{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_40436/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_40436","id":"gutenberg_40436","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40436","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Ancient","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Philosophy, Ancient","Plato","Socrates, 470 BC-399 BC"],"text":"Produced by Ed Brandon as part of the on-line Grote Project\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPLATO, AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.\n\n\n\n\nPLATO,\n\nAND THE\n\nOTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.\n\n\n\nBY\n\nGEORGE GROTE,\n\nAUTHOR OF THE 'HISTORY OF GREECE'.\n\n\n\n_A NEW EDITION._\n\nIN FOUR VOLUMES.\n\nVOL. II.\n\n\n\nLONDON:\n\nJOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.\n\n1888.\n\n_The right of Translation is reserved._\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\nCHAPTER XII.\n\nALKIBIADES I. AND II.\n\n\nSituation supposed in the dialogue. Persons--Sokrates and\nAlkibiades 1\n\nExorbitant hopes and political ambition of Alkibiades 2\n\nQuestions put by Sokrates, in reference to Alkibiades in\nhis intended function as adviser of the Athenians. What does he\nintend to advise them upon? What has he learnt, and what does he\nknow? _ib._\n\nAlkibiades intends to advise the Athenians on questions of\nwar and peace. Questions of Sokrates thereupon. We must fight those\nwhom it is better to fight--to what standard does better refer? To\njust and unjust 3\n\nHow, or from whom, has Alkibiades learnt to discern or\ndistinguish Just and Unjust? He never learnt it from any one; he\nalways knew it, even as a boy 4\n\nAnswer amended. Alkibiades learnt it from the multitude, as\nhe learnt to speak Greek.--The multitude cannot teach just and\nunjust, for they are at variance among themselves about it.\nAlkibiades is going to advise the Athenians about what he does not\nknow himself 5\n\nAnswer farther amended. The Athenians do not generally\ndebate about just or unjust--which they consider plain to every\none--but about expedient and inexpedient, which are not coincident with\njust and unjust. But neither does Alkibiades know the expedient. He\nasks Sokrates to explain. Sokrates declines: he can do nothing but\nquestion 6\n\nComment on the preceding--Sokratic method--the respondent\nmakes the discoveries for himself _ib._\n\nAlkibiades is brought to admit that whatever is just, is\ngood, honourable, expedient: and that whoever acts honourably, both\ndoes well, and procures for himself happiness thereby. Equivocal\nreasoning of Sokrates 7\n\nHumiliation of Alkibiades. Other Athenian statesmen are\nequally ignorant. But the real opponents, against whom Alkibiades is\nto measure himself, are, the kings of Sparta and Persia. Eulogistic\ndescription of those kings. To match them, Alkibiades must make\nhimself as good as possible 8\n\nBut good--for what end, and under what circumstances?\nAbundant illustrative examples 9\n\nAlkibiades, puzzled and humiliated, confesses his\nignorance. Encouragement given by Sokrates. It is an advantage to\nmake such discovery in youth 10\n\nPlatonic Dialectic--its actual effect--its anticipated\neffect--applicable to the season of youth 11\n\nKnow Thyself--Delphian maxim--its urgent importance--What\nis myself? My mind is myself _ib._\n\nI cannot know myself, except by looking into another\nmind. Self-knowledge is temperance. Temperance and Justice are the\nconditions both of happiness and of freedom 11\n\nAlkibiades feels himself unworthy to be free, and declares\nthat he will never quit Sokrates 12\n\nSecond Alkibiades--situation supposed _ib._\n\nDanger of mistake in praying to the Gods for gifts which\nmay prove mischievous. Most men are unwise. Unwise is the generic\nword: madmen, a particular variety under it _ib._\n\nRelation between a generic term, and the specific terms\ncomprehended under it, was not then familiar 13\n\nFrequent cases, in which men pray for supposed benefits,\nand find that when obtained, they are misfortunes. Every one fancies\nthat he knows what is beneficial: mischiefs of ignorance 14\n\nMistake in predications about ignorance generally. We must\ndiscriminate. Ignorance of _what?_ Ignorance of good, is always\nmischievous: ignorance of other things, not always _ib._\n\nWise public counsellors are few. Upon what ground do we\ncall these few wise? Not because they possess merely special arts or\naccomplishments, but because they know besides, upon what occasions\nand under what limits each of these accomplishments ought to be used 15\n\nSpecial accomplishments, without the knowledge of the good\nor profitable, are oftener hurtful than beneficial 16\n\nIt is unsafe for Alkibiades to proceed with his sacrifice,\nuntil he has learnt what is the proper language to address to the\nGods. He renounces his sacrifice, and throws himself upon the counsel\nof Sokrates _ib._\n\nDifferent critical opinions respecting these two dialogues 17\n\nGrounds for disallowing them--less strong against the\nSecond than against the First 18\n\nThe supposed grounds for disallowance are in reality only\nmarks of inferiority _ib._\n\nThe two dialogues may probably be among Plato's earlier\ncompositions 20\n\nAnalogy with various dialogues in the Xenophontic\nMemorabilia--Purpose of Sokrates to humble presumptuous young men 21\n\nFitness of the name and character of Alkibiades for\nidealising this feature in Sokrates _ib._\n\nPlato's manner of replying to the accusers of Sokrates.\nMagical influence ascribed to the conversation of Sokrates 22\n\nThe purpose proclaimed by Sokrates in the Apology is\nfollowed out in Alkibiades I. Warfare against the false persuasion of\nknowledge 24\n\nDifficulties multiplied for the purpose of bringing\nAlkibiades to a conviction of his own ignorance 25\n\nSokrates furnishes no means of solving these difficulties.\nHe exhorts to Justice and Virtue--but these are acknowledged\nIncognita 26\n\nProlixity of Alkibiad\u00eas I.--Extreme multiplication of\nillustrative examples--How explained _ib._\n\nAlkibiad\u00eas II. leaves its problem avowedly undetermined 27\n\nSokrates commends the practice of praying to the Gods for\nfavours undefined--his views about the semi-regular, semi-irregular\nagency of the Gods--he prays to them for premonitory warnings 28\n\nComparison of Alkibiad\u00eas II. with the Xenophontic\nMemorabilia, especially the conversation of Sokrates with Euthydemus.\nSokrates not always consistent with himself 29\n\nRemarkable doctrine of Alkibiad\u00eas II.--that knowledge is\nnot always Good. The knowledge of Good itself is indispensable:\nwithout that, the knowledge of other things is more hurtful than\nbeneficial _ib._\n\nKnowledge of Good--appears postulated and divined, in many\nof the Platonic dialogues, under different titles 31\n\nThe Good--the Profitable--what is it?--How are we to know\nit? Plato leaves this undetermined _ib._\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\n\nHIPPIAS MAJOR--HIPPIAS MINOR.\n\nHippias Major--situation supposed--character of the\ndialogue. Sarcasm and mockery against Hippias 33\n\nReal debate between the historical Sokrates and Hippias in\nthe Xenophontic Memorabilia--subject of that debate 34\n\nOpening of the Hippias Major**--Hippias describes the\nsuccessful circuit which he had made through Greece, and the renown\nas well as the gain acquired by his lectures 35\n\nHippias had met with no success at Sparta. Why the Spartans\ndid not admit his instructions--their law forbids _ib._\n\nQuestion, What is law? The law-makers always aim at the\nProfitable, but sometimes fail to attain it. When they fail, they\nfail to attain law. The lawful is the Profitable: the Unprofitable is\nalso unlawful 36\n\nComparison of the argument of the Platonic Sokrates with\nthat of the Xenophontic Sokrates 37\n\nThe Just or Good is the beneficial or profitable. This is\nthe only explanation which Plato ever gives and to this he does not\nalways adhere 38\n\nLectures of Hippias at Sparta not upon geometry, or\nastronomy, &c., but upon the question--What pursuits are\nbeautiful, fine, and honourable for youth? 39\n\nQuestion put by Sokrates, in the name of a friend in the\nbackground, who has just been puzzling him with it--What is the\nBeautiful? _ib._\n\nHippias thinks the question easy to answer 40\n\nJustice, Wisdom, Beauty must each be something. What is\nBeauty, or the Beautiful? _ib._\n\nHippias does not understand the question. He answers by\nindicating one particularly beautiful object _ib._\n\nCross-questioning by Sokrates--Other things also are\nbeautiful; but each thing is beautiful only by comparison, or under\nsome particular circumstances--it is sometimes beautiful, sometimes\nnot beautiful 41\n\nSecond answer of Hippias--_ Gold_, is that by the\npresence of which all things become beautiful--scrutiny applied to\nthe answer. Complaint by Hippias about vulgar analogies _ib._\n\nThird answer of Hippias--questions upon it--proof given\nthat it fails of universal application 42\n\nFarther answers, suggested by Sokrates himself--1. The\nSuitable or Becoming--objections thereunto--it is rejected 43\n\n2. The useful or profitable--objections--it will not hold 44\n\n3. The Beautiful is a variety of the Pleasurable--that\nwhich is received through the eye and the ear 45\n\nObjections to this last--What property is there common to\nboth sight and hearing, which confers upon the pleasures of these two\nsenses the exclusive privilege of being beautiful? _ib._\n\nAnswer--There is, belonging to each and to both in common,\nthe property of being innocuous and profitable pleasures--upon this\nground they are called beautiful 46\n\nThis will not hold--the Profitable is the cause of Good,\nand is therefore different from Good--to say that the beautiful is\nthe Profitable, is to say that it is different from Good but this has\nbeen already declared inadmissible _ib._\n\nRemarks upon the Dialogue--the explanations ascribed to\nHippias are special conspicuous examples: those ascribed to Sokrates\nare attempts to assign some general concept 47\n\nAnalogy between the explanations here ascribed to\nSokrates, and those given by the Xenophontic Sokrates in the\nMemorabilia 49\n\nConcluding thrust exchanged between Hippias and Sokrates 51\n\nRhetoric against Dialectic 52\n\nMen who dealt with real life, contrasted with the\nspeculative and analytical philosophers _ib._\n\nConcrete Aggregates--abstract or logical Aggregates.\nDistinct aptitudes required by Aristotle for the Dialectician 53\n\nAntithesis of Absolute and Relative, here brought into\ndebate by Plato, in regard to the Idea of Beauty 54\n\nHippias Minor--characters and situation supposed 55\n\nHippias has just delivered a lecture, in which he extols\nAchilles as better than Odysseus--the veracious and straightforward\nhero better than the mendacious and crafty 56\n\nThis is contested by Sokrates. The veracious man and the\nmendacious man are one and the same--the only man who can answer\ntruly if he chooses, is he who can also answer falsely if he chooses,\n_i. e._ the knowing man--the ignorant man cannot make sure of\ndoing either the one or the other 57\n\nAnalogy of special arts--it is only the arithmetician who\ncan speak falsely on a question of arithmetic when he chooses\n _ib._\n\nView of Sokrates respecting Achilles in the Iliad. He\nthinks that Achilles speaks falsehood cleverly. Hippias maintains\nthat if Achilles ever speaks falsehood, it is with an innocent\npurpose, whereas Odysseus does the like with fraudulent purpose 58\n\nIssue here taken--Sokrates contends that those who hurt,\nor cheat, or lie wilfully, are better than those who do the like\nunwillingly--he entreats Hippias to enlighten him and answer his\nquestions _ib._\n\nQuestions of Sokrates--multiplied analogies of the special\narts. The unskilful artist, who runs, wrestles, or sings badly,\nwhether he will or not, is worse than the skilful, who can sing well\nwhen he chooses, but can also sing badly when he chooses 59\n\nIt is better to have the mind of a bowman who misses his\nmark only by design, than that of one who misses even when he intends\nto hit 60\n\nDissent and repugnance of Hippias _ib._\n\nConclusion--That none but the good man can do evil\nwilfully: the bad man does evil unwillingly. Hippias cannot resist\nthe reasoning, but will not accept the conclusion--Sokrates confesses\nhis perplexity 61\n\nRemarks on the dialogue. If the parts had been inverted,\nthe dialogue would have been cited by critics as a specimen of the\nsophistry and corruption of the Sophists 62\n\nPolemical purpose of the dialogue--Hippias humiliated by\nSokrates 63\n\nPhilosophical purpose of the dialogue--theory of the\nDialogues of Search generally, and of Knowledge as understood by\nPlato _ib._\n\nThe Hippias is an exemplification of this theory--Sokrates\nsets forth a case of confusion, and avows his inability to clear it\nup. Confusion shown up in the Lesser Hippias--Error in the Greater 64\n\nThe thesis maintained here by Sokrates, is also affirmed\nby the historical Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia 66\n\nAristotle combats the thesis. Arguments against it 67\n\nMistake of Sokrates and Plato in dwelling too exclusively\non the intellectual conditions of human conduct _ib._\n\nThey rely too much on the analogy of the special arts--they\ntake no note of the tacit assumptions underlying the epithets of\npraise and blame 68\n\nValue of a Dialogue of Search, that it shall be\nsuggestive, and that it shall bring before us different aspects of\nthe question under review 69\n\nAntithesis between Rhetoric and Dialectic 70\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV.\n\nHIPPARCHUS--MINOS.\n\nHipparchus--Question--What is the definition of Lover of\nGain? He is one who thinks it right to gain from things worth\nnothing. Sokrates cross-examines upon this explanation. No man\nexpects to gain from things which he knows to be worth nothing:\nin this sense, no man is a lover of gain 71\n\nGain is good. Every man loves good: therefore all men are\nlovers of gain 72\n\nApparent contradiction. Sokrates accuses the companion of\ntrying to deceive him--accusation is retorted upon Sokrates 73\n\nPrecept inscribed formerly by Hipparchus the\nPeisistratid--never deceive a friend. Eulogy of Hipparchus by\nSokrates _ib._\n\nSokrates allows the companion to retract some of his answers.\nThe companion affirms that some gain is good, other gain is evil 74\n\nQuestions by Sokrates--bad gain is _gain_, as much as\ngood gain. What is the common property, in virtue of which both are\ncalled Gain? Every acquisition, made with no outlay, or with a\nsmaller outlay, is gain. Objections--the acquisition may be\nevil--embarrassment confessed _ib._\n\nIt is essential to gain, that the acquisition made shall be\ngreater not merely in quantity, but also in value, than the outlay.\nThe valuable is the profitable--the profitable is the good.\nConclusion comes back. That Gain is Good 75\n\nRecapitulation. The debate has shown that all gain is good,\nand that there is no evil gain--all men are lovers of gain--no man\nought to be reproached for being so the companion is compelled to\nadmit this, though he declares that he is not persuaded _ib._\n\nMinos. Question put by Sokrates to the companion. What is\nLaw, or The Law? All law is the same, _quatenus_ law: what is\nthe common constituent attribute? 76\n\nAnswer--Law is, 1. The consecrated and binding customs. 2.\nThe decree of the city. 3. Social or civic opinion _ib._\n\nCross-examination by Sokrates--just and lawfully-behaving\nmen are so through law; unjust and lawless men are so through the\nabsence of law. Law is highly honourable and useful: lawlessness is\nruinous. Accordingly, bad decrees of the city--or bad social\nopinion--cannot be law 77\n\nSuggestion by Sokrates--Law is the _good_ opinion of\nthe city--but good opinion is true opinion, or the finding out of\nreality. Law therefore wishes (tends) to be the finding out of\nreality, though it does not always succeed in doing so 77\n\nObjection taken by the Companion--That there is great\ndiscordance of laws in different places--he specifies several cases\nof such discordance at some length. Sokrates reproves his prolixity,\nand requests him to confine himself to question or answer 78\n\nFarther questions by Sokrates--Things heavy and light, just and\nunjust, honourable and dishonourable, &c., are so, and are accounted\nso everywhere. Real things are always accounted real. Whoever\nfails in attaining the real, fails in attaining the lawful _ib._\n\nThere are laws of health and of cure, composed by the few\nphysicians wise upon those subjects, and unanimously declared by\nthem. So also there are laws of farming, gardening, cookery, declared\nby the few wise in those respective pursuits. In like manner, the\nlaws of a city are the judgments declared by the few wise men who\nknow how to rule 79\n\nThat which is right is the regal law, the only true and\nreal law--that which is not right, is not law, but only seems to be\nlaw in the eyes of the ignorant 80\n\nMinos, King of Krete--his laws were divine and excellent,\nand have remained unchanged from time immemorial _ib._\n\nQuestion about the character of Minos--Homer and Hesiod\ndeclare him to have been admirable, the Attic tragedians defame him\nas a tyrant, because he was an enemy of Athens 81\n\nThat Minos was really admirable--and that he has found out truth and\nreality respecting the administration of the city--we may be sure\nfrom the fact that his laws have remained so long unaltered _ib._\n\nThe question is made more determinate--What is it that the\ngood lawgiver prescribes and measures out for the health of the\nmind, as the physician measures out food and exercise for the body?\nSokrates cannot tell. Close 81\n\nThe Hipparchus and Minos are analogous to each other, and\nboth of them inferior works of Plato, perhaps unfinished 82\n\nHipparchus--double meaning of [Greek: philokerd\u00ea\\s] and\n[Greek: ke/rdos] _ib._\n\nState or mind of the agent, as to knowledge, frequent\ninquiry in Plato. No tenable definition found 83\n\nAdmitting that there is bad gain, as well as good gain,\nwhat is the meaning of the word _gain_**? None is found _ib._\n\nPurpose of Plato in the dialogue--to lay bare the\nconfusion, and to force the mind of the respondent into efforts for\nclearing it up 84\n\nHistorical narrative and comments given in the dialogue\nrespecting Hipparchus--afford no ground for declaring the dialogue to\nbe spurious _ib._\n\nMinos. Question--What is the characteristic property\nconnoted by the word [Greek: No/mos] or law? 86\n\nThis question was discussed by the historical Sokrates,\nMemorabilia of Xenophon _ib._\n\nDefinitions of law--suggested and refuted. Law includes,\nas a portion of its meaning, justice, goodness, usefulness, &c.\nBad decrees are not laws 86\n\nSokrates affirms that law is everywhere the same--it is the declared\njudgment and command of the Wise man upon the subject to which it\nrefers--it is truth and reality, found out and certified by him 87\n\nReasoning of Sokrates in the Minos is unsound, but\nPlatonic. The Good, True, and Real, coalesce in the mind of Plato--he\nacknowledges nothing to be Law, except what he thinks ought to\n_be_ Law 88\n\nPlato worships the Ideal of his own mind--the work of\nsystematic constructive theory by the Wise Man 89\n\nDifferent applications of this general Platonic view, in\nthe Minos, Politikus, Kratylus, &c. _Natural_ Rectitude of\nLaw, Government, Names, &c _ib._\n\nEulogy on Minos, as having established laws on this divine\ntype or natural rectitude 90\n\nThe Minos was arranged by Aristophanes at first in a\nTrilogy along with the Leges 91\n\nExplanations of the word Law--confusion in its meaning _ib._\n\n\nCHAPTER XV.\n\nTHEAGES.\n\nTheag\u00eas--has been declared spurious by some modern\ncritics--grounds for such opinion not sufficient 98\n\nPersons of the dialogue--Sokrates, with Demodokus and\nTheag\u00eas, father and son. Theag\u00eas (the son), eager to acquire\nknowledge, desires to be placed under the teaching of a Sophist 99\n\nSokrates questions Theag\u00eas, inviting him to specify what he\nwants _ib._\n\nTheag\u00eas desires to acquire that wisdom by which he can\ngovern freemen with their own consent 100\n\nIncompetence of the best practical statesmen to teach any one else.\nTheag\u00eas requests that Sokrates will himself teach him _ib._\n\nSokrates declares that he is not competent to teach--that\nhe knows nothing except about matters of love. Theag\u00eas maintains that\nmany of his young friends have profited largely by the conversation\nof Sokrates 101\n\nSokrates explains how this has sometimes happened--he\nrecites his experience of the divine sign or D\u00e6mon _ib._\n\nThe D\u00e6mon is favourable to some persons, adverse to others.\nUpon this circumstance it depends how far any companion profits by\nthe society of Sokrates. Aristeides has not learnt anything from\nSokrates, yet has improved much by being near to him 102\n\nTheag\u00eas expresses his anxiety to be received as the\ncompanion of Sokrates 103\n\nRemarks on the Theag\u00eas--analogy with the Lach\u00eas 104\n\nChief peculiarity of the Theag\u00eas--stress laid upon the\ndivine sign or D\u00e6mon _ib._\n\nPlato employs this divine sign here to render some\nexplanation of the singularity and eccentricity of Sokrates, and of\nhis unequal influence upon different companions _ib._\n\nSokrates, while continually finding fault with other\nteachers, refused to teach himself--difficulty of finding an excuse\nfor his refusal. The Theag\u00eas furnishes an excuse 106\n\nPlato does not always, nor in other dialogues, allude to\nthe divine sign in the same way. Its character and working\nessentially impenetrable. Sokrates a privileged person _ib._\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI.\n\nERAST\u00c6 OR ANTERAST\u00c6--RIVALES.\n\n\nErast\u00e6--subject and persons of the dialogue--dramatic\nintroduction--interesting youths in the pal\u00e6stra 111\n\nTwo rival Erast\u00e6--one of them literary, devoted to\nphilosophy--the other gymnastic, hating philosophy _ib._\n\nQuestion put by Sokrates--What is philosophy? It is the\nperpetual accumulation of knowledge, so as to make the largest sum\ntotal 112\n\nIn the case of the body, it is not the maximum of exercise\nwhich does good, but the proper, measured quantity. For the mind\nalso, it is not the maximum of knowledge, but the measured quantity\nwhich is good. Who is the judge to determine this measure? _ib._\n\nNo answer given. What is the best conjecture? Answer of the\nliterary Erastes. A man must learn that which will yield to him the\ngreatest reputation as a philosopher--as much as will enable him to\ntalk like an intelligent critic, though not to practise 113\n\nThe philosopher is one who is second-best in several\ndifferent arts--a Pentathlus--who talks well upon each _ib._\n\nOn what occasions can such second-best men be useful? There\nare always regular practitioners at hand, and no one will call in the\nsecond-best man when he can have the regular practitioner 114\n\nPhilosophy cannot consist in multiplication of learned\nacquirements _ib._\n\nSokrates changes his course of examination--questions put\nto show that there is one special art, regal and political, of\nadministering and discriminating the bad from the good 115\n\nIn this art the philosopher must not only be second-best,\ncompetent to talk--but he must be a fully qualified practitioner,\ncompetent to act _ib._\n\nClose of the dialogue--humiliation of the literary Erastes 116\n\nRemarks--animated manner of the dialogue _ib._\n\nDefinition of philosophy--here sought for the first\ntime--Platonic conception of measure--referee not discovered 117\n\nView taken of the second-best critical talking man, as\ncompared with the special proficient and practitioner 118\n\nPlato's view--that the philosopher has a province special\nto himself, distinct from other specialties--dimly indicated--regal\nor political art 119\n\nPhilosopher--the supreme artist controlling other artists 120\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII.\n\nION.\n\nIon. Persons of the dialogue. Difference of opinion among\nmodern critics as to its genuineness 124\n\nRhapsodes as a class in Greece. They competed for prizes at\nthe festivals. Ion has been triumphant 124\n\nFunctions of the Rhapsodes. Recitation--exposition of the\npoets--arbitrary exposition of the poets was then frequent 125\n\nThe popularity of the Rhapsodes was chiefly derived from\ntheir recitation--powerful effect which they produced _ib._\n\nIon both reciter and expositor--Homer was considered more\nas an instructor than as a poet 126\n\nPlato disregards and disapproves the poetic or emotional\nworking _ib._\n\nIon devoted himself to Homer exclusively. Questions of\nSokrates to him--How happens it that you cannot talk equally upon\nother poets? The poetic art is one 127\n\nExplanation given by Sokrates--both the Rhapsode and the\nPoet work, not by art and system, but by divine inspiration--fine\npoets are bereft of their reason, and possessed by inspiration from\nsome God _ib._\n\nAnalogy of the Magnet, which holds up by attraction\nsuccessive stages of iron rings. The Gods first inspire Homer, then\nact through him and through Ion upon the auditors 128\n\nThis comparison forms the central point of the dialogue. It is an\nexpansion of a judgment delivered by Sokrates in the Apology 129\n\nPlatonic Antithesis: systematic procedure distinguished\nfrom unsystematic: which latter was either blind routine, or madness\ninspired by the Gods. Varieties of madness, good and bad 129\n\nSpecial inspiration from the Gods was a familiar fact in\nGrecian life--privileged communications from the Gods to\nSokrates--his firm belief in them 130\n\nCondition of the inspired person--his reason is for the\ntime withdrawn 131\n\nIon does not admit himself to be inspired and out of his mind 132\n\nHomer talks upon all subjects--Is Ion competent to explain\nwhat Homer says upon all of them? Rhapsodic art. What is its\nprovince? _ib._\n\nThe Rhapsode does not know special matters, such as the\ncraft of the pilot, physician, farmer, &c., but he knows the\nbusiness of the general, and is competent to command soldiers, having\nlearnt it from Homer 133\n\nConclusion. Ion expounds Homer, not with any knowledge of\nwhat he says, but by divine inspiration 134\n\nThe generals in Greece usually possessed no professional\nexperience--Homer and the poets were talked of as the great\nteachers--Plato's view of the poet, as pretending to know\neverything, but really knowing nothing _ib._\n\nKnowledge, opposed to divine inspiration without knowledge 136\n\nIllustration of Plato's opinion respecting the uselessness\nof written geometrical treatises _ib._\n\n\nCHAPTER XVIII.\n\nLACHES.\n\nLach\u00eas. Subject and persons of the dialogue--whether it is\nuseful that two young men should receive lessons from a master of\narms. Nikias and Lach\u00eas differ in opinion 138\n\nSokrates is invited to declare his opinion--he replies that the point\ncannot be decided without a competent professional judge 139\n\nThose who deliver an opinion must begin by proving their\ncompetence to judge--Sokrates avows his own incompetence 140\n\nNikias and Lach\u00eas submit to be cross-examined by Sokrates 141\n\nBoth of them give opinions offhand, according to their\nfeelings on the special case--Sokrates requires that the question\nshall be generalised, and examined as a branch of education 141\n\nAppeal of Sokrates to the judgment of the One Wise Man--this\nman is never seen or identified 142\n\nWe must know what virtue is, before we give an opinion on\neducation--virtue, as a whole, is too large a question--we will\nenquire about one branch of virtue--courage _ib._\n\nQuestion--what is courage? Laches answers by citing\none particularly manifest case of courage--mistake of not giving a\ngeneral explanation 143\n\nSecond answer. Courage is a sort of endurance of the\nmind--Sokrates points out that the answer is vague and\nincorrect--endurance is not always courage: even intelligent\nendurance is not always courage _ib._\n\nConfusion. New answer given by Nikias. Courage is a sort\nof Intelligence--the intelligence of things terrible and not\nterrible. Objections of Lach\u00eas 144\n\nQuestions of Sokrates to Nikias. It is only future events,\nnot past or present, which are terrible; but intelligence of future\nevents cannot be had without intelligence of past or present 145\n\nCourage therefore must be intelligence of good and evil\ngenerally. But this definition would include the whole of virtue, and\nwe declared that courage was only a part thereof--it will not hold\ntherefore as a definition of courage 146\n\nRemarks. Warfare of Sokrates against the false persuasion\nof knowledge. Brave generals deliver opinions confidently about\ncourage without knowing what it is _ib._\n\nNo solution given by Plato--apparent tendency of his mind,\nin looking for a solution. Intelligence--cannot be understood without\nreference to some object or end 147\n\nObject--is supplied in the answer of Nikias. Intelligence--of\nthings terrible and not terrible. Such intelligence is not\npossessed by professional artists 148\n\nPostulate of a Science of Ends, or Teleology, dimly\nindicated by Plato. The Unknown Wise Man--correlates with the\nundiscovered Science of Ends _ib._\n\nPerfect condition of the intelligence--is the one\nsufficient condition of virtue 149\n\nDramatic contrast between Lach\u00eas and Sokrates, as cross-examiners 150\n\n\nCHAPTER XIX.\n\nCHARMIDES.\n\nScene and personages of the dialogue. Crowded pal\u00e6stra.\nEmotions of Sokrates 153\n\nQuestion, What is Temperance? addressed by Sokrates to the temperate\nCharmides. Answer, It is a kind of sedateness or slowness 154\n\nBut Temperance is a fine or honourable thing, and slowness\nis, in many or most cases, not fine or honourable, but the contrary.\nTemperance cannot be slowness _ib._\n\nSecond answer. Temperance is a variety of the feeling of\nshame. Refuted by Sokrates _ib._\n\nThird answer. Temperance consists in doing one's own\nbusiness. Defended by Kritias. Sokrates pronounces it a riddle, and\nrefutes it. Distinction between making and doing 155\n\nFourth answer, by Kritias. Temperance consists in self-knowledge. _ib._\n\nQuestions of Sokrates thereupon. What good does\nself-knowledge procure for us? What is the object known, in this case?\nAnswer: There is no object of knowledge, distinct from the knowledge\nitself 156\n\nSokrates doubts the possibility of any knowledge, without a\ngiven _cognitum_ as its object. Analogies to prove that\nknowledge of knowledge is impossible 156\n\nAll knowledge must be relative to some object 157\n\nAll properties are relative--every thing in nature has its\ncharacteristic property with reference to something else _ib._\n\nEven if cognition of cognition were possible, cognition of\nnon-cognition would be impossible. A man may know what he knows, but\nhe cannot know what he is ignorant of. He knows the fact _that_\nhe knows: but he does not know how much he knows, and how much he\ndoes not know 158\n\nTemperance, therefore, as thus defined, would be of\nlittle or no value 159\n\nBut even granting the possibility of that which has just\nbeen denied, still Temperance would be of little value. Suppose that\nall separate work were well performed, by special practitioners, we\nshould not attain our end--Happiness _ib._\n\nWhich of the varieties of knowledge contributes most to\nwell-doing or happiness? That by which we know good and evil 160\n\nWithout the science of good and evil, the other special\nscience will be of little or of no service. Temperance is not the\nscience of good and evil, and is of little service 161\n\nSokrates confesses to entire failure in his research. He\ncannot find out what temperance is: although several concessions have\nbeen made which cannot be justified _ib._\n\nTemperance is and must be a good thing: but Charmides\ncannot tell whether he is temperate or not; since what temperance is\nremains unknown 162\n\nExpressions both from Charmides and Kritias of praise and\ndevotion to Sokrates, at the close of the dialogue. Dramatic ornament\nthroughout _ib._\n\nThe Charmides is an excellent specimen of Dialogues of\nSearch. Abundance of guesses and tentatives, all ultimately\ndisallowed 163\n\nTrial and Error, the natural process of the human mind.\nPlato stands alone in bringing to view and dramatising this part of\nthe mental process. Sokrates accepts for himself the condition of\nconscious ignorance 164\n\nFamiliar words--constantly used, with much earnest\nfeeling, but never understood nor defined--ordinary phenomenon in\nhuman society 165\n\nDifferent ethical points of view in different Platonic\ndialogues 167\n\nSelf-knowledge is here declared to be impossible _ib._\n\nIn other dialogues, Sokrates declares self-knowledge to be\nessential and inestimable. Necessity for the student to have\npresented to him dissentient points of view _ib._\n\nCourage and Temperance are shown to have no distinct meaning,\nexcept as founded on the general cognizance of good and evil 168\n\nDistinction made between the special sciences and the\nscience of Good and Evil. Without this last, the special sciences are\nof no use _ib._\n\nKnowledge, always relative to some object known. Postulate\nor divination of a Science of Teleology 169\n\nCourage and Temperance, handled both by Plato and by\nAristotle. Comparison between the two 170\n\n\nCHAPTER XX.\n\nLYSIS.\n\nAnalogy between Lysis and Charmides. Richness of dramatic\nincident in both. Youthful beauty 172\n\nScenery and personages of the Lysis _ib._\n\nOrigin of the conversation. Sokrates promises to give an example\nof the proper way of talking to a youth, for his benefit 173\n\nConversation of Sokrates with Lysis _ib._\n\nLysis is humiliated. Distress of Hippothal\u00eas 177\n\nLysis entreats Sokrates to talk in the like strain to\nMenexenus _ib._\n\nValue of the first conversation between Sokrates and Lysis,\nas an illustration of the Platonico-Sokratic manner 177\n\nSokrates begins to examine Menexenus respecting friendship.\nWho is to be called a friend? Halt in the dialogue 178\n\nQuestions addressed to Lysis. Appeal to the maxims of the\npoets. Like is the friend of like. Canvassed and rejected _ib._\n\nOther poets declare that likeness is a cause of aversion;\nunlikeness, of friendship. Reasons _pro_ and _con_.\nRejected 179\n\nConfusion of Sokrates. He suggests, That the Indifferent\n(neither good nor evil) is friend to the Good 180\n\nSuggestion canvassed. If the Indifferent is friend to the\nGood, it is determined to become so by the contact of felt evil, from\nwhich it is anxious to escape 180\n\nPrinciple illustrated by the philosopher. His intermediate\ncondition--not wise, yet painfully feeling his own ignorance 181\n\nSokrates dissatisfied. He originates a new suggestion. The\nPrimum Amabile, or object originally dear to us, _per se_: by\nrelation or resemblance to which other objects become dear _ib._\n\nThe cause of love is desire. We desire that which is akin\nto us or our own 182\n\nGood is of a nature akin to every one, evil is alien to every one.\nInconsistency with what has been previously laid down 183\n\nFailure of the enquiry. Close of the dialogue 184\n\nRemarks. No positive result. Sokratic purpose in analysing the familiar\nwords--to expose the false persuasion of knowledge _ib._\n\nSubject of Lysis. Suited for a Dialogue of Search. Manner\nof Sokrates, multiplying defective explanations, and showing reasons\nwhy each is defective 185\n\nThe process of trial and error is better illustrated by a\nsearch without result than with result. Usefulness of the dialogue\nfor self-working minds 186\n\nSubject of friendship, handled both by the Xenophontic\nSokrates, and by Aristotle _ib._\n\nDebate in the Lysis partly verbal, partly real.\nAssumptions made by the Platonic Sokrates, questionable, such as the\nreal Sokrates would have found reason for challenging 188\n\nPeculiar theory about friendship broached by Sokrates.\nPersons neither good nor evil by nature, yet having a superficial\ntinge of evil, and desiring good to escape from it 189\n\nThis general theory illustrated by the case of the\nphilosopher or lover of wisdom. Painful consciousness of ignorance\nthe attribute of the philosopher. Value set by Sokrates and Plato\nupon this attribute 190\n\nAnother theory of Sokrates. The Primum Amabile, or\noriginal and primary object of Love. Particular objects are loved\nthrough association with this. The object is Good 191\n\nStatement by Plato of the general law of mental association _ib._\n\nTheory of the Primum Amabile, here introduced by Sokrates,\nwith numerous derivative objects of love. Platonic Idea. Generic\ncommunion of Aristotle, distinguished by him from the feebler\nanalogical communion 192\n\nPrimum Amabile of Plato, compared with the Prima Amicitia\nof Aristotle. Each of them is head of an analogical aggregate, not\nmember of a generic family 194\n\nThe Good and Beautiful, considered as objects of attachment _ib._\n\n\nCHAPTER XXI.\n\nEUTHYDEMUS.\n\nDramatic and comic exuberance of the Euthyd\u00eamus. Judgments\nof various critics 195\n\nScenery and personages _ib._\n\nThe two Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus: manner in\nwhich they are here presented 196\n\nConversation carried on with Kleinias, first by Sokrates,\nnext by the two Sophists _ib._\n\nContrast between the two different modes of interrogation 197\n\nWherein this contrast does not consist 198\n\nWherein it does consist 199\n\nAbuse of fallacies by the Sophists--their bidding for the\napplause of the by-standers _ibid._\n\nComparison of the Euthyd\u00eamus with the Parmenid\u00eas 200\n\nNecessity of settling accounts with the negative, before\nwe venture upon the affirmative, is common to both: in the one the\nprocess is solitary and serious; in the other, it is vulgarised and\nludicrous 201\n\nOpinion of Stallbaum and other critics about the\nEuthyd\u00eamus, that Euthyd\u00eamus and Dionysodorus represent the way in\nwhich Protagoras and Gorgias talked to their auditors 202\n\nThat opinion is unfounded. Sokrates was much more Eristic\nthan Protagoras, who generally manifested himself by continuous\nspeech or lecture _ib._\n\nSokrates in the Euthyd\u00eamus is drawn suitably to the\npurpose of that dialogue 203\n\nThe two Sophists in the Euthyd\u00eamus are not to be taken as\nreal persons, or representatives of real persons 204\n\nColloquy of Sokrates with Kleinias--possession of good things is\nuseless, unless we also have intelligence how to use them _ib._\n\nBut intelligence--of what? It must be such intelligence,\nor such an art, as will include both the making of what we want, and\nthe right use of it when made 205\n\nWhere is such an art to be found? The regal or political\nart looks like it; but what does this art do for us? No answer can be\nfound. Ends in puzzle 206\n\nReview of the cross-examination just pursued by Sokrates.\nIt is very suggestive--puts the mind upon what to look for 207\n\nComparison with other dialogues--Republic, Phil\u00eabus, Protagoras.\nThe only distinct answer is found in the Protagoras 208\n\nThe talk of the two Sophists, though ironically admired\nwhile it is going on, is shown at the end to produce no real\nadmiration, but the contrary _ib._\n\nMistaken representations about the Sophists--Aristotle's\ndefinition--no distinguishable line can be drawn between the Sophist\nand the Dialectician 210\n\nPhilosophical purpose of the Euthyd\u00eamus--exposure of\nfallacies, in Plato's dramatic manner, by multiplication of\nparticular examples 211\n\nAristotle (Soph. Elench.) attempts a classification of\nfallacies: Plato enumerates them without classification 212\n\nFallacies of equivocation propounded by the two Sophists\nin the Euthyd\u00eamus _ib._\n\nFallacies--_\u00e0 dicto secundum quid, ad dictum\nsimpliciter_--in the Euthyd\u00eamus 213\n\nObstinacy shown by the two Sophists in their\nreplies--determination not to contradict themselves 214\n\nFarther verbal equivocations _ib._\n\nFallacies involving deeper logical principles--contradiction\nis impossible.--To speak falsely is impossible 215\n\nPlato's Euthyd\u00eamus is the earliest known attempt to set\nout and expose fallacies--the only way of exposing fallacies is to\nexemplify the fallacy by particular cases, in which the conclusion\nproved is known _aliunde_ to be false and absurd 216\n\nMistake of supposing fallacies to have been invented and\npropagated by Athenian Sophists--they are inherent inadvertencies and\nliabilities to error, in the ordinary process of thinking. Formal\ndebate affords the best means of correcting them 217\n\nWide-spread prevalence of erroneous belief, misguided by\none or other of these fallacies, attested by Sokrates, Plato, Bacon,\n&c.,--complete enumeration of heads of fallacies by Mill 218\n\nValue of formal debate as a means for testing and\nconfuting fallacies 221\n\nWithout the habit of formal debate, Plato could not have\ncomposed his Euthyd\u00eamus, nor Aristotle the treatise De Sophisticis\nElenchis _ib._\n\nProbable popularity of the Euthyd\u00eamus at Athens--welcomed\nby all the enemies of Dialectic 222\n\nEpilogue of Plato to the Dialogue, trying to obviate this\ninference by opponents--Conversation between Sokrates and Kriton 223\n\nAltered tone in speaking of Euthyd\u00eamus--Disparagement of\npersons half-philosophers, half-politicians 224\n\nKriton asks Sokrates for advice about the education of his\nsons--Sokrates cannot recommend a teacher--tells him to search for\nhimself 225\n\nEuthyd\u00eamus is here cited as representative of Dialectic\nand philosophy 226\n\nWho is the person here intended by Plato,\nhalf-philosopher, half-politician? Is it Isokrates? 227\n\nVariable feeling at different times, between Plato and\nIsokrates 228\n\n\nCHAPTER XXII.\n\nMENON.\n\nPersons of the Dialogue 232\n\nQuestion put by Menon--Is virtue teachable? Sokrates confesses that\nhe does not know what virtue is. Surprise of Menon _ib._\n\nSokrates stands alone in this confession. Unpopularity\nentailed by it 233\n\nAnswer of Menon--plurality of virtues, one belonging to\neach different class and condition. Sokrates enquires for the\nproperty common to all of them _ib._\n\nAnalogous cases cited--definitions of figure and colour 235\n\nImportance at that time of bringing into conscious view,\nlogical subordination and distinctions--Neither logic nor grammar had\nthen been cast into system _ib._\n\nDefinition of virtue given by Menon: Sokrates pulls it to pieces 236\n\nMenon complains that the conversation of Sokrates confounds\nhim like an electric shock--Sokrates replies that he is himself in\nthe same state of confusion and ignorance. He urges continuance of\nsearch by both 237\n\nBut how is the process of search available to any purpose? No man\nsearches for what he already knows: and for what he does not know,\nit is useless to search, for he cannot tell when he has found it _ib._\n\nTheory of reminiscence propounded by Sokrates--anterior immortality\nof the soul--what is called teaching is the revival and recognition\nof knowledge acquired in a former life, but forgotten _ib._\n\nIllustration of this theory--knowledge may be revived by\nskilful questions in the mind of a man thoroughly untaught. Sokrates\nquestions the slave of Menon 238\n\nEnquiry taken up--Whether virtue is teachable? without\ndetermining what virtue is 239\n\nVirtue is knowledge--no possessions, no attributes, either\nof mind or body, are good or profitable, except under the guidance of\nknowledge _ib._\n\nVirtue, as being knowledge, must be teachable. Yet there\nare opposing reasons, showing that it cannot be teachable. No\nteachers of it can be found 239\n\nConversation of Sokrates with Anytus, who detests the\nSophists, and affirms that any one of the leading politicians can\nteach virtue 240\n\nConfused state of the discussion. No way of acquiring\nvirtue is shown _ib._\n\nSokrates modifies his premisses--knowledge is not the only thing\nwhich guides to good results--right opinion will do the same _ib._\n\nRight opinion cannot be relied on for staying in the mind,\nand can never give rational explanations, nor teach others--good\npractical statesmen receive right opinion by inspiration from the\nGods 241\n\nAll the real virtue that there is, is communicated by\nspecial inspiration from the Gods 242\n\nBut what virtue itself is, remains unknown _ib._\n\nRemarks on the dialogue. Proper order for examining the\ndifferent topics, is pointed out by Sokrates _ib._\n\nMischief of debating ulterior and secondary questions when\nthe fundamental notions and word are unsettled _ib._\n\nDoctrine of Sokrates in the Menon--desire of good alleged\nto be universally felt--in what sense this is true 243\n\nSokrates requires knowledge as the principal condition of\nvirtue, but does not determine knowledge, of what? 244\n\nSubject of Menon; same as that of the Protagoras--diversity\nof handling--Plato is not anxious to settle a question and\nget rid of it 245\n\nAnxiety of Plato to keep up and enforce the spirit of\nresearch 246\n\nGreat question discussed among the Grecian\nphilosophers--criterion of truth--Wherein consists the process\nof verification? _ib._\n\nNone of the philosophers were satisfied with the answer\nhere made by Plato--that verification consists in appeal to pre-natal\nexperience 247\n\nPlato's view of the immortality of the soul--difference\nbetween the Menon, Ph\u00e6drus, and Ph\u00e6don 249\n\nDoctrine of Plato, that new truth may be elicited by skilful\nexamination out of the unlettered mind--how far correct? _ib._\n\nPlato's doctrine about _\u00e0 priori_ reasonings--different\nfrom the modern doctrine 251\n\nPlato's theory about pre-natal experience. He took no\npains to ascertain and measure the extent of post-natal experience 252\n\nLittle or nothing is said in the Menon about the Platonic\nIdeas or Forms 253\n\nWhat Plato meant by Causal Reasoning--his distinction\nbetween knowledge and right opinion _ib._\n\nThis distinction compared with modern philosophical views 254\n\nManifestation of Anytus--intense antipathy to the Sophists\nand to philosophy generally 255\n\nThe enemy of Sokrates is also the enemy of the\nsophists--practical statesmen 256\n\nThe Menon brings forward the point of analogy between\nSokrates and the Sophists, in which both were disliked by the\npractical statesmen 257\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIII.\n\nPROTAGORAS.\n\nScenic arrangement and personages of the dialogue 259\n\nIntroduction. Eagerness of the youthful Hippokrates to\nbecome acquainted with Protagoras 260\n\nSokrates questions Hippokrates as to his purpose and\nexpectations from Protagoras _ib._\n\nDanger of going to imbibe the instruction of a Sophist\nwithout knowing beforehand what he is about to teach 262\n\nRemarks on the Introduction. False persuasion of knowledge\nbrought to light 263\n\nSokrates and Hippokrates go to the house of Kallias.\nCompany therein. Respect shown to Protagoras 264\n\nQuestions of Sokrates to Protagoras. Answer of the latter,\ndeclaring the antiquity of the sophistical profession, and his own\nopenness in avowing himself a sophist _ib._\n\nProtagoras prefers to converse in presence of the assembled\ncompany 266\n\nAnswers of Protagoras. He intends to train young men as\nvirtuous citizens _ib._\n\nSokrates doubts whether virtue is teachable. Reasons for\nsuch doubt. Protagoras is asked to explain whether it is or not. _ib._\n\nExplanation of Protagoras. He begins with a mythe 267\n\nMythe. First fabrication of men by the Gods. Prometheus and\nEpimetheus. Bad distribution of endowments to man by the latter. It\nis partly amended by Prometheus 267\n\nPrometheus gave to mankind skill for the supply of\nindividual wants, but could not give them the social art--Mankind are\non the point of perishing, when Zeus sends to them the dispositions\nessential for society 268\n\nProtagoras follows up his mythe by a discourse. Justice and\nthe sense of shame are not professional attributes, but are possessed\nby all citizens and taught by all to all 269\n\nConstant teaching of virtue. Theory of punishment 270\n\nWhy eminent men cannot make their sons eminent 271\n\nTeaching by parents, schoolmaster, harpist, laws,\ndikastery, &c. _ib._\n\nAll learn virtue from the same teaching by all. Whether a\nlearner shall acquire more or less of it, depends upon his own\nindividual aptitude 272\n\nAnalogy of learning vernacular Greek. No special teacher\nthereof. Protagoras teaches virtue somewhat better than others 273\n\nThe sons of great artists do not themselves become great\nartists 274\n\nRemarks upon the mythe and discourse. They explain the\nmanner in which the established sentiment of a community propagates\nand perpetuates itself 274\n\nAntithesis of Protagoras and Sokrates. Whether virtue is\nto be assimilated to a special art 275\n\nProcedure of Sokrates in regard to the discourse of\nProtagoras--he compliments it as an exposition, and analyses some of\nthe fundamental assumptions 276\n\nOne purpose of the dialogue. To contrast continuous\ndiscourse with short cross-examining question and answer 277\n\nQuestions by Sokrates--Whether virtue is one and\nindivisible, or composed of different parts? Whether the parts are\nhomogeneous or heterogeneous? _ib._\n\nWhether justice is just, and holiness holy? How far\njustice is like to holiness? Sokrates protests against an answer, \"If\nyou please\" 278\n\nIntelligence and moderation are identical, because they\nhave the same contrary 279\n\nInsufficient reasons given by Sokrates. He seldom cares to\ndistinguish different meanings of the same term _ib._\n\nProtagoras is puzzled, and becomes irritated 280\n\nSokrates presses Protagoras farther. His purpose is, to\ntest opinions and not persons. Protagoras answers with angry\nprolixity _ib._\n\nRemonstrance of Sokrates against long answers as\ninconsistent with the laws of dialogue. Protagoras persists. Sokrates\nrises to depart 281\n\nInterference of Kallias to get the debate continued.\nPromiscuous conversation. Alkibiades declares that Protagoras ought\nto acknowledge superiority of Sokrates in dialogue 282\n\nClaim of a special _locus standi_ and professorship\nfor Dialectic, apart from Rhetoric _ib._\n\nSokrates is prevailed upon to continue, and invites\nProtagoras to question him _ib._\n\nProtagoras extols the importance of knowing the works of\nthe poets, and questions about parts of a song of Simonides.\nDissenting opinions about the interpretation of the song 283\n\nLong speech of Sokrates, expounding the purpose of the\nsong, and laying down an ironical theory about the numerous concealed\nsophists at Krete and Sparta, masters of short speech 283\n\nCharacter of this speech--its connection with the\ndialogue, and its general purpose. Sokrates inferior to Protagoras in\ncontinuous speech 284\n\nSokrates depreciates the value of debates on the poets.\nTheir meaning is always disputed, and you can never ask from\nthemselves what it is. Protagoras consents reluctantly to resume the\ntask of answering 285\n\nPurpose of Sokrates to sift difficulties which he really\nfeels in his own mind. Importance of a colloquial companion for this\npurpose 287\n\nThe interrupted debate is resumed. Protagoras says that\ncourage differs materially from the other branches of virtue 288\n\nSokrates argues to prove that courage consists in\nknowledge or intelligence. Protagoras does not admit this. Sokrates\nchanges his attack _ib._\n\nIdentity of the pleasurable with the good--of the painful\nwith the evil. Sokrates maintains it. Protagoras denies. Debate 289\n\nEnquiry about knowledge. Is it the dominant agency in the\nmind? Or is it overcome frequently by other agencies, pleasure or\npain? Both agree that knowledge is dominant 290\n\nMistake of supposing that men act contrary to knowledge.\nWe never call pleasures evils, except when they entail a\npreponderance of pain, or a disappointment of greater pleasures 291\n\nPleasure is the only good--pain the only evil. No man does\nevil voluntarily, knowing it to be evil. Difference between pleasures\npresent and future--resolves itself into pleasure and pain 292\n\nNecessary resort to the measuring art for choosing\npleasures rightly--all the security of our lives depend upon it 293\n\nTo do wrong, overcome by pleasure, is only a bad phrase\nfor describing what is really a case of grave ignorance 294\n\nReasoning of Sokrates assented to by all. Actions which\nconduct to pleasures or freedom from pain, are honourable 295\n\nExplanation of courage. It consists in a wise estimate of\nthings terrible and not terrible _ib._\n\nReluctance of Protagoras to continue answering. Close of\nthe discussion. Sokrates declares that the subject is still in\nconfusion, and that he wishes to debate it again with Protagoras.\nAmicable reply of Protagoras 297\n\nRemarks on the dialogue. It closes without the least\nallusion to Hippokrates 298\n\nTwo distinct aspects of ethics and politics exhibited: one\nunder the name of Protagoras; the other, under that of Sokrates 299\n\nOrder of ethical problems, as conceived by Sokrates _ib._\n\nDifference of method between him and Protagoras flows from\nthis difference of order. Protagoras assumes what virtue is, without\nenquiry 300\n\nMethod of Protagoras. Continuous lectures addressed to\nestablished public sentiments with which he is in harmony 301\n\nMethod of Sokrates. Dwells upon that part of the problem\nwhich Protagoras had left out _ib._\n\nAntithesis between the eloquent lecturer and the\nanalytical cross-examiner 303\n\nProtagoras not intended to be always in the wrong, though\nhe is described as brought to a contradiction _ib._\n\nAffirmation of Protagoras about courage is affirmed by\nPlato himself elsewhere _ib._\n\nThe harsh epithets applied by critics to Protagoras are\nnot borne out by the dialogue. He stands on the same ground as the\ncommon consciousness 304\n\nAversion of Protagoras for dialectic. Interlude about the\nsong of Simonides 305\n\nEthical view given by Sokrates worked out at length\nclearly. Good and evil consist in right or wrong calculation of\npleasures and pains of the agent _ib._\n\nProtagoras is at first opposed to this theory 306\n\nReasoning of Sokrates 307\n\nApplication of that reasoning to the case of courage _ib._\n\nThe theory which Plato here lays down is more distinct and\nspecific than any theory laid down in other dialogues 308\n\nRemarks on the theory here laid down by Sokrates. It is\ntoo narrow, and exclusively prudential 309\n\nComparison with the Republic 310\n\nThe discourse of Protagoras brings out an important part\nof the whole case, which is omitted in the analysis by Sokrates 311\n\nThe Ethical End, as implied in the discourse of\nProtagoras, involves a direct regard to the pleasures and pains of\nother persons besides the agent himself 312\n\nPlato's reasoning in the dialogue is not clear or\nsatisfactory, especially about courage 313\n\nDoctrine of Stallbaum and other critics is not correct.\nThat the analysis here ascribed to Sokrates is not intended by Plato\nas serious, but as a mockery of the sophists 314\n\nGrounds of that doctrine. Their insufficiency 315\n\nSubject is professedly still left unsettled at the close\nof the dialogue 316\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIV.\n\nGORGIAS.\n\nPersons who debate in the Gorgias. Celebrity of the\nhistorical Gorgias 317\n\nIntroductory circumstances of the dialogue. Polus and\nKallikl\u00eas 318\n\nPurpose of Sokrates in questioning. Conditions of a good\ndefinition _ib._\n\nQuestions about the definition of Rhetoric. It is the\nartisan of persuasion 319\n\nThe Rhetor produces belief without knowledge. Upon what\nmatters is he competent to advise? 319\n\nThe Rhetor can persuade the people upon any matter, even\nagainst the opinion of the special expert. He appears to know, among\nthe ignorant 320\n\nGorgias is now made to contradict himself. Polus takes\nup the debate with Sokrates 321\n\nPolemical tone of Sokrates. At the instance of Polus he\ngives his own definition of rhetoric. It is no art, but an empirical\nknack of catering for the immediate pleasure of hearers, analogous to\ncookery. It is a branch under the general head flattery _ib._\n\nDistinction between the true arts which aim at the good of\nthe body and mind--and the counterfeit arts, which pretend to the\nsame, but in reality aim at immediate pleasure 322\n\nQuestions of Polus. Sokrates denies that the Rhetors have\nany real power, because they do nothing which they really wish 323\n\nAll men wish for what is good for them. Despots and\nRhetors, when they kill any one, do so because they think it good for\nthem. If it be really not good, they do not do what they will, and\ntherefore have no real power 324\n\nComparison of Archelaus, usurping despot of Macedonia--Polus\naffirms that Archelaus is happy, and that every one thinks\nso--Sokrates admits that every one thinks so, but nevertheless\ndenies it 325\n\nSokrates maintains--1. That it is a greater evil to do\nwrong, than to suffer wrong. 2. That if a man has done wrong, it is\nbetter for him to be punished than to remain unpunished 326\n\nSokrates offers proof--Definition of Pulchrum and\nTurpe--Proof of the first point 327\n\nProof of the second point _ib._\n\nThe criminal labours under a mental distemper, which\nthough not painful, is a capital evil. Punishment is the only cure\nfor him. To be punished is best for him 328\n\nMisery of the Despot who is never punished. If our friend\nhas done wrong, we ought to get him punished: if our enemy, we ought\nto keep him unpunished 329\n\nArgument of Sokrates paradoxical--Doubt expressed by\nKallikl\u00eas whether he means it seriously 330\n\nPrinciple laid down by Sokrates--That every one acts with\na view to the attainment of happiness and avoidance of misery _ib._\n\nPeculiar view taken by Plato of Good--Evil--Happiness 331\n\nContrast of the usual meaning of these words, with the\nPlatonic meaning _ib._\n\nExamination of the proof given by Sokrates--Inconsistency\nbetween the general answer of Polus and his previous\ndeclarations--Law and Nature 332\n\nThe definition of Pulchrum and Turpe, given by Sokrates,\nwill not hold 334\n\nWorse or better--for whom? The argument of Sokrates does\nnot specify. If understood in the sense necessary for his inference,\nthe definition would be inadmissible _ib._\n\nPlato applies to every one a standard of happiness and\nmisery peculiar to himself. His view about the conduct of Archelaus\nis just, but he does not give the true reasons for it 335\n\nIf the reasoning of Plato were true, the point of view in\nwhich punishment is considered would be reversed 336\n\nPlato pushes too far the analogy between mental distemper\nand bodily distemper--Material difference between the two--Distemper\nmust be felt by the distempered persons 337\n\nKallikl\u00eas begins to argue against Sokrates--he takes a\ndistinction between Just by Law and Just by nature--Reply of\nSokrates, that there is no variance between the two, properly\nunderstood 338\n\nWhat Kallikl\u00eas says is not to be taken as a sample of the\nteachings of Athenian sophists. Kallikl\u00eas--rhetor and politician 339\n\nUncertainty of referring to Nature as an authority. It may\nbe pleaded in favour of opposite theories. The theory of Kallikl\u00eas is\nmade to appear repulsive by the language in which he expresses it 340\n\nSokrates maintains that self-command and moderation is\nrequisite for the strong man as well as for others. Kallikl\u00eas defends\nthe negative 343\n\nWhether the largest measure of desires is good for a man,\nprovided he has the means of satisfying them? Whether all varieties\nof desire are good? Whether the pleasurable and the good are\nidentical? 344\n\nKallikl\u00eas maintains that pleasurable and good are\nidentical. Sokrates refutes him. Some pleasures are good, others bad.\nA scientific adviser is required to discriminate them 345\n\nContradiction between Sokrates in the Gorgias, and\nSokrates in the Protagoras _ib._\n\nViews of critics about this contradiction 346\n\nComparison and appreciation of the reasoning of Sokrates\nin both dialogues _ib._\n\nDistinct statement in the Protagoras. What are good and\nevil, and upon what principles the scientific adviser is to proceed\nin discriminating them. No such distinct statement in the Gorgias 347\n\nModern ethical theories. Intuition. Moral sense--not\nrecognised by Plato in either of the dialogues 348\n\nIn both dialogues the doctrine of Sokrates is\nself-regarding as respects the agent: not considering the\npleasures and pains of other persons, so far as affected by\nthe agent 349\n\nPoints wherein the doctrine of the two dialogues is in\nsubstance the same, but differing in classification _ib._\n\nKallikl\u00eas, whom Sokrates refutes in the Gorgias, maintains\na different argument from that which Sokrates combats in the\nProtagoras 350\n\nThe refutation of Kallikl\u00eas by Sokrates in the Gorgias, is\nunsuccessful--it is only so far successful as he adopts\nunintentionally the doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras 351\n\nPermanent elements--and transient elements--of human\nagency--how each of them is appreciated in the two dialogues 353\n\nIn the Protagoras _ib._\n\nIn the Gorgias 354\n\nCharacter of the Gorgias generally--discrediting all the\nactualities of life 355\n\nArgument of Sokrates resumed--multifarious arts of\nflattery, aiming at immediate pleasure 357\n\nThe Rhetors aim at only flattering the public--even the\nbest past Rhetors have done nothing else--citation of the four great\nRhetors by Kallikles 357\n\nNecessity for temperance, regulation, order. This is the\ncondition of virtue and happiness 358\n\nImpossible to succeed in public life, unless a man be\nthoroughly akin to and in harmony with the ruling force 359\n\nDanger of one who dissents from the public, either for\nbetter or for worse _ib._\n\nSokrates resolves upon a scheme of life for himself--to\nstudy permanent good, and not immediate satisfaction 360\n\nSokrates announces himself as almost the only man at Athens,\nwho follows out the true political art. Danger of doing this 361\n\nMythe respecting Hades, and the treatment of deceased\npersons therein, according to their merits during life--the\nphilosopher who stood aloof from public affairs, will then be\nrewarded _ib._\n\nPeculiar ethical views of Sokrates--Rhetorical or\ndogmatical character of the Gorgias 362\n\nHe merges politics in Ethics--he conceives the rulers as\nspiritual teachers and trainers of the community _id._\n\n_Id\u00e9al_ of Plato--a despotic lawgiver or man-trainer,\non scientific principles, fashioning all characters pursuant to\ncertain types of his own 363\n\nPlatonic analogy between mental goodness and bodily\nhealth--incomplete analogy--circumstances of difference _ib._\n\nSokrates in the Gorgias speaks like a dissenter among a\ncommunity of fixed opinions and habits. Impossible that a dissenter,\non important points, should acquire any public influence 364\n\nSokrates feels his own isolation from his countrymen. He\nis thrown upon individual speculation and dialectic 365\n\nAntithesis between philosophy and rhetoric _ib._\n\nPosition of one who dissents, upon material points, from\nthe fixed opinions and creed of his countrymen 366\n\nProbable feelings of Plato on this subject--Claim put\nforward in the Gorgias of an independent _locus standi_ for\nphilosophy, but without the indiscriminate cross-examination\npursued by Sokrates 367\n\nImportance of maintaining the utmost liberty of discussion.\nTendency of all ruling orthodoxy towards intolerance 368\n\nIssue between philosophy and rhetoric--not satisfactorily\nhandled by Plato. Injustice done to rhetoric. Ignoble manner in which\nit is presented by Polus and Kallikl\u00eas 369\n\nPerikles would have accepted the defence of rhetoric, as\nPlato has put it into the mouth of Gorgias 370\n\nThe Athenian people recognise a distinction between the\npleasurable and the good: but not the same as that which Plato\nconceived 371\n\nRhetoric was employed at Athens in appealing to all the\nvarious established sentiments and opinions. Erroneous inferences\nraised by the Kallikl\u00eas of Plato 373\n\nThe Platonic Id\u00e9al exacts, as good, some order, system,\ndiscipline. But order may be directed to bad ends as well as to good.\nDivergent ideas about virtue 374\n\nHow to discriminate the right order from the wrong. Plato\ndoes not advise us 375\n\nThe Gorgias upholds the independence and dignity of the\ndissenting philosopher _ib._\n\n\nCHAPTER XXV.\n\nPH\u00c6DON.\n\nThe Ph\u00e6don is affirmative and expository 377\n\nSituation and circumstances assumed in the Ph\u00e6don. Pathetic\ninterest which they inspire _ib._\n\nSimmias and Keb\u00eas, the two collocutors with Sokrates. Their\nfeelings and those of Sokrates 378\n\nEmphasis of Sokrates in insisting on freedom of debate, active\nexercise of reason, and independent judgment for each reasoner 379\n\nAnxiety of Sokrates that his friends shall be on their\nguard against being influenced by his authority--that they shall\nfollow only the convictions of their own reason 380\n\nRemarkable manifestation of earnest interest for reasoned\ntruth and the liberty of individual dissent 381\n\nPh\u00e6don and Symposion--points of analogy and contrast 382\n\nPh\u00e6don--compared with Republic and Tim\u00e6us. No recognition\nof the triple or lower souls. Antithesis between soul and body 383\n\nDifferent doctrines of Plato about the soul. Whether all\nthe three souls are immortal, or the rational soul alone 385\n\nThe life and character of a philosopher is a constant\nstruggle to emancipate his soul from his body. Death alone enables\nhim to do this completely 386\n\nSouls of the ordinary or unphilosophical men pass after\ndeath into the bodies of different animals. The philosopher alone is\nrelieved from all communion with body 387\n\nSpecial privilege claimed for philosophers in the Ph\u00e6don\napart from the virtuous men who are not philosophers 388\n\nSimmias and Keb\u00eas do not admit readily the immortality of\nthe soul, but are unwilling to trouble Sokrates by asking for proof.\nUnabated interest of Sokrates in rational debate 390\n\nSimmias and Keb\u00eas believe fully in the pre-existence of\nthe soul, but not in its post-existence. Doctrine--That the soul is a\nsort of harmony--refuted by Sokrates _ib._\n\nSokrates unfolds the intellectual changes or wanderings\nthrough which his mind had passed 391\n\nFirst doctrine of Sokrates as to cause. Reasons why he\nrejected it _ib._\n\nSecond doctrine. Hopes raised by the treatise of\nAnaxagoras 393\n\nDisappointment because Anaxagoras did not follow out the\noptimistic principle into detail. Distinction between causes\nefficient and causes co-efficient 394\n\nSokrates could neither trace out the optimistic principle\nfor himself, nor find any teacher thereof. He renounced it, and\nembraced a third doctrine about cause 395\n\nHe now assumes the separate existence of ideas. These\nideas are the causes why particular objects manifest certain\nattributes 396\n\nProcedure of Sokrates if his hypothesis were impugned. He\ninsists upon keeping apart the discussion of the hypothesis and the\ndiscussion of its consequences 397\n\nExposition of Sokrates welcomed by the hearers. Remarks\nupon it 398\n\nThe philosophical changes in Sokrates all turned upon\ndifferent views as to a true cause _ib._.\n\nProblems and difficulties of which Sokrates first sought\nsolution 399\n\nExpectations entertained by Sokrates from the treatise of\nAnaxagoras. His disappointment. His distinction between causes and\nco-efficients 400\n\nSokrates imputes to Anaxagoras the mistake of substituting\nphysical agencies in place of mental. This is the same which\nAristophanes and others imputed to Sokrates 401\n\nThe supposed theory of Anaxagoras cannot be carried out,\neither by Sokrates himself or any one else. Sokrates turns to general\nwords, and adopts the theory of ideas 403\n\nVague and dissentient meanings attached to the word Cause.\nThat is a cause, to each man, which gives satisfaction to his\ninquisitive feelings 404\n\nDissension and perplexity on the question.--What is a\ncause? revealed by the picture of Sokrates--no intuition to guide him\n407\n\nDifferent notions of Plato and Aristotle about causation,\ncauses regular and irregular. Inductive theory of causation,\nelaborated in modern times _ib._\n\nLast transition of the mind of Sokrates from things to\nwords--to the adoption of the theory of ideas. Great multitude of\nideas assumed, each fitting a certain number of particulars 410\n\nUltimate appeal to hypothesis of extreme generality 411\n\nPlato's demonstration of the immortality of the soul rests\nupon the assumption of the Platonic ideas. Reasoning to prove this 412\n\nThe soul always brings life, and is essentially living. It\ncannot receive death: in other words, it is immortal 413\n\nThe proof of immortality includes pre-existence as well as\npost-existence--animals as well as man--also the metempsychosis or\ntranslation of the soul from one body to another 414\n\nAfter finishing his proof that the soul is immortal,\nSokrates enters into a description, what will become of it after the\ndeath of the body. He describes a [Greek: Nekui/a] 415\n\nSokrates expects that his soul is going to the islands of\nthe blest. Reply to Kriton about burying his body 416\n\nPreparations for administering the hemlock. Sympathy of\nthe gaoler. Equanimity of Sokrates _ib._\n\nSokrates swallows the poison. Conversation with the gaoler 417\n\nUngovernable sorrow of the friends present. Self-command\nof Sokrates. Last words to Kriton, and death _ib._\n\nExtreme pathos, and probable trustworthiness of these\npersonal details 419\n\nContrast between the Platonic Apology and the Ph\u00e6don _ib._.\n\nAbundant dogmatic and poetical invention of the Ph\u00e6don\ncompared with the profession of ignorance which we read in the\nApology 421\n\nTotal renunciation and discredit of the body in the Ph\u00e6don.\nDifferent feeling about the body in other Platonic dialogues 422\n\nPlato's argument does not prove the immortality of the\nsoul. Even if it did prove that, yet the mode of pre-existence and\nthe mode of post-existence, of the soul, would be quite undetermined 423\n\nThe philosopher will enjoy an existence of pure soul\nunattached to any body 425\n\nPlato's demonstration of the immortality of the soul did\nnot appear satisfactory to subsequent philosophers. The question\nremained debated and problematical 426\n\n\n\n\nPLATO.\n\nCHAPTER XII\n\nALKIBIADES I. AND II.\n\nALKIBIADES I.--ON THE NATURE OF MAN.\n\n\n[Side-note: Situation supposed in the dialogue.\nPersons--Sokrates and Alkibiades.]\n\nThis dialogue is carried on between Sokrates and Alkibiades. It\nintroduces Alkibiades as about twenty years of age, having just\npassed through the period of youth, and about to enter on the\nprivileges and duties of a citizen. The real dispositions and\ncircumstances of the historical Alkibiades (magnificent personal\nbeauty, stature, and strength, high family and connections, great\nwealth already possessed, since his father had died when he was a\nchild,--a full measure of education and accomplishments--together\nwith exorbitant ambition and insolence, derived from such accumulated\nadvantages) are brought to view in the opening address of Sokrates.\nAlkibiades, during the years of youth which he had just passed, had\nbeen surrounded by admirers who tried to render themselves acceptable\nto him, but whom he repelled with indifference, and even with scorn.\nSokrates had been among them, constantly present and near to\nAlkibiades, but without ever addressing a word to him. The youthful\nbeauty being now exchanged for manhood, all these admirers had\nretired, and Sokrates alone remains. His attachment is to Alkibiades\nhimself: to promise of mind rather than to attractions of person.\nSokrates has been always hitherto restrained, by his divine sign\nor D\u00e6mon, from speaking to Alkibiades. But this prohibition has now\nbeen removed; and he accosts him for the first time, in the full\nbelief that he shall be able to give improving counsel, essential to\nthe success of that political career upon which the youth is about to\nenter.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Plato, Alkib. i. 103, 104, 105. Perikles is supposed to\nbe still alive and political leader of Athens--104 B.\n\nI have briefly sketched the imaginary situation to which this\ndialogue is made to apply. The circumstances of it belong to Athenian\nmanners of the Platonic age.\n\nSome of the critics, considering that the relation supposed between\nSokrates and Alkibiades is absurd and unnatural, allege this among\ntheir reasons for denying the authenticity of the dialogue. But if\nany one reads the concluding part of the Symposion--the authenticity\nof which has never yet been denied by any critic--he will find\nsomething a great deal more abnormal in what is there recounted about\nSokrates and Alkibiades.\n\nIn a dialogue composed by \u00c6schines Socraticus (cited by the rhetor\nAristeides--[Greek: Peri\\ R(\u00eatorik\u00ea=s], Or. xlv. p. 23-24),\nexpressions of intense love for Alkibiades are put into the mouth of\nSokrates. \u00c6schines was [Greek: gn\u00ea/sios e(tai=ros S\u00f4kra/tous], not\nless than Plato. The different companions of Sokrates thus agreed in\ntheir picture of the relation between him and Alkibiades.]\n\n[Side-note: Exorbitant hopes and political ambition of\nAlkibiades.]\n\nYou are about to enter on public life (says Sokrates to Alkibiades)\nwith the most inordinate aspirations for glory and aggrandisement.\nYou not only thirst for the acquisition of ascendancy such as\nPerikles possesses at Athens, but your ambition will not be satisfied\nunless you fill Asia with your renown, and put yourself upon a level\nwith Cyrus and Xerxes. Now such aspirations cannot be gratified\nexcept through my assistance. I do not deal in long discourses such\nas you have been accustomed to hear from others: I shall put to you\nonly some short interrogatories, requiring nothing more than answers\nto my questions.[2]\n\n[Footnote 2: Plato, Alkib. i. 106 B. [Greek: A)=ra e)r\u00f4tta=|s ei)/\ntina e)/ch\u00f4 ei)pei=n lo/gon makro/n, oi(/ous d\u00ea\\ a)kou/ein\nei)/thisai? ou) ga/r e)sti toiou=ton to\\ e)mo/n.] I give here, as\nelsewhere, not an exact translation, but an abstract.]\n\n[Side-note: Questions put by Sokrates, in reference to\nAlkibiades in his intended function as adviser of the Athenians. What\ndoes he intend to advise them upon? What has he learnt, and what does\nhe know?]\n\n_Sokr._--You are about to step forward as adviser of the public\nassembly. Upon what points do you intend to advise them? Upon points\nwhich you know better than they? _Alk._--Of course.\n_Sokr._--All that you know, has been either learnt from others\nor found out by yourself. _Alk._--Certainly. _Sokr._--But\nyou would neither have learnt any thing, nor found out any thing,\nwithout the desire to learn or find out: and you would have felt no\nsuch desire, in respect to that which you believed yourself to know\nalready. That which you now know, therefore, there was a time when\nyou believed yourself not to know? _Alk._--Necessarily so.\n_Sokr._--Now all that you have learnt, as I am well aware,\nconsists of three things--letters, the harp, gymnastics. Do you\nintend to advise the Athenians when they are debating about letters,\nor about harp-playing, or about gymnastics? _Alk._--Neither of\nthe three. _Sokr._--Upon what occasions, then, do you propose to\ngive advice? Surely, not when the Athenians are debating about\narchitecture, or prophetic warnings, or the public health: for to\ndeliver opinions on each of these matters, belongs not to you but to\nprofessional men--architects, prophets, physicians; whether they be\npoor or rich, high-born or low-born? If not _then_, upon what\nother occasions will you tender your counsel? _Alk._--When they\nare debating about affairs of their own.\n\n[Side-note: Alkibiades intends to advise the Athenians on\nquestions of war and peace. Questions of Sokrates thereupon. We must\nfight those whom it is better to fight--to what standard does better\nrefer? To just and unjust.]\n\n_Sokr._--But about what affairs of their own? Not about affairs\nof shipbuilding: for of that you know nothing. _Alk._--When they\nare discussing war and peace, or any other business concerning the\ncity. _Sokr._--You mean when they are discussing the question\nwith whom they shall make war or peace, and in what manner? But it is\ncertain that we must fight those whom it is best to fight--also\n_when_ it is best--and _as long as_ it is best.\n_Alk._--Certainly. _Sokr._--Now, if the Athenians wished\nto know whom it was best to wrestle with, and when or how long it was\nbest which of the two would be most competent to advise them, you or\nthe professional trainer? _Alk._--The trainer, undoubtedly.\n_Sokr._--So, too, about playing the harp or singing. But when\nyou talk about _better_, in wrestling or singing, what standard\ndo you refer to? Is it not to the gymnastic or musical art?\n_Alk._--Yes. _Sokr._--Answer me in like manner about war or\npeace, the subjects on which you are going to advise your countrymen,\nwhom, and at what periods, it is _better_ to fight, and\n_better_ not to fight? What in this last case do you mean by\n_better_? To what standard, or to what end, do you refer?[3]\n_Alk._--I cannot say. _Sokr._--But is it not a disgrace,\nsince you profess to advise your countrymen when and against whom\nit is better for them to war,--not to be able to say to what end your\n_better_ refers? Do not you know what are the usual grounds and\ncomplaints urged when war is undertaken? _Alk._--Yes:\ncomplaints of having been cheated, or robbed, or injured.\n_Sokr._--Under what circumstances? _Alk._--You mean,\nwhether justly or unjustly? That makes all the difference.\n_Sokr._--Do you mean to advise the Athenians to fight those who\nbehave justly, or those who behave unjustly? _Alk._--The\nquestion is monstrous. Certainly not those who behave justly. It\nwould be neither lawful nor honourable. _Sokr._--Then when you\nspoke about _better_, in reference to war or peace, what you\nmeant was _juster_--you had in view justice and injustice?\n_Alk._--It seems so.\n\n[Footnote 3: Plato, Alkib. i. 108 E--109 A.\n[Greek: i)/thi d\u00ea/, kai\\ to\\ en t\u00f4=| polemei=n be/ltion kai\\ to\\ en\nt\u00f4=| ei)r\u00ea/n\u00ean a)/gein, tou=to to\\ be/ltion ti/ o)noma/zeis? \u00f4(/sper\ne)kei= e)ph' e)ka/st\u00f4| e)/leges to\\ a)/meinon, o(/ti mousik\u00f4/teron,\nkai\\ e)pi\\ t\u00f4=| e(ter\u00f4|, o(/ti gumnastik\u00f4/teron; peir\u00f4= d\u00ea\\ kai\\\ne)ntau=tha le/gein to\\ be/ltion . . . . . pro\\s ti/ teinei to\\ e)n\nt\u00f4=| ei)r\u00ea/n\u00ean te a)/gein a)/meinon kai\\ to\\ e)n t\u00f4=| polemei=n oi(=s\ndei=?] _Alkib._ [Greek: A)lla\\ skop\u00f4=n ou) du/namai\ne)nno\u00ea=sai.]]\n\n[Side-note: How, or from whom, has Alkibiades learnt to discern\nor distinguish Just and Unjust? He never learnt it from any one; he\nalways knew it, even as a boy.]\n\n_Sokr._--How is this? How do you know, or where have you learnt,\nto distinguish just from unjust? Have you frequented some master,\nwithout my knowledge, to teach you this? If you have, pray introduce\nme to him, that I also may learn it from him. _Alk._--You are\njesting. _Sokr._--Not at all: I love you too well to jest.\n_Alk._--But what if I had no master? Cannot I know about justice\nand injustice, without a master? _Sokr._--Certainly: you might\nfind out for yourself, if you made search and investigated. But this\nyou would not do, unless you were under the persuasion that you did\nnot already know. _Alk._--Was there not a time when I really\nbelieved myself not to know it? _Sokr._--Perhaps there may have\nbeen: tell me _when_ that time was. Was it last year?\n_Alk._--No: last year I thought that I knew. _Sokr._--Well,\nthen two years, three years, &c., ago? _Alk._--No: the case\nwas the same then, also, I thought that I knew. _Sokr._--But\nbefore that, you were a mere boy; and during your boyhood you\ncertainly believed yourself to know what was just and unjust; for I\nwell recollect hearing you then complain confidently of other boys,\nfor acting unjustly towards you. _Alk._--Certainly: I was not\nthen ignorant on the point: I knew distinctly that they were acting\nunjustly towards me. _Sokr._--You knew, then, even in your\nboyhood, what was just and what was unjust? _Alk._--Certainly: I\nknew even then. _Sokr._--At what moment did you first find it\nout? Not when you already believed yourself to know: and what time\nwas there when you did not believe yourself to know?\n_Alk._--Upon my word, I cannot say.\n\n[Side-note: Answer amended. Alkibiades learnt it from the\nmultitude, as he learnt to speak Greek.--The multitude cannot teach\njust and unjust, for they are at variance among themselves about it.\nAlkibiades is going to advise the Athenians about what he does not\nknow himself.]\n\n_Sokr._--Since, accordingly, you neither found it out for\nyourself, nor learnt it from others, how come you to know justice or\ninjustice at all, or from what quarter? _Alk._--I was mistaken\nin saying that I had not learnt it. I learnt it, as others do, from\nthe multitude.[4] _Sokr._--Your teachers are none of the best:\nno one can learn from them even such small matters as playing at\ndraughts: much less, what is just and unjust. _Alk._--I learnt\nit from them as I learnt to speak Greek, in which, too, I never had\nany special teacher. _Sokr._--Of that the multitude are\ncompetent teachers, for they are all of one mind. Ask which is a tree\nor a stone,--a horse or a man,--you get the same answer from every\none. But when you ask not simply which are _horses_, but also\nwhich horses are fit to run well in a race--when you ask not merely\nabout which are _men_, but which men are healthy or unhealthy--are\nthe multitude all of one mind, or all competent to answer?\n_Alk._--Assuredly not. _Sokr._--When you see the multitude\ndiffering among themselves, that is a clear proof that they are not\ncompetent to teach others. _Alk._--It is so. _Sokr._--Now,\nabout the question, What is just and unjust--are the multitude all of\none mind, or do they differ among themselves? _Alk._--They\ndiffer prodigiously: they not only dispute, but quarrel and destroy\neach other, respecting justice and injustice, far more than about\nhealth and sickness.[5] _Sokr._ How, then, can we say that the\nmultitude know what is just and unjust, when they thus fiercely\ndispute about it among themselves? _Alk._--I now perceive that\nwe cannot say so. _Sokr._--How can we say, therefore, that\nthey are fit to teach others: and how can you pretend to know, who\nhave learnt from no other teachers? _Alk._--From what you say,\nit is impossible.\n\n[Footnote 4: Plato, Alkib. i. 110 D-E. [Greek: e)/mathon, oi)=mai,\nkai\\ e)g\u00f4\\ \u00f4(/sper kai\\ oi( a)/lloi . . . . para\\ t\u00f4=n poll\u00f4=n.]]\n\n[Footnote 5: Plato, Alkib. i. 112 A. _Sokr._ [Greek: Ti/ de\\\nd\u00ea\\? nu=n peri\\ t\u00f4=n dikai/\u00f4n kai\\ a)di/k\u00f4n a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n kai\\\npragma/t\u00f4n, oi( polloi\\ dokou=si/ soi o(mologei=n au)toi\\ e(autoi=s\n\u00ea)\\ a)ll\u00ea/lois?] _Alkib._ [Greek: \u00ca(/kista, n\u00ea\\ Di/', \u00f4)=\nS\u00f4/krates.] _Sokr._ [Greek: Ti/ de/? ma/lista peri\\ au)t\u00f4=n\ndiaphe/resthai?] _Alkib._ [Greek: polu/ ge.]]\n\n_Sokr._--No: not from what _I_ say, but from what\n_you_ say yourself. I merely ask questions: it is you who give\nall the answers.[6] And what you have said amounts to this--that\nAlkibiades knows nothing about what is just and unjust, but believes\nhimself to know, and is going to advise the Athenians about what he\ndoes not know himself?\n\n[Footnote 6: Plato, Alkib. i. 112-113.]\n\n[Side-note: Answer farther amended. The Athenians do not\ngenerally debate about just or unjust--which they consider plain to\nevery one--but about expedient and inexpedient, which are not\ncoincident with just and unjust. But neither does Alkibiades know the\nexpedient. He asks Sokrates to explain. Sokrates declines: he can do\nnothing but question.]\n\n_Alk._--But, Sokrates, the Athenians do not often debate about\nwhat is just and unjust. They think that question self-evident; they\ndebate generally about what is expedient or not expedient. Justice\nand expediency do not do not always coincide. Many persons commit\ngreat crimes, and are great gainers by doing so: others again behave\njustly, and suffer from it.[7] _Sokr_--Do you then profess to\nknow what is expedient or inexpedient? From whom have you learnt--or\nwhen did you find out for yourself? I might ask you the same round of\nquestions, and you would be compelled to answer in the same manner.\nBut we will pass to a different point. You say that justice and\nexpediency are not coincident. Persuade _me_ of this, by\ninterrogating me as I interrogated you. _Alk._--That is beyond\nmy power. _Sokr._--But when you rise to address the assembly,\nyou will have to persuade _them_. If you can persuade them, you\ncan persuade me. Assume _me_ to be the assembly, and practise\nupon me.[8] _Alk._--You are too hard upon me, Sokrates. It is\nfor you to speak and prove the point. _Sokr_--No: I can only\nquestion: you must answer. You will be most surely persuaded when the\npoint is determined by your own answers.[9]\n\n[Footnote 7: Plato, Alkib. i. 113 D. [Greek: Oi)=mai me\\n o)liga/kis\nA)th\u00eanai/ous bouleu/esthai po/tera dikaio/tera \u00ea)\\ a)dik\u00f4tera; ta\\\nme\\n ga\\r toiau=ta \u00ea(gou=ntai d\u00ea=la ei)=nai], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Plato, Alkib. i. 114 B-C. This same argument is\naddressed by Sokrates to Glaukon, in Xenoph. Memor. iii. 6, 14-15.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Plato, Alkib. i. 114 E.\n[Greek: Ou)kou=n ei) le/geis o(/ti tau=th' ou(/t\u00f4s e)/chei, ma/list'\na)\\n ei)/\u00eas pepeisme/nos?]]\n\n[Side-note: Comment on the preceding--Sokratic method--the\nrespondent makes the discoveries for himself.]\n\nSuch is the commencing portion (abbreviated or abstracted) of\nPlato's First Alkibiad\u00eas. It exhibits a very characteristic specimen\nof the Sokratico-Platonic method: both in its negative and positive\naspect. By the negative, false persuasion of knowledge is exposed.\nAlkibiades believes himself competent to advise about just and\nunjust, which he has neither learnt from any teacher nor investigated\nfor himself--which he has picked up from the multitude, and supposes\nto be clear to every one, but about which nevertheless there is so\nmuch difference of appreciation among the multitude, that fierce and\nperpetual quarrels are going on. On the positive side, Sokrates\nrestricts himself to the function of questioning: he neither affirms\nnor denies any thing. It is Alkibiades who affirms or denies every\nthing, and who makes all the discoveries for himself out of his own\nmind, instigated indeed, but not taught, by the questions of his\ncompanion.\n\n[Side-note: Alkibiades is brought to admit that whatever is\njust, is good, honourable, expedient: and that whoever acts\nhonourably, both does well, and procures for himself happiness\nthereby. Equivocal reasoning of Sokrates.]\n\nBy a farther series of questions, Sokrates next brings Alkibiades to\nthe admission that what is just, is also honourable, good,\nexpedient--what is unjust, is dishonourable, evil, inexpedient: and\nthat whoever acts justly, and honourably, thereby acquires happiness.\nAdmitting, first, that an act which is good, honourable, just,\nexpedient, &c., considered in one aspect or in reference to some\nof its conditions--may be at the same time bad, dishonourable,\nunjust, considered in another aspect or in reference to other\nconditions; Sokrates nevertheless brings his respondent to admit,\nthat every act, _in so far as it is just and honourable_, is\nalso good and expedient.[10] And he contends farther, that whoever\nacts honourably, does well: now every man who does well, becomes\nhappy, or secures good things thereby: therefore the just, the\nhonourable, and the good or expedient, coincide.[11] The argument,\nwhereby this conclusion is here established, is pointed out by\nHeindorf, Stallbaum, and Steinhart, as not merely inconclusive, but\nas mere verbal equivocation and sophistry--the like of which,\nhowever, we find elsewhere in Plato.[12]\n\n[Footnote 10: Plato, Alkib. i. 115 B--116 A.\n[Greek: Ou)kou=n t\u00ea\\n toiau/t\u00ean bo\u00eathei/an kal\u00ea\\n me\\n le/geis kata\\\nt\u00ea\\n e)pichei/r\u00easin tou= s\u00f4=sai ou(=s e)/dei; tou=to d' e)sti\\n\na)ndri/a; . . . . kak\u00ea\\n de/ ge kata\\ tou\\s thana/tous te kai\\ ta\\\ne(/lk\u00ea. . . .\n\nOu)kou=n \u00f4(=de di/kaion prosagoreu/ein e(ka/st\u00ean t\u00f4=n pra/xe\u00f4n;\nei)/per \u00ea)=| kako\\n a)perga/zetai kak\u00ea\\n kalei=s, kai\\ \u00ea)=| a)gatho\\n\na)gath\u00ea\\n kl\u00eate/on.\n\nA)r' ou)=n kai\\ \u00ea)=| a)gatho\\n kalo/n,--\u00ea)=| de\\ kako\\n ai)schro/n?\nNai/.]\n\nCompare Plato, Republic, v. p. 479, where he maintains that in every\nparticular case, what is just, honourable, virtuous, &c., is also\nunjust, dishonourable, vicious, &c. Nothing remains unchanged,\nnor excludes the contrary, except the pure, self-existent, Idea or\ngeneral Concept.--[Greek: au)to\\-dikaiosu/n\u00ea], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Plato, Alkib. i. 116 E.]\n\n[Footnote 12: The words [Greek: eu)= pra/ttein--eu)pragi/a] have a\ndouble sense, like our \"doing well\". Stallbaum, Proleg. p. 175;\nSteinhart, Einl. p. 149.\n\nWe have, p. 116 B, the equivocation between [Greek: kal\u00f4=s pra/ttein]\nand [Greek: eu)= pra/ttein], also with [Greek: kak\u00f4=s pra/ttein], p.\n134 A, 135 A; compare Heindorf ad Platon. Charmid. p. 172 A, p. 174\nB; also Platon. Gorgias, p. 507 C, where similar equivocal meanings\noccur.]\n\n[Side-note: Humiliation of Alkibiades. Other Athenian statesmen\nare equally ignorant. But the real opponents, against whom Alkibiades\nis to measure himself, are, the kings of Sparta and Persia.\nEulogistic description of those kings. To match them, Alkibiades must\nmake himself as good as possible.]\n\nAlkibiades is thus reduced to a state of humiliating embarrassment,\nand stands convicted, by his own contradictions and confession, of\nignorance in its worst form: that is, of being ignorant, and yet\nbelieving himself to know.[13] But other Athenian statesmen are no\nwiser. Even Perikles is proved to be equally deficient--by the fact\nthat he has never been able to teach or improve any one else, not\neven his own sons and those whom he loved best.[14] \"At any rate\"\n(contends Alkibiades) \"I am as good as my competitors, and can hold\nmy ground against them.\" But Sokrates reminds him that the real\ncompetitors with whom he ought to compare himself, are foreigners,\nliable to become the enemies of Athens, and against whom he, if he\npretends to lead Athens, must be able to contend. In an harangue of\nunusual length, Sokrates shows that the kings of Sparta and Persia\nare of nobler breed, as well as more highly and carefully trained,\nthan the Athenian statesmen.[15] Alkibiades must be rescued from his\npresent ignorance, and exalted, so as to be capable of competing with\nthese kings: which object cannot be attained except through the\nauxiliary interposition of Sokrates. Not that Sokrates professes to\nbe himself already on this elevation, and to stand in need of no\nfarther improvement. But he can, nevertheless, help others to attain\nit for themselves, through the discipline and stimulus of his\ninterrogatories.[16]\n\n\n[Footnote 13: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 118.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 118-119.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 120-124.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 124.]\n\n[Side-note: But good--for what end, and under what\ncircumstances? Abundant illustrative examples.]\n\nThe dialogue then continues. _Sokr._--We wish to become as good\nas possible. But in what sort of virtue? _Alk._--In that virtue\nwhich belongs to good men. _Sokr._--Yes, but _good_, in\nwhat matters? _Alk._--Evidently, to men who are good in\ntransacting business. _Sokr._--Ay, but what kind of business?\nbusiness relating to horses, or to navigation? If that be meant, we\nmust go and consult horse-trainers or mariners? _Alk._--No, I\nmean such business as is transacted by the most esteemed leaders in\nAthens. _Sokr._--You mean the intelligent men. Every man is\ngood, in reference to that which he understands: every man is bad, in\nreference to that which he does not understand. _Alk._--Of\ncourse. _Sokr._--The cobbler understands shoemaking, and is\ntherefore good at _that_: he does not understand weaving, and is\ntherefore bad at that. The same man thus, in your view, will be both\ngood and bad?[17] _Alk._--No: that cannot be. _Sokr._--Whom\nthen do you mean, when you talk of _the good_? _Alk._--I mean\nthose who are competent to command in the city. _Sokr._--But\nto command whom or what--horses or men? _Alk._--To command\nmen. _Sokr._--But what men, and under what circumstances? sick\nmen, or men on shipboard, or labourers engaged in harvesting, or in\nwhat occupations? _Alk._--I mean, men living in social and\ncommercial relation with each other, as we live here; men who live in\ncommon possession of the same laws and government. _Sokr._--When\nmen are in communion of a sea voyage and of the same ship, how do we\nname the art of commanding them, and to what purpose does it tend?\n_Alk._--It is the art of the pilot; and the purpose towards which\nit tends, is, bringing them safely through the dangers of the sea.\n_Sokr._--When men are in social and political communion, to what\npurpose does the art of commanding them tend? _Alk._--Towards\nthe better preservation and administration of the city.[18]\n_Sokr._--But what do you mean by _better_? What is that,\nthe presence or absence of which makes _better_ or _worse_?\nIf in regard to the management of the body, you put to me the\nsame question, I should reply, that it is the presence of health, and\nthe absence of disease. What reply will you make, in the case of the\ncity? _Alk._--I should say, when friendship and unanimity among\nthe citizens are present, and when discord and antipathy are absent.\n_Sokr._--This unanimity, of what nature is it? Respecting what\nsubject? What is the art or science for realising it? If I ask you\nwhat brings about unanimity respecting numbers and measures, you will\nsay the arithmetical and the metr\u00eatic art. _Alk._--I mean that\nfriendship and unanimity which prevails between near relatives,\nfather and son, husband and wife. _Sokr._--But how can there be\nunanimity between any two persons, respecting subjects which one of\nthem knows, and the other does not know? For example, about spinning\nand weaving, which the husband does not know, or about military\nduties, which the wife does not know, how can there be unanimity\nbetween the two? _Alk._--No: there cannot be. _Sokr._--Nor\nfriendship, if unanimity and friendship go together?\n_Alk._--Apparently there cannot. _Sokr._--Then when men and women\neach perform their own special duties, there can be no friendship\nbetween them. Nor can a city be well administered, when each citizen\nperforms his own special duties? or (which is the same thing) when\neach citizen acts justly? _Alk._--Not so: I think there may be\nfriendship, when each person performs his or her own business.\n_Sokr._--Just now you said the reverse. What is this friendship\nor unanimity which we must understand and realise, in order to become\ngood men?\n\n[Footnote 17: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 125 B.\n\n[Greek: O( au)to\\s a)/ra tou/t\u00f4| ge t\u00f4=| lo/g\u00f4| kako/s te kai\\\na)gatho/s.]\n\nPlato slides unconsciously here, as in other parts of his reasonings,\n_\u00e0 dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter_.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 126 A. [Greek: ti/ de/? \u00ea)\\n su\\\nkalei=s eu)bouli/an, ei)s ti/ e)stin?] _Alk._ [Greek: Ei)s to\\\na)/meinon t\u00ea\\n po/lin dioikei=n kai\\ s\u00f4/zesthai.] _Sokr._\n[Greek: A)meinon de\\ dioikei=tai kai\\ s\u00f4/zetai ti/nos paragignome/nou\n\u00ea)\\ a)pogignomenou?]]\n\n[Side-note: Alkibiades, puzzled and humiliated, confesses his\nignorance. Encouragement given by Sokrates. It is an advantage to\nmake such discovery in youth.]\n\n_Alk._--In truth, I am puzzled myself to say. I find myself in a\nstate of disgraceful ignorance, of which I had no previous suspicion.\n_Sokr._--Do not be discouraged. If you had made this discovery\nwhen you were fifty years old, it would have been too late for taking\ncare of yourself and applying a remedy: but at your age, it is the\nright time for making the discovery. _Alk._--What am I to do,\nnow that I have made it? _Sokr._--You must answer my questions.\nIf my auguries are just, we shall soon be both of us better for the\nprocess.[19]\n\n[Footnote 19: Plato, Alkib. i. 127 D-E. _Alk._ [Greek: A)lla\\\nma\\ tou\\s theou/s, ou)d' au)to\\s oi)=da o(/ ti le/g\u00f4, kinduneu/\u00f4 de\\\nkai\\ pa/lai lel\u00eathe/nai e)mauto\\n ai)/schist' e)/ch\u00f4n.]\n\n_Sokr._ [Greek: A)lla\\ chr\u00ea\\ thar)r(ei=n; ei) me\\n ga\\r au)to\\\n\u00ea)=|sthou peponth\u00f4\\s pent\u00eakontae/t\u00eas, chalepo\\n a)\\n \u00ea)=n soi\ne)pimel\u00eath\u00ea=nai sautou=; nu=n de\\ \u00ea)\\n e)/cheis \u00ea(liki/an, au)/t\u00ea\ne)sti/n, e)n \u00ea(=| dei= au)to\\ ai)sthe/sthai.]\n\n_Alk._ [Greek: Ti/ ou)=n to\\n ai(stho/menon chr\u00ea\\ poiei=n?]\n\n_Sokr._ [Greek: _A)pokri/nesthai ta\\ e)r\u00f4t\u00f4/mena_, kai\\\ne)a\\n tou=to poi\u00ea=|s, a)\\n theo\\s e)the/l\u00ea|, ei)/ ti dei= kai\\ t\u00ea=|\ne)m\u00ea=| mantei/a| pisteu/ein, su/ te ka)g\u00f4\\ beltio/n\u00f4s sch\u00ea/somen.]]\n\n[Side-note: Platonic Dialectic--its actual effect--its\nanticipated effect--applicable to the season of youth.]\n\nHere we have again, brought into prominent relief, the dialectic\nmethod of Plato, under two distinct aspects: 1. Its actual effects,\nin exposing the false supposition of knowledge, in forcing upon the\nrespondent the humiliating conviction, that he does not know familiar\ntopics which he supposed to be clear both to himself and to others.\n2. Its anticipated effects, if continued, in remedying such defect:\nand in generating out of the mind of the respondent, real and living\nknowledge. Lastly, it is plainly intimated that this shock of\nhumiliation and mistrust, painful but inevitable, must be undergone\nin youth.\n\n[Side-note: Know Thyself--Delphian maxim--its urgent\nimportance--What is myself? My mind is myself.]\n\nThe dialogue continues, in short questions and answers, of which the\nfollowing is an abstract. _Sokr._--What is meant by a man\n_taking care of himself_? Before I can take care of myself, I\nmust know what myself is: I must _know myself_, according to the\nDelphian motto. I cannot make myself better, without knowing what\n_myself_ is.[20] That which belongs to me is not _myself_:\nmy body is not myself, but an instrument governed by myself.[21] My\nmind or soul only, is myself. To take care of myself is, to take care\nof my mind. At any rate, if this be not strictly true,[22] my mind is\nthe most important and dominant element within me. The physician who\nknows his own body, does not for that reason know himself: much less\ndo the husbandman or the tradesman, who know their own properties or\ncrafts, know themselves, or perform what is truly their own business.\n\n[Footnote 20: Plato, Alkib. i. 129 B. [Greek: ti/n' a)\\n tro/pon\neu(rethei/\u00ea _au)to\\ to\\ au)to/_?]]\n\n[Footnote 21: Plato, Alkib. i. 128-130. All this is greatly expanded\nin the dialogue--p. 128 D: [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra o)/tan t\u00f4=n sautou=\ne)pimel\u00ea=|, sautou= e)pime/lei?] This same antithesis is employed by\nIsokrates, De Permutatione, sect. 309, p. 492, Bekker. He recommends\n[Greek: au)tou= pro/teron \u00ea)\\ t\u00f4=n au)tou= poiei=sthai t\u00ea\\n\ne)pime/leian].]\n\n[Footnote 22: Plato considers this point to be not clearly made out.\nAlkib. i. 130.]\n\n[Side-note: I cannot know myself, except by looking into\nanother mind. Self-knowledge is temperance. Temperance and Justice\nare the conditions both of happiness and of freedom.]\n\nSince temperance consists in self-knowledge, neither of these\nprofessional men, as such, is temperate: their professions are of a\nvulgar cast, and do not belong to the virtuous life.[23] How are\nwe to know our own minds? We know it by looking into another mind,\nand into the most rational and divine portion thereof: just as the\neye can only know itself by looking into another eye, and seeing\nitself therein reflected.[24] It is only in this way that we can come\nto know ourselves, or become temperate: and if we do not know\nourselves, we cannot even know what belongs to ourselves, or what\nbelongs to others: all these are branches of one and the same\ncognition. We can have no knowledge of affairs, either public or\nprivate: we shall go wrong, and shall be unable to secure happiness\neither for ourselves or for others. It is not wealth or power which\nare the conditions of happiness, but justice and temperance. Both for\nourselves individually, and for the public collectively, we ought to\naim at justice and temperance, not at wealth and power. The evil and\nunjust man ought to have no power, but to be the slave of those who\nare better than himself.[25] He is fit for nothing but to be a slave:\nnone deserve freedom except the virtuous.\n\n[Footnote 23: Plato, Alkib. i. 131 B.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Plato, Alkib. i. 133.]\n\n[Footnote 25: Plato, Alkib. i. 134-135 B-C.\n\n[Greek: Pri\\n de/ ge a)ret\u00ea\\n e)/chein, to\\ a)/rchesthai a)/meinon\nu(po\\ tou= belti/onos \u00ea)\\ to\\ a)/rchein a)ndri\\, ou) mo/non paidi/\n. . . . Pre/pei a)/ra t\u00f4=| kak\u00f4=| douleu/ein; a)/meinon ga/r.]]\n\n[Side-note: Alkibiades feels himself unworthy to be free, and\ndeclares that he will never quit Sokrates.]\n\n_Sokr._--How do you feel your own condition now, Alkibiades. Are\nyou worthy of freedom? _Alk._--I feel but too keenly that I am\nnot. I cannot emerge from this degradation except by your society and\nhelp. From this time forward I shall never leave you.[26]\n\n[Footnote 26: Plato, Alkib. i. 135.]\n\n\nALKIBIADES II.\n\n\n[Side-note: Second Alkibiades--situation supposed.]\n\nThe other Platonic dialogue, termed the Second Alkibiades, introduces\nAlkibiades as about to offer prayer and sacrifice to the Gods.\n\n[Side-note: Danger of mistake in praying to the Gods for gifts\nwhich may prove mischievous. Most men are unwise. Unwise is the\ngeneric word: madmen, a particular variety under it.]\n\n_Sokr._--You seem absorbed in thought, Alkibiades, and not\nunreasonably. In supplicating the Gods, caution is required not to\npray for gifts which are really mischievous. The Gods sometimes grant\nmen's prayers, even when ruinously destructive; as they granted\nthe prayers of Oedipus, to the destruction of his own sons.\n_Alk._--Oedipus was mad: what man in his senses would put up\nsuch a prayer? _Sokr._--You think that madness is the opposite\nof good sense or wisdom. You recognise men wise and unwise: and you\nfarther admit that every man must be one or other of the two,--just\nas every man must be either healthy or sick: there is no third\nalternative possible? _Alk._--I think so. _Sokr._--But each\nthing can have but one opposite:[27] to be unwise, and to be mad, are\ntherefore identical? _Alk._--They are. _Sokr._--Wise men\nare only few, the majority of our citizens are unwise: but do you\nreally think them mad? How could any of us live safely in the society\nof so many mad-men? _Alk._--No: it cannot be so: I was mistaken.\n_Sokr._--Here is the illustration of your mistake. All men who\nhave gout, or fever, or ophthalmia are sick; but all sick men have\nnot gout, or fever, or ophthalmia. So, too, all carpenters, or\nshoemakers, or sculptors, are craftsmen; but all craftsmen are not\ncarpenters, or shoemakers, or sculptors. In like manner, all mad men\nare unwise; but all unwise men are not mad. _Unwise_ comprises\nmany varieties and gradations of which the extreme is, being mad: but\nthese varieties are different among themselves, as one disease\ndiffers from another, though all agree in being disease and one art\ndiffers from another, though all agree in being art.[28]\n\n[Footnote 27: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 139 B.\n\n[Greek: Kai\\ m\u00ea\\n du/o ge u(penanti/a e(ni\\ pra/gmati p\u00f4=s a)\\n\nei)/\u00ea?]\n\nThat each thing has one opposite, and no more, is asserted in the\nProtagoras also, p. 192-193.]\n\n[Footnote 28: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 139-140 A-B.\n\n[Greek: Kai\\ ga\\r oi( pure/ttontes pa/ntes nosou=sin, ou) me/nntoioi(\nnosou=ntes pa/ntes pure/ttousin ou)de\\ podagr\u00f4=sin ou)de/ ge\no)phthalmi\u00f4=sin; a)lla\\ no/sos me\\n pa=n to\\ toiou=to/n e)sti,\ndiaphe/rein de/ phasin ou(\\s d\u00ea\\ kalou=men i)atros t\u00ea\\n a)pergasi/an\nau)t\u00f4=n; ou) ga\\r pa=sai ou)/te o(/moiai ou)/te o(moi/\u00f4s\ndiapra/ttontai, a)lla\\ kata\\ t\u00ea\\n au)t\u00ea=s du/namin e(ka/st\u00ea.]]\n\n[Side-note: Relation between a generic term, and the specific\nterms comprehended under it, was not then familiar.]\n\n(We may remark that Plato here, as in the Euthyphron, brings under\nespecial notice one of the most important distinctions in formal\nlogic--that between a generic between a term and the various specific\nterms comprehended under it. Possessing as yet no technical language\nfor characterising this distinction, he makes it understood by an\ninduction of several separate but analogous cases. Because the\ndistinction is familiar now to instructed men, we must not suppose\nthat it was familiar then.)\n\n[Side-note: Frequent cases, in which men pray for supposed\nbenefits, and find that when obtained, they are misfortunes. Every\none fancies that he knows what is beneficial: mischiefs of\nignorance.]\n\n_Sokr._--Whom do you call wise and unwise? Is not the wise man,\nhe who knows what it is proper to say and do--and the unwise man, he\nwho does not know? _Alk._--Yes. _Sokr._--The unwise man\nwill thus often unconsciously say or do what ought not to be said or\ndone? Though not mad like Oedipus, he will nevertheless pray to the\nGods for gifts, which will be hurtful to him if obtained. You, for\nexample, would be overjoyed if the Gods were to promise that you\nshould become despot not only over Athens, but also over Greece.\n_Alk._--Doubtless I should: and every one else would feel as I\ndo. _Sokr._--But what if you were to purchase it with your life,\nor to damage yourself by the employment of it? _Alk._--Not on\nthose conditions.[29] _Sokr._--But you are aware that many\nambitious aspirants, both at Athens and elsewhere (among them, the\nman who just now killed the Macedonian King Archelaus, and usurped\nhis throne), have acquired power and aggrandisement, so as to be\nenvied by every one: yet have presently found themselves brought to\nruin and death by the acquisition. So, also, many persons pray that\nthey may become fathers; but discover presently that their children\nare the source of so much grief to them, that they wish themselves\nagain childless. Nevertheless, though such reverses are perpetually\nhappening, every one is still not only eager to obtain these supposed\nbenefits, but importunate with the Gods in asking for them. You see\nthat it is not safe even to accept without reflection boons offered\nto you, much less to pray for boons to be conferred.[30] _Alk._--I\nsee now how much mischief ignorance produces. Every one thinks\nhimself competent to pray for what is beneficial to himself; but\nignorance makes him unconsciously imprecate mischief on his own head.\n\n[Footnote 29: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 141.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 141-142.]\n\n[Side-note: Mistake in predications about ignorance generally.\nWe must discriminate. Ignorance of _what?_ Ignorance of good, is\nalways mischievous: ignorance of other things, not always.]\n\n_Sokr._--You ought not to denounce ignorance in this unqualified\nmanner. You must distinguish and specify. Ignorance of what? and\nunder what modifications of persons and circumstances? _Alk._--How?\nAre there _any_ matters or circumstances in which it is\nbetter for a man to be ignorant, than to know? _Sokr._--You will\nsee that there are such. Ignorance of good, or ignorance of what is\nbest, is always mischievous: moreover, assuming that a man knows what\nis best, then all other knowledge will be profitable to him. In his\nspecial case, ignorance on any subject cannot be otherwise than\nhurtful. But if a man be ignorant things of good, or of what is best,\nin his case knowledge on other subjects will be more often hurtful\nthan profitable. To a man like Orestes, so misguided on the question,\n\"What is good?\" as to resolve to kill his mother, it would be a real\nbenefit, if for the time he did not know his mother. Ignorance on\nthat point, in his state of mind, would be better for him than\nknowledge.[31] _Alk._--It appears so.\n\n[Footnote 31: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 144.]\n\n[Side-note: Wise public counsellors are few. Upon what ground\ndo we call these few wise? Not because they possess merely special\narts or accomplishments, but because they know besides, upon what\noccasions and under what limits each of these accomplishments ought\nto be used.]\n\n_Sokr._--Follow the argument farther. When we come forward to\nsay or do any thing, we either know what we are about to say and do,\nor at least believe ourselves to know it. Every statesman who gives\ncounsel to the public, does so in the faith of such knowledge. Most\ncitizens are unwise, and ignorant of good as well as of other things.\nThe wise are but few, and by their advice the city is conducted. Now\nupon what ground do we call these few, wise and useful public\ncounsellors? If a statesman knows war, but does not know whether it\nis best to go to war, or at what juncture it is best--should we call\nhim wise? If he knows how to kill men, or dispossess them, or drive\nthem into exile,--but does not know upon whom, or on what occasions,\nit is good to inflict this treatment--is he a useful counsellor? If\nhe can ride, or shoot, or wrestle, well,--we give him an epithet\nderived from this special accomplishment: we do not call him wise.\nWhat would be the condition of a community composed of bowmen,\nhorsemen, wrestlers, rhetors, &c., accomplished and excellent\neach in his own particular craft, yet none of them knowing what is\ngood, nor when, nor on what occasions, it is good to employ their\ncraft? When each man pushes forward his own art and speciality,\nwithout any knowledge whether it is good on the whole either for\nhimself or for the city, will not affairs thus conducted be reckless\nand disastrous?[32] _Alk._--They will be very bad indeed.\n\n[Footnote 32: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 145.]\n\n[Side-note: Special accomplishments, without the knowledge of\nthe good or profitable, are oftener hurtful than beneficial.]\n\n_Sokr._--If, then, a man has no knowledge of good or of the\nbetter--if upon this cardinal point he obeys fancy without\nreason--the possession of knowledge upon special subjects will be\noftener hurtful than profitable to him; because it will make him more\nforward in action, without any good result. Possessing many arts and\naccomplishments, and prosecuting one after another, but without the\nknowledge of good,--he will only fall into greater trouble, like a\nship sailing without a pilot. Knowledge of good is, in other words,\nknowledge of what is useful and profitable. In conjunction with this,\nall other knowledge is valuable, and goes to increase a man's\ncompetence as a counsellor: apart from this, all other knowledge will\nnot render a man competent as a counsellor, but will be more\nfrequently hurtful than beneficial.[33] Towards right living, what we\nneed is, the knowledge of good: just as the sick stand in need of a\nphysician, and the ship's crew of a pilot. _Alk._--I admit your\nreasoning. My opinion is changed. I no longer believe myself\ncompetent to determine what I ought to accept from the Gods, or what\nI ought to pray for. I incur serious danger of erring, and of asking\nfor mischiefs, under the belief that they are benefits.\n\n[Footnote 33: Plato, Alkib. ii. 145 C:\n\n[Greek: O(/stis a)/ra ti t\u00f4=n toiou/t\u00f4n oi)=den, e)a\\n me\\n\npare/p\u00eatai au)t\u00f4=| \u00ea( _tou= belti/stou e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea--au(/t\u00ea d' \u00ea)=n\n\u00ea( au)t\u00ea\\ d\u00ea/pou \u00ea(/per kai\\ \u00ea( tou= \u00f4)pheli/mou_--phro/nimo/n ge\nau)to\\n ph\u00ea/somen kai\\ a)pochr\u00f4=nta xu/mboulou kai\\ t\u00ea=| po/lei kai\\\nau)to\\n au(t\u00f4=|; to\\n de\\ m\u00ea\\ toiou=ton, ta)nanti/a tou/t\u00f4n.]\n([Greek: Touou=ton] is Schneider's emendation for [Greek:\npoiou=nta].) Ibid. 146 C: [Greek: Ou)kou=n phame\\n pa/lin tou\\s\npollou\\s di\u00eamart\u00eake/nai tou= belti/stou, \u00f4(s ta\\ polla/ ge, oi)=mai,\na)/neu nou= do/x\u00ea| pepisteuko/tas?] Ibid. 146 E: [Greek: O(ra=|s\nou)=n, o(/te g' e)/ph\u00ean kinduneu/ein to/ ge t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n e)pist\u00eam\u00f4=n\nkt\u00ea=ma, e)a/n tis a)/neu t\u00ea=s tou= belti/stou e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas kekt\u00eame/nos\n\u00ea)=|, o)liga/kis me\\n \u00f4)phelei=n bla/ptein de\\ ta\\ plei/\u00f4 ton\ne)/chont' au)to/.] Ibid. 147 A: [Greek: O( de\\ d\u00ea\\ t\u00ea\\n kaloume/n\u00ean\npoluma/theia/n te kai\\ polutechni/an kekt\u00eame/nos, o)rphano\\s de\\ \u00f4)\\n\ntau/t\u00eas t\u00ea=s e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas, a)go/menos de\\ u(po\\ mia=s e(ka/st\u00eas t\u00f4=n\na)/ll\u00f4n, a)=r' ou)chi\\ t\u00f4=| o)/nti dikai/\u00f4s poll\u00f4=| cheim\u00f4=ni\nchr\u00ea/setai, a(/t', oi)=mai, a)/neu kubern\u00ea/tou diatel\u00f4=n e)n\npela/gei], &c.]\n\n[Side-note: It is unsafe for Alkibiades to proceed with his\nsacrifice, until he has learnt what is the proper language to address\nto the Gods. He renounces his sacrifice, and throws himself upon the\ncounsel of Sokrates.]\n\n_Sokr._--The Laced\u00e6monians, when they offer sacrifice, pray\nsimply that they may obtain what is honourable and good, without\nfarther specification. This language is acceptable to the Gods,\nmore acceptable than the costly festivals of Athens. It has procured\nfor the Spartans more continued prosperity than the Athenians have\nenjoyed.[34] The Gods honour wise and just men, that is, men who know\nwhat they ought to say and do both towards Gods and towards men--more\nthan numerous and splendid offerings.[35] You see, therefore, that it\nis not safe for you to proceed with your sacrifice, until you have\nlearnt what is the proper language to be used, and what are the\nreally good gifts to be prayed for. Otherwise your sacrifice will not\nprove acceptable, and you may even bring upon yourself positive\nmischief.[36] _Alk._--When shall I be able to learn this, and\nwho is there to teach me? I shall be delighted to meet him.\n_Sokr._--There is a person at hand most anxious for your\nimprovement. What he must do is, first to disperse the darkness from\nyour mind, next, to impart that which will teach you to discriminate\nevil from good, which at present you are unable to do. _Alk._--I\nshall shrink from no labour to accomplish this object. Until then, I\npostpone my intended sacrifice: and I tender my sacrificial wreath to\nyou, in gratitude for your counsel.[37] _Sokr._--I accept the\nwreath as a welcome augury of future friendship and conversation\nbetween us, to help us out of the present embarrassment.\n\n[Footnote 34: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 148.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 150.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 150.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 151.]\n\n\n* * * * *\n\n\n[Side-note: Different critical opinions respecting these two\ndialogues.]\n\nThe two dialogues, called First and Second Alkibiad\u00eas, of which I\nhave just given some account, resemble each other more than most of\nthe Platonic dialogues, not merely in the personages introduced, but\nin general spirit, in subject, and even in illustrations. The First\nAlkibiad\u00eas was recognised as authentic by all critics without\nexception, until the days of Schleiermacher. Nay, it was not only\nrecognised, but extolled as one of the most valuable and important of\nall the Platonic compositions; proper to be studied first, as a key\nto all the rest. Such was the view of Jamblichus and Proklus,\ntransmitted to modern times; until it received a harsh contradiction\nfrom Schleiermacher, who declared the dialogue to be both worthless\nand spurious. The Second Alkibiad\u00eas was also admitted both by\nThrasyllus, and by the general body of critics in ancient times: but\nthere were some persons (as we learn from Athen\u00e6us)[38] who\nconsidered it to be a work of Xenophon; perceiving probably (what is\nthe fact) that it bears much analogy to several conversations which\nXenophon has set down. But those who held this opinion are not to be\nconsidered as of one mind with critics who reject the dialogue as a\nforgery or imitation of Plato. Compositions emanating from Xenophon\nare just as much Sokratic, probably even more Sokratic, than the most\nunquestioned Platonic dialogues, besides that they must of necessity\nbe contemporary also. Schleiermacher has gone much farther: declaring\nthe Second as well as the First to be an unworthy imitation of\nPlato.[39]\n\n[Footnote 38: Athen\u00e6us, xi. p. 506.]\n\n[Footnote 39: See the Einleitung of Schleiermacher to Alkib. i. part\nii. vol. iii. p. 293 seq. Einleitung to Alkib. ii. part i. vol. ii.\np. 365 seq. His notes on the two dialogues contain various additional\nreasons, besides what is urged in his Introduction.]\n\n[Side-note: Grounds for disallowing them--less strong against\nthe Second than against the First.]\n\nHere Ast agrees with Schleiermacher fully, including both the First\nand Second Alkibiades in his large list of the spurious. Most of the\nsubsequent critics go with Schleiermacher only half-way: Socher,\nHermann, Stallbaum, Steinhart, Susemihl, recognise the First\nAlkibiad\u00eas, but disallow the Second.[40] In my judgment,\nSchleiermacher and Ast are more consistently right, or more\nconsistently wrong, in rejecting both, than the other critics who\nfind or make so capital a distinction between the two. The similarity\nof tone and topics between the two is obvious, and is indeed admitted\nby all. Moreover, if I were compelled to make a choice, I should say\nthat the grounds for suspicion are rather less strong against the\nSecond than against the First; and that Schleiermacher, reasoning\nupon the objections admitted by his opponents as conclusive against\nthe Second, would have no difficulty in showing that his own\nobjections against the First were still more forcible. The long\nspeech assigned in the First Alkibiad\u00eas to Sokrates, about the\nprivileges of the Spartan and Persian kings,[41] including the\nmention of Zoroaster, son of Oromazes, and the Magian religion,\nappears to me more unusual with Plato than anything which I find in\nthe Second Alkibiad\u00eas. It is more Xenophontic[42] than Platonic.\n\n[Footnote 40: Socher, Ueber Platon's Schriften, p. 112. Stallbaum,\nProlegg. to Alkib. i. and ii. vol. v. pp. 171-304. K. F. Hermann,\nGesch. und Syst. der Platon. Philos. p. 420-439. Steinhart,\nEinleitungen to Alkib. i. and ii. in Hieronymus M\u00fcller's Uebersetzung\ndes Platon's Werke, vol. i. pp. 135-509.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 121-124.\n\nWhoever reads the objections in Steinhart's Einleitung (p. 148-150)\nagainst the First Alkibiad\u00eas, will see that they are quite as\nforcible as what he urges against the Second; only, that in the case\nof the First, he gives these objections their legitimate bearing,\nallowing them to tell against the merit of the dialogue, but not\nagainst its authenticity.]\n\n[Footnote 42: See Xenoph. Oekonom. c. 4; Cyrop\u00e6d. vii. 5, 58-64,\nviii. 1, 5-8-45; Laced. Repub. c. 15.]\n\n[Side-note: The supposed grounds for disallowance are in\nreality only marks of inferiority.]\n\nBut I must here repeat, that because I find, in this or any other\ndialogue, some peculiarities not usual with Plato, I do not feel\nwarranted thereby in declaring the dialogue spurious. In my judgment,\nwe must look for a large measure of diversity in the various\ndialogues; and I think it an injudicious novelty, introduced by\nSchleiermacher, to set up a canonical type of Platonism, all\ndeviations from which are to be rejected as forgeries. Both the First\nand the Second Alkibiad\u00eas appear to me genuine, even upon the showing\nof those very critics who disallow them. Schleiermacher, Stallbaum,\nand Steinhart, all admit that there is in both the dialogues a\nconsiderable proportion of Sokratic and Platonic ideas: but they\nmaintain that there are also other ideas which are not Sokratic or\nPlatonic, and that the texture, style, and prolixity of the Second\nAlkibiad\u00eas (Schleiermacher maintains this about the First also) are\nunworthy of Plato. But if we grant these premisses, the reasonable\ninference would be, not to disallow it altogether, but to admit it as\na work by Plato, of inferior merit; perhaps of earlier days, before\nhis powers of composition had attained their maturity. To presume\nthat because Plato composed many excellent dialogues, therefore all\nthat he composed must have been excellent, is a pretension formally\ndisclaimed by many critics, and asserted by none.[42] Steinhart\nhimself allows that the Second Alkibiad\u00eas, though not composed by\nPlato, is the work of some other author contemporary, an untrained\nSokratic disciple attempting to imitate Plato.[44] But we do not know\nthat there were any contemporaries who tried to imitate Plato:\nthough Theopompus accused him of imitating others, and called most of\nhis dialogues useless as well as false: while Plato himself, in his\ninferior works, will naturally appear like an imitator of his better\nself.\n\n[Footnote 43: Stallbaum (Prolegg. ad Alcib. i. p. 186) makes this\ngeneral statement very justly, but he as well as other critics are\napt to forget it in particular cases.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Steinhart, Einleitung, p. 516-519. Stallbaum and Boeckh\nindeed assign the dialogue to a later period. Heindorf (ad Lysin, p.\n211) thinks it the work \"antiqui auctoris, sed non Platonis\".\n\nSteinhart and others who disallow the authenticity of the Second\nAlkibiad\u00eas insist much (p. 518) upon the enormity of the\nchronological blunder, whereby Sokrates and Alkibiad\u00eas are introduced\nas talking about the death of Archelaus king of Macedonia, who was\nkilled in 399 B.C., in the same year as Sokrates, and four\nyears after Alkibiades. Such an anachronism (Steinhart urges) Plato\ncould never allow himself to commit. But when we read the Symposion,\nwe find Aristophanes in a company of which Sokrates, Alkibiades, and\nAgathon form a part, alluding to the [Greek: dioi/kisis] of\nMantineia, which took place in 386 B.C. No one has ever made\nthis glaring anachronism a ground for disallowing the Symposion.\nSteinhart says that the style of the Second Alkibiad\u00eas copies Plato\ntoo closely (die \u00e4ngstlich platonisirende Sprache des Dialogs, p.\n515), yet he agrees with Stallbaum that in several places it departs\ntoo widely from Plato.]\n\n[Side-note: The two dialogues may probably be among Plato's\nearlier compositions.]\n\nI agree with Schleiermacher and the other recent critics in\nconsidering the First and Second Alkibiad\u00eas to be inferior in merit\nto Plato's best dialogues; and I contend that their own premisses\njustify no more. They may probably be among his earlier productions,\nthough I do not believe that the First Alkibiad\u00eas was composed during\nthe lifetime of Sokrates, as Socher, Steinhart, and Stallbaum\nendeavour to show.[45] I have already given my reasons, in a\nprevious chapter, for believing that Plato composed no dialogues at\nall during the lifetime of Sokrates; still less in that of\nAlkibiad\u00eas, who died four years earlier. There is certainly nothing\nin either Alkibiad\u00eas I. or II. to shake this belief.\n\n[Footnote 45: Stallbaum refers the composition of Alkib. i. to a time\nnot long before the accusation of Sokrates, when the enemies of\nSokrates were calumniating him in consequence of his past intimacy\nwith Alkibiades (who had before that time been killed in 404\nB.C.) and when Plato was anxious to defend his master\n(Prolegg. p. 186). Socher and Steinhart (p. 210) remark that such\nwritings would do little good to Sokrates under his accusation. They\nplace the composition of the dialogue earlier, in 406 B.C.\n(Steinhart, p. 151-152), and they consider it the first exercise of\nPlato in the strict dialectic method. Both Steinhart and Hermann\n(Gesch. Plat. Phil. p. 440) think that the dialogue has not only a\nspeculative but a political purpose; to warn and amend Alkibiades,\nand to prevent him from surrendering himself blindly to the\ndemocracy.\n\nI cannot admit the hypothesis that the dialogue was written in 406\nB.C. (when Plato was twenty-one years of age, at most\ntwenty-two), nor that it had any intended bearing upon the real\nhistorical Alkibiades, who left Athens in 415 B.C. at the\nhead of the armament against Syracuse, was banished three months\nafterwards, and never came back to Athens until May 407 B.C.\n(Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 13; i. 5, 17). He then enjoyed four months of\ngreat ascendancy at Athens, left it at the head of the fleet to Asia\nin Oct. 407 B.C., remained in command of the fleet for about\nthree months or so, then fell into disgrace and retired to\nChersonese, never revisiting Athens. In 406 B.C. Alkibiades\nwas again in banishment, out of the reach of all such warnings as\nHermann and Steinhart suppose that Plato intended to address to him\nin Alkib. i.\n\nSteinhart says (p. 152), \"In dieser Zeit also, _wenige Jahre nach\nseiner triumphirenden R\u00fcckkehr_, wo Alkibiades,\" &c. Now\nAlkibiades left the Athenian service, irrevocably, within less\n_than one year_ after his triumphant return.\n\nSteinhart has not realised in his mind the historical and\nchronological conditions of the period.]\n\n[Side-note: Analogy with various dialogues in the Xenophontic\nMemorabilia--Purpose of Sokrates to humble presumptuous young men.]\n\nIf we compare various colloquies of Sokrates in the Xenophontic\nMemorabilia, we shall find Alkibiad\u00eas I. and II. very analogous to\nthem both in purpose and spirit. In Alkibiad\u00eas I. the situation\nconceived is the same as that of Sokrates and Glaukon, in the third\nbook of the Memorabilia. Xenophon recounts how the presumptuous\nGlaukon, hardly twenty years of age, fancied himself already fit to\nplay a conspicuous part in public affairs, and tried to force\nhimself, in spite of rebuffs and humiliations, upon the notice of the\nassembly.[46] No remonstrances of friends could deter him, nor could\nanything, except the ingenious dialectic of Sokrates, convince him of\nhis own impertinent forwardness and exaggerated self-estimation.\nProbably Plato (Glaukon's elder brother) had heard of this\nconversation, but whether the fact be so or not, we see the same\nsituation idealised by him in Alkibiad\u00eas I., and worked out in a way\nof his own. Again, we find in the Xenophontic Memorabilia another\ncolloquy, wherein Sokrates cross-questions, perplexes, and\nhumiliates, the studious youth Euthydemus,[47] whom he regards as\nover-confident in his persuasions and too well satisfied with\nhimself. It was among the specialties of Sokrates to humiliate\nconfident young men, with a view to their future improvement. He made\nhis conversation \"an instrument of chastisement,\" in the language of\nXenophon: or (to use a phrase of Plato himself in the Lysis) he\nconceived. \"that the proper way of talking to youth whom you love,\nwas, not to exalt and puff them up, but to subdue and humiliate\nthem\".[48]\n\n[Footnote 46: Xenoph. Memor. iii. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Xenoph. Mem. i. 4, 1. [Greek: skepsa/menoi m\u00ea\\ mo/non\na(\\ e)kei=nos] (Sokrates) [Greek: _kolast\u00eari/ou e(/neka _tou/s\npa/nt' oi)ome/nous ei)de/nai e)r\u00f4t\u00f4=n \u00ea)/legchen, a)lla\\ kai\\ a(\\\nle/g\u00f4n sun\u00eame/reue toi=s sundiatri/bousin], &c. So in the\nPlatonic Lysis, the youthful Lysis says to Sokrates \"Talk to\nMenexenus, [Greek: i(/n' au)to\\n kola/s\u00ea|s]\" (Plat. Lysis, 211 B).\nAnd Sokrates himself says, a few lines before (210 E), [Greek: Ou(/t\u00f4\nchr\u00ea\\ toi=s paidikoi=s diale/gesthai, tapeinou=nta kai\\ suste/llonta,\nkai\\ m\u00ea\\ \u00f4(/sper su\\ chaunou=nta kai\\ diathru/ptonta.]]\n\n[Side-note: Fitness of the name and character of Alkibiades for\nidealising this feature in Sokrates.]\n\nIf Plato wished to idealise this feature in the character of\nSokrates, no name could be more suitable to his purpose than that of\nAlkibiades: who, having possessed as a youth the greatest personal\nbeauty (to which Sokrates was exquisitely sensible) had become in his\nmature life distinguished not less for unprincipled ambition and\ninsolence, than for energy and ability. We know the real Alkibiad\u00eas\nboth from Thucydides and Xenophon, and we also know that Alkibiades\nhad in his youth so far frequented the society of Sokrates as to\ncatch some of that dialectic ingenuity, which the latter was expected\nand believed to impart.[49] The contrast, as well as the\ncompanionship, between Sokrates and Alkibiades was eminently\nsuggestive to the writers of Sokratic dialogues, and nearly all of\nthem made use of it, composing dialogues in which Alkibiades was the\nprincipal name and figure.[50] It would be surprising indeed if Plato\nhad never done the same: which is what we must suppose, if we adopt\nSchleiermacher's view, that both Alkibiad\u00eas I. and II. are spurious.\nIn the Protagoras as well as in the Symposion, Alkibiades figures;\nbut in neither of them is he the principal person, or titular hero,\nof the piece. In Alkibiad\u00eas I. and II., he is introduced as the\nsolitary respondent to the questions of Sokrates--[Greek: kolast\u00eari/ou\ne(/neka]: to receive from Sokrates a lesson of humiliation such as\nthe Xenophontic Sokrates administers to Glaukon and Euthydemus,\ntaking care to address the latter when alone.[51]\n\n[Footnote 49: The sensibility of Sokrates to youthful beauty is as\nstrongly declared in the Xenophontic Memorabilia (i. 3, 8-14), as in\nthe Platonic Lysis, Charmid\u00eas, or Symposion.\n\nThe conversation reported by Xenophon between Alkibiades, when not\nyet twenty years of age, and his guardian Perikles, the first man in\nAthens--wherein Alkibiades puzzles Perikles by a Sokratic\ncross-examination--is likely enough to be real, and was probably the\nfruit of his sustained society with Sokrates (Xen. Memor. i. 2, 40).]\n\n[Footnote 50: Stallbaum observes (Prolegg. ad Alcib. i. p. 215, 2nd\ned.), \"Ceterum etiam \u00c6schines, Euclides, Ph\u00e6don, et Antisthenes,\ndialogos _Alcibiadis_ nomine inscriptos composuisse narrantur\".\n\nRespecting the dialogues composed by \u00c6schines, see the first note to\nthis chapter.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 8.]\n\n[Side-note: Plato's manner of replying to the accusers of\nSokrates. Magical influence ascribed to the conversation of\nSokrates.]\n\nI conceive Alkibiad\u00eas I. and II. as composed by Plato among his\nearlier writings (perhaps between 399-390 B.C.)[52] giving\nan imaginary picture of the way in which \"Sokrates handled every\nrespondent just as he chose\" (to use the literal phrase of\nXenophon[53]): taming even that most overbearing youth, whom\nAristophanes characterises as the lion's whelp.[54] In selecting\nAlkibiades as the sufferer under such a chastising process, Plato\nrebuts in his own ideal style that charge which Xenophon answers with\nprosaic directness--the charge made against Sokrates by his enemies,\nthat he taught political craft without teaching ethical sobriety; and\nthat he had encouraged by his training the lawless propensities of\nAlkibiades.[55] When Schleiermacher, and others who disallow the\ndialogue, argue that the inordinate insolence ascribed to Alkibiades,\nand the submissive deference towards Sokrates also ascribed to him,\nare incongruous and incompatible attributes,--I reply that such a\nconjunction is very improbable in any real character. But this does\nnot hinder Plato from combining them in one and the same ideal\ncharacter, as we shall farther see when we come to the manifestation\nof Alkibiades in the Symposion: in which dialogue we find a\ncombination of the same elements, still more extravagant and\nhigh-coloured. Both here and there we are made to see that Sokrates,\nfar from encouraging Alkibiades, is the only person who ever succeeded\nin humbling him. Plato attributes to the personality and conversation\nof Sokrates an influence magical and almost superhuman: which Cicero\nand Plutarch, proceeding probably upon the evidence of the Platonic\ndialogues, describe as if it were historical fact. They represent\nAlkibiades as shedding tears of sorrow and shame, and entreating\nSokrates to rescue him from a sense of degradation insupportably\npainful.[56] Now Xenophon mentions Euthydemus and other young men as\nhaving really experienced these profound and distressing\nemotions.[56] But he does not at all certify the same about\nAlkibiades, whose historical career is altogether adverse to the\nhypothesis. The Platonic picture is an _id\u00e9al_, drawn from what\nmay have been actually true about other interlocutors of Sokrates,\nand calculated to reply to Mel\u00eatus and his allies.\n\n[Footnote 52: The date which I here suppose for the composition of\nAlkib. i. (_i.e._ after the death of Sokrates, but early in the\nliterary career of Plato), is farther sustained (against those\ncritics who place it in 406 B.C. or 402 B.C. before\nthe death of Sokrates) by the long discourse (p. 121-124) of Sokrates\nabout the Persian and Spartan kings. In reference to the Persian\nmonarchy Sokrates says (p. 123 B), [Greek: e)pei/ pot' e)g\u00f4\\ \u00ea(/kousa\na)ndro\\s a)xiopi/stou t\u00f4=n a)nabeb\u00eako/t\u00f4n para\\ basile/a, o(\\s e)/ph\u00ea\nparelthei=n ch\u00f4/ran pa/nu poll\u00ea\\n kai\\ a)gath\u00ea/n--\u00ea(\\n kalei=n tou\\s\ne)pich\u00f4ri/ous z\u00f4/n\u00ean t\u00ea=s basile/\u00f4s gunaiko/s], &c. Olympiodorus\nand the Scholiast both suppose that Plato here refers to Xenophon and\nthe Anabasis, in which a statement very like this is found (i. 4, 9).\nIt is plain, therefore, that _they_ did not consider the\ndialogue to have been composed before the death of Sokrates. I think\nit very probable that Plato had in his mind Xenophon (either his\nAnabasis, or personal communications with him); but at any rate\nvisits of Greeks to the Persian court became very numerous between\n399-390 B.C., whereas Plato can hardly have seen any such\nvisitors at Athens in 406 B.C. (before the close of the\nwar), nor probably in 402 B.C., when Athens, though relieved\nfrom the oligarchy, was still in a state of great public prostration.\nBetween 399 B.C. and the peace of Antalkidas (387\nB.C.), visitors from Greece to the interior of Persia became\nmore and more frequent, the Persian kings interfering very actively\nin Grecian politics. Plato may easily have seen during these years\nintelligent Greeks who had been up to the Persian court on military\nor political business. Both the Persian kings and the Spartan kings\nwere then in the maximum of power and ascendancy--it is no wonder\ntherefore that Sokrates should here be made to dwell upon their\nprodigious dignity in his discourse with Alkibiades. Steinhart (Einl.\np. 150) feels the difficulty of reconciling this part of the dialogue\nwith his hypothesis that it was composed in 406 B.C.: yet he\nand Stallbaum both insist that it must have been composed before the\ndeath of Sokrates, for which they really produce no grounds at all.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Xen. Mem. i. 2, 14. [Greek: toi=s de\\ dialegome/nois\nau)t\u00f4=| pa=si chr\u00f4/menon e)n toi=s lo/gois o(/p\u00f4s bou/loito.]]\n\n[Footnote 54: Aristoph. Ran. 1431. [Greek: ou) chr\u00ea\\ le/ontos\nsku/mnon e)n po/lei tre/phein.] Thucyd. vi. 15. [Greek: phob\u00eathe/ntes\nga\\r au)tou=] (Alkib.) [Greek: oi( polloi\\ to\\ me/gethos t\u00ea=s te\nkata\\ to\\ e(autou= s\u00f4=ma paranomi/as e)s t\u00ea\\n di/aitan, kai\\ t\u00ea=s\ndianoi/as \u00f4(=n kath' e(\\n e(/kaston, e)n o(/t\u00f4| gi/gnoito,\ne)/prassen, \u00f4(s turanni/dos e)pithumou=nti pole/mioi kathe/stasan],\n&c.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Xenoph. Memorab. i. 2, 17.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Cicero, Tusc. Disp. iii. 32, 77; Plutarch, Alkib. c.\n4-6. Compare Plato, Alkib. i. p. 127 D, 135 C; Symposion, p. 215-216.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2, 39-40.]\n\n[Side-note: The purpose proclaimed by Sokrates in the Apology\nis followed out in Alkib. I. Warfare against the false persuasion of\nknowledge.]\n\nLooking at Alkibiad\u00eas I. and II. in this point of view, we shall find\nthem perfectly Sokratic both in topics proclaimed and in\nmanner--whatever may be said about unnecessary prolixity and common-place\nhere and there. The leading ideas of Alkibiad\u00eas I. may be found,\nnearly all, in the Platonic Apology. That warfare, which Sokrates\nproclaims in the Apology as having been the mission of his life,\nagainst the false persuasion of knowledge, or against beliefs ethical\nand \u00e6sthetical, firmly entertained without having been preceded by\nconscious study or subjected to serious examination--is exemplified\nin Alkibiad\u00eas I. and II. as emphatically as in any Platonic\ncomposition. In both these dialogues, indeed (especially in the\nfirst), we find an excessive repetition of specialising\nillustrations, often needless and sometimes tiresome: a defect easily\nintelligible if we assume them to have been written when Plato was\nstill a novice in the art of dialogic composition. But both dialogues\nare fully impregnated with the spirit of the Sokratic process,\nexposing, though with exuberant prolixity, the firm and universal\nbelief, held and affirmed by every one even at the age of boyhood,\nwithout any assignable grounds or modes of acquisition, and amidst\nangry discordance between the affirmation of one man and another. The\nemphasis too with which Sokrates insists upon his own single function\nof merely questioning, and upon the fact that Alkibiades gives all\nthe answers and pronounces all the self-condemnation with his own\nmouth[58]--is remarkable in this dialogue: as well as the confidence\nwith which he proclaims the dialogue as affording the only, but\neffective, cure.[59] The ignorance of which Alkibiades stands\nunexpectedly convicted, is expressly declared to be common to him\nwith the other Athenian politicians: an exception being half allowed\nto pass in favour of the semi-philosophical Perikles, whom Plato\njudges here with less severity than elsewhere[60]--and a decided\nsuperiority being claimed for the Spartan and Persian kings, who are\nextolled as systematically trained from childhood.\n\n[Footnote 58: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 112-113.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 127 E.]\n\n[Footnote 60: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 118-120.]\n\n[Side-note: Difficulties multiplied for the purpose of\nbringing Alkibiades to a conviction of his own ignorance.]\n\nThe main purpose of Sokrates is to drive Alkibiades into\nself-contradictions, and to force upon him a painful consciousness of\nignorance and mental defect, upon grave and important subjects, while\nhe is yet young enough to amend it. Towards this purpose he is made\nto lay claim to a divine mission similar to that which the real\nSokrates announces in the Apology[61] A number of perplexing\nquestions and difficulties are accumulated: it is not meant that\nthese difficulties are insoluble, but that they cannot be solved by\none who has never seriously reflected on them--by one who (as the\nXenophontic Sokrates says to Euthydemus),[62] is so confident of\nknowing the subject that he has never meditated upon it at all. The\ndisheartened Alkibiades feels the necessity of improving himself and\nsupplicates the assistance of Sokrates:[63] who reminds him that he\nmust first determine what \"Himself\" is. Here again we find ourselves\nupon the track of Sokrates in the Platonic Apology, and under the\ninfluence of the memorable inscription at Delphi--_Nosce\nteipsum_. Your mind is yourself; your body is a mere instrument of\nyour mind: your wealth and power are simple appurtenances or\nadjuncts. To know yourself, which is genuine Sophrosyn\u00ea or\ntemperance, is to know your mind: but this can only be done by\nlooking into another mind, and into its most intelligent compartment:\njust as the eye can only see itself by looking into the centre of\nvision of another eye.[64]\n\n[Footnote 61: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 124 C-127 E.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 36. [Greek: A)lla\\ tau=ta me/n,\ne)/ph\u00ea o( S\u00f4kra/t\u00eas, i)/s\u00f4s, dia\\ to\\ spho/dra posteu/ein ei)de/nai,\nou)d' e)/skepsai.]]\n\n[Footnote 63: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 128-132 A.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 133.\n\nA Platonic metaphor, illustrating the necessity for two separate\nminds co-operating in dialectic colloquy.]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates furnishes no means of solving these\ndifficulties. He exhorts to Justice and Virtue--but these are\nacknowledged Incognita.]\n\nAt the same time, when, after having convicted Alkibiades of\ndeplorable ignorance, Sokrates is called upon to prescribe\nremedies--all distinctness of indication disappears. It is exacted only\nwhen the purpose is to bring difficulties and contradictions to view:\nit is dispensed with, when the purpose is to solve them. The conclusion\nis, that assuming happiness as the acknowledged ultimate end,[65]\nAlkibiades cannot secure this either for himself or for his city, by\nstriving for wealth and power, private or public: he can only secure\nit by acquiring for himself, and implanting in his country-men,\njustice, temperance, and virtue. This is perfectly Sokratic, and\nconformable to what is said by the real Sokrates in the Platonic\nApology. But coming at the close of Alkibiad\u00eas I., it presents no\nmeaning and imparts no instruction: because Sokrates had shown in the\nearlier part of the dialogue, that neither he himself, nor\nAlkibiades, nor the general public, knew what justice and virtue\nwere. The positive solution which Sokrates professes to give, is\ntherefore illusory. He throws us back upon those old, familiar,\nemotional, associations, unconscious products and unexamined\ntransmissions from mind to mind--which he had already shown to\nrepresent the fancy of knowledge without the reality--deep-seated\nbelief without any assignable intellectual basis, or outward standard\nof rectitude.\n\n[Footnote 65: Plat. Alkibiad. i. p. 134.]\n\n[Side-note: Prolixity of Alkibiad\u00eas I.--Extreme multiplication\nof illustrative examples--How explained.]\n\nThroughout the various Platonic dialogues, we find alternately two\ndistinct and opposite methods of handling--the generalising of the\nspecial, and the specialising of the general. In Alkibiad\u00eas I, the\nspecialising of the general preponderates--as it does in most of the\nconversations of the Xenophontic Memorabilia: the number of\nexemplifying particulars is unusually great. Sokrates does not accept\nas an answer a general term, without illustrating it by several of\nthe specific terms comprehended under it: and this several times on\noccasions when an instructed reader thinks it superfluous and\ntiresome: hence, partly, the inclination of some modern critics to\ndisallow the dialogue. But we must recollect that though a modern\nreader practised in the use of general terms may seize the meaning at\nonce, an Athenian youth of the Platonic age would not be sure of\ndoing the same. No conscious analysis had yet been applied to general\nterms: no grammar or logic then entered into education. Confident\naffirmation, without fully knowing the meaning of what is affirmed,\nis the besetting sin against which Plato here makes war: and his\nprecautions for exposing it are pushed to extreme minuteness. So,\ntoo, in the Sophist\u00eas and Politikus, when he wishes to illustrate the\nprocess of logical division and subdivision, he applies it to cases\nso trifling and so multiplied, that Socher is revolted and rejects\nthe dialogues altogether. But Plato himself foresees and replies to\nthe objection; declaring expressly that his main purpose is, not to\nexpound the particular subject chosen, but to make manifest and\nfamiliar the steps and conditions of the general classifying\nprocess--and that prolixity cannot be avoided.[66] We must reckon upon\na similar purpose in Alkibiad\u00eas I. The dialogue is a specimen of that\nwhich Aristotle calls Inductive Dialectic, as distinguished from\nSyllogistic: the Inductive he considers to be plainer and easier,\nsuitable when you have an ordinary collocutor--the Syllogistic is the\nmore cogent, when you are dealing with a practised disputant.[67]\n\n[Footnote 66: Plato, Politikus, 285-286.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Aristotel. Topic. i. 104, a. 16. [Greek: Po/sa t\u00f4=n\nlo/g\u00f4n ei)/d\u00ea t\u00f4=n dialektik\u00f4=n--e)/sti de\\ to\\ me\\n e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea/, to\\\nde\\ sullogismo/s . . . . e)/sti d' \u00ea( me\\n e)pag\u00f4g\u00ea\\ pithan\u00f4/teron\nkai\\ saphe/steron kai\\ kata\\ t\u00ea\\n ai)/sth\u00easin gn\u00f4rim\u00f4/teron kai\\\ntoi=s polloi=s koino/n; o( de\\ sullogismo\\s biastik\u00f4/teron kai\\ pro\\s\ntou\\s a)ntilogikou\\s e)nerge/steron.]]\n\n[Side-note: Alkibiad\u00eas II. leaves its problem avowedly\nundetermined.]\n\nIt has been seen that Alkibiad\u00eas I, though professing to give\nsomething like a solution, gives what is really no solution at all.\nAlkibiad\u00eas II., similar in many respects, is here different, inasmuch\nas it does not even profess to solve the difficulty which had been\nraised. The general mental defect--false persuasion of knowledge\nwithout the reality--is presented in its application to a particular\ncase. Alkibiades is obliged to admit that he does not know what he\nought to pray to the Gods for: neither what is _good_, to be\ngranted, nor what is _evil_, to be averted. He relies upon\nSokrates for dispelling this mist from his mind: which Sokrates\npromises to do, but adjourns for another occasion.\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates commends the practice of praying to the\nGods for favours undefined--his views about the semi-regular,\nsemi-irregular agency of the Gods--he prays to them for premonitory\nwarnings.]\n\nSokrates here ascribes to the Spartans, and to various philosophers,\nthe practice of putting up prayers in undefined language, for good\nand honourable things generally. He commends that practice. Xenophon\ntells us that the historical Sokrates observed it:[68] but he tells\nus also that the historical Sokrates, though not praying for any\nspecial presents from the Gods, yet prayed for and believed himself\nto receive special irregular revelations and advice as to what was\ngood to be done or avoided in particular cases. He held that these\nspecial revelations were essential to any tolerable life: that the\ndispensations of the Gods, though administered upon regular\nprinciples on certain subjects and up to a certain point, were kept\nby them designedly inscrutable beyond that point: but that the Gods\nwould, if properly solicited, afford premonitory warnings to any\nfavoured person, such as would enable him to keep out of the way of\nevil, and put himself in the way of good. He declared that to consult\nand obey oracles and prophets was not less a maxim of prudence than a\nduty of piety: for himself, he was farther privileged through his\ndivine sign or monitor, which he implicitly followed.[69] Such\npremonitory warnings were the only special favour which he thought it\nsuitable to pray for--besides good things generally. For special\npresents he did not pray, because he professed not to know whether\nany of the ordinary objects of desire were good or bad. He proves in\nhis conversation with Euthyd\u00eamus, that all those acquisitions which\nare usually accounted means of happiness--beauty, strength, wealth,\nreputation, nay, even good health and wisdom--are sometimes good\nor causes of happiness, sometimes evil or causes of misery; and\ntherefore cannot be considered either as absolutely the one or\nabsolutely the other.[70]\n\n[Footnote 68: Xenoph. Mem. i. 3, 2; Plat. Alk. ii. p. 143-148.]\n\n[Footnote 69: These opinions of Sokrates are announced in various\npassages of the Xenophontic Memorabilia, i. 1, 1-10--[Greek: e)/ph\u00ea\nde\\ dei=n, a(\\ me\\n matho/ntas poiei=n e)/d\u00f4kan oi( theoi/,\nmantha/nein; a(\\ de\\ m\u00ea\\ d\u00ea=la toi=s a)nthr\u00f4/pois e)sti/, peira=sthai\ndia\\ mantik\u00ea=s para\\ t\u00f4=n the\u00f4=n puntha/nesthai; tou\\s theou\\s ga/r,\noi(=s a)\\n \u00f4)=sin i(/le\u00f4|, s\u00eamai/nein]--i. 3, 4; i. 4, 2-15; iv. 3,\n12; iv. 7, 10; iv. 8, 5-11.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2, 31-32-36.[Greek: Tau=ta ou)=n\npote\\ me\\n \u00f4)phelou=nta pote\\ de\\ bla/ptonta, ti/ ma=llon a)gatha\\\n\u00ea)\\ kaka/ e)stin?]]\n\n[Side-note: Comparison of Alkibiad\u00eas II. with the Xenophontic\nMemorabilia, especially the conversation of Sokrates with Euthydemus.\nSokrates not always consistent with himself.]\n\nThis impossibility of determining what is good and what is evil, in\nconsequence of the uncertainty in the dispensations of the Gods and\nin human affairs--is a doctrine forcibly insisted on by the\nXenophontic Sokrates in his discourse with Euthyd\u00eamus, and much akin\nto the Platonic Alkibiad\u00eas II., being applied to the special case of\nprayer. But we must not suppose that Sokrates adheres to this\ndoctrine throughout all the colloquies of the Xenophontic\nMemorabilia: on the contrary, we find him, in other places, reasoning\nupon such matters, as health, strength, and wisdom, as if they were\ndecidedly good.[71] The fact is, that the arguments of Sokrates, in\nthe Xenophontic Memorabilia, vary materially according to the\noccasion and the person with whom he is discoursing: and the case is\nsimilar with the Platonic dialogues: illustrating farther the\nquestionable evidence on which Schleiermacher and other critics\nproceed, when they declare one dialogue to be spurious, because it\ncontains reasoning inconsistent with another.\n\n[Footnote 71: For example, Xen. Mem. iv. 5, 6--[Greek: sophi/an to\\\nme/giston a)gatho/n], &c.]\n\nWe find in Alkibiad\u00eas II. another doctrine which is also proclaimed\nby Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia: that the Gods are not\nmoved by costly sacrifice more than by humble sacrifice, according to\nthe circumstances of the offerer:[72] they attend only to the mind of\nthe offerer, whether he be just and wise: that is, \"whether he knows\nwhat ought to be done both towards Gods and towards men\".[73]\n\n[Footnote 72: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 149-150; Xen. Mem. i. 3. Compare\nPlato, Legg. x. p. 885; Isokrat. ad Nikok.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 149 E, 150 B.]\n\n[Side-note: Remarkable doctrine of Alkibiad\u00eas II.--that\nknowledge is not always Good. The knowledge of Good itself is\nindispensable: without that, the knowledge of other things is more\nhurtful than beneficial.]\n\nBut we find also in Alkibiad\u00eas II. another doctrine, more remarkable.\nSokrates will not proclaim absolutely that knowledge is good, and\nthat ignorance is evil. In some cases, he contends, ignorance is\ngood; and he discriminates which the cases are. That which we\nare principally interested in knowing, is _Good_, or The\n_Best_--The _Profitable_:[74] phrases used as equivalent.\nThe knowledge of this is good, and the ignorance of it mischievous,\nunder all supposable circumstances. And if a man knows good, the more\nhe knows of everything else, the better; since he will sure to make a\ngood use of his knowledge. But if he does not know good, the\nknowledge of other things will be hurtful rather than beneficial to\nhim. To be skilful in particular arts and accomplishments, under the\ncapital mental deficiency supposed, will render him an instrument of\nevil and not of good. The more he knows--and the more he believes\nhimself to know--the more forward will he be in acting, and therefore\nthe greater amount of harm will he do. It is better that he should\nact as little as possible. Such a man is not fit to direct his own\nconduct, like a freeman: he must be directed and controlled by\nothers, like a slave. The greater number of mankind are fools of this\ndescription--ignorant of good: the wise men who know good, and are\nfit to direct, are very few. The wise man alone, knowing good,\nfollows reason: the rest trust to opinion, without reason.[75] He\nalone is competent to direct both his own conduct and that of the\nsociety.\n\n[Footnote 74: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 145 C. [Greek: O(/stis a)/ra ti\nt\u00f4=n toiou/t\u00f4n oi)=den, e)a\\n me\\n pare/p\u00eatai au)t\u00f4=| \u00ea( tou=\nbelti/stou e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea--au)t\u00ea\\ d' \u00ea)=n \u00ea( au)t\u00ea\\ d\u00ea/pou \u00ea(per kai\\ \u00ea(\ntou= \u00f4)pheli/mou]--also 146 B.]\n\n[Footnote 75: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 146 A-D. [Greek: a)/neu nou=\ndo/x\u00ea| pepisteuko/tas.]]\n\nThe stress which is laid here upon the knowledge of good, as\ndistinguished from all other varieties of knowledge--the\nidentification of the good with the profitable, and of the knowledge\nof good with reason ([Greek: nou=s]), while other varieties of\nknowledge are ranked with opinion ([Greek: do/xa])--these are points\nwhich, under one phraseology or another, pervade many of the Platonic\ndialogues. The old phrase of Herakleitus--[Greek: Polumathi/\u00ea no/on\nou) dida/skei]--\"much learning does not teach reason\"--seems to have\nbeen present to the mind of Plato in composing this dialogue. The man\nof much learning and art, without the knowledge of good, and\nsurrendering himself to the guidance of one or other among his\naccomplishments, is like a vessel tossed about at sea without a\npilot.[76]\n\n[Footnote 76: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 147 A. [Greek: o( de\\ d\u00ea\\ t\u00ea\\n\nkaloume/n\u00ean poluma/theia/n te kai\\ polutechni/an kekt\u00eame/nos,\no)rphano\\s de\\ \u00f4)\\n tau/t\u00eas t\u00ea=s e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas, a)go/menos de\\ u(po\\\nmia=s e(ka/st\u00eas t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n], &c.]\n\n[Side-note: Knowledge of Good--appears postulated and divined,\nin many of the Platonic dialogues, under different titles.]\n\nWhat Plato here calls the knowledge of Good, or Reason--the just\ndiscrimination and comparative appreciation of Ends and\nMeans--appears in the Politikus and Euthyd\u00eamus, under the title of the\nRegal or Political Art, of employing or directing[77] the results of all\nother arts, which are considered as subordinate: in the Protagoras,\nunder the title of art of calculation or mensuration: in the\nPhil\u00eabus, as measure and proportion: in the Ph\u00e6drus (in regard to\nrhetoric) as the art of turning to account, for the main purpose of\npersuasion, all the special processes, stratagems, decorations,\n&c., imparted by professional masters. In the Republic, it is\npersonified in the few venerable Elders who constitute the Reason of\nthe society, and whose directions all the rest (Guardians and\nProducers) are bound implicitly to follow: the virtue of the\nsubordinates consisting in this implicit obedience. In the Leges, it\nis defined as the complete subjection in the mind, of pleasures and\npains to right Reason,[78] without which, no special aptitudes are\nworth having. In the Xenophontic Memorabilia, it stands as a Sokratic\nauthority under the title of Sophrosyn\u00ea or Temperance:[79] and the\nProfitable is declared identical with the Good, as the directing and\nlimiting principle for all human pursuits and proceedings.[80]\n\n[Footnote 77: Plato, Politikus, 292 B, 304 B, 305 A; Euthyd\u00eamus, 291\nB, 292 B. Compare Xenophon, Oekonomicus, i. 8, 13.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Leges, iii. 689 A-D, 691 A.]\n\n[Footnote 79: Xenoph. Memor. i. 2. 17; iv. 3. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 6, 8; iv. 7, 7.]\n\n[Side-note: The Good--the Profitable--what is it?--How are we\nto know it? Plato leaves this undetermined.]\n\nBut what are we to understand by the _Good_, about which there\nare so many disputes, according to the acknowledgment of Plato as\nwell as of Sokrates? And what are we to understand by the Profitable?\nIn what relation does it stand to the Pleasurable and the Painful?\n\nThese are points which Plato here leaves undetermined. We shall find\nhim again touching them, and trying different ways of determining\nthem, in the Protagoras, the Gorgias, the Republic, and\nelsewhere. We have here the title and the postulate, but nothing\nmore, of a comprehensive Teleology, or right comparative estimate of\nends and means one against another, so as to decide when, how far,\nunder what circumstances, &c., each ought to be pursued. We shall\nsee what Plato does in other dialogues to connect this title and\npostulate with a more definite meaning.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\n\nHIPPIAS MAJOR--HIPPIAS MINOR.\n\n\n[Side-note: Hippias Major--situation supposed--character of the\ndialogue. Sarcasm and mockery against Hippias.]\n\nBoth these two dialogues are carried on between Sokrates and the\nEleian Sophist Hippias. The general conception of Hippias--described\nas accomplished, eloquent, and successful, yet made to say vain and\nsilly things--is the same in both dialogues: in both also the\npolemics of Sokrates against him are conducted in a like spirit, of\naffected deference mingled with insulting sarcasm. Indeed the figure\nassigned to Hippias is so contemptible, that even an admiring critic\nlike Stallbaum cannot avoid noticing the \"petulans pene et proterva\nin Hippiam oratio,\" and intimating that Plato has handled Hippias\nmore coarsely than any one else. Such petulance Stallbaum attempts to\nexcuse by saying that the dialogue is a youthful composition of\nPlato:[1] while Schleiermacher numbers it among the reasons for\nsuspecting the dialogue, and Ast, among the reasons for declaring\npositively that Plato is not the author.[2] This last conclusion I do\nnot at all accept: nor even the hypothesis of Stallbaum, if it be\ntendered as an excuse for improprieties of tone: for I believe that\nthe earliest of Plato's dialogues was composed after he was\ntwenty-eight years of age--that is, after the death of Sokrates. It is\nhowever noway improbable, that both the Greater and Lesser Hippias\nmay have been among Plato's earlier compositions. We see by the\nMemorabilia of Xenophon that there was repeated and acrimonious\ncontroversy between Sokrates and Hippias: so that we may probably\nsuppose feelings of special dislike, determining Plato to compose two\ndistinct dialogues, in which an imaginary Hippias is mocked and\nscourged by an imaginary Sokrates.\n\n[Footnote 1: Stallbaum, Prolegg. in Hipp. Maj. p. 149-150; also\nSteinhart (Einleitung, p. 42-43), who says, after an outpouring of\nhis usual invective against the Sophist: \"Nevertheless the coarse\njesting of the dialogue seems almost to exceed the admissible limit\nof comic effect,\" &c. Again, p. 50, Steinhart talks of the banter\nwhich Sokrates carries on with Hippias, in a way not less cruel\n(grausam) than purposeless, tormenting him with a string of\nsuccessive new propositions about the definition of the Beautiful,\nwhich propositions, as fast as Hippias catches at them, he again\nwithdraws of his own accord, and thus at last dismisses him (as he\nhad dismissed Ion) uninstructed and unimproved, without even leaving\nbehind in him the sting of anger, &c.\n\nIt requires a powerful hatred against the persons called Sophists, to\nmake a critic take pleasure in a comedy wherein silly and ridiculous\nspeeches are fastened upon the name of one of them, in his own day\nnot merely honoured but acknowledged as deserving honour by\nremarkable and varied accomplishments--and to make the critic\ndescribe the historical Hippias (whom we only know from Plato and\nXenophon--see Steinhart, note 7, p. 89; Socher, p. 221) as if he had\nreally delivered these speeches, or something equally absurd.\n\nHow this comedy may be appreciated is doubtless a matter of\nindividual taste. For my part, I agree with Ast in thinking it\nmisplaced and unbecoming: and I am not surprised that he wishes to\nremove the dialogue from the Platonic canon, though I do not concur\neither in this inference, or in the general principle on which it\nproceeds, viz., that all objections against the composition of a\ndialogue are to be held as being also objections against its\ngenuineness as a work of Plato. The Nubes of Aristophanes, greatly\nsuperior as a comedy to the Hippias of Plato, is turned to an abusive\npurpose when critics put it into court as evidence about the\ncharacter of the real Sokrates.\n\nK. F. Hermann, in my judgment, takes a more rational view of the\nHippias Major (Gesch. und Syst. der Plat. Phil. p. 487-647). Instead\nof expatiating on the glory of Plato in deriding an accomplished\ncontemporary, he dwells upon the logical mistakes and confusion which\nthe dialogue brings to view; and he reminds us justly of the\nintellectual condition of the age, when even elementary distinctions\nin logic and grammar had been scarcely attended to.\n\nBoth K. F. Hermann and Socher consider the Hippias to be not a\njuvenile production of Plato, but to belong to his middle age.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Schleierm. Einleitung. p. 401; Ast, Platon's Leben und\nSchriften, p. 457-459.]\n\n[Side-note: Real debate between the historical Sokrates and\nHippias in the Xenophontic Memorabilia--subject of that debate.]\n\nOne considerable point in the Hippias Major appears to have a bearing\non the debate between Sokrates and Hippias in the Xenophontic\nMemorabilia: in which debate, Hippias taunts Sokrates with always\ncombating and deriding the opinions of others, while evading to give\nopinions of his own. It appears that some antecedent debates between\nthe two had turned upon the definition of the Just, and that on these\noccasions Hippias had been the respondent, Sokrates the objector.\nHippias professes to have reflected upon these debates, and to be now\nprepared with a definition which neither Sokrates nor any one else\ncan successfully assail, but he will not say what the definition is,\nuntil Sokrates has laid down one of his own. In reply to this\nchallenge, Sokrates declares the Just to be equivalent to the Lawful\nor Customary: he defends this against various objections of\nHippias, who concludes by admitting it.[3] Probably this debate, as\nreported by Xenophon, or something very like it, really took place.\nIf so, we remark with surprise the feebleness of the objections of\nHippias, in a case where Sokrates, if he had been the objector, would\nhave found such strong ones--and the feeble replies given by\nSokrates, whose talent lay in starting and enforcing difficulties,\nnot in solving them.[4] Among the remarks which Sokrates makes in\nillustration to Hippias, one is--that Lykurgus had ensured\nsuperiority to Sparta by creating in the Spartans a habit of implicit\nobedience to the laws.[5] Such is the character of the Xenophontic\ndebate.\n\n[Footnote 3: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 4, 12-25.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Compare the puzzling questions which Alkibiades when a\nyouth is reported to have addressed to Perikles, and which he must\nunquestionably have heard from Sokrates himself, respecting the\nmeaning of the word [Greek: No/mos] (Xen. Mem. i. 2, 42). All the\ndifficulties in determining the definition of [Greek: No/mos], occur\nalso in determining that of [Greek: No/mimon], which includes both\nJus Scriptum and Jus Moribus Receptum.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Xen. Mem. iv. 4, 15.]\n\n[Side-note: Opening of the Hippias Major--Hippias describes the\nsuccessful circuit which he had made through Greece, and the renown\nas well as the gain acquired by his lectures.]\n\nHere, in the beginning of the Hippias Major, the Platonic Sokrates\nremarks that Hippias has been long absent from Athens: which absence,\nthe latter explains, by saying that he has visited many cities in\nGreece, giving lectures with great success, and receiving high pay:\nand that especially he has often visited Sparta, partly to give\nlectures, but partly also to transact diplomatic business for his\ncountrymen the Eleians, who trusted him more than any one else for\nsuch duties. His lectures (he says) were eminently instructive and\nvaluable for the training of youth: moreover they were so generally\napproved, that even from a small Sicilian town called Inykus, he\nobtained a considerable sum in fees.\n\n[Side-note: Hippias had met with no success at Sparta. Why the\nSpartans did not admit his instructions--their law forbids.]\n\nUpon this Sokrates asks--In which of the cities were your gains the\nlargest: probably at Sparta? _Hip._--No; I received nothing at\nall at Sparta. _Sokr._--How? You amaze me! Were not your\nlectures calculated to improve the Spartan youth? or did not the\nSpartans desire to have their youth improved? or had they no money?\n_Hip._--Neither one nor the other. The Spartans, like others,\ndesire the improvement of their youth: they also have plenty of\nmoney: moreover my lectures were very beneficial to them as well\nas to the rest.[6] _Sokr._--How could it happen then, that at\nSparta, a city great and eminent for its good laws, your valuable\ninstructions were left unrewarded; while you received so much at the\ninconsiderable town of Inykus? _Hip._--It is not the custom of\nthe country, Sokrates, for the Spartans to change their laws, or to\neducate their sons in a way different from their ordinary routine.\n_Sokr._--How say you? It is not the custom of the country for\nthe Spartans to do right, but to do wrong? _Hip._--I shall not\nsay that, Sokrates. _Sokr._--But surely they would do right, in\neducating their children better and not worse? _Hip._--Yes, they\nwould do right: but it is not lawful for them to admit a foreign mode\nof education. If any one could have obtained payment there for\neducation, I should have obtained a great deal; for they listen to me\nwith delight and applaud me: but, as I told you, their law forbids.\n\n[Footnote 6: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 283-284.]\n\n[Side-note: Question, What is law? The law-makers always aim at\nthe Profitable, but sometimes fail to attain it. When they fail, they\nfail to attain law. The lawful is the Profitable: the Unprofitable is\nalso unlawful.]\n\n_Sokr._--Do you call law a hurt or benefit to the city?\n_Hip._--Law is enacted with a view to benefit: but it sometimes\nhurts if it be badly enacted.[7] _Sokr._--But what? Do not the\nenactors enact it as the maximum of good, without which the citizens\ncannot live a regulated life? _Hip._--Certainly: they do so.\n_Sokr._--Therefore, when those who try to enact laws miss the\nattainment of good, they also miss the lawful and law itself. How say\nyou? _Hip._--They do so, if you speak with strict propriety: but\nsuch is not the language which men commonly use. _Sokr._--What\nmen? the knowing? or the ignorant? _Hip._--The Many.\n_Sokr._--The Many; is it _they_ who know what truth is?\n_Hip._--Assuredly not. _Sokr._--But surely those who do\nknow, account the profitable to be in truth more lawful than the\nunprofitable, to all men. Don't you admit this? _Hip._--Yes, I\nadmit they account it so in truth. _Sokr._--Well, and it is so,\ntoo: the truth is as the knowing men account it. _Hip._--Most\ncertainly. _Sokr._--Now you affirm, that it is more profitable\nto the Spartans to be educated according to your scheme, foreign as\nit is, than according to their own native scheme. _Hip._--I\naffirm it, and with truth too. _Sokr._--You affirm besides,\nthat things more profitable are at the same time more lawful?\n_Hip._--I said so. _Sokr._--According to your reasoning,\nthen, it is more lawful for the Spartan children to be educated by\nHippias, and more unlawful for them to be educated by their fathers--\nif in reality they will be more benefited by you? _Hip._--But\nthey will be more benefited by me. _Sokr._--The Spartans\ntherefore act unlawfully, when they refuse to give you money and to\nconfide to you their sons? _Hip._--I admit that they do: indeed\nyour reasoning seems to make in my favour, so that I am noway called\nupon to resist it. _Sokr._--We find then, after all, that the\nSpartans are enemies of law, and that too in the most important\nmatters--though they are esteemed the most exemplary followers of\nlaw.[8]\n\n[Footnote 7: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 284 C-B.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 285.]\n\n\n* * * * *\n\n[Side-note: Comparison of the argument of the Platonic Sokrates\nwith that of the Xenophontic Sokrates.]\n\nPerhaps Plato intended the above argument as a derisory taunt against\nthe Sophist Hippias, for being vain enough to think his own tuition\nbetter than that of the Spartan community. If such was his intention,\nthe argument might have been retorted against Plato himself, for his\npropositions in the Republic and Leges: and we know that the enemies\nof Plato did taunt him with his inability to get these schemes\nadopted in any actual community. But the argument becomes interesting\nwhen we compare it with the debate before referred to in the\nXenophontic Memorabilia, where Sokrates maintains against Hippias\nthat the Just is equivalent to the Lawful. In that Xenophontic\ndialogue, all the difficulties which embarrass this explanation are\nkept out of sight, and Sokrates is represented as gaining an easy\nvictory over Hippias. In this Platonic dialogue, the equivocal use of\nthe word [Greek: no/mimon] is expressly adverted to, and Sokrates\nreduces Hippias to a supposed absurdity, by making him pronounce the\nSpartans to be enemies of law: [Greek: paranomou/s] bearing a double\nsense, and the proposition being true in one sense, false in the\nother. In the argument of the Platonic Sokrates, a law which does not\nattain its intended purpose of benefiting the community, is no\nlaw at all,--not lawful:[9] so that we are driven back again upon the\nobjections of Alkibiades against Perikles (in the Xenophontic\nMemorabilia) in regard to what constitutes a law. In the argument of\nthe Xenophontic Sokrates, law means a law actually established, by\nofficial authority or custom--and the Spartans are produced as\neminent examples of a lawfully minded community. As far as we can\nassign positive opinion to the Platonic Sokrates in the Hippias\nMajor, he declares that the profitable or useful (being that which\nmen always aim at in making law) is The Lawful, whether actually\nestablished or not: and that the unprofitable or hurtful (being that\nwhich men always intend to escape) is The Unlawful, whether\nprescribed by any living authority or not. This (he says) is the\nopinion of the wise men who know: though the ignorant vulgar hold the\ncontrary opinion. The explanation of [Greek: to\\ di/kaion] given by\nthe Xenophontic Sokrates ([Greek: to\\ di/kaion = to\\ no/mimon]),\nwould be equivalent, if we construe [Greek: to\\ no/mimon] in the\nsense of the Platonic Sokrates (in Hippias Major) as an affirmation\nthat The Just was the generally useful--[Greek: To\\ di/kaion = to\\\nkoin\u00ea=| su/mphoron].\n\n[Footnote 9: Compare a similar argument of Sokrates against\nThrasymachus--Republic, i. 339.]\n\n[Side-note: The Just or Good is the beneficial or profitable.\nThis is the only explanation which Plato ever gives and to this he\ndoes not always adhere.]\n\nThere exists however in all this, a prevalent confusion between Law\n(or the Lawful) as actually established, and Law (or the Lawful) as\nit ought to be established, in the judgment of the critic, or of\nthose whom he follows: that is (to use the phrase of Mr. Austin in\nhis 'Province of Jurisprudence') Law as it would be, if it conformed\nto its assumed measure or test. In the first of these senses, [Greek:\nto\\ no/mimon] is not one and the same, but variable according to\nplace and time--one thing at Sparta, another thing elsewhere:\naccordingly it would not satisfy the demand of Plato's mind, when he\nasks for an explanation of [Greek: to\\ di/kaion]. It is an\nexplanation in the second of the two senses which Plato seeks--a\ncommon measure or test applicable universally, at all times and\nplaces. In so far as he ever finds one, it is that which I have\nmentioned above as delivered by the Platonic Sokrates in this\ndialogue: viz., the Just or Good, that which ought to be the measure\nor test of Law and Positive Morality, is, the beneficial or\nprofitable. This (I repeat) is the only approach to a solution which\nwe ever find in Plato. But this is seldom clearly enunciated, never\nsystematically followed out, and sometimes, in appearance, even\ndenied.\n\n* * * * *\n\n[Side-note: Lectures of Hippias at Sparta not upon geometry, or\nastronomy, &c., but upon the question--What pursuits are\nbeautiful, fine, and honourable for youth.]\n\nI resume the thread of the Hippias Major. Sokrates asks Hippias what\nsort of lectures they were that he delivered with so much success at\nSparta? The Spartans (Hippias replies) knew nothing and cared nothing\nabout letters, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy: but they took delight\nin hearing tales about heroes, early ancestors, foundation-legends of\ncities, &c., which his mnemonic artifice enabled him to\ndeliver.[10] The Spartans delight in you (observes Sokrates) as\nchildren delight in old women's tales. Yes (replies Hippias), but\nthat is not all: I discoursed to them also, recently, about fine and\nhonourable pursuits, much to their admiration: I supposed a\nconversation between Nestor and Neoptolemus, after the capture of\nTroy, in which the veteran, answering a question put by his youthful\ncompanion, enlarged upon those pursuits which it was fine,\nhonourable, beautiful for a young man to engage in. My discourse is\nexcellent, and obtained from the Spartans great applause. I am going\nto deliver it again here at Athens, in the school-room of\nPheidostratus, and I invite you, Sokrates, to come and hear it, with\nas many friends as you can bring.[11]\n\n[Footnote 10: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 285 E.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 286 A-B.]\n\n[Side-note: Question put by Sokrates, in the name of a friend in\nthe background, who has just been puzzling him with it--What is the\nBeautiful?]\n\nI shall come willingly (replied Sokrates). But first answer me one\nsmall question, which will rescue me from a present embarrassment.\nJust now, I was shamefully puzzled in conversation with a friend, to\nwhom I had been praising some things as honourable and\nbeautiful,--blaming other things as mean and ugly. He surprised me by\nthe interrogation--How do you know, Sokrates, what things are beautiful,\nand what are ugly? Come now, can you tell me, What is the Beautiful?\nI, in my stupidity, was altogether puzzled, and could not answer the\nquestion. But after I had parted from him, I became mortified and\nangry with myself; and I vowed that the next time I met any wise man,\nlike you, I would put the question to him, and learn how to answer\nit; so that I might be able to renew the conversation with my friend.\nYour coming here is most opportune. I entreat you to answer and\nexplain to me clearly what the Beautiful is; in order that I may not\nagain incur the like mortification. You can easily answer: it is a\nsmall matter for you, with your numerous attainments.\n\n[Side-note: Hippias thinks the question easy to answer.]\n\nOh--yes--a small matter (replies Hippias); the question is easy to\nanswer. I could teach you to answer many questions harder than that:\nso that no man shall be able to convict you in dialogue.[12]\n\n[Footnote 12: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 286 C-D.]\n\nSokrates then proceeds to interrogate Hippias, in the name of the\nabsentee, starting one difficulty after another as if suggested by\nthis unknown prompter, and pretending to be himself under awe of so\nimpracticable a disputant.\n\n[Side-note: Justice, Wisdom, Beauty must each be something.\nWhat is Beauty, or the Beautiful?]\n\nAll persons are just, through Justice--wise, through Wisdom--good,\nthrough Goodness or the Good--beautiful, through Beauty or the\nBeautiful. Now Justice, Wisdom, Goodness, Beauty or the Beautiful,\nmust each be _something_. Tell me what the Beautiful is?\n\n[Side-note: Hippias does not understand the question. He\nanswers by indicating one particularly beautiful object.]\n\nHippias does not conceive the question. Does the man want to know\nwhat is a beautiful thing? _Sokr._--No; he wants to know what is\n_The Beautiful_. _Hip._--I do not see the difference. I\nanswer that a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing. No one can deny\nthat.[13]\n\n[Footnote 13: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 287 A.]\n\n_Sokr._--My disputatious friend will not accept your answer. He\nwants you to tell him, What is the Self-Beautiful?--that Something\nthrough which all beautiful things become beautiful. Am I to tell\nhim, it is because a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing? He will\nsay--Is not a beautiful mare a beautiful thing also? and a beautiful\nlyre as well? _Hip._--Yes;--both of them are so. _Sokr._--Ay,\nand a beautiful pot, my friend will add, well moulded and rounded\nby a skilful potter, is a beautiful thing too. _Hip._--How,\nSokrates? Who can your disputatious friend be? Some ill-taught\nman, surely; since he introduces such trivial names into a dignified\ndebate. _Sokr._--Yes; that is his character: not polite, but\nvulgar, anxious for nothing else but the truth. _Hip._--A pot,\nif it be beautifully made, must certainly be called beautiful; yet\nstill, all such objects are unworthy to be counted as beautiful, if\ncompared with a maiden, a mare, or a lyre.\n\n[Side-note: Cross-questioning by Sokrates--Other things also\nare beautiful; but each thing is beautiful only by comparison, or\nunder some particular circumstances--it is sometimes beautiful,\nsometimes not beautiful.]\n\n_Sokr._--I understand. You follow the analogy suggested by\nHerakleitus in his dictum--That the most beautiful ape is ugly, if\ncompared with the human race. So you say, the most beautiful pot is\nugly, when compared with the race of maidens. _Hip_--Yes. That\nis my meaning. _Sokr._--Then my friend will ask you in return,\nwhether the race of maidens is not as much inferior to the race of\nGods, as the pot to the maiden? whether the most beautiful maiden\nwill not appear ugly, when compared to a Goddess? whether the wisest\nof men will not appear an ape, when compared to the Gods, either in\nbeauty or in wisdom.[14] _Hip._--No one can dispute it.\n_Sokr._--My friend will smile and say--You forget what was the\nquestion put. I asked you, What is the Beautiful?--the\nSelf-Beautiful: and your answer gives me, as the Self-Beautiful,\nsomething which you yourself acknowledge to be no more beautiful than\nugly? If I had asked you, from the first, what it was that was both\nbeautiful and ugly, your answer would have been pertinent to the\nquestion. Can you still think that the Self-Beautiful,--that\nSomething, by the presence of which all other things become\nbeautiful,--is a maiden, or a mare, or a lyre?\n\n[Footnote 14: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 289.]\n\n[Side-note: Second answer of Hippias--_Gold_, is that by\nthe presence of which all things become beautiful--scrutiny applied\nto the answer. Complaint by Hippias about vulgar analogies.]\n\n_Hip._--I have another answer to which your friend can take no\nexception. That, by the presence of which all things become\nbeautiful, is Gold. What was before ugly, will (we all know), when\nornamented with gold, appear beautiful. _Sokr._--You little know\nwhat sort of man my friend is. He will laugh at your answer, and ask\nyou--Do you think, then, that Pheidias did not know his profession as\na sculptor? How came he not to make the statue of Ath\u00ean\u00ea all\ngold, instead of making (as he has done) the face, hands, and feet of\nivory, and the pupils of the eyes of a particular stone? Is not ivory\nalso beautiful, and particular kinds of stone? _Hip._--Yes, each\nis beautiful, where it is becoming. _Sokr._--And ugly, where it\nis not becoming.[15] _Hip._--Doubtless. I admit that what is\nbecoming or suitable, makes that to which it is applied appear\nbeautiful: that which is not becoming or suitable, makes it appear\nugly. _Sokr._--My friend will next ask you, when you are boiling\nthe beautiful pot of which we spoke just now, full of beautiful soup,\nwhat sort of ladle will be suitable and becoming--one made of gold,\nor of fig-tree wood? Will not the golden ladle spoil the soup, and\nthe wooden ladle turn it out good? Is not the wooden ladle,\ntherefore, better than the golden? _Hip._--By H\u00earakl\u00eas,\nSokrates! what a coarse and stupid fellow your friend is! I cannot\ncontinue to converse with a man who talks of such matters.\n_Sokr._--I am not surprised that you, with your fine attire and\nlofty reputation, are offended with these low allusions. But I have\nnothing to spoil by intercourse with this man; and I entreat you to\npersevere, as a favour to me. He will ask you whether a wooden\nsoup-ladle is not more beautiful than a ladle of gold,--since it is more\nsuitable and becoming? So that though you said--The Self-Beautiful is\nGold--you are now obliged to acknowledge that gold is not more\nbeautiful than fig-tree wood?\n\n[Footnote 15: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 290.]\n\n[Side-note: Third answer of Hippias--questions upon it--proof\ngiven that it fails of universal application.]\n\n_Hip._--I acknowledge that it is so. But I have another answer\nready which will silence your friend. I presume you wish me to\nindicate as The Beautiful, something which will never appear ugly to\nany one, at any time, or at any place.[16] _Sokr._--That is\nexactly what I desire. _Hip._--Well, I affirm, then, that to\nevery man, always, and everywhere, the following is most beautiful. A\nman being healthy, rich, honoured by the Greeks, having come to old\nage and buried his own parents well, to be himself buried by his own\nsons well and magnificently. _Sokr._--Your answer sounds\nimposing; but my friend will laugh it to scorn, and will remind me\nagain, that his question pointed to the Beautiful\n_itself_[17]--something which, being present as attribute in any\nsubject, will make that subject (whether stone, wood, man, God,\naction, study, &c.) beautiful. Now that which you have asserted\nto be beautiful to every one everywhere, was not beautiful to\nAchilles, who accepted by preference the lot of dying before his\nfather--nor is it so to the heroes, or to the sons of Gods, who do\nnot survive or bury their fathers. To some, therefore, what you\nspecify is beautiful--to others it is not beautiful but ugly: that\nis, it is both beautiful and ugly, like the maiden, the lyre, the\npot, on which we have already remarked. _Hip._--I did not speak\nabout the Gods or Heroes. Your friend is intolerable, for touching on\nsuch profanities.[18] _Sokr._--However, you cannot deny that\nwhat you have indicated is beautiful only for the sons of men, and\nnot for the sons of Gods. My friend will thus make good his reproach\nagainst your answer. He will tell me, that all the answers, which we\nhave as yet given, are too absurd. And he may perhaps at the same\ntime himself suggest another, as he sometimes does in pity for my\nembarrassment.\n\n[Footnote 16: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 291 C-D.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 292 D.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 293 B.]\n\n[Side-note: Farther answers, suggested by Sokrates himself--1.\nThe Suitable or Becoming--objections thereunto--it is rejected.]\n\nSokrates then mentions, as coming from hints of the absent friend,\nthree or four different explanations of the Self-Beautiful: each of\nwhich, when first introduced, he approves, and Hippias approves also:\nbut each of which he proceeds successively to test and condemn. It is\nto be remarked that all of them are general explanations: not\nconsisting in conspicuous particular instances, like those which had\ncome from Hippias. His explanations are the following:--\n\n1. The suitable or becoming (which had before been glanced at). It is\nthe suitable or becoming which constitutes the Beautiful.[19]\n\n[Footnote 19: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 293 E.]\n\nTo this Sokrates objects: The suitable, or becoming, is what causes\nobjects to _appear_ beautiful--not what causes them to _be\nreally_ beautiful. Now the latter is that which we are seeking.\nThe two conditions do not always go together. Those objects,\ninstitutions, and pursuits which _are really_ beautiful (fine,\nhonourable) very often do not appear so, either to individuals or to\ncities collectively; so that there is perpetual dispute and\nfighting on the subject. The suitable or becoming, therefore, as it\nis certainly what makes objects appear beautiful, so it cannot be\nwhat makes them really beautiful.[20]\n\n[Footnote 20: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 294 B-E.]\n\n[Side-note: 2. The useful or profitable--objections--it will\nnot hold.]\n\n2. The useful or profitable.--We call objects beautiful, looking to\nthe purpose which they are calculated or intended to serve: the human\nbody, with a view to running, wrestling, and other exercises--a\nhorse, an ox, a cock, looking to the service required from\nthem--implements, vehicles on land and ships at sea, instruments for\nmusic and other arts all upon the same principle, looking to the end\nwhich they accomplish or help to accomplish. Laws and pursuits are\ncharacterised in the same way. In each of these, we give the name\nBeautiful to the useful, in so far as it is useful, when it is\nuseful, and for the purpose to which it is useful. To that which is\nuseless or hurtful, in the same manner, we give the name Ugly.[21]\n\n[Footnote 21: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 295 C-D.]\n\nNow that which is capable of accomplishing each end, is useful for\nsuch end: that which is incapable, is useless. It is therefore\ncapacity, or power, which is beautiful: incapacity, or impotence, is\nugly.[22]\n\n[Footnote 22: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 295 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n to\\ dunato\\n\ne(/kaston a)perga/zesthai, ei)s o(/per dunato/n, ei)s tou=to kai\\\nchr\u00ea/simon; to\\ de\\ a)du/naton a)/chr\u00easton? . . . . Du/namis me\\n\na)/ra kalo/n--a)dunami/a de\\ ai)schro/n?]]\n\nMost certainly (replies Hippias): this is especially true in our\ncities and communities, wherein political power is the finest thing\npossible, political impotence, the meanest.\n\nYet, on closer inspection (continues Sokrates), such a theory will\nnot hold. Power is employed by all men, though unwillingly, for bad\npurposes: and each man, through such employment of his power, does\nmuch more harm than good, beginning with his childhood. Now power,\nwhich is useful for the doing of evil, can never be called\nbeautiful.[23]\n\n[Footnote 23: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 296 C-D.]\n\nYou cannot therefore say that Power, taken absolutely, is beautiful.\nYou must add the qualification--Power used for the production of some\ngood, is beautiful. This, then, would be the profitable--the cause or\ngenerator of good.[24] But the cause is different from its effect:\nthe generator or father is different from the generated or son.\nThe beautiful would, upon this view, be the cause of the good. But\nthen the beautiful would be different from the good, and the good\ndifferent from the beautiful? Who can admit this? It is obviously\nwrong: it is the most ridiculous theory which we have yet hit\nupon.[25]\n\n[Footnote 24: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 297 B.]\n\n[Footnote 25: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 297 D-E. [Greek: ei) oi(=o/n t'\ne)sti/n, e(kei/n\u00f4n ei)=nai (kinduneu/ei) geloio/teros t\u00f4=n\npr\u00f4/t\u00f4n.]]\n\n[Side-note: 3. The Beautiful is a variety of the Pleasurable--that\nwhich is received through the eye and the ear.]\n\n3. The Beautiful is a particular variety of the agreeable or\npleasurable: that which characterises those things which cause\npleasure to us through sight and hearing. Thus the men, the\nornaments, the works of painting or sculpture, upon which we look\nwith admiration,[26] are called beautiful: also songs, music, poetry,\nfable, discourse, in like manner; nay even laws, customs, pursuits,\nwhich we consider beautiful, might be brought under the same\nhead.[27]\n\n[Footnote 26: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 298 A-B.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 298 D.\n\nProfessor Bain observes:--\"The eye and the ear are the great avenues\nto the mind for the \u00e6sthetic class of influences; the other senses\nare more or less in the monopolist interest. The blue sky, the green\nwoods, and all the beauties of the landscape, can fill the vision of\na countless throng of admirers. So with the pleasing sounds, &c.\"\n'The Emotions and the Will.' ch. xiv. (The \u00c6sthetic Emotions), sect.\n2, p. 226, 3rd ed.]\n\n[Side-note: Objections to this last--What property is there\ncommon to both sight and hearing, which confers upon the pleasures of\nthese two senses the exclusive privilege of being beautiful?]\n\nThe objector, however, must now be dealt with. He will ask us--Upon\nwhat ground do you make so marked a distinction between the pleasures\nof sight and hearing, and other pleasures? Do you deny that these\nothers (those of taste, smell, eating, drinking, sex) are really\npleasures? No, surely (we shall reply); we admit them to be\npleasures,--but no one will tolerate us in calling them beautiful:\nespecially the pleasures of sex, which as pleasures are the greatest\nof all, but which are ugly and disgraceful to behold. He will\nanswer--I understand you: you are ashamed to call these pleasures\nbeautiful, because they do not seem so to the multitude: but I did not\nask you, what _seems_ beautiful to the multitude--I asked you, what\n_is_ beautiful.[28] You mean to affirm, that all pleasures which\ndo not belong to sight and hearing, are not beautiful: Do you mean,\nall which do not belong to both? or all which do not belong to\none or the other? We shall reply--To either one of the two--or to\nboth the two. Well! but, why (he will ask) do you single out these\npleasures of sight and hearing, as beautiful exclusively? What is\nthere peculiar in them, which gives them a title to such distinction?\nAll pleasures are alike, so far forth as pleasures, differing only in\nthe more or less. Next, the pleasures of sight cannot be considered\nas beautiful by reason of their coming through sight--for that reason\nwould not apply to the pleasures of hearing: nor again can the\npleasures of hearing be considered as beautiful by reason of their\ncoming through hearing.[29] We must find something possessed as well\nby sight as by hearing, common to both, and peculiar to them,--which\nconfers beauty upon the pleasures of both and of each. Any attribute\nof one, which does not also belong to the other, will not be\nsufficient for our purpose.[30] Beauty must depend upon some\nessential characteristic which both have in common.[31] We must\ntherefore look out for some such characteristic, which belongs to\nboth as well as to each separately.\n\n[Footnote 28: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 298 E, 299 A.\n\n[Greek: Mantha/n\u00f4, a)\\n i)/s\u00f4s phai/\u00ea, kai\\ e)g\u00f4/, o(/ti pa/lai\nai)schu/nesthe tau/tas ta\\s \u00ea(dona\\s pha/nai kala\\s ei)=nai, o(/ti\nou) dokei= toi=s a)nthr\u00f4/pois; a)ll' e)g\u00f4\\ ou) tou=to \u00ea)r\u00f4/t\u00f4n,\n_o(\\ dokei= toi=s polloi=s kalo\\n ei)=nai_, a)ll' o(\\, _ti\ne)/stin_.]]\n\n[Footnote 29: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 299 D-E.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 300 B. A separate argument between\nSokrates and Hippias is here as it were interpolated; Hippias affirms\nthat he does not see how any predicate can be true of both which is\nnot true of either separately. Sokrates points out that two men are\nBoth, even in number, while each is One, an odd number. You cannot\nsay of the two that they are one, nor can you say of either that he\nis Both. There are two classes of predicates; some which are true of\neither but not true of the two together, or _vice vers\u00e2_; some\nagain which are true of the two and true also of each one--such as\njust, wise, handsome, &c. p. 301-303 B.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 302 C. [Greek: t\u00ea=| ou)si/a| t\u00ea=| e)p'\na)mpho/tera e(pome/n\u00ea| \u00f4)=|m\u00ean, ei)/per a)mpho/tera/ e)sti kala/,\ntau/t\u00ea| dei=n au)ta\\ kala\\ ei)=nai, t\u00ea=| de\\ kata\\ ta\\ e(/tera\na)poleipome/n\u00ea| m\u00ea/. kai\\ e(/ti nu=n oi)=omai.]]\n\n[Side-note: Answer--There is, belonging to each and to both in\ncommon, the property of being innocuous and profitable\npleasures--upon this ground they are called beautiful.]\n\nNow there is one characteristic which may perhaps serve. The\npleasures of sight and hearing, both and each, are distinguished from\nother pleasures by being the most innocuous and the best.[32] It is\nfor this reason that we call them beautiful. The Beautiful, then, is\nprofitable pleasure--or pleasure producing good--for the profitable\nis, that which produces good.[33]\n\n[Footnote 32: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 303 E. [Greek: o(/ti a)sine/statai\nau(=tai t\u00f4=n \u00ea(don\u00f4=n ei)si kai\\ be/ltistai, kai\\ a)mpho/terai kai\\\ne(kate/ra.]]\n\n[Footnote 33: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 303 E. [Greek: le/gete d\u00ea\\ to\\ kalo\\n\nei)=nai, _\u00ea(don\u00ea\\n \u00f4)phe/limon_.]]\n\n[Side-note: This will not hold--the Profitable is the cause of\nGood, and is therefore different from Good--to say that the beautiful\nis the Profitable, is to say that it is different from Good but this\nhas been already declared inadmissible.]\n\nNevertheless the objector will not be satisfied even with this. He\nwill tell us--You declare the Beautiful to be Pleasure producing\ngood. But we before agreed, that the producing agent or cause is\ndifferent from what is produced or the effect. Accordingly, the\nBeautiful is different from the good: or, in other words, the\nBeautiful is not good, nor is the Good beautiful--if each of them is\na different thing.[34] Now these propositions we have already\npronounced to be inadmissible, so that your present explanation will\nnot stand better than the preceding.\n\n[Footnote 34: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 303 E--304 A. [Greek: Ou)/koun\n\u00f4)phe/limon, ph\u00ea/sei, to\\ poiou=n ta)gatho/n, to\\ de\\ poiou=n kai\\\nto\\ poiou/menon, e(/teron nu=n d\u00ea\\ e)pha/n\u00ea, kai\\ ei)s to\\n pro/teron\nlo/gon \u00ea(/kei u(mi=n o( lo/gos? _ou)/te ga\\r to\\ a)gatho\\n a)\\n\nei)/\u00ea kalo\\n ou)/te to\\ kalo\\n a)gatho/n, ei)/per a)/llo au)t\u00f4=n\ne(ka/tero/n e)stin_.]\n\nThese last words deserve attention, because they coincide with the\ndoctrine ascribed to Antisthenes, which has caused so many hard words\nto be applied to him (as well as to Stilpon) by critics, from Kol\u00f4tes\ndownwards. The general principle here laid down by Plato is--A is\nsomething different from B, therefore A is not B and B is not A. In\nother words, A cannot be predicated of B nor B of A. Antisthenes said\nin like manner--[Greek: A)/nthr\u00f4pos] and [Greek: A)gatho\\s] are\ndifferent from each other, therefore you cannot say [Greek:\nA)/nthr\u00f4pos e)stin a)gatho/s]. You can only say [Greek: A)/nthr\u00f4pos\ne)stin A)/nthr\u00f4pos]--A)gatho/s e)stin a)gatho/s].\n\nI have touched farther upon this point in my chapter upon Antisthenes\nand the other Viri Sokratici.]\n\n\n* * * * *\n\n\n[Side-note: Remarks upon the Dialogue--the explanations\nascribed to Hippias are special conspicuous examples: those ascribed\nto Sokrates are attempts to assign some general concept.]\n\nThus finish the three distinct explanations of [Greek: To\\ kalo\\n],\nwhich Plato in this dialogue causes to be first suggested by\nSokrates, successively accepted by Hippias, and successively refuted\nby Sokrates. In comparing them with the three explanations which he\nputs into the mouth of Hippias, we note this distinction: That the\nexplanations proposed by Hippias are conspicuous particular\nexemplifications of the Beautiful, substituted in place of the\ngeneral concept: as we remarked, in the Dialogue Euthyphron, that the\nexplanations of the Holy given by Euthyphron in reply to Sokrates,\nwere of the same exemplifying character. On the contrary, those\nsuggested by Sokrates keep in the region of abstractions, and seek to\ndiscover some more general concept, of which the Beautiful is only a\nderivative or a modification, so as to render a definition of it\npracticable. To illustrate this difference by the language of Dr.\nWhewell respecting many of the classifications in Natural History, we\nmay say--That according to the views here represented by Hippias,\nthe group of objects called beautiful is given by Type, not by\nDefinition:[35] while Sokrates proceeds like one convinced that some\ncommon characteristic attribute may be found, on which to rest a\nDefinition. To search for Definitions of general words, was (as\nAristotle remarks) a novelty, and a valuable novelty, introduced by\nSokrates. His contemporaries, the Sophists among them, were not\naccustomed to it: and here the Sophist Hippias (according to Plato's\nfrequent manner) is derided as talking nonsense,[36] because, when\nasked for an explanation of The Self-Beautiful, he answers by citing\nspecial instances of beautiful objects. But we must remember, first,\nthat Sokrates, who is introduced as trying several general\nexplanations of the Self-Beautiful, does not find one which will\nstand: next, that even if one such could be found, particular\ninstances can never be dispensed with, in the way of illustration;\nlastly, that there are many general terms (the Beautiful being one of\nthem) of which no definitions can be provided, and which can only be\nimperfectly explained, by enumerating a variety of objects to which\nthe term in question is applied.[37] Plato thought himself\nentitled to objectivise every general term, or to assume a\nsubstantive Ens, called a Form or Idea, corresponding to it. This was\na logical mistake quite as serious as any which we know to have been\ncommitted by Hippias or any other Sophist. The assumption that\nwherever there is a general term, there must also be a generic\nattribute corresponding to it--is one which Aristotle takes much\npains to negative: he recognises terms of transitional analogy, as\nwell as terms equivocal: while he also especially numbers the\nBeautiful among equivocal terms.[38]\n\n[Footnote 35: See Dr. Whewell's 'History of the Inductive Sciences,'\nii. 120 seq.; and Mr. John Stuart Mill's 'System of Logic,' iv. 8, 3.\n\nI shall illustrate this subject farther when I come to the dialogue\ncalled Lysis.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Stallbaum, in his notes, bursts into exclamations of\nwonder at the incredible stupidity of Hippias--\"En hominis stuporem\nprorsus admirabilem,\" p. 289 E.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Mr. John Stuart Mill observes in his System of Logic,\ni. 1, 5: \"One of the chief sources of lax habits of thought is the\ncustom of using connotative terms without a distinctly ascertained\nconnotation, and with no more precise notion of their meaning than\ncan be loosely collected from observing what objects they are used to\ndenote. It is in this manner that we all acquire, and inevitably so,\nour first knowledge of our vernacular language. A child learns the\nmeaning of Man, White, &c., by hearing them applied to a number\nof individual objects, and finding out, by a process of\ngeneralisation of which he is but imperfectly conscious, what those\ndifferent objects have in common. In many cases objects bear a\ngeneral resemblance to each other, which leads to their being\nfamiliarly classed together under a common name, while it is not\nimmediately apparent what are the particular attributes upon the\npossession of which in common by them all their general resemblance\ndepends. In this manner names creep on from subject to subject until\nall traces of a common meaning sometimes disappear, and the word\ncomes to denote a number of things not only independently of any\ncommon attribute, but which have actually no attribute in common, or\nnone but what is shared by other things to which the name is\ncapriciously refused. It would be well if this degeneracy of language\ntook place only in the hands of the untaught vulgar; but some of the\nmost remarkable instances are to be found in terms of art, and among\ntechnically educated persons, such as English lawyers. _Felony_,\n_e.g._, is a law-term with the sound of which all are familiar:\n_but there is no lawyer who would undertake to tell what a felony\nis, otherwise than by enumerating the various offences so called._\nOriginally the word _felony_ had a meaning; it denoted all\noffences, the penalty of which included forfeiture of lands or goods,\nbut subsequent Acts of Parliament have declared various offences to\nbe felonies without enjoining that penalty, and have taken away that\npenalty from others which continue nevertheless to be called\nfelonies, insomuch that the acts so called have now no property\nwhatever in common save that of being unlawful and punishable.\"]\n\n[Footnote 38: Aristot. Topic, i. 106, a. 21. [Greek: Ta\\ pollach\u00f4=s\nlego/mena--ta\\ pleonach\u00f4=s lego/mena]--are perpetually noted and\ndistinguished by Aristotle.]\n\n[Side-note: Analogy between the explanations here ascribed to\nSokrates, and those given by the Xenophontic Sokrates in the\nMemorabilia.]\n\nWe read in the Xenophontic Memorabilia a dialogue between Sokrates\nand Aristippus, on this same subject--What is the Beautiful, which\naffords a sort of contrast between the Dialogues of Search and those\nof Exposition. In the Hippias Major, we have the problem approached\non several different sides, various suggestions being proposed, and\neach successively disallowed, on reasons shown, as failures: while in\nthe Xenophontic dialogue, Sokrates declares an affirmative doctrine,\nand stands to it--but no pains are taken to bring out the objections\nagainst it and rebut them. The doctrine is, that the Beautiful is\ncoincident with the Good, and that both of them are resolvable into\nthe Useful: thus all beautiful objects, unlike as they may be to the\neye or touch, bear that name because they have in common the\nattribute of conducing to one and the same purpose--the security,\nadvantage, or gratification, of man, in some form or other. This is\none of the three explanations broached by the Platonic Sokrates, and\nafterwards refuted by him, in the Hippias: while his declaration\n(which Hippias puts aside as unseemly)--that a pot and a wooden\nsoup-ladle conveniently made are beautiful is perfectly in harmony\nwith that of the Xenophontic Sokrates, that a basket for carrying dung\nis beautiful, if it performs its work well.[39] We must moreover\nremark, that the objections whereby the Platonic Sokrates, after\nproposing the doctrine and saying much in its favour, finds himself\ncompelled at last to disallow it--these objections are not produced\nand refuted, but passed over without notice, in the Xenophontic\ndialogue, wherein Sokrates affirms it decidedly.[40] The\naffirming Sokrates, and the objecting Sokrates, are not on the\nstage at once.\n\n[Footnote 39: Xen. Mem. iii. 6, 2, 7; iv. 6, 8.\n\nPlato, Hipp. Maj. 288 D, 290 D.\n\nI am obliged to translate the words [Greek: to\\ Kalo/n] by the\nBeautiful or beauty, to avoid a tiresome periphrasis. But in reality\nthe Greek words include more besides: they mean also the _fine_,\nthe _honourable or that which is worthy of honour_, the\n_exalted_, &c. If we have difficulty in finding any common\nproperty connoted by the English word, the difficulty in the case of\nthe Greek word is still greater.]\n\n[Footnote 40: In regard to the question, Wherein consists [Greek: To\\\nKalo/n]? and objections against the theory of the Xenophontic\nSokrates, it is worth while to compare the views of modern\nphilosophers. Dugald Stewart says (on the Beautiful, 'Philosophical\nEssays,' p. 214 seq.), \"It has long been a favourite problem with\nphilosophers to ascertain the common quality or qualities which\nentitle a thing to the denomination of Beautiful. But the success of\ntheir speculations has been so inconsiderable, that little can be\ninferred from them except the impossibility of the problem to which\nthey have been directed. The speculations which have given occasion\nto these remarks have evidently originated in a prejudice which has\ndescended to modern times from the scholastic ages. That when a word\nadmits of a variety of significations, these different significations\nmust all be species of the same genus, and must consequently include\nsome essential idea common to every individual to which the generic\nterm can be applied. Of this principle, which has been an abundant\nsource of obscurity and mystery in the different sciences, it would\nbe easy to expose the unsoundness and futility. Socrates, whose plain\ngood sense appears, on this as on other occasions, to have fortified\nhis understanding to a wonderful degree against the metaphysical\nsubtleties which misled his successors, was evidently apprised fully\nof the justice of the foregoing remarks, if any reliance can be\nplaced on the account given by Xenophon of his conversation with\nAristippus about the Good and the Beautiful,\" &c.\n\nStewart then proceeds to translate a portion of the Xenophontic\ndialogue (Memorab. iii. 8). But unfortunately he does not translate\nthe whole of it. If he had he would have seen that he has\nmisconceived the opinion of Sokrates, who maintains the very doctrine\nhere disallowed by Stewart, viz., That there is an essential idea\ncommon to all beautiful objects, the fact of being conducive to human\nsecurity, comfort, or enjoyment. This is unquestionably an important\ncommon property, though the multifarious objects which possess it may\nbe unlike in all other respects.\n\nAs to the general theory I think that Stewart is right: it is his\ncompliment to Sokrates, on this occasion, which I consider misplaced.\nHe certainly would not have agreed with Sokrates (nor should I agree\nwith him) in calling by the epithet _beautiful_ a basket for\ncarrying dung when well made for its own purpose, or a convenient\nboiling-pot, or a soup-ladle made of fig-tree wood, as the Platonic\nSokrates affirms in the Hippias (288 D, 290 D). The Beautiful and the\nUseful sometimes coincide; more often or at least very often, they do\nnot. Hippias is made to protest, in this dialogue, against the mention\nof such vulgar objects as the pot and the ladle; and this is\napparently intended by Plato as a defective point in his character,\ndenoting silly affectation and conceit, like his fine apparel. But\nDugald Stewart would have agreed in the sentiment ascribed to\nHippias--that vulgar and mean objects have no place in an inquiry\ninto the Beautiful; and that they belong, when well-formed for their\nrespective purposes, to the category of the Useful.\n\nThe Xenophontic Sokrates in the Memorabilia is mistaken in\nconfounding the Beautiful with the Good and the Useful. But his\nremarks are valuable in another point of view, as they insist most\nforcibly on the essential relativity both of the Beautiful and the\nGood.\n\nThe doctrine of Dugald Stewart is supported by Mr. John Stuart Mill\n('System of Logic,' iv. 4, 5, p. 220 seq.);** and Professor Bain\nhas expounded the whole subject still more fully in a chapter (xiv.\np. 225 seq., on the \u00c6sthetic Emotions) of his work on the Emotions\nand the Will.]\n\nThe concluding observations of this dialogue, interchanged between\nHippias and Sokrates, are interesting as bringing out the antithesis\nbetween rhetoric and dialectic--between the concrete and\nexemplifying, as contrasted with the abstract and analytical.\nImmediately after Sokrates has brought his own third suggestion to an\ninextricable embarrassment, Hippias remarks--\n\n[Side-note: Concluding thrust exchanged between Hippias and\nSokrates.]\n\n\"Well, Sokrates, what do you think now of all these reasonings of\nyours? They are what I declared them to be just now,--scrapings and\nparings of discourse, divided into minute fragments. But the really\nbeautiful and precious acquirement is, to be able to set out well and\nfinely a regular discourse before the Dikastery or the public\nassembly, to persuade your auditors, and to depart carrying with you\nnot the least but the greatest of all prizes--safety for yourself,\nyour property, and your friends. These are the real objects to strive\nfor. Leave off your petty cavils, that you may not look like an\nextreme simpleton, handling silly trifles as you do at present.\"[41]\n\n\"My dear Hippias,\" (replies Sokrates) \"you are a happy man, since you\nknow what pursuits a man ought to follow, and have yourself followed\nthem, as you say, with good success. But I, as it seems, am under the\ngrasp of an unaccountable fortune: for I am always fluctuating and\npuzzling myself, and when I lay my puzzle before you wise men, I am\nrequited by you with hard words. I am told just what you have now\nbeen telling me, that I busy myself about matters silly, petty, and\nworthless. When on the contrary, overborne by your authority, I\ndeclare as you do, that it is the finest thing possible to be able to\nset out well and beautifully a regular discourse before the public\nassembly, and bring it to successful conclusion--then there are other\nmen at hand who heap upon me bitter reproaches: especially that one\nman, my nearest kinsman and inmate, who never omits to convict me.\nWhen on my return home he hears me repeat what you have told me, he\nasks, if I am not ashamed of my impudence in talking about beautiful\n(honourable) pursuits, when I am so manifestly convicted upon\nthis subject, of not even knowing what the Beautiful (Honourable) is.\nHow can you (he says), being ignorant what the Beautiful is, know\n_who_ has set out a discourse beautifully and _who_ has\nnot--_who_ has performed a beautiful exploit and _who_ has\nnot? Since you are in a condition so disgraceful, can you think life\nbetter for you than death? Such then is my fate--to hear\ndisparagement and reproaches from you on the one side, and from him\non the other. Necessity however perhaps requires that I should endure\nall these discomforts: for it will be nothing strange if I profit by\nthem. Indeed I think that I have already profited both by your\nsociety, Hippias, and by his: for I now think that I know what the\nproverb means--Beautiful (Honourable) things are difficult.\"[42]\n\n[Footnote 41: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 304 A.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 304 D-E.]\n\n[Side-note: Rhetoric against Dialectic.]\n\nHere is a suitable termination for one of the Dialogues of Search:\n\"My mind has been embarrassed by contradictions as yet unreconciled,\nbut this is a stage indispensable to future improvement\". We have\nmoreover an interesting passage of arms between Rhetoric and\nDialectic: two contemporaneous and contending agencies, among the\nstirring minds of Athens, in the time of Plato and Isokrates. The\nRhetor accuses the Dialectician of departing from the conditions of\nreality--of breaking up the integrity of those concretes, which occur\nin nature each as continuous and indivisible wholes. Each of the\nanalogous particular cases forms a continuum or concrete by itself,\nwhich may be compared with the others, but cannot be taken to pieces,\nand studied in separate fragments.[43] The Dialectician on his side\ntreats the Abstract ([Greek: to\\ kalo\\n]) as the real Integer, and\nthe highest abstraction as the first of all integers, containing in\nitself and capable of evolving all the subordinate integers: the\nvarious accompaniments, which go along with each Abstract to make up\na concrete, he disregards as shadowy and transient disguises.\n\n[Footnote 43: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 301 B. [Greek: A)lla\\ ga\\r d\u00ea\\ su/,\n\u00f4)= S\u00f4/krates, ta\\ me\\n o(/la t\u00f4=n pragma/t\u00f4n ou) skopei=s, ou)d'\ne)kei=noi, oi(=s su\\ ei)/\u00f4thas diale/gesthai, krou/ete de\\\na)polamba/nontes to\\ kalo\\n kai\\ e(/kaston t\u00f4=n o)/nt\u00f4n e)n toi=s\nlo/gois katate/mnontes; dia\\ tau=ta ou(/t\u00f4 mega/la u(ma=s lantha/nei\nkai\\ _dianek\u00ea= s\u00f4/mata t\u00ea=s ou)si/as pephuko/ta_.] Compare 301\nE.\n\nThe words [Greek: dianek\u00ea= s\u00f4/mata t\u00ea=s ou)si/as pephuko/ta]\ncorrespond as nearly as can be to the logical term _Concrete_,\nopposed to _Abstract_. Nature furnishes only Concreta, not\nAbstracta.]\n\n[Side-note: Men who dealt with real life, contrasted with the\nspeculative and analytical philosophers.]\n\nHippias accuses Sokrates of never taking into his view Wholes,\nand of confining his attention to separate parts and fragments,\nobtained by logical analysis and subdivision. Aristophanes, when he\nattacks the Dialectic of Sokrates, takes the same ground, employing\nnumerous comic metaphors to illustrate the small and impalpable\nfragments handled, and the subtle transpositions which they underwent\nin the reasoning. Isokrates again deprecates the over-subtlety of\ndialectic debate, contrasting it with discussions (in his opinion)\nmore useful; wherein entire situations, each with its full clothing\nand assemblage of circumstances, were reviewed and estimated.[44]\nAll these are protests, by persons accustomed to deal with real life,\nand to talk to auditors both numerous and commonplace, against that\nconscious analysis and close attention to general and abstract terms,\nwhich Sokrates first insisted on and transmitted to his disciples. On\nthe other side, we have the emphatic declaration made by the Platonic\nSokrates (and made still earlier by the Xenophontic[45] or historical\nSokrates)--That a man was not fit to talk about beautiful things in\nthe concrete--that he had no right to affirm or deny that attribute,\nwith respect to any given subject--that he was not** even fit to live\nunless he could explain what was meant by The Beautiful, or Beauty\nin the abstract. Here are two distinct and conflicting intellectual\nhabits, the antithesis between which, indicated in this dialogue,\nis described at large and forcibly in the The\u00e6t\u00eatus.[46]\n\n[Footnote 44: Aristophan. Nubes, 130. [Greek: lo/g\u00f4n a)krib\u00f4=n\nschindala/mous--paipa/l\u00ea.] Nub. 261, Aves, 430. [Greek: leptota/t\u00f4n\nl\u00ea/r\u00f4n i(ereu=], Nub. 359. [Greek: gn\u00f4/mais leptais], Nub. 1404.\n[Greek: skariphismoi=si l\u00ea/r\u00f4n], Ran. 1497. [Greek: smileu/mata]--id.\n819. Isokrates, [Greek: Pro\\s Nikokle/a], s. 69, antithesis of the\n[Greek: lo/goi politikoi\\] and [Greek: lo/goi e)ristikoi/--ma/lista\nme\\n kai\\ a)po\\ t\u00f4n kair\u00f4=n the\u00f4rei=n sumbouleu/ontas, ei) de\\ m\u00ea\\,\n_kath' o(/l\u00f4n t\u00f4=n pragma/t\u00f4n_ le/gontas]--which is almost\nexactly the phrase ascribed to Hippias by Plato in this Hippias\nMajor. Also Isokrates, Contra Sophistas, s. 24-25, where he contrasts\nthe useless [Greek: logi/dia], debated by the contentious\ndialecticians (Sokrates and Plato being probably included in this\ndesignation), with his own [Greek: lo/goi politikoi/]. Compare also\nIsokrates, Or. xv. De Permutatione, s. 211-213-285-287.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Xen. Mem. i. 1, 16.]\n\n[Footnote 46: Plato, The\u00e6t\u00eat. pp. 173-174-175.]\n\n[Side-note: Concrete Aggregates--abstract or logical\nAggregates. Distinct aptitudes required by Aristotle for the\nDialectician.]\n\nWhen Hippias accuses Sokrates of neglecting to notice Wholes or\nAggregates, this is true in the sense of Concrete Wholes--the\nphenomenal sequences and co-existences, perceived by sense or\nimagined. But the Universal (as Aristotle says)[47] is one kind of\nWhole: a Logical Whole, having logical parts. In the minds of\nSokrates and Plato, the Logical Whole separable into its logical\nparts and into them only, were preponderant.\n\n[Footnote 47: Aristot. Physic. i. 1. [Greek: to\\ ga\\r o(/lon kata\\\nt\u00ea\\n ai)/sth\u00easin gn\u00f4rim\u00f4/teron, _to\\ de\\ katho/lou o(/lon ti e)sti;\npolla\\ ga\\r perilamba/nei \u00f4(s me/r\u00ea to\\ katho/lou_.] Compare\nSimplikius, Schol. Brandis ad loc. p. 324, a. 10-26.]\n\n[Side-note: Antithesis of Absolute and Relative, here brought\ninto debate by Plato, in regard to the Idea of Beauty.]\n\nOne other point deserves peculiar notice, in the dialogue under our\nreview. The problem started is, What is the Beautiful--the\nSelf-Beautiful, or Beauty _per se_: and it is assumed that this must\nbe Something,[48] that from the accession of which, each particular\nbeautiful thing becomes beautiful. But Sokrates presently comes to\nmake a distinction between that which is really beautiful and that\nwhich appears to be beautiful. Some things (he says) appear\nbeautiful, but are not so in reality: some are beautiful, but do not\nappear so. The problem, as he states it, is, to find, not what that\nis which makes objects appear beautiful, but what it is that makes\nthem really beautiful. This distinction, as we find it in the\nlanguage of Hippias, is one of degree only:[49] that _is_\nbeautiful which appears so to every one and at all times. But in the\nlanguage of Sokrates, the distinction is radical: to _be_\nbeautiful is one thing, to _appear_ beautiful is another;\nwhatever makes a thing appear beautiful without being so in reality,\nis a mere engine of deceit, and not what Sokrates is enquiring\nfor.[50] The Self-Beautiful or real Beauty is so, whether any one\nperceives it to be beautiful or not: it is an Absolute, which exists\n_per se_, having no relation to any sentient or percipient\nsubject.[51] At any rate, such is the manner in which Plato\nconceives it, when he starts here as a problem to enquire, What\nit is.\n\n[Footnote 48: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 286 K. [Greek: au)to\\ to\\ kalo\\n o(/,\nti e)/stin.] Also 287 D, 289 D.]\n\n[Footnote 49: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 291 D, 292 E.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 294 A-B, 299 A.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Dr. Hutcheson, in his inquiry into the Original of our\nIdeas of Beauty and Virtue, observes (sect. i. and ii. p. 14-16):--\n\n\"Beauty is either original or comparative, or, if any like the terms\nbetter, absolute or relative; only let it be observed, that by\n_absolute_ or _original_, is not understood any quality\nsupposed to be in the object, which should of itself be beautiful,\nwithout relation to any mind which perceives it. For Beauty, like\nother names of sensible ideas, properly denotes the perception of\nsome mind. . . . . Our inquiry is only about the qualities which are\nbeautiful to men, or about the foundation of their sense of beauty,\nfor (as above hinted) Beauty has always relation to the sense of some\nmind; and when we afterwards show how generally the objects that\noccur to us are beautiful, we mean that such objects are agreeable to\nthe sense of men, &c.\"\n\nThe same is repeated, sect. iv. p. 40; sect. vi. p. 72.]\n\nHerein we note one of the material points of disagreement between\nPlato and his master: for Sokrates (in the Xenophontic Memorabilia)\naffirms distinctly that Beauty is altogether relative to human wants\nand appreciations. The Real and Absolute, on the one hand, wherein\nalone resides truth and beauty--as against the phenomenal and\nrelative, on the other hand, the world of illusion and meanness--this\nis an antithesis which we shall find often reproduced in Plato. I\nshall take it up more at large, when I come to discuss his argument\nagainst Protagoras in the The\u00e6t\u00eatus.\n\n* * * * *\n\n[Side-note: Hippias Minor--characters and situation supposed.]\n\nI now come to the Lesser Hippias: in which (as we have already seen\nin the Greater) that Sophist is described by epithets, affirming\nvaried and extensive accomplishments, as master of arithmetic,\ngeometry, astronomy, poetry (especially that of Homer), legendary\nlore, music, metrical and rhythmical diversities, &c. His memory\nwas prodigious, and he had even invented for himself a technical\nscheme for assisting memory. He had composed poems, epic, lyric, and\ntragic, as well as many works in prose: he was, besides, a splendid\nlecturer on ethical and political subjects, and professed to answer\nany question which might be asked. Furthermore, he was skilful in\nmany kinds of manual dexterity: having woven his own garments,\nplaited his own girdle, made his own shoes, engraved his own\nseal-ring, and fabricated for himself a curry-comb and oil-flask.[52]\nLastly, he is described as wearing fine and showy apparel. What he is\nmade to say is rather in harmony with this last point of character,\nthan with the preceding. He talks with silliness and presumption, so\nas to invite and excuse the derisory sting of Sokrates, There is a\nthird interlocutor, Eudikus: but he says very little, and other\nauditors are alluded to generally, who say nothing.[53]\n\n[Footnote 52: Plato, Hipp. Minor, 368.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Plato, Hipp. Minor, 369 D, 373 B.\n\nAst rejects both the dialogues called by the name of Hippias, as not\ncomposed by Plato. Schleiermacher doubts about both, and rejects the\nHippias Minor (which he considers as perhaps worked up by a Platonic\nscholar from a genuine sketch by Plato himself) but will not pass the\nsame sentence upon the Hippias Major (Schleierm. Einleit. vol. ii.\npp. 293-296; vol. v. 399-403. Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, pp.\n457-464).\n\nStallbaum defends both the dialogues as genuine works of Plato, and\nin my judgment with good reason (Prolegg. ad Hipp. Maj. vol. iv. pp.\n145-150; ad Hipp. Minor, pp. 227-235). Steinhart (Einleit. p. 99) and\nSocher (Ueber Platon, p. 144 seq., 215 seq.) maintain the same\nopinion on these dialogues as Stallbaum. It is to be remarked that\nSchleiermacher states the reasons both for and against the\ngenuineness of the dialogues; and I think that even in his own\nstatement the reasons _for_ preponderate. The reasons which both\nSchleiermacher and Ast produce as proving the spuriousness, are in my\nview quite insufficient to sustain their conclusion. There is bad\ntaste, sophistry, an overdose of banter and derision (they say very\ntruly), in the part assigned to Sokrates: there are also differences\nof view, as compared with Sokrates in other dialogues; various other\naffirmations (they tell us) are _not_ Platonic. I admit much of\nthis, but I still do not accept their conclusion. These critics\ncannot bear to admit any Platonic work as genuine unless it affords\nto them ground for superlative admiration and glorification of the\nauthor. This postulate I altogether contest; and I think that\ndifferences of view, as between Sokrates in one dialogue and Sokrates\nin another, are both naturally to be expected and actually manifested\n(witness the Protagoras and Gorgias). Moreover Ast designates (p.\n404) a doctrine as \"durchaus unsokratisch\" which Stallbaum justly\nremarks (p. 233) to have been actually affirmed by Sokrates in the\nXenophontic Memorabilia. Stallbaum thinks that both the two dialogues\n(Socher, that the Hippias Minor only) were composed by Plato among\nhis earlier works, and this may probably be true. The citation and\nrefutation of the Hippias Minor by Aristotle (Metaphys. [Greek: D].\n1025, a. 6) counts with me as a strong corroborative proof that the\ndialogue is Plato's work. Schleiermacher and Ast set this evidence\naside because Aristotle does not name Plato as the author. But if the\ndialogue had been composed by any one less celebrated than Plato,\nAristotle would have named the author. Mention by Aristotle, though\nwithout Plato's name, is of greater value to support the genuineness\nthan the purely internal grounds stated by Ast and Schleiermacher\nagainst it.]\n\n[Side-note: Hippias has just delivered a lecture, in which\nhe extols Achilles as better than Odysseus--the veracious and\nstraightforward hero better than the mendacious and crafty.]\n\nIn the Hippias Minor, that Sophist appears as having just concluded a\nlecture upon Homer, in which he had extolled Achilles as better than\nOdysseus: Achilles being depicted as veracious and straightforward,\nOdysseus as mendacious and full of tricks. Sokrates, who had been\namong the auditors, cross-examines Hippias upon the subject of this\naffirmation.\n\nHomer (says Hippias) considers veracious men, and mendacious men, to\nbe not merely different, but opposite: and I agree with him. Permit\nme (Sokrates remarks) to ask some questions about the meaning of this\nfrom you, since I cannot ask any from Homer himself. You will answer\nboth for yourself and him.[54]\n\n[Footnote 54: Plat. Hipp. Minor, 365 C-D.\n\nThe remark here made by Sokrates--\"The poet is not here to answer for\nhimself, so that you cannot put any questions to him\" is a point of\nview familiar to Plato: insisted upon forcibly in the Protagoras (347\nE), and farther generalised in the Ph\u00e6drus, so as to apply to all\nwritten matter compared with personal converse (Ph\u00e6drus, p. 275 D).\n\nThis ought to count, so far as it goes, as a fragment of proof that\nthe Hippias Minor is a genuine work of Plato, instead of which\nSchleiermacher treats it (p. 295) as evincing a poor copy, made by\nsome imitator of Plato, from the Protagoras.]\n\nMendacious men (answers Hippias, to a string of questions,\nsomewhat prolix) are capable, intelligent, wise: they are not\nincapable or ignorant. If a man be incapable of speaking falsely, or\nignorant, he is not mendacious. Now the capable man is one who can\nmake sure of doing what he wishes to do, at the time and occasion\nwhen he does wish it, without let or hindrance.[55]\n\n[Footnote 55: Plat. Hipp. Minor, 366 B-C.]\n\n[Side-note: This is contested by Sokrates. The veracious man\nand the mendacious man are one and the same--the only man who can\nanswer truly if he chooses, is he who can also answer falsely if he\nchooses, _i.e._ the knowing man--the ignorant man cannot make\nsure of doing either the one or the other.]\n\nYou, Hippias (says Sokrates), are expert on matters of arithmetic:\nyou can make sure of answering truly any question put to you on the\nsubject. You are _better_ on the subject than the ignorant man,\nwho cannot make sure of doing the same. But as you can make sure of\nanswering truly, so likewise you can make sure of answering falsely,\nwhenever you choose to do so. Now the ignorant man cannot make sure\nof answering falsely. He may, by reason of his ignorance, when he\nwishes to answer falsely, answer truly without intending it. You,\ntherefore, the intelligent man and the good in arithmetic, are better\nthan the ignorant and the bad for both purposes--for speaking\nfalsely, and for speaking truly.[56]\n\n[Footnote 56: Plato, Hippias Minor, 366 E. [Greek: Po/teron su\\ a)\\n\nma/lista pseu/doio kai\\ a)ei\\ kata\\ tau)ta\\ pseud\u00ea= le/gois peri\\\ntou/t\u00f4n, boulo/menos pseu/desthai kai\\ m\u00eade/pote a)l\u00eath\u00ea=\na)pokri/nesthai? \u00ea)/ o( a)math\u00ea\\s ei)s logismou\\s du/nait' a)\\n sou=\nma=llon pseu/desthai boulome/nou? \u00ea)\\ o( me\\n a)math\u00ea\\s polla/kis\na)\\n boulo/menos pseud\u00ea= le/gein ta)l\u00eath\u00ea= a)\\n ei)/poi a)/k\u00f4n, ei)\ntu/choi, dia\\ to\\ m\u00ea\\ ei)de/nai--su\\ de\\ o( sopho/s, ei)/per bou/loio\npseu/desthai, a)ei\\ a)\\n kata\\ ta\\ au)ta\\ pseu/doio?]]\n\n[Side-note: Analogy of special arts--it is only the\narithmetician who can speak falsely on a question of arithmetic when\nhe chooses.]\n\nWhat is true about arithmetic, is true in other departments also. The\nonly man who can speak falsely whenever he chooses is the man who can\nspeak truly whenever he chooses. Now, the mendacious man, as we\nagreed, is the man who can speak falsely whenever he chooses.\nAccordingly, the mendacious man, and the veracious man, are the same.\nThey are not different, still less opposite: nay, the two epithets\nbelong only to one and the same person. The veracious man is not\nbetter than the mendacious--seeing that he is one and the same.[57]\n\n[Footnote 57: Plato, Hipp. Minor, 367 C, 368 E, 369 A-B.]\n\nYou see, therefore, Hippias, that the distinction, which you drew\nand which you said that Homer drew, between Achilles and Odysseus,\nwill not hold. You called Achilles veracious, and Odysseus,\nmendacious: but if one of the two epithets belongs to either of them,\nthe other must belong to him also.[58]\n\n[Footnote 58: Plat. Hipp. Minor, 360 B.]\n\n[Side-note: View of Sokrates respecting Achilles in the Iliad.\nHe thinks that Achilles speaks falsehood cleverly. Hippias maintains\nthat if Achilles ever speaks falsehood, it is with an innocent\npurpose, whereas Odysseus does the like with fraudulent purpose.]\n\nSokrates then tries to make out that Achilles speaks falsehood in the\nIliad, and speaks it very cleverly, because he does so in a way to\nescape detection from Odysseus himself. To this Hippias replies, that\nif Achilles ever speaks falsehood, he does it innocently, without any\npurpose of cheating or injuring any one; whereas the falsehoods of\nOdysseus are delivered with fraudulent and wicked intent.[59] It is\nimpossible (he contends) that men who deceive and do wrong wilfully\nand intentionally, should be better than those who do so unwillingly\nand without design. The laws deal much more severely with the former\nthan with the latter.[60]\n\n[Footnote 59: Plat. Hipp. Minor, 370 E.]\n\n[Footnote 60: Plat. Hipp. Minor, 372 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Issue here taken--Sokrates contends that those who\nhurt, or cheat, or lie wilfully, are better than those who do the\nlike unwillingly--he entreats Hippias to enlighten him and answer his\nquestions.]\n\nUpon this point, Hippias (says Sokrates), I dissent from you\nentirely. I am, unhappily, a stupid person, who cannot find out the\nreality of things: and this appears plainly enough when I come to\ntalk with wise men like you, for I always find myself differing from\nyou. My only salvation consists in my earnest anxiety to put\nquestions and learn from you, and in my gratitude for your answers\nand teaching. I think that those who hurt mankind, or cheat, or lie,\nor do wrong, _wilfully_--are better than those who do the same\n_unwillingly_. Sometimes, indeed, from my stupidity, the\nopposite view presents itself to me, and I become confused: but now,\nafter talking with you, the fit of confidence has come round upon me\nagain, to pronounce and characterise the persons who do wrong\n_unwillingly_, as worse than those who do wrong _wilfully_.\nI entreat you to heal this disorder of my mind. You will do me\nmuch more good than if you cured my body of a distemper. But it will\nbe useless for you to give me one of your long discourses: for I warn\nyou that I cannot follow it. The only way to confer upon me real\nservice, will be to answer my questions again, as you have hitherto\ndone. Assist me, Eudikus, in persuading Hippias to do so.\n\nAssistance from me (says Eudikus) will hardly be needed, for Hippias\nprofessed himself ready to answer any man's questions.\n\nYes--I did so (replies Hippias)--but Sokrates always brings trouble\ninto the debate, and proceeds like one disposed to do mischief.\n\nEudikus repeats his request, and Hippias, in deference to him,\nconsents to resume the task of answering.[61]\n\n[Footnote 61: Plat. Hipp. Min. 373 B.]\n\n[Side-note: Questions of Sokrates--multiplied analogies of the\nspecial arts. The unskilful artist, who runs, wrestles, or sings\nbadly, whether he will or not, is worse than the skilful, who can\nsing well when he chooses, but can also sing badly when he chooses.]\n\nSokrates then produces a string of questions, with a view to show\nthat those who do wrong wilfully, are better than those who do wrong\nunwillingly. He appeals to various analogies. In running, the good\nrunner is he who runs quickly, the bad runner is he who runs slowly.\nWhat is evil and base in running is, to run slowly. It is the good\nrunner who does this evil wilfully: it is the bad runner who does it\nunwillingly.[62] The like is true about wrestling and other bodily\nexercises. He that is good in the body, can work either strongly or\nfeebly,--can do either what is honourable or what is base; so that\nwhen he does what is base, he does it wilfully. But he that is bad\nin the body does what is base unwillingly, not being able to help\nit.[63]\n\n[Footnote 62: Plat. Hipp. Min. 373 D-E.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Plat. Hipp. Min. 374 B.]\n\nWhat is true about the bodily movements depending upon strength, is\nnot less true about those depending on grace and elegance. To be\nwilfully ungraceful, belongs only to the well-constituted body: none\nbut the badly-constituted body is ungraceful without wishing it. The\nsame, also, about the feet, voice, eyes, ears, nose: of these organs,\nthose which act badly through will and intention, are preferable to\nthose which act badly without will or intention. Lameness of feet is\na misfortune and disgrace: feet which go lame only by intention\nare much to be preferred.[64]\n\n[Footnote 64: Plat. Hipp. Min. 374 C-D.]\n\nAgain, in the instruments which we use, a rudder or a bow,--or the\nanimals about us, horses or dogs,--those are better with which we\nwork badly when we choose; those are worse, with which we work badly\nwithout design, and contrary to our own wishes.\n\n[Side-note: It is better to have the mind of a bowman who\nmisses his mark only by design, than that of one who misses even when\nhe intends to hit.]\n\nIt is better to have the mind of a bowman who misses his mark by\ndesign, than that of one who misses when he tries to hit. The like\nabout all other arts--the physician, the harper, the flute-player. In\neach of these artists, _that_ mind is better, which goes wrong\nonly wilfully--_that_ mind is worse, which goes wrong\nunwillingly, while wishing to go right. In regard to the minds of our\nslaves, we should all prefer those which go wrong only when they\nchoose, to those which go wrong without their own choice.[65]\n\n[Footnote 65: Plat. Hipp. Min. 376 B-D.]\n\nHaving carried his examination through this string of analogous\nparticulars, and having obtained from Hippias successive\nanswers--\"Yes--true in that particular case,\" Sokrates proceeds to\nsum up the result:--\n\n_Sokr._--Well! should we not wish to have our own minds as good\nas possible? _Hip._--Yes. _Sokr._--We have seen that they\nwill be better if they do mischief and go wrong wilfully, than if\nthey do so unwillingly? _Hip._--But it will be dreadful,\nSokrates, if the willing wrong-doers are to pass for better men than\nthe unwilling.\n\n[Side-note: Dissent and repugnance of Hippias.]\n\n_Sokr._--Nevertheless--it seems so: from what we have said.\n_Hip._--It does not seem so to me. _Sokr._--I thought that\nit would have seemed so to you, as it does to me. However, answer me\nonce more--Is not justice either a certain mental capacity? or else\nknowledge? or both together?[66] _Hip._--Yes! it is.\n_Sokr._--If justice be a capacity of the mind, the more capable\nmind will also be the juster: and we have already seen that the more\ncapable soul is the better. _Hip._--We have. _Sokr._--If it\nbe knowledge, the more knowing or wiser mind will of course be\nthe juster: if it be a combination of both capacity and knowledge,\nthat mind which is more capable as well as more knowing,--will be the\njuster that which is less capable and less knowing, will be the more\nunjust. _Hip._--So it appears. _Sokr._--Now we have shown\nthat the more capable and knowing mind is at once the better mind,\nand more competent to exert itself both ways--to do what is\nhonourable as well as what is base--in every employment.\n_Hip._--Yes. _Sokr._--When, therefore, such a mind does what is base,\nit does so wilfully, through its capacity or intelligence, which we\nhave seen to be of the nature of justice? _Hip._--It seems so.\n_Sokr._--Doing base things, is acting unjustly: doing honourable\nthings, is acting justly. Accordingly, when this more capable and\nbetter mind acts unjustly, it will do so wilfully; while the less\ncapable and worse mind will do so without willing it?\n_Hip._--Apparently.\n\n[Footnote 66: Plat. Hipp. Min. 375 D. [Greek: \u00ea( dikaiosu/n\u00ea ou)chi\n\u00ea)\\ du/nami/s ti/s e)stin, \u00ea)\\ e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea, \u00ea)\\ a)mpho/tera?]]\n\n[Side-note: Conclusion--That none but the good man can do evil\nwilfully: the bad man does evil unwillingly. Hippias cannot resist\nthe reasoning, but will not accept the conclusion--Sokrates confesses\nhis perplexity.]\n\n_Sokr._--Now the good man is he that has the good mind: the bad\nman is he that has the bad mind. It belongs therefore to the good man\nto do wrong wilfully, to the bad man, to do wrong without wishing\nit--that is, if the good man be he that has the good mind? _Hip._--But\nthat is unquestionable--that he has it. _Sokr._--Accordingly,\nhe that goes wrong and does base and unjust things\nwilfully, if there be any such character--can be no other than the\ngood man. _Hip._--I do not know how to concede _that_ to\nyou, Sokrates.[67] _Sokr._--Nor I, how to concede it to myself,\nHippias: yet so it must appear to us, now at least, from the past\ndebate. As I told you long ago, I waver hither and thither upon this\nmatter; my conclusions never remain the same. No wonder indeed that I\nand other vulgar men waver; but if you wise men waver also, that\nbecomes a fearful mischief even to us, since we cannot even by coming\nto you escape from our embarrassment.[68]\n\n[Footnote 67: Plat. Hipp. Min. 375 E, 376 B.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Plato, Hipp. Min. 376 C.]\n\n* * * * *\n\nI will here again remind the reader, that in this, as in the other\ndialogues, the real speaker is Plato throughout: and that it is\nhe alone who prefixes the different names to words determined by\nhimself.\n\n[Side-note: Remarks on the dialogue. If the parts had been\ninverted, the dialogue would have been cited by critics as a specimen\nof the sophistry and corruption of the Sophists.]\n\nNow, if the dialogue just concluded had come down to us with the\nparts inverted, and with the reasoning of Sokrates assigned to\nHippias, most critics would probably have produced it as a tissue of\nsophistry justifying the harsh epithets which they bestow upon the\nAthenian Sophists--as persons who considered truth and falsehood to\nbe on a par--subverters of morality--and corruptors of the youth of\nAthens.[69] But as we read it, all that, which in the mouth of\nHippias would have passed for sophistry, is here put forward by\nSokrates; while Hippias not only resists his conclusions, and adheres\nto the received ethical sentiment tenaciously, even when he is unable\nto defend it, but hates the propositions forced upon him, protests\nagainst the perverse captiousness of Sokrates, and requires much\npressing to induce him to continue the debate. Upon the views adopted\nby the critics, Hippias ought to receive credit for this conduct, as\na friend of virtue and morality. To me, such reluctance to debate\nappears a defect rather than a merit; but I cite the dialogue as\nillustrating what I have already said in another place--that\nSokrates and Plato threw out more startling novelties in ethical\ndoctrine, than either Hippias or Protagoras, or any of the other\npersons denounced as Sophists.\n\n[Footnote 69: Accordingly one of the Platonic critics, Schwalbe\n(Oeuvres de Platon, p. 116), explains Plato's purpose in the\nHippias Minor by saying, that Sokrates here serves out to the\nSophists a specimen of their own procedure, and gives them an example\nof sophistical dialectic, by defending a sophistical thesis in a\nsophistical manner: That he chooses and demonstrates at length the\nthesis--the liar is not different from the truth-teller--as an\nexposure of the sophistical art of proving the contrary of any given\nproposition, and for the purpose of deriding and unmasking the false\nmorality of Hippias, who in this dialogue talks reasonably enough.\n\nSchwalbe, while he affirms that this is the purpose of Plato, admits\nthat the part here assigned to Sokrates is unworthy of him; and\nSteinhart maintains that Plato never could have had any such purpose,\n\"however frequently\" (Steinhart says), \"sophistical artifices may\noccur in this conversation of Sokrates, which artifices Sokrates no\nmore disdained to employ than any other philosopher or rhetorician of\nthat day\" (\"so h\u00e4ufig auch in seinen Er\u00f6rterungen sophistische\nKunstgriffe vorkommen m\u00f6gen, die Sokrates eben so wenig verschmaht\nhat, als irgend ein Philosoph oder Redek\u00fcnstler dieser Zeit\").\nSteinhart, Einleitung zum Hipp. Minor, p. 109.\n\nI do not admit the purpose here ascribed to Plato by Schwalbe, but I\nrefer to the passage as illustrating what Platonic critics think of\nthe reasoning assigned to Sokrates in the Hippias Minor, and the\nhypotheses which they introduce to colour it.\n\nThe passage cited from Steinhart also--that Sokrates no more\ndisdained to employ sophistical artifices than any other philosopher\nor rhetorician of the age--is worthy of note, as coming from one who\nis so very bitter in his invectives against the sophistry of the\npersons called Sophists, of which we have no specimens left.]\n\n[Side-note: Polemical purpose of the dialogue--Hippias\nhumiliated by Sokrates.]\n\nThat Plato intended to represent this accomplished Sophist as\nhumiliated by Sokrates, is evident enough: and the words put into his\nmouth are suited to this purpose. The eloquent lecturer, so soon as\nhis admiring crowd of auditors has retired, proves unable to parry\nthe questions of a single expert dialectician who remains behind,\nupon a matter which appears to him almost self-evident, and upon\nwhich every one (from Homer downward) agrees with him. Besides this,\nhowever, Plato is not satisfied without making him say very simple\nand absurd things. All this is the personal, polemical, comic scope\nof the dialogue. It lends (whether well-placed or not) a certain\nanimation and variety, which the author naturally looked out for, in\nan aggregate of dialogues all handling analogous matters about man\nand society.\n\nBut though the polemical purpose of the dialogue is thus plain, its\nphilosophical purpose perplexes the critics considerably. They do not\nlike to see Sokrates employing sophistry against the Sophists: that\nis, as they think, casting out devils by the help of Beelzebub. And\ncertainly, upon the theory which they adopt, respecting the relation\nbetween Plato and Sokrates on one side, and the Sophists on the\nother, I think this dialogue is very difficult to explain. But I do\nnot think it is difficult, upon a true theory of the Platonic\nwritings.\n\n[Side-note: Philosophical purpose of the dialogue--theory of\nthe Dialogues of Search generally, and of Knowledge as understood by\nPlato.]\n\nIn a former chapter, I tried to elucidate the general character and\npurpose of those Dialogues of Search, which occupy more than half the\nThrasyllean Canon, and of which we have already reviewed two or three\nspecimens--Euthyphron, Alkibiad\u00eas, &c. We have seen that they are\ndistinguished by the absence of any affirmative conclusion: that they\nprove nothing, but only, at the most, disprove one or more supposable\nsolutions: that they are not processes in which one man who knows\ncommunicates his knowledge to ignorant hearers, but in which all are\nalike ignorant, and all are employed, either in groping, or guessing,\nor testing the guesses of the rest. We have farther seen that the\nvalue of these Dialogues depends upon the Platonic theory about\nknowledge; that Plato did not consider any one to know, who could not\nexplain to others all that he knew, reply to the cross-examination of\na Sokratic Elenchus, and cross-examine others to test their\nknowledge: that knowledge in this sense could not be attained by\nhearing, or reading, or committing to memory a theorem, together with\nthe steps of reasoning which directly conducted to it:--but that\nthere was required, besides, an acquaintance with many\ncounter-theorems, each having more or less appearance of truth; as\nwell as with various embarrassing aspects and plausible delusions\non the subject, which an expert cross-examiner would not fail to urge.\nUnless you are practised in meeting all the difficulties which he can\ndevise, you cannot be said _to know_. Moreover, it is in this\nlast portion of the conditions of knowledge, that most aspirants are\nfound wanting.\n\n[Side-note: The Hippias is an exemplification of this\ntheory--Sokrates sets forth a case of confusion, and avows his inability\nto clear it up. Confusion shown up in the Lesser Hippias--Error in the\nGreater.]\n\nNow the Greater and Lesser Hippias are peculiar specimens of these\nDialogues of Search, and each serves the purpose above indicated. The\nGreater Hippias enumerates a string of tentatives, each one of which\nends in acknowledged failure: the Lesser Hippias enunciates a thesis,\nwhich Sokrates proceeds to demonstrate, by plausible arguments such\nas Hippias is forced to admit. But though Hippias admits each\nsuccessive step, he still mistrusts the conclusion, and suspects that\nhe has been misled--a feeling which Plato[70] describes elsewhere as\nbeing frequent among the respondents of Sokrates. Nay, Sokrates\nhimself shares in the mistrust--presents himself as an unwilling\npropounder of arguments which force themselves upon him,[71] and\ncomplains of his own mental embarrassment. Now you may call this\nsophistry, if you please; and you may silence its propounders by\ncalling them hard names. But such ethical prudery--hiding all the\nuncomfortable logical puzzles which start up when you begin to\nanalyse an established sentiment, and treating them as non-existent\nbecause you refuse to look at them--is not the way, to attain what\nPlato calls knowledge. If there be any argument, the process of which\nseems indisputable, while yet its conclusion contradicts, or seems to\ncontradict, what is known, upon other evidence--the full and patient\nanalysis of that argument is indispensable, before you can become\nmaster of the truth and able to defend it. Until you have gone\nthrough such analysis, your mind must remain in that state of\nconfusion which is indicated by Sokrates at the end of the Lesser\nHippias. As it is a part of the process of Search, to travel in the\npath of the Greater Hippias--that is, to go through a string of\nerroneous solutions, each of which can be proved, by reasons shown,\nto _be_ erroneous: so it is an equally important part of the\nsame process, to travel in the path of the Lesser Hippias--that is,\nto acquaint ourselves with all those arguments, bearing on the case,\nin which two contrary conclusions appear to be both of them plausibly\ndemonstrated, and in which therefore we cannot as yet determine which\nof them is erroneous--or whether both are not erroneous. The Greater\nHippias exhibits errors,--the Lesser Hippias puts before us\nconfusion. With both these enemies the Searcher for truth must\ncontend: and Bacon tells us, that confusion is the worst enemy of the\ntwo--\"Citius emergit veritas ex errore, quam ex confusione\". Plato,\nin the Lesser Hippias, having in hand a genuine Sokratic thesis, does\nnot disdain to invest Sokrates with the task (sophistical, as some\ncall it, yet not the less useful and instructive) of setting forth at\nlarge this case of confusion, and avowing his inability to clear it\nup. It is enough for Sokrates that he brings home the painful sense\nof confusion to the feelings of his hearer as well as to his own. In\nthat painful sentiment lies the stimulus provocative of farther\nintellectual effort.[72] The dialogue ends but the process of search,\nfar from ending along with it, is emphatically declared to be\nunfinished, and, to be in a condition not merely unsatisfactory\nbut intolerable, not to be relieved except by farther investigation,\nwhich thus becomes a necessary sequel.\n\n[Footnote 70: Plato, Republ. vi. 487 B.\n\n[Greek: Kai\\ o( A)dei/mantos, \u00d4)= S\u00f4/krates, e)/ph\u00ea, pro\\s me\\n\ntau=ta/ soi ou)dei\\s a)\\n oi(=os t' ei)/\u00ea a)nteipei=n; a)lla\\ ga\\r\ntoio/nde ti pa/schousin oi( a)kou/ontes e)ka/stote a)\\ nu=n le/geis;\n\u00ea(gou=ntai di' a)peiri/an tou= e)r\u00f4ta=|n kai\\ a)pokri/nesthai u(po\\\ntou= lo/gou par' e(/kaston to\\ e)r\u00f4/t\u00eama smikro\\n parago/menoi,\na)throisthe/nt\u00f4n t\u00f4=n smikr\u00f4=n e)pi\\ teleut\u00ea=s t\u00f4=n lo/g\u00f4n, me/ga to\\\nspha/lma kai\\ e)nanti/on toi=s pr\u00f4/tois a)naphai/nesthai . . . e)pei\nto/ ge a)l\u00eathe\\s ou)de/n ti ma=llon tau/t\u00ea| e)/chein.]\n\nThis passage, attesting the effect of the Sokratic examination upon\nthe minds of auditors, ought to be laid to heart by those Platonic\ncritics who denounce the Sophists for generating scepticism and\nuncertainty.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Plato, Hipp. Minor, 373 B; also the last sentence of\nthe dialogue.]\n\n[Footnote 72: See the passage in Republic, vii. 523-524, where the\n[Greek: to\\ parakl\u00eatiko\\n kai\\ e)gertiko\\n t\u00ea=s no\u00ea/se\u00f4s] is declared\nto arise from the pain of a felt contradiction.]\n\nThere are two circumstances which lend particular interest to this\ndialogue--Hippias Minor. 1. That the thesis out of which the\nconfusion arises, is one which we know to have been laid down by the\nhistorical Sokrates himself. 2. That Aristotle expressly notices this\nthesis, as well as the dialogue in which it is contained, and combats\nit.\n\n[Side-note: The thesis maintained here by Sokrates, is also\naffirmed by the historical Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia.]\n\nSokrates in his conversation with the youthful Euthydemus (in the\nXenophontic Memorabilia) maintains, that of two persons, each of whom\ndeceives his friends in a manner to produce mischief, the one who\ndoes so wilfully is not so unjust as the one who does so\nunwillingly.[73] Euthydemus (like Hippias in this dialogue) maintains\nthe opposite, but is refuted by Sokrates; who argues that justice is\na matter to be learnt and known like letters; that the lettered man,\nwho has learnt and knows letters, can write wrongly when he chooses,\nbut never writes wrongly unless he chooses--while it is only the\nunlettered man who writes wrongly unwillingly and without intending\nit: that in like manner the just man, he that has learnt and knows\njustice, never commits injustice unless when he intends it--while the\nunjust man, who has not learnt and does not know justice, commits\ninjustice whether he will or not. It is the just man therefore, and\nnone but the just man (Sokrates maintains), who commits injustice\nknowingly and wilfully: it is the unjust man who commits injustice\nwithout wishing or intending it.[74]\n\n[Footnote 73: Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 19. [Greek: t\u00f4=n de\\ d\u00ea\\ tou\\s\nphi/lous e)xapat\u00f4/nt\u00f4n e)pi\\ blab\u00ea=| (i(/na m\u00eade\\ tou=to\nparalei/p\u00f4men a)/skepton) po/teros a)dik\u00f4/tero/s e)stin, o( e(k\u00f4\\n\n\u00ea)\\ o( a)/k\u00f4n?]\n\nThe natural meaning of [Greek: e)pi\\ blab\u00ea=|] would be, \"for the\npurpose of mischief\"; and Schneider, in his Index, gives \"nocendi\ncaus\u00e2\". But in that meaning the question would involve an\nimpossibility, for the words [Greek: o( a)/k\u00f4n] exclude any such\npurpose.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 19-22.]\n\nThis is the same view which is worked out by the Platonic Sokrates in\nthe Hippias Minor: beginning with the antithesis between the\nveracious and mendacious man (as Sokrates begins in Xenophon); and\nconcluding with the general result--that it belongs to the good\nman to do wrong wilfully, to the bad man to do wrong unwillingly.\n\n[Side-note: Aristotle combats the thesis. Arguments against\nit.]\n\nAristotle,[75] in commenting upon this doctrine of the Hippias Minor,\nremarks justly, that Plato understands the epithets _veracious_\nand _mendacious_ in a sense different from that which they\nusually bear. Plato understands the words as designating one who\n_can_ tell the truth if he chooses--one who _can_ speak\nfalsely if he chooses: and in this sense he argues plausibly that the\ntwo epithets go together, and that no man can be mendacious unless he\nbe also veracious. Aristotle points out that the epithets in their\nreceived meaning are applied, not to the power itself, but to the\nhabitual and intentional use of that power. The power itself is\ndoubtless presupposed or implied as one condition to the\napplicability of the epithets, and is one common condition to the\napplicability of both epithets: but the distinction, which they are\nintended to draw, regards the intentions and dispositions with which\nthe power is employed. So also Aristotle observes that Plato's\nconclusion--\"He that does wrong wilfully is a better man than he that\ndoes wrong unwillingly,\" is falsely collected from induction or\nanalogy. The analogy of the special arts and accomplishments, upon\nwhich the argument is built, is not applicable. _Better_ has\nreference, not to the amount of intelligence but to the dispositions\nand habitual intentions; though it presupposes a certain state and\namount of intelligence as indispensable.\n\n[Footnote 75: Aristotel. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1025, a. 8; compare\nEthic. Nikomach. iv. p. 1127, b. 16.]\n\n[Side-note: Mistake of Sokrates and Plato in dwelling too\nexclusively on the intellectual conditions of human conduct.]\n\nBoth Sokrates and Plato (in many of his dialogues) commit the error\nof which the above is one particular manifestation--that of dwelling\nexclusively on the intellectual conditions of human conduct,[76] and\nomitting to give proper attention to the emotional and volitional, as\nessentially co-operating or preponderating in the complex meaning of\nethical attributes. The reasoning ascribed to the Platonic Sokrates\nin the Hippias Minor exemplifies this one-sided view. What he\nsays is true, but it is only a part of the truth. When he speaks of a\nperson \"who does wrong unwillingly,\" he seems to have in view one who\ndoes wrong without knowing that he does so: one whose intelligence is\nso defective that he does not know when he speaks truth and when he\nspeaks falsehood. Now a person thus unhappily circumstanced must be\nregarded as half-witted or imbecile, coming under the head which the\nXenophontic Sokrates called _madness_:[77] unfit to perform any\npart in society, and requiring to be placed under tutelage. Compared\nwith such a person, the opinion of the Platonic Sokrates may be\ndefended--that the mendacious person, who _can_ tell truth when\nhe chooses, is the better of the two in the sense of less mischievous\nor dangerous. But he is the object of a very different sentiment;\nmoreover, this is not the comparison present to our minds when we\ncall one man veracious, another man mendacious. We always assume, in\nevery one, a measure of intelligence equal or superior to the\nadmissible minimum; under such assumption, we compare two persons,\none of whom speaks to the best of his knowledge and belief, the\nother, contrary to his knowledge and belief. We approve the former\nand disapprove the latter, according to the different intention and\npurpose of each (as Aristotle observes); that is, looking at them\nunder the point of view of emotion and volition--which is logically\ndistinguishable from the intelligence, though always acting in\nconjunction with it.\n\n[Footnote 76: Aristotle has very just observations on these views of\nSokrates, and on the incompleteness of his views when he resolved all\nvirtue into knowledge, all vice into ignorance. See, among other\npassages, Aristot. Ethica Magna, i. 1182, a. 16; 1183, b. 9; 1190, b.\n28; Ethic. Eudem. i. 1216, b, 4. The remarks of Aristotle upon\nSokrates and Plato evince a real progress in ethical theory.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 7. [Greek: tou\\s di\u00eamart\u00eako/tas, \u00f4(=n\noi( polloi\\ gign\u00f4/skousi, mainome/nous kalei=n], &c.]\n\n[Side-note: They rely too much on the analogy of the special\narts--They take no note of the tacit assumptions underlying the\nepithets of praise and blame.]\n\nAgain, the analogy of the special arts, upon which the Platonic\nSokrates dwells in the Hippias Minor, fails in sustaining his\ninference. By a good runner, wrestler, harper, singer, speaker,\n&c., we undoubtedly mean one who can, if he pleases, perform some\none of these operations well; although he can also, if he pleases,\nperform them badly. But the epithets _good_ or _bad_, in\nthis case, consider exclusively that element which was left out, and\nleave out that element which was exclusively considered, in the\nformer case. The good singer is declared to stand distinguished from\nthe bad singer, or from the [Greek: i)di\u00f4/t\u00eas], who, if he sings\nat all, will certainly sing badly, by an attribute belonging to his\nintelligence and vocal organs. To sing well is a special\naccomplishment, which is possessed only by a few, and which no man is\nblamed for not possessing. The distinction between such special\naccomplishments, and justice or rectitude of behaviour, is well\nbrought out in the speech which Plato puts into the mouth of the\nSophist Protagoras.[78] \"The special artists (he says) are few in\nnumber: one of them is sufficient for many private citizens. But\nevery citizen, without exception, must possess justice and a sense of\nshame: if he does not, he must be put away as a nuisance--otherwise,\nsociety could not be maintained.\" The special artist is a citizen\nalso; and as such, must be subject to the obligations binding on all\ncitizens universally. In predicating of him that he is _good_ or\n_bad_ as a citizen, we merely assume him to possess the average\nintelligence, of the community; and the epithet declares whether his\nemotional and volitional attributes exceed, or fall short of, the\nminimum required in the application of that intelligence to his\nsocial obligations. It is thus that the words _good_ or\n_bad_ when applied to him as a citizen, have a totally different\nbearing from that which the same words have when applied to him in\nhis character of special artist.\n\n[Footnote 78: Plato, Protagoras, 322.]\n\n[Side-note: Value of a Dialogue of Search, that it shall be\nsuggestive, and that it shall bring before us different aspects of\nthe question under review.]\n\nThe value of these debates in the Platonic dialogues consists in\ntheir raising questions like the preceding, for the reflection of the\nreader--whether the Platonic Sokrates may or may not be represented\nas taking what we think the right view of the question. For a\nDialogue of Search, the great merit is, that it should be suggestive;\nthat it should bring before our attention the conditions requisite\nfor a right and proper use of these common ethical epithets, and the\nstate of circumstances which is tacitly implied whenever any one uses\nthem. No man ever learns to reflect upon the meaning of such familiar\nepithets, which he has been using all his life--unless the process be\nforced upon his attention by some special conversation which brings\nhome to him an uncomfortable sentiment of perplexity and\ncontradiction. If a man intends to acquire any grasp of ethical\nor political theory, he must render himself master, not only of the\nsound arguments and the guiding analogies but also of the unsound\narguments and the misleading analogies, which bear upon each portion\nof it.\n\n[Side-note: Antithesis between Rhetoric and Dialectic.]\n\nThere is one other point of similitude deserving notice, between the\nGreater and Lesser Hippias. In both of them, Hippias makes special\ncomplaint of Sokrates, for breaking the question in pieces and\npicking out the minute puzzling fragments--instead of keeping it\ntogether as a whole, and applying to it the predicates which it\nmerits when so considered.[79] Here is the standing antithesis\nbetween Rhetoric and Dialectic: between those unconsciously acquired\nmental combinations which are poured out in eloquent, impressive,\nunconditional, and undistinguishing generalities--and the logical\nanalysis which resolves the generality into its specialities,\nbringing to view inconsistencies, contradictions, limits,\nqualifications, &c. I have already touched upon this at the close\nof the Greater Hippias.\n\n[Footnote 79: Plato, Hipp. Min. 369 B-C. [Greek: \u00d4)= S\u00f4/krates, a)ei\\\nsu/ tinas toiou/tous ple/keis lo/gous, kai\\ a)polamba/n\u00f4n o(/ a)\\n\n\u00ea)=| duschere/staton tou= lo/gou, tou/tou e)/chei kata\\ smikro\\n\ne)phapto/menos, kai\\ ou)ch o(/l\u00f4 a)g\u00f4ni/zei t\u00f4=| pra/gmati, peri\\\no(/tou a)\\n o( lo/gos \u00ea)=|], &c.\n\nA remark of Aristotle (Topica, viii. 164, b. 2) illustrates this\ndissecting function of the Dialectician.\n\n[Greek: e)/sti ga/r, \u00f4(s a(pl\u00f4=s ei)pei=n, dialektiko\\s o(\nprotatiko\\s kai\\ e)nstatiko/s; e)/sti de\\ to\\ me\\n protei/nesthai,\ne(\\n poiei=n ta\\ plei/\u00f4 (dei= ga\\r e(\\n o(/l\u00f4| l\u00eaphth\u00ea=nai pro\\s o(\\\no( lo/gos), to\\ d' e)ni/stasthai, to\\ e(n polla/; \u00ea)\\ ga\\r diairei=,\n\u00ea)\\ a)nairei=, to\\ me\\n didou/s, to\\ de\\ ou)/, t\u00f4=n\nproteinome/n\u00f4n.]]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV.\n\nHIPPARCHUS--MINOS.\n\n\nIn these two dialogues, Plato sets before us two farther specimens of\nthat error and confusion which beset the enquirer during his search\nafter \"reasoned truth\". Sokrates forces upon the attention of a\ncompanion two of the most familiar words of the market-place, to see\nwhether a clear explanation of their meaning can be obtained.\n\n[Side-note: Hipparchus--Question--What is the definition of\nLover of Gain? He is one who thinks it right to gain from things\nworth nothing. Sokrates cross-examines upon this explanation. No man\nexpects to gain from things which he knows to be worth nothing: in\nthis sense, no man is a lover of gain.]\n\nIn the dialogue called Hipparchus, the debate turns on the definition\nof [Greek: to\\ philokerde\\s] or [Greek: o( philokerd\u00ea/s]--the love of\ngain or the lover of gain. Sokrates asks his Companion to define the\nword. The Companion replies--He is one who thinks it right to gain\nfrom things worth nothing.[1] Does he do this (asks Sokrates) knowing\nthat the things are worth nothing? or not knowing? If the latter, he\nis simply ignorant. He knows it perfectly well (is the reply). He is\ncunning and wicked; and it is because he cannot resist the temptation\nof gain, that he has the impudence to make profit by such things,\nthough well aware that they are worth nothing. _Sokr._--Suppose\na husbandman, knowing that the plant which he is tending is\nworthless--and yet thinking that he ought to gain by it: does not\nthat correspond to your description of the lover of gain?\n_Comp._--The lover of gain, Sokrates, thinks that he ought to\ngain from every thing. _Sokr._--Do not answer in that reckless\nmanner,[2] as if you had been wronged by any one; but answer with\nattention. You agree that the lover of gain knows the value of\nthat from which he intends to derive profit; and that the husbandman\nis the person cognizant of the value of plants. _Comp._--Yes: I\nagree. _Sokr._--Do not therefore attempt, you are so young, to\ndeceive an old man like me, by giving answers not in conformity with\nyour own admissions; but tell me plainly, Do you believe that the\nexperienced husbandman, when he knows that he is planting a tree\nworth nothing, thinks that he shall gain by it? _Comp._--No,\ncertainly: I do not believe it.\n\n[Footnote 1: Plato, Hipparch. 225 A. [Greek: oi(\\ a)\\n kerdai/nein\na)xi\u00f4=sin a)po\\ t\u00f4=n m\u00eadeno\\s a)xi/\u00f4n.]]\n\n[Footnote 2: Plato, Hipparch. 225 C.]\n\nSokrates then proceeds to multiply illustrations to the same general\npoint. The good horseman does not expect to gain by worthless food\ngiven to his horse: the good pilot, by worthless tackle put into his\nship: the good commander, by worthless arms delivered to his\nsoldiers: the good fifer, harper, bowman, by employing worthless\ninstruments of their respective arts, if they know them to be\nworthless.\n\n[Side-note: Gain is good. Every man loves good: therefore all\nmen are lovers of gain.]\n\nNone of these persons (concludes Sokrates) correspond to your\ndescription of the lover of gain. Where then can you find a lover of\ngain? On your explanation, no man is so.[3] _Comp._--I mean,\nSokrates, that the lovers of gain are those, who, through greediness,\nlong eagerly for things altogether petty and worthless; and thus\ndisplay a love of gain.[4] _Sokr._--Not surely knowing them to\nbe worthless--for this we have shown to be impossible--but ignorant\nthat they are worthless, and believing them to be valuable.\n_Comp._--It appears so. _Sokr._--Now gain is the opposite\nof loss: and loss is evil and hurt to every one: therefore gain (as\nthe opposite of loss) is good. _Comp._--Yes. _Sokr._--It\nappears then that the lovers of good are those whom you call lovers\nof gain? _Comp._--Yes: it appears so. _Sokr._--Do not you\nyourself love good--all good things? _Comp._--Certainly.\n_Sokr._--And I too, and every one else. All men love good\nthings, and hate evil. Now we agreed that gain was a good: so that by\nthis reasoning, it appears that all men are lovers of gain while by\nthe former reasoning, we made out that none were so.[5] Which of the\ntwo shall we adopt, to avoid error. _Comp._--We shall commit\nno error, Sokrates, if we rightly conceive the lover of gain. He is\none who busies himself upon, and seeks to gain from, things from\nwhich good men do not venture to gain.\n\n[Footnote 3: Plat. Hipparch. 226 D.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Plat. Hipparch. 226 D. [Greek: A)ll' e)g\u00f4\\, \u00f4)=\nS\u00f4/krates, bou/lomai le/gein tou/tous philokerdei=s ei)=nai, oi(\\\ne(ka/stote u(po\\ a)pl\u00easti/as kai\\ panu\\ smikra\\ kai\\ o)li/gou a)/xia\nkai\\ ou)deno\\s gli/chontai u(perphu\u00f4=s kai\\ philokerdou=sin.]]\n\n[Footnote 5: Plat. Hipparch. 227 C.]\n\n[Side-note: Apparent contradiction. Sokrates accuses the\ncompanion of trying to deceive him. Accusation is retorted upon\nSokrates.]\n\n_Sokr._--But, my friend, we agreed just now, that gain was a\ngood, and that all men always love good. It follows therefore, that\ngood men as well as others love all gains, if gains are good things.\n_Comp._--Not, certainly, those gains by which they will\nafterwards be hurt. _Sokr._--Be hurt: you mean, by which they\nwill become losers. _Comp._--I mean that and nothing else.\n_Sokr._--Do they become losers by gain, or by loss?\n_Comp._--By both: by loss, and by evil gain. _Sokr._--Does\nit appear to you that any useful and good thing is evil?\n_Comp._--No. _Sokr._--Well! we agreed just now that gain\nwas the opposite of loss, which was evil; and that, being the\nopposite of evil, gain was good. _Comp._--That was what we\nagreed. _Sokr._--You see how it is: you are trying to deceive\nme: you purposely contradict what we just now agreed upon.\n_Comp._--Not at all, by Zeus: on the contrary, it is you,\nSokrates, who deceive me, wriggling up and down in your talk, I\ncannot tell how.[6] _Sokr._--Be careful what you say: I should\nbe very culpable, if I disobeyed a good and wise monitor.\n_Comp._--Whom do you mean: and what do you mean?\n_Sokr._--Hipparchus, son of Peisistratus.\n\n[Footnote 6: Plat. Hipparch. 228 A. _Sokr._--[Greek: O(ra=|s\nou)=n? e)picheirei=s me e)xapata=|n, e)pi/t\u00eades e)nanti/a le/g\u00f4n\noi(=s a)/rti \u00f4(molog\u00ea/samen.] _Comp._ [Greek: Ou) ma\\ Di/', \u00f4)=\nS\u00f4/krates; a)lla\\ tou)nanti/on su\\ e)me\\ e)xapata=|s, kai\\ ou)k\noi)=da o(p\u00ea=| e)n toi=s lo/gois a)/n\u00f4 kai\\ ka/t\u00f4 stre/pheis.]]\n\n[Side-note: Precept inscribed formerly by Hipparchus the\nPeisistratid--\"Never deceive a friend\". Eulogy of Hipparchus by\nSokrates.]\n\nSokrates then describes at some length the excellent character of\nHipparchus: his beneficent rule, his wisdom, his anxiety for the\nmoral improvement of the Athenians: the causes, different from what\nwas commonly believed, which led to his death; and the wholesome\nprecepts which he during his life had caused to be inscribed on\nvarious busts of Hermes throughout Attica. One of these busts or\nHerm\u00e6 bore the words--Do not deceive a friend.[7]\n\n[Footnote 7: Plat. Hipparch. 228 B-229 D.\n\nThe picture here given of Hipparchus deserves notice. We are informed\nthat he was older than his brother Hippias, which was the general\nbelief at Athens, as Thucydides (i. 20, vi. 58) affirms, though\nhimself contradicting it, and affirming that Hippias was the elder\nbrother. Plato however agrees with Thucydides in this point, that the\nthree years after the assassination of Hipparchus, during which\nHippias ruled alone, were years of oppression and tyranny; and that\nthe hateful recollection of the Peisistratid\u00e6, which always survived\nin the minds of the Athenians, was derived from these three last\nyears.\n\nThe picture which Plato here gives of Hipparchus is such as we might\nexpect from a philosopher. He dwells upon the pains which Hipparchus\ntook to have the recitation of the Homeric poems made frequent and\ncomplete: also upon his intimacy with the poets Anakreon and\nSimonides. The colouring which Plato gives to the intimacy between\nAristogeiton and Harmodius is also peculiar. The [Greek: e)rast\u00ea\\s]\nis represented by Plato as eager for the education and improvement of\nthe [Greek: e)r\u00f4/menos]; and the jealousy felt towards Hipparchus is\ndescribed as arising from the distinguished knowledge and abilities\nof Hipparchus, which rendered him so much superior and more effective\nas an educator.]\n\nThe Companion resumes: Apparently, Sokrates, either you do not\naccount me your friend, or you do not obey Hipparchus: for you are\ncertainly deceiving me in some unaccountable way in your talk. You\ncannot persuade me to the contrary.\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates allows the companion to retract some of\nhis answers. The companion affirms that some gain is good, other gain\nis evil.]\n\n_Sokr._--Well then! in order that you may not think yourself\ndeceived, you may take back any move that you choose, as if we were\nplaying at draughts. Which of your admissions do you wish to\nretract--That all men desire good things? That loss (to be a loser)\nis evil? That gain is the opposite of loss: that to gain is the\nopposite of to lose? That to gain, as being the opposite of evil\nis a good thing? _Comp._--No. I do not retract any one of these.\n_Sokr._--You think then, it appears, that some gain is good, other\ngain evil? _Comp._--Yes, that is what I do think.[8] _Sokr._--Well, I\ngive you back that move: let it stand as you say. Some gain is good:\nother gain is bad. But surely the good gain is no more _gain_,\nthan the bad gain: both are _gain_, alike and equally.\n_Comp._--How do you mean?\n\n[Footnote 8: Plat. Hipparch. 229 E, 230 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Questions by Sokrates--bad gain is _gain_, as\nmuch as good gain. What is the common property, in virtue of which\nboth are called Gain? Every acquisition, made with no outlay, or with\na smaller outlay, is gain. Objections--the acquisition may be\nevil--embarrassment confessed.]\n\nSokrates then illustrates his question by two or three analogies. Bad\nfood is just as much _food_, as good food: bad drink, as much\n_drink_ as good drink: a good man is no more _man_ than a\nbad man.[9]\n\n[Footnote 9: Plat. Hipparch. 230 C.]\n\n_Sokr._--In like manner, bad gain, and good gain, are (both of\nthem) _gain_ alike--neither of them more or less than the other.\nSuch being the case, what is that common quality possessed by both,\nwhich induces you to call them by the same name _Gain_?[10]\nWould you call _Gain_ any acquisition which one makes either\nwith a smaller outlay or with no outlay at all?[11]\n_Comp._--Yes. I should call that gain. _Sokr._--For example, if after\nbeing at a banquet, not only without any outlay, but receiving an\nexcellent dinner, you acquire an illness? _Comp._--Not at all:\nthat is no gain. _Sokr._--But if from the banquet you acquire\nhealth, would that be gain or loss? _Comp._--It would be gain.\n_Sokr._--Not every acquisition therefore is gain, but only such\nacquisitions as are good and not evil: if the acquisition be evil, it\nis loss. _Comp._--Exactly so. _Sokr._--Well, now, you see,\nyou are come round again to the very same point: Gain is good. Loss\nis evil. _Comp._--I am puzzled what to say.[12]\n_Sokr._--You have good reason to be puzzled.\n\n[Footnote 10: Plat. Hipparch. 230 E. [Greek: dia\\ ti/ pote\na)mpho/tera au)ta\\ ke/rdos kalei=s? ti/ tau)to\\n e)n a)mphote/rois\no(r\u00f4=n?]]\n\n[Footnote 11: Plat. Hipparch. 231 A.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Plat. Hipparch. 231 C. _Sokr._ [Greek: O(ra=|s\nou)=n, \u00f4(s pa/lin au)= peritre/cheis ei)s to\\ au)to\\--to\\ me\\n\nke/rdos a)gatho\\n phai/netai, \u00ea( de\\ z\u00eami/a kako/n?] _Comp._\n[Greek: A)por\u00f4= e)/g\u00f4ge o(\\, ti ei)/p\u00f4.] _Sokr._ [Greek: Ou)k\na)di/k\u00f4s ge su\\ a)por\u00f4=n.]]\n\n[Side-note: It is essential to gain, that the acquisition made\nshall be greater not merely in quantity, but also in value, than the\noutlay. The valuable is the profitable--the profitable is the good.\nConclusion comes back. That Gain is Good.]\n\nBut tell me: you say that if a man lays out little and acquires much,\nthat is gain? _Comp._--Yes: but not if it be evil: it is gain,\nif it be good, like gold or silver. _Sokr._--I will ask you\nabout gold and silver. Suppose a man by laying out one pound of gold\nacquires two pounds of silver, is it gain or loss? _Comp._--It\nis loss, decidedly, Sokrates: gold is twelve times the value of\nsilver. _Sokr._--Nevertheless he has acquired more: double is\nmore than half. _Comp._--Not in value: double silver is not more\nthan half gold. _Sokr._--It appears then that we must include\nvalue as essential to gain, not merely quantity. The valuable is\ngain: the valueless is no gain. The valuable is that which is\nvaluable to possess: is that the profitable, or the unprofitable?\n_Comp._--It is the profitable. _Sokr._--But the profitable\nis good? _Comp._--Yes: it is. _Sokr._--Why then, here, the\nsame conclusion comes back to us as agreed, for the third or fourth\ntime. The gainful is good. _Comp._--It appears so.[13]\n\n[Footnote 13: Plato, Hipparch. 231 D-E, 232 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Recapitulation. The debate has shown that all gain\nis good, and that there is no evil gain--all men are lovers of gain--no\nman ought to be reproached for being so. The companion is compelled\nto admit this, though he declares that he is not persuaded.]\n\n _Sokr._--Let me remind you of what has passed. You contended\n that good men did not wish to acquire all sorts of gain, but\nonly such as were good, and not such as were evil. But now, the\ndebate has compelled us to acknowledge that all gains are good,\nwhether small or great. _Comp._--As for me, Sokrates, the debate\nhas compelled me rather than persuaded me.[14]\n_Sokr._--Presently, perhaps, it may even persuade you. But now,\nwhether you have been persuaded or not, you at least concur with\nme in affirming that all gains, whether small or great, are good.\nThat all good men wish for all good things. _Comp._--I do concur.\n_Sokr._--But you yourself stated that evil men love all gains,\nsmall and great? _Comp._--I said so. _Sokr._--According to your\ndoctrine then, all men are lovers of gain, the good men as well as\nthe evil? _Comp._--Apparently so. _Sokr._--It is therefore\nwrong to reproach any man as a lover of gain: for the person who\nreproaches is himself a lover of gain, just as much.\n\n[Footnote 14: Plat. Hipparch. 232 A-B. _Sokr._ [Greek: Ou)kou=n\nnu=n pa/nta ta\\ ke/rd\u00ea o( lo/gos \u00ea(ma=s \u00ea)na/gkake kai\\ smikra\\ kai\\\nmega/la o(mologei=n a)gatha\\ ei)=nai?] _Comp._ [Greek:\n\u00ca)na/gkake ga/r, \u00f4)= S\u00f4/krates, ma=llon e)me/ ge \u00ea)\\ pe/peiken.]\n_Sokr._ [Greek: A)ll' i)/s\u00f4s meta\\ tou=to kai\\ pei/seien\na)\\n.]]\n\n[Side-note: Minos. Question put by Sokrates to the companion.\nWhat is Law, or The Law? All law is the same, _quatenus_ law:\nwhat is the common constituent attribute?]\n\nThe Minos, like the Hipparchus, is a dialogue carried on between\nSokrates and a companion not named. It relates to Law, or The Law--\n\n_Sokr._--What is Law (asks Sokrates)? _Comp._--Respecting\nwhat sort of Law do you enquire (replies the Companion)?\n_Sokr._--What! is there any difference between one law and\nanother law, as to that identical circumstance, of being Law? Gold\ndoes not differ from gold, so far as the being gold is concerned--nor\nstone from stone, so far as being stone is concerned. In like manner,\none law does not differ from another, all are the same, in so far as\neach is Law alike:--not, one of them more, and another less. It is\nabout this as a whole that I ask you--What is Law?\n\n[Side-note: Answer--Law is, 1. The consecrated and binding\ncustoms. 2. The decree of the city. 3. Social or civic opinion.]\n\n_Comp._--What should Law be, Sokrates, other than the various\nassemblage of consecrated and binding customs and beliefs?[15]\n_Sokr._--Do you think, then, that discourse is, the things\nspoken: that sight is, the things seen? that hearing is, the things\nheard? Or are they not distinct, in each of the three cases--and is\nnot Law also one thing, the various customs and beliefs another?\n_Comp._--Yes! I now think that they are distinct.[16]\n_Sokr._--Law is that whereby these binding customs become\nbinding. What is it? _Comp._--Law can be nothing else than the\npublic resolutions and decrees promulgated among us. Law is the\ndecree of the city.[17] _Sokr._--You mean, that Law is social\nopinion. _Comp._--Yes I do.\n\n[Footnote 15: Plato, Minos, 313 B. [Greek: Ti/ ou)=n a)/llo no/mos\nei)/\u00ea a)\\n a)ll' \u00ea)\\ ta\\ nomizo/mena?]]\n\n[Footnote 16: Plato, Minos, 313 B-C.\n\nI pass over here an analogy started by Sokrates in his next question;\nas [Greek: o)/psis] to [Greek: ta\\ o(r\u00f4/mena], so [Greek: no/mos] to\n[Greek: ta\\ nomizo/mena], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Plato, Minos, 814 A. [Greek: e)peid\u00ea\\ no/m\u00f4| ta\\\nnomizo/mena nomi/zetai, ti/ni o)/nti t\u00f4=| no/m\u00f4| nomi/zetai?]]\n\n[Side-note: Cross-examination by Sokrates--just and\nlawfully-behaving men are so through law; unjust and lawless men\nare so through the absence of law. Law is highly honourable and useful:\nlawlessness is ruinous. Accordingly, bad decrees of the city--or bad\nsocial opinion--cannot be law.]\n\n_Sokr._--Perhaps you are right: but let us examine. You call\nsome persons wise:--they are wise through wisdom. You call some\njust:--they are just through justice. In like manner, the\nlawfully-behaving men are so through law: the lawless men are so\nthrough lawlessness. Now the lawfully-behaving men are just: the\nlawless men are unjust. _Comp._--It is so. _Sokr._--Justice and Law,\nare highly honourable: injustice and lawlessness, highly\ndishonourable: the former preserves cities, the latter ruins them.\n_Comp._--Yes--it does. _Sokr._--Well, then! we must\nconsider law as something honourable; and seek after it, under the\nassumption that it is a good thing. You defined law to be the decree\nof the city: Are not some decrees good, others evil?\n_Comp._--Unquestionably. _Sokr._--But we have already said that law\nis not evil. _Comp._--I admit it. _Sokr._--It is incorrect\ntherefore to answer, as you did broadly, that law is the decree of\nthe city. An evil decree cannot be law. _Comp._--I see that it\nis incorrect.[18]\n\n[Footnote 18: Plato, Minos, 314 B-C-D.]\n\n[Side-note: Suggestion by Sokrates--Law is the _good_\nopinion of the city--but good opinion is true opinion, or the finding\nout of reality. Law therefore wishes (tends) to be the finding out of\nreality, though it does not always succeed in doing so.]\n\n_Sokr._--Still--I think, myself, that law is opinion of some\nsort; and since it is not evil opinion, it must be good opinion. Now\ngood opinion is true opinion: and true opinion is, the finding out of\nreality. _Comp._--I admit it. _Sokr._--Law therefore wishes\nor tends to be, the finding out of reality.[19] _Comp._--But,\nSokrates, if law is the finding out of reality--if we have\ntherein already found out realities--how comes it that all\ncommunities of men do not use the same laws respecting the same\nmatters? _Sokr._--The law does not the less wish or tend to find\nout realities; but it is unable to do so. That is, if the fact be\ntrue as you state--that we change our laws, and do not all of us use\nthe same. _Comp._--Surely, the fact as a fact is obvious\nenough.[20]\n\n[Footnote 19: Plato, Minos, 315 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n \u00ea( a)l\u00eath\u00ea\\s\ndo/xa tou= o)/ntos e)stin e)xeu/resis? . . . o( no/mos a)/ra bou/letai\ntou= o)/ntos ei)=nai e)xeu/resis?]]\n\n[Footnote 20: Plato, Minos, 315 A-B.]\n\n[Side-note: Objection taken by the Companion--That there is\ngreat discordance of laws in different places--he specifies several\ncases of such discordance at some length. Sokrates reproves his\nprolixity, and requests him to confine himself to question or\nanswer.]\n\n(The Companion here enumerates some remarkable local rites,\nvenerable in one place, abhorrent in another, such as the human\nsacrifices at Carthage, &c., thus lengthening his answer much\nbeyond what it had been before. Sokrates then continues):\n\n_Sokr._--Perhaps you are right, and these matters have escaped\nme. But if you and I go on making long speeches each for ourselves,\nwe shall never come to an agreement. If we are to carry on our\nresearch together, we must do so by question and answer. Question me,\nif you prefer:--if not, answer me. _Comp._--I am quite ready,\nSokrates, to answer whatever you ask.\n\n[Side-note: Farther questions by Sokrates--Things heavy and\nlight, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable, &c., are\nso, and are accounted so everywhere. Real things are always accounted\nreal. Whoever fails in attaining the real, fails in attaining the\nlawful.]\n\n_Sokr._--Well, then! do you think that just things are just and\nunjust things are unjust? _Comp._--I think they are.\n_Sokr._--Do not all men in all communities, among the Persians\nas well as here, now as well as formerly, think so too?\n_Comp._--Unquestionably they do. _Sokr._--Are not things which weigh\nmore, accounted heavier; and things which weigh less, accounted\nlighter, here, at Carthage, and everywhere else?[21]\n_Comp._--Certainly. _Sokr._--It seems, then, that honourable things\nare accounted honourable everywhere, and dishonourable things\ndishonourable? not the reverse. _Comp._--Yes, it is so.\n_Sokr._--Then, speaking universally, existent things or\nrealities (not non-existents) are accounted existent and real, among\nus as well as among all other men? _Comp._--I think they are.\n_Sokr._--Whoever therefore fails in attaining the real fails in\nattaining the lawful.[22] _Comp._--As you now put it, Sokrates,\nit would seem that the same things are accounted lawful both by us at\nall times, and by all the rest of mankind besides. But when I reflect\nthat we are perpetually changing our laws, I cannot persuade myself\nof what you affirm.\n\n[Footnote 21: Plato, Minos, 316 A. [Greek: Po/teron de\\ ta\\ plei=on\ne)/lkonta baru/tera nomi/zetai e)ntha/de, ta\\ de\\ e)/latton,\nkoupho/tera, \u00ea)\\ tou)nanti/on?]\n\nThe verb [Greek: nomi/zetai] deserves attention here, being the same\nword as has been employed in regard to law, and derived from [Greek:\nno/mos].]\n\n[Footnote 22: Plato, Minos, 316 B. [Greek: ou)kou=n, \u00f4(s kata\\\npa/nt\u00f4n ei)pei=n, ta\\ o)/nta nomi/zetai ei)=nai, ou) ta\\ m\u00ea\\ o)/nta,\nkai\\ par' \u00ea(mi=n kai\\ para\\ toi=s a)/llois a(/pasin.]\n_Comp._ [Greek: E)/moige dokei=.] _Sokr._ [Greek: O(\\s a)\\n\na)/ra tou= o)/ntos a(marta/n\u00ea|, tou= nomi/mou a(marta/nei.]]\n\n[Side-note: There are laws of health and of cure, composed by\nthe few physicians wise upon those subjects, and unanimously declared\nby them. So also there are laws of farming, gardening, cookery,\ndeclared by the few wise in those respective pursuits. In like\nmanner, the laws of a city are the judgments declared by the few wise\nmen who know how to rule.]\n\n_Sokr._--Perhaps you do not reflect that pieces on the draught-board,\nwhen their position is changed, still remain the same. You\nknow medical treatises: you know that physicians are the really\nknowing about matters of health: and that they agree with each other\nin writing about them. _Comp._--Yes--I know that. _Sokr._--The\ncase is the same whether they be Greeks or not Greeks: Those who\nknow, must of necessity hold the same opinion with each other, on\nmatters which they know: always and everywhere. _Comp._--Yes--always\nand everywhere. _Sokr._--Physicians write respecting\nmatters of health what they account to be true, and these writings of\ntheirs are the medical laws? _Comp._--Certainly they are.\n_Sokr._--The like is true respecting the laws of farming--the\nlaws of gardening--the laws of cookery. All these are the writings of\npersons, knowing in each of the respective pursuits? _Comp._--Yes.[23]\n_Sokr._--In like manner, what are the laws respecting\nthe government of a city? Are they not the writings of those who know\nhow to govern--kings, statesmen, and men of superior excellence?\n_Comp._--Truly so. _Sokr._--Knowing men like these will not\nwrite differently from each other about the same things, nor change\nwhat they have once written. If, then, we see some doing this,\nare we to declare them knowing or ignorant?\n_Comp._--Ignorant--undoubtedly.\n\n[Footnote 23: Plato, Minos, 316 D-E.]\n\n[Side-note: That which is right is the regal law, the only\ntrue and real law--that which is not right, is not law, but only\nseems to be law in the eyes of the ignorant.]\n\n_Sokr._--Whatever is right, therefore, we may pronounce to be\nlawful; in medicine, gardening, or cookery: whatever is not right,\nnot to be lawful but lawless. And the like in treatises respecting\njust and unjust, prescribing how the city is to be administered: That\nwhich is right, is the regal law--that which is not right, is not so,\nbut only seems to be law in the eyes of the ignorant--being in truth\nlawless. _Comp._--Yes. _Sokr._--We were correct therefore\nin declaring Law to be the finding out of reality. _Comp._--It\nappears so.[24] _Sokr._--It is the skilful husbandman who gives\nright laws on the sowing of land: the skilful musician on the\ntouching of instruments: the skilful trainer, respecting exercise of\nthe body: the skilful king or governor, respecting the minds of the\ncitizens. _Comp._--Yes--it is.[25]\n\n[Footnote 24: Plato, Minos, 317 C. [Greek: to\\ me\\n o)rtho\\n no/mos\ne)sti\\ basiliko/s; to\\ de\\ m\u00ea\\ o)rtho/n ou)/, o(\\ dokei= no/mos\nei)=nai toi=s ei)do/sin; e)/sti ga\\r a)/nomon.]]\n\n[Footnote 25: Plato, Minos, 318 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Minos, King of Krete--his laws were divine and\nexcellent, and have remained unchanged from time immemorial.]\n\n_Sokr._--Can you tell me which of the ancient kings has the\nglory of having been a good lawgiver, so that his laws still remain\nin force as divine institutions? _Comp._--I cannot tell.\n_Sokr._--But can you not say which among the Greeks have the\nmost ancient laws? _Comp._--Perhaps you mean the Laced\u00e6monians\nand Lykurgus? _Sokr._--Why, the Laced\u00e6monian laws are hardly\nmore than three hundred years old: besides, whence is it that the\nbest of them come? _Comp._--From Krete, they say. _Sokr._--Then\nit is the Kretans who have the most ancient laws in Greece?\n_Comp._--Yes. _Sokr._--Do you know those good kings of\nKrete, from whom these laws are derived--Minos and Rhadamanthus, sons\nof Zeus and Europa? _Comp._--Rhadamanthus certainly is said to\nhave been a just man, Sokrates; but Minos quite the reverse--savage,\nill-tempered, unjust. _Sokr._--What you affirm, my friend, is a\nfiction of the Attic tragedians. It is not stated either by Homer or\nHesiod, who are far more worthy of credit than all the tragedians put\ntogether. _Comp._--What is it that Homer and Hesiod say\nabout Minos?[26]\n\n[Footnote 26: Plato, Minos, 318 E.]\n\n[Side-note: Question about the character of Minos--Homer and\nHesiod declare him to have been admirable, the Attic tragedians\ndefame him as a tyrant, because he was an enemy of Athens.]\n\nSokrates replies by citing, and commenting upon, the statements of\nHomer and Hesiod respecting Minos, as the cherished son, companion,\nand pupil, of Zeus; who bestowed upon him an admirable training,\nteaching him wisdom and justice, and thus rendering him consummate as\na lawgiver and ruler of men. It was through these laws, divine as\nemanating from the teaching of Zeus, that Krete (and Sparta as the\nimitator of Krete) had been for so long a period happy and virtuous.\nAs ruler of Krete, Minos had made war upon Athens, and compelled the\nAthenians to pay tribute. Hence he had become odious to the\nAthenians, and especially odious to the tragic poets who were the\ngreat teachers and charmers of the crowd. These poets, whom every one\nought to be cautious of offending, had calumniated Minos as the old\nenemy of Athens.[27]\n\n[Footnote 27: Plato, Minos, 319-320.]\n\n[Side-note: That Minos was really admirable--and that he has\nfound out truth and reality respecting the administration of the\ncity--we may be sure from the fact that his laws have remained so\nlong unaltered.]\n\nBut that these tales are mere calumny (continues Sokrates), and that\nMinos was truly a good lawgiver, and a good shepherd ([Greek: nomeu\\s\na)gatho/s]) of his people--we have proof through the fact, that his\nlaws still remain unchanged: which shows that he has really found out\ntruth and reality respecting the administration of a city.[28]\n_Comp._--Your view seems plausible, Sokrates. _Sokr._--If I\nam right, then, you think that the Kretans have more ancient laws\nthan any other Greeks? and that Minos and Rhadamanthus are the best\nof all ancient lawgivers, rulers, and shepherds of mankind?\n_Comp._--I think they are.\n\n[Footnote 28: Plato, Minos, 321 B. [Greek: tou=to me/giston s\u00eamei=on,\no(/ti a)ki/n\u00eatoi au)tou= oi( no/moi ei)si/n, a)/te tou= o)/ntos peri\\\npo/le\u00f4s oi)k\u00ea/se\u00f4s e)xeuro/ntos eu)= t\u00ea\\n a)l\u00ea/theian.]]\n\n[Side-note: The question is made more determinate--What is it\nthat the good lawgiver prescribes and measures out for the health of\nthe mind, as the physician measures out food and exercise for the\nbody? Sokrates cannot tell. Close.]\n\n_Sokr._--Now take the case of the good lawgiver and good\nshepherd for the body--If we were asked, what it is that he\nprescribes for the body, so as to render it better? we should answer,\nat once, briefly, and well, by saying--food and labour: the former to\nsustain the body, the latter to exercise and consolidate it.\n_Comp._--Quite correct. _Sokr._--And if after that we\nwere asked, What are those things which the good lawgiver prescribes\nfor the mind to make it better, what should we say, so as to avoid\ndiscrediting ourselves? _Comp._--I really cannot tell.\n_Sokr._--But surely it is discreditable enough both for your\nmind and mine--to confess, that we do not know upon what it is that\ngood and evil for our minds depends, while we can define upon what it\nis that the good or evil of our bodies depends?[29]\n\n[Footnote 29: Plato, Minos, 321 C-B.]\n\n* * * * *\n\n[Side-note: The Hipparchus and Minos are analogous to each\nother, and both of them inferior works of Plato, perhaps unfinished.]\n\nI have put together the two dialogues Hipparchus and Minos, partly\nbecause of the analogy which really exists between them, partly\nbecause that analogy is much insisted on by Boeckh, Schleiermacher,\nStallbaum, and other recent critics; who not only strike them both\nout of the list of Platonic works, but speak of them with contempt as\ncompositions. On the first point, I dissent from them altogether: on\nthe second, I agree with them thus far--that I consider the two\ndialogues inferior works of Plato:--much inferior to his greatest and\nbest compositions,--certainly displaying both less genius and less\ncareful elaboration--probably among his early performances--perhaps\neven unfinished projects, destined for a farther elaboration, which\nthey never received, and not published until after his decease. Yet\nin Hipparchus as well as in Minos, the subjects debated are important\nas regards ethical theory. Several questions are raised and partially\ncanvassed: no conclusion is finally attained. These characteristics\nthey have in common with several of the best Platonic dialogues.\n\n[Side-note: Hipparchus--Double meaning of [Greek:\nphilokerd\u00ea\\s] and [Greek: ke/rdos].]\n\nIn Hipparchus, the question put by Sokrates is, about the definition\nof [Greek: o( philokerd\u00ea\\s] (the lover of gain), and of [Greek:\nke/rdos] itself--gain. The first of these two words (like many in\nGreek as well as in English) is used in two senses. In its plain,\netymological sense, it means an attribute belonging to all men: all\nmen love gain, hate loss. But since this is predicable of all,\nthere is seldom any necessity for predicating it of any one man or\nknot of men in particular. Accordingly, when you employ the epithet\nas a predicate of A or B, what you generally mean is, to assert\nsomething more than its strict etymological meaning: to declare that\nhe has the attribute in unusual measure; or that he has shown\nhimself, on various occasions, wanting in other attributes, which on\nthose occasions ought, in your judgment, to have countervailed it.\nThe epithet thus comes to connote a sentiment of blame or reproach,\nin the mind of the speaker.[30]\n\n[Footnote 30: Aristotle adverts to this class of ethical epithets,\nconnoting both an attribute in the person designated and an\nunfavourable sentiment in the speaker (Ethic. Nikom. ii. 6, p. 1107,\na. 9). [Greek: Ou) pa=sa d' e)pide/chetai pra=xis, ou)de\\ pa=n\npa/thos, t\u00ea\\n meso/t\u00eata; e)/nia ga\\r eu)thu\\s \u00f4)no/mastai\nsuneil\u00eamme/na meta\\ t\u00ea=s phaulo/t\u00eatos, oi)=on], &c.]\n\n[Side-note: State or mind of the agent, as to knowledge,\nfrequent inquiry in Plato. No tenable definition found.]\n\nThe Companion or Collocutor, being called upon by Sokrates to explain\n[Greek: to\\ philokerde\\s], defines it in this last sense, as\nconveying or connoting a reproach. He gives three different\nexplanations of it (always in this sense), each of which Sokrates\nshows to be untenable. A variety of parallel cases are compared, and\nthe question is put (so constantly recurring in Plato's writings),\nwhat is the state of the agent's mind as to knowledge? The\ncross-examination makes out, that if the agent be supposed to\nknow,--then there is no man corresponding to the definition of a\n[Greek: philokerd\u00ea/s]: if the agent be supposed not to know--then,\non the contrary, every man will come under the definition. The\nCompanion is persuaded that there is such a thing as \"love of\ngain\" in the blamable sense. Yet he cannot find any tenable\ndefinition, to discriminate it from \"love of gain\" in the\nordinary or innocent sense.\n\n[Side-note: Admitting that there is bad gain, as well as good\ngain, what is the meaning of the word _gain_? None is found.]\n\nThe same question comes back in another form, after Sokrates has\ngiven the liberty of retractation. The Collocutor maintains that\nthere is bad _gain_, as well as good _gain_. But what is\nthat common, generic, quality, designated well as good by the word\n_gain_, apart from these two distinctive epithets? He cannot\nfind it out or describe it. He gives two definitions, each of which\nis torn up by Sokrates. To deserve the name of _gain_, that\nwhich a man acquires must be good; and it must surpass, in value as\nwell as in quantity, the loss or outlay which he incurs in order\nto acquire it. But when thus understood, all gains are good. There is\nno meaning in the distinction between good and bad gains: all men are\nlovers of gain.\n\n[Side-note: Purpose of Plato in the dialogue--to lay bare the\nconfusion, and to force the mind of the respondent into efforts for\nclearing it up.]\n\nWith this confusion, the dialogue closes. The Sokratic notion of\n_good_, as what every one loves--_evil_ as what every one\nhates--also of evil-doing, as performed by every evil-doer only\nthrough ignorance or mistake is brought out and applied to test the\nethical phraseology of a common-place respondent. But it only serves\nto lay bare a state of confusion and perplexity, without clearing up\nany thing. Herein, so far as I can see, lies Plato's purpose in the\ndialogue. The respondent is made aware of the confusion, which he did\nnot know before; and this, in Plato's view, is a progress. The\nrespondent cannot avoid giving contradictory answers, under an acute\ncross-examination: but he does not adopt any new belief. He says to\nSokrates at the close--\"The debate has constrained rather than\npersuaded me\".[31] This is a simple but instructive declaration of\nthe force put by Sokrates upon his collocutors; and of the\nreactionary effort likely to be provoked in their minds, with a view\nto extricate themselves from a painful sense of contradiction. If\nsuch effort be provoked, Plato's purpose is attained.\n\n[Footnote 31: Plato, Hipparch. 232 B. [Greek: \u00ea)na/gkake ga\\r (o(\nlo/gos) ma=llon e)me/ ge \u00ea)\\ pe/peiken.]]\n\nOne peculiarity there is, analogous to what we have already seen in\nthe Hippias Major. It is not merely the Collocutor who charges\nSokrates, but also Sokrates who accuses the Collocutor--each charging\nthe other with attempts to deceive a friend.[32] This seems intended\nby Plato to create an occasion for introducing what he had to say\nabout Hipparchus--_apropos_ of the motto on the Hipparchean\nHermes--[Greek: m\u00ea\\ phi/lon e)xapa/ta].\n\n[Footnote 32: Plato, Hipparch. 225 E, 228 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Historical narrative and comments given in the\ndialogue respecting Hipparchus--afford no ground for declaring the\ndialogue to be spurious.]\n\nThe modern critics, who proclaim the Hipparchus not to be the work of\nPlato, allege as one of the proofs of spuriousness, the occurrence of\nthis long narrative and comment upon the historical Hipparchus and\nhis behaviour; which narrative (the critics maintain) Plato would\nnever have introduced, seeing that it contributes nothing to the\nsettlement of the question debated. But to this we may reply, first,\nThat there are other dialogues[33] (not to mention the Minos) in\nwhich Plato introduces recitals of considerable length, historical or\nquasi-historical recitals; bearing remotely, or hardly bearing at\nall, upon the precise question under discussion; next,--That even if\nno such analogies could be cited, and if the case stood single, no\nmodern critic could fairly pretend to be so thoroughly acquainted\nwith Plato's views and the surrounding circumstances, as to put a\nlimit on the means which Plato might choose to take, for rendering\nhis dialogues acceptable and interesting. Plato's political views\nmade him disinclined to popular government generally, and to the\ndemocracy of Athens in particular. Conformably with such sentiment,\nhe is disposed to surround the rule of the Peisistratid\u00e6 with an\nethical and philosophical colouring: to depict Hipparchus as a wise\nman busied in instructing and elevating the citizens; and to\ndiscredit the renown of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, by affirming them\nto have been envious of Hipparchus, as a philosopher who surpassed\nthemselves by his own mental worth. All this lay perfectly in the\nvein of Plato's sentiment; and we may say the same about the\nnarrative in the Minos, respecting the divine parentage and teaching\nof Minos, giving rise to his superhuman efficacy as a lawgiver and\nruler. It is surely very conceivable, that Plato, as a composer of\nethical dialogues or dramas, might think that such recitals lent a\ncharm or interest to some of them. Moreover, something like variety,\nor distinctive features as between one dialogue and another, was a\npoint of no inconsiderable moment. I am of opinion that Plato did so\nconceive these narratives. But at any rate, what I here contend is,\nthat no modern critics have a right to assume as certain that he did\nnot.\n\n[Footnote 33: See Alkibiad. ii. pp. 142-149-150; Alkibiad. i. pp.\n121-122: Protagoras, 342-344; Politikus, 268 D., [Greek: schedo\\n\npaidia\\n e)gkerasame/nous] and the two or three pages which follow.\n\nF. A. Wolf, and various critics after him, contend that the\ngenuineness of the Hipparchus was doubted in antiquity, on the\nauthority of \u00c6lian, V. H. viii.\t2. But I maintain that this is not\nthe meaning of the passage, unless upon the supposition that the word\n[Greek: math\u00eat\u00ea\\s] is struck out of the text conjecturally. The\npassage may be perfectly well construed, leaving [Greek: math\u00eat\u00ea\\s]\nin the text: we must undoubtedly suppose the author to have made an\nassertion historically erroneous: but this is nowise impossible in\nthe case of \u00c6lian. If you construe the passage as it stands, without\nsuch conjectural alteration, it does not justify Wolf's inference.]\n\n[Side-note: Minos. Question--What is the characteristic\nproperty connoted by the word [Greek: No/mos] or law?]\n\nI now come to the Minos. The subject of this dialogue is, the\nexplanation or definition of Law. Sokrates says to his Companion or\nCollocutor,--Tell me what is the generic constituent of Law: All Laws\nare alike _quatenus_ Law. Take no note of the difference between\none law and another, but explain to me what characteristic property\nit is, which is common to all Law, and is implied in or connoted by\nthe name Law.\n\nThis question is logically the same as that which Sokrates asks in\nthe Hipparchus with reference to [Greek: ke/rdos] or gain.\n\n[Side-note: This question was discussed by the historical\nSokrates, Memorabilia of Xenophon.]\n\nThat the definition of [Greek: No/mos] or Law was discussed by\nSokrates, we know, not only from the general description of his\ndebates given in Xenophon, but also from the interesting description\n(in that author) of the conversation between the youthful Alkibiades\nand Perikles.[34] The interrogations employed by Alkibiades on that\noccasion are Sokratic, and must have been derived, directly or\nindirectly, from Sokrates. They are partially analogous to the\nquestions of Sokrates in the dialogue Minos, and they end by driving\nPerikles into a confusion, left unexplained, between Law and\nLawlessness.\n\n[Footnote 34: Xen. Mem. i. 1, 16; i. 2, 42-46.]\n\n[Side-note: Definitions of law--suggested and refuted. Law\nincludes, as a portion of its meaning, justice, goodness, usefulness,\n&c. Bad decrees are not laws.]\n\nDefinitions of [Greek: No/mos] are here given by the Companion, who\nundergoes a cross-examination upon them. First, he says, that [Greek:\nNo/mos = ta\\ nomizo/mena]. But this is rejected by Sokrates, who\nintimates that Law is not the aggregate of laws enacted or of customs\nheld binding: but that which lies behind these laws and customs,\nimparting to them their binding force.[35] We are to enquire what\nthis is. The Companion declares that it is the public decree of the\ncity: political or social opinion. But this again Sokrates contests:\nputting questions to show that Law includes, as a portion of its\nmeaning, justice, goodness, beauty, and preservation of the city with\nits possessions; while lawlessness includes injustice, evil,\nugliness, and destruction. There can be no such thing as bad or\nwicked law.[36] But among decrees of the city, some are bad, some\nare good. Therefore to define Law as a decree of the city, thus\ngenerally, is incorrect. It is only the good decree, not the bad\ndecree, which is Law. Now the good decree or opinion, is the true\nopinion: that is, it is the finding out of reality. Law therefore\nwishes or aims to be the finding out of reality: and if there are\ndifferences between different nations, this is because the power to\nfind out does not always accompany the wish to find out.\n\n[Footnote 35: Plato, Minos, 314 A. [Greek: e)peid\u00ea\\ no/m\u00f4| ta\\\nnomizo/mena nomi/zetai, ti/ni o)/nti t\u00f4=| no/m\u00f4| nomi/zetai?]]\n\n[Footnote 36: Plato, Minos, 314 E. [Greek: kai\\ m\u00ea\\n no/mos ge ou)k\n\u00ea)=n pon\u00earo/s.]]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates affirms that law is everywhere the same--it\nis the declared judgment and command of the Wise man upon the\nsubject to which it refers--it is truth and reality, found out and\ncertified by him.]\n\nAs to the assertion--that Law is one thing here, another thing there,\none thing at one time, another thing at another--Sokrates contests\nit. Just things are just (he says) everywhere and at all times;\nunjust things are unjust also. Heavy things are heavy, light things\nlight, at one time, as well as at another. So also honourable things\nare everywhere honourable, base things everywhere base. In general\nphrase, existent things are everywhere existent,[37] non-existent\nthings are not existent. Whoever therefore fails to attain the\nexistent and real, fails to attain the lawful and just. It is only\nthe man of art and knowledge, in this or that department, who attains\nthe existent, the real, the right, true, lawful, just. Thus the\nauthoritative rescripts or laws in matters of medicine, are those\nlaid down by practitioners who know that subject, all of whom agree\nin what they lay down: the laws of cookery, the laws of agriculture\nand of gardening--are rescripts delivered by artists who know\nrespectively each of those subjects. So also about Just and Unjust,\nabout the political and social arrangements of the city--the\nauthoritative rescripts or laws are, those laid down by the artists\nor men of knowledge in that department, all of whom agree in laying\ndown the same: that is, all the men of art called kings or lawgivers.\nIt is only the right, the true, the real--that which these artists\nattain--which is properly a law and is entitled to be so called. That\nwhich is not right is not a law,--ought not to be so called--and is\nonly supposed to be a law by the error of ignorant men.[38]\n\n[Footnote 37: M. Boeckh remarks justly in his note on this\npassage--\"neque enim illud demonstratum est, eadem omnibus legitima\nesse--sed tantum, _notionem_\" (rather the sentiment or emotion)\n\"_legitimi_ omnibus eandem esse. Sed omnia scriptor hic\nconfundit.\"]\n\n[Footnote 38: Plato, Minos, 317 C.]\n\n[Side-note: Reasoning of Sokrates in the Minos is unsound,\nbut Platonic. The Good, True, and Real, coalesce in the mind of\nPlato--he acknowledges nothing to be Law, except what he thinks ought\nto _be_ Law.]\n\nThat the reasoning of Sokrates in this dialogue is confused and\nunsound (as M. Boeckh and other critics have remarked), I perfectly\nagree. But it is not the less completely Platonic; resting upon views\nand doctrines much cherished and often reproduced by Plato. The\ndialogue Minos presents, in a rude and awkward manner, without\nexplanation or amplification, that worship of the Abstract and the\nIdeal, which Plato, in other and longer dialogues, seeks to diversify\nas well as to elaborate. The definitions of Law here combated and\ngiven by Sokrates, illustrate this. The good, the true, the right,\nthe beautiful, the real--all coalesce in the mind of Plato. There is\nnothing (in his view) real, except _The_ Good, _The_ Just, &c.\n([Greek: to\\ au)to-a)gatho\\n]; [Greek: au)to-di/kaion]--Absolute\nGoodness and Justice): particular good and just things have\nno reality, they are no more good and just than bad and unjust--they\nare one or the other, according to circumstances--they are ever\nvariable, floating midway between the real and unreal.[39] The real\nalone is knowable, correlating with knowledge or with the knowing\nIntelligence [Greek: Nou=s]. As Sokrates distinguishes elsewhere\n[Greek: to\\ di/kaion] or [Greek: au)to-di/kaion] from [Greek: ta\\\ndi/kaia]--so here he distinguishes ([Greek: no/mos] from [Greek: ta\\\nnomizo/mena]) _Law_, from the assemblage of actual commands or\ncustoms received as _laws_ among mankind. These latter are\nvariable according to time and place; but Law is always one and the\nsame. Plato will acknowledge nothing to _be_ Law, except that\nwhich (he thinks) _ought to be_ Law: that which emanates from a\nlawgiver of consummate knowledge, who aims at the accomplishment of\nthe good and the real, and knows how to discover and realise that\nend. So far as \"the decree of the city\" coincides with what would\nhave been enacted by this lawgiver (_i. e._ so far as it is good\nand right), Sokrates admits it as a valid explanation of Law; but no\nfarther. He considers the phrase _bad law_ to express a logical\nimpossibility, involving a contradiction _in adjecto_.[40] What\nothers call a bad law, he regards as being no real law, but only\na fallacious image, mistaken for such by the ignorant. He does not\nconsider such ignorant persons as qualified to judge: he recognises\nonly the judgment of the knowing one or few, among whom he affirms\nthat there can be no difference of opinion. Every one admits just\nthings to be just,--unjust things to be unjust,--heavy things to be\nheavy,--the existent and the real, to be the existent and the real.\nIf then the lawgiver in any of his laws fails to attain this reality,\nhe fails in the very purpose essential to the conception of law:[41]\n_i. e._ his pretended law is no law at all.\n\n[Footnote 39: See the remarkable passage in the fifth book of the\nRepublic, pp. 479-480; compare vii. 538 E.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Plato, Minos, 314 D.\n\nThe same argument is brought to bear by the Platonic Sokrates against\nHippias in the Hippias Major, 284-285. If the laws are not really\nprofitable, which is the only real purpose for which they were\nestablished, they are no laws at all. The Spartans are [Greek:\npara/nomoi]. Some of the answers assigned to Hippias (284 D) are\npertinent enough; but he is overborne.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Plato, Minos, 316 B. [Greek: O(\\s a)\\n a)/ra tou=\no)/ntos a(marta/n\u00ea, tou= nomi/mou a(marta/nei.]]\n\n[Side-note: Plato worships the Ideal of his own mind--the work\nof systematic constructive theory by the Wise Man.]\n\nBy _Law_ then, Plato means--not the assemblage of actual\npositive rules, nor any general property common to and characteristic\nof them, nor the free determination of an assembled Demos as\ndistinguished from the mandates of a despot--but the Type of Law as\nit ought to be, and as it would be, if prescribed by a perfectly wise\nruler, aiming at good and knowing how to realise it. This, which is\nthe ideal of his own mind, Plato worships and reasons upon as if it\nwere the only reality; as Law by nature, or natural Law,\ndistinguished from actual positive laws: which last have either been\nset by some ill-qualified historical ruler, or have grown up\ninsensibly. Knowledge, art, philosophy, systematic and constructive,\napplied by some one or few exalted individuals, is (in his view) the\nonly cause capable of producing that typical result which is true,\ngood, real, permanent, and worthy of the generic name.\n\n[Side-note: Different applications of this general Platonic\nview, in the Minos, Politikus, Kratylus, &c. _Natural_\nRectitude of Law, Government, Names, &c.]\n\nIn the Minos, this general Platonic view is applied to Law: in the\nPolitikus, to government and social administration: in the Kratylus,\nto naming or language. In the Politikus, we find the received\nclassification of governments (monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy)\ndiscarded as improper; and the assertion advanced, That there is only\none government right, true, genuine, really existing--government by\nthe uncontrolled authority and superintendence of the man of exalted\nintelligence: he who is master in the art of governing, whether\nsuch man do in fact hold power anywhere or not. All other governments\nare degenerate substitutes for this type, some receding from it less,\nsome more.[42] Again, in the Kratylus, where names and name-giving\nare discussed, Sokrates[43] maintains that things can only be named\naccording to their true and real nature--that there is, belonging to\neach thing, one special and appropriate Name-Form, discernible only\nby the sagacity of the intelligent Lawgiver: who alone is competent\nto bestow upon each thing its right, true, genuine, real name,\npossessing rectitude by nature ([Greek: o)rtho/t\u00eas phu/sei]).[44]\nThis Name-Form (according to Sokrates) is the same in all languages\nin so far as they are constructed by different intelligent Lawgivers,\nalthough the letters and syllables in which they may clothe the Form\nare very different.[45] If names be not thus apportioned by the\nsystematic purpose of an intelligent Lawgiver, but raised up by\ninsensible and unsystematic growth--they will be unworthy substitutes\nfor the genuine type, though they are the best which actual societies\npossess; according to the opinion announced by Kratylus in that same\ndialogue, they will not be names at all.[46]\n\n[Footnote 42: Plato, Politikus, 293 C-E. [Greek: tau/t\u00ean o)rth\u00ea\\n\ndiaphero/nt\u00f4s ei)=nai kai\\ mo/n\u00ean politei/an, e)n \u00ea(=| tis a)\\n\neu(/riskoi tou\\s a)/rchontas a)l\u00eath\u00f4=s e)pist\u00ea/monas kai\\ ou)\ndokou=ntas mo/non . . . to/te kai\\ kata\\ tou\\s toiou/tous o(/rous\n\u00ea(mi=n mo/n\u00ean o)rth\u00ea\\n politei/an ei)=nai r(\u00eate/on. o(/sas de\\\na)/llas le/gomen, _ou) gn\u00easi/as ou)d' o)/nt\u00f4s ou)/sas lekte/on_,\na)lla\\ memim\u00eame/nas tau/t\u00ean, a(/s me\\n eu)no/mous le/gomen, e)pi\\ ta\\\nkalli/\u00f4, ta\\s de\\ a)/llas e)pi\\ ta\\ ai)schi/ona memim\u00ea=sthai.]\n\nThe historical (Xenophontic) Sokrates asserts this same position in\nXenophon's Memorabilia (iii. 9, 10). \"Sokrates said that Kings and\nRulers were those who knew how to command, not those who held the\nsceptre or were chosen by election or lot, or had acquired power by\nforce or fraud,\" &c.\n\nThe Kings of Sparta and Macedonia, the [Greek: Boul\u00ea\\] and [Greek:\nD\u00ea=mos] of Athens, the Despot of Syracuse or Pher\u00e6 are here declared\nto be not real rulers at all.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Plato, Kratylus, 387 D.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Plato, Kratyl. 388 A-E.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Plato, Kratyl. 389 E, 390 A, 432 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n\nou)/t\u00f4s a)xi\u00f4/seis kai\\ to\\n nomothe/t\u00ean to/n te e)ntha/de kai\\ to\\n\ne)n toi=s barba/rois, e(/\u00f4s a)\\n to\\ tou= o)no/matos ei)=dos\na)podid\u00f4=| to\\ pros\u00ea=kon e(ka/st\u00f4| e)n o(poiaisou=n sullabai=s,\nou)de\\n chei/r\u00f4 nomothe/t\u00ean ei)=nai to\\n e)ntha/de \u00ea)\\ to\\n o(pouou=n\na)/llothi?] Compare this with the Minos, 315 E, 316 D, where Sokrates\nevades, by an hypothesis very similar, the objection made by the\ncollocutor, that the laws in one country are very different from\nthose in another--[Greek: i)/s\u00f4s ga\\r ou)k e)nnoei=s tau=ta\nmetapetteuo/mena o(/ti tau)ta/ e)stin.]]\n\n[Footnote 46: Plato, Kratyl. 430 A, 432 A, 433 D, 435 C.\n\nKratylus says that a name badly given is no name at all; just as\nSokrates says in the Minos that a bad law is no law at all.]\n\n[Side-note: Eulogy on Minos, as having established laws on\nthis divine type or natural rectitude.]\n\nThe Kretan Minos (we here find it affirmed), son, companion, and\npupil of Zeus, has learnt to establish laws of this divine type or\nnatural rectitude: the proof of which is, that the ancient Kretan\nlaws have for immemorial ages remained, and still do remain,[47]\nunchanged. But when Sokrates tries to determine, Wherein consists\nthis Law-Type? What is it that the wise Lawgiver prescribes for the\nminds of the citizens--as the wise gymnastic trainer prescribes\nproper measure of nourishment and exercise for their bodies?--the\nquestion is left unanswered. Sokrates confesses with shame that he\ncannot answer it: and the dialogue ends in a blank. The\nreader--according to Plato's manner--is to be piqued and shamed\ninto the effort of meditating the question for himself.\n\n[Footnote 47: Plato, Minos, 319 B, 321 A.]\n\n[Side-note: The Minos was arranged by Aristophanes at first in\na Trilogy along with the Leges.]\n\nAn attempt to answer this question will be found in Plato's Treatise\nDe Legibus--in the projected Kretan colony, of which he there\nsketches the fundamental laws. Aristophanes of Byzantium very\nnaturally placed this treatise as sequel to the Minos; second in the\nTrilogy of which the Minos was first.[48]\n\n[Footnote 48: I reserve for an Appendix some further remarks upon the\ngenuineness of Hipparchus and Minos.]\n\n[Side-note: Explanations of the word Law--confusion in its\nmeaning.]\n\nWhoever has followed the abstract of the Minos, which I have just\ngiven, will remark the different explanations of the word Law--both\nthose which are disallowed, and that which is preferred, though left\nincomplete, by Sokrates. On this same subject, there are in many\nwriters, modern as well an ancient, two distinct modes of confusion\ntraceable--pointed out by eminent recent jurists, such as Mr.\nBentham, Mr. Austin, and Mr. Maine. 1. Between Law as it is, and Law\nas it ought to be. 2. Between Laws Imperative, set by intelligent\nrulers, and enforced by penal sanction--and Laws signifying\nuniformities of fact expressed in general terms, such as the Law of\nGravitation, Crystallisation, &c.--We can hardly say that in the\ndialogue Minos, Plato falls into the first of these two modes of\nconfusion: for he expressly says that he only recognises the Ideal of\nLaw, or Law as it ought to be (actual Laws everywhere being\ndisallowed, except in so far as they conform thereunto). But he does\nfall into the second, when he identifies the Lawful with the Real or\nExistent. His Ideal stands in place of generalisations of fact.\n\nThere is also much confusion, if we compare the Minos with other\ndialogues; wherein Plato frequently talks of Laws as the laws and\ncustoms actually existing or imperative in any given state--Athens,\nSparta, or elsewhere ([Greek: No/mos = ta\\ nomizo/mena], according to\nthe first words in the Minos). For example, in the harangue which he\nsupposes to be addressed to Sokrates in the Kriton, and which he\ninvests with so impressive a character--the Laws of Athens are\nintroduced as speakers: but according to the principles laid down in\nthe Minos, three-fourths of the Laws of Athens could not be regarded\nas laws at all. If therefore we take Plato's writings throughout, we\nshall not find that he is constant to one uniform sense of the word\nLaw, or that he escapes the frequent confusion between Law as it\nactually exists and Law as it ought to be.[49]\n\n[Footnote 49: The first explanation of [Greek: No/mos] advanced by\nthe Companion in reply to Sokrates (viz. [Greek: No/mos = ta\\\nnomizo/mena], coincides substantially with the meaning of [Greek:\nNo/mos basileu\\s] in Pindar and Herodotus (see above, chap. viii.),\nwho is an imaginary ruler, occupying a given region, and enforcing\n[Greek: ta\\ nomizo/mena]. It coincides also with the precept [Greek:\nNo/m\u00f4| po/le\u00f4s], as prescribed by the Pythian priestess to applicants\nwho asked advice about the proper forms of religious worship (Xen.\nMem. i. 3, 1); though this precept, when Cicero comes to report it\n(Legg. ii. 16, 40), appears divested of its simplicity, and\nover-clouded with the very confusion touched upon in my text. Aristotle\ndoes not keep clear of the confusion (compare Ethic. Nikom. i. 1,\n1094, b. 16, and v. 5, 1130, b. 24). I shall revert again to the\ndistinction between [Greek: no/mos] and [Greek: phu/sis], in touching\non other Platonic dialogues. Cicero expressly declares (Legg. ii. 5,\n11), conformably to what is said by the Platonic Sokrates in the\nMinos, that a bad law, however passed in regular form, is no law at\nall; and this might be well if he adhered consistently to the same\nphraseology, but he perpetually uses, in other places, the words\n_Lex_ and _Leges_ to signify laws actually in force at\nRome, good or bad.\n\nMr. Bentham gives an explanation of Law or The Law, which coincides\nwith [Greek: No/mos = ta\\ nomizo/mena]. He says (Principles of Morals\nand Legislation, vol. ii. ch. 17, p. 257, ed. 1823), \"Now Law, or The\nLaw, taken indefinitely, is an abstract and collective term, which,\nwhen it means anything, can mean neither more nor less than the sum\ntotal of a number of individual laws taken together\".\n\nMr. Austin in his Lectures, 'The Province of Jurisprudence\nDetermined', has explained more clearly and copiously than any\nantecedent author, the confused meanings of the word Law adverted to\nin my text. See especially his first lecture and his fifth, pp. 88\nseq. and 171 seq., 4th ed.]\n\n* * * * *\n\n\nAPPENDIX.\n\nIn continuing to recognise Hipparchus and Minos as Platonic works,\ncontrary to the opinion of many modern critics, I have to remind the\nreader, not only that both are included in the Canon of Thrasyllus,\nbut that the Minos was expressly acknowledged by Aristophanes of\nByzantium, and included by him among the Trilogies: showing that it\nexisted then (220 B.C.) in the Alexandrine Museum as a\nPlatonic work. The similarity between the Hipparchus and Minos is\nrecognised by all the Platonic critics, most of whom declare that\nboth of them are spurious. Schleiermacher affirms and vindicates this\nopinion in his Einleitung and notes: but it will be convenient to\ntake the arguments advanced to prove the spuriousness, as they are\nset forth by M. Boeckh, in his \"Comment. in Platonis qui vulgo fertur\nMinoem\": in which treatise, though among his early works, the case is\nargued with all that copious learning and critical ability, which\nusually adorn his many admirable contributions to the improvement of\nphilology.\n\nM. Boeckh not only rejects the pretensions of Hipparchus and Minos to\nbe considered as works of Plato, but advances an affirmative\nhypothesis to show what they are. He considers these two dialogues,\ntogether with those De Justo, and De Virtute (two short dialogues in\nthe pseudo-Platonic list, not recognised by Thrasyllus) as among the\ndialogues published by Simon; an Athenian citizen and a shoemaker by\ntrade, in whose shop Sokrates is said to have held many of his\nconversations. Simon is reported to have made many notes of these\nconversations, and to have composed and published, from them, a\nvolume of thirty-three dialogues (Diog. L. ii. 122), among the titles\nof which there are two--[Greek: Peri\\ Philkerdou=s] and [Greek: Peri\\\nNo/mou]. Simon was, of course, contemporary with Plato; but somewhat\nolder in years. With this part of M. Boeckh's treatise, respecting\nthe supposed authorship of Simon, I have nothing to do. I only notice\nthe arguments by which he proposes to show that Hipparchus and Minos\nare not works of Plato.\n\nIn the first place, I notice that M. Boeckh explicitly recognises\nthem as works of an author contemporary with Plato, not later\nthan 380 B.C. (p. 46). Hereby many of the tests, whereby we\nusually detect spurious works, become inapplicable.\n\nIn the second place, he admits that the dialogues are composed in\ngood Attic Greek, suitable to the Platonic age both in character and\nmanners--\"At veteris esse et Attici scriptoris, probus sermo, antiqui\nmores, totus denique character, spondeat,\" p. 32.\n\nThe reasons urged by M. Boeckh to prove the spuriousness of the\nMinos, are first, that it is unlike Plato--next, that it is too much\nlike Plato. \"Dupliciter dialogus a Platonis ingenio discrepat: partim\nquod parum, partim quod nimium, similis ceteris ejusdem scriptis sit.\nParum similis est in rebus permultis. Nam cum Plato adhuc vivos ac\nvidentes aut nuper defunctos notosque homines, ut scenicus poeta\nactores, moribus ingeniisque accurate descriptis, nominatim producat\nin medium--in isto opusculo cum Socrate colloquens persona plan\u00e9\nincerta est ac nomine carens: quippe cum imperitus scriptor esset\nartis illius colloquiis suis _dulcissimas veneres_ illas\ninferendi, qu\u00e6 ex peculiaribus personarum moribus pingendis\nredundant, atque \u00e0 Platone ut flores per amplos dialogorum hortos\nsunt disseminat\u00e6\" (pp. 7-8): again, p. 9, it is complained that there\nis an \"infinitus secundarius collocutor\" in the Hipparchus.\n\nNow the sentence, just transcribed from M. Boeckh, shows that he had\nin his mind as standard of comparison, a certain number of the\nPlatonic works, but that he did not take account of all of them. The\nPlatonic Protagoras begins with a dialogue between Sokrates and an\nunknown, nameless person; to whom Sokrates, after a page of\nconversation with him, recounts what has just passed between himself,\nProtagoras, and others. Next, if we turn to the Sophist\u00eas and\nPolitikus, we find that in both of them, not simply the secundarius\ncollocutor, but even the principal speaker, is an unknown and\nnameless person, described only as a Stranger from Elea, and never\nbefore seen by Sokrates. Again, in the Leges, the principal speaker\nis only an [Greek: A)th\u00eanai=os xe/nos], without a name. In the face\nof such analogies, it is unsafe to lay down a peremptory rule, that\nno dialogue can be the work of Plato, which acknowledges as\n_collocutor_ an unnamed person.\n\nThen again--when M. Boeckh complains that the Hipparchus and Minos\nare destitute of those \"_flores et dulcissim\u00e6 Veneres_\" which\nPlato is accustomed to spread through his dialogues--I ask, Where are\nthe \"dulcissim\u00e6 Veneres\" in the Parmenid\u00eas, Sophist\u00eas, Politikus,\nLeges, Tim\u00e6us, Kritias? I find none. The presence of \"dulcissim\u00e6\nVeneres\" is not a condition _sine qu\u00e2 non_, in every\ncomposition which pretends to Plato as its author: nor can the\nabsence of them be admitted as a reason for disallowing Hipparchus\nand Minos.\n\nThe analogy of the Sophist\u00eas and Politikus (besides Symposium,\nRepublic, and Leges) farther shows, that there is nothing wonderful\nin finding the titles of Hipparchus and Minos derived from the\nsubjects ([Greek: Peri\\ Philkerdou=s] and [Greek: Peri\\ No/mou]), not\nfrom the name of one of the collocutors:--whether we suppose the\ntitles to have been bestowed by Plato himself, or by some subsequent\neditor (Boeckh, p. 10).\n\nTo illustrate his first ground of objection--Dissimilarity between\nthe Minos and the true Platonic writings--M. Boeckh enumerates (pp.\n12-23) several passages of the dialogue which he considers\nunplatonic. Moreover, he includes among them (p. 12) examples of\nconfused and illogical reasoning. I confess that to me this evidence\nis noway sufficient to prove that Plato is not the author. That\ncertain passages may be picked out which are obscure, confused,\ninelegant--is certainly no sufficient evidence. If I thought so, I\nshould go along with Ast in rejecting the Euthyd\u00eamus, Menon, Lach\u00eas,\nCharmid\u00eas, Lysis, &c., against all which Ast argues as spurious,\nupon evidence of the same kind. It is not too much to say, that\nagainst almost every one of the dialogues, taken severally, a case of\nthe same kind, more or less plausible, might be made out. You might\nin each of them find passages peculiar, careless, awkwardly\nexpressed. The expression [Greek: t\u00ea\\n a)nthr\u00f4pei/an a)ge/l\u00ean tou=\ns\u00f4/matos], which M. Boeckh insists upon so much as improper, would\nprobably have been considered as a mere case of faulty text, if it\nhad occurred in any other dialogue: and so it may fairly be\nconsidered in the Minos.\n\nMoreover as to faults of logic and consistency in the reasoning, most\ncertainly these cannot be held as proving the Minos not to be Plato's\nwork. I would engage to produce, from most of his dialogues, defects\nof reasoning quite as grave as any which the Minos exhibits. On the\nprinciple assumed by M. Boeckh, every one who agreed with Pan\u00e6tius in\nconsidering the elaborate proof given in the Ph\u00e6don, of the\nimmortality of the soul, as illogical and delusive--would also agree\nwith Pan\u00e6tius in declaring that the Ph\u00e6don was not the work of Plato.\nIt is one question, whether the reasoning in any dialogue be good or\nbad: it is another question, whether the dialogue be written by Plato\nor not. Unfortunately, the Platonic critics often treat the first\nquestion as if it determined the second.\n\nM. Boeckh himself considers that the evidence arising from\ndissimilarity (upon which I have just dwelt) is not the strongest\npart of his case. He relies more upon the evidence arising from\n_too much similarity_, as proving still more clearly the\nspuriousness of the Minos. \"Jam pergamus ad alteram partem nostr\u00e6\nargumentationis, _eamque etiam firmiorem_, de _nimia\nsimilitudine_ Platonicorum aliquot locorum, qu\u00e6 imitationem doceat\nsubesse. Nam de hoc quidem conveniet inter omnes doctos et indoctos,\nPlatonem se ipsum haud posse imitari: nisi si quis dubitet de san\u00e2\nejus mente\" (p. 23). Again, p. 26, \"Jam vero in nostro colloquio\nSymposium, Politicum, Euthyphronem, Protagoram, Gorgiam, Cratylum,\nPhil\u00eabum, dialogos expressos ac tantum non compilatos reperies\". And\nM. Boeckh goes on to specify various passages of the Minos, which he\nconsiders to have been imitated, and badly imitated, from one or\nother of these dialogues.\n\nI cannot agree with M. Boeckh in regarding this _nimia\nsimilitudo_ as the strongest part of his case. On the contrary, I\nconsider it as the weakest: because his own premisses (in my\njudgment) not only do not prove his conclusion, but go far to prove\nthe opposite. When we find him insisting, in such strong language,\nupon the great analogy which subsists between the Minos and seven of\nthe incontestable Platonic dialogues, this is surely a fair proof\nthat its author is the same as their author. To me it appears as\nconclusive as internal evidence ever can be; unless there be some\ndisproof _aliunde_ to overthrow it. But M. Boeckh produces no\nsuch disproof. He converts these analogies into testimony in his own\nfavour, simply by bestowing upon them the name _imitatio,--stulta\nimitatio_ (p. 27). This word involves an hypothesis, whereby the\npoint to be proved is assumed--viz.: difference of authorship. \"Plato\ncannot have imitated himself\" (M. Boeckh observes). I cannot admit\nsuch impossibility, even if you describe the fact in that phrase: but\nif you say \"Plato in one dialogue thought and wrote like Plato in\nanother\"--you describe the same fact in a different phrase, and it\nthen appears not merely possible but natural and probable. Those very\nreal analogies, to which M. Boeckh points in the word\n_imitatio_, are in my judgment cases of the Platonic thought in\none dialogue being like the Platonic thought in another. The\n_similitudo_, between Minos and these other dialogues, can\nhardly be called _nimia_, for M. Boeckh himself points out that\nit is accompanied with much difference. It is a similitude, such as\nwe should expect between one Platonic dialogue and another: with this\ndifference, that whereas, in the Minos, Plato gives the same general\nviews in a manner more brief, crude, abrupt--in the other dialogues\nhe works them out with greater fulness of explanation and\nillustration, and some degree of change not unimportant. That there\nshould be this amount of difference between one dialogue of Plato and\nanother appears to me perfectly natural. On the other hand--that\nthere should have been a contemporary _falsarius_ (scriptor\nmiser, insulsus, vilissimus, to use phrases of M. Boeckh), who\nstudied and pillaged the best dialogues of Plato, for the purpose of\nputting together a short and perverted abbreviation of them--and who\ncontrived to get his miserable abbreviation recognised by the\nByzantine Aristophanes among the genuine dialogues notwithstanding\nthe existence of the Platonic school--this, I think highly\nimprobable.\n\nI cannot therefore agree with M. Boeckh in thinking, that \"ubique se\nprodens Platonis imitatio\" (p. 31) is an irresistible proof of\nspuriousness: nor can I think that his hypothesis shows itself to\nadvantage, when he says, p. 10--\"Ipse autem dialogus (Minos) quum\npost Politicum compositus sit, quod qu\u00e6dam in eo dicta rebus ibi\nexpositis manifest\u00e9 nitantur, ut paullo post ostendemus--quis est qui\nartificiosissimum philosophum, postquam ibi (in Politico) accuratius\nde natur\u00e2 legis egisset, de e\u00e2 iterum putet negligenter egisse?\"--I\ndo not think it so impossible as it appears to M. Boeckh, that a\nphilosopher, after having _written_ upon a given subject\n_accuratius_, should subsequently write upon it\n_negligenter_. But if I granted this ever so fully, I should\nstill contend that there remains another alternative. The negligent\nworkmanship may have preceded the accurate: an alternative which I\nthink is probably the truth, and which has nothing to exclude it\nexcept M. Boeckh's pure hypothesis, that the Minos must have been\ncopied from the Politikus.\n\nWhile I admit then that the Hipparchus and Minos are among the\ninferior and earlier compositions of Plato, I still contend that\nthere is no ground for excluding them from the list of his works.\nThough the Platonic critics of this century are for the most part of\nan adverse opinion, I have with me the general authority of the\ncritics anterior to this century--from Aristophanes of Byzantium down\nto Bentley and Ruhnken--see Boeckh, pp. 7-32.\n\nYxem defends the genuineness of the Hipparchus--(Ueber Platon's\nKleitophon, p. 8. Berlin, 1846).\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV.\n\nTHEAGES.\n\n\n[Side-note: Theag\u00eas--has been declared spurious by some modern\ncritics--grounds for such opinion not sufficient.]\n\nThis is among the dialogues declared by Schleiermacher, Ast,\nStallbaum, and various other modern critics, to be spurious and\nunworthy of Plato: the production of one who was not merely an\nimitator, but a bad and silly imitator.[1] Socher on the other hand\ndefends the dialogue against them, reckoning it as a juvenile\nproduction of Plato.[2] The arguments which are adduced to prove its\nspuriousness appear to me altogether insufficient. It has some\nfeatures of dissimilarity with that which we read in other\ndialogues--these the above-mentioned critics call un-Platonic: it has\nother features of similarity--these they call bad imitation by a\n_falsarius_: lastly, it is inferior, as a performance, to the\nbest of the Platonic dialogues. But I am prepared to expect (and have\neven the authority of Schleiermacher for expecting) that some\ndialogues will be inferior to others. I also reckon with certainty,\nthat between two dialogues, both genuine, there will be points of\nsimilarity as well as points of dissimilarity. Lastly, the critics\nfind marks of a bad, recent, un-Platonic style: but Dionysius of\nHalikarnassus--a judge at least equally competent upon such a\nmatter--found no such marks. He expressly cites the dialogue as the\nwork of Plato,[3] and explains the peculiar phraseology assigned to\nDemodokus by remarking, that the latter is presented as a person of\nrural habits and occupations.\n\n[Footnote 1: Stallbaum, Proleg. pp. 220-225, \"ineptus tenebrio,\"\n&c. Schleiermacher, Einleitung, part ii. v. iii. pp. 247-252.\nAst, Platon's Leben und Schriften, pp. 495-497.\n\nAst speaks with respect (differing in this respect from the other\ntwo) of the Theag\u00eas as a composition, though he does not believe it\nto be the work of Plato. Schleiermacher also admits (see the end of\nhis Einleitung) that the style in general has a good Platonic\ncolouring, though he considers some particular phrases as\nun-Platonic.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Socher, Ueber Platon, pp. 92-102. M. Cobet also speaks\nof it as a work of Plato (Nov\u00e6 Lectiones, &c., p. 624. Lugd. Bat.\n1858).]\n\n[Footnote 3: Dionys. Hal. Ars Rhetor. p. 405, Reiske. Compare\nTheag\u00eas, 121 D. [Greek: ei)s to\\ a)/stu katabai/nontes].\n\nIn general, in discussions on the genuineness of any of the Platonic\ndialogues, I can do nothing but reply to the arguments of those\ncritics who consider them spurious. But in the case of the Theag\u00eas\nthere is one argument which tends to mark Plato positively as the\nauthor.\n\nIn the Theag\u00eas, p. 125, the senarius [Greek: sophoi\\ tu/rannoi t\u00f4=n\nsoph\u00f4=n sunousi/a|] is cited as a verse of _Euripides_. Now it\nappears that this is an error of memory, and that the verse really\nbelongs to _Sophokles_, [Greek: e)n Ai)/anti Lokr\u00f4=|]. If the\nerror had only appeared in this dialogue, Stallbaum would probably\nhave cited it as one more instance of stupidity on the part of the\n_ineptus tenebrio_ whom he supposes to have written the\ndialogue. But unfortunately the error does not belong to the Theag\u00eas\nalone. It is found also in the Republic (viii. 568 B), the most\nunquestionable of all the Platonic compositions. Accordingly,\nSchleiermacher tells us in his note that the _falsarius_ of the\nTheag\u00eas has copied this error out of the above-named passage of the\nRepublic of Plato (notes, p. 500).\n\nThis last supposition of Schleiermacher appears to me highly\nimprobable. Since we know that the mistake is one made by Plato\nhimself, surely we ought rather to believe that he made it in two\ndistinct compositions. In other words, the occurrence of the same\nexact mistake in the Republic and the Theag\u00eas affords strong\npresumption that both are by the same author--Plato.]\n\n[Side-note: Persons of the dialogue--Sokrates, with Demodokus\nand Theag\u00eas, father and son. Theag\u00eas (the son), eager to acquire\nknowledge, desires to be placed under the teaching of a Sophist.]\n\nDemodokus, an elderly man (of rank and landed property), and his\nyouthful son Theag\u00eas, have come from their Deme to Athens, and enter\ninto conversation with Sokrates: to whom the father explains, that\nTheag\u00eas has contracted, from the conversation of youthful companions,\nan extraordinary ardour for the acquisition of wisdom. The son has\nimportuned his father to put him under the tuition of one of the\nSophists, who profess to teach wisdom. The father, though not\nunwilling to comply with the request, is deterred by the difficulty\nof finding a good teacher and avoiding a bad one. He entreats the\nadvice of Sokrates, who invites the young man to explain what it is\nthat he wants, over and above the usual education of an Athenian\nyouth of good family (letters, the harp, wrestling, &c.), which\nhe has already gone through.[4]\n\n[Footnote 4: Plato, Theag\u00eas, 122.]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates questions Theag\u00eas, inviting him to specify\nwhat he wants.]\n\n_Sokr._--You desire wisdom: but what kind of wisdom? That by\nwhich men manage chariots? or govern horses? or pilot ships?\n_Theag._--No: that by which men are governed. _Sokr._--But\nwhat men? those in a state of sickness--or those who are singing in a\nchorus--or those who are under gymnastic training? Each of these\nclasses has its own governor, who bears a special title, and belongs\nto a special art by itself--the medical, musical, gymnastic, &c.\n_Theag._--No: I mean that wisdom by which we govern, not these\nclasses alone, but all the other residents in the city along with\nthem--professional as well as private--men as well as women.[5]\n\n[Footnote 5: Plato, Theag\u00eas, 124 A-B. Schleiermacher (Einleit. p.\n250) censures the prolixity of the inductive process in this\ndialogue, and the multitude of examples here accumulated to prove a\ngeneral proposition obvious enough without proof. Let us grant this\nto be true; we cannot infer from it that the dialogue is not the work\nof Plato. By very similar arguments Socher endeavours to show that\nthe Sophist\u00eas and the Politikus are not works of Plato, because in\nboth these dialogues logical division and differentiation is\naccumulated with tiresome prolixity, and applied to most trivial\nsubjects. But Plato himself (in Politikus, pp. 285-286) explains why\nhe does so, and tells us that he wishes to familiarise his readers\nwith logical subdivision and classification as a process. In like\nmanner I maintain that prolixity in the [Greek: lo/goi e)paktikoi/]\nis not to be held as proof of spurious authorship, any more than\nprolixity in the process of logical subdivision and classification.\n\nI noticed the same objection in the case of the First Alkibiad\u00eas.]\n\n[Side-note: Theag\u00eas desires to acquire that wisdom by which he\ncan govern freemen with their own consent.]\n\nSokrates now proves to Theag\u00eas, that this function and power which he\nis desirous of obtaining, is, the function and power of a despot: and\nthat no one can aid him in so culpable a project. I might yearn (says\nTheag\u00eas) for such despotic power over all: so probably would you and\nevery other man. But it is not _that_ to which I now aspire. I\naspire to govern freemen, with their own consent; as was done by\nThemistokles, Perikles, Kimon, and other illustrious statesmen,[6]\nwho have been accomplished in the political art.\n\n[Footnote 6: Plato, Theag\u00eas, 126 A.]\n\n_Sokr._--Well, if you wished to become accomplished in the art\nof horsemanship, you would put yourself under able horsemen: if in\nthe art of darting the javelin, under able darters. By parity of\nreasoning, since you seek to learn the art of statesmanship, you must\nfrequent able statesmen.[7]\n\n\n[Footnote 7: Plato, Theag\u00eas, 126 C.]\n\n[Side-note: Incompetence of the best practical statesmen to\nteach any one else. Theag\u00eas requests that Sokrates will himself teach\nhim.]\n\n_Theag._--No, Sokrates. I have heard of the language which you\nare in the habit of using to others. You pointed out to them that\nthese eminent statesmen cannot train their own sons to be at all\nbetter than curriers: of course therefore they cannot do _me_\nany good.[8] _Sokr._--But what can your father do for you\nbetter than this, Theag\u00eas? What ground have you for complaining of\nhim? He is prepared to place you under any one of the best and most\nexcellent men of Athens, whichever of them you prefer.\n_Theag._--Why will not you take me yourself, Sokrates? I look\nupon you as one of these men, and I desire nothing better.[9]\n\n[Footnote 8: Plato, Theag\u00eas, 126 D. Here again Stallbaum (p. 222)\nurges, among his reasons for believing the dialogue to be\nspurious--How absurd to represent the youthful Theag\u00eas as knowing\nwhat arguments Sokrates had addressed to others! But the youthful\nThe\u00e6t\u00eatus is also represented as having heard from others the\ncross-examinations made by Sokrates (The\u00e6t\u00eat. 148 E). So likewise the\nyouthful sons of Lysimachus--(Lach\u00eas, 181 A); compare also Lysis, 211\nA.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Plato, Theag\u00eas, 127 A.]\n\nDemodokus joins his entreaties with those of Theag\u00eas to prevail upon\nSokrates to undertake this function. But Sokrates in reply says that\nhe is less fit for it than Demodokus himself, who has exercised high\npolitical duties, with the esteem of every one; and that if practical\nstatesmen are considered unfit, there are the professional Sophists,\nProdikus, Gorgias, Polus, who teach many pupils, and earn not merely\ngood pay, but also the admiration and gratitude of every one--of the\npupils as well as their senior relatives.[10]\n\n[Footnote 10: Plato, Theag\u00eas, 127 D-E, 128 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates declares that he is not competent to\nteach--that he knows nothing except about matters of love. Theag\u00eas\nmaintains that many of his young friends have profited largely by the\nconversation of Sokrates.]\n\n_Sokr._--I know nothing of the fine things which these Sophists\nteach: I wish I did know. I declare everywhere, that I know nothing\nwhatever except one small matter--what belongs to love. In that, I\nsurpass every one else, past as well as present.[11]\n_Theag._--Sokrates is only mocking us. I know youths (of my own age and\nsomewhat older), who were altogether worthless and inferior to every\none, before they went to him; but who, after they had frequented his\nsociety, became in a short time superior to all their former rivals.\nThe like will happen with me, if he will only consent to receive\nme.[12]\n\n[Footnote 11: Plato, Theag\u00eas, 128 B. [Greek: a)lla\\ kai\\ le/g\u00f4 d\u00ea/pou\na)ei/, o(/ti e)g\u00f4\\ tugcha/n\u00f4, \u00f4(s e)/pos ei)pei=n, ou)de\\n\ne)pista/menos pl\u00ea/n ge smikrou= tino\\s math\u00ea/matos, t\u00f4=n e)r\u00f4tik\u00f4=n,\ntou=to me/ntoi to\\ ma/th\u00eama par' o(ntinou=n poiou=mai deino\\s\nei)=nai, kai\\ t\u00f4=n progegono/t\u00f4n a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n kai\\ t\u00f4=n nu=n.]]\n\n[Footnote 12: Plato, Theag\u00eas, 128 C.]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates explains how this has sometimes happened--he\nrecites his experience of the divine sign or D\u00e6mon.]\n\n_Sokr._--You do not know how this happens; I will explain it to\nyou. From my childhood, I have had a peculiar superhuman something\nattached to me by divine appointment: a voice, which, whenever it\noccurs, warns me to abstain from that which I am about to do,\nbut never impels me.[13] Moreover, when any one of my friends\nmentions to me what he is about to do, if the voice shall then occur\nto me it is a warning for him to abstain. The examples of Charmides\nand Timarchus (here detailed by Sokrates) prove what I say: and many\npersons will tell you how truly I forewarned them of the ruin of the\nAthenian armament at Syracuse.[14] My young friend Sannion is now\nabsent, serving on the expedition under Thrasyllus to Ionia: on his\ndeparture, the divine sign manifested itself to me, and I am\npersuaded that some grave calamity will befall him.\n\n[Footnote 13: Plato, Theag\u00eas, 128 D. [Greek: e)sti ga/r ti thei/a|\nmoi/ra| parepo/menon e)moi\\ e)k paido\\s a)rxa/menon daimo/nion;\ne)/sti de\\ tou=to ph\u00f4n\u00ea/, \u00ea)\\ o(/tan ge/n\u00eatai, a)ei/ moi s\u00eamai/nei,\no(\\ a)\\n me/ll\u00f4 pra/ttein, tou/tou a)potrop\u00ea/n, protre/pei de\\\nou)de/pote.]]\n\n[Footnote 14: Plato, Theag. 129.]\n\n[Side-note: The D\u00e6mon is favourable to some persons, adverse to\nothers. Upon this circumstance it depends how far any companion\nprofits by the society of Sokrates. Aristeides has not learnt\nanything from Sokrates, yet has improved much by being near to him.]\n\nThese facts I mention to you (Sokrates continues) because it is that\nsame divine power which exercises paramount influence over my\nintercourse with companions.[15] Towards many, it is positively\nadverse; so that I cannot even enter into companionship with them.\nTowards others, it does not forbid, yet neither does it co-operate:\nso that they derive no benefit from me. There are others again in\nwhose case it co-operates; these are the persons to whom you allude,\nwho make rapid progress.[16] With some, such improvement is lasting:\nothers, though they improve wonderfully while in my society, yet\nrelapse into commonplace men when they leave me. Aristeides, for\nexample (grandson of Aristeides the Just), was one of those who made\nrapid progress while he was with me. But he was forced to absent\nhimself on military service; and on returning, he found as my\ncompanion Thucydides (son of Melesias), who however had quarrelled\nwith me for some debate of the day before. I understand (said\nAristeides to me) that Thucydides has taken offence and gives himself\nairs; he forgets what a poor creature he was, before he came to\nyou.[17] I myself, too, have fallen into a despicable condition.\nWhen I left you, I was competent to discuss with any one and make a\ngood figure, so that I courted debate with the most accomplished men.\nNow, on the contrary, I avoid them altogether--so thoroughly am I\nashamed of my own incapacity. Did the capacity (I, _Sokrates_,\nasked Aristeides) forsake you all at once, or little by little?\nLittle by little, he replied. And when you possessed it (I asked),\ndid you get it by learning from me? or in what other way? I will tell\nyou, Sokrates (he answered), what seems incredible, yet is\nnevertheless true.[18] I never learnt from you any thing at all. You\nyourself well know this. But I always made progress, whenever I was\nalong with you, even if I were only in the same house without being\nin the same room; but I made greater progress, if I was in the same\nroom--greater still, if I looked in your face, instead of turning my\neyes elsewhere--and the greatest of all, by far, if I sat close and\ntouching you. But now (continued Aristeides) all that I then acquired\nhas dribbled out of me.[19]\n\n[Footnote 15: Plato, Theag\u00eas, 129 E. [Greek: tau=ta d\u00ea\\ pa/nta\nei)/r\u00eaka/ soi, o(/ti \u00ea( du/namis au(/t\u00ea tou= daimoni/ou tou/tou kai\\\nei)s ta\\s sunousi/as t\u00f4=n met' e)mou= sundiatribo/nt\u00f4n to\\ a(/pan\ndu/natai. polloi=s me\\n ga\\r e)nantiou=tai, kai\\ ou)k e)/sti tou/tois\n\u00f4)phel\u00eath\u00eanai met' e)mou= diatri/bousin.]]\n\n[Footnote 16: Plato, Theag. 129 E. [Greek: oi(=s d' a)\\n sulla/b\u00eatai\nt\u00ea=s sunousi/as \u00ea( tou= daimo/niou du/namis, ou(=toi ei)sin \u00f4(=n kai\\\nsu\\ \u00ea)/|sth\u00easai; tachu\\ ga\\r parachr\u00ea=ma e)pidido/asin.]]\n\n[Footnote 17: Plato, Theag. 130 A-B. [Greek: Ti/ dai/? ou)k oi)=den,\ne)/ph\u00ea, pri\\n soi\\ suggene/sthai, oi(=on \u00ea)=n to\\ a)ndra/podon?]]\n\n[Footnote 18: Plato, Theag. 130 D. [Greek: \u00ca(ni/ka de/ soi\nparege/neto (\u00ea( du/namis), po/teron matho/nti par' e)mou= ti\nparege/neto, \u00ea)/ tini a)/ll\u00f4| tro/p\u00f4|? E)g\u00f4/ soi, e)/ph\u00ea, e)r\u00f4=, \u00f4)=\nS\u00f4/krates, a)/piston me\\n n\u00ea\\ tou\\s theou/s, a)l\u00eathe\\s de/. e)g\u00f4\\\nga\\r e)/mathon me\\n para\\ sou= ou)de\\n p\u00f4/pote, \u00f4(s au)to\\s oi)=stha;\ne)pedi/doun de\\ o(pote soi sunei/\u00ean, ka)\\n ei) e)n t\u00ea=| au)t\u00ea=|\nmo/non oi)ki/a| ei)/\u00ean, m\u00ea\\ e)n t\u00f4=| au)t\u00f4=| de\\ oi)k\u00ea/mati],\n&c.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Plato, Theag. 130 E. [Greek: polu\\ de\\ ma/lista kai\\\nplei=ston e)pedi/doun, o(po/te par' au)to/n se kathoi/m\u00ean\ne)cho/meno/s sou kai\\ a(pto/menos. nu=n de/, \u00ea)= d' o(/s, pa=sa\ne)kei/n\u00ea \u00ea(\\ e(/xis e)xer)r(u/\u00eaken.]]\n\n[Side-note: Theag\u00eas expresses his anxiety to be received as the\ncompanion of Sokrates.]\n\n_Sokr._--I have now explained to you, Theag\u00eas, what it is to\nbecome my companion. If it be the pleasure of the God, you will make\ngreat and rapid progress: if not, not. Consider, therefore, whether\nit is not safer for you to seek instruction from some of those who\nare themselves masters of the benefits which they impart, rather than\nto take your chance of the result with me.[20] _Theag._--I shall\nbe glad, Sokrates, to become your companion, and to make trial of\nthis divine coadjutor. If he shows himself propitious, that will be\nthe best of all: if not, we can then take counsel, whether I shall\ntry to propitiate him by prayer, sacrifice, or any other means which\nthe prophets may recommend or whether I shall go to some other\nteacher.[21]\n\n[Footnote 20: Plato, Theag. 130 E. [Greek: o(/ra ou)=n m\u00ea/ soi\na)sphale/steron \u00ea)=| par' e)kei/n\u00f4n tini\\ paideu/esthai, oi(\\\ne)gkratei=s au)toi/ ei)si t\u00ea=s \u00f4)phelei/as, \u00ea)\\n \u00f4)phelou=si tou\\s\na)nthr\u00f4/pous, ma=llon \u00ea)\\ par' e)mou= o(/, ti a)\\n tu/ch\u00ea|, tou=to\npra=xai.]]\n\n[Footnote 21: Plato, Theag. 131 A.]\n\n* * * * *\n\n[Side-note: Remarks on the Theag\u00eas--analogy with the\nLach\u00eas.]\n\nThe Theag\u00eas figured in the list of Thrasyllus as first in the fifth\nTetralogy: the other three members of the same Tetralogy being\nCharmid\u00eas, Lach\u00eas, Lysis. Some persons considered it suitable to read\nas first dialogue of all.[22] There are several points of analogy\nbetween the Theag\u00eas and the Lach\u00eas, though with a different turn\ngiven to them. Aristeides and Thucydides are mentioned in both of\nthem: Sokrates also is solicited to undertake the duty of teacher.\nThe ardour of the young Theag\u00eas to acquire wisdom reminds us of\nHippokrates at the beginning of the Protagoras. The string of\nquestions put by Sokrates to Theag\u00eas, requiring that what is called\nwisdom shall be clearly defined and specialised, has its parallel in\nmany of the Platonic dialogues. Moreover the declaration of Sokrates,\nthat he knows nothing except about matters of love, but that in them\nhe is a consummate master--is the same as what he explicitly declares\nboth in the Symposion and other dialogues.[23]\n\n[Footnote 22: Diog. L. iii. 59-61.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Symposion, 177 E. [Greek: ou)/te ga\\r a)/n pou e)g\u00f4\\\na)poph\u00ea/saimi, o(\\s ou)de/n ph\u00eami a)/llo e)pi/stasthai \u00ea)\\ ta\\\ne)r\u00f4tika/.] Compare the same dialogue, p. 212 B, 216 C. Ph\u00e6drus, 227\nE, 257 A; Lysis, 204 B. Compare also Xenoph. Memor. ii. 6, 28;\nXenoph. Sympos. iv. 27.\n\nIt is not reasonable to treat this declaration of Sokrates, in the\nTheag\u00eas, as an evidence that the dialogue is the work of a\n_falsarius_, when a declaration quite similar is ascribed to\nSokrates in other Platonic dialogues.]\n\n[Side-note: Chief peculiarity of the Theag\u00eas--stress laid upon\nthe divine sign or D\u00e6mon.]\n\nBut the chief peculiarity of the Theag\u00eas consists in the stress which\nis laid upon the D\u00e6mon, the divine voice, the inspiration of\nSokrates. This divine auxiliary is here described, not only as giving\na timely check or warning to Sokrates, when either he or his friends\ncontemplated any inauspicious project--but also as intervening, in\nthe case of those youthful companions with whom he conversed, to\npromote the improvement of one, to obstruct that of others; so that\nwhether Sokrates will produce any effect or not in improving any one,\ndepends neither upon his own efforts nor upon those of the recipient,\nbut upon the unpredictable concurrence of a divine agency.[24]\n\n[Footnote 24: See some remarks on this point in Appendix.]\n\n[Side-note: Plato employs this divine sign here to render some\nexplanation of the singularity and eccentricity of Sokrates, and of\nhis unequal influence upon different companions.]\n\nPlato employs the Sokratic D\u00e6mon, in the Theag\u00eas, for a philosophical\npurpose, which, I think, admits of reasonable explanation. During the\neight (perhaps ten) years of his personal communion with Sokrates,\nhe had had large experience of the variable and unaccountable\neffect produced by the Sokratic conversation upon different hearers:\na fact which is also attested by the Xenophontic Memorabilia. This\ndifference of effect was in no way commensurate to the unequal\nintelligence of the hearers. Ch\u00e6rephon, Apollod\u00f4rus, Kriton, seem to\nhave been ordinary men:--[25] while Kritias and Alkibiades, who\nbrought so much discredit both upon Sokrates and his teaching,\nprofited little by him, though they were among the ablest pupils that\nhe ever addressed: moreover Antisthenes, and Aristippus, probably did\nnot appear to Plato (since he greatly dissented from their\nphilosophical views) to have profited much by the common\ncompanionship with Sokrates. Other companions there must have been\nalso personally known to Plato, though not to us: for we must\nremember that Sokrates passed his whole day in talking with all\nlisteners. Now when Plato in after life came to cast the ministry of\nSokrates into dramatic scenes, and to make each scene subservient to\nthe illustration of some philosophical point of view, at least a\nnegative--he was naturally led to advert to the D\u00e6mon or divine\ninspiration, which formed so marked a feature in the character of his\nmaster. The concurrence or prohibition of this divine auxiliary\nserved to explain why it was that the seed, sown broadcast by\nSokrates, sometimes fructified, and sometimes did not fructify, or\nspeedily perished afterwards--when no sufficient explanatory\npeculiarity could be pointed out in the ground on which it fell. It\ngave an apparent reason for the perfect singularity of the course\npursued by Sokrates: for his preternatural acuteness in one\ndirection, and his avowed incapacity in another: for his mastery of\nthe Elenchus, convicting men of ignorance, and his inability to\nsupply them with knowledge: for his refusal to undertake the duties\nof a teacher. All these are mysterious features of the Sokratic\ncharacter. The intervention of the D\u00e6mon appears to afford an\nexplanation, by converting them into religious mysteries: which,\nthough it be no explanation at all, yet is equally efficacious by\nstopping the mouth of the questioner, and by making him believe that\nit is guilt and impiety to ask for explanation--as Sokrates\nhimself declared in regard to astronomical phenomena, and as\nHerodotus feels, when his narrative is crossed by strange religious\nlegends.[26]\n\n[Footnote 25: Xenophon, Apol. Sokr. 28.\n[Greek: A)pollo/d\u00f4ros--e)pithum\u00ea/t\u00eas me\\n i)schur\u00f4=s au)tou=,\na)/ll\u00f4s d' eu)\u00ea/th\u00eas.]--Plat. Ph\u00e6don, 117 D.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Xen. Mem. iv. 7, 5-6; Herodot. ii. 3, 45-46.]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates, while continually finding fault with\nother teachers, refused to teach himself--difficulty of finding an\nexcuse for his refusal. The Theag\u00eas furnishes an excuse.]\n\nIn this manner, the Theag\u00eas is made by Plato to exhibit one way of\nparrying the difficulty frequently addressed to Sokrates by various\nhearers: \"You tell us that the leading citizens cannot even teach\ntheir own sons, and that the Sophists teach nothing worth having: you\nperpetually call upon us to seek for better teachers, without telling\nus where such are to be found. We entreat you to teach us yourself,\nconformably to your own views.\"\n\nIf a leader of political opposition, after years employed in\ndenouncing successive administrators as ignorant and iniquitous,\nrefuses, when invited, to take upon himself the business of\nadministration--an intelligent admirer must find some decent pretence\nto colour the refusal. Such a pretence is found for Sokrates in the\nTheag\u00eas: \"I am not my own master on this point. I am the instrument\nof a divine ally, without whose active working I can accomplish\nnothing: who forbids altogether my teaching of one man--tolerates,\nwithout assisting, my unavailing lessons to another--assists\nefficaciously in my teaching of a third, in which case alone the\npupil receives any real benefit. The assistance of this divine ally\nis given or withheld according to motives of his own, which I cannot\neven foretell, much less influence. I should deceive you therefore if\nI undertook to teach, when I cannot tell whether I shall do good or\nharm.\"\n\nThe reply of Theag\u00eas meets this scruple. He asks permission to make\nthe experiment, and promises to propitiate the divine auxiliary by\nprayer and sacrifice; under which reserve Sokrates gives consent.\n\n[Side-note: Plato does not always, nor in other dialogues,\nallude to the divine sign in the same way. Its character and working\nessentially impenetrable. Sokrates a privileged person.]\n\nIt is in this way that the D\u00e6mon or divine auxiliary serves the\npurpose of reconciling what would otherwise be an inconsistency in\nthe proceedings of Sokrates. I mean, that such is the purpose served\nin _this_ dialogue: I know perfectly that Plato deals with the\ncase differently elsewhere: but I am not bound (as I have said\nmore than once) to force upon all the dialogues one and the same\npoint of view. That the agency of the Gods was often and in the most\nimportant cases, essentially undiscoverable and unpredictable, and\nthat in such cases they might sometimes be prevailed on to give\nspecial warnings to favoured persons--were doctrines which the\nhistorical Sokrates in Xenophon asserts with emphasis.[27] The D\u00e6mon\nof Sokrates was believed, both by himself and his friends, to be a\nspecial privilege and an extreme case of divine favour and\ncommunication to him.[28] It was perfectly applicable to the scope of\nthe Theag\u00eas, though Plato might not choose always to make the same\nemployment of it. It is used in the same general way in the\nThe\u00e6t\u00eatus;[29] doubtless with less expansion, and blended with\nanother analogy (that of the mid-wife) which introduces a\nconsiderable difference.[30]\n\n[Footnote 27: Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 8-9-19.\n\nEuripid. Hecub. 944.\n\n[Greek: phu/rousi d' au)ta\\ theoi\\ pa/lin te kai\\ pro/s\u00f4,\ntaragmo\\n e)ntithe/ntes, \u00f4(s a)gn\u00f4si/a|\nse/b\u00f4men au)tou/s.]]\n\n[Footnote 28: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 3, 12.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Plato, The\u00e6t\u00eat. 150 D-E.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Plato, Apolog. Sokr. 33 C. [Greek: e)moi\\ de\\ tou=to,\n\u00f4(s e)g\u00f4/ ph\u00eami, proste/taktai u(po\\ toou= theou= pra/ttein kai\\ e)k\nmantei\u00f4=n kai\\ e)x e)nupni/\u00f4n kai\\ panti\\ tro/p\u00f4|, \u00f4(=|pe/r ti/s pote\nkai\\ a)/ll\u00ea thei/a moio/ra a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4| kai\\ o(tiou=n prose/taxe\npra/ttein.] 40 A. [Greek: \u00ea( ga\\r ei)\u00f4thui=a/ moi mantik\u00ea\\ \u00ea( tou=\ndaimoni/ou e)n me\\n t\u00f4=| pro/sthen _chro/n\u00f4| panti\\ pa/nu pukn\u00ea\\\na)ei\\ \u00ea)=n kai\\ pa/nu e)pi\\ smikroi=s e)nantioume/n\u00ea_, ei)/ ti\nme/lloimi m\u00ea\\ o)rth\u00f4=s pra/xein.] Compare Xenophon, Memor. iv. 8, 5;\nApol. Sokr. c. 13.]\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX.\n\n[Greek: To\\ daimo/nion s\u00eamei=on.]\n\n\nHere is one of the points most insisted on by Schleiermacher and\nStallbaum, as proving that the Theag\u00eas is not the work of Plato.\nThese critics affirm (to use the language of Stallbaum, Proleg. p.\n220) \"Quam Plato alias de Socratis d\u00e6monio prodidit sententiam, ea\nlongissim\u00e8 recedit ab ill\u00e2 ratione, qu\u00e6 in hoc sermone exposita est\".\nHe says that the representation of the D\u00e6mon of Sokrates, given in\nthe Theag\u00eas, has been copied from a passage in the The\u00e6t\u00eatus, by an\nimitator who has not understood the passage, p. 150, D, E. But Socher\n(p. 97) appears to me to have shown satisfactorily, that there is no\nsuch material difference as these critics affirm between this passage\nof the The\u00e6t\u00eatus and the Theag\u00eas. In the The\u00e6t\u00eatus, Sokrates\ndeclares, that none of his companions learnt any thing from him, but\nthat all of them [Greek: oi(=sper a)\\n o( theo\\s parei/k\u00ea|] (the very\nsame term is used at the close of the Theag\u00eas--131 A, [Greek: e)a\\n\nme\\n parei/k\u00ea| \u00ea(mi=n--to\\ daimo/nion]) made astonishing progress and\nimprovement in his company. Stallbaum says, \"Itaque [Greek: o(\ntheo\\s], qui ibi memoratur, non est Socratis d\u00e6monium, sed potius\ndeus _i.e._ sors divina. Quod non perspiciens _noster\ntenebrio_ protenus illud d\u00e6monium, quod Socrates sibi semper\nadesse dictitabat, ad eum dignitatis et potenti\u00e6 gradum evexit, ut,\n&c.\" I agree with Socher in thinking that the phrase [Greek: o(\ntheo\\s] in the The\u00e6t\u00eatus has substantially the same meaning as\n[Greek: to\\ daimo/nion] in the Theag\u00eas. Both Schleiermacher (Notes on\nthe Apology, p. 432) and Ast (p. 482), have notes on the phrase\n[Greek: to\\ daimo/nion]--and I think the note of Ast is the more\ninstructive of the two. In Plato and Xenophon, the words [Greek: to\\\ndaimo/nion], [Greek: to\\ thei=on], are in many cases\nundistinguishable in meaning from [Greek: o( dai/m\u00f4n], [Greek: o(\ntheo/s]. Compare the Ph\u00e6drus, 242 E, about [Greek: theo\\s] and\n[Greek: thei=o/n ti]. Sokrates, in his argument against Meletus in\nthe Apology (p. 27) emphatically argues that no man could believe in\nany thing [Greek: daimo/nion], without also believing in [Greek:\ndaimo/nes]. The special [Greek: thei=o/n ti kai\\ daimo/nion\n(Apol. p. 31 C), which presented itself in regard to him and his\nproceedings, was only one of the many modes in which (as he believed)\n[Greek: o( theo/s] commanded and stimulated him to work upon the\nminds of the Athenians:--[Greek: e)moi\\ de\\ tou=to, \u00f4(s e)g\u00f4/ ph\u00eami,\nproste/taktai u(po\\ tou= theou= pra/ttein kai\\ e)k mantei\u00f4=n kai\\ e)x\ne)nupni/\u00f4n kai\\ panti\\ tro/p\u00f4|, \u00f4(=|pe/r ti/s pote kai\\ a)/ll\u00ea thei/a\nmoi=ra a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4| kai\\ o(tiou=n prose/taxe pra/ttein] (Apol. p. 33\nC). So again in Apol. p. 40 A, B, [Greek: \u00ea( ei)\u00f4thui=a/ moi mantik\u00ea\\\n\u00ea( tou= daimoni/ou]--and four lines afterwards we read the very same\nfact intimated in the words, [Greek: to\\ tou= theou= s\u00eamei=on], where\nSokratis d\u00e6monium--and Deus--are identified: thus refuting the\nargument above cited from Stallbaum. There is therefore no such\ndiscrepancy, in reference to [Greek: to\\ daimo/nion], as Stallbaum\nand Schleiermacher contend for. We perceive indeed this difference\nbetween them--that in the The\u00e6t\u00eatus, the simile of the obstetric art\nis largely employed, while it is not noticed in the Theag\u00eas. But we\nshould impose an unwarrantable restriction upon Plato's fancy, if we\nhindered him from working out his variety and exuberance of\nmetaphors, and from accommodating each dialogue to the metaphor\npredominant with him at the time.\n\nMoreover, in respect to what is called the D\u00e6mon of Sokrates, we\nought hardly to expect that either Plato or Xenophon would always be\nconsistent even with themselves. It is unsafe for a modern critic to\ndetermine beforehand, by reason or feelings of his own, in what\nmanner either of them would speak upon this mysterious subject. The\nbelief and feeling of a divine intervention was very real on the part\nof both, but their manner of conceiving it might naturally fluctuate:\nand there was, throughout all the proceedings of Sokrates, a mixture\nof the serious and the playful, of the sublime and the eccentric, of\nratiocinative acuteness with impulsive superstition--which it is\ndifficult to bring into harmonious interpretation. Such heterogeneous\nmixture is forcibly described in the Platonic Symposium, pp. 215-222.\nWhen we consider how undefined, and undefinable, the idea of this\n[Greek: daimo/nion] was, we cannot wonder if Plato ascribes to it\ndifferent workings and manifestations at different times. Stallbaum\naffirms that it is made ridiculous in the Theag\u00eas: and K\u00fchner\ndeclares that Plutarch makes it ridiculous, in his treatise De Genio\nSokratia (Comm. ad. Xenoph. Memor. p. 23). But this is because its\nagency is described more in detail. You can easily present it in a\nridiculous aspect, by introducing it as intervening on petty and\ninsignificant matters. Now it is remarkable, that in the Apology, we\nare expressly told that it actually did intervene on the most\ntrifling occasions--[Greek: pa/nu e)pi\\ smikroi=s\ne)nantioume/n\u00ea]. The business of an historian of philosophy is, to\ndescribe it as it was really felt and believed by Sokrates and\nPlato--whether a modern critic may consider the description\nridiculous or not.\n\nWhen Schleiermacher says (Einleitung, p. 248), respecting the\n_falsarius_ whom he supposes to have written the Theag\u00eas--\"Damit\nist ihm begegnet, auf eine h\u00f6chst verkehrte Art wunderbar\nzusammenzur\u00fchren diese g\u00f6ttliche Schickung, und jenes pers\u00f6nliche\nVorgef\u00fchl welches dem Sokrates zur g\u00f6ttlichen Stimme ward\".--I\ncontend that the mistake is chargeable to Schleiermacher himself, for\nbisecting into two phenomena that which appears in the Apology as the\nsame phenomenon under two different names--[Greek: to\\\ndaimo/nion]--[Greek: to\\ tou= theou= s\u00eamei=on]. Besides, to treat the\nD\u00e6mon as a mere \"personal presentiment\" of Sokrates, may be a true\nview:--but it is the view of one who does not inhale the same religious\natmosphere as Sokrates, Plato, and Xenophon. It cannot therefore be\nproperly applied in explaining their sayings or doings. K\u00fchner, who treats\nthe Theag\u00eas as not composed by Plato, grounds this belief partly on the\nassertion, that the [Greek: daimo/nion] of Sokrates is described\ntherein as something peculiar to Sokrates; which, according to\nK\u00fchner, was the fiction of a subsequent time. By Sokrates and his\ncontemporaries (K\u00fchner says) it was considered \"non sibi soli tanquam\nproprium quoddam beneficium a Diis tributum, sed commune sibi esse\ncum c\u00e6teris hominibus\" (pp. 20-21). I dissent entirely from this\nview, which is contradicted by most of the passages noticed even by\nK\u00fchner himself. It is at variance with the Platonic Apology, as well\nas with the The\u00e6t\u00eatus (150 D), and Republic (vi. 496 C). Xenophon\ndoes indeed try, in the first Chapter of the Memorabilia, as the\ndefender of Sokrates, to soften the _invidia_ against Sokrates,\nby intimating that other persons had communications from the Gods as\nwell as he. But we see plainly, even from other passages of the\nMemorabilia, that this was not the persuasion of Sokrates himself,\nnor of his friends, nor of his enemies. They all considered it (as it\nis depicted in the Theag\u00eas also) to be a special privilege and\nrevelation.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI.\n\nERAST\u00c6 OR ANTERAST\u00c6--RIVALES.\n\n\nThe main subject of this short dialogue is--What is philosophy?\n[Greek: \u00ea( philosophi/a--to\\ philosophei=n]. How are we to explain or\ndefine it? What is its province and purport?\n\n[Side-note: Erast\u00e6--subject and persons of the\ndialogue--dramatic introduction--interesting youths in the pal\u00e6stra.]\n\nInstead of the simple, naked, self-introducing, conversation, which\nwe read in the Menon, Hipparchus, Minos, &c. Sokrates recounts a\nscene and colloquy, which occurred when he went into the house of\nDionysius the grammatist or school-master,[1] frequented by many\nelegant and high-born youths as pupils. Two of these youths were\nengaged in animated debate upon some geometrical or astronomical\nproblem, in the presence of various spectators; and especially of two\nyoung men, rivals for the affection of one of them. Of these rivals,\nthe one is a person devoted to music, letters, discourse,\nphilosophy:--the other hates and despises these pursuits, devoting\nhimself to gymnastic exercise, and bent on acquiring the maximum of\nathletic force.[2] It is much the same contrast as that between the\nbrothers Amphion and Zethus in the Antiop\u00ea of Euripides--which is\nbeautifully employed as an illustration by Plato in the Gorgias.[3]\n\n[Footnote 1: Plato, Erast\u00e6, 132. [Greek: ei)s Dionusi/ou tou=\ngrammatistou= ei)s\u00ea=lthon, kai\\ ei)=don au)to/thi t\u00f4=n te ne/\u00f4n tou\\s\ne)pieikesta/tous dokou=ntas ei)=nai t\u00ea\\n i)de/an kai\\ pate/r\u00f4n\neu)doki/m\u00f4n kai\\ tou/t\u00f4n e)rasta/s.]]\n\n[Footnote 2: Plato, Erast. 132 E.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Plato, Gorgias, 485-486. Compare Cicero De Oratore, ii.\n37, 156.]\n\n[Side-note: Two rival Erast\u00e6--one of them literary, devoted to\nphilosophy--the other gymnastic, hating philosophy.]\n\nAs soon as Sokrates begins his interrogatories, the two youths\nrelinquish[4] their geometrical talk, and turn to him as attentive\nlisteners. Their approach affects his emotions hardly less than those\nof the Erastes. He first enquires from the athletic Erastes,\nWhat is it that these two youths are so intently engaged upon? It\nmust surely be something very fine, to judge by the eagerness which\nthey display? How do you mean _fine_ (replies the athlete)? They\nare only prosing about astronomical matters--talking\nnonsense--philosophising! The literary rival, on the contrary, treats this\nathlete as unworthy of attention, speaks with enthusiastic admiration\nof philosophy, and declares that all those to whom it is repugnant\nare degraded specimens of humanity.\n\n[Footnote 4: The powerful sentiment of admiration ascribed to\nSokrates in the presence of these beautiful youths deserves notice as\na point in his character. Compare the beginning of the Charmid\u00eas and\nthe Lysis.]\n\n[Side-note: Question put by Sokrates--What is philosophy? It is\nthe perpetual accumulation of knowledge, so as to make the largest\nsum total.]\n\n_Sokr._--You think philosophy a fine thing? But you cannot tell\nwhether it is fine or not, unless you know what it is.[5] Pray\nexplain to me what philosophy is. _Erast._--I will do so\nreadily. Philosophy consists in the perpetual growth of a man's\nknowledge--in his going on perpetually acquiring something new, both\nin youth and in old age, so that he may learn as much as possible\nduring life. Philosophy is polymathy.[6] _Sokr._--You think\nphilosophy not only a fine thing, but good? _Erast._--Yes--very\ngood. _Sokr._--But is the case similar in regard to gymnastic?\nIs a man's bodily condition benefited by taking as much exercise, or\nas much nourishment, as possible? Is such very great quantity good\nfor the body?[7]\n\n[Footnote 5: Plat. Erast. 133 A-B.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Plato, Erast. 133 D. [Greek: t\u00ea\\n\nphilosophi/an--poluma/theian.]]\n\n[Footnote 7: Plato, Erast. 133 E.]\n\n[Side-note: In the case of the body, it is not the maximum of\nexercise which does good, but the proper, measured quantity. For the\nmind also, it is not the maximum of knowledge, but the measured\nquantity which is good. Who is the judge to determine this measure?]\n\nIt appears after some debate (in which the other or athletic Erastes\nsides with Sokrates[8]) that in regard to exercise and food it is not\nthe great quantity or the small quantity, which is good for the body--but\nthe moderate or measured quantity.[9] For the mind, the case is\nadmitted to be similar. Not the _much_, nor the _little_,\nof learning is good for it but the right or measured amount.\n_Sokr._--And who is the competent judge, how much of either\nis right measure for the body? _Erast._--The physician and the\ngymnastic trainer. _Sokr._--Who is the competent judge, how much\nseed is right measure for sowing a field? _Erast._--The farmer.\n_Sokr._--Who is the competent judge, in reference to the sowing\nand planting of knowledge in the mind, which varieties are good, and\nhow much of each is right measure?\n\n[Footnote 8: Plat. Erast. 134 B-C. The literary Erastes says to\nSokrates, \"To _you_, I have no objection to concede this point,\nand to admit that my previous answer must be modified. But if I were\nto debate the point only with _him_ (the athletic rival), I\ncould perfectly well have defended my answer, and even worse answer\nstill, for _he_ is quite worthless ([Greek: ou)de\\n ga/r\ne)sti]).\"\n\nThis is a curious passage, illustrating the dialectic habits of the\nday, and the pride felt in maintaining an answer once given.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Plato, Erast\u00e6, 134 B-D. [Greek: ta\\ me/tria ma/lista\n\u00f4)phelei=n, a)lla\\ m\u00ea\\ ta\\ polla\\ m\u00eade\\ ta\\ o)li/ga.]]\n\n[Side-note: No answer given. What is the best conjecture?\nAnswer of the literary Erastes. A man must learn that which will\nyield to him the greatest reputation as a philosopher--as much as\nwill enable him to talk like an intelligent critic, though not to\npractise.]\n\nThe question is one which none of the persons present can answer.[10]\nNone of them can tell who is the special referee, about training of\nmind; corresponding to the physician or the farmer in the analogous\ncases. Sokrates then puts a question somewhat different:\n_Sokr._--Since we have agreed, that the man who prosecutes\nphilosophy ought not to learn many things, still less all\nthings--what is the best conjecture that we can make, respecting the\nmatters which he ought to learn? _Erast._--The finest and most suitable\nacquirements for him to aim at, are those which will yield to him the\ngreatest reputation as a philosopher. He ought to appear accomplished\nin every variety of science, or at least in all the more important;\nand with that view, to learn as much of each as becomes a freeman to\nknow:--that is, what belongs to the intelligent critic, as\ndistinguished from the manual operative: to the planning and\nsuperintending architect, as distinguished from the working\ncarpenter.[11] _Sokr._--But you cannot learn even two different\narts to this extent--much less several considerable arts.\n_Erast._--I do not of course mean that the philosopher can be\nsupposed to know each of them accurately, like the artist himself--but\nonly as much as may be expected from the free and cultivated\ncitizen. That is, he shall be able to appreciate, better than other\nhearers, the observations made by the artist: and farther to deliver\na reasonable opinion of his own, so as to be accounted, by all the\nhearers, more accomplished in the affairs of the art than\nthemselves.[12]\n\n[Footnote 10: Plato, Erast. 134 E, 135 A.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Plat. Erast. 135 B. [Greek: o(/sa xune/se\u00f4s e)/chetai,\nm\u00ea\\ o(/sa cheirourgi/as.]]\n\n[Footnote 12: Plat. Erast. 135 D.]\n\n[Side-note: The philosopher is one who is second-best in\nseveral different arts--a Pentathlus--who talks well upon each.]\n\n_Sokr._--You mean that the philosopher is to be second-best in\nseveral distinct pursuits: like the Pentathlus, who is not\nexpected to equal either the runner or the wrestler in their own\nseparate departments, but only to surpass competitors in the five\nmatches taken together.[13] _Erast._--Yes--I mean what you say.\nHe is one who does not enslave himself to any one matter, nor works\nout any one with such strictness as to neglect all others: he attends\nto all of them in reasonable measure.[14]\n\n[Footnote 13: Plat. Erast. 135 E, 136 A. [Greek: kai\\ ou(/t\u00f4s\ngi/gnesthai peri\\ pa/nta u(/pakro/n tina a)/ndra to\\n\npephilosoph\u00eako/ta.] The five matches were leaping, running, throwing\nthe quoit and the javelin, wrestling.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Plat. Erast. 136 B. [Greek: a)lla\\ pa/nt\u00f4n metri/\u00f4s\ne)ph\u00ea=phthai.]]\n\n[Side-note: On what occasions can such second-best men be\nuseful? There are always regular practitioners at hand, and no one\nwill call in the second-best man when he can have the regular\npractitioner.]\n\nUpon this answer Sokrates proceeds to cross-examine: _Sokr._--Do\nyou think that good men are useful, bad men useless? _Erast._--Yes\nI do. _Sokr._--You think that philosophers, as you describe\nthem, are useful? _Erast._--Certainly: extremely useful.\n_Sokr._--But tell me on what occasions such second-best men are\nuseful: for obviously they are inferior to each separate artist. If\nyou fall sick will you send for one of _them_, or for a\nprofessional physician? _Erast._--I should send for both.\n_Sokr._--That is no answer: I wish to know, which of the two you\nwill send for first and by preference? _Erast._--No doubt I\nshall send for the professional physician. _Sokr._--The like\nalso, if you are in danger on shipboard, you will entrust your life\nto the pilot rather than to the philosopher: and so as to all other\nmatters, as long as a professional man is to be found, the\nphilosopher is of no use? _Erast._--So it appears. _Sokr._--Our\nphilosopher then is one of the useless persons: for we assuredly\nhave professional men at hand. Now we agreed before, that good men\nwere useful, bad men useless.[15] _Erast._--Yes; that was\nagreed.\n\n[Footnote 15: Plat. Erast. 136 C-D.]\n\n[Side-note: Philosophy cannot consist in multiplication of\nlearned acquirements.]\n\n_Sokr._--If then you have correctly defined a philosopher to be\none who has a second-rate knowledge on many subjects, he is useless\nso long as there exist professional artists on each subject. Your\ndefinition cannot therefore be correct. Philosophy must be something\nquite apart from this multifarious and busy meddling with\ndifferent professional subjects, or this multiplication of\nlearned acquirements. Indeed I fancied, that to be absorbed in\nprofessional subjects and in variety of studies, was vulgar and\ndiscreditable rather than otherwise.[16]\n\n[Footnote 16: Plato, Erast. 137 B.]\n\nLet us now, however (continues Sokrates), take up the matter in\nanother way. In regard to horses and dogs, those who punish rightly\nare also those who know how to make them better, and to discriminate\nwith most exactness the good from the bad? _Erast._--Yes: such\nis the fact.\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates changes his course of\nexamination--questions put to show that there is one special art, regal\nand political, of administering and discriminating the bad from the\ngood.]\n\n_Sokr._--Is not the case similar with men? Is it not the same\nart, which punishes men rightly, makes them better, and best\ndistinguishes the good from the bad? whether applied to one, few, or\nmany? _Erast._--It is so.[17] _Sokr._--The art or science,\nwhereby men punish evil-doers rightly, is the judicial or justice:\nand it is by the same that they know the good apart from the bad,\neither one or many. If any man be a stranger to this art, so as not\nto know good men apart from bad, is he not also ignorant of himself,\nwhether he be a good or a bad man? _Erast._--Yes: he is.\n_Sokr._--To be ignorant of yourself, is to be wanting in\nsobriety or temperance; to know yourself is to be sober or temperate.\nBut this is the same art as that by which we punish rightly--or\njustice. Therefore justice and temperance are the same: and the\nDelphian rescript, _Know thyself_, does in fact enjoin the\npractice both of justice and of sobriety.[18] _Erast._--So it\nappears. _Sokr._--Now it is by this same art, when practised by\na king, rightly punishing evil-doers, that cities are well governed;\nit is by the same art practised by a private citizen or house-master,\nthat the house is well-governed: so that this art, justice or\nsobriety, is at the same time political, regal, economical; and the\njust and sober man is at once the true king, statesman,\nhouse-master.[19] _Erast._--I admit it.\n\n[Footnote 17: Plato, Erast. 137 C-D.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Plato, Erast. 138 A.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Plato, Erast. 138 C.]\n\n[Side-note: In this art the philosopher must not only be\nsecond-best, competent to talk--but he must be a fully qualified\npractitioner, competent to act.]\n\n_Sokr._--Now let me ask you. You said that it was discreditable\nfor the philosopher, when in company with a physician or any other\ncraftsman talking about matters of his own craft, not to be able to\nfollow what he said and comment upon it. Would it not also be\ndiscreditable to the philosopher, when listening to any king, judge,\nor house-master, about professional affairs, not to be able to\nunderstand and comment? _Erast._--Assuredly it would be most\ndiscreditable upon matters of such grave moment. _Sokr._--Shall\nwe say then, that upon these matters also, as well as all others, the\nphilosopher ought to be a Pentathlus or second-rate performer,\nuseless so long as the special craftsman is at hand? or shall we not\nrather affirm, that he must not confide his own house to any one\nelse, nor be the second-best within it, but must himself judge and\npunish rightly, if his house is to be well administered?\n_Erast._--That too I admit.[20] _Sokr._--Farther, if his\nfriends shall entrust to him the arbitration of their disputes,--if\nthe city shall command him to act as Dikast or to settle any\ndifficulty,--in those cases also it will be disgraceful for him to\nstand second or third, and not to be first-rate? _Erast._--I\nthink it will be. _Sokr._--You see then, my friend, philosophy\nis something very different from much learning and acquaintance with\nmultifarious arts or sciences.[21]\n\n[Footnote 20: Plato, Erast. 138 E. [Greek: Po/teron ou)=n kai\\ peri\\\ntau=ta le/g\u00f4men, pe/ntathlon au)to\\n dei=n ei)=nai kai\\ u(/pakron,\nta\\ deuterei=a e)/chonta pa/nt\u00f4n, to\\n philo/sophon, kai\\ a)chrei=on\nei)=nai, e(/\u00f4s a)\\n tou/t\u00f4n tis \u00ea)=|? \u00ea)\\ pr\u00f4=ton me\\n t\u00ea\\n au(tou=\noi)ki/an ou)k a)ll\u00f4| e)pitrepte/on ou)de ta\\ deuterei=a e)n tou/t\u00f4|\ne(kte/on, a)ll' au)to\\n kolaste/on dika/zonta o)rth\u00f4=s, ei) me/llei\neu)= oi)kei=sthai au)tou= \u00ea( oi)ki/a?]]\n\n[Footnote 21: Plato, Erast. 139 A. [Greek: Pollou= a)/ra dei= \u00ea(mi=n,\n\u00f4)= be/ltiste, to\\ philosophei=n poluma/theia/ te ei)=nai kai\\ \u00ea(\nperi\\ ta\\s te/chnas pragmatei/a.]]\n\n[Side-note: Close of the dialogue--humiliation of the literary\nErastes.]\n\nUpon my saying this (so Sokrates concludes his recital of the\nconversation) the literary one of the two rivals was ashamed and held\nhis peace; while the gymnastic rival declared that I was in the\nright, and the other hearers also commended what I had said.\n\n\n* * * * *\n\n\n[Side-note: Remarks--animated manner of the dialogue.]\n\nThe antithesis between the philo-gymnast, hater of philosophy,--and\nthe enthusiastic admirer of philosophy, who nevertheless cannot\nexplain what it is--gives much point and vivacity to this short\ndialogue. This last person is exhibited as somewhat presumptuous and\nconfident; thus affording a sort of excuse for the humiliating\ncross-examination put upon him by Sokrates to the satisfaction\nof his stupid rival. Moreover, the dramatic introduction is full of\nanimation, like that of the Charmid\u00eas and Lysis.\n\nBesides the animated style of the dialogue, the points raised for\ndiscussion in it are of much interest. The word philosophy has at all\ntimes been vague and ambiguous. Certainly no one before\nSokrates--probably no one before Plato--ever sought a definition of it.\nIn no other Platonic dialogue than this, is the definition of it made a\nspecial topic of research.\n\n[Side-note: Definition of philosophy--here sought for the\nfirst time--Platonic conception of measure--referee not discovered.]\n\nIt is here handled in Plato's negative, elenchtic, tentative, manner.\nBy some of his contemporaries, philosophy was really considered as\nequivalent to polymathy, or to much and varied knowledge: so at least\nPlato represents it as being considered by Hippias the Sophist,\ncontrary to the opinion of Protagoras.[22] The exception taken by\nSokrates to a definition founded on simple quantity, without any\nstandard point of sufficiency by which much or little is to be\nmeasured, introduces that governing idea of [Greek: to\\ me/trion]\n(the moderate, that which conforms to a standard measure) upon which\nPlato insists so much in other more elaborate dialogues. The\nconception of a measure, of a standard of measurement--and of\nconformity thereunto, as the main constituent of what is good and\ndesirable--stands prominent in his mind,[23] though it is not always\nhandled in the same way. We have seen it, in the Second Alkibiad\u00eas,\nindicated under another name as knowledge of Good or of the Best:\nwithout which, knowledge on special matters was declared to be\nhurtful rather than useful.[24] Plato considers that this Measure is\nneither discernible nor applicable except by a specially trained\nintelligence. In the Erast\u00e6 as elsewhere, such an intelligence is\ncalled for in general terms: but when it is asked, Where is the\nperson possessing such intelligence, available in the case of mental\ntraining--neither Sokrates nor any one else can point him out. To\nsuggest a question, and direct attention to it, yet still to\nleave it unanswered--is a practice familiar with Plato. In this\nrespect the Erast\u00e6 is like other dialogues. The answer, if any,\nintended to be understood or divined, is, that such an intelligence\nis the philosopher himself.\n\n[Footnote 22: Plato, Protag. 318 E. Compare too, the Platonic\ndialogues, Hippias Major and Minor.]\n\n[Footnote 23: See about [Greek: \u00ea( tou= metri/ou phu/sis] as [Greek:\nou)si/a]--as [Greek: o)/nt\u00f4s gigno/menon].--Plato, Politikus,\n283-284. Compare also the Phil\u00eabus, p. 64 D, and the Protagoras, pp.\n356-357, where [Greek: \u00ea( metr\u00eatik\u00ea\\ te/chn\u00ea] is declared to be the\nprincipal saviour of life and happiness.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Plato, Alkib. ii. 145-146; supra, ch. xii. p. 16.]\n\n[Side-note: View taken of the second-best critical talking\nman, as compared with the special proficient and practitioner.]\n\nThe second explanation of philosophy here given--that the philosopher\nis one who is second-best in many departments, and a good talker upon\nall, but inferior to the special master in each--was supposed by\nThrasyllus in ancient times to be pointed at Demokritus. By many\nPlatonic critics, it is referred to those persons whom they single\nout to be called Sophists. I conceive it to be applicable (whether\nintended or not) to the literary men generally of that age, the\npersons called Sophists included. That which Perikles expressed by\nthe word, when he claimed the love of wisdom and the love of beauty\nas characteristic features of the Athenian citizen--referred chiefly\nto the free and abundant discussion, the necessity felt by every one\nfor talking over every thing before it was done, yet accompanied with\nfull energy in action as soon as the resolution was taken to act.[25]\nSpeech, ready and pertinent, free conflict of opinion on many\ndifferent topics--was the manifestation and the measure of knowledge\nacquired. Sokrates passed his life in talking, with every one\nindiscriminately, and upon each man's particular subject; often\nperplexing the artist himself. Xenophon recounts conversations with\nvarious professional men--a painter, a sculptor, an armourer--and\ninforms us that it was instructive to all of them, though Sokrates\nwas no practitioner in any craft.[26] It was not merely Demokritus,\nbut Plato and Aristotle also, who talked or wrote upon almost every\nsubject included in contemporary observation. The voluminous works of\nAristotle,--the Tim\u00e6us, Republic, and Leges, of Plato,--embrace a\nlarge variety of subjects, on each of which, severally taken, these\ntwo great men were second-best or inferior to some special\nproficient. Yet both of them had judgments to give, which it was\nimportant to hear, upon all subjects:[27] and both of them could\nprobably talk better upon each than the special proficient himself.\nAristotle, for example, would write better upon rhetoric than\nDemosthenes--upon tragedy, than Sophokles. Undoubtedly, if an oration\nor a tragedy were to be composed--if resolution or action were\nrequired on any real state of particular circumstances--the special\nproficient would be called upon to act: but it would be a mistake to\ninfer from hence, as the Platonic Sokrates intimates in the Erast\u00e6,\nthat the second-best, or theorizing reasoner, was a useless man. The\ntheoretical and critical point of view, with the command of language\napt for explaining and defending it, has a value of its own; distinct\nfrom, yet ultimately modifying and improving, the practical. And such\ncomprehensive survey and comparison of numerous objects, without\nhaving the attention exclusively fastened or enslaved to any one of\nthem, deserves to rank high as a variety of intelligence whether it\nbe adopted as the definition of a philosopher, or not.\n\n[Footnote 25: Thucyd. ii. 39 fin.--40. [Greek: kai\\ e)/n te tou/tois\nt\u00ea\\n po/lin a)xi/an ei)=nai thauma/zesthai, kai\\ e)/ti e)n a)/llois.\nphilokalou=men ga\\r met' eu)telei/as kai\\ philosophou=men a)/neu\nmalaki/as], &c., and the remarkable sequel of the same chapter\nabout the intimate conjunction of abundant speech with energetic\naction in the Athenian character.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Xen. Mem. iii. 10; iii. 11; iii. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 27: The [Greek: pe/ntathlos] or [Greek: u(/pakros] whom\nPlato criticises in this dialogue, coincides with what Aristotle\ncalls \"the man of universal education or culture\".--Ethic. Nikom. I.\ni. 1095, a. 1. [Greek: e(/kastos de\\ kri/nei kal\u00f4=s a(\\ gign\u00f4/skei,\nkai\\ tou/t\u00f4n e)sti\\n a)gatho\\s krit\u00ea/s; kath' e(/kaston a)/ra, o(\npepaideume/nos; a(pl\u00f4=s de/, o( peri\\ pa=n pepaideume/nos.]]\n\n[Side-note: Plato's view--that the philosopher has a province\nspecial to himself, distinct from other specialties--dimly\nindicated--regal or political art.]\n\nPlato undoubtedly did not conceive the definition of the philosopher\nin the same way as Sokrates. The close of the Erast\u00e6 is employed in\nopening a distant and dim view of the Platonic conception. We are\ngiven to understand, that the philosopher has a province of his own,\nwherein he is not second-best, but a first-rate actor and adviser. To\nindicate, in many different ways, that there is or must be such a\npeculiar, appertaining to philosophy--distinct from, though analogous\nto, the peculiar of each several art--is one leading purpose in many\nPlatonic dialogues. But what is the peculiar of the philosopher?\nHere, as elsewhere, it is marked out in a sort of misty outline, not\nas by one who already knows and is familiar with it, but as one who\nis trying to find it without being sure that he has succeeded. Here,\nwe have it described as the art of discriminating good from evil,\ngoverning, and applying penal sanctions rightly. This is the supreme\nart or science, of which the philosopher is the professor; and\nin which, far from requiring advice from others, he is the only\nperson competent both to advise and to act: the art which exercises\ncontrol over all other special arts, directing how far, and on what\noccasions, each of them comes into appliance. It is philosophy,\nlooked at in one of its two aspects: not as a body of speculative\ntruth, to be debated, proved, and discriminated from what cannot be\nproved or can be disproved--but as a critical judgment bearing on\nactual life, prescribing rules or giving directions in particular\ncases, with a view to the attainment of foreknown ends, recognised as\n_expetenda_.[28] This is what Plato understands by the measuring\nor calculating art, the regal or political art, according as we use\nthe language of the Protagoras, Politikus, Euthyd\u00eamus, Republic. Both\njustice and sobriety are branches of this art; and the distinction\nbetween the two loses its importance when the art is considered as a\nwhole--as we find both in the Erast\u00e6 and in the Republic.[29]\n\n[Footnote 28: The difference between the second explanation of\nphilosophy and the third explanation, suggested in the Erast\u00e6, will\nbe found to coincide pretty nearly with the distinction which\nAristotle takes much pains to draw between [Greek: sophi/a] and\n[Greek: phro/n\u00easis].--Ethic. Nikomach. vi. 5, pp. 1140-1141; also\nEthic. Magn. i. pp. 1197-1198.]\n\n[Footnote 29: See Republic, iv. 433 A; Gorgias, 526 C; Charmid\u00eas 164\nB; and Heindorf's note on the passage in the Charmid\u00eas.]\n\n[Side-note: Philosopher--the supreme artist controlling other\nartists.]\n\nHere, in the Erast\u00e6, this conception of the philosopher as the\nsupreme artist controlling all other artists, is darkly indicated and\ncrudely sketched. We shall find the same conception more elaborately\nillustrated in other dialogues; yet never passing out of that state.\n\n\n* * * * *\n\n\nAPPENDIX.\n\nThis is one of the dialogues declared to be spurious by\nSchleiermacher, Ast, Socher, and Stallbaum, all of them critics of\nthe present century. In my judgment, their grounds for such\ndeclaration are altogether inconclusive. They think the dialogue an\ninferior composition, unworthy of Plato; and they accordingly find\nreasons, more or less ingenious, for relieving Plato from the\ndiscredit of it. I do not think so meanly of the dialogue as they do;\nbut even if I did, I should not pronounce it to be spurious, without\nsome evidence bearing upon that special question. No such evidence,\nof any value, is produced.\n\nIt is indeed contended, on the authority of a passage in Diogenes\n(ix. 37), that Thrasyllus himself doubted of the authenticity of the\nErast\u00e6. The passage is as follows, in his life of Demokritus--[Greek:\nei)/per oi( A)nterastai\\ Pla/t\u00f4no/s ei)si, ph\u00easi\\ Thra/sullos,\nou(=tos a)\\n ei)/\u00ea o( parageno/menos a)n\u00f4/numos, t\u00f4=n peri\\\nOi)nopi/d\u00ean kai\\ A)naxago/ran e(/teros, e)n t\u00ea=| pro\\s S\u00f4kra/t\u00ean\no(mili/a| dialego/menos peri\\ philosophi/as; \u00f4(=|, ph\u00easi/n, \u00f4(s\npenta/thl\u00f4| e)/oiken o( philo/sophos; kai\\ \u00ea)=n \u00f4(s a)l\u00eath\u00f4=s e)n\nphilosophi/a| pe/ntathlos] (Demokritus).\n\nNow in the first place, Schleiermacher and Stallbaum both declare\nthat Thrasyllus can never have said that which Diogenes here makes\nhim say (Schleierm. p. 510; Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad. Erast. p. 266,\nand not. p. 273).\n\nNext, it is certain that Thrasyllus did consider it the undoubted\nwork of Plato, for he enrolled it in his classification, as the third\ndialogue in the fourth tetralogy (Diog. L. iii. 59).\n\nYxem, who defends the genuineness of the Erast\u00e6 (Ueber Platon's\nKleitophon, pp. 6-7, Berlin, 1846), insists very properly on this\npoint; not merely as an important fact in itself, but as determining\nthe sense of the words [Greek: ei)/per oi( A)nterastai\\ Pla/t\u00f4no/s\nei)si], and as showing that the words rather affirm, than deny, the\nauthenticity of the dialogue. \"If the Anterast\u00e6 are the work of\nPlato, _as they are universally admitted to be_.\" You must\nsupply the parenthesis in this way, in order to make Thrasyllus\nconsistent with himself. Yxem cites a passage from Galen, in\nwhich [Greek: ei)/per] is used, and in which the parenthesis must be\nsupplied in the way indicated: no doubt at all being meant to be\nhinted. And I will produce another passage out of Diogenes himself,\nwhere [Greek: ei)/per] is used in the same way; not as intended to\nconvey the smallest doubt, but merely introducing the premiss for a\nconclusion immediately following. Diogenes says, respecting the\nPlatonic Ideas, [Greek: ei)/per e)sti\\ mn\u00ea/m\u00ea, ta\\s i)de/as e)n toi=s\nou)=sin u(pa/rchein] (iii. 15). He does not intend to suggest any\ndoubt whether there be such a fact as memory. [Greek: Ei)/per] is\nsometimes the equivalent of [Greek: e)peid\u00ea/per]: as we learn from\nHermann ad Viger. VIII. 6, p. 512.\n\nThere is therefore no fair ground for supposing that Thrasyllus\ndoubted the genuineness of the Erast\u00e6. And when I read what modern\ncritics say in support of their verdict of condemnation, I feel the\nmore authorised in dissenting from it. I will cite a passage or two\nfrom Stallbaum.\n\nStallbaum begins his Prolegomena as follows, pp. 205-206: \"Quanquam\nhic libellus genus dicendi habet purum, castum, elegans, nihil ut\ninveniri queat quod \u00e0 Platonis aut Xenophontis eleganti\u00e2,\nabhorreat--tamen quin \u00e0 Boeckhio, Schleiermachero, Astio, Sochero,\nKnebelio, aliis jure meritoque pro suppositicio habitus sit, haudquaquam\ndubitamus. Est enim materia operis adeo non ad Platonis mentem\nrationemque elaborata, ut potius cuivis alii Socraticorum quam huic\nrect\u00e8 adscribi posse videatur.\"\n\nAfter stating that the Erast\u00e6 may be divided into two principal\nsections, Stallbaum proceeds:--\"Neutra harum partium ita tractata\nest, ut nihil desideretur, quod ad justam argumenti explicationem\nmerito requiras--nihil inculcatum reperiatur, quod vel alio modo\nillustratum vel omnino omissum esse cupias\".\n\nI call attention to this sentence as a fair specimen of the grounds\nupon which the Platonic critics proceed when they strike dialogues\nout of the Platonic Canon. If there be anything wanting in it which\nis required for what they consider a proper setting forth of the\nargument--if there be anything which they would desire to see omitted\nor otherwise illustrated--this is with them a reason for deciding\nthat it is not Plato's work. That is, if there be any defects in it\nof any kind, it cannot be admitted as Plato's work;--_his genuine\nworks have no defects_. I protest altogether against this _ratio\ndecidendi_. If I acknowledged it and applied it consistently I\nshould strike out every dialogue in the Canon. Certainly, the\npresumption in favour of the Catalogue of Thrasyllus must be counted\nas _nil_, if it will not outweigh such feeble counter-arguments\nas these.\n\nOne reason given by Stallbaum for considering the Erast\u00e6 as\nspurious is, that the Sophists are not derided in it. \"Quis est\nigitur, qui Platonem sibi persuadeat illos non fuisse castigaturum,\net omnino non significaturum, quinam illi essent, adversus quos hanc\ndisputationem instituisset?\" It is strange to be called on by learned\nmen to strike out all dialogues from the Canon in which there is no\nderision of the Sophists. Such derision exists already in excess: we\nhear until we are tired how mean it is to receive money for\nlecturing. Again, Stallbaum says that the persons whose opinions are\nhere attacked are not specified by name. But who are the [Greek:\nei)d\u00f4=n phi/loi], attacked in the Sophist\u00eas? They are not specified\nby name, and critics differ as to the persons intended.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII.\n\nION.\n\n\n[Side-note: Ion. Persons of the dialogue. Difference of opinion\namong modern critics as to its genuineness.]\n\nThe dialogue called Ion is carried on between Sokrates and the\nEphesian rhapsode Ion. It is among those disallowed by Ast, first\nfaintly defended, afterwards disallowed, by Schleiermacher,[1] and\ntreated contemptuously by both. Subsequent critics, Hermann,[2]\nStallbaum, Steinhart, consider it as genuine, yet as an inferior\nproduction, of little worth, and belonging to Plato's earliest years.\n\n[Footnote 1: Schleiermacher, Einleit. zum Ion, p. 261-266; Ast, Leben\nund Schriften des Platon, p. 406.]\n\n[Footnote 2: K. F. Hermann, Gesch. und Syst. der Plat. Phil. pp.\n437-438; Steinhart, Einleitung, p. 15.]\n\n[Side-note: Rhapsodes as a class in Greece. They competed for\nprizes at the festivals. Ion has been triumphant.]\n\nI hold it to be genuine, and it may be comparatively early; but I see\nno ground for the disparaging criticism which has often been applied\nto it. The personage whom it introduces to us as subjected to the\ncross-examination of Sokrates is a rhapsode of celebrity; one among a\nclass of artists at that time both useful and esteemed. They recited\nor sang,[3] with appropriate accent and gesture, the compositions of\nHomer and of other epic poets: thus serving to the Grecian epic, the\nsame purpose as the actors served to the dramatic, and the\nharp-singers ([Greek: kithar\u00f4|doi\\]) to the lyric. There were various\nsolemn festivals such as that of \u00c6sculapius at Epidaurus, and (most\nespecially) the Panathen\u00e6a at Athens, where prizes were awarded for\nthe competition of the rhapsodes. Ion is described as having competed\ntriumphantly in the festival at Epidaurus, and carried off the first\nprize. He appeared there in a splendid costume, crowned with a\ngolden wreath, amidst a crowd which is described as containing more\nthan 20,000 persons.[4]\n\n[Footnote 3: The word [Greek: a)/|dein] is in this very dialogue (532\nD, 535 A) applied to the rhapsoding of Ion.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Plato, Ion, 535 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Functions of the Rhapsodes. Recitation--Exposition\nof the poets. Arbitrary exposition of the poets was then frequent.]\n\nMuch of the acquaintance of cultivated Greeks with Homer and the\nother epic poets was both acquired and maintained through such\nrhapsodes; the best of whom contended at the festivals, while others,\nless highly gifted as to vocal power and gesticulation, gave separate\ndeclamations and lectures of their own, and even private lessons to\nindividuals.[5] Euthyd\u00eamus, in one of the Xenophontic conversations\nwith Sokrates, and Antisthenes in the Xenophontic Symposion, are made\nto declare that the rhapsodes as a class were extremely silly. This,\nif true at all, can apply only to the expositions and comments with\nwhich they accompanied their recital of Homer and other poets.\nMoreover we cannot reasonably set it down (though some modern critics\ndo so) as so much incontestable truth: we must consider it as an\nopinion delivered by one of the speakers in the conversation, but not\nnecessarily well founded.[6] Unquestionably, the comments made upon\nHomer (both in that age and afterwards) were often fanciful and\nmisleading. Metrodorus, Anaxagoras, and others, resolved the Homeric\nnarrative into various allegories, physical, ethical, and\ntheological: and most men who had an opinion to defend, rejoiced to\nbe able to support or enforce it by some passages of Homer, well or\nill-explained--just as texts of the Bible are quoted in modern times.\nIn this manner, Homer was pressed into the service of every\ndisputant; and the Homeric poems were presented as containing, or at\nleast as implying, doctrines quite foreign to the age in which they\nwere composed.[7]\n\n[Footnote 5: Xen. Sympos. iii. 6. Nik\u00earatus says that he heard the\nrhapsodes nearly every day. He professes to be able to repeat both\nthe Iliad and the Odyssey from memory.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 10; Sympos. iii. 6; Plato, Ion, 530 E.\n\nSteinhart cites this judgment about the rhapsodes as if it had been\npronounced by the Xenophontic Sokrates himself, which is not the fact\n(Steinhart, Einleitung p. 3).]\n\n[Footnote 7: Diogenes Laert. ii. 11; Nitzsch, Die Heldensage des\nGriechen, pp. 74-78; Lobeck, Agloaphamus, p. 157.\n\nSeneca, Epistol. 88: \"modo Stoicum Homerum faciunt--modo Epicureum\n. . . modo Peripateticum, tria genera bonorum inducentem: modo\nAcademicum, incerta omnia dicentem. Apparet nihil horum esse in illo,\ncui omnia insunt: ista enim inter se dissident.\"]\n\n[Side-note: The popularity of the Rhapsodes was chiefly derived\nfrom their recitation. Powerful effect which they produced.]\n\nThe Rhapsodes, in so far as they interpreted Homer, were\nprobably not less disposed than others to discover in him their\nown fancies. But the character in which they acquired most\npopularity, was, not as expositors, but as reciters, of the poems.\nThe powerful emotion which, in the process of reciting, they both\nfelt themselves and communicated to their auditors, is declared in\nthis dialogue: \"When that which I recite is pathetic (says Ion), my\neyes are filled with tears: when it is awful or terrible, my hair\nstands on end, and my heart leaps. Moreover I see the spectators also\nweeping, sympathising with my emotions, and looking aghast at what\nthey hear.\"[8] This assertion of the vehement emotional effect\nproduced by the words of the poet as declaimed or sung by the\nrhapsode, deserves all the more credit--because Plato himself, far\nfrom looking upon it favourably, either derides or disapproves it.\nAccepting it as a matter of fact, we see that the influence of\nrhapsodes, among auditors generally, must have been derived more from\ntheir efficacy as actors than from their ability as expositors.\n\n[Footnote 8: Plato, Ion, 535 C-E.\n\nThe description here given is the more interesting because it is the\nonly intimation remaining of the strong effect produced by these\nrhapsodic representations.]\n\n[Side-note: Ion both reciter and expositor--Homer was\nconsidered more as an instructor than as a poet.]\n\nIon however is described in this dialogue as combining the two\nfunctions of reciter and expositor: a partnership like that of\nGarrick and Johnson, in regard to Shakspeare. It is in the last of\nthe two functions, that Sokrates here examines him: considering\nHomer, not as a poet appealing to the emotions of hearers, but as a\nteacher administering lessons and imparting instruction. Such was the\nview of Homer entertained by a large proportion of the Hellenic\nworld. In that capacity, his poems served as a theme for rhapsodes,\nas well as for various philosophers and Sophists who were not\nrhapsodes, nor accomplished reciters.\n\n[Side-note: Plato disregards and disapproves the poetic or\nemotional working.]\n\nThe reader must keep in mind, in following the questions put by\nSokrates, that this p\u00e6dagogic and edifying view of Homer is the only\none present to the men of the Sokratic school--and especially to\nPlato. Of the genuine functions of the gifted poet, who touches the\nchords of strong and diversified emotion--\"qui pectus inaniter\nangit, Irritat, mulcet, falsis terroribus implet\" (Horat. Epist. II.\n1, 212)--Plato takes no account: or rather, he declares open war\nagainst them, either as childish delusions[9], or as mischievous\nstimulants, tending to exalt the unruly elements of the mind, and to\noverthrow the sovereign authority of reason. We shall find farther\nmanifestations on this point in the Republic and Leges.\n\n[Footnote 9: The question of Sokrates (Ion, 535 D), about the emotion\nproduced in the hearers by the recital of Homer's poetry, bears out\nwhat is here asserted.]\n\n[Side-note: Ion devoted himself to Homer exclusively. Questions\nof Sokrates to him--How happens it that you cannot talk equally upon\nother poets? The poetic art is one.]\n\nIon professes to have devoted himself to the study of Homer\nexclusively, neglecting other poets: so that he can interpret the\nthoughts, and furnish reflections upon them, better than any other\nexpositor.[10] How does it happen (asked Sokrates) that you have so\nmuch to say about Homer, and nothing at all about other poets? Homer\nmay be the best of all poets: but he is still only one of those who\nexercise the poetic art, and he must necessarily talk about the same\nsubjects as other poets. Now the art of poetry is _One_\naltogether--like that of painting, sculpture, playing on the flute,\nplaying on the harp, rhapsodizing, &c.[11] Whoever is competent\nto judge and explain one artist,--what he has done well and what he\nhas done ill,--is competent also to judge any other artist in the\nsame profession.\n\n[Footnote 10: Plato, Ion, 536 E.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Plato, Ion, 531 A, 532 C-D. [Greek: poi\u00eatik\u00ea\\ pou/\ne)sti to\\ o(/lon. . . Ou)kou=n e)peida\\n la/b\u00ea| tis kai\\ a)/ll\u00ean\nte/chn\u00ean \u00ea(ntinou=n o(/l\u00ean, o( au)to\\s tro/pos t\u00ea=s ske/pse\u00f4/s e)sti\nperi\\ a(pas\u00f4=n t\u00f4=n techn\u00f4=n?] 533 A.]\n\nI cannot explain to you how it happens (replies Ion): I only know the\nfact incontestably--that when I talk about Homer, my thoughts flow\nabundantly, and every one tells me that my discourse is excellent.\nQuite the reverse, when I talk of any other poet.[12]\n\n[Footnote 12: Plato, Ion, 533 C.]\n\n[Side-note: Explanation given by Sokrates. Both the Rhapsode\nand the Poet work, not by art and system, but by divine inspiration.\nFine poets are bereft of their reason, and possessed by inspiration\nfrom some God.]\n\n_I_ can explain it (says Sokrates). Your talent in expounding\nHomer is not an art, acquired by system and method--otherwise it\nwould have been applicable to other poets besides. It is a special\ngift, imparted to you by divine power and inspiration. The like is\ntrue of the poet whom you expound. His genius does not spring from\nart, system, or method: it is a special gift emanating from the\ninspiration of the Muses.[13] A poet is a light, airy, holy, person,\nwho cannot compose verses at all so long as his reason remains within\nhim.[14] The Muses take away his reason, substituting in place of it\ntheir own divine inspiration and special impulse, either towards\nepic, dithyramb, encomiastic hymns, hyporchemata, &c., one or\nother of these. Each poet receives one of these special gifts, but is\nincompetent for any of the others: whereas, if their ability had been\nmethodical or artistic, it would have displayed itself in all of them\nalike. Like prophets, and deliverers of oracles, these poets have\ntheir reason taken away, and become servants of the Gods.[15] It is\nnot _they_ who, bereft of their reason, speak in such sublime\nstrains: it is the God who speaks to us, and speaks through them. You\nmay see this by Tynnichus of Chalkis; who composed his P\u00e6an, the\nfinest of all P\u00e6ans, which is in every one's mouth, telling us\nhimself, that it was the invention of the Muses--but who never\ncomposed anything else worth hearing. It is through this worthless\npoet that the God has sung the most sublime hymn:[16] for the express\npurpose of showing us that these fine compositions are not human\nperformances at all, but divine: and that the poet is only an\ninterpreter of the Gods, possessed by one or other of them, as the\ncase may be.\n\n[Footnote 13: Plato, Ion, 533 E--534 A. [Greek: pa/ntes ga\\r oi(/ te\nt\u00f4=n e)p\u00f4=n poi\u00eatai\\ oi( a)gathoi\\ ou)k e)k te/chn\u00eas a)ll' e)/ntheoi\no)/ntes kai\\ katecho/menoi pa/nta tau=ta ta\\ kala\\ le/gousi\npoi\u00ea/mata, kai\\ oi( melopoioi\\ oi( a)gathoi\\ \u00f4(sau/t\u00f4s; \u00f4(/sper oi(\nkorubantinti\u00f4=tes ou)k e)/mphrones o)/ntes o)rchou=ntai, ou(/t\u00f4 kai\\\noi(] melopoioi\\ ou)k e)/mphrones o)/ntes ta\\ kala\\ me/l\u00ea tau=ta\npoiou=sin], &c.]]\n\n[Footnote 14: Plato, Ion, 534 B. [Greek: kou=phon ga\\r chr\u00ea=ma\npoi\u00eat\u00ea/s e)sti kai\\ pt\u00eano\\n kai\\ i(ero/n, kai\\ ou) pro/teron oi(=o/s\nte poiei=n pri\\n a)\\n e)/ntheo/s te ge/n\u00eatai kai\\ e)/kphr\u00f4n kai\\ o(\nnou=s m\u00eake/ti e)n au)t\u00f4=| e)n\u00ea=|; e(/\u00f4s d' a)\\n touti\\ e)/ch\u00ea| to\\\nkt\u00ea=ma, a)du/natos pa=s poiei=n e)stin a)/nthr\u00f4pos kai\\\nchr\u00easm\u00f4|dei=n.]]\n\n[Footnote 15: Plato. Ion, 534 C-D. [Greek: dia\\ tau=ta de\\ o( theo\\s\ne)xairou/menos tou/t\u00f4n to\\n nou=n tou/tois chr\u00ea=tai u(p\u00eare/tais kai\\\ntoi=s chr\u00easm\u00f4|doi=s kai\\ toi=s ma/ntesi toi=s thei/ois, i(/na \u00ea(mei=s\noi( a)kou/ontes ei)d\u00f4=men, o(/ti ou)ch ou(=toi/ ei)sin oi( tau=ta\nle/gontes ou(/t\u00f4 pollou= a)/xia, a)ll' o( theo\\s au)to/s e)stin o(\nle/g\u00f4n, dia\\ tou/t\u00f4n de\\ phthe/ggetai pro\\s \u00ea(ma=s.]]\n\n[Footnote 16: Plato, Ion. 534 E. [Greek: tau=ta e)ndeiknu/menos o(\ntheo\\s e)xepi/t\u00eades dia\\ tou= phaulota/tou poi\u00eatou= to\\ ka/lliston\nme/los \u00ea)=|sen.]]\n\n[Side-note: Analogy of the Magnet, which holds up by attraction\nsuccessive stages of iron rings. The Gods first inspire Homer, then\nact through him and through Ion upon the auditors.]\n\nHomer is thus (continues Sokrates) not a man of art or reason, but\nthe interpreter of the Gods; deprived of his reason, but possessed,\ninspired, by them. You, Ion, are the interpreter of Homer: and the\ndivine inspiration, carrying away your reason, is exercised over you\nthrough him. It is in this way that the influence of the Magnet\nis shown, attracting and holding up successive stages of iron\nrings.[17] The first ring is in contact with the Magnet itself: the\nsecond is suspended to the first, the third to the second, and so on.\nThe attractive influence of the Magnet is thus transmitted through a\nsuccession of different rings, so as to keep suspended several which\nare a good way removed from itself. So the influence of the Gods is\nexerted directly and immediately upon Homer: through him, it passes\nby a second stage to you: through him and you, it passes by a third\nstage to those auditors whom you so powerfully affect and delight,\nbecoming however comparatively enfeebled at each stage of transition.\n\n[Footnote 17: Plato, Ion, 533 D-E.]\n\n[Side-note: This comparison forms the central point of the\ndialogue. It is an expansion of a judgment delivered by Sokrates in\nthe Apology.]\n\nThe passage and comparison here given by Sokrates--remarkable as an\nearly description of the working of the Magnet--forms the central\npoint or kernel of the dialogue called Ion. It is an expansion of a\njudgment delivered by Sokrates himself in his Apology to the Dikasts,\nand it is repeated in more than one place by Plato.[18] Sokrates\ndeclares in his Apology that he had applied his testing\ncross-examination to several excellent poets; and that finding them\nunable to give any rational account of their own compositions, he\nconcluded that they composed without any wisdom of their own, under\nthe same inspiration as prophets and declarers of oracles. In the\ndialogue before us, this thought is strikingly illustrated and\namplified.\n\n[Footnote 18: Plato, Apol. Sokr. p. 22 D; Plato, Menon, p. 99 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Platonic Antithesis: systematic procedure\ndistinguished from unsystematic: which latter was either blind\nroutine, or madness inspired by the Gods. Varieties of madness, good\nand bad.]\n\nThe contrast between systematic, professional, procedure,\ndeliberately taught and consciously acquired, capable of being\ndefended at every step by appeal to intelligible rules founded upon\nscientific theory, and enabling the person so qualified to impart his\nqualification to others--and a different procedure purely impulsive\nand unthinking, whereby the agent, having in his mind a conception of\nthe end aimed at, proceeds from one intermediate step to another,\nwithout knowing why he does so or how he has come to do so, and\nwithout being able to explain his practice if questioned or to\nimpart it to others--this contrast is a favourite one with Plato. The\nlast-mentioned procedure--the unphilosophical or irrational--he\nconceives under different aspects: sometimes as a blind routine or\ninsensibly acquired habit,[19] sometimes as a stimulus applied from\nwithout by some God, superseding the reason of the individual. Such a\ncondition Plato calls _madness_, and he considers those under it\nas persons out of their senses. But he recognises different varieties\nof madness, according to the God from whom it came: the bad madness\nwas a disastrous visitation and distemper--the good madness was a\nprivilege and blessing, an inspiration superior to human reason.\nAmong these privileged madmen he reckoned prophets and poets; another\nvariety under the same genus, is, that mental love, between a\nwell-trained adult, and a beautiful, intelligent, youth, which he\nregards as the most exalted of all human emotions.[20] In the Ion,\nthis idea of a privileged madness--inspiration from the Gods superseding\nreason--is applied not only to the poet, but also to the rhapsode who\nrecites the poem, and even to the auditors whom he addresses. The\npoet receives the inspiration directly from the Gods: he inoculates\nthe rhapsode with it, who again inoculates the auditors--the fervour\nis, at each successive communication, diminished. The auditor\nrepresents the last of the rings; held in suspension, through the\nintermediate agency of other rings, by the inherent force of the\nmagnet.[21]\n\n[Footnote 19: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, 82 A; Gorgias, 463 A, 486 A.]\n\n[Footnote 20: This doctrine is set forth at length by Sokrates in the\nPlatonic Ph\u00e6drus, in the second discourse of Sokrates about Eros, pp.\n244-245-249 D.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Plato, Ion, 535 E. [Greek: ou(=to/s e)stin o( theat\u00ea\\s\nt\u00f4=n daktuli/\u00f4n o( e)/schatos . . . . o( de\\ me/sos su\\ o( r(aps\u00f4|do\\s\nkai\\ u(pokrit\u00ea\\s, o( de\\ pr\u00f4=tos, au)to\\s o( poi\u00eat\u00ea/s.]]\n\n[Side-note: Special inspiration from the Gods was a familiar\nfact in Grecian life. Privileged communications from the Gods to\nSokrates--his firm belief in them.]\n\nWe must remember, that privileged communications from the Gods to\nmen, and special persons recipient thereof, were acknowledged and\nwitnessed everywhere as a constant phenomenon of Grecian life. There\nwere not only numerous oracular temples, which every one could visit\nto ask questions in matters of doubt--but also favoured persons who\nhad received from the Gods the gift of predicting the future, of\ninterpreting omens, of determining the good or bad indications\nfurnished by animals sacrificed.[22] In every town or village--or\nwherever any body of men were assembled--there were always persons\nwho prophesied or delivered oracles, and to whom special revelations\nwere believed to be vouchsafed, during periods of anxiety. No one was\nmore familiar with this fact than the Sokratic disciples: for\nSokrates himself had perhaps a greater number of special\ncommunications from the Gods than any man of his age: his divine sign\nhaving begun when he was a child, and continuing to move him\nfrequently, even upon small matters, until his death: though the\nrevelations were for the most part negative, not affirmative--telling\nhim often what was not to be done--seldom what was to be\ndone--resembling in this respect his own dialogues with other persons.\nMoreover Sokrates inculcated upon his friends emphatically, that they\nought to have constant recourse to prophecy: that none but impious\nmen neglected to do so: that the benevolence of the Gods was nowhere\nmore conspicuous than in their furnishing such special revelations\nand warnings, to persons whom they favoured: that the Gods\nadministered the affairs of the world partly upon principles of\nregular sequence, so that men by diligent study might learn what they\nwere to expect,--but partly also, and by design, in a manner\nirregular and undecypherable, such that it could not be fathomed by\nany human study, and could not be understood except through direct\nand special revelation from themselves.[23]\n\n[Footnote 22: Not only the [Greek: chr\u00easmolo/goi, ma/nteis] oracular\ntemples, &c., are often mentioned in Herodotus, Thucydides,\nXenophon, &c., but Aristotle also recognises [Greek: oi(\nnumpho/l\u00eaptoi kai\\ theo/l\u00eaptoi t\u00f4=n a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n, e)pipnoi/a|\ndaimoni/ou tino\\s \u00f4(/sper e)nthousia/zontes], as a real and known\nclass of persons. See Ethic. Eudem. i. p. 1214, a. 23; Ethic. Magna,\nii. p. 1207, b. 8.\n\nThe [Greek: ma/ntis] is a recognised profession, the gift of Apollo,\nnot merely according to Homer, but according to Solon (Frag. xi. 52,\nSchn.):\n\n[Greek: A)/llon ma/ntin e)/th\u00eaken a)/nax e(ka/ergos A)po/ll\u00f4n,\ne)/gn\u00f4 d' a)ndri\\ kako\\n t\u00ealo/then e)rcho/menon], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 23: These views of Sokrates are declared in the Memorabilia\nof Xenophon, i. 1, 6-10; i. 4, 2-18; iv. 3, 12.\n\nIt is plain from Xenophon (Mem. i. 1, 3) that many persons were\noffended with Sokrates because they believed,--or at least because he\naffirmed--that he received more numerous and special revelations from\nthe Gods than any one else.]\n\n[Side-note: Condition of the inspired person--his reason is\nfor the time withdrawn.]\n\nHere, as well as elsewhere, Plato places inspiration, both of the\nprophet and the poet, in marked contrast with reason and\nintelligence. Reason is supposed to be for the time withdrawn or\nabolished, and inspiration is introduced by the Gods into its\nplace. \"When Monarch Reason sleeps, this mimic wakes.\" The person\ninspired (prophet or poet) becomes for the time the organ of an\nextraneous agency, speaking what he neither originates nor\nunderstands. The genuine gift of prophecy[24] (Plato says) attaches\nonly to a disabled, enfeebled, distempered, condition of the\nintelligence; the gift of poetry is conferred by the Gods upon the\nmost inferior men, as we see by the case of Tynnichus--whose sublime\np\u00e6an shows us, that it is the Gods alone who utter fine poetry\nthrough the organs of a person himself thoroughly incompetent.\n\n[Footnote 24: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, 71 E. [Greek: i(kano\\n de\\ s\u00eamei=on \u00f4(s\nmantik\u00ea\\n a)phrosu/n\u00ea| theo\\s a)nthr\u00f4pi/n\u00ea| de/d\u00f4ken; ou)dei\\s ga\\r\ne)/nnous e)pha/ptetai mantik\u00ea=s e)nthe/ou kai\\ a)l\u00eathou=s, a)ll' \u00ea)\\\nkath' u(/pnon t\u00ea\\n t\u00ea=s phron\u00ea/se\u00f4s ped\u00eathei\\s du/namin, \u00ea)\\ dia\\\nno/son \u00ea)/ tina e)nthousiasmo\\n paralla/xas.]\n\nCompare Plato, Menon, pp. 99-100. [Greek: oi( chr\u00easm\u00f4|doi/ te kai\\\noi( theoma/nteis . . . . le/gousi me\\n a)l\u00eath\u00ea= kai\\ polla\\ i)/sasi de\\\nou)de\\n \u00f4(=n le/gousi.] Compare Plato, Legg. iv. 719.]\n\n[Side-note: Ion does not admit himself to be inspired and out\nof his mind.]\n\nIt is thus that Plato, setting before himself a process of\nsystematised reason,--originating in a superior intellect, laying\ndown universal principles and deducing consequences from\nthem--capable of being consistently applied, designedly taught, and\ndefended against objections--enumerates the various mental conditions\nopposed to it, and ranks inspiration as one of them. In this\ndialogue, Sokrates seeks to prove that the success of Ion as a\nrhapsode depends upon his being out of his mind or inspired. But Ion\ndoes not accept the compliment: _Ion._--You speak well,\nSokrates; but I should be surprised if you spoke well enough to\ncreate in me the new conviction, that I am possessed and mad when I\neulogize Homer. I do not think that you would even yourself say so,\nif you heard me discourse on the subject.[25]\n\n[Footnote 25: Plato, Ion, 536 E.]\n\n[Side-note: Homer talks upon all subjects--Is Ion competent to\nexplain what Homer says upon all of them? Rhapsodic art. What is its\nprovince?]\n\n_Sokr._--But Homer talks upon all subjects. Upon which of them\ncan you discourse? _Ion._--Upon all. _Sokr._--Not surely on\nsuch as belong to special arts, professions. Each portion of the\nmatter of knowledge is included under some special art, and is known\nthrough that art by those who possess it. Thus, you and I, both of\nus, know the number of our fingers; we know it through the same art,\nwhich both of us possess--the arithmetical. But Homer talks of\nmatters belonging to many different arts or occupations, that of\nthe physician, the charioteer, the fisherman, &c. You cannot know\nthese; since you do not belong to any of these professions, but are a\nrhapsode. Describe to me what are the matters included in the\nrhapsodic art. The rhapsodic art is one art by itself, distinct from\nthe medical and others: it cannot know every thing; tell me what\nmatters come under its special province.[26] _Ion._--The\nrhapsodic art does not know what belongs to any one of the other\nspecial arts: but that of which it takes cognizance, and that which I\nknow, is, what is becoming and suitable to each variety of character\ndescribed by Homer: to a man or woman--to a freeman or slave--to the\ncommander who gives orders or to the subordinate who obeys them,\n&c. This is what belongs to the peculiar province of the rhapsode\nto appreciate and understand.[27] _Sokr._--Will the rhapsode\nknow what is suitable for the commander of a ship to say to his\nseamen, during a dangerous storm, better than the pilot? Will the\nrhapsode know what is suitable for one who gives directions about the\ntreatment of a sick man, better than the physician? Will the rhapsode\nknow what is suitable to be said by the herdsman when the cattle are\nsavage and distracted, or to the female slaves when busy in spinning?\n_Ion._--No: the rhapsode will not know these things so well as\nthe pilot, the physician, the grazier, the mistress, &c.[28]\n_Sokr._--Will the rhapsode know what is suitable for the\nmilitary commander to say, when he is exhorting his soldiers?\n_Ion._--Yes: the rhapsode will know this well: at least I know\nit well.\n\n[Footnote 26: Plato, Ion, 538-539.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Plato, Ion, 540 A. [Greek: a)\\ t\u00f4=| r(aps\u00f4|d\u00f4=|\npros\u00ea/kei kai\\ skopei=sthai kai\\ diakri/nein para\\ tou\\s a)/llous\na)nthr\u00f4/pous], 539 E.]\n\n[Footnote 28: Plato, Ion, 540 B-C.]\n\n[Side-note: The Rhapsode does not know special matters, such\nas the craft of the pilot, physician, farmer, &c., but he knows\nthe business of the general, and is competent to command soldiers,\nhaving learnt it from Homer.]\n\n_Sokr._--Perhaps, Ion, you are not merely a rhapsode, but\npossess also the competence for being a general. If you know matters\nbelonging to military command, do you know them in your capacity of\ngeneral, or in your capacity of rhapsode? _Ion._--I think there\nis no difference. _Sokr._--How say you? Do you affirm that the\nrhapsodic art, and the strategic art, are one? _Ion._--I think\nthey are one. _Sokr._--Then whosoever is a good rhapsode, is\nalso a good general? _Ion._--Unquestionably. _Sokr._--And\nof course, whoever is a good general, is also a good rhapsode?\n_Ion._--No: I do not think that. _Sokr._--But you do\nmaintain, that whosoever is a good rhapsode, is also a good general?\n_Ion._--Decidedly. _Sokr._--You are yourself the best\nrhapsode in Greece? _Ion._--By far. _Sokr._--Are you then\nalso the best general in Greece? _Ion._--Certainly I am,\nSokrates: and that too, by having learnt it from Homer.[29]\n\n[Footnote 29: Plato, Ion, 540 D--541 B.]\n\nAfter putting a question or two, not very forcible, to ask how it\nhappens that Ion, being an excellent general, does not obtain a\nmilitary appointment from Athens, Sparta, or some other city,\nSokrates winds up the dialogue as follows:--\n\n[Side-note: Conclusion. Ion expounds Homer, not with any\nknowledge of what he says, but by divine inspiration.]\n\nWell, Ion, if it be really true that you possess a rational and\nintelligent competence to illustrate the beauties of Homer, you wrong\nand deceive me, because after promising to deliver to me a fine\ndiscourse about Homer, you will not even comply with my preliminary\nentreaty--that you will first tell me what those matters are, on\nwhich your superiority bears. You twist every way like Proteus, until\nat last you slip through my fingers and appear as a general. If your\npowers of expounding Homer depend on art and intelligence, you are a\nwrong-doer and deceiver, for not fulfilling** your promise to me. But\nyou are not chargeable with wrong, if the fact be as I say; that is,\nif you know nothing about Homer, but are only able to discourse upon\nhim finely and abundantly, through a divine inspiration with which\nyou are possessed by him. Choose whether you wish me to regard you as\na promise-breaker, or as a divine man. _Ion._--I choose the\nlast: it is much better to be regarded as a divine man.[30]\n\n[Footnote 30: Plato, Ion, 541 E--542 A. [Greek: ei) me\\n a)l\u00eath\u00ea/\nle/geis, \u00f4(s te/chn\u00ea| kai\\ e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea| oi(=o/s te ei)= O(/m\u00earou\ne)painei=n, a)dikei=s . . . ei) de\\ m\u00ea\\ techniko\\s ei)=, a)lla\\\nthei/a| moi/ra| katecho/menos e)x O(m\u00ea/rou m\u00eade\\n ei)d\u00f4\\s polla\\ kai\\\nkala\\ le/geis peri\\ tou= poi\u00eatou=, \u00f4(/sper e)g\u00f4\\ ei)=pon peri\\ sou=,\nou)de\\n a)dikei=s; e(lou= ou)=n, po/tera bou/lei nomi/zesthai u(ph'\n\u00ea(m\u00f4=n a)/dikos a)n\u00ea\\r ei)=nai \u00ea)\\ thei=os.]]\n\n\n* * * * *\n\n\n[Side-note: The generals in Greece usually possessed no\nprofessional experience--Homer and the poets were talked of as the\ngreat teachers--Plato's view of the poet, as pretending to know\neverything, but really knowing nothing.]\n\nIt seems strange to read such language put into Ion's mouth (we are\nnot warranted in regarding it as what any rhapsode ever did say), as\nthe affirmation--that every good rhapsode was also a good general,\nand that he had become the best of generals simply through\ncomplete acquaintance with Homer. But this is only a caricature of a\nsentiment largely prevalent at Athens, according to which the works\nof the poets, especially the Homeric poems, were supposed to be a\nmine of varied instruction, and were taught as such to youth.[31] In\nGreece, the general was not often required (except at Sparta, and not\nalways even there) to possess professional experience.[32] Sokrates,\nin one of the Xenophontic conversations, tries to persuade\nNikomachides, a practised soldier (who had failed in getting himself\nelected general, because a successful Chor\u00eagus had been preferred to\nhim), how much the qualities of an effective Chor\u00eagus coincided with\nthose of an effective general.[33] The poet Sophokles was named by\nthe Athenians one of the generals of the very important armament for\nreconquering Samos: though Perikles, one of his colleagues, as well\nas his contemporary declared that he was an excellent poet, but knew\nnothing of generalship.[34] Plato frequently seeks to make it evident\nhow little the qualities required for governing numbers, either civil\nor military, were made matter of professional study or special\nteaching. The picture of Homer conveyed in the tenth book of the\nPlatonic Republic is, that of a man who pretends to know\neverything, but really knows nothing: an imitative artist,\nremoved by two stages from truth and reality,--who gives the shadows\nof shadows, resembling only enough to satisfy an ignorant crowd. This\nis the picture there presented of poets generally, and of Homer as\nthe best among them. The rhapsode Ion is here brought under the same\ncategory as the poet Homer, whom he has by heart and recites. The\nwhole field of knowledge is assumed to be distributed among various\nspecialties, not one of which either of the two can claim.\nAccordingly, both of them under the mask of universal knowledge,\nconceal the reality of universal ignorance.\n\n[Footnote 31: Aristophan. Ran\u00e6, 1032.\n\n [Greek: O)rpheu\\s me\\n ga\\r teleta/s th' \u00ea(mi=n kate/deixe pho/n\u00f4n\nt' a)pe/chesthai\nMousai=os d' e)xake/seis te no/s\u00f4n kai\\ chr\u00easmou/s, \u00ca(si/odos de\\\nG\u00ea=s e)rgasi/as, karp\u00f4=n \u00f4(/ras, a)ro/tous; o( de\\ thei=os O(/m\u00earos\nA)po\\ tou= tim\u00ea\\n kai\\ kle/os e)/schein, pl\u00ea\\n tou=d', o(/ti chr\u00ea/st'\ne)di/daxe.\nTa/xeis, a)reta/s, o(pli/seis a)ndr\u00f4=n? . . . .\nA)ll' a)/llous toi pollou\\s a)gathou\\s (e)di/daxen), \u00f4(=n \u00ea)=n kai\\\nLa/machos \u00ea(/r\u00f4s.]\n\nSee these views combated by Plato, Republ. x. 599-600-606 E.\n\nThe exaggerated pretension here ascribed to Ion makes him look\ncontemptible--like the sentiment ascribed to him, 535 E, \"If I make\nthe auditors weep, I myself shall laugh and pocket money,\" &c.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Xenoph. Memor. iii. 5, 21, in the conversation between\nthe younger Perikles and Sokrates--[Greek: t\u00f4=n de\\ strat\u00eag\u00f4=n oi(\nplei=stoi au)toschedia/zousin.] Also iii. 5, 24.\n\nCompare, respecting the generals, the striking lines of Euripides,\nAndrom. 698, and the encomium of Cicero (Academ. Prior. 2, 1)\nrespecting the quickness and facility with which Lucullus made\nhimself an excellent general.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Xen. Mem. iii. 4, especially iii. 4, 6, where\nNikomachides asks with surprise, [Greek: le/geis su/, \u00f4)= S\u00f4/krates,\n\u00f4(s tou= au)tou= a)ndro/s e)sti chor\u00eagei=n te kal\u00f4=s kai\\\nstrat\u00eagei=n?]]\n\n[Footnote 34: See the very curious extract from the contemporary Ion\nof Chios, in Athen\u00e6us, xiii. 604. Aristophanes of Byzantium says that\nthe appointment of Sophokles to this military function arose from the\nextra-ordinary popularity of his tragedy Antigon\u00ea, exhibited a little\ntime before. See Boeckh's valuable 'Dissertation on the Antigon\u00ea,'\nappended to his edition thereof, pp. 121-124.]\n\n[Side-note: Knowledge, opposed to divine inspiration without\nknowledge.]\n\nIon is willing enough (as he promises) to exhibit before Sokrates one\nof his eloquent discourses upon Homer. But Sokrates never permits him\nto arrive at it: arresting him always by preliminary questions, and\nrequiring him to furnish an intelligible description of the matter\nwhich his discourse is intended to embrace, and thus to distinguish\nit from other matters left untouched. A man who cannot comply with\nthis requisition,--who cannot (to repeat what I said in a previous\nchapter) stand a Sokratic cross-examination on the subject--possesses\nno rational intelligence of his own proceedings: no art, science,\nknowledge, system, or method. If as a practitioner he executes well\nwhat he promises (which is often the case), and attains success--he\ndoes so either by blind imitation of some master, or else under the\nstimulus and guidance of some agency foreign to himself--of the Gods\nor Fortune.\n\nThis is the Platonic point of view; developed in several different\nways and different dialogues, but hardly anywhere more conspicuously\nthan in the Ion.\n\n[Side-note: Illustration of Plato's opinion respecting the\nuselessness of written geometrical treatises.]\n\nI have observed that in this dialogue, Ion is anxious to embark on\nhis eloquent expository discourse, but Sokrates will not allow him to\nbegin: requiring as a preliminary stage that certain preliminary\ndifficulties shall first be cleared up. Here we have an illustration\nof Plato's doctrine, to which I adverted in a former chapter,[35]--that\nno written geometrical treatise could impart a knowledge of\ngeometry to one ignorant thereof. The geometrical writer begins by\nlaying down a string of definitions and axioms; and then strikes out\nboldly in demonstrating his theorems. But Plato would refuse him the\nliberty of striking out, until he should have cleared up the\npreliminary difficulties about the definitions and axioms themselves.\nThis the geometrical treatise does not even attempt.[36]\n\n[Footnote 35: Chap. viii. p. 353.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Compare Plato, Republic, vi. 510 C; vii. 538 C-D.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVIII.\n\nLACHES.\n\n\nThe main substance of this dialogue consists of a discussion, carried\non by Sokrates with Nikias and Lach\u00eas, respecting Courage. Each of\nthe two latter proposes an explanation of Courage: Sokrat\u00eas\ncriticises both of them, and reduces each to a confessed\ncontradiction.\n\n[Side-note: Lach\u00eas. Subject and persons of the dialogue,\nWhether it is useful that two young men should receive lessons from a\nmaster of arms. Nikias and Lach\u00eas differ in opinion.]\n\nThe discussion is invited, or at least dramatically introduced, by\ntwo elderly men--Lysimachus, son of Aristeides the Just,--and\nMel\u00easias, son of Thucydides the rival of Perikles. Lysimachus and\nMel\u00easias, confessing with shame that they are inferior to their\nfathers, because their education has been neglected, wish to guard\nagainst the same misfortune in the case of their own sons: respecting\nthe education of whom, they ask the advice of Nikias and Lach\u00eas. The\nquestion turns especially upon the propriety of causing their sons to\nreceive lessons from a master of arms just then in vogue. Nikias and\nLach\u00eas, both of them not merely distinguished citizens but also\ncommanders of Athenian armies, are assumed to be well qualified to\ngive advice. Accordingly they deliver their opinions: Nikias\napproving such lessons as beneficial, in exalting the courage of a\nyoung man, and rendering him effective on the field of battle: while\nLach\u00eas takes an opposite view, disparages the masters of arms as\nbeing no soldiers, and adds that they are despised by the\nLaced\u00e6monians, to whose authority on military matters general\ndeference was paid in Greece.[1] Sokrat\u00eas,--commended greatly by\nNikias for his acuteness and sagacity, by Lach\u00eas for his courage\nin the battle of Delium,--is invited to take part in the\nconsultation. Being younger than both, he waits till they have\ndelivered their opinions, and is then called upon to declare with\nwhich of the two his own judgment will concur.[2]\n\n[Footnote 1: Plato, Lach\u00eas, 182-183.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Plato, Lach\u00eas, 184 D.\n\nNikias is made to say that Sokrates has recently recommended to him\nDamon, as a teacher of [Greek: mousik\u00ea\\] to his sons, and that Damon\nhad proved an admirable teacher as well as companion (180 D). Damon\nis mentioned by Plato generally with much eulogy.]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates is invited to declare his opinion. He\nreplies that the point cannot be decided without a competent\nprofessional judge.]\n\n_Sokr._--The question must not be determined by a plurality of\nvotes, but by superiority of knowledge.[3] If we were debating about\nthe proper gymnastic discipline for these young men, we should\nconsult a known artist or professional trainer, or at least some one\nwho had gone through a course of teaching and practice under the\ntrainer. The first thing to be enquired therefore is, whether, in\nreference to the point now under discussion, there be any one of us\nprofessionally or technically competent, who has studied under good\nmasters, and has proved his own competence as a master by producing\nwell-trained pupils. The next thing is, to understand clearly what it\nis, with reference to which such competence is required.[4]\n_Nikias._--Surely the point before us is, whether it be wise to\nput these young men under the lessons of the master of arms? That is\nwhat we want to know. _Sokr._--Doubtless it is: but that is only\none particular branch of a wider and more comprehensive enquiry. When\nyou are considering whether a particular ointment is good for your\neyes, it is your eyes, and their general benefit, which form the\nsubject of investigation--not the ointment simply. The person to\nassist you will be, he who understands professionally the general\ntreatment of the eyes. So in this case, you are enquiring whether\nlessons in arms will be improving for the minds and character of your\nsons. Look out therefore for some one who is professionally\ncompetent, from having studied under good masters, in regard to the\ngeneral treatment of the mind.[5] _Lach\u00eas._--But there are\nvarious persons who, without ever having studied under masters,\npossess greater technical competence than others who have so\nstudied. _Sokr._--There are such persons: but you will never\nbelieve it upon their own assurance, unless they can show you some\ngood special work actually performed by themselves.\n\n[Footnote 3: Plato, Lach\u00eas, 184 E. [Greek: e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea| dei=\nkri/nesthai a)ll' ou) pl\u00ea/thei to\\ me/llon kal\u00f4=s krith\u00ea/sesthai.]]\n\n[Footnote 4: Plato, Lach\u00eas, 185 C.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Plato, Lach\u00eas, 185 E. [Greek: ei)/ tis \u00ea(m\u00f4=n techniko\\s\nperi\\ psuch\u00ea=s therapei/an, kai\\ oi(=o/s te kal\u00f4=s tou=to\ntherapeu=sai, kai\\ o(/t\u00f4| dida/skaloi a)gathoi\\ gego/nasi, tou=to\nskepte/on.]]\n\n[Side-note: Those who deliver an opinion must begin by proving\ntheir competence to judge--Sokrates avows his own incompetence.]\n\n_Sokr._--Now then, Lysimachus, since you have invited Lach\u00eas and\nNikias, as well as me, to advise you on the means of most effectively\nimproving the mind of your son, it is for us to show you that we\npossess competent professional skill respecting the treatment of the\nyouthful mind. We must declare to you who are the masters from whom\nwe have learnt, and we must prove their qualifications. Or if we have\nhad no masters, we must demonstrate to you our own competence by\nciting cases of individuals, whom we have successfully trained, and\nwho have become incontestably good under our care. If we can fulfil\nneither of these two conditions, we ought to confess our incompetence\nand decline advising you. We must not begin to try our hands upon so\nprecious a subject as the son of a friend, at the hazard of doing him\nmore harm than good.[6]\n\n[Footnote 6: Plato, Lach\u00eas, 186 B.]\n\nAs to myself, I frankly confess that I have neither had any master to\nimpart to me such competence, nor have I been able to acquire it by\nmy own efforts. I am not rich enough to pay the Sophists, who profess\nto teach it. But as to Nikias and Lach\u00eas, they are both older and\nricher than I am: so that they may well have learnt it from others,\nor acquired it for themselves. They must be thoroughly satisfied of\ntheir own knowledge on the work of education; otherwise they would\nhardly have given such confident opinions, pronouncing what pursuits\nare good or bad for youth. For my part, I trust them implicitly: the\nonly thing which surprises me, is, that they dissent from each\nother.[7] It is for you therefore, Lysimachus, to ask Nikias and\nLach\u00eas,--Who have been their masters? Who have been their\nfellow-pupils? If they have been their own masters, what proof can they\nproduce of previous success in teaching, and what examples can they\ncite of pupils whom they have converted from bad to good?[8]\n\n[Footnote 7: Plato, Lach\u00eas, 186 C-D. [Greek: dokou=si d\u00ea/ moi\ndunatoi\\ ei)=nai paideu=sai a)/nthr\u00f4pon; ou) ga\\r a)\\n pote a)de\u00f4=s\na)pephai/nonto peri\\ e)pit\u00eadeuma/t\u00f4n ne/\u00f4| chr\u00east\u00f4=n te kai\\\npon\u00ear\u00f4=n, ei) m\u00ea\\ au)toi=s e)pi/steuon i(kan\u00f4=s ei)de/nai. ta\\ me\\n\nou)=n a)/lla, e)/g\u00f4ge tou/tois pisteu/\u00f4, o(/ti de\\ diaphe/resthon\na)ll\u00ea/loin, e)thau/masa.]]\n\n[Footnote 8: Plato, Lach\u00eas, 186-187.]\n\n[Side-note: Nikias and Lach\u00eas submit to be cross-examined\nby Sokrates.]\n\n_Nikias._--I knew from the beginning that we should both of us\nfall under the cross-examination of Sokrates, and be compelled to\ngive account of our past lives. For my part, I have already gone\nthrough this scrutiny before, and am not averse to undergo it again.\n_Lach\u00eas._--And I, though I have never experienced it before,\nshall willingly submit to learn from Sokrates, whom I know to be a\nman thoroughly courageous and honest in his actions. I hate men whose\nlives are inconsistent with their talk.[9]--Thus speak both of them.\n\n[Footnote 9: Plato, Lach\u00eas, 188.\n\n\"Ego odi homines ignav\u00e2 oper\u00e2 et philosophi\u00e2 sententi\u00e2,\" is a line\ncited by Cicero out of one of the Latin comic writers.]\n\n\n* * * * *\n\n\n[Side-note: Both of them give opinions offhand, according to\ntheir feelings on the special case--Sokrates requires that the\nquestion shall be generalised, and examined as a branch of\neducation.]\n\nThis portion of the dialogue, which forms a sort of preamble to the\nmain discussion, brings out forcibly some of the Platonic points of\nview. We have seen it laid down in the Kriton--That in questions\nabout right and wrong, good and evil, &c., we ought not to trust\nthe decision of the Many, but only that of the One Wise Man. Here we\nlearn something about the criteria by which this One man may be\nknown. He must be one who has gone through a regular training under\nsome master approved in ethical or educational teaching: or, if he\ncannot produce such a certificate, he must at least cite sufficient\nexamples of men whom he has taught well himself. This is the Sokratic\ncomparison, assimilating the general art of living well to the\nrequirements of a special profession, which a man must learn through\nexpress teaching, from a master who has proved his ability, and\nthrough conscious application of his own. Nikias and Lach\u00eas give\ntheir opinions offhand and confidently, upon the question whether\nlessons from the master of arms be profitable to youth or not. Plato,\non the contrary, speaking through Sokrates, points out that this is\nonly one branch of the more comprehensive question as to education\ngenerally--\"What are the qualities and habits proper to be imparted\nto youth by training? What is the proper treatment of the mind? No\none is competent to decide the special question, except he who\nhas professionally studied the treatment of the mind.\" To deal with\nthe special question, without such preliminary general preparation,\ninvolves rash and unverified assumptions, which render any opinion so\ngiven dangerous to act upon. Such is the judgment of the Platonic\nSokrates, insisting on the necessity of taking up ethical questions\nin their most comprehensive aspect.\n\n[Side-note: Appeal of Sokrates to the judgment of the One Wise\nMan--this man is never seen or identified.]\n\nConsequent upon this preamble, we should expect that Lach\u00eas and\nNikias would be made to cite the names of those who had been their\nmasters; or to produce some examples of persons effectively taught by\nthemselves. This would bring us a step nearer to that One Wise\nMan--often darkly indicated, but nowhere named or brought into\ndaylight--from whom alone we can receive a trustworthy judgment. But\nhere, as in the Kriton and so many other Platonic dialogues, we get\nonly a Pisgah view of our promised adviser--nothing more. The discussion\ntakes a different turn.\n\n\n* * * * *\n\n\n[Side-note: We must know what virtue is, before we give an\nopinion on education. Virtue, as a whole, is too large a question. We\nwill enquire about one branch of virtue--courage.]\n\n_Sokr._--\"We will pursue a line of enquiry which conducts to the\nsame result; and which starts even more decidedly from the\nbeginning.[10] We are called upon to advise by what means virtue can\nbe imparted to these youths, so as to make them better men. Of\ncourse, this implies that we know what virtue is: otherwise how can\nwe give advice as to the means of acquiring it? _Lach\u00eas._--We\ncould give no advice at all. _Sokr._--We affirm ourselves\ntherefore to know what virtue is? _Lach\u00eas._--We do.\n_Sokr._--Since therefore we know, we can farther declare what it\nis.[11] _Lach\u00eas._--Of course we can. _Sokr._--Still, we\nwill not at once enquire as to the whole of virtue, which might be an\narduous task, but as to a part of it--Courage: that part to which the\nlessons of the master of arms are supposed to tend. We will\nfirst enquire what courage is: after that has been determined,\nwe will then consider how it can best be imparted to these youths.\"\n\n[Footnote 10: Plato, Lach\u00eas, 189 E. [Greek: kai\\ \u00ea( toia/de ske/psis\nei)s tau)to\\n phe/rei, schedo\\n de/ ti kai\\ ma=llon e)x a)rch\u00ea=s\nei)/\u00ea a)\\n.]]\n\n[Footnote 11: Plato, Lach\u00eas, 190 C. [Greek: phame\\n a)/ra, \u00f4)=\nLa/ch\u00eas, ei)de/nai au)to\\ (t\u00ea\\n a)ret\u00ea\\n) o(/, ti e)/sti. Phame\\n\nme/ntoi. Ou)kou=n o(/ ge i)/smen, ka)\\n ei)/poimen d\u00ea/pou, ti/\ne)/sti. P\u00f4=s ga\\r ou)/?]]\n\n\"Try then if you can tell me, Lach\u00eas, what courage is.\n_Lach\u00eas._--There is no difficulty in telling you that. Whoever\nkeeps his place in the rank, repels the enemy, and does not run away,\nis a courageous man.\"[12]\n\n[Footnote 12: Plato, Lach\u00eas, 190 D-E.]\n\n[Side-note: Question--what is courage? Lach\u00eas answers by citing\none particularly manifest case of courage. Mistake of not giving a\ngeneral explanation.]\n\nHere is the same error in replying, as was committed by Euthyphron\nwhen asked, What is the Holy? and by Hippias, about the Beautiful.\nOne particular case of courageous behaviour, among many, is\nindicated, as if it were an explanation of the whole: but the general\nfeature common to all acts of courage is not declared. Sokrates\npoints out that men are courageous, not merely among hoplites who\nkeep their rank and fight, but also among the Scythian horsemen who\nfight while running away; others also are courageous against disease,\npoverty, political adversity, pain and fear of every sort; others\nmoreover, against desires and pleasures. What is the common attribute\nwhich in all these cases constitutes Courage? If you asked me what is\n_quickness_--common to all those cases when a man runs, speaks,\nplays, learns, &c., quickly--I should tell you that it was that\nwhich accomplished much in a little time. Tell me in like manner,\nwhat is the common fact or attribute pervading all cases of courage?\n\nLach\u00eas at first does not understand the question:[13] and Sokrates\nelucidates it by giving the parallel explanation of quickness. Here,\nas elsewhere, Plato takes great pains to impress the conception in\nits full generality, and he seems to have found difficulty in making\nothers follow him.\n\n[Footnote 13: Plato, Lach\u00eas, 191-192.\n\n[Greek: pa/lin ou)=n peir\u00f4= ei)pei=n a)ndrei/an pr\u00f4=ton, ti/ o)\\n e)n\npa=si tou/tois tau)to/n e)stin. \u00ea)\\ ou)/p\u00f4 katamantha/neis o(\\\nle/g\u00f4?] _Lach\u00eas._ [Greek: Ou) pa/nu ti. . . .] _Sokr._\n[Greek: peir\u00f4= d\u00ea\\ t\u00ea\\n a)ndrei/an ou(/t\u00f4s ei)pein, ti/s ou)=sa\ndu/namis \u00ea( au)t\u00ea\\ e)n \u00ea(don\u00ea=| kai\\ e)n lu/p\u00ea| kai\\ e)n a(/pasin\noi(=s nu=n d\u00ea\\ e)le/gomen au)t\u00ea\\n ei)=nai, e)/peit' a)ndrei/a\nke/kl\u00eatai.]]\n\n[Side-note: Second answer. Courage is a sort of endurance of\nthe mind. Sokrates points out that the answer is vague and incorrect.\nEndurance is not always courage: even intelligent endurance is not\nalways courage.]\n\nLach\u00eas then gives a general definition of courage. It is a sort of\nendurance of the mind.[14]\n\n[Footnote 14: Plato, Lach\u00eas, 192 B. [Greek: karteri/a tis t\u00ea=s\npsuch\u00ea=s.]]\n\nSurely not _all_ endurance (rejoins Sokrates)? You admit that\ncourage is a fine and honourable thing. But endurance without\nintelligence is hurtful and dishonourable: it cannot therefore be\ncourage. Only intelligent endurance, therefore, can be courage. And\nthen what is meant by _intelligent_? Intelligent--of what--or to\nwhat end? A man, who endures the loss of money, understanding well\nthat he will thereby gain a larger sum, is he courageous? No. He who\nendures fighting, knowing that he has superior skill, numbers,\nand all other advantages on his side, manifests more of\nintelligent endurance, than his adversary who knows that he has all\nthese advantages against him, yet who nevertheless endures fighting.\nNevertheless this latter is the most courageous of the two.[15]\nUnintelligent endurance is in this case courage: but unintelligent\nendurance was acknowledged to be bad and hurtful, and courage to be a\nfine thing. We have entangled ourselves in a contradiction. We must\nat least show our own courage, by enduring until we can get right.\nFor my part (replies Lach\u00eas) I am quite prepared for such endurance.\nI am piqued and angry that I cannot express what I conceive. I seem\nto have in my mind clearly what courage is: but it escapes me somehow\nor other, when I try to put it in words.[16]\n\n[Footnote 15: Plato, Lach\u00eas, 192 D-E. [Greek: \u00ea( phro/nimos karteri/a\n. . . i)/d\u00f4men d\u00ea/, _\u00ea( ei)s ti/_ phro/nimos; \u00ea)\\ \u00ea( ei)s a(/panta\nkai\\ ta\\ mega/la kai\\ ta\\ smikra/?]]\n\n[Footnote 16: Plato, Lach\u00eas, 193 C, 194 B.]\n\nSokrates now asks aid from Nikias. _Nikias._--My explanation of\ncourage is, that it is a sort of knowledge or intelligence.\n_Sokr._--But what sort of intelligence? Not certainly\nintelligence of piping or playing the harp. Intelligence of what?\n\n[Side-note: Confusion. New answer given by Nikias. Courage is\na sort of intelligence--the intelligence of things terrible and not\nterrible. Objections of Lach\u00eas.]\n\n_Nikias._--Courage is intelligence of things terrible, and\nthings not terrible, both in war and in all other conjunctures.\n_Lach\u00eas._--What nonsense! Courage is a thing totally apart from\nknowledge or intelligence.[17] The intelligent physician knows best\nwhat is terrible, and what is not terrible, in reference to disease:\nthe husbandman, in reference to agriculture. But they are not for\nthat reason courageous. _Nikias._--They are not; but neither do\nthey know what is terrible, or what is not terrible. Physicians can\npredict the result of a patient's case: they can tell what may\ncure him, or what will kill him. But whether it be better for him to\ndie or to recover--_that_ they do not know, and cannot tell him.\nTo some persons, death is a less evil than life:--defeat, than\nvictory:--loss of wealth, than gain. None except the person who can\ndiscriminate these cases, knows what is really terrible and what is\nnot so. He alone is really courageous.[18] _Lach\u00eas._--Where is\nthere any such man? It can be only some God. Nikias feels himself in\na puzzle, and instead of confessing it frankly as I have done, he is\ntrying to help himself out by evasions more fit for a pleader before\nthe Dikastery.[19]\n\n[Footnote 17: Plato, Lach\u00eas, 195 A. [Greek: t\u00ea\\n t\u00f4=n dein\u00f4n kai\\\nthar)r(ale/\u00f4n e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean kai\\ e)n pole/m\u00f4| kai\\ e)n toi=s a)/llois\na(/pasin.] _Lach\u00eas._--[Greek: \u00d4(s a)/topa le/gei!--ch\u00f4ri\\s d\u00ea/\npou sophi/a e)sti\\n a)ndrei/as.]\n\nIt appears from two other passages (195 E, and 198 B) that [Greek:\nthar)r(a/leos] here is simply the negation of [Greek: deino\\s] and\ncannot be translated by any affirmative word.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Plato, Lach\u00eas, 195-196.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Plato, Lach\u00eas, 196 B.]\n\n[Side-note: Questions of Sokrates to Nikias. It is only future\nevents, not past or present, which are terrible; but intelligence of\nfuture events cannot be had without intelligence of past or present.]\n\n_Sokr._--You do not admit, then, Nikias, that lions, tigers,\nboars, &c., and such animals, are courageous? _Nikias._--No:\nthey are without fear--simply from not knowing the danger--like\nchildren: but they are not courageous, though most people call them\nso. I may call them bold, but I reserve the epithet courageous for\nthe intelligent. _Lach\u00eas._--See how Nikias strips those, whom\nevery one admits to be courageous, of this honourable appellation!\n_Nikias._--Not altogether, Lach\u00eas: I admit you, and Lamachus,\nand many other Athenians, to be courageous, and of course therefore\nintelligent. _Lach\u00eas._--I feel the compliment: but such subtle\ndistinctions befit a Sophist rather than a general in high\ncommand.[20] _Sokr._--The highest measure of intelligence befits\none in the highest command. What you have said, Nikias, deserves\ncareful examination. You remember that in taking up the investigation\nof courage, we reckoned it only as a portion of virtue: you are aware\nthat there are other portions of virtue, such as justice, temperance,\nand the like. Now you define courage to be, intelligence of what is\nterrible or not terrible: of that which causes fear, or does not\ncause fear. But nothing causes fear, except future or apprehended\nevils: present or past evils cause no fear. Hence courage, as you\ndefine it, is intelligence respecting future evils, and future events\nnot evil. But how can there be intelligence respecting the future,\nexcept in conjunction with intelligence respecting the present and\nthe past? In every special department, such as medicine, military\nproceedings, agriculture, &c., does not the same man, who knows\nthe phenomena of the future, know also the phenomena of present and\npast? Are they not all inseparable acquirements of one and the same\nintelligent mind?[21]\n\n[Footnote 20: Plato, Lach\u00eas, 197. [Greek: Kai\\ ga\\r pre/pei, \u00f4)=\nS\u00f4/krates, sophist\u00ea=| ta\\ toiau=ta ma=llon kompseu/esthai \u00ea)\\ a)ndri\\\no(\\n \u00ea( po/lis a)xioi= au(t\u00ea=s proi+sta/nai.]\n\nAssuredly the distinctions which here Plato puts into the mouth of\nNikias are nowise more subtle than those which he is perpetually\nputting into the mouth of Sokrates. He cannot here mean to\ndistinguish the Sophists from Sokrates, but to distinguish the\ndialectic talkers, including both one and the other, from the active\npolitical leaders.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Plato, Lach\u00eas, 198 D. [Greek: peri\\ o(/s\u00f4n e)sti\\n\ne)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea, ou)k a)/ll\u00ea me\\n ei)=nai peri\\ gegono/tos, ei)de/nai\no(/p\u00ea| ge/gonen, a)/ll\u00ea de\\ peri\\ gignome/n\u00f4n, o(/p\u00ea| gi/gnetai,\na)/ll\u00ea de\\ o(/p\u00ea| a)\\n ka/llista ge/noito kai\\ gen\u00ea/setai to\\ m\u00ea/p\u00f4\ngegono/s--a)ll' \u00ea( au)t\u00ea/. oi(=on peri\\ to\\ u(gieino\\n ei)s a(/pantas\ntou\\s chro/nous ou)k a)/ll\u00ea tis \u00ea)\\ \u00ea( i)atrik\u00ea/, mi/a ou)=sa,\ne)phora=| kai\\ gigno/mena kai\\ gegono/ta kai\\ gen\u00easo/mena, o(/p\u00ea|\ngen\u00ea/setai.]\n\n199 B. [Greek: \u00ea( de/ g' au)t\u00ea\\ e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea t\u00f4=n au)t\u00f4=n kai\\\nmello/nt\u00f4n kai\\ pa/nt\u00f4s e)cho/nt\u00f4n ei)=nai [\u00f4(molo/g\u00eatai].]\n\n[Side-note: Courage therefore must be intelligence of good and\nevil generally. But this definition would include the whole of\nvirtue, and we declared that courage was only a part thereof. It will\nnot hold therefore as a definition of courage.]\n\nSince therefore courage, according to your definition, is the\nknowledge of futurities evil and not evil, or future evil and good--and\nsince such knowledge cannot exist without the knowledge of good\nand evil generally--it follows that courage is the knowledge of good\nand evil generally.[22] But a man who knows thus much, cannot be\ndestitute of any part of virtue. He must possess temperance and\njustice as well as courage. Courage, therefore, according to your\ndefinition, is not only a part of virtue, it is the whole. Now we\nbegan the enquiry by stating that it was only a part of virtue, and\nthat there were other parts of virtue which it did not comprise. It\nis plain therefore that your definition of courage is not precise,\nand cannot be sustained. We have not yet discovered what courage\nis.[23]\n\n[Footnote 22: Plato, Lach\u00eas, 199 C. [Greek: kata\\ to\\n so\\n lo/gon\nou) mo/non dein\u00f4=n te kai\\ thar)r(ale/\u00f4n \u00ea( e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea a)ndrei/a\ne)sti/n, a)lla\\ schedo/n ti \u00ea( peri\\ pa/nt\u00f4n a)gath\u00f4=n te kai\\ kak\u00f4=n\nkai\\ pa/nt\u00f4s e)cho/nt\u00f4n], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Plato, Lach\u00eas, 199 E. [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra eu)r\u00ea/kamen,\na)ndrei/a o(/, ti e)/stin.]]\n\n\n* * * * *\n\n\n[Side-note: Remarks. Warfare of Sokrates against the false\npersuasion of knowledge. Brave generals deliver opinions confidently\nabout courage without knowing what it is.]\n\nHere ends the dialogue called Lach\u00eas, without any positive result.\nNothing is proved except the ignorance of two brave and eminent\ngenerals respecting the moral attribute known by the name\n_Courage_: which nevertheless they are known to possess,\nand have the full sentiment and persuasion of knowing perfectly; so\nthat they give confident advice as to the means of imparting it. \"I\nam unaccustomed to debates like these\" (says Lach\u00eas): \"but I am\npiqued and mortified--because I feel that I know well what Courage\nis, yet somehow or other I cannot state my own thoughts in words.\"\nHere is a description[24] of the intellectual deficiency which\nSokrates seeks to render conspicuous to the consciousness, instead of\nsuffering it to remain latent and unknown, as it is in the ordinary\nmind. Here, as elsewhere, he impugns the false persuasion of\nknowledge, and the unconscious presumption of estimable men in\ndelivering opinions upon ethical and social subjects, which have\nbecome familiar and interwoven with deeply rooted associations, but\nhave never been studied under a master, nor carefully analysed and\ndiscussed, nor looked at in their full generality. This is a mental\ndefect which he pronounces to be universal: belonging not less to men\nof action like Nikias and Lach\u00eas, than to Sophists and Rhetors like\nProtagoras and Gorgias.\n\n[Footnote 24: Plato, Lach\u00eas, 194. [Greek: Kai/toi a)\u00ea/th\u00eas g' ei)mi\\]\n(Lach\u00eas) [Greek: t\u00f4=n toiou/t\u00f4n lo/g\u00f4n; a)lla/ ti/s me kai\\\nphiloneiki/a ei)/l\u00eaphe pro\\s ta\\ ei)r\u00eame/na, kai\\ \u00f4(s a)l\u00eath\u00f4=s\na)ganakt\u00f4=, ei) ou(t\u00f4si\\ a)\\ no\u00f4= m\u00ea\\ oi(=o/s t' ei)mi\\ ei)pei=n;\nnoei=n me\\n ga\\r e)/moige dok\u00f4= peri\\ a)ndrei/as o(/, ti e)/stin,\nou)k oi)=da d' o(/p\u00ea| me a)/rti die/phugen, \u00f4(/ste m\u00ea\\ xullabei=n\nt\u00f4=| lo/g\u00f4| au)t\u00ea\\n kai\\ ei)pei=n o(/, ti e)/stin.]\n\nCompare the Charmid\u00eas p. 159 A, 160 D, where Sokrates professes to\ntell Charmides, If temperance is really in you, you can of course\ninform us what it is.]\n\n[Side-note: No solution given by Plato. Apparent tendency of\nhis mind, in looking for a solution. Intelligence--cannot be\nunderstood without reference to some object or end.]\n\nHere, as elsewhere, Plato (or the Platonic Sokrates) exposes the\nfaulty solutions of others, but proposes no better solution of his\nown, and even disclaims all ability to do so. We may nevertheless\ntrace, in the refutation which he gives of the two unsatisfactory\nexplanations, hints guiding the mind into that direction in which\nPlato looks to supply the deficiency. Thus when Lach\u00eas, after having\ngiven as his first answer (to the question, What is Courage?) a\ndefinition not even formally sufficient, is put by Sokrates upon\ngiving his second answer,--That Courage is intelligent endurance:\nSokrates asks him[25]--\"Yes, _intelligent_: but intelligent to\n_what end_? Do you mean, to all things alike, great as well\nas little?\" We are here reminded that _intelligence_, simply\ntaken, is altogether undefined; that intelligence must relate to\n_something_--and when human conduct is in question, must relate\nto some end; and that the Something, and the End, to which it\nrelates, must be set forth, before the proposition can be clearly\nunderstood.\n\n[Footnote 25: Plato, Lach\u00eas, 192 D.\n\n[Greek: \u00ea( phro/nimos karteri/a . . . i)/d\u00f4men d\u00ea/, \u00ea( ei)s ti\nphro/nimos; \u00ea)\\ \u00ea( ei)s a(/panta kai\\ ta\\ mega/la kai\\ ta\\\nsmikra/?]]\n\n[Side-note: Object--is supplied in the answer of Nikias.\nIntelligence--of things terrible and not terrible. Such intelligence\nis not possessed by professional artists.]\n\nComing to the answer given by Nikias, we perceive that this\ndeficiency is in a certain manner supplied. Courage is said to\nconsist in knowledge: in knowledge of things terrible, and things not\nterrible. When Lach\u00eas applies his cross-examination to the answer,\nthe manner in which Nikias defends it puts us upon a distinction\noften brought to view, though not always adhered to, in the Platonic\nwritings. There can be no doubt that death, distemper, loss of\nwealth, defeat, &c. are terrible things (_i.e._ the prospect\nof them inspires fear) in the estimation of mankind generally.\nCorrect foresight of such contingencies, and of the antecedents\ntending to produce or avert them, is possessed by the physician and\nother professional persons: who would therefore, it should seem,\npossess the knowledge of things terrible and not terrible. But Nikias\ndenies this. He does not admit that the contingencies here enumerated\nare, always or necessarily, proper objects of fear. In some cases, he\ncontends, they are the least of two evils. Before you can be said to\npossess the knowledge of things terrible and not terrible, you must\nbe able to take correct measure not only of the intervening\nantecedents or means, but also of the end itself as compared with\nother alternative ends: whether, in each particular case, it be the\nend most to be feared, or the real evil under the given\ncircumstances. The professional man can do the former, but he cannot\ndo the latter. He advises as to means, and executes: but he assumes\nhis own one end as an indisputable datum. The physician seeks to cure\nhis patient, without ever enquiring whether it may not be a less evil\nfor such patient to die than to survive.\n\n[Side-note: Postulate of a Science of Ends, or Teleology,\ndimly indicated by Plato. The Unknown Wise Man--correlates with the\nundiscovered Science of Ends.]\n\nThe ulterior, yet not less important, estimate of the comparative\nworth of different ends, is reserved for that unknown master whom\nNikias himself does not farther specify, and whom Lach\u00eas sets\naside as nowhere to be found, under the peculiar phrase of \"some\nGod\". Subjectively considered, this is an appeal to the judgment of\nthat One Wise Man, often alluded to by Plato as an absent Expert who\nmight be called into court--yet never to be found at the exact\nmoment, nor produced in visible presence: Objectively considered, it\nis a postulate or divination of some yet undiscovered Teleology or\nScience of Ends: that Science of the Good, which (as we have already\nnoticed in Alkibiad\u00eas II.) Plato pronounces to be the crowning and\ncapital science of all--and without which he there declared, that\nknowledge on all other topics was useless and even worse than\nuseless.[26] The One Wise Man--the _Science of Good_--are the\nSubject and Object corresponding to each other, and postulated by\nPlato. None but the One Wise Man can measure things terrible and not\nterrible: none else can estimate the good or evil, or the comparative\nvalue of two alternative evils, in each individual case. The items\nhere directed to be taken into the calculation, correspond with what\nis laid down by Sokrates in the Protagoras, not with that laid down\nin the Gorgias: we find here none of that marked antithesis between\npleasure and good--between pain and evil--upon which Sokrates\nexpatiates in the Gorgias.\n\n[Footnote 26: Plato, Alkib. ii. 146-147. See above, ch. xii. p. 16.]\n\n[Side-note: Perfect condition of the intelligence--is the one\nsufficient condition of virtue.]\n\nThis appears still farther when the cross-examination is taken up by\nSokrates instead of by Lach\u00eas. We are then made to perceive, that the\nknowledge of things terrible and not terrible is a part, but an\ninseparable part, of the knowledge of good and evil generally: the\nlesser cannot be had without the greater--and the greater carries\nwith it not merely courage, but all the other virtues besides. None\ncan know good or evil generally except the perfectly Wise Man. The\nperfect condition of the Intelligence, is the sole and all-sufficient\ncondition of virtue. None can possess one mode of virtue separately.\n\nThis is the doctrine to which the conclusion of the Lach\u00eas points,\nthough the question debated is confessedly left without solution. It\nis a doctrine which seems to have been really maintained by the\nhistorical Sokrates, and is often implied in the reasonings of the\nPlatonic Sokrates, but not always nor consistently.\n\n[Side-note: Dramatic contrast between Lach\u00eas and Sokrates, as\ncross-examiners.]\n\nIn reference to this dialogue, the dramatic contrast is very\nforcible, between the cross-examination carried on by Lach\u00eas, and\nthat carried on by Sokrates. The former is pettish and impatient,\nbringing out no result, and accusing the respondent of cavil and\ndisingenuousness: the latter takes up the same answer patiently,\nexpands it into the full generality wrapped up in it, and renders\npalpable its inconsistency with previous admissions.\n\n\nAPPENDIX.\n\n\nAst is the only critic who declares the Lach\u00eas not to be Plato's work\n(Platon's Leben und Schr. pp. 451-456). He indeed even finds it\ndifficult to imagine how Schleiermacher can accept it as genuine (p.\n454). He justifies this opinion by numerous reasons--pointing out\nwhat he thinks glaring defects, absurdity, and bad taste, both in the\nratiocination and in the dramatic handling, also _dicta_ alleged\nto be _un-Platonic_. Compare Schleiermacher's Einleitung zum\nLach\u00eas, p. 324 seq.\n\nI do not concur with Ast in the estimation of those passages which\nserve as premisses to his conclusion. But even if I admitted his\npremisses, I still should not admit his conclusion. I should conclude\nthat the dialogue was an inferior work of Plato, but I should\nconclude nothing beyond. Stallbaum (Prolegg. ad Lachet. p. 29-30, 2nd\ned.) and Socher discover \"adolescenti\u00e6 vestigia\" in it, which are not\napparent to me.\n\nSocher, Stallbaum, and K. F. Hermann pass lightly over the objections\nof Ast; and Steinhart (Einleit. p. 355) declares them to be unworthy\nof a serious answer. For my part, I draw from these dissensions among\nthe Platonic critics a conviction of the uncertain evidence upon\nwhich all of them proceed. Each has his own belief as to what Plato\n_must_ say, _ought to_ say, and _could not_ have said;\nand each adjudicates thereupon with a degree of confidence which\nsurprises me. The grounds upon which Ast rejects Lach\u00eas, Charmid\u00eas,\nand Lysis, though inconclusive, appear to me not more inconclusive\nthan those on which he and other critics reject the Erast\u00e6, Theag\u00eas.\nHippias Major, Alkibiad\u00eas II., &c.\n\nThe dates which Stallbaum, Schleiermacher, Socher, and Steinhart\nassign to the Lach\u00eas (about 406-404 B.C.) are in my judgment\nerroneous. I have already shown my reasons for believing that not one\nof the Platonic dialogues was composed until after the death of\nSokrates. The hypotheses also of Steinhart (p. 357) as to the special\npurposes of Plato in composing the dialogue are unsupported by any\nevidence; and are all imagined so as to fit his supposition as\nto the date. So also Schleiermacher tells us that a portion of the\nLach\u00eas is intended by Plato as a defence of himself against\naccusations which had been brought against him, a young man, for\nimpertinence in having attacked Lysias in the Ph\u00e6drus, and Protagoras\nin the Protagoras, both of them much older than Plato. But Steinhart\njustly remarks that this explanation can only be valid if we admit\nSchleiermacher's theory that the Ph\u00e6drus and the Protagoras are\nearlier compositions than the Lach\u00eas, which theory Steinhart and most\nof the others deny. Steinhart himself adapts his hypotheses to his\nown idea of the date of the Lach\u00eas: and he is open to the same remark\nas he himself makes upon Schleiermacher.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIX.\n\nCHARMIDES.\n\n\nAs in Lach\u00eas, we have pursued an enquiry into the nature of Courage--so\nin Charmid\u00eas, we find an examination of Temperance, Sobriety,\nModeration.[1] Both dialogues conclude without providing any tenable\nexplanation. In both there is an abundant introduction--in Charmid\u00eas,\nthere is even the bustle of a crowded pal\u00e6stra, with much dramatic\nincident--preluding to the substantive discussion. I omit the notice\nof this dramatic incident, though it is highly interesting to read.\n\n[Footnote 1: I translate [Greek: s\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ea] Temperance, though it\nis very inadequate, but I know no single English word better\nsuited.]\n\n[Side-note: Scene and personages of the dialogue. Crowded\npal\u00e6stra. Emotions of Sokrates.]\n\nThe two persons with whom Sokrates here carries on the discussion,\nare Charmides and Kritias; both of whom, as historical persons, were\nactive movers in the oligarchical government of the Thirty, with its\nnumerous enormities. In this dialogue, Charmides appears as a youth\njust rising into manhood, strikingly beautiful both in face and\nstature: Kritias his cousin is an accomplished literary man of mature\nage. The powerful emotion which Sokrates describes himself as\nexperiencing,[2] from the sight and close neighbourhood of the\nbeautiful Charmides, is remarkable, as a manifestation of Hellenic\nsentiment. The same exaltation of the feelings and imagination, which\nis now produced only by beautiful women, was then excited chiefly by\nfine youths. Charmides is described by Kritias as exhibiting\ndispositions at once philosophical and poetical:[3] illustrating\nthe affinity of these two intellectual veins, as Plato conceived\nthem. He is also described as eminently temperate and modest:[4] from\nwhence the questions of Sokrates take their departure.\n\n[Footnote 2: Plato, Charm. 154 C. Ficinus, in his Argumentum to this\ndialogue (p. 767), considers it as mainly allegorical, especially the\nwarm expressions of erotic sentiment contained therein, which he\ncompares to the Song of Solomon. \"Etsi omnia in hoc dialogo mirificam\nhabeant allegoriam, amatoria maxime, non aliter quam Cantica\nSalomonis--mutavi tamen nonnihil--nonnihil etiam pr\u00e6termisi. Qu\u00e6 enim\nconsonabant castigatissimis auribus Atticorum, rudioribus fort\u00e8\nauribus minim\u00e9 consonarent.\"]\n\n[Footnote 3: Plato, Charm. 155 A.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Plato, Charm. 157 D. About the diffidence of Charmides\nin his younger years, see Xen. Mem. iii. 7, 1.]\n\n[Side-note: Question, What is Temperance? addressed by Sokrates\nto the temperate Charmides. Answer, It is a kind of sedateness or\nslowness.]\n\nYou are said to be temperate, Charmides (says Sokrates). If so, your\ntemperance will surely manifest itself within you in some way, so as\nto enable you to form and deliver an opinion, What Temperance is.\nTell us in plain language what you conceive it to be. Temperance,\nreplies Charmides (after some hesitation),[5] consists in doing every\nthing in an orderly and sedate manner, when we walk in the highway,\nor talk, or perform other matters in the presence of others. It is,\nin short, a kind of sedateness or slowness.\n\n[Footnote 5: Plato, Charm. 159 B. [Greek: to\\ kosmi/\u00f4s pa/nta\npra/ttein kai\\ \u00ea(such\u00ea=|, e)/n te tai=s o)doi=s badi/zein kai\\\ndiale/gesthai . . . sull\u00ea/bd\u00ean \u00ea(suchio/t\u00eas tis.]]\n\n[Side-note: But Temperance is a fine or honourable thing, and\nslowness is, in many or most cases, not fine or honourable, but the\ncontrary. Temperance cannot be slowness.]\n\nSokrates begins his cross-examination upon this answer, in the same\nmanner as he had begun it with Laches in respect to courage.\n_Sokr._--Is not temperance a fine and honourable thing? Does it\nnot partake of the essence and come under the definition, of what is\nfine or and honourable?[6] _Char._--Undoubtedly it does.\n_Sokr._--But if we specify in detail our various operations,\neither of body or mind--such as writing, reading, playing on the\nharp, boxing, running, jumping, learning, teaching, recollecting,\ncomprehending, deliberating, determining, &c.--we shall find that\nto do them quickly is more fine and honourable than to do them\nslowly. Slowness does not, except by accident, belong to the fine and\nhonourable: therefore temperance, which does so belong to it, cannot\nbe a kind of slowness.[7]\n\n[Footnote 6: Plato, Charm. 159 C--160 D. [Greek: ou) t\u00f4=n kal\u00f4=n\nme/ntoi \u00ea( s\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ea e)sti/n? . . . e)peid\u00ea\\ _e)n t\u00f4=| lo/g\u00f4|_ t\u00f4=n\nkal\u00f4=n ti \u00ea(mi=n \u00ea( s\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ea u(pete/th\u00ea.]]\n\n[Footnote 7: Plato, Charm. 160 C.]\n\n[Side-note: Second answer. Temperance is a variety of the\nfeeling of shame. Refuted by Sokrates.]\n\nCharmides next declares Temperance to be a variety of the feeling of\nshame or modesty. But this (observes Sokrates) will not hold more\nthan the former explanation: since Homer has pronounced shame not to\nbe good, for certain persons and under certain circumstances.[8]\n\n[Footnote 8: Plato, Charm. 161 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Third answer. Temperance consists in doing one's\nown business. Defended by Kritias. Sokrates pronounces it a riddle,\nand refutes it. Distinction between making and doing.]\n\n\"Temperance consists in doing one's own business.\" Here we have a\nthird explanation, proposed by Charmides and presently espoused by\nKritias. Sokrates professes not to understand it, and pronounces it\nto be like a riddle.[9] Every tradesman or artisan does the business\nof others as well as his own. Are we to say for that reason that he\nis not temperate? I distinguish (says Kritias) between _making_\nand _doing_: the artisan _makes_ for others, but he does\nnot _do_ for others, and often cannot be said to _do_ at\nall. _To do_, implies honourable, profitable, good, occupation:\nthis alone is a man's own business, and this I call temperance. When\na man acts so as to harm himself, he does not do his own\nbusiness.[10] The doing of good things, is temperance.[11]\n\n[Footnote 9: Plato, Charm. 161 C--162 B. [Greek: s\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ea--to\\ ta\\\nau(tou= pra/ttein . . . ai)ni/gmati/ tini e)/oiken.]\n\nThere is here a good deal of playful vivacity in the dialogue:\nCharmid\u00eas gives this last answer, which he has heard from Kritias,\nwho is at first not forward to defend it, until Charmides forces him\nto come forward, by hints and side-insinuations. This is the dramatic\nart and variety of Plato, charming to read, but not bearing upon him\nas a philosopher.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Plato, Charm. 163 C-D. [Greek: ta\\ kal\u00f4=s kai\\\n\u00f4)pheli/m\u00f4s poiou/mena . . . oi)kei=a mo/na ta\\ toiau=ta \u00ea(gei=sthai,\nta\\ de\\ blabera\\ pa/nta a)llo/tria . . . o(/ti ta\\ oi)kei=a te kai\\\nta\\ au(tou= a)gatha\\ kaloi/\u00eas, kai\\ ta\\s t\u00f4=n a)gath\u00f4=n poi\u00ea/seis\npra/xeis.]]\n\n[Footnote 11: Plato, Charm. 163 E. [Greek: t\u00ea\\n t\u00f4=n a)gath\u00f4=n pra=xin\ns\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ean ei)=nai saph\u00f4=s soi diori/zomai.]]\n\n[Side-note: Fourth answer, by Kritias. Temperance consists in\nself-knowledge.]\n\n_Sokr._--Perhaps it is. But does the well-doer always and\ncertainly know that he is doing well? Does the temperate man know his\nown temperance? _Krit._--He certainly must. Indeed I think that\nthe essence of temperance is, _Self-knowledge_. _Know\nthyself_ is the precept of the Delphian God, who means thereby the\nsame as if he had said--Be temperate. I now put aside all that I have\nsaid before, and take up this new position, That temperance consists\nin a man's knowing himself. If you do not admit it, I challenge your\ncross-examination.[12]\n\n[Footnote 12: Plato, Charm. 164-165.]\n\n[Side-note: Questions of Sokrates thereupon. What good does\nself-knowledge procure for us? What is the object known, in this\ncase? Answer: There is no object of knowledge, distinct from the\nknowledge itself.]\n\n_Sokr._--I cannot tell you whether I admit it or not, until I\nhave investigated. You address me as if I professed to know the\nsubject: but it is because I do not know, that I examine, in\nconjunction with you, each successive answer.[13] If temperance\nconsists in knowing, it must be a knowledge of something.\n_Krit._--It is so: it is knowledge of a man's self.\n_Sokr._--What good does this knowledge procure for us? as\nmedical knowledge procures for us health--architectural knowledge,\nbuildings, &c.? _Krit._--It has no object positive result of\nanalogous character: but neither have arithmetic nor geometry.\n_Sokr._--True, but in arithmetic and geometry, we can at least\nindicate a something known, distinct from the knowledge. Number and\nproportion are distinct from arithmetic, the science which takes\ncognizance of them. Now what is that, of which temperance is the\nknowledge,--distinct from temperance itself? _Krit._--It is on\nthis very point that temperance differs from all the other\ncognitions. Each of the others is knowledge of something different\nfrom itself, but not knowledge of itself: while temperance is\nknowledge of all the other sciences and of itself also.[14]\n_Sokr._--If this be so, it will of course be a knowledge of\nignorance, as well as a knowledge of knowledge?\n_Krit._--Certainly.\n\n[Footnote 13: Plato, Charm. 165 C.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Plato, Charm. 166 C. [Greek: ai( me\\n a)/llai pa=sai\na)/llou ei)si\\n e)pist\u00ea=mai, e(aut\u00f4=n d' ou)/; \u00ea( de\\ mo/n\u00ea t\u00f4=n te\na)/ll\u00f4n e)pist\u00eam\u00f4=n e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea e)sti\\ kai\\ au)t\u00ea\\ e(aut\u00ea=s.] So\nalso 166 E.]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates doubts the possibility of any knowledge,\nwithout a given _cognitum_ as its object. Analogies to prove\nthat knowledge of knowledge is impossible.]\n\n_Sokr._--According to your explanation, then, it is only the\ntemperate man who knows himself. He alone is able to examine himself,\nand thus to find out what he really knows and does not know: he alone\nis able to examine others, and thus to find out what each man knows,\nor what each man only believes himself to know without really\nknowing. Temperance, or self-knowledge, is the knowledge what a man\nknows, and what he does not know.[15] Now two questions arise upon\nthis: First, is it possible for a man to know, that he knows what he\ndoes know, and that he does not know what he does not know? Next,\ngranting it to be possible, in what way do we gain by it? The first\nof these two questions involves much difficulty. How can there be any\ncognition, which is not cognition of a given _cognitum_, but\ncognition merely of other cognitions and non-cognitions? There is no\nvision except of some colour, no audition except of some sound: there\ncan be no vision of visions, or audition of auditions. So\nlikewise, all desire is desire of some pleasure; there is no desire\nof desires. All volition is volition of some good; there is no\nvolition of volitions: all love applies to something beautiful--there\nis no love of other loves. The like is true of fear, opinion, &c.\nIt would be singular therefore, if contrary to all these analogies,\nthere were any cognition not of some _cognitum_, but of itself\nand other cognitions.[16]\n\n[Footnote 15: Plato, Charm. 167 A.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Plato, Charm. 167-168.]\n\n[Side-note: All knowledge must be relative to some object.]\n\nIt is of the essence of cognition to be cognition of something, and\nto have its characteristic property with reference to some\ncorrelate.[17] What is greater, has its property of being greater in\nrelation to something else, which is less--not in relation to itself.\nIt cannot be greater than itself, for then it would also be less than\nitself. It cannot include in itself the characteristic property of\nthe _correlatum_ as well as that of the _relatum_. So too\nabout what is older, younger, heavier, lighter: there is always a\nsomething distinct, to which reference is made. Vision does not\ninclude in itself both the property of seeing, and that of being\nseen: the _videns_ is distinct from the _visum_. A movement\nimplies something else to be moved: a heater something else to be\nheated.\n\n[Footnote 17: Plato, Charm. 168 B. [Greek: e)/sti me\\n au(t\u00ea\\ \u00ea(\ne)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea tino\\s e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea, kai\\ e)/chei tina toiau/t\u00ean du/namin\n\u00f4(/ste tino\\s ei)=nai.]]\n\n[Side-note: All properties are relative--every thing in nature\nhas its characteristic property with reference to something else.]\n\nIn all these cases (concludes Sokrates) the characteristic property\nis essentially relative, implying something distinguishable from, yet\ncorrelating with, itself. May we generalise the proposition, and\naffirm, That all properties are relative, and that every thing in\nnature has its characteristic property with reference, not to itself,\nbut to something else? Or is this true only of some things and not of\nall--so that cognition may be something in the latter category?\n\nThis is an embarrassing question, which I do not feel qualified to\ndecide: neither the general question, whether there be any cases of\ncharacteristic properties having no reference to any thing beyond\nthemselves, and therefore not relative, but absolute--nor the\nparticular question, whether cognition be one of those cases,\nimplying no separate _cognitum_, but being itself both\n_relatum_ and _correlatum_--cognition of cognition.[18]\n\n[Footnote 18: Plato, Charm. 168-169. 169 A: [Greek: mega/lou d\u00ea/ tinos\na)ndro\\s dei=, o(/stis tou=to kata\\ pa/nt\u00f4n i(kan\u00f4=s diair\u00ea/setai,\npo/teron ou)de\\n t\u00f4=n o)/nt\u00f4n t\u00ea\\n au(tou= du/namin au)to\\ pro\\s e(auto\\\npe/phuken e)/chein, a)lla\\ pro\\s a)llo\\--\u00ea)\\ ta\\ me\\n, ta\\ d' ou)/;\nkai\\ ei) e)/stin au(= a(/tina au)ta\\ pro\\s e(auta\\ e)/chei, a)=r' e)n\ntou/tois e)sti\\n e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea, \u00ea(\\n d\u00ea\\ \u00ea(mei=s s\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ean phame\\n\nei)=nai. e)g\u00f4\\ me\\n ou) pisteu/\u00f4 e)maut\u00f4=| i(kano\\s ei)=nai tau=ta\ndiele/sthtai.]]\n\nBut even if cognition of cognition be possible, I shall not\nadmit it as an explanation of what temperance is, until I have\nsatisfied myself that it is beneficial. For I have a presentiment\nthat temperance must be something beneficial and good.[19]\n\n[Footnote 19: Plato, Charm. 169 B. [Greek: \u00f4)phelimo/n ti ka)gatho\\n\nmanteu/omai ei)=nai.]]\n\n[Side-note: Even if cognition of cognition were possible,\ncognition of non-cognition would be impossible. A man may know what\nhe knows, but he cannot know what he is ignorant of. He knows the\nfact _that_ he knows: but he does not know how much he knows,\nand how much he does not know.]\n\nLet us concede for the present discussion (continues Sokrates) that\ncognition of cognition is possible. Still how does this prove that\nthere can be cognition of non-cognition? that a man can know both\nwhat he knows and what he does not know? For this is what we declared\nself-knowledge and temperance to be.[20] To have cognition of\ncognition is one thing: to have cognition of non-cognition is a\ndifferent thing, not necessarily connected with it. If you have\ncognition of cognition, you will be enabled to distinguish that which\nis cognition from that which is not--but no more. Now the knowledge\nor ignorance of the matter of health is known by medical science:\nthat of justice known by political science. The knowledge of\nknowledge simply--cognition of cognition--is different from both. The\nperson who possesses this last only, without knowing either medicine\nor politics, will become aware that he knows something and possesses\nsome sort of knowledge, and will be able to verify so much with\nregard to others. But _what_ it is that he himself knows, or\nthat others know, he will not thereby be enabled to find out: he will\nnot distinguish whether that which is known belong to physiology or\nto politics; to do this, special acquirements are needed. You, a\ntemperate man therefore, as such, do not know _what_ you know\nand _what_ you do not know; you know the bare fact, _that_\nyou know and _that_ you do not know. You will not be competent\nto cross-examine any one who professes to know medicine or any other\nparticular subject, so as to ascertain whether the man really\npossesses what he pretends to possess. There will be no point in\ncommon between you and him. You, as a temperate man, possess\ncognition of cognition, but you do not know any special\n_cognitum_: the special man knows his own special\n_cognitum_ but is a stranger to cognition generally. You cannot\nquestion him, nor criticise what he says or performs, in his own\nspecialty--for of that you are ignorant:--no one can do it except\nsome fellow _expert_. You can ascertain that he possesses some\nknowledge: but whether he possesses that particular knowledge to\nwhich he lays claim, or whether he falsely pretends to it, you cannot\nascertain:--since, as a temperate man, you know only cognition and\nnon-cognition generally. To ascertain this point, you must be not\nonly a temperate man, but a man of special cognition besides.[21] You\ncan question and test no one, except another temperate man like\nyourself.\n\n[Footnote 20: Plato, Charm. 169 D. [Greek: nu=n me\\n tou=to\nxugch\u00f4r\u00ea/s\u00f4men, dunato\\n ei)=nai gene/sthai e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas--i)/thi\nd\u00ea\\ ou)=n, ei) o(/, ti ma/lista dunato\\n tou=to, ti/ ma=llon oi(=o/n\nte/ e)stin ei)de/nai a(/ te/ tis oi)=de kai\\ a(\\ m\u00ea/? tou=to ga\\r\nd\u00ea/pou e)/phamen ei)=nai to\\ gign\u00f4/skein au(to\\n kai\\ s\u00f4phronei=n.]]\n\n[Footnote 21: Plato, Charm. 170-171. 171 C: [Greek: Panto\\s a)/ra\nma=llon, ei) \u00ea( s\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ea e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas e)pis\u00ea/m\u00ea mo/non e)sti\\ kai\\\na)nepist\u00eamosu/n\u00eas, ou)/te i)atro\\n diakri=nai oi(/a te e)/stai\ne)pista/menon ta\\ t\u00ea=s te/chn\u00eas, \u00ea)\\ m\u00ea\\ e)pista/menon prospoiou/menon\nde\\ \u00ea)\\ oi)o/menon, ou)/te a)//lon ou)de/na t\u00f4=n e)pistame/n\u00f4n\nkai\\ o(tiou=n, pl\u00ea/n ge to\\n au(tou= o(mo/technon, \u00f4(/sper oi(\na)/lloi d\u00eamiourgoi/.]]\n\n[Side-note: Temperance, therefore, as thus defined, would be\nof little or no value.]\n\nBut if this be all that temperance can do, of what use is it to us\n(continues Sokrates)? It is indeed a great benefit to know how much\nwe know, and how much we do not know: it is also a great benefit to\nknow respecting others, how much _they_ know, and how much they\ndo not know. If thus instructed, we should make fewer mistakes: we\nshould do by ourselves only what we knew how to do,--we should commit\nto others that which they knew how to do, and which we did not know.\nBut temperance (meaning thereby cognition of cognition and of\nnon-cognition generally) does not confer such instruction, nor have\nwe found any science which does.[22] How temperance benefits us, does\nnot yet appear.\n\n[Footnote 22: Plato, Charm. 172 A. [Greek: o(ra=|s, o(/ti ou)damou=\ne)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea ou)demi/a toiau/t\u00ea ou)=sa pe/phantai.]]\n\n[Side-note: But even granting the possibility of that which\nhas just been denied, still Temperance would be of little value.\nSuppose that all separate work were well performed, by special\npractitioners, we should not attain our end--Happiness.]\n\nBut let us even concede--what has been just shown to be impossible--that\nthrough temperance we become aware of what we do know and what\nwe do not know. Even upon this hypothesis, it will be of little\nservice to us. We have been too hasty in conceding that it would be a\ngreat benefit if each of us did only what he knew, committing to\nothers to do only what they knew. I have an awkward suspicion\n(continues Sokrates) that after all, this would be no great\nbenefit.[23] It is true that upon this hypothesis, all operations in\nsociety would be conducted scientifically and skilfully. We should\nhave none but competent pilots, physicians, generals, &c., acting\nfor us, each of them doing the work for which he was fit. The\nsupervision exercised by temperance (in the sense above defined)\nwould guard us against all pretenders. Let us even admit that as to\nprediction of the future, we should have none but competent and\ngenuine prophets to advise us; charlatans being kept aloof by this\nsame supervision. We should thus have every thing done scientifically\nand in a workmanlike manner. But should we for that reason do well\nand be happy? Can that be made out, Kritias?[24]\n\n[Footnote 23: Plato, Charm. 172-173.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Plato, Charm. 173 C-D. [Greek: kateskeuasme/non d\u00ea\\\nou(/t\u00f4 to\\ a)nthr\u00f4/pinon ge/nos o(/ti me\\n e)pist\u00eamo/n\u00f4s a)\\n pra/ttoi\nkai\\ z\u00f4=|\u00ea, e(/pomai--o(/ti d' e)pist\u00eamo/n\u00f4s a)\\n pra/ttontes eu)= a)\\n\npra/ttoimen kai\\ eu)daimonoi=men, tou=to de\\ ou(/p\u00f4 duna/metha\nmathei=n, \u00f4)= phi/le Kriti/a.]]\n\n[Side-note: Which of the varieties of knowledge contributes\nmost to well-doing or happiness? That by which we know good and\nevil.]\n\n_Krit._--You will hardly find the end of well-doing anywhere\nelse, if you deny that it follows on doing scientifically or\naccording to knowledge.[25] _Sokr._--But according to knowledge,\nof _what_? Of leather-cutting, brazen work, wool, wood, &c.?\n_ Krit._--No, none of these. _Sokr._--Well then, you see,\nwe do not follow out consistently your doctrine--That the happy man\nis he who lives scientifically, or according to knowledge. For all\nthese men live according to knowledge, and still you do not admit\nthem to be happy. Your definition of happiness applies only to some\nportion of those who live according to knowledge, but not to all. How\nare we to distinguish which of them? Suppose a man to know every\nthing past, present, and future; which among the fractions of such\nomniscience would contribute most to make him happy? Would they all\ncontribute equally? _Krit._--By no means. _Sokr._--Which of\nthem then would contribute most? Would it be that by which he knew\nthe art of gaming? _Krit._--Certainly not. _Sokr._--Or that\nby which he knew the art of computing? _Krit._--No.\n_Sokr._--Or that by which he knew the conditions of health?\n_Krit._--That will suit better. _Sokr._--But which of them\nmost of all? _Krit._--That by which he knew good and evil.[26]\n\n[Footnote 25: Plato, Charm. 173 D. [Greek: A)lla\\ me/ntoi, \u00ea)= d' o(/s,\nou) r(a|di/\u00f4s eu(r\u00ea/seis a)/llo ti te/los tou= eu)= pra/ttein\ne)a\\n to\\ e)pist\u00eamo/n\u00f4s a)tima/s\u00eas.]]\n\n[Footnote 26: Plato, Charm. 174.]\n\n[Side-note: Without the science of good and evil, the other\nspecial science will be of little or of no service. Temperance is not\nthe science of good and evil, and is of little service.]\n\n_Sokr._--Here then, you have been long dragging me round in a\ncircle, keeping back the fact, that well-doing and happiness does not\narise from living according to science generally, not of all other\nmatters taken together--but from living according to the science of\nthis one single matter, good and evil. If you exclude this last, and\nleave only the other sciences, each of these others will work as\nbefore: the medical man will heal, the weaver will prepare clothes,\nthe pilot will navigate his vessel, the general will conduct his\narmy--each of them scientifically. Nevertheless, that each of these\nthings shall conduce to our well-being and profit, will be an\nimpossibility, if the science of good and evil be wanting.[27] Now\nthis science of good and evil, the special purpose of which is to\nbenefit us,[28] is altogether different from temperance; which you\nhave defined as the science of cognition and non-cognition, and which\nappears not to benefit us at all. _Krit._--Surely it does\nbenefit us: for it presides over and regulates all the other\nsciences, and of course regulates this very science, of good and\nevil, among the rest. _Sokr._--In what way can it benefit us? It\ndoes not procure for us any special service, such as good health:\n_that_ is the province of medicine: in like manner, each\nseparate result arises from its own producing art. To confer benefit\nis, as we have just laid down, the special province of the science of\ngood and evil.[29] Temperance, as the science of cognition and\nnon-cognition, cannot work any benefit at all.\n\n[Footnote 27: Plato, Charm. 174 C-D. [Greek: e)pei\\ ei) the/leis\ne)xelei=n tau/t\u00ean t\u00ea\\n e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean] (of good and evil) [Greek: e)k\nt\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n e)pist\u00eam\u00f4=n, \u00ea(=tto/n ti \u00ea( me\\n i)atrik\u00ea\\ u(giai/nein\npoi\u00ea/sei, \u00ea( de\\ skutik\u00ea\\ u(podede/sthai, \u00ea( de\\ u(phantik\u00ea\\\n\u00ea(mphie/sthai, \u00ea( de\\ kubbern\u00eatik\u00ea\\ k\u00f4lu/sei e)n t\u00ea=| thala/tt\u00ea|\na)pothn\u00ea/skein kai\\ \u00ea( strat\u00eagik\u00ea\\ e)n pole/m\u00f4|? Ou)de\\n \u00ea(=tton, e)/ph\u00ea.\nA)lla\\ to\\ eu)= te tou/t\u00f4n e(/kasta gi/gnesthai kai\\ \u00f4)pheli/m\u00f4s\na)poleloipo\\s \u00ea(ma=s e)/stai tau/t\u00eas a)pou/s\u00eas.]]\n\n[Footnote 28: Plato, Charm. 174 D. [Greek: \u00ea(=s e)/rgon e)sti\\ to\\\n\u00f4)phelei=n \u00ea(ma=s], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Plato, Charm. 175 A. [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra u(giei/as e)/stai\nd\u00eamiourgo/s (\u00ea( s\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ea). Ou) d\u00ea=ta. A)/ll\u00eas ga\\r \u00ea)=n te/chn\u00eas\nu(giei/a, \u00ea)\\ ou)/? A)/ll\u00eas. Ou)d' a)/ra \u00f4)phelei/as, \u00f4)= e(/taire;\na)/ll\u00ea| ga\\r au)= a)pe/domen tou=to to\\ e)/rgon te/chn\u00ea| nu=n d\u00ea/;\n\u00ea)= ga/r? Pa/nu ge. P\u00f4=s ou)=n \u00f4)phe/limos e)/stai \u00ea( s\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ea,\nou)demia=s \u00f4)phelei/as ou)=sa d\u00eamiourgo/s? Ou)dam\u00f4=s, \u00f4)= S\u00f4/krates,\ne)/oike/ ge.]]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates confesses to entire failure in his\nresearch. He cannot find out what temperance is: although several\nconcessions have been made which cannot be justified.]\n\nThus then, concludes Sokrates, we are baffled in every way: we\ncannot find out what temperance is, nor what that name has been\nintended to designate. All our tentatives have failed; although, in\nour anxiety to secure some result, we have accepted more than one\ninadmissible hypothesis. Thus we have admitted that there might exist\ncognition of cognition, though our discussion tended to negative such\na possibility. We have farther granted, that this cognition of\ncognition, or science of science, might know all the operations of\neach separate and special science: so that the temperate man\n(_i.e._ he who possesses cognition of cognition) might know both\nwhat he knows and what he does not know: might know, namely, that he\nknows the former and that he does not know the latter. We have\ngranted this, though it is really an absurdity to say, that what a\nman does not know at all, he nevertheless does know after a certain\nfashion.[30] Yet after these multiplied concessions against strict\ntruth, we have still been unable to establish our definition of\ntemperance: for temperance as we defined it has, after all, turned\nout to be thoroughly unprofitable.\n\n[Footnote 30: Plato, Charm. 175 B. [Greek: kai\\ ga\\r e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean\ne)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas ei)=nai xunech\u00f4r\u00ea/samen, ou)k e)\u00f4=ntos tou= lo/gou ou)de\\\npha/skontos ei)=nai; kai\\ tau/t\u00ea| au)= t\u00ea=| e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea| kai\\ ta\\ t\u00f4=n\na)/ll\u00f4n e)pist\u00eam\u00f4=n e)/rga gign\u00f4/skein xunech\u00f4r\u00ea/samen, ou)de\\ tou=t'\ne)\u00f4=ntos tou= lo/gou, i(/na d\u00ea\\ \u00ea(mi=n ge/noito o( s\u00f4/phr\u00f4n\ne)pist\u00ea/m\u00f4n \u00f4(=n te oi)=den, o(/ti oi)=de, kai\\ \u00f4(=n m\u00ea\\ oi)=den, o(/ti\nou)k oi)=de. tou=to me\\n d\u00ea\\ kai\\ panta/pasi megaloprep\u00f4=s\nxunech\u00f4r\u00ea/samen, ou)d' e)piskepsa/menoi to\\ a)du/naton ei)=nai\na(/ tis m\u00ea\\ oi)=de m\u00eadam\u00f4=s, tau=ta ei)de/nai a(m\u00f4=s ge/ p\u00f4s; o(/ti\nga\\r ou)k oi)=de, ph\u00easi\\n au)ta\\ ei)de/nai \u00ea( \u00ea(mete/ra o(mologi/a.\nkai/toi, \u00f4(s e)g\u00f4=mai, ou)deno\\s o(/tou ou)chi\\ a)log\u00f4/teron tou=t'\na)\\n phanei/\u00ea.] This would not appear an absurdity to Aristotle.\nSee Analyt. Priora, ii. p. 67, a. 21; Anal. Post. i. 71, a. 28.]\n\n[Side-note: Temperance is and must be a good thing: but\nCharmides cannot tell whether he is temperate or not; since what\ntemperance is remains unknown.]\n\nIt is plain that we have taken the wrong road, and that I (Sokrates)\ndo not know how to conduct the enquiry. For temperance, whatever it\nmay consist in, must assuredly be a great benefit: and you,\nCharmides, are happy if you possess it. How can I tell (rejoins\nCharmides) whether I possess it or not: since even men like you and\nKritias cannot discover what it is?[31]\n\n[Footnote 31: Plato, Charm. 176 A.]\n\n\n* * * * *\n\n\n[Side-note: Expressions both from Charmides and Kritias of\npraise and devotion to Sokrates, at the close of the dialogue.\nDramatic ornament throughout.]\n\nHere ends the dialogue called Charmid\u00eas[32] after the interchange of\na few concluding compliments, forming part of the great dramatic\nrichness which characterises this dialogue from the beginning. I make\nno attempt to reproduce this latter attribute; though it is one of\nthe peculiar merits of Plato in reference to ethical enquiry,\nimparting to the subject a charm which does not naturally belong to\nit. I confine myself to the philosophical bearing of the dialogue.\nAccording to the express declaration of Sokrates, it ends in nothing\nbut disappointment. No positive result is attained. The problem--What\nis Temperance?--remains unsolved, after four or five different\nsolutions have been successively tested and repudiated.\n\n[Footnote 32: See Appendix at end of chapter.]\n\n[Side-note: The Charmides is an excellent specimen of\nDialogues of Search. Abundance of guesses and tentatives, all\nultimately disallowed.]\n\nThe Charmid\u00eas (like the Lach\u00eas) is a good illustrative specimen of\nthose Dialogues of Search, the general character and purpose of which\nI have explained in my eighth** chapter. It proves nothing: it\ndisproves several hypotheses: but it exhibits (and therein consists\nits value) the anticipating, guessing, tentative, and eliminating\nprocess, without which no defensible conclusions can be\nobtained--without which, even if such be found, no advocate can be\nformed capable of defending them against an acute cross-examiner. In most\ncases, this tentative process is forgotten or ignored: even when\nrecognised as a reality, it is set aside with indifference, often\nwith ridicule. A writer who believes himself to have solved any\nproblem, publishes his solution together with the proofs; and\nacquires deserved credit for it, if those proofs give satisfaction.\nBut he does not care to preserve, nor do the public care to know, the\nsteps by which such solution has been reached. Nevertheless in most\ncases, and in all cases involving much difficulty, there has been a\nprocess, more or less tedious, of tentative and groping--of guesses\nat first hailed as promising, then followed out to a certain extent,\nlastly discovered to be untenable. The history of science,[33]\nastronomical, physical, chemical, physiological, &c.,\nwherever it has been at all recorded, attests this constant\nantecedence of a period of ignorance, confusion, and dispute, even in\ncases where ultimately a solution has been found commanding the\nnearly unanimous adhesion of the scientific world. But on subjects\nconnected with man and society, this period of dispute and confusion\ncontinues to the present moment. No unanimity has ever been\napproached, among nations at once active in intellect and enjoying\ntolerable liberty of dissent. Moreover--apart from the condition of\ndifferent sciences among mature men--we must remember that the\ntransitive process, above described, represents the successive stages\nby which every adult mind has been gradually built up from infancy.\nTrial and error--alternate guess and rejection, generation and\ndestruction of sentiments and beliefs--is among the most widespread\nfacts of human intelligence.[34] Even those ordinary minds, which in\nmature life harden with the most exemplary fidelity into the locally\nprevalent type of orthodoxy,--have all in their earlier years gone\nthrough that semi-fluid and indeterminate period, in which the type\nto come is yet a matter of doubt--in which the head might have been\npermanently lengthened or permanently flattened, according to the\ndirection in which pressure was applied.\n\n[Footnote 33: It is not often that historians of science take much\npains to preserve and bring together the mistaken guesses and\ntentatives which have preceded great physical discoveries. One\ninstance in which this has been ably and carefully done is in the\n'Biography of Cavendish,' the chemist and natural philosopher, by Dr.\nGeo. Wilson.\n\nThe great chemical discovery of the composition of water,\naccomplished during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, has\nbeen claimed as the privilege of three eminent scientific\nmen--Cavendish, Watt, and Lavoisier. The controversy on the subject,\nvoluminous and bitter, has been the means of recording each\nsuccessive scientific phase and point of view. It will be found\nadmirably expounded in this biography. Wilson sets forth the\nmisconceptions, confusion of ideas, approximations to truth seen but\nnot followed out, &c., which prevailed upon the scientific men of\nthat day, especially under the misleading influence of the\n\"phlogiston theory,\" then universally received.\n\nTo Plato such a period of mental confusion would have been in itself\nan interesting object for contemplation and description. He might\nhave dramatised it under the names of various disputants, with the\ncross-examining Elenchus, personified in Sokrates, introduced to stir\nup the debate, either by first advocating, then refuting, a string of\nsuccessive guesses and dreams (Charmid\u00eas, 173 A) of his own, or by\nexposing similar suggestions emanating from others; especially in\nregard to the definition of _phlogiston_, an entity which then\noverspread and darkened all chemical speculation, but which every\ntheorist thought himself obliged to define. The dialogues would have\nended (as the Protagoras, Lysis, Charmid\u00eas, &c., now end) by\nSokrates deriding the ill success which had attended them in the\nsearch for an explanation, and by his pointing out that while all the\ntheorists talked familiarly about _phlogiston_ as a powerful\nagent, none of them could agree what it was.\n\nSee Dr. Wilson's 'Biography of Cavendish,' pp. 36-198-320-325, and\nelsewhere.]\n\n[Footnote 34: It is strikingly described by Plato in one of the most\nremarkable passages of the speech of Diotima in the Symposion, pp.\n207-208.]\n\n[Side-note: Trial and Error, the natural process of the human\nmind. Plato stands alone in bringing to view and dramatising this\npart of the mental process. Sokrates accepts for himself the\ncondition of conscious ignorance.]\n\nWe shall follow Plato towards the close of his career (Treatise De\nLegibus), into an imperative and stationary orthodoxy of his\nown: but in the dialogues which I have already reviewed, as well as\nin several others which I shall presently notice, no mention is made\nof any given affirmative doctrine as indispensable to arrive at\nultimately. Plato here concentrates his attention upon the\nindeterminate period of the mind: looking upon the mind not as an\nempty vessel, requiring to be filled by ready-made matter from\nwithout--nor as a blank sheet, awaiting a foreign hand to write\ncharacters upon it--but as an assemblage of latent capacities, which\nmust be called into action by stimulus and example, but which can\nonly attain improvement through multiplied trials and multiplied\nfailures. Whereas in most cases these failures are forgotten, the\npeculiarity of Plato consists in his bringing them to view with full\ndetail, explaining the reasons of each. He illustrates abundantly,\nand dramatises with the greatest vivacity, the intellectual process\nwhereby opinions are broached, at first adopted, then mistrusted,\nunmade, and re-made--or perhaps not re-made at all, but exchanged for\na state of conscious ignorance. The great hero and operator in this\nprocess is the Platonic Sokrates, who accepts for himself this\ncondition of conscious ignorance, and even makes it a matter of\ncomparative pride, that he stands nearly alone in such\nconfession.[35] His colloquial influence, working powerfully and\nalmost preternaturally,[36] not only serves both to spur and to\ndirect the activity of hearers still youthful and undecided, but also\nexposes those who have already made up their minds and confidently\nbelieve themselves to know. Sokrates brings back these latter from\nthe false persuasion of knowledge to the state of conscious\nignorance, and to the prior indeterminate condition of mind, in which\ntheir opinions have again to be put together by the tentative and\nguessing process. This tentative process, prosecuted under the drill\nof Sokrates, is in itself full of charm and interest for Plato,\nwhether it ends by finding a good solution or only by discarding a\nbad one.\n\n[Footnote 35: Plato, Apolog. Sokr. pp. 21-22-23.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Plato, Symposion, 213 E, 215-216; Menon, 80 A-B.]\n\n[Side-note: Familiar words--constantly used, with much earnest\nfeeling, but never understood nor defined--ordinary phenomenon in\nhuman society.]\n\nThe Charmid\u00eas is one of the many Platonic dialogues wherein such\nintellectual experimentation appears depicted without any positive\nresult: except as it adds fresh matter to illustrate that wide-spread\nmental fact,--(which has already come before the reader, in\nEuthyphron, Alkibiad\u00eas, Hippias, Erast\u00e6, Lach\u00eas, &c., as to\nholiness, beauty, philosophy, courage, &c., and is now brought to\nview in the case of _temperance_ also; all of them words in\nevery one's mouth, and tacitly assumed by every one as known\nquantities) the perpetual and confident judgments which mankind are\nin the habit of delivering--their apportionment of praise and blame,\nas well as of reward and punishment consequent on praise and\nblame--without any better basis than that of strong emotion imbibed\nthey know not how, and without being able to render any rational\nexplanation even of the familiar words round which such emotions are\ngrouped. No philosopher has done so much as Plato to depict in detail\nthis important fact--the habitual condition of human society, modern\nas well as ancient, and for that very reason generally unnoticed.[37]\nThe emotional or subjective value of temperance is all that Sokrates\ndetermines, and which indeed he makes his point of departure.\nTemperance is essentially among the fine, beautiful, honourable,\nthings:[38] but its rational or objective value (_i.e._, what is\nthe common object characterising all temperate acts or persons), he\ncannot determine. Here indeed Plato is not always consistent with\nhimself: for we shall come to other dialogues wherein he professes\nhimself incompetent to say whether a thing be beautiful or not, until\nit be determined what the thing is:[39] and we have already found\nSokrates declaring (in the Hippias Major), that we cannot\ndetermine whether any particular object is beautiful or not, until we\nhave first determined, What is Beauty in the Absolute, or the\nSelf-Beautiful? a problem nowhere solved by Plato.\n\n[Footnote 37: \"Whoever has reflected on the generation of ideas in\nhis own mind, or has investigated the causes of misunderstandings\namong mankind, will be obliged to proclaim as a fact deeply seated in\nhuman nature--That most of the misunderstandings and contradictions\namong men, most of the controversies and errors both in science and\nin society, arise usually from our assuming (consciously or\nunconsciously) fundamental maxims and fundamental facts as if they\nwere self-evident, and as if they must be assumed by every one else\nbesides. Accordingly we never think of closely examining them, until\nat length experience has taught us that these _self-evident_\nmatters are exactly what stand most in need of proof, and what form\nthe special root of divergent opinions.\"--(L. O. Br\u00f6cker--Untersuchungen\n\u00fcber die Glaubw\u00fcrdigkeit der alt-R\u00f6mischen Geschichte, p. 490.)]\n\n[Footnote 38: Plato, Charm. 159 B, 160 D. [Greek: \u00ea( s\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ea--t\u00f4=n\nkal\u00f4=n ti--e)n t\u00f4=| lo/g\u00f4=| t\u00f4=n kal\u00f4=n ti]. So also Sokrates\nin the Lach\u00eas (192 C), assumes that courage is [Greek: t\u00f4=n pa/nu kal\u00f4=n\npragma/t\u00f4n], though he professes not to know nor to be able to discover\nwhat courage is.]\n\n[Footnote 39: See Gorgias, 462 B, 448 E; Menon, 70 B.]\n\n[Side-note: Different ethical points of view in different\nPlatonic dialogues.]\n\nAmong the various unsuccessful definitions of temperance propounded,\nthere is more than one which affords farther example to show how\ndifferently Plato deals with the same subject in different dialogues.\nHere we have the phrase--\"to do one's own business\"--treated as an\nunmeaning puzzle, and exhibited as if it were analogous to various\nother phrases, with which the analogy is more verbal than real. But\nin the Republic, Plato admits this phrase as well understood, and\nsets it forth as the constituent element of justice; in the Gorgias,\nas the leading mark of philosophical life.[40]\n\n[Footnote 40: Plato, Republ. iv. 433, vi. 496 C, viii. 550 A;\nGorgias, 526 C. Compare also Tim\u00e6us, 72 A, Xen, Mem. ii. 9, 1.]\n\n[Side-note: Self-knowledge is here declared to be impossible.]\n\nAgain, another definition given by Kritias is, That temperance\nconsists in knowing yourself, or in self-knowledge. In commenting\nupon this definition, Sokrates makes out--first, that self-knowledge\nis impossible: next, that if possible, it would be useless. You\ncannot know yourself, he argues: you cannot know what you know, and\nwhat you do not know: to say that you know what you know, is either\ntautological or untrue--to say that you know what you do not know, is\na contradiction. All cognition must be cognition of something\ndistinct from yourself: it is a relative term which must have some\ncorrelate, and cannot be its own correlate: you cannot have cognition\nof cognition, still less cognition of non-cognition.\n\n[Side-note: In other dialogues, Sokrates declares\nself-knowledge to be essential and inestimable. Necessity for\nthe student to have presented to him dissentient points of view.]\n\nThis is an important point of view, which I shall discuss more at\nlength when I come to the Platonic The\u00e6tetus. I bring it to view here\nonly as contrasting with different language held by the Platonic\nSokrates in other dialogues; where he insists on the great value and\nindispensable necessity of self-knowledge, as a preliminary to all\nother knowledge--upon the duty of eradicating from men's minds that\nfalse persuasion of their own knowledge which they universally\ncherished--and upon the importance of forcing them to know their\nown ignorance as well as their own knowledge. In the face of this\nlast purpose, so frequently avowed by the Platonic Sokrates\n(indirectly even in this very dialogue),[41] we remark a material\ndiscrepancy, when he here proclaims self-knowledge to be impossible.\nWe must judge every dialogue by itself, illustrating it when\npracticable by comparison with others, but not assuming consistence\nbetween them as a postulate _\u00e0 priori_. It is a part of Plato's\ndramatic and tentative mode of philosophising to work out different\nethical points of view, and to have present to his mind one or other\nof them, with peculiar force in each different dialogue. The subject\nis thus brought before us on all its sides, and the reader is\nfamiliarised with what a dialectician might say, whether capable of\nbeing refuted or not. Inconsistency between one dialogue and another\nis not a fault in the Platonic dialogues of Search; but is, on the\ncontrary, a part of the training process, for any student who is\ndestined to acquire that full mastery of question and answer which\nPlato regards as the characteristic test of knowledge. It is a puzzle\nand provocative to the internal meditation of the student.\n\n[Footnote 41: Plato, Charm. 166 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Courage and Temperance are shown to have no\ndistinct meaning, except as founded on the general cognizance of good\nand evil.]\n\nIn analyzing the Lach\u00eas, we observed that the definition of courage\ngiven by Nikias was shown by Sokrates to have no meaning, except in\nso far as it coincided with the general knowledge or cognition of\ngood and evil. Here, too, in the Charmid\u00eas, we are brought in the\nlast result to the same terminus--the general cognition of good and\nevil. But Temperance, as previously good and defined, is not\ncomprehended under that cognition, and is therefore pronounced to be\nunprofitable.\n\n[Side-note: Distinction made between the special sciences and\nthe science of Good and Evil. Without this last, the special sciences\nare of no use.]\n\nThis cognition of good and evil--the science of the profitable--is\nhere (in the Charmid\u00eas) proclaimed by Sokrates to have a place of its\nown among the other sciences; and even to be first among them,\nessentially necessary to supervise and direct them, as it had been\ndeclared in Alkibiad\u00eas II. Now the same supervising place and\ndirectorship had been claimed by Kritias for Temperance as he\ndefines it--that is, self-knowledge, or the cognition of our\ncognitions and non-cognitions. But Sokrates doubts even the reality\nof such self-knowledge: and granting for argument's sake that it\nexists, he still does not see how it can be profitable. For the\nutmost which its supervision can ensure would be, that each\ndescription of work shall be scientifically done, by the skilful man,\nand not by the unskilful. But it is not true, absolutely speaking (he\nargues), that acting scientifically or with knowledge is sufficient\nfor well doing or for happiness: for the question must next be\nasked--Knowledge--of what? Not knowledge of leather-cutting, carpenter's\nor brazier's work, arithmetic, or even medicine: these, and many others,\na man may possess, and may act according to them; but still he will\nnot attain the end of being happy. All cognitions contribute in\ngreater or less proportion towards that end: but what contributes\nmost, and most essentially, is the cognition of good and evil,\nwithout which all the rest are insufficient. Of this last-mentioned\ncognition or science, it is the special object to ensure profit or\nbenefit:[42] to take care that everything done by the other sciences\nshall be done well or in a manner conducing towards the end\nHappiness. After this, there is no province left for\ntemperance--_i.e._, self-knowledge, or the knowledge of cognitions and\nnon-cognitions: no assignable way in which it can yield any benefit.[43]\n\n[Footnote 42: Plato, Charm. 174 D. [Greek: Ou)ch au(/t\u00ea| de/ ge, \u00f4(s\ne)/oiken, e)sti\\n \u00ea( s\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ea, a)ll' \u00ea(=s e)/rgon e)sti\\ to\\\n\u00f4)phelei=n \u00ea(ma=s. Ou) ga\\r e)pist\u00eam\u00f4=n ge kai\\ a)nepist\u00eamosun\u00f4=n\n\u00ea( e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea e)sti/n, a)lla\\ a)gathou= te kai\\ kakou=.]]\n\n[Footnote 43: Plato, Charm. 174 E. [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra u(giei/as e)/stai\nd\u00eamiourgo/s? Ou) d\u00ea=ta. A)/ll\u00eas ga\\r \u00ea)=n te/chn\u00eas u(gi/eia? \u00ea)\\ ou)/?\nA)/ll\u00eas; Ou)d' a)/ra \u00f4)phelei/as, \u00f4)= e(tai=re; a)/ll\u00ea| ga\\r au)=\na)pe/domen tou=to to\\ e)/rgon te/chn\u00ea| nu=n d\u00ea/; \u00ea)= ga\\r? Pa/nu ge.\nP\u00f4=s ou)=n \u00f4)phe/limos e)/stai \u00ea(s\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ea, ou)demia=s \u00f4)phelei/as\nou)=sa d\u00eamiourgo/s? Ou)dam\u00f4=s, \u00f4)= S\u00f4/krates, e)/oike/ ge.]]\n\n[Side-note: Knowledge, always relative to some object known.\nPostulate or divination of a Science of Teleology.]\n\nTwo points are here to be noted, as contained and debated in the\nhandling of this dialogue. 1. Knowledge absolutely, is a word without\nmeaning: all knowledge is relative, and has a definite object or\n_cognitum_: there can be no _scientia scientiarum_. 2.\nAmong the various objects of knowledge (_cognita_ or\n_cognoscenda_), one is, _good and evil_. There is a science\nof good and evil, the function of which is, to watch over and compare\nthe results of the other sciences, in order to promote results of\nhappiness, and to prevent results of misery: without the supervision\nof this latter science, the other sciences might be all exactly\nfollowed out, but no rational comparison could be had between\nthem.[44] In other words, there is a science of Ends, estimating the\ncomparative worth of each End in relation to other Ends (Teleology):\ndistinct from those other more special sciences, which study the\nmeans each towards a separate End of its own. Here we fall into the\nsame track as we have already indicated in Lach\u00eas and Alkibiad\u00eas II.\n\n[Footnote 44: Compare what has been said upon the same subject in my\nremarks on Alkib. i. and ii. p. 31.**]\n\n[Side-note: Courage and Temperance, handled both by Plato and\nby Aristotle. Comparison between the two.]\n\nThese matters I shall revert to in other dialogues, where we shall\nfind them turned over and canvassed in many different ways. One\nfarther observation remains to be made on the Lach\u00eas and Charmid\u00eas,\ndiscussing as they do Courage (which is also again discussed in the\nProtagoras) and Temperance. An interesting comparison may be made\nbetween them and the third book of the Nikomachean Ethics of\nAristotle,[45] where the same two subjects are handled in the\nAristotelian manner. The direct, didactic, systematising, brevity of\nAristotle contrasts remarkably with the indirect and circuitous\nprolixity, the multiplied suggestive comparisons, the shifting points\nof view, which we find in Plato. Each has its advantages: and both\ntogether will be found not more than sufficient, for any one who is\nseriously bent on acquiring what Plato calls knowledge, with the\ncross-examining power included in it. Aristotle is greatly superior\nto Plato in one important attribute of a philosopher: in the care\nwhich he takes to discriminate the different significations of the\nsame word: the univocal and the equivocal, the generically identical\nfrom the remotely analogical, the proper from the improper, the\nliteral from the metaphorical. Of such precautions we discover little\nor no trace in Plato, who sometimes seems not merely to neglect, but\neven to deride them. Yet Aristotle, assisted as he was by all Plato's\nspeculations before us, is not to be understood as having superseded\nthe necessity for that negative Elenchus which animates the Platonic\ndialogues of Search: nor would his affirmative doctrines have held\ntheir grounds before a cross-examining Sokrates.\n\n[Footnote 45: Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. iii. p. 1115, 1119; also Ethic.\nEudem. iii. 1229-1231.\n\nThe comments of Aristotle upon the doctrine of Sokrates respecting\nCourage seem to relate rather to the Protagoras than to the Lach\u00eas of\nPlato. See Eth. Nik. 1116, 6, 4; Eth. Eud. 1229, a. 15.]\n\n\nAPPENDIX.\n\n\nThe dialogue Charmid\u00eas is declared to be spurious, not only by Ast,\nbut also by Socher (Ast, Platon's Leb. pp. 419-428; Socher, Ueber\nPlaton, pp. 130-137). Steinhart maintains the genuineness of the\ndialogue against them; declaring (as in regard to the Lach\u00eas) that he\ncan hardly conceive how critics can mistake the truly Platonic\ncharacter of it, though here too, as in the Lach\u00eas, he detects\n\"adolescenti\u00e6 vestigia\" (Steinhart, Einleit. zum Charmid\u00eas,\npp. 290-293).\n\nSchleiermacher considers Charmid\u00eas as well as Lach\u00eas to be appendixes\nto the Protagoras, which opinion both Stallbaum (Proleg. ad Charm, p.\n121; Proleg. ad Lachet. p. 30, 2nd ed.) and Steinhart controvert.\n\nThe views of Stallbaum respecting the Charmid\u00eas are declared by\nSteinhart (p. 290) to be \"recht \u00e4usserlich und oberfl\u00e4chlich\". To me\nthey appear much nearer the truth than the profound and recondite\nmeanings, the far-sighted indirect hints, which Steinhart himself\nperceives or supposes in the words of Plato.\n\nThese critics consider the dialogue as composed during the government\nof the Thirty at Athens, in which opinion I do not concur.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XX.\n\nLYSIS.\n\n\n[Side-note: Analogy between Lysis and Charmid\u00eas. Richness of\ndramatic incident in both. Youthful beauty.]\n\nThe Lysis, as well as the Charmid\u00eas, is a dialogue recounted by\nSokrates himself, describing both incidents and a conversation in a\ncrowded Pal\u00e6stra; wherein not merely bodily exercises were habitually\npractised, but debate was carried on and intellectual instruction\ngiven by a Sophist named Mikkus, companion and admirer of Sokrates.\nThere is a lively dramatic commencement, introducing Sokrates into\nthe Pal\u00e6stra, and detailing the preparation and scenic arrangements,\nbefore the real discussion opens. It is the day of the Herm\u00e6a, or\nfestival of Hermes, celebrated by sacrifice and its accompanying\nbanquets among the frequenters of gymnasia.\n\n[Side-note: Scenery and personages of the Lysis.]\n\nLysis, like Charmid\u00eas, is an Athenian youth, of conspicuous beauty,\nmodesty, and promise. His father Demokrates represents an ancient\nfamily of the \u00c6xonian Deme in Attica, and is said to be descended\nfrom Zeus and the daughter of the Arch\u00eaget\u00eas or Heroic Founder of\nthat Deme. The family moreover are so wealthy, that they have gained\nmany victories at the Pythian, Isthmian, and Nemean games, both with\nhorses and with chariots and four. Menexenus, companion of Lysis, is\nsomewhat older, and is his affectionate friend. The persons who\ninvite Sokrates into the pal\u00e6stra, and give occasion to the debate,\nare Ktesippus and Hippothal\u00eas: both of them adults, yet in the vigour\nof age. Hippothal\u00eas is the Erastes of Lysis, passionately attached to\nhim. He is ridiculed by Ktesippus for perpetually talking about\nLysis, as well as for addressing to him compositions both in prose\nand verse, full of praise and flattery; extolling not only his\npersonal beauty, but also his splendid ancestry and position.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Plato, Lysis, 203-205.]\n\n[Side-note: Origin of the conversation. Sokrates promises to\ngive an example of the proper way of talking to a youth, for his\nbenefit.]\n\nIn reference to these addresses, Sokrates remonstrates with\nHippothal\u00eas on the imprudence and mischief of addressing to a youth\nflatteries calculated to turn his head. He is himself then invited by\nHippothal\u00eas to exhibit a specimen of the proper mode of talking to\nyouth; such as shall be at once acceptable to the person addressed,\nand unobjectionable. Sokrates agrees to do so, if an opportunity be\nafforded him of conversing with Lysis.[2] Accordingly after some\nwell-imagined incidents, interesting as marks of Greek manners--Sokrates\nand Ktesippus with others seat themselves in the pal\u00e6stra,\namidst a crowd of listeners.[3] Lysis, too modest at first to\napproach, is emboldened to sit down by seeing Menexenus seated by the\nside of Sokrates: while Hippothal\u00eas, not daring to put himself where\nLysis can see him, listens, but conceals himself behind some of the\ncrowd. Sokrates begins the conversation with Menexenus and Lysis\njointly: but presently Menexenus is called away for a moment, and he\ntalks with Lysis singly.\n\n[Footnote 2: Plato, Lysis, 206.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Plato, Lysis, 206-207.]\n\n[Side-note: Conversation of Sokrates with Lysis.]\n\n_Sokr._--Well--Lysis--your father and mother love you extremely.\n_Lysis._--Assuredly they do. _Sokr._--They would wish you\ntherefore to be as happy as possible. _Lysis._--Undoubtedly.\n_Sokr._--Do you think any man happy, who is a slave, and who is\nnot allowed to do any thing that he desires? _Lysis._--I do not\nthink him happy at all. _Sokr._--Since therefore your father and\nmother are so anxious that you should be happy, they of course allow\nyou to do the things which you desire, and never reprove nor forbid\nyou. _Lysis._--Not at all, by Zeus, Sokrates: there are a great\nmany things that they forbid me. _Sokr._--How say you! they wish\nyou to be happy--and they hinder you from doing what you wish! Tell\nme, for example, when one of your father's chariots is going to run a\nrace, if you wished to mount and take the reins, would not they allow\nyou to do so? _Lysis._--No--certainly: they would not allow me.\n_Sokr._--But whom do they allow, then? _Lysis._--My father\nemploys a paid charioteer. _Sokr._--What! do they permit a\nhireling, in preference to _you_, to do what he wishes with the\nhorses? and do they give him pay besides for doing so?\n_Lysis._--Why--to be sure. _Sokr._--But doubtless, I imagine, they\ntrust the team of mules to your direction; and if you chose to take\nthe whip and flog, they would allow you? _Lysis._--Allow me? not at\nall. _Sokr._--What! is no one allowed to flog them?\n_Lysis._--Yes--certainly--the mule-groom. _Sokr._--Is he a\nslave or free? _Lysis._--A slave. _Sokr._--Then, it seems,\nthey esteem a slave higher than you their son; trusting their\nproperty to him rather than to you, letting _him_ do what he\npleases, while they forbid you. But tell me farther: do they allow\nyou to direct yourself--or do not they even trust you so far as that?\n_Lysis._--How can you imagine that they trust me? _Sokr._--But\ndoes any one else direct you? _Lysis._--Yes--this tutor\nhere. _Sokr._--Is he a slave? _Lysis._--To be sure:\nbelonging to our family. _Sokr._--That is shocking: one of free\nbirth to be under the direction of a slave! But what is it that he\ndoes, as your director? _Lysis._--He conducts me to my teacher's\nhouse. _Sokr._--What! do _they_ govern you also, these\nteachers? _Lysis._--Undoubtedly they do. _Sokr._--Then your\nfather certainly is bent on putting over you plenty of directors and\ngovernors. But surely, when you come home to your mother, she at\nleast, anxious that you should be happy as far as she is concerned,\nlets you do what you please about the wool or the web, when she is\nweaving: she does not forbid you to meddle with the bodkin or any of\nthe other instruments of her work? _Lysis._--Ridiculous! not\nonly does she forbid me, but I should be beaten if I did meddle.\n_Sokr._--How is this, by Herakl\u00eas? Have you done any wrong to\nyour father and mother? _Lysis._--Never at all, by Zeus.\n_Sokr._--From what provocation is it, then, that they prevent\nyou in this terrible way, from being happy and doing what you wish?\nkeeping you the whole day in servitude to some one, and never your\nown master? so that you derive no benefit either from the great\nwealth of the family, which is managed by every one else rather than\nby you--or from your own body, noble as it is. Even _that_ is\nconsigned to the watch and direction of another: while you, Lysis,\nare master of nothing, nor can do any one thing of what you desire.\n_Lysis._--The reason is, Sokrates, that I am not yet old enough.\n_Sokr._--That can hardly be the reason; for to a certain extent\nyour father and mother do trust you, without waiting for you to\ngrow older. If they want any thing to be written or read for them,\nthey employ you for that purpose in preference to any one in the\nhouse: and you are then allowed to write or read first, whichever of\nthe letters you think proper. Again, when you take up the lyre,\nneither father nor mother hinder you from tightening or relaxing the\nstrings, or striking them either with your finger or with the\nplectrum. _Lysis._--They do not. _Sokr._--Why is it, then,\nthat they do not hinder you in this last case, as they did in the\ncases before mentioned? _Lysis._--I suppose it is because I know\nthis last, but did not know the others. _Sokr._--Well, my good\nfriend, you see that it is not your increase of years that your\nfather waits for; but on the very day that he becomes convinced that\nyou know better than he, he will entrust both himself and his\nproperty to your management. _Lysis._--I suppose that he will.\n_Sokr._--Ay--and your neighbour too will judge in the same way\nas your father. As soon as he is satisfied that you understand\nhouse-management better than he does, which do you think he will\nrather do--confide his house to you, or continue to manage it\nhimself? _Lysis._--I think he will confide it to me. _Sokr._--The\nAthenians too: do not you think that they also will put their affairs\ninto your management, as soon as they perceive that you have\nintelligence adequate to the task? _Lysis._--Yes: I do.\n_Sokr._--What do you say about the Great King also, by Zeus!\nWhen his meat is being boiled, would he permit his eldest son who is\nto succeed to the rule of Asia, to throw in any thing that he pleases\ninto the sauce, rather than us, if we come and prove to him that we\nknow better than his son the way of preparing sauce?\n_Lysis._--Clearly, he will rather permit us. _Sokr._--The Great King\nwill not let his son throw in even a pinch of salt: while we, if we\nchose to take up an entire handful, should be allowed to throw it in.\n_Lysis._--No doubt. _Sokr._--What if his son has a\ncomplaint in his eyes; would the Great King, knowing him to be\nignorant of medicine, allow him even to touch his own eyes or would\nhe forbid him? _Lysis._--He would forbid him. _Sokr._--As\nto us, on the contrary, if he accounted us good physicians, and if we\ndesired even to open the eyes and drop a powder into them, he would\nnot hinder us, in the conviction that we understood what we were\ndoing. _Lysis._--You speak truly. _Sokr._--All other\nmatters, in short, on which he believed us to be wiser than himself\nor his son, he would entrust to us rather than to himself or his son?\n_Lysis._--Necessarily so, Sokrates. _Sokr._--This is the\nstate of the case, then, my dear Lysis: On those matters on which we\nshall have become intelligent, all persons will put trust in us--Greeks\nas well as barbarians, men as well as women. We shall do\nwhatever we please respecting them: no one will be at all inclined to\ninterfere with us on such matters; not only we shall be ourselves\nfree, but we shall have command over others besides. These matters\nwill be really ours, because we shall derive real good from them.[4]\nAs to those subjects, on the contrary, on which we shall not have\nacquired intelligence, no one will trust us to do what we think\nright: every one,--not merely strangers, but father and mother and\nnearer relatives if there were any,--will obstruct us as much as they\ncan: we shall be in servitude so far as these subjects are concerned;\nand they will be really alien to us, for we shall derive no real good\nfrom them. Do you admit that this is the case?[5] _Lysis._--I do\nadmit it. _Sokr._--Shall we then be friends to any one, or will\nany one love us, on those matters on which we are unprofitable\n_Lysis._--Certainly not. _Sokr._--You see that neither does\nyour father love you, nor does any man love another, in so far as he\nis useless? _Lysis._--Apparently not. _Sokr._--If then you\nbecome intelligent, my boy, all persons will be your friends and all\npersons will be your kinsmen: for you will be useful and good: if you\ndo not, no one will be your friend,--not even your father nor your\nmother nor your other relatives.\n\n[Footnote 4: Plato, Lysis, 210 B. [Greek: kai\\ ou)dei\\s \u00ea(ma=s e(k\u00f4\\n\nei)=nai e)mpodiei=, a)ll' au)toi/ te e)leu/theroi e)so/metha e)n\nau)toi=s kai\\ a)/ll\u00f4n a)/rchontes, \u00ea(me/tera/ te tau=ta e)/stai;\no)n\u00easo/metha ga\\r a)p' au)t\u00f4=n.]]\n\n[Footnote 5: Plato, Lysis, 210 C. [Greek: au)toi/ te e)n au)toi=s\ne)so/metha a)/ll\u00f4n u(p\u00eakooi, kai\\ \u00ea(mi=n e)/stai a)llo/tria; ou)de\\n\nga\\r a)p' au)t\u00f4=n o)n\u00easo/metha. Sugch\u00f4rei=s ou(/t\u00f4s e)/chein?\nSugch\u00f4r\u00f4=.]]\n\nIs it possible then, Lysis, for a man to think highly of himself on\nthose matters on which he does not yet think aright? _Lysis._--How\ncan it be possible? _Sokr._--If you stand in need of a\nteacher, you do not yet think aright? _Lysis._--True.\n_Sokr._--Accordingly, you are not presumptuous on the score of\nintelligence, since you are still without intelligence.\n_Lysis._--By Zeus, Sokrates, I think not.[6]\n\n[Footnote 6: Plato, Lysis, 210 D. [Greek: Oi(=o/n te ou)=n e)pi\\\ntou/tois, \u00f4)= Lu/si, me/ga phronei=n, e)n oi(=s tis m\u00ea/p\u00f4 phronei=?\nKai\\ p\u00f4=s a)\\n? e)/ph\u00ea. Ei) d' a)/ra su\\ didaska/lou de/ei, ou)/p\u00f4\nphronei=s. A)l\u00eath\u00ea=.\n\nOu)d' a)/ra megalo/phr\u00f4n ei)=, ei)/per a)/phr\u00f4n e)/ti. Ma\\ Di/',\ne)/ph\u00ea, \u00f4)= S\u00f4/krates, ou)/ moi dokei=.]\n\nThere is here a double sense of [Greek: me/ga phronei=n,\nmegalo/phr\u00f4n], which cannot easily be made to pass into any other\nlanguage.]\n\n[Side-note: Lysis is humiliated. Distress of Hippothal\u00eas.]\n\nWhen I heard Lysis speak thus (continues Sokrates, who is here the\nnarrator), I looked towards Hippothal\u00eas and I was on the point of\ncommitting a blunder: for it occurred to me to say, That is the way,\nHippothal\u00eas, to address a youth whom you love: you ought to check and\nhumble him, not puff him up and spoil him, as you have hitherto done.\nBut when I saw him agitated and distressed by what had been said, I\ncalled to mind that, though standing close by, he wished not to be\nseen by Lysis. Accordingly, I restrained myself and said nothing of\nthe kind.[7]\n\n[Footnote 7: Plato, Lysis, 210 E.]\n\n[Side-note: Lysis entreats Sokrates to talk in the like strain\nto Menexenus.]\n\nLysis accepts this as a friendly lesson, inculcating humility: and\nseeing Menexenus just then coming back, he says aside to Sokrates,\nTalk to Menexenus, as you have been talking to me. You can tell him\nyourself (replies Sokrates) what you have heard from me: you listened\nvery attentively. Most certainly I shall tell him (says Lysis): but\nmeanwhile pray address to him yourself some other questions, for me\nto hear. You must engage to help me if I require it (answers\nSokrates): for Menexenus is a formidable disputant, scholar of our\nfriend Ktesippus, who is here ready to assist him. I know he is\n(rejoined Lysis), and it is for that very reason that I want you to\ntalk to him--that you may chasten and punish him.[8]\n\n[Footnote 8: Plato, Lysis, 211 B-C. [Greek: a)ll' o(/ra o(/p\u00f4s\ne)pikour\u00ea/seis moi, e)a/n me e)le/gchein e)picheir\u00ea=| o( Mene/xenos.\n\u00ea)\\ ou)k oi)=stha o(/ti e)ristiko/s e)sti? Nai\\ ma\\ Di/a, e)/ph\u00ea,\nspho/dra ge. dia\\ tau=ta/ toi kai\\ bou/lomai/ se au)t\u00f4=|\ndiale/gesthai--i(/n' au)to\\n kola/s\u00ea|s.]\n\nCompare Xenophon, Memor. i. 4, 1, where he speaks of the chastising\npurpose often contemplated by Sokrates in his conversation--[Greek:\na)\\ e)kei=nos kolast\u00eari/ou e(/neka tou\\s pa/nt' oi)ome/nous ei)de/nai\ne)r\u00f4t\u00f4=n \u00ea)/legchen.]]\n\n[Side-note: Value of the first conversation between Sokrates\nand Lysis, as an illustration of the Platonico-Sokratic manner.]\n\nI have given at length, and almost literally (with some few\nabbreviations), this first conversation between Sokrates and Lysis,\nbecause it is a very characteristic passage, exhibiting conspicuously\nseveral peculiar features of the Platonico-Sokratic interrogation.\nFacts common and familiar are placed in a novel point of view,\ningeniously contrasted, and introduced as stepping-stones to a very\nwide generality. Wisdom or knowledge is exalted into the ruling force\nwith liberty of action not admissible except under its guidance:\nthe questions are put in an inverted half-ironical tone (not uncommon\nwith the historical Sokrates[9]), as if an affirmative answer were\nexpected as a matter of course, while in truth the answer is sure to\nbe negative: lastly, the purpose of checking undue self-esteem is\nproclaimed. The rest of the dialogue, which contains the main\nsubstantive question investigated, I can report only in brief\nabridgment, with a few remarks following.\n\n[Footnote 9: See the conversation of Sokrates with Glaukon in\nXenophon, Memor. iii. 6; also the conversation with Perikles, iii. 5,\n23-24.]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates begins to examine Menexenus respecting\nfriendship. Who is to be called a friend? Halt in the dialogue.]\n\nSokrates begins, as Lysis requests, to interrogate Menexenus--first\npremising--Different men have different tastes: some love horses and\ndogs, others wealth or honours. For my part, I care little about all\nsuch acquisitions: but I ardently desire to possess friends, and I\nwould rather have a good friend than all the treasures of Persia. You\ntwo, Menexenus and Lysis, are much to be envied, because at your\nearly age, each of you has made an attached friend of the other. But\nI am so far from any such good fortune, that I do not even know how\nany man becomes the friend of another. This is what I want to ask\nfrom you, Menexenus, as one who must know,[10] having acquired such a\nfriend already.\n\n[Footnote 10: Plato, Lysis, 211-212.]\n\nWhen one man loves another, which becomes the friend of which? Does\nhe who loves, become the friend of him whom he loves, whether the\nlatter returns the affection or not? Or is the person loved, whatever\nbe his own dispositions, the friend of the person who loves him? Or\nis reciprocity of affection necessary, in order that either shall be\nthe friend of the other?\n\nThe speakers cannot satisfy themselves that the title of\n_friend_ fits either of the three cases;[11] so that this line\nof interrogating comes to a dead lock. Menexenus avows his\nembarrassment, while Lysis expresses himself more hopefully.\n\n[Footnote 11: Plato, Lysis, 212-213. 213 C:--[Greek: ei) m\u00ea/te oi(\nphilou=ntes (1) phi/loi e)/sontai, m\u00ea/th' oi( philou/menoi (2),\nm\u00ea/th' oi( philou=nte/s te kai\\ philou/menoi] (3), &c. Sokrates\nhere professes to have shown grounds for rejecting all these three\nsuppositions. But if we follow the preceding argument, we shall see\nthat he has shown grounds only against the first two, not against the\nthird.]\n\n[Side-note: Questions addressed to Lysis. Appeal to the maxims\nof the poets. Like is the friend of like. Canvassed and rejected.]\n\nSokrates now takes up a different aspect of the question, and\nturns to Lysis, inviting him to consider what has been laid down\nby the poets, \"our fathers and guides in respect of wisdom\".[12]\nHomer says that the Gods originate friendship, by bringing the like\nman to his like: Empedokles and other physical philosophers have also\nasserted, that like must always and of necessity be the friend of\nlike. These wise teachers cannot mean (continues Sokrates) that bad\nmen are friends of each other. The bad man can be no one's friend. He\nis not even like himself, but ever wayward and insane:--much less can\nhe be like to any one else, even to another bad man. They mean that\nthe good alone are like to each other, and friends to each other.[13]\nBut is this true? What good, or what harm, can like do to like, which\nit does not also do to itself? How can there be reciprocal love\nbetween parties who render to each other no reciprocal aid? Is not\nthe good man, so far forth as good, sufficient to himself,--standing\nin need of no one--and therefore loving no one? How can good men care\nmuch for each other, seeing that they thus neither regret each other\nwhen absent, nor have need of each other when present?[14]\n\n[Footnote 12: Plato, Lysis, 213 E: [Greek: skopou=nta kata\\ tou\\s\npoi\u00eata/s; ou(=toi ga\\r \u00ea(mi=n \u00f4(/sper pate/res t\u00ea=s sophi/as ei)si\\\nkai\\ \u00ea(gemo/nes.]]\n\n[Footnote 13: Plato, Lysis, 214.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Plato, Lysis 215 B: [Greek: O( de\\ m\u00ea/ tou deo/menos,\nou)de/ ti a)gap\u00f4/| a)\\n. . . . O(\\ de\\ m\u00ea\\ a)gap\u00f4/|\u00ea, ou)d' a)\\n\nphiloi=. . . . P\u00f4=s ou)=n oi( a)gathoi\\ toi=s a)gathoi=s \u00ea(mi=n phi/loi\ne)/sontai t\u00ea\\n a)rch\u00ea/n, oi(\\ m\u00ea/te a(po/ntes potheinoi\\\na)ll\u00ea/lois--i(kanoi\\ ga\\r e(autoi=s kai\\ ch\u00f4ri\\s o)/ntes--m\u00ea/te paro/ntes\nchrei/an au)t\u00f4=n e)/chousi? tou\\s d\u00ea\\ toiou/tous ti/s m\u00eachan\u00ea\\ peri\\\npollou= poiei=sthai a)ll\u00ealous?]]\n\n[Side-note: Other poets declare that likeness is a cause of\naversion; unlikeness, of friendship. Reasons _pro_ and\n_con_. Rejected.]\n\nIt appears, therefore, Lysis (continues Sokrates), that we are\ntravelling in the wrong road, and must try another direction. I now\nremember to have recently heard some one affirming--contrary to what\nwe have just said--that likeness is a cause of aversion, and**\nunlikeness a cause of friendship. He too produced evidence from the\npoets: for Hesiod tells us, that \"potter is jealous of potter, and\nbard of bard\". Things most alike are most full of envy, jealousy and\nhatred to each other: things most unlike, are most full of\nfriendship. Thus the poor man is of necessity a friend to the rich,\nthe weak man to the strong, for the sake of protection: the sick man,\nfor similar reason, to the physician. In general, every ignorant man\nloves, and is a friend to, the man of knowledge. Nay, there are\nalso physical philosophers, who assert that this principle\npervades all nature; that dry is the friend of moist, cold of hot,\nand so forth: that all contraries serve as nourishment to their\ncontraries. These are ingenious teachers: but if we follow them, we\nshall have the cleverest disputants attacking us immediately, and\nasking--What! is the opposite essentially a friend to its opposite?\nDo you mean that unjust is essentially the friend of just--temperate\nof intemperate--good of evil? Impossible: the doctrine cannot be\nmaintained.[15]\n\n[Footnote 15: Plato, Lysis, 215-216.]\n\n[Side-note: Confusion of Sokrates. He suggests, That the\nIndifferent (neither good nor evil) is friend to the Good.]\n\nMy head turns (continues Sokrates) with this confusion and puzzle--since\nneither like is the friend of like, nor contrary of contrary.\nBut I will now hazard a different guess of my own.[16] There are\nthree genera in all: the good--the evil--and that which is neither\ngood nor evil, the indifferent. Now we have found that good is not a\nfriend to good--nor evil to evil--nor good to evil--nor evil to good.\nIf therefore there exist any friendship at all, it must be the\nindifferent that is friend, either to its like, or to the good: for\nnothing whatever can be a friend to evil. But if the indifferent be a\nfriend at all, it cannot be a friend to its own like; since we have\nalready shown that like generally is not friend to like. It remains\ntherefore, that the indifferent, in itself neither good nor evil, is\nfriend to the good.[17]\n\n[Footnote 16: Plato, Lysis, 216 C-D: [Greek: t\u00f4=| o)/nti au)to\\s\ni)liggi\u00f4= u(po\\ t\u00ea=s tou= lo/gou a)pori/as--Le/g\u00f4 toi/nun\na)pomanteuo/menos], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Plato, Lysis, 216 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Suggestion canvassed. If the Indifferent is friend\nto the Good, it is determined to become so by the contact of felt\nevil, from which it is anxious to escape.]\n\nYet hold! Are we on the right scent? What reason is there to\ndetermine, on the part of the indifferent, attachment to the good? It\nwill only have such attachment under certain given circumstances:\nwhen, though neither good nor evil in itself, it has nevertheless\nevil associated with it, of which it desires to be rid. Thus the body\nin itself is neither good nor evil: but when diseased, it has evil\nclinging to it, and becomes in consequence of this evil, friendly to\nthe medical art as a remedy. But this is true only so long as the\nevil is only apparent, and not real: so long as it is a mere\nsuperficial appendage, and has not become incorporated with the\nessential nature of the body. When evil has become engrained,\nthe body ceases to be indifferent (_i.e._, neither good nor\nevil), and loses all its attachment to good. Thus that which\ndetermines the indifferent to become friend of the good, is, the\ncontact and pressure of accessory evil not in harmony with its own\nnature, accompanied by a desire for the cure of such evil.[18]\n\n[Footnote 18: Plato, Lysis, 217 E: [Greek: To\\ m\u00ea/te kako\\n a)/ra\nm\u00ea/t' a)gatho\\n e)ni/ote kakou= paro/ntos ou)/p\u00f4 kako/n e)stin,\ne)/sti d' o(/te \u00ea)/d\u00ea to\\ toiou=ton ge/gonen. Pa/nu ge. Ou)kou=n\no(/tan m\u00ea/p\u00f4 lalo\\n \u00ea(=| kakou= paro/ntos, au)t\u00ea\\ me\\n \u00ea( parousi/a\na)gathou= au)to\\ poiei= e)pithumei=n, \u00ea( de\\ kako\\n poiou=sa\na)posterei= au)to\\ t\u00ea=s t' e)pithumi/as a)/ma kai\\ t\u00ea=s phili/as\nta)gathou=. Ou) ga\\r e)/ti e)sti\\n ou)/te kako\\n ou)/t' a)gatho/n,\na)lla\\ kako/n; phi/lon de\\ a)gath\u00f4=| kako\\n ou)k \u00ea)=n.]]\n\n[Side-note: Principle illustrated by the philosopher. His\nintermediate condition--not wise, yet painfully feeling his own\nignorance.]\n\nUnder this head comes the explanation of the philosopher--the friend\nor lover of wisdom. The man already wise is not a lover of wisdom:\nnor the man thoroughly bad and stupid, with whose nature ignorance is\nengrained. Like does not love like, nor does contrary love contrary.\nThe philosopher is intermediate between the two: he is not wise, but\nneither has he yet become radically stupid and unteachable. He has\nignorance cleaving to him as an evil, but he knows his own ignorance,\nand yearns for wisdom as a cure for it.[19]\n\n[Footnote 19: Plato, Lysis, 218 A. [Greek: dia\\ tau=ta d\u00ea\\ phai=men\na)\\n kai\\ tou\\s \u00ea)/d\u00ea sophou\\s m\u00eake/ti philosophei=n, ei)/te theoi\\\nei)/te a)/nthr\u00f4poi/ ei)sin ou(=toi; ou)d' au)= e)kei/nous\nphilosophei=n tou\\s ou(/t\u00f4s a)/gnoian e)/chontas \u00f4(/ste kakou\\s\nei)=nai; kako\\n ga\\r kai\\ a)math\u00ea= ou)de/na philosophei=n. lei/pontai\nd\u00ea\\ oi( e)/chontes me\\n to\\ kako\\n tou=to, t\u00ea\\n a)/gnoian, m\u00ea/p\u00f4 de\\\nu(p' au)tou= o)/ntes a)gn\u00f4/mones m\u00ead' a)mathei=s, a)ll' e)/ti\n\u00ea(gou/menoi m\u00ea\\ ei)de/nai a(\\ m\u00ea\\ i)/sasin. dio\\ d\u00ea\\ philosophou=sin\noi( ou)/te a)gathoi\\ ou)/te kakoi/ p\u00f4 o)/ntes. o(/soi de\\ kakoi\\, ou)\nphilosophou=sin, ou)de\\ oi( a)gathoi/.]\n\nCompare Plato, Symposion, 204.]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates dissatisfied. He originates a new\nsuggestion. The Primum Amabile, or object originally dear to us,\n_per se_: by relation or resemblance to which other objects\nbecome dear.]\n\nThe two young collocutors with Sokrates welcome this explanation\nheartily, and Sokrates himself appears for the moment satisfied with\nit. But he presently bethinks himself, and exclaims, Ah! Lysis and\nMenexenus, our wealth is all a dream! we have been yielding again to\ndelusions! Let us once more examine. You will admit that all\nfriendship is on account of something and for the sake of something:\nit is relative both to some producing cause, and to some prospective\nend. Thus the body, which is in itself neither good nor evil, becomes\nwhen sick a friend to the medical art: on account of sickness, which\nis an evil--and for the sake of health, which is a good. The medical\nart is dear to us, because health is dear: but is there any thing\nbehind, for the sake of which health also is dear? It is plain\nthat we cannot push the series of references onward for ever, and\nthat we must come ultimately to something which is dear _per\nse_, not from reference to any ulterior _aliud_. We must come\nto some _primum amabile_, dear by its own nature, to which all\nother dear things refer, and from which they are derivatives.[20] It\nis this _primum amabile_ which is the primitive, essential, and\nconstant, object of our affections: we love other things only from\ntheir being associated with it. Thus suppose a father tenderly\nattached to his son, and that the son has drunk hemlock, for which\nwine is an antidote; the father will come by association to prize\nhighly, not merely the wine which saves his son's life, but even the\ncup in which the wine is contained. Yet it would be wrong to say that\nhe prizes the wine or the cup as much as his son: for the truth is,\nthat all his solicitude is really on behalf of his son, and extends\nonly in a derivative and secondary way to the wine and the cup. So\nabout gold and silver: we talk of prizing highly gold and silver--but\nthis is incorrect, for what we really prize is not gold, but the\nulterior something, whatever it be, for the attainment of which gold\nand other instrumental means are accumulated. In general terms--when\nwe say that B is dear on account of A, we are really speaking of A\nunder the name of B. What is really dear, is that primitive object of\nlove, _primum amabile_, towards which all the affections which\nwe bear to other things, refer and tend.[21]\n\n[Footnote 20: Plato, Lysis, 219 C-D. [Greek: A)=r' ou)=n ou)k\na)na/gk\u00ea a)peipei=n \u00ea(ma=s ou(/t\u00f4s i)o/ntas, kai\\ a)phike/sthai e)pi/\ntina a)rch\u00ea\\n, \u00ea)\\ ou)ke/t' e)panoi/sei e)p' a)/llo phi/lon, a)ll'\n\u00ea(/xei e)p' e)kei=no o(/ e)sti _pr\u00f4=ton phi/lon_, ou(= e(/neka\nkai\\ ta)/lla phame\\n pa/nta phi/la ei)=nai?]]\n\n[Footnote 21: Plato, Lysis, c. 37, p. 220 B. [Greek: O(/sa ga/r\nphamen phi/la ei)=nai \u00ea(mi=n e(/neka phi/lou tino/s, e(te/r\u00f4|\nr(\u00ea/mati phaino/metha le/gontes _au)to/_; phi/lon de\\ _t\u00f4=|\no)/nti_ kinduneu/ei _e)kei=no au)to\\_, ei)s o(\\ pa=sai\nau(=tai ai( lego/menai phili/ai teleut\u00f4=sin.]]\n\n[Side-note: The cause of love is desire. We desire that which\nis akin to us or our own.]\n\nIs it then true (continues Sokrates) that good is our _primum\namabile_, and dear to us in itself? If so, is it dear to us on\naccount of evil? that is, only as a remedy for evil; so that if evil\nwere totally banished, good would cease to be prized? Is it true that\nevil is the cause why any thing is dear to us?[22] This cannot be:\nbecause even if all evil were banished, the appetites and\ndesires, such of them as were neither good nor evil, would still\nremain: and the things which gratify those appetites will be dear to\nus. It is not therefore true that evil is the cause of things being\ndear to us. We have just found out another cause for loving and being\nloved--desire. He who desires, loves what he desires and as long as\nhe desires: he desires moreover that of which he is in want, and he\nis in want of that which has been taken away from him--of his\nown.[23] It is therefore this _own_ which is the appropriate\nobject of desire, friendship, and love. If you two, Lysis and\nMenexenus, love each other, it is because you are somehow of kindred\nnature with each other. The lover would not become a lover, unless\nthere were, between him and his beloved, a certain kinship or\naffinity in mind, disposition, tastes, or form. We love, by necessary\nlaw, that which has a natural affinity to us; so that the real and\ngenuine lover may be certain of a return of affection from his\nbeloved.[24]\n\n[Footnote 22: Plato, Lysis, 220 D. We may see that in this chapter\nPlato runs into a confusion between [Greek: to\\ dia/ ti] and [Greek:\nto\\ e(/neka/ tou], which two he began by carefully distinguishing.\nThus in 218 D he says, [Greek: o( phi/los e)sti\\ t\u00f4| phi/los--e(/neka/\ntou kai\\ dia/ ti.] Again 219 A, he says--[Greek: to\\ s\u00f4=ma\nt\u00ea=s i)atrik\u00ea=s phi/lon e)sti/n, _dia\\ t\u00ea\\n no/son, e(/neka t\u00ea=s\nu(giei/as_.] This is a very clear and important distinction.\n\nIt is continued in 220 D--[Greek: o(/ti _dia\\ to\\ kako\\n_\nta)gatho\\n \u00ea)gap\u00f4=men kai\\ e)philou=men, \u00f4(s pha/rmakon o)\\n tou=\nkakou= to\\ a)gatho/n, to\\ de\\ kako/n no/sma.] But in 220 E--[Greek:\nto\\ de\\ t\u00f4=| o)/nti phi/lon pa=n tou)nanti/on tou/tou phai/netai\npephuko/s; _phi/lon ga\\r \u00ea(mi=n a)nepha/n\u00ea o(\\n e(chthrou=\ne(/neka_.] To make the reasoning consistent with what had gone\nbefore, these two last words ought to be exchanged for [Greek: dia\\\nto\\ e)chthro/n]. Plato had laid down the doctrine that good is\nloved--[Greek: dia\\ to\\ kako/n], not [Greek: e(/neka tou= kakou=]. Good\nis loved on _account of evil_, but for _the sake of obtaining_\na remedy to or cessation of the evil.\n\nSteinhart (in his note on Hieron. M\u00fcller's translation of Plato, p.\n268) calls this a \"sophistisches R\u00e4thselspiel\"; and he notes other\nportions of the dialogue which \"remind us of the deceptive tricks of\nthe Sophists\" (die Trugspiele der Sophisten, see p. 222-224-227-230).\nHe praises Plato here for his \"fine pleasantry on the deceptive arts\nof the Sophists\". Admitting that Plato puts forward sophistical\nquibbles with the word [Greek: phi/los], he tells us that this is\nsuitable for the purpose of puzzling the contentious young man\nMenexenus. The confusion between [Greek: e(/neka/ tou] and [Greek:\ndia/ ti] (noticed above) appears to be numbered by Steinhart among\nthe fine jests against Protagoras, Prodikus, or some of the Sophists.\nI can see nothing in it except an unconscious inaccuracy in Plato's\nreasoning.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Plato, Lysis, 221 E. [Greek: To\\ e)pithumou=n ou(= a)\\n\ne)ndee\\s \u00ea)=|, tou/tou e)pithumei=--e)ndee\\s de\\ gi/gnetai ou(= a)/n\ntis a)phair\u00ea=tai--tou= oi)kei/ou d\u00ea/, \u00f4(s e)/oiken, o(/ te e)/r\u00f4s\nkai\\ \u00ea( phili/a kai\\ \u00ea( e)pithumi/a tugcha/nei ou)=sa.] This is the\nsame doctrine as that which we read, expanded and cast into a myth\nwith comic turn, in the speech of Aristophanes in the Symposion, pp.\n191-192-193. [Greek: e(/kastos ou)=n \u00ea(m\u00f4=n e)/stin a)nthr\u00f4/pou\nsu/mbolon, a)/te tetm\u00eame/nos \u00f4(/sper ai( ps\u00ea=ttai e)x e(no\\s du/o.\nz\u00eatei= d\u00ea\\ a)ei\\ to\\ au)tou= e(/kastos xu/mbolon] (191 D)--[Greek:\ndikai/\u00f4s a)\\n u(mnoi=men E)/r\u00f4ta, o(\\s e)/n te t\u00f4=| paro/nti plei=sta\n\u00ea(ma=s o)ni/n\u00easin ei)s to\\ oi)kei=on a)/g\u00f4n], &c. (193 D).]\n\n[Footnote 24: Plato, Lysis, 221-222.]\n\n[Side-note: Good is of a nature akin to every one, evil is\nalien to every one. Inconsistency with what has been previously laid\ndown.]\n\nBut is there any real difference between what is akin and what is\nlike? We must assume that there is: for we showed before, that like\nwas useless to like, and therefore not dear to like. Shall we say\nthat good is of a nature akin to every one, and evil of a nature\nforeign to every one? If so, then there can be no friendship except\nbetween one good man and another good man. But this too has been\nproved to be impossible. All our tentatives have been alike\nunsuccessful.\n\n[Side-note: Failure of the enquiry. Close of the dialogue.]\n\nIn this dilemma (continues Sokrates, the narrator) I was about to ask\nassistance from some of the older men around. But the tutors of\nMenexenus and Lysis came up to us and insisted on conveying their\npupils home--the hour being late. As the youths were departing I said\nto them--Well, we must close our dialogue with the confession, that\nwe have all three made a ridiculous figure in it: I, an old man, as\nwell as you two youths. Our hearers will go away declaring, that we\nfancy ourselves to be friends each to the other two; but that we have\nnot yet been able to find out what a friend is.[25]\n\n[Footnote 25: Plato, Lysis, 223 B. [Greek: Nu=n me\\n katage/lastoi\ngego/namen e)g\u00f4/ te, ger\u00f4\\n a)n\u00ea/r, kai\\ u(mei=s], &c.]\n\n\n* * * * *\n\n\n[Side-note: Remarks. No positive result. Sokratic purpose in\nanalysing the familiar words--to expose the false persuasion of\nknowledge.]\n\nThus ends the main discussion of the Lysis: not only without any\npositive result, but with speakers and hearers more puzzled than they\nwere at the beginning: having been made to feel a great many\ndifficulties which they never felt before. Nor can I perceive any\ngeneral purpose running through the dialogue, except that truly\nSokratic and Platonic purpose--To show, by cross-examination on the\ncommonest words that what every one appears to know, and talks about\nmost confidently, no one really knows or can distinctly explain.[26]\nThis is the meaning of the final declaration put into the mouth\nof Sokrates. \"We believe ourselves to be each other's friends, yet we\nnone of us know what a friend is.\" The question is one, which no one\nhad ever troubled himself to investigate, or thought it requisite to\nask from others. Every one supposed himself to know, and every one\nhad in his memory an aggregate of conceptions and beliefs which he\naccounted tantamount to knowledge: an aggregate generated by the\nunconscious addition of a thousand facts and associations, each\nseparately unimportant and often inconsistent with the remainder:\nwhile no rational analysis had ever been applied to verify the\nconsistency of this spontaneous product, or to define the familiar\nwords in which it is expressed. The reader is here involved in a\ncloud of confusion respecting Friendship. No way out of it is shown,\nand how is he to find one? He must take the matter into his own\nactive and studious meditation: which he has never yet done, though\nthe word is always in his mouth, and though the topic is among the\nmost common and familiar, upon which \"the swain treads daily with his\nclouted shoon\".\n\n[Footnote 26: Among the many points of analogy between the Lysis and\nthe Charmid\u00eas, one is, That both of them are declared to be spurious\nand unworthy of Plato, by Socher as well as by Ast (Ast, Platon's\nLeben, pp. 429-434; Socher, Ueber Platon, pp. 137-144).\n\nSchleiermacher ranks the Lysis as second in his Platonic series of\ndialogues, an appendix to the Ph\u00e6drus (Einl. p. 174 seq.); K. F.\nHermann, Stallbaum, and nearly all the other critics dissent from\nthis view: they place the Lysis as an early dialogue, along with\nCharmid\u00eas and Lach\u00eas, anterior to the Protagoras (K. F. Hermann,\nGesch. und Syst. Plat. Phil. pp. 447-448; Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Lys.\np. 90 (110 2nd ed.); Steinhart, Einl. p. 221) near to or during the\ngovernment of the Thirty. All of them profess to discover in the\nLysis \"adolescenti\u00e6 vestigia\".\n\nAst and Socher characterise the dialogue as a tissue of subtle\nsophistry and eristic contradiction, such as (in their opinion) Plato\ncannot have composed. Stallbaum concedes the sophistry, but contends\nthat it is put by Plato intentionally, for the purpose of deriding,\nexposing, disgracing, the Sophists and their dialectical tricks:\n\"ludibrii caus\u00e2\" (p. 88); \"ut illustri aliquo exemplo demonstretur\ndialecticam istam, quam adolescentes magno quodam studio sectabantur,\nnihil esse aliud, nisi inanem quandam argutiarum captatricem,\"\n&c. (p. 87). Nevertheless he contends that along with this\nderisory matter there is intermingled serious reasoning which may be\neasily distinguished (p. 87), but which certainly he does not clearly\npoint out. (Compare pp. 108-9-14-15, 2nd ed.) Schleiermacher and\nSteinhart also (pp. 222-224-227) admit the sophistry in which\nSokrates is here made to indulge. But Steinhart maintains that there\nis an assignable philosophical purpose in the dialogue, which Plato\npurposely wrapped up in enigmatical language, but of which he\n(Steinhart) professes to give the solution (p. 228).]\n\n[Side-note: Subject of Lysis. Suited for a Dialogue of Search.\nManner of Sokrates, multiplying defective explanations, and showing\nreasons why each is defective.]\n\nThis was a proper subject for a dialogue of Search. In the dialogue\nLysis, Plato describes Sokrates as engaged in one of these searches,\nhandling, testing, and dropping, one point of view after another,\nrespecting the idea and foundation of friendship. He speaks,\nprofessedly, as a diviner or guesser; following out obscure\npromptings which he does not yet understand himself.[27] In this\ncharacter, he suggests several different explanations, not only\ndistinct but inconsistent with each other; each of them true to a\ncertain extent, under certain conditions and circumstances: but each\nof them untrue, when we travel beyond those limits: other\ncontradictory considerations then interfering. To multiply defective\nexplanations, and to indicate why each is defective, is the whole\nbusiness of the dialogue.\n\n[Footnote 27: Plato, Lysis, 216 D. [Greek: le/g\u00f4 toi/nun\na)pomanteuo/menos], &c.]\n\n[Side-note: The process of trial and error is better\nillustrated by a search without result than with result. Usefulness\nof the dialogue for self-working minds.]\n\nSchleiermacher discovers in this dialogue indications of a positive\nresult not plainly enunciated: but he admits that Aristotle did not\ndiscover them--nor can I believe them to have been intended by the\nauthor.[28] But most critics speak slightingly of it, as alike\nsceptical and sophistical: and some even deny its authenticity on\nthese grounds. Plato might have replied by saying that he intended it\nas a specimen illustrating the process of search for an unknown\n_qu\u00e6situm_; and as an exposition of what can be said for, as\nwell as against, many different points of view. The process of trial\nand error, the most general fact of human intelligence, is even\nbetter illustrated when the search is unsuccessful: because when a\nresult is once obtained, most persons care for nothing else and\nforget the antecedent blunders. To those indeed, who ask only to hear\nthe result as soon as it is found, and who wait for others to look\nfor it--such a dialogue as the Lysis will appear of little value. But\nto any one who intends to search for it himself, or to study the same\nproblem for himself, the report thus presented of a previous\nunsuccessful search, is useful both as guidance and warning. Every\none of the tentative solutions indicated in the Lysis has something\nin its favour, yet is nevertheless inadmissible. To learn the grounds\nwhich ultimately compel us to reject what at first appears\nadmissible, is instruction not to be despised; at the very least, it\nhelps to preserve us from mistake, and to state the problem in the\nmanner most suitable for obtaining a solution.\n\n[Footnote 28: Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Lysis, i. p. 177.]\n\n[Side-note: Subject of friendship, handled both by the\nXenophontic Sokrates, and by Aristotle.]\n\nIn truth, no one general solution is attainable, such as Plato here\nprofesses to search for.[29] In one of the three Xenophontic\ndialogues wherein the subject of friendship is discussed we find\nthe real Sokrates presenting it with a juster view of its real\ncomplications.[30] The same remark may be made upon Aristotle's\nmanner of handling friendship in the Ethics. He seems plainly to\nallude to the Lysis (though not mentioning it by name); and to profit\nby it at least in what he puts out of consideration, if not in what\nhe brings forward.[31] He discards the physical and cosmical\nanalogies, which Plato borrows from Empedokles and Herakleitus, as\ntoo remote and inapplicable: he considers that the question must be\ndetermined by facts and principles relating to human dispositions and\nconduct. In other ways, he circumscribes the problem, by setting\naside (what Plato includes) all objects of attachment which are not\ncapable of reciprocating attachment.[32] The problem, as set forth\nhere by Plato, is conceived in great generality. In what manner does\none man become the friend of another?[33] How does a man become the\nobject of friendship or love from another? What is that object\ntowards which our love or friendship is determined? These terms are\nso large, that they include everything belonging to the Tender\nEmotion generally.[34]\n\n[Footnote 29: Turgot has some excellent remarks on the hopelessness\nof such problems as that which Plato propounds, here well as in other\ndialogues, to find definitions of common and vague terms.\n\nWe read in his article Etymologie, in the Encyclop\u00e9die (vol. iii. pp.\n70-72 of his Oeuvres Complets):\n\n\"Qu'on se r\u00e9presente la foule des acceptions du mot _esprit_,\ndepuis son sens primitif _spiritus, haleine_, jusqu'\u00e0 ceux\nqu'on lui donne dans la chimie, dans la litt\u00e9rature, dans la\njurisprudence, _esprit acide_, esprit de Montaigne, _esprit\ndes loix_, &c.--qu'on essaie d'extraire de toutes ces\nacceptions une id\u00e9e qui soit commune \u00e0 toutes--on verra s'\u00e9vanouir\ntous les caract\u00e8res qui distinguent _l'esprit_ de toute autre\nchose, dans quelque sens qu'on le prenne. . . . La multitude et\nl'incompatibilit\u00e9 des acceptions du mot _esprit_, sont telles,\nque personne n'a \u00e9t\u00e9 tent\u00e9 de les comprendre toutes dans une seule\n_d\u00e9finition_, et de d\u00e9finir l'esprit en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral. Mais le vice de\ncette m\u00e9thode n'est pas moins r\u00e9el lorsqu'il n'est pas assez sensible\npour emp\u00eacher qu'on ne la suive.\n\n\"A mesure que le nombre et la diversit\u00e9 des acceptions diminue,\nl'absurdit\u00e9 s'affoiblit: et quand elle disparoit, il reste encore\nl'erreur. J'ose dire, que presque toutes les _d\u00e9finitions_ o\u00f9\nl'on annonce qu'on va d\u00e9finir les choses _dans le sens le plus\ng\u00e9n\u00e9ral_, ont ce d\u00e9faut, et ne d\u00e9finissent v\u00e9ritablement rien:\nparceque leurs auteurs, en voulant renfermer toutes les acceptions\nd'un mot, ont entrepris une chose impossible: je veux dire, de\nrassembler sous une seule id\u00e9e g\u00e9n\u00e9rale des id\u00e9es tr\u00e8s diff\u00e9rentes\nentre elles, et qu'un m\u00eame nom n'a jamais pu d\u00e9signer que\nsuccessivement, en cessant en quelque sorte d'\u00eatre le m\u00eame mot.\"\n\nSee also the remarks of Mr. John Stuart Mill on the same subject.\nSystem of Logic, Book IV. chap. 4, s. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 30: See Xenophon, Memor. ii. 4-5-6. In the last of these\nthree conversations (s. 21-22), Sokrates says to Kritobulus [Greek:\nA)ll' e)/chei me\\n poiki/l\u00f4s p\u00f4s tau=ta, \u00f4)= Krito/boule; phu/sei\nga\\r e)/chousin oi( a)/nthr\u00f4poi ta\\ me\\n philika/; de/ontai te ga\\r\na)ll\u00ea/l\u00f4n, kai\\ e)leou=si, kai\\ sunergou=ntes \u00f4)phelou=si, kai\\\ntou=to sunie/ntes cha/rin e)/chousin a)ll\u00ea/lois, ta\\ de\\ polemika/;\nta/ te ga\\r au)ta\\ kala\\ kai\\ \u00ea(de/a nomi/zontes u(pe\\r tou/t\u00f4n\nma/chontai, kai\\ dichogn\u00f4monou=ntes e)nantiou=ntai; polemiko\\n de\\\nkai\\ e)/ris kai\\ o)rg\u00ea/; kai\\ dusmene\\s me\\n o( tou= pleonektei=n\ne)/r\u00f4s, mis\u00eato\\n de\\ o( phtho/nos.]\n\nThis observation of Sokrates is very true and valuable--that the\ncauses of friendship and the causes of enmity are both of them\nequally natural, _i.e._ equally interwoven with the constant\nconditions of individual and social life. This is very different from\nthe vague, partial, and encomiastic predicates with which [Greek: to\\\nphu/sei] is often decorated elsewhere by Sokrates himself, as well as\nby Plato and Aristotle.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Aristot. Eth. Nikom. viii. 1, p. 1155 b. Compare Plato,\nLysis, 214 A--215 E.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Aristot. Ethic. Nik. viii. 2, p. 1155, b. 28; Plato,\nLysis, 212 D.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Plato, Lysis, 212 A: [Greek: o(/ntina tro/pon gi/gnetai\nphi/los e(/teros e(te/rou.] 223 ad fin.: [Greek: o(/, ti e)sti\\n o(\nphi/los.]]\n\n[Footnote 34: See the chapter on Tender Emotion in Mr. Bain's\nelaborate classification and description of the Emotions. 'The\nEmotions and the Will,' ch. vii. p. 94 seq. (3rd ed., p. 124).\n\nIn the Lysis, 216 C-D, we read, among the suppositions thrown out by\nSokrates, about [Greek: to\\ phi/lon--kinduneu/ei kata\\ t\u00ea\\n\na)rchai/an paroimi/an to\\ kalo\\n phi/lon ei)=nai. e)/oike gou=n\nmalak\u00f4=| tini kai\\lei/\u00f4| kai\\ lipar\u00f4=|; dio\\ kai\\ i)/s\u00f4s r(a|di/\u00f4s\ndiolisthai/nei kai\\ diadu/etai \u00ea(ma=s, a(/te toiou=ton o)/n; le/g\u00f4\nga\\r ta)gatho\\n kalo\\n ei)=nai.] This allusion to the soft and the\nsmooth is not very clear; a passage in Mr. Bain's chapter serves to\nillustrate it.\n\n\"Among the sensations of the senses we find some that have the power\nof awakening tender emotion. The sensations that incline to\ntenderness are, in the first place, the effects of very gentle or\nsoft stimulants, such as soft touches, gentle sounds, slow movements,\ntemperate warmth, mild sunshine. These sensations must be felt in\norder to produce the effect, which is mental and not simply organic.\nWe have seen that an acute sensation raises a vigorous muscular\nexpression, as in wonder; a contrast to this is exhibited by gentle\npressure or mild radiance. Hence tenderness is passive emotion by\npre-eminence: we see it flourishing best in the quiescence of the\nmoving members. Remotely there may be a large amount of action\nstimulated by it, but the proper outgoing accompaniment of it is\norganic not muscular.\"\n\nThat the sensations of the soft and the smooth dispose to the Tender\nEmotion is here pointed out as a fact in human nature, agreeably to\nthe comparison of Plato. Mr. Bain's treatise has the rare merit of\ndescribing fully the physical as well as the mental characteristics\nof each separate emotion.]\n\n[Side-note: Debate in the Lysis partly verbal, partly real.\nAssumptions made by the Platonic Sokrates, questionable, such as the\nreal Sokrates would have found reason for challenging.]\n\nThe debate in the Lysis is partly verbal: _i.e._, respecting the\nword [Greek: phi/los], whether it means the person loving, or the\nperson loved, or whether it shall be confined to those cases in which\nthe love is reciprocal, and then applied to both. Herein the question\nis about the meaning of words--a word and nothing more. The following\nportions of the dialogue enter upon questions not verbal but\nreal--\"Whether we are disposed to love what is like to ourselves, or\nwhat is unlike or opposite to ourselves?\" Though both these are\noccasionally true, it is shown that as general explanations neither\nof them will hold. But this is shown by means of the following\nassumptions, which not only those whom Plato here calls the \"very\nclever Disputants,\"[35] but Sokrates himself at other times, would\nhave called in question, viz.: \"That bad men cannot be friends to\neach other--that men like to each other (therefore good men as\nwell as bad) can be of no use to each other, and therefore there can\nbe no basis of friendship between them--that the good man is\nself-sufficing, stands in need of no one, and therefore will not love\nany one.\"[36] All these assumptions Sokrates would have found sufficient\nreason for challenging, if they had been advanced by Protagoras or\nany other opponents. They stand here as affirmed by him; but here, as\nelsewhere in Plato, the reader must apply his own critical intellect,\nand test what he reads for himself.\n\n[Footnote 35: Plato, Lysis, 216 A.: [Greek: oi( pa/nsophoi a)/ndres\noi( a)ntilogikoi/], &c. Yet Plato, in the Ph\u00e6drus and Symposion,\nindicates colloquial debate as the great generating cause of the most\nintense and durable friendship. Aristeides the Rhetor says, Orat.\nxlvii. ([Greek: Pro\\s Kapi/t\u00f4na]), p. 418, Dindorf, [Greek: e)pei\\\nkai\\ Pla/t\u00f4n to\\ a)l\u00eathe\\s a(pantachou= tima=|, kai\\ ta\\s e)n toi=s\nlo/gois sunousi/as a)phorm\u00ea\\n phili/as a)l\u00eathin\u00ea=s u(polamba/nei.]]\n\n[Footnote 36: Plato, Lysis, 214-215. The discourse of Cicero, De\nAmiciti\u00e2, is composed in a style of pleasing rhetoric; suitable to\nL\u00e6lius, an ancient Roman senator and active politician, who expressly\nrenounces the accurate subtlety of Grecian philosophers (v. 18).\nThere is little in it which we can compare with the Platonic Lysis;\nbut I observe that he too, giving expression to his own feelings,\nmaintains that there can be no friendship except between the good and\nvirtuous: a position which is refuted by the \"nefaria vox,\" cited by\nhimself as spoken by C. Blossius, xi. 37.]\n\n[Side-note: Peculiar theory about friendship broached by\nSokrates. Persons neither good nor evil by nature, yet having a\nsuperficial tinge of evil, and desiring good to escape from it.]\n\nIt is thus shown, or supposed to be shown, that the persons who love\nare neither the Good, nor the Bad: and that the objects loved, are\nneither things or persons similar, nor opposite, to the persons\nloving. Sokrates now adverts to the existence of a third\ncategory--Persons who are neither good, nor bad, but intermediate between\nthe two--Objects which are intermediate between likeness and opposition.\nHe announces as his own conjecture,[37] that the Subject of friendly\nor loving feeling, is, that which is neither good nor evil: the\nObject of the feeling, Good: and the cause of the feeling, the\nsuperficial presence of evil, which the subject desires to see\nremoved.[38] The evil must be present in a superficial and removable\nmanner--like whiteness in the hair caused by white paint, not by the\ngrey colour of old age. Sokrates applies this to the state of mind of\nthe philosopher, or lover of knowledge: who is not yet either\nthoroughly good or thoroughly bad,--either thoroughly wise or\nthoroughly unwise--but in a state intermediate between the two:\nignorant, yet conscious of his own ignorance, and feeling it as a\nmisfortune which he was anxious to shake off.[39]\n\n[Footnote 37: Plato, Lysis, 216 D. [Greek: le/g\u00f4 toi/nun\na)pomanteuo/menos], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 38: Plato, Lysis, 216-217.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Plato, Lysis, 218 C. [Greek: lei/pontai d\u00ea\\ oi(\ne)/chontes me\\n to\\ kako\\ tou=to, t\u00ea\\n a)/gnoian, m\u00ea/p\u00f4 de\\ u(p'\nau)tou= o)/ntes a)gn\u00f4/mones m\u00ead' a)mathei=s, a)ll' e)/ti \u00ea(gou/menoi\nm\u00ea\\ ei)de/nai a)\\ m\u00ea\\ i)/sasi; dio\\ d\u00ea\\ philosophou=sin oi( ou)/te\na)gathoi\\ ou)/te kakoi/ p\u00f4 o)/ntes; o(/soi de\\ kakoi/, ou)\nphilosophou=sin, ou)de\\ oi( a)gathoi/.] Compare the phrase of Seneca,\nEpist. 59, p. 211, Gronov.: \"Elui difficile est: non enim inquinati\nsumus, sed infecti\".]\n\n[Side-note: This general theory illustrated by the case\nof the philosopher or lover of wisdom. Painful consciousness of\nignorance the attribute of the philosopher. Value set by Sokrates and\nPlato upon this attribute.]\n\nThis meaning of philosophy, though it is not always and consistently\nmaintained throughout the Platonic writings, is important as\nexpanding and bringing into system the position laid down by Sokrates\nin the Apology. He there disclaimed all pretensions to wisdom, but he\nannounced himself as a philosopher, in the above literal sense: that\nis, as ignorant, yet as painfully conscious of his own ignorance, and\nanxiously searching for wisdom as a corrective to it: while most men\nwere equally ignorant, but were unconscious of their own ignorance,\nbelieved themselves to be already wise, and delivered confident\nopinions without ever having analysed the matters on which they\nspoke. The conversation of Sokrates (as I have before remarked) was\nintended, not to teach wisdom, but to raise men out of this false\npersuasion of wisdom, which he believed to be the natural state of\nthe human mind, into that mental condition which he called\nphilosophy. His Elenchus made them conscious of their ignorance,\nanxious to escape from it, and prepared for mental efforts in search\nof knowledge: in which search Sokrates assisted them, but without\ndeclaring, and even professing inability to declare, where that truth\nlay in which the search was to end. He considered that this change\nwas in itself a great and serious improvement, converting what was\nevil, radical, and engrained--into evil superficial and removable;\nwhich was a preliminary condition to any positive acquirement. The\nfirst thing to be done was to create searchers after truth, men who\nwould look at the subject for themselves with earnest attention, and\nmake up their own individual convictions. Even if nothing ulterior\nwere achieved, that alone would be a great deal. Such was the scope\nof the Sokratic conversation; and such the conception of philosophy\n(the capital peculiarity which Plato borrowed from Sokrates), which\nis briefly noted in this passage of the Lysis, and developed in other\nPlatonic dialogues, especially in the Symposion,[40] which we shall\nreach presently.\n\n[Footnote 40: Plato, Sympos. 202-203-204. Ph\u00e6drus, 278 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Another theory of Sokrates. The Primum Amabile, or\noriginal and primary object of Love. Particular objects are loved\nthrough association with this. The object is, Good.]\n\nStill, however, Sokrates is not fully satisfied with this\nhypothesis, but passes on to another. If we love anything, we\nmust love it (he says) for the sake of something. This implies that\nthere must exist, in the background, a something which is the\nprimitive and real object of affection. The various things which we\nactually love, are not loved for their own sake, but for the sake of\nthis _primum amabile_, and as shadows projected by it: just as a\nman who loves his son, comes to love by association what is salutary\nor comforting to his son--or as he loves money for the sake of what\nmoney will purchase. The _primum amabile_, in the view of\nSokrates, is _Good_; particular things loved, are loved as\nshadows of good.\n\n[Side-note: Statement by Plato of the general law of mental\nassociation.]\n\nThis is a doctrine which we shall find reproduced in other dialogues.\nWe note with interest here, that it appears illustrated, by a\nstatement of the general law of mental association--the calling up of\none idea by other ideas or by sensations, and the transference of\naffections from one object to others which have been apprehended in\nconjunction with it, either as antecedents or consequents. Plato\nstates this law clearly in the Ph\u00e6don and elsewhere:[41] but he here\nconceives it imperfectly: for he seems to believe that, if an\naffection be transferred by association from a primitive object A, to\nother objects, B, C, D, &c., A always continues to be the only\nreal object of affection, while B, C, D, &c., operate upon the\nmind merely by carrying it back to A. The affection towards B, C, D,\n&c., therefore is, in the view of Plato, only the affection for A\nunder other denominations and disguises.[42] Now this is doubtless\noften the case; but often also, perhaps even more generally, it is\nnot the case. After a certain length of repetition and habit, all\nconscious reference to the primitive object of affection will\ncommonly be left out, and the affection towards the secondary object\nwill become a feeling both substantive and immediate. What was\noriginally loved as means, for the sake of an ulterior end, will in\ntime come to be loved as an end for itself; and to constitute a\nnew centre of force, from whence derivatives may branch out. It may\neven come to be loved more vehemently than any primitive object of\naffection, if it chance to accumulate in itself derivative influences\nfrom many of those objects.[43] This remark naturally presents\nitself, when we meet here for the first time, distinctly stated by\nPlato, the important psychological doctrine of the transference of\naffections by association from one object to others.\n\n[Footnote 41: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, 73-74.\n\nIt is declared differently, and more clearly, by Aristotle in the\ntreatise [Greek: Peri\\ Mn\u00ea/m\u00eas kai\\ A)namn\u00ea/se\u00f4s], pp. 451-452.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Plato, Lysis, 220 B. [Greek: o(/sa ga/r phamen phi/la\nei)=nai \u00ea(mi=n e(/neka phi/lou tino/s, e(te/r\u00f4| r(\u00ea/mati phaino/metha\nle/gontes au)to/; phi/lon de\\ t\u00f4=| o)/nti kinduneu/ei e)kei=no au)to\\\nei)=nai, ei)s o(\\ pa=sai au(=tai ai( lego/menai phili/ai\nteleut\u00f4=sin.]]\n\n[Footnote 43: There is no stronger illustration of this than the love\nof money, which is the very example that Plato himself here cites.\n\nThe important point to which I here call attention, in respect to the\nlaw of Mental Association, is forcibly illustrated by Mr. James Mill\nin his 'Analysis of the Human Mind,' chapters xxi. and xxii., and by\nProfessor Bain in his works on the Senses and the\nIntellect,--Intellect, chap. i. sect. 47-48, p. 404 seq. ed. 3; and on\nthe Emotions and the Will, chap. iv. sect. 4-5, p. 428 seq. (3rd ed. p.\n363 seq.).]\n\n[Side-note: Theory of the Primum Amabile, here introduced by\nSokrates, with numerous derivative objects of love. Platonic Idea.\nGeneric communion of Aristotle, distinguished by him from the feebler\nanalogical communion.]\n\nThe _primum amabile_, here introduced by Sokrates, is described\nin restricted terms, as valuable merely to correct evil, and as\nhaving no value _per se_, if evil were assumed not to exist. In\nconsequence chiefly of this restriction, Sokrates discards it as\nunsatisfactory. Such restriction, however, is noway essential to the\ndoctrine: which approaches to, but is not coincident with, the Ideal\nGood or Idea of Good, described in other dialogues as what every one\nyearns after and aspires to, though without ever attaining it and\nwithout even knowing what it is.[44] The Platonic Idea was conceived\nas a substantive, intelligible, Ens, distinct in its nature from all\nthe particulars bearing the same name, and separated from them all by\na gulf which admitted no gradations of nearer and farther--yet\ncommunicating itself to, or partaken by, all of them, in some\ninexplicable way. Aristotle combated this doctrine, denying the\nseparate reality of the Idea, and admitting only a common generic\nessence, dwelling in and pervading the particulars, but pervading\nthem all equally. The general word connoting this generic unity was\nsaid by Aristotle (retaining the Platonic phraseology) to be [Greek:\nlego/menon kata\\ mi/an i)de/an] or [Greek: kath' e(/n].\n\n[Footnote 44: Plato, Republ. vi. pp. 505-506.]\n\nBut apart from and beyond such generic unity, which implied a common\nessence belonging to all, Aristotle recognised a looser, more\nimperfect, yet more extensive, communion, founded upon common\nrelationship towards some [Greek: A)rch\u00ea\\]--First Principle or First\nObject. Such relationship was not always the same in kind: it might\nbe either resemblance, concomitance, antecedence or consequence,\n&c.: it might also be different in degree, closer or more remote,\ndirect or indirect. Here, then, there was room for graduation, or\nordination of objects as former and latter, first, second, third,\n&c., according as, when compared with each other, they were more\nor less related to the common root. This imperfect communion was\ndesignated by Aristotle under the title [Greek: kat' a)nalogi/an], as\ncontrasted with [Greek: kata\\ ge/nos]: the predicate which affirmed\nit was said to be applied, not [Greek: kata\\ mi/an i)de/an] or\n[Greek: kath' e(/n], but [Greek: pro\\s mi/an phu/sin] or [Greek:\npro\\s e(/n]:[45] it was affirmed neither entirely [Greek: sun\u00f4nu/m\u00f4s]\n(which would imply generic communion), nor entirely [Greek:\no(m\u00f4nu/m\u00f4s] (which would be casual and imply no communion at all),\nbut midway between the two, so as to admit of a graduated communion,\nand an arrangement as former and later, first cousin, or second,\nthird cousin. Members of the same Genus were considered to be\nbrothers, all on a par: but wherever there was this graduated\ncousinship or communion (signified by the words Former and Later,\nmore or less in degree of relationship), Aristotle did not admit a\ncommon Genus, nor did Plato admit a Substantive Idea.[46]\n\n[Footnote 45: Arist. Metaphys. A. 1072, a. 26-29; Bonitz, Comm. p.\n497 id. [Greek: Pr\u00f4=ton o)rekto/n--Pr\u00f4=ton vo\u00eato/n (pr\u00f4=ton\no)rekto\\n]--\"quod _per se_ appetibile est et concupiscitur\").\n\"Quod autem primum est in aliqu\u00e2 serie, id pr\u00e6cipue etiam habet\nqualitatem, qu\u00e6 in reliqu\u00e2 cernitur serie, c. a. 993, b. 24: ergo\nprima illa substantia est [Greek: to\\ a)/riston]\"--also [Greek: G]\n1004, a. 25-26, 1005, a. 7, about the [Greek: pr\u00f4=ton e(/n--pr\u00f4=ton\no)/n]. These were [Greek: ta\\ pollach\u00f4=s lego/mena--ta\\ pleonach\u00f4=s\nlego/mena]--which were something less than [Greek: sun\u00f4/numa] and\nmore than [Greek: o(m\u00f4/numa]; intermediate between the two, having no\ncommon [Greek: lo/gos] or generical unity, and yet not entirely\nequivocal, but designating a [Greek: koino\\n kat' a)nalogi/an]: not\n[Greek: kata\\ mi/an i)de/an lego/mena], but [Greek: pro\\s e(\\n] or\n[Greek: pro\\s mi/an phu/sin]; having a certain relation to one common\n[Greek: phu/sis] called [Greek: to\\ pr\u00f4=ton]. See the Metaphys.\n[Greek: G]. 1003, a. 33--[Greek: to/ de\\ o)/n le/getai me\\n\npollach\u00f4=s, a)lla\\ pro\\s e(/n kai\\ mi/an tina\\ phu/sin, kai\\ ou)ch\no(m\u00f4nu/m\u00f4s, a)ll' \u00f4(/sper to\\ u(gieino\\n a(/pan pro\\s u(giei/an, to\\\nme\\n t\u00f4=| phula/ttein, to\\ de\\ t\u00f4=| poiei=n, to\\ de\\ t\u00ea| s\u00eamei=on\nei)=nai t\u00ea=s u(giei/as, to\\ d' o(/ti dektiko\\n au)t\u00ea=s--kai\\ to\\\ni)atriko\\n pro\\s i)atrik\u00ea/n], &c. The Scholion of Alexander upon\nthis passage is instructive (p. 638, a. Brandis); and a very copious\nexplanation of the whole doctrine is given by M. Brentano, in his\nvaluable treatise, 'Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung _des\nSeienden_ nach Aristoteles,' Freiburg, 1862, pp. 85-108-147.\nCompare Aristotel. Politic. III. i. 9, p. 1275, a. 35.\n\nThe distinction drawn by Aristotle between [Greek: to\\ koino\\n kat'\ni)de/an] and [Greek: to\\ koino\\n kat' a)nalogi/an]--between [Greek:\nta\\ kata\\ mi/an i)de/an lego/mena], and [Greek: ta\\ pro\\s e(\\n] or\n[Greek: pro\\s mi/an phu/sin lego/mena]--this distinction corresponds\nin part to that which is drawn by Dr. Whewell between classes which\nare given by Definition, and natural groups which are given by Type.\n\"Such a natural group\" (says Dr. Whewell) \"is steadily fixed, though\nnot precisely limited; it is given, though not circumscribed; it is\ndetermined, not by a boundary but by a central point within, &c.\"\nThe coincidence between this doctrine and the Aristotelian is real,\nthough only partial: [Greek: to\\ pr\u00f4=ton phi/lon, to\\ pr\u00f4=ton\no(rekto/n], may be considered as types of _objects loveable,\nobjects desirable_, &c., but [Greek: \u00ea( u(giei/a] cannot be\nconsidered as a type of [Greek: ta\\ u(gieina\\] nor [Greek: \u00ea(\ni)atrik\u00ea\\] as a type of [Greek: ta\\ i)atrika/], though it is \"the\ncentral point\" to which all things so called are referred. See Dr.\nWhewell's doctrine stated in the Philosophy of the Inductive\nSciences, i. 476-477; and the comments of Mr. John Stuart Mill on the\ndoctrine--'System of Logic,' Book iv. ch. 7. I have adverted to this\nsame doctrine in remarking on the Hippias Major, supra, p. 47; also\non the Phil\u00eabus, infra, chap. 32, vol. III.]\n\n[Footnote 46: This is attested by Aristotle, Eth. Nik. i. 64, p.\n1096, a. 16. [Greek: Oi( de\\ komi/santes t\u00ea\\n do/xan tau/t\u00ean, ou)k\ne)poi/oun i)de/as e)n oi(=s to\\ pro/teron kai\\ to\\ u(/steron\ne)/legon; dio/per ou)de\\ t\u00f4=n a)rithm\u00f4=n i)de/an kateskeu/azon]:\ncompare Ethic. Eudem. i. 8, 1218, a. 2. He goes on to object that\nPlato, having laid this down as a general principle, departed from it\nin recognizing an [Greek: i)de/an a)gathou=], because [Greek:\nta)gatho\\n] was predicated in all the categories, in that of [Greek:\nou)si/a] as well as in that of [Greek: pro/s ti--to\\ de\\ kath' au(to\\\nkai\\ \u00ea( ou)si/a pro/teron t\u00ea=| phu/sei tou= pro/s ti--\u00f4(/ste ou)k\na)\\n ei)/\u00ea koin\u00ea/ tis e)pi\\ tou/t\u00f4n i)de/a.]]\n\n[Side-note: Primum Amabile of Plato, compared with the Prima\nAmicitia of Aristotle. Each of them is head of an analogical\naggregate, not member of a generic family.]\n\nNow the [Greek: Pr\u00f4=ton phi/lon] or Primum Amabile which we find in\nthe Lysis, is described as the principium or initial root of one of\nthese imperfectly united aggregates; ramifying into many branches\nmore or less distant, in obedience to one or other of the different\nlaws of association. Aristotle expresses the same idea in another\nform of words: instead of a Primum Amabile, he gives us a Prima\nAmicitia--affirming that the diversities of friendship are not\nspecies comprehended under the same genus, but gradations or\ndegeneracies departing in one direction or other from the First or\npure Friendship. The Primum Amabile, in Plato's view, appears to be\nthe Good, though he does not explicitly declare it: the Prima\nAmicitia, with Aristotle, is friendship subsisting between two good\npersons, who have had sufficient experience to know, esteem, and\ntrust, each other.[47]\n\n[Footnote 47: Aristotel. Eth. Nikom. viii. 2, 1155, b. 12, viii. 5,\n1157, a. 30, viii. 4; Eth. Eudem. vii. 2, 1236, a. 15. The statement\nis more full in the Eudemian Ethics than in the Nikomachean; he\nbegins the seventh book by saying that [Greek: phili/a] is not said\n[Greek: monach\u00f4=s] but [Greek: pleonach\u00f4=s]; and in p. 1236 he says\n[Greek: A)na/gk\u00ea a)/ra tri/a phili/as ei)/d\u00ea ei)=nai, kai\\ _m\u00eate\nkath' e(\\n a(pa/sas_ m\u00eath' \u00f4(s _ei)/d\u00ea e(no\\s ge/nous_, m\u00ea/te\npa/mpan le/gesthai o(m\u00f4nu/m\u00f4s; pro\\s _mi/an ga/r tina le/gontai\nkai\\ pr\u00f4/t\u00ean, \u00f4(/sper to\\ i)atriko/n_], &c. The whole passage\nis instructive, but is too long to cite.\n\nBonitz gives some good explanations of these passages. Observationes\nCritic\u00e6 in Aristotelis qu\u00e6 feruntur _Magna Moralia_ et\n_Eudemia_, pp. 55-57.]\n\n[Side-note: The Good and Beautiful, considered as objects of\nattachment.]\n\nIn regard to the Platonic Lysis, I have already observed that no\npositive result can be found in it, and that all the hypotheses\nbroached are successively negatived. What is kept before the reader's\nmind, however, more than anything else, though not embodied in any\ndistinct formula, is--The Good and the Beautiful considered as\nobjects of love or attachment.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXI.\n\nEUTHYDEMUS.\n\n\n[Side-note: Dramatic and comic exuberance of the Euthyd\u00eamus.\nJudgments of various critics.]\n\nDramatic vivacity, and comic force, holding up various persons to\nridicule or contempt, are attributes which Plato manifests often and\nabundantly. But the dialogue in which these qualities reach their\nmaximum, is, the Euthyd\u00eamus. Some portions of it approach to the\nNubes of Aristophanes: so that Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and other\nadmiring critics have some difficulty in explaining, to their own\nsatisfaction,[1] how Plato, the sublime moralist and lawgiver, can\nhere have admitted so much trifling and buffoonery. Ast even rejects\nthe dialogue as spurious; declaring it to be unworthy of Plato and\ninsisting on various peculiarities, defects, and even absurdities,\nwhich offend his critical taste. His conclusion in this case has\nfound no favour: yet I think it is based on reasons quite as forcible\nas those upon which other dialogues have been condemned:[2] upon\nreasons, which, even if admitted, might prove that the dialogue was\nan inferior performance, but would not prove that Plato was not the\nauthor.\n\n[Footnote 1: Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Euthydemos, vol. iii. pp.\n400-403-407; Stallbaum. Proleg. in Euthydem. p. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, pp. 408-418.]\n\n[Side-note: Scenery and personages.]\n\nSokrates recounts (to Kriton) a conversation in which he has just\nbeen engaged with two Sophists, Euthyd\u00eamus and Dionysodorus, in the\nundressing-room belonging to the gymnasium of the Lykeium. There were\npresent, besides, Kleinias, a youth of remarkable beauty and\nintelligence, cousin of the great Alkibiades--Ktesippus, an adult\nman, yet still young, friend of Sokrates and devotedly attached to\nKleinias--and a crowd of unnamed persons, partly friends of\nKleinias, partly admirers and supporters of the two Sophists.\n\n[Side-note: The two Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus:\nmanner in which they are here presented.]\n\nThis couple are described and treated throughout by Sokrates, with\nthe utmost admiration and respect: that is, in terms designating such\nfeelings, but intended as the extreme of irony or caricature. They\nare masters of the art of Contention, in its three varieties[3]--1.\nArms, and the command of soldiers. 2. Judicial and political\nrhetoric, fighting an opponent before the assembled Dikasts or\npeople. 3. Contentious Dialectic--they can reduce every respondent to\na contradiction, if he will only continue to answer their\nquestions--whether what he says be true or false.[4] All or each of these\naccomplishments they are prepared to teach to any pupil who will pay\nthe required fee: the standing sarcasm of Plato against the paid\nteacher, occurring here as in so many other places. Lastly, they are\nbrothers, old and almost toothless--natives of Chios, colonists from\nthence to Thurii, and exiles from Thurii and resident at Athens, yet\nvisiting other cities for the purpose of giving lessons.[5] Their\ndialectic skill is described as a recent acquisition,--made during\ntheir old age, only in the preceding year,--and completing their\nexcellence as professors of the tripartite Eristic. But they now\ndevote themselves to it more than to the other two parts. Moreover\nthey advertise themselves as teachers of virtue.\n\n[Footnote 3: Plato, Euthyd. pp. 271-272.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Plat. Euthyd. p. 272 B. [Greek: e)xele/gchein to\\ a)ei\\\nlego/menon, o(moi/\u00f4s e)a/n te pseu=dos e)a/n t' a)l\u00eathe\\s \u00ea)=|]: p.\n275 C. [Greek: ou)de\\n diaphe/rei, e)a\\n mo/non e)the/l\u00ea|\na)pokri/nesthai o( neani/skos.]]\n\n[Footnote 5: Plat. Euthyd. p. 273 B-C. \"quamvis essent \u00e6tate\ngrandiores et _edentuli_\" says Stallbaum in his Proleg. p. 10.\nHe seems to infer this from page 294 C; the inference, though not\nvery certain, is plausible.\n\nSteinhart, in his Einleitung zum Euthydemos (vol. ii. p. 2 of\nHieronym. M\u00fcller's translation of Plato) repeats these antecedents of\nEuthydemus and Dionysodorus, as recited in the dialogue before us, as\nif they were matter of real history, exemplifications of the\ncharacter of the class called Sophists. He might just as well produce\nwhat is said by the comic poets Eupolis and Aristophanes--the\nproceedings as recounted by the Sokratic disciple in the [Greek:\nphrontist\u00ea/rion] (Nubes)--as evidence about the character of\nSokrates.]\n\n[Side-note: Conversation carried on with Kleinias, first by\nSokrates, next by the two Sophists.]\n\nThe two Sophists, having announced themselves as competent to teach\nvirtue and stimulate pupils to a virtuous life, are entreated by\nSokrates to exercise their beneficent influence upon the youth\nKleinias, in whose improvement he as well as Ktesippus feels the\nwarmest interest. Sokrates gives a specimen of what he wishes by\nputting a series of questions himself. Euthyd\u00eamus follows, and begins\nquestioning Kleinias; who, after answering three or four\nsuccessive questions, is forced to contradict himself. Dionysodorus\nthen takes up the last answer of Kleinias, puts him through another\nseries of interrogations, and makes him contradict himself again. In\nthis manner the two Sophists toss the youthful respondent backwards\nand forwards to each other, each contriving to entangle him in some\npuzzle and contradiction. They even apply the same process to\nSokrates, who cannot avoid being entangled in the net; and to\nKtesippus, who becomes exasperated, and retorts upon them with\ncontemptuous asperity. The alternate interference of the two Sophists\nis described with great smartness and animation; which is promoted by\nthe use of the dual number, peculiar to the Greek language, employed\nby Plato in speaking of them.\n\n[Side-note: Contrast between the two different modes of\ninterrogation.]\n\nThis mode of dialectic, conducted by the two Sophists, is interrupted\non two several occasions by a counter-exhibition of dialectic on the\npart of Sokrates: who, under colour of again showing to the couple a\nspecimen of that which he wishes them to do, puts two successive\nbatches of questions to Kleinias in his own manner.[6] The contrast\nbetween Sokrates and the two Sophists, in the same work, carried on\nrespectively by him and by them, of interrogating Kleinias, is\nevidently meant as one of the special matters to arrest attention in\nthe dialogue. The questions put by the couple are made to turn\nchiefly on verbal quibbles and ambiguities: they are purposely\ndesigned to make the respondent contradict himself, and are\nproclaimed to be certain of bringing about this result, provided the\nrespondent will conform to the laws of dialectic--by confining his\nanswer to the special point of the question, without adding any\nqualification of his own, or asking for farther explanation from the\nquestioner, or reverting to any antecedent answer lying apart from\nthe actual question of the moment.[7] Sokrates, on the contrary,\naddresses interrogations, each of which has a clear and substantive\nmeaning, and most of which Kleinias is able to answer without\nembarrassment: he professes no other design except that of\nencouraging Kleinias to virtue, and assisting him to determine\nin what virtue consists: he resorts to no known quibbles or words of\nequivocal import. The effect of the interrogations is represented as\nbeing, not to confound and silence the youth, but to quicken and\nstimulate his mind and to call forth an unexpected amount of latent\nknowledge: insomuch that he makes one or two answers very much beyond\nhis years, exciting the greatest astonishment and admiration, in\nSokrates as well as in Kriton.[8] In this respect, the youth Kleinias\nserves the same illustrative purpose as the youthful slave in the\nMenon:[9] each is supposed to be quickened by the interrogatory of\nSokrates, into a manifestation of knowledge noway expected, nor\ntraceable to any teaching. But in the Menon, this magical evocation\nof knowledge from an untaught youth is explained by the theory of\nreminiscence, pre-existence, and omniscience, of the soul: while in\nthe Euthyd\u00eamus, no allusion is made to any such theory, nor to any\nother cause except the stimulus of the Sokratic cross-questioning.\n\n[Footnote 6: Plat. Euthyd\u00eam. pp. 279-288.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Plat. Euthyd. pp. 275 E--276 E. [Greek: Pa/nta toiau=ta\n\u00ea(mei=s e)r\u00f4t\u00f4=men a)/phukta], pp. 287 B--295 B--296 A, &c.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Plat. Euthyd\u00eam. pp. 290-291. The unexpected wisdom,\nexhibited by the youth Kleinias in his concluding answer, can be\nunderstood only as illustrating the obstetric efficacy of Sokratic\ninterrogations. See Winckelmann, Proleg. ad Euthyd. pp. xxxiii.\nxxxiv. The words [Greek: t\u00f4=n kreitto/n\u00f4n] must have the usual\nsignification, as recognised by Routh and Heindorf, though\nSchleiermacher treats it as absurd, p. 552, notes.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Plato, Menon, pp. 82-85.]\n\n[Side-note: Wherein this contrast does not consist.]\n\nIn the dialogue _Euthyd\u00eamus_, then, one main purpose of Plato is\nto exhibit in contrast two distinct modes of questioning: one\npractised by Euthydemus and Dionysodorus; the other, by Sokrates. Of\nthese two, it is the first which is shown up in the most copious and\nelaborate manner: the second is made subordinate, serving mainly as a\nstandard of comparison with the first. We must take care however to\nunderstand in what the contrast between the two consists, and in what\nit does not consist.\n\nThe contrast does not consist in this--that Sokrates so contrives his\nstring of questions as to bring out some established and positive\nconclusion, while Euthydemus and his brother leave everything in\nperplexity. Such is not the fact. Sokrates ends without any result,\nand with a confession of his inability to find any. Professing\nearnest anxiety to stimulate Kleinias in the path of virtue, he is at\nthe same time unable to define what the capital condition of\nvirtue is.[10] On this point, then, there is no contrast between\nSokrates and his competitors: if they land their pupil in\nembarrassment, so does he. Nor, again, does Sokrates stand\ndistinguished from them by affirming (or rather implying in his\nquestions) nothing but what is true and indisputable.[11]\n\n[Footnote 10: Plat. Euthyd\u00eam. pp. 291 A--293 A; Plat. Kleitophon, pp.\n409-410.]\n\n[Footnote 11: See Plat. Euthyd\u00eam. p. 281 C-D, where undoubtedly the\npositions laid down by Sokrates would not have passed without\ncontradiction by an opponent.]\n\n[Side-note: Wherein it does consist.]\n\nThe real contrast between the competitors, consists, first in the\npretensions--next in the method. The two Sophists are described as\npersons of exorbitant arrogance, professing to teach virtue,[12] and\nclaiming a fee as if they did teach it: Sokrates disdains the fee,\ndoubts whether such teaching is possible, and professes only to\nencourage or help forward on the road a willing pupil. The pupil in\nthis case is a given subject, Kleinias, a modest and intelligent\nyouth: and the whole scene passes in public before an indiscriminate\naudience. To such a pupil, what is needed is, encouragement and\nguidance. Both of these are really administered by the questions of\nSokrates, which are all suggestive and pertinent to the matter in\nhand, though failing to reach a satisfactory result: moreover,\nSokrates attends only to Kleinias, and is indifferent to the effect\non the audience around. The two Sophists, on the contrary, do not say\na word pertinent to the object desired. Far from seeking (as they\npromised) to encourage Kleinias,[13] they confuse and humiliate him\nfrom the beginning: all their implements for teaching consist only of\nlogical puzzles; lastly, their main purpose is to elicit applause\nfrom the by-standers, by reducing both the modest Kleinias and every\nother respondent to contradiction and stand-still.\n\n[Footnote 12: Plat. Euthyd\u00eam. pp. 273 D, 275 A, 304 B.]\n\n[Footnote 13: Plat. Euthyd. p. 278 C. [Greek: e)pha/t\u00ean ga\\r\ne)pidei/xasthai t\u00ea\\n protreptik\u00ea\\n sophi/an.]]\n\n[Side-note: Abuse of fallacies by the Sophists--their bidding\nfor the applause of the by-standers.]\n\nSuch is the real contrast between Sokrates and the two Sophists, and\nsuch is the real scene which we read in the dialogue. The presence,\nas well as the loud manifestations of an indiscriminate crowd in the\nLykeium, are essential features of the drama.[14] The point of\nview which Plato is working out, is, the abusive employment, the\nexcess, and the misplacement, of logical puzzles: which he brings\nbefore us as administered for the humiliation of a youth who requires\nopposite treatment, in the prosecution of an object which they do not\nreally promote and before undiscerning auditors, for whose applause\nthe two Sophists are bidding.[15] The whole debate upon these\nfallacies is rendered ridiculous; and when conducted with Ktesippus,\ndegenerates into wrangling and ribaldry.\n\n[Footnote 14: The [Greek: o)/chlos] (surrounding multitude) is\nespecially insisted on in the first sentence of the dialogue, and is\nperpetually adverted to throughout all the recital of Sokrates to\nKriton, pp. 276 B-D, 303 B.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Plat. Euthyd\u00eam. p. 303 B.]\n\n[Side-note: Comparison of the Euthyd\u00eamus with the Parmenid\u00eas.]\n\nThe bearing of the Euthyd\u00eamus, as I here state it, will be better\nunderstood if we contrast it with the Parmenid\u00eas. In this\nlast-mentioned dialogue, the amount of negative dialectic and\ncontradiction is greater and more serious than that which we read in\nthe Euthyd\u00eamus. One single case of it is elaborately built up in the\nlong Antinomies at the close of the Parmenid\u00eas (which occupy as much\nspace, and contain nearly as much sophistry, as the speeches assigned\nto the two Sophists in Euthyd\u00eamus), while we are given to understand\nthat many more remain behind.[16] These perplexing Antinomies\n(addressed by the veteran Parmenides to Sokrates as his junior),\nafter a variety of other objections against the Platonic theory of\nIdeas, which theory Sokrates has been introduced as affirming,--are\ndrawn up for the avowed purpose of checking premature affirmation,\nand of illustrating the difficult exercises and problems which must\nbe solved, before affirmation can become justifiable. This task,\nthough long and laborious, cannot be evaded (we are here told) by\naspirants in philosophy. But it is a task which ought only to be\nundertaken in conjunction with a few select companions. \"Before any\nlarge audience, it would be unseemly and inadmissible: for the public\nare not aware that without such roundabout and devious journey in all\ndirections, no man can hit upon truth or acquire intelligence.\"[17]\n\n[Footnote 16: Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 B. I shall revert to this point\nwhen I notice the Parmenid\u00eas.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Plat. Parmen. pp. 135-136. [Greek: e(/lkuson de\\\nsauto\\n kai\\ gu/mnasai ma=llon dia\\ t\u00ea=s dokou/s\u00eas a)chr\u00ea/stou\nei)=nai kai\\ kaloume/n\u00eas u(po\\ t\u00f4=n poll\u00f4=n a)doleschi/as, e(/\u00f4s\ne(/ti ne/os ei)=--ei) me\\n ou)=n plei/ous \u00ea(=men, ou)k a)\\n a)/xion\n\u00ea)=n dei=sthai], (to request Parmenides to give a specimen of\ndialectic) [Greek: a)prep\u00ea= ga\\r ta\\ toiau=ta poll\u00f4=n e)nanti/on\nle/gein, a)/ll\u00f4s te kai\\ t\u00ealikou/t\u00f4|; a)gnoou=si ga\\r oi( polloi\\\no(/ti a)/neu tau/t\u00eas t\u00ea=s dia\\ pa/nt\u00f4n diexo/dou te kai\\ pla/n\u00eas,\na)du/naton e)ntucho/nta t\u00f4=| a)l\u00eathei= nou=n schei=n.]]\n\n[Side-note: Necessity of settling accounts with the\nnegative, before we venture upon the affirmative, is common to both:\nin the one the process is solitary and serious; in the other, it is\nvulgarised and ludicrous.]\n\nThis important proposition--That before a man can be entitled to lay\ndown with confidence any affirmative theory, in the domain of\nphilosophy or \"reasoned truth,\" he must have had before him the\nvarious knots tied by negative dialectic, and must find out the way\nof untying them--is a postulate which lies at the bottom of Plato's\nDialogues of Search, as I have remarked in the eighth chapter of this\nwork. But there is much difference in the time, manner, and\ncircumstances, under which such knots are brought before the student\nfor solution. In the Parmenid\u00eas the process is presented as one both\nserious and indispensable, yet requiring some precautions: the public\nmust be excluded, for they do not understand the purpose: and the\nstudent under examination must be one who is competent or more than\ncompetent to bear the heavy burthen put upon him, as Sokrates is\nrepresented to be in the Parmenid\u00eas.[18] In the Euthyd\u00eamus, on the\ncontrary, the process is intended to be made ridiculous; accordingly\nthese precautions are disregarded. The crowd of indiscriminate\nauditors are not only present, but are the persons whose feelings the\ntwo Sophists address--and who either admire what is said as dexterous\nlegerdemain, or laugh at the interchange of thrusts, as the duel\nbecomes warmer: in fact, the debate ends with general mirth, in which\nthe couple themselves are among the loudest.[19] Lastly, Kleinias,\nthe youth under interrogation, is a modest novice; not represented,\nlike Lysis in the dialogue just reviewed, as in danger of corruption\nfrom the exorbitant flatteries of an Erastes, nor as requiring a\nlowering medicine to be administered by a judicious friend. When the\nXenophontic (historical) Sokrates cross-examines and humiliates\nEuthyd\u00eamus (a youth, but nevertheless more advanced than Kleinias in\nthe Platonic Euthyd\u00eamus is represented to be), we shall see that he\nnot only lays a train for the process by antecedent suggestions, but\ntakes especial care to attack Euthyd\u00eamus when alone.[20] The\ncross-examination pursued by Sokrates inflicts upon this accomplished\nyoung man the severest distress and humiliation, and would have been\nutterly intolerable, if there had been by-standers clapping their\nhands (as we read in the Platonic Euthyd\u00eamus) whenever the respondent\nwas driven into a corner. We see that it was hardly tolerable even\nwhen the respondent was alone with Sokrates; for though Euthyd\u00eamus\nbore up against the temporary suffering, cultivated the society of\nSokrates, and was handled by him more gently afterwards; yet there\nwere many other youths whom Sokrates cross-examined in the same way,\nand who suffered so much humiliation from the first solitary\ncolloquy, that they never again came near him (so Xenophon expressly\ntells us)[21] for a second. This is quite enough to show us how\nimportant is the injunction delivered in the Platonic Parmenid\u00eas--to\ncarry on these testing colloquies apart from indiscriminate auditors,\nin the presence, at most, of a few select companions.\n\n[Footnote 18: See the compliments to Sokrates, on his strenuous\nardour and vocation for philosophy, addressed by Parmenides, p. 135\nD.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Plat. Euthyd. p. 303 B. [Greek: E)ntau=tha me/ntoi, \u00f4)=\nphi/le Kri/t\u00f4n, ou)deis o(/stis ou) t\u00f4=n paro/nt\u00f4n u(perep\u00ea/nese to\\n\nlo/gon, kai\\ t\u00f4\\ a)/ndre] (Euthyd\u00eamus and Dionysodorus) [Greek:\ngel\u00f4=nte kai\\ krotou=nte kai\\ chai/ronte o)li/gou pareta/th\u00easan.]]\n\n[Footnote 20: Xenophon. Memor. iv. 2, 5-8. [Greek: \u00f4(s d' \u00ea)/|stheto]\n(Sokrates) [Greek: au)to\\n e)toimo/teron u(pome/nonta, o(/te\ndiale/goito, kai\\ prothumo/teron a)kou/onta, _mo/nos \u00ea)=lthen_\nei)s to\\ \u00ea(niopoiei=on; parakathezome/non d' au)t\u00f4=| tou=\nEu)thud\u00ea/mou, Ei)=pe/ moi, e)/ph\u00ea], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 39-40. Compare the remarks of Sokrates\nin Plato, The\u00e6t\u00eatus, p. 151 C.]\n\n[Side-note: Opinion of Stallbaum and other critics about the\nEuthyd\u00eamus, that Euthyd\u00eamus and Dionysodorus represent the way in\nwhich Protagoras and Gorgias talked to their auditors.]\n\nStallbaum, Steinhart, and other commentators denounce in severe terms\nthe Eristics or controversial Sophists of Athens, as disciples of\nProtagoras and Gorgias, infected with the mania of questioning and\ndisputing every thing, and thereby corrupting the minds of youth.\nThey tell us that Sokrates was the constant enemy of this school, but\nthat nevertheless he was unjustly confounded with them by the comic\npoets, and others; from which confusion alone his unpopularity with\nthe Athenian people arose.[22] In the Platonic dialogue of Euthyd\u00eamus\nthe two Sophists (according to these commentators) represent the way\nin which Protagoras and Gorgias with their disciples reasoned: and\nthe purpose of the dialogue is to contrast this with the way in which\nSokrates reasoned.\n\n[Footnote 22: Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad Plat. Euthyd\u00eam. pp. 9-11-13;\nWinckelmann, Proleg. ad eundem, pp. xxxiii.-xxxiv.]\n\n[Side-note: That opinion is unfounded. Sokrates was much more\nEristic than Protagoras, who generally manifested himself by\ncontinuous speech or lecture.]\n\nNow, in this opinion, I think that there is much of unfounded\nassumption, as well as a misconception of the real contrast intended\nin the Platonic Euthyd\u00eamus. Comparing Protagoras with Sokrates,\nI maintain that Sokrates was decidedly the more Eristic of the two,\nand left behind him a greater number of active disciples. In so far\nas we can trust the picture given by Plato in the dialogue called\nProtagoras, we learn that the Sophist of that name chiefly manifested\nhimself in long continuous speeches or rhetoric; and though he also\nprofessed, if required, to enter into dialectic colloquy, in this art\nhe was no match for Sokrates.[23] Moreover, we know by the evidence\nof Sokrates himself, that _he_ was an Eristic not only by taste,\nbut on principle, and by a sense of duty. He tells us, in the\nPlatonic Apology, that he felt himself under a divine mission to go\nabout convicting men of ignorance, and that he had prosecuted this\nvocation throughout many years of a long life. Every one of these\nconvictions must have been brought about by one or more disputes of\nhis own seeking: every such dispute, with occasional exceptions, made\nhim unpopular, in the outset at least, with the person convicted: the\nrather, as his ability in the process is known, upon the testimony of\nXenophon[24] as well as of Plato, to have been consummate. It is\ntherefore a mistake to decry Protagoras and the Protagoreans (if\nthere were any) as the special Eristics, and to represent Sokrates as\na tutelary genius, the opponent of such habits. If the commentators\nare right (which I do not think they are) in declaring the Athenian\nmind to have been perverted by Eristic, Sokrates is much more\nchargeable with the mischief than Protagoras. And the comic poets,\nwhen they treated Sokrates as a specimen and teacher of Eristic,\nproceeded very naturally upon what they actually saw or heard of\nhim.[25]\n\n[Footnote 23: See Plat. Protag., especially pp. 329 and 336. About\nthe eristic disposition of Sokrates, see the striking passage in\nPlato, The\u00e6t\u00eat. 169 B-C; also Lach\u00eas, 187, 188.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Xen. Mem. i. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 25: Stallbaum, Proleg. in Platon. Euthyd\u00eam. pp. 50-51. \"Sed\nhoc utcunque se habet, illud quidem ex Aristophane pariter atque ex\nipso Platone evidenter apparet, Socratem non tantum ab orationum\nscriptoribus, sed etiam ab aliis, in vanissimorum sophistaram loco\nhabitum fuisse.\"]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates in the Euthyd\u00eamus is drawn suitably to\nthe purpose of that dialogue.]\n\nThe fact is, that the Platonic Sokrates when he talks with the two\nSophists in the dialogue Euthyd\u00eamus, is a character drawn by Plato\nfor the purpose of that dialogue, and is very different from the real\nhistorical Sokrates, whom the public of Athens saw and heard in\nthe market-place or gymnasia. He is depicted as a gentle, soothing,\nencouraging talker, with his claws drawn in, and affecting inability\neven to hold his own against the two Sophists: such indeed as he\nsometimes may have been in conversing with particular persons (so\nXenophon[26] takes pains to remind his readers in the Memorabilia),\nbut with entire elimination of that characteristic aggressive\nElenchus for which he himself (in the Platonic Apology) takes credit,\nand which the auditors usually heard him exhibit.\n\n[Footnote 26: Xen. Mem. i. 4, 1; iv. 2, 40.]\n\n[Side-note: The two Sophists in the Euthyd\u00eamus are not to be\ntaken as real persons, or representatives of real persons.]\n\nThis picture, accurate or not, suited the dramatic scheme of the\nEuthyd\u00eamus. Such, in my judgment, is the value and meaning of the\nEuthyd\u00eamus, as far as regards personal contrasts. One style of\nreasoning is represented by Sokrates, the other by the two Sophists:\nboth are the creatures of Plato, having the same dramatic reality as\nSokrates and Strepsiades, or the [Greek: Di/kaios Lo/gos] and [Greek:\nA)/dikos Lo/gos], of Aristophanes, but no more. That they correspond\nto any actual persons at Athens, is neither proved nor probable. The\ncomic poets introduce Sokrates as talking what was either\nnonsensical, or offensive to the feelings of the Athenians: and\nSokrates (in the Platonic Apology) complains that the Dikasts judged\nhim, not according to what he had really said or done, but according\nto the impression made on them by this dramatic picture. The Athenian\nSophists would have equal right to complain of those critics, who not\nonly speak of Euthyd\u00eamus and Dionysodorus with a degree of acrimony\napplicable only to historical persons, but also describe them as\nrepresentative types of Protagoras, Gorgias, and their disciples.[27]\n\n[Footnote 27: The language of Schleiermacher is more moderate than\nthat of Stallbaum, Steinhart, and others. He thinks moreover, that\nthe polemical purpose of this dialogue is directed not against\nProtagoras or Gorgias, but against the Megarics and against\nAntisthenes, who (so Schleiermacher supposes) had brought the attack\nupon themselves by attacking Plato first (Einleitung zum Euthyd. p.\n404 seq.). Schleiermacher cannot make out who the two Sophists were\npersonally, but he conceives them as obscure persons, deserving no\nnotice.\n\nThis is a conjecture which admits of no proof; but if any real victim\nis here intended by Plato, we may just as reasonably suppose\nAntisthenes as Protagoras.]\n\n[Side-note: Colloquy of Sokrates with Kleinias--possession of\ngood things is useless, unless we also have intelligence how to use\nthem.]\n\nThe conversation of Sokrates with the youth Kleinias is\nremarkable for its plainness and simplicity. His purpose is to\nimplant or inflame in the youth the aspiration and effort towards\nwisdom or knowledge ([Greek: philosophi/a], in its etymological\nsense). \"You, like every one else, wish to do well or to be happy.\nThe way to be happy is, to have many good things. Every one knows\nthis: every one knows too, that among these good things, wealth is an\nindisputable item:[28] likewise health, beauty, bodily activity, good\nbirth, power over others, honour in our city, temperance, justice,\ncourage, wisdom, &c. Good fortune does not count as a distinct\nitem, because it resolves itself into wisdom.[29]--But it is not\nenough to have all these good things: we must not only have them but\nuse them: moreover, we must use them not wrongly, but rightly. If we\nuse them wrongly, they will not produce their appropriate\nconsequences. They will even make us more miserable than if we had\nthem not, because the possession of them will prompt us to be active\nand meddlesome: whereas, if we have them not, we shall keep in the\nback-ground and do little.[30] But to use these good things rightly,\ndepends upon wisdom, knowledge, intelligence. It thus appears that\nthe enumerated items are not really good, except on the assumption\nthat they are under the guidance of intelligence: if they are under\nthe guidance of ignorance, they are not good; nay, they even produce\nmore harm than good, since they are active instruments in the service\nof a foolish master.[31]\n\n[Footnote 28: Plato, Euthyd\u00eam. p. 279 A. [Greek: a)gatha\\ de\\ poi=a\na)/ra t\u00f4=n o)/nt\u00f4n tugcha/nei \u00ea(mi=n o)/nta? \u00ea)\\ ou) chalepo\\n ou)de\\\nsemnou= a)ndro\\s pa/nu ti ou)de\\ tou=to e)/oiken ei)=nai eu(rei=n?\npa=s ga\\r a)\\n \u00ea(mi=n ei)/poi o(/ti to\\ ploutei=n a)gatho/n?]]\n\n[Footnote 29: Plato, Euthyd\u00eam. pp. 279-280.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Plato, Euthyd\u00eam. p. 281 C. [Greek: \u00ea(=tton de\\ kak\u00f4=s\npra/tt\u00f4n, a)/thlios \u00ea(=tton a)\\n ei)/\u00ea.]]\n\n[Footnote 31: Plato, Euthyd. p. 282 E. If we compare this with p. 279\nC-D we shall see that the argument of Sokrates is open to the\nexception which he himself takes in the case of [Greek: eu)tuchi/a--di\\s\ntau)ta\\ le/gein]. Wisdom is counted twice over.]\n\n[Side-note: But intelligence--of what? It must be such\nintelligence, or such an art, as will include both the making of what\nwe want, and the right use of it when made.]\n\n\"But what intelligence do we want for the purpose? Is it _all_\nintelligence? Or is there any one single variety of intelligence, by\nthe possession of which we shall become good and happy?[32]\nObviously, it must be must be such as will be profitable to us.[33]\nWe have seen that there is no good in possessing wealth--that we\nshould gain nothing by knowing how to acquire wealth or even to turn\nstones into gold, unless we at the same time knew how to use it\nrightly. Nor should we gain any thing by knowing how to make\nourselves healthy, or even immortal, unless we knew how to employ\nrightly our health or immortality. We want knowledge or intelligence,\nof such a nature, as to include both acting, making, or construction\nand rightly using what we have done, made, or constructed.[34] The\nmakers of lyres and flutes may be men of skill, but they cannot play\nupon the instruments which they have made: the logographers compose\nfine discourses, but hand them over for others to deliver. Even\nmasters in the most distinguished arts--such as military commanders,\ngeometers, arithmeticians, astronomers, &c., do not come up to\nour requirement. They are all of them varieties under the general\nclass _hunters_: they find and seize, but hand over what they\nhave seized for others to use. The hunter, when he has caught or\nkilled game, hands it over to the cook; the general, when he has\ntaken a town, delivers it to the political leader or minister: the\ngeometer makes over his theorems to be employed by the dialectician\nor comprehensive philosopher.[35]\n\n[Footnote 32: Plato, Euthyd\u00eam. p. 282 E. Sokrates here breaks off the\nstring of questions to Kleinias, but resumes them, p. 288 D.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Plato, Euthyd\u00eam. p. 288 D. [Greek: ti/na pot' ou)=n\na)\\n kt\u00easa/menoi e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean o)rth\u00f4=s kt\u00easai/metha? a)=r' ou) tou=to\nme\\n a(plou=n, o(/ti tau/t\u00ean \u00ea(/tis \u00ea(ma=s o)n\u00ea/sei?]]\n\n[Footnote 34: Plato, Euthyd. p. 289 B. [Greek: toiau/t\u00eas tino\\s a)/r'\n\u00ea(mi=n e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas dei=, e)n \u00ea(=| sumpe/pt\u00f4ken a(/ma to/ te poiei=n\nkai\\ to\\ e)pi/stasthai chr\u00ea=sthai \u00f4(=| a)\\n poi\u00ea=|.]]\n\n[Footnote 35: Plato, Euthyd. p.290 C-D.]\n\n[Side-note: Where is such an art to be found? The regal or\npolitical art looks like it; but what does this art do for us? No\nanswer can be found. Ends in puzzle.]\n\n\"Where then can we find such an art--such a variety of knowledge or\nintelligence--as we are seeking? The regal or political art looks\nlike it: that art which regulates and enforces all the arrangements\nof the city. But what is the work which this art performs? What\nproduct does it yield, as the medical art supplies good health, and\nthe farmer's art, provision? What good does it effect? You may say\nthat it makes the citizens wealthy, free, harmonious in their\nintercourse. But we have already seen that these acquisitions are not\ngood, unless they be under the guidance of intelligence: that nothing\nis really good, except some variety of intelligence.[36] Does the\nregal art then confer knowledge? If so, does it confer every\nvariety of knowledge--that of the carpenter, currier, &c., as\nwell as others? Not certainly any of these, for we have already\nsettled that they are in themselves neither good nor bad. The regal\nart can thus impart no knowledge except itself; and what is\n_itself_? how are we to use it? If we say, that we shall render\nother men _good_--the question again recurs, _Good_--in\nwhat respect? _useful_--for what purpose?[37]\n\n[Footnote 36: Plato, Euthyd. p. 292 B. [Greek: A)gatho\\n de/ ge/ pou\n\u00f4(molog\u00ea/samen a)ll\u00ea/lois--ou)de\\n ei)=nai a)/llo \u00ea)\\ e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean\ntina/.]]\n\n[Footnote 37: Plat. Euthyd\u00eam. p. 292 D. [Greek: A)lla\\ ti/na d\u00ea\\\ne)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean? \u00ea(=| ti/ chr\u00easo/metha? t\u00f4=n me\\n ga\\r e)/rg\u00f4n ou)deno\\s\ndei= au)t\u00ea\\n d\u00eamiourgo\\n ei)=nai t\u00f4=n m\u00ea/te kak\u00f4=n m\u00ea/te a)gath\u00f4=n,\ne)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean de\\ paradido/nai m\u00eademi/an a)/ll\u00ean \u00ea)\\ au)t\u00ea\\n e(aut\u00ea/n;\nle/g\u00f4men d\u00ea\\ ou)=n, ti/s pote e)/stin au(t\u00ea\\ \u00ea(=| ti/\nchr\u00easo/metha?]]\n\n\"Here then\" (concludes Sokrates), \"we come to a dead lock: we can\nfind no issue.[38] We cannot discover what the regal art does for us\nor gives us: yet this is the art which is to make us happy.\" In this\ndifficulty, Sokrates turns to the two Sophists, and implores their\nhelp. The contrast between him and them is thus brought out.\n\n[Footnote 38: Plat. Euthyd. p. 292 E.]\n\n[Side-note: Review of the cross-examination just pursued by\nSokrates. It is very suggestive--puts the mind upon what to look\nfor.]\n\nThe argument of Sokrates, which I have thus abridged from the\nEuthyd\u00eamus, arrives at no solution: but it is nevertheless eminently\nsuggestive, and puts the question in a way to receive solution. What\nis the regal or political art which directs or regulates all others?\nA man has many different impulses, dispositions, qualities,\naptitudes, advantages, possessions, &c., which we describe by\nsaying that he is an artist, a general, a tradesman, clever, just,\ntemperate, brave, strong, rich, powerful, &c. But in the course\nof life, each particular situation has its different exigencies,\nwhile the prospective future has its exigencies also. The whole man\nis one, with all these distinct and sometimes conflicting attributes:\nin following one impulse, he must resist others--in turning his\naptitudes to one object, he must turn them away from others--he must,\nas Plato says, distinguish the right use of his force from the wrong,\nby virtue of knowledge, intelligence, reason. Such discriminating\nintelligence, which in this dialogue is called the Regal or political\nart,--what is the object of it? It is intelligence or knowledge,--But\n_of what_? Not certainly of the way how each particular act is\nto be performed--how each particular end is to be attained. Each\nof these separately is the object of some special knowledge. But the\nwhole of a man's life is passed in a series of such particular acts,\neach of which is the object of some special knowledge: what then\nremains as the object of Regal or political intelligence, upon which\nour happiness is said to depend? Or how can it have any object at\nall?\n\n[Side-note: Comparison with other dialogues--Republic,\nPhil\u00eabus, Protagoras. The only distinct answer is found in the\nProtagoras.]\n\nThe question here raised is present to Plato's mind in other\ndialogues, and occurs under other words, as for example, What is\ngood? Good is the object of the Regal or political intelligence; but\nwhat is Good? In the Republic he raises this question, but declines\nto answer it, confessing that he could not make it intelligible to\nhis hearers:[39] in the Gorgias, he takes pains to tell us what it\n_is not_: in the Phil\u00eabus, he does indeed tell us what it is,\nbut in terms which need explanation quite as much as the term which\nthey are brought to explain. There is only one dialogue in which the\nquestion is answered affirmatively, in clear and unmistakable\nlanguage, and with considerable development--and that is, the\nProtagoras: where Sokrates asserts and proves at length, that Good is\nat the bottom identical with pleasure, and Evil with pain: that the\nmeasuring or calculating intelligence is the truly regal art of life,\nupon which the attainment of Good depends: and that the object of\nthat intelligence--the items which we are to measure, calculate, and\ncompare--is pleasures and pains, so as to secure to ourselves as much\nas possible of the former, and escape as much as possible of the\nlatter.\n\n[Footnote 39: Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 505-506.]\n\nIn my remarks on the Protagoras, I shall state the view which I take\nof the doctrine laid down in that dialogue by Sokrates. Persons may\nthink the answer insufficient: most of the Platonic critics declare\nit to be absolutely wrong. But at any rate it is the only distinct\nanswer which Plato ever gives, to the question raised by Sokrates in\nthe Euthyd\u00eamus and elsewhere.\n\n[Side-note: The talk of the two Sophists, though ironically\nadmired while it is going on, is shown at the end to produce no real\nadmiration, but the contrary.]\n\nFrom the abstract just given of the argument of Sokrates in the\nEuthyd\u00eamus, it will be seen to be serious and pertinent, though\nending with a confession of failure. The observations placed in\ncontrast with it and ascribed to the two Sophists, are\ndistinguished by being neither serious nor pertinent; but parodies of\ndebate for the most part, put together for the express purpose of\nappearing obviously silly to the reader. Plato keeps up the dramatic\nor ironical appearance, that they are admired and welcomed not only\nby the hearers, but even by Sokrates himself. Nevertheless, it is\nmade clear at the end that all this is nothing but irony, and that\nthe talk which Plato ascribes to Euthyd\u00eamus and Dionysodorus\nproduced, according to his own showing, no sentiment of esteem for\ntheir abilities among the by-standers, but quite the reverse. Whether\nthere were individual Sophists at Athens who talked in that style, we\ncan neither affirm nor deny: but that there were an established class\nof persons who did so, and made both money and reputation by it, we\ncan securely deny. It is the more surprising that the Platonic\ncommentators should desire us to regard Euthyd\u00eamus and Dionysodorus\nas representative samples of a special class named Sophists, since\none of the most eminent of those commentators (Stallbaum),[40] both\nadmits that Sokrates himself was generally numbered in the class and\ncalled by the name and affirms also (incorrectly, in my opinion) that\nthe interrogations of Sokrates, which in this dialogue stand\ncontrasted with those of the two Sophists, do not enunciate the\nopinions either of Sokrates or of Plato himself, but the opinions of\nthese very Sophists, which Plato adopts and utters for the\noccasion.[41]\n\n[Footnote 40: Stallbaum, Proleg. in Platon. Euthydem. p. 50. \"Illud\nquidem ex Aristophane pariter atque ipso Platone evidenter apparet,\nSocratem non tantum ab orationum scriptoribus, sed etiam ab aliis in\nvanissimorum sophistarum numero habitum fuisse.\" Ib. p. 49 (cited in\na previous note). \"Videtur pervulgata fuisse hominum opinio, qu\u00e2\nSocratem inter vanos sophistas numerandum esse existimabant.\" Again\np. 44, where Stallbaum tells us that Sokrates was considered by many\nto belong \"misellorum Sophistarum gregi\".]\n\n[Footnote 41: Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Plat. Euthydem. p. 30. \"Cavendum\nest magnopere, ne qu\u00e6 hic \u00e0 Socrate disputantur, pro ipsius decretis\nhabeamus: _sunt enim omnia ad mentem Sophistarum disputata_,\nquos ille, reprehensis eorum opinionibus, sperat eo adductum iri, ut\ngravem prudentemque earum defensionem suscipiant.\" Compare p. 66.\nStallbaum says that Plato often reasons, adopting for the occasion\nthe doctrine of the Sophists. See his Prolegg. to the Lach\u00eas and\nCharmid\u00eas, and still more his Proleg. to the Protagoras, where he\ntells us that Plato introduces his spokesman Sokrates not only as\narguing _ex mente Sophistarum_, but also as employing captious\nand delusive artifice, such as in this dialogue is ascribed to\nEuthydemus and Dionysodorus.--pp. 23-24. \"Itaque Socrates, miss\u00e2\nhujus rei disputatione, repent\u00e8 ad alia progreditur, scilicet\n_similibus loqueis_ hominem denuo irretiturus. Nemini facil\u00e9\nobscurum erit, hoc quoque loco Protagoram _argutis conclusiunculis\ndeludi_\" (_i.e._ by Sokrates) \"atque _callid\u00e9 eo\npermoveri,_\" &c. \"Quanquam nemo erit, quin videat, _callid\u00e9\ndeludi Protagoram_, ubi ex eo, quod qui injust\u00e9 faciat, is\nneutiquam agat [Greek: s\u00f4phro/n\u00f4s], protinus colligitur justitiam et\n[Greek: s\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ea] unum idemque esse.\"--p. 25. \"Disputat enim\nSocrates pleraque omnia ad mentem ipsius Protagor\u00e6.\"--p. 30.\n\"Platonem ipsum h\u00e6c non prob\u00e2sse, sed e vulgi opinione et mente\nexplicasse, vel illud non obscur\u00e9 significat,\" &c.--p. 33.]\n\n[Side-note: Mistaken representations about the Sophists--Aristotle's\ndefinition--no distinguishable line can be drawn between\nthe Sophist and the Dialectician.]\n\nThe received supposition that there were at Athens a class of men\ncalled Sophists who made money and reputation by obvious fallacies\nemployed to bring about contradictions in dialogue--appears to me to\npervert the representations given of ancient philosophy. Aristotle\ndefines a Sophist to be \"one who seeks to make money by apparent\nwisdom which is not real wisdom\":--the Sophist (he says) is an\nEristic who, besides money-making, seeks for nothing but victory in\ndebate and humiliation of his opponent:--Distinguishing the\nDialectician from the Sophist (he says), the Dialectician impugns or\ndefends, by probable arguments, probable tenets--that is, tenets\nwhich are believed by a numerous public or by a few wise and eminent\nindividuals:--while the Sophist deals with tenets which are probable\nonly in appearance and not in reality--that is to say, tenets which\nalmost every one by the slightest attention recognises as false.[42]\nThis definition is founded, partly on the personal character and\npurpose ascribed to the Sophist: partly upon the distinction between\napparent and real wisdom, assumed to be known and permanent. Now such\npseudo-wisdom was declared by Sokrates to be the natural state of all\nmankind, even the most eminent, which it was his mission to expose:\nmoreover, the determination, what is to be comprised in this\ndescription, must depend upon the judges to whom it is\nsubmitted, since much of the works of Aristotle and Plato would come\nunder the category, in the judgment of modern readers both vulgar and\ninstructed. But apart from this relative and variable character of\nthe definition, when applied to philosophy generally--we may\nconfidently assert, that there never was any real class of\nintellectual men, in a given time or place, to whom it could possibly\napply. Of individuals, the varieties are innumerable: but no\nprofessional body of men ever acquired gain or celebrity by\nmaintaining theses, and employing arguments, which every one could\neasily detect as false. Every man employs sophisms more or less;\nevery man does so inadvertently, some do it by design also; moreover,\nalmost every reasoner does it largely, in the estimation of his\nopponents. No distinct line can be drawn between the Sophist and the\nDialectician: the definition given by Aristotle applies to an ideal\nin his own mind, but to no reality without: Protagoras and Prodikus\nno more correspond to it than Sokrates and Plato. Aristotle observes,\nwith great truth, that all men are dialecticians and testers of\nreasoning, up to a certain point: he might have added that they are\nall Sophists also, up to a certain point.[43] Moreover, when he\nattempts to found a scientific classification of intellectual\nprocesses upon a difference in the purposes of different\npractitioners--whether they employ the same process for money or\ndisplay, or beneficence, or mental satisfaction to themselves--this\nis altogether unphilosophical. The medical art is the same, whether\nemployed to advise gratis, or in exchange for a fee.[44]\n\n[Footnote 42: Aristotel. Topic, i. 1, p. 100, b. 21. [Greek: e)/ndoxa\nde\\ ta\\ dokou=nta pa=sin \u00ea)\\ toi=s plei/stois \u00ea)\\ toi=s sophoi=s,\nkai\\ tou/tois \u00ea)\\ pa=sin \u00ea)\\ toi=s plei/stois \u00ea)\\ toi=s ma/lista\ngn\u00f4ri/mois kai\\ e)ndo/xois. E)ristiko\\s de\\ e)/sti sullogismo\\s o(\ne)k phainome/n\u00f4n e)ndo/x\u00f4n, m\u00ea\\ o)/nt\u00f4n de\\--kai\\ o( e)x e)ndo/x\u00f4n\n\u00ea)\\ phainome/n\u00f4n e)ndo/x\u00f4n phaino/menos. Ou)the\\n ga\\r t\u00f4=n\nlegome/n\u00f4n e)ndo/x\u00f4n e)pipolai/on e)/chei pantel\u00f4=s t\u00ea\\n phantasi/an,\nkatha/per peri\\ ta\\s t\u00f4=n e)ristik\u00f4=n lo/g\u00f4n a)rcha\\s sumbe/b\u00eaken\ne)/chein. Parachr\u00ea=ma ga\\r kai\\ \u00f4(s e)pi\\ to\\ polu\\ toi=s kai\\ mikra\\\nsunora=|n duname/nois, kata/d\u00ealos e)n au)toi=s \u00ea( tou= pseu/dous\ne)/sti phu/sis.]\n\nDe Sophisticis Elenchis, i. p. 165, a. 21. [Greek: e)/sti ga\\r \u00ea(\nsophistik\u00ea\\ phainome/n\u00ea sophi/a, ou)=sa d' ou)/; kai\\ o( sophist\u00ea\\s\nchr\u00eamatist\u00ea\\s a)po\\ phainome/n\u00eas sophi/as, a)ll' ou)k ou)/s\u00eas], p.\n165, b. 10, p. 171, b. 8-27. [Greek: Oi( phile/rides, e)ristikoi\\,\na)g\u00f4nistikoi\\], are persons who break the rules of dialectic ([Greek:\na)dikomachi/a]) for the purpose of gaining victory; [Greek: oi(\nsophistai\\] are those who do the same thing for the purpose of\ngetting money. See also Metaphys. iii. 1004, b. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Aristot. Sophist. Elench. p. 172, a. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Aristot. Rhetor, i. 1, 1355, b. 18. He here admits that\nthe only difference between the Dialectician and the Sophist lies in\ntheir purposes--that the mental activity employed by both is the\nsame. [Greek: o( ga\\r sophistiko\\s ou)k e)n t\u00ea=| duna/mei a)ll' e)n\nt\u00ea=| proaire/sei; pl\u00ea\\n e)ntau=tha me\\n] (in Rhetoric) [Greek:\ne)/stai o( me\\n kata\\ t\u00ea\\n e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean o( de\\ kata\\ t\u00ea\\n proai/resin,\nr(\u00ea/t\u00f4r, e)kei= de\\] (in Dialectic) [Greek: sophist\u00ea\\s me\\n kata\\\nt\u00ea\\n proai/resin, dialektiko\\s de\\ ou) kata\\ t\u00ea\\n proai/resin, a)lla\\\nkata\\ t\u00ea\\n du/namin.]]\n\n[Side-note: Philosophical purpose of the Euthyd\u00eamus--exposure\nof fallacies, in Plato's dramatic manner, by multiplication of\nparticular examples.]\n\nThough I maintain that no class of professional Sophists (in the\nmeaning given to that term by the Platonic critics after Plato and\nAristotle) ever existed--and though the distinction between the paid\nand the gratuitous discourser is altogether unworthy to enter into\nthe history of philosophy--yet I am not the less persuaded that the\nPlatonic dialogue Euthyd\u00eamus, and the treatise of Aristotle De\nSophisticis Elenchis, are very striking and useful compositions. This\nlast-mentioned treatise was composed by Aristotle very much\nunder the stimulus of the Platonic dialogue Euthyd\u00eamus, to which it\nrefers several times--and for the purpose of distributing the variety\nof possible fallacies under a limited number of general heads, each\ndescribed by its appropriate characteristic, and represented by its\nillustrative type. Such attempt at arrangement--one of the many\nvaluable contributions of Aristotle to the theory of reasoning--is\nexpressly claimed by him as his own. He takes a just pride in having\nbeen the first to introduce system where none had introduced it\nbefore.[45] No such system was known to Plato, who (in the\nEuthyd\u00eamus) enumerates a string of fallacies one after another\nwithout any project of classifying them, and who presents them as it\nwere in concrete, as applied by certain disputants in an imaginary\ndialogue. The purpose is, to make these fallacies appear\nconspicuously in their character of fallacies: a purpose which is\nassisted by presenting the propounders of them as ridiculous and\ncontemptible. The lively fancy of Plato attaches suitable accessories\nto Euthyd\u00eamus and Dionysodorus. They are old men, who have been all\ntheir lives engaged in teaching rhetoric and tactics, but have\nrecently taken to dialectic, and acquired perfect mastery thereof\nwithout any trouble--who make extravagant promises--and who as\ntalkers play into each other's hands, making a shuttlecock of the\nrespondent, a modest novice every way unsuitable for such treatment.\n\n[Footnote 45: See the last chapter of the treatise De Sophisticis\nElenchis.]\n\n[Side-note: Aristotle (Soph. Elench.) attempts a\nclassification of fallacies: Plato enumerates them without\nclassification.]\n\nThus different is the Platonic manner, from the Aristotelian manner,\nof exposing fallacies. But those exhibited in the former appear as\nmembers of one or more among the classes framed by the latter. The\nfallacies which we read in the Euthyd\u00eamus are chiefly verbal: but\nsome are verbal, and something beyond.\n\n[Side-note: Fallacies of equivocation propounded by the two\nSophists in the Euthyd\u00eamus.]\n\nThus, for example, if we take the first sophism introduced by the two\nexhibitors, upon which they bring the youth Kleinias, by suitable\nquestions, to declare successively both sides of the\nalternative--\"Which of the two is it that learns, the wise or the\nignorant?\"--Sokrates himself elucidates it by pointing out that the terms\nused are equivocal:[46] You might answer it by using the language ascribed\nto Dionysodorus in another part of this dialogue--\"Neither and\nBoth\".[47] The like may be said about the fallacy in page 284 D--\"Are\nthere persons who speak of things as they are? Good men speak of\nthings as they are: they speak of good men well, of bad men badly:\ntherefore, of course, they speak of stout men stoutly, and of hot men\nhotly. Ay! rejoins the respondent Ktesippus, angrily--they speak of\ncold men coldly, and say that they talk coldly.\"[48] These are\nfallacies of double meaning of words--or double construction of\nphrases: as we read also in page 287 D, where the same Greek verb\n([Greek: noei=n]) may be construed either to _think_ or to\n_mean_: so that when Sokrates talks about what a predication\n_means_--the Sophists ask him--\"Does anything _think_,\nexcept things having a soul? Did you ever know any predication that\nhad a soul?\"\n\n[Footnote 46: Plato, Euthyd\u00eam. pp. 275 D--278 D. Aristotle also\nadverts to this fallacy, but without naming the Euthyd\u00eamus. See Soph.\nEl. 4, 165, b. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Plato, Euthyd\u00eam. p. 300 D. [Greek: Ou)de/tera kai\\\na)mpho/tera]]\n\n[Footnote 48: Plato, Euthyd\u00eam. p. 284 E. [Greek: tou\\s gou=n\npsuchrou\\s psuchr\u00f4=s le/gousi/ te kai\\ phasi\\ diale/gesthai.] The\nmetaphorical sense of [Greek: psuchro\\s] is _pointless_,\n_stupid_, _out of taste_, _out of place_,\n_&c._]\n\n[Side-note: Fallacies--_\u00e0 dicto secundum quid, ad dictum\nsimpliciter_--in the Euthyd\u00eamus.]\n\nAgain, the two Sophists undertake to prove that Sokrates, as well as\nthe youth Kleinias and indeed every one else, knows everything. \"Can\nany existing thing _be_ that which it is, and at the same time\n_not be_ that which it is?--No.--You know some things?--Yes.--Then\nif you know, _you are knowing_?--Certainly. I am knowing of\nthose particular things.--That makes no difference: if you are\nknowing, you necessarily know everything.--Oh! no: for there are many\nthings which I do not know.--Then if there be anything which you do\nnot know, _you are not knowing_?--Yes, doubtless--of that\nparticular thing.--Still you are _not knowing_: and just now you\nsaid that you were _knowing_: and thus, at one and the same\ntime, you are what you are, and you are not what you are.[49]\n\n[Footnote 49: Plato, Euthyd\u00eam. p. 293 C. Aristotle considers\n_know_ to be an equivocal word; he admits that in certain senses\nyou may both _know_ and _not know_ the same thing. Anal.\nPrior. ii. 67, b. 8. Anal. Post. i. 71, a. 25.]\n\n\"But _you_ also\" (retorts Sokrates upon the couple), \"do not\nyou also know some things, not know others?--By no means.--What!\ndo you know nothing?--Far from it.--Then you know all\nthings?--Certainly we do,--and you too: if you know one thing, you know\nall things.--What! do you know the art of the carpenter, the currier, the\ncobbler--the number of stars in the heaven, and of grains of sand in\nthe desert, &c.?--Yes: we know all these things.\"\n\n[Side-note: Obstinacy shown by the two Sophists in their\nreplies--determination not to contradict themselves.]\n\nThe two Sophists maintain their consistency by making reply in the\naffirmative to each of these successive questions: though Ktesippus\npushes them hard by enquiries as to a string of mean and diverse\nspecialties.[50] This is one of the purposes of the dialogue: to\nrepresent the two Sophists as willing to answer any thing, however\nobviously wrong and false, for the purpose of avoiding defeat in the\ndispute--as using their best efforts to preserve themselves in the\nposition of questioners, and to evade the position of respondents--and\nas exacting a categorical answer--Yes or No--to every question\nwhich they put without any qualifying words, and without any\nassurance that the meaning of the question was understood.[51]\n\n[Footnote 50: Plato, Euthyd\u00eam. pp. 293-294.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Plato, Euthyd\u00eam. pp. 295-296.]\n\nThe base of these fallacious inferences is, That respecting the same\nsubject, you cannot both affirm and deny the same predicate: you\ncannot say, A is knowing--A is not knowing ([Greek: e)pist\u00ea/m\u00f4n]).\nThis is a fallacy more than verbal: it is recognised by Aristotle\n(and by all subsequent logicians) under the name--_\u00e0 dicto secundum\nquid, ad dictum simpliciter_.\n\nIt is very certain that this fallacy is often inadvertently committed\nby very competent reasoners, including both Plato and Aristotle.\n\n[Side-note: Farther verbal equivocations.]\n\nAgain--Sophroniskus was my father--Ch\u00e6redemus was the father of\nPatrokles.--Then Sophroniskus was different from a father: therefore\nhe was not a father. You are different from a stone, therefore you\nare not a stone: you are different from gold, therefore you are not\ngold. By parity of reasoning, Sophroniskus is different from a\nfather--therefore he is not a father. Accordingly, you, Sokrates,\nhave no father.[52]\n\n[Footnote 52: Plato, Euthyd\u00eam. pp. 297-298.]\n\nBut (retorts Ktesippus upon the couple) your father is different\nfrom my father.--Not at all.--How can that be?--What! is your father,\nthen, the father of all men and of all animals?--Certainly he is. A\nman cannot be at the same time a father, and not a father. He cannot\nbe at the same time a man, and not a man--gold, and not gold.[53]\n\n[Footnote 53: Plato, Euthyd\u00eam. p. 298. Some of the fallacies in the\ndialogue ([Greek: Po/teron o(r\u00f4=sin oi( a)/nthr\u00f4poi ta\\ dunata\\\no(ra=|n \u00ea)\\ ta\\ a)du/nata? . . . \u00ca)= ou)ch oi(=o/n te sig\u00f4=nta\nle/gein?] p. 300 A) are hardly translatable into English, since they\ndepend upon equivocal constructions peculiar to the Greek language.\nAristotle refers them to the general head [Greek: par'\na)mphiboli/an]. The same about [Greek: pros\u00ea/kei to\\n ma/geiron\nkatako/ptein], p. 301 D.]\n\nYou have got a dog (Euthyd\u00eamus says to Ktesippus).--Yes.--The dog is\nthe father of puppies?--Yes.--The dog, being a father, is\nyours?--Certainly.--Then your father is a dog, and you are brother\nof the puppies.\n\nYou beat your dog sometimes? Then you beat your father.[54]\n\n[Footnote 54: Plat. Euthyd. p. 298.]\n\nThose animals, and those alone are _yours_ (sheep, oxen,\n&c.), which you can give away, or sell, or sacrifice at pleasure.\nBut Zeus, Apollo, and Ath\u00ean\u00ea are _your_ Gods. The Gods have a\nsoul and are animals. Therefore your Gods are your animals. Now you\ntold us that those alone were your animals, which you could give\naway, or sell, or sacrifice at pleasure. Therefore you can give away,\nor sell, or sacrifice at pleasure, Zeus, Apollo, and Ath\u00ean\u00ea.[55]\n\n[Footnote 55: Plat. Euthyd\u00eam. p. 302. This same fallacy, in\nsubstance, is given by Aristotle, De Sophist. El. 17, 176 a. 3, 179,\na. 5, but with different exemplifying names and persons.]\n\nThis fallacy depends upon the double and equivocal meaning of\n_yours_--one of its different explanations being treated as if\nit were the only one.\n\n[Side-note: Fallacies involving deeper logical\nprinciples--contradiction is impossible.--To speak falsely is impossible.]\n\nOther puzzles cited in this dialogue go deeper:--Contradiction is\nimpossible--To speak falsely is impossible.[56] These paradoxes were\nmaintained by Antisthenes and others, and appear to have been matters\nof dialectic debate throughout the fourth and third centuries. I\nshall say more of them when I speak about the Megarics and\nAntisthenes. Here I only note, that in this dialogue, Ktesippus is\nrepresented as put to silence by them, and Sokrates as making an\nanswer which is no answer at all.[57] We see how much trouble these\nparadoxes gave to Plato, when we read the Sophist\u00eas, in which he\nhandles the last of the two in a manner elaborate, but (to my\njudgment) unsatisfactory.\n\n[Footnote 56: Plato, Euthyd\u00eam. pp. 285-286.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Plato, Euthyd\u00eam. pp. 286 B--287 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Plato's Euthyd\u00eamus is the earliest known attempt\nto set out and expose fallacies--the only way of exposing fallacies\nis to exemplify the fallacy by particular cases, in which the\nconclusion proved is known _aliunde_ to be false and absurd.]\n\nThe Euthyd\u00eamus of Plato is memorable in the history of philosophy as\nthe earliest known attempt to set out, and exhibit to attention, a\nstring of fallacious modes of reasoning. Plato makes them all absurd\nand ridiculous. He gives a caricature of a dialectic debate, not\nunworthy of his namesake Plato Comicus--or of Aristophanes, Swift, or\nVoltaire. The sophisms appear for the most part so silly, as he puts\nthem, that the reader asks himself how any one could have been ever\nimposed upon by such a palpable delusion? Yet such confidence is by\nno means justified. A sophism, perfectly analogous in character to\nthose which Plato here exposes to ridicule, may, in another case,\neasily escape detection from the hearer, and even from the reasoner\nhimself. People are constantly misled by fallacies arising from the\nsame word bearing two senses, from double construction of the same\nphrase, from unconscious application of a _dictum secundum\nquid_, as if it were a _dictum simpliciter_; from Petitio\nPrincipii, &c., Ignoratio Elenchi, &c. Neither Plato himself,\nnor Aristotle, can boast of escaping them.[58] If these fallacies\nappear, in the examples chosen by Plato for the Euthyd\u00eamus, so\nobviously inconclusive that they can deceive no one--the reason lies\nnot in the premisses themselves, but in the particular conclusions to\nwhich they lead: which conclusions are known on other grounds to be\nfalse, and never to be seriously maintainable by any person. Such\nconclusions as--\"Sokrates had no father: Sophroniskus, if father of\nSokrates, was father of all men and all animals: In beating your dog,\nyou beat your father: If you know one thing, you know everything,\"\n&c., being known _aliunde_ to be false, prove that there has\nbeen some fallacy in the premisses whereby they have been\nestablished. Such cases serve as a _reductio ad absurdum_ of the\nantecedent process. They make us aware of one mode of liability\nto error, and put us on our guard against it in analogous cases. This\nis a valuable service, and all the more valuable, because the\nliability to error is real and widespread, even from fallacies\nperfectly analogous to those which seem so silly under the particular\nexemplifications which Plato selects and exposes. Many of the\nillustrations of the Platonic Euthyd\u00eamus are reproduced by Aristotle\nin the Treatise de Sophisticis Elenchis, together with other\nfallacies, discriminated with a certain method and system.[59]\n\n[Footnote 58: See a passage in Plato's Charmid\u00eas, where Heindorf\nremarks with propriety upon his equivocal use of the words [Greek:\neu)= z\u00ea=|n] and [Greek: eu)= pra/ttein]--also the Gorgias, p. 507 D,\nwith the notes of Routh and Heindorf. I have noticed both passages in\ndiscussing these two dialogues.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Aristotle, De Sophist. Elench.; also Arist. Rhet. ii.\np. 1401, a-b.]\n\n[Side-note: Mistake of supposing fallacies to have been\ninvented and propagated by Athenian Sophists--they are inherent\ninadvertencies and liabilities to error, in the ordinary process of\nthinking. Formal debate affords the best means of correcting them.]\n\nThe true character of these fallacies is very generally overlooked by\nthe Platonic critics, in their appreciation of the Euthyd\u00eamus; when\nthey point our attention to the supposed tricks and frauds of the\npersons whom they called Sophists, as well as to mischievous\ncorruptions alleged to arise from Eristic or formal contentious\ndebate. These critics speak as if they thought that such fallacies\nwere the special inventions of Athenian Sophists for the purposes of\nAthenian Eristic: as if such causes of error were inoperative on\npersons of ordinary honesty or intelligence, who never consulted or\nheard the Sophists. It has been the practice of writers on logic,\nfrom Aristotle down to Whately, to represent logical fallacies as\nfrauds devised and maintained by dishonest practitioners, whose art\nWhately assimilates to that of jugglers.\n\nThis view of the case appears to me incomplete and misleading. It\nsubstitutes the rare and accidental in place of the constant and\nessential. The various sophisms, of which Plato in the Euthyd\u00eamus\ngives the _reductio ad absurdum_, are not the inventions of\nSophists. They are erroneous tendencies of the reasoning process,\nfrequently incident to human thought and speech: specimens of those\never-renewed \"inadvertencies of ordinary thinking\" (to recur to a\nphrase cited in my preface), which it is the peculiar mission of\nphilosophy or \"reasoned truth\" to rectify. Moreover the practice of\nformal debate, which is usually denounced with so much asperity--if\nit affords on some occasions opportunity to produce such fallacies,\npresents not merely equal opportunity, but the only effective means,\nfor exposing and confuting them. Whately in his Logic,[60] like\nPlato in the Euthyd\u00eamus, when bringing these fallacies into open\ndaylight in order that every one may detect them, may enliven the\ntheme by presenting them as the deliberate tricks of a Sophist.\nDoubtless they are so by accident: yet their essential character is\nthat of infirmities incident to the _intellectus sibi\npermissus_: operative at Athens before Athenian Sophists existed,\nand in other regions also, where these persons never penetrated.]\n\n[Footnote 60: Whately's Logic, ch. v. sect. 5. Though Whately, like\nother logicians, keeps the Sophists in the foreground, as the\nfraudulent enemy who sow tares among that which would otherwise come\nup as a clean crop of wheat--yet he intimates also incidentally how\nwidespread and frequent such fallacies are, quite apart from\ndishonest design. He says--\"It seems by most persons to be taken for\ngranted, that a Fallacy is to be dreaded merely as a weapon fashioned\nand wielded by a skilful Sophist: or, if they allow that a man may\nwith honest intentions slide into one, unconsciously, in the heat of\n_argument_--still they seem to suppose, that where there is no\n_dispute_, there is no cause to dread Fallacy. Whereas there is\nmuch danger, even in what may be called _solitary reasoning_, of\nsliding unawares into some Fallacy, by which one may be so far\ndeceived as even to act upon the conclusion so obtained. By\n_solitary reasoning_, is meant the case in which we are not\nseeking for arguments to prove a given question, but labouring to\nelicit from our previous stock of knowledge some useful inference.\"\n\n\"To speak of all the Fallacies that have ever been enumerated, as too\nglaring and obvious to need even being mentioned--because the simple\ninstances given in books, and there stated in the plainest and\nconsequently most easily detected form, are such as (in that form)\nwould deceive no one--this, surely, shows either extreme weakness or\nextreme unfairness.\"--Aristotle himself makes the same remark as\nWhately--That the man who is easily taken in by a Fallacy advanced by\nanother, will be easily misled by the like Fallacy in his own\nsolitary reasoning. Sophist. Elench. 16, 175, a. 10.]\n\n[Side-note: Wide-spread prevalence of erroneous belief,\nmisguided by one or other of these fallacies, attested by Sokrates,\nPlato, Bacon, &c.,--complete enumeration of heads of fallacies by\nMill.]\n\nThe wide diffusion and constant prevalence of such infirmities is\nattested not less by Sokrates in his last speech, wherein he declares\nreal want of knowledge and false persuasion of knowledge, to be\nuniversal, the mission of his life being to expose them, though he\ncould not correct them--than by Bacon in his reformatory projects,\nwhere he enumerates the various Idola worshipped by the human\nintellect, and the false tendencies acquired \"_in prim\u00e2 digestione\nmentis_\". The psychological analysis of the sentiment of belief\nwith its different sources, given in Mr. Alexander Bain's work on the\nEmotions and the Will, shows how this takes place; and exhibits true\nor sound belief, in so far as it ever is acquired, as an acquisition\nonly attained after expulsion of earlier antecedent error.[61] Of\nsuch error, and of the different ways in which apparent evidence\nis mistaken for real evidence, a comprehensive philosophical\nexposition is farther given by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in the fifth\nbook of his System of Logic, devoted to the subject of Fallacies.\nEvery variety of erroneous procedure is referable to some one or more\nof the general heads of Fallacy there enumerated. It is the Fallacies\nof Ratiocination, of which the two Sophists, in the Platonic\nEuthyd\u00eamus, are made to exhibit specimens: and when we regard such\nFallacies, as one branch among several in a complete logical scheme,\nwe shall see at once that they are not inventions of the Athenian\nSophists--still less inventions for the purpose of Eristic or formal\ndebate. For every one of these Fallacies is of a nature to ensnare\nmen, and even to ensnare them more easily, in the common, informal,\nconversation of life--or in their separate thoughts. Besides mistakes\non matters of fact, the two main causes which promote the\nsuccess and encourage the multiplication of Fallacies generally, are\nfirst, the emotional bias towards particular conclusions, which\ndisposes persons to accept any apparent evidence, favourable to such\nconclusion, as if it, were real evidence: next, the careless and\nelliptical character of common speech, in which some parts of the\nevidence are merely insinuated, and other parts altogether left out.\nIt is this last circumstance which gives occasion to the very\nextensive class of Fallacies called by Mr. Mill Fallacies of\nConfusion: a class so large, that the greater number of Fallacies\nmight plausibly be brought under it.[62]\n\n[Footnote 61: See the instructive and original chapter on the\ngeneration, sources, and growth of Belief, in Mr. Bain's work,\n'Emotions and Will,' p. 568 seq. After laying down the fundamental\ncharacteristic of Belief, as referable altogether to intended action,\neither certain to come, or contingent under supposed circumstances,\nand after enumerating the different Sources of Belief.--1. Intuitive\nor Instinctive. 2. Experience. 3. The Influence of the Emotions\n(sect. x. p. 579)--Mr. Bain says: \"Having in our constitution\nprimordial fountains of activity in the spontaneous and voluntary\nimpulses, we follow the first clue that experience gives us, and\naccept the indication with the whole force of these natural\npromptings. Being under the strongest impulses to act somehow, an\nanimal accepts any lead that is presented, and if successful, abides\nby that lead with unshaken confidence. This is that instinct of\ncredulity so commonly attributed to the infant mind. It is not the\nsingle instance, or the repetition of two or three, that makes up the\nstrong tone of confidence; it is the mind's own active determination,\nfinding some definite vent in the gratification of its ends, and\nabiding by the discovery with the whole energy of the character,\nuntil the occurrence of some check, failure, or contradiction. The\nforce of belief, therefore, is not one rising from zero to a full\ndevelopment by slow degrees, according to the length of the\nexperience. We must treat it rather as a strong primitive\nmanifestation, derived from the natural activity of the system, and\ntaking its direction and rectification from experience (p. 583). The\nanticipation of nature, so strenuously repudiated by Bacon, is the\noffspring of this characteristic of the mental system. With the\nactive tendency at its maximum, and the exercise of intelligence and\nacquired knowledge at the minimum, there can issue nothing but a\nquantity of rash enterprises. The respectable name\n_generalisation_, implying the best products of enlightened\nscientific research, has also a different meaning, expressing one of\nthe most erroneous impulses and crudest determinations of untutored\nhuman nature. To extend some familiar and narrow experience, so as to\ncomprehend cases the most distant, is a piece of mere reckless\ninstinct, demanding severe discipline for its correction. I have\nmentioned the case of our supposing all other minds constituted like\nour own. The veriest infant has got this length in the career of\nfallacy. Sound belief, instead of being a pacific and gentle growth,\nis in reality the battering of a series of strongholds, the\nconquering of a country in hostile occupation. This is a fact common\nboth to the individual and to the race. Observation is unanimous on\nthe point. It will probably be long ere the last of the delusions\nattributable to this method of believing first and proving afterwards\ncan be eradicated from humanity.\" [3rd ed., p. 505 seq.]]\n\n[Footnote 62: Mill, 'System of Logic,' Book V., to which is prefixed\nthe following citation from Hobbes's 'Logica'. \"Errare non modo\naffirmando et negando, sed etiam in sentiendo, et in tacit\u00e2 hominum\ncogitatione, contingit.\"\n\nMr. Mill points out forcibly both the operation of moral or emotional\nbias in perverting the intellect, and causing sophisms or fallacies\nto produce conviction; and the increased chance afforded for the\nsuccess of a sophism by the suppression of part of the premisses,\nwhich is unavoidable in informal discussions.\n\n\"Bias is not a direct source of wrong conclusions (v. 1-3). We cannot\nbelieve a proposition only by wishing, or only by dreading, to\nbelieve it. Bias acts indirectly by placing the intellectual grounds\nof belief in an incomplete or distorted shape before a man's eyes. It\nmakes him shrink from the irksome labour of a rigorous induction. It\noperates too by making him look out eagerly for reasons, or apparent\nreasons, to support opinions which are conformable, or resist those\nwhich are repugnant, to his interests or feelings; and when the\ninterests or feelings are common to great numbers of persons, reasons\nare accepted or pass current which would not for a moment be listened\nto in that character, if the conclusion had nothing more powerful\nthan its reasons to speak in its behalf. The natural or acquired\nprejudices of mankind are perpetually throwing up philosophical\ntheories, the sole recommendation of which consists in the premisses\nwhich they afford for proving cherished doctrines, or justifying\nfavourite feelings; and when any one of these theories has become so\nthoroughly discredited as no longer to serve the purpose, another is\nalways ready to take its place.\"--\"Though the opinions of the\ngenerality of mankind, when not dependent upon mere habit and\ninculcation, have their root much more in the inclinations than in\nthe intellect, it is a necessary condition to the triumph of the\nmoral bias that it should first pervert the understanding.\"\n\nAgain in v. 2, 3. \"It is not in the nature of bad reasoning to\nexpress itself unambiguously. When a sophist, whether he is imposing\nupon himself or attempting to impose upon others, can be constrained\nto throw his argument into so distinct a form, it needs, in a large\nnumber of cases, no farther exposure. In all arguments, everywhere\nbut in the schools, some of the links are suppressed: _\u00e0\nfortiori_, when the arguer either intends to deceive, or is a lame\nand inexpert thinker, little accustomed to bring his reasoning\nprocesses to any test; and it is in those steps of the reasoning\nwhich are made in this tacit and half-conscious, or even wholly\nunconscious, manner, that the error oftenest lurks. In order to\ndetect the fallacy the proposition thus silently assumed must be\nsupplied, but the reasoner, most likely, has never really asked\nhimself what he was assuming; his confuter, unless permitted to\nextort it from him by the Socratic mode of interrogation, must\nhimself judge what the suppressed premiss ought to be, in order to\nsupport the conclusion.\" Mr. Mill proceeds to illustrate this\nconfusion by an excellent passage cited from Whately's 'Logic'. I may\nadd, that Aristotle himself makes a remark substantially the same--That\nthe same fallacy may be referred to one general head or to\nanother, according to circumstances. Sophist. Elench. 33, 182, b. 10.]\n\n[Side-note: Value of formal debate as a means for testing\nand confuting fallacies.]\n\nWe thus see not only that the fallacious agencies are self-operative,\ngenerating their own weeds in the common soil of human thought and\nspeech, without being planted by Athenian Sophists or watered by\nEristic--but that this very Eristic affords the best means of\nrestraining their diffusion. It is only in formal debate that the\ndisputant can be forced to make clear to himself and declare\nexplicitly to others, without reserve or omission, all the premisses\nupon which his conclusion rests--that every part of these premisses\nbecomes liable to immediate challenge by an opponent--that the\nquestion comes distinctly under consideration, what is or is not\nsufficient evidence--that the premisses of one argument can be\ncompared with the premisses of another, so that if in the former you\nare tempted to acquiesce in them as sufficient because you have a\nbias favourable to the conclusion, in the latter you may be made to\nfeel that they are _insufficient_, because the conclusion which\nthey prove is one which you know to be untrue (_reductio ad\nabsurdum_). The habit of formal debate (called by those who do not\nlike it, Eristic[63]) is thus an indispensable condition both for the\nexposure and confutation of fallacies, which exist quite independent\nof that habit--owing their rise and prevalence to deep-seated\npsychological causes.\n\n[Footnote 63: The Platonic critics talk about the Eristics (as they\ndo about the Sophists) as if that name designated a known and\ndefinite class of persons. This is altogether misleading. The term is\nvituperative, and was applied by different persons according to their\nown tastes.\n\nUeberweg remarks with great justice, that Isokrates called all\nspeculators on philosophy by the name of Eristics. \"Als ob jener\nRhetor nicht (wie ja doch Spengel selbst gut nachgewiesen hat) alle\nund jede Spekulation mit dem Nahmen der Eristik bezeichnete.\"\n(Untersuchungen \u00fcber die Zeitfolge der Plat. Schriften, p. 257.) In\nreference to the distinction which Aristotle attempts to draw between\nDialectic and Eristic--the former legitimate, the latter\nillegitimate--we must remark that even in the legitimate Dialectic\nthe purpose prominent in his mind is that of victory over an\nopponent. He enjoins that you are not only to guard against your\nopponent, lest he should out-manoeuvre you, but you are to conceal\nand disguise the sequence of your questions so as to out-manoeuvre\nhim. [Greek: Chr\u00ea\\ d' o(/per phula/ttesthai paragge/llomen\na)pokrinome/nous, au)tou\\s e)picheirou=ntas peira=sthai lantha/nein.]\nAnal. Prior. ii. 66, a. 32. Compare Topic. 108, a. 25, 156, a. 23,\n164, b. 35.]\n\n[Side-note: Without the habit of formal debate, Plato could\nnot have composed his Euthyd\u00eamus, nor Aristotle the treatise De\nSophisticis Elenchis.]\n\nWithout the experience acquired by this habit of dialectic debate at\nAthens, Plato could not have composed his Euthyd\u00eamus, exhibiting a\n_reductio ad absurdum_ of several verbal fallacies--nor could we\nhave had the logical theories of Aristotle, embodied in the\nAnalytica and Topica with its annexed treatise De Sophisticis\nElenchis, in which various fallacies are discriminated and\nclassified. These theories, and the corollaries connected with them,\ndo infinite honour to the comprehensive intellect of Aristotle: but\nhe could not have conceived them without previous study of the\nratiocinative process. He, as the first theorizer, must have had\nbefore him abundant arguments explicitly laid out, and contested, or\nopen to be contested, at every step by an opponent.[64] Towards such\nhabit of formal argumentation, a strong repugnance was felt by many\nof the Athenian public, as there is among modern readers generally:\nbut those who felt thus, had probably little interest in the\nspeculations either of Plato or of Aristotle. That the Platonic\ncritics should themselves feel this same repugnance, seems to me not\nconsistent with their admiration for the great dialectician and\nlogician of antiquity: nor can I at all subscribe to their view, when\nthey present to us the inherent infirmities of the human intellect as\nfactitious distempers generated by the habit of formal debate, and by\nthe rapacity of Protagoras, Prodikus, and others.\n\n[Footnote 64: Mill, 'System of Logic.' Book VI. 1, 1. \"Principles of\nEvidence and Theories of Method, are not to be constructed _\u00e0\npriori_. The laws of our rational faculty, like those of every\nother natural agency, are only got by seeing the agent at work.\"]\n\n[Side-note: Probable popularity of the Euthyd\u00eamus at\nAthens--welcomed by all the enemies of Dialectic.]\n\nI think it probable that the dialogue of Euthyd\u00eamus, as far as the\npoint to which I have brought it (_i.e._, where Sokrates\nfinishes his recital to Kriton of the conversation which he had had\nwith the two Sophists), was among the most popular of all the\nPlatonic dialogues: not merely because of its dramatic vivacity and\ncharm of expression, but because it would be heartily welcomed by the\nnumerous enemies of Dialectic at Athens. We must remember that in the\nestimation of most persons at Athens, Dialectic included Sokrates and\nall the _viri Sokratici_ (Plato among them), just as much as the\npersons called Sophists. The discreditable picture here given of\nEuthyd\u00eamus and Dionysodorus, would be considered as telling against\nDialectic and the Sokratic Elenchus generally: while the rhetors, and\nothers who dealt in long continuous discourse, would treat it as a\nblow inflicted upon the rival art of dialogue, by the professor\nof the dialogue himself. In Plato's view, the dialogue was the\nspecial and appropriate manifestation of philosophy.\n\n[Side-note: Epilogue of Plato to the Dialogue, trying to\nobviate this inference by opponents--Conversation between Sokrates\nand Kriton.]\n\nThat the natural effect of the picture here drawn by Plato, was, to\njustify the antipathy of those who hated philosophy--we may see by\nthe epilogue which Plato has thought fit to annex: an epilogue so\nlittle in harmony with what has preceded, that we might almost\nimagine it to be an afterthought--yet obviously intended to protect\nphilosophy against imputations. Sokrates having concluded the\nrecital, in his ironical way, by saying that he intended to become a\npupil under the two Sophists, and by inviting Kriton to be a pupil\nalong with him--Kriton replies by saying that he is anxious to obtain\ninstruction from any one who can give it, but that he has no sympathy\nwith Euthyd\u00eamus, and would rather be refuted by him, than learn from\nhim to refute in such a manner. Kriton proceeds to report to Sokrates\nthe remarks of a by-stander (an able writer of discourses for the\nDikastery) who had heard all that passed; and who expressed his\nsurprise that Sokrates could have remained so long listening to such\nnonsense, and manifesting so much deference for a couple of foolish\nmen. Nevertheless (continued the by-stander) this couple are among\nthe most powerful talkers of the day upon philosophy. This shows you\nhow worthless a thing philosophy is: prodigious fuss, with\ncontemptible result--men careless what they say, and carping at every\nword that they hear.[65]\n\n[Footnote 65: Plat. Euthyd. pp. 304-305.]\n\nNow, Sokrates (concludes Kriton), this man is wrong for depreciating\nphilosophy, and all others who depreciate it are wrong also. But he\nwas right in blaming you, for disputing with such a couple before a\nlarge crowd.\n\n_Sokr._--What kind of person is this censor of philosophy? Is he\na powerful speaker himself in the Dikastery? Or is he only a composer\nof discourses to be spoken by others? _Krit._--The latter. I do\nnot think that he has ever spoken in court: but every one says that\nhe knows judicial practice well, and that he composes admirable\nspeeches.[66]\n\n[Footnote 66: Plat. Euthyd. p. 305.]\n\n[Side-note: Altered tone in speaking of\nEuthyd\u00eamus--Disparagement of persons half-philosophers,\nhalf-politicians.]\n\n_Sokr._--I understand the man. He belongs to that class whom\nProdikus describes as the border-men between philosophy and politics.\nPersons of this class account themselves the wisest of mankind, and\nthink farther that besides being such in reality, they are also\nadmired as such by many: insomuch that the admiration for them would\nbe universal, if it were not for the professors of philosophy.\nAccordingly they fancy, that if they could once discredit these\nphilosophers, the prize of glory would be awarded to themselves,\nwithout controversy, by every one: they being in truth the wisest men\nin society, though liable, if ever they are caught in dialectic\ndebate, to be overpowered and humbled by men like Euthyd\u00eamus.[67]\nThey have very plausible grounds for believing in their own wisdom,\nsince they pursue both philosophy and politics to a moderate extent,\nas far as propriety enjoins; and thus pluck the fruit of wisdom\nwithout encountering either dangers or contests. _Krit._--What\ndo you say to their reasoning, Sokrates? It seems to me specious.\n_Sokr._--Yes, it is specious, but not well founded. You cannot\neasily persuade them, though nevertheless it is true, that men who\ntake a line mid-way between two pursuits, are _better_ than\neither, if both pursuits be bad--_worse_ than either, if both\npursuits be good, but tending to different ends--_better_ than\none and _worse_ than the other, if one of the pursuits be bad\nand the other good--_better_ than both, if both be bad, but\ntending to different ends. Such being the case, if the pursuit of\nphilosophy and that of active politics be both of them good, but\ntending to different objects, these men are inferior to the pursuers\nof one as well as of the other: if one be good, the other bad, they\nare worse than the pursuers of the former, better than the pursuers\nof the latter: if both be bad, they are better than either. Now I am\nsure that these men themselves account both philosophy and politics\nto be good. Accordingly, they are inferior both to philosophers and\npoliticians:[68] they occupy only the third rank, though they pretend\nto be in the first. While we pardon such a pretension, and\nrefrain from judging these men severely, we must nevertheless\nrecognise them for such as they really are. We must be content with\nevery one, who announces any scheme of life, whatever it be, coming\nwithin the limits of intelligence, and who pursues his work with\npersevering resolution.[69]\n\n[Footnote 67: Plat. Euthyd. p. 305 D. [Greek: ei)=nai me\\n ga\\r t\u00ea=|\na)l\u00eathei/a| spha=s soph\u00f4ta/tous, e)n de\\ toi=s i)di/ois lo/gois\no(/tan a)pol\u00eaphth\u00f4=sin, u(po\\ t\u00f4=n a)mphi\\ Eu)thu/d\u00eamon\nkolou/esthai.]\n\n[Greek: Oi( a)mphi\\ Eu)thu/d\u00eamon] may mean Euthyd\u00eamus himself and\nalone; yet I incline to think that it here means Euthyd\u00eamus and his\nlike.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Plat. Euthyd. p. 306 B.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Plat. Euthyd. p. 306 C. [Greek: suggign\u00f4/skein me\\n\nou)=n au)toi=s chr\u00ea\\ t\u00ea=s e)pithumi/as kai\\ m\u00ea\\ chalepai/nein,\n\u00ea(gei=sthai me/ntoi toiou/tous ei)=nai oi(=oi/ ei)si; pa/nta ga\\r\na)/ndra chr\u00ea\\ a)gapa=|n, o(/stis kai\\ o(tiou=n le/gei e)cho/menon\nphron\u00ea/se\u00f4s pra=gma, kai\\ a)ndrei/\u00f4s diaponei=tai.]]\n\n[Side-note: Kriton asks Sokrates for advice about the\neducation of his sons--Sokrates cannot recommend a teacher--tells him\nto search for himself.]\n\n_Krit._ I am always telling you, Sokrates, that I too am embarrassed\nwhere to seek instructors for my sons. Conversation with you has\nsatisfied me, that it is madness to bestow so much care upon the\nfortune and position of sons, and so little upon their instruction.\nYet when I turn my eyes to the men who make profession of\ninstructing, I am really astonished. To tell you the truth, every one\nof them appears to me extravagantly absurd,[70] so that I know not\nhow to help forward my son towards philosophy. _Sokr._--Don't\nyou know, Kriton, that in every different pursuit, most of the\nprofessors are foolish and worthless, and that a few only are\nexcellent and above price? Is not this the case with gymnastic,\ncommercial business, rhetoric, military command? Are not most of\nthose who undertake these pursuits ridiculously silly?[71]\n_Krit._--Unquestionably: nothing can be more true. _Sokr._--Do\n you think _that_ a sufficient reason for avoiding all these\npursuits yourself, and keeping your son out of them also? _Krit._ No:\nit would be wrong to do so. _Sokr._--Well then, don't do so.\nTake no heed about the professors of philosophy, whether they are\ngood or bad; but test philosophy itself, well and carefully. If it\nshall appear to you worthless, dissuade not merely your sons, but\nevery one else also, from following it.[72] But if it shall appear to\nyou as valuable as I consider it to be, then take courage to pursue\nand practise it, you and your children both, according to the\nproverb.--\n\n[Footnote 70: Plato, Euthyd. p. 306 E. [Greek: kai/ moi dokei= ei)=s\ne(/kastos au)t\u00f4=n skopou=nti pa/nu a)llo/kotos ei)=nai], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Plato, Euthyd. p. 307 B. [Greek: e)n e(ka/st\u00ea| tou/t\u00f4n\ntou\\s pollou\\s pro\\s e(/kaston to\\ e)/rgon ou) katagela/stous\no(ra=|s?]]\n\n[Footnote 72: Plato, Euthyd. p. 307 B. [Greek: e)a/sas chai/rein\ntou\\s e)pit\u00eadeu/ontas philosophi/an, ei)/te chr\u00eastoi/ ei)sin ei)/te\npon\u00earoi/, au)to\\ to\\ pra=gma basani/sas kal\u00f4=s te kai\\ eu)=, e)a\\n\nme/n soi phai/n\u00eatai phaulo\\n o)/n], &c.]\n\n[Side-note: Euthyd\u00eamus is here cited as representative of\nDialectic and philosophy.]\n\nThe first part of this epilogue, which I have here given in\nabridgment, has a bearing very different from the rest of the\ndialogue, and different also from most of the other Platonic\ndialogues. In the epilogue, Euthyd\u00eamus is cited as the representative\nof true dialectic and philosophy: the opponents of philosophy are\nrepresented as afraid of being put down by Euthyd\u00eamus: whereas,\npreviously, he had been depicted as contemptible,--as a man whose\nmanner of refuting opponents was more discreditable to himself than\nto the opponent refuted; and who had no chance of success except\namong hearers like himself. We are not here told that Euthyd\u00eamus was\na bad specimen of philosophers, and that there were others better, by\nthe standard of whom philosophy ought to be judged. On the contrary,\nwe find him here announced by Sokrates as among those dreaded by men\nadverse to philosophy,--and as not undeserving of that epithet which\nthe semi-philosopher cited by Kriton applies to \"one of the most\npowerful champions of the day\".\n\nPlato, therefore, after having applied his great dramatic talent to\nmake dialectic debate ridiculous, and thus said much to gratify its\nenemies--changes his battery, and says something against these\nenemies, without reflecting whether it is consistent or no with what\nhad preceded. Before the close, however, he comes again into\nconsistency with the tone of the earlier part, in the observation\nwhich he assigns to Kriton, that most of the professors of philosophy\nare worthless; to which Sokrates rejoins that this is not less true\nof all other professions. The concluding inference is, that\nphilosophy is to be judged, not by its professors but by itself; and\nthat Kriton must examine it for himself, and either pursue it or\nleave it alone, according as his own convictions dictated.\n\nThis is a valuable admonition, and worthy of Sokrates, laying full\nstress as it does upon the conscientious conviction which the person\nexamining may form for himself. But it is no answer to the question\nof Kriton; who says that he had already heard from Sokrates, and was\nhimself convinced, that philosophy was of first-rate importance--and\nthat he only desired to learn where he could find teachers to forward\nthe progress of his son in it. As in so many other dialogues, Plato\nleaves the problem started, but unsolved. The impulse towards\nphilosophy being assured, those who feel it ask Plato in what\ndirection they are to move towards it. He gives no answer. He can\nneither perform the service himself, nor recommend any one else, as\ncompetent. We shall find such silence made matter of pointed\nanimadversion, in the fragment called Kleitophon.\n\n[Side-note: Who is the person here intended by Plato,\nhalf-philosopher, half-politician? Is it Isokrates?]\n\nThe person, whom Kriton here brings forward as the censor of Sokrates\nand the enemy of philosophy, is peculiarly marked. In general, the\npersons whom Plato ranks as enemies of philosophy are the rhetors and\npoliticians: but the example here chosen is not comprised in either\nof these classes: it is a semi-philosopher, yet a writer of\ndiscourses for others. Schleiermacher, Heindorf, and Spengel, suppose\nthat Isokrates is the person intended: Winckelmann thinks it is\nThrasymachus: others refer it to Lysias, or Theodorus of\nByzantium:[73] Socher and Stallbaum doubt whether any special person\nis intended, or any thing beyond some supposed representative of a\nclass described by attributes. I rather agree with those who refer\nthe passage to Isokrates. He might naturally be described as one\nsteering a middle course between philosophy and rhetoric: which in\nfact he himself proclaims in the Oration De Permutatione, and which\nagrees with the language of Plato in the dialogue Ph\u00e6drus, where\nIsokrates is mentioned by name along with Lysias. In the Ph\u00e6drus,\nmoreover, Plato speaks of Isokrates with unusual esteem, especially\nas a favourable contrast with Lysias, and as a person who, though not\nyet a philosopher, may be expected to improve, so as in no long time\nto deserve that appellation.[74] We must remember that Plato in\nthe Ph\u00e6drus attacks by name, and with considerable asperity, first\nLysias, next Theodorus and Thrasymachus the rhetors--all three\npersons living and of note. Being sure to offend all these, Plato\nmight well feel disposed to avoid making an enemy of Isokrates at the\nsame time, and to except him honourably by name from the vulgar\nprofessors of rhetoric. In the Euthyd\u00eamus (where the satire is\ndirected not against the rhetors, but against their competitors the\ndialecticians or pseudo-dialecticians) he had no similar motive to\naddress compliments to Isokrates: respecting whom he speaks in a\nmanner probably more conformable to his real sentiments, as the\nunnamed representative of a certain type of character--a\nsemi-philosopher, fancying himself among the first men in Athens, and\nassuming unwarrantable superiority over the genuine philosopher; but\nentitled to nothing more than a decent measure of esteem, such as\nbelonged to sincere mediocrity of intelligence.\n\n[Footnote 73: Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Euthyd. p. 47; Winckelmann.\nProleg. p. xxxv.\n\nHeindorf, in endeavouring to explain the difference between Plato's\nlanguage in the Ph\u00e6drus and in the Euthyd\u00eamus respecting Isokrates,\nassumes as a matter beyond question the theory of Schleiermacher,\nthat the Ph\u00e6drus was composed during Plato's early years. I have\nalready intimated my may dissent from this theory.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Plato, Ph\u00e6drus, p. 278 E.\n\nI have already observed that I do not agree with Schleiermacher and\nthe other critics who rank the Ph\u00e6drus as the earliest or even among\nthe earliest compositions of Plato. That it is of much later\ncomposition I am persuaded, but of what particular date can only be\nconjectured. The opinion of K. F. Hermann, Stallbaum, and others,\nthat it was composed about the time when Plato began his school at\nAthens (387-386 B.C.) is sufficiently probable.\n\nThe Euthyd\u00eamus may be earlier or may be later than the Ph\u00e6drus. I\nincline to think it later. The opinion of Stallbaum (resting upon the\nmention of Alkibiad\u00eas, p. 275 A), that it was composed in or before\n404 B.C., appears to me untenable (Stallbaum, Proleg. p.\n64). Plato would not be likely to introduce Sokrates speaking of\nAlkibiad\u00eas as a deceased person, whatever time the dialogue was\ncomposed. Nor can I agree with Steinhart, who refers it to 402\nB.C. (Einleitung, p. 26). Ueberweg (Untersuch. \u00fcber die\nZeitfolge der Plat. Schr. pp. 265-267) considers the Euthyd\u00eamus later\n(but not much later) than the Ph\u00e6drus, subsequent to the\nestablishment of the Platonic school at Athens (387-386\nB.C.) This seems to me more probable than the contrary.\n\nSchleiermacher, in arranging the Platonic dialogues, ranks the\nEuthyd\u00eamus as an immediate sequel to the Menon, and as presupposing\nboth Gorgias and The\u00e6t\u00eatus (Einl. pp. 400-401). Socher agrees in this\nopinion, but Steinhart rejects it (Einleit. p. 26), placing the\nEuthyd\u00eamus immediately after the Protagoras, and immediately before\nthe Menon and the Gorgias; according to him, Euthyd\u00eamus, Menon, and\nGorgias, form a well marked Trilogy.\n\nNeither of these arrangements rests upon any sufficient reasons. The\nchronological order cannot be determined.]\n\n[Side-note: Variable feeling at different times, between Plato\nand Isokrates.]\n\nThat there prevailed at different times different sentiments, more or\nless of reciprocal esteem or reciprocal jealousy, between Plato and\nIsokrates, ought not to be matter of surprise. Both of them were\ncelebrated teachers of Athens, each in his own manner, during the\nlast forty years of Plato's life: both of them enjoyed the favour of\nforeign princes, and received pupils from outlying, sometimes\ndistant, cities--from Bosphorus and Cyprus in the East, and from\nSicily in the West. We know moreover that during the years\nimmediately preceding Plato's death (347 B.C.), his pupil\nAristotle, then rising into importance as a teacher of rhetoric, was\nengaged in acrimonious literary warfare, seemingly of his own\nseeking, with Isokrates (then advanced in years) and some of the\nIsokratean pupils. The little which we learn concerning the literary\nand philosophical world of Athens, represents it as much distracted\nby feuds and jealousies. Isokrates on his part has in his\ncompositions various passages which appear to allude (no name being\nmentioned) to Plato among others, in a tone of depreciation.[75]\n\n[Footnote 75: Isokrates, ad Philipp. Or. v. s. 14, p. 84; contra\nSophistas, Or. xiii.; Or. xiii. s. 2-24, pp. 291-295; Encom. Helen\u00e6,\nOr. x. init.; Panathenaic. Or. xii. s. 126, p. 257; Or. xv. De\nPermutatione, s. 90, p. 440, Bekk.]\n\nIsokrates seems, as far as we can make out, to have been in early\nlife, like Lysias, a composer of speeches to be spoken by clients in\nthe Dikastery. This lucrative profession was tempting, since his\nfamily had been nearly ruined during the misfortunes of Athens at the\nclose of the Peloponnesian war. Having gained reputation by such\nmeans, Isokrates became in his mature age a teacher of Rhetoric, and\na composer of discourses, not for private use by clients, but for the\ngeneral reader, on political or educational topics. In this\ncharacter, he corresponded to the description given by Plato in the\nEuthyd\u00eamus: being partly a public adviser, partly a philosopher. But\nthe general principle under which Plato here attacks him, though\nconforming to the doctrine of the Platonic Republic, is contrary to\nthat of Plato in other dialogues, \"You must devote yourself either\nwholly to philosophy, or wholly to politics: a mixture of the two is\nworse than either\"--this agrees with the Republic, wherein Plato\nenjoins upon each man one special and exclusive pursuit, as well as\nwith the doctrine maintained against Kallikl\u00eas in the Gorgias--but it\ndiffers from the Ph\u00e6drus, where he ascribes the excellence of\nPerikles as a statesmen and rhetor, to the fact of his having\nacquired a large tincture of philosophy.[76] Cicero quotes this last\npassage as applicable to his own distinguished career, a combination\nof philosophy with politics.[77] He dissented altogether from the\ndoctrine here laid down by Plato in the Euthyd\u00eamus, and many other\neminent men would have dissented from it also.\n\n[Footnote 76: See the facts about Isokrates in a good Dissertation by\nH. P. Schr\u00f6der, Utrecht, 1859, Qu\u00e6stiones Isocrate\u00e6, p. 51, seq.\n\nPlato, Ph\u00e6drus, p. 270; Plutarch, Perikl\u00eas, c. 23; Plato, Republic,\niii. p. 397.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Cicero, De Orator. iii. 34, 138; Orator. iv. 14;\nBrutus, 11, 44.]\n\nAs a doctrine of universal application, in fact, it cannot be\ndefended. The opposite scheme of life (which is maintained by\nIsokrates in De Permutatione and by Kallikl\u00eas in the Platonic\nGorgias)[78]--that philosophy is to be attentively studied in the\nearlier years of life as an intellectual training, to arm the mind\nwith knowledge and capacities which may afterwards be applied to the\nactive duties of life--is at least equally defensible, and suits\nbetter for other minds of a very high order. Not only Xenophon and\nother distinguished Greeks, but also most of the best Roman citizens,\nheld the opinion which Plato in the Gorgias ascribes to Kallikl\u00eas and\nreprobates through the organ of Sokrates--That philosophical study,\nif prolonged beyond what was necessary for this purpose of adequate\nintellectual training, and if made the permanent occupation of life,\nwas more hurtful than beneficial.[79] Certainly, a man may often fail\nin the attempt to combine philosophy with active politics. No one\nfailed in such a career more lamentably than Dion, the friend of\nPlato--and Plato himself, when he visited Sicily to second Dion.\nMoreover Alkibiad\u00eas and Kritias were cited by Anytus and the other\naccusers of Sokrates as examples of the like mischievous conjunction.\nBut on the other hand, Archytas at Tarentum (another friend of Plato\nand philosopher) administered his native city with success, as long\n(seemingly) as Perikl\u00eas administered Athens. Such men as these two\nare nowise inferior either to the special philosopher or to the\nspecial politician. Plato has laid down an untenable generality, in\nthis passage of the Euthyd\u00eamus, in order to suit a particular point\nwhich he wished to make against Isokrates, or against the\nsemi-philosopher indicated, whoever else he may have been.\n\n[Footnote 78: Isokrates, De Permutatione, Or. xv. sect. 278-288, pp.\n485-480, Bekk.; Plato, Gorgias, pp. 484-485.]\n\n[Footnote 79: The half-philosophers and half-politicians to whom\nSokrates here alludes, are characterised by one of the Platonic\ncritics as \"jene oberfl\u00e4chlichen und schw\u00e4chlichen Naturen die sich\nzwischen beiden Richtungen stellen, und zur Erreichung\nselbsts\u00fcchtiger und beschr\u00e4nkter Zwecke von beiden aufnehmen was sie\nverstehen und was ihnen gef\u00e4llt\" (Steinhart, Einleit. p. 25). On the\nother hand we find in Tacitus a striking passage respecting the\nstudies of Agricola in his youth at Massilia. \"Memori\u00e2 teneo, solitum\nipsum narrare, se in prim\u00e2 juvent\u00e2 studium philosophi\u00e6 acrius, ultra\nquam concessum Romano ac senatori, hausisse--ni prudentia matris\nincensum ac flagrantem animum exercuisset: Scilicet sublime et\nerectum ingenium, pulchritudinem ac speciem excels\u00e6 magn\u00e6que glori\u00e6\nvehementius quam laut\u00e9 appetebat: retinuitque, quod est\ndifficillimum, ex sapienti\u00e2 modum\" (Vit. Agr. c. 4).\n\nTacitus expresses himself in the same manner about the purpose with\nwhich Helvidius Priscus applied himself to philosophy (Hist. iv. 6):\n\"non, ut plerique, ut nomine magnifico segne otium velaret, sed quo\nconstantior adversus fortuita rempublicam capesseret\".\n\nCompare also the memorable passage in the Funeral Oration pronounced\nby Perikl\u00eas (Thuc. ii. 40)--[Greek: philosophou=men a)/neu\nmalaki/as], &c., which exhibits the like views.\n\nAulus Gellius (x. 22), who cites the doctrine which Plato ascribes to\nKallikl\u00eas in the Gorgias (about the propriety of confining philosophy\nto the function of training and preparation for active pursuits),\ntries to make out that this was Plato's own opinion.]\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXII.\n\nMENON.\n\n\n[Side-note: Persons of the Dialogue.]\n\nThis dialogue is carried on between Sokrates and Menon, a man of\nnoble family, wealth, and political influence, in the Thessalian city\nof Larissa. He is supposed to have previously frequented, in his\nnative city, the lectures and society of the rhetor Gorgias.[1] The\nname and general features of Menon are probably borrowed from the\nThessalian military officer, who commanded a division of the Ten\nThousand Greeks, and whose character Xenophon depicts in the\nAnabasis: but there is nothing in the Platonic dialogue to mark that\nmeanness and perfidy which the Xenophontic picture indicates. The\nconversation between Sokrates and Menon is interrupted by two\nepisodes: in the first of these, Sokrates questions an unlettered\nyouth, the slave of Menon: in the second, he is brought into conflict\nwith Anytus, the historical accuser of the historical Sokrates.\n\n[Footnote 1: Cicero notices Isokrates as having heard Gorgias in\nThessaly (Orator. 53, 176).]\n\nThe dialogue is begun by Menon, in a manner quite as abrupt as the\nHipparchus and Minos:\n\n[Side-note: Question put by Menon--Is virtue teachable?\nSokrates confesses that he does not know what virtue is. Surprise of\nMenon.]\n\n_Menon._--Can you tell me, Sokrates, whether virtue is\nteachable--or acquirable by exercise--or whether it comes by nature--or\nin what other manner it comes? _Sokr._--I cannot answer your\nquestion. I am ashamed to say that I do not even know what virtue is:\nand when I do not know what a thing is, how can I know any thing\nabout its attributes or accessories? A man who does not know, Menon,\ncannot tell whether he is handsome, rich, &c., or the contrary.\n_Menon._--Certainly not. But is it really true, Sokrates,\nthat you do not know what virtue is? Am I to proclaim this respecting\nyou, when I go home?[2] _Sokr._--Yes--undoubtedly: and proclaim\nbesides that I have never yet met with any one who _did_ know.\n_Menon._--What! have you not seen Gorgias at Athens, and did not\nhe appear to you to know? _Sokr._--I have met him, but I do not\nquite recollect what he said. We need not consider what he said,\nsince he is not here to answer for himself.[3] But you doubtless\nrecollect, and can tell me, both from yourself, and from him, what\nvirtue is? _Menon._--There is _no difficulty_ in telling\nyou.[4]\n\n[Footnote 2: Plato, Menon, p. 71 B-C. [Greek: A)lla\\ su/, \u00f4)=\nS\u00f4/krates, ou)d' o(/ ti a)ret\u00ea/ e)stin oi)=stha, a)lla\\ tau=ta peri\\\nsou= kai\\ oi)/kade a)pagge/ll\u00f4men?]]\n\n[Footnote 3: Plato, Menon, p. 71 D. [Greek: a)kei=non me/ntoi nu=n\ne)\u00f4=men, e)peid\u00ea\\ kai\\ a)/pestin.] Sokrates sets little value upon\nopinions unless where the person giving them is present to explain\nand defend: compare what he says about the uselessness of citation\nfrom poets, from whom you can ask no questions, Plato, Protagor. p.\n347 E.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Plato, Menon, p. 71 E. [Greek: A)ll' ou) chalepo/n, \u00f4)=\nS\u00f4/krates, ei)pei=n], &c.]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates stands alone in this confession.\nUnpopularity entailed by it.]\n\nMany commentators here speak as if such disclaimer on the part of\nSokrates had reference merely to certain impudent pretensions to\nuniversal knowledge on the part of the Sophists. But this (as I have\nbefore remarked) is a misconception of the Sokratic or Platonic point\nof view. The matter which Sokrates proclaims that _he_ does not\nknow, is, what, not Sophists alone, but every one else also,\nprofesses to know well. Sokrates stands alone in avowing that he does\nnot know it, and that he can find no one else who knows. Menon treats\nthe question as one of no difficulty--one on which confessed\nignorance was discreditable. \"What!\" says Menon, \"am I really to\nstate respecting you, that you do not know what virtue is?\" The man\nwho makes such a confession will be looked upon by his neighbours\nwith surprise and displeasure--not to speak of probable consequences\nyet worse. He is one whom the multifarious agencies employed by King\nNomos (which we shall find described more at length in the\nProtagoras) have failed to mould into perfect and uninquiring\nconformity, and he is still in process of examination to form a\njudgment for himself.\n\n[Side-note: Answer of Menon--plurality of virtues, one\nbelonging to each different class and condition. Sokrates enquires\nfor the property common to all of them.]\n\nMenon proceeds to answer that there are many virtues: the virtue of a\nman--competence to transact the business of the city, and in such\nbusiness to benefit his friends and injure his enemies: the\nvirtue of a woman--to administer the house well, preserving every\nthing within it and obeying her husband: the virtue of a child, of an\nold man, a slave, &c. There is in short a virtue--and its\ncontrary, a vice--belonging to each of us in every work, profession,\nand age.[5]\n\n[Footnote 5: Plato, Menon, p. 72 A. [Greek: kath' e(ka/st\u00ean ga\\r t\u00f4=n\npra/xe\u00f4n kai\\ t\u00f4=n \u00ea(lik\u00f4=n pro\\s e(/kaston e)/rgon e(ka/st\u00f4| \u00ea(m\u00f4=n\n\u00ea( a)ret\u00ea/ e)stin. \u00f4(sau/t\u00f4s de\\ kai\\ \u00ea( kaki/a.]\n\nThough Sokrates disapproves this method of answering--[Greek: to\\\ne)xarithmei=n ta\\s a)reta/s] (to use the expression of Aristotle)--yet\nAristotle seems to think it better than searching for one general\ndefinition. See Politica, i. 13, p. 1260, a. 15-30, where he has the\nPlatonic Menon in his mind.]\n\nBut (replies Sokrates) are they not all the same, _quatenus_\nvirtue? Health, _quatenus_ Health, is the same in a man or a\nwoman: is not the case similar with virtue? _Menon._--Not\nexactly similar. _Sokr._--How so? Though there are many diverse\nvirtues, have not all of them one and the same form in common,\nthrough the communion of which they _are_ virtues? In answer to\nmy question, you ought to declare what this common form is. Thus,\nboth the man who administers the city, and the woman who administers\nthe house, must act both of them with justice and moderation. Through\nthe same qualities, both the one and the other are good. There is\nthus some common constituent: tell me what it is, according to you\nand Gorgias? _Menon._--It is to be competent to exercise command\nover men.[6] _Sokr._--But that will not suit for the virtue of a\nchild or a slave. Moreover, must we not superadd the condition, to\ncommand justly, and not unjustly? _Menon._--I think so: justice\nis virtue. _Sokr._--Is it virtue--or is it one particular\nvariety of virtue?[7] _Menon._--How do you mean? _Sokr._--Just\nas if I were to say about roundness, that it is not figure, but\na particular variety of figure: because there are other figures\nbesides roundness. _Menon._--Very true: I say too, that there\nare other virtues besides justice--namely, courage, moderation,\nwisdom, magnanimity, and several others also. _Sokr._--We are\nthus still in the same predicament. In looking for one virtue, we\nhave found many; but we cannot find that one form which runs through\nthem all. _Menon._--I cannot at present tell what that one\nis.[8]\n\n[Footnote 6: Plato, Menon, p. 73 D.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Plato, Menon, p. 73 E. [Greek: Po/teron a)ret\u00ea/, \u00f4)=\nMe/n\u00f4n, \u00ea)\\ a)ret\u00ea/ tis?]]\n\n[Footnote 8: Plato, Menon, p. 74 A. [Greek: ou) ga\\r du/namai/ p\u00f4,\n\u00f4)= S\u00f4/krates, \u00f4(s su\\ z\u00eatei=s, mi/an a)ret\u00ea\\n labei=n kata\\\npa/nt\u00f4n.]]\n\n[Side-note: Analogous cases cited--definitions of figure\nand colour.]\n\nSokrates proceeds to illustrate his meaning by the analogies of\nfigure and colour. You call _round_ a figure, and _square_\na figure: you call _white_ and _black_ both colour, the one\nas much as the other, though they are unlike and even opposite.[9]\nTell me, What is this same common figure and property in both, which\nmakes you call both of them figure--both of them colour? Take this as\na preliminary exercise, in order to help you in answering my enquiry\nabout virtue.[10] Menon cannot answer, and Sokrates answers his own\nquestion. He gives a general definition, first of figure, next of\ncolour. He first defines figure in a way which implies colour to be\nknown. This is pointed out; and he then admits that in a good\ndefinition, suitable to genuine dialectical investigation, nothing\nshould be implied as known, except what the respondent admits himself\nto know. Figure and colour are both defined suitably to this\ncondition.[11]\n\n[Footnote 9: Plato, Menon, p. 74 D.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Plato, Menon, c. 7, pp. 74-75. [Greek: Peir\u00f4= ei)pei=n,\ni(/na kai\\ ge/n\u00eatai/ soi mele/t\u00ea pro\\s t\u00ea\\n peri\\ t\u00ea=s a)ret\u00ea=s\na)po/krisin] (75 A).\n\nThe purpose of practising the respondent is here distinctly\nannounced.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Plato, Menon, p. 75 C-E.]\n\n[Side-note: Importance at that time of bringing into conscious\nview, logical subordination and distinctions--Neither logic nor\ngrammar had then been cast into system.]\n\nAll this preliminary matter seems to be intended for the purpose of\ngetting the question clearly conceived as a general question--of\nexhibiting and eliminating the narrow and partial conceptions which\nunconsciously substitute themselves in the mind, in place of that\nwhich ought to be conceived as a generic whole--and of clearing up\nwhat is required in a good definition. A generic whole, including\nvarious specific portions distinguishable from each other, was at\nthat time little understood by any one. There existed no grammar, nor\nany rules of logic founded on analysis of the intellectual processes.\nTo predicate of the genus what was true only of the species--to\npredicate as distinctively characterizing the species, what is true\nof the whole genus in which it is contained--to lose the integrity of\nthe genus in its separate parcels or fragments[12]--these were errors\nwhich men had never yet been expressly taught to avoid. To assign the\none common meaning, constituent of or connoted by a generic term,\nhad never yet been put before them as a problem. Such\npreliminary clearing of the ground is instructive even now, when\nformal and systematic logic has become more or less familiar: but in\nthe time of Plato, it must have been indispensably required, to\narrive at a full conception of any general question.[13]\n\n[Footnote 12: Plato, Menon, p. 79 A. [Greek: e)mou= de\u00eathe/ntos sou\nm\u00ea\\ katagnu/mai m\u00eade\\ kermati/zein t\u00ea\\n a)ret\u00ean], &c. 79 B:\n[Greek: e)mou= de\u00eathe/ntos o(/l\u00ean ei)pei=n t\u00ea\\n a)ret\u00ea/n], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 13: These examples of trial, error, and exposure, have\ngreat value and reflect high credit on Plato, when we regard them as\nan intellectual or prop\u00e6deutic discipline, forcing upon hearers an\nattention to useful logical distinctions at a time when there existed\nno systematic grammar or logic. But surely they must appear degraded,\nas they are presented in the Prolegomena of Stallbaum, and by some\nother critics. We are there told that Plato's main purpose in this\ndialogue was to mock and jeer the Sophists and their pupil, and that\nfor this purpose Sokrates is made to employ not his own arguments but\narguments borrowed from the Sophists themselves--\"ut callid\u00e9 suam\nipsius rationem occultare existimandus sit, quo magis illudat\nSophistarum alumnum\" (p. 15). \"Qu\u00e6 quidem argumentatio\" (that of\nSokrates) \"admodum cavendum est ne pro Socratic\u00e2 vel Platonic\u00e2\naccipiatur. Est enim prorsus ad mentem Sophistarum aliorumque id\ngenus hominum comparata,\" &c. (p. 16). Compare pp. 12-13 seq.\n\nThe Sophists undoubtedly had no distinct consciousness, any more than\nother persons, of these logical distinctions, which were then for the\nfirst pressed forcibly upon attention.]\n\n[Side-note: Definition of virtue given by Menon: Sokrates pulls\nit to pieces.]\n\nMenon having been thus made to understand the formal requisites for a\ndefinition, gives as his definition of virtue the phrase of some\nlyric poet--\"To delight in, or desire, things beautiful, fine,\nhonourable--and to have the power of getting them\". But Sokrates\nremarks that honourable things are good things, and that every one\nwithout exception desires good. No one desires evil except when he\nmistakes it for good. On this point all men are alike; the\ndistinctive feature of virtue must then consist in the second half of\nthe definition--in the power of acquiring good things, such as\nhealth, wealth, money, power, dignities, &c.[14] But the\nacquisition of these things is not virtuous, unless it be made\nconsistently with justice and moderation: moreover the man who acts\njustly is virtuous, even though he does not acquire them. It appears\nthen that every agent who acts with justice and moderation is\nvirtuous. But this is nugatory as a definition of virtue: for justice\nand moderation are only known as parts of virtue, and require to be\nthemselves defined. No man can know what a part of virtue is, unless\nhe knows what virtue itself is.[15] Menon must look for a better\ndefinition, including nothing but what is already known or admitted.\n\n[Footnote 14: Plato, Menon, p. 77 B. [Greek: dokei= toi/nun moi\na)ret\u00ea\\ ei)=nai, katha/per o( poi\u00eat\u00ea\\s le/gei, chai/rein te kaloi=si\nkai\\ du/nasthai. Kai\\ e)g\u00f4\\ tou=to le/g\u00f4 a)ret\u00ea\\n e)pithumou=nta t\u00f4=n\nkal\u00f4=n dunato\\n ei)=nai pori/zesthai.]\n\nWhoever this lyric poet was, his real meaning is somewhat twisted by\nSokrates in order to furnish a basis for ethical criticism, as the\nsong of Simonides is in the Protagoras. A person having power, and\ntaking delight in honourable or beautiful things--is a very\nintelligible Hellenic id\u00e9al, as an object of envy and admiration.\nCompare Protagoras, p. 351 C: [Greek: ei)/per toi=s kaloi=s z\u00f4/|\u00ea\n\u00ea(do/menos.] A poor man may be [Greek: philo/kalos] as well as a rich\nman: [Greek: philokalou=men met' eu)telei/as], is the boast of\nPerikl\u00eas in the name of the Athenians, Thucyd. ii. 40.\n\nPlato, Menon, p. 78 C. _Sokr._ [Greek: A)gatha\\ de\\ kalei=s\nou)chi oi(=on u(gi/eia/n te kai\\ plou=ton? kai\\ chrusi/on le/g\u00f4 kai\\\na)rgu/rion kta=sthai kai\\ tima\\s e)n po/lei kai\\ a)rcha/s? m\u00ea\\ a)/ll'\na)/tta le/geis ta)gatha\\ \u00ea)\\ ta\\ toiau=ta?] _Menon._ [Greek:\nOu)k; a)lla\\ pa/nta le/g\u00f4 ta\\ toiau=ta.]]\n\n[Footnote 15: Plato, Menon, p. 79.]\n\n[Side-note: Menon complains that the conversation of Sokrates\nconfounds him like an electric shock--Sokrates replies that he is\nhimself in the same state of confusion and ignorance. He urges\ncontinuance of search by both.]\n\n_Menon._--Your conversation, Sokrates, produces the effect of\nthe shock of the torpedo: you stun and confound me: you throw me into\ninextricable perplexity, so that I can make no answer. I have often\ndiscoursed copiously--and, as I thought, effectively--upon virtue;\nbut now you have shown that I do not even know what virtue is.\n_Sokr._--If I throw you into perplexity, it is only because I am\nmyself in the like perplexity and ignorance. I do not know what\nvirtue is, any more than you: and I shall be glad to continue the\nsearch for finding it, if you will assist me.\n\n[Side-note: But how is the process of search available to any\npurpose? No man searches for what he already knows: and for what he\ndoes not know, it is useless to search, for he cannot tell when he\nhas found it.]\n\n_Menon._--But how are you to search for that of which you are\naltogether ignorant? Even if you do find it, how can you ever know\nthat you have found it? _Sokr._--You are now introducing a\ntroublesome doctrine, laid down by those who are averse to the labour\nof thought. They tell us that a man cannot search either for what he\nknows, or for what he does not know. For the former, research is\nsuperfluous: for the latter it is unprofitable and purposeless, since\nthe searcher does not know what he is looking for.\n\n[Side-note: Theory of reminiscence propounded by\nSokrates--anterior immortality of the soul--what is called teaching is\nthe revival and recognition of knowledge acquired in a former life, but\nforgotten.]\n\nI do not believe this doctrine (continues Sokrates). Priests,\npriestesses, and poets (Pindar among them) tell us, that the mind of\nman is immortal and has existed throughout all past time, in\nconjunction with successive bodies; alternately abandoning one body,\nor dying--and taking up new life or reviving in another body. In this\nperpetual succession of existences, it has seen every thing,--both\nhere and in Hades and everywhere else--and has learnt every thing.\nBut though thus omniscient, it has forgotten the larger portion of\nits knowledge. Yet what has been thus forgotten may again be\nrevived. What we call learning, is such revival. It is reminiscence\nof something which the mind had seen in a former state of existence,\nand knew, but had forgotten. Since then all the parts of nature are\nanalogous, or cognate--and since the mind has gone through and learnt\nthem all--we cannot wonder that the revival of any one part should\nput it upon the track of recovering for itself all the rest, both\nabout virtue and about every thing else, if a man will only persevere\nin intent meditation. All research and all learning is thus nothing\nbut reminiscence. In our researches, we are not looking for what we\ndo not know: we are looking for what we do know, but have forgotten.\nThere is therefore ample motive, and ample remuneration, for\nprosecuting enquiries: and your doctrine which pronounces them to be\nunprofitable, is incorrect.[16]\n\n[Footnote 16: Plato, Menon, pp. 81 C-D. [Greek: A(=te ou)=n \u00ea(\npsuch\u00ea\\ a)tha/nato/s te ou)=sa kai\\ polla/kis gegonui=a, kai\\\ne(\u00f4rakui=a kai\\ ta\\ e)ntha/de kai\\ ta\\ e)n Ai)/dou kai\\ pa/nta\nchr\u00ea/mata, ou)k e)/stin o(/ ti ou) mema/th\u00eaken; \u00f4(/ste ou)de\\n\nthaumasto\\n kai\\ peri\\ a)ret\u00ea=s kai\\ peri\\ a)/ll\u00f4n oi(=o/n te ei)=nai\nau)t\u00ea\\n a)namn\u00easth\u00ea=nai a(/ ge kai\\ pro/teron \u00ea)pi/stato. A(=te ga\\r\nt\u00ea=s phu/se\u00f4s a(pa/s\u00eas suggenou=s ou)/s\u00eas kai\\ memath\u00eakui/as t\u00ea=s\npsuch\u00ea=s a(/panta, ou)de\\n k\u00f4lu/ei e(\\n mo/non a)namn\u00easthe/nta, o(\\\nd\u00ea\\ ma/th\u00easin kalou=sin a)/nthr\u00f4poi, ta)/lla pa/nta au)to\\n\na)neurei=n, e)a/n tis a)ndrei=os \u00ea)=| kai\\ m\u00ea\\ a)poka/mn\u00ea| z\u00eat\u00f4=n.\nTo\\ ga\\r z\u00eatei=n a)/ra kai\\ to\\ mantha/nein a)na/mn\u00easis o(/lon\ne)sti/n.]]\n\n[Side-note: Illustration of this theory--knowledge may be\nrevived by skilful questions in the mind of a man thoroughly\nuntaught. Sokrates questions the slave of Menon.]\n\nSokrates proceeds to illustrate the position, just laid down, by\ncross-examining Menon's youthful slave, who, though wholly untaught\nand having never heard any mention of geometry, is brought by a\nproper series of questions to give answers out of his own mind,\nfurnishing the solution of a geometrical problem. The first part of\nthe examination brings him to a perception of the difficulty, and\nmakes him feel a painful perplexity, from which he desires to obtain\nrelief:[17] the second part guides his mind in the efforts necessary\nfor fishing up a solution out of its own pre-existing, but forgotten,\nstores. True opinions, which he had long had within him without\nknowing it, are awakened by interrogation, and become cognitions.\nFrom the fact that the mind thus possesses the truth of things\nwhich it has not acquired in this life, Sokrates infers that it must\nhave gone through a pre-existence of indefinite duration, or must be\nimmortal.[18]\n\n[Footnote 17: Plato, Menon, p. 84 C. [Greek: Oi)/ei ou)=n a)\\n\nau)to\\n pro/teron e)picheir\u00ea=sai z\u00eatei=n \u00ea)\\ mantha/nein tou=to o(\\\n\u00f4)=|eto ei)de/nai ou)k ei)d\u00f4/s, pri\\n ei)s a)pori/an kate/pesen\n\u00ea(g\u00easa/menos m\u00ea\\ ei)de/nai, kai\\ e)po/th\u00ease to\\ ei)de/nai? Ou)/ moi\ndokei=. \u00d4)/n\u00eato a)/ra nark\u00ea/sas?]]\n\n[Footnote 18: Plato, Menon, p. 86. [Greek: Ou)kou=n ei) a)ei\\ \u00ea(\na)l\u00ea/theia \u00ea(mi=n t\u00f4=n o)/nt\u00f4n e)sti\\n e)n t\u00ea=| psuch\u00ea=|, a)tha/natos\na)\\n \u00ea( psuch\u00ea\\ ei)/\u00ea?]]\n\n[Side-note: Enquiry taken up--Whether virtue is teachable?\nwithout determining what virtue is.]\n\nThe former topic of enquiry is now resumed: but at the instance of\nMenon, the question taken up, is not--\"What is virtue?\" but--\"Is\nvirtue teachable or not?\" Sokrates, after renewing his objection\nagainst the inversion of philosophical order by discussing the second\nquestion without having determined the first, enters upon the\ndiscussion hypothetically, assuming as a postulate, that nothing can\nbe taught except knowledge. The question then stands thus--\"Is virtue\nknowledge?\" If it be, it can be taught: if not, it cannot be\ntaught.[19]\n\n[Footnote 19: Plato, Menon, p. 87.]\n\n[Side-note: Virtue is knowledge--no possessions, no\nattributes, either of mind or body, are good or profitable, except\nunder the guidance of knowledge.]\n\nSokrates proceeds to prove that virtue is knowledge, or a mode of\nknowledge. Virtue is good: all good things are profitable. But none\nof the things accounted good are profitable, unless they be rightly\nemployed; that is, employed with knowledge or intelligence. This is\ntrue not only of health, wealth, beauty, strength, power, &c.,\nbut also of the mental attributes justice, moderation, courage, quick\napprehension, &c. All of these are profitable, and therefore\ngood, if brought into action under knowledge or right intelligence;\nnone of them are profitable or good, without this condition--which is\ntherefore the distinctive constituent of virtue.[20]\n\n[Footnote 20: Plato, Menon, p. 89.]\n\nVirtue, therefore, being knowledge or a mode of knowledge, cannot\ncome by nature, but must be teachable.\n\n[Side-note: Virtue, as being knowledge, must be teachable. Yet\nthere are opposing reasons, showing that it cannot be teachable. No\nteachers of it can be found.]\n\nYet again there are other contrary reasons (he proceeds) which prove\nthat it cannot be teachable. For if it were so, there would be\ndistinct and assignable teachers and learners of it, and the times\nand places could be pointed out where it is taught and learnt. We see\nthat this is the case with all arts and professions. But in regard to\nvirtue, there are neither recognised teachers, nor learners, nor\nyears of learning. The Sophists pretend to be teachers of it, but are\nnot:[21] the leading and esteemed citizens of the community do\nnot pretend to be teachers of it, and are indeed incompetent to teach\nit even to their own sons--as the character of those sons\nsufficiently proves.[22]\n\n[Footnote 21: Plato, Menon, p. 92.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Plato, Menon, p. 97. Isokrates (adv. Sophistas, s. 25,\np. 401) expressly declares that he does not believe [Greek: \u00f4(/s\ne)sti dikaiosu/n\u00ea didakto/n]. There is no [Greek: te/chn\u00ea] which can\nteach it, if a man be [Greek: kak\u00f4=s pephuk\u00f4/s]. But if a man be\nwell-disposed, then education in [Greek: lo/goi politikoi/] will\nserve [Greek: sumparakeleu/sasthai/ ge kai\\ sunask\u00ea=sai].\n\nFor a man to announce himself as a teacher of justice or virtue, was\nan unpopular and invidious pretension. Isokrates is anxious to guard\nhimself against such unpopularity.]\n\n[Side-note: Conversation of Sokrates with Anytus, who detests\nthe Sophists, and affirms that any one of the leading politicians can\nteach virtue.]\n\nHere, a new speaker is introduced into the dialogue--Anytus, one of\nthe accusers of Sokrates before the Dikastery. The conversation is\ncarried on for some time between Sokrates and him. Anytus denies\naltogether that the Sophists are teachers of virtue, and even\ndenounces them with bitter contempt and wrath. But he maintains that\nthe leading and esteemed citizens of the state do really teach it.\nAnytus however presently breaks off in a tone of displeasure and\nmenace towards Sokrates himself.[23] The conversation is then renewed\nwith Menon, and it is shown that the leading politicians cannot be\nconsidered as teachers of virtue, any more than the Sophists. There\nexist no teachers of it; and therefore we must conclude that it is\nnot teachable.\n\n[Footnote 23: Plato, Menon, p. 94 E.]\n\n[Side-note: Confused state of the discussion. No way of\nacquiring virtue is shown.]\n\nThe state of the discussion as it stands now, is represented by two\nhypothetical syllogisms, as follows:\n1. If virtue is knowledge, it is teachable:\nBut virtue is knowledge:\nTherefore virtue is teachable.\n2. If virtue is knowledge, it is teachable:\nBut virtue is not teachable:\nTherefore virtue is not knowledge.\nThe premisses of each of these two syllogisms contradict the\nconclusion of the other. Both cannot be true. If virtue is not\nacquired by teaching and does not come by nature, how are there any\nvirtuous men?\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates modifies his premisses--knowledge is not\nthe only thing which guides to good results--right opinion will do\nthe same.]\n\nSokrates continues his argument: The second premiss of the first\nsyllogism--that virtue is knowledge--is true, but not the whole\ntruth. In proving it we assumed that there was nothing except\nknowledge which guided us to useful and profitable consequences. But\nthis assumption will not hold. There is something else besides\nknowledge, which also guides us to the same useful results. That\nsomething is _right opinion_, which is quite different from\nknowledge. The man who holds right opinions is just as profitable to\nus, and guides us quite as well to right actions, as if he knew.\nRight opinions, so long as they stay in the mind, are as good as\nknowledge, for the purpose of guidance in practice. But the\ndifference is, that they are evanescent and will not stay in the\nmind: while knowledge is permanent and ineffaceable. They are exalted\ninto knowledge, when bound in the mind by a chain of causal\nreasoning:[24] that is, by the process of reminiscence, before\ndescribed.\n\n[Footnote 24: Plato, Menon, pp. 97 E--98 A. [Greek: kai\\ ga\\r ai(\ndo/xai ai( a)l\u00eathei=s, o(/son me\\n a)\\n chro/non parame/n\u00f4sin, kalo/n\nti chr\u00ea=ma kai\\ pa/nta ta)gatha\\ e)rga/zontai; polu\\n de\\ chro/non\nou)k e)the/lousi parame/nein, a)lla\\ drapeteu/ousin e)k t\u00ea=s psuch\u00ea=s\ntou= a)nthr\u00f4/pou. \u00f4(/ste ou) pollou= a)/xiai/ ei)sin, _e(/\u00f4s a)\\n\ntis au)ta\\s d\u00ea/s\u00ea| ai)ti/as logism\u00f4=|_; tou=to d' e)sti\\n\n_a)na/mn\u00easis_, \u00f4(s e)n toi=s pro/sthen \u00ea(mi=n \u00f4(molo/g\u00eatai.]]\n\n[Side-note: Right opinion cannot be relied on for staying in\nthe mind, and can never give rational explanations, nor teach\nothers--good practical statesmen receive right opinion by inspiration\nfrom the Gods.]\n\nVirtue then (continues Sokrates)--that which constitutes the virtuous\ncharacter and the permanent, trustworthy, useful guide--consists in\nknowledge. But there is also right opinion, a sort of\n_quasi-knowledge_, which produces in practice effects as good as\nknowledge, only that it is not deeply or permanently fixed in the\nmind.[25] It is this right opinion, or _quasi-knowledge_, which\nesteemed and distinguished citizens possess, and by means of which\nthey render useful service to the city. That they do not possess\nknowledge, is certain; for if they did, they would be able to teach\nit to others, and especially to their own sons: and this it has been\nshown that they cannot do.[26] They deliver true opinions and\npredictions, and excellent advice, like prophets and oracular\nministers, by divine inspiration and possession, without knowledge or\nwisdom of their own. They are divine and inspired persons, but not\nwise or knowing.[27]\n\n[Footnote 25: Plato, Menon, p. 99 A. [Greek: \u00f4(=| de\\ a)/nthr\u00f4pos\n\u00ea(gem\u00f4/n e)stin e)pi\\ to\\ o)rtho/n, du/o tau=ta, do/xa a)l\u00eath\u00ea\\s kai\\\ne)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea.]]\n\n[Footnote 26: Plato, Menon, p. 99 B. [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra sophi/a tini\\\nou)de\\ sophoi\\ o)/ntes oi( toiou=toi a)/ndres \u00ea(gou=nto tai=s\npo/lesin, oi( a)mphi\\ Themistokle/a. . . . dio\\ kai\\ ou)ch oi(=oi/ te\na)/llous poiei=n toiou/tous oi(=oi au)toi/ ei)sin, a(/te ou) di'\ne)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean o)/ntes toiou=toi.]]\n\n[Footnote 27: Plato, Menon, p. 99 D. [Greek: kai\\ tou\\s politikou\\s\nou)ch \u00ea(/kista tou/t\u00f4n phai=men, a)\\n thei/ous te ei)=nai kai\\\ne)nthousia/zein, e)pi/pnous o)/ntas kai\\ katechome/nous e)k tou=\ntheou=, o(/tan katorth\u00f4=si le/gontes polla\\ kai\\ mega/la pra/gmata,\nm\u00eade\\n ei)do/tes \u00f4(=n le/gousin.]]\n\n[Side-note: All the real virtue that there is, is\ncommunicated by special inspiration from the Gods.]\n\nAnd thus (concludes Sokrates) the answer to the question originally\nstarted by Menon--\"Whether virtue is teachable?\"--is as follows.\nVirtue in its highest sense, in which it is equivalent to or\ncoincident with knowledge, is teachable: but no such virtue exists.\nThat which exists in the most distinguished citizens under the name\nof virtue,--or at least producing the results of virtue in practice--is\nnot teachable. Nor does it come by nature, but by special\ninspiration from the Gods. The best statesmen now existing cannot\nmake any other person like themselves: if any one of them could do\nthis, he would be, in comparison with the rest, like a real thing\ncompared with a shadow.[28]\n\n[Footnote 28: Plato, Menon, p. 100.]\n\n[Side-note: But what virtue itself is, remains unknown.]\n\nNevertheless the question which we have just discussed--\"How virtue\narises or is generated?\"--must be regarded as secondary and\ndependent, not capable of being clearly understood until the primary\nand principal question--\"What is virtue?\"--has been investigated and\nbrought to a solution.[29]\n\n[Footnote 29: Plato, Menon, p. 100 B.]\n\n\n* * * * *\n\n\n[Side-note: Remarks on the dialogue. Proper order for\nexamining the different topics, is pointed out by Sokrates.]\n\nThis last observation is repeated by Sokrates at the end--as it had\nbeen stated at the beginning, and in more than one place during the\ncontinuance--of the dialogue. In fact, Sokrates seems at first\nresolved to enforce the natural and necessary priority of the latter\nquestion: but is induced by the solicitation of Menon to invert the\norder.[30]\n\n[Footnote 30: Plato, Menon, p. 86.]\n\n[Side-note: Mischief of debating ulterior and secondary\nquestions when the fundamental notions and word are unsettled.]\n\nThe propriety of the order marked out, but not pursued, by Sokrates\nis indisputable. Before you can enquire how virtue is generated or\ncommunicated, you must be satisfied that you know what virtue is. You\nmust know the essence of the subject--or those predicates which the\nword connotes ( = the meaning of the term) before you investigate its\naccidents and antecedents.[31] Menon begins by being satisfied that\nhe knows what virtue is: so satisfied, that he accounts it\ndiscreditable for a man not to know: although he is made to answer\nlike one who has never thought upon the subject, and does not even\nunderstand the question. Sokrates, on the other hand, not only\nconfesses that he does not himself know, but asserts that he never\nyet met with a man who did know. One of the most important lessons in\nthis, as in so many other Platonic dialogues, is the mischief of\nproceeding to debate ulterior and secondary questions, without having\nsettled the fundamental words and notions: the false persuasion of\nknowledge, common to almost every one, respecting these familiar\nethical and social ideas. Menon represents the common state of mind.\nHe begins with the false persuasion that he as well as every one else\nknows what virtue is: and even when he is proved to be ignorant, he\nstill feels no interest in the fundamental enquiry, but turns aside\nto his original object of curiosity--\"Whether virtue is teachable\".\nNothing can be more repugnant to an ordinary mind than the thorough\nsifting of deep-seated, long familiarised, notions--[Greek: to\\ ga\\r\no)rthou=sthai gn\u00f4/man, o)duna=|].\n\n[Footnote 31: To use the phrase of Plato himself in the Euthyphron,\np. 11 A, the [Greek: ou)si/a] must be known before the [Greek:\npa/th\u00ea] are sought--[Greek: kinduneu/eis, \u00f4)= Eu)thu/phron,\ne)r\u00f4t\u00f4/menos to\\ o(/sion, o(/, ti/ pot' e)sti, _t\u00ea\\n me\\n\nou)si/an_ moi au)tou= ou) bou/lesthai d\u00eal\u00f4=sai, _pa/thos de/ ti\nperi\\ au)tou=_ le/gein, o(/, ti pe/ponthe tou=to to\\ o(/sion,\nphilei=sthai u(po\\ pa/nt\u00f4n the\u00f4=n; _o(/ ti de\\ o)/n, ou)/p\u00f4\nei)=pes_.]\n\nCompare Lach\u00eas, p. 190 B and Gorgias, pp. 448 E, 462 C.]\n\n[Side-note: Doctrine of Sokrates in the Menon--desire of good\nalleged to be universally felt--in what sense this is true.]\n\nThe confession of Sokrates that neither he nor any other person in\nhis experience knows what virtue is--that it must be made a subject\nof special and deliberate investigation--and that no man can know\nwhat justice, or any other part of virtue is, unless he first knows\nwhat virtue as a whole is[32]--are matters to be kept in mind also,\nas contrasting with other portions of the Platonic dialogues, wherein\nvirtue, justice, &c., are tacitly assumed (according to the\nreceived habit) as matters known and understood. The contributions\nwhich we obtain from the Menon towards finding out the Platonic\nnotion of virtue, are negative rather than positive. The comments of\nSokrates upon Menon's first definition include the doctrine often\nannounced in Plato--That no man by nature desires suffering or evil;\nevery man desires good: if he seeks or pursues suffering or\nevil, he does so merely from error or ignorance, mistaking it for\ngood.[33] This is true, undoubtedly, if we mean what is good or evil\nfor himself: and if by good or evil we mean (according to the\ndoctrine enforced by Sokrates in the Protagoras) the result of items\nof pleasure and pain, rightly estimated and compared by the Measuring\nReason. Every man naturally desires pleasure, and the means of\nacquiring pleasure, for himself: every man naturally shrinks from\npain, or the causes of pain, to himself: every one compares and\nmeasures the items of each with more or less wisdom and impartiality.\nBut the proposition is not true, if we mean what is good or evil for\nothers: and if by good we mean (as Sokrates is made to declare in the\nGorgias) something apart from pleasure, and by evil something apart\nfrom pain (understanding pleasure and pain in their largest sense). A\nman sometimes desires what is good for others, sometimes what is evil\nfor others, as the case may be. Plato's observation therefore cannot\nbe admitted--That as to the wish or desire, all men are alike: one\nman is no better than another.[34]\n\n[Footnote 32: Plato, Menon, p. 79 B-C. [Greek: t\u00ea\\n ga\\r dikaiosu/n\u00ean\nmo/rion ph\u00ea\\| a)ret\u00ea=s ei)=nai kai\\ e(/kasta tou/t\u00f4n. . . . oi)/ei tina\nei)de/nai mo/rion a)ret\u00ea=s o(/ ti e)/stin, au)t\u00ea\\n m\u00ea\\ ei)do/ta? Ou)k\ne)/moige dokei=.]]\n\n[Footnote 33: Plato, Menon, p. 77.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Plato, Menon, p. 78 B. [Greek: to\\ me\\n bou/lesthai\npa=sin u(pa/rchei, kai\\ tau/t\u00ea| ge ou)de\\n o( e(/teros tou= e(te/rou\nbelti/\u00f4n.]]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates requires knowledge as the principal\ncondition of virtue, but does not determine knowledge, of what?]\n\nThe second portion of Plato's theory, advanced to explain what virtue\nis, presents nothing more satisfactory. Virtue is useful or\nprofitable: but neither health, strength, beauty, wealth, power,\n&c., are profitable, unless rightly used: nor are justice,\nmoderation, courage, quick apprehension, good memory, &c.,\nprofitable, unless they are accompanied and guided by knowledge or\nprudence.[35] Now if by _profitable_ we have reference not to\nthe individual agent alone, but to other persons concerned also, the\nproposition is true, but not instructive or distinct. For what is\nmeant by _right use_? To what ends are the gifts here enumerated\nto be turned, in order to constitute right use? What again is meant\nby _knowledge_? knowledge of what?[36] This is a question put by\nSokrates in many other dialogues, and necessary to be put here also.\nMoreover, knowledge is a term which requires to be determined, not\nmerely to some assignable object, but also in its general import,\nno less than virtue. We shall come presently to an elaborate\ndialogue (The\u00e6t\u00eatus) in which Plato makes many attempts to determine\nknowledge generally, but ends in a confessed failure. Knowledge must\nbe knowledge _possessed by some one_, and must be knowledge of\n_something_. What is it, that a man must know, in order that his\njustice or courage may become profitable? Is it pleasures and pains,\nwith their causes, and the comparative magnitude of each (as Sokrates\ndeclares in the Protagoras), in order that he may contribute to\ndiminish the sum of pains, increase that of pleasures, to himself or\nto the society? If this be what he is required to know, Plato should\nhave said so--or if not, what else--in order that the requirement of\nknowledge might be made an intelligible condition.\n\n[Footnote 35: Plato, Menon, pp. 87-88.]\n\n[Footnote 36: See Republic, vi. p. 505 B, where this question is put,\nbut not answered, respecting [Greek: phro/n\u00easis].]\n\n[Side-note: Subject of Menon; same as that of the\nProtagoras--diversity of handling--Plato is not anxious to settle a\nquestion and get rid of it.]\n\nThough the subject of direct debate in the Menon is the same as that\nin the Protagoras (whether virtue be teachable?) yet the manner of\ntreating this subject is very different in the two. One point of\ndifference between the two has been just noticed. Another difference\nis, that whereas in Menon the teachability of virtue is assumed to be\ndisproved, because there are no recognised teachers or learners of\nit--in the Protagoras this argument is produced by Sokrates, but is\ncombated at length (as we shall presently see) by a counter-argument\non the part of the Sophists, without any rejoinder from Sokrates. Of\nthis counter-argument no notice is taken in the Menon: although, if\nit be well-founded, it would have served Anytus no less than\nProtagoras, as a solution of the difficulties raised by Sokrates.\nSuch diversity of handling and argumentative fertility, are\ncharacteristic of the Platonic procedure. I have already remarked,\nthat the establishment of positive conclusions, capable of being\nsevered from their premisses, registered in the memory, and used as\nprinciples for deduction--is foreign to the spirit of these Dialogues\nof Search. To settle a question and finish with it--to get rid of the\ndebate, as if it were a troublesome temporary necessity--is not what\nPlato desires. His purpose is, to provoke the spirit of enquiry--to\nstimulate responsive efforts of the mind by a painful shock of\nexposed ignorance--and to open before it a multiplicity of new roads\nwith varied points of view.\n\n[Side-note: Anxiety of Plato to keep up and enforce the\nspirit of research.]\n\nNowhere in the Platonic writings is this provocative shock more\nvividly illustrated than in the Menon, by the simile of the\nelectrical fish: a simile as striking as that of the magnet in\nIon.[37] Nowhere, again, is the true character of the Sokratic\nintellect more clearly enunciated. \"You complain, Menon, that I\nplunge your mind into nothing but doubt, and puzzle, and conscious\nignorance. If I do this, it is only because my own mind is already in\nthat same condition.[38] The only way out of it is, through joint\ndialectical colloquy and search; in which I invite you to accompany\nme, though I do not know when or where it will end.\" And then, for\nthe purpose of justifying as well as encouraging such prolonged\nsearch, Sokrates proceeds to unfold his remarkable\nhypothesis--eternal pre-existence, boundless past experience, and\nomniscience, of the mind--identity of cognition with recognition,\ndependent on reminiscence. \"Research or enquiry (said some) is fruitless.\nYou must search either for that which you know, or for that which you do\nnot know. The first is superfluous--the second impossible: for if you do\nnot know what a thing is, how are you to be satisfied that the answer\nwhich you find is that which you are looking for? How can you\ndistinguish a true solution from another which is untrue, but\nplausible?\"\n\n[Footnote 37: Plato, Menon, p. 80 A. [Greek: na/rk\u00ea thalassi/a].\nCompare what I have said above about the Ion, ch. XVII., p. 128.]\n\n[Footnote 38: Plato, Menon, p. 80 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Great question discussed among the Grecian\nphilosophers--criterion of truth--Wherein consists the process of\nverification?]\n\nHere we find explicitly raised, for the first time, that difficulty\nwhich embarrassed the different philosophical schools in Greece for\nthe subsequent three centuries--What is the criterion of truth?\nWherein consists the process called verification and proof, of that\nwhich is first presented as an hypothesis? This was one of the great\nproblems debated between the Academics, the Stoics, and the Sceptics,\nuntil the extinction of the schools of philosophy.[39]\n\n[Footnote 39: Sokrates here calls this problem an [Greek: e)ristiko\\s\nlo/gos]. Stallbaum (in his Prolegom. to the Menon, p. 14) describes\nit as a \"qu\u00e6stiunculam, haud dubie e sophistarum disciplin\u00e2\narreptam\". If the Sophists were the first to raise this question, I\nthink that by doing so they rendered service to the interests of\nphilosophy. The question is among the first which ought to be\nthoroughly debated and sifted, if we are to have a body of \"reasoned\ntruth\" called philosophy.\n\nI dissent from the opinion of Stallbaum (p. 20), though it is adopted\nboth by Socher (Ueber Platon, p. 185) and by Steinhart (Einleitung\nzum Menon, p. 123), that the Menon was composed by Plato during the\nlifetime of Sokrates. Schleiermacher (Einleitung zum Gorgias, p. 22;\nEinleitung zum Menon, pp. 329-330), Ueberweg (Aechth. Plat. Schr. p.\n226), and K. F. Hermann, on the other hand, regard the Menon as\ncomposed after the death of Sokrates, and on this point I agree with\nthem, though whether it was composed not long after that event (as K.\nF. Hermann thinks) or thirteen years after it (as Schleiermacher\nthinks), I see no sufficient grounds for deciding. I incline to the\nbelief that its composition is considerably later than Hermann\nsupposes; the mention of the Theban Ismenias is one among the reasons\nrendering such later origin probable. Plato probably borrowed from\nthe Xenophontic Anabasis the name, country, and social position of\nMenon, who may have received teaching from Gorgias, as we know that\nProxenus did, Xen. Anab. ii. 6, 16. The reader can compare the\nEinleitung of Schleiermacher (in which he professes to prove that the\nMenon is a corollary to the The\u00e6t\u00eatus and Gorgias, and an immediate\nantecedent to the Euthyd\u00eamus,--that it solves the riddle of the\nProtagoras--and that it presupposes and refers back to the Ph\u00e6drus)\nwith the Einleitung of Steinhart (p. 120 seq.), who contests all\nthese propositions, saying that the Menon is decidedly later than the\nEuthyd\u00eamus, and decidedly earlier than the The\u00e6t\u00eatus, Gorgias, and\nPh\u00e6drus; with the opinions of Stallbaum and Hermann, who recognise an\norder different from that either of Steinhart or Schleiermacher; and\nwith that of Ast, who rejects the Menon altogether as unworthy of\nPlato. Every one of these dissentient critics has _something_ to\nsay for his opinion, while none of them (in my judgment) can make out\nanything like a conclusive case. The mistake consists in assuming\nthat there must have been a peremptory order and intentional\ninterdependence among the Platonic Dialogues, and next in trying to\nshow by internal evidence what that order was.]\n\n[Side-note: None of the philosophers were satisfied with\nthe answer here made by Plato--that verification consists in appeal\nto pre-natal experience.]\n\nNot one of these schools was satisfied with the very peculiar answer\nwhich the Platonic Sokrates here gives to the question. When truth is\npresented to us (he intimates), we recognise it as an old friend\nafter a long absence. We know it by reason of its conformity to our\nantecedent, pre-natal, experience (in the Ph\u00e6don, such pre-natal\nexperience is restricted to commerce with the substantial,\nintelligible, Ideas, which are not mentioned in the Menon): the soul\nor mind is immortal, has gone through an indefinite succession of\ntemporary lives prior to the present, and will go through an\nindefinite succession of temporary lives posterior to the\npresent--\"long\u00e6, canitis si cognita, vit\u00e6 Mors media est\". The mind has\nthus become omniscient, having seen, heard, and learnt every thing, both\non earth and in Hades: but such knowledge exists as a confused and\nunavailable mass, having been buried and forgotten on the\ncommencement of its actual life.\n\nSince all nature is in universal kindred, communion, or\ninterdependence, that which we hear or see here, recalls to the\nmemory, by association, portions of our prior forgotten\nomniscience.[40] It is in this recall or reminiscence that\nsearch, learning, acquisition of knowledge, consists. Teaching and\nlearning are words without meaning: the only process really\ninstructive is that of dialectic debate, which, if indefatigably\nprosecuted, will dig out the omniscience buried within.[41] So vast\nis the theory generated in Plato's mind, by his worship of dialectic,\nrespecting that process of search to which more than half of his\ndialogues are devoted.\n\n[Footnote 40: The doctrine of communion or interdependence pervading\nall Nature, with one continuous cosmical soul penetrating everywhere,\nwill be found set forth in the kosmology of the Tim\u00e6us, pp. 37-42-43.\nIt was held, with various modifications, both by the Pythagoreans and\nthe Stoics. Compare Cicero, Divinat. ii. 14-15; Virgil, \u00c6neid vi. 715\nseqq.; Georgic. iv. 220; Sextus Empir. adv. Mathem. ix. 127;\nEkphantus Pythagoreus ap. Stob\u00e6um, Tit. 48, vol. ii. p. 320,\nGaisford.\n\nThe view here taken by Plato, that all nature is cognate and\ninterdependent--[Greek: a(/te ga\\r t\u00ea=s phu/se\u00f4s a(pa/s\u00eas suggenou=s\nou)/s\u00eas]--is very similar to the theory of Leibnitz:--\"Ubique per\nmateriam disseminata statuo principia vitalia seu percipientia. Omnia\nin natur\u00e2 sunt analogica\" (Leibnitz, Epist. ad Wagnerum, p. 466;\nLeibn. Opp. Erdmann). Farther, that the human mind by virtue of its\ninterdependence or kindred with all nature, includes a confused\nomniscience, is also a Leibnitzian view. \"Car comme tout est plein\n(ce qui rend toute la mati\u00e8re li\u00e9e) et comme dans le plein tout\nmouvement fait quelqu' effet sur les corps distans \u00e0 mesure de la\ndistance, de sorte que chaque corps est affect\u00e9 non seulement par\nceux qui le touchent, et se ressent en quelque fa\u00e7on de tout ce qui\nleur arrive--mais aussi par leur moyen se ressent de ceux qui\ntouchent les premiers dont il est touch\u00e9 imm\u00e9diatement. Il s'ensuit\nque cette communication va \u00e0 quelque distance que ce soit. Et par\nconsequent tout corps se ressent de tout ce qui se fait dans\nl'Univers: tellement que celui, qui voit tout, pourroit lire dans\nchacun ce qui se fait partout et m\u00eame ce qui s'est fait et se fera,\nen remarquant dans le pr\u00e9sent ce qui est \u00e9loign\u00e9 tant selon les temps\nque selon les lieux: [Greek: su/mpnoia pa/nta], disoit Hippocrate.\nMais une \u00e2me ne peut lire en elle m\u00eame que ce qui y est represent\u00e9\ndistinctement: elle ne sauroit developper tout d'un coup ses r\u00e8gles,\ncar elles vont \u00e0 l'infini. Ainsi quoique chaque monade cr\u00e9\u00e9e\nrepr\u00e9sente tout l'Univers, elle repr\u00e9sente plus distinctement le\ncorps qui lui est particuli\u00e8rement affect\u00e9, et dont elle fait\nl'Ent\u00e9l\u00e9chie. Et comme ce corps exprime tout l'Univers par la\nconnexion de toute la mati\u00e8re dans le plein, l'\u00e2me repr\u00e9sente aussi\ntout l'Univers en repr\u00e9sentant ce corps qui lui appartient d'une\nmani\u00e8re particuli\u00e8re\" (Leibnitz, Monadologie, sect. 61-62, No. 88, p.\n710; Opp. Leibn. ed. Erdmann).\n\nAgain, Leibnitz, in another Dissertation: \"Comme \u00e0 cause de la\npl\u00e9nitude du monde tout est li\u00e9, et chaque corps agit sur chaque\nautre corps, plus ou moins, selon la distance, et en est affect\u00e9 par\nla r\u00e9action--il s'ensuit que chaque monade est un miroir vivant, ou\ndou\u00e9 d'action interne, repr\u00e9sentatif de l'Univers, suivant son point\nde vue, et aussi r\u00e9gl\u00e9 que l'Univers m\u00eame\" (Principes de la Nature et\nde la Grace, p. 714, ed. Erdmann; also Syst\u00e8me Nouveau, p. 128, a.\n36).\n\nLeibnitz expresses more than once how much his own metaphysical views\nagreed with those of Plato. Lettre \u00e0 M. Bourguet, pp. 723-725. He\nexpresses his belief in the pre-existence of the soul: \"Tout ce que\nje crois pouvoir assurer, est, que l'\u00e2me de tout animal a pr\u00e9exist\u00e9,\net a \u00e9t\u00e9 dans un corps organique: qui enfin, par beaucoup de\nchangemens, involutions, et \u00e9volutions, est devenu l'animal pr\u00e9sent\"\n(Lettre \u00e0 M. Bourguet, p. 731). And in the Platonic doctrine of\nreminiscence to a certain point: \"II y a quelque chose de solide dans\nce que dit Platon de la r\u00e9miniscence\" (p. 137, b. 10). Also\nLeibnitz's Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain, p. 196, b. 28;\nand Epistol. ad Hanschium, p. 446, a. 12.\n\nSee the elaborate account of the philosophy of Leibnitz by Dr. Kuno\nFischer--Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, vol. ii. pp. 226-232.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Plato, Menon, p. 81 D. [Greek: e)a/n tis a)ndrei=os\n\u00ea)=|, kai\\ m\u00ea\\ a)poka/mn\u00ea| z\u00eat\u00f4=n.] Compare also p. 86 B.]\n\n[Side-note: Plato's view of the immortality of the\nsoul--difference between the Menon, Ph\u00e6drus, and Ph\u00e6don.]\n\nIn various other dialogues of Plato, the same hypothesis is found\nrepeated. His conception of the immortality of the soul or mind,\nincludes pre-existence as well as post-existence: a perpetual\nsuccession of temporary lives, each in a distinct body, each\nterminated by death, and each followed by renewed life for a time in\nanother body. In fact, the pre-existence of the mind formed the most\nimportant part of Plato's theory about immortality: for he employed\nit as the means of explaining how the mind became possessed of\ngeneral notions. As the doctrine is stated in the Menon, it is made\napplicable to all minds (instead of being confined, as in Ph\u00e6drus,\nPh\u00e6don, and elsewhere, to a few highly gifted minds, and to commerce\nwith the intelligible substances called Ideas). This appears from the\nperson chosen to illustrate the alleged possibility of stimulating\nartificial reminiscence: that person is an unlettered youth, taken at\nhazard from among the numerous slaves of Menon.[42]\n\n[Footnote 42: Plato, Menon, pp. 82 A, 85 E. [Greek: proska/leson t\u00f4=n\npoll\u00f4=n a)kolou/th\u00f4n tout\u00f4ni\\ t\u00f4=n sautou= e(/na, o(/ntina bou/lei,\ni(/na e)n tou/t\u00f4| soi e)pidei/x\u00f4mai.] Stallbaum says that this\nallusion to the numerous slaves in attendance is intended to\nillustrate conspicuously the wealth and nobility of Menon. In my\njudgment, it is rather intended to illustrate the operation of pure\naccident--the perfectly ordinary character of the mind worked\nupon--\"one among many, which you please\".]\n\n[Side-note: Doctrine of Plato, that new truth may be elicited\nby skilful examination out of the unlettered mind--how far correct?]\n\nIt is true, indeed (as Schleiermacher observes), that the questions\nput by Sokrates to this youth are in great proportion leading\nquestions, suggesting their own answers. They would not have served\ntheir purpose unless they had been such. The illustration here\nfurnished, of the Sokratic interrogatory process, is highly\ninteresting, and his theory is in a great degree true.[43] Not all\nlearning, but an important part of learning, consists in\nreminiscence--not indeed of acquisitions made in an antecedent\nlife, but of past experience and judgments in this life. Of such\nexperience and judgments every one has travelled through a large\ncourse; which has disappeared from his memory, yet not irrevocably.\nPortions of it may be revived, if new matter be presented to the\nmind, fitted to excite the recollection of them by the laws of\nassociation. By suitable interrogations, a teacher may thus recall to\nthe memory of his pupils many facts and judgments which have been\nhitherto forgotten: he may bring into juxtaposition those which have\nnever before been put together in the mind: and he may thus make them\nelicit instructive comparisons and inferences. He may provoke the\npupils to strike out new results for themselves, or to follow, by\nmeans of their own stock of knowledge, in the path suggested by the\nquestions. He may farther lead them to perceive the fallacy of\nerroneous analogies which at first presented themselves as plausible;\nand to become painfully sensible of embarrassment and perplexing\nignorance, before he puts those questions which indicate the way of\nescape from it. Upon the necessity of producing such painful\nconsciousness of ignorance Plato insists emphatically, as is his\ncustom.[44]\n\n[Footnote 43: Plutarch (Fragment. [Greek: Peri\\ psuch\u00ea=s]). Ei) a)ph'\ne(te/rou e(/teron e)nnoou=men? ou)k a)/n, ei) m\u00ea\\ proe/gn\u00f4sto. To\\\ne)pichei/r\u00eama Plat\u00f4niko/n. Ei) prosti/themen to\\ e)/lleipon toi=s\nai)sth\u00eatoi=s?--kai\\ au)to\\ Plat\u00f4niko/n.]\n\nPlutarch, in the same fragment, indicates some of the objections made\nby Bion and Straton against the doctrine of [Greek: a)na/mn\u00easis]. How\n(they asked) does it happen that this reminiscence brings up often\nwhat is false or absurd? (asked Bion). If such reminiscence exists\n(asked Straton) how comes it that we require demonstrations to\nconduct us to knowledge? and how is it that no man can play on the\nflute or the harp without practice?\n\n[Greek: O(/ti Bi/\u00f4n \u00ea)po/rei peri\\ tou= pseu/dous, ei) kai\\ au)to\\\nkat' a)na/mn\u00easin, \u00f4(s to\\ e)nanti/on ge, \u00ea)\\ ou)/? kai\\ ti/ \u00ea(\na)logi/a? O(/ti Stra/t\u00f4n \u00ea)po/rei, ei) e)/stin a)namn\u00easis, p\u00f4=s\na)/neu a)podei/xe\u00f4n ou) gigno/metha e)pist\u00ea/mones? p\u00f4=s de\\ ou)dei\\s\nau)l\u00eat\u00ea\\s \u00ea)\\ kitharist\u00ea\\s ge/gonen a)/neu mele/t\u00eas?]]\n\n[Footnote 44: Plato, Menon, p. 84. The sixteenth Dissertation of\nMaximus Tyrius presents a rhetorical amplification of this\ndoctrine--[Greek: pa=sa ma/th\u00easis, a)na/mn\u00easis]--in which he enters fully\ninto the spirit of the Menon and the Ph\u00e6don--[Greek: au)todi/dakto/n ti\nchr\u00ea=ma \u00ea( psuch\u00ea/--\u00ea( psuch\u00ea=s eu(/resis, au)togen\u00ea/s tis ou)=sa,\nkai\\ au)tophu\u00ea\\s, kai\\ xu/mphutos, ti/ a)/llo e)/stin \u00ea)\\ do/xai\na)l\u00eathei=s e)geiro/menai, \u00f4(=n t\u00ea=| e)pege/rsei te kai\\ xunta/xei\ne)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea o)/noma?] (c. 6). Compare also Cicero, Tusc. D. i. 24.\nThe doctrine has furnished a theme for very elegant poetry: both in\nthe Consolatio Philosophi\u00e6 of Boethius--the piece which ends with\n\n\"Ac si Platonis Musa personat verum,\nQuod quisque discit, immemor recordatur\"--\n\nand in Wordsworth--\"Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting,\"\n&c.\n\nOn the other hand Aristotle alludes also to the same doctrine and\ncriticises it; but he does not seem (so far as I can understand this\nbrief allusion) to seize exactly Plato's meaning. This is the remark\nof the Scholiast on Aristotle: and I think it just. It is curious to\ncompare the way in which [Greek: a)na/mn\u00easis] is handled by Plato in\nthe Menon and Ph\u00e6don, and by Aristotle in the valuable little\ntract--[Greek: Peri\\ mn\u00ea/n\u00eas kai\\ a)namn\u00ea/se\u00f4s] (p. 451, b.). Aristotle\nhas his own way of replying to the difficulty raised in the question of\nMenon, and tries to show that sometimes we _know_ in one sense\nand _do not know_ in another. See Aristotel. Anal. Prior., ii.\np. 67, a. 22; Anal. Poster. i. p. 71, a. 27; and the Scholia on the\nformer passage, p. 193, b. 21, ed. Brandis.\n\nSir William Hamilton, in one of the Appendixes to his edition of\nReid's Works (Append. D. p. 890 seq.), has given a learned and\nvaluable translation and illustration of the treatise of Aristotle\n[Greek: Peri\\ A)namn\u00ea/se\u00f4s]. I note, however, with some surprise,\nthat while collecting many interesting comments from writers who\nlived _after_ Aristotle, he has not adverted to what was said\nupon this same subject by Plato, _before_ Aristotle. It was the\nmore to be expected that he would do this, since he insists so\nemphatically upon the complete originality of Aristotle.]\n\n[Side-note: Plato's doctrine about _\u00e0 priori_\nreasonings--Different from the modern doctrine.]\n\nPlato does not intend here to distinguish (as many modern writers\ndistinguish) geometry from other sciences, as if geometry were known\n_\u00e0 priori_, and other sciences known _\u00e0 posteriori_ or from\nexperience. He does not suppose that geometrical truths are such that\nno man can possibly believe the contrary of them; or that they are\ndifferent in this respect from the truths of any other science. He\nhere maintains that all the sciences lie equally in the untaught\nmind,[45] but buried, forgotten, and confused: so as to require the\nskill of the questioner not merely to recall them into consciousness,\nbut to disentangle truth from error. Far from supposing that the\nuntaught mind has a natural tendency to answer correctly geometrical\nquestions, he treats erroneous answers as springing up more naturally\nthan true answers, and as requiring a process of painful exposure\nbefore the mind can be put upon the right track. The questioner,\nwithout possessing any knowledge himself, (so Plato thinks,) can\nnevertheless exercise an influence at once stimulating, corrective,\nand directive. He stimulates the action of the associative process,\nto call up facts, comparisons, and analogies, bearing on the\nquestion: he arrests the respondent on a wrong answer, creating\nwithin him a painful sense of ignorance and embarrassment: he directs\nhim by his subsequent questions into the path of right answers. His\nobstetric aid (to use the simile in Plato's The\u00e6tetus), though\npresupposing the pregnancy of the respondent mind, is indispensable\nboth to forward the childbirth, and to throw away any offspring which\nmay happen to be deformed. In the The\u00e6tetus, the main stress is laid\non that part of the dialogue which is performed by the questioner: in\nthe Menon, upon the latent competence and large dead stock of an\nuntaught respondent.\n\n[Footnote 45: Plato, Menon, p. 85 E. [Greek: ou(=tos ga\\r] (the\nuntaught slave) [Greek: poi\u00ea/sei peri\\ pa/s\u00eas ge\u00f4metri/as tau)ta\\\ntau=ta, kai\\ t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n math\u00eama/t\u00f4n a(pa/nt\u00f4n.]]\n\nThe mind of the slave questioned by Sokrates is discovered to be\npregnant. Though he has received no teaching from any professed\ngeometer, he is nevertheless found competent, when subjected to a\nskilful interrogatory, to arrive at last, through a series of\nmistakes, at correct answers, determining certain simple\nproblems of geometry. He knows nothing about geometry:\nnevertheless there exist in his mind true opinions respecting that\nwhich he does not know. These opinions are \"called up like a dream\"\nby the interrogatories: which, if repeated and diversified, convert\nthe opinions into knowledge, taken up by the respondent out of\nhimself.[46] The opinions are inherited from an antecedent life and\nborn with him, since they have never been taught to him during this\nlife.\n\n[Footnote 46: Plato, Menon, p. 85. [Greek: t\u00f4=| ou)k eido/ti a)/ra\nperi\\ \u00f4(=n a)\\n m\u00ea\\ ei)d\u00ea=| e)/neisin a)l\u00eathei=s do/xai. . . . kai\\\nnu=n me/n ge _au)t\u00f4=| \u00f4(/sper o)/nar_ a)/rti a)nakeki/n\u00eantai ai(\ndo/xai au(=tai; ei) de\\ au)to/n tis a)ner\u00ea/setai polla/kis ta\\ au)ta\\\ntau=ta kai\\ pollach\u00ea=, oi)=sth' o(/ti teleut\u00f4=n ou)deno\\s \u00ea(=tton\na)krib\u00f4=s e)pist\u00ea/setai peri\\ au)t\u00f4n. . . . Ou)kou=n ou)deno\\s\ndida/xantos a)ll' e)r\u00f4t\u00ea/santos e)pist\u00ea/setai, a)nalab\u00f4\\n au)to\\s e)x\nau)tou= t\u00ea\\n e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean?]]\n\n[Side-note: Plato's theory about pre-natal experience. He took\nno pains to ascertain and measure the extent of post-natal\nexperience.]\n\nIt is thus that Plato applies to philosophical theory the doctrine\n(borrowed from the Pythagoreans) of pre-natal experience and\ncognitions: which he considers, not as inherent appurtenances of the\nmind, but as acquisitions made by the mind during various antecedent\nlives. These ideas (Plato argues) cannot have been acquired during\nthe present life, because the youth has received no special teaching\nin geometry. But Plato here takes no account of the multiplicity and\ndiversity of experiences gone through, comparisons made, and\nacquirements lodged, in the mind of a youthful adult however\nunlettered. He recognises no acquisition of knowledge except through\nspecial teaching. So, too, in the Protagoras, we shall find him\nputting into the mouth of Sokrates the doctrine--That virtue is not\ntaught and cannot be taught, because there were no special masters or\ntimes of teaching. But in that dialogue we shall also see Plato\nfurnishing an elaborate reply to this doctrine in the speech of\nProtagoras; who indicates the multifarious and powerful influences\nwhich are perpetually operative, even without special professors, in\ncreating and enforcing ethical sentiment. If Plato had taken pains to\nstudy the early life of the untaught slave, with its stock of facts,\njudgments, comparisons, and inferences suggested by analogy, &c.,\nhe might easily have found enough to explain the competence of the\nslave to answer the questions appearing in the dialogue. And even if\nenough could not have been found, to afford a direct and specific\nexplanation--we must remember that only a very small proportion\nof the long series of mental phenomena realised in the infant, the\nchild, the youth, ever comes to be remembered or recorded. To assume\nthat the large unknown remainder would be insufficient, if known, to\nafford the explanation sought, is neither philosophical nor\nreasonable. This is assumed in every form of the doctrine of innate\nideas: and assumed by Plato here without even trying any explanation\nto dispense with the hypothesis: simply because the youth\ninterrogated had never received any special instruction in geometry.\n\n[Side-note: Little or nothing is said in the Menon about the\nPlatonic Ideas or Forms.]\n\nI have already observed, that though great stress is laid in this\ndialogue upon the doctrine of opinions and knowledge inherited from\nan antecedent life--upon the distinction between true opinion and\nknowledge--and upon the identity of the process of learning with\nreminiscence--yet nothing is said about universal Ideas or Forms, so\nmuch dwelt upon in other dialogues. In the Ph\u00e6drus and Ph\u00e6don, it is\nwith these universal Ideas that the mind is affirmed to have had\ncommunion during its prior existence, as contrasted with the\nparticulars of sense apprehended during the present life: while in\nthe Menon, the difference pointed out between true opinions and\nknowledge is something much less marked and decisive. Both the one\nand the other are said to be, not acquired during this life, but\ninherited from antecedent life: to be innate, yet\nunperceived--revived by way of reminiscence and interrogation. True\nopinions are affirmed to render as much service as knowledge, in\nreference to practice. There is only this distinction between them--that\ntrue opinions are transient, and will not remain in the mind until they\nare bound in it by causal reasoning, or become knowledge.\n\n[Side-note: What Plato meant by Causal Reasoning--his\ndistinction between knowledge and right opinion.]\n\nWhat Plato meant by this \"causal reasoning, or computation of cause,\"\nis not clearly explained. But he affirms very unequivocally, first,\nthat the distinction between true opinion and knowledge is one of the\nfew things of which he feels assured[47]--next, with somewhat less\nconfidence, that the distinction consists only in the greater\nsecurity which knowledge affords for permanent in-dwelling in the\nmind. This appears substantially the same distinction as what is laid\ndown in other words towards the close of the dialogue--That those,\nwho have only true opinions and not knowledge, judge rightly without\nknowing how or why; by an aptitude not their own but supplied to them\nfrom without for the occasion, in the nature of inspiration or\nprophetic _oestrus_. Hence they are unable to teach others, or\nto transfer this occasional inspiration to any one else. They cannot\ngive account of what they affect to know, nor answer scrutinizing\nquestions to test it. This power of answering and administering\ncross-examination, is Plato's characteristic test of real knowledge--as\nI have already observed in my eighth** chapter.\n\n[Footnote 47: Plato, Menon, p. 98 B. [Greek: o(/ti de/ e)sti/ ti\na)lloi=on o)rth\u00ea\\ do/xa kai\\ e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea, ou) pa/nu moi dok\u00f4= tou=to\nei)ka/zein; a)ll' ei)/per ti a)/llo phai/\u00ean a)\\n ei)de/nai,\n_o)li/ga d' a)\\n phai/\u00ean, e(\\n d' ou)=n kai\\ tou=to e)kei/n\u00f4n\nthei/\u00ean a)\\n \u00f4(=n oi)=da_.]]\n\n[Side-note: This distinction compared with modern\nphilosophical views.]\n\nTo translate the views of Plato into analogous views of a modern\nphilosopher, we may say--That right opinion, as contrasted with\nknowledge, is a discriminating and acute empirical judgment:\ninferring only from old particulars to new particulars (without the\nintermediate help and guarantee of general propositions distinctly\nenunciated and interpreted), but selecting for every new case the\nappropriate analogies out of the past, with which it ought to be\ncompared. Many persons judge in this manner fairly well, and some\nwith extreme success. But let them be ever so successful in practice,\nthey proceed without any conscious method; they are unable to\ncommunicate the grounds of their inferences to others: and when they\nare right, it is only by haphazard--that is (to use Plato's\nlanguage), through special inspiration vouchsafed to them by the\nGods. But when they ascend to knowledge, and come to judge\nscientifically, they then distribute these particular facts into\nclasses--note the constant sequences as distinguished from the\noccasional--and draw their inferences in every new case according to\nsuch general laws or uniformities of antecedent and consequent. Such\nuniform and unconditional antecedents are the only causes of which we\nhave cognizance. They admit of being described in the language which\nPlato here uses ([Greek: ai)ti/as logism\u00f4=|]), and they also serve as\nreasons for justifying or explaining our inferences to others.[48]\n\n[Footnote 48: We have seen that in the Menon Plato denies all [Greek:\ndidach\u00ea/], and recognises nothing but [Greek: a)na/mn\u00easis]. The\ndoctrine of the Tim\u00e6us (p. 51 D-E) is very different. He there lays\nespecial stress on the distinction between [Greek: didach\u00ea\\] and\n[Greek: peith\u00f4/]--the first belonging to [Greek: e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea], the\nsecond to [Greek: do/xa]. Also in Gorgias, 454, and in Republic, v.\npp. 477-479, about [Greek: do/xa] and [Greek: e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea]. In those\ndialogues the distinction between the two is presented as marked and\nfundamental, as if [Greek: do/xa] alone was fallible and [Greek:\ne)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea] infallible. In the Menon the distinction appears as\nimportant, but not fundamental; the Platonic Ideas or Universals\nbeing _not_ recognised as constituting a substantive world by\nthemselves. In this respect the Menon is nearer to the truth in\ndescribing the difference between [Greek: o)rth\u00ea\\ do/xa] and [Greek:\ne)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea]. Mr. John Stuart Mill (in the chapter of his System of\nLogic wherein the true theory of the Syllogism is for the first time\nexpounded) has clearly explained what that difference amounts to. All\nour inferences are _from_ particulars, sometimes _to_ new\nparticulars directly and at once ([Greek: do/xa]), sometimes\n_to_ generals in the first instance, and through them _to_\nnew particulars; which latter, or scientific process, is highly\nvaluable as a security for correctness ([Greek: e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea]). \"Not\nonly\" (says Mr. Mill) \"_may_ we reason from particulars to\nparticulars without passing through generals, but we perpetually\n_do_ so reason. All our earliest inferences are of this nature.\nFrom the first dawn of intelligence we draw inferences, but years\nelapse before we learn the use of general language. We are constantly\nreasoning from ourselves to other people, or from one person to\nanother, without giving ourselves the trouble to erect our\nobservations into general maxims of human or external nature. If we\nhave an extensive experience and retain its impressions strongly, we\nmay acquire in this manner a very considerable power of accurate\njudgment, which we may be utterly incapable of justifying or of\ncommunicating to others. Among the higher order of practical\nintellects, there have been many of whom it was remarked how\nadmirably they suited their means to their ends, without being able\nto give any sufficient account of what they did; and applied, or\nseemed to apply, recondite principles which they were wholly unable\nto state. This is a natural consequence of having a mind stored with\nappropriate particulars, and having been accustomed to reason at once\nfrom these to fresh particulars, without practising the habit of\nstating to one's self or others the corresponding general\npropositions. The cases of men of talent performing wonderful things\nthey know not how, are examples of the rudest and most spontaneous\nforms of the operations of superior minds. It is a defect in them,\nand often a source of errors, not to have generalised as they went\non; but generalisation, though a help, the most important indeed of\nall helps, is not an essential\" (Mill, Syst. of Logic, Book II. ch.\niii.). Compare the first chapter of the Metaphysica of Aristotle, p.\n980, a. 15, b. 7.]\n\n[Side-note: Manifestation of Anytus--intense antipathy to\nthe Sophists and to philosophy generally.]\n\nThe manner in which Anytus, the accuser of Sokrates before the\nDikastery, is introduced into this dialogue, deserves notice. The\nquestions are put to him by Sokrates--\"Is virtue teachable? How is\nMenon to learn virtue, and from whom? Ought he not to do as he would\ndo if he wished to learn medicine or music: to put himself under some\npaid professional man as teacher?\" Anytus answers these questions in\nthe affirmative: but asks, where such professional teachers of virtue\nare to be found. \"There are the Sophists,\" replies Sokrates. Upon\nthis Anytus breaks out into a burst of angry invective against the\nSophists; denouncing them as corruptors of youth, whom none but a\nmadman would consult, and who ought to be banished by public\nauthority.\n\nWhy are you so bitter against the Sophists? asks Sokrates. Have\nany of them ever injured you? _Anyt._--No; never: I have never\nbeen in the company of any one of them, nor would I ever suffer any\nof my family to be so. _Sokr._--Then you have no experience\nwhatever about the Sophists? _Anyt._--None: and I hope that I\nnever may have. _Sokr._--How then can you know about this\nmatter, how far it is good or bad, if you have no experience whatever\nabout it? _Anyt._--Easily. I know what sort of men the Sophists\nare, whether I have experience of them or not. _Sokr._--Perhaps\nyou are a prophet, Anytus: for how else you can know about them, I do\nnot understand, even on your own statement.[49]\n\n[Footnote 49: Plato, Menon, p. 92.]\n\nAnytus then declares, that the persons from whom Menon ought to learn\nvirtue are the leading practical politicians; and that any one of\nthem can teach it. But Sokrates puts a series of questions, showing\nthat the leading Athenian politicians, Themistokl\u00eas, Perikl\u00eas,\n&c., have not been able to teach virtue even to their own sons:\n_\u00e0 fortiori_, therefore, they cannot teach it to any one else.\nAnytus treats this series of questions as disparaging and calumnious\ntowards the great men of Athens. He breaks off the conversation\nabruptly, with an angry warning to Sokrates to be cautious about his\nlanguage, and to take care of his own safety.\n\nThe dialogue is then prosecuted and finished between Sokrates and\nMenon: and at the close of it, Sokrates says--\"Talk to Anytus, and\ncommunicate to him that persuasion which you have yourself\ncontracted,[50] in order that he may be more mildly disposed: for, if\nyou persuade him, you will do some good to the Athenians as well as\nto himself.\"\n\n[Footnote 50: Plato, Menon, ad fin. [Greek: su\\ de\\ tau=ta a(/per\nau)to\\s pe/peisai, pei=the kai\\ to\\n xe/non to/nde A)/nuton, i(/na\npra|o/teros \u00ea)=|; \u00f4(s e)a\\n pei/s\u00ea|s tou=ton, e)/stin o(/, ti kai\\\nA)th\u00eanai/ous o)n\u00ea/seis.]]\n\n[Side-note: The enemy of Sokrates is also the enemy of the\nsophists--Practical statesmen.]\n\nThe enemy and accuser of Sokrates is here depicted as the bitter\nenemy of the Sophists also. And Plato takes pains to exhibit the\nenmity of Anytus to the Sophists as founded on no facts or\nexperience. Without having seen or ascertained anything about them,\nAnytus hates them as violently as if he had sustained from them some\npersonal injury; a sentiment which many Platonic critics and\nmany historians of philosophy have inherited from him.[51] Whether\nthe corruption which these Sophists were accused of bringing about in\nthe minds of youth, was intentional or not intentional on their\npart--how such corruption could have been perpetually continued, while at\nthe same time the eminent Sophists enjoyed long and unabated esteem\nfrom the youth themselves and from their relatives--are difficulties\nwhich Anytus does not attempt to explain, though they are started\nhere by Sokrates. Indeed we find the same topics employed by Sokrates\nhimself, in his defence before the Dikasts against the same\ncharge.[52] Anytus has confidence in no one except the practical\nstatesmen: and when a question is raised about _their_ power to\nimpart their own excellence to others, he presently takes offence\nagainst Sokrates also. The same causes which have determined his\nfurious antipathy against the Sophists, make him ready to transfer\nthe like antipathy to Sokrates. He is a man of plain sense, practical\nhabits, and conservative patriotism--who worships what he finds\naccredited as virtue, and dislikes the talkers and theorisers about\nvirtue in general: whether they debated in subtle interrogation and\ndialectics, like Sokrates--or lectured in eloquent continuous\ndiscourse, like Protagoras. He accuses the Sophists, in this\ndialogue, of corrupting the youth; just as he and Mel\u00eatus, before the\nDikastery, accused Sokrates of the same offence. He understands the\nuse of words, to discuss actual business before the assembly or\ndikastery; but he hates discourse on the generalities of ethics or\nphilosophy. He is essentially [Greek: miso/logos]. The point which he\ncondemns in the Sophists, is that which they have in common with\nSokrates.\n\n[Footnote 51: Upon the bitter antipathy here expressed by Anytus\nagainst the Sophists, whom nevertheless he admits that he does not at\nall know, Steinhart remarks as follows:--\"Gerade so haben zu allen\nZeiten Orthodoxe und Fanatiker aller Arten \u00fcber ihre Gegner\nabgeurtheilt, ohne sie zu kennen oder auch nur kennen lernen zu\nwollen\" (Einleit. zum Menon, not. 15, p. 173).\n\nCertainly orthodox and fanatical persons often do what is here\nimputed to them. But Steinhart might have found a still closer\nparallel with Anytus, in his own criticisms, and in those of many\nother Platonic critics on the Sophists; the same expressions of\nbitterness and severity, with the same slender knowledge of the\npersons upon whom they bear.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Plato, Apol. Sokr. pp. 26 A, 33 D, 34 B.]\n\n[Side-note: The Menon brings forward the point of analogy\nbetween Sokrates and the Sophists, in which both were disliked by the\npractical statesmen.]\n\nIn many of the Platonic dialogues we have the antithesis between\nSokrates and the Sophists brought out, as to the different point of\nview from which the one and the other approached ethical\nquestions. But in this portion of the Menon, we find exhibited the\nfeature of analogy between them, in which both one and the other\nstood upon ground obnoxious to the merely practical politicians. Far\nfrom regarding hatred against the Sophists as a mark of virtue in\nAnytus, Sokrates deprecates it as unwarranted and as menacing to\nphilosophy in all her manifestations. The last declaration ascribed\nto Anytus, coupled with the last speech of Sokrates in the dialogue,\nshow us that Plato conceives the anti-Sophistic antipathy as being\nanti-Sokratic also, in its natural consequences. That Sokrates was in\ncommon parlance a Sophist, disliked by a large portion of the general\npublic, and ridiculed by Aristophanes, on the same grounds as those\nwhom Plato calls Sophists--is a point which I have noticed elsewhere.\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIII.\n\nPROTAGORAS.\n\n\n[Side-note: Scenic arrangement and personages of the dialogue.]\n\nThe dialogue called Protagoras presents a larger assemblage of varied\nand celebrated characters, with more of dramatic winding, and more\nfrequent breaks and resumptions in the conversation, than any\ndialogue of Plato--not excepting even Symposion and Republic. It\nexhibits Sokrates in controversy with the celebrated Sophist\nProtagoras, in the presence of a distinguished society, most of whom\ntake occasional part in the dialogue. This controversy is preceded by\na striking conversation between Sokrates and Hippokrates--a youth of\ndistinguished family, eager to profit by the instructions of\nProtagoras. The two Sophists Prodikus and Hippias, together with\nKallias, Kritias, Alkibiades, Eryximachus, Ph\u00e6drus, Pausanias,\nAgathon, the two sons of Perikl\u00eas (Paralus and Xanthippus),\nCharmides, son of Glaukon, Antimoerus of Mende, a promising pupil\nof Protagoras, who is in training for the profession of a\nSophist--these and others are all present at the meeting, which is held\nin the house of Kallias.[1] Sokrates himself recounts the whole--both his\nconversation with Hippokrates and that with Protagoras--to a nameless\nfriend.\n\n[Footnote 1: Plato, Protag. p. 315.]\n\nThis dialogue enters upon a larger and more comprehensive ethical\ntheory than anything in the others hitherto noticed. But it contains\nalso a great deal in which we hardly recognise, or at least cannot\nverify, any distinct purpose, either of search or exposition. Much of\nit seems to be composed with a literary or poetical view, to enhance\nthe charm or interest of the composition. The personal\ncharacteristics of each speaker--the intellectual peculiarities\nof Prodikus and Hippias--the ardent partisanship of Alkibiades--are\nbrought out as in a real drama. But the great and marked antithesis\nis that between the Sophist Protagoras and Sokrates--the Hektor and\nAjax of the piece: who stand forward in single combat, exchange some\nserious blows, yet ultimately part as friends.\n\n[Side-note: Introduction. Eagerness of the youthful Hippokrates\nto become acquainted with Protagoras.]\n\nAn introduction of some length impresses upon us forcibly the\ncelebrity of the Great Sophist, and the earnest interest excited by\nhis visit to Athens. Hippokrates, a young man of noble family and\neager aspirations for improvement, having just learnt the arrival of\nProtagoras, comes to the house of Sokrates and awakens him before\ndaylight, entreating that Sokrates will introduce him to the\nnew-comer. He is ready to give all that he possesses in order that he\nmay become wise like Protagoras.[2] While they are awaiting a suitable\nhour for such introduction, Sokrates puts a series of questions to\ntest the force of Hippokrates.[3]\n\n[Footnote 2: Plato, Protag. pp. 310-311 A.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Plato, Protag. p. 311 B. [Greek: kai\\ e)g\u00f4\\\npopeir\u00f4/menos tou= I(ppokra/tous t\u00ea=s r(\u00f4/m\u00eas diesko/poun au)to\\n\nkai\\ \u00ea)r\u00f4/t\u00f4n], &c.]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates questions Hippokrates as to his purpose\nand expectations from Protagoras.]\n\n_Sokr._--You are now intending to visit Protagoras, and to pay\nhim for something to be done for you--tell me what manner of man it\nis that you are going to visit--and what manner of man do you wish to\nbecome? If you were going in like manner to pay a fee for instruction\nto your namesake Hippokrates of Kos, you would tell me that you were\ngoing to him as to a physician--and that you wished to qualify\nyourself for becoming a physician. If you were addressing yourself\nwith the like view to Pheidias or Polykleitus, you would go to them\nas to sculptors, and for the purpose of becoming yourself a sculptor.\nNow then that we are to go in all this hurry to Protagoras, tell me\nwho he is and what title he bears, as we called Pheidias a sculptor?\n_Hipp._--They call him a Sophist.[4] _Sokr._--We are going\nto pay him then as a Sophist? _Hipp._--Certainly. _Sokr._--And\nwhat are you to become by going to him? _Hipp._--Why,\njudging from the preceding analogies, I am to become a Sophist.\n_Sokr._--But would not you be ashamed of presenting yourself to\nthe Grecian public as a Sophist? _Hipp._--Yes: if I am to\ntell you my real opinion.[5] _Sokr._--Perhaps however you only\npropose to visit Protagoras, as you visited your schoolmaster and\nyour musical or gymnastical teacher: not for the purpose of entering\nthat career as a professional man, but to acquire such instruction as\nis suitable for a private citizen and a freeman? _Hipp._--That\nis more the instruction which I seek from Protagoras. _Sokr._--Do\nyou know then what you are going to do? You are consigning your\nmind to be treated by one whom you call a Sophist: but I shall be\nsurprised if you know what a Sophist is[6]--and if you do not know,\nneither do you know what it is--good or evil--to which you are\nconsigning your mind. _Hipp._--I think I _do_ know. The\nSophist is, as the name implies, one cognizant of matters wise and\nable.[7] _Sokr._--That may be said also of painters and\ncarpenters. If we were asked in what special department are painters\ncognizant of matters wise and able, we should specify that it was in\nthe workmanship of portraits. Answer me the same question about the\nSophist. What sort of workmanship does he direct? _Hipp._--That\nof forming able speakers.[8] _Sokr._--Your answer may be\ncorrect, but it is not specific enough: for we must still ask, About\n_what_ is it that the Sophist forms able speakers? just as the\nharp-master makes a man an able speaker about harping, at the same\ntime that he teaches him harping. About _what_ is it that the\nSophist forms able speakers: of course about that which he\nhimself knows?[9] _Hipp._--Probably. _Sokr._--What then is\nthat, about which the Sophist is himself cognizant, and makes his\npupil cognizant? _Hipp._--By Zeus, I cannot give you any farther\nanswer.[10]\n\n[Footnote 4: Plato, Protagoras, p. 311.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Plato, Protag. p. 312 A. [Greek: su\\ de/, \u00ea)=n d' e)g\u00f4/,\npro\\s the\u00f4=n, ou)k a)\\n ai)schu/noio ei)s tou\\s E(/ll\u00eanas sauto\\n\nsophist\u00ea\\n pare/ch\u00f4n? N\u00ea\\ to\\n Di/', \u00f4)= S\u00f4/krates, ei)/per ge a)\\\ndianoou=mai chr\u00ea\\ le/gein.] Ast (Platon's Leben, p. 78) and other\nPlatonic critics treat this _Sophistomanie_ (as they call it) of\nan Athenian youth as something ludicrous and contemptible: all the\nmore ludicrous because (they say) none of them goes to qualify\nhimself for becoming a Sophist, but would even be ashamed of the\ntitle. Yet if we suppose the same question addressed to a young\nEnglishman of rank and fortune (as Hippokrates was at Athens), \"Why\ndo you put yourself under the teaching of Dr. ---- at Eton or\nProfessor ---- at Oxford? Do you intend to qualify yourself for\nbecoming a schoolmaster or a professor?\" He will laugh at you for the\nquestion; if he answers it seriously, he will probably answer as\nHippokrates does. But there is nothing at all in the question to\nimply that the schoolmaster or the professor is a worthless\npretender--or the youth foolish, for being anxious to obtain\ninstruction from him; which is the inference that Ast and other\nPlatonic critics desire us to draw about the Athenian Sophists.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Plato, Protag. p. 312 C. [Greek: o(/, ti de/ pote o(\nsophist\u00ea/s e)sti, thauma/zoim' a)\\n ei) oi)=stha], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Plato, Protag. p. 312 C. [Greek: \u00f4(/s per tou)/noma\nle/gei, to\\n t\u00f4=n soph\u00f4=n e)pist\u00ea/mona.] (Quasi sophistes\nsit--[Greek: o( t\u00f4=n soph\u00f4=n i)/st\u00eas], Heindorf.) If this supposition\nof Heindorf be just, we may see in it an illustration of the\netymological views of Plato, which I shall notice when I come to the\nKratylus.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Plato, Protag. p. 312 D. [Greek: poi/as e)rgasi/as\ne)pista/t\u00eas? e)pista/t\u00ean tou= poi\u00ea=sai deino\\n le/gein.]]\n\n[Footnote 9: Plato, Protag. p. 312 D-E. [Greek: e)r\u00f4t\u00ea/se\u00f4s ga\\r\ne)/ti \u00ea( a)po/krisis \u00ea(mi=n dei=tai, peri\\ o(/tou o( sophist\u00ea\\s\ndeino\\n poiei= le/gein; \u00f4(/sper o( kitharist\u00ea\\s deino\\n d\u00ea/pou poiei=\nle/gein peri\\ ou(=per kai\\ e)pist\u00ea/mona, peri\\ kithari/se\u00f4s.]]\n\n[Footnote 10: Plato, Protag. p. 312 E.]\n\n[Side-note: Danger of going to imbibe the instruction of a\nSophist without knowing beforehand what he is about to teach.]\n\n_Sokr._--Do you see then to what danger you are going to submit\nyour mind? If the question were about going to trusting your body to\nany one, with the risk whether it should become sound or unsound, you\nwould have thought long, and taken much advice, before you decided.\nBut now, when it is about your mind, which you value more than your\nbody, and upon the good or evil of which all your affairs turn[11]--you\nare hastening without reflection and without advice, you are\nready to pay all the money that you possess or can obtain, with a\nfirm resolution already taken to put yourself at all hazard under\nProtagoras: whom you do not know--with whom you have never once\ntalked--whom you call a Sophist, without knowing what a Sophist is?\n_Hipp._--I must admit the case to be as you say.[12]\n_Sokr._--Perhaps the Sophist is a man who brings for sale those\ntransportable commodities, instruction or doctrine, which form the\nnourishment of the mind. Now the traders in food for the body praise\nindiscriminately all that they have to sell, though neither they nor\ntheir purchasers know whether it is good for the body; unless by\nchance any one of them be a gymnastic trainer or a physician.[13] So,\ntoo, these Sophists, who carry about food for the mind, praise all\nthat they have to sell: but perhaps some of them are ignorant, and\nassuredly their purchasers are ignorant, whether it be good or bad\nfor the mind: unless by accident any one possess medical knowledge\nabout the mind. Now if you, Hippokrates, happen to possess such\nknowledge of what is good or bad for the mind, you may safely\npurchase doctrine from Protagoras or from any one else:[14] but if\nnot, you are hazarding and putting at stake your dearest\ninterests. The purchase of doctrines is far more dangerous than that\nof eatables or drinkables. As to these latter, you may carry them\naway with you in separate vessels, and before you take them into your\nbody you may invoke the _Expert_, to tell you what you may\nsafely eat and drink, and when, and how much. But this cannot be done\nwith doctrines. You cannot carry away _them_ in a separate\nvessel to be tested; you learn them and take them into the mind\nitself; so that you go away, after having paid your money, actually\ndamaged or actually benefited, as the case may be.[15] We will\nconsider these matters in conjunction with our elders. But first let\nus go and talk with Protagoras--we can consult the others afterwards.\n\n[Footnote 11: Plato, Protag. p. 313 A. [Greek: o(\\ de\\ peri\\\nplei/onos tou= s\u00f4/matos \u00ea(gei=, t\u00ea\\n psuch\u00ea\\n, kai\\ e)n \u00f4)=| pa/nt'\ne)sti\\ ta\\ sa\\ \u00ea)\\ eu)= \u00ea)\\ kal\u00f4=s pra/ttein, chr\u00eastou= \u00ea)\\ pon\u00earou=\nau)tou= genome/nou], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Plato, Protag. p. 313 C.]\n\n[Footnote 13: Plato, Protag. p. 313 D.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Plato, Protag. p. 313 E. [Greek: e)a\\n m\u00ea/ tis tu/ch\u00ea|\nperi\\ t\u00ea\\n psuch\u00ea\\n au)= i)atriko\\s \u00f4)/n. ei) me\\n ou)=n su\\\ntugcha/neis e)pist\u00ea/m\u00f4n tou/t\u00f4n ti/ chr\u00easto\\n kai\\ pon\u00earo/n,\na)sphale/s soi \u00f4)nei=sthai math\u00ea/mata kai\\ para\\ Pr\u00f4tago/rou kai\\\npar' a)/llou o(tounou=n; ei) de\\ m\u00ea/, o(/ra, \u00f4)= phi/ltate, m\u00ea\\ peri\\\ntoi=s philta/tois kubeu/\u00ea|s te kai\\ kinduneu/\u00ea|s.]]\n\n[Footnote 15: Plato, Protag. p. 314 A. [Greek: siti/a me\\n ga\\r kai\\\npota\\ pria/menon e)/xestin e)n a)/llois a)ggei/ois a)pophe/rein, kai\\\npri\\n de/xasthai au)ta\\ e)s to\\ s\u00f4=ma pio/nta \u00ea)\\ phago/nta,\nkatathe/menon oi)/kade e)/xesti sumbouleu/sasthai parakale/santa to\\n\ne)pai+/onta, o(/, ti te e)deste/on \u00ea)\\ pote/on kai\\ o(/, ti m\u00ea/, kai\\\no(po/son, kai\\ o(po/te; . . . . math\u00ea/mata de\\ ou)k e)/stin e)n a)/ll\u00f4|\na)ggei/\u00f4| a)penegkei=n, a)ll' a)na/gk\u00ea katathe/nta t\u00ea\\n tim\u00ea\\n to\\\nma/th\u00eama e)n au)t\u00ea=| t\u00ea=| psuch\u00ea=| labo/nta kai\\ matho/nta a)pie/nai\n\u00ea)\\ beblamme/non \u00ea)\\ \u00f4)phel\u00eame/non.]]\n\n\n* * * * *\n\n\n[Side-note: Remarks on the Introduction. False persuasion of\nknowledge brought to light.]\n\nSuch is the preliminary conversation of Sokrates with Hippokrates,\nbefore the interview with Protagoras. I have given it (like the\nintroduction to the Lysis) at considerable length, because it is a\nvery characteristic specimen of the Sokratico-Platonic point of view.\nIt brings to light that false persuasion of knowledge, under which\nmen unconsciously act, especially in what concerns the mind and its\ntreatment. Common fame and celebrity suffice to determine the most\nvehement aspirations towards a lecturer, in one who has never stopped\nto reflect or enquire what the lecturer does. The pressure applied by\nSokrates in his successive questions, to get beyond vague\ngeneralities into definite particulars--the insufficiency, thereby\nexposed, of the conceptions with which men usually rest\nsatisfied--exhibit the working of his Elenchus in one of its most\ninstructive ways. The parallel drawn between the body and the mind--the\nconstant precaution taken in the case of the former to consult the\nprofessional man and to follow his advice in respect both to\ndiscipline and nourishment--are in the same vein of sentiment\nwhich we have already followed in other dialogues. Here too, as\nelsewhere, some similar _Expert_, in reference to the ethical\nand intellectual training of mind, is desiderated, as still more\nimperatively necessary. Yet where is he to be found? How is the\nbusiness of mental training to be brought to a beneficial issue\nwithout him? Or is Protagoras the man to supply such a demand? We\nshall presently see.\n\n\n* * * * *\n\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates and Hippokrates go to the house of\nKallias. Company therein. Respect shown to Protagoras.]\n\nSokrates and Hippokrates proceed to the house of Kallias, and find\nhim walking about in the fore-court with Protagoras, and some of the\nother company; all of whom are described as treating the Sophist with\nalmost ostentatious respect. Prodikus and Hippias have each their\nseparate hearers, in or adjoining to the court. Sokrates addresses\nProtagoras.\n\n[Side-note: Questions of Sokrates to Protagoras. Answer of the\nlatter, declaring the antiquity of the sophistical profession, and\nhis own openness in avowing himself a sophist.]\n\n_Sokr._--Protagoras, I and Hippokrates here are come to talk to\nyou about something. _Prot._--Do you wish to ta]k to me alone,\nor in presence of the rest? _Sokr._--To us it is indifferent:\nbut I will tell you what we come about, and you may then determine\nfor yourself. This Hippokrates is a young man of noble family, and\nfully equal to his contemporaries in capacity. He wishes to become\ndistinguished in the city; and he thinks he shall best attain that\nobject through your society. Consider whether you would like better\nto talk with him alone, or in presence of the rest.[16] _Prot._--Your\nconsideration on my behalf, Sokrates, is reasonable. A person\nof my profession must be cautious in his proceedings. I, a foreigner,\nvisit large cities, persuading the youth of best family to frequent\nmy society in preference to that of their kinsmen and all others; in\nthe conviction that I shall do them good. I thus inevitably become\nexposed to much jealousy and even to hostile conspiracies.[17]\nThe sophistical art is an old one;[18] but its older professors,\nbeing afraid of enmity if they proclaimed what they really were, have\nalways disguised themselves under other titles. Some, like Homer,\nHesiod, and Simonides, called themselves poets: others, Orpheus,\nMus\u00e6us, &c., professed to prescribe religious rites and\nmysteries: others announced themselves as gymnastic trainers or\nteachers of music. But I have departed altogether from this policy;\nwhich indeed did not succeed in really deceiving any leading\nmen--whom alone it was intended to deceive--and which, when found out,\nentailed upon its authors the additional disgrace of being considered\ndeceivers. The true caution consists in open dealing; and this is\nwhat I have always adopted. I avow myself a Sophist, educating men. I\nam now advanced in years, old enough to be the father of any of you,\nand have grown old in the profession: yet during all these years,\nthank God, I have suffered no harm either from my practice or my\ntitle.[19] If therefore you desire to converse with me, it will be\nfar more agreeable to me to converse in presence of all who are now\nin the house.[20]\n\n[Footnote 16: Plat. Prot. p. 316.\n\nThe motive assigned by Hippokrates, for putting himself under the\nteaching of Protagoras, is just the same as that which Xenophon\nassigns to his friend Proxenus for taking lessons and paying fees to\nthe Leontine Gorgias (Xen. Anab. ii. 6, 16).]\n\n[Footnote 17: The jealousy felt by fathers, mothers, and relatives\nagainst a teacher or converser who acquired great influence over\ntheir youthful relatives, is alluded to by Sokrates in the Platonic\nApology (p. 37 E), and is illustrated by a tragical incident in the\nCyrop\u00e6dia of Xenophon, iii. 1. 14-38. Compare also Xenophon, Memorab.\ni. 2, 52.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Plat. Prot. p. 316 D. [Greek: e)g\u00f4\\ de\\ t\u00ea\\n\nsophistik\u00ea\\n te/chn\u00ean ph\u00eami\\ me\\n ei)=nai palaia/n.]]\n\n[Footnote 19: Plat. Prot. p. 317 C. [Greek: \u00f4(/ste su\\n the\u00f4=|\nei)pei=n m\u00eade\\n deino\\n pa/schein dia\\ to\\ o(mologei=n sophist\u00ea\\s\nei)=nai.]]\n\n[Footnote 20: Plat. Prot. p. 317 D. In the Menon, the Platonic\nSokrates is made to say that Protagoras died at the age of seventy;\nthat he had practised forty years as a Sophist; and that during all\nthat long time he had enjoyed the highest esteem and reputation, even\nafter his death, \"down to the present day\" (Menon, p. 91 E).\n\nIt must be remembered that the speech, of which I have just given an\nabstract, is delivered not by the historical, real, Protagoras, but\nby the character named _Protagoras_, depicted by Plato in this\ndialogue: _i.e._ the speech is composed by Plato himself. I\nread, therefore, with much surprise, a note of Heindorf (ad p. 316\nD), wherein he says about Protagoras: \"Callid\u00e9 in postremis reticet,\nquod addere poterat, [Greek: chr\u00ea/mata dido/ntas].\" \"Protagoras\ncunningly keeps back, what he might have here added, that people gave\nhim money for his teaching.\" Heindorf must surely have supposed that\nhe was commenting upon a real speech, delivered by the historical\nperson called Protagoras. Otherwise what can be meant by this charge\nof \"cunning reticence or keeping back?\" Protagoras here speaks what\nPlato puts into his mouth; neither more nor less. What makes the\nremark of Heindorf the more preposterous is, that in page 328 B the\nvery fact, which Protagoras is here said \"cunningly to keep back,\"\nappears mentioned by Protagoras; and mentioned in the same spirit of\nhonourable frankness and fair-dealing as that which pervades the\ndiscourse which I have just (freely) translated. Indeed nothing can\nbe more marked than the way in which Plato makes Protagoras dwell\nwith emphasis on the frankness and openness of his dealing: nothing\ncan be more at variance with the character which critics give us of\nthe Sophists, as \"cheats, who defrauded pupils of their money while\nteaching them nothing at all, or what they themselves knew to be\nfalse\".]\n\n[Side-note: Protagoras prefers to converse in presence of\nthe assembled company.]\n\nOn hearing this, Sokrates--under the suspicion (he tells us) that\nProtagoras wanted to show off in the presence of Prodikus and\nHippias--proposes to convene all the dispersed guests, and to talk in\ntheir hearing. This is accordingly done, and the conversation\nrecommences--Sokrates repeating the introductory request which he had\npreferred on behalf of Hippokrates.\n\n[Side-note: Answers of Protagoras. He intends to train young\nmen as virtuous citizens.]\n\n_Sokr._--Hippokrates is anxious to distinguish himself in the\ncity, and thinks that he shall best attain this end by placing\nhimself under your instruction. He would gladly learn, Protagoras,\nwhat will happen to him, if he comes into intercourse with you.\n_Prot._--Young man, if you come to me, on the day of your first\nvisit, you will go home better than you came, and on the next day the\nlike: each successive day you will make progress for the better.[21]\n_Sokr._--Of course he will; there is nothing surprising in that:\nbut towards _what_, and about _what_, will he make\nprogress? _Prot._--Your question is a reasonable one, and I am\nglad to reply to it. I shall not throw him back--as other Sophists\ndo, with mischievous effect--into the special sciences, geometry,\narithmetic, astronomy, music, &c., just after he has completed\nhis course in them. I shall teach him what he really comes to learn:\nwisdom and good counsel, both respecting his domestic affairs, that\nhe may manage his own family well--and respecting the affairs of the\ncity, that he may address himself to them most efficaciously, both in\nspeech and act. _Sokr._--You speak of political or social\nscience. You engage to make men good citizens. _Prot._--Exactly\nso.[22]\n\n[Footnote 21: Plato, Protag. p. 318 A. \"Qui ad philosophorum scholas\nvenit, quotidie secum aliquid boni ferat: aut sanior domum redeat,\naut sanabilior.\" Seneca, Epistol. 108, p. 530.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Plato, Protag. pp. 318-319.\n\nThe declaration made by Protagoras--that he will not throw back his\npupils into the special arts--is represented by Plato as intended to\nbe an indirect censure on Hippias, then sitting by.]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates doubts whether virtue is teachable.\nReasons for such doubt. Protagoras is asked to explain whether it is\nor not.]\n\n_Sokr._--That is a fine talent indeed, which you possess, if you\n_do_ possess it; for (to speak frankly) I thought that the thing\nhad not been teachable, nor intentionally communicable, by man to\nman.[23] I will tell you why I think so. The Athenians are\nuniversally recognised as intelligent men. Now when our public\nassembly is convened, if the subject of debate be fortification,\nship-building, or any other specialty which they regard as learnable\nand teachable, they will listen to no one except a professional\nartist or craftsman.[24] If any non-professional man presumes to\nadvise them on the subject, they refuse to hear him, however rich and\nwell-born he may be. It is thus that they act in matters of any\nspecial art;[25] but when the debate turns upon the general\nadministration of the city, they hear every man alike--the\nbrass-worker, leather-cutter, merchant, navigator, rich, poor,\nwell-born, low-born, &c. Against none of them is any exception taken,\nas in the former case--that he comes to give advice on that which he has\nnot learnt, and on which he has had no master.[26] It is plain that\nthe public generally think it not teachable. Moreover our best and\nwisest citizens, those who possess civic virtue in the highest\nmeasure, cannot communicate to their own children this same virtue,\nthough they cause them to be taught all those accomplishments which\npaid masters can impart. Perikl\u00eas and others, excellent citizens\nthemselves, have never been able to make any one else excellent,\neither in or out of their own family. These reasons make me conclude\nthat social or political virtue is not teachable. I shall be glad if\nyou can show me that it is so.[27]\n\n[Footnote 23: Plato, Protag. p. 319 B. [Greek: ou) didakto\\n ei)=nai,\nm\u00ead' u(p' a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n paraskeuasto\\n a)nthr\u00f4/pois.]]\n\n[Footnote 24: Plato, Protag. p. 319 C. [Greek: kai\\ ta)/lla pa/nta\nou(/t\u00f4s, o(/sa \u00ea(gou=ntai math\u00eata/ te kai\\ didakta\\ ei)=nai. e)a/n\nde/ tis a)/llos e)picheir\u00ea=| au)toi=s sumbouleu/ein o(\\n e)kei=noi\nm\u00ea\\ oi)/ontai d\u00eamiourgo\\n ei)=nai], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 25: Plato, Protag. p. 319 D. [Greek: Peri\\ me\\n ou)=n \u00f4(=n\n_oi)/ontai e)n te/chn\u00ea| ei)=nai_, ou(/t\u00f4 diapra/ttontai.]]\n\n[Footnote 26: Plato, Protag. p. 319 D. [Greek: kai\\ tou/tois ou)dei\\s\ntou=to e)pipl\u00ea/ssei \u00f4(sper toi=s pro/teron, o(/ti ou)damo/then\nmath\u00f4/n, ou)de\\ o)/ntos didaska/lou ou)deno\\s au)t\u00f4=|, e)/peita\nsumbouleu/ein e)picheirei=; d\u00ea=lon ga\\r o(/ti ou)ch \u00ea(gou=ntai\ndidakto\\n ei)=nai.]]\n\n[Footnote 27: Plato, Protag. pp. 319-320.]\n\n[Side-note: Explanation of Protagoras. He begins with a\nmythe.]\n\n_Prot._--I will readily show you. But shall I, like an old man\naddressing his juniors, recount to you an illustrative mythe?[28] or\nshall I go through an expository discourse? The mythe perhaps will be\nthe more acceptable of the two.\n\n[Footnote 28: Plato, Protag. p. 320 C. [Greek: po/teron u(mi=n, \u00f4(s\npresbu/teros ne\u00f4te/rois, mu=thon le/g\u00f4n e)pidei/x\u00f4, \u00ea)\\ lo/g\u00f4|\ndiexelth\u00f4/n?]\n\nIt is probable that the Sophists often delivered illustrative mythes\nor fables as a more interesting way of handling social matters before\nan audience. Such was the memorable fable called the choice of\nH\u00earakl\u00eas by Prodikus.]\n\n[Side-note: Mythe. First fabrication of men by the Gods.\nPrometheus and Epimetheus. Bad distribution of endowments to man by\nthe latter. It is partly amended by Prometheus.]\n\nThere was once a time when Gods existed, but neither men nor\nanimals had yet come into existence. At the epoch prescribed by\nFate, the Gods fabricated men and animals in the interior of the\nearth, out of earth, fire, and other ingredients: directing the\nbrothers Prometheus and Epimetheus to fit them out with suitable\nendowments. Epimetheus, having been allowed by his brother to\nundertake the task of distributing these endowments, did his work\nvery improvidently, wasted all his gifts upon the inferior animals,\nand left nothing for man. When Prometheus came to inspect what had\nbeen done, he found that other animals were adequately equipped, but\nthat man had no natural provision for clothing, shoeing, bedding, or\ndefence. The only way whereby Prometheus could supply the defect was,\nby breaking into the common workshop of Ath\u00ean\u00ea and Heph\u00e6stus, and\nstealing from thence their artistic skill, together with fire.[29]\nBoth of these he presented to man, who was thus enabled to construct\nfor himself, by art, all that other animals received from nature and\nmore besides.\n\n[Footnote 29: Plato, Protag. pp. 321-322. [Greek: a)pori/a| ou)=n\ne)cho/menos o( Prom\u00eatheu\\s \u00ea(/ntina s\u00f4t\u00eari/an t\u00f4=| a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4|\neu(/roi, kle/ptei \u00ca(phai/stou kai\\ A)th\u00eana=s t\u00ea\\n e(/ntechnon\nsophi/an su\\n puri/. . . . T\u00ea\\n me\\n ou)=n peri\\ to\\n bi/on sophi/an\na)/nthr\u00f4pos tau/t\u00ea| e)/sche, t\u00ea\\n de\\ politik\u00ea\\n ou)k ei)=chen; \u00ea)=n\nga\\r para\\ t\u00f4=| Di/i+], &c.\n\nIf the reader will compare this with the doctrine delivered in the\nPlatonic Tim\u00e6us--that the inferior animals spring from degenerate\nmen--he will perceive the entire variance between the two (Tim\u00e6us,\npp. 91-92).]\n\n[Side-note: Prometheus gave to mankind skill for the supply of\nindividual wants, but could not give them the social art. Mankind are\non the point of perishing, when Zeus sends to them the dispositions\nessential for society.]\n\nStill however, mankind did not possess the political or social art;\nwhich Zeus kept in his own custody, where Prometheus could not reach\nit. Accordingly, though mankind could provide for themselves as\nindividuals, yet when they attempted to form themselves into\ncommunities, they wronged each other so much, from being destitute of\nthe political or social art, that they were presently forced again\ninto dispersion.[30] The art of war, too, being a part of the\npolitical art, which mankind did not possess--they could not get up a\ncommon defence against hostile animals: so that the human race would\nhave been presently destroyed, had not Zeus interposed to avert such\na consummation. He sent Herm\u00eas to mankind, bearing with him\nJustice and the sense of Shame (or Moderation), as the bonds and\nornaments of civic society, coupling men in friendship.[31] Herm\u00eas\nasked Zeus--Upon what principle shall I distribute these gifts among\nmankind? Shall I distribute them in the same way as artistic skill is\ndistributed, only to a small number--a few accomplished physicians,\nnavigators, &c., being adequate to supply the wants of the entire\ncommunity? Or are they to be apportioned in a certain dose to every\nman? Undoubtedly, to every man (was the command of Zeus). All without\nexception must be partakers in them. If they are confined exclusively\nto a few, like artistic or professional skill, no community can\nexist.[32] Ordain, by my authority, that every man, who cannot take a\nshare of his own in justice and the sense of shame, shall be slain,\nas a nuisance to the community.\n\n[Footnote 30: Plato, Protag. p. 322 B. [Greek: e)z\u00ea/toun d\u00ea\\\na)throi/zesthai kai\\ s\u00f4/zesthai kti/zontes po/leis; o(/t' ou)=n\na)throisthei=en, \u00ea)di/koun a)ll\u00ea/lous, a(/te ou)k e)/chontes t\u00ea\\n\npolitik\u00ea\\n te/chn\u00ean, \u00f4(/ste pa/lin skedannu/menoi diephthei/ronto.]\n\nCompare Plato, Republic, i. p. 351 C, p. 352 B, where Sokrates sets\nforth a similar argument.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Plato, Protagor. p. 322 C. [Greek: E(rm\u00ea=n pe/mpei\na)/gonta ei)s a)nthr\u00f4/pous ai)d\u00f4= te kai\\ di/k\u00ean, i(/n' ei)=en\npo/le\u00f4n ko/smoi te kai\\ desmoi\\ phili/as sunag\u00f4goi/.]]\n\n[Footnote 32: Plato, Protag. p. 322 C-D. [Greek: ei)=s e)/ch\u00f4n\ni)atrik\u00ea\\n polloi=s i(kano\\s i)di\u00f4/tais, kai\\ oi( a)/lloi\nd\u00eamiourgoi/. kai\\ di/k\u00ean d\u00ea\\ kai\\ ai)d\u00f4= ou(/t\u00f4 th\u00f4= e)n toi=s\na)nthr\u00f4/pois, \u00ea)\\ e)pi\\ pa/ntas nei/m\u00f4? E)pi\\ pa/ntas, e)/ph\u00ea o(\nZeu/s, kai\\ pa/ntes metecho/nt\u00f4n; ou) ga\\r a)\\n ge/nointo po/leis,\nei) o)li/goi au)t\u00f4=n mete/choien \u00f4(/sper a)/ll\u00f4n techn\u00f4=n. kai\\\nno/mon ge the\\s par' e)mou=, to\\n m\u00ea\\ duna/menon ai)doou=s kai\\\ndi/k\u00eas mete/chein, ktei/nein \u00f4(s no/son po/le\u00f4s.]\n\nWe see by p. 323 A that [Greek: s\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ea] is employed as\nsubstitute or equivalent for [Greek: ai)d\u00f4/s]: yet still [Greek:\nai)d\u00f4\\s] is the proper word to express Plato's meaning, as it denotes\na distinct and positive regard to the feelings of others--a feeling\nof pain in each man's mind, when he discovers or believes that he is\ndisapproved by his comrades. Hom. Il. O. 561--[Greek: ai)d\u00f4=\nthe/sth' e)ni\\ thum\u00f4=| A)ll\u00ea/lous t' ai)dei=sthe kata\\ kratera\\s\nu(smi/nas.]]\n\n[Side-note: Protagoras follows up his mythe by a discourse.\nJustice and the sense of shame are not professional attributes, but\nare possessed by all citizens and taught by all to all.]\n\nThis fable will show you, therefore, Sokrates (continues Protagoras),\nthat the Athenians have good reason for making the distinction to\nwhich you advert. When they are discussing matters of special art,\nthey will hear only the few to whom such matters are known. But when\nthey are taking counsel about social or political virtue, which\nconsists altogether in justice and moderation, they naturally hear\nevery one; since every one is presumed, as a condition of the\nexistence of the commonwealth, to be a partaker therein.[33]\nMoreover, even though they know a man not to have these virtues in\nreality, they treat him as insane if he does not proclaim himself to\nhave them, and make profession of virtue: whereas, in the case of the\nspecial arts, if a man makes proclamation of his own skill as a\nphysician or musician, they censure or ridicule him.[34]\n\n[Footnote 33: Plat. Prot. pp. 322-323.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Plato, Protag. p. 323 C.]\n\n[Side-note: Constant teaching of virtue. Theory of\npunishment.]\n\nNevertheless, though they account this political or social virtue an\nuniversal endowment, they are far from thinking that it comes\nspontaneously or by nature. They conceive it to be generated by care\nand teaching. For in respect of all those qualities which come by\nnature or by accident, no one is ever angry with another or blames\nanother for being found wanting. An ugly, dwarfish, or sickly man is\nlooked upon simply with pity, because his defects are such as he\ncannot help. But when any one manifests injustice or other qualities\nthe opposite of political virtue, then all his neighbours visit him\nwith indignation, censure, and perhaps punishment: implying clearly\ntheir belief that this virtue is an acquirement obtained by care and\nlearning.[35] Indeed the whole institution of punishment has no other\nmeaning. It is in itself a proof that men think social virtue to be\nacquirable and acquired. For no rational man ever punishes\nmalefactors because they _have_ done wrong, or simply with a\nview to the past:--since what is already done cannot be undone. He\npunishes with a view to the future, in order that neither the same\nman, nor others who see him punished, may be again guilty of similar\nwrong. This opinion plainly implies the belief, that virtue is\nproducible by training, since men punish for the purpose of\nprevention.[36]\n\n[Footnote 35: Plato, Protag. pp. 323-324.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Plato, Protag. p. 324 A-B. [Greek: ou)dei\\s ga\\r\nkola/zei tou\\s a)dikou=ntas pro\\s tou/t\u00f4| to\\n nou=n e)/ch\u00f4n kai\\\ntou/tou e(/neka o(/ti \u00ea)di/k\u00easen, o(/stis m\u00ea\\ \u00f4(/sper th\u00eari/on\na)logi/st\u00f4s tim\u00f4rei=tai; o( de\\ meta\\ lo/gou e)picheir\u00f4=n kola/zein\nou) tou= parel\u00ealutho/tos e(/neka a)dik\u00ea/matos tim\u00f4rei=tai--ou) ga\\r\na)\\n to/ ge prachthe\\n a)ge/n\u00eaton thei/\u00ea--a)lla\\ tou= me/llontos\ncha/rin, i(/na m\u00ea\\ au)=this a)dik\u00ea/s\u00ea| m\u00ea/te au)to\\s ou(=tos m\u00ea/te\na)/llos o( tou=ton i)d\u00f4\\n kolasthe/nta. kai\\ toiau/t\u00ean ei)=nai\na)ret\u00ea/n; _a)potrop\u00ea=s gou=n e(/neka kola/zei_.]\n\nThis clear and striking exposition of the theory of punishment is one\nof the most memorable passages in Plato, or in any ancient author.\nAnd if we are to believe the words which immediately follow, it was\nthe theory universally accepted at that time--[Greek: tau/t\u00ean ou)=n\nt\u00ea\\n do/xan pa/ntes e)/chousin, o(/soi per tim\u00f4rou=ntai kai\\ i)di/a|\nkai\\ d\u00eamosi/a|.] Compare Plato, Legg. xi. p. 933, where the same\ndoctrine is announced: Seneca, De Ir\u00e2, i. 16. \"Nam, ut Plato ait,\nnemo prudens punit, quia peccatum est, sed ne peccetur. Revocari enim\npr\u00e6terita non possunt: futura prohibentur.\" Steinhart (Einleit. zum\nProtag. p. 423) pronounces a just encomium upon this theory of\npunishment, which, as he truly observes, combines together the\npurposes declared in the two modern theories--Reforming and\nDeterring. He says further, however, that the same theory of\npunishment reappears in the Gorgias, which I do not think exact. The\npurpose of punishment, as given in the Gorgias, is simply to cure a\ndistempered patient of a terrible distemper, and thus to confer great\nbenefit on him--but without any allusion to tutelary results as\nregards society.]\n\n[Side-note: Why eminent men cannot make their sons\neminent.]\n\nI come now to your remaining argument, Sokrates. You urge that\ncitizens of eminent civil virtue cannot communicate that virtue to\ntheir own sons, to whom nevertheless they secure all the\naccomplishments which masters can teach. Now I have already shown you\nthat civil virtue is the one accomplishment needful,[37] which every\nman without exception must possess, on pain of punishment or final\nexpulsion, if he be without it. I have shown you, moreover that every\none believes it to be communicable by teaching and attention. How can\nyou believe then that these excellent fathers teach their sons other\nthings, but do not teach them this, the want of which entails such\nterrible penalties?\n\n[Footnote 37: Plato, Protag. p. 324 E. [Greek: Po/teron e)/sti ti\ne(/n, \u00ea)\\ ou)k e)/stin, ou)= a)nagkai=on pa/ntas tou\\s poli/tas\nmete/chein, ei)/per me/llei po/lis ei)=nai? e)n tou/t\u00f4| ga\\r au(/t\u00ea\nlu/etai \u00ea( a)pori/a \u00ea(\\n su\\ a)porei=s.]]\n\n[Side-note: Teaching by parents, schoolmaster, harpist, laws,\ndikastery, &c.]\n\nThe fact is, they _do_ teach it: and that too with great\npains.[38] They begin to admonish and lecture their children, from\nthe earliest years. Father, mother, tutor, nurse, all vie with each\nother to make the child as good as possible: by constantly telling\nhim on every occasion which arises, This is right--That is\nwrong--This is honourable--That is mean--This is holy--That is unholy--Do\nthese things, abstain from those.[39] If the child obeys them, it is\nwell: if he do not, they straighten or rectify him, like a crooked\npiece of wood, by reproof and flogging. Next, they send him to a\nschoolmaster, who teaches him letters and the harp; but who is\nenjoined to take still greater pains in watching over his orderly\nbehaviour. Here the youth is put to read, learn by heart, and recite,\nthe compositions of able poets; full of exhortations to excellence\nand of stirring examples from the good men of past times.[40] On the\nharp also, he learns the best songs, his conduct is strictly watched,\nand his emotions are disciplined by the influence of rhythmical and\nregular measure. While his mind is thus trained to good, he is sent\nbesides to the gymnastic trainer, to render his body a suitable\ninstrument for it,[41] and to guard against failure of energy\nunder the obligations of military service. If he be the son of a\nwealthy man, he is sent to such training sooner, and remains in it\nlonger. As soon as he is released from his masters, the city publicly\ntakes him in hand, compelling him to learn the laws prescribed by old\nand good lawgivers,[42] to live according to their prescriptions, and\nto learn both command and obedience, on pain of being punished. Such\nthen being the care bestowed, both publicly and privately, to foster\nvirtue, can you really doubt, Sokrates, whether it be teachable? You\nmight much rather wonder if it were not so.[43]\n\n[Footnote 38: Plato, Protag. p. 325 B.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Plato, Protag. p. 325 D. [Greek: par' e(/kaston kai\\\ne)/rgon kai\\ lo/gon dida/skontes kai\\ e)ndeiknu/menoi o(/ti to\\ me\\n\ndi/kaion, to\\ de\\ a)/dikon, kai\\ to/de me\\n kalo/n, to/de de\\\nai)schro/n], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Plato, Protag. p. 325 E--326 A. [Greek: paratithe/asin\nau)toi=s e)pi\\ t\u00f4=n ba/thr\u00f4n a)nagin\u00f4/skein poi\u00eat\u00f4=n a)gath\u00f4=n\npoi\u00ea/mata kai\\ e)kmantha/nein a)nagka/zousin, e)n oi(=s pollai\\ me\\n\nnouthet\u00ea/seis e)/neisi, pollai\\ de\\ die/xodoi kai\\ e)/painoi kai\\\ne)gk\u00f4/mia palai\u00f4=n a)ndr\u00f4=n a)gath\u00f4=n, i(/na o( pai=s z\u00eal\u00f4=n mim\u00ea=tai\nkai\\ o)re/g\u00eatai toiou=tos gene/sthai.]]\n\n[Footnote 41: Plato, Protag. p. 326 B. [Greek: i(/na ta\\ s\u00f4/mata\nbelti/\u00f4 e)/chontes u(p\u00earet\u00f4=si t\u00ea=| dianoi/a| chr\u00east\u00ea=| ou)/s\u00ea|],\n&c.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Plato, Protag. p. 326 D. [Greek: no/mous u(pogra/psasa,\na)gath\u00f4=n kai\\ palai\u00f4=n nomothet\u00f4=n eu(r\u00ea/mata], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Plato, Protag. p. 326 E.]\n\n[Side-note: All learn virtue from the same teaching by all.\nWhether a learner shall acquire more or less of it, depends upon his\nown individual aptitude.]\n\nHow does it happen, then, you ask, that excellent men so frequently\nhave worthless sons, to whom, even with all virtue from these\nprecautions, they cannot teach their own virtue? This is not\nsurprising, when you recollect what I have just said--That in regard\nto social virtue, every man must be a craftsman and producer; there\nmust be no non-professional consumers.[44] All of us are interested\nin rendering our neighbours just and virtuous, as well as in keeping\nthem so. Accordingly, every one, instead of being jealous, like a\nprofessional artist, of seeing his own accomplishments diffused,\nstands forward zealously in teaching justice and virtue to every one\nelse, and in reproving all short-comers.[45] Every man is a teacher\nof virtue to others: every man learns his virtue from such general\nteaching, public and private. The sons of the best men learn it in\nthis way, as well as others. The instruction of their fathers counts\nfor comparatively little, amidst such universal and paramount\nextraneous influence; so that it depends upon the aptitude and\npredispositions of the sons themselves, whether they turn out better\nor worse than others. The son of a superior man will often turn out\nill; while the son of a worthless man will prove meritorious. So\nthe case would be, if playing on the flute were the one thing needful\nfor all citizens; if every one taught and enforced flute-playing upon\nall others, and every one learnt it from the teaching of all\nothers.[46] You would find that the sons of good or bad flute-players\nwould turn out good or bad, not in proportion to the skill of their\nfathers, but according to their own natural aptitudes. You would find\nhowever also, that all of them, even the most unskilful, would be\naccomplished flute-players, if compared with men absolutely untaught,\nwho had gone through no such social training. So too, in regard to\njustice and virtue.[47] The very worst man brought up in your society\nand its public and private training, would appear to you a craftsman\nin these endowments, if you compared him with men who had been\nbrought up without education, without laws, without dikasteries,\nwithout any general social pressure bearing on them, to enforce\nvirtue: such men as the savages exhibited last year in the comedy of\nPherekrates at the Len\u00e6an festival. If you were thrown among such\nmen, you, like the chorus of misanthropes in that play, would look\nback with regret even upon the worst criminals of the society which\nyou had left, such as Eurybatus and Phrynondas.[48]\n\n[Footnote 44: Plato, Protag. p. 326 E. [Greek: o(/ti tou/tou tou=\npra/gmatos, t\u00ea=s a)ret\u00ea=s, ei) me/llei po/lis ei)=nai, ou)de/na dei=\n_i)di\u00f4teu/ein_.]\n\nIt is to be regretted that there is no precise word to translate\nexactly the useful antithesis between [Greek: i)di\u00f4/t\u00eas] and [Greek:\ntechni/t\u00eas] or [Greek: d\u00eamiourgo/s].]\n\n[Footnote 45: Plato, Protag. p. 327 A. [Greek: ei) kai\\ tou=to kai\\\ni)di/a| kai\\ d\u00eamosi/a| pa=s pa/nta kai\\ e)di/daske kai\\ e)pe/pl\u00eatte\nto\\n m\u00ea\\ kal\u00f4=s au)lou=nta, kai\\ m\u00ea\\ e)phtho/nei tou/tou, \u00f4(/sper\nnu=n t\u00f4=n dikai/\u00f4n kai\\ t\u00f4=n nomi/m\u00f4n ou)dei\\s phthonei= ou)d'\na)pokru/ptetai, \u00f4(/sper t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n techn\u00eama/t\u00f4n--lusitelei= ga\\r,\noi)=mai, \u00ea(mi=n \u00ea( a)ll\u00ea/l\u00f4n dikaiosu/n\u00ea kai\\ a)ret\u00ea\\; dia\\ tau=ta\npa=s panti\\ prothu/m\u00f4s le/gei kai\\ dida/skei kai\\ ta\\ di/kaia kai\\\nta\\ no/mima.]]\n\n[Footnote 46: Plato, Protag. p. 327 C.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Plato, Protag. p. 327 C-D. [Greek: O(/stis soi\na)dik\u00f4/tatos phai/netai a)/nthr\u00f4pos t\u00f4=n e)n no/mois kai\\\na)nthr\u00f4/pois tethramme/n\u00f4n, di/kaion au)to\\n ei)=nai kai\\\n_d\u00eamiourgo\\n tou/tou tou= pra/gmatos_, ei) de/oi au)to\\n\nkri/nesthai pro\\s a)nthr\u00f4/pous, oi(=s m\u00ea/te paidei/a e)sti\\ m\u00ea/te\ndikast\u00ea/ria m\u00ea/te no/moi m\u00ea/te a)na/gk\u00ea m\u00eademi/a dia\\ panto\\s\na)nagka/zoousa a)ret\u00ea=s e)pimelei=sthai.]]\n\n[Footnote 48: Plato, Protag. p. 327 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Analogy of learning vernacular Greek. No special\nteacher thereof. Protagoras teaches virtue somewhat better than\nothers.]\n\nBut now, Sokrates, you are over-nice, because all of us are teachers\nof virtue, to the best of every man's power; while no particular\nindividual appears to teach it specially and _ex professo_[49]\nBy the same analogy, if you asked who was the teacher for speaking\nour vernacular Greek, no one special person could be pointed out:[50]\nnor would you find out who was the finishing teacher for those sons\nof craftsmen who learnt the rudiments of their art from their own\nfathers--while if the son of any non-professional person learns a\ncraft, it is easy to assign the person by whom he was taught.[51]\nSo it is in respect to virtue. All of us teach and enforce\nvirtue to the best of our power; and we ought to be satisfied if\nthere be any one of us ever so little superior to the rest, in the\npower of teaching it. Of such men I believe myself to be one.[52] I\ncan train a man into an excellent citizen, better than others, and in\na manner worthy not only of the fee which I ask, but even of a still\ngreater remuneration, in the judgment of the pupil himself. This is\nthe stipulation which I make with him: when he has completed his\ncourse, he is either to pay me the fee which I shall demand--or if he\nprefers, he may go into a temple, make oath as to his own estimate of\nthe instruction imparted to him, and pay me according to that\nestimate.[53]\n\n[Footnote 49: Plato, Protag. p. 327 E. [Greek: nu=n de\\ trupha=|s,\n\u00f4)= S\u00f4/krates, dio/ti pa/ntes dida/skaloi/ ei)sin a)ret\u00ea=s, kath'\no(/son du/natai e(/kastos, kai\\ ou)dei/s soi phai/netai.]]\n\n[Footnote 50: Plato, Protag. p. 327 E. [Greek: ei)=th' \u00f4(/s per a)\\n\nei) z\u00eatoi=s ti/s dida/skalos tou= e(ll\u00eani/zein, ou)d' a)\\n ei(=s\nphanei/\u00ea.]]\n\n[Footnote 51: Plato, Protag. p. 328 A.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Plato, Protag. p. 328 B. [Greek: A)lla\\ ka)\\n ei)\no)li/gon e)/sti tis o(/stis diaphe/rei \u00ea(m\u00f4=n probiba/sai ei)s\na)ret\u00ea/n, a)gap\u00eato/n. \u00d4(=n d\u00ea\\ e)g\u00f4\\ oi)=mai ei(=s ei)=nai],\n&c.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Plato, Protag. p. 328 B.]\n\n[Side-note: The sons of great artists do not themselves become\ngreat artists.]\n\nI have thus proved to you, Sokrates--That virtue is teachable--That\nthe Athenians account it to be teachable--That there is nothing\nwonderful in finding the sons of good men worthless, and the sons of\nworthless men good. Indeed this is true no less about the special\nprofessions, than about the common accomplishment, virtue. The sons\nof Polykl\u00eatus the statuary, and of many other artists, are nothing as\ncompared with their fathers.[54]\n\n[Footnote 54: Plato, Protag. p. 328 C.]\n\n\n* * * * *\n\n\n[Side-note: Remarks upon the mythe and discourse. They explain\nthe manner in which the established sentiment of a community\npropagates and perpetuates itself.]\n\nSuch is the discourse composed by Plato and attributed to the\nPlatonic Protagoras--showing that virtue is teachable, and intended\nto remove the difficulties proposed by Sokrates. It is an exposition\nof some length: and because it is put into the mouth of a Sophist,\nmany commentators presume, as a matter of course, that it must be a\nmanifestation of some worthless quality:[55] that it is either empty\nverbiage, or ostentatious self-praise, or low-minded immorality. I am\nunable to perceive in the discourse any of these demerits. I think it\none of the best parts of the Platonic writings, as an exposition\nof the growth and propagation of common sense--the common,\nestablished, ethical and social sentiment, among a community:\nsentiment neither dictated in the beginning, by any scientific or\nartistic lawgiver, nor personified in any special guild of craftsmen\napart from the remaining community--nor inculcated by any formal\nprofessional teachers--nor tested by analysis--nor verified by\ncomparison with any objective standard: but self-sown and\nself-asserting, stamped, multiplied, and kept in circulation, by the\nunpremeditated conspiracy of the general[56] public--the omnipresent\nagency of King Nomos and his numerous volunteers.\n\n[Footnote 55: So Serranus (ad 326 E), who has been followed by many\nlater critics. \"Qu\u00e6stio est, Virtusne doceri possit? Quod instituit\ndemonstrare Sophista, sed ineptissimis argumentis et qu\u00e6 contra\nseipsum faciant.\"\n\nTo me this appears the reverse of the truth. But even if it were\ntrue, no blame could fall on Protagoras. We should only be warranted\nin concluding that it suited the scheme of Plato here to make him\ntalk nonsense.]\n\n[Footnote 56: This is what the Platonic Sokrates alludes to in the\nPh\u00e6don and elsewhere. [Greek: oi( t\u00ea\\n d\u00eamotik\u00ea\\n te kai\\ politik\u00ea\\n\na)ret\u00ea\\n e)pitet\u00eadeuko/tes, \u00ea(\\n d\u00ea\\ kalou=si s\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ean te kai\\\ndikaiosu/n\u00eav, e)x e)/thous te kai\\ mele/t\u00eas gegonui=an, a)/neu\nphilosophi/as te kai\\ nou=.] Ph\u00e6don, p. 82 B; compare the same\ndialogue, p. 68 C; also Republic, x. p. 619 C--[Greek: e)/thei a)/neu\nphilosophi/as a)ret\u00ea=s meteil\u00eapho/ta].]\n\nThe account given by Mr. James Mill (Fragment on Mackintosh, p.\n259-260) of the manner in which the established morality of a society\nis transmitted and perpetuated, coincides completely with the discourse\nof the Platonic Protagoras. The passage is too long to be cited: I\ngive here only the concluding words, which describe the [Greek:\nd\u00eamotik\u00ea\\ a)ret\u00ea\\ a)/neu philosophi/as]--\n\n\"In this manner it is that men, in the social state, acquire the\nhabits of moral acting, and certain affections connected with it,\nbefore they are capable of reflecting upon the grounds which\nrecommend the acts either to praise or blame. Nearly at this point\nthe greater part of them remain: continuing to perform moral acts and\nto abstain from the contrary, chiefly from the habits which they have\nacquired, and the authority upon which they originally acted: though\nit is not possible that any man should come to the years and blessing\nof reason, without perceiving at least in an indistinct and general\nway, the advantage which mankind derive from their acting towards one\nanother in one way rather than another.\"]\n\n[Side-note: Antithesis of Protagoras and Sokrates. Whether\nvirtue is to be assimilated to a special art.]\n\nIn many of the Platonic dialogues, Sokrates is made to dwell upon the\nfact that there are no recognised professional teachers of virtue;\nand to ground upon this fact a doubt, whether virtue be really\nteachable. But the present dialogue is the only one in which the fact\nis accounted for, and the doubt formally answered. There are neither\nspecial teachers, nor professed pupils, nor determinate periods of\nstudy, nor definite lessons or stadia, for the acquirement of virtue,\nas there are for a particular art or craft: the reason being, that in\nthat department every man must of necessity be a practitioner, more\nor less perfectly: every man has an interest in communicating it to\nhis neighbour: hence every man is constantly both teacher and\nlearner. Herein consists one main and real distinction between virtue\nand the special arts; an answer to the view most frequently\nespoused by the Platonic Sokrates, assimilating virtue to a\nprofessional craft, which ought to have special teachers, and a\nspecial season of apprenticeship, if it is to be acquired at all.\n\nThe speech is censured by some critics as prolix. But to me it seems\nfull of matter and argument, exceedingly free from superfluous\nrhetoric. The fable with which it opens presents of course the\npoetical ornament which belongs to that manner of handling. It is\nhowever fully equal, in point of perspicuity as well as charm--in my\njudgment, it is even superior to any other fable in Plato.\n\n[Side-note: Procedure of Sokrates in regard to the discourse\nof Protagoras--he compliments it as an exposition, and analyses some\nof the fundamental assumptions.]\n\nWhen the harangue, lecture, or sermon, of Protagoras is concluded,\nSokrates both expresses his profound admiration of it, and admits the\nconclusion--That virtue is teachable--to be made out, as well as it\ncan be made out by any continuous exposition.[57] In fact, the\nspeaker has done all that could be done by Perikles or the best\norator of the assembly. He has given a long series of reasonings in\nsupport of his own case, without stopping to hear the doubts of\nopponents. He has sailed along triumphantly upon the stream of public\nsentiment, accepting all the established beliefs--appealing to his\nhearers with all those familiar phrases, round which the most\npowerful associations are grouped--and taking for granted that\njustice, virtue, good, evil, &c., are known, indisputable,\ndeterminate data, fully understood, and unanimously interpreted. He\nhas shown that the community take great pains, both publicly and\nprivately, to inculcate and enforce virtue: that is, what _they_\nbelieve in and esteem as virtue. But is their belief well founded? Is\nthat which they esteem, really virtue? Do they and their elegant\nspokesman Protagoras, know what virtue is? If so, _how_ do they\nknow it, and can they explain it?\n\n[Footnote 57: Plato, Protag. pp. 328-329.\n\nVery different indeed is the sentiment of the principal Platonic\ncommentators. Schleiermacher will not allow the mythus of Protagoras\nto be counted among the Platonic mythes: he says that it is composed\nin the style of Protagoras, and perhaps copied from some real\ncomposition of that Sophist. He finds in it nothing but a\n\"grobmaterialistiche Denkungsart, die \u00fcber die sinnliche Erfahrung\nnicht hinaus philosophirt\" (Einleitung zum Protagoras, vol. i. pp.\n233-234).\n\nTo the like purpose Ast (Plat. Leb. p. 71)--who tells us that what is\nexpressed in the mythus is, \"the vulgar and mean sentiment and manner\nof thought of the Sophist: for it deduces every thing, both arts and\nthe social union itself, from human wants and necessity\". Apparently\nthese critics, when they treat this as a proof of meanness and\nvulgarity, have forgotten that the Platonic Sokrates himself does\nexactly the same thing in the Republic--deriving the entire social\nunion from human necessities (Republ. ii. 369 C).\n\nK. F. Hermann is hardly less severe upon the Protagorean discourse\n(Gesch. und Syst. der Plat. Phil. p. 460).\n\nFor my part, I take a view altogether opposed to these learned\npersons. I think the discourse one of the most striking and\ninstructive portions of the Platonic writings: and if I could believe\nthat it was the composition of Protagoras himself, my estimation of\nhim would be considerably raised.\n\nSteinhart pronounces a much more rational and equitable judgment than\nAst and Schleiermacher, upon the discourse of Protagoras (Einleitung\nzum Prot. pp. 422-423).]\n\n[Side-note: One purpose of the dialogue. To contrast\ncontinuous discourse with short cross-examining question and answer.]\n\nThis is the point upon which Sokrates now brings his Elenchus to\nbear: his method of short question and answer. We have seen what long\ncontinuous speaking can do: we have now to see what short\ncross-questioning can do. The antithesis between the two is at least\none main purpose of Plato--if it be not even _the_ purpose (as\nSchleiermacher supposes it to be) in this memorable dialogue.\n\n[Side-note: Questions by Sokrates--Whether virtue is one and\nindivisible, or composed of different parts? Whether the parts are\nhomogeneous or heterogeneous?]\n\nAfter your copious exposition, Protagoras (says Sokrates), I have\nonly one little doubt remaining, which you will easily explain.[58]\nYou have several times spoken of justice, moderation, holiness,\n&c., as if they all, taken collectively, made up virtue. Do you\nmean that virtue is a Whole, and that these three names denote\ndistinct parts of it? Or are the three names all equivalent to\nvirtue, different names for one and are the same thing?\n _Prot._--They are names signifying distinct parts of virtue.\n_Sokr._--Are these parts like the parts of the face,--eyes, nose,\nmouth, ears--each part not only distinct from the rest, but having\nits own peculiar properties? Or are they like the parts of gold,\nhomogeneous with each other and with the whole, differing only in\nmagnitude? _Prot._--The former. _Sokr._--Then some men may possess one\npart, some another. Or is it necessary that he who possesses one\npart, should possess all? _Prot._--By no means necessary. Some\nmen are courageous, but unjust: others are just, but not intelligent.\n_Sokr._--Wisdom and courage then, both of them, are parts of\nvirtue? _Prot._--They are so. Wisdom is the greatest of the\nparts: but no one of the parts is the exact likeness of another: each\nof them has its own peculiar property.[59]\n\n[Footnote 58: Plato, Protag. pp. 328 E--329 B. [Greek: pl\u00ea\\n smikro/n\nti/ moi e)mpod\u00f4/n, o(\\ d\u00ea=lon o(/ti Pr\u00f4tago/ras r(a|di/\u00f4s\ne)pekdida/xei. . . . smikrou= tinos e)nde\u00ea/s ei)mi pa/nt' e)/chein],\n&c.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Plato, Protag, pp. 329-330.]\n\n[Side-note: Whether justice is just, and holiness holy?\nHow far justice is like to holiness? Sokrates protests against an\nanswer, \"If you please\".]\n\n_Sokr._--Now let us examine what sort of thing each of these\nparts is. Tell me--is justice some thing, or no thing? I think it is\nsome thing: are you of the same opinion?[60] _Prot._--Yes.\n_Sokr._--Now this thing which you call _justice_: is it\nitself just or unjust? I should say that it was just: what do you\nsay?[61] _Prot._--I think so too. _Sokr._--Holiness also is\nsome thing: is the thing called _holiness_, itself holy or\nunholy? As for me, if any one were to ask me the question, I should\nreply--Of course it is: nothing else can well be holy, if holiness\nitself be not holy. Would you say the same?\n_Prot._--Unquestionably. _Sokr._--Justice being admitted to be just,\nand holiness to be holy--do not you think that justice also is holy,\nand that holiness is just? If so, how can you reconcile that with your\nformer declaration, that no one of the parts of virtue is like any\nother part? _Prot._--I do not altogether admit that justice is\nholy, and that holiness is just. But the matter is of little moment:\nif you please, let both of them stand as admitted. _Sokr._--Not\nso:[62] I do not want the debate to turn upon an \"If you please\": You\nand I are the debaters, and we shall determine the debate best\nwithout \"Ifs\". _Prot._--I say then that justice and holiness are\nindeed, in a certain way, like each other; so also there is a point\nof analogy between white and black,[63] hard and soft, and between\nmany other things which no one would pronounce to be like generally.\n_Sokr._--Do you think then that justice and holiness have only a\nsmall point of analogy between them? _Prot._--Not exactly so:\nbut I do not concur with you when you declare that one is like the\nother. _Sokr._--Well then! since you seem to follow with\nsome repugnance this line of argument, let us enter upon another.[64]\n\n[Footnote 60: Plato, Protag. p. 330 B. [Greek: koin\u00ea=| skeps\u00f4/metha\n_poi=o/n ti au)t\u00f4=n e)stin e(/kaston_. pr\u00f4=ton me\\n to\\\ntoio/nde; \u00ea( dikaiosu/n\u00ea pra=gma/ ti/ e)stin? \u00ea)\\ ou)de\\n pra=gma?\ne)moi\\ me\\n ga\\r dokei=; ti/ de\\ soi/?]]\n\n[Footnote 61: Plato, Protag. p. 330 C. [Greek: tou=to to\\ pra=gma o(/\n\u00f4)noma/sate a)/rti, \u00ea( dikaiosu/n\u00ea, au)to\\ tou=to di/kaio/n e)stin\n\u00ea)\\ a)/dikon?]]\n\n[Footnote 62: Plato, Protag. p. 331 C. [Greek: ei) ga\\r bou/lei,\ne)/st\u00f4 \u00ea(mi=n kai\\ dikaiosu/n\u00ea o(/sion kai\\ o(sio/t\u00eas di/kaion. M\u00ea/\nmoi, \u00ea(=n d' e)g\u00f4/; ou)de\\n ga\\r de/omai to\\ \"ei/ bou/lei\" tou=to\nkai\\ \"_ei) soi dokei=_\" e)le/gchesthai, a)ll' e)me/ te kai\\\nse/.]\n\nThis passage seems intended to illustrate the indifference of\nProtagoras for dialectic forms and strict accuracy of discussion. The\n[Greek: a)kribologi/a] of Sokrates and Plato was not merely\nunfamiliar but even distasteful to rhetorical and practical men.\nProtagoras is made to exhibit himself as thinking the distinctions\ndrawn by Sokrates too nice, not worth attending to. Many of the\ncontemporaries of both shared this opinion. One purpose of our\ndialogue is to bring such antitheses into view.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Plat. Prot. p. 331 D.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Plat. Prot. p. 332 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Intelligence and moderation are identical, because\nthey have the same contrary.]\n\nSokrates then attempts to show that intelligence and moderation are\nidentical with each other ([Greek: sophi/a] and [Greek:\ns\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ea]). The proof which he produces, elicited by several\nquestions, is--that both the one and the other are contrary to folly\n([Greek: a)phrosu/n\u00ea]), and, that as a general rule, nothing can have\nmore than one single contrary.[65]\n\n[Footnote 65: Plat. Protag. p. 332.]\n\n\n* * * * *\n\n\n[Side-note: Insufficient reasons given by Sokrates. He seldom\ncares to distinguish different meanings of the same term.]\n\nSokrates thus seems to himself to have made much progress in proving\nall the names of different virtues to be names of one and the same\nthing. Moderation and intelligence are shown to be the same: justice\nand holiness had before been shown to be nearly the same:[66] though\nwe must recollect that this last point had not been admitted by\nProtagoras. It must be confessed however that neither the one nor the\nother is proved by any conclusive reasons. In laying down the\nmaxim--that nothing can have more than one single contrary--Plato seems\nto have forgotten that the same term may be used in two different\nsenses. Because the term folly ([Greek: a)phrosu/n\u00ea]), is used\nsometimes to denote the opposite of moderation ([Greek:\ns\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ea]), sometimes the opposite of intelligence ([Greek:\nsophi/a]), it does not follow that moderation and intelligence are\nthe same thing.[67] Nor does he furnish more satisfactory proof of\nthe other point, _viz._: That holiness and justice are the same,\nor as much alike as possible. The intermediate position which is\nassumed to form the proof, _viz._: That holiness is holy, and\nthat justice is just--is either tautological, or unmeaning; and\ncannot serve as a real proof of any thing. It is indeed so futile,\nthat if it were found in the mouth of Protagoras and not in that\nof Sokrates, commentators would probably have cited it as an\nillustration of the futilities of the Sophists. As yet therefore\nlittle has been done to elucidate the important question to which\nSokrates addresses himself--What is the extent of analogy between the\ndifferent virtues? Are they at bottom one and the same thing under\ndifferent names? In what does the analogy or the sameness consist?\n\n[Footnote 66: Plato, Protag. p. 338 B. [Greek: sche/don ti tau)to\\n\no)/n.]]\n\n[Footnote 67: Aristotle would probably have avoided such a mistake as\nthis. One important point (as I have already remarked, vol. ii. p.\n170) in which he is superior to Plato is, in being far more careful\nto distinguish the different meanings of the same word--[Greek: ta\\\npollach\u00f4=s lego/mena]. Plato rarely troubles himself to notice such\ndistinction, and seems indeed generally unaware of it. He constantly\nridicules Prodikus, who tried to distinguish words apparently\nsynonymous.]\n\n[Side-note: Protagoras is puzzled, and becomes irritated.]\n\nBut though little progress has been made in determining the question\nmooted by Sokrates, enough has been done to discompose and mortify\nProtagoras. The general tenor of the dialogue is, to depict this man,\nso eloquent in popular and continuous exposition, as destitute of the\nanalytical acumen requisite to meet cross-examination, and of\npromptitude for dealing with new aspects of the case, on the very\nsubjects which form the theme of his eloquence. He finds himself\nbrought round, by a series of short questions, to a conclusion\nwhich--whether conclusively proved or not--is proved in a manner binding\nupon him, since he has admitted all the antecedent premisses. He\nbecomes dissatisfied with himself, answers with increasing\nreluctance,[68] and is at last so provoked as to break out of the\nlimits imposed upon a respondent.\n\n[Footnote 68: Plato, Protag. pp. 333 B, 335 A.]\n\n\n* * * * *\n\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates presses Protagoras farther. His purpose\nis, to test opinions and not persons. Protagoras answers with angry\nprolixity.]\n\nMeanwhile Sokrates pursues his examination, with intent to prove that\njustice ([Greek: dikaiosu/n\u00ea]) and moderation ([Greek: s\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ea])\nare identical. Does a man who acts unjustly conduct himself with\nmoderation? I should be ashamed (replies Protagoras) to answer in the\naffirmative, though many people say so. _Sokr._--It is\nindifferent to me whether you yourself think so or not, provided only\nyou consent to make answer. What I principally examine is the opinion\nitself: though it follows perhaps as a consequence, that I the\nquestioner, and the respondent along with me, undergo examination at\nthe same time.[69] You answer then (though without adopting the\nopinion) that men who act unjustly sometimes behave with moderation,\nor with intelligence: that is, that they follow a wise policy in\ncommitting injustice. _Prot._--Be it so. _Sokr._--You admit\ntoo that there exist certain things called good things. Are those\nthings good, which are profitable to mankind? _Prot._--By Zeus,\nI call some things good, even though they be not profitable to men\n(replies Protagoras, with increasing acrimony).[70] _Sokr._--Do\nyou mean those things which are not profitable to any _man_, or\nthose which are not profitable to any creature whatever? Do you call\nthese latter _good_ also? _Prot._--Not at all: but there\nare many things profitable to men, yet unprofitable or hurtful to\ndifferent animals. Good is of a character exceedingly diversified and\nheterogeneous.[71]\n\n[Footnote 69: Plato, Protag. p. 333 C. [Greek: to\\n ga\\r lo/gon\ne)/g\u00f4ge ma/lista e)xeta/z\u00f4, sumbai/nei me/ntoi i)/s\u00f4s kai\\ e)me\\ to\\n\ne)r\u00f4t\u00f4=nta kai\\ to\\n e)r\u00f4t\u00f4/menon e)xeta/zesthai.]\n\nHere again we find Plato drawing special attention to the conditions\nof dialectic debate.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Plato, Protag. p. 333 E.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Plato, Protag. p. 334 B. [Greek: Ou(/t\u00f4 de\\ poiki/lon\nti/ e)sti to\\ a)gatho\\n kai\\ pantodapo/n], &c.\n\nThe explanation here given by Protagoras of _good_ is the same\nas that which is given by the historical Sokrates himself in the\nXenophontic Memorabilia (iii. 8). Things called good are diverse in\nthe highest degree; but they are all called _good_ because they\nall contribute in some way to human security, relief, comfort, or\nprosperity. To one or other of these ends _good_, in all its\nmultifarious forms, is relative.]\n\n[Side-note: Remonstrance of Sokrates against long answers as\ninconsistent with the laws of dialogue. Protagoras persists. Sokrates\nrises to depart.]\n\nProtagoras is represented as giving this answer at considerable\nlength, and in a rhetorical manner, so as to elicit applause from the\nhearers.[72] Upon this Sokrates replies, \"I am a man of short memory,\nand if any one speaks at length, I forget what he has said. If you\nwish me to follow you, I must entreat you to make shorter answers.\"\n_Prot._--What do you mean by asking me to make shorter answers?\nDo you mean shorter than the case requires? _Sokr._--No,\ncertainly not. _Prot._--But who is to be judge of the brevity\nnecessary, you or I? _Sokr._--I have understood that you profess\nto be master and teacher both of long speech and of short speech:\nwhat I beg is, that you will employ only short speech, if you expect\nme to follow you. _Prot._--Why, Sokrates, I have carried on many\ndebates in my time; and if, as you ask me now, I had always talked\njust as my opponent wished, I should never have acquired any\nreputation at all. _Sokr._--Be it so: in that case I must\nretire; for as to long speaking, I am incompetent: I can neither make\nlong speeches, nor follow them.[73]\n\n[Footnote 72: Plato, Protag. p. 334 D.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Plato, Prot. pp. 334 E, 335 A-C.]\n\n[Side-note: Interference of Kallias to get the debate\ncontinued. Promiscuous conversation. Alkibiades declares that\nProtagoras ought to acknowledge superiority of Sokrates in dialogue.]\n\nHere Sokrates rises to depart; but Kallias, the master of the house,\ndetains him, and expresses an earnest wish that the debate may be\ncontinued. A promiscuous conversation ensues, in which most persons\npresent take part. Alkibiades, as the champion of Sokrates, gives,\nwhat seems really to be the key of the dialogue, when he says--\"Sokrates\nadmits that he has no capacity for long speaking, and that he is no\nmatch therein for Protagoras. But as to dialectic debate, or\nadministering and resisting cross-examination, I should be surprised\nif any one were a match for him. If Protagoras admits that on this\npoint he is inferior, Sokrates requires no more: if he does not, let\nhim continue the debate: but he must not lengthen his answers so that\nhearers lose the thread of the subject.\"\n\n[Side-note: Claim of a special _locus standi_ and\nprofessorship for Dialectic, apart from Rhetoric.]\n\nThis remark of Alkibiades, speaking altogether as a vehement partisan\nof Sokrates, brings to view at least one purpose--if not the main\npurpose--of Plato in the dialogue. \"Sokrates acknowledges the\nsuperiority of Protagoras in rhetoric: if Protagoras acknowledges the\nsuperiority of Sokrates in dialectic, Sokrates is satisfied.\"[74] An\nexpress _locus standi_ is here claimed for dialectic, and a\nrecognised superiority for its professors on their own ground.\nProtagoras professes to be master both of long speech and of short\nspeech: but in the last he must recognise a superior.\n\n[Footnote 74: Plat. Prot. p. 336 C-D.]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates is prevailed upon to continue, and\ninvites Protagoras to question him.]\n\nKritias, Prodikus, and Hippias all speak (each in a manner of his\nown) deprecating marked partisanship on either side, exhorting both\nparties to moderation, and insisting that the conversation shall be\ncontinued. At length Sokrates consents to remain, yet on condition\nthat Protagoras shall confine himself within the limits of the\ndialectic procedure. Protagoras (he says) shall first question me as\nlong as he pleases: when he has finished, I will question him. The\nSophist, though at first reluctant, is constrained, by the instance\nof those around, to accede to this proposition.[75]\n\n[Footnote 75: Plat. Prot. pp. 337-338.]\n\n[Side-note: Protagoras extols the importance of knowing\nthe works of the poets, and questions about parts of a song of\nSimonides. Dissenting opinions about the interpretation of the song.]\n\nFor the purpose of questioning, Protagoras selects a song of\nSimonides: prefacing it with a remark, that the most important\naccomplishment of a cultivated man consists in being thorough master\nof the works of the poets, so as to understand and appreciate them\ncorrectly, and answer all questions respecting them.[76] Sokrates\nintimates that he knows and admires the song: upon which Protagoras\nproceeds to point out two passages in it which contradict each other,\nand asks how Sokrates can explain or justify such contradiction.[77]\nThe latter is at first embarrassed, and invokes the aid of Prodikus;\nwho interferes to uphold the consistency of his fellow-citizen\nSimonides, but is made to speak (as elsewhere by Plato) in a stupid\nand ridiculous manner. After a desultory string of remarks,[78] with\ndisputed interpretation of particular phrases and passages of the\nsong, but without promise of any result--Sokrates offers to give an\nexposition of the general purpose of the whole song, in order that\nthe company may see how far he has advanced in that accomplishment\nwhich Protagoras had so emphatically extolled--complete mastery of\nthe works of the poets.[79]\n\n[Footnote 76: Plat. Prot. p. 339 A. [Greek: \u00ea(gou=mai e)g\u00f4\\ a)ndri\\\npaidei/as me/giston me/ros ei)=nai, peri\\ e)p\u00f4=n deino\\n ei)=nai.]]\n\n[Footnote 77: Plat. Prot. p. 339 C-D.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Plat. Prot. pp. 340-341.]\n\n[Footnote 79: Plat. Prot. p. 342 A. [Greek: ei) bou/lei labei=n mou\npei=ran o(/p\u00f4s e)/ch\u00f4, o(\\ su\\ le/geis tou=to, peri\\ e)p\u00f4=n.]]\n\n[Side-note: Long speech of Sokrates, expounding the purpose of\nthe song, and laying down an ironical theory about the numerous\nconcealed sophists at Krete and Sparta, masters of short speech.]\n\nHe then proceeds to deliver a long harangue, the commencement of\nwhich appears to be a sort of counter-part and parody of the first\nspeech delivered by Protagoras in this dialogue. That Sophist had\nrepresented that the sophistical art was ancient:[80] and that\nthe poets, from Homer downward, were Sophists, but dreaded the odium\nof the name, and professed a different avocation with another title.\nSokrates here tells us that philosophy was more ancient still in\nKrete and Sparta, and that there were more Sophists (he does not\ndistinguish between the Sophist and the philosopher), female as well\nas male, in those regions, than anywhere else: but that they\nconcealed their name and profession, for fear that others should copy\nthem and acquire the like eminence:[81] that they pretended to\ndevote themselves altogether to arms and gymnastic--a pretence\nwhereby (he says) all the other Greeks were really deluded. The\nspecial characteristic of these philosophers or Sophists was, short\nand emphatic speech--epigram shot in at the seasonable moment, and\nthoroughly prostrating an opponent.[82] The Seven Wise Men, among\nwhom Pittakus was one, were philosophers on this type, of supreme\nexcellence: which they showed by inscribing their memorable brief\naphorisms at Delphi. So great was the celebrity which Pittakus\nacquired by his aphorism, that Simonides the poet became jealous, and\ncomposed this song altogether for the purpose of discrediting him.\nHaving stated this general view, Sokrates illustrates it by going\nthrough the song, with exposition and criticism of several different\npassages.[83] As soon as Sokrates has concluded, Hippias[84]\ncompliments him, and says that he too has a lecture ready prepared on\nthe same song: which he would willingly deliver: but Alkibiades and\nthe rest beg him to postpone it.\n\n[Footnote 80: Plat. Prot. pp. 316-317.]\n\n[Footnote 81: Plat. Prot. p. 342.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Plat. Prot. p. 342 E, 343 B-C. [Greek: O(/ti ou(=tos o(\ntro/pos \u00ea)=n t\u00f4=n palai\u00f4=n t\u00ea=s philosophi/as, brachulogi/a tis\nLak\u00f4nik\u00ea/.]]\n\n[Footnote 83: Plat. Prot. pp. 344-347.]\n\n[Footnote 84: Plat. Prot. p. 347.]\n\n[Side-note: Character of this speech--its connection with the\ndialogue, and its general purpose. Sokrates inferior to Protagoras in\ncontinuous speech.]\n\nNo remark is made by any one present, either upon the circumstance\nthat Sokrates, after protesting against long speeches, has here\ndelivered one longer by far than the first speech of Protagoras, and\nmore than half as long as the second, which contains a large\ntheory--nor upon the sort of interpretation that he bestows upon the\nSimonidean song. That interpretation is so strange and forced--so\nviolent in distorting the meaning of the poet--so evidently\npredetermined by the resolution to find Platonic metaphysics in a\nlyric effusion addressed to a Thessalian prince[85]--that if such an\nexposition had been found under the name of Protagoras, critics\nwould have dwelt upon it as an additional proof of dishonest\nperversions by the Sophists.[86] It appears as if Plato, intending in\nthis dialogue to set out the contrast between long or continuous\nspeech (sophistical, rhetorical, poetical) represented by Protagoras,\nand short, interrogatory speech (dialectical) represented by\nSokrates--having moreover composed for Protagoras in the earlier part\nof the dialogue, an harangue claiming venerable antiquity for his own\naccomplishment--has thought it right to compose for Sokrates a\npleading with like purpose, to put the two accomplishments on a par.\nAnd if that pleading includes both pointless irony and misplaced\ncomparisons (especially what is said about the Spartans)--we must\nremember that Sokrates has expressly renounced all competition with\nProtagoras in continuous speech, and that he is here handling the\nweapon in which he is confessedly inferior. Plato secures a decisive\ntriumph to dialectic, and to Sokrates as representing it: but he\nseems content here to leave Sokrates on the lower ground as a\nrhetorician.\n\n[Footnote 85: Especially his explanation of [Greek: e(k\u00f4\\n e)rd\u00ea=|]\n(p. 345 D.). Heyne (Opuscula, i. p. 160) remarks upon the strange\ninterpretation given by Sokrates of the Simonidean song. Compare\nPlato in Lysis, p. 212 E, and in Alkib. ii. p. 147 D. In both these\ncases, Sokrates cites passages of poetry, assigning to them a sense\nwhich their authors plainly did not intend them to bear. Heindorf in\nhis note on the Lysis (l. c.) observes--\"Videlicet, ut exeat\nsententia, quam Solon ne somniavit quidem, versuum horum structuram,\nneglecto plan\u00e9 sermonis usu, hanc statuit.--Cujusmodi\ninterpretationis aliud est luculentum exemplum in Alcib. ii. p. 147\nD.\"\n\nSee also Heindorf's notes on the Charmid\u00eas, p. 163 B; Lach\u00eas, p. 191\nB; and Lysis, p. 214 D.\n\nM. Boeckh observes (ad Pindar. Isthm. v. p. 528) respecting an\nallusion made by Pindar to Hesiod--\n\n\"Num mal\u00e9 intellexit poeta intelligentissimus perspicua verba\nHesiodi? Non credo: sed bene sciens, consulto alium sensum intulit,\nsuo consilio accommodatum! Simile exemplum offert gravissimus auctor\nPlato The\u00e6tet. p. 155 D.\" Stallbaum in his note on the The\u00e6t\u00eatus\nadopts this remark of Boeckh. Groen van Prinsterer gives a similar\nopinion. (Prosopographia Platonica, p. 17.)]\n\n[Footnote 86: K. F. Hermann observes (Gesch. der Plat. Philos, p.\n460) that Sokrates, in his interpretation of the Simonidean song,\nshows that he can play the Sophist as well as other people can.]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates depreciates the value of debates on the\npoets. Their meaning is always disputed, and you can never ask from\nthemselves what it is. Protagoras consents reluctantly to resume the\ntask of answering.]\n\nMoreover, when Sokrates intends to show himself off as a master of\npoetical lore ([Greek: peri\\ e)p\u00f4=n deino\\s]), he at the same time\nclaims a right of interpreting the poets in his own way. He considers\nthe poets either as persons divinely inspired, who speak fine things\nwithout rational understanding (we have seen this in the Apology and\nthe Ion)--or as men of superior wisdom, who deliver valuable truth\nlying beneath the surface, and not discernible by vulgar eyes. Both\nthese views differ from that of literal interpretation, which is here\nrepresented by Protagoras and Prodikus. And these two Sophists are\nhere contrasted with Sokrates as interpreters of the poets.\nProtagoras and Prodikus look upon poetical compositions as sources of\ninstruction: and seek to interpret them literally, as an\nintelligent hearer would have understood them when they were sung or\nrecited for the first time. Towards that end, discrimination of the\nusual or grammatical meaning of words was indispensable. Sokrates, on\nthe contrary, disregards the literal interpretation, derides verbal\ndistinctions as useless, or twists them into harmony with his own\npurpose: Simonides and other poets are considered as superior men,\nand even as inspired men in whose verses wisdom and virtue must be\nembodied and discoverable[87]--only that they are given in an obscure\nand enigmatical manner: requiring to be extracted by the divination\nof the philosopher, who alone knows what wisdom and virtue are. It is\nfor the philosopher to show his ingenuity by detecting the traces of\nthem. This is what Sokrates does with the song of Simonides. He\ndiscovers in it supposed underlying thoughts ([Greek:\nu(ponoi/as]):[88] distinctions of Platonic Metaphysics (between\n[Greek: ei)=nai] and [Greek: gene/sthai]), and principles of Platonic\nEthics ([Greek: ou)dei\\s e(/k\u00f4 kako/s])--he proceeds to point out\npassages in which they are to be found, and explains the song\nconformably to them, in spite of much violence to the obvious meaning\nand verbal structure.[89] But though Sokrates accepts, when required,\nthe task of discussing what is said by the poets, and deals with them\naccording to his own point of view--yet he presently lets us see that\nthey are witnesses called into court by his opponent and not by\nhimself. Alkibiades urges that the debate which had been interrupted\nshall be resumed and Sokrates himself requests Protagoras to consent.\n\"To debate about the compositions of poets\" (says Sokrates), \"is to\nproceed as silly and common-place men do at their banquets: where\nthey cannot pass the time without hiring musical or dancing girls.\nNoble and well-educated guests, on the contrary, can find enough to\ninterest them in their own conversation, even if they drink ever so\nmuch wine.[90] Men such as we are, do not require to be amused by\nsingers nor to talk about the poets, whom no one can ask what they\nmean; and who, when cited by different speakers, are affirmed by one\nto mean one thing, and by another to mean something else, without any\ndecisive authority to appeal to. Such men as you and I ought to lay\naside the poets, and test each other by colloquy of our own. If you\nwish to persist in questioning, I am ready to answer: if not, consent\nto answer me, and let us bring the interrupted debate to a\nclose.\"[91]\n\n[Footnote 87: See Plato, Ph\u00e6drus, p. 245 A-B; Apol. p. 22 B-C; Ion,\npp. 533-534.\n\nCompare the distinction drawn in Tim\u00e6us, p. 72 A-B, between the\n[Greek: ma/ntis] and the [Greek: proph\u00ea/t\u00eas].]\n\n[Footnote 88: About the [Greek: u(po/noiai] ascribed to the poets,\nsee Repub. ii. p. 378 D.; Xen. Sympos. iii. 6; and F. A. Wolf,\nProlegom. Homer. p. clxii.-clxiv.\n\nF. A. Wolf remarks, respecting the various allegorical\ninterpretations of Homer and other Greek poets--\n\n\"Sed nec prioribus illis, sive allegorica et anagogica somnia sua\nipsi crediderunt, sive ab aliis duntaxat credi voluerunt, idonea\ndeest excusatio. Ita enim ratio comparata est, ut libris, quos a\nteneris statim annis cognoscimus, omnes prop\u00e9 nostras nostr\u00e6que\n\u00e6tatis opiniones subjiciamus: ac si illi jampridem populari usu\nconsecrati sunt, ipsa obstat veneratio, quominus in iis absurda et\nridicula inesse credamus. Lenimus ergo atque adeo ornamus\ninterpretando, quicquid proprio sensu non ferendum videtur. Atque ita\nfactum est omni tempore in libris iis, qui pro sacris habiti sunt.\"\n\nThe distinction was similar in character, and even more marked in\nrespect of earnest reciprocal antipathy, between the different\nschools of the Jews in Alexandria and Palestine about the\ninterpretation of the Pentateuch. 1. Those who interpreted literally,\n[Greek: kata\\ t\u00ea\\n r(\u00eat\u00ea\\n dia/noian]. 2. Those who set aside the\nliteral interpretation, and explained the text upon a philosophy of\ntheir own, above the reach of the vulgar (Eusebius, Pr\u00e6p. Ev. viii.\n10). Some admitted both the two interpretations, side by side.\n\nRespecting these allegorising schools of the Hellenistic Jews, from\nAristobulus (150 B.C.) down to Philo, see the learned and\nvaluable work of Gfr\u00f6rer--_Philo und die J\u00fcdisch.-Alexandr.\nTheosophie_, vol. i. pp. 84-86, ii. p. 356 seq.]\n\n[Footnote 89: Plat. Prot. p. 345.]\n\n[Footnote 90: Plato, Prot. p. 347 D. [Greek: ka)\\n ma/nu polu\\n\noi)=non pi/\u00f4sin]--a phrase which will be found suitably illustrated\nby the persistent dialectic of Sokrates, even at the close of the\nPlatonic Symposion, after he has swallowed an incredible quantity of\nwine.]\n\n[Footnote 91: Plat. Prot. pp. 347-348. This remark--that the poet may\nbe interpreted in many different ways, and that you cannot produce\nhim in court to declare or defend his own meaning--is highly\nsignificant, in regard to the value set by Sokrates on living\nconversation and dialectic.]\n\n[Side-note: Purpose of Sokrates to sift difficulties which he\nreally feels in his own mind. Importance of a colloquial companion\nfor this purpose.]\n\nIn spite of this appeal, Protagoras is still unwilling to resume, and\nis only forced to do so by a stinging taunt from Alkibiades, enforced\nby requests from Kallias and others. He is depicted as afraid of\nSokrates, who, as soon as consent is given, recommences the\ndiscussion by saying--\"Do not think, Protagoras, that I have any\nother purpose in debating, except to sift through and through, in\nconjunction with you, difficulties which puzzle my own mind. Two of\nus together can do more in this way than any one singly.[92]\n\n[Footnote 92: Plat. Prot. p. 348 C. [Greek: m\u00ea\\ oi)/ou diale/gesthai\nme/ soi a)/llo ti boulo/menon \u00ea)\\ a)\\ au)to\\s a)por\u00f4=, e(ka/stote\ntau=ta diaske/psasthai.]\n\nThe remark here given should be carefully noted in appreciating the\nSokratic frame of mind. The cross-examination which he bestows, is\nnot that of one who himself knows--and who only gets up artificial\ndifficulties to ascertain whether others know as much as he does. On\nthe contrary, it proceeds from one who is himself puzzled; and\nthat which puzzles him he states to others, and debates with others,\nas affording the best chance of clearing up his own ideas and\nobtaining a solution.\n\nThe grand purpose with Sokrates is to bring into clear daylight the\ndifficulties which impede the construction of philosophy or \"reasoned\ntruth,\" and to sift them thoroughly, instead of slurring them over or\nhiding them.]\n\n\"We are all more fertile and suggestive, with regard to thought,\nword, and deed, when we act in couples. If a man strikes out anything\nnew by himself, he immediately goes about looking for a companion to\nwhom he can communicate it, and with whom he can jointly review it.\nMoreover, you are the best man that I know for this purpose,\nespecially on the subject of virtue: for you are not only virtuous\nyourself, but you can make others so likewise, and you proclaim\nyourself a teacher of virtue more publicly than any one has ever done\nbefore. Whom can I find so competent as you, for questioning and\ncommunication on these very subjects?\"[93]\n\n[Footnote 93: Plato, Protag. pp. 348-349.]\n\n[Side-note: The interrupted debate is resumed. Protagoras says\nthat courage differs materially from the other branches of virtue.]\n\nAfter this eulogy on dialectic conversation (illustrating still\nfarther the main purpose of the dialogue), Sokrates resumes the\nargument as it stood when interrupted. _Sokr._--You,\nProtagoras, said that intelligence, moderation, justice, holiness,\ncourage, were all parts of virtue; but each different from the\nothers, and each having a separate essence and properties of its own.\nDo you still adhere to that opinion? _Prot._--I now think that\nthe first four are tolerably like and akin to each other, but that\ncourage is very greatly different from all the four. The proof is,\nthat you will find many men pre-eminent for courage, but thoroughly\nunjust, unholy, intemperate, and stupid.[94] _Sokr._--Do you\nconsider that all virtue, and each separate part of it, is fine and\nhonourable? _Prot._--I consider it in the highest degree fine\nand honourable: I must be mad to think otherwise.[95]\n\n[Footnote 94: Plato, Protag. p, 349 D. [Greek: ta\\ me\\n te/ttara\nau)t\u00f4=n e)pieik\u00f4=s parapl\u00ea/sia a)ll\u00ea/lois e)sti/n, \u00ea( de\\ a)ndrei/a\npa/nu polu\\ diaphe/ron pa/nt\u00f4n tou/t\u00f4n.]]\n\n[Footnote 95: Plato, Protag. p. 349 E. [Greek: ka/lliston me\\n ou)=n,\nei) m\u00ea\\ mai/nomai/ ge. o(/lon pou kalo\\n \u00f4(s oi(=o/n te ma/lista.]\n\nIt is not unimportant to notice such declarations as this, put by\nPlato into the mouth of Protagoras. They tend to show that Plato did\nnot seek (as many of his commentators do) to depict Protagoras as a\ncorruptor of the public mind.]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates argues to prove that courage consists in\nknowledge or intelligence. Protagoras does not admit this. Sokrates\nchanges his attack.]\n\nSokrates then shows that the courageous men are confident men,\nforward in dashing at dangers, which people in general will not\naffront: that men who dive with confidence into the water, are those\nwho know how to swim; men who go into battle with confidence as\nhorse-soldiers or light infantry, are those who understand their\nprofession as such. If any men embark in these dangers, without such\npreliminary knowledge, do you consider them men of courage? Not at\nall (says Protagoras), they are madmen: courage would be a\ndishonourable thing, if _they_ were reckoned courageous.[96]\nThen (replies Sokrates) upon this reasoning, those who face dangers\nconfidently, with preliminary knowledge, are courageous: those who do\nso without it, are madmen. Courage therefore must consist in\nknowledge or intelligence?[97] Protagoras declines to admit this,\ndrawing a distinction somewhat confused:[98] upon which Sokrates\napproaches the same argument from a different point.\n\n[Footnote 96: Plato, Protag. p. 350 B. [Greek: Ai)schro\\n me/nt'\na)\\n, e)/ph\u00ea, ei)/\u00ea, \u00ea( a)ndrei/a; e)pei\\ ou(=toi/ ge maino/menoi/\nei)sin.]]\n\n[Footnote 97: Plato, Protag. p. 350 C.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Plato, Protag. pp. 350-351.]\n\n[Side-note: Identity of the pleasurable with the good--of the\npainful with the evil. Sokrates maintains it. Protagoras denies.\nDebate.]\n\n_Sokr._--You say that some men live well, others badly. Do you\nthink that a man lives well if he lives in pain and distress?\n_Prot._--No. _Sokr._--But if he passes his life pleasurably\nuntil its close, does he not then appear to you to have lived well?\n_Prot._--I think so. _Sokr._--To live pleasurably therefore\nis good: to live disagreeably is evil. _Prot._--Yes: at least\nprovided he lives taking pleasure in fine or honourable things.[99]\n_Sokr._--What! do you concur with the generality of people in\ncalling some pleasurable things evil, and some painful things good?\n_Prot._--That is my opinion. _Sokr._--But are not all\npleasurable things, so far forth as pleasurable, to that extent good,\nunless some consequences of a different sort result from them? And\nagain, subject to the like limitation, are not all painful things\nevil, so far forth as they are painful? _Prot._--To that\nquestion, absolutely as you put it, I do not know whether I can reply\naffirmatively--that all pleasurable things are good, and all painful\nthings evil. I think it safer--with reference not merely to the\npresent answer, but to my manner of life generally--to say, that\nthere are some pleasurable things which are good, others which are\nnot good--some painful things which are evil, others which are not\nevil: again, some which are neither, neither good nor evil.[100]\n_Sokr._--You call those things pleasurable, which either partake\nof the nature of pleasure, or cause pleasure? _\nProt._--Unquestionably. _Sokr._--When I ask whether pleasurable things\nare not good, in so far forth as pleasurable--I ask in other words,\nwhether pleasure itself be not good? _Prot._--As you observed\nbefore, Sokrates,[101] let us examine the question on each side, to\nsee whether the pleasurable and the good be really the same.\n\n[Footnote 99: Plat. Prot. p. 351 C. [Greek: To\\ me\\n a)/ra \u00ea(de/\u00f4s\nz\u00ea=n, a)gatho/n, to\\ d' a)\u00ead\u00f4=s, kako/n? Ei)/per toi=s kaloi=s g',\ne)/ph\u00ea, z\u00f4/|\u00ea \u00ea(do/menos.]]\n\n[Footnote 100: Plato, Protag. p. 351 D. [Greek: a)lla/ moi dokei= ou)\nmo/non pro\\s t\u00ea\\n nu=n a)po/krisin e)moi\\ a)sphale/steron ei)=nai\na)pokri/nasthtai, _a)lla\\ kai\\ pro\\s pa/nta to\\n a)/llon bi/on to\\n\ne)mo/n_, o(/ti e)/sti me\\n a)\\ t\u00f4=n \u00ea(de/\u00f4n ou)k e)/stin a)gatha/,\ne)/sti d' au)= kai\\ a(\\ t\u00f4=n a)niar\u00f4=n ou)k e)sti kaka/, e)/sti d'\na(\\ e)/sti, kai\\ tri/ton a(\\ ou)de/tera, ou)/te kaka\\ ou)/t'\na)gatha/.]\n\nThese words strengthen farther what I remarked in a recent note,\nabout the character which Plato wished to depict in Protagoras, so\ndifferent from what is imputed to that Sophist by the Platonic\ncommentators.]\n\n[Footnote 101: Plato, Protag. p. 351 E. [Greek: \u00f4(/sper su\\ le/geis,\ne(ka/stote, \u00f4)= S\u00f4/krates, skop\u00f4/metha au)to/.]\n\nThis is an allusion to the words used by Sokrates not long\nbefore,--[Greek: a(\\ au)to\\s a)por\u00f4= e(ka/stote tau=ta\ndiaske/psasthai], p. 348 C.]\n\n[Side-note: Enquiry about knowledge. Is it the dominant agency\nin the mind? Or is it overcome frequently by other agencies, pleasure\nor pain? Both agree that knowledge is dominant.]\n\n_Sokr._--Let us penetrate from the surface to the interior of\nthe question.[102] What is your opinion about knowledge? Do\nyou share the opinion of mankind generally about it, as you do about\npleasure and pain? Mankind regard knowledge as something neither\nstrong nor directive nor dominant. Often (they say), when knowledge\nis in a man, it is not knowledge which governs him, but something\nelse--passion, pleasure, pain, love, fear--all or any of which\noverpower knowledge, and drag it round about in their train like a\nslave. Are you of the common opinion on this point also?[103] Or do\nyou believe that knowledge is an honourable thing, and made to\ngovern man: and that when once a man knows what good and evil things\nare, he will not be over-ruled by any other motive whatever, so as to\ndo other things than what are enjoined by such knowledge--his own\nintelligence being a sufficient defence to him?[104]\n_Prot._--The last opinion is what I hold. To me, above all others,\nit would be disgraceful not to proclaim that knowledge or intelligence\nwas the governing element of human affairs.\n\n[Footnote 102: Plato, Protag. p. 352 A.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Plato, Protag. p. 352 B-C. [Greek: po/teron kai\\\ntou=to/ soi dokei= \u00f4(/sper toi=s polloi=s a)nthr\u00f4/pois \u00ea)\\ a)/ll\u00f4s?\n. . . dianoou/menoi peri\\ t\u00ea=s e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas \u00f4(/sper peri\\ a)ndrapo/don,\nperielkome/n\u00eas u(po\\ t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n a(pa/nt\u00f4n.] Aristotle in the\nNikomachean Ethics cites and criticises the opinion of Sokrates,\nwherein the latter affirmed the irresistible supremacy of knowledge,\nwhen really possessed, over all passions and desires. Aristotle cites\nit with the express phraseology and illustration contained in this\npassage of the Protagoras. [Greek: E)pista/menon me\\n ou)=n ou)/\nphasi/ tines oi(=o/n te ei)=nai [a)krateu/esthai]. deino\\n ga/r,\ne)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas e)nou/s\u00eas, \u00f4(s \u00f4)/|eto S\u00f4kra/t\u00eas, a)/llo ti kratei=n,\nkai\\ perie/lkein au)t\u00ea\\n \u00f4(/sper a)ndra/podon. S\u00f4kra/t\u00eas me\\n ga\\r\no(/l\u00f4s e)ma/cheto pro\\s to\\n lo/gon, \u00f4(s ou)k ou)/s\u00eas a)krasi/as;\nou)the/na ga\\r u(polamba/nonta, pra/ttein para\\ to\\ be/ltiston,\na)lla\\ di' a)/gnoian] (Ethic. N. vii. 2, vii. 3, p. 1145, b. 24). The\nsame metaphor [Greek: perie/lketai e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea] is again ascribed to\nSokrates by Aristotle, a little farther on in the same treatise, p.\n1147, b. 15.\n\nWe see from hence that when Aristotle comments upon _the doctrine\nof Sokrates_, what he here means is, the doctrine of the Platonic\nSokrates in the Protagoras; the citation of this particular metaphor\nestablishes the identity.\n\nIn another passage of the Nikom. Eth., Aristotle also cites a fact\nrespecting the Sophist Protagoras, which fact is mentioned in the\nPlatonic dialogue Protagoras--respecting the manner in which that\nSophist allowed his pupils to assess their own fee for his teaching\n(Ethic. Nik. ix. 1, 1164, a. 25).]\n\n[Footnote 104: Plato, Protag. p. 352 C. [Greek: a)ll' i(kan\u00ea\\n\nei)=nai t\u00ea\\n phro/n\u00easin bo\u00eathei=n t\u00f4=| a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4|.]]\n\n[Side-note: Mistake of supposing that men act contrary to\nknowledge. We never call pleasures evils, except when they entail a\npreponderance of pain, or a disappointment of greater pleasures.]\n\n_Sokr._--You speak well and truly. But you are aware that most\nmen are of a different opinion. They affirm that many who know what\nis best, act against their own knowledge, overcome by pleasure or by\npain. _Prot._--Most men think so: incorrectly, in my judgment,\nas they say many other things besides.[105] _Sokr._--When they\nsay that a man, being overcome by food or drink or other temptations,\nwill do things which he knows to be evil, we must ask them, On what\nground do you call these things evil? Is it because they impart\npleasure at the moment, or because they prepare disease, poverty, and\nother such things, for the future?[106] Most men would reply, I\nthink, that they called these things evil not on account of the\npresent pleasure which the things produced, but on account of their\nulterior consequences--poverty and disease being both of them\ndistressing? _Prot._--Most men would say this. _Sokr._--It\nwould be admitted then that these things were evil for no other\nreason, than because they ended in pain and in privation of\npleasure.[107] _Prot._--Certainly. _Sokr._--Again, when it\nis said that some good things are painful, such things are meant as\ngymnastic exercises, military expeditions, medical treatment. Now no\none will say that these things are good because of the immediate\nsuffering which they occasion, but because of the ulterior results of\nhealth, wealth, and security, which we obtain by them. Thus,\nthese also are good for no other reason, than because they end in\npleasures, or in relief or prevention of pain.[108] Or can you\nindicate any other end, to which men look when they call these\nmatters evil? _Prot._--No other end can be indicated.\n\n[Footnote 105: Plato, Protag. pp. 352-353.]\n\n[Footnote 106: Plato, Protag. p. 353 D. [Greek: pon\u00eara\\ de\\ au)ta\\\np\u00ea=| phate ei)=nai? po/teron o(/ti t\u00ea\\n \u00ea(don\u00ea\\n tau/t\u00ean e)n t\u00f4=|\nparachr\u00ea=ma pare/chei kai\\ \u00ea(du/ e)stin e(/kaston au)t\u00f4=n, \u00ea)\\ o(/ti\nei)s to\\n u(/steron chro/non no/sous te poiei= kai\\ peni/as kai\\\na)/lla toiau=ta polla\\ paraskeua/zei?]]\n\n[Footnote 107: Plato, Protag. p. 353 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n phai/netai.\n. . . di' ou)de\\n a)/llo tau=ta kaka\\ o)/nta, \u00ea)\\ dio/ti ei)s a)ni/as\nte a)poteleuta=| kai\\ a)/ll\u00f4n \u00ea(don\u00f4=n a)posterei=?]]\n\n[Footnote 108: Plato, Protag. p. 354 B-C. [Greek: Tau=ta de\\ a)gatha/\ne)sti di' a)/llo ti \u00ea)\\ o(/ti ei)s \u00ea(dona\\s a)poteleuta=| kai\\ lup\u00f4=n\na)pallaga\\s kai\\ a)potropa/s? \u00ea)\\ e)/chete/ ti a)/llo te/los le/gein,\nei)s o(\\ a)poble/psantes au)ta\\ a)gatha\\ kalei=te, a)ll' \u00ea)\\ \u00ea(dona/s\nte kai\\ lu/pas? ou)k a)\\n phai=en, \u00f4(s e)g\u00f4)=|mai. . . . Ou)kou=n t\u00ea\\n\nme\\n \u00ea(don\u00ea\\n di\u00f4/kete \u00f4(s a)gatho\\n o)/n, t\u00ea\\n de\\ lu/p\u00ean pheu/gete\n\u00f4(s kako/n?]]\n\n[Side-note: Pleasure is the only good--pain the only evil. No\nman does evil voluntarily, knowing it to be evil. Difference between\npleasures present and future--resolves itself into pleasure and\npain.]\n\n_Sokr._--It thus appears that you pursue pleasure as good, and\navoid pain as evil. Pleasure is what you think good: pain is what you\nthink evil: for even pleasure itself appears to you evil, when it\neither deprives you of pleasures greater than itself, or entails upon\nyou pains outweighing itself. Is there any other reason, or any other\nulterior end, to which you look when you pronounce pleasure to be\nevil? If there be any other between reason, or any other end, tell us\nwhat it is.[109] _Prot._--There is none whatever. _Sokr._--The\ncase is similar about pains: you call pain good, when it\npreserves you from greater pains, or procures for you a future\nbalance of pleasure. If there be any other end to which you look when\nyou call pain good, tell us what it is. _Prot._--You speak\ntruly. _Sokr._--If I am asked why I insist so much on the topic\nnow before us, I shall reply, that it is no easy matter to explain\nwhat is meant by being overcome by pleasure; and that the whole proof\nhinges upon this point--whether there is any other good than\npleasure, or any other evil than pain; and whether it be not\nsufficient, that we should go through life pleasurably and without\npains.[110] If this be sufficient, and if no other good or evil can\nbe pointed out, which does not end in pleasures and pains, mark the\nconsequences. Good and evil being identical with pleasurable and\npainful, it is ridiculous to say that a man does evil voluntarily,\nknowing it to be evil, under the overpowering influence of pleasure:\nthat is, under the overpowering influence of good.[111] How can\nit be wrong, that a man should yield to the influence of good? It\nnever can be wrong, except in this case--when the good obtained is of\nsmaller amount than the consequent good forfeited or the consequent\nevil entailed. What other exchangeable value can there be between\npleasures and pains, except in the ratio of quantity--greater or\nless, more or fewer?[112] If an objector tells me that there is a\nmaterial difference between pleasures and pains of the moment, and\npleasures and pains postponed to a future time, I ask him in reply,\nIs there any other difference, except in pleasure and pain? An\nintelligent man ought to put them both in the scale, the pleasures\nand the pains, the present and the future, so as to determine the\nbalance. Weighing pleasures against pleasures, he ought to prefer the\nmore and the greater: weighing pains against pains, the fewer and the\nless. If pleasures against pains, then when the latter outweigh the\nformer, reckoning distant as well as near, he ought to abstain from\nthe act: when the pleasures outweigh, he ought to do it.\n_Prot._--The objectors could have nothing to say against\nthis.[113]\n\n[Footnote 109: Plato, Protag, p. 354 D. [Greek: e)pei\\ ei) kat'\na)/llo ti au)to\\ to\\ chai/rein kako\\n kalei=te kai\\ ei)s a)/llo ti\nte/los a)poble/psantes, e)/choite a)\\n kai\\ \u00ea(mi=n ei)pei=n; a)ll'\nou)ch e(/xete. Ou)d' e)moi\\ dokou=sin, e)/ph\u00ea o( Pr\u00f4tago/ras.]]\n\n[Footnote 110: Plato, Protag. p. 354 E. [Greek: e)/peita e)n tou/t\u00f4|\nei)si\\ pa=sai ai( a)podei/xeis; a)ll' e)/ti kai\\ nu=n a)nathe/sthai\ne)/xestin, ei) p\u00ea| e)/chete a)/llo ti pha/nai ei)=nai to\\ a)gatho\\n\n\u00ea)\\ t\u00ea\\n \u00ea(don\u00ea/n, \u00ea)\\ to\\ kako\\n a)/llo ti \u00ea)\\ t\u00ea\\n a)ni/an, \u00ea)\\\na)rkei= u(mi=n to\\ \u00ea(de/\u00f4s katabi\u00f4=nai to\\n bi/on a)/neu lup\u00f4=n?]]\n\n[Footnote 111: Plato, Protag. p. 355 C.]\n\n[Footnote 112: Plato, Protag. p. 356 A. [Greek: kai\\ ti/s a)/ll\u00ea\na)xi/a \u00ea(don\u00ea=| pro\\s lu/p\u00f4n e)sti\\n a)ll' \u00ea)\\ u(perbol\u00ea\\ a)ll\u00ea/l\u00f4n\nkai\\ e)/lleipsis? tau=ta d' e)sti\\ mei/z\u00f4 te kai\\ smikro/tera\ngigno/mena a)ll\u00ea/l\u00f4n, kai\\ plei/\u00f4 kai\\ e)la/tt\u00f4, kai\\ ma=llon kai\\\n\u00ea(=tton.]]\n\n[Footnote 113: Plato, Protag. p. 356 C.]\n\n[Side-note: Necessary resort to the measuring art for choosing\npleasures rightly--all the security of our lives depend upon it.]\n\n_Sokr._--Well then--I shall tell them farther--you know that the\nsame magnitude, and the same voice, appears to you greater when near\nthan when distant. Now, if all our well-doing depended upon our\nchoosing the magnitudes really greater and avoiding those really\nless, where would the security of our life be found? In the art of\nmensuration, or in the apparent impression?[114] Would not the latter\nlead us astray, causing us to vacillate and judge badly in our choice\nbetween great and little, with frequent repentance afterwards? Would\nnot the art of mensuration set aside these false appearances, and by\nrevealing to us the truth, impart tranquillity to our minds and\nsecurity to our lives? Would not the objectors themselves\nacknowledge that there was no other safety, except in the art of\nmensuration? _Prot._--They would acknowledge it. _Sokr._--Again,\nIf the good conduct of our lives depended on the choice of odd\nand even, and in distinguishing rightly the greater from the less,\nwhether far or near, would not our safety reside in knowledge, and in\na certain knowledge of mensuration too, in Arithmetic?\n_Prot._--They would concede to you that also. _Sokr._--Well then, my\nfriends, since the security of our lives has been found to depend on\nthe right choice of pleasure and pain--between the more and fewer,\ngreater and less, nearer and farther--does it not come to a simple\nestimate of excess, deficiency, and equality between them? in other\nwords, to mensuration, art, or science?[115] What kind of art or\nscience it is, we will enquire another time: for the purpose of our\nargument, enough has been done when we have shown that it _is_\nscience.\n\n[Footnote 114: Plato, Protag. p. 356 D. [Greek: ei) ou)=n e)n tou/t\u00f4|\n\u00ea(mi=n \u00ea)=n to\\ eu)= pra/ttein, e)n t\u00f4=| ta\\ me\\n mega/la m\u00ea/k\u00ea kai\\\npra/ttein kai\\ lamba/nein, ta\\ de\\ smikra\\ kai\\ pheu/gein kai\\ m\u00ea\\\npra/ttein, ti/s a)\\n \u00ea(mi=n s\u00f4t\u00eari/a e)pha/n\u00ea tou= bi/ou? a)=ra \u00ea(\nmetr\u00eatik\u00ea\\ te/chn\u00ea, \u00ea)\\ \u00ea( tou= phainome/nou du/namis? . . . A)=r' a)\\n\no(mologoi=en oi( a)/nthr\u00f4poi pro\\s tau=ta \u00ea(ma=s t\u00ea\\n metr\u00eatik\u00ea\\n\ns\u00f4/zein a)\\n te/chn\u00ean, \u00ea)\\ a)/ll\u00ean?]]\n\n[Footnote 115: Plato, Protag. p. 357 A-v. [Greek: e)peid\u00ea\\ de\\\n\u00ea(don\u00ea=s te kai\\ lu/p\u00eas e)n o)rth\u00ea=| t\u00ea=| ai(re/sei e)pha/n\u00ea\n_\u00ea(mi=n \u00ea( s\u00f4t\u00eari/a tou= bi/ou ou)=sa, tou= te ple/onos_ kai\\\ne(la/ttonos kai\\ mei/zonos kai\\ smikrote/ron kai\\ por)r(\u00f4te/r\u00f4 kai\\\ne)ggute/r\u00f4, a)=ra pr\u00f4=ton me\\n ou) metr\u00eatik\u00ea\\ phai/netai, u(perbol\u00ea=s\nte kai\\ e)ndei/as ou)=sa kai\\ i)so/t\u00eatos pro\\s a)ll\u00ea/las ske/psis?\nA)ll' a)na/gk\u00ea. E)pei\\ de\\ metr\u00eatik\u00ea/, a)na/gk\u00ea| d\u00ea/pou te/chn\u00ea kai\\\ne)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea.]]\n\n[Side-note: To do wrong, overcome by pleasure, is only a bad\nphrase for describing what is really a case of grave ignorance.]\n\nFor when _we_ (Protagoras and Sokrates) affirmed, that nothing\nwas more powerful than science or knowledge, and that this, in\nwhatsoever minds it existed, prevailed over pleasure and every thing\nelse--_you_ (the supposed objectors) maintained, on the\ncontrary, that pleasure often prevailed over knowledge even in the\ninstructed man: and you called upon us to explain, upon our\nprinciples, what that mental affection was, which people called,\nbeing overcome by the seduction of pleasure. We have now shown you\nthat this mental affection is nothing else but ignorance, and the\ngravest ignorance. You have admitted that those who go wrong in the\nchoice of pleasures and pains--that is, in the choice of good and\nevil things--go wrong from want of knowledge, of the knowledge or\nscience of mensuration. The wrong deed done from want of knowledge,\nis done through ignorance. What you call being overcome by pleasure\nis thus, the gravest ignorance; which these Sophists, Protagoras,\nProdikus, and Hippias, engage to cure: but you (the objectors whom we\nnow address) not believing it to be ignorance, or perhaps\nunwilling to pay them their fees, refuse to visit them, and therefore\ngo on doing ill, both privately and publicly.[116]\n\n[Footnote 116: Plato, Protag. p. 357 E.]\n\n[Side-note: Reasoning of Sokrates assented to by all. Actions\nwhich conduct to pleasures or freedom from pain, are honourable.]\n\nNow then, Protagoras, Prodikus, and Hippias (continues Sokrates), I\nturn to you, and ask, whether you account my reasoning true or false?\n(All of them pronounced it to be surpassingly true.)\n_Sokr._--You all agree, then, all three, that the pleasurable is good,\nand that the painful is evil:[117] for I take no account at present of\nthe verbal distinctions of Prodikus, discriminating between the\n_pleasurable_, the _delightful_, and the _enjoyable_.\nIf this be so, are not all those actions, which conduct to a life of\npleasure or to a life free from pain, honourable? and is not the\nhonourable deed, good and profitable?[118] (In this, all persons\npresent concurred.) If then the pleasurable is good, no one ever does\nanything, when he either knows or believes other things in his power\nto be better. To be inferior to yourself is nothing else than\nignorance: to be superior to yourself, is nothing else than wisdom.\nIgnorance consists in holding false opinions, and in being deceived\nrespecting matters of high importance. (Agreed by all.) Accordingly,\nno one willingly enters upon courses which are evil, or which he\nbelieves to be evil; nor is it in the nature of man to enter upon\nwhat he thinks evil courses, in preference to good. When a man is\ncompelled to make choice between two evils, no one will take the\ngreater when he might take the less.[119] (Agreed to by all three.)\nFarther, no one will affront things of which he is afraid, when other\nthings are open to him, of which he is not afraid: for fear is an\nexpectation of evil, so that what a man fears, he of course thinks to\nbe an evil,--and will not approach it willingly. (Agreed.)[120]\n\n[Footnote 117: Plato, Protag. p. 358 A. [Greek: u(perphu\u00f4=s e)do/kei\na(/pasin a)l\u00eath\u00ea= ei)=nai ta\\ ei)r\u00eame/na. O(mologei=te a)/ra, \u00ea)=n d'\ne)g\u00f4/, to\\ me\\n \u00ea(du\\ a)gatho\\n ei)=nai, to\\ de\\ a)niaro\\n kako/n.]]\n\n[Footnote 118: Plato, Protag. p. 358 B. [Greek: ai( e)pi\\ tou/tou\npra/xeis a(/pasai e)pi\\ tou= a)lu/p\u00f4s z\u00ea=n kai\\ \u00ea)de/\u00f4s, a)=r' ou)\nkalai/? kai\\ to\\ kalo\\n e)/rgon, a)gatho/n te kai\\ \u00f4)phe/limon?]]\n\n[Footnote 119: Plato, Protag. p. 358 C-D. [Greek: e)pi/ ge ta\\ kaka\\\nou)dei\\s e(k\u00f4\\n e)/rchetai, ou)de\\ e)pi\\ a(\\ oi)/etai kaka\\ ei)=nai,\nou)d' e)sti\\ tou=to, \u00f4(s e)/oiken, e)n a)nthr\u00f4/pou phu/sei, e)pi\\ a(\\\noi)/etai kaka\\ ei)=nai e)the/lein i)e/nai a)nti\\ t\u00f4=n a)gath\u00f4=n;\no(/tan te a)nagka/sth\u00ea| duoi=n kakoi=n to\\ e(/teron ai)rei=sthai,\nou)dei\\s to\\ mei=zon ai(r\u00ea/setai, e)xo\\n to\\ e)/latton.]]\n\n[Footnote 120: Plato, Protag. p. 358 E.]\n\n[Side-note: Explanation of courage. It consists in a wise\nestimate of things terrible and not terrible.]\n\n_Sokr._--Let us now revert to the explanation of courage, given\nby Protagoras. He said that four out of the five parts of virtue were\ntolerably similar; but that courage differed greatly from all of\nthem. And he affirmed that there were men distinguished for courage;\nyet at the same time eminently unjust, immoderate, unholy, and\nstupid. He said, too, that the courageous men were men to attempt\nthings which timid men would not approach. Now, Protagoras, what are\nthese things which the courageous men alone are prepared to attempt?\nWill they attempt terrible things, believing them to be terrible?\n_Prot._--That is impossible, as you have shown just now.\n_Sokr._--No one will enter upon that which he believes to be\nterrible,--or, in other words, will go into evil knowing it to be\nevil: a man who does so is inferior to himself--and this, as we have\nagreed, is ignorance, or the contrary of knowledge. All men, both\ntimid and brave, attempt things upon which they have a good heart: in\nthis respect, the things which the timid and the brave go at, are the\nsame.[121] _Prot._--How can this be? The things which the timid\nand the brave go at or affront, are quite contrary: for example, the\nlatter are willing to go to war, which the former are not.\n_Sokr._--Is it honourable to go to war, or dishonourable?\n_Prot._--Honourable. _Sokr._--If it be honourable, it must\nalso be good:[122] for we have agreed, in the preceding debate, that\nall honourable things were good. _Prot._--You speak truly.[123]\nI at least always persist in thinking so. _Sokr._--Which of the\ntwo is it, who (you say) are unwilling to go into war; it being an\nhonourable and good thing? _Prot._--The cowards. _Sokr._--But\nif going to war be an honourable and good thing, it is also\npleasurable? _Prot._--Certainly that has been admitted.[124]\n_Sokr._--Is it then knowingly that cowards refuse to go into\nwar, which is both more honourable, better, and more pleasurable?\n_Prot._--We cannot say so, without contradicting our preceding\nadmissions. _Sokr._--What about the courageous man? does not he\naffront or go at what is more honourable, better, and more\npleasurable? _Prot._--It cannot be denied. _Sokr._--Courageous\nmen then, generally, are those whose fears, when they are\nafraid, are honourable and good--not dishonourable or bad: and whose\nconfidence, when they feel confident, is also honourable and\ngood?[125] On the contrary, cowards, impudent men, and madmen, both\nfear, and feel confidence, on dishonourable occasions?\n_Prot._--Agreed. _Sokr._--When they thus view with confidence things\ndishonourable and evil, is it from any other reason than from\nignorance and stupidity? Are they not cowards from stupidity, or a\nstupid estimate of things terrible? And is it not in this ignorance,\nor stupid estimate of things terrible, and things not terrible--that\ncowardice consists? Lastly,[126]--courage being the opposite of\ncowardice--is it not in the knowledge, or wise estimate, of things\nterrible and things not terrible, that courage consists?\n\n[Footnote 121: Plato, Protag. p. 359 D. [Greek: e)pi\\ me\\n a(\\ deina\\\n\u00ea(gei=tai ei)=nai ou)dei\\s e)/rchetai, e)peid\u00ea\\ to\\ \u00ea(/tt\u00f4 ei)=nai\ne(autou= eu(re/th\u00ea a)mathi/a ou)=sa. \u00d4(molo/gei. A)lla\\ m\u00ea\\n e)pi\\\na(/ ge thar)r(ou=si pa/ntes au)= e)/rchontai, kai\\ deiloi\\ kai\\\na)ndrei=oi, kai\\ tau/t\u00ea| ge e)pi\\ ta\\ au)ta\\ e)/rchontai oi( deiloi/\nte kai\\ oi( a)ndrei=oi.]]\n\n[Footnote 122: Plato, Protag. p. 359 E. [Greek: po/teron kalo\\n o(\\n\ni)e/nai (ei)s to\\n po/lemon) \u00ea)\\ ai)schro/n? Kalo/n, e)/ph\u00ea.\nOu)kou=n, ei)/per kalo/n, kai\\ a)gatho\\n \u00f4(molog\u00ea/samen e)n toi=s\ne)/mprosthen; ta\\s ga\\r kala\\s pra/xeis a(pa/sas a)gatha\\s\n\u00f4(molog\u00ea/samen?]]\n\n[Footnote 123: Plato, Protag. p. 359 E. [Greek: A)l\u00eath\u00ea= le/geis,\nkai\\ a)ei\\ e)/moige dokei= ou(/t\u00f4s.]\n\nThis answer, put into the mouth of Protagoras, affords another proof\nthat Plato did not intend to impute to him the character which many\ncommentators impute.]\n\n[Footnote 124: Plato, Protag. p. 360 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n, \u00ea)\\n d'\ne)g\u00f4/, ei)/per kalo\\n kai\\ a)gatho/n, kai\\ \u00ea(du/? \u00d4(molo/g\u00eatai gou=n,\ne)/ph\u00ea.]]\n\n[Footnote 125: Plato, Protag. p. 360 B. [Greek: Ou)kou=n o(/l\u00f4s oi(\na)ndrei=oi ou)k ai)schrou\\s pho/bous phobou=ntai, o(/tav phob\u00f4=ntai,\nou)de\\ ai)schra\\ tha/r)r(\u00ea tha/r)r(ou=sin? . . . Ei) de\\ m\u00ea\\ ai)schra/,\na)=r' ou) kala/? . . . Ei) de\\ kala/, kai\\ a)gatha/?]]\n\n[Footnote 126: Plato, Protag. p. 360 D. [Greek: Ou)kou=n \u00ea( t\u00f4=n\ndein\u00f4n kai\\ m\u00ea\\ dein\u00f4=n a)mathi/a deili/a a)\\n ei)/\u00ea? . . . \u00ca( sophi/a\na)/ra t\u00f4=n dein\u00f4=n kai\\ m\u00ea\\ dein\u00f4=n, a)ndrei/a e)sti/n, e)nanti/a\nou)=sa t\u00ea=| tou/t\u00f4n a)mathi/a|?]]\n\n[Side-note: Reluctance of Protagoras to continue answering.\nClose of the discussion. Sokrates declares that the subject is still\nin confusion, and that he wishes to debate it again with Protagoras.\nAmicable reply of Protagoras.]\n\nProtagoras is described as answering the last few questions with\nincreasing reluctance. But at this final question, he declines\naltogether to answer, or even to imply assent by a gesture.[127]\n_Sokr._--Why will you not answer my question, either\naffirmatively or negatively? _Prot._--Finish the exposition by\nyourself. _Sokr._--I will only ask you one more question. Do you\nstill think, as you said before, that there are some men extremely\nstupid, but extremely courageous? _Prot._--You seem to be\nobstinately bent on making me answer: I will therefore comply with\nyour wish: I say that according to our previous admissions, it\nappears to me impossible. _Sokr._--I have no other motive for\nquestioning you thus, except the wish to investigate how the truth\nstands respecting virtue and what virtue is in itself.[128] To\ndetermine this, is the way to elucidate the question which you\nand I first debated at length:--I, affirming that virtue was not\nteachable--you, that it was teachable. The issue of our conversation\nrenders both of us ridiculous. For I, who denied virtue to be\nteachable, have shown that it consists altogether in knowledge, which\nis the most teachable of all things: while Protagoras, who affirmed\nthat it was teachable, has tried to show that it consisted in every\nthing rather than knowledge: on which supposition it would be hardly\nteachable at all. I therefore, seeing all these questions sadly\nconfused and turned upside down, am beyond measure anxious to clear\nthem up;[129] and should be glad, conjointly with you, to go through\nthe whole investigation--First, what Virtue is,--Next, whether it is\nteachable or not. It is with a provident anxiety for the conduct of\nmy own life that I undertake this research, and I should be delighted\nto have you as a coadjutor.[130] _Prot._--I commend your\nearnestness, Sokrates, and your manner of conducting discussion. I\nthink myself not a bad man in other respects: and as to jealousy, I\nhave as little of it as any one. For I have always said of you, that\nI admire you much more than any man of my acquaintance--decidedly\nmore than any man of your own age. It would not surprise me, if you\nbecame one day illustrious for wisdom.\n\n[Footnote 127: Plato, Protag. p. 360 D. [Greek: ou)ke/ti e)ntau=tha\nou)/t' e)pineu=sai \u00ea)the/l\u00easen, e)si/ga te.]]\n\n[Footnote 128: Plato, Protag. p. 360-361. [Greek: Ou)/toi a)/llou\ne(/neka e)r\u00f4t\u00f4= pa/nta tau=ta, \u00ea)\\ ske/psasthai boulo/menos p\u00f4=s pot'\ne)/chei ta\\ peri\\ t\u00ea=s a)ret\u00ea=s, kai\\ _ti/ pot' e)sti\\n au)to\\ \u00ea(\na)ret\u00ea/_. Oi)=da ga\\r o(/ti tou/tou phanerou= genome/nou ma/list'\na)\\n kata/d\u00ealon ge/noito e)kei=no, peri\\ ou)= e)g\u00f4/ te kai\\ su\\\nmakro\\n lo/gon e(ka/teros a)petei/namen, e)g\u00f4\\ me\\n le/g\u00f4n, \u00f4(s ou)\ndidakto\\n a)ret\u00ea/, su\\ d', \u00f4(s didakto/n.]]\n\n[Footnote 129: Plato, Protag. p. 361 C. [Greek: e)g\u00f4\\ ou)=n pa/nta\ntau=ta kathor\u00f4=n a)/n\u00f4 ka/t\u00f4 taratto/mena dein\u00f4=s, pa=san prothumi/an\ne)/ch\u00f4 kataphan\u00ea= au)ta\\ gene/sthai, kai\\ bouloi/m\u00ean a)\\n _tau=ta\ndiexeltho/ntas \u00ea(ma=s e)xelthei=n kai\\ e)pi\\ t\u00ea\\n a)ret\u00ea\\n o(/ ti\ne)/stin_.]]\n\n[Footnote 130: Plato, Protag. p. 361 D. [Greek: prom\u00eathou/menos\nu(pe\\r tou= bi/ou tou= e)mautou= panto/s.]]\n\n\n* * * * *\n\n\n[Side-note: Remarks on the dialogue. It closes without the\nleast allusion to Hippokrates.]\n\nSuch is the end of this long and interesting dialogue.[131] We remark\nwith some surprise that it closes without any mention of Hippokrates,\nand without a word addressed to him respecting his anxious request\nfor admission to the society of Protagoras: though such request had\nbeen presented at the beginning, with much emphasis, as the sole\nmotive for the intervention of Sokrates. Upon this point[132]\nthe dialogue is open to the same criticism as that which Plato (in\nthe Ph\u00e6drus) bestows on the discourse of Lysias: requiring that every\ndiscourse shall be like a living organism, neither headless nor\nfootless, but having extremities and a middle piece adapted to each\nother.\n\n[Footnote 131: Most critics treat the Protagoras as a composition of\nPlato's younger years--what they call his _first period_--before\nthe death of Sokrates. They fix different years, from 407\nB.C. (Ast) down to 402 B.C. I do not agree with\nthis view. I can admit no dialogue earlier than 399 B.C.:\nand I consider the Protagoras to belong to Plato's full maturity.]\n\n[Footnote 132: Plato, Ph\u00e6drus, p. 264 C. [Greek: dei=n pa/nta lo/gon\n\u00f4(/sper z\u00f4=on sunesta/nai, s\u00f4=ma/ ti e)/chonta au)to\\n au(tou=, \u00f4/ste\nm\u00ea/te a)ke/phalon ei)=nai m\u00ea/te a)/poun], &c.]\n\n[Side-note: Two distinct aspects of ethics and politics\nexhibited: one under the name of Protagoras; the other, under that of\nSokrates.]\n\nIn our review of this dialogue, we have found first, towards the\nbeginning, an expository discourse from Protagoras, describing the\nmaintenance and propagation of virtue in an established community:\nnext, towards the close, an expository string of interrogatories by\nSokrates, destined to establish the identity of Good with\nPleasurable, Evil with Painful; and the indispensable supremacy of\nthe calculating or measuring science, as the tutelary guide of human\nlife. Of the first, I speak (like other critics) as the discourse of\nProtagoras: of the second, as the theory of Sokrates. But I must\nagain remind the reader, that both the one and the other are\ncompositions of Plato; both alike are offspring of his ingenious and\nproductive imagination. Protagoras is not the author of that which\nappears here under his name: and when we read the disparaging\nepithets which many critics affix to his discourse, we must recollect\nthat these epithets, if they were well-founded, would have no real\napplication to the historical Protagoras, but only to Plato himself.\nHe has set forth two aspects, distinct and in part opposing, of\nethics and politics: and he has provided a worthy champion for each.\nPhilosophy, or \"reasoned truth,\" if it be attainable at all, cannot\nmost certainly be attained without such many-sided handling: still\nless can that which Plato calls knowledge be attained--or such\ncommand of philosophy as will enable a man to stand a Sokratic\ncross-examination in it.\n\n[Side-note: Order of ethical problems, as conceived by\nSokrates.]\n\nIn the last speech of Sokrates in the dialogue,[133] we find him\nproclaiming, that the first of all problems to be solved was, What\nvirtue really is? upon which there prevails serious confusion of\nopinions. It was a second question--important, yet still second and\npresupposing the solution of the first--Whether virtue is teachable?\nWe noticed the same judgment as to the order of the two\nquestions delivered by Sokrates in the Menon.[134]\n\n[Footnote 133: Plato, Protag. p. 361 C.]\n\n[Footnote 134: See the last preceding chapter of this volume, p.\n242.**\n\nUpon this order, necessarily required, of the two questions,\nSchleiermacher has a pertinent remark in his general Einleitung to\nthe works of Plato, p. 26. Eberhard (he says) affirms that the end\nproposed by Plato in his dialogues was to form the minds of the noble\nAthenian youth, so as to make them virtuous citizens. Schleiermacher\ncontroverts the position of Eberhard; maintaining \"that this is far\ntoo subordinate a standing-point for philosophy,--besides that it is\nreasoning in a circle, since philosophy has first to determine what\nthe virtue of a citizen is\".]\n\n[Side-note: Difference of method between him and Protagoras\nflows from this difference of order. Protagoras assumes what virtue\nis, without enquiry.]\n\nNow the conception of ethical questions in this order--the reluctance\nto deal with the second until the first has been fully debated and\nsettled--is one fundamental characteristic of Sokrates. The\ndifference of method, between him and Protagoras, flows from this\nprior difference between them in fundamental conception. What virtue\nis, Protagoras neither defines nor analyses, nor submits to debate.\nHe manifests no consciousness of the necessity of analysis: he\naccepts the ground already prepared for him by King Nomos: he thus\nproceeds as if the first step had been made sure, and takes his\ndeparture from hypotheses of which he renders no account--as the\nPlatonic Sokrates complains of the geometers for doing.[135] To\nProtagoras, social or political virtue is a known and familiar datum,\nabout which no one can mistake: which must be possessed, in greater\nor less measure, by every man, as a condition of the existence of\nsociety: which every individual has an interest in promoting in all\nhis neighbours: and which every one therefore teaches and enforces\nupon every one else. It is a matter of common sense or common\nsentiment, and thus stands in contrast with the special professional\naccomplishments; which are confined only to a few--and the\npossessors, teachers, and learners of which are each an assignable\nsection of the society. The parts or branches of virtue are, in like\nmanner, assumed by him as known, in their relations to each other and\nto the whole. This persuasion of knowledge, without preliminary\ninvestigation, he adopts from the general public, with whom he is in\ncommunion of sentiment. What they accept and enforce as virtue, he\naccepts and enforces also.\n\n[Footnote 135: See supr\u00e0, vol. i. ch. viii. p. 358 and ch. xvii.** p.\n136, respecting these remarks of Plato on the geometers.]\n\n[Side-note: Method of Protagoras. Continuous lectures\naddressed to established public sentiments with which he is in\nharmony.]\n\nAgain, the method pursued by Protagoras, is one suitable to a teacher\nwho has jumped over this first step; who assumes virtue, as something\nfixed in the public sentiments--and addresses himself to those\nsentiments, ready-made as he finds them. He expands and illustrates\nthem in continuous lectures of some length, which fill both the ears\nand minds of the listener--\"Spartam nactus es, hanc exorna\": he\ndescribes their growth, propagation, and working in the community: he\ngives interesting comments on the poets, eulogising the admired\nheroes who form the theme of their verses, and enlarging on their\nadmonitions. Moreover, while resting altogether upon the authority of\nKing Nomos, he points out the best jewel in the crown of that\npotentate; the great social fact of punishment prospective,\nrationally apportioned, and employed altogether for preventing and\ndeterring--instead of being a mere retrospective impulse, vindictive\nor retributive for the past. He describes instructively the machinery\noperative in the community for ensuring obedience to what they think\nright: he teaches, in his eloquent expositions and interpretations,\nthe same morality, public and private, that every one else teaches:\nwhile he can perform the work of teaching, somewhat more effectively\nthan they. Lastly, his method is essentially showy and popular;\nintended for numerous assemblies, reproducing the established creeds\nand sentiments of those assemblies, to their satisfaction and\nadmiration. He is prepared to be met and answered in his own way, by\nopposing speakers; and he conceives himself more than a match for\nsuch rivals. He professes also to possess the art of short\nconversation or discussion. But in the exercise of this art, he runs\nalmost involuntarily into his more characteristic endowment of\ncontinuous speech: besides that the points which he raises for\ndiscussion assume all the fundamental principles, and turn only upon\nsuch applications of those principles as are admitted by most persons\nto be open questions, not foreclosed by a peremptory orthodoxy.\n\n[Side-note: Method of Sokrates. Dwells upon that part of the\nproblem which Protagoras had left out.]\n\nUpon all these points, Sokrates is the formal antithesis of\nProtagoras. He disclaims altogether the capacities to which that\nSophist lays claim. Not only he cannot teach virtue, but he professes\nnot to know what it is, nor whether it be teachable at all, He\nstarts from a different point of view: not considering virtue as a\nknown datum, or as an universal postulate, but assimilating it to a\nspecial craft or accomplishment, in which a few practitioners suffice\nfor the entire public: requiring that in this capacity it shall be\ndefined, and its practitioners and teachers pointed out. He has no\ncommon ground with Protagoras; for the difficulties which he moots\nare just such as the common consciousness (and Protagoras along with\nit) overleaps or supposes to be settled. His first requirement,\nadvanced under the modest guise of a small doubt[136] which\nProtagoras must certainly be competent to remove, is, to know--What\nvirtue is? What are the separate parts of virtue--justice,\nmoderation, holiness, &c.? What is the relation which they bear\nto each other and to the whole--virtue? Are they homogeneous,\ndiffering only in quantity or has each of them its own specific\nessence and peculiarity?[137] Respecting virtue as a whole, we must\nrecollect, Protagoras had discoursed eloquently and confidently, as\nof a matter perfectly known. He is now called back as it were to meet\nan attack in the rear: to answer questions which he had never\nconsidered, and which had never even presented themselves to him as\nquestions. At first he replies as if the questions offered no\ndifficulty;[138] sometimes he does not feel their importance, so that\nit seems to him a matter of indifference whether he replies in the\naffirmative or negative.[139] But he finds himself brought round, by\na series of questions, to assent to conclusions which he nevertheless\nthinks untrue, and which are certainly unwelcome. Accordingly, he\nbecomes more and more disgusted with the process of analytical\ninterrogation: and at length answers with such impatience and\nprolixity, that the interrogation can no longer be prosecuted. Here\ncomes in the break--the remonstrance of Sokrates--and the mediation\nof the by-standers.\n\n[Footnote 136: Plato, Protag. p. 328 E. [Greek: pl\u00ea\\n smikro/n ti/\nmoi e)mpod\u00f4/n, o(/ d\u00ea=lon o(/ti Pr\u00f4tago/ras r(a|di/\u00f4s e)pekdida/xei],\n&c.]\n\n[Footnote 137: Respecting Ariston of Chios, Diogenes Laertius tells\nus--[Greek: A)reta\\s d' ou)/te polla\\s ei)s\u00ea=gen, \u00f4(s o( Z\u00ea/n\u00f4n,\nou)/te mi/an polloi=s o)no/masin kaloume/n\u00ean--a)lla\\ kai\\ to\\ pro\\s\nti/ p\u00f4s e)/chein] (Diog. Laert. vii. 161).]\n\n[Footnote 138: Plato, Protag. p. 329 D. [Greek: A)lla\\ r(a/|dion\ntou=to/ g', e)/ph\u00ea, a)pokri/nasthai], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 139: Plato, Protag. p. 321 D. [Greek: ei) ga\\r bou/lei,\ne)/st\u00f4 \u00ea(mi=n kai\\ dikaiosu/n\u00ea o(/sion kai\\ o(sio/t\u00eas di/kaion. M\u00ea/\nmoi, \u00ea)=n d' e)g\u00f4/; ou)de\\n ga\\r de/omai to\\ \"_ei) bou/lei_\"\ntou=to kai\\ \"_ei) soi dokei=_\" e)le/gchesthai, a)ll' e)me/ te\nkai\\ se/.]]\n\n[Side-note: Antithesis between the eloquent lecturer and\nthe analytical cross-examiner.]\n\nIt is this antithesis between the eloquent popular lecturer, and the\nanalytical enquirer and cross-examiner, which the dialogue seems\nmainly intended to set forth. Protagoras professes to know that which\nhe neither knows, nor has ever tried to probe to the bottom. Upon\nthis false persuasion of knowledge, the Sokratic Elenchus is brought\nto bear. We are made to see how strange, repugnant, and perplexing,\nis the process of analysis to this eloquent expositor: how\nincompetent he is to go through it without confusion: how little he\ncan define his own terms, or determine the limits of those notions on\nwhich he is perpetually descanting.\n\n[Side-note: Protagoras not intended to be always in the wrong,\nthough he is described as brought to a contradiction.]\n\nIt is not that Protagoras is proved to be wrong (I speak now of this\nearly part of the conversation, between chapters 51-62--pp. 329-335)\nin the substantive ground which he takes. I do not at all believe (as\nmany critics either affirm or imply) that Plato intended all which he\nin the composed under the name of Protagoras to be vile perversion of\ntruth, with nothing but empty words and exorbitant pretensions. I do\nnot even believe that Plato intended all those observations, to which\nthe name of Protagoras is prefixed, to be accounted silly--while all\nthat is assigned to Sokrates,[140] is admirable sense and acuteness.\nIt is by no means certain that Plato intended to be understood as\nhimself endorsing the opinions which he ascribes everywhere to\nSokrates: and it is quite certain that he does not always make the\nSokrates of one dialogue consistent with the Sokrates of another. For\nthe purpose of showing the incapacity of the respondent to satisfy\nthe exigencies of analysis, we need not necessarily suppose that the\nconclusion to which the questions conduct should be a true one. If\nthe respondent be brought, through his own admissions, to a\ncontradiction, this is enough to prove that he did not know the\nsubject deeply enough to make the proper answers and distinctions.\n\n[Footnote 140: Sch\u00f6ne, in his Commentary on the Protagoras, is of\nopinion that a good part of Plato's own doctrine is given under the\nname of Protagoras (Ueber den Protag. von Platon, p. 180 seq.).]\n\n[Side-note: Affirmation of Protagoras about courage is\naffirmed by Plato himself elsewhere.]\n\nBut whatever may have been the intention of Plato, if we look at the\nfact, we shall find that what he has assigned to Sokrates is not\nalways true, nor what he has given to Protagoras, always false.\nThe positions laid down by the latter--That many men are courageous,\nbut unjust: that various persons are just, without being wise and\nintelligent: that he who possesses one virtue, does not of necessity\npossess all:[141]--are not only in conformity with the common\nopinion, but are quite true, though Sokrates is made to dispute them.\nMoreover, the arguments employed by Sokrates (including in those\narguments the strange propositions that justice is just, and that\nholiness is holy) are certainly noway conclusive.[142] Though\nProtagoras, becoming entangled in difficulties, and incapable of\nmaintaining his consistency against an embarrassing\ncross-examination, is of course exhibited as ignorant of that which he\nprofesses to know--the doctrine which he maintains is neither untrue\nin itself, nor even shown to be apparently untrue.\n\n[Footnote 141: Plato, Protag. p. 329 E. Protagoras is here made to\naffirm that many men are courageous who are neither just, nor\ntemperate, nor virtuous in other respects. Sokrates contradicts the\nposition. But in the Treatise De Legibus (i. p. 630 B), Plato himself\nsays same thing as Protagoras is here made to say: at least assuming\nthat the Athenian speaker in De Legg. represents the sentiment of\nPlato himself at the time when he composed that treatise.]\n\n[Footnote 142: Plato, Protag. p. 330 C, p. 333 B.\n\nTo say \"Justice is just,\" or \"Holiness is holy,\" is indeed either\nmere tautology, or else an impropriety of speech. Dr. Hutcheson\nobserves on an analogous case: \"None can apply moral attributes to\nthe very faculty of perceiving moral qualities: or call his moral\nSense morally Good or Evil, any more than he calls the power of\ntasting, sweet or bitter--or the power of seeing, straight or\ncrooked, white or black\" (Hutcheson on the Passions, sect. i. p.\n234).]\n\n[Side-note: The harsh epithets applied by critics to\nProtagoras are not borne out by the dialogue. He stands on the same\nground as the common consciousness.]\n\nAs to the arrogant and exorbitant pretensions which the Platonic\ncommentators ascribe to Protagoras, more is said than the reality\njustifies. He pretends to know what virtue, justice, moderation,\ncourage, &c., are, and he is proved not to know. But this is what\nevery one else pretends to know also, and what every body else\nteaches as well as he--\"_H\u00e6c Janus summus ab imo Perdocet: h\u00e6c\nrecinunt juvenes dictata senesque_\". What he pretends to do,\nbeyond the general public, he really can do. He can discourse,\nlearnedly and eloquently, upon these received doctrines and\nsentiments: he can enlist the feelings and sympathies of the public\nin favour of that which he, in common with the public, believes to be\ngood--and against that which he and they believe to be bad: he\ncan thus teach virtue more effectively than others. But whether that\nwhich is received as virtue, be really such--he has never analysed or\nverified: nor does he willingly submit to the process of analysis.\nHere again he is in harmony with the general public; for they hate,\nas much as he does, to be dragged back to fundamentals, and forced to\nexplain, defend, revise, or modify, their established sentiments and\nmaxims: which they apply as _principia_ for deduction to\nparticular cases, and which they recognise as axioms whereby other\nthings are to be tried, not as liable to be tried themselves.\nProtagoras is one of the general public, in dislike of, and\ninaptitude for, analysis and dialectic discussion: while he stands\nabove them in his eloquence and his power of combining, illustrating,\nand adorning, received doctrines. These are points of superiority,\nnot pretended, but real.\n\n[Side-note: Aversion of Protagoras for dialectic. Interlude\nabout the song of Simonides.]\n\nThe aversion of Protagoras for dialectic discussion--after causing an\ninterruption of the ethical argument, and an interlude of comment on\nthe poet Simonides--is at length with difficulty overcome, and the\nargument is then resumed. The question still continues, What is\nvirtue? What are the five different parts of virtue? Yet it is so far\naltered that Protagoras now admits that the four parts of virtue\nwhich Sokrates professed to have shown to be nearly identical, really\nare tolerably alike: but he nevertheless contends that courage is\nvery different from all of them, repeating his declaration that many\nmen are courageous, but unjust and stupid at the same time. This\nposition Sokrates undertakes to refute. In doing so, he lays out one\nof the largest, most distinct, and most positive theories of virtue,\nwhich can be found in the Platonic writings.\n\n[Side-note: Ethical view given by Sokrates worked out at\nlength clearly. Good and evil consist in right or wrong calculation\nof pleasures and pains of the agent.]\n\nVirtue, according to this theory, consists in a right measurement and\nchoice of pleasures and pains: in deciding correctly, wherever we\nhave an alternative, on which side lies the largest pleasure or the\nleast pain--and choosing the side which presents this balance. To\nlive pleasurably, is pronounced to be good: to live without pleasure\nor in pain, is evil. Moreover, nothing but pleasure, or comparative\nmitigation of pain, is good: nothing but pain is evil.[143]\nGood, is identical with the greatest pleasure or least pain: evil,\nwith greatest pain: meaning thereby each pleasure and each pain when\nlooked at along with its consequences and concomitants. The grand\ndetermining cause and condition of virtue is knowledge: the\nknowledge, science, or art, of correctly measuring the comparative\nvalue of different pleasures and pains. Such knowledge (the theory\naffirms), wherever it is possessed, will be sure to command the whole\nman, to dictate all his conduct, and to prevail over every temptation\nof special appetite or aversion. To say that a man who knows on which\nside the greatest pleasure or the least pain lies, will act against\nhis knowledge--is a mistake. If he acts in this way, it is plain that\nhe does not possess the knowledge, and that he sins through\nignorance.\n\n[Footnote 143: The substantial identity of Good with Pleasure, of\nEvil with Pain, was the doctrine of the historical Sokrates as\ndeclared in Xenophon's Memorabilia. See, among other passages, i. 6,\n8. [Greek: Tou= de\\ m\u00ea\\ douleu/ein gastri\\ m\u00eade\\ u(/pn\u00f4| kai\\\nlagnei/a|, oi)/ei ti a)/llo ai)ti\u00f4/teron ei)=nai, \u00ea)\\ to\\ e(/tera\ne)/chein tou/t\u00f4n \u00ea(di/\u00f4, a(\\ ou) mo/non e)n chrei/a| o)/nta\neu)phrai/nei, a)lla\\ kai\\ e)lpi/das pare/chonta \u00f4)phel\u00ea/sein a)ei/?\nKai\\ m\u00ea\\n tou=to/ ge oi)=stha, o(/ti oi( me\\n oi)o/menoi m\u00eade\\n eu)=\npra/ttein ou)k eu)phrai/nontai, oi( de\\ \u00ea(gou/menoi kal\u00f4=s\nproch\u00f4rei=n e(autoi=s, \u00ea)\\ ge\u00f4rgi/an \u00ea)\\ naukl\u00eari/an \u00ea)\\ a)/ll' o(/,\nti a)\\n tugcha/n\u00f4sin e)rgazo/menoi, \u00f4(s eu)= pra/ttontes\neu)phrai/nontai. Oi)/ei ou)=n a)po\\ pa/nt\u00f4n tou/t\u00f4n tosau/t\u00ean\n\u00ea(don\u00ea\\n ei)=nai, o(/s\u00ean a)po\\ tou= e(auto/n te \u00ea(gei=sthai belti/\u00f4\ngi/gnesthai kai\\ phi/lous a)mei/nous kta=sthai? E)g\u00f4\\ toi/nun\ndiatel\u00f4= tau=ta nomi/z\u00f4n.]\n\nLocke says, 'Essay on Human Understanding,' Book ii. ch. 28, \"Good or\nEvil is nothing but pleasure or pain to us--or that which procures\npleasure or pain to us. Moral good or evil then is only the\nconformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law,\nwhereby good or evil is drawn on us by the will and power of the\nlaw-maker; which good or evil, pleasure or pain, attending our\nobservance or breach of the law, is that we call reward or punishment.\"\n\nThe formal distinction here taken by Locke between pleasure and that\nwhich procures pleasure--both the one and the other being called\nGood--(the like in regard to pain and evil) is not distinctly stated\nby Sokrates in the Protagoras, though he says nothing inconsistent\nwith it: but it is distinctly stated in the Republic, ii. p. 357,\nwhere Good is distributed under three heads. 1. That which we desire\nimmediately and for itself--such as Enjoyment, Innocuous pleasure. 2.\nThat which we desire both for itself and for its consequences--health,\nintelligence, good sight or hearing, &c. 3. That which we\ndo not desire (perhaps even shun) for itself, but which we accept by\nreason of its consequences in averting greater pains or procuring\ngreater pleasures.\n\nThis discrimination of the varieties of Good, given in the Republic,\nis quite consistent with what is stated by Sokrates in the\nProtagoras, though it is more full and precise. But it is not\nconsistent with what Sokrates says in the Gorgias, where he asserts a\nradical dissimilarity of nature between [Greek: \u00ea(du\\] and [Greek:\na)gatho/n].]\n\n[Side-note: Protagoras is at first opposed to this theory.]\n\nProtagoras agrees with Sokrates in the encomiums bestowed on the\nparamount importance and ascendancy of knowledge: but does not at\nfirst agree with him in identifying good with pleasure, and evil with\npain. Upon this point, too, he is represented as agreeing in\nopinion with the Many. He does not admit that to live pleasurably is\ngood, unless where a man takes his pleasure in honourable things. He\nthinks it safer, and more consistent with his own whole life, to\nmaintain--That pleasurable things, or painful things, may be either\ngood, or evil, or indifferent, according to the particular case.\n\n[Side-note: Reasoning of Sokrates.]\n\nThis doctrine Sokrates takes much pains to refute. He contends that\npleasurable things, so far forth as pleasurable, are always good--and\npainful things, so far forth as painful, always evil. When some\npleasures are called evil, that is not on account of any thing\nbelonging to the pleasure itself, but because of its ulterior\nconsequences and concomitants, which are painful or distressing in a\ndegree more than countervailing the pleasure. So too, when some pains\nare pronounced to be good, this is not from any peculiarity in the\npain itself, but because of its consequences and concomitants: such\npain being required as a condition to the attainment of health,\nsecurity, wealth, and other pleasures or satisfactions more than\ncounter-balancing. Sokrates challenges opponents to name any other\nend, with reference to which things are called _good_, except\ntheir tendency to prevent or relieve pains and to ensure a balance of\npleasure: he challenges them to name any other end, with reference to\nwhich things are called _evil_, except their tendency to produce\npains and to intercept or destroy pleasures. In measuring pleasures\nand pains against each other, there is no other difference to be\nreckoned except that of greater or less, more or fewer. The\ndifference between near and distant, does indeed obtrude itself upon\nus as a misleading element. But it is the special task of the\n\"measuring science\" to correct this illusion--and to compare\npleasures or pains, whether near or distant, according to their real\nworth: just as we learn to rectify the illusions of the sight in\nregard to near and distant objects.\n\n[Side-note: Application of that reasoning to the case of\ncourage.]\n\nSokrates proceeds to apply this general principle in correcting the\nexplanation of courage given by Protagoras. He shows, or tries to\nshow, that courage, like all the other branches of virtue, consists\nin acting on a just estimate of comparative pleasures and pains. No\nman affronts evil, or the alternative of greater pain, knowing it\nto be such: no man therefore adventures himself in any terrible\nenterprise, knowing it to be so: neither the brave nor the timid do\nthis. Both the brave and the timid affront that which they think not\nterrible, or the least terrible of two alternatives: but they\nestimate differently what is such. The former go readily to war when\nrequired, the latter evade it. Now to go into war when required, is\nhonourable: being honourable, it is good: being honourable and good,\nit is pleasurable. The brave know this, and enter upon it willingly:\nthe timid not only do not know it, but entertain the contrary\nopinion, looking upon war as painful and terrible, and therefore\nkeeping aloof. The brave men fear what it is honourable to fear, the\ncowards what it is dishonourable to fear: the former act upon the\nknowledge of what is really terrible, the latter are misled by their\nignorance of it. Courage is thus, like the other virtues, a case of\naccurate knowledge of comparative pleasures and pains, or of good and\nevil.[144]\n\n[Footnote 144: Compare, respecting Courage, a passage in the\nRepublic, iv. pp. 429 C, 430 B, which is better stated there (though\nsubstantially the same opinion) than here in the Protagoras.\n\nThe opinion of the Platonic Sokrates may be illustrated by a sentence\nfrom the funeral oration delivered by Perikl\u00eas, Thucyd. ii. 43, fin.\n[Greek: A)lgeinote/ra ga\\r a)ndri/ ge phro/n\u00eama e)/chonti \u00ea( e)n t\u00f4=|\nmeta\\ tou= malakisth\u00ea=nai ka/k\u00f4sis, \u00ea)\\ o( meta\\ r(\u00f4/m\u00eas kai\\ koin\u00ea=s\ne)lpi/dos a(/ma gigno/menos a)nai/sth\u00eatos tha/natos]--which Dr.\nArnold thus translates in his note: \"For more grievous to a man of\nnoble mind is the misery which comes together with cowardice, than\nthe unfelt death which befalls him in the midst of his strength and\nhopes for the common welfare.\"\n\nSo again in the Ph\u00e6don (p. 68) Sokrates describes the courage of the\nordinary unphilosophical citizen to consist in braving death from\nfear of greater evils (which is the same view as that of Sokrates in\nthe Protagoras), while the philosopher is courageous on a different\nprinciple; aspiring only to reason and intelligence, with the\npleasures attending it, he welcomes death as releasing his mind from\nthe obstructive companionship of the body.\n\nThe fear of disgrace and dishonour, in his own eyes and in those of\nothers, is more intolerable to the brave man than the fear of wounds\nand death in the service of his country. See Plato, Leg. i. pp.\n646-647. He is [Greek: phobero\\s meta\\ no/mou, meta\\ di/k\u00eas], p. 647 E.\nSuch is the way in which both Plato and Thucydides conceive the\ncharacter of the brave citizen as compared with the coward.\n\nIt is plain that this resolves itself ultimately into a different\nestimate of prospective pains; the case being one in which pleasure\nis not concerned. That the pains of self-reproach and infamy in the\neyes of others are among the most agonising in the human bosom, need\nhardly be remarked. At the same time the sentiments here conceived\nembrace a wide field of sympathy, comprising the interests, honour,\nand security, of others as well as of the individual agent.]\n\n[Side-note: The theory which Plato here lays down is more\ndistinct and specific than any theory laid down in other dialogues.]\n\nSuch is the ethical theory which the Platonic Sokrates enunciates in\nthis dialogue, and which Protagoras and others accept. It is positive\nand distinct, to a degree very unusual with Plato. We shall find that\nhe theorises differently in other dialogues; whether for the\nbetter or the worse, will be hereafter seen. He declares here\nexplicitly that pleasure, or happiness, is the end to be pursued; and\npain, or misery, the end to be avoided: and that there is no other\nend, in reference to which things can be called good or evil, except\nas they tend to promote pleasure or mitigate suffering, on the one\nside--to entail pain or suffering on the other. He challenges\nobjectors to assign any other end. And thus much is certain--that in\nthose other dialogues where he himself departs from the present\ndoctrine, he has not complied with his own challenge. Nowhere has he\nspecified a different end. In other dialogues, as well as in the\nProtagoras, Plato has insisted on the necessity of a science or art\nof calculation: but in no other dialogue has he told us distinctly\nwhat are the items to be calculated.\n\n[Side-note: Remarks on the theory here laid down by Sokrates.\nIt is too narrow, and exclusively prudential.]\n\nI perfectly agree with the doctrine laid down by Sokrates in the\nProtagoras, that pain or suffering is the End to be avoided or\nlessened as far as possible--and pleasure or happiness the End to be\npursued as far as attainable--by intelligent forethought and\ncomparison: that there is no other intelligible standard of\nreference, for application of the terms Good and Evil, except the\ntendency to produce happiness or misery: and that if this standard be\nrejected, ethical debate loses all standard for rational discussion,\nand becomes only an enunciation of the different sentiments,\nauthoritative and self-justifying, prevalent in each community. But\nthe End just mentioned is highly complex, and care must be taken to\nconceive it in its full comprehension. Herein I conceive the argument\nof Sokrates (in the Protagoras) to be incomplete. It carries\nattention only to a part of the truth, keeping out of sight, though\nnot excluding, the remainder. It considers each man as an individual,\ndetermining good or evil for himself by calculating his own pleasures\nand pains: as a prudent, temperate, and courageous agent, but neither\nas just nor beneficent. It omits to take account of him as a member\nof a society, composed of many others akin or co-ordinate with\nhimself. Now it is the purpose of an ethical or political reasoner\n(such as Plato both professes to be and really is) to study the means\nof happiness, not simply for the agent himself, but for that\nagent together with others around him--for the members of the\ncommunity generally.[145] The Platonic Sokrates says this himself in\nthe Republic: and accordingly, he there treats of other points which\nare not touched upon by Sokrates in the Protagoras. He proclaims that\nthe happiness of each citizen must be sought only by means consistent\nwith the security, and to a certain extent with the happiness, of\nothers: he provides as far as practicable that all shall derive their\npleasures and pains from the same causes: common pleasures, and\ncommon pains, to all.[146] The doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras\nrequires to be enlarged so as to comprehend these other important\nelements. Since the conduct of every agent affects the happiness of\nothers, he must be called upon to take account of its consequences\nunder both aspects, especially where it goes to inflict hurt or\nprivation upon others. Good and evil depend upon that scientific\ncomputation and comparison of pleasures and pains which Sokrates in\nthe Protagoras prescribes: but the computation must include, to a\ncertain extent, the pleasures and pains (security and rightful\nexpectations) of others besides the agent himself, implicated in the\nconsequences of his acts.[147]\n\n[Footnote 145: Plato, Republ. iv. pp. 420-421, v. p. 466 A.]\n\n[Footnote 146: Plato, Republ. v. pp. 462 A-B-D, 464 A-D.\n\nThroughout the first of these passages we see [Greek: a)gatho\\n] used\nas the equivalent of [Greek: \u00ea(don\u00ea/], [Greek: kako\\n] as the\nequivalent of [Greek: lu/p\u00ea].]\n\n[Footnote 147: See, especially on this point, the brief but valuable\nTract on Utilitarianism by Mr. John Stuart Mill. In page 16 of that\nwork attention is called to the fact, that in Utilitarianism the\nstandard is not the greatest happiness of the agent himself alone,\nbut the greatest amount of happiness altogether. So that we cannot\nwith exactness call the doctrine of Sokrates, in his conversation\nwith Protagoras, \"the theory of Utilitarianism,\" as Mr. Mill calls it\nin page 1.]\n\n[Side-note: Comparison with the Republic.]\n\nAs to this point, we shall find the Platonic Sokrates not always\ncorrect, nor even consistent with himself. This will appear\nespecially when we come to see the account which he gives of Justice\nin the Republic. In that branch of the Ethical End, a direct regard\nto the security of others comes into the foreground. For in an act of\ninjustice, the prominent characteristic is that of harm, done to\nothers--though that is not the whole, since the security of the agent\nhimself is implicated with that of others in the general fulfilment\nof these obligations. It is this primary regard to others, and\nsecondary regard to self, implicated in one complex feeling--which\ndistinguishes justice from prudence. The Platonic Sokrates in\nthe Republic (though his language is not always clear) does not admit\nthis; but considers justice as a branch of prudence, necessary to\nensure the happiness of the individual agent himself.\n\n[Side-note: The discourse of Protagoras brings out an\nimportant part of the whole case, which is omitted in the analysis by\nSokrates.]\n\nNow in the Protagoras, what the Platonic Sokrates dwells upon (in the\nargument which I have been considering) is prudence, temperance,\ncourage: little or nothing is said about justice: there was therefore\nthe less necessity for insisting on that prominent\nreference to the security of others (besides the agent himself) which\njustice involves. If, however, we turn back to the earlier part of\nthe dialogue, to the speech delivered by Protagoras, we see justice\nbrought into the foreground. It is not indeed handled analytically\n(which is not the manner of that Sophist), nor is it resolved into\nregard to pleasure and pain, happiness and misery: but it is\nannounced as a social sentiment indispensably and reciprocally\nnecessary from every man towards every other ([Greek: di/k\u00ea--ai)d\u00f4\\s]),\ndistinguishable from those endowments which supply the\nwants and multiply the comforts of the individual himself. The very\nexistence of the social union requires, that each man should feel a\nsentiment of duties on his part towards others, and duties on their\nparts towards him: or (in other words) of rights on his part to have\nhis interests considered by others, and rights on their parts to have\ntheir interests considered by him. Unless this sentiment of\nreciprocity--reciprocal duty and right--exist in the bosom of each\nindividual citizen, or at least in the large majority--no social\nunion could subsist. There are doubtless different degrees of the\nsentiment: moreover the rights and duties may be apportioned better\nor worse, more or less fairly, among the individuals of a society;\nthus rendering the society more or less estimable and comfortable.\nBut without a certain minimum of the sentiment in each individual\nbosom, even the worst constituted society could not hold together.\nAnd it is this sentiment of reciprocity which Protagoras (in the\ndialogue before us) is introduced as postulating in his declaration,\nthat justice and the sense of shame (unlike to professional\naptitudes) must be distributed universally and without exception\namong all the members of a community. Each man must feel them,\nin his conduct towards others: each man must also be able to reckon\nthat others will feel the like, in their behaviour towards him.[148]\n\n[Footnote 148: Professor Bain (in his work on the Emotions and the\nWill, ch. xv. On the Ethical Emotions, pp. 271-3) has given remarks\nextremely pertinent to the illustration of that doctrine which Plato\nhas here placed under the name of Protagoras.\n\n\"The supposed uniformity of moral distinctions resolves itself into\nthe two following particulars. First, the common end of _public\nsecurity_, which is also individual preservation, demands certain\nprecautions that are everywhere very much alike, and can in no case\nbe dispensed with. Some sort of constituted authority to control the\nindividual impulses and to protect each man's person and property,\nmust exist wherever a number of human beings live together. The\nduties springing out of this necessary arrangement are essentially\nthe same in all societies. . . They have a pretty uniform character\nall over the globe. If the sense of the common safety were not\nsufficiently strong to constitute the social tie of obedience to some\ncommon regulations, society could not exist. . . . It is no proof of\nthe universal spread of a special innate faculty of moral\ndistinctions, but of a certain rational appreciation of what is\nnecessary for the very existence of every human being living in the\ncompany of others: Doubtless, if the sad history of the human race\nhad been preserved in all its details, we _should have many\nexamples of tribes that perished from being unequal to the conception\nof a social system, or to the restraints imposed by it_. We know\nenough of the records of anarchy, to see how difficult it is for\nhuman nature to comply in full with the social conditions of\nsecurity; but if this were not complied with at all, the result would\nbe mutual and swift destruction. . . . In the second place, mankind\nhave been singularly unanimous in the practice of imposing upon\nindividual members of societies some observances or restraints of\npurely _sentimental_ origin, having no reference, direct or\nindirect, to the maintenance of the social tie, with all the\nsafeguards implied in it. Certain maxims founded in taste, liking,\naversion, or fancy, have, in every community known to us, been raised\nto the dignity of authoritative morality; being rendered (so to\nspeak) 'terms of communion,' and have been enforced by punishment.\n. . . In the rules, founded on men's sentiments, likings, aversions,\nand antipathies, there is nothing common but the fact that some one\nor other of these are carried to the length of public requirement,\nand mixed up in one code with the imperative duties that hold society\ntogether.\"\n\nThe postulate of the Platonic Protagoras--that [Greek: di/k\u00ea] and\n[Greek: ai)d\u00f4\\s] must be felt to a certain extent in each man's\nbosom, as a condition to the very existence of society--agrees with\nthe first of the two elements here distinguished by Mr. Bain, and\ndoes not necessarily go beyond it. But the unsystematic teaching and\nuniversal propagandism, which Protagoras describes as the agency\nwhereby virtue is communicated, applies alike to both the two\nelements distinguished by Mr. Bain: to the factitious exigencies of\nKing Nomos, as well as to his tutelary control. It is this mixed mass\nthat the Sokratic analysis is brought to examine.]\n\n[Side-note: The Ethical End, as implied in the discourse of\nProtagoras, involves a direct regard to the pleasures and pains of\nother persons besides the agent himself.]\n\nIf we thus compare the Ethical End, as implied, though not explicitly\nlaid down, by Protagoras in the earlier part of the dialogue,--and as\nlaid down by Sokrates in the later part--we shall see that while\nSokrates restricts it to a true comparative estimate of the pains and\npleasures of the agent himself, Protagoras enlarges it so as to\ninclude a direct reference to those of others also, coupled with an\nexpectation of the like reference on the part of others.[149]\nSokrates is satisfied with requiring from each person calculating\nprudence for his own pleasures and pains: while Protagoras proclaims\nthat after this attribute had been obtained by man, and individual\nwants supplied, still there was a farther element necessary in the\ncalculation--the social sentiment or reciprocity of regard implanted\nin every one's bosom: without this the human race would have\nperished. Prudence and skill will suffice for an isolated existence;\nbut if men are to live and act in social communion, the services as\nwell as the requirements of each man must be shaped, in a certain\nmeasure, with a direct view to the security of others as well as to\nhis own.\n\n[Footnote 149: Plato, Protag. pp. 321-322.]\n\nIn my judgment, the Ethical End, exclusively self-regarding, here\nlaid down by Sokrates, is too narrow. And if we turn to other\nPlatonic dialogues, we shall find Sokrates still represented as\nproclaiming a self-regarding Ethical End, though not the same as what\nwe read in the Protagoras. In the Gorgias, Republic, Ph\u00e6don, &c.,\nwe shall find him discountenancing the calculation (recommended in\nthe Protagoras) of pleasures and pains against each other, as\ngreater, more certain, durable, &c., and insisting that all shall\nbe estimated according as they bear on the general condition or\nhealth of the mind, which he assimilates to the general condition or\nhealth of the body. The health of the body, considered as an End to\nbe pursued, is essentially self-regarding: so also is the health of\nthe mind. I shall touch upon this farther when I consider the\nabove-mentioned dialogues: at present, I only remark that they agree\nwith the Sokrates of the Protagoras in assuming a self-regarding Ethical\nEnd, though they do not agree with him in describing what that End\nshould be.\n\n[Side-note: Plato's reasoning in the dialogue is not clear or\nsatisfactory, especially about courage.]\n\nThe application which Sokrates makes (in the Protagoras) of his own\nassumed Ethical End to the explanation of courage, is certainly\nconfused and unsatisfactory. And indeed, we may farther remark that\nthe general result at which Plato seems to be aiming in this\ndialogue, viz.: That all the different virtues are at the bottom one\nand the same, and that he who possesses one of them must also\npossess the remainder--cannot be made out even upon his own\nassumptions. Though it be true that all the virtues depend upon\ncorrect calculation, yet as each of them applies to a different set\nof circumstances and different disturbing and misleading causes, the\nsame man who calculates well under one set of circumstances, may\ncalculate badly under others. The position laid down by Protagoras,\nthat men are often courageous but unjust--just, but not wise--is\nnoway refuted by Plato. Nor is it even inconsistent with Plato's own\ntheory, though he seems to think it so.\n\n[Side-note: Doctrine of Stallbaum and other critics is not\ncorrect. That the analysis here ascribed to Sokrates is not intended\nby Plato as serious, but as a mockery of the sophists.]\n\nSome of the Platonic commentators maintain,[150] that the doctrine\nhere explicitly laid down and illustrated by Sokrates, _viz._:\nthe essential identity of the pleasurable with the good, of the\npainful with the evil--is to be regarded as not serious, but as taken\nup in jest for the purpose of mocking and humiliating Protagoras.\nSuch an hypothesis appears to me untenable; contradicted by the whole\ntenor of the dialogue. Throughout all the Platonic compositions,\nthere is nowhere to be found any train of argument more direct, more\nserious, and more elaborate, than that by which Sokrates here proves\nthe identity of good with pleasure, of pain with evil (p. 351 to\nend). Protagoras begins by denying it, and is only compelled to\naccept the conclusion against his own will, by the series of\nquestions which he cannot otherwise answer.[151] Sokrates admits that\nthe bulk of mankind are also opposed to it: but he establishes it\nwith an ingenuity which is pronounced to be triumphant by all the\nhearers around.[152] The commentators are at liberty to impeach\nthe reasoning as unsound; but to set it aside as mere banter and\nmockery, is preposterous. Assume it even to be intended as\nmockery--assume that Sokrates is mystifying the hearers, by a string of\ndelusive queries, to make out a thesis which he knows to be untrue\nand silly--how can the mockery fall upon Protagoras, who denies the\nthesis from the beginning?[153] The irony, if it were irony, would be\nmisplaced and absurd.\n\n[Footnote 150: See Brandis, Gesch. d. Griech.-R\u00f6m., Phil. Part ii.\nsect. 114, note 3 p. 458; Stallbaum, Prolegom. ad Protag.\npp. 15-33-34.\n\nSo too Ficinus says in his Argumentum to the Protagoras: (p. 765)\n\"Tum vero de bono et malo multa tractantur. Siquidem prudentia est\nscientia eligendi boni, malique vitandi. Ambigitur autem utrum bonum\nmalumque idem sit penitus quod et voluptas et dolor. _Neque\naffirmatur id quidem omnino, neque manifest\u00e9 omnino negatur._ De\nhoc enim in Gorgi\u00e2 Phileboque et alibi,\" &c.\n\nWhen a critic composes an Argument to the Protagoras, he is surely\nunder obligation to report faithfully and exactly what is declared by\nSokrates _in the Protagoras_, whether it be consistent or not\nwith the Gorgias and Phil\u00eabus. Yet here we find Ficinus\nmisrepresenting the Protagoras, in order to force it into harmony\nwith the other two.]\n\n[Footnote 151: This is so directly stated that I am surprised to find\nZeller (among many other critics) announcing that Plato here accepts\nfor the occasion the _Standpunkt_ of his enemies (Philos. der\nGriech. vol. ii. p. 380, ed. 2nd).]\n\n[Footnote 152: Plato, Protag. p. 358 A. [Greek: u(perphu\u00f4=s e)do/kei\na(/pasin a)l\u00eath\u00ea= ei)=nai ta\\ ei)r\u00eame/na.]]\n\n[Footnote 153: When Stallbaum asserts that the thesis is taken up by\nSokrates as one which was maintained by Protagoras and the other\nSophists (Proleg. p. 33), he says what is distinctly at variance with\nthe dialogue, p. 351.\n\nSchleiermacher maintains that this same thesis (the fundamental\nidentity of good with pleasure, evil with pain) is altogether\n\"unsokratic and unplatonic\"; that it is handled here by Sokrates in a\nmanner visibly ironical (sichtbar ironisch); that the purpose of the\nargument is to show the stupidity of Protagoras, who is puzzled and\nimposed upon by such obvious fallacies (Einleitung zum Protag. 230,\nbottom of p. 232), and who is made to exhibit (so Schleiermacher\nsays, Einl. zum Gorgias, p. 14) a string of ludicrous absurdities.\n\nUpon this I have to remark first, that if the stupidity of Protagoras\nis intended to be shown up, that of all the other persons present\nmust be equally manifested; for all of them assent emphatically, at\nthe close, to the thesis as having been proved (Prot. p. 358 A):\nnext, that I am unable to see either the absurdities of Protagoras or\nthe irony of Sokrates, which Schleiermacher asserts to be so visible.\nThe argument of Sokrates is as serious and elaborate as any thing\nwhich we read in Plato. Schleiermacher seems to me to misconceive\naltogether (not only here but also in his Einleitung zum Gorgias, p.\n10) the concluding argument of Sokrates in the Protagoras. To\ndescribe the identity between [Greek: \u00ea(du\\] and [Greek: a)gatho\\n]\nas a \"scheinbare Voraussetzung\" is to depart from the plain meaning\nof words.\n\nAgain, Steinhart contends that Sokrates assumes this doctrine\n(identity of pleasure with good, pain with evil), \"not as his own\nopinion, but only hypothetically, with a sarcastic side-glance at the\nabsurd consequences which many deduced from it--only as the received\nworld-morality, as the opinion of the majority\" (Einleit. zum Protag.\np. 419). How Steinhart can find proof of this in the dialogue, I am\nat a loss to understand. The dialogue presents to us Sokrates\nintroducing the opinion as his own, against that of Protagoras and\nagainst that of the multitude (p. 351 C). On hearing this opposition\nfrom Protagoras, Sokrates invites him to an investigation, whether\nthe opinion be just; Sokrates then conducts the investigation\nhimself, along with Protagoras, at considerable length, and\nultimately brings out the doctrine as proved, with the assent of all\npresent.\n\nThese forced interpretations are resorted to, because the critics\ncannot bear to see the Platonic Sokrates maintaining a thesis\nsubstantially the same as that of Eudoxus and Epikurus. Upon this\npoint, K. F. Hermann is more moderate than the others; he admits the\nthesis to be seriously maintained in the dialogue--states that it was\nreally the opinion of the historical Sokrates--and adds that it was\nalso the opinion of Plato himself during his early Sokratic stadium,\nwhen the Protagoras (as he thinks) was composed (Gesch. und Syst. der\nPlat. Phil. pp. 462-463).\n\nMost of the critics agree in considering the Protagoras to be one of\nPlato's earlier dialogues, about 403 B.C. Ast even refers it\nto 407 B.C. when Plato was about twenty-one years of age. I\nhave already given my reasons for believing that none of the Platonic\ndialogues were composed before 399 B.C. The Protagoras\nbelongs, in my opinion, to Plato's most perfect and mature period.]\n\n[Side-note: Grounds of that doctrine. Their insufficiency.]\n\nThe commentators resort to this hypothesis, partly because the\ndoctrine in question is one which they disapprove--partly\nbecause doctrines inconsistent with it are maintained in other\nPlatonic dialogues. These are the same two reasons upon which, in\nother cases, various dialogues have been rejected as not genuine\nworks of Plato. The first of the two reasons is plainly irrelevant:\nwe must accept what Plato gives us, whether we assent to it or not.\nThe second reason also, I think, proves little. The dialogues are\ndistinct compositions, written each with its own circumstances and\npurpose: we have no right to require that they shall be all\nconsistent with each other in doctrine, especially when we look to\nthe long philosophical career of Plato. To suppose that the elaborate\nreasoning of Sokrates in the latter portion of the Protagoras is mere\nirony, intended to mystify both Protagoras himself and all the\nby-standers, who accept it as earnest and convincing--appears to me far\nless reasonable than the admission, that the dialectic pleading\nascribed to Sokrates in one dialogue is inconsistent with that\nassigned to him in another.\n\n[Side-note: Subject is professedly still left unsettled at the\nclose of the dialogue.]\n\nThough there is every mark of seriousness, and no mark of irony, in\nthis reasoning of Sokrates, yet we must remember that he does not\nprofess to leave the subject settled at the close of the dialogue. On\nthe contrary, he declares himself to be in a state of puzzle and\nperplexity. The question, proposed at the outset, Whether virtue is\nteachable? remains undecided.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIV.\n\nGORGIAS.\n\n\n[Side-note: Persons who debate in the Gorgias. Celebrity of the\nhistorical Gorgias.]\n\nAristotle, in one of his lost dialogues, made honourable mention of a\nCorinthian cultivator, who, on reading the Platonic Gorgias, was\nsmitten with such vehement admiration, that he abandoned his fields\nand his vines, came to Athens forthwith, and committed himself to the\ntuition of Plato.[1] How much of reality there may be in this\nanecdote, we cannot say: but the Gorgias itself is well calculated to\njustify such warm admiration. It opens with a discussion on the\nnature and purpose of Rhetoric, but is gradually enlarged so as to\ninclude a comparison of the various schemes of life, and an outline\nof positive ethical theory. It is carried on by Sokrates with three\ndistinct interlocutors--Gorgias, Polus, and Kallikl\u00eas; but I must\nagain remind the reader that all the four are only spokesmen prompted\nby Plato himself.[2] It may indeed be considered almost as three\ndistinct dialogues, connected by a loose thread. The historical\nGorgias, a native of Leontini in Sicily, was the most celebrated of\nthe Grecian rhetors; an elderly man during Plato's youth. He paid\nvisits to different cities in all parts of Greece, and gave lessons\nin rhetoric to numerous pupils, chiefly young men of ambitious\naspirations.[3]\n\n[Footnote 1: Themistius, Or. xxiii. p. 356, Dindorf. [Greek: O( de\\\nge\u00f4rgo\\s o( Kori/nthios t\u00f4=| Gorgi/a| xuggeno/menos--ou)k au)t\u00f4=|\ne)kei/n\u00f4| Gorgi/a|, a)lla\\ t\u00f4=| lo/g\u00f4| o(\\n Pla/t\u00f4n e)/grapsen e)p'\ne)le/gch\u00f4| tou= sophistou=--au)ti/ka a)phei\\s to\\n a)/gron kai\\ tou\\s\na)mpe/lous, Pla/t\u00f4ni u(pe/th\u00eake t\u00ea\\n psuch\u00ea\\n kai\\ ta\\ e)kei/nou\ne)spei/reto kai\\ e)phuteu/eto; kai\\ ou(=to/s e)stin o(\\n tima=|\nA)ristote/l\u00eas e)n t\u00f4=| dialo/g\u00f4| t\u00f4=| Korinthi/\u00f4|.]]\n\n[Footnote 2: Aristeides, Orat. xlvi. p. 387, Dindorf. [Greek: Ti/s\nga\\r ou)k oi)=den, o(/ti kai\\ o( S\u00f4kra/t\u00eas kai\\ o( Kallikl\u00ea=s kai\\ o(\nGorgi/as kai\\ o( P\u00f4=los, pa/nta tau=t' e)sti\\ Pla/t\u00f4n, pro\\s to\\\ndokou=n au)t\u00f4=| tre/p\u00f4n tou\\s lo/gous?] Though Aristeides asks\nreasonably enough, Who is ignorant of this?--the remarks of Stallbaum\nand others often imply forgetfulness of it.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Schleiermacher (Einleitung zum Gorgias, vol. iii. p. 22)\nis of opinion that Plato composed the Gorgias shortly after returning\nfrom his first voyage to Sicily, 387 B.C.\n\nI shall not contradict this: but I see nothing to prove it. At the\nsame time, Schleiermacher assumes as certain that Aristophanes in the\nEkklesiazus\u00e6 alludes to the doctrines published by Plato in his\nRepublic (Einleitung zum Gorgias, p. 20). Putting these two\nstatements together, the Gorgias would be later in date of\ncomposition than the Republic, which I hardly think probable.\nHowever, I do not at all believe that Aristophanes in the\nEkklesiazus\u00e6 makes any allusion to the Republic of Plato. Nor shall I\nbelieve, until some evidence is produced, that the Republic was\ncomposed at so early a date as 390 B.C.]\n\n[Side-note: Introductory circumstances of the dialogue.\nPolus and Kallikl\u00eas.]\n\nSokrates and Ch\u00e6rephon are described as intending to come to a\nrhetorical lecture of Gorgias, but as having been accidentally\ndetained so as not to arrive until just after it has been finished,\nwith brilliant success. Kallikl\u00eas, however, the host and friend of\nGorgias, promises that the rhetor will readily answer any questions\nput by Sokrates; which Gorgias himself confirms, observing at the\nsame time that no one had asked him any new question for many years\npast.[4] Sokrates accordingly asks Gorgias what his profession is?\nwhat it is that he teaches? what is the definition of rhetoric? Not\nreceiving a satisfactory answer, Sokrates furnishes a definition of\nhis own: out of which grow two arguments of wide ethical bearing:\ncarried on by Sokrates, the first against Polus, the second against\nKallikl\u00eas. Both these two are represented as voluble speakers, of\nconfident temper, regarding the acquisition of political power and\noratorical celebrity as the grand objects of life. Polus had even\ncomposed a work on Rhetoric, of which we know nothing: but the tone\nof this dialogue would seem to indicate (as far as we can judge from\nsuch evidence) that the style of the work was affected, and the\ntemper of the author flippant.\n\n[Footnote 4: Plato, Gorg. pp. 447-448 A. The dialogue is supposed to\nbe carried on in the presence of many persons, seemingly belonging to\nthe auditory of the lecture which Gorgias has just finished, p. 455\nC.]\n\n[Side-note: Purpose of Sokrates in questioning. Conditions of a\ngood definition.]\n\nHere, as in the other dialogues above noticed, the avowed aim of\nSokrates is--first, to exclude long speaking--next, to get the\nquestion accurately conceived, and answered in an appropriate manner.\nSpecimens are given of unsuitable and inaccurate answers, which\nSokrates corrects. The conditions of a good definition are made plain\nby contrast with bad ones; which either include much more than the\nthing defined, or set forth what is accessory and occasional in place\nof what is essential and constant. These tentatives and gropings to\nfind a definition are always instructive, and must have been\nespecially so in the Platonic age, when logical distinctions had\nnever yet been made a subject of separate attention or analysis.\n\n[Side-note: Questions about the definition of Rhetoric. It is\nthe artisan of persuasion.]\n\nAbout what is Rhetoric as a cognition concerned, Gorgias?\n_Gorg._--About words or discourses. _Sokr._--About what\ndiscourses? such as inform sick men how they are to get well?\n_Gorg._--No. _Sokr._--It is not about all discourses?\n_Gorg._--It makes men competent to speak: of course therefore\nalso to think, upon the matters on which they speak.[5]\n_Sokr._--But the medical and gymnastic arts do this likewise, each\nwith reference to its respective subject: what then is the difference\nbetween them and Rhetoric? _Gorg._--The difference is, that each\nof these other arts tends mainly towards some actual work or\nperformance, to which the discourses, when required at all, are\nsubsidiary: but Rhetoric accomplishes every thing by discourses\nalone.[6] _Sokr._--But the same may be said about arithmetic,\ngeometry, and other sciences. How are they distinguished from\nRhetoric? You must tell me upon what matters the discourses with\nwhich Rhetoric is conversant turn; just as you would tell me, if I\nasked the like question about arithmetic or astronomy.\n_Gorg._--The discourses, with which Rhetoric is conversant, turn upon\nthe greatest of all human affairs. _Sokr._--But this too, Gorgias,\nis indistinct and equivocal. Every man, the physician, the gymnast,\nthe money-maker, thinks his own object and his own affairs the\ngreatest of all.[7] _Gorg._--The function of Rhetoric, is to\npersuade assembled multitudes, and thus to secure what are in truth\nthe greatest benefits: freedom to the city, political command to the\nspeaker.[8] _Sokr._--Rhetoric is then the artisan of persuasion.\nIts single purpose is to produce persuasion in the minds of hearers?\n_Gorg._--It is so.\n\n[Footnote 5: Plato, Gorgias, p. 449 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n peri\\ \u00f4(=nper\nle/gein, kai\\ phronei=n? P\u00f4=s ga\\r ou)/?]]\n\n[Footnote 6: Plato, Gorgias, p. 450 B-C. [Greek: t\u00ea=s r(\u00eatorik\u00ea=s\n. . . . pa=sa \u00ea( pra=xis kai\\ \u00ea( ku/r\u00f4sis dia\\ lo/g\u00f4n e)sti/n . . . .]]\n\n[Footnote 7: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 451-452.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Plato, Gorgias, p. 452 D. [Greek: O(/per e)/sti t\u00ea=|\na)l\u00eathei/a| me/giston a)gatho/n, kai\\ ai)/tion, a)/ma me\\n\ne)leutheri/as au)toi=s toi=s a)nthr\u00f4/pois, a)/ma de\\ tou= a)/ll\u00f4n\na)/rchein e)n t\u00ea=| au(tou= po/lei e(ka/st\u00f4|.]]\n\n[Side-note: The Rhetor produces belief without knowledge. Upon\nwhat matters is he competent to advise?]\n\n_Sokr._--But are there not other persons besides the Rhetor, who\nproduce persuasion? Does not the arithmetical teacher, and every\nother teacher, produce persuasion? How does the Rhetor differ\nfrom them? What mode of persuasion does he bring about? Persuasion\nabout what? _Gorg._--I reply--it is that persuasion which is\nbrought about in Dikasteries, and other assembled multitudes--and\nwhich relates to just and unjust.[9] _Sokr._--You recognise that\nto have learnt and to know any matter, is one thing--to believe it,\nis another: that knowledge and belief are different--knowledge being\nalways true, belief sometimes false? _Gorg._--Yes. _Sokr._--We\nmust then distinguish two sorts of persuasion: one carrying with\nit knowledge--the other belief without knowledge. Which of the two\ndoes the Rhetor bring about? _Gorg._--That which produces belief\nwithout knowledge. He can teach nothing. _Sokr._--Well, then,\nGorgias, on what matters will the Rhetor be competent to advise? When\nthe people are deliberating about the choice of generals or\nphysicians, about the construction of docks, about practical\nquestions of any kind--there will be in each case a special man\ninformed and competent to teach or give counsel, while the Rhetor is\nnot competent. Upon what then can the Rhetor advise--upon just and\nunjust--nothing else?[10]\n\n[Footnote 9: Plato, Gorgias, p. 454 B.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Plato, Gorgias, p. 455 D.]\n\n[Side-note: The Rhetor can persuade the people upon any matter,\neven against the opinion of the special expert. He appears to know,\namong the ignorant.]\n\nThe Rhetor (says Gorgias) or accomplished public speaker, will give\nadvice about all the matters that you name, and others besides. He\nwill persuade the people and carry them along with him, even against\nthe opinion of the special _Expert_. He will talk more\npersuasively than the craftsman about matters of the craftsman's own\nbusiness. The power of the Rhetor is thus very great: but he ought to\nuse it, like all other powers, for just and honest purposes; not to\nabuse it for wrong and oppression. If he does the latter, the misdeed\nis his own, and not the fault of his teacher, who gave his lessons\nwith a view that they should be turned to proper use. If a man, who\nhas learnt the use of arms, employs them to commit murder, this abuse\nought not to be imputed to his master of arms.[11]\n\n[Footnote 11: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 456-457.]\n\nYou mean (replies Sokrates) that he, who has learnt Rhetoric from\nyou, will become competent not to teach, but to persuade the\nmultitude:--that is, competent among the ignorant. He has acquired an\nengine of persuasion; so that he will appear, when addressing the\nignorant, to know more than those who really do know.[12]\n\n[Footnote 12: Plato, Gorgias, p. 459 B. [Greek: Ou)kou=n kai\\ peri\\\nta\\s a)/llas a(pa/sas te/chnas \u00f4(sau/t\u00f4s e)/chei o( r(\u00ea/t\u00f4r kai\\ \u00ea(\nr(\u00eatorik\u00ea/; au)ta\\ me\\n ta\\ pra/gmata ou)de\\n dei= au)t\u00ea\\n ei)de/nai\no(/p\u00f4s e)/chei, m\u00eachan\u00ea\\n de/ tina peithou=s eu(r\u00eake/nai, \u00f4(/ste\nphai/nesthai toi=s ou)k ei)do/si ma=llon ei)de/nai t\u00f4=n ei)do/t\u00f4n.]]\n\n\n* * * * *\n\n\n[Side-note: Gorgias is now made to contradict himself. Polus\ntakes up the debate with Sokrates.]\n\nThus far, the conversation is carried on between Sokrates and\nGorgias. But the latter is now made to contradict himself--apparently\nrather than really--for the argument whereby Sokrates reduces him to\na contradiction, is not tenable, unless we admit the Platonic\ndoctrine that the man who has learnt just and unjust, may be relied\non to act as a just man;[13] in other words, that virtue consists in\nknowledge.\n\n[Footnote 13: Plato, Gorgias, p. 460 B. [Greek: o( ta\\ di/kaia\nmemath\u00eak\u00f4/s, di/kaios]. Aristotle notices this confusion of Sokrates,\nwho falls into it also in the conversation with Euthydemus, Xenoph.\nMemorab. iv. 2, 20, iii. 9, 5.]\n\n[Side-note: Polemical tone of Sokrates. At the instance of\nPolus he gives his own definition of rhetoric. It is no art, but an\nempirical knack of catering for the immediate pleasure of hearers,\nanalogous to cookery. It is a branch under the general head\nflattery.]\n\nPolus now interferes and takes up the conversation: challenging\nSokrates to furnish what _he_ thinks the proper definition of\nRhetoric. Sokrates obeys, in a tone of pungent polemic. Rhetoric (he\nsays) is no art at all, but an empirical knack of catering for the\npleasure and favour of hearers; analogous to cookery.[14] It is a\ntalent falling under the general aptitude called Flattery; possessed\nby some bold spirits, who are forward in divining and adapting\nthemselves to the temper of the public.[15] It is not honourable, but\na mean pursuit, like cookery. It is the shadow or false imitation of\na branch of the political art.[16] In reference both to the body and\nthe mind, there are two different conditions: one, a condition really\nand truly good--the other, good only in fallacious appearance,\nand not so in reality. To produce, and to verify, the really good\ncondition of the body, there are two specially qualified professions,\nthe gymnast or trainer and the physician: in regard to the mind, the\nfunction of the trainer is performed by the law-giving power, that of\nthe physician by the judicial power. Law-making, and adjudicating,\nare both branches of the political art, and when put together make up\nthe whole of it. Gymnastic and medicine train and doctor the body\ntowards its really best condition: law-making and adjudicating do the\nsame in regard to the mind. To each of the four, there corresponds a\nsham counterpart or mimic, a branch under the general head\n_flattery_--taking no account of what is really best, but only\nof that which is most agreeable for the moment, and by this trick\nrecommending itself to a fallacious esteem.[17] Thus Cosmetic, or\nOrnamental Trickery, is the counterfeit of Gymnastic; and Cookery the\ncounterfeit of Medicine. Cookery studies only what is immediately\nagreeable to the body, without considering whether it be good or\nwholesome: and does this moreover, without any truly scientific\nprocess of observation or inference, but simply by an empirical\nprocess of memory or analogy. But Medicine examines, and that too by\nscientific method, only what is good and wholesome for the body,\nwhether agreeable or not. Amidst ignorant men, Cookery slips in as\nthe counterfeit of medicine; pretending to know what food is\n_good_ for the body, while it really knows only what food is\n_agreeable_. In like manner, the artifices of ornament dress up\nthe body to a false appearance of that vigour and symmetry, which\nGymnastics impart to it really and intrinsically.\n\n[Footnote 14: Plato, Gorgias, p. 462 C. [Greek: e)mpeiri/a . . . .\ncha/rito/s tinos kai\\ \u00ea(don\u00ea=s a)pergasi/as]. In the Phil\u00eabus (pp.\n55-56) Sokrates treats [Greek: i)atrik\u00ea\\] differently, as falling\nshort of the idea of [Greek: te/chn\u00ea], and coming much nearer to what\nis here called [Greek: e)mpeiri/a] or [Greek: stochastik\u00ea/].\nAsklepiades was displeased with the Thracian Dionysius for calling\n[Greek: grammatik\u00ea\\] by the name of [Greek: e)mpeiri/a] instead of\n[Greek: te/chn\u00ea]: see Sextus Empiric. adv. Grammat. s. 57-72, p. 615,\nBekk.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Plato, Gorgias, p. 463 A. [Greek: dokei= moi ei)=nai/\nti e)pit\u00ea/deuma, techniko\\n me\\n ou)/, psuch\u00ea=s de\\ stochastik\u00ea=s\nkai\\ a)ndrei/as kai\\ phu/sei dein\u00ea=s prosomilei=n toi=s a)nthr\u00f4/pois;\nkal\u00f4= de\\ au)tou= e)g\u00f4\\ to\\ kepha/laion _kolakei/an_.]]\n\n[Footnote 16: Plato, Gorgias, p. 463 D. [Greek: politik\u00ea=s mori/ou\nei)/d\u00f4lon].]\n\n[Footnote 17: Plato, Gorgias, p. 464 C. [Greek: tetta/r\u00f4n d\u00ea\\ tou/t\u00f4n\nou)s\u00f4=n, kai\\ a)ei\\ pro\\s to\\ be/ltiston therapeuous\u00f4=n, t\u00f4=n me\\n\nto\\ s\u00f4=ma, t\u00f4=n de\\ t\u00ea\\n psuch\u00ea/n, \u00ea( kolakeutik\u00ea\\ ai)sthome/n\u00ea, ou)\ngnou=sa le/g\u00f4 a)lla\\ stochasame/n\u00ea, te/tracha e(aut\u00ea\\n dianei/masa,\nu(podu=sa u(po\\ e(/kaston t\u00f4=n mori/\u00f4n, prospoiei=tai ei)=nai tou=to\no(/per u(pe/du; kai\\ tou= me\\n belti/stou ou)de\\n phronti/zei, t\u00f4=|\nde\\ a)ei\\ \u00ea(di/st\u00f4| th\u00eareu/etai t\u00ea\\n a)/noian kai\\ e)xapata=|, \u00f4(/ste\ndokei= plei/stou a)xi/a ei)=nai.]]\n\n[Side-note: Distinction between the true arts which aim at the\ngood of the body and mind--and the counterfeit arts, which pretend to\nthe same, but in reality aim at immediate pleasure.]\n\nThe same analogies hold in regard to the mind. Sophistic is the\nshadow or counterfeit of law-giving: Rhetoric, of judging or\nadjudicating. The lawgiver and the judge aim at what is good for the\nmind: the Sophist and the Rhetor aim at what is agreeable to it. This\ndistinction between them (continues Sokrates) is true and real:\nthough it often happens that the Sophist is, both by himself and by\nothers, confounded with and mistaken for the lawgiver, because he\ndeals with the same topics and occurrences: and the Rhetor, in the\nsame manner, is confounded with the judge.[18] The Sophist and the\nRhetor, addressing themselves to the present relish of an\nundiscerning public, are enabled to usurp the functions and the\ncredit of their more severe and far-sighted rivals.\n\n[Footnote 18: Plato, Gorgias, p. 465 C. [Greek: die/st\u00eake me\\n ou(/t\u00f4\nphu/sei; a(/te de\\ e)ggu\\s o)/nt\u00f4n, phu/rontai e)n t\u00f4=| au)t\u00f4=| kai\\\nperi\\ tau)ta\\ sophistai\\ kai\\ r(\u00ea/tores, kai\\ ou)k e)/chousin o(/, ti\nchr\u00ea/s\u00f4ntai ou)/te au)toi\\ e(autoi=s ou)/te oi( a)/lloi a)/nthr\u00f4poi\ntou/tois.]\n\nIt seems to me that the persons whom Plato here designates as being\nconfounded together are, the Sophist with the lawgiver, the Rhetor\nwith the judge or dikast; which is shown by the allusion, three lines\nfarther on, to the confusion between the cook and the physician.\nHeindorf supposes that the persons designated as being confounded\nare, the Sophist with the Rhetor; which I cannot think to be the\nmeaning of Plato.]\n\n[Side-note: Questions of Polus. Sokrates denies that the\nRhetors have any real power, because they do nothing which they\nreally wish.]\n\nThis is the definition given by Sokrates of Rhetoric and of the\nRhetor. Polus then asks him: You say that Rhetoric is a branch of\nFlattery: Do you think that good Rhetors are considered as flatterers\nin their respective cities? _Sokr._--I do not think that[19]\nthey are considered at all. _Polus._--How! not considered? Do\nnot good Rhetors possess great power in their respective cities?\n_Sokr._--No: if you understand the possession of power as a good\nthing for the possessor. _Polus._--I do understand it so.\n_Sokr._--Then I say that the Rhetors possess nothing beyond the\nvery minimum of power. _Polus._--How can that be? Do not they,\nlike despots, kill, impoverish, and expel any one whom they please?\n_Sokr._--I admit that both Rhetors and Despots can do what seems\ngood to themselves, and can bring penalties of death, poverty, or\nexile upon others: but I say that nevertheless they have no\npower, because they can do nothing which they really wish.[20]\n\n[Footnote 19: Plat. Gorg. p. 466 B. _Polus._ [Greek: A)=r'\nou)=n dokou=si/ soi \u00f4(s ko/lakes e)n tai=s po/lesi phau=loi\nnomi/zesthai oi( a)gathoi\\ r(\u00ea/tores? . . . . ] _Sokr._ [Greek:\nOu)de\\ nomi/zesthai e)/moige dokou=sin.]\n\nThe play on words here--for I see nothing else in it--can be\nexpressed in English as well as in Greek. It has very little\npertinence; because, as a matter of fact, the Rhetors certainly had\nconsiderable importance, whether they deserved it or not. How little\nPlato cared to make his comparisons harmonise with the fact, may be\nseen by what immediately follows--where he compares the Rhetors to\nDespots? and puts in the mouth of Polus the assertion that they kill\nor banish any one whom they choose.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Plato, Gorgias, p. 466 E. [Greek: ou)de\\n ga\\r poiei=n\n\u00f4(=n bou/lontai, \u00f4(s e)/pos ei)pei=n; poiei=n me/ntoi o(\\, ti a)\\n\nau)toi=s do/x\u00ea| be/ltiston ei)=nai.]]\n\n[Side-note: All men wish for what is good for them. Despots\nand Rhetors, when they kill any one, do so because they think it good\nfor them. If it be really not good, they do not do what they will,\nand therefore have no real power.]\n\nThat which men wish (Sokrates lays down as a general proposition) is\nto obtain good, and to escape evil. Each separate act which they\nperform, is performed not with a view to its own special result, but\nwith a view to these constant and paramount ends. Good things, or\nprofitable things (for Sokrates alternates the phrases as\nequivalent), are wisdom, health, wealth, and other such things. Evil\nthings are the contraries of these.[21] Many things are in themselves\nneither good nor evil, but may become one or the other, according to\ncircumstances--such as stones, wood, the acts of sitting still or\nmoving, &c. When we do any of these indifferent acts, it is with\na view to the pursuit of good, or to the avoidance of evil: we do not\nwish for the act, we wish for its good or profitable results. We do\nevery thing for the sake of good: and if the results are really good\nor profitable, we accomplish what we wish: if the contrary, not. Now,\nDespots and Rhetors, when they kill or banish or impoverish any one,\ndo so because they think it will be better for them, or\nprofitable.[22] If it be good for them, they do what they wish: if\nevil for them, they do the contrary of what they wish and therefore\nhave no power.\n\n[Footnote 21: Plato, Gorgias, p. 467 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n le/geis\nei)=nai a)gatho\\n me\\n sophi/an te kai\\ u(gi/eian kai\\ plou=ton kai\\\nta)/lla ta\\ toiau=ta, kaka\\ de\\ ta)nanti/a tou/t\u00f4n? E)/g\u00f4ge.]]\n\n[Footnote 22: Plato, Gorgias, p. 468 B-C. [Greek: ou)kou=n kai\\\na)pokti/nnumen, ei)/ tin' a)pokti/nnumen, . . . . oi)o/menoi a)/meinon\nei)=nai \u00ea(mi=n tau=ta \u00ea)\\ m\u00ea/? . . . e(/nek' a)/ra tou= a)gathou=\na(/panta tau=ta poiou=sin oi( poiou=ntes . . . . e)a\\n me\\n \u00f4)phe/lima\n\u00ea)=| tau=ta, boulo/metha pra/ttein au)ta/; blabera\\ de\\ o)/nta, ou)\nboulo/metha. . . . . ta\\ ga\\r a)gatha\\ boulo/metha, \u00f4(=s ph\u00ea\\|s su/],\n&c.]\n\nTo do evil (continues Sokrates), is the worst thing that can happen\nto any one; the evil-doer is the most miserable and pitiable of men.\nThe person who suffers evil is unfortunate, and is to be pitied; but\nmuch less unfortunate and less to be pitied than the evil-doer. If I\nhave a concealed dagger in the public market-place, I can kill any\none whom I choose: but this is no good to me, nor is it a proof of\ngreat power, because I shall be forthwith taken up and punished. The\nresult is not profitable, but hurtful: therefore the act is not\ngood, nor is the power to do it either good or desirable.[23] It is\nsometimes good to kill, banish, or impoverish--sometimes bad. It is\ngood when you do it justly: bad, when you do it unjustly.[24]\n\n[Footnote 23: Plato, Gorgias, p. 469-470.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Plato, Gorgias, p. 470 C.]\n\n[Side-note: Comparison of Archelaus, usurping despot of\nMacedonia--Polus affirms that Archelaus is happy, and that every one\nthinks so--Sokrates admits that every one thinks so, but nevertheless\ndenies it.]\n\n_Polus._--A child can refute such doctrine. You have heard of\nArchelaus King of Macedonia. Is he, in your opinion, happy or\nmiserable? _Sokr._--I do not know: I have never been in his\nsociety. _Polus._--Cannot you tell without that, whether he is\nhappy or not? _Sokr._--No, certainly not. _Polus._--Then\nyou will not call even the Great King happy? _Sokr._--No: I do\nnot know how he stands in respect to education and justice.\n_Polus._--What! does all happiness consist in that?\n_Sokr._--I say that it does. I maintain that the good and\nhonourable man or woman is happy: the unjust and wicked,\nmiserable.[25] _Polus._--Then Archelaus is miserable, according\nto your doctrine? _Sokr._--Assuredly, if he is wicked.\n_Polus._--Wicked, of course; since he has committed enormous\ncrimes: but he has obtained complete kingly power in Macedonia. Is\nthere any Athenian, yourself included, who would not rather be\nArchelaus than any other man in Macedonia?[26] _Sokr._--All the\npublic, with Nikias, Perikles, and the most eminent men among them,\nwill agree with you in declaring Archelaus to be happy. I alone do\nnot agree with you. You, like a Rhetor, intend to overwhelm me and\ngain your cause, by calling a multitude of witnesses: I shall prove\nmy case without calling any other witness than yourself.[27] Do you\nthink that Archelaus would have been a happy man, if he had been\ndefeated in his conspiracy and punished? _Polus._--Certainly\nnot: he would then have been very miserable. _Sokr._--Here again\nI differ from you: I think that Archelaus, or any other wicked man,\nis under all circumstances miserable; but he is less miserable, if\nafterwards punished, than he would be if unpunished and\nsuccessful.[28] _Polus._--How say you? If a man, unjustly\nconspiring to become despot, be captured, subjected to torture,\nmutilated, with his eyes burnt out and with many other outrages\ninflicted, not only upon himself but upon his wife and children--do\nyou say that he will be more happy than if he succeeded in his\nenterprise, and passed his life in possession of undisputed authority\nover his city--envied and extolled as happy, by citizens and\nstrangers alike?[29] _Sokr._--More happy, I shall not say: for\nin both cases he will be miserable; but he will be less miserable on\nthe former supposition.\n\n[Footnote 25: Plato, Gorgias, p. 470 E.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Plato, Gorgias, p. 471 B-C.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Plato, Gorgias, p. 472 B. [Greek: A)ll' e)g\u00f4/ soi ei)=s\n\u00f4)\\n ou)ch o(molog\u00f4=. . . . e)g\u00f4\\ de\\ a)\\n m\u00ea\\ se\\ au)to\\n e(/na o)/nta\nma/rtura para/sch\u00f4mai o(mologou=nta peri\\ \u00f4(=n le/g\u00f4, ou)de\\n\noi)=mai a)/xion lo/gou pepera/nthai peri\\ \u00f4(=n a)\\n \u00ea(mi=n o( lo/gos\n\u00ea)=|; oi)=mai de\\ ou)de\\ soi/, e)a\\n m\u00ea\\ e)g\u00f4/ soi martur\u00f4= ei(=s\n\u00f4)\\n mo/nos, tou\\s d' a)/llous pa/ntas tou/tous chai/rein e)a=|s.]]\n\n[Footnote 28: Plato, Gorgias, p. 473 C.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Plato, Gorgias, p. 473 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates maintains--1. That it is a greater evil\nto do wrong, than to suffer wrong. 2. That if a man has done wrong,\nit is better for him to be punished than to remain unpunished.]\n\n_Sokr._--Which of the two is worst: to do wrong, or to suffer\nwrong? _Polus._--To suffer wrong. _Sokr._--Which of the two\nis the most disgraceful? _Polus._--To do wrong. _Sokr._--If\nmore ugly and disgraceful, is it not then worse? _Polus._--By no\nmeans. _Sokr._--You do not think then that the good--and the\nfine or honourable--are one and the same; nor the bad--and the ugly\nor disgraceful? _Polus._--No: certainly not. _Sokr._--How\nis this? Are not all fine or honourable things, such as bodies,\ncolours, figures, voices, pursuits, &c., so denominated from some\ncommon property? Are not fine bodies said to be fine, either from\nrendering some useful service, or from affording some pleasure to the\nspectator who contemplates them?[30] And are not figures, colours,\nvoices, laws, sciences, &c., called fine or honourable for the\nsame reason, either for their agreeableness or their usefulness, or\nboth? _Polus._--Certainly: your definition of the fine or\nhonourable, by reference to pleasure, or to good, is satisfactory.\n_Sokr._--Of course therefore the ugly or disgraceful must be\ndefined by the contrary, by reference to pain or to evil?\n_Polus._--Doubtless.[31] _Sokr._--If therefore one thing be\nfiner or more honourable than another, this is because it\nsurpasses the other either in pleasure, or in profit: if one thing be\nmore ugly or disgraceful than another, it must surpass that other\neither in pain, or in evil? _Polus._--Yes.\n\n[Footnote 30: Plat. Gorg. p. 474 D. [Greek: e)a\\n e)n t\u00f4=|\nthe\u00f4rei=sthai chai/rein poi\u00ea=| tou\\s the\u00f4rou=ntas?]]\n\n[Footnote 31: Plato, Gorgias, p. 474 E. _Sokr._ [Greek: Kai\\\nm\u00ea\\n ta/ ge kata\\ tou\\s no/mous kai\\ ta\\ e)pit\u00eadeu/mata, ou) d\u00ea/pou\ne)kto\\s tou/t\u00f4n e)sti\\ ta\\ kala/, tou= \u00ea)\\ _\u00f4)phe/lima ei)=nai \u00ea)\\\n\u00ea(de/a \u00ea)\\_ a)mpho/tera.] _Pol._ [Greek: Ou)k e)/moige\ndokei=.] _Sokr._ [Greek: Ou)kou=n kai\\ t\u00f4=n math\u00eama/t\u00f4n ka/llos\n\u00f4(sau/t\u00f4s?] _Pol._ [Greek: Pa/nu ge; kai\\ kal\u00f4=s ge nu=n\no(rizei, _\u00ea(don\u00ea=| te kai\\ a)gath\u00f4=|_ o(rizo/menos to\\ kalo/n.]\n_Sokr._ [Greek: Ou)kou=n to\\ ai)schro\\n t\u00f4=| e)nanti/\u00f4|,\n_lu/p\u00ea| te kai\\ kak\u00f4=|_?] _Pol._ [Greek: A)na/gk\u00ea.]\n\nA little farther on [Greek: blab\u00ea\\] is used as equivalent to [Greek:\nkako/n]. These words--[Greek: kalo/n, ai)schro/n]--(very difficult to\ntranslate properly) introduce a reference to the feeling or judgment\nof spectators, or of an undefined public, not concerned either as\nagents or sufferers.]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates offers proof--Definition of Pulchrum and\nTurpe--Proof of the first point.]\n\n_Sokr._--Well, then! what did you say about doing wrong and\nsuffering wrong? You said that to suffer wrong was the worst of the\ntwo, but to do wrong was the most ugly or disgraceful. Now, if to do\nwrong be more disgraceful than to suffer wrong, this must be because\nit has a preponderance either of pain or of evil?\n_Polus._--Undoubtedly. _Sokr._--Has it a preponderance of pain? Does\nthe doer of wrong endure more pain than the sufferer?\n_Polus._--Certainly not. _Sokr._--Then it must have a preponderance\nof evil? _Polus._--Yes. _Sokr._--To do wrong therefore is\nworse than to suffer wrong, as well as more disgraceful?\n_Polus._--It appears so. _Sokr._--Since therefore it is\nboth worse and more disgraceful, I was right in affirming that\nneither you, nor I, nor any one else, would choose to do wrong in\npreference to suffering wrong. _Polus._--So it seems.[32]\n\n[Footnote 32: Plato, Gorgias, p. 475 C-D.]\n\n[Side-note: Proof of the second point.]\n\n_Sokr._--Now let us take the second point--Whether it be the\ngreatest evil for the wrong-doer to be punished, or whether it be not\na still greater evil for him to remain unpunished. If punished, the\nwrong-doer is of course punished justly; and are not all just things\nfine or honourable, in so far as they are just? _Polus._--I\nthink so. _Sokr._--When a man does anything, must there not be\nsome correlate which suffers; and must it not suffer in a way\ncorresponding to what the doer does? Thus if any one strikes, there\nmust also be something stricken: and if he strikes quickly or\nviolently, there must be something which is stricken quickly or\nviolently. And so, if any one burns or cuts, there must be something\nburnt or cut. As the agent acts, so the patient suffers.\n_Polus._--Yes. _Sokr._--Now if a man be punished for wrong\ndoing, he suffers what is just, and the punisher does what is just?\n_Polus._--He does. _Sokr._--You admitted that all just\nthings were honourable: therefore the agent does what is honourable,\nthe patient suffers what is honourable.[33] But if honourable, it\nmust be either agreeable--or good and profitable. In this case,\nit is certainly not agreeable: it must therefore be good and\nprofitable. The wrong-doer therefore, when punished, suffers what is\ngood and is profited. _Polus._--Yes.[34] _Sokr._--In what\nmanner is he profited? It is, as I presume, by becoming better in his\nmind--by being relieved from badness of mind.\n_Polus._--Probably. _Sokr._--Is not this badness of mind the greatest\nevil? In regard to wealth, the special badness is poverty: in regard\nto the body, it is weakness, sickness, deformity, &c.: in regard\nto the mind, it is ignorance, injustice, cowardice, &c. Is not\ninjustice, and other badness of mind, the most disgraceful of the\nthree? _Polus._--Decidedly. _Sokr._--If it be most\ndisgraceful, it must therefore be the worst. _Polus._--How?\n_Sokr._--It must (as we before agreed) have the greatest\npreponderance either of pain, or of hurt and evil. But the\npreponderance is not in pain: for no one will say that the being\nunjust and intemperate and ignorant, is more painful than being poor\nand sick. The preponderance must therefore be great in hurt and evil.\nMental badness is therefore a greater evil than either poverty, or\ndisease and bodily deformity. It is the greatest of human evils.\n_Polus._--It appears so.[35]\n\n[Footnote 33: See Aristotle, Rhet. i. 9, p. 1366, b. 30, where the\ncontrary of this opinion is maintained, and maintained with truth.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Plato, Gorgias, p. 476 D-E.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Plato, Gorgias, p. 477 E.]\n\n[Side-note: The criminal labours under a mental distemper,\nwhich though not painful, is a capital evil. Punishment is the only\ncure for him. To be punished is best for him.]\n\n_Sokr._--The money-making art is, that which relieves us from\npoverty: the medical art, from sickness and weakness: the judicial or\npunitory, from injustice and wickedness of mind. Of these three\nrelieving forces, which is the most honourable? _Polus._--The\nlast, by far. _Sokr._--If most honourable, it confers either\nmost pleasure or most profit? _Polus._--Yes. _Sokr._--Now,\nto go through medical treatment is not agreeable; but it answers to a\nman to undergo the pain, in order to get rid of a great evil, and to\nbecome well. He would be a happier man, if he were never sick: he is\nless miserable by undergoing the painful treatment and becoming well,\nthan if he underwent no treatment and remained sick. Just so the man\nwho is mentally bad: the happiest man is he who never becomes so; but\nif a man has become so, the next best course for him is, to undergo\npunishment and to get rid of the evil. The worst lot of all is, that\nof him who remains mentally bad, without ever getting rid of\nbadness.[36]\n\n[Footnote 36: Plato, Gorgias, p. 478 D-E.]\n\n[Side-note: Misery of the Despot who is never punished. If our\nfriend has done wrong, we ought to get him punished: if our enemy, we\nought to keep him unpunished.]\n\nThis last, Polus (continues Sokrates), is the condition of Archelaus,\nand of despots and Rhetors generally. They possess power which\nenables them, after they have committed injustice, to guard\nthemselves against being punished: which is just as if a sick man\nwere to pride himself upon having taken precautions against being\ncured. They see the pain of the cure, but they are blind to the\nprofit of it; they are ignorant how much more miserable it is to have\nan unhealthy and unjust mind than an unhealthy body.[37] There is\ntherefore little use in Rhetoric: for our first object ought to be,\nto avoid doing wrong: our next object, if we have done wrong, not to\nresist or elude punishment by skilful defence, but to present\nourselves voluntarily and invite it: and if our friends or relatives\nhave done wrong, far from helping to defend them, we ought ourselves\nto accuse them, and to invoke punishment upon them also.[38] On the\nother hand, as to our enemy, we ought undoubtedly to take precautions\nagainst suffering any wrong from him ourselves: but if he has done\nwrong to others, we ought to do all we can, by word or deed, not to\nbring him to punishment, but to prevent him from suffering punishment\nor making compensation: so that he may live as long as possible in\nimpunity.[39] These are the purposes towards which rhetoric is\nserviceable. For one who intends to do no wrong, it seems of no great\nuse.[40]\n\n[Footnote 37: Plato, Gorgias, p. 479 B. [Greek: to\\ a)lgeino\\n\nau)tou= kathora=|n, pro\\s de\\ to\\ \u00f4)phe/limon tuphl\u00f4=s e)/chein, kai\\\na)gnoei=n o(/s\u00f4| a)thli\u00f4/tero/n e)sti m\u00ea\\ u(giou=s s\u00f4/matos m\u00ea\\\nu(giei= psuch\u00ea=| sunoikei=n, a)lla\\ sathra=| kai\\ a)di/k\u00f4| kai\\\na)nosi/\u00f4|.]]\n\n[Footnote 38: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 480 C, 508 B. [Greek: kat\u00eagor\u00eate/on\nei)/\u00ea kai\\ au(tou= kai\\ ui(e/os kai\\ e(tai/ron, e)a/n ti a)dik\u00ea=|],\n&c.\n\nPlato might have put this argument into the mouth of Euthyphron as a\nreason for indicting his own father on the charge of murder: as I\nhave already observed in reviewing the Euthyphron, which see above,\nvol. i. ch. xi., p. 442.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Plato, Gorgias, p. 481 A. [Greek: e)a\\n de\\ a)/llon\na)dik\u00ea=| o( e)chthro/s, panti\\ tro/p\u00f4| paraskeuaste/on kai\\\npra/ttonta kai\\ le/gonta, o(/p\u00f4s m\u00ea\\ d\u00f4=| di/k\u00ean. . . . e)a/n te\nchrusi/on \u00ea(rpak\u00f4\\s \u00ea)=| polu/, m\u00ea\\ a)podid\u00f4=| tou=to, a)ll' e)/ch\u00f4n\na)nali/sk\u00eatai . . . a)di/k\u00f4s kai\\ a)the/\u00f4s], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Plato, Gorgias, p. 481.]\n\n\n* * * * *\n\n\nThis dialogue between Sokrates and Polus exhibits a\nrepresentation of Platonic Ethics longer and more continuous\nthan is usual in the dialogues. I have therefore given a tolerably\ncopious abridgment of it, and shall now proceed to comment upon its\nreasoning.\n\n[Side-note: Argument of Sokrates paradoxical--Doubt expressed\nby Kallikles whether he means it seriously.]\n\nThe whole tenor of its assumptions, as well as the conclusions in\nwhich it ends, are so repugnant to received opinions, that Polus,\neven while compelled to assent, treats it as a paradox: while\nKallikles, who now takes up the argument, begins by asking from\nCh\u00e6rephon--\"Is Sokrates really in earnest, or is he only\njesting?\"[41] Sokrates himself admits that he stands almost alone. He\nhas nothing to rely upon, except the consistency of his dialectics--and\nthe verdict of philosophy.[42] This however is a matter of little\nmoment, in discussing the truth and value of the reasoning, except in\nso far as it involves an appeal to the judgment of the public as a\nmatter of fact. Plato follows out the train of reasoning--which at\nthe time presents itself to his mind as conclusive, or at least as\nplausible--whether he may agree or disagree with others.\n\n[Footnote 41: Plato, Gorgias, p. 481.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Plato, Gorgias, p. 482.]\n\n[Side-note: Principle laid down by Sokrates--That every one\nacts with a view to the attainment of happiness and avoidance of\nmisery.]\n\nPlato has ranked the Rhetor in the same category as the Despot: a\nclassification upon which I shall say something presently. But\nthroughout the part of the dialogue just extracted, he treats the\noriginal question about Rhetoric as part of a much larger ethical\nquestion.[43] Every one (argues Sokrates) wishes for the attainment\nof good and for the avoidance of evil. Every one performs each\nseparate act with a view not to its own immediate end, but to one or\nother of these permanent ends. In so far as he attains them, he is\nhappy: in so far as he either fails in attaining the good, or incurs\nthe evil, he is unhappy or miserable. The good and honourable man or\nwoman is happy, the unjust and wicked is miserable. Power acquired or\nemployed unjustly, is no boon to the possessor: for he does not\nthereby obtain what he really wishes, good or happiness; but incurs\nthe contrary, evil and misery. The man who does wrong is more\nmiserable than he who suffers wrong: but the most miserable of all is\nhe who does wrong and then remains unpunished for it.[44]\n\n[Footnote 43: I may be told that this comparison is first made by\nPolus (p. 466 C), and that Sokrates only takes it up from him to\ncomment upon. True, but the speech of Polus is just as much the\ncomposition of Plato as that of Sokrates. Many readers of Plato are\napt to forget this.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Isokrates, in his Panathenaic Oration (Or. xii. sect.\n126, pp. 257-347), alludes to the same thesis as this here advanced\nby Plato, treating it as one which all men of sense would reject, and\nwhich none but a few men pretending to be wise would\nproclaim--[Greek: a(/per a(/pantes me\\n a)\\n oi( nou=n e)/chontes\ne)/lointo kai\\ boul\u00eathei=en, o)li/goi de/ tines t\u00f4=n prospoioume/n\u00f4n\nei)=nai soph\u00f4=n, e)r\u00f4t\u00eathe/ntes ou)k a)\\n ph\u00ea/saien.]\n\nIn this last phrase Isokrates probably has Plato in his mind, though\nwithout pronouncing the name.]\n\nPolus, on the other hand, contends, that Archelaus, who has \"waded\nthrough slaughter\" to the throne of Macedonia, is a happy man both in\nhis own feelings and in those of every one else, envied and admired\nby the world generally: That to say--Archelaus would have been more\nhappy, or less miserable, if he had failed in his enterprise and had\nbeen put to death under cruel torture--is an untenable paradox.\n\n[Side-note: Peculiar view taken by Plato of Good--Evil--Happiness.]\n\nThe issue here turns, and the force of Plato's argument rests\n(assuming Sokrates to speak the real sentiments of Plato), upon\nthe peculiar sense which he gives to the words\nGood--Evil--Happiness:--different from the sense in which they are\nconceived by mankind generally, and which is here followed by Polus.\nIt is possible that to minds like Sokrates and Plato, the idea of\nthemselves committing enormous crimes for ambitious purposes might be\nthe most intolerable of all ideas, worse to contemplate than any amount of\nsuffering: moreover, that if they could conceive themselves as having been\nthus guilty, the sequel the least intolerable for them to imagine would\nbe one of expiatory pain. This, taken as the personal sentiment of\nPlato, admits of no reply. But when he attempts to convert this\nsubjective judgment into an objective conclusion binding on all, he\nfails of success, and misleads himself by equivocal language.\n\n[Side-note: Contrast of the usual meaning of these words, with\nthe Platonic meaning.]\n\nPlato distinguishes two general objects of human desire, and two of\nhuman aversion. 1. The immediate, and generally transient,\nobject--Pleasure or the Pleasurable--Pain or the Painful. 2. The distant,\nulterior, and more permanent object--Good or the profitable--Evil or\nthe hurtful.--In the attainment of Good and avoidance of Evil\nconsists happiness. But now comes the important question--In what\nsense are we to understand the words Good and Evil? What did\nPlato mean by them? Did he mean the same as mankind generally? Have\nmankind generally one uniform meaning? In answer to this question, we\nmust say, that neither Plato, nor mankind generally, are consistent\nor unanimous in their use of the words: and that Plato sometimes\napproximates to, sometimes diverges from, the more usual meaning.\nPlato does not here tell us clearly what he himself means by Good and\nEvil: he specifies no objective or external mark by which we may know\nit: we learn only, that Good is a mental perfection--Evil a mental\ntaint--answering to indescribable but characteristic sentiments in\nPlato's own mind, and only negatively determined by this\ncircumstance--That they have no reference either to pleasure or pain.\nIn the vulgar sense, Good stands distinguished from pleasure (or\nrelief from pain), and Evil from pain (or loss of pleasure), as the\nremote, the causal, the lasting from the present, the product, the\ntransient. Good and Evil are explained by enumerating all the things\nso called, of which enumeration Plato gives a partial specimen in\nthis dialogue: elsewhere he dwells upon what he calls the Idea of\nGood, of which I shall speak more fully hereafter. Having said that\nall men aim at good, he gives, as examples of good things--Wisdom,\nHealth, Wealth, and other such things: while the contrary of these,\nStupidity, Sickness, Poverty, are evil things: the list of course\nmight be much enlarged. Taking Good and Evil generally to denote the\ncommon property of each of these lists, it is true that men perform a\nlarge portion of their acts with a view to attain the former and\navoid the latter:--that the approach which they make to happiness\ndepends, speaking generally, upon the success which attends their\nexertions for the attainment of and avoidance of these permanent\nends: and moreover that these ends have their ultimate reference to\neach man's own feelings.\n\nBut this meaning of Good is no longer preserved, when Sokrates\nproceeds to prove that the triumphant usurper Archelaus is the most\nmiserable of men, and that to do wrong with impunity is the greatest\nof all evils.\n\n[Side-note: Examination of the proof given by Sokrates--Inconsistency\nbetween the general answer of Polus and his previous\ndeclarations--Law and Nature.]\n\nSokrates provides a basis for his intended proof by asking Polus,[45]\nwhich of the two is most disgraceful--To do wrong--or to suffer\nwrong? Polus answers--To do wrong: and this answer is\ninconsistent with what he had previously said about Archelaus. That\nprince, though a wrong-doer on the largest scale, has been declared\nby Polus to be an object of his supreme envy and admiration: while\nSokrates also admits that this is the sentiment of almost all\nmankind, except himself. To be consistent with such an assertion,\nPolus ought to have answered the contrary of what he does answer,\nwhen the general question is afterwards put to him: or at least he\nought to have said--\"Sometimes the one, sometimes the other\". But\nthis he is ashamed to do, as we shall find Kallikles intimating at a\nsubsequent stage of the dialogue:[46] because of King Nomos, or the\nestablished habit of the community--who feel that society rests upon\na sentiment of reciprocal right and obligation animating every one,\nand require that violations of that sentiment shall be marked with\ncensure in general words, however widely the critical feeling may\ndepart from such censure in particular cases.[47] Polus is forced to\nmake profession of a faith, which neither he nor others (except\nSokrates with a few companions) universally or consistently apply. To\nbring such a force to bear upon the opponent, was one of the known\nartifices of dialecticians:[48] and Sokrates makes it his point of\ndeparture, to prove the unparalleled misery of Archelaus.\n\n[Footnote 45: Plat. Gorg. p. 474 C.]\n\n[Footnote 46: Plat. Gorg. p. 482 C. To maintain that [Greek: to\\\na)dikei=n be/ltion tou= a)dikei=sthai] was an [Greek: a)/doxos\nu(po/thesis]--one which it was [Greek: chei/ronos \u00ea)/thous\ne(le/sthai]: which therefore Aristotle advises the dialectician not\nto defend (Aristot. Topic. viii. 156, 6-15).]\n\n[Footnote 47: This portion of the Gorgias may receive illustration\nfrom the third chapter (pp. 99-101) of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral\nSentiments, entitled, \"Of the corruption of our moral sentiments,\nwhich is occasioned by the disposition to admire the rich and great,\nand to neglect or despise persons of poor and mean condition\". He\nsays--\"The disposition to admire and almost to worship the rich and\nthe powerful, and to despise, or at least to neglect, persons of poor\nand mean condition, though necessary both to establish and maintain\nthe distinction of ranks and the order of society, is, at the same\ntime, the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our\nmoral sentiments. . . . They are the wise and the virtuous chiefly--a\nselect, though I am afraid, a small party--who are the real and\nsteady admirers of wisdom and virtue. The great mob of mankind are\nthe admirers and worshippers--and what may seem more extraordinary,\nmost frequently the disinterested admirers and worshippers--of wealth\nand greatness. . . . . It is scarce _agreeable to good morals_, or\neven to good language, perhaps, to say that mere wealth and\ngreatness, abstracted from merit and virtue, deserve our respect. We\nmust acknowledge, however, that they _almost constantly obtain\nit_: and _that they may therefore in a certain sense be\nconsidered as the natural objects of it_.\"\n\nNow Archelaus is a most conspicuous example of this disposition of\nthe mass of mankind to worship and admire, disinterestedly, power and\ngreatness: and the language used by Adam Smith in the last sentence\nillustrates the conversation of Sokrates, Polus, and Kallikl\u00eas. Adam\nSmith admits that energetic proceedings, ending in great power, such\nas those of Archelaus, obtain honour and worship from the vast\nmajority of disinterested spectators: and that, therefore they are in\na certain sense the _natural objects_ of such a sentiment\n([Greek: kata\\ phu/sin]). But if the question be put to him, Whether\nsuch proceedings, with such a position, are _worthy of honour_,\nhe is constrained by good morals ([Greek: kata\\ no/mon]) to reply in\nthe negative. It is true that Adam Smith numbers himself with the\nsmall minority, while Polus shares the opinion of the large majority.\nBut what is required by King Nomos must be professed even by\ndissentients, unless they possess the unbending resolution of\nSokrates.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Aristot. De Soph. Elench. pp. 172-173, where he\ncontrasts the opinions which men must make a show of holding, with\nthose which they really do--[Greek: ai( phanerai\\ do/xai--ai(\na)phanei=s, a)pokekrumme/nai, do/xai.]]\n\n[Side-note: The definition of Pulchrum and Turpe, given by\nSokrates, will not hold.]\n\nHe proceeds to define Pulchrum and Turpe ([Greek:\nkalo\\n-ai)schro/n]). When we recollect the Hippias Major, in which\ndialogue many definitions of Pulchrum were canvassed and all rejected,\nso that the search ended in total disappointment--we are surprised to\nsee that Sokrates hits off at once a definition satisfactory both to\nhimself and Polus: and we are the more surprised, because the\ndefinition here admitted without a remark, is in substance one of\nthose shown to be untenable in the Hippias Major.[49] It depends upon\nthe actual argumentative purpose which Plato has in hand, whether he\nchooses to multiply objections and give them effect--or to ignore\nthem altogether. But the definition which he here proposes, even if\nassumed as incontestable, fails altogether to sustain the conclusion\nthat he draws from it. He defines Pulchrum to be that which either\nconfers pleasure upon the spectator when he contemplates it, or\nproduces ulterior profit or good--we must presume profit to the\nspectator, or to him along with others--at any rate it is not said\n_to whom_. He next defines the ugly and disgraceful ([Greek: to\\\nai)schro\\n]) as comprehending both the painful and the hurtful or\nevil. If then (he argues) to do wrong is more ugly and disgraceful\nthan to suffer wrong, this must be either because it is more painful--or\nbecause it is more hurtful, more evil (worse). It certainly is\nnot more painful: therefore it must be worse.\n\n[Footnote 49: Plat. Hipp. Maj. pp. 45-46. See above, vol. ii. ch.\nxiii.]\n\n[Side-note: Worse or better--for whom? The argument of\nSokrates does not specify. If understood in the sense necessary for\nhis inference, the definition would be inadmissible.]\n\nBut worse, for whom? For the spectators, who declare the proceedings\nof Archelaus to be disgraceful? For the persons who suffer by his\nproceedings? Or for Archelaus himself? It is the last of the three\nwhich Sokrates undertakes to prove: but his definition does not\nhelp him to the proof. Turpe is defined to be either what causes\nimmediate pain to the spectator, or ulterior hurt--to whom? If we say\nto the spectator--the definition will not serve as a ground of\ninference to the condition of the agent contemplated. If on the other\nhand, we say--to the agent--the definition so understood becomes\ninadmissible: as well for other reasons, as because there are a great\nmany Turpia which are not agents at all, and which the definition\ntherefore would not include. Either therefore the definition given by\nSokrates is a bad one--or it will not sustain his conclusion. And\nthus, on this very important argument, where Sokrates admits that he\nstands alone, and where therefore the proof would need to be doubly\ncogent--an argument too where the great cause (so Adam Smith terms\nit) of the corruption of men's moral sentiments has to be\ncombated--Sokrates has nothing to produce except premisses alike\nfar-fetched and irrelevant. What increases our regret is, that the real\narguments establishing the turpitude of Archelaus and his acts are obvious\nenough, if you look for them in the right direction. You discover\nnothing while your eye is fixed on Archelaus himself: far from\npresenting any indications of misery, which Sokrates professes to\ndiscover, he has gained much of what men admire as good wherever they\nsee it. But when you turn to the persons whom he has killed,\nbanished, or ruined--to the mass of suffering which he has inflicted--and\nto the widespread insecurity which such acts of successful\niniquity spread through all societies where they become known--there\nis no lack of argument to justify that sentiment which prompts a\nreflecting spectator to brand him as a disgraceful man. This argument\nhowever is here altogether neglected by Plato. Here, as elsewhere, he\nlooks only at the self-regarding side of Ethics.\n\n[Side-note: Plato applies to every one a standard of happiness\nand misery peculiar to himself. His view about the conduct of\nArchelaus is just, but he does not give the true reasons for it.]\n\nSokrates proceeds next to prove--That the wrong-doer who remains\nunpunished is more miserable than if he were punished. The wrong-doer\n(he argues) when punished suffers what is just: but all just things\nare honourable: therefore he suffers what is honourable. But all\nhonourable things are so called because they are either agreeable, or\nprofitable, or both together. Punishment is certainly not agreeable:\nit must therefore be profitable or good. Accordingly the\nwrong-doer when justly punished suffers what is profitable or good. He\nis benefited, by being relieved of mental evil or wickedness, which is\na worse evil than either bodily sickness or poverty. In proportion to\nthe magnitude of this evil, is the value of the relief which removes\nit, and the superior misery of the unpunished wrong-doer who\ncontinues to live under it.[50]\n\n[Footnote 50: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 477-478.]\n\nUpon this argument, I make the same remark as upon that immediately\npreceding. We are not expressly told, whether good, evil, happiness,\nmisery, &c., refer to the agent alone or to others also: but the\ngeneral tenor implies that the agent alone is meant. And in this\nsense, Plato does not make out his case. He establishes an arbitrary\nstandard of his own, recognised only by a few followers, and\naltogether differing from the ordinary standard, to test and compare\nhappiness and misery. The successful criminal, Archelaus himself, far\nfrom feeling any such intense misery as Plato describes, is satisfied\nand proud of his position, which most others also account an object\nof envy. This is not disputed by Plato himself. And in the face of\nthis fact, it is fruitless as well as illogical to attempt to prove,\nby an elaborate process of deductive reasoning, that Archelaus\n_must_ be miserable. That step of Plato's reasoning, in which he\nasserts, that the wrong-doer when justly punished suffers what is\nprofitable or good--is only true if you take in (what Plato omits to\nmention) the interests of society as well as those of the agent. His\npunishment is certainly profitable to (conducive to the security and\nwell being of) society: it may possibly be also profitable to\nhimself, but very frequently it is not so. The conclusion brought out\nby Plato, therefore, while contradicted by the fact, involves also a\nfallacy in the reasoning process.\n\n[Side-note: If the reasoning of Plato were true, the point of\nview in which punishment is considered would be reversed.]\n\nThroughout the whole of this dialogue, Plato intimates decidedly how\ngreat a paradox the doctrine maintained by Sokrates must appear: how\ndiametrically it was opposed to the opinion not merely of the less\ninformed multitude, but of the wiser and more reflecting citizen--even\nsuch a man as Nikias. Indeed it is literally exact--what\nPlato here puts into the mouth of Kallikles--that if the doctrine\nhere advocated by Sokrates were true, the whole of social life would\nbe turned upside down.[51] If, for example, it were true, as Plato\ncontends,--That every man who commits a crime, takes upon him thereby\na terrible and lasting distemper, incurable except by the application\nof punishment, which is the specific remedy in the case--every theory\nof punishment would, literally speaking, be turned upside down. The\ngreat discouragement from crime would then consist in the fear of\nthat formidable distemper with which the criminal was sure to\ninoculate himself: and punishment, instead of being (as it is now\nconsidered, and as Plato himself represents it in the Protagoras) the\ngreat discouragement to the commission of crime, would operate in the\ncontrary direction. It would be the means of removing or impairing\nthe great real discouragement to crime: and a wise legislator would\nhesitate to inflict it. This would be nothing less than a reversal of\nthe most universally accepted political or social precepts (as\nKallikles is made to express himself).\n\n[Footnote 51: Plato, Gorg. p. 481 C. _Kall._--[Greek: ei) me\\n\nga\\r spouda/zeis te kai\\ tugcha/nei tau=ta a)l\u00eath\u00ea= o)/nta a(\\\nle/geis, a)/llo ti \u00ea)\\ \u00ea(m\u00f4=n o( bi/os a)natetramme/nos a)\\n ei)/\u00ea\nt\u00f4=n a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n, kai\\ pa/nta ta\\ e)nanti/a pra/ttomen, \u00ea)\\ a(\\\ndei=?]]\n\n[Side-note: Plato pushes too far the analogy between mental\ndistemper and bodily distemper--Material difference between the\ntwo--Distemper must be felt by the distempered persons.]\n\nIt will indeed be at once seen, that the taint or distemper with\nwhich Archelaus is supposed to inoculate himself, when he commits\nsignal crime--is a pure fancy or poetical metaphor on the part of\nPlato himself.[52] A distemper must imply something painful,\nenfeebling, disabling, to the individual who feels it: there is no\nother meaning: we cannot recognise a distemper, which does not make\nitself felt in any way by the distempered person. Plato is misled by\nhis ever-repeated analogy between bodily health and mental health:\nreal, on some points--not real on others. When a man is in bad bodily\nhealth, his sensations warn him of it at once. He suffers pain,\ndiscomfort, or disabilities, which leave no doubt as to the\nfact: though he may not know either the precise cause, or the\nappropriate remedy. Conversely, in the absence of any such warnings,\nand in the presence of certain positive sensations, he knows himself\nto be in tolerable or good health. If Sokrates and Archelaus were\nboth in good bodily health, or both in bad bodily health, each would\nbe made aware of the fact by analogous evidences. But by what measure\nare we to determine _when_ a man is in a good or bad mental\nstate? By his own feelings? In that case, Archelaus and Sokrates are\nin a mental state equally good: each is satisfied with his own. By\nthe judgment of by-standers? Archelaus will then be the better of the\ntwo: at least his admirers and enviers will outnumber those of\nSokrates. By my judgment? If my opinion is asked, I agree with\nSokrates: though not on the grounds which he here urges, but on other\ngrounds. Who is to be the ultimate referee--the interests or security\nof other persons, who have suffered or are likely to suffer by\nArchelaus, being by the supposition left out of view?\n\n[Footnote 52: The disposition of Plato to build argument on a\nmetaphor is often shown. Aristotle remarks it of him in respect to\nhis theory of Ideas; and Aristotle in his Topica gives several\nprecepts in regard to the general tendency--precepts enjoining\ndisputants to be on their guard against it in dialectic discussion\n(Topica, iv. 123, a. 33, vi. 139-140)--[Greek: pa=n ga\\r a)saphe\\s\nto\\ kata\\ metaphora\\n lego/menon], &c.]\n\nPolus is now dismissed as vanquished, after having been forced,\nagainst his will, to concede--That the doer of wrong is more\nmiserable than the sufferer: That he is more miserable, if\nunpunished,--less so, if punished: That a triumphant criminal on a\ngreat scale, like Archelaus, is the most miserable of men.\n\n[Side-note: Kallikles begins to argue against Sokrates--he\ntakes a distinction between Just by Law and Just by nature--Reply of\nSokrates, that there is no variance between the two, properly\nunderstood.]\n\nHere, then, we commence with Kallikles: who interposes, to take up\nthe debate with Sokrates. Polus (says Kallikles), from deference to\nthe opinions of mankind, has erroneously conceded the point--That it\nis more disgraceful to do wrong, than to suffer wrong. This is indeed\ntrue (continues Kallikles), according to what is just by law or\nconvention, that is, according to the general sentiment of mankind:\nbut it is not true, according to justice by nature, or natural\njustice. Nature and Law are here opposed.[53] The justice of Nature\nis, that among men (as among other animals) the strong individual\nshould govern and strip the weak, taking and keeping as much as he\ncan grasp. But this justice will not suit the weak, who are the\nmany, and who defeat it by establishing a different justice--justice\naccording to law--to curb the strong man, and prevent him from having\nmore than his fair share.[54] The many, feeling their own weakness,\nand thankful if they can only secure a fair and equal division, make\nlaws and turn the current of praise and blame for their own\nprotection, in order to deter the strong man from that encroachment\nand oppression to which he is disposed. _The just according to\nlaw_ is thus a tutelary institution, established by the weak to\ndefend themselves against _the just according to nature_. Nature\nmeasures right by might, and by nothing else: so that according to\nthe right of nature, suffering wrong is more disgraceful than doing\nwrong. H\u00earakl\u00eas takes from Geryon his cattle, by the right of nature\nor of the strongest, without either sale or gift.[55]\n\n[Footnote 53: Plato, Gorgias, p. 482 E. [Greek: \u00f4(s ta\\ polla\\ de\\\ntau=ta e)nanti/a a)ll\u00ea/lois e)sti/n, \u00ea(/ te phu/sis kai\\ o(\nno/mos.]]\n\n[Footnote 54: Plato, Gorgias, p. 483 B. [Greek: a)ll', oi)=mai, oi(\ntithe/menoi tou\\s no/mous oi( a)sthenei=s a)/nthr\u00f4poi/ ei)si kai\\ oi(\npolloi\\. Pro\\s au(tou\\s ou)=n kai\\ to\\ au)toi=s sumphe/ron tou/s te\nno/mous ti/thentai kai\\ tou\\s e)pai/nous e)painou=si kai\\ tou\\s\npso/gous pse/gousin, e)kphobou=nte/s te tou\\s e)r)r(\u00f4meneste/rous\nt\u00f4=n a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n kai\\ dunatou\\s o)/ntas ple/on e)/chein, i(/na m\u00ea\\\nau)t\u00f4=n ple/on e)/ch\u00f4sin, le/gousin \u00f4(s ai)schro\\n kai\\ a)/dikon to\\\npleonektei=n, kai\\ tou=to e)sti to\\ a)dikei=n, to\\ z\u00eatei=n t\u00f4=n\na)/ll\u00f4n ple/on e)/chein; a)gap\u00f4=si ga/r, oi)=mai, au)toi\\ a)\\n to\\\ni)/son e)/ch\u00f4si phaulo/teroi o)/ntes.]]\n\n[Footnote 55: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 484-488.]\n\nBut (rejoins Sokrates) the many are by nature stronger than the one;\nsince, as you yourself say, they make and enforce laws to restrain\nhim and defeat his projects. Therefore, since the many are the\nstrongest, the right which they establish is the right of (or by)\nnature. And the many, as you admit, declare themselves in favour of\nthe answer given by Polus--That to do wrong is more disgraceful than\nto suffer wrong.[56] Right by nature, and right by institution,\nsanction it alike.\n\n[Footnote 56: Plato, Gorgias, p. 488 D-E.]\n\n\n* * * * *\n\n\n[Side-note: What Kallikl\u00eas says is not to be taken as a sample\nof the teachings of Athenian sophists. Kallikl\u00eas--rhetor and\npolitician.]\n\nSeveral commentators have contended, that the doctrine which Plato\nhere puts into the mouth of Kallikl\u00eas was taught by the Sophists at\nAthens: who are said to have inculcated on their hearers that true\nwisdom and morality consisted in acting upon the right of the\nstrongest and taking whatever they could get, without any regard to\nlaw or justice. I have already endeavoured to show, in my\nHistory of Greece, that the Sophists cannot be shown to have taught\neither this doctrine, or any other common doctrine: that one at least\namong them (Prodikus) taught a doctrine inconsistent with it: and\nthat while all of them agreed in trying to impart rhetorical\naccomplishments, or the power of handling political, ethical,\njudicial, matters in a manner suitable for the Athenian public--each\nhad his own way of doing this. Kallikl\u00eas is not presented by Plato as\na Sophist, but as a Rhetor aspiring to active political influence;\nand taking a small dose of philosophy, among the preparations for\nthat end.[57] He depreciates the Sophists as much as the\nphilosophers, and in fact rather more.[58] Moreover Plato represents\nhim as adapting himself, with accommodating subservience, to the\nAthenian public assembly, and saying or unsaying exactly as they\nmanifested their opinion.[59] Now the Athenian public assembly would\nrepudiate indignantly all this pretended right of the strongest, if\nany orator thought fit to put it forward as over-ruling established\nright and law. Any aspiring or subservient orator, such as Kallikl\u00eas\nis described, would know better than to address them in this strain.\nThe language which Plato puts into the mouth of Kallikl\u00eas is noway\nconsistent with the attribute which he also ascribes to him--slavish\ndeference to the judgments of the Athenian D\u00eamos.\n\n[Footnote 57: Plato, Gorgias, p. 487 C, 485.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Plato, Gorgias, p. 520 A.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Plato, Gorgias, p. 481-482.]\n\n[Side-note: Uncertainty of referring to Nature as an\nauthority. It may be pleaded in favour of opposite theories. The\ntheory of Kallikl\u00eas is made to appear repulsive by the language in\nwhich he expresses it.]\n\nKallikl\u00eas is made to speak like one who sympathises with the right of\nthe strongest, and who decorates such iniquity with the name and\nauthority of that which he calls Nature. But this only shows the\nuncertainty of referring to Nature as an authority.[60] It may be\npleaded in favour of different and opposite theories. Nature prompts\nthe strong man to take from weaker men what will gratify his desires:\nNature also prompts these weaker men to defeat him and protect\nthemselves by the best means in their power. The many are\nweaker, taken individually--stronger taken collectively: hence they\nresort to defensive combination, established rules, and collective\nauthority.[61] The right created on one side, and the opposite right\ncreated on the other, flow alike from Nature: that is, from\npropensities and principles natural, and deeply seated, in the human\nmind. The authority of Nature, considered as an enunciation of actual\nand wide-spread facts, may be pleaded for both alike. But a man's\nsympathy and approbation may go either with the one or the other; and\nhe may choose to stamp that which he approves, with the name of\nNature as a personified law-maker. This is what is here done by\nKallikl\u00eas as Plato exhibits him.[62] He sympathises with, and\napproves, the powerful individual. Now the greater portion of mankind\nare, and always have been, governed upon this despotic principle, and\nbrought up to respect it: while many, even of those who dislike\nKallikl\u00eas because they regard him as the representative of\nAthenian democracy (to which however his proclaimed sentiments stand\npointedly opposed), when they come across a great man or so-called\nhero, such as Alexander or Napoleon, applaud the most exorbitant\nambition if successful, and if accompanied by military genius and\nenergy--regarding communities as made for little else except to serve\nas his instruments, subjects, and worshippers. Such are represented\nas the sympathies of Kallikl\u00eas: but those of the Athenians went with\nthe second of the two rights--and mine go with it also. And though\nthe language which Plato puts into the mouth of Kallikl\u00eas, in\ndescribing this second right, abounds in contemptuous rhetoric,\nproclaiming offensively the individual weakness of the multitude[63]--yet\nthis very fact is at once the most solid and most respectable\nfoundation on which rights and obligations can be based. The\nestablishment of them is indispensable, and is felt as indispensable,\nto procure security for the community: whereby the strong man whom\nKallikl\u00eas extols as the favourite of Nature, may be tamed by\ndiscipline and censure, so as to accommodate his own behaviour to\nthis equitable arrangement.[64] Plato himself, in his Republic,[65]\ntraces the generation of a city to the fact that each man\nindividually taken is not self-sufficing, but stands in need of many\nthings: it is no less true, that each man stands also in fear of many\nthings, especially of depredations from animals, and depredations\nfrom powerful individuals of his own species. In the mythe of\nProtagoras,[66] we have fears from hostile animals--in the speech\nhere ascribed to Kallikl\u00eas, we have fears from hostile strong\nmen--assigned as the generating cause, both of political communion and\nof established rights and obligations to protect it.\n\n[Footnote 60: Aristotle (Sophist. Elench. 12, p. 173, a. 10) makes\nallusion to this argument of Kallikl\u00eas in the Gorgias, and notices it\nas a frequent point made by disputants in Dialectics--to insist on\nthe contradiction between the Just according to Nature and the Just\naccording to Law: which contradiction (Aristotle says) all the\nancients recognised as a real one ([Greek: oi( a)rchai=oi pa/ntes\n\u00f4)/|onto sumbai/nein]). It was doubtless a point on which the\nDialectician might find much to say on either side.]\n\n[Footnote 61: In the conversation between Sokrates and Kritobulus,\none of the best in Xenophon's Memorabilia (ii. 6, 21), respecting the\nconditions on which friendship depends, we find Sokrates clearly\nstating that the causes of friendship and the causes of enmity,\nthough different and opposite, nevertheless both exist _by\nnature_. [Greek: A)ll' e)/chei me/n, e)/ph\u00ea o( S\u00f4kra/t\u00eas,\npoiki/l\u00f4s p\u00f4s tau=ta: Phu/sei ga\\r e)/chousin oi( a)/nthr\u00f4poi ta\\\nme\\n philika/--de/ontai/ te ga\\r a)ll\u00ea/l\u00f4n, kai\\ e)leou=si, kai\\\nsunergou=ntes \u00f4)phelou=ntai, kai\\ tou=to sunie/ntes cha/rin\ne)/chousin a)ll\u00ea/lois--ta\\ de\\ polemika/--ta/ te ga\\r au)ta\\ kala\\\nkai\\ \u00ea(de/a nomi/zontes u(pe\\r tou/t\u00f4n ma/chontai kai\\\ndichogn\u00f4monou=ntes e)nantiou=ntai; polemiko\\n de\\ kai\\ e)/ris kai\\\no)rg\u00ea/, kai\\ dusmene\\s me\\n o( tou= pleonektei=n e)/r\u00f4s, mis\u00eato\\n de\\\no( phtho/nos. A)ll' o(/m\u00f4s dia\\ tou/t\u00f4n pa/nt\u00f4n \u00ea( phili/a\ndiaduome/n\u00ea suna/ptei tou\\s kalou/s te ka)gathou/s], &c.\n\nWe read in the speech of Hermokrates the Syracusan, at the congress\nof Gela in Sicily, when exhorting the Sicilians to unite for the\npurpose of repelling the ambitious schemes of Athens, Thucyd. iv. 61:\n[Greek: kai\\ tou\\s me\\n A)th\u00eanai/ous tau=ta pleonektei=n te kai\\\npronoei=sthai poll\u00ea\\ xuggn\u00f4/m\u00ea, kai\\ ou) toi=s a)/rchein boulome/nois\nme/mphomai a)lla\\ toi=s u(pakou/ein e(toimote/rois ou)=si; _\npe/phuke ga\\r to\\ a)nthr\u00f4/peion dia\\ panto\\s a)/rchein me\\n tou=\nei)/kontos, phula/ssesthai de\\ to\\ e)pio/n_. o(/soi de\\\ngign\u00f4/skontes au)ta\\ m\u00ea\\ o)rth\u00f4=s proskopou=men, m\u00eade\\ tou=to/ tis\npresbu/taton \u00ea(/kei kri/nas, to\\ koin\u00f4=s phobero\\n a(/pantas eu)=\nthe/sthai, a(marta/nomen.] A like sentiment is pronounced by the\nAthenian envoys in their debate with the Melians, Thuc. v. 105:\n[Greek: \u00ea(gou/metha ga\\r to/ te thei=on do/x\u00ea|, to\\ a)nthr\u00f4/peio/n te\nsaph\u00f4=s dia\\ panto/s, u(po\\ _phu/se\u00f4s a)nagkai/as_, ou)= a)\\n\nkrat\u00ea=|, a)/rchein.] Some of the Platonic critics would have us\nbelieve that this last-cited sentiment emanates from the corrupt\nteaching of Athenian Sophists: but Hermokrates the Syracusan had\nnothing to do with Athenian Sophists.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Respecting the vague and indeterminate phrases--Natural\nJustice, Natural Right, Law of Nature--see Mr. Austin's Province of\nJurisprudence Determined, p. 160, ed. 2nd. [Jurisp., 4th ed, pp. 179,\n591-2], and Sir H. S. Maine's Ancient Law, chapters iii. and iv.\n\nAmong the assertions made about the Athenian Sophists, it is said by\nsome commentators that they denied altogether any Just or Unjust by\n_nature_--that they recognised no Just or Unjust, except by\n_law or convention_.\n\nTo say that the _Sophists_ (speaking of them collectively)\neither affirmed or denied anything, is, in my judgment, incorrect.\nCertain persons are alluded to by Plato (The\u00e6t\u00eat. 172 B) as adopting\npartially the doctrine of Protagoras (_Homo Mensura_) and as\ndenying altogether the Just by _nature_.\n\nIn another Platonic passage (Protagor. 337) which is also cited as\ncontributing to prove that the Sophists denied [Greek: to\\ di/kaion\nphu/sei]--nothing at all is said about [Greek: to\\ di/kaion]. Hippias\nthe Sophist is there introduced as endeavouring to appease the angry\nfeeling between Protagoras and Sokrates by reminding them, \"I am of\nopinion that we all (_i.e._ men of literature and study) are\nkinsmen, friends, and fellow-citizens by _nature_ though not by\n_law_: for law, the despot of mankind, carries many things by\nforce, contrary to nature\". The remark is very appropriate from one\nwho is trying to restore good feeling between literary disputants:\nand the cosmopolitan character of literature is now so familiar a\ntheme, that I am surprised to find Heindorf (in his note) making it\nan occasion for throwing the usual censure upon the Sophist, because\nsome of them distinguished Nature from the Laws, and despised the\nlatter in comparison with the former.\n\nKallikl\u00eas here, in the Gorgias, maintains an opinion not only\ndifferent from, but inconsistent with, the opinion alluded to above\nin the The\u00e6t\u00eatus, 172 B. The persons noticed in the The\u00e6t\u00eatus\nsaid--There is no Natural Justice: no Justice, except Justice by Law.\nKallikl\u00eas says--There is a Natural Justice quite distinct from (and\nwhich he esteems more than) Justice by Law: he then explains what he\nbelieves Natural Justice to be--That the strong man should take what\nhe pleases from the weak.\n\nThough these two opinions are really inconsistent with each other,\nyet we see Plato in the Leges (x. 889 E, 890 A) alluding to them both\nas the same creed, held and defended by the same men; whom he\ndenounces with extreme acrimony. Who they were, he does not name; he\ndoes not mention [Greek: sophistai/], but calls them [Greek: a)ndr\u00f4=n\nsoph\u00f4=n, i)di\u00f4t\u00f4=n te kai\\ poi\u00eat\u00f4=n].\n\nWe see, in the third chapter of Sir H. S. Maine's excellent work on\nAncient Law, the meaning of these phrases--Natural Justice, Law of\nNature. It designated or included \"a set of legal principles entitled\nto supersede the existing laws, on the ground of intrinsic\nsuperiority\". It denoted an ideal condition of society, supposed to\nbe much better than what actually prevailed. This at least seems to\nhave been the meaning which began to attach to it in the time of\nPlato and Aristotle. What this ideal perfection of human society was,\nvaried in the minds of different speakers. In each speaker's mind the\nword and sentiment was much the same, though the objects to which it\nattached were often different. Empedokles proclaims in solemn and\nemphatic language that the Law of Nature peremptorily forbids us to\nkill any animal. (Aristot. Rhetor. i. 13, 1373 b. 15.) Plato makes\nout to his own satisfaction, that his Republic is thoroughly in\nharmony with the Law of Nature: and he insists especially on this\nharmony, in the very point which even the Platonic critics admit to\nbe wrong--that is, in regard to the training of women and the\nrelations of the sexes (Republic, v. 456 C, 466 D). We learn from\nPlato himself that the propositions of the Republic were thoroughly\nadverse to what other persons reverenced as the Law of Nature.\n\nIn the notes of Beck and Heindorf on Protagor. p. 337 we read,\n\"Hippias pr\u00e6 c\u00e6teris Sophistis contempsit leges, iisque opposuit\nNaturam. Naturam legibus plures cert\u00e9 Sophistarum opposuisse, easque\npr\u00e6 ill\u00e2 contempsisse, multis veterum locis constat.\" Now this\nallegation is more applicable to Plato than to the Sophists. Plato\nspeaks with the most unmeasured contempt of existing communities and\ntheir laws: the scheme of his Republic, radically departing from them\nas it does, shows what he considered as required by the exigencies of\nhuman nature. Both the Stoics and the Epikureans extolled what they\ncalled the Law of Nature above any laws actually existing.\n\nThe other charge made against the Sophists (quite opposite, yet\nsometimes advanced by the same critics) is, that they recognised no\nJust by Nature, but only Just by Law: _i.e._ all the actual laws\nand customs considered as binding in each different community. This\nis what Plato ascribes to some persons (Sophists or not) in the\nThe\u00e6t\u00eatus, p. 172. But in this sense it is not exact to call\nKallikl\u00eas (as Heindorf does, Protagor. p. 337) \"germanus ille\nSophistarum alumnus in Gorgi\u00e0 Callicles,\" nor to affirm (with\nSchleiermacher, Einleit. zum The\u00e6t\u00eat. p. 183) that Plato meant to\nrefute Aristippus under the name of Kallikles, Aristippus maintaining\nthat there was no Just by Nature, but only Just by Law or\nConvention.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Plato, Gorgias, p. 483 B, p. 492 A. [Greek: oi(\npolloi\\, a)pokrupto/menoi t\u00ea\\n e(aut\u00f4=n a)dunami/an], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Plato, Gorgias, p. 483 E.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 369 B. [Greek: o(/ti tugcha/nei\n\u00ea(m\u00f4=n e(/kastos ou)k au)tark\u00ea\\s \u00f4)/n, a)lla\\ poll\u00f4=n e)nde\u00ea/s.]]\n\n[Footnote 66: Plato, Protag. p. 322 B.]\n\n\n* * * * *\n\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates maintains that self-command and\nmoderation is requisite for the strong man as well as for others.\nKallikl\u00eas defends the negative.]\n\nKallikl\u00eas now explains, that by _stronger_ men, he means better,\nwiser, braver men. It is they (he says) who ought, according to right\nby nature, to rule over others and to have larger shares than others.\n_Sokr._--Ought they not to rule themselves as well as\nothers:[67] to control their own pleasures and desires: to be sober\nand temperate? _Kall._--No, they would be foolish if they did.\nThe weak multitude must do so; and there grows up accordingly among\n_them_ a sentiment which requires such self-restraint from all.\nBut it is the privilege of the superior few to be exempt from this\nnecessity. The right of nature authorises them to have the largest\ndesires, since their courage and ability furnish means to satisfy the\ndesires. It would be silly if a king's son or a despot were to limit\nhimself to the same measure of enjoyment with which a poor citizen\nmust be content; and worse than silly if he did not enrich his\nfriends in preference to his enemies. He need not care for that\npublic law and censure which must reign paramount over each man among\nthe many. A full swing of enjoyment, if a man has power to procure\nand maintain it, is virtue as well as happiness.[68]\n\n[Footnote 67: Plato, Gorgias, p. 491 D.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Plato, Gorgias, p. 492 A-C.]\n\n[Side-note: Whether the largest measure of desires is good for\na man, provided he has the means of satisfying them? Whether all\nvarieties of desire are good? Whether the pleasurable and the good\nare identical?]\n\n_Sokr._--I think on the contrary that a sober and moderate life,\nregulated according to present means and circumstances, is better\nthan a life of immoderate indulgence.[69] _Kall._--The man who\nhas no desires will have no pleasure, and will live like a stone. The\nmore the desires, provided they can all be satisfied, the happier a\nman will be. _Sokr._--You mean that a man shall be continually\nhungry, and continually satisfying his hunger: continually thirsty,\nand satisfying his thirst; and so forth. _Kall._--By having and\nby satisfying those and all other desires, a man will enjoy\nhappiness. _Sokr._--Do you mean to include all varieties of\ndesire and satisfaction of desire: such for example as itching and\nscratching yourself:[70] and other bodily appetites which might be\nnamed? _Kall._--Such things are not fit for discussion.\n_Sokr._--It is you who drive me to mention them, by laying down\nthe principle, that men who enjoy, be the enjoyment of what sort it\nmay, are happy; and by not distinguishing what pleasures are\ngood and what are evil. Tell me again, do you think that the\npleasurable and the good are identical? Or are there any pleasurable\nthings which are not good?[71] _Kall._--I think that the\npleasurable and the good are the same.\n\n[Footnote 69: Plato, Gorgias, p. 493 C. [Greek: e)a/n p\u00f4s oi(=o/s t'\n\u00f4)= pei=sai metathe/sthai kai\\ a)nti\\ tou= a)pl\u00ea/st\u00f4s kai\\\na)kola/st\u00f4s e)/chontos bi/ou to\\n kosmi/\u00f4s kai\\ toi=s a)ei\\ parou=sin\ni(kan\u00f4=s kai\\ e)xarkou/nt\u00f4s e)/chonta bi/on e(le/sthai.]]\n\n[Footnote 70: Plato, Gorg. p. 494 E.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Plato, Gorg. pp. 494-495. [Greek: \u00ea)= ga\\r e)g\u00f4\\ a)/g\u00f4\ne)ntau=tha, \u00ea)\\ e)kei=nos o(\\s a)\\n ph\u00ea=| a)ne/d\u00ean ou(/t\u00f4 tou\\s\nchai/rontas, o(/p\u00f4s a)\\n chair\u00f4sin, eu)dai/monas ei)=nai, kai\\ m\u00ea\\\ndiori/z\u00eatai t\u00f4=n \u00ea(don\u00f4=n o(poi=ai a)gathai\\ kai\\ kakai/? a)ll' e)/ti\nkai\\ nu=n le/ge, po/teron ph\u00ea\\| ei)=nai to\\ au)to\\ \u00ea(du\\ kai\\\na)gatho/n, \u00ea)\\ ei)=nai ti t\u00f4=n \u00ea(de/\u00f4n o(\\ ou)k e)/stin a)gatho/n?]]\n\n[Side-note: Kallikl\u00eas maintains that pleasurable and good are\nidentical. Sokrates refutes him. Some pleasures are good, others bad.\nA scientific adviser is required to discriminate them.]\n\nUpon this question the discussion now turns: whether pleasure and\ngood are the same, or whether there are not some pleasures good,\nothers bad. By a string of questions much protracted, but subtle\nrather than conclusive, Sokrates proves that pleasure is not the same\nas good--that there are such things as bad pleasures and good pains.\nAnd Kallikl\u00eas admits that some pleasures are better, others\nworse.[72] Profitable pleasures are good: hurtful pleasures are bad.\nThus the pleasures of eating and drinking are good, if they impart to\nus health and strength--bad, if they produce sickness and weakness.\nWe ought to choose the good pleasures and pains, and avoid the bad\nones. It is not every man who is competent to distinguish what\npleasures are good, and what are bad. A scientific and skilful\nadviser, judging upon general principles, is required to make this\ndistinction.[73]\n\n[Footnote 72: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 496-499.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 499-500. [Greek: A)=r' ou)=n\npanto\\s a)ndro/s e)stin e)kle/xasthai poi=a a)gatha\\ t\u00f4=n \u00ea(de/\u00f4n\ne)sti\\ kai\\ o(poi=a kaka/, \u00ea)= technikou= dei= ei)s e(/kaston?\nTechnikou=.]]\n\n\n* * * * *\n\n\n[Side-note: Contradiction between Sokrates in the Gorgias, and\nSokrates in the Protagoras.]\n\nThis debate between Sokrates and Kallikl\u00eas, respecting the \"Quomodo\nvivendum est,\"[74] deserves attention on more than one account. In\nthe first place, the relation which Sokrates is here made to declare\nbetween the two pairs of general terms, Pleasurable--Good:\nPainful--Evil: is the direct reverse of that which he both declares\nand demonstrates in the Protagoras. In that dialogue, the Sophist\nProtagoras is represented as holding an opinion very like that which\nis maintained by Sokrates in the Gorgias. But Sokrates (in the\nProtagoras) refutes him by an elaborate argument; and demonstrates\nthat pleasure and good (also pain and evil) are names for the same\nfundamental ideas under different circumstances: pleasurable and\npainful referring only to the sensation of the present moment--while\ngood and evil include, besides, an estimate of its future\nconsequences and accompaniments, both pleasurable and painful, and\nrepresent the result of such calculation. In the Gorgias, Sokrates\ndemonstrates the contrary, by an argument equally elaborate but not\nequally convincing. He impugns a doctrine advocated by Kallikl\u00eas, and\nin impugning it, proclaims a marked antithesis and even repugnance\nbetween the pleasurable and the good, the painful and the evil:\nrejecting the fundamental identity of the two, which he advocates in\nthe Protagoras, as if it were a disgraceful heresy.\n\n[Footnote 74: Plato, Gorgias, p. 492 D. [Greek: i(/na t\u00f4=| o)/nti\nkata/d\u00ealon ge/n\u00eatai, p\u00f4=s bi\u00f4te/on], &c. 500 C: [Greek: o(/ntina\nchr\u00ea\\ tro/pon z\u00ea=|n.]]\n\n[Side-note: Views of critics about this contradiction.]\n\nThe subject evidently presented itself to Plato in two different ways\nat different times. Which of the two is earliest, we have no means of\ndeciding. The commentators, who favour generally the view taken in\nthe Gorgias, treat the Protagoras as a juvenile and erroneous\nproduction: sometimes, with still less reason, they represent\nSokrates as arguing in that dialogue, from the principles of his\nopponents, not from his own. For my part, without knowing whether the\nProtagoras or the Gorgias is the earliest, I think the Protagoras an\nequally finished composition, and I consider that the views which\nSokrates is made to propound in it, respecting pleasure and good, are\ndecidedly nearer to the truth.\n\n[Side-note: Comparison and appreciation of the reasoning of\nSokrates in both dialogues.]\n\nThat in the list of pleasures there are some which it is proper to\navoid,--and in the list of pains, some which it is proper to accept\nor invite--is a doctrine maintained by Sokrates alike in both the\ndialogues. Why? Because some pleasures are good, others bad: some\npains bad, others good--says Sokrates in the Gorgias. The same too is\nsaid by Sokrates in the Protagoras; but then, he there explains what\nhe means by the appellation. All pleasure (he there says), so far as\nit goes, is good--all pain is bad. But there are some pleasures which\ncannot be enjoyed without debarring us from greater pleasures or\nentailing upon us greater pains: on that ground therefore, such\npleasures are bad. So again, there are some pains, the suffering\nof which is a condition indispensable to our escaping greater pains,\nor to our enjoying greater pleasures: such pains therefore are good.\nThus this apparent exception does not really contradict, but\nconfirms, the general doctrine--That there is no good but the\npleasurable, and the elimination of pain--and no evil except the\npainful, or the privation of pleasure. Good and evil have no\nreference except to pleasures and pains; but the terms imply, in each\nparticular case, an estimate and comparison of future pleasurable and\npainful consequences, and express the result of such comparison. \"You\ncall enjoyment itself evil\" (says Sokrates in the Protagoras),[75]\n\"when it deprives us of greater pleasures or entails upon us greater\npains. If you have any other ground, or look to any other end, in\ncalling it evil, you may tell us what that end is; but you will not\nbe able to tell us. So too, you say that pain is a good, when it\nrelieves us from greater pains, or when it is necessary as the\nantecedent cause of greater pleasures. If you have any other end in\nview, when you call pain good, you may tell us what that end is; but\nyou will not be able to tell us.\"[76]\n\n[Footnote 75: Plato, Protagoras,** p. 354 D. [Greek: e)pei/, ei) kat'\na)/llo ti au)to\\ to\\ chai/rein kako\\n kalei=te kai\\ ei)s a)/llo ti\nte/los a)poble/psantes, e)/choite a)\\n kai\\ \u00ea(mi=n ei)pei=n; a)ll'\nou)ch e(/xete. . . . e)pei\\ ei) pro\\s a)/llo ti te/los a)poble/pete,\no(/tan kal\u00ea=te au)to\\ to\\ lupei=sthai a)gatho/n, \u00ea)\\ pro\\s o(\\ e)g\u00f4\\\nle/g\u00f4, e)/chete \u00ea(mi=n ei)pein; a)ll' ou)ch e(/xete.]]\n\n[Footnote 76: In a remarkable passage of the De Legibus, Plato denies\nall essential distinction between Good and Pleasure, and all reality\nof Good apart from Pleasure (Legg. ii. pp. 662-663). [Greek: ei) d'\nau)= to\\n dikaio/taton eu)daimone/staton a)pophai/noito bi/on\nei)=nai, z\u00eatoi= pou pa=s a)\\n o( a)kou/\u00f4n, oi)=mai, ti/ pot' e)n\nau)t\u00f4=| to\\ t\u00ea=s \u00ea(don\u00ea=s krei=tton a)gatho/n te kai\\ kalo\\n o(\nno/mos e)no\\n e)painei=? ti/ ga\\r d\u00ea\\ dikai/\u00f4| ch\u00f4rizo/menon \u00ea(don\u00ea=s\na)gatho\\n a)\\n ge/noito?]\n\nPlato goes on to argue as follows: Even though it were not true, as I\naffirm it to be, that the life of justice is a life of pleasure, and\nthe life of injustice a life of pain--still the law-giver must\nproclaim this proposition as a useful falsehood, and compel every one\nto chime in with it. Otherwise the youth will have no motive to just\nconduct. For no one will willingly consent to obey any recommendation\nfrom which he does not expect more pleasure than pain; [Greek:\nou)dei\\s ga\\r a)\\n e(/k\u00f4n e)/theloi pei/thesthai pra/ttein tou=to\no(/, t\u00f4| m\u00ea\\ to\\ chai/rein tou= lupei=sthai ple/on e(/petai] (663\nB).]\n\n[Side-note: Distinct statement in the Protagoras. What are\ngood and evil, and upon what principles the scientific adviser is to\nproceed in discriminating them. No such distinct statement in the\nGorgias.]\n\nIn the Gorgias, too, Sokrates declares that some pleasures are good,\nothers bad--some pains bad, others good. But here he stops. He does\nnot fulfil the reasonable demand urged by Sokrates in the Protagoras--\"If\nyou make such a distinction, explain the ground on which you\nmake it, and the end to which you look\". The distinction in the\nGorgias stands without any assigned ground or end to rest upon. And\nthis want is the more sensibly felt, when we read in the same\ndialogue, that--\"It is not every man who can distinguish the good\npleasures from the bad: a scientific man, proceeding on principle, is\nneeded for the purpose\".[77] But upon what criterion is the\nscientific man to proceed? Of what properties is he to take account,\nin pronouncing one pleasure to be bad, another good--or one pain to\nbe bad and another good--the estimate of consequences, measured in\nfuture pleasures and pains, being by the supposition excluded? No\ninformation is given. The problem set to the scientific man is one of\nwhich all the quantities are unknown. Now Sokrates in the\nProtagoras[78] also lays it down, that a scientific or rational\ncalculation must be had, and a mind competent to such calculation\nmust be postulated, to decide which pleasures are bad or fit to be\nrejected--which pains are good, or proper to be endured. But then he\nclearly specifies the elements which alone are to be taken into the\ncalculation--_viz._, the future pleasures and pains accompanying\nor dependent upon each with the estimate of their comparative\nmagnitude and durability. The theory of this calculation is clear and\nintelligible: though in many particular cases, the data necessary for\nmaking it, and the means of comparing them, may be very imperfectly\naccessible.\n\n[Footnote 77: Plato, Gorgias, p. 500 A. [Greek: A)=r' ou)=n panto\\s\na)ndro/s** e)stin e)kle/xasthai poi=a a)/gatha\\ t\u00f4=n \u00ea(de/\u00f4n\ne)sti\\ kai\\ o(poi=a kaka/? \u00ea)\\ technikou= dei= ei)s e(/kaston?\nTechnikou=.]]\n\n[Footnote 78: Plato, Protagoras, pp. 357 B, 356 E.]\n\n[Side-note: Modern ethical theories. Intuition. Moral sense--not\nrecognised by Plato in either of the dialogues.]\n\nAccording to various ethical theories, which have chiefly obtained\ncurrency in modern times, the distinction--between pleasures good or\nfit to be enjoyed, and pleasures bad or unfit to be enjoyed--is\ndetermined for us by a moral sense or intuition: by a simple,\npeculiar, sentiment of right and wrong, or a conscience, which\nsprings up within us ready-made, and decides on such matters without\nappeal; so that a man has only to look into his own heart for a\nsolution. We need not take account of this hypothesis, in reviewing\nPlato's philosophy: for he evidently does not proceed upon it. He\nexpressly affirms, in the Gorgias as well as in the Protagoras, that\nthe question is one requiring science or knowledge to determine it,\nand upon which none but the man of science or _expert_\n([Greek: techniko\\s]) is a competent judge.\n\n[Side-note: In both dialogues the doctrine of Sokrates is\nself-regarding as respects the agent: not considering the pleasures\nand pains of other persons, so far as affected by the agent.]\n\nMoreover, there is another point common to both the two dialogues,\ndeserving of notice. I have already remarked when reviewing the\ndoctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras, that it appears to me\nseriously defective, inasmuch as it takes into account the pleasures\nand pains of the agent only, and omits the pleasures and pains of\nother persons affected by his conduct. But this is not less true\nrespecting the doctrine of Sokrates in the Gorgias: for whatever\ncriterion he may there have in his mind to determine which among our\npleasures are bad, it is certainly not this--that the agent in\nprocuring them is obliged to hurt others. For the example which\nSokrates cites as specially illustrating the class of bad\npleasures--_viz._, the pleasure of scratching an itching part of the\nbody[79]--is one in which no others besides the agent are concerned.\nAs in the Protagoras, so in the Gorgias--Plato in laying down his\nrule of life, admits into the theory only what concerns the agent\nhimself, and makes no direct reference to the happiness of others as\naffected by the agent's behaviour.\n\n[Footnote 79: The Sokrates of the Protagoras would have reckoned this\namong the bad pleasures, because the discomfort and distress of body\nout of which it arises more than countervail the pleasure.]\n\n[Side-note: Points wherein the doctrine of the two dialogues\nis in substance the same, but differing in classification.]\n\nThere are however various points of analogy between the Protagoras\nand the Gorgias, which will enable us, after tracing them out, to\nmeasure the amount of substantial difference between them; I speak of\nthe reasoning of Sokrates in each. Thus, in the Protagoras,[80]\nSokrates ranks health, strength, preservation of the community,\nwealth, command, &c., under the general head of Good things, but\nexpressly on the ground that they are the producing causes and\nconditions of pleasures and of exemption from pains: he also ranks\nsickness and poverty under the head of Evil things, as productive\ncauses of pain and suffering. In the Gorgias also, he numbers wisdom,\nhealth, strength, perfection of body, riches, &c., among Good\nthings or profitable things[81]--(which two words he treats as\nequivalent)--and their contraries as Evil things. Now he does\nnot expressly say here (as in the Protagoras) that these things are\n_good_, because they are productive causes of pleasure or\nexemption from pain: but such assumption must evidently be supplied\nin order to make the reasoning valid. For upon what pretence can any\none pronounce strength, health, riches, to be _good_--and\nhelplessness, sickness, poverty, to be _evil_--if no reference\nbe admitted to pleasures and pains? Sokrates in the Gorgias[82]\ndeclares that the pleasures of eating and drinking are good, in so\nfar as they impart health and strength to the body--evil, in so far\nas they produce a contrary effect. Sokrates in the Protagoras reasons\nin the same way--but with this difference--that he would count the\npleasure of the repast itself as one item of good: enhancing the\namount of good where the future consequences are beneficial,\ndiminishing the amount of evil where the future consequences are\nUnfavourable: while Sokrates in the Gorgias excludes immediate\npleasure from the list of good things, and immediate pain from the\nlist of evil things.\n\n[Footnote 80: Plato, Protagor. pp. 353 D, 354 A.]\n\n[Footnote 81: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 467-468-499.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Plato, Gorgias, p. 499 D.]\n\nThis last exclusion renders the theory in the Gorgias untenable and\ninconsistent. If present pleasure be not admitted as an item of good\nso far as it goes--then neither can the future and consequent\naggregates of pleasure, nor the causes of them, be admitted as good.\nSo likewise, if present pain be no evil, future pain cannot be\nallowed to rank as an evil.[83]\n\n[Footnote 83: Compare a passage in the Republic (ii. p. 357) where\nSokrates gives (or accepts, as given by Glaukon) a description of\nGood much more coincident with the Protagoras than with the Gorgias.\nThe common property of all Good is to be desired or loved; and there\nare three varieties of it--1. That which we desire for itself, and\nfor its own sake, apart from all ulterior consequences, such as\ninnocuous pleasures or enjoyments. 2. That which we desire both for\nitself and for its ulterior consequences, such as good health, good\nvision, good sense, &c. 3. That which we do not desire--nay,\nwhich we perhaps hate or shun, _per se_: but which we\nnevertheless desire and invite, in connection with and for the sake\nof ulterior consequences: such as gymnastic training, medical\ntreatment when we are sick, labour in our trade or profession.\n\nHere Plato admits the immediately pleasurable _per se_ as one\nvariety of good, always assuming that it is not countervailed by\nconsequences or accompaniments of a painful character. This is the\ndoctrine of the Protagoras, as distinguished from the Gorgias, where\nSokrates sets pleasure in marked opposition to good.]\n\n[Side-note: Kallikl\u00eas, whom Sokrates refutes in the Gorgias,\nmaintains a different argument from that which Sokrates combats in\nthe Protagoras.]\n\nEach of the two dialogues, which I am now comparing, is in truth an\nindependent composition: in each, Sokrates has a distinct argument to\ncombat; and in the latest of the two (whichever that was), no heed is\ntaken of the argumentation in the earlier. In the Protagoras, he\nexalts the dignity and paramount force of knowledge or prudence: if a\nman knows how to calculate pleasures and pains, he will be sure to\nchoose the result which involves the greater pleasure or the less\npain, on the whole: to say that he is overpowered by immediate\npleasure or pain into making a bad choice, is a wrong description--the\nreal fact being, that he is deficient in the proper knowledge how\nto choose. In the Gorgias, the doctrine assigned to Kallikl\u00eas and\nimpugned by Sokrates is something very different. That justice,\ntemperance, self-restraint, are indeed indispensable to the happiness\nof ordinary men; but if there be any one individual, so immensely\nsuperior in force as to trample down and make slaves of the rest,\nthis one man would be a fool if he restrained himself: having the\nmeans of gratifying all his appetites, the more appetites he has, the\nmore enjoyments will he have and the greater happiness.[84]\nObserve--that Kallikl\u00eas applies this doctrine only to the one omnipotent\ndespot: to all other members of society, he maintains that\nself-restraint is essential. This is the doctrine which Sokrates in the\nGorgias undertakes to refute, by denying community of nature between\nthe pleasurable and the good--between the painful and the evil.\n\n[Footnote 84: Plato, Gorgias, p. 492 B.]\n\n[Side-note: The refutation of Kallikl\u00eas by Sokrates in the\nGorgias, is unsuccessful--it is only so far successful as he adopts\nunintentionally the doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras.]\n\nTo me his refutation appears altogether unsuccessful, and the\nposition upon which he rests it incorrect. The only parts of the\nrefutation really forcible, are those in which he unconsciously\nrelinquishes this position, and slides into the doctrine of the\nProtagoras. Upon this latter doctrine, a refutation might be\ngrounded: you may show that even an omnipotent despot (regard for the\ncomfort of others being excluded by the hypothesis) will gain by\nlimiting the gratification of his appetites to-day so as not to spoil\nhis appetites of tomorrow. Even in his case, prudential restraint is\nrequired, though his motives for it would be much less than in the\ncase of ordinary social men. But Good, as laid down by Plato in the\nGorgias, entirely disconnected from pleasure--and Evil, entirely\ndisconnected from pain--have no application to this supposed despot.\nHe has no desire for such Platonic Good--no aversion for such\nPlatonic Evil. His happiness is not diminished by missing the former\nor incurring the latter. In fact, one of the cardinal principles of\nPlato's ethical philosophy, which he frequently asserts both in this\ndialogue and elsewhere,[85]--That every man desires Good, and acts\nfor the sake of obtaining Good, and avoiding Evil--becomes untrue, if\nyou conceive Good and Evil according to the Gorgias, as having no\nreference to pleasure or the avoidance of pain: untrue, not merely in\nregard to a despot under these exceptional conditions, but in regard\nto the large majority of social men. They desire to obtain Good and\navoid Evil, in the sense of the Protagoras: but not in the sense of\nthe Gorgias.[86] Sokrates himself proclaims in this dialogue: \"I and\nphilosophy stand opposed to Kallikl\u00eas and the Athenian public. What I\ndesire is, to reason consistently with myself.\" That is, to speak the\nlanguage of Sokrates in the Protagoras--\"To me, Sokrates, the\nconsciousness of inconsistency with myself and of an unworthy\ncharacter, the loss of my own self-esteem and the pungency of my own\nself-reproach, are the greatest of all pains: greater than those\nwhich you, Kallikl\u00eas, and the Athenians generally, seek to avoid at\nall price and urge me also to avoid at all price--poverty, political\nnullity, exposure to false accusation, &c.\"[87] The noble\nscheme of life, here recommended by Sokrates, may be correctly\ndescribed according to the theory of the Protagoras: without any\nresort to the paradox of the Gorgias, that Good has no kindred or\nreference to Pleasure, nor Evil to Pain.\n\n[Footnote 85: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 467 C, 499 E.]\n\n[Footnote 86: The reasoning of Plato in the Gorgias, respecting this\nmatter, rests upon an equivocal phrase. The Greek phrase [Greek: eu)=\npra/ttein] has two meanings; it means _rect\u00e9 agere_, to act\nrightly; and it also means _felicem esse_, to be happy. There is\na corresponding double sense in [Greek: kak\u00f4=s pra/ttein]. Heindorf\nhas well noticed the fallacious reasoning founded by Plato on this\ndouble sense. We read in the Gorgias, p. 507 C: [Greek: a)na/gk\u00ea to\\n\ns\u00f4/phrona, di/kaion o)/nta kai\\ a)ndrei=on kai\\ o(/sion, a)gatho\\n\na)/ndra ei)=nai tele/\u00f4s, to\\n de\\ a)gatho\\n ei)= te kai\\ kal\u00f4=s\npra/ttein a)\\ a)\\n pra/tt\u00ea|, to\\n d' eu)= pra/ttonta maka/rio/n te\nkai\\ eu)dai/mona ei)=nai, to\\n de\\ pon\u00earo\\n kai\\ kak\u00f4=s pra/ttonta\na)/thlion.] Upon which Heindorf remarks, citing a note of Routh, who\nsays, \"Vix enim potest credi, Platonem duplici sensu verborum [Greek:\neu)= pra/ttein] ad argumentum probandum abuti voluisse, qu\u00e6 fallacia\nesset amphiboli\u00e6\". \"Non meminerat\" (says Heindorf) \"vir doctus\nceteros in Platone locos, ubi eodem modo ex duplici ill\u00e2 potestate\nargumentatio ducitur, cujusmodi plura attulimus ad Charmidem, 42, p.\n172 A.\" Heindorf observes, on the Charmid\u00eas l. c.: \"Argumenti hujus\nvim positam apparet in duplici dictionis [Greek: eu)= pra/ttein]\nsignificatu: quum vulgo sit _felicem esse_, non _rect\u00e9\nfacere_. Hoc aliaque ejusdem generis s\u00e6pius sic ansam pr\u00e6buerunt\nsophismatis magis quam justi syllogismi.\" Heindorf then refers to\nanalogous passages in Plato, Repub. i. p. 354 A: Alkib. i. p. 116 B,\np. 134 A. A similar fallacy is found in Aristotle, Politic. vii. i.\np. 1323, a. 17, b. 32--[Greek: a)/rista ga\\r pra/ttein pros\u00ea/kei\ntou\\s a)/rista politeuome/nous--a)du/naton de\\ kal\u00f4=s pra/ttein toi=s\nm\u00ea\\ ta\\ kala\\ pra/ttousin.] This fallacy is recognised and properly\ncommented on as a \"logisches Wortspiel,\" by Bernays, in his\ninstructive volume, _Die** Dialoge des Aristoteles_, pp. 80-81\n(Berlin, 1863).]\n\n[Footnote 87: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 481 D, 482 B.]\n\n[Side-note: Permanent elements--and transient elements--of\nhuman agency--how each of them is appreciated in the two dialogues.]\n\nLastly I will compare the Protagoras and the Gorgias (meaning always,\nthe reasoning of Sokrates in each of them) under one more point of\nview. How does each of them describe and distinguish the permanent\nelements, and the transient elements, involved in human agency? What\nfunction does each of them assign to the permanent element? The\ndistinction of these two is important in its ethical bearing. The\nwhole life both of the individual and of society consists of\nsuccessive moments of action or feeling. But each individual (and the\nsociety as an aggregate of individuals) has within him embodied and\nrealised an element more or less permanent--an established character,\nhabits, dispositions, intellectual acquirements, &c.--a sort of\ncapital accumulated from the past. This permanent element is of\nextreme importance. It stands to the transient element in the same\nrelation as the fixed capital of a trader or manufacturer to his\nannual produce. The whole use and value of the fixed capital, of\nwhich the skill and energy of the trader himself make an important\npart, consists in the amount of produce which it will yield: but at\nthe same time the trader must keep it up in its condition of fixed\ncapital, in order to obtain such amount: he must set apart, and\nabstain from devoting to immediate enjoyment, as much of the annual\nproduce as will suffice to maintain the fixed capital unimpaired--and\nmore, if he desires to improve his condition. The capital cannot be\ncommuted into interest; yet nevertheless its whole value depends\nupon, and is measured by, the interest which it yields. Doubtless the\nmere idea of possessing the capital is pleasurable to the possessor,\nbecause he knows that it can and will be profitably employed, so long\nas he chooses.\n\n[Side-note: In the Protagoras.]\n\nNow in the Protagoras, the permanent element is very pointedly\ndistinguished from the transient, and is called Knowledge--the\nScience or Art of Calculation. Its function also is clearly\nannounced--to take comparative estimate and measurement of the\ntransient elements; which are stated to consist of pleasures and\npains, present and future--near and distant--certain and\nuncertain--faint and strong. To these elements, manifold yet\ncommensurable, the calculation is to apply. \"The safety of life\"\n(says Sokrates[88]) \"resides in our keeping up this science or art\nof calculation.\" No present enjoyment must be admitted, which would\nimpair it; no present pain must be shunned, which is essential to\nuphold it. Yet the whole of its value resides in its application to\nthe comparison of the pleasures and pains.\n\n[Footnote 88: Plato, Protag. p. 357 A. [Greek: e)peid\u00ea\\ de\\ \u00ea(don\u00ea=s\nte kai\\ lu/p\u00eas e)n o)rth\u00ea=| t\u00ea=| ai(re/sei e)pha/n\u00ea \u00ea(mi=n \u00ea(\ns\u00f4t\u00eari/a tou= bi/ou ou)=sa, tou= te ple/onos kai\\ e)lattonos kai\\\nmei/zonos kai\\ smikrote/rou kai\\ por)r(\u00f4te/r\u00f4 kai\\ e)ggute/r\u00f4],\n&c.]\n\n[Side-note: In the Gorgias.]\n\nIn the Gorgias the same two elements are differently described, and\nless clearly explained. The permanent is termed, Order, arrangement,\ndiscipline, a lawful, just, and temperate, cast of mind (opposed to\nthe doctrine ascribed to Kallikl\u00eas, which negatived this element\naltogether, in the mind of the despot), parallel to health and\nstrength of body: the unordered mind is again the parallel of the\ncorrupt, distempered, helpless, body; life is not worth having until\nthis is cured.[89] This corresponds to the knowledge or Calculating\nScience in the Protagoras; but we cannot understand what its function\nis, in the Gorgias, because the calculable elements are incompletely\nenumerated.\n\n[Footnote 89: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 504 B-C, 506 D-E.\n[Greek: Ta/xis--ko/smos--psuch\u00ea\\ kosmi/a a)mei/n\u00f4n tou= a)kosm\u00ea/tou.]]\n\nIn the Protagoras, these calculable elements are two-fold--immediate\npleasures and pains--and future or distant pleasures and pains.\nBetween these two there is intercommunity of nature, so that they are\nquite commensurable; and the function of the calculating reason is,\nto make a right estimate of the one against the other.[90] But in the\nGorgias, no mention is made of future or distant pleasures and pains:\nthe calculable element is represented only by immediate pleasure or\npain--and from thence we pass at once to the permanent calculator--the\nmind, sound or corrupt. You must abstain from a particular\nenjoyment, because it will taint the soundness of your mind:\nthis is a pertinent reason (and would be admitted as such by Sokrates\nin the Protagoras, who instead of sound mind would say, calculating\nintelligence), but it is neither the ultimate reason (since this\nsoundness of mind is itself valuable with a view to future\ncalculations), nor the only reason: for you must also abstain, if it\nwill bring upon yourself (or upon others) preponderating pains in the\nparticular case--if the future pains would preponderate over the\npresent pleasure. Of this last calculation no notice is taken in the\nGorgias: which exhibits only the antithesis (not merely marked but\neven over-done[91]) between the immediate pleasure or pain and the\ncalculating efficacy of mind, but leaves out the true function which\ngives value to the sound mind as distinguished from the unsound and\ncorrupt. That function consists in its application to particular\ncases: in right dealing with actual life, as regards the agent\nhimself and others: in [Greek: e)nergei/a], as distinguished from\n[Greek: e(/xis], to use Aristotelian language.[92] I am far from\nsupposing that this part of the case was absent from Plato's mind.\nBut the theory laid out in the Gorgias (as compared with that in the\nProtagoras) leaves no room for it; giving exclusive prominence to the\nother elements, and acknowledging only the present pleasure or pain,\nto be set against the permanent condition of mind, bad or good as it\nmay be.\n\n[Footnote 90: There would be also the like intercommunity of nature,\nif along with the pains and pleasures of the agent himself (which\nalone are regarded in the calculation of Sokrates in the Protagoras)\nyou admit into the calculation the pleasures and pains of others\nconcerned, and the rules established with a view to both the two\ntogether with a view to the joint interest both of the agent and of\nothers.]\n\n[Footnote 91: Epikurus and his followers assigned the greatest value,\nin their ethical theory, to the permanent element, or established\ncharacter of the agent, intellectual and emotional. But great as they\nreckoned this value to be, they resolved it all into the diminution\nor mitigation of pains, and, in a certain though inferior degree, the\nmultiplication of pleasures. They did not put it in a separate\ncategory of its own, altogether disparate and foreign to pleasures\nand pains.\n\nSee the letter of Epikurus to Menoekeus, Diog. L. x. 128-132;\nLucretius, v. 18-45, vi. 12-25; Horat. Epist. i. 2, 48-60.]\n\n[Footnote 92: Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. i. 7. The remark of Aristotle in\nthe same treatise, i. 5--[Greek: dokei= ga\\r e)nde/chesthai kai\\\nkatheu/dein e)/chonta t\u00ea\\n a)ret\u00ea/n, \u00ea)\\ a)praktei=n dia\\ bi/ou]--might\nbe applied to the theory of the Gorgias. Compare also Ethic.\nNik. vii. 3 (vii. 4, p. 1146, b. 31, p. 1147, a. 12).]\n\n[Side-note: Character of the Gorgias generally--discrediting\nall the actualities of life.]\n\nIndeed there is nothing more remarkable in the Gorgias, than the\nmanner in which Sokrates not only condemns the unmeasured,\nexorbitant, maleficent desires, but also depreciates and degrades all\nthe actualities of life--all the recreative and elegant arts,\nincluding music and poetry, tragic as well as dithyrambic--all\nprovision for the most essential wants, all protection against\nparticular sufferings and dangers, even all service rendered to\nanother person in the way of relief or of rescue[93]--all the\neffective maintenance of public organised force, such as ships,\ndocks, walls, arms, &c. Immediate satisfaction or relief, and\nthose who confer it, are treated with contempt, and presented as in\nhostility to the perfection of the mental structure. And it is in\nthis point of view that various Platonic commentators extol in an\nespecial manner the Gorgias: as recognising an Idea of Good\nsuperhuman and supernatural, radically disparate from pleasures and\npains of any human being, and incommensurable with them: an Universal\nIdea, which, though it is supposed to cast a distant light upon\nits particulars, is separated from them by an incalculable space, and\nis discernible only by the Platonic telescope.\n\n[Footnote 93: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 501-502-511-512-517-519. [Greek:\na)/neu ga\\r dikaiosu/n\u00eas kai\\ s\u00f4phrosu/n\u00eas lime/n\u00f4n kai\\ ne\u00f4ri/\u00f4n\nkai\\ teich\u00f4=n kai\\ pho/r\u00f4n kai\\ toiou/t\u00f4n phluari\u00f4=n e)mpepl\u00ea/kasi\nt\u00ea\\n po/lin.]\n\nThis is applied to the provision of food, drink, clothing, bedding,\nfor the hunger, thirst, &c., of the community (p. 517 D), to the\nsaving of life (p. 511 D). The boatman between \u00c6gina and Peir\u00e6us\n(says Plato) brings over his passengers in safety, together with\ntheir families and property, preserving them from all the dangers of\nthe sea. The engineer, who constructs good fortifications, preserves\nfrom danger and destruction all the citizens with their families and\ntheir property (p. 512 B). But neither of these persons takes credit\nfor this service: because both of them know that it is doubtful\nwhether they have done any real service to the persons preserved,\nsince they have not rendered them any better; and that it is even\ndoubtful whether they may not have done them an actual mischief.\nPerhaps these persons may be wicked and corrupt; in that case it is a\nmisfortune to them that their lives should be prolonged; it would be\nbetter for them to die. It is under this conviction (says Plato) that\nthe boatman and the engineer, though they do preserve our lives, take\nto themselves no credit for it.\n\nWe shall hardly find any greater rhetorical exaggeration than this,\namong all the compositions of the rhetors against whom Plato declares\nwar in the Gorgias. Moreover, it is a specimen of the way in which\nPlato colours and misinterprets the facts of social life, in order to\nserve the purpose of the argument of the moment. He says truly that\nwhen the passage boat from \u00c6gina to Peir\u00e6us has reached its\ndestination, the steersman receives his fare and walks about on the\nshore, without taking any great credit to himself, as if he had\nperformed a brilliant deed or conferred an important service. But how\ndoes Plato explain this? By supposing in the steersman's mind\nfeelings which never enter into the mind of a real agent; feelings\nwhich are put into words only when a moralist or a satirist is\nanxious to enforce a sentiment. The service which the steersman\nperforms is not only adequately remunerated, but is, on most days, a\nregular and easy one, such as every man who has gone through a decent\napprenticeship can perform. But suppose an exceptional day--suppose a\nsudden and terrible storm to supervene on the passage--suppose the\nboat full of passengers, with every prospect of all on board being\ndrowned--suppose she is only saved by the extraordinary skill,\nvigilance, and efforts of the steersman. In that case he will, on\nreaching the land, walk about full of elate self-congratulation and\npride: the passengers will encourage this sentiment by expressions of\nthe deepest gratitude; while friends as well as competitors will\npraise his successful exploit. How many of the passengers there are\nfor whom the preservation of life may be a curse rather than a\nblessing--is a question which neither they themselves, nor the\nsteersman, nor the public, will ever dream of asking.]\n\n\n* * * * *\n\n\n[Side-note: Argument of Sokrates resumed--multifarious arts of\nflattery, aiming at immediate pleasure.]\n\nWe have now established (continues Sokrates) that pleasure is\nessentially different from good, and pain from evil: also, that to\nobtain good and avoid evil, a scientific choice is required--while to\nobtain pleasure and avoid pain, is nothing more than blind imitation\nor irrational knack. There are some arts and pursuits which aim only\nat procuring immediate pleasure--others which aim at attaining good\nor the best;[94] some arts, for a single person,--others for a\nmultitude. Arts and pursuits which aim only at immediate pleasure,\neither of one or of a multitude, belong to the general head of\nFlattery. Among them are all the musical, choric, and dithyrambic\nrepresentations at the festivals--tragedy as well as comedy--also\npolitical and judicial rhetoric. None of these arts aim at any thing\nexcept to gratify the public to whom they are addressed: none of them\naim at the permanent good: none seek to better the character of the\npublic. They adapt themselves to the prevalent desires: but whether\nthose desires are such as, if realised, will make the public worse or\nbetter, they never enquire.[95]\n\n[Footnote 94: The Sokrates of the Protagoras would have admitted a\ntwofold distinction of aims, but would have stated the distinction\notherwise. Two things (he would say) may be looked at in regard to\nany course of conduct: first, the immediate pleasure or pain which it\nyields; secondly, this item, not alone, but combined with all the\nother pleasures and pains which can be foreseen as its conditions,\nconsequences, or concomitants. To obey the desire of immediate\npleasure, or the fear of immediate pain, requires no science; to\nforesee, estimate, and compare the consequences, requires a\nscientific calculation often very difficult and complicated--a\n[Greek: te/chn\u00ea] or [Greek: e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea metr\u00eatik\u00ea/].\n\nThus we are told not only in what cases the calculation is required,\nbut what are the elements to be taken into the calculation. In the\nGorgias, we are not told on what elements the calculation of good and\nevil is to be based: we are told that there _must be science_,\nbut we learn nothing more.]\n\n[Footnote 95: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 502-503.]\n\n[Side-note: The Rhetors aim at only flattering the public--even\nthe best past Rhetors have done nothing else--citation of the\nfour great Rhetors by Kallikles.]\n\n_Sokr._--Do you know any public speakers who aim at anything\nmore than gratifying the public, or who care to make the public\nbetter? _Kall._--There are some who do, and others who do not.\n_Sokr._--Which are those who do? and which of them has ever made\nthe public better?[96] _Kall._--At any rate, former\nstatesmen did so; such as Miltiades, Themistokles, Kimon, Perikles.\n_Sokr._--None of them. If they had, you would have seen them\ndevoting themselves systematically and obviously to their one end. As\na builder labours to construct a ship or a house, by putting together\nits various parts with order and symmetry--so these statesmen would\nhave laboured to implant order and symmetry in the minds and bodies\nof the citizens: that is, justice and temperance in their minds,\nhealth and strength in their bodies.[97] Unless the statesman can do\nthis, it is fruitless to supply the wants, to fulfil the desires and\nrequirements, to uphold or enlarge the power, of the citizens. This\nis like supplying ample nourishment to a distempered body: the more\nsuch a body takes in, the worse it becomes. The citizens must be\ntreated with refusal of their wishes and with punishment, until their\nvices are healed, and they become good.[98]\n\n[Footnote 96: Plato, Gorgias, p. 503 C.]\n\n[Footnote 97: Plato, Gorgias, p. 504 D.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Plato, Gorgias, p. 505 B.]\n\n[Side-note: Necessity for temperance, regulation, order. This\nis the condition of virtue and happiness.]\n\nWe ought to do (continues Sokrates) what is pleasing for the sake of\nwhat is good: not _vice vers\u00e0_. But every thing becomes good by\npossessing its appropriate virtue or regulation. The regulation\nappropriate to the mind is to be temperate. The temperate man will do\nwhat is just--his duty towards men: and what is holy--his duty\ntowards the Gods. He will be just and holy. He will therefore also be\ncourageous: for he will seek only such pleasures as duty permits, and\nhe will endure all such pains as duty requires. Being thus temperate,\njust, brave, holy, he will be a perfectly good man, doing well and\nhonourably throughout. The man who does well, will be happy: the man\nwho does ill and is wicked, will be miserable.[99] It ought to be our\nprincipal aim, both for ourselves individually and for the city, to\nattain temperance and to keep clear of intemperance: not to let our\ndesires run immoderately (as you, Kallikles, advise), and then seek\nrepletion for them: which is an endless mischief, the life of a\npirate. He who pursues this plan can neither be the friend of any\nother man, nor of the Gods: for he is incapable of communion, and\ntherefore of friendship.[100]\n\n[Footnote 99: Plato, Gorgias, p, 507 D (with Routh and Heindorf's\nnotes).]\n\n[Footnote 100: Plato, Gorgias, p. 507 E. [Greek: koin\u00f4nei=n ga\\r\na)du/natos; o(/t\u00f4| de\\ m\u00ea\\ e(/ni koin\u00f4ni/a, phili/a ou)k a)\\n\nei)/\u00ea.]]\n\n[Side-note: Impossible to succeed in public life, unless\na man be thoroughly akin to and in harmony with the ruling force.]\n\nNow, Kallikles (pursues Sokrates), you have reproached me with\nstanding aloof from public life in order to pursue philosophy. You\ntell me that by not cultivating public speaking and public action, I\nam at the mercy of any one who chooses to accuse me unjustly and to\nbring upon me severe penalties. But I tell you, that it is a greater\nevil to do wrong than to suffer wrong; and that my first business is,\nto provide for myself such power and such skill as shall guard me\nagainst doing wrong.[101] Next, as to suffering wrong, there is only\none way of taking precautions against it. You must yourself rule in\nthe city: or you must be a friend of the ruling power. Like is the\nfriend of like:[102] a cruel despot on the throne will hate and\ndestroy any one who is better than himself, and will despise any one\nworse than himself. The only person who will have influence is, one\nof the same dispositions as the despot: not only submitting to him\nwith good will, but praising and blaming the same things as he\ndoes--accustomed from youth upwards to share in his preferences and\naversions, and assimilated to him as much as possible.[103] Now if\nthe despot be a wrong-doer, he who likens himself to the despot will\nbecome a wrong-doer also. And thus, in taking precautions against\nsuffering wrong, he will incur the still greater mischief and\ncorruption of doing wrong, and will be worse off instead of better.\n\n[Footnote 101: Plato, Gorgias, p. 509 C. Compare Leges, viii. 829 A,\nwhere [Greek: to\\ m\u00ea\\ a)dikei=n] is described as easy of attainment;\n[Greek: to\\ m\u00ea\\ a)dikei=sthai], as being [Greek: pagcha/lepon]: and\nboth equally necessary [Greek: pro\\s to\\ eu)daimo/n\u00f4s z\u00ea=|n].]\n\n[Footnote 102: Plat. Gorg. 510 B. [Greek: phi/los--o( o(/moios t\u00f4=|\no(moi/\u00f4|]. We have already seen this principle discussed and rejected\nin the Lysis, p. 214. See above, ch. xx., p. 179.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Plato, Gorgias, p. 510 C. [Greek: lei/petai d\u00ea\\\ne)kei=nos mo/nos a)/xios lo/gou phi/los t\u00f4=| toiou/t\u00f4|, o(\\s a)\\n,\no(mo\u00ea/th\u00eas \u00f4)/n, tau)ta\\ pse/g\u00f4n kai\\ e)pain\u00f4=n, e)the/l\u00ea|\na)/rchesthai kai\\ u(pokei=sthai t\u00f4=| a)/rchonti. Ou(=tos me/ga e)n\ntau/t\u00ea| t\u00ea=| po/lei dun\u00ea/setai, tou=ton ou)dei\\s chai/r\u00f4n a)dik\u00ea/sei.\n. . . Au(/t\u00ea o(do/s e)stin, eu)thu\\s e)k ve/ou e)thi/zein au)to\\n toi=s\nau)toi=s chai/rein kai\\ a)/chthesthtai t\u00f4=| despo/t\u00ea|, kai\\\nparaskeua/zein o(/p\u00f4s o(/ ti ma/lista o(/moios e)/stai e)kei/n\u00f4|.]]\n\n[Side-note: Danger of one who dissents from the public, either\nfor better or for worse.]\n\n_Kall._--But if he does not liken himself to the despot, the\ndespot may put him to death, if he chooses? _Sokr._--Perhaps he\nmay: but it will be death inflicted by a bad man upon a good\nman.[104] To prolong life is not the foremost consideration, but to\ndecide by rational thought what is the best way of passing that\nlength of life which the Fates allot.[105] Is it my best plan to do\nas you recommend, and to liken myself as much as possible to the\nAthenian people--in order that I may become popular and may acquire\npower in the city? For it will be impossible for you to acquire power\nin the city, if you dissent from the prevalent political character\nand practice, be it for the better or for the worse. Even imitation\nwill not be sufficient: you must be, by natural disposition,\nhomogeneous with the Athenians, if you intend to acquire much favour\nwith them. Whoever makes you most like to them, will help you forward\nmost towards becoming an effective statesman and speaker: for every\nassembly delight in speeches suited to their own dispositions, and\nreject speeches of an opposite tenor.[106]\n\n[Footnote 104: Plato, Gorgias, p. 511 B.]\n\n[Footnote 105: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 511 B, 512 E.]\n\n[Footnote 106: Plato, Gorgias, p. 513 A. [Greek: kai\\ nu=n de\\ a)/ra\ndei= se \u00f4(s o(moio/taton gi/gnesthai t\u00f4=| d\u00eam\u00f4| t\u00f4=| A)th\u00eanai/\u00f4n, ei)\nme/lleis tou/t\u00f4| prosphil\u00ea\\s ei)=nai kai\\ me/ga du/nasthai e)n t\u00ea=|\npo/lei. . . . ei) de/ soi oi)/ei o(ntinou=n a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n parad\u00f4/sein\nte/chn\u00ean tina\\ toiau/t\u00ean, \u00ea(/ ti/s se poi\u00ea/sei me/ga du/nasthai e)n\nt\u00ea=| po/lei t\u00ea=|de, _a)no/moion o)/nta t\u00ea=| politei/a| ei)/t' e)pi\\\nto\\ be/ltion ei)/t' e)pi\\ to\\ chei=ron_, ou)k o)rth\u00f4=s bouleu/ei;\nou) ga\\r mim\u00eat\u00ea\\n dei= ei)=nai, a)ll' au)tophu\u00f4=s o(/moion toou/tois,\nei) me/lleis ti gn\u00ea/sion a)perga/zesthai ei)s phili/an t\u00f4=|\nA)th\u00eanai/\u00f4n d\u00ea/m\u00f4|.]]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates resolves upon a scheme of life for\nhimself--to study permanent good, and not immediate satisfaction.]\n\nSuch are the essential conditions of political success and\npopularity. But I, Kallikl\u00eas, have already distinguished two schemes\nof life; one aiming at pleasure, the other aiming at good: one, that\nof the statesman who studies the felt wants, wishes, and impulses of\nthe people, displaying his genius in providing for them effective\nsatisfaction--the other, the statesman who makes it his chief or sole\nobject to amend the character and disposition of the people. The last\nscheme is the only one which I approve: and if it be that to which\nyou invite me, we must examine whether either you, Kallikles, or I,\nhave ever yet succeeded in amending or improving the character of any\nindividuals privately, before we undertake the task of amending the\ncitizens collectively.[107] None of the past statesmen whom you\nextol, Miltiades, Kimon, Themistokles, Perikles, has produced any\nsuch amendment.[108] Considered as ministers, indeed, they were\nskilful and effective; better than the present statesmen. They were\nsuccessful in furnishing satisfaction to the prevalent wants and\ndesires of the citizens: they provided docks, walls, ships, tribute,\nand other such follies, abundantly:[109] but they did nothing to\namend the character of the people--to transfer the desires of the\npeople from worse things to better things--or to create in them\njustice and temperance. They thus did no real good by feeding the\ndesires of the people: no more good than would be done by a skilful\ncook for a sick man, in cooking for him a sumptuous meal before the\nphysician had cured him.\n\n[Footnote 107: Plato, Gorgias, p. 515 A.]\n\n[Footnote 108: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 516, 517.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 517, 519. [Greek: a)/neu ga\\r\ns\u00f4phrosu/n\u00eas kai\\ dikaiosu/n\u00eas lime/n\u00f4n kai\\ ne\u00f4ri/\u00f4n kai\\ teich\u00f4=n\nkai\\ pho/r\u00f4n kai\\ toiou/t\u00f4n phluari\u00f4=n e)mpepl\u00ea/kasi t\u00ea\\n po/lin.]]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates announces himself as almost the only man\nat Athens, who follows out the true political art. Danger of doing\nthis.]\n\nI believe myself (continues Sokrates) to be the only man in Athens,--or\ncertainly one among a very few,--who am a true statesman,\nfollowing out the genuine purposes of the political art.[110] I aim\nat what is best for the people, not at what is most agreeable. I do\nnot value those captivating accomplishments which tell in the\nDikastery. If I am tried, I shall be like a physician arraigned by\nthe confectioner before a jury of children. I shall not be able to\nrefer to any pleasures provided for them by me: pleasures which\n_they_ call benefits, but which I regard as worthless. If any\none accuses me of corrupting the youth by making them sceptical, or\nof libelling the older men in my private and public talk--it will be\nin vain for me to justify myself by saying the real truth.--Dikasts,\nI do and say all these things justly, for your real benefit. I shall\nnot be believed when I say this, and I have nothing else to say: so\nthat I do not know what sentence may be passed on me.[111] My only\nrefuge and defence will be, the innocence of my life. As for death,\nno one except a fool or a coward fears _that_: the real evil,\nand the greatest of all evils, is to pass into Hades with a corrupt\nand polluted mind.[112]\n\n[Footnote 110: Plato, Gorgias, p. 521 D.]\n\n[Footnote 111: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 521-522.]\n\n[Footnote 112: Plato, Gorgias, p. 522 E. [Greek: au)to\\ me\\n ga\\r to\\\na)pothn\u00ea/skein ou)dei\\s phobei=tai, o(/stis m\u00ea\\ panta/pasin\na)lo/gisto/s te kai\\ a)/nandro/s e)sti, to\\ de\\ a)dikei=n\nphobei=tai], &c.\n]\n\n[Side-note: Mythe respecting Hades, and the treatment of\ndeceased persons therein, according to their merits during life--the\nphilosopher who stood aloof from public affairs, will then be\nrewarded.]\n\nSokrates then winds up the dialogue, by reciting a [Greek: Ne/kuia],\na mythe or hypothesis about judgment in Hades after death, and\nrewards and punishments to be apportioned to deceased men, according\nto their merits during life, by Rhadamanthus and Minos. The greatest\nsufferers by these judgments (he says) will be the kings, despots,\nand men politically powerful, who have during their lives committed\nthe greatest injustices,--which indeed few of them avoid.[113]\nThe man most likely to fare well and to be rewarded, will be the\nphilosopher, \"who has passed through life minding his own business,\nand not meddling with the affairs of others\".[114]\n\n[Footnote 113: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 525-526.]\n\n[Footnote 114: Plato, Gorgias, p. 526 C. [Greek: philoso/phou ta\\\nau)tou= pra/xantos, kai\\ ou) polupragmon\u00ea/santos e)n t\u00f4=| bi/\u00f4|.]\n\nIt must be confessed that these terms do not correspond to the life\nof Sokrates, as he himself describes it in the Platonic Apology. He\nseems to have fancied that no one was [Greek: polupra/gm\u00f4n] except\nthose who spoke habitually in the Ekklesia and the Dikastery.]\n\n\n* * * * *\n\n\n[Side-note: Peculiar ethical views of Sokrates--Rhetorical or\ndogmatical character of the Gorgias.]\n\n\"Dicuntur ista magnifice,\"[115]--we may exclaim, in Ciceronian words,\non reaching the close of the Gorgias. It is pre-eminently solemn and\nimpressive; all the more so, from the emphasis of Sokrates, when\nproclaiming the isolation in which he stands at Athens, and the\ncontradiction between his ethico-political views and those of his\nfellow-citizens. In this respect it harmonises with the Apology, the\nKriton, Republic, and Leges: in all which, the peculiarity of his\nethical points of view stands proclaimed--especially in the Kriton,\nwhere he declares that his difference with his opponents is\nfundamental, and that there can be between them no common ground for\ndebate--nothing but reciprocal contempt.[116]\n\n[Footnote 115: Cicero, De Finib. iii. 3, 11.]\n\n[Footnote 116: Plato, Kriton, p. 49 D.]\n\n[Side-note: He merges politics in Ethics--he conceives the\nrulers as spiritual teachers and trainers of the community.]\n\nThe argument of Sokrates in the Gorgias is interesting, not merely as\nextolling the value of ethical self-restraint, but also as\nconsidering political phenomena under this point of view: that is,\nmerging politics in ethics. The proper and paramount function of\nstatesmen (we find it eloquently proclaimed) is to serve as spiritual\nteachers in the community: for the purpose of amending the lives and\ncharacters of the citizens, and of converting them from bad\ndispositions to good. We are admonished that until this is effected,\nmore is lost than gained by realising the actual wants and wishes of\nthe community, which are disorderly and distempered: like the state\nof a sick man, who would receive harm and not benefit from a\nsumptuous banquet.\n\n[Side-note: _Id\u00e9al_ of Plato--a despotic lawgiver or\nman-trainer, on scientific principles, fashioning all characters\npursuant to certain types of his own.]\n\nThis is the conception of Plato in the Gorgias, speaking through the\nperson of Sokrates, respecting the ends for which the political\nmagistrate ought to employ his power. The magistrate, as\nadministering law and justice, is to the minds of the community what\nthe trainer and the physician are to their bodies: he produces\ngoodness of mind, as the two latter produce health and strength of\nbody. The Platonic _id\u00e9al_ is that of a despotic law-giver and\nman-trainer, wielding the compulsory force of the secular arm for\nwhat he believes to be spiritual improvement. However instructive it\nis to study the manner in which a mind like that of Plato works out\nsuch a purpose in theory, there is no reason for regret that he never\nhad an opportunity of carrying it into practice. The manner in which\nhe always keeps in view the standing mental character, as an object\nof capital importance to be attended to, and as the analogon of\nhealth in the body--deserves all esteem. But when he assumes the\nsceptre of King Nomos (as in Republic and Leges) to fix by\nunchangeable authority what shall be the orthodox type of character,\nand to suppress all the varieties of emotion and intellect, except\nsuch as will run into a few predetermined moulds--he oversteps all\nthe reasonable aims and boundaries of the political office.\n\n[Side-note: Platonic analogy between mental goodness and\nbodily health--incomplete analogy--circumstances of difference.]\n\nPlato forgets two important points of difference, in that favourite\nand very instructive analogy which he perpetually reproduces, between\nmental goodness and bodily health. First, good health and strength of\nthe body (as I have observed already) are states which every man\nknows when he has got them. Though there is much doubt and dispute\nabout causes, preservative, destructive, and restorative, there is\nnone about the present fact. Every sick man derives from his own\nsensations an anxiety to get well. But virtue is not a point thus\nfixed, undisputed, indubitable: it is differently conceived by\ndifferent persons, and must first be discovered and settled by a\nprocess of enquiry; the Platonic Sokrates himself, in many of the\ndialogues--after declaring that neither he nor any one else\nwithin his knowledge, knows what it is--tries to find it out without\nsuccess. Next, the physician, who is the person actively concerned in\nimparting health and strength, exercises no coercive power over any\none: those who consult him have the option whether they will follow\nthe advice given, or not. To put himself upon the same footing with\nthe physician, the political magistrate ought to confine himself to\nthe function of advice; a function highly useful, but in which he\nwill be called upon to meet argumentative opposition, and frequent\nfailure, together with the mortification of leaving those whom he\ncannot convince, to follow their own mode of life. Here are two\nmaterial differences, modifying the applicability of that very\nanalogy on which Plato so frequently rests his proof.\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates in the Gorgias speaks like a dissenter\namong a community of fixed opinions and habits. Impossible that a\ndissenter, on important points, should acquire any public influence.]\n\nIn Plato's two imaginary commonwealths, where he is himself despotic\nlaw-giver, there would have been no tolerable existence possible for\nany one not shaped upon the Platonic spiritual model. But in the\nGorgias, Plato (speaking in the person of Sokrates) is called upon to\ndefine his plan of life in a free state, where he was merely a\nprivate citizen. Sokrates receives from Kallikles the advice, to\nforego philosophy and to aspire to the influence and celebrity of an\nactive public speaker. His reply is instructive, as revealing the\ninterior workings of every political society. No man (he says) can\nfind favour as an adviser--either of a despot, where there is one, or\nof a people where there is free government--unless he be in harmony\nwith the sentiments and ideas prevalent, either with the ruling Many\nor the ruling One. He must be moulded, from youth upwards, on the\nsame spiritual pattern as they are:[117] his love and hate, his\npraise and blame, must turn towards the same things: he must have the\nsame tastes, the same morality, the same _id\u00e9al_, as theirs: he\nmust be no imitator, but a chip of the same block. If he be either\nbetter than they or worse than they,[118] he will fail in acquiring\npopularity, and his efforts as a competitor for public influence\nwill be not only abortive, but perhaps dangerous to himself.\n\n[Footnote 117: Plato, Gorgias, p. 510 C-D. [Greek: o(mo\u00ea/th\u00eas \u00f4)/n,\ntau)ta\\ pse/g\u00f4n kai\\ e)pain\u00f4=n t\u00f4=| a)/rchonti. . . . eu)thu\\s e)k\nne/ou e)thi/zein au(to\\n toi=s au)toi=s chai/rein kai\\ a)/chthesthai\nt\u00f4=| despo/t\u00ea|, kai\\ paraskeua/zein o(/p\u00f4s o(/ ti ma/lista o(/moios\ne)/stai e)kei/n\u00f4|.] 513 B: [Greek: ou) mim\u00eat\u00ea\\n dei= ei)=nai a)ll'\nau)tophu\u00f4=s o(/moion tou/tois.]]\n\n[Footnote 118: Plato, Gorgias, p. 513 A. [Greek: ei)/t' e)pi\\ to\\\nbe/ltion ei)/t' e)pi\\ to\\ chei=ron.]]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates feels his own isolation from his\ncountrymen. He is thrown upon individual speculation and dialectic.]\n\nThe reasons which Sokrates gives here (as well as in the Apology, and\npartly also in the Republic) for not embarking in the competition of\npolitical aspirants, are of very general application. He is an\ninnovator in religion; and a dissenter from the received ethics,\npolitics, social sentiment, and estimate of life and conduct.[119]\nWhoever dissents upon these matters from the governing force (in\nwhatever hands that may happen to reside) has no chance of being\nlistened to as a political counsellor, and may think himself\nfortunate if he escapes without personal hurt or loss. Whether his\ndissent be for the better or for the worse, is a matter of little\nmoment: the ruling body always think it worse, and the consequences\nto the dissenter are the same.\n\n[Footnote 119: Plato, Gorgias, p. 522 B; The\u00e6t\u00eatus, p. 179; Menon, p.\n79.]\n\n[Side-note: Antithesis between philosophy and rhetoric.]\n\nHerein consists the real antithesis between Sokrates, Plato, and\nphilosophy, on the one side--Perikles, Nikias, Kleon, Demosthenes,\nand rhetoric, on the other. \"You,\" (says Sokrates to Kallikl\u00eas),[120]\n\"are in love with the Athenian people, and take up or renounce such\nopinions as they approve or discountenance: I am in love with\nphilosophy, and follow her guidance. You and other active politicians\ndo not wish to have more than a smattering of philosophy; you are\nafraid of becoming unconsciously corrupted, if you carry it beyond\nsuch elementary stage.\"[121] Each of these orators, discussing\npolitical measures before the public assembly, appealed to general\nmaxims borrowed from the received creed of morality, religion, taste,\npolitics, &c. His success depended mainly on the emphasis which\nhis eloquence could lend to such maxims, and on the skill with which\nhe could apply them to the case in hand. But Sokrates could not\nfollow such an example. Anxious in his research after truth, he\napplied the test of analysis to the prevalent opinions--found them,\nin his judgment, neither consistent nor rational--constrained many\npersons to feel this, by an humiliating cross-examination--but became\ndisqualified from addressing, with any chance of assent, the\nassembled public.\n\n[Footnote 120: Plato, Gorgias, p, 481 E.]\n\n[Footnote 121: Plato, Gorgias, p. 487 C. [Greek: e)ni/ka e)s u(mi=n\ntoia/de tis do/xa, m\u00ea\\ prothumei=sthai ei)s t\u00ea\\n a)kribei/an\nphilosophei=n, a)lla\\ eu)labei=sthai. . . . o(/p\u00f4s m\u00ea\\ pe/ra tou=\nde/ontos soph\u00f4/teroi geno/menoi l\u00ea/sete diaphthare/ntes.]\n\nThe view here advocated by Kallikles:--That philosophy is good and\nuseful, to be studied up to a point in the earlier years of life, in\norder to qualify persons for effective discharge of the duties of\nactive citizenship, but that it ought not to be made the main\noccupation of mature life, nor be prosecuted up to the pitch of\naccurate theorising: this view, since Plato here assigns it to\nKallikles, is denounced by most of the Platonic critics as if it were\nlow and worthless. Yet it was held by many of the most respectable\ncitizens of antiquity; and the question is, in point of fact, that\nwhich has always been in debate between the life of theoretical\nspeculation and the life of action.\n\nIsokrates urges the same view both in Orat. xv. De Permutatione,\nsect. 282-287, pp. 485-486, Bekker; and Orat. xii. Panathenaic. sect.\n29-32, p. 321, Bekker. [Greek: diatri/psai me\\n ou)=n peri\\ ta\\s\npaidei/as tau/tas chro/non tina\\ sumbouleu/saim' a)\\n toi=s\nne\u00f4te/rois, m\u00ea\\ me/ntoi perii+dei=n t\u00ea\\n phu/sin t\u00ea\\n au)t\u00f4=n\nkataskeleteuthei=san e)pi\\ tou/tois], &c. Cicero quotes a similar\nopinion put by Ennius the poet into the mouth of Neoptolemus, Tusc.\nD. ii. 1, 1; Aulus Gell. v. 16--\"degustandum ex philosophi\u00e2 censet,\nnon in eam ingurgitandum\".\n\nTacitus, in describing the education of Agricola, who was taken by\nhis mother in his earlier years to study at Massilia, says,\nc. 4:--\"Memori\u00e2 teneo, solitum ipsum narrare, se in prim\u00e2 juvent\u00e2\nstudium philosophi\u00e6, _ultra quam concessum Romano et senatori_,\nhausisse; ni prudentia matris incensum ac flagrantem animum\ncoercuisset\".\n\nI have already cited this last passage, and commented upon the same\npoint, in my notes at the end of the Euthyd\u00eamus, p. 230.]\n\n[Side-note: Position of one who dissents, upon material\npoints, from the fixed opinions and creed of his countrymen.]\n\nThat in order to succeed politically, a man must be a genuine\nbeliever in the creed of King Nomos or the ruling force--cast in the\nsame spiritual mould--(I here take the word _creed_ not as\nconfined to religion, but as embracing the whole of a man's critical\n_id\u00e9al_, on moral or social practice, politics, or taste--the\nends which he deems worthy of being aspired to, or proper to be\nshunned, by himself or others) is laid down by Sokrates as a general\nposition: and with perfect truth. In disposing of the force or\ninfluence of government, whoever possesses that force will use it\nconformably to his own maxims. A man who dissents from these maxims\nwill find no favour in the public assembly; nor, probably, if his\ndissent be grave and wide, will he ever be able to speak out his\nconvictions aloud in it, without incurring dangerous antipathy. But\nwhat is to become of such a dissenter[122]--the man who frequents the\nsame porticos with the people, but does not hold the same creed,\nnor share their judgments respecting social _expetenda_ and\n_fugienda_? How is he to be treated by the government, or by the\northodox majority of society in their individual capacity? Debarred,\nby the necessity of the case, from influence over the public\ncouncils--what latitude of pursuit, profession, or conduct, is to be\nleft to him as a citizen? How far is he to question, or expose, or\nrequire to be proved, that which the majority believe without proof?\nShall he be required to profess, or to obey, or to refrain from\ncontradicting, religious or ethical doctrines which he has examined\nand rejected? Shall such requirement be enforced by threat of legal\npenalties, or of ill-treatment from individuals, which is not less\nintolerable than legal penalties? What is likely to be his character,\nif compelled to suppress all declaration of his own creed, and to act\nand speak as if he were believer in another?\n\n[Footnote 122: Horat. Epist. i. 1, 70--\n\n\"Quod si me populus Romanus fort\u00e9 roget, cur\nNon ut porticibus, sic judiciis fruar iisdem,\nNec sequar aut fugiam qu\u00e6 diligit ipse vel odit:\nOlim quod vulpes \u00e6groto cauta leoni\nRespondit, referam: Quia me vestigia terrent\nOmnia te adversum spectantia, nulla retrorsum.\"]\n\n[Side-note: Probable feelings of Plato on this subject. Claim\nput forward in the Gorgias of an independent _locus standi_ for\nphilosophy, but without the indiscriminate cross-examination pursued\nby Sokrates.]\n\nThe questions here suggested must have impressed themselves forcibly\non the mind of Plato when he recollected the fate of Sokrates. In\nspite of a blameless life, Sokrates had been judicially condemned and\nexecuted for publicly questioning received opinions, innovating upon\nthe established religion, and instilling into young persons habits of\ndoubt. To dissent only for the better, afforded no assurance of\nsafety: and Plato knew well that his own dissent from the Athenian\npublic was even wider and more systematic than that of his master.\nThe position and plan of life for an active-minded reasoner,\ndissenting from the established opinions of the public, could not but\nbe an object of interesting reflection to him.[123] The Gorgias\n(written, in my judgment, long after the death of Sokrates, probably\nafter the Platonic school was established) announces the vocation of\nthe philosopher, and claims an open field for speculation, apart from\nthe actualities of politics--for the self-acting reason of the\nindividual doubter and investigator, against the authority of\nnumbers and the pressure of inherited tradition. A formal\nassertion to this effect was worthy of the founder of the Academy--the\nearliest philosophical school at Athens. Yet we may observe that\nwhile the Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias adopts the life of\nphilosophy, he does not renew that farther demand with which the\nhistorical Sokrates had coupled it in his Apology--the liberty of\noral and aggressive cross-examination, addressed to individuals\npersonally and indiscriminately[124]--to the _primores populi_\nas well as to the _populum tributim_. The fate of Sokrates\nrendered Plato more cautious, and induced him to utter his ethical\ninterrogations and novelties of opinion in no other way except that\nof lectures to chosen hearers and written dialogue: borrowing the\nname of Sokrates or some other speaker, and refraining upon system\n(as his letters[125] tell us that he did) from publishing any\ndoctrines in his own name.\n\n[Footnote 123: I have already referred to the treatise of Mr. John\nStuart Mill \"On Liberty,\" where this important topic is discussed in\na manner equally profound and enlightened. The co-existence of\nindividual reasoners enquiring and philosophising for themselves,\nwith the fixed opinions of the majority, is one of the main\nconditions which distinguish a progressive from a stationary\ncommunity.]\n\n[Footnote 124: Plat. Apol. Sokr. pp. 21-22-23-28 E. [Greek: tou= de\\\ntheou= ta/ttontos, \u00f4(s e)g\u00f4\\ \u00f4)|\u00ea/th\u00ean te kai\\ u(pe/labon,\nphilophou=nta me dei=n z\u00ea=|n kai\\ _e)xeta/zonta e)mauto/n te kai\\\ntou\\s a)/llous_], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 125: Plat. Epist. ii. 314 B. K. F. Hermann (Ueber Platon's\nSchriftstellerische Motive, p. 290) treats any such prudential\ndiscretion, in respect to the form and mode of putting forward\nunpopular opinions, as unworthy of Plato, and worthy only of\nProtagoras and other Sophists. I dissent from this opinion\naltogether. We know that Protagoras was very circumspect as to form\n(Timon ap. Sext. Emp. adv. Mathemat. ix. s. 57); but the passage of\nPlato cited by Hermann does not prove it.]\n\n[Side-note: Importance of maintaining the utmost liberty of\ndiscussion. Tendency of all ruling orthodoxy towards intolerance.]\n\nAs a man dissenting from received opinions, Sokrates had his path\nmarked out in the field of philosophy or individual speculation. To\nsuch a mind as his, the fullest liberty ought to be left, of\nprofessing and defending his own opinions, as well as of combating\nother opinions, accredited or not, which he may consider false or\nuncertified.[126] The public guidance of the state thus falls to one\nclass of minds, the activity of speculative discussion to another;\nthough accident may produce, here and there, a superior\nindividual, comprehensive or dexterous enough to suffice for both.\nBut the main desideratum is that this freedom of discussion should\nexist: that room shall be made, and encouragement held out, to the\nclaims of individual reason, and to the full publication of all\ndoubts or opinions, be they what they may: that the natural tendency\nof all ruling force, whether in few or in many hands, to perpetuate\ntheir own dogmas by proscribing or silencing all heretics and\nquestioners, may be neutralised as far as possible. The great\nexpansive vigour of the Greek mind--the sympathy felt among the best\nvarieties of Greeks for intellectual superiority in all its forms--and\nthe privilege of free speech ([Greek: par)r(\u00easi/a]), on which the\ndemocratical citizens of Athens prided themselves--did in fact\nneutralise very considerably these tendencies in Athens. A greater\nand more durable liberty of philosophising was procured for Athens,\nand through Athens for Greece generally, than had ever been known\nbefore in the history of mankind.\n\n[Footnote 126: So Sokrates also says in the Platonic Apology, pp.\n31-32. [Greek: Ou) ga\\r e)/stin o(/stis a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n s\u00f4th\u00ea/setai ou)/te\nu(mi=n ou)/te a)/ll\u00f4| pl\u00ea/thei ou)deni\\ gn\u00easi/\u00f4s e)nantiou/menos,\nkai\\ diak\u00f4lu/\u00f4n polla\\ a)/dika kai\\ para/noma e)n t\u00ea=| po/lei\ngi/gnesthai; a)ll' a)nagkai=o/n e)sti to\\n t\u00f4=| o)/nti machou/menon\nu(pe\\r tou= dikai/ou, kai\\ ei) me/llei o)li/gon chro/non\ns\u00f4th\u00ea/sesthai, _i)di\u00f4teu/ein a)lla\\ m\u00ea\\ d\u00eamosieu/ein_.]\n\nThe reader will find the speculative individuality of Sokrates\nillustrated in the sixty-eighth chapter of my History of Greece.\n\nThe antithesis of the philosophising or speculative life, against the\nrhetorical, political, forensic life--which is put so much to the\nadvantage of the former by Plato in the Gorgias, The\u00e6t\u00eatus (p. 173,\nseq.), and elsewhere was the theme of Cicero's lost dialogue called\nHortensius: wherein Hortensius was introduced pleading the cause\nagainst philosophy, (see Orelli, Fragm. Ciceron. pp. 479-480), while\nthe other speakers were provided by Cicero with arguments mainly in\ndefence of philosophy, partly also against rhetoric. The competition\nbetween the teachers of rhetoric and the teachers of philosophy\ncontinued to be not merely animated but bitter, from Plato downward\nthroughout the Ciceronian age. (Cicero, De Orat. i. 45-46-47-75,\n&c.)\n\nWe read in the treatise of Plutarch against the Epikurean Kol\u00f4tes, an\nacrimonious invective against Epikurus and his followers, for\nrecommending a scheme of life such as to withdraw men from active\npolitical functions (Plutarch, adv. Kol\u00f4t. pp. 1125 C, 1127-1128);\nthe like also in his other treatise, Non Posse Suaviter Vivi secundum\nEpicurum. But Plutarch at the same time speaks as if Epikurus were\nthe only philosopher who had recommended this, and as if all the\nother philosophers had recommended an active life; nay, he talks of\nPlato among the philosophers actively engaged in practical\nreformatory legislation, through Dion and the pupils of the Academy\n(p. 1126, B, C). Here Plutarch mistakes: the Platonic tendencies were\nquite different from what he supposes. The Gorgias and The\u00e6t\u00eatus\nenforce upon the philosopher a life quite apart from politics,\npursuing his own course, and not meddling with others--[Greek:\nphiloso/phou ta\\ au(tou= pra/xantos kai\\ ou) polupragmon\u00ea/santos e)n\nt\u00f4=| bi/\u00f4|] (Gorg. 526 C); which is the same advice as Epikurus gave.\nIt is set forth eloquently in the poetry of Lucretius, but it had\nbeen set forth previously, not less eloquently, in the rhetoric of\nPlato.]\n\n[Side-note: Issue between philosophy and rhetoric--not\nsatisfactorily handled by Plato. Injustice done to rhetoric. Ignoble\nmanner in which it is presented by Polus and Kallikl\u00eas.]\n\nThis antithesis of the philosophical life to the rhetorical or\npolitical, constitutes one of the most interesting features of the\nPlatonic Gorgias. But when we follow the pleadings upon which Plato\nrests this grand issue, and the line which he draws between the two\nfunctions, we find much that is unsatisfactory. Since Plato himself\npleads both sides of the case, he is bound in fairness to set forth\nthe case which he attacks (that of rhetoric), as it would be put by\ncompetent and honourable advocates--by Perikles, for example, or\nDemosthenes, or Isokrates, or Quintilian. He does this, to a certain\nextent, in the first part of the dialogue, carried on by Sokrates\nwith Gorgias. But in the succeeding portions--carried on with P\u00f4lus\nand Kallikl\u00eas, and occupying three-fourths of the whole--he alters\nthe character of the defence, and merges it in ethical theories which\nPerikles, had he been the defender, would not only have put aside as\nmisplaced, but disavowed as untrue. Perikles would have listened with\nmixed surprise and anger, if he had heard any one utter the monstrous\nassertion which Plato puts into the mouth of Polus--That rhetors,\nlike despots, kill, impoverish, or expel any citizen at their\npleasure. Though Perikles was the most powerful of all Athenian\nrhetors, yet he had to contend all his life against fierce opposition\nfrom others, and was even fined during his last years. He would\nhardly have understood how an Athenian citizen could have made any\nassertion so completely falsified by all the history of Athens,\nrespecting the omnipotence of the rhetors. Again, if he had heard\nKallikl\u00eas proclaiming that the strong giant had a natural right to\nsatiate all his desires at the cost of the weaker Many--and that\nthese latter sinned against Nature when they took precautions to\nprevent him--Perikles would have protested against the proclamation\nas emphatically as Plato.[127]\n\n[Footnote 127: Perikles might indeed have referred to his own\npanegyrical oration in Thucydides, ii. 37.]\n\n[Side-note: Perikles would have accepted the defence of\nrhetoric, as Plato has put it into the mouth of Gorgias.]\n\nIf we suppose Perikles to have undertaken the defence of the\nrhetorical element at Athens, against the dialectic element\nrepresented by Sokrates, he would have accepted it, though not a\nposition of his own choosing, on the footing on which Plato places it\nin the mouth of Gorgias: \"Rhetoric is an engine of persuasion\naddressed to numerous assembled auditors: it ensures freedom to the\ncity (through the free exercise of such a gift by many competing\norators) and political ascendency or command to the ablest rhetor. It\nthus confers great power on him who possesses it in the highest\nmeasure: but he ought by no means to employ that power for unjust\npurposes.\" It is very probable that Perikles might have recommended\nrhetorical study to Sokrates, as a means of defending himself\nagainst unjust accusations, and of acquiring a certain measure of\ninfluence on public affairs.[128] But he would have distinguished\ncarefully (as Horace does) between defending yourself against unjust\nattacks, and making unjust attacks upon others: though the same\nweapon may suit for both.\n\n[Footnote 128: Horat. Satir. ii. 1, 39--\n\n \"Hic stilus haud petet ultro\nQuemquam animantem; et me veluti custodiet ensis\nVagin\u00e2 tectus; quem cur destringere coner,\nTutus ab infestis latronibus? Oh pater et rex\nJupiter! ut pereat positum rubigine telum,\nNec quisquam noceat cupido mihi pacis! At ille\nQui me comm\u00f4rit (melius non tangere! clamo)\nFlebit, et insignis tot\u00e2 cantabitur urbe.\"\n\nWe need only read the Memorabilia of Xenophon (ii. 9), to see that\nthe historical Sokrates judged of these matters differently from the\nPlatonic Sokrates of the Gorgias. Kriton complained to Sokrates that\nlife was difficult at Athens for a quiet man who wished only to mind\nhis own business ([Greek: ta\\ e(autou= pra/ttein]); because there\nwere persons who brought unjust actions at law against him, for the\npurpose of extorting money to buy them off. The Platonic Sokrates of\nthe Gorgias would have replied to him: \"Never mind: you are just, and\nthese assailants are unjust: they are by their own conduct entailing\nupon themselves a terrible distemper, from which, if you leave them\nunpunished, they will suffer all their lives: they injure themselves\nmore than they injure you\". But the historical Sokrates in Xenophon\nreplies in quite another spirit. He advises Kriton to look out for a\nclever and active friend, to attach this person to his interest by\nattention and favours, and to trust to him for keeping off the\nassailants. Accordingly, a poor but energetic man named Archedemus is\nfound, who takes Kriton's part against the assailants, and even\nbrings counterattacks against them, which force them to leave Kriton\nalone, and to give money to Archedemus himself. The advice given by\nthe Xenophontic Sokrates to Kriton is the same in principle as the\nadvice given by Kallikles to the Platonic Sokrates.]\n\n[Side-note: The Athenian people recognise a distinction\nbetween the pleasurable and the good: but not the same as that which\nPlato conceived.]\n\nFarther, neither Perikles, nor any defender of free speech, would\nassent to the definition of rhetoric--That it is a branch of the art\nof flattery, studying the immediately pleasurable, and disregarding\nthe good.[129] This indeed represents Plato's own sentiment, and was\ntrue in the sense which the Platonic Sokrates assigns (in the\nGorgias, though not in the Protagoras) to the words _good_ and\n_evil_. But it is not true in the sense which the Athenian\npeople and the Athenian public men assigned to those words. Both\nthe one and the other used the words _pleasurable_ and\n_good_ as familiarly as Plato, and had sentiments corresponding\nto both of them. The pleasurable and painful referred to present and\ntemporary causes: the Good and Evil to prospective causes and\npermanent situations, involving security against indefinite future\nsuffering, combined with love of national dignity and repugnance to\ndegradation, as well as with a strong sense of common interests and\ncommon obligations to each other. To provide satisfaction for these\ncommon patriotic feelings--to sustain the dignity of the city by\neffective and even imposing public establishments, against foreign\nenemies--to protect the individual rights of citizens by an equitable\nadministration of justice--counted in the view of the Athenians as\nobjects _good_ and _honourable_: while the efforts and\nsacrifices necessary for these permanent ends, were, so far as they\nwent, a renunciation of what they would call the\n_pleasurable_. When, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war,\nthe Athenians, acting on the advice of Perikles, allowed all Attica\nto be ravaged, and submitted to the distress of cooping the whole\npopulation within the long walls, rather than purchase peace by\nabnegating their Hellenic dignity, independence, and security--they\nnot only renounced much that was pleasurable, but endured great\nimmediate distress, for the sake of what they regarded as a permanent\ngood.[130] Eighty years afterwards, when Demosthenes pointed out to\nthem the growing power and encroachments of the Macedonian Philip,\nand exhorted them to the efforts requisite for keeping back that\nformidable enemy, while there was yet time--they could not be wound\nup to the pitch requisite for affronting so serious an amount of\ndanger and suffering. They had lost that sense of Hellenic dignity,\nand that association of self-respect with active personal soldiership\nand sailorship, which rendered submission to an enemy the most\nintolerable of all pains, at the time when Perikles had addressed\nthem. They shut their eyes to an impending danger, which ultimately\nproved their ruin. On both these occasions, we have the\n_pleasurable_ and the _good_ brought into contrast in the\nAthenian mind; in both we have the two most eminent orators of\nGrecian antiquity enforcing the _good_ in opposition to the\n_pleasurable_: the first successfully, the last vainly, in\nopposition to other orators.\n\n[Footnote 129: The reply composed by the rhetor Aristeides to the\nGorgias of Plato is well deserving of perusal, though (like all his\ncompositions) it is very prolix and wordy. See Aristeides, Orationes\nxlv. and xlvi.--[Greek: Perei\\ R(\u00eatorik\u00ea=s], and [Greek: U(pe\\r t\u00f4=n\nTetta/r\u00f4n]. In the last of the two orations he defends the four\neminent Athenians (Miltiades, Themistokl\u00eas, Perikl\u00eas, Kimon) whom\nPlato disparages in the Gorgias.\n\nAristeides insists forcibly on the partial and narrow view here taken\nby Plato of persuasion, as a working force both for establishing laws\nand carrying on government. He remarks truly that there are only two\nforces between which the choice must be made, intimidation and\npersuasion: that the substitution of persuasion in place of force is\nthe great improvement which has made public and private life worth\nhaving ([Greek: mo/n\u00ea bi\u00f4to\\n \u00ea(mi=n pepoi/\u00eake to\\n bi/on], Orat.\nxlv. p. 64, Dindorf); that neither laws could be discussed and\npassed, nor judicial trial held under them, without [Greek:\nr(\u00eatorik\u00ea\\] as the engine of persuasion (pp. 66-67-136); that Plato\nin attacking Rhetoric had no right to single out despots and violent\nconspirators as illustrations of it--[Greek: ei)=t' e)le/gchein me\\n\nbou/letai t\u00ea\\n r(\u00eatorik\u00ea/n, kat\u00eagorei= de\\ t\u00f4=n tura/nn\u00f4n kai\\\ndunast\u00f4=n, _ta\\ a)/mikta mignu/s--ti/s_ ga\\r ou)k oi)=den, o(/ti\nr(\u00eatorik\u00ea\\ kai\\ turanni\\s tosou=ton a)ll\u00ea/l\u00f4n kech\u00f4ri/stai, o(/son\nto\\ pei/thein tou= bia/zesthai] (p. 99). He impugns the distinction\nwhich Plato has drawn between [Greek: i)atrik\u00ea/, gumnastik\u00ea/,\nkubern\u00eatik\u00ea/, nomothetik\u00ea/], &c., on the one side, which Plato\ncalls [Greek: te/chnai], arts or sciences, and affirms to rest on\nscientific principles--and [Greek: r(\u00eatorik\u00ea/, mageirik\u00ea/], &c.,\non the other side, which Plato affirms to be only guess work or\ngroping, resting on empirical analogies. Aristeides says that [Greek:\ni)atrik\u00ea\\] and [Greek: r(\u00eatorik\u00ea\\] are in this respect both on a par;\nthat both are partly reducible to rule, but partly also driven by\nnecessity to conjectures and analogies, and the physician not less\nthan the rhetor (pp. 45-48-49); which the Platonic Sokrates himself\naffirms in another dialogue, Phil\u00eabus, p. 56 A.\n\nThe most curious part of the argument of Aristeides is where he\ndisputes the prerogative which Plato had claimed for [Greek:\ni)atrik\u00ea/, gumnastik\u00ea/] &c., on the ground of their being arts or\nreducible to rules. The effects of human art (says Aristeides) are\nmuch inferior to those of [Greek: thei/a moi=ra] or divine\ninspiration. Many patients are cured of disease by human art; but\nmany more are cured by the responses and directions of the Delphian\noracle, by the suggestion of dreams, and by other varieties of the\ndivine prompting, delivered through the Pythian priestess, a woman\naltogether ignorant (p. 11). [Greek: kai/toi mikra\\ me\\n \u00ea( pa/ntas\nei)dui=a lo/gous i)atrik\u00ea\\ pro\\s ta\\s e)k Delph\u00f4=n du/natai lu/seis,\no(/sai kai\\ i)di/a| kai\\ koin\u00ea=| kai\\ no/s\u00f4n kai\\ path\u00eama/t\u00f4n\na(pant\u00f4n a)nthr\u00f4pi/n\u00f4n e)pha/nth\u00easan.] Patients who are cured in this\nway by the Gods without medical art, acquire a natural impulse which\nleads them to the appropriate remedy--[Greek: e)pithumi/a au)tou\\s\na)/gei e)pi\\ to\\ o)/n\u00eason] (p. 20). Aristeides says that he can\nhimself depose--from his own personal experience as a sick man\nseeking cure, and from personal knowledge of many other such--how\nmuch more efficacious in healing is aid from the Gods, given in\ndreams and other ways, than advice from physicians; who might well\nshudder when they heard the stories which he could tell (pp. 21-22).\nTo undervalue science and art (he says) is the principle from which\nmen start, when they flee to the Gods for help--[Greek: tou=\nkataphugei=n e)pi\\ tou\\s theou\\s schedo\\n a)rch\u00ea/, to\\ t\u00ea=s te/chn\u00eas\nu(peridei=n e)/stin.]]\n\n[Footnote 130: Nothing can be more at variance with the doctrine\nwhich Plato assigns to Kallikl\u00eas in the Gorgias, than the three\nmemorable speeches of Perikles in Thucydides, i. 144, ii. 35, ii. 60,\nseq. All these speeches are penetrated with the deepest sense of that\n[Greek: koin\u00f4ni/a] and [Greek: phili/a] which the Platonic Sokrates\nextols: not one of them countenances [Greek: pleonexi/an], which the\nPlatonic Sokrates forbids (Gorg. 508 E). [Greek: To\\ prostalaip\u00f4rei=n\nt\u00f4=| do/xanti kal\u00f4=|] (to use the expressive phrase of Thucydides,\nii. 53) was a remarkable feature in the character of the Athenians of\nthat day: it was subdued for the moment by the overwhelming misery of\npestilence and war combined.]\n\n[Side-note: Rhetoric was employed at Athens in appealing to\nall the various established sentiments and opinions. Erroneous\ninferences raised by the Kallikl\u00eas of Plato.]\n\nLastly, it is not merely the political power of the Athenians that\nPerikles employs his eloquence to uphold. He dwells also with\nemphasis on the elegance of taste, on the intellectual force and\nactivity, which warranted him in decorating the city with the title\nof Preceptress of Hellas.[131] All this belongs, not to the\npleasurable as distinguished from the good, but to good (whether\nimmediately pleasurable or not) in its most comprehensive sense,\nembracing the improvement and refinement of the collective mind. If\nPerikles, in this remarkable funeral harangue, flattered the\nsentiments of the people--as he doubtless did--he flattered them by\nkindling their aspirations towards good. And Plato himself does the\nsame (though less nobly and powerfully), adopting the received\nframework of Athenian sentiment, in his dialogue called Menexenus,\nwhich we shall come to in a future chapter.\n\n[Footnote 131: Thucyd. ii. 41-42. [Greek: xunel\u00f4/n te le/g\u00f4 t\u00ea/n te\npa=san po/lin t\u00ea=s E(lla/dos pai/deusin ei)=nai], &c.]\n\n[Side-note: The Platonic Id\u00e9al exacts, as good, some order,\nsystem, discipline. But order may be directed to bad ends as well as\nto good. Divergent ideas about virtue.]\n\nThe issue, therefore, which Plato here takes against Rhetoric, must\nstand or fall with the Platonic Id\u00e9al of Good and Evil. But when he\nthus denounces both the general public and the most patriotic\nrhetors, to ensure exclusive worship for his own Id\u00e9al of Good--we\nmay at least require that he shall explain, wherein consists that\nGood--by what mark it is distinguishable--and on what authority\npre-eminence is claimed for it. So far, indeed, we advance by the help\nof Plato's similes[132]--order, discipline, health and strength of\nbody--that we are called upon to recognise, apart from all particular\nmoments of enjoyment or suffering, of action or quiescence, a certain\npermanent mental condition and habit--a certain order, regulation,\ndiscipline--as an object of high importance to be attained. This (as\nI have before remarked) is a valuable idea which pervades, in one\nform or another, all the Hellenic social views, from Sokrates\ndownward, and even before Sokrates; an idea, moreover, which was\ncommon to Peripatetics, Stoics, Epikureans. But mental order and\ndiscipline is not in itself an end: it may be differently cast, and\nmay subserve many different purposes. The Pythagorean brotherhood was\nintensely restrictive in its canons. The Spartan system exhibited the\nstrictest order and discipline--an assemblage of principles and\nhabits predetermined by authority and enforced upon all--yet neither\nPlato nor Aristotle approve of its results. Order and discipline\nattained full perfection in the armies of Julius Caesar and the\nFrench Emperor Napoleon; in the middle ages, also, several of\nthe monastic orders stood high in respect to finished discipline\npervading the whole character: and the Jesuits stood higher than any.\nEach of these systems has included terms equivalent to justice,\ntemperance, virtue, vice, &c., with sentiments associated\ntherewith, yet very different from what Plato would have approved.\nThe question--What is Virtue?--_Vir bonus est quis?_--will be\nanswered differently in each. The Spartans--when they entrapped (by a\ndelusive pretence of liberation and military decoration) two thousand\nof their bravest Helot warriors, and took them off by private\nassassinations,[133]--did not offend against their own idea of\nvirtue, or against the Platonic exigency of Order--Measure--System.\n\n[Footnote 132: Plat. Gorg. p. 504.]\n\n[Footnote 133: Thucydid. iv. 80.]\n\n[Side-note: How to discriminate the right order from the\nwrong. Plato does not advise us.]\n\nIt is therefore altogether unsatisfactory, when Plato--professing to\nteach us how to determine scientifically, which pleasures are bad,\nand which pains are good--refers to a durable mental order and\ndiscipline. Of such order there existed historically many varieties;\nand many more are conceivable, as Plato himself has shown in the\nRepublic and Leges. By what tests is the right order to be\ndistinguished from the wrong? If by its results, by _what_\nresults?--calculations for minimising pains, and maximising\npleasures, being excluded by the supposition? Here the Sokrates of\nthe Gorgias is at fault. He has not told us by what scientific test\nthe intelligent Expert proceeds in determining what pleasures are\nbad, and what pains are good. He leaves such determination to the\nunscientific sentiment of each society and each individual. He has\nnot, in fact, responded to the clear and pertinent challenge thrown\nout by the Sokrates of the Protagoras.\n\n[Side-note: The Gorgias upholds the independence and dignity\nof the dissenting philosopher.]\n\nI think, for these reasons, that the logic of the Gorgias is not at\nall on a par with its eloquence. But there is one peculiar feature\nwhich distinguishes it among all the Platonic dialogues. Nowhere in\nancient literature is the title, position, and dignity of individual\ndissenting opinion, ethical and political--against established\nethical and political orthodoxy--so clearly marked out and so boldly\nasserted. \"The Athenians will judge as they think right: none\nbut those speakers who are in harmony with them, have any chance of\naddressing their public assemblies with effect, and acquiring\npolitical influence. I, Sokrates, dissent from them, and have no\nchance of political influence: but I claim the right of following\nout, proclaiming, and defending, the conclusions of my own individual\nreason, until debate satisfies me that I am wrong.\"\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXV.\n\nPH\u00c6DON.\n\n\n[Side-note: The Ph\u00e6don is affirmative and expository.]\n\nThe Ph\u00e6don is characterised by Proklus as a dialogue wherein Sokrates\nunfolds fully his own mental history, and communicates to his\nadmirers the complete range of philosophical cognition.[1] This\ncriticism is partly well founded. The dialogue generally is among the\nmost affirmative and expository in the Platonic list. Sokrates\nundertakes to prove the immortality of the soul, delivers the various\nreasons which establish the doctrine to his satisfaction, and\nconfutes some dissentient opinions entertained by others. In regard\nto the exposition, however, we must consider ourselves as listening\nto Plato under the name of Sokrates: and we find it so conducted as\nto specify both certain stages through which the mind of Plato had\npassed, and the logical process which (at that time) appeared to him\nto carry conviction.\n\n[Footnote 1: Proklus, in Platon. Republ. p. 392. [Greek: e)n\nPhai/d\u00f4ni me\\n ga\\r o(/pou diaphero/nt\u00f4s o( S\u00f4kra/t\u00eas t\u00ea\\n e(autou=\nz\u00f4\u00ea\\n a)naploi=, kai\\ pa=n to\\ t\u00ea=s e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas pl\u00ea=thos a)noi/gei\ntoi=s e(autou= z\u00eal\u00f4tai=s], &c. Wyttenbach thinks (note, ad p. 108\nE) that Plato was young when he composed the Ph\u00e6don. But no\nsufficient grounds are given for this: and the concluding sentence of\nthe dialogue affords good presumption that it was composed many years\nafter the death of Sokrates--[Greek: \u00ea)/de \u00ea( teleut\u00ea/, \u00f4)=\nE)che/krates, tou= e(tai/rou \u00ea(mi=n e)ge/neto, a)ndro/s, \u00f4(s \u00ea(mei=s\nphai=men a)/n, _t\u00f4=n to/te_ \u00f4(=n e)peira/th\u00eamen a)ri/stou, kai\\\na)/ll\u00f4s phronim\u00f4ta/tou kai\\ dikaiota/tou.] The phrase [Greek: t\u00f4=n\nto/te] which may probably have slipped unconsciously from Plato,\nimplies that Sokrates belonged to the past generation. The beginning\nof the dialogue undoubtedly shows that Plato intended to place it\nshortly after the death of Sokrates; but the word [Greek: to/te] at\nthe end is inconsistent with this supposition, and comes out\nunconsciously as a mark of the real time.]\n\n[Side-note: Situation and circumstances assumed in the Ph\u00e6don.\nPathetic interest which they inspire.]\n\nThe interest felt by most readers in the Ph\u00e6don, however, depends,\nnot so much on the argumentative exposition (which Wyttenbach[2]\njustly pronounces to be obscure and difficult as well as\nunsatisfactory) as on the personality of the expounding speaker, and\nthe irresistible pathos of the situation. Sokrates had been condemned\nto death by the Dikastery on the day after the sacred ship, memorable\nin connection with the legendary voyage of Theseus to Krete, had been\ndispatched on her annual mission of religious sacrifice at the island\nof Delos. The Athenian magistrates considered themselves as precluded\nfrom putting any one to death by public authority, during the absence\nof the ship on this mission. Thirty days elapsed between her\ndeparture and her return: during all which interval, Sokrates\nremained in the prison, yet with full permission to his friends to\nvisit him. They passed most of every day in the enjoyment of his\nconversation.[3] In the Ph\u00e6don, we read the last of these\nconversations, after the sacred vessel had returned, and after the\nEleven magistrates had announced to Sokrates that the draught of\nhemlock would be administered to him before sunset. On communicating\nthis intelligence, the magistrates released Sokrates from the fetters\nwith which he had hitherto been bound. It is shortly after such\nrelease that the friends enter the prison to see him for the last\ntime. One of the number, Ph\u00e6don, recounts to Echekrat\u00eas not only the\nconduct and discourse of Sokrates during the closing hours of his\nlife, but also the swallowing of the poison, and the manner of his\ndeath.\n\n[Footnote 2: See the Prolegomena prefixed to Wyttenbach's edition of\nthe Ph\u00e6don, p. xxi. p. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, pp. 58-50.\n\nIt appears that Kriton became bail before the Dikasts, in a certain\nsum of money, that Sokrates should remain in prison and not escape\n(Plat. Ph\u00e6don, p. 115 D; Kriton, 45 B). Kriton would have been\nobliged to pay this money if Sokrates had accepted his proposition to\nescape, noticed already in chap. x.]\n\n[Side-note: Simmias and Keb\u00eas, the two collocutors with\nSokrates. Their feelings and those of Sokrates.]\n\nMore than fifteen friends of the philosopher are noted as present at\nthis last scene: but the only two who take an active part in the\ndebate, are, two young Thebans named Keb\u00eas and Simmias.[4] These\nfriends, though deeply attached to Sokrates, and full of sorrow at\nthe irreparable loss impending over them, are represented as overawed\nand fascinated by his perfect fearlessness, serenity and dignity.[5]\nThey are ashamed to give vent to their grief, when their master is\nseen to maintain his ordinary frame of mind, neither disquieted\nnor dissatisfied. The fundamental conception of the dialogue is, to\nrepresent Sokrates as the same man that he was before his trial;\nunmoved by the situation--not feeling that any misfortune is about to\nhappen to him--equally delighting in intellectual debate--equally\nfertile in dialectic invention. So much does he care for debate, and\nso little for the impending catastrophe, that he persists in a great\nargumentative effort, notwithstanding the intimation conveyed by\nKriton from the gaoler, that if he heated himself with talking, the\npoison might perhaps be languid in its operation, so that two or\nthree draughts of it would be necessary instead of one.[6] Sokrates\neven advances the position that death appears to him as a benefit\nrather than a misfortune, and that every true philosopher ought to\nprefer death to life, assuming it to supervene without his own\nact--suicide being forbidden by the Gods. He is represented as \"placidus\nore, intrepidus verbis; intempestivas suorum lacrimas coercens\"--to\nborrow a phrase from Tacitus's striking picture of the last hours of\nthe Emperor Otho.[7] To see him thus undisturbed, and even welcoming\nhis approaching end, somewhat hurts the feelings of his assembled\nfriends, who are in the deepest affliction at the certainty of so\nsoon losing him. Sokrates undertakes to defend himself before them as\nhe had done before the Dikasts; and to show good grounds for his\nbelief, that death is not a misfortune, but a benefit, to the\nphilosopher.[8] Simmias and Keb\u00eas, though at first not satisfied with\nthe reasonings, are nevertheless reluctant to produce their doubts,\nfrom fear of mortifying him in his last moments: but Sokrates\nprotests against such reluctance as founded on a misconception of his\nexisting frame of mind.[9] He is now the same man as he was before,\nand he calls upon them to keep up the freedom of debate unimpaired.\n\n[Footnote 4: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, pp. 59 B, 89 A. [Greek: t\u00f4=n neani/sk\u00f4n\nto\\n lo/gon], &c. (p. 89 A).]\n\n[Footnote 5: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, pp. 58-59.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 63 D.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Tacitus, Hist. ii. 48.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 63.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 84 D-E.]\n\n[Side-note: Emphasis of Sokrates in insisting on freedom of\ndebate, active exercise of reason, and independent judgment for each\nreasoner.]\n\nIndeed this freedom of debate and fulness of search--the paramount\nvalue of \"reasoned truth\"--the necessity of keeping up the force of\nindividual reason by constant argumentative exercise--and the right\nof independent judgment for hearer as well as speaker--stand\nemphatically proclaimed in these last words of the dying philosopher.\nHe does not announce the immortality of the soul as a dogma of\nimperative orthodoxy; which men, whether satisfied with the proofs or\nnot, must believe, or must make profession of believing, on pain of\nbeing shunned as a moral pestilence, and disqualified from giving\ntestimony in a court of justice. He sets forth his own conviction,\nwith the grounds on which he adopts it. But he expressly recognises\nthe existence of dissentient opinions: he invites his companions to\nbring forward every objection: he disclaims all special purpose of\nimpressing his own conclusions upon their minds: nay, he expressly\nwarns them not to be biassed by their personal sympathies, then wound\nup to the highest pitch, towards himself. He entreats them to\npreserve themselves from becoming tinged with _misology_, or the\nhatred of free argumentative discussion: and he ascribes this mental\nvice to the early habit of easy, uninquiring, implicit, belief: since\na man thus ready of faith, embracing opinions without any\ndiscriminative test, presently finds himself driven to abandon one\nopinion after another, until at last he mistrusts all opinions, and\nhates the process of discussing them, laying the blame upon\nphilosophy instead of upon his own intellect.[10]\n\n[Footnote 10: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, pp. 89 C-D, 90.\n\n[Greek: Pr\u00f4=ton eu)lab\u00eath\u00f4=me/n ti pa/thos m\u00ea\\ pa/th\u00f4men. To\\ poi=on,\n\u00ea)=n d' e)g\u00f4/? M\u00ea\\ gen\u00f4/metha, \u00ea)=| d' o(/s, miso/logoi, \u00f4(/sper oi(\nmisa/nthr\u00f4poi gigno/menoi; \u00f4(s ou)k e)/stin, e)/ph\u00ea, o(/, ti a)/n tis\nmei=zon tou/tou kako\\n pa/thoi \u00ea)\\ lo/gous mis\u00ea/sas.] p. 90 B.\n[Greek: e)peida/n tis pisteu/s\u00ea| lo/g\u00f4| tini\\ a)l\u00eathei= ei)=nai,\na)/neu t\u00ea=s peri\\ tou\\s lo/gous te/chn\u00eas, ka)/peita o)li/gon\nu(/steron au)t\u00f4=| do/x\u00ea| pseud\u00ea\\s ei)=nai, e)ni/ote me\\n \u00f4)/n,\ne)ni/ote d' ou)k \u00f4)/n, kai\\ au)=this e(/teros kai\\ e(/teros],\n&c.]\n\n[Side-note: Anxiety of Sokrates that his friends shall be on\ntheir guard against being influenced by his authority--that they\nshall follow only the convictions of their own reason.]\n\n\"For myself\" (says Sokrates) \"I fear that in these my last hours I\ndepart from the true spirit of philosophy--like unschooled men, who,\nwhen in debate, think scarcely at all how the real question stands,\nbut care only to make their own views triumphant in the minds of the\nauditors. Between them and me there is only thus much of difference.\nI regard it as a matter of secondary consequence, whether my\nconclusions appear true to my hearers; but I shall do my best to make\nthem appear as much as possible true to myself.[11] My\ncalculation is as follows: mark how selfish it is. If my conclusion\nas to the immortality of the soul is true, I am better off by\nbelieving it: if I am in error, and death be the end of me, even then\nI shall avoid importuning my friends with grief, during these few\nremaining hours: moreover my error will not continue with me--which\nwould have been a real misfortune--but will be extinguished very\nshortly. Such is the frame of mind, Simmias and Keb\u00eas, with which I\napproach the debate. Do you follow my advice: take little thought of\nSokrates, but take much more thought of the truth. If I appear to you\nto affirm any thing truly, assent to me: but if not, oppose me with\nall your powers of reasoning: Be on your guard lest, through earnest\nzeal, I should deceive alike myself and you, and should leave the\nsting in you, like a bee, at this hour of departure.\"\n\n[Footnote 11: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 91 A-C. [Greek: Ou) ga\\r o(/p\u00f4s toi=s\nparou=sin a)\\ e)g\u00f4\\ le/g\u00f4 do/xei a)l\u00eath\u00ea= ei)=nai, prothum\u00ea/somai, ei)\nm\u00ea\\ ei)/\u00ea pa/rergon, a)/ll' o(/p\u00f4s au)t\u00f4=| e)moi\\ o(/ ti ma/lista\ndo/zei ou(/t\u00f4s e)/chein. logi/zomai ga/r, \u00f4)= phi/le e(/taire--kai\\\nthe/asai \u00f4(s pleonektik\u00f4=s--ei) me\\n tugcha/nei a)l\u00eath\u00ea= o)/nta a(\\\nle/g\u00f4, kal\u00f4=s d\u00ea\\ e)/chei to\\ peisth\u00ea=nai; ei) de\\ m\u00eade/n e)sti\nteleut\u00ea/santi, a)ll' ou)=n tou=to/n ge to\\n chro/non au)to\\n to\\n\npro\\ tou= thana/tou \u00ea(=tton toi=s parou=sin a)\u00ead\u00ea\\s e)/somai\no)duro/menos . . . u(mei=s me/ntoi, a)\\n e)moi\\ pei/th\u00easthe,\n_smikro\\n phronti/santes S\u00f4kra/tous, t\u00ea=s de\\ a)l\u00eathei/as polu\\\nma=llon, e)a\\n me/n ti u(mi=n dok\u00f4= a)l\u00eathe\\s le/gein,\nxunomolog\u00ea/sate; ei) de\\ m\u00ea/, panti\\ lo/g\u00f4| a)ntitei/nete_,\neu)labou/menoi o(/p\u00f4s m\u00ea\\ e)g\u00f4\\ u(po\\ prothumi/as a(/ma e)mauto/n te\nkai\\ u(ma=s e)xapat\u00ea/sas, \u00f4(/sper me/litta to\\ ke/ntron e)gkatalip\u00f4\\n\noi)ch\u00ea/somai.]]\n\n[Side-note: Remarkable manifestation of earnest interest for\nreasoned truth and the liberty of individual dissent.]\n\nThis is a remarkable passage, as illustrating the spirit and purpose\nof Platonic dialogues. In my preceding Chapters, I have already\nshown, that it is no part of the aim of Sokrates to thrust dogmas of\nhis own into other men's minds as articles of faith. But then, most\nof these Chapters have dwelt upon Dialogues of Search, in which\nSokrates has appeared as an interrogator, or enquirer jointly with\nothers: scrutinising their opinions, but disclaiming knowledge or\nopinions of his own. Here, however, in the Ph\u00e6don, the case is\naltogether different. Sokrates is depicted as having not only an\naffirmative opinion, but even strong conviction, on a subject of\ngreat moment: which conviction, moreover, he is especially desirous\nof preserving unimpaired, during his few remaining hours of life. Yet\neven here, he manifests no anxiety to get that conviction into the\nminds of his friends, except as a result of their own\nindependent scrutiny and self-working reason. Not only he does not\nattempt to terrify them into believing, by menace of evil\nconsequences if they do not--but he repudiates pointedly even the\ngentler machinery of conversion, which might work upon their minds\nthrough attachment to himself and reverence for his authority. His\ndevotion is to \"reasoned truth\": he challenges his friends to the\nfullest scrutiny by their own independent reason: he recognises the\nsentence which they pronounce afterwards as valid _for them_,\nwhether concurrent with himself or adverse. Their reason is for them,\nwhat his reason is for him: requiring, both alike (as Sokrates here\nproclaims), to be stimulated as well as controlled by all-searching\ndebate--but postulating equal liberty of final decision for each one\nof the debaters. The stress laid by Plato upon the full liberty of\ndissenting reason, essential to philosophical debate--is one of the\nmost memorable characteristics of the Ph\u00e6don. When we come to the\ntreatise De Legibus (where Sokrates does not appear), we shall find a\ntotally opposite view of sentiment. In the tenth book of that\ntreatise Plato enforces the rigid censorship of an orthodox\npersecutor, who makes his own reason binding and compulsory on all.\n\n[Side-note: Ph\u00e6don and Symposion--points of analogy and\ncontrast.]\n\nThe natural counterpart and antithesis to the Ph\u00e6don, is found in the\nSymposion.[12] In both, the personality of Sokrates stands out with\npeculiar force: in the one, he is in the fulness of life and\nenjoyment, along with festive comrades--in the other, he is on the\nverge of approaching death, surrounded by companions in deep\naffliction. The point common to both, is, the perfect self-command of\nSokrates under a diversity of trying circumstances. In the Symposion,\nwe read of him as triumphing over heat, cold, fatigue, danger,\namorous temptation, unmeasured potations of wine, &c.:[13]\nin the Ph\u00e6don, we discover him rising superior to the fear of\ndeath, and to the contagion of an afflicted company around him.\nStill, his resolute volition is occasionally overpowered by fits of\nabsorbing meditation, which seize him at moments sudden and\nunaccountable, and chain him to the spot for a long time. There is\nmoreover, in both dialogues, a streak of eccentricity in his\ncharacter, which belongs to what Plato calls the philosophical\ninspiration and madness, rising above the measure of human temperance\nand prudence.[14] The Ph\u00e6don depicts in Sokrates the same intense\nlove of philosophy and dialectic debate, as the Symposion and\nPh\u00e6drus: but it makes no allusion to that personal attachment, and\npassionate admiration of youthful beauty, with which, according to\nthose two dialogues, the mental fermentation of the philosophical\naspirant is asserted to begin.[15] Sokrates in the Ph\u00e6don describes\nthe initial steps whereby he had been led to philosophical study:[16]\nbut the process is one purely intellectual, without reference to\npersonal converse with beloved companions, as a necessity of the\ncase. His discourse is that of a man on the point of death--\"abruptis\nvit\u00e6 blandimentis\"[17]--and he already looks upon his body, not as\nfurnishing the means of action and as requiring only to be trained by\ngymnastic discipline (as it appears in the Republic), but as an\nimportunate and depraving companion, of which he is glad to get rid:\nso that the ethereal substance of the soul may be left to its free\nexpansion and fellowship with the intelligible world, apart from\nsense and its solicitations.\n\n[Footnote 12: Thus far I agree with Schleiermacher (Einleitung zum\nPh\u00e6don, p. 9, &c.); though I do not think that he has shown\nsufficient ground for his theory regarding the Symposion and the\nPh\u00e6don, as jointly intended to depict the character of the\nphilosopher, promised by Plato as a sequel to the Sophist and the\nStatesman. (Plato, Sophist. p. 217; Politic. p. 257.)]\n\n[Footnote 13: Plato, Symposion, pp. 214 A, 219 D, 220-221-223 D:\ncompare Ph\u00e6don, p. 116, c. 117. Marcus Antoninus (i. 16) compares on\nthis point his father Antoninus Pius to Sokrates: both were capable\nof enjoyment as well as of abstinence, without ever losing their\nself-command. [Greek: E)pharmo/seie d' a)\\n au)t\u00f4=|] (Antoninus P.)\n[Greek: to\\ peri\\ tou= S\u00f4kra/tous mn\u00eamoneuo/menon, o(/ti kai\\\na)pe/chesthai kai\\ a)polau/ein e)du/nato tou/t\u00f4n, \u00f4(=n polloi\\ pro/s\nte ta\\s a)pocha\\s a)sthen\u00f4=s, kai\\ pro\\s ta\\s a)polau/seis\ne)ndotik\u00f4=s, e)/chousin. To\\ de\\ i)schu/ein, kai\\ e)/ti karterei=n\nkai\\ e)nn\u00ea/phein e(kate/r\u00f4|, a)ndro\\s e)/stin a)/rtion kai\\ a)\u00eatt\u00eaton\npsuch\u00ea\\n e)/chontos.]]\n\n[Footnote 14: Plato, Symposion, pp. 174-175-220 C-D. Compare Ph\u00e6don,\npp. 84 C, 95 E.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Plato, Sympos. p. 215 A, p. 221 D. [Greek: oi(=os de\\\nou(tosi\\ ge/gone t\u00ea\\n _a)topi/an_ a)/nthr\u00f4pos, kai\\ au)to\\s kai\\\noi( lo/goi au)tou=, ou)d' e)ggu\\s a)\\n eu(/roi tis z\u00eat\u00f4=n], &c.\np. 218 B: [Greek: pa/ntes ga\\r kekoin\u00f4n\u00ea/kate t\u00ea=s philoso/phou\nmani/as te kai\\ bakchei/as], &c. About the [Greek: philo/sophos\nmani/a], compare Plato, Ph\u00e6drus, pp. 245-250.\n\nPlato, Ph\u00e6drus, pp. 251-253. Symposion, pp. 210-211. [Greek: o(/tan\ntis a)po\\ t\u00f4=nde dia\\ to\\ o)rth\u00f4=s paiderastei=n e)pani\u00f4\\n e)kei=no\nto\\ kalo\\n a)/rch\u00eatai kathora=|n], &c. (211 B).]\n\n[Footnote 16: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 96 A. [Greek: e)g\u00f4\\ ou)=n soi\\\ndi/eimi peri\\ au)t\u00f4=n ta/ g' e)ma\\ pa/th\u00ea], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Tacitus, Hist. ii. 53. \"Othonis libertus, habere se\nsuprema ejus mandata respondit: ipsum viventem quidem relictum, sed\nsol\u00e2 posteritatis cur\u00e2, et abruptis vit\u00e6 blandimentis.\"]\n\n[Side-note: Ph\u00e6don--compared with Republic and Tim\u00e6us. No\nrecognition of the triple or lower souls. Antithesis between soul and\nbody.]\n\nWe have here one peculiarity of the Ph\u00e6don, whereby it stands\ndistinguished both from the Republic and the Tim\u00e6us. The antithesis\non which it dwells is that of the soul or mind, on one hand--the\nbody on the other. The soul or mind is spoken of as one and\nindivisible: as if it were an inmate unworthily lodged or imprisoned\nin the body. It is not distributed into distinct parts, kinds, or\nvarieties: no mention is made of that tripartite distribution which\nis so much insisted on in the Republic and Tim\u00e6us:--the rational or\nintellectual (encephalic) soul, located in the head--the courageous\nor passionate (thoracic), between the neck and the diaphragm--the\nappetitive (abdominal), between the diaphragm and the navel. In the\nPh\u00e6don, the soul is noted as the seat of reason, intellect, the love\nof wisdom or knowledge, exclusively: all that belongs to passion and\nappetite, is put to account of the body:[18] this is distinctly\ncontrary to the Phil\u00eabus, in which dialogue Sokrates affirms that\ndesire or appetite cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to the\nsoul. In Ph\u00e6don, nothing is said about the location of the rational\nsoul, in the head,--nor about the analogy between its rotations in\nthe cranium and the celestial rotations (a doctrine which we read\nboth in the Tim\u00e6us and in the Republic): on the contrary, the soul is\naffirmed to have lost, through its conjunction with the body, that\nwisdom or knowledge which it possessed during its state of\npre-existence, while completely apart from the body, and while in\ncommerce with those invisible Ideas to which its own separate nature\nwas cognate.[19] That controul which in the Republic is exercised by\nthe rational soul over the passionate and appetitive souls, is in the\nPh\u00e6don exercised (though imperfectly) by the one and only soul over\nthe body.[20] In the Republic and Tim\u00e6us, the soul is a tripartite\naggregate, a community of parts, a compound: in the Ph\u00e6don, Sokrates\nasserts it to be uncompounded, making this fact a point in his\nargument.[21] Again, in the Ph\u00e6don, the soul is pronounced to be\nessentially uniform and incapable of change: as such, it is placed in\nantithesis with the body, which is perpetually changing: while\nwe read, on the contrary, in the Symposion, that soul and body alike\nare in a constant and unremitting variation, neither one nor the\nother ever continuing in the same condition.[22]\n\n[Footnote 18: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 66. Compare Plato, Phil\u00eabus, p. 35,\nC-D.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 76.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Compare Ph\u00e6don, p. 94 C-E, with Republic, iv. pp. 439\nC, 440 A, 441 E, 442 C.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 78. [Greek: a)xu/ntheton, monoeide\\s]\n(p. 80 B), contrasted with the [Greek: tri/a ei)d\u00ea t\u00ea=s psuch\u00ea=s]\n(Republic, p. 439). In the abstract given by Alkinous of the Platonic\ndoctrine, we read in cap. 24 [Greek: o(/ti trimer\u00ea/s e)stin \u00ea(\npsuch\u00ea\\ kata\\ ta\\s duna/meis, kai\\ kata\\ lo/gon ta\\ me/r\u00ea au)t\u00ea=s\nto/pois i)di/ois dianene/m\u00eatai]: in cap. 25 that the [Greek: psuch\u00ea\\]\nis [Greek: a)su/nthetos, a)dia/lutos, a)ske/dastos].]\n\n[Footnote 22: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, pp. 79-80; Symposion, pp. 207-208.]\n\n[Side-note: Different doctrines of Plato about the soul.\nWhether all the three souls are immortal, or the rational soul\nalone.]\n\nThe difference which I have here noted shows how Plato modified his\ndoctrine to suit the purpose of each dialogue. The tripartite soul\nwould have been found inconvenient in the Ph\u00e6don, where the argument\nrequired that soul and body should be as sharply distinguished as\npossible. Assuming passion and appetite to be attributes belonging to\nthe soul, as well as reason--Sokrates will not shake them off when he\nbecomes divorced from the body. He believes and expects that the\npost-existence of the soul will be, as its pre-existence has been, a\nrational existence--a life of intellectual contemplation and commerce\nwith the eternal Ideas: in this there is no place for passion and\nappetite, which grow out of its conjunction with the body. The soul\nhere represents Reason and Intellect, in commerce with their\ncorrelates, the objective Entia Rationis: the body represents passion\nand appetite as well as sense, in implication with their correlates,\nthe objects of sensible perception.[23] Such is the doctrine of the\nPh\u00e6don; but Plato is not always consistent with himself on the point.\nHis ancient as well as his modern commentators are not agreed,\nwhether, when he vindicated the immortality of the soul, he meant to\nspeak of the rational soul only, or of the aggregate soul with its\nthree parts as above described. There are passages which countenance\nboth suppositions.[24] Plato seems to have leaned sometimes to the\none view, sometimes to the other: besides which, the view taken\nin the Ph\u00e6don is a third, different from both--_viz._: That the\ntwo non-rational souls, the passionate and appetitive, are not\nrecognised as existing.\n\n[Footnote 23: This is the same antithesis as we read in Xenophon,\nascribed to Cyrus in his dying address to his sons--[Greek: o(\na)/kratos kai\\ katharo\\s nou=s--to\\ a)/phron s\u00f4=ma], Cyrop\u00e6d. viii.\n7, 20.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Alkinous, Introduct. c. 25. [Greek: o(/ti me\\n ou)=n\nai( logikai\\ psuchai\\ a)tha/natoi u(pa/rchousi kata\\ to\\n a)/ndra\ntou=ton, bebai\u00f4/sait' a)/n tis; ei) de\\ kai\\ ai( a)/logoi, tou=to\nt\u00f4=n a)mphisb\u00eatoume/n\u00f4n u(pa/rchei.] Galen considers Plato as\naffirming that the two inferior souls are mortal--[Greek: Peri\\ t\u00f4=n\nt\u00ea=s psuch\u00ea=s \u00ea)th\u00f4=n], T. iv. p. 773, K\u00fchn.\n\nThis subject is handled in an instructive Dissertation of K. F.\nHermann--De Partibus Anim\u00e6 Immortalibus secundum Platonem--delivered\nat G\u00f6ttingen in the winter Session, 1850-1851. He inclines to the\nbelief that Plato intended to represent only the rational soul as\nimmortal, and the other two souls as mortal (p. 9). But the passages\nwhich he produces are quite sufficient to show, that Plato sometimes\nheld one language, sometimes the other; and that Galen, who wrote an\nexpress treatise (now lost) to prove that Plato was inconsistent with\nhimself in respect to the soul, might have produced good reasons for\nhis opinion. The \"inconstantia Platonis\" (Cicero, Nat. Deor. i. 12)\nmust be admitted here as on other matters. We must take the different\narguments and doctrines of Plato as we find them in their respective\nplaces. Hermann (p. 4) says about the commentators--\"De irrationali\nanim\u00e2, alii ancipites h\u00e6serunt, alii claris verbis mortalem\npr\u00e6dicarunt: quumque Neoplatonic\u00e6 sect\u00e6 principes, Numenius et\nPlotinus, non modo brutorum, sed ne plantarum quidem, animas\nimmortalitate privare ausi sunt,--mox insequentes in alia omnia\ndigressi aut plane perire irrationales partes affirmarunt, aut medi\u00e2\nqu\u00e2dam vi\u00e2 ingressi, quamvis corporum fato exemptis, mortalitatem\ntamen et ipsi tribuerunt.\" It appears that the divergence of opinion\non this subject began as early as Xenokrates and Speusippus--see\nOlympiodorus, Scholia in Ph\u00e6donem, \u00a7 175. The large construction\nadopted by Numenius and Plotinus is completely borne out by a passage\nin the Ph\u00e6don, p. 70 E.\n\nI must here remark that Hermann does not note the full extent of\ndiscrepancy between the Ph\u00e6don and Plato's other dialogues,\nconsisting in this--That in the Ph\u00e6don, Plato suppresses all mention\nof the two non-rational souls, the passionate and appetitive:\ninsomuch that if we had only the Ph\u00e6don remaining, we should not have\nknown that he had ever affirmed the triple partition of the soul, or\nthe co-existence of the three souls.\n\nI transcribe an interesting passage from M. Deg\u00e9rando, respecting the\nbelief in different varieties of soul, and partial immortality.\n\nDeg\u00e9rando--Histoire Compar\u00e9e des Syst\u00e8mes de Philosophie, vol. i. p.\n213.\n\n\"Les habitans du Thibet, du Gr\u00f6enland, du nord de l'Am\u00e9rique\nadmettent deux \u00e2mes: les Car\u00e4ibes en admettent trois, dont une,\ndisent-ils, celle qui habite dans la t\u00eate, remonte seule au pays des\n\u00e2mes. Les habitans du Gr\u00f6enland croient d'ailleurs les \u00e2mes des\nhommes semblables au principe de la vie des animaux: ils supposent\nque les divers individus peuvent changer d'\u00e2mes entre eux pendant la\nvie, et qu'apr\u00e8s la vie ces \u00e2mes ex\u00e9cutent de grands voyages, avec\ntoutes sortes de fatigues et de p\u00e9rils. Les peuples du Canada se\nrepr\u00e9sentent les \u00e2mes sous la forme d'ombres errantes: les Patagons,\nles habitans du Sud de l'Asie, croient entendre leurs voix dans\nl'\u00e9cho: et les anciens Romains eux-m\u00eames n'\u00e9taient pas \u00e9trangers \u00e0\ncette opinion. Les N\u00e9gres s'imaginent que la destin\u00e9e de l'\u00e2me apr\u00e8s\nla vie est encore li\u00e9e \u00e0 celle du corps, et fondent sur cette id\u00e9e\nune foule de pratiques.\"]\n\n[Side-note: The life and character of a philosopher is a\nconstant struggle to emancipate his soul from his body. Death alone\nenables him to do this completely.]\n\nThe philosopher (contends Sokrates) ought to rejoice when death comes\nto sever his soul altogether from his body: because he is, throughout\nall his life, struggling to sever himself from the passions,\nappetites, impulses and aspirations, which grow out of the body; and\nto withdraw himself from the perceptions of the corporeal senses,\nwhich teach no truth, and lead only to deceit or confusion: He is\nconstantly attempting to do what the body hinders him from doing\ncompletely--to prosecute pure mental contemplation, as the only way\nof arriving at truth: to look at essences or things in themselves, by\nmeans of his mind or soul in itself apart from the body.[25] Until\nhis mind be purified from all association with the body, it\ncannot be brought into contact with pure essence, nor can his\naspirations for knowledge be satisfied.[26] Hence his whole life is\nreally a training or approximative practice for death, which alone\nwill enable him to realise such aspirations.[27] Knowledge or wisdom\nis the only money in which he computes, and which he seeks to receive\nin payment.[28] He is not courageous or temperate in the ordinary\nsense: for the courageous man, while holding death to be a great\nevil, braves it from fear of greater evils--and the temperate man\nabstains from various pleasures, because they either shut him out\nfrom greater pleasures, or entail upon him disease and poverty. The\nphilosopher is courageous and temperate, but from a different motive:\nhis philosophy purifies him from all these sensibilities, and makes\nhim indifferent to all the pleasures and pains arising from the body:\neach of which, in proportion to its intensity, corrupts his\nperception of truth and falsehood, and misguides him in the search\nfor wisdom or knowledge.[29] While in the body, he feels imprisoned,\nunable to look for knowledge except through a narrow grating and by\nthe deceptive media of sense. From this durance philosophy partially\nliberates him,--purifying his mind, like the Orphic or Dionysiac\nreligious mysteries, from the contagion of body[30] and sense:\ndisengaging it, as far as may be during life, from sympathy with the\nbody: and translating it out of the world of sense, uncertainty, and\nmere opinion, into the invisible region of truth and knowledge. If\nsuch purification has been fully achieved, the mind of the\nphilosopher is at the moment of death thoroughly severed from the\nbody, and passes clean away by itself, into commerce with the\nintelligible Entities or realities.\n\n[Footnote 25: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 66 E. [Greek: ei) me/llome/n pote\nkathar\u00f4=s ti ei)/sesthai, a)pallakte/on au)tou= (tou= s\u00f4/matos) kai\\\nau)t\u00ea=| t\u00ea=| psuch\u00ea=| theate/on au)ta\\ ta\\ pra/gmata.]]\n\n[Footnote 26: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 67 B. [Greek: m\u00ea\\ kathar\u00f4=| ga\\r\nkatharou= e)pha/ptesthai m\u00ea\\ ou) themito\\n \u00ea)=|.]]\n\n[Footnote 27: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 64 A. [Greek: kinduneu/ousi ga\\r\no(/soi tugcha/nousin o)rth\u00f4=s a)pto/menoi philosophi/as lel\u00eathe/nai\ntou\\s a)/llous o(/ti ou)de\\n a)/llo au)toi\\ e)pit\u00eadeu/ousin \u00ea)\\\na)pothn\u00ea/skein te kai\\ tethna/nai.] P. 67 E [Greek: oi( o)rth\u00f4=s\nphilosophou=ntes a)pothn\u00ea/skein melet\u00f4=sin.]]\n\n[Footnote 28: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 69 A. [Greek: a)ll' \u00ea)=| e)kei=no\nmo/non to\\ no/misma o)rtho/n, a)nth' ou(= dei= a(/panta tau=ta\nkatalla/ttesthai, phro/n\u00easis.]]\n\n[Footnote 29: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 69-83-84.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 82 E.]\n\n[Side-note: Souls of the ordinary or unphilosophical men pass\nafter death into the bodies of different animals. The philosopher\nalone is relieved from all communion with body.]\n\nOn the contrary, the soul or mind of the ordinary man, which has\nundergone no purification and remains in close implication with the\nbody, cannot get completely separated even at the moment of death,\nbut remains encrusted and weighed down by bodily accompaniments,\nso as to be unfit for those regions to which mind itself naturally\nbelongs. Such impure minds or souls are the ghosts or shadows which\nhaunt tombs; and which become visible, because they cling to the\nvisible world, and hate the invisible.[31] Not being fit for separate\nexistence, they return in process of time into conjunction with fresh\nbodies, of different species of men or animals, according to the\nparticular temperament which they carry away with them.[32] The souls\nof despots, or of violent and rapacious men, will pass into the\nbodies of wolves or kites: those of the gluttonous and drunkards,\ninto asses and such-like animals. A better fate will be reserved for\nthe just and temperate men, who have been socially and politically\nvirtuous, but simply by habit and disposition, without any philosophy\nor pure intellect: for their souls will pass into the bodies of other\ngentle and social animals, such as bees, ants, wasps,[33] &c., or\nperhaps they may again return into the human form, and may become\nmoderate men. It is the privilege only of him who has undergone the\npurifying influence of philosophy, and who has spent his life in\ntrying to detach himself as much as possible from communion with the\nbody--to be relieved after death from the obligation of fresh\nembodiment, that his soul may dwell by itself in a region akin to its\nown separate nature: passing out of the world of sense, of transient\nphenomena, and of mere opinion, into a distinct world where it will\nbe in full presence of the eternal Ideas, essences, and truth; in\ncompanionship with the Gods, and far away from the miseries of\nhumanity.[34]\n\n[Footnote 31: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 81 C-D. [Greek: o(\\ d\u00ea\\ kai\\\ne)/chousa \u00ea( toiau/t\u00ea psuch\u00ea\\ baru/netai/ te kai\\ e(/lketai pa/lin\nei)s to\\n o(rato\\n to/pon, pho/b\u00f4| tou= a)eidou=s te kai\\ A(/idou,\n\u00f4(/sper le/getai, peri\\ ta\\ mn\u00ea/mata/ te kai\\ tou\\s ta/phous\nkulindoume/n\u00ea, peri\\ a(\\ d\u00ea\\ kai\\ \u00f4)/phth\u00ea a)/tta psuch\u00f4=n skotoeid\u00ea=\npha/smata] [al. [Greek: skioeod\u00ea= phanta/smata]], [Greek: oi(=a\npare/chontai ai( toiau=tai psuchai\\ ei)/d\u00f4la, ai( m\u00ea\\ kathar\u00f4=s\na)poluthei=sai a)lla\\ tou= o(ratou= mete/chousai, dio\\ kai\\\no(r\u00f4=ntai.]]\n\n[Footnote 32: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, pp. 82-84.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, pp. 82 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n\neu)daimone/statoi kai\\ tou/t\u00f4n ei)si\\ kai\\ ei)s be/ltiston to/pon\ni)o/ntes oi( t\u00ea\\n d\u00eamotik\u00ea\\n te kai\\ politik\u00ea\\n a)ret\u00ea\\n\ne)pitet\u00eadeuko/tes, \u00ea(\\n d\u00ea\\ kalou=si s\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ean te kai\\\ndikaiosu/n\u00ean, e)x e)/thous te kai\\ mele/t\u00eas gegonui=an a)/neu\nphilosophi/as te kai\\ nou=? . . . O(/ti tou/tous ei)ko/s e)stin ei)s\ntoiou=ton pa/lin a)phiknei=sthai politiko/n te kai\\ \u00ea(/meron ge/nos,\n\u00ea)/pou melitt\u00f4=n \u00ea)\\ sph\u00eak\u00f4=n \u00ea)\\ murm\u00ea/k\u00f4n], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, pp. 82 B, 83 B, 84 B. Compare p. 114 C:\n[Greek: tou/t\u00f4n de\\ au)t\u00f4=n oi( philosophi/a| i(kan\u00f4=s kath\u00eara/menoi\na)/neu te s\u00f4ma/t\u00f4n z\u00f4=si to\\ para/pan ei)s to\\n e)/peita chro/non],\n&c. Also p. 115 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Special privilege claimed for philosophers in the\nPh\u00e6don apart from the virtuous men who are not philosophers.]\n\nSuch is the creed which Sokrates announces to his friends in the\nPh\u00e6don, as supplying good reason for the readiness and satisfaction\nwith which he welcomes death. It is upon the antithesis between soul\n(or mind) and body, that the main stress is laid. The partnership\nbetween the two is represented as the radical cause of mischief: and\nthe only true relief to the soul consists in breaking up the\npartnership altogether, so as to attain a distinct, disembodied,\nexistence. Conformably to this doctrine, the line is chiefly drawn\nbetween the philosopher, and the multitude who are not philosophers--not\nbetween good and bad agents, when the good agents are not\nphilosophers. This last distinction is indeed noticed, but is kept\nsubordinate. The unphilosophical man of social goodness is allowed to\npass after death into the body of a bee, or an ant, instead of that\nof a kite or ass;[35] but he does not attain the privilege of\ndissolving connection altogether with body. Moreover the distinction\nis one not easily traceable: since Sokrates[36] expressly remarks\nthat the large majority of mankind are middling persons, neither good\nnor bad in any marked degree. Philosophers stand in a category by\nthemselves: apart from the virtuous citizens, as well as from the\nmiddling and the vicious. Their appetites and ambition are indeed\ndeadened, so that they agree with the virtuous in abstaining from\ninjustice: but this is not their characteristic feature. Philosophy\nis asserted to impart to them a special purification, like that of\nthe Orphic mysteries to the initiated: detaching the soul from both\nthe body and the world of sense, except in so far as is indispensable\nfor purposes of life: replunging the soul, as much as possible, in\nthe other world of intelligible essences, real forms or Ideas, which\nare its own natural kindred and antecedent companions. The process\nwhereby this is accomplished is intellectual rather than ethical. It\nis the process of learning, or (in the sense of Sokrates) the revival\nin the mind of those essences or Ideas with which it had been\nfamiliar during its anterior and separate life: accompanied by the\ntotal abstinence from all other pleasures and temptations.[37] Only\nby such love of learning, which is identical with philosophy\n([Greek: philo/sophon, philomathe\\s]), is the mind rescued from the\nignorance and illusions unavoidable in the world of sense.\n\n[Footnote 35: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, pp. 81-82.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 90 A.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, pp. 82-115.--[Greek: ta\\s de\\ (\u00ea(dona\\s)\nperi\\ to\\ mantha/nein e)spou/dase], &c. (p. 114 E).\n\nThese doctrines, laid down by Plato in the Ph\u00e6don, bear great analogy\nto the Sanskrit philosophy called _Sankhy\u00e2_, founded by Kapila,\nas expounded and criticised in the treatise of M. Barth\u00e9lemy St.\nHilaire (M\u00e9moire sur le Sankhy\u00e2, Paris, 1852, pp. 273-278)--and the\nother work, Du Bouddhisme, by the same author (Paris, 1855), pp.\n116-137, 187-194, &c.]\n\n[Side-note: Simmias and Keb\u00eas do not admit readily the\nimmortality of the soul, but are unwilling to trouble Sokrates by\nasking for proof. Unabated interest of Sokrates in rational debate.]\n\nIn thus explaining his own creed, Sokrates announces a full\nconviction that the soul or mind is immortal, but he has not yet\noffered any proof of it: and Simmias as well as Keb\u00eas declare\nthemselves to stand in need of proof. Both of them however are\nreluctant to obtrude upon him any doubts. An opportunity is thus\nprovided, that Sokrates may exhibit his undisturbed equanimity--his\nunimpaired argumentative readiness--his keen anxiety not to relax the\ngrasp of a subject until he has brought it to a satisfactory\nclose--without the least reference to his speedily approaching death.\nThis last-mentioned anxiety is made manifest in a turn of the dialogue,\nremarkable both for dramatic pathos and for originality.[38] We are\nthus brought to the more explicit statement of those reasons upon\nwhich Sokrates relies.\n\n[Footnote 38: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 89 B-C,--the remark made by Sokrates,\nwhen stroking down the head and handling the abundant hair of Ph\u00e6don,\nin allusion to the cutting off of all this hair, which would be among\nthe acts of mourning performed by Ph\u00e6don on the morrow, after the\ndeath of Sokrates: and the impressive turn given to this remark, in\nreference to the solution of the problem then in debate.]\n\n[Side-note: Simmias and Keb\u00eas believe fully in the\npre-existence of the soul, but not in its post-existence.\nDoctrine--That the soul is a sort of harmony--refuted by Sokrates.]\n\nIf the arguments whereby Sokrates proves the immortality of the soul\nare neither forcible nor conclusive, not fully satisfying even\nSimmias[39] to whom they are addressed--the adverse arguments, upon\nthe faith of which the doctrine was denied (as we know it to have\nbeen by many philosophers of antiquity), cannot be said to be\nproduced at all. Simmias and Keb\u00eas are represented as Sokratic\ncompanions, partly Pythagoreans; desirous to find the doctrine true,\nyet ignorant of the proofs. Both of them are earnest believers in the\npre-existence of the soul, and in the objective reality of Ideas or\nintelligible essences. Simmias however adopts in part the opinion,\nnot very clearly explained, \"That the soul is a harmony or\nmixture\": which opinion Sokrates refutes, partly by some other\narguments, partly by pointing out that it is inconsistent with the\nsupposition of the soul as pre-existent to the body, and that Simmias\nmust make his election between the two. Simmias elects without\nhesitation, in favour of the pre-existence: which he affirms to be\ndemonstrable upon premisses or assumptions perfectly worthy of trust:\nwhile the alleged harmony is at best only a probable analogy, not\ncertified by conclusive reasons.[40] Keb\u00eas again, while admitting\nthat the soul existed before its conjunction with the present body,\nand that it is sufficiently durable to last through conjunction with\nmany different bodies--still expresses his apprehension that though\ndurable, it is not eternal. Accordingly, no man can be sure that his\npresent body is not the last with which his soul is destined to be\nlinked; so that immediately on his death, it will pass away into\nnothing. The opinion of Keb\u00eas is remarkable, inasmuch as it shows how\nconstantly the metempsychosis, or transition of the soul from one\nbody to another, was included in all the varieties of ancient\nspeculation on this subject.[41]\n\n[Footnote 39: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 107 B.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 92.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, pp. 86-95. [Greek: kra=sin kai\\\na(rmoni/an], &c.\n\n\"Animam esse harmoniam complures quidem statuerant, sed aliam alii,\net divers\u00e2 ratione,\" says Wyttenbach ad Ph\u00e6don. p. 86. Lucretius as\nwell as Plato impugns the doctrine, iii. 97.\n\nGalen, a great admirer of Plato, though not pretending to determine\npositively wherein the essence of the soul consists, maintains a\ndoctrine substantially the same as what is here impugned--that it\ndepends upon a certain [Greek: kra=sis] of the elements and\nproperties in the bodily organism--[Greek: Peri\\ t\u00f4=n t\u00ea=s psuch\u00ea=s\n\u00ea)th\u00f4=n], vol. iv. pp. 774-775, 779-782, ed. K\u00fchn. He complains much\nof the unsatisfactory explanations of Plato on this point.]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates unfolds the intellectual changes or\nwanderings through which his mind had passed.]\n\nBefore replying to Simmias and Keb\u00eas, Sokrates is described as\nhesitating and reflecting for a long time. He then enters into a\nsketch of[42] his own intellectual history. How far the sketch as it\nstands depicts the real Sokrates, or Plato himself, or a supposed\nmind not exactly coincident with either--we cannot be certain: the\nfinal stage however must belong to Plato himself.\n\n[Footnote 42: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, pp. 96-102.\n\nThe following abstract is intended only to exhibit the train of\nthought and argument pursued by Sokrates; not adhering to the exact\nwords, nor even preserving the interlocutory form. I could not have\nprovided room for a literal translation.]\n\n[Side-note: First doctrine of Sokrates as to cause. Reasons\nwhy he rejected it.]\n\n\"You compel me (says Sokrates) to discuss thoroughly the cause of\ngeneration and destruction.[43] I will tell you, if you like, my own\nsuccessive impressions on these subjects. When young, I was\namazingly eager for that kind of knowledge which people call the\ninvestigation of Nature. I thought it matter of pride to know the\ncauses of every thing--through what every thing is either generated,\nor destroyed, or continues to exist. I puzzled myself much to\ndiscover first of all such matters as these--Is it a certain\nputrefaction of the Hot and the Cold in the system (as some say),\nwhich brings about the nourishment of animals? Is it the blood\nthrough which we think--or air, or fire? Or is it neither one nor the\nother, but the brain, which affords to us sensations of sight,\nhearing, and smell, out of which memory and opinion are generated:\nthen, by a like process, knowledge is generated out of opinion and\nmemory when permanently fixed?[44] I tried to understand destructions\nas well as generations, celestial as well as terrestrial phenomena.\nBut I accomplished nothing, and ended by fancying myself utterly\nunfit for the enquiry. Nay--I even lost all the knowledge of that\nwhich I had before believed myself to understand. For example--From\nwhat cause does a man grow? At first, I had looked upon this as\nevident--that it was through eating and drinking: flesh being thereby\nadded to his flesh, bone to his bone, &c. So too, when a tall and\na short man were standing together, it appeared to me that the former\nwas taller than the latter by the head--that ten were more than eight\nbecause two were added to them[45]--that a rod of two cubits was\ngreater than a rod of one cubit, because it projected beyond it by a\nhalf. Now--I am satisfied that I do not know the cause of any of\nthese matters. I cannot explain why, when one is added to one, such\naddition makes them two; since in their separated state each was one.\nIn this case, it is approximation or conjunction which is said to\nmake the two: in another case, the opposite cause,\n_disjunction_, is said also to make two--when one body is\nbisected.[46] How two opposite causes can produce the same\neffect--and how either conjunction or disjunction can produce two,\nwhere there were not two before--I do not understand. In fact, I\ncould not explain to myself, by this method of research, the\ngeneration, or destruction, or existence, of any thing; and I looked\nout for some other method.\n\n[Footnote 43: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, pp. 95 E--96. [Greek: Ou) phau=lon\npra=gma z\u00eatei=s; o(/l\u00f4s ga\\r dei= peri\\ gene/se\u00f4s kai\\ phthora=s t\u00ea\\n\nai)ti/an diapragmateu/sasthai. e)g\u00f4\\ ou)=n soi\\ di/eimi, e)a\\n\nbou/l\u00ea|, ta/ g' e)ma\\ pa/th\u00ea], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Ph\u00e6don, p. 96 B. [Greek: e)k de\\ mn\u00ea/m\u00eas kai\\ do/x\u00eas,\nlabou/s\u00eas to\\ \u00ea)remei=n, kata\\ tau=ta gi/gnesthai e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean.]\n\nThis is the same distinction between [Greek: do/xa] and [Greek:\ne)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea], as that which Sokrates gives in the Menon, though not\nwith full confidence (Menon, pp. 97-98). See supr\u00e0, chap. xxii. p.\n241.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 96 E. [Greek: kai\\ e)/ti ge tou/t\u00f4n\ne)narge/stera, ta\\ de/ka moi e)do/kei t\u00f4=n o)kt\u00f4\\ plei/ona ei)=nai,\ndia\\ to\\ du/o au)toi=s prosei=nai, kai\\ to\\ di/p\u00eachu tou= p\u00eachuai/ou\nmei=zon ei)=nai dia\\ to\\ \u00ea(mi/sei au)tou= u(pere/chein.]]\n\n[Footnote 46: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 97 B.]\n\n[Side-note: Second doctrine. Hopes raised by the treatise of\nAnaxagoras.]\n\n\"It was at this time that I heard a man reading out of a book, which\nhe told me was the work of Anaxagoras, the affirmation that Nous\n(Reason, Intelligence) was the regulator and cause of all things. I\nfelt great satisfaction in this cause; and I was convinced, that if\nsuch were the fact, Reason would ordain every thing for the best: so\nthat if I wanted to find out the cause of any generation, or\ndestruction, or existence, I had only to enquire in what manner it\nwas best that such generation or destruction should take place. Thus\na man was only required to know, both respecting himself and\nrespecting other things, what was the best: which knowledge, however,\nimplied that he must also know what was worse--the knowledge of the\none and of the other going together.[47] I thought I had thus found a\nmaster quite to my taste, who would tell me, first whether the earth\nwas a disk or a sphere, and would proceed to explain the cause and\nthe necessity why it must be so, by showing me how such arrangement\nwas the best: next, if he said that the earth was in the centre,\nwould proceed to show that it was best that the earth should be in\nthe centre. Respecting the Sun, Moon, and Stars, I expected to hear\nthe like explanation of their movements, rotations, and other\nphenomena: that is, how it was better that each should do and suffer\nexactly what the facts show. I never imagined that Anaxagoras, while\naffirming that they were regulated by Reason, would put upon them any\nother cause than this--that it was best for them to be exactly as\nthey are. I presumed that, when giving account of the cause, both of\neach severally and all collectively, he would do it by setting forth\nwhat was best for each severally and for all in common. Such was\nmy hope, and I would not have sold it for a large price.[48] I took\nup eagerly the book of Anaxagoras, and read it as quickly as I could,\nthat I might at once come to the knowledge of the better and worse.\n\n[Footnote 47: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 97 C-D. [Greek: ei) ou)=n tis\nbou/loito t\u00ea\\n ai)ti/an eu(rei=n peri\\ e(ka/stou, o(/p\u00ea| gi/gnetai\n\u00ea)\\ a)po/llutai \u00ea)\\ e)/sti, tou=to dei=n peri\\ au)tou= eu(rei=n,\no(/p\u00ea| be/ltiston au)t\u00f4=| e)stin \u00ea)\\ ei)=nai \u00ea)\\ a)/llo o(tiou=n\npa/schein \u00ea)\\ poiei=n; e)k de\\ d\u00ea\\ tou= lo/gou tou/tou ou)de\\n a)/llo\nskopei=n pros\u00ea/kein a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4| kai\\ peri\\ au(tou= kai\\ peri\\ t\u00f4=n\na)/ll\u00f4n, a)ll' \u00ea)\\ to\\ a)/riston kai\\ to\\ be/ltiston; a)nagkai=on de\\\nei)=nai to\\n au)to\\n tou=ton kai\\ to\\ chei=ron ei)de/nai; t\u00ea\\n\nau)t\u00ea\\n ga\\r ei)=nai e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean peri\\ au)t\u00f4=n.]]\n\n[Footnote 48: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 98 B. [Greek: kai\\ ou)k a)\\n\na)pedo/m\u00ean pollou= ta\\s e)lpi/das, a)lla\\ pa/nu spoud\u00ea=| lab\u00f4\\n ta\\s\nbi/blous \u00f4(s ta/chista oi(=o/s t' \u00ea)=n a)negi/gn\u00f4skon, i(/n' \u00f4(s\nta/chista ei)dei/\u00ean to\\ be/ltiston kai\\ to\\ chei=ron.]]\n\n[Side-note: Disappointment because Anaxagoras did not follow\nout the optimistic principle into detail. Distinction between causes\nefficient and causes co-efficient.]\n\n\"Great indeed was my disappointment when, as I proceeded with the\nperusal, I discovered that the author never employed Reason at all,\nnor assigned any causes calculated to regulate things generally: that\nthe causes which he indicated were, air, \u00e6ther, water, and many other\nstrange agencies. The case seemed to me the same as if any one, while\nannouncing that Sokrates acts in all circumstances by reason, should\nnext attempt to assign the causes of each of my proceedings\nseverally:[49] As if he affirmed, for example, that the cause why I\nam now sitting here is, that my body is composed of bones and\nligaments--that my bones are hard, and are held apart by commissures,\nand my ligaments such as to contract and relax, clothing the bones\nalong with the flesh and the skin which keeps them together--that\nwhen the bones are lifted up at their points of junction, the\ncontraction and relaxation of the ligaments makes me able to bend my\nlimbs--and that this is the reason why I am now seated here in my\npresent crumpled attitude: or again--as if, concerning the fact of my\npresent conversation with you, he were to point to other causes of a\nlike character--varieties of speech, air, and hearing, with numerous\nother similar facts--omitting all the while to notice the true\ncauses, _viz._[50]--That inasmuch as the Athenians have deemed\nit best to condemn me, for that reason I too have deemed it best and\nmost righteous to remain sitting here and to undergo the sentence\nwhich they impose. For, by the Dog, these bones and ligaments would\nhave been long ago carried away to Thebes or Megara, by my\njudgment of what is best--if I had not deemed it more righteous and\nhonourable to stay and affront my imposed sentence, rather than to\nrun away. It is altogether absurd to call such agencies by the name\nof _causes_. Certainly, if a man affirms that unless I possessed\nsuch joints and ligaments and other members as now belong to me, I\nshould not be able to execute what I have determined on, he will\nstate no more than the truth. But to say that these are the causes\nwhy I, a rational agent, do what I am now doing, instead of saying\nthat I do it from my choice of what is best--this would be great\ncarelessness of speech: implying that a man cannot see the\ndistinction between that which is the cause in reality, and that\nwithout which the cause can never be a cause.[51] It is this last\nwhich most men, groping as it were in the dark, call by a wrong name,\nas if it were itself the cause. Thus one man affirms that the earth\nis kept stationary in its place by the rotation of the heaven around\nit: another contends that the air underneath supports the earth, like\na pedestal sustaining a broad kneading-trough: but none of them ever\nlook out for a force such as this--That all these things now occupy\nthat position which it is best that they should occupy. These\nenquirers set no great value upon this last-mentioned force,\nbelieving that they can find some other Atlas stronger, more\neverlasting, and more capable of holding all things together: they\nthink that the Good and the Becoming have no power of binding or\nholding together any thing.\n\n[Footnote 49: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 98 C. [Greek: kai\\ moi\\ e)/doxen\no(moio/taton peponthe/nai \u00f4(/sper a)\\n ei)/ tis le/g\u00f4n o(/ti\nS\u00f4kra/t\u00eas pa/nta o(/sa pra/ttei n\u00f4=| pra/ttei, ka)/peita\ne)picheir\u00ea/sas le/gein ta\\s ai)ti/as e(ka/st\u00f4n \u00f4(=n pra/tt\u00f4, le/goi\npr\u00f4=ton me\\n o(/ti dia\\ tau=ta nu=n e)ntha/de ka/th\u00eamai, o(/ti\nxugkeitai/ mou to\\ s\u00f4=ma e)x o)st\u00f4=n kai\\ neu/r\u00f4n, kai\\ ta\\ me\\n\no)sta= e)sti sterea\\ kai\\ diaphua\\s e)/chei ch\u00f4ri\\s a)p' a)ll\u00ea/l\u00f4n],\n&c.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 98 E. [Greek: a)mel\u00ea/sas ta\\s \u00f4(s\na)l\u00eath\u00f4=s ai)ti/as le/gein, o(/ti e)pei/d\u00ea A)th\u00eanai/ois e)/doxe\nbe/ltion ei)=nai e)mou= kataps\u00eaphi/sasthai, dia\\ tau=ta d\u00ea\\ kai\\\ne)moi\\ be/ltion au)= de/doktai e)ntha/de kath\u00ea=sthai], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 99 A. [Greek: a)ll' ai)/tia me\\n ta\\\ntoiau=ta kalei=n li/an a)/topon; ei) de/ tis le/goi, o(/ti a)/neu\ntou= ta\\ toiau=ta e)/chein kai\\ o(sta= kai\\ neu=ra kai\\ o(/sa a)/lla\ne)/ch\u00f4, ou)k a)\\n oi(=o/s t' \u00ea)=n poiei=n ta\\ do/xanta/ moi, a)l\u00eath\u00ea=\na)\\n le/goi; \u00f4(s me/ntoi dia\\ tau=ta poi\u00f4=, kai\\ tau/t\u00ea| n\u00f4=|\npra/tt\u00f4, a)ll' ou) t\u00ea=| tou= belti/stou ai(re/sei, poll\u00ea\\ a)\\n kai\\\nmakra\\ r(athumi/a ei)/\u00ea tou= lo/gou. to\\ ga\\r m\u00ea\\ diele/sthai oi(=o/n\nt' ei)=nai, o(/ti a)/llo me/n ti/ e)sti to\\ ai)/tion t\u00f4=| o)/nti,\na)/llo d' e)kei=no a)/neu ou)= to\\ ai)/tion ou)k a)/n pot' ei)/\u00ea\nai)/tion], &c.]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates could neither trace out the optimistic\nprinciple for himself, nor find any teacher thereof. He renounced it,\nand embraced a third doctrine about cause.]\n\n\"Now, it is this sort of cause which I would gladly put myself under\nany one's teaching to learn. But I could neither find any teacher,\nnor make any way by myself. Having failed in this quarter, I took the\nsecond best course, and struck into a new path in search of\ncauses.[52] Fatigued with studying objects through my eyes and\nperceptions of sense, I looked out for images or reflections of\nthem, and turned my attention to words or discourses.[53] This\ncomparison is indeed not altogether suitable: for I do not admit that\nhe who investigates things through general words, has recourse to\nimages, more than he who investigates sensible facts: but such, at\nall events, was the turn which my mind took. Laying down such general\nassumption or hypothesis as I considered to be the strongest, I\naccepted as truth whatever squared with it, respecting cause as well\nas all other matters. In this way I came upon the investigation of\nanother sort of cause.[54]\n\n[Footnote 52: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 99 C-D. [Greek: e)peid\u00ea\\ de\\ tau/t\u00eas\ne)ster\u00ea/th\u00ean, kai\\ ou)/t' au)to\\s eu(rei=n ou)/te par' a)/llou\nmathei=n oi(=o/s te e)geno/m\u00ean, to\\n deu/teron plou=n e)pi\\ t\u00ea\\n t\u00ea=s\nai)ti/as z\u00ea/t\u00easin \u00ea(=| pepragma/teumai, bou/lei soi\\ e)pi/deixin\npoi\u00ea/s\u00f4mai?]]\n\n[Footnote 53: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 99 E. [Greek: i)/s\u00f4s me\\n ou)=n \u00f4(=|\nei)ka/z\u00f4, tro/pon tina\\ ou)k e)/oiken; ou) ga\\r pa/nu xugch\u00f4r\u00f4= to\\n\ne)n toi=s lo/gois skopou/menon ta\\ o)/nta e)n ei)ko/si ma=llon\nskopei=n \u00ea)\\ to\\n e)n toi=s e)/rgois.]]\n\n[Footnote 54: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 100 B. [Greek: e)/rchomai ga\\r d\u00ea\\\ne)picheir\u00f4=n soi\\ e)pidei/xasthai t\u00ea=s ai)ti/as to\\ ei)=dos o(\\\npepragma/teumai], &c.]\n\n[Side-note: He now assumes the separate existence of ideas.\nThese ideas are the causes why particular objects manifest certain\nattributes.]\n\n\"I now assumed the separate and real existence of Ideas by\nthemselves--The Good in itself or the Self-Good, Self-Beautiful,\nGreat, and all such others. Look what follows next upon this\nassumption. If any thing else be beautiful, besides the\nSelf-Beautiful, that other thing can only be beautiful because it\npartakes of the Self-Beautiful: and the same with regard to other similar\nIdeas. This is the only cause that I can accept: I do not understand\nthose other ingenious causes which I hear mentioned.[55] When any one\ntells me that a thing is beautiful because it has a showy colour or\nfigure, I pay no attention to him, but adhere simply to my own\naffirmation, that nothing else causes it to be beautiful, except the\npresence or participation of the Self-Beautiful. In what way such\nparticipation may take place, I cannot positively determine. But I\nfeel confident in affirming that it does take place: that things\nwhich are beautiful, become so by partaking in the Self-Beautiful;\nthings which are great or little, by partaking in Greatness or\nLittleness. If I am told that one man is taller than another by the\nhead, and that this other is shorter than the first by the very same\n(by the head), I should not admit the proposition, but should repeat\nemphatically my own creed,--That whatever is greater than another is\ngreater by nothing else except by Greatness and through\nGreatness--whatever is less than another is less only by Littleness\nand through Littleness. For I should fear to be entangled in a\ncontradiction, if I affirmed that the greater man was greater and the\nlesser man less by the head--First, in saying that the greater was\ngreater and that the lesser was less, by the very same--Next, in\nsaying that the greater man was greater by the head, which is itself\nsmall: it being absurd to maintain that a man is great by something\nsmall.[56] Again, I should not say that ten is more than eight by\ntwo, and that this was the cause of its excess;[57] my doctrine is,\nthat ten is more than eight by Multitude and through Multitude: so\nthe rod of two cubits is greater than that of one, not by half, but\nby Greatness. Again, when One is placed alongside of One,--or when\none is bisected--I should take care not to affirm, that in the first\ncase the juxtaposition, in the last case the bisection, was the cause\nwhy it became two.[58] I proclaim loudly that I know no other cause\nfor its becoming two except participation in the essence of the Dyad.\nWhat is to become two, must partake of the Dyad: what is to become\none, of the Monad. I leave to wiser men than me these juxtapositions\nand bisections and other such refinements: I remain entrenched within\nthe safe ground of my own assumption or hypothesis (the reality of\nthese intelligible** and eternal Ideas).\n\n[Footnote 55: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 100 C. [Greek: ou) toi/nun e)/ti\nmantha/n\u00f4, ou)de\\ du/namai ta\\s a)/llas ai)ti/as ta\\s sopha\\s tau/tas\ngign\u00f4/skein.]]\n\n[Footnote 56: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 101 A. [Greek: phobou/menos m\u00ea/ ti/s\nsoi e)nanti/os lo/gos a)pant\u00ea/s\u00ea|, e)a\\n t\u00ea=| kephal\u00ea=| mei/zona/\ntina ph\u00ea=|s ei)=nai kai\\ e)la/tt\u00f4, pr\u00f4=ton me\\n t\u00f4=| au)t\u00f4=| to\\\nmei=zon mei=zon ei)=nai kai\\ to\\ e)/latton e)/latton, e)/peita t\u00ea=|\nkephal\u00ea=| smikra=| ou)/s\u00ea| to\\n mei/z\u00f4 mei/z\u00f4 ei)=nai, kai\\ tou=to\nd\u00ea\\ te/ras ei)=nai, to\\ smikr\u00f4=| tini\\ me/gan tina\\ ei)=nai.]]\n\n[Footnote 57: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 101 B. [Greek: Ou)/koun ta\\ de/ka\nt\u00f4=n o)kt\u00f4\\ duoi=n plei/\u00f4 ei)=nai, kai\\ dia\\ tau/t\u00ean t\u00ea\\n ai)ti/an\nu(perba/llein, phoboi=o a)\\n le/gein, a)lla\\ m\u00ea\\ pl\u00ea/thei kai\\ dia\\\nto\\ pl\u00ea=thos? kai\\ to\\ di/p\u00eachu tou= p\u00eachuai/ou \u00ea(mi/sei mei=zon\nei)=nai, a)ll' ou) mege/thei?]]\n\n[Footnote 58: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 101 B-C. [Greek: ti/ de/? e(ni\\\ne(no\\s prostethe/ntos, t\u00ea\\n pro/sthesin ai)ti/an ei)=nai tou= du/o\ngene/sthai, \u00ea)\\ diaschisthe/ntos t\u00ea\\n schi/sin, ou)k eu)laboi=o a)\\n\nle/gein, kai\\ me/ga a)\\n bo\u00f4/|\u00eas o(/ti ou)k oi)=stha a)/ll\u00f4s p\u00f4s\ne(/kaston gigno/menon \u00ea)\\ metascho\\n t\u00ea=s i)di/as ou)si/as e(kastou\nou)= a)\\n meta/sch\u00ea|; kai\\ e)n tou/tois ou)k e)/cheis a)/ll\u00ean tina\\\nai)ti/an tou= du/o gene/sthai a)ll' \u00ea)\\ t\u00ea\\n t\u00ea=s dua/dos\nmeta/schesin], &c.]\n\n[Side-note: Procedure of Sokrates if his hypothesis were\nimpugned. He insists upon keeping apart the discussion of the\nhypothesis and the discussion of its consequences.]\n\n\"Suppose however that any one impugned this hypothesis itself? I\nshould make no reply to him until I had followed out fully the\nconsequences of it: in order to ascertain whether they were\nconsistent with, or contradictory to, each other. I should, when the\nproper time came, defend the hypothesis by itself, assuming some\nother hypothesis yet more universal, such as appeared to me\nbest, until I came to some thing fully sufficient. But I would not\npermit myself to confound together the discussion of the hypothesis\nitself, and the discussion of its consequences.[59] This is a method\nwhich cannot lead to truth: though it is much practised by litigious\ndisputants, who care little about truth, and pride themselves upon\ntheir ingenuity when they throw all things into confusion.\"--\n\n[Footnote 59: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 101 E. [Greek: e)peid\u00ea\\ de\\ e)kei/n\u00eas\nau)t\u00ea=s (t\u00ea=s u(pothe/se\u00f4s) de/oi se dido/nai lo/gon, \u00f4(sau/t\u00f4s a)\\n\ndidoi/\u00eas, a)/ll\u00ean au)= u(po/thesin u(pothe/menos, \u00ea(/tis t\u00f4=n\na)/n\u00f4then belti/st\u00ea phai/noito . . . . a)/ma de\\ ou)k a)\\n phu/roio,\n\u00f4(/sper oi( a)ntilogikoi/, peri/ te t\u00ea=s a)rch\u00ea=s dialego/menos kai\\\nt\u00f4=n e)x e)kei/n\u00eas \u00f4(rm\u00eame/n\u00f4n, ei)/per bou/loio/ ti t\u00f4=n o)/nt\u00f4n\neu(rei=n.]]\n\n[Side-note: Exposition of Sokrates welcomed by the hearers.\nRemarks upon it.]\n\nThe exposition here given by Sokrates of successive intellectual\ntentatives (whether of Sokrates or Plato, or partly one, partly the\nother), and the reasoning embodied therein, is represented as\nwelcomed with emphatic assent and approbation by all his\nfellow-dialogists.[60] It deserves attention on many grounds. It\nillustrates instructively some of the speculative points of view, and\nspeculative transitions, suggesting themselves to an inquisitive\nintellect of that day.\n\n[Footnote 60: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 102 A. Such approbation is peculiarly\nsignified by the intervention of Echekrates.]\n\n[Side-note: The philosophical changes in Sokrates all turned\nupon different views as to a true cause.]\n\nIf we are to take that which precedes as a description of the\nphilosophical changes of Plato himself, it differs materially from\nAristotle: for no allusion is here made to the intercourse of Plato\nwith Kratylus and other advocates of the doctrines of Herakleitus:\nwhich intercourse is mentioned by Aristotle[61] as having greatly\ninfluenced the early speculations of Plato. Sokrates describes three\ndifferent phases of his (or Plato's) speculative point of view: all\nturning upon different conceptions of what constituted a true Cause.\nHis first belief on the subject was, that which he entertained before\nhe entered on physical and physiological investigations. It seemed\nnatural to him that eating and drinking should be the cause why a\nyoung man grew taller: new bone and new flesh was added out of the\nfood. So again, when a tall man appeared standing near to a short\nman, the former was tall by the head, or because of the head: ten\nwere more than eight, because two were added on: the measure of\ntwo cubits was greater than that of one cubit, because it stretched\nbeyond by one half. When one object was added on to another, the\naddition was the cause why they became two: when one object was\nbisected, this bisection was the cause why the one became two.\n\n[Footnote 61: Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 987, a. 32.]\n\nThis was his first conception of a true Cause, which for the time\nthoroughly satisfied him. But when he came to investigate physiology,\nhe could not follow out the same conception of Cause, so as to apply\nit to more novel and complicated problems; and he became dissatisfied\nwith it altogether, even in regard to questions on which he had\nbefore been convinced. New difficulties suggested themselves to him.\nHow can the two objects, which when separate were each one, be made\n_two_, by the fact that they are brought together? What\nalteration has happened in their nature? Then again, how can the very\nsame fact, the change from one to two, be produced by two causes\nperfectly contrary to each other--in the first case, by\njuxtaposition--in the last case, by bisection?[62]\n\n[Footnote 62: Sextus Empiricus embodies this argument of Plato among\nthe difficulties which he starts against the Dogmatists, adv.\nMathematicos, x. s. 302-308.]\n\n[Side-note: Problems and difficulties of which Sokrates first\nsought solution.]\n\nThat which is interesting here to note, is the sort of Cause which\nfirst gave satisfaction to the speculative mind of Sokrates. In the\ninstance of the growing youth, he notes two distinct facts, the\nearliest of which is (assuming certain other facts as accompanying\nconditions) the cause of the latest. But in most of the other\ninstances, the fact is one which does not admit of explanation.\nComparisons of eight men with ten men, of a yard with half a yard, of\na tall man with a short man, are mental appreciations, beliefs,\naffirmations, not capable of being farther explained or accounted\nfor: if any one disputes your affirmation, you prove it to him, by\nplacing him in a situation to make the comparison for himself, or to\ngo through the computation which establishes the truth of what you\naffirm. It is not the juxtaposition of eight men which makes them to\nbe eight (they were so just as much when separated by ever so wide an\ninterval): though it may dispose or enable the spectator to count\nthem as eight. We may count the yard measure (whether actually\nbisected or not), either as one yard, or as two half yards, or as\nthree feet, or thirty-six inches. Whether it be one, or two, or\nthree, depends upon the substantive which we choose to attach to the\nnumeral, or upon the comparison which we make (the unit which we\nselect) on the particular occasion.\n\n[Side-note: Expectations entertained by Sokrates from the\ntreatise of Anaxagoras. His disappointment. His distinction between\ncauses and co-efficients.]\n\nWith this description of Cause Sokrates grew dissatisfied when he\nextended his enquiries into physical and physiological problems. Is\nit the blood, or air, or fire, whereby we think? and such like\nquestions. Such enquiries--into the physical conditions of mental\nphenomena--did really admit of some answer, affirmative, or negative.\nBut Sokrates does not tell us how he proceeded in seeking for an\nanswer: he only says that he failed so completely, as even to be\ndisabused of his supposed antecedent knowledge. He was in this\nperplexity when he first heard of the doctrine of Anaxagoras.\n\"_Nous_ or Reason is the regulator and the cause of all things.\"\nSokrates interpreted this to mean (what it does not appear that\nAnaxagoras intended to assert)[63] that the Kosmos was an animal or\nperson[64] having mind or Reason analogous to his own: that this\nReason was an agent invested with full power and perpetually\noperative, so as to regulate in the best manner all the phenomena of\nthe Kosmos; and that the general cause to be assigned for every thing\nwas one and the same--\"It is best thus\"; requiring that in each\nparticular case you should show _how_ it was for the best.\nSokrates took the type of Reason from his own volition and movements;\nsupposing that all the agencies in the Kosmos were stimulated or\nchecked by cosmical Reason for her purposes, as he himself put in\nmotion his own bodily members. This conception of Cause, borrowed\nfrom the analogy of his own rational volition, appeared to Sokrates\nvery captivating, though it had not been his own first conception.\nBut he found that Anaxagoras, though proclaiming the doctrine as a\nprincipium or initiatory influence, did not make applications of it\nin detail; but assigned as causes, in most of the particular cases,\nthose agencies which Sokrates considered to be subordinate and\ninstrumental, as his own muscles were to his own volition.\nSokrates will not allow such agencies to be called Causes: he\nsays that they are only co-efficients indispensable to the efficacy\nof the single and exclusive Cause--Reason. But he tells us himself\nthat most enquirers considered them as Causes; and that Anaxagoras\nhimself produced them as such. Moreover we shall see Plato himself in\nthe Tim\u00e6us, while he repeats this same distinction between Causes\nEfficient and Causes Co-efficient--yet treats these latter as Causes\nalso, though inferior in regularity and precision to the Demiurgic\nNous.[65]\n\n[Footnote 63: I have given (in chap. i. p. 48 seq.) an abridgment and\nexplanation of what seems to have been the doctrine of Anaxagoras.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 30 D. [Greek: to/nde to\\n ko/smon,\nz\u00f4=on e)/mpsuchon e)/nnoun te], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 46 C-D.\n[Greek: ai)/tia--xunai/tia--xummetai/tia]. He says that most persons\nconsidered the [Greek: xunai/tia] as [Greek: ai)/tia]. And he himself\nregisters them as such (Tim\u00e6us, p. 68 E). He there distinguishes the\n[Greek: ai)/tia] and [Greek: xunai/tia] as two different sorts of\n[Greek: ai)/tia], the _divine_ and the _necessary_, in a remarkable\npassage: where he tells us that we ought to study the divine causes, with\na view to the happiness of life, as far as our nature permits--and the\nnecessary causes for the sake of the divine: for that we cannot in\nany way apprehend, or understand, or get sight of the divine causes\nalone, without the necessary causes along with them (69 A).\n\nIn Tim\u00e6us, pp. 47-48, we find again [Greek: nou=s] and [Greek:\na)na/gk\u00ea] noted as two distinct sorts of causes co-operating to\nproduce the four elements. It is farther remarkable that Necessity is\ndescribed as \"the wandering or irregular description of\nCause\"--[Greek: to\\ t\u00ea=s plan\u00f4me/n\u00eas ei)=dos ai)ti/as]. Eros and\n[Greek: A)na/gk\u00ea] are joined as co-operating--in Symposion,\npp. 195 C, 197 B.]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates imputes to Anaxagoras the mistake of\nsubstituting physical agencies in place of mental. This is the same\nwhich Aristophanes and others imputed to Sokrates.]\n\nIn truth, the complaint which Sokrates here raises against\nAnaxagoras--that he assigned celestial Rotation as the cause of\nphenomena, in place of a quasi-human Reason--is just the same as that\nwhich Aristophanes in the Clouds advances against Sokrates\nhimself.[66] The comic poet accuses Sokrates of displacing Zeus to\nmake room for Dinos or Rotation. According to the popular religious\nbelief, all or most of the agencies in Nature were personified, or\nsupposed to be carried on by persons--Gods, Goddesses, D\u00e6mons,\nNymphs, &c., which army of independent agents were conceived, by\nsome thinkers, as more or less systematised and consolidated\nunder the central authority of the Kosmos itself. The causes of\nnatural phenomena, especially of the grand and terrible phenomena,\nwere supposed agents, conceived after the model of man, and assumed\nto be endowed with volition, force, affections, antipathies, &c.:\nsome of them visible, such as Helios, Sel\u00ean\u00ea, the Stars; others\ngenerally invisible, though showing themselves whenever it specially\npleased them.[67] Sokrates, as we see by the Platonic Apology, was\nbelieved by his countrymen to deny these animated agencies, and to\nsubstitute instead of them inanimate forces, not put in motion by the\nquasi-human attributes of reason, feeling and volition. The Sokrates\nin the Platonic Ph\u00e6don, taken at this second stage of his speculative\nwanderings, not only disclaims such a doctrine, but protests against\nit. He recognises no cause except a Nous or Reason borrowed by\nanalogy from that of which he was conscious within himself, choosing\nwhat was best for himself in every special situation.[68] He tells\nus however that most of the contemporary philosophers dissented\nfrom this point of view. To them, such inanimate agencies were the\nsole and real causes, in one or other of which they found what they\nthought a satisfactory explanation.\n\n[Footnote 66: Aristophan. Nubes, 379-815. [Greek: Di=nos basileu/ei,\nto\\n Di/' e)xel\u00ealak\u00f4/s]. We find Proklus making this same complaint\nagainst Aristotle, \"that he deserted theological _principia_,\nand indulged too much in physical reasonings\"--[Greek: t\u00f4=n me\\n\ntheologik\u00f4=n a)rch\u00f4=n a)phista/menos, toi=s de\\ phusikoi=s lo/gois\npe/ra tou= de/ontos e)ndiatri/b\u00f4n] (Proklus ad Tim\u00e6um, ii. 90 E, p.\n212, Schneider). Pascal also expresses the like displeasure against\nthe Cartesian theory of the vortices. Descartes recognised God as\nhaving originally established rotatory motion among the atoms,\ntogether with an equal, unvarying quantity of motion: these two\npoints being granted, Descartes considered that all cosmical facts\nand phenomena might be deduced from them.\n\n\"Sur la philosophie de Descartes, Pascal \u00e9tait de son sentiment sur\nl'automate; et n'en \u00e9tait point sur la mati\u00e8re subtile, dont il se\nmoquait fort. Mais il ne pouvait souffrir sa mani\u00e8re d'expliquer la\nformation de toutes choses; et il disait tr\u00e8s souvent,--Je ne puis\npardonner \u00e0 Descartes: il voudrait bien, dans toute sa philosophie,\npouvoir se passer de Dieu: mais il n'a pu s'emp\u00eacher de lui accorder\nune chiquenaude pour mettre le monde en mouvement: apr\u00e8s cela, il n'a\nque faire de Dieu.\" (Pascal, Pens\u00e9es, ch. xi. p. 237, edition de\nLouandre, citation from Mademoiselle P\u00e9rier, Paris, 1854.)\n\nAgain, Lord Monboddo, in his Ancient Metaphysics (bk. ii. ch. 19, p.\n276), cites these remarks of Plato and Aristotle on the deficiencies\nof Anaxagoras, and expresses the like censure himself against the\ncosmical theories of Newton:--\"Sir Isaac puts me in mind of an\nancient philosopher Anaxagoras, who maintained, as Sir Isaac does,\nthat mind was the cause of all things; but when he came to explain\nthe particular ph\u00e6nomena of nature, instead of having recourse to\nmind, employed airs and \u00e6thers, subtle spirits and fluids, and I know\nnot what--in short, any thing rather than mind: a cause which he\nadmitted to exist in the universe; but rather than employ it, had\nrecourse to imaginary causes, of the existence of which he could give\nno proof. The Tragic poets of old, when they could not otherwise\nuntie the knot of their fable, brought down a god in a machine, who\nsolved all difficulties: but such philosophers as Anaxagoras will\nnot, even when they cannot do better, employ _mind_ or divinity.\nOur philosophers, since Sir Isaac's time, have gone on in the same\ntrack, and still, I think, farther.\"\n\nLord Monboddo speaks with still greater asperity about the Cartesian\ntheory, making a remark on it similar to what has been above cited\nfrom Pascal. (See his Dissertation on the Newtonian Philosophy,\nAppendix to Ancient Metaphysics, pp. 498-499.)]\n\n[Footnote 67: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 41 A. [Greek: pa/ntes o(/soi te\nperipolou=si phaner\u00f4=s kai\\ o(/soi phai/nontai kath' o(/son a)\\n\ne)the/l\u00f4si theoi\\], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 68: What Sokrates understands by the theory of Anaxagoras,\nis evident from his language--Ph\u00e6don, pp. 98-99. He understands an\nindwelling cosmical Reason or Intelligence, deliberating and\nchoosing, in each particular conjuncture, what was best for the\nKosmos; just as his own (Sokrates) Reason deliberated and chose what\nwas best for him ([Greek: t\u00ea=| tou= belti/stou ai(re/sei]), in\nconsequence of the previous determination of the Athenians to condemn\nand punish him.\n\nThis point deserves attention, because it is altogether different\nfrom Aristotle's conception of Nous or Reason in the Kosmos: in which\nhe recognises no consciousness, no deliberation, no choice, no\nreference to any special situation: but a constant, instinctive,\nundeliberating, movement towards Good as a determining\nEnd--_i.e._ towards the reproduction and perpetuation of regular\nForms.\n\nHegel, in his Geschichte der Philosophie (Part i. pp. 355, 368-369,\n2nd edit.), has given very instructive remarks, in the spirit of the\nAristotelian Realism, both upon the principle announced by\nAnaxagoras, and upon the manner in which Anaxagoras is criticised by\nSokrates in the Platonic Ph\u00e6don. Hegel observes:--\n\n\"Along with this principle (that of Anaxagoras) there comes in the\nrecognition of an Intelligence, or of a self-determining agency which\nwas wanting before. Herein we are not to imagine thought,\nsubjectively considered: when thought is spoken of, we are apt to\nrevert to thought as it passes in our consciousness: but here, on the\ncontrary, what is meant is, the Idea, considered altogether\nobjectively, or Intelligence as an effective agent: (N.B.\n_Intellectum_, or _Cogitatum_--not _Intellectio_, or\n_Cogitatio_, which would mean the conscious process--see this\ndistinction illustrated by Trendelenburg ad Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, i. 2,\n5, p. 219: also Marbach, Gesch. der Phil. s. 54, 99 not. 2): as we\nsay, that there is reason in the world, or as we speak of Genera in\nnature, which are the Universal. The Genus Animal is the Essential of\nthe Dog--it is the Dog himself: the laws of nature are her immanent\nEssence. Nature is not formed from without, as men construct a table:\nthe table is indeed constructed intelligently, but by an Intelligence\nextraneous to this wooden material. It is this extraneous form which\nwe are apt to think of as representing Intelligence, when we hear it\ntalked of: but what is really meant is, the Universal--the immanent\nnature of the object itself. The [Greek: Nou=s] is not a thinking\nBeing without, which has arranged the world: by such an\ninterpretation the Idea of Anaxagoras would be quite perverted and\ndeprived of all philosophical value. For to suppose an individual,\nparticular, Something without, is to descend into the region of\nphantasms and its dualism: what is called, a thinking Being, is not\nan Idea, but a Subject. Nevertheless, what is really and truly\nUniversal is not for that reason Abstract: its characteristic\nproperty, qu\u00e2 Universal, is to determine in itself, by itself, and\nfor itself, the particular accompaniments. While it carries on this\nprocess of change, it maintains itself at the same time as the\nUniversal, always the same; this is a portion of its self-determining\nefficiency.\"--What Hegel here adverts to seems identical with that\nwhich Dr. Henry More calls an Emanative Cause (Immortality of the\nSoul, ch. vi. p. 18), \"the notion of a thing possible. An Emanative\nEffect is co-existent with the very substance of that which is said\nto be the Cause thereof. That which _emanes_, if I may so speak,\nis the same in reality with its Emanative Cause.\"\n\nRespecting the criticism of Sokrates upon Anaxagoras, Hegel has\nfurther acute remarks which are too long to cite (p. 368 seq.)]\n\n[Side-note: The supposed theory of Anaxagoras cannot be\ncarried out, either by Sokrates himself or any one else. Sokrates\nturns to general words, and adopts the theory of ideas.]\n\nIt is however singular, that Sokrates, after he has extolled\nAnaxagoras for enunciating a grand general cause, and has blamed him\nonly for not making application of it in detail, proceeds to state\nthat neither he himself, nor any one else within his knowledge, could\nfind the way of applying it, any more than Anaxagoras had done. If\nAnaxagoras had failed, no one else could do better. The facts before\nSokrates could not be reconciled, by any way that he could devise,\nwith his assumed principle of rational directing force, or constant\noptimistic purpose, inherent in the Kosmos. Accordingly he abandoned\nthis track, and entered upon another: seeking a different sort of\ncause ([Greek: t\u00ea=s ai)ti/as to\\ ei)=dos]), not by contemplation\nof things, but by propositions and ratiocinative discourse. He now\nassumed as a principle an universal axiom or proposition, from which\nhe proceeds to deduce consequences. The principle thus laid down is,\nThat there exist substantial Ideas--universal Entia. Each of these\nIdeas communicates or imparts its own nature to the particulars which\nbear the same name: and such communion or participation is the cause\nwhy they are what they are. The cause why various objects are\nbeautiful or great, is, because they partake of the Self-Beautiful or\nthe Self-Great: the cause why they are two or three is, because they\npartake of the Dyad or the Triad.\n\n[Side-note: Vague and dissentient meanings attached to the\nword Cause. That is a cause, to each man, which gives satisfaction to\nhis inquisitive feelings.]\n\nHere then we have a third stage or variety of belief, in the\nspeculative mind of Sokrates, respecting Causes. The self-existent\nIdeas (\"propria Platonis supellex,\" to use the words of Seneca[69])\nare postulated as Causes: and in this belief Sokrates at last finds\nsatisfaction. But these Causative Ideas, or Ideal Causes, though\nsatisfactory to Plato, were accepted by scarcely any one else. They\nwere transformed--seemingly even by Plato himself before his death,\ninto Ideal Numbers, products of the One implicated with Great and\nLittle or the undefined Dyad--and still farther transformed by\nhis successors Speusippus and Xenokrates: they were impugned in\nevery way, and emphatically rejected, by Aristotle.\n\n[Footnote 69: Seneca, Epistol.\n\nAbout this disposition, manifested by many philosophers, and in a\nparticular manner by Plato, to \"embrace logical phantoms as real\ncauses,\" I transcribe a good passage from Malebranche.\n\n\"Je me sens encore extr\u00eamement port\u00e9 \u00e0 dire que cette colonne est\ndure _par sa nature_; ou bien que les petits liens dont sont\ncompos\u00e9s les corps durs, sont des at\u00f4mes, dont les parties ne se\npeuvent diviser, comme \u00e9tant les parties _essentieles_ et\nderni\u00e8res des corps--et qui sont _essentiellement_ crochues ou\nbranchues.\n\nMais je reconnois franchement, que ce n'est point expliquer la\ndifficult\u00e9; et que, quittant les pr\u00e9occupations et les illusions de\nmes sens, j'aurais tort de recourir \u00e0 une forme abstraite, et\nd'_embrasser un fant\u00f4me de logique_ pour la cause que je\ncherche. Je veux dire, que j'aurois tort de con\u00e7evoir, comme quelque\nchose de r\u00e9el et de distinct, l'id\u00e9e vague de _nature_ et\nd'_essence_, qui n'exprime que ce que l'on sait: et de prendre\nainsi une forme abstraite et universelle, comme une cause physique\nd'un effet tr\u00e8s r\u00e9el. Car il y a deux choses dont je ne saurais trop\nd\u00e9fier. La premi\u00e8re est, l'impression de mes sens: et l'autre est, la\nfacilit\u00e9 que j'ai de prendre les natures abstraites et les id\u00e9es\ng\u00e9n\u00e9rales de logique, pour celles qui sont r\u00e9elles et particuli\u00e8res:\net je me souviens d'avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 plusieurs fois s\u00e9duit par ces deux\nprincipes d'erreur.\" (Malebranche--Recherche de la V\u00e9rit\u00e9, vol. iii.,\nliv. vi., ch. 8, p. 245, ed. 1772.)]\n\nThe foregoing picture given by Sokrates of the wanderings of his mind\n([Greek: ta\\s e)ma\\s pla/nas]) in search of Causes, is interesting,\nnot only in reference to the Platonic age, but also to the process of\nspeculation generally. Almost every one talks of a Cause as a word of\nthe clearest meaning, familiar and understood by all hearers. There\nare many who represent the Idea of Cause as simple, intuitive,\nself-originated, universal; one and the same in all minds. These\nphilosophers consider the maxim that every phenomenon must have a\nCause--as self-evident, known _\u00e0 priori_ apart from experience:\nas something which no one can help believing as soon as it is stated\nto him.[70] The gropings of Sokrates are among the numerous facts\nwhich go to refute such a theory: or at least to show in what sense\nalone it can be partially admitted. There is no fixed, positive,\nuniversal Idea, corresponding to the word Cause. There is a wide\ndivergence, as to the question what a Cause really is, between\ndifferent ages of the same man (exemplified in the case of Sokrates):\nmuch more between different philosophers at one time and another.\nPlato complains of Anaxagoras and other philosophers for assigning as\nCauses that which did not truly deserve the name: Aristotle also\nblames the defective conceptions of his predecessors (Plato included)\non the same subject. If there be an intuitive idea corresponding to\nthe word Cause, it must be a different intuition in Plato and\nAristotle--in Plato himself at one age and at another age: in other\nphilosophers, different from both and from each other. The word is\nequivocal--[Greek: pollach\u00f4=s lego/menon], in Aristotelian\nphrase--men use it familiarly, but vary much in the thing signified.\n_That_ is a Cause, to each man, which gives satisfaction to the\ninquisitive feelings--curiosity, anxious perplexity, speculative\nembarrassment of his own mind. Now doubtless these inquisitive\nfeelings are natural and widespread: they are emotions of our nature,\nwhich men seek (in some cases) to appease by some satisfactory\nhypothesis. That answer which affords satisfaction, looked at in one\nof its aspects, is called Cause; Beginning or\nPrinciple--Element--represent other aspects of the same Qu\u00e6situm:--\n\n\"Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,\nAtque metus omnes et inexorabile Fatum\nSubjecit pedibus strepitumque Acherontis avari,\"\nis the exclamation of that sentiment of wonder and uneasiness out of\nwhich, according to Plato and Aristotle, philosophy springs.[71] But\nthough the appetite or craving is common, in greater or less degree,\nto most persons--the nourishment calculated to allay it is by no\nmeans the same to all. Good (says Aristotle) is that which all men\ndesire:[72] but all men do not agree in their judgment, what Good is.\nThe point of communion between mankind is here emotional rather than\nintellectual: in the painful feeling of difficulty to be solved, not\nin the manner of conceiving what the difficulty is, nor in the\ndirection where solution is to be sought, nor in the solution itself\nwhen suggested.[73]\n\n[Footnote 70: Dugald Stewart, Elem. Philos. Hum. Mind, vol. i. ch. 1,\nsect. 2, pp. 98-99, ed. Hamilton, also note c same volume.\n\n\"Several modern philosophers (especially Dr. Reid, On the Intell.\nPowers) have been at pains to illustrate that law of our nature which\nleads us to refer every change we perceive in the universe to the\noperation of an efficient cause. This reference is not the result of\nreasoning, but necessarily accompanies the perception, so as to\nrender it impossible for us to see the change, without feeling a\nconviction of the operation of some cause by which it is produced;\nmuch in the same manner in which we find it impossible to conceive a\nsensation, without being impressed with a belief of the existence of\na sentient being. Hence I conceive it is that when we see two events\nconstantly conjoined, we are led to associate the idea of causation\nor efficiency with the former, and to refer to it that power or\nenergy by which the change is produced; in consequence of which\nassociation we come to consider philosophy as the knowledge of\nefficient causes, and lose sight of the operation of mind in\nproducing the phenomena of nature. It is by an association somewhat\nsimilar that we connect our sensations of colour with the primary\nqualities of body. A moment's reflection must satisfy any one that\nthe sensation of colour can only reside in a mind. . . . In the same\nway we are led to associate with inanimate matter the ideas of power,\nforce, energy, causation, which are all attributes of mind, and can\nexist in a mind only.\"]\n\n[Footnote 71: Virgil, Georg. ii. 490-92. Compare Lucretius, vi.\n50-65, and the letter of Epikurus to Herodotus, p. 25, ed. Orelli.\nPlato, The\u00e6t\u00eat. p. 155 D. [Greek: ma/la ga\\r philoso/phou tou=to to\\\npa/thos, to\\ thauma/zein; ou) ga\\r a)rch\u00ea\\ a)/ll\u00ea philosophi/as, \u00ea)\\\nau(/t\u00ea]:--Aristotel. Metaphys. A. p. 982, b. 10-20. [Greek: dia\\ ga\\r\nto\\ thauma/zein oi( a)/nthr\u00f4poi kai\\ nu=n kai\\ to\\ pr\u00f4=ton \u00ea)rxanto\nphilosophei=n, o( de\\ a)por\u00f4=n kai\\ thauma/z\u00f4n oi)/etai a)gnoei=n.]]\n\n[Footnote 72: Aristotel. Ethic. Nikom. i. 1. [Greek: dio\\ kal\u00f4=s\na)peph\u00ea/|nanto ta)gatho/n, ou)= pa/ntes e)phi/entai.] Plato, Republ.\nvi. p. 505 E. [Greek: O(/ d\u00ea\\ di\u00f4/kei me\\n a(pa=sa psuch\u00ea\\ kai\\\ntou/tou e(/neka pa/nta pra/ttei, a)pomanteuome/n\u00ea ti ei)=nai,\na)porou=sa de\\ kai\\ ou)k e)/chousa labei=n i(kan\u00f4=s ti/ pot'\ne)sti/n], &c.\n\nSeneca, Epistol. 118. \"Bonum est, quod ad se impetum animi secundum\nnaturam movet.\"]\n\n[Footnote 73: Aristotle recognises the different nature of the\ndifficulties and problems which present themselves to the speculative\nmind: he looks back upon the embarrassments of his predecessors as\nantiquated and even silly, Metaphysic. N. 1089, a. 2. [Greek: Polla\\\nme\\n ou)=n ta\\ ai)/tia t\u00ea=s e)pi\\ tau/tas ta\\s ai)ti/as e)ktrop\u00ea=s,\nma/lista de\\ to\\ a)por\u00ea=sai a)rchai+k\u00f4=s], which Alexander of\nAphrodisias paraphrases by [Greek: a)rchai+k\u00f4=s kai\\ eu)\u00eath\u00f4=s].\nCompare A 993, a. 15.\n\nIn another passage of the same book, Aristotle notes and\ncharacterises the emotion experienced by the mind in possessing what\nis regarded as truth--the mental satisfaction obtained when a\ndifficulty is solved, 1090, a. 38. [Greek: Oi( de\\ ch\u00f4risto\\n\npoiou=ntes (to\\n a)rithmo/n), o(/ti e)pi\\ t\u00f4=n ai)sth\u00eat\u00f4=n ou)k\ne)/stai ta\\ a)xi\u00f4/mata, a)l\u00eath\u00ea= de\\ ta\\ lego/mena _kai\\ sai/nei\nt\u00ea\\n psuch\u00ea/n_, ei)=nai/ te u(polamba/nousi kai\\ ch\u00f4rista\\\nei)=nai; o(moi/\u00f4s de\\ ta\\ mege/th\u00ea ta\\ math\u00eamatika/.]\n\nThe subjective origin of philosophy--the feelings which prompt to the\ntheorising process, striking out different hypotheses and analogies--are\nwell stated by Adam Smith, 'History of Astronomy,' sect. ii. and iii.]\n\n[Side-note: Dissension and perplexity on the question.--What\nis a cause? revealed by the picture of Sokrates--no intuition to\nguide him.]\n\nWhen Sokrates here tells us that as a young man he felt anxious\ncuriosity to know what the cause of every phenomenon was, it is plain\nthat at this time he did not know what he was looking for: that he\nproceeded only by successive steps of trial, doubt, discovered error,\nrejection: and that each trial was adapted to the then existing state\nof his own mind. The views of Anaxagoras he affirms to have presented\nthemselves to him as a new revelation: he then came to believe that\nthe only true Cause was, a cosmical reason and volition like to that\nof which he was conscious in himself. Yet he farther tells us, that\nothers did not admit this Cause, but found other causes to satisfy\nthem: that even Anaxagoras did not follow out his own general\nconception, but recognised Causes quite unconnected with it: lastly,\nthat neither could he (Sokrates) trace out the conception for\nhimself.[74] He was driven to renounce it, and to turn to another\nsort of Cause--the hypothesis of self-existent Ideas, in which he\nthen acquiesced. And this last hypothesis, again, was ultimately much\nmodified in the mind of Plato himself, as we know from Aristotle. All\nthis shows that the Idea of Cause--far from being one and the same to\nall, like the feeling of uneasiness which prompts the search for it--is\ncomplicated, diverse, relative, and modifiable.\n\n[Footnote 74: The view of Cause, which Sokrates here declares himself\nto renounce from inability to pursue it, is substantially the same as\nwhat he lays down in the Phil\u00eabus, pp. 23 D, 27 A, 30 E.\n\nIn the Tim\u00e6us Plato assigns to Tim\u00e6us the task (to which Sokrates in\nthe Ph\u00e6don had confessed himself incompetent) of following into\ndetail the schemes and proceedings of the Demiurgic or optimising\n[Greek: Nou=s]. But he also assumes the [Greek: ei)/d\u00ea] or Ideas as\nco-ordinate and essential conditions.]\n\n[Side-note: Different notions of Plato and Aristotle about\ncausation, causes regular and irregular. Inductive theory of\ncausation, elaborated in modern times.]\n\nThe last among the various revolutions which Sokrates represents\nhimself to have undergone--the transition from designing and\nvolitional agency of the Kosmos conceived as an animated system, to\nthe sovereignty of universal Ideas--is analogous to that transition\nwhich Auguste Comte considers to be the natural progress of the\nhuman mind: to explain phenomena at first by reference to some\npersonal agency, and to pass from this mode of explanation to that by\nmetaphysical abstractions. It is true that these are two distinct\nmodes of conceiving Causation; and that in each of them the human\nmind, under different states of social and individual instruction,\nfinds satisfaction. But each of the two theories admits of much\ndiversity in the mode of conception. Plato seems to have first given\nprominence to these metaphysical causes; and Aristotle in this\nrespect follows his example: though he greatly censures the\nincomplete and erroneous theories of Plato. It is remarkable that\nboth these two philosophers recognised Causes irregular and\nunpredictable, as well as Causes regular and predictable. Neither of\nthem included even the idea of regularity, as an essential part of\nthe meaning of Cause.[75] Lastly, there has been elaborated in modern\ntimes, owing to the great extension of inductive science, another\ntheory of Causation, in which unconditional regularity is the\nessential constituent: recognising no true Causes except the\nphenomenal causes certified by experience, as interpreted inductively\nand deductively--the assemblage of phenomenal antecedents, uniform\nand unconditional, so far as they can be discovered and verified.\nCertain it is that these are the only causes obtainable by\ninduction and experience: though many persons are not satisfied\nwithout looking elsewhere for transcendental or ontological causes of\na totally different nature. All these theories imply--what Sokrates\nannounces in the passage just cited--the deep-seated influence of\nspeculative curiosity, or the thirst for finding the Why of things\nand events, as a feeling of the human mind: but all of them indicate\nthe discrepant answers with which, in different enquirers, this\nfeeling is satisfied, though under the same equivocal name\n_Cause_. And it would have been a proceeding worthy of Plato's\ndialectic, if he had applied to the word Cause the same\ncross-examining analysis which we have seen him applying to the\nequally familiar words--Virtue--Courage--Temperance--Friendship, &c.\n\"First, let us settle what a Cause really is: then, and not till\nthen, can we succeed in ulterior enquiries respecting it.\"[76]\n\n[Footnote 75: Monboddo, Ancient Metaphysics, B. 1. ch. iv. p. 32.\n\"Plato appears to have been the first of the Ionic School that\nintroduced _formal causes_ into natural philosophy. These he\ncalled _Ideas_, and made the principles of all things. And the\nreason why he insists so much upon this kind of cause, and so little\nupon the other three, is given us by Aristotle in the end of his\nfirst book of Metaphysics, _viz._, that he studied mathematics\ntoo much, and instead of using them as the handmaid of philosophy,\nmade them philosophy itself. . . . Plato, however, in the Ph\u00e6don says\na good deal about final causes; but in the system of natural\nphilosophy which is in the Tim\u00e6us, he says very little of it.\"\n\nI have already observed that Plato in the Tim\u00e6us (48 A) recognises\nerratic or irregular Causation--[Greek: \u00ea( plan\u00f4me/n\u00ea ai)ti/a].\nAristotle recognises [Greek: Ai)ti/a] among the equivocal words\n[Greek: pollach\u00f4=s lego/mena]; and he enumerates [Greek: Tu/ch\u00ea] and\n[Greek: Au)to/maton]--irregular causes or causes by accident--among\nthem (Physic. ii. 195-198; Metaphys. K. 1065, a.) Schwegler, ad\nAristot. Metaphys. vi. 4, 3, \"Das Zuf\u00e4llige ist ein nothwendiges\nElement alles Geschehens\". Alexander of Aphrodisias, the best of the\nAristotelian commentators, is at pains to defend this view of [Greek:\nTu/ch\u00ea]--Causation by accident, or irregular.\n\nProklus, in his Commentary on the Tim\u00e6us (ii. 80-81, p. 188,\nSchneider), notices the labour and prolixity with which the\ncommentators before him set out the different varieties of Cause;\ndistinguishing sixty-four according to Plato, and forty-eight\naccording to Aristotle. Proklus adverts also (ad Tim\u00e6um, iii. p. 176)\nto an animated controversy raised by Theophrastus against Plato,\nabout Causes and the speculations thereupon.\n\nAn enumeration, though very incomplete, of the different meanings\nassigned to the word Cause, may be seen in Professor Fleming's\nVocabulary of Philosophy.]\n\n[Footnote 76: See Sir William Hamilton, Discussions on Philosophy,\nAppendix, p. 585. The debates about what was meant in philosophy by\nthe word Cause are certainly older than Plato. We read that it was\ndiscussed among the philosophers who frequented the house of\nPerikles; and that that eminent statesman was ridiculed by his\ndissolute son Xanthippus for taking part in such useless refinements\n(Plutarch, Perikles, c. 36). But the Platonic dialogues are the\noldest compositions in which any attempts to analyse the meaning of\nthe word are preserved to us.\n\n[Greek: Ai)/tiai, A)rchai/, Stoichei=a] (Aristot. Metaph. [Greek:\nD].), were the main objects of search with the ancient speculative\nphilosophers. While all of them set to themselves the same problem,\neach of them hit upon a different solution. That which gave mental\nsatisfaction to one, appeared unsatisfactory and even inadmissible to\nthe rest. The first book of Aristotle's Metaphysica gives an\ninstructive view of this discrepancy. His own analysis of Cause will\ncome before us hereafter. Compare the long discussions on the subject\nin Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhon. Hypo. iii. 13-30; and adv. Mathemat.\nix. 195-250. The discrepancy was so great among the dogmatical\nphilosophers, that he pronounces the reality of the causal sequence\nto be indeterminable--[Greek: o(/son me\\n ou)=n e)pi\\ toi=s\nlegome/nois u(po\\ t\u00f4=n dogmatik\u00f4=n, ou)d' a)\\n e)nno\u00ea=sai/ tis to\\\nai)/tion du/naito, ei)/ ge pro\\s t\u00f4=| diaph\u00f4/nous kai\\ a)lloko/tous\n(a)podido/nai) e)nnoi/as tou= ai)ti/ou e)/ti kai\\ t\u00ea\\n u(po/stasin\nau)tou= pepoi\u00ea/kasin a)neu/reton dia\\ t\u00ea\\n peri\\ au)to\\ diaph\u00f4ni/an.]\nSeneca (Epist. 65) blends together the Platonic and the Aristotelian\nviews, when he ascribes to Plato a quintuple variety of Causa.\n\nThe quadruple variety of Causation established by Aristotle governed\nthe speculations of philosophers during the middle ages. But since\nthe decline of the Aristotelian philosophy, there are few subjects\nwhich have been more keenly debated among metaphysicians than the\nIdea of Cause. It is one of the principal points of divergence among\nthe different schools of philosophy now existing. A volume, and a\nvery instructive volume, might be filled with the enumeration and\ncontrast of the different theories on the subject. Upon the view\nwhich a man takes on this point will depend mainly the scope or\npurpose which he sets before him in philosophy. Many seek the\nsolution of their problem in transcendental, ontological,\nextra-phenomenal causes, lying apart from and above the world of fact\nand experience; Reid and Stewart, while acknowledging the existence of\nsuch causes as the true efficient causes, consider them as being out\nof the reach of human knowledge; others recognise no true cause\nexcept personal, quasi-human, voluntary, agency, grounded on the type\nof human volition. Others, again, with whom my own opinion coincides,\nfollowing out the analysis of Hume and Brown, understand by causes\nnothing more than phenomenal antecedents constant and unconditional,\nascertainable by experience and induction. See the copious and\nelaborate chapter on this subject in Mr. John Stuart Mill's 'System\nof Logic,' Book iii. ch. 5, especially as enlarged in the fourth,\nfifth, and sixth editions of that work, including the criticism on\nthe opposite or volitional theory of Causation; also the work of\nProfessor Bain, 'The Emotions and the Will,' pp. 472-584. The\nopposite view, in which Causes are treated as something essentially\ndistinct from Laws, and as ultra-phenomenal, is set forth by Dr.\nWhewell, 'Novum Organon Renovatum,' ch. vii. p. 118 seq.]\n\n[Side-note: Last transition of the mind of Sokrates from\nthings to words--to the adoption of the theory of ideas. Great\nmultitude of ideas assumed, each fitting a certain number of\nparticulars.]\n\nThere is yet another point which deserves attention in this history\ngiven by Sokrates of the transitions of his own mind. His last\ntransition is represented as one from things to words, that is, to\ngeneral propositions:[77] to the assumption in each case of an\nuniversal proposition or hypothesis calculated to fit that case. He\ndoes not seem to consider the optimistic doctrine, which he had\nbefore vainly endeavoured to follow out, as having been an\nhypothesis, or universal proposition assumed as true and as a\nprinciple from which to deduce consequences. Even if it were so,\nhowever, it was one and the same assumption intended to suit all\ncases: whereas the new doctrine to which he passed included many\ndistinct assumptions, each adapted to a certain number of cases and\nnot to the rest.[78] He assumed an untold multitude of self-existent\nIdeas--The Self-Beautiful, Self-Just, Self-Great, Self-Equal,\nSelf-Unequal, &c.--each of them adapted to a certain number of\nparticular cases: the Self-Beautiful was assumed as the cause why all\nparticular things were beautiful--as that, of which all and each of\nthem partakes--and so of the rest.[79] Plato then explains his\nprocedure. He first deduced various consequences from this\nassumed hypothesis, and examined whether all of them were consistent\nor inconsistent with each other. If he detected inconsistencies (as\n_e.g._ in the last half of the Parmenid\u00eas), we must suppose\n(though Plato does not expressly say so) that he would reject or\nmodify his fundamental assumption: if he found none, he would retain\nit. The point would have to be tried by dialectic debate with an\nopponent: the logical process of inference and counter-inference is\nhere assumed to be trustworthy. But during this debate Plato would\nrequire his opponent to admit the truth of the fundamental hypothesis\nprovisionally. If the opponent chose to impugn the latter, he must\nopen a distinct debate on that express subject. Plato insists that\nthe discussion of the consequences flowing from the hypothesis, shall\nbe kept quite apart from the discussion on the credibility of the\nhypothesis itself. From the language employed, he seems to have had\nin view certain disputants known to him, by whom the two were so\nblended together as to produce much confusion in the reasoning.\n\n[Footnote 77: Aristotle (Metaphysic. A. 987, b. 31, [Greek: Th].\n1050, b. 35) calls the Platonici [Greek: oi( e)n toi=s lo/gois]: see\nthe note of Bonitz.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 100 A. [Greek: a)ll' ou)=n d\u00ea\\\ntau/t\u00ea| ge \u00f4(/rm\u00easa, kai\\ u(pothe/menos e(ka/stote lo/gon o(\\n a)\\n\nkri/n\u00f4 e)r)r(\u00f4mene/staton ei)=nai, a(\\ me\\n a)\\n moi dok\u00ea=| tou/t\u00f4|\nxumph\u00f4nei=n, ti/th\u00eami \u00f4(s a)l\u00eath\u00ea= o)/nta, kai\\ peri\\ ai)ti/as kai\\\nperi\\ t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n a(pa/nt\u00f4n; a(\\ d' a)\\n m\u00ea/, \u00f4(s ou)k a)l\u00eath\u00ea=.]]\n\n[Footnote 79: Aristotle controverts this doctrine of Plato in a\npointed manner, De Gen. et Corrupt. ii. 9, p. 335, b. 10, also\nMetaphys. A. 991, b. 3. The former passage is the most animated in\npoint of expression, where Aristotle says--[Greek: \u00f4(/sper o( e)n\nt\u00f4=| Phai/d\u00f4ni S\u00f4kra/t\u00eas; kai\\ ga\\r e)kei=nos, e)pitim\u00ea/sas toi=s\na)/llois \u00f4(s ou)de\\n ei)r\u00eako/sin, u(poti/thetai]--which is very true\nabout the Platonic dialogue _Ph\u00e6don_, &c. But in both the\ntwo passages, Aristotle distinctly maintains that the Ideas cannot be\n_Causes_ of any thing.\n\nThis is another illustration of what I have observed above, that the\nmeaning of the word _Cause_ has been always fluctuating and\nundetermined.\n\nWe see that, while Aristotle affirmed that the Ideas could not be\nCauses of anything, Plato here maintains that they are the only true\nCauses.]\n\n[Side-note: Ultimate appeal to hypothesis of extreme\ngenerality.]\n\nBut if your opponent impugns the hypothesis itself, how are you to\ndefend it? Plato here tells us: by means of some other hypothesis or\nassumption, yet more universal than itself. You must ascend upwards\nin the scale of generality, until you find an assumption suitable and\nsufficient.[80]\n\n[Footnote 80: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 101 E.]\n\nWe here see where it was that Plato looked for full, indisputable,\nself-recommending and self-assuring, certainty and truth. Among the\nmost universal propositions. He states the matter here as if we were\nto provide defence for an hypothesis less universal by ascending to\nanother hypothesis more universal. This is illustrated by what he\nsays in the Tim\u00e6us--Propositions are cognate with the matter which\nthey affirm: those whose affirmation is purely intellectual,\ncomprising only matter of the intelligible world, or of genuine\nEssence, are solid and inexpugnable: those which take in more or less\nof the sensible world, which is a mere copy of the intelligible\nexemplar, become less and less trustworthy--mere probabilities. Here\nwe have the Platonic worship of the most universal propositions, as\nthe only primary and evident truths.[81] But in the sixth and\nseventh books of the Republic, he delivers a precept somewhat\ndifferent, requiring the philosopher not to rest in any hypothesis as\nan ultimatum, but to consider them all as stepping-stones for\nenabling him to ascend into a higher region, above all hypothesis--to\nthe first principle of every thing: and he considers geometrical\nreasoning as defective because it takes its departure from hypothesis\nor assumptions of which no account is rendered.[82] In the Republic\nhe thus contemplates an intuition by the mind of some primary, clear,\nself-evident truth, above all hypotheses or assumptions even the most\nuniversal, and transmitting its own certainty to every thing which\ncould be logically deduced from it: while in the Ph\u00e6don, he does not\nrecognise any thing higher or more certain than the most universal\nhypothesis--and he even presents the theory of self-existent Ideas as\nnothing more than an hypothesis, though a very satisfactory one. In\nthe Republic, Plato has come to imagine the Idea of Good as\ndistinguished from and illuminating all the other Ideas: in the\nTim\u00e6us, it seems personified in the Demiurgus; in the Ph\u00e6don, that\nIdea of Good appears to be represented by the Nous or Reason of\nAnaxagoras. But Sokrates is unable to follow it out, so that it\nbecomes included, without any pre-eminence, among the Ideas\ngenerally: all of them transcendental, co-ordinate, and primary\nsources of truth to the intelligent mind--yet each of them exercising\na causative influence in its own department, and bestowing its own\nspecial character on various particulars.\n\n[Footnote 81: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 29 B. [Greek: \u00f4(=de ou)=n peri/ te\nei)ko/nos kai\\ tou= paradei/gmatos dioriste/on, \u00f4(s a)/ra tou\\s\nlo/gous, \u00f4(=npe/r ei)sin e)x\u00eag\u00eatai/, tou/t\u00f4n au)t\u00f4=n kai\\ xuggenei=s\no)/ntas. tou= me\\n ou)=n moni/mou kai\\ bebai/ou kai\\ meta\\ nou=\nkataphanou=s, moni/mous kai\\ a)metapt\u00f4/tous . . . tou\\s de\\ tou= pro\\s\nme\\n e)kei=no a)peikasthe/ntos, o)/ntos de\\ ei)ko/nos, ei)ko/tas\na)na\\ lo/gon te e)kei/n\u00f4n o)/ntas; o(/, tiper pro\\s ge/nesin ou)si/a,\ntou=to pro\\s pi/stin a)l\u00eathei/a.]]\n\n[Footnote 82: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 511. [Greek: _t\u00f4=n\nu(pothe/se\u00f4n a)n\u00f4te/r\u00f4 e)kbai/nein_ . . . . to\\ e(/teron tm\u00ea=ma tou=\nno\u00eatou=, ou)= au)to\\s o( lo/gos a)/ptetai t\u00ea=| tou= diale/gesthai\nduna/mei, ta\\s u(pothe/seis poiou/menos ou)k a)rcha\\s a)lla\\ t\u00f4=|\no)/nti u(pothe/seis, oi(=on e)piba/seis te kai\\ o(rma/s, i(/na\n_me/chri tou= a)nupothe/tou e)pi\\ t\u00ea\\n tou= panto\\s a)rch\u00ea\\n\ni)\u00f4/n_, a(psa/menos au)t\u00ea=s, pa/lin au)= e)cho/menos t\u00f4=n\ne)kei/n\u00eas e)chome/n\u00f4n, ou(/t\u00f4s e)pi\\ teleut\u00ea\\n katabai/n\u00ea|,\nai)sth\u00eat\u00f4=| panta/pasin ou)deni\\ proschr\u00f4/menos, a)ll' ei)/desin\nau)toi=s di' au)t\u00f4=n ei)s au)ta/, kai\\ teleuta=| ei)s ei)/d\u00ea.]\nCompare vii. p. 533.]\n\n[Side-note: Plato's demonstration of the immortality of the\nsoul rests upon the assumption of the Platonic ideas. Reasoning to\nprove this.]\n\nIt is from the assumption of these Ideas as eternal Essences, that\nPlato undertakes to demonstrate the immortality of the soul. One Idea\nor Form will not admit, but peremptorily excludes, the approach of\nthat other Form which is opposite to it. Greatness will not\nreceive the form of littleness: nor will the greatness which is in\nany particular subject receive the form of littleness. If the form of\nlittleness be brought to bear, greatness will not stay to receive it,\nbut will either retire or be destroyed. The same is true likewise\nrespecting that which essentially has the form: thus fire has\nessentially the form of heat, and snow has essentially the form of\ncold. Accordingly fire, as it will not receive the form of cold, so\nneither will it receive snow: and snow, as it will not receive the\nform of heat, so neither will it receive fire. If fire comes, snow\nwill either retire or will be destroyed. The Triad has always the\nForm of Oddness, and will never receive that of Evenness: the Dyad\nhas always the Form of Evenness, and will never receive that of\nOddness--upon the approach of this latter it will either disappear or\nwill be destroyed: moreover the Dyad, while refusing to receive the\nForm of Oddness, will refuse also to receive that of the Triad, which\nalways embodies that Form--although three is not in direct\ncontrariety with two. If then we are asked, What is that, the\npresence of which makes a body hot? we need not confine ourselves to\nthe answer--It is the Form of Heat--which, though correct, gives no\nnew information: but we may farther say--It is Fire, which involves\nthe Form of Heat. If we are asked, What is that, the presence of\nwhich makes a number odd, we shall not say--It is Oddness: but we\nshall say--It is the Triad or the Pentad--both of which involve\nOddness.\n\n[Side-note: The soul always brings life, and is essentially\nliving. It cannot receive death: in other words, it is immortal.]\n\nIn like manner, the question being asked, What is that, which, being\nin the body, will give it life? we must answer--It is the soul. The\nsoul, when it lays hold of any body, always arrives bringing with it\nlife. Now death is the contrary of life. Accordingly the soul, which\nalways brings with it life, will never receive the contrary of life.\nIn other words, it is deathless or immortal.[83]\n\n[Footnote 83: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 105 C-E. [Greek: A)pokri/nou d\u00ea/,\n\u00f4(=| a)\\n ti/ e)gge/n\u00eatai s\u00f4/mati, z\u00f4=n e)/stai? \u00d4(=i a)\\n psuch\u00ea/,\ne)/ph\u00ea. Ou)kou=n a)ei\\ tou=to ou(/t\u00f4s e)/chei? P\u00f4=s ga\\r ou)chi/? \u00ea)=\nd' o(/s. \u00ca( psuch\u00ea\\ a)/ra o(/, ti a)\\n au)t\u00ea\\ kata/sch\u00ea|, a)ei\\\n\u00ea(/kei e)p' e)kei=no phe/rousa z\u00f4\u00ea/n? \u00ca(/kei me/ntoi, e)/ph\u00ea.\nPo/teron d' e)/sti ti z\u00f4\u00ea=| e)nanti/on, \u00ea)\\ ou)de/n? E)/stin, e)/ph\u00ea.\nTi/? Tha/natos. ou)kou=n \u00ea( psuch\u00ea\\ to\\ e)nanti/on \u00f4(=| au)t\u00ea\\\ne)piphe/rei a)ei\\ ou) m\u00ea/ pote de/x\u00eatai, \u00f4(s e)k t\u00f4=n pro/sthen\n\u00f4(molo/g\u00eatai? Kai\\ ma/la spho/dra, e)/ph\u00ea o( Ke/b\u00eas. . . . O(\\ d' a)\\n\ntha/naton m\u00ea\\ de/ch\u00eatai, ti/ kalou=men? A)tha/naton, e)/ph\u00ea.\nA)tha/naton a)/ra \u00ea( psuch\u00ea/? A)tha/naton.]\n\nNemesius, the Christian bishop of Emesa, declares that the proofs\ngiven by Plato of the immortality of the soul are knotty and\ndifficult to understand, such as even adepts in philosophical study\ncan hardly follow. His own belief in it he rests upon the inspiration\nof the Christian Scriptures (Nemesius de Nat. Homin. c. 2. p. 55, ed.\n1565).]\n\n[Side-note: The proof of immortality includes pre-existence\nas well as post-existence--animals as well as man--also the\nmetempsychosis or translation of the soul from one body to another.]\n\nSuch is the ground upon which Sokrates rests his belief in the\nimmortality of the soul. The doctrine reposes, in Plato's view, upon\nthe assumption of eternal, self-existent, unchangeable, Ideas or\nForms:[84] upon the congeniality of nature, and inherent correlation,\nbetween these Ideas and the Soul: upon the fact, that the soul knows\nthese Ideas, which knowledge must have been acquired in a prior state\nof existence: and upon the essential participation of the soul in the\nIdea of life, so that it cannot be conceived as without life, or as\ndead.[85] The immortality of the soul is conceived as necessary and\nentire, including not merely post-existence, but also pre-existence.\nIn fact the reference to an anterior time is more essential to\nPlato's theory than that to a posterior time; because it is employed\nto explain the cognitions of the mind, and the identity of learning\nwith reminiscence: while Simmias, who even at the close is not\nwithout reserve on the subject of the post-existence, proclaims\nan emphatic adhesion on that of the pre-existence.[86] The proof,\nmoreover, being founded in great part on the Idea of Life, embraces\nevery thing living, and is common to animals[87] (if not to plants)\nas well as to men: and the metempsychosis--or transition of souls not\nmerely from one human body to another, but also from the human to the\nanimal body, and _vice vers\u00e2_--is a portion of the Platonic\ncreed.\n\n[Footnote 84: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, pp. 76 D-E, 100 B-C. It is remarkable\nthat in the Republic also, Sokrates undertakes to demonstrate the\nimmortality of the soul: and that in doing so he does not make any\nreference or allusion to the arguments used in the Ph\u00e6don, but\nproduces another argument totally distinct and novel: an argument\nwhich Meiners remarks truly to be quite peculiar to Plato, Republic,\nx. pp. 609 E, 611 C; Meiners, Geschichte der Wissenschaften, vol. ii.\np. 780.]\n\n[Footnote 85: Zeller, Philosophie der Griech. Part ii. p. 267.\n\n\"Die Seele ist ihrem Begriffe nach dasjenige, zu dessen Wesen es\ngeh\u00f6rt zu leben--sie kann also in keinem Augenblicke als nicht lebend\ngedacht werden: In diesem ontologischen Beweis f\u00fcr die\nUnsterblichkeit, laufen nicht bloss alle die einzelnen Beweise des\nPh\u00e6don zusammen, sondern derselbe wird auch schon im Phaedrus\nvorgetragen,\" &c. Compare Ph\u00e6drus, p. 245.\n\nHegel, in his Geschichte der Philosophie (Part ii. pp. 186-187-189,\ned. 2), maintains that Plato did not conceive the soul as a separate\nthing or reality--that he did not mean to affirm, in the literal\nsense of the words, its separate existence either before or after the\npresent life--that he did not descend to so crude a conception (zu\ndieser Rohheit herabzusinken) as to represent to himself the soul as\na thing, or to enquire into its duration or continuance after the\nmanner of a thing--that Plato understood the soul to exist\nessentially as the Universal Notion or Idea, the comprehensive\naggregate of all other Ideas, in which sense he affirmed it to be\nimmortal--that the descriptions which Plato gives of its condition,\neither before life or after death, are to be treated only as poetical\nmetaphors. There is ingenuity in this view of Hegel, and many\nseparate expressions of Plato receive light from it: but it appears\nto me to refine away too much. Plato had in his own mind and belief\nboth the soul as a particular thing--and the soul as an universal.\nHis language implies sometimes the one sometimes the other.]\n\n[Footnote 86: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, pp. 92, 107 B.]\n\n[Footnote 87: See what Sokrates says about the swans, Ph\u00e6don, p. 85\nA-B.]\n\n[Side-note: After finishing his proof that the soul is\nimmortal, Sokrates enters into a description, what will become of it\nafter the death of the body. He describes a [Greek: Nekui/a].]\n\nHaving completed his demonstration of the immortality of the soul,\nSokrates proceeds to give a sketch of the condition and treatment\nwhich it experiences after death. The [Greek: Nekui/a] here following\nis analogous, in general doctrinal scope, to those others which we\nread in the Republic and in the Gorgias: but all of them are\ndifferent in particular incidents, illustrative circumstances, and\nscenery. The sentiment of belief in Plato's mind attaches itself to\ngeneral doctrines, which appear to him to possess an evidence\nindependent of particulars. When he applies these doctrines to\nparticulars, he makes little distinction between such as are true, or\nproblematical, or fictitious: he varies his mythes at pleasure,\nprovided that they serve the purpose of illustrating his general\nview. The mythe which we read in the Ph\u00e6don includes a description of\nthe Earth which to us appears altogether imaginative and poetical:\nyet it is hardly more so than several other current theories,\nproposed by various philosophers antecedent and contemporary,\nrespecting Earth and Sea. Aristotle criticises the views expressed in\nthe Ph\u00e6don, as he criticises those of Demokritus and Empedokles.[88]\nEach soul of a deceased person is conducted by his Genius to the\nproper place, and there receives sentence of condemnation to\nsuffering, greater or less according to his conduct in life, in\nthe deep chasm called Tartarus, and in the rivers of mud and fire,\nStyx, Kokytus, Pyriphlegethon.[89] To those who have passed their\nlives in learning, and who have detached themselves as much as they\npossibly could from all pleasures and all pursuits connected with the\nbody--in order to pursue wisdom and virtue--a full reward is given.\nThey are emancipated from the obligation of entering another body,\nand are allowed to live ever afterwards disembodied in the pure\nregions of Ideas.[90]\n\n[Footnote 88: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, pp. 107-111. Olympiodorus pronounces the\nmythe to be a good imitation of the truth, Republ. x. 620 seq.;\nGorgias, p. 520; Aristotle, Meteorol. ii. pp. 355-356. Compare also\n356, b. 10, 357, a. 25, where he states and canvasses the doctrines\nof Demokritus and Empedokles; also 352, a. 35, about the [Greek:\na)rchai=oi theo/logoi]. He is rather more severe upon these others\nthan upon Plato. He too considers, like Plato, that the amount of\nevidence which you ought to require for your belief depends upon the\nnature of the subject; and that there are various subjects on which\nyou ought to believe on slighter evidence: see Metaphysic. A. 995, a.\n2-16: Ethic. Nikom. i. 1, 1094, b. 12-14.]\n\n[Footnote 89: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, pp. 111-112. Compare Eusebius, Pr\u00e6p. Ev.\nxiii. 13, and Arnobius adv. Gentes, ii. 14. Arnobius blames Plato for\ninconsistency in saying that the soul is immortal in its own nature,\nand yet that it suffers pain after death--\"Rem inenodabilem suscipit\n(Plato) ut cum animas dicat immortales, perpetuas, et ex corporali\nsoliditate privatas, puniri eas dicat tamen et doloris afficiat\nsensu. Quis autem hominum non videt quod sit immortale, quod simplex,\nnullum posse dolorem admittere; quod autem sentiat dolorem,\nimmortalitatem habere non posse?\"]\n\n[Footnote 90: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 114 C-E.\n\n[Greek: tou=t\u00f4n de\\ au)t\u00f4=n oi( philosophi/a| i(kan\u00f4=s kath\u00eara/menoi\na)/neu te s\u00f4ma/t\u00f4n z\u00f4=si to\\ para/pan ei)s to\\n e)/peita chro/non],\n&c.]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates expects that his soul is going to the\nislands of the blest. Reply to Kriton about burying his body.]\n\nSuch, or something like it, Sokrates confidently expects will be the\nfate awaiting himself.[91] When asked by Kriton, among other\nquestions, how he desired to be buried, he replies with a smile--\"You\nmay bury me as you choose, if you can only catch me. But you will not\nunderstand me when I tell you, that I, Sokrates, who am now speaking,\nshall not remain with you after having drunk the poison, but shall\ndepart to some of the enjoyments of the blest. You must not talk\nabout burying or burning Sokrates, as if I were suffering some\nterrible operation. Such language is inauspicious and depressing to\nour minds. Keep up your courage, and talk only of burying the body of\nSokrates: conduct the burial as you think best and most decent.\"[92]\n\n[Footnote 91: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 115 A.]\n\n[Footnote 92: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 115 D. [Greek: \u00f4(s e)peida\\n pi/\u00f4 to\\\npha/rmakon ou)ke/ti u(mi=n paramen\u00f4=, a)ll' oi)ch\u00ea/somai a)pi\u00f4\\n ei)s\nmaka/r\u00f4n d\u00ea/ tinas eu)daimoni/as.]]\n\n[Side-note: Preparations for administering the hemlock.\nSympathy of the gaoler. Equanimity of Sokrates.]\n\nSokrates then retires with Kriton into an interior chamber to bathe,\ndesiring that the women may be spared the task of washing his body\nafter his decease. Having taken final leave of his wife and children,\nhe returns to his friends as sunset is approaching. We are here made\nto see the contrast between him and other prisoners under like\ncircumstances. The attendant of the Eleven Magistrates comes to warn\nhim that the hour has come for swallowing the poison; expressing\nsympathy and regret for the necessity of delivering so painful a\nmessage, together with admiration for the equanimity and rational\njudgment of Sokrates, which he contrasts forcibly with the discontent\nand wrath of other prisoners under similar circumstances. As he\nturned away with tears in his eyes, Sokrates exclaimed--\"How\ncourteous the man is to me and has been from the beginning! how\ngenerously he now weeps for me! Let us obey him, and let the poison\nbe brought forthwith, if it be prepared: if not, let him prepare it.\"\n\"Do not hurry\" (interposed Kriton): \"there is still time, for the sun\nis not quite set. I have known others who, even after receiving the\norder, deferred drinking the poison until they had had a good supper\nand other enjoyments.\" \"It is natural that they should do so\"\n(replied Sokrates). \"They think that they are gainers by it: for me,\nit is natural that I should not do so--for I shall gain nothing but\ncontempt in my own eyes, by thus clinging to life, and saving up when\nthere is nothing left.\"[93]\n\n[Footnote 93: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 117 A. [Greek: glicho/menos tou=\nz\u00ea=|n, kai\\ pheido/menos ou)deno\\s e)/ti e)no/ntos.]\n\nHesiod. Opp. et Dies, 367. [Greek: deil\u00ea\\ d' e)ni\\ puthme/ni\npheid\u00f4/.]]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates swallows the poison. Conversation with\nthe gaoler.]\n\nKriton accordingly gave orders, and the poison, after a certain\ninterval, was brought in. Sokrates, on asking for directions, was\ninformed, that after having swallowed it, he must walk about until\nhis legs felt heavy: he must then lie down and cover himself up: the\npoison would do its work. He took the cup without any symptom of\nalarm or change of countenance: then looking at the attendant with\nhis usual full and fixed gaze, he asked whether there was enough to\nallow of a libation. \"We prepare as much as is sufficient\" (was the\nanswer), \"but no more.\" \"I understand\" (said Sokrates): \"but at least\nI may pray, and I must pray, to the Gods, that my change of abode\nfrom here to there may be fortunate.\" He then put the cup to his\nlips, and drank it off with perfect ease and tranquillity.[94]\n\n[Footnote 94: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 117 C.]\n\n[Side-note: Ungovernable sorrow of the friends present.\nSelf-command of Sokrates. Last words to Kriton, and death.]\n\nHis friends, who had hitherto maintained their self-control, were\noverpowered by emotion on seeing the cup swallowed, and broke out\ninto violent tears and lamentation. No one was unmoved, except\nSokrates himself: who gently remonstrated with them, and\nexhorted them to tranquil resignation: reminding them that nothing\nbut good words was admissible at the hour of death. The friends,\nashamed of themselves, found means to repress their tears. Sokrates\nwalked about until he felt heavy in the legs, and then lay down in\nbed. After some interval, the attendant of the prison came to examine\nhis feet and legs, pinched his foot with force, and enquired whether\nhe felt it. Sokrates replied in the negative. Presently the man\npinched his legs with similar result, and showed to the friends in\nthat way that his body was gradually becoming chill and benumbed:\nadding that as soon as this should get to the heart, he would\ndie.[95] The chill had already reached his belly, when Sokrates\nuncovered his face, which had been hitherto concealed by the\nbed-clothes, and spoke his last words:[96] \"Kriton, we owe a cock to\n\u00c6sculapius: pay the debt without fail.\" \"It shall be done\" (answered\nKriton); \"have you any other injunctions?\" Sokrates made no reply,\nbut again covered himself up.[97] After a short interval, he made\nsome movement: the attendant presently uncovered him, and found him\ndead, with his eyes stiff and fixed. Kriton performed the last duty\nof closing both his eyes and his mouth.\n\n[Footnote 95: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 118. These details receive\ninteresting confirmation from the remarkable scene described by\nValerius Maximus, as witnessed by himself at Julis in the island of\nKeos, when he accompanied Sextus Pompeius into Asia (Val. M. ii. 6,\n8). A Keian lady of rank, ninety years of age, well in health,\ncomfortable, and in full possession of her intelligence, but deeming\nit prudent (according to the custom in Keos, Strabo, x. p. 486) to\nretire from life while she had as yet nothing to complain of--took\npoison, by her own deliberate act, in the presence of her relatives\nand of Sextus Pompeius, who vainly endeavoured to dissuade her.\n\"Cupido haustu mortiferam traxit potionem, ac sermone significans\nquasnam subind\u00e8 partes corporis sui rigor occup\u00e2ret, cum jam\nvisceribus eum et cordi imminere esset elocuta, filiarum manus ad\nsupremum opprimendorum oculorum officium advocavit. Nostros autem,\ntametsi novo spectaculo obstupefacti erant, suffusos tamen lacrimis\ndimisit.\"]\n\n[Footnote 96: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 118. [Greek: \u00ea)/d\u00ea ou)=n schedo/n ti\nau)tou= \u00ea)=n ta\\ peri\\ to\\ \u00ea)=tron psucho/mena, kai\\ e)kkalupsa/menos\n(e)nekeka/lupto ga\\r) ei)=pen, o(\\ d\u00ea\\ teleutai=on e)phthe/gxato, \u00d4)=\nKri/t\u00f4n, e)/ph\u00ea, t\u00f4=| A)skl\u00eapi\u00f4=| o)phei/lomen a)lektru/ona; a)ll'\na)po/dote kai\\ m\u00ea\\ a)mel\u00ea/s\u00eate.]\n\nCicero, after recovering from a bilious attack, writes to his wife\nTerentia (Epist. Famil. xiv. 7): \"Omnes molestias et solicitudines\ndeposui et ejeci. Quid caus\u00e6 autem fuerit, postridi\u00e9 intellexi quam \u00e0\nvobis discessi. [Greek: Chol\u00ea\\n a)/kraton] noctu ejeci: statim ita\nsum levatus, ut mihi Deus aliquis medicinam fecisse videatur. Cui\nquidem Deo, quemadmodum tu soles, pi\u00e9 et cast\u00e9 satisfacies: id est,\nApollini et \u00c6sculapio.\" Compare the rhetor Aristeides, Orat. xlv. pp.\n22-23-155, ed. Dindorf. About the habit of sacrificing a cock to\n\u00c6sculapius, see also a passage in the [Greek: I(er\u00f4=n Lo/goi] of the\nrhetor Aristeides (Orat. xxvii. p. 545, ed. Dindorf, at the top of\nthe page). I will add that the five [Greek: I(er\u00f4=n Lo/goi] of that\nRhetor (Oratt. xxiii.-xxvii.) are curious as testifying the multitude\nof dreams and revelations vouchsafed to him by \u00c6sculapius; also the\nimplicit faith with which he acted upon them in his maladies, and the\nsuccess which attended the curative prescriptions thus made known to\nhim. Aristeides declares himself to place more confidence in these\nrevelations than in the advice of physicians, and to have often acted\non them in preference to such advice (Orat. xlv. pp. 20-22, Dind.).\n\nThe direction here given by Sokrates to Kriton (though some critics,\neven the most recent, see Krische, Lehren der Griechischen Denker, p.\n227, interpret it in a mystical sense) is to be understood simply and\nliterally, in my judgment. On what occasion, or for what, he had made\nthe vow of the cock, we are not told. Sokrates was a very religious\nman, much influenced by prophecies, oracles, dreams, and special\nrevelations (Plato, Apol. Sokr. pp. 21-29-33; also Ph\u00e6don, p. 60).]\n\n[Footnote 97: Euripid. Hippol. 1455\n\n[Greek: Kekarte/r\u00eatai ta)/m'; o)/l\u00eala ga/r, pate/r.\nKru=pson de/ mou pro/s\u00f4pon \u00f4(s ta/chos pe/plois.]]\n\n[Side-note: Extreme pathos, and probable trustworthiness of\nthese personal details.]\n\nThe pathetic details of this scene--arranged with so much dramatic\nbeauty, and lending imperishable interest to the Ph\u00e6don of Plato--may\nbe regarded as real facts, described from the recollection of an\neye-witness, though many years after their occurrence. They present to\nus the personality of Sokrates in full harmony with that which we read\nin the Platonic Apology. The tranquil ascendancy of resolute and\nrational conviction, satisfied with the past, and welcoming instead\nof fearing the close of life--is exhibited as triumphing in the one\ncase over adverse accusers and judges, in the other case over the\nunnerving manifestations of afflicted friends.\n\n[Side-note: Contrast between the Platonic Apology and the\nPh\u00e6don.]\n\nBut though the personal incidents of this dialogue are truly\nSokratic--the dogmatic emphasis, and the apparatus of argument and\nhypothesis, are essentially Platonic. In these respects, the dialogue\ncontrasts remarkably with the Apology. When addressing the Dikasts,\nSokrates not only makes no profession of dogmatic certainty, but\nexpressly disclaims it. Nay more--he considers that the false\npersuasion of such dogmatic certainty, universally prevalent among\nhis countrymen, is as pernicious as it is illusory: and that his own\nsuperiority over others consists merely in consciousness of his own\nignorance, while they are unconscious of theirs.[98] To dissipate\nsuch false persuasion of knowledge, by perpetual cross-examination of\nevery one around, is the special mission imposed upon him by the\nGods: in which mission, indeed, he has the firmest belief--but it is\na belief, like that in his D\u00e6mon or divine sign, depending upon\noracles, dreams, and other revelations peculiar to himself, which he\ndoes not expect that the Dikasts will admit as genuine evidence.[99]\nOne peculiar example, whereby Sokrates exemplifies the false\npersuasion of knowledge where men have no real knowledge, is borrowed\nfrom the fear of death. No man knows (he says) what death is, not\neven whether it may not be a signal benefit: yet every man fears it\nas if he well knew that it was the greatest evil.[100] Death must be\none of two things: either a final extinction--a perpetual and\ndreamless sleep--or else a transference of the soul to some other\nplace. Sokrates is persuaded that it will be in either case a benefit\nto him, and that the Gods will take care that he, a good man, shall\nsuffer no evil, either living or dead: the proof of which is, to him,\nthat the divine sign has never interposed any obstruction in\nregard to his trial and sentence. If (says he) I am transferred to\nsome other abode, among those who have died before me, how delightful\nwill it be to see Homer and Hesiod, Orpheus and Mus\u00e6us, Agamemnon,\nAjax or Palam\u00eades--and to pass my time in cross-examining each as to\nhis true or false knowledge![101] Lastly, so far as he professes to\naim at any positive end, it is the diffusion of political, social,\nhuman virtue, as distinguished from acquisitions above the measure of\nhumanity. He tells men that it is not wealth which produces virtue,\nbut virtue which produces wealth and other advantages, both public\nand private.[102]\n\n[Footnote 98: Plato, Apol. Sokr. pp. 21-29. [Greek: kai\\ tou=to p\u00f4=s\nou)k a)mathi/a e)sti\\n au(/t\u00ea \u00ea( e)ponei/distos, \u00ea( tou= oi)/esthai\nei)de/nai a(\\ ou)k oi)=den?] (29 A-B).]\n\n[Footnote 99: Plato, Apol. Sokr. pp. 21-23, 31 D; 33 C: [Greek:\ne)moi\\ de\\ tou=to, \u00f4(s e)g\u00f4/ ph\u00eami, proste/taktai u(po\\ tou= theou=\npra/ttein kai\\ e)k mantei\u00f4=n kai\\ e)x e)nupni/\u00f4n kai\\ panti\\ tro/p\u00f4|,\n\u00f4(=|pe/r ti/s pote kai\\ a)/ll\u00ea thei/a moi=ra a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4| kai\\\no(tiou=n prose/taxe pra/ttein.] p. 37 E: [Greek: e)a/n te ga\\r le/g\u00f4\no(/ti t\u00f4=| the\u00f4=| a)peithei=n tou=t' e)sti\\ kai\\ dia\\ tou=t'\na)du/naton \u00ea(suchi/an a)/gein, ou) pei/sesthe/ moi \u00f4(s\nei)r\u00f4neuome/n\u00f4|.]]\n\n[Footnote 100: Plato, Apol. S. p. 29 B.\n\nIn the Xenophontic Apology of Sokrates, no allusion is made to the\nimmortality of the soul. Sokrates is there described as having shaped\nhis defence under a belief that he had arrived at a term when it was\nbetter for him to die than to live, and that prolonged life would\nonly expose him to the unavoidable weaknesses and disabilities of\nsenility. It is a proof of the benevolence of the Gods that he is\nwithdrawn from life at so opportune a moment. This is the explanation\nwhich Xenophon gives of the haughty tone of the defence (sects.\n6-15-23-27). In the Xenophontic Cyrop\u00e6dia, Cyrus, on his death-bed,\naddresses earnest exhortations to his two sons: and to give greater\nforce to such exhortations, reminds them that his own soul will still\nsurvive and will still exercise a certain authority after his death.\nHe expresses his own belief not only that the soul survives the body,\nbut also that it becomes more rational when disembodied; because--1.\nMurderers are disturbed by the souls of murdered men. 2. Honours are\npaid to deceased persons, which practice would not continue, unless\nthe souls of the deceased had efficacy to enforce it. 3. The souls of\nliving men are more rational during sleep than when awake, and sleep\naffords the nearest analogy to death (viii. 7, 17-21). (Much the same\narguments were urged in the dialogues of Aristotle. Bernays, Dialog.\nAristot. pp. 23-105.) He however adds, that even if he be mistaken in\nthis point, and if his soul perish with his body, still he conjures\nhis sons, in the name of the gods, to obey his dying injunctions (s.\n22). Again, he says (s. 27), \"Invite all the Persians to my tomb, to\njoin with me in satisfaction that I shall now be in safety, so as to\nsuffer no farther harm, whether I am united to the divine element, or\nperish altogether\" ([Greek: sun\u00easth\u00easome/nous e)moi/, o(/ti e)n t\u00f4=|\na)sphalei= \u00ea)/d\u00ea e)/somai, \u00f4(s m\u00eade\\n a)\\n e)/ti kako\\n pathei=n,\nm\u00ea/te \u00ea)\\n meta\\ tou= thei/ou ge/n\u00f4mai, m\u00ea/te \u00ea)\\n m\u00eade\\n e)/ti\n\u00f4)=|]). The view taken here by Cyrus, of death in its analogy with\nsleep ([Greek: u(/pn\u00f4| kai\\ thana/t\u00f4| diduma/osin], Iliad, xvi. 672)\nas a refuge against impending evil for the future, is much the same\nas that taken by Sokrates in his Apology. Sokrates is not less proud\nof his past life, spent in dialectic debate, than Cyrus of his\nglorious exploits. [Greek: O( tha/natos, lim\u00ea\\n kak\u00f4=n toi=s\ndusdaimonou=sin], Longinus, de Subl. c. 9, p. 23. Compare also the\nOration of Julius C\u00e6sar in Sallust, Bell. Catilin. c. 51--\"in luctu\natque miseriis, mortem \u00e6rumnarum requiem, non cruciatum esse: illam\ncuncta mortalium mala dissolvere: ultra neque cur\u00e6 neque gaudio locum\nesse\".]\n\n[Footnote 101: Plato, Apol. S. pp. 40-41.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Plato, Apol. S. pp. 20 C, 29-30. [Greek: le/g\u00f4n o(/ti\nou)k e)k chr\u00eama/t\u00f4n a)ret\u00ea\\ gi/gnetai, a)ll' e)x a)ret\u00ea=s chr\u00ea/mata,\nkai\\ ta)=lla a)gatha\\ toi=s a)nthr\u00f4/pois a(/panta, kai\\ i)di/a| kai\\\nd\u00eamosi/a|] (30 B). Compare Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 8-9.]\n\n[Side-note: Abundant dogmatic and poetical invention of the\nPh\u00e6don compared with the profession of ignorance which we read in the\nApology.]\n\nIf from the Apology we turn to the Ph\u00e6don, we seem to pass, not\nmerely to the same speaker after the interval of one month (the\nostensible interval indicated) but to a different speaker and over a\nlong period. We have Plato speaking through the mouth of Sokrates,\nand Plato too at a much later time.[103] Though the moral character\n([Greek: \u00ea)=thos]) of Sokrates is fully maintained and even\nstrikingly dramatised--the intellectual personality is altogether\ntransformed. Instead of a speaker who avows his own ignorance, and\nblames others only for believing themselves to know when they are\nequally ignorant--we have one who indulges in the widest range of\ntheory and the boldest employment of hypothesis. Plato introduces his\nown dogmatical and mystical views, leaning in part on the Orphic and\nPythagorean creeds.[104] He declares the distinctness of nature, the\nincompatibility, the forced temporary union and active conflict,\nbetween the soul and the body. He includes this in the still wider\nand more general declaration, which recognises antithesis between the\ntwo worlds: the world of Ideas, Forms, Essences, not perceivable but\nonly cogitable, eternal, and unchangeable, with which the soul or\nmind was in kindred and communion--the world of sense, or of\ntransient and ever-changing appearances or phenomena, never\narriving at permanent existence, but always coming and going, with\nwhich the body was in commerce and harmony. The philosopher, who\nthirsts only after knowledge and desires to look at things[105] as\nthey are in themselves, with his mind by itself--is represented as\ndesiring, throughout all his life, to loosen as much as possible the\nimplication of his soul with his body, and as rejoicing when the hour\nof death arrives to divorce them altogether.\n\n[Footnote 103: In reviewing the Apology (supra, vol. i. ch. ix. p.\n410) I have already noticed this very material discrepancy, which is\ninsisted upon by Ast as an argument for disallowing the genuineness\nof the Apology.]\n\n[Footnote 104: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, pp. 69 C, 70 C, 81 C, 62 B.]\n\n[Footnote 105: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 66 E. [Greek: a)pallakte/on au)tou=\n(tou= s\u00f4/matos) kai\\ au)t\u00ea=| t\u00ea=| psuch\u00ea=| theate/on au)ta\\ ta\\\npra/gmata.]]\n\n[Side-note: Total renunciation and discredit of the body in\nthe Ph\u00e6don. Different feeling about the body in other Platonic\ndialogues.]\n\nSuch total renunciation of the body is put, with dramatic propriety,\ninto the mouth of Sokrates during the last hour of his life. But it\nwould not have been in harmony with the character of Sokrates as\nother Platonic dialogues present him--in the plenitude of\nlife--manifesting distinguished bodily strength and soldierly efficiency,\nproclaiming gymnastic training for the body to be co-ordinate with\nmusical training for the mind, and impressed with the most intense\nadmiration for the personal beauty of youth. The human body, which in\nthe Ph\u00e6don is discredited as a morbid incumbrance corrupting the\npurity of the soul, is presented to us by Sokrates in the Ph\u00e6drus as\nthe only sensible object which serves as a mirror and reflection of\nthe beauty of the ideal world:[106] while the Platonic Tim\u00e6us\nproclaims (in language not unsuitable to Locke) that sight, hearing,\nand speech are the sources of our abstract Ideas, and the generating\ncauses of speculative intellect and philosophy.[107] Of these, and of\nthe world of sense generally, an opposite view was appropriate in the\nPh\u00e6don; where the purpose of Sokrates is to console his distressed\nfriends by showing that death was no misfortune, but relief from\na burthen. And Plato has availed himself of this impressive\nsituation,[108] to recommend, with every charm of poetical\nexpression, various characteristic dogmas respecting the essential\ndistinction between Ideas and the intelligible world on one\nside--Perceptions and the sensible world on the other: respecting the\nsoul, its nature akin to the intelligible world, its pre-existence\nanterior to its present body, and its continued existence after the\ndeath of the latter: respecting the condition of the soul before birth\nand after death, its transition, in the case of most men, into other\nbodies, either human or animal, with the condition of suffering\npenalties commensurate to the wrongs committed in this life: finally,\nrespecting the privilege accorded to the souls of such as have passed\ntheir lives in intellectual and philosophical occupation, that they\nshall after death remain for ever disembodied, in direct communion\nwith the world of Ideas.\n\n[Footnote 106: Plato, Charmid\u00eas, p. 155 D. Protagoras, init. Ph\u00e6drus,\np. 250 D. Symposion, pp. 177 C, 210 A.\n\n\u00c6schines, one of the Socratici viri or fellow disciples of Sokrates\nalong with Plato, composed dialogues (of the same general nature as\nthose of Plato) wherein Sokrates was introduced conversing or\narguing. \u00c6schines placed in the mouth of Sokrates the most intense\nexpressions of passionate admiration towards the person of\nAlkibiades. See the Fragments cited by the Rhetor Aristeides, Orat.\nxlv. pp. 20-23, ed. Dindorf. Aristeides mentions (p. 24) that various\npersons in his time mistook these expressions ascribed to Sokrates\nfor the real talk of Sokrates himself. Compare also the Symposion of\nXenophon, iv. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 107: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 47, A-D. Consult also the same\ndialogue, pp. 87-88, where Plato insists on the necessity of\nco-ordinate attention both to mind and to body, and on the mischiefs of\nhighly developed force in the mind unless it be accompanied by a\ncorresponding development of force in the body.]\n\n[Footnote 108: Compare the description of the last discourse of P\u00e6tus\nThrasea. Tacitus, Annal. xvi. 34.]\n\n[Side-note: Plato's argument does not prove the immortality of\nthe soul. Even if it did prove that, yet the mode of pre-existence\nand the mode of post-existence, of the soul, would be quite\nundetermined.]\n\nThe main part of Plato's argumentation, drawn from the general\nassumptions of his philosophy, is directed to prove the separate and\nperpetual existence of the soul, before as well as after the body.\nThese arguments, interesting as specimens of the reasoning which\nsatisfied Plato, do not prove his conclusion.[109] But even if\nthat conclusion were admitted to be proved, the condition of the\nsoul, during such anterior and posterior existence, would be\naltogether undetermined, and would be left to the free play of\nsentiment and imagination. There is no subject upon which the\npoetical genius of Plato has been more abundantly exercised.[110] He\nhas given us two different descriptions of the state of the soul\nbefore its junction with the body (Tim\u00e6us, and Ph\u00e6drus), and three\ndifferent descriptions of its destiny after separation from the body\n(Republic, Gorgias, Ph\u00e6don). In all the three, he supposes an\nadjudication and classification of the departed souls, and a better\nor worse fate allotted** to each according to the estimate which he\nforms of their merits or demerits during life: but in each of the\nthree, this general idea is carried out by a different machinery. The\nHades of Plato is not announced even by himself as anything more than\napproximation to the truth: but it embodies his own ethical and\njudicial sentence on the classes of men around him--as the Divina\nCommedia embodies that of Dante on antecedent individual persons.\nPlato distributes rewards and penalties in the measure which he\nconceives to be deserved: he erects his own approbation and\ndisapprobation, his own sympathy and antipathy, into laws of the\nunknown future state: the Gods, whom he postulates, are imaginary\nagents introduced to execute the sentences which he dictates. While\nothers, in their conceptions of posthumous existence, assured the\nhappiest fate, sometimes even divinity itself, to great warriors and\nlaw-givers--to devoted friends and patriots like Harmodius and\nAristogeiton--to the exquisite beauty of Helen--or to favourites of\nthe Gods like Ganym\u00eades or Pelops[111]--Plato claims that supreme\ndistinction for the departed philosopher.\n\n[Footnote 109: Wyttenbach has annexed to his edition of the Ph\u00e6don an\ninstructive review of the argumentation contained in it respecting\nthe Immortality of the soul. He observes justly--\"Videamus jam de\nPh\u00e6done, qui ab omni antiquitate is habitus est liber, in quo\nrationes immortalitatis animarum gravissim\u00e9 luculentissim\u00e9que\nexposita essent. Qu\u00e6 quidem libro laus et auctoritas conciliata est,\nnon tam firmitate argumentorum, quam eloquenti\u00e2 Platonis,\" &c.\n(Disputat. De Placit. Immort. Anim. p. 10). The same feeling,\nsubstantially, is expressed by one of the disputants in Cicero's\nTusculan Disputations, who states that he assented to the reasoning\nwhile he was reading the dialogue, but that as soon as he had laid\ndown the book, his assent all slipped away from him. I have already\nmentioned that Pan\u00e6tius, an extreme admirer of Plato on most points,\ndissented from him about the immortality of the soul (Cicero, Tusc.\nDisp. i. 11, 24--i. 32, 79), and declared the Ph\u00e6don to be spurious.\nGalen also mentions (De Format. Foet\u00fbs, vol. iv. pp. 700-702. K\u00fchn)\nthat he had written a special treatise (now lost) to prove that the\nreasonings in the Ph\u00e6don were self-contradictory, and that he could\nnot satisfy himself, either about the essence of the soul, or whether\nit was mortal or immortal. Compare his treatise [Greek: Peri\\\nOu)si/as t\u00f4=n phusik\u00f4=n duna/me\u00f4n]--iv. pp. 762-763--and [Greek:\nPeri\\ t\u00f4=n t\u00ea=s Psuch\u00ea=s \u00ea)th\u00f4=n], iv. 773. In this last passage, he\nrepresents the opinion of Plato to be--That the two inferior souls,\nthe courageous and the appetitive, are mortal, in which he (Galen)\nagrees, and that the rational soul alone is immortal, of which he\n(Galen) is not persuaded. Now this view of Plato's opinion is derived\nfrom the Republic and Tim\u00e6us, not from the Ph\u00e6don, in which last the\ntriple soul is not acknowledged. We may thus partly understand the\ninconsistencies, which Galen pointed out in his lost Treatise, in the\nargumentation of the Ph\u00e6don: wherein one of the proofs presented to\nestablish the immortality of the soul is--That the soul is\ninseparably and essentially identified with life, and cannot admit\ndeath (p. 105 D). This argument, if good at all, is just as good to\nprove the immortality of the two inferior souls, as of the superior\nand rational soul. Galen might therefore remark that it did not\nconsist with the conclusion which he drew from the Tim\u00e6us and the\nRepublic.]\n\n[Footnote 110: Wyttenbach, l. c. p. 19. \"Vidimus de philosoph\u00e2 hujus\nloci parte, qu\u00e2 demonstratur, Animos esse immortales. Altera pars,\nqu\u00e2 ostenditur, qualis sit ille post hanc vitam status, fabulos\u00e9 et\npoetic\u00e9 \u00e0 Platone tractata est.\" &c.]\n\n[Footnote 111: Skolion of Kallistratus, Antholog. Gr\u00e6c. p. 155.\nIsokrates, Encomium Helen\u00e6, Or. x. s. 70-72. Compare the [Greek:\nNe/kuia] of the Odyssey and that of the \u00c6neid, respecting the\nheroes--\n\n \"Qu\u00e6 gratia curr\u00fbm\nArmorumque fuit vivis, qu\u00e6 cura nitentes\nPascere equos, eadem sequitur tellure repostos.\" (\u00c6n. vi. 653-5.)]\n\n[Side-note: The philosopher will enjoy an existence of\npure soul unattached to any body.]\n\nThe Philosopher, as a recompense for having detached himself during\nlife as much as possible from the body and all its functions, will be\nadmitted after death to existence as a soul pure and simple,\nunattached to any body. The souls of all other persons, dying with\nmore or less of the taint of the body attached to each of them,[112]\nand for that reason haunting the tombs in which the bodies are\nburied, so as to become visible there as ghosts--are made subject, in\nthe Platonic Hades, to penalty and purification suitable to the\nrespective condition of each; after which they become attached to new\nbodies, sometimes of men, sometimes of other animals. Of this\ndistributive scheme it is not possible to frame any clear idea, nor\nis Plato consistent with himself except in a few material features.\nBut one feature there is in it which stands conspicuous--the belief\nin the metempsychosis, or transfer of the same soul from one animal\nbody to another: a belief very widely diffused throughout the ancient\nworld, associated with the immortality of the soul, pervading the\nOrphic and Pythagorean creeds, and having its root in the Egyptian\nand Oriental religions.[113]\n\n[Footnote 112: Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 81 C-D. [Greek: o(\\ d\u00ea\\ kai\\\ne)/chousa \u00ea( toiau/t\u00ea psuch\u00ea\\ baru/netai te kai\\ e(/lketai pa/lin\nei)s to\\n o(rato\\n to/pon, pho/b\u00f4| tou= a)eidou=s te kai\\ A(/idou,\n\u00f4(/sper le/getai, peri\\ ta\\ mn\u00ea/mata/ te kai\\ tou\\s ta/phous\nkalindoume/n\u00ea; peri\\ a(\\ d\u00ea\\ kai\\ \u00f4)/phth\u00ea a(/tta psuch\u00f4=n skioeid\u00ea=\nphanta/smata oi(=a pare/chontai ai( toiau=tai psuchai\\ ei)/d\u00f4la, ai(\nm\u00ea\\ kathar\u00f4=s a)poluthei=sai, a)lla\\ _tou= o(ratou= mete/chousai,\ndio\\ kai\\ o(r\u00f4=ntai_.]\n\nLactantius--in replying to the arguments of Demokritus, Epikurus, and\nDik\u00e6archus against the immortality of the soul--reminded them that\nany _Magus_ would produce visible evidence to refute them; by\ncalling up before them the soul of any deceased person to give\ninformation and predict the future--\"qui profecto non auderent de\nanimarum interitu mago praesente disserere, qui sciret certis\ncarminibus cieri ab infernis animas et adesse et pr\u00e6bere se videndas\net loqui et futura pr\u00e6dicere: et si auderent, re ips\u00e2 et documentis\npr\u00e6sentibus vincerentur\" (Lactant. Inst. vii. 13). See Cicero, Tusc.\nDisp. i. 31.]\n\n[Footnote 113: Compare the closing paragraph of the Platonic Tim\u00e6us:\nVirgil, \u00c6neid vi. 713, Herodot. ii. 123, Pausanias, iv. 32, 4, Sextus\nEmpiric. adv. Math. ix. 127, with the citation from Empedokles:--\n\n\"Tum pater Anchises: 'Anim\u00e6 quibus altera fato\nCorpora debentur, Leth\u00e6i ad fluminis undam\nSecuros latices et longa oblivia potant'.\"\n\nThe general doctrine, upon which the Metempsychosis rests, is set\nforth by Virgil in the fine lines which follow, 723-751; compare\nGeorgic iv. 218. The souls of men, beasts, birds, and fishes, are all\nof them detached fragments or portions from the universal soul, mind,\nor life, \u00e6therial or igneous, which pervades the whole Kosmos. The\nsoul of each individual thus detached to be conjoined with a distinct\nbody, becomes tainted by such communion; after death it is purified\nby penalties, measured according to the greater or less taint, and\nbecomes then fit to be attached to a new body, yet not until it has\ndrunk the water of L\u00eath\u00ea (Plato, Phil\u00eabus, p. 30 A; Tim\u00e6us, p. 30 B).\n\nThe statement of Nemesius is remarkable, that all Greeks who believed\nthe immortality of the soul, believed also in the\nmetempsychosis--[Greek: Koin\u00ea=| me\\n ou)=n pa/ntes E)/ll\u00eanes, oi( t\u00ea\\n\npsuch\u00ea\\n a)tha/naton a)poph\u00ea|na/menoi, t\u00ea\\n metens\u00f4ma/t\u00f4sin\ndogmati/zousin] (De Natur\u00e2 Hominis, cap. ii. p. 50, ed. 1565). Plato\naccepted the Egyptian and Pythagorean doctrine, continued in the Orphic\nmysteries (Arnob. adv. Gentes, ii. 16), making no essential distinction\nbetween the souls of men and those of animals, and recognising\nreciprocal interchange from the one to the other. The Platonists\nadhered to this doctrine fully, down to the third century A.D.,\nincluding Plotinus, Numenius, and others. But Porphyry, followed by\nJamblichus, introduced a modification of this creed, denying the\npossibility of transition of a human soul into the body of another\nanimal, or of the soul of any other animal into the body of a man,--yet\nstill recognising the transition from one human body to another, and\nfrom one animal body to another. (See Alkinous, Introd. in Platon.\nc. 25.) This subject is well handled in a learned work published in\n1712 by a Jesuit of Toulouse, Michel Mourgues. He shows (in opposition\nto Dacier and others, who interpreted the doctrine in a sense merely\nspiritual and figurative) that the metempsychosis was a literal\nbelief of the Platonists down to the time of Proklus. \"Les quatre\nPlatoniciens qui ont tenu la Transmigration born\u00e9e\" (_i.e._ from\none human body into another human body) \"n'ont pas laiss\u00e9 d'admettre\nla pluralit\u00e9 d'animations ou de vies d'une m\u00eame \u00e2me: et cela sans\nfigure et sans m\u00e9taphore. Cet article, qui est l'essentiel, n'a\njamais trouv\u00e9 un seul contradicteur dans les sectes qui ont cru l'\u00e2me\nimmortelle: ni Porphyre, ni Hi\u00e9rocle, ni Procle, ni Salluste, n'ont\njamais touch\u00e9 \u00e0 ce point que pour l'approuver. D'o\u00f9 il suit que la\nr\u00e9alit\u00e9 de la M\u00e9tempsychose est indubitable; c'est \u00e0 dire, qu'il est\nindubitable que tous les sectateurs de Pythagore et de Platon l'ont\nsoutenue dans un sens tr\u00e8s r\u00e9el quant \u00e0 la pluralit\u00e9 des vies et\nd'animations\" (Tom. i. p. 525: also Tom. ii. p. 432) M. Cousin and M.\nBarth\u00e9lemy St Hilaire are of the same opinion.\n\nM. Barth\u00e9lemy St. Hilaire observes in his Premier M\u00e9moire sur le\nSankhy\u00e2 p. 416, Paris, 1852.\n\n\"Voil\u00e0 donc la transmigration dans les plus grands dialogues de\nPlaton--le Tim\u00e9e, la R\u00e9publique, le Ph\u00e8dre, le Ph\u00e9don. On peut en\nretrouver la trace manifeste dans d'autres dialogues moins\nconsid\u00e9rables, le Menon et le Politique, par exemple. La\ntransmigration est m\u00eame positivement indiqu\u00e9e dans le dixi\u00e8me Livre\ndes Lois, o\u00f9 Platon traite avec tant de force et de solennit\u00e9 de la\nprovidence et de la justice divines.\n\n\"En pr\u00e9sence de t\u00e9moignages si s\u00e9rieux, et de tant de persistance \u00e0\nrevenir sur des opinions qui ne varient pas, je crois que tout esprit\nsens\u00e9 ne peut que partager l'avis de M. Cousin. Il est impossible que\nPlaton ne se fasse de l'exposition de ces opinions qu'un pur\nbadinage. Il les a r\u00e9pet\u00e9es, sans les modifier en rien, au milieu des\ndiscussions les plus graves et les plus \u00e9tendues. Ajoutez que ces\ndoctrines tiennent intim\u00e9ment \u00e0 toutes celles qui sont le fond m\u00eame\ndu platonisme, et qu'elles s'y entrelacent si \u00e9troitement, que les en\nd\u00e9tacher, c'est le mutiler et l'amoindrir. Le syst\u00e8me des Id\u00e9es ne se\ncomprend pas tout entier sans la r\u00e9miniscence: et la r\u00e9miniscence\nelle m\u00eame implique necessairement l'existence ant\u00e9rieure de l'\u00e2me.\"\n\nDr. Henry More, in his 'Treatise on the Immortality of the Soul,'\nargues at considerable length in defence of pre-existence of each\nsoul, as a part of the doctrine. He considers himself to have clearly\nproved--\"That the pre-existence of the soul is an opinion both in\nitself the most rational that can be maintained, and has had the\nsuffrage of the most renowned philosophers in all ages of the world\".\nOf these last-mentioned philosophers he gives a list, as follows--Moses,\non the authority of the Jewish Cabbala--Zoroaster, Pythagoras,\nEpicharmus, Empedocles, Ceb\u00eas, Euripides, Plato, Euclid, Philo,\nVirgil, Marcus Cicero, Plotinus, Jamblichus, Proclus, Boethius,\n&c. See chapters xii. and xiii. pages 116, 117, 121 of his\nTreatise. Compare also what he says in Sect. 18 of his Preface\nGeneral, page xx.-xxiv.]\n\n[Side-note: Plato's demonstration of the immortality of\nthe soul did not appear satisfactory to subsequent philosophers. The\nquestion remained debated and problematical.]\n\nWe are told that one vehement admirer of Plato--the Ambrakiot\nKleombrotus--was so profoundly affected and convinced by reading the\nPh\u00e6don, that he immediately terminated his existence by leaping from\na high wall; though in other respects well satisfied with life. But\nthe number of persons who derived from it such settled conviction,\nwas certainly not considerable. Neither the doctrine nor the\nreasonings of Plato were adopted even by the immediate successors in\nhis school: still less by Aristotle and the Peripatetics--or by the\nStoics--or by the Epikureans. The Epikureans denied altogether the\nsurvivorship of soul over body: Aristotle gives a definition of the\nsoul which involves this same negation, though he admits as credible\nthe separate existence of the rational soul, without individuality or\npersonality. The Stoics, while affirming the soul to be material\nas well as the body, considered it as a detached fragment of the\nall-pervading cosmical or mundane soul, which was re-absorbed after the\ndeath of the individual into the great whole to which it belonged.\nNone of these philosophers were persuaded by the arguments of Plato.\nThe popular orthodoxy, which he often censures harshly, recognised\nsome sort of posthumous existence as a part of its creed; and the\nuninquiring multitude continued in the teaching and traditions of\ntheir youth. But literary and philosophical men, who sought to form\nsome opinion for themselves without altogether rejecting (as the\nEpikureans rejected) the basis of the current traditions--were in no\nbetter condition for deciding the question with the assistance of\nPlato, than they would have been without him. While the knowledge of\nthe bodily organism, and of mind or soul as embodied therein,\nreceived important additions, from Aristotle down to Galen--no new\nfacts either were known or could become known, respecting soul _per\nse_, considered as pre-existent or post-existent to body. Galen\nexpressly records his dissatisfaction with Plato on this point,\nthough generally among his warmest admirers. Questions of this kind\nremained always problematical, standing themes for rhetoric or\ndialectic.[114] Every man could do, though not with the same\nexuberant eloquence, what Plato had done--and no man could do more.\nEvery man could coin his own hopes and fears, his own \u00e6sthetical\npreferences and repugnances, his own ethical aspiration to distribute\nrewards and punishments among the characters around him--into\naffirmative prophecies respecting an unknowable future, where neither\nverification nor Elenchus were accessible. The state of this\ndiscussion throughout the Pagan world bears out the following remark\nof Lord Macaulay, with which I conclude the present chapter:--\"There\nare branches of knowledge with respect to which the law of the\nhuman mind is progress. . . . But with theology, the case is very\ndifferent. As respects natural religion--revelation being for the\npresent altogether left out of the question--it is not easy to see\nthat a philosopher of the present day is more favourably situated\nthan Thales or Simonides. . . . As to the other great question--the\nquestion, what becomes of man after death--we do not see that a\nhighly educated European, left to his unassisted reason, is more\nlikely to be in the right than a Blackfoot Indian. Not a single one\nof the many sciences in which we surpass the Blackfoot Indians,\nthrows the smallest light on the state of the soul after the animal\nlife is extinct. In truth, all the philosophers, ancient and modern,\nwho have attempted, without the help of revelation, to prove the\nimmortality of man--from Plato down to Franklin--appear to us to have\nfailed deplorably. Then again, all the great enigmas which perplex\nthe natural theologian are the same in all ages. The ingenuity of a\npeople just emerging from barbarism, is quite sufficient to propound\nthem. The genius of Locke or Clarke is quite unable to solve\nthem. . . . Natural Theology, then, is not a progressive science.\"[115]\n\n[Footnote 114: Seneca says, Epist. 88. \"Innumerabiles sunt qu\u00e6stiones\nde animo: unde sit, qualis sit, quando esse incipiat, quamdiu sit; an\naliunde ali\u00f2 transeat, et domicilium mutet, ad alias animalium formas\naliasque conjectus, an non amplius quam semel serviat, et emissus\nevagetur in toto; utrum corpus sit, an non sit: quid sit facturus,\nquum per nos aliquid facere desierit: quomodo libertate usurus, cum\nex h\u00e2c exierit cave\u00e2: an obliviscatur priorum et illic nosse\nincipiat, postquam de corpore abductus in sublime secessit.\" Compare\nLucretius, i. 113.]\n\n[Footnote 115: Macaulay, Ranke's History of the Popes (Crit. and\nHist. Essays, vol. iii. p. 210). Sir Wm. Hamilton observes (Lectures\non Logic, Lect. 26, p. 55): \"Thus Plato, in the Ph\u00e6don, demonstrates\nthe immortality of the soul from its simplicity: in the Republic, he\ndemonstrates its simplicity from its immortality.\"]\n\n\n\n\nEND OF VOL. II.\n\n\n\n*************************************\nTranscriber's Note\n\nThe text is based on versions made available by the Internet Archive.\n\nFor the Greek transcriptions the following conventions have been used:\n) is for smooth breathing; ( for hard; + for diaeresis; / for acute\naccent; \\ for grave; = for circumflex; | for iota subscript.\nch is used for chi, ph for phi, ps for psi, th for theta;\n\u00ea for eta and \u00f4 for omega; u is used for upsilon in all cases.\n\nCorrections to the text, indicated in text with **:\n\nLocation Text of scan of 3rd edition Correction\nToC, Ch. 13 s-n 3 Minor Major\nToC, Ch. 14 s-n 24 _pain_ _gain_\nCh. 13 fn. 40 iv. 4, 5; iv. 4, 5, p. 220 seq.);\nCh. 13 near fn. 46 he was even fit he was not even fit\nCh. 17 near fn. 3 fulfiling fulfilling\nCh. 19 after fn. 32 sixth eighth\nCh. 19 fn. 44 p. . p. 31.\nCh. 20 after fn. 13 aud and\nCh. 22 after fn. 47 sixth eighth\nCh. 23 fn. 134 p. 240 p. 242\nCh. 23 fn. 135 ch. xviii ch. xvii\nCh. 24 fn. 75 Pratagoras Protagoras\nCh. 24 fn. 77 a)nro/s a)ndro/s\nCh. 24 fn. 86 Die _Dialoge..._ _Die Dialoge..._\nCh. 25 after fn. 58 intellegible intelligible\nCh. 25 after fn. 110 alloted allotted","title":"Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":198965}