{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_40342/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_40342","id":"gutenberg_40342","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40342","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Free thought","Modernism (Christian theology) -- Catholic Church","Religion and science","Teaching, Freedom of"],"text":"The Freedom of Science\n\n                                    By\n\n                         Joseph Donat, S.J., D.D.\n\n                      Professor Innsbruck University\n\n                                 New York\n\n                             Joseph F. Wagner\n\n                                   1914\n\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nImprimatur.\nAuthor\u2019s Preface To The English Edition.\nTranslator\u2019s Note.\nFirst Section. The Freedom of Science and its Philosophical Basis.\n   Chapter I. Science And Freedom.\n   Chapter II. Two Views Of The World And Their Freedom.\n   Chapter III. Subjectivism And Its Freedom.\nSecond Section. Freedom of Research and Faith.\n   Chapter I. Research And Faith In General.\n   Chapter II. The Authority Of Faith And The Free Exercise Of Research.\n   Chapter III. Unprepossession Of Research.\n   Chapter IV. Accusations And Objections.\n   Chapter V. The Witnesses of the Incompatibility Of Science And Faith.\nThird Section. The Liberal Freedom of Research.\n   Chapter I. Free From The Yoke Of The Supernatural.\n   Chapter II. The Unscientific Method.\n   Chapter III. The Bitter Fruit.\nFourth Section. Freedom of Teaching.\n   Chapter I. Freedom Of Teaching And Ethics.\n   Chapter II. Freedom Of Teaching And The State.\nFifth Section. Theology.\n   Chapter I. Theology And Science.\n   Chapter II. Theology And University.\nIndex.\nFootnotes\n\n\n\n\n\n\nIMPRIMATUR.\n\n\nNihil Obstat\nREMIGIUS LAFORT, D.D.\n_Censor_\n\nImprimatur\nJOHN CARDINAL FARLEY\n_Archbishop of New York_\n\nNEW YORK, January 22, 1914.\n\nCOPYRIGHT, 1914, BY JOSEPH F. WAGNER, NEW YORK\n\n\n\n\n\nAUTHOR\u2019S PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION.\n\n\nThe present work has already secured many friends in German Europe. An\ninvitation has now been extended for its reception among the\nEnglish-speaking countries, with the object that there, too, it may seek\nreaders and friends, and communicate to them its thoughts\u2014the ideas it has\nto convey and to interpret. While wishing it heartfelt success and good\nfortune on its journey, the Author desires it to convey his greetings to\nits new readers.\n\nThis book has issued from the throes of dissension and strife, seeing the\nlight at a time when, in Austria and Germany, the bitter forces of\nopposition, that range themselves about the shibboleth _Freedom of\nScience_, were seen engaging in a combat of fiercer intensity than ever.\nYet, notwithstanding, this Child of Strife has learned the language of\nPeace only. It speaks the language of an impartial objectivity which\nendeavours, in a spirit of unimpassioned, though earnest, calm, to range\nitself over the burning questions of the day\u2014over those great\n_Weltanschauung_ questions, that stand in such close relation with the\ncompendious motto: _Freedom of Science_. Yes, _Freedom_ and _Science_\nserve, in our age and on both sides of the Atlantic, as trumpet-calls, to\nsummon together\u2014often indeed to pit in deadly combat\u2014the rival forces of\nopposition. They are catch-words that tend to hold at fever-pitch the\nintellectual life of modern civilization\u2014agents as they are of such mighty\nand far-reaching influences. On the one hand, Science, whence the moving\nand leading ideas of the time take shape and form to go forth in turn and\nsubject to their sway the intellect of man; on the other, Freedom\u2014that\nFreedom of sovereign emancipation, that Christian Freedom of well-ordered\nself-development, which determine the actions, the strivings of the human\nspirit, even as they control imperceptibly the march of Science. While the\npresent volume is connected with this chain of profound problems, it\nbecomes, of itself, a representation of the intellectual life of our day,\nwith its far-reaching philosophical questions, its forces of struggle and\nopposition, its dangers, and deep-seated evils.\n\nThe Author has a lively recollection of an expression which he heard a few\nyears ago, in a conversation with an American professor, then journeying\nin Europe. \u201cHere, they talk of tolerance,\u201d he observed, \u201cwhile in America\nwe put it into practice.\u201d The catch-word _Freedom of Science_ will not,\ntherefore, in _every_ quarter of the world, serve as a call to arms,\ncausing the opposing columns to engage in mutual conflict, as is the case\nin many portions of Europe. But certain it is that everywhere alike\u2014in the\nnew world of America, as well as in the old world of Europe\u2014the human\nspirit has its attention engaged with the same identical questions\u2014those\ntopics of nerve-straining interest that sway and surge about this same\ncatch-word like so many opposing forces. Everywhere we shall have those\ntense oppositions between sovereign Humanity and Christianity, between\nKnowledge and Faith, between Law and Freedom; everywhere those questions\non the Rights and Obligations of Science, on Catholic Thought, and on\nCatholic Doctrinal Beliefs and Duties.\n\nMay it fall to the lot of this book to be able to communicate to many a\nreader, interested in such topics, words of enlightenment and\nexplanation\u2014to some for the strengthening of their convictions, to others\nfor the correction, perhaps, of their erroneous views. At home, while\nwinning the sympathy of many readers, it has not failed to encounter also\nantagonism. This was to be expected. The resolute championing of the\nprinciples of the Christian view of the world, as well as many a candid\nexpression of views touching the intellectual impoverishment and the\never-shifting position of unshackled Freethinking, must necessarily arouse\nsuch antagonism. May the present volume meet on the other side of the\nAtlantic with a large share of that tolerance which is put into actual\npractice there, and is there not merely an empty phrase on the lips of\nmen! May it contribute something to the better and fuller understanding of\nthe saying of that great English scientist, WILLIAM THOMSON: \u201cDo not be\nafraid of being free-thinkers! If you think strongly enough, you will be\nforced by science to the belief in God, which is the foundation of all\nreligion.\u201d\n\nFinally, I may be allowed to express my sincere thanks to the publisher\nfor undertaking the work of this translation.\n\nMay it accomplish much good.\n\nJ. Donat.\n\nUNIVERSITY INNSBRUCK,\nCHRISTMAS, 1913.\n\n\n\n\n\nTRANSLATOR\u2019S NOTE.\n\n\nThe German original is replete with references to works especially in the\nGerman language, the author having with great care quoted title and page\nwhenever referring to an author. Since many of these references are of\nvalue only to those familiar with the German, they have been abbreviated\nor omitted in this English version, whenever they would seem to needlessly\nencumber its pages.\n\nThose desirous of verifying quotations will be enabled to do so in all\ninstances by a reference to the German original.\n\n\n\n\n\nFIRST SECTION. THE FREEDOM OF SCIENCE AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS.\n\n\n\n\nChapter I. Science And Freedom.\n\n\nIf a question is destined to agitate and divide for considerable length of\ntime the minds of men, it must undoubtedly have its root deep in the\nentire intellectual life of the times; it must be anchored in profound\nphilosophical thought, in theories of life. From this source it derives\nits power of captivating the minds. All this applies to the question of\nthe Freedom of Science. If, then, we desire a thorough understanding of\nthis question, we must first of all seek and examine its deeper lying\nphilosophical basis; we must trace the threads which so closely unite it\nto the intellectual life and effort of the times.\n\nBut before we begin our study, let us remember a rule of the great orator\nand philosopher of ancient Rome; a rule only too often forgotten in our\ntimes: \u201cEvery philosophical discussion, of anything whatsoever, should\nbegin with a definition, in order to make clear what the discussion is\nabout\u201d (_Cicero_, De Officiis, I, 2). If we would form a judgment as to\nthe demand of science for freedom, as to the justification of this demand,\nas to its compatibility or incompatibility with the duty of faith, the\nfirst question that naturally arises is: What is the purport of this\ndemand, what does it mean? Only after we have clearly circumscribed this\ndemand can we approach its philosophical presumptions and test its basis.\n\nWhat, then, do we understand by Science, and what freedom may be granted\nto it?\n\n\n\nScience.\n\n\nWhen a man of Northern or Central Europe hears of science, his thoughts\ngenerally turn to the universities and their teachers. To him the\nuniversity is the home of science, there its numerous branches dwell in\ngood fellowship, there hundreds of men have consecrated themselves to its\nservice. In those parts of Europe it is customary for men of science to be\nuniversity professors. Of what university is he? is asked. Celebrated\nscientists, like _Helmholtz_, _Liebig_, _Hertz_, _Kirchhoff_;\nphilosophers, like _Kant_, _Fichte_, _Schelling_, _Hegel_, _Herbart_;\ngreat philologists, historians, and so on, were university professors.\n\nFor all that, _science_ and _university_ are not necessarily inseparable\nthings. The university needs science, but science does not absolutely need\nthe university. Science was in the world before the twelfth and thirteenth\ncenturies, the time when France and Italy built their first universities;\nand also since then science has been enriched by the achievements of many\na genius who never occupied a university chair. _Pythagoras_, _Aristotle_,\n_St. Augustine_ belonged to no universities; _Copernicus_, _Newton_, and\n_Kepler_ never taught in the higher schools. In the countries of Western\nEurope and America the man of science and the university professor are to\nthis day not so much identical in person. Therefore, if the freedom of\nscience applies _principally_ to the higher schools and their teachers,\nthis is not its exclusive application. Science and university are not\nidentical terms.\n\nWhat, then, is science?\n\nAt the sound of this magic word there arises in the minds of many the\nimage of a superhuman being: open on his lap lies the book of wisdom in\nwhich all mysteries are solved; in his hand is the flaming torch which\nenlightens the path down into the lowest depths of research, dispelling\nall darkness. This, in the minds of many, is what science means. The mere\nappeal to this infallible being suffices to settle all problems, to\nsilence every contradiction; woe to him who dares open his profane mouth\nto utter an If or a But!\n\nWere this science, there would be no dispute. We should have to admit that\nthere could be no limit set to the freedom of this being; he must share\nthe privileges of divine Intelligence, for no command to keep silent can\nbe imposed on Infallible Truth; there can be no amendment. But, alas! in\nthe world of reality this personified Science is nowhere to be found, it\nexists solely in the realm of rhetoric and poetry. Science, as it exists\namong men, has its seat, after all, nowhere else than in the human mind.\nIt is, indeed, nothing else but _the well-ordered summary of knowledge and\nof the research for the causes of things_. Natural science is the summary\nof knowledge and research in the realm of natural phenomena, arranged in\nan orderly way, as a text-book will give it; that is, an investigation of\nphenomena and their causes. A mere description of natural phenomena,\nwithout any explanation, or reference of them to the laws of nature, would\nindeed be teaching about nature, but not natural science. Similarly, the\nscience of history is the well-ordered summary of knowledge and research\nin the domain of human events, derived from their sources, with the\nstatement of facts according to cause and effect.\n\nAnd not all this knowledge is certain, and free from doubt. The modern\nconception of science, as we now have it\u2014the ancients had a much narrower\nconception\u2014includes certain as well as uncertain knowledge, results and\nhypotheses, and even the activity of research, together with its methods.\nAstronomy was thus in _Ptolemy\u2019s_ time the summary of what was then known\nwith more or less certainty about the stars; included in this, as is well\nknown, was the opinion that the sun circles around the earth. And the\nphilosophy of _Aristotle_ embraced his philosophical ideas about God, the\nworld and man; hence many errors. Further, when speaking of science in\ngeneral, we mean the whole number of the individual sciences. It is the\nfreedom of science in this sense that we have to investigate here. The\nindividual sciences are distinguished one from another principally by the\nsubjects of which they treat. Astronomy is distinguished from pal\u00e6ontology\nand philosophy by the fact that it treats of the stars, not of fossils, or\nof the fundamental truths of reason.\n\nFrom this brief analysis of concepts it is clear that science and\nscientific research are not superhuman beings, but an activity or\ncondition of the human mind, distinguished from the ordinary thought of\nthe individual only by system and method, and, commonly, by greater\nthoroughness and by the united effort of many. _It is subject to all the\nlimitations of the human mind._\n\nWhat follows from this? Two things. Let us at once make a brief reference\nto both of them, because in our discussion they are of the greatest\nimportance.\n\nSince, then, science is an activity of the human mind, it must, like it,\nalways and everywhere be _subject to the Truth_ and _subject to God_.\nSubject to the Truth: whenever science comes in contact with it, it must\nreverently bow to the truth. And subject to God: if God is the Creator of\nman and of his spiritual and bodily activity, He is also the master of his\nwhole being, and man is subject to Him in all his activity and\ndevelopment, therefore in his intellectual life, and in his artistic and\nscientific pursuits. Everything is and remains the activity of the\n_creature_. As gravitation rules the entire planet and its material\nactivity, attracts it towards the sun and makes it circle around it, so\ndoes the law of dependence on God rule the whole life of the creature. Man\ncannot therefore, even in his scientific research, ignore his Creator,\ncannot emancipate himself from His authority; and if God has given a\nrevelation and demands faith, the man of science, too, must believe. There\ncannot be an emancipated, free, science in this sense.\n\nAnother consequence is this: since science is an activity of the human\nmind, it shares all its _imperfections and weaknesses_. It is truly flesh\nof its flesh. The fruit cannot be more perfect than the tree that produces\nit, nor the flower better than the plant on which it blossomed. Now, as\nthe human mind is throughout limited in its nature, so is it also in its\nresearch. It is not given to man to soar aloft on eagle wings to the\nheights of knowledge, thence to gaze upon truth with unerring intuition;\nthe ascent must be slow, with constant dangers of stumbling, even of\nfalling headlong. To these dangers must be added his latent likes and\ndislikes, which imperceptibly guide his thought, especially in forming\nopinions on questions of the world and of life, which the human heart\ncannot view with indifference: they influence his thought. Hence\nignorance, darkness, and error, everywhere accompany the investigator\nindividually, and science as a whole, all the more the loftier the\nquestions that present themselves.\n\n\n    Already the philosopher of the dim past gave expression to the\n    complaint, that our reason is no more capable of knowing the\n    divine than the eyes of the owl are of seeing in broad daylight.\n    It is _Aristotle_ who so complains. And the great _Newton_, in the\n    evening of his life, thus estimates the worth of his knowledge:\n    \u201cWhat the world may think about my labour, I do not know; I feel\n    like a child that plays on the strand of the sea: now and then I\n    may perhaps find a pebble or shell more beautiful than those of my\n    playmates, while the boundless ocean lies ever before me with its\n    undiscovered treasures\u201d (apud _O. Zoeckler_, Gottes Zeugen im\n    Reich der Natur (1906), 173). The same sorrowful plaint is heard\n    from all serious investigators, especially those in the domain of\n    the natural sciences, who should have more reason than others to\n    be proud of their achievements. \u201cHowever great the amount of human\n    knowledge may seem to the multitude,\u201d writes the well-known\n    chemist _Schoenbein_, \u201cthe most experienced scientist feels the\n    incompleteness and patchwork of it, and realizes that man so far\n    has been able to learn but infinitely little of what nature is,\n    and of what can be known.\u201d \u201cThe more exact the investigation,\u201d\n    says the geologist _Quenstedt_, \u201cso much the more obscure is its\n    beginning. Indeed, the deeper we think to have understood the\n    single parts, the further the original plan of the Creator seems\n    to escape us\u201d (cf. _Kneller_, Das Christentum und die Vertreter\n    der neueren Naturwissenschaften (1904), 208, 281). \u201cAlthough\n    science,\u201d so we are assured by another modern savant, \u201chas brought\n    to light many a treasure, still, compared with what we do not yet\n    know, it is as a drop to the ocean. In all our knowledge there\n    will always be the danger of error.\u201d We are probably not very far\n    in advance of the time of _Albrecht von Haller_, who said: \u201cWe,\n    all of us, err, only each errs in a different way. Every passage\n    that has been illuminated by science is surrounded by dense\n    darkness; beyond the visible lies the invisible.\u201d And Prof. _J.\n    Reinke_ continues: \u201cAs early as the day of _Socrates_, the\n    beginning of philosophy was to know that we know nothing; the end\n    of philosophy, to know that we must believe: such is the\n    inevitable fate of human wisdom\u201d (Naturwissenschaft und Religion,\n    in Natur und Kultur IV (1907), 418, 425. Printed also separately).\n    Some years ago Sir _W. Ramsay_, a noted scientist, concluded a\n    discourse on his scientific labour with the words: \u201cWhen a man has\n    reached the middle of his life, he begins to believe that the\n    longer he lives the less he knows! This is my excuse for having\n    molested you for an hour with my ignorance\u201d (Einige Betrachtungen\n    ueber das periodische Gesetz der Elemente. Vortrag auf der 75.\n    Versammlung Deutscher Naturforscher und \u00c6rzte zu Cassel (1903)).\n\n    If science, then, can only with difficulty lift from visible\n    nature the veils that hide the truth\u2014and even this is often beyond\n    its power\u2014no wonder it is confronted with still greater obstacles\n    when it approaches the truths that are beyond visible nature.\n    Moreover, it is an old truth that here it is led not by reason\n    only, but also, and even more energetically, by self-interest.\n    \u201cMost men,\u201d says _Cicero_, \u201care swayed in their judgments by\n    either love or hatred, likes or dislikes\u201d (De Oratore, II, 42).\n\n\nIf this is the nature of human science, its adepts would be badly\ndeceiving themselves, if, in the pride of learning, they would reject\nevery correction, even proudly pushing aside the hand of God that reaches\ndown into the darkness of man\u2019s intellectual life to offer its guidance.\nHe who realizes that he is in danger of losing his way in the dark, will\nnot reject a reliable guide; and he who fears to stumble will not refuse a\nhelping hand. Self-knowledge is the sister of wisdom, and the mother of\nmodesty.\n\n\n\nFreedom.\n\n\nSuch, then, is science: not the goddess that emanated from the head of\nimmortal Jove, but the offspring of the puny mind of man, bone of his bone\nand flesh of his flesh. And this science cries for freedom. It would be\nfree and act freely; it urges its claim in the name of truth, which must\nnot be slighted; in the name of the progress of civilization, which must\nnot be hindered.\n\n_Freedom_ clearly means nothing less than to be untrammeled and free from\nrestraint, from fetter and check, in action, thought, and desire. The\nprisoner is free when his chains drop off, a people is free when it has\ncast off the yoke of serfdom, the eagle is free and can spread out its\nwings in lofty flight when not bound down to the earth. Science,\ntherefore, should be free in its activity from bond, fetter, and\nrestraint. Does this mean it must be free from _all_ restraint and law?\nShould the historian be given the right to make _Solon_ a member of the\nFrench Academy, or of the heroes of Troy medi\u00e6val knights? Should the\nscientist be given the right to break every rule of logic, to ignore all\nprogress, and perhaps in his capriciousness return to the four elements of\n_Aristotle_, or the astronomical chart of primitive ages? Nobody demands\nthis. No, science must be bound by the _truth_. Freedom indeed should not\nmean lawlessness. Science remains bound by the general laws of logic, and\nby positive facts. Truth is the irremovable barrier set in restraint of\nthe freedom of everything, even of scientific thought. The freedom of\nscience therefore can only be freedom from _unreasonable_ restraint and\nfetters; from such that hinder it unreasonably in its inquiry after the\ntruth, and in the communication of the results of its investigation. _It\nshould be free, not from the internal bondage of truth, but from the\nrestraint by external authority_, the restraint which would hinder it, in\nan _improper way_, from approaching those questions, and using those\nmethods, that lead to the discovery of truth, and from acknowledging the\nresults it has found to be true; or which would unlawfully keep it from\nmaking known, for the benefit of others, the results of its investigation.\nIt should be free from any unjust restriction, imposed by state or Church,\nby popular opinion, by party spirit, by hampering protectorate, or\nservility of any kind.\n\nFrom any _unjust_ restriction, we said. For this is clear: if under\ncertain circumstances there might be warrant for a _just_ restriction by\nexternal authority, such a restriction could not be refused in the name of\nfreedom. So long, then, as we understand by freedom a _lawful_ freedom,\nthere cannot be included in this the freedom from _every_ external\nauthority, but only from _unlawful_ interference. There is, then, the\nquestion whether there may be a legitimate restraint, imposed by external\nauthority, which man must not evade, and what the nature of such restraint\nmay be.\n\nWe must, moreover, take into consideration two elements, which are\ndistinguished in the above definitions, both belonging to the modern idea\nof scientific freedom. We will call them _freedom of research_, and\n_freedom of teaching_. The investigator and the scientist claim the one;\nthe teacher, the other. Searching after truth, and communicating the truth\nfound, are, as is known, the principal occupations of science. The\nscientist should first of all be an investigator. He should not be content\nto appropriate to himself the knowledge of others, he should also make his\nown additions to knowledge. He is also commonly a teacher, by word of\nmouth, as at the university, or by his writing, in his literary activity.\nResearch, as such, imparts directly a certain knowledge only to the\ninvestigator; it is of a private nature and as such does not reach beyond\nhim. But by teaching, his ideas are communicated to others, and then begin\nto influence their thought, will, and action, often very strongly.\nTeaching is a social factor; with it are bound up the weal and woe of\nothers. Suppose a man of influence conceives in his study the idea that\nmonogamy is an infringement upon the universal rights of man; should he be\ngiven without any ado the right of disseminating, by teaching, the\nimagined results of his investigation, to the confusion of men, and with\nserious danger to the peace of society?\n\nWe shall therefore have to distinguish between freedom of research and\nfreedom of teaching. The neglect of this distinction causes not a little\nconfusion; thus, if one complains of his convictions being trammeled or\nhis liberty of conscience being violated, when he is hindered from\nimmediately proclaiming whatever he calls his convictions. Private\nopinion, and the public propaganda of this opinion, are evidently very\ndifferent things. It may be that an opinion seems to me the right one,\nbut, in spite of that, public dissemination of it may, always or under\ncertain circumstances, mean danger to my fellow-men. If I am for this\nreason prevented from publishing it, I am not thereby hindered from giving\nit my own private assent. It is, moreover, quite clear that the state\u2014we\ndisregard here religious authority\u2014cannot at all directly restrict\nresearch, which is something personal. It can only impose restrictions on\nthe communication of one\u2019s ideas by teaching them to others, which is a\nsocial function.\n\n\n    From these few remarks will be followed the impropriety of the\n    following, or similar, observations: \u201cThe fostering of science and\n    its teaching are not separate functions ... to insinuate a twofold\n    function of freedom, viz., that of the savant and that of the\n    teacher, would be to dissolve the unity of the moral personality\u201d\n    (_W. Kahl_, Bekenntnissgebundenheit und Lehrfreiheit (1897), 22).\n    It is not at all double-dealing if some one does not publicly\n    proclaim one\u2019s private knowledge. Is it double-dealing, is it a\n    violation of \u201cthe unity of the moral personality,\u201d if one is, and\n    must be, silent about official secrets? And if one does not tell,\n    and is not allowed to tell, official secrets, if one prevents an\n    anarchist from spreading his revolutionary ideas, is this a\n    violation of the unity of the moral personality? It is true that\n    \u201cto deny one\u2019s convictions is a violation of one of the most\n    indubitable principles of moral conduct\u201d (_K. v. Amira_, Die\n    Stellung des akademischen Lehrers zur Freiheit in Forschung und\n    Lehre. Beilage der Muenchener Neuesten Nachrichten. 9. Juli,\n    1908). But it is logically incorrect to conclude therefrom that\n    the freedom of teaching should not be restricted. To keep silence\n    is not denying one\u2019s convictions. Later on, when speaking of\n    freedom in teaching, we shall return to this thought and deal with\n    it more thoroughly.\n\n\nSo far there can be no serious diversity of opinion. Freedom from unjust\nrestraint is demanded, and rightly demanded, for science. The very object\nof science requires it. In scientific research man\u2019s power of discernment\nshould freely develop; his inclination towards truth should exert itself;\nand by communication of acquired knowledge mankind should advance in\nmental and material culture.\n\nThe bud bursts forth and freely unfolds its splendour; the butterfly grows\nunhindered in beauty; the tree, too, wants freedom, in order to develop\nits boughs and branches according to its nature, and if you try to bind\nand tie it, it resists as much as it can. Just so is freedom needful for\nthe development of the noblest aspirations of human nature, for its\nprogress in knowledge. Every friend of humanity, every one who loves his\nown kind, must be in sympathy with its progress. Who will not rejoice to\nsee the mind of man happily trace the laws of nature, laid down by the\nSpirit of God in the stillness of eternity when as yet there was no\ncreature to heed, the laws He then placed in nature in order that the\nreasonable creature might discern the marks of his Creator? Who would not\nrejoice to see man, diligently following the facts of history and studying\nthe works of literature and art, find therein the ideas of God reflected,\nas the rays of the sun in the trembling drop of dew, and, finally, trying\nto solve the difficult problems of life? To this end has the Creator\nenkindled in the mind of man a spark of His own intelligence; to this end\nhas He put in him a desire to inquire and learn, a desire which has\nexerted itself most in the noblest of men. Man is destined to find his\nultimate gratification in beholding the Eternal Truth and Beauty, a vision\nwhich will be the completion of human science and culture, the highest\nperfection of created life. Thus man\u2019s noble desire for knowledge and\ntruth must develop, it must be able to produce leaves and blossoms. For\nthis he needs freedom, free air, and free light.\n\nIf science is to attain its high purpose, it must have freedom also to\nimpart the knowledge acquired. It should indeed further the progress of\nmankind. By its discovery it should enhance the beauty of human life,\nshould enrich the treasure of human knowledge, should promote education\nand morality, to the honour of the Creator. For this end, too, freedom is\nnecessary: freedom to impart newly acquired knowledge, else there would be\nno pleasure in work, stagnation rather than progress.\n\n\n\n\nChapter II. Two Views Of The World And Their Freedom.\n\n\nThere can, then, be no difference of opinion on this matter among\nsober-minded men: science must be free from all unjust hindrances and\nrestraint. But we have not yet finished. We have not even proceeded very\nfar on our way. The further question at once presents itself: Which are\nthose unjust hindrances and restraints that scientific research and\nteaching may reject? May there not perhaps be such which it must respect?\nThere is little meaning in the cry: Freedom! Freedom! This attractive\nword, which always finds an enthusiastic echo in man, may easily prove a\nmisleading catchword, and become a dangerous weapon of the thoughtless and\nthe unscrupulous.\n\nThe question is not, whether our science, or, to speak more generally, our\nintellectual life, must be free\u2014of that there can be no doubt. No life can\nspring up and thrive without due freedom. The question is: _What sort of\nfreedom?_ how can it be more precisely defined? We all, indeed, demand\nfreedom for the citizen; but what kind of freedom? He should be free from\nthe fetters of tyranny and despotism. Do we also demand that he be free\nfrom the laws of the state? By no means! On the contrary, he must be\nsubject to these, for the very reason that he is a citizen and not the\ninhabitant of an uncivilized world. We demand freedom for the artist; he\nshould not be bound by the tyranny of fashion. Do we also demand that he\nbe exempt from the laws of beauty and art? Not at all. He must subject\nhimself to these if he means to be an artist and not a quack. That would\nnot be true freedom, but lawlessness and license, the privilege of\nbarbarism. Freedom therefore is a very ambiguous word.\n\nThere are _two kinds of freedom_, _lawful_ and _unlawful_: the latter is\nfreedom from just laws, the former from unjust laws.\n\nWe ask again, what is that lawful freedom which man may claim for his\nscientific activity? In other words, what are the restraints which he may\nreject as unjust, and as enslaving the mind?\u2014Here the ways part. Here,\ntoo, our question goes deeper, and touches something which moves men\u2019s\nminds very powerfully. Two different views of the world, two opposite\nconceptions of man and his thought, come here in collision.\n\n\n\nThe Christian View of the World and its Freedom.\n\n\nOn the one hand there is the Christian view of the world: it is\nessentially also the one which appears self-evident to every unbiassed\nmind. In this view man is a _creature, limited in every way, therefore in\nmany ways dependent upon_ external rules, forces, and authorities. To God\nalone is it reserved to be infinite, and, therefore, to possess in Himself\nall perfection, goodness, and truth; for which reason there is nothing\nabove Him on which He could be dependent. This is not the case with man.\nAs a creature man is subject to his Creator. The latter is master over\nman\u2019s life and therefore at the same time its ultimate aim. For this\nreason religion is of obligation to man, that is, he must honour God as He\ndemands it; if God requires faith in a revelation, if He established a\nChurch and duly authorized it to guide us, we must submit to it. In the\nsame way the intellect of man is bound by the laws of objective truth,\nwhich is not of his making, but presents itself to him as a norm: he must\nalways be subject to it whether he wishes or not. Man is, finally, a\nfactor in social life; he lives in the family, state, and Church, in the\ngreat society of mankind; upon them he is dependent for his education and\ndevelopment. And society requires that man be subject to a ruling\nauthority, that in many things his own interests be subordinated to the\nwelfare of the community.\n\nThis is the order that God has established and wishes observed. Hence all\nhuman authority is a participation in God\u2019s supreme government. Thus it\ncomes about that limits may be set to the scientist\u2019s free expression of\nhis views, if the interest of the community require it.\n\nMan is, nevertheless, free. But his freedom does not mean complete\nindependence; nor freedom from all restraint, but only from those external\nrestraints which are opposed to his nature and position, which hinder his\nlegitimate development and activity. He possesses freedom, but only such a\nfreedom as is his due, by which he can unfold and develop his physical and\nmental powers. To keep his place of subordination to, and dependence on,\nthese higher authorities and powers of truth and order, tends not to\ninjure but to improve his being, not to dwarf but to develop his\npersonality; for they are sources of life to him, they impart to his\nexistence order and harmony, they raise him above himself and his own\nlittleness, they free him from the prison of his own narrowness and\nselfishness, from the chains of his unruly desires. If a man emancipates\nhimself from these bonds, which he ought to bear, he has freedom of\ncourse, but an unnatural freedom, which will be harmful and perhaps\nruinous to him.\n\nTake the tree, for instance. It should have freedom for its natural\ngrowth. If you force it to creep along the ground instead of growing\nupward, if you deny it air and light, you infringe on the freedom it\nshould have. Still it cannot have absolute freedom, for it is dependent on\nthe ground from which it derives its nourishment, dependent on the laws of\nlight and atmosphere and gravitation, on the laws of season; it must adapt\nitself to climate and soil. It may not say to the light: Away with you!\u2014a\nstunted growth and deformity would be the result of such emancipation. It\nmay not say to the ground: Away with you!\u2014a sad but quick death would be\nits fate. It has its freedom, and in this freedom it grows and thrives. If\nit desires greater freedom, it would be an unnatural one, and it would\ntend, not to its development, but to its destruction.\n\nSuch is the Christian view of man and his thought. Here, then, there is\nbut one question to solve: Are the external restraints imposed on me in my\ninvestigation and teaching against my nature; against the right of my mind\nto truth; against my position in human society? If so, then I reject them,\nbecause they mean serfdom, not duty; unjust bonds, not natural restraint.\nBut if not, then I do not refuse them my submission. Freedom I want, but\nonly the freedom of man.\n\nHere we pause. Suffice it at present to have formulated the question; we\nshall return to this topic later and discuss it at greater length.\n\n\n\nThe Modern Idea of Freedom.\n\n\nThe Christian view of man and his freedom, which to past ages appeared\nself-evident, has grown obscure to many minds, and given place to another,\na more modern view.(1)\n\nFor the modern man, freedom, especially freedom of intellectual life,\nmeans _independence from external ties, from all authority_, or, to\nexpress it positively, absolute right of self-determination, _autonomy_.\nHe does not recognize any law or rule which he has not imposed upon\nhimself. In civil life, of course, it is a principle that man must submit\nto external, legal restraint in many things that do not directly concern\nhis own person, but only so far as is necessary in order that others, too,\nmay enjoy the same freedom; but also here every citizen must be able to\nshare in the legislation, according to the rules of constitutional or\nrepublican government. But he must be free from every external restraint\nin whatever touches the core of his personality, his feeling, desire,\nthought, and the expression of his thought.\n\nIt should now be clear, from what has been said, what is meant by _freedom\nof science_. It means independence from every external authority and\nrestraint in research and teaching, the unhindered development and\nassertion of one\u2019s own intellectual personality. Man must let himself be\ndirected only by his own judgment and his instinct for the truth, or his\npersonal need, without heeding dogmas, Church laws, tradition, or any\nother external norm whatsoever. This is particularly true in the _domain\nof philosophy and religion_, in questions regarding the world and life,\nand in fundamental social questions. This is principally, and almost\nexclusively, the field in which an authoritative influence of the Church,\nor state, or society in general, is to be feared. Hence the importance of\nthe question of the freedom of science in this field.\n\nThis is also the manner in which the advocates of modern freedom of\nscience unanimously describe it.\n\n\n    For the academic teacher, says _G. Kaufmann_, there are \u201cstrictly\n    speaking only the barriers drawn by his own instinct for the\n    truth. It is in this sense that we demand freedom of science\n    to-day for the university teacher. The freedom of the scientist\n    and of the academic teacher must not be limited by patented truth,\n    nor by faint-hearted consideration\u201d (Die Lehrfreiheit an den\n    deutschen Universitaeten im neunzehnten Jahrhundert (1898), 36).\n    The first resolution proposed at the _Second Conference of German\n    University Teachers_, at Jena, in September, 1908, was this: \u201cThe\n    purpose of scientific research, and the communication of its\n    results, demand that it be independent of every consideration\n    foreign to scientific method itself.\u201d Of this resolution we have\n    from another source the following explanation: \u201cTherefore, it\n    should be independent especially of tradition and the prejudices\n    of the masses, independent of authority and social bodies,\n    independent of party interest.\u201d (This was the addition to the\n    thesis as originally formulated by Prof. _von Amira_. Beilage der\n    Muenchener Neuesten Nachrichten, July 9, 1908.) And Prof. _F.\n    Paulsen_ writes: \u201cNo thought can be commanded or forbidden the\n    academic teacher or his audience\u201d (Die deutschen Universitaeten\n    und das Universitaets-studium, 1902, 288).\n\n    _A. Harnack_ likewise teaches that \u201cIn regard to research and\n    knowledge there must be unlimited freedom,\u201d especially in matters\n    of religion. Here \u201cman must fully understand his own innermost\n    being; the soul must recognize its own needs and the indicated way\n    to their satisfaction. This it can do only when it is entirely\n    free.\u201d \u201cThe fear that thereby the door to serious error is thrown\n    open should not in the least deter it, for the most serious error\n    of all is the opinion that man should not enjoy perfect freedom in\n    the determination of his state\u201d (Neue Freie Presse, 7 Juni, 1908).\n\n    The same demands are made by free-thinkers, who are always and\n    everywhere in favor of free science. The _International Congress\n    of Free-thinkers_, held at Rome in June, 1904, thus defines\n    free-thought: \u201cSince free-thought cannot concede to any authority\n    whatever the right to oppose human reason, or even to supersede\n    it, it demands that its advocates reject directly not only any\n    compulsory belief, but also every authority that tries to enforce\n    its dogmas, even though such an authority be based on revelation,\n    or though it command obedience to dogmas or a-priori principles of\n    philosophy, or to the decisions of public authority or the vote of\n    a majority.\u201d\u2014We shall have frequent occasion to speak of this\n    freedom in these pages.\n\n\nHence it is easily seen that this view differs from the one we considered\nbefore. Freedom from _all_ external restraint has superseded freedom from\n_unjust_ restraint. The presumption has found acceptance that every\ninterference by authority is unjust, a violation of the natural rights of\nman and his thought. On what is this presumption based? In other words:\nWhat are the philosophical premises of modern freedom of science? We shall\nbe occupied with this question now for some time. For only after we have\nattentively considered it, can we gain an intelligent idea of the nature\nof this freedom, of its methods, and of the justice of its claims.\nAdvocates of this view not infrequently think they have exhausted its\nmeaning when they have protested against ecclesiastical encroachments,\nwhen they have held forth against Syllabus and Index. Of the deeper\nthoughts it contains they have scarcely any idea.\n\n\n\nThe Humanitarian View of the World.\n\n\nWe may distinguish a twofold basis for this view, a general and a\nparticular one. The latter, which is connected with the former, is\nsubjectivism in thought. The former, the more _general_, at the same time\nthe _real basis of the modern freedom of science_, is that particular view\nof man and his position in the world, which we may call the theory of\nhumanitarianism. We are familiar with this word\u2014it has its history. The\nword of itself conveys a good meaning: it means human nature and dignity,\nthought and desire worthy of man, nobility of culture. During the\nRenaissance the so-called \u201chumanists\u201d identified culture with knowledge of\nthe ancient classical literature. Many of them, however, added to the\nadmiration of classical literature also preference for pagan tastes, to\nthe contempt of the Christian spirit. Since that time the word\n_humanitarian_ has never lost its unchristian sense; it has ever been made\nthe motto of men who emancipated themselves from God and Christianity.\nHence it is extensively the motto of our times.\n\nIt has changed the position of man. It has forgotten that man is a\ncreated, limited, even a fallen being, withal destined for eternal\nexistence. To it man is everything; man left to himself and to his life in\nthis world, severed from God and his eternal destiny, an _absolute, purely\nworldly being_. No longer does he look up to Heaven, no longer does he get\nfrom above his laws, his hope for help, and strength, and eternal life. He\nis his own and only end: he and his earthly happiness and advancement. In\nhimself alone he sees the source of his strength, in himself he finds his\nlaw, to himself alone is he responsible, the inherited corruption of his\nnature he has forgotten. What God once was to our fathers\u2014the end and rule\nof their life\u2014that now is Man to their sons. The anthropocentric has\nsucceeded the theocentric view of the world. _Diis extinctis successit\nhumanitas_ (Man has succeeded the fallen gods). \u201cOut of the corrupted\nnations and decaying religions let there arise a more beautiful humanity!\u201d\nis the radical cry of this humanitarian religion.\n\nWhen in 1892 the battle for a new school law was raging in Prussia,\n_Caprivi_, the Chancellor of the Empire, said: \u201cIt is here question of a\ncontrast between Christianity and atheism. Essential to man is his\nrelation to God.\u201d Scarcely had these words been uttered when a champion of\nmodern thought, Prof. _Fr. Jodl_, took up his pen and wrote: \u201cNo sharper\ncontrast with the convictions of the modern world is imaginable than that\nexpressed by the words of the imperial Chancellor, \u2018essential to man is\nhis relation to God.\u2019 To this sentence, which might be expected in a\nspeech of Cromwell, or in a papal encyclical, rather than from a statesman\nof modern Germany, liberalism must with all possible emphasis oppose this\nother sentence: What determines the real worth of a man, is, first and\nlast, his relation to humanity\u201d (Moral, Religion und Schule, 1892, 14f.).\n_Diis extinctis successit humanitas_. We shall not deny that the modern\nspirit is a complicated structure: but neither can any one deny that its\nchief characteristic is the humanitarian view, with its emancipation from\nGod, its decided emphasis of the things of this world, and its boundless\noverestimation of man.\n\nAn attentive observer of these days, should he chance to come from an old,\nCatholic town, and saunter with observant eye through one of our great\nmodern cities, particularly a Protestant one, would behold a vivid\nrealization of this modern view of the world. The most prominent feature\nof the Catholic town of old was the House of God. It towered high above\nthe city, its spires reached heavenward; the houses of the faithful clung\naround the House of God like chicks about the mother hen. The mere sight\ntold the beholder that here dwelt a people whose thoughts were directed\ntowards the other world; over their lives ruled the sacred peace of\neternity.\n\nBut here all is different. Here the most prominent feature is no longer\nthe House of God; worldly edifices have usurped its place; railroad\ndepots, barracks, city-hall and court-house dominate the city. The state\nhouse bears no longer on its front the Christian motto, _Nisi Dominus\ncustodierit_ (\u201cUnless the Lord keep the city he watcheth in vain that\nkeepeth it\u201d). It would be considered a degradation should the state base\nits existence upon religion. Should, then, the observer enter the\nlegislature he would learn the modern principles of state wisdom. The\nstate as such has no relation to religion; the principle is the separation\nof state and Church. In the public squares he beholds mighty monuments,\nerected, not to religious heroes and leaders, as perhaps of old, but to\ngreat men of the world, champions of national progress. At their feet lie\nwreaths of homage. They have brought modern humanity to its full stature,\nmaturity, and self-consciousness. Here it is Man who is standing\neverywhere in the foreground. \u201cIt is I,\u201d says he, \u201cthat lives here. Here I\nhave pitched my tent, from this earth come all my joys, and this sun is\nshining upon my sorrows.\u201d\n\nOur observer, wandering about, finds everywhere magnificent state-schools,\nscientific institutes, splendid colleges and universities. In years gone\nby a cross or a word of divine wisdom was probably found here somewhere.\nIt is seen no more. Often it would seem that we can almost hear the words:\n\u201cWe will not have this One rule over us.\u201d Here a new race is being reared,\nwhich no longer follows blindly the \u201cold tradition,\u201d it believes in its\nown self and its own reason: culture and science take the place of the old\nreligion. He finds but few churches; and where found they are mostly\novershadowed by great palaces, and\u2014mostly empty. The modern man passes\nthem by. He has no longer any understanding for the truths of the\nChristian religion. It fails to satisfy him because it does not appeal to\nmodern ways of thinking and feeling, because it does not symbolize the\nhumanitarian creed. His desire is no longer for Heaven; his aspirations\nare earthward. \u201cThe life beyond concerns me little: my joys come from this\nworld.\u201d Contemplating modern civilization he exclaims, with the king of\nBabylon: \u201cIs not this the great Babylon, which I have built to be the seat\nof the kingdom, by the strength of my power, and in the glory of my\nexcellence?\u201d (Dan. iv. 27). The doctrine of a nature corrupted by original\nsin, of a darkened intellect that needs divine revelation, of a weakened\nwill that needs strength from above, of sin that demands atonement,\u2014all\nthis has become meaningless to him, it offends his higher sentiments, his\nhuman dignity. He has no longer any understanding for a Saviour of the\nworld, in whom alone salvation is to be sought, much less for a Cross.\nThis sign of redemption, as a certain herald of modern thought remarked,\nweighs like a mountain upon the mind of our day. He has no longer any\nunderstanding for the saving institution of the Church, by whom he should\nbe led: she is to him an institution of intellectual serfdom. He makes his\nown religion, free from dogma, just as his individuality desires, just as\nhe \u201clives\u201d it.\n\nShould our observer, while visiting the Protestant city, make a final\nvisit to its university, he will find there the thoughts, which hitherto\nhe had but vaguely felt, clothed in scientific language. There they meet\nhis gaze, defined sharply on the pedestal of Research as the Modern\nPhilosophy, protected, often exclusively privileged, by the state license\nof teaching. It is the modern scientific view of the world, the only one\nthat men of modern times may hold. From here it is to find its way to\nwider circles.\n\n\n    \u201cMan,\u201d we are told by a pupil of _Feuerbach_, in accord with his\n    master\u2019s teaching, \u201cman is man\u2019s god. And only by the enthronement\n    of this human god can the super-human and ultra-human God be made\n    superfluous. What Christianity was and claimed to be in times gone\n    by, that now is claimed by humanity.\u201d \u201cThe being which man in\n    religion and theology reveres,\u201d continues _Jodl_ with _Feuerbach_,\n    \u201cis his own being, the essence of his own desires and ideals. If\n    you eliminate from this conception all that is mere fancy and\n    contrary to the laws of nature, what is left is a cultural ideal\n    of civilization, a refined humanity, which will become a reality\n    by its own independent strength and labour\u201d (_Ludwig Feuerbach_,\n    1904, 111 f., 194). \u201cThe greatest achievement of modern times,\u201d\n    says another panegyrist of emancipated humanity, \u201cis the\n    deliverance from the traditional bondage of a direct\n    revelation.... Neither revelation nor redemption approach man from\n    without; he is bound rather to struggle for his perfection by his\n    own strength. What he knows about God, nature, and his own self,\n    is of his own doing. He is in reality \u2018the measure of all things,\n    of those that are, and why they are; of those that are not, and\n    why they are not.\u2019 Of his dignity as an image of God, he has\n    therefore not lost anything; on the contrary, he has come nearer\n    to his resemblance to God, his highest end, by his consciousness\n    of being self-existent and of having the destiny to produce\n    everything of himself; from a receptive being he has become a\n    spontaneous one; he has at last come to a clear knowledge of his\n    own real importance and destiny\u201d (_Spicker_, Der Kampf zweier\n    Weltanschauungen, 1898, 134).\n\n    Hence \u201cnot to make man religious,\u201d to quote again the\n    above-mentioned exponent of modern wisdom of life, \u201cbut to\n    educate, to promote culture among all classes and professions,\n    this is the task of the present time.\u201d \u201cReligion cannot therefore\n    be the watchword of a progressive humanity; neither the religion\n    of the past nor the religion that is to be looked for in the\n    future, but ethics\u201d (_Jodl_, ibid., 108, 112). Ethics, to be sure,\n    the fundamental principles of which are not the commandments of\n    God, by the keeping of which we are to reach our eternal\n    happiness, but human laws, which are observed for the sake of man.\n    \u201cMorality and religion,\u201d we are told, \u201cshall no longer give us a\n    narrow ladder on which we, each one for himself, climb to the\n    heights of the other world; we are vaulting a majestic dome above\n    this earth under which the generations come and go, succeeding\n    each other in continuous procession.... The day will come when the\n    rays of thought which are now dawning upon the highest and freest\n    mountain-tops will bring the light of noonday down to mankind.\u201d\n    Woe to us, if from these high mountain-tops, where the bare rocks\n    no longer take life and fecundity from the heavens, the sad desert\n    of estrangement from God should extend into the fresh green of the\n    valleys!\n\n    The central ideas of the humanitarian view of the world appear\n    again, though under different form, among Freemasons and\n    free-thinkers, agitators for free religion and free schools. It is\n    well known that Freemasonry has emblazoned \u201chumanity\u201d upon its\n    standard. \u201cOne word of the highest meaning,\u201d so wrote an official\n    authority some years ago, \u201ccontains in itself the principle, the\n    purpose, and the whole tenor of Freemasonry, this word is\n    humanity. Humanity is indeed everything to us.\u201d \u201cWhat is humanity?\n    It is all, and only that, which is human\u201d (Freiburger Ritual, 24.\n    _Pachtler_, Der Goetze der Humanitaet, 1875, 249 f.). \u201cThat which\n    is essentially human is the sublime, divine, and the only\n    Christian ideal,\u201d adds another authority, addressing the aspirant\n    to Freemasonry. \u201cLeave behind you in the world your different\n    church-formulas when you enter our temple, but let there always be\n    with you the sense for what is holy in man, the religion which\n    alone makes us happy\u201d (Latomia, 1868, p. 167, _Pachtler_, 248). As\n    early as 1823 the \u201cZeitschrift fuer Freimauerei\u201d wrote: \u201cWe should\n    be accused of idolatry should we personify the idea of humanity in\n    the way in which the Divinity is usually personified. This is\n    indeed our reason for withholding from the eyes of profane persons\n    the humanitarian cult, till the time has come when, from east to\n    west, from noon to midnight, its high ideal will be pondered and\n    its cult propagated everywhere\u201d (_Pachtler_, 255).\n\n    The time has already come when \u201cthe rays of thought that dawned\n    upon the mountain-tops\u201d are descending into the valley. The\n    Twenty-second Convention of German Free-religionists, at Goerlitz,\n    at the end of May, 1907, passed this resolution: \u201cThe Convention\n    sees one of its chief tasks in the alliance of all anti-clericals\n    and free-thinkers, and tries by united effort to obtain this\n    common end and interest by promoting culture, liberty of mind, and\n    humanitarianism.\u201d There was, moreover, taken up for discussion the\n    thesis: \u201cFree-religionists reject the teaching that declares man\n    lost by original sin, unable to raise himself of his own strength\n    and reason, that directs him to revelation, redemption, and grace\n    from above.\u201d\n\n\nThis view of the world finds its most characteristic expression in\n_pantheism_, which, though expressed in various and often fantastic forms,\nis eminently the religion of modern man. From this gloomy depth of\nautotheism the apotheosis of man and his earthly life, the modern\nconsciousness of freedom, draws its strength and determination.\n\nTo find this modern view of man expressed in the language of consistent\nradicalism, let us hear _Fr. Nietzsche_, the most modern of all\nphilosophers. His ideal is the transcendental man, who knows that God is\ndead, that now there is no bar to stepping forth in unrestricted freedom\nto superhuman greatness and independence. To this \u201cmasterman,\u201d who deems\nhimself superior to others, everything is licit that serves his egotism\nand will, everything that will promote his interest to the disadvantage of\nthe rabble; probity is cowardice! \u201cBut now this god is dead. Ye superior\nmen, this god was your greatest danger.\u201d Thus spoke Zarathustra. \u201cOnly\nsince this god is buried do you begin to rise. Now at length the great\nNoon is in its zenith. Now the superior man becomes master. Onward and\nupward, then, ye superior men! At last the mountain of man\u2019s future is in\ntravail. God is dead; let the superior man arise and live.\u201d (Also sprach\nZarathustra, W. W. VI, 418.) And, in the consciousness that the Christian\nreligion condemns this self-exaltation, he breaks out in this blasphemous\ncharge: \u201cI call Christianity the one great curse, the one great internal\ncorruption.... I call it the one immortal, disgraceful, blot on mankind\u201d\n(Antichrist, W. W. VIII, 313). This is independent humanity in the cloak\nof fanaticism. _Nietzsche_ has carried the modern view of the world to its\nfinal consequences; the autonomous man has developed into the god-like\nsuperman who carries into effect the behest: Ye shall be as gods; his code\nof ethics is that of the autocrat who is above the notions of good and\nbad.\n\nAnd \u201clet no one deceive himself,\u201d writes an intelligent observer of the\ntimes, \u201cthe spirit of our time is attuned to _Nietzsche\u2019s_ idea.\u201d\nConsciously or unconsciously this sentiment dominates more minds than many\na man learned in the wisdom of the schools may dream of. Did _Nietzsche_\ncreate this spirit? Certainly not: he grew out of it, he has only given it\na philosophical setting. _Nietzsche_ would never have caused that\ntremendous sensation, never have gathered around him his enthusiastic\nfollowers, had not the soil been prepared. As it was, he appeared to \u201chis\u201d\nmen as the Messiah \u201cin the fulness of time.\u201d He, too, in his own way\n\u201cloosened the tongue of the dumb and opened the eyes of the blind.\u201d The\nveiled anti-Christian spirit, the unconscious religious and ethical\nnihilism, which no one before dared profess openly, though it was hatching\nin the minds, now had found its \u201cmaster,\u201d its \u201cscientific system\u201d (_Von\nGrotthuss_, Tuermer, VII, 1905, 79). It is, asserts _Wundt_, \u201cthe new\nideal of free personality, dependent on precarious moods and chance\ninfluences, that has found in _Nietzsche\u2019s_ philosophy a fantastic\nexpression\u201d (Ethik, ed. 3. 1905, p. 522).\n\n\n\nThe Autonomous Man.\n\n\nNow we have a clearer idea of modern freedom. It is known as autonomism.\nThe individual wants to be a law to himself, his own court of last appeal;\nhe wants to develop his personality, feeling, desires, and thought,\nindependently of all authority. Too long, it is said, have man\u2019s\naspirations been directed upward, away from things, of this world, to a\nsupernatural world. Religion and Church seek to determine his thought and\ndesire, to subject him to dogma. Too long has he clung like a child to the\napron-strings of authority. Man has at last awoken to self-consciousness\nand to a sense of his own dignity, after a period of estrangement, so to\nsay, from himself; he has become himself again, as the poet sang when the\ncentury of the \u201cilluminati\u201d was closing:\n\n\n    \u201cHow beautiful, with palm of victory,\n    O man, thou standest at the century\u2019s close,\n    The mightiest son thy Time has given birth,\n    By reason free, by law and precept strong,\n    Alike in meekness great and treasure rich,\n    So long unknown concealed within thy breast.\u201d\n\n\nYes, man has discovered the treasure that long lay hidden in his breast,\nthe seed and bud that longed to burst forth into life and blossom. Now the\nmotto is: Independent self-development; no more restraint, but living out\none\u2019s personality. The eagle is not given wings to be bound down upon the\nearth; nor does the bud come forth never to unfold. Full freedom,\ntherefore, too, for everything human! And modern man leaps to the fatal\nconclusion: therefore all interference of external authority is unjust, is\nforce, constraint upon my being; the same error that boys fall into when\nlife begins to tingle with its fulness of strength. Being ignorant of\ntheir nature, they feel any kind of dependence a chain; only themselves,\ntheir judgments and desires, are law. Just so modern man, in his\ndeplorable want of self-knowledge, fails to see how he is cutting himself\noff from the source and support of life; how he is pulling himself out by\nthe roots from the soil whence he derives his strength; how, left to his\nown littleness, he withers away; how, abandoned to his own diseased\nnature, he condemns himself to intellectual decay.\n\nAutonomism, individualism, independent personality\u2014these have become the\nideals that permeate the man of this age, and influence the thought of\nthousands without their knowing it.\n\n\n    The well-known, Protestant, theologian, _A. Sabatier_, writes: \u201cIt\n    is not difficult to find the common principle to which all the\n    expressions and tendencies of the spirit of modern times can be\n    reduced in any field whatever. One word expresses it\u2014the word,\n    \u2018autonomy.\u2019 By autonomy I understand the firm confidence, which\n    the mind of man has attained in his present stage of development,\n    that he contains in himself his own rule of life and norm of\n    thought, and that he harbours the ardent desire of realizing\n    himself by obeying his own law\u201d (La Religion de la Culture\n    moderne, 10).\n\n    \u201cModern times,\u201d writes _R. Eucken_, \u201chave changed the position of\n    the human subject ... it has become to them the centre of his life\n    and the ultimate end of his endeavours\u201d (Zeitschrift fuer\n    Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 112 (1898), 165 s.). Still\n    clearer are the following words of _G. Spicker_: \u201cMan depended\n    formerly either on nature or on revelation, or on both at once;\n    now it is just the opposite: man is in every way, theoretically as\n    well as practically, an autonomist. If anything can denote clearly\n    the characteristic difference between the modern and the old\n    scholastic view, it is this absolute, subjective, standpoint.\u201d \u201cAs\n    we in principle do not intend to depend on any objectivity or\n    authority, there is nothing left but the autonomy of the subject\u201d\n    (Der Kampf zweier Weltanschauungen (1898), 143, 145).\n\n\nA noted apostle of modern freedom exclaims enthusiastically:\n\n\n    \u201cThis after all is freedom: an unconditional appreciation of human\n    greatness, no matter how it asserts itself. This greatest\n    happiness, as _Goethe_ called it, the humanists have restored to\n    us. Henceforth we must with all our strength retain it. Whoever\n    wants to rob us of it, even should he descend from heaven, is our\n    deadliest enemy.\u201d (_H. St. Chamberlain._)\n\n\nIt is true, of course, that man should strive for perfection of self in\nevery respect; for the harmonious development of all the faculties and\ngood inclinations of his own being, and, in this sense, for a nobler\nhumanity; he should also develop and assert his own peculiar disposition\nand originality, so far as they are in order, and thus promote a healthy\nindividualism. But all this he should do within the moral bonds of his\ncreated and limited nature, being convinced that only by keeping within\nthe right limits of his being can he develop his ability and personality\nharmoniously; he dare not reach out, in reckless venture after\nindependence, to free himself from God and his eternal end, and from the\nyoke of truth; he dare not transform the divine sovereignty into the\ndistorted image of created autotheism.\n\nHe who professes a Christian view of the world, can see in such a view of\nman and his freedom only an utter misunderstanding of human nature and an\noverthrow of the right order of things. This overthrow, again, can only\nproduce calamity, interior and exterior disorder. Woe to the planet that\nfeels its orbit a tyrannical restraint, and leaves it to move in sovereign\nfreedom through the universe! It will move along free, and free will it go\nto ruin. Woe to the speeding train that leaves its track; it will speed on\nfree, but invariably dash itself to pieces! A nature that abandons the\nprescribed safeguards can only degenerate into a wild sprout. We shall see\nhow these principles have actually become in modern intellectual life the\nprinciples of negation and intellectual degeneration.\n\n_St. Augustine_ states the history of mankind in the following, thoughtful\nwords: \u201cA twofold love divides mankind into the City of the World and the\nCity of God. Man\u2019s self-love and his self-exaltation pushed to the\ncontempt of God constitute the City of the World; but the love of God\npushed to contempt of self is the foundation of the City of God.\u201d\n(_Fecerunt itaque civitates duas amores duo, terrenam scilicet amor sui\nusque ad contemptum Dei, coelestem vero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui._\nDe civ. Dei XIV, 28.) Thus _St. Augustine_, while contemplating the time\nwhen the war between heathenism and Christianity was raging. The same\nspectacle is presented to our own eyes to-day, probably more thoroughly\nthan ever before in history.\n\n\n\nThe Period of Man\u2019s Emancipation.\n\n\nThe modern view of man and his freedom has shaped itself gradually in\nrecent times; the present is ever the child of the past. The most\nimportant factor in this development was undoubtedly the _Reformation_. It\nemancipated man in the most important affair, religious life, from the\nauthority of the Church, and made him independent. \u201cAll have the right to\ntry and to judge what is right and wrong in belief,\u201d so _Luther_ told the\nChristian nobility of the German nation; \u201ceverybody shall according to his\nbelieving mind interpret the Scriptures, it is the duty of every believing\nChristian to espouse the faith, to understand and defend it, and to\ncondemn all errors.\u201d Protestantism means even to the modern man \u201cthe\nthinking mind\u2019s break with authority, a protest against being fettered by\nanything positive, the mind\u2019s return to itself from self-alienation\u201d\n(_Schwegler_, Geschichte der Philosophie (1887), 167): \u201cit puts out of\njoint the Christian Church organization, and overturns its supernatural\nfoundation, quite against its will, but with an actual, and ever more\nplainly visible, effect\u201d (_E. Troeltsch_, Die Bedeutung des\nProtestantismus fuer die Entstehung der modernen Welt (1906), 29).\n\nThe first step towards full autonomy was taken with energy; the\nemancipation from external authority then progressed rapidly in the domain\nof politics, sociology, economy, and especially of religion, to the very\nelimination of everything supernatural. There came the English\nindividualism of the seventeenth century. The liberty of \u201cindividual\nconviction,\u201d termed also \u201ctolerance,\u201d in the sense of rejecting every\nauthoritative interference in the sanctuary of man\u2019s thought and feeling,\nwas extolled; of course at first only as the privilege of those who were\nintellectually superior. Soon the Deism of a _Herbert of Cherbury_ and\n_Locke_ was reached; it was the religion of natural reason, with belief in\nGod and the obligation to moral action. Whatever is added by positive\nreligions, and therefore by the Christian religion, is superfluous; hence\nnot dogma, but freedom! _Locke_, indeed, denied to atheists state\ntoleration; but _J. Toland_ already advised full freedom of thought, even\nto the tolerance of atheism. In the year 1717 _Freemasonry_ came into\nexistence in England. _Adam Smith_ originated the idea of a liberal\npolitical economy which frees the individual from all bond, even in the\neconomic field. The views prevailing in England then exert great influence\nin France. _Rousseau_ and _Voltaire_ appear.\n\nIn France and Germany the enlightenment of the eighteenth century makes\nrapid strides in the direction of emancipation. \u201cThe enlightenment of the\neighteenth century,\u201d writes _H. Heltner_, \u201cnot only resumes the\nprematurely interrupted work of the sixteenth century, the Reformation,\nbut carries it on independently, and in its own way. The thoughts and\ndemands of the \u2018enlightened\u2019 are bolder and more aggressive, more\nunscrupulous and daring.... With _Luther_ the idea of revelation remained\nintact; the new method of thought rejects the idea of a divine revelation,\nand bases all religious knowledge on merely human thought and\nsentiment.... It is only the free, entirely independent thought that\ndecides in truth and justice, moral and political rights and duties.\nReason has regained its self-glory; man comes to his senses again\u201d\n(Literaturgeschichte des 18. Jahrhunderts II (1894), 553). _Kant_ gave it\na philosophical setting.\n\nThen the _French Revolution_ breaks into fierce blaze, writing on the\nskies of Europe with flaming letters the ideas of emancipated humanity;\nthe adherents to the old religion are sent to the guillotine. On August\n27, 1789, the proclamation of the \u201crights of man\u201d is made. \u201cThe principles\nof 1789,\u201d as they are now called, henceforth dominate the nineteenth\ncentury. The system which adopted these principles called itself, and\nstill calls itself, _Liberalism_.\n\nLiberalism as a principle\u2014we are speaking of the principles of liberalism,\nnot of its adherents, who for the most part do not carry out these\nprinciples in their consequences, and occasionally do not even grasp them\ncompletely\u2014tried to accomplish man\u2019s utter emancipation from all external\nand superior authority. It sought to accomplish this in the political\nfield, by instituting constitutional, and, wherever possible, a republican\nform of government; in the field of economy, by granting freedom to labour\nand possession, to capital and commerce; but especially in the field of\nmorals and religion, by emancipating thought and science, and the entire\nlife of man,\u2014school, marriage, state,\u2014from every religious influence and\ndirection, and in this sense it aimed at humanizing the whole life of man.\nThis is its purpose. To achieve this, it aims at establishing itself in\nthe state, by gaining political power through the aid of compulsory laws,\nof course against all principles of freedom; it tries to attain this by\ncompulsory state-education, by obligatory civil marriage, and so on. At\nfirst there appeared only a moderate liberalism, which gradually gave\nplace to a more radical tendency, striving more directly and openly toward\nthe enfeeblement and, if possible, the destruction of the Christian view\nof the world and its chief representative, the Church. In 1848 the\nwell-known materialist _K. Vogt_ said at the national assembly in\nFrankfort: \u201cEvery church is opposed to a free development of mankind, in\nthat it demands faith above all. Every church is an obstacle in the way of\nman\u2019s free intellectual development, and since I am for such intellectual\ndevelopment of man, I am against every church\u201d (cf. _Rothenbuecher_,\nTrennung von Staat und Kirche (1908), 106).\n\nIn the field of economics, every one can see how liberalism has failed. In\nsome countries people were ashamed to retain its name any longer. It\nsuddenly disappeared from public life, and gave place to its\ntranslation,\u2014free thought. This shows that nobody cares to boast of its\nsuccess. All barriers of safety had been removed in a night; crises,\nconfusion, and the serious danger of the social question were the\nconsequence. In the field of actual economics it became clear that the\nprinciple of unlimited freedom could not be carried out, because it was\nutterly ruinous, and it really means a complete misunderstanding of human\nnature. Therefore liberalism has disappeared from this field, leaving to\nothers to solve the problem it created, and to heal the wounds it\ninflicted. It is otherwise in the field of theoretical economics. Here it\nstill strives to dominate, often more thoroughly than before, no matter\nwhat name it may assume. The consequences do not appear so gross to the\neyes as they would in the tangible sphere of sociology. Especially science\nit wants to hold in subjection to its principles of freedom in\nundiminished severity.\n\nThat freedom which is identified with absolute independence from all\nauthority, especially in the intellectual sphere, we shall here know as\nLiberal freedom, in contradistinction to Christian freedom, which is\nsatisfied with independence from unjust restraint.\n\nIn the foregoing discussion it has been shown how deeply the liberal idea\nof freedom is imbedded in the unchristian philosophical view of the world.\nThe inevitable result is a freedom of science which considers every\nauthoritative interference in research and teaching as an encroachment\nupon the rights of free development in man\u2019s personality, especially in\nthe sphere of philosophy and religion. Moreover, the humanitarian view of\nthe world, insisting on the independence of man and his earthly life,\nnaturally demands the exclusion of God and the other world, it orders the\nrejection of \u201cdualism\u201d as unscientific, and the adoption of the monistic\nview in its stead; an autonomous science can hardly be reconciled with a\nsuperior, restricting authority. Later on we shall demonstrate that the\nmain law of modern science is that the supernatural is inadmissible.\nFurthermore, since science is not a superhuman being, but has its seat in\nthe intellect of man, subject to the psychology of man, every one who\nknows the heart of man will suspect from the outset that man cannot stop\nat merely ignoring, but will often proceed to combat and explain away\nfaith, the Church, and all authority that might be considered an oppressor\nof the truth. This undue love of liberty will of itself become a struggle\nfor freedom against the oppressor. How far this is actually the case we\nshall have occasion to discuss later on.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nWe have heard _Nietzsche\u2019s_ haughty and proud boast. Shortly after the\nphilosopher had penned these words he was stricken (1889) with permanent,\nincurable insanity, with which he was afflicted till his death in 1900.\nThe \u201ctranscendental man\u201d was dethroned. The strength of the Titan was\nshattered. He that said with _Prometheus_, I am not a god, still I am in\nstrength the equal of any of them, received the ironical answer, \u201cBehold\nhe has become as one of us\u201d (Gen. iii. 22). He that cursed Christian\ncharity towards the poor and suffering, was now cast helpless upon\ncharity. His grave at Roecken, the place also of his birth, is a sign of\nwarning to the modern world.\n\nTo the believing Christian a different grave opens on Easter day. From it\ncomes the risen God-man; in His hand the banner of immortal victory. It\npoints the way to true human greatness, to a superior humanity according\nto the will of God. Man longs for perfection; he longs to go beyond the\nnarrow limits of his present condition. But modern man wants to rise to\ngreatness by his own strength, without help from above; he would rise with\ngiant bounds, without law. In his weakness he falls; error and scepticism\nand the loss of morality are the bitter fruit. Another way is pointed out\nby the great Friend of Man. Humanity is to be led on the way of progress\nby the hand of God, by faith in God, supported by His grace; thus man\nshall participate in God\u2019s nature, shall one day attain his highest\nperfection in eternal life, far beyond the limits of his present\ncondition. \u201cI am the way, the truth, and the life.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nChapter III. Subjectivism And Its Freedom.\n\n\nThe tendency of the modern intellect to independence in its own peculiar\nsphere of thinking and knowing, cannot fail to work itself out\nenergetically. In this sphere it leads naturally to that view of human\nreasoning called subjectivism: the thinking or reasoning subject is its\nown law, the autonomous creator and guide of its thought. Herein lies the\n_essential presumption_, the very core, of the liberal freedom of science.\nWherever we turn we meet subjectivism with its autonomous rejection of all\nauthority, its arbitrary separation of knowledge from faith, its\nagnosticism, its relativity to truth as the moving factor of, and the\nostensible warrant for, this freedom, especially in the sphere which it\nconsiders peculiarly its own, philosophy and religion. Only when we look\ncloser into its philosophical premises will it be possible to form a\njudgment of the \u201cscientific method\u201d it employs in this, its peculiar\nsphere, and of the justice of its claim to be the sole administrator of\nman\u2019s ideal possessions, and to be altogether \u201cindependent of every view\nnot conforming to this scientific method.\u201d Before considering subjectivism\nlet us by way of preface set down a few considerations on the nature of\nhuman, intellectual perception.\n\n\n\nObjectivism and Subjectivism.\n\n\nIt always has been, and still is, the firm conviction of unbiassed men,\u2014a\nconviction which irresistibly forces itself upon us,\u2014that in our\nintellectual perception and thought we grasp an _objective, exterior order\nof things, an existence distinct from our thought_; of this objective\nreality we reproduce an image in our minds, and thus grasp it\nintellectually. _Cognitio est similitudo rei_, says the old school; that\nis, Knowledge is the reproduction of an objective reality, which thus\nbecomes the criterion of cognition. The reproduction is a counterpart of\nthe original. In this perfect resemblance of our cognition to the\nobjective reality there has ever been recognized the _truth_ of knowledge.\n\nWhen the thinking mind has arrived at the mathematical truth that the\ncircumference of a circle is the product of the diameter multiplied by\n_Ludolph\u2019s_ number, it knows\u2014unless indeed it has lost its natural\ncandour\u2014that it has not of itself produced this result of reasoning, but\nthat it has recognized in it an objective reality of truth, distinct from\nits own thought, and has reproduced that truth in itself. And because this\nreproduction corresponds to the reality, it is called true cognition.\nSimilarly, when the intellect expresses the general law of causality,\nnamely, everything that happens has a cause, the intellect is again\nconvinced that it has not of itself produced this result of reasoning, but\nhas only reproduced it by assimilating to itself an objective truth which\nis necessarily so and cannot be otherwise, and which the mind must\nassimilate if it wants to think aright. This is true not only when the\nmind is dealing with concrete things, but also when it would give\nexpression to general principles, as in the present instance; these, too,\nare not subjective projections, but are independent of the thinking\nsubject, and are eternal laws.\n\nThis view of the nature of human cognition and thought has gradually\nundergone an essential change, not indeed with those outside the influence\nof philosophical speculation, but with the representatives of modern\nphilosophy, and those subject to its influence. Objectivism has been\nsuperseded by subjectivism. Its principle is this: cognition, imagination,\nand thought are not the intellectual apprehension of an objective world\nexisting independent of us, of which we reproduce in ourselves a\ncounterpart. No, _the mind creates its own results of reason and\ncognition_; the objects before us are the creatures of the imagining\nsubject. At the utmost, we can but say that our reasoning is the manner in\nwhich a hidden exterior world appears to us. This manner must necessarily\nconform to the peculiarity of the subject, to his faculties and stage of\ndevelopment; but the exterior world as it is in itself we can never\napprehend. _Descartes_, starting with the premise that consciousness is\nthe beginning of all certainty, was the first modern philosopher to enter\nupon the way of subjectivism. He was followed by _Locke_, _Berkeley_, and\n_Kant_. It is due to them that in the modern theory of cognition the\nfundamental principle of idealistic subjectivism, no matter how difficult\nand unreasonable it may appear to an ordinary thinker, has obtained so\nmany advocates who, nevertheless, cannot adhere to it, but contradict it\nat every step.\n\n\n    \u201cThe world,\u201d _Schopenhauer_ is convinced, \u201cis the projection of my\n    idea.... No truth is more certain, more independent of all others,\n    less in need of proof, than this, that all there is to be known,\n    hence the whole world, is an object only in relation to a subject,\n    a vision of the beholder; in a word, the projection of my own\n    idea. Hence the subject is the bearer of the world\u201d (Die Welt als\n    Wille und Vorstellung, I, \u00a7\u00a7 1-2). \u201cIt is evidently true that\n    knowledge cannot go beyond our consciousness, and hence the\n    existence of things outside of our sphere of consciousness must,\n    to say the least, remain problematical\u201d (Der Gegenstand der\n    Erkenntniss, 1892, p. 2). In like manner _O. Liebmann_ says: \u201cWe\n    can never go beyond our individual sphere of ideas (projection of\n    our ideas), even though we apprehend what is independent of us,\n    still the absolute reality of it is known to us only as our own\n    idea\u201d (Zur Analysis der Wirklichkeit, 1900, p. 28). Therefore \u201cthe\n    contrast between \u2018I\u2019 and the world,\u201d says _E. Mach_, \u201cbetween\n    feeling or apprehension and the reality, falls away\u201d (Die Analysis\n    der Empfindungen, 2d ed., 1900, p. 9). And a disciple of _Mach_\n    says: \u201cIt is important to hold fast to the idea that a\n    self-existent, divine Truth, independent of the subject,\n    objectively binding, enthroned, so to say, above men and gods, is\n    meaningless.... Such a Truth is nonsense\u201d (_H. Kleinpeter_,\n    Kantstudien, VIII, 1903, p. 314).\n\n    None of these representatives of worldly wisdom are able to fulfil\n    the first duty of the wise man: \u201cLive according to what you\n    teach.\u201d Even the sceptic _Hume_ has to admit that in the common\n    affairs of life he feels himself compelled of necessity to talk\n    and act like other people.\n\n\nSubjectivism is really nothing but _scepticism_, for it eliminates the\nknowableness of objective truth. But it is a masked\u2014if you will, a\nreformed\u2014scepticism. Cognition is given another purpose; its task is not\nat all, so it is said, to reproduce or assimilate a world distinct from\nitself, but to create its own contents. The very nature of cognition is\nreversed.\n\n\n\nThe Autonomy of Reason.\n\n\nIt was _Kant_, the herald of a new era in philosophy, who gave to this\ngradually maturing subjectivism its scientific form and basis. At the same\ntime he gave prominence to that element of subjectivism which seems to\ngive justification to freedom of thought, to wit, autonomism, the creative\npower of the intellect which makes its own laws. Independence of reason\nand free thought have become catchwords since _Kant\u2019s_ time. They are a\nprecious ingredient of the autonomy of modern man.\n\nWhen the flaming blaze of the French Revolution was reddening the skies of\nEurope, and inaugurating the restoration of the rights of man, _Kant_ was\nsitting in his study at K\u00f6nigsberg, his heart beating strongly in sympathy\nwith the Revolution, for he saw in it a hopeful turn of the times. An old\nman of nearly seventy, he followed the events with most passionate\ninterest. _Varnhagen_ records in his Memoirs, based on the stories of\n_Staegemann_, that, when the proclamation of the Republic was announced in\nthe newspapers, _Kant_, with tears in his eyes, said to some friends: \u201cNow\ncan I say with Simeon, \u2018Now dost Thou, O Lord, dismiss Thy servant in\npeace, because mine eyes have seen Thy Salvation\u2019 \u201d (_H. Hettner_,\nLiteraturgeschichte des 18. Jahrh. III, 4th ed., 3, 2, 1894, p. 38). While\non the other side of the Rhine the Jacobins were doing their bloody work\nof political liberation, the German philosopher, the herald of a new era\nand an ardent admirer of _Rousseau_, sat in his study labouring for man\u2019s\nintellectual liberation. To give man the right of autonomous\nself-determination in action and thought was the work of his life.\nAutonomy was indeed to him \u201c \u2018the source\u2019 of all dignity of man and of\nevery rational nature\u201d (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, II). And\nhence it was that his ardent followers beheld in him \u201cthe first perfect\nmodel of a really free German, one who had purged himself from every trace\nof Roman absolutism, dogmatism, and anti-individualism\u201d (_H. St.\nChamberlain_, Die Grundlagen des 19. Jahrh., 8th ed., 1907, II, 1127).\n\nIn his \u201cGrundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten\u201d (The Foundation of the\nMetaphysics of Ethics) and \u201cKritik der praktischen Vernunft\u201d (Critique of\nPractical Reason) _Kant_ sought to establish _autonomy in moral life_ and\naction. Man himself, his practical reason, is the ultimate foundation of\nall moral obligation; did man lead a good life out of obedience to God it\nwould be a heteronomy unworthy of the name of \u201cmoral.\u201d \u201cThe autonomy of\nthe will,\u201d he teaches, \u201cis the sole principle of all moral laws and the\nduties allied to them; all arbitrary heteronomy, on the contrary, far from\nhaving any binding force, is contrary to the principle of morality of the\nwill\u201d (Kritik der prakt. Vern., Elementarlehre, I, 1, 4. Lehrsatz). Or, as\namplified by a faithful interpreter of the master: \u201cIn the moral world the\nindividual should be not only a member but also a ruler; he is a member of\nthe moral order when he obeys its law; he is its ruler when he enacts the\nlaw.... The distinction between autonomy and heteronomy separates true\nfrom false ethics, the system of _Kant_ from all other systems. All moral\nsystems, except that of _Kant_, are based on the principles of heteronomy;\nthey can have no other. And critical philosophy was the first to grasp the\nprinciple of autonomy\u201d (_Kuno Fischer_, Geschichte der neuen Philosophie,\nIV, 2d ed., 1869, p. 114 _seq._). _Kant\u2019s_ just man no longer prays \u201cThy\nwill be done\u201d; he identifies the law with himself. _Nietzsche\u2019s_\ntranscendental man is seen in the background.\n\n_Autonomy of thought_ is the result of the \u201cCritique of Pure Reason,\u201d and\nin spite of its inconsistency of expression, its involved sentences, its\nextremely tiresome style, it is and will long continue to be the text-book\nof modern philosophy. According to _Kant_ our cognition consists in our\nfashioning the substance of our perceptions and reasoning after innate,\npurely subjective, views and conceptions. Time and place, and especially\nthe abstract notions of existence and non-existence, necessity, causality,\nsubstance, have no truth independent of our thought; they are but forms\nand patterns according to which we are forced to picture the world. Their\nfirst matter is supplied by sense experience, such as sound, colour,\nfeeling; but these, too, according to _Kant_, are not objective. Nothing\nthen remains to our cognition that is not purely subjective, having\nexistence in ourselves alone. Our cognition is no longer a reproduction,\nbut a creation of its object; our thought is no longer subject to an\nexternal truth that may be forced upon it. \u201cHitherto,\u201d says _Kant_, \u201cit\nhas been generally supposed that our cognition must be governed by\nobjects.... Let us see if we cannot make better headway in the province of\nmetaphysics by supposing that objects must be governed by our cognition\u201d\n(Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, Vorrede zur zweiten Ausgabe).\n\nThis is, indeed, nothing but a complete falsification of human cognition.\nIt is evident to an unbiassed mind that there must be a reason for\neverything, not because I so think, but I think so because such is the\nfact; that the multiplication table is right, not because I think so, but\nI must multiply according to it simply because it is right. My thought is\nsubject to objective truth. But _Kant\u2019s_ autonomy means emancipation from\nobjective truth, and hence, though _Kant_ himself held fast to the\nunchangeable laws of thinking and acting, he energetically opened the way\nfor subjectivism with all its consequences. This was _Kant\u2019s_ doing, and\nhistory credits him with it. It was one of those events which have made\nmen famous: the giving to the ideas and sentiments of a period their\nscientific formula, and thereby also their apparent justification.\n\n\n    _Schiller_ wrote in 1805 to _W. von Humboldt_: \u201cThe profound\n    fundamental ideas of ideal philosophy remain an enduring treasure,\n    and for this reason alone one should think himself fortunate for\n    having lived at the present time.... Finally, we are both\n    idealists, and should be ashamed to have it said of us that things\n    made us and not we the things.\u201d _Fr. Paulsen_ gives expression to\n    the opinion of many when he says: \u201c_Kant_ gives to the intellect\n    the self-determination that is essential to it, and the position\n    in the world which it deserves. He has raised the intellect\u2019s\n    creative power to a position of honour: the essence of the\n    intellect is freedom\u201d (Immanuel Kant, 1898, p. 386). \u201cThe autonomy\n    of reason ... we cannot give up\u201d (_Kant_, Der Philosoph des\n    Protestantismus, in Philosophia militans, 2d ed., 1901, p. 51).\n    \u201cIt is indeed the offspring of Protestantism.\u201d \u201cTo me it is beyond\n    doubt,\u201d _Paulsen_ continues, \u201cthat the fundamental tendency of\n    primitive Protestantism has here been carried out in all\n    clearness\u201d (Ibid. 43). _Luther_, too, found in the heart of the\n    individual the unfailing source of truth. For that reason _Kant_\n    has been called the philosopher of Protestantism.\n\n    Hence the well-known historian, _J. Scherr_, may not be wrong when\n    he calls the philosophy of _Kant_ \u201cthe foundation of granite\n    whereon is built the freedom of the German intellect.\u201d\n\n\nNow, indeed, we easily understand the demand for freedom of thought. It is\nunintelligible how an external authority, a divine revelation or\ninfallible Church, could have ever approached man, assured him of the\ntruth of its teaching, and laid upon him in consequence of this testimony\nthe obligation of accepting it as true. \u201cAn external authority,\u201d we are\nassured, \u201cbe it ever so great, will never succeed in arousing in us a\nsense of obligation; its laws, be they ever so lofty and earnest, will be\ndeemed arbitrary, simply because they come from without\u201d (_Sabatier_, La\nReligion et la Culture moderne, apud _Fonsegrive_, Die Stellung der\nKatholiken gegenueber der Wissenschaft, Deutsch von _Schieser_ (1903),\n10). Man accepts only what he himself has produced, what is congenial to\nhis individuality, what is in harmony with his personal intellectual life.\nIn the place of truth steps \u201cpersonal conviction,\u201d the shaping of one\u2019s\nviews and ideals; in the place of unselfish submission to the truth steps\nthe \u201cdevelopment of one\u2019s intellectual individuality,\u201d the \u201cevolution of\none\u2019s intellectual personality\u201d; in a word, free-thought. Exterior\nauthority can no longer impose an obligation. \u201cIs there on earth,\u201d asks\n_Paulsen_, \u201can instance where authority can decide for us in matters of\nbelief and thought?\u201d And he answers: \u201cThere is none; there cannot be on\nthis earth an infallible teaching authority.\u201d And why not? \u201cPhilosophy and\nscience must refuse to recognize such an authority.... If I could believe\nall that the Church or the Pope teaches, this one thing I could never\nbelieve, that they are infallible; it would include a resolution, once for\nall, to renounce my own judgment regarding whatever they declare true or\nfalse, good or bad; it would be the utter renunciation of the use of my\nreason and conscience.\u201d (Ibid. 51-53. We shall often cite the testimony of\n_Paulsen_ for the purpose of illustrating modern thought, partly because\nhe is no longer living, partly because he is quite an outspoken\nrepresentative of the modern view of the world, though generally regarded\nas moderate. Moreover, he is without doubt one of the most widely read of\nthe modern German philosophers.)\n\nThe demonstration of all this is quite unique. Here it is in brief: Were\nthere an infallible authority, one which necessarily taught the truth,\nthen thought and science would be irrevocably subjected to this authority:\nthat will not do; therefore there is no such authority. Or thus: Were\nthere an infallible teaching, then we should have to accept it without\ncontradiction: that is impossible; therefore there is no infallibility.\nHence it is clear, the protest against an infallible authority, even\nthough divine,\u2014for the argument holds good also in regard to such an\nauthority,\u2014is not based on the impossibility of teaching the truth, for\nthe authority is supposed to be infallible, but on man\u2019s refusal to be\ntaught. And this refusal is made in accordance with that sovereign freedom\nof thought which is the natural offspring of subjectivism; the principal\nrenunciation is based on its denial of objective truth. _It is the\nrejection of the truth._\n\n\n    \u201cIn advanced progress,\u201d _Paulsen_ continues, \u201cthe individual is\n    also separating himself from the intellectual mass of the people\n    in order to enjoy a separate mental existence.... The individual\n    is beginning to have his own ideas about things; he is no longer\n    satisfied with the common opinions and notions about the world and\n    life which have been dealt out to him by religion and mythology:\n    all philosophy begins with freeing the individual from common\n    notions.\u201d \u201cIf the individual ideals of a personality, gifted with\n    extraordinary power of mind and will, happen to come in conflict\n    with the objective morality of the time, then there results one of\n    those struggles which cause the dramatic crises of history. They\n    who thus struggled were the real heroes of mankind. They rose\n    against the conventional and indifferent ideals which had grown\n    obsolete, against untrue appearances, against the salt that had\n    lost its savour; they preached a new truth, pointed out new\n    aspirations and ideals which breathed a new strength into life and\n    raised it to a higher plane\u201d (System der Ethik, 8th ed., 1906, I,\n    372 f.).\n\n\nTruly encouraging words for the modern agitator and reformer. To summon\nthe courage to rise above the level of the masses, to feel within himself\nthe centre of gravity, and to fashion his thoughts regardless of the whole\nworld, this is nothing less than the beginning of philosophy and wisdom.\nAnd should he feel himself strong-minded he may simply change all moral\nand religious values which do not square with his individual judgments.\n\u201cTo remain faithful to one\u2019s own self,\u201d we are told again, \u201cthat is the\nessence of this ideal bravery. No one can possess this virtue who does not\nfeel within himself the centre about which life gravitates; whoever\npursues exterior things as his ultimate end cannot penetrate to interior\nfreedom. _Spinoza_, by life and teaching, is a great preacher of this\nfreedom\u201d (Ibid. II, p. 27). Self-consciousness as arrogant as that of a\npantheist like _Spinoza_, who indeed did not pursue \u201cexterior things as\nthe ultimate end,\u201d nor God either; the self-consciousness in which man\nfeels himself the centre about which world and life revolve; the will\nwhich now directs thought on its way,\u2014these are the life-nerves of\nautonomous free-thought.\n\n\n    In fact, inclination and will, not objective truth, are the\n    measure and norm of free-thought. This _Paulsen_ again expresses\n    with astonishing candour. According to him, intelligence is after\n    all nothing else than a transformation of the will, this doctrine\n    is rooted in the more modern voluntaristic monism, and is akin to\n    subjectivism. If our cognition itself forms its object, then the\n    real concept of cognition has been lost to us, and in its place we\n    have the will determining the action even of the intellect.\n    _Paulsen_ says emphatically, \u201cIntelligence is an instrument of the\n    will in the service of preservation of life.... Perhaps it can be\n    said that even the elementary formations of thought, the logical\n    and metaphysical forms of reality, are already codetermined by the\n    will. If the forms of abstract thought are at all the result of\n    biological evolution, then this must be accepted: they are\n    formations and conceptions of reality, which have proved effective\n    and life-preserving, and have therefore attained their object. The\n    principle of identity is in reality not a mere statement, not an\n    indicative, but an imperative: A is A; that is, what I have put\n    down as A shall be A and remain A.... If this be so, if thought\n    and cognition be determined fundamentally by the will, then it is\n    altogether unintelligible how it might finally turn against the\n    will, and force upon it a view against its will\u201d (_Kant\u2019s_\n    Verhaeltniss zur Metaphysik, 1900, p. 31 f.).\n\n    We have to do here with a confusion of ideas possible only when\n    correct reasoning has sunk to a surprisingly low level. To think\n    with the will, to draw conclusions with intention, is degenerate\n    thinking. But now we understand better what is meant by autonomy\n    of thought. It gives man license to disregard by shallow reasoning\n    everything that clashes with his own will. \u201cWhat I have put down\n    as A shall be A and remain A!\u201d\n\n\nIt is now clear that subjectivism and autonomism in thinking are rooted in\nthe positive disregard of objective truth, in the refusal of an\nunconditional subjection to it; they mean _emancipation from the truth_.\nHere we have the most striking and _deepest difference_ between modern\nsubjectivistic and Christian objective thought. The latter adheres to the\nold conviction that our thoughts do not make the truth, but are subject to\nan objective order of things as a norm. For this reason autonomous freedom\nand subjective caprice, a manner of reasoning that would approach truth as\na lawgiver, and even change it according to time and circumstance, are\nunintelligible in the Christian objective thought. This thought submits\nunselfishly to truth wherever met, be it without a divine revelation or\nwith it, if the revelation be but vouched for. And the reward of this\nunselfishness is the preservation of the truth.\n\nBut subjectivism, with its freedom, leads inevitably to the loss of the\ntruth; it is scepticism in principle, in fact, if my thoughts are not a\ncounterpart of an objective world, but only a subjectively produced image;\nnot knowledge of an external reality, but only a figment of the\nimagination, a projection, then I can have no assurance that they are more\nthan an empty dream.\n\n\n\nThe Modern Separation of Knowledge and Faith.\n\n\nOf course it would be too much to expect that subjectivism in modern\nthought and scientific work should go to the very limit, viz., to\ndisregard all reasoning, to advance at will any theory whatever, to\nsilence disagreeable critics by merely referring to one\u2019s autonomy in\nthinking, and denying that any one can attain to absolute truth. Errors in\nempirical speculation never prosper as others do; the power of natural\nevidence asserts itself at every step, and tears down the artificial\ncobwebs of apparently scientific scepticism. It asserts itself less\nstrongly where the opposing power of natural evidence is weaker, than is\nthe case in matters of actual sense-experience. Here indeed one sees the\nobjective reality before him, which he cannot fashion according to his\ncaprice. The astronomer has no thought of creating his own starry sky, nor\ndoes the arch\u00e6ologist wish to create out of his own mind the history of\nancient nations. They both desire to know and to reveal the reality. But\nin the _suprasensible sphere_, in dealing with questions of the whence and\nwhither of human life, where there is question of religion and morals,\nthere autonomy and scepticism assert themselves as though they were in\ntheir own country, there the free-thinker steps in, boasting of his\nindependence and taking for his motto the axiom of ancient sophistry: the\nmeasure of all things is man.\n\nHere at the same time the natural product of subjectivism, sceptic\nagnosticism, has full sway. In such matters, we are told, there is no\ncertain truth; nothing can be proved, nothing refuted: they are all\nmatters of _faith_\u2014not faith, of course, in the Catholic sense. The latter\nis the acceptance by reason of recognized divine testimony, hence an act\nof the intellect. The modern so-called faith, on the contrary, is not an\nact of the intellect, but is supposed to be a vague _feeling_, a want, a\nlonging and striving after the divine in one\u2019s innermost soul, which\ndivine is then to be grasped by the soul in some mysterious way as\nsomething immediately present in it. This feeling is said to emerge from\nthe subconsciousness of the soul, and to raise in the mind those images\nand symbols which we encounter in the doctrines of the various religions,\nvarying according to times and men. They are only the symbols for that\nunutterable experience of the divine, which can be as little expressed by\ndefinitions and tenets as sounds can by colour. It is a conviction of the\nideal and divine, but different from the conviction of reason; it is an\ninner, actual experience. Hence there can no longer be absolute religious\ntruth, no unchangeable dogmas, which would have to be adhered to forever.\nIn religion, in views of the world and life, the free feeling of the human\nsubject holds sway, a feeling that experiences and weaves together those\nthoughts and ideals that are in accord with his individuality. This is the\nmodern doctrine.\n\nThe dark mysticism of the ancient East and the agnosticism of modern times\nhere join hands. This modern method of separating knowledge and faith is,\nas we all know, a prominent feature of modern thought. Knowledge, that is,\ncognition by reason, is said to exist only in the domain of the natural\nsciences and history. Of what may be beyond these we can have no true\nknowledge. Here, too, _Kant_ has led the way; for the important result of\nhis criticism is his incessant injunction: we can have true knowledge only\nof empiric objects, never of things lying beyond the experience of the\nsenses; our ideas are merely subjective constructions of the reason which\nobtain weight and meaning only by applying them to objects of sense\nexperiment. Hence God, immortality, freedom, and the like, remain forever\noutside the field of our theoretical or cognitive reason. Nevertheless\n_Kant_ did not like to drop these truths. Hence he constructed for himself\na conviction of another kind. The \u201cpractical reason\u201d is to guide man\u2019s\naction in accomplishing the task in which her more timid sister,\ntheoretical reason, failed. And it does it, too. It simply \u201cpostulates\u201d\nthese truths; they are its \u201c_postulates_,\u201d since without them moral life\nand moral order, which it is bound to recognize, would be impossible. No\none knows, of course, whether this be truth, but it ought to be truth.\n_Stat pro ratione voluntas._ The Gordian knot is cut. \u201cIt is so,\u201d the will\nnow cries from the depths of the soul, \u201cI believe it\u201d; while the intellect\nstands hesitatingly by protesting \u201cI don\u2019t know whether it is so or not.\u201d\nDoubt and conviction embrace each other; Yes and No meet peacefully. \u201cI\nhad to suspend knowledge,\u201d _Kant_ suggests, \u201cin order to make room for\nfaith\u201d (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 2. Vorrede). \u201cIt is an exigency of\npure practical reason based on duty,\u201d he further comments on his\npostulate, \u201cto make something the highest good, the object of my will, in\norder to further it with all my power. Herein, however, I have to assume\nits possibility, and therefore its conditions, viz., God, freedom, and\nimmortality, because I cannot prove them by speculative reason, nor yet\ndisprove them.\u201d Thus \u201cthe just man may say I wish that there be a God; I\ninsist upon it, I will not have my faith taken from me\u201d (Kritik der prakt.\nVernunft, 1. Teil, 2. Buch, 2 VIII).\n\nOthers have followed the lead of _Kant_. For philosophers, Protestant\ntheologians, and modernists, he has become the pilot in whom they trust.\n\n\n    \u201c_Kant\u2019s_ critical philosophy,\u201d says _Paulsen_, \u201cgives to\n    knowledge what belongs to it\u2014the entire world of phenomena, for\n    the freest investigation; on the other hand, it gives to faith its\n    eternal right, viz., the interpretation of life and the world\n    according to their value\u201d (Immanuel Kant, 1898, 6). \u201cFaith does\n    not simply rest upon proofs, but upon practical necessity\u201d; \u201cit\n    does not come from the intellect, but from the heart and will\u201d\n    (Einleitung in die Philosophie, 10th ed., 1903, 271, 269).\n    \u201cReligion is not a science, hence it cannot be proved nor\n    disproved.\u201d \u201cTherefore man\u2019s view of the world does not depend on\n    the intellect, but solely on his will.... The ultimate and highest\n    truths, truths by which man lives and for which he dies, have not\n    their source in scientific knowledge, but come from the heart and\n    from the individual will.\u201d In a similar strain _R. Falkenberg_\n    writes: \u201cThe views of the world growing out of the chronology of\n    the human race, as the blossoms of a general process of\n    civilization, are not so much thoughts as rhythms of thinking, not\n    theories but views, saturated with appreciations.... Not only\n    optimism and pessimism, determinism and doctrine of freedom, but\n    also pantheism and individualism, idealism and materialism, even\n    rationalism and sensualism, have their roots ultimately in the\n    affections, and even while working with the tools of reason remain\n    for the most part matters of faith, sentiment, and resolve\u201d\n    (Geschichte der neuen Philosophie, 5th ed., 1905, p. 3).\n\n    You may look up any books or magazines of modern philosophy or\n    Protestant theology, and you will find in all of them \u201cthat faith\n    is a kind of conviction for which there is no need of proof\u201d (_H.\n    Luedemann_, Prot. Monatshefte IX, 1903, 367). This emotional faith\n    has been introduced into Protestant theology especially by\n    _Schleiermacher_. It is also this view of the more recent\n    philosophy that the modernists have adopted. They themselves\n    confess: \u201cThe _modernists_ in accord with modern psychology\n    distinguish clearly between knowledge and faith. The intellectual\n    processes which lead to them appear to the modernists altogether\n    foreign to and independent of one another. This is one of our\n    fundamental principles\u201d (Programma dei Modernisti (1908), 121).\n\n    Religious instruction for children will then have to become\n    altogether different. The demand is already made for \u201ca recast of\n    thought from the sphere of the intellect into the sphere of\n    affection.\u201d Away, so they clamour, away with the dogmas of\n    creation, of Christ as the Son of God, of His miracles, as taught\n    in the old schools! For all these are religious ideas. Pupils of\n    the higher grades should be told \u201cthe plain truth about the degree\n    of historicity in elementary religious principles.... The\n    fundamental idea of religion can neither be created nor destroyed\n    by teaching, it has its seat in sentiment, like\u2014excuse the term\u2014an\n    insane idea\u201d (_Fr. Niebergall_, Christliche Welt, 1909, p. 43).\n\n\nThis dualism of \u201cfaith\u201d and knowledge is as untenable as it is common. It\nis a psychological _impossibility_ as well as a sad _degradation of\nreligion_.\n\nHow can I seriously believe, and seriously hold for true, a view of the\nworld of which I do not know whether it be really true, when the intellect\nunceasingly whispers in my ear: it is all imagination! As long as faith is\na conviction so long must it be an activity of the intellect. With my\nfeeling and will I may indeed wish that something be true; but to wish\nsimply that there be a God is not to be convinced that there actually is a\nGod. By merely longing and desiring I can be as little convinced as I can\nmake progress in virtue by the use of my feet, or repent of sins by a\ntoothache. It is \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ac\u03b2\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2. A dualism of this kind, between\nhead and heart, doubt and belief, between the No of the mind and the Yes\nof the heart, is a process incompatible with logic and psychology. How\ncould such a dualism be maintained for any length of time? It may perhaps\nlast longer in one in whom a vivid imagination has dimmed the clearness of\nintellect; but where the intellectual life is clear, reason will very soon\nemancipate itself from a deceptive imagination. One may go on dreaming of\nideal images, but as soon as the intellect awakens they vanish.\nHallucinations are taken for real while the mind is affected, but they\npass away the moment it sees clearly.\n\n\n    _Kant_ himself, the father of modern agnostic mysticism, has made\n    it quite clear that his postulates of faith concerning the\n    existence of God and the immortality of the soul, have never taken\n    in him the place of earnest conviction. Thus in the first place\n    _Kant_ holds that there are no duties towards God, since He is\n    merely a creature of our mind. \u201cSince this idea proceeds entirely\n    from ourselves, and is a product of ours, we have here before us a\n    postulated being towards whom we cannot have an obligation; for\n    its reality would have to be proved first by experience (or\n    revealed)\u201d; but \u201cto have religion is a duty man owes to himself.\u201d\n    Again, he dislikes an oath, he asks whether an oath be possible\n    and binding, since we swear only on condition that there is a God\n    (without, however, stipulating it, as did _Protagoras_). And he\n    thinks that \u201cin fact all oaths taken honestly and discreetly have\n    been taken in no other sense\u201d (Metaphysik der Sitten, II, \u00a7 18,\n    Beschluss).\n\n    _Prayer_ he dislikes still more. \u201cPrayer,\u201d he says, \u201cas an\n    internal form of cult, and therefore considered as a means of\n    grace, is a superstitious delusion (feticism).... A hearty wish to\n    please God in all our actions, that is, a disposition present in\n    all our actions to perform them as if in the service of God, is a\n    spirit of prayer that can and ought to be our perpetual guide.\u201d\n    \u201cBy this desire, the spirit of prayer, man seeks to influence only\n    himself; by prayer, since man expresses himself in words, hence\n    outwardly, he seeks to influence God. In the former sense a prayer\n    can be made with all sincerity, though man does not pretend to\n    assert the existence of God fully established; in the latter form,\n    as an address, he assumes this highest Being as personally\n    present, or at least pretends that he is convinced of its\n    presence, in the belief that even if it should not be so it can do\n    him no harm, on the contrary it may win him favour; hence in the\n    latter form of actual prayer we shall not find the sincerity as\n    perfect as in the former. The truth of this last remark any one\n    will find confirmed when he imagines to himself a pious and\n    well-meaning man, but rather backward in regard to such advanced\n    religious ideas, surprised by another man while, I will not say\n    praying aloud, but only in an attitude of prayer; any one will\n    expect, without my saying so, that that man will be confused, as\n    if he were in a condition of which he ought to be ashamed. But why\n    this? A man caught talking aloud to himself raises at once the\n    suspicion that his mind is slightly deranged; and not altogether\n    wrongly, because one would seem out of mind if found all alone\n    making gestures as though he had somebody else before him; that,\n    however, is the case in the example given\u201d (Religion innerhalb der\n    Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 4. Stueck, 2, \u00a7 4, Allgemeine\n    Anmerkung). Thus it happens that in his opinion those who have\n    advanced in perfection cease to pray.\n\n    Nor does it seem that _Kant_ is serious about his postulate of the\n    _immortality_ of the soul. Asked by _Lacharpe_ what he thought of\n    the soul, he did not answer at first, but remarked, when the\n    question was repeated: \u201cWe must not make too much boast of it\u201d\n    (_H. Hettner_, Literat. Gesch. des 18. Jahrh., III, 4. ed., 3, p.\n    26. From _Varnhausen\u2019s_ Denkwuerdigkeiten).\n\n    Thousands have with _Kant_ destroyed their religious conviction by\n    a boastful scepticism, and, like him, finally given it up to\n    replace its lack by artificial autosuggestions.\n\n\nAnd is not the religious life of man thereby made completely valueless?\nThe highest truths on which the mind of man lives, and which from the\nfirst stage of his existence not only interested but deeply stirred him,\nbecome fiction, pictures of the fancy, suggestions of an effeminate mind,\nthat cannot make a lasting impression on stronger minds. And how can the\nproducts of autosuggestion give comfort and strength in hours of need and\ntrial? It is true they do not impose any obligations. Every one is free to\nform his own notions of life; they are not to be taken seriously anyway,\nwhether they be this or that; they are all equally true and equally false.\nBuddhism is just as true as Christianity, Materialism as true as\nSpiritualism, Mohammedanism as true as Quakerism, the wisdom of the Saints\nas true as the philosophy of the worldly. \u201cThe most beautiful flower is\ngrowing on the same soil (that of the emotions) with the rankest weed\u201d\n(_Hegel_). The decision rests with sentiments which admit of no arguing.\nThus all is made over to scepticism, to that constant doubting which\ndegrades and unnerves the higher life of modern times, to that _modern\nagnosticism_ which, though bearing the distinction of aristocratic\nreserve, is in reality dulness and poverty of intellect; not a perfection\nof the human intellect, but a hideous disease, all the more dangerous\nbecause difficult to cure. It is the neurasthenia of the intellect of\nwhich the physical neurasthenia of our generation is the counterpart.\n\nThe distinguishing mark between man and the lower animals has ever been\nheld to be that the former could knowingly step beyond the sphere of the\nsenses, into that world of which his intellect is a part. The conviction\nhas always prevailed that man by means of his own valid laws of thought,\nfor instance, the principle of causality, could safely ascend from the\nvisible world to an invisible one. Thus also the physician concludes the\ninterior cause of the disease from the exterior symptoms, the physicist\nthus comes to the knowledge of the existence of atoms and ions which he\nhas never seen, and the astronomer calculates with _Leverrier_ the\nexistence and location of stars which no eye has yet detected.\n\nOne thing has certainly been established: a _free sentiment_ can now\nassert itself with sovereignty in the most important spheres of\nintellectual life, without any barriers of stationary truths and immovable\nChristian dogmas; one is now free to fashion his religion and ideals to\nsuit the _individuum ineffabile_. The latter asks no longer what religion\ndemands of him, but rather how religion can serve his purposes. \u201cFor the\ngods,\u201d it is said, \u201cwhich we now acknowledge, are those we need, which we\ncan use, whose demands confirm and strengthen our own personal demands and\nthose of our fellow-men.... We apply thereby only the principle of\nelimination of everything unsuitable to man, and of the survival of the\nfittest, to our own religious convictions\u201d; \u201cwe turn to that religion\nwhich best suits our own individuality\u201d (_W. James_). Arrogant doubt can\nnow undermine all fundamental truths of Christian faith until they crumble\nto pieces; beside it rises the free genius of the new religion, on whose\nemblem the name of God is no longer emblazoned, but the glittering seal of\nan independent humanity.\n\n\n\nRelative Truth.\n\n\nFreedom of thought appears still more justified when we take a further\nstep which brings us to the _consequence of subjectivism_; _i.e._, when we\nadvance so far as to assert that there are no unchangeable and in this\nsense no absolute truths, but only temporary, changeable, relative truths.\nAnd modern thought does profess this: there is no absolute truth, no\n_religio et philosophia perennis_; different principles and views are\njustified and even necessary for different times and even classes. This\nremoves another barrier to freedom of thought, viz., allegiance to\ngenerally accepted truths and to the convictions of bygone ages.\n\nThe logicalness of this further step can hardly be denied. If the human\nintellect, independent of the laws of objective truth, fashions its own\nobject and truth, especially in things above the senses, why can it not\nform for itself, at different periods and in different stages of life, a\ndifferent religion and another view of the world? Cannot the human subject\npass through different phases? He indeed changes his costume and style of\narchitecture; why not also his thoughts? Every product of thought would\nthen be the right one for the time, but would be untenable for a further\nstage of his intellectual genesis and growth, and would have to be\nreplaced by a new one. The nature of subjectivistic thought is no longer\nan obstacle to this. Besides, we have the modern idea of _evolution_,\nalready predominant in all fields: the world, the species of plants and\nanimals, man himself with his whole life, his language, right, family, all\nof them the products of a perpetual evolution, everything constantly\nchanging. Why not also his religion, morality, and view of the world? They\nare only reflexes of a temporary state of civilization. Hence also here\nmotion and change, evolution into new shapes!\n\nTherefore, so it is said, we have now broken definitely with the \u201cdogmatic\nmethod of reasoning\u201d of the belief in revelation, and of scholastic\nphilosophy which adhered to absolute truth. They are replaced by the\nhistorical-genetical reasoning of the _saeculum historicum_ which \u201chas\ndiscarded absolute truth: there are only relative, no eternal truths\u201d\n(_Paulsen_, Immanuel Kant, 1898, 389). We are further assured that \u201cthis\ntreatment of the history of thought prevails in the scientific world; the\nCatholic Church alone has not adopted it. She still clings to dogmatic\nreasoning, and that is natural to her; she is sure that she is in\npossession of the absolute truth\u201d (Idem, Philosophia militans, 2d ed.,\n1901, 5). Outside of this Church every period of time is free to construct\nits own theories, which will eventually go with it as they came with it.\n\nWe meet this relative truth, and all the indefinable hazy notions\nidentified with it, _in all spheres_.\n\n\n    The modern history of philosophy and religion concedes to every\n    system and religion the right to their historic position: they are\n    necessary phases of evolution. The notion of immutable problems\n    and truths by which any system of thought would have to be\n    measured has been lost. \u201cThe appearance and rejection of a\n    system,\u201d says _J. E. Erdmann_, \u201cis a necessity of world-history.\n    The former was demanded by the character of the time which the\n    system reflected, the latter again is demanded by the fact that\n    the time has changed\u201d (Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie,\n    3rd, I, 1878, 4). And Professor _Eucken_ says: \u201cDespite all its\n    advantages, such a view and construction of life is not a definite\n    truth, it remains an attempt, a problem that always causes new\n    discord among minds\u201d (Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung,\n    1907, 2). \u201cThus, if according to _Hegel_ the coming into being\n    constitutes the truth of being, the ideals and aims also must\n    share in the mobility, and truth becomes a child of the times\n    (_veritas temporis filia_). That apparently subjects life to a\n    full-blown relativism, but such a relativism has lost all its\n    terror by the deterioration of the older method of reasoning. For\n    agreement with existing truth is no longer its chief object.\u201d\n    (Geistige Stroemungen der Gegenwart, 1904, p. 197). The new theory\n    of knowledge assures us quite generally: \u201cIt is a vain attempt to\n    single out certain lasting primitive forms of consciousness,\n    acknowledged constant elements of the mind, to retain them. Every\n    \u2018a-priori\u2019 principle which is thus maintained as an unalienable\n    dowry of thought, as a necessary result of its psychological and\n    physiological \u2018disposition,\u2019 will prove an obstacle of which the\n    progress of science will steer clear sooner or later\u201d (_E.\n    Cassirer_, Das Erkenntnissproblem in der Philosophie und\n    Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit, 1906, 6).\n\n    That this relativism is also laying hand, more and more firmly,\n    upon modern ethics is well known. One often gets the conviction\n    that, as _E. Westermark_ teaches, \u201cthere is no absolute standard\n    of morality,\u201d that \u201cthere are no general truths,\u201d \u201cthat all moral\n    values,\u201d as Prof. _R. Broda_ writes, \u201care relative and varying\n    with every people, every civilization, every society, every free\n    person\u201d (Dokumente des Fortschritts, 1908, 362).\n\n\nThus modern subjectivism has lost all sense for definite rules of thought;\nin its frantic rush for freedom and in its confused excitement it seeks to\nupset all barriers. Now, of course, we may disregard convictions thousands\nof years old, by simply observing that they suited former ages but not the\npresent; that they perhaps suit the uneducated but not the educated.\nHenceforth one may also reject the dogmas of _Christianity_ by merely\npointing out that they were at one time of importance, but are not suited\nto the modern man. That is an idea readily grasped, one which has already\nbecome quite general with those who are mentally tired of Christianity.\nWhat is demanded is a further evolution also of the Christian religion, a\ncontinuous cultivation of freer, higher forms, an undogmatic Christianity\nwithout duty to believe, without a Church: nothing else, in the end, but a\nveiled humanitarian religion.\n\n\n    \u201cIt will be difficult for coming generations to understand,\u201d says\n    _Paulsen_, in the same sense, \u201chow our time could cling in\n    religious instruction with such peace of mind to a system which,\n    having originated several centuries ago under entirely different\n    conditions of intellectual life, stands in striking contrast to\n    facts and ideas accepted by our time everywhere outside the\n    schools.\u201d Hence a revision of the fundamental truths of\n    Christianity is needed. Away with everything supernatural and\n    miraculous, obedience to faith, original sin, redemption: all this\n    sounds strange to the modern man. \u201cSo there remains but one way:\n    to adapt the doctrine of the Church to the theories and views of\n    our times\u201d (System der Ethik, 8th ed., 1906, II, pp. 247, 250).\n    And _Eucken_ says similarly: \u201cWe can adopt the doctrinal system of\n    the Church only by retiring from the present back to the past\u201d\n    (Zeitschr. fuer Philosophie u. Phil. Kritik 112, 1898, 165).\n    Therefore we demand evolution of the Christian religion! \u201cLet us\n    not blindly follow antiquated doctrines disposed of by science,\u201d\n    we are exhorted. \u201cLet there be no fear lest our belief in God and\n    true piety suffer by it! Let us remember that everything earthly\n    is in continual motion, carried along by the rushing river of\n    life.\u201d Onward, therefore, to advancement! ... cheerfully avowing\n    the watchword: \u201cevolution of religion\u201d (_Fr. Delitzsch_, Zweiter\n    Vortrag ueber Babel u. Bibel, 45. thousand, 1904, 42).\n\n    Modern Protestant theology has achieved a great deal in this\n    direction; its evolution has progressed to a complete\n    disintegration of Christianity, by adapting it to modern ideas so\n    thoroughly that there is not a single thought left which this\n    Christianity, reduced to meaningless words, might not accept.\n\n\nThis is the relativism of the present subjectivistic reasoning and its\nconsequences.\n\nNow, it is true that there is room for a certain relativity and evolution\nin the field of thought and truth. There is a relative truth in the sense\nthat our knowledge of it is never exhaustive. Even the eternal truths of\nthe Christian religion we always know only imperfectly, and we ought to\nperfect our knowledge continually; established facts of history can also\nbe known, if studied, in greater detail. Thus there is progress and\nevolution. But from this we may not conclude that there can be no fixed\ntruths at all. In the astronomy of to-day one can surely have the\nconviction that the fundamental truths of _Copernicus\u2019s_ System of the\nUniverse must remain an unchangeable truth, and that the time will never\ncome when we shall go back to the obsolete doctrines of old _Ptolemy_, who\nmade the sun revolve around the earth. Is astronomy therefore excluded\nfrom progress and evolution? It is moreover true that the individual as\nwell as the community pass through an intellectual evolution in the sense\nthat they gradually increase their knowledge and correct their errors,\nthat literature and the schools gradually enhance the energy and wealth of\nour ideas and thoughts.\n\nBut a progressive change of the laws of thought, to the effect that we\nmust now hold to a proposition which at another time we should naturally\nreject as untenable, can be maintained only upon the supposition that the\nthought of evolution has driven all others out of the intellect. It would\nbe absurd to hold that the same view could be true at one time and false\nat another, that the same views about the world and life could be right\nto-day and wrong to-morrow, to be accepted to-day and rejected to-morrow.\nA view is either true or false. If true, it is always true and warranted.\nOr was old _Thales_ right when he declared the world to consist of water;\nwere _Plato_ and _Aristotle_ right in maintaining that it consisted of\nideas, or forms, with real existences; was _Fichte_ and his time right\nwith his Ego, and are finally _Schopenhauer_, _Wundt_, and _Paulsen_ right\nin claiming the world to be the work of the will? Were our heroic\nancestors right, as the theories of evolution claim, in holding that trees\nare inhabited by ghosts; were then the Greeks right with their idea of a\nhost of gods dwelling in the Olympus; and later on, was the civilized\nworld right in holding that there is but one God, a personal one; and,\nafter that, are many others of to-day right when they tell us that the\nworld, and nature itself, is god? These are conclusions that threaten\nconfusion to the human brain. And yet they are the logical consequences of\n\u201crelative truth,\u201d and any one reluctant to accept these consequences would\nprove thereby that he has never realized what absurdities are marketed as\nrelative truth.\n\nOr shall we give it up, as entirely impossible, to judge of the truth or\nfalseness of doctrines and views? Are we to value them only so far as they\nare adapted to a period, and as moulding and benefiting that period? This\nopinion indeed is held. \u201cThe values of science and philosophy,\u201d says\n_Paulsen_, \u201cof our arts and poetry, consist in what they give us; whether\na distant future will still use them is very questionable. Scholastic\nphilosophy has passed away; we use it no longer; that is, however, no\nproof against its value; if it has made the generations living in the\nlatter half of the Middle Ages more intelligent and wise ... then it has\ndone all that could rightfully be expected of it: having served its\npurpose, it may be laid with the dead: there is no philosophy of enduring\nvalue.\u201d \u201cWhatever new ideas a people produces from its own inner nature\nwill be beneficial to it. Nature may be confidently expected to produce\nhere and everywhere at the right time what is proper and necessary\u201d\n(System der Ethik, 8th ed., 1906, I, 339, _seq._, II, 241).\n\nWe have here a very deplorable misconception of the real value of truth,\ndegrading it to suit passing interests and to promote them. This also is\nin conformity with subjectivism. But what could be answered to the\nstraight question: suppose the opinions which some prefer to call \u201cfalse\u201d\nare more useful and valuable than \u201ctruth\u201d? None but _Nietzsche_ had the\ncourage to say that \u201cthe falsity of a judgment is not yet a sufficient\nprejudice against it; here our new speech will perhaps sound strangest.\nThe question is: How far is that judgment life-promoting, life-sustaining,\npreservative, even creative of species, and we are inclined, on principle,\nto say that the falsest judgments are to us the most indispensable\u201d\n(Jenseits von Gut und Boese, I, 4, W. W. VII, 12.) The view that doctrines\nand opinions become especially or exclusively true and valuable by their\nusefulness for practical life, has become in our times the principle of\npragmatism.\n\nWhat others thought out only half way, _Nietzsche_ reasons out to the end.\n\n\n    To what lengths this contempt of objective truth may lead a man of\n    such an honest character as _Paulsen_, is learned from his advice\n    to the modern Protestant preacher who can no longer believe what\n    he has to preach to his orthodox congregation: he may speak just\n    as suits his congregation, orthodox as well as unorthodox,\n    according to the principles of relative truth. \u201cLet us assume,\u201d he\n    says, \u201cthat his congregation is of a remote country village, where\n    not the slightest report of the happenings in theology and\n    literature has penetrated, where the names of _Strauss_ and\n    _Renan_ are as little heard as those of _Kant_ and\n    _Schleiermacher_. Here the Bible is still taken to be the literal\n    Word of God, transmitted to us by holy men commissioned to do it.\n    In this case the preacher may speak without scruple of that book\n    in the same way as his present hearers are used to. Would he thus\n    be saying what is wrong? What is meant by saying the Bible is the\n    Word of God? The same preacher, if transferred to other\n    surroundings where he has to address readers of _Strauss_ and\n    _Kant_, may change his manner of speaking without changing his\n    view or without violating the truth one way or the other. He would\n    be speaking to them from their own point of view.... Again, should\n    the same preacher publish his philosophical scientific research,\n    he could speak of Holy Scripture in an entirely different way....\u201d\n    And he adds: \u201cSome have taken exception to this opinion.\u201d Surely\n    not without reason!\n\n    A justification of this counsel was attempted in these words:\n\n    \u201cJust as the electric incandescent light and the tallow-candle may\n    exist side by side, and as each of them may serve its purpose in\n    its proper place, so there exist also side by side various\n    physical and metaphysical ideas and fundamental notions: the\n    scientist and the philosopher and the old grandmother in her\n    cottage on the remote mountain-side, cannot think of the world in\n    the same way\u201d (Ethik II, 240-244). But the argument, if it should\n    prove anything, must be formulated thus: \u201cAs the incandescent\n    light can at the same time be a tallow-candle, just so can two\n    different and opposite views about one and the same thing be at\n    the same time both right.\u201d\n\n\nThus, thanks to the science of modern subjectivism, every fixed and\nunchangeable truth, especially in the sphere of philosophy and religion,\nis removed, and with it also every barrier to freedom of thought in\nscience as well as elsewhere. The human intellect in its autonomous\nself-consciousness may not only reject those truths which are proposed by\nrevelation or the Church; it may not only experience its views of religion\nand the world by giving free activity to its feelings, it also knows that\nto be no longer satisfied with the old truths means to be progressive.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nAbove we have sketched the deeper-lying thoughts on which the liberal\nfreedom of science is based; it is the humanitarian view of the world with\nits emancipation of man, and autonomous scepticism in thought, joined to\nthat sceptical disregard of truth which once the representative of\nexpiring pagan antiquity comprised in the words: _Quid est veritas?_ Now\nwe also understand better the liberal science which often claims the\nprivilege of being \u201cthe\u201d science, and which only too often likes to put\ndown as unwarranted and inferior every other science that does not pursue\nits investigations in the same way. We understand its methods of thought\nin philosophy and religion, for which it claims an exclusive privilege; we\ncan also form a judgment of its claim to be the leader of humanity in\nplace of faith.\n\nNo doubt there are many who are flirting with this freedom without\naccepting its principles entirely. They do not reason out the thing to the\nend, they argue against the invasion of the Church into the field of\nscience, and point to _Galileo_; they denounce Index and Syllabus, and\nthen believe they have therewith exhausted the meaning of freedom of\nscience. That the real matter in question is a view of the world\ndiametrically opposed to the Christian view, that a changed theory of\ncognition is underlying it, is by many but insufficiently realized.\n\nThis freedom is not acceptable to one who professes the Christian view of\nthe world. He will not offer any feeble apology to the eulogist of this\nfreedom, as, for instance: Indeed you are quite right about your freedom,\nbut please remember that I, too, as a faithful Christian am entitled to\nprofess freedom. No; the answer can only be: Freedom, yes; but _this_\nfreedom, no. A wholly different view of the world separates me from it. I\nsee in it not freedom but rebellion, not the rights of man but upheaval,\nnot a real boon of mankind but real danger.\n\nThe principle of liberalism has in the field of social economy already\ndone enough to wreck man\u2019s welfare. It has here proved its incompetence as\na factor of civilization. That in science also, where it is active in the\nfield of philosophy and religion, liberalism is the principle of\noverthrowing true science, without any appreciation for truth and human\nnature, that it is a principle of intellectual pauperism and decay, that\nit despoils man of his greatest treasures, inherited from better\ncenturies\u2014this we shall prove conclusively.\n\nIt is difficult to say how long the high tide of liberalism will sweep\nover the fields of modern intellectual life before it subsides. One thing,\nhowever, is certain, that just so long it will remain a danger to\nChristian civilization, and to the intellectual life of mankind.\n\n\n\n\n\nSECOND SECTION. FREEDOM OF RESEARCH AND FAITH.\n\n\n\n\nChapter I. Research And Faith In General.\n\n\n\nIntroduction.\n\n\nWhen the youth growing to maturity begins to feel the development of his\nown strength, it may happen that he finds his dependence on home\nunbearably trying. Perhaps he will say, \u201cFather, give me the portion of\nsubstance that falleth to me,\u201d and then depart into a strange country.\n\nThe men of Europe have for centuries lived in the Christian religion as in\ntheir fathers\u2019 house, and have fared well. But to many children of our\ntime the old homestead has become too confining. Modern man, we are told,\nhas at last come to his senses. He wants to develop his personality,\nthoughts, and sentiments freely, independently of every authority. He\nturns his back on his father\u2019s house. His parting words are the\naccusation: The old Church \u201copposes the modern principles of free\nindividuality, the right to drain the cup of one\u2019s own reason and personal\nlife, and it sets itself against the whole of modern feeling,\ninvestigation, and activity\u201d (_Th. Ziegler_, Gesch. der Ethik, II, 2d ed.,\n1892, p. 589).\n\nWe are already acquainted with this freedom. We approach now the main\nquestion: What is the true relation of the freedom, which man may rightly\nclaim for his scientific activity and reason, to external laws and\nregulations? Is man really justified to reject them all on the plea that\nthey degrade his intellect and are an obstacle to his development, or does\nthis rejection but manifest an error into which his desire of freedom has\ndecoyed him? This is the question, it will be remembered, that we reached\nsoon in the beginning of our investigation. We have already found the\ncategorical answer\u2014an emphatic rejection of such justification; we also\ntraced the hypotheses on which the answer rests. We now return to the\nquestion to discuss it in principle. We begin with the freedom of\nscientific _research_, in order to take up afterwards the freedom in\n_teaching_.\n\nWhat are those external powers that may interrupt or caution the scientist\nin his investigations and problems? Here we do not yet consider the\nscientist as a teacher, communicating to the public the result of his\ninvestigation, his ideas and views, from the university chair to his\nscientific audience, or to a wider circle of hearers by means of\npublications; we here regard him in his private study only, in the pursuit\nof which he perhaps encounters new questions, and new solutions suggest\nthemselves to him. What freedom can he and must he enjoy here? This\nprivate freedom must evidently be judged from a point of view other than\nthat from which the freedom in teaching should be judged. With the latter,\nthe interests of his contemporaries must be taken into account, and the\nquestion must be considered, whether they suffer by such teaching. The\nfreedom of the scientist is greater than that of the teacher. Moreover,\nresearch is the principal and most important activity of science: nothing,\nsurely, is taught that has not been previously investigated. If,\ntherefore, research is in any way restricted, so also is teaching; but not\n_vice versa_. Are there, then, exterior authorities that may restrain\nresearch and reasoning, and what are they?\n\nOne who lives in the Christian world knows at once of what authority to\nthink. It is not the state. The state cannot directly influence the\nprivate work of the student: if it may exert its influence directly upon\nanything, it is only upon freedom in teaching. No, the authority to think\nof is the authority of the faith, revealed religion and its guardian, the\nChurch.\n\nOf course, this is not the only authority. Even if a revelation from\nheaven had not been given us, yet those _general convictions of mankind_,\ncommon to all nations and times, of the immutability of the laws of\nthought and morality, of the existence of a supramundane God, of the\nretribution for moral conduct to be made in the world to come, of the\nsanctity of state-authority, of the necessity of private property, and\nothers, would ever remain most revered utterances of truth. No one would\nbe allowed to contradict this avowal of all mankind, relying on his own\nreasoning, which he calls science, and give the lie to the reasoning of\nall other men, in order to make his own reason the sole measure of truth.\n\nBut for the present let us pass over the natural authority of mankind, of\nits convictions and traditions. It is surpassed and replaced by the\n_authority of faith_ which belongs to _our Christian religion_. The latter\ncomes to us claiming to possess the only true view of the world, and\nlaying upon us the obligation of accepting it. It has even the courage to\nput its anathema upon propositions which the scientist may call science;\nit dares write out a list of the propositions which it condemns as\nuntenable. Against this authority the protest is raised: Where is freedom\nof research, if one cannot even indulge in his own ideas, if the intellect\nis to be cropped and fettered? What is to become of frank, unprejudiced\ninvestigation, if I am from the outset bound to certain propositions, if\nfrom the outset the result at which I must arrive is already determined?\nIt is intellectual bondage that the man of faith is languishing in. Thus\nreads the indictment; thus sounds the battle-cry. Is the indictment\njustified? Can and shall science take faith as a guide in many instances\nwithout detriment to its own innate freedom? And where, and when?\n\nFirst, the more general question: Is freedom of research compatible with\nthe duty to believe, or do they exclude each other in principle?\n\n\n\nWhat Faith is Not.\n\n\nWhat, then, is faith, and what does the duty to believe demand of us?\n\nHere we meet at once with a false proposition which the opponents of the\nChristian faith will not abandon. To them faith is always a blind assent,\nin giving which one does not ask, nor dare ask, whether the proposition be\ntrue\u2014_a belief without personal conviction_. According to them the\nbeliever holds himself \u201ccaptive to the teaching of his Church. He cannot\nreflect personally, but follows blindly the lead of authority and force of\nhabit.\u201d Thus \u201cCatholicism is the religion of bondage\u201d (_W. Wundt_, Ethik,\n3d ed., 1903, II, 255, 254). To them it is but an \u201cuncritical submission\nto the existing authority, uninfluenced either by the testimony of the\nsenses or the reflection of the intellect\u201d (_K. Menger_, Neue Freie\nPresse, 24 Nov., 1907). The campaign for liberal science is denouncing\nthose who \u201ceven to-day dare to demand blind faith,\u201d \u201cwithout proof or\ncriticism,\u201d faith in the \u201cword of the Popes and men pretending to be\ninterpreters and emissaries of God, men who have proved their incompetence\nand inability by the physical and religious coercion to which they have\nsubjected mankind\u201d (_T. G. Masaryk_, V boji o n\u00e1bozenstvi, The Battle for\nReligion, 1904, p. 10, 23).\n\nTo be sure, if the Christian faith were such, it would be intellectual\nslavery. If I am compelled to believe something of which I cannot know the\ntruth, this is coercion, and conflicts with the nature of the intellect\nand its right to truth. Infidelity would then be liberation. But faith is\n_not_ that.\n\nAs a rule this view is based on a presumption, which has already been\nextensively discussed, viz., that faith and religion have nothing at all\nto do with intellectual activity, but are merely the _product of the\nheart_, a sentimental, freely acting notion; for, of metaphysical objects\nno human intellect can form a certain conviction. It is subjectivism that\nleads to this view. According to it the subject creates its own world of\nthought, free in action and feeling, not indeed everywhere,\u2014in the sphere\nof sense-experience the evidence of the concrete is too great,\u2014but at\nleast in the sphere of metaphysical truth.\n\nSuch modes of expression find their way also into Catholic literature and\nlanguage; even here we meet with the assertion that religion is a matter\nof the heart, and for that very reason has nothing to do with science. On\nthe whole it is a remarkable fact that among believing men many\nexpressions are current that have been coined in the mint of modern\nphilosophy, and have there received a special significance. They are used\nwithout real knowledge of their origin and purposed meaning; but the words\ndo not fail to colour their ideas, and to create imperceptibly a strange\ntrain of thought.\n\nOne who is of the opinion that religion and views of the world are but\nsentiment and feeling, which change with one\u2019s personality and\nindividuality, can, of course, no longer understand a dogmatic\nChristianity and the obligation to hold fast to clearly defined dogmas as\nunchangeable truth. I can hold dogmas and doctrinal decisions to be\nunquestionably true only when I can _convince myself of their credibility_\nby the judgment of my reason. If I cannot do that, and am still bound to\nbelieve them, without the least doubt, then such obedience is compulsory\nrepression of the reason. Then it would indeed be necessary for the\nChurch, as _Kant_ says, \u201cto instil into its flock a pious dread of the\nleast deviation from certain articles of faith based on history, and a\ndread of all investigation, to such a degree that they dare not let a\ndoubt rise, even in thought, against the articles proposed for their\nbelief, because this would be tantamount to lending an ear to the evil\nspirit\u201d (Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 3. Stueck,\n2. Abtlg.). Fixed dogmas may then at the very most, according to the great\nmaster of modern thought, be of pedagogic value to a minor, until he be\ngrown to maturity. But to more advanced minds must be unconditionally\nconceded the freedom to construct dogmas as they think best, viz., as\nsymbols and images for the subjective thought they underlie. This also, as\nis well known, is an article of Modernism, which here again follows in the\nsteps of _Kant_.\n\n\n    \u201cEcclesiastical faith,\u201d says _Kant_, \u201cmay be useful as a vehicle\n    to minors who can grasp a purely rational religion only through\n    symbols, until in the course of time, owing to the general\n    enlightenment, they can with the consent of everybody exchange the\n    form of degrading means of coercion for an ecclesiastical form\n    suitable to the dignity of a moral religion\u2014that of free faith.\u201d\n    \u201cThe membranes,\u201d he says in another place, \u201cin which the embryo\n    first shaped itself into man must be cast off, if he is to see the\n    light of day. The apron-strings of sacred tradition with its\n    appendages, viz., the statutes and observances which at one time\n    did good service, can gradually be dispensed with; they may even\n    become a harmful hindrance when one is growing to manhood.\u201d\n\n\nOf course, to him who takes the position of _Kant\u2019s_ _dualism of belief\nand rational judgment_, freedom from every authority in matters of faith,\nand in this sense tolerance, will appear to be self-evident. Whatever has\nnothing to do with knowledge, but is merely the personal result of an\ninner, subjective experience, cannot be offered by external authority as\nmatter for instruction. The sole standard for this belief is the\nautonomous subject and its own needs. In this sense _Harnack_ tells us:\n\u201cThe kernel of one\u2019s being is to be grasped in its own depths and the soul\nis merely to recognize its own needs and the road traced out for their\ngratification. This can only be done with the fullest freedom. Any\nrestraint here is tantamount to the destruction of the problem; any\nsubmission to the teaching of others ... is treason to one\u2019s own religion\u201d\n(Religioeser Glaube und freie Forschung. Neue Freie Presse, 7. Juni,\n1908). To have one\u2019s religion determined by any authority, even a divine\none, would be treason to the sovereignty of man!\n\nViewed from this standpoint, the _reconciliation between faith and\nscience_ is no longer a problem. And they congratulate themselves on the\nsolution of this vexing question. Now, they say, deliverance from an\noppressive misery has been found, now the peace sought for so long is\nrestored. A fair division has been made: two worlds, the world of the\nsenses, and the world above sense experience. One belongs to science,\nwhere it now rules supreme; the other belongs to faith, where it can move\nfreely, undisturbed by, and even unapproachable to science. Just as the\nstars in the sky are inaccessible to the custodian of civil order,\u2014he can\nneither support them nor hinder them, nor pull them down,\u2014just so the\nrealm of faith is inaccessible to science: peace reigns everywhere.\n\n\n    Cheered on by this treaty of peace, _Paulsen_ writes: \u201cThus\n    critical philosophy has solved the old problem of the relation of\n    knowledge to faith. _Kant_ is convinced that by properly setting\n    the limits he has succeeded in laying the foundation for real and\n    enduring peace between them. In fact, upon this in the first place\n    will rest the importance and vitality of his philosophy. It gives\n    to knowledge, on the one hand, what belongs to it for unlimited\n    research, the whole world of phenomena; on the other hand it gives\n    to faith its eternal right, the interpretation of life and the\n    world from the view-point of values. There can be no doubt that\n    herein lies the cause of the great impression made by _Kant_ upon\n    his time; he appeared as the liberator from unbearable suspense\u201d\n    (Immanuel Kant, 1898, 6).\n\n\nTo a critical observer, such peace-making is utterly incomprehensible.\nThey probably did not consider that in this way _religion and faith_ were\nnot liberated, but _dispossessed_; not brought to a place of safety, but\ntransferred from the realm of reality into the realm of fancy. Similarly\nan aggressive ruler might address a neighbouring prince thus: We cannot\nagree any longer, let us make peace: you retain all your titles, and I\nshall see to your decent support, but you will have to lay down your crown\nand sovereignty and leave the country\u2014in this way we can have peace.\nReligion, once the greatest power in the life of man, for the sake of\nwhich man made sacrifices and even laid down his life, has now become a\nmatter of sterile devotion; it may, moreover, no longer claim power and\nimportance; it is now reduced to a poetic feeling, with which one can fill\nup intellectual vacancies. No longer is man here for religion\u2019s sake;\nreligion is here for man\u2019s sake. A buttonhole flower, a poetic perfume to\nsprinkle over his person. For he does not want to give up religion\nentirely. \u201cWe are the less inclined to give up religion forthwith, since\nwe are prone to consider a religious disposition as a prerogative of human\nnature, even as its noblest title.\u201d Thus _D. F. Strauss_, when he asked of\nthose who sympathized with his opinions, Have we still religion? (Der alte\nu. neue Glaube, II, n. 33). Of course religion has now become something\nquite different; it has been _consigned to deep degradation_.\n\nTo be sure, feeling is of great importance in religion. Dissatisfaction\nwith the things of this earth, man\u2019s longing for something higher, for the\nInfinite, his craving for immortality, for aid and consolation\u2014are all\nnaturally seeking for religious truths. If these are known, they in turn\narouse fear and hope, love and gratitude; they become a source of\nhappiness and inspiration. But these feelings have no meaning unless we\nare certain that there exists something corresponding to them; much less\ncould they of themselves be a conviction, just as little as hunger could\nconvince us that we have food and drink. If one cannot perceive that there\nis a God, a Providence, a life beyond, then religion sinks to the level of\na hazy feeling, without reason and truth, which must appear foolish to men\nwho think,\u2014as \u201cthe great phantasmagoria of the human mind, which we call\nreligion\u201d (_Jodl_, Gedanken \u00fcber Reform Katholizismus, 1902, 12),\u2014which\ndeparts from the sphere of rational intellectual life, and which many have\neven begun to contemplate from the view-point of psychopathology. It is\nonly due to the after-effect of a more religious past that religion is\nsuffered to lead still a life of pretence: moral support in struggles it\ncan give no more, nor comfort in dark hours, much less may it presume to\nguide man\u2019s thought. It stands far below science.\n\nDespair of the possibility of knowing higher truths is confronting us, the\ndisease of deteriorating times and intellectually decaying nations. But\njust as Christianity, once in youthful vigour, went to the rescue of an\nold World dying of scepticism, just as the Catholic Church has ever upheld\nthe rights of reason, especially against Protestantism, which from its\nbeginning has torn asunder faith and knowledge: so the Catholic Church\nstands to this day unaffected by the doubting tendency of our times,\nupholding the rights of reason. It also upholds faith. But its faith has\nnothing to do with modern agnosticism.\n\n\n\nWhat Faith Is.\n\n\nWhat, then, according to Catholic doctrine, is faith and the duty to\nbelieve?\n\nLet us briefly recall to mind the _fundamental tenets_ of the _Christian\nreligion_. It tells us that even in the Old Testament, but more especially\nin the New, through His Incarnate Son, God has revealed to man all those\nreligious and moral truths which are necessary and sufficient for the\nattainment of his supernatural end. Some of them are truths which reason\nby itself could not discover; others it could discover, but only by great\nlabour. And this divine revelation demands belief. Belief is natural to\nman. The child believes its parents, the judge believes the witnesses, the\nruler believes his counsellors. God wished to meet man in this way, and to\ngive him certainty in regard to the highest truths.\n\nBut revelation was to be an heritage of mankind, it was to be transmitted\nand laid unadulterated before all generations. For this reason it could\nnot be left unprotected to the vicissitudes of time, or the arbitrary\ninterpretation of the individual. It would have utterly failed in its\npurpose of transmitting sure knowledge of certain truth,\u2014the history of\nProtestantism proves this,\u2014had it been given merely with the injunction:\nReceive what I have committed to your keeping, and do with it what you\nplease. No, it had to be made secure against subjective, arbitrary choice.\n\nTo this end Christ established an international organization, the\n_Church_, and committed to it His Gospel as a means of grace, together\nwith the right and sacred duty to teach it to all men in His Name, to keep\ninviolate the heirloom of revelation, defending it against all error.\n\u201cGoing, therefore, teach ye all nations\u201d (Matt. xxviii. 19), was His\ncommand. \u201cGo ye into the whole world and preach the Gospel to every\ncreature; he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but he that\nbelieveth not shall be condemned\u201d (Mark xvi. 15). \u201cHe that heareth you,\nheareth Me, and he that despiseth you, despiseth Me\u201d (Luke x. 16).\n\u201cBehold, I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world\u201d\n(Matt. xxviii. 20). He gave His divine aid to the Church, in order that\nshe might _infallibly_ keep His doctrine to the very end of time.\n\nThus the divine revelation and the Church approach all men with the duty\nto believe: \u201che that believeth shall be saved,\u201d God gravely commands; \u201cand\nif he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as the heathen and\npublican\u201d (Matt. xviii. 17). They lay their teachings before the human\nintellect, bidding it retain them as indubitable truth, upon their\ninfallible testimony, yet only after convincing itself that God has really\nspoken, and that this Church is the true one, which cannot err. And only\nafter having convinced itself of the credibility of the proposed teaching\nis it obliged to believe. Hence, according to the Christian mind, faith is\nthe _reasonable conviction of the truth of what is proposed for belief, by\nreason of an acknowledged infallible testimony_.\n\n\n    The Catholic dogma we find explained in the definition of the\n    Vatican Council, which had to expose so many errors that are\n    liable in our days to confuse the faithful in their notions of\n    faith and Church. \u201cThis faith,\u201d says the Vatican Council (Sess.\n    III, chap. 3), \u201cwhich is the beginning of human salvation, the\n    Catholic Church teaches to be a supernatural virtue, by which,\n    through the inspiration and co-operation of the grace of God, we\n    believe to be true what He has revealed, not on account of the\n    intrinsic truth of it, perceived by the natural light of reason,\n    but on the authority of God who gives the revelation, who can\n    neither deceive nor be deceived.... Nevertheless, in order that\n    the service of our belief might be in accord with reason (\u2018a\n    reasonable service\u2019) God willed to unite to the internal helps of\n    the Holy Ghost external proofs of His revelation, to wit, external\n    works divine, especially miracles and prophecies, which, clearly\n    demonstrating God\u2019s omnipotence and infinite knowledge, are most\n    certain signs of divine revelation and are suited to the\n    intelligence of all.\u201d The Council adds expressly the canon: \u201cIf\n    any one say that divine revelation cannot be made credible by\n    exterior signs, and that men ought therefore to be moved to belief\n    solely by their interior experience or individual inspiration, let\n    him be anathema.\u201d We have here stated the Catholic dogma as\n    unanimously taught by all Christian centuries, by all Fathers and\n    theologians.\n\n\nHence, the act of faith by which I believe that the Son of God became man,\nthat I shall rise from the dead, is first of all a _judgment of the\nreason_, not an act of the will, or a feeling of the heart. It is,\nmoreover, a _certain_ rational judgment upon weighty reasons, not, indeed,\nsuch which I draw from intellectual knowledge, but those which rest upon\nthe infallible testimony of God. The act of faith agrees therefore with\nassent to historic truth in that it is of the same kind of knowledge, but\nupon the authority of infallible testimony. Just as I believe that\nAlexander once marched victoriously through Asia, because there is sure\ntestimony to that effect, so I believe that I shall rise from the dead,\nbecause God has revealed it. The difference being that in the former case\nwe have only human testimony, whereas in the latter God Himself speaks.\nThus, according to Catholic teaching, faith and knowledge may be distinct\nfrom each other, but in a sense quite different from that of the\nrepresentatives of modern, sentimental faith. The latter understand\nknowledge, in this connection, to be any judgment of the reason based upon\nevidence, and they deny that faith is such; but to a Catholic, faith, too,\nis a _judgment of the reason_, and in this sense true knowledge; only it\nis not knowledge in the more common sense of a cognition derived from\none\u2019s own mental activity _without_ the external means of authority.\n\nAs we have heard from the Vatican Council, it is the recognized fact of\ndivine revelation which bestows upon the matter of faith its certainty in\nreason. Hence the knowledge of this fact must precede faith itself. But\nthe knowledge must be certain, not merely a belief, for it is the very\npresupposition of belief, but a knowledge, derived from the intellect,\nwhich may at any time be traced back to scientific proofs if there is the\nrequisite philosophical training. So long as man is not certain that God\nhas spoken, he cannot have faith according to the Catholic view. One of\nthe sentences condemned by _Innocent XI._, to say nothing of other\necclesiastical testimonies, is this: \u201cThe assent of supernatural faith,\nuseful for salvation, can exist with merely probable information of the\nfact of revelation, even with the fear that God has not spoken.\u201d And very\nrecently there has been condemned also the proposition: \u201cThe assent of\nfaith ultimately rests upon a sum of probabilities\u201d (Decretum Lamentabile,\nJuly 3, 1907. Sent. 25).\n\nIt cannot be our task here to show at length how the Christian arrives at\nthis certain knowledge. Our present purpose is only to state the Catholic\nconcept of faith. We have already heard the Vatican Council refer to\nmiracles and prophecies. To most of the faithful the chief fact that\noffers them this security is the wonderful phenomenon of the _Catholic\nChurch_ itself, which proposes to them the doctrines of faith as divine\nrevelation.\n\n\n    Thus again the Vatican Council defines clearly: \u201cTo enable us to\n    do our duty in embracing the true faith and remaining in it\n    steadfastly, God has through His incarnate Son established the\n    Church and set plain marks upon His institution, in order that it\n    may be recognized by all as the guardian and interpreter of\n    revelation. For only the Catholic Church possesses all those\n    arrangements, so various and wonderful, made by God in order to\n    demonstrate publicly the credibility of Christianity. Indeed the\n    Church of itself, because of its wonderful propagation, its\n    pre-eminent sanctity and inexhaustible fecundity in everything\n    good, its Catholic unity and invincible duration, is a grand\n    permanent proof of its credibility and irrefutable testimony in\n    behalf of its divine mission. Thus, like a \u2019standard unto the\n    nations,\u2019 it invites those to come to it who have not yet\n    believed, and assures its children that the faith they profess\n    rests upon a most firm foundation.\u201d\n\n    The Catholic looks with pride upon his Church: she has stood all\n    the trials of history. He sees her endure, though within harassed\n    by heresies and endangered by various unworthiness and incapacity\n    of her priests, and attacked incessantly from without by\n    irreconcilable enemies, yet prevailing victoriously through the\n    centuries, blessing, converting nations and beloved by them; while\n    by her side worldly kingdoms, supported by armies and weapons, go\n    down into the grave of human instability. The most wonderful fact\n    in the world\u2019s history, contrary to all laws of natural,\n    historical events,\u2014here a higher hand is plainly thrust into human\n    history; it is the fulfilment of the divine promise: \u201cI am with\n    you all days, even to the consummation of the world.\u201d \u201cThe gates\n    of hell shall not prevail against it.\u201d He sees the Saints, who\n    have lived in this Church and have become saints through her,\n    those superhuman heroes of virtue, who far surpass the laws of\n    human capacity.\n\n    In the most widely different states of life in the Church he sees\n    virtue grow in the degree in which one submits to her guidance. He\n    witnesses the remarkable spectacle, that everything noble and good\n    is attracted by the Church, and their contrary repelled. He sees\n    the miracles which never cease in her midst. Finally he beholds\n    her admirable unity and vigorous faith; she alone holding firm to\n    her teaching, not compromising with any error; she alone holding\n    fearlessly aloft the principle of divine authority, and thus\n    becoming a beacon to many who are seeking a safe shelter from\n    spiritual ruin. In addition we finally have that harmony and\n    grandeur of the truths of faith, and\u2014perhaps not in the last\n    place\u2014that calm and peace of mind, produced in the faithful soul\n    by a life led according to this faith, by prayer and the reception\n    of the Sacraments. This is a clear proof that where the Spirit of\n    God breathes there cannot be the seat of untruth.\n\n\nThese are sufficient proofs to produce even in the uneducated, and in\nchildren, true and reasonable certainty, provided they have had sufficient\ninstruction in religion. It must, however, be emphasized that this\nconviction produced by faith need _not first be gained by scientific\ninvestigation_ of the motives of faith, or by minute or extensive\ntheological studies. A wrong notion of human knowledge frequently leads to\nthe opinion that there is no true certainty at all unless it is the result\nof scientific study\u2014a presumption on which is based the claim of freedom\nof science to disregard any conviction, be it ever so sacred, and the\nclaim that it is reserved to science alone to attain the sure possession\nof the truth. Later on we shall dwell more at length upon this important\npoint. Let it suffice here to remark that the intellect can attain real\ncertainty even without scientific research; most of our convictions, which\nwe all hold unhesitatingly as true, are of this kind. They constitute a\nbelief that is based upon the real knowledge of the reason, which\nknowledge is not, however, so clear and distinct that it could be\ndemonstrated easily in scientific form.\n\nThe certainty of faith, therefore, is based upon the knowledge that God\nHimself vouches for the truth of the teachings of faith. This relieves the\nfaithful from the necessity of obtaining by his own reflection an insight\ninto the intrinsic reasons of the why and the wherefore of the proposed\ntruth, and to examine in each instance the correctness of the thing. He\nknows that God has revealed it, that His infallible Church vouches for it;\nhence it is credible and true; that suffices for him, just as trustworthy\nevidence suffices for the historian concerning facts which he himself has\nnot observed.\n\nLet no one say that faith is a _blind belief_ and blind obedience, and\nthat dogmatic Christianity, or, to use another phrase, \u201cthe religion of\nthe law, demands first of all obedience: it is true it would like, besides\nthat, an interior assent for its thoughts and commandments, but where this\nis lacking the law itself furnishes the ways and means to compensate the\nlack of this internal assent, if only obedience is there\u201d (_A. Harnack_,\nReligioeser Glaube u. freie Forschung. Neue Freie Presse, June 7, 1908).\nNor let any one say that free research has \u201cat least this advantage over\ndogma, that its claims can be proved, which is not true of the other\u2019s\nclaims\u201d (_J. H. van\u2019t Hoff_, ibid., Dec. 29, 1907). These are\nmisrepresentations.\n\nThere is no obedience to faith which is not _internal assent and\nconviction_, and there is no clinging to dogmas which is not based on\nmotives of faith, or which could not at any time be subjected to\nscientific investigation. If the term \u201cblindness of belief\u201d were intended\nto express only that the believer holds the revealed doctrine to be true,\nnot because he has discovered its truth by his own reasoning, but on the\nauthority of God, then we might suffer the misleading word. But it is\nutterly false in the sense that the believer has no conviction at all.\nEven though others have it not, the faithful Catholic, the believing\nChristian, has it, and it is personal conviction. He has convinced himself\nthat God has spoken, and of the credibility and hence the truth of the\nrevealed doctrine, by his own reason, and this is why he assents.\n\n\n    Still greater is the misrepresentation of the real motive of\n    faith, if it is held to be the opinion of the Pope or of Roman\n    Prelates. _Wundt_ thus misstates the Catholic position: \u201cNot every\n    one can acquire knowledge. But any one can believe. The\n    enlightened leaders of the Church, and the Church herself first of\n    all, have knowledge, and by dint of authority determine what is to\n    be believed\u201d (Ethik, 3d ed., 1903, I, p. 342). According to the\n    popular scientific propaganda of unbelief, we have to deal in the\n    Church merely with \u201cignorant monks, Asiatic patriarchs, and\n    similar dignitaries, some very superstitious, who, for instance,\n    assembled in the third century and decided _by vote_ that the\n    Gospel is the word of God; we have to deal with men who have\n    proved their incapacity and incompetence\u201d (_Masaryk_, Im Kampfe um\n    die Religion, 1904, pp. 22-23).\n\n    Any one who shares such ideas about the supernaturalness of the\n    Catholic Church has, of course, forfeited his claim to understand\n    Catholic life and faith. The Catholic believes in his Church, not\n    on any account of Asiatic patriarchs and superstitious\n    dignitaries, but because she is led by the Holy Ghost, and the\n    Pope must believe the same as the humblest of the faithful:\n    neither the Pope himself relies upon his own judgment, nor does\n    the Catholic who trusts in the word of the Pope.\n\n    We add a few remarks which may further illustrate the action of\n    faith.\n\n    The knowledge of the fact of revelation, hence of the credibility\n    of the truths revealed, is certain, as shown above. Nevertheless,\n    _it does not compel_ reason to assent. Under ordinary\n    circumstances it would be impossible to think of one\u2019s own\n    existence, of the elementary laws of mathematics, without being\n    constrained by the evidence to give direct internal assent. But\n    insight into the truth of a thing is not always of this high\n    degree of clearness. In such cases it is an empirical law of the\n    mind that reason discerns of itself the _logical_ necessity, that\n    is, if it desires to proceed according to the merits of the case,\n    without, however, acting under _physical_ constraint. There\n    remains then the determination, the command of the will. This is\n    generally true of many judgments about natural things, but\n    especially true of belief. The knowledge of the fact of revelation\n    is true and certain, though it might be still clearer. The truths\n    offered by divine revelation are too deep for us to comprehend\n    them fully; they imply questions and difficulties for us to\n    ponder. We feel the physical possibility of pondering these\n    difficulties, although we see at the same time that the difficulty\n    is exploded by the certainty of the fact of revelation; but we\n    remain _free_ in giving our assent.\n\n    Herein lies the possibility of _meritorious_ faith, the\n    possibility of the creature rendering to God the free tribute of\n    his free submission. At the same time it opens the possibility of\n    turning voluntarily to doubts, and of submitting to them more and\n    more, till the mind becomes clouded and ensnared by error. Thus,\n    since faith depends on free will, the will is strictly commanded\n    to impel the intellect to assent and cling to faith and to put\n    aside doubts. God has revealed the truths of faith that they may\n    be firmly believed.\n\n    Hence faith is a product of the will also, and may become part and\n    parcel of the sentimental life. Firmly believed, revealed truths\n    engender in man love and gratitude, fear and hope. And being\n    beautiful and comforting, they are embraced fervently by the\n    heart, and become objects of desire, sources of comfort and\n    happiness. Nevertheless they are in themselves, and remain,\n    rational judgments, based upon insight and knowledge; just as the\n    fond recollections of home are and remain acts of cognition,\n    though our affections are twined round those reminiscences like\n    wreaths of evergreen.\n\n    What has just been said illustrates also another point,\u2014the\n    _relation of faith to grace_. The Vatican Council says: \u201cFaith is\n    a supernatural virtue by which, through the inspiration and\n    co-operation of the grace of God, we believe to be true what He\n    has revealed.\u201d Faith is called a gift of God, a work of grace. But\n    this must not mislead us to think that it is a mystical process,\n    taking place in the human mind, indeed, but not moving along the\n    natural course of human cognition, but along quite a different\n    course: perhaps an immediate mystical grasp of the revealed truth,\n    while natural intelligence stands aside, not understanding it.\n    This would be returning to our starting point,\u2014making faith\n    anything but a judgment of the reason. It is a common doctrine of\n    theology that the process of faith differs nothing in kind from\n    the natural process of human intellect in its apprehension of the\n    truth. It is belief on grounds recognized as sufficient motives\n    for assent.\n\n    What then does grace do? Two things. First, it elevates the act of\n    the soul in the process of believing to a higher sphere. Just as\n    sanctifying grace elevates the soul itself to a supernatural\n    sphere, permitting it to partake of the nature of God, so does the\n    grace of faith raise the acts of the soul to the supernatural\n    order. The _kind_ of cognition, however, remains the same: just as\n    a ring does not alter its form by being golden instead of silver.\n\n    In the second place, grace is _assistance_: it enlightens the\n    intellect that it may be able to see more clearly, not giving to\n    motives of faith an importance which they have not of themselves,\n    but helping the intellect to see them as they are; removing the\n    troubles and dangers of doubt which beset the mind, so that it may\n    retain that calmness which generally accompanies the possession of\n    the truth. The pledge of this assistance is given the Christian at\n    baptism and with each increase of sanctifying grace. But the\n    actual effect of grace depends on many conditions. If one omits\n    prayer and neglects religious duties, deafens one\u2019s ear to the\n    word of God, incurs knowingly unnecessary dangers to faith,\n    forsakes the path of virtue, then grace may withdraw to a\n    considerable extent; doubts become stronger, intellectual darkness\n    and confusion increase, and man goes on apace towards infidelity.\n\n    This is the Catholic doctrine concerning faith.\n\n\n\nFaith and Reason.\n\n\nBut to return to our question: In what relation do faith and the duty to\nbelieve stand to freedom of research? We said that freedom of research\nconsists in exemption from all unjust external restraint, that is, from\nthose external hindrances to the action of the human intellect which\nprevent it from attaining its natural end. Now what is this natural end?\nThe answer will make clear what restraint and laws must be respected by\nthe human mind, and which may be rightly rejected.\n\nOn the coat-of-arms of Harvard University is written the beautiful word\n\u201cTruth.\u201d Upon the human mind, too, is inscribed the word _Veritati_\u2014_for\nthe truth_. The human mind exists for the sake of truth; for the truth it\nreasons and searches; it is its natural object, as sound is the object of\nthe human ear, and light and colour the object of the eye. And truth\nattracts the mind strongly. The child wants the truth, and tries to get it\nby its many questions; the historian wants the truth, and tries to get it\nby his incessant searching and collecting. \u201cI can hardly resist my\ncraving,\u201d _William von Humboldt_ confesses, \u201cto see and know and examine\nas much as possible: after all, man seems to be here only for the purpose\nof appropriating to himself, making his own property, the property of his\nintellect, all that surrounds him\u2014and life is short. When I depart this\nlife I should like to leave behind me as little as possible unexperienced\nby me\u201d (apud _O. Willmann_, Didaktik als Bildungslehre, 3d ed., II, 1903,\np. 7). The great physicist, _W. Thomson_, a few years ago closed a life of\neighty-three years\u2014he died in December, 1907\u2014devoted to the last to\nunabated search for the truth. It is true not all are called to labour in\nthis field like _W. Thomson_. But every one who has capability may and\nshould help to promote the noble work. Only they are excluded who do not\nwant to look for the truth, or who are even ready, for external\nconsiderations, to pass off falsehood for the truth, unproved for\nestablished results. \u201cI know of nothing,\u201d says the ancient sage, _Plato_,\n\u201cthat is more worthy of the human mind than truth\u201d (Rep. VI, p. 483 c.).\nAnd so the poet _Pindar_ sings: \u201cQueen Truth, the mother of sublime\nVirtue.\u201d\n\nIf this is the aim of the human mind and its science, there is but one\nfreedom of research, the _freedom for the truth_, the right not to be\nhampered in searching for the truth, not to be forced to hold as true what\nhas not been previously vouched for to the intellect as true; in a word,\nthe freedom to wear but one chain, the golden chain of the truth. Hence,\nif the scientist should be compelled by party interest, or public opinion,\nto pursue a course in science which he cannot acknowledge as the right\none; if the younger scientist should feel constrained to conform the\nresults of his research to the pleasure of his older colleagues or of men\nof name, against his own better judgment, then he would be deprived of his\nrightful freedom of searching for the truth, and of deciding for himself\nwhen he has found it. But there is one sort of freedom the scientist\nshould never claim\u2014_freedom against the truth_, freedom to ignore the\ntruth, to emancipate himself from the truth. He is bound to accept every\ntruth, sufficiently proved, even religious dogmas, miracles too, provided\nthey are authenticated. Not freedom, but truth, is the purpose of\nresearch: emancipation from the truth is degeneration of the intellect,\ndestruction of science.\n\nWhat, then, does the duty to believe require of the faithful Christian? He\nis required, first of all, to assure himself of the certain credibility of\nthose truths which he is required to believe, and here authentic proofs\nare offered him. On his perception of the credibility of these truths, he\nought to assent to and accept God\u2019s testimony. Hence there should be no\ncoercion to believe without interior conviction, no obstacle put in the\nway of recognizing the truth. _Where, then, is here any opposition to the\nlawful freedom of research_, to the right of unimpeded search for the\ntruth? How is reason hindered in its search for the truth when truth is\noffered it by an infallible authority? We have here no opposition to the\nlaws of reason, but due honour to its sacred rights; no bondage, but\nelevation and enrichment, completion and crowning of its thought, for the\nhighest truth has been communicated to the reason that it may be of one\nmind with that Infinite Wisdom which has shaped reason for the truth, and\nfrom which it obtains its light as the planet from the sun around which it\nrevolves.\n\nTherefore, it cannot be said that \u201cthe Catholic resolves to believe as\ntrue what the Church teaches in the Apostles\u2019 Creed, but were he offered\nanything else as Church doctrine he would accept it as well. Hence these\ndoctrines do not express his own personal opinions, they are something\nextraneous to him.\u201d (_W. Herrmann_, Roemische u. evangelische\nSittlichkeit, 3d ed., 1903, p. 3). No, what the Catholic, what any true\nChristian, believes by faith, that is his innermost conviction, as it is\nthe firm conviction of the historian that what he has drawn from reliable\nsources is true.\u2014But what if the contrary were offered him? Well, this\nassumption is absurd; and why? Because God and His Church are infallible,\nand an infallible authority cannot speak the truth and its contrary at the\nsame time. Much less than a reliable historical witness can testify to the\ntruth and its contrary at the same time.\n\nThis same conviction gives to the faithful Christian the firm assurance\nthat no certain result of human research will ever come in conflict with\nhis faith, just as the mathematician does not fear that his principle will\never be contradicted by any further work. Truth can never contradict\ntruth. \u201cThus we believe and thus we teach and herein lies our salvation.\u201d\nIt is the very old conviction of the faithful Christian \u201cthat philosophy,\nthat is, the study of wisdom, and religion are not different things.\u201d _Non\naliam esse philosophiam, i.e., sapientiae studium et aliam religionem_\n(_Augustinus_, De Vera Religione, 5). It is precisely this that enables\nthe believing scientist to devote himself with great freedom and\nimpartiality to research in every field, and to acknowledge any certified\nresult without fear of ever having to stop before a definite conclusion.\n\nSuch is the _peace between faith and science_ according to Christian\nprinciples. They are not torn apart, but join hands peacefully, like truth\nwith truth, like two certain convictions, only gained in different ways.\nSimilar is the peace and harmony between the results of various sciences,\nas physics and astronomy, geology and biology, which results, though\narrived at by different methods, are still not opposed to each other,\nbecause they are both true.\n\nThe authority of faith, however, must be _infallible_; the authority of a\nscientist, a school or the state, can never approach us with an absolute\nobligation to believe it, because it cannot vouch for the truth. To the\nCatholic his Church proves itself infallible; hence everything is here\nlogically consequent. Protestant Church authorities have not\ninfallibility, nor do they claim it. Hence their precepts are seen more\nand more opposed. Hence to the Protestant the firm attachment of the\nCatholic to his Church must ever remain unintelligible, and it is\nregrettable that Catholics take instruction from Protestants about their\nrelation to their Church.(2)\n\nWe must go a step further. If there is a divine revelation or an\ninfallible Church\u2014we speak only hypothetically\u2014then no man and _no\nscientific research can claim the right_ to contradict this revelation and\nChurch. Scientific research is not the hypostatized activity of a\nsuperhuman genius, of a god-like intelligence. No, it is the activity of a\nhuman intellect, and the latter is subject to God and truth everywhere.\nThere can be no freedom to oppose the truth; no privilege not to be bound\nto the truth but rather to have the right to construct one\u2019s views\nautonomously.\n\nBut here lies the deeper reason why to-day thousands to whom _Kant\u2019s_\n_autonomism in thought_ has become the nerve of their intellectual life,\nwill have nothing to do with guidance by revelation and Church. They can\nno longer understand that their reason should accept the truth from an\nexternal authority, not, indeed, because they would not find the truth,\nbut because they would lose their independence.\n\n\n    It was _Sabatier_ who maintained that \u201can external authority, no\n    matter how great one may think it to be, does not suffice to\n    arouse in us any sense of obligation.\u201d And _Th. Lipps_ says on\n    this further: \u201cIf obedience is taken in its narrower sense, that\n    is, of determination by the will of another, then no obedience is\n    moral.\u201d \u201cIn brief, obedience is immoral\u2014not as a fact but as a\n    feeling, betokening an unfree, slavish mind\u201d (Die ethiseben\n    Grundfragen, 2d ed., 1905, p. 119). And _W. Herrmann_ assures us.\n    \u201cWe would deem it a sin if we dared treat a proposition as true of\n    which the ideas are not our own. If we should find such a\n    proposition in the Bible, then we may perhaps resolve to wait and\n    see whether its truth cannot be brought home to us after we have\n    obtained a clearer and stronger insight of ourselves. But from the\n    resolution to take that proposition as true without more ado, we\n    could not promise ourselves anything beneficial.\u201d\n\n\nIt is for the sovereign subject himself to decide whether the ideas\noffered are compatible with the rest of his notions. A truth offered from\nwithout is acceptable to the subject only when, and because, he can\nproduce of himself at the same time what is offered; but he cannot accept\nthe obligation of _submitting_ to that truth in obedience to faith. \u201cThere\nis no infallible teaching authority on earth, nor can there be any.\nPhilosophy and science would have to contradict themselves to acknowledge\nit,\u201d says another champion of _Kant\u2019s_ freedom (_Paulsen_, Philosophia\nmilitans, 2d ed., p. 52). Hence the reason why there cannot be any\ninfallible authority is, not because it does not offer the truth, but\nbecause the human intellect must not be chained down.\n\nNow, this is no longer true freedom, but rebellion against the sacred\nright that truth has over the intellect. It is rebellion against the\nsupreme authority of God, who can oblige man to embrace His revelation\nwith that reason which He Himself has bestowed upon man. It is a\nmisconception of the human mind, for it is by no means the source of truth\nand absolute knowledge, but weak and in need of supplement. Many truths it\ncannot by itself find at all, while in the quest for others it needs safe\nguidance lest it lose its way. If it refuses to be supplemented and guided\nfrom above, it demands the freedom of the weak vine allowed to break loose\nfrom the needed support of the tree, the freedom of the planet allowed to\ndeviate from its orbit to be hopelessly wrecked in the universe. The\nbarrenness and disintegration in the ideal life of our own unchristian\nage, are clear testimony that freedom is not only lawlessness but a sin\nagainst one\u2019s own nature.\n\nOr, do they seek to save themselves by asserting that a divine revelation\nand the founding of an infallible Church are _impossible_? Very well,\nthen, let them prove it. On this the question hinges. If they can prove it\nto us, that very moment we shall cease to be faithful Catholics, and\nChristianity will have been the most stupendous lie in history. But if the\nreverse is the case, then all declamations in the name of free research\nfall to the ground.\n\nThis impossibility, however, could only be proved by the aid of a\npresumption. This presumption is _atheism_, which denies the existence of\na personal God, or at least doubts it. If it is admitted that there is a\npersonal God, then it is self-evident that He can give a revelation, and\nfound an infallible Church, and can oblige all to believe. But herewith\ncollapses also the liberal principle that, in reasoning, one may reject an\nexternal authority. Hence the principle of liberal freedom in science can\nonly then be taken seriously, when one advances to atheism. Then, of\ncourse, they will say with _Nietzsche_: God is dead; long live the\ntranscendental man!\n\nOur assertions are proved by experience. At the end of the eighteenth\ncentury the enlightenment began by excluding all revelation; but it was\ndesired to retain the rational truth of God\u2019s existence. Since then,\nliberal science has been aiming at atheism in philosophy, whether open or\nmasked. And if we follow up the career of men who have left their faith,\nwe shall soon find that if they do not seek peace in the sheltering\nharbour of thoughtlessness, they have reached the terminal station of\natheism. There is no stopping on this incline.\n\nSince it is the express fundamental principle of the liberal freedom of\nresearch, that science is not bound to any external authority, it is\nevident that it is nothing else but the refusal to submit to God\u2019s\nauthority, hence, also, to submit to truth if it appears as revelation.\nFor, either it is admitted that if there is a divine revelation, we have\nto give it our assent\u2014and in this event liberal freedom of science would\nhave to be abandoned,\u2014or this liberal freedom is adopted in real\nearnest\u2014then it must be admitted that it is tantamount to _radical\napostasy and defection from the truth_. If a man wishes to be a faithful\nChristian and at the same time to uphold the liberal freedom of science,\nthen he has never made clear to himself what he wishes.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\n_Ecce ancilla Domini._ Thus spoke the Mother of the Lord, when she heard\nthe message that she was to receive the Word of the eternal Father in her\nbosom. This word of humility and submission was the condition under which\nshe could receive in herself the eternal Wisdom of the Father.\n\nBehold, the Handmaid of the Lord! This word of humility and submission to\nGod must also be spoken by the creature\u2019s intelligence, if it desires by\nfaith to share in God\u2019s truth. Without humility of mind a faithful\nattachment to God is impossible; pride and arrogance lead to desertion of\nGod, faith, and truth. _Multum errant, quoniam superbi sunt_, says\n_Augustine_ of the erring companions of his youth. Only if there is\nhumility does God\u2019s wisdom cross the threshold of the creature\u2019s mind,\nonly if there is humility can it be said of man: _Et verbum caro factum\nest et habitat in nobis, plenum gratiae et veritatis_.\n\n\n\n\nChapter II. The Authority Of Faith And The Free Exercise Of Research.\n\n\n\nPreliminary Remarks.\n\n\nWe must not stop at what we have just said in general about the relation\nbetween the freedom of research and the obligation to believe. We must go\nfurther into detail, in order to give a more exact explanation of how and\nwhere the authority of faith clashes with research and restrains it. Is it\ntrue that the believing scientist cannot move freely in his research, that\nthere are barriers on all sides which he may not overstep? Is it true that\nthe Church may prescribe for the Catholic scientist what he is allowed to\ndefend and approve, what he ought to refute and reprove, suppress or\nadvocate, so that his eyes must ever be turned towards Rome, to inquire\nand ascertain what might there be approved? And what a chain of\nproscriptions of free thinking is attached to the name of Rome! Index,\nSyllabus, _Galileo_\u2014link after link is added to this chain of miserable\nslavery!\n\nWe shall say something more about this chain later on. First we must\nconsider the principal question: Where and how do faith and science come\nin contact? And what we are going to say we shall condense into four\npoints. Thus freedom of science will be more precisely defined; it will be\nshown what freedom revelation, and especially the guardian of revelation,\nthe Church, offers to science: there can be no doubt that its natural\nfreedom of exercise must be left to science intact.\n\nWe shall deal in the first place with the _profane sciences_, and, at\nleast for the present, leave aside the discussion of theology, since it is\nclear that theology, being the science of faith, must assume a peculiar\nposition in regard to the authority of faith: theology, moreover, is a\nspecial mark for attack; accordingly we shall deal with it particularly\nlater on. However, the principles to be cited, being of a general nature,\nrefer also to the science of faith, and for this reason we shall have\noccasion to refer to them.\n\n\n\n1. Authority of Faith and Private Authority.\n\n\nWe often meet with the most inconceivable notions. We are told quite\nseriously that the Church teaches, and that the Catholic has therefore to\nbelieve, that the earth is a flat disc surrounded by the sea, as the\nancients believed; above it is a vault, below it hell-fire; that the earth\nstands still and the sun and stars revolve about it, just as _Ptolemy_ of\nEgypt taught; that God created the whole world just as it is now in\nexactly six days of twenty-four hours each; that He made the sun and moon,\njust as they are now illuminating the skies; that the strata, just as they\nnow look when bared by the geologist\u2019s hammer, even the coal-fields and\npetrified saurians and fossils\u2014all were made, just as they now are, well\nnigh six thousand years ago. The Scriptures teach this, the Fathers of old\nand the theologians believe this: and that is where the Catholic must get\nhis science. And then they are astonished, and consider dogma retreating\nbefore science, when they see other notions prevailing, when they see\nCatholic scientists defend without prejudice the evolution of the solar\nsystem, and even the system of the whole universe, from some primitive\nmatter, or assume an organic evolution, as far as science supports it (cf.\n_Braun_, Ueber Kosmologie u. Standpunkt christlich. Wiss., 2d ed., 1906,\netc.). They would be still more astonished perhaps to learn that similar\nideas had long ago been proposed by _St. Augustine_ and _St. Thomas_ (cf.\nSumma c. G. l. 3, c. 77; _Knabenbauer_, in Stimmen a. M. Laach xiii, 75\n_seq._).\n\nA distinction must be made between the teaching of the Church and the\nprivate views of individuals, schools, or periods. Only the teaching of\nthe Church is the obligatory standard of Christian and Catholic thought,\nnot the opinion of individuals. Hence not everything that Catholic savants\nhave held to be true belongs to the teaching of the Church. Only when\ntheologians unanimously declare something to be contained in the deposit\nof revealed truth, or the teaching of the Church,\u2014only then is their\nteaching authoritative; not because it is the teaching of theologians, but\nbecause it is contained in revelation or the teaching of the Church. Else\nthe maxim holds good: _Tantum valet auctoritas, quantum argumenta_. Nor is\nall that which a former age found in Holy Scripture, therefore to be\nbelieved as revealed truth, to the exclusion of all other interpretations.\n\nThe foregoing may be elucidated by the examples given above. When Holy\nWrit describes in figurative language and Oriental, demonstrative style,\nhow God created the heaven and earth, the sun and moon, the sea and its\ncontents, it means to teach us religious truths: that God is the First\nCause of everything, and hence that the sun and moon, for instance, are\nnot uncreated deities, as the Egyptian believed them to be. The narrative\nneed not be taken in a literal sense, as if God immediately formed\neverything in the exact condition as it now appears to us; it may be\ninterpreted in the sense that God let the present condition of things\ngradually grow out of the forces and materials and plan of nature He\ncreated, the result of a lengthy evolution. When our Lord tells us in the\ngospel that His Father in heaven feeds the birds of the air and clothes\nthe grass of the field, we know that this is to be understood as a mediate\naction of God, which He exercises through the instinct of animals and\nthrough natural forces which He created for the purpose. Now when former\nages, reading the narrative of Genesis, generally understood an immediate\ncreation of the world, because the knowledge of nature at the time did not\nadmit of any other interpretation, it is by no means necessary to conclude\nfrom it that every other interpretation must be rejected as against the\nBible, or that the Church herself has prescribed this literal\ninterpretation as the only correct one. As is known, _St. Augustine_, the\ngreatest Father of the Church, had another very liberal explanation of the\nGenesis narrative, and the Church has never censured him. (He taught that\nthe whole world had been created at one time, and that the six days of the\nMosaic narrative were the logical divisions of an account of the various\norders of creatures.) And now the interpretations vary greatly. The\npassages in Scripture, in which, according to popular modes of expression,\nthe sun is said to rise and set and revolve about the earth, the latter\nstanding in the centre of the world\u2014these, too, were interpreted literally\nin the days of the Fathers: there was no cause for interpreting them\notherwise; but it was only due to defective knowledge of nature at the\ntime. These temporary errors remained till corrected by research in the\nfield of the natural sciences: had the discoveries been made sooner, the\nerrors, too, would have disappeared sooner.\n\nThe Church knows, and the holy Fathers knew, that it is not the purpose of\nHoly Writ to teach profane sciences, but to instruct in faith and morals;\nif it speaks of other matters, it is but occasionally, and then in the\nidiom of common life, which is not the same as the scientific language of\nthe specialist. Indeed, the Bible does not intend to give scientific\ninstruction in such matters, nor could it have done so at a time when men\nwere not ripe for such enlightenment.\n\n\n    Thus _St. Augustine_ insists that the Spirit of God who spoke\n    through the authors of Scripture did not intend to instruct men in\n    matters which do not serve for salvation, and hence he objects to\n    the Scriptures being taken literally in regard to such matters,\n    because the Bible adapts itself to man\u2019s manner of speech: a\n    distinction is to be made between letter and sense (\u201cMulti multum\n    disputant de iis rebus, quae majore prudentia nostri auctores\n    omiserunt, ad beatam vitam non profuturas discentibus ... Breviter\n    dicendum est, ... Spiritum Dei, qui per ipsos loquebatur, noluisse\n    ita docere homines nulli saluti profuturas,\u201d De Gen. ad lit., II,\n    9, n. 20. Cf. De Gen. contra Manich. 1, 5, n. 3; 11, n. 17). He\n    further cautions Bible students against putting their own\n    interpretation upon obscure passages and then claiming it to be\n    dogma, because one may easily go astray and thus make the\n    Scriptures appear ridiculous. \u201cIn rebus obscuris atque a nostris\n    oculis remotissimis, si qua inde scripta etiam divina legerimus,\n    quae possint salva fide, qua imbuimur, alias atque alias parere\n    sententias, in nullam earum nos praecipiti affirmatione\n    proiciamus, ut si forte, diligentius discussa veritas eam recte\n    labefactaverit, corruamus, non pro sententia divinarum\n    scripturarum sed pro nosctra ita dimicantes, ut eam velimus\n    scripturarum esse, quae nostra est\u201d (De genesi ad lit. I, 18 n.\n    37). \u201cPlerumque accidit, ut aliquid de terra, de coelo, de ceteris\n    mundi huius elementis ... etiam non christianus ita noverit, ut\n    certissima ratione et experientia teneat. Turpe est autem nimis et\n    perniciosum ac maxime cavendum, ut christianus de his rebus quasi\n    secundum christianas literas loquentem ita delirare quilibet\n    infidelis audiat, ut, quemadmodum dicitur, toto coelo errare\n    conspiciens, risum tenere vix possit\u201d (Ibid. I, 19 n. 39). Cf.\n    also I, 21. _St. Thomas of Aquin_ also expresses himself in this\n    sense: \u201cMultum autem nocet, talia, quae ad pietatis doctrinam non\n    spectant, vel asserere vel negare, quasi pertinentia ad sacram\n    doctrinam ... Unde mihi videtur tutius esse, ut haec, quae\n    philosophi communius senserunt et nostrae fidei non repugnant,\n    neque sic esse asserenda ut dogmata fidei, licet aliquando sub\n    nomine philosophorum introducantur, neque sic esse neganda tamquam\n    fidei contraria, ne sapientibus huius mundi contemnendi doctrinam\n    fidei occasio praebeatur\u201d (Opusc. X. ad Jo. Vercel. Proem.).\n\n    The doctrine of the _Church_ concurs with this, as laid down in\n    numerous documents, many of them quoting the above-mentioned words\n    of _St. Augustine_. It also insists that the interpretation of the\n    Fathers be only taken as a standard of the Church\u2019s explanation of\n    the meaning of Scripture when they are unanimous on the meaning of\n    a passage relating to faith and morals; but not to other things\n    (cf. Encycl. Providentissimus, Denz. 10 ed., n. 1947, 1944; Conc.\n    Trid., sess. IV., Conc. Vat. sess. III., c. 2, Denz. nn. 786,\n    1788).\n\n\nNow if one simply opens Holy Scripture, takes up some passage at random,\nexplains it in its most literal sense, and then insists that this is the\nevident meaning, and goes on to assert with the same insistence that this\nis the interpretation of the Church, and a part of the faith of Catholics\nin regard to the natural sciences, then of course it is very easy to make\nout contradictions between faith and science: but such efforts cannot\nclaim to be scientific. It is not necessary to know theology and the\nprinciples of Catholic exegesis; but it is not proper that those who are\nignorant of these matters pass judgment on them, not even in the name of\nobjective research.\n\n\n    Hence we may easily see what we should think of a writer who\n    asserts that the examination of the Christian-Catholic idea of the\n    world leads to the following results: \u201cThe Books of Moses,\n    inspired by divine revelation, are the golden key to the\n    understanding of the whole history of creation. Other Scriptural\n    passages of the Old and New Testaments, the writings of the\n    Fathers, etc., are to be considered as supplementary to these.\n    According to these authorities the earth is a flat disc,\n    surrounded by the sea. Above it arches the firmament of heaven,\n    with its great lights for day and night. Below it are purgatory\n    and hell. All this is not the gradual outgrowth of lengthy\n    evolution, but was created by God out of nothing in a few days,\n    about six thousand years ago, of which four thousand are reckoned\n    before Christ and two thousand after Christ. Although modern\n    science has long since established that the Biblical narrative is\n    of no worth, nothing but an imperfect reproduction of older myths,\n    the Catholic Church continues to teach it literally to this very\n    day, spreading it broadcast by thousands and thousands of\n    catechisms, and insisting on it being learned as a part of\n    religious instruction in all schools, and to be accepted as the\n    revealed truth\u201d (_L. Wahrmund_, Katholische Weltanschauung und\n    freie Wissenschaft, 1908, p. 14. The scientific value of this work\n    has been considered by _L. Fonck_, Katholische Weltansch).\n\n    \u201cClericalism,\u201d we are told, \u201cstands on a rigidly fixed view of the\n    world, corresponding in part to the childhood of mankind, to the\n    dawning of civilization.... Philosophy, built upon the results of\n    progress, since it is unceasingly forcing its way ahead, cannot\n    remain in accord with the notions belonging to a remote past,\n    partly to Babylonian and Egyptian civilization, partly to the\n    thought of nomadic times.\u201d It is then pointed out how this view of\n    the world on which clericalism, that is, the Catholic Church, is\n    based, has already been overthrown in many instances. \u201cThe\n    geocentric position, the doctrine of our earth being the centre\n    and man the ultimate aim of the universe, must needs be abandoned\n    by the world of scientists, in view of the new system of\n    Copernicus; the doctrine also of the earth being a disc must be\n    abandoned in consequence of the voyage of Columbus, and subsequent\n    discoveries, which make it certain that the earth is a globe\u201d\n    (Prof. _K. Menger_, Die Eroberung der Universitaeten. Neue Freie\n    Presse, Nov. 24, 1907). It is surprising what little knowledge\n    suffices to warrant writing about theological matters in the name\n    of \u201cobjective research.\u201d\n\n    These passages, in regard to their scientific contents and manner,\n    recall vividly an American work that appeared some time ago, and\n    reached many editions. It is entitled, \u201cA History of the Conflict\n    Between Religion and Science,\u201d by _J. W. Draper_. The book was\n    answered by a competent authority, _De Smedt_, S. J., \u201cL\u2019Eglise et\n    la Science,\u201d 1877.\n\n    It seems _Draper\u2019s_ arguments have since become a pattern for\n    many. He, too, maintains that Holy Writ has always been declared\n    by the Church and the Fathers to be a source of profane science.\n    This, he states, is true especially of _St. Augustine_. We read:\n    \u201cThe book of Genesis ... also in a philosophical point of view\n    became the grand authority of Patristic science. Astronomy,\n    geology, geography, anthropology, chronology, and indeed all the\n    various departments of human knowledge, were made to conform to\n    it.... The doctrines of _St. Augustine_ have had the effect of\n    thus placing theology in antagonism with science....\u201d \u201cNo one did\n    more than this Father to bring science and religion into\n    antagonism; it was mainly he who diverted the Bible from its true\n    office\u2014a guide to purity of life\u2014and placed it in the perilous\n    position of being the arbiter of human knowledge....\u201d \u201cWhat, then,\n    is that sacred, that revealed science, declared by the Fathers to\n    be the sum of all knowledge?... As to the earth, it affirmed that\n    it is a flat surface, over which the sky is spread like a dome. In\n    this the sun and moon and stars move, so that they may give light\n    by day and by night to man.... Above the sky or firmament is\n    heaven; in the dark and fiery space beneath the earth is hell....\u201d\n    (pp. 57-63).\n\n    By reading again what we said above, especially the urgent\n    admonitions of _St. Augustine_ not to look upon the Scriptures as\n    a text-book of profane science, one will be able to appreciate the\n    scientific quality of the book in question.\n\n    The fancy of this writer has distorted Christianity and the Church\n    into a monster that has nothing more important to do than to tread\n    down and crush science and civilization. A few examples will\n    suffice to show how he proves the _contradictions between faith\n    and science_. The Christian religion teaches that man is subject\n    to death as a penalty for original sin: prior to that sin death\n    had no power over Adam and Eve. It is claimed that this is a\n    contradiction of science. But how? Long before Adam, thousands of\n    animals and plants had died, the author asserts. \u201cThe doctrine\n    declared to be orthodox by ecclesiastical authority is overthrown\n    by the unquestionable discoveries of modern science. Long before a\n    human being had appeared on earth millions of individuals, nay,\n    more, thousands of species and even genera had died\u201d (p. 57). The\n    author has completely missed the point. The matter in question is\n    not the death of animals and plants, but the death of man. The\n    infallibility of the Pope is refuted by the fact that he failed to\n    foresee the result of the war between France and Germany.\n    \u201cNotwithstanding his infallibility, which implies omniscience, His\n    Holiness did not foresee the issue of the Franco-Prussian war\u201d (p.\n    352, also p. 362).\n\n    How high his historical statements are to be rated is shown by the\n    assertion that _Cyril of Alexandria_ had much to do with the\n    introduction of the worship of the Virgin Mary (p. 55); that\n    auricular confession was introduced by the Fourth Lateran Council\n    in 1215 (p. 208). He asks when the idea originated that the\n    Pentateuch was written by Moses under divine inspiration, and he\n    finds that \u201cnot until after the second century [of the Christian\n    era] was there any such extravagant demand on human credulity\u201d (p.\n    220). It would seem incredible that any one could write such\n    stuff.\n\n    The author says in his preface: \u201cI had also devoted much attention\n    to the experimental investigation of natural phenomena, and had\n    published many well-known memoirs on such subjects. And perhaps no\n    one can give himself to these pursuits, and spend a large part of\n    his life in the public teaching of science, without partaking of\n    that love of impartiality and truth which philosophy incites\u201d\n    (VIII-IX). We do not care to argue with the author about his\n    experience in experimental research, nor about his love for the\n    truth, but he himself has shown superabundantly that they have not\n    sufficed to keep him clear from scientific shallowness and the\n    grossest blunders. Nevertheless, it seems that his scientific\n    ability obtained for him in the consideration of many the weight\n    of an authority. _Haeckel_, in his \u201cWeltraetsel,\u201d refers\n    repeatedly to the book, and recommends \u201cits truthful statements\n    and excellent discussion\u201d to his readers (Weltraetsel, 17. Kap.,\n    Wissenschaft u. Christentum).\n\n    Such is the fashion in which contradictions between faith and\n    science, and the Church\u2019s hostility towards scientific research,\n    are proved.\n\n\nThe result is that we must distinguish clearly between dogmas of faith and\nprivate opinions or interpretations. Of course it may frequently happen,\nand has happened, that the Christian savant is too timorous, and looks\naskance at the discoveries of science, and even thinks he ought to resist\nthem, because he is afraid that religious truth might be opposed by them.\nNor can it be said that this timidity is altogether without excuse, for\nthere was hardly one scientific discovery of the nineteenth century that\nwas not immediately grasped and exploited by eager enemies of the\nChristian religion. Too often has science been made the menial of\ninfidelity, and the assertion has been untiringly repeated that science\nand faith cannot agree. No wonder, then, that timid souls become\nsuspicious, that they are prone to resist the whole theory of evolution in\na lump, instead of trying to distinguish between what is of scientific\nvalue in it, and what is misused for the purpose of denying creation.\n\nNevertheless, such narrow-mindedness is strongly to be censured. It has\noften caused the reproach, that Catholics lack the freedom to admit\nscientific discoveries. They forget the wise admonition of the prince of\nmedi\u00e6val theologians, that it were advisable, in regard to scientific\nviews which have nothing to do with religion, neither to set them down as\ntruths of faith, nor either to reject them as contrary to faith lest\noccasion be given to think contemptuously of the faith. As long as men are\nand men think, narrow-mindedness will never be lacking. Hence if the\nbelieving scientist wants to know whether he is running counter to faith\nin any particular, he has to ascertain from theological text-books what\nthe Church declares to belong to faith, what explanation of Holy Scripture\nis unconditionally binding, and not what is the individual opinion of\ntheologians, much less what some pious nurse is telling the little ones.\n\nThis is the first rule concerning the relation between faith and science:\nit states what the scientist is _not_ tied down to.\n\n\n\n2. Science Retains its Method of Research.\n\n\nBut when and how may the scientist be restricted? Here we come to the\nsecond point: the directions which faith may give to the profane sciences\nare in themselves not of a positive but of a _negative kind_; revelation\nand Church cannot tell the scientist what he is to assert or defend in the\nfield of the profane sciences, but only what propositions he must _avoid_.\nThus every science is left free to pursue its own method of research. It\nis not difficult to understand this.\n\nFaith draws from divine revelation; profane sciences, as such, do not draw\nfrom divine revelation, but only from experience and reason. Philosophy\nwould cease to be philosophy and become theology did it demonstrate the\nimmortality of the soul by revelation. The anthropologist would cease to\nbe an anthropologist and become a theologian if he would attempt to prove\nthe common origin of mankind by Holy Scripture.\n\nIn other words, the profane sciences are distinguished from faith and\ntheology by their formal object, by the end they have in view, by the\nscientific method with which they handle their subject. Theology, of\ncourse, uses revelation extensively; and in this it differs from the other\nsciences. Hence faith cannot command the anthropologist to defend also in\nprofane science the common origin of the human race from Adam and Eve,\nbecause it is held to be a revealed truth. He must say: I believe as a\nChristian that this is true, established by divine revelation, and no\nscience will ever prove the contrary; but whether I can positively defend\nthis fact as resulting from anthropology, depends on my ability to\ncorroborate it by the methods of this science, that is by the testimony of\nprofane history. And just as little could the historian be required to\nobtain historical results of which he cannot produce the evidence\naccording to his method.\n\nTherefore faith can only tell the profane scientist that he must not\nassert anything which is held by faith to be erroneous; that it is false\nto say there is nothing but force and matter, that the human soul ends in\ndeath, or that the various families of the human race have not a common\norigin. As soon as the scientist knows by faith that a thing is false, he\nis bound to refrain from asserting it: bound in the first place by the\nduty to believe, but also by the principles of his own science, which is\nto find not error, but truth, which forbids to assert what has been proved\nto be erroneous. Perhaps his own means will not enable him to prove the\ntruth independently of revelation; then from the standpoint of his science\nhe must say, _Non liquet._\n\n\n    The position of the Catholic Church agrees with these principles.\n    She knows, and emphasizes that science has its own method, and\n    hence a natural right and freedom to proceed in its own field\n    according to its method. The Church rejects but one kind of\n    freedom, viz., the freedom to propound a doctrine proved by faith\n    to be erroneous. \u201cThe Church by no means forbids these disciplines\n    to use in their own field their own principles and method,\u201d\n    declares the Vatican Council. \u201cBut, while acknowledging this\n    lawful freedom, the Church takes care to prevent them from taking\n    up errors in opposition to divine teaching, or from creating\n    confusion by transgressing their limits and invading the realm of\n    faith\u201d (Vat. sess. III, ch. 4. Cf. also the letter of _Pius IX_.,\n    \u201cGravissimas,\u201d of Dec. 11, 1862, to the Archbishop of Munich,\n    Denz. n. 1666, _seq._)\n\n\nThese few remarks show the lack of intelligence in the charge that\n\u201cCatholic philosophy starts from dogmas and revelation,\u201d or that the\nChurch would dictate to scientists everything they should teach; that,\naccording to its principles it could claim the right \u201cto impose upon a\nphysicist of _Zeppelin\u2019s_ era the task of proving the Ascension of Christ\nor the Assumption of Mary by a\u00ebrostatic rules.\u201d This is simply gross\nignorance or misrepresentation.\n\n\n\n3. Restraint Only in the Province of Revelation.\n\n\nIn what matters may faith and the Church be a guide to research in this\nnegative sense? In all fields, or only some? Evidently only in their own\nsphere. But to the sphere of faith belongs only what is contained in\ndivine revelation, viz., the truths of _religion and morality_, as laid\ndown in Scripture and tradition, the truths of God and His work of\nsalvation, of man and his way to his eternal destiny, of the means of\ngrace, and of the Church. Whatever lies outside of that sphere does not\nbelong to the province of faith. This is true also of the teaching\nauthority of the Church. The purpose of the Church is to guard faithfully\nthe treasure of divine revelation and to transmit it in an authoritative\nmanner to mankind: hence her authority in teaching is confined to what is\ncontained in revelation, and what is necessary for an efficient custody\nand transmission of it to mankind. Hence she may declare certain truths as\nrevealed, she may reject opposing errors, she may condemn books offensive\nto faith, she may approve or reject systems of ethics. But she cannot set\nup wholly new religious truths or revelations. _Depositum custodi_\u2014this is\nthe purpose of the Church. Still less are matters of an entirely profane\nnature subject to the teaching authority of the Church. Profane sciences\ncan therefore receive direction from faith only in those matters which at\nthe same time belong to the province of faith.\n\nWhat follows from this? It follows that _almost all the profane sciences\nare incapable of being instructed or restricted by faith_, because their\nprovince lies outside that of faith, and does not come in touch with it:\nthey are left to themselves to correct their errors. When the astronomer\nin his observatory watches the movements of the planets, and bases thereon\nhis mathematical calculations, when the physicist or chemist in his\nlaboratory observes the laws of nature or makes new discoveries, when the\npathologist studies the symptoms of diseases in organisms, no warning\nvoice interrupts their work of study. Of course when they deny the\ncreation, the possibility of miracles, then they conflict with faith; but\nthen they have ceased to be naturalists, they have become philosophers.\nWhen the botanist or zo\u00f6logist in his laboratory is studying plants and\nanimals and collecting his specimens, when the pal\u00e6ontologist is\nexcavating and examining his fossils, they enjoy perfect freedom: all this\nhas nothing directly to do with faith. And there is no warning sign set up\nfor the geographer or geologist when settling the orographical or\nhydrographical conditions of countries or measuring geological strata; no\ndanger signal disturbs the linguist in establishing the grammar of unknown\nlanguages, nor the arch\u00e6ologist or the historian, when they discover new\ndocuments or decipher inscriptions. Nor does anybody interrupt the\nmathematician in his calculations.\n\nWhat unnecessary worry, then, for the representatives of mathematics,\ngeology, pal\u00e6ontology, and chemistry to write burning protests against the\nfetters of dogma in the interest of their scientific activity! And it is\nsuperfluous worry for professors of the technical arts to get excited by\nimagining that electricity and steam must be treated according to\necclesiastical precepts. Nor is there need of emphasizing the statement\nthat there cannot be a Catholic chemistry, geography, or mathematics\u2014it is\nself-evident.\n\nHence almost the entire province of the profane sciences, which are the\npride of our age and occupy the foremost position in our universities,\nwith their laboratories, institutes and observatories and meteorological\nstations, are free and perfectly undisturbed by faith. If accordingly any\none should be of the opinion that the Christian-minded scientist were\nhindered in his scientific research, he would have to consider him an\nunhampered investigator at least in this vast field.\n\nMost in touch with faith comes _philosophy_. Not in the vast field of\nlogic, of empirical psychology, in questions concerning the essence of\nbodies and their forces, in matters of mere history of philosophy; but in\nquestions of views of the world and life, in metaphysics and ethics, it\ndoes. These, the highest questions, bearing on the direction and pursuit\nof human life, matters that most occupy the human mind, are at the same\ntime subjects of revelation; God Himself has deigned to teach the truth in\nthese matters, to make them safe for all time against the error of the\nmind of man. Here philosophers encounter danger-signals. They hear, what\ntheir reason even tells them, that it is erroneous to think there is no\nworld of spirits, no God above nature, no immortality, no life hereafter,\nno providence. Nor could one say that philosophy is the loser by being\nkept from error which endangers human life. Nowhere are errors so apt to\noccur as in questions which are outside the sphere of immediate\nexperience; nowhere are self-deceptions more common than there, where\ndisposition and character continually influence the mind.\n\n\n    A modern representative of philosophy, _E. Adickes_, writes as\n    follows: \u201cIn the course of this history (of metaphysics) there\n    have been given long since all the principal answers that are at\n    all possible to all metaphysical questions. The building up of\n    metaphysical systems can and will proceed, nevertheless, and their\n    multiplicity will remain.... Of course, progress will not be\n    gained thereby: results will not gain in certainty, contradictions\n    and mysteries do not diminish.\u201d\n\n    \u201cIf the greatest of the ancient Greek natural scientists,\n    physicians, and geographers should rise again they would be amazed\n    at the progress made in their sciences; like beginners they would\n    sit at the feet of teachers of our day, they would lack the most\n    elementary ideas; they would first have to learn what every\n    grammar-school boy knows, and much of what they once considered\n    achievements would be disclosed to them as deception or mere\n    hypothesis. On the other hand a _Plato_, an _Aristotle_, a _Zeno_\n    or _Epicurus_, might readily take part in our discussions about\n    God and the soul, about virtue and immortality. And they could\n    safely use their old weapons, the keenness of which has suffered\n    but little from the rust of time and the attacks of opponents.\n    They would be astonished at the little progress made, so that now,\n    after two thousand years, the same answers are given to the same\n    questions.\u201d (Charakter und Weltanschauung, 1905, p. 24).\n\n    A science which must make such a confession has no reason to\n    reject with haughty self-confidence the intimations of a divine\n    revelation.\n\n\nThe _science of history_ again has not the duty of praising everything\nthat has happened within the Catholic Church or else to repress it; no,\nonly the truth is desired. But it must not start out with the assumption\nthat God\u2019s influence in the world, a divine revelation, miracles, and a\nsupernatural guidance of the Church, are impossible; nor must it attempt\nto construe history according to that assumption. Hence it must not\nundertake to explain the religion of the Jewish nation, or the origin of\nChristianity, by unconditionally ignoring everything supernatural, and\nattempting to eliminate it by prejudiced research and by means of natural\nfactors, whether they be called Babylonic myths or Greek philosophy or\nanything else; it must not impugn the credibility of the Gospel, claiming\nthat reports of miracles must be false; it must not write the history of\nthe Church and deliberately ignore its supernatural character, as if it\nwere the violent struggle of a federation of priests for universal rule.\nAssured results undoubtedly are arrived at in history less frequently than\nin other sciences; it offers full play to suppositions, hypotheses,\nconstructive fancy, the influence of ideas inculcated by education and\npersonal views of the world, especially when summing up facts. Hence here\nmore than anywhere else must moral character and unselfish love of the\ntruth stand higher than the desire for freedom.\n\nThe _history of religion_ and _anthropology_ must be forbidden to assume\nthat the human mind is but a product of animal evolution, that therefore\nreligion and morality, family and state life, reason and language, and the\nentire intellectual and social life have necessarily evolved from the\nfirst stages of animal life. If we add that _jurisprudence_ in its highest\nprinciples comes in touch with faith, and that it also must not dispute\nthe divine right of the Church, we have mentioned the most important\nsciences and instances in which the investigator must take faith into\nconsideration.\n\nWe now understand in what sense we may rightly speak of a \u201c_Christian\nphilosophy and science_\u201d or of a \u201c_Catholic science of history_.\u201d Surely\nnot in this sense that philosophy and history have to draw their results\nfrom Holy Scripture or from the dogmatical decisions of the Church; nor in\nthe sense that they have to make positive defence for everything that the\nChurch finds it necessary to prescribe. The sense is merely this: they\nguide themselves by faith, as we said above, by refraining from\npropositions and presumptions proved by faith to be false. In a large\nmeasure this is also the meaning of the often-misrepresented term,\n_Catholic University_. In the reverse sense we may speak of a liberal\nscience. It is that science which in the field of philosophy and religion\nguides itself by the principles of liberalism and the principle of liberal\nfreedom and the rejection of faith. But to speak of a Catholic,\nProtestant, Liberal chemistry or mathematics, has no sense at all, because\nthese disciplines, like most other profane sciences, have no direct\nconnection with Catholicism, Protestantism, or Liberalism.\n\n\n    That we have stated correctly the _attitude of the Catholic\n    Church_ is evidenced by more than one official document. In the\n    decree of the Holy Office of July 3, 1907, the so-called Syllabus\n    of _Pius X._, the following (5.) proposition is condemned:\n    \u201cInasmuch as the treasure of faith contains only revealed truths,\n    it does not behoove the Church under any consideration to pass\n    judgment on the assertions made by human sciences.\u201d Similarly was\n    the proposition (14), likewise condemned in the Syllabus of _Pius\n    IX._: \u201cPhilosophy must be pursued without any regard to\n    supernatural revelation.\u201d\n\n    These condemnations stirred up anger: \u201cNow,\u201d it was said, \u201cthe\n    Church wants to subject the whole of human knowledge to her\n    judgment: this is unbearable insolence.\u201d But what follows from\n    these condemnations? The opposite truth asserted in them is this:\n    the Church in one respect must pass judgment on the assertions\n    made by human science, namely, in so far as they come in conflict\n    with the doctrines of faith. The only freedom rejected by the\n    Council is the freedom to contradict revealed truth: it must not\n    be held \u201cthat human science may be pursued with freedom, that its\n    assertions can be considered true and must not be rejected by the\n    Church even if they contradict a revealed doctrine.\u201d (sess. III,\n    ch. 4, can. 2). The Church does not want to judge on matters of\n    profane science; but she claims the right, due to her as guardian\n    appointed for the preservation of the pure faith, to raise her\n    warning voice when, for instance, natural science transgresses its\n    limits and trespasses on the province of religion by denying the\n    creation of the world. It is but self-defence against an attack\n    upon her inviolable domain. But she does not claim the authority\n    to sit in judgment upon the results of astro-physics, upon the\n    atom-hypothesis, or its opposite; or on the acceptance of a theory\n    about ions or earthquakes.\n\n\nAnother question may be touched upon: Is the _Catholic historian_ free to\nproceed steadily in the search after historic truth, even where he\ndiscovers facts which do not reflect honour on his Church? And where it is\na question of uncertain, private revelation, of doubtfulness of relics and\nother sacred objects exposed for public worship, may he proceed\nundisturbed with his critical research, or is he restrained by\necclesiastical authority?\n\nShould the Catholic meet with dark passages in the history of his Church,\nthen every well-meaning observer will demand that he display in the\ntreatment of such matters a pious forbearance for his Church. His respect\nfor her will dictate this. Unsparing criticism and hunting for blemishes\nand shadows must be excluded. But he cannot on this account be bound to\npass by the unpleasant facts he may meet in his researches, or to cloak or\ndeny them against his better knowledge. He knows that the divinity of his\nChurch shows itself to best advantage just because, notwithstanding many\nweaknesses and faults, past and present, she passes unvanquished and\nimperishable through all storms,\u2014a token of the supernatural origin of her\nstrength and power of endurance.\n\nIt was this very thought that moved _Leo XIII._ to open the Vatican\nArchives for freest research to friend and enemy,\u2014the clearest proof that\ncould possibly be given that the Church does not fear historical truth. In\nhis letter of admonition, of August 18, 1883, urging the fostering of\nhistoriography, the same Pope gives the following rules for the Catholic\nscientist: \u201cThe first law of history is that it must not say anything\nfalse; the second, that it must not be afraid of saying the truth, lest a\nsuspicion of partiality and unfairness arise.\u201d An excellent example of the\napplication of these rules is found in _L. v. Pastor\u2019s_ \u201cHistory of the\nPopes,\u201d especially in what he says about _Alexander VI._ and _Leo X._\n\nIn his historical investigation of private revelations, such as those of\n_St. Gertrude_, _St. Mechtild_, _Bl. Juliana of Li\u00e8ge_, or of relics and\nobjects of veneration, the historian is likewise not restricted by\nChurch-direction. Having merely the task of preserving the treasure of the\nfaith received from Christ and the Apostles, the Church in her function as\nTeacher never vouches for the divine origin of new, private revelations,\nnor for the accuracy of pious traditions of another kind. True, she\ndecides authoritatively whether private revelations contain anything\nagainst faith and morals, but she decides nothing more. If she accepts\nsuch revelations or traditions as genuine, she claims for the facts in\nquestion only that human faith which corresponds to their historical\nproof.\n\n\n    This is clearly stated by the recent encyclical _Pascendi_: \u201cIn\n    judging of pious traditions, the following must be kept in mind:\n    the Church employs such prudence in treating of these matters that\n    she does not allow such traditions to be written about except with\n    great precaution and only after making the declarations required\n    by _Urban VIII._; and even then, after this has been properly\n    done, the Church by no means asserts the truth of the private\n    revelation or of the tradition, but merely permits them to be\n    believed, provided there be sufficient human reasons. It was in\n    this sense that the Sacred Congregation of Rites declared\n    thirty-one years ago: \u2018These apparitions are neither approved nor\n    condemned by the Holy See; it merely permits them to be believed\n    in a natural way, provided the tradition on which they rest be\n    corroborated by credible testimonies and documents.\u2019 Whoever\n    follows this maxim is safe. The veneration of such things is\n    always conditional, it is only relative, and on the condition that\n    the tradition be true. In so far only is the veneration absolute\n    as it relates to the Saint to whom the veneration is paid. The\n    same applies to the veneration of relics.\u201d (_Benedict XIV._ says\n    of private revelations: \u201cPraedictis revelationibus etsi\n    _approbatis_, non debere nec posse a nobis adhiberi assensum fidei\n    catholicae, sed tantum fidei humanae juxta regulas prudentiae,\n    juxta quas praedictae revelationes sunt probabiles et pie\n    credibiles.\u201d De Serv. Dei beatificatione, III, c. ult. n. 15).\n\n    Hence the historian is free to investigate such traditions\n    critically, provided, of course, that he does not violate the\n    reverence due to sacred things.\n\n\n\n4. Infallible and Non-Infallible Teachings.\n\n\nNow to consider a last point. Does it not rest entirely with the pleasure\nof ecclesiastical authority, as would seem from what has been said above,\nto suppress at any time the results, or at least the hypotheses, of\nscientific research by pointing to putative truths of faith presumed to be\nin opposition? Then, of course, the scientist would be at the mercy of a\nzealous ecclesiastical authority. Or will it perhaps be said that this\nauthority is infallible in its every decision? Think of _Galileo_, of the\ninterdict against the Copernican view of the world, and you will be able\nfully to appreciate the danger alluded to!\n\nWe shall later on return to the famous case of _Galileo_. For the present\nwe only call attention to a distinction which must not be overlooked, the\ndistinction between infallible teachings and those that are not\ninfallible.(3)\n\nAccording to Catholic teaching, the universal teaching body of the Church,\nwhen declaring unanimously to be an object of faith something relating to\nfaith and morals, is endowed with _infallibility_, and also when in its\ndaily practice of the faith it unanimously professes a doctrine to be a\ntruth of faith. This infallibility is also possessed by the Pope alone\nwhen, acting in his capacity as Supreme Teacher of the Church in matters\nof faith and morals, he intends to give a permanent decision for the whole\nChurch (ex cathedra).\n\nBesides these infallible teachings there are also _non-infallible_\nteachings, and they are the more frequent. Such are, first of all, the\nordinary doctrinal utterances of the Pope himself in his regular\nsupervision of the teaching of doctrine: these instructions and\ndeclarations are of a lower kind than those peremptory ones that are\npronounced ex cathedra: he is infallible only in the utterance of these\nultimate, supreme decisions, the chief bulwark, as it were, erected\nagainst the floods of error. Decisions ex cathedra are very rare.\nEncyclical letters, too, are, as a rule, not infallible. It is\nself-evident that the theological opinions and statements of the Pope as a\nprivate person, not as Supreme Head of the Church, do not belong here at\nall. They have no official character and are in no way binding.\n\nAmong decisions that are not infallible are further included, in various\ndegrees, the doctrinal utterances of Bishops, of particular synods, and\nespecially those of the Roman Congregations. The latter are bodies of\nCardinals, delegated by the Head of the Church, as highest Papal boards,\nto co-operate with him in the various offices of administration. Of these,\nthe Congregation of the Holy Office and that of the Index may also render\ndecisions on doctrinal questions. Although the Congregations act by virtue\nof their delegation from the Pope, and publish their decrees with his\nconsent, the decisions are not decisions of the Pope himself, but remain\ndecisions of the Cardinals. Much less can the infallibility of the Pope\npass over to them: it is his personal prerogative, the aid of the Holy\nGhost is promised to him, and protects his judgments under certain\nconditions against error.\n\nBut the Catholic owes submission also to the non-infallible teachings; and\nnot only an outer submission, a reverent silence, that offends not either\nverbally or in writing against the decision rendered, but he owes also his\ninner assent. But it cannot be that unconditional inner assent which he\nowes to the infallible decision, for this he holds to be irrevocably\ncertain; nor is his assent to non-infallible decisions a real act of\nfaith. He is not given any unconditional guarantee of the truth. An error\nis, of course, most unlikely, but not absolutely impossible. Hence the\nfaithful Catholic should always be ready to accept such decisions in as\nfar as they are warranted by recognized truth. This applies to all kinds\nof doctrinal teaching, but of course in different ways, corresponding to\nthe degree of authority,\u2014for instance, Papal decisions are of higher\nauthority than those of the Congregations,\u2014yet it applies also to the\ndoctrinal decisions of the Congregations, because they are the ordinary\nteaching organs of the Church.\n\n\n    When the Congregation of the Index, 1857, had forbidden the works\n    of _Guenther_ and many thought they could evade the decision,\n    _Pius IX._ wrote, June 15, to the Archbishop of Cologne: \u201cThe\n    decree is so far-reaching that nobody may think himself free not\n    to hold what we have confirmed.\u201d Similar was what the Pope had\n    written to the Archbishop of Mecheln after the condemnation of the\n    ontological errors of _Ubagh_. The Motu proprio of _Pius X._ of\n    November 8, 1907, speaks similarly of the obligation of submission\n    to the decisions of the Papal Biblical Commission relating to\n    doctrines, and to the decrees of Congregations when approved by\n    the Pope. (Cf. also the Syllabus of Pius IX., sent. 22.)\n\n    Theologians agree that this requisite internal assent is not the\n    same as irrevocable assent. This was also declared by _Pius IX._\n    in his letter to the Archbishop of Munich-Freising, saying that\n    this inner submission is by no means faith; and no theologian will\n    ascribe infallibility to a mere congregational decree. (See on\n    this point: _e.g._ _Grisar_, Galileistudien, 1882, 171 _seq._ Cr.\n    _Pesch_, Theol. Zeitfragen, Erste Folge, 1900, III. _Egger_,\n    Streiflichter ueber die freiere Bibelforschung, 1889.)\n\n    It would be erroneous to think that only in recent times, after\n    the embarrassment caused by the regrettable _Galileo_ decision the\n    subtle distinction had been invented that congregational decisions\n    are not binding on Catholics with absolute force. This was taught\n    by theologians long before the _Galileo_ case caused any\n    excitement. In this sense the celebrated writer on Moral Theology,\n    _Lacroix_, said: \u201cThe declarations of none of these Congregations\n    are infallible.... No infallibility is promised to the\n    Congregation in so far as it is viewed as separate from the Pope\u201d\n    (Theologia Moralis, 1729, I, n. 215). _Raccioli_, soon after the\n    _Galileo_ trial, wrote: \u201cThe Holy Congregation of Cardinals as\n    separate from the Pope cannot give to any proposition the proper\n    authority of faith.\u201d And he adds: \u201cThere being extant no decision\n    of the Pope, or of a Council directed and confirmed by him, the\n    proposition of the sun moving and the earth standing still cannot\n    on the strength of a congregational decree be considered a truth\n    that must be believed\u201d (Almagestum novum, 1651, I, 52).\n\n\nThe obligation to give interior assent also to an authority not\ninfallible, cannot seem strange if this authority offers a guarantee for\nthe truth commensurate to the assent demanded. We certainly ask of a child\nto receive the instruction from his parent and teacher with internal\nassent, so far as the latter does not run counter to its instinct for the\ntruth, else the education of the child and the needful influence over its\nintellectual life would be impossible. Upon the Church has been bestowed\nby her divine Founder the task of guiding the faithful authoritatively in\nthe educational matters committed to the Church, and not only in their\nyouth but throughout their lives. This guidance in religion and morality\nwould be impossible if the faithful could constantly deny their internal\nassent to the instruction of the Church, which is given generally in a\nform that is not infallible. The full power of the Church to teach with\nauthority implies a corresponding duty of the faithful to assent to her\nteachings as far as this is possible. Does not the scientific specialist\nthink himself obliged to accept a proposition on the strength of a certain\nauthority, even if the latter\u2019s infallibility is not established? He reads\nin his scientific periodical and finds in it the report of special\nresearches made by a colleague. He cannot examine them over again, yet he\naccepts them because of the reliability of his colleague, in which he sees\nthe guarantee of truth. Likewise, only more so, does the Catholic owe it\nto his sense of truth to impose upon himself an assent even where the\nrepresentatives of the teaching authority of the Church are not endowed in\ntheir decision with the gift of infallibility. For he knows that even in\nsuch teachings the Church is commonly under the guidance of the Holy\nGhost, who will seldom tolerate error. He is promised to the teaching\nChurch for the safe guidance of the faithful; these declarations are,\nhowever, the ordinary doctrinal utterances of that ecclesiastical office.\nAnd the Holy Ghost cannot permit that the teaching authority should by a\nwrong decision forfeit the confidence it enjoys.\n\nMoreover, this authority ranks very high even when looked at from a purely\nhuman standpoint. Those who are invested with it are mostly men of great\nlearning, competent to give such doctrinal decisions by virtue of their\nexperience and position, and learned advisers are at their side. They are\nguided by the tradition and wisdom of a universal Church, which measures\nits history by thousands of years: the decisions, too, are for the most\npart but the application or repetition of previous doctrinal utterances.\nBesides, there is the hesitating caution which advances to a decision only\nafter long deliberations, and in undemonstrated matters usually refrains\nfrom decision; a caution which has increased still more in recent times,\nsince so many subtle questions have arisen on the boundaries of science\nand faith. It is also known that many inquisitive eyes are constantly\nturned on Rome, and a single wrong decision might entail most disagreeable\nconsequences for friend and foe. The pressure must be very great before a\nmuch-disputed question is taken up at all.\n\nOf course it is by no means impossible that difficulties may pile up in\nsuch a way that an error may really be made. History knows of such a case.\nBut the very fact that the one case of _Galileo_ is always quoted, and,\ntherefore, that in the long history of the Congregations this is\nconsidered to be almost the only case of importance, is a proof how\ncarefully the Congregations proceed, and that supernatural aid is granted\nthem. An institution which in the course of its long existence had to\nreply to innumerable questions and against which only one wrong decision\nof importance can be pointed out, must necessarily be an exemplary\ninstitution. An institution so free from human error must surely be guided\nby the Holy Ghost. Compare with this the many cases in which science has\nhad to correct itself, had to abandon its long-championed propositions as\nuntenable.\n\nThus, in a given case, the decision is not difficult for the Catholic. On\none side stand the representatives of a science which has erred, very\noften, incomparably more frequently than the ecclesiastical teaching\nauthority, and which lacks the special aid of God. On the other side is\nthe ecclesiastical authority, which has almost never erred, and which\nenjoys special divine aid; moreover, it examines into its questions with\ngreater caution and care, because it has more to lose. In addition it is\nalmost invariably able to point to a large number, and frequently the\nmajority, of savants who indorse its decisions, because these mostly\nconcern disputed questions not yet scientifically determined. Hence the\nCatholic will find no difficulty in presuming that the decision is in\naccord with the truth; the more so because, as a rule, he himself is\nunable to examine scientifically both sides of the question.\n\nShould any one, nevertheless, be clearly convinced, by substantial and\nvalid reasons, that there has been prejudgment, then he would not be any\nlonger obliged to give it his interior assent: truth before all else. It\nwould be easy, too, by presenting reliable information to an authoritative\nquarter, to secure the triumph of the truth. However, in this case a man\nmust be ever on his guard against the tendency to overrate his own\narguments. In excitement he easily thinks himself to be certainly in the\nright, but when considering the matter quietly before God and his\nconscience, he will rarely come to the conclusion that it would be wise to\nset his judgment above the decision. In the case of _Galileo_ the decision\nof the Congregation was by no means opposed by a clear conviction of the\ntruth of the opposite.\n\n\n    Take, for instance, a more recent decision of the Congregation,\n    forbidding craniotomy. It has often been denounced. The question\n    was submitted to the Congregation of the Holy Office whether it\n    were permissible to teach that craniotomy is allowable in case the\n    mother cannot give birth to the child, and that both will have to\n    die unless the child be killed and removed by a surgical\n    operation. The Congregation answered twice in the negative, in May\n    and August, 1889. Neither craniotomy, nor any operation implying\n    the direct murder of the child or mother can be taught to be\n    permissible. The reason on which the answers were based is that\n    the direct murder of an innocent person in order to save human\n    life is never allowable; and this applies to the murder of a\n    child, which has as much right to its life as any other person. In\n    the case of craniotomy we have the direct murder of the child. We,\n    too, shall have to admit, if we judge according to the objective\n    morality of the action, that the Congregation is in the right;\n    though it may seem hard to let both mother and child die rather\n    than take a life directly, we shall have to admit that it is more\n    in accord with the sanctity of the moral law than the opposite,\n    though the latter may seem preferable to medical practice. Viewed\n    in the interest of truth and the purity of the moral law, it is\n    gratifying to know that there is a court courageous enough to\n    uphold this law always and everywhere, even when it becomes hard.\n\n\nSo much about assenting to doctrinal decisions that are not infallible.\n\nIn regard to _infallible_ decisions, the Catholic knows that there are\ncertain truths which no result of science can contradict. To these\ndecisions he owes unconditional submission, and he gives it with\nconviction: he knows the promise, \u201cI am with you always, even unto the\nconsummation of the world.\u201d New decisions of this kind are very rare. When\nthe dogma of the Infallibility of the Pope was proclaimed in 1870, the\nfear was frequently expressed that the Head of the Roman Church would\nhasten to make the fullest use of this prerogative, by erecting\ntheological barriers at all nooks and corners in the realm of thought. The\nfear did not come true; it was unfounded.\n\n\n    A Protestant scientist wrote recently: \u201cThose who thought\n    _Doellinger\u2019s_ prediction of a prolific crop of dogmas would come\n    true were disappointed. There has been no new dogma pronounced\n    since 1870, although there were many pious opinions that certain\n    circles would have been only too glad to see confirmed. On looking\n    calmly at the dogma of infallibility it is seen that it was, after\n    all, not so bad as had been feared during the first excitement\u201d\n    (_K. Holl_, Modernismus, 1908, p. 9, Religionsgesch. Volksbuecher,\n    IV, 7, Heft).\n\n\nWe may get a good idea of the precaution taken prior to the proclamation\nof an infallible decision by perusing the History of the Vatican Council,\npublished by _Granderath_, in three volumes. He describes the proceedings\nwith conscientious objectiveness. He shows how minutely all questions had\nbeen previously studied, with all the available means of scientific\ninvestigation, and how minutely and freely they were discussed by the most\nvenerable representatives of the Catholic world.\n\nCardinal _Gibbons_, Archbishop of Baltimore, gave his impressions of the\nVatican Council as follows:\n\n\u201cI happened to be the youngest Bishop that attended the Council of the\nVatican, and, while my youth and inexperience imposed on me a discreet\nsilence among my elders, I do not remember to have missed a single\nsession, and I was an attentive listener at all the debates.... I think I\nam not exaggerating when I say that the Council of the Vatican has been\nexcelled by few, if any, deliberative assemblies, civil or ecclesiastical,\nthat have ever met, whether we consider the _maturity_ of years of its\nmembers, their _learning_, their _experience_ and _piety_, or the\nwidespread influence of the _Decrees_ that they framed for the spiritual\nand moral welfare of the Christian Republic.\n\n\u201cThe youngest Bishop in the Council was thirty-six years old. Fully\nthree-fourths of the Prelates ranged between fifty-six and ninety years.\nThe great majority, therefore, had grown gray in the service of their\nDivine Master. Several Fathers of the Church, bent with age, might be seen\npassing through St. Peter\u2019s Basilica to the council chamber every morning,\nleaning with one hand on their staff, the other resting on the shoulder of\ntheir secretary. One or two blind Bishops could be observed, guided by\ntheir servants, as they advanced to their posts with tottering steps,\ndetermined to aid the Church in their declining years by the wisdom of\ntheir counsel, as they had consecrated to her their vigorous manhood by\ntheir Apostolic labours.\n\n\u201cBut to the gravity of years the members of the Council generally united\nprofound and varied learning....\n\n\u201cThey were men, too, of world-wide experience and close observation. Each\nBishop brought with him an intimate knowledge of the history of his\ncountry and of the religious, moral, social, and political condition of\nthe people among whom he lived. One could learn more from an hour\u2019s\ninterview with this living encyclop\u00e6dia of divines, who were a world in\nminiature, than from a week\u2019s study of books.... The most ample liberty of\ndiscussion prevailed in the Council. This freedom the Holy Father pledged\nat the opening of the synod, and the pledge was religiously kept. I can\nsafely say that neither in the British House of Commons, nor in the French\nChambers, nor in the German Reichstag, nor in our American Congress, would\na wider liberty of debate be tolerated than was granted in the Vatican\nCouncil. The presiding Cardinal exhibited a courtesy of manner and a\nforbearance even in the heat of debate that was worthy of all praise. I do\nnot think that he called a speaker to order more than a dozen times during\nthe eighty-nine sessions, and then only in deference to the dissenting\nmurmurs or demands of some Bishops. A Prelate representing the smallest\ndiocese had the same rights that were accorded to the highest dignitary in\nthe Chamber. There was no limit prescribed as to the length of the\nspeeches. We may judge of the wide scope of discussion from the single\nfact that the debate on the Infallibility of the Pope lasted two months,\noccupying twenty-five sessions, and was participated in by one hundred and\ntwenty-five Prelates, not counting one hundred others who handed in\nwritten observations. No stone was left unturned, no text of Sacred\nScripture, no passage in the writings of the Fathers, no page of\nEcclesiastical History bearing on the subject, escaped the vigilant\ninvestigations of the Bishops, so that the whole truth of God might be\nbrought to light....\n\n\u201cThe most important debate in the Council was that on the Infallibility of\nthe Pope. It may be proper to observe here that the discussion was rather\non the expediency or opportuneness of defining the dogma than on the\nintrinsic truth of the doctrine itself. The number of Prelates who\nquestioned the claim of Papal Infallibility could be counted on the\nfingers of a single hand. Many of the speakers, indeed, impugned the\ndogma, not because they did not personally accept it, but with the view of\npointing out the difficulties with which the teaching body of the Church\nwould have to contend in vindicating it before the world. I have listened\nin the council chamber to far more subtle, more plausible, and more\nsearching objections against this prerogative of the Pope than I have ever\nread or heard from the pen or tongue of the most learned and formidable\nProtestant assailant\u201d (North American Review, April, 1894).\n\n\n\nObedience of Faith and Freedom of Action.\n\n\nIn looking back at what has been said, we see the justice of the question:\nwhere is here any real injury to lawful freedom in thought and scientific\nresearch? In most of the profane sciences the scientist receives no\ndirections from the authority of faith; he is altogether free, as long as\nhe keeps within his province. In some matters he is given a list of errors\nto beware of: these are in the first place the great questions concerning\nviews of the world and life, of which, after all, it is very difficult to\nobtain scientific knowledge. But here he knows, through the conviction he\nhas of the truth of his faith, that he is offered the truth free from\nerror and prejudice.\n\nIt is true, adhering to a religious authority implies restraint. But it is\nonly the restraint of truth. Truth does not lose its claim upon the mind\nbecause it is offered to the latter by a supernatural authority; much less\ndoes the Creator lose the right to the tribute of homage of his rational\ncreature; and this tribute is rendered by voluntary submission to the\nrevealed truth. Upon the Church, however, has been laid the task of\npreserving unadulterated the legacy of her Founder from generation to\ngeneration. She is responsible before God and history for the faithful\npresentation of the most sacred inheritance of mankind. Therefore the\nChurch must raise her voice when the puny thoughts of men, called science\nand progress, rise against the saving truth to disparage, to falsify, to\nannihilate it. _It is not science the Church opposes, but error_; not\ntruth, but the emancipation of the human mind from God\u2019s authority, an\nemancipation that is trying to hide its real self under the guise of\nscientific truth.\n\n\u201cThe Church,\u201d says the Vatican Council (Sess. III, ch. 4), \u201chaving\nreceived with her apostolic office to teach, the obligation of preserving\nthe legacy of the faith, has also the God-given right and duty to condemn\nwhat is falsely called science, \u2019lest any one be cheated by philosophy and\nvain deceit.\u2019\u201d That the denial of the faith is flippantly called science\ndoes not alter the case. What determines the attitude of the Church is not\neagerness to rule, not a propensity to apply force to the mind, but\nloyalty to her vocation. If it is disagreeable for any superior to have to\ncorrect those under him, then it requires an heroic strength and courage\nto cry out time and again to the whole world and its leading minds,\n_Errastis_, you have erred! It requires heroism to reject, to oppose and\ncondemn, time and again, propositions sailing under the flag of progress,\nlight and enlightenment, in spite of the protest of those concerned, who\ndenounce whatever opposes them as darkness and retrogression. How much\neasier it would be to fawn upon the pet ideas of the age,\nNeo-protestantism and Modernism, and thus to gain their approval, than to\nhear repeatedly the distressing words, \u201cWe will not have her to rule over\nus\u2014_crucifige, crucifige_!\u201d\n\nBut why not let _science correct itself_? Why these violent condemnations\nand indictments? Science, by virtue of its instinct for the truth will by\nitself find the way back, when it has gone on the wrong track; only be\npatient. Science has in itself the cure for all its defects. Has it not\nalready all by itself overcome numerous errors in the course of the\ncenturies? Indeed, were there nothing at stake but scientific theories\nthey might be readily left to themselves: the loss to mankind would not be\ngreat. But here there are more important issues at stake. The protection\nof the faith, of truths of the vastest importance for Christian life and\nthe souls of men. And it is the duty of the Church to protect her charges\nfrom going astray, from dangers to salvation. How many thousands of them\nwould suffer harm before it would please science to correct its heresies!\nIt often takes a long time to pull down the idols placed upon pedestals,\nand then it may be only to erect another idol. How long will it take\nmodern philosophy to agree that the will of man is free, that there is a\nsubstantial immortal soul, that a Creator of the world dwells above the\nheavens? Is the Church to wait till the men of science make up their minds\nto desist from denying the existence of a personal God, and to bow before\nthe Creator of heaven and earth? Should she meanwhile look on calmly how\nsuch ruinous doctrines are pervading and penetrating society deeper and\ndeeper? Souls cannot wait thus to suffer shipwreck. Finally, the duty to\nbelieve remains the same for all, for the scientist, too\u2014he is not free to\ndelay his assent until he has exhausted all his antagonistic scientific\nexperiments.\n\nTo be sure, the scientist is restricted in so far as he is not allowed to\npursue any and every hypothesis, regardless of the immutable truth; he may\nno longer follow every scientific fashion. But is this a real detriment to\nthe human intellect and science? Has not every science to bear _restraint\nfrom other sciences_ at all times? The adherent of _Darwin\u2019s_ theory of\nnatural selection needs a billion years for his slow evolution; but the\ngeologist tells him that neither the formation of the earth\u2019s surface nor\nthe strata or sub-strata have taken so long in formation\u2014he corrects him.\nWhen the philosopher, drawing the logical deductions from his\nmaterialistic views of the world, assumes that the first living being\nsprang from lifeless matter, the naturalist informs him that this is\ncontradicted by facts\u2014there never has been a case of spontaneous\ngeneration. The naturalist is corrected by the better experiment of men of\nhis profession, the scientific author is corrected by his critic. Hence if\na man submits to the guidance of other men of his profession, if one\nscience accepts direction from another science, without any one seeing any\ninjury to freedom therein, why, then, should it be mental oppression for\nGod\u2019s infallible wisdom to call out through His Church to the fallible\nhuman mind: this is error, I declare it so? When the guide-post points out\nto the traveller that he is on the wrong way, will the wanderer\nindignantly resent the correction as an interference with his freedom of\naction? Is the railing along the steep precipice, to guard against falling\ndown, an interference with liberty? Is the lighthouse, warning the sailor\nof cliffs and shoals, any interference with his freedom?\n\nGenerally those who oppose the Christian and Catholic duty to believe use\nthe following argument: Where there is restraint and dependence there is\nno freedom; the Christian, and especially the Catholic, is restrained and\ndependent; hence he is not free: consequently he has no true science,\nbecause there can be no true science without freedom. In the same way it\nmay be argued: The civilized nation is restrained in various ways by the\ncivil order, therefore it is not free. The careful writer of scientific\nworks is tied down on all sides by the rules of logic, by the dictates of\ngood style, by scientific usages: hence he is not free.\n\nLet us not lose sight of the question. It cannot be denied that the man\nwho does not bother about faith has a greater outer freedom than the man\nwho does. We speak purposely of outer freedom. It is quite another\nquestion, where real internal freedom exists, _i.e._, freedom from the\nfetters of one\u2019s own inclinations and prejudices,\u2014in the religiously\ndisciplined mind, or in the other. Here we speak of inner freedom.\nObviously it is greater in the former. The deer in the forest is freer in\nhis movements than the cautious mountain-climber, who keeps to marked\nroads and paths, so as to journey safely, yet the latter is not without\nfreedom. Nor will any one deny that the Australian bushman enjoys a\ngreater outer freedom than the civilized white, restrained by laws, by\nrules and regulations, by standards of decency. And the busy writer of\nmany things and everything, who in his writing never pays any attention to\nlogic, to scientific form, to style and tact, has more freedom than one\nwho strictly conforms to all these.\n\n_Every civilization, culture, and education implies restriction of\nfreedom_, and the more the rejection of dependence and laws increases the\nnearer we approach the state of uncultured and barbarous nations. The same\napplies to intellectual culture. The higher it is, the more learning and\nmental culture a man has, the greater the number of truths, principles,\nand intellectual standards he carries within him. By these he is bound if\nhe wants to advance into the higher spheres of intellectuality. And the\nmore the intellect rejects laws and standards the more unregulated and\ndull its intellectual life will become. The more one knows the more\nstrictly is he bound to truth in every respect; the less one knows the\nfreer he is to commit errors. This is no advantage, it is the privilege of\nthe ignorant and untrained mind. The believer is bound by religious truth\nin the same way as one who knows the truth is bound by it, while one who\nis ignorant of it is not.\n\nIt is certainly not impossible for the obedience of faith to create\n_intellectual conflict_. There may be cases when scientific views look\nprobable to the scientist, while they contradict a doctrine of faith or an\necclesiastical decision. The roads may even cross more radically. It may\nhappen that his views and books are condemned, forbidden by the Church.\n\nIf the conflicting doctrine should be an _infallible_ one, the decision of\nthe believing scientist is soon reached. He knows now what to think of his\nhypothesis, that it is not true progress but aberration, and consistency\nwith his own conviction moves him to desist. Thus the philosophical errors\nof modern times are opposed almost throughout to infallible dogmas, for\nthe most part fundamental doctrines of the Christian religion. This is\nalso the legal right under which revelation and the Church approach the\nscientist with the demand not to permit his views to go contrary to faith,\nbecause there can never be a contradiction between faith and reason.\n\u201cThere can never be a contradiction between faith and reason,\u201d the Vatican\nCouncil teaches; \u201cthe apparent conflict is due either to the doctrine not\nbeing understood and interpreted in the sense of the Church, or to\nerroneous opinions that are mistaken for conclusions of reason\u201d (Conc.\nVat. sess. III, cp. 4). If the Catholic finds his position opposed to\n_non-infallible_ decisions, then he will re-examine his views in unselfish\nimpartiality before God. If he must calmly tell himself that his arguments\nare not so weighty as to be able to stand up before so high an authority,\nguided by the Holy Ghost, then he will forego the gratification of holding\nfast to his own opinions, and will remind himself that true wisdom knows\nthe fallibility of the human mind, and is ever ready to take advice from a\ndivinely guided authority. Perhaps he will recall the words of the great\n_St. Augustine_: \u201cBetter bow before an incomprehensible but saving symbol\nthan entangle one\u2019s neck in the meshes of error\u201d (De doctr. Christ. III,\n13). This Christian self-denial surpasses in beauty even science itself,\nand sheds upon it a greater splendour.\n\n\n    The great _F\u00e9nelon_, proceeding to his pulpit in the cathedral of\n    Cambrai, on Annunciation day in 1699, was handed by his brother\n    the Roman brief condemning twenty-three propositions of\n    _F\u00e9nelon\u2019s_ \u201cMaximes des Saints.\u201d The Bishop took the writing,\n    calmly ascended the pulpit and announced it forthwith, and\n    preached a sermon on the submission due to ecclesiastical\n    superiors, at which the whole congregation was greatly moved. A\n    few days later he announced in an episcopal letter to his diocese\n    his submission, \u201csimple, absolute, and without a shadow of\n    reservation.\u201d By this deed, an heroic act of obedience, _F\u00e9nelon_\n    is placed higher in history than by his brilliant works, than by\n    the honour of having been the illustrious tutor of the Dauphin of\n    France.\n\n    _Antonio Rosmini-Serbati_ in August, 1849, received official\n    notice of the condemnation of two of his works by the Congregation\n    of the Index. He immediately sent in his submission: \u201cWith the\n    sentiments of a true and obedient son of the Apostolic See, that I\n    have always been by the grace of God and wish ever to be, and have\n    ever acknowledged myself, I now declare clearly and sincerely,\n    without reservation, my submission, in the most complete manner,\n    to the condemnation of my writings.\u201d Both the condemnation and the\n    submission were soon made the target of attack by the Liberal\n    press. _Rosmini_ replied in an admirable open letter: \u201cTo my great\n    sorrow I have seen several articles in different newspapers which\n    dare criticize the Holy Congregation of the Index for condemning\n    my writings. Inasmuch as I have submitted to the decree of the\n    said Congregation with all sincerity, and with full interior and\n    exterior obedience as becomes a true son of the Church, every one\n    will easily understand how much I regret these articles and\n    disapprove of them. Yet I deem it not superfluous to declare\n    expressly that I reject those articles entirely and that I do not\n    accept the praise for me which they offer. With regard to other\n    newspaper writers, who are censuring me and even insulting me for\n    having done what it was my duty to do, in submitting to the\n    condemnation, as though I had committed a crime, I can only say\n    that I greatly pity them, and that they would fill me with\n    contempt could I deem it permissible to despise any one\u201d (apud _J.\n    Hilgers_, Der Index der verbotenen Buecher, 1904, 413).\n\n    A _F\u00e9nelon_ or a _Rosmini_, bowing with the humility of the\n    Christian savant to the judgment of their Church, have thereby\n    forfeited nothing of their intellectual fame in the eyes of\n    earnest critics, but, on the contrary, have greatly increased the\n    respect for their noble character.\n\n\nEven should the future prove as scientifically correct that which the\nbelieving scientist does not as yet clearly see, that he was\nscientifically in the right, no considerable damage would result to\nscience. Providence, which guides human affairs, will protect science for\nits noble modesty in submitting meanwhile to an authority appointed by\nGod. As a matter of fact, science cannot be shown ever to have suffered\nany real loss by such submission, not even in the _Galileo_ case, as we\nshall see further on. On the other hand, countless are the errors and\ninjuries which have befallen human thought and belief, and which the\nChurch has warded off from those who yielded to her guidance. Of course\nthe submission may become difficult if a man clings to his views, or has\nalready publicly proclaimed them. Then, indeed, a bitter struggle may\nensue. A number of scientists have failed to stand the test and have left\nto posterity the ill-fated name of apostates. The Church regrets such\ncases; but the deposit of faith is too precious to be endangered for the\nsake of any individual.\n\nFor this reason the Church is and must be _conservative_; for this reason\nshe may have to warn against the dissemination of propositions which may\nnot in themselves be false, but fraught with danger for the time being.\nShe cannot take part in any hasty effort to make experiments, risking\neverything inherited in order to try something new.\n\n\n    During the nineteenth century the United States was repeatedly the\n    scene of communistic experiments. Daring adventurers assembled\n    people and founded settlements on communistic principles, private\n    property being abolished. In 1824 _Robert Owen_ founded a colony\n    in Indiana, which soon grew to nine hundred members, living in the\n    fashion of atheistic communism. In 1825 the colony adopted its\n    first constitution, which within the following year suffered six\n    complete revisions. In June of the second year the last members of\n    the colony ate their farewell dinner together. The experiment had\n    come to a speedy termination. A Frenchman, _Etienne Cabet_,\n    founded, in 1848, a new colony in Texas, called Icaria. Soon it\n    numbered 500 members. Each family had its small homestead.\n    Children were educated by the community. Amusement was provided\n    for by a band and a theatre; a library supplied more intellectual\n    wants. But soon it all fell into decay. _Cabet_ departed and died.\n    In 1895 the newspapers reported the dissolution of the last\n    remnant of the colony. Such is the fate of experiments.\n\n    Daring adventurers may undertake them. The lecturer at college,\n    too, will be readily pardoned for his eagerness to take up the\n    cudgel in defence of what is new in his profane science: he may\n    easily correct himself. But the Teacher of the Centuries and of\n    the Nations, in the sphere of religion and morals, has not the\n    right to experiment. Here, where mistakes may entail the direst\n    consequences, the rule must be: slowly onward, to keep the whole\n    from ruin. Cardinal _Benedict Gaetani_, later Pope _Boniface\n    VIII._, once praised Rome for having _pedes non plumeos sed\n    plumbeos_\u2014not winged feet, but leaden heels.\n\n\nSentiments of the kind just set forth are of course possible only in\nconjunction with the belief in a revelation and in the supernatural\ncharacter of the Church, where the interests of faith come first, and must\nbe unconditionally preserved. He who lacks this conviction, he to whom the\nChurch is but a human institution, founded in the course of time, tending\nperhaps to oppose truth and science for fear they might endanger the\nsubmission of minds\u2014to such a one the Catholic\u2019s confident devotion to his\nChurch, and consciousness of unimpaired freedom at the same time, will be\nunintelligible; and the inflexibility of the Church in defending the faith\nwill pass his comprehension. And woe to the Church when her position\ntoward science is being tried before this court: only harsh denunciations\nare to be expected where the judge does not understand the matter he\nundertakes to decide.\n\nNor do we attempt to bridge the chasm that separates the two views of the\nworld which we here again encounter, the one, which rejects the\nsupernatural world, the other, the view of the believing Christian. We\nhave but endeavoured to show that _faith does not restrain the mental\nfreedom of one who is convinced of the truth of his faith_. Submission to\nthe authority of faith is the consequence of his conviction. This is the\nquestion to be decided: Either there is a revelation and a Church founded\nby God, or there is not. If such there be, or if it is only possible, then\nmodern freedom of thought, with its demand of exemption from all\nauthority, is against reason and morality. If there is not, then this\nshould be proved. It can be done consistently only by acknowledging\natheism. For if there is a personal God, then He can give a revelation and\nfound a Church, and demand submission from all. Since the days of _Celsus_\nto this day the attempt to demonstrate that the convictions of a faithful\nChristian are unjustifiable has proved futile.\n\n\n\nObedience of Faith and Injury to Science.\n\n\nWhile all this is true, yet one may not share this conviction, nor rise to\nthe certainty that there is a supernatural world whence the Son of God\ndescended to teach man and to found an infallible Church. Still, to be\nfair, he must admit that no real danger to freedom of research and\nprogress of science results from submission to faith, as shown above.\n\nIn the first place it must be admitted that the assertion is still\nunproved, that a positive result of research has ever come in hopeless\nconflict with a dogma of faith; hence that science has been prevented from\naccepting this result. No such case can be found. The condemnation of the\nCopernican view of the world will be considered presently; we pass over\nthe fact that at the time of its condemnation it was not a positive result\nof science: the main point is that the condemnation was not an irrevocable\ndogma of faith, but only the decision of a Congregation, which was\nwithdrawn as soon as the truth was clearly demonstrated. Besides, science\nhas suffered no injury from that decision.\n\nIn general, where there is real contradiction between science and faith,\nthe matters in question are invariably _hypotheses_. Is it more than an\nhypothesis, and a very doubtful hypothesis at that, that the world and God\nare identical, that there is an eternal, uncreated course of the world,\nthat miracles are impossible? That what is said about the natural origin\nof Christianity, the origin of the Jewish religion from Babylonian myths,\nthe origin of all religions from fear, fancy, or deception, is it anything\nmore than hypothetical? The false systems of knowledge, subjectivism, and\nagnosticism\u2014are they more than hypotheses? Ask their originators and\nchampions; they will admit it themselves; and if they will not admit it,\nothers will tell them that their propositions are not only hypotheses, but\noften quite untenable. There is hardly a single hypothesis which has not\nits vehement opponents. That the serious conflict between dogma and\nscience is waged only in this field could be proved by abundant examples.\nBesides, is it not the philosophical axiom of modern freedom of thought,\nthat in the sphere of philosophy and religion there is no certain\nknowledge, but only supposition?\n\nCan hypotheses claim to rank as assured results of research which should\nbe universally accepted? Why should it not be allowed to contradict them,\nto oppose them with other suppositions? Is it not in the interest of\nscience that this be done, that they be subjected to sharp criticism, lest\nthey gradually be given out for positive results? Is it not a shameful\ntrifling with the truth, when a _Haeckel_ deceives wide circles by\npretending that most frivolous hypotheses are established results of\nscience? Is it not misleading when modern science treats the rejection of\na supernatural order as an established principle?\n\n\n    And how often the hypotheses of profane sciences change! \u201cLaymen\n    are astonished,\u201d says _H. Poincar\u00e9_, \u201cthat so many scientific\n    theories are perishable. They see them thrive for a few years, to\n    be abandoned one after the other; they see wrecks heaped upon\n    wrecks; they foresee that theories now fashionable will after a\n    short while be forgotten, and they conclude that these theories\n    are absolute fallacy. They call it the bankruptcy of science\u201d\n    (Wissenschaft u. Hypothese, German by _F. Lindemann_, 2d ed.,\n    1906, 161). The conclusion is certainly unjustified, but the fact\n    itself remains. Is it then a loss to science when faith opposes in\n    the field of religion these variations of opinion with fixed\n    dogmas?\n\n    Or are these perhaps of less worth, or less certain than their\n    contraries? Is the dogma of the existence of God of less value\n    than atheism? Is the conviction of the existence of a world of\n    spirits less substantial than the philosophy of materialistic\n    monism? Is the doctrine of the origin of the human soul from the\n    creating hand of God found inferior to the notion that the soul\n    has developed from the lower stages of animal life? Should the\n    holy teaching of Christianity, doctrines believed by the best\n    periods in the world\u2019s history, believed in and professed by minds\n    like those of an _Augustine_, a _Thomas_, and a _Leibnitz_;\n    doctrines that since their appearance on earth have always\n    attracted the noble and good, and repelled chiefly the base and\n    immoral; doctrines that still wait for their first unobjectionable\n    refutation\u2014should such doctrines be less sure than the\n    innumerable, ever-changing suggestions of unregulated thought,\n    apparently directed by an aversion to everything supernatural?\n\n\n\nErravimus.\n\n\nYet another fact may be pointed out. It is an undeniable fact that\nscience, after straying for some time, is not unfrequently _compelled to\nreturn to what is taught by faith and the Church_, thus confirming the\ntruth of the faith. Frequently the new theory has come on like a tornado,\nsweeping all minds before it. But the tempest was soon spent, the minds\nrecovered their balance and the hasty misjudgment was recognized.\n\n\n    Not long ago, when materialism revelled in its orgies, especially\n    in Germany, when _Vogt_, _Buechner_, and _Moleschott_ were writing\n    their books, and science with _Du Bois-Reymond_ was hunting\n    _Laplace\u2019s_ theory in the evolution of the world, the Syllabus,\n    undaunted, put its anathema upon the (58.) proposition: \u201cNo other\n    forces are acknowledged but those of matter.\u201d The summer-night\u2019s\n    dream came to an end, and people rubbed their eyes and saw the\n    reality they had lost a while. The materialism of the 60\u2019s and\n    70\u2019s has been discarded by the scientific world, and finds a\n    shelter only in the circles of unschooled infidelity. _J. Reinke_,\n    in the name of biology, bears testimony in the words: \u201cIn my\n    opinion materialism has been disposed of in biology; if,\n    nevertheless, a number of biologists still stand by its colours,\n    this tenacity may be explained psychologically; for, in the apt\n    words of _Du Bois-Reymond_, in the domain of ideas a man does not\n    willingly and easily forsake the highway of thought which his\n    entire mental training has opened up\u201d (Einleitung in die\n    theoretische Biologie, 1901, 52).\n\n    A few decades ago a number of scientists declared it impossible\n    that the different races could have descended from one pair of\n    ancestors, as taught by faith: the difference between the various\n    families being too great and radical, it was said; the difference\n    being rather of species than of race. Moreover, there was\n    announced the discovery of people without religion, without\n    notions of morality and family life; of tribes incapable of\n    civilization and culture; it was asserted in the early days of\n    _Darwin_ enthusiasm that there had been discovered a race of men\n    that clearly belonged to the species ape. Assertions of this kind\n    have gradually ceased. Now the different human races are\n    considered to belong to the same species, and their common\n    parentage is considered possible from the view-point of the theory\n    of evolution. The anthropologist _Ranke_ expresses his opinion\n    thus: \u201cWe find the bodily differences perfectly connected by\n    intermediate forms, graded to a nicety, and the summary of the\n    differences appears to point to but one species.... This is the\n    prevalent opinion of all independent research of anatomically\n    schooled anthropologists\u201d (Der Mensch, 2d ed., II, 1894, 261).\n    Ethnology denies the existence of nations or tribes without\n    religion (_Ratzel_, Voelkerkunde, I, 1885, 31). _Peschel_ says:\n    \u201cThe statement that any nation or tribe has ever been found\n    anywhere on earth without notions and suggestions of religion can\n    be denied emphatically\u201d (_O. Peschel_, Voelkerkunde, 6th ed.,\n    1885, 273). \u201cThe more recent ethnology knows of no tribes without\n    morality, nor does history record any\u201d (_W. Schneider_, Die\n    Naturvoelker, 1886, II, 348).\n\n    Until a short time ago it was believed that the derivation of\n    man\u2019s life from inferior stages of animal life would not be\n    difficult to prove; but at present, while many still adhere to the\n    theory that man has developed from the brute, the conviction is\n    steadily gaining ground that it cannot be scientifically proved\n    and that it becomes more and more difficult to disprove man\u2019s\n    higher origin. Unable to withstand the force of facts, one\n    hypothesis gives place to another: what had to be found could not\n    be found, living or extinct links between the brute and man\n    refused to appear anywhere, and those which people thought they\n    had found, turned out to be unsuitable. _Kohlbrugge_ concludes his\n    criticism of the recent theories of the evolution of the body of\n    man from lower animals with the confession: \u201cThe above summary is\n    enough to convince everybody that we do not know anything distinct\n    about the great problem of evolution; we have not yet seen its\n    face. All must be done over again\u201d (Die Morpholog. Abstammung des\n    Menschen, 1908, 88). _Virchow_ said at the anthropological\n    congress of Vienna, 1889: \u201cWhen we met at Innsbruck twenty years\n    ago Darwinism had just finished its first triumphal march through\n    the world, and my friend _Vogt_ became its ardent champion. We\n    have searched in vain for the missing link connecting man directly\n    with the ape.\u201d\n\n    What has become of those anatomic-morphologic links between man\n    and beast, the _pithecanthropus erectus_, the man dug out at\n    Neandertal, Spy, Schipka, La Naulette, and Krapina, and shown with\n    great confidence to the world? What has become of the prehistoric\n    man, said to belong to the glacial period of Europe, and to have\n    ranked far below the present man? _J. Kohlmann_ writes: \u201cI wish to\n    state that I thoroughly adhere to the theory of evolution, but my\n    own experience has led me to the result that man has not changed\n    his racial characteristics since the glacial period. He appears on\n    the soil of Europe physically complete, and there is no ape-man to\n    be found\u201d (apud _Ranke_, Ibid. 480). Prof. _Branco_, director of\n    the Pal\u00e6ontological Institute of Berlin, says: \u201cPal\u00e6ontology tells\n    us nothing about the missing link. This science knows of no\n    ancestors of man\u201d (at the 5th international Zoological Congress,\n    1901, _Wasmann_, Die mod. Biolog. 3, p. 488). And the\n    pal\u00e6ontologist _Zittel_ says: \u201cThe missing link between man and\n    ape, though a postulate of the theory of evolution, has not been\n    found\u201d (_Ranke_, l. c. 504). _E. Grosse_ concludes his studies on\n    evolution with the significant words: \u201cI began this book with the\n    intention of writing a history of the evolution of the family, and\n    I finish it convinced that at present the writing of that history\n    is impossible for me or for anybody else\u201d (Die Formen der Familie,\n    1896, Vorwort). _Ranke_ is perfectly right in saying that \u201cit\n    behoves the dignity of science to confess that it knows nothing of\n    the origin of man\u201d (Thuermer V, 1902, I. Heft).\n\n    A century ago or so, ridicule was heaped in the name of science on\n    the description in the Bible of the last day: \u201cThe stars shall\n    fall,\u201d \u201cand the powers of heaven shall be moved,\u201d \u201cthe elements\n    shall be melted with heat, and the earth shall be burnt up\u201d (Matt.\n    xxiv. 29 _seq._; Luke xxi. 25 _seq._; Mark xiii. 24 _seq._; 2 Pet.\n    iii. 10). Then the assertion that stones could fall from the skies\n    caused a smile, but now science has come to the general knowledge\n    that this is not only possible, but perhaps really will be the end\n    of all things, if once our earth on its journey through unknown\n    spaces of the universe should collide with a comet or get into a\n    cosmic cloud of large meteors. (Cf. the graphic description in _K.\n    Braun_, Ueber Kosmogonie, 3d ed., 1905, p. 381 _seq._)\n\n    An example of another kind: It is not so long since Protestant,\n    liberal Bible-criticism and its history of early Christian\n    literature, in the endeavour to remove everything supernatural\n    from the beginning of Christianity, regarded the New Testament and\n    the oldest Christian documents as unreliable testimony, even\n    forgeries, and for this reason placed the date of their origin as\n    late as possible. But now they have to retrace their steps.\n\n    _A. Harnack_ writes: \u201cThere was a period\u2014the general public is\n    still living in it\u2014when the New Testament and the oldest Christian\n    literature were thought to be but a tissue of lies and forgeries.\n    This time has passed. For science it was an episode in which much\n    was learned of which much must be forgotten. The result of\n    subsequent research over-reaches in a \u2018reactionary\u2019 effect what\n    might be termed the central position of modern criticism. The\n    oldest literature of the Church is in the main and in most details\n    true and reliable, that is, from the literary and historical point\n    of view.... I am not afraid to use the word \u2018retrogressive\u2019\u2014for we\n    should call a spade a spade\u2014the criticism of the sources of the\n    earliest Christianity is beyond doubt moving retrogressively\n    towards tradition\u201d (Chronologie der Alt-Christ. Literatur I, 1897,\n    VIII). In a more recent work the same savant writes: \u201cDuring the\n    years from 30 to 70 all originated in Palestine, or, better, in\n    Jerusalem, what later on was developed. This knowledge is steadily\n    gaining and replacing the former \u2018critical\u2019 opinion that the\n    fundamental development had extended over a period of about a\n    hundred years\u201d (Lukas der Arzt, 1906, Vorwort). This retrogression\n    is continued still farther in his later work, \u201cNeue Untersuchungen\n    zur Apostolgesch. u. zur Abfassungszeit der synopt. Evang., 1911,\u201d\n    in which _Harnack_ draws very near to the Catholic view regarding\n    the date of writing of the Acts of the Apostles, as also regarding\n    _St. Paul\u2019s_ attitude towards Judaism and Christian-Judaism, and\n    departs from the modern Protestant view (cf. pp. 28-47, 79 _seq._,\n    86, 93 _seq._). \u201cProtestant authorities on church-history,\u201d he\n    says elsewhere, \u201cno longer take offence at the proposition that\n    the main elements of Catholicism go back to the Apostolic era, and\n    not only peripherically\u201d (Theol. Literar. Zeitung, 1905, 52).\n\n    In a speech, much commented on, which he made at his university\n    January 12, 1907, Prof. _Harnack_, discussing the religious\n    question in Germany, called attention to the fact that there has\n    been quite a marked return to the Catholic standpoint: \u201cFrom the\n    study of Church history we find that we all have become different\n    from what our fathers were, whether we may like it or not. Study\n    has shown that we are separated from our fathers by a long course\n    of development; that we do not understand their ideas and words at\n    all, much less do we use them in the sense they used them.\u201d He\n    then draws out the comparison more particularly: \u201c_Flacius_ and\n    the older Protestants denied that _Peter_ had ever been in Rome at\n    all. Now we know that his having been there is a fact well\n    evidenced in history.\u201d The motto of the older Protestants was that\n    the Scriptures are the sole source of revelation. \u201cBut now, and\n    for a long time past, Protestant savants have realized that the\n    Scriptures could not be separated from tradition, and that the\n    collecting of the New Testament Scriptures was a part of\n    tradition.\u201d \u201cProtestants of the sixteenth century taught\n    justification by faith alone, without works. In the absence of\n    confessional controversy, no evangelical Christian would now find\n    fault with the teaching which declares only such faith to be of\n    any worth which shows itself by the love of God and of the\n    neighbour\u201d (Protestantismus u. Katholizismus in Deutschland,\n    Preussisch. Jahrb\u00fccher 127. Bd., 1907, 301 _seq._).\n\n\nMany similar instances of science confessing Erravimus in regard to the\nChristian or Catholic position could be cited. They are an admonition to\nbe modest, not to overrate the value of a scientific proposition, and not,\nwith supreme confidence and infallibility, to brand it as an offence\nagainst the human intellect to let one\u2019s self be guided by the principles\nof faith.\n\nMoreover, it has often happened that science emphatically and sneeringly\nrejected propositions, and called them false and absurd, which to-day are\nconsidered elementary.\n\n_Newton_, in 1687, had correctly explained the revolution of the moon\naround the earth, and of the planets around the sun, as the co-operation\nof gravitation and inertia, and thence concluded also the elliptic form of\nthe orbits of planets previously discovered by _Kepler_. _Leibnitz_\nrejected this theory, _Huygens_ called it absurd, and the Academy of Paris\nas late as 1730 still favoured the theory of revolution of _Descartes_; it\nwas only about the year 1740 that it was generally accepted. _Huygens_,\nhimself, had formed in 1690 his theory about light-waves. For a long time\nit was misunderstood. Only in 1800, or somewhat later, it received its\nmerited acknowledgment, but noted physicists like _Biot_ and _Brewster_\nrejected it still for some time and held to the theory of emission. \u201cEven\nin the intellectual world the law of inertia holds good\u201d (_Rosenberger_,\nGesch. der Physik, III, 1887, 139).\n\n\n    The great discoverer _Galvani_ complained of being attacked from\n    two opposite sides, by the scientists and by the ignorant: \u201cBoth\n    make fun of me. They call me the dancing master of frogs. Yet I\n    know I have discovered one of the greatest forces of nature.\u201d\n\n\nWhen _Benjamin Franklin_ explained the lightning-rod to the Royal Academy\nof Sciences, he was ridiculed as a dreamer. The same happened to _Young_\nwith his theory of the undulation of light. \u201cThe Edinburgh Review\u201d\nproposed to the public to put _Thomas Grey_ in a strait-jacket when he\npresented his plan for railroads. Sir _Humphry Davy_ laughed at the idea\nof illuminating the city of London by gas. The French Academy of Sciences\nactually sneered at the physicist _Arago_ when he proposed a resolution to\nmerely open a discussion of the idea of an electric telegraph (_Wallace_,\nDie wissensch. Ansicht des Uebernatuerlichen, 102 _seq._).\n\n\n    Until about a hundred years ago scientists almost universally\n    thought it impossible for a stone to fall from the skies\u2014not to\n    mention a rain of stones. Of the big meteor that fell at Agram in\n    1751 the learned Vienna professor, _Stuetz_, wrote in 1790 as\n    follows: \u201cThat iron had fallen from the skies may have been\n    believed in Germany in 1751 even by its enlightened minds, owing\n    to the uncertainty then prevailing in regard to physics and\n    natural history. In our times, however, it were unpardonable to\n    consider similar fairy tales even probable.\u201d Some museums threw\n    away their collections of meteors, fearing they would appear\n    ridiculous by keeping them. In that very year, 1790, a meteor fell\n    near the city of Juillac in France, and the mayor of the town sent\n    a report of it to the French Academy of Sciences, signed by three\n    hundred eye-witnesses. But the wise men of the academy knew\n    better. Referee _Bertholon_ said: \u201cIt is a pity for a town to have\n    so foolish a mayor,\u201d and added: \u201cIt is sad to see the whole\n    municipality certifying by affidavit to a folk-saga that can only\n    be pitied. What more can I say of an affidavit like that? Comment\n    is self-evident to a philosophically trained mind who reads this\n    authentic testimonial about an evidently false fact, about a\n    physically impossible phenomenon.\u201d _A. Deluc_, in other respects a\n    sober-minded man, and a scientist, even remarked that should a\n    stone like that fall before his feet, then he would have to admit\n    that he had seen it, but nevertheless would not believe it.\n    _Vaudin_ remarked: \u201cBetter to deny such incredible things than to\n    have to try to explain them.\u201d Thus taught the French Academy of\n    that time (apud _Braun_, Ueber Kosmogonie, 3d ed., 1905, 378\n    _seq._). And now science is teaching the contrary. Everybody knows\n    that such falling meteors are not only possible, but that they\n    fall about seven hundred times a year on our earth.\n\n\nDo not these examples bear a striking resemblance to the attitude of many\nof the representatives of modern science towards facts and truths of our\nfaith?\n\nThis has not been said with a view of detracting from the reputation of\nscience. Not at all. It has fallen to the lot of man to be subject to\nerror. The above was said to recall that fact. Science is not so\ninfallible as to be able to claim the right to ignore, in religious and\nethical questions, faith and the Church, and even to usurp the place of\nthe faith given by God, in order to lead its disciples upon the new paths\nof a delivered mankind.\n\n\n\n\nChapter III. Unprepossession Of Research.\n\n\n\nWhat It Is.\n\n\nIn the year 1901 a case, insignificant in itself, caused great excitement\nin and even beyond the scientific world. What had happened? At the\nUniversity of Strassburg, in a territory for the most part Catholic, no\nless than one-third of the students were Catholic, yet of the seventy-two\nprofessors sixty-one were Protestant, six Israelites and but four\nCatholics (according to the report of the Secretary of State, _Koeller_,\nin the 115th session of the Reichstag, January 11, 1901). The government\nresolved, in view of the state of affairs, to give more consideration,\nwhen appointing professors, to the Catholic members of the university.\nEven the non-Catholic members of the Bundesrat desired it. A vacancy\noccurring in the faculty of history, the government, besides appointing\nthe Protestant professor proposed by the faculty of philosophy, decided to\ncreate a new chair to be filled by a Catholic.\n\nThe appointment of a Catholic professor of history was regarded as\nseriously endangering science. The storm broke. The venerable historian,\n_Th. Mommsen_, who had been a champion of liberty in the revolution of\n1848, promptly gave the alarm. In the Munich \u201cNeueste Nachrichten\u201d there\nappeared over his signature an article that created a general sensation.\n\u201cGerman university circles,\u201d he said, in his solemn protest, \u201care pervaded\nby a feeling of degradation. Our vital nerve is unprejudiced research;\nresearch that does not find what it seeks and expects to find, owing to\npurposes, considerations, and restraints that serve other, practical ends\nextraneous to science\u2014but finds what logically and historically appears to\nthe conscientious scientist the right thing, truthfulness. The appointment\nof a college teacher whose freedom is restricted by barriers is laying the\naxe to the root of German science. The call to a chair of history, or\nphilosophy, of one who must be a Catholic or a Protestant, and who must\nserve this or that confession, is tantamount to compelling him to set\nbounds to his work whenever the results might be awkward for a religious\ndogma.\u201d And he concludes with a ringing appeal for the solidarity of the\nrepresentatives of science: \u201cPerhaps I am not deceived in the hope of\nhaving given expression to the sentiments of our colleagues.\u201d This\nstatement of the famous scientist, conceived in the temper of his days of\n\u201948, was soon softened, if not neutralized, by a subsequent statement from\nhis pen. But the spark had already started the fire. From most\nuniversities there came letters of approval and praise of his courageous\nstand, in behalf of the honour of the universities and of German science.\nOn the other hand, some gave vent to their regret of his hot-spurred\naction. Since then the song of unprejudiced science has been sung in\ncountless variations and keys, ending as a rule with the chorus: Hence the\nbelieving, especially Catholics, cannot be true scientists. For this was\nthe central idea of _Mommsen\u2019s_ protest, and in that sense it had been\nunderstood.\n\nFor the sake of clearness we shall condense the substance of the thought\ninto a brief form: The vital nerve of science, the condition under which\nalone it can exist, is unprepossession, that is, a straightforward honesty\nthat knows of no other consideration than to aim at the truth for its own\nsake. The believer, the Catholic, cannot be unprepossessed, because he\nmust pay regard to dogmas and Church-doctrine and precept. Therefore he is\nwanting in the most essential requisite of true science. Hence college\nprofessors of a Catholic conviction are anomalous: they have no right to\nclaim a chair in the home of unprepossessed science. For reasons of\nexpediency it may be advisable to appoint some of them, but they cannot be\nregarded as sterling scientists. Catholic theology, building upon faith,\nis not science in the true sense of the word, and deserves no place in a\nuniversity. A Catholic university, a home of scientific research built\nupon a Catholic foundation, is something like a squared circle. It may be\nthat Catholic scientists, too, have their achievements, but they cannot be\nexpected to be possessed of that unflinching pursuit of the truth which\nmust be part of the man of science.\n\nThese are thoughts which have petrified in the minds of many into\nself-evident principles, with all the obstinacy of intolerance. It is not\ndifficult to recognize in it the old reproach we have already dealt with,\nit is here in a slightly different form. The believing scientist is not\nfree to search for the truth, being tied down by his duty to believe.\nScience, however, must be free. Hence the believer cannot properly pursue\nscience.\n\nFreedom of science and science unprepossessed are related terms and are\noften used synonymously. Therefore, in putting the probe to the\noften-repeated demand for unprepossession, we shall meet with ideas\nsimilar to those we have already discussed, only in a slightly different\nshape.\n\nWhat, then, is that unprepossession which science must avow? Can the\nCatholic, the believing scientist, possess it? Unprepossessed research\u2014\u201cI\ndon\u2019t like the expression,\u201d says a representative of free-thought,\n\u201cbecause it is a product of that shortcoming which has already done great\ndamage to free-thought in its struggle with the powers of the past\u201d\n(_Jodl_). Hence we have reason to fear that the confidence with which this\nword is used is greater than the clearness of thought it represents.\n\nWhat is meant by saying that science must be _unprepossessed_? Undoubtedly\nit means that science should make no presuppositions, it must enter upon\nits work free from prejudice and presumption. And what is presumption?\nEvidently something presumed, upon which the research is to rest the level\nand rule of its direction: the supposition being taken for granted,\nwithout express proof. What I have expressly proved in my process of\nthought is no longer a supposition to the structure of thought, but a part\nof that structure.\n\nIs the scientist, however, to allow no presumption at all? That would be\nimpossible. When making his calculations the mathematician presupposes the\ncorrectness of the multiplication table. Or is he first to prove that\ntwice three are six? He could not do it, because it is immediately\nself-evident. In his optical experiments in the laboratory, in drawing\ninferences as to the nature of light from different indications, the\nphysicist presupposes that senses are able to observe the facts correctly,\nthat everything has its respective reason, that nothing can be and not be,\nat the same time, under the same conditions. Can he or must he try first\nto prove it? He must presume it because it is beyond a doubt, and because\nit cannot be proved at all, at least all of it cannot. The astronomer,\ntoo, makes unhesitating use of the formulas of mathematics without\nexamining them anew; every natural scientist calmly presupposes the\ncorrectness of the results established by his predecessors and goes on\nbuilding upon those results: he may do so because he cannot with reason\ndoubt them. Hence presumptions are common; they may be made when we are\nconvinced of their truth; they must be made because not everything can be\nproved. Much cannot be proved because it is immediately self-evident, as,\nfor instance, the ability to recognize the true or the elementary\nprinciples of reasoning; many other things cannot always be proved\nminutely, because not every scientist cares to begin with the egg of Leda.\nHe that wants to build a house builds upon a given base; if he will not\naccept it, if he desires to dig up the fundament to the very bottom, in\norder to lay it anew, he will be digging forever, but the house will never\nbe built.\n\nHence to say that science must be unprepossessed cannot mean that it must\nnot make any presupposition. What, therefore, does it mean? Simply this:\n_Science must not presume anything to be true which is false, nor anything\nas proved which is still uncertain and unproved_. Whatever the scientist\nknows to be certain he may take as such, presuming it as the foundation\nand direction of further work; and what he knows to be probable he may\nsuppose to be probable.\n\nIn so doing he in no way offends against the ideal that should be\never-present to his mind\u2014the truth, because he merely allows himself to be\nguided by the truth, recognized as such. And the sequence of truth cannot\nbut be truth, the sequence of certainty cannot but be certainty. But\nshould he presuppose to be true what is false and unproved, and the\nuncertain to be certain, then he would offend against truth, against the\naim of every science.\n\n\n    Hence if the critic of the Bible presupposes miracles and\n    prophecies to be impossible, inferring therefrom that many\n    narratives in Holy Writ cannot be authentic, but must be legends\n    of a later period, he is making arbitrary presuppositions, he is\n    not an unprepossessed scientist. Likewise, if an historian\n    presupposing God\u2019s supernatural providence over the world to be\n    impossible, and, in building upon this basis, comes to the\n    conclusion that the Christian religion grew from purely natural\n    factors, from Oriental notions and myths, from Greek philosophy\n    and Roman forms of government, he again makes unproved\n    suppositions. If the natural philosopher assumes that there cannot\n    be a personal Creator, and infers from it that the world is of\n    itself and eternal, he has forfeited the claim of being an\n    unprepossessed scientist, and by making in any way his own pet\n    ideas the basis of his research he is violating the demands of\n    unprepossession; the results he arrives at are not scientific\n    results, but the speculations of an amateur.\n\n\n\nUnprepossession and Religious Conviction.\n\n\nIs it possible for the Christian scientist who adheres to his faith, to be\nunprepossessed, as demanded by science? According to all that has been\nsaid hitherto about the relation of science to faith, the answer can be\nonly in the affirmative. The believing Christian and Catholic looks upon\nthe doctrines of faith taught him by revelation and the Church as an\n_established truth_. What to me is true and certain I can take for the\ntrue and certain basis and standard of my thought. This is demanded by\nunprepossession\u2014nothing more.\n\nConsidering the immense extent of the sciences, the profane sciences will\nbut seldom, and in but few matters, have occasion to presuppose truths of\nfaith in the above-mentioned way; and only in a negative form at that. We\nhave previously shown that the profane sciences must never take truths of\nfaith for a positive basis to build upon; they must regard the doctrines\nof revelation only in so far as it is not allowed to teach anything in\ncontradiction to them. And with this demand they will meet in rare\ninstances only, because, if not overstepping their province, they will\nvery seldom come in touch with faith (cf. pp. 88-96). When _Kepler_ was\nstudying his planetary orbits, and _Newton_ discovered the law of\ngravitation, both worked independent of the Christian view of the world\nwhich they both professed; it was in no way a necessary presupposition to\ntheir research. When _Scheiner_ discovered the sun-spots, and _Secchi_\nclassified the spectra of the stars, they were not doing so as Jesuits nor\nas Catholics; as Mohammedans or atheists they might have made the same\ndiscoveries. Steam engines and railways, _Volta\u2019s_ electricity,\ncathode-rays and X-rays, all discoveries that the nineteenth century can\nboast of, do not depend directly on any special view of the world.\n\nAnd if the believing scientist does take his faith for a guide in some\nmatters, when in all his researches in the history of the Christian\nreligion and the Church he presupposes that God\u2019s miraculous interference\nis not impossible, because the contrary would offend not only against his\nfaith, but also against his common sense; when in pondering the ultimate\nreasons of all things he allows himself to be influenced by the idea that\natheism is false, or at least not proved\u2014for that there is a God both his\nfaith and his reason tell him\u2014then these presumptions are by no means\ninadmissible. The naturalist, too, presupposing certain results of science\nto be true, takes care not to get into conflict with them, and he will\nsoon correct himself should he arrive at different results. If a\nmathematician should arrive at results conflicting with other proved\nresults, he would infer therefrom that his calculation was faulty; why,\nthen, cannot the Christian now and then be led by the truths of his faith,\nof which he is certain, without by doing so offending against the spirit\nof scientific truthfulness?\n\nOr may he not do so just because they are _religious_ truths, vouched for\nby a supernatural authority? As a fact many of them are established also\nby the testimony of reason. This is shown by the examples just mentioned.\nHowever, the question is not how a truth is vouched for, but whether it be\na truth or not. If the scientist is assured that something is\nunquestionably true, then he owes it to the spirit of truthfulness to\naccept it. In doing so he will in no way be unfaithful to his scientific\nmethod; the truths of faith are to him not a source of proofs for the\nresults of his profane science, but only hints, calling his attention to\nthe fact that certain propositions are not proved, that they are even\nfalse.\n\n\n    Much less is in historical questions the Catholic obliged to\n    defend or praise everything of advantage to his Church, whether\n    true or not. Hence _Mommsen_ is grossly mistaken when he states in\n    his letter of protest mentioned above: \u201cThe appointment of a\n    historian or philosopher, who must be a Catholic or a Protestant\n    and who must serve his confession, evidently means nothing else\n    but to prohibit the Protestant historian from presenting the\n    powerful mental structure of the papacy in its full light, and the\n    Catholic historian from appreciating the profound thought and the\n    tremendous importance of heresy and Protestantism.\u201d The Catholic\n    is only bound to the truth.\n\n\nOr are the Christian truths of faith perhaps regrettable errors, hence\npresumptions that should not be made? If so, demonstrate it. Hitherto such\ndemonstration has not succeeded. So long as the creed of the believing\nChristian cannot be refuted convincingly, he has the right to cling to it\nin the name of truth.\n\nOr can we not have reasonable certainty at all in religious matters? Are\nthey the undemonstrable things of an uncontrollable sentiment? To be sure,\nthis is asserted often enough, explicitly or by insinuation. If this were\ntrue, then of course duty of faith and true unprepossession could not go\ntogether; one would be regarding as the truth things of which one cannot\nbe convinced. But this is also an unproved assumption: it is the duality\nof subjectivism and agnosticism, the fundamental presumption of liberal\nfreedom of science, which we have already sufficiently exposed.\n\nHowever, let us assume again the position of those who do not feel\nthemselves personally convinced of the truth of the Christian dogmatic\nfaith, or of the Catholic Church. But the Catholic is _firmly convinced_\nthereof and, if need be, will make sacrifices for this conviction, as\nmillions have done. Hence, can any one forbid him to think and judge\naccording to his conviction? Would they who differ from his opinion for\nthis very reason force him to think against his own conviction? Would not\nthat indeed be \u201cseduction to sin against the Holy Ghost\u201d? If the jurist or\nhistorian has formed the conviction that _Mommsen_ is on historical\nquestions concerning Roman law an authority, who may be followed without\nscruple, and he does so without re-examining the particular points, will\nthis be looked upon as an offence against unprepossession? If, then, the\nCatholic is certain that he may safely trust to revelation and the\nChurch\u2014and there is no authority on earth of more venerable standing, even\nif viewed from a purely natural point\u2014will he alone be accused of mental\nblindness and lack of freedom?\n\nOr may the scientist have _no view of the world_ at all, because he might\nbe influenced thereby in certain directions? The champions of this demand\nwill surely not admit that they have not a definite view of the world. By\nno means! We know very well that just those who are most vehement in\nurging unprepossessed science have a very pronounced notion of the world,\nwe know also that they are resolutely propagating that notion. Yet nothing\nis said against a scientist who is a monist, or who starts from\nagnosticism. It seems they intend to exclude one view only, the positive\nreligious view. Yet not even this one wholly. No one finds the Jew who\nadheres to his religion unfit for scientific research. Of course not.\nProtestants, too, find favour: according to the statutes of some German\nuniversities Protestants only may be professors there. Neither _Mommsen_\nnor any other herald of unprepossession deems it necessary to defend\nscience against these institutions and usages. It is plain what is meant\nby the popular cry for science unprepossessed: The man of science may be\nanything, sceptic or atheist, pagan or Hottentot, only he must not be a\nfaithful Catholic. Is this fair? Is this the spirit of truth and justice\nwith which they claim to be filled?\n\n\n    What has just been said about the Catholic being excluded, could\n    easily be exemplified by a lengthy list of facts. But we shall\n    pass them over. We shall note one utterance only, from the pen of\n    a non-Catholic writer. The renowned pedagogue, _Fr. W. Foerster_,\n    says in the preface to the second edition of his book on \u201cSexual\n    Ethics and Sexual Pedagogy\u201d: \u201cSpecial exception has been taken to\n    the catholicizing tendency of my book, and not infrequently the\n    author has without further ado been made out an orthodox Catholic.\n    For many years past I have been in a position to gain interesting\n    information concerning the incredible bias of many champions of\n    unprepossessed research. To them it is an a-priori dogma that\n    everything represented by the Catholic Church is nonsense,\n    superstition, bigotry. They are past comprehending how an\n    unprejudiced man, simply by concrete experience, unprepossessed\n    research and serious pondering in the field of pedagogy, could be\n    brought to affirm that certain notions of the Roman Catholic\n    Church are the unavoidable consequence of a penetrating knowledge\n    of soul and life. This cannot be admitted by the non-Catholic: for\n    him the truth must cease where the Catholic faith begins; he dares\n    not assent to anything, else he will no longer be taken for a\n    reputable scientific man.\u201d\n\n\nThe bluster about unprepossession proceeds from _shallowness and\ndishonesty_. The most varied presumptions, that have nothing to do with\nscience and the pursuit of the truth, may pass without notice; only when\nChristian and Catholic religious convictions, resting upon divine\nauthority, are encountered, then tolerance gives way to excitement, a hue\nand cry is raised, the gate is shut, and entrance to the scientific world\ndenied.\n\n\n    Philosophers arise, and each philosophizes according to his\n    manner. _Fichte_ says: \u201cWhat philosophy to choose depends on the\n    kind of a man one is.\u201d The historian enters. It is reported that\n    _Treitschke_ said: \u201cIf I cannot write history from my own\n    view-point, with my own judgment, then I had rather be a\n    soapmaker.\u201d According to trustworthy testimony, the well-known\n    Protestant historian, _Giesebrecht_, used to preface his lectures\n    in Munich with the words: \u201cI am a Prussian and a Protestant: I\n    shall lecture accordingly\u201d (Hochschulnachrichten, 1901, 2, p. 30).\n    Even here there are no objections in the name of Unprepossession.\n    \u201cScience,\u201d says _Harnack_, \u201cwill tear off the mask of the\n    hypocrite or plagiarist and throw him out of the temple, but the\n    queerest suppositions it must let pass if they go by the name of\n    convictions, and if those who harbour them are trying to\n    demonstrate them by scientific means.\u201d\n\n    Therefore the convictions, or, to speak with _Harnack_, the\n    \u201cprejudices,\u201d of the Catholic \u201ccertainly deserve as much\n    consideration and patience as the velleities, idiosyncrasies, and\n    blind dogmas which we have to meet and refute in the struggle\n    between intellects\u201d (Internationale Wochenschrift, 1908, 259\n    _seq._). \u201cScience has been restricted,\u201d the same authority also\n    admits, \u201cat all times; our progeny will find even modern science\n    in many ways not ruled by pure reason only\u201d (Dogmengesch. III, 3d\n    ed., 1907, 326).\n\n    And what is to be said of those more serious suppositions,\n    unproved and unprovable, which guide modern science wherever it\n    meets philosophical-religious questions? That truly dogmatic\n    rejection of everything supernatural and transcendental, that\n    obstinate ignoration of a personal God, the rejection of any\n    creative act, of any miracle, of any revelation,\u2014a presupposition\n    directly raised to a scientific principle: the principle of\n    causality. Later on we shall make an excursion into various fields\n    of science, and we shall show clearly how this presumption is\n    stamped upon entire branches of science. Those solemn assurances\n    of persevering unselfishness in desiring nothing but the truth;\n    the confidence with which they claim a monopoly of the instinct\n    for the truth, all this will appear in quite a strange light, the\n    twilight of dishonesty, when we examine the documents and records\n    of liberal science itself. We shall see sufficiently how truthful\n    the self-confession of a modern champion of liberal science really\n    is: \u201cThe recently coined expression, \u2018science unprepossessed,\u2019 I\n    do not like, because it is a product of that shortcoming which has\n    already done so much damage to free thought in its struggle with\n    the powers of the past\u2014because that word is not entirely honest.\n    None of us sits down to his work unprepossessed\u201d (_F. Jodl_, Neue\n    Freie Presse, November 26, 1907). Here we shall touch upon only\n    one more question.\n\n\n\nThe Duty to Believe and Scientific Demonstration.\n\n\nBut cannot the believing Christian submit to scientific investigation the\ndoctrine of faith itself, which he must without doubt hold to be true?\nThis must surely be allowed if he is to convince himself scientifically of\nthe truth of it. Indeed, this is allowed. He may critically examine\neverything to the very bottom, even the existence of God, the rationality\nof his own mind. But how can he, if no doubt is permissible? To examine\nmeans to search doubtingly; it means to call the matter in question\u2014this,\ntoo, is right. It is, on the one hand, a doctrine of the Catholic Church\nthat they who have received faith through the ministry of the Church, that\nis, they that have been made familiar with the essential subjects of the\nfaith and the motives of their credibility by proper religious\ninstruction, must not doubt their faith. They have no reasonable excuse\nfor doubting because they are assured of the truth of the faith. We have\ndiscussed this point before.(4)\n\n\n    As a matter of course only voluntary doubts are excluded, doubts\n    by which one assents deliberately and wilfully to the judgment\n    that perhaps not all may be true that is proposed for our belief.\n    Involuntary doubts are neither excluded nor sinful. These are\n    apparent counter-arguments, objections, difficulties against the\n    faith, which occur to the mind without getting its conscious\n    approval. They are not unlikely, because the cognition of the\n    credibility of Christian truths, while it is certain, is yet\n    lacking in that obvious clearness which would render obscurity and\n    counter-argument impossible; the assent to faith is free. Doubts\n    of this kind are apt to molest the mind and buzz round it like\n    bothersome insects, but they are not sinful because they do not\n    set aside the assent to faith any more than the cloud that\n    intervenes between us and the sun can extinguish its light. The\n    assent to faith is withdrawn only when the will with clear\n    consideration approves of the judgment that the doubt may be\n    right.\n\n    But what about doubts which one cannot solve? Would we not owe it\n    to truth and probity to withhold assent to faith for a while?\n\n    The answer lies in the distinction of a twofold solution of\n    difficulties. It is by no means necessary, nor even possible, to\n    solve directly all objections; it suffices to solve them\n    indirectly, that is, by recognizing them as void; since faith is\n    certain, whatever is contrary to it must be false. If one is\n    convinced by clear proofs of the innocence of a defendant he will\n    not be swayed in his assurance, no matter how much circumstantial\n    evidence be offered against the defendant. He may not be able to\n    account directly for one or the other remarkable coincidence of\n    circumstances, but all the arguments of the other side are to him\n    refuted, because to him the defendant\u2019s innocence is a certainty.\n    Thus the faithful Christian may hear it solemnly proclaimed as a\n    scientifically established fact that miracles are impossible,\n    because they would be tantamount to God making correction on His\n    own work, because they would imply a self-contradiction, or they\n    would be against the law of preservation of energy; he hears of\n    atrocities in the history of the Church, of the Inquisition, of\n    the Church being an enemy of civilization\u2014he knows not what to\n    say: but one thing he knows, that there must be an answer, because\n    he knows, enlightened by faith, that his belief cannot be false.\n    Nowhere is it demanded that all objections be directly answered,\n    in order that the conviction be true. If I, with the whole world,\n    am convinced that I am able to recognize the truth, must I\n    therefore carefully disentangle all the cobwebs ever spun about\n    the truth by brooding philosophical brains? If I am in the house,\n    safe from the rain, must I, in order to keep dry, go out and catch\n    every drop of rain that is falling? Such doubts may indeed harass\n    the untrained mind, may even confuse it. This is the juncture\n    where grace comes in, the pledge of which has been received at\n    baptism, bringing enlightenment, peace, assurance; then we learn\n    from others and from ourselves that faith is also a grace.\n\n\nNevertheless a scientific examination of the foundations and truths of\nfaith is allowed and wholesome. Nearly all the theological works written\nby Catholics since the days of _Justin_ and _Augustine_ are nothing but\nexaminations of this kind. At every examination one proceeds with doubt\nand question. This is admitted; but this doubt must be merely a methodical\none, not a serious one, nor need it be serious. These two kinds of doubt\nmust be clearly distinguished. In case of a serious doubt I look upon the\nmatter as really dubious, and withhold my assent. I am not yet convinced\nof its truth. This kind of a doubt is not allowed in matters of faith and\nit is the only one that is forbidden. In case of a methodical doubt I\nproceed as convinced of a truth, but I do not yet see the reasons plainly,\nand would like to be fully conscious of them. Evidently there is no need\nof casting aside the convictions I have hitherto held, and of beginning to\nthink that the matter is by no means positively established.\n\nFor instance, I am convinced that a complicated order must be the work of\nintellect; however, I would like to find the proof of it. Hence I proceed\nas if the truth were yet to be found. But it would evidently be absurd to\nthink in the meantime that such admirable order could be the result of\nblind accident. Or, I am convinced that there must be a source for every\nevent: I desire to find the demonstration of it. In the meantime shall I\nthink it possible for another Nova Persei to be produced in the sky\nwithout any cause? Or, investigating to see whether I am capable of\nrecognizing the truth, shall I seriously become a sceptic till I am\nconvinced that I ought not to be such? As soon as I really doubt that I\ncan recognize anything at all as true, obviously I cannot proceed any\nfurther. _Kant_ begins his \u201cCritique of Pure Reason\u201d with this doubt, and\nmany imitate him, but only by evident inconsistency are they able to\ncontinue their researches by means of reason. Scientific examination does\nnot consist in repudiating a certainty held hitherto, in order to arrive\nat it anew; it consists in bringing to one\u2019s clear consciousness the\nreasons for that certainty, and in trying to formulate those reasons\nprecisely. To investigate the light it is evidently not necessary first to\nextinguish it.\n\nThus the believing Christian may most certainly probe into his religious\nconviction without interfering with his adherence, and by doing so proceed\nunprepossessed in the fullest sense, for unprepossession does not mean the\nrooting up of all certainty. At the threshold of wisdom does not sit\nScepticism.\n\n\n\nWhat Unprepossession is Not.\n\n\nBut the deeper, modern meaning of unprepossession is precisely the right\nto doubt seriously everything, especially the truths of the Christian\nfaith; this is the freedom demanded. Scepticism, the stamp of our time.\n\nMany a misconception may have contributed to the definition of this\nunprepossession. For instance, overlooking the important difference\nbetween methodical doubt and serious doubt.\n\nThen there is the erroneous opinion that we should and could proceed\neverywhere in the same way as in the natural sciences. Almost parallel\nwith the progress in the natural sciences grew the doubt of the\ncorrectness of the ancient physical and astronomical notion of the world;\npiece after piece crumbled away under the hand of research; new truths\nwere discovered. In just admiration of these results it was concluded that\nall provinces of human cognition should be \u201cresearched\u201d in the same way,\nnot excepting religion and theories of the world; here, too, science\nshould cast a radical doubt upon everything and discover truth\u2014as if here\nwe had to deal with matters similar to astronomy and physics, in the state\nthey were centuries ago; as if all mankind was still ignorant of the truth\nand science had to discover it.\n\nThis right to doubt is claimed especially in the higher questions of\nreligion. Certain cognition by reason is, after all, impossible here, such\nis the presumption, and therefore, first of all, it is the right and duty\nof man, as soon as he has attained his intellectual maturity, to shape by\ndoubt his views of the world to the satisfaction of his mind and heart, to\nwin them by a struggle; nor is this true only in the case of the single\nindividual, but also of entire generations. To see problems everywhere,\nnot to have any convictions, this is taken to be true unprepossession.\n\n\n    \u201cMan must learn,\u201d so we are told, \u201cthat there is no absolute\n    miracle, not even in the domain of the religious life, which\n    supernaturally offers truth at a point or by an institution, but\n    that every man and every era as witnessed by the authority of\n    history must conquer truth by themselves for their own sake and at\n    their own risk\u201d (_E. Troeltsch_, Internationale Wochensch. 1908,\n    26). Thus the mind of man cannot slake its thirst for positive\n    truth at the divine fountain of revelation, but only by search and\n    research. Such is the cheerful message of this science. \u201cAmid\n    grave crises,\u201d we are told again, \u201ca new concept of science has\n    forced its way to the front since the beginning of the eighteenth\n    century and conquered the universities.\u201d \u201cScience is not a\n    finished system, but a research to be forever under examination\u201d\n    (_A. Harnack_, Die Aufgabe der theol. Facultaeten, 1901, 17).\n\n\nResearch without ever arriving at the sure possession of the truth, this\nis now the meaning of science, especially of philosophy. Hence there\ncannot be a philosophy conclusive and immutable, and any point which seems\nestablished may at any time be revised according to new perceptions.\n\u201cThere is no question that may not be asked; none which in the abstract\ncould not just as well be denied as affirmed. In this sense philosophy is\nunprepossessed\u201d (_Paulsen_, Die deutschen Universitaeten, 1902, 304\n_seq._). The highest achievement it declares itself capable of, is not to\npoint out the truth to its disciples, for it does not know the truth\nitself, but only this: \u201cWe expect, or at least we should expect, that\nduring the years of study the mind give itself earnestly to philosophy,\nand strive for a firm grasp of ideas. The great pathfinders in world\nthought, _Plato_, _Aristotle_, _Spinoza_, _Kant_, and whoever may be\nranked with them, remain the living teachers of philosophy.\u201d Thus we hold\nthose great intellectual achievements, _Plato\u2019s_ doctrine and ideas,\n_Spinoza\u2019s_ atheistic pantheism, _Aristotle\u2019s_ objectivism and _Kant\u2019s_\nsubjectivism, with other views of the world of most variegated patterns,\nall contradicting and excluding one another, all dubious, none sure. What\nwould be said of an astronomy that could do nothing better than fix the\ntelescope on the different stars and then tell its disciples: Now look for\nwhat you please, ideas of _Ptolemy_ or _Copernicus_; _Aristotle\u2019s_ theory\nof the spheres or _Newton\u2019s_ theory of gravity; each has its points, but\nof none can it be said it is certain! Such an astronomy would probably be\nleft to its deserved fate.\n\nIn the most important points of religion mankind has ever, even in pagan\ntimes, recognized the truth, albeit imperfectly. This is evinced by the\nconviction that there exists a personal God and a hereafter; convictions\nwhich can be proved historically. God\u2019s revelation has provided those who\ndesire to believe with a fuller knowledge of the truth: heaven and earth\nwill pass away, but these words will not pass away. But what is already in\nour safe possession cannot be once more discovered by research. What has\nalready been found is no longer an object of research. Mankind\u2019s lot would\nbe a sad one indeed were this unprepossessed science in the right; if in\nthe most important questions of life it were condemned forever to\ntantalizing doubt. God\u2019s providence has ordained matters more kindly for\nhumanity.\n\nOn the other hand, it is a poor science that has nothing to offer but an\neternal query for the truth. A poor science, that with self-consciousness\npromises enlightenment and what not, but finally can give nothing but\nceaseless doubt instead of truth, tormenting darkness instead of cheerful\nlight. Why, then, research where nothing can be found? Why raise searching\neyes to the sky when the stars do not show themselves? What kind of\nprogress is this when science does nothing further than dig forever at the\nfoundation? The great _St. Augustine_ has long also passed judgment on\nthis kind of science: \u201cSuch doubting is abhorred by the City of God as\nfalse wisdom, because among the things which we grasp with our intellect\nand reason there is a knowledge, limited, it is true, because the soul is\nweighed down by a perishable body, as the Apostle says: _ex parte\nscimus_\u2014but which has full certainty\u201d (De Civitate Dei, XIX, 18).\n\n\n\nAn Erroneous Supposition.\n\n\nThe errors just dealt with, and the demand that scientific research must\ndoubt everything, is based on a supposition often stated expressly as a\nprinciple, and which appears quite plausible even to a mind not trained in\nphilosophy. It says: There is but one certainty, the scientific certainty;\nthe certain possession of the truth can be obtained only by scientific\nresearch. To rid the world of error, we are told, \u201cthere is but one way,\nviz., scientific work. Only science and scientific truth are able to\ndispose of error\u201d (_Th. Lipps_, Allgemeine Zeitung, Muenchen, August 4,\n1908). \u201cTruth is scientific truth, based on criticism, hence the religion\nof modern man must also rest on critical truth.... There is no other\nauthority but science\u201d (_Masaryk_, Kampf um die Religion, 13).\n\nThis sort of speech we hear from the college chair as the slogan for\neducation and enlightenment: any one deficient in science or in education\nbelongs more or less to the unthinking mass who have no convictions of\ntheir own, but submit blindly to impressions and authority.\n\n\n    Such unclarified conceptions, with their inferences, are even met\n    with where they would not be expected, for instance, we read:\n    \u201cWhat the average individual needed was a good shepherd, a\n    shepherd\u2019s devotion and love, that uplifts and urges onward; it\n    was authority, Church-ministry and care of souls, that was needed.\n    The Church is an organized pastorate, for the average individual\n    likes to go with the flock. The chosen are they who feel within\n    themselves the great question of truth as the care of their heart\n    and task of their life, who experience its tremendous tension, and\n    who are struggling to the end with the intellectual battles\n    provoked by this question of truth. The average people, _i.e._,\n    the many, the great majority, need something steady to which they\n    can cling\u2014persons and teachers, laws and practice.\u201d And why this\n    uncharitable distinction between people belonging to the flock and\n    the chosen ones, as if the Church and its ecclesiastical functions\n    were only appointed for the former? Particularly because \u201cwithout\n    methodical scientific work man cannot attain to the truth\u201d (_H.\n    Schell_, Christus, 1900, 125, 64).\n\n\nThus science may summon everything before its forum, no one having a right\nto interfere; in the superiority bestowed by the right of autocracy it may\nsweep aside everything that is opposed to it, no matter by what authority.\nHence science must be free to jolt everything, free to question the truth\nof everything, which it has not itself examined and approved. This is the\nfundamental supposition of modern freedom of science; also a fatal error,\nbetraying a woeful ignorance of the construction of the human intellect,\nin spite of all its pretentiousness. As a rule we have a true certainty in\nmost matters, particularly in philosophical-religious convictions, a\ncertainty not gained by scientific studies; by aid of the latter we may\nexplain or strengthen that certainty, but we are not free to upset it.\n\nWe cannot avoid examining this point a little closer. There is a twofold\ncertainty, one, which we shall call the _natural_ certainty, is a firm\nconviction based on positive knowledge, but without a clear reflexive\nconsciousness of the grounds on which the conviction is actually resting.\nReason recognizes these grounds, but the recognition is not distinct\nenough for reason to become conscious of them, to be able to state them\naccurately and in scientific formulas. _scientific_ certainty is a firm\nconviction, with a clear consciousness of the grounds, hence it can easily\naccount for them. Natural certainty is the usual one in human life;\nscientific certainty is the privilege of but a few, and even they have it\nin but very few things.\n\n\n    Everybody has a positive intellectual certainty that a complicated\n    order cannot be the result of accident, and that for every event\n    there must be a cause, though not every one will be able readily\n    to demonstrate the truth of his certainty. But if the philosopher\n    should look for the proof, he would do so in no other way than by\n    reflecting upon his natural and direct knowledge, and by trying to\n    become conscious of what he has thus directly found out. To\n    illustrate by a few examples: We are all convinced of the\n    existence of an exterior world, and any one who is not an idealist\n    will call this conviction a reasonable certainty, and yet only a\n    few will be able to answer the subtle questions of a sceptic. This\n    certainty again is a natural but not a scientific one. How\n    difficult it is here also for reason to attain scientific\n    certainty, how easy it is to go astray in these researches, is\n    proved by the errors of idealism so incomprehensible to the\n    untrained natural mind. Let us ask, finally, any one: Why must we\n    say: \u201c_C\u00e6sar_ defeated _Pompey_,\u201d but not \u201c_C\u00e6sar_ defeated of\n    _Pompey_\u201d? He will tell us this is nonsense; maybe he will add\n    that the genitive has another meaning. But should I ask further\n    how the meaning of the genitive differs from that of the\n    accusative, as both cases seem to have often the same meaning, I\n    shall get no answer. There is a certitude, but only a natural one.\n    Even if I should ask modern students of the psychology and history\n    of languages, like _Wundt_, _Paul_, or whatever their names may\n    be, I should not get a satisfactory answer either. The whole logic\n    of language, with its subtle forms and moods of expression\u2014how\n    difficult for scientific research! And yet the mind of even a\n    child penetrates it, and not only a European child, but the\n    Patagonian and negro child, who is able to master by its\n    intellectual power complex languages, with four numbers, many\n    moods, fourteen tenses, etc.\n\n    These examples will suffice, though volumes of them could be\n    written. They show us clearly a twofold certainty. The difference\n    between the natural and scientific certainty is not that the\n    former is a blind conviction formed at random, but only that one\n    is not clearly conscious of the reasons on which it rests, whereas\n    this is the case in scientific certitude. We see further the\n    untrained power of the intellect manifest itself in natural\n    knowledge and certainty; for this purpose it is primarily created;\n    philosophical thought is difficult for it, and many have no talent\n    at all for it. It is also unfailing in apprehending directly\n    things pertaining to human life. Here the mind is free of that\n    morbid scepticism of which it too easily becomes a prey when it\n    begins to investigate and probe scientifically. What it there sees\n    with certainty cannot always be found here distinctly, and thus\n    the mind begins to doubt things it was hitherto sure of, and which\n    often remain instinctively certain to the mind despite its\n    artificial doubts. Now we can also understand why philosophers so\n    often have doubts which to the untrained look absurd, and why\n    philosophers differ in their opinions on most important things,\n    whereas mankind guided by its natural certitude is unanimous in\n    them.\n\n\nThis certainty is destined to be the reliable guide of man through life.\nIt precedes science, and can even exist without it. Long before there was\na science of art and of jurisprudence the Babylonians and Egyptians had\nbuilt their monuments, and _Solon_ and _Lycurgus_ had given their wise\nlaws. And long before philosophers were disputing about the moral laws,\nmen had the right view in regard to virtue and vice (cf. _Cicero_, De\nOratore, I, 32). The same certitude is also destined to guide man in the\nmore important questions, in the questions of religion and morality. The\nCreator of human nature and its destiny, who implanted instinct in the\nanimal to guide it unconsciously in the necessities of life, has also\ngiven to man the necessary light to perceive with certainty truths without\nwhich it would be impossible to live a life worthy of man.\n\nIt is just this natural knowledge and certitude that gives man certainty\nof divine revelation, after God vouchsafed to give it to mankind for its\nunfailing guidance and help. For revelation was not only intended for\ntheologians, Bible critics, philosophers, and Church-historians, but for\nall. And God has taken care, as He had to do, that man has ample evidence\nthat God has spoken, and that the Church is the authorized Guardian of\nthis revelation, even without critical research in history and philosophy.\nWe have elsewhere briefly stated this evidence in the words of the Vatican\nCouncil.\n\n\n    This evidence is seen in the invincible stability of the Church\n    and its unity of faith, the incontestable miracles never ceasing\n    within it, the grand figures of its Saints and Martyrs, virtue in\n    the various classes, a virtue increasing in proportion to the\n    influence the Church exerts, the spectacle that everything truly\n    noble is attracted by the Christian faith and the contrary\n    repulsed. In addition the intrinsic grandeur and harmony of the\n    truths of faith, above all the unique figure of Christ, with His\n    wonderful life and sufferings, also the calm and peace of mind\n    effected in the soul of the faithful by living and thinking in\n    this faith; all these tell him that here the spirit of God is\n    breathing, the spirit of truth. The natural light of his\n    intellect, further illuminated by grace, suffices to give him a\n    true intellectual certainty of his faith, based upon these motives\n    and similar ones, even without scientific studies. The calmness of\n    the mind that holds fast to this faith, the compunction and unrest\n    which follow defection from the faith, both so characteristic of\n    Catholics, prove that their minds embrace the truth in their\n    faith.\n\n    Hence it betrays little philosophical knowledge of the peculiarity\n    of man\u2019s intellectual life, if infidelity approaches an\n    inexperienced, believing student, perhaps even an uneducated\n    labourer, with the express assurance that his faith hitherto has\n    been but a blind belief, an unintelligent following of the lead of\n    a foreign authority, with the distinct admonition to turn his back\n    on the faith of his childhood.\n\n    What has been said above makes it clear why a Catholic is not\n    permitted to have a serious doubt about his faith under the\n    pretext that he ought first to form a certain conviction all for\n    himself by scientific investigation. He has it already, if we\n    presuppose sufficient instruction and normal conditions; he may\n    raise his natural certitude to a scientific one by study if he has\n    the time and talent for it, but he must not condition his assent\n    upon the success of his scientific investigations. He has\n    certitude; he has no right to demand scientific knowledge as a\n    necessary condition, because it is not required for certitude, and\n    also because it lies altogether outside of the conditions of human\n    life. It would amount simply to shaking off the yoke of truth. The\n    Church teaches as follows: \u201cIf any one says that the condition of\n    the faithful and of those who have not yet come to the only true\n    faith is equal, so that Catholics can have a just cause for\n    suspending their assent and calling in question the faith which\n    they have received by the ministry of the Church until they have\n    completed the scientific demonstration of the credibility and\n    truth of it, let him be anathema.\u201d\n\n\nHow high this wisdom rises above the limited thought of a science that\nimagines itself alone to be wise! Sad indeed would be the lot of mankind\ncould it attain to certain truth in the most important questions of life\nonly by lengthy scientific investigations. The overwhelming majority of\nmankind would be forever excluded from the certain knowledge that there is\na God, an eternity, liberty, that there are immutable moral laws and\ntruths, on the value of which depends the woe and weal of humanity.\n\n\n    Behold the wisdom of the world that is put before us: \u201cIn order to\n    arrive at a definite conclusion by our own philosophical reasoning\n    (on the existence of God and the possibility of miracles) what a\n    multitude of things must be presupposed!\u201d Thus we are informed in\n    a philosophical novel of modern times which aims at proving the\n    incompatibility of the Catholic duty to believe with the freedom\n    of the intellect [Katholische Studenten, by _A. Friedwald_ (nom de\n    plume). An explanation of the ideas contained in it is given by\n    the Academia 18, 1905-6, December and March. The ideas found in\n    the novel are also advanced by _A. Messer_, Einf\u00fchrung in die\n    Erkenntnistheorie, 1909, p. 158 _seq._]. And Prof. _Rhodius_, who\n    put the ideas of the novel in formulas, teaches: \u201cThe question\n    whether our knowledge could penetrate beyond what we know by our\n    experience and even our senses, is answered, as you know, in the\n    negative by a noted philosophical school. Hence, before attacking\n    those metaphysical questions regarding the existence of God and\n    His relations to the world, we must first try to have definite\n    views as to the essence of human knowledge, of its criterion, its\n    scope, and of the degrees of its certainty. But these preliminary\n    questions of theoretic knowledge, how difficult and perplexing\n    they are! You probably have not the faintest idea into what a mass\n    of individual problems the main questions must be dissected, nor\n    what a multitude of heterogeneous views are struggling here\n    against one another\u201d (p. 181).\n\n    Consider how shortsighted a wisdom is manifested by these words.\n    Is it seriously intended to summon the peasant from his plough,\n    the old grandmother from behind the stove, and lead them into the\n    lecture rooms of the university in order that they might there\n    listen to lectures on phenomenalism, and positivism, and realism,\n    and criticism, until their heads are swimming? Or else can they\n    not hope to arrive at the truth? Do they seriously think that the\n    truth asked for by every man, the truth in the most vital\n    questions of mankind, is the exclusive privilege of a few college\n    professors? And how very few. More than twenty-four hundred years\n    have elapsed since the days of _Pythagoras_, and yet modern\n    philosophy still stands before the first preliminary question in\n    all knowledge, whether a man can know what the eye does not see.\n    \u201cMany views are at variance there.\u201d If this be the only way for\n    mankind to reach certain truth, then we are indeed in a pitiful\n    plight!\n\n    We esteem philosophy and its subtle questions, and we heartily\n    wish our Catholic young men in college to obtain a more thorough\n    philosophical training. But if, involved in theories, one will\n    lose his insight into the world and human life to such a degree as\n    to make of the \u201cwisdom of the world\u201d an isolated narrow\n    speculation which boasts of being alone able to discover the\n    higher truths, while withering in neurasthenic doubt\u2014such wisdom\n    should be left to its deserved fate, sterility.\n\n    Or should it be possible to the ideal of Protestantism\u2014and\n    therefore also of the modern spirit\u2014to console mankind by pointing\n    out that the knowledge of the question which concerns us most\n    deeply, \u201cthe knowledge of God and the knowledge of good, remains\n    but a leading idea and problem, though we are confident of\n    advancing nearer to its solution\u201d? Is thus mankind to be eternally\n    without light in the most important questions and problems? Every\n    little plant and animal is equipped by nature with everything it\n    needs\u2014and man alone to be a failure? The young shoots of the tree\n    strive to bring forth blossoms and fruit, and succeed; the bird\n    flies off in the fall in quest of a new home, and finds it; hunger\n    and thirst demand food and get it; only the aim of the human mind\n    shall never be fulfilled\u2014he alone shall ever pine without\n    hope!\u2014_Dicentes se esse sapientes stulti facti sunt._ What a\n    difference between such principles and the grand thoughts of\n    Christianity! A difference like that between peace and eternal\n    restless doubt, like that between man\u2019s dignity and man\u2019s\n    degradation, between man\u2019s short-sightedness and the wisdom of\n    God.\n\n\nHence the result of our discussion is: independent of science mankind has\nits positive convictions, independent of science it finds here rest and\ngratification in its longing for truth. Scientific study and research are\nfor the purpose of setting these truths in a brighter light, of defending\nthe patrimony of mankind. But the fosterer of science must not claim the\nfreedom to ignore these positive convictions in himself and in others, to\nendanger the patrimony of mankind by doubts and attacks instead of\nprotecting it, much less must he condemn the human mind to the eternal\nlabour of _Sisyphus_, to the eternal rolling of a huge stone which,\nrecoiling, must always be lifted anew.\n\n\n\n\nChapter IV. Accusations And Objections.\n\n\nAmong the notable facts in history one stands out prominently, it is more\nremarkable than any other, and evokes serious thought. It is the fact that\nthe Christian religion, especially its foremost representative, the\nCatholic Church, concerning which every unbiassed critic is bound to admit\nthat none has made more nations moral, happy and great than this Church;\nthat nowhere else has virtue and holiness flourished more than in her;\nthat no one else has laboured more for truth and purity of morals; that\nnevertheless there is not, and never was, an institution which has more\nenemies, which has been more persecuted, than the Catholic Church. This\nfact will suggest to every serious-minded critic the question, whether we\nhave not here focussed that tremendous struggle, which truth and justice\nhave ever waged in the bosom of mankind against error and passions\u2014an\nimage of the struggle raging in every human breast. The Church recognizes\nin this fact the fulfilment of the prophecy of her Founder: \u201cAnd ye shall\nbe hated by all men for my name\u2019s sake\u201d (Luke xxi. 17). And the Church may\nadd, that in her alone this prophecy is being fulfilled.\n\n\n\nThe Enemy of Progress.\n\n\nIn her journey through the centuries the Church has had to listen to many\naccusations because she, the keeper of the truth entrusted to her care,\nhas refused to respond to the demand to accept unconditionally the ideals\ndevised by existing fashions. _Cantavimus vobis et non saltastis_ (we have\npiped to you and you have not danced). Therefore the Church has been\ncalled reactionary; the heretics of the first centuries of Christianity\ndenounced her as the enemy of the higher gnosis; a later period denounced\nher as an enemy of the genuine humanism, in the eighteenth century she was\ndenounced as the enemy of enlightenment, to-day she is denounced as the\nenemy of progress. Again the Church is accused before the judicial bar of\nthe children of the age. They desire to eat plentifully from the tree of\nknowledge, but the Church, they say, prevents them. They wish to climb the\nheights of human perfection, to ascend higher than any preceding\ngeneration, but the Church holds them back. She will keep them in the\nfetters of her guardianship. And with a keen, searching eye the smart\nchildren of our age have looked the old Church over, taking notice of\neverything, anxious to put her in the wrong.\n\nTheir charges do not fail to make an impression, even on the Church\nherself. She wishes to justify herself before the plaintiffs, and still\nmore before her own children who trust in her. Thus she has not hesitated\nin declaring loudly on most solemn occasions that _she is not an enemy of\nnoble science_ and of human progress, and with great earnest she takes\nexception to this charge.\n\nNo wonder, one might say, that the Church makes such assurances. It is\ntime for her to realize that unless she can clear herself from it this\naccusation will be her moral ruin at a time when the banner of progress is\nheld aloft, and when even the Catholic world shares in that progress.\nTrue, but let us not forget this: if there is anything characteristic of\nthe Catholic Church it is her frankness and honesty. She is not afraid to\nproclaim her doctrines and judgments before the whole world; she leaves\nher Index and Syllabus open for inspection, openly avowing that she is the\nirreconcilable enemy of that emancipated freedom proclaimed by modern\nliberalism as the ideal of the age. It is the honesty which she inherited\nfrom her Founder, who told the truth to friend and enemy, to His disciples\nand to the Scribes, to _Nicodemus_, that lonely night, and to _Caiaphas_.\nWith the same straightforwardness the Church declares that she feels not\nenmity but sympathy toward civilization. A fair-minded critic will admit\nhere again that the Church is in earnest. \u201cFar from opposing the fostering\nof human arts and sciences, the Church is supporting and promoting them in\nvarious ways,\u201d declares the Vatican Council. \u201cThe Church does not\nunderrate nor despise their advantages for human life: on the contrary, it\navows that they, coming as they do from God, the Master of the sciences,\nalso lead to God by aid of His grace, when properly used\u201d (Sess. III, c.\n4). The Church has put this accusation on the list of errors of the age\ncondemned by _Pius X._ (Sent. 57). She feels the charge as an injury.\n\n\n\nThe Testimony of History.\n\n\nNevertheless, in anti-ecclesiastical circles it is taken very often for an\nestablished fact that the Roman Church has ever tried her best to hamper\nthe progress of science, or has suppressed it, or at least scowled at it.\nHow could it be otherwise? they say. How could she favour the progress\nmade in enlightening reason or in advancing human knowledge? Must she not\nfear for its intellectual sway over men whom she keeps under the yoke of\nfaith? Must she not fear that they might awaken from the slumber in which\nthey were held prisoners by the suggestive force of her authority, held to\nbe transcendental; that they might awaken to find out the truth for\nthemselves? And what is the use of science? He that believes will be\nsaved: hence faith suffices. If we wish to hear the accusation in the\nlanguage of militant science, here it is: \u201cOutside the monastic\ninstitutions no attempt at intellectual advancement was made (in the\nMiddle Ages), indeed, so far as the laity were concerned, the influence of\nthe Church was directed to an opposite result, for the maxim universally\nreceived was, that \u2018ignorance is the mother of devotion\u2019 \u201d (_J. W.\nDraper_, History of the Conflict between Religion and Science).\n\nThis is the train of thought and the result of anti-ecclesiastical\na-priorism and its historical research. Are the plain facts of history in\naccord with it? The first and immediate task of the Church is certainly\nnot to disseminate science: her task, first of all, lies in the province\nof morals and religion. But as she is the highest power of morality and\nreligion, she stands in the midst of mankind\u2019s intellectual life, and\ncannot but come in contact with its other endeavours, owing to the close\nunity of that life. Hence, let us ask history, not about everything it\nmight tell us in this respect, but about one thing only.\n\nWe do not wish to show how the Church, headed by the Papacy, has become\nthe mother of Western civilization and culture. Nor shall we enumerate the\nmerits of the Church in art, nor point out the alertness she has certainly\nshown, in her walk through the centuries, by taking up the intellectual\nachievements of the time and assimilating them with her moral and\nreligious treasure of faith, withal preserved unchanged. The old Church\nhad done this with the treasures of ancient learning and science; \u201cthis\nspirit of Christianity proved itself by the facility with which Christian\nthinkers gathered the truth contained in the systems of old philosophy,\nand, even before that, by assimilating those old truths into Christian\nthought, the beginning of which had already been made in the New\nTestament. They were appropriated, without hesitating experiment, without\nwavering, and were given their place in a higher order\u201d (_O. Willmann_,\nGesch. des Idealismus, 2d ed., II, 1907, 67). This, she unceasingly\ncontinues to do, as proved by the high standard of Catholic life and\nCatholic science at the present, a fact not even disputed by opponents. We\npoint only incidentally to _the foundation and the fostering of primary\nschools_ by the Church. It is an historical fact that public education\nbegan to thrive only with the freer unfolding of the Church.\n\n\n    The first elementary schools were those of the monasteries. Later\n    on there were established after their pattern the cathedral and\n    chapter schools, then the parish schools. Still later there came\n    the town and village schools\u2014all of ecclesiastical origin, or at\n    least under the direction of the Church and in close connection\n    with her. As early as 774 we find an ecclesiastical school law, to\n    the effect that each Bishop should found an ecclesiastical school\n    in his episcopal town and appoint a competent teacher to instruct\n    \u201caccording to the tradition of the Romans.\u201d _Eugene II._ ordained\n    in 826 anew that efficient teachers should be provided for the\n    cathedral schools wherever needed, who were \u201cto lecture on the\n    sciences and the liberal arts with zeal.\u201d \u201cAll Bishops should have\n    the liberal arts taught at their churches,\u201d was a resolution of\n    the Council held in Rome in 1079 by _Gregory VII._ We read in the\n    acts of the Lateran Synod of 1179: \u201cInasmuch as it behooves the\n    Church, like a loving mother, to see to it that poor children who\n    cannot count upon the support of their parents should not lack\n    opportunity of learning to read and make progress, there should at\n    every cathedral church be given an adequate prebend to the\n    teacher\u2014who is to teach the clerics of this church and the poor\n    pupils gratuitously\u201d (_E. Michael_, Gesch. des Deutschen Volkes\n    II, 1899, 370). School education flourished more and more; in the\n    thirteenth century it was in full bloom. In Germany even many\n    unimportant places, market towns, boroughs, and villages had their\n    schools at that time. In Mayence and its immediate neighbourhood\n    there were, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, seven chapter\n    schools; at Muenster at least four schools; the clerical schools\n    at Erfurt had an attendance of no less than 1,000 pupils. About\n    the year 1400 the diocese of Prague alone had 460 schools. In the\n    middle Rhine district, about the year 1500, many counties had an\n    elementary school for every radius of two leagues; even rural\n    communities with 500 to 600 inhabitants, like Weisenau near Mainz,\n    and Michaelstadt in Odenwald, did not lack schools. (_J. Janssen_,\n    Gesch. des Deutschen Volkes, 15th ed., 1890, 26; cf. Michael, 1.\n    c. 402, 417-419; _Palacky_, Gesch. v. Boehmen, III, 1, p. 186).\n    Even in far-off Transylvania there was, as early as the fourteenth\n    century, no village without a church and a school (_K. Th.\n    Becker_, Die Volksschule der Siebenbuerger Sachsen, 1894, y;\n    Michael, 430). There is no doubt that this flourishing state of\n    schools was due in the first place to the stimulus, support, and\n    unselfish effort of the Church.\n\n\nBut we will not dwell longer on this subject. We wish, however, to point\nout more plainly something more closely related to our subject, viz., _the\nattitude of the Church towards the universities_, at a time when the most\nprominent nurseries of science were first coming into existence and\nbeginning to flourish, when they began to exert their influence upon the\ncivilization of Europe. Here, in the first place, it should become clear\nwhether it be true that the Church has ever looked upon the progress of\nscience with suspicion or even suppressed it. History teaches, in this\ninstance again, that no one has shown more interest, more devotion, more\nreadiness, to make sacrifices in promoting the establishment and growth of\nthe university, than the Church.\n\nWhen, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the thirst for knowledge,\nstronger than at any time in history, made itself felt in the Christian\ncountries of Europe, there were erected in the universities great\ninternational homes of science, so as to gratify the deeply felt need of\neducation. And thousands hastened to these places to acquire the knowledge\nof the period, overcoming all difficulties, then much greater than now. A\nrecent writer remarks about this not without reason: \u201cThe academic\ninstruction met on part of the thronging thousands with a psychic\ndisposition more favourable than at any other time. In a way it was here a\ncase of first love\u201d (_W. Muench_, Zukunftspaedagogik, 1908, 337). At the\nuniversities of the Middle Ages there were taught theology, ecclesiastical\nand civil law, the liberal arts, and medicine. But not in the manner that\nall four faculties were everywhere represented. Theology especially was\nquite frequently lacking, though the aim was to have all sciences\nrepresented. What since the beginning of the thirteenth century was first\nof all understood by a university were _studia generalia_\u2014then the usual\nname for universities, in contradistinction to _studium particulare_.\nUniversities enjoyed the privilege of having their academic degrees\nhonoured everywhere, and their graduates could teach anywhere. The\nuniversities were of an international character. Hence it happened that at\nthe German universities there were sitting in quest of knowledge by the\nside of Germans also foreign youths, from Scotland, Sweden, and Norway,\nfrom Italy and France, all contending for academic honours\u2014a moment which\nunquestionably contributed in no small degree to the improvement of\neducation.\n\nPrior to the Reformation, universities were not state institutions, as\nthey are at present in Europe, but free, independent corporations. They\nwere complete in themselves, they made their own statutes, had their own\njurisdiction, and many other privileges. The modern university enjoys but\na small remnant of those ancient prerogatives. In a public speech, made in\nthe presence of the Duke of Saxony, the Leipsic professor, _Johann Kone_,\ncould say in 1445: \u201cNo king, no chancellor, has any right to interfere\nwith our privileges and exemptions; the university rules itself, and\nchanges and improves its statutes according to its needs\u201d (_Janssen_, 1.\nc. 91).\n\nUp to the year 1300 there were no less than 23 universities established in\nItaly, 5 in France, 2 in England, 4 in Spain, and 1 in Portugal. \u201cHad all\nintentions been realized, Europe would have had by the year 1400 no fewer\nthan 55 universities, including Paris and Bologna. But of 9 of them there\nare extant only the charter deeds that were never executed. At any rate,\nthere were 46 of them, of which 37 or 39 existed at the turn of the\nfourteenth century; a considerable number, which was not known till recent\nyears\u201d (_Denifle_). Germany, Austria, and Hungary shared in 8: Prague,\nCracow, Vienna, Fuenfkirchen, Ofen, Heidelberg, Cologne, and Erfurt.\nWithin fifty years, from 1460 to 1510, no less than 9 universities were\nfounded in Germany\u2014a clear proof of the generous enthusiasm for science of\nthat period.\n\nBy their fostering and founding of universities, secular princes have won\nthe lasting gratitude of posterity, and so have the municipalities of a\nlater period for showing an even greater zeal than those princes. But it\nwas indisputably the Church that bestowed upon these homes of learning and\nculture the greatest benevolence and support for their foundation and\nmaintenance.\n\nIn the first place, history shows that the majority of them were founded\nby _Papal charters_. Since universities were understood to have the power\nof conferring degrees of international value, they had to be universally\nacknowledged; this could be effected only by an authority of universal\nrecognition; hence by the Roman-German Emperor\u2014as the supreme prince of\nthe world-wide Christian monarchy, or by the Pope, who was considered in\nthe first place. He was the general Father and Teacher of Christendom;\nthis is why Papal charters were so zealously sought after, in addition to\nimperial charters. Of the 44 universities called into existence before the\nyear 1400, 31 were founded by Papal charters. A similar condition\nprevailed in the fifteenth century and afterwards, up to the Reformation.\nThis was no interference in foreign affairs: such an interpretation would\nhave caused just surprise in the Middle Ages. That the highest spiritual\npower on earth should have the first claim in education was a matter of\ngeneral concession. And certainly the manner in which the Church made use\nof this right, to speak with an historian of the universities, forms \u201cone\nof the most important, and by no means least inglorious, parts of an\nactivity so manifold and difficult\u201d (_V. A. Huber_, Die Englischen\nUniversitaeten, I, 1839, p. 14).\n\nThese Papal charters breathe a warm _benevolence_ for science. Everywhere\nwe find the wish expressed, that studies thrive in those places which are\nmost suitable for the effectual spread of science, and that the different\ncountries have a sufficient number of scientifically trained men.\n\n\n    Read, for instance, the charter given by Pope _Boniface VIII._ to\n    Pamiers and Avignon, or the Letter of Privileges granted to\n    Coimbra by _Clement V._ (apud _Denifle_, 793, 524), or _Pius\n    II.\u2019s_ Bull founding the university of Basle. The Pope says here\n    about the aim of science: \u201cAmong the various blessings to which\n    man may by the grace of God attain in this mortal life, the last\n    place is not to be given to persevering study, by which man may\n    gain the pearl of the sciences, which point out the way to a good\n    and happy life, and by their excellence elevate the learned men\n    above the uneducated. Science makes man like to God, and enables\n    him to clearly perceive the secrets of the world. It aids the\n    unlearned, it elevates to sublime heights those born in the\n    lowliest condition.\u201d \u201cFor this reason the Holy See has always\n    promoted the sciences, given them homes, and provided for their\n    wants, that they might flourish, so that men, well directed, might\n    the more easily acquire so lofty a human happiness, and, when\n    acquired, share it with others.\u201d This was the longing desire that\n    led to the opening at Basle of \u201ca plentiful spring of science, of\n    whose fulness all those may draw who desire to be introduced into\n    the study of the mysteries of Scripture and learning.\u201d Even prior\n    to this, the same Pope had written to the Duke _Louis of Bavaria_:\n    \u201cThe Apostolic See desires the widest possible extension of\n    science,\u201d which, \u201cwhile other things are exhausted by\n    dissemination, is the only thing that expands the more the greater\n    the number of those reached by it\u201d (apud _Janssen_, 1. c, p. 89).\n\n\nBut the Church was not satisfied with granting charters. She also gave\nvery _substantial material aid_ to most of the universities. The Popes\nmaintained two universities at Rome, one of them connected with the Papal\nCuria, a sort of court-school. It was founded by _Innocent IV._, in order\nthat the many who came to the Papal court from all parts of Christendom\nmight satisfy also their thirst for knowledge. Theology, law, especially\ncivil law, medicine, and languages, including Oriental languages, were\ntaught there. Besides this there was another university at Rome, founded\nby _Boniface VIII._ for a similar purpose: it did not flourish long,\nthough in 1514 it counted no less than eighty-eight professors. Many\nattempts to found or support universities would have proved abortive had\nnot the Popes provided for the salaries of professors by prebends and\nstipends, and by allotting to that end a portion of the income of priests\nand churches. Bishops, too, proved themselves zealous patrons of the\nuniversities (_Paulsen_, Gesch. des gelehrten Unterrichts, 2d ed., I,\n1898, p. 27).\n\n\n    Thus, to cite a few examples of German universities, there was in\n    1532, with the consent of the Archbishop _Arnest_, a contribution\n    raised by the clergy for the endowment of the university of\n    Prague, to which the various cloisters and chapters, especially\n    those at Prague, contributed. With the money thus raised the\n    Archbishop purchased property, the income from which was to\n    provide salaries for the professors. Twelve professors received\n    from _Urban V._ the canonicates of the church of All Saints\n    (_Denifle_, 598). Erfurt university was given 4 canonicates,\n    Cologne 11, Greifswald still more. Similarly Tuebingen, Breslau,\n    Rostock, Wittenberg, and Freiburg were cared for (_Kaufmann_, Die\n    Gesch. der Deutschen Universitaeten, II, 1896, p. 34, _seq._).\n    Vienna found a benefactor in the pastor of Gars, who on October\n    13, 1370, founded a purse for 3 sublectors and 1 scholar.\n    Heidelberg received 10 canonicates. Its great benefactor was the\n    learned _Johann von Dalberg_, first curator of the university, and\n    later Bishop of Worms. Under him Heidelberg reached the zenith of\n    its lustre, and laid the foundation of almost all that has won it\n    the reputation it at present enjoys. By his co-operation the first\n    chair of Greek was founded; to him the foundation of the college\n    library is due, which later on gained world-wide fame under the\n    name of \u201cPalatina.\u201d He further collected a private library, rich\n    in Latin, Greek, and Hebrew books, the use of which was open to\n    all scientists. \u201cThe Rhenish Literary Society\u201d attained its\n    greatest prominence under his direction (_Janssen_, 1. c.\n    100-105). Ingolstadt, too, obtained its needed income by the\n    donation of rich church-prebends, to such an extent that the\n    \u201cendowments netted the university about 2,500 florins,\u201d a very\n    large sum for that time (_Kaufmann_, 1. c. 38). _Prantl_ also\n    admits in regard to Ingolstadt: \u201cThe Papal Curia did its best to\n    furnish the university\u201d (Gesch. der Ludwig-Maximilian in\n    Ingolstadt, 1872, I, 19, apud _Janssen_, 1. c. p. 9).\n\n\nIt is true, the Church then owned much property. But it is just as true\nthat she was ever ready to support science and colleges out of this\nproperty. Pope and clergy were also taking incessant pains to make it\npossible for _poor students_ to attend the university, not only for\ntheological students, but for those of all the faculties, to give an\nopportunity to rich and poor alike to enjoy the advantages of higher\neducation. Stipends and legacies of this kind are numerous. Even in our\nown days many a son of an _alma mater_ owes the stipend he enjoys to\nendowments made by the Church. In the course of time there were\nestablished at most of the universities so-called _colleges_ for the\npurpose of offering shelter and maintenance to poor students.\n\n\n    These colleges contributed essentially to the flourishing\n    condition of the university. Thus _Albrecht v. Langenstein_\n    suggested, at the founding of Vienna university, to the Duke,\n    _Albrecht of Austria_, the establishment of such colleges,\n    inasmuch as the continuance of the university was dependent on\n    them, and stated that Paris owed its prosperity to them\n    (_Denifle_, 624).\n\n    The Popes set here the best example. _Zoen_, Bishop of Avignon,\n    had provided in his testament that eight students from the\n    province of Avignon should be maintained at Bologna by his\n    successors from their estates at Bologna. These estates, however,\n    were sold later on. _John XXII._ then interfered in favour of the\n    students injured thereby and annulled the deed of purchase. The\n    income was set aside and increased to an amount sufficient for\n    thirty scholars; later on the Pope endeavoured to raise their\n    number to fifty. At the same celebrated academy, which, next to\n    Paris, had long been a beacon of science sought from near and\n    afar, _Urban V._ founded a home for poor students and directed the\n    appropriation of 4,000 gold ducats a year for it. From June 16,\n    1367, to June 15, 1368, the home received an appropriation of\n    5,908 ducats in gold and 155 baskets of cereals. His successor,\n    _Gregory XI._, set himself to the task of completing the work\n    begun. Out of the income of the Church he ordered appropriated in\n    the future 1,500 ducats a year for thirty students, of whom one\n    half were to study Canon Law, the other half Civil Law. He then\n    decreed the purchase of a home for 4,500 ducats in gold, and\n    ordered to pay out immediately 4,000 florins in gold for the next\n    school year. Besides the college named, _Urban V._ had founded one\n    at Montpellier for medical students, and another, which had its\n    seat at first at Trets, later at Monosque. During his pontificate\n    this Pope maintained no less than 1,000 students at various\n    institutions. Toulouse also had several colleges for poor\n    students, founded by high princes of the Church. In the year 1359\n    _Innocent VI._ devoted his own home at Toulouse with all its\n    possessions and its entire income to twenty poor students, ten of\n    whom were to study Canon Law and ten Civil Law. For their further\n    maintenance he ordered given to them, besides other things, 25,000\n    florins in gold \u201cmanualiter\u201d (_Denifle_, 213 _seq._, 308 _seq._,\n    339).\n\n\nFinally, nearly all universities, whether they owed their existence to\necclesiastical or civil power, received many and far-reaching _privileges_\nfrom the Popes. Not the least one was for clerical students the\ndispensation to free them from the requirement of residence for the\nenjoyment of their benefices, which made it possible for them to study in\nremote university towns, where they were free to study not only theology,\nbut other sciences as well. This dispensation was quite common.\nFurthermore, the Popes protected in the most energetic way the\nuniversities in their privileges and freedom every time they were applied\nto for aid.\n\n\n    This happened, for instance, at Bologna. The students there had\n    their free guilds. The municipal authorities began to restrict\n    their privileges by forbidding native students under heavy\n    penalties to study outside of Bologna, which was later on extended\n    to the alien students. The professors sided with the city.\n    _Honorius III._ in 1220 called upon the latter to repeal those\n    statutes; if they wanted to confine the students to the city, it\n    should be done by clemency, not with severity and coercion. The\n    city relented. But we see again in 1224 the students appeal, for\n    the third time since 1217, to the Pope, begging for protection.\n    The tension had grown; the city was actually beginning to use\n    force. _Honorius_ sharply rebuked the city for this action,\n    threatening excommunication if the authorities continued to\n    suppress freedom. The city yielded completely, and the freedom of\n    the students was saved, thanks to their protector. Later on the\n    Popes had to interfere again. _Clement V._ had already ordered the\n    Bishops to protect the students at Bologna. His successor, _John\n    XXII._, received complaints that privileges of students in Italy\n    were being violated by authorities and citizens of the city.\n    Against the Podesta of Bologna especially complaints were made.\n    The Pope, in 1321 and 1322, bade the Bishops and Archbishops to\n    take measures against those who _directe et indirecte impedire\n    dieuntur, ne ad praedictum studium valeant declinare contra\n    apostolica et imperialia privilegia_. He appointed at Bologna a\n    special protector and conservator of the university. Some years\n    after, when the Podesta declined to take the _juramentum de\n    observandis statutis ejusdem studiis factis et faciendis_, he was\n    commanded to take the oath.\n\n    At Orleans there was a flourishing law school; especially its _jus\n    civile_ was famous. Professors and students were granted by\n    _Clement V._ the privilege of an autonomous university with the\n    right of free corporation, with the power to suspend lectures in\n    case they could get no satisfaction for any wrong done them. These\n    privileges were a thorn in the eye of the city; its citizens even\n    allowed violence to be done the university. Then _Philip the Fair_\n    interfered, but in a way which indicates that he did not know\n    sufficiently the university life of the Middle Ages. Moreover, he\n    annulled the granted free fellowship, and put professors and the\n    students under civil supervision. But this was not tolerated in\n    those days. The king had at the same time given many privileges,\n    but they were disregarded. In 1316 professors and students left\n    Orleans and the university ceased to exist. The first act of _John\n    XXII._ upon ascending the Papal throne was to restore this school,\n    the French king himself having begged his support in the matter.\n    The king\u2019s suggestion to take the privilege of free fellowship\n    from the professors and students was rejected by the Pope. The\n    Pope reaffirmed all privileges granted to the university,\n    whereupon the professors and students returned, to inaugurate the\n    most brilliant epoch of their college.\n\n\nConsidering these facts, one may subscribe to the judgment of _Denifle_\nwhich he pronounces at the conclusion of his thorough treatise on the\nuniversities of the Middle Ages: \u201cSo far as the foundation of the\nuniversities can be spoken of, its merit belongs to the Popes, to secular\nrulers, clergy, and laity. But that the lion\u2019s share belongs to the Popes\nevery one must admit who has followed my presentment, which is exclusively\nbased on documents, and who examines history with impartiality\u201d (Ib. 792\n_seq._). Even _Kaufmann_, who is very unfavourably disposed towards the\nChurch, cannot deny that \u201cnumerous Popes have shown warm interest for the\nfostering of sciences during those centuries, and were for the most part\nthemselves prominent representatives of science\u201d (Ib. 403).\n\nThat the medi\u00e6val universities in some points, though not in all, were\ninferior to modern universities, was not their fault. No good judge of\nhuman conditions could expect it to be otherwise. The experience and\nefficiency of the mature man is not attained at once, but only after the\nexertions and experiments made by him during the period of youth and\ndevelopment. At a time when all the experiences in the field of school\nlegislation, which are the property of the present day, had yet to be\ncollected, when the relation between lower and higher schools had not been\nregulated in all respects, at that time it was not possible to be in the\nposition we are in to-day. Future critics of our times will see in our\npresent educational systems many gross defects, which often are not hidden\neven to our own eyes. But it would be arrogance for them to belittle our\nefforts, the fruits of which they will once enjoy without any merit on\ntheir part. The university of yore conformed to the educational purposes\nof that period; it was the focus of intellectual life, perhaps to a larger\ndegree than is the case to-day. This suffices. Moreover, the number of\nprofessors was quite considerable, that of the students even more so. In\nBologna in 1388 the number of professors was 70, not including the\ntheologians, among them 39 jurists; in Piacenza there were from the years\n1398 to 1402 71 professors; among them were 27 teachers of Roman law and\n22 teachers of medicine (_Denifle_, 209, 571).\n\nIn regard to the zeal displayed by the Church in promoting universities,\nit might be objected that she was caring in the first place for\n_theology_, not for the other sciences, and that the universities then had\nchiefly been established for theological students. This, however, is not\nthe case. The universities especially favoured by the Popes were first of\nall law schools, chiefly of civil law, or medical schools. Those at\nBologna, Padua, Florence, and Orleans were principally law schools; in\nItaly, in general, chief attention was paid to jurisprudence, particularly\nto Roman law. Montpellier was essentially a medical college; it attained\nduring the thirteenth century preponderance even over Salerno. The\nassertion has been made that the vigorous life at this medical college was\nowing to its independence of Rome (_Haeser_, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der\nMedizin, 1, 655. Cfr. _Denifle_, 342). But _Denifle_ has proved that\n\u201cclerical organs have been the moving spirits of the medical college at\nMontpellier.\u201d\n\nNor did the Papal charter deeds exclude any profane science. The common\nformula, which always prevails, authorizes to teach indiscriminately _in\njure canonico et civili necnon in medicina et qualibet alia licita\nfacultate_. Only one science was frequently excepted, and that was just\ntheology. Of the forty-six high schools that had been established up to\nthe year 1400, about twenty-eight, therefore nearly two-thirds, excluded\nby their charter the teaching of theology. At first a number of\nuniversities sprang up merely as law schools, others as medical schools,\nand there was then no need to include the science of theology in the\nschedule of studies. Furthermore, Paris was ever since the twelfth century\nlooked upon as the home and the natural place for theology (_Denifle_, 703\nf.). Hence the benevolence of the Church towards the universities was not\nmerely determined by selfish interest.\n\nOr was it, nevertheless? May the Church not have bestowed so much care on\nthe homes of science in order to increase her own influence thereby, and\nalso with an eye to the future? This assertion has been made. But this\nassertion is an injustice and it is against the testimony of history. The\nPopes very often issued their charter deeds only then, when request was\nmade by worldly rulers and by the cities themselves. Hence there was no\nhurried self-assertion. And the Church has never denied the right to\nworldly powers to found their own high schools. The theologians of the\nthirteenth century expressedly declared it to be the duty of princes to\nprovide for institutions of learning (Cfr. _Thomas of Aquin_, De regimine\nprincipum, I, 13; Op. contra impug. relig. 3).\n\n\n    Thus up to the year 1400 nine high schools had received no\n    charters at all, ten only imperial charters or charters from their\n    local sovereigns. If the Popes had cared only about their\n    influence, why then did they treat such colleges with the same\n    benevolence? Spain\u2019s first college was founded at Paleneia in the\n    years 1212-1214 by _Alfonso VIII._ without asking the Pope. When\n    soon afterwards it was in trouble it was _Honorius III._ who aided\n    _Alfonso\u2019s_ successor in restoring it, by assigning some\n    ecclesiastical income to its professors. When the college was\n    nearly wrecked and Rome once more applied to for help, _Urban IV._\n    lent an aiding hand because he did not want _ut lucerna tanta\n    claritatis in commune mutorum dispendium sic extincta remaneat_.\n    _Frederick II._ had founded a university of his own. When it\n    failed it was _Clement IV._ who urged _King Charles_ of Anjou to\n    re-establish it. _In eodem regno facias et jubeas hujusmodi\n    studium reformari_ (_Denifle_, 478, 459). This is not the language\n    and action of one who is only ruled by the passion to spread his\n    own influence, and not guided by benevolence for science.\n\n    But it is true, in supporting the higher schools the Church did\n    not aim at science as its ultimate object; it was her view that\n    science should serve the material welfare of man, but still more\n    the highest ethical and religious purpose of life. This in general\n    was the conception of the entire Middle Ages. At that time it\n    would have been considered curious to seek a science ultimately\n    for its own sake.\n\n\nAnd the universities repaid the Church by gratitude and devotion. The\neffort has been made to demonstrate that the modern separation of science\nfrom religion had already begun in the Middle Ages, and had showed itself\neverywhere; this tendency for autonomy \u201cappeared at first only timidly and\nin manifold disguises\u201d (_Kaufmann_, 14). How easy it is to find such\ndisguises may be shown by an example. The university of Paris had after\nthe death of _St. Thomas_ asked for his remains. _Kaufmann_ holds that the\nnotion of the autonomy of science had found sharp expression in the\nmemorandum wherein the university stated the motive of its request. Now\nhow does this harmless document sound? \u201cQuoniam omnino est indecens et\nindignum ut alia ratio aut locus quam omnium studiorum nobilissima\nParisiensis civitas quae ipsum prius educavit nutrivit et fovit et post\nmodum ad eodem doctrinae monumenta et ineffabilia fomenta suscepit ossa\n... habeat.... Si enim Ecclesia merito ossa et reliquias Sanctorum honorat\nnobis non sine causa videtur honestum et sanctum tanti doctoris corpus in\nperpetuum penes nos habere in honore.\u201d Evidently the university requests\nthe relic for itself, or rather for the Parisiensis civitas, not in\nopposition to the Church, but in opposition to other cities, altera natio\naut locus. I wonder if the Parisian admirers of St. Thomas ever dreamed\nthat they would one day be put in the light of forerunners of liberal\nscience, because of their pious application for the bones of their great\nteacher? This is tantamount to carrying one\u2019s own idea into the fact.\n_Denifle_, probably the most competent judge of the affairs of medi\u00e6val\nuniversities, writes as follows: \u201cIf we weigh the different acts which\nsuggest themselves to us in these various foundations, and if we compare\nthem with one another, there is revealed to us, in the realm of history of\nthe foundation of medi\u00e6val universities, a wonderful harmony between\nChurch and State, between the spiritual and material. This is the reason\nwhy the universities of the Middle Ages appear to us as the highest civil\nas well as the highest ecclesiastical teaching institutions.\nFundamentally, they are the product of the Christian spirit which\npenetrated the whole, wherein Pope and Prince, clergy and laity, each held\nthe proper position\u201d (l. c. p. 795).\n\nOne consequence of this relation between the universities and the Church\nwas that \u201cthey attained their greatest prosperity as long as the unity of\nChurch and faith remained unimpaired, and that, at the time of the\nReformation, they all sided with the Church with the exception of two,\nWittenberg and Erfurt. Torn away from their ecclesiastical and established\nbasis only by violent means, they were led to the new doctrine, but really\nsuccumbed to it only when their freedom had been curtailed and they had\nbeen reduced to state institutions\u201d (_Janssen_, l. c. p. 91). They had\nbeen, as the learned _Wimpheling_ wrote at the close of the sixteenth\ncentury, \u201cthe most favoured daughters of the Church, who tried to repay by\nfidelity and attachment what they owed to their Mother\u201d (De arte\nimpressoria, apud _Janssen_, l. c. 91).\n\n\n\nA False Progress.\n\n\nHence history cannot subscribe to the accusation that the Church is the\nenemy of progress. How then does it happen that this accusation is made so\nfrequently? The idea suggests itself that there may be here a different\nmeaning given to the word \u201cprogress,\u201d that the Church opposes a certain\nkind of progress which her enemies call \u201cthe\u201d progress. And this is the\nactual fact. If we examine the proofs which are to show the hostile\nattitude of the Church, we meet at every step _Galileo_, the Copernican\nsystem, the Syllabus, and Index. But this appears only on the surface,\nwhich hides beneath it something that is easily overlooked by the cursory\nglance. And this is the precise definition of scientific and civilized\nprogress. Progress has ever been an ideal of powerful attraction. The\nnoblest and best of men have ever displayed the most earnest endeavour\nonward and upward. In our times, however, this ideal comes forward\ndifferently garbed, in the name of the new view of the world, and\nresolutely censures as reactionary everything that will oppose it. What is\nthis definition?\n\nSince the _theory of evolution_ of _Lamarck_ and _Darwin_ entered biology,\nit has also more and more invaded other branches of science. The principle\nis now that everywhere, in the organic or inorganic world and in the whole\nprovince of human life there is a gradual growth and change\u2014nothing\npermanent, nothing definite and absolute. Uninterrupted evolution\nhitherto; hereafter restless development; especially in the greatest good\nbelonging to human life, thought, philosophy, and chiefly religion. Here,\ntoo, there are no forms nor dogmas which evolution in its continual\ndevelopment does not evolve and elevate. This idea of evolution is\nsupplemented by subjectivism with its _relativism of truth_: all views,\nespecially philosophical and religious \u201cTruths,\u201d are no longer the\nreproduction of objectively existing things, but a creation of the\nsubject, of his inner experience and feeling; hence each age must proceed\nto new thought of _its own_.\n\n\n    \u201cThe methods of scientific research,\u201d we are told, \u201care determined\n    by the idea of evolution, and this applies not only to natural\n    sciences but also to the so-called intellectual sciences,\u2014history,\n    philology, philosophy, and theology. The idea of evolution\n    influences and dominates all our thoughts; without it progress in\n    the field of scientific knowledge is quite impossible.\u201d We read,\n    for instance, in the modern history of philosophy: \u201cThe rise and\n    fall of a system is a necessary part of universal history; it is\n    conditioned by the character of its time, the system being the\n    understanding of that time, while this understanding of the time\n    is conditioned by the fact that the time has changed.\u201d At\n    _Roscellin\u2019s_ time the nominalists were intellectually inferior;\n    but where there is question of undermining the militant Church of\n    the Middle Ages the nominalists will be considered to have been\n    the greater philosophers. In this the realists \u201cby the futility of\n    their struggle proved that the time for nominalism had arrived,\n    hence that whoever favours it understands the time better; that\n    is, more philosophically. After the beginning of the Renaissance\n    we notice an attempt at philosophizing in such a way as to ignore\n    the existence of divine wisdom taught by Christianity. The\n    pre-Christian sages had done so: to philosophize in their spirit\n    was therefore the task of the time, and those who had a better\n    understanding of the time philosophized that way better than by\n    the scholastic method; though their method may appear reactionary\n    to unphilosophical minds\u201d (_J. E. Erdmann_, Grundriss der Gesch.\n    der Philosophie, 3d ed., I (1878), 4, 262, 434, 502). This is a\n    frank denial of any truth in philosophy: the more neological and\n    modern a thing is, the more truth there is in it! Realism was\n    right in _Roscellin\u2019s_ time, but a later period had to sweep it\n    away. The Christian religion was right for the Middle Ages, but\n    when the Greek authors began to be read again it was no longer\n    modern.\n\n    Apostasy from the faith is considered a mark of progress. \u201cItalian\n    natural philosophy,\u201d we are told, \u201creached its pinnacle with\n    _Bruno_ and _Campanella_, of whom the former, though the older,\n    appears to be more progressive on account of his freer attitude\n    towards the Church\u201d (_R. Falkenburg_, Gesch. der neueren\n    Philosophie, 5th ed. (1905), page 30, _seq._). Hence evidently\n    further development of Christianity, too, is demanded. According\n    to subjectivistic views it was hitherto only an historical product\n    of the human intellect: hence \u201conward to new and higher forms\n    corresponding to modern thought and feeling, onward to a new\n    Christianity without dogmas and authority!\u201d \u201cBreak up those old\n    tablets,\u201d spoke _Zarathustra_.\n\n\nSuch is progress in thought and science, for which the way must be opened.\nThat the immutable dogmas of Christianity, that the task of the Catholic\nChurch to preserve revelation intact, are incompatible with it, that the\nChurch appears reactionary, and as an obstacle to this progress, is now\nself-evident. Here we have the _deeper contrast between progress, in the\nanti-Christian sense, and the essence of Christianity_ in general, and,\nespecially, of the _Catholic Church_.\n\n\n    \u201cIt is frankly admitted that the issue is the struggle between the\n    two views of the world\u2014between the Christian, conservative\n    dogmatism and the anti-dogmatic evolutionary philosophy\u201d (Neue\n    Freie Presse, Jun. 7, 1908). Faith according to its very essence\n    is immutable and stationary, science is essentially progressive:\n    they had therefore to part in a manner which could not be kept a\n    secret. \u201cA divine revelation must necessarily be intolerant of\n    contradiction, it must repudiate all improvement in itself\u201d (_J.\n    Draper_, History of the Conflict between Religion and Science,\n    VI). \u201cThe great opposition between the rigid dogmatism of the\n    Roman Catholic Church and the ever progressing modern science\n    cannot be removed\u201d (Academicus, l. c. 362). So say the opponents\n    of the Church.\n\n\nThere is no error, says _St. Augustine_, which does not contain some\ntruth, especially when it is able to rule the thought of many. Hence its\ncapacity to deceive. The same is true in the present case.\n\nThere is evolution and progress in everything, or at least there should\nbe. The individual gradually develops from the embryo into a perfect form,\nthough it becomes nothing else than what it had formerly been in its\nembryonic state. Mankind advances rapidly in civilization; we no longer\nride in the rumbling stage-coach but in a comfortable express train, and\nthe tallow candle has been replaced by the electric light. Thus we demand\nprogress also in knowledge and science, and even in religion. Many things\nthat were obscure to older generations have become clear to us; we have\ncorrected many an error, made many discoveries which were unknown to our\nancestors. Many doctrines of faith, also, appear to our eyes in sharper\noutlines than before; of many we have a deeper understanding, discovered\nnew relations, meanings, and deductions. Thus there is progress and\ndevelopment everywhere.\n\nBut it would be erroneous to conclude from all this that there cannot be\nany stable truths and dogmas, that progress to new and different views and\ndoctrines is necessary. By the same right we might conclude that the main\nprinciples of the Copernican system cannot be immutable, because they\nwould hinder the progress of science. Progress certainly does not consist\nin throwing away all certainty acquired, in order to begin anew. Or does\nit really belong to progress in astronomy to again give up _Copernicus_,\nto go back to _Ptolemy_ and let the sun and all the stars revolve again\naround the earth? Does not progress rather consist in our studying these\nastronomical results more closely, in building up the details, and, first\nof all, in trying to solve new problems?\n\nThe champion of the faith will reply: Just as established results do not\nhinder the progress of science, just so do the doctrines of faith not form\nan obstacle to progress and evolution. The fixed doctrines of the faith\nthemselves, in themselves and in their application to the conditions of\nlife, offer rich material for the growth of religious knowledge. And there\nis the immense field for progress in the profane sciences. If any one\nshould say that the believing scientist, who is bound by his dogmas, can\ndo nothing further but reiterate his old truths, one might in turn argue:\nThen the astronomer bound by the fundamental rules of the Copernican\nsystem could have only the monotonous task of drawing over and over again\nthe outlines of his system, while the mathematician who holds the\nmultiplication table to be an unalienable possession would not be allowed\nto do aught but to repeat the multiplication table.\n\nOr the argument may be put thus: We have made great progress in the\nmaterial province of civilization, in science and art; \u201ccan an old\nreligion suffice under these new and improved conditions, a religion which\noriginated at an age when these conditions did not exist? This\ncontradiction is shocking.... Progress in culture demands progress in\nreligion.... We want a more perfect religion, a higher religion\u201d\n(_Masaryk_, Im Kampf um die Religion, 1904, 29). Note the logic of this\ndemonstration. We no longer light our rooms by the dim light of a small\noil lamp, we walk no longer at night through dark narrow lanes, but\nthrough brightly illuminated avenues, does it follow from this that it can\nno longer be true that Christ is the Son of God, nor that He has worked\nmiracles, or founded a Church, and a new religion is therefore necessary?\nWe have made progress in our knowledge of history; we know a good deal of\nRome and Carthage, of the civilization of ancient Egypt and of Greece, and\nof their mutual relations; we have other fashions of life than our fathers\nhad, we build and paint differently\u2014our political life, too, has grown\nmore complicated; does it follow from all this, that it cannot be true\nthat we are created by God, that we must believe a divine revelation,\nhence a new religion is necessary? Progress and evolution to consist in\never abandoning the old and advancing to new and different views\u2014this is\n_absurd_. Absurd, in the first place, because it is no _progress_ at all,\nbut a retrogression, a hopeless alternation of forwards and backwards.\nThere can be no progress if I am always withdrawing from my old position;\nprogress is possible only by retaining the basis established and then\nadvancing therefrom. And _evolution_ is not a continuous remodelling and\nshaping anew, but a continuance in growth. Evolution means that the embryo\nunfolds, and by retaining and perfecting the old matter gradually becomes\na plant; evolution is in the progress from bud to blossom; but not in the\nchanging mass of clouds, swept away to-day by the current wind and\nreplaced to-morrow by other clouds. An absurdity, also, for the reason\nthat it violates all laws of reason, that once there was a revelation of\nGod to be believed, but that this is no longer true.\n\nFurthermore, the demand to follow always \u201cthe ideas of the period\u201d\nsuggests the question: Who is to represent the period? Who represented\nGreece, the sophists or _Plato_? Who was representative of the first days\nof Christianity, the Roman emperors or the martyrs? Will not the passage\nin _Goethe\u2019s_ Faust apply in most cases: \u201cWhat they call the spirit of the\ntimes is but their own mind wherein the times are reflected\u201d? True, if\nprogress is taken to be the overstepping by human reason of the eternal\nstandards of immutable truth and the barriers of faith, if it is to be the\nattempt at emancipation from God and religion, then there is no more\nresolute foe of progress than the Christian religion, than the Catholic\nChurch. But this is not progress but loss of the truth, not higher\nreligion but apostasy, not development of what is best in man, but\nretrogression to mental disintegration by scepticism.\n\n\n\nThe Syllabus.\n\n\nIn the eyes of many it is especially the Syllabus of _Pius IX._ by which\nthe Catholic Church has erected a lasting monument to its enmity to\ncivilization. It is the Syllabus, we are told, in which _Pius IX._ has \u201cex\ncathedra condemned the freedom of science\u201d (_W. Kahl_,\nBekenntnissgebundenheit und Lehrfreiheit, 1897, 10); \u201cin which modern\nculture and science is being cursed\u201d (_Th. Fuchs_, Neue Freie Presse, Nov.\n25, 1907); in which \u201cthe most general foundations of our political order,\nthe freedom of conscience, are rejected\u201d (_G. Kaufmann_, Die Lehrfreiheit\nan den deutschen Universitaeten, 1898, 34); \u201cin which it has simply\nanathematized the achievements of the modern concept of right\u201d (_F. Jodl_,\nGedanken \u00fcber Reformkatholizismus, 1902, 5); the Syllabus \u201cstrikes blows\nagainst the autonomy of human development of culture, it is a _non\npossumus_, I cannot make peace, I cannot compromise with what is termed\nprogress, liberalism, and civilization.\u201d The Syllabus is a favorite stock\nargument of professional free-thinkers and agitators, and the one with\nwhich they like to open the discussion. For this reason we must say a few\nwords about it.\n\nWhen a Syllabus is spoken of without any distinction, the Syllabus of\n_Pius IX._ is meant. It is a list of eighty condemned propositions which\nthis Pope sent on December 8, 1864, to all the Bishops of the world,\ntogether with the encyclical letter \u201cQuanta Cura.\u201d _Pius IX._ had, prior\nto this, and on various occasions, denounced these propositions as false\nand to be repudiated. They were now gathered together in the Syllabus.\nThey represent the _program of modern liberalism_ in the province of\nreligion and in politics in relation to religion. They are repudiated in\nthe following order: Pantheism; liberal freedom of thought and of\nconscience as a repudiation of the duty to believe; religious freedom as a\ndemand of emancipation from faith and Church; religious indifferentism;\nthe denial of the Church and of her independence of the state; the\nomnipotence of state power, especially in the province of thought. The\nsingle propositions are not all designated as heretical, hence the\ncontrary is not always pronounced to be dogma; they are rejected in\ngeneral as \u201cerrors.\u201d It is not necessary to discuss here the question\nwhether and to what extent the Syllabus is an infallible decision. Suffice\nit to say it is binding for believing Catholics.\n\nHas the Catholic any reason to be ashamed of the Syllabus?\n\nIt was a resolute deed. A deed of that intrepidity and firm consistency\nwhich has ever characterized the Catholic Church. With her fearless love\nof truth the Church has in the Syllabus solemnly condemned the errors of\nthe modern rebellion against the supernatural order, of the naturalization\nand declaration of independence of the human life. For this reason the\nSyllabus is called an attack upon modern culture, science, and education,\nupon the foundations of the state. Is this true?\n\nIt is, and it is not. All that is good and Christian in modern culture is\nnot touched by the Syllabus; it strikes only at what is anti-Christian in\nour times and in the leading ideas of our times. It does not condemn\nfreedom of science, but only the liberal freedom which throws off the yoke\nof faith; it does not repudiate freedom of religion and conscience, but\nthe _liberal_ freedom which will not acknowledge a divine revelation nor\ntake the Church as a guide. Not the foundations of modern states are\nattacked, but only the liberal ideas of emancipation from religion, and of\nopposition to the Church. The Church proclaims to the world only what has\nbeen known to all Christian centuries, that, just as the single individual\nis bound to have the Christian belief and must lead a Christian life, so\nare nations and organized states; that the human creature is subject to\nthe law of Christ in all its relations. Nor does she contend against\ngenuine progress in science, education and in the material domain, but\nmerely against liberal progress towards the irreligious materialization of\nlife.\n\nThis emancipation from the Christian faith poses mostly under the\nattractive and deceptive name of \u201cmodern progress.\u201d Indeed, it has ever\nbeen the pretension of liberalism to look upon itself as the sole\nharbinger of civilization, to claim the guidance of intellectual life for\nits aim, and to stigmatize as a foe of culture any one that opposes the\ndissemination of its anti-Christian humanism. It is also an expert in\ngiving to words a charm and an ambiguous meaning that deceive.\nEmancipation from religion is \u201cprogress\u201d and \u201cenlightenment.\u201d Everything\nelse is reactionary. Its infidelity is freedom of conscience and thought.\nEverything else is \u201cbondage.\u201d Only its secular schools, its civil\nmarriage, its separation of Church and State are \u201cmodern.\u201d Everything else\nis obsolete, hence no longer warranted. For the Church to defend her\nrights is arrogance; when the Church uses her God-given authority for the\ngood of the faith, she practises intellectual oppression; the Catholic who\nlets himself be guided by his Church is called unpatriotic, bereft of his\ncivil spirit.\n\nWhat striking contrast to the honesty in which the Church presents her\ndoctrines frankly before the whole world, without disguise or artifice.\nThe reason is that she has sufficient interior strength and truth to\nrender it unnecessary for her to take refuge in disguise or present the\ntruth in ambiguity.\n\n\n    The clearest evidence of the Church\u2019s hostility to culture is the\n    condemnation of the 80th thesis of the _Syllabus_, so it is said.\n    It is the thesis that the Pope can and must reconcile himself to,\n    and compromise with, progress, liberalism, and modern\n    civilization. This is a condemned proposition, hence the contrary\n    is true: the Pope of Rome cannot, and must not, reconcile himself,\n    nor compromise with, liberalism and modern civilization. Here we\n    have the frankly admitted hostility against progress, education,\n    and science\u2014it is the watchword of the Papacy.\n\n    This conclusion can be arrived at only by pushing aside all rules\n    of scientific interpretation. What progress is this, with what\n    civilization can the Papacy not be reconciled? The progress of\n    modern liberalism. The heading of the paragraph containing this\n    proposition states expressly that \u201cerrors of modern liberalism\u201d\n    are to be condemned. This becomes clear by the Allocution\n    \u201cJamdudum cernimus\u201d of March 18, 1861, from which this\n    condemnation is taken. There it is stated: \u201cIt is asked that the\n    Pope of Rome reconcile himself with progress, to liberalism as\n    they call it, to the new civilization, and compromise with\n    them.... But now we ask of those inviting us to be reconciled with\n    modern civilization, whether the facts be such as to tempt the\n    Vicar of Christ on earth ... to connect himself with the\n    civilization of to-day without the greatest injury to this\n    conscience ... a civilization that has caused the dissemination of\n    numerous despicable opinions, errors, and principles in conflict\n    with the Catholic religion and its doctrines.\u201d Of course a\n    civilization cut off from any true Christianity by education and\n    science, by family life and political life, a progress, trying to\n    stop the activity of the Church in every sphere and attacking her\n    in their speech, in newspapers, and in schools, cannot demand of\n    the Papacy to join hands with them. No Christian, whether Catholic\n    or Protestant, can profess this \u201cprogress.\u201d We have here at the\n    same time a specimen of how they proceed in interpreting the\n    propositions of the Syllabus in order to discover in them all\n    possible absurdities. Many propositions are short sentences taken\n    from the work of an author, or from previous Papal declarations.\n    Hence they must be understood in the sense of those sources.\n    Furthermore, attention must be paid to what is specially\n    emphasized. Then, again, we must remember that by repudiating a\n    proposition only the contradictory is asserted, but not the\n    contrary; to conclude this would be to conclude too much. For\n    instance, the seventy-seventh condemned proposition reads: \u201cIn our\n    times it is no longer to any purpose that the Catholic religion\n    should be the sole religion of the state to the exclusion of all\n    other confessions.\u201d According to some, _e.g._, _Frins_, the\n    contradictory is thus formulated: \u201cIn our times also it is still\n    to the purpose....\u201d According to others, however, _e.g._,\n    _Hoensbroeeh_ and _Goetz_: \u201cIn our times also it is\n    beneficial....\u201d Thus while _Hoensbroech_ and _Goetz_ make the\n    ecclesiastical doctrine appear to read that it would be beneficial\n    to hold fast to the Catholic as the sole religion of the state\n    under all circumstances even to-day, the actual opposite is the\n    doctrine, that this may be yet to the purpose under certain\n    circumstances. While no reasonable man could object to the latter,\n    the former is eagerly exploited against the Church (_Heiner_, Der\n    Syllabus, 1905, p. 31, _seq._; cf. _Frins_, Kirchenlex, 2d ed.,\n    XI, 1031; _Hoensbroech_, l. c. 25; _Goetz_, Der Ultramontanismus,\n    1905, 148).\n\n\nOf course it may be taken for granted that the Syllabus is distasteful to\nmodern liberalism, which is branded there as one of the errors of the day.\nYet the Church cannot be censured for not becoming unfaithful to her\nvocation of preserving the patrimony of Christianity to mankind, or for\nacting as the invincible defender of the Christian religion in the\nuniversal struggle between truth and error, even though the latter pose\nwith great assurance.\n\n\n\nThe Condemnation of Modernism.\n\n\nThe great excitement caused in intellectual circles by the Syllabus of\n_Pius IX._ was aroused again, though not with the same intensity, when\nsome years ago the news of another Syllabus was circulated through the\nworld, and the excitement increased when the rumour was followed by the\npublication of the encyclical \u201cPascendi Dominici gregis.\u201d Indeed, the new\nevent was not very unlike the former: in the 60\u2019s Rome\u2019s sentence was\ndirected against the Modernism of that period, which called itself\nliberalism. The excitement caused by its condemnation was more intense,\nbecause it struck directly at the principles governing the liberal\npolitics against the Church, which principles were claimed to be the\nfoundation of the modern state. Now the Modernism repudiated by the\nChurch\u2019s voice was nothing more than the old humanistic, fundamental,\nerrors of liberalism, but put in the form of a religious and philosophical\nview of the world, and in Catholic garb: it meant man detached from\neverything supernatural, and dependent alone on himself in his\nintellectual life, more especially in his religious life.\n\nNow, as then, similar charges were raised: The Church is the\nirreconcilable foe of modern achievements and the opponent of them; \u201cthe\nencyclical aims at modern intellectual life in all its phases and forms\u201d\n(XX. Jahrh., 1908, 568). Now, as then, we have the same ambiguity of the\nterms \u201cmodern\u201d and \u201cprogress.\u201d\n\nWhat was condemned by the Church? The document \u201cLamentabili sane exitu,\u201d\nissued by the teaching authority of the Church on July 3, 1907, is\nentitled \u201cA Decree of the Holy Congregation of the Roman and General\nInquisition or the Holy Office,\u201d which has to watch over the unadulterated\npreservation of the faith. The decree soon was christened the \u201cNew\nSyllabus,\u201d because of its similarity with the Syllabus of _Pius IX._ In a\nsimilar way it condemns sixty-five propositions against the inspiration\nand the historical character of Holy Scripture, against the divine origin\nof revelation and of faith, against the divinity of Christ, His\nResurrection and His atoning death, against the Sacraments, and against\nthe Church. These are component parts of the philosophical religious\nsystem of thought which soon after was set forth and condemned by the\nencyclical \u201cPascendi,\u201d of September 8, 1907.\n\nModernism is essentially philosophy, combining modern _agnostic-autonomous\nsubjectivism_ with _evolutionism_, and applied to the Christian religion,\nwhich thereby becomes disfigured beyond recognition. Its chain of thought,\nexcellently stated by the encyclical, starts with the proposition that the\nsupernatural is beyond the knowledge of man, and hence man cannot know\nanything of God. The faith which unites us to God is nothing but a\nfeeling, born of a blind impulse, which may be considered a divine\nrevelation. If this religious feeling is expressed in forms, the result is\n\u201cdoctrines of faith\u201d; for Christian \u201cdogmas\u201d are this and nothing more,\nimages and symbols of the noble and divine, hence they are of human origin\nand are changeable according to the disposition and the degree of learning\nof the individual, as well as of the times. There is no dogmatic\nChristianity, in the sense of an immutable religious doctrine, nor is\nthere any absolutely true religion, for religion is but a variable\nfeeling, that has nothing to do with cognition and knowledge. For this\nreason they never can come in conflict. The Christian religion originally\nwas nothing else but the religious experience of Christ, who was not God\nbut a man; in the course of time it has undergone changes which are\nreflected in the shaping of Christian dogma. Holy Scripture is, similarly,\nthe expression of the religious experience of its human authors; the\nSacraments are symbols, arousing religious sentiments; the Church is not\nfounded by God, and only has the task of regulating the development of\nChristianity, and of sanctioning at any time whatever religious\nexperiences the changeable spirit of progressive civilization may produce.\n\nThis is Modernism, as represented chiefly in France, Italy, and to an\nextent also in England; in Germany it did not appear as a system, but even\nthere its spirit became quite apparent. Thus, Modernism is nothing else\nbut the systematic arrangement of those ideas which we have hitherto met,\nin various places, as the fundamental principles of modern religious\nthought opposed to Christianity. It is subjectivism with its autonomy of\nthe human subject, its agnosticism, its relativism of truth, sailing under\nthe name of \u201chistorical method of thought\u201d and \u201cprogress,\u201d and, finally,\nwith its freedom of thought and conscience which rejects all authority. It\nis _Kant_ in the robe of a Catholic theologian. Ultimately it is nothing\nelse but the shocking negation of everything supernatural, hence complete\napostasy. \u201cThe salient point is recognized,\u201d says _Troeltsch_, \u201cthe enemy\nis the modern historical method of thought, the concept of evolution, the\ntheory of inner experience and relativism as applied to religion, the\nnegation of supernaturalism as taught by the old Church\u201d (l. c. 22).\nHence, was it not manifest that the Church had to take measures against\nthis positive denial of Christianity as a whole, the more so as the\nuneducated could be easily deceived by it? Every organism will throw off\nexcrescences, the more energetically the stronger it is. Any religion\nlacking this strength is doomed. That the Papal declaration aroused such\nopposition must not be wondered at; it hit once more the central idea of\nthe anti-Christian view of the world. The judgment was not passed against\nmodern intellectual life, but only against the grave errors inherent in\nit; the Church did not condemn progress, nor the increase and deepening of\nknowledge of the truth; not the enrichment of the life of the mind, of\nfeeling, and the will, but only pretended progress; she did not condemn\nthe historical method nor the idea of evolution, but their false\napplication, which dissolved anything and everything in growth, purely\nnatural growth at that, without acknowledging a revelation of absolute\ntruths.\n\n\n    Orthodox Protestants have openly praised this bold deed of the\n    Pope as highly meritorious for the preservation of the Christian\n    faith. Thus the South African Church Quarterly Review (Episcopal)\n    of January, 1908, said: \u201cThe Syllabus and Encyclical of _Pius X._\n    against Modernism are deserving of the respectful consideration of\n    all Christians.... At the present stage of history the opposing\n    factors are driving with great speed towards a fierce and resolute\n    struggle between Christ and anti-Christ. All who sincerely love\n    Christ, our Lord, must rally under one flag.... Narrow-minded\n    hostility towards the Pope must give way to the desire to be\n    united with the great community which is fighting so valiantly for\n    the old faith of our fathers.... One must be blind, to misjudge\n    the tremendous influence exerted by the last deed of the Pope in\n    favour of the faith.\u201d\n\n    Even the Evangelical \u201cKirchenzeitung\u201d admitted that the encyclical\n    is \u201cdirected chiefly against the more or less unchristian modern\n    views of the world ... which we must combat.... Undoubtedly it is\n    not only the Pope\u2019s right to lay bare the unchristian tendency of\n    these ideas and their incompatibility with the Christian faith,\n    but it is also his duty and his merit\u201d (November 29, 1908, n. 48).\n\n\nPuny men, entangled in the ideas of their time and surroundings, are\neasily led to take for their standard the thoughts and actions of their\nage. They often imagine that they possess not a little strength and\nindependence, when they are intellectually entirely dependent and unable\nto rise above their time. \u201cIt is the fashion, others think that way,\ntherefore I must think so, too\u201d; these are often the principles of their\nwisdom, and they ask the Church to do likewise. The Church, however, looks\nback upon a long history, and numerous ideas and opinions she has seen\narise and vanish. And whoever can look back upon a great experience, and\nmoreover carries in himself the call to lead the times, feels no restless\nimpulse to be carried away by changing doctrines.\n\n\n\nThe Index.\n\n\nWhenever the subject of Rome\u2019s enmity to science and progress of culture\nis discussed, there invariably appears on the scene, beside Syllabus and\n_Galileo_, also the Index. The latter is held by many to be Rome\u2019s\npermanent means of hindering the progress of humanity in general, and the\nfree scientific activity of the Catholic in particular, and to annihilate\nthe freedom of teaching and learning (_Hoensbroech_, Die Kath. theol.\nFakultaeten, 1907, 40 _seq._). They say \u201cthe Congregation of the Index has\nno pity nor consideration for the classical works of literature, and\ncondemns in the name of religion the most admirable products of the human\nintellect\u201d (Grande Dict. univ. du XIX. si\u00e8cle, IX, 640, apud _J. Hilgers_,\nDer Index der Verb. Buecher, 1904, 166; much of what we shall say on this\ntopic is taken from this work by _Hilgers_).\n\n\n    This statement again reminds that the accusations against the\n    Catholic Church and her institutions are to be considered with\n    caution, because of the ignorance of her opponents in Catholic\n    things. This is especially true of the Index. Thus the above\n    assertion is false. _Dante\u2019s_ \u201cDivina Commedia\u201d (the work referred\n    to) is neither forbidden nor needs approval nor correction: of the\n    classical literature of the world little or nothing is forbidden;\n    even morally offensive books, that are considered classical, may\n    without ecclesiastical permission be read for the sake of their\n    elegant diction, whenever their reading is required by one\u2019s work\n    or duty of teaching.\n\n    A few examples of the _incredible ignorance_ alluded to will\n    suffice. In the \u201cGrande Dictionnaire Universel du XIX. Si\u00e8cle\u201d it\n    is actually stated that the works of _Albert the Great_ were\n    condemned by a decree of April 10, 1666. What does the Index\n    really forbid? It states: \u201c_Alberto __ Magno, diviso in tre libri,\n    nel primo si tratta della virtu delle herbe, nel secondo della\n    virtu delle pietre, e nel terzo della virtu di alcuni\n    animali._\u2014Albert the Great, in three parts: the first treats of\n    the virtue of plants; the second, of the virtue of stones; and the\n    third, of the virtue of some animals.\u201d It is the title of a little\n    superstitious book, attributed to \u201cAlbert the Great\u201d by an unknown\n    author.\n\n    The first edition of the Index of _Leo XIII._ in 1900 was sold out\n    in less than a year; a second edition followed in 1901, and, like\n    the first, could be had at all booksellers, at a very moderate\n    price. In December, 1901, there appeared in the Anglo-American\n    weekly, \u201cThe Roman World,\u201d an article which says that it is\n    difficult to obtain this list of notorious books forbidden to\n    Catholics, unless one be a Church official, since only a few\n    copies are printed and even these are not handled by general\n    book-dealers; hence that no details could be given about the\n    purchase of the copy referred to; but it was quite evident that it\n    had commanded a good price. \u201cThe copy in question, a model of fine\n    printing, might be worth about $40 to $50, but owing to its\n    rareness, it had undoubtedly cost $400. The history of this famous\n    Index is interesting. The one who first hit upon the idea was\n    _Charles V._ of Spain, about 1550. The first compilation of the\n    book-list was made by the university of Louvain in 1564, Pope\n    _Paul IV._ assuming the direction of the edition. It remained for\n    357 years in the hands of the Pope.\u201d Every one of these statements\n    is false. And just as false is the statement that the \u201cSyllabus\n    condemns not only a book written by a Pope, but by Pope _Leo\n    XIII._ himself.\u201d Still it could not surprise us, since even\n    David\u2019s psalter is on the Index! When the Index of _Leo XIII._ was\n    published, Dr. _Max Claar_ wrote from Rome to the \u201cNeue Freie\n    Presse\u201d of Vienna: \u201cOn the old Index we find among other things\n    the Psalms of King David and the Divina Commedia of _Dante_.\u201d We\n    have already stated that the latter was never on the Index. But\n    how in the world could this man find Holy Scripture condemned on\n    the Index? Perhaps he found this passage: \u201cIl salmista secondo la\n    biblia\u201d and \u201cSalmi (sessanta) di David.\u201d The first is a\n    superstitious booklet, the second is a translation of sixty Psalms\n    of David by the heretic, _Giovanni Diodati_. The learned doctor in\n    all seriousness mistook them for the Psalms of David (_Hilgers_,\n    167, _seq._).\n\n\nWhat then is the Index, and how is it to be judged?\n\nEver since the Apostle of the Nations had at Ephesus the superstitious\nbooks burned under his eyes, the Holy Fathers, Bishops, and Councils since\nthe first centuries of Christianity have been careful to keep from the\nfaithful writings hurtful to faith and morals. Thus even in the olden time\nwe find several catalogues of forbidden books, then followed the Indices\nof the Middle Ages. In the year 1571 a special Congregation of Cardinals\nwas formed, the \u201cCongregation of the Index,\u201d which has ever since had\ncharge of the ecclesiastical book-laws. The last edition of the Index,\nobligatory for the whole Church, emanated from _Leo XIII._ The title of\nthe work now in force reads, \u201cThe Index of Forbidden Books, revised and\npublished by order of and in the name of Leo XIII. 1900.\u201d It is divided\ninto two parts. The first and shorter part contains the general book\nregulations, giving in short paragraphs the rules on various classes of\nforbidden books, the permission required for reading them, the examination\nto be made previous to the publication of certain books. The second part\nenumerates the writings forbidden by special decree\u2014the Index in the\nparticular sense, and the part most often considered. But it is second in\nimportance to the first, because by far not all books dangerous to faith\nand morals are named in it. Most such books are forbidden by the general\nlaws contained in the first part, without mentioning the many which are\nforbidden by mere common sense.\n\nEcclesiastical legislation on books is composed of two factors: first, the\nprevious censorship\u2014certain books must be examined by ecclesiastical\nauthority before their publication. Second, the prohibition of books\nalready published.\n\nThe previous scrutiny in general is delegated to the Bishop; all books\ndealing with morals and theology must be submitted. The license to print\nthe book is to be given if the book is in accord with the teaching of the\nChurch, in so far as determined by ecclesiastical authority, the decision\nbased on it rests solely with the censor; if the author of the book should\nfail to see that the passages objected to need revision he may try to\nclear himself by stating his reasons; however, he is also free to submit\nhis work to another Bishop and to look for a printer in the latter\u2019s\ndiocese. If one looks over the numerous books bearing the ecclesiastical\nimprimatur, he will readily notice how much freedom is given, if the\nauthor keeps within the doctrine of the Church.\n\nThe _condemnation_ of a book never strikes at the person of the author,\nnor at what he has intended to express by the passages objected to;\njudgment is passed only upon what is actually expressed in them. Hence it\nis not necessary to give to the author himself a hearing, or a chance to\nexplain. The reason is that the judgment is rendered on the sense of the\npassages, not on the meaning of the author. In general those books and\nperiodicals are forbidden which are likely to do serious damage to faith\nand morals. The isolated cases of indicting the works of Catholic authors\nin the nineteenth century\u2014we may mention _Lamennais_, _Hermes_,\n_Guenther_, _Loisy_, and _Schell_\u2014show that the Church proceeds but slowly\nand with consideration against the author involved.\n\nTo appreciate the Index properly, one must try to grasp without prejudice\nthe _purpose_ the Church has in view. This purpose is to protect the\nfaithful from error and from moral contagion, and to preserve the faith\nintact. \u201cWhat is more precious than souls, what more precious than the\nfaith? But both suffer damage from such reading.\u201d Such was the judgment of\nthe Council of Ephesus when it drew up its book-decrees; such was the\njudgment of an _Augustine_, of _Leo the Great_, and of the Holy Fathers;\nsuch is still the judgment of the Church. Books and writings that offend\nagainst morals are a menace to her faithful. They become infected with\nwrong ideas; they are as a rule not in a position to distinguish by\nthemselves the false from the true, and for the most part they are not\nmorally strong enough to resist the allurements of error. It may also\nhappen that certain thoughts are true in the abstract, yet for the time\nbeing would be a danger for many. Now, it is the right and duty of any\nsocial authority, beginning with the head of the family and up to the\ngovernment, to protect with strong hand the precious possessions of its\nsubjects.\n\nThe state keeps under control the sale of poison and dynamite, keeps out\ncontagious diseases from its boundaries\u2014it protects the possessions of its\nsubjects. European states have for centuries claimed the right to censure\nbooks, and have used it much more rigorously than the Church ever did, to\nsay nothing of the censures of the Protestant Church of former times (see\nabundant proof apud _Hilgers_, 206-402). The modern state also, despite\nthe great freedom granted to the press, cannot entirely forego its sense\nof responsibility. It restricts the freedom of the press by censorship,\nand by preventive measures often not less drastic than the censure itself,\nand it always regards the confiscation of particularly dangerous writings\nto be a matter of course. It puts under censure school-books, political\nposters, and theatrical plays, and does not tolerate any socialistic\nliterature in the soldiers\u2019 barracks. And do we not take it as a matter of\ncourse if a father forbids his child to associate with dangerous\nplaymates, and takes bad books from its hands? We cannot find fault with\nthe Church if she seeks to protect her children, if she represses the\npromiscuous dissemination of false ideas and doctrines, and if she takes\ndangerous books under her control. \u201cFeed my lambs, feed my sheep,\u201d was the\ncommand given to the Church.\n\nThe objection should therefore not be made that \u201csuch precaution is proper\nwhen dealing with children but not with men; especially since the thinking\nelements among the Catholics of the Germanic tongue or origin are too\nprofound and firm in their faith to warrant a fear of the effects of\nunrestricted free research\u201d (from the petition of the so-called\n\u201cIndex-league\u201d of Muenster). This perusal may become dangerous even for\nhighly educated men, else how could Modernism break so forcefully into the\nChurch? Manifestly only because learned theologians did not possess that\nfirmness of Catholic faith and Catholic knowledge which would prevent them\nfrom being deceived by the misleading ideas of modern philosophy, and of\nthe new Protestant theology. Moreover, all forbidden books may be read\nupon obtaining the necessary permission.\n\n\u201cPreserve the deposit of faith,\u201d the Church has been told. She cannot look\non silently when her doctrines are being falsified and denied, when the\nmost venerable sphere of theology is made the stamping ground for immature\nminds and a laboratory for all kinds of experiments. When _Zola\u2019s_ novel,\n\u201cRome,\u201d had been put on the Index, the atheistic literary critic,\n_Sarcey_, made the following comment: \u201cIf my own criticisms of literature\nare regarded by many people as highest decisions, why should a positive\ncriticism be looked upon as monstrous just because it comes from the Pope?\nIt is my aim to guard good taste in literature, and it is the aim of the\nPope to guard the true faith\u201d (Allgemeine Rundschau, 1908, 828). Every\nsocial authority must interfere when its foundations are attacked. A\nchurch that tolerates false doctrines cannot be the teacher that Christ\nsent to the nations. As a matter of fact the Index has from the first\nhelped in no small degree to keep the Catholic doctrine pure, to induce\ncaution in reading certain authors, and to keep awake in the faithful that\naversion against immoral and irreligious writings which is the\ncharacteristic of Catholics, and which has rescued the faith for\nthousands.\n\nTo judge the Index fairly one must be convinced that the preservation of\ntrue Christian doctrine is its highest aim. Then the zeal of the Catholic\nChurch will be intelligible. Of course, he who thinks that the true weal\nof mankind consists in the speedy emancipation from all Christian dogma,\nhe who holds the task of science to be the establishment of a new\n\u201cscientific view of the world,\u201d he who no longer knows faith, will see in\nthe Index nothing but restraint. But, whoever is of a different view will\nnot take offence at the restriction of the freedom of writing and reading\nwhen it is productive of higher good. Freedom of science cannot be\nunrestricted, especially in regard to teaching; the welfare of humanity\nmust be considered. Moreover, the Index concerns almost exclusively\ntheology and some branches of philosophy, the rest of the profane sciences\nbut little or not at all; the scientific works prohibited, however, are\nnot removed from scientific perusal: only permission is necessary, and\nthis is granted without difficulty and without cost.\n\nIt is true, an error on the part of the Church authorities is not\nimpossible. We know of such a case, putting on the Index the writings of\n_Copernicus_, in 1616. But just the circumstance that history knows of but\none such case of importance is a clear testimony to the Holy Ghost\u2019s\ndirection of the teaching office even when it is rendering non-infallible\ndecisions. Besides, the damage that might result from a few mistakes would\nnot be so great as the damage resulting if everything were allowed to be\nwritten and read.\n\nThe Catholic scientist who appreciates the supernatural mission of his\nChurch will _yield to her guidance in humble confidence_, he will practise\nthis submission to the Church by requesting permission for reading\nforbidden books, and by this spirit he will obtain God\u2019s blessing on his\nwork.\n\n\n    In doing so he may recall to mind the edifying words of _St.\n    Francis of Sales_, in the preface to his treatise on the errors of\n    the Lutherans and Calvinists, where he gives the assurance of\n    having conscientiously asked for and received permission to read\n    their writings. \u201cWe fervently request our Catholic readers,\u201d\n    writes the Saint, \u201cnot to let an evil suspicion against us arise,\n    as if we had read the forbidden books in spite of the prohibition\n    of holy Church. We are able to assure them in all truth of having\n    done nothing forbidden to a good Christian, and of having taken\n    every precaution due in a matter of so vast importance, so as not\n    to incur in any way the very just censures of the Church, nor in\n    any manner to violate the profound reverence we owe to her.\u201d The\n    permission granted him, dated July 16, 1608, is still extant;\n    likewise one asked by _St. Charles Borromeo_.\n\n\nThe Catholic scientist also will readily ask the ecclesiastical Imprimatur\nfor certain of his works. If a careful author before publishing a work\nsubmits the proofs to a friend of his profession, taking his comment for a\nguide, why should we deem it intellectual bondage if the Catholic\nscientist, in matters of faith and morals, submits his work to the formal\napproval of his Church, which to him is a higher authority than any other?\nand does this willingly, as in consistency with his Catholic\nconviction?(5)\n\n_Via stulti recta in oculis ejus, qui autem sapiens est audit consilia_,\nsays the Wise Man. It is characteristic of the fool to be wise in his own\neyes, and stubbornly to cling to his own judgment; but the prudent man\nseeks advice, and suffers his attention to be called to his mistakes.\n\nThe believing scientist, too, will submit to correction; should the rare\ncase fall to his lot to have the Church condemn his work, he will know how\nto be generously obedient. Splendid examples are blazing the way for him.\n\u201cWere we to draw up a list of the scientists, who, in a similar critical\nposition as _F\u00e9nelon_, found strength in the virtue of obedience, and on\nthe other hand a list of all those whose subjective scientific views did\nnot allow them to submit, then we should perceive at a glance that their\nproud persistence in their own opinion has been injurious to true wisdom\nin the same degree as humble submission proved a benefit to science\u201d\n(_Hilgers_, 412). Finally, he who is convinced that the Christian faith is\nthe greatest heritance of truth from the past, which must be preserved in\nhim, he will take no offence if the Church is not impressed even by names\nlike _Kant_, _Spinoza_, _Schopenhauer_, _Strauss_, men much featured as\nthe captains of modern science and philosophy. In the eyes of the Church\nnothing is genuine and true science that is contrary to the testimony of\nGod, and errors are errors even then when their perpetrator is receiving\ncheers and applause. Just as the state prohibits the physician from\ndesignedly assisting any one to commit suicide, even though the physician\nbe a noted scientist, just so the Church opposes any one who assaults\nGod\u2019s truth, be he journalist or philosopher.\n\n\n    Frequently the _great number of forbidden books mentioned by the\n    Index_ is pointed out. The Index of 1900 contains about 5,000\n    titles belonging to the last three centuries; of these about 1,300\n    belong to the nineteenth century. Quite a small number,\n    considering the immense literature of the world. Yet it will look\n    even smaller when compared, for instance, with the censure of\n    books by the _Prussian state_.\n\n    In the year 1845 there appeared the following catalogue: \u201cIndex\n    _librorum prohibitorum_, Catalogue of the books forbidden in\n    Germany during 1844-1845, first volume.\u201d The second volume was\n    issued in 1846. The list is not complete: it does not contain, for\n    instance, the names of prohibited newspapers and periodicals. Yet\n    it contains 437 writings, forbidden by 570 decrees, _i.e._, two or\n    three times as many as the entire number of German books of the\n    nineteenth century enumerated by name in the Roman Index. The\n    \u201cHistorisch-Politischen Blaetter\u201d of 1840 contain an article\n    beginning thus: \u201c_Veritas odium parit._ In Prussia there are now\n    prohibited nearly all Catholic journals and periodicals, and in\n    order to begin the matter _ab ovo_ they have grasped a welcome\n    opportunity to throw interdicts at wholesale against works not yet\n    published, or to render their circulation difficult to a degree\n    amounting to prohibition.\u201d\n\n    How the Prussian censorship proceeded in those days may be\n    illustrated by another example. \u201cAt the time of the Vatican\n    Council a publisher, _Joseph Bachem_, came to Dr. _Westhoff_,\n    rector of the Seminary of Cologne, a man of venerable years, and\n    told him of his misgivings about the dogma of the infallibility.\n    In his youth he had been taught the maxim that that is Catholic\n    which has been taught always, everywhere, and by everybody; yet he\n    had until recently never found the doctrine of Papal Infallibility\n    taught, neither in schools nor in text-books. Then the reverend\n    old rector took the visitor by the hand and led him into the\n    library of the seminary, where he showed him not less than sixteen\n    catechisms that had been in use in the Archdiocese of Cologne\n    during the eighteenth century, and which stated without exception,\n    clearly and convincingly, the doctrine of Papal Infallibility in\n    matters of faith and morals. The publisher in utter astonishment\n    then asked how it was that this doctrine was not taught in later\n    editions. Dr. _Westhoff_ referred him to the Prussian censure,\n    enforced until 1848, which had expunged this doctrine from all\n    Catholic catechisms. From that moment _Bachem_ no longer wavered\n    in his opinions\u201d (Koelnische Volkszeitung, September 7, 1893).\n\n    One may also remember _Bismarck\u2019s_ press-campaign during the\n    _Kulturkampf_. Professor _Friedberg_, Prussian court canonist,\n    instigated this campaign, and in many ways devised the plan of\n    attack. This much-praised liberalism\u2014how tyrannically it proceeded\n    against the Catholic press! The Frankfurter Zeitung in those days\n    took a census of convictions due to the press law. According to\n    the census, which \u201cdoes not by far claim to be complete,\u201d there\n    were of newspaper editors sentenced in 1875\u201421 in January, 35 in\n    February, 29 in March, 24 in April; in four months 137 newspaper\n    writers were either fined or sent to jail. During the same period\n    30 newspapers were confiscated (Staatslexikon, IV, 550). This is\n    not all. \u201cWe could mention at least three instances,\u201d says _P.\n    Majunke_ in his History of the Kulturkampf, \u201cwhere agents of the\n    Berlin secret police have succeeded in obtaining a position on the\n    editorial staff of Catholic papers, staying for a year or more.\n    Besides serving as spies these fellows had to perform the task of\n    _agents provocateurs_, viz., to incite the editors of Catholic\n    papers to extreme utterances, similar to the denunciations\n    suggested to correspondents of foreign Catholic organs for their\n    papers.\u201d This happened in a civilized state, despite its\n    constitutional freedom of the press, by order of the same\n    liberalism which always pretends to be full of righteous\n    indignation when the Church prohibits books and puts them on the\n    Index.\n\n    Towards the end of the last century, again with the aid of\n    liberalism, laws against the socialists were drawn up. After they\n    had been passed war was waged against socialistic literature. In\n    the year 1886 there appeared a real Index Librorum Prohibitorum,\n    its title read, \u201cSocial Democratic publications and societies\n    prohibited by the imperial law against the dangerous designs of\n    Social Democracy,\u201d which law had then been in force eight years. A\n    supplementary list was published two years later, in 1888.\n    _Hilgers_ makes this comment on it: \u201cHow many additional pamphlets\n    have been condemned in the time from March 28, 1888, to September\n    30, 1890, we cannot state.\u201d According to the foregoing official\n    statement the average is 130 a year. Hence we assume that the\n    printed matter prohibited during the twelve years that the law was\n    in force amounted to between 15,000 and 16,000. This number of\n    social democratic pamphlets forbidden within twelve years exceeds\n    by far the number of all books prohibited by the Roman Index in\n    the course of the entire nineteenth century\u2014books that are the\n    products of all countries in the world and dealing with all\n    branches; the number of these German prohibitions is ten times\n    that of Roman prohibitions. Indeed, in the course of a year and a\n    half the new German Empire prohibited more writings of Germans\n    than Rome had prohibited during the entire past century. We may\n    mention here _Goethe_. In the atheism dispute, at the end of the\n    eighteenth century, decision was rendered upon _Goethe\u2019s_ advice\n    against the philosopher _Fichte_; _Fichte_ was discharged in spite\n    of petitions and mediations in his favour. The liberal Grand Duke\n    _Karl August of Saxony Weimar_ granted in 1816, after the French\n    conqueror had been overthrown, freedom of the press. Professor\n    _Oken_ of Jena availed himself of this privilege, and printed in\n    his \u201cIsis\u201d contributions complaining about the government.\n    _Goethe_ had to advise what should be done against it. He thought\n    that the paper should have been suppressed by the police at its\n    very first announcement; \u201cthe measure neglected at the beginning\n    is to be taken immediately and the paper is to be prohibited. By\n    prohibiting the \u2018Isis\u2019 the trouble will be stopped at once\u201d\n    (Briefwechsel des Grossh. _Karl August v. Sax.-Weimar-Eisenach_\n    mit _Goethe_, II, 1863, 90). And this was done, in spite of the\n    freedom granted the press.\n\n    _Frederick II._ is called the Royal Free-thinker; and yet the\n    general introduction of the book censure into Prussia occurred\n    precisely during his reign. The first general censure edict was\n    issued in 1749 and remained in force till the death of the king.\n    All books, even those printed in foreign tongues, were subject to\n    the censure. Even all episcopal and Papal proclamations were\n    subjected to the royal censure. That the leaders in the\n    Reformation and their successors were not prevented by their\n    avowal of the principle of free research from exercising rigorous,\n    often tyrannical, censure, not only against the Catholics but also\n    against their fellow reformers, is well known.\n\n    _M. Lehmann_ writes in the Preuss. Jahrb. 1902: \u201cIt claims to be\n    infallible, this Papal Church, it wants to be to the faithful\n    everything, in science and even in nationality. It offends every\n    nation. The Index in the shape given it in 1900 by the present\n    Pope proscribes the \u2018Oeuvres du Philosophe de Sanssouci,\u2019 _Kant\u2019s_\n    \u2018Critique of Pure Reason,\u2019 _Ranke\u2019s_ \u2018History of the Popes,\u2019 the\n    greatest German king, the greatest German philosopher, and the\n    greatest German historian\u201d (1902, no. 8).\n\n    As to _Frederick II._, his own works appeared only after his death\n    in 1788, and even then only in part; later on there were other\n    editions. None of these is put on the Index. On this list we find\n    since 1760 the \u201cOeuvres du Philosophe de Sanssouci.\u201d Under this\n    title appeared at first three volumes, in but a few copies,\n    intended for the most intimate friends of the king. The first\n    volume he soon withdrew and had it burned of his own accord; it\n    contained the \u201cPalladion\u201d an imitation of Voltaire\u2019s \u201cPucelle,\u201d a\n    salacious work throughout. In 1762 a new edition was issued. It\n    also contains a philosophical treatise denying the immortality of\n    the soul; this treatise was also published separately and\n    specially prohibited in 1767. A third work put on the Index is a\n    spurious attack on the Popes published by order of King _Frederick\n    II._, with a preface by him. Its author is said to have been the\n    French abb\u00e9 _Jean Martin De Prades_, reader to the king. These are\n    the indicted works of _Frederick II._, all written in French and\n    in substance French Voltairianism. Thus came the greatest German\n    king on the Index!\n\n    _Ranke\u2019s_ \u201cRoemische Paepste\u201d is on the Index, because the book\n    belittles the constitutions and doctrines of the Catholic Church:\n    not because of the true things the author says about Popes. _Von\n    Pastor\u2019s_ \u201cHistory of the Popes\u201d is not on the Index,\n    notwithstanding the bitter truths he writes about Popes _Alexander\n    VI._ and _Leo X._\n\n    He who knows even the fundamental ideas of _Kant\u2019s_ \u201cKritik der\n    reinen Vernunft\u201d will see that not only the Catholic Church, but\n    every Christian denomination, might forfeit its existence if it\n    showed itself indifferent towards it. Heresies are especially\n    dangerous to the uneducated when they bear the names of authors of\n    scientific repute. But the Church willingly grants the permission\n    to read them when there is reason for it. Moreover, it was not\n    Rome alone that took steps against _Kant_. This was done by the\n    Prussian king _Frederick II._ also. One may recall his cabinet\n    order, under minister _Woellner_, against Kant\u2019s \u201cReligion\n    innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft.\u201d Similarly the works\n    of _Spinoza_ were proceeded against, whereas his indictment by\n    Rome now calls forth protest because he has since been assigned a\n    prominent place among philosophers. _Freudenthal_ registers a list\n    of 500 sharp prohibitions issued against _Spinoza\u2019s_ works during\n    the years 1556-1580: they were condemned by the states of Holland,\n    by the court, by synods and magistrates. Those judgments were\n    passed during a period when the competent authorities had views\n    different from those of to-day; when the state deemed it its duty\n    to oppose the undermining of Christianity. The state\u2019s judgment\n    has changed in many ways, Rome\u2019s judgment has remained the same.\n    But the works of _Kant_ and _Spinoza_ likewise have remained the\n    same, and so is Christianity, against which they occupy an\n    irreconcilable position, still the same.\n\n\n\u201cIn the moral world nothing can support that cannot also resist\u201d is a\ntruthful saying of _Treitschke_: it is also the principle of the Catholic\nChurch. Without ever surrendering to the unchristian tendency of a time,\nshe opposes error with unsubdued courage. If this be intolerance, it is\nnot intolerance towards erring men but towards their errors, it is the\nintolerance that the gardener shows in uprooting harmful weeds, it is the\nintolerance of the physician towards disease. Obedience to the Index makes\nhigh moral demands upon the Catholic. But it has been characteristic of\nthe Christian religion and of its faithful children never to shrink before\nany moral action where it appeared demanded. And if the preservation of\nmoral purity exacts conscientious discipline, this is also true of the\npreservation of the pure faith, especially at a time when a neo-paganism\nin league with an uncontrolled mania for reading is threatening in many\nforms.\n\n\n\nGalileo, and Other Topics.\n\n\n_Galileo Galilei_\u2014but few names have achieved equal fame. Men like\n_Alexander_ and _C\u00e6sar_, like _Homer_ and _Dante_, have scarcely succeeded\nin writing their names with a sharper pencil on the tablet of history than\nthe astronomer of Pisa. His grand discoveries in natural science have done\nlittle to crown his temples with the wreath of immortality\u2014it was the fate\nof his life that did it. And one may add: if this fate had been caused by\nthe French government, or by a Protestant General Assembly, he would never\nhave obtained his position in history; but since this lot came to him by\nthe human limitation of a Roman Church authority, his name is not only\nentered on the calendar of the anti-Roman journalist, it also stands\nsurrounded with the halo of a Martyr in the esteem of serious scientists,\nwho see in _Galileo_ and in the consequent condemnation of the Copernican\nsystem the proof that dogma and science cannot agree, that the Catholic\nChurch assumes a hostile attitude toward science. Whenever this theme is\nmentioned, _Galileo\u2019s_ ghost is paraded. For this reason we cannot pass by\nthis fact of history. To a son of the Church they are unpleasant\nrecollections, but this shall not keep us from looking history firmly in\nthe eye.\n\nThere are some other charges brought forth from history, but the _Galileo_\ncase overshadows them all. We shall touch upon them but briefly, and then\nreturn to _Galileo_.\n\nAttention is called to the Church\u2019s condemnation of the _doctrine of\nAntipodes_. The Priest _Vigilius_ was accused in Rome, in 747, of having\ntaught that there exists another world under the earth, and other people\nalso, or another sun and moon (_quod alius mundus et alii homines sub\nterra sint seu sol et luna_). Such was his doctrine as stated by Pope\n_Zacharias_ in his reply to _Boniface_, the Apostle of Germany, in which\nhe said that he had cited _Vigilius_ to Rome in order that his doctrine be\nthoroughly investigated: if it should turn out that this had really been\ntaught by him, he would be condemned. Further particulars of his teaching\nare unknown, because it is mentioned only in the above passage. The\nassertion ascribed to him is that there is another world besides this one,\nwith other inhabitants and with another sun and moon\u2014an assertion\nscientifically absurd and dogmatically inadmissible, as this might call in\nquestion the common descent of mankind from one pair of parents. The\nanxiety and rebuke of the Pope is directed solely against the latter\npoint. The condemnation of _Vigilius_ has never taken place, for he\nremained in his office, won great respect, was elevated to the bishopric\nof Salzburg, and later canonized by _Gregory IX._ Had a condemnation of\nhis particular doctrine taken place, this would not have involved the\ncondemnation of the antipodean theory, in the sense that the side of the\nglobe opposite to us is also inhabited by human beings, a proposition\nwhich does not conflict with any doctrine of faith. The doctrine described\nabove has another tendency. The entire case is hidden in obscurity\n(_Hefele_, Conc. Gesch., 2d ed., III, 557 _seq._).\n\nFurthermore, it has been said that at the time when the universities were\nin close union with the Church, medical science could not advance because\nthe Church had prohibited human _anatomy_ (Prof. _J. H. van\u2019t Hoff_, Neue\nFreie Presse, December 29, 1907). In amplification it was said: \u201c_Boniface\nVIII._ had forbidden every anatomical dissection of a body\u201d (_O.\nZoeckler_, Theologie und Naturwissenschaft, 1877, I, 342). What is true of\nthis assertion?\n\n\n    In the first place, _Boniface VIII._ did not forbid anatomy. He\n    merely prohibited in 1299 and 1300 the hideous custom then\n    prevailing regarding the bodies of noblemen who had died away from\n    home: they were disembowelled, dissected, and boiled, for the\n    purpose of removing the flesh from the bones so that the latter\n    could be transported the more easily. This process had nothing to\n    do with anatomy. The wish to possess the bones of the dead did not\n    seem to the Pope a sufficient reason for treating the human body\n    in such a way (Cfr. _Michael_, Gesch. des deutschen Volkes III,\n    1903, 433). Nor does history know of any other prohibition of\n    anatomy by the Church. It tells us, however, that _Frederick II._\n    in his excellent rules for the benefit of his Sicilian kingdom in\n    the regulation of medical science among other things emphasizes\n    the study of surgery: he ordered that no one be allowed to\n    practise surgery who could not show by attestation of his\n    professors that he had studied surgery for at least one year,\n    especially that he had learned at school how to dissect bodies; a\n    physician must be perfect in anatomy, else he may not undertake\n    operations (_Michael_, l. c. 430). This was done and practised\n    under the eyes of the Church. The accusers also seem ignorant of\n    the fact that bodies of those executed were given to universities\n    for dissection. In the year 1336 the medical students of\n    Montpellier, the famous medical school under the immediate\n    direction of the Church (see above, page 154) were granted the\n    privilege of obtaining once a year an executed criminal\u2019s body for\n    dissection. The same privilege was extended to the medical\n    students of Lerida by King _Juan I._ on June 3, 1391, who decreed\n    that the delinquent should be drowned _pro speriencia seu anatomia\n    fienda_ (_Denifle_, Die Universitaeten des Mittelalters, I, 1885,\n    507).\n\n    The story is also circulated that the fourth Lateran Council in\n    1215 prohibited monks from studying natural sciences and medicine\n    (Deutschoester. Lehrerzeitung 15th Dec., 1909). It will suffice to\n    quote this particular decree of the Lateran Council: \u201cNo clergyman\n    is allowed to pronounce capital sentence, nor to execute it, nor\n    to be present at its execution. No clergyman is allowed to draw up\n    a document concerning a death sentence: at the courts this should\n    be done by laymen. No clergyman is allowed to assume command of\n    Rotarians (freebooters), of archers or any others who shed human\n    blood; no subdeacon, deacon, or priest is allowed to practise that\n    part of surgery by which cutting and burning is done, nor must any\n    one pronounce a benediction at an ordeal\u201d (_Hefele_, Koncil.\n    Gesch., 2d ed., V, 1887, 887). This will thoroughly dispose of\n    that charge.\n\n    Just as briefly may we settle the story of _Columbus_ having been\n    excommunicated because of his intention to discover new lands. It\n    is said that the \u201cSpanish clergy denounced his plans as against\n    the faith, and that the Council of Salamanca excommunicated him\u201d\n    (_W. Draper_, ibid. 163). This is a fairy tale. The truth is, that\n    King _Ferdinand_ and Queen _Isabella_ referred the plans of the\n    bold Genoese to a council of scientists and ecclesiastical\n    dignitaries, which was held in the Dominican Monastery of\n    Salamanca, _Columbus_ being present. There never was a Council of\n    Salamanca. _Weiss_ writes in his \u201cHistory of the World\u201d: \u201cMuch has\n    been surmised concerning the objections and their refutation. It\n    is only certain that the majority rejected the plan as impossible\n    of execution, and that _Columbus_ won over a minority of them,\n    especially the priests, among whom the learned Dominican _Deza_\n    deserves mention\u201d (Weltgesch. VII, 187). _Denthofen_, in his\n    biography of _Columbus_, says: \u201cThe Dominican Fathers supported\n    him during the long time the conference lasted, and even defrayed\n    the expenses of his journey. Father _Diego de Deza_, chief\n    professor of theology, was convinced by the reasons of _Columbus_,\n    and in turn convinced the more learned of his confr\u00e8res. The\n    majority, however, thought the idea but a phantom, while others\n    deemed it impracticable. The conference adjourned without coming\n    to any definite decision\u201d (Christof Columbus, Eine biographische\n    Skizze ..., 1878, 21). _Columbus_ found his warmest friend in the\n    learned Father _Juan Perez_, Guardian of the Franciscan Monastery\n    of St. Maria de la Rabida. Within the quiet walls of this cloister\n    _Columbus\u2019_ plans were disclosed for the first time in Spain, and\n    admired and resolved upon. _Perez_ spoke untiringly to Isabella in\n    favour of the plan, and even aided _Columbus_ in gathering men for\n    his crew. This is the fact about the anathema the Church is paid\n    to have pronounced on _Columbus_.\n\n    But let us return to _Galileo_.(6)\n\n\n_Galileo Galilei_, the great Italian physicist, was born in 1564, at Pisa.\nAt first he was professor in his native town, then at Padua, where he\ntaught the doctrine of _Ptolemy_, although at that time there was no\nobstacle to accepting the Copernican system. In 1611 he became\nmathematician at the court of _Cosimo II._ at Florence. His talents and\nhappy discoveries soon won fame. In general he was more of a physicist\nthan an astronomer; his astronomical discoveries were, almost without\nexception, of a kind that did not presuppose a thorough astronomical\ntraining. As is known, he was not the original inventor of the telescope,\nthough with its aid he achieved some of the most important of his\ndiscoveries; for instance, that of the satellites of Jupiter. The\ntelescope was invented in Holland.\n\nWhen he went to Rome, in 1611, he was received with great honour. In one\nof his letters from there he wrote: \u201cI have received marked favours from\nmany Cardinals and prelates here, and from several princes. They wanted to\nhear of my inventions, and were all well pleased.\u201d The Jesuits gave a\nspecial reception in his honour at the Roman College. This shows in what\nesteem science was then held at Rome. But five years later _Galileo_\nreturned to the Eternal City under quite different circumstances. What had\nhappened? In 1612 he had issued a treatise on \u201cThe History and Explanation\nof the Sun-spots,\u201d in which he declared unreservedly for the Copernican\nsystem. And this caused the change. True, _Copernicus_ himself was a\nCatholic Priest, and had dedicated his principal work to Pope _Paul III._\nBut it was generally supposed that he had brought forward the doctrine\nonly as an hypothesis, only to illustrate and facilitate calculations, not\nclaiming for it absolute certainty. This assumption was based on the\npreface of the first edition of his book, containing assurance to that\neffect. That preface, however, was not the work of _Copernicus_, but had\nbeen smuggled into the book by the Protestant publisher _Osiander_,\nwithout the author\u2019s knowledge, because _Osiander_ feared _his own_ church\nauthorities.\n\n_Galileo_ spoke in quite another tone. He defended the doctrine as true.\nHe soon aroused opposition. Men standing for the geocentric theory were\nopposed by others, siding with _Galileo_ for the solar system, such as the\nlearned Benedictine, _Castelli_. _Galileo\u2019s_ great bitterness and sarcasm\nin dealing with his opponents aggravated the quarrel with the \u201cpartisans\nof _Aristotle_.\u201d Extreme irritability and love of praise were prominent\ntraits of _Galileo\u2019s_ character.\n\nIt was the custom of that time to bring Scripture into controversies about\nnature. This was done also in _Galileo\u2019s_ case. Passages were quoted\nagainst him, referring to the \u201crising and setting sun,\u201d to the \u201cearth that\nnever moves,\u201d of _Joshua\u2019s_ \u201ccommanding the sun to stand still.\u201d This\nprompted _Galileo_ to cross over into the field of theology himself. In a\nletter to _Castelli_ in 1613 he says: \u201cHoly Writ can never lie nor err; on\nthe contrary, its sayings are absolute and incontestable truth; but its\ninterpreters are liable to err in various ways, and it is a fatal and very\ncommon mistake to stop always at the literal sense\u201d (_Kepler_, even prior\nto _Galileo_, had interpreted the respective passages of the Scriptures\nproperly and with surprising skill; especially in his introduction to his\n\u201cAstronomia nova.\u201d Cfr. _Anschuetz_, Johannes Kepler als Exeget.\nZeitschrift f\u00fcr katholische Theologie, XI, 1887, 1-24).\n\nCorrect as these arguments were, it was nevertheless imprudent for the\ncourt mathematician to trespass upon grounds regarded by theologians as\ntheir own, instead of furnishing natural scientific proofs. Thus the\nmatter was brought to Rome before the Congregation of the Inquisition.\n_Galileo_, worrying about his case, went voluntarily to Rome, in 1615. He\nfailed to assuage the opposition against his theory, though he says he was\nreceived favourably by the princes of the Church. Moreover, heedless of\nthe admonition of his friends, he pursued the matter with indiscreet zeal,\nwith vehemence and impetuosity, practically provoking a decision. Cardinal\n_Bellarmin_ opposed the haste with which the matter was being pressed; the\nJesuit _Grienberger_ thought that _Galileo_ should first set forth his\nproofs, and then speak about the Scriptures. Had scientific proofs been\nbrought forth, theological difficulties would have been easily cleared\naway; but scientific proof was lacking, and what there perhaps was of it,\n_Galileo_ failed to offer.\n\nThe right of the Congregation to take up the matter can hardly be denied,\nfor although the matter was one of natural sciences, yet, by introducing\ntheology and Scripture, it had assumed the character of theology and\nexegesis. _Galileo_ personally was dealt with very leniently. During the\ndiscussions of 1616 he was never cited before the bar of the Inquisition,\nnor was his exterior freedom in any way restricted. Only one thing was\ndone: he was cautioned by Cardinal _Bellarmin_, \u201cby order of the Holy\nCongregation,\u201d not to adhere to, nor teach any longer, the Copernican\ntheory. The documents of the case say that \u201c_Galileo_ submitted to this\norder and promised to obey.\u201d The Congregation of the Index prohibited,\nMarch 5, 1616, all books defending the Copernican theory, declaring the\ndoctrine to be against Holy Scripture. Even the work of _Copernicus_ was\nprohibited _donec corrigatur_\u2014until it be corrected. A decision of the\nyear 1620 declared which passages should be corrected. They are those in\nwhich the author speaks of his theory not as an hypothesis but as of an\nestablished truth: _non ex hypothesi, sed asserando_. The Protestant\n_Kepler_, upon hearing this, wrote: \u201cBy their imprudent acts some have\ncaused the work of _Copernicus_ to be condemned, after it had been left\nunmolested for nearly eighty years; and the prohibition will last at least\ntill the corrections are made. I have been assured, however, by competent\nauthority, both ecclesiastical and civil, that the decree was not intended\nto put any hindrance in the way of astronomical research\u201d (_A. Mueller_,\nJ. Kepler, 1903, 105). The reproach of imprudence was intended for\n_Galileo_.\n\nTo teach the doctrine as an hypothesis was permitted even to _Galileo_,\nand this left the way clear for the development of the hypothesis, because\nwhatever showed the usefulness of the hypothesis was sure to increase its\nvalue as a truth, but _Galileo_ would not keep within these limits.\nInstead of showing in a Christian spirit a submission to Providence, which\neven an erring authority may demand, he openly violated his promise and\ndisobeyed the command he had received. In the spring of 1632 there\nappeared at Florence his \u201c_Dialogue on the two most important systems of\nthe world_.\u201d It contained an open, though by no means victorious, defence\nof the Copernican system\u2014seeking to hide under a confidence-inspiring\nmask. It contained many passages of caustic sarcasm, with the evident\nintention of arousing public opinion against the attitude of the Roman\nCongregations. It was a flagrant _violation of the command given him\npersonally_.\n\nThe Pope under whom the proceedings against _Galileo_ took place was\n_Urban VIII._, who, when a Cardinal, had followed _Galileo\u2019s_ discoveries\nwith enthusiasm, though never partial to the system of _Copernicus_, and,\nin accord with the custom of the age, he had written an ode to _Galileo_.\n\nCited to Rome, _Galileo_ came only after repeated urging, on February 14,\n1633. The story of his having been imprisoned and tortured on this second\nvisit to Rome is false. _Galileo_ wrote on April 16 of that year: \u201cI live\nin an apartment of three rooms, belonging to the Fiscal of the\nInquisition, and am free to move in many rooms. My health is good.\u201d This\nstay in the apartment belonging to the Inquisition lasted but twenty-two\ndays; after that _Galileo_ was allowed to live in the palace of the\nAmbassador of Tuscany. During his whole life _Galileo_ was never even for\nan hour in a real prison.\n\n_Galileo\u2019s_ demeanour before the Inquisition bespeaks little truthfulness\nand manliness. It makes a painful impression. Many other events in his\nlife cast dark shades of insincerity upon his character, especially his\nrelations with _Kepler_. While in his dialogue he openly defended the\ntruth of the Copernican system, while he had written, time and again, that\nthe theory had been demonstrated by \u201cforceful, convincing arguments,\u201d\nwhereas nothing but insignificant reasons could be pleaded for the\ncontrary, he now assumes the attitude before the Inquisition of denying\nthat he had championed that theory, at least not consciously; that he had\nnever taught that doctrine otherwise than hypothetically. And this he\nasserts although he had taken the oath to say nothing but the truth. We\neven hear him declare that he considers the doctrine to be false, and that\nhe was ready to refute it at once.\n\nThe judges were convinced of the untruthfulness of the defendant. In those\ntimes, in order to obtain further confessions, especially when the accused\nhad been previously convicted of guilt, torture was resorted to. This\nregrettable practice was then in vogue at every European court; the\nInquisition, too, had adopted it, but strict rules were laid down to guard\nagainst abuses. Very old persons were exempt from the rack; they were only\nthreatened with it. This happened also in _Galileo\u2019s_ case, he was never\nactually put on the rack. Moreover, one can safely presume that this\nthreat did not terrify him much. His reading must have enlightened him on\nthis point, and even without it he must have known the practice by his\nactive intercourse with those theologians of the Curia who were friendly\nto him. In fact, he clung obstinately to his denial, to the very end of\nthe hearing, although it must be surmised that he would not have\naggravated his case by confession. The commissioner of Inquisition,\n_Macolano_, at the first stages of the trial had expressed his hope that\nin this event \u201cit would be possible to show indulgence to the guilty, and\nwhatever the result might be, he would realize the benefit received, apart\nfrom all other consequences to be expected from a desired mutual\nsatisfaction\u201d (Letter to Cardinal _Fr. Barberini_, April 28, 1633).\n\nOn June 22 _the final verdict_ was rendered: it told the defendant: \u201cThou\nart convicted by the Holy Congregation of being suspected of heresy, to\nwit, to have held for true, and believed in, a false theory, contrary to\nHoly Writ\u2014which makes the sun the centre of the orbit of the earth,\nwithout moving from east to west, and which lets the earth, on the other\nhand, move outside the centre of the world, and to have believed that an\nopinion may be considered probable and be defended, though it had been\nexpressly declared to be contrary to the Scripture.\u201d _Galileo_ was\ndeclared suspect of heresy, because, in the opinion of the judges, he had\nassumed that a doctrine in contradiction to the Scriptures might be\ndefended. _Galileo_ retracted by oath. That upon retraction he arose and\nexclaimed, stamping with his foot, \u201c_Pur si muove!_\u201d (\u201cand yet it does\nmove!\u201d) is a fable. He was sentenced to be jailed in the Holy Office. But\nalready the next day he was allowed to go to the palace of the Grand Duke\nof Tuscany and to consider that palace his prison. Soon after he departed\nfor Siena, \u201cin the best of health,\u201d according to the report of the Tuscan\nambassador, _Niccolini_, and there took up his abode with his friend the\nArchbishop _Piccolomini_. After a lapse of five months he was allowed to\nreturn to his villa at Arcetri, near Florence, where he remained, with the\nexception of occasional visits to Florence, till his death. Two of his\ndaughters were nuns in the nearby cloister of S. Matteo. His literary\nactivity was not suppressed by the surveillance of the Inquisition. His\nlively and fertile mind, cut off from polemics, turned to the completion\nof his researches in other directions. His lively intercourse with friends\nand disciples, of whom many belonged to various Orders, proved beneficial\nto him. In the year 1638 he published his \u201cDialogue on the New Sciences,\u201d\nwhich he rightly pronounced to be his best effort, and by which he became\nthe founder of dynamics. His productiveness continued until he became\nblind.\n\nWe may say without fear of contradiction that, apart from their\ntheoretical error, the Roman Congregations had shown the greatest\nindulgence towards one guilty of having broken his pledge, and doubtless\nthey would have been still more lenient had _Galileo_, confirmed by\nflattering friends in his anger at the supposed intrigues of his enemies,\nnot himself made this impossible; if he had not continued to propagate\nsecretly his views, verbally and in writing, which was bound to be\ndiscovered. Considering all this, Rome\u2019s proceeding in the case appears to\nbe quite indulgent. Here the position was taken that the spread of the\ndoctrine would mean an imminent danger to the purity of the faith. The\nunfortunate scientist died on January 8, 1642, at the age of seventy-eight\nyears, fortified by the holy Sacraments. _Urban VIII._ sent him his\nblessing. Undoubtedly _Galileo_ had nothing in common with the champions\nof that unbelieving freedom of science, which now tries to lift him upon\nits shield; notwithstanding his later bitterness he remained to his death\nsteadfast in his Catholic faith.\n\n\n\nComments on the Galileo Case.\n\n\nThe above is a brief history of _Galileo\u2019s_ conviction, and of the\noccurrences leading to it. An event regrettable to all, a stumbling-block\nfor not a few; for others a welcome event to make the Church appear in the\nlight of an enemy of science. Let us now give more particulars of the\nmerits of the case.\n\nWe have before us two decisions of Roman Tribunals: the Index decree of\n1616, announcing the rejection of the Copernican doctrine and prohibiting\nbooks maintaining it, and the conviction of _Galileo_ in 1633 by the\nCongregation of the Inquisition. It is freely admitted that these Roman\nTribunals committed an _error_ in advocating an interpretation of the\nBible which was false in itself, and is to-day recognized as false.\n\nWell, _does this confute the infallibility of the Church?_ It does not.\nThe matter in point is merely an error of the Congregations, of bodies of\nCardinals, who were responsible for the transactions and decisions. The\nCongregations, however, are not infallible organs. There is no Bull or\nPapal decree designating the Copernican doctrine as false, much less is\nthere extant a decision ex cathedra. Neither in 1616 nor in 1633, nor at\nany other time, has the Holy See ever manifested its intention of\ndeclaring, by a peremptory, dogmatic decision, the new system to be\nagainst Scripture.\n\n\n    It was thus the general understanding of that age that in the\n    present case there was no irrevocable dogmatic decision given. For\n    instance, the Jesuit _Riccioli_, wrote not long after the\n    decision: \u201cInasmuch as no dogmatic decision was rendered in this\n    case, neither on the part of the Pope nor on the part of a Council\n    ruled by the Pope and acknowledged by him, it is not made, by\n    virtue of that decree of the Congregation, a doctrine of faith\n    that the sun is moving and the earth standing still, but at most\n    it is a doctrine for those who by reason of Holy Writ seem to be\n    morally certain that God has so revealed it. Yet every Catholic is\n    bound by virtue of obedience to conform to the decree of the\n    Congregation, or at least not to teach what is directly opposed to\n    it\u201d (Almagestum novum, 1651, 162). _Descartes_, _Gassendi_, and\n    others of that time expressed themselves similarly (_Grisar_, 165,\n    _seq._). There is an interesting letter of the Protestant\n    philosopher _Leibnitz_, written to the Landgrave _Ernest of\n    Hessia_, 1688, begging him to work for the repeal of the\n    condemnation of the Copernican theory, because of the growing\n    verification of this theory: \u201cIf the Congregation would change its\n    censure, or mitigate it, as one issued hastily at a time when the\n    proofs for the correctness of the Copernican theory were not yet\n    clear enough, this step could not detract from the authority of\n    the Congregation, much less of the Church, because the Pope had no\n    part in it. There is no judicial authority which has not at times\n    reformed its own decisions.\u201d\n\n\nBut have we here not at least a _wilful attack on science_? or a\nmanifestation of the Congregation\u2019s narrow-mindedness and ignorance, which\nare bound to deprive it of all respect and confidence of sober-minded\npeople?\n\nThis harsh judgment overlooks two points. In the first place, the error of\nthe judges was quite _pardonable_. Could the liberal critics of to-day,\nwho so harshly denounce the Cardinals of the Congregation, be suddenly\nchanged into ecclesiastical prelates, and transferred back to the years of\n1616-1633, and placed in the chairs of the tribunal which had to decide\nthose delicate questions, it may be feared that, did they carry into the\ndecision but a part of the animosity they now show, they would disgrace\nthemselves and compromise the Church even more than the judges of\n_Galileo_ did. It is true that were we to judge the handling of the\nquestion by the knowledge of to-day, we might be astonished at the\nnarrow-mindedness of the judges, trying to uphold their untenable views\nagainst the established results of scientific research. But it would be\naltogether unhistorical to look at the matter in that way. When the\nCopernican theory entered upon the battlefield, it was _by no means\ncertain and demonstrated_.\n\n\n    The real arguments for the rotation of the earth were not then\n    known. There were no direct proofs for the progressive revolution\n    of the earth around the sun. _Galileo_ advanced three main\n    arguments for his theory. First, he advanced the argument from the\n    phenomenon of the tides, which, he said, could not be accounted\n    for but by the rotation of the earth: an argument rejected as\n    futile even at that time. Next he argued from certain observations\n    of the spots on the sun: another worthless argument, which others,\n    like _Scheiner_, looked upon as proof of the older theory. The\n    third argument was that the new theory simplified the explanation\n    of certain celestial phenomena; but the scope of this argument,\n    valid though it was in the abstract, could not be expressed or\n    grasped at the time, especially since the corrections of _Tycho de\n    Brahe_ had removed the greatest objections to the Ptolemaic\n    system. The Copernican theory could not be considered certain till\n    the end of the seventeenth century, after _Newton\u2019s_ work on\n    gravitation.\n\n    Then there were difficulties, the greatest of which was probably\n    the old idea of inertia, which at that time meant only that all\n    bodies tend to a state of rest; hence it seemed impossible that\n    the earth could ceaselessly execute two movements at the same\n    time, around the sun and around its own axis. This notion of\n    inertia had not been doubted in 1616; even _Kepler_ adhered to it.\n    Later on _Galileo_ came very near to the new idea of inertia: that\n    bodies tended to retain their state of repose or motion. But this\n    new notion, like everything else new, gained ground but slowly.\n    Then it was only with great difficulty that he could dispose of\n    the objection that were the earth to speed through space, as the\n    new theory claimed, the atmosphere would take a stormlike motion.\n    Lastly, the philosophical objection had to be met: the sun and\n    other celestial bodies, as far as we can know by observation, are\n    moving; if they do not move, then we must admit that we can know\n    nothing by observation.\n\n    Thus the new doctrine was not at all proven at that time, as could\n    be easily shown by its opponents; although it cannot be denied\n    that they did not always enter into the discussion with\n    impartiality. The astronomer, _Secchi_, testifies that \u201cnone of\n    the real arguments for the rotary motion of the earth was known at\n    _Galileo\u2019s_ time, also direct proofs for the progressive movement\n    of the earth around the sun were lacking at that time\u201d (_Grisar_,\n    30). Another famous astronomer, _Schiaparelli_, writes: \u201cIn the\n    sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Ptolemaic as well as the\n    Copernican system could serve for the description of phenomena;\n    geometrically they were equivalent to each other and to _Tycho\u2019s_\n    eclectic system\u201d (_Schiaparelli_, Die Vorl\u00e4ufer des Copernicus im\n    Altertum (German, 1876), 86).\n\n    Hence no direct evidence could be pleaded against the decision of\n    the Congregation, not even _Galileo_ had that evidence. At any\n    rate no judge who observed his demeanour at the trial could have\n    suspected _Galileo_ of coming in conflict with his conscience by\n    swearing off the theory.\n\n\nFor this reason it would be wrong to call _Galileo_ a martyr for science,\nbecause he did not suffer any martyrdom. He has seen neither rack nor\nprison. But he was not a martyr chiefly for the reason that he could not\nhave had any scientific conviction, apart from the fact that he did not\nclaim any such conviction, even denied it expressly.\n\nNo wonder, then, that the heliocentric system had considerable opponents\nat that time; no wonder the opposite view was even the prevalent one. _A.\nTanner_ wrote in 1626: \u201c_Ita habet communis ac certa omnium theologorum ac\nphilosophorum naturalium sentia_\u201d (Theol. Schol. I, disp. 6, q. 4., dub.\n3). Had valid argument been brought forth there never would have been a\n_Galileo_ case. In this respect a passage from a letter of _Bellarmin_\ndeserves attention: \u201cIf it could be really demonstrated that the sun be in\nthe centre of the world ... then we would have to proceed quite cautiously\nin explaining the apparently opposite passages in the Scriptures, we would\nrather have to say that we do not understand them, than to say of things\ndemonstrated that they are false\u201d (to _Foscarini_, April 12, 1615). The\nCardinals of that time could not be expected to anticipate the knowledge\nof a later period. They had to consult the judgment of their\ncontemporaneous savants. When seeing the majority of them sharply\nrejecting the new theory and refuting the arguments of their opponents, it\nis little wonder that the Cardinals could not overcome their theological\nscruples.\n\nThe scruples arose from the opinion, then prevalent, that the Holy\nScripture taught that the earth stood still and the sun moved; that the\nwords of the Scripture must be taken literally till the contrary is\ndemonstrated. The unanimous explanation of the Christian centuries was\nalso cited. As a matter of fact, however, the Christian past had not\ntaught this to be the only true sense of the words, but at that time the\nwords were understood that way, because no one could arrive at any other\nsense in those days.\n\nUnder these circumstances, an error was hardly avoidable, if a decision\nwas required. And a decision seemed to be urgent, and this is the second\npoint we must not overlook, if we wish to judge fairly. It was a time\neager for innovations, full of anti-religious ideas. A renaissance,\nsidling off into false humanism, was combating religious convictions,\nfalse notions were invading philosophy; in addition, Protestantism was\ntrying to invade Italy. All this caused suspicion of any innovation apt to\nendanger the faith; interpretations of the Scriptures deviating from the\naccustomed sense were particularly distrusted. The _Galileo_ quarrel\nhappened at an inopportune time. Indeed a sudden spread of the Copernican\ntheory might have been accompanied by great religious dangers. Even now,\nafter nearly three hundred years, the leaders of the anti-Christian\npropaganda are still pointing out that the progress of natural science has\nproved Holy Scripture to be erroneous, and many are impressed by the\nargument; many thousands would have been confused in those days by the\nsudden collapse of old astronomical views that were connected with\nunclarified religious ideas\u2014dreading that victorious science might shatter\nall religious traditions. Now, if one is convinced that the damage to\nreligion is to be estimated greater than any other, then one may also have\nthe conviction that it was better for the nations of the new era to have\ntheir scientific progress a little delayed, than to have their most sacred\npossession endangered. Of course considerations of this kind will have no\nweight with representatives of the naturalistic view of the world. Then it\ncan only be emphasized that a science that has no appreciation of the\nsupernatural character of the Catholic Church cannot be in a position to\nrender a fair judgment on many facts in the history of that Church.\n\nWhat we have said shows sufficiently that the condemnation of _Galileo_\nwas not due to any hostility to science.\n\n\n    The idea that the Church\u2019s attitude towards _Galileo_ and the\n    Copernican theory was a result of her antipathy to science is\n    entirely in contradiction with the character of that strenuous\n    period. In Catholic countries, especially in Italy, intellectual\n    life was zealously promoted by the Popes and their influence. It\n    was developing and flourishing even in the natural sciences. When\n    reading the correspondence of _Galileo_ one must be surprised to\n    see how popular astronomical, physical, and mathematical studies\n    were in the educated circles of the period. These studies belonged\n    to the curriculum of a general philosophical education, and it was\n    a matter of honour for many ecclesiastical dignitaries to remain\n    philosophers in that sense, notwithstanding their official duties.\n    We recall to mind the scientific discussion carried on with\n    _Galileo_ in Rome in 1611 and 1616, by Cardinals _Del Monte_,\n    _Farnese_, _Bonzi_, _Bemerio_, _Orsini_, and _Maffeo Baberini_,\n    and by clergymen like _Agucchi_, _Dini_, and _Campioli_. Similarly\n    in France we meet with names like _Mersenne_, _Gassendi_, and\n    _Descartes_. And in Italy, after _Galileo_ and at his time, we\n    meet with a long list of eminent naturalists like _Toricelli_,\n    _Cassini_, _Riccioli_, and others. In 1667 _Gemiani Montanari_\n    could write that in Italy there were continually forming new\n    societies of scientists. The advance in knowledge of truth was\n    made on safe grounds; at Naples, Rome, and elsewhere science was\n    enriched by a great variety of new experiences, inasmuch as the\n    scientists were making progress in the observation and the\n    investigation of nature. _Targioni-Tozzetti_ writes: \u201cAstronomy\n    with us, about the middle of the sixteenth century, was a very\n    diligently cultivated branch of science\u201d (Galileistudien (1882)\n    338 f.). The Church was by no means hostile to this newly awakened\n    life, not even holding aloof from it; on the contrary, it\n    flourished especially in ecclesiastical circles; a proof that\n    narrow-minded disappreciation of natural science did not prevail,\n    and that there was a different explanation for the _Galileo_ case.\n\n\n\nCopernicus on the Index till 1835.\n\n\nAnd what of the fact that _Copernicus_ remained on the Index until the\nnineteenth century? Does it not show a rigid adherence to old, traditional\nmethod and opposition to progress? The fact is true: The work of\n_Copernicus_, and other Copernican writings, remained on the Index until\n1835. But it is also true that a great deal connected with this fact is\nnot generally known or ignored. Let us mention here some of these facts.\n\n\n    To begin with, it must not be forgotten that we owe the new world\n    system, and with it the turning-point in astronomy, first of all\n    to representatives of the Catholic clergy. After the learned\n    Bishop _Nicholas Oresme_ had expressed with fullest certainty the\n    most important point of the Copernican system as early as 1377 (in\n    a manuscript hitherto unknown, discovered a short time ago by\n    _Pierre Duhem_ in the National Library at Paris. Cfr. Liter.\n    Zentralblatt (1909), page 1618), and after the learned Cardinal\n    _Nicholaus von Kues_ (d. 1474) adopted a rotary motion of the\n    earth in his cosmic system, it was _Copernicus_, a canon of the\n    diocese of Ermland, who became the father of the new theory, in\n    his work \u201cDe evolutionibus orbium coelestium.\u201d He published it at\n    the urgent request of Cardinal _Nikolaus Schoenberg_. But the most\n    zealous promoter of his work was Bishop _Tiedemann Giese_ of Kulm.\n    Enthusiastic over the novel idea, he incessantly urged his friend\n    to publish his work, took care of its publication, and sent a copy\n    to Pope _Paul III._, who accepted its dedication. Again, it was a\n    prince of the Church, Bishop _Martin Kromer_, who, in 1851,\n    dedicated a tablet in the cathedral at Frauenberg to \u201cThe Great\n    Astronomer and Innovator of Astronomical Science.\u201d All these men\n    knew that _Copernicus_ defended his work not as an hypothesis or\n    as fiction, but as true. Before _Copernicus_ issued his great\n    work, _Clement VIII._ showed a lively interest in his system and\n    had it explained to him by the learned _Johann Widmannstadt_ in\n    the Vatican Gardens (_Pastor_, Gesch. der P\u00e4pste, IV, 2 (1907)\n    550).\n\n    The first attack against the new system, as being contrary to Holy\n    Writ, came not from Catholic but from Protestant circles. Among\n    the latter the opposition against _Copernicus_ was being agitated,\n    while peaceful calm reigned among the former. Twelve Popes\n    succeeded _Paul III._, and not one interfered with this doctrine.\n    _Luther_, even in _Copernicus\u2019_ time, hurled his anathema against\n    the \u201cFrauenberg Fool,\u201d and six years after the publication of\n    _Copernicus\u2019_ chief work, _Melanchthon_ declared it a sin and a\n    scandal to publish such nonsensical opinions, contrary to the\n    divine testimony of the Scriptures. In fear of his religious\n    community the Protestant publisher _Osiander_ smuggled in the\n    spurious preface already mentioned, \u201cOn the hypothesis of this\n    work.\u201d The Protestant _Rheticus_, a friend and pupil of\n    _Copernicus_, got into disfavour with _Melanchthon_ and had to\n    discontinue his lectures at Wittenberg. The genial _Kepler_,\n    finally, was prosecuted by his own congregation, because of his\n    defence of the theory. And when on the Catholic side the Index\n    decree of 1616 was already beginning to be regarded as obsolete,\n    Protestant theology still held to the old view even up to the\n    nineteenth century: a long list of names could be adduced in\n    proof.\n\n    Certainly no fair-minded person can see wilful hostility against\n    astronomy in this procedure. Likewise there should not be imputed\n    dishonourable intentions to Catholics, if in the course of history\n    they rendered tribute to human limitation.\n\n\nBut did not the decrees of 1616 and 1633 do _great harm to research_? Not\nat all. That this was hardly the case with _Galileo_ himself we have shown\nabove. Soon after we find in Italy a goodly number of distinguished\nscientists; the Church in no way opposed the newly awakened life, nor even\nheld aloof from it. _Galileo_ himself was honoured in ecclesiastical\ncircles. Soon after _Galileo\u2019s_ conviction the Jesuit _Grimaldi_ named a\nmountain on the moon after him.\n\nNor was there any considerable harm done to the development of the\nCopernican theory. Although after _Galileo_ the occasions were not\nlacking, still no further advocate of his theory was ever up for trial.\nNor was any other book on the subject prohibited. Freedom was quietly\ngranted more and more. In the edition of the Index of 1758, the general\nprohibition of 1616 of Copernican writings was withdrawn; it was an\nofficial withdrawal from the old position. But not until 1822 were the\nspecial prohibitions repealed, although they had long since lost their\nbinding force. The occasion was given by an accidental occurrence. The\nMagister S. Palatii of the time intended to deny the Imprimatur to a book\non the Copernican theory, on account of the obsolete prohibition. An\nappeal was made, which brought about the formal repeal of the prohibition.\nOf course there had been no hurry to revoke a decision once given. But\naccording to the astronomer _Lalande\u2019s_ report of his interview with the\nCardinal Prefect of the Congregation of the Index, in 1765, the removal\nfrom the Index of _Galileo\u2019s_ Dialogue had been postponed only on account\nof extraneous difficulties. _Leibnitz_, while in Rome, worked for a repeal\nof the decree. According to Em\u00e9ry, there are extant statements of\n_Leibnitz_ vouching for the fact that he very nearly succeeded (_Em\u00e9ry_,\nPens\u00e9es de Leibnitz, 1, 275). The name of _Copernicus_, too, was omitted\nin the next edition of the Index, which appeared in 1835.\n\nBut even while the prohibition was still in force, the works of _Galileo_\nand _Copernicus_ were read everywhere. As early as 1619 _John Remus_ wrote\nfrom Vienna to _Kepler_ that the Copernican writings may be read by\nscientific men who had received special permission, and that this was done\nin all Italy and in Rome itself. Besides, it was allowed at any time to\nmake use of the doctrine as an hypothesis. Thus it advanced continually\nnearer and nearer to the position of an established truth.\n\nSoon after the publication of the decree, according to the report of\n_Kepler_, it was the general conviction in ecclesiastical and civil\ncircles of Austria \u201cthat the censure was no obstacle to the freedom of\nscience in the investigation of God\u2019s work.\u201d In 1685 we are assured by the\nJesuit _Kochansky_, that any Catholic was free to \u201clook for an\nirrefutable, mathematical, and physical demonstration of the movement of\nthe earth.\u201d It was also known that the condemnation of the theory had been\naided by the supposition that there were no valid arguments in support of\nthe new theory. Hence the Congregation\u2019s decree had in the eighteenth\ncentury for the most part lost its force. The Jesuit _Boscovich_, a\ncelebrated physicist and astronomer, wrote in 1755: \u201cIn consequence of the\nextraordinary arguments offered by the consideration of _Kepler\u2019s_ laws,\nastronomers no longer look upon his theory as a mere hypothesis, but as an\nestablished truth\u201d (Grisar, 347, 350).\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nThus in the light of history the condemnation of the Copernican theory\nappears quite differently from the picture presented by the superficial\naccusation that Rome up to the nineteenth century condemned this theory.\nThere is no trace of callousness and oppression, but only submission to\nlegitimate authority, in so far and as long as one deemed himself obliged.\nIt was a science enlightened by Christianity, which, in questions not yet\nclearly decided, laid down upon the altar of the Giver of all wisdom the\ntribute of humble submission, for the sake of higher interests.\n\nWe shall have to class with _St. Augustine_ the uncertainty of human\njudgments and tribunals among the \u201ctroubles of human life,\u201d and say with\nhim: \u201cIt is also a misery that the judge is subject to the necessity of\nnot knowing many things, but to the wise man it is not a fault\u201d (De Civ.\nDei, IX, 6). May we therefore infer that the teaching authority is an\nevil? Were that true, we should have to abolish the authority of the state\nand of parents, because they also make mistakes. We should have to\nconclude that there had better be no authority at all on earth. Where men\nlive and rule, mistakes will certainly be made. The physician makes\nmistakes in his important office, yet patients return to him with\nconfidence. Every pedagogue, every professor, has made mistakes, yet they\nstill command respect. The state government is subject to mistakes, yet\nnone but the anarchist will say that it must therefore be abolished. \u201cThat\nthe judge is subject to the necessity of not knowing many things, is a\nmisery, but to the wise man not a fault.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nChapter V. The Witnesses of the Incompatibility Of Science And Faith.\n\n\n\nThe Objection.\n\n\nWe shall not go wrong in presuming that the reader, who has patiently\nfollowed our deductions, has had for some time in his mind the question:\nHow about the representatives of scientific research themselves? Do not a\nlarge majority of them, perhaps virtually all, stand alien and repellant\nto Christian faith and its fundamental truths? We do not refer to our\nmodern philosophers, for of them it might be said that their researches\nyield questionable speculations of individualistic stamp, rather than\nexact results. But there are the representatives of the more exact\nsciences, especially of the most exact of all, natural science. They may\nbe considered the legitimate representatives of modern science, since\ntheir results are the most accurate, their methods the most strictly\nscientific; and are they not, every one of them, opposed to Christian\nfaith, especially to its fundamental dogma? Is not _Haeckel_ right when he\nstates in the final summary of his \u201cWeltr\u00e4tsel,\u201d in which he so strongly\ninsists on the incompatibility of religion and natural science: \u201cI am\nsupported by the accord of nearly all modern naturalists who have the\ncourage to express their convictions\u201d? Is it not true that _A. von\nHumboldt_ is considered the prince of German naturalists? and yet in his\nvoluminous \u201c_Kosmos_\u201d he not once mentions the name of God? Have not, with\nfew exceptions, German naturalists, under _Humboldt\u2019s_ influence, turned\nagainst Christianity? (_W. Menzel_, Die letzten hundertzwanzig Jahre der\nWeltgeschichte, VI, 1860, p. 70; cfr. _Pohle_, P. Angelo Secchi, 1904, p.\n6). Here indeed the antagonism between true scientific spirit and the\nfaith seems to take shape in tangible reality, and to invalidate every\nargument to the contrary.\n\nThus runs the speech that is ever recurring in the literature of the day,\nin newspapers and magazines no less than in books. And this speech makes\nan impression on its hearers. Indeed, why should it not? After describing\nhow these heroes of science in recent times marched on triumphantly from\nvictory to victory, how they renewed the face of the earth, and became the\npioneers of human progress, how can they fail to make a deep impression if\nin the same breath they state that these discoverers of truth have, almost\nto a man, broken with the ancient teachings of the Christian religion?\n\nWithout doubt the suggestive effect of such speculation must be very\nconsiderable with those who lack sufficient historical knowledge. The case\nis different with those better acquainted with the history of the natural\nsciences. They know that it is not true to state that the leading natural\nscientists, for the most part, or even unanimously, have rejected and\ndenied Christian religion, that it is a _lie_ and a falsification of\nhistory.\n\nLet us illustrate it briefly. We do not, of course, mean to say, that _if_\nit were true that all the leading naturalists were infidels, the inference\nwould necessarily follow that Christianity is untenable, and incompatible\nwith science. Not at all. First of all, natural scientists who oppose\nChristianity could hardly ever come forward in the capacity of experts in\nthis matter. For by venturing the assertion that world-matter and\nworld-force are eternal and uncreated, that they develop by force of\nnatural causality, by unending evolution, and not by the power and\ndirection of an intelligent cause, they leave their own province and\ntrespass on the domain of philosophy. These and similar questions are not\nsolved by natural science research, by experiment, observation, or\ncalculation, but are the subjects of philosophical speculation. Atheism,\nmaterialism, the denial of the soul\u2019s immortality or of eternal\ndestination, all these are philosophical matters, and a natural science\ntheory of the world is a misconception about as absurd as a Swiss England\nor a Bavarian Spain.\n\nAs it is impossible to review here all scientists of the past centuries,\nto probe their bent of mind, we shall restrict ourselves in the following\nto scientists of the first rank, for to them the assertion above mentioned\nmust chiefly refer. First of all, they were possessed of that spirit of\nscientific research claimed to be incompatible with the faith; and they,\nmore than others, should have been conscious of this contradiction. It is\nplain that if they did not know anything of the claimed antagonism between\nthe theories of evolution and of creation, between physical facts and\nspirituality of soul, between natural law and miracles; if it be shown\nthat many of them were actually orthodox Christians, believing in the\nsupernatural and yet enthusiastic friends of science, fathoming the laws\nof nature and yet unshaken in their faith, then the fact that inferior\nminds talk of a contradiction unknown to these great ones can no longer\nmake much of an impression.\n\nTherefore let us look over the long list of great scholars of the last\ncenturies, those great men to whom we owe knowledge and discoveries that\nare our joy to this very day. Among them we shall find many who, in their\nlife and thought, have plainly confessed themselves faithful Christians;\nwe shall find that others were at least the opponents of atheism and\nmaterialism, that they clung to the fundamental truths of the Christian\nfaith, and that is a matter of moment when the antagonism between natural\nscience and faith is under discussion.\n\nWe shall not go back to the ancient representatives of natural science,\nmen like _Pythagoras_, _Aristotle_, _Archimedes_, _Albert the Great_,\n_Roger Bacon_, and others of past ages, partly because there is no doubt\nabout the religious views of those men, partly because research at their\ntime was imperfect. We begin at the rise of modern natural science.\n\n\n\nThe Old Masters.\n\n\nAt the threshold of modern natural science there stands the man who solved\nthe riddle that had puzzled centuries before him, the father of modern\nastronomy, _Nikolaus Copernicus_. He had studied at the universities of\nCracow, Bologna, Ferrara, and Padua, and while he was one of the foremost\nhistorians of his time, it was astronomy that had engaged his enthusiastic\ndevotion from his youth. He was a Catholic priest, a Canon of Frauenberg.\n\u201cIf recent representatives of the Roman Church,\u201d so writes the Protestant\ntheologian, _O. Zoeckler_, \u201cpraise this Frauenberg Canon as a faithful son\nof their Church, this fact must be granted by Protestants, despite the\nfrankness with which he opposed the Aristotelian and Ptolemaic theories\ntaught by the scholastics, and despite his friendship with the Protestant\n_Rheticus_\u201d (Gottes Zeugen im Reiche der Natur, 1906, p. 82). _George\nJoachim_, a native of Feldkirch, surnamed _Rheticus_, and a Protestant\nprofessor at Wittenberg, came to _Copernicus_ at Frauenberg, and was\ncordially received. His praise for \u201chis teacher\u201d is unreserved. He speaks\nin the same admiring terms of _Tiedemann Giese_, in those days Bishop of\nKulm.\n\nFor nearly forty years _Copernicus_ sat in the modest observatory which he\nhad erected at Frauenberg, studying and collecting the material for his\nbook. Even after all this time this deliberate scholar, despite the urging\nof his friends, especially Bishop _Tiedemann Giese_ and Cardinal\n_Schoenberg_, Archbishop of Capua, hesitated for ten years longer before\npublishing his discoveries. The work was entitled _De revolutionibus\norbium caelestium, libri VI_, and was dedicated to Pope _Paul III._ The\nauthor himself could enjoy his achievement but very little. The first copy\nsent by the printer reached _Copernicus_ on his deathbed, and a few hours\nlater he breathed his last, on May 24, 1543.\n\nIn the introduction to his work this devout Christian scientist wrote:\n\u201cWho would not be urged by the intimate intercourse with the work of His\nhands to the contemplation of the Most High, and to the admiration for the\nOmnipotent Architect of the universe, in whom is the highest happiness,\nand in whom is the perfection of all that is good?\u201d\n\nWithout _Copernicus_ there could have been no _Kepler_, without _Kepler_\nno _Newton_. These three men, in the words of a recent astronomer, belong\ninseparably together, they support and supplement one another. It might be\nfittingly asked, after which of these three the celestial system should be\nnamed; and were it possible to ask these three men for their opinion in\nthis matter, they would probably all give the answer that has been\nascribed to one or the other of them: Not my system, but God\u2019s Order. Like\n_Copernicus_, so _Kepler_ and _Newton_ were profoundly religious men.\n\n_Johann Kepler_, born of Protestant parents in W\u00fcrttemberg in 1571, was\nraised a Lutheran. In 1594 he was appointed professor of mathematics at a\nschool in Graz, and after that he dwelt for the most time in Austria,\nwhich country became his second home. From Graz he was called to Prague to\nbe mathematician at the imperial court, and from there to Linz to be\nprofessor at the college there. His last years were passed at Sagan and\nRatisbon, where he died in 1630. Even after having left Austria he\ngratefully remembered the _clementia austriaca_ and the _favor\narchiducalis_. _Kepler\u2019s_ astronomical achievements are known to\neverybody, especially his laws of the planets. With an untiring spirit of\nresearch he combined beautiful traits of character, cheerfulness,\nkindness, and modesty, but chiefly a profoundly religious mind. However,\nhe was in difficult circumstances as far as his religious life was\nconcerned. Quite early he came in conflict with the religious authorities\nof his confession, particularly for the reason that they considered\n_Kepler\u2019s_ Copernican views as against the Bible, a fact which the learned\nastronomer could not see. There were also other differences. The conflict\nbecame more and more aggravated. It cannot be denied that the Lutheran\nChurch-authorities proceeded against _Kepler_ with a lack of consideration\nnever shown by Rome against men like _Galileo_. _Kepler_ was expelled from\nthe Lutheran Church, and despite his efforts to be reinstated the ban was\nnever lifted.\n\n\n    Like _Kepler_, so was his predecessor at the Catholic court of\n    Prague, the Danish astronomer _Tycho Brahe_ (died 1601), a devout\n    Protestant, but the trials of _Kepler_ were spared him. His\n    erroneous idea that the Copernican system conflicted with Holy\n    Writ kept him from subscribing to it: it led him to devise a\n    system midway between _Copernicus_ and _Ptolemy_. His religious\n    sentiment is evidenced by a passage from a letter of his, written\n    at his father\u2019s death, \u201cAlthough there are many consolations for\n    me, of a religious nature based on Holy Writ, and of a\n    philosophical kind drawn from the contemplation of the fate of all\n    men and of the inconstancy of everything under the moon, it is a\n    special comfort for me that my father departed so sweetly and\n    piously from this valley of misery to the heavenly eternal home,\n    where, according to _St. Paul_, we shall find a lasting abode.\u201d\n\n\nBut let us return to _Kepler_. There is evidence that at various times in\nhis life he wavered between his Lutheran confession and the Catholic\nfaith, but that is as far as he went. He was of the opinion that the\nfundamental truths of both were in accord, and he would not presume to\njudge of the differences; he had taken a view-point of his own, from which\nhe could not be made to recede. On the other hand, he was shocked when his\nfellow-Lutherans in Styria were on two occasions severely dealt with,\nalthough he personally had been treated with especial consideration.\nOtherwise his opinions on Catholic matters and the \u201cwisdom\u201d of the\nCatholic Church were eminently fair; he censured his co-religionists for\ntheir invidious attacks on Rome, and for their hesitancy in adopting the\nGregorian reform of the calendar. He had friendly relation with many a\nCatholic scientist, was in correspondence with many Jesuits, was even\nfrequently their guest, receiving stimulus, commendation, and scientific\ncommunications from them.\n\nTo _Kepler_ the study of astronomy became largely a prayer; the finest of\nhis scientific works he was wont to conclude with the doxology of the\nPsalmist, \u201cGreat is our Lord, and great is His power, and of His wisdom\nthere is no number: praise Him ye Heavens; praise ye Him, O Sun, and Moon,\nye Stars and light, and praise Him in your language. Thou, too, praise\nHim, O soul of mine, thy Lord, thy Creator, as long as it is granted to\nthee\u201d (_Harmonices Mundi_, v. 9). His name and work is commemorated in the\nKeplerbund in Germany, which aims at the promotion of scientific knowledge\nin the sense of _Kepler_, in opposition to the misuse of natural science\nfor purposes of materialism and atheism.\n\nThe work, begun so happily by _Copernicus_ and _Kepler_, was completed by\nthe great Englishman, _Newton_ (died 1727). It was he who in his immortal\nwork, _Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica_, laid bare the law of\nthe universe, which compels the heavenly bodies to revolve about one\nanother. Therewith the laws of _Kepler_, and consequently the Copernican\nhypothesis, became established. When, in 1727, this scientist, at the age\nof eighty-five, died, his mortal remains were entombed in Westminster\nAbbey, the Pantheon of the British nation. Lofty science and the reverent\nworship of his Creator were combined in the noble mind of this great\nBriton. In an appendix to his master-work, referred to above, he cited his\nproofs for the existence of God, and stated that \u201cthe entire order, as to\nspace and time of all things existing, must have necessarily proceeded\nfrom the conception and will of an existing Being,\u201d that \u201cthe admirable\narrangement of sun, planets, and comets could only emanate from the decree\nand the design of an All-wise and Omnipotent Being,\u201d that \u201cwe admire Him\nfor His perfections, we adore and worship Him as the ruler of the world,\nwe, the servants of the great Sovereign of the Universe.\u201d According to\n_Voltaire_, it was stated by _Newton\u2019s_ disciple, _Clarke_, that his\nmaster invariably pronounced the name of God with reverent attitude and\nexpression.\n\n\n    Inseparably connected with the history of the Copernican system\n    there is the name, which recalls harsh accusations and painful\n    memories, the name of _Galileo_. That he had nothing in common\n    with the aims of those who have broken with faith and\n    Christianity, nor with that hostility against his Church for which\n    his name is so often misused, has been made evident by what we\n    have said on another page (see page 189). Not only during his\n    early life was his religious turn of mind evidenced, but also\n    later on and up to the end of his life he continued to observe\n    faithfully the duties of his religion.\n\n\nOne of the greatest physicists of recent times was _Christian Huygens_,\nwho died in 1695 at his native city, The Hague. To him we owe the\nepoch-making discovery of the undulation of light, while _Newton_ had held\nlight to be a matter of emission. But while _Huygens_ advanced over\n_Newton_ in this respect, he paid tribute to human limitation by remaining\nprejudiced against _Newton\u2019s_ theory of gravitation, which he rejected.\n_Huygens_ was a believing Christian.\n\n\n    In his philosophic dissertation \u201cKosmotheoros,\u201d a posthumous work,\n    he says in regard to the possibility of the celestial bodies being\n    inhabited: \u201cHow could the investigator look up to God, the Creator\n    of all these great worlds, otherwise but in the spirit of deepest\n    reverence? Here it will be possible for us to find manifold proofs\n    to demonstrate His providence and wonderful wisdom; likewise will\n    our contemplation contend against those who are spreading false\n    opinions, such as attributing the origin of the earth to the\n    accidental union of atoms, or of the earth being without a\n    beginning and without a creator.\u201d\n\n\nReligious fervour is still more pronounced in _Huygens\u2019_ contemporary,\n_Robert Boyle_ (died 1692), a son of Ireland. While he had made\nconsiderable achievements in physics, his chief fame lies in chemistry: he\ninaugurated the period in which chemistry became gradually an independent\nscience. Although working in a different field of research, he is similar\nto _Newton_ in many respects: like _Newton_ and _Huygens_, his love of\nscientific studies induced him to remain unmarried, like _Newton_ he found\nhis last resting place in Westminster Abbey, but chiefly he is like\n_Newton_ because of his pious, religious mind. He was much occupied with\ntheological studies, and in them the demonstration from nature of the\nexistence of God, and the author\u2019s reverence for the Scriptures are most\nconspicuous: \u201cIn relation to the Bible,\u201d he writes, \u201call the books of men,\neven the most learned, are like the planets that receive their light and\nbrightness from the sun.\u201d On his deathbed he made a foundation for\napologetic lectures: the Boyle-lectures are held to this very day.\n\n\n    We shall have to pass by others. We might point to the English\n    philosopher and statesman, _Francis Bacon_ of Verulam (died 1626),\n    who won his place in the history of natural science by his urging\n    of the empiric method; we might point to _W. Harvey_ (died 1658),\n    the discoverer of the blood-circulation, a man of earnest and\n    simple piety; we might mention the pious _Albrecht von Haller_\n    (died 1777), _J. Bernouilli_ (died 1728) the co-inventor of\n    integral calculus, the man of whom his great disciple _Euler_\n    relates that this _Bernouilli_, co-inventor of the most difficult\n    of all calculations, this great mathematician, expressed regret in\n    his old age that he had devoted so many years to science, and only\n    few hours to religion, and that on his deathbed he admonished\n    those around him to adhere to the Word of God because that alone\n    is the word of life.\n\n\nWe shall name but one more, a son of northern Sweden, the famous botanist,\n_Karl Linn\u00e9_ (died 1778). He, too, found God in the living nature which he\nstudied so diligently.\n\n\n    In commenting on his _Systema naturae_ he writes: \u201cMan, know\n    thyself; in theological aspect, that thou art created with an\n    immortal soul, after the image of God; in moral aspect, that thou\n    alone art blessed with a rational soul for the praise of thy\n    sublime Creator. I ask, why did God put man equipped thus in sense\n    and spirit on this earth, where he perceives this wonderfully\n    ordered nature? For what, but to praise and admire the invisible\n    Master-builder for His magnificent work.\u201d\n\n\nThese are the great masters and reformers of recent natural science, the\nmen who opened up the paths which natural science of the present day is\nstill pursuing; most of these savants were of a Christian mind, many of\nthem even pious. There were but few indifferent or irreligious, such as\n_E. Halley_ (died 1742), who computed the cycle of the comet since named\nafter him, and _G. de Buffon_ (died 1788): but they are a small minority.\nThe period of highest achievement in modern natural science bears the\nstamp of religion; indeed, to a great extent it bears the halo of devotion\nand fervour. An incompatibility of research and faith, a solidarity of\nscience and anti-Christian tendency, was never known to the mind of these\ngreat masters.\n\n\u201cAny one who has grasped even the elements of natural science, the unity\nof natural forces and their rigid conformity to laws, becomes a monist if\nhe has the faculty for clear reasoning, and as to the others, there is no\nhelp for them anyway\u201d (_L. Plate_, Ultramontane Weltanschauung und moderne\nLebenskunde, 1907, 11). This sort of argument is shouted at us in manifold\nvariations. How does that statement look in the light of history? Men like\n_Copernicus_, _Kepler_, _Newton_, _Linn\u00e9_, _Boyle_, thus knew nothing of\nthe elements of natural science, nothing of the conformity to laws of\nnatural forces: because they were neither monists nor atheists, but\nworshippers of the Creator of heaven and earth! A more painful contrast\ncannot be imagined than to see these great masters and pioneers rated as\nlesser minds, ignorant of real natural science, by those who trail far\nbehind them and who are seeking their footsteps. The religious conviction\nof the natural scientists of a past age is sufficient proof that, not the\nresearch in natural science, but other causes lead minds to infidelity.\n\n\n\nModern Times.\n\n\nWe turn to the nineteenth century. Does the picture perhaps change\nessentially in the century that has shown its children so much progress,\nthat has disclosed so many secrets of nature, but has also taught\nirreligion to thousands of men? Does it become true now that natural\nscience and Christian fundamental truths are opposed to each other in\nhostile attitude? Claims to this effect are not lacking. In fact, the\nnumber of those who refuse assent to the Christian religion is increasing.\nBut even at this time we do not find such to be the majority of eminent\nscientists, and our inquiry is about eminent scientists, those who make\nthe science of a period, not those who can hardly expect to have their\nnames known by posterity. A considerable number, indeed the majority, of\nthe master minds of natural science, even in the nineteenth century,\nreject materialism and atheism, and not infrequently they are pious\nChristians; another proof that just upon the deeper and more serious minds\nreligion exercises a stronger power of attraction.\n\nLet us commence with the astronomers.\n\n\u201cThe sciences and their true representatives,\u201d so states the renowned\n_M\u00e4dler_ of Dorpat, \u201cdo not deserve the reproaches and imputations heaped\nupon them from a certain side, that they would estrange man from God, even\nturn him into an atheist ... we hope to show of astronomy especially that\njust the contrary is taking place\u201d (Reden und Abhandlungen \u00fcber\nGegenst\u00e4nde der Himmelskunde, 1870, 326).\n\nThe greatest astronomer of the nineteenth century, and one of the greatest\ndiscoverers of all ages, was undoubtedly _William Herschel_ (died 1822).\nHis son _John Herschel_ (died 1871) became his \u201cworthy successor, almost\nhis peer, who won a fame nearly equal to that of the inherited name\u201d (_R.\nWolf_, Geschichte der Astronomie, 1877, 505). While not hostile to\nreligion, the father had been so engrossed in his restless research, that\nreligion received little attention, but religious thought and sentiment\nplayed a prominent part in the son. Time and again he opposed with zeal\nthe materialistic-atheistic explanation of the universe. \u201cNothing is more\nunfounded than the objection made by some well-meaning but undiscerning\npersons, that the study of natural science induces a doubt of religion and\nof the immortality of the soul. Be assured that its logical effect upon\nany well-ordered mind must be just the opposite\u201d (Preliminary Discourse on\nthe Study of Natural Philosophy, 1830, 7).\n\nIt was _Leverrier_ (died 1877), Director of the Paris Observatory, who by\ncalculations ascertained the existence and exact position of the remotest\nplanet Neptune even before it was discovered. When eventually _Galle_ of\nBerlin really found the planet in the position indicated, _Leverrier\u2019s_\nname became famous. But greater still were the achievements of this\nindefatigable investigator in respect to the known planets. When he\npresented to the French Academy the final part of his great work, the\ncalculations of Jupiter and Saturnus, he said: \u201cDuring our long labours,\nwhich it took us thirty-five years to complete, we needed the support\nobtained by the contemplation of one of the grandest works of creation,\nand by the thought that it strengthened in us the imperishable truths of a\nspiritualistic (_i.e._, non-materialistic) philosophy.\u201d He was an orthodox\nCatholic, known as a Clerical. A newspaper complained of him that \u201cUnder\nthe empire he was a clerical Senator, concerned with the interests of the\naltar no less than with those of the throne\u201d (_Kneller_, Das Christenthum\nund die Vertreter der neueren Naturwissenschaft, 1904, 96. In the\nfollowing pages we have made frequent use of the material gathered in this\nsterling work. See also _James J. Walsh_, Makers of Modern Medicine\n(1907); and the same author\u2019s Catholic Churchmen in Science, I (1909), II\n(1910)).\n\nOne year after the death of _Leverrier_ another scientist of the first\nrank died. It was _A. Secchi_ (died 1878). Member of nearly all the\nscientific academies of the world, he was not only a faithful Christian,\nbut also a priest: for forty-five years, and until his death, he wore the\ngarb of the Society of Jesus. As an astronomer he has been named, not\nwithout good cause, the father of astrophysics: he ascertained the\nchemical composition of about 4,000 stars and classified them into what is\nknown as _Secchi\u2019s_ four types of stars. As a physicist he wrote an\nimportant work on The Unity of Natural Forces. He was also an eminent\nmeteorologist.\n\n\n    At the second International Exposition at Paris his meteorograph\n    was quite a feature. The _K\u00f6lnische Zeitung_ wrote, on March 2,\n    1878: \u201cVisitors of the Italian Exhibition, at the second World\u2019s\n    Fair in Paris, could see the marvellous instrument which does the\n    work of ten observers and surpasses them in accuracy. At the same\n    time they could obtain all needed information about details and\n    scope of the meteorograph from the exhibitor himself; for _Secchi_\n    was there daily, devoting several hours to answering questions in\n    any of the civilized languages of Europe. It is peculiarly\n    interesting to observe the silent movement of the hands working\n    day and night like registrars of the natural forces, and recording\n    for every quarter of an hour with the utmost accuracy all changes\n    in temperature, in humidity, every variance of the wind, any\n    movement of the mercury in the barometer. Even the force of the\n    wind and the time of rain is registered by this wonderful\n    instrument.\u201d The inventor, out of 40,000 art exhibitors, was\n    awarded the great golden medal. He also received the insignia of\n    an officer of the French Legion of Honor, while the Emperor of\n    Brazil appointed him an officer of the \u201cGolden Rose.\u201d\n\n    The French scientist _Moigno_ writes of _Secchi_: \u201c_Secchi_ was\n    very pious, and as a worker he knew no limits. He was ever ready\n    to evolve new scientific plans, to enter into new and long\n    campaigns of observation. The mere list of his 800 works reveals\n    him as one of the most intrepid workers of our century. And let\n    this be considered: every one of these writings, no matter how\n    brief, was the result of subtle and difficult researches and\n    observations. And after devoting the day to arduous writing, he\n    passed the night searching the skies\u201d (_Pohle_, P. Angelo Secchi,\n    1904, 191).\n\n    In the nineteenth century, too, astronomy has not failed in its\n    mission of leading to God. A long list could be named of believing\n    astronomers of great achievements. For instance, the Roman\n    astronomer _Respighi_ (died 1889), a resolute Catholic. And\n    _Lamont_, Director of the Observatory of Munich, whose Catholic\n    orthodoxy was generally known. _Heis_ (died 1877) likewise was a\n    zealous Catholic: when he had finished his map of the sky, after\n    27 years of hard work, he sent one of the first copies to _Pius\n    IX._ The astronomers _Bessel_ and _Olbers_ speak in their letters\n    of God, of the hereafter and Providence, in a way that has nothing\n    in common with materialism.\n\n    _Secchi_ was not the only priest and monk among the astronomers of\n    the nineteenth century. The very first day of the century was made\n    notable by the astronomical achievement of a monk. _Joseph\n    Piazzi_, a member of the Theatine order (died 1826), discovered on\n    that day the first asteroid, Ceres. The great mathematician\n    _Gauss_ named his first born son Joseph, in _Piazzi\u2019s_ honor.\n\n    It is, indeed, a remarkable fact, testifying strongly against the\n    incompatibility of natural science and faith, that just the\n    Catholic clergy, the prominent representatives of religion and\n    faith, have contributed a large contingent to the number of\n    natural scientists. _Poggendorf\u2019s_ Biographical Dictionary of the\n    Exact Sciences contains, down to 1863, according to preface and\n    recapitulation, the names and biographical sketches of 8,847\n    natural scientists. Of these, 862 are Catholic priests, amounting\n    to 9.8 per cent. To appreciate these 10 per cent it must be taken\n    into account that most of them were not connected with natural\n    science by their position, but only through their personal\n    interest, and most of them were engaged in other duties.\n\n\nMathematics, although not natural science proper, is inseparably connected\nwith it. For this reason we may extend our consideration to\nmathematicians. We only point to the three greatest, _Euler_, _Gauss_, and\n_Cauchy_, and all three were religious men. _Euler_ (died 1783 at\nPetersburg) has no peer in the recent history of science in prolific\nactivity: ten times he was awarded the prize by the Paris Academy of\nSciences. _Cantor_ says of him: \u201cLike most great mathematicians, _Euler_\nwas profoundly religious, though without bigotry. He personally conducted\nevery evening the private devotions at his home, and one of the few\npolemical books he wrote was a defence of revelation against the\nobjections of free-thinkers.\u201d Its publication at Berlin in 1747, in close\nproximity of the court of _Frederick the Great_, presupposed a certain\nmoral courage. In this book he refers to the difficulties found in all\nsciences, even in geometry, adding: \u201cBy what right then can the\nfree-thinkers demand of us to reject at once Holy Writ in its entirety,\nbecause of some difficulties which frequently are not even so important as\nthose complained of in geometry?\u201d _Gauss_ (died 1855) is perhaps the\ngreatest mathematician of all times. It sounds incredible, yet it is well\nattested, that as a child of three years, when in the workshop of his\nfather, a plain mechanic, he was able to correct the father if he made a\nmistake in figuring out the wages paid to his journeymen. His biographer,\n_Waltershausen_, says of him: \u201cThe conviction of a personal existence\nafter death, the firm belief in an ultimate Ruler of things, in an\neternal, just, all-wise and all-powerful God, formed the foundation of his\nreligious life, which, with his unsurpassed scientific researches,\nresolved itself into a perfect harmony.\u201d _Cauchy_ (died 1857) was a man of\nmost extraordinary genius, whose creative genius knew how to discover new\npaths everywhere, and almost at every weekly meeting of the Paris Academy\n_Cauchy_ had something new to offer. In addition he was a dutiful\nCatholic, and a member of St. Vincent\u2019s Society. When, shortly before the\nFebruary revolution, an onslaught upon the Jesuit schools was made, he\ndefended them in two pamphlets.\n\n\n    One of them contains the following confession of faith: \u201cI am a\n    Christian, that is, I believe in the divinity of Jesus Christ,\n    with _Tycho __ Brahe_, _Copernicus_, _Descartes_, _Newton_,\n    _Fermat_, _Leibnitz_, _Pascal_, _Grimaldi_, _Euler_, _Guldin_,\n    _Boscovich_, _Gerdil_; with all great astronomers, all great\n    physicists, all great mathematicians of past centuries. I am also\n    a Catholic, with the majority of them, and if asked for my\n    reasons, I would enumerate them readily. By them it would be made\n    clear that my conviction is not the result of inherited\n    prejudices, but of profound inquiry. I am a sincere Catholic, as\n    _Corneille_, _Racine_, _La Bruy\u00e8re_, _Bossuet_, _Bourdaloue_,\n    _F\u00e9nelon_ were, and such as were and still are a large portion of\n    the most eminent men of our times, among them those who have\n    achieved most in the exact sciences, in philosophy and literature,\n    and who have most prominently adorned our Academy\u201d (_Valson_, Vie\n    de Cauchy, I, 173). When near death, and told that the priest\n    would bring the Holy Sacrament, he ordered the finest flowers of\n    his garden used in the reception of the Lord.\n\n\nWe now come to the physicists. To begin with the most prominent\nrepresentatives of the science of optics, which was developed especially\nduring the first half of the century, there are to be named chiefly\n_Fresnel_, _Frauenhofer_, _Fizeau_, _Foucault_. _A. Fresnel_ (died 1827),\nthe originator of the modern theory of light, clung to his conviction of\nthe spirituality and immortality of the soul. _Frauenhofer_ (died 1826)\nshowed himself to be a man of refinement and of kindness, which only\noccasionally was disturbed by natural irritability: he was much devoted to\nhis religion, so that even his guests while at his house had to observe\nthe abstinence prescribed by the Church; this was quite significant,\nconsidering the indifference of his times in this respect. _Fizeau_ (died\n1896), too, was a staunch Catholic, who fearlessly testified to his\nbelief, even before the Paris Academy. Though his work was of the first\nrank, France\u2019s chief marks of honour passed him by, and little notice was\neven given to his death. A significant fact. \u201cThese circumstances,\u201d so\nwrites _Kneller_, \u201cinduced us to inquire for particulars; and through the\nservices of friends we obtained information in Paris from most reliable\nsource that _Fizeau_ was a faithful Christian, who fulfilled his religious\nduties. For this very reason his name had been stricken, at the Centenary\nof the Academy, from the list of candidates for the cross of the legion of\nhonor, notwithstanding the fact that, on the strength of his scientific\nachievement, he should long have been Commander and even Grand Officer of\nthis order.\u201d _Cornu_ was the only one to protest against this slight.\n_Foucault_ (died 1868) had, in the time of his restless scientific work,\ntaken an unsympathetic attitude towards the Catholic religion. In his last\nillness he returned, step by step, to his Creator and Redeemer, in whom he\nfound his comfort, and he breathed his last in peace with God and the\nChurch.\n\n_Foucault\u2019s_ great countryman, _Amp\u00e8re_ (died 1836), the celebrated\ninvestigator in the fields of electricity, was also estranged from the\nChristian religion, but, after passing through torturing doubts, he\nregained undisturbed possession of his Catholic faith, and was a pious\nChristian at the time of his brilliant discoveries. He had frequent\nintercourse with _A. F. Ozanam_, and the discussion almost without\nexception turned to God. Then _Amp\u00e8re_ would cover his forehead with his\nhands, exclaiming: \u201cHow great God is! Ozanam! how great God is, and our\nknowledge is as nothing.\u201d \u201cThis venerable head,\u201d _Ozanam_ relates of his\nfriend, \u201ccovered with honours and full of knowledge, bowed down before the\nmysteries of the faith; he knelt at the same altars where before him\n_Descartes_ and _Pascal_ worshipped humbly, beside the poor widow and the\nsmall child, who perhaps were less humble than he\u201d (_A. F. Ozanam_,\nOeuvres Compl\u00e8tes, X, 37, and VIII, 89). As he was dying, and _M.\nDeschamps_, director of the college of Marseille, began to read aloud some\npassages from the \u201cImitation of Christ,\u201d the dying man remarked that he\nknew the book by heart.\n\nAnother great discoverer in the domain of electricity, who had preceded\n_Amp\u00e8re_, was _Volta_ (died 1827). Like his great fellow countryman,\n_Galvani_ (died 1798), who did not disdain to be a member of the third\norder of St. Francis, _Volta_ was a staunch Catholic; every day he recited\nthe rosary.\n\nAt Como, his home, he was daily seen to go to holy Mass and, on holidays,\nto the Sacraments. Those who passed his house on Saturdays saw a small\nlamp burning before the picture of the Blessed Virgin Mary over his door.\nIf the servant forgot to light the lamp, _Volta_ did it himself. On Feast\ndays, when visiting the parish church, the great electrician could be seen\namong the children, explaining the catechism to them.\n\n\n    A friend of _Volta_, the Canon _Giacomo Ciceri_, once was\n    endeavoring to convert a dying man, who, however, refused to hear\n    him, on the ground that whereas religion might be good for the\n    common people, scientists did not need it, and he reckoned himself\n    among them. _Ciceri_ thereupon reminded him of _Volta_. This made\n    an impression upon the dying man, who declared that if _Volta_ be\n    seriously religious, and not only as a matter of convention, he\n    would consent to receive the Sacraments. The Canon then requested\n    _Volta_ to write a few lines. _Volta_ replied as follows: \u201cI do\n    not understand how anybody can doubt my sincerity and constancy in\n    the religion which I profess, and which is that of Catholic,\n    Apostolic, Roman Church, wherein I was born and raised, and which\n    I have professed all my life, inwardly and outwardly.... Should\n    any misdemeanor on my part have prompted any one to suspect me of\n    unbelief, then I will declare, for the purpose of making\n    reparation ... that I always have believed this Holy Catholic\n    religion to be the only true and infallible one, and that I still\n    think so, and I thank our dear Lord incessantly for having given\n    me this belief, in which to live and to die is my resolution, in\n    the firm hope of gaining the eternal life. It is true, I\n    acknowledge this belief to be a gift of God, a supernatural\n    belief; yet, I have not neglected human means to fortify myself in\n    this belief, and to drive away all doubts that may arise to tempt\n    me. For this reason, I have studied the faith diligently in its\n    foundations, by reading apologetic and controversial writings,\n    weighing the reasons for and against; a way, which supplies the\n    strongest proof, and makes it most credible for the human reason\n    to such a degree, that any noble mind, not perverted by sins and\n    passions, cannot help embracing and loving it. I wish this\n    profession, for which I was asked and which I willingly make,\n    written and signed by my own hand, to be shown at will to any one,\n    because I am not ashamed of the Gospel. May my writing bear good\n    fruit.\n\n    _Alexander Volta._\n\n    MILAN, January 6th, 1815.\n    (_C. Grandi_, Alessandro Volta, 1899, 575.)\u201d\n\n\nHe who, for the first time, is made aware of the religious confession of\nthe greatest natural scientists may perhaps be astonished. Hitherto, he\nhad heard little of the Christian mind of these men, but a great deal\nabout their alleged indifference for religion, and about their materialism\nand atheism. Now, suddenly, he sees a large number of them to be the\nenemies of atheism, many, indeed, to be zealous Christians.\n\nThis is due to the biographers: they dwell largely on the scientific\nachievement of a man, likewise on his human qualities, but his religion is\noften not mentioned at all. When, in 1888, a monument was erected to\n_Amp\u00e8re_ in his native city, Lyons, not a word in the speeches referred to\nthe fact that he was a faithful Catholic. Nay, more; on one of the books\nseen on his monument is chiselled in bold letters the word \u201cEncyclop\u00e9die.\u201d\nThose unaware of the facts would infer that _Amp\u00e8re_ had been one of the\nEncyclop\u00e6dists. His actual relation to this infamous work was that he had\nread it in his youth, but abhorred it in his later age.\n\nThe English physicist, _Faraday_ (died 1867), according to _Tyndall_ and\n_Du Bois-Reymond_ the greatest experimentist of all times, was, like\n_Volta_ and _Amp\u00e8re_, of religious mind.\n\n\n    In a letter to a lady he wrote: \u201cI belong to a small and despised\n    Christian sect, known by the name of Sandemanians. Our hope is\n    based upon the belief which is in Christ.\u201d In 1847, he concluded\n    his lectures at the Royal Institution with the following words:\n    \u201cIn teaching us those things, our science should prompt us to\n    think of Him whose works they are.\u201d At a later lecture, he\n    declared: \u201cI have never encountered anything to cause a\n    contradiction between things within the scope of man, and the\n    higher things, relating to his future and unconceivable to\n    (unaided) human mind\u201d (_Jones_, The Life and Letters of Faraday).\n\n\nOf the same bent of mind was _Faraday\u2019s_ fellow countryman, _Maxwell_\n(died 1879), known to every one who has studied the development of the\ntheories of electricity. This ingenious theoretician of electrics,\nprofessor of experimental physics at Cambridge, was deeply religious.\nEvery evening he led in the family prayer; he regularly attended divine\nservice, and partook of the monthly communion of his denomination. Those\nmore intimately acquainted with _Maxwell_ agree, that he was one of the\nworthiest men they ever met.\n\n\n    Nothing could better illustrate his religious sentiment than the\n    splendid prayer found among his posthumous papers: \u201cAlmighty God,\n    Thou who hast created man after Thy image and hast given him a\n    living soul, that he should search Thee and rule over Thy\n    creatures, teach us to study the works by Thy hands that we may\n    subject the earth for our use, and strengthen our reason for Thy\n    service, and let us receive Thy holy word thus, that we may\n    believe in Him whom Thou hast sent us to give us the knowledge of\n    salvation and the forgiving of our sins, all of which we pray for\n    in the name of the same Jesus Christ, our Lord\u201d\n    (_Campbell-Garnett_, The Life of J. C. Maxwell).\n\n\n_Maxwell\u2019s_ devout mind is especially significant here, because, like\n_Amp\u00e8re_ and _Volta_, he occupied himself much with philosophical and\ntheological questions. Every Sunday upon return from church he is said to\nhave buried himself in his theological books.\n\nMany others might be mentioned of English physicists of the past century,\nwho combined religious belief with great knowledge. The peculiar trait of\nthe English character to respect and preserve with piety the inherited\ninstitutions of the past, as against radicalism and the craze for\ninnovation, manifests itself also in the absence of the immature and\nfrivolous juggling with the great truths of the Christian past, not\ninfrequently met with elsewhere. Let us mention but one more of England\u2019s\ngreat men who have died in recent years. In December, 1907, the papers\nreported the death of _William Thomson_, latterly better known as _Lord\nKelvin_. He lived to the age of 83 years, up to his death incessantly busy\nwith scientific work. As early as 1855, _Helmholtz_ described him as \u201cone\nof the foremost mathematical physicists of Europe.(7)\u201d The Berlin Academy\nof Science expressed high praise and admiration in its address\nfelicitating _Thomson_ on his Golden Jubilee. Undoubtedly, he merited this\nadmiration also by stoutly defending from the viewpoint of science the\nnecessity of a Divine Creator.\n\n\n    \u201cWe do not know,\u201d he wrote, \u201cat what moment a creation of matter\n    or of energy fixed a beginning beyond which no speculation based\n    on mechanical laws is able to lead us. In exact mechanics, if we\n    were ever inclined to forget this barrier, we necessarily would be\n    reminded of it by the consideration that reasoning, resting\n    exclusively upon the law of mechanics, points to a time when the\n    earth must have been uninhabited, and it also teaches us that our\n    own bodies, like those of all living plants and animals, and\n    fossils, are organized forms of matter for which science can give\n    no other explanation than the will of a Creator, a truth, in\n    support of which geological history offers rich evidence\u201d (On\n    Mechanical Antecedent of Motion, Heat and Light, 1884). \u201cThe only\n    contribution of dynamics to theoretical biology consists in the\n    absolute negation of an automatic beginning and automatic\n    continuance of life\u201d (Addresses and Speeches).\n\n    On May 1, 1902, the Rev. Prof. _G. Henslow_, according to the\n    _London Times_, spoke at University College, before a big audience\n    with the President of the University as chairman, on the subject\n    \u201cThe Rationalism of To-day, an Examination of Darwinism.\u201d On\n    conclusion of the speech the venerable octogenarian, _Lord\n    Kelvin_, arose and proposed a resolution of thanks to the speaker.\n    While fully subscribing to the fundamental ideas of Prof.\n    _Henslow\u2019s_ lecture, _Lord Kelvin_ said, he could not assent to\n    the proposition that natural science neither affirms nor denies\n    the origin of life by a creative force. He stated that natural\n    science _does_, positively, assert a creative force. Science\n    forces every one to recognize a miracle within himself. That we\n    are living, and moving, and existing, is not due to dead matter,\n    but to a creating and directing force, and science forces us to\n    accept this assumption as a tenet of faith. _Lord Kelvin_\n    subsequently amplified these remarks in an article that appeared\n    in the _Nineteenth Century_, of June, 1903. It concludes with the\n    admonition, not to be afraid to think independently. \u201cIf you\n    reason sharply, you will be forced by science to believe in God,\n    who is the basis of all religion. You will find science to be, not\n    an opponent of religion, but a support\u201d (_Times_, May 8 and 15,\n    1903).\n\n\nSuch were the views of those to whom, in the first place, the\nestablishment of natural science and its progress are due. It is not\nscience and strong reasoning that lead away from God, but the lack of true\nscience. _Bacon_ said: _Leviores gustus in philosophia movere fortasse\nanimum ad atheismum, sed pleniores haustus ad Deum reducere_. Another\nthing must be observed. Among those earnest men, earnest in the\ninvestigation of nature, and earnest in the consideration of questions of\na supernatural life, there are many who made the religious question the\nsubject of mature study, and who were well acquainted with the objections\nagainst religion and Christianity. But they cling to their religious\npersuasion only the more firmly. We may be reminded of men like _Volta_,\n_Cauchy_, _Amp\u00e8re_, and _Maxwell_.\n\nTo speak of authorities, what comparison is there between these great\nscientists and discoverers, and those who are satisfied with the general\nassurance that \u201cany one who has grasped the elements of natural sciences\nmust become a monist,\u201d and \u201cthat the supernatural exists only in the brain\nof the visionary and ignorant,\u201d that, \u201cin the same measure in which the\nvictorious progress of modern knowledge of nature surpasses the scientific\nachievements of former centuries, the untenableness of all mystical views\nof life that tend to harness the reason in the yoke of so-called\nrevelation has been made clear\u201d (_Haeckel_), and who in such assurance\nfind perfect intellectual gratification. They recall an incident at the\nCongress of English natural scientists, held at Belfast in 1874, when\n_Tyndall_ delivered from the platform a materialistic lecture, and among\nthe audience sat _Maxwell_, his superior in scientific research, who put\ndown the lecture in doggerel rhyme, in a humorous vein, of course, but not\nwithout deserved sarcasm.\n\nWe proceed on our way, trying to make haste, and omitting many names that\nmight be mentioned, limiting ourselves to the most prominent ones.\n\nAmong the chemists we name _Lavoisier_. A martyr to his science, he died\nunder the guillotine of the Revolution in 1794; he had remained true to\nhis Christian faith. The Swede, _J. Berzelius_ (died 1848), openly\nprofessed his belief in God. _Th\u00e9nard_ (died 1859), the discoverer of\nboron, of a blue dye named after him, and of many other chemicals, was a\nstaunch Catholic. The pastor of St. Sulpice could testify at his funeral\nas follows: \u201cHe attended church every Sunday, eyes and heart fixed on his\nprayer-book, and on solemn Feast days he received Holy Communion.... With\n_Baron Th\u00e9nard_ one of the greatest benefactors of my poor people is gone\u201d\n(_Kneller_).\n\n_Dumas_ (died 1884), who is esteemed by his pupil _Pasteur_ as the peer of\n_Lavoisier_, was also a practical Catholic, as was his compatriot\n_Chevreul_ (died 1889). This great man had the rare good fortune to be\npresent at his own centenary in 1886. At this great celebration he\nreceived an address by the Berlin Academy, stating that his name had a\nprominent place on the list of the great scientists who had carried the\nscientific repute of France to all quarters of the globe. When, in view of\nthe mundane character of the celebration, the liberal press endeavoured to\nrank him among the representatives of unbelieving science, and this\nquestion being discussed in public, _Chevreul_ felt himself constrained to\nproclaim his religious persuasion openly in a letter to _Count de\nMontravel_, in which he said: \u201cI am simply a scientist, but those who know\nme, know also that I was born a Catholic, that I lead a Catholic life, and\nthat I want to die a Catholic\u201d (Civilta Cattolica, 1891, 292).\n\nTwo Germans may conclude the list of chemists, _Schoenbein_ (died 1868)\nand _J. Liebig_ (died 1873).\n\n\n    In his diary, \u201cMenschen und Dinge,\u201d 1885 (page 29), _Schoenbein_\n    writes: \u201cThere are still people who fancy in their limited mind\n    that, the deeper the human intellect penetrates the secrets of\n    nature, the more extensive its knowledge, the wider its conception\n    of the exterior world, the more it must forget the cause of all\n    things. Many have gone even so far as to assert that natural\n    science must lead to the denial of God. This view is without all\n    foundation. He, who contemplates with open eyes, daily and hourly,\n    the doings and workings of nature, will not only believe, but will\n    actually perceive, and be firmly convinced, that there is not the\n    smallest place in space where the divine does not reveal itself in\n    the most magnificent and admirable way.\u201d And in a similar strain\n    _Liebig_ writes: \u201cIndeed, the greatness and infinite wisdom of the\n    Creator of the world can be realized only by him who endeavours to\n    understand His ideas as laid down in that immense book,\u2014nature, in\n    comparison to which everything that men otherwise know and tell of\n    Him, appears like empty talk\u201d (Die Chemie in ihrer Anwendung).\n\n\nNow let us turn to the geographers. We merely mention _Ritter_ (died\n1859), the man who raised geography to the dignity of a science; he was a\nfaithful Protestant, while biassed against the Catholic Church. In spite\nof this, a Catholic historian, _J. Janssen_, has sketched his life, in\nwhich we read: \u201cFirm in his belief in the living God, and in the Incarnate\nSon of God, His Redeemer, he furnishes a clear and convincing proof that\nthis faith, far from being a contradiction to natural science ... alone\nenables man to acquire an extensive and deep knowledge of nature.\u201d We give\nonly passing notice to the founder of scientific crystallography, _R.\nHauy_ (died 1822), who was a dutiful Catholic priest. The geologists now\nwill get a hearing.\n\n\n    Among them we meet, in the first place, the noted geologist and\n    zo\u00f6logist, _Cuvier_ (died 1832), a faithful Protestant: also the\n    foremost French geologist of his time, _L. De Beaumont_ (died\n    1874), \u201ca Christian in all things and a steadfast Christian ...\n    which he remained through his whole life;\u201d so _Dumas_ testifies of\n    him in his obituary (Comptes Rendus, 1874). Then there is _J.\n    Barrande_, the untiring explorer of the antediluvian strata of\n    Bohemia. He came in 1830 to Bohemia with the banished royal\n    family, as _Chambord\u2019s_ teacher, and died 1883 at Frohsdorf near\n    Vienna. He was a pious Catholic. The volumes of his works are\n    nearly all dated on Catholic feasts. The recently deceased French\n    geologist, _A. De Lapparent_, was a practical Catholic, and such\n    were the two Belgian geologists, _J. d\u2019Omalius_ (died 1875), and\n    _A. Dumont_ (died 1857), to both of whom Belgium owes its\n    geological exploration. The English geologists, _Buckland_ (died\n    1856), _Hitchcock_ (died 1864), and _A. Sedgwick_ (died 1872),\n    were ministers of the English Church. _J. Dwight Dana_ (died\n    1895), the foremost geologist of North America, begins his\n    celebrated text-book of geology with a homage to his Creator, and\n    concludes it by paying tribute to Holy Writ. _W. Dawson_ (died\n    1899) the worthy geological explorer of his native land, Canada,\n    published several apologetic dissertations on the Bible and\n    Nature. A kindred sentiment animated the German scientists,\n    _Bischof_ (died 1870), _Quenstedt_ (died 1898), the geologist of\n    Suabia _Pfaff_ (died 1886), _Schafh\u00e6utl_ (died 1890), and the\n    equally pious as learned Swiss geologist _O. Heer_ (died 1883).\n    They all have much to say about the greatness of their Creator,\n    but not a word of any insolvable contradictions between the Bible\n    and geologic research.\n\n\nAs a last division of an imposing phalanx, there are now the biologists\nand physiologists. Modern biology, as the science of life, has in the eyes\nof many accomplished the bold deed of demonstrating the superfluity of a\nsoul distinct from matter. Claim is made that it has sufficiently\nexplained the sensitive and mental life by the sole agency of physical and\nchemical forces, and thus to have removed the boundary between live and\ndead matter. It is said, further, that biology in conjunction with zo\u00f6logy\nand botany has furnished proof that the wonderful organic forms of life\nmay be explained by purely natural causes, without having to assume as an\nultimate cause the act of a higher intelligence; that a never ceasing\nevolution is the sole ultimate cause,\u2014creation is made superfluous by\nevolution. Biology is thus claimed to have refuted the old dualism of soul\nand matter, of world and God, and to have awarded the palm to monism.\n\nAre the eminent representatives of this science really the materialists\nand monists they would have to be, if all this were true? The foremost\nphysiologist of the nineteenth century was _J. M\u00fcller_ (died 1858), buried\nin the Catholic cemetery at Berlin. He was a decided opponent of\nmaterialism; he not only contended for the existence of a spiritual soul,\nbut also for an immaterial vital force in plants. _Th. Schwann_ (died\n1882) is the founder of the cellular theory. In the year 1839 he accepted\na call to take the chair of anatomy at the Catholic University of Louvain.\nOne of the most prominent physiologists of the nineteenth century was _A.\nVolkmann_ (died 1877). He was a stout champion of the spirituality and\nimmortality of the soul, of purposive cause in animated beings, and an\nopponent of _Darwin\u2019s_ theory. _G. J. Mendel_ (died 1884) became by his\nwork on _Experimenting with Hybrid Plants_ the pioneer of the modern\ntheory of hereditary transmission, adopted by modern biology; and\nscientists like _H. de Vries_, _Correns_, _Tschermak_, and _Bateson_\nfollowed his lead. \u201cHis important laws of hereditary transmission are the\nbest so far offered by the research in this field\u201d (_Muckermann_,\nGrundriss der Biologie). He was a Catholic priest, and the abbot of the\nAugustinian Monastery at Old-Br\u00fcnn. _Karl von Vierordt_ (died 1884) is\nwell known by his \u201cManual of Physiology,\u201d still in demand as a reference\nbook in the libraries of universities. In 1865 he delivered a speech at\nthe T\u00fcbingen University on the unity of science, concluding with this\nappeal to the students: \u201cUntil your religious notions become clear by a\nmature insight, trust in the well-meant assurance that the belief in the\ndivinity of the religion of Jesus has not been put falsely into your\nheart. True piety is equally remote from narrow pietism as from\nfreethinking indifference; it leaves to reason its full rights, but it\nalso assures to us the faculty to be aware, in joyful confidence in\nAlmighty Providence, of an immaterial and for us eternal destiny.\u201d _Ch.\nEhrenberg_ (died 1876) is the explorer of the world of little things: of\ninfusoria and protozoa. He did not countenance _Haeckel\u2019s_ materialism nor\n_Darwin\u2019s_ denial of teleology: to him they were fantastic theories and\nromances. A friend of his, and of the same mind, was _K. von Martius_, who\nadmired God\u2019s wisdom in the wonders of the world of vegetation. Long\nbefore his death he ordered his burial dress to be made of white cloth\nembroidered with a green cross,\u2014\u201ca cross because I am a Christian, and\ngreen in honour of botany.\u201d Another renowned name may be mentioned, that\nof the Austrian anatomist _J. Hyrtl_ (died 1894).\n\n\n    In the years when materialism was flourishing, _Hyrtl_ was\n    painfully grieved to see science fall into disrepute through the\n    fault of individuals. He gave vent to his indignation on the\n    occasion of the fifth centenary of the Vienna University (1864),\n    when, having been elected Rector, and being considered the\n    greatest celebrity at that college, he delivered his inaugural\n    speech on the materialistic tendency of our times. Summing up he\n    said: \u201cI am at a loss how to explain what scientific grounds there\n    are to defend and fortify a revival of the old materialistic views\n    of an _Epicurus_ and a _Lucretius_, and to endeavour to insure to\n    it a permanent rule.... Its success is due to the boldness of its\n    assertion and to the prevailing spirit of the time, which\n    popularizes teachings of this sort the more willingly, the more\n    danger they seem to entail for the existing order of things.\u201d It\n    was the same protest made some years later by another famous\n    scientist against \u201cthe dangerous opinion that there were dogmas of\n    natural science in inimical opposition to the highest ideals of\n    the human mind.\u201d He stated that \u201cit would be a desirable reward\n    for the efforts of our foremost naturalists to erect with the aid\n    of anthropology a barrier to this error which is so demoralizing\n    for the people\u201d (_J. Ranke_, Der Mensch, 1894).\n\n    _Hyrtl\u2019s_ speech at once aroused a storm of indignation in the\n    liberal press of Vienna, and the great scientist, until then\n    honoured and extolled, became the object of denunciation and\n    sneer. Thus was the freedom of science understood in those\n    circles.\n\n    _Haeckel_ was much vexed by two fellow scientists, _M. von Baer_\n    (died 1876) and _G. J. Romanes_ (died 1894). _Baer_ was prominent\n    in the science of evolution. He was led to theism by his studies.\n    _Romanes_, a friend of _Darwin_, had been an adherent of\n    materialism, but through serious study he returned to the belief\n    in God and Christianity. His posthumous work, \u201cThoughts on\n    Religion, a scientist\u2019s religious evolution from Atheism to\n    Christianity,\u201d furnishes a brilliant voucher thereof. _Romanes\u2019s_\n    conversion was a sad blow for _Haeckel_. However, he constructed\n    an explanation to give himself comfort. \u201cWhen the news of this\n    conversion,\u201d he wrote, \u201cwas first circulated by a friend of\n    _Romanes_, a zealous English Churchman, the assumption suggested\n    itself to me that it was all a mystification and invention, for it\n    is known that the fanatical champions of ecclesiastical\n    superstition have never hesitated to pervert the truth to save\n    their dogma. Later on, however, it was found that it was really an\n    instance (analogous to the case of old _Baer_) of one of those\n    interesting psychological metamorphoses with which I have dealt in\n    Chapter 6 of my book. _Romanes_ was in his last years a sick man.\n    It was pathological debility. The first condition, however, of an\n    unbiassed, pure conception of reason is the normal condition of\n    its organ. His phronema was not in a normal condition.\u201d _Haeckel_\n    will have to rank among those whose phronema is not in a normal\n    condition a good many other natural scientists; indeed, most of\n    those of higher standing.\n\n\nEvery one knows the celebrated name of _Louis Pasteur_ (died 1895), the\ndiscoverer of various bacteria, of whom _Huxley_ says that his manifold\ninventions have repaid to French industry the five billion francs\nindemnity which France had to pay to Germany after the war. It is equally\nwell known that _Pasteur_ was to his death a staunch Catholic. \u201cAs his\nsoul departed, he held in his hands a small cross of brass, and his last\nwords were the confession of faith and hope\u201d (La Science Catholique, X,\n1896, 182). The story is told that one of his pupils asked him how he\ncould be so religious after all his thinking and studying. _Pasteur_\nreplied: \u201cJust because I have thought and studied, I remained religious\nlike a man of Brittany, and had I thought and studied still more, I would\nbe as religious as a woman of Brittany\u201d (Revue des Questions\nScientifiques, 1896, 385).\n\n\n    In the year 1859 great commotion was caused in the world of\n    thought by the appearance of _Darwin\u2019s_ book on the \u201cOrigin of\n    Species.\u201d It stated that the various species had gradually evolved\n    from most simple, primordial forms, and this by natural selection;\n    not, therefore, in the sense that the Creator had put the laws of\n    evolution into nature, but that in the struggle for existence the\n    survival of the fittest was the result of natural selection. Soon\n    it was claimed that man, too, in his rational life, was the result\n    of an evolution from animal stages; indeed, the whole universe had\n    arisen by the survival of the accidentally fittest. Evolution was\n    to be substituted for creation. In Germany, _E. Haeckel_ was the\n    man who considered it the task of his life to spread those ideas\n    as the established result of science. In our own time a belated\n    high tide is sweeping over the intellectual lowlands.\n\n    _Darwin_ himself was an agnostic; to begin with, he lacked all\n    religious training; his mother had died early, his father was a\n    free-thinker, and his education at school was rationalistic. The\n    doubt of all higher truths, and finally, according to his own\n    confession, the doubt respecting the power of reason, were his\n    companions through life. Yet he confesses: \u201c... I never was an\n    atheist in the sense that I would deny the existence of God. I\n    think, in general (and more so the older I grow), but not at all\n    times, agnostic would be a more accurate description of my state\n    of mind\u201d (_F. Darwin_, The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, I,\n    304). Remarkable, however, is the following passage at the end of\n    _Darwin\u2019s_ chief work: \u201cIt is a great belief, indeed, of the\n    Creator having breathed the embryo of all life surrounding us into\n    a few forms, or in but one single form, and an endless row of most\n    beautiful, most wonderful forms having evolved and are still\n    evolving from such a simple beginning, while our planet, following\n    the laws of gravitation, has steadily revolved in its circle.\u201d\n    What _Darwin_ was lacking in a high degree was a philosophical\n    training of the mind.\n\n    In itself the _theory of evolution_, which asserts the variability\n    of species of animals and plants, is by no means opposed to\n    religious truths. It neither includes a necessity of assuming the\n    origin of the human soul from the essentially lower animal soul,\n    nor is it an atheistic theory. On the contrary, such an evolution\n    would most clearly certify to God\u2019s wisdom in laying such a\n    wonderful basis for the progress of nature, provided this theory\n    could be proved by scientific facts; indeed, for an evolution\n    within narrow limits, circumstantial evidence is not lacking. That\n    there is no contradiction between the theory of evolution and the\n    fundamental tenets of Christian Creed is sufficiently shown by the\n    representatives of the theory. _Lamarck_ (died 1829) and\n    _Saint-Hilaire_ (died 1844), both of them representatives of the\n    theory of evolution long before _Darwin_, believed in God. There\n    were, prior to _Darwin_, two celebrated Catholic scientists, to\n    wit, _Amp\u00e8re_ and _d\u2019Omalius_, who had decidedly taken the part of\n    _Saint-Hilaire_ in his controversy with _Cuvier_. And also after\n    _Darwin_, a number of Christian and Catholic scientists have\n    contended for the idea of evolution, as, for instance, the pious\n    Swiss geologist, _Heer_; also _Quenstedt_, _Volkmann_, and the\n    American geologist, _Ch. Lyell_. More recently Catholic scientists\n    have expressed themselves in favour of the theory of evolution;\n    for instance, the noted zo\u00f6logist, _E. Wasmann_, and the\n    geologists _Lossen_ and _W. Waagen_, both of whom had to bring\n    bitter sacrifices in their career on account of their Catholic\n    faith.\n\n\n\nMature Science Respects Faith.\n\n\nThere have now passed in review the great natural scientists of the past,\nthose living at the present time we shall leave to the judgment of the\nfuture. Is it true, then, that the foremost representatives of natural\nscience had the conviction that science and faith are incompatible? No! On\nthe contrary, most of them, and the greatest of them, have professed the\nfundamental truths of religion, or have even been devout Christians\nthemselves.\n\n\n    \u201cTheism in natural science, or, if you prefer, in natural\n    philosophy,\u201d so says a modern scientist, \u201crests upon the basis of\n    a fundamental view which an old formula has clothed in words as\n    simple as they are sublime: \u2018I believe in God, the Almighty\n    Creator of Heaven and of Earth.\u2019 This confession does not cling to\n    theistic scientists like an egg-shell from the time of\n    unsophisticated childhood faith; it is the result of their entire\n    scientific thought and judgment. This conviction has been\n    professed by the most discerning natural scientists of all ages\u201d\n    (_J. Reinke_, Naturwissenschaft und Religion).\n\n\nStill it cannot be denied that some of the great scientists were of\ndifferent mind, men like _R. von Virchow_, _Tyndall_, _A. von Humboldt_,\n_Du Bois-Reymond_. Nor shall it be disputed that, at the present time, a\nlarge number of men of average learning are on the side of unbelief.\nHowever, it must not be forgotten that unbelief is more frequently\npretended to the outside world for appearance\u2019s sake than it really dwells\nin the heart. This is, to a great extent, due to human respect, to public\nopinion, and the prevailing tendency of science. Then again, it must be\nremembered, that religiously minded scientists are often crowded out from\nthe schools of science, with the natural result that the others\npredominate. Another point to be borne in mind is that the atheistic\nrepresentatives of science are doing more to get themselves talked about;\nthey are seeking more diligently the attention of public opinion. Men like\n_Tyndall_, _Vogt_, _Moleschott_, _Haeckel_, are known in larger circles\nthan men like _Faraday_, _Maxwell_, _Amp\u00e8re_, _Volta_, _Pasteur_, who,\nengaged in serious work, gave no time to making propaganda, as the others\ndid by lecturing and popular writing for materialistic and monistic views\nin the name of science; they had no desire for the limelight of attention,\nand for posing as personified science.\n\nAll this does not change the fact that a very large number, indeed the\nlargest number, of natural scientists of first rank were believers in God,\nor of pious, Christian mind. And that is of the greater importance. To do\npioneer work in the field of science, to give impetus, to make progress,\nrequires a penetrating and, at the same time, an independent mind, one\nthat can rise above conventional commonplace. The fact that such men have\nlargely been very religious, that they never belittled religion, weighs\nmuch more in the balance than the disparagement of inferior minds.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nThese, then, are the often-cited witnesses for the incompatibility of\nscience and faith. While only taken from the province of natural science,\nthey may in our case be deemed representative of science in general. For\nnatural science is generally regarded the most exact of all, and as the\none which, more than any other, has the scientific spirit said to be\nincompatible with faith, and which, by many, is believed to have brought\nabout in the modern world of thought the irreconcilable conflict between\nfaith and science. This is not so! Such antagonism does _not_ exist. It\ncannot exist, because it is certain from the outset that both faith and\nscience unfold the truth. Truth, however, can never be in conflict with\ntruth. Nor has that antagonism ever existed historically in any of the\ngreat representatives of science. This antagonism is fictitious, it is\nfalse in its very essence. It is fabricated, either by distorting faith\ninto a blind belief of absurd things, or else by distorting the human\nfaculty of conception into infallible omniscience, or, the other extreme,\nby denying its faculty for a higher perception.\n\nFaith has nothing to fear from a mature science that has arrived at the\nconviction of its cognitions, nor has it anything to fear from the great\nintellects who reason profoundly and seriously. But it has to fear\nmock-science and ignorance, and those small and superficial minds that aim\nat stretching their pseudo-knowledge to a gigantic infallibility.\n\n\n\n\n\nTHIRD SECTION. THE LIBERAL FREEDOM OF RESEARCH.\n\n\n\n\nThe Yoke of the Sun.\n\n\nThe gifted Danish writer and convert, _J. J\u00f6rgensen_, tells a parable\nwhich is pregnant with thought. \u201cIn the midst of a large rye-field,\u201d he\nrelates, \u201cthere stood a tall poplar, with other trees standing nearby. One\nday the poplar turned to the other trees and plants, and thus began to\nspeak: \u2018Sisters and brothers! To us, the glorious tribe of plants, belongs\nthe earth, and everything upon it is dependent on us. We fertilize and\nfeed ourselves, while beasts and men are fed and clothed by us. Indeed,\nthe earth itself feeds upon our decaying leaves, upon our boughs and\nbranches. There is only one power in the world our existence and growth is\nsaid to depend on; I refer to the Sun. I purposely used the words, \u201cis\nsaid,\u201d because I am sure that we do not depend on the Sun. This doctrine\nof sunlight being a necessity and a benefit to our plant life is nothing\nbut a superstition, which at last ought to give way to enlightenment.\u2019\nHere the poplar paused. From some old oaks and elms in the neighbouring\ngrove there came signs of disapproval, but the inconstant rye-field\nmuttered assent. Thus encouraged and raising its voice the poplar\ncontinued: \u2018I know well that there is a musty faction amongst us which\nclings obstinately to obsolete views. However, I have confidence in the\nindependence of the younger generation of plants. They will realize the\nbaseness of continuing to do homage to an absurd superstition. Our\nfreeborn heads shall never bow to a yoke, not even to the yoke of the Sun.\nDown, therefore, with that yoke! And free from restraint there will arise\na free and beautiful generation that will astonish the world.\u2019 The poplar\npaused for the second time, and now the applause was long and loud, the\nfields cheered and the groves gave boisterous applause, so that the\ndisapproval of a few old trees could not be heard. The following days\nlooked upon an odd spectacle. At daybreak, when the Sun ascended and cast\nits first rays over the landscape, the flowers closed their cups and\ndenied admission, as if asleep; the leaves no longer turned toward the\nSun. But when the dispenser of warmth and light had gone down behind the\nhills, the gayly coloured flowers opened in the dim starlight, as if now\nthe time had come for them to grow and blossom.\n\n\u201cAlas, how sad was the fate of these poor rebels! The rye soon began to\nlanguish till it lay prone on the ground; green leaves turned yellow, the\nflowers drooped, faded and withered. Then the plants began to grumble at\nthe poplar. There it stood, its leaves a seared yellow. \u2018What simpletons\nyou are, brothers and sisters!\u2019 it said. \u2018Can\u2019t you see that now you are\nmuch more like yourselves than under the rule of the Sun? Now you are\nrefined, independent beings, well rid of the sluggish health of yore.\u2019\nThere were some who still believed what the poplar said. \u2018We are\nindependent, we are unfettered,\u2019 they clamoured, till the last spark of\nlife was gone. Not long after the poplar, too, stood there with its\nbranches bared,\u2014it had died. The farmers, however, complained about the\nfailing of the crop, and consoled themselves by hoping for better success\nthe next year.\u201d\n\nA parable of deep meaning! It may serve as an illustration for the facts\nstated, and for those yet to be dealt with.\n\nAccording to the Christian view, man is dependent on his Creator, from\nwhom he receives life and light, and, in the same way, his mind depends on\ntruth, by which it lives as the plants live, by the light and the warmth\nof the sun. To many generations this was self-evident, and withal they\nfelt themselves free, because they looked for the freedom only of the\ndependent creature. And, keeping within these bounds, they had a cheerful\nexistence in the happy possession of their faith, contented and serene in\nthe possession of truth; their higher spiritual life throve and\nflourished, promoted by the Eternal Giver of light and warmth, who held\nout to them the prospect of completing their mental life in the\ncontemplation of His eternal truth.\n\nWhat the fathers deemed self-evident has now become a problem to their\nsons. What to their fathers was lofty and revered, the things to which\nthey ascribed their ennoblement, have become to the sons an obstacle to\nfree development. They have forgotten what they are. They demand\nindependence and freest realization of their own individuality, in which\nthey see the sole source of greatness and progress. In every dependence\nthey perceive a hampering of their natural development.\n\nWe have in previous chapters become acquainted with this _liberal\nfreedom_, particularly in reasoning and in scientific research, the child\nof the philosophy of humanitarianism and subjectivism, the philosophy that\nemancipates man from God\u2019s rule, from the immutable religious truths, and\nwhich sees in this emancipation perfect freedom. We have listened to the\narguments in behalf of this position, especially arguments against the\nduty to believe. All that we have set forth hitherto was to prove that\nsuch a freedom is not required. In the faithful adherence to God\u2019s\nrevelation and to His Church there is no degradation of reason, an\nexaltation rather; because to join in the eternal reason of its Creator is\nnot bondage but a privilege.\n\nWe proceed. We shall demonstrate that this freedom is not only not\nrequired, but that it is entirely untenable and ruinous; that it is\nespecially so because it is urged and demanded in the name of truth and\nproper order, in the name of uplift of human intellectual life, and of\nprogress towards real enlightenment. We shall see that this freedom is not\na liberation from mean fetters, but simply a revolt against the natural\norder, an apostasy from God and the supernatural which one shuns. Hence,\nnot the natural and orderly development of the human individual, but a\nprinciple of negation under the garb of freedom, the severance of man from\nthe sources of his greatness and strength, the perversion of true science;\nnot the only admissible scientific method, but an altogether unscientific\nmethod. We shall show that it becomes thereby the principle of mental\npauperization and decay, a principle of mental decadence, which in the\nsphere of idealism will reduce mankind to beggary. Thereby public\ntestimony is given that in the midst of mankind there is needed an\nintelligent force that preserves, with conscientious earnestness and\nunyielding firmness, the intellectual inheritance of mankind, the ideal\ntreasures of truth and of morality.\n\n\n\n\nChapter I. Free From The Yoke Of The Supernatural.\n\n\n\nIgnoramus, We Ignore.\n\n\nThe liberal principle of research rests on the basis of the humanitarian\nview of the world, which makes man autonomous, and causes him to turn his\neyes from above and downward, and to fix them upon his earthly existence.\nTo remain true to its own idea, this liberal science will feel the\nnecessity to sever itself gradually from the restraining powers of the\nworld beyond, and to shun the thought of God and of His divine influence\nand supremacy over the world and human life. It must resent such truths as\na burdensome yoke that oppresses human freedom.\n\nAnd to this thought it remains faithful, if not in all its\nrepresentatives, then at any rate in a good many of them. With unremitting\npersistency it enforces in all its domains the demand: _Science must not\nreckon with supernatural factors_. Ignoramus is its watchword, \u201cwe do not\nknow it\u201d in the sense of its usual agnosticism, but \u201cwe ignore it\u201d in the\nspirit of the impulse which dreads the loss of its freedom through higher\npowers. Creation and miracles, divine revelation and the God-imposed duty\nof belief, it does not know. A moral law, as given by God, does not exist\nfor this science. It wants nothing to do with a religion that worships a\npersonal God, much less with a supernatural religion, with mysteries,\nmiracles, and grace. It praises all the higher that modern religion of\nsentiment, without dogmas and religious duties, which sovereign man\ncreates for himself, a poetical adornment of his individuality, a religion\nhe need not ask what he owes it, but rather what it offers him. All\nconnection with the world beyond is cut off. Man is now free in his own\nhouse. We shall show this in detail, by the testimony chiefly of men\ngenerally accepted as foremost representatives of modern science. We do\nnot assert, however, that all representatives of modern science belong\nhere. Far be it from us to sit in judgment as to the good intentions of\nthe champions of liberal science. We know very well that an education\nindifferent to religion, early habitual association with the ideas of a\nsceptical, naturalistic philosophy, the acquisition of prejudices and\nunsolved difficulties, a continuous stay in an intellectual atmosphere\nforeign and inimical to religious belief\u2014all this, we well understand,\nwill gradually rob the mind of all inclination and unbiassed judgment for\nreligious truth, and thus make for apostasy from religion. Nor do we\nassert that the idea of God and Christianity are extinct in the hearts of\nthe representatives of liberal science, but we do assert that their\n_science_ no longer wants to know God and His true religion, that only too\noften it is in the grip of a Theophobia, which slinks past God and His\nworks, with its eyes designedly averted.\n\nAt the same time the _unprepossession of this science_ will be made clear.\n\u201cA feeling of degradation pervades the German university circles,\u201d so the\nlearned _Mommsen_ expressed himself some years ago when Strassburg was to\nget a Catholic chair of history; therefore a Catholic who takes his\nCatholic view of the world as his guide cannot be unprepossessed, hence\ncannot be a true scientist. We have become used to this reproach;\nnevertheless it is very painful to a Catholic, especially when he devotes\nhis life to scientific work. The other side claims very emphatically to\nhave a monopoly on unprepossession and truthfulness; it gives most solemn\nassurances of not desiring anything but the truth, of serving the truth\nalone, with persevering unselfishness, unaffected by disposition and party\ninterest, and that it has its unbiassed spiritual eye turned only to the\nchaste sunlight of truth. Hence, we may be permitted to inquire whether\nthese assurances square with the facts. As they demand belief, we may also\ndemand proofs; and if those assurances are accompanied by sharp\naccusations, the accused will have even a greater right to examine the\ndeeds and records of this assertive science.\n\nWhat about the unprepossession of liberal science, especially in the\nprovince of philosophy and religion? It cannot be our intention to explore\nthe whole territory in every direction. We shall keep to the central and\nmain road, the road to which chiefly lead all other roads of life, we mean\nthe attitude of this school of research towards the world beyond. We find\nthis attitude to be one of persistent ignoring! Science cannot acknowledge\nthe supernatural; this presumption, unproved and impossible of proof, it\nnever loses sight of, it is even made a scientific principle, which is\ncalled:\n\n\n\nThe Principle of Exclusive Natural Causation.\n\n\nThis principle demands that everything belonging to nature in its widest\nsense, consequently all objects and events of irrational nature and of\nhuman life, must be explained by natural causes only; supernatural factors\nmust not be brought in. To assume an interposition by God, in the form of\ncreation, miracle, or revelation, is unscientific; he who does so is not a\ntrue scientist. A presumption, a mandate of truly stupendous enormity! How\ncan it be proved that there is no God, that creation, miracles, the\nsupernatural origin of religion, are impossible things? And if they are\npossible, why should it be forbidden to make use of them in explaining\nfacts which cannot otherwise be explained?\n\nHowever, it is readily admitted that the principle is merely a postulate,\nan _unproved_ presumption.\n\n\n    \u201cThe postulate of exclusive natural causation tells us that\n    natural events can have their causes only in other natural events,\n    and not in conditions lying outside of the continuity of natural\n    causality\u201d; so _W. Wundt_. This is a \u201cpostulate, accepted by\n    modern natural science partly tacitly, partly by open profession.\u201d\n    \u201cEven where an exact deduction is not possible, natural science\n    nevertheless acts under this supposition. It never will consider a\n    natural event to be causally explained, if it is attempted to\n    derive that event from other conditions than preceding natural\n    events.\u201d\n\n    Professor _Jodl_ protests against alliance with the Catholic\n    Church, for the reason that the latter does not acknowledge the\n    fundamental presumption of all scientific research, namely, the\n    uninterrupted natural causation, and because the Church is\n    essentially founded on supernatural presumptions. Prof. _A.\n    Messer_ thinks he has proved sufficiently the untenableness of the\n    Catholic faith by the simple appeal to this presumption: \u201cNatural\n    sciences rest upon the presumption that everything is causally\n    determined. This means, that the same causes must be followed by\n    the same effects, and all natural events take their course\n    according to invariable laws. It is against this presumption that\n    the Church exacts a belief in miracles, in immediate divine\n    manifestations, not explainable by natural causes. _God_ is not a\n    causal factor in the eyes of natural science, because everything,\n    and for that very reason, nothing, could be explained through\n    Him.\u201d We see that the principle is expressly admitted to be a mere\n    presumption. \u201cI concede readily,\u201d says _Paulsen_, \u201cthat the law of\n    natural causation is not a proven fact, but a demand or\n    presumption with which reason approaches the task of explaining\n    natural phenomena. But this postulate ... is the hard-fought\n    victory of long scientific effort.... Gradually there were\n    eliminated from the course of nature demoniacal influence and the\n    miraculous intervention of God, and in their stead the idea of\n    natural causation was installed.\u201d\n\n\nIt is merely another expression for the same thing if one calls, with\n_Paulsen_, the unbroken causal connection \u201cthe fundamental presumption of\nall our natural research\u201d; or concludes, with _A. Drews_, that the\nassumption of a transcendental God, beyond the visible, and in causal\nrelation to the world, destroys the universal conformity to laws in the\nworld, the self-evident presumption of all scientific knowledge; or one\nmay say, with _F. Steudel_, \u201cThe theory of unbroken causal connection has\nbecome the fundamental presupposition of all philosophical explanation of\nworld happenings. This finally disposes of a transcendental God, together\nwith his empiric correlative, the miracle, as a philosophical explanation\nof the world.\u201d The same result is achieved by declaring evolution from\nnatural factors as the universal world-law.\n\n\u201c_I Know not God the Father, Almighty Creator of Heaven and of Earth_\u201d\n\nWith inexorable persistency this principle is now applied wherever science\nmeets with God and the world beyond. Hence, let us proceed on our way and\nhalt at some points to watch this science at work.\n\nThe unbiassed reasoning of the mind shows that this world, limited and\nfinite, in all its phenomena accidental and perishable, cannot have in\nitself the cause of its existence, hence, that it demands a supernatural\ncreative cause. This solution of the question is by no means demonstrated\nby liberal science as untenable, it is simply declined.\n\n\n    \u201cNatural science, once for all, has not the least occasion to\n    assume a supernatural act of creation\u201d; this we are told by the\n    famous historian of materialism, _F. A. Lange_. \u201cTo fall back upon\n    explanations of this sort amounts always to straying from\n    scientific grounds, which not only is not permissible in a\n    scientific investigation, but should never enter into\n    consideration.\u201d And _L. Plate_ states: \u201cA creation of matter we\n    cannot assume, nor would such an assumption be any explanation at\n    all; at most, it would be tantamount to exchanging one question\n    mark for another. We natural scientists are modest enough, as\n    matters now stand, to forego a further solution of the question.\u201d\n    They will subscribe to _Du Bois-Reymond\u2019s_ \u201cignoramus\u201d rather than\n    assume the only solution of the question, an act of creation. This\n    scientist, asking himself the question, from where the\n    world-matter received its first impulse, argues: \u201cLet us try to\n    imagine a primordial condition, where matter had not yet been\n    influenced by any cause, and we arrive at the conclusion that\n    matter an infinite time ago was inactive, and equally distributed\n    in infinite space. Since a supernatural impulse does not fit into\n    our theory of the universe, an adequate cause for the first action\n    is lacking.\u201d\n\n\nThus they frankly violate the scientific method that demands acceptance of\nthe explanation demonstrated as necessary, and violate it only for the\nreason to dodge the acknowledgment of a Creator. This is not science, but\npolitics.\n\nBut let us ask, Why should it be against science to reckon with\nsupernatural factors? Is it because we cannot disclose with certainty the\nother world? Are they not aware that such a principle is opposed by the\nconviction of all mankind, that always held these conceptions to be the\nhighest, and therefore not to be considered illusions? Do they not see,\nmoreover, how they involve themselves in flagrant contradictions? Does not\nscience by means of its laws of reasoning, especially on the principle of\ncausality, constantly infer invisible causes from visible facts? From\nphysical-chemical facts ether and physical atoms, which no man has ever\nseen, are deduced: from falling stones and the movement of astral bodies\nis inferred a universal gravitation, undemonstrable by experience; from an\nanonymous letter is deduced an author. The astronomer deduces from certain\nfacts that fixed stars must have dark companions, visible to no one; from\ndisturbances in the movements of Uranus _Leverrier_ found by calculation\nthe existence and location of Neptune, then not as yet discovered. Hence,\nwhat does it mean: \u201cto fall back upon explanations of this sort always\namounts to straying away from scientific ground\u201d? Let us imagine a noble\nvessel on the high seas to have become the victim of a catastrophe. It\nlies now at the bottom of the sea. Fishes come from all sides and stop\nmusingly before the strange visitor. Whence did this come? Was it made out\nof water? Impossible! Did it creep up from the bottom of the sea? No! At\nlast a fish reasons: \u201cWhat we see here has undoubtedly come down to us\nfrom a higher world, far above us, and invisible to us.\u201d The speech meets\nwith approval. But another fish objects: \u201cNonsense! To fall back upon\nexplanations of this sort always amounts to straying away from the\nscientific grounds on which we fish must stand. We cannot assume such a\nworld to exist, because this would offend against the first principle of\nour science, the principle of the exclusive natural causation of sea and\nwater.\u201d With these words the speaker departs, wagging his tail, his speech\nhaving been received with stupefaction rather than with understanding.\n\nTo this philosophy may be applied the word of the Apostle: \u201cBeware lest\nany man cheat you by philosophy and vain deceit\u201d (Col. ii. 8). No, it is\nnot the spirit of true science that opposes the belief in supernatural\nfactors, but it is the desertion of the traditions and the spirit of a\nbetter science. To the representatives of paganism, to _Plato_ and others,\nthe highest goal of human quest of truth was to find God and to worship\nHim. For the great leaders in recent natural science, _Copernicus_,\n_Kepler_, _Newton_, _Linn\u00e9_, _Boyle_,_ Volta_, _Faraday_, and _Maxwell_,\nthe highest achievement was to point to God\u2019s wisdom in the wonderful\nworks of nature; their science ended in prayer. A principle of unbroken\nnatural causation, as a boycott of the Deity, was to them not a postulate\nof science but an abomination. They were carried by a conviction expressed\nby a later scientist, _W. Thomson_, in the following words: \u201cFear not to\nbe independent thinkers! If you think vigorously enough, you will be\nforced by science to believe in a God, Who is the basis of all religion\u201d;\nand expressed by _R. Mayer_ in the following words: \u201cTrue philosophy must\nnot and cannot be anything else but the prop\u00e6deutics of the Christian\nreligion.\u201d\n\nBut let us proceed. We have before us an astonishing _order_, we behold\nuncounted wonders of well-designed purpose in the world. The question\nsuggests itself: Whence this Order? The watch originates from the\nintelligence of a maker, an accident could not have produced it; hence\nalso the great world-machine must have had an intelligent maker. This is\nthe logic of unbiassed reason. But the principles of liberal research\nobject to the acceptance of this explanation. What is theirs?\n\n\n    There have been some scientists endeavouring to discover the\n    purposeless in nature, and they have gleaned various things.\n    _Haeckel_ invented for them the name Dysteleologists; and this is\n    now the name they go by. Why the destruction of so many living\n    embryos? What is the purpose of pain, of the vermiform appendix?\n    \u201cTo what purpose is the immense belt of desert extending through\n    both large continents of the Old World? Could the Sahara not have\n    been avoided?... Indeed, numerous forms of life we cannot look at\n    but with repugnance and horror; for instance, the parasitical\n    beings.\u201d ... (_F. Paulsen_). Hence the order claimed for the world\n    does not exist, on the contrary, \u201cit is beyond doubt that the most\n    essential means of nature is of a kind which can only be put on a\n    level with the blindest accident\u201d (_F. A. Lange_). But they do not\n    feel satisfied with this. They feel that even if all these things\n    were actually purposeless, they would amount only to a few drops\n    in the immense ocean of order which still has to be explained. At\n    most, they would form but a few typographical errors in an\n    otherwise ingenious book,\u2014errors that evidently are no proof that\n    the whole book is a mass of nonsense and not dictated by reason.\n\n\nThere appears to them, like a rescuing plank in a shipwreck, _Darwin\u2019s_\nNatural Selection. The artistic forms in the kingdom of plants and animals\narose, says _Darwin_, by the fact that, among numerous seemingly tentative\nformations, there were some useful organs or their rudiments which\nsurvived in the struggle for existence and became hereditary in the\noffspring, while others disappeared. It was seen very soon, and it is even\nbetter understood to-day, that this enormous feat of \u201cnatural selection\u201d\nis contrary to the facts, and would be, above all, an incredible accident.\nNevertheless _Darwin_ has become the rescuing knight for many who became\nalarmed about the threatening Supernaturalism.\n\n\n    _Du Bois-Reymond_ speaks very frankly: \u201cAlbeit, in holding to this\n    theory we may feel like a man kept from drowning only by holding\n    firmly to a plank just strong enough to keep him afloat. But when\n    we have to choose between a plank and death, the preference will\n    decidedly be with the plank.\u201d The same idea is expressed somewhat\n    more gracefully by _W. Ostwald_: \u201cThat the quite complicated\n    problem concerning the purposiveness of organism loses its\n    character of a riddle, at least in principle, and assumes the\n    aspect of a scientific task, all by virtue of this simple thought\n    ... is a gain that cannot be sufficiently appreciated.\u201d With\n    vehement plainness _H. Spitzer_ maintains: \u201cPurposiveness in\n    nature, which was feared by positive research like a ghost,\n    because it really seemed only to be due to the intervention of\n    ghosts in the course of the world, has now been traced by _Darwin_\n    to its origin from natural causes, and he thereby made it a fit\n    object for the science that is at home only in the sphere of\n    natural causes.\u201d \u201cTo the height of this point of view,\u201d _D. F.\n    Strauss_ boasts, \u201cwe have been led by modern natural research in\n    _Darwin_.\u201d(8)\n\n    At any rate one thing is settled: \u201cThe theological explanation\n    must be rejected,\u201d as _Plate_ puts it. \u201cIt sees in adaptation the\n    proof for the love and kindness of a Creator, who has ordered all\n    organisms most conformable to their purpose. Natural Science\n    cannot accept such an explanation.\u201d\n\n\nIs this the boasted spirit of truthfulness, which desires only the\ntruth,\u2014but is evading it persistently? Is this that unbiassed eye that\nseeks only the truth? Truly, it seems to be unsound, since it cannot bear\nthe rays of truth. Let us go to another workshop of liberal science. It is\nknown now that our earth has once been a ball of glowing fluid, with a\ntemperature in which no living being could exist. Consequently the latter\nmust have appeared at a later stage of evolution. As a fact, pal\u00e6ontology\ndoes not show any remnants of organisms in the lower strata of the earth.\nNow again a question suggests itself to the scientist, _Whence did the\nfirst life come from?_ We have the choice of only two explanations: either\nit has risen by itself, out of unorganic, dead matter, or it was produced\nby the hand of a Creator: either by _generatio aequivoca_ or the act of\ncreation. Now there has never been observed a _generatio aequivoca_, as is\ntestified to by natural science itself, and never has it been accomplished\nin the laboratory. Therefore, inasmuch as the natural laws of olden times\ncannot have been any different from those of the present, there has never\nbeen a primordial genesis. Do they perhaps give the Creator his due here,\nwhere the case is so obvious? Let us see.\n\n\n    The noted zo\u00f6logist, _R. Hertwig_, writes: \u201cInasmuch as there has\n    doubtless been a time when the prevailing temperature of our globe\n    made any life impossible, there must have been a time when life on\n    it arose either by an act of creation or by primordial genesis.\n    If, conformable to the spirit of natural sciences, we are relying\n    only on natural forces for an explanation of natural phenomena,\n    then we are necessarily led to the hypothesis of primordial\n    genesis,\u201d although it contradicts all experience. But the\n    deduction is only brought forth as a \u201clogical postulate\u201d: there\n    \u201cmust\u201d be such genesis after creation is eliminated. \u201cWe natural\n    scientists say,\u201d states _Plate_, \u201cthat all living beings must have\n    originated some time in former geological periods ... from dead,\n    unorganic matter; to assume a creation would be no explanation at\n    all, exactly as it would be no explanation to assume the creation\n    of matter.\u201d Which philosophy teaches that it is not an explanation\n    of a fact to assume for it the only reasonable cause? But just\n    this cause they do not want. _Virchow_ says in this respect: \u201cIf I\n    do not wish to assume a creative act, if I desire to explain the\n    matter in my way, then it is clear that I must resort to\n    _generatio aequivoca_. _Tertium non datur._ There is nothing else\n    left, if one once has said: \u2018I do not accept creation, but I want\n    an explanation of it.\u2019 If this is the first thesis, the second\n    thesis is, ergo, I accept the _generatio aequivoca_. _But we have\n    no actual proof of it._\u201d Hence _Haeckel_ only follows the lead of\n    others when he writes: \u201cWe admit that this process (_primordial\n    genesis_) must remain a pure hypothesis, as long as it is not\n    directly observed or duplicated by experiment. But I repeat that\n    this hypothesis is indispensable for the entire coherence of the\n    history of natural creation. Unless you accept the hypothesis of\n    primordial genesis at this one point in the theory of evolution,\n    you must take refuge in the miracle of a supernatural creation.\u201d\n\n\nIs this science, or is it not rather Theophobia? Does the freedom of\nscience consist, first of all, in the privilege of emancipating one\u2019s self\nfrom truth, whenever truth is not to one\u2019s taste? True, liberal science\nwill then be free from distasteful truths, but all the more shackled by\nits irreligious prejudices.\n\nIn modern times, the _theory of evolution_ is in high favour. On earth we\ndo not only see life, but life in a great variety of forms, from plant to\nman. The question, whence this variety, admits in its turn only of the\nalternative: either it was immediately created by God\u2019s hand, or it is the\nresult of a slow evolution from common original forms. Whether there has\nbeen an evolution within the vegetable and animal kingdom is a problem for\nnatural science. But it is a philosophical question, whether the\nessentially superior human soul, endowed with spirituality and reason,\ncould have evolved from the inferior animal soul. Philosophy must answer:\nNo, just as impossible as to evolve ten from two, or a whole book from a\nsingle proofsheet. Faith says the human soul is created by God. We do not\nintend to discuss the problem here any further, but shall only point out\nhow science here, too, expressly or tacitly, is determined very\nenergetically by the presumption of the exclusive natural causation; this\nis applied to the entire theory of evolution, but especially in regard to\nman.\n\n\n    \u201cThe notion of the evolution of the living world on earth,\u201d thus\n    states _Weismann_ quite significantly, \u201cextends far beyond the\n    provinces of individual sciences, and it influences our entire\n    range of thoughts. This notion means nothing less than the\n    elimination of miracle from our knowledge of nature, and the\n    classification of the phenomena of life on an equal footing with\n    the rest of natural events.\u201d The guiding motive is plainly in\n    evidence.\n\n\nThe aim to eliminate the \u201cmiracle of creation\u201d is manifested even more\nconspicuously in the question about the origin of man: man with his entire\nequipment, intellectual as well as cultural, must have evolved upward from\nthe most imperfect rudiments; this is regarded as a self-evident\nproposition.\n\n\n    _M. Hoernes_, for instance, writes: \u201cThe Cosmogonies, _i.e._, the\n    theories of creation, of all nations ascribe the origin of man to\n    a supernatural act of creation, whereby the Creator is imagined as\n    a human being, because at the intellectual stage corresponding to\n    these notions something created could only be conceived as\n    something formed, something constructed.\u201d Thus the theory of\n    creation, and the Christian doctrine of the genesis of man, is\n    disposed of as a notion of the lower intellect. \u201cOn the contrary,\n    we are taught by science to look upon the highest mammals as our\n    nearest blood-relatives.\u201d This \u201cwe are taught by science,\u201d\n    although it is confessed: \u201cWe know the fact of the existence of\n    the man of the fourth, or glacial, period, but we have not a\n    solitary fact that would throw light upon his origin and his\n    previous existence.\u201d\n\n    \u201cThe theory of miracles can be given up only when we shall cease\n    to contemplate man as a creature apart from the rest of creation,\n    and look upon him as a being developed within creation to what he\n    is now. Then, however, reason and language, as well as man\n    himself, are the products of a continuous evolution,\u201d says _Wundt_\n    in his \u201cPsychology of Nations.\u201d _Fr. M\u00fcller_, in a text-book on\n    the science of language, argues: \u201cAccording to _Darwin_ and to\n    modern natural science, man was not created but has evolved from a\n    lower organism during a process of thousands and thousands of\n    years.... For this reason, we must (?) assume that the first\n    language of primitive man could not have ranked above the speech\n    by which animals living in families communicate with each other.\u201d\n\n    On the basis of this truly dogmatical presumption, that the\n    \u201cmiracle theory\u201d of creation must not be accepted, they proceed\n    then to construe one hypothesis upon another, of the origin of\n    language, of thought, of conscience, of religion, according to the\n    method of _Darwin_ and _Spencer_, hypotheses of utmost\n    arbitrariness, and frequently most fantastic. \u201cEthnographical\n    researches,\u201d so we are told by _E. Lehmann_, \u201cmade by travellers,\n    representatives of science and of practical life, in all parts of\n    the globe, ... are starting to-day, almost without exception, from\n    the tacit presumption that the civilization of peoples living in\n    the primitive state represent an early and low stage in a\n    historical chain of evolution.\u201d\n\n\nAll these are suitable commentaries upon the trite proposition that\nnatural science, or more generally science, is incompatible with religious\nbelief. Of course research, like that described above, does not agree with\nFaith. But the fault lies in its unscientific method, rather than in its\nscientific character, in its latent atheistic presumption which prevents\nan unbiassed conception of truth.\n\n\n    In February, 1907, the well-known biologist and priest of the\n    Jesuit order, _E. Wasmann_, gave three lectures in Berlin on the\n    theory of evolution, before a large audience; they were followed\n    on the fourth evening by a discussion, in the course of which\n    eleven opponents voiced for nearly three hours their objections\n    and attacks, to which _Wasmann_ replied briefly at midnight, but\n    little time having been allotted to him for this purpose.\n    _Wasmann_, as well as his chief opponent, Prof. _Plate_ of Berlin,\n    have published the arguments on both sides with notes, comments,\n    and supplements. The report of Prof. _Plate_ lays stress upon the\n    assertion, which had also formed the refrain of all opposing\n    speeches, viz., \u201cthe discussion has shown, in the first place,\n    that true research in natural science is impossible for those\n    taking the position of the Roman Catholic Church; secondly, the\n    glaring and irreconcilable opposition of the scientific theory of\n    the world to the Orthodox-Christian view was sharply manifested.\u201d\n    In examining how this was demonstrated by this particular natural\n    science, one meets with a painful surprise.\n\n    Even the facts concerning the arrangements for the discussion make\n    an unpleasant impression. It is true, _Plate_ accused _Wasmann_ of\n    calumny on account of the latter\u2019s complaint. However, upon\n    comparing closely the statements of both, the following facts\n    remain undisputed. _Wasmann_ notified _Plate_ that he desired to\n    speak twice during the discussion, and that the entire discussion\n    should not last much over two hours. _Plate_ promised to arrange\n    matters accordingly. But on the forenoon of February 18th, the\n    opponents held a meeting, _Plate_ presiding, and they resolved,\n    without the least notification to _Wasmann_, that there should be\n    eleven speakers against _Wasmann_, and that the latter should\n    reply but once, at the end. Only just before the beginning of the\n    discussion, the same evening, _Plate_ informed _Wasmann_ of the\n    arrangement, making it practically impossible for the latter to\n    change the situation. Furthermore, upon _Plate\u2019s_ proposal, an\n    intermission of five minutes before the appearance of the tenth\n    speaker was decided upon, \u201cin order to give those in the audience,\n    who might find the session too exhausting, a chance to leave.\u201d\n    Thus the audience was to be subjected for three long hours to the\n    influence of heated attacks on Theism, Christianity, and the\n    Church, and without hearing the reply unless they held out from\n    half-past eight in the evening to half-past twelve in the morning.\n\n    _Plate\u2019s_ Monism rejects principally everything metaphysical:\n    \u201cMonism is the short term for the natural science view of the\n    world, that rejects all preternatural and supernatural ideas.\u201d\n    Solutions, not given by the natural sciences, simply do not exist\n    for him; for him the sun sets on the horizon of his natural\n    science. \u201cNatural laws comprise all that we are able to fathom:\n    what is behind them, or what is living in them and operates in\n    them, is the ultimate question for philosophy, and there one\n    thinks this way, another that way\u201d (_Plate_). Nevertheless, he\n    knows that \u201cOut of nothing can come nothing: hence matter is\n    eternal,\u201d and he is certain that there is no personal God, no\n    angel nor devil, no beyond nor immortality. Whoever fails to think\n    the same way is no scientist, he is not even a man of sound\n    reason: because \u201che who has grasped even the elements of natural\n    science, the unity and strict conformity to law of the natural\n    forces, and has a head for sound reasoning, will become a monist\n    all by himself, while the rest are past help, anyhow.\u201d\n\n    \u201cThe Polytheism of the orthodox Church,\u201d he says further,\n    referring to the mystery of the Trinity, \u201cis irrational\u201d; for\n    \u201cCommon Sense says that 3 is not equal to 1, nor 1 to 3,\u201d and this\n    is sufficient for _Plate_. \u201cTrinity, the Incarnation of the Son of\n    God, Christ\u2019s Ascension and His descent into hell, Original Sin,\n    Redemption from sin by Christ\u2019s sacrifice, Angels and Devils, the\n    Immaculate Conception, the Infallibility of the Pope, all these\n    and many other doctrines of the orthodox Church are thrown to the\n    winds by anybody convinced of the permanence and imperviousness of\n    the natural laws.\u201d This again is sufficient for him. \u201cThe question\n    whether God is personal or impersonal,\u201d says he, in another place,\n    \u201cshould never be raised: it is just as preposterous as the\n    question whether God has eyes or not.\u201d Another of his arguments\n    reads: \u201cIf the body after death can become dust by natural means,\n    then there must have been conditions under which the dust became\n    by natural means a body.\u201d An analogous argument would be: \u201cIf a\n    book can of itself finally wear away into withered and loosened\n    leaves, then there must be conditions under which the perfect book\n    could originate all by itself, and without Prof. _Plate_, out of\n    withered, loose leaves.\u201d\n\n    _Plate_ assures us: \u201cI do not know anything about metaphysics.\u201d We\n    do not want to dispute that. It is regrettable that so many\n    scientists of our times are betraying a pitiable lack of\n    philosophical training, a lack which becomes a social danger if\n    they, nevertheless, yield to the temptation to invade the domain\n    of Philosophy. Even the Protestant scientist _G. Wobbermin_ in\n    referring to the above-mentioned discussion remarked: \u201c_Wasmann\u2019s_\n    opponents on that evening have betrayed without exception a really\n    amazing lack of philosophical training.\u201d In glaring contrast with\n    this ignorance stands their intolerance for any different theory\n    of the world. Because he thinks as a Christian, _Wasmann_ is\n    peremptorily expelled from the ranks of natural scientists.\n    \u201c_Father Wasmann_ is not a true natural scientist, he is not a\n    true scholar.\u201d With this crushing verdict Prof. _Plate_ concluded\n    his speech. He repeats this finding on the last page of his book\n    in conspicuous type: \u201c_Father Wasmann_, S. J., no true natural\n    scientist, no true scholar.\u201d That his opponent, in answer to\n    questions that go beyond mere natural science, is giving\n    philosophical replies, in accord with the doctrine of\n    Christianity, is explained by \u201chis voluntary or involuntary\n    submission to the Church,\u201d \u201cnatural science bows to Theology.\u201d He\n    therefore lacks \u201cthe freedom of thought and of deduction.\u201d\n    Sophistical stunts in the service of intolerance! But let us\n    proceed on our way.\n\n\nThe compulsory dogma of the inadmissibility of a supernatural order of the\nworld, and of its operation in the visible world, becomes most manifest\nwhen liberal science comes in contact with the miracle. Forsooth, it\nshirks this contact. But time and again, now and in the past, it is\nconfronted by clearly attested facts and it cannot avoid noticing them.\nHowever, it is determined from the outset that miracles are impossible. Of\ncourse, this cannot be proved except by the presumption that there is no\nsupermundane God. Even the agnostic _Stuart Mill_ admits that if the\nexistence of God is conceded, an effect produced by His will, which in\nevery instance owes its origin to its creator, appears no longer as a\npurely arbitrary hypothesis, but must be considered a serious possibility\n(Essays, 1874). Generally, however, liberal science does not try hard to\ndemonstrate in a scientific way the impossibility.\n\n\n    \u201cIt is my unyielding conviction,\u201d so speaks _A. Harnack_, and his\n    is perhaps the most telling expression of this dogmatic mood,\n    \u201cthat anything that happens within time and space is subject to\n    the laws of motion. Hence, that in this sense, _i.e._, of\n    interrupting the natural connection, there cannot be any\n    miracles.\u201d One simply does not believe such things. \u201cThat a\n    tempest at sea,\u201d thus _Harnack_ again, \u201ccould have been stilled by\n    a word we do not believe, nor shall we ever again believe it.\u201d\n    Similarly reads _Baumgarten\u2019s_ declaration regarding the\n    resurrection of Christ: \u201cEven if all the reports had been written\n    on the third day, and had been transmitted to us as a certainty\n    ... nevertheless modern consciousness could not accept the story.\u201d\n    And _W. Foerster_ writes: \u201cThe supposition that such interferences\n    do not occur, and that everything in the world is advancing\n    steadily and in accordance with fixed laws, forms the\n    indispensable presumption of scientific research.\u201d And _H. von\n    Sybel_ holds \u201cAn absolute concord with the laws of evolution, a\n    common level in the existence of things terrestrial, forms the\n    presumption of all knowledge: it stands and falls with it.\u201d\n\n\nThis is the presumption, from which is drawn the most extravagant\nconclusion, which, though so manifestly improper, is made the basis for\nrejecting the entire supernatural religion of Christianity. Because God\u2019s\nIncarnate Son, in a small town of Palestine, once turned water into wine,\nwill the Christian housewife lose her confidence in the stability of\nwater? When it was suddenly discovered that the orbit of the planet Uranus\nwas not a perfect ellipsis, as required by the law of _Kepler_, was it\nthought that these deviations are impossible because there must not be any\nexception to the law of perfect elliptical movements? Happily, this law\ncontinued to be accepted without deeming an irregularity impossible, and\nshortly afterwards Neptune was discovered and found to be the cause of the\ndisturbance. But anything miraculous, no matter how well proven, must be\nconsidered unacceptable by reason of such unsound presumption.\nPhilosophical a-priorism is superior to facts.\n\n\n    Thus _St. Augustine_ tells in his work \u201cDe civitate Dei\u201d (1. xxii.\n    c. 8) of a number of miracles happening in his time, of which he\n    had knowledge either as eye-witness or by authentical reports from\n    eye-witnesses. _E. Zeller_ renders judgment on the historical\n    value of the statement as follows: \u201cThe narrator is a\n    contemporary, and partly even an eye-witness, of the events\n    reported: by virtue of his episcopal office he is particularly\n    commissioned to closely investigate them; we know him as a man\n    overtowering his contemporaries in intellect and knowledge, second\n    to none in religious zeal, strong faith, and moral earnestness.\n    The wonderful events happened to well-known persons, sometimes in\n    the presence of big crowds of people; they were attested and\n    recorded by official order.\u201d Hence the statement must be accepted\n    without objection. But must it not also be believed? is the query\n    of an unbiassed listener. Not in the judgment of one who is in the\n    tyrannical yoke of his presumptions. \u201cWhat are we to say about\n    it?\u201d continues _Zeller_, and finds that \u201cin this unparalleled\n    aggregation of miracles we can after all see nothing else but a\n    proof of the credulity of that age.\u201d The report is incontestable,\n    but it must not be believed!\n\n    In our times _Lourdes_ has become the scene of events which are\n    founded on facts, and the miraculous character has been proven at\n    least of some of them. _Bertrin_, in his \u201cHistoire critique des\n    ev\u00e9n\u00e9ments de Lourdes,\u201d deals with the attitude of the physicians\n    toward the miracles. The believing physician can enter upon his\n    investigation without prejudice: not so the unbelieving physician\n    and scientist, who is shackled by his prejudice against the\n    possibility of miracles. Of this a few examples:\n\n    \u201cHow did you get cured?\u201d was the question put by a physician to a\n    young woman who, after having suffered for four years from a\n    suppurating inflammation of the hip joints, complicated by caries,\n    had a few days previously suddenly regained her full health. Pains\n    and sores had disappeared. \u201cBy whom was I cured? By the Blessed\n    Virgin!\u201d \u201cNever mind the Blessed Virgin,\u201d replied the physician.\n    \u201cYoung woman, why don\u2019t you admit that you had been assured in\n    advance that you would get well. You were told that, once in\n    Lourdes, you would suddenly rise from the box wherein you were\n    lying. That sort of thing happens\u2014we call it suggestion.\u201d The girl\n    replied, unhesitatingly, that it did not happen this way at all.\n    Finally the physician offered her money if she would admit having\n    really been cured by suggestion. The girl declined the\n    offer.\u2014Another girl arrived in Lourdes, with a physician\u2019s\n    attestation that she was a consumptive. She is cured after the\n    first bath. At the bureau of verification her lungs were found to\n    be no longer diseased. Her physician\u2019s statement having been very\n    brief, a telegram was sent to him as a matter of precaution,\n    asking him for another statement without, however, informing him\n    of the cure. The physician immediately wired back: \u201cShe is a\n    consumptive.\u201d This was also the opinion of other physicians who\n    had treated the girl. The girl joyfully returns home, and hurries\n    to her physician, requesting him to certify to her cure. He does\n    so quite reluctantly. Upon reading his certificate, she discovers\n    that it said she had been cured, but only of a _cough_. The case\n    of consumption of his original testimonial had changed into a\n    cough. His dread of a miracle had induced this physician to commit\n    a falsehood.\n\n    _A. Rambacher_, as he relates in a pamphlet, sent the scientific\n    treatise on Lourdes by Dr. _Boissarie_ to Prof. _Haeckel_, with\n    the request to read it, in order to gain a better notion of the\n    existence of a supernatural world. After some urging he finally\n    received the following reply, which speaks volumes for the\n    attitude of the natural scientist towards facts: \u201cWith many thanks\n    I hereby return the book by Dr. _Boissarie_ on the Great Cures of\n    Lourdes which you sent me. The perusal of the same has convinced\n    me anew of the tremendous power of superstition (glorified as\n    \u2018pious belief\u2019) of na\u00efve credulity (without critical examination),\n    and of contagious collective suggestion, as well as of the cunning\n    of the clergy, exploiting them for their gain.... The physicians,\n    said to testify in behalf of the \u2018miracles\u2019 and the supernatural\n    phenomena, are either ignorant and undiscerning quacks, or\n    positive frauds in collusion with the priests. The most accurate\n    description of the gigantic swindle of Lourdes I know of, is that\n    of _Zola_ in his well-known novel.... With repeated thanks for\n    your kindness ... _Ernst Haeckel_.\u201d Against all the facts in\n    evidence this dogmatic scientist was safely intrenched behind the\n    stone wall of his presumptions. He knew in advance that everything\n    was superstition or the fraud of cunning priests, that all\n    physicians who certified to cures were quacks and cheats. _Zola\u2019s_\n    tendentious romance considered the best historical source! Mention\n    should be made here how this celebrated novelist dealt with facts\n    at Lourdes. In the year 1892, the time of the great pilgrimage,\n    _Zola_ went to Lourdes. He wanted to observe and then tell what he\n    had seen. An historical novel it was to be; time and again he had\n    proclaimed in the newspapers that he would tell the whole truth.\n    At Lourdes all doors were opened to him; he had admittance\n    anywhere; he could interview and obtain explanations at will. How\n    he kept his promise to report the truth may be shown by a single\n    instance: _Marie Lebranchu_ came to Lourdes on August 20, 1892,\n    suffering from incurable consumption. She was suddenly cured, and\n    never had a relapse. One year after her cure she returned to the\n    miraculous Grotto. The excellent condition of her lungs was again\n    verified. Now, what does _Zola_ make of this event? In his novel\n    the cured girl suffers a terrible relapse upon her first return\n    home, \u201ca brutal return of the disease which remained victorious,\u201d\n    we read in _Zola\u2019s_ book. One day, the president of the Lourdes\n    Bureau of Investigation introduced himself to _Zola_ in Paris, and\n    asked him \u201cHow dare you let _Marie Lebranchu_ die in your novel;\n    you know very well that she is alive and just as well as you and\n    I.\u201d \u201cWhat do I care,\u201d was _Zola\u2019s_ reply, \u201cI think I have the\n    right to do as I please with the characters I create.\u201d If a\n    romancer desires to avail himself of this privilege he certainly\n    has not the right to proclaim his novels as truthful historical\n    writings, much less may others see in such a novel the \u201cmost\n    accurate description of the events at Lourdes.\u201d\n\n    _Renan_ at one time said: \u201cOh, if we just once might have a\n    miracle brought before professional scientists! But, alas! this\n    will never happen!\u201d He borrowed this saying from _Voltaire_, with\n    the difference that the latter demanded God to perform a miracle\n    before the Academy of Sciences, as if there were need for miracles\n    in a physical or chemical laboratory. Those who desire in earnest\n    to investigate miracles ought to go where they are performed. And\n    even there, where the eyes can see them, it also takes good will\n    to acknowledge them. In this respect an interview is instructive\n    which _Zola_ once had with an editor. The latter asked: \u201cIf you\n    were witness to a miracle, that would occur under strictest\n    conditions suggested by yourself, would you acknowledge the\n    miracle? Would you then accept the teachings of the faith?\u201d After\n    a few moments of serious thought, _Zola_ replied: \u201cI do not know,\n    but I do not believe I would\u201d (_Bertrin_). On April 7, 1875, there\n    came to the Belgian sanctuary, Oostacker, a Flemish labourer, by\n    name _Peter de Rudder_, whose leg had eight years before been\n    broken below the knee, and who was then suffering from two\n    suppurating cancerous sores, that had formed at the place of the\n    fracture and on the foot. He suddenly was entirely cured. The case\n    was investigated in a most exact way. In 1900 a treatise\n    concerning the case was published by three physicians. _E.\n    Wasmann_ had as early as 1900 published a short extract of it in\n    the \u201cStimmen aus Maria Laach.\u201d In February, 1907, when, at Berlin,\n    he delivered his lectures which were followed by a discussion, his\n    opponents, headed by Prof. _Plate_, did not know of this article.\n    When they learned of it, some time afterwards, he was put under\n    the ban because he \u201chad degraded himself to the position of a\n    charlatan by vouching with his scientific repute for the happening\n    of a miraculous cure\u201d; and they said \u201cthey would fight him in the\n    same way as they would fight every quack, but as a scientist he\n    was discarded.\u201d _Plate_ had on the evening of the discussion asked\n    of the assembled scientists the question: \u201cHave we ever observed\n    anything like a suspension of the natural laws? The reply to it is\n    an unconditional \u2018we have not\u2019; consequently Theism becomes\n    inadmissible to the natural scientist.\u201d Here, in the _de Rudder_\n    case, is found the required instance. But _Plate_ knows, in\n    advance of any investigation, that it is a fairy tale, believed\n    without critical examination. And Prof. _Hansemann_, another\n    opposing speaker of that evening, subsequently sent word to\n    _Wasmann_ that: \u201cOne can pretty well judge what to think of a\n    natural scientist who publishes such stuff. For this reason I now\n    declare that I shall never in future, no matter how or where,\n    enter into discussion of matters of natural science with Mr.\n    _Wasmann_.\u201d When on a certain occasion _Hegel_ was advised that\n    some facts did not agree with his philosophical notions, he\n    replied: \u201cThe more pity for the facts.\u201d\n\n\nThe English natural scientist, _W. Thomson_, once said before the British\nSociety at Edinburgh: \u201cScience is bound by eternal honour to face\nfearlessly every problem that can be clearly laid before it.\u201d The equally\nfamous _Faraday_, in the name of empirical research, demands of its\nadherents the determination to stand or to fall with the results of a\ndirect appeal to the facts in the first place, and with the strict logical\ndeductions therefrom in the second. In general these principles are\nadhered to so long as religious notions are not encountered. But as soon\nas these are sighted, the engine is reversed, and all scientific\nprinciples are forgotten.\n\nA science led by this spirit will set out to emancipate man\u2019s moral\nconduct of life from God and religion. Indeed, the first postulate of\nmodern ethics directs that _morality_ must be _independent of religion_.\nThat God and eternal salvation is the end of man, the ultimate norm of his\nmoral life, that God\u2019s Command is the ultimate reason of the moral\nobligation, and divine sanction its strongest support, it does not want to\nacknowledge. Here, too, we find the principle of natural causality in\noperation. \u201cAs in physics God\u2019s will must not be made to serve as an\nexplanation, so likewise in the theory of moral phenomena. Both the\nnatural and the moral world, as they exist, may point beyond themselves to\nsomething transcendental. But we cannot admit the transcendental ... a\nscientific explanation will have to be wholly immanent, and\nanthropological\u201d (_Paulsen_). According to this approved principle of\nignoration, the supreme aim and law of a morality without religion is\n_man_, his earthly happiness, and his culture.\n\n\n    Its aims, according to Prof. _Jodl_, one of its noted champions,\n    are: \u201cPromotion of moral life, fostering of a refined humanity,\n    development of a true fellow-feeling, without the religious and\n    metaphysical notions upon which mankind hitherto has mostly built\n    its ethical ideals.\u201d _Kant_ was the pioneer here: \u201cIn so far as\n    morality is based on the conception of man as a free, being, it\n    requires neither the idea of a superior being to make him\n    cognizant of his duties, nor any motive but the law itself in\n    order to observe it ... hence morality for its own sake does not\n    by any means need religion.\u201d This is the viewpoint of the\n    autonomous man, who is his own law. \u201cFrom the viewpoint of\n    authority,\u201d so tells us _E. von Hartmann_, \u201cautonomy does not mean\n    anything else but that in ethical matters I am for myself the\n    highest court without appeal.... The God, Who in the beginning\n    spoke to His children from a fiery cloud ... has descended into\n    our bosom, and, transformed into our own being, speaks out of us\n    as a moral autonomy.\u201d _Diis extinctis successit humanitas._\n\n\n\u201cAlthough an individual representative of science may be a believer in God\nin his private life,\u201d so argues the English philosopher, _W. James_, \u201cat\nany rate the times have passed when it could be said that the heavens\nannounce to science the glory of God, and that the heaven shows the works\nof His hands.\u201d The flight from divinity, atheism open or disguised, is the\npsychological effect of the liberal principle. Free thought aims to free\nman of all authority, it aims at severing from religion his entire\nexistence, marriage, state, schools, and likewise science. \u201cIt is\nundeniable,\u201d we hear from the lips of champions of modern man, standing on\nthe pinnacle of religious liberalism, \u201cthat there is a certain\nforsakenness in this existence of man, as compared to a life brightened by\nthe idea of a God,\u201d but that forsakenness is not purchased too dearly, for\n\u201cit is the solitude of autonomy, a possession so precious that no price\nfor it could be too high\u201d (_Carneri_).\n\nIndeed, these modern men use even plainer language: science is applauded\nfor having at last freed man from God. With _Kant\u2019s_ principle that we\ncannot know anything of the supernatural, we are told, there \u201cwere thrown\noverboard the cosmogonic notions of the Semitic races, notions that have\nso severely oppressed our science and religion, and are still oppressing\nthem.... By this insight an idol is smashed. In a previous chapter I\ncalled the Israelites the worshippers of abstract idols; now, I believe, I\nshall be fully understood.\u201d Indeed, we understand. It means: Away with\nGod. \u201cThis German metaphysics frees us from idolatry and reveals to us the\nliving divinity in our own bosom\u201d (_Chamberlain_).\n\nThis is the manner in which this free thought, within science and without,\nis fulfilling the earnest admonition of the Psalmist: \u201cSeek ye the Lord\nand be strengthened: seek His face evermore\u201d (Ps. civ. 4), and it turns\ninto irony the words: \u201cThis is the generation of them that seek Him, of\nthem that seek the face of the God of Jacob\u201d (Ps. xxiii. 6).\n\n\n\n\u201cI Know not Jesus Christ, His Only Begotten Son, Our Lord.\u201d\n\n\nWhere the thought of independence and of this world enslaves the minds,\nand holds them captive in harsh aversion to the supernatural, an objective\njudgment on the nature and history of the Christian religion, to say\nnothing of the Catholic Church, can hardly be hoped for. What may be\nexpected is that we will also meet here with a science which, with its\nhands held before the eye that fears the light, wards off and combats\neverything that is specifically Christian. It is to be feared only that it\nwill turn light into darkness regarding the view of life, as also the\ndoctrine and history, of the Christian religion.\n\nRegarding the Christian view of life we need only read the superficial and\nyet so arrogant discussions of Christian philosophy, as found in\n_Paulsen_, _Wundt_, or _E. von Hartmann_. From this judicial bench the\nwisdom of Him, of Whom it is said \u201cAnd we saw His glory, full of grace and\ntruth,\u201d we see condemned, if not even treated with subtle ridicule.\n\nLet us for instance take _Paulsen\u2019s_ presentment of the \u201cView of Life\nunder Christianity.\u201d Whoever reads it, and believes it, to him the\nteaching of Jesus Christ can only be, what the Apostle said it was to the\nheathens, foolishness. No longer can he have adoration for its Founder,\nbut rather the pity that one has for an enthusiastic visionary devoid of\nany knowledge of the world and men. The wisdom taught by Christ is\ndistorted into a sombre grimace, while side by side with it the conception\nof life of Hellenic paganism is transfigured into a beautiful ideal.\n\n\n    We are told there: \u201cWhile classical antiquity saw as the task of\n    life the perfect development of the natural powers and talents of\n    man, ... Christianity with clear consciousness makes the contrary\n    the goal of life.\u201d \u201cThe cultivation and exercise of intellectual\n    faculties was of great importance to the Greeks.... Primitive\n    Christianity looks upon reason and natural cognition with\n    indifference, even with suspicion and contempt ... indeed, natural\n    reason and knowledge are an obstacle for the kingdom of God.\n    Christianity at first was indifferent, even inimical, not only to\n    philosophy and science, but also to art and poetry. It cuts off\n    not only sensual but also \u00e6sthetical gratification,\u201d because _St.\n    John_ condemned the gratification of the eyes (which means\n    something quite different from \u00e6sthetical gratification)\n    Christianity is said to reject \u201cthe arts of the Muses and\n    athletics: they belong to that sowing of the flesh of which the\n    harvest is perdition.\u201d \u201cWhat the Christians valued highly was not\n    erudition and eloquence, but silence. Silence is the first thing\n    recommended by _Ambrose_\u201d (and he the great and renowned\n    representative of early Christian eloquence!). There is more: \u201cIn\n    the primitive view the first virtue was valour, especially valour\n    in war; indeed, in Greek and Latin speech the word \u2019virtue\u2019 meant\n    valour; the Christian\u2019s virtue, however, is patience and\n    endurance. He does not draw the sword; to him are expressly\n    forbidden not only anger, hatred, and private revenge, but even\n    litigation.\u201d\n\n    In this tendentious strain _Paulsen_ continues, with exaggerations\n    and misrepresentations that have nothing in common with science.\n    According to the Greek view, he says, high-mindedness was a great\n    virtue, but, naturally, the Christian is not allowed to have it;\n    \u201cthe virtue of the Christian is humility,\u201d _i.e._, in _Paulsen\u2019s_\n    sense low-mindedness; this is \u201cthe starting point of\n    Christianity.\u201d True, the author assures us that Christianity of\n    to-day is no longer the one he is describing; it has adapted\n    itself more to the world. But it is sad to have this gloomy,\n    visionary fanaticism described to us as the one which was taught\n    by the words of Jesus Himself.\n\n    The adherent of this Christianity looks upon governments and their\n    aims as something essentially foreign to it, even to be an\n    official \u201cwould doubtless have been felt as a contradiction\u201d; but\n    a sudden change is said to have taken place under _Constantine_.\n    Earthly joys and benefits, the holy ties of the family, those that\n    Jesus in person blessed at Cana, they were, according to _St.\n    Paul_, so we are told, in the spirit of Christ things to avoid and\n    condemn.\n\n    And how are these theological discoveries proven, what sources are\n    quoted in substantiation? By some arbitrarily selected passages of\n    the Scriptures, that one must hate father and mother, wife and\n    child, brother and sister; that the poor in spirit are blessed,\n    that the lust of the eye is sinful, that evil should not be\n    resisted; and in quoting these passages all scientific\n    interpretation is carefully avoided, all the writers who have\n    amply explained them are ignored. And what the scriptural passages\n    fail to prove must be demonstrated by some extreme statement\n    borrowed from _Tertullian_, who is generally prone to\n    exaggeration. As a matter of course, gloomy Christianity then\n    seems inferior to the brilliancy of Greek paganism; Christianity\n    is directly a danger to civilization; it may be good enough for\n    those tired of life. \u201cThe objection has been made that the\n    fulfilment of this command would destroy our entire civilization.\n    Most probably this would be the case. But where is it written (in\n    Holy Writ) that our civilization must be preserved?\u201d We have here\n    the picture formed of the doctrine of Christ by the world, whereof\n    the Lord has predicted: the world will hate you. _Paulsen_ admits\n    frankly: \u201cWhence this hatred? Because the Christian despises that\n    which to the world is the highest good. There can be no better\n    reason for hating any one....\u201d\n\n    It is easy to understand that one who has for a long time mentally\n    abandoned his Christian faith, cannot carry in mind its picture as\n    undistorted as he did in his better days, and as would conform to\n    reality. But it is reprehensible to exhibit in public this\n    picture, without having previously and conscientiously examined\n    the main lines, to see whether they are not caricatures. And they\n    are caricatures, traced by a hand that is led by the mood of a\n    secret anti-Christianity.\n\n\nA treatment identical with that of its view of life is accorded to the\n_doctrine and history of the Christian religion_. Not science and\nuncorrupted truthfulness, but antipathy, presumption, harsh denial of\neverything divine, only too often point the way. Let us listen again to\nthe author named above, since he knows to express modern thought with a\nclearness and precision almost unequalled by any one else.\n\n\n    It made a painful impression to find in the Christmas number,\n    1908, of the liberal-theological \u201cChristliche Welt\u201d a posthumous\n    article by _Fr. Paulsen_: \u201cWhat think you of Christ: Whose Son is\n    He?\u201d The article was without doubt one of the last he had written.\n    It contains the program of modern liberal science. \u201cWith the\n    seventeenth century,\u201d we read there, \u201cbegins the reorganization of\n    the theory of the universe by science. Its general tendency may be\n    described by the formula: Elimination of the supernatural from the\n    natural and historical world.\u201d \u201cConsequently, no miracles in\n    history, no supernatural birth, no resurrection, no revelation, in\n    fact no interference by the Eternal in temporal events.\u201d Hence,\n    the man who \u201cthinks scientifically _in this wise_ can have no\n    doubt that the old ecclesiastical dogma cannot be reconciled with\n    scientific thought.\u201d This, of course, amounts to a complete\n    renunciation of positive Christianity.\n\n    This scientific thought, in the words of _Baumgarten_, \u201crejects\n    any projection of the supernatural into tangible reality\u201d;\n    especially is \u201cthe metaphysical genesis and nature of the Saviour\n    highly offensive to our ethical consciousness,\u201d even \u201cabsolutely\n    unbearable.\u201d The Christian religion can no longer be permitted to\n    overtower other religions by its supernaturalness. \u201cThe\n    distinction between a revealed and a natural religion becomes an\n    impossibility,\u201d says _W. Bousset_. And _Wundt_ declares:\n    \u201cChristianity, as an \u2018absolute\u2019 or a \u2018revealed\u2019 religion, would\n    stand opposed to all other religious development, as an\n    incommensurable magnitude. This point of view, evidently, cannot\n    be competent for our speculations.\u201d\n\n\nHaving become the ruling mode of thought, these presumptions determine\nfrom the outset the results to be obtained by \u201cresearch,\u201d and they force\nit to violate its own method, so that it may be dragged along the by-ways\nand false ways of a mistaken, philosophical a-priorism, thereby making\nfreedom of science a mockery. From the abundant material at our disposal\nlet us take only one example, viz., the _Modern Criticism of the Gospels_.\n\nThe Gospels contain many records of facts of a supernatural character, of\nmiracles and prophecies. That these records are necessarily false is the\nfirst principle of the historical, or critical, method, as it is called.\n\u201cAs a miracle of itself is unthinkable, so the miracles in the history of\nChristianity, and in the Christianity of the New Testament, are likewise\nunthinkable. Hence, when miracles are nevertheless narrated, these\nnarratives must be false, in as far as they report miracles: that is,\neither the relation did not happen at all, or, if it did, there was a\nsufficient natural explanation\u201d; \u201cthe historian must under all\ncircumstances answer, \u2018No,\u2019 to the question whether the report of a\nmiracle is worthy of belief\u201d (_T. Zeller_). Thus instructed,\n\u201cunprejudiced\u201d research proceeds to construct its results of the\ninvestigation of the genuineness, time and date, of the writing of the\nGospels and of the Acts, as well as of their credibility. Let us see how\nthis is done.\n\nThe tradition of the early Church, as well as intrinsic evidence, testify\nthat the first Gospel was really written by the Apostle _Matthew_, and\nthis certainly before the destruction of Jerusalem. Liberal-Protestant\ncriticism, however, assigns its origin to a time after the year 70,\nchiefly for two reasons: First, the striking prophecy of the destruction\nof Jerusalem, conforming so accurately to the actual event, could have\nbeen written only after the year 70; otherwise it would have amounted to a\nreal prophecy subsequently fulfilled, a conclusion that cannot be\naccepted. The second reason is this: The contents of _St. Matthew\u2019s_\nGospel is already wholly Catholic, hence it must have been written during\na later, Catholic, period. For as there can be no influences from above,\nand as everything is evolved in a natural way, the principle must govern:\nthat the more supernatural and the more dogmas, so much later the period\nin question; at first there could have been only a religion of sentiment\nwithout dogma, which gradually developed into Catholic dogmatism. Similar\nare the presumptions which direct modern research in respect to the\ngenuineness of the other Gospels and the Acts. A few proofs:\n\n\n    Prof. _J\u00fclicher_ thinks that, \u201cWhile we cannot go prior to the\n    beginning of the second century, because of external testimony, we\n    cannot on the other hand maintain a later date. The most probable\n    time for our Gospel is the one shortly before the year 100....\u201d\n    Why? \u201cBecause the ill-fitting feature in the parable of the\n    wedding feast, that the king in his wrath, because his invitation\n    had been made light of, sent forth his armies and destroyed those\n    murderers and burned up their city, could hardly have been\n    invented before the conflagration of Jerusalem\u201d\u2014a prophecy,\n    namely, of the coming destruction of Jerusalem cannot be admitted.\n    \u201cBut to my mind, the decisive point is found in the religious\n    position of _Matthew_. Despite his conservative treatment of\n    tradition, he already stands quite removed from its spirit; he has\n    written a Catholic Gospel.... To _Matthew_ the congregation, the\n    Church, forms the highest court of discipline, being the\n    administrator of all heavenly goods of salvation; his Gospel\n    determines who is to rule, who to give laws: in its essential\n    features the early Catholicism is completed.\u201d\n\n    _J\u00fclicher_ arrives at a similar conclusion in his research on _St.\n    Luke\u2019s_ Gospel: \u201cThat _Luke\u2019s_ Gospel was written sometime after\n    the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 A.D., is proven beyond any\n    doubt, by xxi. 22-24, where the terrible events of the Jewish war\n    are \u2018foretold.\u2019... All arguments in favor of a later date of\n    writing concerning _Matthew_ hold good also of _Luke_.\u201d Even more\n    unreserved is _O. Pfleiderer_, until recently a prominent\n    representative of liberal-Protestant theology at Berlin: \u201cIn this\n    Gospel we find the elements of dogma, morals, the constitution of\n    the developing Catholic Church. Catholic is its trinitarian\n    formula of christening, this embryo of the Creed and of the\n    apostolic symbol. Catholic is its teaching of Christ ... Catholic,\n    the doctrine of Salvation ... Catholic are the morals ...\n    Catholic, finally, is the importance attached to _Peter_ as the\n    foundation of the Church and as the bearer of the power of the\n    key.\u201d In regard to this latter point _Pfleiderer_ remarks\n    expressly: \u201cIn spite of all attempts of Protestants to mitigate\n    this passage (Matt. xvi. 17-20) there is no doubt that it contains\n    the solemn proclamation of _Peter\u2019s_ Primacy.\u201d The unsophisticated\n    reader thereupon would be likely to deduct: If the oldest Gospel\n    is already Catholic, then it must be admitted that earliest\n    Christianity was already Catholic. In so reasoning he might have\n    rightly concluded, but he would have shown himself little\n    acquainted with the method of liberal science. This infers\n    contrariwise: early Christianity must not be Catholic, hence the\n    Catholic Gospel cannot be so old, it must be the fraudulent\n    concoction of a later time; \u201chence the origin of the Gospel of\n    _Matthew_ is to be put down not before the time of _Hadrian_; in\n    the fourth century rather than in the third.\u201d\n\n    _A. Harnack_ fixes the date of the Gospel at shortly after 70,\n    because \u201c_Matthew_, as well as _Luke_, are presupposing the\n    destruction of Jerusalem. This follows with the greatest\n    probability from Matt. xxii. 7 (the parable of the marriage\n    feast).\u201d This is to be held also of _Luke\u2019s_ Gospel. \u201cThis much\n    can be concluded without hesitation: that, as now admitted by\n    almost all critics, _Luke\u2019s_ Gospel presupposes the destruction of\n    Jerusalem.\u201d\n\n    Remarkable is _Harnack\u2019s_ latest attitude towards the Acts; it\n    shows again that the results of modern biblical criticism are less\n    the results of historical research than of philosophical\n    presumptions. In his \u201cActs of the Apostles\u201d _Harnack_ admits:\n    \u201cVery weighty observations indicate that the Acts (hence also the\n    Gospels) were already written at the beginning of the sixties.\u201d In\n    substantiation he cites not less than six reasons which evidently\n    prove it: they are based upon the principles of sound historical\n    criticism. \u201cThese are opposed solely by the observation that the\n    prophecy about the catastrophe of Jerusalem in some striking\n    points comes near to the actual event, and that the reports about\n    the Apparition and the legend of the Ascension would be hard to\n    understand prior to the destruction of Jerusalem. It is hard to\n    decide.... But it is not difficult to judge on which side the\n    weightier arguments are\u201d (viz., on the part of the contention for\n    an earlier date). Yet _Harnack_ is loath to accept the better\n    scientific reasons: they must suffer correction by presumptions.\n    He formulates his final decision in the following way: \u201c_Luke_\n    wrote at the time of _Titus_, or during the earlier time of\n    _Domitian_ (?), but perhaps (only _perhaps_, in spite of decisive\n    arguments) already at the beginning of the sixties.\u201d (Recently\n    _Harnack_ recedes to the time before the destruction of Jerusalem\n    without, however, acknowledging a divine prophecy of this\n    catastrophe.) Similar is this theologian\u2019s proof that the fourth\n    Gospel could not have been written by _John_, the son of\n    _Zebedee_; because xxi. 20-23 (I will that he tarry till I come)\n    cannot be a prophecy, but must have been written down after the\n    death of the favourite disciple. \u201cThe section xx. 20-23 obviously\n    presupposes the death of the beloved disciple; on the other hand\n    he cannot be left out of the 21st Chapter. This 21st Chapter,\n    however, shows no other pen than that which had written Chapters\n    1-20. This proves that the author of Chapter 21, hence the author\n    of Chapters 1-20, could not have been the son of _Zebedee_, whose\n    death is there presupposed.\u201d The whole argument again rests upon\n    the refusal to hold possible a prophecy from the lips of Jesus.\n\n    The main reason, however, for disputing the genuineness of the\n    fourth Gospel, although external tradition and internal criterions\n    testify to it as the writing of _St. John_, is, because it teaches\n    so clearly the _divinity of Christ_: and this must be denied.\n    Significant are, for instance, the words in which _Weizs\u00e4cker_\n    sums up his objections to this gospel: \u201cThat the Apostle, the\n    favorite disciple according to the Gospel, who sat at the table\n    beside Christ, should have looked upon and represented everything\n    that he once experienced, as the living together with the\n    incarnate divine Logos, is rather a puzzle. No power of faith and\n    no philosophy can be imagined big enough to extinguish the memory\n    of real life and to replace it by this miraculous image of a\n    divine being ... of one of the original Apostles, it is\n    unthinkable. Upon this the decision of this point will always\n    hinge. Anything else that may be added from the contents of the\n    Gospel is subordinate.\u201d This means, Christ cannot be admitted to\n    be a Divine Being\u2014impossible. An eye-witness could not take Him\n    for it: therefore, this \u201cmiraculous picture of a Divine Being\u201d\n    cannot have been the work of an eye-witness.\n\n\nLike the _genuineness_ of the Gospels, so is also their _credibility_\nbeyond a doubt. Two of them are written by Apostles, the two others by\nDisciples of the Apostles: they also have all the marks peculiar to\nwritings of eye or ear witnesses, or of persons who have heard the\nnarratives directly from the lips of eye-witnesses. Nor would any one\ndoubt their credibility if they did not report supernatural facts. But,\nthis being the case, infidel research is bound to arrive at the opposite\nresult.\n\nThe writers were frauds\u2014this was long ago the hypothesis of the\nsuperficial Hamburg Professor, _Samuel Reimarus_, whose \u201cFragments\u201d were\npublished by _Lessing_. But even to a _D. F. Strauss_ \u201csuch a suspicion\nwas repulsive.\u201d The Heidelberg Professor, _H. E. Paulus_, sought his\nsalvation in trying to reduce the reports of miracles to a natural sense,\nby doing painful violence to the text: for instance, the Lord did not walk\n_upon_ the sea, but only _along_ the sea; the miracle of the wine at Cana\nwas only a wedding joke. Then came _D. F. Strauss_ (died 1874), and he\ntried it in a different way. \u201cIf the Gospels are really historical\ndocuments, then the miracle cannot be removed from the life of Jesus.\u201d\nHence, it is to remain? Indeed not! The Gospels must not be accepted as\nhistorical sources. They are products of purposeless poetic legends, the\nmiracles are garlands of religious myths, gradually twined around the\npicture of Jesus. Myths, however, need time for their formation, hence\n_Strauss_ fixes the date of the Gospels within the second century. He\nopenly admits that his hypothesis would fall to the ground if but a single\nGospel has been written in the first century. As a fact, more recent\nrationalistic criticism has found itself constrained to drop this\nhypothesis. _F. Ch. Baur_ (died 1860) fell back upon the fraud-hypothesis\nof a _Reimarus_. It, too, has been laid among the dead. Thus they have\nexhausted themselves in the attempt to shake off the burdensome yoke of\ntruth.\n\nInfluenced by _Strauss_, _Baur_, and other German critics, _E. Renan_\n(died 1892) wrote his \u201cLife of Jesus,\u201d a frivolous romance. Quite frank\nare the words he wrote down in the preface to the thirteenth edition of\nhis \u201cVie de J\u00e9sus\u201d (1883): \u201cIf miracle has any reality, then my book is\nnothing but a tissue of errors.... If the miracle and the inspiration of\ncertain books are real things, then our method is abominable.\u201d But he\nsilences all doubts by the phrase: \u201cTo admit the supernatural is alone\nsufficient to place one\u2019s self outside of science.\u201d\n\nThe newer \u201chistorical-critical\u201d school, while having disposed of many\ncontentions of the old schools, is nevertheless in its research bound just\nas energetically by the postulate of conformity to natural laws. The\nfourth Gospel is pushed aside: in the others all miraculous occurrences\nare expounded away, till the \u201chistorically credible core\u201d is reached.\n\nThe books of the Old Testament fare even worse, if possible.\n\n\n    \u201cDoes Genesis relate history or a legend?\u201d asks Prof. _Gunkel_,\n    and continues: \u201cthis is no longer a question to the historian.\u201d\n    Well, a legend, then. But how does the historian know this? From\n    his own pantheistic philosophy, which recognizes no God differing\n    from this world: \u201cThe narratives of Genesis being mostly of a\n    religious nature, they continuously speak of God. The way,\n    however, in which narratives speak of God is one of the most\n    reliable standards to judge whether they are meant historically or\n    poetically. Here, too, the historian cannot do without a world\n    philosophy. We believe that God acts in the world as the latent,\n    hidden motive of all things ... but He never appears to us as an\n    acting factor _jointly with others_ (the italics are the\n    author\u2019s), but always as the ultimate cause of all things. Quite\n    different in many narratives of Genesis. We are able to understand\n    these narratives of miracles and apparitions as the artlessness of\n    primitive people, but we refuse to believe them.\u201d\n\n\nAnalogous to Bible-criticism is the research in other branches of\ntheology. The _origin of Christianity_, this wonderful power which so\nsuddenly made its appearance in history and speedily vanquished a whole\nworld, must of course not be a work of Heaven. Hence its origin must be\nexplained at any cost in a natural way, or \u201chistorically,\u201d as they put it.\nThe religious notions of Christianity must not be conceded a supernatural\ncertainty over all other religions; and \u201cto understand an event\nhistorically means: to conceive it by its causal connection with the\nconditions of a given place and at a certain time of the human life. Hence\nscience cannot consider such a thing as the appearance of a supernatural\nbeing upon the earth\u201d (_Pfleiderer_).\n\nAnd then they proceed to show that Christianity is a natural, evolutionary\nproduct of the Israelite religion, of Greek philosophy, of Oriental myths,\nand Roman customs. That it is far superior to all these, and that it is\nthe opposite to them in various ways, is carefully hushed up. The\ninadequacy and impossibility of such an explanation is adroitly concealed.\nNor could the Israelite religion of the Old Covenant, according to the\nnaturalistic principle of liberal theology, have had its origin in\nrevelation and the prophets; hence it comes from Babylon, as the product\nof natural evolution from Oriental myths and customs. Any old and new\nanalogies, hypotheses, and fancies are good enough then to demonstrate\nthis as \u201chistorical.\u201d\n\n\n\nThe Truth is not in Them.\n\n\nWe pause here. We might thus continue for a long time; but it is enough.\nThe patient reader, who has accompanied us on the tedious way to this\npoint, may begin to feel tired. May he excuse the detailed recital for the\nreason that we had to do some extensive reconnoitring, through the\nprecincts of modern philosophical-religious research, to avoid the\nreproach that we were making accusations without furnishing proofs. Our\ncontention was, that liberal science is trying to shake off the yoke of\nreligious truth, and to explain it away by its self-made presumptions. We\nbelieve that we have proved our contention.\n\nWe are confronted by a science that boasts of monopolizing the spirit of\ntruthfulness; as a matter of fact, we see that it uses all scientific\ndevices to shirk the truth and to disguise its effort. In loquacious\nprotests it rejects the \u201crigid dogmatism,\u201d the \u201cfixed views,\u201d of the\nChristian faith, and it proclaims experience and reason as the sole\ncriterions of scientific cognition; yet it always stands upon the platform\nof rigid presumptions, that are derived from no experience, and which no\nreason can prove. It clamours for research free from presumption, and,\nwithout winking an eye, substitutes its own presumption, secretly or\nopenly. It is _dishonest_.\n\nIt promises to preserve for man the highest ideals and blessings for which\nhis mind is yearning, yet it has no religion and no God. It recalls to\nmind the words spoken by _St. Augustine_ of the philosophers whom he had\nfollowed in the false ways of his youth: \u201cThey said: truth, and always\ntruth, and talked much of truth, but it was not in them.... Oh, truth,\ntruth, how deeply my inmost spirit sighed after thee, while they filled my\nears incessantly with thy bare name and with the palaver of their bulky\nvolumes.\u201d Free it wants to be, this science. One of its disciples boasted:\n\u201cIt has taught its disciples to look down without dizziness from the airy\nheights of sovereign scepticism. How easy and free one breathes up there!\u201d\nAye, it has made itself free,\u2014from the yoke of unpalatable truth. So much\nmore firmly is it fettered, not with the holy bonds of belief in God, but\nby the more burdensome mental yoke of a disbelief that weakens and blinds\nthe eyes against the cognition of the higher truth:\u2014and bound by the\nchains of public opinion, which threatens anathema to every one who fails\nto stop at the border of the natural. Truly free is only the science that\nenjoys a clear and free perception for the truth. Unfree is a science that\nrestrains the mental eye with the blinkers of theophoby. Our age seeks for\nthe lost happiness of the soul, it seeks longingly God and the\nsupernatural that have been removed from its sight. But science, so often\nits leader, loathingly dodges God, and refuses to fold the hands and pray.\nAs long as our age does not break with a science that refuses to know a\nGod and a Saviour, so long will it hopelessly grope about without result,\nand look in vain for an escape from the wretched labyrinth of doubt.\n\n\n\n\nChapter II. The Unscientific Method.\n\n\nThe efforts of liberal science, to remove more and more from its scope the\nsupernatural powers, show clearly that man may feel the truth to be a\nyoke, and that he may attempt to free himself from this yoke by opposing\nthe truth and by substituting postulates for knowledge. Sceptical,\nautonomous subjectivism, the philosophy of liberal free thought, has\nchanged the nature of human reasoning, and its relation to truth, and\nperverted it to its very opposite. No longer is the human mind the vassal\nof Queen Truth, as _Plutarch_ put it, but the autocratic ruler who\ndegrades truth to the position of a servant. Thus liberal freedom of\nthought becomes the principle of an unscientific method, because it loses,\nby false reasoning and false truth, the first condition of solid and\nscientific research; furthermore, by treating the highest questions with\nconsequent levity, it betrays a lack of earnestness which again renders it\nunfit for scientific research in serious matters.\n\n\n\nFalse Reasoning.\n\n\n\u201cThe philosophical thinkers of to-day,\u201d says an admirer of _Kant_, _A.\nSabatier_, \u201cmay be divided into two classes, the pre-Kantian and those who\nhave received their initiation and their philosophical baptism from\n_Kant\u2019s_ Critic.\u201d\n\nThe Christian philosophy of a _St. Thomas_, which is, as even\nrepresentatives of modern philosophy are constrained to admit, \u201ca system\ncarried out with clear perception and great sagacity\u201d (_Paulsen_),\ncontains many a principle, the intrinsic merit of which will be fully\nappreciated only when contrasted with the experiments of modern\nphilosophy. An instance is the principle of the old school, that cognition\nis the likeness of that which is cognized. Apart from the cognition by\nsense, we are given here the only correct principle, coinciding with the\ngeneral conviction that reasoning is the mental reproduction of an\nobjective order of existence, independent of us, even in our conception of\nthe metaphysical world. Thinking does not create its object, but is a\nreproduction of it; it is not a producer, but a painter, who copies the\nworld with his mental brush within himself, sometimes only in the\nindistinct outlines of indefinite conception, often, however, in the sharp\nlines of clear cognition.\n\nIf, according to its nature, thinking is subject to standards and laws\ngiven it by an objective world, then subjective arbitrariness, a method of\nthought which, while pretending to be a free producer of truth, yet\ndetermines it according to necessity or desire; and, even more so, a\nmethod of thought which feels itself justified to hold an opinion upon the\nsame question in one way to-day, and another and entirely opposite one\nto-morrow, is wholly incomprehensible: just as incomprehensible as if a\ndraughtsman, attempting to draw a true picture of St. Peter\u2019s Church,\nwould not follow the reality but prefer to draw the picture at random,\naccording to his fancy and mood.\n\nWe have stated these fundamental principles already at the beginning of\nour book, we have also set forth how greatly liberal freedom of thought is\nlacking the first presumption of any proper science, namely, the clear\nperception that there is an objective truth in philosophical-religious\nquestions, to which we must submit, there, in fact, most of all.\n\nNo! We also want autonomy of thought, especially in questions of\nmetaphysics, where, anyway, there can only be postulates! so shouted\n_Kant_ to the modern world on the threshold of the nineteenth century.\nThere are no stable truths, everything is relative and changing, adds the\nmodern theory of evolution. At last there is freedom for thought and\nresearch, freedom from the yoke of absolute truth! Behold the aberrations\nof an unbridled rush for freedom which moves the world of to-day. This\nunruly hankering for a freer existence than allowed by their nature and\nposition, makes unbearable to many modern children of man the idea of iron\nlaws of truth and marked boundaries of thought. Revelling in the\nconsciousness of their sovereign personality, they want to measure all\nthings by their individuality, even religion, philosophy, truth, and\nethics. Only that what is created and experienced by them within the\nsanctuary of their personality, only what is made important and legitimate\nby their sentiment, is truth and of value to them. _Autonomism_ thus\nchanges unnoticeably into _individualism_; the own individuality, in its\npeculiar inclinations, moods, and humours, its exigencies and egotistical\naims, its infirmities and diseases\u2014they have, under the name of\n_individual reason_, become the law of thinking and reasoning.\n\n\n\nWithout Knowledge of the Human Nature.\n\n\n\u201cVaried, according to character, are the demands made by heart and mind,\u201d\nassures us a representative of modern philosophy, \u201ccorresponding to them\nis the image of the world to which the individual turns by inner\nnecessity. He may waver hither and thither, uncertain as to himself; at\nlast, however, his innermost tendency of life will prevail and press him\ninto the view of the world corresponding to his individuality. Upon its\nfurther development worldly and local influences will play a very\nimportant part. But the deciding factor in giving the direction is\npersonality.\u201d \u201cAnd,\u201d continues Prof. _Adickes_, \u201cthe sharper and more\none-sided a character type is brought to expression, the more it will be\nurged into a certain metaphysical or religious tendency, and this man will\nfind no rest, nor feel himself at home in the world, until he has found\nthe view of life that fits him. Nor does man assemble his metaphysics with\ndiscrimination on the grounds of logical necessity, choosing here,\nrejecting there, but it grows within himself by that inner compulsion\nidentical with true freedom.\u201d Hence, not unselfish yielding to truth, no,\nthe inclinations of heart and mind, the \u201cpersonality\u201d must form the view\nof the world. Let every type of character therefore develop itself sharply\nand one-sidedly, let every one get the view of the world corresponding to\nhimself, without regard to objective truth and logical necessity. This\nprecisely is the \u201ctrue freedom.\u201d \u201cFor when is a man more free, than when\nhe chooses and does\u2014without any compulsion, even resisting compulsion\u2014what\nhis innermost soul is urging him to choose and do? How could he be more\ntrue to himself, more like himself?\u201d With such a freedom \u201cthe outer\ncompulsion\u201d of an absolute truth, to say nothing of the duty to believe,\nwill not agree. \u201cThe core of one\u2019s very being,\u201d so _Harnack_ informs us,\n\u201cshould be grasped in its depths, and the soul should only know its own\nneeds and the way indicated by it to gratify them.\u201d \u201cAccording to my\ncharacter,\u201d says _Adickes_ again, \u201cis the world reflected within myself by\nintrinsic necessity just as my creed represents it, and no opponent is\nable to shake my position by arguments of reason or by empirical facts.\u201d\n\nHence it is not only true, as has been known from the beginning, that the\ninclinations of the heart are trying to prevail upon reason to urge their\ndesires, and to oppose what displeases them, and that reason must beware\nof the heart\u2014no, inclination and character are now directly called upon to\nshape our religion and view of the world. Every type of man, every period,\nmay construct its own philosophical system, or, if this is beyond it, at\nleast its own ideas; it may also shape its own Christianity, according to\nits experience. As the individual chooses his clothes, and puts his\nindividuality into them, in like manner may the individual put on the view\nof life that fits him.\n\nThese principles represent the apostasy from objective truth, and, at the\nsame time, the apostasy from the _principles of true science_: their first\ndemand, the proper understanding of truth, is perverted into its very\nopposite. A necessary quality of scientific research is exactness;\nexactness, however, demands most conscientious cleaving to truth; scale\nand measure are its instruments. The reverse of exactness is to cast away\nscale and measure, to turn eye and ear, not toward reality, but toward\none\u2019s self, so as to observe personal wishes and inclinations, and then\nshape the results of the \u201cresearch\u201d accordingly. This may be a method of\nfreedom, but it cannot be the method of science. The very thing that true\nresearch would eliminate in the first place, viz., to have the decision\ninfluenced by hobbies and moods, is most important in the method of\nindividualism; objectiveness, deemed by true science the highest\nrequirement, is to that method the least one: what true science first of\nall insists on, namely, to prove that which is claimed, this method knows\nbut little of. It recalls the method of the gourmet who selects that which\ngratifies his taste: it may be likened to the dandy picking frock-coat and\ntrousers that suit his whim. True research, with a firm hand at the helm,\naims to direct its craft so as to discover new coasts, or at least a new\nisland; the exploring done by liberal research is like casting off the\nrudder to be tossed by the waves, for its task is only to hold to the\ncourse which the waving billows of individual life give to it. True\nscience, finally, seeks for serious results, able to withstand criticism:\nthe research by individualism produces results which, as individualism\nitself confesses, must not be taken seriously. They are the subjective\nachievements of amateurs, creations of fashion, cut to the pattern of the\nruling principle: _nihil nisi quod modernum est_. A science that professes\nsuch a method is beyond a doubt unfit to play a beneficial part in the\nendeavour of mankind.\n\nDo not say: but it is not claimed that religion and view of life are\nmatters of scientific research: on the contrary, they are always\ndistinguished from science. It is true, this is not infrequently claimed.\nBut it is also known how energetically just these matters are appropriated\nby science. Is it not exactly this sphere in which free research is to be\nactive? Is it not its aim to construct a \u201cscientific view of the world,\u201d\nas opposed to the Christian belief? Is there not the conviction that\nscience has already carried much light and enlightenment into this very\nsphere, that it has upset the old tenets of faith?\n\nAnd what an amount of _ignorance of human nature_ underlies these\nprinciples! It is the same complete misconception that has always\ncharacterized liberalism, and which it has also manifested in economical\nmatters. There, too, it demanded boundless freedom for all economic\nsources, ignoring man\u2019s disordered inclinations that will work disorder\nand destruction if not restrained by laws. In a similar manner they dream\nthat man, if left to the unrestrained influence of his personality, will\nsoar without fail to the heights of the pure truth. They know no longer\nthe maxim once engraved by the wisdom of the ancient world upon Delphi\u2019s\nsanctuary: \u201cKnow thyself\u201d! They no longer know the beguiling and benumbing\ninfluence exerted upon reason by inclination, how it fetters the mind.\n_Amor premit oculos_, says Quintilian. The thing we like, we desire to\nestablish as true; favourable arguments are decisive, counter arguments\nare ignored or belittled, inclinations guide the observation, determine\nthe books and sources drawn from. If we meet with something unsympathetic,\nsomething that interferes with the liberties we have grown fond of, it\ntakes a rare degree of unselfishness to love the painful truth more than\none\u2019s self. It is easy to leave cool reason in control in mathematical\nspeculations: they seldom affect the heart; quite different, however, in\nquestions of philosophy and religion that often have vexatious\nconsequences.\n\n\n    We have to concede that _D. F. Strauss_ was right when he wrote:\n    \u201cHe who writes about the Rulers of Nineveh or the Pharaohs of\n    Egypt, may pursue a purely historical interest: but Christianity\n    is a power so alive, and the question of what occurred at its\n    origin is involved in such vast consequences for the immediate\n    present, that the inquirer would have to be dull-witted to be\n    interested only in a purely historical way in the solution of\n    these questions.\u201d But we must also regret that this personal\n    interest has misled him, for one, into pernicious ways.\n\n    In view of the frequent assurances of the noted historian, _Th.\n    Mommsen_, that he hates the sight of old Christian inscriptions(9)\n    we may perhaps welcome it in the interest of history that he\n    refrained from writing the fourth volume of his Roman history,\n    wherein the Origin of Christianity was to be treated. One of his\n    biographers asserts that the downfall of paganism through\n    Christianity was a fact not to _Mommsen\u2019s_ liking, that \u201ca\n    description of the decomposition of all things ancient, and the\n    substitution therefor of the Nazarene spirit would not have been a\n    labour of love.\u201d(10) And again, when we see the well-known\n    historian of philosophy, _F. Ueberweg_, in a letter to _F. A.\n    Lange_, denouncing from the bitterness of his heart \u201cthe miserable\n    beggar-principle of Christianity,\u201d and the \u201csurrendering of\n    independence and of personal honour in favour of a servile\n    submission to the master, who is made a Messiah, nay, even the\n    incarnate _Son of God_,\u201d then we may well dread the historical\n    objectivity of a man of such notions in writing about the religion\n    of Jesus Christ.\n\n    With reference to the chief subject of psychology, the noted\n    psychologist, _W. James_, writes with utmost frankness: \u201cThe soul\n    is an entity, and truly one of the worst kind, a scholastic one,\n    and something said to be destined for salvation or perdition. As\n    far as I am concerned, I must frankly admit that the antipathy\n    against the particular soul I find myself burdened with, is an old\n    hardness of heart, which I cannot account for, not even to myself.\n    I will admit that the formal disposition of the question in\n    dispute would come to an end, if the existence of souls could be\n    used for an explanatory principle. I admit the soul would be a\n    means of unification, whereas the working of the brain, or ideas,\n    show no harmonizing efficacy, no matter how thoroughly\n    synchronical they be. Yet, despite these admissions, I never\n    resort in my psychologizing to the soul.\u201d\n\n\nIf we read such statement, if, in addition, we remember the\npopular-philosophical science of men like _Haeckel_, particularly perhaps\nthe literature which he recommends for information about Christianity, and\nof which he himself makes use; if we have read _Schopenhauer_,\n_Nietzsche_, or the \u201cPhilosophy of Races\u201d of a _Chamberlain_,\u2014we can no\nlonger be at a loss what to think of the \u201crule of reason\u201d and of the\n\u201csearch for pure truth.\u201d Observe, also, the restless haste of those who,\nhaving turned their back upon the Catholic Church, now proceed to attack\nher, observe their agitated work and incitement, how they rummage and\nransack the nooks and corners of the history of the Church in quest of\nrefuse and filth, and if the find is not sufficient how they even help it\nalong by forgery, all this to demonstrate to the world that the grandest\nfact in history is really absurdity and filth;\u2014then one will understand\nwhat instincts may be found there to guide \u201creason and science.\u201d How even\nsexual impulses are trying to shape their own ethics we shall not examine\nhere. _F. W. Foerster_ relates: \u201cI once heard a moral pervert expound his\nethical and religious notions; they were nothing but the reflection of his\nperverse impulses. But he thought them to be the result of his reasoning.\u201d\nIs there not known in these days the inherited disorder of the human heart\nas characterized by the Apostle in the words: \u201cBut I see another law in my\nmembers, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the\nlaw of sin (Rom. vii. 23)\u201d? The Ancients knew it. The wisdom of _Plato_\nknew it, who speaks of the \u201cpricks of sin, sunk into man, coming from an\nold, unexpiated offence, giving birth to wickedness.\u201d The wise _Cicero_\nknew of it: \u201cNature has bestowed upon us but a few sparks of knowledge,\nwhich, corrupted by bad habits and errors, we soon extinguish, with the\nresult that the light of nature does nowhere appear in its clearness and\nbrightness.\u201d Truth is often disagreeable to nature. And if not subdued and\nruled by strong discipline, nature proceeds to oppose the truth. Only to\nlofty self-discipline and purity of morals is reserved the privilege of\nfacing the highest truths with a calm eye. \u201cBlessed are the pure in heart,\nfor they shall see God.\u201d\n\n\n\nMental Bondage.\n\n\nOf this wisdom the admirer of liberal freedom knows little. Instead of\ndistinguishing the good from the evil in man, of unfolding his inner\nkernel, the pure spirit, and making it rule; instead of demanding, like\n_Pythagoras_, discipline as a preparatory school for wisdom, he has\nlearned from _Rousseau_, the master of modern Liberalism, that everything\nin man is good. Depravity of nature, original sin, are unsympathetic\nthings to his ear. Even _Goethe_ wrote to _Herder_, when _Kant_ had in his\nreligious philosophy found a radical Evil in man: \u201cAfter it has taken\n_Kant_ a lifetime to clean his philosophical gown of many filthy\nprejudices, he now outrageously slabbers it with the stain of the radical\nEvil, so that Christians, too, may be enticed to come and kiss the seam.\u201d\nInstead of exhorting for a redemption from internal fetters, as the sages\nof all ages did, the principle of wisdom now proposed is to quietly let\nindividuality develop, with all its inclinations. They call this freedom.\nIs it not the freedom whereof the slave of sensuality avails himself to\nform his theory of life? It, too, \u201cgrows up in man with that inner\ncompulsion which is identical with true freedom\u201d (_Adickes_).\n\nFreedom this may be. But _only external freedom_, the only freedom they\noften know. They are unaware that they forfeit thereby the real, the inner\nfreedom. \u201cThou aimest at free heights,\u201d admonishes even the most impetuous\nherald of freedom, \u201cthy soul is athirst for stars. But also thy wicked\nimpulses are athirst for freedom. Thy wild hounds want to be free, they\nbark joyfully in their kennel when thy spirit essays to throw open all\ndungeons.\u201d(11) They think to be free and speak of the self-assurance of\nindividual reason, and they cannot see that the mind is in the fetters of\nbondage.\n\nElse how is it that the atheistic free science, considered in general,\narrives with infallible regularity at results that obviously tend to a\nmorally loose conduct of life? How is it, that it tries throughout to\nshirk the acceptance of a personal God, and is at home only in open or\ndisguised atheism? that it so persistently avoids the acceptance of\nanything supernatural? Why does it in its researches never arrive at\ntheism, which has as much foundation at least as pantheism and atheism?\nWhy does it, nearly without exception, deny or ignore the personal\nimmortality of the soul and a Beyond; why does it never reach the opposite\nresult which, in intrinsic evidence, ranks at least on a par with it? Why\nis it not admitted, that the will is free and strictly responsible for its\nacts, although this fact is borne out by the obvious experience and\ntestimony of mankind? Why does it so regularly arrive at the conclusion\nthat the Christian religion has become untenable, and needs development;\nthat its ethics, too, must be reformed, more especially in sexual matters?\nWhy does it not defend the duty to believe, but reject it persistently? A\nstriking fact! The matters in question here concern truths that impose\nsacrifices upon man, whereas their opposites have connections of intimate\nfriendship with unpurged impulses. It may be noted also that this same\nscience, that announces to the world these results of research, meets with\nthe boisterous applause from the elements that belong to the morally\ninferior part of mankind.\n\n\n    _St. Augustine_ prays: \u201cRedeem me, O God, from the throng of\n    thoughts, which I feel so painfully within my soul, which feels\n    lowly in Thy presence, which is fleeing to Thy mercy. Grant me\n    that I may not give my assent to them; that I may disapprove of\n    them, even if they seek to delight me, and that I may not stay\n    with them in sleepiness. May they not have the power to insinuate\n    themselves into my works; may I be protected from them in my\n    resolution, may my conscience be protected by Thy keeping.\u201d It is\n    the realization of the want of freedom of the human reason, the\n    only way to the liberation from the fetters of our own\n    imperfection. He, who has seriously begun to take up the struggle\n    with his inner disorders, will, by his own experience, pray as\n    _St. Augustine_ prayed.\n\n\nRecognizing this fact, man will try to rise above himself, to cleave to a\nsuperior Power and Wisdom, who, in purer heights, untouched by human\npassions, holds aloft the truth, in order to rise thereby above his own\nbondage; he will understand the necessity of an authority clothed with\ndivine power and dignity, so that it may hold in unvanquished hands the\nideal against all onslaughts of human passions. He will without difficulty\nfind this power in the religion of Jesus Christ and in His Church: in Him,\nwho could not be accused of sin, who by His Cross has achieved the highest\ntriumph over flesh and sin, who has surrounded His Church with the bright\nthrong of saints. And if he sees this religion and Church an object of\npersecution, he will behold in it the signature of its truth. For truth is\na yoke despised by sensualism and pride, and the spiritual power that\ncontends for purity and truth will be hated.\n\n\n\nWithout Earnestness.\n\n\nThe regrettable conception of truth proper to the modern freedom of\nthought, leads to that flippancy with which our time is prone to treat the\nhighest questions. Why conscientiousness and anxious care? All that is\nneeded is to form one\u2019s personal views; there is no certain, generally\nvalid, truth in religious matters. Hence there is often in this sphere of\nscientific research a method wholly different from that in use anywhere\nelse. In history, philology, natural science, there is a striving for\nexactness, but in these matters exact reasoning is replaced only too often\nby discretionary reasoning, by loose forming of ideas; in the very domain\nwhich has ever pre-eminently been called the province of the wisdom of\nlife, there is now in vogue the method of flippancy.\n\nTrue wisdom is convinced that reason has not been given to man to grope in\nthe dark in respect to the most momentous questions of life; that reason,\nthough limited and liable to err, is given him to find the truth. True\nwisdom knows its difficulties when the matter in quest is metaphysical\ntruth: it knows how, in this case, more than in any other, reason is\nexposed to the influence of inclinations from within, and to the power of\nerror and of public opinion from without; that in these matters, least of\nall, reason is not in the habit of taking the truth by assault. True,\nthere are intuitions, and inspiration by genius\u2014they have their rights,\nbut they are the exceptions. The ordinary, and only safe, way is to\nadvance cautiously, by discoursive thinking, from cognition to cognition,\notherwise there is danger of a sudden fall from the steep path.\n\nIn the early Christian ages this insight led to careful cultivation and\napplication of certain methodical means of thinking and terms of\nexpressions, to definitions, distinctions, and forms of syllogism, with\nthat \u201cinsulting lucidity,\u201d in the words of a modern philosopher, which\ngives to them the stamp of scrupulousness. The same insight into the\ncognitive weakness of reason leads to the noble union between science and\nmodesty.\n\nWhat, however, do we see in modern philosophic-religious thinking? Often\nunsolidity, with hardly a remnant of the principles of the serious pursuit\nof knowledge.\n\nThe autonomous freethinker of these days lacks chiefly humility and\nmodesty. The ancient Sage of Samos once declined the name of \u201csage,\u201d\nsaying that God alone is wise, while man must be content to be\nwisdom-loving (\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03cc\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03bf\u03c2). Not always so the sages of modern times.\n\n\n    _Kant_ believed of his system: \u201cCritical philosophy must be\n    convinced that there is not in store for it a change of opinions,\n    no improvement nor possibly a differently formed system, but that\n    the system of criticism, resting on a fully assured basis, will be\n    established forever, indispensable for all coming ages to the\n    highest aims of mankind.\u201d _Hegel_, in turn, was no less convinced\n    of the indispensability of his doctrine. In the summer term of\n    1820 he began his lectures with the words: \u201cI would say with\n    Christ: I teach the truth, and I am the truth.\u201d Yet, to\n    _Schopenhauer_ _Hegel\u2019s_ philosophy is nonsense, humbug, and\n    worse. _Schopenhauer_ knew better, and was convinced that he had\n    lifted the veil of truth higher than any mortal before him; he\n    claimed that he had written paragraphs \u201cwhich may be taken to have\n    been inspired by the Holy Ghost.\u201d Shortly before his death he\n    wrote: \u201cMy curse upon any one, who in reprinting my works shall\n    knowingly make a change; be it but a sentence, or a word, a\n    syllable or a punctuation point.\u201d _Nietzsche_ held: \u201cI have given\n    to the world the most profound book in its possession.\u201d To the\n    eyes of this philosophy, modesty and humility are no longer\n    virtues. _B. Spinoza_, a leader in later philosophy, states\n    expressly: \u201cHumility is no virtue; it does not spring from reason.\n    It is a sadness, springing from the fact that man becomes aware of\n    his impotence.\u201d\n\n\nAn arrogant mind is not capable of finding the higher truth with\ncertainty; conscientious obedience to truth, unselfish abstention from\nasserting one\u2019s ego, and one\u2019s pet opinion, can dwell only in the humble\nmind. Here applies what _St. Augustine_ said of the Neoplatonists: \u201cTo\nacquiesce in truth you need humility, which, however, is very difficult to\ninstil into your minds.\u201d(12)\n\nWhen God\u2019s authority steps before scientists and earnestly demands faith,\nthey will talk excitedly about their human dignity that does not permit\nthem to believe; about reason being their court of last resort that must\nnot know of submission; and if the Church, in the name of God, steps\nbefore them, they become abusive.\n\nMen who have scarcely outgrown their minority often feel it incumbent upon\nthemselves to furnish humanity with new thought and to discard the old.\n_D. F. Strauss_, a young under-master of twenty-seven years, writes his\n\u201cLife of Jesus, critically analyzed\u201d (1835); he tells the Christian world\nthat everything it has hitherto held sacred is a delusion and a snare; he\nfeels the vocation to \u201creplace the old, obsolete, supernatural, method of\ncontemplating the history of Jesus with a new one,\u201d which changes all\ndivine deeds into myths. Hardly out of knickerbockers and kilts, they feel\nexperienced enough to come forth with novel and unheard-of propositions on\nthe highest problems. In business and office, as in public service,\nsober-mindedness and maturity are demanded; but to work out the ultimate\nquestions of humanity, inexperience and lack of the deeper knowledge of\nlife do not disqualify in our time. If _Schiller\u2019s_ complaint of the\nKantians of his time was that, \u201cWhat they have scarcely learned to-day,\nthey want to teach to-morrow,\u201d what is to be said of those who teach even\nbefore they have learned? And what superficial thinking do we meet in the\nphilosophy of the day! Lacking all solid training, they proceed to\nconstruct new systems, or at least fragments of them. As regards their\ncompetence, one is often tempted to quote the harsh words of a modern\nwriter: \u201cI believe _Schopenhauer_ would have formed a better opinion of\nthe human intellect, had he paid less attention to authors and\nnewspaper-writers, and more to the common sense evinced by men in their\nwork and business\u201d (_Paulsen_).\n\nIt would be highly instructive to take a longer journey through the realm\nof modern philosophy, in so far as it touches upon questions concerning\nthe theory of the world, or even liberal Protestant theology, so as to\nsubject to a searching criticism the untenable notions and attempts at\ndemonstration even of acknowledged representatives of this science,\nwhereby they generally do away with God and miracles, the soul and\nimmortality, freedom of the will, the divine moral laws, the Gospel, the\ndivinity of Christ, and so much more, and show what they offer in place of\nall this. It would disclose an enormous lack of scientific method: instead\nof assured results they offer questionable, even untenable theories; in\nplace of proofs, emphatical assertions, imperatives, catch phrases; or\nelse arguments which under the simplest test will prove miscarriages of\nlogic. These philosophers vault ditches and boundaries with ease, and\nderive full gratification from imperfect and warped ideas. Of course,\nexactness in philosophical thinking is not a fruit to be plucked while out\ntaking a walk; it is the product of serious mental work, of sterling\nphilosophical training, which, alas, is wanting to-day in large circles of\nscientists.\n\nAs an instance, we point to the method described in a previous chapter, by\nwhich all supernatural factors are rejected by the arbitrary postulate of\n\u201cexclusively natural causation,\u201d without valid proofs, based only upon the\narbitrary decision of so-called modern science\u2014in the gravest matter an\nunscientific process that cannot be outdone.\n\nAnother instructive instance, of serious matters treated with levity, is\nfurnished in the unscrupulous way in which the Catholic Church, her\nteaching, institutions, and history, are passed upon in judgment by those\nhaving neither knowledge nor fairness.\n\n\n\nWithout Reverence.\n\n\nTrue wisdom accepts advice and guidance. It feels reverence for sacred and\nvenerable traditions, for the convictions of mankind on the great\nquestions of life, and greater reverence still for an authority of faith\nthat has received from God its warrant to be the teacher of mankind, and\nwhich has stood the test of time. True wisdom is convinced that continuity\nin human thinking and in knowledge is necessary. Life is short, and gives\nto the individual hardly time to attain mental maturity. Philosophy, and\nthis is the matter before us at present,\u2014philosophy can never be the work\nof a single person; it is the achievement of centuries; succeeding\ngenerations, with searching eye and careful hand, building further upon\nthe achievement for which past ages have laid the foundations. By nailing\ntogether beams and boards the individual may erect a house good enough for\na short time to serve his sports and pleasures; and if wrecked by the\nfirst storm, it may be replaced by another. But the building of massive\nand towering cathedrals that last for ages required the work of\ngenerations. And only skilful and experienced hands may do the work; haste\nis out of place here. The ancient sages of Greece, _Plato_, _Pythagoras_,\nand _Aristotle_, had this reverence for the philosophical and religious\ntraditions of the past. These representatives of true wisdom did not\nconsider philosophy and theology as the product of individual sagacity,\nthey did not attempt to be free rulers in the realm of thought; on the\ncontrary, they looked upon wisdom as the patrimony of the past, which it\nwas their duty to preserve.\n\n\n    They pointed to their venerable traditions, however meagre they\n    were. \u201cOur forefathers,\u201d says _Plato_, \u201cwho were better than we\n    are, and stood nearer to the gods than we, have handed down to us\n    this revelation.\u201d(13) That the testimony of the great sages, to\n    the effect that the most essential elements of their philosophy\n    had their origin in religious traditions, is based upon truth and\n    not on fancy has been proven by _O. Willmann_, whose knowledge of\n    ancient civilization was very extensive, in his monumental\n    \u201cHistory of Idealism.\u201d Delhi, the home of mysteries, the\n    generations of priests in ancient Egypt, the doctrinal traditions\n    of the Chaldeans, the Magi of Medes and Persians, and the wisdom\n    of the Brahmins of ancient India are witnesses to the fact. \u201cThe\n    Ancients were correct,\u201d says _Willmann_, \u201cin tracing their\n    philosophy to earliest traditions ... they knew what they owed to\n    their forefathers better than we do. They direct our astonished\n    eyes to a very ancient reality, to a towering remoteness of living\n    thought.\u201d This fact is very much against the taste of our\n    times.... An inherited wisdom, springing from an original\n    revelation, adapted to the nations, shining with renewed\n    brightness in true philosophy, is quite the opposite to a\n    philosophy that seeks the source of mental life only in isolated\n    thinking; that thinks its success to be conditioned upon\n    unprepossession; that holds the refutation of tradition to be the\n    test of its strength.\n\n\nUnfortunately this latter view is widespread in our time. Research is\noften directed, not by reverence for the wisdom inherited from many\nChristian centuries, but by the mania, unwise and fatal alike, of seeking\nnew paths. \u201cLove of truth,\u201d so we are told, \u201cis what urges on the great\nleaders of humanity, the prophets and reformers, to seek new and untrodden\npaths of life. \u2018Plus ultra\u2019 is the rallying-cry of these pathfinders of\nthe future, who are clearing the way for the mental life of mankind. No\nauthority can restrain them, no prejudice, however holy: they are\nfollowing the light which has dawned upon their soul\u201d (_Paulsen_).\n\nAnd a multitude discover this light in their souls, and join the prophets\nand pathfinders! Everybody goes abroad looking for untrodden paths; from\nall directions comes the cry: Here and there, to the right, to the left,\nis the right way! Do we not only too often see self-willed and\nself-satisfied thinkers, whose shortsighted conceit gets within the four\nwalls of their study puffed up against God and religion, offer us for holy\ntruth the fanciful products of their narrow brains? Do we not see, only\ntoo often, champions of shallow reasoning, without discipline of thought\nand without ethical maturity, recommending their undigested efforts as the\nwisdom of the world? Youthful thinkers there are in numbers, each of whom\nclaims that he at last has succeeded in solving the world riddle; they\noffer us new theories of the world, new ideas on ethics, on law and\ntheology, for a few dollars per copy or less. The holy abode of truth has\nbecome the campus for saunterers, each eager to displace the other so that\nhe may be sole proprietor, or at least a respected partner. Day by day new\nsolutions of \u201cproblems,\u201d \u201cvital questions,\u201d or at least \u201coutlines\u201d of\nthem; new \u201cviews of the world\u201d; new forms of religion and of Christianity\nfor the \u201cmodern man\u201d; \u201creforms\u201d of marriage and of sexual ethics, and so\non. Truth had not been discovered until the newcomer puts his pen to the\npaper. Every one is free to join in. Yea, more, he may not only join in,\nbut lash those who do not applaud him. According to this notion, nothing\nhas a right to exist, no \u201csacred prejudice\u201d may be claimed once this\nself-appointed representative of science takes the field for \u201cresearch.\u201d\nBehold the Christian truth, it has stood the test of centuries: but it\ncannot resist these scientific freebooters, they rush over it with banners\nflying.\n\nSevere speech would here be in order. A painful spectacle, these doings of\nmodern thought in the sacred precincts of truth. \u201cPut off the shoes from\nthy feet; for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground,\u201d we imagine\nto hear; yet this sanctuary of truth has been made a profane place of\nbartering.\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nWhile still a pagan, but moved by his desire for truth, the philosopher\n_Justin_ went to the schools of his day to seek the solution of his doubts\nand queries. First he turned to a Stoic, but as he taught nothing of God,\n_Justin_ was unsatisfied. He next went to a Peripatetic teacher, then to a\nPythagorean, but failed to find what he desired. The Platonist at last\ngave him something. Walking alone along the beach, and musing over\n_Plato\u2019s_ principles, he met an old man who referred him to the truth of\nChristianity, to the Prophets and the Apostles: \u201cThey alone have seen the\ntruth and proclaimed it unto man, they were afraid of no one, knew no\nfear; yielded to no opinion; filled with the Holy Ghost, they spoke only\nwhat they saw and heard. The Scriptures are still extant, and he who takes\nthem up will find in them a treasure of information about principles and\nultimate things, and all else the philosopher must know, if he believes\nthem.\u201d(14) And _Justin_ found truth and peace, and bowed to the yoke of\nthe doctrine of Jesus Christ.\n\nWhat a striking contrast between this serious love of truth in the days of\npassing heathendom, and the uncontrolled thinking of so many in our\nChristian age! To them truth is no longer a sacred treasure, a yoke to be\nassumed in reverence; it has become the plaything of their impressions and\ninclinations. Indeed, they consider it a burden to accept the old\nChristian truth, with which they meet on all their ways.\n\n\n\n\nChapter III. The Bitter Fruit.\n\n\n\nThe Vocation of Science.\n\n\nScience is, and ever was, an influential factor operating upon the\nthought, aims, and actions of man. Hence science must remain conscious of\nits vocation. First of all it is to hold aloft and preserve the _spiritual\npossessions of mankind_. True, science must also progress; but progress\nmeans growth, which presupposes the preservation of what has been received\nfrom of old. This applies pre-eminently to the philosophical-religious\npatrimony of the past; no error could be more fatal than to presume that\neach generation must start from the beginning, that the foundations, which\nhave safely supported human life for centuries, must be obsolete because\nhuman nature is suddenly considered changed.\n\nWhat are these foundations? They are the tested religious and moral\nconvictions of mankind, and, for our nations particularly, the divine\ntenets of Christianity, that have been their highest ideals for centuries,\nand have produced serenity and a high standard of morality. If science\naims to be the principle of conservation and not of destruction, it must\nlook upon the safeguarding of those possessions of the nations as its\nsacred task. Indeed, it would perform this task but poorly were it to\nwaste this patrimony piece by piece, or to shatter it with wicked fist,\ninstead of respecting and honouring it, or to set fire to the sanctuary\nwhere mankind hitherto has dwelled in peace and happiness. A science of\nthis kind would not only cease to be a bulwark for the mental life of\nmankind, but turn into a positive danger.\n\nIn as far as it follows the principles of liberal freedom of research,\npresent-day science does present this danger. This cannot be denied, the\nfacts speak too plainly. By its very nature it _must_ become such danger.\nFor it recognizes no belief, neither in God nor in the Church; no dogmas,\nno \u201cprejudices,\u201d no traditions, however sacred, are to be respected; it is\nfundamental unbelief, the principle of opposition to the Christian\nreligion. Its autonomous Subject emancipates himself from the yoke of\nobjective truth which he cannot procreate free out of himself. It\nconfesses the principle that there are neither truths nor values that\nendure; _plus ultra!_ always new ideas! _Quieta movere_, hitherto the\nwatchword of unwisdom, is this science\u2019s maxim. And liberal freedom of\nresearch is what its nature compels it to be. Can it do any more than it\nhas done, to prove itself a principle of mental pauperism? We shall not\ndemand a list of the things it has thrown aside and shattered. Let us\nrather ask, _what it has left whole_ of the sacred institutions of truth,\ninherited from a Christian past. Alas, it has cast off and denied\neverything; it has lost not only the things a Christian age has treasured,\nbut even those a higher paganism had revered. Let us examine this sad work\nof negation and annihilation. It is a more melancholy spectacle than any\nwar of extermination that was ever waged against Europe\u2019s Christian\ncivilization by a people bent on trampling down every flower of Christian\nculture, and on razing every castle to the ground.\n\n\n\nAre We Still Christians?\n\n\nThis was the question proposed some scores of years ago by _D. Strauss_ to\nhimself, and to those of his mind. With this question we will begin. To\nour forefathers, especially of the German nation, nothing was more sacred\nthan the Christian religion; no people like the German has absorbed it so\nfully, has been so permeated with it. But now, wherever liberal\nscience\u2014here especially modern Protestant theology that brings liberal\nfreedom of research into full application\u2014wherever it has made the\nChristian religion a subject of its study, one treasure after another has\nbeen lost; of the whole of Christendom nothing remains but an empty name\nand a formal homage, reminding of the courtesy paid to deposed rulers.\n\nIn the first place, there has been dropped the fundamental thesis of the\n_divinity of Christ_, whereupon rests the entire structure of\nChristianity. Man\u2019s modern emancipation from everything supernatural has\nbeen accomplished also with respect to the person of Christ: the man\nChrist is divested of His divinity and of everything miraculous; His birth\nby the virgin, His miracles and prophecies, His resurrection and\nascension, once the subjects of exalting feasts, have fallen a victim to\nunbelieving science. It is true, they exert themselves to keep His person\nin view, they want the purely human Jesus to hold His old position of God\nand man in the believing consciousness, to conceal the mental\npauperization. But this trick is failing more and more. The Son of God\nsees Himself gradually placed among the great men of history; we are\nbecoming accustomed to find in the \u201cBiographies of Celebrated Men,\u201d among\n\u201cReligious Educators,\u201d side by side with _Confucius_, _Buddha_,\n_Augustine_, _Mohammed_, _Luther_, _Kant_, and _Goethe_, also the name of\nJesus. The lustre of the past belief in His divinity is paling. In the\neyes of unbelieving science He has ceased to be the infallible,\nall-surpassing Authority, and the basis of the faith. The teaching of\nJesus has become the subject of an analyzing and eliminating criticism,\nand whenever deemed advisable His authority is simply ignored; He was\nhuman, affected by the views and errors of His age.\n\n\n    Thus they know, as does _H. Gunkel_, that \u201cJesus and the Apostles\n    evidently have taken those narratives (the miracles of Genesis) to\n    be reality and not poetry\u201d; \u201cthe men of the New Testament on such\n    questions take no particular attitude but share the (erroneous)\n    opinions of their times.\u201d They also know \u201cthat in regard to\n    persons possessed with demons Jesus shared the erroneous notions\n    of his time\u201d (_Braun_), and _Fr. Delitzsch_ informs us that it was\n    \u201cparticularly a Babylonian superstition,\u201d in consequence of which\n    \u201cthe belief in demons and devils assumed such importance in the\n    imagination of Jesus of Nazareth and of his Galilean disciples.\u201d\n    Thus the word is fulfilled literally: \u201cHe is a sign which will be\n    contradicted.\u201d\n\n\nNo one knows really _who Jesus was_. His person is the football of\nopinions. \u201cIf any one desiring reliable information, as to who Jesus\nChrist was, and what message He brought, should consult the literature of\nthe day, he would find buzzing round him contradictory voices.... Taken\nall in all, the impression made by these contradicting opinions is\ndepressing: the confusion seems past hope,\u201d admits Prof. _Harnack_.\n\n\n    Also _E. V. Hartmann_ remarks: \u201cThus, according to some, Jesus was\n    a poet, to others a mystic visionary, a third sees in him the\n    militant hero for freedom and human dignity, to a fourth he was\n    the organizer of a new Church and of an ecclesiastical system of\n    ethics, to a fifth the rationalistic reformer ... to the eleventh\n    a naturalistic pantheist like _Giordano Bruno_, to the twelfth a\n    superman on the order of _Nietzsche\u2019s_ Zarathustra....\u201d A chaos of\n    opinions agreeing only in the one aim of rejecting His divinity.\n    _A. Schweitzer_, himself a representative of liberal Protestant\n    research, says, \u201cNothing is more negative than the result of the\n    research concerning the life of Jesus.\u201d And knowing Jesus\u2019s person\n    no longer, they no longer know anything certain about His\n    teaching, as is clear from the above. According to _I.\n    Wellhausen_, from the \u201cunsufficient fragments at hand we can get\n    but a scanty conception of the doctrine of Jesus.\u201d\u2014The fathers\n    were rich, the children have grown poor. _Dissipaverunt\n    substantiam suam!_\n\n    To many even the _existence of Jesus_ has become doubtful; and\n    this not only to men of an irreligious propaganda, like Prof. _A.\n    Drews_, who, carried away by the corroding tendency of a radical\n    age, journeyed from town to town in order to proclaim, in the\n    twentieth century of Christian reckoning, the scientific discovery\n    of the \u201cMyth of Christ\u201d; but even to others the existence of Jesus\n    has become doubtful or at least valueless. The task now is to do\n    away entirely with the person of Jesus, and to solve the problem\n    of preserving a Christian faith without a Christ. In this sense\n    Prof. _M. Rade_ writes: \u201cSerious and gifted men having asserted\n    that Jesus never existed (or, what amounts to the same, that, if\n    He ever lived, nothing is known of Him; hence, His existence is of\n    no historical importance), we dogmatists almost have to be\n    grateful to them for having helped us to put a very concrete\n    question no longer in general terms: how does religious certainty\n    face historical criticism? but quite specifically: how does\n    religious certainty (of the Christian) regard the\n    historic-scientific possibility of the non-existence of the\n    historical Jesus?\u201d They frankly assert that they could entirely\n    forego the person of Christ. Thus Prof. _P. W. Schmiedel_\n    declares: \u201cMy innermost religious conviction would not suffer\n    injury were I to be convinced to-day that Jesus never lived.... I\n    would know that I could not lose the measure of piety that has\n    become my property long since, even if I cannot derive it any\n    longer from Jesus.\u201d \u201cNeither does my piety require me to see in\n    Jesus an absolutely perfect type, nor would it disturb me were I\n    to find someone else actually surpassing Him, which undoubtedly is\n    the case in some respects.\u201d For him to whom Christ is no longer\n    God but a man and capable of error, His person and existence have\n    necessarily lost their value.\n\n\nThus we have arrived at a _Christianity without a Christ_. As yet the\nperson of the Lord is usually surrounded by a halo: it is the after-effect\nof a faithful past, the last rays of a setting sun. That this last\nglimmer, too, will pale and give way to darkness is but a question of\ntime, when with more honesty expression will be given to the conclusion\nnecessarily arrived at. If Christ is not what He claimed to be, God and\nMessiah, then the belief in His being the Son of God and the Messiah, in\nHis right to abrogate the religion of the Old Testament and to found a new\nreligion, commanding its acceptance under penalty of damnation\u2014all this\ncan be nothing but the result of religious fanaticism and mental\nderangement. And science is, in all seriousness, preparing to turn into\nthis direction.\n\n\n    It is true, many are hesitating to draw these fearful conclusions\n    and to utter them; arriving at this point, they cautiously stop:\n    so _Harnack_. \u201cHow Jesus could arrive at the consciousness of His\n    unique relation to God as His Son, how He became conscious of His\n    power as well as of the obligation and task involved in this\n    power, that is His secret, and no psychology will ever disclose\n    it.... Here, all research must halt.\u201d It is the silence of\n    embarrassment, but equally of unscientific method. Having arrived\n    at untenable conclusions, when question upon question is\n    impetuously suggested, they stop suddenly and have nothing to say\n    but a vague word about inscrutableness.\n\n    But there are those who actually speak the word so horrible to a\n    Christian heart: Jesus was demented, a subject for pathology.\n    _Strauss_ indicated this cautiously: \u201cOne who expects to return\n    after his death in a manner in which no human being had ever\n    returned, he is to us ... not exactly a lunatic, but a great\n    visionary.\u201d Others speak more plainly. _Holtzmann\u2019s_ answer to the\n    question: Was Jesus an Ecstatic, is an emphatic: \u201cYes, He was.\u201d\n    _De Loosten_ considers him insane. _E. Rasmussen_ thinks Him an\n    epileptic, but grants to physicians the right to reckon him among\n    paranoiacs or lunatics. To _A. J\u00fclicher_ Jesus is a visionary, \u201ca\n    mystic, not satisfied to dream of his ideals, but who lived with\n    them, worked with them, even saw them tangibly before his eyes,\n    deceiving himself and others.\u201d Thus the supernatural has become\n    madness; Jesus Christ, for whose divinity the martyrs went to\n    their death, wears now, before the forum of a false science,\n    Herod\u2019s cloak of foolishness.\n\n\nWith the fall of this fundamental dogma there must necessarily fall all\nother specific truths of Christianity, and they have fallen. The Holy\nWrit, once the work of the Holy Ghost, has now become a book like the\nIndian Vedda, to some perhaps even more unreliable; original sin,\nRedemption and grace, the Sacrifice of the Mass and the Sacraments, have\nbeen dropped or changed into symbols, of which every one may think what he\npleases. They have tried to make Christianity \u201cacceptable to our times,\u201d\nto \u201cbring it nearer to the modern idea.\u201d There is really nothing left to\noffend modern man, nothing that could get in conflict with any idea. The\nessence of Christianity is depreciated and emptied until it has become\nonly a vague sentiment, without thought; a few names, without ideas.\n\u201cChristianity as a Gospel,\u201d so teaches _Harnack_, \u201chas but one aim: to\nfind the living God, that every individual may find Him as his God,\ngaining strength and joy and peace. How it attains this aim through the\ncenturies, whether with the Coefficient of the Jewish or the Greek, of\nflight from the world or of civilization, of Gnosticism or\nAgnosticism\u2014this all is of secondary consideration.\u201d Of secondary\nconsideration it is, then, whether one is convinced of the existence of\nGod or whether he doubts with the agnostics, whether he believes in a\npersonal God or not. To-day even the pantheist who does not acknowledge a\nCreator of Heaven and Earth may be a Christian; and so can he who no\nlonger believes in personal immortality and in a hereafter; for, we are\ninformed, \u201cthis religion is above the contrasts of here and the beyond, of\nlife and death, of Reason and Ecstatics, of Judaism and Hellenism\u201d\n(_Harnack_). Thus there is no thought which could not be made to agree\nwith this despoiled Christianity. For, we are told further, \u201cmuch less\ndoes the Gospel presuppose, or is joined to, a fixed theory of nature\u2014not\neven in a negative sense could this be asserted\u201d (_Harnack_). Materialism\nand Spiritualism, Theism and Pantheism, Belief or Negation of Creation,\neverything will harmonize with a Christianity thus degraded to a thing\nwithout character or principle.(15)\n\nAll that is left is a word of love, of a kind Father, of filiation to God,\nand union with God: words robbed of their true meaning; a shell without a\nkernel, ruins with the name \u201cChristianity\u201d still inscribed thereon,\ntelling of a house that once stood here, wherein the fathers dwelt, but\nlong since vacated by their children. _Dissipaverunt substantiam suam!_\n\n\n    As to God and divine filiation, everybody is welcome to his own\n    interpretation. He may form with _O. Pfleiderer_ the\n    \u201cNeoprotestantism\u201d which, \u201cafter breaking with all ecclesiastical\n    dogmas, recalled to mind the truths of the Christian religion,\n    hidden beneath the surface of these dogmas, in order to realize,\n    more purely and more perfectly than ever before, the truth of\n    God\u2019s incarnation in the new forms of autonomous thought and of\n    the moral life of human society.\u201d Christianity and God\u2014the symbols\n    of autonomous man! Or he may follow _Bousset_, to whom nature is\n    God, and in this way combines harmoniously Christianity and\n    Atheism. \u201cThis is the forceful evolution of Christian religion,\u201d\n    says he, \u201cthe notion of redemption, the Dogma of the divinity of\n    Christ, the trinity, the idea of satisfaction and sacrifice,\n    miracles, the old conception of revelation\u2014all these we see\n    carried off by this wave of progress.\u201d \u201cWhat is left? Timid people\n    may think: a wreck. But to our pleasant surprise we found stated\n    at many points in our inquiry: what is left is the simple Gospel\n    of Jesus.\u201d And what does this simplified Gospel contain? \u201cOf\n    course we cannot simply accept in full the Gospel of Jesus....\n    There is the internal and the external. The external and\n    non-essential includes the judgment of the world, angels,\n    miracles, inspiration, and other things.\u201d All this may be\n    disregarded. \u201cBut even the essentials, the internal of the Gospel\n    cannot be simply subscribed to. They must be interpreted.\u201d What,\n    then, is this essential, this internal of the Gospel, and what is\n    its interpretation? \u201cThe belief of the Gospel in the personal\n    heavenly Father; to this we hold fast with all our strength. But\n    we carry this belief in God into our modern thought.\u201d And what\n    becomes then of \u201cGod\u201d? \u201cTo us, God is no longer the kind Father\n    above the starry skies. God is the Infinite, Omnipotent, who is\n    active in the immense universe, in infiniteness of time and space,\n    in infinitely small and in infinitely large things. He is the God\n    whose garb is the iron law of nature which hides Him from the\n    human eye by a compact, impenetrable veil.\u201d We see the belief of\n    the Gospel has dwindled down to atheistic Monism.\n\n    As early as 1874 _Ed. von Hartmann_, in his book \u201cDie\n    Selbstzersetzung des Christentums,\u201d came to the conclusion that\n    \u201cliberal Protestantism has in no sense the right to claim a place\n    within Christendom.\u201d In a later book his keen examination\n    demonstrates how the speculation of liberal Protestantism has\n    changed the Christian religion step by step into pantheism: \u201cNot a\n    single point in the doctrine of the Church is spared by this\n    upheaval of principle, every dogma is formally turned into its\n    very opposite, in order to make its religious idea conform to the\n    tenet of divine immanence.\u201d\n\n    This is called the development of Christianity. It is this\n    \u201creligious progress,\u201d the same \u201cfree Christianity,\u201d that they are\n    now trying to promote by international congresses. The invitation\n    to the \u201cWorld\u2019s Congress for free Christianity and religious\n    progress\u201d at Berlin, in 1910, was signed by more than 130 German\n    professors, including 47 theologians. We have here the development\n    of the dying into the lifeless corpse, the progress of the strong\n    castle into a dilapidated ruin, the advance of the rich man to\n    beggary.\n\n\nWe began our inquiry with the question proposed some years ago by _D.\nStrauss_ to his brethren-in-spirit: Are we still Christians? We may now\nquote the answer, which he gives at the conclusion of his own\ninvestigation: \u201cNow, I think, we are through. And the result? the reply to\nmy question?\u2014must I state it explicitly? Very well; my conviction is, that\nif we do not want to make excuses, if we do not want to shift and shuffle\nand quibble, if yes is to be yes, and no to remain no, in short, if we\ndesire to speak like honest, sincere men, we must confess: we are no\nlonger Christians.\u201d\n\nThis is the bitter fruit of autonomous freedom of thinking, which,\ndeclining any guidance by faith, recognizes no other judge of truth than\nindividual reason, with all the license and the hidden inclinations that\nrule it. Protestantism has adopted this freedom of research as its\nprinciple; in consistently applying it, Protestantism has completely\ndenatured the Christian religion. If anything can prove irrefutably the\nmonstrosity and cultural incapacity of modern freedom of research, it is\nthe fate of Protestantism. Any one capable of seriously judging serious\nthings must realize here how pernicious this freedom is for the human\nmind.\n\n\n\nReduced to Beggary.\n\n\nBut the loss is even greater. The better class of paganism still clung to\nthe general notion of an existing personal God, of a future life, of a\nreward after death; it was convinced of the existence of an immortal soul\nand a future reward, of the necessity of religion, of immutable standards\nfor morals and thought. Has liberal science at least been able to preserve\nthis essential property of a higher paganism? Alas, no! It has lost nearly\neverything.\n\nNo longer has it a personal God. While belief in God may still survive in\nthe hearts of many representatives of this science, it has vanished from\nscience itself. It begs to be excused from accepting any solution of\nquestions, if God is a factor in the solution. The opinion prevails that\n_Kant_ has forever shattered all rational demonstrations of the existence\nof God. Yet _Kant_ permits this existence as a \u201cpostulate,\u201d which,\naccording to _Strauss_, \u201cmay be regarded as the attic room, where God who\nhas been retired from His office may be decently sheltered and employed.\u201d\nBut now He has been given notice to quit even this refuge. There must be\nnothing left of Him but His venerable name, which is appropriated by the\nnew apostasy in the guise of pantheism or a masked materialism. Monism is\nthe joint name for it: this is the modern \u201cbelief in God.\u201d In days gone by\nit was frankly called \u201catheism.\u201d\n\n\n    This disappearance of the old belief in God is noted with\n    satisfaction by modern science: \u201cIt is true,\u201d says _Paulsen_, \u201cthe\n    belief in gods ... is dying out, and will never be resurrected.\n    Nor is there an essential difference whether many or only one of\n    these beings are assumed. A monotheism which looks upon God as an\n    individual being and lets him occasionally interfere in the world\n    as in something separate from and foreign to him, such a\n    monotheism is essentially not different from polytheism. If one\n    should insist on such conception of theism, then, of course, it\n    will be difficult to contradict those who maintain that science\n    must lead to atheism.\u201d\n\n\nTherefore God, as a personal being, is dead, and will never come to life\nagain. While there is an enormous exaggeration in these words, they\nnevertheless glaringly characterize the ideas of the science of which\n_Paulsen_ is the mouthpiece. It does not want directly to give up the name\nof God; it serves as a mask to conceal the uncanny features of pantheism\nand materialism.\n\n\n    \u201cThe universe,\u201d we hear often and in many variations, \u201cis the\n    expression of a uniform, original principle, which may be termed\n    God, Nature, primitive force, or anything else, and which appears\n    to man in manifold forms of energy, like matter, light, warmth,\n    electricity, chemical energy, or psychical process.... These\n    fundamental ideas of monism are by no means \u2018atheistic.\u2019 Many\n    monists in spite of assertions to the contrary believe in a\n    supreme divine principle, which penetrates the whole world, living\n    and operating in everything. Of course, if God is taken to mean a\n    being who exists outside of the world ... then it is true we are\n    atheists\u201d (_Plate_). We have already seen that one can even be a\n    Protestant theologian and yet be satisfied with a \u201cGod\u201d of this\n    description.\n\n\nIn the place of God has stepped _man_, with his advanced civilization,\nradiant in the divine aureole of the absolute as its highest incarnation.\nBut what has liberal research done even to him? According to the Christian\nidea, man bears the stamp of God on his forehead: \u201cafter My image I have\ncreated thee\u201d; in his breast he carries a spiritual soul, endowed with\nfreedom and immortality\u2014_gloria et honore coronasti eum_. Liberal science\npretends to uplift and exalt man; but in reality it strips him of his\nadornments, one after the other. He is no longer a creature of God because\nthis would contradict science. His birthplace and the home of his\nchildhood are no longer in Paradise, but in the jungles of Africa, among\nthe animals, whose descendent man is now said to be. Liberal science,\nalmost without exception, denies the freedom of will which raises man high\nabove the beast, and as a rule it calls such freedom an \u201cillusion\u201d: of a\nsubstantial soul, of immortality, of an ultimate possession of God after\ndeath, it frequently, if not always, knows nothing.\n\n\n    Let us take up a handbook of modern _Psychology_ of this kind,\n    Wundt\u2019s, for instance. We see at a glance that it is a very\n    learned work. The thirty lectures inform us in minute\n    investigations of the various methods and resources of\n    psychological research. The reader has reached the twentieth\n    lecture, and he asks, how about the soul? The title of the book\n    states that the chapters would treat of the human soul, but so far\n    not a word has been said about it. But there are ten lectures\n    more; he continues to turn over the leaves of the book. He finds\n    beautiful things said about expression and emotions, about\n    instincts in animal and man, about spontaneous actions and other\n    things. At last, the third before the last page of the book, there\n    arises the question, what about the soul, and what does the reader\n    learn? \u201cOur soul is nothing else, but the sum total of our\n    perception, our feeling and our will.\u201d The conviction he held\n    hitherto, that he possessed a substantial, immortal soul, which\n    remains through changing conceptions and sentiments, he sees\n    rejected as \u201cfiction.\u201d The reader learns that, though he may still\n    use the term \u201csoul,\u201d he has no real soul, much less a spiritual\n    soul, least of all an immortal soul. In its stead he is treated to\n    some learned statements about muscular sensations and such things,\n    by way of compensation. _Jodl_, too, speaks of the \u201cillusions,\n    based upon the old theories about the soul,\u201d and he rejects the\n    dualistic psychology which \u201cmistook an abstract thought, the soul,\n    for a real being, for an immaterial substance\u201d; and which defended\n    this notion \u201cwith worthless reasons.\u201d\n\n    It is manifest that, together with the substantial soul,\n    immortality is also disposed of. True, here too the word is\n    cautiously retained; but by immortality is now understood\n    perpetuation in the human race, in the ideas of posterity, in\n    \u201cobjective spirit,\u201d in the \u201cimperishable value of ethical\n    possessions,\u201d for which the individual has laboured. Some fine\n    words are said about it, as roses are used to cover a grave. Yet,\n    it is only the immortality of the barrel of Regulus, or the\n    Gordian knot in history, the immortality of which the printers\u2019\n    press may partake in the effect of the books it prints. To quote\n    _Jodl_ again: \u201cThe fact of the objective spirit, together with the\n    organic connection of the generations to one another, form the\n    scientific reality of what appears in popular, mythological tenets\n    of faith as the idea of personal immortality ... and which has\n    been defended by the dualistic psychology with worthless, invalid\n    arguments.\u201d The refutation of these arguments does not bother him.\n    \u201cA refutation of these scholastic arguments is as little needed as\n    a refutation of the belief in the miracles and demons of former\n    centuries is needed by a man standing on the ground of modern\n    natural science.\u201d This reminds one of _Haeckel\u2019s_ method. The\n    latter nevertheless found it worth while in his \u201cWeltraetsel\u201d to\n    dispose in thirteen lines of six such arguments, and then to\n    assure the reader that \u201cAll these and similar arguments have\n    fallen to the ground.\u201d That the matter in question is an idea that\n    has been the foundation of Christian civilization and ethics for\n    thousands of years, that has led millions to holiness; an idea,\n    indeed, that has been the common property of all nations at all\n    times\u2014this seems to count for very little.\n\n    This technique of a superficial speculation, which, devoid of\n    piety, casts everything overboard, finds no trouble in disposing\n    of the entire _spiritual world_. \u201cNo one is capable,\u201d says _Jodl_\n    again, \u201cof imagining a purely spiritual reality.\u201d This is disposed\n    of. \u201cSince the war between the Aristotle-scholastic and the\n    mechanical method has been waged, spiritual powers have never\n    played any other part in the explanation of the world than that of\n    an unknown quantity in equations of a higher degree, which,\n    unsolvable by methods hitherto prevalent, are only awaiting the\n    superior master and a new technique (_sic_) in order to disappear\u201d\n    (p. 77 _seq._).\n\n\nWith the denial of a personal God and of the immortality of the soul, true\n_religion_ is abandoned. Of course, there is much said and written about\nreligion in our days: the scientific literature about it has grown to\ntremendous proportions\u2014to say nothing of newspapers, novels, and plays.\nOne might welcome this as a proof that this world will never entirely\nsatisfy the human heart. But it is also a sign that religion is no longer\na secure possession, but has become a problem\u2014that it has been lost. Even\non the part of free-thought it is not denied that \u201conly unhappy times will\npermit the existence of religious problems; and that this problem is the\nutterance of mental discord.\u201d Yet they do not want to forego religion\nentirely, for they feel that irreligion is tantamount to degeneration. But\nwhat has become of religion? It has been degraded to a vague sentiment and\nlonging, without religious truths and duties, a plaything for pastime.\n\n\n    For _Schleiermacher_ religion is a feeling of simple dependence,\n    though no one knows upon whom he is dependent: according to\n    _Wundt_ religion consists in \u201cman serving infinite purposes,\n    together with his finite purposes, the ultimate fulfilment whereof\n    remains hidden to his eye,\u201d which probably means something, but I\n    do not know what. _Haeckel_ calls his materialism the religion of\n    the true, good, and beautiful; _Jodl_ even thinks, \u201cAs the realm\n    of science is the real, and the realm of art the possible, so the\n    realm of religion is the impossible.\u201d Religion having been\n    degraded to such a level, it is no longer astonishing that\n    religion is attributed even to animals, and in the words of _E.\n    von Hartmann_, \u201cwe cannot help attributing a religious character,\n    as far as the animal is concerned, to the relation between the\n    intelligent domestic animals and their masters.\u201d\n\n\nWhat, finally, has become of the old standard of _morals_? A modern\nphilosopher may answer the question.\n\n\n    _Fouill\u00e9e_ writes: \u201cIn our day, far more so than thirty years ago,\n    morality itself, its reality, its necessity and usefulness, is in\n    the balance.... I have read with much concern how my\n    contemporaries are at fundamental variance in this respect, and\n    how they contradict one another. I have tried to form an opinion\n    of all these different opinions. Shall I say it? I have found in\n    the province of morals a confusion of ideas and sentiments to an\n    extent that it seemed impossible to me to illustrate thoroughly\n    what might be termed contemporaneous sophistry\u201d (Le Moralisme de\n    Kant, etc.).\n\n\nWhere is left now to liberal science a single remnant of those great\ntruths on which mankind has hitherto lived, and which it needs for\nexistence? There was a God\u2014but He is gone. There was a life to come, and a\nsupernatural world; they are lost. Man had a soul, endowed with freedom,\nspirituality, and immortality; he has it no longer. He had fixed\nprinciples of reasoning and laws of morals; they are gone. He possessed\nChrist, full of grace and truth, he possessed redemption and a Church;\neverything is lost. Burnt to the ground is the homestead. In the blank\nvoids, that cheerful casements were, sits despair; man stands at the grave\nof all that fortune gave!\n\nThe names alone have survived; now and then they speak of God and\nreligion, of Christianity and faith, immortality and freedom; but the\nwords are false, pretending a possession that is lost long since. They are\npatches from a grand dress, once worn by our ancestors; ruins of the\nancestral house that the children have lost. They are still cherished as\nthe memories of better times. People thus acknowledge the irreparable\nforfeiture which those names denote, without realizing how they pronounce\ntheir own condemnation by having destroyed these possessions.(16)\n_Dissipaverunt substantiam suam._\n\nThe son came to his father. In his heedless anxiety for freedom he would\nleave the father\u2019s house, to get away from restraining discipline and\ndependence. \u201cFather, give me the portion of the goods that falleth to me.\u201d\nAnd he departed into a far country. Soon he had spent all and had nothing\nto appease his hunger.\n\n\n\nDespairing of Truth.\n\n\nThese, then, are the achievements liberal research can boast of in the\nfields of philosophy and religion: Negations and again negations; temples\nand altars it has destroyed, sacred images it has broken, pillars it has\nknocked down. Free from Christianity, free from God, free from the life to\ncome and the supernatural, free from authority and faith\u2014it is rich in\nfreedom and negation. But what does it offer in place of all the things it\nhas destroyed? What spiritual goods does it show to the expectant eyes of\nits confiding followers? The most hopeless things imaginable, namely,\ndespair of all higher truth, mental confusion, and decay. One other brief\nglance at the consequences and we shall be competent to judge of the\nfitness of liberal freedom of thought for the civilization of mankind.\n\nAs far as it is inspired by philosophy, modern science confesses the\nprinciple: \u201cNo objective truth can be positively known, at least not in\nmetaphysics\u201d; restless doubt is the lot of the searching intellect. We\nhave amplified this elsewhere in these pages. This result of the modern\ndoctrine of cognition is not infrequently boasted of. It was good enough,\nsay they, for the ancients to live in the silly belief of possessing\neternal truth; they were simple and unsuspecting; we know there is in\nstore for man only doubt and everlasting struggle for truth.\n\n\n    \u201cWe confess that we do not know whether there are for mankind as a\n    whole, and for the individual, tasks and goals that extend beyond\n    this earthly existence\u201d (_Jodl_). \u201cThere is no scientific\n    philosophy of generally recognized standard, but only in the form\n    of various experiments for the purpose of defining and expressing\n    the harmony and the idea of the active principle; consequently\n    there cannot be a final philosophy, it must be ready at all times\n    to revise any point that previously seemed to have been\n    established\u201d (_Paulsen_). \u201cOnly to dogmatism,\u201d says another, \u201care\n    the various theories of the world contradictory; to science they\n    are hypotheses of equal value, which, as they are all limited, may\n    exist side by side, the theistic as well as the atheistic, the\n    dualistic, the monistic, and whatever their names may be. Man, who\n    conceives these hypotheses, is master over them all and makes use\n    of them, here of one, there of another, according to the kind of\n    the problem he is occupied with at the time. Thus, he is\n    independent of any view of the world\u201d (_L. von Sybel_). Again we\n    are told: \u201cThere has been formulated a free variety of\n    metaphysical systems, none of them demonstrable.... Is it our\n    task, perhaps, to select the true one? This would be an odd\n    superstition; this metaphysical anarchy is teaching, as obviously\n    as possible, the relativity of all metaphysical systems\u201d (_W.\n    Dilthey_). Therefore, nothing but impressions and opinions, and\n    not the truth; indeed, for the cognition of transcendental,\n    metaphysical truths, they often have only words of disdain.\n\n    \u201cThe fact should be emphasized,\u201d says _G. Spicker_, \u201cthat\n    philosophy really is devoid of any higher ideal; that, through its\n    doubt of the objective cognizability of things above us, outside\n    and inside of us, it has fallen prey to scepticism, even if\n    philosophers do not admit it and try to evade the issue with the\n    phrase \u2018theory of cognition.\u2019 \u201d\n\n\nA science cannot sink to a lower level than by the admission that it has\nnothing to offer and nothing to accomplish. It is tantamount to\nbankruptcy. This science undertakes to nourish the human mind, but offers\nstones instead of bread; it wants to uplift and to instruct, and confesses\nthat it has nothing to tell. _Amphora coepit institui, currente rota\nurceus exit._ In the beginning a proud consciousness and the promise to be\neverything to mankind; at the end mental pauperism and scepticism, a\ncaricature of science.\n\nThis, then, is the terminal at which the free-thought of subjectivism has\narrived: the loss of truth, without which man\u2019s mind wanders restlessly\nand without a goal. That is the penalty for gambling boldly with human\nperception, the retribution for rebelling against the rights of truth and\nfor the vainglorious arrogance of the intellect, which would draw only\nfrom its own cisterns the water of life, while alone those lying deep in\nthe Divine may offer him the eternal fountains of objective truth.\nScepticism is gnawing at the mental life of the world. A scepticism\ncloaked with the names of criticism and research, and of positivism and\nempiric knowledge, but which, nevertheless, remains what it is, an ominous\ndemon, liberated from the grave into which has been lowered the Christian\nspiritual life, the spirit of darkness now pervading the world.\n\n\n\nIn All Directions of the Compass.\n\n\nThey have lost their way, puzzled by mazes and perplexed with error they\nare in hopeless confusion; a correlative of individualistic thinking. If\nthe absolute subject and his experiences of life are the self-appointed\ncourt of last resort, the result must be anarchy and not accord. This is\nmanifest; moreover, it is frankly admitted by the spokesmen of\nfreethought.\n\n\n    This anarchy is described in vivid words by Prof. _Paulsen_,\n    recently the indefatigable champion of freest thought: \u201cWe no\n    longer have a Protestant philosophy, in the sense of a standard\n    system. _Hegel\u2019s_ philosophy was the last to occupy such a\n    position. Anarchy rules ever since. The attempted rally around the\n    name of _Kant_ failed to put an end to the prevalent anarchy, or\n    to the division into small fractions and individualisms. Then\n    there is the mental neurasthenia of our times, the absolute lack\n    of ideas, especially noticeable among so-called educated\n    people.... Billboard art has found a counterpart in\n    billboard-philosophy. Here, there, and everywhere we meet the cry:\n    here is the saviour, the secret ruler, the magic doctor, who cures\n    all ills of our diseased age.... After a while, the mob has again\n    dispersed and the thing is forgotten\u201d (\u201cPhilosophia Militans\u201d).\n\n    \u201cThere is no uniform philosophic theory of the world, such as we,\n    at least to a certain extent, used to have,\u201d says _Paulsen_\n    elsewhere, \u201cthe latest ideas are diverging in all directions of\n    the compass.\u201d When one buildeth up, and another pulleth down, what\n    profit have they but the labour? (Ecclus. xxxiv. 28). \u201cWe have no\n    metaphysics nowadays,\u201d says _R. Eucken_ in the same strain, \u201cand\n    there are not a few who are proud of it. They only would have the\n    right to be so if our philosophy were in excellent shape, if, even\n    without metaphysics, firm convictions ruled our life and actions,\n    if great aims held us together and lifted us above the smallness\n    of the merely human. The fact is an unlimited discordance, a\n    pitiful insecurity in all matters of principle, a defencelessness\n    against the petty human, and soullessness accompanied by\n    superabounding exterior manifestation of life.\u201d\n\n\nThis is the status of modern philosophy and also of liberal, Protestant,\ntheology. Of views of the world, of notions and forms of Christianity, of\nideas, essays and contributions to them, there is choice in abundance.\nHere, materialistic Monism is proclaimed, warranted to solve all riddles.\nThere, spiritualistic Pantheism is retailed in endless varieties. Yonder,\nAgnosticism is strutting: no longer philosophy, but facts and reality, is\nits slogan. Then comes the long procession of ethical views of life:\n\u201cContemplations of life; theories of human existence surround us and court\nus in plenty; the coincidence of ample historical learning with active\nreflection induces manifold combinations, and makes it easy for the\nindividual to draw pictures of this kind according to circumstance and\nmood; and so we see individual philosophies whirling about promiscuously,\nwinning and losing the favour of the day, and shifting and transmuting\nthemselves in kaleidoscopic change\u201d (_Eucken_). _Hegel_, although he\nlectured with great assurance on his own system, lamented: \u201cEvery\nphilosophy comes forth with the pretension to refute not only the\npreceding philosophy, but to remedy its defects, to have at last found the\nright thing.\u201d But past experience shows, that to this philosophy, too, the\npassage from Holy Writ is applicable: \u201cBehold, the feet that will carry\nthee away are already at the threshold.\u201d Indeed, often it has come to pass\nthat these philosophers themselves bury their ideas, preparatory to\nentering another camp. Consider the changes that men like _Kant_,\n_Fichte_, _Schelling_, _Strauss_, _Nietzsche_, have essayed in the short\ncourse of a few decades, and we are justified in assuming that they would\nagain have changed their last ideas had death not interfered.\n\nNow and then such confusion of opinions is considered an advantage, the\nadvantage of fertility. To be sure, it is fertility,\u2014the fertility of\nfruitless attempts, of errors, and of fancies, the fertility of disorder\nand chaos. If this fertility be a cause of pride for science, then\nmathematics, physics, astronomy, and other exact sciences, are indeed to\nbe pitied for having to forego this fertility of philosophy, and the\nprivilege of being an arena for contradictory views.\n\n\n\nWithout Peace and without Joy.\n\n\nAfter the hopeless shipwreck of the modern, godless thought, can we wonder\nat meeting frequently the despondency of _pessimism_? Is not pessimism the\nfirst born of scepticism? At the close of the nineteenth century we read,\nagain and again, in reviews of the past and forecasts of the future, how\nthe modern world stands perplexed before the riddles of life, confessing\nin pessimistic mood that it is dissatisfied and unhappy to the depth of\nits soul. With proud self-consciousness, boasting of knowledge and power\nof intellect, they had entered the nineteenth century, praising themselves\nin the words: How great, O man, thou standest at the century\u2019s close, with\npalm of victory in thy hand, the fittest son of time! With heads bowed in\nshame these same representatives of modern thought make their exit from\nthe same century.\n\n\n    Of the number that voiced this sentiment we quote but one, Prof.\n    _R. Eucken_, who wrote: \u201cThe greatness of the work is beyond\n    doubt. This work more and more opens up and conquers the world,\n    unfolds our powers, enriches our life, it leads us in quick\n    victorious marches from triumph to triumph.... Thus, it is true,\n    our desired objects have been attained, but they disclosed other\n    things than we expected: the more our powers and ideas are\n    attracted by the work, the more we must realize the neglect of the\n    inner man and of his unappeased, ardent longing for happiness.\n    Doubts spring up concerning the entire work; we must ask whether\n    the new civilization be not too much a development of bare force,\n    and too little a cultivation of the being, whether because of our\n    strenuous attention to surroundings, the problems of innermost man\n    are not neglected. There is also noticeable a sad lack in moral\n    power: we feel powerless against selfish interests and\n    overwhelming passions: mankind is more and more dividing itself\n    into hostile sects and parties. And such doubts arouse to renewed\n    vigour the old, eternal problems, which faithfully accompany our\n    evolution through all its stages. Former times did not finally\n    solve them, (?) but they were, at least to a degree, mollified and\n    quieted. But now they are here again unmitigated and unobscured.\n    The enigmatical of human existence is impressed upon us with\n    unchecked strength, the darkness concerning the Whence and\n    Whither, the dismal power of blind necessity, accident and sorrow\n    in our fate, the low and vulgar in the human soul, the difficult\n    complications of the social body: all unite in the question: Has\n    our existence any real sense or value? Is it not torn asunder to\n    an extent that we shall be denied truth and peace for ever?...\n    Hence it is readily understood why a gloomy pessimism is spreading\n    more and more, why the depressed feeling of littleness and\n    weakness is pervading mankind in the midst of its triumphs.\u201d\n\n    Similar, and profoundly true, are the words spoken some years ago\n    by a noted critic in the \u201cLiterarische Zentralblatt\u201d (1900): \u201cA\n    painful lament and longing pervades our restless and peaceless\n    time. The bulk of our knowledge is daily increasing, our technical\n    ability hardly knows of difficulties it could not overcome ... and\n    yet we are not satisfied. More and more frequently we meet with\n    the tired, disheartened question: What\u2019s the use? We lack the one\n    thing which would give support and impetus to our existence, a\n    firm and assured view of the world. Or, to be more exact, we have\n    found that we cannot live with the view of the world which in this\n    century of enlightenment has stamped its imprint more and more\n    upon our entire mental life. Materialism, in coarser or finer\n    form, has penetrated deeply our habits of thought, even in those\n    who would indignantly protest against being called materialists;\n    the name seemed to imply scientific earnestness and liberal views.\n    However, there was still left a considerable fund of old,\n    idealistic values, and as long as we could draw upon them we saw\n    in materialism only the power to clear up rooted prejudices, and\n    to open the road for progress in every field. To the newer\n    generation, however, little or nothing is left of this old fund,\n    hence, having nothing else but materialism to depend upon, they\n    are confronted by an appalling dreariness and emptiness of\n    existence. And ever since the man on the street has absorbed the\n    easy materialistic principles, and looks down from the height of\n    his \u2018scientific\u2019 view of life contemptuously upon all\n    reactionaries, we have become aware of the danger that imperils\n    everything implied by the collective word \u2018humanism.\u2019 This\n    explains the plethora of literature which in these days deals with\n    the questions of a world philosophy.\u201d Who is not reminded after\n    reading this mournful confession of the words of _St. Augustine_:\n    \u201cRestless is our heart, till it finds rest in Thee\u201d?\n\n\nIf it be true, then, that philosophical thought stands in closest\nconnection with civilization, determining the latter in its loftier\naspects, then the freedom of thought of modern subjectivism has proved its\nincompetence as a power for civilization; it can produce only a\nsham-civilization, it can incite the minds and keep them in nervous\ntension, until, tired of fruitless endeavour, they yield to pessimism.\nHowever painful it may be to admit it, this freedom of thought is and\nremains the principle of natural decadence of all the higher elements of a\nculture that is not determined by the number of guns, by steam-engines,\nand high-schools for girls, but which consists, chiefly, in a steadfast,\nideal condition of reason and will, from which all else obtains\nsignificance and value. What further proof of intellectual and cultural\nincompetence can be demanded which this principle has not furnished\nalready?\n\nIf this be the fact, then it follows in turn that in the life of higher\nculture, where the health of the soul and the marrow of mental life is at\nstake, there can rule but a single principle, the _objectivism of\nChristian thought_, the principle of absolute submission, without variance\nand change, to a truth against which man has no rights. The submission of\nChristian thought to a religious, teaching authority, recognized as\ninfallible in all matters pertaining to its domain, while not an\nexhaustive presentment of this principle, is its perceptive and concrete\neffect.\n\n\n\nA Rock in the Waters.\n\n\nThe history of human thought of all ages, but especially of the last\ncenturies, proves how necessary a divine revelation is to man; viz., the\nclear exposition of the highest truths in the view of world and of life,\nemphasized by a divine authority, which links the human mind to the one\nimmutable truth; not only in ignorant nations, not only in the man of the\ncommon people, but also, and more especially, in the educated man and in\nthe scientist, he, namely, who, through the moderate studies of a small\nintellect, has collected a little sum of knowledge that is apt to confuse\nhis limited understanding and to rob him of modesty. It is just as\nmanifest that revelation alone does not suffice, that there is needed also\nthe enduring forum of a teaching Church, which in the course of centuries\ngives expression to truth with infallible, binding authority.\n\nThe full truth of this is felt even by those unfavourably disposed toward\nthis authority. A recent champion of autonomous freedom of thought, the\nProtestant theologian, _F. Troeltsch_, makes this concession in the words:\n\u201cThe immediate consequence of such autonomy is necessarily a steadily more\nintensified individualism of convictions, opinions, theories, and\npractical ends and aims. An absolute supra-individual union is effected\nonly by an enormous power such as the belief in an immediate,\nsupernatural, divine, revelation, as possessed by Catholicism, and\norganized in the Church as the extended and continued incarnation of God.\nThis tie gone, the necessary sequel will be a splitting up in all sorts of\nhuman opinions.\u201d(17)\n\nThis is to the Catholic a caution to appreciate the ministry of his Church\never more highly, and to cleave to it still closer. He will not agree with\nthose who think that in our time the principle of Authority must retire.\nThe more his eyes are opened by the present situation, the more clearly he\nrealizes where thought emancipated from faith and authority has led, the\nmore he will affirm his conscious belief in authority. His foothold upon\nthe rock of the Church will be the firmer the more restless the billows of\nunsafe opinions rise and roll about him. The Catholic of mature, Catholic,\nconviction would consider it folly to abandon the rock for the restless\nand turbulent play of the waves. Many, indeed, who are looking for a safe\nplace of truth, we see for this reason taking refuge in a strong Church;\nmany are impressed by the stability of Catholic authority.(18)\n\nThe present situation is similar socially to that of the ancient world at\nits close, and also in regard to the spiritual life. Then, as now, there\nwas learning without idealism, corroded by scepticism, without harmony and\ncheer. Then, as now, there was but one power to offer rescue. Faith and\nChurch. A longing for help is now also prevailing in the world. It feels\nits helplessness. If they only had the conviction of a _St. Augustine_,\nwho prayed for deliverance from his errors: \u201cWhen I often and forcefully\nrealized the agility, sagacity, and acumen of the human mind, I could not\nbelieve that truth was hidden completely from us\u2014rather only the way and\nmanner how to discover it, and that we must accept these from a divine\nauthority\u201d (_De utilit. credendi_, 8).\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\nIt was a solemn hour, pregnant with profound significance, when at\nmidnight at the beginning of this century all the churchbells of the\nCatholic globe were ringing, and, while everything around was silent,\ntheir blessed sound was resounding alone over the earth, over villages and\ncities, over countries and nations. Grandly there resounded into the whole\nworld, over the heads of the children of men about to enter upon a new\ncentury of their history, that the Catholic Church is the Queen in the\nrealm of mind, that she alone preserves infallibly the truths and ideals\nof which mankind is in quest, by which they are raised above earthly\nturmoil\u2014those truths and ideals in which the heart and mind of earthly\npilgrims find rest and peace on their long journey to the goal of time.\nSince she assumed the mission of Him who said, \u201cI am the Way and the\nTruth,\u201d and, \u201cI am with you all days, even unto the consummation of the\nworld,\u201d the Church has travelled a long way through the centuries, has\nwithstood hard times and fierce storms. And she has faithfully preserved\nfor mankind the precious patrimony from God\u2019s hand. And now, at the dawn\nof new times, her bells proclaimed that she is still alive, holding the\nold truths in a strong hand. And after another century the bells of the\nglobe will ring again, they will, so we hope\u2014ring more loudly and more\nforcefully, over the nations. And these bells will also ring over the\ngraves of this present generation, over fallen giants of the forest and\nover collapsed towers, over mouldy books, and the wreckage left by a\nculture that the emancipated, fallible human mind created, but which truth\ndid not consecrate. And again the bells will proclaim to a new century\nthat God, and the world\u2019s history, are thinking greater thoughts than the\npuny child of man is capable of thinking within the narrow compass of his\nyears and of his surroundings.\n\n\n\n\n\nFOURTH SECTION. FREEDOM OF TEACHING.\n\n\n\n\nPreliminary Conceptions and Distinctions.\n\n\nAcquisition and distribution, labour and communication of the fruits of\nlabour, are the two factors that determine the progress of mankind. Thus\nthe precious metal is mined and brought to the surface by the labourer,\nwhence it speeds through the world; thus the faithful missionary journeys\ninto remote countries, to disseminate there the mental treasures acquired\nby study and hard religious effort. And thus science desires to work, and\nshould work, for the culture and progress of mankind, and this work is\npre-eminently its task. To properly pursue this vocation science demands\nfreedom, _freedom in research and teaching_. There is, as we have already\npointed out, an important distinction between the two. Although research\nand teaching are mostly joined, the former only attaining its chief end in\nteaching, there is a real difference between the two elements; and not\nunfrequently they are separated. It makes quite a difference whether some\none within the four walls of his room studies anarchy, or whether he\nproceeds to proclaim its principles to the world; it is quite different\nwhether a man embraces atheism for his personal use only, or whether he\nmakes propaganda for it from the pulpit; it makes also a world of\ndifference whether a man is personally convinced that materialism is the\nsole truth, or whether he proclaims it as a science, and is able to affirm\nthat of the German edition of \u201cWeltr\u00e4tsel\u201d 200,000 copies have been sold,\nof the English edition about as many, and that a dozen other translations\nhave spread the fundamental notions of monism broadcast through the world\n(_E. Haeckel_, Monismus u. Naturgesetz). Teaching must be viewed from a\ndifferent point. Research is a personal function, whereas Teaching is a\nsocial one. This fact, of itself, makes it evident that teaching cannot be\nallowed the same measure of freedom as research, hence that teaching must\nbe confined within narrower limits.\n\nBut Freedom is demanded not only for research, but also for teaching, in\nmost cases even an unlimited freedom. It is demanded as an inalienable\nright of the individual, it is demanded in the name of progress, which can\nbe promoted only by new knowledge. Some countries grant this freedom in\ntheir constitutions. Before discussing this demand and its presumptions,\nwe shall have to make clear some preliminary conceptions.\n\nFirst, the meaning of _freedom of teaching_. How is it precisely to be\nunderstood? Freedom in teaching in general means, evidently, exemption\nfrom unwarranted restraint in teaching. Teaching, however, to use the\nwords of a great thinker of the past, means _Causare in alio scientiam_,\nto impart knowledge to some one else (_Thomas Aquinas_, Quaest. disp. De\nverit. q. XI al.). Thus the pious mother teaches the child truths about\nGod and Heaven, the school-teacher teaches elementary knowledge, the\ncollege-professor teaches science. Teaching is chiefly understood to be\nthe instruction by professional teachers, from grammar school up to\nuniversity. Hence freedom in teaching does not necessarily refer to\nscientific matters only; we may also speak of a freedom of teaching in the\nelementary school. As a rule, however, the term is used in the narrower\nsense of freedom in teaching science.\n\n\n    Here it may not be amiss to mention further distinctions. As we\n    may distinguish in teaching three essentials, namely, the matter,\n    the method, and the teacher, so there is a corresponding triple\n    freedom of teaching. If we regard the matter, we meet with the\n    demand, that no one be excluded in an unjust way from exercising\n    his right to teach, that no single party should have the monopoly\n    of teaching: the right to found free universities also belongs\n    here. It is part of the freedom of teaching. As it has relation to\n    the state, we shall return to this point later on. A second\n    freedom, which might be called methodological, concerns the choice\n    of the method. This is naturally subject to considerable\n    restraint; not only because the academic teacher may frequently\n    have to get along without desirable paraphernalia, but also\n    because of the commission he receives with his appointment,\n    wherein his field and scope are prescribed. This is necessary for\n    the purpose of the university; the students are to acquire the\n    varied knowledge needed later on in their vocations of clergyman,\n    lawyer, teacher, or physician. There is frequent complaint that\n    this freedom in method is abused to a certain extent, that the\n    students are taught many fragments of science with thoroughness,\n    but too little of that which they actually need later on; they are\n    trained too much for theoretical work and not enough for the\n    practical vocation. Thus there is limitation here, too. But this\n    is not the freedom in teaching which occupies the centre of\n    interest to-day.\n\n\nThe trophy for which the battle is waged is the freedom relating to the\n_subject_ of teaching; we shall term it \u201cdoctrinal\u201d freedom in teaching:\nShall the representative of science be permitted to promulgate any view he\nhas formed? Even if that view conflicts with general religious or moral\nconvictions, with the social order? Or must this freedom be curbed? This\nis the question.(19)\n\nObviously, teaching need not always be done _verbally_, it can be done\nalso by _writing_. The professor lectures in the classrooms, but he may\nalso expound his theories in books; this latter the private scholar may\nalso do. In this way _Plato_ and _Aristotle_ and the Fathers are still\nteaching by their writings, though their lips have long been silent. True,\nthis way of teaching has not the force of the spoken word, vibrating with\npersonal conviction, but it reaches farther out, with telling effect upon\nmasses and remote circles. Thus, freedom in teaching includes also the\nfreedom to print and publish scientific theories, hence it includes part\nof the _freedom of the press_; in its full meaning, however, the freedom\nof the press relates also to unscientific periodicals, especially\nnewspapers.\n\nA counterpart to the freedom in teaching is presented by the _freedom in\nlearning_. It concerns the student, and may consist of the right granted\nto the \u201cacademic citizen\u201d to choose at his discretion, but within the\nrestrictions set by his studies, his university, his teachers, and his\ncurriculum.\n\n\n\n\nChapter I. Freedom Of Teaching And Ethics.\n\n\nNow for a closer examination of the problem of freedom of teaching, from\nthe point of _general ethics_, not of law. This is an important\ndistinction, not seldom overlooked. The former point of view deals with\nfreedom in teaching only in as far as regulated or circumscribed by\nethical principles, by the moral principles of conscience, without regard\nto state-laws or other positive rules. The freedom in teaching as\ndetermined by governmental decrees may be called freedom of teaching by\nstate-right. It may happen that the state does not prohibit the\ndissemination of doctrines which may be forbidden by reason and\nconscience, for instance, atheistical doctrine. There may be immoral\nproducts of art not prohibited by the state; yet ethics cannot grant\nlicense to pornography. The state grants the liberty of changing from one\ncreed to another, or of declaring one\u2019s self an atheist; yet this does not\njustify the act before the conscience. The statutes do not forbid\neverything that is morally impermissible; their aim is directed only at\noffences against the good of the commonwealth. Moreover, even such\noffences may not be prohibited by statute, for the simple reason that the\nenactment of such laws may be impossible on account of the complexion of\nlegislative bodies, or because of other conditions.\n\nWe will now take the ethical position and try to judge the freedom of\nteaching from this point of view. First of all, we shall have to explain\nthe _social character_ of teaching and the _responsibility_ attached\nthereto. We start again with the meaning of freedom of teaching. It\ndemands that the communication of scientific opinions should not be\nrestrained in unwarranted manner. \u201cIn unwarranted manner\u201d; because,\nmanifestly, not all bars are to be removed; no one will assert that a man\nmay teach things he knows to be false. Every activity, including\nscientific activity, must conform to truth and morals. Hence there is only\nthe question to determine, when is freedom in teaching morally\nreprehensible, and when not; which are the bars that must not be\ntransgressed, and which bars may be disregarded? Is it allowed or not to\nteach any opinion, if the teacher subjectively believes it to be true?\nHere the views differ. However, one thing at present is clear:\n\n\n\nFreedom of Teaching is Necessary.\n\n\nAlso in respect to method. Even the teacher in public and grammar schools,\nthough minutely guided by the plan of instruction, must be granted, by the\ndemands of pedagogy, a certain liberty; he should be free to arrange and\nto try many things. Only where individual spontaneity is given play will\nlove for work be aroused, which in turn stimulates devotion to the cause\nand makes for success. This applies with even greater force to the\ncollege-professor, in respect to method, course of instruction, subject,\nand the results of his research. He must be free to communicate them,\nwithout consideration for unwarranted prejudices, or for private and party\ninterests.\n\nIf the scientist were condemned to do nothing but repeat the old things,\nwithout change and variance, without improvement and correction, without\nnew additions and discoveries, all alertness and impulse would disappear;\nbut his alacrity and ardour will increase, if allowed to contribute to\nprogress, if assured beforehand of publicity for the new solutions he\nhopes to find, if allowed to promulgate new discoveries.\n\nThis freedom is demanded, even more imperatively, by the vocation of\nscience to work for the progress of mankind, primarily for the\nintellectual and through this for the general progress. The demand in\nbehalf of the individual is even more urgent in behalf of science at\nlarge: no standing still, ever onward to new knowledge and the enrichment\nof the mind, to moral uplift, to a beautifying of life\u2014and ultimately to\nthe glorification of God! For, verily, the purpose of the whole universe\nis the glory of the Creator. Glory is given to Him by the world of stars,\nas they speed through space, conforming to His laws; glory is given to Him\nby the dewdrop, as it reflects the rays of the morning sun; glory is given\nto Him by the butterfly, as it unfolds the brilliancy of colours received\nfrom His hand. The chief glory of all is given to Him by the\nreason-endowed human mind, developing its powers ever more fully, the\ncrowning achievement of visible creation, wherein God\u2019s wisdom reflects\nbrighter than the sun in the morning-dew. And for this is needed the\nfreedom of scientific progress, which would be impossible without a\nfreedom in teaching.\n\n\n    And this applies not only to fixed conclusions; it must also be\n    permitted, within admissible bounds, to teach scientific\n    _hypotheses_. Science needs them for its progress; they are the\n    buds that burst forth into blossoms. Had men like _Copernicus_,\n    _Newton_, _Huygens_, not been free to propound their hypotheses,\n    the sun would still revolve around the earth, we still would have\n    _Ptolemy\u2019s_ revolution of the spheres, and the results of optical\n    science would be denied us.\n\n\n\nA Twofold Freedom of Teaching and Its Presumption.\n\n\nThere cannot be any doubt that science must have freedom in teaching. But\nof what kind? One that is necessary and suitable. Yes, but what kind of\nfreedom is that? Here is the crux of the question. Now we are again at the\nboundary line where we stood, when defining the freedom of science in\ngeneral, at the parting of the ways of two contrary conceptions of man.\n\nOne is the Christian idea, and also that of unbiassed reason. Man is a\nlimited creature, depending on God, on truth and moral law, at the same\ntime dependent on social life, hence also dependent on social order and\nauthority; consequently he cannot claim independence, but only the freedom\ncompatible with his position. Therefore the barriers demanded by truth and\nby the duty of belief are set to his research; hence his freedom in\nteaching can only be the one permitted by his social position; personal\nperception of truth _and_ consideration for the welfare of mankind will be\nthe barriers of this freedom.\n\nThis view is opposed by another, claiming full independence for both\nresearch and teaching, a claim prompted by the modern philosophy of _free\nhumanity_, which sees in man an autonomous being, who needs only follow\nthe immanent impulses of his own individuality; and this especially in\nthat activity which is deemed the most perfect, the pursuit of science:\nthis hypostatized collective-being of the highest human pursuit is also to\nbe the supreme bearer of autonomism. As a matter of course this results in\nthe claim for unlimited freedom in teaching, a freedom we shall term\n_liberal_: in communicating his scientific view the scientist need merely\nbe guided by his perception of truth, without any considerations for\nexternal authorities or interests, provided his communication is a\nscientific one, viz., observing the usual form of scientific teaching.\nThis latter limitation is usually added, because this freedom is to apply\nto the teaching of _science_ only; to the popular presentation of\nscientific views, appealing directly to the masses, such a freedom is not\nalways conceded.\n\n\n    \u201cResearch,\u201d we are told, \u201cdemands full freedom, with no other\n    barrier but its own desire for truth, hence the academic teacher\n    who teaches in the capacity of an investigator is likewise not to\n    know any barriers but his inner truthfulness and propriety.\u201d \u201cIn\n    this sense we demand to-day freedom in teaching for our\n    universities. The freedom of the scientist and of the academic\n    teacher must not be constrained by any patented truth, nor by\n    faint-hearted consideration. We let the word of the Bible comfort\n    us: \u2018if this doctrine is of God, it will endure; if not, it will\n    pass away\u2019 \u201d (_Kaufmann_). Whatever the academic teacher produces\n    from his subjective veracity must be inviolable; he may proclaim\n    it as truth, regardless of consequences. \u201cThe searching\n    scientist,\u201d so says another, \u201cmust consider only the one question:\n    What is truth? But inasmuch as there cannot be research without\n    communication(?), we must go a step further: the teaching, too,\n    must not be restricted. The scientific writer has to heed but one\n    consideration: How can I present the things exactly as I perceive\n    them, in the clearest and most precise manner?\u201d (_Paulsen_).\n    \u201cScientific research and the communication of its results must,\n    conformable to its purpose, be independent of any consideration\n    not innate in the scientific method itself,\u2014hence independent of\n    the traditions and prejudices of the masses, independent of\n    authorities and social groups, independent of interested parties.\n    That this independence is indispensable needs no demonstration.\u201d\n    \u201cNor can any limitation of the freedom of research and teaching be\n    deduced from the official position of the scientist or teacher\u201d\n    (_Von Amira_). Just as soon as he begins his research according to\n    scientific method, _i.e._, adapts his thoughts to scientific\n    rules, customs, and postulates, he may question Christianity, God,\n    everything; neither state nor Church must object, no matter if\n    thousands are led astray.\n\n\nThis freedom is pre-eminently claimed for philosophical and religious\nthought, for ideas relating to views of the world and the foundations of\nsocial order; because only in this province is absolute freedom of\nteaching likely to be seriously refused. In mathematics and the natural\nsciences, in philology and kindred sciences, there is hardly occasion for\nit; there only petty disputes occur, differences among competitors, things\nthat do not reach beyond the precinct of the learned fraternity. Whether\none is for or against the theory of three-dimensional space, for or\nagainst the theory of ions and the like, all that touches very little on\nthe vital questions of mankind; but the case is quite different when it\ncomes to publicly advocating the abolition of private property, to the\npreaching of polygamy: it is here where great clashes threaten. Here,\nalso, there enter into the plan the social powers, whose duty it is to\nshield the highest possessions of human society against wanton attack.\nNevertheless the demand is for unlimited freedom in teaching. What, then,\nare the arguments used in giving to this exceptional claim the semblance\nof justification? This shall be the first question.\n\n\n\nUnlimited Freedom in Teaching not Demanded.\n\n\n1. Not by Veracity.\n\n\nVeracity is appealed to first; it obligates the teacher, so it is said, to\nannounce his own convictions unreservedly, for to \u201cdeny one\u2019s own\nconvictions would offend against one of the most positive principles of\nmorals\u201d; hence the academic teacher could not grant to the state the right\nto set a barrier in this respect, \u201cit would be a violation of the duty of\nveracity, which is innate to the teacher\u2019s office\u201d (_Von Amira_).\n\nWas it realized in making this claim what the duty of truthfulness really\ndemands? This duty is complied with when one is not untruthful, that is to\nsay, does not state something to be his opinion when secretly he believes\nthe contrary to be true; to force him to do this would of course be\ninstigating untruthfulness. Truthfulness, however, does not require any\none to speak out publicly what he thinks; one may be silent. Or is\ncautious silence untruthfulness? It is oftentimes prudence, but not\nuntruthfulness. There is a considerable difference between thinking and\ncommunicating thought, even to the scientist.\n\nOr is the scientist _obliged_, for instance, to proclaim publicly views he\nhas formed contrary to the prevailing principles of morals,\u2014views he calls\nthe \u201cresults of his research,\u201d so that mankind at last may learn the\ntruth? Was _Nietzsche_ in duty bound to proclaim to the wide world his\nrevolutionary ideas? Any sober-minded man might have told him he need not\nworry about this duty. Has the teacher of science this duty? How will he\nprove it? How are they going to prove that it is incumbent upon an\natheistic college-professor to teach his atheism also to others? Or, must\nhe teach that the fundamental principles of Christian marriage are\nuntenable, if this has become his personal opinion? Is it, perhaps,\nimpossible for him to refrain from such teaching in the lectures he is\nappointed to give? This view will mostly prove a delusion. A conscientious\nexamination of his opinion would convince him that he, too, had better\nabandon it, since it is merely an aberration of his mind. But let us\nassume that he could neither correct his views nor refrain from\nproclaiming them, that he would declare: \u201cI should lie if, in discussing\nthe question in how far this or that public institution is morally\nsanctioned, I were to halt before certain institutions; for instance if,\nhaving the moral conviction that monarchy is a morally objectionable\ninstitution, I omitted to say so\u201d (_Th. Lipps_).\n\nWell, he has the option to change his branch of teaching, or to resign his\noffice; he is not indispensable, no one forces him to retain his office.\nIndeed, he owes it to _truthfulness_ to leave his post the very instant he\nfinds he is not able to occupy it in a beneficial way; he owes it to\n_honesty_ to yield his position, if he has lost the proper relation to\nreligion, state, and the people, to whom his position is to render\nservice.\n\n\n2. Not the Duty of Science.\n\n\n\u201cNevertheless,\u201d we are told, \u201cthe representatives of science have the duty\nof freely communicating their opinions; they are called by people and\nstate to find the truth for the great multitude, that is not itself in the\nposition to pursue laborious research. Where else could it get the truth\nbut from science?\u201d \u201cThe multitude participates in truth generally in a\nreceptive, passive manner; only a few pre-eminent minds are destined by\nnature to be the dispensers and promoters of knowledge\u201d (_Paulsen_), and\nwith this vocation of science a restriction of its freedom of speech would\nbe incompatible.\n\nThe idea has something enticing about it. It also has its justification,\nif the matter at issue concerns things outside of the common scope of\nhuman knowledge, such as the more precise research of nature, of history,\nand so on. But the idea is not warranted when applied to the higher\nquestions of human life. Here it is based on the false premise that man\ncannot arrive at the certain possession of truth without scientific\nresearch. We have demonstrated previously how this notion involves a total\nmisconception of the nature of human thought.\n\n\n    There is, beside the scientific certainty, another true certainty,\n    a natural certainty, the only one we have in most matters, and a\n    safe guide to mankind especially in higher questions, nay, in\n    general much safer than science, which, as proved by history, goes\n    easily astray in such matters. Long before there was a science,\n    mankind possessed the truth about the principles of life; and it\n    possesses this truth still, through common sense and, even more,\n    through divine revelation, which offers enlightenment to every one\n    regardless of science. Here apply the words of the poet:\n\n    \u201cDas Wahre ist schon laengst gefunden\n    Hat edle Geisterschaar verbunden\n    Das alte Wahre, fasst es an!\u201d\n\n\nNevertheless, it is claimed, science remains the sole guide to truth and\nprogress. Must not truth be searched for and struggled for always anew?\nThere are no patented truths for all times\u2014each age must sketch its own\nimage of the world, must form new values. And it is for science to point\nout these new roads. Therefore, full swing for its doctrines. \u201cScience\nknows not of statutes of limitations or prescription, hence of no\nabsolutely established possession. Consequently real, scientific,\ninstruction can only mean absolutely free instruction\u201d (_Paulsen_). We may\nbe brief. Every line bears the imprint of that sceptical subjectivism\nwhich we have met so often as the philosophical presumption of modern\nfreedom of science. It is the wisdom of ancient sophistry, which even\nAristotle stigmatized as a \u201csham-science,\u201d \u201ca running after something that\ninvariably slips away.\u201d A freedom in teaching with such a theory of\ncognition can never be a factor of mental progress, least of all when it\nseeks to rise above a God-given, Christian truth to \u201chigher\u201d forms of\nreligion. This, however, is often the very progress for which freedom in\nteaching is intended\u2014the unhindered propagation of an anti-Christian view\nof the world.\n\n\n3. No Innate Right.\n\n\nVery well, we are told, leave aside the appeal to the province of science;\nbut it cannot be denied that man has at least an innate right of\ncommunicating his thoughts in the freest manner. The first right of the\nhuman individual, a right which must not be curtailed in any way, is his\nright to free development according to his inner laws, provided the\nfreedom of the fellow-man is not thereby injured. Hence every man has the\nright of freely uttering his opinion, in science especially, because the\nfree right of others is thereby not infringed upon in any matter\nwhatsoever.\n\nThis is the claim. It is again rooted in the autonomy of the human\nsubject, the main idea of the liberal view of life, and, at the same time,\nthe principal presumption of its freedom of science. It leads to the\n_individualistic theory of rights_, which declares freedom to be man\u2019s\nself-sufficient object, viz., freedom in all things regardless of the weal\nand woe of others, no matter if the sequel be error, scandal, or\nseduction, if only the strict right to freedom be not violated.\n\n\n    \u201cAct outwardly so,\u201d says the philosophic preceptor of autonomism,\n    \u201cthat the free use of thy free will may be consistent with the\n    liberty of others according to a general law.\u201d \u201cThis liberty,\u201d\n    continues _Kant_, \u201cis the sole, original right of every man by\n    virtue of his humanity.\u201d And _Spencer_ concurrently teaches:\n    \u201cEvery one is free to do what he wants, as long as he does not\n    infringe upon the liberty of others.\u201d\n\n    This is termed the \u201cMaxim of Co-existence.\u201d Accordingly any one\n    may say and write anything at will, no matter if people are led\n    astray by his errors. Even the government must in no way limit\n    this freedom, except where rights are violated; to defend religion\n    and morals against attacks, to guard innocence and inexperience\n    against seduction, is, according to this theory, not allowed to\n    the state. _W. von Humboldt_ writes: \u201cHe who utters things or\n    commits actions, offending the conscience or the morals of other\n    people, may act immorally: but unless he is guilty of\n    obtrusiveness, he does not injure any right.\u201d Hence the state must\n    not interfere. \u201cEven the assuredly graver case, when the\n    witnessing of an action, the listening to certain reasoning, would\n    mislead the virtue or the thought of others, even this case would\n    not permit restraint of freedom.\u201d\n\n\nWe are dealing here with that misconception of the social nature of man\nwhich has always characterized liberalism. It knows only of the right and\nliberty of the individual; of his duties to society it knows nothing, not\neven that men should not injure the possessions of others, but rather\npromote them; nor does it know that men are placed in a society that\nrequires the free will of the individual to yield to the common weal of\nthe many. To liberal thought human society is only an accidental\naggregation of individuals, not connected by social unity. The autonomous\nspheres of the single individuals are rolling side by side, each one for\nitself: wherever it pleases them to roll, there they are carried by the\nautonomous centre of gravity, whatever they upset in their career has no\nright to complain. This principle of freedom was given free rein in the\neconomical legislation of the nineteenth century. Free enterprise, free\ndevelopment of energy, was the rallying cry; the result was devastation\nand wreckage.\n\n\n\nUnrestricted Freedom of Teaching Inadmissible.\n\n\nHence the claim for absolute freedom in teaching is not warranted; on the\ncontrary, its chief arguments are borrowed from a philosophy that is\nunacceptable to the Christian mind. Is it even admissible? Though not\nwarranted, is it permissible at least from the viewpoint of ethics? It is\nnot even this. The claim is ethically inadmissible, because the\n_religious, moral, and social_ institutions, especially the _Christian\nfaith_ and the Christian morals of mankind, would be seriously injured. In\nother words: The claim that it is permissible to proclaim scientific\ntheories which are apt to do great _damage_ to the foundations of\nreligious, moral, and social life, especially to Christian conviction and\nmorals, is ethically reprehensible.\n\nA few remarks in explanation. We merely speak here of the freedom in\nteaching relating to the philosophical-religious foundations of life; that\nit cannot be the subject of serious objection in other matters we have\npreviously mentioned. Nor do we yet inquire what social powers should fix\nthe needed limitations, whether state or Church should regulate them; we\nare merely investigating, from the viewpoint of ethics, what barriers are\nset by the law of reason, and would have to be set even in the absence of\nstate laws, because of the important influence exercised by scientific\ndoctrine upon the social life\u2014the social welfare of mankind is the\nconsideration beside the truth that is decisive in considering freedom in\nteaching.\n\nThe teacher or writer may himself be of the opinion that his pernicious\nerrors are not dangerous; he may fancy them even of utmost importance to\nthe world; hence he thinks he has the right, even the duty, to communicate\nthem to the world. And do we not hear them all assure us that they desire\nonly the truth? We do not wish to sit in judgment on the good faith of\nthem individually; we make no comment when a man like _D. F. Strauss_,\nlooking back upon the forty years of his career as a writer, vouches for\nhis unwavering and pure aim for truth; and when even _Haeckel_ asserts\nthis of himself. Every fallacy has made its appearance with this avowal.\n\n\n    But, by way of parenthesis, there is no reason to boast in a\n    general way of the sincere aim at truth and the pure mind for the\n    ideal, alleged to prevail in the modern literature of our times,\n    especially in philosophical literature. He who stands upon\n    Christian ground knows that the denial of a personal God, of\n    immortality and other matters, are errors of gravest consequence.\n    Furthermore, if one is convinced of the capability of man to\n    recognize the truth, at least in the most important matters, and\n    if one knows that God has made His Revelation the greatest\n    manifestation in history, and proved it sufficiently by\n    documents\u2014indeed, had to prove it; that He will let all who are of\n    good will come to the knowledge of the truth; then it remains\n    incomprehensible how modern philosophy considered as a whole is\n    said on the one hand to be guided by a sincere desire for truth,\n    while on the other hand it clings with hopeless obstinacy to the\n    most radical errors.\n\n    Such talk of general sincere searching for truth is apt to deceive\n    the inexperienced. He who has obtained a deeper insight into\n    modern philosophy, he who steadily watches it at work, will recall\n    to mind only too often the word of the Holy Ghost: \u201cFor there\n    shall be a time when they will not endure sound doctrine, but\n    according to their own desires shall they heap to themselves\n    teachers ... and will indeed turn away their hearing from the\n    truth and shall be turned unto fables\u201d (2 Tim. iv. 3).\n\n\nEven if the teacher is himself convinced of the truth and inoffensiveness\nof his theory, it does not follow by any means that society is obliged to\nreceive it. Indeed not. The state prohibits cults dangerous to the common\nweal: it does not intend to suffer damage just because the adherents of\nsuch cults may be in good faith. And if some one thinks himself called to\ndeliver a people from its legitimate ruler, let it be undecided whether\nhis purpose is good or not, he will nevertheless be restrained by rather\ndrastic means from proceeding according to his idea. This proves that the\nprinciple of \u201cno barrier but one\u2019s own veracity\u201d is not conceded in\npractical life. The teacher and author, this is the sense of our thesis,\nmust ever be conscious of the grave responsibility of science, against\nwhose power the unscientific are so often defenceless; his great duty will\nbe to make use of this power with utmost compunction, to teach nothing\nwhereof he is not fully convinced, nor to announce for truth anything he\nis still investigating.\n\nAs we turn to the demonstration of our proposition, a start from the\n_definition of scientific teaching_ suggests itself; manifestly this must\nbe decisive for the measure of its freedom. No doubt, its purpose\nobviously is: to promote the weal of mankind by communicating the truth,\nby guarding men against errors, especially against those which would most\nharm them, by elevating and increasing the blessings of this life: for\nknowledge guides man in all his steps, it is the light on his way.\n\nScience is not self-sufficient. It is an equally false and pernicious\nnotion to make science a sovereign authority, throning above man, who must\npay homage, and subordinate his interests to it, but which he must not ask\nto serve him for his own ends in life. There are such notions of science\nand also of art. Art, too, it is sometimes claimed, should serve its own\nends only; the demand, that it should edify, or promote the ideals of\nsociety, is deemed a desertion of its purposes, \u201cthe furtherance of\nworldly or heavenly ideals may be eliminated from its task\u201d (_E. von\nHartmann_). These are the excrescences of unclarified cultural thoughts.\nSince man and his culture is more and more replacing the divine Ideal,\nthis culture itself has grown to be the overshadowing ideal of the Deity,\nwithout whom evidently man cannot live. The Egyptians worshipped Sun and\nMoon; modern man often burns incense before the products of his own mind.\nIt is a reversal of the right proportion. Science and its doctrine are\nactivities of life, results of the human mind. Activities of life,\nhowever, have man for their end, they are to develop and perfect him: man\ndoes not exist for the clothes he wears\u2014the clothes exist on account of\nman; the leaves exist for the sake of the tree that puts them forth, nor\ncan grapes be of more importance than the vine that has produced them.\n\nHence, where science does not serve this end, where it in consequence\nbecomes not a blessing, but an injury to man, where it tears down, instead\nof building up, there it forfeits the right to exist; it is no longer a\nfruitful bough on the tree of humanity, but a harmful outgrowth. Like\nevery organism actively opposes its harmful growths, society, too, must\nnot tolerate within its bosom any scientific tendencies which act as\nmalign germs, perhaps attack its very marrow.\n\nFrom the true object of science, as above stated, it follows that it is\nwrong to disseminate doctrines that are apt to injure mankind in the\npossession of the truth, which may even imperil the authenticated\nfoundations of life. For nobody will deny that firm foundations are needed\nto uphold and support the highest ideals of life; they can no more\nwithstand a constant jarring and shaking than can a house of frame and\nstone. Such foundations are, first of all, the moral and religious truths\nand convictions about the Whence and Whither of human life, about God and\nthe hereafter, the social duties toward the fellow-man, obedience to\nauthority, and so on. If man is to perform burdensome duties as husband\nand father, if, as a citizen, he is to do justice to others and yield in\nobedience to authority, he must have powerful motives; else his impulses\nwill take the helm, the sensible, moral being becomes a sensual being who\nreverses the order and drives the ship of life towards the cataract of\nethical and social revolution. And these motives must rest deeply in the\nmind, like the foundation that supports the house; they must become\nidentified with it, as the vital principle penetrates the tree, as the\ninstinct of the animal is part of its innermost being. If new notions are\ncontinually whizzing without resistance through the mind, like the wind\nover the fields, repose and permanence are impossible in human life. To\njolt the foundations invites collapse and ruin.\n\nIt is the duty of self-preservation, for which every being strives, that\nsociety guard these foundations of order against subversion and capricious\nexperimentation. Of the Locrians it is told that any one desiring to offer\na resolution for changing existing laws, was required to appear at the\npublic meeting with a rope around his neck. He was hanged with it if he\nfailed to win his fellow-citizens over to his view. This custom pictures\nthe necessity of erecting a powerful dam against the inundation by illicit\nmental tidal waves, that endanger the stability of the order of life.\nThis, of course, does not oppose every new progress. In building a house,\nfirm foundations do not prevent the house from growing in size; but the\nfoundations are a necessary preliminary to a suitable construction. Under\nno circumstances must a man be permitted, in his individualistic mania for\nreform, to lay an impious hand at the fundamental principles of life; and\nthe scientist must bear in mind the fact that it is not the task and\nprivilege of his individualistic reason to put the seal of approval on\nthese principles as if the truth had never before been discovered.\n\nTo _Christian_ nations the immutable truths of Christianity are these safe\nfoundations. They are vouched for by divine authority, they have stood all\nhistorical tests of fitness; they sustain the institutions of family and\nof government, they determine thought, education, the ideas of right and\nwrong\u2014a venerable patrimony of the nations. Shall every _Nietzsche_, big\nor little, be free to attack them? Experiments may be made with rabbits,\nflowers, or drugs; but it would violate the first principle of prudence\nand justice to allow every Tom, Dick, and Harry, who may have the\nneological itch, to experiment on the highest institutions of mankind.\n\n_Primum non nocere_ is an old caution to the physician; for many medical\npractitioners and surgeons not an untimely admonition. It is asserted, and\nvouched for by proof, that patients are made the subjects of experiment\nfor purposes of science; not, indeed, rich people, but the poor in\nhospitals and clinics (comp. _A. Moll_, Arztliche Ethik, 1902). Every\nconscientious physician will turn with moral abhorrence from such action.\nIndeed, man and his greatest possession, life, is not to be made the\nvictim of scientific experiment. If this holds good as to the physical\nthings of life, then how much more of the ideal things of mankind!\n\n\n\n\u201cEvery One to Form His Own Judgment\u201d?\n\n\nBut, then, cannot every one decide for himself as to the teachings of\nscience, and reject whatever he thinks to be false? Then would be avoided\nall damage that might result from a freedom in teaching. Science does not\nforce its opinion upon any one. With due respect for the discernment of\nits disciples, science lays its results before them, leaving it to them to\njudge and choose, whatever they think is good.\n\nSuch words voice the optimism of an inexperienced idealism. To be sure,\nwere the devotee to science, be he a student at a university or a reader\nof scientific works, a clear-sighted diagnostician, who could at once\nperceive error, and, moreover, if he were a mathematical entity, without\npersonal interest in the matter, the argument might be listened to. But\nany one past the immaturity of youth, he, especially, who has earnestly\ncommenced to know himself, is aware that unfortunately the opposite is the\ncase.\n\nFirst the lack of ability to _distinguish error from truth_. Even when\nrecognized, error is not without danger; it shares with truth the property\nto act suggestively, especially when it repeatedly and with assurance\napproaches the mind. And often error does pose with great assurance, as\nthe result of science, as the conclusion of the superior mind of the\nteacher, perhaps of a famous teacher! It is taken for granted that\nwhatever serious men assert in the name of science must be right; or, if\nnot that, there is the overawing feeling that there must be some\njustification for the confidence of the assertion. Authority impresses\neven without argument, and impresses the more strongly, the less there is\nof intellectual independence. The latter is at lowest ebb at the youthful\nage. That which in hypnotic suggestion is intensified into the morbid: the\neffective psychical transfer of one\u2019s own thought into some one else,\noccurs in a lesser form through the influence of the morbid scepsis of our\ntimes; it is a poisonous atmosphere, affecting imperceptively the\nsusceptible mind which remains long in it.\n\n\n    For this reason the religious savant, who has to do a great deal\n    with infidel books, must be on his watch incessantly, even though\n    he has the knowledge and the intellect to detect wrong\n    conclusions. Thus we find that great scholars often display a\n    striking fear of irreligious books. Of Cardinal _Mai_ it is told:\n    \u201cHe said\u2014and this we can vouch for\u2014\u2018I have the permission to read\n    forbidden books; but I never make use of it nor do I intend to do\n    so\u2019 \u201d (_Hilger_, Der Index, 1905, 41).\n\n    The learned _L. A. Muratori_ wrote a refutation of a heretic book.\n    In the preface he thought it necessary to apologize for having\n    read the book. He said: \u201cThe book got into my hands very late, and\n    for a long time I could not get myself to read it. For why should\n    one read the writings of innovators except to commit one\u2019s self to\n    their folly? I seek and like books which confirm my faith, but not\n    those which would lead me away from my religion. But when I heard\n    that the book was circulated in Italy, I resolved to muster up my\n    strength for the defence of truth and religion, and for the safety\n    of my brethren.\u201d\n\n    _Saint Francis of Sales_, with touching simplicity, gives in his\n    writings praise to God for having preserved him from losing his\n    faith through the reading of heretical books. Of the learned\n    Spanish philosopher _Balmes_ is preserved a saying that he once\n    addressed to two of his friends: \u201cYou know, the faith is deeply\n    rooted in my heart. Nevertheless, I cannot read a fallacious book\n    without feeling the necessity of regaining the right mood by\n    reading Holy Writ, the Imitation of Christ, and the writings of\n    blessed _Louis of Granada_.\u201d\n\n\nWhat then must happen when the needed training is lacking? when one easily\ngrasps the objections to the truth, but cannot find the answer? when one\nis not in a position to ascertain whether the asserted facts are based on\ntruth, whether something important is kept back, whether there are stated\npositive facts, or mere hypotheses, or perhaps even idle suppositions? If\none is not capable to recognize wrong conclusions, to note the ambiguities\nof words? Our present treatise cites proof of it. How many earnest men,\nwho in good faith are the warm advocates of freedom of science, are aware\nhow ambiguous that term is; how a whole theory of cognition and view of\nthe world is hidden behind it? How many can at once see the ambiguity of\nphrases like \u201cDifference between knowledge and faith,\u201d of \u201cexperiencing\none\u2019s religion,\u201d of \u201cevolution and progress,\u201d of \u201chumanism,\u201d of \u201cunfolding\npersonality\u201d? And of the self-conscious postulate that science cannot\nreckon with supernatural factors, how many perceive that it is nothing but\nan undemonstrated supposition? We are told that all great representatives\nof science reject the Christian view of the world; who knows at once that\nsuch assertion is untrue? We read that the Copernican theory was condemned\nby Rome, even prohibited up to 1835, and this cannot fail to make an\nimpression; but the part omitted in the story, who will at once supplement\nor even suspect it?\n\nThen there is the great _want of philosophical training_. Formerly a\nthorough philosophical education was the indispensable condition for\nmaturity, and considered the indispensable foundation for higher studies.\nAll this has changed; frequently there is not even the desire for\nphilosophical training. Of course, modern philosophy in its present state\ndoes not promise much of benefit. \u201cStudents of medicine and law remain for\nthe larger part without any philosophical education, and among those of\nthe other two faculties but few students do better than come into a more\nor less superficial touch with philosophy\u201d (_Paulsen_). The consequence\nis, they cannot scientifically get their bearings in respect to ultimate\nquestions, and easily lose their faith, succumbing to errors and sophisms.\n\nImagine a young man, untrained; in books, in the lecture room, in his\nintercourse, everywhere, he is courted by a disbelieving science, with its\ntheories, its objections, its doubts,\u2014tension everywhere that is not\nrelieved, accusations that are not explained; how is he to bring with a\nsteady hand order in all this? To clinch it, he hears the obtrusive\nexhortation to form forthwith his own conviction by his own reasoning!\n\n\n    He is, moreover, likely to be informed as follows: \u201cThe university\n    is a place for mental struggle, for incessant investigation of\n    inherited opinions. For years and years the student was fed with\n    prescribed matter which he had to swallow believingly, ... at last\n    the moment has arrived when he can choose and decide for himself.\n    True, this freedom of mental choice\u2014and it is the essence of\n    academic freedom\u2014has also its anguish. But how magnificent it is,\n    on the other hand, when the gloomy walls of the classroom vanish,\n    and the bright ether of research dawns into view with its wide\n    horizon! He who cannot grasp and enjoy this moment in its grandeur\n    and exquisiteness, he who prefers to the free life of the colt on\n    the vast prairies the dull existence in a narrow fold ... he has\n    taken the wrong road when he came to the gates of the Alma Mater\n    to study worldly science\u2014he should have remained at the restful\n    hearth of the pious, parental home, in the shadow of the old\n    village-church\u201d (_Jodl_).\n\n\nWhat a lack of earnestness and of knowledge of man, what lack of the sense\nof responsibility! Of young men, without thorough philosophical and\ntheological preparation, it is demanded to doubt at once their Christian\nreligion, despite all compunctions of their conscience, and to argue the\ndangerous theses of an anti-Christian view of the world. They are\nexpected, as if they were heirs to the wisdom of all centuries, to judge\nand correct forthwith that which their teachers call the result of their\nlong studies\u2014for they are not supposed to follow them blindly, they are\nexpected to sit in judgment over theological tendencies and philosophical\nsystems, and to struggle through doubts and aberrations, untouched by\nerror, to display a mental independence which even the man of highest\nlearning lacks. Such a knowledge of human nature might be left to itself,\nif the wrecks it causes were not so saddening.\n\n\n    \u201cHow terrible is the power of science!\u201d a voice of authority\n    warned a short time ago. \u201cThe unlearned are defenceless against\n    the learned, those who know little against those that know much;\n    the unlearned are incapable of independently judging the theories\n    of the learned; error in the garb of knowledge impresses them with\n    the force of truth, especially when it finds an ally in their evil\n    lusts. No wielder of state-power can lay waste, can destroy, as\n    much as an unconscientious, or even merely careless, wielder of\n    the weapons of knowledge. Exalted as is the pursuit of knowledge,\n    and as knowledge itself is if guided by strong moral sentiment and\n    earnest conscience, so degraded it becomes if it tears itself from\n    the self-control of conscience. This fatal rupture will happen the\n    instant science deviates but a hair\u2019s breadth from the truth it\n    can vouch for upon conscientious examination.... Sacred is the\n    freedom of science keeping within the bounds of the moral laws;\n    but transgressing them it is no longer science, but a farce staged\n    with scientific technique, a negation of the essence of science\u201d\n    (Count _A. Apponyi_, former Hungarian Minister of Education,\n    officiating at a _Promotio sub auspiciis_, 1908).\n\n    In the year 1877, at the Fiftieth Congress of Natural Scientists\n    in Munich, Prof. _R. Virchow_, founder and leader of the\n    Progressive Party in Germany, sounded a warning to be\n    conscientious in the use of the freedom in teaching, and in the\n    first place, to announce as the result of science nothing but what\n    has been demonstrated beyond doubt: \u201cI am of the opinion that we\n    are actually in danger of jeopardizing the future by making too\n    much use of the freedom offered to us by present conditions, and I\n    would caution not to continue in the arbitrary personal\n    speculation, which spreads itself nowadays in many branches of\n    natural science. We must make rigid distinction between that which\n    we teach and that which is the object of research. The subjects of\n    our research are problems. But a problem should not be made a\n    subject of teaching. In teaching, we have to remain within the\n    small, and yet large domain which we actually control. Any attempt\n    to model our problems into doctrines, to introduce our conjectures\n    as the foundation of education, must fail, especially the attempt\n    to simply depose the Church and to replace its dogma without\n    ceremony by evolutionary religion; indeed, gentlemen, this attempt\n    must fail, but in failing it will carry with it the greatest\n    dangers for science in general.... We must set ourselves the task,\n    in the first place, to hand down the actual, the real knowledge,\n    and, in going further, we must tell our students invariably: This,\n    however, is not proved, it is _my_ opinion, _my_ notion, _my_\n    theory, _my_ speculation.... Gentlemen, I think we would misuse\n    our power, and endanger our power, if in teaching we would not\n    restrict ourselves to this legitimate province.\u201d\n\n\nAnd is nothing known of the inclinations and passions, especially of the\nyouthful heart, to which truth is so often a heavy yoke, constraining and\noppressing them? Will they not try to use every means to relieve the\ntension? Will they not gravitate by themselves to a science that tells\nthem the old religion with its oppressive dogmas, its unworldly morals, is\na stage of evolution long since passed by, and that many other things,\nonce called sin by obsolete prejudices, are the justified utterances of\nnature? Will they not worship this science as their liberator? He who once\nsaid \u201cI am the truth,\u201d He was crucified; a sign for all ages. Base nature\nwill at all times crucify the truth. _F. Copp\u00e9e_, a member of the French\nAcademy, led back by severe sickness to the faith of his youth, relates\nthe following in his confessions: \u201cI was raised a Christian, and fulfilled\nthe religious duties with zeal even for some years after my first Holy\nCommunion. What made me deviate from my pious habits were, I confess it\nopenly, the aberrations of youthful age and the loathing to make certain\nconfessions. Quite many who are in the same position will admit, if they\nwill be frank, that at the beginning they were estranged from their creed\nby the severe law which religion imposes on all in respect to sensuality,\nand only in later years they felt the want to extenuate and justify the\ntransgressions of the moral law by a scientific system.\u201d \u201cHaving taken the\nfirst step on the downward road, I could not fail to read books, listen to\nwords, see examples, which confirmed my notion that nothing can be more\nwarranted but that man obey his pride and his sensuality; and soon I\nbecame totally indifferent in respect to religion. As will be seen, my\ncase is an everyday case.\u201d\n\nOnly exalted moral purity can keep the mind free from being made captive\nand dragged down by the passions.\n\nIn a college town in southern Germany a Catholic Priest some time ago met\na college girl who belonged to a club of monists. They started upon a\ndiscussion, and soon the college girl had no argument left. But as a last\nshot she exclaimed, \u201cWell, you cannot prevent me from hating your God.\u201d\n\nProf. _G. Spicker_ relates in his autobiography instructive reminiscences\nof his college years. Religiously trained in his youth, and in his early\nyears for some time a Capuchin, he left this Order to go to the\nuniversity. Previous to this he had been led to doubt by the perusal of\nmodern philosophical writings, and at Munich he sank still more deeply\ninto doubt. Prof. _Huber_ advised him to hear the radical _Prantl_. In his\ndejection he went to a fellow-student in quest of comfort, and received\nthe significant advice: \u201cIndeed, _Huber_ is right: you are not a bit of a\nphilosopher; you still believe in sin, that is only a theological notion;\ngo and hear _Prantl_, he\u2019ll rid you of your fancies.\u201d Of the impression\n_Prantl\u2019s_ lectures made upon the susceptible young students he relates:\n\u201cThey were especially overawed by his passionate enthusiasm, his trenchant\ncriticism, his sarcastic treatment of everything mediocre and superficial,\nand, chiefly, by his self-conscious, authoritative, demeanor. Like a\ntornado he swept through hazy, obscure regions, whether in science, art,\npoetry, or religion. Even by only attending the lectures one became more\nconscious of one\u2019s knowledge and looked down with silent contempt upon\nsemi-philosophers and theologians.\u201d In regard to himself he admits that a\nfew weeks sufficed to destroy the last remnants of his former religious\npersuasion: \u201c_Huber\u2019s_ prophecy was completely fulfilled, the last stump\nof my dogmatic belief was smashed into a thousand splinters.\u201d\n\n_Vae mundo a scandalis!_ What a responsibility rests especially upon those\nwho become the scandal for inexperienced youth!\n\nIn the upper classes of a largely Protestant college in northern Germany\nthe professor of mathematics, some years ago, asked the question, who\namong the students had read _Haeckel\u2019s_ \u201cWeltraetsel.\u201d All except four or\nfive rose to their feet. Upon his further question, who of them believed\nin what is said in the book, about half of the classroom rose. \u201cThe\nimmature youth who read the \u2018Weltraetsel,\u2019 \u201d so says _A. Hansen_,\n\u201cunfortunately conclude: \u2018_Haeckel_ says there is no God, therefore we may\nboldly live as it suits our natural immorality....\u2019 Is _Haeckel_ the\nstrong mind to assume for a long future the responsibility for this\nconclusion?\u201d\n\nOne is frightened by the manner the highest ideals of mankind are often\njuggled with, what they dare offer with easy conscience to the tenderest\nyouth. Prof. _Forel_ is known by his widely spread book on \u201cThe Sexual\nQuestion,\u201d perhaps better known even by his lectures on the subject, which\nsome cities prohibited in the interest of public morals. In the seventh\nedition of his book we find published as a testimonial, also as proof of\nthe good reading the book makes for early youth, a letter of a young woman\nwhose opinion of the book had been requested by the author. Her answer\nreads: \u201cYou ask me what impression your book made upon me. I should state\nthat I am very young, but have read a great deal. My mother has given me a\nvery liberal education, and so I have a right to count myself among the\nunprejudiced girls.\u201d She assures the author: \u201cI never thought for a single\nmoment that your book was immoral, hence I do not believe that you have\ncorrupted me.\u201d And such books are offered to young girls as fit reading!\n\nSome years ago a sensation was created when in Berlin a young author,\ntwenty-two years of age, _George Scheufler_ by name, killed himself.\nThough of a religious training, he began at an early age to read the\nwritings of infidel natural scientists and philosophers. His belief became\nweaker and weaker, and he finally abandoned it entirely. Only a few years\nafterwards, the young man, who had become a writer of repute, put a\nrevolver to his heart, nauseated by the world, tortured by religious\ndoubts. An organ of modern infidelity commented upon the event in the cold\nwords: \u201cThe truth is probably that the undoubtedly talented author had not\nnerves strong enough for the Berlin life, hence he dies. May his ashes\nrest in peace!\u201d Heartless words on the misfortune of a poor victim of the\nmodern propaganda of disbelief.\n\nHeavy, indeed, is the responsibility courted by representatives of science\nwhen they sin against the holiest ideals of mankind, especially when they\ninduce the maturing youth, with his susceptibilities and awakening\nimpulses, to emancipate himself from the belief of his childhood, and to\ntear down the fortifications of innocence! If the teacher is high-minded,\nthis cannot mitigate the perniciousness of his teaching, but only increase\nit, neither can the fact that his personal morals are without a flaw\nvindicate him. If a man by strewing poison does no harm to himself, this\ndoes not give him the right to injure others. If science demands the\nprivilege of assuming the mental education of our people, then science\nassumes also the duty of administering these interests conscientiously,\nand the gravest responsibility will rest upon him in whose hand science\nspreads ruin.\n\n\n\n\u201cKnowledge does no Harm\u201d?\n\n\n\u201cThe increase and spread of knowledge\u201d (this is a further objection) \u201ccan\nnever harm society, only benefit its interests\u201d (_Von Amira_). Hence, do\nnot get alarmed: nothing is to be feared from science. The apostles of the\nenlightened eighteenth century tried to quiet their age with similar\nassertions. \u201cIt is not true,\u201d says _Lessing_, \u201cthat speculations about God\nand divine things have ever done harm to society; not the speculations did\nit\u2014but the folly and tyranny to forbid them.\u201d\n\nIf this were amended to read _true_ knowledge can never do harm, then the\nmind might be set at rest, although even then it might become dangerous to\nteach the truth without discrimination or caution. Not all are ripe for\nevery truth: truth can often be misunderstood, lead to false conclusions.\nThus, it may become certain, perhaps, that a much-worshipped relic, a\nmuch-visited shrine, is not genuine: nevertheless in giving such\nexplanation to simple, pious people one would have to display caution in\norder to keep them from doubting even the tenets of the creed.\n\nBut there is also false knowledge; can this \u201cnever do harm but only\nbenefit?\u201d Will all knowledge exert the same influence, whether the\nChristian tenets of love and mercy, or _Nietzsche\u2019s_ moral for the\nwealthy, whether young people are given to read Christian books, or those\nof _Haeckel_, _Buechner_, and _Strauss_? The story is told of _Voltaire_,\nthat he sent all servants out of the room when he had friends for guests\nand philosophical discussions started at the dining-table, because he did\nnot wish to have his throat cut the next night. So this free-thinker, too,\ndid not think that all knowledge is beneficial.\n\nBut, we are further assured, let science peacefully pursue its way; if it\nshould err it will correct itself.\n\nIt is true, sciences of obvious subjects, that have no direct relation to\nmoral conduct of life, do, sooner or later, correct their mistakes; recent\nphysics has corrected the mistakes of the physics of past ages; historical\nerrors, too, are disappearing with the times. Quite different is the\nmatter when philosophical-religious questions are at issue. Pantheism,\nsubjectivism, \u201cscientific\u201d rejection of faith, are errors, grave errors,\nyet it does not follow that they will fall of themselves into desuetude;\nthey may prevail for a long time, may return with the regularity of\ncertain diseases. Their error is not tangible, and the desires of the\nheart incline to them by the law of least resistance. From the earliest\nages to this day the same philosophical errors have returned, in varied\nform.\n\nBut let us assume that this would be the case; that these errors, too,\nwould disappear after some time, disappear for good. Is it demanded that\nthe errors in the meanwhile ought to have free play? Shall the surgeon be\nallowed to perform risky experiments on the patient, because later on he\nwill realize that his act was objectionable? Will the father hand to his\nson an improper book, consoling himself that truth must prevail in the\nend, even though defeated temporarily?\n\nThese are delusions of the abstract intellectualism of our times, which\nsees all salvation and human perfection merely in learning and knowledge,\nand forgets that knowledge signifies education and benefit for mankind\nonly when attached to truth and moral order. Not knowledge, but knowledge\nof the truth, and moral dignity, make for civilization and perfection;\nknowledge no longer controlled by truth and ethics becomes the hireling of\nthe low passions, and fights for their freedom.\n\n\n\n\u201cThe Vehicle of Truth.\u201d\n\n\nBack of the urgent demands for unrestricted freedom in teaching stands\ninvariably a thought that operates with palsying effect upon the minds: to\nwit, that science is the embodiment of truth, a genius carrying the\nunextinguishable beacon of light: to silence it would be to resist the\ntruth.\n\nOur first thought when we began our dissertation of the Freedom of Science\nwas, that science is not the poetical being so often described: it is an\nindividual activity, a product of the human mind, sharing its defects and\nweaknesses. For this reason science is not the infallible bearer of the\ntruth; least of all in the higher questions of life, where its eyes are\ndimmed, and where inclinations of the heart still further obscure its\nstrength of vision. And this is admitted, even to the point of despairing\nof the ability to find the truth on these questions, and if one is not\nready to admit this, the fact is made apparent by a glance at the\ncountless errors exhibited in the history of human thinking.\n\nIs error to have the same right that truth has? If wholesome beverage may\nrightly be offered to anybody, can, with the same right, poison be given?\nMay one follow his false sense of truth, calling it science, and teach\nanything he thinks right?\n\nMoreover, is not this science, which, according to its exponents, need not\nregard anything but its own method, entirely a _special kind of science_?\nIndeed it is, as we have learned to know it. We have learned to know this\nfree science, with its autonomous subjectivism, that shapes its changing\nviews according to personal experience; this feeble but proud scepticism;\nwe have learned of those ominous imperatives, that banish everything\ndivine from the horizon of knowledge\u2014a science with its torch turned\nupside down. And its aim\u2014negation. The beautiful thought is frequently\nexpressed that science, especially the science of our universities, is to\nact as the leader in the mental life of the nation, \u201ca universal\nParliament of science, which would represent the authoritative power so\nurgently needed by our discordant and sceptical age, an age that has lost\nfaith in authority.\u201d\n\nThe idea is beautiful, it is sublime; it coincides with a conception of\nthe divine Spirit, who has already realized it, though, it is true, in\nanother manner. The divine Spirit has founded in the bosom of mankind such\na centre of mental life; namely, the Church. She, and only she, bears all\nthe marks of the universal teacher of truth. By virtue of divine aid the\nChurch alone has the prerogative of infallibility, as necessary to the\nteacher of the nations; human philosophy is not infallible, least of all a\nscience that despairs of the highest truth, nay, that often deals with it\nas the cat does with the mouse. A teacher of the nations must possess\nunity of doctrine. The Church has this unity, her view of the world stands\nbefore us in perfect concord; while discord reigns in the philosophy of a\nfree mankind, one thought opposed to another. The Church is holy, holy in\nher moral laws, holy in her service of the truth; she never shirks truth,\nnot even where truth is painful; the Church never surrenders the truth to\nhuman passions. The Church is Catholic, general, for the learned and the\nunlearned; she is apostolic, with faithful hand she preserves for all\ngenerations the spiritual patrimony of the forefathers. And the\nunbelieving science of liberalism, where is its holiness, when its eye\ncannot bear the sight of heaven? when it numbers among its admirers all\nthe unholy elements of humanity? Where is its catholicity, its reverence\nfor traditions, its historic sense, the indispensable requirement for the\nteacher of centuries? The ruins of overthrown truths, amongst which wanton\nthought holds its orgies, bear witness to the unfitness of infidel science\nto be the teacher of mankind.\n\n\n\nSerious Charges.\n\n\nThe science of our day must often listen to charges of the gravest nature.\nThey are uttered not only by servants of the Church, but in public\nmeetings, legislative bodies, and in numerous articles by the press:\nscience, we are told, has become a danger to faith and morals, it has\nbecome the teacher of irreligion, a leader in the war against\nChristianity. The force of the accusation is felt and attempts are made to\nward it off. And then we are assured that science is not the enemy of\nreligion, nor of the precious possessions of society.\n\nIt is clear, without further proof, that science in itself cannot be a\nsocial danger; hence the charge cannot apply to science in general, but\nonly to that special brand of science cultivated in an _anti-Christian_\nspirit. The assurance from its champions, that their intentions are the\nbest, may often be a proof that they do not realize the scope of their\ndoctrines; nevertheless, it cannot be denied that this science has become,\nthrough its principles, as taught in lectures and in print, the greatest\ndanger to the religious-moral possessions of our nations and to the\nfoundations of public order, hence an unlimited freedom for the activities\nof this science means unlimited freedom for a destructive power that\nspells ruin to our mental culture.\n\nCan the principles of this science be anything but a danger? Their sharp\nantagonism to the principle of authority, must it not undermine the\nrespect for state authority, must it not strengthen the elements of social\ndisorder? Its contempt of sacred traditions, must it not become a danger\nto everything existing? \u201cIf all mankind were of one opinion,\u201d it teaches,\n\u201cand but one single man were of a different opinion, then mankind would\nhave no more right to impose silence on him than he to silence all of\nmankind, if he could,\u201d must not such an individualism become the fertile\nsoil of revolutionary ideas? Its ethics without religion tells every one\nthat his own individuality is the court of last resort for his moral\ndoings, that moral laws are subject to change, and must such views not\nbecome a danger to moral order? Finally, the separation of mankind from\nGod and its eternal destiny, must it not necessarily lead the whole of\nlife to materialism? and from the scullery it is not far to the sewer.\nThrough its antagonism to Christian faith this science becomes the chief\nfactor in dechristianizing the nations.\n\nIt is objected that this accusation is not true, because science addresses\nitself to _professional circles_ only; the people, of course, cannot\ndigest these things, therefore religion is to be preserved for the people.\n\nWhy this distinction? The principles of liberal science of to-day are\neither true or they are not true. If not true, why profess them? If they\nare true, as is vehemently asserted, then why should the people be\nexcluded from a true view of the world? Have the people not an equal right\nto the truth in important questions, equal right to light and happiness?\nAh, the consequences of this doctrine of freedom are feared; it is feared\nthe people\u2019s natural logic would take hold of these principles and draw\nfrom them its conclusions. And by that very fear these principles stand\ncondemned of themselves. The truth can stand its consequences, as does the\nChristian view of the world; and the more zealously its consequences are\npursued, the more blessed the fruits. It is otherwise with error.\nTherefore, if the principles of liberal science cannot stand their\nconsequences, they must be erroneous. \u201cConsider chiefly to be good that\nwhich enhances when communicated to others,\u201d is a wise maxim of the\nPythagoreans. Anything spelling damage and ruin, when communicated to\nothers, is not good, but evil.\n\nNor is it true that science confines itself to professional circles. Any\none who does not lead the isolated existence of pedantry knows that this\nis not the case. What the professor of our day teaches in the lecture\nroom, finds its way into the minds of his students, and from there into\npreparatory and public schools; ideas committed by the scientific writer\nto paper and print, go into all the world, and, transformed into popular\nspeech, become the common property of the millions. The flood of books,\npamphlets, and leaflets attacking and vilifying the Christian tenets of\nfaith is ever swelling, and day by day tons of this literature are spread\nwithout hindrance over Christian countries. There is not a single book\nagainst the Christian truth, be its author named _Feuerbach_, _Strauss_,\n_Darwin_, _Haeckel_, _Carneri_, _Nietzsche_, or otherwise, that does not\nsoon circulate in popular editions in every country, or at least has to\nlend its subject to pamphlets and booklets, which then carry these\n\u201cresults of science\u201d to every nook and corner, to the remotest backwoods\nvillage. And the fruits? All those who in these days profess infidelity\nand radicalism, they all unanimously profess adherence to modern free\nscience.\n\n\n\nTell Me with Whom Thou Goest.\n\n\nIn stately array they come along nowadays, free-thinkers and freemasons,\nfree-religionists and representatives of the free view of the world,\nmonists, agitators for \u201cfree school\u201d and socialists, all impetuously\nactive in the service of anti-Christianity, bent on reviving and spreading\nancient heathendom. All are avowed disciples of free science, all spread\nits doctrines, and all work for the popularizing of their ideas. There\nthey press on, the living proof that modern science, as far as it is\ninfidel, has become, voluntarily or involuntarily, the teacher of\nradicalism, of paganism, and the leader in the battle against religion and\nChristian morals.\n\nAnd in its train is marching Free-thought in all its varieties. Its aim at\ndestruction, its dismal designs against religion and state, have become\nmanifest in its books and conventions; for instance, the international\nfree-thinker conventions lately held at Rome and at Prague were plainly of\nanarchistical sentiment. In their midst we see men of science, academic\nteachers. Under their auspices are arranged \u201cscientific lectures\u201d to make\nknown the \u201cresults of modern science,\u201d with the conviction that this will\nsuffice for the overthrow of religion; they demand that \u201cthe instruction\nin public institutions be only a scientific one\u201d; itinerant orators are\nsent to speak with preference on \u201cScience and the Church,\u201d on the\ntheocratic view of the world and free science. The doctrines of liberal\nscience are adopted by freemasonry, its rallying-cry is \u201cfreedom from God,\nfreedom of the human reason.\u201d And following the band-wagon of free\nscience, we see a shouting and jeering multitude, its clenched fists\nthreatening any one who would dare to attack this fine science, their\nliberator from the yoke of religion; they are the thousands of the common\npeople, whose faith has been torn out of their hearts, and, with faith,\nalso peace and good morals. We see marching there hundreds from the ranks\nof youth, who in the heedless impulse of their inexperience have cast off\nbelief, and, with belief, frequently all moral discipline; they, too, look\nupon science as their liberator. The morally inferior part of mankind,\nwhich declares anything to be ethical that \u201cpromotes life\u201d; which fights\nagainst \u201clove-denying views\u201d and against obsolete maxims of morals, it,\ntoo, follows in the tracks of free science. And wherever the issue is to\nfight Christian institutions, under the name of marriage-reform,\nfree-school, or what not, there we are sure to see representatives of\nscience and of universities, and to hear them hold forth for free science.\n\nWhere the purpose is to kindle the fires of revolt against religious\nauthority, there we are certain to meet in the first rank the modern\nteachers of science.\n\nScience and its representatives have an ideal vocation. They should be the\nhearth of the spiritual goods of the nations; new and wholesome forces\nshould at all times emanate from the abodes of science, and the people\nshould look up with confidence to these watch-towers of knowledge and\ntruth. What a shocking contrast to this exalted ideal it is, to hear time\nand again the believing people and their leaders raise a complaining and\nindignant voice against a science that has become a most dangerous\nantagonist to their holiest goods! Is it not painful to see the devout\nmother apprehensively cautioning her son, who departs for the university,\nnot to let his faith be taken from him by teaching and association? Is it\nnot sad to observe that it has become the common saying: \u201cHe has lost his\nfaith at the university\u201d? Is it not regrettable to see that Catholic\nuniversities have become necessary to preserve the ideal goods of the\nChristian religion? It is unavoidable that such complaints are sometimes\nexaggerated. In their generality they include universities that have given\nsmall reason for them; honourable men and representatives of sciences who\nshould not be reproached are being mixed up in these charges. But it is\ntrue, nevertheless, that many have given such occasion. Is it not true\nalso that many remain silent instead of protesting in the name of true\nscience? that they feel it incumbent upon themselves to protect such a\nprocedure, for the sake of the freedom of science?\n\n\n    For a generation and longer, _Haeckel_ misused science to make war\n    upon religion, and went to the extreme in his scientific\n    outrageousness, not even stopping at forgery. Professor _W. His_\n    had already in 1875 expressed his opinion of _Haeckel_ in relation\n    to the false drawings of his embryonic illustrations in the words:\n    \u201cOthers may respect _Haeckel_ as an active and reckless leader: in\n    my judgment he has on account of his methods forfeited the right\n    to be considered an equal in the circle of serious investigators.\u201d\n    When Dr. _Brass_, a member of the Kepler Bund, recently disclosed\n    new forgeries of this kind, it should have been made the occasion\n    for a protest in the interest of science and its freedom against\n    such methods. Instead of that, however, forty-six professors of\n    biology and zo\u00f6logy published a statement in defence of _Haeckel_,\n    declaring that while not approving of _Haeckel\u2019s_ method in some\n    instances, they condemned in the interest of science and of\n    freedom of teaching most strongly the war waged against _Haeckel_\n    by _Brass_ and the Kepler Bund. Is the freedom to use methods like\n    _Haeckel\u2019s_ included in the freedom of teaching, which they\n    consider must be defended? Can it surprise any one that this\n    freedom of teaching is viewed with concern?\n\n    Much excitement was caused a few years ago by a pamphlet of an\n    Austrian professor. Another Austrian professor, of high rank in\n    science, criticized the pamphlet as \u201cA reckless and absolute\n    negation of the foundation of the Christian dogma in the widest\n    sense of the word, proclaimed as the verdict of science and of\n    common sense. It is replete with blasphemous jokes, such as may\n    usually be heard only in the most vulgar places.\u201d\n\n    A cry of indignation was raised by the Catholic people of the\n    Tyrol against this base insult to their creed; it was shown that\n    the author of this pamphlet had misused his lectures on Catholic\n    Canon Law, to speak to his Catholic students disdainfully of the\n    Divinity of Christ, of the Sacraments, of the Church, and the\n    prime foundations of Christianity. Upon indictment by the public\n    prosecutor, the pamphlet was condemned in Court as a libel upon\n    the Christian religion.\n\n    It was expected that the representatives of science, in defence of\n    the threatened honour of science, would repudiate all community of\n    interest with a production that was merely the expression of an\n    anti-Christian propaganda. That expectation was not fulfilled; on\n    the contrary, those in authority at the Austrian universities, and\n    numerous professors of other countries, joined in a protest\n    against the violation of the rights of a professor, against the\n    attacks on freedom of science. They demanded full immunity for the\n    author of the libel. Even the state department of Religion and\n    Education expressed the opinion that the accused \u201chad only availed\n    himself of the right of free research.\u201d Is this the freedom in\n    teaching that is to be protected by the state? And yet there are\n    those who indignantly deny that there is danger for religion in\n    this freedom!\n\n\nHe who really has at heart the honour of science and of the universities,\nand is inspired by their ideals, should bear in mind that to realize these\nideals the first thing necessary is public confidence: not the confidence\nof a revolutionizing minority,\u2014a scrutiny of those elements that give them\ntheir plaudits ought to arouse reflection,\u2014but the confidence of earnest,\nconservative circles of the uncorrupted people.\n\n\n    In academic circles the increasing lack of respect for the\n    university and its teachers is complained of. Professor _Von\n    Amira_ writes: \u201cThirty years ago the academic teacher was\n    reverenced by the highest society; his association was sought; he\n    had no need of any other title than the one that told what he was.\n    To-day we see a different picture, particularly as to the title\n    \u2019professor.\u2019 To-day they smile at it. Nowadays, if a professor\n    desires to impress, he must bear a title designating something\n    else than what he really is. A literature has grown up that deals\n    with the decline of the universities. The fact of a decline is\n    taken for granted, only its causes and remedies are discussed. And\n    this is not all. Invectives are bestowed upon the institutions,\n    upon the teachers as a body, upon the individual teacher. And\n    there is no one to take up the cudgels in our defence!\u201d A fact\n    suggesting earnest self-examination, and the resolution not to\n    forfeit still more this respect. It is not sufficient to repudiate\n    with indignation the complaints. Nor will it do to pretend a\n    respect for religion and Christianity, and a desire to see both\n    preserved, that are not really felt. What is needed is the\n    admission that the road taken is the wrong one.\n\n\n\nThe Responsibility before History.\n\n\nThe distressing fact is realized that the worm of immorality is devouring\nin our day the marrow of the most civilized nations. It is also known that\nits wretched victims are in no class so numerous as in the class of\ncollege men. Earnest-minded men and women are raising a warning cry, and\nare forming societies to stem the ruin of the nations. The alarm bell is\nringing through the lands.\n\n\n    Remarkable words on this subject are those written not long ago by\n    _Paulsen_: \u201cIt looks as if all the demons had been let loose at\n    this moment to devastate the basis of the people\u2019s life. Those who\n    know Germany through reading only, through its comic weeklies, its\n    plays, its novels, the windows of its bookshops, the lectures\n    delivered and attended by male and female, must arrive at the\n    opinion that the paramount question to the German people just now\n    is whether the restrictions put on the free play of the sexual\n    impulse by custom and law are evil and should be abolished?\u201d\n    _Paulsen_ puts the responsibility for it upon the sophistry on the\n    sexual instinct and the present naturalism in the view of the\n    world: \u201cThe prevailing naturalism in the view of world and life is\n    leading to astonishing aberrations of judgment, and this is true\n    also of men otherwise discerning. If man is nothing else but a\n    system of natural instincts, similar in this to the rest of living\n    beings, then, indeed, no one can tell what other purpose life\n    could have than the gratification of all instincts.... Reformation\n    of ideas\u2014this is the cry heard in all streets; cast off a\n    Christianity hostile to life, that is killing in embryo thousands\n    of possibilities for happiness. True, even in past ages young\n    people were not spared temptation. But the barriers were stronger;\n    traditional, moral, religious sentiment, and sensible views. Our\n    time has pulled down these barriers; young people everywhere are\n    advised by all the leading lights of the day: old morals and\n    religion are dead, slain by modern science; the old commandments\n    are the obsolete fetters of superstition. We know now their\n    origin; they are but auto-suggestions of common consciousness\n    which mistakes them for voices from another world, that has been\n    deposed long since by the scientific thought of to-day.\u201d\n\n\nThese are words of indignation of a well-meaning friend of mankind. Do\nthey not rebound upon the speaker himself to become terrible\nself-accusations for him and others, who, while perhaps of similar\nwell-meaning sentiment, are actually working for the annihilation of the\nmoral-religious sentiment, as _Paulsen_ himself has done by his books?\n\n\n    \u201cThe old religion is dead, slain by science,\u201d is proclaimed in\n    innumerable passages of his books; the idea of another world has\n    long been disposed of by the scientific reasoning of the present\n    time, \u201chence a philosophy,\u201d he tells us, \u201cwhich insists upon the\n    thesis that certain natural processes make it necessary to assume\n    a metaphysical principle, or a supernatural agency, will always\n    have science for an irreconcilable opponent.\u201d \u201cIt will be\n    difficult for a future age to understand,\u201d he writes elsewhere,\n    \u201chow our times so complacently could cling to a system of\n    religious instruction originated many centuries ago under entirely\n    different conditions of intellectual life, and which in many\n    points forms the decided opposite to facts and notions which,\n    outside of the school, are taken by our times for granted.\u201d In\n    respect to morals, too, one can do without a supernatural law.\n    \u201cAccording to the view presented here, ethics as a science does\n    not depend on belief.... Moral laws are the natural laws of the\n    human-historical life of time and place.... Nor does it seem\n    advisable in pedagogical-practical respect to make the force or\n    the significance of ethical commands dependent on a matter so\n    uncertain as the belief in a future life.\u201d We might cite many\n    similar expressions from his writings.\n\n    It is significant that they have to condemn their own science in\n    view of its sad consequences.\n\n\n_Paulsen_ loudly demands _restriction for the freedom of art_, for the\nindustry of lewdness, for the literature of perversity.\n\n\n    He says: \u201cThe English people, admired by us because of their\n    liberal principles and free institutions, are less afraid to show\n    by the sternest means the door to salacious minds ... the feeling\n    of responsibility for preserving the roots of the strength of the\n    people\u2019s life is in England far more wide awake than with us, who\n    still feel in our bones the fear of censure and the policeman\u2019s\n    club.... But what are the things committed by our nasty trades and\n    the publications in their service other than so many assaults upon\n    our liberty? Are they not primarily an assault upon the inner\n    freedom of adolescent youth who are made slaves of their lowest\n    instincts by the industries of these merchants? Therefore admonish\n    the hangman not to be swerved by the plea of freedom.\u201d\n\n\nNo one will deny approval to these words. But do they not, again, become a\nsevere condemnation of the reckless freedom in teaching, that claims the\nright to assault without hindrance the truths which are the foundation of\nour nation? If art must not become a danger, why may science? If the\nartist is asked to take into consideration the innocence and weal of young\npeople, if he is cautioned not to follow solely \u201chis sense for beauty,\u201d\nwhy should the teacher be allowed to follow his \u201csense for truth\u201d without\nregard for anything else? If no statute of limitation and restriction\nexist for science, neither prescribed nor prohibited ideas for the\nacademic teacher, why should there be any prohibited \u201c\u00e6sthetic principles\u201d\nfor the artist? Manifestly, because here the absurdity of this freedom is\nmore clearly perceptible, because it leads to shamelessness. At this\njuncture, therefore, they are constrained to concede the untenability and\nthe senselessness of the unlimited human freedom, that is defended with so\nmuch volubility.\n\n\n    _Paulsen_ points to an age in which, similarly to our times,\n    progressive men arose and, in the name of science, discarded\n    religion and morals; they called themselves men of science, sages,\n    \u201csophists.\u201d \u201cIt is remarkable that the very same occurrence was\n    observed more than 2,000 years ago, when _Plato_ experienced it in\n    his time with the young people of Athens, who became fascinated by\n    similar sophistical speech.\u201d\n\n    The noble Sage of Greece had caustic words for _Protagoras_, the\n    champion of sophistry, and his brethren in spirit: \u201cIf cobblers\n    and tailors were to put in worse condition the shoes and clothes\n    they receive for improving, this would soon be known and they\n    would starve; not so _Protagoras_, who is corrupting quietly the\n    whole of Hellas, and who has dismissed his disciples in a worse\n    state than he received them, and this for more than forty\n    years.... Not _Protagoras_ alone, but many others did this before\n    and after him. Did they knowingly deceive and poison the youth or\n    did they not realize what they were doing? Are we to assume that\n    these men, praised by many for their sagacity, have done so in\n    ignorance? No, they were not blind to their acts, but blind were\n    the young people who paid them for instruction, blind were their\n    parents who confided them to these sophists, blindest were the\n    communities that admitted them instead of turning them away.\u201d\n\n\nWhat a responsibility to co-operate in the intellectual corruption of\nentire generations! And the corruption by dechristianizing is increasing\nin all circles, owing to the misuse of science. That the condition is not\neven worse is not the merit of this science, nor evidence of the\nharmlessness of its freedom; it is the merit of the after effect of a\nChristian past, which continues to influence, consciously or\nunconsciously, the thought and feeling even of those circles that seem to\nbe long since estranged from Christianity.\n\n\n    Concerning the decline of morality in our age _Paulsen_ observes:\n    \u201c_Foerster_ rightly emphasizes the fact that the old Church\n    rendered an imperishable service in moralizing and spiritualizing\n    our life, by urging first of all the discipline of the will, and\n    by raising heroes of self-denial in the persons of her Saints.\n    That we still draw from this patrimony I, too, do not doubt. _That\n    we waste it carelessly is indeed the great danger._\u201d\n\n                  \u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\u2010\n\n    \u201cIt was a wonderfully balmy evening in the fall of 1905,\u201d relates\n    Rev. _L. Ballet_, missionary in Japan, \u201cand the sun had just set\n    behind Mount Fiji. Unexpectedly a young Japanese appeared in front\n    of me, desiring to talk to me. I noticed that he was a young\n    student. I bade him enter, and we saluted each other with a low\n    bow, as persons meeting for the first time. I asked him to take a\n    seat opposite to me, and took advantage of the first moments of\n    silence to take a good look at him. But imagine my astonishment\n    when his first question was, \u2018Do you believe life is worth\n    living?\u2019 asked in an earnest but calm manner. I confess this\n    question from lips so young alarmed me and went to my heart like a\n    thrust. \u2018Why, certainly,\u2019 was my reply, \u2018life is worth living, and\n    living good. How do you come to ask a question that sounds so\n    strange from the lips of a young man? You certainly do not desire\n    to follow the example of your fellow-countryman _Fijimura Misao_,\n    who jumped into the abyss from Mount Kegon?\u2019\u2014\u2018No, sir, at least\n    not yet. I confess, however, that I feel my hesitation to be\n    cowardice, for I have made this resolution for some time. In my\n    opinion man is purely a thing of blind accident, a wretched,\n    ephemeral fly without importance, without value. Why then prolong\n    a life in which a little pleasure is added to so much sorrow, so\n    much disappointment; a life that at any rate finally melts away\n    into nothing? I am more and more convinced that this is the\n    truth.\u2019\u2014\u2018And what brought you to such views?\u2019\u2014\u2018Well, science,\n    philosophy, the books which I have read for pastime or study. If\n    it were only the opinion of our few Japanese scientists one might\n    hesitate; but the science, the philosophy, of Europe, translated\n    and expounded by our writers, teach the same thing. God, soul,\n    future life, all is idle delusion. Nothing is eternal but only\n    matter. After twenty, thirty, sixty years, man dies, and there\n    remains nothing of him but his body, which will decay in order to\n    pass into other beings, matter like he was. This is what science\n    teaches us; a hard doctrine, I confess; but what is there to be\n    said against it, considering the positive results of scientific\n    research?\u2019 \u201d\n\n\nGreat responsibility is borne by a science that despoils mankind of its\nbest, of all that gives it comfort and support in life! In faraway Japan\nthere is not the spiritual power of Christianity to counteract the misuse\nof science; the poison does its work and there is no antidote.\n\nThat the Christian nations \u201ccarelessly waste their patrimony, that,\nindeed, is the great danger.\u201d\n\n\n\n\nChapter II. Freedom Of Teaching And The State.\n\n\nClose bonds of mutual dependence and solidarity interlink all created\nbeings, especially men. Insufficient in himself, both physically and\nmentally, man finds in uniting with others everything he needs; thus do\nindividuals and families join forces, generations join hands; what the\nfathers have earned is inherited and increased by new generations. Human\nlife is essentially social life and co-operation\u2014in the indefinite form\nsocial life within the great human society, in the definite form social\nlife within the two great bodies, Church and state. Within both bodies\nhuman benefits are to be attained and protected against danger by common\nexertion\u2014within the Church the spiritual benefits of eternal character,\nwithin the state the temporal benefits.\n\nHence both bodies, or societies, will have to take a position in relation\nto science and its doctrine. Indeed, in civilized nations there is hardly\na public activity of mightier influence upon life than science. The\ncontemplation of this position shall now be our task.\n\nScience, as we have above set forth, addresses itself to mankind\u2014a\nfallible science addressing itself to men easily deceived; therefore, an\nunrestricted freedom in teaching is ethically inadmissible. Hence it\nfollows, as a matter of course, that the authorities of state and Church,\nwho must guard the common benefits, have the duty of keeping the freedom\nin scientific teaching within its proper bounds, so far as this lies in\ntheir power. Hitherto we have left these social authorities out of\nconsideration; the position taken was the general ethical one.\n\nThe case might be supposed that the Church had provided few restrictions\nof this kind, and the state none at all; nevertheless, an absolute freedom\nin teaching would still present a condition dangerous to the community at\nlarge, contrary to the demands of morality; we should then have an\nunrestricted freedom in teaching, permitted by law, but ethically\ninadmissible.\n\nThe distinction is important. Quite often freedom in teaching is spoken of\nas permitted by the state, as if it was identical with ethical permission.\nIf freedom in teaching is permitted by the state, this evidently means\nonly that the state permits teaching without interference on its part; it\nsays, I do not stand in the way, I let things proceed. But this does not\nmean that it is right and proper. The burden of personal responsibility\nrests upon him who avails himself of a freedom which, though not hindered\nby the state, is in conflict with what is right. The state tolerates many\nthings\u2014it does not interfere against unkindness, nor against extravagance,\nnor deceit; nevertheless everybody is morally responsible for such doings.\n\nIf, then, we take up the question, what position social authority should\ntake toward scientific teaching, whether it be in the higher schools, or\noutside of them, we are considering chiefly the state. It is the state\nthat enters most into consideration when freedom in teaching nowadays is\ndiscussed; the state may interfere most effectively in the management of\nschools and universities, for these are state institutions in most\ncountries.\n\n\n\nUniversities as State Institutions.\n\n\nThey were not always state institutions. The universities of the Middle\nAges were autonomous corporations, which constituted themselves, made\ntheir own statutes, had their own courts, but enjoyed at the same time\nlegal rights. Conditions gradually changed after the Reformation. The\npower of princes began more and more to interfere in the management of the\nuniversities, until in the seventeenth century, and still more in the\neighteenth, the universities became state institutions, subject to the\nreigning sovereign, the professors his salaried officials, and text-books,\nsubject and form of instruction were prescribed by the minute, paternal\ndirections of the sovereign, and with the mania for regulating that was a\nfeature of the eighteenth century. The nineteenth century brought more\nliberty; it was demanded by the enlarged scope of universities, which no\nlonger were only the training schools for the learned professions, but\nbecame the home of research, needing freedom of movement.\n\nNevertheless, universities are in many countries still state institutions.\nThey are founded by the state, are given organization and laws by the\nstate; the teachers are appointed and given their commissions by the\nstate. They are state officials, though less under government supervision\nthan other state officials. At the same time these universities are\npossessed of a certain measure of autonomy, a remainder of olden times.\nThey elect their academic authorities, which have some autonomy and\ndisciplinary jurisdiction. Likewise the separate faculties have their\npowers; they confer degrees, administer their benefices, and exert\nconsiderable influence in filling vacant chairs.\n\nThe state then considers it its duty to grant freedom in teaching.\n\u201cScience and its teaching are free,\u201d says the law in some countries. No\ndoubt a loosely drawn sentence; at any rate, it means that science should\nbe granted the _proper_ freedom. And this freedom it must have. We have\nbecome more sensitive of unjustified paternal government than were the\npeople of the eighteenth century.\n\n\n\nThe Object of the State.\n\n\nWhat kind of a freedom in teaching, then, should be granted by the state?\nUnlimited freedom? This is, at any rate, not a necessary conclusion. The\nstate must also grant freedom to the father for the education of his\nchildren, to the landowner for the culture of his fields, to the artist in\nthe production of his works; but that freedom would not be understood to\nbe an unlimited one, having no regard to the interests of society, but\nmerely as the exclusion of unwarranted interference. Hence if the state,\nfor reasons of the commonwealth, were to restrict freedom of teaching, the\nrestraint could not be considered unjust. The purpose of the state must\nnot suffer injury; to attain this purpose the state has the right to\ndemand, and must demand, all that is necessary to the purpose in view,\neven though it entails a restriction of somebody\u2019s freedom. Now for a\ndefinition of this purpose of the state.\n\nLike any other society, the state seeks to attain a definite object, so\nmuch the more because the state is necessary to man, who otherwise would\nhave to forego the things most needed in life; and but for the public\nco-operation of the many these could be attained not at all, or at least\nnot sufficiently. To provide these things is the object of the state,\nviz., the public welfare of the citizens; it is to bring about public\nconditions which will enable the citizens to attain their temporal\nwelfare. To this end the state must protect the rights of its subjects,\nand must protect and promote the public goods of economic life, but\nespecially the spiritual benefits of morals and religion. The state,\nthrough its legislative, judicial, and executive functions, is to _direct_\neffectively the community to this end; therefore it is incumbent upon the\nstate to care for the preservation and promotion of both material and\nspiritual benefits, for the protection of private rights, and for the\nconditions necessary to its own existence, even against the arbitrary will\nof its subjects.\n\n\n\nProtection for the Spiritual Foundations of Life.\n\n\nFrom this the conclusion naturally follows, that the state must not grant\nfreedom to propound in public, by speech or writing, theories that will\n_endanger the religious and moral goods of its citizens and the foundation\nof the state_.\n\nWe claim that the state neglects a solemn duty if it permits without\nhindrance\u2014we will not say, the ridicule and disparagement of religion and\nmorals: the less so, as freedom to ridicule and to slander has nothing to\ndo with freedom in teaching\u2014but the public promulgation of theories which\nare either irreligious, or against morals, or against the state. Even\nthough they be done in scientific form, injuries to the common weal remain\ninjuries, and they do not change into something else by being committed in\nscientific form. The state must seek to prevent such injuries by strictly\nenforced penalties and by the selection of conscientious teachers. The\nenforcement of the principle may not be possible under circumstances,\nlegislatures may lack insight or good will, or the complexion of the state\nmay not admit of it for the time being, or permanently. Then we would\nsimply see a regrettable condition, a government incapable of ridding\nitself of the morbid matter which is poisoning its marrow. But if there is\ngood will and energy, one thing may always be done to check injurious\ninfluences, and that is the awakening and employment of forces of\nopposition.\n\n\n    The University of Halle is said to have been the first one to\n    enjoy modern freedom in teaching. What, at that time, however, was\n    meant by freedom in teaching, is shown by the words of _Chr.\n    Thomasius_ in 1694: \u201cThank God that He has prompted His Anointed\n    (the prince) not to introduce here the yoke under which many are\n    now and then languishing, but gracefully to grant our teachers the\n    freedom of doctrines _that are not against God and the state_.\u201d\n    One hundred and fifty years later Minister _Eichhorn_ advised the\n    University of Koenigsberg that in natural sciences neither the\n    individual freedom in teaching nor of research are limited, that\n    the case is different, however, with philosophy as applied to\n    life, with history, theology, and the science of laws. \u201cThe first\n    requisite there,\u201d he said, \u201cis a proper bent of mind, which,\n    however, can find its basis and its lasting support only in\n    religion. With the proper bent of mind there will be no desire to\n    teach doctrines which attack the roots of the very life of one\u2019s\n    own country.\u201d\n\n\nNow, what considerations make it plain that the duty of the state is as\nstated? Two: consideration for its subjects, and consideration for the\nstate itself. The state must protect the highest _possessions of its\ncitizens_. For that reason men are by nature itself prompted to found\nstates, so as to protect better their common goods, by the strong hand of\nan authority, against foes from within and without, and to enable them to\nbequeath those goods inviolate to their sons and grandsons. Hence they\nmust demand of state-power not to tolerate conditions which would greatly\njeopardize those goods, and certainly not to allow attacks thereon by its\nown educational organs. The highest spiritual benefits of civilization,\nand at the same time the necessary foundations of a well-ordered life,\nare, first of all, morality and religion; not morality alone, but also\nreligion, do not forget this. Man\u2019s first duty is the duty of worshipping\nGod, of recognizing and worshipping his Creator, the ultimate end of all\nthings. A profound truth was stated by _Aristotle_, when, coupling the\nduties to God with those to parents, he said that those merit punishment\nwho question the duty of worshipping the gods and of loving one\u2019s parents.\nHence the first thing to be preserved to the nations is religion; it is in\nmany ways their most precious possession, too. Not only do all nations\npossess religion, not excepting the most uncivilized; but there is no\npower that influences life and stirs the heart more than religion.\nConsider the religious wars of history; while they were surely deplorable,\nthey demonstrate what religion is to man. Even in individuals who to all\nappearance are irreligious, religion never fully dies out; it appears\nthere in false forms, or is their great puzzle, maybe the incubus of their\nlives, giving them no rest. Only in conjunction with firm religious\nprinciple can morality stand fast. Nowadays they work for ethics without\nreligion, for education and school without God. Theoreticians in their\nfour walls, removed from all real life, are busily working out systems of\nthis sort. This new ethics has not yet stood the test of life, or, if it\ndid, it has succeeded in gaining for its adherents only those who are at\nodds with religion and morals. These theories must first be otherwise\nattested before they may replace the old, well-tried religious\nfoundations.\n\n\n    The noted and justly esteemed pedagogue, _Fr. W. Foerster_,\n    writes: \u201cOn the part of free-thinkers vigorous complaint has been\n    made that my book so decidedly confesses the unparalleled\n    pedagogic strength of the Christian religion. The author therefore\n    repeats emphatically that this confession has not grown out of an\n    arbitrary metaphysical mood, but directly out of his\n    moral-pedagogic studies. For over ten years of a long period of\n    instructing the youth in ethics, he has been engaged exclusively\n    in studying psychologically the problem of character-forming, and\n    the result of his studies is his conviction that all attempts at\n    educating youth without religion are absolutely futile. And, in\n    the judgment of the author, the only reason why the notion that\n    religion is superfluous in education is prevalent in such large\n    circles of modern pedagogues, is, that they have no extensive\n    practical experience in character-training, nor made thorough and\n    concentrated studies.\u201d \u201cThe fact is, that all education in which\n    religion to all outward appearance is dispensed with, is still\n    deeply influenced by the after-effect of religious sanction and\n    religious earnestness. What education without religion really\n    means will become more clearly known in the coming generation.\u201d\n\n\nThe state is zealous in protecting the property of its citizens, to which\nend a powerful police apparatus is constantly at work. If the state deems\nit its duty to interfere in this matter, must it not consider it a still\nhigher duty to protect religion and morals, for the very reason that they\nare the property of its citizens, and even their most precious? _Pro aris\net focis_, for home and altar, was what was fought for by the old Romans.\nIs it possible that a pagan government was more sterling and high-minded\nthan the Christian state of the present? If it is to be the bearer of\ncivilization, it ought to consider that man liveth not by bread alone. The\nonly true mental civilization is the one which does not hamper but helps\nman in attaining his eternal goal.\n\nModern state power is being urged from all sides to take measures against\nthe corruption of morals by the novel and the shop window, and not to look\non apathetically when the consuming fire is spreading all about, in the\nname of art. Are the dangers to the spiritual health of society any less\nif reformers, in the name of science, shake at the foundations of\nmatrimony, advocate polygamy, teach atheism? Because a so-called reformer\nhas lost the fundamental truths of our moral-religious order, must all the\nrest submit to an attack upon the sacred possessions of themselves and\ntheir descendants?\n\n\n    That the rights of the teacher are not unrestricted was set forth\n    by an American paper (\u201cScience,\u201d No. 321) in its comment upon the\n    removal of certain professors: \u201cThere are barriers set to them on\n    the one hand by the rights of the students, and by the rights of\n    the college where he teaches, on the other. The college must\n    preserve its reputation and its good name, the student must be\n    protected against palpable errors and waste of time.... If a\n    professor of sociology should attack the institution of matrimony,\n    and propound the gospel of polygamy and of free love, then neither\n    the right to teach his views nor his honesty of purpose would save\n    him from dismissal. This is of course a very extreme case, not\n    likely to happen.\u201d\n\n    Is it so very extreme? Certainly not in regard to teaching by\n    books. Listen: \u201cFrom the foregoing it is self-evident that\n    polygyny based upon the rivalry of men for women (analogous to the\n    animal kingdom) presents the natural sexual practice of mankind.\n    Whether there is to be preferred a simultaneous or a successive\n    polygyny, or a combination of both, would depend on varying\n    conditions. The ethical type of the sexual condition, viz., in\n    general the desirable biological type, is the one that would best\n    suit a polygyny based upon a selection of man.\u201d It is taught\n    further: \u201cThe monogamic principle of marriage in general is only\n    conditionally favorable to civilization, whereas it is destructive\n    of it constitutionally, hence in need of reform.\u201d \u201cOur\n    contemporaneous sexual reform wave has not yet assumed the\n    position of this knowledge; on the contrary, notwithstanding its\n    revolutionary aspect in some particulars, it is still under the\n    ban of the traditional ideal of marriage\u201d; continence before\n    marriage is an \u201cabsurd\u201d proposition!\n\n    This new system of morals, fit for the barnyard, but for women the\n    lowest degradation, is now to become the ideal of men, nay, even\n    of women: \u201cTrue motherly pride, true womanly dignity, are\n    incompatible with the exclusiveness of the monogamic property\n    principle. If our movement for sexual reform is to elevate us\n    instead of plunging us into the mire, then this view must become\n    part and parcel of our women.\u201d \u201cThe picture of the motherly woman,\n    of the woman with the pride of sexual modesty, instead of with the\n    exciting desire of possession ... this picture must become the\n    ideal of men, and sink down to the bottom of their soul and into\n    the fibres of their nervous system; it must animate their fancy\n    and awaken their sensual passions.\u201d(20) We stand right in the\n    midst of the world of beasts!\n\n    This perilous moral teaching is allowed also in public lectures.\n    On November 14, 1908, the \u201cAllgemeine Rundschau\u201d wrote: \u201cImagine a\n    spacious concert-hall, brightly illuminated, every one of the many\n    seats occupied, the boxes filled to the last place, the aisles\n    crowded, by a most variegated audience: men and women, young\n    maidens, youths with downy beard; gentlemen of high rank with\n    their ladies, faces upon which are written a life of vast\n    experience side by side with childish faces whose innocence is\n    betrayed by their looks, and on the platform a university\n    professor and physician, holding forth about the most intimate\n    relations of sexual life: the unfitness of celibacy, the Catholic\n    morals of matrimony, prostitution and prostitutes, the causes of\n    adultery, \u2018sterile marriage,\u2019 onanism, and many kinds of\n    perversities. The man is, moreover, speaking in a fashion that\n    makes one forget the admonishments of conscience.\u201d\n\n    The city council of Lausanne, in its meeting of February 10, 1907,\n    prohibited _Forel\u2019s_ lecture as an attack upon decency and public\n    morals, making reference in its resolution to _Forel\u2019s_ ideas as\n    laid down in his book. In protest, _Forel_ made a public\n    statement, saying among other things: \u201cIf the council desires to\n    be logical it would have to prohibit also the sale of my book.\u201d We\n    have no objection to make to his conclusion.\n\n\nWe stated that religion is man\u2019s first duty. This applies not only to the\nindividual, but also\u2014and this is forgotten too often\u2014to the state. Man, by\nhis nature, and hence in all forms of his life, including his citizenship,\nis obliged to have religion. He remains in all conditions the creature\nwhich is dependent upon God. And does not the state, too, owe special\nduties of gratitude to God? It owes its origin to God: the impulse to\nfound states has been put into the human nature by its Creator; the state\nowes to God the foundation of its authority: in a thousand difficulties\nthe state is thrown upon His help. Therefore a public divine service is\nfound with all peoples. Does the state comply with this duty by silently\nsupporting a public atheism when it might do otherwise? by even becoming\nits patron, when, posing as science, it ascends to the lecturing desk to\nteach adolescing youth?\n\nOf course, free-thought is of a different opinion, especially the one of\nto-day. Its principle is: the state need not trouble itself about God and\nReligion, that is the private matter of each individual. In the eyes of\nfree-thought the state is an imaginary being, hovering over the heads of\nits citizens; though they may be religious, the state itself should have\nno Religion. What absurdity! It is nothing short of nonsense to demand of\nthe members of a state, the overwhelming majority of whom hold Religion to\nbe true and necessary, that as a political community they are to act as if\ntheir Religion were false and worthless, as if to deny and to destroy it\nwere quite proper. What else is the state but an organized aggregation of\nits citizens? To make of religious citizens, a state without Religion is\njust as absurd as a Catholic state composed wholly and entirely of\nProtestant citizens. This leads us to a further consideration. The state\nmust protect its own foundations. Just as it must defend its existence\nagainst enemies from without, it must protect itself against those enemies\nfrom within, who, whether realizing the consequences or not, are by their\nactions actually shaking its foundations. These foundations consist of\nproper views on social and political principles, on morals and Religion.\nIf the state does not intend to abolish itself, it must not permit\ndoctrines to be disseminated which imperil these foundations and,\nconsequently, the peaceful continuance of the state. In fact, no state\npower in its senses would permit a teacher, who directly attacks the\nvalidity of the state order, to continue; it would retire every professor\nof law who would dare to teach that regicide is permissible, or who would\nwith the oratory of a Tolstoy preach the unnaturalness of a state\npossessing coercive power.\n\n\n    As a rule, open advocates of _Socialism_ are kept out of\n    college-chairs. And rightly so. So long as the adherents of\n    Socialism see in the state but the product of the egotism of the\n    ruling classes, and an institute for subjugating the masses, and\n    in the obtainment of political power the means of doing away with\n    this state of affairs, so long will it be impossible for the state\n    to trust the education of the future citizen to a Socialist, nor\n    can the latter, as an honest man, accept a position of trust from\n    the state, much less bind himself by the oath of office to\n    co-operate in the work of the state. Prof. _C. Bornhak_ makes the\n    following comment: \u201cThe decisive point is not freedom in teaching,\n    but the circumstance that the Socialist professor takes advantage\n    of the respect connected with a state office, or of his position\n    at a state institution, to undermine the state. A state that would\n    stand for this would deserve nothing better than its abolition.\u201d\n\n    And _Paulsen_ similarly writes: \u201cA state that would allow in the\n    lecture rooms of its colleges Socialistic views to be taught as\n    the results of science ... such a state will be looked for in\n    vain.\u201d\n\n\nHence it is certain the state cannot grant a freedom in teaching that\nwould jeopardize the foundation of its existence. It must consequently\nrecognize no freedom which, in lectures and publications, will seriously\ninjure public morality and religion. Morality and religion are, first of\nall, the indispensable conditions for the continuance of the state.\n\n\n    _Aristotle_ says the first duty of the state is to care for\n    religion. _Plato_ proposes heavy penalty for those who deny the\n    existence of the gods; a well-ordered state, he claims, must care\n    first of all for the fostering of religion. _Plutarch_ calls\n    religion the bond of every society and the foundation of the law.\n    _Cicero_ declares that there can be neither loyalty nor justice\n    without regard for God. _Valerius Maximus_ could say of Rome: \u201cIt\n    has ever been the principle of our city to give preference to\n    religion before any other matter, even before the highest and most\n    glorious benefits.\u201d _Washington_, in his speech to Congress in\n    1789, declared religion and morality to be the most indispensable\n    support of the commonweal. He stated that it would be in vain for\n    one, who tries to wreck these two fundamental pillars of the\n    social structure, to boast of his patriotism.\n\n\nWithout religion there can be no firm resistance by conscience against\nman\u2019s lower nature, no social virtues and sacrifices, there can only be\negotism, the foe of all social order. No secure state-life can be built\nupon the principles that formed the basis of the French Revolution. So we\nsee, generally and instinctively, the endeavour to prevent as much as\npossible anti-religious doctrines from being expounded directly to the\nbroad masses of the people. This of itself is tantamount to the\nacknowledgment of their danger to the state. Yet, millions have tasted the\nfruit of an atheistic science, and the poison shows its effect; they have\nshaken off the yoke of religion; in its place dissatisfaction and\nbitterness are filling their breast, and fists are clenched against the\nexisting order.\n\n\n    _Bebel_ said in a speech in the German Reichstag, on September 16,\n    1878: \u201cGentlemen, you attack our views in respect to religion,\n    because they are atheistic and materialistic. I acknowledge them\n    to be so.... I firmly believe Socialism will ultimately lead to\n    atheism. But these atheistic doctrines, that now are causing so\n    much pain and trouble for you, by whom were they scientifically\n    and philosophically demonstrated? Was it by Socialists? Men like\n    _Edgar_ and _Bruno_, _Bauer_, _Feuerbach_, _David Strauss_, _Ernst\n    Renan_, were they Socialists? They were men of science.... What is\n    allowed to the one\u2014why should it be forbidden to the other?\u201d\n\n    The notorious anarchist _Vaillant_ said: \u201cI have demonstrated to\n    the physicians at Hotel-Dieu that my deed is the inexorable\n    consequence of my philosophy, and of the philosophy of _Buechner_,\n    _Darwin_, and _Herbert Spencer_.\u201d\n\n    The youthful criminal _Emil Herny_ read at his trial a memorandum\n    wherein he said among other things: \u201cI am an anarchist since 1891.\n    Up to this time I was wont to esteem and even to idolize my\n    country, the family, the state, and property.... Socialism is not\n    able to change the present order. It upholds the principle of\n    authority which, all affirmations of so-called free-thinkers\n    notwithstanding, is an obsolete remnant of the belief in a higher\n    power. I however was a materialist, atheist. My scientific\n    researches taught me gradually the work of natural forces. I\n    conceived that science had done away with the hypothesis of \u2018God,\u2019\n    which it needs no longer, hence that also the\n    religious-authoritative doctrine of morals, built upon it, as upon\n    a false foundation, had to disappear.\u201d\n\n\nWhat political wisdom would it be to honor as science any doctrine that\nbecomes a social danger the moment it is taken seriously; what logic to\ndenounce those as dangerous who are putting into practice a science that\nis hailed as the bearer of civilization!\n\nOne may object: How is the state to determine whether scientific doctrines\nare warranted or not warranted? The state has the conviction that in its\npolitical offices it has no organs for the cognition of scientific truth,\nfor this reason it leaves science to self-regulation. Only the scientist,\nit is said, is able to revise the scientist.\n\nNothing but scholarly conceit can engender such ideas. Then any one would\nhave the right to pin upon himself the badge of the scientist and become\nthereby completely immune. Thus, the bearers of practical political wisdom\nare declared incompetent to recognize the chief foundation of their\nstate-structure; to realize, what daily experience and the experience of\ncenturies teaches, that disbelief in God, even if sailing under false\ncolors, undermines authority, that communism and upheaval of moral\nconceptions are tantamount to social danger. They are directed to depend\nfor their information in such matters upon the latest ideas of impractical\nscientists. The fact is, the matters at issue have, with hardly an\nexception, long been decided. And where the Christian faith is concerned,\nthe Church and the Christian centuries tell us clearly enough, what has\nhitherto been understood by Christianity. If the objection here advanced\nwere true, then the state would not have a right to decide in the matter\nof exhibiting immoral pictures in show windows, without having argued the\nmatter previously with representatives of art. The state would not be\nallowed to pronounce a death sentence because some scientists denounce\ncapital punishment: the state would have to expunge \u201cguilt,\u201d \u201cexpiation,\u201d\nand \u201cliberty\u201d from its penal code, because many recent scientists, by\nrejecting the freedom of choice, have removed the dividing line between\ncrime and insanity, between punishment and correction.\n\n\n\nProtection for Christianity.\n\n\nHitherto we have, in respect to religion, considered chiefly the rational\ntruths, which are the foundations of every religion and also common to\nnon-Christian creeds; the existence of a supermundane God and of a life\nafter death are the most important of them. The revealed Christian\nreligion contains, beside these truths, some others, which supplement them\nand surround them like a living garland, viz., original sin, redemption,\nresurrection, the divinity of Christ, grace and the Sacraments, the\nexistence of a Church with its God-given rights, indissolubility of\nmatrimony, etc. Should state-power protect the Christian and Catholic\nreligion by warding off attacks against it, though such attacks are made\nin scientific form? This, too, in a state in which perhaps other\nconfessions are enjoying the freedom of worship?\n\n\n    It would seem superfluous to propose this question specifically.\n    If, according to the gist of our argument, religion is to be\n    protected, what other religion can be meant than the Christian\n    religion? That is the religion of our nations; none other is.\n    While the stated distinction may have more of an academic than a\n    practical interest, the discussion of this question will not be\n    idle, if only for the reason that it will shed even more light\n    upon our previous statements. Besides, there are manifest efforts\n    to dislodge Christianity from the life of our people, and with it\n    all true religion, under the pretext of opposing church-doctrines\n    and dogmatism. The war against Christianity has not since the days\n    of a _Celsus_ been waged as it is to-day.\n\n\nWe premise a principle of a general nature. Of conflicting religions and\nviews of the world, only one can be true; this is clear to every one who\nstill believes in truth. It is equally clear that this one truth only can\nhave the right to come forward and to enlist support in public life as a\nspiritual power; error has no right to prevail against truth. Hence it\nwill not do to say simply: There are also the convictions of minorities in\nthe state; some claim that none of the existing religions is the right\none, others have dropped all belief in God; in our times we wish to\nconcede to any conviction the right to enter into competition with others,\nprovided mockery and abuse are barred. These remarks are quite true, in\nthe sense that neither the individual nor the state may directly interfere\nwith conscience or prescribe opinions: leaving entirely aside the question\nwhether any one really could have a serious conviction of atheism. The\nforegoing is true also in the sense that public avowal of opinion must not\nbe hindered by individuals. To interpret this to mean that the state must\ngrant freedom to any expression of doctrine would be a grave misconception\nof the social influence which false ideas are liable to exercise. Does the\nstate grant this freedom to any kind of medical practice, whether\nexercised skilfully or awkwardly, conscientiously or unscrupulously?\n\nMoral-religious error may in public life expect only _tolerance_\u2014just as\nmany other evils must be tolerated, because their prevention would cause\ngreater evils to arise. This is the reason why the state may, and often\nmust, grant freedom of worship even to false creeds, because its denial\nwould give rise to greater harm to the public weal (_St. Thomas_, 2, 2 q.\n10, 11). Freedom of teaching, likewise, must not be granted in the sense\nof acknowledging that false doctrines and truth have equal rights; this\nwould amount to an assassination of truth. Freedom can be conceded to\nerror for the one reason only, that by not granting it there would be\nengendered greater evils. Consequently, if a state-power, or the organs of\nits legislative part, are convinced that the Christian religion is the\nonly true one, they cannot possibly concede to contrary doctrines the\nright to pose as the truth and thus deceive minds; they may be granted the\nsame freedom in teaching only because restrictive laws can either not be\nenforced at all, or not without creating a disorder that would give rise\nto greater evils. Hence the lesser evil must be carefully ascertained.\n\nWith this general principle in mind, it is easily seen that a freedom\nlarge enough to include an open attack on the fundamental, rational,\ntruths of religion and morals\u2014this having been our subject hitherto\u2014could\nbe conceded only if disbelief and atheism had gained so much power as to\nmake impossible its prohibition. In this case, however, the state should\nbe conscious of the fact that it allows the undermining of its\nfoundations. If, in another state, religious feeling were at so low an\nebb, that the freedom of the Christian truth could not be obtained in any\nother way than by granting full freedom for everything, then even such\nunlimited freedom would be a good thing to be striven for; of itself a\ndeplorable condition and contrary to God\u2019s intentions, but good as the\nlesser evil.\n\nBut let us return to the revealed religion. In the eyes of those who are\nconvinced that the Christian religion, namely, the Catholic religion, is\nthe only true religion, the ideal condition would be to have the entire\npopulation united in its faithful confession; then matters would simplify\nthemselves in our case. But this ideal hardly exists anywhere. True, in\nmany countries the population is almost wholly Christian; but the\ndenominations are mixed, and many have separated at heart from\nChristianity. What standards, then, should rule in this case?\n\nLooking at it specially, the demand of ethical reason is no doubt this:\nNations and governments whose past was Christian, whose institutions and\ncivilization are still Christian, and an overwhelming majority of whose\nmembers still think and believe in a Christian way, would fail in their\ngravest duties if they would expose or permit the Christian religion to\nremain unprotected against the attacks and the attempts at destruction by\na false science, or by conceding to the adversaries of Christianity equal\nrights or even preference. The Christian religion will not be destroyed;\nbut whole nations may lose it, and its loss will in great measure be the\nfault of those in whose hands their fate was laid. Here might be applied\n_Napoleon\u2019s_ well-known saying: \u201cThe weakness of the highest authority is\nthe greatest misfortune of the nations.\u201d\n\nIt remains an anomaly that a state, the members of which for the most part\nare Christians, should treat this religion with indifference, and tolerate\nthat its tenets and traditions be represented as fairy-tales and fables,\nits moral law as a danger to civilization, and perhaps its divine Founder\nas a victim of religious frenzy. If the state is the expression and the\n_representative of its subjects_, then such disharmony between public and\nprivate life is unnatural. Moreover, the Christian religion is held by the\nmajority of its citizens to be the most precious legacy of their\nforefathers; they must demand from the state _protection for their\ngreatest good_. And this may be claimed with even greater right by\nprovinces where the population almost unanimously clings to the creed of\ntheir ancestors; at the colleges in these parts the faithful people will\nbe entitled to protection more than elsewhere against dangers to its\ninherited religion. It would be unnatural in this case to apply the\nthoughtless principle of dealing uniformly with all provinces of the\nstate. The state is not a heap of uniform pebbles, but an organism\ncomposed of different parts, each desiring to retain its own peculiar\nlife.\n\n\n    Do not say this presumption does not admit of application to our\n    conditions, the majority of the people of this age being long\n    since estranged from Christianity. It is true, if we turn our eye\n    only to the more conspicuous classes of society, the classes that\n    control the newspapers and mould public opinion, this view might\n    be admitted as to some countries. But if we look at the masses,\n    those not infected by half-education, then this opinion is true no\n    longer. And there are many who at heart are not so distant from\n    faith as it would seem. In public life they pose as free-thinkers,\n    but their domestic life bears frequently a Christian character.\n    And often they approach more and more the faith, the older they\n    grow. This is known to be the fact even of scientists. Instances\n    are men like _Amp\u00e8re_, _Foucault_, _Flourens_, _Hermite_, _Bion_,\n    _Biran_, _Fechner_, _Lotze_, _Romanes_, _Littr\u00e9_, and others.\n    _Plato_ claimed that no one who in his youth disputed the\n    existence of the gods retained this view to his old age.\n    \u201cChristianity,\u201d observes _Savigny_ rightly, \u201cis not only to be\n    acknowledged as a rule of life, it has actually transformed the\n    world, so that all our thoughts are ruled and penetrated by it, no\n    matter how foreign, even hostile, to Christianity they may\n    appear.\u201d\n\n\nIt is a sign how deeply Christian religion has sunk its roots into the\nheart, that it remains _the_ religion even for those who have turned away\nfrom it. To be sure, for our nations Christianity is _the_ religion. For\nthem the religion of a _Confucius_ or _Zoroaster_ does not enter into\nconsideration; nor any of the products of modern religious foundations,\nwhich would replace Christianity with substitutions of all kinds of\nreligious essences; they are on a level with the attempts at\nreconstructing sexual ethics: both are regrettable delusions.\n\u201cImprovement\u201d of Christian morality is tantamount to abandoning all\nmorals, and desertion from the Christian religion, amongst our people, has\nalways been apostasy from all religion. The Christian religion is so true,\nthat no one can renounce it inwardly and then find peace in a self-made\none. And all efforts aimed at displacing Christianity lead only to an\nabandonment of all religion.\n\nLook at the number of people from whom slander and insinuation have torn\ntheir old religion to be replaced by another\u2014a freer, higher religion;\ntheir moral decadence soon bears testimony of the religious consecration\nwhich has been given to them. Woe unto those authorities who, while able\nto oppose, are indifferent, and who lend a hand in causing Christian\nthought to withdraw more and more from our mental atmosphere, to be\nreplaced by another spirit, a spirit that will gradually control the\ndecision of the judge, the practice of the physician, the instruction of\nthe teacher, and thus more and more enter into the life of the people.\n\n\n    It is not assured to those nations of Europe, whose public life is\n    feeding to-day upon the remnants of their Christian past, that\n    they will not relapse into a state of moral and religious\n    barbarity. \u201cMaybe civilized mankind, or our nation at least, is\n    really losing its hold more and more upon definite moral\n    standards,\u201d so complains a modern pedagogue; \u201cpossibly the\n    emancipation of sensuality will increase without end, perhaps we\n    have passed forever the stage of true humanity and of a live\n    idealism, and we shall henceforth glide downward.... These are no\n    mere, feverish dreams; there is good reason for facing these\n    possibilities with a determined eye, and no accidental or\n    philosophical optimism can ignore them\u201d (_M\u00fcnch_).\n\n    \u201cIt is quite possible,\u201d we are told by another, \u201cthat much will go\n    down in our old Europe during the next centuries; and the downfall\n    will not be restricted by any means to Church and Christianity,\n    and in the crises that will come Europe will hardly get the needed\n    support from an \u00e6sthetic heathendom, from the Monists\u2019 Union, or\n    from the evidences of science\u201d (_Troeltsch_).\n\n    If it does not come to it, it will not be the merit of authorities\n    who let the vessel of state drift rudderless toward the rocks of\n    dechristianization.\n\n\nThey do not realize that they greatly endanger thereby also the\nfoundations of the state. _The foundations of our governments rest upon\nChristianity._ The Christian faith created the state, created matrimony,\nfamily, and the education of the youth; created the social virtues of\nloyalty and of obedience. What we have of religion is Christian, what we\nhave of the religious support of morality is equally Christian;\n\u201cChristianity, Christian faith, Christian formation of life penetrates all\nvital utterances of the Occidental world like an all-pervading element\u201d\n(_Paulsen_).\n\nIt is one of the first principles of political prudence not to shake the\nfoundations upon which the state rests. States and nations are not\nephemeral beings, existing from one day to the other, they are historical\nstructures measuring their lives by centuries; past generations join hands\nwith present generations, deeds and customs of the fathers live on in\ntheir sons.\n\nStates must remain on the historical tracks on which they have travelled\nto success, at least until the new track has stood the test of\nreliability. So far anti-Christian philosophy has terribly shaken\ngovernments; it has not yet proved itself a state-conserving principle.\n\nIt is a sad condition to see the guardians of states, devoid of historical\nappreciation, allow their people to tear themselves away from the soil\nwherein reposed the roots from which they drew life and strength. Sad,\ntoo, that complaints are made of college-professors who abuse freedom in\nteaching by constructing an unproved contradiction between knowledge and\nfaith, by misrepresenting Christian tenets, by lowering the prestige of\nthe Church, by distorting her historical picture. It would be regrettable\nfor a Christian state, if the complaint were justified that for the most\npart our colleges have become places where religion is ignored; where the\nname of Jesus Christ, the Redeemer of mankind, is no longer mentioned;\nwhere the name of God never occurs in history, in natural and political\nscience; where religion is considered the most unessential factor of\nmental life, a factor that has nothing to offer, that can answer no\nquestion\u2014a treatment which, by the force of suggestion, must lead young\nmen to think that religion is of no account. It is a banishment which in\nits effect is little different from an attack upon religion.\n\n\n    Sadder still would it be if the following view were to prevail at\n    our colleges: \u201cA right of the student to see protected and not\n    destroyed any views and convictions, including those of a\n    religious nature, which he may bring to the university from his\n    home surroundings, from his preliminary education, as it is\n    asserted time and again in the frequent complaints about the\n    dechristianizing of youth at the universities\u2014does not exist and\n    cannot exist, because it would be in contradiction to the very\n    essence of the university and its tasks\u201d (_Jodl_).\n\n    Is not this the ethical principle of the bird of prey? Is it not\n    allowed to guard the defenceless chick against the hawk? Christian\n    people send their sons to the university, and demand that the\n    education of the parental home be spared, that the inexperience of\n    youth be not misused. The state must demand that the\n    religious-moral education which it furthers in its public schools\n    be not destroyed by the higher schools. Yet, all these rights must\n    be silenced the moment the vision of the absolute freedom of\n    teaching makes its appearance, since to refrain from\n    dechristianizing the youth would be contrary to his tasks.\n\n\nIf such abuse in the management of the power of knowledge, within and\nwithout colleges, is not counteracted by all possible means, then none\nneed be surprised when a science free from religion and Christianity is\nfollowed by an elementary school free from religion, when in public and\npreparatory schools the free-thinking teacher is telling the pupils that\nthere is no creation but only evolution, and that the gospels and biblical\nhistory are poetical stories such as the Nibelungenlied and the Iliad and\nOdyssey.\n\n\n    We cannot be astonished to find the following rules advocated for\n    the instruction in public schools: \u201cReligious instruction in\n    schools should not differ from the instruction in other subjects,\n    namely, one of full freedom, bound only by recognized documents\n    and personalities of religious literature and religious science.\n    The school must teach that which is, it must present the tenets of\n    all times and all nations in so far as this is possible within its\n    modest compass.... But if the pupil should ask, What really is?\n    What position should the teacher assume toward this question? In\n    my opinion, he should speak in plain terms. He should say: There\n    are people who believe all that is taught by the different systems\n    of religion.... The child may further ask of the teacher whether\n    he himself believes. No teacher who claims the confidence of the\n    children should shirk the answer. He may confess his faith or\n    disbelief, without need of worry. It cannot hurt his prestige in\n    the eyes of the child, because, if for no other reason, either way\n    he will find himself in an equally large and good company\u201d\n    (_Tews_).\n\n    But we hear much more radical utterances. For instance, the\n    official organ of teachers in a Catholic country urges defection\n    from the Church in the following words: \u201cHow long will\n    Social-Democracy, now so formidable, remain inactive against\n    clerical arrogance? How much longer will it shirk a duty that is\n    clear to the dullest eye? If the millions of our Social-Democrats,\n    including the women and children, would break away from Rome, the\n    priestcraft in Austria is as good as defeated. A grave\n    responsibility rests upon the Social-Democratic leaders. Should\n    they miss the moment to act, they will be judged by history!\u201d\n    (Deutsch-oesterreichische Lehrerzeitung, June 1, 1909).\n\n    Another organ of teachers declares Christianity to be nothing else\n    but _victorious heresy_, for which Christ had to lay down His life\n    the same as _Giordano_, _Hus_, and countless others. \u201cThe subject\n    of religion as taught in the preparatory schools is for the most\n    part taken from ages whose customs and morals are\u2014happily\u2014no\n    longer ours.\u201d We see radicalism rampant in large circles of public\n    school teachers, demanding noisily, excitedly, and, of course, in\n    the name of modern science and enlightenment, the abolition of the\n    divine service, of prayer, and religious instruction in school,\n    giving as reason that, \u201cas to matters of mental freedom no\n    difference should be made between a university and a village\n    school.\u201d That our people will \u201ccarelessly waste their Christian\n    patrimony, this is the great danger.\u201d\n\n\nOur argument is not that only Catholics should be professors, nor even to\nlimit the teaching office to Christians. But one thing must be demanded of\nthe college-teacher, that he possess the pedagogic qualifications to\nrender him competent of educating the hope of the Christian people. As a\nrule this demands a religious, Christian disposition. One thing the state\nmust absolutely demand of the teacher, that he have appreciation for the\nfoundations of the Christian state; he who has no understanding for the\nhistorical forms of the life of a nation, who even regards them with\nhostility, should remain away from this vocation.\n\nIn the United States the Jesuit Order has five free universities, founded\nand directed by the Order. Their professors are not all Catholics; there\nare professors of other creeds, even Jews. All work in harmony to the\ncommon end of the university.\n\n\n    Men who sincerely and conscientiously strive for the interests of\n    science will everywhere show not only consideration, but even\n    understanding and respect, for what is true in the ideas of\n    others. \u201cI gaze,\u201d so writes Prof. _Smolka_, \u201cupon the likenesses\n    of my venerable Protestant masters, under whom I studied at\n    G\u00f6ttingen. Thirty-seven years have passed since I went to them, in\n    full confidence to find in their school the leaders who would be\n    free from the influence of the Catholic view of the world. To\n    their profound knowledge I owe, first of all, the emancipation\n    from the prejudices I was raised in, from the views of an\n    atmosphere devoted to Indifferentism in which I had passed my\n    youth. Prof. _Waitz_ opened my eyes to the grandeur of the\n    Catholic Church in the course of the centuries, in the repeated\n    prostration of the Papacy and its ever-following rise to\n    unsuspected heights, a fact unparalleled in the history of human\n    institutions. Prof. _Lotze_ rebuked me at the very beginning of my\n    studies at G\u00f6ttingen for a slighting remark about scholastic\n    philosophy: later he imbued me with profound respect for it and\n    for the wealth of problems it embraces. These scientists,\n    Protestants without exception and in exclusively Protestant\n    surroundings, inoculated me with sincere love for scientific\n    truth, regardless of the consequences it would lead to. They also\n    introduced the youthful mind to the tried methods of scientific\n    research, indicating the boundaries where the domain of research\n    ends and the right of dogma, or arbitrary rule of subjective\n    imagination, begins.\u201d\n\n\n\nRestriction of Right.\n\n\nWe need no further proof that the state is justified in restricting the\nfreedom of teaching, whenever demanded by the business of the state as\ndescribed above. Restriction of this kind can be considered unjustified\nonly by a state theory of liberalism, which holds that the object of the\nstate consists in merely protecting individual liberty, no matter if this\nliberty should lead to the gravest injuries so long as it does not affect\nthe freedom of others; a theory which changes the state community from an\nintegral organism into a conglomeration of autonomous individuals.\n_Lasalle_ scornfully termed this theory the \u201cnightwatchman idea\u201d of the\nstate. The state has the right and the duty to exert a necessary influence\nupon the pursuit of science, especially at the universities. Against it\nthe pleading of _autonomy of the college_ and its teacher will not hold.\nThey have a certain autonomy, that was even greater in former times. An\nimportant part of it is the right to propose appointments for vacant\nchairs. It must be admitted that this method of appointment is proper; it\nvouches for the scientific fitness of the appointee, and will prove a\nprotection against the exercise of undue political influence and\nministerial absolutism, provided that this method is impartially\nexercised. But an autonomy that disputes the right of the state to protect\nits interests, where free science conflicts with it, that would demand, as\nhas been asserted, that \u201cno infringement of the freedom in teaching must\nbe deduced from the official position as teacher,\u201d\u2014such autonomy would be\na palpable misconception of the dependency of the college-teacher and of\nthe social service of science. The rules that apply to other,\nnon-judicial, officers should apply to teachers appointed by the state,\nand offences in their office, or conduct injurious to the purpose and the\ndignity of their office, should be treated similarly as in the case of\nother public servants. Nor should members of the legislature be forbidden\nto defend the rightful interests of their constituents in regard to\nschools. They are elected by the people for this purpose, and the people\nhave a claim on the schools, which are supported by their taxes and to\nwhich some of their greatest interests are attached.\n\n\n    It has been demanded to concede to college-teachers the\n    independence and immunity of judges. This, however, would be\n    overlooking the vast difference between professors and judges. The\n    judge has to render legal decisions in concrete cases, according\n    to existing laws; in order to lessen the danger of his being\n    guided by outside considerations he is given a large measure of\n    independence. But what questions has the college-professor to\n    decide? Mathematical or physical questions? There his\n    incorruptibility is not in such danger that he must be made\n    independent of government. Religious and moral questions,\n    questions of views of the world? These he is not compelled to\n    decide. Neither state nor people have appointed him to question,\n    time and again, the fundamental foundations of human life, and to\n    render decisions which nobody requested.\n\n\nIt is not clear why science, pleading its independence, should oppose\njustified restrictions. As a matter of fact _this independence does not\nexist anywhere_. Numerous are the considerations, often unwarranted, it is\nactually tied to, yea, often tied to by its own hands. He who is familiar\nwith scientific doings, especially academic doings, knows numbers of such\nties\u2014there is the professional opinion in scientific circles; woe unto him\nwho in his scientific works dares to confess a supernatural view of the\nworld!\u2014ties of the predominance of certain leaders or schools, without or\nagainst whose favor it is difficult to attain recognition, approval, or\nposition; the ties of parties and cliques in an academic career; the tie,\ntoo, of that insinuating power of the state that confers much-desired\ndecorations and titles.\n\n\n    \u201cWhere is this freedom of science?\u201d asks a modern academic\n    teacher. \u201cSome will say science and its teaching are free in our\n    country. True, it is so written on paper. But those charged with\n    keeping this principle inviolate are human. For instance the\n    monists have the chief voice in appointments to zo\u00f6logical chairs.\n    They will propose only scientists who are not opponents to the\n    monistic faith. Far be it from me to assume any _mala fides_. They\n    simply believe that only their faith is the proper one to promote\n    science. But I ask again, where is the freedom of science?\u201d\n    (_Dahl_).\n\n    _H. St. Chamberlain_ tells of an amusing incident in his life:\n    \u201cMany years ago, when I desired to devote myself to an academic\n    career, a chemist said to me: \u2018My dear fellow, since you belong to\n    the profession, I tell you as a friend that it is not enough for\n    you to be proficient: you should try, first of all, to marry the\n    daughter of one of the professors, of a privy counsellor if\n    possible.\u2019 \u2018This advice comes too late,\u2019 I replied, \u2018I am already\n    married.\u2019 My well-wisher was visibly shocked. \u2018What a pity! Too\n    bad! You don\u2019t realize what an influence this has here upon one\u2019s\n    career.\u2019 What trouble I had to obtain even the _venia docendi_!\n    and then I stuck fast and could not budge despite all achievements\n    until I undertook to marry the daughter of one of the\n    \u2018head-wirepullers\u2019; then things were fixed within three months. I\n    may have looked at him in a peculiar way, for his wife was a\n    veritable Xanthippe, and, he added with a laugh: \u2018You know I am\n    all day at the laboratory, from morning until late at night.\u2019 \u201d\n    There is nothing new under the sun. In the year of grace, 1720,\n    _Johann Jacob Moser_ started his lectures in Tuebingen, but could\n    get no audience. \u201cNo wonder, even a cleverer man than I would not\n    have fared better at that time, when everything depended on\n    nepotism.\u201d The young man had crossed Chancellor _Pfaff_ by\n    rejecting a marriage arrangement (_Horn_).\n\n    One will find these things very human. Moreover, it would be\n    unwarranted to assume that they happen always and everywhere. But\n    they prove that the pursuit of science rests also on general human\n    grounds, and does not always remain aloft, in the ethereal heights\n    of pure truth.\n\n\n\nThe Freedom of Teaching in History.\n\n\nWhen we said that it is the duty of the state to protect the common\nbenefits of life against injury by freedom in teaching, and to stand guard\nover its Christian past, we stated nothing but what has been the\nconviction of the Christian nations and their rulers up into the\nnineteenth century. Absolute freedom in teaching cannot plead the support\nof history, it is only of yesterday. History shows it to be the natural\nchild, not of the first awakening of the consciousness of freedom, but of\n_the de-Christianizing of the modern state_. Its official entry coincides\nwith the increasing de-christianizing of public life during the nineteenth\ncentury, after the modern state adopted more and more the principles of\nliberal thought. A naturalistic view of the world, without faith, was\nstruggling for supremacy; science had to proclaim it as higher\nenlightenment, and vehemently urged freedom in its behalf. The state\nreceded step by step, confused by the commanding note in the new demands,\nby high-sounding words about the rights of science; it allowed itself to\nbe talked into the belief that it must become the leader in the new\ncourse, and it took the banner that was forced into its hands. It has\nalways been so; claims presented with impudence will intimidate, and\nassume in the eyes of many the appearance of right.\n\n\n    In so far as it signifies the removal of the religious-moral bars\n    in teaching, the freedom in teaching developed first in Protestant\n    Germany, together with the increasing change of universities into\n    state institutions. Reformation and the ensuing _Enlightenment_\n    had gradually prepared the way for it. Neither the rationalism nor\n    the pietism of the eighteenth century could have an understanding\n    for the tenets of the faith. In addition there was the confusion\n    engendered by the multiplication of Protestant denominations, none\n    supported by an overtowering spiritual authority; it led more and\n    more to the parting between science and religious confession;\n    political reasons, too, made it desirable to disregard\n    confessions. Thus the severance of science from religion increased\n    and the \u201cfreedom of teaching\u201d in this sense was finally adopted\n    also by Catholic states as an achievement.\n\n    The enlightenment that had developed outside of the universities\n    made its entry into the halls of universities chiefly under the\n    Prussian Minister _von Zedlitz_, a champion of enlightenment and a\n    friend of the philosophers _Wolff_ and _Kant_. That the\n    universities at that time were controlled by free-thinkers is\n    illustrated by a saying of _Frederick II._ On January 4, 1774,\n    _von Zedlitz_ asked of the king whether _Steinhauss_, M.D., should\n    be denied the appointment for professor extraordinary at\n    Frankfort-on-the-Oder, for the reason that he was a Catholic. The\n    king decreed in his own handwriting that \u201cThis does not matter if\n    he is clever; besides, doctors know too much to have belief\u201d\n    (_Bornhak_).\n\n    In the year of the Revolution, 1848, freedom of teaching became a\n    political catch-word. \u201cThe terms freedom of teaching and freedom\n    of learning, that became popular in 1848, when any phrase\n    compounded with freedom could not be often enough repeated, have\n    been ever since reminiscent of barricades, and men who have\n    witnessed those times become nervous at their mere sound\u201d\n    (_Billroth_).\n\n    What was understood by freedom in teaching at the turning point of\n    the eighteenth century is shown by the demand of _Thomasius_ for\n    \u201cfreedom of doctrines that are not against God and the state.\u201d The\n    first move was to break away from _human_ authorities, _Aristotle_\n    and others. Thus the Kiel University, by its regulation of January\n    27, 1707, ordered that \u201cno faculty should enslave itself to\n    certain principles or opinions, in so far as they are dependent on\n    a human authority\u201d (_Horn_).\n\n    In G\u00f6ttingen and Halle freedom of teaching also became the maxim,\n    and \u201c_Libertas sentiendi_,\u201d as _M\u00fcnchhausen_ declared, \u201cwas open\n    to every one and not restrained by statute, except that there\n    should be taught nothing _ungodly_ and _Unchristian_.\u201d In those\n    days this restriction was looked upon as a matter of course. It is\n    known that _Kant_ was disciplined by Minister _Woellner_ in 1794,\n    because of his treatise on religion; at Koenigsberg this reproof\n    was accepted with good grace, and both the philosophical and the\n    theological faculties pledged themselves not to lecture on\n    _Kant\u2019s_ religious philosophy. As recently as the middle of the\n    nineteenth century a restriction in this sense was ordered by the\n    Prussian Minister _Eichhorn_, and the restriction was observed.\n    The Materialist _Moleschott_ was cautioned in 1845 by the Senate\n    of Heidelberg University, and in reply he resigned his post; in\n    the following year at T\u00fcbingen _B\u00fcchner\u2019s venia legendi_ was\n    cancelled, because, as he himself stated, \u201cit was feared I would\n    poison with my teaching the minds of my young students\u201d (_Horn_).\n\n    In 1842, _Bruno Bauer_, the radical Bible-critic, was removed by\n    the Prussian faculties from the academic chair because of his\n    writings. _D. Strauss_ lectured on philosophy at T\u00fcbingen, but was\n    forced to resign when the first volume of his \u201cLife of Jesus\u201d\n    appeared in 1835. Later on, when called by the authorities of\n    Zurich to the chair for Church history and dogmatics, an emphatic\n    protest of the people made the appointment impossible.\n\n\nWhile showing a regrettable indifference for attacks against religion, the\nmodern states, inoculated with the principles of Liberalism, have not\nentirely forgotten their traditions. Many sections in their penal codes\nstill protect religion, not only against defamation, but, as is the case\nin Austria, also against public anti-Christian propaganda, and the\n\u201creligious-moral education\u201d in public schools is made compulsory by law.\nOf course there is a contradiction, between the conviction of the state\nthat the principles of morals and religion must be preserved, and the\ngrant of full freedom to an anti-religious misuse of science, whose effect\nupon the masses is unavoidable. It is a contradiction to tear down the dam\nat the river and then erect emergency levees against the onrushing flood.\nThe amazing presumption, that holds inviolate and sacred everything that\nposes under the name of science, is the fault of it all.\n\n\n\nFreedom of Teaching and Party Rule.\n\n\nIn some countries the complaint is heard that a certain faction has\nobtained control of the universities, and so exercises its control that\nthose who are not of its bent of mind are excluded from both teaching and\ntaking part in the administration of its affairs, despite the fact that\nfreedom in teaching and learning has been guaranteed by the state. It is\nthe faction that professes free-thought and cultivates the freedom of\nscience in this sense. This condition forces students faithful to their\nreligion to study in a strange atmosphere, and they are looked upon as\nstrangers. The parties so accused seek to disclaim these charges as\nunjust; for they feel that, if justified, it would disclose an unlawful\ncondition of things. Nevertheless the facts are so notorious, that all\nprotestations will be without avail.\n\n\n    These facts must be painful to the sense of justice, order, and\n    good-fellowship; and to this sense it is not pleasing to deal\n    further with matters which have often been the cause for indignant\n    resentment, and to go into concrete details. We shall but briefly\n    recall to mind how persistently candidates for academic positions\n    are pushed aside when they are known to be of staunch Catholic\n    mind. This is borne out by their trifling percentage among the\n    large number of college-teachers; by the high pressure that is\n    often needed to lift the embargo for a _Catholic_; by assaults\n    which not seldom resulted in physical violence. This small number\n    is glaringly emphasized by the considerable, even disquieting,\n    number of college lecturers of Jewish extraction. Furthermore,\n    there is the improper usage that the theological faculty is passed\n    over at the annual election of the rector, and likewise, that\n    teachers even of lay-faculties are excluded from academic offices\n    when they profess themselves openly as Catholics.\n\n    Catholic students have seen themselves treated as strangers at\n    more than one university; they were not given the usual\n    privileges, and were accorded rights only in the proportion that\n    their number had to be reckoned with. Their corporate bodies were\n    ignored, self-evident rights either denied or grossly violated.\n\n    As to the small number of religious-minded lecturers at colleges\n    it is not to be denied that the number of those who combine\n    fervent religious persuasion with high scientific efficacy is not\n    considerable these days. Their long suppression furnishes a reason\n    for it, but not the only one. A modern university professor\n    rightly states: \u201cWhile there never has been a want of courageous,\n    determined confessors of the Catholic faith who have occupied a\n    prominent, even leading, position in the progress of science, in\n    the perfection of methods and means of scientific research, they\n    were and still are the exception. They were men of _self-reliance\n    and independent_ judgment, who were able to exempt themselves from\n    an humble submission to the powerful view of the world, which\n    emanates from the hatred of Christianity and prevails in educated\n    circles. The issue is still the same secular contrast between the\n    two views of the world, which _St. Augustine_ illustrated with\n    unsurpassed mastery as long as fifteen hundred years ago. But the\n    view of the world which has been in the ascendant in scientific\n    circles long since, has certainly nothing in common with\n    scientific research.\u201d\n\n\nOur task, however, is not to examine the facts, but to prove that such\nconditions are unlawful, no matter where and when found. We do not wish to\ndiscuss further the fact that a university polity, exclusively in the\nspirit of a liberalism that gradually goes over into radicalism, would\nconstitute a grave danger for Christian traditions. Indifference to the\nChristian and every other religion, or to an extent direct rejection, must\nmake it appear more and more inferior and obsolete in the eyes of educated\ncircles; this view will then easily find its way to the people. Nor do we\nintend to enlarge upon a second point, viz., the interest of science\nitself. The kernel of liberal research in the province of the spiritual is\na frivolous agnosticism, with a rigid bondage to its naturalistic\npostulates, with which we have become sufficiently acquainted. Principles\nof this kind are poison for true science. For this reason alone it is\nnecessary that a Christian philosophy be placed by the side of a\nphilosophy in fear of metaphysics, one that never extends beyond puzzles\nand problems; that a history guided by Christian principles be placed\nalongside of one inspired by anti-ecclesiastical sentiment; in general\nthat a spirit of veracity assert itself, which would give an example, from\nthe home of highest culture, not of vain arrogance, but of that mental\nfirmness which, conscious of the limits of human knowledge, is also ready\nto believe. How can our universities remain the seats of sterling mental\nlife, if the highest power of truth that has ever been, the Christian\nreligion, is ignored there, and even maligned; and if in its stead is\ncultivated a philosophical-religious research which leads only to the\nnegation of everything that hitherto was our ideal, and which gives birth\nto a mental anarchy, which, before the forum of history, makes it a\nprinciple of pauperization.\n\nOne point to be particularly emphasized is the _violation of rights and\nthe oppression of mental liberty_, resulting from a party-rule in the\nrealm of higher education. Under a government of law every one, assuming\nhe possesses the necessary qualification, has an equal right to teach:\nthis is elemental to freedom of teaching. The state with its institutions\nexists for the benefit of all classes, not for one certain class that has\nformed the notion that it is the sole bearer of science. Enemies of the\nstate should be excluded from teaching, but not good citizens. Nor can it\nbe demanded, as a necessary preliminary for academic teaching, that one\nmust subscribe to the catch-phrases of any particular party, and so\ndiscard one\u2019s religious belief. And there is the violation of the rights\nof faithful Christian people. Since their money in the form of taxes\nmaintains to a large extent the schools and their teachers, they surely\ncan demand a conscientious administration of their interests, and a\nrepresentation of the Christian view of the world, in a way becoming its\npast and its dignity; Christian people can demand that their sons receive\nan education in consonance with their Christian convictions, and that the\nuniversities will train officials, physicians, and teachers, in whom they\nmay have confidence. If there are no other but state universities in a\ncountry, and these are monopolized by a free-thought party, then a\ncondition of mental bondage will arise for those of a different mind. They\nare compelled either to have their sons forego the learned profession, or\nelse expose them to an atmosphere wherein they see danger of a religious\nand moral nature, in ideas, association, and example. No right is left to\nthem, but the right to pay taxes toward the budget of education, and then\nto look on how an irreligious party is striving to turn the higher schools\ninto training camps of obligatory liberalism, and to monopolize the entire\nmental life for this purpose. Now and then there is great indignation\nagainst state monopolies; it is said, shall the state determine what kind\nof cigars I should smoke, and what I am to pay for them! Now, then, where\nis freedom if the majority of the Christian population is to be forced\ninto taking mental nourishment it does not desire and rejects, and pay for\nit besides? If we recall to mind the past, which gave birth to the most\nvenerable universities of the present, a sorrowful feeling comes over us.\nWe see how far our colleges have deviated from their original purpose, how\nour governments have lost their old traditions. Promotion of the Christian\nreligion and of the fear of God, was the lofty aim which their founders\nhad in mind.\n\n\n    In bestowing the charter upon Vienna University, Duke _Albrecht_\n    stated that he beheld in the university an institution \u201cwhereby\n    the glory of the Creator in heaven and His true faith on earth\n    would be furthered, knowledge would be increased, the state\n    benefited, and the light of justice and truth brightened.\u201d And\n    when, in 1366, he donated property to the university, he declared\n    the object of the donation to be \u201cthat the university may increase\n    the prosperity of the entire Church.\u201d\n\n    When Leopold I, on April 26, 1677, signed the charter of Innsbruck\n    University he declared that he founded this university\n    pre-eminently for the protection and prosperity of the Catholic\n    Religion, as a means for its preservation, and also that many of\n    those who had lost the faith might be led back to religion, for\n    the honour and the glory of the Tyrol.\n\n    In the charter of T\u00fcbingen University, _Eberhard_ of W\u00fcrttemberg\n    states: \u201cI believe I can do no better work, none more helpful to\n    gain salvation, none more pleasing to the eternal God, than to\n    provide with special diligence and emulation for the instruction\n    of good and zealous young men in the fine arts and sciences, to\n    enable them to recognize God, to know, to honour, and to serve Him\n    alone.\u201d \u201cIn those days there was no hesitation to assign to\n    science the loftiest vocation and to declare ... that, coming from\n    God, science should also lead back to Him as its origin.... The\n    school was charged to work for the spread and the defence of the\n    true belief. Christian truth was once queen at these universities;\n    now, she has only too often become a stranger, to be denounced at\n    times if she attempts to knock at the portals of her old home\u201d\n    (_Probst_).\n\n\n\nFree Universities.\n\n\nAnother manner, to provide proper freedom of teaching, is open to the\nmodern state by incorporating free universities. Unlike the state\ninstitutions, they are not directly controlled by the state, but are\nindependent of it in their internal affairs; they are founded and managed\nby private persons or societies. Universities of this kind are found in\nBelgium and in England, to some extent in France, but their home is\nchiefly in the United States. At the head of the free university of the\nUnited States is the president, with a governing body and a board of\ntrustees elected from members of the university; they appoint teachers,\nprescribe schedules of study and examinations, and conduct its business.\nTrue, the state cannot relinquish its right to oppose a system of teaching\ndangerous to the common weal; it will also provide that those to be\nlicensed to practice the professions possess the necessary education and\ntraining; but the state refrains from further interference in the\nmanagement of free universities.\n\nIt is no doubt difficult to establish by private means universities\nequally efficient with those of the state; in the countries of Middle\nEurope this undertaking is perhaps more difficult than elsewhere, but the\npossibility is there, and it is even realized in some places. This,\nhowever, is not a question to occupy us here; we merely wish to declare,\nif similar foundations are about to be undertaken, and the necessary\nconditions are present, then the state must not prevent them, it must\ngrant freedom in teaching.\n\nTrue, the state is obliged to assist its subjects in acquiring material\nand spiritual goods, but only in so far as private means are insufficient\nthereto: the state must only act in a supplemental way. If it does that\nwhich its citizens themselves are able to do, then the state is needlessly\nabridging their free right. This includes the establishment of schools and\nthe teaching in them. Presuming fitness, everybody has a _natural right_\nto teach others; hence, also, to found schools, whether by himself or\njointly with others. Furthermore, instruction is a part of education, even\nat the university; it could hardly be said of the graduate of the\npreparatory school that his education is completed. Education, however, is\na matter for the parents. Their rights would be infringed upon, if\nneedlessly forced by the state to intrust their sons exclusively to the\nstate colleges and to their method of teaching. How could the state\u2019s\nexclusive right to teach be proved? Does the pursuit of science belong to\nits domain? No one will care to claim this. If science were to be allotted\nto the jurisdiction of any one body, the Church would be the first to\nenter into consideration, because of her international and spiritual\ncharacter. Or is this right to be conceded to the state because it is to\nbe the bearer of culture? The state is to promote culture, but not to\nprescribe a certain brand of it. The argument that private universities\ncannot be founded and conducted in the proper way is certainly not borne\nout by the facts.\n\nEven if the state, owing to its superior facilities, could provide better\nuniversities than private effort, it would not be entitled to the\nmonopoly; the fact of being able to do something better does not secure\nthe sole privilege of doing it. Moreover, in order to attract students,\nfree universities will have to emulate state universities. The right of\nthe state to found universities will of course not be disputed; but this\nright must not deteriorate into a disguised monopoly, that would grant\nprivileges to its own universities, and deny them to free universities in\norder to put them out of existence. At any rate, the state will always\nretain considerable influence over the studies at free universities. It\nmay require certain standards in candidates for political and professional\npositions, for judges and lawyers, teachers at state schools, physicians;\nit may insist upon state examinations, or it may make its stipulations for\nrecognizing the examinations and academic degrees of the free schools.\n\nBy free schools of higher learning, a greater degree of freedom in\nteaching and in learning would be assured, or, speaking generally, a\ngreater freedom in the intellectual life. If these higher institutions of\nlearning are exclusively in the hands of the state, it cannot fail that\nthe higher intellectual life will be dangerously dependent upon the state,\nor fall into the control of a dominating clique. As an example might be\ncited the restrictions placed upon jurisprudence by Prussia in the\neighteenth century; the long-continued control of Hegelian philosophy; the\nUniversit\u00e9 Imp\u00e9riale of Napoleon; the predominance of anti-Catholic\nthought in our own schools. Universities, founded upon a positive,\nChristian basis, would surely be a comfort for thousands.\n\nNo need to say that such foundations may also be undertaken by the Church.\nThis right cannot be denied to the Church, just as little as to any other\ncorporation. Nay, much less! Because of its intellectual and international\ncharacter science is most closely related to the Church. The latter,\nfurthermore, has an eminent, historical right; no one has done more for\nthe foundation and promotion of the European universities than the Church.\n\n\n    A remarkable and at the same time _characteristic attitude_\n    towards free, particularly Catholic, universities is assumed by\n    Liberalism. The stereotyped objection to Catholic universities is\n    known; it can be reduced to this formula: At a Catholic university\n    there can be no freedom in research nor freedom in teaching; but\n    without them there can be no science; consequently, a Catholic\n    university is a contradiction. It is the same old song: there is\n    but one science, there is but one freedom\u2014the free-thought that\n    rejects belief. If it is really so obvious that a Catholic\n    university is a contradiction to science, hence incapable to\n    foster it, why the excitement? Either such universities are\n    incompetent, or they are not. Let the experiment go on; the result\n    will tell. If the result is certain, as is claimed, very well, one\n    may serenely await it. Liberalism shows itself again here in the\n    shape of that nasty hybrid of freedom and intolerance for which it\n    is known. It is the head of Janus with its two faces: the one\n    showing the bright mien of freedom, the other the sinister scowl\n    of an intolerant tyrant. They shout for freedom, freedom they\n    demand; Church and Revelation are put under the ban, because they\n    restrain freedom. The state is denounced as soon as it wants to\n    interfere. But if others attempt research free and independently,\n    though not just so as Liberalism would like, then tyranny\n    immediately takes the place of liberty, the herald of freedom\n    resorts to oppression, and those who just now proclaimed the\n    independence of universities from the state, who protested against\n    the interference of the state in science, turn about and loudly\n    call for the help of the state, avowing that science can thrive\n    only under state control.\n\n\n\nThe Church and the Universities.\n\n\nIn discussing the position of the social authorities toward freedom of\nteaching, we have chiefly considered the state. Of the Church we shall say\nbut a brief word. It will suffice to recall what has been said previously;\nwhat has been stated about the relation of the Church to freedom of\nresearch, applies in many respects equally to freedom of teaching. Little\nwill have to be added. The Church, and the Church alone, has received from\nher divine Founder the command to preserve the doctrine of revelation and\nto proclaim it to mankind. \u201cGoing, therefore, teach ye all nations\u201d\u2014this\nis the commission of the Lord.\n\nFor this reason the teaching of the revealed truth, Theology, is the\nprivilege of the Church. But the rest of the sciences will not be exempt\nfrom the obligation to listen to the admonition of the God-appointed\nauthority, in all cases where religious grounds are invaded. To the Church\nis intrusted the religious-moral guidance of her faithful; she cannot\nremain indifferent, when in the public teaching of science a system is\nfollowed detrimental to the Christian principles of the faithful. And\nwhoever has entered the Church by baptism, remains subject to her\nauthority in all matters within her sphere.\n\nThe state must acknowledge these rights of the Church, or else forfeit its\nclaim to be a Christian state; these rights, belonging to the essence of\nthe Christian religion, are guaranteed by God, and are independent of\nhuman sanction. Hence, in case of clashes in this respect, the state must\nlisten to the grievances of the Church; this will chiefly concern\nTheology, rarely other sciences. Thus it would be partially correct to say\nthat the theological faculties are subject to the Church, but those of the\nrest of the sciences to the power of the state. But only partially;\nspiritual interests cannot be marked out by faculties. Interests of faith\nmay be also violated in other faculties: then cases may arise which lose\ntheir purely worldly character, and extend into the religious sphere of\nthe Church. If a professor should lecture on a matter touching closely\nupon interests of faith, for instance, Catholic Canon law or philosophy,\nand should show bias against Church and Christianity, deny its authority,\ndistort and attack its tenets\u2014then this would constitute an evident wrong\nto the Church and a flagrant violation of the interests which to guard it\nis her duty, especially in a country overwhelmingly Catholic. In that case\nthe Church would be entitled to make expostulation.\n\nIn rejecting the protests of the Church in such cases, as being the\ninterference of a foreign power, the state would thereby prove that it\nmisunderstands both, the religious vocation of the Church and the proper\nrelation between state and Church. For the faithful, whom the state calls\nits subject, are also the subjects of the Church, they are the lambs and\nsheep the Church is to feed, in obedience to divine command. Church and\nstate having in common the same subjects, and being closely connected for\nso long a time that it has become historical, it would be unnatural if\nthey were to treat each other as strangers, such as might be expected in a\nheathen country, Japan, for instance. The nature of the case and the weal\nof the people demand harmonious action in such matters. It cannot be\ndenied, moreover, that the Church commonly meets the state government to\nthe extreme limit of her ability. About the divine rights of the Church\nopinions differ, but those able to fully appreciate the precious benefits\nof religion and morality will regard it as one of the greatest boons to\nhumanity, that there exists within its fold an organization which protects\nwith fearless, awe-inspiring majesty these benefits against all attacks,\neven against the state and its all-devouring policy of utility, and in\nthis way defends the mental dignity of the human individual against\noppression by the reckless reality of external life.\n\n\n    Just to show how an avowed free-thinker appreciates the\n    significance of a commanding spiritual force as against the state\n    we will quote the French positivist _A. Comte_, who declares: \u201cThe\n    absorption of the spiritual by the worldly power is a return to\n    barbarity; the separation of the two powers, however, is the\n    principle for mental uplift and moral dignity.\u201d \u201cTrue,\u201d says he,\n    \u201cmen struggle in blind aversion against spiritual power of any\n    kind; yet it will even then prevail, though in a mistaken way.\n    Professors, authors, and newspaper writers will then pose as the\n    speculative leaders of mankind, although they lack all mental and\n    moral qualification for it\u201d (Cours de philosophie positive).\n\n    Short-sighted perception may upbraid the Catholic Church; but a\n    far-sighted judgment will have to concede that mankind owes\n    gratitude to the Church and the Papacy. A noted Protestant writer\n    remarks: \u201cBut for the Papacy the Middle Ages would have fallen a\n    prey to barbarity. Even in our day the liberty of nations would be\n    threatened with greatest danger if there were no Papacy. It is the\n    most effective counterpoise to an omnipotent power of the state.\n    If it did not exist, it would have to be invented\u201d (_H\u00fcbler_).\n\n\n\n\n\nFIFTH SECTION. THEOLOGY.\n\n\n\n\nChapter I. Theology And Science.\n\n\nNow one other, the concluding point. So far our discussion has dealt\nalmost exclusively with the profane sciences, and while there were often\nunder discussion general principles, applying also to theology, we did not\nrefer to the latter expressly for the reason that it occupies a special\nposition in regard to our question. Theology is the science of the faith,\nits subjects are truths established by divine or inspired authority;\nhence, in teaching, authority plays a larger part in this than in any\nother science. For this reason much fault is found with theology, and many\nconsider that it forfeits thereby its claim to rank as a science. They say\nit lacks all liberty, the results are prescribed; it lacks possibility of\nprogress; nothing but rigid dogmas, rejecting all development and\nimprovement; its vocation is exhausted by the incessant transmitting of\nthe immutable; hence it lacks all the essential conditions of a true\nscience, it has no claim to a place at the university; if it nevertheless\nhas established itself at the university, as is the case in some\ncountries, it must be considered as an alien body, a remnant of an\nobsolete time.\n\nA keen eye cannot fail to detect in these words the prompting voice of\nthat view of the world which rejects everything supernatural, and declares\nthat Christian dogmatics and morals, and ideas of sin, redemption,\nhumility of faith, cross, and self-denial, do no longer correspond to\nmodern man. At bottom is the struggle between the two views of the\nworld\u2014one the philosophy of modern, sovereign man, the other the\ncontemplation of the world in the light of Christianity: a process of\nrepulsion, psychologically easily understood, by which the one seeks to\nexpel the other from the position which it desires to occupy. A closer\nexamination of the matter will show this.\n\n\n\nTheology as a Science.\n\n\nIs theology a science in the proper sense? May it rightly claim a place\namong the branches of human science? This shall be the first question to\nbe answered. Theology, meaning the doctrine of God, is the science of the\nRevelation, or of the faith; of the Revelation which began in the Old\nTestament and reached its perfection in Christ, the Son of God, in whom\nappeared the fulness of God, the image of the glory of God, the perfection\nof all religion; the Revelation intrusted to the Church to be preserved\ninfallibly, so that by these truths, and means of salvation, the Church\nmight guide and enrich the life of believing mankind. Hence, in the broad\nsense in which it is understood now, theology is the science that gathers\nthe revealed truths from their sources, endeavours to grasp and to defend\nthem, and to deduce new truths from them; which also studies these truths\nand the means given for salvation, in their development and effect in the\nChristian life.\n\nThus it includes a wide range of subordinate branches, connected by a\ncommon object. The biblical sciences have for their subject Holy Writ; the\nsciences of introduction to the Bible deal with its external history, with\nhistorical criticism playing an important part; exegesis is occupied with\nthe scientific interpretation of the text and uncovers the treasures of\ntruth in Holy Writ, assisted in this task by hermeneutics and a number of\nphilosophical-historical auxiliary sciences. Ecclesiastical history and\nits branches of patrology, history of dogma, ecclesiastical arch\u00e6ology,\nand art, and other auxiliary sciences, describe the doctrine of Revelation\nin its historical course through the centuries, and its development in the\nbosom of the Church. Dogmatics (with apologetics) and morals have the task\nto explain and defend the doctrine of faith and morals, as drawn from the\nScriptures and from tradition, to deduce new truths from them and to unite\nthem all in a system. Finally, Canon law, and even to a greater degree the\ndepartments of pastoral theology, homiletics, liturgy, show how the\ntreasures of Revelation and Redemption find their realization in the\npractical life of the Church and of the Christian people.\n\nHence there cannot be any doubt but that theology is a science in the\nproper sense, unless a wrong definition of science is presumed. Of course,\nif we should identify science in general with empirical science, and\nscientific methods with the methods of natural sciences and mathematics,\nand refuse to recognize any results as scientific except those gained by\nobservation and mathematical calculation, then, of course, theology would\nnot be a science, nor would many other branches of knowledge come under\nthis head; the fault, however, would lie with a narrow conception, that\nlimits itself to the portion of human knowledge within its vision,\nignoring everything that exists beyond its horizon.\n\nWhat are we to understand by science? It is the systematic concentration\nof the knowledge and the research of things according to their causes;\nhence of our cognition of a subject that can be proved by careful\ndemonstration to be certain or at least probable. This we find to be the\ncase in theology. It is the sum total, systematically arranged, of\nknowledge and researches concerning the tenets of faith, considered in the\nabstract, in their history, and in their effects on the life of the\nChurch. Applying the method of natural thought, theology first studies the\npresumptions and foundations of faith, examines the sources of revelation\nby the philosophical and historical-critical method, proves the doctrines\nof faith by these sources, endeavours to grasp these truths\nintellectually, by the methods of analytical and synthetical thinking, and\nto make clear their connection. We have here the same methods as applied\nin other sciences: ascertaining the facts, definition of terms, deduction,\ninduction. In respect to the history of the Church and to Canon law their\nsimilarity with analogous profane sciences is at once obvious.\n\nThere is one _difference_: in the theological sciences there is active,\nnot only rational research, but also the _belief_ in revealed truths. In\nsome departments, like that of ecclesiastical history, this difference is\nless pronounced, they proceed by the method of critically establishing and\nconnecting the facts; but they, too, are guided by the conviction that\nthere is in the life of the Church not only natural causation, but also\nsupernatural principle. Dogmatics takes faith to a greater degree as its\npoint of support, in order to connect natural reason with the convictions\nof faith, and how richly natural reason may unfold itself is shown in the\nworks of _St. Augustine_ and _St. Thomas_, on the great mysteries of the\nfaith. As regards faith itself, we must keep in mind that it has a\nscientific foundation: the credibility of revelation is proven, it is a\nreasoning faith. It may be likened to history. The historian, on the\ntestimony of his sources, believes in the actuality of human events,\nhaving convinced himself of the credibility of his sources; this belief\nbecomes then his starting point for further researches of a pragmatical\nnature: he penetrates more deeply into the facts, and connects them\naccording to their causal relations. The difference is this: the historian\nrests upon human authority, the theologian upon divine.\n\nYet the objection is raised: theology is faith, or at least rests on\nfaith. Faith, however, has nothing to do with science; faith is sentiment,\nwhereas science is knowledge. That this view of faith is wrong, and the\nresult of subjective agnosticism that denies to man any positive\nunderstanding of supernatural truths, we have shown repeatedly. Certainly,\nif faith were nothing but sentiment, no science could be built upon it;\nyou cannot build stone houses upon water. But the Catholic faith is not\nsimply sentiment, it is a conviction of reason, based upon God\u2019s testimony\nthat the revealed doctrines are true. In the same way that the\nhistorian\u2014to use the comparison once more\u2014believes positively in his\nhistorical facts, on the strength of the authority of a _Livy_ or\n_Tacitus_, or accepts as proved some events of ancient times, relying upon\nthe testimony of Babylonian tablets of clay or upon the pyramids, and\nmakes these events his starting point for further researches, without\nhaving to fear objections to his work on the ground that knowledge and\nbelief are incompatible; just so the theologian believes in his religious\ntruths because they are vouched for by God\u2019s testimony. This proves that\nthe foundation for his further thought is not formed by uncontrollable,\nirrational sentiment, but by a conviction of reason.\n\nHence, if by knowledge is meant nothing but a conviction of reason\u2014and in\nthis sense faith and knowledge are usually contrasted by modern\nphilosophical writers\u2014then faith is knowledge in the proper sense and a\ncontradiction does not exist. If, however, knowledge is taken to be the\nunderstanding gained by personal insight without reliance on external\ntestimony, then, of course, there is a distinction, and theology would not\nbe a science, in so far as it _believes_; just as little as history would\nbe a science, in so far as it believes its sources. But theology is a\nscience, in so far as it makes use of experience and reason, examines its\nsources, draws from them the facts of faith, and makes them the starting\npoint for its investigations.\n\n\n    Theology also has mysteries among its subjects, namely, truths\n    whose actuality is cognizable, but whose contents, while not\n    indeed inconsistent, yet remain obscure and incomprehensible to\n    us. But even this does not impair its scientific character. Other\n    sciences share with it this lot of human limitation. Instances are\n    plentiful in natural science where the existence of natural forces\n    of one kind or another is proven; of which it is able to form some\n    idea, but cannot fathom; they remain a puzzle to science,\n    sometimes presenting the greatest difficulties. For instance,\n    ether, gravitation, electricity, the nature of motion, and so on.\n    The noted physicist _J. J. Thomson_ says: \u201cGravitation is the\n    secret of secrets. But the very same holds good of all molecular\n    forces, of magnetism, electricity, etc. There are in animated\n    nature even more things we cannot understand. We could say that of\n    the processes of living organisms we understand practically\n    nothing. Our knowledge of indigestion, of propagation, of\n    instinct, is so small that we can almost say it is limited to the\n    enumeration of them. What we do know and understand is not one\n    thousandth part of what would be necessary for a knowledge in any\n    degree complete. \u2018If we raise an arm,\u2019 says _Pasteur_, \u2018or put our\n    teeth in action, we do something that no one can explain.\u2019 \u201d\n\n\n\nTheology and Progress.\n\n\nWith a very superficial conception of theology we might easily arrive at\nthe opinion that it lacks a characteristic of science, which, in our time\nespecially, is insisted upon, namely, progress. For it must adhere to\ndogmas and not go beyond them. Hence, seemingly, there is nothing to do\nfor theology but to transmit unchangeable truths, perhaps in different\naspects, but nevertheless the same truths.\n\nIt must be admitted that one kind of progress is barred in theology, as\nalso in other sciences; to wit, the progress of incessant remodelling and\nreshaping, the continuous tearing down of the old facts, the eternal\nsearch after truth without ever gaining its possession.\n\n\n    This is often the progress demanded. \u201cThe new tuition,\u201d it is\n    said, \u201cstarts from the premise that the truth is to be searched\n    for\u201d (_Paulsen_). \u201cScience is not a perfected doctrine, but a\n    research, ever to be revised\u201d (_Harnack_). It is particularly\n    demanded of theology that it procure a FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF\n    CHRISTIANITY, and substitute for it thoughts which modern age has\n    adopted and which it calls scientific thinking. \u201cThere remains the\n    task,\u201d they say, \u201cof expressing faith and its objects so as to\n    coincide with the conception formed by scientific thinking of the\n    natural and historical reality\u201d (_Paulsen_). Hence miracles, the\n    divinity of Christ, and mysteries of any kind, must be eliminated;\n    even the notion of a personal God will have to be changed to a\n    pantheistic notion: \u201cAfter the great revolution in our cosmic\n    theories we can no longer think of God, the eternal holy Will that\n    we revere as First Cause of all things, as the \u2018first mover\u2019\n    throning outside and above the universe, as _Aristotle_ and\n    _Thomas_ did\u201d (_Paulsen_).\n\n\nSuch a progress is impossible in theology, at least in Catholic theology,\nand in any other that still aims to be the theology of the Christian,\nrevealed religion. It cannot be expected from theology, nor from any other\nscience, that it will degrade itself to a fashionable science, that takes\nfor its level not truth but the variable imperatives and moods of the\ntimes, and, destitute of character, changes with each varying fashion. The\nscience of faith cannot assume this position, so much the less as it must\nbe aware that its truths often clash with the inclinations of the human\nheart, and that its vocation is to lift up mankind, not to let itself be\ndragged down. This kind of progress therefore is barred. This, indeed, is\nnot progress, but a hopeless wavering from pillar to post, a building and\ntearing down, acquiring without permanent possession, searching without\nfinding.\n\n_True progress_ can be shown in theology as in any other science.\n\nThe _possibility_ of progress is manifest, particularly, in\nChurch-history, in the biblical and pastoral sciences: they are closely\nrelated to the profane-historical, philological, social, and juridical\nbranches of science, hence theology shares in their progress. It would\nseem that dogmatics would have to forego progress. Its progress certainly\ncannot consist in changing the revealed doctrines, nor in interpreting\ndifferently in the course of times the formulas of creed; here the rule\nis, _veritas Domini manet in aeternum_. The development of dogmatic\nknowledge consists rather in the following: the revealed truths are in the\ncourse of the centuries more and more clearly perceived and more sharply\ncircumscribed, more surely demonstrated, more and more extensively\nappreciated in their connections, relations, and deductions. The sources\nof Divine Revelation flow the richer the more they are drawn from; their\ntruths are so substantial, so abundant in relation to knowledge and life,\nthat, the more research advances, the less it reaches its limit. \u201cNo one\ngets nearer to the realization of truth than he who perceives that in\ndivine things, no matter how far he progresses, there remains always\nsomething more to be examined\u201d (_Leo the Great_).\n\nConsider the progress in mathematics. No one will say the mathematician is\ndoomed to stagnation because he cannot change the multiplication table or\nthe geometrical propositions. The increasing mathematical literature, with\nits big volumes, contradicts this notion: but its growth of knowledge is\nnot the zigzag progress of restless to and fro, it is the solid progress\nfrom the seed to the plant.\n\n\n    As early as the fifth century _St. Vincent_ of Lerin described the\n    progress in dogmatical knowledge: \u201cSed forsitan dicet aliquis:\n    Nullusne ergo in Ecclesia Christi profectus habebitur religionis?\n    Habeatur plane et maximus. Nam quis ille est tam invidus\n    hominibus, tam exosus Deo, qui istud prohibere conetur? Sed ita\n    tamen, ut vere profectus sit ille fidei, non permutatio. Siquidem\n    ad profectum pertinet, ut in semetipsum quaeque res amplificetur;\n    ad permutationem vero, ut aliquid ex alio in aliud transvertatur.\n    Crescat igitur oportet et multum vehementerque proficiat tam\n    singulorum quam omnium, tam unius hominis, quam totius Ecclesiae,\n    aetatum ac saeculorum gradibus, intelligentia, scientia,\n    sapientia, sed in suo duntaxat genere, in eodem scilicet dogmate,\n    eodem sensu eademque sententia.... Quodeunque igitur in hac\n    Ecclesiae Dei agricultura fide Patrum satum est, hoc idem filiorem\n    industria decet excolatur et observetur, hoc idem floreat et\n    maturescat, hoc idem proficiat et perficiatur. Fas est etenim, ut\n    prisca illa coelestis philosophiae dogmata processu temporis\n    excurentur, limentur, poliantur, sed nefas est, ut commutentur,\n    nefas, ut detruncentur, ut mutilentur.\u201d\n\n\nThe _proof for the actual progress_ of theology is furnished by its\nhistory. It shows how theology has gradually grown from the first seed of\nthe divine Word, placed by the hand of God\u2019s Son into the soil of\nhumanity, until it became a great tree, rich in branches and leaves. The\nholiest men of the Christian centuries, equipped with the choicest mental\nforces, enlightened by the light of grace, have worked on its growth;\ntoiling and praying, they filled libraries with their books.\n\n\n    It is not our intention to outline here a sketch of this\n    development. A few hints may suffice. Hardly had the faith taken\n    root in the civilized nations of the old times when researches\n    were begun. A long list of Holy Fathers and ecclesiastical authors\n    were the bearers of the first development. Drawing upon Greek\n    philosophy in aid and to deepen their thought in the mental battle\n    against the ancient pagan view of the world, against Judaism and\n    heresy, they elucidated more and more the tenets of faith and\n    morals, and endeavoured to draw ever more fully from their\n    spiritual contents. We encounter among the shining host men like\n    _Tertullian_, _Cyprian_, _Clement of Alexandria_, _Origines_,\n    _Cyril of Jerusalem_, _Basil_, _Gregory of Nyssa_, and many\n    others, up to the powerful dogmatist of the old time, _Augustine_,\n    who treated scientifically and often extensively the great dogmas\n    of faith. Truly a voluminous theological literature with a\n    plethora of genius and truth. The great edition of the Greek and\n    Latin Fathers by _Migne_ numbers 382 volumes in quarto, each of\n    1,500 pages or more in close print. Comparing with these 382\n    volumes the modest book of the Bible, which had been their\n    foremost source, the progress of these centuries becomes manifest.\n\n    Soon the way was broken for systematizing the tenets of the faith,\n    especially by _St. John Damascene_ (eighth century). Scholasticism\n    completed the work: it created a systematical whole and connected\n    theology and philosophy, especially the Aristotelian, into a\n    harmonious union. Its pioneers were _St. Anselm_ and still more\n    _Petrus Lombard_ (died 1160). Then, in the Middle Ages, when\n    universities began to flourish, there followed the great\n    theologians _Alexander of Hales_, _Bonaventure_, _Albert the\n    Great_, _Scotus_, and chief of all _Thomas of Aquin_ (died 1274),\n    in whom scholasticism reached its perfection, and undeniably one\n    of the greatest minds known in the history of science;\n    distinguished by an astonishing prolificness, still more by a\n    wealth and depth of thought combined with the greatest simplicity\n    and lucidity in presenting truths, he will for ever remain\n    unapproachable. The decline of scholasticism during the fourteenth\n    and fifteenth centuries was followed by a new bloom, when the life\n    of the Church, rejuvenated by the Council of Trent, gave birth to\n    new forces in theology. The mighty tomes of men like _Suarez_,\n    _Lugo_, _Gregory of Valencia_, _Ruiz_, _Ba\u00f1ez_, _Billuart_, and\n    others joined the volumes of their predecessors and continued\n    their work. At the same time the various departments of the\n    science were branching off more and more, and became independent.\n\n    _M. Canus_ created the theory of theological cognition as an\n    introduction to dogmatics, _Bellarmin_ and _Th. Stapleton_ founded\n    the newer controversial theology. Moral Theology became in the\n    sixteenth century a separate science and was developed by men like\n    _Lugo_, _Laymann_, _Busembaum_, _Alphons of Liguori_. Similarly a\n    new period of research began in the biblical sciences. Not that\n    the first foundations were laid at that time; there had been\n    _Origines_, who had become the founder of biblical text criticism\n    by his \u201cHexapla\u201d; the Antioch school of exegetes, _Chrysostomus_,\n    _Hilarius_, and especially _Jerome_. But it was fostered with\n    renewed zeal. The great Antwerp and Paris polyglots furnished\n    aids, men like _Maldonatus_, _Salmeron_, _Toletus_, _Cornelius_,\n    _\u00e1 Lapide_, wrote their exegetic works. To the seventeenth century\n    belongs the creation of the prop\u00e6deutics, by _Richard Simon_ and\n    _Bernard Lami_. The monumental work, \u201cCursus sacrae scripturae\u201d\n    (since 1885), containing so far thirty-six volumes, demonstrates,\n    among other things, that there has been in recent years no\n    standstill in the research in Holy Writ. In the province of\n    ecclesiastical history, too, with its branches and auxiliary\n    sciences, new life was awakened at that time. In the sixteenth\n    century, when the defence of the creed by the witnesses of a\n    former age became urgent, patristics and history of dogma enjoyed\n    their first rise. _Petavius_ was prominently connected with them.\n    How these sciences have been fostered in the nineteenth century is\n    indicated by the names of _Mai_, _De Rossi_, _Hergenroether_,\n    _Hefele_, _Pastor_. There remains to be mentioned the gradual\n    establishment of the science of Canon law, of the\n    pastoral-theological departments which have attained an\n    independent position since the close of the eighteenth century,\n    and since then produced a voluminous literature. The fear of a\n    standstill in theological research seems unwarranted in the light\n    of its history. The errors of the present time will prevent a\n    standstill. The more vehement the attacks by natural science and\n    philosophy, by philology and arch\u00e6ology, the more they seek to\n    shake the foundations of the Christian religion, the stronger\n    theology must grow by the combat. The solid progress of our times\n    in knowledge and methodics will not remain without influence; nor\n    can the empirical, the historical-critical method, the theory of\n    evolution, and so on, fail to exert their stimulating influence\n    upon theology.\n\n    The progress that Catholic theology has made since the days of the\n    Fathers, the vast amount of mental work it has performed, is\n    perhaps made most clear by a glance at the \u201cNomenclator literarius\n    theologiae catholicae,\u201d by _H. Hurter_ (2d ed., 3 vols.; the 3d\n    ed. is in 6 vols., 5 being ready). It gives in concise briefness\n    the biographical data and the more important works of Catholic\n    theologians of greater repute. Counting the names there presented,\n    we find not less than 3,900 from 1109 to 1563; about 2,900 from\n    1564 to 1663; about 3,900 between 1664 and 1763; finally, from\n    1764 to 1894 about 4,000 theological authors; hence in the period\n    from 1109 to 1894 nearly 14,700 theologians. That these 14,700\n    scientists\u2014and their number is not exhausted by this figure\u2014should\n    have written their works without offering in them any new\n    knowledge, would surely be a bold assertion! In addition consider\n    the long rows of tomes which some of them wrote. Perhaps it would\n    not be wholly amiss to refer to the restless zeal of many of them,\n    as recorded by their biographers. _Baronius_ (died 1607) could\n    truthfully assert before his death, that for thirty years he had\n    never had sufficient sleep; he usually slept only four or five\n    hours. _Pierre Halloix_ (died 1656) likewise was content with four\n    or five hours of rest. _Dionysius Sanmarthanus_ (died 1725) gave\n    only four hours to sleep and devoted less than half an hour daily\n    to recreation; likewise _Fr. Comb\u00e9fis_ (died 1679), during the\n    last forty years of his life. _A. Fr. Orsi_ (died 1761) contented\n    himself with three or four hours of sleep; _Fr. Clement_ (died\n    1793) and _H. Oberrauch_ (died 1808) are said to have slept but\n    two hours daily. _J. Caramuel de Lobkowicz_ (died 1682) persevered\n    for fourteen hours every day at his books; _Chr. Lupus_ (died\n    1681) even for fifteen hours daily. The theologian _Lessius_ is\n    characterized by \u201c_Parcissimus erat temporis, laboris pertinax_\u201d;\n    the same holds good of hundreds of others of these men.\n\n    A science, enumerating its disciples by so many thousands, with\n    the greatest intellects among its workers, which has commanded so\n    much zeal and work for centuries, should be safe from the reproach\n    of having back of it a history of stagnation.\n\n\n\nTheology and Freedom of Science.\n\n\nTo many it seems obvious that theology lacks at least the other predicate\nof science, freedom; because it is bound to dogmas and ecclesiastical\nauthorities, at least Catholic theology is.\n\nAlthough this claim is pressed persistently and with confidence, we may\ndispose of it very briefly. The freedom missed in theology, and demanded\nin its behalf, is none other than the liberal freedom of science, the\nnature of which we have had sufficiently long under the searchlight, so\nthat there remains nothing to be added. We have proved sufficiently that\nthis freedom is not a freedom from unnatural fetters, but a dissolute\nsubjectivism, that claims the right not to be bound to any unchangeable,\nreligious truths. We admit that the Catholic theology does not possess\n_THIS_ freedom. Convinced of the truth of the doctrines established by\ndivine testimony, and by the infallible voice of the Church, theology sees\nnot freedom but a sin against truth in the license to assert the contrary\nof what it has recognized as the truth.\n\nThere is but one freedom which science may claim: it is freedom from\nhindrance in reaching the truth in its legitimate domain. If this truth is\ntransmitted to science infallibly, by the highest instance of wisdom\u2014and\nof this every theologian is convinced\u2014how can science be said to be\nhindered thereby in attaining the truth? Restrained it is, but only by\ntruth: truth, however, can only be a barrier to license, but not to\nprecious freedom. This restraint theology shares with the rest of the\nsciences. The physicist is tied to the facts brought forth by the\nexperiments of his laboratory; the astronomer is tied to the results\nreported to him by the instruments of his observatory, the historian is\ntied to the events disclosed by his sources. Moreover, all sciences are\ntied to their methods. In this way, and in no other way, the theologian,\ntoo, is tied to the facts given him by Revelation, and to his method.\nEvery science has its own method. The astronomer gains his facts by\nobservation and calculation, the mathematician arrives at his facts by\ncalculation and study; the historian, by human testimony; the theologian,\nhowever, by divine testimony, at least as to fundamental truths. That they\nare transmitted to him not by his personal study, but by external\ntestimony, does not matter; the historian too draws from such sources. Nor\ncan theological knowledge be less certain because vouched for by divine\nauthority: it makes it the more certain. Or is there no divine authority,\nand can there be none? This is exactly the silent presumption, which is\nthe basis of the charge against theology. But where is the proof for it?\nIt can only be demonstrated by denying the existence of a supermundane\nGod; for, if there is an Almighty God, there can be no doubt that He can\ngive a Revelation and demand belief.\n\nPerhaps it may be said further, the theologian is not permitted to doubt\nhis doctrines, hence he is prohibited from examining them; he surely\ncannot be _unprepossessed_.\n\nWe can refer to what we have previously said. Unprepossession demands but\none thing, namely, not to assume something as true and certain that is\nfalse or unproved; it demands strong proofs for anything that needs proof.\nWe may safely assert that there is no other science more exacting in this\nrespect than Catholic theology, both of the present and of the past. It\nhas not a single position that is not incessantly tested by attacks as to\nits tenability. Any one not unacquainted with theology, who knows the\nworks of _St. Thomas_ and of the later theologians, with their exact\nmethods of thinking, who observes the conscientious work in Catholic\nbiblical-exegetic, historical-critical field, must be convinced of the\nserious atmosphere of truth prevailing here. Unprepossession does not\ndemand to doubt, time and again, that which has been positively proved, to\nrediscover it by new research. Positive facts are no longer a subject for\nresearch; in their case research has fully achieved its end. Methodical\ndoubt, proper in scientific examination, is proper also in regard to\nreligious truths.\n\nFurthermore, the latitude of the theologian is much larger than presumed\nby those who derive their information solely from modern assertions about\ndogmatic bondage. One may safely assert that the freedom of movement of\nthe mathematician is more limited by his principles, his train of thought\nmore sharply prescribed, than is the case with the theologian. Of course\nthe theologian is bound by everything he finds infallibly established\ndirectly by revelation and by the authority of the Church; or indirectly\nby the concurring teaching of the Fathers or the theologians; he is bound\nalso by non-infallible decisions, especially those of congregations,\nthough not absolutely and not irrevocably.\n\nBut this is only the smaller part of his province. In many departments,\nlike the one of ecclesiastical history, there are almost no restrictions\nto his research, except those imposed by historical facts. Canon law and\nsimilar departments dealing with the laws of the Church, coincide in\nmethod and liberty of research with the profane science of law. Of all\ndepartments of theology, the dogmatical is the one most affected by the\nauthority of faith. Yet even here a great deal is left to unhampered work.\nMany a void has to be filled, many a question solved, which the theology\nof the past has never taken up; even the defined truths still offer a\nlarge scope for personal work, in regard to demonstration, or to the\nphilosophic-speculative penetration of the dogmas and their\ninterpretation.\n\nAs a fact, the reader of theological literature, both old and new, will,\nin a multitude of cases, meet with unrestrained individuality.\n\n\n\nEcclesiastical Supervision of Teaching.\n\n\nThe _Encyclica_ against Modernism (September 8, 1907) gave rise to fears\nthat any free movement would henceforth be impossible for Catholic\ntheology. These fears referred chiefly to the disciplinary measures,\nprescribed by the Encyclical for the purpose of supervising theological\nteaching in each diocese. Then came the papal Motu Proprio, of September\n1, 1910, which, among other things, required the teacher of theology to\nconfirm by oath his confession of the Creed and his intention to repudiate\nmodernistic errors. Since then many a complaint has been heard about\nespionage and coercion. Similar complaint, about an imminent debasement of\nthe Church, has been raised whenever important measures in the discipline\nof the Catholic Church were published, and they emanated primarily from\nthe camp of the enemy.\n\nIt is not to be denied, however, that such an energetic call for\nwatchfulness and action, issued from the highest ecclesiastical\nwatchtower, like the one referred to, may lead in some cases to anxiety\nand false suspicions. This is no doubt regrettable; but it is an incident\ncommon to human legislation and will surprise no one who has any\nexperience of life. A glance at these decrees will show that they are\nnothing more than an urgent injunction, and the exercise of that\nsupervision of religious life and teaching which pertains to the authority\nof the Catholic Church, and which has been practised by her at all times.\nThe language is urgent, it has a severity which is softened in the\nexecution. Its explanation lies in the eminent danger of the modernistic\nmovement to the continuance of Catholic life. Modernism, as described and\ncondemned by the Encyclica, is nothing less than the absolute destruction\nof the Catholic faith, and of Christianity.\n\nThe Protestant theologian, Prof. _Tr\u00f6ltsch_, wrote after the publication\nof the Encyclica: \u201cAs viewed from the position of curialism and of the\nstrict Catholic dogma, there existed a real danger. Catholicism had gotten\ninto a state of inner fermentation, corresponding to the same condition\ncaused by modern theology within the Protestant churches.\u201d\n\nThe danger of Modernism is often enhanced by a deceptive semblance of the\nright faith, and by the pretence to urge only the righteous interests of\nmodern progress against obsolete forms of thought and life, now and then\nalso by its secret propaganda. Hence this intervention by a firm hand, and\nthis only after having waited a long time. They were measures of\nprevention, like those taken to stave off a serious danger; the tidal wave\nreceding, their urgency disappears automatically.\n\n\n    The German bishops stated in their pastoral letter of December 10,\n    1907, that in some Catholic lay-circles there was uneasiness about\n    the Encyclical, fearing that it might endanger scientific\n    endeavour and independence in thought and research, and that the\n    Church intended to prohibit or render impossible co-operation in\n    solving the problems of civilization. \u201cMay they all recognize,\u201d\n    they said, \u201chow groundless such fears are! The Church desires to\n    set bars only to one kind of freedom\u2014the freedom to err.\u201d If the\n    rules and precepts of the Church do sound harsh sometimes, it is\n    because the Church adheres unconditionally to the principle: The\n    truth above all. \u201cThe Church has at no time opposed the true\n    progress of civilization, but only that which hinders its\n    progress: heedlessness, haste, the mania for innovation, the\n    morbid aversion against the truth that comes from God. But we\n    Catholic Christians can join free and unhampered, with all our\n    strength and talent, in the peaceful strife of noble, intellectual\n    work and genuine mental education.\u201d\n\n    The fears of too great a pressure by the ecclesiastical\n    authorities have been given trenchant expression in most recent\n    times by a man who, while standing outside of the Catholic Church,\n    has always shown himself well disposed towards it, namely, the\n    noted pedagogue, _Fr. W. F\u00f6rster_ of Zurich. _F\u00f6rster_ has won\n    merit and distinction by his manly and spirited defence of the\n    Christian view in pedagogical science and mental culture. In the\n    book referred to he again describes urgently the worthlessness and\n    fatality of modern individualism, that knows a good deal about\n    freedom but nothing of self-discipline, nor of authority or\n    tradition, and which represents most superficial amateurism in the\n    domain of religion and morals. Then he turns to criticize Church\n    practice; and his criticism becomes a sharp accusation. His main\n    charge is \u201cfatal restraint of the spirit of universality.\u201d \u201cSome\n    groups in the Church,\u201d he asserts, \u201cof mediocre learning, have\n    established a clique rule, under which the others, the more\n    creative and intensive souls, become the victims of intolerance,\n    espionage, and false suspicion\u201d; \u201cuniversality, which unites the\n    different mental tendencies, has given way to separation\u201d;\n    \u201ceverywhere a one-sided denunciatory information of the leading\n    circles by accidentally ruling groups and factions; anxious\n    intolerance for everything unusual, disciplinary austerity and\n    unintelligent pedantry, individualistic and unchristian spirit of\n    distrust and mutual espionage\u201d; \u201clevelling of the mental life\u201d;\n    \u201cone is tired,\u201d we are told, \u201cof the spirit of incessant\n    disciplining\u201d; \u201cof the invariable cold and disdainful forbidding\n    and repression.\u201d In the Middle Ages and earlier times it was\n    different; then \u201cuniversality was the ruling spirit, the working\n    of the many into a unit full of life; this policy was changed for\n    no other reason than because of the struggle of the Church against\n    Protestantism.\u201d \u201cThe greatest harm that Catholicism suffered by\n    the great rupture of the sixteenth century is most likely seen in\n    the tendency of the Church to view thenceforth religious freedom\n    within Catholic Christianity with an anxious, even hostile eye.\u201d\n\n    Readers of the literature of the day will recognize here views\n    often met with during the last years, and the same excited note,\n    which is quite in contrast to the even temper that ordinarily\n    characterizes _F\u00f6rster\u2019s_ books. But what the reader will not find\n    stated are the proofs for these enormous accusations.\n\n    Undeniably, things have happened in the wide range of\n    ecclesiastical authority that cannot be approved. But where are\n    the facts that would justify charges of such sweeping nature? A\n    Protestant author can hardly be presumed to possess such a direct\n    and positive insight into the ecclesiastical practice of the\n    higher and the highest order, to give convincing strength to his\n    bare assertion. Or is the number of dissatisfied voices that make\n    these charges sufficient proof in itself? If the ecclesiastical\n    authority be allowed, now and then, to emerge from its passiveness\n    to take measures against dangerous doctrinal tendencies, is it not\n    to be expected, as a matter of course, that some minds become\n    disgruntled and complain about oppression and clique rule? Or must\n    that right be denied the Church altogether? _F\u00f6rster_ says\n    himself: \u201cThe spirit of dignity and responsibility has never ruled\n    all parts of the hierarchy in the same measure as now, and rarely\n    if ever were there found in its leading circles so many men\n    leading an almost holy life as at present.\u201d And yet we are asked\n    to believe that it was reserved exactly for this worthy hierarchy,\n    and for these saintly men, to forget the traditions of the Church\n    in the most irresponsible manner. One will have to say: \u201cIf\n    _F\u00f6rster_ would examine without bias the situation and apply\n    consistently in respect to authority the principles that he\n    himself defends, he would be convinced that the Church could not\n    have acted any differently than it did in regard to the\n    regrettable events of the last years, and that it has ever been\n    the aim of the Church, before the sixteenth century as after, to\n    guard carefully the purity of traditions of faith against any\n    attack\u201d (Prof. _G. Reinhold_ in a review of _F\u00f6rster\u2019s_ book).\n\n    The Church has never known a universality that did not oppose\n    doctrinal errors. The Middle Ages did not know it; one need only\n    read the many condemnations from Nicholas I. to Innocent VIII.;\n    nor was such a universality known to the great Councils of ancient\n    Christianity up to the Nic\u00e6an, which hurled its anathema against\n    numerous teachings that opposed no dogmas defined at that time;\n    nor did the Holy Fathers know such a universality, nor the\n    Apostles, with their strict admonitions of unity of faith. The\n    reply is made, the \u201cChurch must not yield the least of its\n    fundamental truths,\u201d that \u201cits centralizing power ought to remain\n    within the region of the most essential\u201d; whereas she actually\n    exercises it in the domain of the incidental. The ecclesiastical\n    supervision of teaching has never limited itself to the most\n    essential, nor would this practice ever accomplish the object to\n    preserve pure the doctrine of faith. Furthermore, what is the\n    \u201cmost essential\u201d what is the \u201cincidental\u201d? _F\u00f6rster\u2019s_ book does\n    not inform us about this most important question. The views\n    against which the Church has made front in the last years, do they\n    relate only to the incidental? Does this apply to the doctrines of\n    a _Rosmini_ and _Lamennais_, who are referred to in passing? No\n    well-informed theologian will assert this.\n\n    We shall hardly be wrong in assuming that the charge of\n    overstraining the ecclesiastical authority is based upon a\n    presumption of a philosophical nature, which is in evidence in\n    several other passages of the book\u2014on the view, namely, that in\n    religion the intellectual moment should recede before the\n    mystical, before anticipation and inner experience. Hence the\n    severe censure of \u201cthe narrow autocracy of the intellectual\n    interpretation\u201d against the \u201cpreponderance of the intellectual\n    contemplation\u201d in the Church, which is said to have become so\n    prevalent as to exert unavoidably a paralyzing effect upon the\n    entire religious life. Here we have the result of the notion that\n    theory of life, religion, and faith, depend but little on rational\n    knowledge. This notion is also in accord with the argument about\n    the impossibility of an independent scientific ethics. We have\n    discussed this elsewhere. We demonstrated that religion and faith\n    relate to positive truths that can be realized, and that can\n    therefore be accurately defined; they must be so defined. Of\n    course this realization need not be a scientific one, it can be of\n    the natural kind that is not clearly conscious of its reasons.\n    _F\u00f6rster_, too, touches upon this important distinction when\n    quoting _Saitschick_: \u201cThe inner perception overtowers feeling and\n    logical reason\u2014here, too, lies the source of a light shining\n    brighter, stronger, and incomparably more true than any light of\n    reason\u201d; and again, when his advice is, to foster to a greater\n    extent the \u201cinner perception.\u201d What is felt here vaguely has long\n    since been expressed much more lucidly in Christian philosophy.\n\n    Certainly a view that fails to lay, first of all, absolute stress\n    on the protection of the _doctrine_ of faith cannot understand the\n    Catholic point of view; it will assume only too easily that the\n    supervision relates to incidentals. It will also engender a\n    criticism against which the Church may rightly protest, because it\n    starts from presumptions that do not apply to the Church.\n\n    No one will be astonished to find a Protestant author lacking the\n    clarified conception of the supernatural character of the Church\n    that is possessed by the Catholic; to see him view the Church\n    almost invariably in the light of a human organization, similar to\n    the Protestant denominations which he may cite before the court of\n    his individual reason and force to bow under the yoke of his\n    criticism. The Catholic has a better understanding of the words:\n    \u201cI am with you all days, even unto the consummation of the world.\u201d\n    There will be foreign to his mind the idea that the Church has\n    since the days of Reformation, for now nearly four centuries,\n    deviated from the right way, and degenerated more and more to a\n    separatistic and insignificant community; a church able to forget\n    its traditions to the extent of grossly misconceiving its proper\n    sphere of authority, and fettering itself in a narrow spirit to\n    incidentals, could not keep his confidence any longer.\n\n\n\nThe Oath Against Modernism.\n\n\nThe _Motu Proprio_ of September 1, 1910, decreed that teachers of\ntheology, and also Catholic priests generally, had to bind themselves by\noath to reject modernistic heresies, and to accept obediently the\necclesiastical precepts. Dispensed from this pledge were only the\nprofessors of theology at state institutions, to spare them difficulties\nwith state authorities.\n\nThis anti-modernist oath at once became the signal for a storm of\nindignation, than which there has been hardly a greater one since the days\nof the Vatican Council. A cry was raised for freedom of science, for the\nexclusion of theological faculties, even for another \u201cKulturkampf.\u201d The\nGeneral Convention of German college professors, held at Leipzig January\n7, 1911, issued a declaration to the effect that \u201cAll those who have taken\nthe anti-modernist oath have thereby expressed their renunciation of an\nindependent recognition of truth and of the exercise of their scientific\nconviction, hence they have forfeited all claim to be considered\nindependent scientists.\u201d Interpellations were made in legislative bodies,\nit was demanded that the option of taking the oath should be taken away\nfrom university professors, because \u201cthe dignity of the universities would\nbe lowered if their members had the opportunity to bind themselves by such\nan oath.\u201d\n\nEven threats were made by statesmen, hinting at reprisals by the state,\nbecause its interests were being jeopardized, while, on the other hand,\nthere were those who declared: \u201cIf the Catholic Church thinks it necessary\nfor her ecclesiastical and religious interests to put her servants under\noath, it is her own business; neither the state nor the Evangelical Church\nhave a right to interfere\u201d (Prime Minister _Bethmann-Hollweg_, in the\nPrussian Diet, on March 7, 1911).\n\nThe agitation of the minds will soon subside, as on former occasions of\nthis kind; and, with calm restored, people will find, as _J. G. Fichte_\ntold the impulsive _F. Nicolai_, one hundred and thirty years ago, that\nthe fact has only just been discovered that the Catholics are Catholic.\n\nYes, indeed, the Catholics are Catholic, and desire to remain\nCatholic\u2014this and nothing else is the gist of the anti-modernist oath. It\ndoes not oblige to anything else but what was believed and adhered to\nbefore. It obliges to accept the doctrines of faith; but they are the old\ntruths of the Catholic Church, propounded and believed at all times, and\nthe necessary inferences from them. Even the proposition that truths of\nfaith can never be contradicted by the results of historical research, or\nby human science in general, is as old as faith itself. In addition, the\noath avows obedient submission to Church precepts; but this has been\ndemanded for centuries by the _professio fidei Tridentina_, a pledge by\noath to which every professor of theology has been before obliged:\n_Apostolicas et ecclesiasticas traditiones reliquasque eiusdem Ecclesiae\nobservationes et constitutiones firmissime admitto et amplector_. This was\nthe opinion of all competent judges on this theological question. \u201cWe are\nconvinced,\u201d declared correctly a prominent theological institution, \u201cthat\nthere is not assumed by this oath any obligation new in subject, and no\nobligation not already existing. The oath is but the affirmation of a duty\nalready imposed by conscience\u201d (the professors of Theology of Paderborn,\nDecember 12, 1910). The Breslau faculty said, in the same sense: \u201cThe\nfaculty does not see in the so-called anti-modernist oath any new\nobligation, nor one exceeding the rule of faith ever adhered to by the\nfaculty.\u201d And this declaration was fully approved of by Rome.\n\n\n    Cardinal _Kopp_, at the session of the German Upper House on April\n    7, 1911, commented on these statements as follows: \u201cAgainst the\n    opinions of these circles (having a different opinion of the oath)\n    I set the testimony and the statement of the most competent\n    people, to wit, the professors of university faculties and also\n    those at episcopal seminaries. Those who have taken the oath, as\n    well as those who have refrained from it by the privilege granted\n    them by the Holy See, they both declare positively that the oath\n    does not contain any new obligations, nor does it impose new\n    duties on them; hence that, on the contrary, they are not impeded\n    in the pursuit of their tasks as teachers and of their scientific\n    work of research. Now, gentlemen, I do not think it would be\n    proper to insinuate that these earnest men, appointed by the\n    Government, or at least in office by its consent, would make this\n    declaration against their conviction and not in full sincerity.\u201d\n\n\nNo wonder, therefore, that of the hundreds of thousands of Catholic\npriests hardly a handful have refused the oath.\n\n\n    Nor is there anything new in the obligation to swear and subscribe\n    in writing to a confession of creed. Very often in the course of\n    the centuries decrees of creed and symbols had to be subscribed to\n    in writing. In the days of Jansenism, when priests were required\n    to swear to and sign a statement, many Jansenists tried to dodge\n    this oath, and the Jansenist _Racine_ complained that this demand\n    was unheard-of in the Church. Thereupon the learned theologian\n    _Tournely_ and others cited a number of examples of this kind from\n    the history of the Church.\n\n\nTherefore the anti-modernist oath has not created anything new.\nConsequently it has not changed anything in regard to the freedom of\ntheological research. It is the same as before; nor has the oath changed\nanything in the quality of theological professors, they merely promise to\nbe what they must be anyway; nor can, for instance, the oath induce the\nCatholic priest, in teaching profane history, to present the history of\nthe Reformation in a different light than before, and thus render him\nunfit to teach history; the oath has created no new, confessional\ndifferences, hence has given no justified cause for excitement\u2014provided\none has the needed theological comprehension of the oath. If one has not\nthis insight, and will not trust to information from a competent source,\nthen it will be the act of prudence to leave the test to the future; and\nwe can await this test serenely.\n\n\n    We referred above to the declaration of German college teachers,\n    to the effect that all who have taken the oath have thereby\n    expressed their renunciation of independent cognition of truth.\n    These stereotyped ideas we have so often heard, with the same\n    haziness and inconsistency. \u201cBecause they have thereby expressed\n    the renunciation of independent cognition of the truth,\u201d namely,\n    by the acceptance of certain doctrines. But is not every one who\n    clings to his Christian belief bound by this very fact to certain\n    doctrines? Does every one who still prays his Credo express the\n    renunciation of his independence? If the argument quoted is to\n    mean anything at all, it means the full rejection of all Christian\n    duty to believe; indeed, this is the real sense of this\n    \u201cindependent recognition of truth,\u201d as we have already seen. But\n    cannot some one, because of his conviction, renounce this\n    independence and believe, and in this conviction accept the\n    doctrines of the Church? If this conviction is his, and he affirms\n    it by oath, how can any one see in this oath a want of freedom,\n    nay, a renunciation of truth? If an atheist solemnly declared his\n    intention to be and to remain an atheist, he would hardly be\n    accused of lack of character by the advocates of modern freedom of\n    thought. The judge, the military officer, the member of a\n    legislature, the professor, who must all take the oath of\n    allegiance,\u2014all of these will have to be protected against the\n    insinuation of disloyalty to truth. If a man affirms by oath his\n    unalterable Catholic faith, he is without any hesitation accused\n    of untruthfulness. The government has been urged to forbid this\n    spontaneous exercise of Catholic sentiment. The inconsistency of\n    modern catch-phrases can hardly be given more drastic expression.\n    In order to guard the freedom of thought the government is to\n    forbid one from pledging himself to his own principles; in order\n    to remain an independent thinker a man must be forced by penal\n    statute to confess unconditionally the brand of free science\n    prescribed by a certain school and by no means have an opinion of\n    his own; in order to be free in his research the teacher in\n    theology must be tied to the catch-phrases of liberal philosophy.\n    This is modern freedom, a hybrid of freedom and bondage, of\n    sophistry and contradiction, of arrogance and barrenness of\n    thought, which will exert its rule over the minds as long as they\n    are guided by half-thinking.\n\n\n\nBonds of Love, not of Servitude.\n\n\nPeople to whose mind Catholic thinking is foreign will never be able to\nappreciate the energetic activity of the Church authority.\n\nOn close examination, however, they will not deny that, _if_ the Christian\ntreasure of faith is to be preserved undiminished, _if_ in the hopeless\nconfusion and the unsteady vacillation of opinions in our days there is to\nbe left anywhere a safe place for truth and unity of faith, this cannot be\naccomplished otherwise than in the shape of a strong authority that has\nthe assurance of the aid of God.\n\n\n    The Catholic theologian may be permitted to point in exemplifying\n    this fact to the recent history of Protestantism and of its\n    theology. Protestantism does not acknowledge a teaching authority:\n    its theology demands complete freedom of research and teaching,\n    making the most extensive use of both. The result is the\n    demoralization of the Christian faith, which is speeding with\n    frightfully accelerated steps to total annihilation. The very\n    danger which Modernism threatened to carry into the Catholic\n    Church has overwhelmed Protestant theology: the metaphysical ideas\n    of a modern philosophy penetrated it without check, and killed its\n    Christian substance. The measures against Modernism were sharply\n    criticized by many Protestants who, at the same time, laid stress\n    upon the fact that nothing of the sort could happen among\n    themselves. Indeed it could not, at least not consistently with\n    Protestant principle. But there is not a single fact in all\n    history which demonstrates more clearly the necessity of the\n    Catholic authority of faith, than just the condition of\n    Protestantism at the present time. On the part of believing\n    Protestants this is admitted, if not expressly, then at least in\n    practice. To stem the destructive work of liberal theology they\n    resort to authority; invoke Evangelical formulas of confession,\n    the traditional doctrine, sometimes even the aid of the state;\n    neological preachers are disciplined by censures, even by\n    dismissal, against the loud protest of the liberals. Such action\n    is easily understandable; one cannot hear without sadness the cry\n    for help of pious Protestantism, a cry that grows more desperate\n    every day; one cannot help regretting its forlorn situation in\n    view of the millions of souls whose salvation is jeopardized, who\n    are in danger of being despoiled of the last remains of their\n    Christian faith. Yet it must be admitted that this cry for\n    authority and obedience signifies the abandoning of the Protestant\n    principle, and the involuntary imitation and therefore\n    acknowledgment of the Catholic principle\u2014for the Catholic an\n    incentive to cleave the more closely to his Church.\n\n\nMany to whom the Catholic way of thinking is foreign, look upon the duty\nof obedience which ties the Catholic to his Church as a sort of servitude;\nto the Catholic it is the tie of love, uniting free people to a sacred\nauthority. Many look upon the Church of Rome as a tyrannical curia, where\nUmbrian prelates are cracking their whips over millions of servile and\nignorant souls; to the Catholic the Church is the divinely appointed\ninstitution of truth, that possesses his fullest confidence. He knows that\nhistory has given the most magnificent justification to the Catholic\nprinciple of authority. Opinions have come and gone, systems were born and\nhave died, thrones of learning rose and fell; only one towering mental\nstructure remained standing upon the rock of God-founded authority in the\nvast field of ruins with its wrecks of human wisdom. And its ancient\nCredo, prayed by all nations, is the same Credo once prayed by the\nmartyrs.\n\n\n\n\nChapter II. Theology And University.\n\n\n\u201cHe is not for our turn, and he is contrary to our doings\u201d; thus spoke in\nbygone ages the children of this world. \u201cLet us therefore lie in wait for\nthe just.... He boasteth that he hath the knowledge of God and calleth\nhimself the Son of God\u201d (Wisdom ii, 12 _seq._). Centuries later the\nchildren of the world treated in the same manner God\u2019s Son and His\ndoctrine. And in these days, when the science of the faith is to be driven\nfrom the rooms of the school, let us recall that in olden times the\nchildren of the world planned similarly.\n\nIn the days when the private and public life of Europe\u2019s nations was\npermeated with the Christian faith, and their ideas were still centred in\nGod and eternity, then the science of the faith was held to be the highest\namong the sciences, not only by rank but in fact.\n\nAnd when, in the budding desire for knowledge, they erected universities,\nthe first and largest of them, Paris University, was to be the pre-eminent\nhome of theology, and wherever theology joined with the other sciences it\nreceived first honours. Thus it was in the days of yore, and for a long\ntime. The secular tendency of modern thought led to the gradual\nemancipation of science from religion; unavoidably, its aversion for a\nsupernatural view of the world soon turned against, and demanded the\nremoval of, the science representing that view. Reasons for the demand\nwere soon found. Thus the removal of theology from the university has\nbecome part and parcel of the system of ideas of the unbelieving modern\nman; the liberal press exploits the idea whenever occasion offers.\nResolutions to this effect are introduced in parliaments and diets,\nmeetings of young students are echoing the ideas heard elsewhere. No\nwonder that the Portuguese revolution of 1910 had nothing more urgent to\ndo than to close the theological faculty at Portugal\u2019s only university.\n\nWhat are the _reasons_ advanced? Many are advanced; the main reason is\nusually disguised; we shall treat of it when concluding. In the first\nplace we are again met by the old tune of free science, which has been in\nour ears so long; the rooms of the colleges, it is said, are destined for\na research which seeks truth with an undimmed eye, and not for blindfolded\nscience confined to a prescribed path.\n\nNo need to waste words on this. Just one more reference may be permitted\nus, namely, to the study of law. There is hardly another science with less\nlatitude than the science of law. Its task is not to doubt the\njustification of state laws, but to look upon constitutions and statutes\nas established, to explain them, and by doing so to train efficient\nofficials and administrators of the law. When explaining the civil code\nthe teacher of law has small opportunity for pursuing \u201cfree search after\ntruth\u201d; neither will his pupil be tested at examinations in the maxims of\na free research that accepts no tradition; he will have to prove his\nknowledge of the matter that had been given to him. Yet no one has ever\nobjected to the teaching of jurisprudence at the university. Therefore the\nobjection cannot be valid that theology is restricted to the established\ndoctrines of its religion and has to transmit them without change to its\nfuture servants. It should be borne in mind that our universities are not\nintended for research only, but also, and chiefly, for training candidates\nfor the professions.\n\n\n    This disposes at the same time of the objection that theology has\n    to serve ecclesiastical purposes outside of and foreign to\n    science. Religious science, like any other science, serves the\n    desire that strives for truth. True, it serves also for the\n    practical training of the clergyman for his vocation. But shall we\n    eliminate from science the interests of practical life? Then\n    medicine and legal science would also have to be excluded, and for\n    these there would be planted only sterile theories, and the\n    universities transformed into a place of abstract intellectualism.\n\n    Again it is argued that religion and faith are not really\n    cognition and knowledge, but only the products of sentiment, and\n    hence theology has no claim to a place among the sciences; that\n    religion can only be a subject for psychology which lays bare its\n    roots in the human heart, and a subject for the history of\n    religion, to trace its historical forms and to study its laws of\n    evolution\u2014sciences which belong to the philosophical faculty.\n\n    Thus we come back to the principles of an erroneous theory of\n    knowledge. No need to demonstrate again that the Christian belief\n    is built upon the clear perception of reason, and that it is not a\n    sentimental but a rational function.\n\n\nBut has not the Church her theological seminaries? Let theology seek\nrefuge there! We answer the Church herself desires this; she does not like\ntheological faculties, they are in her eyes a danger to the faith.\n\nNow, _if_ the Church would be deprived of her authoritative influence upon\nthe appointment of professors at theological faculties and upon the\nsubject of their teachings, consequently, _if_ there would be jeopardized\nthe purity of belief of the candidates for priesthood, and through them of\nthe people, then, we admit, the Church would rather forego theological\nfaculties at state-universities. This could not be done without\nconsiderable injury to the public prestige of the Church, to her contact\nwith worldly sciences and their representatives and disciples, even to the\nscientific study of theology. In the latter particularly by the loss of\nthe greater resources of the state, and by the absence of inducement to\nscientific aim, which is more urgent for theologians than for others at\ncollege. Neither would the state escape injury, because of the open slight\nand harm to religion, and of lessening its contact with the most\ninfluential body in Christian countries. But if the Church is assured of\nher proper influence on the faculties, she has no reason for an unfriendly\nattitude toward them. The object the Church seeks to achieve in her\nseminaries is the clerical education of her candidates, their ascetic\ntraining, the introduction into a life of recollection and prayer, into an\norder of life befitting priests; this cannot be sufficiently done in the\nfree life at the university.\n\nThis is not a bar to scientific instruction by the theological faculty.\nSeminary and faculty supplement one another. We see very frequently, at\nRome and outside of Rome, the theological school separated from the\nseminary with the approval of the Church. But all these objections do not\ngive the real reason, the roots lie deeper.\n\nWhen the Divine Founder of our Religion stood before the tribunal of Judea\nHe said: \u201cMy kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this\nworld, servants would strive for me.\u201d This was the whole explanation of\nwhy He stood there accused. The guardian of the doctrine of her Master may\nuse these words to explain the fact that, in the eyes of many, she stands\nto-day accused and defamed. The mind of modern man has forsaken the world\nof the Divine and Eternal; no longer is he a servant of this kingdom. His\nideals are not God and Heaven, but he himself and this world; not the\nservice of God, but human rights and human dignity. This view of the\nworld, which cannot grasp the wisdom of Jesus Christ, and which takes\noffence at the Cross, also takes offence at a science that confesses as\nthe loftiest ideal _Jesum Christum, et hunc crucifixum_.\n\nThe real kernel of the question is: Does the Christian religion in its\nentirety still serve the purpose of to-day\u2014or does it not? is it to remain\nwith us, the religion wherein our fathers found the gratification of their\nhighest mental aims, the religion that gave Europe its civilization and\nculture, that created its superior mental life, and still rules it to this\nhour? Or shall religion be expelled by a return to a heathendom which\nChristianity had overthrown? \u201cWe do not want Him to rule over us\u201d\u2014there is\nthe real reason for the modern antipathy to Catholic theology. Else,\nwhence the excited demand for its removal? Because it is superfluous? Even\nif this were the fact, there is many a category of officials, the little\nneed of which can be demonstrated without difficulty, yet no one grows\nexcited about it; many expenditures by the state are rather superfluous,\nyet there is no indignation. No, the matter at issue is not so much the\nscientific character of theology, nor misgivings about its progress or its\nfreedom; the real question is this:\n\n\n\nDo we Desire to Remain Christians?\n\n\nFor _if_ we still recognize the Christian religion as the standard for our\nthought, _if_ we are persuaded that it must remain the foundation of our\nlife, then there can be no doubt that its facts, its truths, and standards\nof life require scientific presentation; then it cannot be disputed that\nthis science is entitled to a place alongside of the science of law, of\nchemistry, or Indology. Indeed, then it must assume the first place in the\nsystem of sciences.\n\n\n    Surely a science ranks the higher, the higher its object and its\n    sources, the surer its results, and the greater its significance\n    for the most exalted aim of mankind. The subject of theology is\n    God and His works, the ultimate causes of all things in God\u2019s\n    eternal plan of the universe, the \u201cwisdom of God in a mystery, a\n    wisdom which is hidden, which God ordained before the world, unto\n    our glory\u201d (1 Cor. ii. 7). Therefore it is wisdom; for \u201cthe\n    science of things divine is science proper\u201d (Augustinus, De\n    Trinit. xii, 14). A science, having as its subject Greek\n    architecture, geography, or physical law, may claim respect, yet\n    it must step back before a science of Religion, that rises to the\n    highest sphere of truth by a power of flight that participates in\n    the omniscience of the Holy Ghost; for such is the faith. For this\n    reason its results, in so far as they rest on faith, are more\n    certain than the results of all other sciences.\n\n    Finally, the aims of life which theology serves are not physical\n    health or advantages in the external life, but the knowledge of\n    God, the spread of His kingdom on earth, and the eternal goal of\n    all human life.\n\n\nSo long as the Christian religion is the valued possession of the people\nof a country, and the roots of their lives rest more in Christianity than\nin mathematics, astrophysics, or Egyptology, so long is the science of\nreligion entitled to a seat at the hearth of the sciences; and the people,\nthen, have the right to demand that the servants of religion get their\neducation at the place where the other leading professions get their\ntraining. If the state considers it its duty to train teachers of history\nand physics for the benefit of its citizen, then it is still more its duty\nto help in the education of the servants of religion, who are called upon\nto care for more important interests of the people and state than all the\nrest of the professions. Let us consider the task of universities. As\nestablished in the countries of central Europe, they are destined to\nfoster science in the widest sense, and to educate the leading\nprofessions: to be the hearth for the sum total of mental endeavour, this\nis their vocation; hence all things that contain truth and have\neducational value should join hands here. To eliminate the science of the\nhighest sphere of knowledge would be tantamount to a mutilation of the\nuniversity. Here all boughs and branches of human knowledge should be\nunited into a large organism, of unity and community of work, of giving\nand taking Theology needs for auxiliaries other sciences, such as profane\nhistory and philology, Assyriology and Egyptology, psychology and\nmedicine. In turn it offers indispensable aid to history and other\nbranches of science, it guards the ethical and ideal principles of every\nscience, and crowns them by tendering to them the most exalted thoughts.\nHere is the place of education for the judge and official, for the\nphysician and teacher; hence it should be the place also for the education\nof the servant of the chief spiritual power, religion.\n\n\n    The university should unite all active mental powers that lift man\n    above the commonplace. But is there any stronger mental power than\n    religion?\n\n    It is the oldest and mightiest factor in mental life; it is as\n    natural to man as the flower is to the field; his mind gravitates\n    to a religious resting place, whence he may view time and\n    eternity, where he may rest. Therefore religion demands a science\n    that inquires into its substance, its justification, its effect on\n    thought and life. Man strives to give to himself an account of\n    everything, but most of all of what is foremost in his mind. A\n    system of sciences without theology would be like an uncompleted\n    tower, like a body without a head.\n\n    The history of theology dates back to the very beginning of\n    science and culture. If we trace the oldest philosophy we find as\n    its starting point theological research and knowledge. _Orpheus_\n    and _Hesiod_, who sang of the gods, and the sages of the oldest\n    mysteries, were called theologians; _Plutarch_ sees in the\n    theologians of past ages the oldest philosophers, in the\n    philosophers, however, the descendants of the theologians; _Plato_\n    derives philosophy from the teachers of theology. Even more\n    prominently was religious study and knowledge responsible for\n    Hindoo, Chaldean, and Egyptian philosophy.\n\n    Was it reserved for our age to discard all the better traditions\n    of mankind? Shall victory rest with the destructive elements in\n    the mental education of Europe? Against this danger to our ideal\n    goods, theology should stay at the universities, as a bulwark and\n    permanent protest.\n\n\n\nTheological Faculty in State and Church.\n\n\nFor this reason the theological faculty has a birth-right at the\nuniversity, whether state school or free university. Where it is joined to\na state university, theology automatically becomes subordinate to the\nstate, in a limited sense. More essential is its dependency upon the\nChurch, because, being the science of the faith, theology is primarily\nsubject to the authority and supervision of the Church. For the Church,\nand only the Church, is charged by its Divine Founder to teach His\nreligion to all nations. Hence no one can exercise the office of a\nreligious teacher, neither in the public school nor at college, if not\nauthorized to do so by the Church. It is a participation in the ministry\nof the Church; and the latter alone can designate its organs. Whoever has\nnot been given by the Church such license to teach, or he from whom she\ntakes it away, does not possess it; no other power can grant it, not even\nthe state. Nor can the state restore the license of teaching to a\ntheologian from whom the Church has withdrawn it; this would be an act\nbeyond state jurisdiction, hence invalid.\n\nIn granting the license to teach, the Church does so in the self-evident\npresumption that the one so licensed will teach his students the correct\ndoctrine of the Church, as far as it has been established; and he binds\nhimself to do so by voluntarily taking the office, and more explicitly by\nthe profession of the creed. If he should deviate from the creed later on,\nit is the obvious right of the Church to cancel his license. In this the\nChurch only draws the logical conclusion from the office of the teacher\nand from his voluntary obligation. He holds his office as an organ of the\nChurch, destined to lecture on pure doctrine before future priests.\nWhether or not he has honestly searched for the truth when deviating\ntherefrom, this he may settle with his conscience; but he is incapacitated\nto act still further as an organ of the Church, and it is only common\nhonesty to resign his office if he cannot fulfil any longer the\nobligations he assumed. The professor of theology is therefore in the\nfirst place a deputy of his Church. Also he is teacher at a state\ninstitution and as such a state official; he is appointed by the state to\nbe the teacher of students belonging to a certain denomination, he is paid\nby the state, and may be removed by the state from his position as\nofficial teacher. But withal the right must not be denied to the Church to\nwatch over the correctness of the Christian doctrine, and to make\nappointment and continuance in the teaching office dependent upon it.\n\n\n    Indeed, this demand was urged by Prof. _Paulsen_, notwithstanding\n    his entirely different position: he says: \u201cThe\n    Catholic-theological faculties are in a certain sense a concession\n    by the Church to the state; of course they are also a service of\n    the state for the Church, and a valuable one, too; but they rest\n    in the first place upon a concession made by the Church to the\n    state, with a view to the historically established fact, and to\n    peace. Naturally, this concession cannot be unconditional. The\n    condition is: the professors appointed by the state must stand\n    upon ecclesiastical ground, they must acknowledge the doctrine of\n    the Church as the standard of their teaching, and they must\n    receive from the Church the _missio canonica_. The Church cannot\n    accept hostile scientists for teachers. Hence for the appointment\n    an agreement must be reached with ecclesiastical authority. The\n    universities are not merely workshops for research, they are at\n    the same time educational institutions for important public\n    professions; in fact, they were founded for this latter purpose:\n    they are the outcome of the want for scientifically educated\n    clergymen, teachers, physicians, judges, and other professionals.\n    And this purpose necessitates restrictions: the professor of\n    Evangelical theology cannot teach arbitrary opinions any more than\n    his Catholic fellow-professor can; the lawyer is also restricted\n    by presumptions, for instance, that the civil code is not an\n    accumulation of nonsense, but, on the whole, a pretty good order\n    of life. Just as little as we should dispute the lawyer\u2019s standing\n    as a scientist on this account, so little shall we be able to deny\n    this standing to the Catholic theologian who stands with honest\n    conviction on the platform of his Church.\u201d \u201cWe want the Catholic\n    theological faculties to be preserved; of course, under the\n    presumption of freedom of scientific research within the limits\n    drawn by the creed of the Church.\u201d\n\n    In a similar sense the Bavarian minister of education, Dr. _V.\n    Wehner_, said, on Feb. 11, 1908, in the course of a speech in the\n    Bavarian Diet: \u201cThus the Catholic professor of theology is bound\n    to the standards of creed and morals as established by the Church.\n    The decision as to whether a Catholic professor of theology\n    teaches the right doctrine of the Church is not for the state to\n    give, but for the Church alone.\u201d \u201cThe business of the professors\n    at theological faculties is to transmit the teachings of the\n    Church to future candidates for the priesthood, and this is what\n    they are employed for by the state. That the Church does not\n    tolerate a doctrine to differ from her own is to me quite\n    self-evident.\u201d Hence we may conclude, \u201cThe attacks directed here\n    and there in recent times against the continuance of Catholic\n    theological faculties need not worry us in any way. Nor are they\n    likely to meet with response at the places where the decision\n    rests. Times have changed. Even non-Catholic governments are no\n    longer blind to the conviction that an educated clergy must be\n    reckoned among the most eminent factors for conserving the state\u201d\n    (_Freiherr von Hertling_). Even during the heated debates on the\n    anti-modernist oath in the Prussian Diet and upper house, the\n    importance of the theological faculties was acknowledged by the\n    speakers, none of whom demanded the removal of these faculties,\n    though outspoken in their criticism of the oath. Prime minister\n    _Bethmann-Hollweg_ declared on March 7: \u201cCatholic students will\n    get their training at the Catholic faculties the same as hitherto,\n    even after the anti-modernist oath is introduced. The state never\n    will claim for itself the authority to determine in any way which,\n    and in what, forms doctrines of faith shall be taught to Catholic\n    students. This is no affair of the state. If, and this is my wish,\n    the Catholic faculties will retain that value to teachers,\n    students, and the total organism of the universities, which is the\n    natural condition of their existence, then they will continue to\n    exist for the profit of both, the Catholic population and the\n    state. Should they lose this value, however, an event I do not\n    wish to see, then they will die by themselves. But I do not see\n    that it is demanded by the interest of the state to abolish\n    without awaiting further development these faculties with one\n    stroke, thereby harming our Catholic population, whose wants and\n    needs deserve as much consideration as those of any other part of\n    the population.\u201d\n\n    There is no warrant for the view that theology is subject to a\n    foreign power, and therefore it cannot claim a place in a state\n    institution. In its external relations the theological faculty is\n    subject also to the state, serving the public interests so much\n    the better the more continually the priest by his activity\n    influences the life of the people. By the way, why this urgent\n    demand for state control in the pursuit of a science by a party\n    that otherwise is striving zealously to put the university beyond\n    the influence of the state? To be a state institution or not can\n    only be an extrinsic matter to the university itself. Or has the\n    science of medicine not enough intellectual substance and\n    consistency to thrive at a free university? Is science as such a\n    matter of state? Therefore, why find fault with theology because\n    it will not be entirely subordinated to the state? Nor is it\n    proper to call the Church a \u201cforeign\u201d power. It is certainly not a\n    foreign power to theology; neither to the Christian state, that\n    has developed in closest relation to the Church, which owes its\n    civilization and culture to the Church, shares with her its\n    subjects, and is based even to-day upon the doctrines and customs\n    of the Church.\n\n\nAgainst Christ there arose the Jewish scribes and denounced His wisdom as\nerror; the scribes have passed away, we know them no longer. To the\nNeoplatonics Christianity was ignorance, even barbarity; Manicheans and\nGnostics praised as the higher wisdom Oriental and Greek philosophy\nadorned with Christian ideas. They belong to history. When the people of\nIsrael came in touch with the brilliant civilization of Egypt, Assyria,\nand Greece, they often became ashamed of the religion of their\nforefathers, and embraced false gods; to-day we look upon their fancy of\ninferiority as foolishness, and we rank their religion high above the\nreligious notions of the pagan Orient.\n\nThus has truth pursued its way through the centuries of human history,\noften unrecognized by the children of men, scolded for being obsolete,\nnay, more, driven from its home and forced to make room for delusion and\nerror. Delusion fled, and error sank into its grave\u2014but truth remained.\nThus the Church has endured, and thus the Church will live on, with her\ndoctrines and science misunderstood and repulsed by the children of a\nworld unable to grasp them; they will pass away and so will their\nthoughts, yet the Church will remain, and so will her science. \u201cShe was\ngreat and respected\u201d\u2014this is the familiar quotation from a Protestant\nhistorian\u2014\u201cbefore the Saxon had set foot on Britain, before the Frank had\npassed the Rhine, when Grecian eloquence still nourished in Antioch, when\nidols were still worshipped in the temple of Mecca. And she may still\nexist in undiminished vigor when some traveller from New Zealand shall, in\nthe midst of a vast solitude, take his stand on a broken arch of London\nBridge to sketch the ruins of St. Paul\u2019s\u201d (_Lord Macaulay_).\n\nThen, perhaps, another observer, leaning against the pillars of history,\nand looking back upon the culture of this age, will realize that only one\npower of truth may rightly say: \u201cHeaven and earth will pass away, but my\nwords will not pass away\u201d\u2014Christ and His Church.\n\n\n\nLaw and Freedom. An Epilogue.\n\n\nThe great Renovator of mankind, in whom the pious Christian sees his God,\nand in whom the greater part of the modern world, though turned from\nfaith, still sees the ideal of a perfect human being, hence also of true\nfreedom, once spoke the significant words: \u201c_Et veritas liberabit vos_,\nand the truth shall make you free\u201d (John viii. 32). As all the words that\nfell from His lips are the truth for all centuries to come, so are these\nwords pre-eminently true.\n\nThere is in our times a strong tension felt between freedom on the one\nhand, and law and authority on the other; true freedom and true worth it\nsees too exclusively in the independent assertion of the self-will, and in\nthe unrestrained manifestation of one\u2019s strength and energy, while law and\nauthority are looked upon as onerous fetters. Our times do not understand\nthat freedom and human dignity are not opposed to law and obedience, that\nno other freedom can be intended for man than the voluntary compliance\nwith the law and the standards of order.\n\nAll creatures, from the smallest to the largest, are bound by law; none is\ndestined for the eminent isolation of independence. The same law of\ngravitation that causes the stone to fall, also governs the giants of the\nskies, and they obey its rule; the same laws that rule the candle-flame,\nthat are at work in the drop of water, also rule the fires of the sun and\nguide the fates of the ocean. The heart, like all other organs of the\nhuman body, is ruled by laws, and medical science, with its institutes and\nmethods, is kept busy to cure the consequences of the disturbance of these\nlaws. Every being has its laws: it must follow them to attain perfection;\ndeviation leads to degeneration.\n\nThus the decision of the worth and dignity of man does not rest with an\nunrestrained display of strength, but with order; not with unchecked\nactivity, but with control of his acts and with truth. The floods that\nbreak through the dam have force and energy, but being without order they\ncreate destruction; the avalanche crashing down the mountain side has\nforce and power, but, free from the law of order, it carries devastation;\nglowing metal when led into the mould becomes a magnificent bell, while\nflowing lava brings ruin. Only _one_ dignity and freedom can be destined\nfor man, it consists in voluntarily adhering to warranted laws and\nauthorities.\n\nFor him who with conviction and free decision has made the law of thought,\nfaith, and action his own principle, the law has ceased to be a yoke and a\nburden; it has become his own standard of life, which he loves; it has\nbecome the fruit of his conviction, _truth_ has made him free. Ask the\nvirtuoso who obeys the rules of his art whether he considers them fetters;\nindeed he does not, he has made them his principles. Let us ask of the\ncivilized citizen whether he feels the laws of civilization to be a yoke;\nhe does not, he obeys them of his own free will, they are his own order of\nlife. Unfree, slaves and serfs, will be those only who carry with\nresentment the burden of the laws they must obey. Unfree feels the savage\npeople fighting against the laws of civilization; unfree the wicked boy to\nwhom discipline is repugnant. It is not the law that makes man unfree, it\nis his own lawlessness and rebellion.\n\nNor does submission to the God-given law of the Christian belief make man\nlow or unfree; to those to whom their belief is conviction and life, the\nsuggestion that they are oppressed will sound strange. On the contrary,\nthey feel that this belief fits in harmoniously with the nobler impulses\nof their thought and will, like the pearl in the shell, like the gem in\nits setting. Man experiences this when his belief lifts him above the\nlowlands of his sensual life to mental independence, and frees him from\nthe bondage of his own unruly impulses, that so often seek to control him.\n\n\n    Freiheit sei der Zweck des Zwanges\n      Wie man eine Rebe bindet,\n    Dass sie, statt im Staub zu kriechen,\n      Frei sich in die L\u00fcfte windet.\n\n\n(Freedom be the aim of restraint, just as the vine is tied to the trellis\nthat it may freely rise in the air, instead of crawling in the dust.) This\nis the freedom of mind, knowing but one yoke, the truth; the freedom that\ndoes not bow to error, nor to high sounding phrases, nor to public\nopinion, nor to the bondage of political life; neither is true freedom\nshackled by the fetters of one\u2019s own lawless impulses. _Et veritas\nliberabit vos._\n\n\n\n\n\nINDEX.\n\n\nAccusations of the Church, 142 _et seq._\n\nAchievements of liberal research, 291\n\n_Adickes, E._, 92, 264, 269\n\nAgnosticism, 43, 46, 48\n\n_Amira, K. von_, 11, 17, 309, 326\n\n_Amp\u00e8re, A._, 212 _et seq._, 223, 224\n\nAnthropocentric view of the world, 19\n\n_Apponyi, A., Count_, 323\n\n_Arago_, 119\n\n_Aristotle_, 4, 5, 7, 52, 345, 349\n\n_Arnest, Archbishop_, 150\n\nAtheism, 19, 79, 287\n\n_Augustine, St._, 4, 27, 76, 80, 82 _et seq._, 110, 135, 159, 179, 246,\n            260, 273\n\nAuthority of Faith, 81, 112, 125 _et seq._\n\u2014\u2014 private, 82\n\u2014\u2014 Protestant, 397\n\u2014\u2014 rejection of, 33, 40\n\nAutonomism, 25, 29, 33\n\nAutonomy of the College, 360\n\u2014\u2014 of Reason, 36\n\u2014\u2014 of the Teacher, 361\n\nAutotheism, 23\n\n_Bacon, F._, 205, 216\n\n_Baer, M. von_, 221\n\n_Balmes, J._, 320\n\n_Barrande_, 219\n\n_Baumgarten, O._, 246, 254\n\n_Baur, F. Ch._, 258\n\n_Beaumont, L. de_, 218\n\n_Bebel_, 350\n\n_Becker, K._, 146\n\n_Bellarmin, Cardinal_, 185, 192\n\n_Benedict XIV._, 96\n\n_Berkeley_, 35\n\n_Bernouilli_, 205\n\n_Bertholon_, 119\n\n_Bertrin, G._, 247\n\n_Berzelius, J._, 217\n\n_Bessel, F. W._, 209\n\n_Bethmann-Hollweg_, 394, 405\n\nBible, 281, 283\n\nBible-Criticism, modern, 254 _et seq._\n\n_Billroth, Th._, 363\n\n_Biot, J._, 116\n\n_Bischof, K. G._, 219\n\n_Boissarie, Dr._, 247 _et seq._\n\n_Boniface VIII._, 149, 181\n\n_Bornhak, C._, 349, 363\n\n_Boscovich_, 197\n\n_Bourdaloue_, 211\n\n_Bousset, W._, 254, 285\n\n_Boyle, Robert_, 205\n\n_Brahe, Tycho de_, 191, 202\n\n_Branco, W._, 116\n\n_Brass, A._, 333\n\n_Braun, K._, 82, 117, 119, 281\n\n_Brewster, D._, 118\n\n_Broda, R._, 50\n\n_B\u00fcchner_, 115, 364\n\n_Buckland, W._, 219\n\n_Buffon, G. de_, 206\n\n_Cabet, Etienne_, 111\n\n_Cantor, M._, 210\n\n_Caprivi_, 19\n\nCardinals, 98\n\n_Carneri, B._, 251\n\n_Cassirer_, 50\n\nCatholic, not free in research, 108\n\nCatholic Universities, 370\n\n_Cauchy_, 210\n\nCausation, Natural, 34, 235 _et seq._\n\nCertainty, scientific, 137\n\nCensorship of Books, civil, 172\n\n\u2014\u2014 ecclesiastical, 171\n\n_Chamberlain, H. St._, 26, 36, 251, 361\n\n_Charles Borromeo, St._, 175\n\n_Cherbury, Herbert of_, 28\n\n_Chevreul, M. E._, 217\n\nChrist, 31, 143, 246, 401, 407\n\u2014\u2014 Divinity denied, 251\n\nChristian Religion, State Protection for, 352 _et seq._\n\u2014\u2014 Truths, 21\n\u2014\u2014 View of the World, 14 _et seq._, 27, 30, 55\n\nChristianity, 21, 24, 51\n\u2014\u2014 compared with Paganism, 267\n\u2014\u2014 free, 285\n\u2014\u2014 Origin of, 259\n\u2014\u2014 _vs._ Paganism, 253\n\u2014\u2014 without Christ, 252, 282\n\nChurch, the, 14, 30, 39, 50, 63 _et seq._, 70, 90 _et seq._, 106, 125,\n            179, 235, 275 _et seq._\n\u2014\u2014 Accusations of the, 142 _et seq._\n\u2014\u2014 and Medical Science, 181\n\u2014\u2014 Catholic, alone enduring, 298\n\u2014\u2014 Episcopal, 298\n\u2014\u2014 founder of Schools and Universities, 145 _et seq._\n\u2014\u2014 not a foreign Power, 406\n\u2014\u2014 the Mother of Civilization, 145 _et seq._\n\n_Cicero_, 3, 8, 138, 269, 349\n\n_Claar_, M., 170\n\n_Clement IV._, 155\n\n_Clement V._, 149, 152\n\n_Clement VIII._, 195\n\nCognition, human, 34 _et seq._, 43\n\nCollege Professors, 393\n\n_Columbus, Christopher_, 182\n\nCommunistic Experiments, 111\n\nCongregations, Roman, 98, 189\n\nCopernican System, 183\n\nCopernicus, 4, 113, 174, 184, 186, 189, 194 _et seq._, 200\n\n_Copp\u00e9e, F._, 324\n\n_Corneille_, 211\n\n_Cornu_, 211\n\nCosmogonies, of Nations, 242\n\nCouncil, Fourth Lateran, 182\n\nCouncil, Vatican, 68 _et seq._, 90, 103, 106, 109, 130\n\nCraniotomy, 102\n\nCreation, disputed, 241\n\nCriticism of the Gospels, modern, 254 _et seq._\n\n_Cuvier, G._, 218, 223\n\n_Cyril, St., of Alexandria_, 87\n\n_Dalberg, J. von_, 150\n\n_Dana, J. Dwight_, 219\n\n_Darwin_, 107, 115, 157, 239, 243\n\u2014\u2014 an Agnostic, 222\n\n_Davy, Sir H._, 119\n\n_Dawson, W._, 219\n\nDechristianizing of the modern State, 362 _et seq._\n\n_Delitzsch, Fr._, 51, 281\n\n_Deluc, A._, 119\n\n_Denifle, H._, 151, 153 _et seq._, 182\n\n_Denthofen_, 182\n\n_Descartes, R._, 35, 118, 190\n\n_Dilthey, W._, 292\n\nDivinity of Christ, 281\n\u2014\u2014 denied, 251 _et seq._\n\nDogmas, 51, 67, 97, 158\n\n_D\u00f6llinger_, 103\n\n_Draper, J._, 86 _et seq._, 144, 159, 182\n\n_Drews, A._, 236, 282\n\nDualism, 31, 63\n\n_Du Bois-Reymond_, 115, 224, 237, 240\n\n_Dumas, J. B._, 217\n\n_Dumont, A._, 219\n\nEconomics, liberal, 30\n\n_Egger, F._, 99\n\n_Ehrenberg, Ch._, 220\n\n_Ehrenfels, Chr. von_, 347\n\n_Eichhorn, Minister_, 344, 364\n\nEmancipation from the Truth, 41\n\n_Em\u00e9ry_, 196\n\n_Epinois, de l\u2019_, 183\n\nEpiscopal Church, 298\n\n_Erdmann, J. E._, 50, 158\n\nError, Danger of Infection by, 319\n\u2014\u2014 to be taught with same right as truth? 328\n\nEthics, modern, 50, 250, 325, 330, 347\n\n_Eucken, R._, 26, 50, 51, 244, 294 _et seq._\n\n_Euler_, 210\n\nEvolution, Theory of, 49, 157, 241 _et seq._\n\u2014\u2014 Theory, held by Catholic Scientists, 223\n\nFaith, 14, 43, 51\n\u2014\u2014 and Reason, 73\n\u2014\u2014 Authority of, 61, 81\n\u2014\u2014 Definition of, 61, 63, 66\n\u2014\u2014 Doubts forbidden, 139\n\u2014\u2014 its scientific Demonstration, 130 _et seq._\n\u2014\u2014 Motive of, 71\n\u2014\u2014 not blind, 61, 71\n\u2014\u2014 Obedience of, and Freedom of Action, 105\n\n_Falkenberg, R._, 45, 158\n\n_Faraday, M._, 214, 224, 249\n\n_Favaro, A._, 183\n\n_F\u00e9n\u00e9lon_, 110\n\n_Feuerbach, L._, 21, 22\n\n_Fichte, J. G._, 4, 52, 129, 178, 394\n\n_Fischer, Kuno_, 37\n\n_Fizeau, A._, 211\n\n_Foerster, F. W._, 128, 246, 268, 338, 345, 390\n\n_Fonck, L._, 86\n\n_Fonsegrive, G._, 39\n\n_Forel, A._, 325, 347\n\n_Foucault, L._, 211\n\n_Fouillie, A._, 290\n\n_Franc\u00e9, R. H._, 240\n\n_Francis of Sales, St._, 175, 320\n\n_Franklin, B._, 119\n\n_Frauenhofer_, 211\n\n_Frederick II., King_, 178, 179, 363\n\nFreedom, Definition of, 8, 16\n\u2014\u2014 for the Truth, 74\n\u2014\u2014 modern Idea of, 16 _et seq._, 18, 26\n\u2014\u2014 of Art, 336\n\u2014\u2014 of Research, different from Freedom of Teaching, 9\n\u2014\u2014 of Research, liberal, 229 _et seq._\n\u2014\u2014 of Science, Necessity, 12\n\u2014\u2014 \u2014\u2014 Subject to human Nature, 361\n\u2014\u2014 of Teaching, as understood in the Past, 344, 363 _et seq._, 370\n\u2014\u2014 \u2014\u2014 Danger of, admitted by modern Scientists, 323\n\u2014\u2014 \u2014\u2014 Definition of, 303\n\u2014\u2014 \u2014\u2014 unrestricted, inadmissible, 314\n\nFreedom of Thought, 30, 298\n\u2014\u2014 two Kinds of, 13, 15, 55\n\nFreemasons, 22, 28, 331\n\nFree-religionists, 23\n\nFree-thinkers, 17, 22, 30, 272, 291, 331, 332, 345, 363\n\n_Fresnel, A._, 211\n\n_Friedwald_, 140\n\n_Frins, V._, 165\n\n_Fuchs, Th._, 162\n\n_Galileo_, 55, 97, 99, 101, 102, 180 _et seq._\n\n_Galle, J. G._, 208\n\n_Galvani, L._, 118, 212\n\n_Gassendi, P._, 190\n\n_Gauss, K._, 209, 210\n\n_Gebler, K. von_, 183\n\nGeneratio aequivoca, 241\n\nGenesis, 281\n\u2014\u2014 Doctrine of, 212\n\u2014\u2014 History or Legend? 259\n\u2014\u2014 primordial, 241\n\n_Gerdil_, 211\n\n_Gibbons, Cardinal_, 103\n\n_Giese, T._, 194, 201\n\n_Giesebrecht, F. W._, 129\n\nGod, 6, 11, 14, 23, 26, 32, 44, 53, 65, 176, 235, 236, 286, 387\n\nGod\u2019s Order of Life, 14\n\n_Goethe_, 178, 269\n\n_Goetz, L._, 165\n\nGospels, 285\n\u2014\u2014 modern Criticism of, 254 _et seq._\n\nGovernment, founded on Christianity, 356\n\n_Goyau, G._, 299\n\nGrace, divine, Definition of, 73\n\n_Gray, Th._, 119\n\n_Gregory VII._, 145\n\n_Gregory IX._, 181\n\n_Gregory XI._, 151\n\n_Grienberger_, 185\n\n_Grimaldi, F._, 195\n\n_Grisar, H._, 99, 190, 197\n\n_Grosse, E._, 116\n\n_Grotthuss, von_, 24\n\n_Guldin_, 211\n\n_Gunkel, H._, 259, 281\n\n_G\u00fcnther, A._, 99, 172\n\n_H\u00e4ckel, E._, 87, 114, 198, 217, 221, 222, 239, 241, 268, 303, 325\n\u2014\u2014\u2014 denounced for Forgery, 333\n\u2014\u2014\u2014 on Lourdes, 247\n\n_Haeser_, 154\n\n_Haller, A. von_, 7, 205\n\n_Halley_, E., 206\n\n_Hansen, A._, 325\n\n_Harnack, A._, 17, 64, 71, 117, 129, 134, 246, 256 _et seq._, 265, 282,\n            283, 284, 382\n\n_Hartmann, E. von_, 250, 282, 285, 290, 317\n\nHarvard University, 74\n\n_Harvey, W._, 205\n\n_Hauy, R._, 218\n\n_Heer, O._, 219, 223\n\n_Hefele, K. von_, 181 _et seq._\n\n_Hegel_, 4, 47, 50, 272, 294\n\n_Heis, E._, 209\n\n_Helmholtz, H. von_, 4, 215\n\n_Henslow, G._, 216\n\n_Herbart_, 4\n\n_Hermes, G._, 172\n\n_Herrmann, W._, 76, 78\n\n_Herschel_, 207\n\n_Hertwig, R._, 241\n\n_Hertz_, 4\n\n_Hettner, H._, 28, 36, 47\n\n_Hilgers, J._, 111, 169, 176, 177\n\n_His, W._, 333\n\nHistorian, the Catholic, 95 _et seq._\n\nHistory, and the Faith, 93\n\n_Hitchcock_, 219\n\n_Hoensbroech, P._, 165, 169\n\n_Hoff, van\u2019t_, 71, 181\n\n_Holl, K._, 103\n\n_Holtzmann, O._, 283\n\n_Honorius III._, 152, 155\n\n_H\u00f6rnes, M._, 242\n\n_Huber, V. A._, 148, 324\n\nHumanists, 18 _et seq._\n\nHumanitarian Religion, 51\n\u2014\u2014 View of Life, 55\n\nHumanity, emancipated, 22\n\nHuman race, Origin of, 115 _et seq._\n\n_Humboldt, A. von_, 198, 224\n\n_Humboldt, W. von_, 38, 74, 314\n\n_Hume, D._, 35\n\n_Huxley, Th._, 222\n\n_Huygens, Chr._, 118, 204 _et seq._\n\n_Hyrtl, J._, 221\n\nIlluminati, 25\n\nImmorality, among College Men, 335\n\nInclinations, human, 264 _et seq._\n\nIncompatibility of Science and Faith, 198 _et seq._\n\nIndex of forbidden Books, 55, 169 _et seq._, 189, 196\n\nIndividualism, 25, 28\n\nInfallibility, 76, 97 _et seq._, 109\n\n_Innocent IV._, 149\n\n_Innocent VI._, 151\n\n_James, W._, 48, 250, 268\n\n_Janssen, J._, 146, 149, 150, 156, 218\n\nJesuit Order, 183, 359\n\nJesus Christ, 252, 357\n\u2014\u2014 Existence of, 282\n\u2014\u2014 who was? 281 _et seq._\n\nJews, 128\n\n_Joachim, G._ (see _Rheticus_)\n\n_Jodl, F._, 19, 21, 22, 66, 123, 130, 162, 245, 250, 288, 292, 322, 357\n\n_John XXII._, 151 _et seq._\n\n_Jones, Dr. Spencer_, 298\n\n_J\u00f6rgensen_, 229\n\n_J\u00fclicher_, 255, 283\n\n_Justin, Phil._, 277\n\n_Kahl, W._, 10, 162\n\n_Kant, I._, 4, 29, 35, 36, 37 _et seq._, 43 _et seq._, 46 _et seq._, 54,\n            63, 64, 77, 132, 167, 179, 250, 263, 269, 272, 287, 293, 313,\n            363\n\n_Kaufmann, G._, 17, 150, 153, 155, 162, 309\n\n_Kelvin, Lord_ (see _Thomson_)\n\n_Kepler, J._, 4, 125, 184, 185, 187, 191, 195 _et seq._, 201 _et seq._\n\nKepler-Bund, 333\n\n_Kirchhoff, G. R._, 4\n\n_Kleinpeter, H._, 35\n\n_Kneller_, 7, 208\n\nKnowledge and Faith, separation of, 42\n\n_Kochansky_, 196\n\n_Kohlbrugge, J. H._, 116\n\n_K\u00f6ller_, 121\n\n_Kollmann, J._, 116\n\n_Kone, J._, 147\n\n_Kromer, Bishop_, 195\n\n_Kues, N. von_, 194\n\n_Lacharpe_, 47\n\n_Lalande_, 196\n\n_Lamarck, J. B. de_, 157, 223\n\n_Lammenais, F._, 172\n\n_Lamont, J. von._, 209\n\n_Lange, F._, 237, 239\n\n_Lapparent, A. de_, 219\n\nLateran Council, Fourth, 182\n\n_Lavoisier, A._, 217\n\nLaw, necessity of, 408\n\nLaws of nature, 11\n\n_Lehmann, E._, 243\n\n_Lehmann, M._, 178\n\n_Leibnitz, G. W._, 114, 118, 190, 196, 211\n\n_Leo, the Great_, 383\n\n_Leo XIII._, 95, 170 _et seq._\n\n_Lessing, G. F._, 326\n\n_Leverrier, M._, 48, 207 _et seq._, 238\n\nLiberalism, 29 _et seq._, 162, 364, 370\n\nLicense to teach, ecclesiastical, 404\n\n_Liebig, J. von_, 4, 218\n\n_Liebmann, O._, 35\n\nLife, first, whence did it come, 240\n\n_Linn\u00e9, Karl_, 205\n\n_Lipps, Th._, 78, 135, 311\n\n_Locke, J._, 28, 35\n\n_Loisy, A._, 172\n\n_Loosten, de_, 283\n\n_Lossen_, 223\n\nLourdes, 247\n\n_L\u00fcdeman_, 45\n\n_Luther_, 27, 29, 38, 195\n\nLutheran Church, expelled Kepler, 202\n\n_Lyell, Ch._, 223\n\n_Macaulay_, 407\n\n_Mach, E._, 35\n\n_Macolano_, 187\n\n_M\u00e4dler, J._, 206\n\n_Mai, Cardinal_, 320\n\nMan, Descent of, 288\n\u2014\u2014 free, 15, 25\n\u2014\u2014 his Destiny, 11, 19\n\u2014\u2014 Member of Society, 11\n\nMan, the autonomous, 24 _et seq._, 29, 33, 287\n\u2014\u2014 the transcendental, 23 _et seq._, 37\n\nMan\u2019s Emancipation, 27\n\u2014\u2014 Intellect, 14\n\n_Martius, von_, 220\n\n_Masaryk, T. G._, 62, 72, 136, 160\n\n_Maxwell, J._, 214 _et seq._, 224\n\n_Mayer, R._, 215, 239\n\n_Melanchthon_, 195\n\n_Mendel, G. J._, 220\n\n_Menger, K._, 62, 86\n\n_Messer, A._, 140, 235\n\nMethod of modern Science, 262\n\n_Michael, E._, 146, 181, 182\n\n_Mign\u00e9_, 384\n\n_Mill, Stuart_, 245\n\nMiracles denied, 246 _et seq._\n\nModernism, 44, 45, 165 _et seq._, 389 _et seq._\n\u2014\u2014 Oath against, 393\n\n_Moigno_, 209\n\n_Moleschott, J._, 115, 224, 364\n\n_Mommsen, Th._, 121, 128, 234, 267\n\nMonism, 31, 331\n\u2014\u2014 Definition of, 244\n\nMonists, 331\n\n_Montanari, G._, 194\n\nMorality, 325\n\u2014\u2014 independent of Religion, 250, 336\n\u2014\u2014 no absolute Standard of, 50\n\n_Muckermann, H._, 220\n\n_M\u00fcller, A._, 186\n\n_M\u00fcller, Fr._, 243\n\n_M\u00fcller, J._, 219\n\n_M\u00fcnch, W._, 147, 356\n\n_Muratori, L. A._, 320\n\n_Mysticism_, 43, 46\n\nNature, human, ignored, 264\n\n_Newton_, 4, 7, 118, 125, 191, 201, 203 _et seq._\n\n_Nicolai, F._, 394\n\n_Niebergall, F._, 45\n\n_Nietzsche_, 23 _et seq._, 31, 37, 53, 54, 79, 270, 273\n\nOath against Modernism, 405\n\u2014\u2014 binding? 46\n\nOath of Allegiance in civil Professions, 396\n\u2014\u2014 of the Professio Fidei Tridentina, 394\n\nObjectivism, 33\n\n_Oken_, 178\n\n_Olbers, W._, 209\n\n_Omalius, J. de_, 219, 223\n\nOppression, of mental Liberty, by Party Rule, 366\n\n_Oresme, Bishop_, 194\n\n_Osiander_, 184, 195\n\n_Ostwald, W._, 240\n\n_Owen, R._, 111\n\n_Ozanam, A._, 212\n\nPaganism, 267, 286\n\u2014\u2014 extolled by modern Science, 212\n\u2014\u2014 preferred to Christianity, 267\n\n_Palacky_, 146\n\nPantheism, 23, 41, 284\n\nPapacy, Importance of, 373\n\nPapal Charters of Universities, 148 _et seq._\n\n_Pascal_, 211\n\n_Pasteur_, 217, 222, 224, 381\n\n_Pastor, L. von_, 96, 195\n\nPatients, made Subjects for medical Experiments, 319\n\n_Paul III._, 184, 195, 201\n\n_Paul IV._, 170\n\n_Paulsen, F._, 17, 38, 39, 40, 41, 44, 49, 51 _et seq._, 64, 78, 134, 150,\n            236, 239, 252, 253, 262, 274, 276, 287, 292 _et seq._, 309,\n            312, 321, 335, 338, 382, 404\n\n_Paulus, H. E._, 258\n\nPedagogy, 345\n\nPerception, the Nature of human, 33\n\n_Pesch, Chr._, 99\n\n_Peschel, O._, 115\n\n_Pessimism_, 295 _et seq._\n\n_Pfaff, F._, 219\n\n_Pfleiderer, O._, 256, 259, 285\n\n_Philip, the Fair_, 152\n\nPhilosophical Errors, 327\n\u2014\u2014 Training, great Want of, 321\n\nPhilosophy, 7, 16, 21, 28, 36, 44, 78, 242, 275, 292 _et seq._\n\nPhilosophy and the Faith, 92\n\u2014\u2014 Scholastic, 49, 53\n\n_Piazzi, G._, 209\n\n_Pindar_, 74\n\n_Pius IX._, 99, 162, 165, 166\n\n_Pius X._, 99\n\n_Plate, L._, 206, 237, 240, 241, 243 _et seq._, 249, 287\n\n_Plato_, 52, 74, 249, 269, 275, 337\n\n_Plutarch_, 349\n\n_Poggendorff_, 209\n\n_Pohle, J._, 209\n\n_Poincar\u00e9, H._, 114\n\nPope, his Person, 98\n\nPopes, and the Universities, 150 _et seq._\n\n_Prantl, K. von_, 324\n\nPrayer, 46\n\n_Pressens\u00e9, F. de_, 299\n\nPrimordial Genesis, 241\n\nProgress, 159\n\nPromoting the Christian Faith, the Aim of Founders of Universities, 367\n\nProtestantism, 19, 27 _et seq._, 44, 45, 51, 54, 66, 77, 97, 117, 128,\n            129, 140, 168, 193, 195, 202, 255, 293, 298, 359, 363, 390,\n            396\n\n_Ptolemy_, 5\n\n_Pythagoras_, 4, 140\n\n_Quenstedt, F._, 7, 219, 223\n\n_Rade, M._, 282\n\nRadicalism, 332\n\n_Ramsay, W._, 7\n\n_Ranke, L. von._, 116, 179\n\n_Ratzel, F._, 115\n\nReason, its Limitations, 7, 14\n\nReformation, the, 27, 28, 363\n\n_Reimarus, H. S._, 258\n\n_Reinhold, G._, 391\n\n_Reinke, J._, 7, 115, 223\n\nRelative Truth, 157\n\nReligion, 16, 20, 25, 28, 51\n\u2014\u2014 abandoned, 289 _et seq._\n\u2014\u2014 distinguished from Science, 266\n\u2014\u2014 of natural Reason, 28, 51\n\nReligious Instruction of Children, 45\n\n_Remus, John_, 196\n\n_Renan, E._, 54, 248, 258\n\nResearch, and Faith, 59\n\u2014\u2014 Definition of, 9\n\nRestraint, proper, of Science, 90\n\nRevelation, 29, 51, 72, 77 _et seq._, 90, 125, 297\n\u2014\u2014 Proof of, 138\n\nRevolution, French, 29, 36\n\u2014\u2014 of 1848, 363\n\n_Rheticus_ (_G. Joachim_), 195, 201\n\n_Rhodius_, 140\n\n_Riccioli, J._, 190\n\nRight of Christians, to be represented, 367\n\u2014\u2014 to teach, natural, 369\n\nRights of Teacher, not unrestricted, 346\n\n_Ritter, K._, 218\n\n_Romanes, G._, 221\n\n_Roscellin_, 158\n\n_Rosenberger_, 118\n\n_Rosmini-Serbati_, 110\n\n_Rothenb\u00fccher_, 30\n\n_Rousseau, J. J._, 28\n\n_Rudder, P. de_, 249\n\n_Ruville, A. von_, 77\n\n_Sabatier, A._, 26, 39, 78, 262\n\n_Saint-Hilaire_, 223\n\n_Saitschick_, 392\n\n_Sarcey_, 173\n\n_Savigny, F. von_, 355\n\nScepticism, 35, 47, 55, 293\n\n_Schafh\u00e4utl, K. von_, 219\n\n_Scheiner, Ch._, 125, 191\n\n_Schell, H._, 136, 172\n\n_Schelling_, 4\n\n_Scherr, J._, 38\n\n_Schiaparelli, G._, 191\n\n_Schiller_, 274\n\n_Schleiermacher_, 45, 54, 290\n\n_Schmiedel, P._, 282\n\n_Schneider, W._, 116\n\n_Sch\u00f6nbein_, 7, 218\n\n_Sch\u00f6nberg, Cardinal_, 194, 201\n\nSchools, free, 22\n\n_Schopenhauer_, 35, 272, 274\n\n_Schwann, Th._, 220\n\n_Schwegler, A._, 28\n\n_Schweitzer, A._, 282\n\nScience, an Activity of the human Mind, 6\n\u2014\u2014 anti-Christian, its Danger, 329 _et seq._\n\u2014\u2014 Definition, 3 _et seq._\n\u2014\u2014 Errors of, 115 _et seq._\n\u2014\u2014 grave Charges against Modern, 329\n\u2014\u2014 Limitations, 7\n\u2014\u2014 Power of, 322\n\u2014\u2014 restricted by accidental Conditions, 361\n\u2014\u2014 subject to God, 6\n\u2014\u2014 subject to Imperfections of human Mind, 6, 31\n\u2014\u2014 subject to Truth, 6\n\u2014\u2014 Vocation of, 279\n\nSciences, profane and the Faith, 88\n\nScientific Research, Methods, 158\n\u2014\u2014 Teaching, Definition, 316\n\nScientists, Catholic, 384 _et seq._\n\nScripture, does not teach profane Sciences, 84\n\u2014\u2014 Interpretation, 27\n\u2014\u2014 Narratives not to be taken in literal Sense, 82 _et seq._\n\n_Secchi, A._, 191, 208\n\n_Sedgwick, A._, 219\n\nSeminaries, 400\n\nSensuality, Emancipation of, Danger to Civilization, 356\n\nSexual Perversities, 347\n\u2014\u2014 Practice, natural, 346\n\u2014\u2014 Questions, 325\n\u2014\u2014 Reform, 347\n\nSham-Science, 313\n\nSilence not Denial, 11\n\n_Smet, de_, 86\n\n_Smith, Adam_, 28\n\n_Smolko, S. von_, 359\n\nSocialism, 111, 349, 350\n\nSocialists, 331\n\nSocial question, 30\n\nSociology, 30\n\n_Socrates_, 7\n\nSoul, the, 46 _et seq._\n\u2014\u2014 the, an illusion, 288 _et seq._\n\n_Spencer, H._, 243, 313\n\n_Spicker, G._, 22, 26, 292, 324\n\n_Spinoza, B._, 41, 179\n\n_St\u00e4gemann_, 36\n\nState, the, and Freedom of Teaching, 340 _et seq._\n\n_Steudel_, 236\n\n_Strauss, D. F._, 54, 65, 240, 258, 267, 273, 280, 283, 286, 287, 315, 364\n\n_St\u00fctz_, 119\n\n_Subjectivism_, 33 _et seq._\n\nSupernatural, Factors to be excluded, 235 _et seq._\n\u2014\u2014 the, inadmissible, 31\n\nSupervision of Teaching, Ecclesiastical, 389\n\n_Sybel, L. von_, 246, 292\n\nSyllabus, the, 55, 94, 115, 162 _et seq._\n\nTanner, A., 192\n\n_Targioni-Tozzetti_, 194\n\nTeachers, anti-Christian, 358\n\u2014\u2014 Catholic, small Number of, 365\n\u2014\u2014 Jewish, 365\n\nTeaching, Definition of, 10\n\u2014\u2014 of the Church, as distinguished from Opinions of Theologians, 82 _et\n            seq._\n\n_Tews, J._, 358\n\n_Th\u00e9nard, L._, 217\n\nTheocentric View of the World, 19\n\nTheologians, Catholic, of Repute, 384 _et seq._\n\nTheological Literature, Catholic, 384 _et seq._\n\nTheology and Progress, 381 _et seq._\n\u2014\u2014 a Science, 378 _et seq._\n\u2014\u2014 History of, 403\n\nTheophobia of Science, 234, 241\n\nTheory of Rights, individualistic, 313\n\n_Thomas, St._, 82, 84, 155, 262, 353, 388\n\n_Thomasius, Chr._, 344, 363\n\n_Thomson_ (_Lord Kelvin_), 74, 238, 249, 251 _et seq._, 381\n\n_Toland, J._, 28\n\n_Treitschke, H. von_, 129, 179\n\n_Tr\u00f6ltsch, E._, 28, 134, 167, 298, 356, 389\n\nTruth, relative, 49 _et seq._\n\n_Tyndall, J._, 217, 224\n\n_\u00dcberweg, F._, 267\n\n_Uhlich, L._, 291\n\nUnited States, 111, 368\n\nUniversities, 150, 341 _et seq._\n\u2014\u2014 and the Church, 371\n\u2014\u2014 Catholic, 370\n\u2014\u2014 free, 368\n\nUniversity, and Theology, 398\n\u2014\u2014 Teachers, 17\n\u2014\u2014 vanishing Respect for, 334\n\nUnprepossession in Research, 121 _et seq._, 357\n\n_Urban IV._, 155\n\n_Urban V._, 151\n\n_Urban VIII._, 96, 186, 189\n\n_Vaillant_, _Anarchist_, 350\n\n_Valerius, Maximus_, 319\n\n_Varnhagen_, 36\n\nVatican Archives, 95\n\nVatican Council, 68 _et seq._, 90, 103, 106, 109, 130\n\n_Vaudin_, 119\n\n_Vierort, K. von_, 220\n\nView of life, Christian, 252\n\u2014\u2014 of the World, anthropocentric, 19\n\u2014\u2014 \u2014\u2014 Christian, 14, 27\n\u2014\u2014 \u2014\u2014 humanitarian, 18, 21 _et seq._, 31\n\u2014\u2014 \u2014\u2014 theocentric, 19\n\nViews of the World, various, 13, 22, 159, 294\n\n_Vigilius, St._, 180 _et seq._\n\n_Vincent, St. of Lerin_, 383\n\n_Virchow, R. von_, 116, 224, 241, 323\n\n_Vogt, K._, 30, 115, 224\n\n_Volkmann, A._, 220, 223\n\n_Volta, A._, 212 _et seq._, 224\n\n_Voltaire_, 28, 326\n\n_Vries, H. de_, 220\n\n_Waagen, W._, 223\n\n_Wahrmund, L._, 86\n\n_Wallace, A._, 119\n\n_Walsh, J. J._, 208\n\n_Walther, W._, 284\n\n_Washington, George_, 349\n\n_Wasmann, E._, 116, 223, 243, 249\n\n_Wehner, von_, 405\n\n_Weismann_, 242\n\n_Weizs\u00e4cker_, 257\n\n_Westermark_, 50\n\n_Westhoff_, 177, 74, 145, 276, 282\n\n_Wimpheling_, 156\n\n_Wobbermin, G._, 245\n\n_Wolf, R._, 207\n\n_W\u00f6llner, Minister_, 363\n\n_Wundt, W._, 24, 52, 62, 71, 137, 235, 243, 254, 288, 290\n\n_Young, Th._, 119\n\n_Zacharias, Pope_, 180\n\n_Zedlitz, von_, 363\n\n_Zeller, E._, 246, 255\n\n_Ziegler, Th._, 59\n\n_Zittel_, 116\n\n_Z\u00f6ckler_, 7, 181, 201\n\n_Zoen, Bishop_, 151\n\n_Zola_, 248 _et seq._\n\n\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n\n    1 Whenever we use here the word \u201cmodern,\u201d we do not take it in the\n      sense of \u201cpresent,\u201d\u2014the Christian view of the world is also a\n      present one, and is still of the utmost importance,\u2014but in the sense\n      of \u201cnew\u201d in contrast to the time-honoured and inherited.\n\n    2 The difference between the Protestant and the Catholic manner of\n      reasoning is stated by the convert, Prof. _A. von Ruville_, as\n      follows:\n\n      \u201cMy mind had harboured up to now the characteristically Protestant\n      thought that I, from my superior mental standpoint, was going to\n      probe the Catholic Church, that I was going to pass an infallible\n      judgment on her truth or untruth, and this in spite of my being\n      ready to acknowledge the truth in her. But now I became more and\n      more conscious of the fact that it was the Church who had a right to\n      pass judgment on me, that I had to bow to her opinion, that she\n      immeasurably surpassed me in wisdom. Many details, which I was\n      inclined to criticize, demonstrated this to me, for in every\n      instance I recognized that it was my understanding that was at\n      fault, and that what appeared to me as an imperfection was rooted in\n      the deepest truth. In this way I was gradually brought to the real\n      Catholic standpoint, to accept the doctrines immediately as Truth,\n      because they proceeded from the Church, and then to endeavour to\n      understand them thoroughly, and to reap from them the fullest\n      possible harvest of Truth. Formerly, with regard to Protestant\n      doctrines, I always retained my independence and the sovereignty of\n      my judgment. Why should I not have had my own opinion, when every\n      denomination and every theologian had an individual opinion? How\n      different with the Catholic Church. Before her sublime, never\n      varying wisdom, as it is proclaimed by every simple priest, I bowed\n      my knees in humility. Compared to her experience of two thousand\n      years my ephemeral knowledge was a mere nothing\u201d (Back to Holy\n      Church, by Dr. _Albert von Ruville_, pp. 30, 31).\n\n    3 Infallible teachings are often also called dogmas. But they are not\n      always dogmas in the strict sense. In the strict sense dogmas are\n      such truths as are contained in divine revelation, and are\n      proclaimed by the infallible teaching authority of the Church to be\n      believed as such by the faithful. In a broader sense those tenets\n      are often called dogmas which are presented by revelation or by the\n      Church as infallible truths. In this sense all teachings of faith\n      clearly found in Holy Scripture are dogmas, even if not declared by\n      the Church. In this sense Protestants, too, believe in revealed\n      dogmas.\n\n    4 \u201cThey that have received the faith through the ministry of the\n      Church can never have just cause for changing their faith or calling\n      it into doubt\u201d (Sess. III, ch. 3). The Vatican Council did not\n      thereby mean to say that an exceptional case could not happen where\n      some one, without fault of his own, might fall away from his faith,\n      either on account of insufficient religious instruction, or of\n      natural dullness or exceptional misfortunes in the circumstances of\n      life in which he may be placed. The theologians who worded the\n      decision also say that the Council did not intend to condemn the\n      opinion expressed by many older theologians, that under certain\n      conditions an uneducated Catholic might be led in such way into\n      error as to join another faith without committing a sin. (cf.\n      _Granderath_, Const. Dog. ss. oec. Concl. Vat. 69).\n\n    5 At a certain Austrian university, where the custom obtains that a\n      member of a faculty of the university, in the regular order of the\n      faculties, publishes during the year a book on some study in its\n      particular branch, the turn came to the theological faculty. One of\n      its members then issued a work on moral theology, of course with the\n      ecclesiastical Imprimatur. Upon this being discovered the senate\n      resolved not to acknowledge the book as a university publication,\n      nor to issue it as such, as is usually the custom. They believed\n      they saw in the Imprimatur a degradation of science and a violation\n      of its freedom\u2014a procedure entirely in accord with the traditional\n      narrow-mindedness and intolerance of liberalism.\n\n    6 A clear understanding of the case of _Galileo_ has been made\n      possible only since the year 1877, when the papers of the trial were\n      published by two men of opposite religious views,\u2014the\n      Catholic-minded historian, _de l\u2019Epinois_, and the liberal author,\n      _K. Gebler_, who in 1876 had already published a work on \u201cGalileo\n      Galilei and the Roman Curia,\u201d in the spirit of the anti-clerical\n      tendency of the times. Yet, in spite of his attitude, he was given\n      free permission to copy the papers\u2014a magnanimity by which the Holy\n      See has earned the gratitude and admiration of every fair-minded\n      lover of history. In more recent times, _A. Favaro_ published, in\n      1890-1907, a work of twenty volumes containing all the papers\n      relating to the trial of _Galileo_, \u201cOpere di Galileo Galilei,\n      Edizione Nazionale.\u201d He, too, had access to the ecclesiastical\n      archives, which he acknowledges with thanks. It may be said now that\n      the _Galileo_ case has been settled by documentary evidence.\n\n    7 After visiting _Thomson_ at Kreuznach, _Helmholtz_ wrote: \u201cHe\n      surpasses all great scientists I have personally met, in acumen,\n      clearness and activity of spirit, so that I felt somewhat dull\n      beside him.\u201d _Helmholtz_ himself (died 1894) has never expressed\n      himself about religion. Absorbed by his scientific work, he seemed\n      to have been indifferent to religion, but according to his\n      biographer his father was a decided theist, and his philosophical\n      views were held in great esteem, and partly subscribed to, by the\n      son. According to _Dennert_, _Helmholtz_ attended church now and\n      then, and even partook of holy communion. Of decided religious bent\n      of mind was _Helmholtz\u2019s_ fellow-countryman, and co-discoverer of\n      the law of energy, _Robert Mayer_. At the Congress of scientists at\n      Innsbruck, in 1869, _Mayer_ ended his address with the significant\n      words: \u201cLet me in conclusion declare from the bottom of my heart\n      that true philosophy cannot and must not be anything else but\n      prop\u00e6deutics of the Christian religion.\u201d His letters breathe piety.\n      For a time he had the intention of joining the Catholic Church.\n\n    8 Others take refuge in the fantastic theory of an \u201cAll-Animation.\u201d\n      According to it all organisms, including trees, shrubs, grasses, are\n      possessed of a soulful sensation and feeling for the purposes they\n      serve, and for the elaborate actions they undertake: this is the\n      reason for their efficacy, not because a wise Creator had arranged\n      them thus. _R. H. Franc\u00e9_ exclaims triumphantly: \u201cWhen the powers\n      that be should ask in their dissatisfaction: \u2018Where has God a place\n      in your system?\u2019 we can answer calmly: \u2018We do not need the\n      hypothesis of a personal God.\u2019 \u201d God is superfluous\u2014this is the\n      precious gain which this unscientific explanation is to yield.\n\n    9 Compare Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum XI (1883, vii.).\n\n_   10 L. M. Hartmann_, Theodor Mommsen (1908), 81. The author of the\n      biography is a Jew. There is a much-circulated story, alleged to\n      come from _F. X. Kraus_. _Mommsen_ is said to have told _Kraus_,\n      inasmuch as neither the origin, nor nature, nor the spread of\n      Christianity can be explained by natural causes, and since he, in\n      his capacity of historian, could never acknowledge anything\n      supernatural, therefore the fourth volume will remain unwritten.\n\n_   11 Nietzsche_, \u201cThus spoke Zarathustra.\u201d\n\n   12 \u201c_Veritati ut possetis acquiescere, humilitate opus erat, quae\n      civitati, vestrae difficillime persuaderi potest_\u201d (De civit. Dei,\n      X, 29).\n\n_   13 Plato_, Phil. 6 c. Similarly _Pythagoras_, _Aristotle_, and\n      _Cicero_.\n\n   14 Dial. c. Tryph. 2.\n\n   15 \u201cBut for the retention of names and terms _Harnack_ leaves nothing\n      of the specific nature of Christianity,\u201d admits the Protestant\n      Professor of Theology, _W. Walther_, in his book, \u201cHarnack\u2019s Wesen\n      des Christentums\u201d (1901).\n\n_   16 Uhlich_, founder of a community of free-thinkers, who died in 1873,\n      thus describes his evolution from rationalism to atheism: \u201cAt the\n      beginning I could say: We hold fast to Jesus, to Him who stood too\n      high to be called a mere man. Ten years later I could say: God,\n      virtue, immortality\u2014these three are the eternal foundation of\n      religion. And after ten more years I could issue a declaration\n      wherein God was mentioned no more.\u201d Similar progress in spiritual\n      disintegration has been shown by Liberalism in recent years: first\n      it partially abandoned Christian dogma, without however quite\n      breaking loose from it; in the eighteenth century rationalistic\n      enlightenment tore loose from all revelation, adhering only to\n      natural religion: to-day even this is lost.\n\n   17 Dr. _Spencer Jones_, an Episcopal clergyman, says in his book,\n      \u201cEngland and the Holy See\u201d: \u201cFor the Episcopal Church the junction\n      with Rome, with its sharply defined dogmas, its supreme ministry,\n      and its firm leadership, is a question of life. More and more the\n      supernatural belief is replaced by individual opinions, a condition\n      which in itself causes faith to disappear. A condition like the\n      present, making it possible that in one and the same congregation\n      the most pronounced contrariety of opinions in respect to most\n      essential tenets, as well as a general confusion of minds, is not\n      only tolerated, but directly welcomed, such a condition cannot\n      endure in the long run.\u201d\n\n   18 A French author, _G. Goyau_, states with truth: \u201cWhat makes the\n      (Catholic) Church lovable in the eyes of thinking minds outside of\n      the Church, is just her uncompromising attitude. They see a Church\n      steadfast, permanent, imperturbable. The stumbling block of yore has\n      become for them an isle of safety. They are thankful to Rome for\n      holding before their eyes _the_ Christianity, instead of giving them\n      the choice of several kinds of Christianity, including kinds still\n      unknown, which they undoubtedly themselves may discover, if so\n      inclined. They welcome the Roman Church as the \u2018Teacher of Faith\u2019\n      and \u2018Conqueror of Errors,\u2019 and, to quote more of the forcible\n      language of the Protestant _de Pressens\u00e9_: \u2018they are disgusted with\n      a Christianity for the lowest bidder, but are impressed by the rigid\n      inflexibility of Catholicism....\u2019 \u201d (Autour du Catholicisme social.\n      I. 1896).\n\n   19 \u201cThe Independent\u201d (New York) of Feb. 2, 1914, reports under the head\n      _freedom of teaching_ the dismissal of a professor from the\n      Presbyterian University at Easton, Pa. After quoting from the\n      charter article VIII, which provides \u201cthat persons of every\n      religious denomination shall be capable of being elected Trustees,\n      nor shall any person, either as principal, professor, tutor or pupil\n      be refused admittance into said college, or denied any of the\n      privileges, immunities or advantages thereof, for or on account of\n      his sentiments in matters of religion,\u201d the report goes on to say:\n      \u201cit appears however, from the investigations of the committee, that\n      President _Warfield_ insists that the instruction in philosophy and\n      psychology has to be such, as, in his opinion, accords with the most\n      conservative form of Presbyterian theology.\u201d\n\n   20 Prof. _Chr. von Ehrenfels_, Sexualethik. Similar passages might be\n      quoted from numerous other books by college-professors.","title":"The Freedom of Science","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":165552}