n27th of August 1830 there was held at Morpeth, in England, a coroner\u2019s\ninquest on the keeper, Baptist Bernhard, who was killed by his elephant.\nIt appeared from the evidence that two years before he had offended the\nelephant grossly, and now, without any occasion, but on a favourable\nopportunity, the elephant had seized him and crushed him. (See the\n_Spectator_ and other English papers of that day.) For special information\non the intelligence of brutes I recommend Leroy\u2019s excellent book, \u201c_Sur\nl\u2019Intelligence des Animaux_,\u201d _nouv. \u00e9d._ 1802.\n\n\n\nChapter VI. On The Doctrine of Abstract or Rational Knowledge.\n\n\nThe outward impression upon the senses, together with the mood which it\nalone awakens in us, vanishes with the presence of the thing. Therefore\nthese two cannot of themselves constitute _experience_ proper, whose\nteaching is to guide our conduct for the future. The image of that\nimpression which the imagination preserves is originally weaker than the\nimpression itself, and becomes weaker and weaker daily, until in time it\ndisappears altogether. There is only one thing which is not subject either\nto the instantaneous vanishing of the impression or to the gradual\ndisappearance of its image, and is therefore free from the power of time.\nThis is the _conception_. In it, then, the teaching of experience must be\nstored up, and it alone is suited to be a safe guide to our steps in life.\nTherefore Seneca says rightly, \u201c_Si vis tibi omnia subjicere, te subjice\nrationi_\u201d (Ep. 37). And I add to this that the essential condition of\nsurpassing others in actual life is that we should reflect or deliberate.\nSuch an important tool of the intellect as the _concept_ evidently cannot\nbe identical with the _word_, this mere sound, which as an impression of\nsense passes with the moment, or as a phantasm of hearing dies away with\ntime. Yet the concept is an idea, the distinct consciousness and\npreservation of which are bound up with the word. Hence the Greeks called\nword, concept, relation, thought, and reason by the name of the first, \u1f41\n\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2. Yet the concept is perfectly different both from the word, to which\nit is joined, and from the perceptions, from which it has originated. It\nis of an entirely different nature from these impressions of the senses.\nYet it is able to take up into itself all the results of perception, and\ngive them back again unchanged and undiminished after the longest period\nof time; thus alone does _experience_ arise. But the concept preserves,\nnot what is perceived nor what is then felt, but only what is essential in\nthese, in an entirely altered form, and yet as an adequate representative\nof them. Just as flowers cannot be preserved, but their ethereal oil,\ntheir essence, with the same smell and the same virtues, can be. The\naction that has been guided by correct conceptions will, in the result,\ncoincide with the real object aimed at. We may judge of the inestimable\nvalue of conceptions, and consequently of the reason, if we glance for a\nmoment at the infinite multitude and variety of the things and conditions\nthat coexist and succeed each other, and then consider that speech and\nwriting (the signs of conceptions) are capable of affording us accurate\ninformation as to everything and every relation when and wherever it may\nhave been; for comparatively _few_ conceptions can contain and represent\nan infinite number of things and conditions. In our own reflection\n_abstraction_ is a throwing off of useless baggage for the sake of more\neasily handling the knowledge which is to be compared, and has therefore\nto be turned about in all directions. We allow much that is unessential,\nand therefore only confusing, to fall away from the real things, and work\nwith few but essential determinations thought in the abstract. But just\nbecause general conceptions are only formed by thinking away and leaving\nout existing qualities, and are therefore the emptier the more general\nthey are, the use of this procedure is confined to the _working up_ of\nknowledge which we have already acquired. This working up includes the\ndrawing of conclusions from premisses contained in our knowledge. New\ninsight, on the contrary, can only be obtained by the help of the faculty\nof judgment, from perception, which alone is complete and rich knowledge.\nFurther, because the content and the extent of the concepts stand in\ninverse relation to each other, and thus the more is thought _under_ a\nconcept, the less is thought _in_ it, concepts form a graduated series, a\nhierarchy, from the most special to the most general, at the lower end of\nwhich scholastic realism is almost right, and at the upper end nominalism.\nFor the most special conception is almost the individual, thus almost\nreal; and the most general conception, _e.g._, being (_i.e._, the\ninfinitive of the copula), is scarcely anything but a word. Therefore\nphilosophical systems which confine themselves to such very general\nconceptions, without going down to the real, are little more than mere\njuggling with words. For since all abstraction consists in thinking away,\nthe further we push it the less we have left over. Therefore, if I read\nthose modern philosophemes which move constantly in the widest\nabstractions, I am soon quite unable, in spite of all attention, to think\nalmost anything more in connection with them; for I receive no material\nfor thought, but am supposed to work with mere empty shells, which gives\nme a feeling like that which we experience when we try to throw very light\nbodies; the strength and also the exertion are there, but there is no\nobject to receive them, so as to supply the other moment of motion. If any\none wants to experience this let him read the writings of the disciples of\nSchelling, or still better of the Hegelians. _Simple conceptions_ would\nnecessarily be such as could not be broken up. Accordingly they could\nnever be the subject of an analytical judgment. This I hold to be\nimpossible, for if we think a conception we must also be able to give its\ncontent. What are commonly adduced as examples of simple conceptions are\nreally not conceptions at all, but partly mere sensations\u2014as, for\ninstance, those of some special colour; partly the forms of perception\nwhich are known to us _a priori_, thus properly the ultimate elements of\n_perceptive knowledge_. But this itself is for the whole system of our\nthought what granite is for geology, the ultimate firm basis which\nsupports all, and beyond which we cannot go. The _distinctness_ of a\nconception demands not only that we should be able to separate its\npredicates, but also that we should be able to analyse these even if they\nare abstractions, and so on until we reach knowledge of _perception_, and\nthus refer to concrete things through the distinct perception of which the\nfinal abstractions are verified and reality guaranteed to them, as well as\nto all the higher abstractions which rest upon them. Therefore the\nordinary explanation that the conception is distinct as soon as we can\ngive its predicates is not sufficient. For the separating of these\npredicates may lead perhaps to more conceptions; and so on again without\nthere being that ultimate basis of perceptions which imparts reality to\nall those conceptions. Take, for example, the conception \u201cspirit,\u201d and\nanalyse it into its predicates: \u201cA thinking, willing, immaterial, simple,\nindestructible being that does not occupy space.\u201d Nothing is yet\ndistinctly thought about it, because the elements of these conceptions\ncannot be verified by means of perceptions, for a thinking being without a\nbrain is like a digesting being without a stomach. Only perceptions are,\nproperly speaking, _clear_, not conceptions; these at the most can only be\ndistinct. Hence also, absurd as it was, \u201cclear and confused\u201d were coupled\ntogether and used as synonymous when knowledge of perception was explained\nas merely a confused abstract knowledge, because the latter kind of\nknowledge alone was distinct. This was first done by Duns Scotus, but\nLeibnitz has substantially the same view, upon which his \u201c_Identitas\nIndiscernibilium_\u201d depends. (See Kant\u2019s refutation of this, p. 275 of the\nfirst edition of the Critique of Pure Reason.)\n\nThe close connection of the conception with the word, thus of speech with\nreason, which was touched on above, rests ultimately upon the following\nground. _Time_ is throughout the form of our whole consciousness, with its\ninward and outward apprehension. Conceptions, on the other hand, which\noriginate through abstraction and are perfectly general ideas, different\nfrom all particular things, have in this property indeed a certain measure\nof objective existence, which does not, however, belong to any series of\nevents in time. Therefore in order to enter the immediate present of an\nindividual consciousness, and thus to admit of being introduced into a\nseries of events in time, they must to a certain extent be reduced again\nto the nature of individual things, individualised, and therefore linked\nto an idea of sense. Such an idea is the _word_. It is accordingly the\nsensible sign of the conception, and as such the necessary means of\n_fixing_ it, that is, of presenting it to the consciousness, which is\nbound up with the form of time, and thus establishing a connection between\nthe reason, whose objects are merely general universals, knowing neither\nplace nor time, and consciousness, which is bound up with time, is\nsensuous, and so far purely animal. Only by this means is the reproduction\nat pleasure, thus the recollection and preservation, of conceptions\npossible and open to us; and only by means of this, again, are the\noperations which are undertaken with conceptions possible\u2014judgment,\ninference, comparison, limitation, &c. It is true it sometimes happens\nthat conceptions occupy consciousness without their signs, as when we run\nthrough a train of reasoning so rapidly that we could not think the words\nin the time. But such cases are exceptions, which presuppose great\nexercise of the reason, which it could only have obtained by means of\nlanguage. How much the use of reason is bound up with speech we see in the\ncase of the deaf and dumb, who, if they have learnt no kind of language,\nshow scarcely more intelligence than the ourang-outang or the elephant.\nFor their reason is almost entirely potential, not actual.\n\nWords and speech are thus the indispensable means of distinct thought. But\nas every means, every machine, at once burdens and hinders, so also does\nlanguage; for it forces the fluid and modifiable thoughts, with their\ninfinitely fine distinctions of difference, into certain rigid, permanent\nforms, and thus in fixing also fetters them. This hindrance is to some\nextent got rid of by learning several languages. For in these the thought\nis poured from one mould into another, and somewhat alters its form in\neach, so that it becomes more and more freed from all form and clothing,\nand thus its own proper nature comes more distinctly into consciousness,\nand it recovers again its original capacity for modification. The ancient\nlanguages render this service very much better than the modern, because,\non account of their great difference from the latter, the same thoughts\nare expressed in them in quite another way, and must thus assume a very\ndifferent form; besides which the more perfect grammar of the ancient\nlanguages renders a more artistic and more perfect construction of the\nthoughts and their connection possible. Thus a Greek or a Roman might\nperhaps content himself with his own language, but he who understands\nnothing but some single modern patois will soon betray this poverty in\nwriting and speaking; for his thoughts, firmly bound to such narrow\nstereotyped forms, must appear awkward and monotonous. Genius certainly\nmakes up for this as for everything else, for example in Shakespeare.\n\nBurke, in his \u201cInquiry into the Sublime and Beautiful,\u201d p. 5, \u00a7 4 and 5,\nhas given a perfectly correct and very elaborate exposition of what I laid\ndown in \u00a7 9 of the first volume, that the words of a speech are perfectly\nunderstood without calling up ideas of perception, pictures in our heads.\nBut he draws from this the entirely false conclusion that we hear,\napprehend, and make use of words without connecting with them any idea\nwhatever; whereas he ought to have drawn the conclusion that all ideas are\nnot perceptible images, but that precisely those ideas which must be\nexpressed by means of words are abstract notions or conceptions, and these\nfrom their very nature are not perceptible. Just because words impart only\ngeneral conceptions, which are perfectly different from ideas of\nperception, when, for example, an event is recounted all the hearers will\nreceive the same conceptions; but if afterwards they wish to make the\nincident clear to themselves, each of them will call up in his imagination\na different _image_ of it, which differs considerably from the correct\nimage that is possessed only by the eye-witness. This is the primary\nreason (which, however, is accompanied by others) why every fact is\nnecessarily distorted by being repeatedly told. The second recounter\ncommunicates conceptions which he has abstracted from the image of _his\nown_ imagination, and from these conceptions the third now forms another\nimage differing still more widely from the truth, and this again he\ntranslates into conceptions, and so the process goes on. Whoever is\nsufficiently matter of fact to stick to the conceptions imparted to him,\nand repeat them, will prove the most truthful reporter.\n\nThe best and most intelligent exposition of the essence and nature of\nconceptions which I have been able to find is in Thomas Reid\u2019s \u201cEssays on\nthe Powers of Human Mind,\u201d vol. ii., Essay 5, ch. 6. This was afterwards\ncondemned by Dugald Stewart in his \u201cPhilosophy of the Human Mind.\u201d Not to\nwaste paper I will only briefly remark with regard to the latter that he\nbelongs to that large class who have obtained an undeserved reputation\nthrough favour and friends, and therefore I can only advise that not an\nhour should be wasted over the scribbling of this shallow writer.\n\nThe princely scholastic Pico de Mirandula already saw that reason is the\nfaculty of abstract ideas, and understanding the faculty of ideas of\nperception. For in his book, \u201c_De Imaginatione_,\u201d ch. 11, he carefully\ndistinguishes understanding and reason, and explains the latter as the\ndiscursive faculty peculiar to man, and the former as the intuitive\nfaculty, allied to the kind of knowledge which is proper to the angels,\nand indeed to God. Spinoza also characterises reason quite correctly as\nthe faculty of framing general conceptions (Eth., ii. prop. 40, schol. 2).\nSuch facts would not need to be mentioned if it were not for the tricks\nthat have been played in the last fifty years by the whole of the\nphilosophasters of Germany with the conception _reason_. For they have\ntried, with shameless audacity, to smuggle in under this name an entirely\nspurious faculty of immediate, metaphysical, so-called super-sensuous\nknowledge. The reason proper, on the other hand, they call\n_understanding_, and the understanding proper, as something quite strange\nto them, they overlook altogether, and ascribe its intuitive functions to\nsensibility.\n\nIn the case of all things in this world new drawbacks or disadvantages\ncleave to every source of aid, to every gain, to every advantage; and thus\nreason also, which gives to man such great advantages over the brutes,\ncarries with it its special disadvantages, and opens for him paths of\nerror into which the brutes can never stray. Through it a new species of\nmotives, to which the brute is not accessible, obtains power over his\nwill. These are the _abstract_ motives, the mere thoughts, which are by no\nmeans always drawn from his own experience, but often come to him only\nthrough the talk and example of others, through tradition and literature.\nHaving become accessible to thought, he is at once exposed to error. But\nevery error must sooner or later do harm, and the greater the error the\ngreater the harm it will do. The individual error must be atoned for by\nhim who cherishes it, and often he has to pay dearly for it. And the same\nthing holds good on a large scale of the common errors of whole nations.\nTherefore it cannot too often be repeated that every error wherever we\nmeet it, is to be pursued and rooted out as an enemy of mankind, and that\nthere can be no such thing as privileged or sanctioned error. The thinker\nought to attack it, even if humanity should cry out with pain, like a sick\nman whose ulcer the physician touches. The brute can never stray far from\nthe path of nature; for its motives lie only in the world of perception,\nwhere only the possible, indeed only the actual, finds room. On the other\nhand, all that is only imaginable, and therefore also the false, the\nimpossible, the absurd, and senseless, enters into abstract conceptions,\ninto thoughts and words. Since now all partake of reason, but few of\njudgment, the consequence is that man is exposed to delusion, for he is\nabandoned to every conceivable chimera which any one talks him into, and\nwhich, acting on his will as a motive, may influence him to perversities\nand follies of every kind, to the most unheard-of extravagances, and also\nto actions most contrary to his animal nature. True culture, in which\nknowledge and judgment go hand in hand, can only be brought to bear on a\nfew; and still fewer are capable of receiving it. For the great mass of\nmen a kind of training everywhere takes its place. It is effected by\nexample, custom, and the very early and firm impression of certain\nconceptions, before any experience, understanding, or judgment were there\nto disturb the work. Thus thoughts are implanted, which afterward cling as\nfirmly, and are as incapable of being shaken by any instruction as if they\nwere _inborn_; and indeed they have often been regarded, even by\nphilosophers, as such. In this way we can, with the same trouble, imbue\nmen with what is right and rational, or with what is most absurd. For\nexample, we can accustom them to approach this or that idol with holy\ndread, and at the mention of its name to prostrate in the dust not only\ntheir bodies but their whole spirit; to sacrifice their property and their\nlives willingly to words, to names, to the defence of the strangest whims;\nto attach arbitrarily the greatest honour or the deepest disgrace to this\nor that, and to prize highly or disdain everything accordingly with full\ninward conviction; to renounce all animal food, as in Hindustan, or to\ndevour still warm and quivering pieces, cut from the living animal, as in\nAbyssinia; to eat men, as in New Zealand, or to sacrifice their children\nto Moloch; to castrate themselves, to fling themselves voluntarily on the\nfuneral piles of the dead\u2014in a word, to do anything we please. Hence the\nCrusades, the extravagances of fanatical sects; hence Chiliasts and\nFlagellants, persecutions, _autos da fe_, and all that is offered by the\nlong register of human perversities. Lest it should be thought that only\nthe dark ages afford such examples, I shall add a couple of more modern\ninstances. In the year 1818 there went from W\u00fcrtemberg 7000 Chiliasts to\nthe neighbourhood of Ararat, because the new kingdom of God, specially\nannounced by Jung Stilling, was to appear there.(17) Gall relates that in\nhis time a mother killed her child and roasted it in order to cure her\nhusband\u2019s rheumatism with its fat.(18) The tragical side of error lies in\nthe practical, the comical is reserved for the theoretical. For example,\nif we could firmly persuade three men that the sun is not the cause of\ndaylight, we might hope to see it soon established as the general\nconviction. In Germany it was possible to proclaim as the greatest\nphilosopher of all ages Hegel, a repulsive, mindless charlatan, an\nunparalleled scribbler of nonsense, and for twenty years many thousands\nhave believed it stubbornly and firmly; and indeed, outside Germany, the\nDanish Academy entered the lists against myself for his fame, and sought\nto have him regarded as a _summus philosophus_. (Upon this see the preface\nto my _Grundproblemen der Ethik_.) These, then, are the disadvantages\nwhich, on account of the rarity of judgment, attach to the existence of\nreason. We must add to them the possibility of madness. The brutes do not\ngo mad, although the carnivora are subject to fury, and the ruminants to a\nsort of delirium.\n\n\n\nChapter VII.(19) On The Relation of the Concrete Knowledge of Perception\nto Abstract Knowledge.\n\n\nIt has been shown that conceptions derive their material from knowledge of\nperception, and therefore the entire structure of our world of thought\nrests upon the world of perception. We must therefore be able to go back\nfrom every conception, even if only indirectly through intermediate\nconceptions, to the perceptions from which it is either itself directly\nderived or those conceptions are derived of which it is again an\nabstraction. That is to say, we must be able to support it with\nperceptions which stand to the abstractions in the relation of examples.\nThese perceptions thus afford the real content of all our thought, and\nwhenever they are wanting we have not had conceptions but mere words in\nour heads. In this respect our intellect is like a bank, which, if it is\nto be sound, must have cash in its safe, so as to be able to meet all the\nnotes it has issued, in case of demand; the perceptions are the cash, the\nconceptions are the notes. In this sense the perceptions might very\nappropriately be called _primary_, and the conceptions, on the other hand,\n_secondary_ ideas. Not quite so aptly, the Schoolmen, following the\nexample of Aristotle (_Metaph._, vi. 11, xi. 1), called real things\n_substanti\u00e6 prim\u00e6_, and the conceptions _substanti\u00e6 secund\u00e6_. Books impart\nonly secondary ideas. Mere conceptions of a thing without perception give\nonly a general knowledge of it. We only have a thorough understanding of\nthings and their relations so far as we are able to represent them to\nourselves in pure, distinct perceptions, without the aid of words. To\nexplain words by words, to compare concepts with concepts, in which most\nphilosophising consists, is a trivial shifting about of the\nconcept-spheres in order to see which goes into the other and which does\nnot. At the best we can in this way only arrive at conclusions; but even\nconclusions give no really new knowledge, but only show us all that lay in\nthe knowledge we already possessed, and what part of it perhaps might be\napplicable to the particular case. On the other hand, to perceive, to\nallow the things themselves to speak to us, to apprehend new relations of\nthem, and then to take up and deposit all this in conceptions, in order to\npossess it with certainty\u2014that gives new knowledge. But, while almost\nevery one is capable of comparing conceptions with conceptions, to compare\nconceptions with perceptions is a gift of the select few. It is the\ncondition, according to the degree of its perfection, of wit, judgment,\ningenuity, genius. The former faculty, on the contrary, results in little\nmore than possibly rational reflections. The inmost kernel of all genuine\nand actual knowledge is a perception; and every new truth is the profit or\ngain yielded by a perception. All original thinking takes place in images,\nand this is why imagination is so necessary an instrument of thought, and\nminds that lack imagination will never accomplish much, unless it be in\nmathematics. On the other hand, merely abstract thoughts, which have no\nkernel of perception, are like cloud-structures, without reality. Even\nwriting and speaking, whether didactic or poetical, has for its final aim\nto guide the reader to the same concrete knowledge from which the author\nstarted; if it has not this aim it is bad. This is why the contemplation\nand observing of every real thing, as soon as it presents something new to\nthe observer, is more instructive than any reading or hearing. For indeed,\nif we go to the bottom of the matter, all truth and wisdom, nay, the\nultimate secret of things, is contained in each real object, yet certainly\nonly _in concreto_, just as gold lies hidden in the ore; the difficulty is\nto extract it. From a book, on the contrary, at the best we only receive\nthe truth at second hand, and oftener not at all.\n\nIn most books, putting out of account those that are thoroughly bad, the\nauthor, when their content is not altogether empirical, has certainly\n_thought_ but not _perceived_; he has written from reflection, not from\nintuition, and it is this that makes them commonplace and tedious. For\nwhat the author has thought could always have been thought by the reader\nalso, if he had taken the same trouble; indeed it consists simply of\nintelligent thought, full exposition of what is _implicite_ contained in\nthe theme. But no actually new knowledge comes in this way into the world;\nthis is only created in the moment of perception, of direct comprehension\nof a new side of the thing. When, therefore, on the contrary, _sight_ has\nformed the foundation of an author\u2019s thought, it is as if he wrote from a\nland where the reader has never been, for all is fresh and new, because it\nis drawn directly from the original source of all knowledge. Let me\nillustrate the distinction here touched upon by a perfectly easy and\nsimple example. Any commonplace writer might easily describe profound\ncontemplation or petrifying astonishment by saying: \u201cHe stood like a\nstatue;\u201d but Cervantes says: \u201cLike a clothed statue, for the wind moved\nhis garments\u201d (_Don Quixote_, book vi. ch. 19). It is thus that all great\nminds have ever _thought in presence of the perception_, and kept their\ngaze steadfastly upon it in their thought. We recognise this from this\nfact, among others, that even the most opposite of them so often agree and\ncoincide in some particular; because they all speak of the same thing\nwhich they all had before their eyes, the world, the perceived reality;\nindeed in a certain degree they all say the same thing, and others never\nbelieve them. We recognise it further in the appropriateness and\noriginality of the expression, which is always perfectly adapted to the\nsubject because it has been inspired by perception, in the naivete of the\nlanguage, the freshness of the imagery, and the impressiveness of the\nsimiles, all of which qualities, without exception, distinguish the works\nof great minds, and, on the contrary, are always wanting in the works of\nothers. Accordingly only commonplace forms of expression and trite figures\nare at the service of the latter, and they never dare to allow themselves\nto be natural, under penalty of displaying their vulgarity in all its\ndreary barrenness; instead of this they are affected mannerists. Hence\nBuffon says: \u201c_Le style est l\u2019homme m\u00eame_.\u201d If men of commonplace mind\nwrite poetry they have certain traditional conventional opinions,\npassions, noble sentiments, &c., which they have received in the abstract,\nand attribute to the heroes of their poems, who are in this way reduced to\nmere personifications of those opinions, and are thus themselves to a\ncertain extent abstractions, and therefore insipid and tiresome. If they\nphilosophise, they have taken in a few wide abstract conceptions, which\nthey turn about in all directions, as if they had to do with algebraical\nequations, and hope that something will come of it; at the most we see\nthat they have all read the same things. Such a tossing to and fro of\nabstract conceptions, after the manner of algebraical equations, which is\nnow-a-days called dialectic, does not, like real algebra, afford certain\nresults; for here the conception which is represented by the word is not a\nfixed and perfectly definite quality, such as are symbolised by the\nletters in algebra, but is wavering and ambiguous, and capable of\nextension and contraction. Strictly speaking, all thinking, _i.e._,\ncombining of abstract conceptions, has at the most the _recollections_ of\nearlier perceptions for its material, and this only indirectly, so far as\nit constitutes the foundation of all conceptions. Real knowledge, on the\ncontrary, that is, immediate knowledge, is perception alone, new, fresh\nperception itself. Now the concepts which the reason has framed and the\nmemory has preserved cannot all be present to consciousness at once, but\nonly a very small number of them at a time. On the other hand, the energy\nwith which we apprehend what is present in perception, in which really all\nthat is essential in all things generally is virtually contained and\nrepresented, is apprehended, fills the consciousness in one moment with\nits whole power. Upon this depends the infinite superiority of genius to\nlearning; they stand to each other as the text of an ancient classic to\nits commentary. All truth and all wisdom really lies ultimately in\nperception. But this unfortunately can neither be retained nor\ncommunicated. The _objective_ conditions of such communication can\ncertainly be presented to others purified and illustrated through plastic\nand pictorial art, and even much more directly through poetry; but it\ndepends so much upon _subjective_ conditions, which are not at the command\nof every one, and of no one at all times, nay, indeed in the higher\ndegrees of perfection, are only the gift of the favoured few. Only the\nworst knowledge, abstract, secondary knowledge, the conception, the mere\nshadow of true knowledge, is unconditionally communicable. If perceptions\nwere communicable, that would be a communication worth the trouble; but at\nlast every one must remain in his own skin and skull, and no one can help\nanother. To enrich the conception from perception is the unceasing\nendeavour of poetry and philosophy. However, the aims of man are\nessentially _practical_; and for these it is sufficient that what he has\napprehended through perception should leave traces in him, by virtue of\nwhich he will recognise it in the next similar case; thus he becomes\npossessed of worldly wisdom. Thus, as a rule, the man of the world cannot\nteach his accumulated truth and wisdom, but only make use of it; he\nrightly comprehends each event as it happens, and determines what is in\nconformity with it. That books will not take the place of experience nor\nlearning of genius are two kindred phenomena. Their common ground is that\nthe abstract can never take the place of the concrete. Books therefore do\nnot take the place of experience, because _conceptions_ always remain\n_general_, and consequently do not get down to the particular, which,\nhowever, is just what has to be dealt with in life; and, besides this, all\nconceptions are abstracted from what is particular and perceived in\nexperience, and therefore one must have come to know these in order\nadequately to understand even the general conceptions which the books\ncommunicate. Learning cannot take the place of genius, because it also\naffords merely conceptions, but the knowledge of genius consists in the\napprehension of the (Platonic) Ideas of things, and therefore is\nessentially intuitive. Thus in the first of these phenomena the\n_objective_ condition of perceptive or intuitive knowledge is wanting; in\nthe second the _subjective_; the former may be attained, the latter\ncannot.\n\nWisdom and genius, these two summits of the Parnassus of human knowledge,\nhave their foundation not in the abstract and discursive, but in the\nperceptive faculty. Wisdom proper is something intuitive, not something\nabstract. It does not consist in principles and thoughts, which one can\ncarry about ready in his mind, as results of his own research or that of\nothers; but it is the whole manner in which the world presents itself in\nhis mind. This varies so much that on account of it the wise man lives in\nanother world from the fool, and the genius sees another world from the\nblockhead. That the works of the man of genius immeasurably surpass those\nof all others arises simply from the fact that the world which he sees,\nand from which he takes his utterances, is so much clearer, as it were\nmore profoundly worked out, than that in the minds of others, which\ncertainly contains the same objects, but is to the world of the man of\ngenius as the Chinese picture without shading and perspective is to the\nfinished oil-painting. The material is in all minds the same; but the\ndifference lies in the perfection of the form which it assumes in each,\nupon which the numerous grades of intelligence ultimately depend. These\ngrades thus exist in the root, in the _perceptive_ or _intuitive_\napprehension, and do not first appear in the abstract. Hence original\nmental superiority shows itself so easily when the occasion arises, and is\nat once felt and hated by others.\n\nIn practical life the intuitive knowledge of the understanding is able to\nguide our action and behaviour directly, while the abstract knowledge of\nthe reason can only do so by means of the memory. Hence arises the\nsuperiority of intuitive knowledge in all cases which admit of no time for\nreflection; thus for daily intercourse, in which, just on this account,\nwomen excel. Only those who intuitively know the nature of men as they are\nas a rule, and thus comprehend the individuality of the person before\nthem, will understand how to manage him with certainty and rightly.\nAnother may know by heart all the three hundred maxims of Gracian, but\nthis will not save him from stupid mistakes and misconceptions if he lacks\nthat intuitive knowledge. For all _abstract knowledge_ affords us\nprimarily mere general principles and rules; but the particular case is\nalmost never to be carried out exactly according to the rule; then the\nrule itself has to be presented to us at the right time by the memory,\nwhich seldom punctually happens; then the _propositio minor_ has to be\nformed out of the present case, and finally the conclusion drawn. Before\nall this is done the opportunity has generally turned its back upon us,\nand then those excellent principles and rules serve at the most to enable\nus to measure the magnitude of the error we have committed. Certainly with\ntime we gain in this way experience and practice, which slowly grows to\nknowledge of the world, and thus, in connection with this, the abstract\nrules may certainly become fruitful. On the other hand, the _intuitive\nknowledge_, which always apprehends only the particular, stands in\nimmediate relation to the present case. Rule, case, and application are\nfor it one, and action follows immediately upon it. This explains why in\nreal life the scholar, whose pre-eminence lies in the province of abstract\nknowledge, is so far surpassed by the man of the world, whose pre-eminence\nconsists in perfect intuitive knowledge, which original disposition\nconferred on him, and a rich experience has developed. The two kinds of\nknowledge always stand to each other in the relation of paper money and\nhard cash; and as there are many cases and circumstances in which the\nformer is to be preferred to the latter, so there are also things and\nsituations for which abstract knowledge is more useful than intuitive. If,\nfor example, it is a conception that in some case guides our action, when\nit is once grasped it has the advantage of being unalterable, and\ntherefore under its guidance we go to work with perfect certainty and\nconsistency. But this certainty which the conception confers on the\nsubjective side is outweighed by the uncertainty which accompanies it on\nthe objective side. The whole conception may be false and groundless, or\nthe object to be dealt with may not come under it, for it may be either\nnot at all or not altogether of the kind which belongs to it. Now if in\nthe particular case we suddenly become conscious of something of this\nsort, we are put out altogether; if we do not become conscious of it, the\nresult brings it to light. Therefore Vauvenargue says: \u201c_Personne n\u2019est\nsujet \u00e0 plus de fautes, que ceux qui n\u2019agissent que par r\u00e9flexion_.\u201d If,\non the contrary, it is direct perception of the objects to be dealt with\nand their relations that guides our action, we easily hesitate at every\nstep, for the perception is always modifiable, is ambiguous, has\ninexhaustible details in itself, and shows many sides in succession; we\nact therefore without full confidence. But the subjective uncertainty is\ncompensated by the objective certainty, for here there is no conception\nbetween the object and us, we never lose sight of it; if therefore we only\nsee correctly what we have before us and what we do, we shall hit the\nmark. Our action then is perfectly sure only when it is guided by a\nconception the right ground of which, its completeness, and applicability\nto the given cause is perfectly certain. Action in accordance with\nconceptions may pass into pedantry, action in accordance with the\nperceived impression into levity and folly.\n\n_Perception_ is not only the _source_ of all knowledge, but is itself\nknowledge \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1fbd \u03b5\u03be\u03bf\u03c7\u03b7\u03bd, is the only unconditionally true, genuine knowledge\ncompletely worthy of the name. For it alone imparts _insight_ properly so\ncalled, it alone is actually assimilated by man, passes into his nature,\nand can with full reason be called _his_; while the conceptions merely\ncling to him. In the fourth book we see indeed that true virtue proceeds\nfrom knowledge of perception or intuitive knowledge; for only those\nactions which are directly called forth by this, and therefore are\nperformed purely from the impulse of our own nature, are properly symptoms\nof our true and unalterable character; not so those which, resulting from\nreflection and its dogmas, are often extorted from the character, and\ntherefore have no unalterable ground in us. But _wisdom_ also, the true\nview of life, the correct eye, and the searching judgment, proceeds from\nthe way in which the man apprehends the perceptible world, but not from\nhis mere abstract knowledge, _i.e._, not from abstract conceptions. The\nbasis or ultimate content of every science consists, not in proofs, nor in\nwhat is proved, but in the unproved foundation of the proofs, which can\nfinally be apprehended only through perception. So also the basis of the\ntrue wisdom and real insight of each man does not consist in conceptions\nand in abstract rational knowledge, but in what is perceived, and in the\ndegree of acuteness, accuracy, and profundity with which he has\napprehended it. He who excels here knows the (Platonic) Ideas of the world\nand life; every case he has seen represents for him innumerable cases; he\nalways apprehends each being according to its true nature, and his action,\nlike his judgment, corresponds to his insight. By degrees also his\ncountenance assumes the expression of penetration, of true intelligence,\nand, if it goes far enough, of wisdom. For it is pre-eminence in knowledge\nof perception alone that stamps its impression upon the features also;\nwhile pre-eminence in abstract knowledge cannot do this. In accordance\nwith what has been said, we find in all classes men of intellectual\nsuperiority, and often quite without learning. Natural understanding can\ntake the place of almost every degree of culture, but no culture can take\nthe place of natural understanding. The scholar has the advantage of such\nmen in the possession of a wealth of cases and facts (historical\nknowledge) and of causal determinations (natural science), all in\nwell-ordered connection, easily surveyed; but yet with all this he has not\na more accurate and profound insight into what is truly essential in all\nthese cases, facts, and causations. The unlearned man of acuteness and\npenetration knows how to dispense with this wealth; we can make use of\nmuch; we can do with little. One case in his own experience teaches him\nmore than many a scholar is taught by a thousand cases which he _knows_,\nbut does not, properly speaking, _understand_. For the little knowledge of\nthat unlearned man is living, because every fact that is known to him is\nsupported by accurate and well-apprehended perception, and thus represents\nfor him a thousand similar facts. On the contrary, the much knowledge of\nthe ordinary scholar is _dead_, because even if it does not consist, as is\noften the case, in mere words, it consists entirely in abstract knowledge.\nThis, however, receives its value only through the _perceptive_ knowledge\nof the individual with which it must connect itself, and which must\nultimately realise all the conceptions. If now this perceptive knowledge\nis very scanty, such a mind is like a bank with liabilities tenfold in\nexcess of its cash reserve, whereby in the end it becomes bankrupt.\nTherefore, while the right apprehension of the perceptible world has\nimpressed the stamp of insight and wisdom on the brow of many an unlearned\nman, the face of many a scholar bears no other trace of his much study\nthan that of exhaustion and weariness from excessive and forced straining\nof the memory in the unnatural accumulation of dead conceptions. Moreover,\nthe insight of such a man is often so puerile, so weak and silly, that we\nmust suppose that the excessive strain upon the faculty of indirect\nknowledge, which is concerned with abstractions, directly weakens the\npower of immediate perceptive knowledge, and the natural and clear vision\nis more and more blinded by the light of books. At any rate the constant\nstreaming in of the thoughts of others must confine and suppress our own,\nand indeed in the long run paralyse the power of thought if it has not\nthat high degree of elasticity which is able to withstand that unnatural\nstream. Therefore ceaseless reading and study directly injures the\nmind\u2014the more so that completeness and constant connection of the system\nof our own thought and knowledge must pay the penalty if we so often\narbitrarily interrupt it in order to gain room for a line of thought\nentirely strange to us. To banish my own thought in order to make room for\nthat of a book would seem to me like what Shakespeare censures in the\ntourists of his time, that they sold their own land to see that of others.\nYet the inclination for reading of most scholars is a kind of _fuga\nvacui_, from the poverty of their own minds, which forcibly draws in the\nthoughts of others. In order to have thoughts they must read something;\njust as lifeless bodies are only moved from without; while the man who\nthinks for himself is like a living body that moves of itself. Indeed it\nis dangerous to read about a subject before we have thought about it\nourselves. For along with the new material the old point of view and\ntreatment of it creeps into the mind, all the more so as laziness and\napathy counsel us to accept what has already been thought, and allow it to\npass for truth. This now insinuates itself, and henceforward our thought\non the subject always takes the accustomed path, like brooks that are\nguided by ditches; to find a thought of our own, a new thought, is then\ndoubly difficult. This contributes much to the want of originality on the\npart of scholars. Add to this that they suppose that, like other people,\nthey must divide their time between pleasure and work. Now they regard\nreading as their work and special calling, and therefore they gorge\nthemselves with it, beyond what they can digest. Then reading no longer\nplays the part of the mere initiator of thought, but takes its place\naltogether; for they think of the subject just as long as they are reading\nabout it, thus with the mind of another, not with their own. But when the\nbook is laid aside entirely different things make much more lively claims\nupon their interest; their private affairs, and then the theatre,\ncard-playing, skittles, the news of the day, and gossip. The man of\nthought is so because such things have no interest for him. He is\ninterested only in his problems, with which therefore he is always\noccupied, by himself and without a book. To give ourselves this interest,\nif we have not got it, is impossible. This is the crucial point. And upon\nthis also depends the fact that the former always speak only of what they\nhave read, while the latter, on the contrary, speaks of what he has\nthought, and that they are, as Pope says:\n\n\n    \u201cFor ever reading, never to be read.\u201d\n\n\nThe mind is naturally free, not a slave; only what it does willingly, of\nits own accord, succeeds. On the other hand, the compulsory exertion of a\nmind in studies for which it is not qualified, or when it has become\ntired, or in general too continuously and _invita Minerva_, dulls the\nbrain, just as reading by moonlight dulls the eyes. This is especially the\ncase with the straining of the immature brain in the earlier years of\nchildhood. I believe that the learning of Latin and Greek grammar from the\nsixth to the twelfth year lays the foundation of the subsequent stupidity\nof most scholars. At any rate the mind requires the nourishment of\nmaterials from without. All that we eat is not at once incorporated in the\norganism, but only so much of it as is digested; so that only a small part\nof it is assimilated, and the remainder passes away; and thus to eat more\nthan we can assimilate is useless and injurious. It is precisely the same\nwith what we read. Only so far as it gives food for thought does it\nincrease our insight and true knowledge. Therefore Heracleitus says:\n\u201c\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03b8\u03b9\u03b1 \u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03bd \u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u201d (_multiscitia non dat intellectum_). It\nseems, however, to me that learning may be compared to a heavy suit of\narmour, which certainly makes the strong man quite invincible, but to the\nweak man is a burden under which he sinks altogether.\n\nThe exposition given in our third book of the knowledge of the (Platonic)\nIdeas, as the highest attainable by man, and at the same time entirely\n_perceptive or intuitive_ knowledge, is a proof that the source of true\nwisdom does not lie in abstract rational knowledge, but in the clear and\nprofound apprehension of the world in perception. Therefore wise men may\nlive in any age, and those of the past remain wise men for all succeeding\ngenerations. Learning, on the contrary, is relative; the learned men of\nthe past are for the most part children as compared with us, and require\nindulgence.\n\nBut to him who studies in order to gain _insight_ books and studies are\nonly steps of the ladder by which he climbs to the summit of knowledge. As\nsoon as a round of the ladder has raised him a step, he leaves it behind\nhim. The many, on the other hand, who study in order to fill their memory\ndo not use the rounds of the ladder to mount by, but take them off, and\nload themselves with them to carry them away, rejoicing at the increasing\nweight of the burden. They remain always below, because they bear what\nought to have borne them.\n\nUpon the truth set forth here, that the kernel of all knowledge is the\n_perceptive or intuitive_ apprehension, depends the true and profound\nremark of Helvetius, that the really characteristic and original views of\nwhich a gifted individual is capable, and the working up, development, and\nmanifold application of which is the material of all his works, even if\nwritten much later, can arise in him only up to the thirty-fifth or at the\nlatest the fortieth year of his life, and are really the result of\ncombinations he has made in his early youth. For they are not mere\nconnections of abstract conceptions, but his own intuitive comprehension\nof the objective world and the nature of things. Now, that this intuitive\napprehension must have completed its work by the age mentioned above\ndepends partly on the fact that by that time the ectypes of all (Platonic)\nIdeas must have presented themselves to the man, and therefore cannot\nappear later with the strength of the first impression; partly on this,\nthat the highest energy of brain activity is demanded for this\nquintessence of all knowledge, for this proof before the letter of the\napprehension, and this highest energy of the brain is dependent on the\nfreshness and flexibility of its fibres and the rapidity with which the\narterial blood flows to the brain. But this again is at its strongest only\nas long as the arterial system has a decided predominance over the venous\nsystem, which begins to decline after the thirtieth year, until at last,\nafter the forty-second year, the venous system obtains the upper hand, as\nCabanis has admirably and instructively explained. Therefore the years\nbetween twenty and thirty and the first few years after thirty are for the\nintellect what May is for the trees; only then do the blossoms appear of\nwhich all the later fruits are the development. The world of perception\nhas made its impression, and thereby laid the foundation of all the\nsubsequent thoughts of the individual. He may by reflection make clearer\nwhat he has apprehended; he may yet acquire much knowledge as nourishment\nfor the fruit which has once set; he may extend his views, correct his\nconceptions and judgments, it may be only through endless combinations\nthat he becomes completely master of the materials he has gained; indeed\nhe will generally produce his best works much later, as the greatest heat\nbegins with the decline of the day, but he can no longer hope for new\noriginal knowledge from the one living fountain of perception. It is this\nthat Byron feels when he breaks forth into his wonderfully beautiful\nlament:\n\n\n    \u201cNo more\u2014no more\u2014oh! never more on me\n      The freshness of the heart can fall like dew,\n    Which out of all the lovely things we see\n      Extracts emotions beautiful and new,\n    Hived in our bosoms like the bag o\u2019 the bee:\n      Think\u2019st thou the honey with those objects grew?\n    Alas! \u2019twas not in them, but in thy power\n      To double even the sweetness of a flower.\u201d\n\n\nThrough all that I have said hitherto I hope I have placed in a clear\nlight the important truth that since all abstract knowledge springs from\nknowledge of perception, it obtains its whole value from its relation to\nthe latter, thus from the fact that its conceptions, or the abstractions\nwhich they denote, can be realised, _i.e._, proved, through perceptions;\nand, moreover, that most depends upon the quality of these perceptions.\nConceptions and abstractions which do not ultimately refer to perceptions\nare like paths in the wood that end without leading out of it. The great\nvalue of conceptions lies in the fact that by means of them the original\nmaterial of knowledge is more easily handled, surveyed, and arranged. But\nalthough many kinds of logical and dialectical operations are possible\nwith them, yet no entirely original and new knowledge will result from\nthese; that is to say, no knowledge whose material neither lay already in\nperception nor was drawn from self-consciousness. This is the true meaning\nof the doctrine attributed to Aristotle: _Nihil est in intellectu, nisi\nquod antea fuerit in sensu_. It is also the meaning of the Lockeian\nphilosophy, which made for ever an epoch in philosophy, because it\ncommenced at last the serious discussion of the question as to the origin\nof our knowledge. It is also principally what the \u201cCritique of Pure\nReason\u201d teaches. It also desires that we should not remain at the\n_conceptions_, but go back to their _source_, thus to _perception_; only\nwith the true and important addition that what holds good of the\nperception also extends to its subjective conditions, thus to the forms\nwhich lie predisposed in the perceiving and thinking brain as its natural\nfunctions; although these at least _virtualiter_ precede the actual\nsense-perception, _i.e._, are _a priori_, and therefore do not depend upon\nsense-perception, but it upon them. For these forms themselves have indeed\nno other end, nor service, than to produce the empirical perception on the\nnerves of sense being excited, as other forms are determined afterwards to\nconstruct thoughts in the abstract from the material of perception. The\n\u201cCritique of Pure Reason\u201d is therefore related to the Lockeian philosophy\nas the analysis of the infinite to elementary geometry, but is yet\nthroughout to be regarded as the _continuation of the Lockeian\nphilosophy_. The given material of every philosophy is accordingly nothing\nelse than the _empirical consciousness_, which divides itself into the\nconsciousness of one\u2019s own self (self-consciousness) and the consciousness\nof other things (external perception). For this alone is what is\nimmediately and actually given. Every philosophy which, instead of\nstarting from this, takes for its starting-point arbitrarily chosen\nabstract conceptions, such as, for example, absolute, absolute substance,\nGod, infinity, finitude, absolute identity, being, essence, &c., &c.,\nmoves in the air without support, and can therefore never lead to a real\nresult. Yet in all ages philosophers have attempted it with such\nmaterials; and hence even Kant sometimes, according to the common usage,\nand more from custom than consistency, defines philosophy as a science of\nmere conceptions. But such a science would really undertake to extract\nfrom the partial ideas (for that is what the abstractions are) what is not\nto be found in the complete ideas (the perceptions), from which the former\nwere drawn by abstraction. The possibility of the syllogism leads to this\nmistake, because here the combination of the judgments gives a new result,\nalthough more apparent than real, for the syllogism only brings out what\nalready lay in the given judgments; for it is true the conclusion cannot\ncontain more than the premisses. Conceptions are certainly the material of\nphilosophy, but only as marble is the material of the sculptor. It is not\nto work _out of_ them but _in_ them; that is to say, it is to deposit its\nresults in them, but not to start from them as what is given. Whoever\nwishes to see a glaring example of such a false procedure from mere\nconceptions may look at the \u201c_Institutio Theologica_\u201d of Proclus in order\nto convince himself of the vanity of that whole method. There abstractions\nsuch as \u201c\u1f11\u03bd, \u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2, \u03b1\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03ba\u03b5\u03c2, \u03b1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd,\n\u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u03b1\u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u201d (_unum_, _multa_, _bonum_,\n_producens et productum_, _sibi sufficiens_, _causa_, _melius_, _mobile_,\n_immobile_, _motum_), &c., are indiscriminately collected, but the\nperceptions to which alone they owe their origin and content ignored and\ncontemptuously disregarded. A theology is then constructed from these\nconceptions, but its goal, the \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u03c2, is kept concealed; thus the whole\nprocedure is apparently unprejudiced, as if the reader did not know at the\nfirst page, just as well as the author, what it is all to end in. I have\nalready quoted a fragment of this above. This production of Proclus is\nreally quite peculiarly adapted to make clear how utterly useless and\nillusory such combinations of abstract conceptions are, for we can make of\nthem whatever we will, especially if we further take advantage of the\nambiguity of many words, such, for example, as \u03ba\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd. If such an\narchitect of conceptions were present in person we would only have to ask\nnaively where all the things are of which he has so much to tell us, and\nwhence he knows the laws from which he draws his conclusions concerning\nthem. He would then soon be obliged to turn to empirical perception, in\nwhich alone the real world exhibits itself, from which those conceptions\nare drawn. Then we would only have to ask further why he did not honestly\nstart from the given perception of such a world, so that at every step his\nassertions could be proved by it, instead of operating with conceptions,\nwhich are yet drawn from perception alone, and therefore can have no\nfurther validity than that which it imparts to them. But of course this is\njust his trick. Through such conceptions, in which, by virtue of\nabstraction, what is inseparable is thought as separate, and what cannot\nbe united as united, he goes far beyond the perception which was their\nsource, and thus beyond the limits of their applicability, to an entirely\ndifferent world from that which supplied the material for building, but\njust on this account to a world of chimeras. I have here referred to\nProclus because in him this procedure becomes specially clear through the\nfrank audacity with which he carries it out. But in Plato also we find\nsome examples of this kind, though not so glaring; and in general the\nphilosophical literature of all ages affords a multitude of instances of\nthe same thing. That of our own time is rich in them. Consider, for\nexample, the writings of the school of Schelling, and observe the\nconstructions that are built up out of abstractions like finite and\ninfinite\u2014being, non-being, other being\u2014activity, hindrance,\nproduct\u2014determining, being determined, determinateness\u2014limit, limiting,\nbeing limited\u2014unity, plurality, multiplicity\u2014identity, diversity,\nindifference\u2014thinking, being, essence, &c. Not only does all that has been\nsaid above hold good of constructions out of such materials, but because\nan infinite amount can be thought _through_ such wide abstractions, only\nvery little indeed can be thought _in_ them; they are empty husks. But\nthus the matter of the whole philosophising becomes astonishingly trifling\nand paltry, and hence arises that unutterable and excruciating tediousness\nwhich is characteristic of all such writings. If indeed I now chose to\ncall to mind the way in which Hegel and his companions have abused such\nwide and empty abstractions, I should have to fear that both the reader\nand I myself would be ill; for the most nauseous tediousness hangs over\nthe empty word-juggling of this loathsome philophaster.\n\nThat in _practical_ philosophy also no wisdom is brought to light from\nmere abstract conceptions is the one thing to be learnt from the ethical\ndissertations of the theologian Schleiermacher, with the delivery of which\nhe has wearied the Berlin Academy for a number of years, and which are\nshortly to appear in a collected form. In them only abstract conceptions,\nsuch as duty, virtue, highest good, moral law, &c., are taken as the\nstarting-point, without further introduction than that they commonly occur\nin ethical systems, and are now treated as given realities. He then\ndiscusses these from all sides with great subtilty, but, on the other\nhand, never makes for the source of these conceptions, for the thing\nitself, the actual human life, to which alone they are related, from which\nthey ought to be drawn, and with which morality has, properly speaking, to\ndo. On this account these diatribes are just as unfruitful and useless as\nthey are tedious, which is saying a great deal. At all times we find\npersons, like this theologian, who is too fond of philosophising, famous\nwhile they are alive, afterwards soon forgotten. My advice is rather to\nread those whose fate has been the opposite of this, for time is short and\nvaluable.\n\nNow although, in accordance with all that has been said, wide, abstract\nconceptions, which can be realised in no perception, must never be the\nsource of knowledge, the starting-point or the proper material of\nphilosophy, yet sometimes particular results of philosophy are such as can\nonly be thought in the abstract, and cannot be proved by any perception.\nKnowledge of this kind will certainly only be half knowledge; it will, as\nit were, only point out the place where what is to be known lies; but this\nremains concealed. Therefore we should only be satisfied with such\nconceptions in the most extreme case, and when we have reached the limit\nof the knowledge possible to our faculties. An example of this might\nperhaps be the conception of a being out of time; such as the proposition:\nthe indestructibility of our true being by death is not a continued\nexistence of it. With conceptions of this sort the firm ground which\nsupports our whole knowledge, the perceptible, seems to waver. Therefore\nphilosophy may certainly at times, and in case of necessity, extend to\nsuch knowledge, but it must never begin with it.\n\nThe working with wide abstractions, which is condemned above, to the\nentire neglect of the perceptive knowledge from which they are drawn, and\nwhich is therefore their permanent and natural controller, was at all\ntimes the principal source of the errors of dogmatic philosophy. A science\nconstructed from the mere comparison of conceptions, that is, from general\nprinciples, could only be certain if all its principles were synthetical\n_a priori_, as is the case in mathematics: for only such admit of no\nexceptions. If, on the other hand, the principles have any empirical\ncontent, we must keep this constantly at hand, to control the general\nprinciples. For no truths which are in any way drawn from experience are\never unconditionally true. They have therefore only an approximately\nuniversal validity; for here there is no rule without an exception. If now\nI link these principles together by means of the intersection of their\nconcept-spheres, one conception might very easily touch the other\nprecisely where the exception lies. But if this happens even only once in\nthe course of a long train of reasoning, the whole structure is loosed\nfrom its foundation and moves in the air. If, for example, I say, \u201cThe\nruminants have no front incisors,\u201d and apply this and what follows from it\nto the camel, it all becomes false, for it only holds good of horned\nruminants. What Kant calls _das Vern\u00fcnfteln_, mere abstract reasoning, and\nso often condemns, is just of this sort. For it consists simply in\nsubsuming conceptions under conceptions, without reference to their\norigin, and without proof of the correctness and exclusiveness of such\nsubsumption\u2014a method whereby we can arrive by longer or shorter circuits\nat almost any result we choose to set before us as our goal. Hence this\nmere abstract reasoning differs only in degree from sophistication\nstrictly so called. But sophistication is in the theoretical sphere\nexactly what chicanery is in the practical. Yet even Plato himself has\nvery frequently permitted such mere abstract reasoning; and Proclus, as we\nhave already mentioned, has, after the manner of all imitators, carried\nthis fault of his model much further. Dionysius the Areopagite, \u201c_De\nDivinis Nominibus_,\u201d is also strongly affected with this. But even in the\nfragments of the Eleatic Melissus we already find distinct examples of\nsuch mere abstract reasoning (especially \u00a7 2-5 in Brandis\u2019 _Comment.\nEleat._) His procedure with the conceptions, which never touch the reality\nfrom which they have their content, but, moving in the atmosphere of\nabstract universality, pass away beyond it, resembles blows which never\nhit the mark. A good pattern of such mere abstract reasoning is the \u201c_De\nDiis et Mundo_\u201d of the philosopher Sallustius B\u00fcchelchen; especially\nchaps. 7, 12, and 17. But a perfect gem of philosophical mere abstract\nreasoning passing into decided sophistication is the following reasoning\nof the Platonist, Maximus of Tyre, which I shall quote, as it is short:\n\u201cEvery injustice is the taking away of a good. There is no other good than\nvirtue: but virtue cannot be taken away: thus it is not possible that the\nvirtuous can suffer injustice from the wicked. It now remains either that\nno injustice can be suffered, or that it is suffered by the wicked from\nthe wicked. But the wicked man possesses no good at all, for only virtue\nis a good; therefore none can be taken from him. Thus he also can suffer\nno injustice. Thus injustice is an impossible thing.\u201d The original, which\nis less concise through repetitions, runs thus: \u201c\u0391\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b9\u03b1 \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b1\u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03b1\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u03c5; \u03c4\u03bf \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b1\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03b9 \u03b1\u03bd \u03b5\u03b9\u03b7 \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf \u03b7 \u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03b7?\u2014\u1f21 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03b7 \u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd. \u039f\u03c5\u03ba\n\u03b1\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03c5\u03bd \u1f41 \u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03b5\u03c7\u03c9\u03bd, \u03b7 \u03bf\u03c5\u03ba \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b9\u03b1 \u03b1\u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b1\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u03c5;\n\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd \u03b3\u03b1\u03c1 \u03b1\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u1fbd \u03c7\u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03b2\u03bb\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u03bf\u03c5\u03b4 \u1f11\u03bb\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b5 \u03bb\u03b7\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd.\n\u0395\u03b9\u03b5\u03bd \u03bf\u03c5\u03bd, \u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u1fbd \u03b1\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f41 \u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u03bf\u03c5\u03b4 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bc\u03bf\u03c7\u03b8\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5; \u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b1\u03c1.\n\u039b\u03b5\u03b9\u03c0\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03c5\u03bd \u03b7 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b1\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1\u03c0\u03b1\u03be, \u03b7 \u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03bf\u03c7\u03b8\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\n\u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5; \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff3 \u03bc\u03bf\u03c7\u03b8\u03b7\u03c1\u1ff3 \u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u03c5; \u1f21 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b1\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b9\u03b1 \u03b7\u03bd \u03b1\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u03c5\n\u03b1\u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2; \u1f41 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03bc\u03b7 \u03b5\u03c7\u03c9\u03bd \u1f41, \u03c4\u03b9 \u03b1\u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7, \u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b5 \u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f41, \u03c4\u03b9 \u03b1\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b7\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7, \u03b5\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u201d\n(_Sermo 2_). I shall add further a modern example of such proofs from\nabstract conceptions, by means of which an obviously absurd proposition is\nset up as the truth, and I shall take it from the works of a great man,\nGiordano Bruno. In his book, \u201c_Del Infinito Universo e Mondi_\u201d (p. 87 of\nthe edition of A. Wagner), he makes an Aristotelian prove (with the\nassistance and exaggeration of the passage of Aristotle\u2019s _De C\u0153lo_, i. 5)\nthat there can be _no space_ beyond the world. The world is enclosed by\nthe eight spheres of Aristotle, and beyond these there can be no space.\nFor if beyond these there were still a body, it must either be simple or\ncompound. It is now proved sophistically, from principles which are\nobviously begged, that no _simple_ body could be there; and therefore,\nalso, no compound body, for it would necessarily be composed of simple\nones. Thus in general there can be no body there\u2014but if not, then _no\nspace_. For space is defined as \u201cthat in which bodies can be;\u201d and it has\njust been proved that no body can be there. Thus there is also there no\nspace. This last is the final stroke of this proof from abstract\nconceptions. It ultimately rests on the fact that the proposition, \u201cWhere\nno space is, there can be no body\u201d is taken as a universal negative, and\ntherefore converted simply, \u201cWhere no body can be there is no space.\u201d But\nthe former proposition, when properly regarded, is a universal\naffirmative: \u201cEverything that has no space has no body,\u201d thus it must not\nbe converted simply. Yet it is not every proof from abstract conceptions,\nwith a conclusion which clearly contradicts perception (as here the\nfiniteness of space), that can thus be referred to a logical error. For\nthe sophistry does not always lie in the form, but often in the matter, in\nthe premisses, and in the indefiniteness of the conceptions and their\nextension. We find numerous examples of this in Spinoza, whose method\nindeed it is to prove from conceptions. See, for example, the miserable\nsophisms in his \u201cEthics,\u201d P. iv., prop. 29-31, by means of the ambiguity\nof the uncertain conceptions _convenire_ and _commune habere_. Yet this\ndoes not prevent the neo-Spinozists of our own day from taking all that he\nhas said for gospel. Of these the Hegelians, of whom there are actually\nstill a few, are specially amusing on account of their traditional\nreverence for his principle, _omnis determinatio est negatio_, at which,\naccording to the charlatan spirit of the school, they put on a face as if\nit was able to unhinge the world; whereas it is of no use at all, for even\nthe simplest can see for himself that if I limit anything by\ndeterminations, I thereby exclude and thus negate what lies beyond these\nlimits.\n\nThus in all mere reasonings of the above kind it becomes very apparent\nwhat errors that algebra with mere conceptions, uncontrolled by\nperception, is exposed to, and that therefore perception is for our\nintellect what the firm ground upon which it stands is for our body: if we\nforsake perception everything is _instabilis tellus, innabilis unda_. The\nreader will pardon the fulness of these expositions and examples on\naccount of their instructiveness. I have sought by means of them to bring\nforward and support the difference, indeed the opposition, between\nperceptive and abstract or reflected knowledge, which has hitherto been\ntoo little regarded, and the establishment of which is a fundamental\ncharacteristic of my philosophy. For many phenomena of our mental life are\nonly explicable through this distinction. The connecting link between\nthese two such different kinds of knowledge is the _faculty of judgment_,\nas I have shown in \u00a7 14 of the first volume. This faculty is certainly\nalso active in the province of mere abstract knowledge, in which it\ncompares conceptions only with conceptions; therefore every judgment, in\nthe logical sense of the word, is certainly a work of the faculty of\njudgment, for it always consists in the subsumption of a narrower\nconception under a wider one. Yet this activity of the faculty of\njudgment, in which it merely compares conceptions with each other, is a\nsimpler and easier task than when it makes the transition from what is\nquite particular, the perception, to the essentially general, the\nconception. For by the analysis of conceptions into their essential\npredicates it must be possible to decide upon purely logical grounds\nwhether they are capable of being united or not, and for this the mere\nreason which every one possesses is sufficient. The faculty of judgment is\ntherefore only active here in shortening this process, for he who is\ngifted with it sees at a glance what others only arrive at through a\nseries of reflections. But its activity in the narrower sense really only\nappears when what is known through perception, thus the real experience,\nhas to be carried over into distinct abstract knowledge, subsumed under\naccurately corresponding conceptions, and thus translated into reflected\nrational knowledge. It is therefore this faculty which has to establish\nthe firm _basis_ of all sciences, which always consists of what is known\ndirectly and cannot be further denied. Therefore here, in the fundamental\njudgments, lies the difficulty of the sciences, not in the inferences from\nthese. To infer is easy, to judge is difficult. False inferences are rare,\nfalse judgments are always the order of the day. Not less in practical\nlife has the faculty of judgment to give the decision in all fundamental\nconclusions and important determinations. Its office is in the main like\nthat of the judicial sentence. As the burning-glass brings to a focus all\nthe sun\u2019s rays, so when the understanding works, the intellect has to\nbring together all the data which it has upon the subject so closely that\nthe understanding comprehends them at a glance, which it now rightly\nfixes, and then carefully makes the result distinct to itself. Further,\nthe great difficulty of judging in most cases depends upon the fact that\nwe have to proceed from the consequent to the reason, a path which is\nalways uncertain; indeed I have shown that the source of all error lies\nhere. Yet in all the empirical sciences, and also in the affairs of real\nlife, this way is for the most part the only one open to us. The\nexperiment is an attempt to go over it again the other way; therefore it\nis decisive, and at least brings out error clearly; provided always that\nit is rightly chosen and honestly carried out; not like Newton\u2019s\nexperiments in connection with the theory of colours. But the experiment\nitself must also again be judged. The complete certainty of the _a priori_\nsciences, logic and mathematics, depends principally upon the fact that in\nthem the path from the reason to the consequent is open to us, and it is\nalways certain. This gives them the character of _purely objective_\nsciences, _i.e._, sciences with regard to whose truths all who understand\nthem must judge alike; and this is all the more remarkable as they are the\nvery sciences which rest on the subjective forms of the intellect, while\nthe empirical sciences alone have to do with what is palpably objective.\n\nWit and ingenuity are also manifestations of the faculty of judgment; in\nthe former its activity is reflective, in the latter subsuming. In most\nmen the faculty of judgment is only nominally present; it is a kind of\nirony that it is reckoned with the normal faculties of the mind, instead\nof being only attributed to the _monstris per excessum_. Ordinary men show\neven in the smallest affairs want of confidence in their own judgment,\njust because they know from experience that it is of no service. With them\nprejudice and imitation take its place; and thus they are kept in a state\nof continual non-age, from which scarcely one in many hundreds is\ndelivered. Certainly this is not avowed, for even to themselves they\nappear to judge; but all the time they are glancing stealthily at the\nopinion of others, which is their secret standard. While each one would be\nashamed to go about in a borrowed coat, hat, or mantle, they all have\nnothing but borrowed opinions, which they eagerly collect wherever they\ncan find them, and then strut about giving them out as their own. Others\nborrow them again from them and do the same thing. This explains the rapid\nand wide spread of errors, and also the fame of what is bad; for the\nprofessional purveyors of opinion, such as journalists and the like, give\nas a rule only false wares, as those who hire out masquerading dresses\ngive only false jewels.\n\n\n\nChapter VIII.(20) On The Theory Of The Ludicrous.\n\n\nMy theory of the ludicrous also depends upon the opposition explained in\nthe preceding chapters between perceptible and abstract ideas, which I\nhave brought into such marked prominence. Therefore what has still to be\nsaid in explanation of this theory finds its proper place here, although\naccording to the order of the text it would have to come later.\n\nThe problem of the origin, which is everywhere the same, and hence of the\npeculiar significance of laughter, was already known to Cicero, but only\nto be at once dismissed as insoluble (_De Orat._, ii. 58). The oldest\nattempt known to me at a psychological explanation of laughter is to be\nfound in Hutcheson\u2019s \u201cIntroduction into Moral Philosophy,\u201d Bk. I., ch. i.\n\u00a7 14. A somewhat later anonymous work, \u201c_Trait\u00e9 des Causes Physiques et\nMorals du Rire_,\u201d 1768, is not without merit as a ventilation of the\nsubject. Platner, in his \u201cAnthropology,\u201d \u00a7 894, has collected the opinions\nof the philosophers from Hume to Kant who have attempted an explanation of\nthis phenomenon peculiar to human nature. Kant\u2019s and Jean Paul\u2019s theories\nof the ludicrous are well known. I regard it as unnecessary to prove their\nincorrectness, for whoever tries to refer given cases of the ludicrous to\nthem will in the great majority of instances be at once convinced of their\ninsufficiency.\n\nAccording to my explanation given in the first volume, the source of the\nludicrous is always the paradoxical, and therefore unexpected, subsumption\nof an object under a conception which in other respects is different from\nit, and accordingly the phenomenon of laughter always signifies the sudden\napprehension of an incongruity between such a conception and the real\nobject thought under it, thus between the abstract and the concrete object\nof perception. The greater and more unexpected, in the apprehension of the\nlaughter, this incongruity is, the more violent will be his laughter.\nTherefore in everything that excites laughter it must always be possible\nto show a conception and a particular, that is, a thing or event, which\ncertainly can be subsumed under that conception, and therefore thought\nthrough it, yet in another and more predominating aspect does not belong\nto it at all, but is strikingly different from everything else that is\nthought through that conception. If, as often occurs, especially in\nwitticisms, instead of such a real object of perception, the conception of\na subordinate species is brought under the higher conception of the genus,\nit will yet excite laughter only through the fact that the imagination\nrealises it, _i.e._, makes a perceptible representative stand for it, and\nthus the conflict between what is thought and what is perceived takes\nplace. Indeed if we wish to understand this perfectly explicitly, it is\npossible to trace everything ludicrous to a syllogism in the first figure,\nwith an undisputed _major_ and an unexpected _minor_, which to a certain\nextent is only sophistically valid, in consequence of which connection the\nconclusion partakes of the quality of the ludicrous.\n\nIn the first volume I regarded it as superfluous to illustrate this theory\nby examples, for every one can do this for himself by a little reflection\nupon cases of the ludicrous which he remembers. Yet, in order to come to\nthe assistance of the mental inertness of those readers who prefer always\nto remain in a passive condition, I will accommodate myself to them.\nIndeed in this third edition I wish to multiply and accumulate examples,\nso that it may be indisputable that here, after so many fruitless earlier\nattempts, the true theory of the ludicrous is given, and the problem which\nwas proposed and also given up by Cicero is definitely solved.\n\nIf we consider that an angle requires two lines meeting so that if they\nare produced they will intersect each other; on the other hand, that the\ntangent of a circle only touches it at one point, but at this point is\nreally parallel to it; and accordingly have present to our minds the\nabstract conviction of the impossibility of an angle between the\ncircumference of a circle and its tangent; and if now such an angle lies\nvisibly before us upon paper, this will easily excite a smile. The\nludicrousness in this case is exceedingly weak; but yet the source of it\nin the incongruity of what is thought and perceived appears in it with\nexceptional distinctness. When we discover such an incongruity, the\noccasion for laughter that thereby arises is, according as we pass from\nthe real, _i.e._, the perceptible, to the conception, or conversely from\nthe conception to the real, either a witticism or an absurdity, which in a\nhigher degree, and especially in the practical sphere, is folly, as was\nexplained in the text. Now to consider examples of the first case, thus of\nwit, we shall first of all take the familiar anecdote of the Gascon at\nwhom the king laughed when he saw him in light summer clothing in the\ndepth of winter, and who thereupon said to the king: \u201cIf your Majesty had\nput on what I have, you would find it very warm;\u201d and on being asked what\nhe had put on, replied: \u201cMy whole wardrobe!\u201d Under this last conception we\nhave to think both the unlimited wardrobe of a king and the single summer\ncoat of a poor devil, the sight of which upon his freezing body shows its\ngreat incongruity with the conception. The audience in a theatre in Paris\nonce called for the \u201cMarseillaise\u201d to be played, and as this was not done,\nbegan shrieking and howling, so that at last a commissary of police in\nuniform came upon the stage and explained that it was not allowed that\nanything should be given in the theatre except what was in the playbill.\nUpon this a voice cried: \u201c_Et vous, Monsieur, \u00eates-vous aussi sur\nl\u2019affiche?_\u201d\u2014a hit which was received with universal laughter. For here\nthe subsumption of what is heterogeneous is at once distinct and unforced.\nThe epigramme:\n\n\n    \u201cBav is the true shepherd of whom the Bible spake:\n    Though his flock be all asleep, he alone remains awake:\u201d\n\n\nsubsumes, under the conception of a sleeping flock and a waking shepherd,\nthe tedious preacher who still bellows on unheard when he has sent all the\npeople to sleep. Analogous to this is the epitaph on a doctor: \u201cHere lies\nhe like a hero, and those he has slain lie around him;\u201d it subsumes under\nthe conception, honourable to the hero, of \u201clying surrounded by dead\nbodies,\u201d the doctor, who is supposed to preserve life. Very commonly the\nwitticism consists in a single expression, through which only the\nconception is given, under which the case presented can be subsumed,\nthough it is very different from everything else that is thought under it.\nSo is it in \u201cRomeo\u201d when the vivacious Mercutio answers his friends who\npromise to visit him on the morrow: \u201cAsk for me to-morrow, and you shall\nfind me a grave man.\u201d Under this conception a dead man is here subsumed;\nbut in English there is also a play upon the words, for \u201ca grave man\u201d\nmeans both a serious man and a man of the grave. Of this kind is also the\nwell-known anecdote of the actor Unzelmann. In the Berlin theatre he was\nstrictly forbidden to improvise. Soon afterwards he had to appear on the\nstage on horseback, and just as he came on the stage the horse dunged, at\nwhich the audience began to laugh, but laughed much more when Unzelmann\nsaid to the horse: \u201cWhat are you doing? Don\u2019t you know we are forbidden to\nimprovise?\u201d Here the subsumption of the heterogeneous under the more\ngeneral conception is very distinct, but the witticism is exceedingly\nhappy, and the ludicrous effect produced by it excessively strong. To this\nclass also belongs the following announcement from Hall in a newspaper of\nMarch 1851: \u201cThe band of Jewish swindlers to which we have referred were\nagain delivered over to us with obligato accompaniment.\u201d This subsuming of\na police escort under a musical term is very happy, though it approaches\nthe mere play upon words. On the other hand, it is exactly a case of the\nkind we are considering when Saphir, in a paper-war with the actor Angeli,\ndescribes him as \u201cAngeli, who is equally great in mind and body.\u201d The\nsmall statue of the actor was known to the whole town, and thus under the\nconception \u201cgreat\u201d unusual smallness was presented to the mind. Also when\nthe same Saphir calls the airs of a new opera \u201cgood old friends,\u201d and so\nbrings the quality which is most to be condemned under a conception which\nis usually employed to commend. Also, if we should say of a lady whose\nfavour could be influenced by presents, that she knew how to combine the\n_utile_ with the _dulci_. For here we bring the moral life under the\nconception of a rule which Horace has recommended in an \u00e6sthetical\nreference. Also if to signify a brothel we should call it the \u201cmodest\nabode of quiet joys.\u201d Good society, in order to be thoroughly insipid, has\nforbidden all decided utterances, and therefore all strong expressions.\nTherefore it is wont, when it has to signify scandalous or in any way\nindecent things, to mitigate or extenuate them by expressing them through\ngeneral conceptions. But in this way it happens that they are more or less\nincongruously subsumed, and in a corresponding degree the effect of the\nludicrous is produced. To this class belongs the use of _utile dulci_\nreferred to above, and also such expressions as the following: \u201cHe had\nunpleasantness at the ball\u201d when he was thrashed and kicked out; or, \u201cHe\nhas done too well\u201d when he is drunk; and also, \u201cThe woman has weak\nmoments\u201d if she is unfaithful to her husband, &c. Equivocal sayings also\nbelong to the same class. They are conceptions which in themselves contain\nnothing improper, but yet the case brought under them leads to an improper\nidea. They are very common in society. But a perfect example of a full and\nmagnificent equivocation is Shenstone\u2019s incomparable epitaph on a justice\nof the peace, which, in its high-flown lapidary style, seems to speak of\nnoble and sublime things, while under each of their conceptions something\nquite different is to be subsumed, which only appears in the very last\nword as the unexpected key to the whole, and the reader discovers with\nloud laughter that he has only read a very obscene equivocation. In this\nsmooth-combed age it is altogether impossible to quote this here, not to\nspeak of translating it; it will be found in Shenstone\u2019s poetical works,\nunder the title \u201cInscription.\u201d Equivocations sometimes pass over into mere\npuns, about which all that is necessary has been said in the text.\n\nFurther, the ultimate subsumption, ludicrous to all, of what in one\nrespect is heterogeneous, under a conception which in other respects\nagrees with it, may take place contrary to our intention. For example, one\nof the free negroes in North America, who take pains to imitate the whites\nin everything, quite recently placed an epitaph over his dead child which\nbegins, \u201cLovely, early broken lily.\u201d If, on the contrary, something real\nand perceptible is, with direct intention, brought under the conception of\nits opposite, the result is plain, common irony. For example, if when it\nis raining hard we say, \u201cNice weather we are having to-day;\u201d or if we say\nof an ugly bride, \u201cThat man has found a charming treasure;\u201d or of a knave,\n\u201cThis honest man,\u201d &c. &c. Only children and quite uneducated people will\nlaugh at such things; for here the incongruity between what is thought and\nwhat is perceived is total. Yet just in this direct exaggeration in the\nproduction of the ludicrous its fundamental character, incongruity,\nappears very distinctly. This species of the ludicrous is, on account of\nits exaggeration and distinct intention, in some respects related to\n_parody_. The procedure of the latter consists in this. It substitutes for\nthe incidents and words of a serious poem or drama insignificant low\npersons or trifling motives and actions. It thus subsumes the commonplace\nrealities which it sets forth under the lofty conceptions given in the\ntheme, under which in a certain respect they must come, while in other\nrespects they are very incongruous; and thereby the contrast between what\nis perceived and what is thought appears very glaring. There is no lack of\nfamiliar examples of this, and therefore I shall only give one, from the\n\u201cZobeide\u201d of Carlo Gozzi, act iv., scene 3, where the famous stanza of\nAriosto (_Orl. Fur._, i. 22), \u201c_Oh gran bont\u00e0 de\u2019 cavalieri antichi_,\u201d\n&c., is put word for word into the mouth of two clowns who have just been\nthrashing each other, and tired with this, lie quietly side by side. This\nis also the nature of the application so popular in Germany of serious\nverses, especially of Schiller, to trivial events, which clearly contains\na subsumption of heterogeneous things under the general conception which\nthe verse expresses. Thus, for example, when any one has displayed a very\ncharacteristic trait, there will rarely be wanting some one to say, \u201cFrom\nthat I know with whom I have to do.\u201d But it was original and very witty of\na man who was in love with a young bride to quote to the newly married\ncouple (I know not how loudly) the concluding words of Schiller\u2019s ballad,\n\u201cThe Surety:\u201d\n\n\n    \u201cLet me be, I pray you,\n    In your bond the third.\u201d\n\n\nThe effect of the ludicrous is here strong and inevitable, because under\nthe conceptions through which Schiller presents to the mind a moral and\nnoble relation, a forbidden and immoral relation is subsumed, and yet\ncorrectly and without change, thus is thought through it. In all the\nexamples of wit given here we find that under a conception, or in general\nan abstract thought, a real thing is, directly, or by means of a narrower\nconception, subsumed, which indeed, strictly speaking, comes under it, and\nyet is as different as possible from the proper and original intention and\ntendency of the thought. Accordingly wit, as a mental capacity, consists\nentirely in a facility for finding for every object that appears a\nconception under which it certainly can be thought, though it is very\ndifferent from all the other objects which come under this conception.\n\nThe second species of the ludicrous follows, as we have mentioned, the\nopposite path from the abstract conception to the real or perceptible\nthings thought through it. But this now brings to light any incongruity\nwith the conception which was overlooked, and hence arises an absurdity,\nand therefore in the practical sphere a foolish action. Since the play\nrequires action, this species of the ludicrous is essential to comedy.\nUpon this depends the observation of Voltaire: \u201c_J\u2019ai cru remarquer aux\nspectacles, qu\u2019il ne s\u2019\u00e9l\u00e8ve presque jamais de ces \u00e9clats de rire\nuniversels, qu\u2019\u00e0 l\u2019occasion d\u2019une_ M\u00c9PRISE\u201d (_Preface de L\u2019Enfant\nProdigue_). The following may serve as examples of this species of the\nludicrous. When some one had declared that he was fond of walking alone,\nan Austrian said to him: \u201cYou like walking alone; so do I: therefore we\ncan go together.\u201d He starts from the conception, \u201cA pleasure which two\nlove they can enjoy in common,\u201d and subsumes under it the very case which\nexcludes community. Further, the servant who rubbed a worn sealskin in his\nmaster\u2019s box with Macassar oil, so that it might become covered with hair\nagain; in doing which he started from the conception, \u201cMacassar oil makes\nhair grow.\u201d The soldiers in the guard-room who allowed a prisoner who was\nbrought in to join in their game of cards, then quarrelled with him for\ncheating, and turned him out. They let themselves be led by the general\nconception, \u201cBad companions are turned out,\u201d and forget that he is also a\nprisoner, _i.e._, one whom they ought to hold fast. Two young peasants had\nloaded their gun with coarse shot, which they wished to extract, in order\nto substitute fine, without losing the powder. So one of them put the\nmouth of the barrel in his hat, which he took between his legs, and said\nto the other: \u201cNow you pull the trigger slowly, slowly, slowly; then the\nshot will come first.\u201d He starts from the conception, \u201cProlonging the\ncause prolongs the effect.\u201d Most of the actions of Don Quixote are also\ncases in point, for he subsumes the realities he encounters under\nconceptions drawn from the romances of chivalry, from which they are very\ndifferent. For example, in order to support the oppressed he frees the\ngalley slaves. Properly all M\u00fcnchhausenisms are also of this nature, only\nthey are not actions which are performed, but impossibilities, which are\npassed off upon the hearer as having really happened. In them the fact is\nalways so conceived that when it is thought merely in the abstract, and\ntherefore comparatively _a priori_, it appears possible and plausible; but\nafterwards, if we come down to the perception of the particular case, thus\n_a posteriori_ the impossibility of the thing, indeed the absurdity of the\nassumption, is brought into prominence, and excites laughter through the\nevident incongruity of what is perceived and what is thought. For example,\nwhen the melodies frozen up in the post-horn are thawed in the warm\nroom\u2014when M\u00fcnchhausen, sitting upon a tree during a hard frost, draws up\nhis knife which has dropped to the ground by the frozen jet of his own\nwater, &c. Such is also the story of the two lions who broke down the\npartition between them during the night and devoured each other in their\nrage, so that in the morning there was nothing to be found but the two\ntails.\n\nThere are also cases of the ludicrous where the conception under which the\nperceptible facts are brought does not require to be expressed or\nsignified, but comes into consciousness itself through the association of\nideas. The laughter into which Garrick burst in the middle of playing\ntragedy because a butcher in the front of the pit, who had taken off his\nwig to wipe the sweat from his head, placed the wig for a while upon his\nlarge dog, who stood facing the stage with his fore paws resting on the\npit railings, was occasioned by the fact that Garrick started from the\nconception of a spectator, which was added in his own mind. This is the\nreason why certain animal forms, such as apes, kangaroos, jumping-hares,\n&c., sometimes appear to us ludicrous because something about them\nresembling man leads us to subsume them under the conception of the human\nform, and starting from this we perceive their incongruity with it.\n\nNow the conceptions whose observed incongruity with the perceptions moves\nus to laughter are either those of others or our own. In the first case we\nlaugh at others, in the second we feel a surprise, often agreeable, at the\nleast amusing. Therefore children and uneducated people laugh at the most\ntrifling things, even at misfortunes, if they were unexpected, and thus\nconvicted their preconceived conception of error. As a rule laughing is a\npleasant condition; accordingly the apprehension of the incongruity\nbetween what is thought and what is perceived, that is, the real, gives us\npleasure, and we give ourselves up gladly to the spasmodic convulsions\nwhich this apprehension excites. The reason of this is as follows. In\nevery suddenly appearing conflict between what is perceived and what is\nthought, what is perceived is always unquestionably right; for it is not\nsubject to error at all, requires no confirmation from without, but\nanswers for itself. Its conflict with what is thought springs ultimately\nfrom the fact that the latter, with its abstract conceptions, cannot get\ndown to the infinite multifariousness and fine shades of difference of the\nconcrete. This victory of knowledge of perception over thought affords us\npleasure. For perception is the original kind of knowledge inseparable\nfrom animal nature, in which everything that gives direct satisfaction to\nthe will presents itself. It is the medium of the present, of enjoyment\nand gaiety; moreover it is attended with no exertion. With thinking the\nopposite is the case; it is the second power of knowledge, the exercise of\nwhich always demands some, and often considerable, exertion. Besides, it\nis the conceptions of thought that often oppose the gratification of our\nimmediate desires, for, as the medium of the past, the future, and of\nseriousness, they are the vehicle of our fears, our repentance, and all\nour cares. It must therefore be diverting to us to see this strict,\nuntiring, troublesome governess, the reason, for once convicted of\ninsufficiency. On this account then the mien or appearance of laughter is\nvery closely related to that of joy.\n\nOn account of the want of reason, thus of general conceptions, the brute\nis incapable of laughter, as of speech. This is therefore a prerogative\nand characteristic mark of man. Yet it may be remarked in passing that his\none friend the dog has an analogous characteristic action peculiar to him\nalone in distinction from all other brutes, the very expressive, kindly,\nand thoroughly honest fawning and wagging of its tail. But how favourably\ndoes this salutation given him by nature compare with the bows and\nsimpering civilities of men. At least for the present, it is a thousand\ntimes more reliable than their assurance of inward friendship and\ndevotion.\n\nThe opposite of laughing and joking is _seriousness_. Accordingly it\nconsists in the consciousness of the perfect agreement and congruity of\nthe conception, or thought, with what is perceived, or the reality. The\nserious man is convinced that he thinks the things as they are, and that\nthey are as he thinks them. This is just why the transition from profound\nseriousness to laughter is so easy, and can be effected by trifles. For\nthe more perfect that agreement assumed by seriousness may seem to be, the\nmore easily is it destroyed by the unexpected discovery of even a slight\nincongruity. Therefore the more a man is capable of entire seriousness,\nthe more heartily can he laugh. Men whose laughter is always affected and\nforced are intellectually and morally of little worth; and in general the\nway of laughing, and, on the other hand, the occasions of it, are very\ncharacteristic of the person. That the relations of the sexes afford the\neasiest materials for jokes always ready to hand and within the reach of\nthe weakest wit, as is proved by the abundance of obscene jests, could not\nbe if it were not that the deepest seriousness lies at their foundation.\n\nThat the laughter of others at what we do or say seriously offends us so\nkeenly depends on the fact that it asserts that there is a great\nincongruity between our conceptions and the objective realities. For the\nsame reason, the predicate \u201cludicrous\u201d or \u201cabsurd\u201d is insulting. The laugh\nof scorn announces with triumph to the baffled adversary how incongruous\nwere the conceptions he cherished with the reality which is now revealing\nitself to him. Our own bitter laughter at the fearful disclosure of the\ntruth through which our firmly cherished expectations are proved to be\ndelusive is the active expression of the discovery now made of the\nincongruity between the thoughts which, in our foolish confidence in man\nor fate, we entertained, and the truth which is now unveiled.\n\nThe _intentionally_ ludicrous is the _joke_. It is the effort to bring\nabout a discrepancy between the conceptions of another and the reality by\ndisarranging one of the two; while its opposite, _seriousness_, consists\nin the exact conformity of the two to each other, which is at least aimed\nat. But if now the joke is concealed behind seriousness, then we have\n_irony_. For example, if with apparent seriousness we acquiesce in the\nopinions of another which are the opposite of our own, and pretend to\nshare them with him, till at last the result perplexes him both as to us\nand them. This is the attitude of Socrates as opposed to Hippias,\nProtagoras, Gorgias, and other sophists, and indeed often to his\ncollocutors in general. The converse of irony is accordingly seriousness\nconcealed behind a joke, and this is _humour_. It might be called the\ndouble counterpoint of irony. Explanations such as \u201cHumour is the\ninterpenetration of the finite and the infinite\u201d express nothing more than\nthe entire incapacity for thought of those who are satisfied with such\nempty phrases. Irony is objective, that is, intended for another; but\nhumour is subjective, that is, it primarily exists only for one\u2019s own\nself. Accordingly we find the masterpieces of irony among the ancients,\nbut those of humour among the moderns. For, more closely considered,\nhumour depends upon a subjective, yet serious and sublime mood, which is\ninvoluntarily in conflict with a common external world very different from\nitself, which it cannot escape from and to which it will not give itself\nup; therefore, as an accommodation, it tries to think its own point of\nview and that external world through the same conceptions, and thus a\ndouble incongruity arises, sometimes on the one side, sometimes on the\nother, between these concepts and the realities thought through them.\nHence the impression of the intentionally ludicrous, thus of the joke, is\nproduced, behind which, however, the deepest seriousness is concealed and\nshines through. Irony begins with a serious air and ends with a smile;\nwith humour the order is reversed. The words of Mercutio quoted above may\nserve as an example of humour. Also in \u201cHamlet\u201d\u2014_Polonius_: \u201cMy honourable\nlord, I will most humbly take my leave of you. _Hamlet_: You cannot, sir,\ntake from me anything that I will more willingly part withal, except my\nlife, except my life, except my life.\u201d Again, before the introduction of\nthe play at court, Hamlet says to Ophelia: \u201cWhat should a man do but be\nmerry? for, look you, how cheerfully my mother looks, and my father died\nwithin these two hours. _Ophelia_: Nay, \u2019tis twice two months, my lord.\n_Hamlet_: So long? Nay, then let the devil wear black, for I\u2019ll have a\nsuit of sables.\u201d\n\nAgain, in Jean Paul\u2019s \u201cTitan,\u201d when Schoppe, melancholy and now brooding\nover himself, frequently looking at his hands, says to himself, \u201cThere\nsits a lord in bodily reality, and I in him; but who is such?\u201d Heinrich\nHeine appears as a true humourist in his \u201c_Romancero_.\u201d Behind all his\njokes and drollery we discern a profound seriousness, which is ashamed to\nappear unveiled. Accordingly humour depends upon a special kind of mood or\ntemper (German, _Laune_, probably from _Luna_) through which conception in\nall its modifications, a decided predominance of the subjective over the\nobjective in the apprehension of the external world, is thought. Moreover,\nevery poetical or artistic presentation of a comical, or indeed even a\nfarcical scene, through which a serious thought yet glimmers as its\nconcealed background, is a production of humour, thus is humorous. Such,\nfor example, is a coloured drawing of Tischbein\u2019s, which represents an\nempty room, lighted only by the blazing fire in the grate. Before the fire\nstands a man with his coat off, in such a position that his shadow, going\nout from his feet, stretches across the whole room. Tischbein comments\nthus on the drawing: \u201cThis is a man who has succeeded in nothing in the\nworld, and who has made nothing of it; now he rejoices that he can throw\nsuch a large shadow.\u201d Now, if I had to express the seriousness that lies\nconcealed behind this jest, I could best do so by means of the following\nverse taken from the Persian poem of Anwari Soheili:\u2014\n\n\n    \u201cIf thou hast lost possession of a world,\n      Be not distressed, for it is nought;\n    Or hast thou gained possession of a world,\n      Be not o\u2019erjoyed, for it is nought.\n    Our pains, our gains, all pass away;\n      Get thee beyond the world, for it is nought.\u201d\n\n\nThat at the present day the word humorous is generally used in German\nliterature in the sense of comical arises from the miserable desire to\ngive things a more distinguished name than belongs to them, the name of a\nclass that stands above them. Thus every inn must be called a hotel, every\nmoney-changer a banker, every concert a musical academy, the merchant\u2019s\ncounting-house a bureau, the potter an artist in clay, and therefore also\nevery clown a humourist. The word _humour_ is borrowed from the English to\ndenote a quite peculiar species of the ludicrous, which indeed, as was\nsaid above, is related to the sublime, and which was first remarked by\nthem. But it is not intended to be used as the title for all kinds of\njokes and buffoonery, as is now universally the case in Germany, without\nopposition from men of letters and scholars; for the true conception of\nthat modification, that tendency of the mind, that child of the sublime\nand the ridiculous, would be too subtle and too high for their public, to\nplease which they take pains to make everything flat and vulgar. Well,\n\u201chigh words and a low meaning\u201d is in general the motto of the noble\npresent, and accordingly now-a-days he is called a humourist who was\nformerly, called a buffoon.\n\n\n\nChapter IX.(21) On Logic In General.\n\n\nLogic, Dialectic, and Rhetoric go together, because they make up the whole\nof a _technic of reason_, and under this title they ought also to be\ntaught\u2014Logic as the technic of our own thinking, Dialectic of disputing\nwith others, and Rhetoric of speaking to many (_concionatio_); thus\ncorresponding to the singular, dual, and plural, and to the monologue, the\ndialogue, and the panegyric.\n\nUnder Dialectic I understand, in agreement with Aristotle (_Metaph._, iii.\n2, and _Analyt. Post._, i. 11), the art of conversation directed to the\nmutual investigation of truth, especially philosophical truth. But a\nconversation of this kind necessarily passes more or less into\ncontroversy; therefore dialectic may also be explained as the art of\ndisputation. We have examples and patterns of dialectic in the Platonic\ndialogues; but for the special theory of it, thus for the technical rules\nof disputation, eristics, very little has hitherto been accomplished. I\nhave worked out an attempt of the kind, and given an example of it, in the\nsecond volume of the \u201cParerga,\u201d therefore I shall pass over the exposition\nof this science altogether here.\n\nIn Rhetoric the rhetorical figures are very much what the syllogistic\nfigures are in Logic; at all events they are worth considering. In\nAristotle\u2019s time they seem to have not yet become the object of\ntheoretical investigation, for he does not treat of them in any of his\nrhetorics, and in this reference we are referred to Rutilius Lupus, the\nepitomiser of a later Gorgias.\n\nAll the three sciences have this in common, that without having learned\nthem we follow their rules, which indeed are themselves first abstracted\nfrom this natural employment of them. Therefore, although they are of\ngreat theoretical interest, they are of little practical use; partly\nbecause, though they certainly give the rule, they do not give the case of\nits application; partly because in practice there is generally no time to\nrecollect the rules. Thus they teach only what every one already knows and\npractises of his own accord; but yet the abstract knowledge of this is\ninteresting and important. Logic will not easily have a practical value,\nat least for our own thinking. For the errors of our own reasoning\nscarcely ever lie in the inferences nor otherwise in the form, but in the\njudgments, thus in the matter of thought. In controversy, on the other\nhand, we can sometimes derive some practical use from logic, by taking the\nmore or less intentionally deceptive argument of our opponent, which he\nadvances under the garb and cover of continuous speech, and referring it\nto the strict form of regular syllogisms, and thus convicting it of\nlogical errors; for example, simple conversion of universal affirmative\njudgments, syllogisms with four terms, inferences from the consequent to\nthe reason, syllogisms in the second figure with merely affirmative\npremisses, and many such.\n\nIt seems to me that the doctrine of the laws of thought might be\nsimplified if we were only to set up two, the law of excluded middle and\nthat of sufficient reason. The former thus: \u201cEvery predicate can either be\naffirmed or denied of every subject.\u201d Here it is already contained in the\n\u201ceither, or\u201d that both cannot occur at once, and consequently just what is\nexpressed by the laws of identity and contradiction. Thus these would be\nadded as corollaries of that principle which really says that every two\nconcept-spheres must be thought either as united or as separated, but\nnever as both at once; and therefore, even although words are brought\ntogether which express the latter, these words assert a process of thought\nwhich cannot be carried out. The consciousness of this infeasibility is\nthe feeling of contradiction. The second law of thought, the principle of\nsufficient reason, would affirm that the above attributing or denying must\nbe determined by something different from the judgment itself, which may\nbe a (pure or empirical) perception, or merely another judgment. This\nother and different thing is then called the ground or reason of the\njudgment. So far as a judgment satisfies the first law of thought, it is\nthinkable; so far as it satisfies the second, it is true, or at least in\nthe case in which the ground of a judgment is only another judgment it is\nlogically or formally true. But, finally, material or absolute truth is\nalways the relation between a judgment and a perception, thus between the\nabstract and the concrete or perceptible idea. This is either an immediate\nrelation or it is brought about by means of other judgments, _i.e._,\nthrough other abstract ideas. From this it is easy to see that one truth\ncan never overthrow another, but all must ultimately agree; because in the\nconcrete or perceptible, which is their common foundation, no\ncontradiction is possible. Therefore no truth has anything to fear from\nother truths. Illusion and error have to fear every truth, because through\nthe logical connection of all truths even the most distant must some time\nstrike its blow at every error. This second law of thought is therefore\nthe connecting link between logic and what is no longer logic, but the\nmatter of thought. Consequently the agreement of the conceptions, thus of\nthe abstract idea with what is given in the perceptible idea, is, on the\nside of the object _truth_, and on the side of the subject _knowledge_.\n\nTo express the union or separation of two concept-spheres referred to\nabove is the work of the copula, \u201cis\u2014is not.\u201d Through this every verb can\nbe expressed by means of its participle. Therefore all judging consists in\nthe use of a verb, and _vice vers\u00e2_. Accordingly the significance of the\ncopula is that the predicate is to be thought in the subject, nothing\nmore. Now, consider what the content of the infinitive of the copula \u201cto\nbe\u201d amounts to. But this is a principal theme of the professors of\nphilosophy of the present time. However, we must not be too strict with\nthem; most of them wish to express by it nothing but material things, the\ncorporeal world, to which, as perfectly innocent realists at the bottom of\ntheir hearts, they attribute the highest reality. To speak, however, of\nthe bodies so directly appears to them too vulgar; and therefore they say\n\u201cbeing,\u201d which they think sounds better, and think in connection with it\nthe tables and chairs standing before them.\n\n\u201cFor, because, why, therefore, thus, since, although, indeed, yet, but,\nif, then, either, or,\u201d and more like these, are properly _logical\nparticles_, for their only end is to express the form of the thought\nprocesses. They are therefore a valuable possession of a language, and do\nnot belong to all in equal numbers. Thus \u201c_zwar_\u201d (the contracted \u201c_es ist\nwahr_\u201d) seems to belong exclusively to the German language. It is always\nconnected with an \u201c_aber_\u201d which follows or is added in thought, as \u201cif\u201d\nis connected with \u201cthen.\u201d\n\nThe logical rule that, as regards quantity, singular judgments, that is,\njudgments which have a singular conception (_notio singularis_) for their\nsubject, are to be treated as _universal judgments_, depends upon the\ncircumstance that they are in fact universal judgments, which have merely\nthe peculiarity that their subject is a conception which can only be\nsupported by a single real object, and therefore only contains a single\nreal object under it; as when the conception is denoted by a proper name.\nThis, however, has really only to be considered when we proceed from the\nabstract idea to the concrete or perceptible, thus seek to realise the\nconceptions. In thinking itself, in operating with judgments, this makes\nno difference, simply because between singular and universal conceptions\nthere is no logical difference. \u201cImmanuel Kant\u201d signifies logically,\n\u201c_all_ Immanuel Kant.\u201d Accordingly the quantity of judgments is really\nonly of two kinds\u2014universal and particular. An _individual idea_ cannot be\nthe subject of a judgment, because it is not an abstraction, it is not\nsomething thought, but something perceived. Every conception, on the other\nhand, is essentially universal, and every judgment must have a\n_conception_ as its subject.\n\nThe difference between _particular judgments_ (_propositiones\nparticulares_) and _universal judgments_ often depends merely on the\nexternal and contingent circumstance that the language has no word to\nexpress by itself the part that is here to be separated from the general\nconception which forms the subject of such a judgment. If there were such\na word many a particular judgment would be universal. For example, the\nparticular judgment, \u201cSome trees bear gall-nuts,\u201d becomes a universal\njudgment, because for this part of the conception, \u201ctree,\u201d we have a\nspecial word, \u201cAll oaks bear gall-nuts.\u201d In the same way is the judgment,\n\u201cSome men are black,\u201d related to the judgment, \u201cAll negroes are black.\u201d Or\nelse this difference depends upon the fact that in the mind of him who\njudges the conception which he makes the subject of the particular\njudgment has not become clearly separated from the general conception as a\npart of which he defines it; otherwise he could have expressed a universal\ninstead of a particular judgment. For example, instead of the judgment,\n\u201cSome ruminants have upper incisors,\u201d this, \u201cAll unhorned ruminants have\nupper incisors.\u201d\n\nThe _hypothetical and disjunctive judgments_ are assertions as to the\nrelation of two (in the case of the disjunctive judgment even several)\ncategorical judgments to each other. The _hypothetical judgment_ asserts\nthat the truth of the second of the two categorical judgments here linked\ntogether depends upon the truth of the first, and the falseness of the\nfirst depends upon the falseness of the second; thus that these two\npropositions stand in direct community as regards truth and falseness. The\n_disjunctive judgment_, on the other hand, asserts that upon the truth of\none of the categorical judgments here linked together depends the\nfalseness of the others, and conversely; thus that these propositions are\nin conflict as regards truth and falseness. The _question_ is a judgment,\none of whose three parts is left open: thus either the copula, \u201cIs Caius a\nRoman\u2014or not?\u201d or the predicate, \u201cIs Caius a Roman\u2014or something else?\u201d or\nthe subject, \u201cIs Caius a Roman\u2014or is it some one else who is a Roman?\u201d The\nplace of the conception which is left open may also remain quite empty;\nfor example, \u201cWhat is Caius?\u201d\u2014\u201cWho is a Roman?\u201d\n\nThe \u03b5\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03b7, inductio, is with Aristotle the opposite of the \u03b1\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03b7. The\nlatter proves a proposition to be false by showing that what would follow\nfrom it is not true; thus by the _instantia in contrarium_. The \u03b5\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03b7,\non the other hand, proves the truth of a proposition by showing that what\nwould follow from it is true. Thus it leads by means of examples to our\naccepting something while the \u03b1\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03b7 leads to our rejecting it. Therefore\nthe \u03b5\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03b7, or induction, is an inference from the consequents to the\nreason, and indeed _modo ponente_; for from many cases it establishes the\nrule, from which these cases then in their turn follow. On this account it\nis never perfectly certain, but at the most arrives at very great\nprobability. However, this _formal_ uncertainty may yet leave room for\n_material_ certainty through the number of the sequences observed; in the\nsame way as in mathematics the irrational relations are brought infinitely\nnear to rationality by means of decimal fractions. The \u03b1\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03b7, on the\ncontrary, is primarily an inference from the reason to the consequents,\nthough it is afterwards carried out _modo tollente_, in that it proves the\nnon-existence of a necessary consequent, and thereby destroys the truth of\nthe assumed reason. On this account it is always perfectly certain, and\naccomplishes more by a single example _in contrarium_ than the induction\ndoes by innumerable examples in favour of the proposition propounded. So\nmuch easier is it to refute than to prove, to overthrow than to establish.\n\n\n\nChapter X. On The Syllogism.\n\n\nAlthough it is very hard to establish a new and correct view of a subject\nwhich for more than two thousand years has been handled by innumerable\nwriters, and which, moreover, does not receive additions through the\ngrowth of experience, yet this must not deter me from presenting to the\nthinker for examination the following attempt of this kind.\n\nAn inference is that operation of our reason by virtue of which, through\nthe comparison of two judgments a third judgment arises, without the\nassistance of any knowledge otherwise obtained. The condition of this is\nthat these two judgments have _one_ conception in common, for otherwise\nthey are foreign to each other and have no community. But under this\ncondition they become the father and mother of a child that contains in\nitself something of both. Moreover, this operation is no arbitrary act,\nbut an act of the reason, which, when it has considered such judgments,\nperforms it of itself according to its own laws. So far it is objective,\nnot subjective, and therefore subject to the strictest rules.\n\nWe may ask in passing whether he who draws an inference really learns\nsomething new from the new proposition, something previously unknown to\nhim? Not absolutely; but yet to a certain extent he does. What he learns\nlay in what he knew: thus he knew it also, but he did not know that he\nknew it; which is as if he had something, but did not know that he had it,\nand this is just the same as if he had it not. He knew it only\n_implicite_, now he knows it _explicite_; but this distinction may be so\ngreat that the conclusion appears to him a new truth. For example:\n\n\n    All diamonds are stones;\n    All diamonds are combustible:\n    Therefore some stones are combustible.\n\n\nThe nature of inference consequently consists in this, that we bring it to\ndistinct consciousness that we have already thought in the premisses what\nis asserted in the conclusion. It is therefore a means of becoming more\ndistinctly conscious of one\u2019s own knowledge, of learning more fully, or\nbecoming aware of what one knows. The knowledge which is afforded by the\nconclusion was _latent_, and therefore had just as little effect as latent\nheat has on the thermometer. Whoever has salt has also chlorine; but it is\nas if he had it not, for it can only act as chlorine if it is chemically\nevolved; thus only, then, does he really possess it. It is the same with\nthe gain which a mere conclusion from already known premisses affords: a\npreviously _bound or latent knowledge_ is thereby set _free_. These\ncomparisons may indeed seem to be somewhat strained, but yet they really\nare not. For because we draw many of the possible inferences from our\nknowledge very soon, very rapidly, and without formality, and therefore\nhave no distinct recollection of them, it seems to us as if no premisses\nfor possible conclusions remained long stored up unused, but as if we\nalready had also conclusions prepared for all the premisses within reach\nof our knowledge. But this is not always the case; on the contrary, two\npremisses may have for a long time an isolated existence in the same mind,\ntill at last some occasion brings them together, and then the conclusion\nsuddenly appears, as the spark comes from the steel and the stone only\nwhen they are struck together. In reality the premisses assumed from\nwithout, both for theoretical insight and for motives, which bring about\nresolves, often lie for a long time in us, and become, partly through\nhalf-conscious, and even inarticulate, processes of thought, compared with\nthe rest of our stock of knowledge, reflected upon, and, as it were,\nshaken up together, till at last the right major finds the right minor,\nand these immediately take up their proper places, and at once the\nconclusion exists as a light that has suddenly arisen for us, without any\naction on our part, as if it were an inspiration; for we cannot comprehend\nhow we and others have so long been in ignorance of it. It is true that in\na happily organised mind this process goes on more quickly and easily than\nin ordinary minds; and just because it is carried on spontaneously and\nwithout distinct consciousness it cannot be learned. Therefore Goethe\nsays: \u201cHow easy anything is he knows who has discovered it, he knows who\nhas attained to it.\u201d As an illustration of the process of thought here\ndescribed we may compare it to those padlocks which consist of rings with\nletters; hanging on the box of a travelling carriage, they are shaken so\nlong that at last the letters of the word come together in their order and\nthe lock opens. For the rest, we must also remember that the syllogism\nconsists in the process of thought itself, and the words and propositions\nthrough which it is expressed only indicate the traces it has left behind\nit\u2014they are related to it as the sound-figures of sand are related to the\nnotes whose vibrations they express. When we reflect upon something, we\ncollect our data, reduce them to judgments, which are all quickly brought\ntogether and compared, and thereby the conclusions which it is possible to\ndraw from them are instantly arrived at by means of the use of all the\nthree syllogistic figures. Yet on account of the great rapidity of this\noperation only a few words are used, and sometimes none at all, and only\nthe conclusion is formally expressed. Thus it sometimes happens that\nbecause in this way, or even merely intuitively, _i.e._, by a happy\n_apper\u00e7u_, we have brought some new truth to consciousness, we now treat\nit as a conclusion and seek premisses for it, that is, we desire to prove\nit, for as a rule knowledge exists earlier than its proofs. We then go\nthrough our stock of knowledge in order to see whether we can find some\ntruth in it in which the newly discovered truth was already implicitly\ncontained, or two propositions which would give this as a result if they\nwere brought together according to rule. On the other hand, every judicial\nproceeding affords a most complete and imposing syllogism, a syllogism in\nthe first figure. The civil or criminal transgression complained of is the\nminor; it is established by the prosecutor. The law applicable to the case\nis the major. The judgment is the conclusion, which therefore, as\nsomething necessary, is \u201cmerely recognised\u201d by the judge.\n\nBut now I shall attempt to give the simplest and most correct exposition\nof the peculiar mechanism of inference.\n\n_Judging_, this elementary and most important process of thought, consists\nin the comparison of two _conceptions_; _inference_ in the comparison of\ntwo _judgments_. Yet ordinarily in text-books inference is also referred\nto the comparison of conceptions, though of _three_, because from the\nrelation which two of these conceptions have to a third their relation to\neach other may be known. Truth cannot be denied to this view also; and\nsince it affords opportunity for the perceptible demonstration of\nsyllogistic relations by means of drawn concept-spheres, a method approved\nof by me in the text, it has the advantage of making the matter easily\ncomprehensible. But it seems to me that here, as in so many cases,\ncomprehensibility is attained at the cost of thoroughness. The real\nprocess of thought in inference, with which the three syllogistic figures\nand their necessity precisely agree, is not thus recognised. In inference\nwe operate _not_ with mere _conceptions_ but with whole _judgments_, to\nwhich quality, which lies only in the copula and not in the conceptions,\nand also quantity are absolutely essential, and indeed we have further to\nadd modality. That exposition of inference as a relation of _three\nconceptions_ fails in this, that it at once resolves the judgments into\ntheir ultimate elements (the conceptions), and thus the means of combining\nthese is lost, and that which is peculiar to the judgments as such and in\ntheir completeness, which is just what constitutes the necessity of the\nconclusion which follows from them, is lost sight of. It thus falls into\nan error analogous to that which organic chemistry would commit if, for\nexample, in the analysis of plants it were at once to reduce them to their\n_ultimate_ elements, when it would find in all plants carbon, hydrogen,\nand oxygen, but would lose the specific differences, to obtain which it is\nnecessary to stop at their more special elements, the so-called alkaloids,\nand to take care to analyse these in their turn. From three given\nconceptions no conclusion can as yet be drawn. It may certainly be said:\nthe relation of two of them to the third must be given with them. But it\nis just the _judgments_ which combine these conceptions, that are the\nexpression of this relation; thus _judgments_, not mere _conceptions_, are\nthe material of the inference. Accordingly inference is essentially a\ncomparison of two _judgments_. The process of thought in our mind is\nconcerned with these and the thoughts expressed by them, not merely with\nthree conceptions. This is the case even when this process is imperfectly\nor not at all expressed in words; and it is as such, as a bringing\ntogether of the complete and unanalysed judgments, that we must consider\nit in order properly to understand the technical procedure of inference.\nFrom this there will then also follow the necessity for three really\nrational syllogistic figures.\n\nAs in the exposition of syllogistic reasoning by means of\n_concept-spheres_ these are presented to the mind under the form of\ncircles, so in the exposition by means of entire judgments we have to\nthink these under the form of rods, which, for the purpose of comparison,\nare held together now by one end, now by the other. The different ways in\nwhich this can take place give the three figures. Since now every premiss\ncontains its subject and its predicate, these two conceptions are to be\nimagined as situated at the two ends of each rod. The two judgments are\nnow compared with reference to the two _different_ conceptions in them;\nfor, as has already been said, the third conception must be the same in\nboth, and is therefore subject to no comparison, but is that _with which_,\nthat is, in reference to which, the other two are compared; it is the\n_middle_. The latter is accordingly always only the means and not the\nchief concern. The two different conceptions, on the other hand, are the\nsubject of reflection, and to find out their relation to each other by\nmeans of the judgments in which they are contained is the aim of the\nsyllogism. Therefore the conclusion speaks only of them, not of the\nmiddle, which was only a means, a measuring rod, which we let fall as soon\nas it has served its end. Now if this conception which is _identical_ in\nboth propositions, thus the middle, is the subject of _one_ premiss, the\nconception to be compared with it must be the predicate, and conversely.\nHere at once is established _a priori_ the possibility of three cases;\neither the subject of one premiss is compared with the predicate of the\nother, or the subject of the one with the subject of the other, or,\nfinally, the predicate of the one with the predicate of the other. Hence\narise the three syllogistic figures of Aristotle; the fourth, which was\nadded somewhat impertinently, is ungenuine and a spurious form. It is\nattributed to Galenus, but this rests only on Arabian authority. Each of\nthe three figures exhibits a perfectly different, correct, and natural\nthought-process of the reason in inference.\n\nIf in the two judgments to be compared the relation between the _predicate\nof the one and the subject of the other_ is the object of the comparison,\nthe _first figure_ appears. This figure alone has the advantage that the\nconceptions which in the conclusion are subject and predicate both appear\nalready in the same character in the premisses; while in the two other\nfigures one of them must always change its roll in the conclusion. But\nthus in the first figure the result is always less novel and surprising\nthan in the other two. Now this advantage in the first figure is obtained\nby the fact that the predicate of the major is compared with the subject\nof the minor, but not conversely, which is therefore here essential, and\ninvolves that the middle should assume both the positions, _i.e._, it is\nthe subject in the major and the predicate in the minor. And from this\nagain arises its subordinate significance, for it appears as a mere weight\nwhich we lay at pleasure now in one scale and now in the other. The course\nof thought in this figure is, that the predicate of the major is\nattributed to the subject of the minor, because the subject of the major\nis the predicate of the minor, or, in the negative case, the converse\nholds for the same reason. Thus here a property is attributed to the\nthings thought through a conception, because it depends upon another\nproperty which we already know they possess; or conversely. Therefore here\nthe guiding principle is: _Nota not\u00e6 est nota rei ipsius, et repugnans\nnot\u00e6 repugnat rei ipsi_.\n\nIf, on the other hand, we compare two judgments with the intention of\nbringing out the relation which the _subjects of both_ may have to each\nother, we must take as the common measure their predicate. This will\naccordingly be here the middle, and must therefore be the same in both\njudgments. Hence arises the _second figure_. In it the relation of two\nsubjects to each other is determined by that which they have as their\ncommon predicate. But this relation can only have significance if the same\npredicate is attributed to the one subject and denied of the other, for\nthus it becomes an essential ground of distinction between the two. For if\nit were attributed to both the subjects this could decide nothing as to\ntheir relation to each other, for almost every predicate belongs to\ninnumerable subjects. Still less would it decide this relation if the\npredicate were denied of both the subjects. From this follows the\nfundamental characteristic of the second figure, that the premisses must\nbe of _opposite quality_; the one must affirm and the other deny.\nTherefore here the principal rule is: _Sit altera negans_; the corollary\nof which is: _E meris affirmativis nihil sequitur_; a rule which is\nsometimes transgressed in a loose argument obscured by many parenthetical\npropositions. The course of thought which this figure exhibits distinctly\nappears from what has been said. It is the investigation of two kinds of\nthings with the view of distinguishing them, thus of establishing that\nthey are _not_ of the same species; which is here decided by showing that\na certain property is essential to the one kind, which the other lacks.\nThat this course of thought assumes the second figure of its own accord,\nand expresses itself clearly only in it, will be shown by an example:\n\n\n    All fishes have cold blood;\n    No whale has cold blood:\n    Thus no whale is a fish.\n\n\nIn the first figure, on the other hand, this thought exhibits itself in a\nweak, forced, and ultimately patched-up form:\n\n\n    Nothing that has cold blood is a whale;\n    All fishes have cold blood:\n    Thus no fish is a whale,\n    And consequently no whale is a fish.\n\n\nTake also an example with an affirmative minor:\n\n\n    No Mohamedan is a Jew;\n    Some Turks are Jews:\n    Therefore some Turks are not Mohamedans.\n\n\nAs the guiding principle for this figure I therefore give, for the mood\nwith the negative minor: _Cui repugnat nota, etiam repugnat notatum_; and\nfor the mood with the affirmative minor: _Notato repugnat id cui nota\nrepugnat_. Translated these may be thus combined: Two subjects which stand\nin opposite relations to one predicate have a negative relation to each\nother.\n\nThe third case is that in which we place two judgments together in order\nto investigate the relation of their _predicates_. Hence arises the _third\nfigure_, in which accordingly the middle appears in both premisses as the\nsubject. It is also here the _tertium comparationis_, the measure which is\napplied to both the conceptions which are to be investigated, or, as it\nwere, a chemical reagent, with which we test them both in order to learn\nfrom their relation to it what relation exists between themselves. Thus,\nthen, the conclusion declares whether a relation of subject and predicate\nexists between the two, and to what extent this is the case. Accordingly,\nwhat exhibits itself in this figure is reflection concerning two\nproperties which we are inclined to regard either as _incompatible_, or\nelse as _inseparable_, and in order to decide this we attempt to make them\nthe predicates of one subject in two judgments. From this it results\neither that both properties belong to the same thing, consequently their\n_compatibility_, or else that a thing has the one but not the other,\nconsequently their _separableness_. The former in all moods with two\naffirmative premisses, the latter in all moods with one negative; for\nexample:\n\n\n    Some brutes can speak;\n    All brutes are irrational:\n    Therefore some irrational beings can speak.\n\n\nAccording to Kant (_Die Falsche Spitzfinigkeit_, \u00a7 4) this inference would\nonly be conclusive if we added in thought: \u201cTherefore some irrational\nbeings are brutes.\u201d But this seems to be here quite superfluous and by no\nmeans the natural process of thought. But in order to carry out the same\nprocess of thought directly by means of the first figure I must say:\n\n\n    \u201cAll brutes are irrational;\n    Some beings that can speak are brutes,\u201d\n\n\nwhich is clearly not the natural course of thought; indeed the conclusion\nwhich would then follow, \u201cSome beings that can speak are irrational,\u201d\nwould have to be converted in order to preserve the conclusion which the\nthird figure gives of itself, and at which the whole course of thought has\naimed. Let us take another example:\n\n\n    All alkalis float in water;\n    All alkalis are metals:\n    Therefore some metals float in water.\n\n\n                 [Alkalis and Metals overlapping circles]\n\n                                 Figure 1\n\n\n              [Metals circle with Alkalis circle inside it]\n\n                                 Figure 2\n\n\nWhen this is transposed into the first figure the minor must be converted,\nand thus runs: \u201cSome metals are alkalis.\u201d It therefore merely asserts that\nsome metals lie in the sphere \u201calkalis,\u201d thus [Figure 1], while our actual\nknowledge is that all alkalis lie in the sphere \u201cmetals,\u201d thus [Figure 2]:\nIt follows that if the first figure is to be regarded as the only normal\none, in order to think naturally we would have to think less than we know,\nand to think indefinitely while we know definitely. This assumption has\ntoo much against it. Thus in general it must be denied that when we draw\ninferences in the second and third figures we tacitly convert a\nproposition. On the contrary, the third, and also the second, figure\nexhibits just as rational a process of thought as the first. Let us now\nconsider another example of the other class of the third figure, in which\nthe separableness of two predicates is the result; on account of which one\npremiss must here be negative:\n\n\n    No Buddhist believes in a God;\n    Some Buddhists are rational:\n    Therefore some rational beings do not believe in a God.\n\n\nAs in the examples given above the _compatibility_ of two properties is\nthe problem of reflection, now their _separableness_ is its problem, which\nhere also must be decided by comparing them with _one_ subject and showing\nthat _one_ of them is present in it without the _other_. Thus the end is\ndirectly attained, while by means of the first figure it could only be\nattained indirectly. For in order to reduce the syllogism to the first\nfigure we must convert the minor, and therefore say: \u201cSome rational beings\nare Buddhists,\u201d which would be only a faulty expression of its meaning,\nwhich really is: \u201cSome Buddhists are yet certainly rational.\u201d\n\nAs the guiding principle of this figure I therefore give: for the\naffirmative moods: _Ejusdem rei not\u0153, modo sit altera universalis, sibi\ninvicem sunt not\u0153 particulares_; and for the negative moods: _Nota rei\ncompetens, not\u0153 eidem repugnanti, particulariter repugnat, modo sit altera\nuniversalis_. Translated: If two predicates are affirmed of one subject,\nand at least one of them universally, they are also affirmed of each other\nparticularly; and, on the contrary, they are denied of each other\nparticularly whenever one of them contradicts the subject of which the\nother is affirmed; provided always that either the contradiction or the\naffirmation be universal.\n\nIn the _fourth figure_ the subject of the major has to be compared with\nthe predicate of the minor; but in the conclusion they must both exchange\ntheir value and position, so that what was the subject of the major\nappears as the predicate of the conclusion, and what was the predicate of\nthe minor appears as the subject of the conclusion. By this it becomes\napparent that this figure is merely the _first_, wilfully turned upside\ndown, and by no means the expression of a real process of thought natural\nto the reason.\n\nOn the other hand, the first three figures are the ectypes of three real\nand essentially different operations of thought. They have this in common,\nthat they consist in the comparison of two judgments; but such a\ncomparison only becomes fruitful when these judgments have _one_\nconception in common. If we present the premisses to our imagination under\nthe sensible form of two rods, we can think of this conception as a clasp\nthat links them to each other; indeed in lecturing one might provide\noneself with such rods. On the other hand, the three figures are\ndistinguished by this, that those judgments are compared either with\nreference to the subjects of both, or to the predicates of both, or\nlastly, with reference to the subject of the one and the predicate of the\nother. Since now every conception has the property of being subject or\npredicate only because it is already part of a judgment, this confirms my\nview that in the syllogism only judgments are primarily compared, and\nconceptions only because they are parts of judgments. In the comparison of\ntwo judgments, however, the essential question is, in _respect of what_\nare they compared? not _by what means_ are they compared? The former\nconsists of the concepts which are different in the two judgments; the\nlatter consists of the middle, that is, the conception which is identical\nin both. It is therefore not the right point of view which Lambert, and\nindeed really Aristotle, and almost all the moderns have taken in starting\nfrom the _middle_ in the analysis of syllogisms, and making it the\nprincipal matter and its position the essential characteristic of the\nsyllogisms. On the contrary, its role is only secondary, and its position\na consequence of the logical value of the conceptions which are really to\nbe compared in the syllogism. These may be compared to two substances\nwhich are to be chemically tested, and the middle to the reagent by which\nthey are tested. It therefore always takes the place which the conceptions\nto be compared leave vacant, and does not appear again in the conclusion.\nIt is selected according to our knowledge of its relation to both the\nconceptions and its suitableness for the place it has to take up.\nTherefore in many cases we can change it at pleasure for another without\naffecting the syllogism. For example, in the syllogism:\n\n\n    All men are mortal;\n    Caius is a man:\n\n\nI can exchange the middle \u201cman\u201d for \u201canimal existence.\u201d In the syllogism:\n\n\n    All diamonds are stones;\n    All diamonds are combustible:\n\n\nI can exchange the middle \u201cdiamond\u201d for \u201canthracite.\u201d As an external mark\nby which we can recognise at once the figure of a syllogism the middle is\ncertainly very useful. But as the fundamental characteristic of a thing\nwhich is to be explained, we must take what is essential to it; and what\nis essential here is, whether we place two propositions together in order\nto compare their predicates or their subjects, or the predicate of the one\nand the subject of the other.\n\nTherefore, in order as premisses to yield a conclusion, two judgments must\nhave a conception in common; further, they must not both be negative, nor\nboth particular; and lastly, in the case in which the conceptions to be\ncompared are the subjects of both, they must not both be affirmative.\n\nThe voltaic pile may be regarded as a sensible image of the syllogism. Its\npoint of indifference, at the centre, represents the middle, which holds\ntogether the two premisses, and by virtue of which they have the power of\nyielding a conclusion. The two different conceptions, on the other hand,\nwhich are really what is to be compared, are represented by the two\nopposite poles of the pile. Only because these are brought together by\nmeans of their two conducting wires, which represent the copulas of the\ntwo judgments, is the spark emitted upon their contact\u2014the new light of\nthe conclusion.\n\n\n\nChapter XI.(22) On Rhetoric.\n\n\nEloquence is the faculty of awakening in others our view of a thing, or\nour opinion about it, of kindling in them our feeling concerning it, and\nthus putting them in sympathy with us. And all this by conducting the\nstream of our thought into their minds, through the medium of words, with\nsuch force as to carry their thought from the direction it has already\ntaken, and sweep it along with ours in its course. The more their previous\ncourse of thought differs from ours, the greater is this achievement. From\nthis it is easily understood how personal conviction and passion make a\nman eloquent; and in general, eloquence is more the gift of nature than\nthe work of art; yet here, also, art will support nature.\n\nIn order to convince another of a truth which conflicts with an error he\nfirmly holds, the first rule to be observed, is an easy and natural one:\n_let the premisses come first, and the conclusion follow_. Yet this rule\nis seldom observed, but reversed; for zeal, eagerness, and dogmatic\npositiveness urge us to proclaim the conclusion loudly and noisily against\nhim who adheres to the opposed error. This easily makes him shy, and now\nhe opposes his will to all reasons and premisses, knowing already to what\nconclusion they lead. Therefore we ought rather to keep the conclusion\ncompletely concealed, and only advance the premisses distinctly, fully,\nand in different lights. Indeed, if possible, we ought not to express the\nconclusion at all. It will come necessarily and regularly of its own\naccord into the reason of the hearers, and the conviction thus born in\nthemselves will be all the more genuine, and will also be accompanied by\nself-esteem instead of shame. In difficult cases we may even assume the\nair of desiring to arrive at a quite opposite conclusion from that which\nwe really have in view. An example of this is the famous speech of Antony\nin Shakspeare\u2019s \u201cJulius C\u00e6sar.\u201d\n\nIn defending a thing many persons err by confidently advancing everything\nimaginable that can be said for it, mixing up together what is true, half\ntrue, and merely plausible. But the false is soon recognised, or at any\nrate felt, and throws suspicion also upon the cogent and true arguments\nwhich were brought forward along with it. Give then the true and weighty\npure and alone, and beware of defending a truth with inadequate, and\ntherefore, since they are set up as adequate, sophistical reasons; for the\nopponent upsets these, and thereby gains the appearance of having upset\nthe truth itself which was supported by them, that is, he makes _argumenta\nad hominem_ hold good as _argumenta ad rem_. The Chinese go, perhaps, too\nfar the other way, for they have the saying: \u201cHe who is eloquent and has a\nsharp tongue may always leave half of a sentence unspoken; and he who has\nright on his side may confidently yield three-tenths of his assertion.\u201d\n\n\n\nChapter XII.(23) On The Doctrine Of Science.\n\n\nFrom the analysis of the different functions of our intellect given in the\nwhole of the preceding chapters, it is clear that for a correct use of it,\neither in a theoretical or a practical reference, the following conditions\nare demanded: (1.) The correct apprehension through perception of the real\nthings taken into consideration, and of all their essential properties and\nrelations, thus of all _data_. (2.) The construction of correct\nconceptions out of these; thus the connotation of those properties under\ncorrect abstractions, which now become the material of the subsequent\nthinking. (3.) The comparison of those conceptions both with the perceived\nobject and among themselves, and with the rest of our store of\nconceptions, so that correct judgments, pertinent to the matter in hand,\nand fully comprehending and exhausting it, may proceed from them; thus the\nright _estimation_ of the matter. (4.) The placing together or\n_combination_ of those judgments as the premisses of _syllogisms_. This\nmay be done very differently according to the choice and arrangement of\nthe judgments, and yet the actual _result_ of the whole operation\nprimarily depends upon it. What is really of importance here is that from\namong so many possible combinations of those different judgments which\nhave to do with the matter free deliberation should hit upon the very ones\nwhich serve the purpose and are decisive. But if in the first function,\nthat is, in the apprehension through perception of the things and\nrelations, any single essential point has been overlooked, the correctness\nof all the succeeding operations of the mind cannot prevent the result\nfrom being false; for there lie the data, the material of the whole\ninvestigation. Without the certainty that these are correctly and\ncompletely collected, one ought to abstain, in important matters, from any\ndefinite decision.\n\nA conception is _correct_; a judgment is _true_; a body is _real_; and a\nrelation is _evident_. A proposition of immediate certainty is an _axiom_.\nOnly the fundamental principles of logic, and those of mathematics drawn\n_a priori_ from intuition or perception, and finally also the law of\ncausality, have immediate certainty. A proposition of indirect certainty\nis a maxim, and that by means of which it obtains its certainty is the\nproof. If immediate certainty is attributed to a proposition which has no\nsuch certainty, this is a _petitio principii_. A proposition which appeals\ndirectly to the empirical perception is an _assertion_: to confront it\nwith such perception demands judgment. Empirical perception can primarily\nafford us only _particular_, not universal truths. Through manifold\nrepetition and confirmation such truths indeed obtain a certain\nuniversality also, but it is only comparative and precarious, because it\nis still always open to attack. But if a proposition has absolute\nuniversality, the perception to which it appeals is not empirical but _a\npriori_. Thus Logic and Mathematics alone are absolutely certain sciences;\nbut they really teach us only what we already knew beforehand. For they\nare merely explanations of that of which we are conscious _a priori_, the\nforms of our own knowledge, the one being concerned with the forms of\nthinking, the other with those of perceiving. Therefore we spin them\nentirely out of ourselves. All other scientific knowledge is empirical.\n\nA proof proves _too much_ if it extends to things or cases of which that\nwhich is to be proved clearly does not hold good; therefore it is refuted\napagogically by these. The _deductio ad absurdum_ properly consists in\nthis, that we take a false assertion which has been made as the major\nproposition of a syllogism, then add to it a correct minor, and arrive at\na conclusion which clearly contradicts facts of experience or\nunquestionable truths. But by some round-about way such a refutation must\nbe possible of every false doctrine. For the defender of this will yet\ncertainly recognise and admit some truth or other, and then the\nconsequences of this, and on the other hand those of the false assertion,\nmust be followed out until we arrive at two propositions which directly\ncontradict each other. We find many examples in Plato of this beautiful\nartifice of genuine dialectic.\n\nA _correct hypothesis_ is nothing more than the true and complete\nexpression of the present fact, which the originator of the hypothesis has\nintuitively apprehended in its real nature and inner connection. For it\ntells us only what really takes place here.\n\nThe opposition of the _analytical_ and _synthetical_ methods we find\nalready indicated by Aristotle, yet perhaps first distinctly described by\nProclus, who says quite correctly: \u201c\u039c\u03b5\u03b8\u03bf\u03b4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9; \u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\n\u1f21 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03bb\u03c5\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b5\u03c0\u1fbd \u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03b7\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7\u03bd \u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf \u03b6\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd; \u1f21\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03a0\u03bb\u03b1\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9, \u039b\u03b1\u03bf\u03b4\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03b4\u03c9\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd. \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb.\u201d (_Methodi traduntur\nsequentes: pulcherrima quidem ea, qu\u00e6 per analysin qu\u00e6situm refert ad\nprincipium, de quo jam convenit; quam etiam Plato Laodamanti tradidisse\ndicitur._) \u201c_In Primum Euclidis Librum_,\u201d L. iii. Certainly the analytical\nmethod consists in referring what is given to an admitted principle; the\nsynthetical method, on the contrary, in deduction from such a principle.\nThey are therefore analogous to the \u03b5\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03b7 and \u03b1\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03c9\u03b3\u03b7 explained in\nchapter ix.; only the latter are not used to establish propositions, but\nalways to overthrow them. The analytical method proceeds from the facts;\nthe particular, to the principle or rule; the universal, or from the\nconsequents to the reasons; the other conversely. Therefore it would be\nmuch more correct to call them _the inductive and the deductive methods_,\nfor the customary names are unsuitable and do not fully express the\nthings.\n\nIf a philosopher tries to begin by thinking out the methods in accordance\nwith which he will philosophise, he is like a poet who first writes a\nsystem of \u00e6sthetics in order to poetise in accordance with it. Both of\nthem may be compared to a man who first sings himself a tune and\nafterwards dances to it. The thinking mind must find its way from original\ntendency. Rule and application, method and achievement, must, like matter\nand form, be inseparable. But after we have reached the goal we may\nconsider the path we have followed. \u00c6sthetics and methodology are, from\ntheir nature, younger than poetry and philosophy; as grammar is younger\nthan language, thorough bass younger than music, and logic younger than\nthought.\n\nThis is a fitting place to make, in passing, a remark by means of which I\nshould like to check a growing evil while there is yet time. That Latin\nhas ceased to be the language of all scientific investigations has the\ndisadvantage that there is no longer an immediately common scientific\nliterature for the whole of Europe, but national literatures. And thus\nevery scholar is primarily limited to a much smaller public, and moreover\nto a public hampered with national points of view and prejudices. Then he\nmust now learn the four principal European languages, as well as the two\nancient languages. In this it will be a great assistance to him that the\n_termini technici_ of all sciences (with the exception of mineralogy) are,\nas an inheritance from our predecessors, Latin or Greek. Therefore all\nnations wisely retain these. Only the Germans have hit upon the\nunfortunate idea of wishing to Germanise the _termini technici_ of all the\nsciences. This has two great disadvantages. First, the foreign and also\nthe German scholar is obliged to learn all the technical terms of his\nscience twice, which, when there are many\u2014for example, in Anatomy\u2014is an\nincredibly tiresome and lengthy business. If the other nations were not in\nthis respect wiser than the Germans, we would have the trouble of learning\nevery _terminus technicus_ five times. If the Germans carry this further,\nforeign men of learning will leave their books altogether unread; for\nbesides this fault they are for the most part too diffuse, and are written\nin a careless, bad, and often affected and objectionable style, and\nbesides are generally conceived with a rude disregard of the reader and\nhis requirements. Secondly, those Germanised forms of the _termini\ntechnici_ are almost throughout long, patched-up, stupidly chosen,\nawkward, jarring words, not clearly separated from the rest of the\nlanguage, which therefore impress themselves with difficulty upon the\nmemory, while the Greek and Latin expressions chosen by the ancient and\nmemorable founders of the sciences possess the whole of the opposite good\nqualities, and easily impress themselves on the memory by their sonorous\nsound. What an ugly, harsh-sounding word, for instance, is \u201c_Stickstoff_\u201d\ninstead of _azot_! \u201c_Verbum_,\u201d \u201c_substantiv_,\u201d \u201c_adjectiv_,\u201d are\nremembered and distinguished more easily than \u201c_Zeitwort_,\u201d \u201c_Nennwort_,\u201d\n\u201c_Beiwort_,\u201d or even \u201c_Umstandswort_\u201d instead of \u201c_adverbium_.\u201d In Anatomy\nit is quite unsupportable, and moreover vulgar and low. Even \u201c_Pulsader_\u201d\nand \u201c_Blutader_\u201d are more exposed to momentary confusion than \u201c_Arterie_\u201d\nand \u201c_Vene_;\u201d but utterly bewildering are such expressions as\n\u201c_Fruchth\u00e4lter_,\u201d \u201c_Fruchtgang_,\u201d and \u201c_Fruchtleiter_\u201d instead of\n\u201c_uterus_,\u201d \u201c_vagina_,\u201d and \u201c_tuba Faloppii_,\u201d which yet every doctor must\nknow, and which he will find sufficient in all European languages. In the\nsame way \u201c_Speiche_\u201d and \u201c_Ellenbogenr\u00f6hre_\u201d instead of \u201c_radius_\u201d and\n\u201c_ulna_,\u201d which all Europe has understood for thousands of years.\nWherefore then this clumsy, confusing, drawling, and awkward Germanising?\nNot less objectionable is the translation of the technical terms in Logic,\nin which our gifted professors of philosophy are the creators of a new\nterminology, and almost every one of them has his own. With G. E. Schulze,\nfor example, the subject is called \u201c_Grundbegriff_,\u201d the predicate\n\u201c_Beilegungsbegriff_;\u201d then there are \u201c_Beilegungsschl\u00fcsse_,\u201d\n\u201c_Voraussetzungsschl\u00fcsse_,\u201d and \u201c_Entgegensetzungsschl\u00fcsse_;\u201d the\njudgments have \u201c_Gr\u00f6sse_,\u201d \u201c_Beschaffenheit_,\u201d \u201c_Verh\u00e4ltniss_,\u201d and\n\u201c_Zuverl\u00e4ssigkeit_,\u201d _i.e._, quantity, quality, relation, and modality.\nThe same perverse influence of this Germanising mania is to be found in\nall the sciences. The Latin and Greek expressions have the further\nadvantage that they stamp the scientific conception as such, and\ndistinguish it from the words of common intercourse, and the ideas which\ncling to them through association; while, for example, \u201c_Speisebrei_\u201d\ninstead of _chyme_ seems to refer to the food of little children, and\n\u201c_Lungensack_\u201d instead of _pleura_, and \u201c_Herzbeutel_\u201d instead of\n_pericardium_ seem to have been invented by butchers rather than\nanatomists. Besides this, the most immediate necessity of learning the\nancient languages depends upon the old _termini technici_, and they are\nmore and more in danger of being neglected through the use of living\nlanguages in learned investigations. But if it comes to this, if the\nspirit of the ancients bound up with their languages disappears from a\nliberal education, then coarseness, insipidity, and vulgarity will take\npossession of the whole of literature. For the works of the ancients are\nthe pole-star of every artistic or literary effort; if it sets they are\nlost. Even now we can observe from the miserable and puerile style of most\nwriters that they have never written Latin.(24) The study of the classical\nauthors is very properly called the study of _Humanity_, for through it\nthe student first becomes a _man_ again, for he enters into the world\nwhich was still free from all the absurdities of the Middle Ages and of\nromanticism, which afterwards penetrated so deeply into mankind in Europe\nthat even now every one comes into the world covered with it, and has\nfirst to strip it off simply to become a man again. Think not that your\nmodern wisdom can ever supply the place of that initiation into manhood;\nye are not, like the Greeks and Romans, born freemen, unfettered sons of\nnature. Ye are first the sons and heirs of the barbarous Middle Ages and\nof their madness, of infamous priestcraft, and of half-brutal,\nhalf-childish chivalry. Though both now gradually approach their end, yet\nye cannot yet stand on your own feet. Without the school of the ancients\nyour literature will degenerate into vulgar gossip and dull philistinism.\nThus for all these reasons it is my well-intended counsel that an end be\nput at once to the Germanising mania condemned above.\n\nI shall further take the opportunity of denouncing here the disorder which\nfor some years has been introduced into German orthography in an\nunprecedented manner. Scribblers of every species have heard something of\nconciseness of expression, but do not know that this consists in the\ncareful omission of everything superfluous (to which, it is true, the\nwhole of their writings belong), but imagine they can arrive at it by\nclipping the words as swindlers clip coin; and every syllable which\nappears to them superfluous, because they do not feel its value, they cut\noff without more ado. For example, our ancestors, with true tact, said\n\u201c_Beweis_\u201d and \u201c_Verweis_;\u201d but, on the other hand, \u201c_Nachweisung_.\u201d The\nfine distinction analogous to that between \u201c_Versuch_\u201d and \u201c_Versuchung_,\u201d\n\u201c_Betracht_\u201d and \u201c_Betrachtung_,\u201d is not perceptible to dull ears and\nthick skulls; therefore they have invented the word \u201c_Nachweis_,\u201d which\nhas come at once into general use, for this only requires that an idea\nshould be thoroughly awkward and a blunder very gross. Accordingly a\nsimilar amputation has already been proposed in innumerable words; for\nexample, instead of \u201c_Untersuchung_\u201d is written \u201c_Untersuch_;\u201d nay, even\ninstead of \u201c_allm\u00e4lig_,\u201d \u201c_m\u00e4lig_;\u201d instead of \u201c_beinahe_,\u201d \u201c_nahe_;\u201d\ninstead of \u201c_best\u00e4ndig_,\u201d \u201c_st\u00e4ndig_.\u201d If a Frenchman took upon himself to\nwrite \u201c_pr\u00e8s_\u201d instead of \u201c_presque_,\u201d or if an Englishman wrote \u201c_most_\u201d\ninstead of \u201c_almost_,\u201d they would be laughed at by every one as fools; but\nin Germany whoever does this sort of thing passes for a man of\noriginality. Chemists already write \u201c_l\u00f6slich_\u201d and \u201c_unl\u00f6slich_\u201d instead\nof \u201c_unaufl\u00f6slich_,\u201d and if the grammarians do not rap them over the\nknuckles they will rob the language of a valuable word. Knots,\nshoe-strings, and also conglomerates of which the cement is softened, and\nall analogous things are \u201c_l\u00f6slich_\u201d (can be loosed); but what is\n\u201c_aufl\u00f6slich_\u201d (soluble), on the other hand, is whatever vanishes in a\nliquid, like salt in water. \u201c_Aufl\u00f6sen_\u201d (to dissolve) is the _terminus ad\nhoc_, which says this and nothing else, marking out a definite conception;\nbut our acute improvers of the language wish to empty it into the general\nrinsing-pan \u201c_l\u00f6sen_\u201d (to loosen); they would therefore in consistency be\nobliged to make \u201c_l\u00f6sen_\u201d also take the place everywhere of \u201c_abl\u00f6sen_\u201d\n(to relieve, used of guards), \u201c_ausl\u00f6sen_\u201d (to release), \u201c_einl\u00f6sen_\u201d (to\nredeem), &c., and in these, as in the former case, deprive the language of\ndefiniteness of expression. But to make the language poorer by a word\nmeans to make the thought of the nation poorer by a conception. Yet this\nis the tendency of the united efforts of almost all our writers of books\nfor the last ten or twenty years. For what I have shown here by _one_\nexample can be supported by a hundred others, and the meanest stinting of\nsyllables prevails like a disease. The miserable wretches actually count\nthe letters, and do not hesitate to mutilate a word, or to use one in a\nfalse sense, whenever by doing so they can gain two letters. He who is\ncapable of no new thoughts will at least bring new words to market, and\nevery ink-slinger regards it as his vocation to improve the language.\nJournalists practise this most shamelessly; and since their papers, on\naccount of the trivial nature of their contents, have the largest public,\nindeed a public which for the most part reads nothing else, a great danger\nthreatens the language through them. I therefore seriously advise that\nthey should be subjected to an orthographical censorship, or that they\nshould be made to pay a fine for every unusual or mutilated word; for what\ncould be more improper than that changes of language should proceed from\nthe lowest branch of literature? Language, especially a relatively\nspeaking original language like German, is the most valuable inheritance\nof a nation, and it is also an exceedingly complicated work of art, easily\ninjured, and which cannot again be restored, therefore a _noli me\ntangere_. Other nations have felt this, and have shown great piety towards\ntheir languages, although far less complete than German. Therefore the\nlanguage of Dante and Petrarch differs only in trifles from that of\nto-day; Montaigne is still quite readable, and so also is Shakspeare in\nhis oldest editions. For a German indeed it is good to have somewhat long\nwords in his mouth; for he thinks slowly, and they give him time to\nreflect. But this prevailing economy of language shows itself in yet more\ncharacteristic phenomena. For example, in opposition to all logic and\ngrammar, they use the imperfect for the perfect and pluperfect; they often\nstick the auxiliary verb in their pocket; they use the ablative instead of\nthe genitive; for the sake of omitting a couple of logical particles they\nmake such intricate sentences that one has to read them four times over in\norder to get at the sense; for it is only the paper and not the reader\u2019s\ntime that they care to spare. In proper names, after the manner of\nHottentots, they do not indicate the case either by inflection or article:\nthe reader may guess it. But they are specially fond of contracting the\ndouble vowel and dropping the lengthening _h_, those letters sacred to\nprosody; which is just the same thing as if we wanted to banish \u03b7 and \u03c9\nfrom Greek, and make \u03b5 and \u03bf take their place. Whoever writes _Scham_,\n_M\u00e4rchen_, _Mass_, _Spass_, ought also to write _Lon_, _Son_, _Stat_,\n_Sat_, _Jar_, _Al_, &c. But since writing is the copy of speech, posterity\nwill imagine that one ought to speak as one writes; and then of the German\nlanguage there will only remain a narrow, mouth-distorting, jarring noise\nof consonants, and all prosody will be lost. The spelling \u201c_Literatur_\u201d\ninstead of the correct \u201c_Litteratur_\u201d is also very much liked, because it\nsaves a letter. In defence of this the participle of the verb _linere_ is\ngiven as the root of the word. But _linere_ means to smear; therefore the\nfavoured spelling might actually be correct for the greater part of German\nbookmaking; so that one could distinguish a very small \u201c_Litteratur_\u201d from\na very extensive \u201c_Literatur._\u201d In order to write concisely let a man\nimprove his style and shun all useless gossip and chatter, and then he\nwill not need to cut out syllables and letters on account of the dearness\nof paper. But to write so many useless pages, useless sheets, useless\nbooks, and then to want to make up this waste of time and paper at the\ncost of the innocent syllables and letters\u2014that is truly the superlative\nof what is called in English being penny wise and pound foolish. It is to\nbe regretted that there is no German Academy to take charge of the\nlanguage against literary _sans-culottism_, especially in an age when even\nthose who are ignorant of the ancient language venture to employ the\npress. I have expressed my mind more fully on the whole subject of the\ninexcusable mischief being done at the present day to the German language\nin my \u201cParerga,\u201d vol. ii. chap. 23.\n\nIn my essay on the principle of sufficient reason, \u00a7 51, I already\nproposed a first _classification of the sciences_ in accordance with the\nform of the principle of sufficient reason which reigns in them; and I\nalso touched upon it again in \u00a7\u00a7 7 and 15 of the first volume of this\nwork. I will give here a small attempt at such a classification, which\nwill yet no doubt be susceptible of much improvement and perfecting:\u2014\n\n\n    I. Pure _a priori_ Sciences.\n\n    1. The doctrine of the ground of being.\n\n    (_a._) In space: Geometry.\n\n    (_b._) In time: Arithmetic and Algebra.\n\n    2. The doctrine of the ground of knowing: Logic.\n\n    II. Empirical or _a posteriori_ Sciences. All based upon the\n    ground of becoming, _i.e._, the law of causality, and upon the\n    three modes of that law.\n\n    1. The doctrine of causes.\n\n    (_a._) Universal: Mechanics, Hydrodynamics, Physics, Chemistry.\n\n    (_b._) Particular: Astronomy, Mineralogy, Geology, Technology,\n    Pharmacy.\n\n    2. The doctrine of stimuli.\n\n    (_a._) Universal: Physiology of plants and animals, together with\n    the ancillary science, Anatomy.\n\n    (_b._) Particular: Botany, Zoology, Zootomy, Comparative\n    Physiology, Pathology, Therapeutics.\n\n    3. The doctrine of motives.\n\n    (_a._) Universal: Ethics, Psychology.\n\n    (_b._) Particular: Jurisprudence, History.\n\n\nPhilosophy or Metaphysics, as the doctrine of consciousness and its\ncontents in general, or of the whole of experience as such, does not\nappear in the list, because it does not at once pursue the investigation\nwhich the principle of sufficient reason prescribes, but first has this\nprinciple itself as its object. It is to be regarded as the thorough bass\nof all sciences, but belongs to a higher class than they do, and is almost\nas much related to art as to science. As in music every particular period\nmust correspond to the tonality to which thorough bass has advanced, so\nevery author, in proportion to the line he follows, must bear the stamp of\nthe philosophy which prevails in his time. But besides this, every science\nhas also its special philosophy; and therefore we speak of the philosophy\nof botany, of zoology, of history, &c. By this we must reasonably\nunderstand nothing more than the chief results of each science itself,\nregarded and comprehended from the highest, that is the most general,\npoint of view which is possible within that science. These general results\nconnect themselves directly with general philosophy, for they supply it\nwith important data, and relieve it from the labour of seeking these\nitself in the philosophically raw material of the special sciences. These\nspecial philosophies therefore stand as a mediating link between their\nspecial sciences and philosophy proper. For since the latter has to give\nthe most general explanations concerning the whole of things, these must\nalso be capable of being brought down and applied to the individual of\nevery species of thing. The philosophy of each science, however, arises\nindependently of philosophy in general, from the data of its own science\nitself. Therefore it does not need to wait till that philosophy at last be\nfound; but if worked out in advance it will certainly agree with the true\nuniversal philosophy. This, on the other hand, must be capable of\nreceiving confirmation and illustration from the philosophies of the\nparticular sciences; for the most general truth must be capable of being\nproved through the more special truths. Goethe has afforded a beautiful\nexample of the philosophy of zoology in his reflections on Dalton\u2019s and\nPander\u2019s skeletons of rodents (_Hefte zur Morphologie_, 1824). And like\nmerit in connection with the same science belongs to Kielmayer, Delamark,\nGeoffroy St. Hilaire, Cuvier, and many others, in that they have all\nbrought out clearly the complete analogy, the inner relationship, the\npermanent type, and systematic connection of animal forms. Empirical\nsciences pursued purely for their own sake and without philosophical\ntendency are like a face without eyes. They are, however, a suitable\noccupation for men of good capacity who yet lack the highest faculties,\nwhich would even be a hindrance to minute investigations of such a kind.\nSuch men concentrate their whole power and their whole knowledge upon one\nlimited field, in which, therefore, on condition of remaining in entire\nignorance of everything else, they can attain to the most complete\nknowledge possible; while the philosopher must survey all fields of\nknowledge, and indeed to a certain extent be at home in them; and thus\nthat complete knowledge which can only be attained by the study of detail\nis necessarily denied him. Therefore the former may be compared to those\nGeneva workmen of whom one makes only wheels, another only springs, and a\nthird only chains. The philosopher, on the other hand, is like the\nwatchmaker, who alone produces a whole out of all these which has motion\nand significance. They may also be compared to the musicians of an\norchestra, each of whom is master of his own instrument; and the\nphilosopher, on the other hand, to the conductor, who must know the nature\nand use of every instrument, yet without being able to play them all, or\neven one of them, with great perfection. Scotus Erigena includes all\nsciences under the name _Scientia_, in opposition to philosophy, which he\ncalls _Sapientia_. The same distinction was already made by the\nPythagoreans; as may be seen from Stob\u00e6us (_Floril._, vol. i. p. 20),\nwhere it is very clearly and neatly explained. But a much happier and more\npiquant comparison of the relation of the two kinds of mental effort to\neach other has been so often repeated by the ancients that we no longer\nknow to whom it belongs. Diogenes Laertius (ii. 79) attributes it to\nAristippus, Stob\u00e6us (_Floril._, tit. iv. 110) to Aristo of Chios; the\nScholiast of Aristotle ascribes it to him (p. 8 of the Berlin edition),\nbut Plutarch (_De Puer. Educ._, c. 10) attributes it to Bio\u2014\u201c_Qui ajebat,\nsicut Penelopes proci, __ quum non possent cum Penelope concumbere, rem\ncum ejus ancillis habuissent; ita qui philosophiam nequeunt apprehendere\neos in alliis nullius pretii disciplinis sese conterere._\u201d In our\npredominantly empirical and historical age it can do no harm to recall\nthis.\n\n\n\nChapter XIII.(25) On The Methods Of Mathematics.\n\n\nEuclid\u2019s method of demonstration has brought forth from its own womb its\nmost striking parody and caricature in the famous controversy on the\ntheory of parallels, and the attempts, which are repeated every year, to\nprove the eleventh axiom. This axiom asserts, and indeed supports its\nassertion by the indirect evidence of a third intersecting line, that two\nlines inclining towards each other (for that is just the meaning of \u201cless\nthan two right angles\u201d) if produced far enough must meet\u2014a truth which is\nsupposed to be too complicated to pass as self-evident, and therefore\nrequires a demonstration. Such a demonstration, however, cannot be\nproduced, just because there is nothing that is not immediate. This\nscruple of conscience reminds me of Schiller\u2019s question of law:\u2014\n\n\u201cFor years I have used my nose for smelling. Have I, then, actually a\nright to it that can be proved?\u201d Indeed it seems to me that the logical\nmethod is hereby reduced to absurdity. Yet it is just through the\ncontroversies about this, together with the vain attempts to prove what is\n_directly_ certain as merely _indirectly_ certain, that the\nself-sufficingness and clearness of intuitive evidence appears in contrast\nwith the uselessness and difficulty of logical proof\u2014a contrast which is\nno less instructive than amusing. The direct certainty is not allowed to\nbe valid here, because it is no mere logical certainty following from the\nconceptions, thus resting only upon the relation of the predicate to the\nsubject, according to the principle of contradiction. That axiom, however,\nis a synthetical proposition _a priori_, and as such has the guarantee of\npure, not empirical, perception, which is just as immediate and certain as\nthe principle of contradiction itself, from which all demonstrations first\nderive their certainty. Ultimately this holds good of every geometrical\ntheorem, and it is quite arbitrary where we draw the line between what is\ndirectly certain and what has first to be demonstrated. It surprises me\nthat the eighth axiom is not rather attacked. \u201cFigures which coincide with\neach other are equal to each other.\u201d For \u201ccoinciding with each other\u201d is\neither a mere tautology or something purely empirical which does not\nbelong to pure perception but to external sensuous experience. It\npresupposes that the figures may be moved; but only matter is movable in\nspace. Therefore this appeal to coincidence leaves pure space\u2014the one\nelement of geometry\u2014in order to pass over to what is material and\nempirical.\n\nThe reputed motto of the Platonic lecture-room, \u201c\u0391\u03b3\u03b5\u03c9\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c4\u03c9,\u201d of which mathematicians are so proud, was no doubt inspired by\nthe fact that Plato regarded the geometrical figures as intermediate\nexistences between the eternal Ideas and particular things, as Aristotle\nfrequently mentions in his \u201cMetaphysics\u201d (especially i. c. 6, p. 887, 998,\n_et Scholia_, p. 827, ed. Berol.) Moreover, the opposition between those\nself-existent eternal forms, or Ideas, and the transitory individual\nthings, was most easily made comprehensible in geometrical figures, and\nthereby laid the foundation of the doctrine of Ideas, which is the central\npoint of the philosophy of Plato, and indeed his only serious and decided\ntheoretical dogma. In expounding it, therefore, he started from geometry.\nIn the same sense we are told that he regarded geometry as a preliminary\nexercise through which the mind of the pupil accustomed itself to deal\nwith incorporeal objects, having hitherto in practical life had only to do\nwith corporeal things (_Schol. in Aristot._, p. 12, 15). This, then, is\nthe sense in which Plato recommended geometry to the philosopher; and\ntherefore one is not justified in extending it further. I rather\nrecommend, as an investigation of the influence of mathematics upon our\nmental powers, and their value for scientific culture in general, a very\nthorough and learned discussion, in the form of a review of a book by\nWhewell in the _Edinburgh Review_ of January 1836. Its author, who\nafterwards published it with some other discussions, with his name, is Sir\nW. Hamilton, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in Scotland. This work has\nalso found a German translator, and has appeared by itself under the\ntitle, \u201c_Ueber den Werth und Unwerth der Mathematik_\u201d _aus dem Englishen_,\n1836. The conclusion the author arrives at is that the value of\nmathematics is only indirect, and lies in the application to ends which\nare only attainable through them; but in themselves mathematics leave the\nmind where they find it, and are by no means conducive to its general\nculture and development, nay, even a decided hindrance. This conclusion is\nnot only proved by thorough dianoiological investigation of the\nmathematical activity of the mind, but is also confirmed by a very learned\naccumulation of examples and authorities. The only direct use which is\nleft to mathematics is that it can accustom restless and unsteady minds to\nfix their attention. Even Descartes, who was yet himself famous as a\nmathematician, held the same opinion with regard to mathematics. In the\n\u201c_Vie de Descartes par Baillet_,\u201d 1693, it is said, Liv. ii. c. 6, p. 54:\n\u201c_Sa propre exp\u00e9rience l\u2019avait convaincu du peu d\u2019utilit\u00e9 des\nmath\u00e9matiques, surtout lorsqu\u2019on ne les cultive que pour elles m\u00eames....\nIl ne voyait rien de moins solide, que de s\u2019occuper de nombres tout\nsimples et de figures imaginaires_,\u201d &c.\n\n\n\nChapter XIV. On The Association Of Ideas.\n\n\nThe presence of ideas and thoughts in our consciousness is as strictly\nsubordinated to the principle of sufficient reason in its different forms\nas the movement of bodies to the law of causality. It is just as little\npossible that a thought can appear in the mind without an occasion as that\na body can be set in motion without a cause. Now this occasion is either\n_external_, thus an impression of the senses, or _internal_, thus itself\nalso a thought which introduces another thought by means of _association_.\nThis again depends either upon a relation of reason and consequent between\nthe two; or upon similarity, even mere analogy; or lastly upon the\ncircumstance that they were both first apprehended at the same time, which\nagain may have its ground in the proximity in space of their objects. The\nlast two cases are denoted by the word _\u00e0 propos_. The predominance of one\nof these three bonds of association of thoughts over the others is\ncharacteristic of the intellectual worth of the man. The first named will\npredominate in thoughtful and profound minds, the second in witty,\ningenious, and poetical minds, and the third in minds of limited capacity.\nNot less characteristic is the degree of facility with which one thought\nrecalls others that stand in any kind of relation to it: this constitutes\nthe activeness of the mind. But the impossibility of the appearance of a\nthought without its sufficient occasion, even when there is the strongest\ndesire to call it up, is proved by all the cases in which we weary\nourselves in vain to _recollect_ something, and go through the whole store\nof our thoughts in order to find any one that may be associated with the\none we seek; if we find the former, the latter is also found. Whoever\nwishes to call up something in his memory first seeks for a thread with\nwhich it is connected by the association of thoughts. Upon this depends\nmnemonics: it aims at providing us with easily found occasioners or causes\nfor all the conceptions, thoughts, or words which are to be preserved. But\nthe worst of it is that these occasioners themselves have first to be\nrecalled, and this again requires an occasioner. How much the occasion\naccomplishes in memory may be shown in this way. If we have read in a book\nof anecdotes say fifty anecdotes, and then have laid it aside, immediately\nafterwards we will sometimes be unable to recollect a single one of them.\nBut if the occasion comes, or if a thought occurs to us which has any\nanalogy with one of those anecdotes, it immediately comes back to us; and\nso with the whole fifty as opportunity offers. The same thing holds good\nof all that we read. Our immediate remembrance of words, that is, our\nremembrance of them without the assistance of mnemonic contrivances, and\nwith it our whole faculty of speech, ultimately depends upon the direct\nassociation of thoughts. For the learning of language consists in this,\nthat once for all we so connect a conception with a word that this word\nwill always occur to us along with this conception, and this conception\nwill always occur to us along with this word. We have afterwards to repeat\nthe same process in learning every new language; yet if we learn a\nlanguage for passive and not for active use\u2014that is, to read, but not to\nspeak, as, for example, most of us learn Greek\u2014then the connection is\none-sided, for the conception occurs to us along with the word, but the\nword does not always occur to us along with the conception. The same\nprocedure as in language becomes apparent in the particular case, in the\nlearning of every new proper name. But sometimes we do not trust ourselves\nto connect directly the name of _this_ person, or town, river, mountain,\nplant, animal, &c., with the thought of each so firmly that it will call\neach of them up of itself; and then we assist ourselves mnemonically, and\nconnect the image of the person or thing with any perceptible quality the\nname of which occurs in that of the person or thing. Yet this is only a\ntemporary prop to lean on; later we let it drop, for the association of\nthoughts becomes an immediate support.\n\nThe search of memory for a clue shows itself in a peculiar manner in the\ncase of a dream which we have forgotten on awaking, for in this case we\nseek in vain for that which a few minutes before occupied our minds with\nthe strength of the clearest present, but now has entirely disappeared. We\ngrasp at any lingering impression by which may hang the clue that by\nvirtue of association would call that dream back again into our\nconsciousness. According to Kieser, \u201c_Tellurismus_,\u201d Bd. ii. \u00a7 271, memory\neven of what passed in magnetic-somnambular sleep may possibly sometimes\nbe aroused by a sensible sign found when awake. It depends upon the same\nimpossibility of the appearance of a thought without its occasion that if\nwe propose to do anything at a definite time, this can only take place if\nwe either think of nothing else till then, or if at the determined time we\nare _reminded_ of it by something, which may either be an external\nimpression arranged beforehand or a thought which is itself again brought\nabout in the regular way. Both, then, belong to the class of motives.\nEvery morning when we awake our consciousness is a _tabula rasa_, which,\nhowever, quickly fills itself again. First it is the surroundings of the\nprevious evening which now reappear, and remind us of what we thought in\nthese surroundings; to this the events of the previous day link themselves\non; and so one thought rapidly recalls the others, till all that occupied\nus yesterday is there again. Upon the fact that this takes place properly\ndepends the health of the mind, as opposed to madness, which, as is shown\nin the third book, consists in the existence of great blanks in the memory\nof past events. But how completely sleep breaks the thread of memory, so\nthat each morning it has to be taken up again, we see in particular cases\nof the incompleteness of this operation. For example, sometimes we cannot\nrecall in the morning a melody which the night before ran in our head till\nwe were tired of it.\n\nThe cases in which a thought or a picture of the fancy suddenly came into\nour mind without any conscious occasion seem to afford an exception to\nwhat has been said. Yet this is for the most part an illusion, which rests\non the fact that the occasion was so trifling and the thought itself so\nvivid and interesting, that the former is instantly driven out of\nconsciousness. Yet sometimes the cause of such an instantaneous appearance\nof an idea may be an internal physical impression either of the parts of\nthe brain on each other or of the organic nervous system upon the brain.\n\nIn general our internal process of thought is in reality not so simple as\nthe theory of it; for here it is involved in many ways. To make the matter\nclear to our imagination, let us compare our consciousness to a sheet of\nwater of some depth. Then the distinctly conscious thoughts are merely the\nsurface; while, on the other hand, the indistinct thoughts, the feelings,\nthe after sensation of perceptions and of experience generally, mingled\nwith the special disposition of our own will, which is the kernel of our\nbeing, is the mass of the water. Now the mass of the whole consciousness\nis more or less, in proportion to the intellectual activity, in constant\nmotion, and what rise to the surface, in consequence of this, are the\nclear pictures of the fancy or the distinct, conscious thoughts expressed\nin words and the resolves of the will. The whole process of our thought\nand purpose seldom lies on the surface, that is, consists in a combination\nof distinctly thought judgments; although we strive against this in order\nthat we may be able to explain our thought to ourselves and others. But\nordinarily it is in the obscure depths of the mind that the rumination of\nthe materials received from without takes place, through which they are\nworked up into thoughts; and it goes on almost as unconsciously as the\nconversion of nourishment into the humours and substance of the body.\nHence it is that we can often give no account of the origin of our deepest\nthoughts. They are the birth of our mysterious inner life. Judgments,\nthoughts, purposes, rise from out that deep unexpectedly and to our own\nsurprise. A letter brings us unlooked-for and important news, in\nconsequence of which our thoughts and motives are disordered; we get rid\nof the matter for the present, and think no more about it; but next day,\nor on the third or fourth day after, the whole situation sometimes stands\ndistinctly before us, with what we have to do in the circumstances.\nConsciousness is the mere surface of our mind, of which, as of the earth,\nwe do not know the inside, but only the crust.\n\nBut in the last instance, or in the secret of our inner being, what sets\nin activity the association of thought itself, the laws of which were set\nforth above, is the _will_, which urges its servant the intellect,\naccording to the measure of its powers, to link thought to thought, to\nrecall the similar, the contemporaneous, to recognise reasons and\nconsequents. For it is to the interest of the will that, in general, one\nshould think, so that one may be well equipped for all cases that may\narise. Therefore the form of the principle of sufficient reason which\ngoverns the association of thoughts and keeps it active is ultimately the\nlaw of motivation. For that which rules the sensorium, and determines it\nto follow the analogy or other association of thoughts in this or that\ndirection, is the will of the thinking subject. Now just as here the laws\nof the connection of ideas subsist only upon the basis of the will, so\nalso in the real world the causal connection of bodies really subsists\nonly upon the basis of the will, which manifests itself in the phenomena\nof this world. On this account the explanation from causes is never\nabsolute and exhaustive, but leads back to forces of nature as their\ncondition, and the inner being of the latter is just the will as thing in\nitself. In saying this, however, I have certainly anticipated the\nfollowing book.\n\nBut because now the _outward_ (sensible) occasions of the presence of our\nideas, just as well as the _inner_ occasions (those of association), and\nboth independently of each other, constantly affect the consciousness,\nthere arise from this the frequent interruptions of our course of thought,\nwhich introduce a certain cutting up and confusion of our thinking. This\nbelongs to its imperfections which cannot be explained away, and which we\nshall now consider in a separate chapter.\n\n\n\nChapter XV. On The Essential Imperfections Of The Intellect.\n\n\nOur self-consciousness has not space but only time as its form, and\ntherefore we do not think in three dimensions, as we perceive, but only in\n_one_, thus in a line, without breadth or depth. This is the source of the\ngreatest of the essential imperfections of our intellect. We can know all\nthings only in _succession_, and can become conscious of only one at a\ntime, indeed even of this one only under the condition that for the time\nwe forget everything else, thus are absolutely unconscious of everything\nelse, so that for the time it ceases to exist as far as we are concerned.\nIn respect of this quality our intellect may be compared to a telescope\nwith a very narrow field of vision; just because our consciousness is not\nstationary but fleeting. The intellect apprehends only successively, and\nin order to grasp one thing must let another go, retaining nothing but\ntraces of it, which are ever becoming weaker. The thought which is vividly\npresent to me now must after a little while have escaped me altogether;\nand if a good night\u2019s sleep intervene, it may be that I shall never find\nit again, unless it is connected with my personal interests, that is, with\nmy will, which always commands the field.\n\nUpon this imperfection of the intellect depends the disconnected and often\n_fragmentary nature_ of our course of thought, which I have already\ntouched on at the close of last chapter; and from this again arises the\nunavoidable _distraction_ of our thinking. Sometimes external impressions\nof sense throng in upon it, disturbing and interrupting it, forcing\ndifferent kinds of things upon it every moment; sometimes _one_ thought\ndraws in _another_ by the bond of association, and is now itself dislodged\nby it; sometimes, lastly, the intellect itself is not capable of fixing\nitself very long and continuously at a time upon _one_ thought, but as the\neye when it gazes long at one object is soon unable to see it any more\ndistinctly, because the outlines run into each other and become confused,\nuntil finally all is obscure, so through long-continued reflection upon\none subject our thinking also is gradually confused, becomes dull, and\nends in complete stupor. Therefore after a certain time, which varies with\nthe individual, we must for the present give up every meditation or\ndeliberation which has had the fortune to remain undisturbed, but yet has\nnot been brought to an end, even if it concerns a matter which is most\nimportant and pertinent to us; and we must dismiss from our consciousness\nthe subject which interests us so much, however heavily our anxiety about\nit may weigh upon us, in order to occupy ourselves now with insignificant\nand indifferent things. During this time that important subject no longer\nexists for us; it is like the heat in cold water, _latent_. If now we\nresume it again at another time, we approach it like a new thing, with\nwhich we become acquainted anew, although more quickly, and the agreeable\nor disagreeable impression of it is also produced anew upon our will. We\nourselves, however, do not come back quite unchanged. For with the\nphysical composition of the humours and tension of the nerves, which\nconstantly changes with the hours, days, and years, our mood and point of\nview also changes. Moreover, the different kinds of ideas which have been\nthere in the meantime have left an echo behind them, the tone of which\ninfluences the ideas which follow. Therefore the same thing appears to us\nat different times, in the morning, in the evening, at mid-day, or on\nanother day, often very different; opposite views of it now press upon\neach other and increase our doubt. Hence we speak of sleeping upon a\nmatter, and for important determinations we demand a long time for\nconsideration. Now, although this quality of our intellect, as springing\nfrom its weakness, has its evident disadvantages, yet, on the other hand,\nit affords the advantage that after the distraction and the physical\nchange we return to our subject as comparatively new beings, fresh and\nstrange, and thus are able to see it repeatedly in very different lights.\nFrom all this it is plain that human consciousness and thought is in its\nnature necessarily fragmentary, on account of which the theoretical and\npractical results which are achieved by piecing together such fragments\nare for the most part defective. In this our thinking consciousness is\nlike a magic lantern, in the focus of which only one picture can appear at\na time, and each, even if it represents the noblest objects, must yet soon\npass away in order to make room for others of a different, and even most\nvulgar, description. In practical matters the most important plans and\nresolutions are formed in general; but others are subordinated to these as\nmeans to an end, and others again are subordinated to these, and so on\ndown to the particular case that has to be carried out _in concreto_. They\ndo not, however, come to be carried out in the order of their dignity, but\nwhile we are occupied with plans which are great and general, we have to\ncontend with the most trifling details and the cares of the moment. In\nthis way our consciousness becomes still more desultory. In general,\ntheoretical occupations of the mind unfit us for practical affairs, and\n_vice vers\u00e2_.\n\nIn consequence of the inevitably distracted and fragmentary nature of all\nour thinking, which has been pointed out, and the mingling of ideas of\ndifferent kinds thereby introduced, to which even the noblest human minds\nare subject, we really have only _half a consciousness_ with which to\ngrope about in the labyrinth of our life and the obscurity of our\ninvestigations; bright moments sometimes illuminate our path like\nlightning. But what is to be expected of heads of which even the wisest is\nevery night the scene of the strangest and most senseless dreams, and\nwhich has to take up its meditations again on awakening from these?\nClearly a consciousness which is subject to such great limitations is\nlittle suited for solving the riddle of the world; and such an endeavour\nwould necessarily appear strange and pitiful to a being of a higher order\nwhose intellect had not time as its form, and whose thinking had thus true\ncompleteness and unity. Indeed it is really wonderful that we are not\ncompletely confused by the very heterogeneous mixture of ideas and\nfragments of thought of every kind which are constantly crossing each\nother in our minds, but are yet always able to see our way again and make\neverything agree together. Clearly there must exist a simpler thread upon\nwhich everything ranges itself together: but what is this? Memory alone is\nnot sufficient, for it has essential limitations of which I shall speak\nshortly, and besides this, it is exceedingly imperfect and untrustworthy.\nThe _logical ego_ or even the _transcendental synthetic unity of\napperception_ are expressions and explanations which will not easily serve\nto make the matter comprehensible; they will rather suggest to many:\n\n\n    \u201c\u2019Tis true your beard is curly, yet it will not draw you the\n    bolt.\u201d\n\n\nKant\u2019s proposition, \u201cThe _I think_ must accompany all our ideas,\u201d is\ninsufficient; for the \u201cI\u201d is an unknown quantity, _i.e._, it is itself a\nsecret. That which gives unity and connection to consciousness in that it\nruns through all its ideas, and is thus its substratum, its permanent\nsupporter, cannot itself be conditioned by consciousness, therefore cannot\nbe an idea. Rather it must be the _prius_ of consciousness, and the root\nof the tree of which that is the fruit. This, I say, is the _will_. It\nalone is unchangeable and absolutely identical, and has brought forth\nconsciousness for its own ends. Therefore it is also the will which gives\nit unity and holds together all its ideas and thoughts, accompanying them\nlike a continuous harmony. Without it the intellect would no longer have\nthe unity of consciousness, as a mirror in which now this and now that\nsuccessively presents itself, or at the most only so much as a convex\nmirror whose rays unite in an imaginary point behind its surface. But the\n_will_ alone is that which is permanent and unchangeable in consciousness.\nIt is the will which holds together all thoughts and ideas as means to its\nends, and tinges them with the colour of its own character, its mood, and\nits interests, commands the attention, and holds in its hand the train of\nmotives whose influence ultimately sets memory and the association of\nideas in activity; at bottom it is the will that is spoken of whenever \u201cI\u201d\nappears in a judgment. Thus it is the true and final point of unity of\nconsciousness, and the bond of all its functions and acts; it does not\nitself, however, belong to the intellect, but is only its root, source,\nand controller.\n\nFrom the _form of time and the single dimension_ of the series of ideas,\non account of which, in order to take up one, the intellect must let all\nthe others fall, there follows not only its distraction, but also its\n_forgetfulness_. Most of what it lets fall it never takes up again;\nespecially since the taking up again is bound to the principle of\nsufficient reason, and thus demands an occasion which the association of\nthoughts and motivation have first to supply; an occasion, however, which\nmay be the more remote and smaller in proportion as our sensibility for it\nis heightened by our interest in the subject. But memory, as I have\nalready shown in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, is not a\nstore-house, but merely a faculty acquired by practice of calling up ideas\nat pleasure, which must therefore constantly be kept in practice by use;\nfor otherwise it will gradually be lost. Accordingly the knowledge even of\nthe learned man exists only _virtualiter_ as an acquired facility in\ncalling up certain ideas; _actualiter_, on the other hand, it also is\nconfined to one idea, and is only conscious of this one at a time. Hence\narises a strange contrast between what he knows _potenti\u00e2_ and what he\nknows _actu_; that is, between his knowledge and what he thinks at any\nmoment: the former is an immense and always somewhat chaotic mass, the\nlatter is a single distinct thought. The relation resembles that between\nthe innumerable stars of the heavens and the limited field of vision of\nthe telescope; it appears in a striking manner when upon some occasion he\nwishes to call distinctly to his remembrance some particular circumstance\nin his knowledge, and time and trouble are required to produce it from\nthat chaos. Rapidity in doing this is a special gift, but is very\ndependent upon day and hour; therefore memory sometimes refuses us its\nservice, even in things which at another time it has readily at hand. This\nconsideration calls us in our studies to strive more to attain to correct\ninsight than to increase our learning, and to lay it to heart that the\n_quality_ of knowledge is more important than its _quantity_. The latter\nimparts to books only thickness, the former thoroughness and also style;\nfor it is an _intensive_ quantity, while the other is merely _extensive_.\nIt consists in the distinctness and completeness of the conceptions,\ntogether with the purity and accuracy of the knowledge of perception which\nforms their foundation; therefore the whole of knowledge in all its parts\nis penetrated by it, and in proportion as it is so is valuable or\ntrifling. With a small quantity, but of good quality, one achieves more\nthan with a very large quantity of bad quality.\n\nThe most perfect and satisfactory knowledge is that of perception, but it\nis limited absolutely to the particular, the individual. The combination\nof the many and the different in _one_ idea is only possible through the\n_conception_, that is, through the omission of the differences; therefore\nthis is a very imperfect manner of presenting things to the mind.\nCertainly the particular also can be directly comprehended as a universal,\nif it is raised to the (Platonic) Idea; but in this process, which I have\nanalysed in the third book, the intellect already passes beyond the limits\nof individuality, and therefore of time; moreover it is only an exception.\n\nThese inner and essential imperfections of the intellect are further\nincreased by a disturbance which, to a certain extent, is external to it,\nbut yet is unceasing\u2014the influence exerted by the will upon all its\noperations whenever it is in any way concerned in their result. Every\npassion, indeed every inclination and aversion, tinges the objects of\nknowledge with its colour. Of most common occurrence is the falsifying of\nknowledge which is brought about by wishes and hopes, for they picture to\nus the scarcely possible as probable and well nigh certain, and make us\nalmost incapable of comprehending what is opposed to it: fear acts in a\nsimilar way; and every preconceived opinion, every partiality, and, as has\nbeen said, every interest, every emotion and inclination of the will, acts\nin an analogous manner.\n\nTo all these imperfections of the intellect we have finally to add this,\nthat it grows old with the brain, that is, like all physiological\nfunctions, it loses its energy in later years, whereby all its\nimperfections are then much increased.\n\nThe defective nature of the intellect here set forth will not, however,\nsurprise us if we look back at its origin and destiny as established by me\nin the second book. Nature has produced it for the service of an\nindividual will. Therefore it is only designed to know things so far as\nthey afford the motives of such a will, but not to fathom them or\ncomprehend their true being. Human intellect is only a higher gradation of\nthe intellect of the brutes; and as this is entirely confined to the\npresent, our intellect also bears strong traces of this limitation,\nTherefore our memory and recollection is something very imperfect. How\nlittle of all that we have done, experienced, learnt, or read, can we\nrecall! And even this little for the most part only laboriously and\nimperfectly. For the same reasons is it so very difficult for us to keep\nourselves free from the impressions of the present. Unconsciousness is the\noriginal and natural condition of all things, and therefore also the basis\nfrom which, in particular species of beings, consciousness results as\ntheir highest efflorescence; wherefore even then unconsciousness always\ncontinues to predominate. Accordingly most existences are without\nconsciousness; but yet they act according to the laws of their nature,\n_i.e._, of their will. Plants have at most a very weak analogue of\nconsciousness; the lowest species of animals only the dawn of it. But even\nafter it has ascended through the whole series of animals to man and his\nreason, the unconsciousness of plants, from which it started, still\nremains the foundation, and may be traced in the necessity for sleep, and\nalso in all those essential and great imperfections, here set forth, of\nevery intellect produced through physiological functions; and of another\nintellect we have no conception.\n\nThe imperfections here proved to be _essential_ to the intellect are\nconstantly increased, however, in particular cases, by _non-essential_\nimperfections. The intellect is never in _every_ respect what it possibly\nmight be. The perfections possible to it are so opposed that they exclude\neach other. Therefore no man can be at once Plato and Aristotle, or\nShakspeare and Newton, or Kant and Goethe. The imperfections of the\nintellect, on the contrary, consort very well together; therefore in\nreality it for the most part remains far below what it might be. Its\nfunctions depend upon so very many conditions, which we can only\ncomprehend as anatomical and physiological, in the _phenomenon_ in which\nalone they are given us, that a decidedly excelling intellect, even in\n_one_ respect alone, is among the rarest of natural phenomena. Therefore\nthe productions of such an intellect are preserved through thousands of\nyears, indeed every relic of such a highly favoured individual becomes a\nmost valuable treasure. From such an intellect down to that which\napproaches imbecility the gradations are innumerable. And primarily, in\nconformity with these gradations, the _mental horizon_ of each of us\nvaries very much from the mere comprehension of the present, which even\nthe brute has, to that which also embraces the next hour, the day, even\nthe morrow, the week, the year, the life, the century, the thousand years,\nup to that of the consciousness which has almost always present, even\nthough obscurely dawning, the horizon of the infinite, and whose thoughts\ntherefore assume a character in keeping with this. Further, that\ndifference among intelligences shows itself in the rapidity of their\nthinking, which is very important, and which may be as different and as\nfinely graduated as that of the points in the radius of a revolving disc.\nThe remoteness of the consequents and reasons to which any one\u2019s thought\ncan extend seems to stand in a certain relation to the rapidity of his\nthinking, for the greatest exertion of thought-power in general can only\nlast quite a short time, and yet only while it lasts can a thought be\nthought out in its complete unity. It therefore amounts to this, how far\nthe intellect can pursue it in so short a time, thus what length of path\nit can travel in it. On the other hand, in the case of some, rapidity may\nbe made up for by the greater duration of that time of perfectly\nconcentrated thought. Probably the slow and lasting thought makes the\nmathematical mind, while rapidity of thought makes the genius. The latter\nis a flight, the former a sure advance upon firm ground, step by step. Yet\neven in the sciences, whenever it is no longer a question of mere\nquantities, but of understanding the nature of phenomena, this last kind\nof thinking is inadequate. This is shown, for example, by Newton\u2019s theory\nof colour, and later by Biot\u2019s nonsense about colour rings, which yet\nagrees with the whole atomistic method of treating light among the French,\nwith its _mol\u00e9cules de lumi\u00e8re_, and in general with their fixed idea of\nreducing everything in nature to mere mechanical effects. Lastly, the\ngreat individual diversity of intelligence we are speaking about shows\nitself excellently in the _degrees of the clearness of understanding_, and\naccordingly in the distinctness of _the whole thinking_. To one man that\nis to understand which to another is only in some degree to observe; the\none is already done and at the goal while the other is only at the\nbeginning; to the one that is the solution which to the other is only the\nproblem. This depends on the _quality of thought_ and knowledge, which was\nalready referred to above. As in rooms the degree of light varies, so does\nit in minds. We can detect this _quality of the whole thought_ as soon as\nwe have read only a few pages of an author. For in doing so we have been\nobliged to understand both with his understanding and in his sense; and\ntherefore before we know all that he has thought we see already how he\nthinks, what is the _formal_ nature, the _texture_ of his thinking, which\nremains the same in everything about which he thinks, and whose expression\nis the train of thought and the style. In this we feel at once the pace,\nthe flexibleness and lightness, even indeed the soaring power of his mind;\nor, on the contrary, its dulness, formality, lameness and leaden quality.\nFor, as language is the expression of the mind of a nation, style is the\nmore immediate expression of the mind of an author than even his\nphysiognomy. We throw a book aside when we observe that in it we enter an\nobscurer region than our own, unless we have to learn from it mere facts,\nnot thoughts. Apart from mere facts, only that author will afford us\nprofit whose understanding is keener and clearer than our own, who\nforwards our thinking instead of hindering it, like the dull mind that\nwill force us to keep pace with the toad-like course of its thought; thus\nthat author with whose mind it gives us sensible relief and assistance\nsometimes to think, by whom we feel ourselves borne where we could not\nhave gone alone. Goethe once said to me that if he read a page of Kant he\nfelt as if he entered a brightly lighted room. Inferior minds are so not\nmerely because they are distorted, and therefore judge falsely, but\nprimarily through the _indistinctness_ of their whole thinking, which may\nbe compared to seeing through a bad telescope, when all the outlines\nappear indistinct and as if obliterated, and the different objects run\ninto each other. The weak understanding of such minds shrinks from the\ndemand for distinctness of conceptions, and therefore they do not\nthemselves make this claim upon it, but put up with haziness; and to\nsatisfy themselves with this they gladly have recourse to _words_,\nespecially such as denote indefinite, very abstract, unusual conceptions\nwhich are hard to explain; such, for example, as infinite and finite,\nsensible and supersensible, the Idea of being, Ideas of the reason, the\nabsolute, the Idea of the good, the divine, moral freedom, power of\nspontaneous generation, the absolute Idea, subject-object, &c. The like of\nthese they confidently fling about, imagine they really express thoughts,\nand expect every one to be content with them; for the highest summit of\nwisdom which they can see is to have at command such ready-made words for\nevery possible question. This immense _satisfaction in words_ is\nthoroughly characteristic of inferior minds. It depends simply upon their\nincapacity for distinct conceptions, whenever these must rise above the\nmost trivial and simple relations. Hence upon the weakness and indolence\nof their intellect, and indeed upon the secret consciousness of this,\nwhich in the case of scholars is bound up with the early learnt and hard\nnecessity of passing themselves off as thinking beings, to meet which\ndemand in all cases they keep such a suitable store of ready-made words.\nIt must really be amusing to see a professor of philosophy of this kind in\nthe chair, who _bon\u00e2 fide_ delivers such a juggle of words destitute of\nthoughts, quite sincerely, under the delusion that they are really\nthoughts, and in front of him the students, who just as _bon\u00e2 fide_,\n_i.e._, under the same delusion, listen attentively and take notes, while\nyet in reality neither the one nor the other goes beyond the words, but\nrather these words themselves, together with the audible scratching of\npens, are the only realities in the whole matter. This peculiar\n_satisfaction in words_ has more than anything else to do with the\nperpetuation of errors. For, relying on the words and phrases received\nfrom his predecessors, each one confidently passes over obscurities and\nproblems, and thus these are propagated through centuries from book to\nbook; and the thinking man, especially in youth, is in doubt whether it\nmay be that he is incapable of understanding it, or that there is really\nnothing here to understand; and similarly, whether for others the problem\nwhich they all slink past with such comical seriousness by the same path\nis no problem at all, or whether it is only that they will not see it.\nMany truths remain undiscovered simply on this account, that no one has\nthe courage to look the problem in the face and grapple with it. On the\ncontrary, the distinctness of thought and clearness of conceptions\npeculiar to eminent minds produces the effect that even known truths when\nbrought forward by them gain new light, or at least a new stimulus. If we\nhear them or read them, it is as if we exchanged a bad telescope for a\ngood one. Let one only read, for example, in Euler\u2019s \u201cLetters to the\nPrincess,\u201d his exposition of the fundamental truths of mechanics and\noptics. Upon this rests the remark of Diderot in the _Neveu de Rameau_,\nthat only the perfect masters are capable of teaching really well the\nelements of a science; just because it is only they who really understand\nthe questions, and for them words never take the place of thoughts.\n\nBut we ought to know that inferior minds are the rule, good minds the\nexception, eminent minds very rare, and genius a portent. How otherwise\ncould a human race consisting of about eight hundred million individuals\nhave left so much after six thousand years to discover, to invent, to\nthink out, and to say? The intellect is calculated for the support of the\nindividual alone, and as a rule it is only barely sufficient even for\nthis. But nature has wisely been very sparing of conferring a larger\nmeasure; for the man of limited intelligence can survey the few and simple\nrelations which lie within reach of his narrow sphere of action, and can\ncontrol the levers of them with much greater ease than could the eminently\nintellectual man who commands an incomparably larger sphere and works with\nlong levers. Thus the insect sees everything on its stem or leaf with the\nmost minute exactness, and better than we, and yet is not aware of the man\nwho stands within three steps of it. This is the reason of the slyness of\nhalf-witted persons, and the ground of the paradox: _Il y a un myst\u00e8re\ndans l\u2019esprit des gens qui n\u2019en ont pas_. For practical life genius is\nabout as useful as an astral telescope in a theatre. Thus, with regard to\nthe intellect nature is highly _aristocratic_. The distinctions which it\nhas established are greater than those which are made in any country by\nbirth, rank, wealth, or caste. But in the aristocracy of intellect, as in\nother aristocracies, there are many thousands of plebeians for one\nnobleman, many millions for one prince, and the great multitude of men are\nmere populace, mob, rabble, _la canaille_. Now certainly there is a\nglaring contrast between the scale of rank of nature and that of\nconvention, and their agreement is only to be hoped for in a golden age.\nMeanwhile those who stand very high in the one scale of rank and in the\nother have this in common, that for the most part they live in exalted\nisolation, to which Byron refers when he says:\u2014\n\n\n    \u201cTo feel me in the solitude of kings\n    Without the power that makes them bear a crown.\u201d\n\n    \u2014_Proph. of Dante_, c. I.\n\n\nFor intellect is a differentiating, and therefore a separating principle.\nIts different grades, far more than those of mere culture, give to each\nman different conceptions, in consequence of which each man lives to a\ncertain extent in a different world, in which he can directly meet those\nonly who are like himself, and can only attempt to speak to the rest and\nmake himself understood by them from a distance. Great differences in the\ngrade and in the cultivation of the understanding fix a wide gulf between\nman and man, which can only be crossed by benevolence; for it is, on the\ncontrary, the unifying principle, which identifies every one else with its\nown self. Yet the connection remains a moral one; it cannot become\nintellectual. Indeed, when the degree of culture is about the same, the\nconversation between a man of great intellect and an ordinary man is like\nthe journey together of two men, one of whom rides on a spirited horse and\nthe other goes on foot. It soon becomes very trying to both of them, and\nfor any length of time impossible. For a short way the rider can indeed\ndismount, in order to walk with the other, though even then the impatience\nof his horse will give him much to do.\n\nBut the public could be benefited by nothing so much as by the recognition\nof that _intellectual aristocracy of nature_. By virtue of such\nrecognition it would comprehend that when facts are concerned, thus when\nthe matter has to be decided from experiments, travels, codes, histories,\nand chronicles, the normal mind is certainly sufficient; but, on the other\nhand, when mere thoughts are in question, especially those thoughts the\nmaterial or data of which are within reach of every one, thus when it is\nreally only a question of _thinking before_ others, decided\nreflectiveness, native eminence, which only nature bestows, and that very\nseldom, is inevitably demanded, and no one deserves to be heard who does\nnot at once give proofs of this. If the public could be brought to see\nthis for itself, it would no longer waste the time which is sparingly\nmeasured out to it for its culture on the productions of ordinary minds,\nthus on the innumerable botches of poetry and philosophy which are\nproduced every day. It would no longer seize always what is newest, in the\nchildish delusion that books, like eggs, must be enjoyed while they are\nfresh, but would confine itself to the works of the few select and chosen\nminds of all ages and nations, would strive to learn to know and\nunderstand them, and might thus by degrees attain to true culture. And\nthen, also, those thousands of uncalled-for productions which, like tares,\nhinder the growth of the good wheat would be discontinued.\n\n\n\nChapter XVI.(26) On The Practical Use Of Reason And On Stoicism.\n\n\nIn the seventh chapter I have shown that, in the theoretical sphere,\nprocedure based upon _conceptions_ suffices for mediocre achievements\nonly, while great achievements, on the other hand, demand that we should\ndraw from perception itself as the primary source of all knowledge. In the\npractical sphere, however, the converse is the case. Here determination by\nwhat is perceived is the way of the brutes, but is unworthy of man, who\nhas _conceptions_ to guide his conduct, and is thus emancipated from the\npower of what is actually perceptibly present, to which the brute is\nunconditionally given over. In proportion as a man makes good this\nprerogative his conduct may be called _rational_, and only in this sense\ncan we speak of _practical reason_, not in the Kantian sense, the\ninadmissibility of which I have thoroughly exposed in my prize essay on\nthe foundation of morals.\n\nIt is not easy, however, to let oneself be determined by _conceptions_\nalone; for the directly present external world, with its perceptible\nreality, intrudes itself forcibly even on the strongest mind. But it is\njust in conquering this impression, in destroying its illusion, that the\nhuman spirit shows its worth and greatness. Thus if incitements to lust\nand pleasure leave it unaffected, if the threats and fury of enraged\nenemies do not shake it, if the entreaties of erring friends do not make\nits purpose waver, and the delusive forms with which preconcerted plots\nsurround it leave it unmoved, if the scorn of fools and of the vulgar herd\ndoes not disturb it nor trouble it as to its own worth, then it seems to\nstand under the influence of a spirit-world, visible to it alone (and this\nis the world of conceptions), before which that perceptibly present world\nwhich lies open to all dissolves like a phantom. But, on the other hand,\nwhat gives to the external world and visible reality their great power\nover the mind is their nearness and directness. As the magnetic needle,\nwhich is kept in its position by the combined action of widely distributed\nforces of nature embracing the whole earth, can yet be perturbed and set\nin violent oscillation by a small piece of iron, if only it comes quite\nclose to it, so even a great mind can sometimes be disconcerted and\nperturbed by trifling events and insignificant men, if only they affect it\nvery closely, and the deliberate purpose can be for the moment shaken by a\ntrivial but immediately present counter motive. For the influence of the\nmotives is subject to a law which is directly opposed to the law according\nto which weights act on a balance, and in consequence of it a very small\nmotive, which, however, lies very near to us, can outweigh one which in\nitself is much stronger, but which only affects us from a distance. But it\nis this quality of the mind, by reason of which it allows itself to be\ndetermined in accordance with this law, and does not withdraw itself from\nit by the strength of actual practical reason, which the ancients denoted\nby _animi impotentia_, which really signifies _ratio regend\u00e6 voluntatis\nimpotens_. Every _emotion_ (_animi perturbatio_) simply arises from the\nfact that an idea which affects our will comes so excessively near to us\nthat it conceals everything else from us, and we can no longer see\nanything but it, so that for the moment we become incapable of taking\naccount of things of another kind. It would be a valuable safeguard\nagainst this if we were to bring ourselves to regard the present, by the\nassistance of imagination, as if it were past, and should thus accustom\nour apperception to the epistolary style of the Romans. Yet conversely we\nare very well able to regard what is long past as so vividly present that\nold emotions which have long been asleep are thereby reawakened in their\nfull strength. Thus also no one would be irritated or disconcerted by a\nmisfortune, a disappointment, if reason always kept present to him what\nman really is: the most needy of creatures, daily and hourly abandoned to\ninnumerable misfortunes, great and small, \u03c4\u03bf \u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b6\u03c9\u03bf\u03bd, who has\ntherefore to live in constant care and fear. Herodotus already says, \u201c\u03a0\u03b1\u03bd\n\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b1\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b1\u201d (_homo totus est calamitas_).\n\nThe application of reason to practice primarily accomplishes this. It\nreconstructs what is one-sided and defective in knowledge of mere\nperception, and makes use of the contrasts or oppositions which it\npresents, to correct each other, so that thus the objectively true result\nis arrived at. For example, if we look simply at the bad action of a man\nwe will condemn him; on the other hand, if we consider merely the need\nthat moved him to it, we will compassionate him: reason, by means of its\nconceptions, weighs the two, and leads to the conclusion that he must be\nrestrained, restricted, and curbed by a proportionate punishment.\n\nI am again reminded here of Seneca\u2019s saying: \u201c_Si vis tibi omnia\nsubjicere, te subjice rationi_.\u201d Since, however, as was shown in the\nfourth book, the nature of suffering is positive, and that of pleasure\nnegative, he who takes abstract or rational knowledge as the rule of his\nconduct, and therefore constantly reflects on its consequences and on the\nfuture, will very frequently have to practise _sustine et abstine_, for in\norder to obtain the life that is most free from pain he generally\nsacrifices its keenest joys and pleasures, mindful of Aristotle\u2019s \u201c\u1f41\n\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf \u03b1\u03bb\u03c5\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03c9\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9, \u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf \u1f21\u03b4\u03c5\u201d (_quod dolore vacat, non quod __\nsuave est, persequitur vir prudens_). Therefore with him the future\nconstantly borrows from the present, instead of the present borrowing from\nthe future, as is the case with a frivolous fool, who thus becomes\nimpoverished and finally bankrupt. In the case of the former reason must,\nfor the most part, assume the _r\u00f4le_ of a churlish mentor, and unceasingly\ncall for renunciations, without being able to promise anything in return,\nexcept a fairly painless existence. This rests on the fact that reason, by\nmeans of its conceptions, surveys the _whole_ of life, whose outcome, in\nthe happiest conceivable case, can be no other than what we have said.\n\nWhen this striving after a painless existence, so far as it might be\nattainable by the application of and strict adherence to rational\nreflection and acquired knowledge of the true nature of life, was carried\nout with the greatest consistency and to the utmost extreme, it produced\ncynicism, from which stoicism afterwards proceeded. I wish briefly here to\nbring this out more fully for the sake of establishing more firmly the\nconcluding exposition of our first book.\n\nAll ancient moral systems, with the single exception of that of Plato,\nwere guides to a happy life. Accordingly in them the end of virtue was\nentirely in this life, not beyond death. For to them it is only the right\npath to a truly happy life; and on this account the wise choose it. Hence\narise those lengthy debates chiefly preserved for us by Cicero, those keen\nand constantly renewed investigations, whether virtue quite alone and in\nitself is really sufficient for a happy life, or whether this further\nrequires some external condition; whether the virtuous and wise may also\nbe happy on the rack and the wheel, or in the bull of Phalaris; or whether\nit does not go as far as this. For certainly this would be the touchstone\nof an ethical system of this kind; the practice of it must give happiness\ndirectly and unconditionally. If it cannot do this it does not accomplish\nwhat it ought, and must be rejected. It is therefore with truth and in\naccordance with the Christian point of view that Augustine prefaces his\nexposition of the moral systems of the ancients (_De Civ. Dei_, Lib. xix.\nc. 1) with the explanation: \u201c_Exponenda sunt nobis argumenta mortalium,\nquibus sibi ipsi beatitudinem facere_ IN HUJUS VIT\u00c6 INFELICITATE _moliti\nsunt; ut ab eorum rebus vanis spes nostra quid differat clarescat. De\nfinibus bonorum et malorum multa inter se philosophi disputarunt; quam\nqu\u00e6stionem maxima intentione versantes, invenire conati sunt, quid\nefficiat hominem beatum: illud enim est finis bonorum._\u201d I wish to place\nbeyond all doubt the eud\u00e6monistic end which we have ascribed to all\nancient ethics by several express statements of the ancients themselves.\nAristotle says in the \u201c_Eth. Magna_,\u201d i. 4: \u201c\u1f29 \u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03b1 \u03b5\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff3 \u03b5\u03bd \u03b6\u1fc3\u03bd\n\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9, \u03c4\u03bf \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b5\u03c5 \u03b6\u1fc3\u03bd \u03b5\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff3 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b6\u1fc3\u03bd.\u201d (_Felicitas in bene vivendo\nposita est: verum bene vivere est in eo positum, ut secundum virtutem\nvivamus_), with which may be compared \u201c_Eth. Nicom._,\u201d i. 5. \u201c_Cic.\nTusc._,\u201d v. 1: \u201c_Nam, quum ea causa impulerit eos, qui primi se ad\nphilosophi\u00e6 studia contulerunt, ut, omnibus rebus posthabitis, totos se in\noptimo vit\u00e6 statu exquirendo collocarent; profecto spe beate vivendi\ntantam in eo studio curam operamque posuerunt_\u201d. According to Plutarch\n(_De Repugn. Stoic._, c. xviii.) Chrysippus said: \u201c\u03a4\u03bf \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03b6\u1fc3\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff3\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b6\u1fc3\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9.\u201d (_Vitiose vivere idem est guod vivere\ninfeliciter._) Ibid., c. 26: \u201c\u1f29 \u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf\u03c5\u03c7 \u1f11\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03b1\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fbd \u1f11\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf, \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u1fbd \u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03b1.\u201d (_Prudentia nihil differt a felicitate,\nestque ipsa adeo felicitas._) \u201cStob. Ecl.,\u201d Lib. ii. c. 7: \u201c\u03a4\u03b5\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03c6\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf \u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f41\u03c5 \u1f11\u03bd\u03b5\u03ba\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9.\u201d (_Finem esse dicunt\nfelicitatem, cujus causa fiunt omnia._) \u201c\u0395\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd\u03c5\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\n\u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9.\u201d (_Finem bonorum et felicitatem synonyma esse dicunt._) \u201cArrian\nDiss. Epict.,\u201d i. 4: \u201c\u1f29 \u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03b7 \u03c4\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03b5\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03b5\u03c0\u03b1\u03b3\u03b3\u03b5\u03bb\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd, \u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9.\u201d (_Virtus profitetur, se felicitatem pr\u00e6stare._) Sen., Ep. 90:\n\u201c_Ceterum (sapientia) ad beatum statum tendit, illo ducit, __ illo vias\naperit_.\u201d\u2014Id., Ep. 108: \u201c_Illud admoneo auditionem philosophorum,\nlectionemque, ad propositum beat\u00e6 vit\u00e6 trahendum._\u201d\n\nThe ethics of the Cynics also adopted this end of the happiest life, as\nthe Emperor Julian expressly testifies (Orat. vi.): \u201c\u03a4\u03b7\u03c2 \u039a\u03c5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b5\n\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b9\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f61\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03b4\u03b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b9\u03b1\u03c2, \u03c4\u03bf\n\u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd; \u03c4\u03bf \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff3 \u03b6\u1fc3\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03bc\u03b7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03b1\u03c2.\u201d (_Cynic\u00e6 philosophi\u00e6 ut etiam omnis philosophi\u00e6, scopus et\nfinis est feliciter vivere: felicitas vit\u00e6 autem in eo posita est, ut\nsecundum naturam vivatur, nec vero secundum opiniones multitudinis._) Only\nthe Cynics followed quite a peculiar path to this end, a path directly\nopposed to the ordinary one\u2014the path of extreme privation. They start from\nthe insight that the motions of the will which are brought about by the\nobjects which attract and excite it, and the wearisome, and for the most\npart vain, efforts to attain these, or, if they are attained, the fear of\nlosing them, and finally the loss itself, produce far greater pain than\nthe want of all these objects ever can. Therefore, in order to attain to\nthe life that is most free from pain, they chose the path of the extremest\ndestitution, and fled from all pleasures as snares through which one was\nafterwards handed over to pain. But after this they could boldly scorn\nhappiness and its caprices. This is the _spirit of cynicism_. Seneca\ndistinctly expresses it in the eighth chapter, \u201c_De Tranquilitate Animi_:\u201d\n\u201c_Cogitandum est, quanto levior dolor sit, non habere, quam perdere: et\nintelligemus paupertati eo minorem tormentorum, quo minorem damnorum esse\nmateriam._\u201d Then: \u201c_Tolerabilius est, faciliusque, non acquirere, quam\namittere.... Diogenes effecit, ne quid sibi eripi posset, ... qui se\nfortuitis omnibus exuit.... Videtur mihi dixisse; age tuum negotium,\nfortuna: nihil apud Diogenem jam tuum est._\u201d The parallel passage to this\nlast sentence is the quotation of Stob\u00e6us (_Ecl._ ii. 7): \u201c\u0394\u03b9\u03bf\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b5\u03c6\u03b7\n\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b9\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f41\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03a4\u03c5\u03c7\u03b7\u03bd \u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd; \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1fbd \u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03b2\u03b1\u03bb\u03b5\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03ba\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03bb\u03c5\u03c3\u03c3\u03b7\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03b1.\u201d (_Diogenes credere se dixit, videre Fortunam,\nipsum intuentem, ac dicentem: aut hunc non potui tetigisse canem\nrabiosum._) The same spirit of cynicism is also shown in the epitaph on\nDiogenes, in Suidas, under the word \u03a6\u03b9\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2, and in \u201cDiogenes Laertius,\u201d\nvi. 2:\n\n\n    \u201c\u0393\u03b7\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03c7\u03b1\u03bb\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf \u03c7\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5; \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03b9\n      \u039a\u03c5\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f41 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b1\u03b9\u03c9\u03bd, \u0394\u03b9\u03bf\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9;\n    \u039c\u03bf\u03c5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b2\u03b9\u03bf\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03ba\u03b5\u03b1 \u03b4\u03bf\u03be\u03b1\u03bd \u03b5\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03be\u03b1\u03c2\n      \u0398\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b6\u03c9\u03b7\u03c2 \u03bf\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u03bb\u03b1\u03c6\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd.\u201d\n\n    (_\u00c6ra quidem absumit tempus, sed tempore numquam_\n      _Interitura tua est gloria, Diogenes:_\n    _Quandoquidem ad vitam miseris mortalibus \u00e6quam_\n      _Monstrata est facilis, te duce, et ampla via._)\n\n\nAccordingly the fundamental thought of cynicism is that life in its\nsimplest and nakedest form, with the hardships that belong to it by\nnature, is the most endurable, and is therefore to be chosen; for every\nassistance, convenience, gratification, and pleasure by means of which men\nseek to make life more agreeable only brings with it new and greater ills\nthan originally belonged to it. Therefore we may regard the following\nsentence as the expression of the kernel of the doctrine of cynicism:\n\u201c\u0394\u03b9\u03bf\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b5\u03b2\u03bf\u1fb3 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03ba\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd, \u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b1\u03bd\u03b8\u03c9\u03c0\u03c9\u03bd \u03b2\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03b4\u03b5\u03b4\u03bf\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03b1\u03c0\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u03ba\u03c1\u03c5\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b6\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u03b5\u03bb\u03b9\u03c0\u03b7\u03ba\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03c5\u03c1\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b1\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1.\u201d (_Diogenes clamabat s\u00e6pius, hominum vitam facilem a diis\ndari, verum occultari illam qu\u00e6rentibus mellita cibaria, unguenta et his\nsimilia._) (_Diog., Laert._, vi. 2.) And further: \u201c\u0394\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd, \u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b1\u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd, \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f11\u03bb\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u03b6\u1fc3\u03bd \u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03c9\u03c2; \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9.... \u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c7\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b2\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03be\u03b1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f41\u03bd\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\n\u1f29\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2, \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u03b5\u03bd \u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03b8\u03b7\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd.\u201d (_Quum igitur, repudiatis inutilibus\nlaboribus, naturales insequi, ac vivere beate debeamus, per summam\ndementiam infelices sumus.... eandem vit\u00e6 formam, quam Hercules, se vivere\naffirmans, nihil libertati pr\u00e6ferens. Ibid._) Therefore the old, genuine\nCynics, Antisthenes, Diogenes, Krates, and their disciples had once for\nall renounced every possession, all conveniences and pleasures, in order\nto escape for ever from the troubles and cares, the dependence and the\npains, which are inevitably bound up with them and are not counterbalanced\nby them. Through the bare satisfaction of the most pressing wants and the\nrenunciation of everything superfluous they thought they would come off\nbest. Accordingly they contented themselves with what in Athens or Corinth\nwas to be had almost for nothing, such as lupines, water, an old\nthreadbare cloak, a wallet, and a staff. They begged occasionally, as far\nas was necessary to supply such wants, but they never worked. Yet they\naccepted absolutely nothing that exceeded the wants referred to above.\nIndependence in the widest sense was their aim. They occupied their time\nin resting, going about, talking with all men, and much mocking, laughing,\nand joking; their characteristic was carelessness and great cheerfulness.\nSince now in this manner of life they had no aims of their own, no\npurposes or ends to pursue, thus were lifted above the sphere of human\naction, and at the same time always enjoyed complete leisure, they were\nadmirably fitted, as men of proved strength of mind, to be the advisers\nand admonishers of the rest. Therefore Apuleius says (_Florid._, iv.):\n\u201c_Crates, ut lar familiaris apud homines su\u00e6 \u00e6tatis cultus est. Nulla\ndomus ei unquam clausa erat: nec erat patrisfamilias tam absconditum\nsecretum, quin eo tempestive Crates interveniret, litium omnium et\njurgiorum inter propinquos disceptator et arbiter._\u201d Thus in this, as in\nso many other respects, they show a great likeness to the mendicant friars\nof modern times, that is, to the better and more genuine among them, whose\nideal may be seen in the Capucine Christoforo in Manzoni\u2019s famous romance.\nYet this resemblance lies only in the effects, not in the cause. They\nagree in the result, but the fundamental thought of the two is quite\ndifferent. With the friars, as with the Sanny\u00e2sis, who are akin to them,\nit is an aim which transcends life; but with the Cynics it is only the\nconviction that it is easier to reduce their wishes and their wants to the\n_minimum_, than to attain to the _maximum_ in their satisfaction, which\nindeed is impossible, for with their satisfaction the wishes and wants\ngrow _ad infinitum_; therefore, in order to reach the goal of all ancient\nethics, the greatest happiness possible in this life, they took the path\nof renunciation as the shortest and easiest: \u201c\u1f41\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u039a\u03c5\u03bd\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03b7\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u03c0\u1fbd \u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u1f41\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd.\u201d (_Unde Cynismum dixere compendiosam\nad virtutem viam._) _Diog. Laert._, vi. 9. The fundamental difference\nbetween the spirit of cynicism and that of asceticism comes out very\nclearly in the humility which is essential to the ascetic, but is so\nforeign to the Cynic that, on the contrary, he is distinguished beyond\neverything else for pride and scorn:\u2014\n\n\n    \u201c_Sapiens uno minor est Jove, dives,_\n    _Liber, honoratus, pulcher, rex denique regum._\u201d\u2014_Hor._\n\n\nOn the other hand, the view of life held by the Cynics agrees in spirit\nwith that of J. J. Rousseau as he expounds it in the \u201c_Discours sur\nl\u2019Origine de l\u2019In\u00e9galit\u00e9_.\u201d For he also would wish to lead us back to the\ncrude state of nature, and regards the reduction of our wants to the\nminimum as the surest path to happiness. For the rest, the Cynics were\nexclusively _practical_ philosophers: at least no account of their\ntheoretical philosophy is known to me.\n\nNow the Stoics proceeded from them in this way\u2014they changed the practical\ninto the theoretical. They held that the _actual_ dispensing with\neverything that can be done without is not demanded, but that it is\nsufficient that we should regard possessions and pleasures constantly as\n_dispensable_, and as held in the hand of chance; for then the actual\ndeprivation of them, if it should chance to occur, would neither be\nunexpected nor fall heavily. One might always have and enjoy everything;\nonly one must ever keep present the conviction of the worthlessness and\ndispensableness of these good things on the one hand, and of their\nuncertainty and perishableness on the other, and therefore prize them all\nvery little, and be always ready to give them up. Nay more, he who must\nactually dispense with these things in order not to be moved by them,\nthereby shows that in his heart he holds them to be truly good things,\nwhich one must put quite out of sight if one is not to long after them.\nThe wise man, on the other hand, knows that they are not good things at\nall, but rather perfectly indifferent things, \u03b1\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03b1, in any case\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1. Therefore if they present themselves he will accept them, but\nyet is always ready to let them go again, if chance, to which they belong,\nshould demand them back; for they are \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03bf\u03c5\u03ba \u03b5\u03c6\u1fbd \u1f21\u03bc\u03b9\u03bd. In this sense,\nEpictetus, chap. vii., says that the wise man, like one who has landed\nfrom a ship, &c., will also let himself be comforted by a wife or a child,\nbut yet will always be ready, whenever the captain calls, to let them go\nagain. Thus the Stoics perfected the theory of equanimity and independence\nat the cost of the practice, for they reduced everything to a mental\nprocess, and by arguments, such as are presented in the first chapter of\nEpictetus, sophisticated themselves into all the amenities of life. But in\ndoing so they left out of account that everything to which one is\naccustomed becomes a need, and therefore can only be given up with pain;\nthat the will does not allow itself to be played with, cannot enjoy\nwithout loving the pleasures; that a dog does not remain indifferent if\none draws a piece of meat through its mouth, and neither does a wise man\nif he is hungry; and that there is no middle path between desiring and\nrenouncing. But they believed that they satisfied their principles if,\nsitting at a luxurious Roman table, they left no dish untasted, yet at the\nsame time protested that they were each and all of them mere \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b7\u03b3\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1,\nnot \u03b1\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03b1; or in plain English, if they eat, drank, and were merry, yet\ngave no thanks to God for it all, but rather made fastidious faces, and\npersisted in boldly asserting that they gained nothing whatever from the\nwhole feast. This was the expedient of the Stoics; they were therefore\nmere braggarts, and stand to the Cynics in much the same relation as\nwell-fed Benedictines and Augustines stand to Franciscans and Capucines.\nNow the more they neglected practice, the more they refined the theory. I\nshall here add a few proofs and supplementary details to the exposition of\nit given at the close of our first book.\n\nIf we search in the writings of the Stoics which remain to us, all of\nwhich are unsystematically composed, for the ultimate ground of that\nirrefragible equanimity which is unceasingly demanded of us, we find no\nother than the knowledge that the course of the world is entirely\nindependent of our will, and consequently, that the evil which befalls us\nis inevitable. If we have regulated our claims by a correct insight into\nthis, then mourning, rejoicing, fearing, and hoping are follies of which\nwe are no longer capable. Further, especially in the commentaries of\nArrian, it is surreptitiously assumed that all that is \u03bf\u03c5\u03ba \u03b5\u03c6\u1fbd \u1f21\u03bc\u03b9\u03bd\n(_i.e._, does not depend upon us) is at once also \u03bf\u03c5 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bc\u03b1\u03c2 (_i.e._,\ndoes not concern us). Yet it remains true that all the good things of life\nare in the power of chance, and therefore whenever it makes use of this\npower to deprive us of them, we are unhappy if we have placed our\nhappiness in them. From this unworthy fate we are, in the opinion of the\nStoics, delivered by the right use of reason, by virtue of which we regard\nall these things, never as ours, but only as lent to us for an indefinite\ntime; only thus can we never really lose them. Therefore Seneca says (Ep.\n98): \u201c_Si, quid humanarum rerum varietas possit, cogitaverit, ante quam\nsenserit_,\u201d and Diogenes Laertius (vii. 1. 87): \u201c\u0399\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1fbd\n\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03b6\u1fc3\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff3 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1fbd \u03b5\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bc\u03b2\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b6\u1fc3\u03bd.\u201d (_Secundum\nvirtutem vivere idem est, quod secundum experientiam eorum, qu\u00e6 secundum\nnaturam accidunt, vivere._) The passage in Arrian\u2019s \u201cDiscourses of\nEpictetus,\u201d B. iii., c. 24, 84-89, is particularly in point here; and\nespecially, as a proof of what I have said in this reference in \u00a7 16 of\nthe first volume, the passage: \u201c\u03a4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf \u03b3\u03b1\u03c1 \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf \u03b1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b1\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b7 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b5\u03c6\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03bf\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03b5\u03c0\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2,\u201d Ibid. iv., 1. 42. (_H\u00e6c enim causa est hominibus omnium\nmalorum, quod anticipationes generales rebus singularibus accommodare non\npossunt._) Similarly the passage in \u201cMarcus Aurelius\u201d (iv. 29): \u201c\u0395\u03b9 \u03be\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2\n\u03ba\u03bf\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f41 \u03bc\u03b7 \u03b3\u03bd\u03c9\u03c1\u03b9\u03b6\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1 \u03b5\u03bd \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1, \u03bf\u03c5\u03c7 \u1f21\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03be\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bf \u03bc\u03b7 \u03b3\u03bd\u03c9\u03c1\u03b9\u03b6\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\n\u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1;\u201d that is: \u201cIf he is a stranger to the universe who does not\nknow what is in it, no less is he a stranger who does not know how things\ngo on in it.\u201d Also Seneca\u2019s eleventh chapter, \u201c_De Tranquilitate Animi_,\u201d\nis a complete proof of this view. The opinion of the Stoics amounts on the\nwhole to this, that if a man has watched for a while the juggling illusion\nof happiness and then uses his reason, he must recognise both the rapid\nchanges of the dice and the intrinsic worthlessness of the counters, and\ntherefore must henceforth remain unmoved. Taken generally the Stoical\npoint of view may be thus expressed: our suffering always arises from the\nwant of agreement between our wishes and the course of the world.\nTherefore one of these two must be changed and adapted to the other. Since\nnow the course of things is not in our power (\u03bf\u03c5\u03ba \u03b5\u03c6\u1fbd \u1f21\u03bc\u03b9\u03bd), we must\ndirect our volitions and desires according to the course of things: for\nthe will alone is \u03b5\u03c6\u1fbd \u1f21\u03bc\u03b9\u03bd. This adaptation of volition to the course of\nthe external world, thus to the nature of things, is very often understood\nunder the ambiguous \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b6\u03b7\u03bd. See the \u201cDiscourses of Epictetus,\u201d ii.\n17, 21, 22. Seneca also denotes this point of view (Ep. 119) when he says:\n\u201c_Nihil interest, utrum non desideres, an habeas. Summa rei in utroque est\neadem: non torqueberis._\u201d Also Cicero (_Tusc._ iv. 26) by the words:\n\u201c_Solum habere velle, summa dementia est._\u201d Similarly Arrian (iv. 1. 175):\n\u201c\u039f\u03c5 \u03b3\u03b1\u03c1 \u03b5\u03ba\u03c0\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c5\u03b1\u03b6\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9, \u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\n\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c5\u03b7 \u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b5\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03b9\u03b1\u03c2.\u201d (_Non enim explendis desideriis libertas\ncomparatur, sed tollenda cupiditate._)\n\nThe collected quotations in the \u201c_Historia Philosophi\u00e6 Gr\u00e6co-Roman\u00e6_\u201d of\nRitter and Preller may be taken as proofs of what I have said, in the\nplace referred to above, about the \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b6\u1fc3\u03bd of the Stoics. Also\nthe saying of Seneca (Ep. 31, and again Ep. 74): \u201c_Perfecta virtus est\n\u00e6qualitas et tenor vit\u00e6 per omnia consonans sibi._\u201d The following passage\nof Seneca\u2019s indicates the spirit of the Stoa generally (Ep. 92): \u201c_Quid\nest beata vita? Securitas et perpetua tranquillitas. Hanc dabit animi\nmagnitudo, dabit constantia bene judicati tenax._\u201d A systematical study of\nthe Stoics will convince every one that the end of their ethics, like that\nof the ethics of Cynicism from which they sprang, is really nothing else\nthan a life as free as possible from pain, and therefore as happy as\npossible. Whence it follows that the Stoical morality is only a special\nform of _Eud\u00e6monism_. It has not, like the Indian, the Christian, and even\nthe Platonic ethics, a metaphysical tendency, a transcendental end, but a\ncompletely immanent end, attainable in this life; the steadfast serenity\n(\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03be\u03b9\u03b1) and unclouded happiness of the wise man, whom nothing can\ndisturb. Yet it cannot be denied that the later Stoics, especially Arrian,\nsometimes lose sight of this end, and show a really ascetic tendency,\nwhich is to be attributed to the Christian and Oriental spirit in general\nwhich was then already spreading. If we consider closely and seriously the\ngoal of Stoicism, that \u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03be\u03b9\u03b1, we find in it merely a hardening and\ninsensibility to the blow of fate which a man attains to because he keeps\never present to his mind the shortness of life, the emptiness of pleasure,\nthe instability of happiness, and has also discerned that the difference\nbetween happiness and unhappiness is very much less than our anticipation\nof both is wont to represent. But this is yet no state of happiness; it is\nonly the patient endurance of sufferings which one has foreseen as\nirremediable. Yet magnanimity and worth consist in this, that one should\nbear silently and patiently what is irremediable, in melancholy peace,\nremaining always the same, while others pass from rejoicing to despair and\nfrom despair to rejoicing. Accordingly one may also conceive of Stoicism\nas a spiritual hygiene, in accordance with which, just as one hardens the\nbody against the influences of wind and weather, against fatigue and\nexertion, one has also to harden one\u2019s mind against misfortune, danger,\nloss, injustice, malice, perfidy, arrogance, and the folly of men.\n\nI remark further, that the \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b3\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 of the Stoics, which Cicero\ntranslates _officia_, signify as nearly as possible _Obliegenheiten_, or\nthat which it befits the occasion to do; English, _incumbencies_; Italian,\n_quel che tocca a me di fare, o di lasciare_, thus what _it behoves_ a\nreasonable man to do. Cf. _Diog. Laert._, vii. 1. 109. Finally, the\n_pantheism_ of the Stoics, though absolutely inconsistent with many an\nexhortation of Arrian, is most distinctly expressed by Seneca: \u201c_Quid est\nDeus? Mens universi. Quid est Deus? Quod vides totum, et quod non vides\ntotum. Sic demum magnitudo sua illi redditur, qua nihil majus excogitari\npotest: si solus est omnia, opus suum et extra, et intra tenet._\u201d (_Qu\u00e6st.\nNatur._ 1, _pr\u00e6fatio_ 12.)\n\n\n\nChapter XVII.(27) On Man\u2019s Need Of Metaphysics.\n\n\nWith the exception of man, no being wonders at its own existence; but it\nis to them all so much a matter of course that they do not observe it. The\nwisdom of nature speaks out of the peaceful glance of the brutes; for in\nthem the will and the intellect are not yet so widely separated that they\ncan be astonished at each other when they meet again. Thus here the whole\nphenomenon is still firmly attached to the stem of nature from which it\nhas come, and is partaker of the unconscious omniscience of the great\nmother. Only after the inner being of nature (the will to live in its\nobjectification) has ascended, vigorous and cheerful, through the two\nseries of unconscious existences, and then through the long and broad\nseries of animals, does it attain at last to reflection for the first time\non the entrance of reason, thus in man. Then it marvels at its own works,\nand asks itself what it itself is. Its wonder however is the more serious,\nas it here stands for the first time consciously in the presence of\n_death_, and besides the finiteness of all existence, the vanity of all\neffort forces itself more or less upon it. With this reflection and this\nwonder there arises therefore for man alone, the _need for a metaphysic_;\nhe is accordingly an _animal metaphysicum_. At the beginning of his\nconsciousness certainly he also accepts himself as a matter of course.\nThis does not last long however, but very early, with the first dawn of\nreflection, that wonder already appears, which is some day to become the\nmother of metaphysics. In agreement with this Aristotle also says at the\nbeginning of his metaphysics: \u201c\u0394\u03b9\u03b1 \u03b3\u03b1\u03c1 \u03c4\u03bf \u03b8\u03b1\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31 \u03b1\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bd\u03c5\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf \u03c0\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b7\u03c1\u03be\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd.\u201d (_Propter admirationem enim et nunc et\nprimo inceperunt homines philosophari._) Moreover, the special\nphilosophical disposition consists primarily in this, that a man is\ncapable of wonder beyond the ordinary and everyday degree, and is thus\ninduced to make the _universal_ of the phenomenon his problem, while the\ninvestigators in the natural sciences wonder only at exquisite or rare\nphenomena, and their problem is merely to refer these to phenomena which\nare better known. The lower a man stands in an intellectual regard the\nless of a problem is existence itself for him; everything, how it is, and\nthat it is, appears to him rather a matter of course. This rests upon the\nfact that his intellect still remains perfectly true to its original\ndestiny of being serviceable to the will as the medium of motives, and\ntherefore is closely bound up with the world and nature, as an integral\npart of them. Consequently it is very far from comprehending the world in\na purely objective manner, freeing itself, so to speak, from the whole of\nthings, opposing itself to this whole, and so for a while becoming as if\nself-existent. On the other hand, the philosophical wonder which springs\nfrom this is conditioned in the individual by higher development of the\nintellect, yet in general not by this alone; but without doubt it is the\nknowledge of death, and along with this the consideration of the suffering\nand misery of life, which gives the strongest impulse to philosophical\nreflection and metaphysical explanation of the world. If our life were\nendless and painless, it would perhaps occur to no one to ask why the\nworld exists, and is just the kind of world it is; but everything would\njust be taken as a matter of course. In accordance with this we find that\nthe interest which philosophical and also religious systems inspire has\nalways its strongest hold in the dogma of some kind of existence after\ndeath; and although the most recent systems seem to make the existence of\ntheir gods the main point, and to defend this most zealously, yet in\nreality this is only because they have connected their special dogma of\nimmortality with this, and regard the one as inseparable from the other:\nonly on this account is it of importance to them. For if one could\nestablish their doctrine of immortality for them in some other way, their\nlively zeal for their gods would at once cool, and it would give place\nalmost to complete indifference if, conversely, the absolute impossibility\nof immortality were proved to them; for the interest in the existence of\nthe gods would vanish with the hope of a closer acquaintance with them, to\nthe residuum which might connect itself with their possible influence on\nthe events of this present life. But if one could prove that continued\nexistence after death is incompatible with the existence of gods, because,\nlet us say, it pre-supposes originality of being, they would soon\nsacrifice the gods to their own immortality and become zealous for\nAtheism. The fact that the materialistic systems, properly so-called, and\nalso absolute scepticism, have never been able to obtain a general or\nlasting influence, depends upon the same grounds.\n\nTemples and churches, pagodas and mosques, in all lands and in all ages,\nin splendour and vastness, testify to the metaphysical need of man, which,\nstrong and ineradicable, follows close upon his physical need. Certainly\nwhoever is satirically inclined might add that this metaphysical need is a\nmodest fellow who is content with poor fare. It sometimes allows itself to\nbe satisfied with clumsy fables and insipid tales. If only imprinted early\nenough, they are for a man adequate explanations of his existence and\nsupports of his morality. Consider, for example, the Koran. This wretched\nbook was sufficient to found a religion of the world, to satisfy the\nmetaphysical need of innumerable millions of men for twelve hundred years,\nto become the foundation of their morality, and of no small contempt for\ndeath, and also to inspire them to bloody wars and most extended\nconquests. We find in it the saddest and the poorest form of Theism. Much\nmay be lost through the translations; but I have not been able to discover\none single valuable thought in it. Such things show that metaphysical\ncapacity does not go hand in hand with the metaphysical need. Yet it will\nappear that in the early ages of the present surface of the earth this was\nnot the case, and that those who stood considerably nearer than we do to\nthe beginning of the human race and the source of organic nature, had also\nboth greater energy of the intuitive faculty of knowledge, and a truer\ndisposition of mind, so that they were capable of a purer, more direct\ncomprehension of the inner being of nature, and were thus in a position to\nsatisfy the metaphysical need in a more worthy manner. Thus originated in\nthe primitive ancestors of the Brahmans, the Rishis, the almost\nsuper-human conceptions which were afterwards set down in the Upanishads\nof the Vedas.\n\nOn the other hand, there have never been wanting persons who were\ninterested in deriving their living from that metaphysical need, and in\nmaking the utmost they could out of it. Therefore among all nations there\nare monopolists and farmers-general of it\u2014the priests. Yet their trade had\neverywhere to be assured to them in this way, that they received the right\nto impart their metaphysical dogmas to men at a very early age, before the\njudgment has awakened from its morning slumber, thus in early childhood;\nfor then every well-impressed dogma, however senseless it may be, remains\nfor ever. If they had to wait till the judgment is ripe, their privileges\ncould not continue.\n\nA second, though not a numerous class of persons, who derive their support\nfrom the metaphysical need of man, is constituted by those who live by\n_philosophy_. By the Greeks they were called Sophists, by the moderns they\nare called Professors of Philosophy. Aristotle (_Metaph._, ii. 2) without\nhesitation numbers Aristippus among the Sophists. In Diogenes Laertius\n(ii. 65) we find that the reason of this is that he was the first of the\nSocratics who accepted payment for his philosophy; on account of which\nSocrates also returned him his present. Among the moderns also those who\nlive _by_ philosophy are not only, as a rule, and with the rarest\nexceptions, quite different from those who live _for_ philosophy, but they\nare very often the opponents, the secret and irreconcilable enemies of the\nlatter. For every true and important philosophical achievement will\novershadow their own too much, and, moreover, cannot adapt itself to the\nviews and limitations of their guild. Therefore it is always their\nendeavour to prevent such a work from making its way; and for this\npurpose, according to the age and circumstances in each case, the\ncustomary means are suppressing, concealing, hushing up, ignoring and\nkeeping secret, or denying, disparaging, censuring, slandering and\ndistorting, or, finally, denouncing and persecuting. Hence many a great\nman has had to drag himself wearily through life unknown, unhonoured,\nunrewarded, till at last, after his death, the world became undeceived as\nto him and as to them. In the meanwhile they had attained their end, had\nbeen accepted by preventing him from being accepted, and, with wife and\nchild, had lived _by_ philosophy, while he lived _for_ it. But if he is\ndead, then the thing is reversed; the new generation of the former class,\nwhich always exists, now becomes heir to his achievements, cuts them down\nto its own measure, and now lives _by_ him. That Kant could yet live both\n_by_ and _for_ philosophy depended on the rare circumstance that, for the\nfirst time since _Divus Antoninus_ and _Divus Julianus_, a philosopher sat\non the throne. Only under such auspices could the \u201cCritique of Pure\nReason\u201d have seen the light. Scarcely was the king dead than we see that\nKant also, seized with fear, because he belonged to the guild, modified,\nexpurgated, and spoiled his masterpiece in the second edition, and yet was\nsoon in danger of losing his place; so that Campe invited him to come to\nhim, in Brunswick, and live with him as the instructor of his family\n(Ring., _Ansichten aus Kant\u2019s Leben_, p. 68). University philosophy is, as\na rule, mere juggling. Its real aim is to impart to the students, in the\ndeepest ground of their thought, that tendency of mind which the ministry\nthat appoints to the professorships regards as consistent with its views.\nThe ministry may also be perfectly right in this from a statesman\u2019s point\nof view; only the result of it is that such philosophy of the chair is a\n_nervis alienis mobile lignum_, and cannot be regarded as serious\nphilosophy, but as the mere jest of it. Moreover, it is at any rate just\nthat such inspection or guidance should extend only to the philosophy of\nthe chair, and not to the real philosophy that is in earnest. For if\nanything in the world is worth wishing for\u2014so well worth wishing for that\neven the ignorant and dull herd in its more reflective moments would prize\nit more than silver and gold\u2014it is that a ray of light should fall on the\nobscurity of our being, and that we should gain some explanation of our\nmysterious existence, in which nothing is clear but its misery and its\nvanity. But even if this is in itself attainable, it is made impossible by\nimposed and compulsory solutions.\n\nWe shall now subject to a general consideration the different ways of\nsatisfying this strong metaphysical need.\n\nBy _metaphysics_ I understand all knowledge that pretends to transcend the\npossibility of experience, thus to transcend nature or the given\nphenomenal appearance of things, in order to give an explanation of that\nby which, in some sense or other, this experience or nature is\nconditioned; or, to speak in popular language, of that which is behind\nnature, and makes it possible. But the great original diversity in the\npower of understanding, besides the cultivation of it, which demands much\nleisure, makes so great a difference between men, that as soon as a people\nhas emerged from the state of savages, no _one_ metaphysic can serve for\nthem all. Therefore among civilised nations we find throughout two\ndifferent kinds of metaphysics, which are distinguished by the fact that\nthe one has its evidence _in itself_, the other _outside itself_. Since\nthe metaphysical systems of the first kind require reflection, culture,\nand leisure for the recognition of their evidence, they can be accessible\nonly to a very small number of men; and, moreover, they can only arise and\nmaintain their existence in the case of advanced civilisation. On the\nother hand, the systems of the second kind exclusively are for the great\nmajority of men who are not capable of thinking, but only of believing,\nand who are not accessible to reasons, but only to authority. These\nsystems may therefore be called metaphysics of the people, after the\nanalogy of poetry of the people, and also wisdom of the people, by which\nis understood proverbs. These systems, however, are known under the name\nof religions, and are found among all nations, not excepting even the most\nsavage. Their evidence is, as has been said, external, and as such is\ncalled revelation, which is authenticated by signs and miracles. Their\narguments are principally threats of eternal, and indeed also temporal\nevils, directed against unbelievers, and even against mere doubters. As\n_ultima ratio theologorum_, we find among many nations the stake or things\nsimilar to it. If they seek a different authentication, or if they make\nuse of other arguments, they already make the transition into the systems\nof the first kind, and may degenerate into a mixture of the two, which\nbrings more danger than advantage, for their invaluable prerogative of\nbeing imparted to _children_ gives them the surest guarantee of the\npermanent possession of the mind, for thereby their dogmas grow into a\nkind of second inborn intellect, like the twig upon the grafted tree;\nwhile, on the other hand, the systems of the first kind only appeal to\ngrown-up people, and in them always find a system of the second kind\nalready in possession of their convictions. Both kinds of metaphysics,\nwhose difference may be briefly expressed by the words reasoned conviction\nand faith, have this in common, that every one of their particular systems\nstands in a hostile relation to all the others of its kind. Between those\nof the first kind war is waged only with word and pen; between those of\nthe second with fire and sword as well. Several of the latter owe their\npropagation in part to this last kind of polemic, and all have by degrees\ndivided the earth between them, and indeed with such decided authority\nthat the peoples of the earth are distinguished and separated more\naccording to them than according to nationality or government. They alone\n_reign_, each in its own province. The systems of the first kind, on the\ncontrary, are at the most _tolerated_, and even this only because, on\naccount of the small number of their adherents, they are for the most part\nnot considered worth the trouble of combating with fire and\nsword\u2014although, where it seemed necessary, these also have been employed\nagainst them with effect; besides, they occur only in a sporadic form. Yet\nin general they have only been endured in a tamed and subjugated\ncondition, for the system of the second kind which prevailed in the\ncountry ordered them to conform their teaching more or less closely to its\nown. Sometimes it not only subjugated them, but even employed their\nservices and used them as a support, which is however a dangerous\nexperiment. For these systems of the first kind, since they are deprived\nof power, believe they may advance themselves by craft, and never entirely\nlay aside a secret ill-will which at times comes unexpectedly into\nprominence and inflicts injuries which are hard to heal. For they are\nfurther made the more dangerous by the fact that all the real sciences,\nnot even excepting the most innocent, are their secret allies against the\nsystems of the second kind, and without themselves being openly at war\nwith the latter, suddenly and unexpectedly do great mischief in their\nprovince. Besides, the attempt which is aimed at by the enlistment\nreferred to of the services of the systems of the first kind by the\nsecond\u2014the attempt to add an inner authentication to a system whose\noriginal authentication was external, is in its nature perilous; for, if\nit were capable of such an authentication, it would never have required an\nexternal one. And in general it is always a hazardous thing to attempt to\nplace a new foundation under a finished structure. Moreover, how should a\nreligion require the suffrage of a philosophy? It has everything upon its\nside\u2014revelation, tradition, miracles, prophecies, the protection of the\ngovernment, the highest rank, as is due to the truth, the consent and\nreverence of all, a thousand temples in which it is proclaimed and\npractised, bands of sworn priests, and, what is more than all, the\ninvaluable privilege of being allowed to imprint its doctrines on the mind\nat the tender age of childhood, whereby they became almost like innate\nideas. With such wealth of means at its disposal, still to desire the\nassent of poor philosophers it must be more covetous, or to care about\ntheir contradiction it must be more fearful, than seems to be compatible\nwith a good conscience.\n\nTo the distinction established above between metaphysics of the first and\nof the second kind, we have yet to add the following:\u2014A system of the\nfirst kind, thus a philosophy, makes the claim, and has therefore the\nobligation, in everything that it says, _sensu stricto et proprio_, to be\ntrue, for it appeals to thought and conviction. A religion, on the other\nhand, being intended for the innumerable multitude who, since they are\nincapable of examination and thought, would never comprehend the\nprofoundest and most difficult truths _sensu proprio_, has only the\nobligation to be true _sensu allegorico_. Truth cannot appear naked before\nthe people. A symptom of this _allegorical_ nature of religions is the\n_mysteries_ which are to be found perhaps in them all, certain dogmas\nwhich cannot even be distinctly thought, not to speak of being literally\ntrue. Indeed, perhaps it might be asserted that some absolute\ncontradictions, some actual absurdities, are an essential ingredient in a\ncomplete religion, for these are just the stamp of its allegorical nature,\nand the only adequate means of making the ordinary mind and the uncultured\nunderstanding _feel_ what would be incomprehensible to it, that religion\nhas ultimately to do with quite a different order of things, with an order\nof _things in themselves_, in the presence of which the laws of this\nphenomenal world, in conformity with which it must speak, vanish; and that\ntherefore not only the contradictory but also the comprehensible dogmas\nare really only allegories and accommodations to the human power of\ncomprehension. It seems to me that it was in this spirit that Augustine\nand even Luther adhered to the mysteries of Christianity in opposition to\nPelagianism, which sought to reduce everything to the dull level of\ncomprehensibility. From this point of view it is also conceivable how\nTertullian could say in all seriousness: \u201c_Prorsus credibile est, quia\nineptum est: ... certum est, quia impossibile_\u201d (_De Carne Christi_, c.\n5). This _allegorical_ nature of religions makes them independent of the\nproofs which are incumbent on philosophy, and in general withdraws them\nfrom investigation. Instead of this they require faith, that is, a\nvoluntary admission that such is the state of the case. Since, then, faith\nguides action, and the allegory is always so framed that, as regards the\npractical, it leads precisely to that which the truth _sensu proprio_\nwould also lead to, religion is justified in promising to those who\nbelieve eternal salvation. Thus we see that in the main, and for the great\nmajority, who cannot apply themselves to thought, religions very well\nsupply the place of metaphysics in general, the need of which man feels to\nbe imperative. They do this partly in a practical interest, as the guiding\nstar of their action, the unfurled standard of integrity and virtue, as\nKant admirably expresses it; partly as the indispensable comfort in the\nheavy sorrows of life, in which capacity they fully supply the place of an\nobjectively true metaphysic, because they lift man above himself and his\nexistence in time, as well perhaps as such a metaphysic ever could. In\nthis their great value and indeed necessity shows itself very clearly. For\nPlato says, and says rightly, \u201c\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03bb\u1fc6\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f01\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u201d (_vulgus\nphilosophum esse impossible est_. _De Rep._, vi. p. 89, _Bip_.) On the\nother hand, the only stumbling-stone is this, that religions never dare to\nconfess their allegorical nature, but have to assert that they are true\n_sensu proprio_. They thereby encroach on the province of metaphysics\nproper, and call forth the antagonism of the latter, which has therefore\nexpressed itself at all times when it was not chained up. The controversy\nwhich is so perseveringly carried on in our own day between\nsupernaturalists and rationalists also rests on the failure to recognise\nthe allegorical nature of all religion. Both wish to have Christianity\ntrue _sensu proprio_; in this sense the former wish to maintain it without\ndeduction, as it were with skin and hair; and thus they have a hard stand\nto make against the knowledge and general culture of the age. The latter\nwish to explain away all that is properly Christian; whereupon they retain\nsomething which is neither _sensu proprio_ nor _sensu allegorico_ true,\nbut rather a mere platitude, little better than Judaism, or at the most a\nshallow Pelagianism, and, what is worst, an abject optimism, absolutely\nforeign to Christianity proper. Moreover, the attempt to found a religion\nupon reason removes it into the other class of metaphysics, that which has\nits authentication _in itself_, thus to the foreign ground of the\nphilosophical systems, and into the conflict which these wage against each\nother in their own arena, and consequently exposes it to the light fire of\nscepticism and the heavy artillery of the \u201cCritique of Pure Reason;\u201d but\nfor it to venture there would be clear presumption.\n\nIt would be most beneficial to both kinds of metaphysics that each of them\nshould remain clearly separated from the other and confine itself to its\nown province, that it may there be able to develop its nature fully.\nInstead of which, through the whole Christian era, the endeavour has been\nto bring about a fusion of the two, for the dogmas and conceptions of the\none have been carried over into the other, whereby both are spoiled. This\nhas taken place in the most open manner in our own day in that strange\nhermaphrodite or centaur, the so-called philosophy of religion, which, as\na kind of gnosis, endeavours to interpret the given religion, and to\nexplain what is true _sensu allegorico_ through something which is true\n_sensu proprio_. But for this we would have to know and possess the truth\n_sensu proprio_ already; and in that case such an interpretation would be\nsuperfluous. For to seek first to find metaphysics, _i.e._, the truth\n_sensu proprio_, merely out of religion by explanation and interpretation\nwould be a doubtful and dangerous undertaking, to which one would only\nmake up one\u2019s mind if it were proved that truth, like iron and other base\nmetals, could only be found in a mixed, not in a pure form, and therefore\none could only obtain it by reduction from the mixed ore.\n\nReligions are necessary for the people, and an inestimable benefit to\nthem. But if they oppose themselves to the progress of mankind in the\nknowledge of the truth, they must with the utmost possible forbearance be\nset aside. And to require that a great mind\u2014a Shakspeare; a Goethe\u2014should\nmake the dogmas of any religion implicitly, _bon\u00e2 fide et sensu proprio_,\nhis conviction is to require that a giant should put on the shoe of a\ndwarf.\n\nReligions, being calculated with reference to the power of comprehension\nof the great mass of men, can only have indirect, not immediate truth. To\nrequire of them the latter is as if one wished to read the letters set up\nin the form-chase, instead of their impression. The value of a religion\nwill accordingly depend upon the greater or less content of truth which it\ncontains under the veil of allegory, and then upon the greater or less\ndistinctness with which it becomes visible through this veil, thus upon\nthe transparency of the latter. It almost seems that, as the oldest\nlanguages are the most perfect, so also are the oldest religions. If I\nwere to take the results of my philosophy as the standard of truth, I\nwould be obliged to concede to Buddhism the pre-eminence over the rest. In\nany case it must be a satisfaction to me to see my teaching in such close\nagreement with a religion which the majority of men upon the earth hold as\ntheir own; for it numbers far more adherents than any other. This\nagreement, however, must be the more satisfactory to me because in my\nphilosophising I have certainly not been under its influence. For up till\n1818, when my work appeared, there were very few, exceedingly incomplete\nand scanty, accounts of Buddhism to be found in Europe, which were almost\nentirely limited to a few essays in the earlier volumes of \u201cAsiatic\nResearches,\u201d and were principally concerned with the Buddhism of the\nBurmese. Only since then has fuller information about this religion\ngradually reached us, chiefly through the profound and instructive essays\nof the meritorious member of the St. Petersburg Academy, J. J. Schmidt, in\nthe proceedings of his Academy, and then little by little through several\nEnglish and French scholars, so that I was able to give a fairly numerous\nlist of the best works on this religion in my work, \u201c_Ueber den Willen in\nder Natur_,\u201d under the heading _Sinologie_. Unfortunately Csoma K\u00f6r\u00f6si,\nthat persevering Hungarian, who, in order to study the language and sacred\nwritings of Buddhism, spent many years in Tibet, and for the most part in\nBuddhist monasteries, was carried off by death just as he was beginning to\nwork out for us the results of his researches. I cannot, however, deny the\npleasure with which I read, in his provisional accounts, several passages\ncited directly from the Kahgyur itself; for example, the following\nconversation of the dying Buddha with Brahma, who is doing him homage:\n\u201cThere is a description of their conversation on the subject of\ncreation,\u2014by whom was the world made? Shakya asks several questions of\nBrahma,\u2014whether was it he who made or produced such and such things, and\nendowed or blessed them with such and such virtues or properties,\u2014whether\nwas it he who caused the several revolutions in the destruction and\nregeneration of the world. He denies that he had ever done anything to\nthat effect. At last he himself asks Shakya how the world was made,\u2014by\nwhom? Here are attributed all changes in the world to the moral works of\nthe animal beings, and it is stated that in the world all is illusion,\nthere is no reality in the things; all is empty. Brahma, being instructed\nin his doctrine, becomes his follower\u201d (Asiatic Researches, vol. XX. p.\n434).\n\nI cannot place, as is always done, the fundamental difference of all\nreligions in the question whether they are monotheistic, polytheistic,\npantheistic, or atheistic, but only in the question whether they are\noptimistic or pessimistic, that is, whether they present the existence of\nthe world as justified by itself, and therefore praise and value it, or\nregard it as something that can only be conceived as the consequence of\nour guilt, and therefore properly ought not to be, because they recognise\nthat pain and death cannot lie in the eternal, original, and immutable\norder of things, in that which in every respect ought to be. The power by\nvirtue of which Christianity was able to overcome first Judaism, and then\nthe heathenism of Greece and Rome, lies solely in its pessimism, in the\nconfession that our state is both exceedingly wretched and sinful, while\nJudaism and heathenism were optimistic. That truth, profoundly and\npainfully felt by all, penetrated, and bore in its train the need of\nredemption.\n\nI turn to a general consideration of the other kind of metaphysics, that\nwhich has its authentication in itself, and is called _philosophy_. I\nremind the reader of its origin, mentioned above, in a _wonder_ concerning\nthe world and our own existence, inasmuch as these press upon the\nintellect as a riddle, the solution of which therefore occupies mankind\nwithout intermission. Here, then, I wish first of all to draw attention to\nthe fact that this could not be the case if, in Spinoza\u2019s sense, which in\nour own day has so often been brought forward again under modern forms and\nexpositions as pantheism, the world were an \u201c_absolute substance_,\u201d and\ntherefore an _absolutely necessary existence_. For this means that it\nexists with so great a necessity that beside it every other necessity\ncomprehensible to our understanding as such must appear as an accident. It\nwould then be something which comprehended in itself not only all actual\nbut also all possible existence, so that, as Spinoza indeed declares, its\npossibility and its actuality would be absolutely one. Its non-being would\ntherefore be impossibility itself; thus it would be something the\nnon-being or other-being of which must be completely inconceivable, and\nwhich could therefore just as little be thought away as, for example,\nspace or time. And since, further, _we ourselves_ would be parts, modes,\nattributes, or accidents of such an absolute substance, which would be the\nonly thing that, in any sense, could ever or anywhere exist, our and its\nexistence, together with its properties, would necessarily be very far\nfrom presenting itself to us as remarkable, problematical, and indeed as\nan unfathomable and ever-disquieting riddle, but, on the contrary, would\nbe far more self-evident than that two and two make four. For we would\nnecessarily be incapable of thinking anything else than that the world is,\nand is, as it is; and therefore we would necessarily be as little\nconscious of its existence _as such_, _i.e._, as a problem for reflection,\nas we are of the incredibly fast motion of our planet.\n\nAll this, however, is absolutely not the case. Only to the brutes, who are\nwithout thought, does the world and existence appear as a matter of\ncourse; to man, on the contrary, it is a problem, of which even the most\nuneducated and narrow-minded becomes vividly conscious in certain brighter\nmoments, but which enters more distinctly and more permanently into the\nconsciousness of each one of us the clearer and more enlightened that\nconsciousness is, and the more material for thought it has acquired\nthrough culture, which all ultimately rises, in minds that are naturally\nadapted for philosophising, to Plato\u2019s \u201c\u03b8\u03b1\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u03bc\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1 \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2\u201d\n(_mirari, valde philosophicus affectus_), that is, to that _wonder_ which\ncomprehends in its whole magnitude that problem which unceasingly occupies\nthe nobler portion of mankind in every age and in every land, and gives it\nno rest. In fact, the pendulum which keeps in motion the clock of\nmetaphysics, that never runs down, is the consciousness that the\nnon-existence of this world is just as possible as its existence. Thus,\nthen, the Spinozistic view of it as an absolutely necessary existence,\nthat is, as something that absolutely and in every sense ought to and must\nbe, is a false one. Even simple Theism, since in its cosmological proof it\ntacitly starts by inferring the previous non-existence of the world from\nits existence, thereby assumes beforehand that the world is something\ncontingent. Nay, what is more, we very soon apprehend the world as\nsomething the non-existence of which is not only conceivable, but indeed\npreferable to its existence. Therefore our wonder at it easily passes into\na brooding over the _fatality_ which could yet call forth its existence,\nand by virtue of which such stupendous power as is demanded for the\nproduction and maintenance of such a world could be directed so much\nagainst its own interest. The philosophical astonishment is therefore at\nbottom perplexed and melancholy; philosophy, like the overture to \u201cDon\nJuan,\u201d commences with a minor chord. It follows from this that it can\nneither be Spinozism nor optimism. The more special nature, which has just\nbeen indicated, of the astonishment which leads us to philosophise clearly\nsprings from the sight of the _suffering and the wickedness_ in the world,\nwhich, even if they were in the most just proportion to each other, and\nalso were far outweighed by good, are yet something which absolutely and\nin general ought not to be. But since now nothing can come out of nothing,\nthese also must have their germ in the origin or in the kernel of the\nworld itself. It is hard for us to assume this if we look at the\nmagnitude, the order and completeness, of the physical world, for it seems\nto us that what had the power to produce such a world must have been able\nto avoid the suffering and the wickedness. That assumption (the truest\nexpression of which is Ormuzd and Ahrimines), it is easy to conceive, is\nhardest of all for Theism. Therefore the freedom of the will was primarily\ninvented to account for wickedness. But this is only a concealed way of\nmaking something out of nothing, for it assumes an _Operari_ that\nproceeded from no _Esse_ (see Die beiden _Grundprobleme der Ethik_, p. 58,\n_et seq._; second edition, p. 57 _et seq._.) Then it was sought to get rid\nof evil by attributing it to matter, or to unavoidable necessity, whereby\nthe devil, who is really the right _Expediens ad hoc_, was unwillingly set\naside. To evil also belongs _death_; but wickedness is only the throwing\nof the existing evil from oneself on to another. Thus, as was said above,\nit is wickedness, evil, and death that qualify and intensify the\nphilosophical astonishment. Not merely that the world exists, but still\nmore that it is such a wretched world, is the _punctum pruriens_ of\nmetaphysics, the problem which awakens in mankind an unrest that cannot be\nquieted by scepticism nor yet by criticism.\n\nWe find _physics_ also (in the widest sense of the word) occupied with the\nexplanation of the phenomena in the world. But it lies in the very nature\nof its explanations themselves that they cannot be sufficient. Physics\ncannot stand on its own feet, but requires a metaphysic to lean upon,\nwhatever airs it may give itself towards the latter. For it explains the\nphenomena by something still more unknown than they are themselves; by\nlaws of nature, resting upon forces of nature, to which the power of life\nalso belongs. Certainly the whole present condition of all things in the\nworld, or in nature, must necessarily be explicable from purely physical\ncauses. But such an explanation\u2014supposing one actually succeeded so far as\nto be able to give it\u2014must always just as necessarily be tainted with two\nimperfections (as it were with two sores, or like Achilles with the\nvulnerable heel, or the devil with the horse\u2019s hoof), on account of which\neverything so explained really remains still unexplained. First with this\nimperfection, that the _beginning_ of every explanatory chain of causes\nand effects, _i.e._, of connected changes, can absolutely _never_ be\nreached, but, just like the limits of the world in space and time,\nunceasingly recedes _in infinito_. Secondly with this, that the whole of\nthe efficient causes out of which everything is explained constantly rest\nupon something which is completely inexplicable, the original _qualities_\nof things and the _natural forces_ which play a prominent part among them,\nby virtue of which they produce a specific kind of effect, _e.g._, weight,\nhardness, impulsive force, elasticity, warmth, electricity, chemical\nforces, &c., and which now remain in every explanation which is given,\nlike an unknown quantity, which absolutely cannot be eliminated, in an\notherwise perfectly solved algebraical equation. Accordingly there is no\nfragment of clay, however little worth, that is not entirely composed of\ninexplicable qualities. Thus these two inevitable defects in every purely\nphysical, _i.e._, causal, explanation show that such an explanation can\nonly be _relative_, and that its whole method and nature cannot be the\nonly one, the ultimate and thus the sufficient one, _i.e._, cannot be the\nmethod of explanation that can ever lead to the satisfactory solution of\nthe difficult riddle of things, and to the true understanding of the world\nand existence; but that the physical explanation in general and as such\nrequires further a _metaphysical_ explanation, which affords us the key to\nall its assumptions, but just on this account must necessarily follow\nquite a different path. The first step to this is that one should bring to\ndistinct consciousness and firmly retain the difference of the two, hence\nthe difference between _physics_ and _metaphysics_. It rests in general on\nthe Kantian distinction between _phenomenon_ and _thing in itself_. Just\nbecause Kant held the latter to be absolutely unknowable, there was,\naccording to him, no _metaphysics_, but merely immanent knowledge, _i.e._,\n_physics_, which throughout can speak only of phenomena, and also a\ncritique of the reason which strives after metaphysics. Here, however, in\norder to show the true point of connection between my philosophy and that\nof Kant, I shall anticipate the second book, and give prominence to the\nfact that Kant, in his beautiful exposition of the compatibility of\nfreedom and necessity (Critique of Pure Reason, first edition, p. 532-554;\nand Critique of Practical Reason, p. 224-231 of Rosenkranz\u2019s edition),\nshows how one and the same action may in one aspect be perfectly\nexplicable as necessarily arising from the character of the man, the\ninfluence to which he has been subject in the course of his life, and the\nmotives which are now present to him, but yet in another aspect must be\nregarded as the work of his free will; and in the same sense he says, \u00a7 53\nof the \u201cProlegomena:\u201d \u201cCertainly natural necessity will belong to every\nconnection of cause and effect in the world of sense; yet, on the other\nhand, freedom will be conceded to that cause which is not itself a\nphenomenon (though indeed it is the ground of phenomena), thus nature and\nfreedom may without contradiction be attributed to the same thing, but in\na different reference\u2014in the one case as a phenomenon, in the other case\nas a thing in itself.\u201d What, then, Kant teaches of the phenomenon of man\nand his action my teaching extends to _all_ phenomena in nature, in that\nit makes the _will_ as a thing in itself their foundation. This proceeding\nis justified first of all by the fact that it must not be assumed that man\nis specifically _toto genere_ radically different from the other beings\nand things in nature, but rather that he is different only in degree. I\nturn back from this premature digression to our consideration of the\ninadequacy of physics to afford us the ultimate explanation of things. I\nsay, then, everything certainly is physical, but yet nothing is explicable\nphysically. As for the motion of the projected bullet, so also for the\nthinking of the brain, a physical explanation must ultimately be in itself\npossible, which would make the latter just as comprehensible as is the\nformer. But even the former, which we imagine we understand so perfectly,\nis at bottom as obscure to us as the latter; for what the inner nature of\nexpansion in space may be\u2014of impenetrability, mobility, hardness,\nelasticity, and gravity remains, after all physical explanations, a\nmystery, just as much as thought. But because in the case of thought the\ninexplicable appears most immediately, a spring was at once made here from\nphysics to metaphysics, and a substance of quite a different kind from all\ncorporeal substances was hypostatised\u2014a soul was set up in the brain. But\nif one had not been so dull as only to be capable of being struck by the\nmost remarkable of phenomena, one would have had to explain digestion by a\nsoul in the stomach, vegetation by a soul in the plant, affinity by a soul\nin the reagents, nay, the falling of a stone by a soul in the stone. For\nthe quality of every unorganised body is just as mysterious as the life in\nthe living body. In the same way, therefore, the physical explanation\nstrikes everywhere upon what is metaphysical, by which it is annihilated,\n_i.e._, it ceases to be explanation. Strictly speaking, it may be asserted\nthat no natural science really achieves anything more than what is also\nachieved by Botany: the bringing together of similars, classification. A\nphysical system which asserted that its explanations of things\u2014in the\nparticular from causes, and in general from forces\u2014were really sufficient,\nand thus exhausted the nature of the world, would be the true\n_Naturalism_. From Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus down to the\n_Syst\u00e8me de la Nature_, and further, to Delamark, Cabanis, and to the\nmaterialism that has again been warmed up in the last few years, we can\ntrace the persistent attempt to set up a _system of physics without\nmetaphysics_, that is, a system which would make the phenomenon the thing\nin itself. But all their explanations seek to conceal from the explainers\nthemselves and from others that they simply assume the principal matter\nwithout more ado. They endeavour to show that all phenomena, even those of\nmind, are physical. And they are right; only they do not see that all that\nis physical is in another aspect also metaphysical. But, without Kant,\nthis is indeed difficult to see, for it presupposes the distinction of the\nphenomenon from the thing in itself. Yet without this Aristotle, much as\nhe was inclined to empiricism, and far as he was removed from the Platonic\nhyper-physics, kept himself free from this limited point of view. He says:\n\u201c\u0395\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03bf\u03c5\u03bd \u03bc\u03b7 \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f11\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1 \u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03ba\u03c5\u03b9\u03b1\u03c2, \u1f21 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u03b7\n\u03b1\u03bd \u03b5\u03b9\u03b7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03b7 \u03b5\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b7; \u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1 \u03b1\u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u03b7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03b7, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bf\u1f51\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2, \u1f41\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03b7; \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c3 \u1f91 \u03bf\u03bd,\n\u03c4\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b1\u03bd \u03b5\u03b9\u03b7 \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9.\u201d (_Si igitur non est aliqua alia substantia,\npr\u0153ter eas, qu\u0153 natura consistunt, physica profecto prima scientia esset:\nquodsi autem est aliqua substantia immobilis, h\u0153c prior et philosophia\nprima, et universalis sic, quod prima; et de ente, prout ens est,\nspeculari hujus est_), \u201cMetaph.,\u201d V. 1. Such an _absolute system of\nphysics_ as is described above, which leaves room for no _metaphysics_,\nwould make the _Natura naturata_ into the _Natura naturans_; it would be\nphysics established on the throne of metaphysics, yet it would comport\nitself in this high position almost like Holberg\u2019s theatrical would-be\npolitician who was made burgomaster. Indeed behind the reproach of\natheism, in itself absurd, and for the most part malicious, there lies, as\nits inner meaning and truth, which gives it strength, the obscure\nconception of such an absolute system of physics without metaphysics.\nCertainly such a system would necessarily be destructive of ethics; and\nwhile Theism has falsely been held to be inseparable from morality, this\nis really true only of _metaphysics in general_, _i.e._, of the knowledge\nthat the order of nature is not the only and absolute order of things.\nTherefore we may set up this as the necessary _Credo_ of all just and good\nmen: \u201cI believe in metaphysics.\u201d In this respect it is important and\nnecessary that one should convince oneself of the untenable nature of an\n_absolute system of physics_, all the more as this, the true _naturalism_,\nis a point of view which of its own accord and ever anew presses itself\nupon a man, and can only be done away with through profound speculation.\nIn this respect, however, all kinds of systems and faiths, so far and so\nlong as they are accepted, certainly serve as a substitute for such\nspeculation. But that a fundamentally false view presses itself upon man\nof its own accord, and must first be skilfully removed, is explicable from\nthe fact that the intellect is not originally intended to instruct us\nconcerning the nature of things, but only to show us their relations, with\nreference to our will; it is, as we shall find in the second book, only\nthe medium of motives. Now, that the world schematises itself in the\nintellect in a manner which exhibits quite a different order of things\nfrom the absolutely true one, because it shows us, not their kernel, but\nonly their outer shell, happens accidentally, and cannot be used as a\nreproach to the intellect; all the less as it nevertheless finds in itself\nthe means of rectifying this error, in that it arrives at the distinction\nbetween the phenomenal appearance and the inner being of things, which\ndistinction existed in substance at all times, only for the most part was\nvery imperfectly brought to consciousness, and therefore was inadequately\nexpressed, indeed often appeared in strange clothing. The Christian\nmystics, when they call it the _light of nature_, declare the intellect to\nbe inadequate to the comprehension of the true nature of things. It is, as\nit were, a mere surface force, like electricity, and does not penetrate to\nthe inner being.\n\nThe insufficiency of pure naturalism appears, as we have said, first of\nall, on the empirical path itself, through the circumstance that every\nphysical explanation explains the particular from its cause; but the chain\nof these causes, as we know _a priori_, and therefore with perfect\ncertainty, runs back to infinity, so that absolutely no cause could ever\nbe the first. Then, however, the effect of every cause is referred to a\nlaw of nature, and this finally to a force of nature, which now remains as\nthe absolutely inexplicable. But this inexplicable, to which all phenomena\nof this so clearly given and naturally explicable world, from the highest\nto the lowest, are referred, just shows that the whole nature of such\nexplanation is only conditional, as it were only _ex concessis_, and by no\nmeans the true and sufficient one; therefore I said above that physically\neverything and nothing is explicable. That absolutely inexplicable element\nwhich pervades all phenomena, which is most striking in the highest,\n_e.g._, in generation, but yet is just as truly present in the lowest,\n_e.g._, in mechanical phenomena, points to an entirely different kind of\norder of things lying at the foundation of the physical order, which is\njust what Kant calls the order of things in themselves, and which is the\ngoal of metaphysics. But, secondly, the insufficiency of pure naturalism\ncomes out clearly from that fundamental philosophical truth, which we have\nfully considered in the first half of this book, and which is also the\ntheme of the \u201cCritique of Pure Reason;\u201d the truth that every _object_,\nboth as regards its objective existence in general and as regards the\nmanner (forms) of this existence, is throughout conditioned by the knowing\n_subject_, hence is merely a phenomenon, not a thing in itself. This is\nexplained in \u00a7 7 of the first volume, and it is there shown that nothing\ncan be more clumsy than that, after the manner of all materialists, one\nshould blindly take the objective as simply given in order to derive\neverything from it without paying any regard to the subjective, through\nwhich, however, nay, in which alone the former exists. Samples of this\nprocedure are most readily afforded us by the fashionable materialism of\nour own day, which has thereby become a philosophy well suited for\nbarbers\u2019 and apothecaries\u2019 apprentices. For it, in its innocence, matter,\nassumed without reflection as absolutely real, is the thing in self, and\nthe one capacity of a thing in itself is impulsive force, for all other\nqualities can only be manifestations of this.\n\nWith naturalism, then, or the purely physical way of looking at things, we\nshall never attain our end; it is like a sum that never comes out. Causal\nseries without beginning or end, fundamental forces which are inscrutable,\nendless space, beginningless time, infinite divisibility of matter, and\nall this further conditioned by a knowing brain, in which alone it exists\njust like a dream, and without which it vanishes\u2014constitute the labyrinth\nin which naturalism leads us ceaselessly round. The height to which in our\ntime the natural sciences have risen in this respect entirely throws into\nthe shade all previous centuries, and is a summit which mankind reaches\nfor the first time. But however great are the advances which _physics_\n(understood in the wide sense of the ancients) may make, not the smallest\nstep towards _metaphysics_ is thereby taken, just as a plane can never\nobtain cubical content by being indefinitely extended. For all such\nadvances will only perfect our knowledge of the _phenomenon_; while\n_metaphysics_ strives to pass beyond the phenomenal appearance itself, to\nthat which so appears. And if indeed it had the assistance of an entire\nand complete experience, it would, as regards the main point, be in no way\nadvantaged by it. Nay, even if one wandered through all the planets and\nfixed stars, one would thereby have made no step in _metaphysics_. It is\nrather the case that the greatest advances of physics will make the need\nof metaphysics ever more felt; for it is just the corrected, extended, and\nmore thorough knowledge of nature which, on the one hand, always\nundermines and ultimately overthrows the metaphysical assumptions which\ntill then have prevailed, but, on the other hand, presents the problem of\nmetaphysics itself more distinctly, more correctly, and more fully, and\nseparates it more clearly from all that is merely physical; moreover, the\nmore perfectly and accurately known nature of the particular thing more\npressingly demands the explanation of the whole and the general, which,\nthe more correctly, thoroughly, and completely it is known empirically,\nonly presents itself as the more mysterious. Certainly the individual,\nsimple investigator of nature, in a special branch of physics, does not at\nonce become clearly conscious of all this; he rather sleeps contentedly by\nthe side of his chosen maid, in the house of Odysseus, banishing all\nthoughts of Penelope (cf. ch. 12 at the end). Hence we see at the present\nday the _husk of nature_ investigated in its minutest details, the\nintestines of intestinal worms and the vermin of vermin known to a nicety.\nBut if some one comes, as, for example, I do, and speaks of the _kernel of\nnature_, they will not listen; they even think it has nothing to do with\nthe matter, and go on sifting their husks. One finds oneself tempted to\ncall that over-microscopical and micrological investigator of nature the\ncotquean of nature. But those persons who believe that crucibles and\nretorts are the true and only source of all wisdom are in their own way\njust as perverse as were formerly their antipodes the Scholastics. As the\nlatter, absolutely confined to their abstract conceptions, used these as\ntheir weapons, neither knowing nor investigating anything outside them, so\nthe former, absolutely confined to their empiricism, allow nothing to be\ntrue except what their eyes behold, and believe they can thus arrive at\nthe ultimate ground of things, not discerning that between the phenomenon\nand that which manifests itself in it, the thing in itself, there is a\ndeep gulf, a radical difference, which can only be cleared up by the\nknowledge and accurate delimitation of the subjective element of the\nphenomenon, and the insight that the ultimate and most important\nconclusions concerning the nature of things can only be drawn from\nself-consciousness; yet without all this one cannot advance a step beyond\nwhat is directly given to the senses, thus can get no further than to the\nproblem. Yet, on the other hand, it is to be observed that the most\nperfect possible knowledge of nature is the corrected _statement of the\nproblem_ of metaphysics. Therefore no one ought to venture upon this\nwithout having first acquired a knowledge of all the branches of natural\nscience, which, though general, shall be thorough, clear, and connected.\nFor the problem must precede its solution. Then, however, the investigator\nmust turn his glance inward; for the intellectual and ethical phenomena\nare more important than the physical, in the same proportion as, for\nexample, animal magnetism is a far more important phenomenon than mineral\nmagnetism. The last fundamental secret man carries within himself, and\nthis is accessible to him in the most immediate manner; therefore it is\nonly here that he can hope to find the key to the riddle of the world and\ngain a clue to the nature of all things. The special province of\nmetaphysics thus certainly lies in what has been called mental philosophy.\n\n\n    \u201cThe ranks of living creatures thou dost lead\n    Before me, teaching me to know my brothers\n    In air and water and the silent wood:\n\n    Then to the cave secure thou leadest me,\n    Then show\u2019st me mine own self, and in my breast\n    The deep, mysterious miracles unfold.\u201d(28)\n\n\nFinally, then, as regards the _source or the foundation_ of metaphysical\nknowledge, I have already declared myself above to be opposed to the\nassumption, which is even repeated by Kant, that it must lie _in mere\nconceptions_. In no knowledge can conceptions be what is first; for they\nare always derived from some perception. What has led, however, to that\nassumption is probably the example of mathematics. Mathematics can leave\nperception altogether, and, as is especially the case in algebra,\ntrigonometry, and analysis, can operate with purely abstract conceptions,\nnay, with conceptions which are represented only by signs instead of\nwords, and can yet arrive at a perfectly certain result, which is still so\nremote that any one who adhered to the firm ground of perception could not\narrive at it. But the possibility of this depends, as Kant has clearly\nshown, on the fact that the conceptions of mathematics are derived from\nthe most certain and definite of all perceptions, from the _a priori_ and\nyet intuitively known relations of quantity, and can therefore be\nconstantly realised again and controlled by these, either arithmetically,\nby performing the calculations which are merely indicated by those signs,\nor geometrically, by means of what Kant calls the construction of the\nconceptions. This advantage, on the other hand, is not possessed by the\nconceptions out of which it was believed metaphysics could be built up;\nsuch, for example, as essence, being, substance, perfection, necessity,\nreality, finite, infinite, absolute, ground, &c. For such conceptions are\nby no means original, as fallen from heaven, or innate; but they also,\nlike all conceptions, are derived from perceptions; and as, unlike the\nconceptions of mathematics, they do not contain the mere form of\nperception, but more, empirical perceptions must lie at their foundation.\nThus nothing can be drawn from them which the empirical perceptions did\nnot also contain, that is, nothing which was not a matter of experience,\nand which, since these conceptions are very wide abstractions, we would\nreceive with much greater certainty at first hand from experience. For\nfrom conceptions nothing more can ever be drawn than the perceptions from\nwhich they are derived contain. If we desire pure conceptions, _i.e._,\nsuch as have no empirical source, the only ones that can be produced are\nthose which concern space and time, _i.e._, the merely formal part of\nperception, consequently only the mathematical conceptions, or at most\nalso the conception of causality, which indeed does not originate in\nexperience, but yet only comes into consciousness by means of it (first in\nsense-perception); therefore experience indeed is only possible by means\nof it; but it also is only valid in the sphere of experience, on which\naccount Kant has shown that it only serves to communicate the connection\nof experience, and not to transcend it; that thus it admits only of\nphysical application, not of metaphysical. Certainly only its _a priori_\norigin can give apodictic certainty to any knowledge; but this limits it\nto the mere _form_ of experience in general, for it shows that it is\nconditioned by the subjective nature of the intellect. Such knowledge,\nthen, far from taking us beyond experience, gives only one _part_ of\nexperience itself, the _formal_ part, which belongs to it throughout, and\ntherefore is universal, consequently mere form without content. Since now\nmetaphysics can least of all be confined to this, it must have also\n_empirical_ sources of knowledge; therefore that preconceived idea of a\nmetaphysic to be found purely _a priori_ is necessarily vain. It is really\na _petitio principii_ of Kant\u2019s, which he expresses most distinctly in \u00a7 1\nof the Prolegomena, that metaphysics must not draw its fundamental\nconceptions and principles from experience. In this it is assumed\nbeforehand that only what we knew _before_ all experience can extend\nbeyond all possible experience. Supported by this, Kant then comes and\nshows that all such knowledge is nothing more than the form of the\nintellect for the purpose of experience, and consequently can never lead\nbeyond experience, from which he then rightly deduces the impossibility of\nall metaphysics. But does it not rather seem utterly perverse that in\norder to discover the secret of experience, _i.e._, of the world which\nalone lies before us, we should look quite away from it, ignore its\ncontent, and take and use for its material only the empty forms of which\nwe are conscious _a priori_? Is it not rather in keeping with the matter\nthat _the science of experience in general_, and as such, should also be\ndrawn from experience? Its problem itself is given it empirically; why\nshould not the solution of it call in the assistance of experience? Is it\nnot senseless that he who speaks of the nature of things should not look\nat things themselves, but should confine himself to certain abstract\nconceptions? The task of metaphysics is certainly not the observation of\nparticular experiences, but yet it is the correct explanation of\nexperience as a whole. Its foundation must therefore, at any rate, be of\nan empirical nature. Indeed the _a priori_ nature of a part of human\nknowledge will be apprehended by it as a given _fact_, from which it will\ninfer the subjective origin of the same. Only because the consciousness of\nits _a priori_ nature accompanies it is it called by Kant _transcendental_\nas distinguished from _transcendent_, which signifies \u201cpassing beyond all\npossibility of experience,\u201d and has its opposite in _immanent_, _i.e._,\nremaining within the limits of experience. I gladly recall the original\nmeaning of this expression introduced by Kant, with which, as also with\nthat of the Categories, and many others, the apes of philosophy carry on\ntheir game at the present day. Now, besides this, the source of the\nknowledge of metaphysics is not _outer_ experience alone, but also\n_inner_. Indeed, what is most peculiar to it, that by which the decisive\nstep which alone can solve the great question becomes possible for it,\nconsists, as I have fully and thoroughly proved in \u201c_Ueber den Willen in\nder Natur_,\u201d under the heading, \u201c_Physische Astronomie_,\u201d in this, that at\nthe right place it combines outer experience with inner, and uses the\nlatter as a key to the former.\n\nThe origin of metaphysics in empirical sources of knowledge, which is here\nset forth, and which cannot fairly be denied, deprives it certainly of\nthat kind of apodictic certainty which is only possible through knowledge\n_a priori_. This remains the possession of logic and mathematics\u2014sciences,\nhowever, which really only teach what every one knows already, though not\ndistinctly. At most the primary elements of natural science may also be\ndeduced from knowledge _a priori_. By this confession metaphysics only\nsurrenders an ancient claim, which, according to what has been said above,\nrested upon misunderstanding, and against which the great diversity and\nchangeableness of metaphysical systems, and also the constantly\naccompanying scepticism, in every age has testified. Yet against the\npossibility of metaphysics in general this changeableness cannot be urged,\nfor the same thing affects just as much all branches of natural science,\nchemistry, physics, geology, zoology, &c., and even history has not\nremained exempt from it. But when once, as far as the limits of human\nintellect allow, a true system of metaphysics shall have been found, the\nunchangeableness of a science which is known _a priori_ will yet belong to\nit; for its foundation can only be _experience in general_, and not the\nparticular and special experiences by which, on the other hand, the\nnatural sciences are constantly modified and new material is always being\nprovided for history. For experience as a whole and in general will never\nchange its character for a new one.\n\nThe next question is: How can a science drawn from experience pass beyond\nit and so merit the name of metaphysics? It cannot do so perhaps in the\nsame way as we find a fourth number from three proportionate ones, or a\ntriangle from two sides and an angle. This was the way of the pre-Kantian\ndogmatism, which, according to certain laws known to us _a priori_, sought\nto reason from the given to the not given, from the consequent to the\nreason, thus from experience to that which could not possibly be given in\nany experience. Kant proved the impossibility of a metaphysic upon this\npath, in that he showed that although these laws were not drawn from\nexperience, they were only valid for experience. He therefore rightly\ntaught that in such a way we cannot transcend the possibility of all\nexperience. But there are other paths to metaphysics. The whole of\nexperience is like a cryptograph, and philosophy the deciphering of it,\nthe correctness of which is proved by the connection appearing everywhere.\nIf this whole is only profoundly enough comprehended, and the inner\nexperience is connected with the outer, it must be capable of being\n_interpreted_, _explained_ from itself. Since Kant has irrefutably proved\nto us that experience in general proceeds from two elements, the forms of\nknowledge and the inner nature of things, and that these two may be\ndistinguished in experience from each other, as that of which we are\nconscious _a priori_ and that which is added _a posteriori_, it is\npossible, at least in general, to say, what in the given experience, which\nis primarily merely phenomenal, belongs to the _form_ of this phenomenon,\nconditioned by the intellect, and what, after deducting this, remains over\nfor the _thing in itself_. And although no one can discern the thing in\nitself through the veil of the forms of perception, on the other hand\nevery one carries it in himself, indeed is it himself; therefore in\nself-consciousness it must be in some way accessible to him, even though\nonly conditionally. Thus the bridge by which metaphysics passes beyond\nexperience is nothing else than that analysis of experience into\nphenomenon and thing in itself in which I have placed Kant\u2019s greatest\nmerit. For it contains the proof of a kernel of the phenomenon different\nfrom the phenomenon itself. This can indeed never be entirely separated\nfrom the phenomenon and regarded in itself as an _ens extramundanum_, but\nis always known only in its relations to and connections with the\nphenomenon itself. But the interpretation and explanation of the latter,\nin relation to the former, which is its inner kernel, is capable of\naffording us information with regard to it which does not otherwise come\ninto consciousness. In this sense, then, metaphysics goes beyond the\nphenomenon, _i.e._, nature, to that which is concealed in or behind it (\u03c4\u03bf\n\u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd), always regarding it, however, merely as that which\nmanifests itself in the phenomenon, not as independent of all phenomenal\nappearance; it therefore remains immanent, and does not become\ntranscendent. For it never disengages itself entirely from experience, but\nremains merely its interpretation and explanation, since it never speaks\nof the thing in itself otherwise than in its relation to the phenomenon.\nThis at least is the sense in which I, with reference throughout to the\nlimitations of human knowledge proved by Kant, have attempted to solve the\nproblem of metaphysics. Therefore his Prolegomena to future metaphysics\nwill be valid and suitable for mine also. Accordingly it never really goes\nbeyond experience, but only discloses the true understanding of the world\nwhich lies before it in experience. It is neither, according to the\ndefinition of metaphysics which even Kant repeats, a science of mere\nconceptions, nor is it a system of deductions from _a priori_ principles,\nthe uselessness of which for the _end_ of metaphysics has been shown by\nKant. But it is rational knowledge, drawn from perception of the external\nactual world and the information which the most intimate fact of\nself-consciousness affords us concerning it, deposited in distinct\nconceptions. It is accordingly the science of experience; but its subject\nand its source is not particular experiences, but the totality of all\nexperience. I completely accept Kant\u2019s doctrine that the world of\nexperience is merely phenomenal, and that the _a priori_ knowledge is\nvalid only in relation to phenomena; but I add that just as phenomenal\nappearance, it is the manifestation of that which appears, and with him I\ncall this the thing in itself. This must therefore express its nature and\ncharacter in the world of experience, and consequently it must be possible\nto interpret these from this world, and indeed from the matter, not the\nmere form, of experience. Accordingly philosophy is nothing but the\ncorrect and universal understanding of experience itself, the true\nexposition of its meaning and content. To this the metaphysical, _i.e._,\nthat which is merely clothed in the phenomenon and veiled in its forms, is\nthat which is related to it as thought to words.\n\nSuch a deciphering of the world with reference to that which manifests\nitself in it must receive its confirmation from itself, through the\nagreement with each other in which it places the very diverse phenomena of\nthe world, and which without it we do not perceive. If we find a document\nthe alphabet of which is unknown, we endeavour to make it out until we hit\nupon an hypothesis as to the significance of the letters in accordance\nwith which they make up comprehensible words and connected sentences.\nThen, however, there remains no doubt as to the correctness of the\ndeciphering, because it is not possible that the agreement and connection\nin which all the letters of that writing are placed by this explanation is\nmerely accidental, and that by attributing quite a different value to the\nletters we could also recognise words and sentences in this arrangement of\nthem. In the same way the deciphering of the world must completely prove\nitself from itself. It must throw equal light upon all the phenomena of\nthe world, and also bring the most heterogeneous into agreement, so that\nthe contradiction between those which are most in contrast may be\nabolished. This proof from itself is the mark of genuineness. For every\nfalse deciphering, even if it is suitable for some phenomena, will\nconflict all the more glaringly with the rest. So, for example, the\noptimism of Leibnitz conflicts with the palpable misery of existence; the\ndoctrine of Spinoza, that the world is the only possible and absolutely\nnecessary substance, is incompatible with our wonder at its existence and\nnature; the Wolfian doctrine, that man obtains his _Existentia_ and\n_Essentia_ from a will foreign to himself, is contradicted by our moral\nresponsibility for the actions which proceed with strict necessity from\nthese, in conflict with the motives; the oft-repeated doctrine of the\nprogressive development of man to an ever higher perfection, or in general\nof any kind of becoming by means of the process of the world, is opposed\nto the _a priori_ knowledge that at any point of time an infinite time has\nalready run its course, and consequently all that is supposed to come with\ntime would necessarily have already existed; and in this way an\ninterminable list might be given of the contradictions of dogmatic\nassumptions with the given reality of things. On the other hand, I must\ndeny that any doctrine of my philosophy could fairly be added to such a\nlist, because each of them has been thought out in the presence of the\nperceived reality, and none of them has its root in abstract conceptions\nalone. There is yet in it a fundamental thought which is applied to all\nthe phenomena of the world as their key; but it proves itself to be the\nright alphabet at the application of which all words and sentences have\nsense and significance. The discovered answer to a riddle shows itself to\nbe the right one by the fact that all that is said in the riddle is\nsuitable to it. In the same way my doctrine introduces agreement and\nconnection into the confusion of the contrasting phenomena of this world,\nand solves the innumerable contradictions which, when regarded from any\nother point of view, it presents. Therefore, so far, it is like a sum that\ncomes out right, yet by no means in the sense that it leaves no problem\nover to solve, no possible question unanswered. To assert anything of that\nsort would be a presumptuous denial of the limits of human knowledge in\ngeneral. Whatever torch we may kindle, and whatever space it may light,\nour horizon will always remain bounded by profound night. For the ultimate\nsolution of the riddle of the world must necessarily be concerned with the\nthings in themselves, no longer with the phenomena. But all our forms of\nknowledge are adapted to the phenomena alone; therefore we must comprehend\neverything through coexistence, succession, and causal relations. These\nforms, however, have meaning and significance only with reference to the\nphenomenon; the things in themselves and their possible relations cannot\nbe apprehended by means of those forms. Therefore the actual, positive\nsolution of the riddle of the world must be something that human intellect\nis absolutely incapable of grasping and thinking; so that if a being of a\nhigher kind were to come and take all pains to impart it to us, we would\nbe absolutely incapable of understanding anything of his expositions.\nThose, therefore, who profess to know the ultimate, _i.e._, the first\nground of things, thus a primordial being, an absolute, or whatever else\nthey choose to call it, together with the process, the reasons, motives,\nor whatever it may be, in consequence of which the world arises from it,\nor springs, or falls, or is produced, set in existence, \u201cdischarged,\u201d and\nushered forth, are playing tricks, are vain boasters, when indeed they are\nnot charlatans.\n\nI regard it as a great excellence of my philosophy that all its truths\nhave been found independently of each other, by contemplation of the real\nworld; but their unity and agreement, about which I had been unconcerned,\nhas always afterwards appeared of itself. Hence also it is rich, and has\nwide-spreading roots in the ground of perceptible reality, from which all\nnourishment of abstract truths springs; and hence, again, it is not\nwearisome\u2014a quality which, to judge from the philosophical writings of the\nlast fifty years, one might regard as essential to philosophy. If, on the\nother hand, all the doctrines of a philosophy are merely deduced the one\nout of the other, and ultimately indeed all out of one first principle, it\nmust be poor and meagre, and consequently wearisome, for nothing can\nfollow from a proposition except what it really already says itself.\nMoreover, in this case everything depends upon the correctness of _one_\nproposition, and by a single mistake in the deduction the truth of the\nwhole would be endangered. Still less security is given by the systems\nwhich start from an intellectual intuition, _i.e._, a kind of ecstasy or\nclairvoyance. All knowledge so obtained must be rejected as subjective,\nindividual, and consequently problematical. Even if it actually existed it\nwould not be communicable, for only the normal knowledge of the brain is\ncommunicable; if it is abstract, through conceptions and words; if purely\nperceptible or concrete, through works of art.\n\nIf, as so often happens, metaphysics is reproached with having made so\nlittle progress, it ought also to be considered that no other science has\ngrown up like it under constant oppression, none has been so hampered and\nhindered from without as it has always been by the religion of every land,\nwhich, everywhere in possession of a monopoly of metaphysical knowledge,\nregards metaphysics as a weed growing beside it, as an unlicensed worker,\nas a horde of gipsies, and as a rule tolerates it only under the condition\nthat it accommodates itself to serve and follow it. For where has there\never been true freedom of thought? It has been vaunted sufficiently; but\nwhenever it wishes to go further than perhaps to differ about the\nsubordinate dogmas of the religion of the country, a holy shudder seizes\nthe prophets of tolerance, and they say: \u201cNot a step further!\u201d What\nprogress of metaphysics was possible under such oppression? Nay, this\nconstraint which the privileged metaphysics exercises is not confined to\nthe _communication_ of thoughts, but extends to _thinking_ itself, for its\ndogmas are so firmly imprinted in the tender, plastic, trustful, and\nthoughtless age of childhood, with studied solemnity and serious airs,\nthat from that time forward they grow with the brain, and almost assume\nthe nature of innate thoughts, which some philosophers have therefore\nreally held them to be, and still more have pretended to do so. Yet\nnothing can so firmly resist the comprehension of even the _problem_ of\nmetaphysics as a previous solution of it intruded upon and early implanted\nin the mind. For the necessary starting-point for all genuine philosophy\nis the deep feeling of the Socratic: \u201cThis one thing I know, that I know\nnothing.\u201d The ancients were in this respect in a better position than we\nare, for their national religions certainly limited somewhat the imparting\nof thoughts; but they did not interfere with the freedom of thought\nitself, because they were not formally and solemnly impressed upon\nchildren, and in general were not taken so seriously. Therefore in\nmetaphysics the ancients are still our teachers.\n\nWhenever metaphysics is reproached with its small progress, and with not\nhaving yet reached its goal in spite of such sustained efforts, one ought\nfurther to consider that in the meanwhile it has constantly performed the\ninvaluable service of limiting the boundless claims of the privileged\nmetaphysics, and yet at the same time combating naturalism and materialism\nproper, which are called forth by it as an inevitable reaction. Consider\nto what a pitch the arrogance of the priesthood of every religion would\nrise if the belief in their doctrines was as firm and blind as they really\nwish. Look back also at the wars, disturbances, rebellions, and\nrevolutions in Europe from the eighth to the eighteenth century; how few\nwill be found that have not had as their essence, or their pretext, some\ncontroversy about beliefs, thus a metaphysical problem, which became the\noccasion of exciting nations against each other. Yet is that whole\nthousand years a continual slaughter, now on the battlefield, now on the\nscaffold, now in the streets, in metaphysical interests! I wish I had an\nauthentic list of all crimes which Christianity has really prevented, and\nall good deeds it has really performed, that I might be able to place them\nin the other scale of the balance.\n\nLastly, as regards the _obligations_ of metaphysics, it has only one; for\nit is one which endures no other beside it\u2014the obligation to be _true_. If\none would impose other obligations upon it besides this, such as to be\nspiritualistic, optimistic, monotheistic, or even only to be moral, one\ncannot know beforehand whether this would not interfere with the\nfulfilment of that first obligation, without which all its other\nachievements must clearly be worthless. A given philosophy has accordingly\nno other standard of its value than that of truth. For the rest,\nphilosophy is essentially _world-wisdom_: its problem is the world. It has\nto do with this alone, and leaves the gods in peace\u2014expects, however, in\nreturn, to be left in peace by them.\n\n\n\n\n\nSUPPLEMENTS TO THE SECOND BOOK.\n\n\n    \u201cIhr folget falscher Spur,\n      Denkt nicht, wir scherzen!\n    Ist nicht der Kern der Natur\n      Menschen im Herzen?\u201d\n\n    \u2014Goethe.\n\n\n\n\nChapter XVIII.(29) On The Possibility Of Knowing The Thing In Itself.\n\n\nIn 1836 I already published, under the title \u201c_Ueber den Willen in der\nNatur_\u201d (second ed., 1854; third ed., 1867), the most essential supplement\nto this book, which contains the most peculiar and important step in my\nphilosophy, the transition from the phenomenon to the thing in itself,\nwhich Kant gave up as impossible. It would be a great mistake to regard\nthe foreign conclusions with which I have there connected my expositions\nas the real material and subject of that work, which, though small as\nregards its extent, is of weighty import. These conclusions are rather the\nmere occasion starting from which I have there expounded that fundamental\ntruth of my philosophy with so much greater clearness than anywhere else,\nand brought it down to the empirical knowledge of nature. And indeed this\nis done most exhaustively and stringently under the heading \u201c_Physische\nAstronomie_;\u201d so that I dare not hope ever to find a more correct or\naccurate expression of that core of my philosophy than is given there.\nWhoever desires to know my philosophy thoroughly and to test it seriously\nmust therefore give attention before everything to that section. Thus, in\ngeneral, all that is said in that little work would form the chief content\nof these supplements, if it had not to be excluded on account of having\npreceded them; but, on the other hand, I here take for granted that it is\nknown, for otherwise the very best would be wanting.\n\nI wish now first of all to make a few preliminary observations from a\ngeneral point of view as to the sense in which we can speak of a knowledge\nof the thing in itself and of its necessary limitation.\n\nWhat is _knowledge_? It is primarily and essentially _idea_. What is\n_idea_? A very complicated _physiological_ process in the brain of an\nanimal, the result of which is the consciousness of a _picture_ there.\nClearly the relation between such a picture and something entirely\ndifferent from the animal in whose brain it exists can only be a very\nindirect one. This is perhaps the simplest and most comprehensible way of\ndisclosing the _deep gulf between the ideal and the real_. This belongs to\nthe things of which, like the motion of the earth, we are not directly\nconscious; therefore the ancients did not observe it, just as they did not\nobserve the motion of the earth. Once pointed out, on the other hand,\nfirst by Descartes, it has ever since given philosophers no rest. But\nafter Kant had at last proved in the most thorough manner the complete\ndiversity of the ideal and the real, it was an attempt, as bold as it was\nabsurd, yet perfectly correctly calculated with reference to the\nphilosophical public in Germany, and consequently crowned with brilliant\nresults, to try to assert the _absolute identity_ of the two by dogmatic\nutterances, on the strength of a pretended intellectual intuition. In\ntruth, on the contrary, a subjective and an objective existence, a being\nfor self and a being for others, a consciousness of one\u2019s own self, and a\nconsciousness of other things, is given us directly, and the two are given\nin such a fundamentally different manner that no other difference can\ncompare with this. About himself every one knows directly, about all\nothers only very indirectly. This is the fact and the problem.\n\nWhether, on the other hand, through further processes in the interior of a\nbrain, general conceptions (_Universalia_) are abstracted from the\nperceptible ideas or images that have arisen within it, for the assistance\nof further combinations, whereby knowledge becomes _rational_, and is now\ncalled _thinking_\u2014this is here no longer the essential question, but is of\nsubordinate significance. For all such _conceptions_ receive their content\nonly from the perceptible idea, which is therefore _primary knowledge_,\nand has consequently alone to be taken account of in an investigation of\nthe relation between the ideal and the real. It therefore shows entire\nignorance of the problem, or at least it is very inept, to wish to define\nthat relation as that between _being_ and _thinking_. Thinking has\nprimarily only a relation to _perceiving_, but _perception_ has a relation\nto the _real being_ of what is perceived, and this last is the great\nproblem with which we are here concerned. Empirical being, on the other\nhand, as it lies before us, is nothing else than simply being given in\nperception; but the relation of the latter to _thinking_ is no riddle, for\nthe conceptions, thus the immediate materials of thought, are obviously\n_abstracted_ from perception, which no reasonable man can doubt. It may be\nsaid in passing that one can see how important the choice of expressions\nin philosophy is from the fact that that inept expression condemned above,\nand the misunderstanding which arose from it, became the foundation of the\nwhole Hegelian pseudo-philosophy, which has occupied the German public for\ntwenty-five years.\n\nIf, however, it should be said: \u201cThe perception is itself the knowledge of\nthe thing in itself: for it is the effect of that which is outside of us,\nand as this _acts_, so it _is_: its action is just its being;\u201d to this we\nreply: (1.) that the law of causality, as has been sufficiently proved, is\nof subjective origin, as well as the sensation from which the perception\narises; (2.) that at any rate time and space, in which the object presents\nitself, are of subjective origin; (3.) that if the being of the object\nconsists simply in its action, this means that it consists merely in the\nchanges which it brings about in others; therefore itself and in itself it\nis nothing at all. Only of _matter_ is it true, as I have said in the\ntext, and worked out in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason,\nat the end of \u00a7 21, that its being consists in its action, that it is\nthrough and through only causality, thus is itself causality objectively\nregarded; hence, however, it is also nothing in itself (\u1f21 \u1f51\u03bb\u03b7 \u03c4\u03bf \u03b1\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03c8\u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2, _materia mendacium verax_), but as an ingredient in the perceived\nobject, is a mere abstraction, which for itself alone can be given in no\nexperience. It will be fully considered later on in a chapter of its own.\nBut the perceived object must be something _in itself_, and not merely\nsomething _for others_. For otherwise it would be altogether merely idea,\nand we would have an absolute idealism, which would ultimately become\ntheoretical egoism, with which all reality disappears and the world\nbecomes a mere subjective phantasm. If, however, without further question,\nwe stop altogether at the _world as idea_, then certainly it is all one\nwhether I explain objects as ideas in my head or as phenomena exhibiting\nthemselves in time and space; for time and space themselves exist only in\nmy head. In this sense, then, an identity of the ideal and the real might\nalways be affirmed; only, after Kant, this would not be saying anything\nnew. Besides this, however, the nature of things and of the phenomenal\nworld would clearly not be thereby exhausted; but with it we would always\nremain still upon the ideal side. The _real_ side must be something _toto\ngenere_ different from _the world as idea_, it must be that which things\nare _in themselves_; and it is this entire diversity between the ideal and\nthe real which Kant has proved in the most thorough manner.\n\nLocke had denied to the senses the knowledge of things as they are in\nthemselves; but Kant denied this also to the perceiving _understanding_,\nunder which name I here comprehend what he calls the _pure_ sensibility,\nand, as it is given _a priori_, the law of causality which brings about\nthe empirical perception. Not only are both right, but we can also see\nquite directly that a contradiction lies in the assertion that a thing is\nknown as it is in and for itself, _i.e._, outside of knowledge. For all\nknowing is, as we have said, essentially a perceiving of ideas; but my\nperception of ideas, just because it is mine, can never be identical with\nthe inner nature of the thing outside of me. The being in and for itself,\nof everything, must necessarily be _subjective_; in the idea of another,\nhowever, it exists just as necessarily as _objective_\u2014a difference which\ncan never be fully reconciled. For by it the whole nature of its existence\nis fundamentally changed; as objective it presupposes a foreign subject,\nas whose idea it exists, and, moreover, as Kant has shown, has entered\nforms which are foreign to its own nature, just because they belong to\nthat foreign subject, whose knowledge is only possible by means of them.\nIf I, absorbed in this reflection, perceive, let us say lifeless bodies,\nof easily surveyed magnitude and regular, comprehensible form, and now\nattempt to conceive this spatial existence, in its three dimensions, as\ntheir being in itself, consequently as the existence which to the things\nis subjective, the impossibility of the thing is at once apparent to me,\nfor I can never think those objective forms as the being which to the\nthings is subjective, rather I become directly conscious that what I there\nperceive is only a picture produced in my brain, and existing only for me\nas the knowing subject, which cannot constitute the ultimate, and\ntherefore subjective, being in and for itself of even these lifeless\nbodies. But, on the other hand, I must not assume that even these lifeless\nbodies exist only in my idea, but, since they have inscrutable qualities,\nand, by virtue of these, activity, I must concede to them a _being in\nitself_ of some kind. But this very inscrutableness of the properties,\nwhile, on the one hand, it certainly points to something which exists\nindependently of our knowledge, gives also, on the other hand, the\nempirical proof that our knowledge, because it consists simply in _framing\nideas_ by means of subjective forms, affords us always mere _phenomena_,\nnot the true being of things. This is the explanation of the fact that in\nall that we know there remains hidden from us a certain something, as\nquite inscrutable, and we are obliged to confess that we cannot thoroughly\nunderstand even the commonest and simplest phenomena. For it is not merely\nthe highest productions of nature, living creatures, or the _complicated_\nphenomena of the unorganised world that remain inscrutable to us, but even\nevery rock-crystal, every iron-pyrite, by reason of its\ncrystallographical, optical, chemical, and electrical properties, is to\nthe searching consideration and investigation an abyss of\nincomprehensibilities and mysteries. This could not be the case if we knew\nthings as they are in themselves; for then at least the simpler phenomena,\nthe path to whose qualities was not barred for us by ignorance, would\nnecessarily be thoroughly comprehensible to us, and their whole being and\nnature would be able to pass over into our knowledge. Thus it lies not in\nthe defectiveness of our acquaintance with things, but in the nature of\nknowledge itself. For if our perception, and consequently the whole\nempirical comprehension of the things that present themselves to us, is\nalready essentially and in the main determined by our faculty of\nknowledge, and conditioned by its forms and functions, it cannot but be\nthat things exhibit themselves in a manner which is quite different from\ntheir own inner nature, and therefore appear as in a mask, which allows us\nmerely to assume what is concealed beneath it, but never to know it;\nhence, then, it gleams through as an inscrutable mystery, and never can\nthe nature of anything entire and without reserve pass over into\nknowledge; but much less can any real thing be construed _a priori_, like\na mathematical problem. Thus the empirical inscrutableness of all natural\nthings is a proof _a posteriori_ of the ideality and merely\nphenomenal-actuality of their empirical existence.\n\nAccording to all this, upon the path of _objective knowledge_, hence\nstarting from the _idea_, one will never get beyond the idea, _i.e._, the\nphenomenon. One will thus remain at the outside of things, and will never\nbe able to penetrate to their inner nature and investigate what they are\nin themselves, _i.e._, for themselves. So far I agree with Kant. But, as\nthe counterpart of this truth, I have given prominence to this other\ntruth, that we are not merely the _knowing subject_, but, in another\naspect, we ourselves also belong to the inner nature that is to be known,\n_we ourselves are the thing in itself_; that therefore a _way from within_\nstands open for us to that inner nature belonging to things themselves, to\nwhich we cannot penetrate _from without_, as it were a subterranean\npassage, a secret alliance, which, as if by treachery, places us at once\nwithin the fortress which it was impossible to take by assault from\nwithout. The thing in itself can, as such, only come into consciousness\nquite directly, in this way, that _it is itself conscious of itself_: to\nwish to know it objectively is to desire something contradictory.\nEverything objective is idea, therefore appearance, mere phenomenon of the\nbrain.\n\nKant\u2019s chief result may in substance be thus concisely stated: \u201cAll\nconceptions which have not at their foundation a perception in space and\ntime (sensuous intuition), that is to say then, which have not been drawn\nfrom such a perception, are absolutely empty, _i.e._, give no knowledge.\nBut since now perception can afford us only _phenomena_, not things in\nthemselves, we have also absolutely no knowledge of things in themselves.\u201d\nI grant this of everything, with the single exception of the knowledge\nwhich each of us has of his own _willing_: this is neither a perception\n(for all perception is spatial) nor is it empty; rather it is more real\nthan any other. Further, it is not _a priori_, like merely formal\nknowledge, but entirely _a posteriori_; hence also we cannot anticipate it\nin the particular case, but are hereby often convicted of error concerning\nourselves. In fact, our _willing_ is the one opportunity which we have of\nunderstanding from within any event which exhibits itself without,\nconsequently the one thing which is known to us _immediately_, and not,\nlike all the rest, merely given in the idea. Here, then, lies the datum\nwhich alone is able to become the key to everything else, or, as I have\nsaid, the single narrow door to the truth. Accordingly we must learn to\nunderstand nature from ourselves, not conversely ourselves from nature.\nWhat is known to us immediately must give us the explanation of what we\nonly know indirectly, not conversely. Do we perhaps understand the rolling\nof a ball when it has received an impulse more thoroughly than our\nmovement when we feel a motive? Many may imagine so, but I say it is the\nreverse. Yet we shall attain to the knowledge that what is essential in\nboth the occurrences just mentioned is identical; although identical in\nthe same way as the lowest audible note of harmony is the same as the note\nof the same name ten octaves higher.\n\nMeanwhile it should be carefully observed, and I have always kept it in\nmind, that even the inward experience which we have of our own will by no\nmeans affords us an exhaustive and adequate knowledge of the thing in\nitself. This would be the case if it were entirely an immediate\nexperience; but it is effected in this way: the will, with and by means of\nthe corporisation, provides itself also with an intellect (for the sake of\nits relations to the external world), and through this now knows itself as\nwill in self-consciousness (the necessary counterpart of the external\nworld); this knowledge therefore of the thing in itself is not fully\nadequate. First of all, it is bound to the form of the idea, it is\napprehension, and as such falls asunder into subject and object. For even\nin self-consciousness the I is not absolutely simple, but consists of a\nknower, the intellect, and a known, the will. The former is not known, and\nthe latter does not know, though both unite in the consciousness of an I.\nBut just on this account that I is not thoroughly _intimate_ with itself,\nas it were transparent, but is opaque, and therefore remains a riddle to\nitself, thus even in inner knowledge there also exists a difference\nbetween the true being of its object and the apprehension of it in the\nknowing subject. Yet inner knowledge is free from two forms which belong\nto outer knowledge, the form of _space_ and the form of _causality_, which\nis the means of effecting all sense-perception. On the other hand, there\nstill remains the form of _time_, and that of being known and knowing in\ngeneral. Accordingly in this inner knowledge the thing in itself has\nindeed in great measure thrown off its veil, but still does not yet appear\nquite naked. In consequence of the form of time which still adheres to it,\nevery one knows his will only in its successive _acts_, and not as a\nwhole, in and for itself: therefore no one knows his character _a priori_,\nbut only learns it through experience and always incompletely. But yet the\napprehension, in which we know the affections and acts of our own will, is\nfar more immediate than any other. It is the point at which the thing in\nitself most directly enters the phenomenon and is most closely examined by\nthe knowing subject; therefore the event thus intimately known is alone\nfitted to become the interpreter of all others.\n\nFor in every emergence of an act of will from the obscure depths of our\ninner being into the knowing consciousness a direct transition occurs of\nthe thing in itself, which lies outside time, into the phenomenal world.\nAccordingly the act of will is indeed only the closest and most distinct\n_manifestation_ of the thing in itself; yet it follows from this that if\nall other manifestations or phenomena could be known by us as directly and\ninwardly, we would be obliged to assert them to be that which the will is\nin us. Thus in this sense I teach that the inner nature of everything is\n_will_, and I call will the thing in itself. Kant\u2019s doctrine of the\nunknowableness of the thing in itself is hereby modified to this extent,\nthat the thing in itself is only not absolutely and from the very\nfoundation knowable, that yet by far the most immediate of its phenomena,\nwhich by this immediateness is _toto genere_ distinguished from all the\nrest, represents it for us; and accordingly we have to refer the whole\nworld of phenomena to that one in which the thing in itself appears in the\nvery thinnest of veils, and only still remains phenomenon in so far as my\nintellect, which alone is capable of knowledge, remains ever distinguished\nfrom me as the willing subject, and moreover does not even in _inner_\nperfection put off the form of knowledge of _time_.\n\nAccordingly, even after this last and furthest step, the question may\nstill be raised, what that will, which exhibits itself in the world and as\nthe world, ultimately and absolutely is in itself? _i.e._, what it is,\nregarded altogether apart from the fact that it exhibits itself as will,\nor in general _appears_, _i.e._, in general is _known_. This question can\nnever be answered: because, as we have said, becoming known is itself the\ncontradictory of being in itself, and everything that is known is as such\nonly phenomenal. But the possibility of this question shows that the thing\nin itself, which we know most directly in the will, may have, entirely\noutside all possible phenomenal appearance, ways of existing,\ndeterminations, qualities, which are absolutely unknowable and\nincomprehensible to us, and which remain as the nature of the thing in\nitself, when, as is explained in the fourth book, it has voluntarily\nabrogated itself as _will_, and has therefore retired altogether from the\nphenomenon, and for our knowledge, _i.e._, as regards the world of\nphenomena, has passed into empty nothingness. If the will were simply and\nabsolutely the thing in itself this nothing would also be _absolute_,\ninstead of which it expressly presents itself to us there as only\n_relative_.\n\nI now proceed to supplement with a few considerations pertinent to the\nsubject the exposition given both in our second book and in the work\n\u201c_Ueber den Willen in der Natur_,\u201d of the doctrine that what makes itself\nknown to us in the most immediate knowledge as will is also that which\nobjectifies itself at different grades in all the phenomena of this world;\nand I shall begin by citing a number of psychological facts which prove\nthat first of all in our own consciousness the will always appears as\nprimary and fundamental, and throughout asserts its superiority to the\nintellect, which, on the other hand, always presents itself as secondary,\nsubordinate, and conditioned. This proof is the more necessary as all\nphilosophers before me, from the first to the last, place the true being\nor the kernel of man in the _knowing_ consciousness, and accordingly have\nconceived and explained the I, or, in the case of many of them, its\ntranscendental hypostasis called soul, as primarily and essentially\n_knowing_, nay, _thinking_, and only in consequence of this, secondarily\nand derivatively, as _willing_. This ancient and universal radical error,\nthis enormous \u03c0\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c8\u03b5\u03c5\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 and fundamental \u1f51\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd, must before\neverything be set aside, and instead of it the true state of the case must\nbe brought to perfectly distinct consciousness. Since, however, this is\ndone here for the first time, after thousands of years of philosophising,\nsome fulness of statement will be appropriate. The remarkable phenomenon,\nthat in this most essential point all philosophers have erred, nay, have\nexactly reversed the truth, might, especially in the case of those of the\nChristian era, be partly explicable from the fact that they all had the\nintention of presenting man as distinguished as widely as possible from\nthe brutes, yet at the same time obscurely felt that the difference\nbetween them lies in the intellect, not in the will; whence there arose\nunconsciously within them an inclination to make the intellect the\nessential and principal thing, and even to explain volition as a mere\nfunction of the intellect. Hence also the conception of a soul is not only\ninadmissible, because it is a transcendent hypostasis, as is proved by the\n\u201cCritique of Pure Reason,\u201d but it becomes the source of irremediable\nerrors, because in its \u201csimple substance\u201d it establishes beforehand an\nindivisible unity of knowledge and will, the separation of which is just\nthe path to the truth. That conception must therefore appear no more in\nphilosophy, but may be left to German doctors and physiologists, who,\nafter they have laid aside scalpel and spattle, amuse themselves by\nphilosophising with the conceptions they received when they were\nconfirmed. They might certainly try their luck in England. The French\nphysiologists and zootomists have (till lately) kept themselves free from\nthat reproach.\n\nThe first consequence of their common fundamental error, which is very\ninconvenient to all these philosophers, is this: since in death the\nknowing consciousness obviously perishes, they must either allow death to\nbe the annihilation of the man, to which our inner being is opposed, or\nthey must have recourse to the assumption of a continued existence of the\nknowing consciousness, which requires a strong faith, for his own\nexperience has sufficiently proved to every one the thorough and complete\ndependence of the knowing consciousness upon the brain, and one can just\nas easily believe in digestion without a stomach as in a knowing\nconsciousness without a brain. My philosophy alone leads out of this\ndilemma, for it for the first time places the true being of man not in the\nconsciousness but in the will, which is not essentially bound up with\nconsciousness, but is related to consciousness, _i.e._, to knowledge, as\nsubstance to accident, as something illuminated to the light, as the\nstring to the resounding-board, and which enters consciousness from within\nas the corporeal world does from without. Now we can comprehend the\nindestructibleness of this our real kernel and true being, in spite of the\nevident ceasing of consciousness in death, and the corresponding\nnon-existence of it before birth. For the intellect is as perishable as\nthe brain, whose product or rather whose action it is. But the brain, like\nthe whole organism, is the product or phenomenon, in short, the\nsubordinate of the will, which alone is imperishable.\n\n\n\n\nChapter XIX.(30) On The Primacy Of The Will In Self-Consciousness.\n\n\nThe will, as the thing in itself, constitutes the inner, true, and\nindestructible nature of man; in itself, however, it is unconscious. For\nconsciousness is conditioned by the intellect, and the intellect is a mere\naccident of our being; for it is a function of the brain, which, together\nwith the nerves and spinal cord connected with it, is a mere fruit, a\nproduct, nay, so far, a parasite of the rest of the organism; for it does\nnot directly enter into its inner constitution, but merely serves the end\nof self-preservation by regulating the relations of the organism to the\nexternal world. The organism itself, on the other hand, is the visibility,\nthe objectivity, of the individual will, the image of it as it presents\nitself in that very brain (which in the first book we learned to recognise\nas the condition of the objective world in general), therefore also\nbrought about by its forms of knowledge, space, time, and causality, and\nconsequently presenting itself as extended, successively acting, and\nmaterial, _i.e._, as something operative or efficient. The members are\nboth directly felt and also perceived by means of the senses only in the\nbrain. According to this one may say: The intellect is the secondary\nphenomenon; the organism the primary phenomenon, that is, the immediate\nmanifestation of the will; the will is metaphysical, the intellect\nphysical;\u2014the intellect, like its objects, is merely phenomenal\nappearance; the will alone is the thing in itself. Then, in a more and\nmore _figurative sense_, thus by way of simile: The will is the substance\nof man, the intellect the accident; the will is the matter, the intellect\nis the form; the will is warmth, the intellect is light.\n\nWe shall now first of all verify and also elucidate this thesis by the\nfollowing facts connected with the inner life of man; and on this\nopportunity perhaps more will be done for the knowledge of the inner man\nthan is to be found in many systematic psychologies.\n\n1. Not only the consciousness of other things, _i.e._, the apprehension of\nthe external world, but also _self-consciousness_, contains, as was\nmentioned already above, a knower and a known; otherwise it would not be\n_consciousness_. For _consciousness_ consists in knowing; but knowing\nrequires a knower and a known; therefore there could be no\nself-consciousness if there were not in it also a known opposed to the\nknower and different from it. As there can be no object without a subject,\nso also there can be no subject without an object, _i.e._, no knower\nwithout something different from it which is known. Therefore a\nconsciousness which is through and through pure intelligence is\nimpossible. The intelligence is like the sun, which does not illuminate\nspace if there is no object from which its rays are reflected. The knower\nhimself, as such, cannot be known; otherwise he would be the known of\nanother knower. But now, as the _known_ in self-consciousness we find\nexclusively the _will_. For not merely willing and purposing in the\nnarrowest sense, but also all striving, wishing, shunning, hoping,\nfearing, loving, hating, in short, all that directly constitutes our own\nweal and woe, desire and aversion, is clearly only affection of the will,\nis a moving, a modification of willing and not-willing, is just that\nwhich, if it takes outward effect, exhibits itself as an act of will\nproper.(31) In all knowledge, however, the known is first and essential,\nnot the knower; for the former is the \u03c0\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u03bf\u03c4\u03c5\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2, the latter the \u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03c5\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2.\nTherefore in self-consciousness also the known, thus the will, must be\nwhat is first and original; the knower, on the other hand, only what is\nsecondary, that which has been added, the mirror. They are related very\nmuch as the luminous to the reflecting body; or, again, as the vibrating\nstrings to the resounding-board, in which case the note produced would be\nconsciousness. We may also regard the plant as a like symbol of\nconsciousness. It has, we know, two poles, the root and the corona: the\nformer struggling into darkness, moisture, and cold, the latter into\nlight, dryness, and warmth; then, as the point of indifference of the two\npoles, where they part asunder, close to the ground, the collum\n(_rhizoma_, _le collet_). The root is what is essential, original,\nperennial, the death of which involves that of the corona, is thus the\nprimary; the corona, on the other hand, is the ostensible, but it has\nsprung from something else, and it passes away without the root dying; it\nis thus secondary. The root represents the will, the corona the intellect,\nand the point of indifference of the two, the collum, would be the _I_,\nwhich, as their common termination, belongs to both. This I is the _pro\ntempore_ identical subject of knowing and willing, whose identity I called\nin my very first essay (on the principle of sufficient reason), and in my\nfirst philosophical wonder, the miracle \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4 \u03b5\u03be\u03bf\u03c7\u03b7\u03bd. It is the temporal\nstarting-point and connecting-link of the whole phenomenon, _i.e._, of the\nobjectification of the will: it conditions indeed the phenomenon, but is\nalso conditioned by it. This comparison may even be carried to the\nindividual nature of men. As a large corona commonly springs only from a\nlarge root, so the greatest intellectual capabilities are only found in\nconnection with a vehement and passionate will. A genius of a phlegmatic\ncharacter and weak passions would resemble those succulent plants that,\nwith a considerable corona consisting of thick leaves, have very small\nroots; will not, however, be found. That vehemence of will and\npassionateness of character are conditions of heightened intelligence\nexhibits itself physiologically through the fact that the activity of the\nbrain is conditioned by the movement which the great arteries running\ntowards the _basis cerebri_ impart to it with each pulsation; therefore an\nenergetic pulse, and even, according to Bichat, a short neck, is a\nrequisite of great activity of the brain. But the opposite of the above\ncertainly occurs: vehement desires, passionate, violent character, along\nwith weak intellect, _i.e._, a small brain of bad conformation in a thick\nskull. This is a phenomenon as common as it is repulsive: we might perhaps\ncompare it to beetroot.\n\n2. But in order not merely to describe consciousness figuratively, but to\nknow it thoroughly, we have first of all to find out what appears in the\nsame way in every consciousness, and therefore, as the common and constant\nelement, will also be the essential. Then we shall consider what\ndistinguishes _one_ consciousness from another, which accordingly will be\nthe adventitious and secondary element.\n\nConsciousness is positively only known to us as a property of animal\nnature; therefore we must not, and indeed cannot, think of it otherwise\nthan as _animal consciousness_, so that this expression is tautological.\nNow, that which in _every_ animal consciousness, even the most imperfect\nand the weakest, is always present, nay, lies at its foundation, is an\nimmediate sense of _longing_, and of the alternate satisfaction and\nnon-satisfaction of it, in very different degrees. This we know to a\ncertain extent _a priori_. For marvellously different as the innumerable\nspecies of animals are, and strange as some new form, never seen before,\nappears to us, we yet assume beforehand its inmost nature, with perfect\ncertainty, as well known, and indeed fully confided to us. We know that\nthe animal _wills_, indeed also _what_ it wills, existence, well-being,\nlife, and propagation; and since in this we presuppose with perfect\ncertainty identity with us, we do not hesitate to attribute to it\nunchanged all the affections of will which we know in ourselves, and speak\nat once of its desire, aversion, fear, anger, hatred, love, joy, sorrow,\nlonging, &c. On the other hand, whenever phenomena of mere knowledge come\nto be spoken of we fall at once into uncertainty. We do not venture to say\nthat the animal conceives, thinks, judges, knows: we only attribute to it\nwith certainty ideas in general; because without them its _will_ could not\nhave those emotions referred to above. But with regard to the definite\nmanner of knowing of the brutes and the precise limits of it in a given\nspecies, we have only indefinite conceptions, and make conjectures. Hence\nour understanding with them is also often difficult, and is only brought\nabout by skill, in consequence of experience and practice. Here then lie\ndistinctions of consciousness. On the other hand, a longing, desiring,\nwishing, or a detesting, shunning, and not wishing, is proper to every\nconsciousness: man has it in common with the polyp. This is accordingly\nthe essential element in and the basis of every consciousness. The\ndifference of the manifestations of this in the different species of\nanimal beings depends upon the various extension of their sphere of\nknowledge, in which the motives of those manifestations lie. We understand\ndirectly from our own nature all actions and behaviour of the brutes which\nexpress movements of the will; therefore, so far, we sympathise with them\nin various ways. On the other hand, the gulf between us and them results\nsimply and solely from the difference of intellect. The gulf which lies\nbetween a very sagacious brute and a man of very limited capacity is\nperhaps not much greater than that which exists between a blockhead and a\nman of genius; therefore here also the resemblance between them in another\naspect, which springs from the likeness of their inclinations and\nemotions, and assimilates them again to each other, sometimes appears with\nsurprising prominence, and excites astonishment. This consideration makes\nit clear that in all animal natures the _will_ is what is primary and\nsubstantial, the _intellect_ again is secondary, adventitious, indeed a\nmere tool for the service of the former, and is more or less complete and\ncomplicated, according to the demands of this service. As a species of\nanimals is furnished with hoofs, claws, hands, wings, horns, or teeth\naccording to the aims of its will, so also is it furnished with a more or\nless developed brain, whose function is the intelligence necessary for its\nendurance. The more complicated the organisation becomes, in the ascending\nseries of animals, the more numerous also are its wants, and the more\nvaried and specially determined the objects which are capable of\nsatisfying them; hence the more complicated and distant the paths by which\nthese are to be obtained, which must now be all known and found: therefore\nin the same proportion the ideas of the animal must be more versatile,\naccurate, definite, and connected, and also its attention must be more\nhighly strung, more sustained, and more easily roused, consequently its\nintellect must be more developed and perfect. Accordingly we see the organ\nof intelligence, the cerebral system, together with all the organs of\nsense, keep pace with the increasing wants and the complication of the\norganism; and the increase of the part of consciousness that has to do\nwith ideas (as opposed to the willing part) exhibits itself in a bodily\nform in the ever-increasing proportion of the brain in general to the rest\nof the nervous system, and of the cerebrum to the cerebellum; for\n(according to Flourens) the former is the workshop of ideas, while the\nlatter is the disposer and orderer of movements. The last step which\nnature has taken in this respect is, however, disproportionately great.\nFor in man not only does the faculty of ideas of _perception_, which alone\nexisted hitherto, reach the highest degree of perfection, but the\n_abstract_ idea, thought, _i.e._, _reason_, and with it reflection, is\nadded. Through this important advance of the intellect, thus of the\nsecondary part of consciousness, it now gains a preponderance over the\nprimary part, in so far as it becomes henceforward the predominantly\nactive part. While in the brute the immediate sense of its satisfied or\nunsatisfied desire constitutes by far the most important part of its\nconsciousness, and the more so indeed the lower the grade of the animal,\nso that the lowest animals are only distinguished from plants by the\naddition of a dull idea, in man the opposite is the case. Vehement as are\nhis desires, even more vehement than those of any brute, rising to the\nlevel of passions, yet his consciousness remains continuously and\npredominantly occupied and filled with ideas and thoughts. Without doubt\nthis has been the principal occasion of that fundamental error of all\nphilosophers on account of which they make thought that which is essential\nand primary in the so-called soul, _i.e._, in the inner or spiritual life\nof man, always placing it first, but will, as a mere product of thought,\nthey regard as only a subordinate addition and consequence of it. But if\nwilling merely proceeded from knowing, how could the brutes, even the\nlower grades of them, with so very little knowledge, often show such an\nunconquerable and vehement will? Accordingly, since that fundamental error\nof the philosophers makes, as it were, the accident the substance, it\nleads them into mistaken paths, which there is afterwards no way of\ngetting out of. Now this relative predominance of the _knowing_\nconsciousness over the _desiring_, consequently of the secondary part over\nthe primary, which appears in man, may, in particular exceptionally\nfavoured individuals, go so far that at the moments of its highest\nascendancy, the secondary or knowing part of consciousness detaches itself\naltogether from the willing part, and passes into free activity for\nitself, _i.e._, untouched by the will, and consequently no longer serving\nit. Thus it becomes purely objective, and the clear mirror of the world,\nand from it the conceptions of genius then arise, which are the subject of\nour third book.\n\n3. If we run through the series of grades of animals downwards, we see the\nintellect always becoming weaker and less perfect, but we by no means\nobserve a corresponding degradation of the will. Rather it retains\neverywhere its identical nature and shows itself in the form of great\nattachment to life, care for the individual and the species, egoism and\nregardlessness of all others, together with the emotions that spring from\nthese. Even in the smallest insect the will is present, complete and\nentire; it wills what it wills as decidedly and completely as the man. The\ndifference lies merely in _what_ it wills, _i.e._, in the motives, which,\nhowever, are the affair of the intellect. It indeed, as the secondary part\nof consciousness, and bound to the bodily organism, has innumerable\ndegrees of completeness, and is in general essentially limited and\nimperfect. The _will_, on the contrary, as original and the thing in\nitself, can never be imperfect, but every act of will is all that it can\nbe. On account of the simplicity which belongs to the will as the thing in\nitself, the metaphysical in the phenomenon, its nature admits of no\ndegrees, but is always completely itself. Only its _excitement_ has\ndegrees, from the weakest inclination to the passion, and also its\nsusceptibility to excitement, thus its vehemence from the phlegmatic to\nthe choleric temperament. The _intellect_, on the other hand, has not\nmerely degrees of _excitement_, from sleepiness to being in the vein, and\ninspiration, but also degrees of its nature, of the completeness of this,\nwhich accordingly rises gradually from the lowest animals, which can only\nobscurely apprehend, up to man, and here again from the fool to the\ngenius. The _will_ alone is everywhere completely itself. For its function\nis of the utmost simplicity; it consists in willing and not willing, which\ngoes on with the greatest ease, without effort, and requires no practice.\nKnowing, on the contrary, has multifarious functions, and never takes\nplace entirely without effort, which is required to fix the attention and\nto make clear the object, and at a higher stage is certainly needed for\nthinking and deliberation; therefore it is also capable of great\nimprovement through exercise and education. If the intellect presents a\nsimple, perceptible object to the will, the latter expresses at once its\napproval or disapproval of it, and this even if the intellect has\nlaboriously inquired and pondered, in order from numerous data, by means\nof difficult combinations, ultimately to arrive at the conclusion as to\nwhich of the two seems to be most in conformity with the interests of the\nwill. The latter has meanwhile been idly resting, and when the conclusion\nis arrived at it enters, as the Sultan enters the Divan, merely to express\nagain its monotonous approval or disapproval, which certainly may vary in\ndegree, but in its nature remains always the same.\n\nThis fundamentally different nature of the will and the intellect, the\nessential simplicity and originality of the former, in contrast to the\ncomplicated and secondary character of the latter, becomes still more\nclear to us if we observe their remarkable interaction within us, and now\nconsider in the particular case, how the images and thoughts which arise\nin the intellect move the will, and how entirely separated and different\nare the parts which the two play. We can indeed perceive this even in\nactual events which excite the will in a lively manner, while primarily\nand in themselves they are merely objects of the intellect. But, on the\none hand, it is here not so evident that this reality primarily existed\nonly in the intellect; and, on the other hand, the change does not\ngenerally take place so rapidly as is necessary if the thing is to be\neasily surveyed, and thereby become thoroughly comprehensible. Both of\nthese conditions, however, are fulfilled if it is merely thoughts and\nphantasies which we allow to act on the will. If, for example, alone with\nourselves, we think over our personal circumstances, and now perhaps\nvividly present to ourselves the menace of an actually present danger and\nthe possibility of an unfortunate issue, anxiety at once compresses the\nheart, and the blood ceases to circulate in the veins. But if then the\nintellect passes to the possibility of an opposite issue, and lets the\nimagination picture the long hoped for happiness thereby attained, all the\npulses quicken at once with joy and the heart feels light as a feather,\ntill the intellect awakes from its dream. Thereupon, suppose that an\noccasion should lead the memory to an insult or injury once suffered long\nago, at once anger and bitterness pour into the breast that was but now at\npeace. But then arises, called up by accident, the image of a long-lost\nlove, with which the whole romance and its magic scenes is connected; then\nthat anger will at once give place to profound longing and sadness.\nFinally, if there occurs to us some former humiliating incident, we shrink\ntogether, would like to sink out of sight, blush with shame, and often try\nforcibly to distract and divert our thoughts by some loud exclamation, as\nif to scare some evil spirit. One sees, the intellect plays, and the will\nmust dance to it. Indeed the intellect makes the will play the part of a\nchild which is alternately thrown at pleasure into joyful or sad moods by\nthe chatter and tales of its nurse. This depends upon the fact that the\nwill is itself without knowledge, and the understanding which is given to\nit is without will. Therefore the former is like a body which is moved,\nthe latter like the causes which set it in motion, for it is the medium of\nmotives. Yet in all this the primacy of the will becomes clear again, if\nthis will, which, as we have shown, becomes the sport of the intellect as\nsoon as it allows the latter to control it, once makes its supremacy in\nthe last instance felt by prohibiting the intellect from entertaining\ncertain ideas, absolutely preventing certain trains of thought from\narising, because it knows, _i.e._, learns from that very intellect, that\nthey would awaken in it some one of the emotions set forth above. It now\nbridles the intellect, and compels it to turn to other things. Hard as\nthis often may be, it must yet be accomplished as soon as the will is in\nearnest about it, for the resistance in this case does not proceed from\nthe intellect, which always remains indifferent, but from the will itself,\nwhich in one respect has an inclination towards an idea that in another\nrespect it abhors. It is in itself interesting to the will simply because\nit excites it, but at the same time abstract knowledge tells it that this\nidea will aimlessly cause it a shock of painful or unworthy emotion: it\nnow decides in conformity with this abstract knowledge, and compels the\nobedience of the intellect. This is called \u201cbeing master of oneself.\u201d\nClearly the master here is the will, the servant the intellect, for in the\nlast instance the will always keeps the upper hand, and therefore\nconstitutes the true core, the inner being of man. In this respect the\ntitle \u0397\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd would belong to the _will_; yet it seems, on the other\nhand, to apply to the _intellect_, because it is the leader and guide,\nlike the _valet de place_ who conducts a stranger. In truth, however, the\nhappiest figure of the relation of the two is the strong blind man who\ncarries on his shoulders the lame man who can see.\n\nThe relation of the will to the intellect here explained may also be\nfurther recognised in the fact that the intellect is originally entirely a\nstranger to the purposes of the will. It supplies the motives to the will,\nbut it only learns afterwards, completely _a posteriori_, how they have\naffected it, as one who makes a chemical experiment applies the reagents\nand awaits the result. Indeed the intellect remains so completely excluded\nfrom the real decisions and secret purposes of its own will that sometimes\nit can only learn them like those of a stranger, by spying upon them and\nsurprising them, and must catch the will in the act of expressing itself\nin order to get at its real intentions. For example, I have conceived a\nplan, about which, however, I have still some scruple, but the\nfeasibleness of which, as regards its possibility, is completely\nuncertain, for it depends upon external and still undecided circumstances.\nIt would therefore certainly be unnecessary to come to a decision about it\nat present, and so for the time I leave the matter as it is. Now in such a\ncase I often do not know how firmly I am already attached to that plan in\nsecret, and how much, in spite of the scruple, I wish to carry it out:\nthat is, my intellect does not know. But now only let me receive news that\nit is practicable, at once there rises within me a jubilant, irresistible\ngladness, that passes through my whole being and takes permanent\npossession of it, to my own astonishment. For now my intellect learns for\nthe first time how firmly my will had laid hold of that plan, and how\nthoroughly the plan suited it, while the intellect had regarded it as\nentirely problematical, and had with difficulty been able to overcome that\nscruple. Or in another case, I have entered eagerly into a contract which\nI believed to be very much in accordance with my wishes. But as the matter\nprogresses the disadvantages and burdens of it are felt, and I begin to\nsuspect that I even repent of what I so eagerly pursued; yet I rid myself\nof this feeling by assuring myself that even if I were not bound I would\nfollow the same course. Now, however, the contract is unexpectedly broken\nby the other side, and I perceive with astonishment that this happens to\nmy great satisfaction and relief. Often we don\u2019t know what we wish or what\nwe fear. We may entertain a wish for years without even confessing it to\nourselves, or even allowing it to come to clear consciousness; for the\nintellect must know nothing about it, because the good opinion which we\nhave of ourselves might thereby suffer. But if it is fulfilled we learn\nfrom our joy, not without shame, that we have wished this. For example,\nthe death of a near relation whose heir we are. And sometimes we do not\nknow what we really fear, because we lack the courage to bring it to\ndistinct consciousness. Indeed we are often in error as to the real motive\nfrom which we have done something or left it undone, till at last perhaps\nan accident discovers to us the secret, and we know that what we have held\nto be the motive was not the true one, but another which we had not wished\nto confess to ourselves, because it by no means accorded with the good\nopinion we entertained of ourselves. For example, we refrain from doing\nsomething on purely moral grounds, as we believe, but afterwards we\ndiscover that we were only restrained by fear, for as soon as all danger\nis removed we do it. In particular cases this may go so far that a man\ndoes not even guess the true motive of his action, nay, does not believe\nhimself capable of being influenced by such a motive; and yet it is the\ntrue motive of his action. We may remark in passing that in all this we\nhave a confirmation and explanation of the rule of Larochefoucauld:\n\u201c_L\u2019amour-propre est plus habile que le plus habile homme du monde;_\u201d nay,\neven a commentary on the Delphic \u03b3\u03bd\u03c9\u03b8\u03b9 \u03c3\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd and its difficulty. If now,\non the contrary, as all philosophers imagine, the intellect constituted\nour true nature and the purposes of the will were a mere result of\nknowledge, then only the motive from which we imagined that we acted would\nbe decisive of our moral worth; in analogy with the fact that the\nintention, not the result, is in this respect decisive. But really then\nthe distinction between imagined and true motive would be impossible. Thus\nall cases here set forth, to which every one who pays attention may\nobserve analogous cases in himself, show us how the intellect is so\nstrange to the will that it is sometimes even mystified by it: for it\nindeed supplies it with motives, but does not penetrate into the secret\nworkshop of its purposes. It is indeed a confidant of the will, but a\nconfidant that is not told everything. This is also further confirmed by\nthe fact, which almost every one will some time have the opportunity of\nobserving in himself, that sometimes the intellect does not thoroughly\ntrust the will. If we have formed some great and bold purpose, which as\nsuch is yet really only a promise made by the will to the intellect, there\noften remains within us a slight unconfessed doubt whether we are quite in\nearnest about it, whether in carrying it out we will not waver or draw\nback, but will have sufficient firmness and persistency to fulfil it. It\ntherefore requires the deed to convince us ourselves of the sincerity of\nthe purpose.\n\nAll these facts prove the absolute difference of the will and the\nintellect, the primacy of the former and the subordinate position of the\nlatter.\n\n4. The _intellect_ becomes tired; the _will_ is never tired. After\nsustained work with the head we feel the tiredness of the brain, just like\nthat of the arm after sustained bodily work. All _knowing_ is accompanied\nwith effort; _willing_, on the contrary, is our very nature, whose\nmanifestations take place without any weariness and entirely of their own\naccord. Therefore, if our will is strongly excited, as in all emotions,\nthus in anger, fear, desire, grief, &c., and we are now called upon to\nknow, perhaps with the view of correcting the motives of that emotion, the\nviolence which we must do ourselves for this purpose is evidence of the\ntransition from the original natural activity proper to ourselves to the\nderived, indirect, and forced activity. For the will alone is \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2,\nand therefore \u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b1\u03b3\u03b7\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 (_lassitudinis et senii\nexpers in sempiternum_). It alone is active without being called upon, and\ntherefore often too early and too much, and it knows no weariness. Infants\nwho scarcely show the first weak trace of intelligence are already full of\nself-will: through unlimited, aimless roaring and shrieking they show the\npressure of will with which they swell, while their willing has yet no\nobject, _i.e._, they will without knowing what they will. What Cabanis has\nobserved is also in point here: \u201c_Toutes ces passions, qui se succ\u00e8dent\nd\u2019une manni\u00e8re si rapide, et se peignent avec tant de na\u00efvet\u00e9, sur le\nvisage mobile des enfants. Tandis que les faibles muscles de leurs bras et\nde leurs jambes savent encore a peine former quelque mouvemens ind\u00e9cis,\nles muscles de la face expriment d\u00e9j\u00e0 par des mouvemens distincts presque\ntoute la suite des affections g\u00e9n\u00e9rales propres a __ la nature humaine: et\nl\u2019observateur attentif reconnait facilement dans ce tableau les traits\ncaract\u00e9ristiques de l\u2019homme futur_\u201d (_Rapports du Physique et Moral_, vol.\ni. p. 123). The intellect, on the contrary, develops slowly, following the\ncompletion of the brain and the maturity of the whole organism, which are\nits conditions, just because it is merely a somatic function. It is\nbecause the brain attains its full size in the seventh year that from that\ntime forward children become so remarkably intelligent, inquisitive, and\nreasonable. But then comes puberty; to a certain extent it affords a\nsupport to the brain, or a resounding-board, and raises the intellect at\nonce by a large step, as it were by an octave, corresponding to the\nlowering of the voice by that amount. But at once the animal desires and\npassions that now appear resist the reasonableness that has hitherto\nprevailed and to which they have been added. Further evidence is given of\nthe indefatigable nature of the will by the fault which is, more or less,\npeculiar to all men by nature, and is only overcome by\neducation\u2014_precipitation_. It consists in this, that the will hurries to\nits work before the time. This work is the purely active and executive\npart, which ought only to begin when the explorative and deliberative\npart, thus the work of knowing, has been completely and thoroughly carried\nout. But this time is seldom waited for. Scarcely are a few data\nconcerning the circumstances before us, or the event that has occurred, or\nthe opinion of others conveyed to us, superficially comprehended and\nhastily gathered together by knowledge, than from the depths of our being\nthe will, always ready and never weary, comes forth unasked, and shows\nitself as terror, fear, hope, joy, desire, envy, grief, zeal, anger, or\ncourage, and leads to rash words and deeds, which are generally followed\nby repentance when time has taught us that the hegemonicon, the intellect,\nhas not been able to finish half its work of comprehending the\ncircumstances, reflecting on their connection, and deciding what is\nprudent, because the will did not wait for it, but sprang forward long\nbefore its time with \u201cNow it is my turn!\u201d and at once began the active\nwork, without the intellect being able to resist, as it is a mere slave\nand bondman of the will, and not, like it, \u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, nor active from its\nown power and its own impulse; therefore it is easily pushed aside and\nsilenced by a nod of the will, while on its part it is scarcely able, with\nthe greatest efforts, to bring the will even to a brief pause, in order to\nspeak. This is why the people are so rare, and are found almost only among\nSpaniards, Turks, and perhaps Englishmen, who even under circumstances of\nprovocation _keep the head uppermost_, imperturbably proceed to comprehend\nand investigate the state of affairs, and when others would already be\nbeside themselves, _con mucho sosiego_, still ask further questions, which\nis something quite different from the indifference founded upon apathy and\nstupidity of many Germans and Dutchmen. Iffland used to give an excellent\nrepresentation of this admirable quality, as Hetmann of the Cossacks, in\nBenjowski, when the conspirators have enticed him into their tent and hold\na rifle to his head, with the warning that they will fire it if he utters\na cry, Iffland blew into the mouth of the rifle to try whether it was\nloaded. Of ten things that annoy us, nine would not be able to do so if we\nunderstood them thoroughly in their causes, and therefore knew their\nnecessity and true nature; but we would do this much oftener if we made\nthem the object of reflection before making them the object of wrath and\nindignation. For what bridle and bit are to an unmanageable horse the\nintellect is for the will in man; by this bridle it must be controlled by\nmeans of instruction, exhortation, culture, &c., for in itself it is as\nwild and impetuous an impulse as the force that appears in the descending\nwaterfall, nay, as we know, it is at bottom identical with this. In the\nheight of anger, in intoxication, in despair, it has taken the bit between\nits teeth, has run away, and follows its original nature. In the _Mania __\nsine delirio_ it has lost bridle and bit altogether, and shows now most\ndistinctly its original nature, and that the intellect is as different\nfrom it as the bridle from the horse. In this condition it may also be\ncompared to a clock which, when a certain screw is taken away, runs down\nwithout stopping.\n\nThus this consideration also shows us the will as that which is original,\nand therefore metaphysical; the intellect, on the other hand, as something\nsubordinate and physical. For as such the latter is, like everything\nphysical, subject to _vis inerti\u00e6_, consequently only active if it is set\nagoing by something else, the will, which rules it, manages it, rouses it\nto effort, in short, imparts to it the activity which does not originally\nreside in it. Therefore it willingly rests whenever it is permitted to do\nso, often declares itself lazy and disinclined to activity; through\ncontinued effort it becomes weary to the point of complete stupefaction,\nis exhausted, like the voltaic pile, through repeated shocks. Hence all\ncontinuous mental work demands pauses and rest, otherwise stupidity and\nincapacity ensue, at first of course only temporarily; but if this rest is\npersistently denied to the intellect it will become excessively and\ncontinuously fatigued, and the consequence is a permanent deterioration of\nit, which in an old man may pass into complete incapacity, into\nchildishness, imbecility, and madness. It is not to be attributed to age\nin and for itself, but to long-continued tyrannical over-exertion of the\nintellect or brain, if this misfortune appears in the last years of life.\nThis is the explanation of the fact that Swift became mad, Kant became\nchildish, Walter Scott, and also Wordsworth, Southey, and many _minorum\ngentium_, became dull and incapable. Goethe remained to the end clear,\nstrong, and active-minded, because he, who was always a man of the world\nand a courtier, never carried on his mental occupations with\nself-compulsion. The same holds good of Wieland and of Kuebel, who lived\nto the age of ninety-one, and also of Voltaire. Now all this proves how\nvery subordinate and physical and what a mere tool the intellect is. Just\non this account it requires, during almost a third part of its lifetime,\nthe entire suspension of its activity in sleep, _i.e._, the rest of the\nbrain, of which it is the mere function, and which therefore just as truly\nprecedes it as the stomach precedes digestion, or as a body precedes its\nimpulsion, and with which in old age it flags and decays. The will, on the\ncontrary, as the thing in itself, is never lazy, is absolutely untiring,\nits activity is its essence, it never ceases willing, and when, during\ndeep sleep, it is forsaken of the intellect, and therefore cannot act\noutwardly in accordance with motives, it is active as the vital force,\ncares the more uninterruptedly for the inner economy of the organism, and\nas _vis natur\u00e6 medicatrix_ sets in order again the irregularities that\nhave crept into it. For it is not, like the intellect, a function of the\nbody; _but the body is its function_; therefore it is, _ordine rerum_,\nprior to the body, as its metaphysical substratum, as the in-itself of its\nphenomenal appearance. It shares its unwearying nature, for the time that\nlife lasts, with the heart, that _primum mobile_ of the organism, which\nhas therefore become its symbol and synonym. Moreover, it does not\ndisappear in the old man, but still continues to will what it has willed,\nand indeed becomes firmer, more inflexible, than it was in youth, more\nimplacable, self-willed, and unmanageable, because the intellect has\nbecome less susceptible: therefore in old age the man can perhaps only be\nmatched by taking advantage of the weakness of his intellect.\n\nMoreover, the prevailing _weakness_ and _imperfection_ of the intellect,\nas it is shown in the want of judgment, narrow-mindedness, perversity, and\nfolly of the great majority of men, would be quite inexplicable if the\nintellect were not subordinate, adventitious, and merely instrumental, but\nthe immediate and original nature of the so-called soul, or in general of\nthe inner man: as all philosophers have hitherto assumed it to be. For how\ncould the original nature in its immediate and peculiar function so\nconstantly err and fail? The _truly_ original in human consciousness, the\n_willing_, always goes on with perfect success; every being wills\nunceasingly, capably, and decidedly. To regard the immorality in the will\nas an imperfection of it would be a fundamentally false point of view. For\nmorality has rather a source which really lies above nature, and therefore\nits utterances are in contradiction with it. Therefore morality is in\ndirect opposition to the natural will, which in itself is completely\negoistic; indeed the pursuit of the path of morality leads to the\nabolition of the will. On this subject I refer to our fourth book and to\nmy prize essay, \u201c_Ueber das Fundament der Moral_.\u201d\n\n5. That the _will_ is what is real and essential in man, and the\n_intellect_ only subordinate, conditioned, and produced, is also to be\nseen in the fact that the latter can carry on its function with perfect\npurity and correctness only so long as the will is silent and pauses. On\nthe other hand, the function of the intellect is disturbed by every\nobservable excitement of the will, and its result is falsified by the\nintermixture of the latter; but the converse does not hold, that the\nintellect should in the same way be a hindrance to the will. Thus the moon\ncannot shine when the sun is in the heavens, but when the moon is in the\nheavens it does not prevent the sun from shining.\n\nA great _fright_ often deprives us of our senses to such an extent that we\nare petrified, or else do the most absurd things; for example, when fire\nhas broken out run right into the flames. _Anger_ makes us no longer know\nwhat we do, still less what we say. _Zeal_, therefore called blind, makes\nus incapable of weighing the arguments of others, or even of seeking out\nand setting in order our own. _Joy_ makes us inconsiderate, reckless, and\nfoolhardy, and _desire_ acts almost in the same way. _Fear_ prevents us\nfrom seeing and laying hold of the resources that are still present, and\noften lie close beside us. Therefore for overcoming sudden dangers, and\nalso for fighting with opponents and enemies, the most essential\nqualifications are _coolness and presence of mind_. The former consists in\nthe silence of the will so that the intellect can act; the latter in the\nundisturbed activity of the intellect under the pressure of events acting\non the will; therefore the former is the condition of the latter, and the\ntwo are nearly related; they are seldom to be found, and always only in a\nlimited degree. But they are of inestimable advantage, because they permit\nthe use of the intellect just at those times when we stand most in need of\nit, and therefore confer decided superiority. He who is without them only\nknows what he should have done or said when the opportunity has passed. It\nis very appropriately said of him who is violently moved, _i.e._, whose\nwill is so strongly excited that it destroys the purity of the function of\nthe intellect, he is _disarmed_; for the correct knowledge of the\ncircumstances and relations is our defence and weapon in the conflict with\nthings and with men. In this sense Balthazar Gracian says: \u201c_Es la passion\nenemiga declarada de la cordura_\u201d (Passion is the declared enemy of\nprudence). If now the intellect were not something completely different\nfrom the will, but, as has been hitherto supposed, knowing and willing had\nthe same root, and were equally original functions of an absolutely simple\nnature, then with the rousing and heightening of the will, in which the\nemotion consists, the intellect would necessarily also be heightened; but,\nas we have seen, it is rather hindered and depressed by this; whence the\nancients called emotion _animi perturbatio_. The intellect is really like\nthe reflecting surface of water, but the water itself is like the will,\nwhose disturbance therefore at once destroys the clearness of that mirror\nand the distinctness of its images. The _organism_ is the will itself, is\nembodied will, _i.e._, will objectively perceived in the brain. Therefore\nmany of its functions, such as respiration, circulation, secretion of\nbile, and muscular power, are heightened and accelerated by the\npleasurable, and in general the healthy, emotions. The _intellect_, on the\nother hand, is the mere function of the brain, which is only nourished and\nsupported by the organism as a parasite. Therefore every perturbation of\nthe _will_, and with it of the _organism_, must disturb and paralyse the\nfunction of the brain, which exists for itself and for no other wants than\nits own, which are simply rest and nourishment.\n\nBut this disturbing influence of the activity of the will upon the\nintellect can be shown, not only in the perturbations brought about by\nemotions, but also in many other, more gradual, and therefore more lasting\nfalsifications of thought by our inclinations. _Hope_ makes us regard what\nwe wish, and _fear_ what we are apprehensive of, as probable and near, and\nboth exaggerate their object. Plato (according to \u00c6lian, V.H., 13, 28)\nvery beautifully called hope the dream of the waking. Its nature lies in\nthis, that the will, when its servant the intellect is not able to produce\nwhat it wishes, obliges it at least to picture it before it, in general to\nundertake the roll of comforter, to appease its lord with fables, as a\nnurse a child, and so to dress these out that they gain an appearance of\nlikelihood. Now in this the intellect must do violence to its own nature,\nwhich aims at the truth, for it compels it, contrary to its own laws, to\nregard as true things which are neither true nor probable, and often\nscarcely possible, only in order to appease, quiet, and send to sleep for\na while the restless and unmanageable _will_. Here we see clearly who is\nmaster and who is servant. Many may well have observed that if a matter\nwhich is of importance to them may turn out in several different ways, and\nthey have brought all of these into one disjunctive judgment which in\ntheir opinion is complete, the actual result is yet quite another, and one\nwholly unexpected by them: but perhaps they will not have considered this,\nthat this result was then almost always the one which was unfavourable to\nthem. The explanation of this is, that while their _intellect_ intended to\nsurvey the possibilities completely, the worst of all remained quite\ninvisible to it; because the _will_, as it were, covered it with its hand,\nthat is, it so mastered the intellect that it was quite incapable of\nglancing at the worst case of all, although, since it actually came to\npass, this was also the most probable case. Yet in very melancholy\ndispositions, or in those that have become prudent through experience like\nthis, the process is reversed, for here apprehension plays the part which\nwas formerly played by hope. The first appearance of danger throws them\ninto groundless anxiety. If the intellect begins to investigate the matter\nit is rejected as incompetent, nay, as a deceitful sophist, because the\nheart is to be believed, whose fears are now actually allowed to pass for\narguments as to the reality and greatness of the danger. So then the\nintellect dare make no search for good reasons on the other side, which,\nif left to itself, it would soon recognise, but is obliged at once to\npicture to them the most unfortunate issue, even if it itself can scarcely\nthink this issue possible:\n\n\n    \u201cSuch as we know is false, yet dread in sooth,\n    Because the worst is ever nearest truth.\u201d\n\n    \u2014BYRON (_Lara_, c. 1).\n\n\n_Love_ and _hate_ falsify our judgment entirely. In our enemies we see\nnothing but faults\u2014in our loved ones nothing but excellences, and even\ntheir faults appear to us amiable. Our _interest_, of whatever kind it may\nbe, exercises a like secret power over our judgment; what is in conformity\nwith it at once seems to us fair, just, and reasonable; what runs contrary\nto it presents itself to us, in perfect seriousness, as unjust and\noutrageous, or injudicious and absurd. Hence so many prejudices of\nposition, profession, nationality, sect, and religion. A conceived\nhypothesis gives us lynx-eyes for all that confirms it, and makes us blind\nto all that contradicts it. What is opposed to our party, our plan, our\nwish, our hope, we often cannot comprehend and grasp at all, while it is\nclear to every one else; but what is favourable to these, on the other\nhand, strikes our eye from afar. What the heart opposes the head will not\nadmit. We firmly retain many errors all through life, and take care never\nto examine their ground, merely from a fear, of which we ourselves are\nconscious, that we might make the discovery that we had so long believed\nand so often asserted what is false. Thus then is the intellect daily\nbefooled and corrupted by the impositions of inclination. This has been\nvery beautifully expressed by Bacon of Verulam in the words: _Intellectus_\nLUMINIS SICCI _non est; sed recipit infusionem a voluntate et affectibus:\nid quod generat ad quod vult scientias: quod enim mavult homo, id potius\ncredit. Innumeris modis, iisque interdum imperceptibilibus, affectus\nintellectum imbuit et inficit_ (_Org. Nov._, i. 14). Clearly it is also\nthis that opposes all new fundamental opinions in the sciences and all\nrefutations of sanctioned errors, for one will not easily see the truth of\nthat which convicts one of incredible want of thought. It is explicable,\non this ground alone, that the truths of Goethe\u2019s doctrine of colours,\nwhich are so clear and simple, are still denied by the physicists; and\nthus Goethe himself has had to learn what a much harder position one has\nif one promises men instruction than if one promises them amusement. Hence\nit is much more fortunate to be born a poet than a philosopher. But the\nmore obstinately an error was held by the other side, the more shameful\ndoes the conviction afterwards become. In the case of an overthrown\nsystem, as in the case of a conquered army, the most prudent is he who\nfirst runs away from it.\n\nA trifling and absurd, but striking example of that mysterious and\nimmediate power which the will exercises over the intellect, is the fact\nthat in doing accounts we make mistakes much oftener in our own favour\nthan to our disadvantage, and this without the slightest dishonest\nintention, merely from the unconscious tendency to diminish our _Debit_\nand increase our _Credit_.\n\nLastly, the fact is also in point here, that when advice is given the\nslightest aim or purpose of the adviser generally outweighs his insight,\nhowever great it may be; therefore we dare not assume that he speaks from\nthe latter when we suspect the existence of the former. How little perfect\nsincerity is to be expected even from otherwise honest persons whenever\ntheir interests are in any way concerned we can gather from the fact that\nwe so often deceive ourselves when hope bribes us, or fear befools us, or\nsuspicion torments us, or vanity flatters us, or an hypothesis blinds us,\nor a small aim which is close at hand injures a greater but more distant\none; for in this we see the direct and unconscious disadvantageous\ninfluence of the will upon knowledge. Accordingly it ought not to surprise\nus if in asking advice the will of the person asked directly dictates the\nanswer even before the question could penetrate to the forum of his\njudgment.\n\nI wish in a single word to point out here what will be fully explained in\nthe following book, that the most perfect knowledge, thus the purely\nobjective comprehension of the world, _i.e._, the comprehension of genius,\nis conditioned by a silence of the will so profound that while it lasts\neven the individuality vanishes from consciousness and the man remains _as\nthe pure subject of knowing_, which is the correlative of the _Idea_.\n\nThe disturbing influence of the will upon the intellect, which is proved\nby all these phenomena, and, on the other hand, the weakness and frailty\nof the latter, on account of which it is incapable of working rightly\nwhenever the will is in any way moved, gives us then another proof that\nthe will is the radical part of our nature, and acts with original power,\nwhile the intellect, as adventitious and in many ways conditioned, can\nonly act in a subordinate and conditional manner.\n\nThere is no direct disturbance of the will by the intellect corresponding\nto the disturbance and clouding of knowledge by the will that has been\nshown. Indeed we cannot well conceive such a thing. No one will wish to\nconstrue as such the fact that motives wrongly taken up lead the will\nastray, for this is a fault of the intellect in its own function, which is\ncommitted quite within its own province, and the influence of which upon\nthe will is entirely indirect. It would be plausible to attribute\n_irresolution_ to this, for in its case, through the conflict of the\nmotives which the intellect presents to the will, the latter is brought to\na standstill, thus is hindered. But when we consider it more closely, it\nbecomes very clear that the cause of this hindrance does not lie in the\nactivity of the _intellect_ as such, but entirely in _external objects_\nwhich are brought about by it, for in this case they stand in precisely\nsuch a relation to the will, which is here interested, that they draw it\nwith nearly equal strength in different directions. This real cause merely\nacts _through_ the intellect as the medium of motives, though certainly\nunder the assumption that it is keen enough to comprehend the objects in\ntheir manifold relations. Irresolution, as a trait of character, is just\nas much conditioned by qualities of the will as of the intellect. It is\ncertainly not peculiar to exceedingly limited minds, for their weak\nunderstanding does not allow them to discover such manifold qualities and\nrelations in things, and moreover is so little fitted for the exertion of\nreflection and pondering these, and then the probable consequences of each\nstep, that they rather decide at once according to the first impression,\nor according to some simple rule of conduct. The converse of this occurs\nin the case of persons of considerable understanding. Therefore, whenever\nsuch persons also possess a tender care for their own well-being, _i.e._,\na very sensitive egoism, which constantly desires to come off well and\nalways to be safe, this introduces a certain anxiety at every step, and\nthereby irresolution. This quality therefore indicates throughout not a\nwant of understanding but a want of courage. Yet very eminent minds survey\nthe relations and their probable developments with such rapidity and\ncertainty, that if they are only supported by some courage they thereby\nacquire that quick decision and resolution that fits them to play an\nimportant part in the affairs of the world, if time and circumstances\nafford them the opportunity.\n\nThe only decided, direct restriction and disturbance which the will can\nsuffer from the intellect as such may indeed be the quite exceptional one,\nwhich is the consequence of an abnormally preponderating development of\nthe intellect, thus of that high endowment which has been defined as\ngenius. This is decidedly a hindrance to the energy of the character, and\nconsequently to the power of action. Hence it is not the really great\nminds that make historical characters, because they are capable of\nbridling and ruling the mass of men and carrying out the affairs of the\nworld; but for this persons of much less capacity of mind are qualified\nwhen they have great firmness, decision, and persistency of will, such as\nis quite inconsistent with very high intelligence. Accordingly, where this\nvery high intelligence exists we actually have a case in which the\nintellect directly restricts the will.\n\n6. In opposition to the hindrances and restrictions which it has been\nshown the intellect suffers from the will, I wish now to show, in a few\nexamples, how, conversely, the functions of the intellect are sometimes\naided and heightened by the incitement and spur of the will; so that in\nthis also we may recognise the primary nature of the one and the secondary\nnature of the other, and it may become clear that the intellect stands to\nthe will in the relation of a tool.\n\nA motive which affects us strongly, such as a yearning desire or a\npressing need, sometimes raises the intellect to a degree of which we had\nnot previously believed it capable. Difficult circumstances, which impose\nupon us the necessity of certain achievements, develop entirely new\ntalents in us, the germs of which were hidden from us, and for which we\ndid not credit ourselves with any capacity. The understanding of the\nstupidest man becomes keen when objects are in question that closely\nconcern his wishes; he now observes, weighs, and distinguishes with the\ngreatest delicacy even the smallest circumstances that have reference to\nhis wishes or fears. This has much to do with the cunning of half-witted\npersons, which is often remarked with surprise. On this account Isaiah\nrightly says, _vexatio dat intellectum_, which is therefore also used as a\nproverb. Akin to it is the German proverb, \u201c_Die Noth ist die Mutter der\nK\u00fcnste_\u201d (\u201cNecessity is the mother of the arts\u201d); when, however, the fine\narts are to be excepted, because the heart of every one of their works,\nthat is, the conception, must proceed from a perfectly will-less, and only\nthereby purely objective, perception, if they are to be genuine. Even the\nunderstanding of the brutes is increased considerably by necessity, so\nthat in cases of difficulty they accomplish things at which we are\nastonished. For example, they almost all calculate that it is safer not to\nrun away when they believe they are not seen; therefore the hare lies\nstill in the furrow of the field and lets the sportsman pass close to it;\ninsects, when they cannot escape, pretend to be dead, &c. We may obtain a\nfuller knowledge of this influence from the special history of the\nself-education of the wolf, under the spur of the great difficulty of its\nposition in civilised Europe; it is to be found in the second letter of\nLeroy\u2019s excellent book, \u201c_Lettres sur l\u2019intelligence et la perfectibilit\u00e9\ndes animaux_.\u201d Immediately afterwards, in the third letter, there follows\nthe high school of the fox, which in an equally difficult position has far\nless physical strength. In its case, however, this is made up for by great\nunderstanding; yet only through the constant struggle with want on the one\nhand and danger on the other, thus under the spur of the will, does it\nattain that high degree of cunning which distinguishes it especially in\nold age. In all these enhancements of the intellect the will plays the\npart of a rider who with the spur urges the horse beyond the natural\nmeasure of its strength.\n\nIn the same way the memory is enhanced through the pressure of the will.\nEven if it is otherwise weak, it preserves perfectly what has value for\nthe ruling passion. The lover forgets no opportunity favourable to him,\nthe ambitious man forgets no circumstance that can forward his plans, the\navaricious man never forgets the loss he has suffered, the proud man never\nforgets an injury to his honour, the vain man remembers every word of\npraise and the most trifling distinction that falls to his lot. And this\nalso extends to the brutes: the horse stops at the inn where once long ago\nit was fed; dogs have an excellent memory for all occasions, times, and\nplaces that have afforded them choice morsels; and foxes for the different\nhiding-places in which they have stored their plunder.\n\nSelf-consideration affords opportunity for finer observations in this\nregard. Sometimes, through an interruption, it has entirely escaped me\nwhat I have just been thinking about, or even what news I have just heard.\nNow if the matter had in any way even the most distant personal interest,\nthe after-feeling of the impression which it made upon the _will_ has\nremained. I am still quite conscious how far it affected me agreeably or\ndisagreeably, and also of the special manner in which this happened,\nwhether, even in the slightest degree, it vexed me, or made me anxious, or\nirritated me, or depressed me, or produced the opposite of these\naffections. Thus the mere relation of the thing to my will is retained in\nthe memory after the thing itself has vanished, and this often becomes the\nclue to lead us back to the thing itself. The sight of a man sometimes\naffects us in an analogous manner, for we remember merely in general that\nwe have had something to do with him, yet without knowing where, when, or\nwhat it was, or who he is. But the sight of him still recalls pretty\naccurately the feeling which our dealings with him excited in us, whether\nit was agreeable or disagreeable, and also in what degree and in what way.\nThus our memory has preserved only the response of the will, and not that\nwhich called it forth. We might call what lies at the foundation of this\nprocess the memory of the heart; it is much more intimate than that of the\nhead. Yet at bottom the connection of the two is so far-reaching that if\nwe reflect deeply upon the matter we will arrive at the conclusion that\nmemory in general requires the support of a will as a connecting point, or\nrather as a thread upon which the memories can range themselves, and which\nholds them firmly together, or that the will is, as it were, the ground to\nwhich the individual memories cleave, and without which they could not\nlast; and that therefore in a pure intelligence, _i.e._, in a merely\nknowing and absolutely will-less being, a memory cannot well be conceived.\nAccordingly the improvement of the memory under the spur of the ruling\npassion, which has been shown above, is only the higher degree of that\nwhich takes place in all retention and recollection; for its basis and\ncondition is always the will. Thus in all this also it becomes clear how\nvery much more essential to us the will is than the intellect. The\nfollowing facts may also serve to confirm this.\n\nThe intellect often obeys the will; for example, if we wish to remember\nsomething, and after some effort succeed; so also if we wish now to ponder\nsomething carefully and deliberately, and in many such cases. Sometimes,\nagain, the intellect refuses to obey the will; for example, if we try in\nvain to fix our minds upon something, or if we call in vain upon the\nmemory for something that was intrusted to it. The anger of the will\nagainst the intellect on such occasions makes its relation to it and the\ndifference of the two very plain. Indeed the intellect, vexed by this\nanger, sometimes officiously brings what was asked of it hours afterwards,\nor even the following morning, quite unexpectedly and unseasonably. On the\nother hand, the will never really obeys the intellect; but the latter is\nonly the ministerial council of that sovereign; it presents all kinds of\nthings to the will, which then selects what is in conformity with its\nnature, though in doing so it determines itself with necessity, because\nthis nature is unchangeable and the motives now lie before it. Hence no\nsystem of ethics is possible which moulds and improves the will itself.\nFor all teaching only affects _knowledge_, and knowledge never determines\nthe will itself, _i.e._, the _fundamental character_ of willing, but only\nits application to the circumstances present. Rectified knowledge can only\nmodify conduct so far as it proves more exactly and judges more correctly\nwhat objects of the will\u2019s choice are within its reach; so that the will\nnow measures its relation to things more correctly, sees more clearly what\nit desires, and consequently is less subject to error in its choice. But\nover the will itself, over the main tendency or fundamental maxim of it,\nthe intellect has no power. To believe that knowledge really and\nfundamentally determines the will is like believing that the lantern which\na man carries by night is the _primum mobile_ of his steps. Whoever,\ntaught by experience or the admonitions of others, knows and laments a\nfundamental fault of his character, firmly and honestly forms the\nintention to reform and give it up; but in spite of this, on the first\nopportunity, the fault receives free course. New repentance, new\nintentions, new transgressions. When this has been gone through several\ntimes he becomes conscious that he cannot improve himself, that the fault\nlies in his nature and personality, indeed is one with this. Now he will\nblame and curse his nature and personality, will have a painful feeling,\nwhich may rise to anguish of consciousness, but to change these he is not\nable. Here we see that which condemns and that which is condemned\ndistinctly separate: we see the former as a merely theoretical faculty,\npicturing and presenting the praiseworthy, and therefore desirable, course\nof life, but the other as something real and unchangeably present, going\nquite a different way in spite of the former: and then again the first\nremaining behind with impotent lamentations over the nature of the other,\nwith which, through this very distress, it again identifies itself. Will\nand intellect here separate very distinctly. But here the will shows\nitself as the stronger, the invincible, unchangeable, primitive, and at\nthe same time as the essential thing in question, for the intellect\ndeplores its errors, and finds no comfort in the correctness of the\n_knowledge_, as its own function. Thus the intellect shows itself entirely\nsecondary, as the spectator of the deeds of another, which it accompanies\nwith impotent praise and blame, and also as determinable from without,\nbecause it learns from experience, weighs and alters its precepts. Special\nillustrations of this subject will be found in the \u201c_Parerga_,\u201d vol. ii. \u00a7\n118 (second ed., \u00a7 119.) Accordingly, a comparison of our manner of\nthinking at different periods of our life will present a strange mixture\nof permanence and changeableness. On the one hand, the moral tendency of\nthe man in his prime and the old man is still the same as was that of the\nboy; on the other hand, much has become so strange to him that he no\nlonger knows himself, and wonders how he ever could have done or said this\nand that. In the first half of life to-day for the most part laughs at\nyesterday, indeed looks down on it with contempt; in the second half, on\nthe contrary, it more and more looks back at it with envy. But on closer\nexamination it will be found that the changeable element was the\n_intellect_, with its functions of insight and knowledge, which, daily\nappropriating new material from without, presents a constantly changing\nsystem of thought, while, besides this, it itself rises and sinks with the\ngrowth and decay of the organism. The will, on the contrary, the basis of\nthis, thus the inclinations, passions, and emotions, the character, shows\nitself as what is unalterable in consciousness. Yet we have to take\naccount of the modifications that depend upon physical capacities for\nenjoyment, and hence upon age. Thus, for example, the eagerness for\nsensuous pleasure will show itself in childhood as a love of dainties, in\nyouth and manhood as the tendency to sensuality, and in old age again as a\nlove of dainties.\n\n7. If, as is generally assumed, the will proceeded from knowledge, as its\nresult or product, then where there is much will there would necessarily\nalso be much knowledge, insight, and understanding. This, however, is\nabsolutely not the case; rather, we find in many men a strong, _i.e._,\ndecided, resolute, persistent, unbending, wayward, and vehement will,\ncombined with a very weak and incapable understanding, so that every one\nwho has to do with them is thrown into despair, for their will remains\ninaccessible to all reasons and ideas, and is not to be got at, so that it\nis hidden, as it were, in a sack, out of which it wills blindly. Brutes\nhave often violent, often stubborn wills, but yet very little\nunderstanding. Finally, plants only will without any knowledge at all.\n\nIf willing sprang merely from knowledge, our _anger_ would necessarily be\nin every case exactly proportionate to the occasion, or at least to our\nrelation to it, for it would be nothing more than the result of the\npresent knowledge. This, however, is rarely the case; rather, anger\ngenerally goes far beyond the occasion. Our fury and rage, the _furor\nbrevis_, often upon small occasions, and without error regarding them, is\nlike the raging of an evil spirit which, having been shut up, only waits\nits opportunity to dare to break loose, and now rejoices that it has found\nit. This could not be the case if the foundation of our nature were a\n_knower_, and willing were merely a result of _knowledge_; for how came\nthere into the result what did not lie in the elements? The conclusion\ncannot contain more than the premisses. Thus here also the will shows\nitself as of a nature quite different from knowledge, which only serves it\nfor communication with the external world, but then the will follows the\nlaws of its own nature without taking from the intellect anything but the\noccasion.\n\nThe intellect, as the mere tool of the will, is as different from it as\nthe hammer from the smith. So long as in a conversation the intellect\nalone is active it remains _cold_. It is almost as if the man himself were\nnot present. Moreover, he cannot then, properly speaking, compromise\nhimself, but at the most can make himself ridiculous. Only when the will\ncomes into play is the man really present: now he becomes _warm_, nay, it\noften happens, _hot_. It is always the will to which we ascribe the warmth\nof life; on the other hand, we say the _cold_ understanding, or to\ninvestigate a thing _coolly_, _i.e._, to think without being influenced by\nthe will. If we attempt to reverse the relation, and to regard the will as\nthe tool of the intellect, it is as if we made the smith the tool of the\nhammer.\n\nNothing is more provoking, when we are arguing against a man with reasons\nand explanations, and taking all pains to convince him, under the\nimpression that we have only to do with his _understanding_, than to\ndiscover at last that he _will_ not understand; that thus we had to do\nwith his _will_, which shuts itself up against the truth and brings into\nthe field wilful misunderstandings, chicaneries, and sophisms in order to\nintrench itself behind its understanding and its pretended want of\ninsight. Then he is certainly not to be got at, for reasons and proofs\napplied against the will are like the blows of a phantom produced by\nmirrors against a solid body. Hence the saying so often repeated, \u201c_Stat\npro ratione voluntas._\u201d Sufficient evidence of what has been said is\nafforded by ordinary life. But unfortunately proofs of it are also to be\nfound on the path of the sciences. The recognition of the most important\ntruths, of the rarest achievements, will be looked for in vain from those\nwho have an interest in preventing them from being accepted, an interest\nwhich either springs from the fact that such truths contradict what they\nthemselves daily teach, or else from this, that they dare not make use of\nthem and teach them; or if all this be not the case they will not accept\nthem, because the watchword of mediocrity will always be, _Si quelqu\u2019un __\nexcelle parmi nous, qu\u2019il aille exceller ailleurs_, as Helvetius has\nadmirably rendered the saying of the Ephesian in the fifth book of\nCicero\u2019s \u201c_Tusculan\u00e6_\u201d (c. 36), or as a saying of the Abyssinian Fit Arari\nputs it, \u201cAmong quartzes adamant is outlawed.\u201d Thus whoever expects from\nthis always numerous band a just estimation of what he has done will find\nhimself very much deceived, and perhaps for a while he will not be able to\nunderstand their behaviour, till at last he finds out that while he\napplied himself to _knowledge_ he had to do with the _will_, thus is\nprecisely in the position described above, nay, is really like a man who\nbrings his case before a court the judges of which have all been bribed.\nYet in particular cases he will receive the fullest proof that their will\nand not their insight opposed him, when one or other of them makes up his\nmind to plagiarism. Then he will see with astonishment what good judges\nthey are, what correct perception of the merit of others they have, and\nhow well they know how to find out the best, like the sparrows, who never\nmiss the ripest cherries.\n\nThe counterpart of the victorious resistance of the will to knowledge here\nset forth appears if in expounding our reasons and proofs we have the will\nof those addressed with us. Then all are at once convinced, all arguments\nare telling, and the matter is at once clear as the day. This is well\nknown to popular speakers. In the one case, as in the other, the will\nshows itself as that which has original power, against which the intellect\ncan do nothing.\n\n8. But now we shall take into consideration the individual qualities, thus\nexcellences and faults of the will and character on the one hand, and of\nthe intellect on the other, in order to make clear, in their relation to\neach other, and their relative worth, the complete difference of the two\nfundamental faculties. History and experience teach that the two appear\nquite independently of each other. That the greatest excellence of mind\nwill not easily be found combined with equal excellence of character is\nsufficiently explained by the extraordinary rarity of both, while their\nopposites are everywhere the order of the day; hence we also daily find\nthe latter in union. However, we never infer a good will from a superior\nmind, nor the latter from the former, nor the opposite from the opposite,\nbut every unprejudiced person accepts them as perfectly distinct\nqualities, the presence of which each for itself has to be learned from\nexperience. Great narrowness of mind may coexist with great goodness of\nheart, and I do not believe Balthazar Gracian was right in saying\n(_Discreto_, p. 406), \u201c_No ay simple, que no sea malicioso_\u201d (\u201cThere is no\nsimpleton who would not be malicious\u201d), though he has the Spanish proverb\nin his favour, \u201c_Nunca la necedad anduvo sin malicia_\u201d (\u201cStupidity is\nnever without malice\u201d). Yet it may be that many stupid persons become\nmalicious for the same reason as many hunchbacks, from bitterness on\naccount of the neglect they have suffered from nature, and because they\nthink they can occasionally make up for what they lack in understanding\nthrough malicious cunning, seeking in this a brief triumph. From this, by\nthe way, it is also comprehensible why almost every one easily becomes\nmalicious in the presence of a very superior mind. On the other hand,\nagain, stupid people have very often the reputation of special\ngood-heartedness, which yet so seldom proves to be the case that I could\nnot help wondering how they had gained it, till I was able to flatter\nmyself that I had found the key to it in what follows. Moved by a secret\ninclination, every one likes best to choose for his more intimate\nintercourse some one to whom he is a little superior in understanding, for\nonly in this case does he find himself at his ease, because, according to\nHobbes, \u201c_Omnis animi voluptas, omnisgue alacritas in eo sita est, quod\nquis habeat, quibuscum conferens se, possit magnifice sentire de se ipso_\u201d\n(_De Cive_, i. 5). For the same reason every one avoids him who is\nsuperior to himself; wherefore Lichtenberg quite rightly observes: \u201cTo\ncertain men a man of mind is a more odious production than the most\npronounced rogue.\u201d And similarly Helvetius says: \u201c_Les gens m\u00e9diocres ont\nun instinct s\u00fbr et prompt, pour conna\u00eetre et fuir les gens d\u2019esprit._\u201d And\nDr. Johnson assures us that \u201cthere is nothing by which a man exasperates\nmost people more than by displaying a superior ability of brilliancy in\nconversation. They seem pleased at the time, but their envy makes them\ncurse him in their hearts\u201d (Boswell; aet. anno 74). In order to bring this\ntruth, so universal and so carefully concealed, more relentlessly to\nlight, I add the expression of it by Merck, the celebrated friend of\nGoethe\u2019s youth, from his story \u201c_Lindor:_\u201d \u201cHe possessed talents which\nwere given him by nature and acquired by himself through learning; and\nthus it happened that in most society he left the worthy members of it far\nbehind.\u201d If, in the moment of delight at the sight of an extraordinary\nman, the public swallows these superiorities also, without actually at\nonce putting a bad construction upon them, yet a certain impression of\nthis phenomenon remains behind, which, if it is often repeated, may on\nserious occasions have disagreeable future consequences for him who is\nguilty of it. Without any one consciously noting that on this occasion he\nwas insulted, no one is sorry to place himself tacitly in the way of the\nadvancement of this man. Thus on this account great mental superiority\nisolates more than anything else, and makes one, at least silently, hated.\nNow it is the opposite of this that makes stupid people so generally\nliked; especially since many can only find in them what, according to the\nlaw of their nature referred to above, they must seek. Yet this the true\nreason of such an inclination no one will confess to himself, still less\nto others; and therefore, as a plausible pretext for it, will impute to\nthose he has selected a special goodness of heart, which, as we have said,\nis in reality only very rarely and accidentally found in combination with\nmental incapacity. Want of understanding is accordingly by no means\nfavourable or akin to goodness of character. But, on the other hand, it\ncannot be asserted that great understanding is so; nay, rather, no\nscoundrel has in general been without it. Indeed even the highest\nintellectual eminence can coexist with the worst moral depravity. An\nexample of this is afforded by Bacon of Verulam: \u201cUngrateful, filled with\nthe lust of power, wicked and base, he at last went so far that, as Lord\nChancellor and the highest judge of the realm, he frequently allowed\nhimself to be bribed in civil actions. Impeached before his peers, he\nconfessed himself guilty, was expelled by them from the House of Lords,\nand condemned to a fine of forty thousand pounds and imprisonment in the\nTower\u201d (see the review of the latest edition of Bacon\u2019s Works in the\n_Edinburgh Review_, August 1837). Hence also Pope called him \u201cthe wisest,\nbrightest, meanest of mankind\u201d (\u201cEssay on Man,\u201d iv. 282). A similar\nexample is afforded by the historian Guicciardini, of whom Rosini says in\nthe _Notizie Storiche_, drawn from good contemporary sources, which is\ngiven in his historical romance \u201c_Luisa Strozzi_:\u201d \u201c_Da coloro, che\npongono l\u2019ingegno e il sapere al di sopra di tutte le umane qualit\u00e0,\nquesto uomo sar\u00e0 riguardato come fra i pi\u00f9 grandi del suo secolo: ma da\nquelli, che reputano la virt\u00f9 dovere andare innanzi a tutto, non potra\nesecrarsi abbastanza la sua memoria. Esso fu il pi\u00f9 crudele fra i\ncittadini a perseguitare, uccidere e confinare_,\u201d &c.(32)\n\nIf now it is said of one man, \u201cHe has a good heart, though a bad head,\u201d\nbut of another, \u201cHe has a very good head, yet a bad heart,\u201d every one\nfeels that in the first case the praise far outweighs the blame\u2014in the\nother case the reverse. Answering to this, we see that if some one has\ndone a bad deed his friends and he himself try to remove the guilt from\nthe _will_ to the _intellect_, and to give out that faults of the heart\nwere faults of the head; roguish tricks they will call _errors_, will say\nthey were merely want of understanding, want of reflection,\nlight-mindedness, folly; nay, if need be, they will plead a paroxysm,\nmomentary mental aberration, and if a heavy crime is in question, even\nmadness, only in order to free the _will_ from the guilt. And in the same\nway, we ourselves, if we have caused a misfortune or injury, will before\nothers and ourselves willingly impeach our _stultitia_, simply in order to\nescape the reproach of _malitia_. In the same way, in the case of the\nequally unjust decision of the judge, the difference, whether he has erred\nor been bribed, is so infinitely great. All this sufficiently proves that\nthe _will_ alone is the real and essential, the kernel of the man, and the\n_intellect_ is merely its tool, which may be constantly faulty without the\nwill being concerned. The accusation of want of understanding is, at the\nmoral judgment-seat, no accusation at all; on the contrary, it even gives\nprivileges. And so also, before the courts of the world, it is everywhere\nsufficient to deliver a criminal from all punishment that his guilt should\nbe transferred from his will to his intellect, by proving either\nunavoidable error or mental derangement, for then it is of no more\nconsequence than if hand or foot had slipped against the will. I have\nfully discussed this in the appendix, \u201c_Ueber die Intellektuelle\nFreiheit_,\u201d to my prize essay on the freedom of the will, to which I refer\nto avoid repetition.\n\nEverywhere those who are responsible for any piece of work appeal, in the\nevent of its turning out unsatisfactorily, to their good intentions, of\nwhich there was no lack. Hereby they believe that they secure the\nessential, that for which they are properly answerable, and their true\nself; the inadequacy of their faculties, on the other hand, they regard as\nthe want of a suitable tool.\n\nIf a man is _stupid_, we excuse him by saying that he cannot help it; but\nif we were to excuse a _bad_ man on the same grounds we would be laughed\nat. And yet the one, like the other, is innate. This proves that the will\nis the man proper, the intellect merely its tool.\n\nThus it is always only our _willing_ that is regarded as depending upon\nourselves, _i.e._, as the expression of our true nature, and for which we\nare therefore made responsible. Therefore it is absurd and unjust if we\nare taken to task for our beliefs, thus for our knowledge: for we are\nobliged to regard this as something which, although it changes in us, is\nas little in our power as the events of the external world. And here,\nalso, it is clear that the _will_ alone is the inner and true nature of\nman; the _intellect_, on the contrary, with its operations, which go on as\nregularly as the external world, stands to the will in the relation of\nsomething external to it, a mere tool.\n\nHigh mental capacities have always been regarded as the gift of nature or\nthe gods; and on that account they have been called _Gaben_, _Begabung_,\n_ingenii dotes_, gifts (a man highly gifted), regarding them as something\ndifferent from the man himself, something that has fallen to his lot\nthrough favour. No one, on the contrary, has ever taken this view of moral\nexcellences, although they also are innate; they have rather always been\nregarded as something proceeding from the man himself, essentially\nbelonging to him, nay, constituting his very self. But it follows now from\nthis that the will is the true nature of man; the intellect, on the other\nhand, is secondary, a tool, a gift.\n\nAnswering to this, all religions promise a reward beyond life, in\neternity, for excellences of the _will_ or heart, but none for excellences\nof the head or understanding. Virtue expects its reward in that world;\nprudence hopes for it in this; genius, again, neither in this world nor in\nthat; it is its own reward. Accordingly the will is the eternal part, the\nintellect the temporal.\n\nConnection, communion, intercourse among men is based, as a rule, upon\nrelations which concern the _will_, not upon such as concern the\n_intellect_. The first kind of communion may be called the _material_, the\nother the _formal_. Of the former kind are the bonds of family and\nrelationship, and further, all connections that rest upon any common aim\nor interest, such as that of trade or profession, of the corporation, the\nparty, the faction, &c. In these it merely amounts to a question of views,\nof aims; along with which there may be the greatest diversity of\nintellectual capacity and culture. Therefore not only can any one live in\npeace and unity with any one else, but can act with him and be allied to\nhim for the common good of both. Marriage also is a bond of the heart, not\nof the head. It is different, however, with merely formal communion, which\naims only at an exchange of thought; this demands a certain equality of\nintellectual capacity and culture. Great differences in this respect place\nbetween man and man an impassable gulf: such lies, for example, between a\nman of great mind and a fool, between a scholar and a peasant, between a\ncourtier and a sailor. Natures as heterogeneous as this have therefore\ntrouble in making themselves intelligible so long as it is a question of\nexchanging thoughts, ideas, and views. Nevertheless close _material_\nfriendship may exist between them, and they may be faithful allies,\nconspirators, or men under mutual pledges. For in all that concerns the\nwill alone, which includes friendship, enmity, honesty, fidelity,\nfalseness, and treachery, they are perfectly homogeneous, formed of the\nsame clay, and neither mind nor culture make any difference here; indeed\nhere the ignorant man often shames the scholar, the sailor the courtier.\nFor at the different grades of culture there are the same virtues and\nvices, emotions and passions; and although somewhat modified in their\nexpression, they very soon mutually recognise each other even in the most\nheterogeneous individuals, upon which the similarly disposed agree and the\nopposed are at enmity.\n\nBrilliant qualities of mind win admiration, but never affection; this is\nreserved for the moral, the qualities of the character. Every one will\nchoose as his friend the honest, the good-natured, and even the agreeable,\ncomplaisant man, who easily concurs, rather than the merely able man.\nIndeed many will be preferred to the latter, on account of insignificant,\naccidental, outward qualities which just suit the inclination of another.\nOnly the man who has much mind himself will wish able men for his society;\nhis friendship, on the other hand, he will bestow with reference to moral\nqualities; for upon this depends his really high appreciation of a man in\nwhom a single good trait of character conceals and expiates great want of\nunderstanding. The known goodness of a character makes us patient and\nyielding towards weaknesses of understanding, as also towards the dulness\nand childishness of age. A distinctly noble character along with the\nentire absence of intellectual excellence and culture presents itself as\nlacking nothing; while, on the contrary, even the greatest mind, if\naffected with important moral faults, will always appear blamable. For as\ntorches and fireworks become pale and insignificant in the presence of the\nsun, so intellect, nay, genius, and also beauty, are outshone and eclipsed\nby the goodness of the heart. When this appears in a high degree it can\nmake up for the want of those qualities to such an extent that one is\nashamed of having missed them. Even the most limited understanding, and\nalso grotesque ugliness, whenever extraordinary goodness of heart declares\nitself as accompanying them, become as it were transfigured, outshone by a\nbeauty of a higher kind, for now a wisdom speaks out of them before which\nall other wisdom must be dumb. For goodness of heart is a transcendent\nquality; it belongs to an order of things that reaches beyond this life,\nand is incommensurable with any other perfection. When it is present in a\nhigh degree it makes the heart so large that it embraces the world, so\nthat now everything lies within it, no longer without; for it identifies\nall natures with its own. It then extends to others also that boundless\nindulgence which otherwise each one only bestows on himself. Such a man is\nincapable of becoming angry; even if the malicious mockery and sneers of\nothers have drawn attention to his own intellectual or physical faults, he\nonly reproaches himself in his heart for having been the occasion of such\nexpressions, and therefore, without doing violence to his own feelings,\nproceeds to treat those persons in the kindest manner, confidently hoping\nthat they will turn from their error with regard to him, and recognise\nthemselves in him also. What is wit and genius against this?\u2014what is Bacon\nof Verulam?\n\nOur estimation of our own selves leads to the same result as we have here\nobtained by considering our estimation of others. How different is the\nself-satisfaction which we experience in a moral regard from that which we\nexperience in an intellectual regard! The former arises when, looking back\non our conduct, we see that with great sacrifices we have practised\nfidelity and honesty, that we have helped many, forgiven many, have\nbehaved better to others than they have behaved to us; so that we can say\nwith King Lear, \u201cI am a man more sinned against than sinning;\u201d and to its\nfullest extent if perhaps some noble deed shines in our memory. A deep\nseriousness will accompany the still peace which such a review affords us;\nand if we see that others are inferior to us here, this will not cause us\nany joy, but we will rather deplore it, and sincerely wish that they were\nas we are. How entirely differently does the knowledge of our intellectual\nsuperiority affect us! Its ground bass is really the saying of Hobbes\nquoted above: _Omnis animi voluptas, omnisque alacritas in eo sita est,\nquad quis habeat, quibuscum conferens se, possit magnifice sentire de se\nipso._ Arrogant, triumphant vanity, proud, contemptuous looking down on\nothers, inordinate delight in the consciousness of decided and\nconsiderable superiority, akin to pride of physical advantages,\u2014that is\nthe result here. This opposition between the two kinds of\nself-satisfaction shows that the one concerns our true inner and eternal\nnature, the other a more external, merely temporal, and indeed scarcely\nmore than a mere physical excellence. The _intellect_ is in fact simply\nthe function of the brain; the _will_, on the contrary, is that whose\nfunction is the whole man, according to his being and nature.\n\nIf, looking without us, we reflect that \u1f41 \u03b2\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b2\u03c1\u03b1\u03c7\u03c5\u03c2, \u1f21 \u03b4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03b5\u03c7\u03bd\u03b7 \u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\n(_vita brevis, ars longa_), and consider how the greatest and most\nbeautiful minds, often when they have scarcely reached the summit of their\npower, and the greatest scholars, when they have only just attained to a\nthorough knowledge of their science, are snatched away by death, we are\nconfirmed in this, that the meaning and end of life is not intellectual\nbut moral.\n\nThe complete difference between the mental and moral qualities displays\nitself lastly in the fact that the intellect suffers very important\nchanges through time, while the will and character remain untouched by it.\nThe new-born child has as yet no use of its understanding, but obtains it\nwithin the first two months to the extent of perception and apprehension\nof the things in the external world\u2014a process which I have described more\nfully in my essay, \u201c_Ueber das Sehn und die Farben_,\u201d p. 10 of the second\n(and third) edition. The growth of reason to the point of speech, and\nthereby of thought, follows this first and most important step much more\nslowly, generally only in the third year; yet the early childhood remains\nhopelessly abandoned to silliness and folly, primarily because the brain\nstill lacks physical completeness, which, both as regards its size and\ntexture, it only attains in the seventh year. But then for its energetic\nactivity there is still wanting the antagonism of the genital system; it\ntherefore only begins with puberty. Through this, however, the intellect\nhas only attained to the _capacity_ for its psychical improvement; this\nitself can only be won by practice, experience, and instruction. Thus as\nsoon as the mind has escaped from the folly of childhood it falls into the\nsnares of innumerable errors, prejudices, and chimeras, sometimes of the\nabsurdest and crudest kind, which it obstinately sticks to, till\nexperience gradually removes them, and many of them also are insensibly\nlost. All this takes many years to happen, so that one grants it majority\nindeed soon after the twentieth year, yet has placed full maturity, years\nof discretion, not before the fortieth year. But while this psychical\neducation, resting upon help from without, is still in process of growth,\nthe inner _physical_ energy of the brain already begins to sink again.\nThis has reached its real culminating point about the thirtieth year, on\naccount of its dependence upon the pressure of blood and the effect of the\npulsation upon the brain, and through this again upon the predominance of\nthe arterial over the venous system, and the fresh tenderness of the brain\nfibre, and also on account of the energy of the genital system. After the\nthirty-fifth year a slight diminution of the physical energy of the brain\nbecomes noticeable, which, through the gradually approaching predominance\nof the venous over the arterial system, and also through the increasing\nfirmer and drier consistency of the brain fibre, more and more takes\nplace, and would be much more observable if it were not that, on the other\nhand, the psychical perfecting, through exercise, experience, increase of\nknowledge, and acquired skill in the use of it, counteracts it\u2014an\nantagonism which fortunately lasts to an advanced age, for the brain\nbecomes more and more like a worn-out instrument. But yet the diminution\nof the original energy of the intellect, resting entirely upon organic\nconditions, continues, slowly indeed, but unceasingly: the faculty of\noriginal conception, the imagination, the plastic power, the memory,\nbecome noticeably weaker; and so it goes on step by step downwards into\nold age, garrulous, without memory, half-unconscious, and ultimately quite\nchildish.\n\nThe will, on the contrary, is not affected by all this becoming, this\nchange and vicissitude, but is from beginning to end unalterably the same.\n_Willing_ does not require to be learned like _knowing_, but succeeds\nperfectly at once. The new-born child makes violent movements, rages, and\ncries; it wills in the most vehement manner, though it does not yet know\nwhat it wills. For the medium of motives, the intellect, is not yet fully\ndeveloped. The will is in darkness concerning the external world, in which\nits objects lie, and now rages like a prisoner against the walls and bars\nof his dungeon. But little by little it becomes light: at once the\nfundamental traits of universal human willing, and, at the same time, the\nindividual modification of it here present, announce themselves. The\nalready appearing character shows itself indeed at first in weak and\nuncertain outline, on account of the defective service of the intellect,\nwhich has to present it with motives; but to the attentive observer it\nsoon declares its complete presence, and in a short time it becomes\nunmistakable. The characteristics appear which last through the whole of\nlife; the principal tendencies of the will, the easily excited emotions,\nthe ruling passion, declare themselves. Therefore the events at school\nstand to those of the future life for the most part as the dumb-show in\n\u201cHamlet\u201d that precedes the play to be given at the court, and foretells\nits content in the form of pantomime, stands to the play itself. But it is\nby no means possible to prognosticate in the same way the future\nintellectual capacities of the man from those shown in the boy; rather as\na rule the _ingenia pr\u00e6cocia_, prodigies, turn out block-heads; genius, on\nthe contrary, is often in childhood of slow conception, and comprehends\nwith difficulty, just because it comprehends deeply. This is how it is\nthat every one relates laughing and without reserve the follies and\nstupidities of his childhood. For example, Goethe, how he threw all the\nkitchen crockery out of the window (_Dichtung und Wahrheit_, vol. i. p.\n7); for we know that all this only concerns what changes. On the other\nhand, a prudent man will not favour us with the bad features, the\nmalicious or deceitful actions, of his youth, for he feels that they also\nbear witness to his present character. I have been told that when Gall,\nthe phrenologist and investigator of man, had to put himself into\nconnection with a man as yet unknown to him, he used to get him to speak\nabout his youthful years and actions, in order, if possible, to gather\nfrom these the distinctive traits of his character; because this must\nstill be the same now. This is the reason why we are indifferent to the\nfollies and want of understanding of our youthful years, and even look\nback on them with smiling satisfaction, while the bad features of\ncharacter even of that time, the ill-natured actions and the misdeeds then\ncommitted exist even in old age as inextinguishable reproaches, and\ntrouble our consciences. Now, just as the character appears complete, so\nit remains unaltered to old age. The advance of age, which gradually\nconsumes the intellectual powers, leaves the moral qualities untouched.\nThe goodness of the heart still makes the old man honoured and loved when\nhis head already shows the weaknesses which are the commencement of second\nchildhood. Gentleness, patience, honesty, veracity, disinterestedness,\nphilanthropy, &c., remain through the whole life, and are not lost through\nthe weaknesses of old age; in every clear moment of the worn-out old man\nthey come forth undiminished, like the sun from the winter clouds. And, on\nthe other hand, malice, spite, avarice, hard-heartedness, infidelity,\negoism, and baseness of every kind also remain undiminished to our latest\nyears. We would not believe but would laugh at any one who said to us, \u201cIn\nformer years I was a malicious rogue, but now I am an honest and\nnoble-minded man.\u201d Therefore Sir Walter Scott, in the \u201cFortunes of Nigel,\u201d\nhas shown very beautifully, in the case of the old usurer, how burning\navarice, egoism, and injustice are still in their full strength, like a\npoisonous plant in autumn, when the intellect has already become childish.\nThe only alterations that take place in our inclinations are those which\nresult directly from the decrease of our physical strength, and with it of\nour capacities for enjoyment. Thus voluptuousness will make way for\nintemperance, the love of splendour for avarice, and vanity for ambition;\njust like the man who before he has a beard will wear a false one, and\nlater, when his own beard has become grey, will dye it brown. Thus while\nall organic forces, muscular power, the senses, the memory, wit,\nunderstanding, genius, wear themselves out, and in old age become dull,\nthe will alone remains undecayed and unaltered: the strength and the\ntendency of willing remains the same. Indeed in many points the will shows\nitself still more decided in age: thus, in the clinging to life, which, it\nis well known, increases; also in the firmness and persistency with regard\nto what it has once embraced, in obstinacy; which is explicable from the\nfact that the susceptibility of the intellect for other impressions, and\nthereby the movement of the will by motives streaming in upon it, has\ndiminished. Hence the implacable nature of the anger and hate of old\npersons\u2014\n\n\n    \u201cThe young man\u2019s wrath is like light straw on fire,\n    But like red-hot steel is the old man\u2019s ire.\u201d\n\n    \u2014_Old Ballad._\n\n\nFrom all these considerations it becomes unmistakable to the more\npenetrating glance that, while the _intellect_ has to run through a long\nseries of gradual developments, but then, like everything physical, must\nencounter decay, the _will_ takes no part in this, except so far as it has\nto contend at first with the imperfection of its tool, the intellect, and,\nagain, at last with its worn-out condition, but itself appears perfect and\nremains unchanged, not subject to the laws of time and of becoming and\npassing away in it. Thus in this way it makes itself known as that which\nis metaphysical, not itself belonging to the phenomenal world.\n\n9. The universally used and generally very well understood expressions\n_heart_ and _head_ have sprung from a true feeling of the fundamental\ndistinction here in question; therefore they are also apt and significant,\nand occur in all languages. _Nec cor nec caput habet_, says Seneca of the\nEmperor Claudius (_Ludus de morte Claudii C\u00e6saris_, c. 8). The heart, this\n_primum mobile_ of the animal life, has with perfect justice been chosen\nas the symbol, nay, the synonym, of the _will_, as the primary kernel of\nour phenomenon, and denotes this in opposition to the intellect, which is\nexactly identical with the head. All that, in the widest sense, is matter\nof the will, as wish, passion, joy, grief, goodness, wickedness, also what\nwe are wont to understand under \u201cGem\u00fcth,\u201d and what Homer expresses through\n\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u1f20\u03c4\u03bf\u03c1, is attributed to the _heart_. Accordingly we say: He has a bad\nheart;\u2014his heart is in the thing;\u2014it comes from his heart;\u2014it cut him to\nthe heart;\u2014it breaks his heart;\u2014his heart bleeds;\u2014the heart leaps for\njoy;\u2014who can see the heart of man?\u2014it is heart-rending, heart-crushing,\nheart-breaking, heart-inspiring, heart-touching;\u2014he is good-hearted,\nhard-hearted, heartless, stout-hearted, faint-hearted, &c. &c. Quite\nspecially, however, love affairs are called affairs of the heart,\n_affaires de c\u0153ur_; because the sexual impulse is the focus of the will,\nand the selection with reference to it constitutes the chief concern of\nnatural, human volition, the ground of which I shall show in a full\nchapter supplementary to the fourth book. Byron in \u201cDon Juan,\u201d c. xi. v.\n34, is satirical about love being to women an affair of the head instead\nof an affair of the heart. On the other hand, the _head_ denotes\neverything that is matter of _knowledge_. Hence a man of head, a good\nhead, a fine head, a bad head, to lose one\u2019s head, to keep one\u2019s head\nuppermost, &c. Heart and head signifies the whole man. But the head is\nalways the second, the derived; for it is not the centre but the highest\nefflorescence of the body. When a hero dies his heart is embalmed, not his\nbrain; on the other hand, we like to preserve the skull of the poet, the\nartist, and the philosopher. So Raphael\u2019s skull was preserved in the\nAcademia di S. Luca at Rome, though it has lately been proved not to be\ngenuine; in Stockholm in 1820 the skull of Descartes was sold by\nauction.(33)\n\nA true feeling of the real relation between will, intellect, and life is\nalso expressed in the Latin language. The intellect is _mens_, \u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2; the\nwill again is _animus_, which comes from _anima_, and this from \u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd.\n_Anima_ is the life itself, the breath, \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b7; but _animus_ is the living\nprinciple, and also the will, the subject of inclinations, intentions,\npassions, emotions; hence also _est mihi animus_,\u2014_fert animus_,\u2014for \u201cI\nhave a desire to,\u201d also _animi causa_, &c.; it is the Greek \u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2, the\nGerman \u201cGem\u00fcth,\u201d thus the heart but not the head. _Animi perturbatio_ is\nan emotion; _mentis perturbatio_ would signify insanity. The predicate\n_immortalis_ is attributed to _animus_, not to _mens_. All this is the\nrule gathered from the great majority of passages; though in the case of\nconceptions so nearly related it cannot but be that the words are\nsometimes interchanged. Under \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b7 the Greeks appear primarily and\noriginally to have understood the vital force, the living principle,\nwhereby at once arose the dim sense that it must be something\nmetaphysical, which consequently would not be reached by death. Among\nother proofs of this are the investigations of the relation between \u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2\nand \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b7 preserved by Stob\u00e6us (_Ecl._, Lib. i. c. 51, \u00a7 7, 8).\n\n10. Upon what depends the _identity of the person_? Not upon the matter of\nthe body; it is different after a few years. Not upon its form, which\nchanges as a whole and in all its parts; all but the expression of the\nglance, by which, therefore, we still know a man even after many years;\nwhich proves that in spite of all changes time produces in him something\nin him remains quite untouched by it. It is just this by which we\nrecognise him even after the longest intervals of time, and find the\nformer man entire. It is the same with ourselves, for, however old we\nbecome, we yet feel within that we are entirely the same as we were when\nwe were young, nay, when we were still children. This, which unaltered\nalways remains quite the same, and does not grow old along with us, is\nreally the kernel of our nature, which does not lie in time. It is assumed\nthat the identity of the person rests upon that of consciousness. But by\nthis is understood merely the connected recollection of the course of\nlife; hence it is not sufficient. We certainly know something more of our\nlife than of a novel we have formerly read, yet only very little. The\nprincipal events, the interesting scenes, have impressed themselves upon\nus; in the remainder a thousand events are forgotten for one that has been\nretained. The older we become the more do things pass by us without\nleaving any trace. Great age, illness, injury of the brain, madness, may\ndeprive us of memory altogether, but the identity of the person is not\nthereby lost. It rests upon the identical _will_ and the unalterable\ncharacter of the person. It is it also which makes the expression of the\nglance unchangeable. In the _heart_ is the man, not in the head. It is\ntrue that, in consequence of our relation to the external world, we are\naccustomed to regard as our real self the subject of knowledge, the\nknowing I, which wearies in the evening, vanishes in sleep, and in the\nmorning shines brighter with renewed strength. This is, however, the mere\nfunction of the brain, and not our own self. Our true self, the kernel of\nour nature, is what is behind that, and really knows nothing but willing\nand not willing, being content and not content, with all the modifications\nof this, which are called feelings, emotions, and passions. This is that\nwhich produces the other, does not sleep with it when it sleeps, and in\nthe same way when it sinks in death remains uninjured. Everything, on the\ncontrary, that belongs to _knowledge_ is exposed to oblivion; even actions\nof moral significance can sometimes, after years, be only imperfectly\nrecalled, and we no longer know accurately and in detail how we acted on a\ncritical occasion. But the _character itself_, to which the actions only\ntestify, cannot be forgotten by us; it is now still quite the same as\nthen. The will itself, alone and for itself, is permanent, for it alone is\nunchangeable, indestructible, not growing old, not physical, but\nmetaphysical, not belonging to the phenomenal appearance, but to that\nitself which so appears. How the identity of consciousness also, so far as\nit goes, depends upon it I have shown above in chapter 15, so I need not\ndwell upon it further here.\n\n11. Aristotle says in passing, in his book on the comparison of the\ndesirable, \u201cTo live well is better than to live\u201d (\u03b2\u03b5\u03bb\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b6\u1fc3\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf \u03b5\u03c5\n\u03b6\u1fc3\u03bd, Top. iii. 2). From this we might infer, by double contraposition, not\nto live is better than to live badly. This is also evident to the\nintellect; yet the great majority live very badly rather than not at all.\nThis clinging to life cannot therefore have its ground in the _object_ of\nlife, since life, as was shown in the fourth book, is really a constant\nsuffering, or at the least, as will be shown further on in the 28th\nchapter, a business which does not cover its expenses; thus that clinging\nto life can only be founded in the _subject_ of it. But it is not founded\nin the _intellect_, it is no result of reflection, and in general is not a\nmatter of choice; but this willing of life is something that is taken for\ngranted: it is a _prius_ of the intellect itself. We ourselves are the\nwill to live, and therefore we must live, well or ill. Only from the fact\nthat this clinging to a life which is so little worth to them is entirely\n_a priori_ and not a _posteriori_ can we explain the excessive fear of\ndeath that dwells in every living thing, which Rochefoucauld has expressed\nin his last reflection, with rare frankness and na\u00efvet\u00e9, and upon which\nthe effect of all tragedies and heroic actions ultimately rest, for it\nwould be lost if we prized life only according to its objective worth.\nUpon this inexpressible _horror mortis_ is also founded the favourite\nprinciple of all ordinary minds, that whosoever takes his own life must be\nmad; yet not less the astonishment, mingled with a certain admiration,\nwhich this action always excites even in thinking minds, because it is so\nopposed to the nature of all living beings that in a certain sense we are\nforced to admire him who is able to perform it. For suicide proceeds from\na purpose of the intellect, but our will to live is a _prius_ of the\nintellect. Thus this consideration also, which will be fully discussed in\nchapter 28, confirms the primacy of the will in self-consciousness.\n\n12. On the other hand, nothing proves more clearly the secondary,\ndependent, conditioned nature of the _intellect_ than its periodical\nintermittance. In deep sleep all knowing and forming of ideas ceases. But\nthe kernel of our nature, the metaphysical part of it which the organic\nfunctions necessarily presuppose as their _primum mobile_, must never\npause if life is not to cease, and, moreover, as something metaphysical\nand therefore incorporeal, it requires no rest. Therefore the philosophers\nwho set up a _soul_ as this metaphysical kernel, _i.e._, an originally and\nessentially _knowing_ being, see themselves forced to the assertion that\nthis soul is quite untiring in its perceiving and knowing, therefore\ncontinues these even in deep sleep; only that we have no recollection of\nthis when we awake. The falseness of this assertion, however, was easy to\nsee whenever one had rejected that _soul_ in consequence of Kant\u2019s\nteaching. For sleep and waking prove to the unprejudiced mind in the\nclearest manner that knowing is a secondary function and conditioned by\nthe organism, just like any other. Only the _heart_ is untiring, because\nits beating and the circulation of the blood are not directly conditioned\nby nerves, but are just the original manifestation of the will. Also all\nother physiological functions governed merely by ganglionic nerves, which\nhave only a very indirect and distant connection with the brain, are\ncarried on during sleep, although the secretions take place more slowly;\nthe beating of the heart itself, on account of its dependence upon\nrespiration, which is conditioned by the cerebral system (_medulla\noblongata_), becomes with it a little slower. The stomach is perhaps most\nactive in sleep, which is to be attributed to its special consensus with\nthe now resting brain, which occasions mutual disturbances. The _brain_\nalone, and with it knowing, pauses entirely in deep sleep. For it is\nmerely the minister of foreign affairs, as the ganglion system is the\nminister of the interior. The brain, with its function of knowing, is only\na _vedette_ established by the will for its external ends, which, up in\nthe watch-tower of the head, looks round through the windows of the senses\nand marks where mischief threatens and where advantages are to be looked\nfor, and in accordance with whose report the will decides. This _vedette_,\nlike every one engaged on active service, is then in a condition of strain\nand effort, and therefore it is glad when, after its watch is completed,\nit is again withdrawn, as every watch gladly retires from its post. This\nwithdrawal is going to sleep, which is therefore so sweet and agreeable,\nand to which we are so glad to yield; on the other hand, being roused from\nsleep is unwelcome, because it recalls the _vedette_ suddenly to its post.\nOne generally feels also after the beneficent systole the reappearance of\nthe difficult diastole, the reseparation of the intellect from the will. A\nso-called _soul_, which was originally and radically a _knowing_ being,\nwould, on the contrary, necessarily feel on awaking like a fish put back\ninto water. In sleep, when merely the vegetative life is carried on, the\nwill works only according to its original and essential nature,\nundisturbed from without, with no diminution of its power through the\nactivity of the brain and the exertion of knowing, which is the heaviest\norganic function, yet for the organism merely a means, not an end;\ntherefore, in sleep the whole power of the will is directed to the\nmaintenance and, where it is necessary, the improvement of the organism.\nHence all healing, all favourable crises, take place in sleep; for the\n_vis natur\u00e6 medicatrix_ has free play only when it is delivered from the\nburden of the function of knowledge. The embryo which has still to form\nthe body therefore sleeps continuously, and the new-born child the greater\npart of its time. In this sense Burdach (_Physiologie_, vol. iii. p. 484)\nquite rightly declares sleep to be the _original state_.\n\nWith reference to the brain itself, I account to myself for the necessity\nof sleep more fully through an hypothesis which appears to have been first\nset up in Neumann\u2019s book, \u201c_Von den Krankheiten des Menschen_,\u201d 1834, vol.\n4, \u00a7 216. It is this, that the nutrition of the brain, thus the renewal of\nits substance from the blood, cannot go on while we are awake, because the\nvery eminent organic function of knowing and thinking would be disturbed\nor put an end to by the low and material function of nutrition. This\nexplains the fact that sleep is not a purely negative condition, a mere\npausing of the activity of the brain, but also shows a positive character.\nThis makes itself known through the circumstance that between sleep and\nwaking there is no mere difference of degree, but a fixed boundary, which,\nas soon as sleep intervenes, declares itself in dreams which are\ncompletely different from our immediately preceding thoughts. A further\nproof of this is that when we have dreams which frighten us we try in vain\nto cry out, or to ward off attacks, or to shake off sleep; so that it is\nas if the connecting-link between the brain and the motor nerves, or\nbetween the cerebrum and the cerebellum (as the regulator of movements)\nwere abolished; for the brain remains in its isolation and sleep holds us\nfast as with brazen claws. Finally, the positive character of sleep can be\nseen in the fact that a certain degree of strength is required for\nsleeping. Therefore too great fatigue or natural weakness prevent us from\nseizing it, _capere somnum_. This may be explained from the fact that the\n_process of nutrition_ must be introduced if sleep is to ensue: the brain\nmust, as it were, begin to feed. Moreover, the increased flow of blood\ninto the brain during sleep is explicable from the nutritive process; and\nalso the position of the arms laid together above the head, which is\ninstinctively assumed because it furthers this process: also why children,\nso long as their brain is still growing, require a great deal of sleep,\nwhile in old age, on the other hand, when a certain atrophy of the brain,\nas of all the parts, takes place, sleep is short; and finally why\nexcessive sleep produces a certain dulness of consciousness, the\nconsequence of a certain hypertrophy of the brain, which in the case of\nhabitual excess of sleep may become permanent and produce imbecility: \u03b1\u03bd\u03b9\u03b7\n\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 (_nox\u00e6 est etiam multus somnus_), Od. 15, 394. The need of\nsleep is therefore directly proportionate to the intensity of the\nbrain-life, thus to the clearness of the consciousness. Those animals\nwhose brain-life is weak and dull sleep little and lightly; for example,\nreptiles and fishes: and here I must remind the reader that the winter\nsleep is sleep almost only in name, for it is not an inaction of the brain\nalone, but of the whole organism, thus a kind of apparent death. Animals\nof considerable intelligence sleep deeply and long. Men also require more\nsleep the more developed, both as regards quantity and quality, and the\nmore active their brain is. Montaigne relates of himself that he had\nalways been a long sleeper, that he had passed a large part of his life in\nsleeping, and at an advanced age still slept from eight to nine hours at a\ntime (Liv. iii., chap. 13). Descartes also is reported to have slept a\ngreat deal (Baillet, _Vie de Descartes_, 1693, p. 288). Kant allowed\nhimself seven hours for sleep, but it was so hard for him to do with this\nthat he ordered his servant to force him against his will, and without\nlistening to his remonstrances, to get up at the set time (Jachmann,\n_Immanuel Kant_, p. 162). For the more completely awake a man is, _i.e._,\nthe clearer and more lively his consciousness, the greater for him is the\nnecessity of sleep, thus the deeper and longer he sleeps. Accordingly much\nthinking or hard brain-work increases the need of sleep. That sustained\nmuscular exertion also makes us sleepy is to be explained from the fact\nthat in this the brain continuously, by means of the _medulla oblongata_,\nthe spinal marrow, and the motor nerves, imparts the stimulus to the\nmuscles which affects their irritability, and in this way it exhausts its\nstrength. The fatigue which we observe in the arms and legs has\naccordingly its real seat in the brain; just as the pain which these parts\nfeel is really experienced in the brain; for it is connected with the\nmotor nerves, as with the nerves of sense. The muscles which are not\nactuated from the brain\u2014for example, those of the heart\u2014accordingly never\ntire. The same grounds explain the fact that both during and after great\nmuscular exertion we cannot think acutely. That one has far less energy of\nmind in summer than in winter is partly explicable from the fact that in\nsummer one sleeps less; for the deeper one has slept, the more completely\nawake, the more lively, is one afterwards. This, however, must not mislead\nus into extending sleep unduly, for then it loses in intension, _i.e._, in\ndeepness and soundness, what it gains in extension; whereby it becomes\nmere loss of time. This is what Goethe means when he says (in the second\npart of \u201cFaust\u201d) of morning slumber: \u201cSleep is husk: throw it off.\u201d Thus\nin general the phenomenon of sleep most specially confirms the assertion\nthat consciousness, apprehension, knowing, thinking, is nothing original\nin us, but a conditioned and secondary state. It is a luxury of nature,\nand indeed its highest, which it can therefore the less afford to pursue\nwithout interruption the higher the pitch to which it has been brought. It\nis the product, the efflorescence of the cerebral nerve-system, which is\nitself nourished like a parasite by the rest of the organism. This also\nagrees with what is shown in our third book, that knowing is so much the\npurer and more perfect the more it has freed and severed itself from the\nwill, whereby the purely objective, the \u00e6sthetic comprehension appears.\nJust as an extract is so much the purer the more it has been separated\nfrom that out of which it is extracted and been cleared of all sediment.\nThe opposite is shown by the _will_, whose most immediate manifestation is\nthe whole organic life, and primarily the untiring heart.\n\nThis last consideration is related to the theme of the following chapter,\nto which it therefore makes the transition: yet the following observation\nbelongs to it. In magnetic somnambulism the consciousness is doubled: two\ntrains of knowledge, each connected in itself, but quite different from\neach other, arise; the waking consciousness knows nothing of the\nsomnambulent. But the will retains in both the same character, and remains\nthroughout identical; it expresses in both the same inclinations and\naversions. For the function may be doubled, but not the true nature.\n\n\n\n\nChapter XX.(34) Objectification Of The Will In The Animal Organism.\n\n\nBy _objectification_ I understand the self-exhibition in the real\ncorporeal world. However, this world itself, as was fully shown in the\nfirst book and its supplements, is throughout conditioned by the knowing\nsubject, thus by the intellect, and therefore as such is absolutely\ninconceivable outside the knowledge of this subject; for it primarily\nconsists simply of ideas of perception, and as such is a phenomenon of the\nbrain. After its removal the thing in itself would remain. That this is\nthe _will_ is the theme of the second book, and is there proved first of\nall in the human organism and in that of the brutes.\n\nThe knowledge of the external world may also be defined as the\n_consciousness of other things_, in opposition to _self-consciousness_.\nSince we have found in the latter that its true object or material is the\nwill, we shall now, with the same intention, take into consideration the\nconsciousness of other things, thus objective knowledge. Now here my\nthesis is this: _that which in self-consciousness, thus subjectively is\nthe intellect, presents itself in the consciousness of other things, thus\nobjectively, as the brain; and that which in self-consciousness, thus\nsubjectively, is the will, presents itself in the consciousness of other\nthings, thus objectively, as the whole organism_.\n\nTo the evidence which is given in support of this proposition, both in our\nsecond book and in the first two chapters of the treatise \u201c_Ueber den\nWillen in der Natur_,\u201d I add the following supplementary remarks and\nillustrations.\n\nNearly all that is necessary to establish the first part of this thesis\nhas already been brought forward in the preceding chapter, for in the\nnecessity of sleep, in the alterations that arise from age, and in the\ndifferences of the anatomical conformation, it was proved that the\nintellect is of a secondary nature, and depends absolutely upon a single\norgan, the brain, whose function it is, just as grasping is the function\nof the hand; that it is therefore physical, like digestion, not\nmetaphysical, like the will. As good digestion requires a healthy, strong\nstomach, as athletic power requires muscular sinewy arms, so extraordinary\nintelligence requires an unusually developed, beautifully formed brain of\nexquisitely fine texture and animated by a vigorous pulse. The nature of\nthe will, on the contrary, is dependent upon no organ, and can be\nprognosticated from none. The greatest error in Gall\u2019s phrenology is that\nhe assigns organs of the brain for moral qualities also. Injuries to the\nhead, with loss of brain substance, affect the intellect as a rule very\ndisadvantageously: they result in complete or partial imbecility or\nforgetfulness of language, permanent or temporary, yet sometimes only of\none language out of several which were known, also in the loss of other\nknowledge possessed, &c., &c. On the other hand, we never read that after\na misfortune of this kind the _character_ has undergone a change, that the\nman has perhaps become morally worse or better, or has lost certain\ninclinations or passions, or assumed new ones; never. For the will has not\nits seat in the brain, and moreover, as that which is metaphysical, it is\nthe _prius_ of the brain, as of the whole body, and therefore cannot be\naltered by injuries of the brain. According to an experiment made by\nSpallanzani and repeated by Voltaire,(35) a snail that has had its head\ncut off remains alive, and after some weeks a new head grows on, together\nwith horns; with this consciousness and ideas again appear; while till\nthen the snail had only given evidence of blind will through unregulated\nmovements. Thus here also we find the will as the substance which is\npermanent, the intellect, on the contrary, conditioned by its organ, as\nthe changing accident. It may be defined as the regulator of the will.\n\nIt was perhaps Tiedemann who first compared the cerebral nervous system to\na _parasite_ (_Tiedemann und Trevirann\u2019s Journal f\u00fcr Physiologie_, Bd. i.\n\u00a7 62). The comparison is happy; for the brain, together with the spinal\ncord and nerves which depend upon it, is, as it were, implanted in the\norganism, and is nourished by it without on its part _directly_\ncontributing anything to the support of the economy of the organism;\ntherefore there can be life without a brain, as in the case of brainless\nabortions, and also in the case of tortoises, which live for three weeks\nafter their heads have been cut off; only the _medulla oblongata_, as the\norgan of respiration, must be spared. Indeed a hen whose whole brain\nFlourens had cut away lived for ten months and grew. Even in the case of\nmen the destruction of the brain does not produce death directly, but only\nthrough the medium of the lungs, and then of the heart (_Bichat, Sur la\nVie et la Mort_, Part ii., art. ii. \u00a7 1). On the other hand, the brain\ncontrols the relations to the external world; this alone is its office,\nand hereby it discharges its debt to the organism which nourishes it,\nsince its existence is conditioned by the external relations. Accordingly\nthe brain alone of all the parts requires sleep, because its _activity_ is\ncompletely distinct from its _support_; the former only consumes both\nstrength and substance, the latter is performed by the rest of the\norganism as the nurse of the brain: thus because its activity contributes\nnothing to its continued existence it becomes exhausted, and only when it\npauses in sleep does its nourishment go on unhindered.\n\nThe second part of our thesis, stated above, will require a fuller\nexposition even after all that I have said about it in the writings\nreferred to. I have shown above, in chapter 18, that the thing in itself,\nwhich must lie at the foundation of every phenomenon, and therefore of our\nown phenomenal existence also, throws off in self-consciousness _one_ of\nits phenomenal forms\u2014space, and only retains the other\u2014time. On this\naccount it presents itself here more immediately than anywhere else, and\nwe claim it as will, according to its most undisguised manifestation. But\nno _permanent substance_, such as matter is, can present itself in time\nalone, because, as \u00a7 4 of the first volume showed, such a substance is\nonly possible through the intimate union of space and time. Therefore, in\nself-consciousness the will is not apprehended as the enduring substratum\nof its impulses, therefore is not perceived as a permanent substance; but\nonly its individual acts, such as purposes, wishes, and emotions, are\nknown successively and during the time they last, directly, yet not\nperceptibly. The knowledge of the will in self-consciousness is\naccordingly not a _perception_ of it, but a perfectly direct becoming\naware of its successive impulses. On the other hand, for the knowledge\nwhich is directed _outwardly_, brought about by the senses and perfected\nin the understanding, which, besides time, has also space for its form,\nwhich two it connects in the closest manner by means of the function of\nthe understanding, causality, whereby it really becomes _perception_\u2014this\nknowledge presents to itself _perceptibly_ what in inner immediate\napprehension was conceived as will, as _organic body_, whose particular\nmovements visibly present to us the acts, and whose parts and forms\nvisibly present to us the sustained efforts, the fundamental character, of\nthe individually given will, nay, whose pain and comfort are perfectly\nimmediate affections of this will itself.\n\nWe first become aware of this identity of the body with the will in the\nindividual actions of the two, for in these what is known in\nself-consciousness as an immediate, real act of will, at the same time and\nunseparated, exhibits itself outwardly as movement of the body; and every\none beholds the purposes of his will, which are instantaneously brought\nabout by motives which just as instantaneously appear at once as\nfaithfully copied in as many actions of his body as his body itself is\ncopied in his shadow; and from this, for the unprejudiced man, the\nknowledge arises in the simplest manner that his body is merely the\noutward manifestation of his will, _i.e._, the way in which his will\nexhibits itself in his perceiving intellect, or his will itself under the\nform of the idea. Only if we forcibly deprive ourselves of this primary\nand simple information can we for a short time marvel at the process of\nour own bodily action as a miracle, which then rests on the fact that\nbetween the act of will and the action of the body there is really no\ncausal connection, for they are directly _identical_, and their apparent\ndifference only arises from the circumstance that here what is one and the\nsame is apprehended in two different modes of knowledge, the outer and the\ninner. Actual willing is, in fact, inseparable from doing and in the\nstrictest sense only that is an act of will which the deed sets its seal\nto. Mere resolves of the will, on the contrary, till they are carried out,\nare only intentions, and are therefore matter of the intellect alone; as\nsuch they have their place merely in the brain, and are nothing more than\ncompleted calculations of the relative strength of the different opposing\nmotives. They have, therefore, certainly great probability, but no\ninfallibility. They may turn out false, not only through alteration of the\ncircumstances, but also from the fact that the estimation of the effect of\nthe respective motives upon the will itself was erroneous, which then\nshows itself, for the deed is untrue to the purpose: therefore before it\nis carried out no resolve is certain. The _will itself_, then, is\noperative only in real action; hence in muscular action, and consequently\nin _irritability_. Thus the _will_ proper objectifies itself in this. The\ncerebrum is the place of motives, where, through these, the will becomes\nchoice, _i.e._, becomes more definitely determined by motives. These\nmotives are ideas, which, on the occasion of external stimuli of the\norgans of sense, arise by means of the functions of the brain, and are\nalso worked up into conceptions, and then into resolves. When it comes to\nthe real act of will these motives, the workshop of which is the cerebrum,\nact through the medium of the cerebellum upon the spinal cord and the\nmotor nerves which proceed from it, which then act upon the muscles, yet\nmerely as _stimuli_ of their irritability; for galvanic, chemical, and\neven mechanical stimuli can effect the same contraction which the motor\nnerve calls forth. Thus what was _motive_ in the brain acts, when it\nreaches the muscle through the nerves, as mere stimulus. Sensibility in\nitself is quite unable to contract a muscle. This can only be done by the\nmuscle itself, and its capacity for doing so is called _irritability_,\n_i.e._, _susceptibility to stimuli_. It is exclusively a property of the\nmuscle, as sensibility is exclusively a property of the nerve. The latter\nindeed gives the muscle the _occasion_ for its contraction, but it is by\nno means it that, in some mechanical way, draws the muscle together; but\nthis happens simply and solely on account of the _irritability_, which is\na power of the muscle itself. Apprehended from without this is a _Qualitas\nocculta_, and only self-consciousness reveals it as the _will_. In the\ncausal chain here briefly set forth, from the effect of the motive lying\noutside us to the contraction of the muscle, the will does not in some way\ncome in as the last link of the chain; but it is the metaphysical\nsubstratum of the irritability of the muscle: thus it plays here precisely\nthe same part which in a physical or chemical chain of causes is played by\nthe mysterious forces of nature which lie at the foundation of the\nprocess\u2014forces which as such are not themselves involved as links in the\ncausal chain, but impart to all the links of it the capacity to act, as I\nhave fully shown in \u00a7 26 of the first volume. Therefore we would ascribe\nthe contraction of the muscle also to a similar mysterious force of\nnature, if it were not that this contraction is disclosed to us by an\nentirely different source of knowledge\u2014self-consciousness as _will_.\nHence, as was said above, if we start from the will our own muscular\nmovement appears to us a miracle; for indeed there is a strict causal\nchain from the external motive to the muscular action; but the will itself\nis not included as a link in it, but, as the metaphysical substratum of\nthe possibility of an action upon the muscle through brain and nerve, lies\nat the foundation of the present muscular action also; therefore the\nlatter is not properly its _effect_ but its _manifestation_. As such it\nenters the world of idea, the form of which is the law of causality, a\nworld which is entirely different from the _will_ in itself: and thus, if\nwe start from the _will_, this manifestation has, for attentive\nreflection, the appearance of a miracle, but for deeper investigation it\naffords the most direct authentication of the great truth that what\nappears in the phenomenon as body and its action is in itself _will_. If\nnow perhaps the motor nerve that leads to my hand is severed, the will can\nno longer move it. This, however, is not because the hand has ceased to\nbe, like every part of my body, the objectivity, the mere visibility, of\nmy will, or in other words, that the irritability has vanished, but\nbecause the effect of the motive, in consequence of which alone I can move\nmy hand, cannot reach it and act on its muscles as a stimulus, for the\nline of connection between it and the brain is broken. Thus really my will\nis, in this part, only deprived of the effect of the motive. The will\nobjectifies itself directly, in irritability, not in sensibility.\n\nIn order to prevent all misunderstandings about this important point,\nespecially such as proceed from physiology pursued in a purely empirical\nmanner, I shall explain the whole process somewhat more thoroughly. My\ndoctrine asserts that the whole body is the will itself, exhibiting itself\nin the perception of the brain; consequently, having entered into its\nforms of knowledge. From this it follows that the will is everywhere\nequally present in the whole body, as is also demonstrably the case, for\nthe organic functions are its work no less than the animal. But how, then,\ncan we reconcile it with this, that the _voluntary_ actions, those most\nundeniable expressions of the will, clearly originate in the brain, and\nthus only through the spinal cord reach the nerve fibres, which finally\nset the limbs in motion, and the paralysis or severing of which therefore\nprevents the possibility of voluntary movement? This would lead one to\nthink that the will, like the intellect, has its seat only in the brain,\nand, like it, is a mere function of the brain.\n\nYet this is not the case: but the whole body is and remains the exhibition\nof the will in perception, thus the will itself objectively perceived by\nmeans of the functions of the brain. That process, however, in the case of\nthe acts of will, depends upon the fact that the will, which, according to\nmy doctrine, expresses itself in every phenomenon of nature, even in\nvegetable and inorganic phenomena, appears in the bodies of men and\nanimals as a _conscious will_. A _consciousness_, however, is essentially\na unity, and therefore always requires a central point of unity. The\nnecessity of consciousness is, as I have often explained, occasioned by\nthe fact that in consequence of the increased complication, and thereby\nmore multifarious wants, of an organism, the acts of its will must be\nguided by _motives_, no longer, as in the lower grades, by mere stimuli.\nFor this purpose it had at this stage to appear provided with a knowing\nconsciousness, thus with an intellect, as the medium and place of the\nmotives. This intellect, if itself objectively perceived, exhibits itself\nas the brain, together with its appendages, spinal cord, and nerves. It is\nthe brain now in which, on the occasion of external impressions, the ideas\narise which become motives for the will. But in the _rational_ intellect\nthey undergo besides this a still further working up, through reflection\nand deliberation. Thus such an intellect must first of all unite in _one_\npoint all impressions, together with the working up of them by its\nfunctions, whether to mere perception or to conceptions, a point which\nwill be, as it were, the focus of all its rays, in order that that unity\nof consciousness may arise which is the the _theoretical ego_, the\nsupporter of the whole consciousness, in which it presents itself as\nidentical with the _willing ego_, whose mere function of knowledge it is.\nThat point of unity of consciousness, or the theoretical ego, is just\nKant\u2019s synthetic unity of apperception, upon which all ideas string\nthemselves as on a string of pearls, and on account of which the \u201cI\nthink,\u201d as the thread of the string of pearls, \u201cmust be capable of\naccompanying all our ideas.\u201d(36) This assembling-place of the motives,\nthen, where their entrance into the single focus of consciousness takes\nplace, is the brain. Here, in the non-rational consciousness, they are\nmerely perceived; in the _rational_ consciousness they are elucidated by\nconceptions, thus are first thought in the abstract and compared; upon\nwhich the will chooses, in accordance with its individual and immutable\ncharacter, and so the _purpose_ results which now, by means of the\ncerebellum, the spinal cord, and the nerves, sets the outward limbs in\nmotion. For although the will is quite directly present in these, inasmuch\nas they are merely its manifestation, yet when it has to move according to\nmotives, or indeed according to reflection, it requires such an apparatus\nfor the apprehension and working up of ideas into such motives, in\nconformity with which its acts here appear as resolves: just as the\nnourishment of the blood with chyle requires a stomach and intestines, in\nwhich this is prepared, and then as such is poured into the blood through\nthe _ductus thoracicus_, which here plays the part which the spinal cord\nplays in the former case. The matter may be most simply and generally\ncomprehended thus: the will is immediately present as irritability in all\nthe muscular fibres of the whole body, as a continual striving after\nactivity in general. Now if this striving is to realise itself, thus to\nmanifest itself as movement, this movement must as such have some\ndirection; but this direction must be _determined_ by something, _i.e._,\nit requires a guide, and this is the nervous system. For to the mere\nirritability, as it lies in the muscular fibres and in itself is pure\nwill, all directions are alike; thus it determines itself in no direction,\nbut behaves like a body which is equally drawn in all directions; it\nremains at rest. Since the activity of the nerves comes in as motive (in\nthe case of reflex movements as a stimulus), the striving force, _i.e._,\nthe irritability, receives a definite direction, and now produces the\nmovements. Yet those external acts of will which require no motives, and\nthus also no working up of mere stimuli into ideas in the brain, from\nwhich motives arise, but which follow immediately upon stimuli, for the\nmost part inward stimuli, are the reflex movements, starting only from the\nspinal cord, as, for example, spasms and cramp, in which the will acts\nwithout the brain taking part. In an analogous manner the will carries on\nthe organic life, also by nerve stimulus, which does not proceed from the\nbrain. Thus the will appears in every muscle as irritability, and is\nconsequently of itself in a position to contract them, yet only _in\ngeneral_; in order that some definite contraction should take place at a\ngiven moment, there is required here, as everywhere, a cause, which in\nthis case must be a stimulus. This is everywhere given by the nerve which\ngoes into the muscle. If this nerve is in connection with the brain, then\nthe contraction is a conscious act of will, _i.e._, takes place in\naccordance with motives, which, in consequence of _external_ impressions,\nhave arisen as ideas in the brain. If the nerve is _not_ in connection\nwith the brain, but with the _sympathicus maximus_, then the contraction\nis involuntary and unconscious, an act connected with the maintenance of\nthe organic life, and the nerve stimulus which causes it is occasioned by\n_inward_ impressions; for example, by the pressure upon the stomach of the\nfood received, or of the chyme upon the intestines, or of the in-flowing\nblood upon the walls of the heart, in accordance with which the act is\ndigestion, or _motus peristalticus_, or beating of the heart, &c.\n\nBut if now, in this process, we go one step further, we find that the\nmuscles are the product of the blood, the result of its work of\ncondensation, nay, to a certain extent they are merely solidified, or, as\nit were, clotted or crystallised blood; for they have taken up into\nthemselves, almost unaltered, its fibrin (_cruor_) and its colouring\nmatter (_Burdach\u2019s Physiologie_, Bd. v. \u00a7 686). But the force which forms\nthe muscle out of the blood must not be assumed to be different from that\nwhich afterwards moves it as irritability, upon nerve stimulus, which the\nbrain supplies; in which case it then presents itself in\nself-consciousness as that which we call _will_. The close connection\nbetween the blood and irritability is also shown by this, that where, on\naccount of imperfection of the lesser circulation, part of the blood\nreturns to the heart unoxidised, the irritability is also uncommonly weak,\nas in the batrachia. Moreover, the movement of the blood, like that of the\nmuscle, is independent and original; it does not, like irritation, require\nthe influence of the nerve, and is even independent of the heart, as is\nshown most clearly by the return of the blood through the veins to the\nheart; for here it is not propelled by a _vis a tergo_, as in the case of\nthe arterial circulation; and all other mechanical explanations, such as a\npower of suction of the right ventricle of the heart, are quite\ninadequate. (See _Burdach\u2019s Physiologie_, Bd. 4, \u00a7 763, and _R\u00f6sch, Ueber\ndie Bedeutung des Blutes, \u00a7 II, seq._) It is remarkable to see how the\nFrench, who recognise nothing but mechanical forces, controvert each other\nwith insufficient grounds upon both sides; and Bichat ascribes the flowing\nback of the blood through the veins to the pressure of the walls of the\ncapillary tubes, and Magendie, on the other hand, to the continue action\nof the impulse of the heart (_Pr\u00e9cis de Physiologie par Magendie_, vol.\nii. p. 389). That the movement of the blood is also independent of the\nnervous system, at least of the cerebral nervous system, is shown by the\nfetus, which (according to _M\u00fcller\u2019s Physiologie_), without brain and\nspinal cord, has yet circulation of the blood. And Flourens also says:\n\u201c_Le mouvement du c\u0153ur, pris en soi, et abstraction faite de tout ce qui\nn\u2019est pas essentiellement lui, comme sa dur\u00e9e, son \u00e9nergie, ne d\u00e9pend ni\nimm\u00e9diatement, ni coinstantan\u00e9ment, du syst\u00e8me nerveux central, et\ncons\u00e9quemment c\u2019est dans tout autre point de ce syst\u00e8me que dans les\ncentres nerveux eux-m\u00eames, qu\u2019il faut chercher le principe primitif et\nimm\u00e9diat de ce mouvement_\u201d (_Annales des sciences naturelles p. Audouin et\nBrougniard_, 1828, vol. 13). Cuvier also says: \u201c_La circulation survit \u00e0\nla d\u00e9struction de tout l\u2019enc\u00e9phale et de toute la mo\u00eblle \u00e9piniaire_ (_M\u00e9m.\nde l\u2019acad. d. sc._, 1823, vol. 6; _Hist. d. l\u2019acad. p. Cuvier_,\u201d p. cxxx).\n\u201c_Cor primum vivens et ultimum moriens_,\u201d says Haller. The beating of the\nheart ceases at last in death. The blood has made the vessels themselves;\nfor it appears in the ovum earlier than they do; they are only its path,\nvoluntarily taken, then beaten smooth, and finally gradually condensed and\nclosed up; as Kaspar Wolff has already taught: \u201c_Theorie der Generation_,\u201d\n\u00a7 30-35. The motion of the heart also, which is inseparable from that of\nthe blood, although occasioned by the necessity of sending blood into the\nlungs, is yet an original motion, for it is independent of the nervous\nsystem and of sensibility, as Burdach fully shows. \u201cIn the heart,\u201d he\nsays, \u201cappears, with the maximum of irritability, a minimum of\nsensibility\u201d (_loc. cit._, \u00a7 769). The heart belongs to the muscular\nsystem as well as to the blood or vascular system; from which, however, it\nis clear that the two are closely related, indeed constitute one whole.\nSince now the metaphysical substratum of the force which moves the muscle,\nthus of irritability, is the _will_, the will must also be the\nmetaphysical substratum of the force which lies at the foundation of the\nmovement and the formations of the blood, as that by which the muscles are\nproduced. The course of the arteries also determines the form and size of\nall the limbs; consequently the whole form of the body is determined by\nthe course of the blood. Thus in general the blood, as it nourishes all\nthe parts of the body, has also, as the primary fluidity of the organism,\nproduced and framed them out of itself. And the nourishment which\nconfessedly constitutes the principal function of the blood is only the\ncontinuance of that original production of them. This truth will be found\nthoroughly and excellently explained in the work of R\u00f6sch referred to\nabove: \u201c_Ueber die Bedeutung des Blutes_,\u201d 1839. He shows that the blood\nis that which first has life and is the source both of the existence and\nof the maintenance of all the parts; that all the organs have sprung from\nit through secretion, and together with them, for the management of their\nfunctions, the nervous system, which appears now as _plastic_, ordering\nand arranging the life of the particular parts within, now as _cerebral_,\ncontrolling the relation to the external world. \u201cThe blood,\u201d he says, p.\n25, \u201cwas flesh and nerve at once, and at the same moment at which the\nmuscle freed itself from it the nerve, severed in like manner, remained\nopposed to the flesh.\u201d Here it is a matter of course that the blood,\nbefore those solid parts have been secreted from it, has also a somewhat\ndifferent character from afterwards; it is then, as R\u00f6sch defines it, the\nchaotic, animated, slimy, primitive fluid, as it were an organic emulsion,\nin which all subsequent parts are _implicite_ contained: moreover, it has\nnot the red colour quite at the beginning. This disposes of the objection\nwhich might be drawn from the fact that the brain and the spinal cord\nbegin to form before the circulation of the blood is visible or the heart\nappears. In this reference also Schultz says (_System der Circulation_, \u00a7\n297): \u201cWe do not believe that the view of Ba\u016bmg\u00e4rten, according to which\nthe nervous system is formed earlier than the blood, can consistently be\ncarried out; for Ba\u016bmg\u00e4rten reckons the appearance of the blood only from\nthe formation of the corpuscles, while in the embryo and in the series of\nanimals blood appears much earlier in the form of a pure plasma.\u201d The\nblood of invertebrate animals never assumes the red colour; but we do not\ntherefore, with Aristotle, deny that they have any. It is well worthy of\nnote that, according to the account of Justinus Kerner (_Geschichte zweier\nSomnambulen_, \u00a7 78), a somnambulist of a very high degree of clairvoyance,\nsays: \u201cI am as deep in myself as ever a man can be led; the force of my\nmortal life seems to me to have its source in the blood, whereby, through\nthe circulation in the veins, it communicates itself, by means of the\nnerves, to the whole body, and to the brain, which is the noblest part of\nthe body, and above the blood itself.\u201d\n\nFrom all this it follows that the will objectifies itself most immediately\nin the blood as that which originally makes and forms the organism,\nperfects it by growth, and afterwards constantly maintains it, both by the\nregular renewal of all the parts and by the extraordinary restoration of\nany part that may have been injured. The first productions of the blood\nare its own vessels, and then the muscles, in the irritability of which\nthe will makes itself known to self-consciousness; but with this also the\nheart, which is at once vessel and muscle, and therefore is the true\ncentre and _primum mobile_ of the whole life. But for the individual life\nand subsistence in the external world the will now requires two assistant\nsystems: _one_ to govern and order its inner and outer activity, and\n_another_ for the constant renewal of the mass of the blood; thus a\ncontroller and a sustainer. It therefore makes for itself the nervous and\nthe intestinal systems; thus the _functiones animales_ and the _functiones\nnaturales_ associate themselves in a subsidiary manner with the\n_functiones vitales_, which are the most original and essential. In the\n_nervous system_, accordingly, the will only objectifies itself in an\nindirect and secondary way; for this system appears as a mere auxiliary\norgan, as a contrivance by means of which the will attains to a knowledge\nof those occasions, internal and external, upon which, in conformity with\nits aims, it must express itself; the internal occasions are received by\nthe _plastic_ nervous system, thus by the sympathetic nerve, this\n_cerebrum abdominale_, as mere stimuli, and the will thereupon reacts on\nthe spot without the brain being conscious; the _outward_ occasions are\nreceived by the brain, as _motives_, and the will reacts through conscious\nactions directed outwardly. Therefore the whole nervous system\nconstitutes, as it were, the antenn\u00e6 of the will, which it stretches\ntowards within and without. The nerves of the brain and spinal cord\nseparate at their roots into sensory and motory nerves. The sensory nerves\nreceive the knowledge from without, which now accumulates in the thronging\nbrain, and is there worked up into ideas, which arise primarily as\nmotives. But the motory nerves bring back, like couriers, the result of\nthe brain function to the muscle, upon which it acts as a stimulus, and\nthe irritability of which is the immediate manifestation of the will.\nPresumably the plastic nerves also divide into sensory and motory,\nalthough on a subordinate scale. The part which the ganglia play in the\norganism we must think of as that of a diminutive brain, and thus the one\nthrows light upon the other. The ganglia lie wherever the organic\nfunctions of the vegetative system require care. It is as if there the\nwill was not able by its direct and simple action to carry out its aims,\nbut required guidance, and consequently control; just as when in some\nbusiness a man\u2019s own memory is not sufficient, and he must constantly take\nnotes of what he does. For this end mere knots of nerves are sufficient\nfor the interior of the organism, because everything goes on within its\nown compass. For the exterior, on the other hand, a very complicated\ncontrivance of the same kind is required. This is the brain with its\nfeelers, which it stretches into the outer world, the nerves of sense. But\neven in the organs which are in communication with this great nerve\ncentre, in very simple cases the matter does not need to be brought before\nthe highest authority, but a subordinate one is sufficient to determine\nwhat is needed; such is the spinal cord, in the reflex actions discovered\nby Marshall Hall, such as sneezing, yawning, vomiting, the second half of\nswallowing, &c. &c. The will itself is present in the whole organism,\nsince this is merely its visible form; the nervous system exists\neverywhere merely for the purpose of making the _direction_ of an action\npossible by a control of it, as it were to serve the will as a mirror, so\nthat it may see what it does, just as we use a mirror to shave by. Hence\nsmall sensoria arise within us for special, and consequently simple,\nfunctions, the ganglia; but the chief sensorium, the brain, is the great\nand skilfully contrived apparatus for the complicated and multifarious\nfunctions which have to do with the ceaselessly and irregularly changing\nexternal world. Wherever in the organism the nerve threads run together in\na ganglion, there, to a certain extent, an animal exists for itself and\nshut off, which by means of the ganglion has a kind of weak knowledge, the\nsphere of which is, however, limited to the part from which these nerves\ndirectly come. But what actuates these parts to such _quasi_ knowledge is\nclearly the _will_; indeed we are utterly unable to conceive it otherwise.\nUpon this depends the _vita propria_ of each part, and also in the case of\ninsects, which, instead of a spinal cord, have a double string of nerves,\nwith ganglia at regular intervals, the capacity of each part to continue\nalive for days after being severed from the head and the rest of the\ntrunk; and finally also the actions which in the last instance do not\nreceive their motives from the brain, _i.e._, instinct and natural\nmechanical skill. Marshall Hall, whose discovery of the reflex movements I\nhave mentioned above, has given us in this the _theory of involuntary\nmovements_. Some of these are normal or physiological; such are the\nclosing of the places of ingress to and egress from the body, thus of the\n_sphincteres vesic\u00e6 et ani_ (proceeding from the nerves of the spinal\ncord); the closing of the eyelids in sleep (from the fifth pair of\nnerves), of the larynx (from _N. vagus_) if food passes over it or\ncarbonic acid tries to enter; also swallowing, from the pharynx, yawning\nand sneezing, respiration, entirely in sleep and partly when awake; and,\nlastly, the erection, ejaculation, as also conception, and many more.\nSome, again, are abnormal and pathological; such are stammering,\nhiccoughing, vomiting, also cramps and convulsions of every kind,\nespecially in epilepsy, tetanus, in hydrophobia and otherwise; finally,\nthe convulsive movements produced by galvanic or other stimuli, and which\ntake place without feeling or consciousness in paralysed limbs, _i.e._, in\nlimbs which are out of connection with the brain, also the convulsions of\nbeheaded animals, and, lastly, all movements and actions of children born\nwithout brains. All cramps are a rebellion of the nerves of the limbs\nagainst the sovereignty of the brain; the normal reflex movements, on the\nother hand, are the legitimate autocracy of the subordinate officials.\nThese movements are thus all involuntary, because they do not proceed from\nthe brain, and therefore do not take place in accordance with motives, but\nfollow upon mere stimuli. The stimuli which occasion them extend only to\nthe spinal cord or the _medulla oblongata_, and from there the reaction\ndirectly takes place which effects the movement. The spinal cord has the\nsame relation to these involuntary movements as the brain has to motive\nand action, and what the sentient and voluntary nerve is for the latter\nthe incident and motor nerve is for the former. That yet, in the one as in\nthe other, that which really moves is the _will_ is brought all the more\nclearly to light because the involuntarily moved muscles are for the most\npart the same which, under other circumstances, are moved from the brain\nin the voluntary actions, in which their _primum mobile_ is intimately\nknown to us through self-consciousness as the _will_. Marshall Hall\u2019s\nexcellent book \u201cOn the Diseases of the Nervous System\u201d is peculiarly\nfitted to bring out clearly the difference between volition and will, and\nto confirm the truth of my fundamental doctrine.\n\nFor the sake of illustrating all that has been said, let us now call to\nmind that case of the origination of an organism which is most accessible\nto our observation. Who makes the chicken in the egg? Some power and skill\ncoming from without, and penetrating through the shell? Oh no! The chicken\nmakes itself, and the force which carries out and perfects this work,\nwhich is complicated, well calculated, and designed beyond all expression,\nbreaks through the shell as soon as it is ready, and now performs the\noutward actions of the chicken, under the name of _will_. It cannot do\nboth at once; previously occupied with the perfecting of the organism, it\nhad no care for without. But after it has completed the former, the latter\nappears, under the guidance of the brain and its feelers, the senses, as a\ntool prepared beforehand for this end, the service of which only begins\nwhen it grows up in self-consciousness as intellect, which is the lantern\nto the steps of the will, its \u1f21\u03b3\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd, and also the supporter of the\nobjective external world, however limited the horizon of this may be in\nthe consciousness of a hen. But what the hen is now able to do in the\nexternal world, through the medium of this organ, is, as accomplished by\nmeans of something secondary, infinitely less important than what it did\nin its original form, for it made itself.\n\nWe became acquainted above with the cerebral nervous system as an\n_assistant organ_ of the will, in which it therefore objectifies itself in\na secondary manner. As thus the cerebral system, although not directly\ncoming within the sphere of the life-functions of the organism, but only\ngoverning its relations to the outer world, has yet the organism as its\nbasis, and is nourished by it in return for its services; and as thus the\ncerebral or animal life is to be regarded as the production of the organic\nlife, the brain and its function, knowledge, thus the intellect, belong\nindirectly and in a subordinate manner to the manifestation of the _will_.\nThe will objectifies itself also in it, as will to apprehend the external\nworld, thus as _will to know_. Therefore great and fundamental as is the\ndifference in us between willing and knowing, the ultimate substratum of\nboth is yet the same, the _will_, as the real inner nature of the whole\nphenomenon. But knowing, the intellect, which presents itself in\nself-consciousness entirely as secondary, is to be regarded not only as\nthe accident of the will, but also as its work, and thus, although in a\ncircuitous manner, is yet to be referred to it. As the intellect presents\nitself physiologically as the function of an organ of the body,\nmetaphysically it is to be regarded as a work of the will, whose\nobjectification or visible appearance is the whole body. Thus the will _to\nknow_, objectively perceived, is the brain; as the will _to go_,\nobjectively perceived, is the foot; the will _to grasp_, the hand; the\nwill _to digest_, the stomach; the will _to beget_, the genitals, &c. This\nwhole objectification certainly ultimately exists only for the brain, as\nits perception: in this the will exhibits itself as organised body. But so\nfar as the brain knows, it is _itself_ not known, but is the _knower_, the\nsubject of all knowledge. So far, however, as in objective perception,\n_i.e._, in the consciousness of _other things_, thus secondarily, _it is\nknown_, it belongs, as an organ of the body, to the objectification of the\nwill. For the whole process is the _self-knowledge of the will_; it starts\nfrom this and returns to it, and constitutes what Kant has called the\n_phenomenon_ in opposition to the thing in itself. Therefore that which is\n_known_, that which is _idea_, is the _will_; and this idea is what we\ncall body, which, as extended in space and moving in time, exists only by\nmeans of the functions of the brain, thus only in it. That, on the other\nhand, which _knows_, which _has that idea_, is the _brain_, which yet does\nnot know itself, but only becomes conscious of itself subjectively as\nintellect, _i.e._, as the _knower_. That which when regarded from within\nis the faculty of knowledge is when regarded from without the brain. This\nbrain is a part of that body, just because it itself belongs to the\nobjectification of the _will_, the will\u2019s _will to know_ is objectified in\nit, its tendency towards the external world. Accordingly the brain, and\ntherefore the intellect, is certainly conditioned immediately by the body,\nand this again by the brain, yet only indirectly, as spatial and\ncorporeal, in the world of perception, not in itself, _i.e._, as will.\nThus the whole is ultimately the will, which itself becomes idea, and is\nthat unity which we express by I. The brain itself, so far as it is\n_perceived_\u2014thus in the consciousness of other things, and hence\nsecondarily\u2014is only idea. But in itself, and so far as it _perceives_, it\nis the will, because this is the real substratum of the whole phenomenon;\nits will to know objectifies itself as brain and its functions. We may\ntake the voltaic pile as an illustration, certainly imperfect, but yet to\nsome extent throwing light upon the nature of the human phenomenon, as we\nhere regard it. The metals, together with the fluid, are the body; the\nchemical action, as the basis of the whole effect, is the will, and the\nelectric current resulting from it, which produces shock and spark, is the\nintellect. But _omne simile claudicat_.\n\nQuite recently the _physiatrica_ point of view has at last prevailed in\npathology. According to it diseases are themselves a curative process of\nnature, which it introduces to remove, by overcoming its causes, a\ndisorder which in some way has got into the organism. Thus in the decisive\nbattle, the crisis, it is either victorious and attains its end, or else\nis defeated. This view only gains its full rationality from our\nstandpoint, which shows the _will_ in the vital force, that here appears\nas _vis natur\u0153 medicatrix_, the will which lies at the foundation of all\norganic functions in a healthy condition, but now, when disorder has\nentered, threatening its whole work, assumes dictatorial power in order to\nsubdue the rebellious forces by quite extraordinary measures and entirely\nabnormal operations (the disease), and bring everything back to the right\ntrack. On the other hand, that the _will itself_ is sick, as Brandis\nrepeatedly expresses himself in his book, \u201c_Ueber die Anwendung der\nK\u00e4lte_,\u201d which I have quoted in the first part of my essay, \u201c_Ueber den\nWillen in der Natur_,\u201d is a gross misunderstanding. When I weigh this, and\nat the same time observe that in his earlier book, \u201c_Ueber die\nLebenskraft_,\u201d of 1795, Brandis betrayed no suspicion that this force is\nin itself the will, but, on the contrary, says there, page 13: \u201cIt is\nimpossible that the vital force can be that which we only know through our\nconsciousness, for most movements take place without our consciousness.\nThe assertion that this, of which the only characteristic known to us is\nconsciousness, also affects the body without consciousness is at the least\nquite arbitrary and unproved;\u201d and page 14: \u201cHaller\u2019s objections to the\nopinion that all living movements are the effect of the soul are, as I\nbelieve, quite unanswerable;\u201d when I further reflect that he wrote his\nbook, \u201c_Ueber die Anwendung der K\u00e4lte_,\u201d in which all at once the will\nappears so decidedly as the vital force, in his seventieth year, an age at\nwhich no one as yet has conceived for the first time original fundamental\nthoughts; when, lastly, I bear in mind that he makes use of my exact\nexpressions, \u201cwill and idea,\u201d and not of those which are far more commonly\nused by others, \u201cthe faculties of desire and of knowledge,\u201d I am now\nconvinced, contrary to my earlier supposition, that he borrowed his\nfundamental thought from me, and with the usual honesty which prevails at\nthe present day in the learned world, said nothing about it. The\nparticulars about this will be found in the second (and third) edition of\nmy work, \u201c_Ueber den Willen in der Natur_,\u201d p. 14.\n\nNothing is more fitted to confirm and illustrate the thesis with which we\nare occupied in this chapter than Bichat\u2019s justly celebrated book, \u201c_Sur\nla vie et la mort_.\u201d His reflections and mine reciprocally support each\nother, for his are the physiological commentary on mine, and mine are the\nphilosophical commentary on his, and one will best understand us both by\nreading us together. This refers specially to the first half of his work,\nentitled \u201c_Recherches physiologiques sur la vie_.\u201d He makes the foundation\nof his expositions the opposition of the _organic_ to the _animal_ life,\nwhich corresponds to mine of the will to the intellect. Whoever looks at\nthe sense, not at the words, will not allow himself to be led astray by\nthe fact that he ascribes the will to the animal life; for by will, as is\nusual, he only understands conscious volition, which certainly proceeds\nfrom the brain, where, however, as was shown above, it is not yet actual\nwilling, but only deliberation upon and estimation of the motives, the\nconclusion or product of which at last appears as the act of will. All\nthat I ascribe to the _will_ proper he ascribes to the _organic_ life, and\nall that I conceive as _intellect_ is with him the _animal_ life: the\nlatter has with him its seat in the brain alone, together with its\nappendages: the former, again, in the whole of the remainder of the\norganism. The complete opposition in which he shows that the two stand to\neach other corresponds to that which with me exists between the will and\nthe intellect. As anatomist and physiologist he starts from the objective,\nthat is, from the consciousness of other things; I, as a philosopher,\nstart from the subjective, self-consciousness; and it is a pleasure to see\nhow, like the two voices in a duet, we advance in harmony with each other,\nalthough each expresses something different. Therefore, let every one who\nwishes to understand me read him; and let every one who wishes to\nunderstand him, better than he understood himself, read me. Bichat shows\nus, in article 4, that the _organic_ life begins earlier and ends later\nthan the _animal_ life; consequently, since the latter also rests in\nsleep, has nearly twice as long a duration; then, in articles 8 and 9,\nthat the organic life performs everything perfectly, at once, and of its\nown accord; the animal life, on the other hand, requires long practice and\neducation. But he is most interesting in the sixth article, where he shows\nthat the _animal_ life is completely limited to the intellectual\noperations, therefore goes on coldly and indifferently, while the emotions\nand passions have their seat in the _organic_ life, although the occasions\nof them lie in the animal, _i.e._, the cerebral, life. Here he has ten\nvaluable pages which I wish I could quote entire. On page 50 he says: \u201c_Il\nest sans doute \u00e9tonnant, que les passions n\u2019ayent jamais leur terme ni\nleur origine dans les divers organs de la vie animale; qu\u2019au contraire les\nparties servant aux fonctions internes, soient constamment affect\u00e9es par\nelles, et m\u00eame les d\u00e9terminent suivant l\u2019\u00e9tat o\u00f9 elles se trouvent. Tel\nest cependant ce que la stricte observation nous prouve. Je dis d\u2019abord\nque l\u2019effet de toute esp\u00e8ce de passion, constamment \u00e9tranger \u00e0 la vie\nanimale, est de faire na\u00eetre un changement, une alt\u00e9ration quelconque dans\nla vie organique._\u201d Then he shows in detail how anger acts on the\ncirculation of the blood and the beating of the heart, then how joy acts,\nand lastly how fear; next, how the lungs, the stomach, the intestines, the\nliver, glands, and pancreas are affected by these and kindred emotions,\nand how grief diminishes the nutrition; and then how the animal, that is,\nthe brain life, is untouched by all this, and quietly goes on its way. He\nrefers to the fact that to signify intellectual operations we put the hand\nto the head, but, on the contrary, we lay it on the heart, the stomach,\nthe bowels, if we wish to express our love, joy, sorrow, or hatred; and he\nremarks that he must be a bad actor who when he spoke of his grief would\ntouch his head, and when he spoke of his mental effort would touch his\nheart; and also that while the learned make the so-called soul reside in\nthe head, the common people always indicate the well-felt difference\nbetween the affections of the intellect and the will by the right\nexpression, and speak, for example, of a capable, clever, fine head; but,\non the other hand, say a good heart, a feeling heart, and also \u201cAnger\nboils in my veins,\u201d \u201cStirs my gall,\u201d \u201cMy bowels leap with joy,\u201d \u201cJealousy\npoisons my blood,\u201d &c. \u201c_Les chants sont le langage des passions, de la\nvie organique, comme la parole ordinaire __ est celui de l\u2019entendement, de\nla vie animale: la d\u00e9clamation, tient le milieu, elle anime la langue\nfroide du cerveau par la langue expressive des organes int\u00e9rieurs, du\nc\u0153ur, du foie, de l\u2019estomac_,\u201d &c. His conclusion is: \u201c_La vie organique\nest le terme o\u00f9 aboutissent, et le centre d\u2019o\u00f9 partent les passions_.\u201d\nNothing is better fitted than this excellent and thorough book to confirm\nand bring out clearly that the body is only the embodied (_i.e._,\nperceived by means of the brain functions, time, space, and causality)\nwill itself, from which it follows that the will is the primary and\noriginal, the intellect, as mere brain function, the subordinate and\nderived. But that which is most worthy of admiration, and to me most\npleasing, in Bichat\u2019s thought is, that this great anatomist, on the path\nof his purely physiological investigations, actually got so far as to\nexplain the unalterable nature of the _moral character_ from the fact that\nonly the _animal_ life, thus the functions of the brain, are subject to\nthe influence of education, practice, culture, and habit, but the moral\ncharacter belongs to the _organic_ life, _i.e._, to all the other parts,\nwhich cannot be modified from without. I cannot refrain from giving the\npassage; it occurs in article 9, \u00a7 2: \u201c_Telle est donc la grande\ndiff\u00e9rence des deux vies de l\u2019animal_\u201d (cerebral or animal and organic\nlife) \u201c_par rapport \u00e0 l\u2019in\u00e9galit\u00e9 de perfection des divers syst\u00e8mes de\nfonctions, dont chacune r\u00e9sulte; savoir, que dans l\u2019une la pr\u00e9dominance ou\nl\u2019inf\u00e9riorit\u00e9 d\u2019un syst\u00e8me relativement aux autres, tient presque toujours\n\u00e0 l\u2019activit\u00e9 ou \u00e0 l\u2019inertie plus grandes de ce syst\u00e8me, \u00e0 l\u2019habitude\nd\u2019agir ou de ne pas agir; que dans l\u2019autre, au contraire, cette\npr\u00e9dominance ou cette inf\u00e9riorit\u00e9 sont imm\u00e9diatement li\u00e9es a la texture\ndes organes, et jamais \u00e0 leur \u00e9ducation. Voil\u00e0 pourquoi le temp\u00e9rament\nphysique et le_ CHARACT\u00c8RE MORAL _ne sont point susceptible de changer par\nl\u2019\u00e9ducation, qui modifie si prodigieusement les actes de la vie animale;\ncar, comme nous l\u2019avons vu, tous deux_ APPARTIENNENT \u00c0 LA VIE ORGANIQUE.\n_La charact\u00e8re est, si je puis m\u2019exprimer ainsi, la physionomie des\npassions; le temp\u00e9rament est celle des fonctions __ internes: or les unes\net les autres \u00e9tant toujours les m\u00eames, ayant une direction que l\u2019habitude\net l\u2019exercice ne d\u00e9rangent jamais, il est manifeste que le temp\u00e9rament et\nle charact\u00e8re doivent \u00eatre aussi soustraits \u00e0 l\u2019empire de l\u2019\u00e9ducation.\nElle peut mod\u00e9rer l\u2019influence du second, perfectionner assez le jugement\net la r\u00e9flection, pour rendre leur empire sup\u00e9rieur au sien, fortifier la\nvie animal afin qu\u2019elle r\u00e9siste aux impulsions de l\u2019organique. Mais\nvouloir par elle d\u00e9naturer le charact\u00e8re, adoucir ou exalter les passions\ndont il est l\u2019expression habituelle, agrandir ou resserrer leur sph\u00e8re,\nc\u2019est une entreprise analogue a celle d\u2019un m\u00e9decin qui essaierait d\u2019\u00e9lever\nou d\u2019abaisser de quelque degr\u00e9s, et pour toute la vie, la force de\ncontraction ordinaire au c\u0153ur dans l\u2019\u00e9tat de sant\u00e9, de pr\u00e9cipiter ou de\nralentir habituellement le mouvement naturel aux art\u00e8res, et qui est\nn\u00e9cessaire \u00e0 leur action, etc. Nous observerions \u00e0 ce m\u00e9decin, que la\ncirculation, la respiration, etc., ne sont point sous le domaine de la\nvolont\u00e9_ (volition), _quelles ne peuvent \u00eatre modifi\u00e9es par l\u2019homme, sans\npasser \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9tat maladif, etc. Faisons la m\u00eame observation \u00e0 ceux qui\ncroient qu\u2019on change le charact\u00e8re, et par-l\u00e0, m\u00eame les_ PASSIONS,\n_puisque celles-ci sont un_ PRODUIT DE L\u2019ACTION DE TOUS LES ORGANES\nINTERNES, _ou qu\u2019elles y ont au moins sp\u00e9cialement leur si\u00e8ge._\u201d The\nreader who is familiar with my philosophy may imagine how great was my joy\nwhen I discovered, as it were, the proof of my own convictions in those\nwhich were arrived at upon an entirely different field, by this\nextraordinary man, so early taken from the world.\n\nA special authentication of the truth that the organism is merely the\nvisibility of the will is also afforded us by the fact that if dogs, cats,\ndomestic cocks, and indeed other animals, bite when violently angry, the\nwounds become mortal; nay, if they come from a dog, may cause hydrophobia\nin the man who is bitten, without the dog being mad or afterwards becoming\nso. For the extremest anger is only the most decided and vehement will to\nannihilate its object; this now appears in the assumption by the saliva of\nan injurious, and to a certain extent magically acting, power, and springs\nfrom the fact that the will and the organism are in truth one. This also\nappears from the fact that intense vexation may rapidly impart to the\nmother\u2019s milk such a pernicious quality that the sucking child dies\nforthwith in convulsions (_Most, Ueber sympathetische Mittel_, p. 16).\n\n\n\n\nNote On What Has Been Said About Bichat.\n\n\nBichat has, as we have shown above, cast a deep glance into human nature,\nand in consequence has given an exceedingly admirable exposition, which is\none of the most profound works in the whole of French literature. Now,\nsixty years later, M. Flourens suddenly appears with a polemic against it\nin his work, \u201c_De la vie et de l\u2019intelligence_,\u201d and makes so bold as to\ndeclare without ceremony that all that Bichat has brought to light on this\nimportant subject, which was quite his own, is false. And what does he\noppose to him in the field? Counter reasons? No, counter assertions(37)\nand authorities, indeed, which are as inadmissible as they are\nremarkable\u2014Descartes and Gall! M. Flourens is by conviction a Cartesian,\nand to him Descartes, in the year 1858, is still \u201c_le philosophe par\nexcellence_.\u201d Now Descartes was certainly a great man, yet only as a\nforerunner. In the whole of his dogmas, on the other hand, there is not a\nword of truth; and to appeal to these as authorities at this time of day\nis simply absurd. For in the nineteenth century a Cartesian in philosophy\nis just what a follower of Ptolemy would be in astronomy, or a follower of\nStahl in chemistry. But for M. Flourens the dogmas of Descartes are\narticles of faith. Descartes has taught, _les volont\u00e9s sont des pens\u00e9es_:\ntherefore this is the case, although every one feels within himself that\nwilling and thinking are as different as white and black. Hence I have\nbeen able above, in chapter 19, to prove and explain this fully and\nthoroughly, and always under the guidance of experience. But above all,\naccording to Descartes, the oracle of M. Flourens, there are two\nfundamentally different substances, body and soul. Consequently M.\nFlourens, as an orthodox Cartesian, says: \u201c_Le premier point est de\ns\u00e9parer, m\u00eame par les mots, ce qui est du corps de ce qui est de l\u2019\u00e2me_\u201d\n(i. 72). He informs us further that this \u201c_\u00e2me r\u00e9side uniquement et\nexclusivement dans le cerveau_\u201d (ii. 137); from whence, according to a\npassage of Descartes, it sends the _spiritus animales_ as couriers to the\nmuscles, yet can only itself be affected by the brain; therefore the\npassions have their seat (_si\u00e8ge_) in the heart, which is altered by them,\nyet their place (_place_) in the brain. Thus, really thus, speaks the\noracle of M. Flourens, who is so much edified by it, that he even utters\nit twice after him (i. 33 and ii. 135), for the unfailing conquest of the\nignorant Bichat, who knows neither soul nor body, but merely an animal and\nan organic life, and whom he then here condescendingly informs that we\nmust thoroughly distinguish the parts where the passions have their _seat_\n(_si\u00e8gent_) from those which they _affect_. According to this, then, the\npassions _act_ in one place while they _are_ in another. Corporeal things\nare wont to act only where they are, but with an immaterial soul the case\nmay be different. But what in general may he and his oracle really have\nthought in this distinction of _place_ and _si\u00e8ge_, of _si\u00e8ger_ and\n_affecter_? The fundamental error of M. Flourens and Descartes springs\nreally from the fact that they confound the motives or occasions of the\npassions, which, as ideas, certainly lie in the intellect, _i.e._, in the\nbrain, with the passions themselves, which, as movements of the will, lie\nin the whole body, which (as we know) is the perceived will itself. M.\nFlourens\u2019 second authority is, as we have said, Gall. I certainly have\nsaid, at the beginning of this twentieth chapter (and already in the\nearlier edition): \u201cThe greatest error in Gall\u2019s phrenology is, that he\nmakes the brain the organ of moral qualities also.\u201d But what I censure and\nreject is precisely what M. Flourens praises and admires, for he bears in\nhis heart the doctrine of Descartes: \u201c_Les volont\u00e9s sont des pens\u00e9es._\u201d\nAccordingly he says, p. 144: \u201c_Le premier service que Gall a rendu \u00e0 la\nphysiologie (?) a \u00e9te de rammener le moral \u00e0 l\u2019intellectuel, et de faire\nvoir que les facult\u00e9s morales et les facult\u00e9s intellectuelles sont du m\u00eame\nordre, et de les placer toutes, autant les unes que les autres, uniquement\net exclusivement dans le cerveau._\u201d To a certain extent my whole\nphilosophy, but especially the nineteenth chapter of this volume, consists\nof the refutation of this fundamental error. M. Flourens, on the contrary,\nis never tired of extolling this as a great truth and Gall as its\ndiscoverer; for example, p. 147: \u201c_Si j\u2019en \u00e9tais \u00e0 classer les services\nque nous a rendu Gall, je dirais que le premier a \u00e9t\u00e9 de rammener les\nqualit\u00e9s morales au cerveau_;\u201d\u2014p. 153: \u201c_Le cerveau seul est l\u2019organe de\nl\u2019\u00e2me, et de l\u2019\u00e2me dans toute la pl\u00e9nitude de ses fonctions_\u201d (we see the\nsimple soul of Descartes still always lurks in the background, as the\nkernel of the matter); \u201c_il est le si\u00e8ge de toutes les facult\u00e9s\nintellectuelles.... Gall a rammen\u00e9_ LE MORAL A L\u2019INTELLECTUEL, _il a\nrammen\u00e9 les qualit\u00e9s morales au m\u00eame si\u00e8ge, au m\u00eame organe, que les\nfacult\u00e9s intellectuelles_.\u201d Oh how must Bichat and I be ashamed of\nourselves in the presence of such wisdom! But, to speak seriously, what\ncan be more disheartening, or rather more shocking, than to see the true\nand profound rejected and the false and perverse extolled; to live to find\nthat important truths, deeply hidden, and extracted late and with\ndifficulty, are to be torn down, and the old, stale, and late conquered\nerrors set up in their place; nay, to be compelled to fear that through\nsuch procedure the advances of human knowledge, so hardly achieved, will\nbe broken off! But let us quiet our fears; for _magma est vis veritatis et\npr\u00e6valebit_. M. Flourens is unquestionably a man of much merit, but he has\nchiefly acquired it upon the experimental path. Just those truths,\nhowever, which are of the greatest importance cannot be brought out by\nexperiments, but only by reflection and penetration. Now Bichat by his\nreflection and penetration has here brought a truth to light which is of\nthe number of those which are unattainable by the experimental efforts of\nM. Flourens, even if, as a true and consistent Cartesian, he tortures a\nhundred more animals to death. But he ought betimes to have observed and\nthought something of this: \u201cTake care, friend, for it burns.\u201d The\npresumption and self-sufficiency, however, such as is only imparted by\nsuperficiality combined with a false obscurity, with which M. Flourens\nundertakes to refute a thinker like Bichat by counter assertions, old\nwives\u2019 beliefs, and futile authorities, indeed to reprove and instruct\nhim, and even almost to mock at him, has its origin in the nature of the\nAcademy and its _fauteuils_. Throned upon these, and saluting each other\nmutually as _illustre confr\u00e8re_, gentlemen cannot avoid making themselves\nequal with the best who have ever lived, regarding themselves as oracles,\nand therefore fit to decree what shall be false and what true. This impels\nand entitles me to say out plainly for once, that the really superior and\nprivileged minds, who now and then are born for the enlightenment of the\nrest, and to whom certainly Bichat belongs, are so \u201cby the grace of God,\u201d\nand accordingly stand to the Academy (in which they have generally\noccupied only the forty-first _fauteuil_) and to its _illustres\nconfr\u00e8res_, as born princes to the numerous representatives of the people,\nchosen from the crowd. Therefore a secret awe should warn these gentlemen\nof the Academy (who always exist by the score) before they attack such a\nman,\u2014unless they have most cogent reasons to present, and not mere\ncontradictions and appeals to _placita_ of Descartes, which at the present\nday is quite absurd.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n\n    1 Bruno and Spinoza are here entirely to be excepted. They stand each\n      for himself and alone, and belong neither to their age nor their\n      quarter of the globe, which rewarded the one with death and the\n      other with persecution and insult. Their miserable existence and\n      death in this Western world is like that of a tropical plant in\n      Europe. The banks of the sacred Ganges were their true spiritual\n      home; there they would have led a peaceful and honoured life among\n      men of like mind. In the following lines, with which Bruno begins\n      his book _Della Causa Principio et Uno_, for which he was brought to\n      the stake, he expresses clearly and beautifully how lonely he felt\n      himself in his age, and he also shows a presentiment of his fate\n      which led him to delay the publication of his views, till that\n      inclination to communicate what one knows to be true, which is so\n      strong in noble minds, prevailed:\n\n      \u201c_Ad partum properare tuum, mens \u00e6gra, quid obstat;_\n      _ Seclo h\u00e6c indigno sint tribuenda licet?_\n      _ Umbrarum fluctu terras mergente, cacumen_\n      _ Adtolle in clarum, noster Olympe, Jovem._\u201d\n\n      Whoever has read this his principal work, and also his other Italian\n      writings, which were formerly so rare, but are now accessible to all\n      through a German edition, will find, as I have done, that he alone\n      of all philosophers in some degree approaches to Plato, in respect\n      of the strong blending of poetical power and tendency along with the\n      philosophical, and this he also shows especially in a dramatic form.\n      Imagine the tender, spiritual, thoughtful being, as he shows himself\n      to us in this work of his, in the hands of coarse, furious priests\n      as his judges and executioners, and thank Time which brought a\n      brighter and a gentler age, so that the after-world whose curse was\n      to fall on those fiendish fanatics is the world we now live in.\n\n    2 Bayard Taylor\u2019s translation of \u201cFaust,\u201d vol. i. p. 14.\u2014TRS.\n\n    3 \u201cFaust,\u201d scene vi., Bayard Taylor\u2019s translation, vol. i. p.\n      134.\u2014TRS.\n\n    4 Observe here that I always quote the \u201cKritik der reinen Vernunft\u201d\n      according to the paging of the first edition, for in Rosenkranz\u2019s\n      edition of Kant\u2019s collected works this paging is always given in\n      addition. Besides this, I add the paging of the fifth edition,\n      preceded by a V.; all the other editions, from the second onwards,\n      are the same as the fifth, and so also is their paging.\n\n    5 Cf. Christian Wolf\u2019s \u201c_Vern\u00fcnftige Gedanken von Gott, Welt und\n      Seele_,\u201d \u00a7 577-579. It is strange that he only explains as\n      contingent what is necessary according to the principle of\n      sufficient reason of becoming, _i.e._, what takes place from causes,\n      and on the contrary recognises as necessary that which is so\n      according to the other forms of the principle of sufficient reason;\n      for example, what follows from the _essentia_ (definition), thus\n      analytical judgments, and further also mathematical truths. The\n      reason he assigns for this is, that only the law of causality gives\n      infinite series, while the other kinds of grounds give only finite\n      series. Yet this is by no means the case with the forms of the\n      principle of sufficient reason in pure space and time, but only\n      holds good of the logical ground of knowledge; but he held\n      mathematical necessity to be such also. Compare the essay on the\n      principle of sufficient reason, \u00a7 50.\n\n    6 With my refutation of the Kantian proof may be compared the earlier\n      attacks upon it by Feder, _Ueber Zeit, Raum und Kausalit\u00e4t_, \u00a7 28;\n      and by G. E. Schulze, _Kritik der theoretischen Philosophie_, Bd.\n      ii. S. 422-442.\n\n    7 See _Sext. Empir. Pyrrhon. hypotyp._, lib. i. c. 13, \u03bd\u03bf\u03bf\u03c5\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1\n      \u03c6\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b9\u03b8\u03b7 \u0391\u03bd\u03b1\u03be\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 (intelligibilia apparentibus\n      opposuit Anaxagoras).\n\n    8 That the assumption of a limit of the world in time is certainly not\n      a necessary thought of the reason may be also proved historically,\n      for the Hindus teach nothing of the kind, even in the religion of\n      the people, much less in the Vedas, but try to express\n      mythologically by means of monstrous chronology the infinity of this\n      phenomenal world, this fleeting and baseless web of M\u00e2y\u00e2, for they\n      at once bring out very ingeniously the relativity of all periods of\n      time in the following mythus (Polier, _Mythologie des Indous_, vol.\n      ii. p. 585). The four ages, in the last of which we live, embrace\n      together 4,320,000 years. Each day of the creating Brahma has 1000\n      such periods of four ages, and his nights have also 1000. His year\n      has 365 days and as many nights. He lives 100 of his years, always\n      creating; and if he dies, at once a new Brahma is born, and so on\n      from eternity to eternity. The same relativity of time is also\n      expressed in the special myth which is quoted in Polier\u2019s work, vol.\n      ii. p. 594, from the Puranas. In it a Rajah, after a visit of a few\n      seconds to Vishnu in his heaven, finds on his return to earth that\n      several millions of years have elapsed, and a new age has begun; for\n      every day of Vishnu is 100 recurrences of the four ages.\n\n    9 Kant said, \u201cIt is very absurd to expect enlightenment from reason,\n      and yet to prescribe to her beforehand which side she must\n      necessarily take\u201d (\u201cCritique of Pure Reason,\u201d p. 747; V. 775). On\n      the other hand, the following is the naive assertion of a professor\n      of philosophy in our own time: \u201cIf a philosophy denies the reality\n      of the fundamental ideas of Christianity, it is either false, or,\n      _even if true, it is yet useless_.\u201d That is to say, for professors\n      of philosophy. It was the late Professor Bachmann who, in the Jena\n      _Litteraturzeitung_ for July 1840, No. 126, so indiscreetly blurted\n      out the maxim of all his colleagues. However, it is worth noticing,\n      as regards the characteristics of the University philosophy, how\n      here the truth, if it will not suit and adapt itself, is shown the\n      door without ceremony, with, \u201cBe off, truth! we cannot make _use_ of\n      you. Do we owe you anything? Do you pay us? Then be off!\u201d\n\n   10 By the way, Machiavelli\u2019s problem was the solution of the question\n      how the prince, _as a prince_, was to keep himself on the throne in\n      spite of internal and external enemies. His problem was thus by no\n      means the ethical problem whether a prince, as a man, ought to will\n      such things, but purely the political one how, if he so wills, he\n      can carry it out. And the solution of this problem he gives just as\n      one writes directions for playing chess, with which it would be\n      folly to mix up the answer to the question whether from an ethical\n      point of view it is advisable to play chess at all. To reproach\n      Machiavelli with the immorality of his writing is just the same as\n      to reproach a fencing-master because he does not begin his\n      instructions with a moral lecture against murder and slaughter.\n\n   11 Although the conception of legal right is properly negative in\n      opposition to that of wrong, which is the positive starting-point,\n      yet the explanation of these conceptions must not on this account be\n      entirely negative.\n\n   12 I specially recommend here the passage in Lichtenberg\u2019s\n      \u201cMiscellaneous Writings\u201d (G\u00f6thingen, 1801, vol. ii. p. 12): \u201cEuler\n      says, in his letters upon various subjects in connection with\n      natural science (vol. ii. p. 228), that it would thunder and lighten\n      just as well if there were no man present whom the lightning might\n      strike. It is a very common expression, but I must confess that it\n      has never been easy for me completely to comprehend it. It always\n      seems to me as if the conception _being_ were something derived from\n      our thought, and thus, if there are no longer any sentient and\n      thinking creatures, then there is nothing more whatever.\u201d\n\n   13 Lichtenberg says in his \u201c_Nachrichten und Bemerkungen von und \u00fcber\n      sich selbst_\u201d (_Vermischte Schriften, G\u00f6ttingen_, 1800, vol. i. p.\n      43): \u201cI am extremely sensitive to all noise, but it entirely loses\n      its disagreeable character as soon as it is associated with a\n      rational purpose.\u201d\n\n   14 That the three-toed sloth has nine must be regarded as a mistake;\n      yet Owen still states this, \u201c_Ost\u00e9ologie Comp._,\u201d p. 405.\n\n   15 This, however, does not excuse a professor of philosophy who,\n      sitting in Kant\u2019s chair, expresses himself thus: \u201cThat mathematics\n      as such contains arithmetic and geometry is correct. It is\n      incorrect, however, to conceive arithmetic as the science of time,\n      really for no other reason than to give a pendant (_sic_) to\n      geometry as the science of space\u201d (Rosenkranz in the \u201c_Deutschen\n      Museum_,\u201d 1857, May 14, No. 20). This is the fruit of Hegelism. If\n      the mind is once thoroughly debauched with its senseless jargon,\n      serious Kantian philosophy will no longer enter it. The audacity to\n      talk at random about what one does not understand has been inherited\n      from the master, and one comes in the end to condemn without\n      ceremony the fundamental teaching of a great genius in a tone of\n      peremptory decision, just as if it were Hegelian foolery. We must\n      not, however, fail to notice that these little people struggle to\n      escape from the track of great thinkers. They would therefore have\n      done better not to attack Kant, but to content themselves with\n      giving their public full details about God, the soul, the actual\n      freedom of the will, and whatever belongs to that sort of thing, and\n      then to have indulged in a private luxury in their dark back-shop,\n      the philosophical journal; there they may do whatever they like\n      without constraint, for no one sees it.\n\n   16 This chapter, along with the one which follows it, is connected with\n      \u00a7 8 and 9 of the first book.\n\n   17 Illgen\u2019s \u201c_Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Historische Theologie_,\u201d 1839, part i, p.\n      182.\n\n_   18 Gall et Spurzheim_, \u201c_Des Dispositions Inn\u00e9es_,\u201d 1811, p. 253.\n\n   19 This chapter is connected with \u00a7 12 of the first volume.\n\n   20 This chapter is connected with \u00a7 13 of the first volume.\n\n   21 This chapter and the one which follows it are connected with \u00a7 9 of\n      the first volume.\n\n   22 This chapter is connected with the conclusion of \u00a7 9 of the first\n      volume.\n\n   23 This chapter is connected with \u00a7 14 of the first volume.\n\n   24 A principal use of the study of the ancients is that it preserves us\n      from _verbosity_; for the ancients always take pains to write\n      concisely and pregnantly, and the error of almost all moderns is\n      verbosity, which the most recent try to make up for by suppressing\n      syllables and letters. Therefore we ought to pursue the study of the\n      ancients all our life, although reducing the time devoted to it. The\n      ancients knew that we ought not to write as we speak. The moderns,\n      on the other hand, are not even ashamed to print lectures they have\n      delivered.\n\n   25 This chapter is connected with \u00a7 15 of the first volume.\n\n   26 This chapter is connected with \u00a7 16 of the first volume.\n\n   27 This chapter is connected with \u00a7 15 of the first volume.\n\n   28 [Bayard Taylor\u2019s translation of Faust, vol. i. 180. Trs.]\n\n   29 This chapter is connected with \u00a7 18 of the first volume.\n\n   30 This chapter is connected with \u00a7 19 of the first volume.\n\n   31 It is remarkable that Augustine already knew this. In the fourteenth\n      book, \u201c_De Civ. Dei_,\u201d c. 6, he speaks of the _affectionibus animi_,\n      which in the preceding book he had brought under four categories,\n      _cupiditas_, _timor_, _l\u00e6titia_, _tristitia_, and says: \u201c_Voluntas\n      est quippe in omnibus, imo omnes nihil aliud, quam voluntates sunt:\n      nam quid est cupiditas et l\u00e6titia, nisi voluntas in eorum\n      consensionem, qu\u00e6 volumus? et quid est metus atque tristitia, nisi\n      voluntas in dissensionem ab his, qu\u00e6 nolumus? cet._\u201d\n\n   32 By those who place mind and learning above all other human qualities\n      this man will be reckoned the greatest of his century. But by those\n      who let virtue take precedence of everything else his memory can\n      never be execrated enough. He was the cruelest of the citizens in\n      persecuting, putting to death, and banishing.\n\n   33 The _Times_ of 18th October 1845; from the _Athen\u00e6um_.\n\n   34 This chapter is connected with \u00a7 20 of the first volume.\n\n_   35 Spallanzani, Risultati di esperienze sopra la riproduzione della\n      testa nelle lumache terrestri_: in the _Memorie di matematica e\n      fisica della Societ\u00e0 Italiana_, Tom. i. p. 581. _Voltaire, Les\n      colima\u00e7ons du r\u00e9v\u00e9rend p\u00e8re l\u2019escarbotier_.\n\n   36 Cf. Ch. 22.\n\n_   37 \u00ab __Tout ce qui est relatif \u00e0 l\u2019entendement appartient \u00e0 la vie\n      animale,__ \u00bb__ dit Bichat, et jusque-l\u00e0 point de doute; __\u00ab __tout\n      ce qui est relatif aux passions appartient \u00e0 la vie\n      organique,__ \u00bb__\u2014et ceci est absolument faux._ Indeed!\u2014_decrevit\n      Florentius magnus_.","title":"The World as Will and Idea (Vol. 2 of 3)","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":167741}