{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_40438/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_40438","id":"gutenberg_40438","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40438","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Philosophy, Ancient","Plato","Socrates, 470 BC-399 BC"],"text":"PLATO, AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.\n\n\n\n\nPLATO,\n\nAND THE\n\nOTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.\n\n\n\nBY\n\nGEORGE GROTE\n\nAUTHOR OF THE 'HISTORY OF GREECE'.\n\n\n\n_A NEW EDITION._\n\nIN FOUR VOLUMES.\n\nVOL. IV.\n\nLONDON:\n\nJOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.\n\n1888.\n\n_The right of Translation is reserved._\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\nCHAPTER XXXV.\n\nPLATONIC REPUBLIC--ABSTRACT.\n\n\nDeclared theme of the Republic--Expansion and multiplication of\nthe topics connected with it   1\n\nPersonages of the dialogue   2\n\nViews of Kephalus about old age   _ib._\n\nDefinition of Justice by Simonides--It consists in rendering to\nevery man what is owing to him   _ib._\n\nObjections to it by Sokrates--There are cases in which it is not\nright to restore what is owing, or to tell the truth   3\n\nExplanation by Polemarchus--Farther interrogations by\nSokrates--Justice renders what is proper and suitable: but how?\nin what cases, proper? Under what circumstances is Justice useful?   4\n\nThe just man, being good for keeping property guarded, must also\nbe good for stealing property--Analogies cited   5\n\nJustice consists in doing good to friends, evil to enemies--But\nhow, if a man mistakes who his friends are, and makes friends of\nbad men?   6\n\nJustice consists in doing good to your friend, if really a good\nman: hurt to your enemy, with the like proviso. Sokrates affirms\nthat the just man will do no hurt to any one. Definition of\nSimonides rejected   _ib._\n\nThrasymachus takes up the dialogue--Repulsive portrait drawn of\nhim   7\n\nViolence of Thrasymachus--Subdued manner of Sokrates--Conditions\nof useful colloquy   _ib._\n\nDefinition given by Thrasymachus--Justice is that which is\nadvantageous to the more powerful. Comments by Sokrates. What if\nthe powerful man mistakes his own advantage?   8\n\nCorrection by Thrasymachus--if the Ruler mistakes, he is _pro\ntanto_ no Ruler--The Ruler, _qu\u00e2_ Ruler--_qu\u00e2_\nCraftsman--is infallible   9\n\nReply by Sokrates--The Ruler, _qu\u00e2_ infallible Craftsman,\nstudies the interest of those whom he governs, and not his own\ninterest   _ib._\n\nThrasymachus denies this--Justice is the good of another. The just\nmany are worse off than the unjust One, and are forced to submit\nto his superior strength   10\n\nPosition laid for the subsequent debate and exposition   11\n\nArguments of Sokrates--Injustice is a source of weakness--Every\nmultitude must observe justice among themselves, in order to avoid\nperpetual quarrels. The same about any single individual: if he is\nunjust, he will be at war with himself, and perpetually weak\n_ib._\n\nFarther argument of Sokrates--The just man is happy, the unjust\nman miserable--Thrasymachus is confuted and silenced. Sokrates\ncomplains that he does not yet know what Justice is   _ib._\n\nGlaukon intimates that he is not satisfied with the proof, though\nhe agrees in the opinion expressed by Sokrates. Tripartite\ndistribution of Good--To which of the three heads does Justice\nbelong?   12\n\nGlaukon undertakes to set forth the case against Sokrates, though\nprofessing not to agree with it     _ib._\n\nPleading of Glaukon. Justice is in the nature of a compromise for\nall--a medium between what is best and what is worst   13\n\nComparison of the happiness of the just man derived from his\njustice alone, when others are unjust to him with that of the\nunjust man under parallel circumstances   14\n\nPleading of Adeimantus on the same side. He cites advice given by\nfathers to their sons, recommending just behaviour by reason of\nits consequences   15\n\nNobody recommends Justice _per se_, but only by reason of its\nconsequences   16\n\nAdeimantus calls upon Sokrates to recommend and enforce Justice on\nits own grounds, and to explain how Justice in itself benefits the\nmind of the just man   17\n\nRelation of Glaukon and Adeimantus to Thrasymachus   18\n\nStatement of the question as it stands after the speeches of\nGlaukon and Adeimantus. What Sokrates undertakes to prove\n_ib._\n\nPosition to be proved by Sokrates--Justice makes the just man\nhappy _per se_, whatever be its results   20\n\nArgument of Sokrates to show what Justice is--Assumed analogy\nbetween the city and the individual   _ib._\n\nFundamental principle, to which communities of mankind owe their\norigin--Reciprocity of want and service between individuals--No\nindividual can suffice to himself   _ib._\n\nModerate equipment of a sound and healthy city--Few wants   22\n\nEnlargement of the city--Multiplied wants and services. First\norigin of war and strife with neighbours--It arises out of these\nmultiplied wants   _ib._\n\nSeparate class of soldiers or Guardians. One man cannot do well\nmore than one business. Character required in the\nGuardians--Mildness at home with pugnacity against enemies   23\n\nPeculiar education necessary, musical as well as gymnastical   23\n\nMusical education, by fictions as well as by truth. Fictions\naddressed to the young: the religious legends now circulating are\noften pernicious: censorship necessary   24\n\nOrthodox type to be laid down: all poets are required to conform\ntheir legends to it. The Gods are causes of nothing but good:\ntherefore they are causes of few things. Great preponderance of\nactual evil   _ib._\n\nThe Guardians must not fear death. No terrible descriptions of\nHades must be presented to them: no intense sorrow, nor violent\nnor sensual passion, must be recounted either of Gods or Heroes\n25\n\nType for all narratives respecting men   26\n\nStyle of narratives. The poet must not practise variety of\nimitation: he must not speak in the name of bad characters\n_ib._\n\nRhythm and Melody regulated. None but simple and grave music\nallowed: only the Dorian and Phrygian moods, with the lyre and\nharp   _ib._\n\nEffect of musical training of the mind--makes youth love the\nBeautiful and hate the Ugly   27\n\nTraining of the body--simple and sober. No refined medical art\nallowed. Wounds or temporary ailments treated; but sickly frames\ncannot be kept alive   28\n\nValue of Gymnastic in imparting courage to the mind--Gymnastic and\nMusic necessary to correct each other   29\n\nOut of the Guardians a few of the very best must be chosen as\nElders or Rulers--highly educated and severely tested   _ib._\n\nFundamental creed required to be planted in the minds of all the\ncitizens respecting their breed and relationship   30\n\nHow is such a fiction to be accredited in the first instance?\nDifficulty extreme, of first beginning; but if once accredited, it\nwill easily transmit itself by tradition   31\n\nGuardians to reside in barracks and mess together; to have no\nprivate property or home; to be maintained by contribution from\nthe people   32\n\nIf the Guardians fail in these precautions, and acquire\nprivate interests, the city will be ruined   32\n\nComplete unity of the city, every man performing his own special\nfunction   33\n\nThe maintenance of the city depends upon that of the habits,\ncharacter, and education of the Guardians   34\n\nReligious legislation--Consult the Delphian Apollo   _ib._\n\nThe city is now constituted as a good city--that is, wise,\ncourageous, temperate, just. Where is its Justice?   _ib._\n\nFirst, where is the wisdom of the city? It resides in the few\nelder Rulers   _ib._\n\nWhere is the Courage? In the body of Guardians or Soldiers   35\n\nWhere is the Temperance? It resides in all and each, Rulers,\nGuardians, and People. Superiors rule and Inferiors obey\n_ib._\n\nWhere is the Justice? In all and each of them also. It consists in\neach performing his own special function, and not meddling with\nthe function of the others   36\n\nInjustice arises when any one part of the city interferes with the\nfunctions of the other part, or undertakes double functions   37\n\nAnalogy of the city to the individual--Each man is tripartite,\nhaving in his mind Reason, Energy, Appetite. These three elements\nare distinct, and often conflicting   _ib._\n\nReason, Energy, Appetite, in the individual--analogous to Rulers,\nGuardians, Craftsmen in the city. Reason is to rule Appetite.\nEnergy assists Reason in ruling it   39\n\nA man is just when these different parts of his mind exercise\ntheir appropriate functions without hindrance   _ib._\n\nJustice and Injustice in the mind--what health and disease are in\nthe body   40\n\nOriginal question now resumed--Does Justice make a man happy, and\nInjustice make him miserable, apart from all consequences?\nAnswer--Yes   _ib._\n\nGlaukon requires farther explanation about the condition of the\nGuardians, in regard to sexual and family ties   41\n\nMen and women will live together and perform the duties of\nGuardians alike--They will receive the same gymnastic and musical\ntraining   41\n\nNature does not prescribe any distribution of functions between\nmen and women. Women are inferior to men in every thing. The best\nwomen are equal to second-best men 42\n\nCommunity of life and relations between the male and female\nGuardians. Temporary marriages arranged by contrivance of the\nElders. No separate families   _ib._\n\nRegulations about age, for procreation--Children brought up under\npublic authority   44\n\nPerfect communion of sentiment and interest among the\nGuardians--Causes of pleasure and pain the same to all, like parts\nof the same organism   _ib._\n\nHarmony--absence of conflicting interest--assured scale of equal\ncomfort--consequent happiness--among the Guardians   45\n\nIn case of war both sexes will go together to battle--Rewards to\ndistinguished warriors   46\n\nWar against Hellenic enemies to be carried on mildly--Hellens are\nall by nature kinsmen   47\n\nQuestion--How is the scheme practicable? It is difficult, yet\npracticable on one condition--That philosophy and political power\nshould come into the same hands   _ib._\n\nCharacteristic marks of the philosopher--He contemplates and knows\nEntia or unchangeable Forms, as distinguished from fluctuating\nparticulars or Fientia   48\n\nEns alone can be known--Non-Ens is unknowable. That which is\nmidway between Ens and Non-Ens (particulars) is matter only of\nopinion. Ordinary men attain nothing beyond opinion   49\n\nParticulars fluctuate: they are sometimes just or beautiful,\nsometimes unjust or ugly. Forms or Entia alone remain constant\n50\n\nThe many cannot discern or admit the reality of Forms--Their minds\nare always fluctuating among particulars   51\n\nThe philosopher will be ardent for all varieties of knowledge--His\nexcellent moral attributes--He will be trained to capacity for\nactive life   _ib._\n\nAdeimantus does not dispute the conclusion, but remarks that it is\nat variance with actual facts--Existing philosophers are either\nworthless pretenders, or when they are good, useless   52\n\nSokrates admits the fact to be so--His simile of the able\nsteersman on shipboard, among a disobedient crew   53\n\nThe uselessness of the true philosopher is the fault of the\ncitizen, who will not invoke his guidance   54\n\nThe great qualities required to form a philosopher, become sources\nof perversion, under a misguiding public opinion   _ib._\n\nMistake of supposing that such perversion arises from the\nSophists. Irresistible effect of the public opinion generally, in\ntempting or forcing a dissenter into orthodoxy   55\n\nThe Sophists and other private teachers accept the prevalent\northodoxy, and conform their teaching to it   56\n\nThe people generally hate philosophy--A youth who aspires to it\nwill be hated by the people, and persecuted even by his own\nrelatives   57\n\nThe really great minds are thus driven away from the path of\nphilosophy--which is left to empty pretenders   58\n\nRare cases in which a highly qualified philosopher remains--Being\nat variance with public opinion, he can achieve nothing, and is\nlucky if he can obtain safety by silence   _ib._\n\nThe philosopher must have a community suitable to him, and worthy\nof him   59\n\nIt must be such a community as Sokrates has been describing--But\nmeans must be taken to keep up a perpetual succession of\nphilosophers as Rulers   60\n\nProper manner of teaching philosophy--Not to begin at a very early\nage   _ib._\n\nIf the multitude could once see a real, perfect, philosopher, they\ncould not fail to love him: but this never happens   61\n\nCourse of training in the Platonic city, for imparting philosophy\nto the Rulers. They must be taught to ascend to the Idea of Good.\nBut what is Good?   _ib._\n\nAncient disputes upon this point, though every one yearns after\nGood. Some say Intelligence; some say Pleasure. Neither is\nsatisfactory   62\n\nAdeimantus asks what Sokrates says. Sokrates says that he can not\nanswer: but he compares it by a metaphor to the Sun   63\n\nThe Idea of Good rules the ideal or intelligible world, as the Sun\nrules the sensible or visible world   64\n\nTo the intelligible world there are applicable two distinct modes\nof procedure--the Geometrical--the Dialectic. Geometrical\nprocedure assumes diagrams   65\n\nDialectic procedure assumes nothing. It departs from the highest\nForm, and steps gradually down to the lowest, without meddling\nwith any thing except Forms   66\n\nTwo distinct grades of Cognition--Direct or\nSuperior--Nous--Indirect or Inferior--Dianoia    _ib._\n\nTwo distinct grades of Opinion also in the Sensible World--Faith\nor Belief--Conjecture   67\n\nDistinction between the philosopher and the unphilosophical\npublic, illustrated by the simile of the Cave, and the captives\nimprisoned therein   _ib._\n\nDaylight of philosophy contrasted with the firelight and shadows\nof the Cave   69\n\nPurpose of a philosophical training, to turn a man round from\nfacing the bad light of the Cave to face the daylight of\nphilosophy, and to see the eternal Forms   _ib._\n\nThose who have emerged from the Cave into full daylight amidst\neternal Forms, must be forced to come down again and undertake\nactive duties--Their reluctance to do this   70\n\nStudies serving as introduction to philosophy--Arithmetic, its\nawakening power--shock to the mind by felt contradiction\n_ib._\n\nPerplexity arising from the One and Many, stimulates the mind to\nan intellectual effort for clearing it up   72\n\nGeometry conducts the mind to wards Universal Ens   _ib._\n\nAstronomy--how useful--not useful as now taught--must be studied\nby ideal figures, not by observation   73\n\nAcoustics, in like manner--The student will be thus conducted\nto the highest of all studies--Dialectic: and to the region of\npure intelligible Forms   74\n\nQuestion by Glaukon--What is the Dialectic Power? Sokrates\ndeclares that he cannot answer with certainty, and that Glaukon\ncould not follow him if he did   75\n\nHe answers partially--It is the consummation of all the sciences,\nraising the student to the contemplation of pure Forms, and\nespecially to that of the highest Form--_Good_   _ib._\n\nThe Synoptic view peculiar to the Dialectician   76\n\nScale and duration of various studies for the Guardians, from\nyouth upwards   _ib._\n\nAll these studies, and this education, are common to females as\nwell as males   77\n\nFirst formation of the Platonic city--how brought about:\ndifficult, but not impossible   78\n\nThe city thus formed will last long, but not for ever. After a\ncertain time, it will begin to degenerate. Stages of its\ndegeneracy   _ib._\n\n1. Timocracy and the timocratical individual. 2 Oligarchy, and the\noligarchical individual   79\n\n3. Democracy, and the democratical individual   80\n\n4. Passage from democracy to despotism. Character of the despotic\ncity  81\n\nDespotic individual corresponding to that city   82\n\nThe city has thus passed by four stages, from best to worse.\nQuestion--How are Happiness and Misery apportioned among them?\n_ib._\n\nMisery of the despotised city   83\n\nSupreme Misery of the despotising individual   _ib._\n\nConclusion--The Model city and the individual corresponding to it,\nare the happiest of all--That which is farthest removed from it,\nis the most miserable of all   84\n\nThe Just Man is happy in and through his Justice, however he may\nbe treated by others. The Unjust Man, miserable   84\n\nOther arguments proving the same conclusion--Pleasures of\nIntelligence are the best of all pleasures   _ib._\n\nThey are the only pleasures completely true and pure. Comparison\nof pleasure and pain with neutrality. Prevalent illusions   86\n\nMost men know nothing of true and pure pleasure. Simile of the\nKosmos--Absolute height and depth   87\n\nNourishment of the mind partakes more of real essence than\nnourishment of the body--Replenishment of the mind imparts fuller\npleasure than replenishment of the body   88\n\nComparative worthlessness of the pleasures of Appetite and\nAmbition, when measured against those of Intelligence   89\n\nThe Just Man will be happy from his justice--He will look only to\nthe good order of his own mind--He will stand aloof from public\naffairs, in cities as now constituted   90\n\nTenth Book--Censure of the poets is renewed--Mischiefs of\nimitation generally, as deceptive--Imitation from imitation   91\n\nCensure of Homer--He is falsely extolled as educator of the\nHellenic world. He and other poets only deceive their hearers   92\n\nThe poet chiefly appeals to emotions--Mischiefs of such eloquent\nappeals, as disturbing the rational government of the mind\n_ib._\n\nAncient quarrel between philosophy and poetry--Plato fights for\nphilosophy, though his feelings are strongly enlisted for poetry\n93\n\nImmortality of the soul affirmed and sustained by argument--Total\nnumber of souls always the same   _ib._\n\nRecapitulation--The Just Man will be happy, both from his justice\nand from its consequences, both here and hereafter   94\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVI.\n\nREPUBLIC--REMARKS ON ITS MAIN THESIS.\n\n\nSummary of the preceding chapter   95\n\nTitle of the Republic, of ancient date, but only a partial\nindication of its contents   96\n\nParallelism between the Commonwealth and the Individual   96\n\nEach of them a whole, composed of parts distinct in function and\nunequal in merit   97\n\nEnd proposed by Plato. Happiness of the Commonwealth. Happiness\nof the individual. Conditions of happiness   98\n\nPeculiar view of Justice taken by Plato   99\n\nPleadings of Glaukon and Adeimantus _ib._\n\nThe arguments which they enforce were not invented by the\nSophists, but were the received views anterior to Plato   100\n\nArgument of Sokrates to refute them. Sentiments in which it\noriginates. Panegyric on Justice   101\n\nDifferent senses of justice--wider and narrower sense   102\n\nPlato's sense of the word Justice or Virtue--self-regarding   104\n\nHe represents the motives to it, as arising from the internal\nhappiness of the just agents   105\n\nHis theory departs more widely from the truth than that which he\nopposes. Argument of Adeimantus discussed   106\n\nA Reciprocity of rights and duties between men in social\nlife--different feelings towards one and towards the other   109\n\nPlato's own theory, respecting the genesis of society, is based on\nreciprocity   111\n\nAntithesis and correlation of obligation and right. Necessity of\nkeeping the two ideas together, as the basis of any theory\nrespecting society   112\n\nCharacteristic feature of the Platonic\nCommonwealth--specialization of services to that function for\nwhich each man is fit--will not apply to one individual separately   114\n\nPlato has not made good his refutation--the thesis which he\nimpugns is true   116\n\nStatement of the real issue between him and his opponents   117\n\nHe himself misrepresents this issue--he describes his opponents as\nenemies of justice   _ib._\n\nFarther arguments of Plato in support of his thesis. Comparison of\nthree different characters of men   118\n\nHis arguments do not go to the point which he professes to aim at\n120\n\nExaggerated parallelism between the Commonwealth and the\nindividual man   121\n\nSecond Argument of Plato to prove the happiness of the just\nman--He now recalls his previous concession, and assumes that the just\nman will receive just treatment and esteem from others\n_ib._\n\nDependence of the happiness of the individual on the society in\nwhich he is placed   123\n\nInconsistency of affirming general positions respecting the\nhappiness of the just man, in all societies without distinction\n124\n\nQualified sense in which only this can be done   125\n\nQuestion--Whether the just man is orthodox or dissenter in his\nsociety?--important in discussing whether he is happy   126\n\nComparison of the position of Sokrates at Athens, with that of his\naccusers   _ib._\n\nImperfect ethical basis on which Plato has conducted the\ndiscussion in the Republic   127\n\nPlato in Republic is preacher, inculcating useful beliefs--not\nphilosopher, establishing scientific theory. State of Just and\nUnjust Man in the Platonic Commonwealth   129\n\nComparative happiness of the two in actual communities. Plato is\ndissatisfied with it--This is his motive for recasting society on\nhis own principles   130\n\nConfusion between the preacher and the philosopher in the Platonic\nRepublic   131\n\nRemarks on the contrast between ethical theory and ethical\nprecepts   _ib._\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVII.\n\nREPUBLIC--REMARKS ON THE PLATONIC COMMONWEALTH.\n\n\nDouble purpose of the Platonic Republic--ethical and political\n133\n\nPlato recognises the generating principle of human\nsociety--reciprocity of need and service. Particular direction\nwhich he gives to this principle   133\n\nThe four cardinal virtues are assumed as constituting the whole of\nGood or Virtue, where each of these virtues resides   134\n\nFirst mention of these, as an exhaustive classification, in\nethical theory. Plato effaces the distinction between Temperance\nand Justice   135\n\nAll the four are here assumed as certain and determinate, though\nin former dialogues they appear indeterminate and full of unsolved\ndifficulties   137\n\nDifficulties left unsolved, but overleaped by Plato   138\n\nEthical and political theory combined by Plato, treated apart by\nAristotle   _ib._\n\nPlatonic Commonwealth--only an outline--partially filled up   139\n\nAbsolute rule of a few philosophers--Careful and peculiar training\nof the Guardians   _ib._\n\nComparison of Plato with Xenophon--Cyrop\u00e6dia--OEconomicus   141\n\nBoth of them combine polity with education--temporal with\nspiritual   142\n\nDifferences between them--Character of Cyrus   _ib._\n\nXenophontic genius for command--Practical training--Sokratic\nprinciples applied in Persian training   144\n\nPlato does not build upon an individual hero. Platonic training\ncompared with Xenophontic   146\n\nPlatonic type of character compared with Xenophontic, is like the\nAthenian compared with the Spartan   147\n\nProfessional soldiers are the proper modern standard of comparison\nwith the regulations of Plato and Xenophon   148\n\nMusic and Gymnastic--multifarious and varied effects of music\n149\n\nGreat influence of the poets and their works on education\n_ib._\n\nPlato's idea of the purpose which poetry and music _ought_ to\nserve in education   151\n\nHe declares war against most of the traditional and consecrated\npoetry, as mischievous   _ib._\n\nStrict limits imposed by Plato on poets   153\n\nHis view of the purposes of fiction--little distinction between\nfiction and truth. His censures upon Homer and the tragedians\n154\n\nType of character prescribed by Plato, to which all poets must\nconform, in tales about Gods and Heroes 155\n\nPosition of Plato as an innovator on the received faith and\ntraditions. Fictions indispensable to the Platonic Commonwealth\n156\n\nDifficulty of procuring first admission for fictions. Ease with\nwhich they perpetuate themselves after having been once admitted\n158\n\nViews entertained by Kritias and others, that the religious\ndoctrines generally believed had originated with law-givers, for\nuseful purposes   159\n\nMain points of dissent between Plato and his countrymen, in\nrespect to religious doctrine   161\n\nTheology of Plato compared with that of Epikurus--Neither of them\nsatisfied the exigencies of a believing religious mind of that day\n_ib._\n\nPlato conceives the Gods according to the exigencies of his own\nmind--complete discord with those of the popular mind   163\n\nRepugnance of ordinary Athenians in regard to the criticism of\nSokrates on the religious legends   165\n\nAristophanes connects the idea of immorality with the freethinkers\nand their wicked misinterpretations   _ib._\n\nHeresies ascribed to Sokrates by his own friends--Unpopularity of\nhis name from this circumstance   168\n\nRestrictions imposed by Plato upon musical modes and reciters\n_ib._\n\nAll these restrictions intended for the emotional training of the\nGuardians   169\n\nRegulations for the life of the Guardians, especially the\nprohibition of separate property and family   _ib._\n\nPurpose of Plato in these regulations   _ib._\n\nCommon life, education, drill, collective life, and duties, for\nGuardians of both sexes. Views of Plato respecting the female\ncharacter and aptitudes   171\n\nHis arguments against the ordinary doctrine   172\n\nOpponents appealed to nature as an authority against Plato. He\ninvokes Nature on his own side against them   173\n\nCollective family relations and denominations among the\nGuardians   174\n\nRestrictions upon sexual intercourse--Purposes of such\nrestrictions   175\n\nRegulations about marriages and family   176\n\nProcreative powers of individual Guardians required to be held at\nthe disposal of the rulers, for purity of breed   177\n\nPurpose to create an intimate and equal sympathy among all the\nGuardians, but to prevent exclusive sympathy of particular members\n178\n\nPlatonic scheme--partial communism   179\n\nSoldiership as a separate profession has acquired greater\ndevelopment in modern times   180\n\nSpartan institutions--great impression which they produced upon\nspeculative Greek minds   181\n\nPlans of these speculative minds compared with Spartan--Different\ntypes of character contemplated   182\n\nPlato carries abstraction farther than Xenophon or Aristotle   183\n\nAnxiety shown by Plato for the good treatment of the Demos,\ngreater than that shown by Xenophon and Aristotle   _ib._\n\nIn Aristotle's theory, the Demos are not considered as members of\nthe Commonwealth, but as adjuncts   184\n\nObjection urged by Aristotle against the Platonic Republic, that\nit will be two cities. Spiritual pride of the Guardians, contempt\nfor the Demos   _ib._\n\nPlato's scheme fails, mainly because he provides no training for\nthe Demos   186\n\nPrinciple of Aristotle--That every citizen belongs to the city,\nnot to himself--applied by Plato to women   187\n\nAristotle declares the Platonic Commonwealth impossible--In what\nsense this is true   189\n\nThe real impossibility of the Platonic Commonwealth, arises from\nthe fact that discordant sentiments are already established   191\n\nPlato has strong feelings of right and wrong about sexual\nintercourse, but referring to different objects   192\n\nDifferent sentiment which would grow up in the Platonic\nCommonwealth respecting the sexual relations   193\n\nWhat Nature prescribes in regard to the relations of the two\nsexes--Direct contradiction between Plato and Aristotle   194\n\nOpinion of Plato respecting the capacities of women, and the\ntraining proper for women, are maintained in the Leges, as well as\nin the Republic. Ancient legends harmonising with this opinion\n195\n\nIn a Commonwealth like the Platonic, the influence of Aphrodit\u00ea\nwould probably have been reduced to a minimum   197\n\nOther purposes of Plato--limitation of number of Guardians--common\nto Aristotle also   198\n\nLaw of population expounded by Malthus--Three distinct checks to\npopulation--alternative open between preventive and positive\n_ib._\n\nPlato and Aristotle saw the same law as Malthus, but arranged the\nfacts under a different point of view   202\n\nRegulations of Plato and Aristotle as to number of births and\nnewborn children   _ib._\n\nSuch regulations disapproved and forbidden by modern sentiment.\nVariability of ethical sentiment as to objects approved or\ndisapproved   203\n\nPlato and Aristotle required subordination of impulse to reason\nand duty--they applied this to the procreative impulse, as to\nothers   204\n\nTraining of the few select philosophers to act as chiefs   205\n\nComprehensive curriculum for aspirants to philosophy--consummation\nby means of Dialectic   206\n\nValuable remarks on the effects of these preparatory studies   207\n\nDifferences between the Republic and other dialogues--no mention\nof reminiscence nor of the Elenchus   _ib._\n\nDifferent view taken by Plato in the Republic about Dialectic--and\ndifferent place assigned to it   208\n\nContradiction with the spirit of other dialogues Parmenid\u00eas,\n&c.   209\n\nContradiction with the character and declarations of Sokrates\n210\n\nThe remarks here made upon the effect of Dialectic upon youth\ncoincide with the accusation of Mel\u00eatus against Sokrates\n211\n\nContrast between the real Sokrates, as a dissenter at Athens, and\nthe Platonic Sokrates, framer and dictator of the Platonic\nRepublic   _ib._\n\nIdea of Good--The Chiefs alone know what it is--If they did not\nthey would be unfit for their functions   212\n\nWhat is the Good? Plato does not know; but he requires the Chiefs\nto know it. Without this the Republic would be a failure   213\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVIII.\n\nTIM\u00c6US AND KRITIAS.\n\n\nPersons and scheme of the Tim\u00e6us and Kritias   215\n\nThe Tim\u00e6us is the earliest ancient physical theory, which we\npossess in the words of its author   216\n\nPosition and character of the Pythagorean Tim\u00e6us   _ib._\n\nPoetical imagination displayed by Plato. He pretends to nothing\nmore than probability. Contrast with Sokrates, Isokrates, Xenophon\n217\n\nFundamental distinction between Ens and Fientia   219\n\nPostulates of Plato. The Demiurgus--The Eternal Ideas--Chaotic\nMateria or Fundamentum. The Kosmos is a living being and a God\n220\n\nThe Demiurgus not a Creator--The Kosmos arises from his operating\nupon the random movements of Necessity. He cannot controul\nnecessity--he only persuades   _ib._\n\nMeaning of Necessity in Plato   221\n\nProcess of demiurgic construction--The total Kosmos comes\nlogically first, constructed on the model of the [Greek:\nAu)toz\u00f4=on]   223\n\nBody of the Kosmos, perfectly spherical--its rotations   225\n\nSoul of the Kosmos--its component ingredients--stretched from\ncentre to circumference   _ib._\n\nRegular or measured Time--began with the Kosmos   227\n\nDivine tenants of the Kosmos. Primary and Visible Gods--Stars and\nHeavenly Bodies   229\n\nSecondary and generated Gods--Plato's dictum respecting them. His\nacquiescence in tradition   230\n\nRemarks on Plato's Canon of Belief   231\n\nAddress and order of the Demiurgus to the generated Gods   233\n\nPreparations for the construction of man. Conjunction of three\nsouls and one body   _ib._\n\nProceedings of the generated Gods--they fabricate the cranium, as\nminiature of the Kosmos, with the rational soul rotating within it\n235\n\nThe cranium is mounted on a tall body--six varieties of\nmotion--organs of sense. Vision--Light   236\n\nPrincipal advantages of sight and hearing. Observations of the\nrotation of the Kosmos   237\n\nThe Kosmos is product of joint action of Reason and Necessity. The\nfour visible and tangible elements are not primitive   238\n\nForms or Ideas and Materia Prima--Forms of the Elements--Place, or\nReceptivity   _ib._\n\nPrimordial Chaos--Effect of intervention by the Demiurgus   240\n\nGeometrical theory of the elements--fundamental triangles--regular\nsolids   _ib._\n\nVarieties of each element   242\n\nConstruction of man imposed by the Demiurgus upon the secondary\nGods. Triple Soul. Distribution thereof in the body   243\n\nFunctions of the heart and lungs. Thoracic soul   245\n\nAbdominal Soul--difficulty of controuling it--functions of the\nliver   _ib._\n\nThe liver is made the seat of the prophetic agency. Function of\nthe spleen   246\n\nLength of the intestinal canal, in order that food might not be\nfrequently needed   247\n\nBone--Flesh--Marrow   _ib._\n\nNails--Mouth--Teeth. Plants produced for nutrition of man   248\n\nGeneral view of Diseases and their Causes   249\n\nDiseases of mind--wickedness is a disease--no man is voluntarily\nwicked   _ib._\n\nBadness of mind arises from body   250\n\nPreservative and healing agencies against disease--well-regulated\nexercise, of mind and body proportionally   250\n\nTreatment proper for mind alone, apart from body--supremacy of the\nrational soul must be cultivated   251\n\nWe must study and understand the rotations of the Kosmos--this is\nthe way to amend the rotations of the rational soul   252\n\nConstruction of women, birds, quadrupeds, fishes, &c., all\nfrom the degradation of primitive man   _ib._\n\nLarge range of topics introduced in the Tim\u00e6us   254\n\nThe Demiurgus of the Platonic Tim\u00e6us--how conceived by other\nphilosophers of the same century   _ib._\n\nAdopted and welcomed by the Alexandrine Jews, as a parallel to the\nMosaic Genesis   256\n\nPhysiology of the Platonic Tim\u00e6us--subordinate to Plato's views of\nethical teleology. Triple soul--each soul at once material and\nmental 257\n\nTriplicity of the soul--espoused afterwards by Galen   258\n\nAdmiration of Galen for Plato--his agreement with Plato, and his\ndissension from Plato--his improved physiology   259\n\nPhysiology and Pathology of Plato--compared with that of Aristotle\nand the Hippokratic treatises   260\n\nContrast between the admiration of Plato for the constructors of\nthe Kosmos, and the defective results which he describes   262\n\nDegeneration of the real tenants of Earth from their primitive\ntype   263\n\nClose of the Tim\u00e6us. Plato turns away from the shameful results,\nand reverts to the glorification of the primitive types   264\n\nKritias: a fragment   265\n\nProoemium to Tim\u00e6us. Intended Tetralogy for the Republic. The\nKritias was third piece in that Tetralogy   _ib._\n\nSubject of the Kritias. Solon and the Egyptian priests. Citizens\nof Platonic Republic are identified with ancient Athenians   266\n\nPlato professes that what he is about to recount is matter of\nhistory, recorded by Egyptian priests   268\n\nDescription of the vast island of Atlantis and its powerful kings\n_ib._\n\nCorruption and wickedness of the Atlantid people   269\n\nConjectures as to what the Platonic Kritias would have been--an\nethical epic in prose   _ib._\n\nPlato represents the epic Kritias as matter of recorded history\n270\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIX.**\n\nLEGES AND EPINOMIS.**\n\n\nLeges, the longest of Plato's works--Persons of the dialogue   272\n\nAbandonment of Plato's philosophical projects prior to the Leges\n273\n\nUntoward circumstances of Plato's later life--His altered tone in\nregard to philosophy   _ib._\n\nGeneral comparison of Leges with Plato's earlier works   275\n\nScene of the Leges, not in Athens, but in Krete. Persons Kretan\nand Spartan, comparatively illiterate   277\n\nGymnastic training, military drill, and public mess, in Krete and\nSparta   279\n\nDifference between Leges and Republic, illustrated by reference to\nthe Politikus   280\n\nLarge proportion of preliminary discussions and didactic\nexhortation in the Leges   281\n\nScope of the discussion laid down by the Athenian speaker--The\nSpartan institutions are framed only for war--This is narrow and\nerroneous   282\n\nPrinciples on which the institutions of a state ought to be\ndefended--You must show that its ethical purpose and working is\ngood   284\n\nReligious and ethical character postulated by Plato for a\ncommunity   _ib._\n\nEndurance of pain enforced as a part of the public discipline at\nSparta   285\n\nWhy are not the citizens tested in like manner, in regard to\nresistance against the seductions of pleasure?   _ib._\n\nDrunkenness forbidden at Sparta, and blamed by the Spartan\nconverser. The Athenian proceeds to inquire how far such\nunqualified prohibition is justifiable   286\n\nDescription of Sokrates in the Symposion--his self-command under\nabundant potations   287\n\nSokrates--an ideal of self-command, both as to pain and as to\npleasure   288\n\nTrials for testing the self-controul of the citizen, under the\ninfluence of wine. Dionysiac banquets, under a sober president\n289\n\nThe gifts of Dionysus may, by precautions, be rendered\nuseful--Desultory manner of Plato   _ib._\n\nTheory of ethical and \u00e6sthetical education--Training of the\nemotions of youth through the influence of the Muses, Apollo, and\nDionysus. Choric practice and ceremonies   290\n\nMusic and dancing--imitation of the voice and movements of brave\nand virtuous men. Youth must be taught to take delight in this\n291\n\nBad musical exhibitions and poetry forbidden by the lawgiver.\nSongs and dances must be consecrated by public authority. Prizes\nat the musical festivals to be awarded by select judges   292\n\nThe Spartan and Kretan agree with the Athenian, that poets must be\nkept under a strict censorship. But they do not agree as to what\nthe poets are required to conform to   _ib._\n\nEthical creed laid down by the Athenian--Poets required to conform\nto it   294\n\nThe Spartan and Kretan do not agree with him   296\n\nChorus of Elders are required to set an example in keeping up the\npurity of the music prescribed   297\n\nThe Elders require the stimulus of wine, in order to go through\nthe choric duties with spirit   _ib._\n\nPeculiar views of Plato about intoxication   298\n\nGeneral ethical doctrine held by Plato in Leges   299\n\nPleasure--Good--Happiness--What is the relation between them?\n_ib._\n\nComparison of the doctrine laid down in Leges   300\n\nDoctrine in Leges about Pleasure and Good--approximates more\nnearly to the Protagoras than to Gorgias and Phil\u00eabus   301\n\nComparison of Leges with Republic and Gorgias   302\n\nPlato here mistrusts the goodness of his own proof. He falls back\nupon useful fiction   303\n\nDeliberate ethical fiction employed as means of governing   304\n\nImportance of music and chorus as an engine of teaching for Plato.\nViews of Xenophon and Aristotle compared   305\n\nHistorical retrospect as to the growth of cities--Frequent\ndestruction of established communities, with only a small remnant\nleft   307\n\nHistorical or legendary retrospect--The Trojan war--The return of\nthe Herakleids   308\n\nDifficulties of government--Conflicts about command--Seven\ndistinct titles to command exist among mankind, all equally\nnatural, and liable to conflict   309\n\nImprudence of founding government upon any one of these titles\nseparately--Governments of Argos and Mess\u00ean\u00ea ruined by the\nsingle principle--Sparta avoided it   310\n\nPlato casts Hellenic legend into accordance with his own political\ntheories   311\n\nPersia and Athens compared--Excess of despotism. Excess of liberty\n312\n\nCyrus and Darius--Bad training of sons of kings   _ib._\n\nChanges for the worse in government of Athens, after the Persian\ninvasion of Greece   313\n\nThis change began in music, and the poets introduced new modes of\ncomposition--they appealed to the sentiment of the people, and\ncorrupted them   314\n\nDanger of changes in the national music--declared by Damon, the\nmusical teacher   315\n\nPlato's aversion to the tragic and comic poetry at Athens   316\n\nThis aversion peculiar to himself, not shared either by\noligarchical politicians, or by other philosophers   317\n\nDoctrines of Plato in this prefatory matter   318\n\nCompared with those of the Republic and of the Xenophontic\nCyrop\u00e6dia   319\n\nConstructive scheme--Plato's new point of view   320\n\nNew Colony to be founded in Krete--its general conditions\n_ib._\n\nThe Athenian declares that he will not merely promulgate\nperemptory laws, but will recommend them to the citizens by\nprologues or hortatory discourses   321\n\nGeneral character of these prologues--didactic or rhetorical\nhomilies   322\n\nGreat value set by Plato himself upon these prologues. They are to\nserve as type for all poets. No one is allowed to contradict\nthem   323\n\nContrast of Leges with Gorgias and Ph\u00e6drus   324\n\nRegulations for the new colony--About religious worship, the\noracles of Delphi and Dodona are to be consulted   325\n\nPerpetuity of number of citizens, and of lots of land, one to\neach, inalienable and indivisible   326\n\nPlato reasserts his adherence to the principle of the Republic,\nthough the repugnance of others hinders him from realising it\n327\n\nRegulations about land, successions, marriages, &c. The number\nof citizens must not be allowed to increase   328\n\nPosition of the city and akropolis--Distribution of the territory\nand citizens into twelve equal sections or tribes   329\n\nMovable property--Inequality therein reluctantly allowed, as far\nas four to one, but no farther   330\n\nCensus of the citizens--four classes, with graduated scale of\nproperty. No citizen to possess gold or silver. No loans or\ninterest. No debts enforced by law   331\n\nBoard of thirty-seven Nomophylakes--general supervisors of the\nlaws and their execution--how elected 332\n\nMilitary commanders--General council of 360--complicated mode of\nelection   _ib._\n\nCharacter of the electoral scheme--Plato's views about wealth--he\ncaters partly for the oligarchical sentiment, partly for the\ndemocratical   333\n\nMeetings of council--other magistrates--Agoranomi--Astynomi,\n&c.   335\n\nDefence of the territory--rural police--Agronomi, &c.\n_ib._\n\nComparison with the Laced\u00e6monian Kryptia   336\n\nPriests--Ex\u00eag\u00eat\u00e6--Property belonging to temples   337\n\nSuperintendence of Music and Gymnastic. Educational function\n_ib._\n\nGrave duties of the Minister of Education--precautions in electing\nhim   338\n\nJudicial duties   339\n\nPrivate Causes--how tried   _ib._\n\nPublic Causes must be tried directly by the citizens--strong\nfeeling among Greeks about this   340\n\nPlato's way of meeting this feeling--intermediate inquiry and\nreport by a special Commissioner   340\n\nWhat laws the magistrates are to enforce--Many details must be\nleft to the Nomophylakes   341\n\nMarriage-Laws--Rich husbands to choose poor wives--No\ndowries--costly marriage festivals are forbidden   342\n\nLaws about slavery. Slaves to be well fed, and never treated with\ncruelty or insolence. The master must not converse with them\n_ib._\n\nCircular form for the city--Temples in the centre--No walls round\nit   344\n\nMode of life prescribed to new-married couples They are to take\nthe best care about good procreation for the city   _ib._\n\nBoard of superintending matrons   345\n\nAge fixed for marriage. During the first ten years the couple are\nunder obligation to procreate for the city--Restrictions during\nthese ten years   _ib._\n\nHow infants are to be brought up--Nurses--Perpetual regulated\nmovements useful for toning down violent emotions   346\n\nChoric and orchestic movements, their effect in discharging strong\nemotions   347\n\nTraining of boys and girls   348\n\nMusical and literary teaching for youth--Poetry, songs, music,\ndances, must all be fixed by authority, and never\nchanged--Mischief done by poets aiming to please   349\n\nBoys and girls to learn letters and the lyre, from ten to thirteen\nyears of age. Masters will teach the laws and homilies of the\nlawgiver, and licensed extracts from the poets   350\n\nThe teaching is to be simple, and common to both sexes   351\n\nRudiments of arithmetic and geometry to be taught   352\n\nAstronomy must be taught, in order that the citizens may not\nassert libellous falsehoods respecting the heavenly bodies   354\n\nHunting--how far permitted or advised   355\n\nLarge general sense which Plato gives to the word hunting   356\n\nNumber of religious sacrifices to be determined by lawgiver   357\n\nMilitary muster of the whole citizen population once in each\nmonth--men, women, and children   358\n\nGymnastic training must have reference to war, not to\nathletic prizes   358\n\nRegulation of sexual intercourse. Syssitia or public mess   359\n\nRegulations about landed property--Boundaries--Limited power of\nfining by magistrates   360\n\nRegulations about artisans--Distribution of the annual landed\nproduce   361\n\nAdmission of resident Metics--conditions attached   362\n\nOffences and penal judicature--Procedure of the Dikasts\n_ib._\n\nSacrilege, the gravest of all crimes. High Treason   363\n\nTheft punished by _poena dupli_. General exhortation\nfounded by Plato upon this enactment   364\n\nAll unjust men are unjust involuntarily.--No such thing as\nvoluntary injustice. Injustice depends upon the temper of the\nagent--Distinction between damage and injury   365\n\nDamage may be voluntary or involuntary--Injustice is shown often\nby conferring corrupt profit upon another--Purpose of punishment,\nto heal the distemper of the criminal   _ib._\n\nThree distinct causes of misguided proceedings. 1. Painful\nstimulus. 2. Pleasurable stimulus. 3. Ignorance   366\n\nThe unjust man is under the influence either of the first or\nsecond of these causes, without controul of Reason. If he acts\nunder controul of Reason, though the Reason be bad, he is not\nunjust   367\n\nReasoning of Plato to save his doctrine--That no man commits\ninjustice voluntarily   _ib._\n\nPeculiar definition of injustice. A man may do great voluntary\nhurt to others, and yet not be unjust, provided he does it under\nthe influence of Reason, and not of Appetite   368\n\nPlato's purpose in the Laws is to prevent or remedy not only\ninjustice but misconduct   369\n\nVarieties of homicide--modes of dealing with them penally   370\n\nHomicide involuntary--Homicide under provocation   _ib._\n\nHomicide voluntary   371\n\nHomicide between kinsmen 372\n\nHomicide justifiable--in what cases   _ib._\n\nInfliction of wounds   _ib._\n\nInfliction of blows   373\n\nPlato has borrowed much from Attic procedure, especially in regard\nto Homicide--Peculiar view of Homicide at Athens, as to procedure\n374\n\nImpiety or outrage offered to divine things or places   375\n\nAll impiety arises from one or other of three heresies. 1. No\nbelief in the Gods. 2. Belief that the Gods interfere very little.\n3. Belief that they may be appeased by prayer and sacrifice   376\n\nPunishment for these three heretical beliefs, with or without\novert act   _ib._\n\nHeretic, whose conduct has been virtuous and faultless, to be\nimprisoned for five years, perhaps more   _ib._\n\nHeretic with bad conduct--punishment to be inflicted   377\n\nNo private worship or religious rites allowed. Every citizen must\nworship at the public temples   _ib._\n\nUncertain and mischievous action of the religious sentiment upon\nindividuals, if not controuled by public authority   378\n\nIntolerant spirit of Plato's legislation respecting uniformity of\nbelief   379\n\nThe persons denounced by Plato as heretics, and punished as such,\nwould have included a majority of the Grecian world   381\n\nPro\u00ebm or prefatory discourse of Plato, for these severe laws\nagainst heretics   383\n\nThe third variety of heresy is declared to be the worst--the\nbelief in Gods persuadable by prayer and sacrifice   384\n\nHeretics censured by Plato--Sokrates censured before the Athenian\nDikasts   385\n\nKosmological and Kosmogonical theory announced in Leges   386\n\nSoul--older, more powerful in the universe than Body. Different\nsouls are at work in the universe--the good soul and the bad soul\n_ib._\n\nPlato's argument is unsatisfactory and inconsistent   388\n\nReverence of Plato for uniform circular rotation   389\n\nArgument of Plato to confute the second class of heretics\n_ib._\n\nContrary doctrine of Plato in Republic   390\n\nArgument of Plato to refute the third class of heretics   391\n\nGeneral belief in Greece about the efficacy of prayer and\nsacrifice to appease the Gods   392\n\nIncongruities of Plato's own doctrine   393\n\nBoth Herodotus and Sokrates dissented from Plato's doctrine   394\n\nGreat opposition which Plato's doctrine would have encountered in\nGreece   395\n\nLocal infallibility was claimed as a rule in each community,\nthough rarely enforced with severity: Plato both claims it more\nemphatically, and enforces it more rigorously   396\n\nFarther civil and political regulations for the Magnetic\ncommunity. No evidence that Plato had studied the working of\ndifferent institutions in practice   397\n\nModes of acquiring property--legitimate and illegitimate\n_ib._\n\nPlato's general regulations leave little room for disputes about\nownership   398\n\nPlato's principles of legislation, not consistent--comparison of\nthem with the Attic law about Eranoi   399\n\nRegulations about slaves, and about freedmen   400\n\nProvisions in case a slave is sold, having a distemper upon him\n401\n\nRetailers. Strict regulations about them. No citizen can be a\nretailer   _ib._\n\nFrauds committed by sellers--severe punishments on them   402\n\nComparison with the lighter punishment inflicted by Attic law\n403\n\nRegulations about Orphans and Guardians: also about Testamentary\npowers   404\n\nPlato's general coincidence with Attic law and its sentiment   406\n\nTutelage of Orphans--Disagreement of Married Couples--Divorce\n_ib._\n\nNeglect of Parents   407\n\nPoison--Magic--Incantations--Severe punishment   _ib._\n\nPunishment is inflicted with a view to future prevention or\namendment   408\n\nPenalty for abusive words--for libellous comedy. Mendicity\nforbidden   409\n\nRegulations about witnesses on judicial trials   _ib._\n\nCensure of forensic eloquence, and the teachers of it. Penalties\nagainst contentious litigation   410\n\nMany of Plato's laws are discharges of ethical antipathy. The\nantipathy of Mel\u00eatus against Sokrates was of the same character\n411\n\nPenalty for abuse of public trust--wrongful appropriation of\npublic money--evasion of military service   412\n\nOaths. Dikasts, Judges, Electors, are to be sworn: but no parties\nto a suit, or interested witnesses, can be sworn   413\n\nRegulations about admission of strangers, and foreign travel of\ncitizens   414\n\nSuretyship--Length of prescription for ownership, &c.   415\n\nJudicial trial--three stages. 1. Arbitrators.\n2. Tribe-Dikasteries. 3. Select Dikastery   _ib._\n\nFunerals--proceedings prescribed--expense limited   _ib._\n\nConservative organ to keep up the original scheme of the lawgiver.\nNocturnal Council for this purpose--how constituted   _ib._\n\nThis Council must keep steadily in view the one great end of the\ncity--Mistakes made by existing cities about the right end   417\n\nThe one end of the city is the virtue of its citizens--that\nproperty which is common to the four varieties of Virtue--Reason,\nCourage, Temperance, Justice   _ib._\n\nThe Nocturnal** Council must comprehend this unity of Virtue,\nexplain it to others, and watch that it be carried out in detail\n418\n\nThey must also adopt, explain, and enforce upon the citizens, an\northodox religious creed. Fundamental dogmas of such creed   419\n\nLeges close, without describing the education proper for the\nNocturnal Counsellors. _Epinomis_ supplying this defect   420\n\nThe Athenian declares his plan of education--Arithmetic, Geometry,\nAstronomy   _ib._\n\nTheological view of Astronomy--Divine Kosmos--Soul more ancient\nand more sovereign than Body   421\n\nImproving effects of the study of Astronomy in this spirit   422\n\nStudy of arithmetic and geometry: varieties of proportion   423\n\nWhen the general forms of things have thus been learnt, particular\nindividuals in nature must be brought under them   _ib._\n\nQuestion as to education of the Nocturnal Council is answered in\nthe Epinomis   424\n\nProblem which the Nocturnal Council are required to solve,\nWhat is the common property of Prudence, Courage, Temperance,\nJustice, by reason of which each is called Virtue?   425\n\nThe only common property is that all of them are essential to the\nmaintenance of society, and tend to promote human security and\nhappiness   _ib._\n\nTendency of the four opposite qualities to lessen human happiness\n426\n\nA certain measure of all the four virtues is required. In judging\nof particular acts instigated by each, there is always a tacit\nreference to the hurt or benefit in the special case   _ib._\n\n\nPlato places these four virtues in the highest scale of Expetenda\nor Bona, on the ground that all the other Bona are sure to flow\nfrom them   428\n\nIn thus directing the attention of the Council to the common\nproperty of the four virtues, Plato enforces upon them the\nnecessity of looking to the security and happiness of their\ncommunity as the paramount end   429\n\nBut he enjoins also other objectionable ends   _ib._\n\nIntolerance of Plato--Comparison of the Platonic community with\nAthens   _ib._\n\n\n\n\nPLATO.\n\nCHAPTER XXXV.\n\nPLATONIC REPUBLIC--ABSTRACT.\n\n\nThe Republic is the longest of all the Platonic dialogues, except\nthe dialogue De Legibus. It consists of ten books, each of them as\nlong as any one of the dialogues which we have passed in review.\nPartly from its length--partly from its lofty pretensions as the\ngreat constructive work of Plato--I shall give little more than an\nabstract of it in the present chapter, and shall reserve remark\nand comment for the succeeding.\n\n[Side-note: Declared theme of the Republic--Expansion and\nmultiplication of the topics connected with it.]\n\nThe professed subject is--What is Justice? Is the just man happy\nin or by reason of his justice? whatever consequences may befall\nhim? Is the unjust man unhappy by reason of his injustice? But the\nground actually travelled over by Sokrates, from whose mouth the\nexposition proceeds, is far more extensive than could have been\nanticipated from this announced problem. An immense variety of\ntopics, belonging to man and society, is adverted to more or less\nfully. A theory of psychology or phrenology generally, is laid\ndown and advocated: likewise a theory of the Intellect,\ndistributed into its two branches: 1. Science, with the Platonic\nForms or Ideas as Realities corresponding to it; 2. Opinion, with\nthe fluctuating semi-realities or pseudo-realities, which form its\nobject. A sovereign rule, exercised by philosophy, is asserted as\nindispensable to human happiness. The fundamental conditions of a\ngood society, as Plato conceived it, are set forth at considerable\nlength, and contrasted with the social corruptions of various\nexisting forms of government. The outline of a perfect education,\nintellectual and emotional, is drawn up and prescribed for the\nruling class: with many accompanying remarks on the objectionable\ntendencies of the popular and consecrated poems. The\npost-existence, as well as the pre-existence of the soul, is affirmed\nin the concluding books. As the result of the whole, Plato\nemphatically proclaims his conviction, that the just man is happy\nin and through his justice, quite apart from all consideration of\nconsequences--yet that the consequences also will be such as to\nadd to his happiness, both during life as well as after death: and\nthe unjust man unhappy in and through his injustice.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Plat. Repub. i. pp. 328 A, 350 D, 354 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Personages of the dialogue.]\n\nThe dramatic introduction of the dialogue (which is described as\nheld during the summer, immediately after the festival of the\nBendideia in Peir\u00e6us), with the picture of the aged Kephalus and\nhis views upon old age, is among the richest and most spirited in\nthe Platonic works: but the discussion does not properly begin\nuntil Kephalus retires, leaving it to be carried on by Sokrates\nwith Polemarchus, Glaukon, Adeimantus, and Thrasymachus.\n\n[Side-note: Views of Kephalus about old age.]\n\n\"Old age has its advantages to reasonable men (says Kephalus). If\nI have lost the pleasures of youth, I have at the same time lost\nthe violent desires which then overmastered me. I now enjoy\ntranquillity and peace. Without doubt, this is in part owing to my\nwealth. But the best that wealth does for me is, that it enables\nme to make compensation for deceptions and injustice, practised on\nother men in my younger days--and to fulfil all vows made to the\nGods. An old man who is too poor to render such atonement for past\nfalsehood and injustice, becomes uneasy in his mind as death\napproaches; he begins to fear that the stories about Hades, which\nhe has heard and ridiculed in his youth, may perhaps prove\ntrue.\"[2]\n\n[Footnote 2: Plato, Repub. i. pp. 330-331.\n\nCompare the language of Cato, more rhetorical and exaggerated than\nthat of Kephalus, in Cic. De Senect. c. 13-14.]\n\n[Side-note: Definition of Justice by Simonides--It consists\nin rendering to every man what is owing to him.]\n\n\"Is that your explanation of justice (asks Sokrates): that it\nconsists in telling truth, and rendering to every one what you\nhave had from him?\" The old man Kephalus here withdraws;\nPolemarchus and the others prosecute the discussion. \"The poet\nSimonides (says Polemarchus) gives an explanation like to that\nwhich you have stated--when he affirms, That just dealing consists\nin rendering to every man what is owing to him.\"\n\n[Side-note: Objections to it by Sokrates--There are cases in\nwhich it is not right to restore what is owing, or to tell the\ntruth.]\n\n\"I do not know what Simonides means,\" replies Sokrates. \"He cannot\nmean that it is always right to tell the truth, or always right to\ngive back a deposit. If my friend, having deposited arms with me,\nafterwards goes mad, and in that state demands them back, it would\nnot be right in me either to restore the arms, or to tell the\ntruth, to a man in that condition. Therefore to say that justice\nconsists in speaking truth and in giving back what we have\nreceived, cannot be a good definition.\"[3]\n\n[Footnote 3: Plato, Repub. i. p. 331 C-D.\n\nThe historical Sokrates argues in the same manner (in the\nMemorabilia of Xenophon. See his conversation with Euthydemus, iv.\n2; and Cicero, De Offic. iii. 25, 94-95).]\n\nPolemarchus here gives a peculiar meaning to the phrase of\nSimonides: a man owes good to his friends--evil to his enemies:\nand he ought to pay back both. Upon this Sokrates comments.[4]\n\n[Footnote 4: Sokrates here remarks that the precepts--Speak truth;\nRestore what has been confided to you--ought not to be considered\nas universally binding. Sometimes justice, or those higher grounds\nupon which the rules of justice are founded, prescribe that we\nshould disobey the precepts. Sokrates takes this for granted, as a\nmatter which no one will dispute; and it is evident that what\nPlato had here in his mind was, the obvious consideration that to\ntell the truth or restore a weapon deposited, to one who had gone\nmad, would do no good to any one, and might do immense mischief:\nthus showing that general utility is both the foundation and the\nlimiting principle of all precepts respecting just and unjust.\nThat this is present to the mind of Plato appears evident from his\nassuming the position as a matter of course; it is moreover\nSokratic, as we see by the Memorabilia of Xenophon.\n\nBut Plato, in another passage of the Republic, clothes this\nSokratic doctrine in a language and hypothesis of his own. He sets\nup Forms or Ideas, _per se_. The Just,--The Unjust,--The\nHonourable,--The Base, &c. He distinguishes each of these from\nthe many separate manifestations in which it is specialised. The\nForm, though one reality in itself, appears manifold when embodied\nand disguised in these diversified accompaniments. It remains One\nand Unchanged, the object of Science and universal infallible\ntruth; but each of its separate manifestations is peculiar to\nitself, appears differently to different minds, and admits of no\nhigher certainty than fallible opinion. Though the Form of Justice\nalways remains the same, yet its subordinate embodiments ever\nfluctuate; there is no given act nor assemblage of acts which is\nalways just. Every just act (see Republic, v. pp. 476 A-479 A) is\nliable under certain circumstances to become unjust; or to be\ninvaded and overclouded by the Form of Injustice. The genuine\nphilosopher will detect the Form of Justice wherever it is to be\nfound, in the midst of accompaniments however discrepant and\nconfused, over all which he will ascend to the region of universal\ntruth and reality. The unphilosophical mind cannot accomplish this\nascent, nor detect the pure Form, nor even recognise its real\nexistence: but sees nothing beyond the multiplicity of diverse\nparticular cases in which it is or appears to be embodied.\nRespecting these particular cases there is no constant or\nuniversal truth, no full science. They cannot be thrown into\nclasses to which the superior Form constantly and unconditionally\nadheres. They are midway between reality and non-reality: they are\nmatters of opinion more or less reasonable, but not of certain\nscience or unconditional affirmation. Among mankind generally, who\nsee nothing of true and absolute Form, the received rules and\ndogmas respecting the Just, the Beautiful, &c., are of this\nintermediate and ambiguous kind: they can neither be affirmed\nuniversally, nor denied universally; they are partly true, partly\nfalse, determinable only by opinion in each separate case. Plato,\nRepub. v. p. 479 C-D: [Greek: ou)/t' ei)=nai ou)/te m\u00ea\\ ei)=nai\nou)de\\n au)t\u00f4=n dunato\\n pagi/\u00f4s no\u00ea=sai, ou)/te a)mpho/tera\nou)/te ou)de/teron . . . Ta\\ t\u00f4=n poll\u00f4=n polla\\ no/mima, kalou=\nte pe/ri kai\\ t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n, metaxu/ pou kulindei=tai tou= te m\u00ea\\\no)/ntos kai\\ tou= o)/ntos ei)likrin\u00f4=s.]\n\nOf the distinction here drawn in general terms by Plato, between\nthe pure unchangeable Form, and the subordinate classes of\nparticulars in which that Form is or appears to be embodied, the\nreasoning above cited respecting truth-telling and giving back a\ndeposit is an example.]\n\n[Side-note: Explanation by Polemarchus--Farther\ninterrogations by Sokrates--Justice renders what is proper and\nsuitable: but how? in what cases, proper? Under what circumstances\nis Justice useful?]\n\n_S._--Simonides meant to say (you tell me) that Justice\nconsists in rendering benefits to your friends, evil to your\nenemies: that is, in rendering to each what is proper and\nsuitable. But we must ask him farther--Proper and suitable--how?\nin what cases? to whom? The medical art is that which renders what\nis proper and suitable, of nourishment and medicaments for the\nhealth of the body: the art of cookery is that which renders what\nis proper and suitable, of savoury ingredients for the\nsatisfaction of the palate. In like manner, the cases must be\nspecified in which justice renders what is proper and suitable--to\nwhom, how, or what?[5] _P._--Justice consists in doing good\nto friends, evil to enemies. _S._--Who is it that is most\nefficient in benefiting his friends and injuring his enemies, as\nto health or disease? _P._--It is the physician. _S._--Who,\nin reference to the dangers in navigation by sea? _P._--The\nsteersman. _S._--In what matters is it that the just man\nshows his special efficiency, to benefit friends and hurt\nenemies?[6] _P._--In war: as a combatant for the one and\nagainst the other. _S._--To men who are not sick, the\nphysician is of no use nor the steersman, to men on dry land:\nDo you mean in like manner, that the just man is useless to those\nwho are not at war? _P._--No: I do not mean that. Justice is\nuseful in peace also. _S._--So also is husbandry, for raising\nfood--shoemaking, for providing shoes. Tell me for what want or\nacquisition justice is useful during peace? _P._--It is\nuseful for the common dealings and joint transactions between man\nand man. _S._--When we are engaged in playing at draughts,\nthe good player is our useful co-operator: when in laying bricks\nand stones, the skilful mason: much more than the just man. Can\nyou specify in what particular transactions the just man has any\nsuperior usefulness as a co-operator? _P._--In affairs of\nmoney, I think. _S._--Surely not in the employment of money.\nWhen you want to buy a horse, you must take for your assistant,\nnot the just man, but one who knows horses: so also, if you are\npurchasing a ship. What are those modes of jointly employing\nmoney, in which the just man is more useful than others?\n_P._--He is useful when you wish to have your money safely\nkept. _S._--That is, when your money is not to be employed,\nbut to lie idle: so that when your money is useless, then is the\ntime when justice is useful for it. _P._--So it seems.\n_S._--In regard to other things also, a sickle, a shield, a\nlyre when you want to use them, the pruner, the hoplite, the\nmusician, must be invoked as co-operators: justice is useful only\nwhen you are to keep them unused. In a word, justice is useless\nfor the use of any thing, and useful merely for things not in use.\nUpon this showing, it is at least a matter of no great worth.[7]\n\n[Footnote 5: Plato, Republic, i. p. 332 D. [Greek: \u00ea( ou)=n d\u00ea\\\nti/si ti/ a)podidou=sa te/chn\u00ea dikaiosu/n\u00ea a)\\n kaloi=to?]]\n\n[Footnote 6: Plato, Republic, i. p. 332 E. [Greek: o( di/kaios e)n\nti/ni pra/xei kai\\ pro\\s ti/ e)/rgon dunat\u00f4/tatos phi/lous\n\u00f4)phelei=n kai\\ e)chthrou\\s bla/ptein?]]\n\n[Footnote 7: Plat. Repub. i. pp. 332-333. 333 E: [Greek: Ou)k a)\\n\nou)=n pa/nu ge/ ti spoudai=on ei)/\u00ea \u00ea( dikaiosu/n\u00ea, ei) pro\\s ta\\\na)/chr\u00easta chr\u00ea/simon o)\\n tugcha/nei?]]\n\n[Side-note: The just man, being good for keeping property\nguarded, must also be good for stealing property--Analogies\ncited.]\n\nBut let us pursue the investigation (continues Sokrates). In\nboxing or in battle, is not he who is best in striking, best also\nin defending himself? In regard to disease, is not he who can best\nguard himself against it, the most formidable for imparting it to\nothers? Is not the general who watches best over his own camp,\nalso the most effective in surprising and over-reaching the enemy?\nIn a word, whenever a man is effective as a guard of any thing, is\nhe not also effective as a thief of it? _P._--Such seems the\ncourse of the discussion. _S._--Well then, the just man turns\nout to be a sort of thief, like the Homeric Autolykus.\nAccording to the explanation of Simonides, justice is a mode of\nthieving, for the profit of friends and damage of enemies.[8]\n_P._--It cannot be so. I am in utter confusion. Yet I think\nstill that justice is profitable to friends, and hurtful to\nenemies.\n\n[Footnote 8: Plat. Repub. i. p. 334 B. [Greek: e)/oiken ou)=n \u00ea(\ndikaiosu/n\u00ea . . . kleptik\u00ea/ tis ri)=nai, e)p' \u00f4)phelei/a| me/ntoi\nt\u00f4=n phi/l\u00f4n, kai\\ e)pi\\ bla/b\u00ea| t\u00f4=n e)chthr\u00f4=n.]]\n\n[Side-note: Justice consists in doing good to friends, evil\nto enemies--But how, if a man mistakes who his friends are, and\nmakes friends of bad men?]\n\n_S._--Whom do you call friends: those whom a man believes to\nbe good,--or those who really are good, whether he believes them\nto be so or not: and the like, in reference to enemies?\n_P._--I mean those whom he believes to be good. It is natural that\nhe should love _them_ and that he should hate those whom he\nbelieves to be evil. _S._--But is not a man often mistaken in\nthis belief? _P._--Yes: often. _S._--In so far as a man\nis mistaken, the good men are his enemies, and the evil men his\nfriends. Justice, therefore, on your showing, consists in doing\ngood to the evil men, and evil to the good men. _P._--So it\nappears. _S._--Now good men are just, and do no wrong to any\none. It is therefore just, on your explanation, to hurt those who\ndo no wrong. _P._--Impossible! that is a monstrous doctrine.\n_S._--You mean, then, that it is just to hurt unjust men, and\nto benefit just men? _P._--Yes; that is something better.\n_S._--It will often happen, therefore, when a man misjudges\nabout others, that justice will consist in hurting his friends,\nsince they are in his estimation the evil men: and in benefiting\nhis enemies, since they are in his estimation the good men. Now\nthis is the direct contrary of what Simonides defined to be\njustice.[9]\n\n[Footnote 9: Plato, Republic, i. p. 334 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Justice consists in doing good to your friend, if\nreally a good man: hurt to your enemy, with the like proviso.\nSokrates affirms that the just man will do no hurt to any one.\nDefinition of Simonides rejected.]\n\n\"We have misconceived the meaning of Simonides (replies\nPolemarchus). He must have meant that justice consists in\nbenefiting your friend, assuming him to be a good man: and in\nhurting your enemy, assuming him to be an evil man.\" Sokrates\nproceeds to impugn the definition in this new sense. He shows that\njustice does not admit of our hurting any man, either evil or\ngood. By hurting the evil man, we only make him more evil than he\nwas before. To do this belongs not to justice, but to\ninjustice.[10] The definition of justice--That it consists in\nrendering benefit to friends and hurt to enemies--is not suitable\nto a wise man like Simonides, but to some rich potentate like\nPeriander or Xerxes, who thinks his own power irresistible.[11]\n\n[Footnote 10: Plato, Republic, i. pp. 335-336.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Here is a characteristic specimen of searching\ncross-examination in the Platonic or Sokratic style: citing\nmultiplied analogies, and requiring the generalities of a\ndefinition to be clothed with particulars, that its sufficiency\nmay be proved in each of many successive as well as different\ncases.]\n\n[Side-note: Thrasymachus takes up the dialogue--Repulsive\nportrait drawn of him.]\n\nAt this turn of the dialogue, when the definition given by\nSimonides has just been refuted, Thrasymachus breaks in, and takes\nup the conversation with Sokrates. He is depicted as angry,\nself-confident to excess, and coarse in his manners even to the length\nof insult. The portrait given of him is memorable for its dramatic\nvivacity, and is calculated to present in an odious point of view\nthe doctrines which he advances: like the personal deformities\nwhich Homer heaps upon Thersites in the Iliad.[12] But how far it\nis a copy of the real man, we have no evidence to inform us.\n\n[Footnote 12: Homer, Iliad B 216. Respecting Thrasymachus the\nreader should compare Spengel--[Greek: Sunag\u00f4g\u00ea\\ Techn\u00f4=n]--pp.\n94-98: which abates the odium inspired by this picture in the\nRepublic.]\n\n[Side-note: Violence of Thrasymachus--Subdued manner of\nSokrates--Conditions of useful colloquy.]\n\nIn the contrast between Sokrates and Thrasymachus, Plato gives\nvaluable hints as to the conditions of instructive colloquy. \"What\nnonsense is all this!\" (exclaims Thrasymachus). \"Do not content\nyourself with asking questions, Sokrates, which you know is much\neasier than answering: but tell us yourself what Justice is: give\nus a plain answer: do not tell us that it is what is right--or\nprofitable--or for our interest--or gainful--or advantageous: for\nI will not listen to any trash like this.\" \"Be not so harsh with\nus, Thrasymachus\" (replies Sokrates, in a subdued tone). \"If we\nhave taken the wrong course of inquiry, it is against our own\nwill. You ought to feel pity for us rather than anger.\" \"I\nthought\" (rejoined Thrasymachus, with a scornful laugh) \"that you\nwould have recourse to your usual pretence of ignorance, and would\ndecline answering.\" _S._--How can I possibly answer, when you\nprescribe beforehand what I am to say or not to say? If you ask\nmen--How much is twelve? and at the same time say--Don't tell\nme that it is twice six, or three times four, or four times\nthree--how can any man answer your question? _T._--As if the two\ncases were similar! _S._--Why not similar? But even though\nthey be not similar, yet if the respondent thinks them so, how can\nhe help answering according as the matter appears to him, whether\nwe forbid him or not? _T._--Is that what you intend to do?\nAre you going to give me one of those answers which I forbade?\n_S._--Very likely I may, if on consideration it appears to me\nthe proper answer.[13] _T._--What will you say if I show you\nanother answer better than all of them? What penalty will you then\nimpose upon yourself? _S._--What penalty?--why, that which\nproperly falls upon the ignorant. It is their proper fate to learn\nfrom men wiser than themselves: that is the penalty which I am\nprepared for.[14]\n\n[Footnote 13: Plato, Repub. i. p. 337 C. [Greek: Ei) d' ou)=n\n_kai\\ m\u00ea\\ e)/stin o(/moion, phai/netai de\\ t\u00f4=| e)r\u00f4t\u00eathe/nti\ntoiou=ton, \u00ea(=tto/n ti au)to\\n oi)/ei a)pokrinei=sthai to\\\nphaino/menon e(aut\u00f4=|_, e)a/n te \u00ea(mei=s a)pagoreu/\u00f4men, e)a/n\nte m\u00ea/? A)/llo ti ou)=n, e)/ph\u00ea, kai\\ su\\ ou(/t\u00f4 poi\u00ea/seis? \u00f4(=n\ne)g\u00f4\\ a)pei=pon, tou/t\u00f4n ti a)pokrinei=? Ou)k a)\\n thauma/saimi,\n\u00ea)=n d' e)g\u00f4/, _ei)/ moi skepsame/n\u00f4| ou(/t\u00f4_ do/xeien.]\n\nThis passage deserves notice, inasmuch as Plato here affirms, in\nvery plain language, the Protagorean doctrine, which we have seen\nhim trying to refute in the The\u00e6t\u00eatus and Kratylus,--\"Homo\nMensura,--Every man is a measure to himself. That is true or false\nto every man which appears to him so.\"\n\nMost of Plato's dialogues indeed imply this truth; for no man\nmakes more constant appeal to the internal assent or dissent of\nthe individual interlocutor. But it is seldom that he declares it\nin such express terms.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Plato, Republic, i. p. 337 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Definition given by Thrasymachus--Justice is\nthat which is advantageous to the more powerful. Comments by\nSokrates. What if the powerful man mistakes his own advantage?]\n\nAfter a few more words, in the same offensive and insolent tone\nascribed to him from the beginning, Thrasymachus produces his\ndefinition of Justice:--\"Justice is that which is advantageous to\nthe more powerful\". Some comments from Sokrates bring out a fuller\nexplanation, whereby the definition stands amended:--\"Justice is\nthat which is advantageous to the constituted authority, or to\nthat which holds power, in each different community: monarchy,\noligarchy, or democracy, as the case may be. Each of these\nauthorities makes laws and ordinances for its own interest:\ndeclares what is just and unjust: and punishes all citizens who\ninfringe its commands. Justice consists in obeying these commands.\nIn this sense, justice is everywhere that which is for the\ninterest or advantage of the more powerful.\"[15] \"I too believe\"\n(says Sokrates) \"that justice is something advantageous, in a\ncertain sense. But whether you are right in adding these words--'to\nthe more powerful'--is a point for investigation.[16] Assuming\nthat the authorities in each state make ordinances for their own\nadvantage, you will admit that they sometimes mistake, and enact\nordinances tending to their own disadvantage. In so far as they do\nthis, justice is not that which is advantageous, but that which is\ndisadvantageous, to the more powerful.[17] Your definition\ntherefore will not hold.\"\n\n[Footnote 15: Plato, Republic, i. pp. 338-339.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Plato, Republic, i. p. 339 B. [Greek: e)peid\u00ea\\ ga\\r\nxumphe/ron ge/ ti ei)=nai kai\\ e)g\u00f4\\ o(molog\u00f4= to\\ di/kaion, su\\\nde\\ prosti/th\u00eas kai\\ au)to\\ ph\u00ea\\s ei)=nai _to\\ tou=\nkrei/ttonos_, e)g\u00f4\\ de\\ a)gno\u00f4=, skepte/on d\u00ea/.]]\n\n[Footnote 17: Plato, Republic, i. p. 339 E.]\n\n[Side-note: Correction by Thrasymachus--if the Ruler\nmistakes, he is _pro tanto_ no Ruler--The Ruler, _qu\u00e2_\nRuler--_qu\u00e2_ Craftsman--is infallible.]\n\nThrasymachus might have replied to this objection by saying, that\nhe meant what the superior power conceived to be for its own\nadvantage, and enacted accordingly, whether such conception was\ncorrect or erroneous. This interpretation, though indicated by a\nremark put into the mouth of Kleitophon, is not farther\npursued.[18] But in the reply really ascribed to Thrasymachus, he\nis made to retract what he had just before admitted--that the\nsuperior authority sometimes commits mistakes. In so far as a\nsuperior or a ruler makes mistakes (Thrasymachus says), he is not\na superior. We say, indeed, speaking loosely, that the ruler falls\ninto error, just as we say that the physician or the steersman\nfalls into error. The physician does not err _qu\u00e2_ physician,\nnor the steersman _qu\u00e2_ steersman. No craftsman errs\n_qu\u00e2_ craftsman. If he errs, it is not from his craft, but\nfrom want of knowledge: that is, from want of craft.[19] What the\nruler, as such, declares to be best for himself, and therefore\nenacts, is always really best for himself: this is justice for the\npersons under his rule.\n\n[Footnote 18: Plato, Republic, i. p. 340 B.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Plato, Republic, i. p. 340 E. [Greek: e)pilipou/s\u00eas\nga\\r e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas o( a(marta/n\u00f4n a(marta/nei, e)n \u00f4(=| ou)/k e)sti\nd\u00eamiourgo/s; \u00f4(/ste d\u00eamiourgo\\s \u00ea)\\ sopho\\s \u00ea)\\ a)/rch\u00f4n ou)dei\\s\na(marta/nei to/te o(/tan a)/rch\u00f4n \u00ea)=|.]]\n\n[Side-note: Reply by Sokrates--The Ruler, _qu\u00e2_\ninfallible Craftsman, studies the interest of those whom he\ngoverns, and not his own interest.]\n\nTo this subtle distinction, Sokrates replies by saying (in\nsubstance), \"If you take the craftsman in this strict meaning, as\nrepresenting the abstraction Craft, it is not true that his\nproceedings are directed towards his own interest or advantage.\nWhat he studies is, the advantage of his subjects or clients,\nnot his own. The physician, as such, has it in view to cure his\npatients: the steersman, to bring his passengers safely to\nharbour: the ruler, so far forth as craftsman, makes laws for the\nbenefit of his subjects, and not for his own. If obedience to\nthese laws constitutes justice, therefore, it is not true that\njustice consists in what is advantageous to the superior or\ngoverning power. It would rather consist in what is advantageous\nto the governed.\"[20]\n\n[Footnote 20: Plato, Republic, i. p. 342.]\n\n[Side-note: Thrasymachus denies this--Justice is the good of\nanother. The just many are worse off than the unjust One, and are\nforced to submit to his superior strength.]\n\nThrasymachus is now represented as renouncing the abstraction\nabove noted,[21] and reverting to the actualities of life. \"Such\ntalk is childish!\" (he exclaims, with the coarseness imputed to\nhim in this dialogue). \"Shepherds and herdsmen tend and fatten\ntheir flocks and herds, not for the benefit of the sheep and oxen,\nbut for the profit of themselves and the proprietors. So too the\ngenuine ruler in a city: he regards his subjects as so many sheep,\nlooking only to the amount of profit which he can draw from\nthem.[22] Justice is, in real truth, the good of another; it is\nthe profit of him who is more powerful and rules--the loss of\nthose who are weaker and must obey. It is the unjust man who rules\nover the multitude of just and well-meaning men. They serve him\nbecause he is the stronger: they build up his happiness at the\ncost of their own. Everywhere, both in private dealing and in\npublic function, the just man is worse off than the unjust. I mean\nby the unjust, one who has the power to commit wrongful seizure on\na large scale. You may see this if you look at the greatest\ninjustice of all--the case of the despot, who makes himself happy\nwhile the juster men over whom he rules are miserable. One who is\ndetected in the commission of petty crimes is punished, and gets a\nbad name: but if a man has force enough to commit crime on the\ngrand scale, to enslave the persons of the citizens, and to\nappropriate their goods--instead of being called by a bad name, he\nis envied and regarded as happy, not only by the citizens\nthemselves, but by all who hear him named. Those who blame\ninjustice, do so from the fear of suffering it, not from the fear\nof doing it. Thus then injustice, in its successful efficiency, is\nstrong, free, and over-ruling, as compared with justice. Injustice\nis profitable to a man's self: justice (as I said before) is what\nis profitable to some other man stronger than he.\"[23]\n\n[Footnote 21: Plato, Republic, p. 345 B-C.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Plato, Republic, p. 343 B.\n\nA similar comparison is put into the mouth of Sokrates himself by\nPlato in the The\u00e6t\u00eatus, p. 174 D.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Plato, Republic, i. pp. 343-344.]\n\n[Side-note: Position laid for the subsequent debate and\nexposition.]\n\nThrasymachus is described as laying down this position in very\nperemptory language, and as anxious to depart immediately after\nit, if he had not been detained by the other persons present. His\nposition forms the pivot of the subsequent conversation. The two\nopinions included in it--(That justice consists in obedience\nyielded by the weak to the orders of the strong, for the advantage\nof the strong--That injustice, if successful, is profitable and\nconfers happiness: justice the contrary)--are disputed, both of\nthem, by Sokrates as well as by Glaukon.[24]\n\n[Footnote 24: Plato, Repub. i. pp. 345 A-348 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Arguments of Sokrates--Injustice is a source of\nweakness--Every multitude must observe justice among themselves,\nin order to avoid perpetual quarrels. The same about any single\nindividual: if he is unjust, he will be at war with himself, and\nperpetually weak.]\n\nSokrates is represented as confuting and humiliating Thrasymachus\nby various arguments, of which the two first at least are more\nsubtle than cogent.[25] He next proceeds to argue that injustice,\nfar from being a source of strength, is a source of weakness--That\nany community of men, among whom injustice prevails, must be in\ncontinual dispute; and therefore incapable of combined action\nagainst others--That a camp of mercenary soldiers or robbers, who\nplunder every one else, must at least observe justice among\nthemselves--That if they have force, this is because they are\nunjust only by halves: that if they were thoroughly unjust, they\nwould also be thoroughly impotent--That the like is true also of\nan individual separately taken, who, so far as he is unjust, is in\na perpetual state of hatred and conflict with himself, as well as\nwith just men and with the Gods: and would thus be divested of all\npower to accomplish any purpose.[26]\n\n[Footnote 25: Plato, Republic, i. pp. 346-350.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Plato, Republic, i. pp. 351-352 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Farther argument of Sokrates--The just man is\nhappy, the unjust man miserable--Thrasymachus is confuted and\nsilenced. Sokrates complains that he does not yet know what\nJustice is.]\n\nHaving thus shown that justice is stronger than injustice,\nSokrates next offers an argument to prove that it is happier or\nconfers more happiness than injustice. The conclusion of this\nargument is--That the just man is happy, and the unjust\nmiserable.[27] Thrasymachus is confuted, and retires humiliated\nfrom the debate. Yet Sokrates himself is represented as\ndissatisfied with the result. \"At the close of our debate\" (he\nsays) \"I find that I know nothing about the matter. For as I do\nnot know what justice is, I can hardly expect to know whether it\nis a virtue or not; nor whether the man who possesses it is happy\nor not happy.\"[28]\n\n[Footnote 27: Plato, Republic, i. pp. 353-354 A.]\n\n[Footnote 28: Plato, Republic, i. fin. p. 354 C. [Greek: \u00f4(/ste\nmoi ge/gonen e)k tou= dialo/gou m\u00eade\\n ei)de/nai; o(po/te ga\\r to\\\ndi/kaion m\u00ea\\ oi)=da o(\\ e)sti, schol\u00ea=| ei)/somai ei)/te a)ret\u00ea/\ntis ou)=sa tugcha/nei ei)/te kai\\ ou)/, kai\\ po/teron o( e)/ch\u00f4n\nau)to\\ ou)k eu)dai/m\u00f4n e)sti\\n \u00ea)\\ eu)dai/m\u00f4n.]]\n\n[Side-note: Glaukon intimates that he is not satisfied with\nthe proof, though he agrees in the opinion expressed by Sokrates.\nTripartite distribution of Good--To which of the three heads does\nJustice belong?]\n\nHere Glaukon enters the lists, intimating that he too is\ndissatisfied with the proof given by Sokrates, that justice is\nevery way better than injustice: though he adopts the conclusion,\nand desires much to hear it fully demonstrated. \"You know\" (he\nsays), \"Sokrates, that there are three varieties of Good--1. Good,\n_per se_, and for its own sake (apart from any regard to\nulterior consequences): such as enjoyment and the innocuous\npleasures. 2. Good both in itself, and by reason of its ulterior\nconsequences: such as full health, perfect vision, intelligence,\n&c. 3. Good, not in itself, but altogether by reason of its\nconsequences: such as gymnastic training, medical treatment,\nprofessional business, &c. Now in which of these branches do\nyou rank Justice?\" _S._--I rank it in the noblest--that is--in\nthe second branch: which is good both in itself, and by reason\nof its consequences. _G._--Most persons put it in the third\nbranch: as being in itself difficult and laborious, but deserving\nto be cultivated in consequence of the reward and good name which\nattaches to the man who is reputed just.[29] _S._--I know\nthat this is the view taken by Thrasymachus and many others: but\nit is not mine. _G._--Neither is it mine.\n\n[Footnote 29: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 357.]\n\n[Side-note: Glaukon undertakes to set forth the case against\nSokrates, though professing not to agree with it.]\n\nYet still I think that you have not made out your case against\nThrasymachus, and that he has given up the game too readily. I\nwill therefore re-state his argument, not at all adopting his\nopinion as my own, but simply in order to provoke a full\nrefutation of it from you, such as I have never yet heard from any\none. First, I shall show what his partisans say as to the nature\nand origin of justice. Next, I shall show that all who practise\njustice, practise it unwillingly; not as good _per se_, but\nas a necessity. Lastly, I shall prove that such conduct on their\npart is reasonable. If these points can be made out, it will\nfollow that the life of the unjust man is much better than that of\nthe just.[30]\n\n[Footnote 30: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 358.]\n\n[Side-note: Pleading of Glaukon. Justice is in the nature of\na compromise for all--a medium between what is best and what is\nworst.]\n\nThe case, as set forth first by Glaukon, next by Adeimantus,\nmaking themselves advocates of Thrasymachus--is as follows. \"To do\ninjustice, is by nature good: to suffer injustice is by nature\nevil: but the last is greater as an evil, than the first as a\ngood: so that when men have tasted of both, they find it\nadvantageous to agree with each other, that none shall either do\nor suffer injustice. These agreements are embodied in laws; and\nwhat is prescribed by the law is called lawful and just. Here you\nhave the generation and essence of justice, which is intermediate\nbetween what is best and what is worst: that is, between the power\nof committing injustice with impunity, and the liability to suffer\ninjustice without protection or redress. Men acquiesce in such\ncompromise, not as in itself good, but because they are too weak\nto commit injustice safely. For if any man were strong enough to\ndo so, and had the dispositions of a man, he would not make such a\ncompromise with any one: it would be madness in him to do so.[31]\n\n[Footnote 31: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 358-359.]\n\n\"That men are just, only because they are too weak to be unjust,\nwill appear if we imagine any of them, either the just or the\nunjust, armed with full power and impunity, such as would be\nconferred by the ring of Gyges, which rendered the wearer\ninvisible at pleasure. If the just man could become thus\nprivileged, he would act in the same manner as the unjust: his\ntemper would never be adamantine enough to resist the temptations\nwhich naturally prompt every man to unlimited satisfaction of\nhis desires. Such temptations are now counteracted by the force of\nlaw and opinion; but if these sanctions were nullified, every man,\njust or unjust, would seize every thing that he desired, without\nregard to others. When he is just, he is so not willingly, but by\ncompulsion. He chooses that course not as being the best for him\nabsolutely, but as the best which his circumstances will permit.\n\n[Side-note: Comparison of the happiness of the just man\nderived from his justice alone, when others are unjust to him with\nthat of the unjust man under parallel circumstances.]\n\n\"To determine which of the two is happiest, the just man or the\nunjust, let us assume each to be perfect in his part, and then\ncompare them. The unjust man must be assumed to have at his\ncommand all means of force and fraud, so as to procure for himself\nthe maximum of success; _i.e._, the reputation of being a\njust man, along with all the profitable enormities of injustice.\nAgainst him we will set the just man, perfect in his own\nsimplicity and righteousness; a man who cares only for being just\nin reality, and not for seeming to be so. We shall suppose him,\nthough really just, to be accounted by every one else thoroughly\nunjust. It is only thus that we can test the true value of his\njustice: for if he be esteemed just by others, he will be honoured\nand recompensed, so that we cannot be sure that his justice is not\ndictated by regard to these adventitious consequences. He must be\nassumed as just through life, yet accounted by every one else\nunjust, and treated accordingly: while the unjust man, with whom\nwe compare him, is considered and esteemed by others as if he were\nperfectly just. Which of the two will have the happiest life?\nUnquestionably the unjust man. He will have all the advantages\nderived from his unscrupulous use of means, together with all that\nextrinsic favour and support which proceeds from good estimation\non the part of others: he will acquire superior wealth, which will\nenable him both to purchase partisans, and to offer costly\nsacrifices ensuring to him the patronage of the Gods. The just\nman, on the contrary, will not only be destitute of all these\nadvantages, but will be exposed to a life of extreme suffering and\ntorture. He will learn by painful experience that his happiness\ndepends, not upon being really just, but upon being accounted just\nby others.\"[32]\n\n[Footnote 32: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 361-362.]\n\n[Side-note: Pleading of Adeimantus on the same side. He\ncites advice given by fathers to their sons, recommending just\nbehaviour by reason of its consequences.]\n\nHere Glaukon concludes. Adeimantus now steps in as second counsel\non the same side, to the following effect:[33] \"Much yet remains\nto be added to the argument. To make it clearer, we must advert to\nthe topics insisted on by those who oppose Glaukon--those who\npanegyrise justice and denounce injustice. A father, who exhorts\nhis sons to be just, says nothing about the intrinsic advantages\nof justice _per se_: he dwells upon the beneficial\nconsequences which will accrue to them from being just. Through\nsuch reputation they will obtain from men favours, honours,\ncommands, prosperous alliances--from the Gods, recompenses yet\nmore varied and abundant. If, on the contrary, they commit\ninjustice, they will be disgraced and ill-treated among men,\nseverely punished by the Gods. Such are the arguments whereby a\nfather recommends justice, and dissuades injustice, he talks about\nopinions and after consequences only, he says nothing about\njustice or injustice in themselves. Such are the allegations even\nof those who wish to praise and enforce justice. But there are\nothers, and many among them, who hold an opposite language,\nproclaiming unreservedly that temperance and justice are difficult\nto practise--injustice and intemperance easy and agreeable, though\nlaw and opinion brand them as disgraceful. These men affirm that\nthe unjust life is for the most part more profitable than the\njust. They are full of panegyrics towards the wealthy and\npowerful, however unprincipled; despising the poor and weak, whom\nnevertheless they admit to be better men.[34] They even say that\nthe Gods themselves entail misery upon many good men, and confer\nprosperity on the wicked. Then there come the prophets and\njugglers, who profess to instruct rich men, out of many books,\ncomposed by Orpheus and Mus\u00e6us, how they may by appropriate\npresents and sacrifices atone for all their crimes and die\nhappy.[35]\n\n[Footnote 33: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 362-367.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 364 A-B.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Plato, Republic, p. 364 C-E.]\n\n\"When we find that the case is thus stated respecting justice,\nboth by its panegyrists and by its enemies--that the former extol\nit only from the reputation which it procures, and that the\nlatter promise to the unjust man, if clever and energetic, a\nhigher recompense than any such reputation can obtain for\nhim--what effect can we expect to be produced on the minds of young\nmen of ability, station, and ambition? What course of life are they\nlikely to choose? Surely they will thus reason: A just life is\nadmitted to be burdensome--and it will serve no purpose, unless I\nacquire, besides, the reputation of justice in the esteem of\nothers. Now the unjust man, who can establish such reputation,\nenjoys the perfection of existence. My happiness turns not upon\nthe reality, but upon the seeming: upon my reputation with\nothers.[36] Such reputation then it must be my aim to acquire. I\nmust combine the real profit of injustice with the outside show\nand reputation of justice. Such combination is difficult: but all\nconsiderable enterprises are difficult: I must confederate with\npartisans to carry my point by force or fraud. If I succeed, I\nattain the greatest prize to which man can aspire. I may be told\nthat the Gods will punish me; but the same poets, who declare the\nexistence of the Gods, assure me also that they are placable by\nprayer and sacrifice: and the poets are as good authority on the\none point as on the other.[37] Such\" (continues Adeimantus) \"will\nbe the natural reasoning of a powerful, energetic, aspiring, man.\nHow can we expect that such a man should prefer justice, when the\nrewards of injustice on its largest scale are within his\nreach?[38] Unless he be averse to injustice, from some divine\npeculiarity of disposition--or unless he has been taught to\nabstain from it by the acquisition of knowledge,--he will treat\nthe current encomiums on justice as ridiculous. No man is just by\nhis own impulse. Weak men or old men censure injustice, because\nthey have not force enough to commit it with success: which is\nproved by the fact than any one of them who acquires power,\nimmediately becomes unjust as far as his power reaches.\n\n[Footnote 36: Plat. Rep. ii. pp. 365 E, 366 A.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Plat. Rep. ii. p. 365 B-D.]\n\n[Footnote 38: Plat. Rep. ii. p. 366 B-D.]\n\n[Side-note: Nobody recommends Justice _per se_, but\nonly by reason of its consequences.]\n\n\"The case as I set it forth\" (pursues Adeimantus) \"admits of no\nanswer on the ground commonly taken by those who extol justice and\nblame injustice, from the earliest poets down to the present\nday.[39] What they praise is not justice _per se_, but\nthe reputation which the just man obtains, and the consequences\nflowing from it. What they blame is not injustice _per se_,\nbut its results. They never commend, nor even mention, justice as\nit exists in and moulds the internal mind and character of the\njust man; even though he be unknown, misconceived and detested, by\nGods as well as by men. Nor do they ever talk of the internal and\nintrinsic effects of injustice upon the mind of the unjust man,\nbut merely of his ulterior prospects. They never attempt to show\nthat injustice itself, in the mind of the unjust man, is the\ngravest intrinsic evil: and justice in the mind of the just man,\nthe highest intrinsic good: apart from consequences on either\nside. If you had all held this language from the beginning, and\nhad impressed upon us such persuasion from our childhood, there\nwould have been no necessity for our keeping watch upon each other\nto prevent injustice. Every man would have been the best watch\nupon himself, through fear lest by becoming unjust he might take\ninto his own bosom the gravest evil.[40]\n\n[Footnote 39: Plat. Rep. ii. p. 366 D-E. [Greek: pa/nt\u00f4n u(m\u00f4=n,\no(/soi e)paine/tai phate\\ dikaiosu/n\u00eas ei)=nai, a)po\\ t\u00f4=n e)x\na)rch\u00ea=s \u00ea(r\u00f4/\u00f4n a)rxa/menoi, o(/s\u00f4n lo/goi leleimme/noi, me/chri\nt\u00f4=n nu=n a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n, ou)dei\\s p\u00f4/pote e)/psexen a)diki/an ou)d'\ne)p\u00ea/|nese dikaiosu/n\u00ean a)/ll\u00f4s \u00ea)\\ do/xas te kai\\ tima\\s kai\\\nd\u00f4rea\\s ta\\s a)p' au)t\u00f4=n duna/mei e)n t\u00ea=| tou= e)/chontos\npsuch\u00ea=| e)no\\n kai\\ lantha/non theou/s te kai\\ a)nthr\u00f4/pous,\nou)dei\\s p\u00f4/pote ou)/t' e)n poi\u00ea/sei ou)/t' e)n i)di/ois lo/gois\ne)pex\u00ea=lthen i(kan\u00f4=s t\u00f4=| lo/g\u00f4|], &c. Compare p. 362 E.\n\nWhoever reads this, will see that Plato does not intend (as most\nof his commentators assert) that the arguments which Sokrates\ncombats in the Republic were the invention of Protagoras,\nProdikus, and other Sophists of the Platonic century.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 367 A. [Greek: ei) ga\\r\nou)/t\u00f4s e)le/geto e)x a)rch\u00ea=s u(po\\ pa/nt\u00f4n u(m\u00f4=n, kai\\ e)k\nne/\u00f4n \u00ea(ma=s e)pei/thete, ou)k a)n a)ll\u00ea/lous e)phula/ttomen m\u00ea\\\na)dikei=n, a)ll' au)to\\s au(tou= \u00ea)=n e(/kastos phu/lax, dedi\u00f4\\s\nm\u00ea\\ a)dik\u00f4=n t\u00f4=| megi/st\u00f4| kak\u00f4=| xu/noikos \u00ea)=|.]]\n\n[Side-note: Adeimantus calls upon Sokrates to recommend and\nenforce Justice on its own grounds, and to explain how Justice in\nitself benefits the mind of the just man.]\n\n\"Here therefore is a deficiency in the argument on behalf of\njustice, which I call upon you,[41] Sokrates, who have employed\nall your life in these meditations, to supply. You have declared\njustice to be good indeed for its consequences, but still more of\na good from its own intrinsic nature. Explain how it is good, and\nhow injustice is evil, in its own intrinsic nature: what effect\neach produces on the mind, so as to deserve such an appellation.\nOmit all notice of consequences accruing to the just or unjust\nman, from the opinion, favourable or otherwise, entertained\ntowards him by others. You must even go farther: you must suppose\nthat both of them are misconceived, and that the just man is\ndisgraced and punished as if he were unjust--the unjust man\nhonoured and rewarded as if he were just. This is the only way of\ntesting the real intrinsic value of justice and injustice,\nconsidered in their effects upon the mind. If you expatiate on the\nconsequences--if you regard justice as in itself indifferent, but\nvaluable on account of the profitable reputation which it\nprocures, and injustice as in itself profitable, but dangerous to\nthe unjust man from the hostile sentiment and damage which it\nbrings upon him--the real drift of your exhortation will be, to\nmake us aspire to be unjust in reality, but to aim at maintaining\na reputation of justice along with it. In that line of argument\nyou will concede substantially the opinion of Thrasymachus--That\njustice is another man's good, the advantage of the more powerful:\nand injustice the good or profit of the agent, but detrimental to\nthe weaker.\"[42]\n\n[Footnote 41: Plat. Rep. ii. p. 367 E. [Greek: dio/ti pa/nta to\\n\nbi/on ou)de\\n a)/llo skop\u00f4=n diel\u00ea/luthas \u00ea)\\ tou=to] (_you_,\nSokrates).]\n\n[Footnote 42: Plat. Republic, ii. p. 367 C-D.]\n\n[Side-note: Relation of Glaukon and Adeimantus to\nThrasymachus.]\n\nWith the invocation here addressed to Sokrates, Adeimantus\nconcludes his discourse. Like Glaukon, he disclaims participation\nin the sentiments which the speech embodies. Both of them,\nprofessing to be dissatisfied with the previous refutation of\nThrasymachus by Sokrates, call for a deeper exposition of the\nsubject. Both of them then enunciate a doctrine, resembling\npartially, though not entirely, that of Thrasymachus--but without\nhis offensive manner, and with superior force of argument. They\npropose it as a difficult problem, which none but Sokrates can\nadequately solve. He accepts the challenge, though with apparent\ndiffidence: and we now enter upon his solution, which occupies the\nremaining eight books and a half of the Republic. All these last\nbooks are in fact expository, though in the broken form of\ndialogue. The other speakers advance scarce any opinions for\nSokrates to confute, but simply intervene with expressions of\nassent, or doubt, or demand for farther information.\n\n[Side-note: Statement of the question as it stands after the\nspeeches of Glaukon and Adeimantus. What Sokrates undertakes to\nprove.]\n\nI here repeat the precise state of the question, which is very apt\nto be lost amidst the m\u00e6anderings of a Platonic dialogue.\n\nFirst, What is Justice? Sokrates had declared at the close of\nthe first book, that he did not know what Justice was; and that\ntherefore he could not possibly decide, whether it was a virtue or\nnot:--nor whether the possessor of it was happy or not.\n\nSecondly, To which of the three classes of good things does\nJustice belong? To the second class--_i. e._ things good\n_per se_, and good also in their consequences? Or to the\nthird class--_i. e._ things not good _per se_, but good\nonly in their consequences? Sokrates replies (in the beginning of\nthe second book) that it belongs to the second class.\n\nEvidently, these two questions cannot stand together. In answering\nthe second, Sokrates presupposes a certain determination of the\nfirst; inconsistent with that unqualified ignorance, of which he\nhad just made profession. Sokrates now professes to know, not\nmerely that Justice is a good, but to what class of good things it\nbelongs. The first question has thus been tacitly dropped without\nexpress solution, and has given place to the second. Yet Sokrates,\nin providing his answer to the second, includes implicitly an\nanswer to the first, so far as to assume that Justice is a good\nthing, and proceeds to show in what way it is good.\n\nSome say that Justice is good (_i.e._ that it ensures, or at\nleast contributes to, the happiness of the agent), but not _per\nse_: only in its ulterior consequences. Taken _per se_, it\nimposes privation, loss, self-denial; diminishing instead of\naugmenting the agent's happiness. But taken along with its\nresults, this preliminary advance is more than adequately repaid;\nsince without it the agent would not obtain from others that\nreciprocity of justice, forbearance, and good treatment without\nwhich his life would be intolerable.\n\nIf this last opinion be granted, Glaukon argues that Justice would\nindeed be good for weak and middling agents, but not for men of\npower and energy, who had a good chance of extorting the benefit\nwithout paying the antecedent price. And Thrasymachus, carrying\nthis view still farther, assumes that there are in every society\nmen of power who despotise over the rest; and maintains that\nJustice consists, for the society generally, in obeying the orders\nof these despots. It is all gain to the strong, all loss to the\nweak. These latter profit by it in no other way than by saving\nthemselves from farther punishment or ill usage on the part of the\nstrong.\n\n[Side-note: Position to be proved by Sokrates--Justice makes\nthe just man happy _per se_, whatever be its results.]\n\nSokrates undertakes to maintain the opposite--That Justice is a\ngood _per se_, ensuring the happiness of the agent by its\ndirect and intrinsic effects on the mind: whatever its ulterior\nconsequences may be. He maintains indeed that these ulterior\nconsequences are also good: but that they do not constitute the\nparamount benefit, or the main recommendation of Justice: that the\ngood of Justice _per se_ is much greater. In this point of\nview, Justice is not less valuable and necessary to the strong\nthan to the weak. He proceeds to show, what Justice is, and how it\nis beneficial _per se_ to the agent, apart from consequences:\nalso, what Injustice is, and how it is injurious to the agent\n_per se_, apart from consequences.[43]\n\n[Footnote 43: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 368 seq.]\n\n[Side-note: Argument of Sokrates to show what Justice\nis--Assumed analogy between the city and the individual.]\n\nHe begins by affirming the analogy between an entire city or\ncommunity, and each individual man or agent. There is justice (he\nsays) in the entire city--and justice in each individual man. In\nthe city, the characteristics of Justice are stamped in larger\nletters or magnified, so as to be more easily legible. We will\ntherefore first read them in the city, and then apply the lesson\nto explain what appears in smaller type in the individual man.[44]\nWe will trace the steps by which a city is generated, in order\nthat we may see how justice and injustice spring up in it.\n\n[Footnote 44: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 368-369.]\n\nIt is in this way that Plato first conducts us to the formation of\na political community. A parallel is assumed between the entire\ncity and each individual man: the city is a man on a great\nscale--the man is a city on a small scale. Justice belongs both to\none and to the other. The city is described and analysed, not merely\nas a problem for its own sake, but in order that the relation\nbetween its constituent parts may throw light on the analogous\nconstituent parts, which are assumed to exist in each individual\nman.[45]\n\n[Footnote 45: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 369 A. [Greek: t\u00ea\\n tou=\nmei/zonos o(moio/t\u00eata e)n t\u00ea=| tou= e)la/ttonos i)de/a|\ne)piskopou=ntes.]]\n\n[Side-note: Fundamental principle, to which communities of\nmankind owe their origin--Reciprocity of want and service between\nindividuals--No individual can suffice to himself.]\n\nThe fundamental principle (Sokrates affirms) to which cities\nor communities owe their origin, is, existence of wants and\nnecessities in all men. No single man is sufficient for himself:\nevery one is in want of many things, and is therefore compelled to\nseek communion or partnership with neighbours and auxiliaries.\nReciprocal dealings begin: each man gives to others, and receives\nfrom others, under the persuasion that it is better for him to do\nso.[46] Common needs, helplessness of individuals apart,\nreciprocity of service when they are brought together--are the\ngenerating causes of this nascent association. The simplest\nassociation, comprising the mere necessaries of life, will consist\nonly of four or five men: the husbandman, builder, weaver,\nshoemaker, &c. It is soon found advantageous to all, that each\nof these should confine himself to his own proper business: that\nthe husbandman should not attempt to build his own house or make\nhis own shoes, but should produce corn enough for all, and\nexchange his surplus for that of the rest in their respective\ndepartments. Each man has his own distinct aptitudes and\ndispositions; so that he executes both more work and better work,\nby employing himself exclusively in the avocation for which he is\nsuited. The division of labour thus becomes established, as\nreciprocally advantageous to all. This principle soon extends\nitself: new wants arise: the number of different employments is\nmultiplied. Smiths, carpenters, and other artisans, find a place:\nalso shepherds and herdsmen, to provide oxen for the farmer, wool\nand hides for the weaver and the shoemaker. Presently a farther\nsub-division of labour is introduced for carrying on exchange and\ndistribution: markets are established: money is coined: foreign\nmerchants will import and export commodities: dealers, men of weak\nbody, and fit for sedentary work, will establish themselves to\npurchase wholesale the produce brought by the husbandman, and to\nsell it again by retail in quantities suitable for distribution.\nLastly, the complement of the city will be made up by a section of\nlabouring men who do jobs for hire: men of great bodily strength,\nthough not adding much to the intelligence of the community.[47]\n\n[Footnote 46: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 369.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 371.\n\nIt is remarkable that in this first outline of the city Plato\nrecognises only free labour, not slave labour.]\n\n[Side-note: Moderate equipment of a sound and healthy\ncity--Few wants.]\n\nSuch is the full equipment of the sound and healthy city, confined\nto what is simple and necessary. Those who compose it will have\nsufficient provision of wheat and barley, for loaves and cakes--of\nwine to drink--of clothing and shoes--of houses for shelter, and\nof myrtle and yew twigs for beds. They will enjoy their cheerful\nsocial festivals, with wine, garlands, and hymns to the Gods. They\nwill take care not to beget children in numbers greater than their\nmeans, knowing that the consequence thereof must be poverty or\nwar.[48] They will have, as condiment, salt and cheese, olives,\nfigs, and chestnuts, peas, beans, and onions. They will pass their\nlives in peace, and will die in a healthy old age, bequeathing a\nsimilar lot to their children. Justice and injustice, which we are\nseeking for, will be founded on a certain mode of mutual want and\ndealing with each other.[49]\n\n[Footnote 48: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 372 B-C. [Greek: ou)ch\nu(pe\\r t\u00ea\\n ou)si/an poiou/menoi tou\\s pai=das, eu)labou/menoi\npeni/an \u00ea)\\ po/lemon.]]\n\n[Footnote 49: Plato, Republ. ii. p. 372 A. [Greek: e)n au)t\u00f4=n\ntou/t\u00f4n chrei/a| tini\\ t\u00ea=| pro\\s a)ll\u00ea/lous.]]\n\nYou feed your citizens, Sokrates (observes Glaukon), as if you\nwere feeding pigs. You must at least supply them with as many\nsweets and condiments as are common at Athens: and with beds and\ntables besides.\n\n[Side-note: Enlargement of the city--Multiplied wants and\nservices. First origin of war and strife with neighbours--It\narises out of these multiplied wants.]\n\nI understand you (replies Sokrates): you are not satisfied with a\ncity of genuine simplicity: you want a city luxurious and\ninflated. Well then--we will suppose it enlarged until it\ncomprehends all the varieties of elegant and costly enjoyment:\ngold, silver, and ivory: musicians and painters in their various\nbranches: physicians: and all the crowd of attendants required for\na society thus enlarged. Such extension of consumption will carry\nwith it a numerous population, who cannot be maintained from the\nlands belonging to the city. We shall be obliged to make war upon\nour neighbours and seize some of their lands. They too will do the\nsame by us, if they have acquired luxurious habits. Here we see\nthe first genesis of war, with all its consequent evils: springing\nfrom the acquisition of wealth, beyond the limit of necessity.[50]\nHaving war upon our hands, we need soldiers, and a\nconsiderable camp of them. Now war is essentially a separate craft\nand function, requiring to be carried on by persons devoted to it,\nwho have nothing else to do. We laid down from the beginning, that\nevery citizen ought to confine himself exclusively to that\nbusiness for which he was naturally fit; and that no one could be\nallowed to engage in two distinct occupations. This rule is above\nall things essential for the business of war. The soldier must\nperform the duties of a soldier, and undertake no others.[51]\n\n[Footnote 50: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 373.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 374.]\n\n[Side-note: Separate class of soldiers or Guardians. One man\ncannot do well more than one business. Character required in the\nGuardians--Mildness at home with pugnacity against enemies.]\n\nThe functions of these soldiers are more important than those of\nany one else. Upon them the security of the whole community\ndepends. They are the Guardians of the city: or rather, those few\nseniors among them, who are selected from superior merit and\nexperience, and from a more perfect education to exercise command,\nare the proper Guardians: while the remaining soldiers are their\nAuxiliaries.[52] These Guardians, or Guardians and their\nAuxiliaries, must be first chosen with the greatest care, to\nensure that they have appropriate natural dispositions: next,\ntheir training and education must be continued as well as\nsystematic. Appropriate natural dispositions are difficult to\nfind: for we require the coincidence of qualities which are rarely\nfound together. The Auxiliaries must be mild and gentle towards\ntheir fellow citizens, passionate and fierce towards enemies. They\nmust be like generous dogs, full of kindness towards those whom\nthey know, angrily disposed towards those whom they do not\nknow.[53]\n\n[Footnote 52: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 414 B.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 376.]\n\n[Side-note: Peculiar education necessary, musical as well as\ngymnastical.]\n\nAssuming children of these dispositions to be found, we must\nprovide for them the best training and education. The training\nmust be twofold: musical, addressed to the mind: gymnastical,\naddressed to the body--pursuant to the distribution dating from\nancient times.[54] Music includes all training by means of words\nor sounds: speech and song, recital and repetition, reading\nand writing, &c.\n\n[Footnote 54: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 376 E. [Greek: Ti/s ou)=n \u00ea(\npaidei/a? \u00ea)\\ chalepo\\n eu(rei=n belti/\u00f4 t\u00ea=s u(po\\ tou= pollou=\nchro/nou eu(r\u00eame/n\u00eas e)/sti de/ pou \u00ea( me\\n e)pi\\ s\u00f4/masi\ngumnastik\u00ea/, \u00ea( d' e)pi\\ psuch\u00ea=| mousik\u00ea/.]\n\nThis appeal of Plato to antiquity and established custom deserves\nnotice.]\n\n[Side-note: Musical education, by fictions as well as by\ntruth. Fictions addressed to the young: the religious legends now\ncirculating are often pernicious: censorship necessary.]\n\nThe earliest training of every child begins from the stories or\nfables which he hears recounted: most of which are false, though\nsome among them are true. We must train the child partly by means\nof falsehood, partly by means of truth: and we must begin first\nwith the falsehood. The tenor of these fictions, which the child\nfirst hears, has a powerful effect in determining his future\ntemper and character. But such fictions as are now currently\nrepeated, will tend to corrupt his mind, and to form in him\nsentiments and opinions adverse to those which we wish him to\nentertain in after life. We must not allow the invention and\ncirculation of stories at the pleasure of the authors: we must\nestablish a censorship over all authors; licensing only such of\ntheir productions as we approve, and excluding all the rest,\ntogether with most of those now in circulation.[55] The fables\ntold by Homer, Hesiod, and other poets, respecting the Gods and\nHeroes, are in very many cases pernicious, and ought to be\nsuppressed. They are not true; and even were they true, ought not\nto be mentioned before children. Stories about battles between the\nGods and the Giants, or quarrels among the Gods themselves, are\nmischievous, whether intended as allegories or not: for young\nhearers cannot discriminate the allegorical from the literal.[56]\n\n[Footnote 55: Plato, Republ. ii. p. 377 C. [Greek: \u00f4(=n de\\ nu=n\nle/gousi tou\\s pollou\\s e)kbl\u00eate/on.]\n\nCompare the animadversions in Sextus Empiricus about the\nmischievous doctrines to be found in the poets, adv. Mathematicos,\ni. s. 276-293.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Plato, Republ. p. 378 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Orthodox type to be laid down: all poets are\nrequired to conform their legends to it. The Gods are causes of\nnothing but good: therefore they are causes of few things. Great\npreponderance of actual evil.]\n\nI am no poet (continues the Platonic Sokrates), nor can I pretend\nto compose legends myself: but I shall lay down a type of\ntheological orthodoxy, to which all the divine legends in our city\nmust conform. Every poet must proclaim that the Gods are good, and\ntherefore cannot be the cause of anything except good. No poet can\nbe allowed to describe the Gods (according to what we now read in\nHomer and elsewhere) as dispensing both good and evil to mankind.\nThe Gods must be announced as causes of all the good which\nexists, but other causes must be found for all the evil: the Gods\ntherefore are causes of comparatively few things, since bad things\nare far more abundant among us than good.[57] No poetical tale can\nbe tolerated which represents the Gods as assuming the forms of\ndifferent persons, and going about to deceive men into false\nbeliefs.[58] Falsehood is odious both to Gods and to men: though\nthere are some cases in which it is necessary as a precaution\nagainst harm, towards enemies, or even towards friends during\nseasons of folly or derangement.[59] But none of these exceptional\ncircumstances can apply to the Gods.\n\n[Footnote 57: Plato, Republ. ii. p. 379 C. [Greek: Ou)d' a)/ra o(\ntheo/s, e)peid\u00ea\\ a)gatho/s, pa/nt\u00f4n a)\\n ei)/\u00ea ai)/tios, \u00f4(s oi(\npolloi\\ le/gousin, a)ll' o)li/g\u00f4n me\\n toi=s a)nthr\u00f4/pois\nai)/tios, poll\u00f4=n de\\ a)nai/tios; polu\\ ga\\r e)la/tt\u00f4 ta)gatha\\\nt\u00f4=n kak\u00f4=n \u00ea(mi=n. Kai\\ t\u00f4=n me\\n a)gath\u00f4=n ou)de/na a)/llon\nai)tiate/on, t\u00f4=n de\\ kak\u00f4=n a)/ll' a)/tta dei= z\u00eatei=n ta\\\nai)/tia, a)ll' ou) to\\n theo/n.]]\n\n[Footnote 58: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 380-381.\n\nDacier blames Plato for this as an error, saying, that God may\nappear, and has appeared to men, under the form of an Angel or of\nsome man whom he has created after his own image (Traduction de\nPlaton, tom. i. p. 172).]\n\n[Footnote 59: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 382 C.]\n\n[Side-note: The Guardians must not fear death. No terrible\ndescriptions of Hades must be presented to them: no intense\nsorrow, nor violent nor sensual passion, must be recounted either\nof Gods or Heroes.]\n\nIt is indispensable to inspire these youthful minds with courage,\nand to make them fear death as little as possible. But the\nterrific descriptions, given by the poets, of Hades and the\nunderworld, are above all things likely to aggravate the fear of\ndeath. Such descriptions must therefore be interdicted, as neither\ntrue nor useful. Even if poetically striking, they\nare all the more pernicious to be listened to by youths\nwhom we wish to train up as spirited free-men, fearing enslavement\nmore than death.[60] We must also prohibit the representations of\nintense grief and distress, imputed by Homer to Heroes or Gods, to\nAchilles, Priam, or Zeus, for the death of friends and relatives.\nA perfectly reasonable man will account death no great evil,\neither for himself or for his friend: he will be, in a peculiar\ndegree, sufficient to himself for his own happiness, and will\ntherefore endure with comparative equanimity the loss of friends,\nrelatives, or fortune.[61] We must teach youth to be ashamed of\nindulging in immoderate grief or in violent laughter.[62] We must\nteach them also veracity and temperance, striking out all\nthose passages in Homer which represent the Gods or Heroes as\nincontinent, sensual, furiously vindictive, reckless of\nobligation, or money-loving.[63] The poets must either not recount\nsuch proceedings at all, or must not ascribe them to Gods and\nHeroes.\n\n[Footnote 60: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 386-387.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 387 D-E.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 388 B-E.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 390-391.]\n\n[Side-note: Type for all narratives respecting men.]\n\nWe have thus prescribed the model to which all poets must\naccommodate their narratives respecting Gods and Heroes. We ought\nnow to set out a similar model for their narratives respecting\nmen. But this is impossible, until our present investigation is\nbrought to a close: because one of the worst misrepresentations\nwhich the poets give of human affairs, is, when they say that\nthere are many men unjust, yet happy--just, yet still\nmiserable:--that successful injustice is profitable, and that justice\nis a benefit to other persons, but a loss to the agent. We affirm\nthat this is a misrepresentation; but we cannot assume it as such at\npresent, since the present enquiry is intended to prove that it is\nso.[64]\n\n[Footnote 64: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 392 C.]\n\n[Side-note: Style of narratives. The poet must not practise\nvariety of imitation: he must not speak in the name of bad\ncharacters.]\n\nFrom the substance of these stories we pass to the style and\nmanner. The poet will recount either in his own person, by simple\nnarrative: or he will assume the characters and speak in the names\nof others, thus making his composition imitative. He will imitate\nevery diversity of character, good and bad, wise and foolish. This\nhowever cannot be tolerated in our city. We can permit no\nimitation except that of the reasonable and virtuous man. Every\nman in our city exercises one simple function: we have no\ndouble-faced or many-faced citizens. We shall respectfully dismiss\nthe poet who captivates us by variety of characters, and shall be\nsatisfied with the dry recital of simple stories useful in their\ntendency, expressing the feeling of the reasonable man and no\nother.[65]\n\n[Footnote 65: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 396-398.]\n\n[Side-note: Rhythm and Melody regulated. None but simple and\ngrave music allowed: only the Dorian and Phrygian moods, with the\nlyre and harp.]\n\nWe must farther regulate the style of the Odes and Songs,\nconsistent with what has been already laid down. Having prescribed\nwhat the sense of the words must be, we must now give directions\nabout melody and rhythm. We shall permit nothing but simple music,\ncalculated less to please the ear, than to inspire grave,\ndignified, and resolute sentiment. We shall not allow either the\nwailing Lydian, or the soft and convivial Ionic mood: but only the\nPhrygian and Dorian moods. Nor shall we tolerate either the fife,\nor complicated stringed instruments: nothing except the lyre and\nharp, with the panspipe for rural abodes.[66] The rhythm or\nmeasure must also be simple, suitable to the movements of a calm\nand moderate man. Both good rhythm, graceful and elegant speaking,\nand excellence of sense, flow from good and virtuous dispositions,\ntending to inspire the same dispositions in others:[67] just as\nbad rhythm, ungraceful and indecorous demeanour, defective\nproportion, &c., are companions of bad speech and bad\ndispositions. Contrasts of this kind pervade not only speech and\nsong, but also every branch of visible art: painting,\narchitecture, weaving, embroidery, pottery, and even the natural\nbodies of animals and plants. In all of them we distinguish grace\nand beauty, the accompaniments of a good and sober\ndisposition--from ungracefulness and deformity, visible signs of\nthe contrary disposition. Now our youthful Guardians, if they are\never to become qualified for their functions, must be trained to\nrecognise and copy such grace and beauty.[68] For this purpose our\npoets, painters, architects, and artisans, must be prohibited from\nembodying in their works any ungraceful or unseemly type. None\nwill be tolerated as artists, except such as can detect and embody\nthe type of the beautiful. Our youth will thus insensibly contract\nexclusive familiarity, both through the eye and through the ear,\nwith beauty in its various manifestations: so that their minds\nwill be brought into harmonious preparation for the subsequent\ninfluence of beautiful discourse.[69]\n\n[Footnote 66: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 398-399.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 400 A.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 400-401.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 401 C-D.]\n\n[Side-note: Effect of musical training of the mind--makes\nyouth love the Beautiful and hate the Ugly.]\n\nThis indeed (continues Sokrates) is the principal benefit arising\nfrom musical tuition, that the internal mind of a youth becomes\nimbued with rhythm and harmony. Hence he learns to commend and be\ndelighted with the beautiful, and to hate and blame what is ugly;\nbefore he is able to render any reason for his sentiments: so that\nwhen mature age arrives, his sentiments are found in unison\nwith what reason enjoins, and already predisposed to welcome\nit.[70] He becomes qualified to recognise the Forms of Temperance,\nCourage, Liberality, Magnanimity, and their embodiments in\nparticular persons. To a man brought up in such sentiments, no\nspectacle can be so lovely as that of youths combining beauty of\nmental disposition with beauty of exterior form. He may indeed\ntolerate some defects in the body, but none in the mind.[71] His\nlove, being genuine and growing out of musical and regulated\ncontemplations, will attach itself to what is tempered and\nbeautiful; not to the intense pleasures of sense, which are\ninconsistent with all temperance. Such will be the attachments\nsubsisting in our city, and such is the final purpose of musical\ntraining--To generate love of the Beautiful.[72]\n\n[Footnote 70: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 402 A.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 402 D-E.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 403 C. [Greek: dei= de/ pou\nteleuta=|n ta\\ mousika\\ ei)s ta\\ tou= kalou= e)r\u00f4tika/.]]\n\n[Side-note: Training of the body--simple and sober. No\nrefined medical art allowed. Wounds or temporary ailments treated;\nbut sickly frames cannot be kept alive.]\n\nWe next proceed to gymnastic training, which must be simple, for\nthe body--just as our musical training was simple for the mind. We\ncannot admit luxuries and refinements either in the one or in the\nother. Our gymnastics must impart health and strength to the body,\nas our music imparts sobriety to the mind.[73] We shall require\nfew courts of justice and few physicians. Where many of either are\nneeded, this is a proof that ill-regulated minds and\ndiseased bodies abound. It would be a disgrace to our Guardians if\nthey could not agree on what is right and proper among themselves,\nwithout appealing to the decision of others. Physicians too are\nonly needed for wounds or other temporary and special diseases. We\ncannot admit those refinements of the medical art, and that\nelaborate nomenclature and classification of diseases, which the\nclever sons of \u00c6sculapius have invented, in times more recent than\n\u00c6sculapius himself.[74] He knew, but despised, such artifices;\nwhich, having been devised chiefly by Herodikus, serve only to\nkeep alive sickly and suffering men--who are disqualified for all\nactive duty through the necessity of perpetual attention to\nhealth,--and whose lives are worthless both to themselves and to\nthe city. In our city, every man has his distinct and special\nfunction, which he is required to discharge. If he be disqualified\nby some temporary ailment, the medical art will be well employed\nin relieving and restoring him to activity: but he has no leisure\nto pass his life as a patient under cure, and if he be permanently\nunfit to fill his place in the established cycle of duties, his\nlife ought not to be prolonged by art, since it is useless to\nhimself and useless to the city also.[75] Our medical treatment\nfor evils of the body, and our judicial treatment for evils of the\nmind, must be governed by analogous principles. Where body and\nmind are sound at bottom, we must do our best to heal temporary\nderangements: but if a man has a body radically unsound, he must\nbe suffered to die--and if he has a mind unsound and incurable, he\nmust be put to death by ourselves.[76]\n\n[Footnote 73: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 404 B.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 405 D. [Greek: phu/sas te\nkai\\ kata/r)r(ous nos\u00ea/masin o)no/mata ti/thesthai a)nagka/zein\ntou\\s kompsou\\s A)skl\u00eapia/das, ou)k ai)schro\\n dokei=? Kai\\ ma/l',\ne)/ph\u00ea, \u00f4(s a)l\u00eath\u00f4=s kaina\\ tau=ta kai\\ a)/topa nos\u00eama/t\u00f4n\no)no/mata. Oi(=a, \u00f4(s oi)=mai, ou)k \u00ea)=n e)p' A)skl\u00eapiou=.] Also\n406 C.]\n\n[Footnote 75: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 406 C. [Greek: ou)deni\\\nschol\u00ea\\ dia\\ bi/ou ka/mnein i)atreuome/n\u00f4|.] 406 D: [Greek: ou)\nschol\u00ea\\ ka/mnein ou)de\\ lusitelei= ou(/t\u00f4 z\u00ea=n, nos\u00ea/mati to\\n\nnou=n prose/chonta, t\u00ea=s de\\ prokeime/n\u00eas e)rgasi/as a)melou=nta.]\n407 D-E: [Greek: a)lla\\ to\\n m\u00ea\\ duna/menon e)n t\u00ea=|\nkathest\u00eakui/a| perio/d\u00f4| z\u00ea\\n, m\u00ea\\ oi)/esthai dei=n therapeu/ein,\n\u00f4(s ou)/te au(t\u00f4=| ou)/te po/lei lusitel\u00ea=.] P. 408 A.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 409-410.]\n\n[Side-note: Value of Gymnastic in imparting courage to the\nmind--Gymnastic and Music necessary to correct each other.]\n\nGymnastic training does some good in strengthening the body, but\nit is still more serviceable in imparting force and courage to the\nmind. As regards the mind, gymnastic and music form the\nindispensable supplement one to the other. Gymnastic by itself\nmakes a man's nature too savage and violent: he acquires no relish\nfor knowledge, comes to hate discourse, and disdains verbal\npersuasion.[77] On the other hand, music by itself makes him soft,\ncowardly, and sensitive, unfit for danger or hardship. The\njudicious combination of the two is the only way to form a\nwell-balanced mind and character.[78]\n\n[Footnote 77: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 411 D. [Greek: Misolo/gos\nd\u00ea\\ o( toiou=tos gi/gnetai kai\\ a)/mousos, kai\\ peithoi= me\\n dia\\\nlo/g\u00f4n ou)de\\n e)/ti chr\u00ea=tai], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 410-411.]\n\n[Side-note: Out of the Guardians a few of the very best must\nbe chosen as Elders or Rulers--highly educated and severely\ntested.]\n\nSuch must be the training, from childhood upwards, of these\nGuardians and Auxiliaries of our city. We must now select from\namong these men themselves, a few to be Governors or chief\nGuardians; the rest serving as auxiliaries. The oldest and best of\nthem must be chosen for this purpose, those who possess in the\ngreatest perfection the qualities requisite for Guardians.\nThey must be intelligent, capable, and solicitous for the welfare\nof the city. Now a man is solicitous for the welfare of that which\nhe loves. He loves those whose interests he believes to be the\nsame as his own; those whose well-being he believes to coincide\nwith his own well-being[79]--the contrary, with the contrary. The\nGuardians chosen for Chiefs must be those who are most thoroughly\npenetrated with such sympathy; who have preserved most tenaciously\nthroughout all their lives the resolution to do every thing which\nthey think best for the city, and nothing which they do not think\nto be best for it. They must be watched and tested in temptations\npleasurable as well as painful, to see whether they depart from\nthis resolution. The elders who have best stood such trial, must\nbe named Governors.[80] These few will be the chief Guardians or\nRulers: the remaining Guardians will be their auxiliaries or\nsoldiers, acting under their orders.\n\n[Footnote 79: Plato, Republ. iii. p. 412 C. [Greek: Ou)kou=n\nphroni/mous te ei)s tou=to dei= u(pa/rchein kai\\ dunatou\\s kai\\\ne)/ti k\u00eademo/nas t\u00ea=s po/le\u00f4s? E)/sti tau=ta. K\u00ea/doito de/ g' a)/n\ntis ma/lista tou/tou o(\\ tugcha/noi phil\u00f4=n. A)na/gk\u00ea. Kai\\ m\u00ea\\n\ntou=to/ g' a)\\n ma/lista philoi=, \u00f4(=| xumphe/rein \u00ea(goi=to ta\\\nau)ta\\ kai\\ e(aut\u00f4=| kai\\ o(/tan ma/lista e)kei/nou me\\n eu)=\npra/ttontos oi)/oito xumbai/nein kai\\ e(aut\u00f4=| ei)= pra/ttein, m\u00ea\\\nde/, tou)nanti/on.]]\n\n[Footnote 80: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 413-414.\n\nRefer to De Leg. (I. p. 633-636-637) about resisting pleasure as\nwell as pain.]\n\n[Side-note: Fundamental creed required to be planted in the\nminds of all the citizens respecting their breed and\nrelationship.]\n\nHere then our city will take its start; the body of Guardians\nmarching in arms under the orders of their Chiefs, and encamping\nin a convenient acropolis, from whence they may best be able to\nkeep order in the interior and to repel foreign attack.[81] But it\nis indispensable that both they and the remaining citizens should\nbe made to believe a certain tale,--which yet is altogether\nfictitious and of our own invention. They must be told that they\nare all earthborn, sprung from the very soil which they inhabit:\nall therefore brethren, from the same mother Earth: the\nauxiliaries or soldiers, born with their arms and equipments. But\nthere was this difference (we shall tell them) between the\ndifferent brethren. Those fit for Chiefs or Rulers, were born with\na certain mixture of gold in their constitution: those fit for\nsoldiers or Guardians simply, with a like mixture of silver: the\nremainder, with brass or iron. In most individual cases, each\nof these classes will beget an offspring like themselves. But\nexceptions will sometimes happen, in which the golden man will\nhave a child of silver, or brass,--or the brazen or iron man, a\nchild of nobler metal than his own. Now it is of the last\nimportance that the Rulers should keep watch to preserve the\npurity of these breeds. If any one of their own children should\nturn out to be of brass or iron, they must place him out among the\nhusbandmen or artisans: if any of the brazen or iron men should\nchance to produce a child of gold, they must receive him among\nthemselves, since he belongs to them by his natural constitution.\nUpon the maintenance of these distinct breeds, each in its\nappropriate function, depends the entire fate of the city: for an\noracle has declared that it will perish, if ever iron or brazen\nmen shall become its Guardians.[82]\n\n[Footnote 81: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 415 D.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 414-415.]\n\n[Side-note: How is such a fiction to be accredited in the\nfirst instance? Difficulty extreme, of first beginning; but if\nonce accredited, it will easily transmit itself by tradition.]\n\nIt is indispensable (continues Sokrates) that this fiction should\nbe circulated and accredited, as the fundamental, consecrated,\nunquestioned, creed of the whole city, from which the feeling of\nharmony and brotherhood among the citizens springs. But how can we\nimplant such unanimous and unshaken belief, in a story altogether\nuntrue? Similar fables have often obtained implicit credence in\npast times: but no such case has happened of late, and I question\nwhether it could happen now.[83] The postulate seems extravagant:\ndo _you_ see by what means it could be realised?--I see no\nmeans (replies Glaukon) by which the fiction could be first passed\noff and accredited, among these men themselves: but if it were\nonce firmly implanted, in any one generation, I do not doubt that\ntheir children and descendants would inherit and perpetuate\nit.[84] We must be satisfied with thus much (replies Sokrates):\nassuming the thing to be done, and leaving the process of\nimplanting it to spontaneous and oracular inspiration.[85] I\nnow proceed with the description of the city.\n\n[Footnote 83: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 414 B. [Greek: Ti/s a)\\n\nou)=n \u00ea(mi=n m\u00eachan\u00ea\\ ge/noito t\u00f4=n pseud\u00f4=n t\u00f4=n e)n de/onti\ngignome/n\u00f4n, \u00f4(=n d\u00ea\\ nu=n e)le/gomen, gennai=o/n ti e(\\n\npseudome/nous pei=sai ma/lista me\\n kai\\ au)tou\\s tou\\s\na)/rchontas, ei) de\\ m\u00ea/, t\u00ea\\n a)/ll\u00ean po/lin? . . . M\u00eade\\n\nkaino/n, a)lla\\ Phoinikiko/n ti, pro/teron me\\n \u00ea)/d\u00ea pollachou=\ngegono/s, \u00f4(/s phasin oi( poi\u00eatai\\ kai\\ pepei/kasin, e)ph' \u00ea(m\u00f4=n\nde\\ ou) gegono\\s ou)d' oi)=da ei) geno/menon a)/n, pei=sai de\\\nsuchn\u00ea=s peithou=s.]]\n\n[Footnote 84: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 415 C-D [Greek: Tou=ton\nou)=n to\\n mu=thon o(/p\u00f4s a)\\n peisthei=en, e)/cheis tina\\\nm\u00eachan\u00ea/n? Ou)dam\u00f4=s, e)/ph\u00ea, o(/p\u00f4s g' a)\\n au)toi\\ ou(=toi;\no(/p\u00f4s me/nt' a)\\n oi( tou/t\u00f4n ui(ei=s kai\\ oi( e)/peita, oi(/ t'\na)/lloi a)/nthr\u00f4poi oi( u(/steron.]]\n\n[Footnote 85: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 415 D. [Greek: Kai\\ tou=to\nme\\n d\u00ea\\ e(/xei o(/p\u00ea| a)\\n au)to\\ \u00ea( ph\u00ea/m\u00ea a)ga/g\u00ea|.]\n\n[Side-note: Guardians to reside in barracks and mess\ntogether; to have no private property or home; to be maintained by\ncontribution from the people.]\n\nThe Rulers and their auxiliaries the body of Guardians must be\nlodged in residences, sufficient for shelter and comfort, yet\nsuitable for military men, and not for tradesmen. Every\narrangement must be made for rendering them faithful guardians of\nthe remaining citizens. It would be awful indeed, if they were to\nemploy their superior strength in oppressing instead of protecting\nthe flock entrusted to them. To ensure their gentleness and\nfidelity, the most essential guarantee is to be found in the good\nmusical and gymnastic training which they will have received. But\nthis alone will not suffice. All the conditions of their lives\nmust be so determined, that they shall have the least possible\nmotive for committing injustice towards the other citizens. None\nof them must have any separate property of his own, unless in\nspecial case of proved necessity: nor any house or store cupboard\nfrom which others are excluded. They must receive, from the\ncontributions of the remaining citizens, sufficient subsistence\nfor the health and comfort of military men, but nothing beyond.\nThey must live together in their camp or barrack, and dine\ntogether at a public mess-table. They must not be allowed either\nto possess gold and silver, or to drink in cups of those metals,\nor to wear them as appendages to clothing, or even to have them\nunder the same roof. They must be told, that these metals, though\nnot forbidden to the other citizens, are forbidden to them,\nbecause they have permanently inherent in their mental\nconstitution the divine gold and silver, which would be corrupted\nby intermixture with human.[86]\n\n[Footnote 86: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 416-417.]\n\n[Side-note: If the Guardians fail in these precautions, and\nacquire private interests, the city will be ruined.]\n\nIf these precautions be maintained, the Guardians may be secure\nthemselves, and may uphold in security the entire city. But if the\nprecautions be relinquished--if the Guardians or Soldiers acquire\nseparate property in lands, houses, and money--they will then\nbecome householders and husbandmen instead of Guardians or\nSoldiers: hostile masters, instead of allies and protectors to\ntheir fellow-citizens. They will hate their fellow-citizens, and\nbe hated by them in return: they will conspire against them, and\nwill be themselves conspired against. In this manner they will\npass their lives, dreading their enemies within far more than\ntheir enemies without. They, and the whole city along with them,\nwill be perpetually on the brink of destruction.[87]\n\n[Footnote 87: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 417 A-B.]\n\n[Side-note: Complete unity of the city, every man performing\nhis own special function.]\n\nBut surely (remarks Adeimantus), according to this picture, your\nGuardians or Soldiers, though masters of all the city, will be\nworse off than any of the other citizens. They will be deprived of\nthose means of happiness which the others are allowed to enjoy.\nPerhaps they will (replies Sokrates): yet I should not be\nsurprised if they were to be the happiest of all. Be that as it\nmay, however, my purpose is, not to make _them_ especially\nhappy, but to make the whole city happy. The Guardians can enjoy\nonly such happiness as consists with the due performance of their\nfunctions as Guardians. Every man in our city must perform his\nappropriate function, and must be content with such happiness as\nhis disposition will admit, subject to this condition.[88] In\nregard to all the citizens without exception, it must be the duty\nof the Guardians to keep out both riches and poverty, both of\nwhich spoil the character of every one. No one must be rich, and\nno one must be poor.[89] In case of war, the constant discipline\nof our soldiers will be of more avail than money, in making them\nefficient combatants against other cities.[90] Moreover, other\ncities are divided against themselves: each is many cities, and\nnot one: poor and rich are at variance with each other, and\nvarious fractions of each of these classes against other\nfractions. Our city alone, constituted as I propose, will be\nreally and truly One. It will thus be the greatest of all cities,\neven though it have only one thousand fighting men. It may be\npermitted to increase, so long as it will preserve its complete\nunity, but no farther.[91] Farthermore, each of our citizens is\none and not many: confined to that special function for which he\nis qualified by his nature.\n\n[Footnote 88: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 420-421.]\n\n[Footnote 89: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 421 E.]\n\n[Footnote 90: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 422 B.]\n\n[Footnote 91: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 423 A.]\n\n[Side-note: The maintenance of the city depends upon\nthat of the habits, character, and education of the Guardians.]\n\nIt will devolve upon our Guardians to keep up this form of\ncommunion unimpaired; and they will have no difficulty in doing\nso, as long as they maintain their own education and training\nunimpaired. No change must be allowed either in the musical or\ngymnastic training: especially not in the former, where changes\nare apt to creep in, with pernicious effect.[92] Upon this\neducation depends the character and competence of the Guardians.\nThey will provide legislation in detail, which will be good, if\ntheir general character is good--bad, on the contrary supposition.\nIf their character and the constitution of the city be defective\nat the bottom, it is useless for us to prescribe regulations of\ndetail, as we would do for sick men. The laws in detail cannot be\ngood, while the general constitution of the city is bad. Those\nteachers are mistaken who exhort us to correct the former, but to\nleave the latter untouched.[93]\n\n[Footnote 92: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 424 A.]\n\n[Footnote 93: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 425-426.]\n\n[Side-note: Religious legislation--Consult the Delphian\nApollo.]\n\nIn regard to religious legislation--the raising of temples,\narrangement of sacrifices, &c.--we must consult Apollo at\nDelphi, and obey what he directs. We know nothing ourselves about\nthese matters, nor is there any other authority equally\ntrustworthy.[94]\n\n[Footnote 94: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 427 B. [Greek: ta\\ ga\\r d\u00ea\\\ntoiau=ta ou)/t' e)pista/metha \u00ea(mei=s], &c.]\n\n[Side-note: The city is now constituted as a good city--that\nis, wise, courageous, temperate, just. Where is its Justice?]\n\nOur city is now constituted and peopled (continues Sokrates). We\nmast examine it, and see where we can find Justice and\nInjustice--reverting to our original problem, which was, to know what\neach of them was, and which of the two conferred happiness. Now assuming\nour city to be rightly constituted, it will be perfectly good:\nthat is, it will be wise, courageous, temperate, and just. These\nfour constituents cover the whole: accordingly, if we can discover\nand set out Wisdom, Courage, and Temperance--that which remains\nafterwards will be Justice.[95]\n\n[Footnote 95: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 427-428.]\n\n[Side-note: First, where is the wisdom of the city? It\nresides in the few elder Rulers.]\n\nFirst, we can easily see where Wisdom resides. The city includes\nin itself a great variety of cognitions, corresponding to all the\ndifferent functions in which its citizens are employed. But it is\nnot called _wise_, from its knowledge of husbandry, or of\nbrazier's and carpenter's craft: since these are specialties which\ncover only a small fraction of its total proceedings. It is called\n_wise_, or well-advised, from that variety of intelligence or\ncognition which directs it as a whole, in its entire affairs: that\nis, the intelligence possessed by the chief Guardians or Rulers.\nNow the number of persons possessing this variety of intelligence\nis smaller than the number of those who possess any other variety.\nThe wisdom of the entire city resides in this very small presiding\nfraction, and in them alone.[96]\n\n[Footnote 96: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 428-429.]\n\n[Side-note: Where is the Courage? In the body of Guardians\nor Soldiers.]\n\nNext, we can also discern without difficulty in what fraction of\nthe city Courage resides. The city is called courageous from the\nvalour of those Guardians or Soldiers upon whom its defence rests.\nThese men will have learnt, in the course of their training, what\nare really legitimate objects of fear, and what are not legitimate\nobjects of fear. To such convictions they will resolutely adhere,\nthrough the force of mind implanted by their training, in defiance\nof all disturbing impulses. It is these right convictions,\nrespecting the legitimate objects of fear, which I (says Sokrates)\ncall true political courage, when they are designedly inculcated\nand worked in by regular educational authority: when they spring\nup without any rational foundation, as in animals or slaves, I do\nnot call them Courage. The Courage of the entire city thus resides\nin its Guardians or Soldiers.[97]\n\n[Footnote 97: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 429-430.]\n\n[Side-note: Where is the Temperance? It resides in all and\neach, Rulers, Guardians, and People. Superiors rule and Inferiors\nobey.]\n\nThirdly, wherein resides the Temperance of the city? Temperance\nimplies a due relation, proportion, or accord, between different\nelements. The temperate man is called superior to himself: but\nthis expression, on first hearing, seems unmeaning, since the man\nmust also be inferior to himself. But the expression acquires a\ndefinite meaning, when we recognise it as implying that there are\nin the same man's mind better and worse elements: and that when\nthe better rules over the worse, he is called superior to himself,\nor temperate--when the worse rules over the better, he is called\ninferior to himself, or intemperate. Our city will be temperate,\nbecause the better part of it, though smaller in number, rules\nover the worse and inferior part, numerically greater. The\npleasures, pains, and desires of our few Rulers, which are\nmoderate and reasonable, are preponderant: controuling those of\nthe Many, which are miscellaneous, irregular, and violent. And\nthis command is exercised with the perfect consent and good-will\nof the subordinates. The Many are not less willing to obey than\nthe Few to command. There is perfect unanimity between them as to\nthe point--Who ought to command, and who ought to obey? It is this\nunanimity which constitutes the temperance of the city: which thus\nresides, not in any one section of the city, like Courage and\nWisdom, but in all sections alike: each recognising and\ndischarging its legitimate function.[98]\n\n[Footnote 98: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 431-432.]\n\n[Side-note: Where is the Justice? In all and each of them\nalso. It consists in each performing his own special function, and\nnot meddling with the function of the others.]\n\nThere remains only Justice for us to discover. Wherein does the\nJustice of the city reside? Not far off. Its justice consists in\nthat which we pointed out at first as the fundamental\ncharacteristic of the city, when we required each citizen to\ndischarge one function, and one alone--that for which he was best\nfitted by nature. That each citizen shall do his own work, and not\nmeddle with others in their work--that each shall enjoy his own\nproperty, as well as do his own work--this is true Justice.[99] It\nis the fundamental condition without which neither temperance, nor\ncourage, nor wisdom could exist; and it fills up the good\nremaining after we have allowed for the effects of the preceding\nthree.[100] All the four are alike indispensable to make up the\nentire Good of the city: Justice, or each person (man, woman,\nfreeman, slave, craftsman, guardian) doing his or her own\nwork--Temperance, or unanimity as to command and obedience between\nChiefs, Guardians, and the remaining citizens--Courage, or the\nadherence of the Guardians to right reason, respecting what is\nterrible and not terrible--Wisdom, or the tutelary superintendence\nof the Chiefs, who protect each person in the enjoyment of his\nown property.[101]\n\n[Footnote 99: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 432-433. 433 A: [Greek:\nKai\\ m\u00ea\\n o(/ti ge to\\ ta\\ au(tou= pra/ttein kai\\ m\u00ea\\\npolupragmonei=n dikaiosu/n\u00ea e)sti/, kai\\ tou=to a)/ll\u00f4n te poll\u00f4=n\na)k\u00eako/amen, kai\\ au)toi\\ polla/kis ei)r\u00ea/kamen.]\n\n433 E. [Greek: \u00ea( tou= oi)kei/ou te kai\\ e(autou= e(/xis te kai\\\npra=xis dikaiosu/n\u00ea a)\\n o(mologoi=to.]]\n\n[Footnote 100: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 433 B. [Greek: dokei= moi\nto\\ u(po/loipon e)n t\u00ea=| po/lei \u00f4(=n e)ske/mmetha, s\u00f4phrosu/n\u00eas\nkai\\ a)ndrei/as kai\\ phron\u00ea/se\u00f4s, tou=to ei)=nai o(\\ pa=sin\ne)kei/nois t\u00ea\\n du/namin pa/reschen \u00f4(/ste e)ggene/sthai, kai\\\ne)ggenome/nois ge s\u00f4t\u00eari/an pare/chein, e(/\u00f4s per a)\\n e)n\u00ea=|.]]\n\n[Footnote 101: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 433 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Injustice arises when any one part of the city\ninterferes with the functions of the other part, or undertakes\ndouble functions.]\n\nAs justice consists in each person doing his own work, and not\nmeddling with that of another--so injustice occurs, when a person\nundertakes the work of another instead of his own, or in addition\nto his own. The mischief is not great, when such interference\ntakes place only in the subordinate functions: when, for example,\nthe carpenter pretends to do the work of the shoemaker, or _vice\nvers\u00e2_; or when either of them undertake both. But the mischief\nbecomes grave and deplorable, when a man from the subordinate\nfunctions meddles with the higher--when a craftsman, availing\nhimself of some collateral support, wealth or party or strength,\nthrusts himself into the functions of a soldier or auxiliary--or\nwhen the Guardian, by similar artifice, usurps the functions of a\nChief--or when any one person combines these several functions all\nat once in himself. Herein consists the true injustice, ruinous to\nthe city: when the line of demarcation is confounded between these\nthree classes--men of business, Guardians, Chiefs. That each of\nthese classes should do its own work, is Justice: that either of\nthem should meddle with the work of the rest, and especially that\nthe subordinate should meddle with the business of the superior,\nis Injustice, with ruin following in its train.[102] It is from\nthese opposite characteristics that the titles Just or Unjust will\nbe rightfully bestowed upon our city.\n\n[Footnote 102: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 434 B-C. [Greek: \u00ea( tri\u00f4=n\na)/ra o)/nt\u00f4n gen\u00f4=n polupragmosu/n\u00ea kai\\ metabol\u00ea\\ ei)s a)/ll\u00eala,\nmegi/st\u00ea te bla/b\u00ea t\u00ea=| po/lei kai\\ o)rtho/tat' a)\\n\nprosagoreu/oito ma/lista kakourgi/a . . . Kakourgi/an de\\ t\u00ea\\n\nmegi/st\u00ean t\u00ea=s e(autou= po/le\u00f4s ou)k a)diki/an ph\u00ea/seis ei)=nai? . . .\n\nchr\u00eamatistikou=, e)pikourikou=, phulakikou=, ge/nous\noi)keiopragi/a, . . . dikaiosu/n\u00ea t' a)\\n ei)/\u00ea, kai\\ t\u00ea\\n po/lin\ndikai/an pa/rechoi.]]\n\n[Side-note: Analogy of the city to the individual--Each man\nis tripartite, having in his mind Reason, Energy, Appetite. These\nthree elements are distinct, and often conflicting.]\n\nWe must now apply, as we undertook to do, the analogy of the city\nto the individual. The just man, so far forth as justice is\nconcerned, cannot differ from the just city. He must therefore\nhave in his own individual mind three distinct parts, elements, or\nclasses, corresponding to the three classes above distinguished in\nthe city. But is it the fact that there are in each man three such\nmental constituents--three different classes, sorts, or varieties,\nof mind?\n\nTo settle this point as it ought to be settled, would require\na stricter investigation than our present dialogue will permit:\nbut we may contribute something towards it.[103] It is manifest\nthat there exist different individuals in whom reason, energy\n(courage or passion), and appetite, are separately and unequally\ndeveloped: thus in the Thracians there is a predominance of energy\nor courage--in the Phoenicians of appetite--in the Athenians, of\nintellect or reason. The question is, whether we employ one and\nthe same mind for all the three--reason, energy, and appetite; or\nwhether we do not employ a different mind or portion of mind, when\nwe exercise reason--another, when we are under the influence of\nenergy--and a third, when we follow appetite.[104]\n\n[Footnote 103: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 435 C.\n\nSchleiermacher (in the Introduction to his translation of the\nRepublic, p. 71) considers that this passage of the Republic is\nintended to note as a desideratum the exposition in the Tim\u00e6us;\nwherein the constituent elements of mind or soul are more fully\nlaid down, and its connection with the fundamental elements of the\nKosmos.]\n\n[Footnote 104: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 436 A.]\n\nTo determine this question, we must consider that the same thing\ncannot at the same time do or suffer opposites, in the same\nrespect and with reference to the same thing. The same thing or\nperson cannot at the same time, and in the same respect, both\nstand still and move. This may be laid down as an universal truth:\nbut since some may not admit it to be so, we will at any rate\nassume it as an hypothesis.[105] Now in reference to the mind, we\nexperience at the same time various movements or affections\ncontrary to each other: assent and dissent--desire and aversion--the\nattracting any thing to ourselves, and the repelling it from\nourselves: each of these is different from and contrary to the\nother. As a specimen of desires, we will take thirst. When a man\nis in this condition, his mind desires nothing else but to drink;\nand strains entirely towards that object. If there be any thing\nwhich drags back his mind when in this condition, it must be\nsomething different from that which pulls him forward and attracts\nhim to drink. That which attracts him, and that which repels him,\ncannot be the same: just as when the archer at the same time pulls\nhis bow towards him and pushes it away from him, it is one of his\nhands that pulls and another that pushes.[106] Now it often\nhappens that a man athirst refuses to drink: there is something\nwithin him that prompts him to drink, and something still more\npowerful that forbids him. These two cannot be the same: one of\nthem is different from the other: that which prompts is appetite,\nthat which forbids is reason. The rational element of the mind is\nin like manner something different or distinguishable from all the\nappetites, which tend towards repletion and pleasure.\n\n[Footnote 105: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 437 A.]\n\n[Footnote 106: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 439 A-B.]\n\n[Side-note: Reason, Energy, Appetite, in the individual--analogous\nto Rulers, Guardians, Craftsmen in the city. Reason is\nto rule Appetite. Energy assists Reason in ruling it.]\n\nHere then we have two distinct species, forms, or kinds, existing\nin the mind.[107] Besides these two, however, there is a third,\ndistinct from both: Energy, Passion, Courage, which neither\nbelongs to Appetite nor to individual Reason. Each of these three\nacts apart from, and sometimes in contrariety to, each of the\nothers.[108] There are thus three distinct elements or varieties\nof mind in the individual--Reason, Energy, Appetite: corresponding\nto the three constituent portions of the city--The Chiefs or\nRulers--The Guardians or Soldiers--The Craftsmen, or the remaining\nCommunity.[109] The Wisdom of the city resides in its Elders: that\nof the individual in his Reason. The Courage of the city resides\nin its Guardians or Soldiers: that of the individual in his\nEnergy. But in the city as well as in the individual, it is the\nright and privilege of the rational element to exercise command,\nbecause it alone looks to the welfare and advantage of the whole\ncompound:[110] it is the duty of the two other elements--the\nenergetic and the appetitive--to obey. It is moreover the special\nfunction of the Guardians in the city to second the Chiefs in\nenforcing obedience upon the Craftsmen: so also in the individual,\nit is the special function of Energy or Courage to second Reason\nin controuling Appetite.\n\n[Footnote 107: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 439 E. [Greek: Tau=ta me\\n\ntoi/nun du/o \u00ea(mi=n \u00f4(ri/sth\u00f4 ei)/d\u00ea e)n psuch\u00ea=| e)no/nta],\n&c.]\n\n[Footnote 108: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 440-441.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 441 C. [Greek: ta\\ au)ta\\\nme\\n e)n po/lei, ta\\ au)ta\\ d' e)n e(no\\s e(ka/stou t\u00ea=| psuch\u00ea=|\nge/n\u00ea e)nei=nai, kai\\ i)/sa to\\n a)rithmo/n.] 443 D: [Greek: ta\\\ne)n t\u00ea=| psuch\u00ea=| ge/n\u00ea], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 110: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 441 E, 442 C. [Greek:\nt\u00f4=| me\\n logistik\u00f4=| a)/rchein pros\u00ea/kei, soph\u00f4=| o)/nti kai\\\ne)/chonti t\u00ea\\n u(pe\\r a(pa/s\u00eas t\u00ea=s psuch\u00ea=s prom\u00ea/theian . . . .\nSopho\\n de/ ge (e(/na e(/kaston kalou=men) e)kei/n\u00f4| t\u00f4=| smikr\u00f4=|\nme/rei, t\u00f4=| o(\\ \u00ea)=rche/ t' e)n au)t\u00f4=| kai\\ tau=ta par\u00ea/ggellen,\ne)/chon au)= ka)kei=no e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean e)n au(t\u00f4=| t\u00ea\\n tou=\nxumphe/rontos e(ka/st\u00f4| te kai\\ o(/l\u00f4| t\u00f4=| koin\u00f4=| sph\u00f4=n au)t\u00f4=n\ntri\u00f4=n o)/nt\u00f4n.]]\n\n[Side-note: A man is just when these different parts of his\nmind exercise their appropriate functions without hindrance.]\n\nThese special functions of the separate parts being laid down,\nJustice as well as Temperance will appear analogous in the\nindividual and in the city. Both Justice and Temperance reside in\nall the parts equally: not in one of them exclusively, as Wisdom\nand Courage reside. Justice and Temperance belong to the\nsubordinate as well as to the dominant parts. Justice exists when\neach of the parts performs its own function, without encroaching\non the function of the others: Temperance exists when all the\nparts are of one opinion as to the title of the higher or rational\nelement to exercise command.[111]\n\n[Footnote 111: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 442 C, 443 B.]\n\nA man as well as a city is just, when each of his three sorts or\nvarieties of mind confines itself to its own legitimate function:\nwhen Reason reigns over and controuls the other two, and when\nEnergy seconds Reason in controuling Appetite. Such a man will not\ncommit fraud, theft, treachery, perjury, or any like\nproceedings.[112] On the contrary, injustice exists when the parts\nare in conflict with each other: when either of them encroaches on\nthe function of the other: or when those parts which ought to be\nsubordinate rise in insurrection against that which ought to be\nsuperior.\n\n[Footnote 112: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 442-443.]\n\n[Side-note: Justice and Injustice in the mind--what health\nand disease are in the body.]\n\nJustice is in the mind what health is in the body, when the parts\nare so arranged as to controul and be controuled pursuant to the\ndictates of nature. Injustice is in the mind what disease is in\nthe body, when the parts are so arranged as to controul and be\ncontrouled contrary to the dictates of nature. Virtue is thus the\nhealth, beauty, good condition of the mind: Vice is the disease,\nugliness, weakness, of the mind.[113]\n\n[Footnote 113: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 444 B-C.]\n\n[Side-note: Original question now resumed--Does Justice make\na man happy, and Injustice make him miserable, apart from all\nconsequences? Answer--Yes.]\n\nHaving thus ascertained the nature of justice and injustice, we\nare now in a condition (continues Sokrates) to reply to the\nquestion proposed for investigation--Is it profitable to a man to\nbe just and to do justice _per se_, even though he be not\nknown as just either by Gods or men, and may thus be debarred from\nthe consequences which would ensue if he were known? Or is it\nprofitable to him to be unjust, if he can contrive to escape\ndetection and punishment? We are enabled to answer the first\nquestion in the affirmative, and the second question in the\nnegative. As health is the greatest good, and sickness the\ngreatest evil, of body: so Justice is the greatest good, and\ninjustice the greatest evil, of mind. No measure of luxury,\nwealth, or power, could render life tolerable, if we lost our\nbodily health: no amount of prosperity could make life tolerable,\nwithout mental health or justice. As bodily health is good _per\nse_, and sickness evil _per se_, even apart from its\nconsequences: so justice also is good in itself, and injustice\nevil in itself, apart from its consequences.[114]\n\n[Footnote 114: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 445 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Glaukon requires farther explanation about the\ncondition of the Guardians, in regard to sexual and family ties.]\n\nSokrates now assumes the special question of the dialogue to be\nanswered, and the picture of the just or perfect city, as well as\nof the just or perfect individual, to be completed. He is next\nproceeding to set forth the contrasts to this picture--that is,\nthe varieties of injustice, or the various modes of depravation\nand corruption--when he is arrested by Polemarchus and Adeimantus:\nwho call upon him to explain more at large the position of the\nbody of Guardians or Soldiers in the city, in regard to women,\nchildren, and the family.[115]\n\n[Footnote 115: Plato, Republic, v. p. 449 C.]\n\n[Side-note: Men and women will live together and perform the\nduties of Guardians alike--They will receive the same gymnastic\nand musical training.]\n\nIn reply, Sokrates announces his intention to make such provision\nas will exclude separate family ties, as well as separate\nproperty, among these Guardians. The Guardians will consist both\nof men and women. The women will receive the same training, both\nmusical and gymnastical, as the men.[116] They will take part both\nin the bodily exercises of the pal\u00e6stra, in the military drill,\nand in the combats of war. Those who deride these naked exercises\nas preposterous for the female sex, should be reminded (Sokrates\nsays) that not long ago it was considered unseemly among the\nGreeks (as it still is among many of the _barbari_) for men\nto expose their naked bodies in the pal\u00e6stra: but such repugnance\nhas been overpowered by the marked usefulness of the practice: the\nKretans first setting the example, next the Laced\u00e6monians;\nlastly all other Greeks doing the same.[117] We maintain the\nprinciple which we laid down in the beginning, that one person\nshould perform only one duty--that for which he is best qualified.\nBut there is no one function, or class of functions, for which\nwomen as such are peculiarly qualified, or peculiarly\ndisqualified. Between women generally, and men generally, in\nreference to the discharge of duties, there is no other\ndifference, except that men are superior to women in every\nthing:[118] the best women will be on a level only with the\nsecond-best men, but they will be superior to all men lower than\nthe second best. But among women, as among men, there are great\nindividual differences: one woman is fit for one duty, another for\nanother: and in our city, each must be employed for the duty\nsuitable to her individual disposition. Those who are best\nqualified by nature for the office of Guardians, must be allotted\nto that office: they must discharge it along with the men, and\nmust be trained for it by the same education as the men, musical\nand gymnastical.\n\n[Footnote 116: Plato, Republic, v. p. 452 A.]\n\n[Footnote 117: Plato, Republic, v. p. 452 D.]\n\n[Footnote 118: Plato, Republic, v. p. 455 C-D.]\n\n[Side-note: Nature does not prescribe any distribution of\nfunctions between men and women. Women are inferior to men in\nevery thing. The best women are equal to second-best men.]\n\nIf an objector accuses us of proposing arrangements contrary to\nnature, we not only deny the force of the objection, but we retort\nthe charge. We affirm that the arrangements now existing in\nsociety, which restrict all women to a limited number of domestic\nand family functions, are contrary to nature--and that ours are\nfounded upon the genuine and real dictates of nature.[119] The\nonly difference admissible between men and women, in the joint\ndischarge of the functions of Guardians, is, that the easier\nportion of such functions must in general be assigned to women,\nand the more difficult to men, in consequence of the inferiority\nof the feminine nature.[120]\n\n[Footnote 119: Plato, Republic, v. p. 456 C. [Greek: kata\\ phu/sin\ne)ti/themen to\\n no/mon; a)lla\\ ta\\ nu=n para\\ tau=ta gigno/mena\npara\\ phu/sin ma=llon, \u00f4(s e)/oike, gi/gnetai.]]\n\n[Footnote 120: Plato, Republic, v. p. 457 B.]\n\n[Side-note: Community of life and relations between the male\nand female Guardians. Temporary marriages arranged by contrivance\nof the Elders. No separate families.]\n\nThese intermingled male and female Guardians, in the discharge of\ntheir joint functions, will live together in common barracks and\nat common mess-tables. There must be no separate houses or\nseparate family-relations between them. All are wives or\nhusbands of all: no youth must know his own father, no mature man\nmust know his own son: all the mature men and women are fathers or\nmothers of all the younger: all of the same age are brothers and\nsisters.[121] We do not intend, however, that the copulation\nbetween them shall take place in a promiscuous and arbitrary\nmanner: we shall establish laws to regulate the intermarriages and\nbreeding.[122] We must copy the example of those who regulate the\ncopulation of horses, dogs, and other animals: we must bring\ntogether those who will give existence to the best offspring.[123]\nWe must couple, as often as we can, the men who are best, with the\nwomen who are best, both in mind and body; and the men who are\nleast good, with the women who are least good. We must bring up\nthe offspring of the former couples--we must refuse to bring up\nthe offspring of the latter.[124] And such results must be\naccomplished by underhand arrangements of the Elder Chiefs; so as\nto be unknown to every one else, in order to prevent discontent\nand quarrel among the body of the Guardians. These Elders will\ncelebrate periodical festivals, in which they will bring together\nthe fitting brides and bridegrooms, under solemn hymns and\nsacrifices. They must regulate the number of marriages in such\nmanner as to keep the total list of Guardians as much as possible\nwithout increase as well as without diminution.[125] The Elders\nmust make an artful use of the lot, so that these couplings shall\nappear to every one else the effect of chance. Distinguished\nwarriors must be rewarded with a larger licence of copulation with\ndifferent women, which will produce the farther advantage of\nhaving as many children as possible born from their\nprocreation.[126] All the children as soon as born must be\nconsigned to the Chiefs or Elders, male and female, who will\nconceal in some convenient manner those who are born either from\nthe worst couples or with any bodily imperfection: while they\nplace the offspring of the best couples in special outbuildings\nunder the charge of nurses. Those mothers who are full of milk\nwill be brought here to give suck, but every precaution will be\ntaken that none of them shall know her own child: wet-nurses will\nalso be provided in addition, to ensure a full supply: but all the\ncare of the children will devolve on the public nurses, not on the\nmothers.[127]\n\n[Footnote 121: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 457-458.]\n\n[Footnote 122: Plato, Republic, v. p. 458 E.]\n\n[Footnote 123: Plato, Republic, v. p. 459 A.]\n\n[Footnote 124: Plato, Republic, v. p. 459 D-E. [Greek: dei= me\\n\ne)k t\u00f4=n \u00f4(molog\u00eame/n\u00f4n tou\\s a)ri/stous tai=s a)ri/stais\nsuggi/gnesthai \u00f4(s pleista/kis, tou\\s de\\ phaulota/tous tai=s\nphaulota/tais tou)nanti/on, kai\\ t\u00f4=n me\\n ta\\ e)/kgona tre/phein,\nt\u00f4=n de\\ m\u00ea/, ei) me/llei to\\ poi/mnion o(/, ti a)kro/taton\nei)=nai; kai\\ tau=ta pa/nta gigno/mena lantha/nein pl\u00ea\\n au)tou\\s\ntou\\s a)/rchontas, ei) au)= \u00ea( a)ge/l\u00ea t\u00f4=n phula/k\u00f4n o(/, ti\nma/lista a)stasi/astos e)/stai.]]\n\n[Footnote 125: Plato, Republic, v. p. 460 A.]\n\n[Footnote 126: Plato, Republic, v. p. 460 B.]\n\n[Footnote 127: Plato, Republic, v. p. 460 C-D.]\n\n[Side-note: Regulations about age, for procreation--Children\nbrought up under public authority.]\n\nThe age for such intermarriages, destined to be procreative for\nthe benefit of the city, must be from thirty to fifty-five, for\nmen--from twenty to forty, for women. No man or woman, above or\nbelow these limits of age, will be allowed to meddle with the\nfunction of intermarriage and procreation for the public; which\nfunction must always be conducted under superintendence of the\nauthorities, with proper sacrifice and prayers to the Gods. Nor\nwill any man, even within the licensed age, be allowed to approach\nany woman except by assignment from the authorities. If any\ninfringement of this law should occur, the offspring arising from\nit will be pronounced spurious and outcast.[128] But when the\nabove limits of age are passed, both men and women may have\nintercourse with whomsoever they please, except fathers with\ndaughters or sons with mothers: under condition, however, that no\noffspring shall be born from such intercourse, or that if any\noffspring be born, it shall be exposed.[129]\n\n[Footnote 128: Plato, Republic, v. p. 461 A-B.]\n\n[Footnote 129: Plato, Republic, v. p. 461 C.]\n\nHow is the father to know his own daughter (it is asked), or the\nson his own mother? They cannot know (replies Sokrates): but each\ncouple will consider every child born in the seventh month or\ntenth month after their marriage, as their child, and will address\nhim or her by the appellation of son or daughter. The fathers and\nmothers will be fathers and mothers of all the children born at\nthat time: the sons and daughters will be in filial relation to\nall the couples brought together at the given antecedent\nperiod.[130]\n\n[Footnote 130: Plato, Republic, v. p. 461 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Perfect communion of sentiment and interest\namong the Guardians--Causes of pleasure and pain the same to all,\nlike parts of the same organism.]\n\nThe main purpose of such regulations, in respect to family as in\nrespect to property, is to establish the fullest communion between\nall the Guardians, male and female--and to eliminate as much\nas possible the feeling of separate interest in any fraction of\nthem. The greatest evil to any city is, that which pulls it to\npieces and makes it many instead of one: the greatest good to it\nis that which binds it together and makes it one. Now what is most\nefficacious in binding it together, is, community of the causes of\npleasure and pain: when each individual feels pleasure from the\nsame causes and on the same occasions as all the rest, and pain in\nlike manner. On the other hand, when the causes of pleasure and\npain are distinct, this tends to dissolution; and becomes fatal if\nthe opposition is marked, so that some individuals are much\ndelighted, and others much distressed, under the same\ncircumstances. That city is the best arranged, wherein all the\ncitizens pronounce the words _Mine_ and _Not Mine_, with\nreference to the same things: when they coalesce into an unity\nlike the organism of a single individual. To him a blow in the\nfinger is a blow to the whole man: so also in the city, pleasure\nor pain to any one citizen ought to communicate itself by sympathy\nas pleasure and pain to all.[131]\n\n[Footnote 131: Plato, Republic, v. p. 462 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Harmony--absence of conflicting interest--assured\nscale of equal comfort--consequent happiness--among the\nGuardians.]\n\nNow the Guardians under our regulations will present as much as\npossible this community of _Mine_ and _Not Mine_, as\nwell as of pleasures and pains--and this exclusion of the separate\nindividual _Mine_ and _Not Mine_, as well as of separate\npleasures and pains. No individual among them will have either\nseparate property or separate family relationship: each will have\nboth one and the other in common with the rest.[132] No one will\nhave property of his own to be increased, nor a family of his own\nto be benefited, apart from the rest: all will be as much as\npossible common recipients of pleasure and pain.[133] All the\nordinary causes of dispute and litigation will thus be excluded.\nIf two Guardians of the same age happen to quarrel, they must\nfight it out: this will discharge their wrath and prevent worse\nconsequences--while at the same time it will encourage attention\nto gymnastic excellence.[134] But no younger Guardian will\nraise his hand against an older Guardian, whom he is taught to\nreverence as his father, and whom every one else would protect if\nattacked. If the Guardians maintain harmony among themselves, they\nwill easily ensure it among the remaining inhabitants. Assured of\nsufficient but modest comforts, the Guardians will be relieved\nfrom all struggles for the maintenance of a family, from the arts\nof trade, and from subservience to the rich.[135] They will escape\nall these troubles, and will live a life happier than the envied\nOlympic victor: for they will gain the victory in an enterprise\nmore illustrious than he undertakes, and they will receive from\ntheir fellow-citizens fuller maintenance and higher privilege than\nwhat is awarded to him, as well as honours after death.[136] Their\nlives are not to be put in comparison with those of the farmer or\nthe shoemaker. They must not indeed aspire to any happiness\nincompatible with their condition and duty as Guardians. But that\ncondition will itself involve the highest happiness. And if any\nsilly ambition prompts them to depart from it, they will assuredly\nchange for the worse.[137]\n\n[Footnote 132: Plato, Republic, v. p. 464 B.]\n\n[Footnote 133: Plato, Republic, v. p. 464 D. [Greek: pa/ntas ei)s\nto\\ dunato\\n o(mopathei=s lu/p\u00eas te kai\\ \u00ea(don\u00ea=s ei)=nai.]]\n\n[Footnote 134: Plato, Republic, v. p. 464 E.]\n\n[Footnote 135: Plato, Republic, v. p. 465 C. [Greek: t\u00f4=n kak\u00f4=n . . .\n\u00f4(=n a)p\u00eallagme/noi a)\\n ei)=en, kolakei/as te plousi/\u00f4n\npe/n\u00eates a)pori/as te kai\\ a)lg\u00eado/nas], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 136: Plato, Republic, v. p. 465 D. [Greek: Pa/nt\u00f4n te\nd\u00ea\\ tou/t\u00f4n a)palla/xontai, z\u00ea/sousi/ te tou= makaristou= bi/ou,\no(\\n oi( O)lumpioni=kai z\u00f4=si, makari\u00f4/teron.]]\n\n[Footnote 137: Plato, Republic, v. p. 466 A-C.]\n\n[Side-note: In case of war both sexes will go together to\nbattle--Rewards to distinguished warriors.]\n\nSuch is the communion of sexes which must be kept up for the\nduties of Guardians, and for the exigencies of military defence.\nAs in other races of animals, males and females must go out to\nfight, and each will inspire the other with bravery. The children\nmust be taken out on horseback to see the encounters from a\ndistance, so that they may be kept clear of danger, yet may\nnevertheless be gradually accustomed to the sight of it.[138] If\nany one runs away from the field, he must be degraded from the\nrank of Guardian to that of husbandman or craftsman. If any man\nsuffers himself to be taken prisoner, he is no loss: the enemy may\ndo what they choose with him. When any one distinguishes himself\nin battle, he shall be received on his return by garlands and by\nan affectionate welcome from the youth.[139] Should he be slain\nin battle, he shall be recognised as having become a D\u00e6mon or\nDemigod (according to the Hesiodic doctrine), and his sepulchre\nshall be honoured by appropriate solemnities.[140]\n\n[Footnote 138: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 466-467.]\n\n[Footnote 139: Plato, Republic, v. p. 468 B.]\n\n[Footnote 140: Plato, Republic, v. p. 469 B.]\n\n[Side-note: War against Hellenic enemies to be carried on\nmildly--Hellens are all by nature kinsmen.]\n\nIn carrying on war, our Guardians will observe a marked difference\nin their manner of treating Hellenic enemies and barbaric enemies.\nThey will never enslave any Hellenic city, nor hold any Hellenic\nperson in slavery. They will never even strip the body of an\nHellenic enemy, except so far as to take his arms. They will never\npile up in their temples the arms, nor burn the houses and lands,\nof Hellenic enemies. They will always keep in mind the members of\nthe Hellenic race as naturally kindred with each other, and bound\nto aid each other in mutual defence, against Barbaric aliens who\nare the natural enemies of all of them.[141] They will not think\nthemselves authorised to carry on war as Hellens now do against\neach other, except when their enemies are Barbaric.\n\n[Footnote 141: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 470-471.]\n\nEnough of this, Sokrates, replies Glaukon. I admit that your city\nwill have all the excellencies and advantages of which you boast.\nBut you have yet to show me that it is practicable, and how.[142]\n\n[Footnote 142: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 471-472.]\n\n[Side-note: Question--How is the scheme practicable? It is\ndifficult, yet practicable on one condition--That philosophy and\npolitical power should come into the same hands.]\n\nThe task which you impose (says Sokrates) is one of great\ndifficulty: even if you grant me, what must be granted, that every\nreality must fall short of its ideal type.[143] One condition, and\none only, is essential to render it practicable: a condition which\nyou may ridicule as preposterous, but which, though not probable,\nis certainly supposable. Either philosophers must acquire the\nruling power, or else the present rulers of mankind must\nthemselves become genuine philosophers. In one or other of these\ntwo ways philosophy and political power must come into the into\nthe same hands. Unless such condition be fulfilled, our city can\nnever be made a reality, nor can there ever be any respite of\nsuffering to the human race.[144]\n\n[Footnote 143: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 472-473.]\n\n[Footnote 144: Plato, Republic, v. p. 473 D.]\n\nThe supremacy which you claim for philosophers (replies\nGlaukon), will be listened to with repugnance and scorn. But\nat least you must show who the philosophers are, on whose behalf\nyou invoke such supremacy. You must show that it belongs to them\nby nature both to pursue philosophy, and to rule in the various\ncities: and that by nature also, other men ought to obey them as\nwell as to abstain from philosophy.[145]\n\n[Footnote 145: Plato, Republic, v. p. 474 A-B.]\n\n[Side-note: Characteristic marks of the philosopher--He\ncontemplates and knows Entia or unchangeable Forms, as\ndistinguished from fluctuating particulars or Fientia.]\n\nThe first requisite for a philosopher (replies Sokrates) is, that\nhe shall love and pursue eagerly every sort of knowledge or\nwisdom, without shrinking from labour for such purpose. But it is\nnot sufficient that he should be eager about hearing tragedies or\nlearning the minor arts. Other men, accomplished and curious, are\nfond of hearing beautiful sounds and discourses, or of seeing\nbeautiful forms and colours. But the philosopher alone can see or\ndistinguish truth.[146] It is only he who can distinguish the\ngenuine Form or Idea, in which truth consists, from the particular\nembodiments in which it occurs. These Forms or Ideas exist,\neternal and unchangeable. Since Pulchrum is the opposite of Turpe,\nthey must be two, and each of them must be One: the same about\nJust and Unjust, Good and Evil; each of these is a distinct Form\nor Idea, existing as One and Unchangeable by itself, but\nexhibiting itself in appearance as manifold, diverse, and\nfrequently changing, through communion with different objects and\nevents, and through communion of each Form with others.[147] Now\nthe accomplished, but unphilosophical, man cannot see or recognise\nthis Form in itself. He can see only the different particular\ncases and complications in which it appears embodied.[148] None\nbut the philosopher can contemplate each Form by itself, and\ndiscriminate it from the various particulars in conjunction with\nwhich it appears. Such philosophers are few in number, but they\nare the only persons who can be said truly to live. Ordinary and\neven accomplished men--who recognise beautiful things, but\ncannot recognise Beauty in itself, nor even follow an instructor\nwho points it out to them--pass their lives in a sort of dream or\nreverie: for the dreamer, whether asleep or awake, is one who\nbelieves what is similar to another thing to be not merely\nsimilar, but to be the actual thing itself.[149] The philosopher\nalone, who embraces in his mind the one and unchangeable Form or\nIdea, along with, yet distinguished from, its particular\nembodiments, possesses knowledge or science. The unphilosophical\nman, whose mind embraces nothing higher than variable particulars,\ndoes not know--but only opines, or has opinions.[150]\n\n[Footnote 146: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 474-475. [Greek: tou\\s t\u00ea=s\na)l\u00eathei/as philothea/monas] (p. 475 E).]\n\n[Footnote 147: Plato, Republic, v. p. 476 A. [Greek: E)peid\u00ea/\ne)stin e)nanti/on kalo\\n ai)schr\u00f4=|, du/o au)t\u00f4\\ ei)=nai . . .\nOu)kou=n e)peid\u00ea\\ du/o, kai\\ e(\\n e)ka/teron? . . . Kai\\ peri\\\ndikai/ou kai\\ a)di/kou kai\\ a)gathou= kai\\ kakou= kai\\ pa/nt\u00f4n\nt\u00f4=n ei)d\u00f4=n pe/ri, o( au)to\\s lo/gos, au)to\\ me\\n e(\\n e(/kaston\nei)=nai, t\u00ea=| de\\ t\u00f4=n pra/xe\u00f4n kai\\ s\u00f4ma/t\u00f4n kai\\ a)ll\u00ea/l\u00f4n\nkoin\u00f4ni/a| pantachou= phantazo/mena polla\\ phai/nesthai\ne(/kaston?]]\n\n[Footnote 148: Plato, Republic, v. p. 476 B.]\n\n[Footnote 149: Plato, Republic, v. p. 476 B.]\n\n[Footnote 150: Plato, Republic, v. p. 476 D. [Greek: Ou)kou=n\ntou/tou me\\n t\u00ea\\n dia/noian \u00f4(s gign\u00f4/skontos _gn\u00f4/m\u00ean_ a)\\n\no)rth\u00f4=s phai=men ei)=nai, tou= de\\ _do/xan_, \u00f4(s\ndoxa/zontos.]]\n\n[Side-note: Ens alone can be known--Non-Ens is unknowable.\nThat which is midway between Ens and Non-Ens (particulars) is\nmatter only of opinion. Ordinary men attain nothing beyond\nopinion.]\n\nThis latter, the unphilosophical man, will not admit what we say.\nAccordingly, we must prove it to him. You cannot know without\nknowing Something: that is, Some Ens: for Non-Ens cannot be known.\nThat which is completely and absolutely Ens, is completely and\nabsolutely cognizable: that which is Non-Ens and nowhere, is in\nevery way uncognizable. If then there be anything which is at once\nEns and Non-Ens, it will lie midway between these two: it will be\nsomething neither absolutely and completely cognizable, nor\nabsolutely and completely uncognizable: it belongs to something\nbetween ignorance and science. Now science or knowledge is one\nthing, its object is, complete Ens. Opinion is another thing, its\nobject also is different. Knowing and Opining belong, like Sight\nand Hearing, to the class of Entia called Powers or Faculties,\nwhich we and others possess, and by means of which--that is, by\nmeans of one or other of them--we accomplish everything that we do\naccomplish. Now no one of these powers or faculties has either\ncolour or figure, whereby it may be recognised or distinguished\nfrom others. Each is known and distinguished, not by what it is in\nitself, but by what it accomplishes, and by the object to which it\nhas special relation. That which has the same object and\naccomplishes the same result, I call the same power or faculty:\nthat which has a different object, and accomplishes a different\nresult, I call a different power or faculty. Now Knowing,\nCognition, Science, is one of our faculties or powers, and the\nstrongest of all: Opining is another, and a different one. A\nmarked distinction between the two is, that Knowing or Cognition\nis infallible--Opining is fallible. Since Cognition is one power\nor faculty, and Opining another--the object of one must be\ndifferent from the object of the other. But the object of\nCognition is, the Complete Ens: the object of Opining must\ntherefore be, not the Complete Ens, but something different from\nit. What then is the object of Opining? It is not Complete Ens,\nbut it is still Something. It is not Non-Ens, or Nothing; for\nNon-Ens or Nothing is not thinkable or opinable: you cannot think\nor opine, and yet think or opine nothing. Whoever opines or thinks,\nmust opine or think something. Ens is the object of Cognition,\nNon-Ens is the object of non-Cognition or Ignorance: Opination or\nOpinion is midway between Cognition and Ignorance, darker than the\nformer, but clearer than the latter. The object of opination is\ntherefore something midway between Ens and Non-Ens.\n\n[Side-note: Particulars fluctuate: they are sometimes just\nor beautiful, sometimes unjust or ugly. Forms or Entia alone\nremain constant.]\n\nBut what is this Something, midway between Ens and Particulars\nNon-Ens, and partaking of both--which is the object of Opination?\nTo make out this, we must revert to the case of the\nunphilosophical man. We have described him, as not believing in\nthe existence of the Form or Idea of Beauty, or Justice _per\nse_; not enduring to hear it spoken of as a real Ens and Unum;\nnot knowing anything except of the many diverse particulars,\nbeautiful and just. We must remind him that every one of these\nparticular beautiful things will appear repulsive also: every one\nof these just and holy particulars, will appear unjust and unholy\nalso. He cannot refuse to admit that each of them will appear\nunder certain circumstances beautiful and ugly, just and unjust,\nholy and unholy. In like manner, every particular double will\nappear also a half: every light thing will appear heavy: every\nlittle thing great. Of each among these many particulars, if you\ncan truly predicate any one quality about it, you may with equal\ntruth predicate the opposite quality also. Each of them both is,\nand is not, the substratum of all these different and opposite\nqualities. You cannot pronounce them to be either one or the\nother, with fixity and permanence: they are at once both and\nneither.\n\n[Side-note: The many cannot discern or admit the reality of\nForms--Their minds are always fluctuating among particulars.]\n\nHere then we find the appropriate object of Opination: that which\nis neither Ens nor Non-Ens, but something between both.\nParticulars are the object of Opination, as distinguished from\nuniversal Entities, Forms, or Ideas, which are the object of\nCognition. The many, who disbelieve or ignore the existence of\nthese Forms, and whose minds dwell exclusively among\nparticulars--cannot know, but only opine. Their usages and creeds,\nas to beautiful, just, honourable, float between positive Ens and\nNon-Ens. It is these intermediate fluctuations which are caught up by\ntheir opining faculty, intermediate as it is between Cognition and\nIgnorance. It is these also, the objects of Opination, which they\nlove and delight in: they neither recognise nor love the objects\nof Cognition or Knowledge. They are lovers of opinion and its\nobjects, not lovers of Knowledge. The philosopher alone recognises\nand loves Knowledge and the objects of Knowledge. His mind dwells,\nnot amidst the fluctuating, diverse, and numerous particulars, but\nin contemplation of the One, Universal, permanent, unchangeable,\nForm or Idea.\n\n[Side-note: The philosopher will be ardent for all varieties\nof knowledge--His excellent moral attributes--He will be trained\nto capacity for active life.]\n\nHere is the characteristic difference (continues Sokrates) which\nyou required me to point out, between the philosopher and the\nunphilosophical man, however accomplished. The philosopher sees,\nknows, and contemplates, the One, Real, unchangeable, Form or\nIdea: the unphilosophical man knows nothing of this Form _per\nse_, and sees only its multifarious manifestations, each\nperpetually variable and different from all the rest. The\nphilosopher, having present to his mind this type--and\napproximating to it, as far as may be, the real institutions and\npractices--will be the person most competent to rule our city:\nespecially as his education will give him farthermore--besides\nsuch familiarity with the Form or Type--as large a measure of\nexperience, and as much virtue, as can fall to the lot of the\nunphilosophical man.[151] The nature and disposition of the\ntrue philosopher, if improved by education, will include all the\nvirtue and competence of the practical man. The philosopher is\nbent on learning everything which can make him familiar with\nUniversal Forms and Essences in their pure state, not floating\namidst the confusion of generated and destroyed realities: and\nwith Forms and Essences little as well as great, mean as well as\nsublime.[152] Devoted to knowledge and truth--hating falsehood--he\nhas little room in his mind for the ordinary desires: he is\ntemperate, indifferent to money, free from all meanness or\nshabbiness. A man like him, whose contemplations stretch over all\ntime and all essence, thinks human life a small affair, and has no\nfear of death. He will be just, mild in his demeanour, quick in\napprehension, retentive in memory, elegant in his tastes and\nmovements. All these excellences will be united in the\nphilosophers to whom we confide the rule of our city.[153]\n\n[Footnote 151: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 484.]\n\n[Footnote 152: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 485 A.]\n\n[Footnote 153: Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 485-486.]\n\n[Side-note: Adeimantus does not dispute the conclusion, but\nremarks that it is at variance with actual facts--Existing\nphilosophers are either worthless pretenders, or when they are\ngood, useless.]\n\nIt is impossible, Sokrates (remarks Adeimantus), to answer in the\nnegative to your questions. Nevertheless we who hear and answer,\nare not convinced of the truth of your conclusion. Unskilled as we\nare in the interrogatory process, we feel ourselves led astray\nlittle by little at each successive question; until at length,\nthrough the accumulated effect of such small deviations, we are\ndriven up into a corner without the power of moving, like a bad\nplayer at draughts defeated by one superior to himself.[154] Here\nin this particular case your conclusion has been reached by steps\nto which we cannot refuse assent. Yet if we look at the facts, we\nsee something quite the reverse as to the actual position of\nphilosophers. Those who study philosophy, not simply as a branch\nof juvenile education but as a continued occupation throughout\nlife, are in most cases strange creatures, not to say thoroughly\nunprincipled: while the few of them who are most reasonable,\nderive nothing from this pursuit which you so much extol, except\nthat they become useless in their respective cities.[155]\n\n[Footnote 154: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 487 B. [Greek: Pro\\s me\\n\ntau=ta soi ou)dei\\s a)\\n oi(=o/s t' ei)/\u00ea a)nteipei=n; a)lla\\ ga\\r\ntoio/nde ti pa/schousin oi( a)kou/ontes e(ka/stote a)\\ nu=n\nle/geis; \u00ea(gou=ntai di' a)peiri/an tou= e)r\u00f4ta=|n te kai\\\na)pokri/nesthai u(po\\ tou= lo/gou par' e(/kaston to\\ e)r\u00f4/t\u00eama\nsmikro\\n parago/menoi, a)throisthe/nt\u00f4n t\u00f4=n smikr\u00f4=n e)pi\\\nteleut\u00ea=s t\u00f4=n lo/g\u00f4n, me/ga to\\ spha/lma kai\\ e)nanti/on toi=s\npr\u00f4/tois a)naphai/nesthai], &c.\n\nThis is an interesting remark on the effect produced upon many\nhearers by the Sokratic and Platonic dialogues,--puzzling,\nsilencing, and ultimately stimulating the mind, but not satisfying\nor convincing, rather raising suspicions as to the trustworthiness\nof the process, which suspicions have to be turned over and\nscrutinised by subsequent meditation.]\n\n[Footnote 155: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 487 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates admits the fact to be so--His simile of\nthe able steersman on shipboard, among a disobedient crew.]\n\nYes (replies Sokrates), your picture is a correct one. The\nposition of true and reasonable philosophers, in their respective\ncities, is difficult and uncomfortable. Conceive a ship on her\nvoyage, under the management of a steersman distinguished for\nforce of body as well as for skill in his craft, but not clever in\ndealing with, or acting upon other men. Conceive the seamen all\nquarrelling with each other to get possession of the rudder; each\nman thinking himself qualified to steer, though he has never\nlearnt it--nor had any master in it--nor even believes it to be\nteachable, but is ready to massacre all who affirm that it is\nteachable.[156] Imagine, besides, these seamen importuning the\nqualified steersman to commit the rudder to them, each being ready\nto expel or kill any others whom he may prefer to them: and at\nlast proceeding to stupify with wine or drugs the qualified\nsteersman, and then to navigate the vessel themselves according to\ntheir own views; feasting plentifully on the stores. These men\nknow nothing of what constitutes true and able steersmanship. They\nextol, as a perfect steersman, that leader who is most\nefficacious, either by persuasion or force, in seizing the rudder\nfor them to manage: they despise as useless any one who does not\npossess this talent. They never reflect that the genuine steersman\nhas enough to do in surmounting the dangers of his own especial\nart, and in watching the stars and the winds: and that if he is to\nacquire technical skill and practice adequate to such a purpose,\nhe cannot at the same time possess skill and practice in keeping\nhis hold of the rudder whether the crew are pleased with him or\nnot. Such being the condition of the ship and the crew, you see\nplainly that they will despise and set aside the true steersman as\nan useless proser and star-gazer.[157]\n\n[Footnote 156: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 488.]\n\n[Footnote 157: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 488 D-E.]\n\n[Side-note: The uselessness of the true philosopher is\nthe fault of the citizen, who will not invoke his guidance.]\n\nNow the crew of this ship represent the citizens and leaders of\nour actual cities: the steersman represents the true philosopher.\nHe is, and must be, useless in the ship: but his uselessness is\nthe fault of the crew and not his own. It is not for the true\nsteersman to entreat permission from the seamen, that they will\nallow him to command; nor for the wise man to solicit employment\nat the doors of the rich. It is for the sick man, whether he be\npoor or rich, to ask for the aid of the physician; and for every\none who needs to be commanded, to invoke the authority of the\nperson qualified to command. No man really qualified will submit\nto ask command as a favour.[158]\n\n[Footnote 158: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 489 B. [Greek: t\u00ea=s me/ntoi\na)chr\u00easti/as tou\\s m\u00ea\\ chr\u00f4me/nous ke/leue ai)tia=sthai, a)lla\\\nm\u00ea\\ tou\\s e)pieikei=s. Ou) ga\\r e)/chei phu/sin kubern\u00ea/t\u00ean\nnaut\u00f4=n dei=sthai a)/rchesthai u(ph' au(tou=], &c.]\n\nThus, Adeimantus (continues Sokrates), I have dealt with the first\npart of your remark, that the true philosopher is an useless man\nin cities as now constituted: I have shown you this is not his\nfault--that it could not be otherwise,--and that a man even of the\nhighest aptitude, cannot enjoy reputation among those whose turn\nof mind is altogether at variance with his own.[159]\n\n[Footnote 159: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 489 D. [Greek: e)/k te\ntoi/nun tou/t\u00f4n kai\\ e)n tou/tois ou) r(a/|dion eu)dokimei=n to\\\nbe/ltiston e)pit\u00ea/deuma u(po\\ t\u00f4=n ta)nanti/a e)pit\u00eadeuo/nt\u00f4n.]]\n\nI shall now deal with your second observation--That while even the\nbest philosophers are useless, the majority of those who cultivate\nphilosophy are worthless men, who bring upon her merited\ndiscredit. I admit that this also is correct; but I shall prove\nthat philosophy is not to be blamed for it.[160]\n\n[Footnote 160: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 489 E. [Greek: o(/ti ou)de\\\ntou/tou philosophi/a ai)ti/a, peirath\u00f4=men dei=xai.]]\n\n[Side-note: The great qualities required to form a\nphilosopher, become sources of perversion, under a misguiding\npublic opinion.]\n\nYou will remember the great combination of excellent dispositions,\nintellectual as well as moral, which I laid down as indispensable\nto form the fundamental character of the true philosopher. Such a\ncombination is always rare. Even under the best circumstances\nphilosophers must be very few. But these few stand exposed, in our\nexisting cities, to such powerful causes of corruption, that they\nare prevented from reaching maturity, except by some happy\naccident. First, each one of those very qualities, which, when\ncombined, constitute the true philosopher,--serves as a cause\nof corruption, if it exists by itself and apart from the rest.\nNext, what are called good things, or external advantages, act in\nthe same manner--such as beauty, strength, wealth, powerful\nconnections, &c. Again, the stronger a man's natural aptitudes\nand the greater his external advantages,--the better will he\nbecome under favourable circumstances, the worse will he become,\nif circumstances are unfavourable. Heinous iniquity always springs\nfrom a powerful nature perverted by bad training: not from a\nfeeble nature, which will produce no great effects either for good\nor evil. Thus the eminent predispositions,--which, if properly\nimproved, would raise a man to the highest rank in virtue,--will,\nif planted in an unfavourable soil, produce a master-mind in deeds\nof iniquity, unless counteracted by some providential\ninterposition.\n\n[Side-note: Mistake of supposing that such perversion arises\nfrom the Sophists. Irresistible effect of the public opinion\ngenerally, in tempting or forcing a dissenter into orthodoxy.]\n\nThe multitude treat these latter as men corrupted by the Sophists.\nBut this is a mistake. Neither Sophists nor other private\nindividuals produce mischief worth mentioning. It is the multitude\nthemselves, utterers of these complaints, who are the most active\nSophists and teachers: it is they who educate and mould every\nindividual, man and woman, young and old, into such a character as\nthey please.[161] When they are assembled in the public assembly\nor the dikastery, in the theatre or the camp--when they praise\nsome things and blame others, with vociferation and vehemence\nechoed from the rocks around--how irresistible will be the\nimpression produced upon the mind of a youth who hears them! No\nprivate training which he may have previously received can hold\nout against it. All will be washed away by this impetuous current\nof multitudinous praise or blame, which carries him along with it.\nHe will declare honourable or base the same things as they declare\nto be so: he will adopt the character, and follow the pursuits,\nwhich they enjoin. Moreover, if he resists such persuasive\ninfluence, these multitudinous teachers and Sophists have\nstronger pressure in store for him.[162] They punish the\ndisobedient with disgrace, fine, and even death. What other\nSophist, or what private exhortation, can contend successfully\nagainst teachers such as these? Surely none. The attempt to do so\nis insane. There neither is, nor has been, nor will be, any\nindividual human disposition educated to virtue in opposition to\nthe training of the multitude:[163] I say _human_, as\ndistinguished from _divine_, of which I make exception: for\nin the existing state of society, any individual who is preserved\nfrom these ascendant influences to acquire philosophical\nexcellence, owes his preservation to the divine favour.\n\n[Footnote 161: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 492 A. [Greek: \u00ea)\\ kai\\ su\\\n\u00ea(gei=, \u00f4(/sper oi( polloi/, diaphtheirome/nous tina\\s ei)=nai\nu(po\\ sophist\u00f4=n ne/ous, diaphthei/rontas de/ tinas sophista\\s\ni)di\u00f4tikou/s, o(/, ti kai\\ a)/xion lo/gon, a)ll' ou)k au)tou\\s\ntou\\s tau=ta le/gontas megi/stous me\\n ei)=nai sophista/s?\npaideu/ein de\\ tele\u00f4/tata kai\\ a)perga/zesthai oi(/ous bou/lontai\nei)=nai kai\\ ne/ous kai\\ presbute/rous kai\\ a)/ndras kai\\\ngunai=kas?]]\n\n[Footnote 162: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 492 C-D. [Greek: Kai\\\nph\u00ea/sein te ta\\ au)ta\\ tou/tois kala\\ kai\\ ai)schra\\ ei)=nai, kai\\\ne)pit\u00eadeu/sein a(/per a)\\n ou(=toi, kai\\ e)/sesthai toiou=ton . . .\nKai\\ m\u00ea\\n ou(/p\u00f4 t\u00ea\\n megi/st\u00ean a)na/gk\u00ean ei)r\u00ea/kamen. Poi/an?\nE(\\n e)/rg\u00f4| prostithe/asi, lo/g\u00f4| m\u00ea\\ pei/thontes, ou(=toi oi(\npaideutai/ te kai\\ sophistai/. \u00ca)\\ ou)k oi)=stha o(/ti to\\n m\u00ea\\\npeitho/menon a)timi/ais te kai\\ chr\u00ea/masi kai\\ thana/tois\nkola/zousin? Kai\\ ma/la, e)/ph\u00ea, spho/dra.]]\n\n[Footnote 163: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 492 D.]\n\n[Side-note: The Sophists and other private teachers accept\nthe prevalent orthodoxy, and conform their teaching to it.]\n\nMoreover, though the multitude complain of these professional\nteachers as rivals, and decry them as Sophists--yet we must\nrecollect that such teachers inculcate only the opinions received\namong the multitude themselves, and extol these same opinions as\nwisdom.[164] The teachers know nothing of what is really\nhonourable and base,--good and evil,--just and unjust. They\ndistribute all these names only with reference to the opinions of\nthe multitude:--pronouncing those things which please the\nmultitude to be good, and those which displease to be\nevil,--without furnishing any other rational account. They call\nthings necessary by the name of just and honourable; not knowing\nthe material difference between what is good and what is necessary,\nnor being able to point out that difference to others. Thus\npreposterous are the teachers, who count it wisdom to suit the\ntaste and feelings of the multitude, whether in painting or in\nmusic or in social affairs. For whoever lives among them, publicly\nexhibiting either poetry or other performances private or\nofficial, thus making the multitude his masters beyond the strict\nlimits of necessity--the consequence is infallible, that he must\nadapt his works to that which they praise. But whether the works\nwhich he executes are really good and honourable, he will be\nunable to render any tolerable account.[165]\n\n[Footnote 164: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 493 A. [Greek: e(/kaston\nt\u00f4=n mistharnou/nt\u00f4n i)di\u00f4t\u00f4=n, ou(\\s d\u00ea\\ ou(=toi sophista\\s\nkalou=si kai\\ a)ntite/chnous \u00ea(gou=ntai, m\u00ea\\ a)/lla paideu/ein \u00ea)\\\ntau=ta ta\\ t\u00f4=n poll\u00f4=n do/gmata, a(\\ doxa/zousin o(/tan\na)throisth\u00f4=si, kai\\ sophi/an tau/t\u00ean kalei=n.]]\n\n[Footnote 165: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 493 C-D.]\n\n[Side-note: The people generally hate philosophy--A youth\nwho aspires to it will be hated by the people, and persecuted even\nby his own relatives.]\n\nIt is therefore the multitude, or the general voice of society--not\nthe Sophists or private teachers, mere echoes of that general\nvoice--which works upon and moulds individuals. Now the multitude\ncannot tolerate or believe in the existence of those Universals or\nForms which the philosopher contemplates. They know only the many\nparticulars, not the One Universal. Incapable of becoming\nphilosophers themselves, they look upon the philosopher with\nhatred: and this sentiment is adopted by all those so-called\nphilosophers who seek to please them.[166] Under these\ncircumstances, what chance is there that those eminent\npredispositions, which we pointed out as the foundation of the\nfuture philosopher, can ever be matured to their proper result? A\nyouth of such promise, especially if his body be on a par with his\nmind, will be at once foremost among all his fellows. His\nrelatives and fellow-citizens, eager to make use of him for their\nown purposes, and anxious to appropriate to themselves his growing\nforce, will besiege him betimes with solicitations and\nflatteries.[167] Under these influences, if we assume him to be\nrich, well born, and in a powerful city, he will naturally become\nintoxicated with unlimited hopes and ambition; fancying himself\ncompetent to manage the affairs of all governments, and giving\nhimself the empty airs of a lofty potentate.[168] If there be any\none to give him a quiet hint that he has not yet acquired\nintelligence, nor can acquire it without labour--he will turn a\ndeaf ear. But suppose that such advice should by chance prevail,\nin one out of many cases, so that the youth alters his tendencies\nand devotes himself to philosophy--what will be the conduct of\nthose who see, that they will thereby be deprived of his\nusefulness and party-service, towards their own views? They will\nleave no means untried to prevent him from following the\nadvice, and even to ruin the adviser, by private conspiracy and\njudicial prosecution.[169] It is impossible that the young man can\nreally turn to philosophy, against obstructions thus powerful. You\nsee that those very excellences and advantages, which form the\ninitial point of the growing philosopher, become means and\ntemptations for corrupting him. The best natures, rare as they\nalways are, become thus not only ruined, but turned into\ninstruments of evil. For the same men (as I have already said)\nwho, under favourable training, would have done the greatest good,\nbecome perpetrators of the greatest evil, if they are badly\nplaced. Small men will do nothing important, either in the one way\nor the other.[170]\n\n[Footnote 166: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 494 A. [Greek: philo/sophon\nme\\n a)/ra pl\u00ea=thos a)du/naton ei)=nai . . . Kai\\ tou\\s\nphilsophou=ntas a)/ra a)na/gk\u00ea pse/gesthai u(p' au)t\u00f4=n . . . kai\\\nu(po\\ tou/t\u00f4n d\u00ea\\ t\u00f4=n i)di\u00f4t\u00f4=n, o(/soi prosomilou=ntes o)/chl\u00f4|\na)re/skein au)t\u00f4=| e)pithumou=sin.]]\n\n[Footnote 167: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 494 B.]\n\n[Footnote 168: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 494 C. [Greek:\npl\u00ear\u00f4th\u00ea/sesthai a)m\u00eacha/nou e)lpi/dos, \u00ea(gou/menon kai\\ ta\\ t\u00f4=n\nE(ll\u00ea/n\u00f4n kai\\ ta\\ t\u00f4=n barba/r\u00f4n i(kano\\n ei)=nai pra/ttein.]]\n\n[Footnote 169: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 494 D-E. [Greek: e)a\\n d'\nou)=n, dia\\ to\\ eu)= pephuke/nai kai\\ to\\ xuggene\\s t\u00f4=n lo/g\u00f4n,\nei)=s ai)stha/n\u00eatai/ te/ p\u00ea| kai\\ ka/mpt\u00eatai kai\\ e(/lk\u00eatai pro\\s\nphilosophi/an, ti/ oi)o/metha dra/sein e)kei/nous tou\\s\n\u00ea(goume/nous a)pollu/nai au)tou= t\u00ea\\n chrei/an te kai\\\ne(tairei/an? ou) pa=n me\\n e)/rgon, pa=n d' e)/pos, le/gonta/s te\nkai\\ pra/ttontas kai\\ peri\\ au)to/n, o(/p\u00f4s a)\\n m\u00ea\\ peisth\u00ea=|,\nkai\\ peri\\ to\\n pei/thonta, o(/p\u00f4s a)\\n m\u00ea\\ oi(=o/s t' \u00ea)=|, kai\\\ni)di/a| e)pibouleu/ontas kai\\ d\u00eamosi/a| ei)s a)g\u00f4=nas\nkathi/stantas?]]\n\n[Footnote 170: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 495 A-B.]\n\n[Side-note: The really great minds are thus driven away from\nthe path of philosophy--which is left to empty pretenders.]\n\nIt is thus that the path of philosophy is deserted by those who\nought to have trodden it, and who pervert their exalted powers to\nunworthy objects. That path--being left vacant, yet still full of\nimposing titles and pretensions, and carrying a show of superior\ndignity as compared with the vulgar professions--becomes invaded\nby interlopers of inferior worth and ability, who quit their own\nsmall craft, and set up as philosophers.[171] Such men, poorly\nendowed by nature, and debased by habits of trade, exhibit\nthemselves, in their self-assumed exaltation as philosophers, like\na slave recently manumitted, who has put on new clothes and\nmarried his master's daughter.[172] Having intruded themselves\ninto a career for which they are unfit, they cannot produce any\ngrand or genuine philosophical thoughts, or any thing better than\nmere neat sophisms, pleasing to the ear.[173] Through them arises\nthe discredit which is now attached to philosophers.\n\n[Footnote 171: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 495 C-D. [Greek:\nkathor\u00f4=ntes ga\\r a)/lloi a)nthr\u00f4pi/skoi ken\u00ea\\n t\u00ea\\n ch\u00f4/ran\ntau/t\u00ean gignome/n\u00ean, kal\u00f4=n de\\ o)noma/t\u00f4n kai\\ prosch\u00eama/t\u00f4n\nmest\u00ea/n, \u00f4(/sper oi( e)k t\u00f4=n ei)rgm\u00f4=n ei)s ta\\ i(era\\\na)podidra/skontes, a)/smenoi kai\\ ou(=toi e)k t\u00f4=n techn\u00f4=n\ne)kp\u00ead\u00f4=sin ei)s t\u00ea\\n philosophi/an.]]\n\n[Footnote 172: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 495 E.]\n\n[Footnote 173: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 496 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Rare cases in which a highly qualified\nphilosopher remains--Being at variance with public opinion, he can\nachieve nothing, and is lucky if he can obtain safety by silence.]\n\nAmidst such general degradation of philosophy, some few and\nrare cases are left, in which the pre-eminent natures qualified\nfor philosophy remain by some favourable accident uncorrupted. One\nof these is Theag\u00eas, who would have been long ago drawn away from\nphilosophy to active politics, had he not been disqualified by bad\nhealth. The restraining D\u00e6mon, peculiar to myself (says Sokrates),\nis another case.[174] Such an exceptional man, having once tasted\nthe sweetness and happiness of philosophy, embraces it as an\nexclusive profession. He sees that the mass of society are\nwrongheaded--that scarce any one takes wholesome views on social\nmatters--that he can find no partisans to aid him in upholding\njustice[175]--that while he will not take part in injustice, he is\ntoo weak to contend single-handed against the violence of all, and\nwould only become a victim to it without doing any good either to\nthe city or to his friends--like a man who has fallen among wild\nbeasts. On these grounds he stands aloof in his own separate\npursuit, like one sheltering himself under a wall against a\nhurricane of wind and dust. Witnessing the injustice committed by\nall around, he is content if he can keep himself clear and pure\nfrom it during his life here, so as to die with satisfaction and\ngood hopes.\n\n[Footnote 174: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 496 D.]\n\n[Footnote 175: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 496 C-D. [Greek: kai\\\ntou/t\u00f4n d\u00ea\\ t\u00f4=n o)li/g\u00f4n oi( geuo/menoi kai\\ geusa/menoi \u00f4(s\n\u00ea(du\\ kai\\ maka/rion to\\ kt\u00ea=ma, kai\\ t\u00f4=n poll\u00f4=n au)= i(kan\u00f4=s\ni)do/ntes t\u00ea\\n mani/an, kai\\ o(/ti ou)dei\\s ou)de\\n u(gie\\s, \u00f4(s\ne)/pos ei)pei=n, peri\\ ta\\ t\u00f4=n po/le\u00f4n pra/ttei, ou)d' e)/sti\nxu/mmachos meth' o(/tou tis i)\u00f4\\n e)pi\\ t\u00ea\\n t\u00f4=n dikai/\u00f4n\nbo\u00ea/theian s\u00f4/zoit' a)/n, a)ll' \u00f4(/sper ei)s th\u00eari/a a)/nthr\u00f4pos\ne)mpes\u00f4/n, ou)/te xunadikei=n e)the/l\u00f4n ou)/te i(kano\\s \u00f4)\\n ei(=s\npa=sin a)gri/ois a)nte/chein, pri/n ti t\u00ea\\n po/lin \u00ea)\\ phi/lous\no)n\u00easai proapolo/menos a)n\u00f4phel\u00ea\\s au(t\u00f4=| te kai\\ toi=s a)/llois\na)\\n ge/noito--tau=ta pa/nta logism\u00f4=| lab\u00f4=n, \u00ea(suchi/an e)/ch\u00f4n\nkai\\ ta\\ au)tou= pra/tt\u00f4n . . . o(r\u00f4=n tou\\s a)/llous\nkatapimplame/nous a)nomi/as, a)gapa=| ei)/ p\u00ea au)to\\s katharo\\s\na)diki/as], &c.]\n\nHe will perform no small achievement (remarks Adeimantus) if he\nkeeps clear to the end.[176]\n\n[Footnote 176: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 497 A.]\n\n[Side-note: The philosopher must have a community suitable\nto him, and worthy of him.]\n\nTrue (replies Sokrates)--yet nevertheless he can perform no great\nachievement, unless he meets with a community suited to him.\nAmidst such a community he will himself rise to greatness, and\nwill preserve the public happiness as well as his own. But there\nexists no such community anywhere, at the present moment. Not one\nof those now existing is worthy of a philosophical\ndisposition:[177] which accordingly becomes perverted, and\ndegenerates into a different type adapted to its actual abode,\nlike exotic seed transported to a foreign soil. But if this\nphilosophical disposition were planted in a worthy community, so\nas to be able to assert its own superior excellence, it would then\nprove itself truly divine, leaving other dispositions and pursuits\nbehind as merely human.\n\n[Footnote 177: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 497 B-C.]\n\n[Side-note: It must be such a community as Sokrates has been\ndescribing--But means must be taken to keep up a perpetual\nsuccession of philosophers as Rulers.]\n\nYou mean by a worthy community (observes Adeimantus), such an one\nas that of which you have been drawing the outline?--I do (replies\nSokrates): with this addition, already hinted but not explained,\nthat there must always be maintained in it a perpetual supervising\nauthority representing the scheme and purpose of the primitive\nlawgiver. This authority must consist of philosophers: and the\nquestion now arises--difficult but indispensable--how such\nphilosophers are to be trained up and made efficient for the good\nof the city.\n\n[Side-note: Proper manner of teaching philosophy--Not to\nbegin at a very early age.]\n\nThe plan now pursued for imparting philosophy is bad. Some do not\nlearn it at all: and even to those who learn it best, the most\ndifficult part (that which relates to debate and discourse) is\ntaught when they are youths just emerging from boyhood, in the\nintervals of practical business and money-getting.[178] After that\nperiod, in their mature age, they abandon it altogether; they will\nscarcely so much as go to hear an occasional lecture on the\nsubject, without any effort of their own: accordingly it has all\ndied out within them, when they become mature in years. This\nmanner of teaching philosophy ought to be reversed. In childhood\nand youth, instruction of an easy character and suitable to that\nage ought to be imparted; while the greatest care is taken to\nimprove and strengthen the body during its period of growth, as a\nminister and instrument to philosophy. As age proceeds, and the\nmind advances to perfection, the mental exercises ought to become\nmore difficult and absorbing. Lastly, when the age of bodily\neffort passes away, philosophy ought to become the main and\nprincipal pursuit.[179]\n\n[Footnote 178: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 498 A. [Greek: Nu=n me\\n\noi( kai\\ a(pto/menoi meira/kia o)/nta a)/rti e)k paid\u00f4=n to\\\nmetaxu\\ oi)konomi/as kai\\ chr\u00eamatismou= pl\u00easia/santes au)tou= t\u00f4=|\nchalep\u00f4ta/t\u00f4| a)palla/ttontai, oi( philosoph\u00f4/tatoi poiou/menoi;\nle/g\u00f4 de\\ chalep\u00f4/taton to\\ peri\\ tou\\s lo/gous; e)n de\\ t\u00f4=|\ne)/peita, e)a\\n kai\\ a)/ll\u00f4n tou=to pratto/nt\u00f4n parakalou/menoi\ne)the/l\u00f4sin a)kroatai\\ gi/gnesthai, mega/la \u00ea(gou=ntai, pa/rergon\noi)o/menoi au)to\\ dei=n pra/ttein.]]\n\n[Footnote 179: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 498 C.]\n\n[Side-note: If the multitude could once see a real, perfect,\nphilosopher, they could not fail to love him: but this never\nhappens.]\n\nMost people will hear all this (continues Sokrates) with mingled\nincredulity and repugnance. We cannot wonder that they do so: for\nthey have had no experience of one or a few virtuously trained men\nruling in a city suitably prepared.[180] Such combination of\nphilosophical rulers within a community adapted to them, we must\nassume to be realised.[181] Though difficult, it is noway\nimpracticable: and even the multitude will become reconciled to\nit, if you explain to them mildly what sort of persons we mean by\nphilosophers. We do not mean such persons as the multitude now\ncall by that name; interlopers in the pursuit, violent in dispute\nand quarrel with each other, and perpetually talking personal\nscandal.[182] The multitude cannot hate a philosophical temper\nsuch as we depict, when they once come to know it--a man who,\nindifferent to all party disputes, dwells in contemplation of the\nUniversal Forms, and tries to mould himself and others into\nharmony with them.[183] Such a philosopher will not pretend to\nmake regulations, either for a city or for an individual, until he\nhas purified it thoroughly. He will then make regulations framed\nupon the type of the Eternal Forms--Justice, Temperance,\nBeauty--adapting them as well as he can to human exigencies.[184]\nThe multitude, when they know what is really meant, will become\nperfectly reconciled to it. One single prince, if he rises so as\nto become a philosopher, and has a consenting community, will\nsuffice to introduce the system which we have been describing. So\nfortunate an accident can undoubtedly occur but seldom; yet it is\nnot impossible, and one day or other it will really occur.[185]\n\n[Footnote 180: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 498 E.]\n\n[Footnote 181: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 499 B-C.]\n\n[Footnote 182: Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 499-500.]\n\n[Footnote 183: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 500 C-D.]\n\n[Footnote 184: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 501 A.]\n\n[Footnote 185: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 502.]\n\n[Side-note: Course of training in the Platonic city, for\nimparting philosophy to the Rulers. They must be taught to ascend\nto the Idea of Good. But what is Good?]\n\nI must now (continues Sokrates) explain more in detail the studies\nand training through which these preservers Rulers of our city,\nthe complete philosophers, must be created. The most perfect among\nthe Guardians, after having been tested by years of exercises\nand temptations of various kinds, will occupy that distinguished\nplace. Very few will be found uniting those distinct and almost\nincompatible excellences which qualify them for the post. They\nmust give proof of self-command against pleasures as well as\npains, and of competence to deal with the highest studies.[186]\nBut what are the highest studies? What is the supreme object of\nknowledge? It is the Idea of Good--the Form of Good: to the\nacquisition of which our philosophers must be trained to ascend,\nhowever laborious and difficult the process may be.[187] Neither\njustice nor any thing else can be useful or profitable, unless we\nsuperadd to them a knowledge of the Idea of Good: without this, it\nwould profit us nothing to possess all other knowledge.[188]\n\n[Footnote 186: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 503.]\n\n[Footnote 187: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 504.]\n\n[Footnote 188: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 A. [Greek: o(/ti ge \u00ea(\ntou= a)gathou= i)de/a me/giston ma/th\u00eama polla/kis a)k\u00ea/koas, \u00ea)=|\ndi/kaia kai\\ ta)/lla proschr\u00easa/mena chr\u00ea/sima kai\\ \u00f4)phe/lima\ngi/gnetai], &c.]\n\n[Side-note: Ancient disputes upon this point, though every\none yearns after Good. Some say Intelligence; some say Pleasure.\nNeither is satisfactory.]\n\nNow as to the question, What Good is? there are great and\nlong-standing disputes. Every mind pursues Good, and does every thing\nfor the sake of it--yet without either knowledge or firm assurance\nwhat Good is, and consequently with perpetual failure in deriving\nbenefit from other acquisitions.[189] Most people say that\nPleasure is the Good: an ingenious few identify Intelligence with\nthe Good. But neither of these explanations is satisfactory. For\nwhen a man says that Intelligence is the Good, our next question\nto him must be, What sort of Intelligence do you\nmean?--Intelligence of what? To this he must reply, Intelligence\nof the Good: which is absurd, since it presumes us to know already\nwhat the Good is--the very point which he is pretending to elucidate.\nAgain, he who contends that Pleasure is the Good, is forced in\ndiscussion to admit that there are such things as bad pleasures:\nin other words, that pleasure is sometimes good, sometimes\nbad.[190] From these doubts and disputes about the real nature\nof good, we shall require our philosophical Guardians to have\nemancipated themselves, and to have attained a clear vision. They\nwill be unfit for their post it they do not well know what the\nGood is, and in what manner just or honourable things come to be\ngood.[191] Our city will have received its final consummation,\nwhen it is placed under the superintendence of one who knows what\nthe Good is.\n\n[Footnote 189: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 E. [Greek: O(\\ d\u00ea\\\ndi\u00f4/kei me\\n a(/pasa psuch\u00ea\\ kai\\ tou/tou e(/neka pa/nta pra/ttei,\na)pomanteuome/n\u00ea ti\\ ei)=nai, a)porou=sa de\\ kai\\ ou)k e)/chousa\nlabei=n i(kan\u00f4=s ti/ pot' e)sti/n, ou)de\\ pi/stei chr\u00ea/sasthai\nmoni/m\u00f4|, oi(/a| kai\\ peri\\ ta)/lla, dia\\ tou=to de\\\na)potugcha/nei kai\\ t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n ei)/ ti o)/phelos \u00ea)=n],\n&c.]\n\n[Footnote 190: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 C.]\n\n[Footnote 191: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 506 A. [Greek: di/kaia/ te\nkai\\ kala\\ a)gnoou/mena o(/p\u00ea| pote\\ a)gatha/ e)stin, ou) pollou=\ntino\\s a)/xion phu/laka kekt\u00ea=sthai a)\\n e(aut\u00f4=n to\\n tou=to\na)gnoou=nta.]]\n\n[Side-note: Adeimantus asks what Sokrates says. Sokrates\nsays that he can not answer: but he compares it by a metaphor to\nthe Sun.]\n\nBut tell me, Sokrates (asks Adeimantus), what do _you_\nconceive the Good to be--Intelligence or Pleasure, or any other\nthing different from these? I do not profess to know (replies\nSokrates), and cannot tell you. We must decline the problem, What\nGood itself is? as more arduous than our present impetus will\nenable us to reach.[192] Nevertheless I will partially supply the\ndeficiency by describing to you the offspring of Good, very like\nits parent. You will recollect that we have distinguished the Many\nfrom the One: the many just particulars, beautiful particulars,\nfrom the One Universal Idea or Form, Just _per se_, Beautiful\n_per se_. The many particulars are seen but not conceived:\nthe one Idea is conceived, but not seen.[193] We see the many\nparticulars through the auxiliary agency of light, which emanates\nfrom the Sun, the God of the visible world. Our organ and sense of\nvision are not the Sun itself, but they are akin to the Sun in a\ngreater degree than any of our other senses. They imbibe their\npeculiar faculty from the influence of the Sun.[194] The Sun\nfurnishes to objects the power of being seen, and to our eyes the\npower of seeing: we can see no colour unless we turn to objects\nenlightened by its rays. Moreover it is the Sun which also brings\nabout the generation, the growth, and the nourishment, of these\nobjects, though it is itself out of the limits of generation: it\ngenerates and keeps them in existence, besides rendering them\nvisible.[195] Now the Sun is the offspring and representative\nof the Idea of Good: what the Sun is in the sensible and visible\nworld, the Idea of Good is in the intelligible or conceivable\nworld.[196] As the Sun not only brings into being the objects of\nsense, but imparts to them the power of being seen so the Idea of\nGood brings into being the objects of conception or cognition,\nimparts to them the power of being known, and to the mind the\npower of knowing them.[197] It is from the Idea of Good that all\nknowledge, all truth, and all real essence spring. Yet the Idea of\nGood is itself extra-essential; out of or beyond the limits of\nessence, and superior in beauty and dignity both to knowledge and\nto truth; which are not Good itself, but akin to Good, as vision\nis akin to the Sun.[198]\n\n[Footnote 192: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 506 B-E. [Greek: Au)to\\\nme\\n ti/ pot' e)sti\\ ta)gatho\\n e)a/s\u00f4men ta\\ nu=n ei)=nai; ple/on\nga/r moi phai/netai \u00ea)\\ kata\\ t\u00ea\\n parou=san o(rm\u00ea\\n e)phike/sthai\ntou= ge dokou=ntos e)moi\\ ta\\ nu=n; o(/s de\\ e)/kgono/s te tou=\na)gathou= phai/netai kai\\ o(moio/tatos e)kei/n\u00f4|, le/gein\ne)the/l\u00f4] (p. 506 E).]\n\n[Footnote 193: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 507 B-C. [Greek: Kai\\ ta\\\nme\\n (polla\\) d\u00ea\\ o(ra=sthai/ phamen, noei=sthai de\\ ou)/; ta\\s d'\nau)= i)de/as noei=sthai me/n, o(ra=sthai de\\ ou)/.]]\n\n[Footnote 194: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 508 A. [Greek: \u00ea(\no)/psis--\u00ea(lioeide/staton t\u00f4=n peri\\ ta\\s ai)sth\u00ea/seis o)rga/n\u00f4n.]]\n\n[Footnote 195: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 509 B. [Greek: To\\n \u00ea(/lion\ntoi=s o(r\u00f4me/nois ou) mo/non t\u00ea\\n tou= o(ra=sthai du/namin\npare/chein ph\u00ea/seis, a)lla\\ kai\\ t\u00ea\\n ge/nesin kai\\ au)/x\u00ean kai\\\ntroph\u00ea/n, ou) ge/nesin au)to\\n o)/nta.]]\n\n[Footnote 196: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 508 B-C. [Greek: Tou=ton\n(to\\n \u00ea(/lion) to\\n tou= a)gathou= e)/kgonon, o(\\n ta)gatho\\n\ne)ge/nn\u00easen a)na/logon e(aut\u00f4=|, o(/, ti per au)to\\ e)n t\u00f4=|\nno\u00eat\u00f4=| to/p\u00f4| pro/s te nou=n kai\\ ta\\ noou/mena, tou=to tou=ton\ne)n t\u00f4=| o(rat\u00f4=| pro/s te o)/psin kai\\ ta\\ o(r\u00f4/mena.]]\n\n[Footnote 197: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 508 E. [Greek: Tou=to\ntoi/nun to\\ t\u00ea\\n a)l\u00ea/theian pare/chon toi=s gign\u00f4skome/nois kai\\\nt\u00f4=| gign\u00f4/skonti t\u00ea\\n du/namin a)podido\\n t\u00ea\\n tou= a)gathou=\ni)de/an pha/thi ei)=nai, ai)ti/an d' e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas ou)=san kai\\\na)l\u00eathei/as \u00f4(s gign\u00f4skome/n\u00eas], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 198: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 509 B. [Greek: Kai\\ toi=s\ngign\u00f4skome/nois toi/nun m\u00ea\\ mo/non to\\ gign\u00f4/skesthai pha/nai\nu(po\\ tou= a)gathou= parei=nai, a)lla\\ kai\\ to\\ ei)=nai te kai\\\nt\u00ea\\n ou)si/an u(p' e)kei/nou au)tois prosei=nai, ou)k ou)si/as\no)/ntos tou= a)gathou=, a)ll' e)/ti e)pe/keina t\u00ea=s ou)si/as\npresbei/a| kai\\ duna/mei u(pere/chontos. Kai\\ o( Glau/k\u00f4n ma/la\ngeloi/\u00f4s, A)/pollon, e)/ph\u00ea, daimoni/as u(perbol\u00ea=s! Su\\ ga/r,\n\u00ea)=n d' e)g\u00f4/, ai)/tios, a)nagka/z\u00f4n ta\\ e)moi\\ dokou=nta peri\\\nau)tou= le/gein.]--Also p. 509 A.]\n\n[Side-note: The Idea of Good rules the ideal or intelligible\nworld, as the Sun rules the sensible or visible world.]\n\nHere then we have two distinct regions or genera; one, the\nconceivable or intelligible, ruled by the Idea of Good--the other\nthe visible, ruled by the Sun, which is the offspring of Good. Now\nlet us subdivide each of these regions or genera, into two\nportions. The two portions of the visible will be--first, real\nobjects, visible such as animals, plants, works of art,\n&c.--second, the images or representations of these, such as shadows,\nreflexions in water or in mirrors, &c. The first of these two\nsubdivisions will be greatly superior in clearness to the second:\nit will be distinguished from the second as truth is distinguished\nfrom not-truth.[199] Matter of knowledge is in the same relation\nto matter of opinion, as an original to its copy. Next, the\nconceivable or intelligible region must be subdivided into two\nportions, similarly related one to the other: the first of these\nportions will be analogous to the real objects of vision, the\nsecond to the images or representations of these objects: the\nfirst will thus be the Forms, Ideas, or Realities of Conception or\nIntellect--the second will be particular images or embodiments\nthereof.[200]\n\n[Footnote 199: Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 509-510. 510 A: [Greek:\ndi\u00ea|r\u00ea=sthai a)l\u00eathei/a| te kai\\ m\u00ea/, \u00f4(s to\\ doxasto\\n pro\\s to\\\ngn\u00f4sto/n, ou)/t\u00f4 to\\ o(moi\u00f4the\\n pro\\s to\\ \u00f4(=| \u00f4(moi\u00f4/th\u00ea.]]\n\n[Footnote 200: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 510 B.]\n\n[Side-note: To the intelligible world there are applicable\ntwo distinct modes of procedure--the Geometrical--the Dialectic.\nGeometrical procedure assumes diagrams.]\n\nNow in regard to these two portions of the conceivable or\nintelligible region, two different procedures of the mind are\nemployed: the pure Dialectic, and the Geometrical, procedure. The\nGeometer or the Arithmetician begins with certain visible images,\nlines, figures, or numbered objects, of sense: he takes his\ndeparture from certain hypotheses or assumptions, such as given\nnumbers, odd and even--given figures and angles, of three\ndifferent sorts.[201] He assumes these as data without rendering\naccount of them, or allowing them to be called in question, as if\nthey were self-evident to every one. From these premisses he\ndeduces his conclusions, carrying them down by uncontradicted\nsteps to the solution of the problem which he is examining.[202]\nBut though he has before his eyes the visible parallelogram\ninscribed on the sand, with its visible diagonal, and though all\nhis propositions are affirmed respecting these--yet what he has\nreally in his mind is something quite different--the Parallelogram\n_per se_, or the Form of a Parallelogram--the Form of a\nDiagonal, &c. The visible figure before him is used only as an\nimage or representative of this self-existent form; which last he\ncan contemplate only in conception, though all his propositions\nare intended to apply to it.[203] He is unable to take his\ndeparture directly from this Form, as from a first principle: he\nis forced to assume the visible figure as his point of departure,\nand cannot ascend above it: he treats it as something privileged\nand self-evident.[204]\n\n[Footnote 201: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 510 B. [Greek: \u00ea(=| to me\\n\nau)tou= (tm\u00ea=ma) toi=s to/te tm\u00eathei=sin \u00f4(s ei)ko/si chr\u00f4me/n\u00ea]\n(this is farther illustrated by p. 511 A--[Greek: ei)ko/si\nchr\u00f4me/n\u00ean au)toi=s toi=s u(po\\ t\u00f4=n ka/t\u00f4 a)peikasthei=si)\npsuch\u00ea\\ z\u00eatei=n a)nagka/zetai e)x u(pothe/se\u00f4n, ou)k e)p' a)rch\u00ea\\n\nporeuome/n\u00ea a)ll' e)pi\\ teleut\u00ea/n], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 202: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 510 C-D. [Greek: oi( peri\\\nta\\s ge\u00f4metri/as te kai\\ logismou\\s kai\\ ta\\ toiau=ta\npragmateuo/menoi, u(pothe/menoi to/ te peritto\\n kai\\ to\\ a)/rtion\nkai\\ ta\\ sch\u00ea/mata kai\\ g\u00f4ni\u00f4=n tritta\\ ei)/d\u00ea kai\\ a)/lla tou/t\u00f4n\na)delpha\\ kath' e(ka/st\u00ean me/thodon, tau=ta me\\n \u00f4(s ei)do/tes,\npoi\u00easa/menoi u(pothe/seis au)ta/, ou)de/na lo/gon ou)/te au(toi=s\nou)/te toi=s a)/llois e)/ti a)xiou=si peri\\ au)t\u00f4=n dido/nai, \u00f4(s\npanti\\ phaner\u00f4=n; e)k tou/t\u00f4n d' a)rcho/menoi ta\\ loipa\\ \u00ea)/d\u00ea\ndiexio/ntes teleut\u00f4=sin o(mologoume/n\u00f4s e)pi\\ tou=to, ou)= a)\\n\ne)pi\\ ske/psin o(rm\u00ea/s\u00f4sin.]]\n\n[Footnote 203: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 510 D-E. [Greek: toi=s\no(r\u00f4me/nois ei)/desi proschr\u00f4=ntai, kai\\ tou\\s lo/gous peri\\\nau)t\u00f4=n poiou=ntai, ou) peri\\ tou/t\u00f4n dianoou/menoi, a)ll'\ne)kei/n\u00f4n pe/ri oi(=s tau=ta e)/oike, tou= tetrag\u00f4/nou au)tou=\ne(/neka tou\\s lo/gous poiou/menoi kai\\ diame/tron au)t\u00ea=s, a)ll'\nou) tau/t\u00eas \u00ea(\\n gra/phousi, kai\\ ta)/lla ou(/t\u00f4s; au)ta\\ me\\n\ntau=ta a(\\ pla/ttousi/ te kai\\ gra/phousin, \u00f4(=n] kai\\ skiai\\ kai\\\ne)n u(/dasin ei)ko/nes ei)si/, tou/tois me\\n \u00f4(s ei)ko/sin au)=\nchr\u00f4/menoi, z\u00eatou=nte/s te au)ta\\ e)kei=na i)dei=n, a(\\ ou)k a)\\n\na)/ll\u00f4s i)/doi tis \u00ea)\\ t\u00ea=| dianoi/a|.]\n\n[Footnote 204: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 511 A. [Greek: ou)k e)p'\na)rch\u00ea\\n i)ou=san, \u00f4(s ou) duname/n\u00ean t\u00f4=n u(pothe/se\u00f4n a)n\u00f4te/r\u00f4\ne)kbai/nein, ei)ko/si de\\ chr\u00f4me/n\u00ean au)toi=s toi=s u(po\\ t\u00f4=n\nka/t\u00f4 a)peikasthei=sin, kai\\ e)kei/nois pro\\s e)kei=na \u00f4(s\ne)narge/si dedoxasme/nois te kai\\ tetim\u00eame/nois.]]\n\n[Side-note: Dialectic procedure assumes nothing. It departs\nfrom the highest Form, and steps gradually down to the lowest,\nwithout meddling with any thing except Forms.]\n\nFrom the geometrical procedure thus described, we must now\ndistinguish the other section--the pure Dialectic. Here the\nIntellect ascends to the absolute Form, and grasps it directly.\nParticular assumptions or hypotheses are indeed employed, but only\nas intervening stepping-stones, by which the Intellect is to\nascend to the Form: they are afterwards to be discarded: they are\nnot used here for first principles of reasoning, as they are by\nthe Geometer.[205] The Dialectician uses for his first principle\nthe highest absolute Form; he descends from this to the next\nhighest, and so lower and lower through the orderly gradation of\nForms, until he comes to the end or lowest: never employing\nthroughout the whole descent any hypothesis or assumption, nor any\nillustrative aid from sense. He contemplates and reasons upon the\npure intelligible essence, directly and immediately: whereas the\nGeometer can only contemplate it indirectly and mediately, through\nthe intervening aid of particular assumptions.[206]\n\n[Footnote 205: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 511 B. [Greek: to\\ e(/teron\ntm\u00ea=ma tou= no\u00eatou= . . . ou)= au)to\\s o( lo/gos a(/ptetai t\u00ea=|\ntou= diale/gesthai duna/mei, ta\\s u(pothe/seis poiou/menos ou)k\na)rcha\\s a)lla\\ t\u00f4=| o)/nti u(pothe/seis, oi(=on e)piba/seis te\nkai\\ o(rma/s, i(/na me/chri tou= a)nupothe/tou, e)pi\\ t\u00ea\\n tou=\npanto\\s a)rch\u00ea\\n i)\u00f4/n, a(psa/menos au)t\u00ea=s, pa/lin au)=\ne)cho/menos t\u00f4=n e)kei/n\u00eas e)chome/n\u00f4n, ou(/t\u00f4s e)pi\\ teleut\u00ea\\n\nkatabai/n\u00ea|, ai)sth\u00eat\u00f4=| panta/pasin ou)deni\\ proschr\u00f4/menos,\na)ll' ei)/desin au)toi=s di' au)t\u00f4=n ei)s au)ta/, kai\\ teleuta=|\nei)s ei)/d\u00ea.]]\n\n[Footnote 206: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 511 C. [Greek: saphe/steron\nei)=nai to\\ u(po\\ t\u00ea=s tou= diale/gesthai e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas tou= o)/ntos\nte kai\\ no\u00eatou= the\u00f4rou/menon \u00ea)\\ to\\ u(po\\ t\u00f4=n techn\u00f4=n\nkaloume/n\u00f4n, ai(=s ai( u(pothe/seis a)rchai/], &c.]\n\n[Side-note: Two distinct grades of Cognition--Direct or\nSuperior--No\u00fbs--Indirect or Inferior--Dianoia.]\n\nThe distinction here indicated between the two different sections\nof the Intelligible Region, and the two different sections of the\nRegion of Sense--we shall mark (continues Sokrates) by appropriate\nterms. The Dialectician alone has No\u00fbs or Intellect, direct or the\nhighest cognition: he alone grasps and comprehends directly the\npure intelligible essence or absolute Form. The Geometer does\nnot ascend to this direct contemplation or intuition of the Form:\nhe knows it only through the medium of particular assumptions, by\nindirect Cognition or Dianoia; which is a lower faculty than No\u00fbs\nor Intellect, yet nevertheless higher than Opinion.\n\n[Side-note: Two distinct grades of Opinion also in the\nSensible World--Faith or Belief--Conjecture.]\n\nAs we assign two distinct grades of Cognition to the Intelligible\nRegion, so we also assign two distinct grades of Opinion to the\nRegion of Sense, and its two sections. To the first of these two\nsections, or to real objects of sense, we assign the highest grade\nof Opinion, _viz._: Faith or Belief. To the second of the\ntwo, or to the images of real objects of sense, we assign the\nlower grade, _viz._: Conjecture.\n\nHere then are the four grades. Two grades of Cognition--1. No\u00fbs,\nor Direct Cognition. 2. Dianoia, or Indirect Cognition: both of\nthem belonging to the Intelligible Region, and both of them higher\nthan Opinion. Next follow the two grades of Opinion. 3. The higher\ngrade, Faith or Belief. 4. The lower grade, Conjecture. Both the\ntwo last belong to the sensible world; the first to real objects,\nthe last to images of those objects.[207]\n\n[Footnote 207: Plato, Republic, p. 511 D-E.]\n\n[Side-note: Distinction between the philosopher and the\nunphilosophical public, illustrated by the simile of the Cave, and\nthe captives imprisoned therein.]\n\nSokrates now proceeds to illustrate the contrast between the\nphilosopher and the unphilosophical or ordinary man, by the\nmemorable simile of the cave and its shadows. Mankind live in a\ncave, with its aperture directed towards the light of the sun; but\nthey are so chained, that their backs are constantly turned\ntowards this aperture, so that they cannot see the sun and\nsunlight. What they do see is by means of a fire which is always\nburning behind them. Between them and this fire there is a wall;\nalong the wall are posted men who carry backwards and forwards\nrepresentations or images of all sorts of objects; so that the\nshadows of these objects by the firelight are projected from\nbehind these chained men upon the ground in front of them, and\npass to and fro before their vision. All the experience which such\nchained men acquire, consists in what they observe of the\nappearance and disappearance, the transition, sequences, and\nco-existences, of these shadows, which they mistake for truth and\nrealities, having no no acquaintance with any other\nphenomena.[208] If now we suppose any one of them to be liberated\nfrom his chains, turned round, and brought up to the light of the\nsun and to real objects--his eyesight would be at first altogether\ndazzled, confounded, and distressed. Distinguishing as yet nothing\nclearly, he would believe that the shadows which he had seen in\nhis former state were true and distinct objects, and that the new\nmode of vision to which he had been suddenly introduced was\nillusory and unprofitable. He would require a long time to\naccustom him to daylight: at first his eyes would bear nothing but\nshadows--next images in the water--then the stars at\nnight--lastly, the full brightness of the Sun. He would learn that\nit was the Sun which not only gave light, but was the cause of varying\nseasons, growth, and all the productions of the visible world. And\nwhen his mind had been thus opened, he would consider himself much\nto be envied for the change, looking back with pity on his\ncompanions still in the cave.[209] He would think them all\nmiserably ignorant, as being conversant not with realities, but\nonly with the shadows which passed before their eyes. He would\nhave no esteem even for the chosen few in the cave, who were\nhonoured by their fellows as having best observed the\nco-existences and sequences among these shadows, so as to predict\nmost exactly how the shadows would appear in future.[210] Moreover\nif, after having become fully accustomed to daylight and the\ncontemplation of realities, he were to descend again into the\ncave, his eyesight would be dim and confused in that comparative\ndarkness; so that he would not well recognise the shadows, and\nwould get into disputes about them with his companions. They on\ntheir side would deride him as having spoilt his sight as well as\nhis judgment, and would point him out as an example to deter\nothers from emerging out of the cave into daylight.[211] Far from\nwishing to emerge themselves, they would kill, if they could,\nany one who tried to unchain them and assist them in\nescaping.[212]\n\n[Footnote 208: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 514-515.]\n\n[Footnote 209: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 515-516.]\n\n[Footnote 210: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 516 C. [Greek: Timai\\ de\\\nkai\\ e)/painoi ei)/ tines au)toi=s \u00ea)=san to/te par' a)ll\u00ea/l\u00f4n\nkai\\ ge/ra t\u00f4=| o)xu/tata kathor\u00f4=nti ta\\ pario/nta, kai\\\nmn\u00eamoneu/onti ma/lista o(/sa te pro/tera au)t\u00f4=n kai\\ u(/stera\nei)\u00f4/thei kai\\ a(/ma poreu/esthai, kai\\ e)k tou/t\u00f4n d\u00ea\\\ndunat\u00f4/tata a)pomanteuome/n\u00f4| to\\ me/llon \u00ea(/xein, dokei=s a)\\n\nau)to\\n e)pithum\u00eatik\u00f4=s au)t\u00f4=n e)/chein kai\\ z\u00ealou=n tou\\s par'\ne)kei/nois tim\u00f4me/nous te kai\\ e)ndunasteu/ontas?]]\n\n[Footnote 211: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 517 A. [Greek: a)=r' ou)\nge/l\u00f4t' a)\\n para/schoi kai\\ le/goito a)\\n peri\\ au)tou= \u00f4(s\na)naba\\s a)/n\u00f4 diephtharme/nos \u00ea(/kei ta\\ o)/mmata, kai\\ o(/ti\nou)k a)/xion ou)de\\ peira=sthai a)/n\u00f4 i)e/nai?]]\n\n[Footnote 212: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 517 A. [Greek: kai\\ to\\n\ne)picheirou=nta lu/ein te kai\\ a)na/gein, ei)/ p\u00f4s e)n tai=s\nchersi\\ du/naito labei=n kai\\ a)poktei=nai, a)poktinnu/nai\na)\\n?]]\n\n[Side-note: Daylight of philosophy contrasted with the\nfirelight and shadows of the Cave.]\n\nBy this simile (continues Sokrates) I intend to illustrate, as far\nas I can, yet without speaking confidently,[213] the relations of\nthe sensible world to the intelligible world: the world of\ntransitory shadows, dimly seen and admitting only opinion,\ncontrasted with that of unchangeable realities steadily\ncontemplated and known, illuminated by the Idea of Good, which is\nitself visible in the background, being the cause both of truth in\nspeculation and of rectitude in action.[214] No wonder that the\nfew who can ascend into the intelligible region, amidst the clear\ncontemplations of Truth and Justice _per se_, are averse to\nmeddle again with the miseries of human affairs and to contend\nwith the opinions formed by ordinary men respecting the shadows of\nJustice, the reality of which these ordinary men have never seen.\nThere are two causes of temporary confused vision: one, when a man\nmoves out of darkness into light--the other when he moves from\nlight into darkness. It is from the latter cause that the\nphilosopher suffers when he redescends into the obscure cave.[215]\n\n[Footnote 213: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 517. [Greek: t\u00ea=s g'\ne)m\u00ea=s e)lpi/dos, e)peid\u00ea\\ tau/t\u00eas e)pithumei=s a)kou/ein;\n_theo\\s de/ pou oi)=den ei) a)l\u00eath\u00ea\\s ou)=sa tugcha/nei_.]\n\nThis tone of uncertainty in Plato deserves notice. It forms a\nstriking contrast with the dogmatism of many among his\ncommentators.]\n\n[Footnote 214: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 517 C.]\n\n[Footnote 215: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 517-518.]\n\n[Side-note: Purpose of a philosophical training, to turn a\nman round from facing the bad light of the Cave to face the\ndaylight of philosophy, and to see the eternal Forms.]\n\nThe great purpose of education is to turn a man round from his\nnatural position at the bottom of this dark cave, where he sees\nnothing but shadows: to fix his eyes in the other direction, and\nto induce him to ascend into clear daylight. Education does not,\nas some suppose, either pour knowledge into an empty mind, or\nimpart visual power to blind persons. Men have good eyes, but\nthese eyes are turned in the wrong direction. The clever among\nthem see sharply enough what is before them: but they have nothing\nbefore them except shadows, and the sharper their vision the more\nmischief they do.[216] What is required is to turn them round\nand draw them up so as to face the real objects of daylight. Their\nnatural eyesight would then suffice to enable them to see these\nobjects well.[217] The task of our education must be, to turn\nround the men of superior natural aptitude, and to draw them up\ninto the daylight of realities. Next, when they shall have become\nsufficiently initiated in truth and philosophy, we must not allow\nthem to bury themselves permanently in such studies--as they will\nthemselves be but too eager to do. We must compel them to come\ndown again into the cave and exercise ascendancy among their\ncompanions, for whose benefit their superior mental condition will\nthus become available.[218]\n\n[Footnote 216: Plato, Republic, p. 519 A-B.]\n\n[Footnote 217: Plato, Republic, p. 519 B. [Greek: \u00f4(=n ei)\na)pallage\\n periestre/pheto ei)s ta)l\u00eath\u00ea=, kai\\ e)kei=na a)\\n to\\\nau)to\\ tou=to t\u00f4=n au)t\u00f4=n a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n o)xu/tata e(\u00f4/ra, \u00f4(/sper\nkai\\ e)ph' a)\\ nu=n te/traptai.]]\n\n[Footnote 218: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 519-520.]\n\n[Side-note: Those who have emerged from the Cave into full\ndaylight amidst eternal Forms, must be forced to come down again\nand undertake active duties--Their reluctance to do this.]\n\nComing as they do from the better light, they will, after a little\ntemporary perplexity, be able to see the dim shadows better than\nthose who have never looked at anything else. Having contemplated\nthe true and real Forms of the Just, Beautiful, Good--they will\nbetter appreciate the images of these Forms which come and go,\npass by and repass in the cave.[219] They will indeed be very\nreluctant to undertake the duties or exercise the powers of\ngovernment: their genuine delight is in philosophy; and if left to\nthemselves, they would cultivate nothing else. But such reluctance\nis in itself one proof that they are the fittest persons to\ngovern. If government be placed in the hands of men eager to\npossess it, there will be others eager to dispossess them, so that\ncompetition and factions will arise. Those who come forward to\ngovern, having no good of their own, and seeking to extract their\nown good from the exercise of power, are both unworthy of trust\nand sure to be resisted by opponents of the like disposition. The\nphilosopher alone has his own good in himself. He enjoys a life\nbetter than that of a ruler; which life he is compelled to forego\nwhen he accepts power and becomes a ruler.[220]\n\n[Footnote 219: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 520 C.]\n\n[Footnote 220: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 520-521.]\n\n[Side-note: Studies serving as introduction to\nphilosophy--Arithmetic, its awakening power--shock to the mind\nby felt contradiction.]\n\nThe main purpose of education, I have said (continues Sokrates)\nis, to turn round the faces of the superior men, and to invite\nthem upwards from darkness to light--from the region of\nperishable shadows to that of imperishable realities.[221] Now\nwhat cognitions, calculated to aid such a purpose, can we find to\nteach?[222] Gymnastic, music, the vulgar arts, are all useful to\nbe taught: but they do not tend to that which we are here seeking.\nArithmetic does so to a certain extent, if properly taught which\nat present it is not.[223] It furnishes a stimulus to awaken the\ndormant intellectual and reflective capacity. Among the variety of\nsensible phenomena, there are some in which the senses yield a\nclear and satisfactory judgment, leaving no demand in the mind for\nanything beyond: there are others in which the senses land us in\napparent equivocation, puzzle, and contradiction--so that the mind\nis stung by this apparent perplexity, and instigated to find a\nsolution by some intellectual effort.[224] Thus, if we see or feel\nthe fingers of our hand, they always appear to the sense, fingers:\nin whatever order or manner they may be looked at, there is no\ncontradiction or discrepancy in the judgment of sense. But if we\nsee or feel them as great or small, thick or thin, hard or soft,\n&c., they then appear differently according as they are seen\nor felt in different order or under different circumstances. The\nsame object which now appears great, will at another time appear\nsmall: it will seem to the sense hard or soft, light or heavy,\naccording as it is seen under different comparisons and\nrelations.[225] Here then, sense is involved in an apparent\ncontradiction, declaring the same object to be both hard and soft,\ngreat and small, light and heavy, &c. The mind, painfully\nconfounded by such a contradiction, is obliged to invoke\nintellectual reflection to clear it up. Great and small are\npresented by the sense as inhering in the same object. Are they\none thing, or two separate things? Intellectual reflection informs\nus that they are two: enabling us to conceive separately two\nthings, which to our sense appeared confounded together.\nIntellectual (or abstract) conception is thus developed in our\nmind, as distinguished from sense, and as a refuge from the\nconfusion and difficulties of sense, which furnish the stimulus\nwhereby it is awakened.[226]\n\n[Footnote 221: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 521 C. [Greek: psuch\u00ea=s\nperiag\u00f4g\u00ea/, e)k nukterin\u00ea=s tino\\s \u00ea(me/ras ei)s a)l\u00eathin\u00ea\\n tou=\no)/ntos i)ou/s\u00eas e)pa/nodon, \u00ea(\\n d\u00ea\\ philosophi/an a)l\u00eath\u00ea=\nph\u00ea/somen ei)=nai.]]\n\n[Footnote 222: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 521 C. [Greek: Ti/ a)\\n\nou)=n ei)/\u00ea ma/th\u00eama psuch\u00ea=s o(lko\\n a)po\\ tou= gignome/nou e)pi\\\nto\\ o)/n?]]\n\n[Footnote 223: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 522-523 A.]\n\n[Footnote 224: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 523 C.]\n\n[Footnote 225: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 523-524.]\n\n[Footnote 226: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 524 B-C.]\n\n[Side-note: Perplexity arising from the One and Many,\nstimulates the mind to an intellectual effort for clearing it up.]\n\nNow arithmetic, besides its practical usefulness for arrangements\nof war, includes difficulties and furnishes a stimulus of this\nnature. We see the same thing both as One and as infinite in\nmultitude: as definite and indefinite in number.[227] We can\nemerge from these difficulties only by intellectual and abstract\nreflection. It is for this purpose, and not for purposes of\ntraffic, that our intended philosophers must learn Arithmetic.\nTheir minds must be raised from the confusion of the sensible\nworld to the clear daylight of the intelligible.[228] In teaching\nArithmetic, the master sets before his pupils numbers in the\nconcrete, that is, embodied in visible and tangible objects--so\nmany balls or pebbles.[229] Each of these balls he enumerates as\nOne, though they be unequal in magnitude, and whatever be the\nmagnitude of each. If you remark that the balls are unequal--and\nthat each of them is Many as well as One, being divisible into as\nmany parts as you please--he will laugh at the objection as\nirrelevant. He will tell you that the units to which his\nnumeration refers are each _Unum per se_, indivisible and\nwithout parts; and all equal among themselves without the least\nshade of difference. He will add that such units cannot be\nexhibited to the senses, but can only be conceived by the\nintellect: that the balls before you are not such units in\nreality, but serve to suggest and facilitate the effort of\nabstract conception.[230] In this manner arithmetical teaching\nconducts us to numbers in the abstract--to the real, intelligible,\nindivisible unit--the _Unum per se_.\n\n[Footnote 227: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 525 A. [Greek: a(/ma ga\\r\ntau)to\\n \u00f4(s e(/n te o(r\u00f4=men kai\\ \u00f4(s a)/peira to\\ pl\u00ea=thos.]]\n\n[Footnote 228: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 525 B. [Greek: dia\\ to\\\nt\u00ea=s ou)si/as a(pte/on ei)=nai gene/se\u00f4s e)xanadu/nti], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 229: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 525 D. [Greek: o(rata\\ \u00ea)\\\na(pta\\ s\u00f4/mata e)/chontas a)rithmou\\s], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 230: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 526 A. [Greek: ei)/ tis\ne)/roito au)tou/s, \u00d4)= thauma/sioi, peri\\ poi/\u00f4n a)rithm\u00f4=n\ndiale/gesthe, e)n oi(=s to\\ e(\\n oi(=on u(mei=s a)xiou=te/ e)stin,\ni)/son te e(/kaston pa=n panti\\ kai\\ ou)de\\ smikro\\n diaphe/ron,\nmo/rio/n te e)/chon e)n e(aut\u00f4=| ou)de/n? ti/ a)\\n oi)/ei au)tou\\s\na)pokri/nasthai? Tou=to e)/g\u00f4ge, o(/ti peri\\ tou/t\u00f4n le/gousin\n\u00f4(=n diano\u00eath\u00ea=nai mo/non e)gch\u00f4rei=, a)/ll\u00f4s d' ou)dam\u00f4=s\nmetacheiri/zesthai dunato/n.]]\n\n[Side-note: Geometry conducts the mind to wards Universal\nEns.]\n\nGeometrical teaching conducts the mind to the same order of\ncontemplations; leading it away from variable particulars to\nunchangeable universal Essence. Some persons extol Geometry\nchiefly on the ground of its usefulness in applications to\npractice. But this is a mistake: its real value is in conducing to\nknowledge, and to elevated contemplations of the mind. It does,\nhowever, like Arithmetic, yield useful results in practice: and\nboth of them are farther valuable as auxiliaries to other\nstudies.[231]\n\n[Footnote 231: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 526-527.]\n\n[Side-note: Astronomy--how useful--not useful as now\ntaught--must be studied by ideal figures, not by observation.]\n\nAfter Geometry--the measurement of lines and superficial\nareas--the proper immediate sequel is Stereometry, the measurement\nof solids. But this latter is nowhere properly honoured and\ncultivated: though from its intrinsic excellence, it forces its\nway partially even against public neglect and discouragement.[232]\nMost persons omit it, and treat Astronomy as if it were the\nimmediate sequel to Geometry: which is a mistake, for Astronomy\nrelates to solid bodies in a state of rotatory movement, and ought\nto be preceded by the treatment of solid bodies generally.[233]\nAssuming Stereometry, therefore, as if it existed, we proceed to\nAstronomy.\n\n[Footnote 232: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 528 A-C.]\n\n[Footnote 233: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 528 A-B. [Greek: e)n\nperiphora=| o)\\n \u00ea)/d\u00ea stereo\\n labo/ntes, pri\\n au)to\\ kath'\nau(to\\ labei=n.] Also 528 E.]\n\nCertainly (remarks Glaukon) Astronomy, besides its usefulness in\nregard to the calendar, and the seasons, must be admitted by every\none to carry the mind upwards, to the contemplation of things not\nbelow but on high. I do not admit this at all (replies Sokrates),\nas Astronomy is now cultivated: at least in my sense of the words,\n_looking upwards and looking downwards_. If a man lies on his\nback, contemplating the ornaments of the ceiling, he may carry his\neyes upward, but not his mind.[234] To look upwards, as I\nunderstand it, is to carry the mind away from the contemplation of\nsensible things, whereof no science is attainable--to the\ncontemplation of intelligible things, entities invisible and\nunchangeable, which alone are the objects of science. Observation\nof the stars, such as astronomers now teach, does not fulfil any\nsuch condition. The heavenly bodies are the most beautiful of all\nvisible bodies and the most regular of all visible movements,\napproximating most nearly, though still with a long interval of\ninferiority, to the ideal figures and movements of genuine and\nself-existent Forms--quickness, slowness, number, figure, &c.,\nas they are in themselves, not visible to the eye, but\nconceivable only by reason and intellect.[235] The movements of\nthe heavenly bodies are exemplifications, approaching nearest to\nthe perfection of these ideal movements, but still falling greatly\nshort of them. They are like visible circles or triangles drawn by\nsome very exact artist; which, however beautiful as works of art,\nare far from answering to the conditions of the idea and its\ndefinition, and from exhibiting exact equality and\nproportion.[236] So about the movements of the sun and stars: they\nare comparatively regular, but they are yet bodily and visible,\nnever attaining the perfect sameness and unchangeableness of the\nintelligible world and its forms. We cannot learn truth by\nobservation of phenomena constantly fluctuating and varying. We\nmust study astronomy, as we do geometry, not by observation, but\nby mathematical theorems and hypotheses: which is a far more\narduous task than astronomy as taught at present. Only in this way\ncan it be made available to improve and strengthen the\nintellectual organ of the mind.[237]\n\n[Footnote 234: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 529 B.]\n\n[Footnote 235: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 529 D.]\n\n[Footnote 236: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 529-530.]\n\n[Footnote 237: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 530 B. [Greek:\nProbl\u00ea/masin a)/ra chr\u00f4/menoi \u00f4(/sper ge\u00f4metri/an, ou(/t\u00f4 kai\\\na)stronomi/an me/timen; ta\\ d' e)n t\u00f4=| ou)ra/n\u00f4| e)a/somen],\n&c.]\n\n[Side-note: Acoustics, in like manner--The student will be\nthus conducted to the highest of all studies--Dialectic: and to\nthe region of pure intelligible Forms.]\n\nIn like manner (continues Sokrates), Acoustics or Harmonics must\nbe studied, not by the ear, listening to and comparing various\nsounds, but by the contemplative intellect, applying arithmetical\nrelations and theories.[238]\n\n[Footnote 238: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 531.]\n\nAfter going through all these different studies, the student will\nhave his mind elevated so as to perceive the affinity of\nmethod[239] and principle which pervades them all. In this state\nhe will be prepared for entering on Dialectic, which is the final\nconsummation of his intellectual career. He will then have\nascended from the cave into daylight. He will have learnt to see\nreal objects, and ultimately the Sun itself, instead of the dim\nand transitory shadows below. He will become qualified to grasp\nthe pure Intelligible Form with his pure Intellect alone, without\neither aid or disturbance from sense. He will acquire that\ndialectical discursive power which deals exclusively with these\nIntelligible Forms, carrying on ratiocination by means of them\nonly, with no reference to sensible objects. He will attain at\nlength the last goal of the Dialectician--the contemplation of\nBonum _per se_ (the highest perfection and elevation of the\nIntelligible)[240] with Intellect _per se_ in its full\npurity: the best part of his mind will have been raised to the\ncontemplation and knowledge of the best and purest entity.[241]\n\n[Footnote 239: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 531 D.]\n\n[Footnote 240: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 532 A. [Greek: ou(/t\u00f4 kai\\\no(/tan tis t\u00f4=| diale/gesthai e)picheir\u00ea=|, a)/neu pas\u00f4=n t\u00f4=n\nai)sth\u00ea/se\u00f4n dia\\ tou= lo/gou e)p' au)to\\ o(\\ e)/stin e(/kaston\no(rma=|, kai\\ m\u00ea\\ a)post\u00ea=| pri\\n a)\\n au)to\\ o(\\ e)/stin\na)gatho\\n au)t\u00ea=| t\u00ea=| no\u00ea/sei la/b\u00ea|, e)p' au)t\u00f4=| gi/gnetai t\u00f4=|\ntou= no\u00eatou= te/lei], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 241: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 532 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Question by Glaukon--What is the Dialectic\nPower? Sokrates declares that he cannot answer with certainty, and\nthat Glaukon could not follow him if he did.]\n\nI know not whether I ought to admit your doctrine, Sokrates\n(observes Glaukon). There are difficulties both in admitting and\ndenying it. However, let us assume it for the present. Your next\nstep must be to tell us what is the characteristic function of\nthis Dialectic power--what are its different varieties and ways\nof proceeding? I would willingly do so (replies Sokrates), but you\nwould not be able to follow me.[242] I would lay before you not\nmerely an image of the truth but the very truth itself; as it\nappears to me at least, whether I am correct or not--for I ought\nnot to be sure of my own correctness.\n\n[Footnote 242: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 533 A.]\n\n[Side-note: He answers partially--It is the consummation of\nall the sciences, raising the student to the contemplation of pure\nForms, and especially to that of the highest Form--_Good_.]\n\nBut I am sure that the dialectic power is something of the nature\nwhich I have described. It is the only force which can make plain\nthe full truth to students who have gone through the preliminary\nstudies that we have described. It is the only study which\ninvestigates rationally real forms and essences[243]--what each\nthing is, truly in itself. Other branches of study are directed\neither towards the opinions and preferences of men--or towards\ngeneration and combination of particular results--or towards\nupholding of combinations already produced or naturally springing\nup: while even as to geometry and the other kindred studies, we\nhave seen that as to real essence, they have nothing better than\ndreams[244]--and that they cannot see it as it is, so long as\nthey take for their principle or point of departure certain\nassumptions or hypotheses of which they can render no account. The\nprinciple being thus unknown, and the conclusion as well as the\nintermediate items being spun together out of that unknown, how\ncan such a convention deserve the name of Science?[245] Pursuant\nto custom, indeed, we call these by the name of Sciences. But they\ndeserve no higher title than that of Intellectual Cognitions,\nlower than Science, yet higher than mere Opinion. It is the\nDialectician alone who discards all assumptions, ascending at once\nto real essence as his principle and point of departure:[246]\ndefining, and discriminating by appropriate words, each variety of\nreal essence--rendering account of it to others--and carrying it\nsafely through the cross-examining process of question and\nanswer.[247] Whoever cannot discriminate in this way the Idea or\nForm of Good from every thing else, will have no proper cognition\nof Good itself, but only, at best, opinions respecting the various\nshadows of Good. Dialectic--the capacity of discriminating real\nForms and maintaining them in cross-examining dialogue is thus the\ncoping-stone, completion, or consummation, of all the other\nsciences.[248]\n\n[Footnote 243: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 533 B. [Greek: \u00f4(s au)tou=\nge e(ka/stou pe/ri, o(\\ e)/stin e(/kaston, ou)k a)/ll\u00ea tis\ne)picheirei= me/thodos o(d\u00f4=| peri\\ panto\\s lamba/nein], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 244: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 533 C. [Greek: \u00f4(s\no)neir\u00f4/ttousi me\\n peri\\ to\\ o)/n, u(/par de\\ a)du/naton au)tai=s\ni)dei=n, e(/\u00f4s a)\\n u(pothe/sesi chr\u00f4/menai tau/tas a)kin\u00ea/tous\ne)\u00f4=sin], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 245: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 533 D.]\n\n[Footnote 246: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 533 E.]\n\n[Footnote 247: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 534 B. [Greek: \u00ea)= kai\\\ndialektiko\\n kalei=s to\\n lo/gon e(/kastou lamba/nonta t\u00ea=s\nou)si/as?]]\n\n[Footnote 248: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 534 C-E. [Greek: \u00f4(/sper\nthrigko\\s toi=s math\u00ea/masin \u00ea( dialektik\u00ea\\ \u00ea(mi=n e)pa/n\u00f4\nkei=sthai], &c.]\n\n[Side-note: The Synoptic view peculiar to the\nDialectician.]\n\n[Side-note: Scale and duration of various studies for the\nGuardians, from youth upwards.]\n\nThe preliminary sciences must be imparted to our Guardians during\nthe earlier years of life, together with such bodily and mental\ntraining as may test their energy and perseverance of\ncharacter.[249] After the age of twenty, those who have\ndistinguished themselves in the juvenile studies and gymnastics,\nmust be placed in a select class of honour above the rest, and\nmust be initiated in a synoptic view of the affinity pervading all\nthe separate cognitions which have been imparted to them. They\nmust also be introduced to the view of Real Essence and its\nnature. This is the test of aptitude for Dialectics: it is the\nsynoptic view only, which constitutes the Dialectician.[250]\n\n[Footnote 249: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 535-536 D.]\n\n[Footnote 250: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 536-537 C. [Greek: kai\\\nmegi/st\u00ea pei=ra dialektik\u00ea=s phu/se\u00f4s kai\\ m\u00ea/; o( me\\n ga\\r\nsunoptiko\\s dialektiko/s, o( de\\ m\u00ea/, ou)/.]]\n\nIn these new studies they will continue until thirty years of\nage: after which a farther selection must be made, of those\nwho have most distinguished themselves. The men selected will be\nenrolled in a class of yet higher honour, and will be tested by\ndialectic cross-examination: so that we may discover who among\nthem are competent to apprehend true, pure, and real Essence,\nrenouncing all visual and sensible perceptions.[251] It is\nimportant that such Dialectic exercises should be deferred until\nthis advanced age--and not imparted, as they are among us at\npresent, to immature youths: who abuse the license of\ninterrogation, find all their homegrown opinions uncertain, and\nend by losing all positive convictions.[252] Our students will\nremain under such dialectic tuition for five years, until they are\nthirty-five years of age: after which they must be brought again\ndown into the cave, and constrained to acquire practical\nexperience by undertaking military and administrative functions.\nIn such employments they will spend fifteen years: during which\nthey will undergo still farther scrutiny, to ascertain whether\nthey can act up to their previous training, in spite of all\nprovocations and temptations.[253] Those who well sustain all\nthese trials will become, at fifty years of age, the finished\nElders or Chiefs of the Republic. They will pass their remaining\nyears partly in philosophical contemplations, partly in\napplication of philosophy to the regulation of the city. It is\nthese Elders whose mental eye will have been so trained as to\ncontemplate the Real Essence of Good, and to copy it as an\narchetype in all their ordinances and administration. They will be\nthe Moderators of the city: but they will perform this function as\na matter of duty and necessity--not being at all ambitious of it\nas a matter of honour.[254]\n\n[Footnote 251: Plato, Republic, p. 537 D.]\n\n[Footnote 252: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 538-539.]\n\n[Footnote 253: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 539 D-E.]\n\n[Footnote 254: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 539-540.]\n\n[Side-note: All these studies, and this education, are\ncommon to females as well as males.]\n\nWhat has here been said about the male guardians and philosophers\nmust be understood to apply equally to the female. We recognise no\ndifference in this respect between the two sexes. Those females\nwho have gone through the same education and have shown themselves\ncapable of enduring the same trials as males, will participate,\nafter fifty years of age, in the like philosophical\ncontemplations, and in superintendence of the city.[255]\n\n[Footnote 255: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 540 C.]\n\n[Side-note: First formation of the Platonic city--how\nbrought about: difficult, but not impossible.]\n\nI have thus shown (Sokrates pursues) how the fundamental postulate\nfor our city may be brought about.--That philosophers, a single\nman or a few, shall become possessed of supreme rule: being\nsufficiently exalted in character to despise the vulgar\ngratifications of ambition, and to carry out systematically the\ndictates of rectitude and justice. The postulate is indeed hard to\nbe realised--yet not impossible.[256] Such philosophical rulers,\nas a means for first introducing their system into a new city,\nwill send all the inhabitants above ten years old away into the\ncountry, reserving only the children, whom they will train up in\ntheir own peculiar manners and principles. In this way the city,\naccording to our scheme, will be first formed: when formed, it\nwill itself be happy, and will confer inestimable benefit on the\nnation to which it belongs.[257]\n\n[Footnote 256: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 540 E.]\n\n[Footnote 257: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 541 A.]\n\nPlato thus assumes his city, and the individual man forming a\nparallel to his city, to be perfectly well constituted. Reason,\nthe higher element, exercises steady controul: the lower elements,\nEnergy and Appetite, both acquiesce contentedly in her right to\ncontroul, and obey her orders--the former constantly and\nforwardly--the latter sometimes requiring constraint by the\nstrength of the former.]\n\n[Side-note: The city thus formed will last long, but not\nfor ever. After a certain time, it will begin to degenerate.\nStages of its degeneracy.]\n\nBut even under the best possible administration, the city, though\nit will last long, will not last for ever. Eternal continuance\nbelongs only to Ens; every thing generated must one day or other\nbe destroyed.[258] The fatal period will at length arrive, when\nthe breed of Guardians will degenerate. A series of changes for\nthe worse will then commence, whereby the Platonic city will pass\nsuccessively into timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, despotism. The\nfirst change will be, that the love of individual wealth and\nlanded property will get possession of the Guardians: who, having\nin themselves the force of the city, will divide the territory\namong themselves, and reduce the other citizens to dependence and\nslavery.[259] They will at the same time retain a part of their\nformer mental training. They will continue their warlike\nhabits and drill: they will be ashamed of their wealth, and will\nenjoy it only in secret: they will repudiate money-getting\noccupations as disgraceful. They will devote themselves to the\ncontests of war and political ambition--the rational soul becoming\nsubordinate to the energetic and courageous.[260] The system which\nthus obtains footing will be analogous to the Spartan and Kretan,\nwhich have many admirers.[261] The change in individual character\nwill correspond to this change in the city. Reason partially\nlosing its ascendancy, while energy and appetite both gain\nground--an intermediate character is formed in which energy or\ncourage predominates. We have the haughty, domineering, contentious,\nman.[262]\n\n[Footnote 258: Plato, Republic, viii. p. 546 A. [Greek: genome/n\u00f4|\npanti\\ phthora/ e)stin], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 259: Plato, Republic, vii. p. 547.]\n\n[Footnote 260: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 547-548 D. [Greek:\ndiaphane/staton d' e)n au)t\u00ea=| e)sti\\n e(/n ti mo/non u(po\\ tou=\nthumoeidou=s kratou=ntos--philonei/kiai kai\\ philoti/miai.]]\n\n[Footnote 261: Plato, Republic, viii. p. 544 C.]\n\n[Footnote 262: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 549-550.]\n\n[Side-note: 1. Timocracy and the timocratical individual. 2\nOligarchy, and the oligarchical individual.]\n\nOut of this timocracy, or timarchy, the city will next pass into\nan oligarchy, or government of wealth. The rich will here govern,\nto the exclusion of the poor. Reason, in the timocracy, was under\nthe dominion of energy or courage: in the oligarchy, it will be\nunder the dominion of appetite. The love of wealth will become\npredominant, instead of the love of force and aggrandisement. Now\nthe love of wealth is distinctly opposed to the love of virtue:\nvirtue and wealth are like weights in opposite scales.[263] The\noligarchical city will lose all its unity, and will consist of a\nfew rich with a multitude of discontented poor ready to rise\nagainst them.[264] The character of the individual citizen will\nundergo a modification similar to that of the collective city. He\nwill be under the rule of appetite: his reason will be only\ninvoked as the servant of appetite, to teach him how he may best\nenrich himself.[265] He will be frugal,--will abstain from all\nunnecessary expenditure, even for generous and liberal\npurposes--and will keep up a fair show of honesty, from the fear\nof losing what he has already got.[266]\n\n[Footnote 263: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 550 D-E-551 A. 550 E:\n[Greek: proi+o/ntes ei)s to\\ pro/sthen tou= chr\u00eamati/zesthai,\no(/s\u00f4| a)\\n tou=to timi\u00f4/teron \u00ea(g\u00f4=ntai, tosou/t\u00f4| a)ret\u00ea\\n\na)timote/ran. \u00ea)\\ ou)ch ou(/t\u00f4 plou/tou a)ret\u00ea\\ die/st\u00eaken,\n\u00f4(/sper e)n pla/stiggi zugou= keime/nou e(kate/rou a)ei\\\ntou)nanti/on r(e/ponte?] Also p. 555 D.]\n\n[Footnote 264: Plato, Republic, viii. p. 552 D-E.]\n\n[Footnote 265: Plato, Republic, viii. p. 553 C.]\n\n[Footnote 266: Plato, Republic, viii. p. 554 D.]\n\n[Side-note: 3. Democracy, and the democratical\nindividual.]\n\nThe oligarchical city will presently be transformed into a\ndemocracy, mainly through the abuse and exaggeration of its own\nruling impulse--the love of wealth. The rulers, anxious to enrich\nthemselves, rather encourage than check the extravagance of young\nspendthrifts, to whom they lend money at high interest, or whose\nproperty they buy on advantageous terms. In this manner there\narises a class of energetic men, with ruined fortunes and habits\nof indulgence. Such are the adventurers who put themselves at the\nhead of the discontented poor, and overthrow the oligarchy.[267]\nThe ruling few being expelled or put down, a democracy is\nestablished with equal franchise, and generally with officers\nchosen by lot.[268]\n\n[Footnote 267: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 555-556.]\n\n[Footnote 268: Plato, Republic, viii. p. 557 A.]\n\nThe characteristic of the democracy is equal freedom and open\nspeech to all, with liberty to each man to shape his own life as\nhe chooses. Hence there arises a great diversity of individual\ntaste and character. Uniformity of pursuit or conduct is scarcely\nenforced: there is little restraint upon any one. A man offers\nhimself for office whenever he chooses and not unless he chooses.\nHe is at war or at peace, not by obedience to any public\nauthority, but according to his own individual preference. If he\nbe even condemned by a court of justice, he remains in the city\ncareless of the sentence, which is never enforced against him.\nThis democracy is an equal, agreeable, diversified, society, with\nlittle or no government: equal in regard to all--to the good, bad,\nand indifferent.[269]\n\n[Footnote 269: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 557-558.]\n\nSo too the democratical individual. The son of one among these\nfrugal and money-getting oligarchs, departing from the habits and\ndisregarding the advice of his father, contracts a taste for\nexpensive and varied indulgences. He loses sight of the\ndistinction between what is necessary, and what is not necessary,\nin respect to desires and pleasures. If he be of a quiet\ntemperament, not quite out of the reach of advice, he keeps clear\nof ruinous excess in any one direction; but he gives himself up to\na great diversity of successive occupations and amusements,\npassing from one to the other without discrimination of good\nfrom bad, necessary from unnecessary.[270] His life and\ncharacter thus becomes an agreeable, unconstrained, changeful,\ncomprehensive, miscellany, like the society to which he\nbelongs.[271]\n\n[Footnote 270: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 560-561 B. [Greek: ei)s\ni)/son d\u00ea/ ti katast\u00ea/sas ta\\s \u00ea(dona\\s dia/gei, t\u00ea=|\nparapiptou/s\u00ea| a)ei\\ \u00f4(/sper lachou/s\u00ea| t\u00ea\\n e(autou= a)rch\u00ea\\n\nparadidou/s, e(/\u00f4s a)\\n pl\u00ear\u00f4th\u00ea=|, kai\\ au)=this a)/ll\u00ea|,\nou)demi/an a)tima/z\u00f4n, a)ll' e)x i)/sou tre/ph\u00f4n.]]\n\n[Footnote 271: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 561 D-E. [Greek:\npantodapo/n te kai\\ plei/st\u00f4n \u00ea(th\u00f4=n mesto/n, kai\\ to\\n kalo/n te\nkai\\ poiki/lon, \u00f4(/sper e)kei/n\u00ean t\u00ea\\n po/lin, tou=ton to\\n\na)/ndra ei)=nai.]]\n\n[Side-note: 4. Passage from democracy to despotism.\nCharacter of the despotic city.]\n\nDemocracy, like oligarchy, becomes ultimately subverted by an\nabuse of its own characteristic principle. Freedom is gradually\npushed into extravagance and excess, while all other\nconsiderations are neglected. No obedience is practised: no\nauthority is recognised. The son feels himself equal to his\nfather, the disciple to his teacher, the metic to the citizen, the\nwife to her husband, the slave to his master. Nay, even horses,\nasses, and dogs, go free about, so that they run against you in\nthe road, if you do not make way for them.[272] The laws are not\nobeyed: every man is his own master.\n\n[Footnote 272: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 562-563 C.]\n\nThe subversion of such a democracy arises from the men who rise to\nbe popular leaders in it: violent, ambitious, extravagant, men,\nwho gain the favour of the people by distributing among them\nconfiscations from the property of the rich. The rich, resisting\nthese injustices, become enemies to the constitution: the people,\nin order to put them down, range themselves under the banners of\nthe most energetic popular leader, who takes advantage of such a\nposition to render himself a despot.[273] He begins his rule by\nsome acceptable measures, such as abolition of debts, and\nassignment of lands to the poorer citizens, until he has expelled\nor destroyed the parties opposed to him. He seeks pretences for\nforeign war, in order that the people may stand in need of a\nleader, and may be kept poor by the contributions necessary to\nsustain war. But presently he finds, or suspects, dissatisfaction\namong the more liberal spirits. He kills or banishes them as\nenemies: and to ensure the continuance of his rule, he is under\nthe necessity of dispatching in like manner every citizen\nprominent either for magnanimity, intelligence, or wealth.[274]\nBecoming thus odious to all the better citizens, he is obliged\nto seek support by enlisting a guard of mercenary foreigners and\nmanumitted slaves. He cannot pay his guards, without plundering\nthe temples, extorting perpetual contributions from the people,\nand grinding them down by severe oppression and suffering.[275]\nSuch is the government of the despot, which Euripides and other\npoets employ their genius in extolling.[276]\n\n[Footnote 273: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 565-566.]\n\n[Footnote 274: Plato, Republic, viii. p. 567 B.]\n\n[Footnote 275: Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 568-569.]\n\n[Footnote 276: Plato, Republic, viii. p. 568 B.]\n\n[Side-note: Despotic individual corresponding to that\ncity.]\n\nWe have now to describe the despotic individual, the parallel of\nthe despotised city. As the democratic individual arises from the\nson of an oligarchical citizen departing from the frugality of his\nfather and contracting habits of costly indulgence: so the son of\nthis democrat will contract desires still more immoderate and\nextravagant than his father, and will thus be put into training\nfor the despotic character. He becomes intoxicated by insane\nappetites, which serve as seconds and auxiliaries to one despotic\npassion or mania, swaying his whole soul.[277] To gratify such\ndesires, he spends all his possessions, and then begins to borrow\nmoney wherever he can. That resource being exhausted, he procures\nadditional funds by fraud or extortion; he cheats and ruins his\nfather and mother; he resorts to plunder and violence. If such men\nare only a small minority, amidst citizens of better character,\nthey live by committing crimes on the smaller scale. But if they\nare more numerous, they set up as a despot the most unprincipled\nand energetic of their number, and become his agents for the\nenslavement of their fellow-citizens.[278] The despotic man passes\nhis life always in the company of masters, or instruments, or\nflatterers: he knows neither freedom nor true friendship--nothing\nbut the relation of master and slave. The despot is the worst and\nmost unjust of mankind: the longer he continues despot, the worse\nhe becomes.[279]\n\n[Footnote 277: Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 572-573 D. [Greek: E)/r\u00f4s\ntu/rannos e)/ndon oi)k\u00f4=n diakuberna=| ta\\ t\u00ea=s psuch\u00ea=s\na(/panta.] 574 E-575 A: [Greek: turanneuthei\\s u(po\\\nE)/r\u00f4tos--E)/r\u00f4s mo/narchos], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 278: Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 574-575.]\n\n[Footnote 279: Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 575-576.]\n\n[Side-note: The city has thus passed by four stages, from\nbest to worse. Question--How are Happiness and Misery apportioned\namong them?]\n\nWe have thus gone through the four successive depravations which\nour perfect city will undergo--timocracy, oligarchy, democracy,\ndespotism. Step by step we have passed from the best to the\nworst--from one extreme to the other. As is the city, so is the\nindividual citizen--good or bad: the despotic city is like the\ndespotic individual,--and so about the rest. Now it remains to\ndecide whether in each case happiness and misery is proportioned\nto good and evil: whether the best is the happiest, the worst the\nmost miserable,--and so proportionally about the\nintermediate.[280] On this point there is much difference of\nopinion.[281]\n\n[Footnote 280: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 576 D.]\n\n[Footnote 281: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 576 C. [Greek: toi=s de\\\npolloi=s polla\\ kai\\ dokei=.]]\n\n[Side-note: Misery of the despotised city.]\n\nIf we look at the condition of the despotised city, it plainly\nexhibits the extreme of misery; while our model city presents the\nextreme of happiness. Every one in the despotised city is\nmiserable, according to universal admission, except the despot\nhimself with his immediate favourites and guards. To be sure, in\nthe eyes of superficial observers, the despots with these few\nfavourites will appear perfectly happy and enviable. But if we\npenetrate beyond this false exterior show, and follow him into his\ninterior, we shall find him too not less miserable than those over\nwhom he tyrannises.[282]\n\n[Footnote 282: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 577 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Supreme Misery of the despotising individual.]\n\nWhat is true of the despotised city, is true also of the\ndespotising individual.[283] The best parts of his mind are under\nsubjection to the worst: the rational mind is trampled down by the\nappetitive mind, with its insane and unsatisfied cravings. He is\nfull of perpetual perturbation, anxiety, and fear; grief when he\nfails, repentance even after he has succeeded. Speaking of his\nmind as a whole, he never does what he really wishes for the\nrational element, which alone can ensure satisfaction to the whole\nmind, and guide to the attainment of his real wishes, is enslaved\nby furious momentary impulses.[284] The man of despotical mind is\nthus miserable; and most of all miserable, the more completely he\nsucceeds in subjugating his fellow-citizens and becoming a despot\nin reality. Knowing himself to be hated by everyone, he lives\nin constant fear of enemies within as well as enemies without,\nagainst whom he can obtain support only by courting the vilest of\nmen as partisans.[285] Though greedy of all sorts of enjoyment, he\ncannot venture to leave his city, or visit any of the frequented\npublic festivals. He lives indoors like a woman, envying those who\ncan go abroad and enjoy these spectacles.[286] He is in reality\nthe poorest and most destitute of men, having the most vehement\ndesires, which he can never satisfy.[287] Such is the despot who,\nnot being master even of himself, becomes master of others: in\nreality, the most wretched of men, though he may appear happy to\nsuperficial judges who look only at external show.[288]\n\n[Footnote 283: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 577 C-D. [Greek: t\u00ea\\n\no(moio/t\u00eata a)namimn\u00easko/menos t\u00ea=s te po/le\u00f4s kai\\ tou= a)ndro/s\n. . . ei) ou)=n o(/moios a)n\u00ea\\r t\u00ea=| po/lei, ou) kai\\ e)n\ne)kei/n\u00f4| a)na/gk\u00ea t\u00ea\\n au)t\u00ea\\n ta/xin e)nei=nai?] &c. Also\n579 E.]\n\n[Footnote 284: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 577-578. [Greek: Kai\\ \u00ea(\nturannoume/n\u00ea a)/ra psuch\u00ea\\ \u00ea(/kista poi\u00ea/sei a(\\ a)\\n boul\u00ea/th\u00ea|,\n\u00f4(s peri\\ o(/l\u00eas ei)pei=n psuch\u00ea=s; u(po\\ de\\ oi)/strou a)ei\\\ne(lkome/n\u00ea bi/a| tarach\u00ea=s kai\\ metamelei/as mest\u00ea\\ e)/stai] (557\nE).]\n\n[Footnote 285: Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 578-579.]\n\n[Footnote 286: Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 579 C.]\n\n[Footnote 287: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 579 E.]\n\n[Footnote 288: Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 579-580.]\n\n[Side-note: Conclusion--The Model city and the individual\ncorresponding to it, are the happiest of all--That which is\nfarthest removed from it, is the most miserable of all.]\n\nThus then (concludes Sokrates) we may affirm with confidence,\nhaving reference to the five distinct cities above described--(1.\nThe Model-City, regal or aristocratical. 2. Timocracy. 3.\nOligarchy. 4. Democracy. 5. Despotism)--that the first of these is\nhappy, and the last miserable: the three intermediate cities being\nmore or less happy in the order which they occupy from the first\nto the last.\n\n[Side-note: The Just Man is happy in and through his\nJustice, however he may be treated by others. The Unjust Man,\nmiserable.]\n\nEach of these cities has its parallel in an individual citizen.\nThe individual citizen corresponding to the first is happy--he who\ncorresponds to the last is miserable: and so proportionally for\nthe individual corresponding to the three intermediate cities. He\nis happy or miserable, in and through himself, or essentially;\nwhether he be known to Gods and men or not--whatever may be the\nsentiment entertained of him by others.[289]\n\n[Footnote 289: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 580 D. [Greek: e)a/n te\nlantha/n\u00f4si toiou=toi o)/ntes e)a/n te m\u00ea\\ pa/ntas a)nthr\u00f4/pous te\nkai\\ theou/s.]]\n\nThere are two other lines of argument (continues Sokrates)\nestablishing the same conclusion.\n\n[Side-note: Other arguments proving the same\nconclusion--Pleasures of Intelligence are the best of all pleasures.]\n\n1. We have seen that both the collective city and the individual\nmind are distributed into three portions: Reason, Energy,\nAppetite. Each of these portions has its own peculiar pleasures\nand pains, desires and aversions, beginnings or principles of\naction: Love of Knowledge: Love of Honour: Love of Gain. If you\nquestion men in whom these three varieties of temper respectively\npreponderate, each of them will extol the pleasures of his own\ndepartment above those belonging to the other two. The lover of\nwealth will declare the pleasures of acquisition and appetite to\nbe far greater than those of honour or of knowledge: each of the\nother two will say the same for himself, and for the pleasures of\nhis own department. Here then the question is opened, Which of the\nthree is in the right? Which of the three varieties of pleasure\nand modes of life is the more honourable or base, the better or\nworse, the more pleasurable or painful?[290] By what criterion, or\nby whose judgment, is this question to be decided? It must be\ndecided by experience, intelligence and rational discourse.[291]\nNow it is certain that the lover of knowledge, or the philosopher,\nhas greater experience of all the three varieties of pleasure than\nis possessed by either of the other two men. He must in his\nyounger days have tasted and tried the pleasures of both; but the\nother two have never tasted his.[292] Moreover, each of the three\nacquires more or less of honour, if he succeeds in his own\npursuits: accordingly the pleasures belonging to the love of\nhonour are shared, and may be appreciated, by the philosopher;\nwhile the lover of honour as such, has no sense for the pleasures\nof philosophy. In the range of personal experience, therefore, the\nphilosopher surpasses the other two: he surpasses them no less in\nexercised intelligence, and in rational discourse, which is his\nown principal instrument.[293] If wealth and profit furnished the\nproper means of judgment, the money-lover would have been the best\njudge of the three: if honour and victory furnished the proper\nmeans, we should consult the lover of honour: but experience,\nintelligence, and rational discourse, have been shown to be the\nmeans--and therefore it is plain that the philosopher is a better\nauthority than either of the other two. His verdict must be\nconsidered as final. He will assuredly tell us, that the pleasures\nbelonging to the love of knowledge are the greatest: those\nbelonging to the love of honour and power, the next: those\nbelonging to the love of money and to appetite, the least.[294]\n\n[Footnote 290: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 581.]\n\n[Footnote 291: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 582 A. [Greek: e)mpeiri/a|\nte kai\\ phron\u00ea/sei kai\\ lo/g\u00f4|.]]\n\n[Footnote 292: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 582 B.]\n\n[Footnote 293: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 582 C-D. [Greek: lo/goi de\\\ntou/tou ma/lista o)/rganon.]]\n\n[Footnote 294: Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 582-583.]\n\n[Side-note: They are the only pleasures completely true and\npure. Comparison of pleasure and pain with neutrality. Prevalent\nillusions.]\n\n2. The second argument, establishing the same conclusion, is as\nfollows:--No pleasures, except those belonging to philosophy or\nthe love of wisdom, are completely true and pure. All the other\npleasures are mere shadowy outlines, looking like pleasure at a\ndistance, but not really pleasures when you contemplate them\nclosely.[295] Pleasure and pain are two conditions opposite to\neach other. Between them both is another state, neither one nor\nthe other, called neutrality or indifference. Now a man who has\nbeen sick and is convalescent, will tell you that nothing is more\npleasurable than being in health, but that he did not know what\nthe pleasure of it was, until he became sick. So too men in pain\naffirm that nothing is more pleasurable than relief from pain.\nWhen a man is grieving, it is exemption or indifference, not\nenjoyment, which he extols as the greatest pleasure. Again, when a\nman has been in a state of enjoyment, and the enjoyment ceases,\nthis cessation is painful. We thus see that the intermediate\nstate--cessation, neutrality, indifference--will be some times\npain, sometimes pleasure, according to circumstances. Now that\nwhich is neither pleasure nor pain cannot possibly be both.[296]\nPleasure is a positive movement or mutation of the mind: so also\nis pain. Neutrality or indifference is a negative condition,\nintermediate between the two: no movement, but absence of\nmovement: non-pain, non-pleasure. But non-pain is not really\npleasure: non-pleasure is not really pain. When therefore\nneutrality or non-pain, succeeding immediately after pain,\nappears to be a pleasure--this is a mere appearance or illusion,\nnot a reality. When neutrality or non-pleasure, succeeding\nimmediately after pleasure, appears to be pain--this also is a\nmere appearance or illusion, not a reality. There is nothing sound\nor trustworthy in such appearances. Pleasure is not cessation of\npain, but something essentially different: pain is not cessation\nof pleasure, but something essentially different.\n\n[Footnote 295: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 583 B. [Greek: ou)de\\\npanal\u00eath\u00ea/s e)stin e( t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n \u00ea(don\u00ea\\ pl\u00ea\\n t\u00ea=s tou=\nphroni/mou, ou)de\\ kathara/, a)ll' e)skiagraph\u00eame/n\u00ea tis, \u00f4(s\ne)g\u00f4\\ dok\u00f4= moi t\u00f4=n soph\u00f4=n tino\\s a)k\u00eakoe/nai.]]\n\n[Footnote 296: Plato, Republ. ix. pp. 583 E-584 A. [Greek: O(\\\nmetaxu\\ a)/ra nu=n d\u00ea\\ a)mphote/r\u00f4n e)/phamen ei)=nai, t\u00ea\\n\n\u00ea(suchi/an, tou=to/ pote a)mpho/tera e)/stai, lu/p\u00ea te kai\\\n\u00ea(don\u00ea/ . . . \u00ca)= kai\\ dunato\\n to\\ m\u00eade/tera o)\\n a)mpho/tera\ngi/gnesthai? Ou)/ moi dokei=. Kai\\ m\u00ea\\n to/ ge \u00ea(du\\ e)n psuch\u00ea=|\ngigno/menon kai\\ to\\ lup\u00earo\\n ki/n\u00easi/s tis a)mphote/r\u00f4 e)/ston?\n\u00ea)\\ ou)/? Nai/. To\\ de\\ m\u00ea/te \u00ea(du\\ m\u00ea/te lup\u00earo\\n ou)chi\\\n\u00ea(suchi/a me/ntoi kai\\ e)n me/s\u00f4| tou/t\u00f4n e)pha/n\u00ea a)/rti?\nE)pha/n\u00ea ga/r. P\u00f4=s ou)=n o)rth\u00f4=s e)/sti to\\ m\u00ea\\ a)lgei=n \u00ea(du\\\n\u00ea(gei=sthai, \u00ea)\\ to\\ m\u00ea\\ chai/rein a)niaro/n? Ou)dam\u00f4=s. Ou)k\ne)/stin a)/ra tou=to, a)lla\\ phai/netai, para\\ to\\ a)lgeino\\n\n\u00ea(du\\ kai\\ para\\ to\\ \u00ea(du\\ a)lgeino\\n to/te \u00ea( \u00ea(suchi/a, kai\\\nou)de\\n u(gie\\s tou/t\u00f4n t\u00f4=n phantasma/t\u00f4n pro\\s \u00ea(don\u00ea=s\na)l\u00ea/theian, a)lla\\ go\u00eatei/a tis.]]\n\n[Side-note: Most men know nothing of true and pure\npleasure. Simile of the Kosmos--Absolute height and depth.]\n\nTake, for example, the pleasures of smell, which are true and\ngenuine pleasures, of great intensity: they spring up\ninstantaneously without presupposing any anterior pain--they\ndepart without leaving any subsequent pain.[297] These are true\nand pure pleasures, radically different from cessation of pain: so\nalso true and pure pains are different from cessation of pleasure.\nMost of the so-called pleasures, especially the more intense,\nwhich reach the mind through the body, are in reality not\npleasures at all, but only cessations or reliefs from pain. The\nsame may be said about the pleasures and pains of anticipation\nbelonging to these so-called bodily pleasures.[298] They may be\nrepresented by the following simile:--There is in nature a real\nAbsolute Up and uppermost point--a real Absolute Down and lowest\npoint--and a centre between them.[299] A man borne from the lowest\npoint to the centre will think himself moving upwards, and will be\nmoving upwards relatively. If his course be stopped in the centre,\nhe will think himself at the absolute summit--on looking to the\npoint from which he came, and ignorant as he is of any thing\nhigher. If he be forced to return from the centre to the point\nfrom whence he came, he will think himself moving downwards, and\nwill be really moving downwards, absolutely as well as relatively.\nSuch misapprehension arises from his not knowing the portion of\nthe Kosmos above the centre--the true and absolute Up or summit.\nNow the case of pleasure and pain is analogous to this. Pain is\nthe absolute lowest--Pleasure the absolute highest--non-pleasure,\nnon-pain, the centre intermediate between them. But most men know\nnothing of the region above the centre, or the absolute\nhighest--the region of true and pure pleasure: they know only the\ncentre and what is below it, or the region of pain. When they fall\nfrom the centre to the point of pain, they conceive the situation\ntruly, and they really are pained: but when they rise from the\nlowest point to the centre, they misconceive the change, and\nimagine themselves to be in a process of replenishment and\nacquisition of pleasure. They mistake the painless condition for\npleasure, not knowing what true pleasure is: just as a man who has\nseen only black and not white, will fancy, if dun be shown to him,\nthat he is looking on white.[300]\n\n[Footnote 297: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 584 B.]\n\n[Footnote 298: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 584 C.]\n\n[Footnote 299: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 584 C. [Greek: Nomi/zeis ti\ne)n t\u00ea=| phu/sei ei)=nai to\\ me\\n a)/n\u00f4, to\\ de\\ ka/t\u00f4, to\\ de\\\nme/son? E)/g\u00f4ge.]]\n\n[Footnote 300: Plato, Republic, pp. 584 E-585 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n\ntau=ta pa/schoi a)\\n pa/nta dia\\ to\\ m\u00ea\\ e)/mpeiros ei)=nai tou=\na)l\u00eathin\u00f4=s a)/n\u00f4 te o)/ntos kai\\ e)n me/s\u00f4|? . . . o(/tan me\\n\ne)pi\\ to\\ lup\u00earo\\n phe/r\u00f4ntai, a)l\u00eath\u00ea= te oi)/ontai kai\\ t\u00f4=|\no)/nti lupou=ntai, o(/tan de\\ a)po\\ lu/p\u00eas e)pi\\ to\\ metaxu/,\nspho/dra me\\n oi)/ontai pro\\s pl\u00ear\u00f4/sei te kai\\ \u00ea(don\u00ea=|\ngi/gnesthai, \u00f4(/sper de\\ pro\\s me/lan phaio\\n a)poskopou=ntes\na)peiri/a| leukou=, kai\\ pro\\s to\\ a)/lupon ou(/t\u00f4 lu/p\u00ean\na)phor\u00f4=ntes a)peiri/a| \u00ea(don\u00ea=s a)pat\u00f4=ntai?]]\n\n[Side-note: Nourishment of the mind partakes more of real\nessence than nourishment of the body--Replenishment of the mind\nimparts fuller pleasure than replenishment of the body.]\n\nHunger and thirst are states of emptiness in the body: ignorance\nand folly are states of emptiness in the mind. A hungry man in\neating or drinking obtains replenishment: an ignorant man becoming\ninstructed obtains replenishment also. Now replenishment derived\nfrom that which exists more fully and perfectly is truer and more\nreal than replenishment from that which exists less fully and\nperfectly.[301] Let us then compare the food which serves for\nreplenishment of the body, with that which serves for\nreplenishment of the mind. Which of the two is most existent?\nWhich of the two partakes most of pure essence? Meat and drink--or\ntrue opinions, knowledge, intelligence, and virtue? Which of the\ntwo exists most perfectly? That which embraces the true, eternal,\nand unchangeable--and which is itself of similar nature? Or that\nwhich embraces the mortal, the transient, and the ever\nvariable--being itself of kindred nature? Assuredly the former. It\nis clear that what is necessary for the sustenance of the body\npartakes less of truth and real essence, than what is necessary\nfor the sustenance of the mind. The mind is replenished with\nnourishment more real and essential: the body with nourishment\nless so: the mind itself is also more real and essential than the\nbody. The mind therefore is more, and more thoroughly, replenished\nthan the body. Accordingly, if pleasure consists in being\nreplenished with what suits its peculiar nature, the mind will\nenjoy more pleasure and truer pleasure than the body.[302] Those\nwho are destitute of intelligence and virtue, passing their lives\nin sensual pursuits, have never tasted any pure or lasting\npleasure, nor ever carried their looks upwards to the higher\nregion in which alone it resides. Their pleasures, though seeming\nintense, and raising vehement desires in their uninstructed minds,\nare yet only phantoms deriving a semblance of pleasure from\ncontrast with pains:[303] they are like the phantom of Helen, for\nwhich (as Stesichorus says) the Greeks and Trojans fought so many\nbattles, knowing nothing about the true Helen, who was never in\nTroy.\n\n[Footnote 301: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 585 B. [Greek: Pl\u00ea/r\u00f4sis\nde\\ a)l\u00eatheste/ra tou= \u00ea(=tton \u00ea)\\ tou= ma=llon o)/ntos? D\u00ea=lon\no(/ti tou= ma=llon. Po/tera ou)=n \u00ea(gei= ta\\ ge/n\u00ea ma=llon\nkathara=s ou)si/as mete/chein, ta\\ oi(=on si/tou kai\\ potou= kai\\\no)/psou kai\\ xumpa/s\u00eas troph\u00ea=s, \u00ea)\\ to\\ do/x\u00eas te a)l\u00eathou=s\nei)=dos kai\\ e)pist\u00ea/m\u00eas kai\\ nou= kai\\ xull\u00ea/bd\u00ean xumpa/s\u00eas\na)ret\u00ea=s?]]\n\n[Footnote 302: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 585 E.]\n\n[Footnote 303: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 586.]\n\n[Side-note: Comparative worthlessness of the pleasures of\nAppetite and Ambition, when measured against those of\nIntelligence.]\n\nThe pleasures belonging to the Love of Honour (Energy or Passion)\nare no better than those belonging to the Love of Money\n(Appetite). In so far as the desires belonging to both these\ndepartments of mind are under the controul of the third or best\ndepartment (Love of Wisdom, or Reason), the nearest approach to\ntrue pleasure, which it is in the nature of either of them to\nbestow, will be realised. But in so far as either of them throws\noff the controul of Reason, it will neither obtain its own truest\npleasures, nor allow the other departments of mind to obtain\ntheirs.[304] The desires connected with love, and with despotic\npower, stand out more than the others, as recusant to Reason. Law,\nand Regulation. The kingly and moderate desires are most obedient\nto this authority. The lover and the despot, therefore, will enjoy\nthe least pleasure: the kindly-minded man will enjoy the most. Of\nthe three sorts of pleasure, one true and legitimate, two bastard,\nthe despot goes most away from the legitimate, and to the farthest\nlimit of the bastard. His condition is the most miserable, that of\nthe kingly-minded man is the happiest: between the two come the\noligarchical and the democratical man. The difference between\nthe two extremes** is as 1: 729.[305]\n\n[Footnote 304: Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 586-587.]\n\n[Footnote 305: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 587 E.]\n\n[Side-note: The Just Man will be happy from his justice--He\nwill look only to the good order of his own mind--He will stand\naloof from public affairs, in cities as now constituted.]\n\nI have thus refuted (continues Sokrates) the case of those who\ncontend--That the unjust man is a gainer by his injustice,\nprovided he could carry it on successfully, and with the\nreputation of being just. I have shown that injustice is the\ngreatest possible mischief, intrinsically and in itself, apart\nfrom consequences and apart from public reputation: inasmuch as it\nenslaves the better part of the mind to the worse. Justice, on the\nother hand, is the greatest possible good, intrinsically and in\nitself, apart from consequences and reputation, because it keeps\nthe worse parts of the mind under due controul and subordination\nto the better.[306] Vice and infirmity of every kind is\npernicious, because it puts the best parts of the mind under\nsubjection to the worst.[307] No success in the acquisition of\nwealth, aggrandisement, or any other undue object, can compensate\na man for the internal disorder which he introduces into his own\nmind by becoming unjust. A well-ordered mind, just and temperate,\nwith the better part governing the worse, is the first of all\nobjects: greater even than a healthy, strong, and beautiful\nbody.[308] To put his mind into this condition, and to acquire all\nthe knowledge thereunto conducing, will be the purpose of a wise\nman's life. Even in the management of his body, he will look not\nso much to the health and strength of his body, as to the harmony\nand fit regulation of his mind. In the acquisition of money, he\nwill keep the same end in view: he will not be tempted by the\nadmiration and envy of people around him to seek great wealth,\nwhich will disturb the mental polity within him:[309] he will, on\nthe other hand, avoid depressing poverty, which might produce the\nsame effect. He will take as little part as possible in public\nlife, and will aspire to no political honours, in cities as at\npresent constituted--nor in any other than the model-city\nwhich we have described.[310]\n\n[Footnote 306: Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 588-589.]\n\n[Footnote 307: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 590 B-C.]\n\n[Footnote 308: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 591 B.]\n\n[Footnote 309: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 591 D-E. [Greek: kai\\ to\\n\no)/gkon tou= pl\u00ea/thous ou)k, e)kpl\u00eatto/menos u(po\\ tou= t\u00f4=n\npoll\u00f4=n makarismou=, a)/peiron au)x\u00ea/sei, a)pe/ranta kaka\\ e)/ch\u00f4n\n. . . A)ll' a)poble/p\u00f4n ge, pro\\s t\u00ea\\n e)n au(t\u00f4=| politei/an,\nkai\\ phula/tt\u00f4n m\u00ea/ ti parakin\u00ea=| au)tou= t\u00f4=n e)kei= dia\\\npl\u00ea=thos ou)si/as \u00ea)\\ di' o)ligo/t\u00eata, ou(/t\u00f4 kubern\u00f4=n\nprosth\u00ea/sei kai\\ a)nal\u00f4/sei t\u00ea=s ou)si/as, kath' o(/son a)\\n\noi(=o/s t' \u00ea)=|.]]\n\n[Footnote 310: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 592.]\n\n[Side-note: Tenth Book--Censure of the poets is\nrenewed--Mischiefs of imitation generally, as deceptive--Imitation\nfrom imitation.]\n\nThe tenth and last book of the Republic commences with an argument\nof considerable length, repeating and confirming by farther\nreasons the sentence of expulsion which Plato had already\npronounced against the poets in his second and third books.[311]\nThe Platonic Sokrates here not only animadverts upon poetry, but\nextends his disapprobation to other imitative arts, such as\npainting. He attacks the process of imitation generally, as false\nand deceptive; pleasing to ignorant people, but perverting their\nminds by phantasms which they mistake for realities. The work of\nthe imitator is not merely not reality, but is removed from it by\ntwo degrees. What is real is the Form or Idea: the one conceived\nobject denoted by each appellative name common to many\nparticulars. There is one Form or Idea, and only one, known by the\nname of Bed; another by the name of Table.[312] When the carpenter\nconstructs a bed or a table, he fixes his contemplation on this\nForm or Idea, and tries to copy it. What he constructs, however,\nis not the true, real, existent, table, which alone exists in\nnature, and may be presumed to be made by the Gods[313]--but a\nsomething like the real existent table: not true Ens, but only\nquasi-Ens:[314] dim and indistinct, as compared with the truth,\nand standing far off from the truth. Next to the carpenter comes\nthe painter, who copies not the real existent table, but the copy\nof that table made by the carpenter. The painter fixes his\ncontemplation upon it, not as it really exists, but simply as it\nappears: he copies an appearance or phantasm, not a reality. Thus\nthe table will have a different appearance, according as you look\nat it from near or far--from one side or the other: yet in reality\nit never differs from itself. It is one of these appearances\nthat the painter copies, not the reality itself. He can in like\nmanner paint any thing and every thing, since he hardly touches\nany thing at all--and nothing whatever except in appearance. He\ncan paint all sorts of craftsmen and their works--carpenters,\nshoemakers, &c. without knowledge of any one of their\narts.[315]\n\n[Footnote 311: Plato, Republic, x. p. 607 B. The language here\nused by Plato seems to imply that his opinions adverse to poetry\nhad been attacked and required defence.]\n\n[Footnote 312: Plato, Republic, x. p. 596 A-B. [Greek: Bou/lei\nou)=n e)/nthende a)rx\u00f4/metha e)piskopou/ntes, e)k t\u00ea=s ei)\u00f4thui/as\nmetho/dou? ei)=dos ga/r pou/ ti e(\\n e(/kaston ei)\u00f4/thamen\nti/thesthai peri\\ e(/kasta ta\\ polla/, oi(=s tau)to\\n o)/noma\ne)piphe/romen . . . th\u00f4=men d\u00ea\\ kai\\ nu=n o(/ti bou/lei t\u00f4=n\npoll\u00f4=n; oi(=on, ei) the/leis pollai/ pou/ ei)si kli=nai kai\\\ntra/pezai . . . A)ll' i)de/ai ge/ pou peri\\ tau=ta ta\\ skeu/\u00ea\ndu/o, mi/a me\\n kli/n\u00eas, mi/a de\\ trape/z\u00eas.]\n\n[Footnote 313: Plato, Republic, x. p. 597 B-D. 597 B: [Greek: mi/a\nme\\n \u00ea( e)n t\u00ea=| phu/sei ou)=sa, \u00ea(\\n phai=men a)/n, \u00f4(s\ne)g\u00f4=|mai, theo\\n e)rga/sasthai.]]\n\n[Footnote 314: Plato, Republic, x. p. 597 A. [Greek: ou)k a)\\n to\\\no)\\n poioi=, a)lla/ ti toiou=ton oi(=on to\\ o)/n, o)\\n de\\\nou)/.]]\n\n[Footnote 315: Plato, Republic, x. p. 598 B-C.]\n\n[Side-note: Censure of Homer--He is falsely extolled as\neducator of the Hellenic world. He and other poets only deceive\ntheir hearers.]\n\nThe like is true also of the poets. Homer and the tragedians give\nus talk and affirmations about everything: government,\nlegislation, war, medicine, husbandry, the character and\nproceedings of the Gods, the habits and training of men, &c.\nSome persons even extol Homer as the great educator of the\nHellenic world, whose poems we ought to learn by heart as guides\nfor education and administration.[316] But Homer, Hesiod, and the\nother poets, had no real knowledge of the multifarious matters\nwhich they profess to describe. These poets know nothing except\nabout appearances, and will describe only appearances, to the\nsatisfaction of the ignorant multitude.[317] The representations\nof the painter, reproducing only the appearances to sense, will be\nconstantly fallacious and deceptive, requiring to be corrected by\nmeasuring, weighing, counting--which are processes belonging to\nReason.[318] The lower and the higher parts of the mind are here\nat variance; and the painter addresses himself to the lower,\nsupplying falsehood as if it were truth. The painter does this\nthrough the eye, the poet through the ear.[319]\n\n[Footnote 316: Plato, Republic, p. 606 E.]\n\n[Footnote 317: Plato, Republic, x. pp. 600-601 C. 601 B: [Greek:\ntou= me\\n o)/ntos ou)de\\n e)pai+/ei, tou= de\\ phainome/nou.] 602\nB: [Greek: oi(=on phai/netai kalo\\n ei)=nai toi=s polloi=s te kai\\\nm\u00eade\\n ei)do/si, tou=to mim\u00ea/setai.]]\n\n[Footnote 318: Plato, Republic, x. pp. 602-603.]\n\n[Footnote 319: Plato, Republic, x. p. 603 B.]\n\n[Side-note: The poet chiefly appeals to emotions--Mischiefs\nof such eloquent appeals, as disturbing the rational government of\nthe mind.]\n\nIn the various acts and situations of life a man is full of\ncontradictions. He is swayed by manifold impulses, often directly\ncontradicting each other. Hence we have affirmed that there are in\nhis mind two distinct principles, one contradicting the other: the\nemotional and the rational.[320] When a man suffers misfortune,\nemotion prompts him to indulge in extreme grief, and to\nabandon himself like a child to the momentary tide. Reason, on the\ncontrary, exhorts him to resist, and to exert himself immediately\nin counsel to rectify or alleviate what has happened, adapting his\nconduct as well as he can to the actual throw of the dice which\nhas befallen him.[321] Now it is these vehement bursts of emotion\nwhich lend themselves most effectively to the genius of the poet,\nand which he must work up to please the multitude in the theatre:\nthe state of rational self-command can hardly be described so as\nto touch their feelings. We see thus that the poet, like the\npainter, addresses himself to the lower department of the mind,\nexalting the emotional into preponderance over the rational--the\nfoolish over the wise--the false over the true.[322] He introduces\nbad government into the mind, giving to pleasure and pain the\nsceptre over reason. Hence we cannot tolerate the poet, in spite\nof all his sweets and captivations. We can only permit him to\ncompose hymns for the Gods and encomiums for good men.[323]\n\n[Footnote 320: Plato, Republic, x. p. 603 D. [Greek: muri/\u00f4n\ntoiou/t\u00f4n e)nanti\u00f4ma/t\u00f4n a(/ma gignome/n\u00f4n \u00ea( psuch\u00ea\\ ge/mei\n\u00ea(m\u00f4=n . . .] 604 B: [Greek: e)nanti/as de\\ a)g\u00f4g\u00ea=s gignome/n\u00eas\ne)n t\u00f4=| a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4| peri\\ to\\ au)to\\ a(/ma du/o tine/ phamen e)n\nau)t\u00f4=| a)nagkai=on ei)=nai.]]\n\n[Footnote 321: Plato, Republic, x. p. 604 C. [Greek: T\u00f4=|\nbouleu/esthai peri\\ to\\ gegono\\s kai\\ \u00f4(/sper e)n pt\u00f4/sei ku/b\u00f4n\npro\\s ta\\ pept\u00f4ko/ta ti/thesthai ta\\ au)tou= pra/gmata, o(/p\u00ea| o(\nlo/gos ai(rei= be/ltist' a)\\n e)/chein, a)lla\\ m\u00ea\\\nprosptai/santas, katha/per pai=das, e)chome/nous tou= pl\u00eage/ntos\ne)n t\u00f4=| boa=n diatri/bein], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 322: Plato, Republic, x. p. 605.]\n\n[Footnote 323: Plato, Republic, x. pp. 605-606-607. 605 B: [Greek:\nto\\n mim\u00eatiko\\n poi\u00eat\u00ea\\n ph\u00ea/somen kak\u00ea\\n politei/an i)di/a|\ne(ka/stou t\u00ea=| psuch\u00ea=| e)mpoiei=n, t\u00f4=| a)no\u00ea/t\u00f4| au)t\u00ea/s\ncharizo/menon . . .] 607 A: [Greek: ei) de\\ t\u00ea\\n \u00ea(dusme/n\u00ean\nmou=san parade/xei e)n me/lesin \u00ea)\\ e)/pesin, \u00ea(don\u00ea/ soi kai\\\nlu/p\u00ea basileu/seton a)nti\\ no/mou te kai\\ tou= koin\u00ea=| a)ei\\\ndo/xantos ei)=nai belti/stou lo/gou.]]\n\n[Side-note: Ancient quarrel between philosophy and\npoetry--Plato fights for philosophy, though his feelings are\nstrongly enlisted for poetry.]\n\nThis quarrel between philosophy and poetry (continues the Platonic\nSokrates) is of ancient date.[324] I myself am very sensible to\nthe charms of poetry, especially that of Homer. I should be\ndelighted if a case could be made out to justify me in admitting\nit into our city. But I cannot betray the cause of what seems to\nme truth. We must resist our sympathies and preferences, when they\nare incompatible with the right government of the mind.[325]\n\n[Footnote 324: Plato, Republic, x. p. 607 B. [Greek: palaia/ tis\ndiaphora\\ philosophi/a| te kai\\ poi\u00eatik\u00ea=|].]\n\n[Footnote 325: Plato, Republic, x. pp. 607-608.]\n\n[Side-note: Immortality of the soul affirmed and sustained\nby argument--Total number of souls always the same.]\n\nTo maintain the right government and good condition of the soul or\nmind, is the first of all considerations: and will be seen yet\nfarther to be such, when we consider that it is immortal and\nimperishable. Of this Plato proceeds to give a proof,[326]\nconcluding with a mythical sketch of the destiny of the soul\nafter death. The soul being immortal (he says), the total\nnumber of souls is and always has been the same--neither\nincreasing nor diminishing.[327]\n\n[Footnote 326: Plato, Republic, x. pp. 609-610.]\n\n[Footnote 327: Plato, Republic, x. p. 611 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Recapitulation--The Just Man will be happy,\nboth from his justice and from its consequences, both here and\nhereafter.]\n\nI have proved (the Platonic Sokrates concludes) in the preceding\ndiscourse, that Justice is better, in itself and intrinsically,\nthan Injustice, quite apart from consequences in the way of reward\nand honour; that a man for the sake of his own happiness, ought to\nbe just, whatever may be thought of him by Gods or men--even\nthough he possessed the magic ring of Gyges. Having proved this,\nand having made out the intrinsic superiority of justice to\ninjustice, we may now take in the natural consequences and\ncollateral bearings of both. We have hitherto reasoned upon the\nhypothesis that the just man was mistaken for unjust, and treated\naccordingly--that the unjust man found means to pass himself off\nfor just, and to attract to himself the esteem and the rewards of\njustice. But this hypothesis concedes too much, and we must now\ntake back the concession. The just man will be happier than the\nunjust, not simply from the intrinsic working of justice on his\nown mind, but also from the exterior consequences of justice.[328]\nHe will be favoured and rewarded both by Gods and men. Though he\nmay be in poverty, sickness, or any other apparent state of evil,\nhe may be assured that the Gods will compensate him for it by\nhappiness either in life or after death.[329] And men too, though\nthey may for a time be mistaken about the just and the unjust\ncharacter, will at last come to a right estimation of both. The\njust man will finally receive honour, reward, and power, from his\nfellow-citizens: the unjust man will be finally degraded and\npunished by them.[330] And after death, the reward of the just\nman, as well as the punishment of the unjust, will be far greater\nthan even during life.\n\n[Footnote 328: Plato, Republic, x. p. 612 B-C.]\n\n[Footnote 329: Plato, Republic, x. pp. 612-613.]\n\n[Footnote 330: Plato, Republic, x. p. 613 C-D.]\n\nThis latter position is illustrated at some length by the mythe\nwith which the Republic concludes, describing the realm of Hades,\nwith the posthumous condition and treatment of the departed souls.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVI.\n\nREPUBLIC--REMARKS ON ITS MAIN THESIS.\n\n\n[Side-note: Summary of the preceding chapter.]\n\nThe preceding Chapter has described, in concise abstract, that\nsplendid monument of Plato's genius, which passes under the name\nof the [Greek: Politei/a] or Republic. It is undoubtedly the\ngrandest of all his compositions; including in itself all his\ndifferent points of excellence. In the first Book, we have a\nsubtle specimen of negative Dialectic,--of the Sokratic\ncross-examination or Elenchus. In the second Book, we find two\nexamples of continuous or Ciceronian pleading (like that ascribed\nto Protagoras in the dialogue called by his name), which are\nsurpassed by nothing in ancient literature, for acuteness and\nability in the statement of a case. Next, we are introduced to\nPlato's most sublime effort of constructive ingenuity, in putting\ntogether both the individual man and the collective City: together\nwith more information (imperfect as it is even here) about his\nDialectic or Philosophy, than any other dialogue furnishes. The\nninth Book exhibits his attempts to make good his own thesis\nagainst the case set forth in his own antecedent\ncounter-pleadings. The last Book concludes with a highly poetical\nmythe, embodying a [Greek: Nekui/a] shaped after his own fancy,--and\nthe outline of cosmical agencies afterwards developed, though with\nmany differences, in the Tim\u00e6us. The brilliancy of the Republic\nwill appear all the more conspicuous, when we come to compare it\nwith Plato's two posterior compositions: with the Pythagorean\nmysticism and theology of the Tim\u00e6us--or with the severe and\ndictatorial solemnity of the Treatise De Legibus.\n\n[Side-note: Title of the Republic, of ancient date, but only\na partial indication of its contents.]\n\nThe title borne by this dialogue--the Republic or\nPolity--whether affixed by Plato himself or not, dates at least\nfrom his immediate disciples, Aristotle among them.[1] This title\nhardly presents a clear idea either of its proclaimed purpose or\nof its total contents.\n\n[Footnote 1: See Schleiermacher, Einl. zum Staat, p. 63 seq.;\nStallbaum, Proleg. p. lviii. seq.]\n\nThe larger portion of the treatise is doubtless employed in\nexpounding the generation of a commonwealth generally: from whence\nthe author passes insensibly to the delineation of a\nModel-Commonwealth--enumerating the conditions of aptitude for its\ngovernors and guardian-soldiers, estimating the obstacles which\nprevent it from appearing in the full type of goodness--and\npointing out the steps whereby, even if fully realised, it is\nlikely to be brought to perversion and degeneracy. Nevertheless\nthe avowed purpose of the treatise is, not to depict the ideal of\na commonwealth, but to solve the questions, What is Justice? What\nis Injustice? Does Justice, in itself and by its own intrinsic\nworking, make the just man happy, apart from all consequences,\neven though he is not known to be just, and is even treated as\nunjust, either by Gods or men? Does Injustice, under the like\nhypothesis, (_i.e._ leaving out all consideration of\nconsequences either from Gods or from men), make the unjust man\nmiserable? The reasonings respecting the best polity, are means to\nthis end--intermediate steps to the settlement of this problem. We\nmust recollect that Plato insists strongly on the parallelism\nbetween the individual and the state: he talks of \"the polity\" or\nRepublic in each man's mind, as of that in the entire city.[2]\n\n[Footnote 2: Plato, Repub. ix. p. 591 E. [Greek: a)poble/p\u00f4n pro\\s\nt\u00ea\\n e)n au(t\u00f4=| politei/an.] x. p. 608 B: [Greek: peri\\ t\u00ea=s e)n\nau(t\u00f4=| politei/as dedio/ti], &c.]\n\n[Side-note: Parallelism between the Commonwealth and the\nIndividual.]\n\nThe Republic, or Commonwealth, is introduced by Plato as being the\nindividual man \"writ large,\" and therefore more clearly\ndiscernible and legible to an observer.[3] To illustrate the\nindividual man, he begins by describing (to use Hobbes's language)\nthe great Leviathan called a \"Commonwealth or State, in Latin\nCivitas, which is but an artificial man, though of greater stature\nand strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence\nit was intended\".[4] He pursues in much detail this parallel\nbetween the individual and the commonwealth, as well as between\nthe component parts and forces of the one, and those of the other.\nThe perfection of the commonwealth (he represents) consists in its\nbeing One:[5] an integer or unit, of which the constituent\nindividuals are merely functions, each having only a fractional,\ndependent, relative existence. As the commonwealth is an\nindividual on a large scale, so the individual is a commonwealth\non a small scale; in which the constituent fractions,\nReason,--Energy or Courage,--and many-headed Appetite,--act each for\nitself and oppose each other. It is the tendency of Plato's imagination\nto bestow vivid reality on abstractions, and to reason upon\nmetaphorical analogy as if it were close parallelism. His language\nexaggerates both the unity of the commonwealth, and the\npartibility of the individual, in illustrating the one by\ncomparison with the other. The commonwealth is treated as capable\nof happiness or misery as an entire Person, apart from its\ncomponent individuals:[6] while on the other hand, Reason, Energy,\nAppetite, are described as distinct and conflicting Persons,\npacked up in the same wrapper and therefore looking like One from\nthe outside, yet really distinct, each acting and suffering by and\nfor itself: like the charioteer and his two horses, which form the\nconspicuous metaphor in the Ph\u00e6drus.[7] We are thus told, that\nthough the man is apparently One, he is in reality Many or\nmultipartite: though the perfect Commonwealth is apparently Many,\nit is in reality One.\n\n[Footnote 3: Plato, Repub. ii. p. 368 D.\n\n\"New presbyter is but old priest writ large.\"--(Milton.)]\n\n[Footnote 4: This is the language of Hobbes. Preface to the\nLeviathan. In the same treatise (Part ii. ch. 17, pp. 157-158,\nMolesworth's edition) Hobbes says:--\"The only way to erect such a\ncommon power as may be able to defend men from the invasion of\nforeigners and the injury of one another, is to confer all their\npower and strength upon one man or one assembly of men, that may\nreduce all their wills by plurality of voices to one will: which\nis as much as to say, to appoint one man or assembly of men to\nbear their person. This is more than consent or concord: _it is\na real unity of them all in one and the same person_, made by\ncovenant of every man with every man. This done, the multitude so\nunited in one person, is called a Commonwealth, in Latin Civitas.\nThis is the generation of that great Leviathan,\" &c.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 423.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 420-421.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 588, x. p. 604, iv. pp.\n436-441. ix. p. 588 E: [Greek: \u00f4(/ste t\u00f4=| m\u00ea\\ duname/n\u00f4| ta\\\ne)nto\\s o(ra=|n, a)lla\\ to\\ e)/x\u00f4 mo/non e)/lutron o(r\u00f4=nti, e(\\n\nz\u00f4=on phai/nesthai, a)/nthr\u00f4pon.]]\n\n[Side-note: Each of them a whole, composed of parts distinct\nin function and unequal in merit.]\n\nOf the parts composing a man, as well as of the parts composing a\ncommonwealth, some are better, others worse. A few are good and\nexcellent; the greater number are low and bad; while there are\nintermediate gradations between the two. The perfection of a\ncommonwealth, and the perfection of an individual man, is attained\nwhen each part performs its own appropriate function and no\nmore,--not interfering with the rest. In the commonwealth there are\na small number of wise Elders or philosophers, whose appropriate\nfunction it is to look out for the good or happiness of the whole;\nand to controul the ordinary commonplace multitude, with a view to\nthat end. Each of the multitude has his own special duty or\naptitude, to which he confines himself, and which he executes in\nsubordination to the wise or governing Few. And to ensure such\nsubordination, there are an intermediate number of trained, or\ndisciplined Guardians; who employ their force under the orders of\nthe ruling Few, to controul the multitude within, as well as to\nrepel enemies without. So too in the perfect man. Reason is the\nsmall but excellent organ whose appropriate function is, to\ncontroul the multitude of desires and to watch over the good of\nthe whole: the function of Energy or Courage is, while itself\nobeying the Reason, to assist Reason in maintaining this controul\nover the Desires: the function of each several desire is to obey,\npursuing its own special end in due harmony with the rest.\n\n[Side-note: End proposed by Plato. Happiness of the\nCommonwealth. Happiness of the individual. Conditions of\nhappiness.]\n\nThe End to be accomplished, and with reference to which Plato\ntests the perfection of the means, is, the happiness of the entire\ncommonwealth,--the happiness of the entire individual man. In\norder to be happy, a commonwealth or an individual man must be at\nonce wise, brave, temperate, just. There is however this\ndifference between the four qualities. Though all four are\nessential, yet wisdom and bravery belong only to separate\nfractions of the commonwealth and separate fractions of the\nindividual: while justice and temperance belong equally to all the\nfractions of the commonwealth and all the fractions of the\nindividual. In the perfect commonwealth, Wisdom or Reason is found\nonly in the One or Few Ruling Elders:--Energy or Courage only in\nthe Soldiers or Guardians: but Elders, Guardians, and the working\nmultitude, alike exhibit Justice and Temperance. All are just,\ninasmuch as each performs his appropriate business: all are\ntemperate, inasmuch as all agree in recognising what is the\nappropriate business of each fraction--that of the Elders is, to\nrule--that of the others is, to obey. So too the individual: he is\nwise only in his Reason, brave only in his Energy or Courage: but\nhe is just and temperate in his Reason, Courage, and Appetites\nalike--each of these Fractions acting in its own sphere under\nproper relations to the rest. In fact, according to the\ndefinitions given by Plato in the Republic, justice and temperance\nare scarce at all distinguishable from each other--and must at any\nrate be inseparable.\n\n[Side-note: Peculiar view of Justice taken by Plato.]\n\nNow in regard to the definition here given by Plato of Justice,\nwhich is the avowed object of his Treatise, we may first remark\nthat it is altogether peculiar to Plato; and that if we reason\nabout Justice in the Platonic sense, we must take care not to\naffirm of it predicates which might be true in a more usual\nacceptation of the word. Next, that even adopting Plato's own\nmeaning of Justice, it does not answer the purpose for which he\nproduces it--_viz._: to provide reply to the objections, and\nsolution for the difficulties, which he had himself placed in the\nmouths of Glaukon and Adeimantus.\n\n[Side-note: Pleadings of Glaukon and Adeimantus.]\n\nThese two speakers (in the second Book) have advanced the position\n(which they affirm to be held by every one, past and\npresent)--That justice is a good thing or a cause of happiness to\nthe just agent--not in itself or separately, since the performance\nof just acts is more or less onerous and sometimes painful,\npresenting itself in the aspect of an obligation, but--because of\nits consequences, as being indispensable to procure for him some\nulterior good, such as esteem and just treatment from others.\nSokrates on the other hand declares justice to be good, or a cause\nof happiness, to the just agent, most of all in itself--but also,\nadditionally, in its consequences: and injustice to be bad, or a\ncause of misery to the unjust agent, on both grounds also.\n\nSuppose (we have seen it urged by Glaukon and Adeimantus) that a\nman is just, but is mis-esteemed by the society among whom he\nlives, and believed to be unjust. He will certainly be hated and\nill-used by others, and may be ill-used to the greatest\npossible extent--impoverishment, scourging, torture, crucifixion.\nAgain, suppose a man to be unjust, but to be in like manner\nmisconceived, and treated as if he were just. He will receive from\nothers golden opinions, just dealing, and goodwill, producing to\nhim comfortable consequences: and he will obtain, besides, the\nprofits of injustice. Evidently, under these supposed\ncircumstances, the just man will be miserable, in spite of his\njustice: the unjust man will, to say the least, be the happier of\nthe two.\n\nMoreover (so argues Glaukon), all fathers exhort their sons to be\njust, and forbid them to be unjust, admitting that justice is a\ntroublesome obligation, but insisting upon it as indispensable to\navert evil consequences and procure good. So also poets and\nteachers. All of them assume that justice is not inviting for\nitself, but only by reason of its consequences: and that injustice\nis in itself easy and inviting, were it not for mischievous\nconsequences and penalties more than countervailing the\ntemptation. All of them either anticipate, or seek to provide,\npenalties to be inflicted in case the agent commits injustice, and\nnot to be inflicted if he continues just: so that the treatment\nwhich he receives afterwards shall be favourable, or severe,\nconditional upon his own conduct. Such treatment may emanate\neither from Gods or from men: but in either case, it is assumed\nthat the agent shall be known, or shall seem, to be what he really\nis: that the unjust agent shall seem, or be known, to be\nunjust--and that the just shall seem also to be what he is.\n\n[Side-note: The arguments which they enforce were not\ninvented by the Sophists, but were the received views anterior to\nPlato.]\n\nIt is against this doctrine that the Platonic Sokrates in the\nRepublic professes to contend. To refute it, he sets forth his own\nexplanation, wherein justice consists. How far, or with what\nqualifications, the Sophists inculcated the doctrine (as various\ncommentators tell us) we do not know. But Plato himself informs us\nthat it was current and received in society, before Protagoras and\nProdikus were born: taught by parents to their children, and by\npoets in their compositions generally circulated.[8] Moreover,\nSokrates himself (in the Platonic Apology) recommends virtue\non the ground of its remunerative consequences to the agent in the\nshape of wealth and other good things.[9] Again, the Xenophontic\nSokrates, as well as Xenophon himself, agree in the same general\ndoctrine: presenting virtue as laborious and troublesome in\nitself, but as being fully requited by its remunerative\nconsequences in the form of esteem and honour, to the attainment\nof which it is indispensable. In the memorable Choice of Herakl\u00eas,\nthat youth is represented as choosing a life of toil and painful\nself-denial, crowned ultimately by the attainment of honourable\nand beneficial results--in preference to a life of easy and\ninactive enjoyment.[10]\n\n[Footnote 8: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 363-364.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Plato, Apolog. Sokrat. p. 30 B.\n\n[Greek: le/g\u00f4n o(/ti ou)k e)k chr\u00eama/t\u00f4n a)ret\u00ea\\ gi/gnetai, a)ll'\ne)x a)ret\u00ea=s chr\u00ea/mata kai\\ ta)/lla a)gatha\\ toi=s a)nthr\u00f4/pois\na(/panta kai\\ i)di/a kai\\ d\u00eamosi/a|.]\n\nXenophon in the Cyrop\u00e6dia puts the following language into the\nmouth of the hero Cyrus, in addressing his officers (Cyrop. i. 5,\n9). [Greek: Kai/toi e)/g\u00f4ge oi)=mai, ou)demi/an a)ret\u00ea\\n\na)skei=sthai u(p' a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n, \u00f4(s m\u00eade\\n ple/on e)/ch\u00f4sin oi(\ne)sthloi\\ geno/menoi t\u00f4=n pon\u00ear\u00f4=n; a)ll' oi(/ te t\u00f4=n parauti/ka\n\u00ea(don\u00f4=n a)pecho/menoi, ou)/ch i(/na m\u00eade/pote eu)phranth\u00f4=si,\ntou=to pra/ttousin, a)ll' \u00f4(s dia\\ tau/t\u00ean t\u00ea\\n e)gkra/teian\npollapla/sia ei)s to\\n e)/peita chro/non eu)phranou/menoi, ou(/t\u00f4\nparaskeua/zontai], &c.\n\nThe love of praise is represented as the prominent motive of Cyrus\nto the practice of virtue (i. 5, 12, i. 2, 1).\n\nCompare also Xenophon, Cyrop\u00e6d. ii. 3, 5-15, vii. 5, 82, and\nXenophon, Economic. xiv. 5-9; Xenophon, De Venatione, xii.\n15-19.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Xenophon, Memorab. ii. 1, 19-20, &c. We read in\nthe 'Works and Days' of Hesiod, 287:--\n\n[Greek: T\u00ea\\n me/n toi kako/t\u00eata kai\\ i)lado\\n e)/stin e)le/sthai\nR(\u00eai+di/\u00f4s; lei/\u00ea me\\n o(do/s, ma/la d' e)ggu/thi nai/ei.\nT\u00ea=s d' a)ret\u00ea=s i(dr\u00f4=ta theoi\\ propa/roithen e)/th\u00eakan\nA)tha/natoi; makro\\s de\\ kai\\ o)/rthios oi)=mos e)p' au)t\u00ea/n,\nKai\\ tr\u00ea=chus topr\u00f4=ton; e)p\u00ea\\n d' ei)s a)/kron i(/k\u00eaai,\nR(\u00eai+di/\u00ea d' \u00ea)peita pe/lei, chalep\u00ea/ per e)ou=sa.]\n\nIt is remarkable that while the Xenophontic Sokrates cites these\nverses from Hesiod as illustrating and enforcing the drift of his\nexhortation, the Platonic Sokrates cites them as misleading, and\nas a specimen of the hurtful errors instilled by the poets\n(Republic, ii. p. 364 D).]\n\nWe see thus that the doctrine which the Platonic Sokrates impugns\nin the Republic, is countenanced elsewhere by Sokratic authority.\nIt is, in my judgment, more true than that which he opposes to it.\nThe exhortations and orders of parents to their children, which he\ncondemns--were founded upon views of fact and reality more correct\nthan those which the Sokrates of the Republic would substitute in\nplace of them.\n\n[Side-note: Argument of Sokrates to refute them. Sentiments\nin which it originates. Panegyric on Justice.]\n\nLet us note the sentiment in which Plato's creed here originates.\nHe desires, above every thing, to stand forward as the champion\nand panegyrist of justice--as the enemy and denouncer of\ninjustice. To praise justice, not in itself, but for its\nconsequences--and to blame injustice in like manner--appears\nto him disparaging and insulting to justice.[11] He is not\nsatisfied with showing that the just man benefits others by his\njustice, and that the unjust man hurts others by his injustice: he\nadmits nothing into his calculation, except happiness or misery to\nthe agent himself: and happiness, moreover, inherent in the\nprocess of just behaviour--misery inherent in the process of\nunjust behaviour--whatever be the treatment which the agent may\nreceive from either Gods or men. Justice _per se_ (affirms\nPlato) is the cause of happiness to the just agent, absolutely and\nunconditionally: injustice, in like manner, of misery to the\nunjust--_quand m\u00eame_--whatever the consequences may be either\nfrom men or Gods. This is the extreme strain of panegyric\nsuggested by Plato's feeling, and announced as a conclusion\nsubstantiated by his reasons. Nothing more thoroughgoing can be\nadvanced in eulogy of justice. \"Neither the eastern star nor the\nwestern star is so admirable\"--to borrow a phrase from\nAristotle.[12]\n\n[Footnote 11: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 368 B-C. [Greek: de/doika\nga\\r m\u00ea\\ ou)d' o(/sion \u00ea)=| parageno/menon dikaiosu/n\u00ea|\nkak\u00eagoroume/n\u00ea| a)pagoreu/ein kai\\ m\u00ea\\ bo\u00eathei=n], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. v. 3 (1), 1129, b. 28.\n[Greek: ou)/th' e(/speros ou)/th' e(\u00f4=|os ou(/t\u00f4 thaumasto/s.]]\n\nPlato is here the first proclaimer of the doctrine afterwards so\nmuch insisted on by the Stoics--the all-sufficiency of virtue to\nthe happiness of the virtuous agent, whatever may be his fate in\nother respects--without requiring any farther conditions or\nadjuncts. It will be seen that Plato maintains this thesis with\nreference to the terms _justice_ and its opposite\n_injustice_; sometimes (though not often) using the general\nterm _virtue_ or wisdom, which was the ordinary term with the\nStoics afterwards.\n\n[Side-note: Different senses of justice--wider and narrower\nsense.]\n\nThe ambiguous meaning of the word _justice_ is known to Plato\nhimself (as it is also to Aristotle). One professed purpose of the\ndialogue called the Republic is to remove such ambiguity. Apart\nfrom the many other differences of meaning (arising from\ndissentient sentiments of different men and different ages), there\nis one duplicity of meaning which Aristotle particularly dwells\nupon.[13] In the stricter and narrower sense, justice comprehends\nonly those obligations which each individual agent owes to\nothers, and for the omission of which he becomes punishable as\nunjust--though the performance of them, under ordinary\ncircumstances, carries little positive merit: in another and a\nlarger sense, justice comprehends these and a great deal more,\nbecoming co-extensive with wise, virtuous, and meritorious\ncharacter generally. The narrower sense is that which is in more\ncommon use; and it is that which Plato assumes provisionally when\nhe puts forward the case of opponents in the speeches of Glaukon\nand Adeimantus. But when he comes to set forth his own\nexplanation, and to draw up his own case, we see that he uses the\nterm justice in its larger sense, as the condition of a mind\nperfectly well-balanced and well-regulated: as if a man could not\nbe just, without being at the same time wise, courageous, and\ntemperate. The just man described in the counter-pleadings of\nGlaukon and Adeimantus, would be a person like the Athenian\nAristeides: the unjust man whom they contrast with him, would be\none who maltreats, plunders, or deceives others, or usurps power\nover them. But the just man, when Sokrates replies to them and\nunfolds his own thesis, is made to include a great deal more: he\nis a person in whose mind each of the three constituent elements\nis in proper relation of controul or obedience to the others, so\nthat the whole mind is perfect: a person whose Reason, being\nilluminated by contemplation of the Universals or self-existent\nIdeas of Goodness, Justice, Virtue, has become qualified to\nexercise controul over the two inferior elements: one of which\n(Energy) is its willing subordinate and auxiliary--while the\nlowest of the three (Appetite) is kept in regulation by the joint\naction of the two. The just man, so described, becomes identical\nwith the true philosopher: no man who is not a philosopher\ncan be just.[14] Aristeides would not at all correspond to\nthe Platonic ideal of justice. He would be a stranger to the\npleasure extolled by Plato as the exclusive privilege of the just\nand virtuous--the pleasure of contemplating universal Ideas and\nacquiring extended knowledge.[15]\n\n[Footnote 13: Aristotel. Eth. Nikom. v. 2 (1), 1129, a. 25.\n[Greek: e)/oike de\\ pleonach\u00f4=s le/gesthai \u00ea( dikaiosu/n\u00ea kai\\ \u00ea(\na)diki/a.]\n\nAlso v. 3 (1), 1130, a. 3. [Greek: dia\\ de\\ to\\ au)to\\ tou=to kai\\\na)llo/trion a)gatho\\n dokei= ei)=nai \u00ea( dikaiosu/n\u00ea, mo/n\u00ea t\u00f4=n\na)ret\u00f4=n, o(/ti pro\\s e(/teron e)stin; a)/ll\u00f4| ga\\r ta\\\nsumphe/ronta pra/ttei, \u00ea)\\ a)/rchonti \u00ea)\\ koin\u00f4=|.]\n\nThis proposition--that justice is [Greek: a)llo/trion\na)gatho/n]--is the very proposition which Thrasymachus is\nintroduced as affirming and Sokrates as combating, in the first\nbook of the Republic.\n\nCompare also Aristotle's Ethica Magna, i. 34, p. 1193, b. 19,\nwhere the same explanation of justice is given: also p. 1194, a.\n7, where the Republic of Plato is cited, and the principle of\nreciprocity, as laid down at the end of the second book of the\nRepublic, is repeated. We read in a fragment of the lost treatise\nof Cicero, De Republic\u00e2 (iii. 6, 7):--\"Justitia foras spectat, et\nprojecta tota est atque eminet.--Qu\u00e6 virtus, pr\u00e6ter c\u00e6teras, tota\nse ad alienas porrigit utilitates atque explicat.\"]\n\n[Footnote 14: This is the same distinction as that drawn by\nEpiktetus between the [Greek: philo/sophos] and the [Greek:\ni)di\u00f4/t\u00eas] (Arrian, Epiktet. iii. 19). An [Greek: i)di\u00f4/t\u00eas] may\nbe just in the ordinary meaning of the word. Aristeides was an\n[Greek: i)di\u00f4/t\u00eas]. The Greek word [Greek: i)di\u00f4/t\u00eas], designating\nthe ordinary average citizen, as distinguished from any special or\nprofessional training, is highly convenient.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 582 C. [Greek: t\u00ea=s de\\ tou=\no)/ntos the/as, oi(/an \u00ea(don\u00ea\\n e)/chei, a)du/naton a)/ll\u00f4|\ngegeu=sthai pl\u00ea\\n t\u00f4=| philoso/ph\u00f4|.]]\n\n[Side-note: Plato's sense of the word Justice or\nVirtue--self-regarding.]\n\nThe Platonic conception of justice or Virtue on the one side, and\nof Injustice or Vice on the other, is self-regarding and\nprudential. Justice is in the mind a condition analogous to good\nhealth and strength in the body--(_mens sana in corpore\nsano_)--Injustice is a condition analogous to sickness,\ncorruption, impotence, in the body.[16] The body is healthy, when\neach of its constituent parts performs its appropriate function:\nit is unhealthy, when there is failure in this respect, either\ndefective working of any part, or interference of one part with\nthe rest. So too in the just mind, each of its tripartite\nconstituents performs its appropriate function--the rational mind\ndirecting and controuling, the energetic and appetitive minds\nobeying such controul. In the unjust mind, the case is opposite:\nReason exercises no supremacy: Passion and Appetite, acting each\nfor itself, are disorderly, reckless, exorbitant. To possess a\nhealthy body is desirable for its consequences as a means towards\nother constituents of happiness; but it is still more desirable in\nitself, as an essential element of happiness _per se_,\n_i.e._, the negation of sickness, which would of itself make\nus miserable. On the other hand, an unhealthy or corrupt body is\nmiserable by reason of its consequences, but still more miserable\n_per se_, even apart from consequences. In like manner, the\njust mind blesses the possessor twice: first and chiefly, as\nbringing to him happiness in itself--next also, as it leads to\nulterior happy results:[17] the unjust mind is a curse to its\npossessor in itself, and apart from results--though it also\nleads to ulterior results which render it still more a curse to\nhim.\n\n[Footnote 16: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 591 B, iv. p. 444 E.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 367 C. [Greek: e)peid\u00ea\\\nou)=n \u00f4(molo/g\u00easas t\u00f4=n megi/st\u00f4n a)gath\u00f4=n ei)=nai dikaiosu/n\u00ean,\na(\\ t\u00f4=n te a)pobaino/nt\u00f4n a)p' au)t\u00f4=n e(/neka a)/xia\nkekt\u00ea=sthai, _polu\\ de\\ ma=llon au)ta\\ au(t\u00f4=n_], &c.]\n\nThis theory respecting justice and injustice was first introduced\ninto ethical speculation by Plato. He tells us himself (throughout\nthe speeches ascribed to Glaukon and Adeimantus), that no one\nbefore him had announced it: that all with one accord[18]--both\nthe poets in addressing an audience, and private citizens in\nexhorting their children--inculcated a different doctrine,\nenforcing justice as an onerous duty, and not as a\nself-recommending process: that he was the first who extolled justice\nin itself, as conferring happiness on the just agent, apart from\nall reciprocity or recognition either by men or Gods--and the\nfirst who condemned injustice in itself, as inflicting misery on\nthe unjust agent, independent of any recognition by others. Here\nthen we have the first introduction of this theory into ethical\nspeculation. Injustice is an internal taint, corruption of mind,\nwhich (like bad bodily health) is in itself misery to the agent,\nhowever he may be judged or treated by men or Gods; and justice is\n(like good bodily health) a state of internal happiness to the\nagent, independent of all recognition and responsive treatment\nfrom others.\n\n[Footnote 18: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 364 A. [Greek: pa/ntes e)x\ne(no\\s sto/matos u(mnou=sin], &c. Also p. 366 D.]\n\n[Side-note: He represents the motives to it, as arising from\nthe internal happiness of the just agents.]\n\nThe Platonic theory, or something substantially equivalent to it\nunder various forms of words, has been ever since upheld by\nvarious ethical theorists, from the time of Plato downward.[19]\nEvery one would be glad if it could be made out as true: Glaukon\nand Adeimantus are already enlisted in its favour, and only demand\nfrom Sokrates a decent justification for their belief. Moreover,\nthose who deny its truth incur the reproach of being deficient in\nlove of virtue or in hatred of vice. What is still more\nremarkable--Plato has been complimented as if his theory had been\nthe first antithesis to what is called the \"selfish theory of\nmorals\"--a compliment which is certainly noway merited: for\nPlato's theory is essentially self-regarding.[20] He does not\nindeed lay his main stress on the retribution and punishments\nwhich follow injustice, because he represents injustice as being\nitself a state of misery to the unjust agent: nor upon the rewards\nattached to justice, because he represents justice itself as a\nstate of intrinsic happiness to the just agent. Nevertheless the\nmotive to performance of justice, and to avoidance of injustice,\nis derived in his theory (as it is in what is called the selfish\ntheory) entirely from the happiness or misery of the agent\nhimself. The just man is not called upon for any self-denial or\nself-sacrifice, since by the mere fact of being just, he acquires\na large amount of happiness: it is the unjust man who, from\nignorance or perversion, sacrifices that happiness which just\nbehaviour would have ensured to him. Thus the Platonic theory is\nentirely self-regarding; looking to the conduct of each separate\nagent as it affects his own happiness, not as it affects the\nhappiness of others.\n\n[Footnote 19: It will be found maintained by Shaftesbury and\nHutcheson and impugned by Rutherford in his Essay on Virtue: also\nadvocated by Sir James Mackintosh in his Dissertation on Ethical\nPhilosophy, prefixed to the Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica; and\ncontroverted, or rather reduced to its proper limits, by Mr. James\nMill, in his very acute and philosophical volume, Fragment on\nMackintosh, published in 1835, see pp. 174-188 seq. Sir James\nindeed uses the word Benevolence where Plato uses that of Justice:\nhe speaks of \"the inherent delights and intrinsic happiness of\nBenevolence,\" &c.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Plat. Rep. p. lvii. \"Quo facto\ndeinceps ad gravissimam totius sermonis partem ita transitur, ut\ninter colloquentes conveniat, justiti\u00e6 vim et naturam eo modo esse\ninvestigandam, ut emolumentorum atque commodorum ex e\u00e2\nredundantium nulla plan\u00e9 ratio habeatur.\"\n\nThis is not strictly exact, for Plato claims on behalf of justice\nnot only that the performance of it is happy in itself, but also\nthat it entails an independent result of ulterior happiness. But\nhe dwells much less upon the second point; which indeed would be\nsuperfluous if the first could be thoroughly established. Compare\nCicero, Tusc. Disput. v. 12-34, and the notes on Mr. James\nHarris's Three Treatises, p. 351 seq., wherein the Stoical\ndoctrine--[Greek: Pa/nta au(tou= e(/neka pra/ttein]--is\nexplained.]\n\n[Side-note: His theory departs more widely from the truth\nthan that which he opposes. Argument of Adeimantus discussed.]\n\nSo much to explain what the Platonic theory is. But when we ask\nwhether it consists with the main facts of society, or with the\nordinary feelings of men living in society, the reply must be in\nthe negative.\n\n\"If\" (says Plato, putting the words into the counter-pleading of\nAdeimantus)--\"If the Platonic theory were preached by all of you,\nand impressed upon our belief from childhood, we should not have\nwatched each other to prevent injustice; since each man would have\nbeen the best watch upon himself, from fear lest by committing\ninjustice he should take to his bosom the maximum of evil.\"[21]\n\n[Footnote 21: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 367 A. [Greek: ei) ga\\r\nou(/t\u00f4s e)le/geto e)x a)rch\u00ea=s u(po\\ pa/nt\u00f4n u(m\u00f4=n kai\\ e)k ne/\u00f4n\n\u00ea(ma=s e)pei/thete, ou)k a)\\n a)ll\u00ea/lous e)phula/ttomen m\u00ea\\\na)dikei=n, a)ll' au)to\\s au(tou= \u00ea)=n e(/kastos a)/ristos phu/lax,\ndedi\u00f4\\s m\u00ea\\ a)dik\u00f4=n t\u00f4=| megi/st\u00f4| kak\u00f4=| xu/noikos \u00ea)=|.]\n\nThese words are remarkable. They admit of two constructions:--1. If\nthis Platonic theory were true. 2. If the Platonic theory,\nthough not true, were constantly preached and impressed upon every\none's belief from childhood.\n\nUnderstanding the words in the first of these two constructions,\nthe hypothetical proposition put into the mouth of Adeimantus is a\nvalid argument against the theory afterwards maintained by\nSokrates. If the theory were conformable to facts, no precautions\nwould need to be taken by men against the injustice of each other.\nBut such precautions have been universally recognised as\nindispensable, and universally adopted. Therefore the Sokratic\ntheory is not conformable to facts. It is not true that the\nperformance of duty (considered apart from consequences) is\nself-inviting and self-remunerative--the contrary path self-deterring\nand self-punitory--to each individual agent. Plato might perhaps\nargue that it would be true, if men were properly educated; and\nthat the elaborate education which he provides for his Guardians\nin the Republic would suffice for this purpose. But even if this\nwere granted, we must recollect that the producing Many of his\nRepublic would receive no such peculiar education.\n\nUnderstanding the words in the second construction, they would\nthen mean that the doctrine, though not true, ought to be preached\nand accredited by the lawgiver as an useful fiction: that if every\none were told so from his childhood, without ever hearing either\ndoubt or contradiction, it would become an established creed which\neach man would believe, and each agent would act upon: that the\neffect in reference to society would therefore be the same as if\nthe doctrine were true. This is in fact expressly affirmed by\nPlato in another place.[22] Now undoubtedly the effect of\npreaching and teaching, assuming it to be constant and unanimous,\nis very great in accrediting all kinds of dogmas. Plato believed\nit to be capable of almost unlimited extension--as we may see by\nthe prescriptions which he gives for the training of the Guardians\nin his Republic. But to persuade every one that the path of duty\nand justice was in itself inviting, would be a task overpassing\nthe eloquence even of Plato, since every man's internal\nsentiment would refute it. You might just as well expect to\nconvince a child, through the declarations and encouragements of\nhis nurse, that the medicine prescribed to him during sickness was\nvery nice. Every child has to learn obedience as a necessity,\nunder the authority and sanction of his parents. You may assure\nhim that what is at first repulsive will become by habit\ncomparatively easy: and that the self-reproach, connected with\nevasion of duty, will by association become a greater pain than\nthat which is experienced in performing duty. This is to a great\ndegree true, but it is by no means true to the full extent: still\nless can it be made to appear true before it has been actually\nrealised. You cannot cause a fiction like this to be universally\naccredited. A child is compelled to practise justice by the fear\nof displeasure and other painful consequences from those in\nauthority over him: the reason for bringing this artificial motive\nto bear upon him, is, that it is essential in the first instance\nfor the comfort and security of others: in the second instance for\nhis own. In Plato's theory, the first consideration is omitted,\nwhile not only the whole stress is laid upon the second, but more\nis promised in regard to the second than the reality warrants.\n\n[Footnote 22: Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 663-664.]\n\nThe opponents whom the Platonic Sokrates here seeks to confute\nheld--That Justice is an obligation in itself onerous to the\nagent, but indispensable in order to ensure to him just dealing\nand estimation from others--That injustice is a path in itself\neasy and inviting to the agent, but necessary to be avoided,\nbecause he forfeits his chance of receiving justice from others,\nand draws upon himself hatred and other evil consequences. This\ndoctrine (argues Plato) represents the advantages of justice to\nthe just agent as arising, not from his actually being just, but\nfrom his seeming to be so, and being reputed by others to be so:\nin like manner, it represents the misery of injustice to the\nunjust agent as arising not from his actually being unjust, but\nfrom his being reputed to be so by others. The inference which a\nman will naturally draw from hence (adds Plato) is, That he must\naim only at seeming to be just, not at being just in reality: that\nhe must seek to avoid the reputation of injustice, not injustice\nin reality: that the mode of life most enviable is, to be unjust\nin reality, but just in seeming--to study the means either of\ndeceiving others into a belief that you are just, or of coercing\nothers into submission to your injustice.[23] This indeed cannot\nbe done unless you are strong or artful: it you are weak or\nsimple-minded, the best thing which you can do is to be just. The\nweak alone are gainers by justice: the strong are losers by it,\nand gainers by injustice.[24]\n\n[Footnote 23: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 362-367.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 366 C.]\n\nThese are legitimate corollaries (so Glaukon and Adeimantus are\nhere made to argue) from the doctrine preached by most fathers to\ntheir children, that the obligations of justice are in themselves\nonerous to the just agent, and remunerative only so far as they\ndetermine just conduct on the part of others towards him. Plato\nmeans, not that fathers, in exhorting their children, actually\ndrew these corollaries: but that if they followed out their own\ndoctrine consistently, they would have drawn them: and that there\nis no way of escaping them, except by adopting the doctrine of the\nPlatonic Sokrates--That justice is in itself a source of happiness\nto the just agent, and injustice a source of misery to the unjust\nagent--however each of them may be esteemed or treated by others.\n\n[Side-note: A Reciprocity of rights and duties between men\nin social life--different feelings towards one and towards the\nother.]\n\nNow upon this we may observe, that Plato, from anxiety to escape\ncorollaries which are only partially true, and which, in so far as\nthey are true, may be obviated by precautions--has endeavoured to\naccredit a fiction misrepresenting the constant phenomena and\nstanding conditions of social life. Among those conditions,\nreciprocity of services is one of the most fundamental. The\ndifference of feeling which attaches to the services which a man\nrenders, called duties or obligations--and the services which he\nreceives from others, called his rights--is alike obvious and\nundeniable. Each individual has both duties and rights: each is\nboth an agent towards others, and a patient or sentient from\nothers. He is required to be just towards others, they are\nrequired to be just towards him: he in his actions must have\nregard, within certain limits, to their comfort and security--they\nin their actions must have regard to his. If he has obligations\ntowards them, he has also rights against them; or (which is the\nsame thing) they have obligations towards him. If punishment\nis requisite to deter him from doing wrong to them, it is equally\nrequisite to deter them from doing wrong to him. Whoever theorises\nupon society, contemplating it as a connected scheme or system\nincluding different individual agents, must accept this\nreciprocity as a fundamental condition. The rights and\nobligations, of each towards the rest, must form inseparable and\ncorrelative parts of the theory. Each agent must be dealt with by\nothers according to his works, and must be able to reckon\nbeforehand on being so dealt with:--on escaping injury or hurt,\nand receiving justice, from others, if he behaves justly towards\nthem. The theory supposes, that whether just or unjust, he will\nappear to others what he really is, and will be appreciated\naccordingly.[25]\n\n[Footnote 25: Euripid. Herakleid. 425.\n\n[Greek: Ou) ga\\r turanni/d', \u00f4(/ste barba/r\u00f4n, e)/ch\u00f4,\nA)ll', \u00ea)\\n di/kaia dr\u00f4=, di/kaia pei/somai.]\n\nIn a remarkable passage of the Laws, Plato sets a far higher value\nupon correct estimation from others, which in the Republic he\ndepicts under the contemptuous appellation of show or seeming.\n\nPlato, Legg. xii. p. 950 B. [Greek: Chr\u00ea\\ de\\ ou)/pote peri\\\nsmikrou= poiei=sthai to\\ dokei=n a)gathou\\s ei)=nai toi=s a)/llois\n\u00ea)\\ m\u00ea\\ dokei=n; ou) ga\\r o(/son ou)si/as a)ret\u00ea=s a)pesphalme/noi\ntugcha/nousin oi( polloi/, tosou=ton kai\\ tou= kri/nein tou\\s\na)/llous oi( pon\u00earoi\\ kai\\ a)/chr\u00eastoi, thei=on de/ ti kai\\\neu)/stocho/n e)sti kai\\ toi=s kakoi=s. \u00f4(/ste pa/mpolloi kai\\ t\u00f4=n\nspho/dra kak\u00f4=n eu)= toi=s lo/gois kai\\ tai=s do/xais diairou=ntai\ntou\\s a)mei/nous t\u00f4=n a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n kai\\ tou\\s chei/rous. Dio\\\nkalo\\n tai=s pollai=s po/lesi to\\ parake/leusma/ e)sti, protima=|n\nt\u00ea\\n eu)doxi/an pro\\s t\u00f4=n poll\u00f4=n; to\\ me\\n ga\\r o)rtho/taton\nkai\\ me/giston, o)/nta a)gatho\\n a)l\u00eath\u00f4=s ou(/t\u00f4 to\\n eu)/doxon\nbi/on th\u00eareu/ein--ch\u00f4ri\\s de\\ m\u00eadam\u00f4=s, to/n ge te/leon a)/ndra\ne)so/menon.]]\n\nThe fathers of families, whose doctrine Plato censures, adopted\nthis doctrine of reciprocity, and built upon it their exhortations\nto their children. \"Be just to others: without that condition, you\ncannot expect that they will be just to you.\" Plato objects to\ntheir doctrine, on the ground, that it assumed justice to be\nonerous to the agent, and therefore indirectly encouraged the\nevading of the onerous preliminary condition, for the purpose of\nextorting or stealing the valuable consequent without earning it\nfairly. Persons acting thus unjustly would efface reciprocity by\ntaking away the antecedent. Now Plato, in correcting them, sets up\na counter-doctrine which effaces reciprocity by removing the\nconsequent. His counter-doctrine promises me that if I am just\ntowards others, I shall be happy in and through that single\ncircumstance; and that I ought not to care whether they behave\njustly or unjustly towards me. Reciprocity thus disappears. The\nauthoritative terms _right_ and _obligation_ lose all\ntheir specific meaning.\n\n[Side-note: Plato's own theory, respecting the genesis\nof society, is based on reciprocity.]\n\nIn thus eliminating reciprocity--in affirming that the performance\nof justice is not an onerous duty, but in itself happiness-giving,\nto the just agent--Plato contradicts his own theory respecting the\ngenesis and foundation of society. What is the explanation which\nhe himself gives (in this very Republic) of the primary origin of\na city? It arises (he says) from the fact, that each individual\namong us is not self-sufficing, but full of wants. All having many\nwants, each takes to himself others as partners and auxiliaries to\nsupply them: thus grows up the aggregation called a city.[26] Each\nman gives to another, and receives from another, in the belief\nthat it will be better for him to do so. It is found most\nadvantageous to all, that each man shall devote himself\nexclusively to one mode of production, and shall exchange his\nproduce with that of others. Such interchange of productions and\nservices is the generating motive which brings about civic\ncommunion.[27] Justice and injustice will be found in certain\nmodes of carrying on this useful interchange between each man and\nthe rest.[28]\n\n[Footnote 26: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 369 B-C. [Greek: gi/gnetai\npo/lis, e)peid\u00ea\\ tugcha/nei \u00ea(m\u00f4=n e(/kastos ou)k au)ta/rk\u00eas\na)lla\\ poll\u00f4=n e)nde\u00ea/s . . . metadi/d\u00f4si d\u00ea\\ a)/llos a)/ll\u00f4|,\nei)/ ti metadi/d\u00f4sin, \u00ea)\\ metalamba/nei, _oi)o/menos au(t\u00f4=|\na)/meinon ei)=nai_ . . . poi\u00ea/sei de\\ au)t\u00ea\\n (t\u00ea\\n po/lin),\n\u00f4(s e)/oiken, \u00ea)\\ _\u00ea(mete/ra chrei/a_.]]\n\n[Footnote 27: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 371 B. [Greek: Ti/ de\\ d\u00ea/?\ne)n au)t\u00ea=| t\u00ea=| po/lei p\u00f4=s a)ll\u00ea/lois metad\u00f4/sousin \u00f4(=n a)\\n\ne(/kastoi e)rga/z\u00f4ntai? _\u00f4(=n d\u00ea\\_ e(/neka _kai\\ koin\u00f4ni/an\npoi\u00easa/menoi po/lin \u00f4)|ki/samen_.]]\n\n[Footnote 28: Plato, Republ. ii. pp. 371 E-372 A. [Greek: Pou=\nou)=n a)/n pote e)n au)t\u00ea=| (t\u00ea=| po/lei) ei)/\u00ea \u00ea(/ te dikaiosu/n\u00ea\nkai\\ \u00ea( a)diki/a? . . . E)g\u00f4\\ ou)k e(nno\u00f4=, ei) m\u00ea/ pou _e)n\nau)t\u00f4=n tou/t\u00f4n chrei/a| tini\\ t\u00ea=| pro\\s a)ll\u00ea/lous_.]]\n\nHere Plato expressly declares the principle of reciprocity to be\nthe fundamental cause which generates and sustains the communion\ncalled the city. No man suffices to himself: every man has wants\nwhich require supply from others: every man can contribute\nsomething to supply the wants of others. Justice or injustice have\nplace, according as this reciprocal service is carried out in one\nmanner or another. Each man labours to supply the wants of others\nas well as his own.\n\nThis is the primitive, constant, indispensable, bond whereby\nsociety is brought and held together. Doubtless it is not the only\nbond, nor does Plato say that it is. There are other auxiliary\nsocial principles besides, of great value and importance: but they\npresuppose and are built upon the fundamental\nprinciple--reciprocity of need and service--which remains when we\nreduce society to its lowest terms; and which is not the less real\nas underlying groundwork, though it is seldom enunciated separately,\nbut appears overlaid, disguised, and adorned, by numerous\nadditions and refinements. Plato correctly announces the\nreciprocity of need and service as one indivisible, though complex\nfact, when looked at with reference to the social communion.\nNeither of the two parts of that fact, without the other part,\nwould serve as adequate groundwork. Each man must act, not for\nhimself alone, but for others also: he must keep in view the\nrequirements of others, to a certain extent, as well as his own.\nIn his purposes and scheme of life, the two must be steadily\ncombined.\n\n[Side-note: Antithesis and correlation of obligation and\nright. Necessity of keeping the two ideas together, as the basis\nof any theory respecting society.]\n\nIt is clear that Plato--in thus laying down the principle of\nreciprocity, or interchange of service, as the ground-work of the\nsocial union--recognises the antithesis, and at the same time the\ncorrelation, between obligation and right. The service which each\nman renders to supply the wants of others is in the nature of an\nonerous duty; the requital for which is furnished to him in the\nservices rendered by others to supply his wants. It is payment\nagainst receipt, and is expressly so stated by Plato--which every\nman conforms to, \"believing that he will be better off thereby\".\nTaking the two together, every man is better off; but no man would\nbe so by the payment alone; nor could any one continue paying out,\nif he received nothing in return. Justice consists in the proper\ncarrying on of this interchange in its two correlative parts.[29]\n\n[Footnote 29: We may remark that Plato, though he states the\nprinciple of reciprocity very justly, does not state it\ncompletely. He brings out the reciprocity of need and service; he\ndoes not mention the reciprocal liability of injury. Each man can\ndo hurt to others: each man may receive hurt from others.\nAbstinence on the part of each from hurting others, and security\nto each that he shall not be hurt by others, are necessities quite\nas fundamental as that of production and interchange.\n\nThe reciprocal feeling of security, or absence of all fear of\nill-usage from others ([Greek: to\\ kath' \u00ea(me/ran a)dee\\s kai\\\na)nepibou/leuton pro\\s a)ll\u00ea/lous], to use the phrase of\nThucydides iii. 37), is no less essential to social sentiment,\nthan the reciprocal confidence that each man may obtain from\nothers a supply of his wants, on condition of supplying theirs.]\n\nWe see therefore that Plato contradicts his own fundamental\nprinciple, when he denies the doing of justice to be an onerous\nduty, and when he maintains that it is in itself\nhappiness-giving to the just agent, whether other men account him\njust and do justice to him in return--or not. By this latter doctrine\nhe sets aside that reciprocity of want and service, upon which he had\naffirmed the social union to rest. The fathers, whom he blames,\ngave advice in full conformity with his own principle of\nreciprocity--when they exhorted their sons to the practice of\njustice, not as self-inviting, but as an onerous service towards\nothers, to be requited by corresponding services and goodwill from\nothers towards them. If (as he urges) such advice operates as an\nencouragement to crime, because it admits that the successful\ntyrant or impostor, who gets the services of others for nothing,\nis better off than the just man who gets them only in exchange for\nan onerous equivalent--this inference equally flows from that\nproclaimed reciprocity of need and service, which he himself\naffirms to be the generating cause of human society. If it be true\n(as Plato states) that each individual is full of wants, and\nstands in need of the services of others--then it cannot be true,\nthat payment without receipt, as a systematic practice, is\nself-inviting and self-satisfying. That there are temptations for\nstrong or cunning men to evade obligation and to usurp wrongful\npower, is an undeniable fact. We may wish that it were not a fact:\nbut we gain nothing by denying or ignoring it. The more clearly\nthe fact is stated, the better; in order that society may take\nprecaution against such dangers--a task which has always been\nfound necessary and often difficult. In reviewing the Gorgias,[30]\nwe found Sokrates declaring, that Archelaus, the energetic and\npowerful king of Macedonia, who had usurped the throne by means of\ncrime and bloodshed, was thoroughly miserable: far more miserable\nthan he would have been, had he been defeated in his enterprise\nand suffered cruel punishment. Such a declaration represents the\ngenuine sentiment of Sokrates as to what he _himself_ would\nfeel, and what ought to be (in his conviction) the feeling of\nevery one, after having perpetrated such nefarious acts. But it\ndoes not represent the feeling of Archelaus himself, nor that of\nthe large majority of bystanders: both to these latter, and\nto himself, Archelaus appears an object of envy and\nadmiration.[31] And it would be a fatal mistake, if the peculiar\nsentiment of Sokrates were accepted as common to others besides,\nand as forming a sound presumption to act upon: that is, if, under\nthe belief that no ambitious man will voluntarily bring upon\nhimself so much misery, it were supposed that precautions against\nhis designs were unnecessary. The rational and tutelary purpose of\npunishment is, to make the proposition true and obvious to\nall--That the wrong-doer will draw upon himself a large preponderance\nof mischief by his wrong-doing. But to proclaim the proposition by\nvoice of herald (which Plato here proposes) as if it were already\nan established fact of human nature, independent of all such\nprecautions--would be only an unhappy delusion.[32]\n\n[Footnote 30: See above, ch. xxiv., vol. ii., pp. 325-29.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Xenophon, Cyrop\u00e6d. iii. 3, 52-53. Cyrus says:--\n\n[Greek: A)=r' ou)k, ei) me/llousi toiau=tai dia/noiai\ne)ggen\u00ea/sesthai a)nthr\u00f4/pois kai\\ e)/mmonoi e)/sesthai, pr\u00f4=ton\nme\\n no/mous u(pa/rxai dei= toiou/tous, di' \u00f4(=n _toi=s me\\n\na)gathoi=s e)/ntimos kai\\ e)leuthe/rios o( bi/os\nparaskeuasth\u00ea/setai_, toi=s _de\\ kakoi=s tapeino/s te kai\\\na)lgeino\\s_ kai\\ a)bi/\u00f4tos o( ai)\u00f4\\n e)panakei/setai? E)/peita\nde\\ didaska/lous, oi)/mai, dei= kai\\ a)/rchontas e)pi\\ tou/tois\ngene/sthai, oi(/tines dei/xousi/ te o)rth\u00f4=s kai\\ dida/xousi kai\\\ne)thi/sousi tau=ta dra=|n, e)/st' a)\\n e)gge/n\u00eatai au)toi=s, tou\\s\nme\\n _a)gathou\\s kai\\ eu)kleei=s eu)daimonesta/tous_ t\u00f4=|\no)/nti nomi/zein, tou\\s de\\ _kakou\\s kai\\ duskleei=s\na)thli\u00f4ta/tous_ a(pa/nt\u00f4n \u00ea(gei=sthai.]\n\nXenophon here uses language at variance with that of Plato, and\nconsonant to that of the fathers of families whom Plato censures.\nTo create habits of just action, and to repress habits of unjust\naction, society must meet both the one and the other by a suitable\nresponse. Assuming such conditional reciprocity to be realised,\nyou may then persuade each agent that the unjust man, whom society\nbrands with dishonour, is miserable ([Greek: oi( kakoi\\\n_kai\\_ duskleei=s]).]\n\n[Footnote 32: Xenophon, Economic. xiii. 11. Ischomachus there\ndeclares:--\n\n[Greek: Pa/nu ga/r moi dokei=, \u00f4)= S\u00f4/krates, a)thumi/a\ne)ggi/gnesthai toi=s a)gathoi=s, o(/tan o(r\u00f4=si ta\\ me\\n e)/rga\ndi' au)t\u00f4=n katapratto/mena, t\u00f4=n de\\ o(moi/\u00f4n tugcha/nontas\ne(autoi=s tou\\s m\u00ea/te ponei=n m\u00ea/te kinduneu/ein e)the/lontas,\no(/tan de/\u00ea|.]--Also xiv. 9-10.]\n\n[Side-note: Characteristic feature of the Platonic\nCommonwealth--specialization of services to that function for\nwhich each man is fit--will not apply to one individual\nseparately.]\n\nThe characteristic feature of the Platonic commonwealth is to\nspecialize the service of each individual in that function for\nwhich he is most fit. It is assumed, that each will render due\nservice to the rest, and will receive from them due service in\nrequital. Upon this assumption, Plato pronounces that the\ncommunity will be happy.\n\nLet us grant for the present that this conclusion follows from his\npremisses. He proceeds forthwith to apply it by analogy to another\nand a different case--the case of the individual man. He\npresumes complete analogy between the community and an\nindividual.[33] To a certain extent, the analogy is real: but it\nfails on the main point which Plato's inference requires as a\nbasis. The community, composed of various and differently endowed\nmembers, suffices to itself and its own happiness: \"the individual\nis not sufficient to himself, but stands in need of much aid from\nothers\"[34]--a grave fact which Plato himself proclaims as the\ngenerating cause and basis of society. Though we should admit,\ntherefore, that Plato's commonwealth is perfectly\nwell-constituted, and that a well-constituted commonwealth will be\nhappy--we cannot from thence infer that an individual, however\nwell-constituted, will be happy. His happiness depends upon others\nas well as upon himself. He may have in him the three different\nmental varieties of souls, or three different persons--Reason,\nEnergy, Appetite--well tempered and adjusted; so as to produce a\nfull disposition to just behaviour on his part: but constant\ninjustice on the part of others will nevertheless be effectual in\nrendering him miserable. From the happiness of a community, all\ncomposed of just men--you cannot draw any fair inference to that\nof one just man in an unjust community.\n\n[Footnote 33: The parallel between the Commonwealth and the\nindividual is perpetually reproduced in Plato's reasoning.\nRepublic, ii. pp. 368-369, vii. p. 541 B, ix. pp. 577 C-D, 579 E,\n&c.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 369 B.]\n\nThus much to show that the parallel between the community and the\nindividual, which Plato pursues through the larger portion of the\nRepublic, is fallacious. His affirmation--That the just man is\nhappy in his justice, _quand m\u00eame_--in his own mental\nperfection, whatever supposition may be made as to the community\namong whom he lives--implies that the just man is self-sufficing:\nand Plato himself expressly declares that no individual is\nself-sufficing. Indeed, no author can set forth more powerfully than\nPlato himself in this very dialogue--the uncomfortable and\nperilous position of a philosophical individual, when standing\nsingly as a dissenter among a community with fixed habits and\nsentiments--unphilosophical and anti-philosophical. Such a person\n(Plato says) is like a man who has fallen into a den of wild\nbeasts: he may think himself fortunate, if by careful\nretirement and absence from public manifestation, he can preserve\nhimself secure and uncorrupted: but his characteristic and\nsuperior qualities can obtain no manifestation. The philosopher\nrequires a community suited to his character. Nowhere does any\nsuch community (so Plato says) exist at present.[35]\n\n[Footnote 35: Plato, Repub. vi. pp. 494 E, 496 D, 497 B. [Greek:\n\u00f4(/sper ei)s th\u00eari/a a)/nthr\u00f4pos e)mpes\u00f4/n], &c. Compare also\nix. p. 592 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Plato has not made good his refutation--the\nthesis which he impugns is true.]\n\nI cannot think, therefore, that the main thesis which Sokrates\nprofesses to have established, against the difficulties raised by\nGlaukon, is either proved or provable. Plato has fallen into\nerror, partly by exaggerating the parallelism between the\nindividual man and the commonwealth: partly by attempting to\nreason on justice and injustice in abstract isolation, without\nregard to the natural consequences of either--while yet those\nconsequences cannot be really excluded from consideration, when we\ncome to apply to these terms, predicates either favourable or\nunfavourable. That justice, taken along with its ordinary and\nnatural consequences, tends materially to the happiness of the\njust agent--that injustice, looked at in the same manner, tends to\ndestroy or impair the happiness of the unjust--these are\npropositions true and valuable to be inculcated. But this was the\nvery case embodied in the exhortations of the ordinary moralists\nand counsellors, whom Plato intends to refute. He is not satisfied\nto hear them praise justice taken along with its natural\nconsequences: he stands forward to panegyrise justice\nabstractedly, and without its natural consequences: nay, even if\nfollowed by consequences the very reverse of those which are\nordinary and natural.[36] He insists that justice is eligible and\npleasing _per se_, self-recommending: that among the three\nvarieties of _Bona_ (1. That which we choose for itself and\nfrom its own immediate attractions. 2. That which is in itself\nindifferent or even painful, but which we choose from regard to\nits ulterior consequences. 3. That which we choose on both\ngrounds, both as immediately attractive and as ultimately\nbeneficial), it belongs to the last variety: whereas the opponents\nwhom he impugns referred it to the second.\n\n[Footnote 36: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 367 B. [Greek: ei) ga\\r m\u00ea\\\na)phair\u00ea/seis e(kate/r\u00f4then] (_i.e._ both from justice and\nfrom injustice) [Greek: ta\\s a)l\u00eathei=s, ta\\s de\\ pseudei=s\nprosth\u00ea/seis, ou) to\\ di/kaion ph\u00ea/somen e)painei=n se, a)lla\\ to\\\ndokei=n, ou)de\\ to\\ a)/dikon ei)=nai pse/gein, a)lla\\ to\\ dokei=n,\nkai\\ parakeleu/esthai a)/dikon o)/nta lantha/nein], &c.]\n\n[Side-note: Statement of the real issue between him and his\nopponents.]\n\nHere the point at issue between the two sides is expressly set\nforth. Both admit that Justice is a Bonum--both of them looking at\nthe case with reference only to the agent himself. But the\nopponents contend, that it is Bonum (with reference to the agent)\nonly through its secondary effects, and noway Bonum or attractive\nin its primary working: being thus analogous to medical treatment\nor gymnastic discipline, which men submit to only for the sake of\nulterior benefits. On the contrary, Plato maintained that it is\ngood both in its primary and secondary effects: good by reason of\nthe ulterior benefits which it confers, but still better and more\nattractive in its direct and primary effect: thus combining the\npleasurable and the useful, like a healthy constitution and\nperfect\nsenses. Both parties agree in recognising justice as a good: but\nthey differ in respect of the grounds on which, and the mode in\nwhich, it is good.\n\n[Side-note: He himself misrepresents this issue--he\ndescribes his opponents as enemies of justice.]\n\nSuch is the issue as here announced by Plato himself: and the\nannouncement deserves particular notice because the Platonic\nSokrates afterwards, in the course of his argument, widens and\nmisrepresents the issue: ascribing to his opponents the invidious\npost of enemies who defamed justice and recommended injustice,\nwhile he himself undertakes to counterwork the advocates of\ninjustice, and to preserve justice from unfair calumny[37]--thus\nprofessing to be counsel for Justice _versus_ Injustice. Now\nthis is not a fair statement of the argument against which\nSokrates is contending. In that argument, justice was admitted to\nbe a Good, but was declared to be a Good of that sort which is\nlaborious and irksome to the agent in the primary proceedings\nrequired from him--though highly beneficial and indispensable to\nhim by reason of its ulterior results: like medicine, gymnastic\ndiscipline, industry,[38] &c. Whether this doctrine be correct\nor not, those who hold it cannot be fairly described as\nadvocates of injustice and enemies of Justice:[39] any more than\nthey are enemies of medicine, gymnastic discipline, industry,\n&c., which they recommend as good and indispensable, on the\nsame grounds as they recommend justice.\n\n[Footnote 37: Plato, Repub. ii. p. 368 B-C. [Greek: de/doika ga\\r\nm\u00ea\\ ou)d' o(/sion \u00ea)=| parageno/menon dikaiosu/n\u00ea| kak\u00eagoroume/n\u00ea|\na)pagoreu/ein kai\\ m\u00ea\\ bo\u00eathei=n, e)/ti e)mpne/onta kai\\\nduna/menon phthe/ggesthai.]]\n\n[Footnote 38: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 357-358.]\n\n[Footnote 39: In the lost treatise De Republic\u00e2 of Cicero, Philus,\none of the disputants, was introduced as spokesman of the\nmemorable discourse delivered by Karneades at Rome, said to have\nbeen against Justice, and in favour of Injustice--\"patrocinium\ninjustiti\u00e6\". L\u00e6lius replied to him, as \"_Justiti\u00e6 defensor_\".\nThe few fragments preserved do not enable us to appreciate the\nline of argument taken by Karneades: but as far as we can judge,\nit seems to have been very different from that which is assigned\nto Glaukon and Adeimantus in the Platonic Republic. See the\nFragments of the third book De Republic\u00e2 in Orelli's edition of\nCicero, pp. 460-467.]\n\nIt may suit Plato's purpose, when drawing up an argument which he\nintends to refute, to give to it the colour of being a panegyric\nupon injustice: but this is no real or necessary part of the\nopponent's case. Nevertheless the commentators on Plato bring it\nprominently forward. The usual programme affixed to the Republic\nis--Plato, the defender of Justice, against Thrasymachus and the\nSophists, advocates and panegyrists of Injustice. How far the real\nThrasymachus may have argued in the slashing and offensive style\ndescribed in the first book of the Republic, we have no means of\ndeciding. But the Sophists are here brought in as assumed\npreachers of injustice, without any authority either from Plato or\nelsewhere: not to mention the impropriety of treating the Sophists\nas one school with common dogmas. Glaukon (as I have already\nobserved) announces the doctrine against which Sokrates contends,\nnot as a recent corruption broached by the Sophists, but as the\ngenerally received view of Justice: held by most persons, repeated\nby the poets from ancient times downwards, and embodied by fathers\nin lessons to their children: Sokrates farther declares the\ndoctrine which he himself propounds to be propounded for the first\ntime.[40]\n\n[Footnote 40: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 358 A. [Greek: Ou) toi/nun\ndokei= _toi=s polloi=s_, a)lla\\ tou= e)pipo/nou ei)/dous],\n&c. 358 C-D: [Greek: a)kou/\u00f4n Thrasuma/chou kai\\ muri/\u00f4n\na)/ll\u00f4n. to\\n de\\ u(pe\\r t\u00ea=s dikaiosu/n\u00eas lo/gon ou)deno/s p\u00f4\na)k\u00ea/koa \u00f4(s bou/lomai.] 362 E-364: [Greek: le/gousi de/ pou kai\\\nparakeleu/ontai pate/res te ui(e/si kai\\ pa/ntes oi(/ tin\u00f4n\nk\u00eado/menoi], &c.--[Greek: tou/tois de\\ pa=si toi=s lo/gois\nma/rturas poi\u00eata\\s e)pa/gontai] (p. 364 C). Also p. 366 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Farther arguments of Plato in support of his\nthesis. Comparison of three different characters of men.]\n\nOver and above the analogy between the just commonwealth and the\njust individual, we find two additional and independent arguments,\nto confirm the proof of the Platonic thesis, respecting the\nhappiness of the just man. Plato distributes mankind into three\nvarieties. 1. He in whom Reason is preponderant--the\nphilosopher. 2. He in whom Energy or Courage is preponderant--the\nlover of dominion and superiority--the ambitious man. 3. He in\nwhom Appetite is preponderant--the lover of money. Plato considers\nthe two last as unjust men, contrasting them with the first, who\nalone is to be regarded as just.\n\nThe language of Plato in arguing this point is vague, and requires\nto be distinguished before we can appreciate the extent to which\nhe has made out his point. At one time, he states his conclusion\nto the effect--That the man who pursues and enjoys the pleasures\nof ambition or enrichment, but only under the conditions and\nlimits which reason prescribes, is happier than he who pursues\nthem without any such controul, and who is the slave of violent\nand ungovernable impulses.[41] This is undoubtedly true.\n\n[Footnote 41: Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 586-587.]\n\nBut elsewhere Plato puts his thesis in another way. He compares\nthe pleasures of the philosopher, arising from intellectual\ncontemplation and the acquisition of knowledge--with the pleasures\nof the ambitious man and the money-lover, in compassing their\nrespective ends, the attainment of power and wealth. If you ask\n(says Plato) each of these three persons which is the best and\nmost pleasurable mode of life, each will commend his own: each\nwill tell you that the pleasures of his own mode of life are the\ngreatest, and that those of the other two are comparatively\nworthless.[42] But though each thus commends his own, the judgment\nof the philosopher is decidedly the most trustworthy of the three.\nFor the necessities of life constrain the philosopher to have some\nexperience of the pleasures of the other two, while they two are\naltogether ignorant of his: moreover, the comparative estimate\nmust be made by reason and intelligent discussion, which is his\nexclusive prerogative. Therefore, the philosopher is to be taken\nas the best judge, when he affirms that his pleasures are the\ngreatest, in preference to the other two.[43] To establish this\nsame conclusion, Plato even goes a step farther. No pleasures,\nexcept those peculiar to the philosopher, are perfectly true and\ngenuine, pure from any alloy or mixture of pain. The\npleasures of the ambitious man, and of the money-lover, are\nuntrue, spurious, alloyed with pain and for the most part mere\nriddances from pain--appearing falsely to be pleasures by contrast\nwith the antecedent pains to which they are consequent. The\npleasures of the philosophic life are not preceded by any pains.\nThey are mental pleasures, having in them closer affinity with\ntruth and reality than the corporeal: the matter of knowledge,\nwith which the philosophising mind is filled and satisfied, comes\nfrom the everlasting and unchangeable Ideas and is thus more akin\nto true essence and reality, than the perishable substances which\nrelieve bodily hunger and thirst.[44]\n\n[Footnote 42: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 581 C-D.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 582-583.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 585-586.]\n\n[Side-note: His arguments do not go to the point which he\nprofesses to aim at.]\n\nIt is by these two lines of reasoning, and especially by the last,\nthat Plato intends to confirm and place beyond dispute the triumph\nof the just man over the unjust.[45] He professes to have\nsatisfied the requirement of Glaukon, by proving that the just man\nis happy by reason of his justice--_quand m\u00eame_--however he\nmay be esteemed or dealt with either by Gods or men. But even if\nwe grant the truth of his premisses, no such conclusion can be\nelicited from them. He appears to be successful only because he\nchanges the terminology, and the state of the question. Assume it\nto be true, that the philosopher, whose pleasures are derived\nchiefly from the love of knowledge and of intellectual\nacquisitions, has a better chance of happiness than the ambitious\nor the money-loving man. This I believe to be true in the main,\nsubject to many interfering causes--though the manner in which\nPlato here makes it out is much less satisfactory than the\nhandling of the same point by Aristotle after him.[46] But when\nthe point is granted, nothing is proved about the just and the\nunjust man, except in a sense of those terms peculiar to Plato\nhimself.\n\n[Footnote 45: Plato, Republic, ix. p. 583 B. [Greek: Tau=ta me\\n\ntoi/nun ou)/t\u00f4 du/' e)phex\u00ea=s a)\\n ei)/\u00ea kai\\ di\\s nenik\u00eak\u00f4\\s o(\ndi/kaios to\\n a)/dikon; to\\ de\\ tri/ton . . . tou=t' a)\\n ei)/\u00ea\nme/gisto/n te kai\\ kuri\u00f4/taton t\u00f4=n pt\u00f4ma/t\u00f4n.]]\n\n[Footnote 46: Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. i. 5, p. 1095 b, 1096 a, x.\n6-9, pp. 1176-1179.]\n\nNor indeed is Plato's conclusion proved, even in his own sense of\nthe words. He identifies the just man with the philosopher or man\nof reason--the unjust man with the pursuer of power or wealth.\nNow, even in this Platonic meaning, the just man or\nphilosopher cannot be called happy _quand m\u00eame_: he\nrequires, as one condition of his happiness, a certain amount of\nservice, forbearance, and estimation, on the part of his fellows.\nHe is not completely self-sufficing, nor can any human being be\nso.\n\n[Side-note: Exaggerated parallelism between the Commonwealth\nand the individual man.]\n\nThe confusion, into which Plato has here fallen, arises mainly\nfrom his exaggerated application of the analogy between the\nCommonwealth and the Individual: from his anxiety to find in the\nindividual something like what he notes as justice in the\nCommonwealth: from his assimilating the mental attributes of each\nindividual, divisible only in logical abstraction,--to the really\ndistinct individual citizens whose association forms the\nCommonwealth.[47] It is only by a poetical or rhetorical metaphor\nthat you can speak of the several departments of a man's mind, as\nif they were distinct persons, capable of behaving well or ill\ntowards each other. A single man, considered without any reference\nto others, cannot be either just or unjust. \"The just man\"\n(observes Aristotle, in another line of argument), \"requires\nothers, towards whom and with whom he may behave justly.\"[48] Even\nwhen we talk by metaphor of a man being just towards himself,\nreference to others is always implied, as a standard with which\ncomparison is taken.\n\n[Footnote 47: Plato, Republic, i. pp. 351 C, 352 C. [Greek: ou)\nga\\r a)\\n a)pei/chonto a)ll\u00ea/l\u00f4n komid\u00ea=| o)/ntes a)/dikoi, a)lla\\\nd\u00ea=lon o(/ti e)n\u00ea=n tis au)toi=s dikaiosu/n\u00ea, \u00ea(\\ au)tou\\s\ne)poi/ei m\u00ea/ toi kai\\ a)ll\u00ea/lous ge kai\\ e)ph' ou(\\s \u00ea)/|esan\na(/ma a)dikei=n, di' \u00ea(\\n e)/praxan a(\\ e)/praxan, \u00f4(/rm\u00easan de\\\ne)pi\\ ta\\ a)/dika a)diki/a| \u00ea(mimo/chth\u00earoi o)/ntes], &c.\n\nWe find the same sentiment in the Opera et Dies of Hesiod, 275,\ncontrasting human society with animal life:--\n\n[Greek: i)/chthusi me\\n kai\\ th\u00earsi\\ kai\\ oi)\u00f4noi=s pete\u00ea/nois\ne)/sthein a)ll\u00ea/lous, e)pei\\ ou) di/k\u00ea e)sti\\n e)n au)toi=s;\na)nthr\u00f4/poisi d' e)/d\u00f4ke (Zeu\\s) di/k\u00ean, \u00ea(\\ pollo\\n a)ri/st\u00ea\ngi/netai.]]\n\n[Footnote 48: Aristotel. Ethic. Nikomach. x. 7. [Greek: o(\ndi/kaios dei=tai pro\\s ou(\\s dikaioprag\u00ea/sei, kai\\ meth' \u00f4(=n.]]\n\n[Side-note: Second Argument of Plato to prove the happiness\nof the just man--He now recalls his previous concession, and\nassumes that the just man will receive just treatment and esteem\nfrom others.]\n\nIn the main purpose of the Republic, therefore--to prove that the\njust man is happy in his justice, and the unjust miserable in his\ninjustice, whatever supposition may be made as to consequent\nesteem or treatment from Gods or men--we cannot pronounce Plato to\nhave succeeded. He himself indeed speaks with triumphant\nconfidence of his own demonstration. Yet we find him at the close\nof the dialogue admitting that he had undertaken the defence of a\nposition unnecessarily difficult. \"I conceded to you\" (he\nsays) \"for argument's sake that the just man should be accounted\nunjust, by Gods as well as men, and that the unjust man should be\naccounted just. But this is a concession which I am not called\nupon to make; for the real fact will be otherwise. I now compare\nthe happiness of each, assuming that each has the reputation and\nthe treatment which he merits from others. Under this supposition,\nthe superior happiness of the just man over the unjust, is still\nmore manifest and undeniable.\"[49]\n\n[Footnote 49: Plato, Republic, x. pp. 612-613.]\n\nPlato then proceeds to argue the case upon this hypothesis, which\nhe affirms to be conformable to the reality. The just man will be\nwell-esteemed and well-treated by men: he will also be favoured\nand protected by the Gods, both in this life and after this life.\nThe unjust man, on the contrary, will be ill-esteemed and\nill-treated by men: he will farther be disapproved and punished by\nthe Gods, both while he lives and after his death. Perhaps for a time\nthe just man may seem to be hardly dealt with and miserable the\nunjust man to be prosperous and popular but in the end, all this\nwill be reversed.[50]\n\n[Footnote 50: Plato, Republic, x. p. 613.]\n\nThe second line of argument is essentially different from the\nfirst. Plato dispatches it very succinctly, in two pages: while in\ntrying to prove the first, and in working out the very peculiar\ncomparison on which his proof rests, he had occupied the larger\nportion of this very long treatise.\n\nIn the first line of argument, justice was recommended as\nimplicated with happiness _per se_ or absolutely--_quand\nm\u00eame_--to the agent: injustice was discouraged, as implicated\nwith misery. In the second line, justice is recommended by reason\nof its happy ulterior consequences to the agent: injustice is\ndissuaded on corresponding grounds, by reason of its miserable\nulterior consequences to the agent.\n\nIt will be recollected that this second line of argument is the\nsame as that which Glaukon described as adopted by parents and by\nother monitors, in discourse with pupils. Plato therefore here\nadmits that their exhortations were founded on solid grounds;\nthough he blames them for denying or omitting the\nannouncement, that just behaviour conferred happiness upon\nthe agent by its own efficacy, apart from all consequences. He\nregards the happiness attained by the just man, through the\nconsequent treatment by men and Gods, as real indeed,--but as only\nsupplemental and secondary, inferior in value to the happiness\ninvolved in the just behaviour _per se_.\n\nIn this part of the argument, too, as well as in the former, we\nare forced to lament the equivocal meaning of the word\n_justice_: and to recollect the observation of Plato at the\nclose of the first book, that those who do not know what justice\nis, can never determine what is to be truly predicated of it, and\nwhat is not.[51] If by the just man he means the philosopher, and\nby the unjust man the person who is not a philosopher,--he has\nhimself told us before, that in societies as actually constituted,\nthe philosopher enjoys the minimum of social advantages, and is\neven condemned to a life of insecurity; while the unphilosophical\nmen (at least a certain variety of them) obtain sympathy, esteem,\nand promotion.[52]\n\n[Footnote 51: Plato, Republic, i. p. 354 B.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 492-494-495-497.]\n\nNow in this second line of argument, Plato holds a totally\ndifferent language respecting the way in which the just man is\ntreated by society. He even exaggerates, beyond what can be\nreasonably expected, the rewards accruing to the just man: who\n(Plato tells us), when he has become advanced in life and\nthoroughly known, acquires command in his own city if he chooses\nit, and has his choice among the citizens for the best matrimonial\nalliances: while the unjust man ends in failure and ignominy,\nincurring the hatred of every one and suffering punishment.[53]\nThis is noway consistent with Plato's previous description of the\nposition of the philosopher in actual society: yet nevertheless\nhis argument identifies the just man with the philosopher.\n\n[Footnote 53: Plato, Republic, x. p. 613 D-E.]\n\n[Side-note: Dependence of the happiness of the individual on\nthe society in which he is placed.]\n\nPlato appears so anxious to make out a triumphant case in favour\nof justice and against injustice, that he forgets not only the\nreality of things, but the main drift of his own previous\nreasonings. Nothing can stand out more strikingly, throughout this\nlong and eloquent treatise, than the difference between one\nsociety and another: the necessary dependence of every one's lot,\npartly indeed upon his own character, but also most\nmaterially upon the society to which he belongs: the impossibility\nof affirming any thing generally respecting the result of such and\nsuch dispositions in the individual, until you know the society of\nwhich he is a member, as well as his place therein. Hence arises\nthe motive for Plato's own elaborate construction--a new society\nupon philosophical principles. This essentially relative point of\nview pervades the greater part of his premisses, and constitutes\nthe most valuable part of them.\n\nWhether the commonwealth as a whole, assuming it to be once\nerected, would work as he expects, we will not here enquire. But\nit is certain that the commonwealth and the individuals are\nessential correlates of each other; and that the condition of each\nindividual must be criticised in reference to the commonwealth in\nwhich he is embraced. Take any member of the Platonic\nCommonwealth, and place him in any other form of government, at\nAthens, Syracuse, Sparta, &c.--immediately his condition, both\nactive and passive, is changed. Thus the philosophers, for whom\nPlato assumes unqualified ascendancy as the cardinal principle in\nhis system, become, when transferred to other systems, divested of\ninfluence, hated by the people, and thankful if they can obtain\neven security. \"The philosopher (says Plato) must have a community\nsuited to him and docile to his guidance: in communities such as\nnow exist, he not only has no influence as philosopher, but\ngenerally becomes himself corrupted by the contagion and pressure\nof opinions around him: this is the natural course of events, and\nit would be wonderful if the fact were otherwise.\"[54]\n\n[Footnote 54: Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 487-488-489 B, 497 B-C. 492\nC: [Greek: kai\\ ph\u00ea/sein ta\\ au)ta\\ tou/tois kala\\ kai\\ ai)schra\\\nei)=nai, kai\\ e)pit\u00eadeu/sein a(/per a)\\n ou(=toi, kai\\ e)/sesthai\ntoiou=ton?] Compare also ix. pp. 592 A, 494 A: [Greek: tou\\s\nphilosophou=ntas a)/ra a)na/gk\u00ea pse/gesthai u(p' au)t\u00f4=n (tou=\npl\u00ea/thous).] And vii. p. 517 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Inconsistency of affirming general positions\nrespecting the happiness of the just man, in all societies without\ndistinction.]\n\nAfter thus forcibly insisting upon the necessary correlation\nbetween the individual and the society, as well as upon the\nvariability and uncertainty of justice and injustice in different\nexisting societies[55]--Plato is inconsistent with himself in\naffirming, as an universal position, that the just man receives\nthe favour and good treatment of society, the unjust man, hatred\nand punishment.[56] You cannot decide this until you know in\nwhat society the just man is placed. In order to make him\ncomfortable, Plato is obliged to construct an imaginary society\nsuited to him: which would have been unnecessary, if you can\naffirm that he is sure to be well treated in every society.\n\n[Footnote 55: Plato, Republic, v. p. 479, vi. p. 493 C.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Plato, Republic, x. p. 613.]\n\n[Side-note: Qualified sense in which only this can be done.]\n\nThere is a sense indeed (different from what Plato intended), in\nwhich the proposition is both true, and consistent with his own\ndoctrine about the correlation between the individual and the\nsociety. When Plato speaks of the just or the unjust man, to whose\njudgment does he make appeal? To his own judgment? or to which of\nthe numerous other dissentient judgments? For that there were\nnumerous dissentient opinions on this point, Plato himself\ntestifies: a person regarded as just or unjust in one community,\nwould not be so regarded in another. All this ethical and\nintellectual discord is fully recognised as a fact, by Plato\nhimself: who moreover keenly felt it, when comparing his own\njudgment with that of the Athenians his countrymen. Such being the\nambiguity of the terms, we can affirm nothing respecting the just\nor the unjust man absolutely and generally--respecting justice or\ninjustice in the abstract: We cannot affirm any thing respecting\nthe happiness or misery of either, except with reference to the\nsentiments of the community wherein each is placed. Assuming their\nsentiments to be known, we may pronounce that any individual\ncitizen who is unjust _relatively to them_ (_i.e._, who\nbehaves in a manner which they account unjust), will be punished\nby their superior force, and rendered miserable: while any one who\nabstains from such behaviour, and conducts himself in a manner\nwhich they account just, will receive from them just dealing, with\na certain measure of trust, and esteem: Taken in this relative\nsense, we may truly say of the unjust man, that he will be\nunhappy; because displeasure, hatred, and punitory infliction from\nhis countrymen will be quite sufficient to make him so, without\nany other causes of unhappiness. Respecting the just man, we can\nonly say that he will be happy, so far as exemption from this\ncause of misery is concerned: but we cannot make sure that he\nwill be happy on the whole, because happiness is a product to\nwhich many different conditions, positive and negative, must\nconcur--while the serious causes of misery are efficacious, each\ntaken singly, in producing their result.\n\n[Side-note: Question--Whether the just man is orthodox or\ndissenter in his society?--important in discussing whether he is\nhappy.]\n\nMoreover, in estimating the probable happiness either of the just\n(especially taking this word _sensu Platonico_ as equivalent\nto _the philosophers_) or the unjust, another element must be\nincluded: which an illustrious self-thinking reasoner like Plato\nought not to have omitted. Does the internal reason and sentiment\nof the agent coincide with that of his countrymen, as to what is\njust and unjust? Is he essentially homogeneous with his countrymen\n(to use the language of Plato in the Gorgias[57]), a chip of the\nsame block? Or has he the earnest conviction that the commandments\nand prohibitions which they enforce upon him, on the plea of\npreventing injustice, are themselves unjust? Is he (like the\nphilosopher described by Plato among societies actually\nconstituted, or like Sokrates at Athens[58]) a conscientious\ndissenter from the orthodox creed--political, ethical, or\n\u00e6sthetical--received among his fellow-citizens generally? Does he\n(like Sokrates) believe himself to be inculcating useful and\nexcellent lessons, while his countrymen blame and silence him as a\ncorruptor of youth, and as a libeller of the elders?[59] Does he,\nin those actions which he performs either under legal restraint or\nunder peremptory unofficial custom, submit merely to what he\nregards as _civium ardor prava jubentium_, or as _vultus\ninstantis tyranni_?\n\n[Footnote 57: Plato, Gorgias, p. 513 B. [Greek: au)tophu\u00f4=s\no(/moios t\u00ea=| politei/a|], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 496-497. Plato, Gorgias, p.\n521 D.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Plato, Gorgias, p. 522 B. [Greek: e)a/n te/ ti/s me\n\u00ea)\\ ne\u00f4te/rous ph\u00ea=| diaphthei/rein a)porei=n poiou=nta, \u00ea)\\ tou\\s\npresbute/rous kak\u00eagorei=n le/gonta pikrou\\s lo/gous \u00ea)\\ i)di/a|\n\u00ea)\\ d\u00eamosi/a|, ou)/te to\\ a)l\u00eathe\\s e(/x\u00f4 ei)pei=n, o(/ti Dikai/\u00f4s\npa/nta tau=ta e)g\u00f4\\ le/g\u00f4 kai\\ pra/tt\u00f4 to\\ u(me/teron d\u00ea\\ tou=to,\n\u00f4)= a)/ndres dikastai/, ou)/te a)/llo ou)de/n; \u00f4(/ste i)/s\u00f4s, o(/,\nti a)\\n tu/ch\u00f4, tou=to pei/somai.]]\n\n[Side-note: Comparison of the position of Sokrates at\nAthens, with that of his accusers.]\n\nThis is a question essentially necessary to be answered, when we\nare called upon to affirm the general principle--\"That the just\nman is happy, and that the unjust man is unhappy\". Antipathy and\nill-treatment will be the lot of any citizen who challenges\nopinions which his society cherish as consecrated, or professes\nsuch as they dislike. Such was the fate of Sokrates himself\nat Athens. He was indicted as unjust and criminal ([Greek:\nA)dikei= S\u00f4kra/t\u00eas]), while his accusers, Anytus and Mel\u00eatus,\ncarried away the esteem and sympathy of their fellow-citizens\ngenerally, as not simply just men, but zealous champions of\njustice--as resisting the assailants of morality and religion, of\nthe political constitution, and of parental authority. How\nvehement was the odium and reprobation which Sokrates incurred\nfrom the majority of his fellow-citizens, we are assured by his\nown Apology[60] before the Dikasts. Now it is to every one a\nserious and powerful cause of unhappiness, to feel himself the\nobject of such a sentiment. Most men dread it so much, like the\nPlatonic Euthyphron, that they refrain from uttering, or at least\nare most reserved in communicating, opinions which are accounted\nheretical among their countrymen or companions.[61] The resolute\nand free-spoken Sokrates braved that odium; which, aggravated by\nparticular circumstances, as well as by the character of his own\ndefence, attained at last such a height as to bring about his\ncondemnation to death. That he was sustained in this unthankful\ntask by native force of character, conscientious persuasion, and\nbelief in the approbation of the Gods--is a fact which we should\nbelieve, even if he himself had not expressly told us so. But to\ncall him _happy_, would be a misapplication of the term,\nwhich no one would agree with Plato in making--least of all the\nfriends of Sokrates in the last months of his life. Besides, if we\nare to call Sokrates happy on these grounds, his accusers would be\nstill happier: for they had the same conscientious conviction, and\nthe same belief in the approbation of the Gods: while they enjoyed\nbesides the sympathy of their country men as champions of religion\nand morality.\n\n[Footnote 60: Plato, Apolog. Sokr. pp. 28 A. 37 D.\n\n[Greek: poll\u00ea/ moi a)pechthei/a ge/gone kai\\ pro\\s pollou/s],\n&c.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Plato, Euthyphron, p. 3 C-D. [Greek: A)th\u00eanai/ois\nga/r toi ou) spho/dra me/lei, a)/n tina deino\\n oi)/\u00f4ntai ei)=nai,\nm\u00ea\\ me/ntoi didaskaliko\\n t\u00ea=s au(tou= sophi/as; o(\\n d' a)\\n kai\\\na)/llous oi)/\u00f4ntai poiei=n toiou/tous, thumou=ntai, ei)/t' ou)=n\nphtho/n\u00f4|, ei)/te di' a)/llo ti.]\n\n_Euthyphr._ [Greek: Tou/tou me\\n pe/ri o(/p\u00f4s pote\\ pro\\s\ne)me\\ e)/chousin, ou) pa/nu e)pithum\u00f4= peirath\u00ea=nai.]\n\n_Sokrat._ [Greek: I)/s\u00f4s ga\\r su\\ me\\n dokei=s spa/nion\nseauto\\n pare/chein, kai\\ dida/skein ou)k e)the/lein t\u00ea\\n seautou=\nsophi/an], &c.]\n\n[Side-note: Imperfect ethical basis on which Plato has\nconducted the discussion in the Republic.]\n\nIn spite of all the charm and eloquence, therefore, which abounds\nin the Republic, we are compelled to declare that the Platonic\nSokrates has not furnished the solution required from him by\nGlaukon and Adeimantus: and that neither the first point (ix.\np. 580 D) nor the second point of his conclusion (x. p. 613) is\nadequately made out. The very grave ethical problem, respecting\nthe connexion between individual just behaviour and individual\nhappiness, is discussed in a manner too exclusively\nself-regarding, and inconsistent with that reciprocity which Plato\nhimself sets forth as the fundamental, generating, sustaining,\nprinciple of human society. If that principle of reciprocity is to\nbe taken as the starting-point, you cannot discuss the behaviour\nof any individual towards society, considered in reference to his\nown happiness, without at the same time including the behaviour of\nsociety towards him. Now Plato, in the conditions that he\nexpressly prescribes for the discussion,[62] insists on keeping\nthe two apart; and on establishing a positive conclusion about the\nfirst, without at all including the second. He rejects\nperemptorily the doctrine--\"That just behaviour is performed for\nthe good of others, apart from the agent\". Yet if society be, in\nthe last analysis (as Plato says that it is), an exchange of\nservices, rendered indispensable by the need which every one has\nof others--the services which each man renders are rendered _for\nthe good of others_, as the services which they render to him\nare rendered _for his good_. The just dealing of each man is,\nin the first instance, beneficial to others: in its secondary\nresults, it is for the most part beneficial to himself.[63] His\nunjust dealing, in like manner, is, in the first instance,\ninjurious to others: in its secondary results, it is for the most\npart injurious to himself. Particular acts of injustice may, under\ncertain circumstances, be not injurious, nay even beneficial, to\nthe unjust agent: but they are certain to be hurtful to\nothers: were it not so, they would not deserve to be branded as\ninjustice. I am required to pay a debt, for the benefit of my\ncreditor, and for the maintenance of a feeling of security among\nother creditors though the payment may impose upon myself severe\nprivation: indirectly, indeed, I am benefited, because the same\nlaw which compels me, compels others also to perform their\ncontracts towards me. The law (to use a phrase of Aristotle)\nguarantees just dealing by and towards each.[64] The Platonic\nThrasymachus, therefore, is right in so far as he affirms--That\ninjustice is _Malum Alienum_, and justice _Bonum\nAlienum_,[65] meaning that such is the direct and primary\ncharacteristic of each. The unjust man is one who does wrong to\nothers, or omits to render to others a service which they have a\nright to exact, with a view to some undue profit or escape of\ninconvenience for himself: the just man is one who abstains from\nwrong to others, and renders to others the full service which they\nhave a right to require, whatever hardship it may impose upon\nhimself. A man is called just or unjust, according to his conduct\ntowards others.\n\n[Footnote 62: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 367.]\n\n[Footnote 63: See the instructive chapter on the Moral Sense, in\nMr. James Mill's Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, ch.\nxxiii. vol. ii. p. 280.\n\n\"The actions from which men derive advantage have all been classed\nunder four titles--Prudence, Fortitude, Justice, Beneficence. . .\nWhen those names are applied to our own acts, the first two,\nPrudent and Brave, express acts which are useful _to\nourselves_, in the first instance: the latter two, Just and\nBeneficent, express acts which are useful _to others_, in the\nfirst instance. . . It is further to be remarked, that those acts\nof ours which are primarily useful to ourselves, are secondarily\nuseful to others; and those which are primarily useful to others,\nare secondarily useful to ourselves. Thus, it is by our own\nprudence and fortitude that we are best enabled to do acts of\njustice and beneficence to others. And it is by acts of justice\nand beneficence to others, that we best dispose them to do similar\nacts to us.\"]\n\n[Footnote 64: Aristot. Polit. iii. 9, 1280, b. 10, [Greek: o(\nno/mos sunth\u00ea/k\u00ea, kai\\ katha/per e)/ph\u00ea Luko/phr\u00f4n o( sophist\u00ea/s,\ne)ggu\u00eat\u00ea\\s a)ll\u00ea/lois t\u00f4=n dikai/\u00f4n.] Chrysippus also, writing\nagainst Plato, maintained that [Greek: a)diki/a] was essentially\n[Greek: pro\\s e(/teron, ou) pro\\s e(auto/n] (Plutarch, Stoic.\nRepugnant. c. 16, p. 1041 D).]\n\n[Footnote 65: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 367 C. [Greek: kai\\\no(mologei=n Thrasuma/ch\u00f4| o(/ti to\\ me\\n di/kaion, a)llo/trion\na)gatho/n, xumphe/ron tou= krei/ttonos; to\\ de\\ a)/dikon, au)t\u00f4=|\nme\\n xumphe/ron kai\\ lusitelou=n, t\u00f4=| de\\ \u00ea(/ttoni,\na)xu/mphoron.]]\n\n[Side-note: Plato in Republic is preacher, inculcating\nuseful beliefs--not philosopher, establishing scientific theory.\nState of Just and Unjust Man in the Platonic Commonwealth.]\n\nIn considering the main thesis of the Republic, we must look upon\nPlato as preacher--inculcating a belief which he thinks useful to\nbe diffused; rather than as philosopher, announcing general truths\nof human nature, and laying down a consistent, scientific, theory\nof Ethics. There are occasions on which even he himself seems to\naccept this character. \"If the fable of Kadmus and the dragon's\nteeth\" (he maintains) \"with a great many other stories equally\nimprobable, can be made matters of established faith, surely a\ndoctrine so plausible as mine, about justice and injustice, can be\neasily taught and accredited.\"[66] To ensure unanimous\nacquiescence, Plato would constrain all poets to proclaim and\nillustrate his thesis--and would prohibit them from uttering\nanything inconsistent with it.[67] But these or similar official\nprohibitions may be employed for the upholding of any creed,\nwhatever it be: and have been always employed, more or less, in\nevery society, for the upholding of the prevalent creed. Even in\nthe best society conceivable under the conditions of human life,\nassuming an ideal commonwealth in which the sentiments of\n_just_ and _unjust_ have received the most systematic,\nbeneficent, and rational embodiments, and have become engraven on\nall the leading minds--even then Plato's first assertion--That the\njust man is happy _quand m\u00eame_--could not be admitted without\nnumerous reserves and qualifications. Justice must still be done\nby each agent, not as a self-inviting process, but as an\nobligation entailing more or less of sacrifice made by him to the\nsecurity and comfort of others. Plato's second assertion--That the\nunjust man is miserable--would be more near the truth; because the\nideal commonwealth is assumed to be one in which the governing\nbody has both the disposition and the power to punish\ninjustice--and the discriminating equanimity, or absence of\nantipathies, which secures them against punishing anything else.\nThe power of society to inflict misery is far more extensive than\nits power of imparting happiness. But even thus, we have to recollect\nthat the misery of the unjust person arises not from his in justice\n_per se_, but from consequent treatment at the hands of others.\n\n[Footnote 66: See Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 663-664.\n\nGood and simple people, in the earlier times (says Plato) believed\nevery thing that was told them. They were more virtuous and just\nthen than they are now (Legg. iii. p. 679 C-E).]\n\n[Footnote 67: Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 661-662. Illustrated in the\nrigid and detailed censorship which he imposes on the poets in the\nRepublic, in the second and third books.\n\nIn the Legg., however, Plato puts his thesis in a manner less\nuntenable than in the Republic:--\"Neither to do wrong to others,\nnor to suffer wrong from others; this is the happiest condition\"\n(Legg. ii. p. 663 A). This is a very different proposition from\nthat which is defended in the Republic; where we are called upon\nto believe, that the man who acts justly will be happy, whatever\nmay be the conduct of others towards him.\n\nEpikurus laid down, as one of the doctrines in his [Greek: Ku/riai\nDo/xai] (see Diog. Laert. x. 150): [Greek: To\\ t\u00ea=s phu/se\u00f4s\ndi/kaion e)sti\\ su/mbolon tou= sumphe/rontos, ei)s to\\ m\u00ea\\\nbla/ptein a)ll\u00ea/lous m\u00eade\\ bla/ptesthai. O(/sa t\u00f4=n z\u00f4/|\u00f4n m\u00ea\\\n\u00ea)du/nato sunth\u00ea/kas poiei=sthai ta\\s u(pe\\r tou= m\u00ea\\ bla/ptein\na)/ll\u00eala m\u00eade\\ bla/ptesthai, pro\\s tau=ta ou)the/n e)stin ou)de\\\ndi/kaion ou)/de\\ a)/dikon. \u00d4(sau/t\u00f4s de\\ kai\\ t\u00f4=n e)thn\u00f4=n o(/sa\nm\u00ea\\ \u00ea)du/nato, \u00ea)\\ m\u00ea\\ e)bou/leto, ta\\s sunth\u00ea/kas poiei=sthai\nta\\s u(pe\\r tou= m\u00ea\\ bla/ptein a)ll\u00ea/lous m\u00eade\\ bla/ptesthai],\n&c.\n\nLucretius expresses the same--v. 1020:--\n\n\"Tunc et amicitiam coeperunt jungere aventes\n\"Finitimi inter se nec _l\u00e6dere nec violari_,\" &c.]\n\n[Side-note: Comparative happiness of the two in actual\ncommunities. Plato is dissatisfied with it--This is his motive for\nrecasting society on his own principles.]\n\nThus much for the Platonic or ideal commonwealth. But when we pass\nfrom that hypothesis into the actual world, the case becomes far\nstronger against the truth of both Plato's assertions. Of\nactual societies, even the best have many imperfections--the less\ngood, many attributes worse than imperfections:--\"_ob virtutes\ncertissimum exitium_\". The dissenter for the better, is liable\nto be crucified alongside of the dissenter for the worse: King\nNomos will tolerate neither.\n\n[Side-note: Confusion between the preacher and the\nphilosopher in the Platonic Republic.]\n\nPlato as a preacher holds one language: as a philosopher and\nanalyst, another. When he is exhorting youth to justice, or\ndissuading them from injustice, he thinks himself entitled to\ndepict the lot of the just man in the most fascinating colours,\nthat of the unjust man as the darkest contrast against\nit,--without any careful observance of the line between truth and\nfiction: the fiction, if such there be, becomes in his eyes a\n_pia fraus_, excused or even ennobled by its salutary\ntendency. But when he drops this practical purpose, and comes to\nphilosophise on the principles of society, he then proclaims\nexplicitly how great is the difference between society as it now\nstands, and society as it ought to be: how much worse is the\ncondition of the just, how much less bad that of the unjust (in\nevery sense of the words, but especially in the Platonic sense)\nthan a perfect commonwealth would provide. Between the\nexhortations of Plato the preacher, and the social analysis of\nPlato the philosopher, there is a practical contradiction, which\nis all the more inconvenient because he passes backwards and\nforwards almost unconsciously, from one character to the other.\nThe splendid treatise called the Republic is composed of both, in\nportions not easy to separate.\n\n[Side-note: Remarks on the contrast between ethical theory\nand ethical precepts.]\n\nThe difference between the two functions just mentioned--the\npreceptor, and the theorizing philosopher--deserves careful\nattention, especially in regard to Ethics. If I lay down a theory\nof social philosophy, I am bound to take in all the conditions and\ncircumstances of the problem: to consider the whole position of\neach individual in society, as an agent affecting the security and\ncomfort of others, and also as a person acted on by others, and\nhaving his security and comfort affected by their behaviour: as\nsubject to obligations or duties, in the first of the two\ncharacters--and as enjoying rights (_i.e._, having\nothers under obligation to him) in the second. This reciprocity of\nservice and need--of obligation and right--is the basis of social\ntheory: its two parts are in indivisible correlation: alike\nintegrant and co-essential. But when a preceptor delivers\nexhortations on conduct, it is not necessary that he should insist\nequally on each of the two parts. As a general fact of human\nnature, it is known that men are disposed _proprio motu_ to\nclaim their rights, but not so constantly or equally disposed to\nperform their obligations: accordingly, the preceptor insists upon\nthis second part of the case, which requires extraneous support\nand enforcement--leaving untouched the first part, which requires\nnone. But the very reason why the second part needs such support,\nis, because the performance of the obligation is seldom\nself-inviting, and often the very reverse: that is, because the\nPlatonic doctrine misrepresents the reality. The preceptor ought\nnot to indulge in such misrepresentation: he may lay stress\nespecially upon one part of the entire social theory, but he ought\nnot to employ fictions which deny the necessary correlation of the\nother omitted part. Many preceptors have insisted on the\nperformance of obligation, in language which seemed to imply that\nthey considered a man to exist only for the performance of\nobligation, and to have no rights at all. Plato in another way\nundermines equally the integrity of the social theory, when he\ncontends, that the performance of obligations alone, without any\nrights, is delightful _per se_, and suffices to ensure\nhappiness to the performer. Herein we can recognise only a\nwell-intentioned preceptor, narrowing and perverting the social\ntheory for the purpose of edification to his hearers.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVII.\n\nREPUBLIC--REMARKS ON THE PLATONIC COMMONWEALTH.\n\n\n[Side-note: Double purpose of the Platonic Republic--ethical\nand political.]\n\nIn my last Chapter, I discussed the manner in which Plato had\nendeavoured to solve the ethical problem urged upon him by Glaukon\nand Adeimantus. But this is not the entire purpose of the\nRepublic. Plato, drawing the closest parallel between the\nCommonwealth and the individual, seeks solution of the problem\nfirst in the former; because it is there (he says) written in\nlarger and clearer letters. He sketches the picture of a perfect\nCommonwealth--shows wherein its justice consists--and proves, to\nhis own satisfaction, that it will be happy in and through its\njustice--_per se_. This picture of a Commonwealth is\nunquestionably _one_ of the main purposes of the dialogue;\nserving as commencement--or more properly as intermediate\nstage--to the Tim\u00e6us and Kritias. Most critics have treated it\nas if it were the dominant and almost exclusive purpose. Aristotle,\nthe earliest of all critics, adverts to it in this spirit;\nnumbering Plato or the Platonic Sokrates among those who, not being\npractical politicians, framed schemes for ideal commonwealths,\nlike Phaleas or Hippodamus. I shall now make some remarks on the\npolitical provisions of the Platonic Commonwealth: but first I\nshall notice the very peculiar manner in which Plato discovers\ntherein the notions of Justice and Injustice.\n\n[Side-note: Plato recognises the generating principle of\nhuman society--reciprocity of need and service. Particular\ndirection which he gives to this principle.]\n\nThe Platonic Sokrates (as I remarked above) lays down as the\nfundamental, generating, principle of human society, the\nreciprocity of need and service, essentially belonging to human\nbeings: exchange of services is indispensable, because each man\nhas many wants more than he can himself supply, and thus\nneeds the services of others: while each also can contribute\nsomething to supply the wants of others. To this general principle\nPlato gives a peculiar direction. He apportions the services among\nthe various citizens; and he provides that each man shall be\nspecialised for the service to which he is peculiarly adapted, and\nconfined to that alone. No double man[1] is tolerated. How such\nspecialisation is to be applied in detail among the multitude of\ncultivators and other producers, Plato does not tell us. Each is\nto have his own employment: we know no more. But in regard to the\ntwo highest functions, he gives more information: first, the small\ncabinet of philosophical Elders,[2] Chiefs, or Rulers--artists in\nthe craft of governing, who supply professionally that necessity\nof the Commonwealth, and from whom all orders emanate: next, the\nbody of Guardians, Soldiers, Policemen, who execute the orders of\nthis cabinet, and defend the territory against all enemies.\nRespecting both of these, Plato carefully prescribes both the\neducation which they are to receive, and the circumstances under\nwhich they are to live. They are to be of both sexes intermingled,\nbut to know neither family nor property: they live together in\nbarrack, and with common mess, receiving subsistence and the means\nof decent comfort, but no more, from the producers: respecting\nsexual relations and births, I shall say more presently.\n\n[Footnote 1: Plato, Rep. iii. p. 397 E.]\n\n[Footnote 2: The principle laid down in the Protagoras will be\nremembered--[Greek: ei(=s e)/ch\u00f4n te/chn\u00ean polloi=s i(kano\\s\ni)di\u00f4/tais] (Protag. p. 322 D).]\n\n[Side-note: The four cardinal virtues are assumed as\nconstituting the whole of Good or Virtue, where each of these\nvirtues resides.]\n\nWhen Plato has provided thus much, he treats his city as already\nplanted and brought to consummation. He thinks himself farther\nentitled to proclaim it as perfectly good, and therefore as\nincluding the four constituent elements of Good: that is, as being\nwise, brave, temperate, just.[3] He then looks to find wherein\neach of these four elements resides: wisdom resides specially in\nthe cabinet of Rulers--courage specially in the\nGuardians--temperance and justice, in these two, but in the\nproducing multitude also. The two last virtues are universal in\nthe Commonwealth. Temperance consists in the harmony of opinion\nbetween the multitude and the two higher classes as to obedience:\nthe Guardians are as ready to obey as the Chiefs to command: the\nmultitude are also for the most part ready to obey--but should\nthey ever fail in obedience, the Guardians are prepared to lend\ntheir constraining force to the authority of the Chiefs. Having\nthus settled three out of the four elements of Good, which\nenumeration he assumes to be exhaustive--Plato assumes that what\nremains must be Justice. This remainder he declares to be--That\neach of the three portions of the Commonwealth performs its own\nwork and nothing else: and this is Justice. Justice and Temperance\nare thus common to all the three portions of the Commonwealth:\nwhile Wisdom and Prudence belong entirely to the Chiefs, and\nCourage entirely to the Guardians.\n\n[Footnote 3: Plato, Repub. iv. pp. 427 D-428 A. [Greek:\n\u00f4|kisme/n\u00ea me\\n toi/nun, \u00ea)=n d' e)g\u00f4/, \u00ea/d\u00ea a)/n soi\nei)/\u00ea, \u00f4)= pai= A)ri/st\u00f4nos, \u00ea( po/lis . . . Oi)=mai \u00ea(mi=n\nt\u00ea\\n po/lin, ei)/per o)rth\u00f4=s ge \u00f4/|kistai, _te/le\u00f4s\na)gath\u00ea\\n ei)=nai_. A)na/gk\u00ea, e)/ph\u00ea. D\u00ea=lon d\u00ea/, o(/ti\nsoph\u00ea/ t' e)sti\\ kai\\ a)ndrei/a kai\\ s\u00f4/phr\u00f4n kai\\ dikai/a.\nD\u00ea=lon. Ou)kou=n, o(/, ti a)\\n au)t\u00f4=n eu(/r\u00f4men e)n au)t\u00ea=|,\nto\\ u(po/loipon e)/stai to\\ ou)ch eu(r\u00eame/non?] &c.]\n\n[Side-note: First mention of these, as an exhaustive\nclassification, in ethical theory. Plato effaces the distinction\nbetween Temperance and Justice.]\n\nHere, for the first time in Ethical Theory, Prudence, Courage,\nTemperance, Justice, are assumed as an exhaustive enumeration of\nvirtues: each distinct from the other three, but all together\nincluding the whole of Virtue.[4] Through Cicero and others, these\nfour have come down as the cardinal virtues. From whom Plato\nderived it, I do not know: not certainly from the historical\nSokrates, who resolved the last three into the first.[5] Nor is it\nindeed in harmony with Plato's own view: for temperance and\njustice are substantially coincident, in his explanation of them\n(since he does not recognise the characteristic feature of\nJustice, as directly tending to the good of a person other than\nthe agent): and the line, by which he endeavours to part them, is\nobscure as well as unimportant. Schleiermacher--who admits that\nthe distinction drawn here between Temperance and Justice is\naltogether forced--supposes that Plato took up this quadruple\nclassification, because he found it already established in the\ncommon, non-theorising, consciousness.[6] If this be true, the\nreal distinction between Justice (as directly bearing on the\nrights of another person) and Temperance (as directly concerning\nonly the future happiness of the agent himself), which is one of\nthe most important distinctions in Ethics--must have been already\nfelt, without being formulated, in the common mind: and Plato, by\nretaining the two words, but effacing the distinction between the\ntwo, and giving a new meaning to Justice--took a step in the wrong\ndirection. He himself however tells us, that the definition, here\ngiven of Justice, is not his own; but that he had heard it\nenunciated by many others before him.[7] What makes this more\nremarkable is, That the same definition (to do your own business\nand not to meddle with other people's business) is what we read in\nthe Charmid\u00eas as delivered respecting Temperance, by Charmides\nand Kritias:[8] delivered by them, and afterwards pulled to pieces\nin cross-examination by Sokrates. Herein we see farther proof how\nlittle distinction Plato drew between Justice and Temperance.\n\n[Footnote 4: Plat. Rep. iv. p. 432 B. [Greek: to\\ _de\\ d\u00ea\\\nloipo\\n ei)=dos_, di' o(\\ a)\\n e)/ti a)ret\u00ea=s mete/choi\npo/lis, ti/ pot' a)\\n ei)/\u00ea? d\u00ea=lon ga\\r o(/ti _tou=to/_\ne)stin \u00ea( _dikaiosu/n\u00ea_.]\n\nCompare p. 444 D, where he defines [Greek: A)ret\u00ea/--A)ret\u00ea\\ me\\n\na)/ra, \u00f4(s e)/oiken, u(gi/eia te/ tis a)\\n ei)/\u00ea kai\\ ka/llos\nkai\\ eu)exi/a psuch\u00ea=s; kaki/a de\\, no/sos te kai\\ ai)=schos kai\\\na)sthe/neia.]]\n\n[Footnote 5: Xenoph. Mem. iii. 9, 4-5. [Greek: sophi/an de\\ kai\\\ns\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ean ou) di\u00f4/rizen], &c.\n\nCompare the discussion of [Greek: s\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ea], iv. 5, 9-11,\nwhere Sokrates enforces the practice of it on the ground that it\nensured to a man both more pleasures and greater pleasures, of\nwhich he would deprive himself if he were foolish enough to be\nintemperate.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Schleiermacher, Einl. zum Staat, pp. 25-26. \"Dieser\nTadel trifft h\u00f6chstens die Aufstellung jener vier\nzusammengeh\u00f6rigen Tugenden; welche Platon offenbar genug nur mit\nrichtigem praktischen Sinne aus Ehrfurcht f\u00fcr das Bestehende\naufgenommen hat: wie sie denn schon auf dieselbe Weise aus dem\ngemeinen Gebrauch in die Lehrweise des Sokrates \u00fcbergegangen\nsind.\"]\n\n[Footnote 7: Plato, Repub. iv. p. 433 A. [Greek: kai\\ m\u00ea\\n o(/ti\nge to\\ ta\\ au(tou= pra/ttein kai\\ m\u00ea\\ polupragmonei=n\ndikaiosu/n\u00ea e)sti/, kai\\ tou=to _a)/ll\u00f4n te poll\u00f4=n\na)k\u00eako/amen_, kai\\ au)toi\\ polla/kis ei)r\u00ea/kamen.] Compare\niii. p. 406 E.]\n\n[Footnote 8: See Charmid\u00eas, pp. 161-162. Heindorf observes in his\nnote on this passage:--\"A _sophistis_ ergo vulgata h\u00e6c\n[Greek: s\u00f4phrosu/n\u00eas] definitio: ad _justitiam_ quoque ab\niisdem ut videtur, translata. Republ. iv. p. 433 (the passage\ncited in note preceding). Quo pertinent illa Ciceronis, De\nOfficiis, i. 9, 2. Item ad _prudentiam_, Aristot. Eth. Nicom.\nvi. 8, Philosopho vero hoc tribuit Sokrates, Gorgias, p. 526).\"\n\nThe definition given in the Charmid\u00eas appears plainly ascribed to\nKritias as its author (p. 162 D). The affirmation that it was \"a\nsophistis vulgata,\" and afterwards transferred by these same to\nJustice, is made without any authority produced; and is expressed\nin the language usual with the Platonic commentators, who treat\nthe Sophists as a philosophical sect or school.]\n\nFrom whomsoever Plato may have derived this ethical\nclassification--Virtue as a whole, distributed into four\nvarieties--1. Prudence or Knowledge--2. Courage or Energy--3.\nTemperance--4. Justice--we find it here placed in the foreground\nof his doctrine, respecting both the collective Commonwealth and\nthe individual man.[9] He professes to understand and explain\nwhat they are--to reason upon them all with confidence--and to\napply them to very important conclusions.\n\n[Footnote 9: In some of the Platonic Dialogues these four\nvarieties are not understood as exhausting the sum total of\nVirtue: [Greek: \u00ea( o(sio/t\u00eas] is included also; see Lach\u00eas, p.\n199 D, Protagoras, p. 329 D, Euthyphron, pp. 5-6. Plato does not\nadvert to [Greek: to\\ o(/sion] in the Republic as a separate\nconstituent, seemingly because on matters of piety he enjoins\ndirect reference to Apollo and the Delphian oracle (Rep. iv. p.\n427 B).]\n\n[Side-note: All the four are here assumed as certain and\ndeterminate, though in former dialogues they appear indeterminate\nand full of unsolved difficulties.]\n\nBut let us pause for a moment to ask, how these professions\nharmonise with the dialogues reviewed in my preceding volumes. No\nreader will have forgotten the doubts and difficulties, exposed by\nthe Sokratic Elenchus throughout the Dialogues of Search: the\nconfessed inability of Sokrates himself to elucidate them, while\nat the same time his contempt for the false persuasion of\nknowledge--for those who talk confidently about matters which they\ncan neither explain nor defend--is expressed without reserve. Now,\nwhen we turn to the Hippias Major, we find Sokrates declaring,\nthat no man can affirm, and that a man ought to be ashamed to\npretend to affirm, what particular matters are beautiful (fine,\nhonourable) or ugly (mean, base), unless he knows and can explain\nwhat Beauty is.[10] A similar declaration appears in the Menon,\nwhere Sokrates treats it as absurd to affirm or deny any predicate\nrespecting a Subject, until you have satisfied yourself that you\nknow what the Subject itself is: and where he farther proclaims,\nthat as to Virtue, he does not know what it is, and that he has\nnever yet found any one who _did_ know.[11] Such ignorance is\nstated at the end of the dialogue not less emphatically than at\nthe beginning. Again, respecting the four varieties or parts of\nVirtue. The first of the four, Prudence--(Wisdom--Knowledge)--has\nbeen investigated in the The\u00e6t\u00eatus--one of the most elaborate of\nall the Platonic dialogues: several different explanations of it\nare proposed by The\u00e6t\u00eatus, and each is shown by Sokrates to be\nuntenable; the problem remains unsolved at last. As to Courage and\nTemperance, we have not been more fortunate. The Lach\u00eas and\nCharmid\u00eas exhibit nothing but a fruitless search both for one and\nfor the other. And here the case is more remarkable; because in\nthe Lach\u00eas, one of the several definitions of Courage,\ntendered to Sokrates and refuted by him, is, the very definition\nof Courage delivered by him in the Republic as complete and\nsatisfactory: while in the Charmid\u00eas, one of the definitions of\nTemperance, refuted, and even treated as scarcely intelligible, by\nSokrates ([Greek: to\\ pra/ttein ta\\ e(autou=]) is the same as that\nwhich Sokrates in the Republic relies on as a valid definition of\nJustice.[12] Lastly, every one who has read the Parmenid\u00eas, will\nremember the acute objections there urged against the Platonic\nhypothesis of substantive Ideas, participated in by particulars:\nof which objections no notice is taken in the Republic, though so\nmuch is said therein about these Ideas, in regard to the training\nof the philosophical Chiefs.\n\n[Footnote 10: Plat. Hipp. Maj. pp. 286 D, 304 C.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Plato, Menon, pp. 71 B-C, 86 B, 100 B.]\n\n[Footnote 12: See Lach\u00eas p. 195 A. [Greek: t\u00ea\\n t\u00f4=n dein\u00f4=n\nkai\\ thar)r(ale/\u00f4n e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ean], pp. 196 C-199 A-E--in the\ncross-examination of Nikias by Sokrates: and the question in the\ncross-examination of Lach\u00eas (who has defined Courage to be\n[Greek: \u00ea( phro/nimos karteri/a]) put by Sokrates--[Greek: \u00ea(\n_ei)s ti/_ phro/nimos?] compared with Republic, iv. pp. 429\nC, 430 B, 433 C. See also Charmid\u00eas, pp. 161 B, 162 B-C, compared\nwith Republic, iv. p. 433 B-D.]\n\n[Side-note: Difficulties left unsolved, but overleaped by\nPlato.]\n\nIf we revert to these passages (and many others which might be\nproduced) of past dialogues, we shall find no means provided of\nharmonising them with the Republic. The logical and ethical\ndifficulties still exist: they have never been elucidated: the\nRepublic does not pretend to elucidate them, but overlooks or\noverleaps them. In composing it, Plato has his mind full of a\ndifferent point of view, to which he seeks to give full effect.\nWhile his spokesman Sokrates was leader of opposition, Plato\ndelighted to arm him with the maximum of negative cross-examining\nacuteness: but here Sokrates has passed over to the ministerial\nbenches, and has undertaken the difficult task of making out a\ncase in reply to the challenge of Glaukon and Adeimantus. No new\nleader of opposition is allowed to replace him. The splendid\nconstructive effort of the Republic would have been spoiled, if\nexposed to such an analytical cross-examination as that which we\nread in Menon, Lach\u00eas, or Charmid\u00eas.\n\n[Side-note: Ethical and political theory combined by Plato,\ntreated apart by Aristotle.]\n\nIn remarking upon the Platonic Republic as a political scheme\nonly, we pass from the Platonic point of view to the Aristotelian:\nthat is, to the discussion of Ethics and Politics as separate\nsubjects, though adjoining and partially overlapping each other.\nPlato conceives the two in intimate union, and even employs\nviolent metaphors to exaggerate the intimacy. Xenophon also\nconceives them in close conjunction. Aristotle goes farther in\nseparating the two: a great improvement in regard to the\nspeculative dealing with both of them.[13]\n\n[Footnote 13: The concluding chapter of the Nikomachean Ethics\ncontains some striking remarks upon this separation.]\n\n[Side-note: Platonic Commonwealth--only an outline--partially\nfilled up.]\n\nIf, following the example of Aristotle, we criticise the Platonic\nRepublic as a scheme of political constitution, we find that on\nmost points which other theorists handle at considerable length,\nPlato is intentionally silent. His project is an outline and\nnothing more. He delineates fully the brain and heart of the great\nLeviathan, but leaves the rest in very faint outline. He announces\nexplicitly the purpose of all his arrangements, to obtain\nhappiness for the whole city: by which he means, not happiness for\nthe greatest number of individuals, but for the abstract unity\ncalled the City, supposed to be capable of happiness or misery,\napart from any individuals, many or few, composing it.[14] Each\nindividual is to do the work for which he is best fitted,\ncontributory to the happiness of the whole--and to do nothing\nelse. Each must be content with such happiness as consists with\nhis own exclusive employment.[15]\n\n[Footnote 14: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 420-421. The objection that\nthe Guardians will have no happiness, is put by Plato into the\nmouth of Adeimantus, but is denied by Sokrates; who, however, says\nthat even if it were true he could not admit it as applicable,\nsince what he wishes is that the entire commonwealth shall be\nhappy. Aristotle (Politic. ii. 5, 1264, 6-15) repeats the\nobjection of Adeimantus, and declares that collective happiness\n(not enjoyed by some individuals) is impossible.\n\nSee the valuable chapter on Ideal Models in Politics (vol. ii. ch.\nxxii. p. 236 seq.) in Sir George Cornewall Lewis's Treatise on the\nmethods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics. The different\nideal models framed by theorists ancient and modern, Plato among\nthe number, are there collected, with judicious remarks in\ncomparing and appreciating them.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 421 C.\n\nHe lays down this minute sub-division and speciality of aptitude\nin individuals as a fundamental property of human nature. Repub.\niii. p. 395 B, [Greek: kai\\ e)/ti ge tou/t\u00f4n phai/netai/ moi ei)s\nsmikro/tera katakekermati/sthai \u00ea( tou= a)nthr\u00f4/pou phu/sis],\n&c.\n\nCompare Xenophon, Cyrop\u00e6d. ii. 1, 21, where the same principle is\nlaid down. Another passage in the same treatise (Cyrop\u00e6d. viii. 2,\n5) is also interesting. Xenophon there contrasts the smaller\ntowns, where many trades were combined in the same hand and none\nof the works well performed, with the larger towns, where there\nwas a minuter subdivision of labour, each man doing one work only,\nand doing it well.]\n\n[Side-note: Absolute rule of a few philosophers--Careful and\npeculiar training of the Guardians.]\n\nThe Chiefs or Rulers are assumed to be both specially qualified\nand specially trained for the business of governing. Their\nauthority is unlimited: they represent that One Infallible\nWise Man, whom Plato frequently appeals to (in the Politikus,\nKriton, Gorgias, and other dialogues), but never names. They are a\nvery small number, perhaps only one: the persons naturally\nqualified being very few, and even they requiring the severest\npreparatory training. The Guardians, all of them educated up to a\nconsiderable point, both obey themselves the orders of these few\nChiefs, and enforce obedience upon the productive multitude. Of\nthis last-mentioned multitude, constituting numerically almost the\nwhole city, we hear little or nothing: except that the division of\nlabour is strictly kept up among them, and that neither wealth nor\npoverty is allowed to grow up.[16] How this is to be accomplished,\nPlato does not point out: nor does he indicate how the mischievous\nworking (_i.e._, mischievous, in his point of view, and as he\ndeclares it) of the proprietary and the family relations is to be\nobviated. His scheme tacitly assumes that separate property and\nfamily are to subsist among the great mass of the community, but\nnot among the Guardians: he proclaims explicitly, that if the\nproprietary relations or the family relations were permitted among\nthe Guardians, entire corruption of their character would\nensue.[17] Among the Demos or multitude, he postulates nothing\nexcept unlimited submission to the orders of the Rulers enforced\nthrough the Guardians. The regulative powers of the Rulers are\nassumed to be of omnipotent efficacy against every cause of\nmischief, subject only to one condition--That the purity of the\ngolden breed, together with the Platonic training and discipline,\nare to be maintained among them unimpaired.\n\n[Footnote 16: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 421.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 417.]\n\nEverything in the Platonic Republic turns upon this elaborate\ntraining of the superior class: most of all, the Chiefs or\nRulers--next, the Soldiers or Guardians. Besides this training, they\nare required to be placed in circumstances which will prevent them\nfrom feeling any private or separate interest of their own, apart\nfrom or adverse to that of the multitude. \"Every man\" (says Plato)\n\"will best love those whose advantage he believes to coincide with\nhis own, and when he is most convinced that **if they do well, he\nhimself will do well also: if not, not.\"[18] \"The Rulers\nmust be wise, powerful, and affectionately solicitous for the\ncity.\"\n\n[Footnote 18: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 412 D.\n\n[Greek: Kai\\ me\\n tou=to/ g' a)\\n ma/lista philoi=, \u00f4(=|\nxumphe/rein \u00ea(goi=to ta\\ au)ta\\ kai\\ e(aut\u00f4=|, kai\\ o(/tan\nma/lista e)kei/nou me\\n eu)= pra/ttontos oi)/\u00eatai xumbai/nein\nkai\\ e(aut\u00f4=| eu)= pra/ttein, m\u00ea\\ de/, tou)nanti/on.]\n\nCompare v. pp. 463-464.]\n\nThese then are the two circumstances which Plato works out: The\nEducation of the Rulers and Guardians: Their position and\ncircumstances in regard to each other and to the remaining\nmultitude. He does not himself prescribe, or at least he\nprescribes but rarely, what is to be enacted or ordered. He\ncreates the generals and the soldiers; he relies upon the former\nfor ordering, upon the latter for enforcing, aright.\n\n[Side-note: Comparison of Plato with\nXenophon--Cyrop\u00e6dia--OEconomicus.]\n\nOn this point we may usefully compare him with his contemporary\nXenophon. He, like Plato, presents himself to mankind as a\npreceptor or schoolmaster, rather than as a lawgiver. Most Grecian\ncities (he remarks) left the education of youth in the hands of\nparents, and permitted adults to choose their own mode of life,\nsubject only to the necessity of obeying the laws: that is, of\nabstaining from certain defined offences, and of performing\ncertain defined obligations--under penalties if such obedience\nwere not rendered. From this mode of proceeding Xenophon dissents,\nand commends the Spartan Lawgiver Lykurgus for departing from\nit.[19] To regulate public matters, without regulating the private\nlife of the citizens, appeared to him impossible.[20] At Sparta,\nthe citizen was subject to authoritative regulation, from\nchildhood to old age. In the public education, or in the public\ndrill, he was constantly under supervision, going through\nprescribed exercises. This produced, according to Xenophon, \"a\ncity of pre-eminent happiness\". He proclaims and follows out the\nsame peculiar principle, in his ideal scheme of society called the\nPersian laws. He embodies in the Cyrop\u00e6dia the biography of a\nmodel chief, trained up from his youth in (what Xenophon calls)\nthe Persian system, and applying the virtues acquired therein to\nmilitary exploits and to the government of mankind. The Persian\npolity, in which the hero Cyrus receives his training, is\ndescribed. Instead of leaving individuals to their own free\nwill, except as to certain acts or abstinences specifically\nenjoined, this polity placed every one under a regimental\ntraining: which both shaped his character beforehand, so as to\nmake sure that he should have no disposition to commit\noffences[21]--and subjected him to perpetual supervision\nafterwards, commencing with boyhood and continued to old age,\nthrough the four successive stages of boys, youths, mature men,\nand elders.\n\n[Footnote 19: Xenophon, Rep. Laced\u00e6m. i. 2. [Greek: Lukou=rgos,\nou) mim\u00easa/menos ta\\s a)/llas po/leis, a)lla\\ kai\\ e)nanti/a\ngnou\\s tai=s plei/stais, proe/chousan eu)daimoni/a| t\u00ea\\n patri/da\na)pe/deixen.]]\n\n[Footnote 20: Compare Plato, Legg. vi. p. 780 A.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Xenophon, Cyrop. i. 2, 2-6. [Greek: Ou(=toi de\\\ndokou=sin oi( no/moi a)/rchesthai tou= koinou= a)gathou=\ne)pimelou/menoi ou)k e)/nthen o(/thenper e)n tai=s plei/stais\npo/lesin a)/rchontai. Ai( me\\n ga\\r plei=stai po/leis, a)phei=sai\npaideu/ein o(/p\u00f4s tis e)the/lei tou\\s e(autou= pai=das kai\\\nau)tou\\s tou\\s presbute/rous o(/p\u00f4s e)the/lousi dia/gein,\ne)/peita prosta/ttousin au)tou\\s m\u00ea\\ kle/ptein. . . . Oi( de\\\nPersikoi\\ no/moi prolabo/ntes e)pime/lontai o(/p\u00f4s t\u00ea\\n\na)rch\u00ea\\n m\u00ea\\ toiou=toi e)/sontai oi( poli=tai, oi(=oi pon\u00earou=\ntinos \u00ea)\\ ai)schrou= e)/rgou e)phi/esthai. E)pime/lontai de\\ d\u00ea\\\n\u00f4(=de.]]\n\n[Side-note: Both of them combine polity with\neducation--temporal with spiritual.]\n\nThis general principle of combining polity with education, is\nfundamental both with Plato and Xenophon: to a great degree, it is\nretained also by Aristotle. The lawgiver exercises a spiritual as\nwell as a temporal function. He does not content himself with\nprohibitions and punishments, but provides for fashioning every\nman's character to a predetermined model, through systematic\ndiscipline begun in childhood and never discontinued. This was the\ngeneral scheme, realised at Sparta in a certain manner and degree,\nand idealised both by Plato and Xenophon. The full application of\nthe scheme, however, is restricted, in all the three, to a select\nbody of qualified citizens; who are assumed to exercise dominion\nor headship over the remaining community.[22]\n\n[Footnote 22: In Xenophon all Persians are supposed to be legally\nadmissible to the public training; but in practice, none can\nfrequent it constantly except those whose families can maintain\nthem without labour; nor can any be received into the advanced\nstages, except those who have passed through the lower. Hence none\ngo really through the training except the Homotimoi.]\n\n[Side-note: Differences between them--Character of Cyrus.]\n\nThus far the general conception of Xenophon and Plato is similar:\nyet there are material differences between them. In Xenophon, the\nultimate purpose is, to set forth the personal qualities of Cyrus:\nto which purpose the description of the general training of the\ncitizens is preparatory, occupying only a small portion of the\nCyrop\u00e6dia, and serving to explain the system out of which Cyrus\nsprang. And the character of Cyrus is looked at in reference to\nthe government of mankind. Xenophon had seen governments, of\nall sorts, resisted and overthrown--despotisms, oligarchies,\ndemocracies. His first inference from these facts is, that man is\na very difficult animal to govern:--much more difficult than sheep\nor oxen. But on farther reflection he recognises that the problem\nis noway insoluble: that a ruler may make sure of ruling mankind\nwith their own consent, and of obtaining hearty\nobedience--provided that he goes to work in an intelligent manner.[23]\nSuch a ruler is described in Cyrus; who both conquered many distant\nand unconnected nations,--and governed them, when conquered,\nskilfully, so as to ensure complete obedience without any active\ndiscontent. The abilities and exploits of Cyrus thus step far\nbeyond the range of the systematic Persian discipline, though that\ndiscipline is represented as having first formed both his\ncharacter and that of his immediate companions. He is a despot\nresponsible to no one, but acting with so much sagacity, justice,\nand benevolence, that his subjects obey him willingly. His\nmilitary orders are arranged with the utmost prudence and\ncalculation of consequences. He promotes the friends who have gone\nthrough the same discipline with himself, to be satraps of the\nconquered provinces, exacting from them submission, and\ntribute-collection for himself, together with just dealing towards\nthe subjects. Each satrap is required to maintain his ministers,\nofficers, and soldiers around him under constant personal\ninspection, with habits of temperance and constant exercise in\nhunting.[24] These men and the Persians generally, constitute the\nprivileged class and the military force of the empire:[25] the\nother mass of subjects are not only kept disarmed, but governed as\n\"_gens tailleables et corv\u00e9ables_\". Moreover, besides\ncombining justice and personal activity with generosity and\nwinning manners, Cyrus does not neglect such ceremonial artifices\nand pomp as may impose on the imagination of spectators.[26] He\nkeeps up designedly not merely competition but mutual\njealousy and ill-will among those around him. And he is careful\nthat the most faithful among them shall be placed on his left hand\nat the banquet, because that side is the most exposed to\ntreachery.[27]\n\n[Footnote 23: Xenoph. Cyrop. i. 1,** 3. [Greek: \u00ea)/n tis\ne)pistame/n\u00f4s tou=to pra/tt\u00ea|.]\n\nCompare Xenoph. Economic. c. xxi. where [Greek: to\\ e)thelo/nt\u00f4n\na)/rchein] is declared to be a superhuman good, while [Greek: to\\\na)ko/nt\u00f4n turannei=n] is reckoned as a curse equivalent to that\nof Tantalus.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Xenophon, Cyrop\u00e6d. viii. 6, 1-10.]\n\n[Footnote 25: Xenoph. Cyrop. viii. 1, 43-45, viii. 6, 13, vii. 5,\n79. viii. 5, 24: [Greek: ei) de\\ su/, \u00f4)= Ku=re, e)parthei\\s\ntai=s parou/sais tu/chais, e)picheir\u00ea/seis kai\\ Pers\u00f4=n\n_a)/rchein e)pi\\ pleonexi/a|, \u00f4(/sper t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n_],\n&c.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Xenoph. Cyrop. viii. 1, 40. [Greek: a)lla\\ kai\\\nkatago\u00eateu/ein \u00f4)/|eto chr\u00ea=nai au)tou/s.] Also viii. 3, 1.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Xenoph. Cyrop. viii. 2, viii. 4, 3.]\n\n[Side-note: Xenophontic genius for command--Practical\ntraining--Sokratic principles applied in Persian training.]\n\nWhat is chiefly present to the mind of Xenophon is, a select\nfraction of citizens passing their whole lives in a regimental\ntraining like that of Laced\u00e6mon: uniformity of habits, exact\nobedience, the strongest bodily exercise combined with the\nsimplest nutritive diet, perfect command of the physical appetites\nand necessities, so that no such thing as spitting or blowing the\nnose is seen.[28] The grand purpose of the system, as at\nSparta,[29] is warlike efficiency: war being regarded as the\nnatural state of man. The younger citizens learn the use of the\nbow and javelin, the older that of the sword and shield. As war\nrequires not merely perfectly trained soldiers, but also the\ninitiative of a superior individual chief, so Xenophon assumes in\nthe chief of these men (like Agesilaus at Sparta) an unrivalled\ngenius for command. The Xenophontic Cyrus is altogether a\npractical man. We are not told that he learnt anything except in\ncommon with the rest. Neither he nor they receive any musical or\nliterary training. The course which they go through is altogether\nethical, gymnastical, and military. Their boyhood is passed in\nlearning justice and temperance,[30] which are made express\nsubjects of teaching by Xenophon and under express masters:\nXenophon thus supplies the deficiency so often lamented by the\nPlatonic Sokrates, who remarks that neither at Athens nor\nelsewhere can he find either teaching or teacher of justice. Cyrus\nlearns justice and temperance along with the rest,[31] but he does\nnot learn more than the rest: nor does Xenophon perform his\npromise of explaining by what education such extraordinary genius\nfor command is brought about.[32] The superior character of Cyrus\nis assumed and described, but noway accounted for: indeed his rank\nand position at the court of Astyages (in which he stands\ndistinguished from the other Persians) present nothing but\ntemptations to indulgence, partially countervailed by wise counsel\nfrom his father Kambyses. We must therefore consider Cyrus to be a\nking by nature, like the chief bee in each hive[33]--an untaught\nor self-taught genius, in his excellence as general and emperor.\nHe obtains only one adventitious aid peculiar to himself. Being of\ndivine progeny, he receives the special favour and revelations of\nthe Gods, who, in doubtful emergencies, communicate to him by\nsigns, omens, dreams, and sacrifices, what he ought to do and what\nhe ought to leave undone.[34] Such privileged communications are\nrepresented as indispensable to the success of a leader: for\nthough it was his duty to learn all that could be learnt, yet even\nafter he had done this, so much uncertainty remained behind, that\nhis decisions were little better than a lottery.[35] The Gods\narranged the sequences of events partly in a regular and\ndecypherable manner, so that a man by diligent study might come to\nunderstand them: but they reserved many important events for their\nown free-will, so as not to be intelligible by any amount of human\nstudy. Here the wisest man was at fault no less than the most\nignorant: nor could he obtain the knowledge of them except by\nspecial revelation solicited or obtained. The Gods communicated\nsuch peculiar knowledge to their favourites, but not to every one\nindiscriminately: for they were under no necessity to take care of\nmen towards whom they felt no inclination.[36] Cyrus was one of\nthe men thus specially privileged: but he was diligent in\ncultivating the favour of the Gods by constant worship, not\nmerely at times when he stood in need of their revelations, but at\nother times also: just as in regard to human friends or patrons,\nassiduous attentions were requisite to keep up their goodwill.[37]\n\n[Footnote 28: Xenoph. Cyrop. i. 2, 16, viii. 1, 42, viii. 8, 8. He\ninsists repeatedly upon this point. Compare a curious passage in\nthe Meditations of Marcus Antoninus, vi. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Plato, Legg. i. p. 626. Plutarch, Lykurg. 25.\nCompare Lykurg. and Num. c. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Xenophon, Cyrop. i. 2, 6-8.\n\nThe boys are appointed to adjudicate, under the supervision of the\nteacher, in disputes which occur among their fellows. As an\ninstance of this practice, we find the well-known adjudication by\nyoung Cyrus, between the great boy and the little boy, in regard\nto the two coats; and a very instructive illustration it is, of\nthe principle of property (Cyrop. i. 3, 17).]\n\n[Footnote 31: Xenoph. Cyrop. i. 3, 16, iii. 3, 35. Cyrus is indeed\nrepresented as having taken lessons from a paid teacher in the art\n[Greek: tou= strat\u00eagei=n]: but these lessons were meagre,\ncomprising nothing beyond [Greek: ta\\ taktika/], i. 6, 12-15.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Xenoph. Cyrop. i. 1, 6. [Greek: poi/a| tini\\\npaidei/a| paideuthei\\s tosou=ton di\u00ea/negken ei)s to\\ a)/rchein\na)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n.]]\n\n[Footnote 33: Xenoph. Cyrop. v. 1, 24. The queen-bee is masculine\nin Xenophon's conception.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Xenoph. Cyrop. viii. 7, 3, iv. 2, 15, iv. 1, 24.\nCompare Xenoph. Economic. v. 19-20.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Xenophon, Cyrop. i. 6, 46. [Greek: Ou(/t\u00f4s \u00ea(/ ge\na)nthr\u00f4pi/n\u00ea sophi/a ou)de\\n ma=llon oi)=de to\\ a)/riston\nai)rei=sthai, \u00ea)\\ ei) kl\u00earou/menos o(/, ti la/choi tou=to/ tis\npra/ttoi. Theoi\\ de\\ a)ei\\ o)/ntes pa/nta i)/sasi ta/ te\ngegen\u00eame/na kai\\ ta\\ o)/nta, kai\\ o(/, ti e)x e(ka/stou au)t\u00f4=n\na)pob\u00ea/setai; kai\\ _t\u00f4=n sumbouleuome/n\u00f4n_ a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n\n_oi(=s a)\\n i)le/\u00f4| \u00f4)=si_, pros\u00eamai/nousin a(/ te chr\u00ea\\\npoiei=n kai\\ a(/ ou) chr\u00ea/. Ei) de\\ m\u00ea\\ pa=sin e)the/lousi\nsumbouleu/ein, ou)de\\n thaumasto/n; ou) ga\\r a)na/gk\u00ea au)toi=s\ne)stin, \u00f4(=n a)\\n m\u00ea\\ the/l\u00f4sin, e)pimelei=sthai.]\n\nCompare i. 6, 6-23, also the Memorab. i. 1, 8, where the same\ndoctrine is ascribed to Sokrates.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Xenoph. Cyrop. i. 6, 46 ad fin.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Xenoph. Cyrop. i. 6, 3-5.]\n\nWhen it is desired to realise an ideal improvement of society\n(says Plato),[38] the easiest postulate is to assume a despot,\nyoung, clever, brave, thoughtful, temperate, and aspiring,\nbelonging to that superhuman breed which reigned under the\npresidency of Kronus. Such a postulate is assumed by Xenophon in\nhis hero Cyrus. The Xenophontic scheme, though presupposing a\ncollective training, resolves itself ultimately into the will of\nan individual, enforcing good regulations, and full of tact in\ndealing with subordinates. What Cyrus is in campaign and empire,\nIschomachus (see the Economica of Xenophon) is in the household:\nbut everything depends on the life of this distinguished\nindividual. Xenophon leads us at once into practice, laying only a\nscanty basis of theory.\n\n[Footnote 38: Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 709 E, 710-713.]\n\n[Side-note: Plato does not build upon an individual hero.\nPlatonic training compared with Xenophontic.]\n\nIn Plato's Republic, on the contrary, the theory predominates. He\ndoes not build upon any individual hero: he constructs a social\nand educational system, capable of self-perpetuation at least for\na considerable time.[39] He describes the generating and\nsustaining principles of his system, but he does not exhibit it in\naction, by any pseudo-historical narrative: we learn indeed, that\nhe had intended to subjoin such a narrative, in the dialogue\ncalled Kritias, of which only the commencement was ever\nwritten.[40] He aims at forming a certain type of character,\ncommon to all the Guardians: superadding new features so as\nto form a still more exalted type, peculiar to those few Elders\nselected from among them to exercise the directorial function. He\nnot only lays down the process of training in greater detail than\nXenophon, but he also gives explanatory reasons for most of his\nrecommendations.\n\n[Footnote 39: Plato pronounces Cyrus to have been a good general\nand a patriot, but not to have received any right education, and\nespecially to have provided no good education for his children,\nwho in consequence became corrupt and degenerate (Legg. iii. 694).\nUpon this remark some commentators of antiquity founded the\nsupposition of grudge or quarrel between Plato and Xenophon. We\nhave no evidence to prove such a state of unfriendly feeling\nbetween the two, yet it is no way unlikely: and I think it highly\nprobable that the remark just cited from Plato may have had direct\nreference to the Xenophontic Cyrop\u00e6dia. When we read the elaborate\nintellectual training which Plato prescribes for the rulers in his\nRepublic, we may easily understand that, in his view, the\nXenophontic Cyrus had received no right education at all. His\nremark moreover brings to view the defect of all schemes built\nupon a perfect despot--that they depend upon an individual life.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 20-26. Plato, Kritias, p. 108.]\n\nOne prominent difference between the two deserves to be noticed.\nIn the Xenophontic training, the ethical, gymnastic, and military,\nexigencies are carefully provided for: but the musical and\nintellectual exigencies are left out. The Xenophontic Persians are\nnot affirmed either to learn letters, or to hear and repeat\npoetry, or to acquire the knowledge of any musical instrument. Nor\ndoes it appear, even in the case of the historical Spartans, that\nletters made any part of their public training. But the Platonic\ntraining includes music and gymnastics as co-ordinate and equally\nindispensable. Words or intellectual exercises, come in under the\nhead of music.[41] Indeed, in Plato's view, even gymnastics,\nthough bearing immediately on the health and force of the body,\nhave for their ultimate purpose a certain action upon the mind;\nbeing essential to the due development of courage, energy,\nendurance, and self-assertion.[42] Gymnastics without music\nproduce a hard and savage character, insensible to persuasive\nagencies, hating discourse or discussion,[43] ungraceful as well\nas stupid. Music without gymnastics generates a susceptible\ntemperament, soft, tender, and yielding to difficulties, with\nquick but transient impulses. Each of the two, music and\ngymnastic, is indispensable as a supplement and corrective to the\nother.\n\n[Footnote 41: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 376 E.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 410 B. [Greek: pro\\s to\\\nthumoeide\\s t\u00ea=s phu/se\u00f4s ble/p\u00f4n ka)kei=no e)gei/r\u00f4n\npon\u00ea/sei ma=llon \u00ea)\\ pro\\s i)schu/n, ou)ch \u00f4(/sper oi( a)/lloi\na)thl\u00eatai\\ r(\u00f4/m\u00eas e(/neka.]]\n\n[Footnote 43: Plato, Republ. iii. pp. 410-411. 411 D-E: [Greek:\nMiso/logos d\u00ea/, oi)=mai, o( toiou=tos gi/gnetai kai\\ a)/mousos,\nkai\\ peithoi= me\\n dia\\ lo/g\u00f4n ou)de\\n e)/ti chr\u00ea=tai, bi/a| de\\\nkai\\ a)grio/t\u00eati \u00f4(/sper th\u00eari/on pro\\s pa/nta diapra/ttetai,\nkai\\ e)n a)mathi/a| kai\\ skaio/t\u00eati meta\\ a)r)r(uthmi/as te kai\\\na)charisti/as z\u00ea=|.]]\n\n[Side-note: Platonic type of character compared with\nXenophontic, is like the Athenian compared with the Spartan.]\n\nThe type of character here contemplated by Plato deserves\nparticular notice, as contrasted with that of Xenophon. It is the\nAthenian type against the Spartan. Perikl\u00eas in his funeral\noration, delivered at Athens in the first year of the\nPeloponnesian war, boasts that the Athenians had already reached a\ntype similar to this--and that too, without any special\nindividual discipline, legally enforced: that they combined\ncourage, ready energy, and combined action--with developed\nintelligence, the love of discourse, accessibility to persuasion,\nand taste for the Beautiful. That which Plato aims at\naccomplishing in his Guardians, by means of a state-education at\nonce musical and gymnastical--Perikl\u00eas declares to have been\nalready realised at Athens without any state-education, through\nthe spontaneous tendencies of individuals called forth and\nseconded by the general working of the political system.[44] He\ncompliments his countrymen as having accomplished this object\nwithout the unnecessary rigour of a positive state-discipline, and\nwithout any other restraints than the special injunctions and\nprohibitions of a known law. It is this absence of\nstate-discipline to which both Xenophon and Plato are opposed. Both\nof them follow Lykurgus in proclaiming the insufficiency of mere\nprohibitions; and in demanding a positive routine of duty to be\nprescribed by authority, and enforced upon individuals through\nlife. In regard to end, Plato is more in harmony with Perikl\u00eas:\nin regard to means, with Xenophon.\n\n[Footnote 44: Thucyd. ii. 38-39-40.\n\nThe comparison between this speech and the third book of Plato's\nRepublic (pp. 401-402-410-411), is very interesting. The words of\nPerikles, [Greek: philokalou=men ga\\r met' eu)telei/as kai\\\nphilosophou=men a)/neu malaki/as], taken along with the chapter\npreceding, mark that concurrent development of [Greek: to\\\nphilo/sophon] and [Greek: to\\ thumoeide\\s] which Plato provides,\nand the avoidance of those defects which spring from the separate\nand exclusive cultivation of either.]\n\nPlato's views respecting special laws and criminal procedure\ngenerally are remarkable. He not only manifests that repugnance\ntowards the Dikastery--which is common to Sokrates, Xenophon,\nIsokrates, and Aristophanes--but he excludes it almost entirely\nfrom his system, as being superseded by the constant public\ndiscipline of the Guardians.\n\n[Side-note: Professional soldiers are the proper modern\nstandard of comparison with the regulations of Plato and\nXenophon.]\n\nIt is to be remembered that these propositions of Plato have\nreference, not to an entire and miscellaneous community, but to a\nselect body called the Guardians, required to possess the bodily\nand mental attributes of soldiers, policemen, and superintendents.\nThe standard of comparison in modern times, for the Lykurgean,\nXenophontic or Platonic, training, is to be sought in the\nstringent discipline of professional soldiers; not in the general\nliberty, subject only to definite restrictions, enjoyed by\nnon-military persons. In regard to soldiers, the Platonic principle\nis now usually admitted--that it is not sufficient to enact articles\nof war, defining what a soldier ought to do, and threatening him\nwith punishment in case of infraction--but that, besides this, it\nis indispensable to exact from him a continued routine of positive\nperformances, under constant professional supervision. Without\nthis preparation, few now expect that soldiers should behave\neffectively when the moment of action arrives. This is the\ndoctrine applied by Plato and Xenophon to the whole life of the\ncitizen.\n\n[Side-note: Music and Gymnastic--multifarious and varied\neffects of music.]\n\nMusic and Gymnastic are regarded by Plato mainly as they bear upon\nand influence the emotional character of his citizens. Each of\nthem is the antithesis, and at the same time the supplement, to\nthe other. Gymnastic tends to develop exclusively the courageous\nand energetic emotions:--anger and the feeling of power--but no\nothers. Whereas music (understood in the Platonic sense) has a far\nmore multifarious and varied agency: it may develop either those,\nor the gentle and tender emotions, according to circumstances.[45]\nIn the hands of Tyrt\u00e6us and \u00c6schylus, it generates vehement and\nfearless combatants: in the hands of Euripides and other pathetic\npoets, it produces tender, amatory, effeminate natures, ingenious\nin talk but impotent for action.[46]\n\n[Footnote 45: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 376 B-C. If we examine\nPlato's tripartite classification of the varieties of soul or\nmind, as it is given both in the Republic and in the Tim\u00e6us (1.\nReason, in the cranium. 2. Energy, [Greek: thumo/s], in the\nthoracic region. 3. Appetite, in the abdominal region)--we shall\nsee that it assigns no place to the gentle, the tender, or the\n\u00e6sthetical emotions. These cannot be properly ranked either with\nenergy ([Greek: thumo\\s]) or with appetite ([Greek: e)pithumi/a]).\nPlato can find no root for them except in reason or knowledge,\nfrom which he presents them as being collateral derivatives--a\nsingular origin. He illustrates his opinion by the equally\nsingular analogy of the dog, who is gentle towards persons whom he\n_knows_, fierce towards those whom he does not _know_;\nso that _gentleness_ is the product of _knowledge_.]\n\n[Footnote 46: See the argument between \u00c6schylus and Euripides in\nthe Ran\u00e6 of Aristophanes, 1043-1061-1068.]\n\n[Side-note: Great influence of the poets and their works on\neducation.]\n\nIn the age of Plato, Homer and other poets were extolled as the\nteachers of mankind, and as themselves possessing universal\nknowledge. They enjoyed a religious respect, being supposed to\nspeak under divine inspiration, and to be the privileged\nreporters or diviners of a forgotten past.[47] They furnished the\nmost interesting portion of that floating mass of traditional\nnarrative respecting Gods, Heroes, and ancestors, which found easy\ncredence both as matter of religion and as matter of history:\nbeing in full harmony with the emotional preconceptions, and\nuncritical curiosity, of the hearers. They furnished likewise\nexhortation and reproof, rules and maxims, so expressed as to live\nin the memory--impressive utterance for all the strong feelings of\nthe human bosom. Poetry was for a long time the only form of\nliterature. It was not until the fifth century B.C. that\nprose compositions either began to be multiplied, or were carried\nto such perfection as to possess a charm of their own calculated\nto rival the poets, who had long enjoyed a monopoly as purveyors\nfor \u00e6sthetical sentiment and fancy. Rhetors, Sophists,\nPhilosophers, then became their competitors; opening new veins of\nintellectual activity,[48] and sharing, to a certain extent, the\np\u00e6dagogic influence of the poets--yet never displacing them from\ntheir traditional function of teachers, narrators, and guides to\nthe intelligence, as well as improving ministers to the\nsentiments, emotions, and imagination, of youth. Indeed, many\nSophists and Rhetors presented themselves not as superseding,[49]\nbut as expounding and illustrating, the poets. Sokrates also did\nthis occasionally, though not upon system.[50]\n\n[Footnote 47: Aristoph. Ran\u00e6, 1053. \u00c6schylus is made to say:--\n\n[Greek: A)ll' a)pokru/ptein chr\u00ea\\ to\\ pon\u00earo\\n to/n ge\npoi\u00eat\u00ea/n,\nkai\\ m\u00ea\\ para/gein m\u00eade\\ dida/skein; toi=s me\\n ga\\r\npaidari/oisin\ne)sti\\ dida/skalos o(/stis phra/zei, toi=sin d' \u00ea(b\u00f4=si\npoi\u00eatai/.\npa/nu d\u00ea\\ dei= chr\u00easta\\ le/gein \u00ea(ma=s.]\n\nCompare the words of Pluto which conclude the Ran\u00e6, 1497.\n\nPlato, Repub. x. p. 598 D-E. [Greek: e)peid\u00ea/ tin\u00f4n a)kou/omen\no(/ti ou(=toi] (Homer and the poets) [Greek: pa/sas me\\n te/chnas\ne)pi/santai, pa/nta de\\ ta)nthr\u00f4/peia ta\\ pro\\s a)ret\u00ea\\n kai\\\nkaki/an, kai\\ ta/ ge thei=a], &c. Also Plato, Legg. vii. pp.\n810-811; Ion, pp. 536 A, 541 B: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2, 10; and\nSympos. iii. 6, where we learn that Nikeratus could repeat by\nheart the whole Iliad and Odyssey.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 810. [Greek: o(/lous poi\u00eata\\s\ne)kmantha/nontas], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 49: It was to gain this facility that Kritias and\nAlkibiades, as Xenophon tells us, frequented the society of\nSokrates, who (as Xenophon also tells us) \"handled persons\nconversing with him just as he pleased\" (Memor. i. 2, 14-18.)\n\nA speaker in one of the Orations of Lysias (Orat. viii. [Greek:\nKakologi\u00f4=n], s. 12) considers this power of arguing a disputed\ncase as one of the manifestations [Greek: tou= philosophei=n--Kai\\\ne)g\u00f4\\ me\\n \u00f4)/|m\u00ean _philosophou=ntas_ au)tou\\s peri\\ tou=\npra/gmatos _a)ntile/gein to\\n e)nanti/on lo/gon_; oi( d'\na)/ra ou)k a)nte/legon a)ll' a)nte/pratton.]\n\nCompare the curious oration of Demosthenes against Lakritus, where\nthe speaker imputes to Lakritus this abuse of argumentative power,\nas having been purchased by him at a large price from the teaching\nof Isokrates the Sophist, pp. 928-937-938.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Xenoph. Memorab. i. 2, 57-60.]\n\n[Side-note: Plato's idea of the purpose which poetry\nand music _ought_ to serve in education.]\n\nIt is this educational practice--common to a certain extent among\nGreeks, but more developed at Athens than elsewhere[51]--which\nPlato has in his mind, when he draws up the outline of a musical\neducation for his youthful Guardians. He does not intend it as a\nscheme for fostering the highest intellectual powers, or for\nexalting men into philosophers--which he reserves as an ulterior\nimprovement, to be communicated at a later period of life, and\nonly to a chosen few--the large majority being supposed incapable\nof appropriating it. His musical training (co-operating with the\ngymnastical) is intended to form the character of the general body\nof Guardians: to implant in them from early childhood a peculiar\nvein of sentiments, habits, emotions and emotional beliefs,\nethical esteem and disesteem, love and hatred, &c., to inspire\nthem (in his own phrase) with love of the beautiful or honourable.\n\n[Footnote 51: The language of Plato is remarkable on this point.\nRepublic, ii. p. 376 E. [Greek: Ti/s ou)=n \u00ea( paidei/a? _\u00ea(\\\nchalepo\\n eu(rei=n belti/\u00f4 t\u00ea=s u(po\\ tou= pollou= chro/nou\neu(r\u00eame/n\u00eas_? e)sti\\ de/ pou \u00ea( me\\n e)pi\\ s\u00f4/masi\ngumnastik\u00ea/, \u00ea( d' e)pi\\ psuch\u00ea=| mousik\u00ea/]--and a striking\npassage in the Kriton (p. 50 D), where education in [Greek:\nmousik\u00ea\\] and [Greek: gumnastik\u00ea\\] is represented as a positive\nduty on the part of fathers towards their sons.\n\nAbout the multifarious and indefinite province of the Muses,\ncomprehending all [Greek: paidei/a] and [Greek: lo/gos], see\nPlutarch, Sympos. Problem. ix. 14, 2-3, p. 908-909. Also Plutarch,\nDe Audiendis Poetis, p. 31 F, about the many diverse\ninterpretations of Homer; especially those by Chrysippus and\nKleanthes.\n\nThe last half of the eighth Book of Aristotle's Politica contains\nremarkable reflections on the educational effects of music,\nshowing the refined distinctions which philosophical men of that\nday drew respecting the varieties of melody and rhythm. Aristotle\nadverts to music as an agency not merely for [Greek: paidei/a] but\nalso for [Greek: ka/tharsis] (viii. 7, 1341, b. 38); to which last\nPlato does not advert. Aristotle also notices various\nanimadversions by musical critics upon some of the dicta on\nmusical subjects in the Platonic Republic ([Greek: kal\u00f4=s\ne)pitim\u00f4=si kai\\ tou=to S\u00f4kra/tei t\u00f4=n peri\\ t\u00ea\\n mousik\u00ea/n\ntines], 1342, b. 23)--perhaps Aristoxenus: also 1342, a. 32. That\nthe established character and habits of music could not be changed\nwithout leading to a revolution, ethical and political, in the\nminds of the citizens--is a principle affirmed by Plato, not as\nhis own, but as having been laid down previously by Damon the\ncelebrated musical instructor (Repub. iii. p. 424 C).\n\nThe following passage about Luther is remarkable:--\n\n\"Apr\u00e8s avoir essay\u00e9 de la th\u00e9ologie, Luther fut d\u00e9cid\u00e9 par les\nconseils de ses amis, \u00e0 embrasser l'\u00e9tude du droit; qui conduisait\nalors aux postes les plus lucratifs de l'\u00c9tat et de l'\u00c9glise. Mais\nil ne semble pas s'y \u00eatre jamais livr\u00e9 avec go\u00fbt.** Il aimait bien\nmieux la belle litt\u00e9rature, et surtout la musique. C'\u00e9tait son art\nde pr\u00e9dilection. Il la cultiva toute sa vie et l'enseigna \u00e0 ses\nenfans. Il n'h\u00e9site pas \u00e0 d\u00e9clarer que la musique lui semble le\npremier des arts, apr\u00e8s la th\u00e9ologie. La musique (dit il) est\nl'art des proph\u00e8tes: c'est le seul qui, comme la th\u00e9ologie, puisse\ncalmer les troubles de l'\u00e2me et mettre le diable en fuite. Il\ntouchait du luth, jouait de la fl\u00fbte.\" (_Michelet_, M\u00e9moires\nde Luther, \u00e9crits par lui-m\u00eame, pp. 4-5, Paris, 1835.)]\n\n[Side-note: He declares war against most of the traditional\nand consecrated poetry, as mischievous.]\n\nIt is in this spirit that he deals with the traditional, popular,\nalmost consecrated, poetical literature which prevailed\naround him. He undertakes to revise and recast the whole of it.\nRepudiating avowedly the purpose of the authors, he sets up a\ndifferent point of view by which they are to be judged. The\ncontest of principle, into which he now enters, subsisted (he\ntells us) long before his time: a standing discord between the\nphilosophers and the poets.[52] The poet is an artist[53] whose\naim is to give immediate pleasure and satisfaction: appealing to\n\u00e6sthetical sentiment, feeding imagination and belief, and finding\nembodiment for emotions, religious or patriotic, which he shares\nwith his hearers: the philosopher is a critic, who lays down\nauthoritatively deeper and more distant ends which he considers\nthat poetry _ought to_ serve, judging the poets according as\nthey promote, neglect, or frustrate those ends. Plato declares the\nend which he requires poetry to serve in the training of his\nGuardians. It must contribute to form the ethical character which\nhe approves: in so far as it thus contributes, he will tolerate\nit, but no farther. The charm and interest especially, belonging\nto beautiful poems, is not only no reason for admitting them, but\nis rather a reason (in his view) for excluding them.[54] The more\nbeautiful a poem is, the more effectively does it awaken,\nstimulate, and amplify, the emotional forces of the mind: the\nstronger is its efficacy in giving empire to pleasure and pain,\nand in resisting or overpowering the rightful authority of Reason.\nIt thus directly contravenes the purpose of the Platonic\neducation--the formation of characters wherein Reason shall\neffectively controul all the emotions and desires.[55] Hence he\nexcludes all the varieties of imitative poetry:--that is,\nnarrative, descriptive, or dramatic poetry. He admits only hymns\nto the Gods and panegyrics upon good citizens:--probably also\ndidactic, gnomic, or hortative, poetry of approved tone. Imitative\npoetry is declared objectionable farther, not only as it\nexaggerates the emotions, but on another ground--that it fills the\nmind with false and unreal representations; being composed by men\nwho have no real knowledge of their subject, though they pretend\nto a sort of fallacious omniscience, and talk boldly about every\nthing.[56]\n\n[Footnote 52: Plato, Republ. x. p. 607 B. [Greek: palaia\\ me/n tis\ndiaphora\\ philosophi/a| te kai\\ poi\u00eatik\u00ea=|], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Plato, Republ. x. p. 607 A-C. [Greek: t\u00ea\\n\n\u00ea(dusme/n\u00ean Mou=san . . . \u00ea( pro\\s \u00ea(don\u00ea\\n poi\u00eatik\u00ea\\ kai\\\n\u00ea( mi/m\u00easis], &c.\n\nCompare also Leges ii. p. 655 D seq., about the [Greek: mousik\u00ea=s\no)rtho/t\u00eas].]\n\n[Footnote 54: It is interesting to read in the first book of\nStrabo (pp. 15-19-25-27, &c.) the controversy which he carries\non with Eratosthenes, as to the function of poets generally, and\nas to the purpose of Homer in particular. Eratosthenes considered\nHomer, and the other poets also, as having composed verses to\nplease and interest, not to teach--[Greek: psuchag\u00f4gi/as cha/rin,\nou) didaskali/as]. Strabo (following the astronomer Hipparchus)\ncontroverts this opinion; affirming that poets had been the\nearliest philosophers and teachers of mankind, and that they must\nalways continue to be the teachers of the multitude, who were\nunable to profit by history and philosophy. Strabo has the\nstrongest admiration for Homer, not merely as a poet but as a\nmoralising teacher. While Plato banishes Homer from his\ncommonwealth, on the ground of pernicious ethical influence,\nStrabo claims for Homer the very opposite merit, and extols him as\nthe best of all popular teachers--[Greek: \u00ea( de\\ poi\u00eatik\u00ea\\\nd\u00eam\u00f4pheleste/ra kai\\ the/atra pl\u00earou=n duname/n\u00ea; \u00ea( de\\ d\u00ea\\\ntou= O(m\u00earou= u(perballo/nt\u00f4s . . . A)/te d\u00ea\\ pro\\s to\\\npaideutiko\\n ei)=dos tou\\s mu/thous a)naphe/r\u00f4n o( poi\u00eat\u00ea\\s\ne)phro/ntise polu\\ me/ros ta)l\u00eathou=s] (Strabo, i. p. 20). The\ncontradiction between Plato and Strabo is remarkable. Compare the\nbeginning of Horace's Epistle, i. 2. In the time of Strabo (more\nthan three centuries after Plato's death) there existed an\nabundant prose literature on matters of erudition, history,\nscience, philosophy. The work of instruction was thus taken out of\nthe poet's hands; yet Strabo cannot bear to admit this. In the age\nof Plato the prose literature was comparatively small. Alexandria\nand its school did not exist: the poets covered a far larger\nportion of the entire ground of instruction.\n\nAs a striking illustration of the continued and unquestioning\nfaith in the ancient legends, we may cite Galen: who, in a medical\nargument against Erasistratus, cites the cure of the daughters of\nProetus by Melampus as an incontestable authentic fact in\nmedical evidence; putting to shame Erasistratus, who had not\nattended to it in his reasoning (Galen, De Atr\u00e2 Bile, T. v. p.\n132, K\u00fchn).]\n\n[Footnote 55: Plato, Republic, x. pp. 606-607, iii. p. 387 B.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Plato, Republic, x. pp. 598-599. When Plato attacks\nthe poets so severely on the ground of their departure from truth\nand reality, and their false representations of human life--the\npoets might have retorted, that Plato departed no less from truth\nand reality in many parts of his Republic, and especially in his\npanegyric upon Justice; not to mention the various mythes which we\nread in Republic, Ph\u00e6don, Ph\u00e6drus, Politikus, &c.\n\nPlato's fictions are indeed ethical, intended to serve a pedagogic\npurpose; Homer's fictions are \u00e6sthetical, addressed to the fancy\nand emotions.\n\nBut it is not fair in Plato, the avowed champion of useful\nfiction, to censure the poets on the ground of their departing\nfrom truth.]\n\n[Side-note: Strict limits imposed by Plato on poets.]\n\nEven hymns to the Gods, however, may be composed in many different\nstrains, according to the conception which the poet entertains of\ntheir character and attributes. The Homeric Hymns which we now\npossess could not be acceptable to Plato. While denouncing much of\nthe current theological poetry, he assumes a censorial authority,\nin his joint character of Lykurgus and Sokrates,[57] to dictate\nwhat sort of poetical compositions shall be tolerated among his\nGuardians. He pronounces many of the tales in Homer and Hesiod to\nbe not merely fictions, but mischievous fictions: not fit to\nbe circulated, even if they had been true.\n\n[Footnote 57: Plutarch, Sympos. Qu\u00e6st. viii. 2, 2, p. 719.\n\n[Greek: O( Pla/t\u00f4n, a(/te d\u00ea\\ t\u00f4=| S\u00f4kra/tei to\\n Lukou=rgon\na)namignu/s], &c.]\n\n[Side-note: His view of the purposes of fiction--little\ndistinction between fiction and truth. His censures upon Homer and\nthe tragedians.]\n\nPlato admits fiction, indeed, along with truth as an instrument\nfor forming the character. Nay, he draws little distinction\nbetween the two, as regards particular narratives. But the point\nupon which he specially insists, is, that all the narratives in\ncirculation, true or false, respecting Gods and Heroes, shall\nascribe to them none but qualities ethically estimable and\nvenerable. He condemns Homer and Hesiod as having misrepresented\nthe Gods and Heroes, and as having attributed to them acts\ninconsistent with their true character, like a painter painting a\nportrait unlike to the original.[58] He rejects in this manner\nvarious tales told in these poems respecting Zeus, H\u00ear\u00ea,\nHeph\u00e6stus--the fraudulent rupture of the treaty between the Greeks\nand Trojans by Pandarus, at the instigation of Zeus and\nAth\u00ean\u00ea--the final battle of the Gods, in the Iliad[59]--the\ntransformations of Proteus and Thetis, and the general declaration\nin the Odyssey that the Gods under the likeness of various\nstrangers visit human cities as inspectors of good and bad\nbehaviour[60]--the dream sent by Zeus to deceive Agamemnon (in the\nsecond book of the Iliad), and the charge made by Thetis in\n\u00c6schylus against Apollo, of having deceived her and killed her son\nAchilles[61]--the violent amorous impulse of Zeus, in the\nfourteenth book of the Iliad--the immoderate laughter among the\nGods, when they saw the lame Heph\u00e6stus busying himself in the\nservice of the banquet. Plato will not permit the realm of Hades\nto be described as odious and full of terrors, because the\nGuardians will thereby learn to fear death.[62] Nor will he\ntolerate the Homeric pictures of heroes or semi-divine persons,\nlike Priam or Achilles, plunged in violent sorrow for the\ndeath of friends and relatives:--since a thoroughly right-minded\nman, while he regards death as no serious evil to the deceased, is\nat the same time most self-sufficing in character, and least in\nneed of extraneous sympathy.[63]\n\n[Footnote 58: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 377 E.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Plato, Repub. ii. pp. 378-379. Plutarch observes\nabout Chrysippus--[Greek: o(/ti t\u00f4=| the\u00f4=| kala\\s me\\n\ne)pikl\u00ea/seis kai\\ philanthr\u00f4/pous a)ei/, a)/gria d' e)/rga kai\\\nba/rbara kai\\ Galaktika\\ prosti/th\u00easin] (De Stoic. Repugnant. c.\n32, p. 1049 B).]\n\n[Footnote 60: Plato, Republ. ii. p. 380 B. Plato in the beginning\nof his Sophist\u00eas treats this doctrine of the appearances of the\nGods with greater respect. Lucretius argues that the Gods, being\nin a state of perfect happiness and exempt from all want, cannot\nchange; Lucret. v. 170, compared with Plato, Rep. ii. p. 381 B.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Plato, Republ. ii. pp. 380-381-383.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Plato, Republ. iii. p. 386 C. Maximus Tyrius (Diss.\nxxiv. c. 5) remarks, that upon the principles here laid down by\nPlato, much of what occurs in the Platonic dialogues respecting\nthe erotic vehemence and enthusiasm of Sokrates ought to be\nexcluded from education.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 387 D-E. [Greek: o(\ne)pieik\u00ea\\s a)n\u00ea\\r t\u00f4=| e)pieikei=, ou(=per kai\\ e(tai=ro/s\ne)sti, to\\ tethna/nai ou) deino\\n \u00ea(g\u00ea/setai . . . Ou)k a)/ra\nu(pe/r ge e)kei/nou \u00f4(s deino/n ti pepontho/tos o)du/roit' a)/n . . .\nA)lla\\ m\u00ea\\n . . . o( toiou=tos ma/lista au)to\\s au(t\u00f4=|\nau)ta/rch\u00eas pro\\s to\\ eu)= z\u00ea=|n kai\\ diaphero/nt\u00f4s t\u00f4=n\na)/ll\u00f4n \u00ea(/kista e(te/rou prosdei=tai . . . \u00ca(/kist' a)/ra\nau)t\u00f4=| deino\\n ster\u00eath\u00ea=nai ui(e/os, \u00ea)\\ a)de/lphou, \u00ea)\\\nchr\u00eama/t\u00f4n, \u00ea)\\ a)/llou tou t\u00f4=n toiou/t\u00f4n] &c.\n\nThe doctrine of Epikurus, as laid down by Lucretius (iii.\n844-920), coincides here with that of Plato:--\n\nTu quidem ut es leto sopitus, sic eris \u00e6vi\nQuod superest, cunctis privatu' doloribus \u00e6gris;\nAt nos horrifico cinefactum te prop\u00e9 busto\nInsatiabiliter deflebimus, \u00e6ternumque\nNulla dies nobis moerorem e pectore demet.\nIllud ab hoc igitur qu\u00e6rendum est, quid sit amari\nTantopere, ad somnum si res redit atque quietem\nCur quisquam \u00e6terno possit tabescere luctu?\n\nPlato insists, not less strenuously than Lucretius, upon\npreserving the minds of his Guardians from the frightful pictures\nof Hades, which terrify all hearers--[Greek: phri/ttein d\u00ea\\\npoiei= \u00f4(s oi(=o/n te pa/ntas tou\\s a)kou/ontas] (Repub. iii. p.\n387 C). Lucret. iii. 37:\n\n  \"metus ille foras pr\u00e6ceps Acheruntis agendus\nFunditus, humanam qui vitam turbat ab imo\".]\n\n[Side-note: Type of character prescribed by Plato, to which\nall poets must conform, in tales about Gods and Heroes.]\n\nThese and other condemnations are passed by Plato upon the current\nhistories respecting Gods, and respecting heroes the sons or\nimmediate descendants of Gods. He entirely forbids such histories,\nas suggesting bad examples to his Guardians. He prohibits all\npoetical composition, except under his own censorial supervision.\nHe lays down, as a general doctrine, that the Gods are good; and\nhe will tolerate no narrative which is not in full harmony with\nthis predetermined type. Without giving any specimens of approved\nnarratives--which he declares to be the business not of the\nlawgiver, but of the poet--he insists only that all poets shall\nconform in their compositions to his general standard of\northodoxy.[64]\n\n[Footnote 64: Compare also Plato de Legg. x. p. 886 C, xii. p. 941\nB.]\n\nApplying such a principle of criticism, Plato had little\ndifficulty in finding portions of the current mythology offensive\nto his ideal type of goodness. Indeed he might have found many\nothers, yet more offensive to it than some of those which he has\nselected.[65] But the extent of his variance with the current\nviews reveals itself still more emphatically, when he says\nthat the Gods are not to be represented as the cause of evil\nthings to us, but only of good things. Most persons (he says)\nconsider the Gods as causes of all things, evil as well as good:\nbut this is untrue:[66] the Gods dispense only the good things,\nnot the evil; and the good things are few in number compared with\nthe evil. Plato therefore requires the poet to ascribe all good\nthings to the Gods and to no one else; but to find other causes,\napart from the Gods, for sufferings and evils. But if the poet\nchooses to describe sufferings as inflicted by the Gods, he must\nat the same time represent these sufferings as a healing penalty\nor real benefit to the sufferers.[67]\n\n[Footnote 65: As one example, Plato cites the story in the Iliad,\nthat Achilles cut off his hair as an offering to the deceased\nPatroklus, after his hair had been consecrated by vow to the river\nSpercheius (Rep. iii. p. 391). If we look at the Iliad (xxiii.\n150), we find that the vow to the Spercheius had been originally\nmade by Peleus, conditionally upon the return of Achilles to his\nnative land. Now Achilles had been already forewarned that he\nwould never return thither, consequently the vow to Spercheius was\nvoid, and the execution of it impracticable.\n\nPlato does not disbelieve the legend of Hippolytus; the cruel\ndeath of an innocent youth, brought on by the Gods in consequence\nof the curse of his father Theseus (Legg. xi. p. 931 B).]\n\n[Footnote 66: Plato, Republ. ii. p. 379 C. [Greek: Ou)d' a)/ra o(\ntheo/s, e)peid\u00ea\\ a)gatho/s, pa/nt\u00f4n a)\\n ei)/\u00ea ai)/tios, \u00f4(s\noi( polloi\\ le/gousin, a)ll' o)li/g\u00f4n me\\n toi=s a)nthr\u00f4/pois\nai)/tios, poll\u00f4=n de\\ a)nai/tios; _polu\\ ga\\r e)la/tt\u00f4\nta)gatha\\ t\u00f4=n kak\u00f4=n \u00ea(mi=n_. Kai\\ t\u00f4=n me\\n a)gath\u00f4=n\nou)de/na a)/llon ai)tiate/on, t\u00f4=n de\\ kak\u00f4=n a)/ll' a)/tta dei=\nz\u00eatei=n ta\\ ai)/tia, a)ll' ou) to\\n theo/n.]]\n\n[Footnote 67: Plato, Rep, ii. p. 380 B. Plutarch, Consolat. ad\nApollonium (107 C, 115 E), citation from Pindar--[Greek: e(\\n par'\ne)sthlo\\n p\u00ea/mata su/nduo dai/ontai brotoi=s\nA)tha/natoi--poll\u00f4=| ga\\r plei/ona ta\\ kaka/; kai\\ ta\\ me\\n]\n(sc. [Greek: a)gatha\\]) [Greek: mo/gis kai\\ dia\\ poll\u00f4=n\nphronti/d\u00f4n kt\u00f4/metha, ta\\ de\\ kaka/, pa/nu r(a|di/\u00f4s.]\n\nIn the Sept. cont. Thebas of \u00c6schylus, Eteokles complains of this\ndoctrine as a hardship and unfairness to the chief. If (says he)\nwe defend the city successfully, our success will be ascribed to\nthe Gods; if, on the contrary, we fail, Eteokles alone will be the\nperson blamed for it by all the citizens:--\n\n[Greek: Ei) me\\n ga\\r eu)= pra/xaimen, ai)ti/a theou=;\nEi) d' au)=th', o(\\ m\u00ea\\ ge/noito, sumphora\\ tu/choi,\nE)teokle/\u00eas a)\\n ei(=s polu\\s kata\\ pto/lin\nU(mnoi=th' u(p' a)st\u00f4=n phroimi/ois polur)r(o/thois\nOi)m\u00f4/gmasin th']--(v. 4).]\n\nThe principle involved in these criticisms of Plato deserves\nnotice, in more than one point of view.\n\n[Side-note: Position of Plato as an innovator on the\nreceived faith and traditions. Fictions indispensable to the\nPlatonic Commonwealth.]\n\nThat which he proposes for his commonwealth is hardly less than a\nnew religious creed, retaining merely old names of the Gods and\nold ceremonies. He intends it to consist of a body of premeditated\nfictitious stories, prepared by poets under his inspection and\ncontroul. He does not set up any pretence of historical truth for\nthese stories, when first promulgated: he claims no traditionary\nevidence, no divine inspiration, such as were associated more or\nless with the received legends, in the minds both of those who\nrecited and of those who heard them. He rejects these legends,\nbecause they are inconsistent with his belief and sentiment\nas to the character of the Gods. Such rejection we can\nunderstand:--but he goes a step farther, and directs the coinage\nof a new body of legends, which have no other title to credence,\nexcept that they are to be in harmony with his belief about the\ngeneral character of the Gods, and that they will produce a\nsalutary ethical effect upon the minds of his Guardians. They are\ndeliberate fictions, the difference between fact and fiction being\naltogether neglected: they are pious frauds, constructed upon an\nauthoritative type, and intended for an orthodox purpose. The\nexclusive monopoly of coining and circulating fictions is a\nprivilege which Plato exacts for himself as founder, and for the\nRulers, after his commonwealth is founded.[68] All the narrative\nmatter circulating in his community is to be prepared with\nreference to his views, and stamped at his mint. He considers it\nnot merely a privilege, but a duty of the Rulers, to provide and\ncirculate fictions for the benefit of the community, like\nphysicians administering wholesome medicines.[69] This is a part\nof the machinery essential to his purpose. He remarks that it had\nalready been often worked successfully by others, for the\nestablishment of cities present or past. There had been no recent\nexample of it, indeed, nor will he guarantee the practicability of\nit among his own contemporaries. Yet, unless certain fundamental\nfictions can be accredited among his citizens, the scheme of his\ncommonwealth must fail. They must be made to believe that they are\nall earthborn and all brethren; that the earth which they inhabit\nis also their mother: but that there is this difference among\nthem--the Rulers have gold mingled with their constitution,\nthe other Guardians have silver, the remaining citizens have brass\nor iron. This bold fiction must be planted as a fundamental dogma,\nas an article of unquestioned faith, in the minds of all the\ncitizens, in order that they may be animated with the proper\nsentiments of reverence towards the local soil as their common\nmother--of universal mutual affection among themselves as\nbrothers--and of deference, on the part of the iron and brazen\nvariety, towards the gold and silver. At least such must be the\nestablished creed of all the other citizens except the few Rulers.\nIt ought also to be imparted, if possible, to the Rulers\nthemselves; but _they_ might be more difficult to\npersuade.[70]\n\n[Footnote 68: Plato, Republ. iii. p. 389 B; compare ii. p. 382 C.\n\nD\u00e4hne (Darstellung der J\u00fcdisch-Alexandrin. Religions-Philosophie,\ni. pp. 48-56) sets forth the motives which determined the new\ninterpretations of the Pentateuch by the Alexandrine Jews, from\nthe translators of the Septuagint down to Philo. In the view of\nPhilo there was a double meaning: the literal meaning, for the\nvulgar: but also besides this, there was an allegorical, the real\nand true meaning, discoverable only by sagacious judges. Moses (he\nsaid) gave the literal meaning, though not true, [Greek: pro\\s\nt\u00ea\\n t\u00f4=n poll\u00f4=n didaskali/an. Manthane/t\u00f4san ou)=n pa/ntes\noi( toiou=toi ta= pseud\u00ea=, di' \u00f4(=n \u00f4)phel\u00eath\u00ea/sontai, ei)\nm\u00ea\\ du/nantai di' a)l\u00eathei/as s\u00f4phroni/zesthai] (Philo, Qu\u00e6st.\nin Genesin, ap. D\u00e4hne, p. 50). Compare also Philo, on the [Greek:\nkano/nes kai\\ no/moi t\u00ea=s a)ll\u00eagori/as], D\u00e4hne, pp. 60-68.\n\nHerakleitus (Allegori\u00e6 Homeric\u00e6 ed. Mehler, 1851) defends Homer\nwarmly against the censorial condemnation of Plato. Herakleitus\ncontends for an allegorical interpretation, and admits that it is\nnecessary to find one. He inveighs against Plato in violent terms.\n[Greek: E)r)r(i/phth\u00f4 de\\ kai\\ Pla/t\u00f4n o( ko/lax], &c.\n\nIsokrates (Orat. Panathen. s. 22-28) complains much of the obloquy\nwhich he incurred, because some opponents alleged that he\ndepreciated the poets, especially Homer and Hesiod.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Plato, Repub. iii. pp. 389 B, 414 C.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Plato, Repub. iii. p. 414 B-C. [Greek: Ti/s a)\\n\nou)=n \u00ea(mi=n m\u00eachan\u00ea\\ ge/noito t\u00f4=n pseud\u00f4=n t\u00f4=n e)n\nde/onti gignome/n\u00f4n, \u00f4(=n nu=n d\u00ea\\ e)le/gomen, gennai=o/n ti\ne(\\n pseudome/nous pei=sai, ma/lista me\\n kai\\ au)tou\\s tou\\s\na)/rchontas, ei) de\\ m\u00ea/, t\u00ea\\n a)/ll\u00ean po/lin? Poi=on ti?\nM\u00eade\\n kaino/n, a)lla\\ Phoinikiko/n ti, _pro/teron me\\n \u00ea)/d\u00ea\npollachou= gegono/s_, \u00f4(s phasin oi( poi\u00eatai\\ kai\\\npepei/kasin, e)ph' \u00ea(m\u00f4=n de\\ ou) gegono\\s ou)d' oi)=da ei)\ngeno/menon a)/n, pei=sai de\\ suchn\u00ea=s peithou=s.] Compare De\nLegg. pp. 663-664.]\n\n[Side-note: Difficulty of procuring first admission for\nfictions. Ease with which they perpetuate themselves after having\nbeen once admitted.]\n\nPlato fully admits the extreme difficulty of procuring a first\nintroduction and establishment for this new article of faith,\nwhich nevertheless is indispensable to set his commonwealth\nafloat. But if it can be once established, there will be no\ndifficulty at all in continuing and perpetuating it.[71] Even as\nto the first commencement, difficulty is not to be confounded with\nimpossibility: for the attempt has already been made with success\nin many different places, though there happens to be no recent\ninstance.\n\n[Footnote 71: Plato, Repub. iii. p. 415 C-D. [Greek: Tou=ton ou)=n\nto\\n mu=thon o(/p\u00f4s a)\\n peisthei=en, e)/cheis tina\\ m\u00eachan\u00ea/n?\nOu)dam\u00f4=s, o(/p\u00f4s g' a)\\n _au)toi\\ ou(=toi_; o(/p\u00f4s me/nt'\na)\\n oi( tou/t\u00f4n ui(ei=s kai\\ oi( e)/peita oi(/ t' a)/lloi\na)/nthr\u00f4poi oi( u(/steron.]]\n\nWe learn hence to appreciate the estimate which Plato formed of\nthe ethical and religious faith, prevalent in the various\nsocieties around him. He regards as fictions the accredited\nstories respecting Gods and Heroes, which constituted the matter\nof religious belief among his contemporaries; being familiarised\nto all through the works of poets, painters, and sculptors, as\nwell as through votive offerings, such as the robe annually worked\nby the women of Athens for the Goddess Ath\u00ean\u00ea. These fictions he\nsupposes to have originally obtained credence either through the\ncharm of poets and narrators, or through the deliberate coinage\nof an authoritative lawgiver; presupposing in the community a\nvague emotional belief in the Gods--invisible, quasi-human agents,\nof whom they knew nothing distinct--and an entire ignorance of\nrecorded history, past as well as present. Once received into the\ngeneral belief, which is much more an act of emotion than of\nreason, such narratives retain their hold both by positive\nteaching and by the self-operating transmission of this emotional\nfaith to each new member of the community, as well as by the\nalmost entire absence of criticism: especially in earlier days,\nwhen men were less intelligent but more virtuous than they are now\n(in Plato's time)--when among their other virtues, that of\nunsuspecting faith stood conspicuous, no one having yet become\nclever enough to suspect falsehood.[72] This is what Plato assumes\nas the natural mental condition of society, to which he adapts his\nimprovements. He disapproves of the received fictions, not because\nthey are fictions, but because they tend to produce a mischievous\nethical effect, from the acts which they ascribe to the Gods and\nHeroes. These acts were such, that many of them (he says), even if\nthey had been true, ought never to be promulgated. Plato does not\npretend to substitute truth in place of fiction; but to furnish a\nbetter class of fictions in place of a worse.[73] The religion of\nthe Commonwealth, in his view, is to furnish fictions and\nsanctions to assist the moral and political views of the lawgiver,\nwhose duty it is to employ religion for this purpose.[74]\n\n[Footnote 72: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 679 C-E. [Greek: a)gathoi\\ me\\n\nd\u00ea\\ dia\\ tau=ta/ te \u00ea)=san kai\\ dia\\ t\u00ea\\n legome/n\u00ean\neu)\u00ea/theian; a(\\ ga\\r \u00ea)/kouon kala\\ kai\\ ai)schra/, eu)\u00ea/theis\no)/ntes \u00ea(gou=nto a)l\u00eathe/stata le/gesthai kai\\ e)pei/thonto;\npseu=dos ga\\r u(ponoei=n ou)dei\\s \u00ea)pi/stato dia\\ sophi/an,\n_\u00f4(/sper ta\\ nu=n_, a)lla\\ peri\\ the\u00f4=n te kai\\\na)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n ta\\ lego/mena a)l\u00eath\u00ea= nomi/zontes e)/z\u00f4n kata\\\ntau=ta . . . t\u00f4=n nu=n a)techno/teroi me\\n kai\\ a)mathe/steroi . . .\neu)\u00eathe/steroi de\\ kai\\ a)ndreio/teroi kai\\ a(/ma\ns\u00f4phrone/steroi kai\\ xu/mpanta dikaio/teroi.]]\n\n[Footnote 73: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 663 E.\n\nThis carelessness about historical matter of fact, as such--is not\nuncommon with ancient moralists and rhetoricians. Both of them\nwere apt to treat history not as a series of true matters of fact,\nexemplifying the laws of human nature and society, and enlarging\nour knowledge of them for future inference--but as if it were a\nbranch of fiction, to be handled so as to please our taste or\nimprove our morality. Dionysius of Halikarnassus, blaming\nThucydides for the choice of his subject, goes so far as to say\n\"that the Peloponnesian war, a period of ruinous discord in\nGreece, ought to have been left in oblivion, and never to have\npassed into history\" (Dion. Hal. ad Cn. Pomp. de Pr\u00e6c. Histor.\nJudic. p. 768 Reiske).\n\nSee a note at the beginning of chap. 38 of my \"History of\nGreece\".]\n\n[Footnote 74: Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathematicos, ix. 54, p. 562.\nCompare Polybius, vi. 56; Dion. Hal. ii. 13; Strabo, i. p. 19.\n\nThese three, like Plato, consider the matters of religious belief\nto be fictions prescribed by the lawgiver for the purpose of\ngoverning those minds which are of too low a character to listen\nto truth and reason. Strabo states, more clearly than the other\ntwo, the employment of [Greek: mu=thoi] by the lawgiver for\npurposes of education and government; he extends this doctrine to\n[Greek: pa=sa theologi/a a)rchai+k\u00ea\\ . . . pro\\s tou\\s\nn\u00eapio/phronas] (p. 19).]\n\n[Side-note: Views entertained by Kritias and others, that\nthe religious doctrines generally believed had originated with\nlaw-givers, for useful purposes.]\n\nWe read in a poetical fragment of Kritias (the contemporary\nof Plato, though somewhat older) an opinion advanced--that\neven the belief in the existence of the Gods sprang originally\nfrom the deliberate promulgation of lawgivers, for useful\npurposes. The opinion of Plato is not exactly the same, but it is\nvery analogous: for he holds that all which the community believe,\nrespecting the attributes and acts of the Gods, must consist of\nfictions, and that accordingly it is essential for the lawgiver to\ndetermine what the accredited fictions in his own community shall\nbe: he must therefore cause to be invented and circulated such as\nconduce to the ethical and political results which he himself\napproves. Private citizens are forbidden to tell falsehood; but\nthe lawgiver is to administer falsehood, on suitable occasions, as\na wholesome medicine.[75]\n\n[Footnote 75: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 389 B. [Greek: e)n\npharma/kou ei)/dei]. Compare De Legg. ii. p. 663 D.\n\nEusebius enumerates this as one of the points of conformity\nbetween Plato and the Hebrew records: in which, Eusebius says, you\nmay find numberless similar fictions ([Greek: muri/a toiau=ta]),\nsuch as the statements of God being jealous or angry or affected\nby other human passions, which are fictions recounted for the\nbenefit of those who require such treatment (Euseb. Pr\u00e6par. Evan.\nxii. 31).]\n\nPlato lays down his own individual preconception respecting the\ncharacters of the Gods, as orthodoxy for his Republic: directing\nthat the poets shall provide new narratives conformable to that\ntype. What is more, he establishes a peremptory censorship to\nprevent the circulation of any narratives dissenting from it. As\nto truth or falsehood, all that he himself claims is that his\ngeneral preconception of the character of the Gods is true, and\nworthy of their dignity; while those entertained by his\ncontemporaries are false; the particular narratives are alike\nfictitious in both cases. Fictitious as they are, however, Plato\nhas fair reason for his confident assertion, that if they could\nonce be imprinted on the minds of his citizens, as portions of an\nestablished creed, they would maintain themselves for a long time\nin unimpaired force and credit. He guards them by the artificial\nprotection of a censorship, stricter than any real Grecian city\nexhibited: over and above the self-supporting efficacy,\nusually sufficient without farther aid, which inheres in every\nestablished religious creed.\n\n[Side-note: Main points of dissent between Plato and his\ncountrymen, in respect to religious doctrine.]\n\nThe points upon which Plato here chiefly takes issue with his\ncountrymen, are--the general character of the Gods--and the extent\nto which the Gods determine the lot of human beings. He distinctly\nrepudiates as untrue, that which he declares to be the generally\nreceived faith: though in other parts of his writings, we find him\neulogising the merit of uninquiring faith--of that age of honest\nsimplicity when every one believed what was told him from his\nchildhood, and when no man was yet clever enough to suspect\nfalsehood.[76]\n\n[Footnote 76: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 679; compare x. p. 887 C, xi.\np. 913 C.\n\nSo again in the Tim\u00e6us (p. 40 E), he accepts the received\ngenealogy of the Gods, upon the authority of the sons and early\ndescendants of the Gods. These sons must have known their own\nfathers; we ought therefore \"to follow the law and believe them\"\n([Greek: e)pome/nous t\u00f4=| no/m\u00f4| pisteute/on]) though they spoke\nwithout either probable or demonstrative proof ([Greek: a)du/naton\nou)=n the\u00f4=n paisi\\n a)pistei=n, kai/per a)/neu te ei)ko/t\u00f4n\nkai\\ a)nagkai/\u00f4n a)podei/xe\u00f4n le/gousin]).\n\nThat which Plato here enjoins to be believed is the genealogy of\nHesiod and other poets, though he does not expressly name the\npoets. Julian in his remark on the passage (Orat. vii. p. 237)\nunderstands the poets to be meant, and their credibility to be\nupheld, by Plato--[Greek: kai\\ toiau=ta e(/tera e)n Timai/\u00f4|;\npisteu/ein ga\\r a(pl\u00f4=s a)xioi= kai\\ ch\u00f4ri\\s a)podei/xe\u00f4s\nlegome/nois, o(/sa u(pe\\r t\u00f4=n the\u00f4=n phasi\\n oi( poi\u00eatai/.]\nSee Lindau's note on this passage in his edition of the Tim\u00e6us, p.\n62.]\n\n[Side-note: Theology of Plato compared with that of\nEpikurus--Neither of them satisfied the exigencies of a believing\nreligious mind of that day.]\n\nThe discord on this important point between Plato and the\nreligious faith of his countrymen, deserves notice the rather,\nbecause the doctrines in the Republic are all put into the mouth\nof Sokrates, and are even criticised by Aristotle under the name\nof Sokrates.[77] Most people, and among them the historical\nSokrates, believed in the universal agency of the Gods.[78]\nNo--(affirms Plato) the Gods are good beings, whose nature is\ninconsistent with the production of evil: we must therefore divide\nthe course of events into two portions, referring the good only to\nthe Gods and the evil to other causes. Moreover--since the evil in\nthe world is not merely considerable, but so considerable as\ngreatly to preponderate over good, we must pronounce that most\nthings are produced by these other causes (not farther\nparticularised by Plato) and comparatively few things by the Gods.\nNow Epikurus (and some contemporaries[79] of Plato even before\nEpikurus) adopted these same premisses as to the preponderance of\nevil--but drew a different inference. They inferred that the Gods\ndid not interfere at all in the management of the universe.\nEpikurus conceived the Gods as immortal beings living in eternal\ntranquillity and happiness; he thought it repugnant to their\nnature to exchange this state for any other--above all, to\nexchange it for the task of administering the universe, which\nwould impose upon them endless vexation without any assignable\nbenefit. Lastly, the preponderant evil, visibly manifested in the\nuniverse, afforded to his mind a positive proof that it was not\nadministered by them.[80]\n\n[Footnote 77: Aristotel. Politic. ii. 1, &c. Compare the\nsecond of the Platonic Epistles, p. 314.]\n\n[Footnote 78: [Greek: Zeu\\s panai/tios, panerge/tas], &c.\n\u00c6schyl. Agamem. 1453. Xenophon, Memorab. i. 1, 8-9.]\n\n[Footnote 79: Plato, Legg. x. pp. 899 D, 888 C. He intimates that\nthere were no inconsiderable number of persons who then held the\ndoctrine, compare p. 891 B.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Lucretius, ii. 180:\n\nNequaquam nobis divinitus esse creatam\nNaturam mundi, qu\u00e6 tant\u00e2 'st pr\u00e6dita culp\u00e2--\n\nii. 1093:--\n\nNam--pro** sancta De\u00fbm tranquill\u00e2 pectora pace,\nQu\u00e6 placidum degunt \u00e6vum, vitamque serenam--\nQuis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi\nIndu manu validas potis est moderanter habenas?\n\nCompare v. 167-196, vi. 68.]\n\nComparing the two doctrines, we see that Plato, though he did not\nreject altogether, as Epikurus did, the agency of the Gods in the\nuniverse,--restricted it here nevertheless so as to suit the\nethical exigencies of his own mind. He thus discarded so large a\nportion of it, as to place himself, or rather his spokesman\nSokrates, in marked hostility with the received religious faith.\nIf Mel\u00eatus and Anytus lived to read the Platonic Republic (we may\nadd, also the dialogue called Euthyphron), they would probably\nhave felt increased persuasion that their indictment against\nSokrates was well-grounded:[81] since he stood proclaimed by the\nmost eminent of his companions as an innovator in matters of\nreligion, and as disbelieving a very large portion of what\nwas commonly received by pious Athenians. With many persons, it\nwas considered a species of sacrilege to disbelieve any narrative\nwhich had once been impressed upon them respecting the Gods or the\ndivine agency: the later Pythagoreans laid it down as a canon,\nthat this was never to be done.[82]\n\n[Footnote 81: Xenoph. Memorab. i. 1. [Greek: A)dikei= S\u00f4kra/t\u00eas,\nou(\\s me\\n \u00ea( po/lis nomi/zei theou\\s ou) nomi/z\u00f4n, e(/tera de\\\nkaina\\ daimo/nia ei)sphe/r\u00f4n; a)dikei= de\\ kai\\ tou\\s ne/ous\ndiaphthei/r\u00f4n.]\n\nThis was the form of the indictment against Sokrates. The Republic\nof Plato certainly shows ground for the first part of it. Sokrates\ndid not introduce new names and persons of Gods, but he preached\nnew views about their characters and agency, and (what probably\nwould cause the greatest offence) he emphatically blames the\nreceived views. The Republic of Plato here embodies what we read\nin the Platonist Maximus Tyrius (ix. 8) as the counter-indictment\nof Sokrates against the Athenian people--[Greek: \u00ea( de\\\nS\u00f4kra/tous kata\\ A)th\u00eanai/\u00f4n graph\u00ea/; A)dikei= o(\nA)th\u00eanai/\u00f4n d\u00ea=mos, ou(\\s me\\n S\u00f4kra/t\u00eas nomi/zei theou\\s ou)\nnomi/z\u00f4n, e(/tera de\\ kaina\\ daimo/nia e)peisphe/r\u00f4n . . .\nA)dikei= de\\ o( d\u00ea=mos kai\\ tou\\s ne/ous diaphthei/r\u00f4n.]]\n\n[Footnote 82: Jamblichus, Vit. Pythag. c. 138-148. Adhortatio ad\nPhilosophiam, p. 324, ed. Kiessling. See chap. xxxvii. of my\n\"History of Greece,\" p. 345, last edit.]\n\n[Side-note: Plato conceives the Gods according to the\nexigencies of his own mind--complete discord with those of the\npopular mind.]\n\nNow the Gods, as here conceived by Plato conformably to his own\nethical exigencies, are representatives of abstract goodness, or\nof what he considers as such[83]--but they are nothing else. They\nhave no other human emotions: they are invoked for the purposes of\nthe schoolmaster and the lawgiver, to distribute prizes, and\ninflict chastisements, on occasions which Plato thinks suitable.\nBut Gods with these restricted functions were hardly less at\nvariance with the current religious belief than the contemplative,\ntheorising, Gods of Aristotle--or the perfectly tranquil and happy\nGods of Epikurus. The Gods of the popular faith were not thus\nspecialised types, embodiments of one abstract, ethical, idea.\nThey were concrete personalities, many-sided and many-coloured,\nendowed with great variety of dispositions and emotions: having\nsympathies and antipathies, preferences and dislikes, to persons,\nplaces, and objects: sensitive on the score of attention paid to\nthemselves, and of offerings tendered by men, jealous of any\nperson who appeared to make light of them, or to put himself upon\na footing of independence or rivalry: connected with particular\nmen and cities by ties of family and residence.[84] They\ncorresponded with all the feelings of the believer; with his\nhopes and fears, his joys and sorrows, his pride or his shame, his\nlove or preference towards some persons or institutions, his\nhatred and contempt for others. They were sometimes benevolent,\nsometimes displeased and unpropitious, according to circumstances.\nThey were indeed believed to interfere for the protection of what\nthe believer accounted innocence or merit, and for the avenging of\nwhat he called wrong. But this was only one of many occasions on\nwhich they interfered. They dispensed alternately evil and good,\nout of the two casks mentioned in that Homeric verse[85] which\nPlato so emphatically censures. Nay, it was as much a necessity of\nthe believer's imagination to impute marked and serious suffering\nto the envy or jealousy of the Gods, as good fortune and\nprosperity to their kindness. Such a turn of thought is not less\nvisible in Herodotus, Xenophon, Demosthenes, Lykurgus, &c.,\nthan in Homer and the other poets whom Plato rebukes. Moreover it\nis frequently expressed or implied in the answers or admonitions\ndelivered from oracles.[86]\n\n[Footnote 83: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 379.\n\nIn the sixteenth chapter of my \"History of Greece\" (see p. 504\nseq.) I have given many remarks on the ancient Grecian legends,\nand on the varying views entertained in ancient times respecting\nthem, considered chiefly in reference to the standard of\nhistorical belief. I here regard them more as matters of religious\nbelief and emotion.]\n\n[Footnote 84: Nowhere is the relation between men and the Gods,\nand the all-covering variety of divine agency, in ancient Grecian\nbelief, more instructively illustrated than in the Hippolytus of\nEuripides. Hippolytus, a youth priding himself on piety and still\nmore upon inexorable continence (1140-1365), is not merely the\nconstant worshipper of the goddess Artemis, but also her\ncompanion; she sits with him, hunts with him; he hears her voice\nand converses with her; he knows her presence by the divine odour,\nthough he does not see her ([Greek: su/nthake, sugku/nage],\n1093-1391-87). But he disdains to address a respectful word to\nAphrodit\u00e9, or to yield in any way to her influence, though he\ncontinually passes by her statue which stands at his gates; he\neven speaks of her in disparaging terms (13-101). Aphrodit\u00e9\nbecomes deeply indignant with him, not because he is devoted to\nArtemis, but because he neglects and despises herself (20): for\nthe Gods take offence when they are treated with disrespect, just\nas men do (6-94). His faithful attendant laments this misguided\nself-sufficiency, and endeavours in vain to reason his master out\nof it (see the curious dialogue 87-120, also 445). Aphrodit\u00e9\naccordingly resolves to punish Hippolytus for this neglect by\ninspiring Ph\u00e6dra, his step-mother, with an irresistible passion\nfor him: she foresees that this will prove the destruction of\nPh\u00e6dra as well as of Hippolytus, but no such consideration can be\nallowed to countervail the necessity of punishing her enemies. She\naccordingly smites Ph\u00e6dra with love-sickness, which, since Ph\u00e6dra\nwill not reveal the cause, the chorus ascribes to the displeasure\nand visitation of some unknown divinity, Pan, Hekat\u00ea, Kybel\u00ea,\n&c. (142-238). The course of this beautiful drama is well\nknown: Aphrodit\u00e9 proves herself a goddess and something more\n(359): Ph\u00e6dra and Hippolytus both perish; Theseus is struck down\nwith grief and remorse (1402); while Artemis, who appears at the\nend to console the dying Hippolytus and reprove Theseus, laments\nthat it was not in her power, according to the established\netiquette among the Gods, to interpose for the protection of\nHippolytus against the anger of Aphrodit\u00e9, but promises to avenge\nhim by killing with her unerring arrows some marked favourite of\nAphrodit\u00e9 (1327-1421). \"Non esse cur\u00e6 Diis securitatem nostram,\nesse ultionem.\"--Tacitus.]\n\n[Footnote 85: Homer, Iliad xxiv. 527.]\n\n[Footnote 86: The opinion is memorable, which Herodotus puts into\nthe mouth of the wisest and best man of his age--Solon. [Greek:\n\u00d4)= Kroi=se, e)pista/meno/n me to\\ thei=on pa=n e)o\\n phthonero/n\nte kai\\ tarach\u00f4=des, e)peir\u00f4ta=s a)nthr\u00f4p\u00eai+/\u00f4n pragma/t\u00f4n\nperi/?] (Herod. i. 32). Kroesus was overtaken by a terrible\ndivine judgment because he thought himself the happiest of men (i.\n34). The Gods strike at persons of high rank and position: they do\nnot suffer any one except themselves to indulge in self-exaltation\n(vii. 10). Herodotus ascribes the like sentiment to another man\ndistinguished for prudence--Amasis king of Egypt (iii. 40-44-125).\nCompare Pausanias, ii. 33, and \u00c6schyl. Pers. 93, Supplices, 388,\nHermann. Herodotus and Pausanias proclaim the envy and jealousy of\nthe Gods more explicitly than other writers. About the usual\ndisposition to regard the jealousy of the Gods as causing\nmisfortunes and suffering, see Thucyd. ii. 54, vii. 77; especially\nwhen a man by rash speech or act brings grave misfortune on\nhimself, he is supposed to be under a misguiding influence by the\nGods, expressed by Herodotus in the remarkable word [Greek:\ntheoblab\u00ea/s] (Herodot. i. 127, viii. 137; Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 4,\n3; Soph. Oed. Kol. 371). The poverty in which Xenophon found\nhimself when he quitted the Cyreian army, is ascribed by himself,\nat the suggestion of the prophet Eukleides, to his having omitted\nto sacrifice to Zeus Meilichius during the whole course of the\nexpedition and retreat. The next day Xenophon offered an ample\nsacrifice to this God, and good fortune came upon him immediately\nafterwards; he captured Asidates the Persian, receiving a large\nransom, with an ample booty, and thus enriched himself (Xenoph.\nAnab. vii. 8, 4-23). Compare about [Greek: the\u00f4=n phtho/nos],\nPindar, Pyth. x. 20-44; Demosthenes cont. Timokratem, p. 738;\nN\u00e4gelsbach, Die Nach-Homerische Theologie der Griechen,\npp. 330-355.]\n\n[Side-note: Repugnance of ordinary Athenians in regard\nto the criticism of Sokrates on the religious legends.]\n\nWhen therefore the Platonic Sokrates in this treatise affirms\nauthoritatively,--and affirms without any proof--his restricted\nversion of the agency of the Gods, calling upon his countrymen to\nreject all that large portion of their religious belief, which\nrested upon the assumption of a wider agency, as being unworthy of\nthe real attributes of the Gods,--he would confirm, in the minds\nof ordinary Athenians, the charge of culpable innovation in\nreligion, preferred against him by his accusers. To set up _\u00e0\npriori_ a certain type (either Platonic or Epikurean) of what\nthe Gods _must_ be, different from what they were commonly\nbelieved to be,--and then to disallow, as unworthy and incredible,\nall that was inconsistent with this type, including a full half of\nthe narratives consecrated in the emotional belief of the\npublic--all this could not but appear as \"impious rationalism,\" on\nthe part of \"the Sophist Sokrates\".[87] It would be not less repugnant\nto the feelings of ordinary Greeks, and would appear not more\nconclusive to their reason, than the arguments of rationalising\ncritics upon many narratives of the Old Testament appear to\northodox readers of modern times--when these critics disallow as\nuntrue many acts therein ascribed to God, on the ground that such\nacts are unworthy of a just and good being.\n\n[Footnote 87: \u00c6schines cont. Timarch. [Greek: S\u00f4kra/t\u00ea to\\n\nsophist\u00ea/n].\n\nLucretius, i. 80.\n\nIllud in his rebus vereor, ne fort\u00e9 rearis\nImpia te rationis inire elementa, viamque\nIndugredi sceleris--\n\nPlato, in Leges, v. 738 B, recognises the danger of disturbing the\nestablished and accredited religious [Greek: ph\u00ea=mai], as well as\nthe rites and ceremonies.]\n\n[Side-note: Aristophanes connects the idea of immorality\nwith the freethinkers and their wicked misinterpretations.]\n\nThough the Platonic Sokrates, repudiating most of the\nnarratives believed respecting Gods and Heroes, as being\nimmoral and suggesting bad examples to the hearers, proposes to\nconstruct a body of new fictions in place of them--yet, if we turn\nto the Clouds of Aristophanes, we shall find that the\nold-fashioned and unphilosophical Athenian took quite the opposite\nview. He connected immoral conduct with the new teaching, not with\nthe old: he regarded the narratives respecting the Gods as\nrealities of an unrecorded past, not as fictions for the purposes\nof the training-school: he did not imagine that the conduct of\nZeus, in chaining up his father Kronus, was a proper model to be\ncopied by himself or any other man: nay, he denounced all such\ndisposition to copy, and to seek excuse for human misconduct in\nthe example of the Gods, as abuse and profanation introduced by\nthe sophistry of the freethinkers.[88] In his eyes, the\nreligious traditions were part and parcel of the established\nfaith, customs and laws of the state; and Sokrates, in\ndiscrediting the traditions, set himself up as a thinker above the\nlaws. As to this feature, the Aristophanic Sokrates in the Clouds,\nand the Platonic Sokrates in the Republic, perfectly\nagree--however much they differ in other respects.\n\n[Footnote 88: Aristophan. Nubes, 358: [Greek: leptota/t\u00f4n\nl\u00ea/r\u00f4n i(ereu=]. 885: [Greek: gn\u00f4/mas kaina\\s e)xeuri/sk\u00f4n].\n\n1381.--\n\n[Greek: \u00f4(s \u00ea(du\\ kainoi=s pra/gmasin kai\\ dexioi=s o(milei=n,\nkai\\ t\u00f4=n kathest\u00f4/t\u00f4n no/m\u00f4n u(perphronei=n du/nasthai.]\n\n894.--\n\n[Greek: (A)/dikos Lo/gos.)--\n\nP\u00f4=s d\u00ea=ta di/k\u00eas ou)/s\u00eas, o( Zeu\\s\nou)k a)po/l\u00f4len, to\\n pate/r' au(tou=\nd\u00ea/sas?\n(Di/k. Lo/gos) ai)boi=, touti\\ kai\\ d\u00ea\\\nch\u00f4rei= to\\ kako/n; do/te moi leka/n\u00ean.]\n\n1061.--\n\n[Greek: moicho\\s ga\\r \u00ea)\\n tu/ch\u00ea|s a(lou/s, ta/d' a)nterei=s\npro\\s au)to/n,\n\u00f4(s ou)de\\n \u00ea)di/k\u00eakas; ei)=t' e)s to\\n Di/' e)panenegkei=n;\nka)kei=nos \u00f4(s \u00ea(/tt\u00f4n e)/r\u00f4to/s e)sti kai\\ gunaik\u00f4=n.]\n\nWhile Aristophanes introduces the freethinker as justifying\nunlawful acts by the example of Zeus, Plato (in the dialogue\ncalled Euthyphron) represents Euthyphron as indicting his father\nfor murder, and justifying himself by the analogy of Zeus;\nEuthyphron being a very religious man, who believed all the divine\nmatters commonly received and more besides (p. 6). This exhibits\nthe opposition between the Platonic and the Aristophanic point of\nview. In the Eumenides of \u00c6schylus (632), these Goddesses reproach\nZeus with inconsistency, after chaining up his old father Kronus,\nin estimating so highly the necessity of avenging Agamemnon's\ndeath, as to authorise Orestes to kill Klyt\u00e6mnestra.\n\nAn extract from Butler's Analogy, in reply to the objections\noffered by Deists against the Old Testament, will serve to\nillustrate the view which pious Athenians took of those ancient\nnarratives which Plato censures. Butler says: \"It is the province\nof Reason to judge of the morality of the Scripture; _i.e._\nnot whether it contains things different from what we should have\nexpected from a wise, just, and good Being, . . . but whether it\ncontains things plainly contradictory to Wisdom, Justice, or\nGoodness; to what the light of Nature teaches us of God. And I\nknow nothing of this sort objected against Scripture, excepting\nsuch objections as are formed upon suppositions which would\nequally conclude that the constitution of Nature is contradictory\nto wisdom, justice, or goodness; which most certainly it is not.\nIndeed, there are some particular precepts in Scripture, given to\nparticular persons, requiring actions which would be immoral and\nvicious, were it not for such precepts. But it is easy to see that\nall these are of such a kind, as that the precept changes the\nwhole nature of the case and of the action, and both constitutes\nand shows that not to be unjust or immoral which, prior to the\nprecept, must have appeared and really been so; which may well be,\nsince none of these precepts are contrary to immutable morality.\nIf it were commanded to cultivate the principles, and act from the\nspirit, of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty; the command would not\nalter the nature of the case or of the action, in any of these\ninstances. But it is quite otherwise in precepts which require\nonly the doing an external action; for instance, taking away the\nproperty or life of any. For men have no right to either life or\nproperty, but what arises solely from the grant of God; when this\ngrant is revoked, they cease to have any right at all in either;\nand when this revocation is made known, as surely it is possible\nit may be, it must cease to be unjust to deprive them of either.\nAnd though a course of external acts which, without command, would\nbe immoral, must make an immoral habit; yet a few detached\ncommands have no such natural tendency.\n\n\"I thought proper to say thus much of the few Scripture precepts\nwhich require, not vicious actions, but actions which would have\nbeen vicious had it not been for such precepts; because they are\nsometimes weakly urged as immoral, and great weight is laid upon\nobjections drawn from them. But to me there seems no difficulty at\nall in these precepts, but what arises from their being\noffences--_i.e._ from their being liable to be perverted, as\nindeed they are, by wicked designing men, to serve the most horrid\npurposes, and perhaps to mislead the weak and enthusiastic. And\nobjections from this head are not objections against Revelation,\nbut against the whole notion of Religion as a trial, and against\nthe whole constitution of Nature.\" (Butler's Analogy, Part. ii.\nch. 3.)\n\nI do not here propose to examine the soundness of this argument\n(which has been acutely discussed in a good pamphlet by Miss\nHennell--'Essay on the Sceptical Tendency of Butler's Analogy,' p.\n15, John Chapman, 1859). It appeared satisfactory to an able\nreasoner like Butler: and believers at Athens would have found\nsatisfaction in similar arguments, when the narratives in which\nthey believed were pronounced by Sokrates mischievous and\nincredible, as imputing to the Gods unworthy acts. For\nexample--Zeus and Ath\u00eane instigate Pandarus to break the sworn\ntruce between the Greeks and Trojans: Zeus sends Oneirus, or the\nDream-God, to deceive Agamemnon (Plat. Rep. ii. pp. 379-383). Here\nare acts (the orthodox reasoner would say) which would be immoral if\nit were not for the special command: but Agamemnon and the Greeks\nhad no right to life or property, much less to any other comforts\nor advantages, except what arose from the gift of the Gods. Now\nthe Gods, on this particular occasion, thought fit to revoke the\nright which they had granted, making known such revocation to\nPandarus; who, accordingly, in that particular case, committed no\ninjustice in trying to kill Menelaus, and in actually wounding\nhim. The Gods did not give any general command \"to cultivate the\nspirit and act upon the principles\" of perjury and faithlessness:\nthey merely licensed the special act of Pandarus--_hic et\nnunc_--by making known to him that they had revoked the right\nof the Greeks to have faith observed with them, at that particular\nmoment. When any man argues--\"Pandarus was instigated by Zeus to\nbreak faith: therefore faithlessness is innocent and authorised:\ntherefore _I_ may break faith\"--this is \"a perversion by\nwicked and designing men for a horrid purpose, and can mislead\nonly the weak and enthusiastic\".\n\nFarther, If the Gods may by special mandates cause the murder or\nimpoverishment of particular men by other men to be innocent acts,\nwithout sanctioning any inference by analogy--much more may the\nsame be said respecting the acts of the Gods among themselves,\nwhich Sokrates censures, _viz._ their quarrels, violent\nmanifestations by word and deed, amorous gusts, hearty laughter,\n&c. These too are particular acts, not intended to lead to\nconsequences in the way of example. The Gods have not issued any\ngeneral command. \"Be quarrelsome, be violent,\" &c. If they are\nquarrelsome themselves on particular occasions, they have a right\nto be so; just as they have a right to take away any man's life or\nproperty whenever they choose: but _you_ are not to follow\ntheir example, and none but wicked men will advise you to do so.\n\nTo those believers who denounced Sokrates as a freethinker (Plat.\nEuthyp. p. 6 A) such arguments would probably appear satisfactory.\n\"_Sunt Superis sua jura_\" is a general principle, flexible\nand wide in its application. Of arguments analogous to those of\nButler, really used in ancient times by advocates who defended the\npoets against censures like those of Plato, we find an\nillustrative specimen in the Scholia on Sophokles. At the\nbeginning of the Elektra (35-50), Orestes comes back with his old\nattendant or tutor to Argos, bent on avenging the death of his\nfather. He has been stimulated to that enterprise by the Gods\n(70), having consulted Apollo at Delphi, and having been directed\nby him to accomplish it not by armed force but by deceits ([Greek:\ndo/loisi kle/psai], 36). Keeping himself concealed, he sends the\nold attendant into the house of \u00c6gisthus, with orders to\ncommunicate a false narrative that he (Orestes) is dead, having\nperished by an accident in the Pythian chariot-race: and he\ndirects the attendant to certify this falsehood by oath ([Greek:\na)/ggelle d' o)/rk\u00f4| prostithei/s], 47). Upon which last words\nthe Scholiast observes as follows:--\"We must not take captious\nexception to the poet, as if he were here exhorting men to perjure\nthemselves. For Orestes is bound to obey the God, who commands him\nto accomplish the whole by deceit; so that while he appears to be\nimpious by swearing a false oath, he by that very act shows his\npiety, since he does it in obedience to the God\"--[Greek: m\u00ea\\\nsmikrolo/g\u00f4s tis e)pila/b\u00eatai, \u00f4(s keleu/ontos e)piorkei=n tou=\npoi\u00eatou=; dei= ga\\r au)to\\n pei/thesthai t\u00f4=| the\u00f4=|, to\\ pa=n\ndo/l\u00f4| pra/ssein parakeleuome/n\u00f4|; \u00f4(/ste e)n oi(=s dokei=\ne)piork\u00f4=n dussebei=n, dia\\ tou/t\u00f4n eu)sebei=, peitho/menos\nt\u00f4=| the\u00f4=|.]]\n\n[Side-note: Heresies ascribed to Sokrates by his own\nfriends--Unpopularity of his name from this circumstance.]\n\nIn reviewing the Platonic Republic, I have thought it necessary to\nappreciate the theological and p\u00e6dagogic doctrines, not merely\nwith reference to mankind in the abstract, but also as they\nappeared to the contemporaries among whom they were promulgated.\n\n[Side-note: Restrictions imposed by Plato upon musical modes\nand reciters.]\n\nTo all the above mentioned restrictions imposed by Plato upon the\nmanifestation of the poet, both as to thoughts, words, and manner\nof recital--we must add those which he provides for music in its\nlimited sense: the musical modes and instruments, the varieties of\nrhythm. He allows only the lyre and the harp, with the panspipe\nfor shepherds tending their flocks. He forbids both the flute and\nall complicated stringed instruments. Interdicting the lugubrious,\npassionate, soft, and convivial, modes of music, he tolerates none\nbut the Dorian and Phrygian, suitable to a sober, resolute,\ncourageous, frame of mind: to which also all the rhythm and\nmovement of the body is to be adapted.[89] Each particular\nmanifestation of speech, music, poetry, and painting, having a\nnatural affinity with some particular emotional and volitional\nstate--emanating from it in the mind of the author and\nsuggesting it in other minds--nothing is to be tolerated except\nwhat exhibits goodness and temperance of disposition,--grace,\nproportion, and decency of external form.[90] Artisans are to\nobserve the like rules in their constructions: presenting to the\neye nothing but what is symmetrical. The youthful Guardians,\nbrought up among such representations, will have their minds\nimbued with correct \u00e6sthetical sentiment; they will learn even in\ntheir youngest years, before they are competent to give reasons,\nto love what is beautiful and honourable to hate what is ugly and\nmean.[91]\n\n[Footnote 89: Plato, Repub. iii. pp. 399-400.]\n\n[Footnote 90: Plato, Repub. iii. pp. 400 D-401 B. [Greek: o(\ntro/pos t\u00ea=s le/xe\u00f4s--t\u00f4=| t\u00ea=s psuch\u00ea=s \u00ea)/thei\ne(/petai--prosanagkaste/on t\u00ea\\n tou= a)gathou= ei)ko/na\n\u00ea)/thous e)mpoiei=n.]]\n\n[Footnote 91: Plato, Repub. iii. pp. 401-402 A.]\n\n[Side-note: All these restrictions intended for the\nemotional training of the Guardians.]\n\nAll these enactments and prohibitions have for their purpose the\nethical and \u00e6sthetical training of the Guardians: to establish and\nkeep up in each individual Guardian, a good state of the emotions,\nand a proper internal government--that is, a due subordination of\nenergy and appetite to Reason.[92] Their bodies will also be\ntrained by a good and healthy scheme of gymnastics, which will at\nthe same time not only impart to them strength but inspire them\nwith courage. The body is here considered, not (like what we read\nin Ph\u00e6don and Phil\u00eabus) as an inconvenient and depraving\ncompanion to the mind: but as an indispensable co-operator, only\nrequiring to be duly reined.\n\n[Footnote 92: Plato, Repub. x. p. 608 B. [Greek: peri\\ t\u00ea=s e)n\nau(t\u00f4=| politei/as dedio/ti--me/gas o( a)g\u00f4/n, me/gas, ou)ch\no(/sos dokei=, to\\ chr\u00easto\\n \u00ea)\\ kako\\n gene/sthai.]]\n\n[Side-note: Regulations for the life of the Guardians,\nespecially the prohibition of separate property and family.]\n\nThe Guardians, of both sexes, thus educated and disciplined, are\nintended to pass their whole lives in the discharge of their\nduties as Guardians; implicitly obeying the orders of the Few\nPhilosophical chiefs, and quartered in barracks under strict\nregulations. Among these regulations, there are two in particular\nwhich have always provoked more surprise and comment than any\nother features in the commonwealth; first, the prohibition of\nseparate property--next, the prohibition of separate\nfamily--including the respective position of the two sexes.\n\n[Side-note: Purpose of Plato in these regulations.]\n\nThe directions of Plato on these two points not only hang\ntogether, but are founded on the same reason and\nconsiderations. He is resolved to prevent the growth of any\nseparate interest, affections, or aspirations, in the mind of any\nindividual Guardian. Each Guardian is to perform his military and\ncivil duties to the Commonwealth, and to do nothing else. He must\nfind his happiness in the performance of his duty: no double\nfunctions or occupations are tolerated. This principle, important\nin Plato's view as regards every one, is of supreme importance as\napplying to the Guardians,[93] in whom resides the whole armed\nforce of the Commonwealth and by whom the orders of the Chiefs or\nElders are enforced. If the Guardians aspire to private ends of\ntheir own, and employ their force for the attainment of such ends,\nnothing but oppression and ruin of the remaining community can\nensue. A man having land of his own to cultivate, or a wife and\nfamily of his own to provide with comforts, may be a good\neconomist, but he will never be a tolerable Guardian.[94] To be\ncompetent for this latter function, he must neither covet wealth\nnor be exposed to the fear of poverty: he must desire neither\nenjoyments nor power, except what are common to his entire\nregiment. He must indulge neither private sympathies nor private\nantipathies: he must be inaccessible to all motives which could\nlead him to despoil or hurt his fellow-citizens the producers.\nAccordingly the hopes and fears involved in self-maintenance--the\nfeelings of buyer, seller, donor, or receiver--the ideas of\nseparate property, house, wife, or family--must never be allowed\nto enter into his mind. The Guardians will receive from the\nproductive part of the community a constant provision, sufficient,\nbut not more than sufficient, for their reasonable maintenance.\nTheir residence will be in public barracks and their meals at a\ncommon mess: they must be taught to regard it as a disgrace to\nmeddle in any way with gold and silver.[95] Men and women will\nlive all together, or distributed in a few fractional companies,\nbut always in companionship, and under perpetual drill; beginning\nfrom the earliest years with both sexes. Boys and girls will be\nplaced from the beginning under the same superintendence; and\nwill receive the same training, as well in gymnastic as in music.\nThe characters of both will be exposed to the same influences and\nformed in the same mould. Upon the maintenance of such early,\nequal, and collective training, especially in music, under the\norders of the Elders,--Plato declares the stability of the\nCommonwealth to depend.[96]\n\n[Footnote 93: Plato, Repub. iv. pp. 421-A 423 D.]\n\n[Footnote 94: Plato, Repub. iii. p. 417 A-B.]\n\n[Footnote 95: Plato, Repub. iii. pp. 416-417.]\n\n[Footnote 96: Plato, Repub. iv. pp. 423-424 D-425 A-C.]\n\n[Side-note: Common life, education, drill, collective life,\nand duties, for Guardians of both sexes. Views of Plato respecting\nthe female character and aptitudes.]\n\nThe purpose being, to form good and competent Guardians the same\ntraining which will be best for the boys will also be best for the\ngirls. But is it true that women are competent to the function of\nGuardians? Is the female nature endued with the same aptitudes for\nsuch duties as the male? Men will ridicule the suggestion (says\nPlato) and will maintain the negative. They will say that there\nare some functions for which men are more competent, others for\nwhich women are more competent than men: and that women are unfit\nfor any such duty as that of Guardians. Plato dissents from this\nopinion altogether. There is no point on which he speaks in terms\nof more decided conviction. Men and women (he says) can perform\nthis duty conjointly, just as dogs of both sexes take part in\nguarding the flock. It is not true that the female, by reason of\nthe characteristic properties of sex--parturition and suckling--is\ndisqualified for out-door occupations and restricted to the\ninterior of the house.[97] As in the remaining animals generally,\nso also in the human race. There is no fundamental difference\nbetween the two sexes, other than that of the sexual attributes\nthemselves. From that difference no consequences flow, in respect\nto aptitude for some occupations, inaptitude for others. There are\ngreat individual differences between one woman and another, as\nthere are between one man and another: this woman is peculiarly\nfit for one task, that woman for something else. But speaking of\nwomen generally and collectively, there is not a single profession\nfor which they are peculiarly fit, or more fit than men. Men are\nsuperior to women in every thing; in one occupation as well as in\nanother. Yet among both sexes, there are serious individual\ndifferences, so that many women, individually estimated, will\nbe superior to many men; no women will equal the best men, but the\nbest women will equal the second-best men, and will be superior to\nthe men below them.[98] Accordingly, in order to obtain the best\nGuardians, selection must be made from both sexes\nindiscriminately. For ordinary duties, both will be found equally\nfit: but the heaviest and most difficult duties, those which\nrequire the maximum of competence to perform, will usually devolve\nupon men.[99]\n\n[Footnote 97: Plato, Repub. v. p. 451 D.]\n\n[Footnote 98: See this remarkable argument--Republic, v. pp.\n453-456--[Greek: gunai=kes me/ntoi pollai\\ poll\u00f4=n a)ndr\u00f4=n\nbelti/ous ei)s polla/; to\\ de\\ o(/lon e)/chei \u00f4(s su\\ le/geis.\nOu)de\\n a)/ra e)sti\\n e)pit\u00ea/deuma t\u00f4=n po/lin dioikou/nt\u00f4n\ngunaiko\\s dio/ti gun\u00ea/, ou)/d' a)ndro\\s dio/ti a)n\u00ea/r, a)ll'\no(moi/\u00f4s diesparme/nai ai( phu/seis e)n a)mphoi=n toi=n z\u00f4/oin,\nkai\\ pa/nt\u00f4n me\\n mete/chei gun\u00ea\\ e)pit\u00eadeuma/t\u00f4n kata\\\nphu/sin, pa/nt\u00f4n de\\ a)n\u00ea/r; e)pi\\ pa=si de\\ a)sthene/steron\ngun\u00ea\\ a)ndro/s] (p. 455 D). It would appear (from p. 455 C) that\nthose who maintained the special fitness of women for certain\noccupations and their special unfitness for others, cited, as\nexamples of occupations in which women surpassed men, weaving and\ncookery. But Plato denies this emphatically as a matter of fact;\npronouncing that women were inferior to men (_i.e._ the best\nwomen to the best men) in weaving and cookery no less than in\nother things. We should have been glad to know what facts were\npresent to his mind as bearing out such an assertion, and what\nobservations were open to him of weaving as performed by males. In\nGreece, weaving was the occupation of women very generally,\nwhether exclusively or not we can hardly say; in Phoenicia,\nduring the Homeric times, the finest robes are woven by Sidonian\nwomen (Iliad vi. 289): in Egypt, on the contrary, it was\nhabitually performed by men, and Herodotus enumerates this as one\nof the points in which the Egyptians differed from other countries\n(Herodot. ii. 35; Soph. Oed. Kol. 340, with the Scholia, and the\ncurious citation contained therein from the [Greek: Barbarika\\] of\nNymphodorus). The process of weaving was also conducted in a\ndifferent manner by the Egyptians. Whether Plato had seen finer\nwebs in Egypt than in Greece we cannot say.]\n\n[Footnote 99: Plato, Repub. v. p. 457 A.]\n\n[Side-note: His arguments against the ordinary doctrine.]\n\nThose who maintain (continues Plato) that because women are\ndifferent from men, therefore the occupations of the two ought to\nbe different--argue like vexatious disputants who mistake verbal\ndistinctions for real: who do not enquire what is the formal or\nspecific distinction indicated by a name, or whether it has any\nessential bearing on the matter under discussion.[100] Long-haired\nmen are different from bald-heads: but shall we conclude, that if\nthe former are fit to make shoes, the latter are unfit? Certainly\nnot: for when we inquire into the formal distinction connoted\nby these words, we find that it has no bearing upon such\nhandicraft processes. So again the formal distinction implied by\nthe terms _male_, _female_, in the human race as in\nother animals, lies altogether in the functions of sex and\nprocreation.[101] Now this has no essential bearing on the\noccupations of the adult; nor does it confer on the male fitness\nfor one set of occupations--on the female, fitness for another.\nEach sex is fit for all, but the male is most fit for all: in each\nsex there are individuals better and worse, and differing one from\nanother in special aptitudes. Men are competent for the duties of\nGuardians, only on condition of having gone through a complete\nmusical and gymnastical education. Women are competent also, under\nthe like condition; and are equally capable of profiting by the\ncomplete education. Moreover, the chiefs must select for those\nduties the best natural subjects. The total number of such is very\nlimited: and they must select the best that both sexes\nafford.[102]\n\n[Footnote 100: Plato, Republic, v. p. 454 A. [Greek: dia\\ to\\ m\u00ea\\\ndu/nastai kat' ei)/d\u00ea diairou/menoi to\\ lego/meon e)piskopei=n,\na)lla\\ kat' au)to\\ to\\ o)/noma di\u00f4/kein tou= lechthe/ntos t\u00ea\\n\ne)nanti/\u00f4sin, e)/ridi, ou) diale/kt\u00f4|, pro\\s a)ll\u00ea/lous\nchr\u00f4/menoi.] 454 B: [Greek: e)peskepsa/metha de\\ ou)d'\no(p\u00ea|ou=n, ti/ ei)=dos to\\ t\u00ea=s e(te/ras te kai\\ t\u00ea=s au)t\u00ea=s\nphu/se\u00f4s, kai\\ pro\\s ti/ tei=non \u00f4(rizo/metha to/te, o(/te ta\\\ne)pit\u00eadeu/mata a)/ll\u00ea| phu/sei a)/lla, t\u00ea=| de\\ au)t\u00ea=| ta\\\nau)ta/, a)pedi/domen.] Xenophon is entirely opposed to Plato on\nthis point. He maintains emphatically the distinct special\naptitudes of man and woman. Oeconom. vii. 20-38; compare\nEuripid. Electra, 74.]\n\n[Footnote 101: Plato, Repub. v. p. 455 C-D.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Plato, Repub. v. p. 456.]\n\n[Side-note: Opponents appealed to nature as an authority\nagainst Plato. He invokes Nature on his own side against them.]\n\nThe strong objections, generally entertained against thus\nassigning to women equal participation in the education and\nfunctions of the Guardians, were enforced by saying--That\nit was a proceeding contrary to Nature. But Plato not\nonly denies the validity of this argument: he even retorts it upon\nthe objectors, and affirms that the existing separation of functions\nbetween the two sexes is contrary to Nature, and that his\nproposition alone is conformable thereunto.[103] He has shown that\nthe specific or formal distinction of the two has no essential\nbearing on the question, and therefore that no argument can be\nfounded upon it. The specific or formal characteristic, in the\ncase of males, is doubtless superior, taken abstractedly: yet in\nparticular men it is embodied or manifested with various degrees\nof perfection, from very good to very bad. In the case of females,\nthough inferior abstractedly, it is in its best particular\nembodiments equal to all except the best males, and superior to\nall such as are inferior to the best. Accordingly, the true\ndictate of Nature is, not merely that females _may be_ taken,\nbut that they _ought to be_ taken, conjointly with males,\nunder the selection of the Rulers, to fulfil the most important\nduties in the Commonwealth. The select females must go through the\nsame musical and gymnastic training as the males. He who ridicules\nthem for such bodily exercises, prosecuted with a view to the best\nobjects, does not know what he is laughing at. \"For this is the\nmost valuable maxim which is now, or ever has been,\nproclaimed--What is useful, is honourable. What is hurtful, is\nbase.\"[104]\n\n[Footnote 103: Plato, Repub. v. p. 456 C. [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra\na)du/nata/ ge, ou)de\\ eu)chai=s o(/moia, e)nomothetou=men,\ne)pei/per kata\\ phu/sin e)ti/themen to\\n no/mon; a)lla\\ ta\\ nu=n\npara\\ tau=ta gigno/mena para\\ phu/sin ma=llon, \u00f4(s e)/oike,\ngi/gnetai.]]\n\n[Footnote 104: Plato, Repub. v. p. 457 B. [Greek: O( de\\ gel\u00f4=n\na)n\u00ea\\r e)pi\\ gumnai=s gunaixi/, tou= belti/stou e(/neka\ngumnazome/nais, a)tel\u00ea= tou= geloi/ou sophi/as dre/p\u00f4n karpo/n,\nou)de\\n oi)=den, \u00f4(s e)/oiken, e)ph' \u00f4(=| gela=| ou)d' o(/, ti\npra/ttei; ka/llista ga\\r d\u00ea\\ tou=to kai\\ le/getai kai\\\nlele/xetai, o(/ti to\\ me\\n \u00f4)phe/limon, kalo/n--to\\ de\\\nblabero/n, ai)schro/n.]]\n\n[Side-note: Collective family relations and denominations\namong the Guardians.]\n\nPlato now proceeds to unfold the relations of the sexes as\nintended to prevail among the mature Guardians, after all have\nundergone the public and common training from their earliest\ninfancy. He conceives them as one thousand in total number,\ncomposed of both sexes in nearly equal proportion: since they are\nto be the best individuals of both sexes, the male sex, superior\nin formal characteristic, will probably furnish rather a greater\nnumber than the female. It has already been stated that they are\nall required to live together in barracks, dining at a common\nmess-table, with clothing and furniture alike for all. There is no\nindividual property or separate house among them: the collective\nexpense, in a comfortable but moderate way, is defrayed by\ncontributions from the producing class. Separate families are\nunknown: all the Guardians, male and female, form one family, and\none only: the older are fathers and mothers of all the younger,\nthe younger are sons and daughters of all the older: those of the\nsame age are all alike brothers and sisters of each other: those\nwho, besides being of the same age, are within the limits of the\nnuptial age and of different sexes, are all alike husbands and\nwives of each other.[105] It is the principle of the Platonic\nCommonwealth that the affections implied in these family-words,\ninstead of being confined to one or a few exclusively, shall\nbe expanded so as to embrace all of appropriate age.\n\n[Footnote 105: Plato, Republic, v. p. 457 C-D. [Greek: ta\\s\ngunai=kas tau/tas t\u00f4=n a)ndr\u00f4=n tou/t\u00f4n pa/nt\u00f4n pa/sas ei)=nai\nkoina/s, i)di/a| de\\ m\u00eadeni\\ m\u00eademi/an sunoikei=n; kai\\ tou\\s\npai=das au)= koinou/s, kai\\ m\u00ea/te gone/a e)/kgonon ei)de/nai to\\n\nau)tou= m\u00ea/te pai=da gone/a.]]\n\n[Side-note: Restrictions upon sexual intercourse--Purposes\nof such restrictions.]\n\nBut Plato does not at all intend that sexual intercourse shall\ntake place between these men and women promiscuously, or at the\npleasure of individuals. On the contrary, he expressly denounces\nand interdicts it.[106] A philosopher who has so much general\ndisdain for individual impulse or choice, was not likely to\nsanction it in this particular case. Indeed it is the special\npurpose of his polity to bring impulse absolutely under the\ncontroul of reason, or of that which he assumes as such. This\npurpose is followed out in a remarkable manner as to procreation.\nWhat he seeks as lawgiver is, to keep the numbers of the Guardians\nnearly stationary, with no diminution and scarcely any\nincrease:[107] and to maintain the breed pure, so that the\nchildren born shall be as highly endowed by nature as possible. To\nthese two objects the liberty of sexual intercourse is made\nsubservient. The breeding is regulated like that of noble horses\nor dogs by an intelligent proprietor: the best animals of both\nsexes being brought together, and the limits of age fixed\nbeforehand.[108] Plato prescribes, as the limits of age, from\ntwenty to forty for females--from thirty to fifty-five for\nmales--when the powers of body and mind are at the maximum in both.\nAll who are younger as well as all who are older, are expressly\nforbidden to meddle in the procreation _for the city_: this\nbeing a public function.[109] Between the ages above named,\ncouples will be invited to marry in such numbers as the Rulers may\nconsider expedient for ensuring a supply of offspring sufficient\nand not more than sufficient--having regard to wars, distempers,\nor any other recent causes of mortality.[110]\n\n[Footnote 106: Plato, Repub. v. p. 458 E. [Greek: a)ta/kt\u00f4s me\\n\nmi/gnusthai a)ll\u00ea/lois \u00ea)\\ a)/llo o(tiou=n poiei=n ou)/te\no(/sion e)n eu)daimo/n\u00f4n po/lei ou)/t' e)a/sousin oi(\na)/rchontes.]]\n\n[Footnote 107: Plato, Republic, v. p. 460 A. [Greek: to\\ de\\\npl\u00ea=thos t\u00f4=n ga/m\u00f4n e)pi\\ toi=s a)/rchousi poi\u00ea/somen, i(/n'\n\u00f4(s ma/lista dias\u00f4/z\u00f4si to\\n au)to\\n a)rithmo\\n t\u00f4=n\na)ndr\u00f4=n, pro\\s pole/mous te kai\\ no/sous kai\\ pa/nta ta\\\ntoiau=ta a)poskopou=ntes, kai\\ m\u00ea/te mega/l\u00ea \u00ea(mi=n \u00ea( po/lis\nkata\\ to\\ dunato\\n m\u00ea/te smikra\\ gi/gn\u00eatai.]]\n\n[Footnote 108: Plato, Repub. v. p. 459.]\n\n[Footnote 109: This is his phrase, repeated more than\nonce--[Greek: ti/ktein t\u00ea=| po/lei, genna=|n t\u00ea=| po/lei--t\u00f4=n\nei)s to\\ koino\\n genn\u00ea/se\u00f4n] (pp. 460-461).\n\nWhat Lucan (ii. 387) observes about Cato of Utica, is applicable\nto the Guardians of the Platonic Republic:--\n\n\"Venerisque huic maximus usus\nProgenies. Urbi pater est, Urbique maritus.\"]\n\n[Footnote 110: Plato, Repub. v. p. 460 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Regulations about marriages and family.]\n\nThere is no part of the Platonic system in which individual choice\nis more decidedly eliminated, and the intervention of the Rulers\nmade more constantly paramount, than this respecting the\nmarriages: and Plato declares it to be among the greatest\ndifficulties which they will have to surmount. They will establish\nfestivals, in which they bring together the brides and\nbridegrooms, with hymns, prayer, and sacrifices, to the Gods: they\nwill determine by lot what couples shall be joined, so as to make\nup the number settled as appropriate: but they will arrange the\nsortition themselves so cleverly, that what appears chance to\nothers will be a result to them predetermined. The best men will\nthus always be assorted with the best women, the inferior with the\ninferior: but this will appear to every one, except themselves,\nthe result of chance.[111] Any young man (of thirty and upwards)\ndistinguished for bravery or excellence will be allowed to have\nmore than one wife; since it is good not merely to recompense his\nmerit, but also to multiply his breed.[112]\n\n[Footnote 111: Plato, Repub. v. p. 460.]\n\n[Footnote 112: Plato, Repub. v. pp. 460 B, 468 C. In the latter\npassage it even appears that he is allowed to make a choice.]\n\nIn the seventh month, or in the tenth month, after the ceremonial\nday, offspring will be born, from these unions. But the children,\nimmediately on being born, will be taken away from their mothers,\nand confided to nurses in an appropriate lodgment. The mothers\nwill be admitted to suckle them, and wet-nurses will also be\nprovided, as far as necessary: but the period for the mother to\nsuckle will be abridged as much as possible, and all other trouble\nrequired for the care of infancy will be undertaken, not by her,\nbut by the nurses. Moreover the greatest precautions will be taken\nthat no mother shall know her own child: which is considered to be\npracticable, since many children will be born at nearly the same\ntime.[113] The children in infancy will be examined by the Rulers\nand other good judges, who will determine how many of them are\nsufficiently well constituted to promise fitness for the duties of\nGuardians. The children of the good and vigorous couples, except\nin any case of bodily deformity, will be brought up and placed\nunder the public training for Guardians: the unpromising children,\nand those of the inferior couples, being regarded as not fit\nsubjects for the public training, will be secretly got rid of, or\nplaced among the producing class of the Commonwealth.[114]\n\n[Footnote 113: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 460 D, 461 D.]\n\n[Footnote 114: Compare Republic, v. pp. 459 D, 460 C, 461 C, with\nTim\u00e6us, p. 19 A. In Tim\u00e6us, where the leading doctrines of the\nRepublic are briefly recapitulated, Plato directs that the\nchildren considered as unworthy shall be secretly distributed\namong the remaining community, _i.e._ not among the\nGuardians: in the Republic itself, his language, though not clear,\nseems to imply that they shall be exposed and got rid of.]\n\n[Side-note: Procreative powers of individual Guardians\nrequired to be held at the disposal of the rulers, for purity of\nbreed.]\n\nWhat Plato here understands by marriage, is a special, solemn,\nconsecrated, coupling for the occasion, with a view to breed for\nthe public. It constitutes no permanent bond between the two\npersons coupled: who are brought together by the authorities under\na delusive sortition, but who may perhaps never be brought\ntogether at any future sortition, unless it shall please the same\nauthorities. The case resembles that of a breeding stud of horses\nand mares, to which Plato compares it: nothing else is wanted but\nthe finest progeny attainable. But this, in Plato's judgment, is\nthe most important of all purposes: his commonwealth cannot\nmaintain itself except under a superior breed of Guardians.\nAccordingly, he invests his marriages with the greatest possible\nsanctity. The religious solemnities accompanying them are\nessential to furnish security for the goodness of the offspring.\nAny proceeding, either of man or woman, which contravenes the\nprovisions of the rulers on this point, is peremptorily forbidden:\nand any child, born from unauthorised intercourse without the\nrequisite prayers and sacrifices, is considered as an outcast.\nWithin the limits of the connubial age, all persons of both sexes\nhold their procreative powers exclusively at the disposition of\nthe lawgiver. But after that age is past, both men and women may\nindulge in intercourse with whomsoever they please, since they are\nno longer in condition to procreate for the public. They are\nsubject only to this one condition: not to produce any children,\nor, if perchance they do, not to bring them up.[115] There is\nmoreover one restriction upon the personal liberty of intercourse,\nafter the connubial limits of age. No intercourse is permitted\nbetween father and daughter, or between mother and son. But how\ncan such restriction be enforced, since no individual paternity or\nmaternity is recognised in the Commonwealth? Plato answers by\nadmitting a collective paternity and maternity. Every child born\nin the seventh month or in the tenth month after a couple have\nbeen solemnly wedded will be considered by them as their son or\ndaughter, and will consider himself as such.[116]\n\n[Footnote 115: Plato, Repub. v. p. 461 C.]\n\n[Footnote 116: Plato, Repub. v. p. 461 D.]\n\nBesides all these direct provisions for the purity of the breed of\nGuardians, which will succeed (so Plato anticipates) in a large\nmajority of cases--the Rulers will keep up an effective\nsupervision of detail, so as to exclude any unworthy exception,\nand even to admit into the Guardians any youth of very rare and\nexceptional promise who may be born among the remaining community.\nFor Plato admits that there may be accidental births both ways:\nbrass and iron may by occasional accident give birth to gold or\nsilver--and _vice vers\u00e2_.\n\n[Side-note: Purpose to create an intimate and equal sympathy\namong all the Guardians, but to prevent exclusive sympathy of\nparticular members.]\n\nIt is in this manner that Plato constitutes his body of Guardians;\none thousand adult persons of both sexes,[117] in nearly equal\nnumbers, together with a small proportion of children--the\nproportion of these latter must be very small since the total\nnumber is not allowed to increase. His end here is to create an\nintimate and equal sympathy among them all, like that between all\nthe members of the same bodily organism: to abolish all\nindependent and exclusive sympathies of particular parts: to make\nthe city One and Indivisible--a single organism, instead of many\ndistinct conterminous organisms: to provide that the causes of\npleasure and pain shall be the same to all, so that a man shall\nhave no feeling of mine or thine, except in reference to his own\nbody and that of another, which Plato notes as the greatest\ngood--instead of each individual struggling apart for his own objects\nand rejoicing on occasions when his neighbour sorrows, which Plato\nregards as the greatest evil.[118] All standing causes of\ndisagreement or antipathy among the Guardians are assumed to be\nthus removed. But if any two hot-headed youths get into a\nquarrel, they must fight it out on the spot. This will serve as a\nlesson in gymnastics:--subject however to the interference of any\nold man as by-stander, whom they as well as all other young men\nare bound implicitly to obey.[119] Moreover all the miseries,\nprivations, anxiety, and dependence, inseparable from the life of\na poor man under the system of private property, will disappear\nentirely.[120]\n\n[Footnote 117: This number of 1000 appears stated by Aristotle\n(Politic. ii. 6, p. 1265, a. 9), and is probably derived from\nRepublic, iv. p. 423 A; though that passage appears scarcely\nsufficient to prove that Plato meant to declare the number 1000 as\nperemptory. However the understanding of Aristotle himself on the\npoint is one material evidence to make us believe that this is the\nreal construction intended by Plato.]\n\n[Footnote 118: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 462-463-464 D. [Greek: dia\\\nto\\ m\u00eade/na i)/dion e)kt\u00ea=sthai pl\u00ea\\n to\\ s\u00f4=ma, ta\\ de\\\na)/lla koina/.] Compare Plato, Legg. v. p. 739 C.]\n\n[Footnote 119: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 464-465.]\n\n[Footnote 120: Plato, Republic, v. p. 465 C.]\n\nSuch are the main features of Plato's Republic, in reference to\nhis Guardians. They afford a memorable example of that\nphilosophical analysis, applied to the circumstances of man and\nsociety, which the Greek mind was the first to conceive and follow\nout. Plato lays down his ends with great distinctness, as well as\nthe means whereby he proposes to attain them. Granting his ends,\nthe means proposed are almost always suitable and appropriate,\nwhether practicable or otherwise.\n\n[Side-note: Platonic scheme--partial communism.]\n\nThe Platonic scheme is communism, so far as concerns the\nGuardians: but not communism in reference to the entire\nCommonwealth. In this it falls short of his own ideal, and is only\na second best: the best of all would be, in his view, a communion\nthat should pervade all persons and all acts and sentiments,\neffacing altogether the separate self.[121] Not venturing to soar\nso high, he confined his perfect communion to the Guardians.\nMoreover his communism differs from modern theories in this. They\ncontemplate individual producers and labourers, handing over the\nproduce to be distributed among themselves by official authority;\nthey contemplate also a regulation not merely of distribution, but\nof reserved capital and productive agency, under the same\nauthority. But the Platonic Guardians are not producers at all.\nEverything which they consume is found for them. They are in the\nnature of paid functionaries, exempted from all cares and anxiety\nof self-maintenance, either present or future. They are all\ncomfortably provided, without hopes of wealth or fear of poverty:\nmoreover they are all equally comfortable, so that no sentiment\ncan grow up among them, arising from comparison of each other's\npossessions or enjoyments. Among such men and women, brought\nup from infancy as Plato directs, the sentiment of property, with\nall the multifarious associations derived from it, would be\nunknown. No man's self-esteem, no man's esteem of others, would\nturn upon it.\n\n[Footnote 121: See Plato, De Legibus, v. p. 739 D. The Republic is\n_second best_; that which appears sketched in the treatise De\nLegibus is _third best_.]\n\nIn this respect, the remaining members of the city, apart from the\nGuardians, and furnishing all the subsistence of the Guardians,\nare differently circumstanced. They are engaged in different modes\nof production, each exclusively in one mode. They exchange, buy,\nand sell, with each other: there exist therefore among them\ngradations of strength, skill, perseverance, frugality, and good\nluck--together with the consequent gradations of wealth and\npoverty. The substance or capital of the Commonwealth is\nmaintained altogether by the portion of it which is extraneous to\nthe Guardians; and among that portion there is no communism. The\nmaintenance of the Guardians is a tax which these men have to pay:\nbut after paying it, they apply or enjoy the rest of their produce\nas they please, subject to the requirements of the Rulers for\npublic service.[122]\n\n[Footnote 122: Aristotle, in his comments upon the Platonic\nRepublic (Politic. ii. 5. p. 1262, b. 42 seq.), advances arguments\njust in themselves, in favour of individual property, and against\ncommunity of property. But these arguments have little application\nto the Republic.]\n\nNevertheless we are obliged to divine what Plato means about the\ncondition of the producing classes in his Commonwealth. He himself\ntells us little or nothing about them; though they must constitute\nthe large numerical majority. And this defect is in him the less\nexcusable, since he reckons them as component members of his\nCommonwealth; while Aristotle, in his ideal Commonwealth, does not\nreckon them as component members or citizens, but merely as\nindispensable adjuncts, in the same manner as slaves. All that we\nknow about the producers in the Platonic Commonwealth is, that\neach man is to have only one business--that for which he is most\nfit:--and that all are to be under the administration of the\nRulers through the Guardians.\n\n[Side-note: Soldiership as a separate profession has\nacquired greater development in modern times.]\n\nThe enlistment of soldiers, apart from civilians, and the holding\nof them under distinct laws and stricter discipline, is a practice\nfamiliar to modern ideas, though it had little place among the\nGreeks of Plato's day. There prevailed also in Egypt[123] and in\nparts of Eastern Asia, from time immemorial, a distinction of\ncastes: one caste being soldiers, invested with the defence of the\ncountry, and enjoying certain lands by the tenure of such military\nservice: but in other respects, private proprietors like the\nrest--and receiving no special discipline, training, or education.\nIn Grecian Ideas, military duties were a part, but only a part, of\nthe duties of a citizen. This was the case even at Sparta. Though\nin practice, the discipline of that city tended in a preponderant\ndegree towards military aptitude, yet the Spartan was still a\ncitizen, not exclusively a soldier.\n\n[Footnote 123: Aristot. Politic. vii. 10. Herodot. ii. 164. Plato\nalludes (Tim\u00e6. 24 A) to the analogy of Egyptian castes.]\n\n[Side-note: Spartan institutions--great impression which\nthey produced upon speculative Greek minds.]\n\nIt was from the Spartan institutions (and the Kretan, in many\nrespects analogous) that the speculative political philosophers in\nGreece usually took the point of departure for their theories. Not\nonly Plato did so, but Xenophon and Aristotle likewise. The most\nmaterial fact which they saw before them at Sparta was, a public\ndiscipline both strict and continued, which directed the movements\nof the citizens, and guided their thoughts and feelings, from\ninfancy to old age. To this supreme controul the private feelings,\nboth of family and property, though not wholly suppressed, were\nmade to bend: and occasionally in a way quite as remarkable as any\nrestrictions proposed by either Plato or Xenophon.[124] Moreover,\nthe Spartan institutions were of immemorial antiquity; believed to\nhave been suggested or sanctioned originally by Apollo and the\nDelphian oracle, as the Kretan institutions were by Zeus.[125]\nThey had lasted longer than other Hellenic institutions without\nforcible subversion: they obtained universal notice, admiration,\nand deference, throughout Greece. It was this conspicuous fact\nwhich emboldened the Grecian theorists to postulate for the\nlawgiver that unbounded controul, over the life and habits of\ncitizens, which we read not merely in the Republic of Plato but in\nthe Cyrop\u00e6dia of Xenophon, and to a great degree even in the\nPolitica of Aristotle. To an objector, who asked them how they\ncould possibly expect that individuals would submit to such\nunlimited interference, they would have replied--\"Look at\nSparta. You see there interference, as constant and rigorous as\nthat which I propose, endured by the citizens not only without\nresistance, but with a tenacity and long continuance such as is\nnot found among other communities with more lax regulations. The\nhabits and sentiments of the Spartan citizen are fashioned to\nthese institutions. Far from being anxious to shake them off, he\naccounts them a necessity as well as an honour.\" This reply would\nhave appeared valid and reasonable, in the fourth century before\nthe Christian era. And it explains--what, after all, is the most\nsurprising circumstance to a modern reader--the extreme boldness\nof speculation, the ideal omnipotence, assumed by the leading\nGrecian political theorists: much even by Aristotle, though his\naspirations were more limited and practical--far more by\nXenophon--most of all by Plato. Any theorist, proceeding avowedly\n[Greek: kat' eu)ch\u00ea\\n], considered himself within bounds when he\nassumed to himself no greater influence than had actually been\nexercised by Lykurgus.\n\n[Footnote 124: See Xenophon, Hellenic. vi. 4, 16, the account of\nwhat passed at Sparta after the battle of Leuktra, related also in\nmy \"History of Greece,\" chap. 78, vol. x. p. 253.]\n\n[Footnote 125: Plato, Legg. i. pp. 632 D, 634 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Plans of these speculative minds compared with\nSpartan--Different types of character contemplated.]\n\nAssuming such influence, however, he intended to employ it for\nends approved by himself: agreeing with Lykurgus in the general\nprinciple of forming the citizen's character by public and\ncompulsory discipline, but not agreeing with him in the type of\ncharacter proper to be aimed at. Xenophon departs least from the\nSpartan type: Aristotle and Plato greatly more, though in\ndifferent directions. Each of them applies to a certain extent the\nprocess of abstraction and analysis both to the individual and to\nthe community: considering both of them as made up of component\nelements working simultaneously either in co-operation or\nconflict. But in Plato the abstraction is carried farthest: the\nwholeness of the individual Guardian is completely effaced, so\nthat each constitutes a small fraction or wheel of the real\nPlatonic whole--the commonwealth. The fundamental Platonic\nprinciple is, that each man shall have one function, and one only:\nan extreme application of that which political economists call the\ndivision of labour. Among these many different functions, one, and\ndoubtless the most difficult as well as important, is that of\ndirecting, administering, and defending the community: which is\ndone by the Guardians and Rulers. It is to this one function\nthat all Plato's treatise is devoted: he tells us how such persons\nare to be trained and circumstanced. What he describes, therefore,\nis not properly citizens administering their own affairs, but\ncommanders and officers watching over the interests of others: a\nsort of military _bureaucracy_, with chiefs at its head,\ndirecting as well as guarding a multitude beneath them. And what\nmainly distinguishes the Platonic system, is the extreme\nabstraction with which this public and official character is\nconceived: the degree to which the whole man is merged in the\nperformance of his official duties: the entire extinction within\nhim of the old individual Adam--of all private feelings and\ninterests.\n\n[Side-note: Plato carries abstraction farther than Xenophon\nor Aristotle.]\n\nBoth in Xenophon and in Aristotle, as well as at Sparta, the\ncitizen is subjected to a public compulsory training, severe as\nwell as continuous: but he is still a citizen as well as a\nfunctionary. He has private interests as well as public duties:--a\nseparate home, property, wife, and family. Plato, on the contrary,\ncontends that the two are absolutely irreconcileable: that if the\nGuardian has private anxieties for his own maintenance, private\nhouse and lands to manage, private sympathies and antipathies to\ngratify--he will become unfaithful to his duties as Guardian, and\nwill oppress instead of protecting the people.[126] You must\nchoose between the two (he says): you cannot have the self-caring\ncitizen and the public-minded Guardian in one.[127]\n\n[Footnote 126: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 416-417.]\n\n[Footnote 127: See the contrary opinion asserted by Nikias in his\nspeech at Athens, Thucyd. vi. 9.]\n\n[Side-note: Anxiety shown by Plato for the good treatment of\nthe Demos, greater than that shown by Xenophon and Aristotle.]\n\nLooking to ideal perfection, I think Plato is right. If the Rulers\nand Guardians have private interests of their own, those interests\nwill corrupt more or less the discharge of their public duties.\nThe evil may be mitigated, by forms of government (representative\nand other arrangements), which make the continuance of power\ndependent upon popular estimation of the functionaries: but it\ncannot be abolished. Neither Xenophon, nor Aristotle, nor the\nSpartan system, provided any remedy for this difficulty. They\nscarcely even recognise the difficulty as real. In all the three,\nthe proportion of trained citizens to the rest of the people,\nwould be about the same (so far as we can judge) as the\nproportion of the Platonic Guardians to the Demos or rest of the\npeople. But when we look to see what security either of the three\nsystems provide for good behaviour on the part of citizens towards\nnon-citizens, we find no satisfaction; nor do they make it, as\nPlato does, one prominent object of their public training. Plato\nshows extreme anxiety for the object: as is proved by his\nsacrificing, in order to ensure it, all the private sources of\npleasure to his Guardians. Aristotle reproaches him with doing\nthis, so as to reduce the happiness of his Guardians to nothing:\nbut Plato, from his own point of view, would not admit the justice\nof such reproach, since he considers happiness to be derived from,\nand proportional to, the performance of duty.\n\n[Side-note: In Aristotle's theory, the Demos are not\nconsidered as members of the Commonwealth, but as adjuncts.]\n\nThis last point must be perpetually kept in mind, in following\nPlato's reasoning. But though he does not consider himself as\nsacrificing the happiness of his Guardians to their duty, we must\ngive him credit for anxiety, greater than either Aristotle or\nXenophon has shown, to ensure a faithful discharge of duty on the\npart of the Guardians towards the rest of the people. In\nAristotle's theory,[128] the rest of the people are set aside as\nnot members of the Commonwealth, thus counting as a secondary and\ninferior object in his estimation; while the citizens, who alone\nare members, are trained to practise virtue for its own sake and\nfor their own happiness. In Plato's theory, the rest of the people\nare not only proclaimed as members of the Commonwealth,[129] but\nare the ultimate and capital objects of all his solicitude. It is\nin protecting, governing, and administering them, that the lives\nof the Rulers and Guardians are passed. Though they (the remaining\npeople) receive no public training, yet Plato intends them to reap\nall the benefit of the laborious training bestowed on the\nGuardians. This is a larger and more generous conception of the\npurpose of political institutions, than we find either in\nAristotle or in Xenophon.\n\n[Footnote 128: Aristotle, Politic. vii. 9, p. 1328, b. 40, p.\n1329, a. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 129: Aristot. Politic. ii. 5, p. 1264, a. 12-26,\nrespecting the Platonic Commonwealth, [Greek: kai/toi schedo\\n\nto/ge pl\u00ea=thos t\u00ea=s po/le\u00f4s to\\ t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n polit\u00f4=n\ngi/netai pl\u00ea=thos], &c. . . .\n\n[Greek: Poiei= ga\\r] (Plato) [Greek: tou\\s me\\n phu/lakas oi(=on\nphrourou/s, tou\\s de\\ ge\u00f4rgou\\s kai\\ tou\\s techni/tas kai\\ tou\\s\na)/llous, poli/tas.]]\n\n[Side-note: Objection urged by Aristotle against the\nPlatonic Republic, that it will be two cities. Spiritual pride of\nthe Guardians, contempt for the Demos.]\n\nThere is however another objection, which seems grave and\nwell founded, advanced by Aristotle against the Platonic\nRepublic. He remarks that it will be not one city, but two cities,\nwith tendencies more or less adverse to each other:[130] that the\nGuardians, educated under the very peculiar training and placed\nunder the peculiar relations prescribed to them, will form one\ncity--while the remaining people, who have no part either in the\none or the other, but are private proprietors with separate\nfamilies--will form another city. I do not see what reply the\nPlatonic Republic furnishes to this objection. Granting full\nsuccess to Plato in his endeavours to make the Guardians One among\nthemselves, we find nothing to make them One with the remaining\npeople, nor to make the remaining people One with them.[131] On\nthe contrary, we observe such an extreme divergence of sentiment,\ncharacter, pursuit, and education, as to render mutual sympathy\nvery difficult, and to open fatal probabilities of mutual\nalienation: probabilities hardly less, than if separate\nproprietary interests had been left to subsist among the\nGuardians. This is a source of mischief which Plato has not taken\ninto his account. The entire body of Guardians cannot fail to\ncarry in their bosoms a sense of extreme pride in their own\ntraining, and a proportionally mean estimate of the untrained\nmultitude alongside of them. The sentiment of the gold and silver\nmen, towards the brass and iron men, will have in it too much of\ncontempt to be consistent with civic fraternity: like the pride of\nthe Twice-Born Hindoo Brahmin, when comparing himself with the\nlower Hindoo castes: or like that of the Pythagorean brotherhood,\nwho \"regarded the brethren as equal to the blessed Gods, but held\nall the rest to be unworthy of any account\".[132] The Spartan\ntraining appears to have produced a similar effect upon the minds\nof the citizens who went through it. And indeed such an\neffect appears scarcely avoidable, under the circumstances assumed\nby Plato. He himself is proud of his own ideal training, so as to\nascribe to those who receive it a sentiment akin to that of the\nOlympic victors: while he employs degrading analogies to signify\nthe pursuits and enjoyments of the untrained multitude, who are\nassimilated to the appetite or lower element in the organism,\nexisting only as a mutinous crew necessary to be kept down.[133]\nThat spiritual pride, coupled with spiritual contempt, should be\nfelt by the Guardians, is the natural result; as it is indeed the\nessential reimbursement to their feelings, for the life of drill\nand self-denial which Plato imposes upon them. And how, under such\na sentiment, the two constituent elements in his system are to be\ncompetent to work out his promised result of mutual happiness, he\nhas not shown.[134]\n\n[Footnote 130: Aristotel. Politic. ii. 5, p. 1264, a. 24. [Greek:\ne)n mia=| ga\\r po/lei du/o po/leis, a)nagkai=on ei)=nai, kai\\\ntau/tas u(penanti/as a)ll\u00ea/lais.]\n\nThe most forcible of the objections urged by Aristotle against the\nPlatonic Republic, are those contained in this chapter respecting\nthe relations between the Guardians and the rest of the\ncommunity.]\n\n[Footnote 131: The oneness, which Plato proclaims as belonging to\nhis whole city, belongs in reality only to the body of Guardians;\nof whom he sometimes speaks as if they were the whole city, which\nhowever is not his real intention; see Republic, v. p. 462-463\nA.]\n\n[Footnote 132: [Greek: Tou\\s me\\n e(tai/rous \u00ea)=gen i)/sous\nmaka/ressi theoi=sin,\nTou\\s d' a)/llous \u00ea(gei=t' ou)/t' e)n lo/g\u00f4| ou)/t' e)n\na)rithm\u00f4=|.]]\n\n[Footnote 133: Plato, Republ. v. 465 D.\n\nAristotle says (in the Nikom. Ethics, i. 5) when discussing the\nvarious ideas entertained about happiness--[Greek: Oi( me\\n ou)=n\npolloi\\ pantel\u00f4=s a)ndrapod\u00f4/deis phai/nontai bosk\u00eama/t\u00f4n\nbi/on proairou/menoi.] This is much the estimation which the\nPlatonic Guardians would be apt to form respecting the Demos.]\n\n[Footnote 134: The foregoing remarks are an expansion, and a\nsequel, of Aristotle's objection against the Platonic\nRepublic--That it is not One City, but two discordant cities in that\nwhich is nominally One. I must however add that the same objection\nmay be urged against the Xenophontic constitution of a city; and\nalso, in substance, even against the proposition of Aristotle himself\nfor the same purpose. Xenophon, in his Cyrop\u00e6dia, proposes a\nsevere, life-long drill and discipline, like that of the Spartans:\nfrom which indeed he does not formally exclude any citizens, but\nwhich he announces to be actually attended only by the wealthy,\nsince they alone can afford to attend continuously and habitually,\nthe poorer men being engaged in the cares of maintenance. All the\nfunctions of the state, civil and military, are performed\nexclusively by those who go through the public discipline. We have\nhere the two cities in One, which Aristotle objects to in Plato;\nwith the consequent loss of civic fraternity between them. And\nwhen we look to that which Aristotle himself suggests, we find him\nevading the objection by a formal sanction of the very mischief\nupon which the objection is founded. He puts the husbandmen and\nartisans altogether out of the pale of his city, which is made to\ninclude the disciplined citizens or Guardians alone. His city may\nthus be called One, inasmuch as it admits only homogeneous\nelements, and throws out all such as are heterogeneous; but he\nthus avowedly renounces as insoluble the problem which Plato and\nXenophon try, though unsuccessfully, to solve. If there be discord\nand alienation among the constituent members of the Platonic and\nXenophontic city--there will subsist the like feelings, in\nAristotle's proposition, between the members of the city and the\noutlying, though indispensable, adjuncts. There will be the same\nmischief in kind, and probably exaggerated in amount: since the\nabolition of the very name and idea of fellow-citizen tends to\nsuppress altogether an influence of tutelary character, however\ninsufficient as to its force.]\n\n[Side-note: Plato's scheme fails, mainly because he provides\nno training for the Demos.]\n\nIn explanation of the foregoing remarks, I will add that Plato\nfails in his purpose not from the goodness of the training which\nhe provides for his select Few, but from leaving the rest of his\npeople without any training--without even so much as would\nenable them properly to appreciate superior training in the few\nwho obtain it--without any powers of self-defence or\nself-helpfulness. His fundamental postulate--That every man shall do\nonly one thing--when applied to the Guardians, realises itself in\nsomething great and considerable: but when applied to the ordinary\npursuits of life, reduces every man to a special machine, unfit\nfor any other purpose than its own. Though it is reasonable that a\nman should get his living by one trade, and should therefore\nqualify himself peculiarly and effectively for that trade--it is\nnot reasonable that he should be altogether impotent as to every\nthing else: nor that his happiness should consist, as Plato\ndeclares that it ought, exclusively in the performance of this one\nservice to the commonwealth. In the Platonic Republic, the body of\nthe people are represented not only as without training, but as\nmachines rather than individual men. They exist partly as\nproducers to maintain, partly as governable matter to obey, the\nGuardians; and to be cared for by them.\n\n[Side-note: Principle of Aristotle--That every citizen\nbelongs to the city, not to himself--applied by Plato to women.]\n\nAristotle, when speaking about the citizens of his own ideal\ncommonwealth (his citizens form nearly the same numerical\nproportion of the whole population, as the Platonic Guardians),\ntells us--\"Since the End for which the entire City exists is One,\nit is obviously necessary that the education of all the citizens\nshould be one and the same, and that the care of such education\nshould be a public duty--not left in private hands as it is now,\nfor a man to teach his children what he thinks fit. Public\nexigencies must be provided for by public training. Moreover, we\nought not to regard any of the citizens as belonging to himself,\nbut all of them as belonging to the city: for each is a part of\nthe city: and nature prescribes that the care of each part shall\nbe regulated with a view to the care of the whole.\"[135]\n\n[Footnote 135: Aristotel. Politic. viii. 1, p. 1337, [Greek:\nE)pei\\ d' e(\\n to\\ te/los t\u00ea=| po/lei pa/s\u00ea|, phanero\\n o(/ti\nkai\\ t\u00ea\\n paidei/an mi/an kai\\ t\u00ea\\n au)t\u00ea\\n a)nagkai=on ei)=nai\npa/nt\u00f4n, kai\\ tau/t\u00eas t\u00ea\\n e)pime/leian ei)=nai koin\u00ea\\n kai\\\nm\u00ea\\ kat' i)di/an; o(\\n tro/pon nu=n e(/kastos e)pimelei=tai t\u00f4=n\nau)tou= te/kn\u00f4n i)di/a te kai\\ ma/th\u00easin i)di/an, \u00ea(\\n a)\\n\ndo/x\u00ea|, dida/sk\u00f4n . . . A(/ma de\\ ou)de\\ chr\u00ea\\ nomi/zein\nau)to\\n au(tou= tina\\ ei)=nai t\u00f4=n polit\u00f4=n, a)lla\\ pa/ntas\nt\u00ea=s po/le\u00f4s . . . \u00ea( d' e)pime/leias pe/phuken e(ka/stou\nmori/ou ble/pein pro\\s t\u00ea\\n tou= o(/lou e)pime/leian.]]\n\nThe broad principle thus laid down by Aristotle is common to\nhim with Plato, and lies at the bottom of the schemes of\npolity imagined by both. Each has his own way of applying it.\n\nPlato clearly perceives that it cannot be applied with consistency\nand effect, unless women are brought under its application as well\nas men. And to a great extent, Aristotle holds the same opinion\ntoo. While commending the Spartan principle, that the character of\nthe citizen must be formed and upheld by continued public training\nand discipline--Aristotle blames Lykurgus for leaving the women\n(that is, a numerical half of the city) without training or\ndiscipline; which omission produced (he says) very mischievous\neffects, especially in corrupting the character of the men. He\npronounces this to be a serious fault, making the constitution\ninconsistent and self-contradictory, and indeed contrary to the\nintentions of Lykurgus himself; who had tried to bring the women\nunder public discipline as well as the men, but was forced to\ndesist by their strenuous opposition.[136] Such remarks from\nAristotle are the more remarkable, since it appears as matter of\nhistory, that the maidens at Sparta (though not the married women)\ndid to a great extent go through gymnastic exercises along with\nthe young men.[137] These exercises, though almost a singular\nexception in Greece, must have appeared to Aristotle very\ninsufficient. What amount or kind of regulation he himself would\npropose for women, he has not defined. In his own ideal\ncommonwealth, he lays it down as alike essential for men and women\nto have their bodies trained and exercised so as to be adequate to\nthe active duties of free persons (as contrasted with the harder\npreparation requisite for the athletic contests, which he\ndisapproves), but he does not go into farther particulars.[138]\nThe regulations which he proposes, too, with reference to marriage\ngenerally and to the maintenance of a vigorous breed of citizens,\nshow, that he considered it an important part of the lawgiver's\nduty to keep up by positive interference the physical condition\nboth of males and females.[139]\n\n[Footnote 136: Aristotel. Politic. ii. 9, p. 1269, b. 12. [Greek:\nE)/ti d' \u00ea( peri\\ ta\\s gunai=kas a)/nesis kai\\ pro\\s t\u00ea\\n\nproai/resin t\u00ea=s politei/as blabera\\ kai\\ pro\\s eu)daimoni/an\npo/le\u00f4s . . . \u00d4(st' e)n o(/sais politei/ais phau/l\u00f4s e)/chei\nto\\ peri\\ ta\\s gunai=kas, to\\ \u00ea(/misu t\u00ea=s po/le\u00f4s ei)=nai dei=\nnomi/zein a)nomothe/t\u00eaton. O(/per e)kei=] (at Sparta) [Greek:\nsumbe/b\u00eaken; o(/l\u00ean ga\\r t\u00ea\\n po/lin o( nomothe/t\u00eas** ei)=nai\nboulo/menos karterik\u00ea/n, kata\\ me\\n tou\\s a)/ndras phanero/s\ne)sti toiou=tos \u00f4)/n, e)pi\\ de\\ t\u00f4=n gunaik\u00f4=n e)x\u00eame/l\u00eaken],\n&c. . . . [Greek: Ta\\ de\\ peri\\ ta\\s gunai=kas e)/chonta m\u00ea\\\nkal\u00f4=s e)/oiken ou) mo/non a)pre/peia/n tina poiei=n t\u00ea=s\npo/le\u00f4s au)t\u00ea=s kath' au(t\u00ea/n, a)lla\\ sumba/llesthai/ ti pro\\s\nt\u00ea\\n philochr\u00eamati/an.]\n\nPlato has a similar remark, Legg. vi. pp. 780-781.]\n\n[Footnote 137: Stallbaum (in his note on Plato, Legg. i. p. 637 C,\n[Greek: t\u00ea\\n t\u00f4=n gunaik\u00f4=n par' u(mi=n a)/nesin])\nobserves--\"Lac\u00e6narum licentiam, quum ex aliis institutis patriis,\ntum ex gymnicarum exercitationum usu repetendam, Plato carpit etiam\ninfr\u00e0,\" &c. This is a mistake. Plato does not blame the\ngymnastic exercises of the Spartan maidens: the four passages to\nwhich Stallbaum refers do not prove his assertion. They even\ncountenance the reverse of that assertion. Plato approves of\ngymnastic and military exercises for maidens in the Laws, and for\nall the female Guardians in the Republic.\n\nStallbaum also refers to Aristotle as disapproving the gymnastic\nexercises of the Spartan maidens. I cannot think that this is\ncorrect. Aristotle does indeed blame the arrangements for women at\nSparta, but not, as I understand him, because the women were\nsubjected to gymnastic exercise; his blame is founded on the\ncircumstance that the women were not regulated, but left to do as\nthey pleased, while the men were under the strictest drill. This I\nconceive to be the meaning of [Greek: gunaik\u00f4=n a)/nesis].\nEuripides indeed has a very bitter passage condemning the\nexercises of the Spartan maidens; but neither Plato nor Aristotle\nshared this view.\n\nRespecting the Spartan maidens and their exercises, see Xenophon,\nRepubl. Laced. i. 4; Plutarch, Lykurg. c. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 138: Aristotel. Politic. vii. 16, p. 1335, b. 8. [Greek:\nPepon\u00eame/n\u00ean me\\n ou)=n e)/chein dei= t\u00ea\\n e(/xin,\npepon\u00eame/n\u00ean de\\ po/nois m\u00ea\\ biai/ois, m\u00eade\\ pro\\s e(/na\nmo/non, \u00f4(/sper \u00ea( t\u00f4=n a)thl\u00eat\u00f4=n e(/xis, a)lla\\ pro\\s ta\\s\nt\u00f4=n e)leutheri/\u00f4n pra/xeis. O(moi/\u00f4s de\\ dei= tau=ta\nu(pa/rchein a)ndra/si kai\\ gunaixi/.] Compare also i. 8, near the\nend of the first book.]\n\n[Footnote 139: Aristotel. Politic. vii. 16, p. 1335, a. 20, b.\n15.]\n\nIn principle, therefore, Aristotle agrees with Plato,[140] as to\nthe propriety of comprehending women as well as men under public\ntraining and discipline: but he does not follow out the principle\nwith the same consistency. He maintains the Platonic Commonwealth\nto be impossible.[141]\n\n[Footnote 140: If we take the sentence from Aristotle's Politics,\ncited in a note immediately preceding, to the effect that all the\ncitizens belonged to the city, and that each was a part of the\ncity (viii. 1, p. 1337, a. 28) in conjunction with another passage\nin the Politics (i. 3, p. 1254, a. 10)--[Greek: To/ te ga\\r\nmo/rion, ou) mo/non a)/llou e)sti\\ mo/rion, a)lla\\ kai\\ _o(/l\u00f4s\na)/llou_]--it is difficult to see how he can, consistently with\nthese principles, assign to his citizens any individual\nself-regarding agency. Plato denies all such to his Guardians, and\nin so doing he makes deductions consistent with the principles of\nAristotle, who lays down his principles too absolutely for the use\nwhich he afterwards makes of them.]\n\n[Footnote 141: Aristotel. Politic. ii. 5, p. 1263, b. 29. [Greek:\nphai/netai d' ei)=nai pa/mpan a)du/natos o( bi/os.]]\n\n[Side-note: Aristotle declares the Platonic Commonwealth\nimpossible--In what sense this is true.]\n\nIf we go through the separate objections which Aristotle advances\nas justifying his verdict, we shall find them altogether\ninadequate for the purpose. He shows certain inconveniences and\ndifficulties as belonging to it,--which are by no means all real,\nbut which, even conceding them in full force, would have to be set\nagainst the objections admitted by himself to bear against other\nactual societies before we can determine whether they are\nsufficiently weighty to render the scheme to which they belong\nimpossible. The Platonic commonwealth, and the Aristotelian\ncommonwealth, are both of them impossible, in my judgment, for the\nsame reason: that all the various communities of mankind exist\nunder established customs, beliefs, and sentiments, in complete\ndiscordance with them: and that we cannot understand from whence\nthe force is to come, tending and competent to generate either of\nthese two new systematic projects. Both of them require a\nsimultaneous production of many reciprocally adapted elements:\nboth therefore require an express initiative force, exceptional\nand belonging to some peculiar crisis--something analogous to Zeus\nin Krete, and to Apollo at Sparta. This is alike true of both:\nthough the Platonic Republic, departing more widely from received\nprinciples and sentiments than the Aristotelian, would of course\nrequire a more potent initiative.[142] In the treatises of the two\nphilosophers, each explains and vindicates the principles of his\nsystem, without including in the hypothesis any specification of a\nprobable source from whence it was to acquire its first start.\nWhere is the motive, operative, demiurgic force, ready to\ntranslate such an idea into reality?[143] But if we assume that\neither of them had once begun, there is no reason why it might not\nhave continued. The causes which first brought about the\nSpartan constitution and discipline must have been very peculiar,\nthough we have no historical account what they were. At any rate\nthey never occurred a second time; for no second Sparta was ever\nformed, in spite of the admiration inspired by the first. If\nSparta had never been actually established, and if Aristotle had\nread a description of it as a mere project, he would probably have\npronounced it impracticable:[144] though when once brought into\nreality, it proved eminently durable. In like manner, the laws,\ncustoms, beliefs, and feelings, prevalent in Egypt,--which\nastonished so vehemently Herodotus and other observing\nGreeks--would have been declared to be impossible, if described\nsimply in project: yet, when once established, they were found to\nlast longer without change than those of other nations.\n\n[Footnote 142: Plato indeed in one place tells us that a single\ndespot, becoming by inspiration or accident a philosopher, and\nhaving an obedient city, would accomplish the primary construction\nof his commonwealth (Republic, vi. p. 502 B). That despot (Plato\nsupposes) will send away all the population of his city above ten\nyears old, and will train up the children in the Platonic\nprinciples (vii. pp. 540-541).\n\nThis is little better than an [Greek: eu)ch\u00ea/], whatever Plato\nmay say to deprecate the charge of uttering [Greek: eu)cha/s], p.\n540 D.]\n\n[Footnote 143: Aristotel. Metaphys. A. p. 991, a. 22. [Greek: Ti/\nga/r e)sti to\\ e)rgazo/menon, pro\\s ta\\s i)de/as a)poble/pon?]\n\nWe find Aristotle arguing, in the course of his remarks on the\nPlatonic Republic, that it is useless now to promulgate any such\nnovelties; a long time has elapsed, and such things would already\nhave been found established if they had been good (Politic. ii. 5,\np. 1264, a. 2). This would have applied (somewhat less in degree,\nyet with quite sufficient force) to the ideal commonwealth of\nAristotle himself, as well as to that of Plato.\n\nBecause such institutions have never yet been established anywhere\nas those proposed by Plato or Aristotle, you cannot fairly argue\nthat they would not be good, or that they would not stand if\nestablished. What you may fairly argue is, that they are not at\nall likely to be established; no originating force will be\nforthcoming adequate to the first creation of them. Existing\nsocieties have fixed modes of thinking and feeling on social and\npolitical matters; each moves in its own groove, and the direction\nin which it will henceforward move will be a consequence and\ncontinuance of the direction in which it is already moving, by\nvirtue of powerful causes now in operation. New originating force\nis a very rare phenomenon. Overwhelming enemies or physical\ncalamities may destroy what exists, but they will not produce any\nsuch innovations as those under discussion.]\n\n[Footnote 144: Plato himself makes this very remark in the\nTreatise De Legibus (viii. p. 839 D) in defending the\npracticability of some of the ordinances therein recommended.]\n\n[Side-note: The real impossibility of the Platonic\nCommonwealth, arises from the fact that discordant sentiments are\nalready established.]\n\nThe Platonic project is submitted, however, not to impartial\njudges comparing different views on matters yet undetermined, but\nto hearers with a canon of criticism already fixed and\nanti-Platonic \"_animis consuetudine imbutis_\". It appears\nimpossible, because it contradicts sentiments conceived as\nfundamental and consecrated, respecting the sexual and family\nrelations. The supposed impossibility is the mode of expressing\nstrong disapprobation and repugnance: like that which Herodotus\ndescribes as manifested by the Greeks on one side and by the\nIndians on the other--when Darius, having asked each of them at\nwhat price they would consent to adopt the practice of the other\nrespecting the mode of treating the bodies of deceased parents,\nwas answered by a loud cry of horror at the mere proposition.[145]\nThe reasons offered to prove the Platonic project impossible, are\nprincipally founded upon the very sentiment above adverted to, and\nderive all their force from being associated with it. Such is the\ncharacter of many among the Aristotelian objections.[146] The\nreal, and the truly forcible, objection consists in the\nsentiment itself. If that be deeply rooted in the mind, it is\ndecisive. To those who feel thus, the Platonic project would be\nboth intolerable and impossible.\n\n[Footnote 145: Herodot. iii. 38. [Greek: oi( de/, a)mb\u00f4/santes\nme/ga, eu)ph\u00eame/ein min e)ke/leuon.]\n\nPlato in a remarkable passage of the Leges (i. 638 B), deprecates\nand complains of this instantaneous condemnation without impartial\nhearing of argument on both sides.]\n\n[Footnote 146: See the arguments urged by Aristotle, Politic. ii.\n4, p. 1262, a. 25 et seq. His remarks upon the fictions which\nPlato requires to be impressed on the belief of his Guardians are\nextremely just. There are, however, several objections urged by\nhim which turn more upon the Platonic language than upon the\nPlatonic vein of thought, and which, if judged by Plato from his\nown point of view, would have appeared admissions in his favour\nrather than objections. In reply to Plato, whose aim it is that\nall or many of the Guardians shall say _mine_ in reference to\nthe same persons or the same things, and not in reference to\ndifferent persons and different things, Aristotle contends that\nthe word _mine_ will not then designate any such strong\naffection as it does now, when it is special, exclusive, and\nconcentrated on a few persons or things; that each Guardian,\nhaving many persons whom he called _brother_ and many persons\nwhom he called _father_, would not feel towards them as\npersons now feel towards brothers and fathers; that the affection\nby being disseminated would be weakened, and would become nothing\nmore than a \"_diluted friendship_\"--[Greek: phili/a\nu(dar\u00ea/s]. See Aristot. Politic. ii. 3, p. 1261, b. 22; ii. 4, p.\n1262, b. 15.\n\nPlato, if called upon for an answer to this reasoning, would\nprobably have allowed it to be just; but would have said that the\n\"diluted friendship\" pervading all the Guardians was apt and\nsufficient for his purpose, as bringing the whole number most\nnearly into the condition of one organism. Strong exclusive\naffections, upon whatever founded, between individuals, he wishes\nto discourage: the hateful or unfriendly sentiments he is bent on\nrooting out. What he desires to see preponderant, in each\nGuardian, is a sense of duty to the public: subordinate to that,\nhe approves moderate and kindly affections, embracing all the\nGuardians; towards the elders as fathers, towards those of the\nsame age as brothers. Aristotle's expression--[Greek: phili/a\nu(dar\u00ea/s]--describes such a sentiment fairly enough. See\nRepublic, v. pp. 462-463. It must be conceded, however, that\nPlato's _language_ is open to Aristotle's objection.]\n\n[Side-note: Plato has strong feelings of right and wrong\nabout sexual intercourse, but referring to different objects.]\n\nBut we must recollect that it is these very sentiments which Plato\nimpugns and declares to be inapplicable to his Guardians: so that\nan opponent who, not breaking off at once with the cry of horror\nuttered by the Indians to Darius, begins to discuss the question\nwith him, is bound to forego objections and repugnances springing\nas corollaries from a basis avowedly denied. Plato has earnest\nfeelings of right and wrong, in regard both to the functions of\nwomen and to the sexual intercourse: but his feelings dissent\nentirely from those of readers generally. That is right, in his\nopinion, which tends to keep up the excellence of the breed and\nthe proper number of Guardians, as well as to ensure the exact and\nconstant fulfilment of their mission: that is wrong, which tends\nto defeat or abridge such fulfilment, or to impair the breed, or\nto multiply the number beyond its proper limit. Of these ends the\nRulers are the proper judges, not the individual person. All\nthe Guardians are enjoined to leave the sexual power absolutely\nunexercised until the age of thirty for men, of twenty for\nwomen--and then only to exercise it under express sanction and\nauthorisation, according as the Rulers may consider that children\nare needed to keep up the legitimate number.\n\nMarriage is regarded as holy, and celebrated under solemn\nrites--all the more because both the ceremony is originated, and\nthe couples selected, by the magistrates, for the most important\npublic purpose: which being fulfilled, the marriage ceases and\ndetermines. It is not celebrated with a view to the couple\nthemselves, still less with a view to establish any permanent\nexclusive attachment between them: which object Plato not only\ndoes not contemplate, but positively discountenances: on the same\ngeneral principle as the Catholic Church forbids marriage to\npriests: because he believes that it will create within them\nmotives and sentiments inconsistent with the due discharge of\ntheir public mission.\n\n[Side-note: Different sentiment which would grow up in the\nPlatonic Commonwealth respecting the sexual relations.]\n\nIt is clear that among such a regiment as that which Plato\ndescribes in his Guardians, a sentiment would grow up, respecting\nthe intercourse of the sexes, totally different from that which\nprevailed elsewhere around him. The Platonic restriction upon that\nintercourse up in the (until the ulterior limits of age) would be\nfar more severe: but it would be applied with reference to\ndifferent objects. Instead of being applied to enforce the\nexclusive consecration of one woman to one man, choosing each\nother or chosen by fathers, without any limit on the\nmultiplication of children,--and without any attention to the\nmaintenance or deterioration of the breed--it would be directed to\nthe obtaining of the most perfect breed and of the appropriate\nnumber, leaving the Guardians, female as well as male, free from\nall permanent distracting influences to interfere with the\ndischarge of their public duties. In appreciating the details of\nthe Platonic community, we must look at it with reference to this\nform of sexual morality; which would generate in the Guardians an\nappreciation of details consistent with itself both as to the\nwomen and as to the children. The sentiment of obligation, of\nright and wrong, respecting the relations of the sexes, is\neverywhere very strong; but it does not everywhere attach to the\nsame acts or objects. The important obligation for a woman never\nto show her face in public, which is held sacred through so large\na portion of the Oriental world, is noway recognised in the\nOccidental: and in Plato's time, when mankind were more\ndisseminated among small independent communities, the divergence\nwas yet greater than it is now. The Spartans were not induced, by\nthe censures or mockery of persons in other Grecian cities,[147]\nto suppress the gymnastic exercises practised by their maidens in\nconjunction with the young men: nor is Plato deterred by the\nridicule or blame which others may express, from proclaiming his\nconviction, that the virtue of his female Guardians is the same as\nthat of the male--consisting in the faithful performance of their\nduty as Guardians, after going through all the requisite training,\ngymnastic and musical. And he follows this up by the general\ndeclaration, one of the most emphatic in all his writings, \"The\nbest thing which is now said or ever has been said, is, that what\nis profitable is honourable--and what is hurtful, is base\".[148]\n\n[Footnote 147: Eurip. Androm. 598.\n\nThe criticisms of Xenophon in the first chapter of his treatise,\nDe Laced. Republ., exhibit a point of view on many points\nanalogous to that of Plato respecting the female sex, and\ndiffering from that which he puts into the mouth of Ischomachus in\nhis Oekonomicus. See above, p. 172, note 3. Among the lost\ntreatises of Kleanthes, successor of Zeno as Scholarch of the\nStoic School, one was composed expressly to show [Greek: O(/ti \u00ea(\nau)t\u00ea\\ a)ret\u00ea\\ kai\\ a)ndro\\s kai\\ gunaiko/s]. (Diog. Laert. vii.\n175.)]\n\n[Footnote 148: Plato, Repub. v. p. 457 A-B. [Greek: A)podute/on\nd\u00ea\\ tai=s t\u00f4=n phula/k\u00f4n gunaixi/n, e)pei/per a)ret\u00ea\\n a)nti\\\ni(mati/\u00f4n a)mphie/sontai, kai\\ koin\u00f4n\u00eate/on pole/mou te kai\\\nt\u00ea=s a)/ll\u00eas phulak\u00ea=s t\u00ea=s peri\\ t\u00ea\\n po/lin, kai\\ ou)k\na)/lla prakte/on; tou/t\u00f4n d' au)t\u00f4=n ta\\ e)laphro/tera tai=s\ngunaixi\\n \u00ea)\\ toi=s a)ndra/si dote/on, dia\\ t\u00ea\\n tou= ge/nous\na)sthe/neian. O( de\\ gel\u00f4=n a)n\u00ea\\r e)pi\\ gumnai=s gunaixi/, tou=\nbelti/stou e(/neka gumnazome/nais, a)tel\u00ea= tou= geloi/ou sophi/as\ndre/p\u00f4n karpo/n, ou)de\\n oi)=den, \u00f4(s e)/oiken, e)ph' \u00f4(=|\ngela=| ou)d' o(/, ti pra/ttei. _Ka/llista ga\\r d\u00ea\\ tou=to kai\\\nle/getai kai\\ lele/xetai, o(/ti to\\ me\\n \u00f4)phe/limon, kalo/n--to\\\nde\\ blabero/n, ai)schro/n_.]]\n\n[Side-note: What Nature prescribes in regard to the\nrelations of the two sexes--Direct contradiction between Plato and\nAristotle.]\n\nPlato in truth reduces the distinction between the two sexes to\nits lowest terms: to the physical difference in regard to\nprocreation--and to the general fact, that the female is every way\nweaker and inferior to the male; while yet, individually taken,\nmany women are superior to many men, and both sexes are alike\nimprovable by training. He maintains that this similarity of\ntraining and function is the real order of Nature, and that\nthe opposite practice, which insists on a separation of life\nand functions between the sexes, is unnatural:[149] which doctrine\nhe partly enforces by the analogy of the two sexes in other\nanimals.[150] Aristotle disputes this reasoning altogether:\ndeclaring that Nature prescribes a separation of life and\nfunctions between the two sexes--that the relation of man to woman\nis that of superiority and command on one side, inferiority and\nobedience on the other, like the relation between father and\nchild, master and slave, though with a difference less in\ndegree--that virtue in a man, and virtue in a woman, are quite\ndifferent, imposing diverse obligations.[151] It shows how little\nstress can be laid on arguments based on the word _Nature_, when\nwe see two such distinguished thinkers completely at issue as to the\nquestion, what Nature indicates, in this important case. Each of\nthem decorates by that name the rule which he himself approves;\nwhether actually realised anywhere, or merely recommended as a\nreform of something really existing. In this controversy,\nAristotle had in his favour the actualities around him, against\nPlato: but Aristotle himself is far from always recognising\nexperience and practice as authoritative interpreters of the\ndictates of Nature, as we may see by his own ideal commonwealth.\n\n[Footnote 149: Plato, Republic, v. p. 456 C. [Greek: ta\\ nu=n\npara\\ tau=ta gigno/mena para\\ phu/sin ma=llon], &c. Also p.\n466 D.]\n\n[Footnote 150: Compare a similar appeal to the analogy of animals,\nas proving the [Greek: e)/r\u00f4tas a)r)r(e/n\u00f4n] to be unnatural,\nPlato, Legg. viii. p. 836 C.]\n\n[Footnote 151: Aristotel. Politic. i. 13, p. 1260 a. 20-30.]\n\n[Side-note: Opinion of Plato respecting the capacities of\nwomen, and the training proper for women, are maintained in the\nLeges, as well as in the Republic. Ancient legends harmonising\nwith this opinion.]\n\nHow strongly Plato was attached to his doctrines about the\ncapacity of women--how unchanged his opinion continued about the\nmischief of separating the training and functions of the two\nsexes, and of confining women to indoor occupations, or to what he\ncalls \"a life of darkness and fear\"[152]--may be seen farther by\nhis Treatise De Legibus. Although in that treatise he recedes\n(perforce and without retracting) from the principles of his\nRepublic, so far as to admit separate properties and families for\nall his citizens--yet he still continues to enjoin public\ngymnastic and military training, for women and men alike: and he\nstill opens, to both sexes alike, superintending social\nfunctions to a great extent, as well as the privilege of being\nhonoured by public hymns after death, in case of distinguished\nmerit.[153] Respecting military matters, he speaks with peculiar\nearnestness. That women are perfectly capable of efficient\nmilitary service, if properly trained, he proves not only by the\nancient legends, but also by facts actual and contemporary, the\nknown valour of the Scythian and Sarmatian women. Whatever doubts\npersons may have hitherto cherished (says Plato), this is now\nestablished matter of fact:[154] the cowardice and impotence of\nwomen is not less disgraceful in itself than detrimental to the\ncity, as robbing it of one-half of its possible force.[155] He\ncomplains bitterly of the repugnance felt even to the discussion\nof this proposition.[156] Most undoubtedly, there were ancient\nlegends which tended much to countenance his opinion. The warlike\nAmazons, daughters of Ar\u00eas, were among the most formidable forces\nthat had ever appeared on earth; they had shown their power once\nby invading Attica and bringing such peril on Athens, that it\nrequired all the energy of the great Athenian hero Theseus to\nrepel them. We must remember that these stories were not only\nfamiliarised to the public eye in conspicuous painting and\nsculpture, but were also fully believed as matters of past\nhistory.[157] Moreover the Goddess Ath\u00ean\u00ea, patroness of Athens,\nwas the very impersonation of intelligent terror-striking\nmight--constraining and subduing Ar\u00eas[158] himself: the Goddess\nEnyo presided over war, no less than the God Ar\u00eas:[159] lastly\nArtemis, though making war only on wild beasts, was hardly less\nformidable in her way--indefatigable as well as rapid in her\nmovements and unerring with her bow, as Ath\u00ean\u00ea was irresistible\nwith her spear. Here were abundant examples in Grecian legend, to\nembolden Plato in his affirmations respecting the capacity of the\nfemale sex for warlike enterprise and laborious endurance.\n\n[Footnote 152: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 781 C. [Greek: ei)thisme/non\nga\\r dedoiko\\s kai\\ skoteino\\n z\u00ea=n], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 153: Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 795 C, 796 C, 802 A.]\n\n[Footnote 154: Plat. Legg. vii. pp. 804-805-806. 804 E: [Greek:\na)kou/\u00f4n me\\n ga\\r d\u00ea\\ mu/thous palaiou=s pe/peismai, ta\\ de\\\nnu=n, \u00f4(s e)/pos ei)pei=n, oi)=da o(/ti muria/des a)nari/thm\u00eatoi\ngunaik\u00f4=n ei)si\\ t\u00f4=n peri\\ to\\n Po/nton, a(\\s Sauromati/das\nkalou=sin, ai(=s ou)ch i(/pp\u00f4n mo/non a)lla\\ kai\\ to/x\u00f4n kai\\\nt\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n o(/pl\u00f4n koin\u00f4ni/a kai\\ toi=s a)ndra/sin i)/s\u00ea\nprostetagme/n\u00ea i)/s\u00f4s a)skei=tai.] We may doubt whether Plato\nknew anything of the brave and skilful Artemisia, queen of\nHalikarnassus, who so greatly distinguished herself in the\nexpedition of Xerxes against Greece (Herod. vii. 99, viii. 87),\nand, indeed, whether he had ever read the history of Herodotus.\nHis argument might have been strengthened by another equally\npertinent example, if he could have quoted the original letter\naddressed by the Emperor Aurelian to the Roman Senate, attesting\nthe courage, vigour, and prudence, of Zenobia, queen of Palmyra.\nTrebellius Pollio, Vit\u00e6 Triginta Tyrannorum in Histor. August. p.\n198 (De Zenobia, xxix.: cap. xxx.): \"Audio, Patres Conscripti,\nmihi objici, quod non virile munus impleverim, Zenobiam\ntriumphando. N\u00e6, illi qui me reprehendunt, satis laudarent, si\nscirent qualis illa est mulier, quam prudens in consiliis, quam\nconstans in dispositionibus, quam erga milites gravis, quam larga\ncum necessitas postulet, quam tristis cum severitas poscat. Possum\ndicere illius esse quod Odenatus Persas vicit, ac fugato Sapore\nCtesiphontem usque pervenit. Possum asserere, tanto apud\nOrientales et \u00c6gyptiorum populos timori mulierem fuisse, ut se non\nArabes, non Saraceni, non Armenii, commoverent. Nec ego illi vitam\nconservassem, nisi eam scissem multum Roman\u00e6 Reipublic\u00e6 profuisse,\ncum sibi vel liberis suis Orientis servaret imperium.]\n\n[Footnote 155: Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 813-814.]\n\n[Footnote 156: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 781 D.]\n\n[Footnote 157: Plutarch, Theseus, c. 27; \u00c6schylus, Eumenid. 682;\nIsokrates, Panegyr. ss. 76-78. How popular a subject the Amazons\nwere for sculptors, we learn from the statement of Pliny (**xxxiv.\n8, 19) that all the most distinguished sculptors executed Amazons;\nand that this subject was the only one upon which a direct\ncomparison could be made between them.]\n\n[Footnote 158: Homer, Iliad, xv. 123.]\n\n[Footnote 159: Homer, Iliad, v. 333-592.]\n\n[Side-note: In a Commonwealth like the Platonic, the\ninfluence of Aphrodit\u00ea would probably have been reduced to a\nminimum.]\n\nThe two Goddesses, Ath\u00ean\u00ea and Artemis, were among the few\naltogether insensible to amorous influences and to the\ninspirations of Aphrodit\u00ea: who is the object of contemptuous\nsarcasm on the part of Ath\u00ean\u00ea, and of repulsive antipathy on the\npart of Artemis.[160] This may supply an illustration for the\nRepublic of Plato. As far as one can guess what the effect of his\ninstitutions would have been, it is probable that the influence of\nAphrodit\u00ea would have been at its minimum among his Guardians of\nboth sexes: as it was presented in the warlike dramas of\n\u00c6schylus.[161] There would have been everything to deaden it, with\nan entire absence of all provocatives. The muscular development,\nbut rough and unadorned bodies, of females--\n\n  Sabina qualis, aut perusta solibus\n     Pernicis uxor Apuli--(Hor. _Epod._ ii. 41-42).\n\nthe indiscriminate companionship, with perfect identity of\ntreatment and manners, between the two sexes from the earliest\ninfancy--the training of both together for the same public duties,\nthe constant occupation of both throughout life in the\nperformance of those duties, under unceasing official\nsupervision--the strict regulation of exercise and diet, together\nwith the monastic censorship on all poetry and literature--the\nself-restraint, equal and universal, enforced as the characteristic\nfeature and pride of the regiment, and seconded by the jealous\nespionage of all over all, the more potent because privacy was\nunknown--such an assemblage of circumstances would do as much as\ncircumstances could do to starve the sexual appetite, to prevent\nit from becoming the root of emotional or imaginative\nassociations, and to place it under the full controul of the\nlawgiver for purposes altogether public. Such was probably Plato's\nintention: since he more generally regards the appetites as\nenemies to be combated and extirpated so far as\npracticable--rather than as sources of pleasure, yet liable to\naccompaniments of pain, requiring to be regulated so as to exclude\nthe latter and retain the former.\n\n[Footnote 160: Homer, Hymn. ad Venerem, 10; Iliad, v. 425;\nEuripid. Hippolyt. 1400-1420.\n\nAth\u00ean\u00ea combined the attributes of [Greek: philopo/lemos] and\n[Greek: philo/sophos]. Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 24 D; compare Kritias, p.\n109 D.]\n\n[Footnote 161: See Aristophan. Ran\u00e6, 1042.\n\n_Eurip._ [Greek: Ma\\ Di/' ou)de\\ ga\\r \u00ea)=n t\u00ea=s\nA)phrodi/t\u00eas ou)de/n soi.]\n\n_\u00c6schyl._ [Greek: M\u00eade/ g' e)pei/\u00ea. A)ll' e)pi/ soi/ toi\nkai\\ toi=s soi=sin poll\u00ea\\ pollou= 'pikath\u00ea=to.]]\n\n[Side-note: Other purposes of Plato--limitation of number of\nGuardians--common to Aristotle also.]\n\nThe public purposes, with a view to which Plato sought to controul\nthe sexual appetite in his Guardians, were three, as I have\nalready stated. 1. To obtain from each of them individually,\nfaithful performance of the public duties, and observance of the\nlimits, prescribed by his system. 2. To ensure the best and purest\nbreed. 3. To maintain unaltered the same total number, without\nexcess or deficiency.\n\n[Side-note: Law of population expounded by Malthus--Three\ndistinct checks to population--alternative open between preventive\nand positive.]\n\nThe first of these three purposes is peculiar to the Platonic\nsystem. The two last are not peculiar to it. Aristotle recognises\nthem[162] as ends, no less than Plato, though he does not approve\nPlato's means for attaining them. In reference to the limitation\nof number, Aristotle is even more pronounced than Plato. The great\nevil of over-population forced itself upon these philosophers;\nliving as both of them did among small communities, each with its\nnarrow area hedged in by others--each liable to intestine dispute,\nsometimes caused, always aggravated, by the presence of large\nfamilies and numerous poor freemen--and each importing bought\nslaves as labourers. To obtain for their community the quickest\npossible increase in aggregate wealth and population, was an\nend which they did not account either desirable or commendable.\nThe stationary state, far from appearing repulsive or\ndiscouraging, was what they looked upon as the best\narrangement[163] of things. A mixed number of lots of land,\nindivisible and inalienable, is the first principle of the\nPlatonic community in the treatise De Legibus. Not to encourage\nwealth, but to avert, as far as possible, the evils of poverty and\ndependence, and to restrain within narrow limits the proportion of\nthe population which suffered those evils--was considered by Plato\nand Aristotle to be among the gravest problems for the solution of\nthe statesman.[164] Consistent with these conditions, essential to\nsecurity and tranquillity, whatever the form of government might\nbe, there was only room for the free population then existing: not\nalways for that (seeing that the proportion of poor citizens was\noften uncomfortably great), and never for any sensible increase\nabove that. If all the children were born and brought up, that it\nwas possible for adult couples to produce, a fearful aggravation\nof poverty, with all its accompanying public troubles and\nsufferings, would have been inevitable.[165] Accordingly both\nPlato (for the Guardians in the Republic) and Aristotle agree in\nopinion that a limit must be fixed upon the number of children\nwhich each couple is permitted to introduce. If any objector had\nargued that each couple, by going through the solemnity of\nmarriage, acquired a natural right to produce as many children as\nthey could, and that others were under a natural obligation to\nsupport those children--both philosophers would have denied the\nplea altogether. But they went even further. They considered\nprocreation as a duty which each citizen owed to the public,\nin order that the total of citizens might not fall below the\nproper minimum--yet as a duty which required controul, in order\nthat the total might not rise above the proper maximum.[166] Hence\nthey did not even admit the right of each couple to produce as\nmany children as their private means could support. They thought\nit necessary to impose a limit on the number of children in every\nfamily, binding equally on rich and poor: the number prescribed\nmight be varied from time to time, as circumstances indicated. As\nthe community could not safely admit more than a certain aggregate\nof births, these philosophers commanded all couples\nindiscriminately, the rich not excepted, to shape their conduct\nwith a view to that imperative necessity.\n\n[Footnote 162: Aristotel. Politic. vii. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 163: Compare the view (not unlike though founded on\ndifferent reasons) of the stationary state taken by Mr. John\nStuart Mill, in a valuable chapter of his Principles of Political\nEconomy, Book iv. chap. 6. He says (s. 2):--\"The best state for\nhuman nature is that in which, while no one is poor, no one\ndesires to be richer, nor has any reason to fear being thrust back\nby the efforts of others to push themselves forward\". This would\ncome near to the views of Plato and Aristotle.]\n\n[Footnote 164: See a striking passage in Plato, Legg. v. pp.\n742-743. He speaks of rich men as they are spoken of in some verses\nof the Gospels--a very rich man can hardly be a good man. Wealth\nand poverty are both of them evils, p. 744 D. Repub. iv. p. 421.\n\nPheidon the Corinthian, an ancient lawgiver (we do not know when\nor where), prescribed an unchangeable number both of lots (of\nland) and of citizens, but the lots were not to be all equal.\nAristotel. Politic. ii. 6, p. 1265, b. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 165: Aristot. Politic. ii. 6, p. 1265, b. 10. [Greek:\nTo\\ d' a)phei=sthai (t\u00ea\\n teknopoii+/an a)o/riston**), katha/per\ne)n tai=s plei/stais po/lesin, peni/as a)nagkai=on ai)/tion\ngi/nesthai toi=s poli/tais; \u00ea( de\\ peni/a sta/sin e)mpoiei= kai\\\nkakourgi/an.] Compare ibid. ii. 7, p. 1266, b. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 166: Aristotel. Politic. vii. 16, p. 1335, b. 28-38.\n[Greek: leitourgei=n pro\\s teknopoii+/an . . . a)phei=sthai dei=\nt\u00ea=s ei)s to\\ phanero\\n genn\u00ea/se\u00f4s.]\n\nPlato, Republic, v. pp. 460-461. [Greek: ti/ktein t\u00ea=|\npo/lei--genna=|n t\u00ea=| po/lei--t\u00f4=n ei)s to\\ koino\\n genn\u00ea/se\u00f4n].]\n\nPlato in his Republic (as I have already mentioned) assumes for\nhis Archons the privilege of selecting (by a pretended sortition)\nthe couples through whom the legitimate amount of breeding shall\nbe accomplished: in the semi-Platonic commonwealth (De Legibus),\nhe leaves the choice free, but prescribes the limits of age,\nrendering marriage a peremptory duty between twenty and\nthirty-five years of age, and adding some emphatic exhortations,\nthough not peremptory enactments, respecting the principles which\nought to guide individual choice.[167] In the same manner too he\ndeals with procreation: recognising the necessity of imposing a limit\non individual discretion, yet not naming that limit by law, but\nleaving it to be enforced according to circumstances by the\nmagistrates: who (he says), by advice, praise, and censure, can\napply either effective restraints on procreation, or\nencouragements if the case requires.[168] Aristotle blames this\nguarantee as insufficient: he feels so strongly the necessity\nof limiting procreation, that he is not satisfied unless a proper\nlimit be imposed by positive law. Unless such a result be made\nthoroughly sure (he says), all other measures of lawgivers for\nequalising properties, or averting poverty and the discontents\ngrowing out of it--must fail in effect.[169] Aristotle also lays\nit down as a part of the duty of the lawgiver to take care that\nthe bodies of the children brought up shall be as good as\npossible: hence he prescribes the ages proper for marriage, and\nthe age after which no parents are to produce any more\nchildren.[170]\n\n[Footnote 167: Plato, Legg. vi. pp. 772-773-774. The wording is\ncharacteristic of the view taken by these philosophers, and of the\nextent to which they subordinated individual sentiment to public\nconsiderations. [Greek: kata\\ panto\\s ei(=s e)/st\u00f4 mu=thos\nga/mou; to\\n ga\\r t\u00ea=| po/lei dei= xumphe/ronta mn\u00easteu/ein\nga/mon e(/kaston, a)ll' ou) to\\n \u00ea(/diston au(t\u00f4=|. phe/retai\nde/ p\u00f4s pa=s a)ei\\ kata\\ phu/sin pro\\s to\\n o(moio/taton\nau(t\u00f4=|], &c. (p. 773 B). In marriage (he says) the natural\ntendency is that like seeks like; but it is good for the city that\nlike should be coupled to unlike, rich to poor, hasty tempers with\nsober tempers, &c., in order that the specialties may be\nblended together and mitigated. He does not pretend to embody this\nin a written law, but directs the authorities to obtain it as far\nas they can by exhortation. P. 733 E. Compare the Politikus, p.\n311.]\n\n[Footnote 168: Plato, Legg. v. p. 740 D. [Greek: porize/t\u00f4\nm\u00eachan\u00ea\\n o(/ti ma/lista, o(/p\u00f4s ai( pentakischi/liai kai\\\ntettara/konta oi)k\u00ea/seis _a)ei\\ mo/non_ e)/sontai; kai\\ ga\\r\n_e)pische/seis gene/se\u00f4s_, oi(=s a)\\n eu)/rous ei)/\u00ea\nge/nesis, kai\\ tou)nanti/on e)pime/leiai kai\\ spoudai\\ pl\u00ea/thous\ngenn\u00eama/t\u00f4n ei)si\\n], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 169: Aristotel. Politic. ii. 6, p. 1264, a. 38; ii. 7,\np. 1266, b. 10; vii. 16.\n\nAristotle has not fully considered all that Plato says, when he\nblames him for inconsistency in proposing to keep properties\nequal, without taking pains to impose and maintain a constant\nlimit on offspring in families. [Greek: A)/topon de\\ kai\\ to\\ ta\\s\nkt\u00ea/seis i)sa/zonta] (Plato) [Greek: to\\ peri\\ to\\ pl\u00ea=thos\nt\u00f4=n polit\u00f4=n m\u00ea\\ kataskeua/zein, a)ll' a)phei=nai t\u00ea\\n\nteknopoii+/an a)o/riston], &c. (Aristot. Polit. ii. 6, p.\n1265, a. fin.)\n\nWhat Plato really directs is stated in my text and in my note\nimmediately preceding.]\n\n[Footnote 170: Aristotel. Politic. vii. 16, p. 1334, b. 39.\n[Greek: ei)/per ou)=n a)p' a)rch\u00ea=s to\\n nomothe/t\u00ean o(ra=|n\ndei=, o(/p\u00f4s be/ltista ta\\ s\u00f4/mata ge/n\u00eatai t\u00f4=n\ntrephome/n\u00f4n, pr\u00f4=ton me\\n e)pimel\u00eate/on peri\\ t\u00ea\\n su/zeuxin,\npo/te kai\\ poi/ous tina\\s o)/ntas chr\u00ea\\ poiei=sthoi pro\\s\na)ll\u00ea/lous t\u00ea\\n gamik\u00ea\\n o(mili/an], &c. He names\nthirty-seven as the age proper for a man, eighteen for a woman, to\nmarry. At the age of fifty-five a man becomes unfit to procreate\nfor the public, and none of his children are to appear ([Greek:\na)phei=sthai t\u00ea=s ei)s to\\ phanero\\n genn\u00ea/se\u00f4s], vii. 16, p.\n1335, b. 36).]\n\nThe paramount necessity of limiting the number of children born in\neach family, here enforced by Plato and Aristotle, rests upon that\ngreat social fact which Malthus so instructively expounded at the\nclose of the last century. Malthus, enquiring specially into the\nlaw of population, showed upon what conditions the increase of\npopulation depends, and what were the causes constantly at work to\nhold it back--checks to population. He ranged these causes under\nthree different heads, though the two last are multiform in\ndetail. 1. Moral or prudential restraint--the preventive check. 2.\nVice, and 3. Misery--the two positive checks. He farther showed\nthat though the aggregate repressive effect of these three causes\nis infallible and inevitable, determined by the circumstances of\neach given society--yet that mankind might exercise an option\nthrough which of the three the check should be applied: that the\neffect of the two last causes was in inverse proportion to that of\nthe first--in other words, that the less there was of\nprudential restraint limiting the number of births, the more\nthere must be of vice or misery, under some of their thousand\nforms, to shorten the lives of many of the children born--and _\u00e9\nconverso_, the more there was of prudential restraint, the less\nwould be the operation of the other checks tending to shorten\nlife.\n\n[Side-note: Plato and Aristotle saw the same law as Malthus,\nbut arranged the facts under a different point of view.]\n\nThree distinct facts--preventive restraint, vice, and\nmisery--having nothing else in common, are arranged under one general\nhead by Malthus, in consequence of the one single common property\nwhich they possess--that of operating as checks to population. To\nhim, that one common property was the most important of all, and the\nmost fit to be singled out as the groundwork of classification,\nhaving reference to the subject of his enquiry. But Plato and\nAristotle looked at the subject in a different point of view. They\nhad present to their minds the same three facts, and the tendency\nof the first to avert or abate the second and third: but as they\nwere not investigating the law of population, they had nothing to\ncall their attention to the one common property of the three. They\ndid not regard vice and misery as causes tending to keep down\npopulation, but as being in themselves evils; enemies among the\nworst which the lawgiver had to encounter, in his efforts to\nestablish a good political and social condition--and enemies which\nhe could never successfully encounter, without regulating the\nnumber of births. Such regulation they considered as an essential\ntutelary measure to keep out disastrous poverty. The inverse\nproportion, between regulated or unregulated number of births on\nthe one hand, and diminution or increase of poverty on the other,\nwas seen as clearly by Aristotle and Plato as by Malthus.\n\n[Side-note: Regulations of Plato and Aristotle as to number\nof births and newborn children.]\n\nBut these two Greek philosophers ordain something yet more\nremarkable. Having prescribed both the age of marriage and the\nnumber of permitted births, so as to ensure both vigorous citizens\nand a total compatible with the absence of corrupting\npoverty--they direct what shall be done if the result does not\ncorrespond to their orders. Plato in his Republic (as I have already\nstated) commands that all the children born to his wedded couples\nshall be immediately consigned to the care of public nurses--that the\noffspring of the well-constituted parents shall be brought up,\nthat of the ill-constituted parents not brought up--and that no\nchildren born of parents after the legitimate age shall be brought\nup.[171] Aristotle forbids the exposure of children, wherever the\nhabits of the community are adverse to it: but if after any\nmarried couple have had the number of children allowed by law, the\nwife should again become pregnant, he directs that abortion shall\nbe procured before the commencement of life or sense in the\nfoetus: after such commencement, he pronounces abortion to be\nwrong.[172] On another point Plato and Aristotle agree: both of\nthem command that no child born crippled or deformed shall be\nbrought up:[173] a practice actually adopted at Sparta under the\nLykurgean institutions, and even carried farther, since no child\nwas allowed to be brought up until it had been inspected and\napproved by the public nurses.[174]\n\n[Footnote 171: Plato, Republ. v. pp. 459 D, 460 C, 461 C.]\n\n[Footnote 172: Aristotel. Politic. vii. 16, 10, p. 1335, b. 20.\n[Greek: Peri\\ de\\ a)pothe/se\u00f4s kai\\ troph\u00ea=s t\u00f4=n gignome/n\u00f4n,\ne)/st\u00f4 no/mos, m\u00eade\\n pep\u00ear\u00f4me/non tre/phein; dia\\ de\\\npl\u00ea=thos te/kn\u00f4n, e)a\\n \u00ea( ta/xis t\u00f4=n e)th\u00f4=n k\u00f4lu/\u00ea|,\nm\u00eade\\n a)poti/thesthai t\u00f4=n gignome/n\u00f4n; \u00f4(/ristai ga\\r d\u00ea\\\nt\u00ea=s teknopoii+/as to\\ pl\u00ea=thos. e)a\\n de/ tisi gi/gn\u00eatai para\\\ntau=ta sunduasthe/nt\u00f4n, pri\\n ai)/sth\u00easin e)ggene/sthai kai\\\nz\u00f4\u00ea/n, e)mpoiei=sthai dei= t\u00ea\\n a)/mbl\u00f4sin; to\\ ga\\r o(/sion\nkai\\ to\\ m\u00ea\\ di\u00f4risme/non t\u00ea=| ai)sth\u00ea/sei kai\\ t\u00f4=| z\u00ea=|n\ne)/stai.] For the text of this passage I have followed Bekker and\nthe Berlin edition. As to the first half of the passage there are\nsome material differences in the text and in the MSS.; some give\n[Greek: e)thn\u00f4=n] instead of [Greek: e)th\u00f4n], and [Greek:\n\u00f4(ri/sthai ga\\r dei=] instead of [Greek: \u00f4(/ristai ga\\r d\u00ea\\].\nCompare Plato, The\u00e6t\u00eat. 149 C.]\n\n[Footnote 173: Plato, Republic, v. p. 460 C. [Greek: ta\\ de\\ t\u00f4=n\ncheiro/n\u00f4n (te/kna), kai\\ e)a/n ti t\u00f4=n e(te/r\u00f4n a)na/p\u00earon\ngi/gn\u00eatai, e)n a)por)r(\u00ea/t\u00f4| te kai\\ a)d\u00ea/l\u00f4| katakru/psousin\n\u00f4(s pre/pei.] Aristot. _ut supr\u00e2_, [Greek: e)/st\u00f4 no/mos,\nm\u00eade\\n pep\u00ear\u00f4me/non tre/phein], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 174: Plutarch, Lykurgus, c. 16.]\n\n[Side-note: Such regulations disapproved and forbidden by\nmodern sentiment--Variability of ethical sentiment as to objects\napproved or disapproved.]\n\nWe here find both these philosophers not merely permitting, but\nenjoining--and the Spartan legislation, more admired than any in\nGreece, systematically realising--practices which modern sentiment\nrepudiates and punishes. Nothing can more strikingly\nillustrate--what Plato and Aristotle have themselves repeatedly\nobserved[175]--how variable and indeterminate is the _matter_ of\nethical sentiment, in different ages and communities, while the\n_form_ of ethical sentiment is the same universally: how all\nmen agree subjectively, in that which they\nfeel--disapprobation and hatred of wrong and vice, approbation and\nesteem of right and virtue--yet how much they differ objectively,\nas to the acts or persons which they designate by these names and\ntowards which their feelings are directed. It is with these\nemotions as with the other emotions of human nature: all men are\nmoved in the same manner, though in different degree, by love and\nhatred--hope and fear--desire and aversion--sympathy and\nantipathy--the emotions of the beautiful, the sublime, the\nludicrous: but when we compare the objects, acts, or persons,\nwhich so move them, we find only a very partial agreement, amidst\nwide discrepancy and occasionally strong opposition.[176] The\npresent case is one of the strongest opposition. Practices now\nabhorred as wrong, are here directly commanded by Plato and\nAristotle, the two greatest authorities of the Hellenic world: men\ndiffering on many points from each other, but agreeing in this:\nmen not only of lofty personal character, but also of first-rate\nintellectual force, in whom the ideas of virtue and vice had been\nas much developed by reflection as they ever have been in any\nmind: lastly, men who are extolled by the commentators as the\nchampions of religion and sound morality, against what are styled\nthe unprincipled cavils of the Sophists.\n\n[Footnote 175: Aristotel. Politic. viii. 2, p. 1337, b. 2. [Greek:\nPeri/ te t\u00f4=n pro\\s a)ret\u00ea/n, ou)the/n e)stin o(mologou/menon;\nkai\\ ga\\r t\u00ea\\n a)ret\u00ea\\n ou) t\u00ea\\n au)t\u00ea\\n eu)thu\\s pa/ntes\ntim\u00f4=sin; \u00f4(/st' eu)lo/g\u00f4s diaphe/rontai kai\\ pro\\s t\u00ea\\n\na)/sk\u00easin au)t\u00ea=s.]\n\nEthica Nikomach. i. 3, p. 1094, b. 15. [Greek: Ta\\ de\\ kala\\ kai\\\nta\\ di/kaia, peri\\ \u00f4(=n \u00ea( politik\u00ea\\ skopei=tai, tosau/t\u00ean\ne)/chei diaphora\\n kai\\ pla/n\u00ean, \u00f4(/ste dokei=n no/m\u00f4| mo/non\nei)=nai, phu/sei de\\ m\u00ea/.]]\n\n[Footnote 176: The extraordinary variety and discrepancy of\napproved and consecrated customs prevalent in different portions\nof the ancient world, is instructively set forth in the treatise\nof the Syrian Christian Bardisanes, in the time of the Antonines.\nA long extract from this treatise is given in Eusebius, Pr\u00e6parat.\nEvang., vi. 10; it has been also published by Orelli, annexed to\nhis edition (Zurich, 1824) of the argument of Alexander of\nAphrodisias, De Fato, p. 202. Compare Euseb. Hist. Eccles. iv. 30.\n\nBardisanes is replying to the arguments of astrologers and\ncalculators of nativities, who asserted the uniform and\nuncontrollable influence of the heavenly bodies, in given\npositions, over human conduct. As a proof that mankind are not\nsubject to any such necessity, but have a large sphere of freewill\n([Greek: au)texou/sion]), he cites these numerous instances of\ndiverse and contradictory institutions among different societies.\nSeveral of the most conspicuous among these differences relate to\nthe institutions concerning sex and family, the conduct and\noccupations held obligatory in men and women, &c.\n\nCompare Sextus Empiric., Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. iii. s. 198 seqq.]\n\n[Side-note: Plato and Aristotle required subordination of\nimpulse to reason and duty--they applied this to the procreative\nimpulse, as to others.]\n\nIt is, in my judgment, both curious and interesting to study the\nmanner in which these two illustrious men--Plato and\nAristotle--dealt with the problem of population. Grave as that\nproblem is in all times, it was peculiarly grave among the small\nrepublics of antiquity. Neither of them were disposed to ignore or\noverlook it: nor to impute to other causes the consequences which\nit produces: nor to treat as indifferent the question, whether\npoor couples had a greater or less family, to share subsistence\nalready scanty for themselves. Still less were these philosophers\ndisposed to sanction the short-sighted policy of some Hellenic\nstatesmen, who under a mistaken view of increasing the power of\nthe state, proclaimed encouragement and premium simply to the\nmultiplication of male births, without any regard to the comfort\nand means of families. Both Plato and Aristotle saw plainly, that\na married couple, by multiplying their offspring, produced serious\neffects not merely upon their own happiness but upon that of\nothers besides: up to a certain limit, for good--beyond that\nlimit, for evil. Hence they laid it down, that procreation ought\nto be a rational and advised act, governed by a forecast of those\nconsequences--not a casual and unforeseen result of present\nimpulse. The same preponderance of reason over impulse as they\nprescribed in other cases, they endeavoured to enforce in this.\nThey regarded it too, not simply as a branch of prudence, but as a\nbranch of duty; a debt due by each citizen to others and to the\ncommonwealth. It was the main purpose of their elaborate political\nschemes, to produce a steady habit and course of virtue in all the\ncitizens: and they considered every one as greatly deficient in\nvirtue, who refused to look forward to the consequences of his own\nprocreative acts--thereby contributing to bring upon the state an\naggravated measure of poverty, which was the sure parent of\ndiscord, sedition, and crime. That the rate of total increase\nshould not be so great as to produce these last-mentioned\neffects--and that the limit of virtue and prudence should be made\noperative on all the separate families--was in their judgment one\nof the most important cares of the lawgiver.\n\nWe ought to disengage this general drift and purpose, common both\nto Plato and Aristotle, on the subject of population, from the\nvarious means--partly objectionable, partly impossible to be\nenforced--whereby they intended to carry the purpose into effect.\n\n[Side-note: Training of the few select philosophers to act\nas chiefs.]\n\nI pass from Plato's picture of the entire regiment of Guardians,\nunder the regulations above described--to his description of the\nspecial training whereby the few most distinguished persons\nin the regiment (male or female, as the case may be) are to be\nimproved, tested, and exalted to the capacity of philosophers:\nqualified to act as Rulers or Chiefs.[177] These are the two\nmarked peculiarities of Plato's Republic. The Guardians are\nadmirable as instruments, but have no initiative of their own: we\nhave now to find the chiefs from whom they will receive it. How\nare philosophers to be formed? None but a chosen Few have the\nprecious gold born with them, empowering them to attain this\nelevation. To those Few, if properly trained, the privilege and\nright to exercise command belongs, by Nature. For the rest,\nobedience is the duty prescribed by Nature.[178]\n\n[Footnote 177: Plato, Republic, v. p. 473, vi. p. 503 B. [Greek:\ntou\\s a)kribesta/tous phu/lakas philoso/phous dei=\nkathista/nai.]]\n\n[Footnote 178: Plato, Repub. v. p. 474 B. [Greek: toi=s me\\n\npros\u00ea/kei phu/ei, a(/ptesthai/ te philosophi/as, \u00ea(gemoneu/ein\nt' e)n po/lei; toi=s d' a)/llois m\u00ea/te a(/ptesthai, a)kolouthei=n\nte t\u00f4=| \u00ea(goume/n\u00f4|.]\n\n476 B: [Greek: spa/nioi a)\\n ei)=en]. Also vi. 503, vii. 535. They\nare to be [Greek: e)k t\u00f4=n prokri/t\u00f4n pro/kritoi], vii. 537 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Comprehensive curriculum for aspirants to\nphilosophy--consummation by means of Dialectic.]\n\nI have already given, in Chap. XXXV., a short summary of the\npeculiar scientific training which Sokrates prescribes for\nripening these heroic aspirants into complete philosophers. They\npass years of intellectual labour, all by their own spontaneous\nimpulse, over and above the full training of Guardians. They study\nArithmetic, Geometry, Stereometry, Astronomy, Acoustics, &c.,\nuntil the age of thirty: they then continue in the exercise of\nDialectic, with all the test of question and answer, for five\nyears longer: after which they enter upon the duties of practice\nand administration, succeeding ultimately to the position of\nchiefs if found competent. It is assumed that this long course of\nstudy, consummated by Dialectic, has operated within them that\ngreat mental revolution which Plato calls, turning the eye from\nthe shadows in the cave to the realities of clear daylight: that\nthey will no longer be absorbed in the sensible world or in\npassing phenomena, but will become familiar with the unchangeable\nIdeas or Forms of the Intelligible world, knowable only by\nintellectual intuition. Reason has with them been exalted to its\nhighest power: not only strengthening them to surmount all\nintellectual difficulties and to deal with the most complicated\nconjectures of practice--but also ennobling their\ndispositions, so as to overcome all the disturbing temptations and\nnarrow misguiding prejudices inherent in the unregenerate man.\nUpon the perfection of character, emotional and intellectual,\nimparted to these few philosophers, depends the Platonic\nCommonwealth.\n\n[Side-note: Valuable remarks on the effects of these\npreparatory studies.]\n\nThe remarks made by Plato on the effect of this preparatory\ncurriculum, and on the various studies composing it, are highly\ninteresting and instructive--even when they cannot be defended as\nexact. Much of what he so eloquently enunciates respecting\nphilosophy and the philosophical character, is in fact just and\nprofound, whatever view we may take as to Universals: whether we\nregard them (like Plato) as the only Real Entia, cognizable by the\nmental eye, and radically disparate from particulars--or whether\nwe hold them to be only general Concepts, abstracted and\ngeneralised more or less exactly from particulars. The remarks\nmade by Plato on the educational effect produced by Arithmetic and\nthe other studies, are valuable and suggestive. Even the discredit\nwhich he throws on observations of fact, in Astronomy and\nAcoustics--the great antithesis between him and modern times--is\nuseful as enabling us to enter into his point of view.[179]\n\n[Footnote 179: Plato, Repub. vii. p. 529 C-D.\n\nThe manner in which Plato here depreciates astronomical\nobservation is not easily reconcileable with his doctrine in the\nTim\u00e6us. He there tells us that the rotations of the Nous\n(intellective soul) in the interior of the human cranium, are\ncognate or analogous to those of the cosmical spheres, but more\nconfused and less perfect: our eyesight being expressly intended\nfor the purpose, that we might contemplate the perfect and\nunerring rotations of the cosmical spheres, so as to correct\nthereby the disturbed rotations in our own brain (Tim\u00e6us, pp.\n46-47).\n\nMalebranche shares the feeling of Plato on the subject of\nastronomical observation. Recherche de la V\u00e9rit\u00e9, liv. iv. ch.\nvii. vol. ii. p. 219, ed. 1772 (p. 278, ed. 1721).\n\n\"Car enfin qu'y a-t-il de grand dans la connoissance des mouvemens\ndes plan\u00e8tes? et n'en s\u00e7avons nous pas assez pr\u00e9sentement pour\nr\u00e9gler nos mois et nos ann\u00e9es? Qu'avons nous tant \u00e0 faire de\ns\u00e7avoir, si Saturne est environn\u00e9 d'un anneau ou d'un grand nombre\nde petites lunes, et pourquoi prendre parti l\u00e0-dessus? Pourquoi se\nglorifier d'avoir pr\u00e9dit la grandeur d'une \u00e9clipse, o\u00f9 l'on a\npeut-\u00eatre mieux rencontr\u00e9 qu'un autre, parcequ'on a \u00e9t\u00e9 plus\nheureux? Il y a des personnes destin\u00e9es, par l'ordre du Prince, \u00e0\nobserver les astres; contentons nous de leurs observations. . .\nNous devons \u00eatre pleinement satisfaits sur une mati\u00e8re qui nous\ntouche si peu, lorsqu'ils nous font partie de leurs\nd\u00e9couvertes.\"]\n\n[Side-note: Differences between the Republic and other\ndialogues--no mention of reminiscence nor of the Elenchus.]\n\nBut his point of view in the Republic differs materially from that\nwhich we read in other dialogues: especially in two ways.\n\nFirst, The scientific and long-continued Quadrivium, through which\nPlato here conducts the student to philosophy, is very\ndifferent from the road to philosophy as indicated elsewhere.\nNothing is here said about reminiscence--which in the Menon,\nPh\u00e6don, Ph\u00e6drus, and elsewhere, stands in the foreground of his\ntheory, as the engine for reviving in the mind Forms or Ideas.\nWith these Forms it had been familiar during a prior state of\nexistence, but they had become buried under the sensible\nimpressions arising from its conjunction with the body. Nor do we\nfind in the Republic any mention of that electric shock of the\nnegative Elenchus, which (in the The\u00e6t\u00eatus, Sophist\u00eas, and\nseveral other dialogues) is declared indispensable for stirring up\nthe natural mind not merely from ignorance and torpor, but even\nfrom a state positively distempered--the false persuasion of\nknowledge.\n\n[Side-note: Different view taken by Plato in the Republic\nabout Dialectic--and different place assigned to it.]\n\nSecondly, following out this last observation, we perceive another\ndiscrepancy yet more striking, in the directions given by Plato\nrespecting the study of Dialectic. He prescribes that it shall\nupon no account be taught to young men: and that it shall come\nlast of all in teaching, only after the full preceding Quadrivium.\nHe censures severely the prevalent practice of applying it to\nyoung men, as pregnant with mischief. Young men (he says) brought\nup in certain opinions inculcated by the lawgiver, as to what is\njust and honourable, are interrogated on these subjects, and have\nquestions put to them. When asked What is the just and the\nhonourable, they reply in the manner which they have learnt from\nauthority: but this reply, being exposed to farther\ninterrogatories, is shown to be untenable and inconsistent, such\nas they cannot defend to their own satisfaction. Hence they lose\nall respect for the established ethical creed, which however\nstands opposed in their minds to the seductions of immediate\nenjoyment: yet they acquire no new or better conviction in its\nplace. Instead of following an established law, they thus come to\nlive without any law.[180] Besides, young men when initiated in\ndialectic debate, take great delight in the process, as a\nmeans of exposing and puzzling the respondent. Copying the skilful\ninterrogators whom they have found themselves unable to answer,\nthey interrogate others in their turn, dispute everything, and\npride themselves on exhibiting all the negative force of the\nElenchus. Instead of employing dialectic debate for the discovery\nof truth, they use it merely as a disputatious pastime, and thus\nbring themselves as well as philosophy into discredit.[181]\n\n[Footnote 180: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 538 D-539. [Greek: o(/tan\nto\\n ou(/t\u00f4s e)/chonta e)ltho\\n e)r\u00f4/t\u00eama e)/r\u00eatai, ti/ e)sti\nto\\ kalo/n, kai\\ a)pokrina/menon o(\\ tou= nomothetou= \u00ea)/kouen\ne)xelegch\u00ea=| o( lo/gos, kai\\ polla/kis kai\\ pollach\u00ea=\ne)le/gch\u00f4n ei)s do/xan katabal\u00ea=| \u00f4(s tou=to ou)de\\n ma/llon\nkalo\\n \u00ea)\\ ai)schro\\n, kai\\ peri\\ dikai/ou \u00f4(sau/t\u00f4s kai\\\na)di/kou, kai\\ a(\\ ma/lista \u00ea)=gen e)n tim\u00ea=|], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 181: Plato, Repub. vii. p. 539 B.]\n\nAccordingly, we must not admit (says Plato) either young men, or\nmen of ordinary untrained minds, to dialectic debate. We must\nadmit none but mature persons, of sedate disposition, properly\nprepared: who will employ it not for mere disputation, but for the\ninvestigation of truth.[182]\n\n[Footnote 182: Plato, Repub. vii. p. 539 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Contradiction with the spirit of other\ndialogues--Parmenid\u00eas, &c.]\n\nNow the doctrine thus proclaimed, with the grounds upon which it\nrests--That dialectic debate is unsuitable and prejudicial to\nyoung men--distinctly contradict both the principles laid down by\nhimself elsewhere, and the frequent indications of his own\ndialogues: not to mention the practice of Sokrates as described by\nXenophon. In the Platonic Parmenid\u00eas, and The\u00e6t\u00eatus, the season\nof youth is expressly pronounced to be that in which dialectic\nexercise is not merely appropriate, but indispensable to the\nsubsequent attainment of truth.[183] Moreover, Plato puts into the\nmouth of Parmenides a specimen intentionally given to represent\nthat dialectic exercise which will be profitable to youth. The\nspecimen is one full of perplexing, though ingenious,\nsubtleties: ending in establishing, by different trains of\nreasoning, the affirmative, as well as the negative, of several\ndistinct conclusions. Not only it supplies no new positive\ncertainty, but it appears to render any such consummation more\ndistant and less attainable than ever.[184] It is therefore\neminently open to the censure which Plato pronounces, in the\npassage just cited from his Republic, against dialectic as\naddressed to young men. The like remark may be made upon the\nnumerous other dialogues (though less extreme in negative subtlety\nthan the Parmenid\u00eas), wherein the Platonic Sokrates interrogates\nyouths (or interrogates others, in the presence of youths) without\nany positive result: as in the The\u00e6t\u00eatus, Charmid\u00eas, Lysis,\nAlkibiad\u00eas, Hippias, &c., to which we may add the\nconversations of the Xenophontic Sokrates with Euthydemus and\nothers.[185]\n\n[Footnote 183: Plato, Parmenid\u00eas, pp. 135 D, 137 B. The\u00e6t\u00eat. 146\nA.\n\nProklus, in his Commentary on the Parmenid\u00eas (p. 778, Stallbaum),\nadverts to the passage of the Republic here discussed, and\nendeavours to show that it is not inconsistent with the\nParmenid\u00eas. He states that the exhortation to practise dialectic\ndebate in youth, as the appropriate season, must be understood as\nspecially and exclusively addressed to a youth of the\nextraordinary mental qualities of Sokrates; while the passage in\nthe Republic applies the prohibition only to the general regiment\nof Guardians. But this justification is noway satisfactory; for\nPlato in the Republic makes no exception in favour of the most\npromising Guardians. He lays down the position generally. Again,\nin the Parmenid\u00eas, we find the encouragement to dialectic debate\naddressed not merely to the youthful Sokrates, but to the youthful\nAristoteles (p. 137 B). Moreover, we are not to imagine that all\nthe youths who are introduced as respondents in the Platonic\ndialogues are implied as equal to Sokrates himself, though they\nare naturally represented as superior and promising subjects.\nCompare Plato, Sophist\u00eas, p. 217 E; Politikus, p. 257 E.]\n\n[Footnote 184: Plato, Parmenid. p. 166 ad fin. [Greek:\nei)r\u00ea/sth\u00f4 toi/nun tou=to/ te kai\\ o(/ti, \u00f4(s e)/oiken, e(\\n\nei)/t' e)/stin, ei)te m\u00ea\\ e)/stin, au)to/ te kai\\ ta)/lla kai\\\npro\\s au)ta\\ kai\\ pro\\s a)/ll\u00eala pa/nta pa/nt\u00f4s e)/sti te kai\\\nou)k e)/sti, kai\\ phai/netai te kai\\ ou) phai/netai.\nA)l\u00eathe/stata.]]\n\n[Footnote 185: Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 2.]\n\n[Side-note: Contradiction with the character and\ndeclarations of Sokrates.]\n\nIn fact, the Platonic Sokrates expressly proclaims himself (in the\nApology as well as in the other dialogues just named) to be\nignorant and incapable of teaching anything. His mission was to\nexpose the ignorance of those, who fancy that they know without\nreally knowing: he taught no one anything, but he cross-examined\nevery one who would submit to it, before all the world, and in a\nmanner especially interesting to young men. Sokrates mentions that\nthese young men not only listened with delight, but tried to\nimitate him as well as they could, by cross-examining others in\nthe same manner:[186] and in mentioning the fact, he expresses\nneither censure nor regret, but satisfaction in the thought that\nthe chance would be thereby increased, of exposing that false\npersuasion of knowledge which prevailed so widely everywhere. Now\nPlato, in the passage just cited from the Republic, blames this\ncontagious spirit of cross-examination on the part of young men,\nas a vice which proved the mischief of dialectic debate addressed\nto them at that age. He farther deprecates the disturbance of\n\"those opinions which they have heard from the lawgiver respecting\nwhat is just and honourable\". But it is precisely these\nopinions which, in the Alkibiad\u00eas, Menon, Protagoras, and other\ndialogues, the Platonic Sokrates treats as untaught, if not\nunteachable:--as having been acquired, no man knew how, without\nthe lessons of any assignable master and without any known period\nof study:--lastly, as constituting that very illusion of false\nknowledge without real knowledge, of which Sokrates undertakes to\npurge the youthful mind, and which must be dispelled before any\nimprovement can be effected in it.[187]\n\n[Footnote 186: Plato, Apolog. Sokrat c. 10, p. 23 D, c. 22, p. 33\nC, c. 27, p. 37 E, c. 30, p. 39 C.]\n\n[Footnote 187: Plato, Sophist. p. 230.]\n\n[Side-note: The remarks here made upon the effect of\nDialectic upon youth coincide with the accusation of Mel\u00eatus\nagainst Sokrates.]\n\nWe thus see, that the dictum forbidding dialectic debate with\nyouth--cited from the seventh book of the Republic, which Plato\nthere puts into the mouth of Sokrates--is decidedly anti-Sokratic;\nand anti-Platonic, in so far as Plato represents Sokrates. It\nbelongs indeed to the case of Mel\u00eatus and Anytus, in their\nindictment against Sokrates before the Athenian dikastery. It is\nidentical with their charge against him, of corrupting youth, and\ninducing them to fancy themselves superior to the authority of\nestablished customs and opinions heard from their elders.[188] Now\nthe Platonic Sokrates is here made to declare explicitly, that\ndialectic debate addressed to youth does really tend to produce\nthis effect:--to render them lawless, immoral, disputatious. And\nwhen we find him forbidding all such discourse at an earlier age\nthan thirty years--we remark as a singular coincidence, that this\nis the exact prohibition which Kritias and Charikles actually\nimposed upon Sokrates himself, during the shortlived dominion of\nthe Thirty Oligarchs at Athens.[189]\n\n[Footnote 188: Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 19-49. Compare\nAristophanes, Nubes, 1042-1382.]\n\n[Footnote 189: Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 33-38.\n\nIsokrates complains that youthful students took more delight in\ndisputation than he thought suitable; nevertheless he declares\nthat youth, and not mature age, is the proper season for such\nexercises, as well as for Geometry and Astronomy (Orat. xii.\nPanathen. s. 29-31, p. 239).]\n\n[Side-note: Contrast between the real Sokrates, as a\ndissenter at Athens, and the Platonic Sokrates, framer and\ndictator of the Platonic Republic.]\n\nThe matter to which I here advert, illustrates a material\ndistinction between some writings of Plato as compared with\nothers, and between different points of view which his mind took\non at different times. In the Platonic Apology, we find Sokrates\nconfessing his own ignorance, and proclaiming himself to be\nisolated among an uncongenial public falsely persuaded of\ntheir own knowledge. In several other dialogues, he is the same:\nhe cannot teach anything, but can only cross-examine, test, and\napply the spur to respondents. But the Republic presents him in a\nnew character. He is no longer a dissenter amidst a community of\nfixed, inherited, convictions.[190] He is himself on the throne of\nKing Nomos: the infallible authority, temporal as well as\nspiritual, from whom all public sentiment emanates, and by whom\northodoxy is determined. Hence we now find him passing to the\nopposite pole; taking up the orthodox, conservative, point of\nview, the same as Mel\u00eatus and Anytus maintained in their\naccusation against Sokrates at Athens. He now expects every\nindividual to fall into the place, and contract the opinions,\nprescribed by authority: including among those opinions deliberate\nethical and political fictions, such as that about the gold and\nsilver earthborn men. Free-thinking minds, who take views of their\nown, and enquire into the evidence of these beliefs, become\ninconvenient and dangerous. Neither the Sokrates of the Platonic\nApology, nor his negative Dialectic, could be allowed to exist in\nthe Platonic Republic.\n\n[Footnote 190: Plato, Repub. vii. p. 541.]\n\n[Side-note: Idea of Good--The Chiefs alone know what it\nis--If they did not they would be unfit for their functions.]\n\nOne word more must be said respecting a subject which figures\nconspicuously in the Republic--the Idea or Form of Good. The\nchiefs alone (we read) at the end of their long term of study,\nhaving ascended gradually from the phenomena of sense to\nintellectual contemplation and familiarity with the unchangeable\nIdeas--will come to discern and embrace the highest of all\nIdeas--the Form of Good:[191] by the help of which alone,\nJustice, Temperance, and the other virtues, become useful and\nprofitable.[192] If the Archons do not know how and why just and\nhonourable things are good, they will not be fit for their\nduty.[193] In regard to Good (Plato tells us) no man is satisfied\nwith mere appearance. Here every man desires and postulates that\nwhich is really good: while as to the just and the honourable,\nmany are satisfied with the appearance, without caring for the\nreality.[194]\n\n[Footnote 191: Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 533-534.]\n\n[Footnote 192: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 A.]\n\n[Footnote 193: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 506 A.]\n\n[Footnote 194: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 D.]\n\n[Side-note: What is the Good? Plato does not know; but\nhe requires the Chiefs to know it. Without this the Republic would\nbe a failure.]\n\nPlato proclaims this Real Good, as distinguished from Apparent\nGood, to be the paramount and indispensable object of knowledge,\nwithout which all other knowledge is useless. It is that which\nevery man divines to exist, yearns for, and does everything with a\nview to obtain: but which he misses, from not knowing where to\nseek; missing also along with it that which gives value to other\nacquisitions.[195] What then is this Real Good--the Noumenon,\nIdea, or form of Good?\n\n[Footnote 195: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 A-E. [Greek: O(\\ d\u00ea\\\ndi\u00f4/kei me\\n a(/pasa psuch\u00ea\\ kai\\ tou/tou e(/neka pa/nta\npra/ttei, a)pomanteuome/n\u00ea ti\\ ei)=nai, a)porou=sa de\\ kai\\ ou)k\ne)/chousa labei=n i(kan\u00f4=s ti/ pot' e)sti\\n ou)de\\ pi/stei\nchr\u00ea/sasthai moni/m\u00f4|, oi(/a| kai\\ peri\\ ta)/lla, dia\\ tou=to\nde\\ a)potugcha/nei kai\\ t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n ei)/ ti o)/phelos \u00ea)=n],\n&c.]\n\nThis question is put by Glaukon to Sokrates, with much\nearnestness, in the dialogue of the Republic. But unfortunately it\nremains unanswered. Plato declines all categorical reply; though\nthe question is one, as he himself emphatically announces, upon\nwhich all the positive consequences of his philosophy turn.[196]\nHe conducts us to the chamber wherein this precious and\nindispensable secret is locked up, but he has no key to open the\ndoor. In describing the condition of other men's minds--that they\ndivine a Real Good--[Greek: Au)to\\-a)gatho\\n] or Bonum _per\nse_--do everything in order to obtain it, but puzzle themselves\nin vain to grasp and determine what it is[197]--he has\nunconsciously described the condition of his own.\n\n[Footnote 196: Certainly when we see the way in which Plato deals\nwith the [Greek: i)de/a a)gathou=], we cannot exempt him from the\ncriticism which he addresses to others, vi. p. 493 E. [Greek: \u00f4(s\nde\\ kai\\ a)gatha\\ kai\\ kala\\ tau=ta t\u00ea=| a)l\u00eathei/a|, \u00ea)/d\u00ea\np\u00f4pote/ tou= \u00ea)/kousas au)t\u00f4=n lo/gon dido/ntos ou)\nkatage/laston?]\n\nWe may illustrate this procedure of Plato by an Oriental fable,\ncited in an instructive Dissertation of M. Ernest Renan.\n\n\"Aristoteles primum sub Almamuno (813-833, A.D.) arabic\u00e8\nfactus est. Somniumque effictum \u00e0 credulis hominibus: vidisse\nAlmamunum in somno virum aspectu venerabili, solio insidentem:\nmirantem Almamunum qu\u00e6sivisse, quisnam ille esset? responsum,\nAristotelem esse. Quo audito, Chalifam ab eo qu\u00e6sivisse, Quidnam\nBonum esset? respondisse Aristotelem: Quod sapientiores probarent.\nQu\u00e6renti Chalif\u00e6 quid hoc esset? Quod lex divina probat--dixisse.\nInterroganti porro illi, Quid hoc? Quod omnes\nprobarent--respondisse: _neque alii ultra qu\u00e6stioni respondere\nvoluisse_. Quo somnio permotum Almamunum \u00e0 Gr\u00e6corum imperatore\nveniam petiisse, ut libri philosophici in ipsius regno\nqu\u00e6rerentur: hujusque rei grati\u00e2 viros doctos misisse.\" Ernest\nRenan, De Philosophi\u00e2 Peripatetic\u00e2 apud Syros, commentatio\nHistorica, p. 57; Paris, 1852.\n\nAmong the various remarks which might be made upon this curious\ndream, one is, that Bonum is always determined as having relation\nto the appreciative apprehension of some mind--the Wise Men, the\nDivine Mind, the Mind of the general public. _Bonum_ is that\nwhich some mind or minds conceive and appreciate as such. The word\nhas no meaning except in relation to some apprehending Subject.]\n\n[Footnote 197: Plato, Republ. vi. p. 505 E. [Greek:\na)pomanteuome/n\u00ea ti ei)=nai, a)porou=sa de\\ kai\\ ou)k e)/chousa\nlabei=n i(kan\u00f4=s ti/ pot' e)sti/n], &c.\n\nThe remarks of Aristotle in impugning the Platonic [Greek: i)de/an\na)gathou=] are very instructive, Ethic. Nikom. i. p. 1096-1097;\nEthic. Eudem. i. p. 1217-1218. He maintains that there exists\nnothing corresponding to the word; and that even if it did exist,\nit would neither be [Greek: prakto\\n] nor [Greek: kt\u00eato\\n\na)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4|]. Aristotle here looks upon Good as being\nessentially relative or phenomenal: he understands [Greek: to\\\na(pl\u00f4=s a)gatho\\n] to mean [Greek: to\\ a)gatho\\n to\\ phaino/menon\nt\u00f4=| spoudai/\u00f4|] (Eth. Nik. iii. p. 1113, b. 16-32). But he does\nnot uniformly adhere to this meaning.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVIII.\n\nTIM\u00c6US AND KRITIAS.\n\n\n[Side-note: Persons and scheme of the Tim\u00e6us and Kritias.]\n\nThough the Republic of Plato appears as a substantive composition,\nnot including in itself any promise of an intended sequel--yet the\nTim\u00e6us and Kritias are introduced by Plato as constituting a\nsequel to the Republic. Tim\u00e6us the Pythagorean philosopher of\nLokri, the Athenian Kritias, and Hermokrates, are now introduced,\nas having been the listeners while Sokrates was recounting his\nlong conversation of ten Books, first with Thrasymachus, next with\nGlaukon and Adeimantus. The portion of that conversation, which\ndescribed the theory of a model commonwealth, is recapitulated in\nits main characteristics: and Sokrates now claims from the two\nlisteners some requital for the treat which he has afforded to\nthem. He desires to see the citizens, whose training he has\ndescribed at length, and whom he has brought up to the stage of\nmature capacity--exhibited by some one else as living, acting, and\naffording some brilliant evidence of courage and military\ndiscipline.[1] Kritias undertakes to satisfy his demand, by\nrecounting a glorious achievement of the ancient citizens of\nAttica, who had once rescued Europe from an inroad of countless\nand almost irresistible invaders, pouring in from the vast island\nof Atlantis in the Western Ocean. This exploit is supposed to have\nbeen performed nearly 10,000 years before; and though lost out of\nthe memory of the Athenians themselves, to have been commemorated\nand still preserved in the more ancient records of Sais in Egypt,\nand handed down through Solon by a family tradition to Kritias.\nBut it is agreed between Kritias and Tim\u00e6us,[2] that before the\nformer enters upon his quasi-historical or mythical recital\nabout the invasion from Atlantis, the latter shall deliver an\nexpository discourse, upon a subject very different and of far\ngreater magnitude. Unfortunately the narrative promised by Kritias\nstands before us only as a fragment. There is reason to believe\nthat Plato never completed it.[3] But the discourse assigned to\nTim\u00e6us was finished, and still remains, as a valuable record of\nancient philosophy.\n\n[Footnote 1: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 20 B.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 27 A.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Plutarch, Solon, c. 33.\n\nAnother discourse appears to have been contemplated by Plato, to\nbe delivered by Hermokrates after Kritias had concluded (Plato,\nTim\u00e6us, p. 20 A; Kritias, p. 108). But nothing of this was\nprobably ever composed.]\n\n[Side-note: The Tim\u00e6us is the earliest ancient physical\ntheory, which we possess in the words of its author.]\n\nFor us, modern readers, the Tim\u00e6us of Plato possesses a species of\ninterest which it did not possess either for the contemporaries of\nits author, or for the ancient world generally. We read in it a\nsystem--at least the sketch of a system--of universal philosophy,\nthe earliest that has come to us in the words of the author\nhimself. Among the many other systems, anterior or\nsimultaneous--those of Thales and the other Ionic philosophers, of\nHerakleitus, Pythagoras, Parmenides, Empedokles, Anaxagoras,\nDemokritus--not one remains to us as it was promulgated by its original\nauthor or supporters. We know all of them only in fragments and\nthrough the criticisms of others: fragments always scanty--criticisms\ngenerally dissentient, often harsh, sometimes unfair, introduced\nby the critic to illustrate opposing doctrines of his own. Here,\nhowever, the Platonic system is made known to us, not in this\nfragmentary and half-attested form, but in the full exposition\nwhich Plato himself deemed sufficient for it. This is a remarkable\npeculiarity.\n\n[Side-note: Position** and character of the Pythagorean\nTim\u00e6us.]\n\nTim\u00e6us is extolled by Sokrates as combining the character of a\nstatesman with that of a philosopher: as being of distinguished\nwealth and family in his native city (the Epizephyrian Lokri),\nwhere he had exercised the leading political functions:--and as\nhaving attained besides, the highest excellence in science,\nastronomical as well as physical.[4] We know from other sources\n(though Plato omits to tell us so, according to his usual\nundefined manner of designating contemporaries) that he was of the\nPythagorean school. Much of the exposition assigned to him is\nfounded on Pythagorean principles, though blended by Plato\nwith other doctrines, either his own or borrowed elsewhere. Tim\u00e6us\nundertakes to requite Sokrates by giving a discourse respecting\n\"The Nature of the Universe\"; beginning at the genesis of the\nKosmos, and ending with the constitution of man.[5] This is to\nserve as an historical or mythical introduction to the Platonic\nRepublic recently described; wherein Sokrates had set forth the\neducation and discipline proper for man when located as an\ninhabitant of the earth. Neither during the exposition of Tim\u00e6us,\nnor after it, does Sokrates make any remark. But the commencement\nof the Kritias (which is evidently intended as a second part or\ncontinuation of the Tim\u00e6us) contains, first, a prayer from Tim\u00e6us\nthat the Gods will pardon the defects of his preceding discourse\nand help him to amend them--next an emphatic commendation bestowed\nby Sokrates upon the discourse: thus supplying that recognition\nwhich is not found in the first part.[6]\n\n[Footnote 4: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 20 A, 27 A.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 27 A. [Greek: e)/doxe ga\\r \u00ea(mi=n\nTi/maion me/n, a(/te a)stronomik\u00f4/taton \u00ea(m\u00f4=n, kai\\ _peri\\\nphu/se\u00f4s tou= panto\\s_ ei)de/nai ma/lista e)/rgon\npepoi\u00eame/non, pr\u00f4=ton le/gein a)rcho/menon a)po\\ t\u00ea=s tou=\nko/smou gene/se\u00f4s, teleuta=|n de\\ ei)s a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n phu/sin.]]\n\n[Footnote 6: Plato, Kritias, p. 108 B.]\n\n[Side-note: Poetical imagination displayed by Plato. He\npretends to nothing more than probability. Contrast with Sokrates,\nIsokrates, Xenophon.]\n\nIn this Hymn of the Universe (to use a phrase of the rhetor\nMenander[7] respecting the Platonic Tim\u00e6us) the prose of Plato is\nquite as much the vehicle of poetical imagination as the\nhexameters of Hesiod, Empedokles, or Parmenides. The Gods and\nGoddesses, whom Tim\u00e6us invokes at the commencement,[8] supply him\nwith superhuman revelations, like the Muses to Hesiod,\nor the Goddess of Wisdom to Parmenides. Plato expressly recognises\nthe multiplicity of different statements current, respecting the\nGods and the generation of the Universe. He claims no superior\ncredibility for his own. He professes to give us a new doctrine,\nnot less probable than the numerous dissentient opinions already\nadvanced by others, and more acceptable to his own mind. He bids\nus be content with such a measure of probability, because the\nlimits of our human nature preclude any fuller approach to\ncertainty.[9] It is important to note the modest pretensions\nhere unreservedly announced by Plato as to the conviction and\nassent of hearers:--so different from the confidence manifested in\nthe Republic, where he hires a herald to proclaim his\nconclusion--and from the overbearing dogmatism which we read in his\nTreatise De Legibus, where he is providing a catechism for the\nschooling of citizens, rather than proofs to be sifted by opponents.\nHe delivers, respecting matters which he admits to be unfathomable,\nthe theory most in harmony with his own religious and poetical\npredispositions, which he declares to be as probable as any other\nyet proclaimed. The Xenophontic Sokrates, who disapproved all\nspeculation respecting the origin and structure of the Kosmos,\nwould probably have granted this equal probability, and equal\nabsence of any satisfactory grounds of preferential belief--both\nto Plato on one side and to the opposing theorists on the other.\nAnd another intelligent contemporary, Isokrates, would probably\nhave considered the Platonic Tim\u00e6us as one among the same class of\nunprofitable extravagancies, to which he assigns the theories of\nHerakleitus, Empedokles, Alkm\u00e6on, Parmenides, and others.[10]\nPlato himself (in the Sophist\u00eas)[11] characterises the theories\nof these philosophers as fables recited to an audience of\nchildren, without any care to ensure a rational comprehension\nand assent. _They_ would probably have made the like\ncriticism upon his Tim\u00e6us. While he treats it as fable to apply to\nthe Gods the human analogy of generation and parentage--they would\nhave considered it only another variety of fable, to apply to them\nthe equally human analogy of constructive fabrication or mixture\nof ingredients. The language of Xenophon shows that he agreed with\nhis master Sokrates in considering such speculations as not merely\nunprofitable, but impious.[12] And if the mission from the\nGods--constituting Sokrates Cross-Examiner General against the\nprevailing fancy of knowledge without the reality of\nknowledge--drove him to court perpetual controversy with the\nstatesmen, poets, and Sophists of Athens; the same mission would have\ncompelled him, on hearing the sweeping affirmations of Tim\u00e6us, to\napply the test of his Elenchus, and to appear in his well-known\ncharacter of confessed[13] but inquisitive ignorance. The Platonic\nTim\u00e6us is positively anti-Sokratic. It places us at the opposite\nor dogmatic pole of Plato's character.[14]\n\n[Footnote 7: Menander, De Encomiis, i. 5, p. 39. Compare Karsten,\nDe Empedoclis Vit\u00e2, p. 72; De Parmenidis Vit\u00e2, p. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 27 D; Hesiod, Theogon, 22-35-105.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 29 D, 28 D, 59 C-D, 68 C, 72 D.\n[Greek: kat' e)m\u00ea\\n do/xan--para\\ t\u00ea=s e)m\u00ea=s ps\u00ea/phou] (p. 52\nD). In many parts of the dialogue he repeats that he is delivering\nhis _own opinion_--that he is affirming what is probable. In\nthe Ph\u00e6don, however, we find that [Greek: ei)ko/tes lo/goi] are\nset aside as deceptive and dangerous, Ph\u00e6don, p. 92 D. In the\nremarkable passage of the Tim\u00e6us, p. 48 C-D, Plato intimates that\nhe will not in the present discourse attempt to go to the bottom\nof the subject--[Greek: t\u00ea\\n me\\n peri\\ a(pa/nt\u00f4n ei)/te\na)rch\u00ea\\n ei)/te a)rcha\\s ei)/te o(/p\u00ea| dokei= tou/t\u00f4n pe/ri,\nto\\ nu=n ou) r(\u00eate/on]--but that he will confine himself to\n[Greek: ei)ko/tes lo/goi--to\\ de\\ kat' a)rcha\\s r(\u00eathe\\n\ndiaphula/tt\u00f4n, t\u00ea\\n _t\u00f4=n ei)ko/t\u00f4n lo/g\u00f4n du/namin,\npeira/somai m\u00eadeno\\s \u00ea(=tton ei)ko/ta_, ma=llon de\\ kai\\\ne)/mprosthen a)p' a)rch\u00ea=s peri\\ e(ka/st\u00f4n kai\\ xumpa/nt\u00f4n\nle/gein.]\n\nWhat these _principia_ are, which Plato here keeps in the\nbackground, I do not clearly understand. Susemihl (Entwickelung\nder Plat. Phil. ii. p. 405) and Martin (\u00c9tudes sur le Tim\u00e9e, ii.\np. 173, note 56) have both given elucidations of this passage, but\nneither of them appear to me satisfactory. Simplikius\nsays:--[Greek: O( Pla/t\u00f4n t\u00ea\\n phusiologi/an ei)kotologi/an e)/legen\nei)=nai, \u00f4(=| kai\\ A)ristote/l\u00eas summarturei=], Schol. Aristot.\nPhys. 325, a. 25 Brandis.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Isokrates, De Permutatione, Or. xv. s. 287-288-304.\n[Greek: \u00ea(gou=mai ga\\r ta\\s me\\n toiau/tas _perittologi/as_\no(moi/as ei)=nai tai=s thaumatopoii/ais tai=s ou)de\\n me\\n\n\u00f4)phelou/sais, u(po\\ de\\ t\u00f4=n a)no\u00ea/t\u00f4n perista/tois\ngignome/nais] (s. 288). . . .\n\n[Greek: tou\\s de\\ t\u00f4=n me\\n a)nagkai/\u00f4n a)melou=ntas, ta\\s de\\\nt\u00f4=n palai\u00f4=n sophist\u00f4=n _teratologi/as_ a)gap\u00f4=ntas,\nphilosophei=n phasi/n] (s. 304).\n\nCompare another passage of Isokrates, the opening of Orat. x.\nEncomium Helen\u00e6; in which latter passage he seems plainly to\nnotice one of the main ethical doctrines advanced by Plato, though\nhe does not mention Plato's name, nor indeed the name of any\nliving person.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Plato, Sophist. pp. 242-243. [Greek: Mu=tho/n tina\ne(/kastos phai/netai/ moi di\u00eagei=sthai paisi\\n \u00f4(s ou)=sin\n\u00ea(mi=n; o( me\\n \u00f4(s tri/a ta\\ o)/nta, polemei= de\\ a)ll\u00ea/lois\ne)ni/ote au)t\u00f4=n a)/tta p\u00ea|, to/te de\\ kai\\ phi/la gigno/mena\nga/mous te kai\\ to/kous kai\\ tropha\\s t\u00f4=n e)kgo/n\u00f4n\npare/chetai] (p. 242 C-D).]\n\n[Footnote 12: Xenophon, Memorab. i. 1, 11-14. [Greek: Ou)dei\\s de\\\np\u00f4/pote S\u00f4kra/tous ou)de\\n a)sebe\\s ou)de\\ a)no/sion ou)/te\npra/ttontos ei)=den ou)/te le/gontos \u00ea)/kousen; _ou)de\\\nga\\r_ peri\\ t\u00ea=s t\u00f4=n pa/nt\u00f4n phu/se\u00f4s \u00ea(=per t\u00f4=n\na)/ll\u00f4n oi(/ plei=stoi, diele/geto, skop\u00f4=n _o(/p\u00f4s o(\nkalou/menos u(po\\ t\u00f4=n sophist\u00f4=n ko/smos_ e)/chei, kai\\\nti/sin a)na/gkais e(/kasta gi/gnetai t\u00f4=n ou)rani/\u00f4n; a)lla\\\nkai\\ tou\\s phronti/zontas ta\\ toiau=ta m\u00f4rai/nontas\na)pedei/knue.]\n\nLucretius, i. 80:--\n\nIllud in his rebus vereor, ne fort\u00e9 rearis\nImpia te rationis inire elementa, viamque\nIndugredi sceleris, &c.\n\nThe above cited passage of Xenophon shows that the term [Greek:\nKo/smos] was in his time a technical word among philosophers, not\nyet accepted in that meaning by the general public. The aversion\nto investigation of the Kosmos, on the ground of impiety,\nentertained by Sokrates and Xenophon, is expressed by Plato in the\nLeges (vii. 821 A) in the following words of the principal\nspeaker,--[Greek: To\\n me/giston theo\\n kai\\ o(/lon to\\n ko/smon\nphame\\n ou)/te z\u00eatei=n dei=n ou)/te polupragmonei=n ta\\s ai)ti/as\ne)reun\u00f4=ntas; ou) ga\\r ou)d' o(/sion ei)=nai; to\\ de\\ e)/oike\npa=n tou/tou tou)nanti/on gigno/menon o)rth\u00f4=s a)\\n gi/gnesthai.]\nThis last passage is sometimes cited as if the word [Greek:\nphame\\n] expressed the opinion of the principal speaker, or of\nPlato himself--which is a mistake: [Greek: phame\\n] here expresses\nthe opinion which the principal speaker is about to controvert.]\n\n[Footnote 13: See above, vol. i. ch. ix. of the present work,\nwhere the Platonic Apology is reviewed.]\n\n[Footnote 14: \"Quocirca Tim\u00e6us non dialectic\u00e9 disserens inducitur,\nsed loquitur ut hierophanta, qui mundi arcana aliunde accepta\ngrandi ac magnific\u00e2 oratione pronunciat; quin etiam qu\u00e6\nexperienti\u00e6 suspicionem superant, mythorum ac symbolorum\ninvolucris obtegit, eoque modo quam ea certa sint, legentibus non\nobscur\u00e9 significat.\"--Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad Platon. Tim\u00e6um, c.\niv. p. 37.]\n\n[Side-note: Fundamental distinction between Ens and Fientia.]\n\nTim\u00e6us begins by laying down the capital distinction between--1.\nEns or the Existent, the eternal and unchangeable, the world of\nIdeas or Forms, apprehended only by mental conception or\nReason, but the object of infallible cognition. 2. The Generated\nand Perishable--the sensible, phenomenal, material world--which\nnever really exists, but is always appearing and disappearing;\napprehended by sense, yet not capable of becoming the object of\ncognition, nor of anything better than opinion or conjecture. The\nKosmos, being a visible and tangible body, belongs to this last\ncategory. Accordingly, it can never be really known: no true or\nincontestable propositions can be affirmed respecting it: you can\narrive at nothing higher than opinion and probability.\n\nPlato seems to have had this conviction, respecting the\nuncertainty of all affirmations about the sensible world or any\nportions of it, forcibly present to his mind.\n\n[Side-note: Postulates of Plato. The Demiurgus--The Eternal\nIdeas--Chaotic Materia or Fundamentum. The Kosmos is a living\nbeing and a God.]\n\nHe next proceeds to assume or imply, as postulates, his eternal\nIdeas or Forms--a coeternal chaotic matter or indeterminate\nSomething--and a Demiurgus or Architect to construct, out of this\nchaos, after contemplation of the Forms, copies of them as good as\nwere practicable in the world of sense. The exposition begins with\nthese postulates. The Demiurgus found all visible matter, not in a\nstate of rest, but in discordant and irregular motion. He brought\nit out of disorder into order. Being himself good (says Plato),\nand desiring to make everything else as good as possible, he\ntransformed this chaos into an orderly Kosmos.[15] He planted in\nits centre a soul spreading round, so as to pervade all its\nbody--and reason in the soul: so that the Kosmos became animated,\nrational--a God.\n\n[Footnote 15: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 29-30.]\n\n[Side-note: The Demiurgus not a Creator--The Kosmos arises\nfrom his operating upon the random movements of Necessity. He\ncannot controul necessity--he only persuades.]\n\nThe Demiurgus of Plato is not conceived as a Creator,[16] but as a\nConstructor or Artist. He is the God Prom\u00eatheus, conceived as\npre-kosmical, and elevated to the primacy of the Gods: instead of\nbeing subordinate to Zeus, as depicted by \u00c6schylus and others. He\nrepresents provident intelligence or art, and beneficent purpose,\ncontending with a force superior and irresistible, so as to\nimprove it as far as it will allow itself to be improved.[17] This\npre-existing superior force Plato denominates Necessity--\"the\nerratic, irregular, random causality,\" subsisting prior to the\nintervention of the Demiurgus; who can only work upon it by\npersuasion, but cannot coerce or subdue it.[18] The genesis of the\nKosmos thus results from a combination of intelligent force with\nthe original, primordial Necessity; which was persuaded, and\nconsented, to have its irregular agency regularised up to a\ncertain point, but no farther. Beyond this limit the systematising\narrangements of the Demiurgus could not be carried; but all that\nis good or beautiful in the Kosmos was owing to them.[19]\n\n[Footnote 16: \"The notion of absolute Creation is unknown to\nPlato, as it is to all Grecian and Roman antiquity\" (Brandis,\nGesch. der Griech. R\u00f6m. Philos. vol. ii. part 2, p. 306).]\n\n[Footnote 17: The verbs used by Plato to describe the proceedings\nof the Demiurgus are [Greek: xunetektai/neto, xune/st\u00ease,\nxunekera/sato, e)m\u00eachan\u00ea/sato], and such like.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 47 E-48 A. [Greek: e)pide/deiktai\nta\\ dia\\ nou= ded\u00eamiourg\u00eame/na; dei= de\\ kai\\ ta\\ di' a)na/gk\u00eas\ngigno/mena t\u00f4=| lo/g\u00f4| parathe/sthai. Memigme/n\u00ea ga\\r ou)=n \u00ea(\ntou=de tou= ko/smou ge/nesis e)x a)na/gk\u00eas te kai\\ nou=\nxusta/se\u00f4s e)genn\u00ea/th\u00ea; nou= de\\ a)na/gk\u00eas a)/rchontos\n_t\u00f4=| pei/thein au)t\u00ea\\n_ t\u00f4=n gignome/n\u00f4n ta\\ plei=sta\ne)pi\\ to\\ be/ltiston a)/gein, tau/t\u00ea| kata\\ tau=ta/ te di'\na)na/gk\u00eas \u00ea(tt\u00f4me/n\u00eas u(po\\ _pei/thous_ e)/mphronos,\nou(/t\u00f4 kat' a)rcha\\s xuni/stato to/de to\\ pa=n. Ei)/ tis ou)=n\n\u00ea(= ge/gone, kata\\ tau=ta o)/nt\u00f4s e)rei=, mikte/on kai\\ _to\\\nt\u00ea=s plan\u00f4me/n\u00eas ei)=dos ai)ti/as_, \u00ea(= phe/rein\npe/phuken.] Compare p. 56 C: [Greek: o(/p\u00ea|per \u00ea( t\u00ea=s\na)na/gk\u00eas _e(kou=sa peisthei=sa/_ te phu/sis u(pei=ke.] Also\npp. 68 E, 75 B, 30 A.\n\n[Greek: Te/chn\u00ea d' a)na/gk\u00eas a)stheneste/ra makr\u00f4=|] says\nPrometheus in \u00c6schylus (P. V. 514). He identifies [Greek:\nA)na/gk\u00ea] with the [Greek: Moi=rai]: and we read in Herodotus (i.\n91) of Apollo as trying to persuade the Fates to spare Kroesus,\nbut obtaining for him only a respite of three years--[Greek: ou)k\noi(=o/n te e)ge/neto paragagei=n moi/ras, _o(/son de\\\ne)ne/d\u00f4kan au(=tai_, \u00ea)nu/sato kai\\ e)chari/sato/ oi(.] This\nis the language used by Plato about [Greek: A)na/gk\u00ea] and the\nDemiurgus. A valuable exposition of the relations believed to\nsubsist between the Gods and [Greek: Moi=ra] is to be found in\nNaegelsbach, Homerische Theologie (chap. iii. pp. 113-131).]\n\n[Footnote 19: Plutarch reproduces this theory (Phokion, c. 2, ad\nfin.) of God governing the Kosmos, not by superior force, but by\nreason and persuasion--[Greek: \u00ea(=| kai\\ to\\n ko/smon o( theo\\s\nle/getai dioikei=n, ou) biazo/menos, a)lla\\ peithoi= kai\\ lo/g\u00f4|\npara/g\u00f4n t\u00ea\\n a)na/gk\u00ean.]]\n\n[Side-note: Meaning of Necessity in Plato.]\n\nWe ought here to note the sense in which Plato uses the word\nNecessity. This word is now usually understood as denoting what is\nfixed, permanent, unalterable, knowable beforehand. In the\nPlatonic Tim\u00e6us it means the very reverse:--the indeterminate, the\ninconstant, the anomalous, that which can neither be understood\nnor predicted. It is Force, Movement, or Change, with the negative\nattribute of not being regular, or intelligible, or determined by\nany knowable antecedent or condition--_Vis consili expers_.\nIt coincides, in fact, with that which is meant by\n_Freewill_, in the modern metaphysical argument between\nFreewill and Necessity: it is the undetermined or\nself-determining, as contrasted with that which depends upon some\ngiven determining conditions, known or knowable. The Platonic\nNecessity[20] is identical with the primeval Chaos, recognised in\nthe Theogony or Kosmogony of Hesiod. That poet tells us that Chaos\nwas the primordial Something: and that afterwards came G\u00e6a, Eros,\nUranus, Nyx, Erebus, &c., who intermarried, males with\nfemales, and thus gave birth to numerous divine persons or\nkosmical agents--each with more or less of definite character and\nattributes. By these supervening agencies, the primeval Chaos was\nmodified and regulated, to a greater or less extent. The Platonic\nTim\u00e6us starts in the same manner as Hesiod, from an original\nChaos. But then he assumes also, as co\u00e6val with it, but apart from\nit, his eternal Forms or Ideas: while, in order to obtain his\nkosmical agents, he does not have recourse, like Hesiod, to the\nanalogy of intermarriages and births, but employs another analogy\nequally human and equally borrowed from experience--that of a\nDemiurgus or constructive professional artist, architect, or\ncarpenter; who works upon the model of these Forms, and introduces\nregular constructions into the Chaos. The antithesis present to\nthe mind of Plato is that between disorder or absence of order,\nannounced as Necessity,--and order or regularity, represented by\nthe Ideas.[21] As the mediator between these two primeval\nopposites, Plato assumes Nous, or Reason, or artistic skill\npersonified in his Demiurgus: whom he calls essentially\ngood--meaning thereby that he is the regularising agent by whom\norder, method, and symmetry, are copied from the Ideas and partially\nrealised among the intractable data of Necessity. Good is\nsomething which Plato in other works often talks about, but never\ndetermines: his language implies sometimes that he knows what it\nis, sometimes that he does not know. But so far as we can\nunderstand him, it means order, regularity, symmetry, proportion--by\nconsequence, what is ascertainable and predictable.[22] I\nwill not say that Plato means this always and exclusively, by\nGood: but he seems to mean so in the Tim\u00e6us. Evil is the reverse.\nGood or regularity is associated in his mind exclusively with\nrational agency. It can be produced, he assumes, only by a reason,\nor by some personal agent analogous to a reasonable and\nintelligent man. Whatever is not so produced, must be irregular or\nbad.\n\n[Footnote 20: In the Symposion (pp. 195 D, 197 B) we find Eros\npanegyrised as having amended and mollified the primeval empire of\n[Greek: A)na/gk\u00ea].\n\nThe Scholiast on Hesiod, Theogon. 119, gives a curious\nmetaphysical explanation of [Greek: E)/ros], mentioned in the\nHesiodic text--[Greek: t\u00ea\\n e)gkatesparme/n\u00ean phusik\u00f4=s\nkin\u00eatik\u00ea\\n ai)ti/an e(ka/st\u00f4| t\u00f4=n o)nt\u00f4n, kath' \u00ea(\\n\ne)phi/etai e(/kastos tou= ei)=nai.]]\n\n[Footnote 21: In the Phil\u00eabus, p. 23 C-D, these three are\nrecognised under the terms:--1. [Greek: Pe/ras]. 2. [Greek:\nA)/peiron]. 3. [Greek: Ai)ti/a--t\u00ea=s xummi/xe\u00f4s tou/t\u00f4n pro\\s\na)/ll\u00eala t\u00ea\\n ai)ti/an].\n\nCompare a curious passage of Plutarch, Symposiacon, viii. 2, p.\n719 E, illustrating the Platonic phrase--[Greek: to\\n theo\\n a)ei\\\nge\u00f4metrei=n].]\n\n[Footnote 22: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 30 A. Compare the Republic, vi. p.\n506, Phil\u00eabus, pp. 65-66, and the investigation in the\nEuthyd\u00eamus, pp. 279-293, which ends in no result.]\n\n[Side-note: Process of demiurgic construction--The total\nKosmos comes logically first, constructed on the model of the\n[Greek: Au)toz\u00f4=on].]\n\nThese are the fundamental ideas which Plato expands into a\ndetailed Kosmology. The first application which he makes of them\nis, to construct the total Kosmos. The total is here the logical\nPrius, or anterior to the parts in his order of conception. The\nKosmos is one vast and comprehensive animal: just as in\nphysiological description, the leading or central idea is, that of\nthe animal organism as a whole, to which each and all the parts\nare referred. The Kosmos is constructed by the Demiurgus according\nto the model of the [Greek: Au)toz\u00f4=on],[23]--(the Form or Idea\nof Animal--the eternal Generic or Self-Animal,)--which comprehends\nin itself the subordinate specific Ideas of different sorts of\nanimals. This Generic Idea of Animal comprehended four of such\nspecific Ideas: 1. The celestial race of animals, or Gods, who\noccupied the heavens. 2. Men. 3. Animals living in air--Birds. 4.\nAnimals living on land or in water.[24] In order that the Kosmos\nmight approach near to its model the Self-animal, it was required\nto contain all these four species. As there was but one\nSelf-Animal, so there could only be one Kosmos.\n\n[Footnote 23: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 30 D.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Plat. Tim\u00e6us, pp. 39 E-40 A. [Greek: \u00ea(=per ou)=n\nnou=s e)nou/sas i)de/as t\u00f4=| o(\\ e)/sti z\u00f4=on, oi(=ai/ te\ne)/neisi kai\\ o(/sai, kathora=|, toiau/tas kai\\ tosau/tas\ndieno\u00ea/th\u00ea dei=n kai\\ to/de schei=n. Ei)si\\ de\\ te/ttares, mi/a\nme\\n ou)ra/nion the\u00f4=n ge/nos, a)/ll\u00ea de\\ pt\u00eano\\n kai\\\na)eropo/ron, tri/t\u00ea de\\ e)/nudron ei)=dos, pezo\\n de\\ kai\\\nchersai=on te/tarton.]]\n\nWe see thus, that the primary and dominant idea, in Plato's mind,\nis, not that of inorganic matter, but that of organised and\nanimated matter--life or soul embodied. With him, biology comes\nbefore physics.\n\nThe body of the Kosmos was required to be both visible and\ntangible: it could not be visible without fire: it could not be\ntangible without something solid, nor solid without earth. But\ntwo things cannot be well put together by themselves, without\na third to serve as a bond of connection: and that is the best\nbond which makes them One as much as possible. Geometrical\nproportion best accomplishes this object. But as both Fire and\nEarth were solids and not planes, no one mean proportional could\nbe found between them. Two mean proportionals were necessary.\nHence the Demiurgus interposed air and water, in such manner, that\nas fire is to air, so is air to water: and as air is to water, so\nis water to earth.[25] Thus the four elements, composing the body\nof the Kosmos, were bound together in unity and friendship. Of\neach of the four, the entire total was used up in the\nconstruction: so that there remained nothing of them apart, to\nhurt the Kosmos from without, nor anything as raw material for a\nsecond Kosmos.[26]\n\n[Footnote 25: Plato, Tim. pp. 31-32. The comment of Macrobius on\nthis passage (Somn. Scip. i. 6, p. 30) is interesting, if not\nconclusive. But the language in which Plato lays down this\ndoctrine about mean proportionals is not precise, and has\noccasioned much difference of opinion among commentators. Between\ntwo solids (he says), that is, solid numbers, or numbers generated\nout of the product of three factors, no one mean proportional can\nbe found. This is not universally true. The different suggestions\nof critics to clear up this difficulty will be found set forth in\nthe elaborate note of M. Martin (\u00c9tudes sur le Tim\u00e9e, vol. 1, note\nxx. pp. 337-345), who has given what seems a probable explanation.\nPlato (he supposes) is speaking only of prime numbers and their\nproducts. In the language of ancient arithmeticians _linear\nnumbers_, _par excellence_ or properly so-called, were the\nprime numbers, measurable by unity only; _plane numbers_ were\nthe products of two such linear numbers or prime numbers; _solid\nnumbers_ were the products of three such. Understanding solid\nnumbers in this restricted sense, it will be perfectly true that\nbetween any two of them you can never find _any one_ solid\nnumber or any whole number which shall be a mean proportional, but\nyou can always find _two_ solid numbers which shall be mean\nproportionals. One mean proportional will never be sufficient. On\nthe contrary, one mean proportional will be sufficient between two\nplane numbers (in the restricted sense) when these numbers are\nsquares, though not if they are not squares. It is therefore true,\nthat in the case of two _solid_ numbers** (so understood) one\nsuch mean proportional will never be sufficient, while two can\nalways be found; and that between two _plane_ numbers** (so\nunderstood) one such mean proportional will in certain cases be\nsufficient and may be found. This is what is present to Plato's\nmind, though in enunciating it he does not declare the restriction\nunder which alone it is true. M. Boeckh (Untersuchungen \u00fcber das\nKosmische System des Platon, p. 17) approves of Martin's\nexplanation. At the same time M. Martin has given no proof that\nPlato had in his mind the distinction between prime numbers and\nother numbers, for his references in p. 338 do not prove this\npoint; moreover, the explanation assumes such very loose\nexpression, that the phrase of M. Cousin in his note (p. 334) is,\nafter all, perfectly just: \"Platon n'a pas song\u00e9 \u00e0 donner \u00e0 sa\nphrase une rigueur math\u00e9matique\": and the more simple explanation\nof M. Cousin (though Martin rejects it as unworthy) may perhaps\ninclude all that is really intended. \"Si deux surfaces peuvent\n\u00eatre unies par un seul terme interm\u00e9diaire, il faudra deux termes\ninterm\u00e9diaires pour unir deux solides: et l'union sera encore plus\nparfaite si la raison des deux proportions est la m\u00eame.\"]\n\n[Footnote 26: Plat. Tim\u00e6us, p. 32 E.]\n\n[Side-note: Body of the Kosmos, perfectly spherical--its\nrotations.]\n\nThe Kosmos was constructed as a perfect sphere, rounded, because\nthat figure both comprehends all other figures, and is, at the\nsame time, the most perfect, and most like to itself.[27] The\nDemiurgus made it perfectly smooth on the outside, for various\nreasons.[28] First, it stood in no need of either eyes or ears,\nbecause there was nothing outside to be seen or heard. Next, it\ndid not want organs of respiration, inasmuch as there was no\noutside air to be breathed:--nor nutritive and excrementary\norgans, because its own decay supplied it with nourishment, so\nthat it was self-sufficing, being constructed as its own agent and\nits own patient.[29] Moreover the Demiurgus did not furnish it\nwith hands, because there was nothing for it either to grasp or\nrepel--nor with legs, feet, or means of standing, because he\nassigned to it only one of the seven possible varieties of\nmovement.[30] He gave to it no other movement except that of\nrotation in a circle, in one and the same place: which is the sort\nof movement that belongs most to reason and intelligence, while it\nis impracticable to all other figures except the spherical.[31]\n\n[Footnote 27: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 33 B. [Greek: kuklotere\\s au)to\\\ne)torneu/sato], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 28: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 33 C. [Greek: lei=on de\\ d\u00ea\\\nku/kl\u00f4| pa=n e)/x\u00f4then au)to\\ a)p\u00eakribou=to, poll\u00f4=n cha/rin],\n&c.\n\nAristotle also maintains that the sphericity of the Kosmos is so\nexact that no piece of workmanship can make approach to it. (De\nCoelo, ii. p. 287, b. 15.)]\n\n[Footnote 29: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 33 E. On this point the Platonic\nTim\u00e6us is not Pythagorean, but the reverse. The Pythagoreans\nrecognised extraneous to the Kosmos, [Greek: to\\ a)/peiron\npneu=ma] or [Greek: to\\ keno/n]. The Kosmos was supposed to inhale\nthis vacuum, which penetrating into the interior, formed the\nseparating interstices between its constituent parts (Aristot.\nPhysic. iv. p. 213, b. 22).]\n\n[Footnote 30: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 34 A. [Greek: e)pi\\ de\\ t\u00ea\\n\nperi/odon tau/t\u00ean, a(/t' ou)de\\n pod\u00f4=n de/on, a)skele\\s kai\\\na)/poun au)to\\ e)ge/nn\u00easen.]\n\nPlato reckons six varieties of rectilinear motion, neither of\nwhich was assigned to the Kosmos--forward, backward, upward,\ndownward, to the right, to the left.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Plat. Tim. p. 34 A. [Greek: ki/n\u00easin ga\\r\na)pe/neimen au)t\u00f4=| t\u00ea\\n tou= s\u00f4/matos oi)kei/an, t\u00f4=n e(/pta\nt\u00ea\\n peri\\ nou=n kai\\ phro/n\u00easin ma/lista ou)/san.] This\npredicate respecting circular motion belongs to Plato and not to\nAristotle; but Aristotle makes out, in his own way, a strong case\nto show that circular motion _must belong_ to the [Greek:\nPr\u00f4=ton s\u00f4=ma], as being the first among all varieties of\nmotion, the most dignified and privileged, the only one which can\nbe for ever uniform and continuous. Aristot. Physic. ix. p. 265,\na. 15; De Coelo, i. pp. 269-270, ii. p. 284, a. 10.]\n\n[Side-note: Soul of the Kosmos--its component\ningredients--stretched from centre to circumference.]\n\nThe Kosmos, one and only-begotten, was thus perfect as to its\nbody, including all existent bodily material,--smooth, even,\nround, and equidistant from its centre to all points of the\ncircumference.[32] The Demiurgus put together at the same time its\nsoul or mind; which he planted in the centre and stretched\nthroughout its body in every direction,--so as not only to reach\nthe circumference, but also to enclose and wrap it round\nexternally. The soul, being intended to guide and govern the body,\nwas formed of appropriate ingredients, three distinct ingredients\nmixed together: 1. The Same--The Identical--The indivisible, and\nunchangeable essence of Ideas. 2. The Different--The Plural--The\ndivisible essence of bodies or of the elements. 3. A third\ncompound, formed of both these ingredients melted into one.--These\nthree ingredients--Same, Different, Same and Different in\none,--were blended together in one compound, to form the soul of\nthe Kosmos: though the Different was found intractable and hard to\nconciliate.[33] The mixture was divided, and the portions blended\ntogether, according to a scale of harmonic numerical proportion\ncomplicated and difficult to follow.[34] The soul of the Kosmos\nwas thus harmonically constituted. Among its constituent elements,\nthe Same, or Identity, is placed in an even and undivided rotation\nof the outer or sidereal sphere of the Kosmos,--while the\nDifferent, or Diversity, is distributed among the rotations, all\noblique, of the seven interior or planetary spheres--that is, the\nfive planets, Sun, and Moon. The outer sphere revolved towards the\nright: the interior spheres in an opposite direction towards the\nleft. The rotatory force of the Same (of the outer Sphere) being\nnot only one and undivided, but connected with and dependent upon\nthe solid revolving axis which traverses the diameter of the\nKosmos--is far greater than that of the divided spheres of the\nDifferent; which, while striving to revolve in an opposite\ndirection, each by a movement of its own--are overpowered and\ncarried along with the outer sphere, though the time of\nrevolution, in the case of each, is more or less modified by its\nown inherent counter-moving force.[35]\n\n[Footnote 32: Plat. Tim. p. 31 B. [Greek: ei(=s o(/de monogen\u00ea\\s\nou)rano/s], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Plat. Tim. p. 35 A. [Greek: Tau)to\\n--to\\\na)me/riston--tha/teron--to\\ meristo\\n--tri/ton e)x a)mphoi=n\nou)si/as ei)=dos.]]\n\n[Footnote 34: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 35-36. The pains which were taken\nby commentators in antiquity to expound and interpret this\nnumerical scale may be seen especially illustrated in Plutarch's\nTreatise, De Anim\u00e6 Procreatione in Tim\u00e6o, pp. 1012-1030, and the\nEpitome which follows it. There were two fundamental [Greek:\ntetraktu/es] or quaternions, one on a binary, the other on a\nternary scale of progression, which were arranged by Krantor\n(Plutarch, p. 1027 E) in the form of the letter [Greek: L], as\ngiven in Macrobius (Somn. Scip. i. 6, p. 35). The intervals\nbetween these figures, are described by Plato as filled up by\nintervening harmonic fractions, so as to constitute an harmonic or\nmusical diagram or scale of four octaves and a major sixth.\n(Boeckh's Untersuch. p. 19.) M. Boeckh has expounded this at\nlength in his Dissertation, Ueber die Bildung der Welt-Seele im\nTim\u00e4os. Other expositors after him.\n\n                     1  /\\\n                       /  \\\n                    2_/_  _\\_3\n                     /      \\\n                 4 _/_      _\\_9\n                   /          \\\n               ------       ------\n                 8              27\n]\n\n[Footnote 35: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 36 C. [Greek: t\u00ea\\n me\\n ou)=n\ne)/x\u00f4 phora\\n e)peph\u00ea/misen ei)=nai t\u00ea=s tau)tou= phu/se\u00f4s,\nt\u00ea\\n d' e)nto/s, t\u00ea=s tha)te/rou. t\u00ea\\n me\\n d\u00ea\\ tau)tou= kata\\\npleura\\n e)pi\\ dexia\\ peri\u00ea/gage, t\u00ea\\n de\\ thate/rou kata\\\ndia/metron e)p' a)ristera/.]\n\nFor the meaning of [Greek: kata\\ pleura\\n] and [Greek: kata\\\ndia/metron], referring to the equator and the ecliptic, see the\nexplanation and diagram in Boeckh, Untersuchungen, p. 25, also in\nthe note of Stallbaum. The allusion in Plato to the letter [Greek:\nchi=] is hardly intelligible without both a commentary and a\ndiagram.]\n\nIn regard to the constitution of the kosmical soul, we must note,\nthat as it is intended to know Same, Different, and Same and\nDifferent in one--so it must embody these three ingredients in its\nown nature: according to the received axiom. Like knows like--Like\nis known by like.[36] Thus began, never to end, the rotatory\nmovements of the living Kosmos or great Kosmical God. The\ninvisible soul of the Kosmos, rooted at its centre and stretching\nfrom thence so as to pervade and enclose its visible body,\ncirculates and communicates, though without voice or sound,\nthroughout its own entire range, every impression of identity and\nof difference which it encounters either from essence ideal and\nindivisible, or from that which is sensible and divisible.\nInformation is thus circulated, about the existing relations\nbetween all the separate parts and specialties.[37] Reason and\nScience are propagated by the Circle of the Same: Sense and\nOpinion, by those of the Different. When these last-mentioned\nCircles are in right movement, the opinions circulated are true\nand trustworthy.\n\n[Footnote 36: Aristotel. De Anim\u00e2, i. 2, 7, i. 3, 11 (pp. 404, b.\n16--406 b. 26), with Trendelenburg's note, pp. 227-253; Stallbaum,\nnot. ad Tim\u00e6um, pp. 136-157. See also the interpretation of\nPlato's opinion by Krantor, as given in Plutarch, De Anim\u00e6\nProcreatione in Tim\u00e6o, p. 1012 E. We learn from Plutarch, however,\nthat the passage gave much trouble to commentators.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 36-37. 37 A: [Greek: le/gei\nkinoume/n\u00ea dia\\ pa/s\u00eas e(aut\u00ea=s, o(/t\u00f4| t' a)/n ti tau)to\\n\n\u00ea(=|, kai\\ o(/tou a)\\n e(/teron, pro\\s o(/, ti te ma/lista kai\\\no(/p\u00ea| kai\\ o(/p\u00f4s kai\\ o(po/te xumbai/nei kata\\ ta\\ gigno/mena/\nte pro\\s e(/kaston e(/kasta ei)=nai kai\\ pa/schein, kai\\ pro\\s ta\\\nkata\\ tau)ta\\ e)/chonta a)ei/.]]\n\n[Side-note: Regular or measured Time--began with the\nKosmos.]\n\nWith the rotations of the Kosmos, began the course of Time--years,\nmonths, days, &c. Anterior to the Kosmos, there was no time:\nno past, present, and future: no numerable or mensurable motion or\nchange. The Ideas are eternal essences, without fluctuation or\nchange: existing _sub specie \u00e6ternitatis_, and having only a\nperpetual present, but no past or future.[38] Along with them\nsubsisted only the disorderly, immeasurable, movements of Chaos.\nThe nearest approach which the Demiurgus could make in copying\nthese Ideas, was, by assigning to the Kosmos an eternal and\nunchanging motion, marked and measured by the varying position of\nthe heavenly bodies. For this purpose, the sun, moon, and planets,\nwere distributed among the various portions of the circle of\nDifferent: while the fixed stars were placed in the Circle of the\nSame, or the outer Circle, revolving in one uniform rotation and\nin unaltered position in regard to each other. The interval of one\nday was marked by one revolution of this outer or most rational\nCircle:[39] that of one month, by a revolution of the moon: that\nof one year, by a revolution of the sun. Among all these sidereal\nand planetary Gods the Earth was the first and oldest. It was\npacked close round the great axis which traversed the centre of\nthe Kosmos, by the turning of which axis the outer circle of the\nKosmos was made to revolve, generating night and day. The Earth\nregulated the movement of this great kosmical axis, and thus\nbecome the determining agent and guarantee of night and day.[40]\n\n[Footnote 38: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 37-38. Lassalle, in his copious\nand elaborate explanation of the doctrine of Herakleitus (Die\nPhilosophie Herakleitos des Dunkeln, Berlin, 1858, vol. ii. p.\n210, s. 26), represents this doctrine of Plato respecting Time as\n\"durch und durch heraklitisch\". To me it seems quite distinct\nfrom, or rather the inversion of, that which Lassalle himself sets\ndown as the doctrine of Herakleitus. Plato begins with [Greek: to\\\na)i+/dion] or [Greek: ai)\u00f4/nion], an eternal sameness or\nduration, without succession, change, generation or\ndestruction,--this passes into perpetual succession or change,\nwith frequent generation and destruction. Herakleitus, on the other\nhand, recognises for his primary or general law perpetual succession,\ninterchange of contraries, generation and destruction; this passes\ninto a secondary state, in which there is temporary duration and\nsameness of particulars--the flux being interrupted.\n\nThe ideal [Greek: lo/gos] or law of Herakleitus is that of\nunremitting process, flux, revolution, implication of Ens with\nNon-Ens: the real world is an imperfect manifestation of this law,\nbecause each particular clings to existence, and thereby causes\ntemporary halts in the process. Now Plato's starting point is\n[Greek: to\\ ai)\u00f4/nion to\\ a)ei\\ \u00f4(sau/t\u00f4s e)/chon to\\ o)/nt\u00f4s\no)/n]: the perishable world of sense and particulars is the world\nof process, and is so far degenerate from the eternal uniformity\nof primordial Ens. See Lassalle, pp. 39-292-319.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 39 C. [Greek: \u00ea( t\u00ea=s mia=s kai\\\nphronim\u00f4ta/t\u00eas kukl\u00ea/se\u00f4s peri/odos]. Plato remarks that there\nwas a particular interval of time measured off and designated by\nthe revolution of each of the other planets, but that these\nintervals were unnoticed and unknown by the greater part of\nmankind.]\n\n[Footnote 40: My explanation of this much controverted sentence\ndiffers from that of previous commentators. I have given reasons\nfor adopting it in a separate Dissertation ('Plato and the\nRotation of the Earth,' Murray), to which I here refer. In that\nDissertation I endeavoured to show cause for dissenting from the\ninference of M. Boeckh: who contends that Plato cannot have\nbelieved in the diurnal rotation of the Earth, because he (Plato)\nexplicitly affirms the diurnal rotation of the outer celestial\nsphere, or Aplanes. These two facts nullify each other, so that\nthe effect would be the same as if there were no rotation of\neither. My reply to this argument was, in substance, that though\nthe two facts really are inconsistent--the one excluding the\nother--yet we cannot safely conclude that Plato must have\nperceived the inconsistency; the more so as Aristotle certainly\ndid not perceive it. To hold incompatible doctrines without being\naware of the incompatibility, is a state of mind sufficiently\ncommon even in the present advanced condition of science, which I\ncould illustrate by many curious examples if my space allowed. It\nmust have been much more common in the age of Plato than** it is\nnow.\n\nBatteux observes (Traduction et Remarques sur Ocellus Lucanus, ch.\niv. p. 116):--\"Il y a un maxime qu'on ne doit jamais perdre de vue\nen discutant les opinions des Anciens: c'est de ne point leur\npr\u00eater les cons\u00e9quences de leurs principes, ni les principes de\nleurs cons\u00e9quences\".\n\nAs a general rule, I subscribe to the soundness of this\nadmonition.]\n\n[Side-note: Divine tenants of the Kosmos. Primary and\nVisible Gods--Stars and Heavenly Bodies.]\n\nIt remained for the Demiurgus,--in order that the Kosmos might\nbecome a full copy of its model the Generic Animal or Idea of\nAnimal,--to introduce into it those various species of animals\nwhich that Idea contained. He first peopled it with Gods: the\neldest and earliest of whom was the Earth, planted in the centre\nas sentinel over night and day: next the fixed stars, formed for\nthe most part of fire, and annexed to the circle of the Same or\nthe exterior circle, so as to impart to it light and brilliancy.\nEach star was of spherical figure and had two motions,--one, of\nuniform rotation peculiar to itself,--the other, an uniform\nforward movement of translation, being carried along with the\ngreat outer circle in its general rotation round the axis of the\nKosmos.[41] It is thus that the sidereal orbs, animated beings\neternal and divine, remained constantly turning round in the same\nrelative position: while the sun, moon, and planets, belonging to\nthe inner circles of the Different, and trying to revolve by their\nown effort in the opposite direction to the outer sphere, became\nirregular in their own velocities and variable in their relative\npositions.[42] The complicated movements of these planetary\nbodies, alternately approaching and receding--together with their\noccultations and reappearances, full of alarming prognostic as to\nconsequences--cannot be described without having at hand some\ndiagrams or mechanical illustrations to refer to.[43]\n\n[Footnote 41: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 40.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 40 B. [Greek: o(/s' a)plan\u00ea=\nt\u00f4=n a)/str\u00f4n z\u00f4=a thei=a o)/nta kai\\ a)i+/dia], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 40 D. [Greek: to\\ le/gein a)/neu\ndio/pse\u00f4s tou/t\u00f4n au)= t\u00f4=n mim\u00eama/t\u00f4n ma/taios a)\\n ei)/\u00ea\npo/nos.] Plato himself here acknowledges the necessity of\ndiagrams: the necessity was hardly less in the preceding part of\nhis exposition.]\n\n[Side-note: Secondary and generated Gods--Plato's\ndictum respecting them. His acquiescence in tradition.]\n\nSuch were all the primitive Gods visible and generated[44] by the\nDemiurgus, to preside over and regulate the Kosmos. By them are\ngenerated, and from them are descended, the remaining Gods.\n\n[Footnote 44: Plato, Tim\u00e6. p. 40 D. [Greek: the\u00f4=n o(rat\u00f4=n kai\\\ngenn\u00eat\u00f4=n].]\n\nRespecting these remaining Gods, however, the Platonic Tim\u00e6us\nholds a different language. Instead of speaking in his own name\nand delivering his own convictions, as he had done about the\nDemiurgus and the cosmical Gods--with the simple reservation, that\nsuch convictions could be proclaimed only as probable and not as\ndemonstratively certain--he now descends to the Sokratic platform\nof confessed ignorance and incapacity. \"The generation of these\nremaining Gods (he says) is a matter too great for me to\nunderstand and declare. I must trust to those who have spoken upon\nthe subject before me--who were, as they themselves said,\noffspring of the Gods, and must therefore have well known their\nown fathers. It is impossible to mistrust the sons of the Gods.\nTheir statements indeed are unsupported either by probabilities or\nby necessary demonstration; but since they here profess to be\ndeclaring family traditions, we must obey the law and believe.[45]\nThus then let it stand and be proclaimed, upon their authority,\nrespecting the generation of the remaining Gods. The\noffspring of Uranus and G\u00e6a were, Okeanus and Tethys: from whom\nsprang Phorkys, Kronus, Rhea, and those along with them. Kronus\nand Rhea had for offspring Zeus, H\u00ear\u00ea, and all these who are\ntermed their brethren: from whom too, besides, we hear of other\noffspring. Thus were generated all the Gods, both those who always\nconspicuously revolve, and those who show themselves only when\nthey please.\"[46]\n\n[Footnote 45: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 40 D-E. [Greek: Peri\\ de\\ t\u00f4=n\na)/ll\u00f4n daimo/n\u00f4n ei)pei=n kai\\ gn\u00f4=nai t\u00ea\\n ge/nesin mei=zon\n\u00ea)\\ kath' \u00ea(ma=s, peiste/on de\\ toi=s ei)r\u00eako/sin e)/mprosthen,\ne)kgo/nois me\\n the\u00f4=n ou)=sin, saph\u00f4=s de/ pou tou/s ge au)t\u00f4n\nprogo/nous ei)do/sin; _a)du/naton ou)=n the\u00f4=n paisi\\n\na)pistei=n, kai/per a)/neu te ei)ko/t\u00f4n kai\\ a)nagkai/\u00f4n_\na)podei/xe\u00f4n le/gousin, a)ll' _\u00f4(s oi)kei=a pha/skousin\na)pagge/llein, e)pome/nous t\u00f4=| no/m\u00f4| pisteute/on_. Ou(/t\u00f4s\nou)=n _kat' e)kei/nous_ \u00ea(mi=n \u00ea( ge/nesis peri\\ tou/t\u00f4n\nt\u00f4=n the\u00f4=n e)che/t\u00f4 kai\\ lege/sth\u00f4.]\n\nSo, too, in the Platonic Epinomis, attached as an appendix to the\nTreatise De Legibus, we find (p. 984) Plato--after arranging his\nquintuple scale of elemental animals (fire, \u00e6ther, air, water,\nearth), the highest and most divine being the stars or visible\nGods, the lowest being man, and the three others intermediate\nbetween the two; after having thus laid out the scale, he leaves\nto others to determine, [Greek: o(p\u00ea=| tis e)the/lei], in which\nplace Zeus, H\u00ear\u00ea, and the other Gods, are to be considered as\nlodged. He will not contradict any one's feeling on that point; he\nstrongly protests (p. 985 D) against all attempts on the part of\nthe lawgiver to innovate ([Greek: kainotomei=n]) in contravention\nof ancient religious tradition--this is what Aristophanes in the\nNubes, and Mel\u00eatus before the Dikasts, accuse Sokrates of\ndoing--but he denounces harshly all who will not acknowledge with\nworship and sacrifice the sublime divinity of the Sun, Moon, Stars,\nand Planets.\n\nThe Platonic declaration given here--[Greek: e)pome/nous t\u00f4=|\nno/m\u00f4| pisteute/on]--is illustrated in the lines of Euripides,\nBacch\u00e6, 202--\n\n[Greek: ou)de\\n sophizo/mestha toi=si dai/mosin;\npatri/ous paradocha/s, a(/s th' o(m\u00ea/likas chro/n\u00f4|\nkekt\u00ea/meth', ou)dei\\s au)ta\\ katabalei= lo/gos,\nou)d' \u00ea)\\n di' a)kr\u00f4=n to\\ sopho\\n eu(/r\u00eatai phren\u00f4=n.]]\n\n[Footnote 46: Plato, Tim\u00e6. p. 41 A. [Greek: e)pei\\ d' ou)=n\npa/ntes o(/soi te peripolou=si phaner\u00f4=s, kai\\ o(/soi phai/nontai\nkath' o(/son a)\\n e)the/l\u00f4si, theoi\\ ge/nesin e)/schon.]]\n\n[Side-note: Remarks on Plato's Canon of Belief.]\n\nThe passage above cited serves to illustrate both Plato's own\ncanon of belief, and his position in regard to his countrymen. The\nquestion here is, about the Gods of tradition and of the popular\nfaith: with the paternity and filiation ascribed to them, by\nHesiod and the other poets, from whom Greeks of the fifth and\nfourth centuries B.C. learnt their Theogony.[47] Plato\nwas a man both competent and willing to strike out a physical\ntheology of his own, but not to follow passively in the track of\northodox tradition. I have stated briefly what he has affirmed\nabout the cosmical Gods (Earth, Stars, Sun, Planets) generated or\nconstructed by the Demiurgus as portions or members of the Kosmos:\ntheir bodies, out of fire and other elements,--their souls out of\nthe Forms or abstractions called Identity and Diversity; while the\nentire Kosmos is put together after the model of the Generic Idea\nor Form of Animal. All this, combined with supposed purposes, and\nfancies of arithmetical proportion dictating the proceedings of\nthe Demiurgus, Plato does not hesitate to proclaim on his own\nauthority and as his own belief--though he does not carry it\nfarther than probability.\n\n[Footnote 47: Herodot. ii. 53.]\n\nBut while the feeling of spontaneous belief thus readily arises in\nPlato's mind, following in the wake of his own constructive\nimagination and ethical or \u00e6sthetical sentiment (_fingunt simul\ncreduntque_)--it does not so readily cleave to the theological\ndogmas in actual circulation around him. In the generation of Gods\nfrom Uranus and G\u00e6a--which he as well as other Athenian youths\nmust have learnt when they recited Hesiod with their\nschoolmasters--he can see neither proof nor probability: he\ncan find no internal ground for belief.[48] He declares himself\nincompetent: he will not undertake to affirm any thing upon his\nown judgment: the mystery is too dark for him to penetrate. Yet on\nthe other hand, though it would be rash to affirm, it would be\nequally rash to deny. Nearly all around him are believers, at\nleast as well satisfied with their creed as he was with the\nuncertified affirmations of his own Tim\u00e6us. He cannot prove them\nto be wrong, except by appealing to an ethical or \u00e6sthetical\nsentiment which they do not share. Among the Gods said to be\ndescended from Uranus and G\u00e6a, were all those to whom public\nworship was paid in Greece,--to whom the genealogies of the heroic\nand sacred families were traced,--and by whom cities as well as\nindividuals believed themselves to be protected in dangers, healed\nin epidemics, and enlightened on critical emergencies through\nseasonable revelations and prophecies. Against an established\ncreed thus avouched, it was dangerous to raise any doubts.\nMoreover Plato could not have forgotten the fate of his master\nSokrates;[49] who was indicted both for not acknowledging the Gods\nwhom the city acknowledged, and for introducing other new divine\nmatters and persons. There could be no doubt that Plato was guilty\non this latter count: prudence therefore rendered it the more\nincumbent on him to guard against being implicated in the former\ncount also. Here then Plato formally abnegates his own\nself-judging power, and submits himself to orthodox authority. \"It\nis impossible to doubt what we have learnt from witnesses, who\ndeclared themselves to be the offspring of the Gods, and who must\nof course have known their own family affairs. We must obey the\nlaw and believe.\" In what proportion such submission, of reason to\nauthority, embodied the sincere feeling of Pascal and\nMalebranche, or the irony of Bayle and Voltaire, we are\nunable to determine.[50]\n\n[Footnote 48: The remark made by Condorcet upon Buffon is\nstrikingly applicable to Plato:--\"On n'a reproch\u00e9 \u00e0 M. de Buffon\nque ses hypoth\u00e8ses. Ce sont aussi des esp\u00e8ces de fables--mais des\nfables produites par une imagination active qui a besoin de cr\u00e9er,\net non par une imagination passive qui c\u00e8de \u00e0 des impressions\n\u00e9trang\u00e8res\" (Condorcet, \u00c9loge de Buffon, ad fin.).\n\n[Greek: Au)todi/daktos d' ei)mi/, theo\\s de/ moi e)n phresi\\n\noi)/mas\nPantoi/as e)ne/phusen]--(Homer, Odyss. xxii. 347)--the\ndeclaration of the bard Phemius.]\n\n[Footnote 49: Xenoph. Memor. i. 1. [Greek: A)dikei= S\u00f4kra/t\u00eas,\nou(\\s me\\n \u00ea( po/lis nomi/zei theou/s, ou) nomi/z\u00f4n, e(/tera de\\\nkaina\\ daimo/nia ei)sphe/r\u00f4n.]\n\nThe word [Greek: daimo/nia] may mean matters, or persons, or both\ntogether.]\n\n[Footnote 50: M. Martin supposes Plato to speak ironically, or\nwith a prudent reserve, \u00c9tudes sur le Tim\u00e9e, ii. p. 146.\n\nWhat Plato says here about the Gods who bore personal names, and\nwere believed in by the contemporary public--is substantially\nequivalent to the well-known profession of ignorance enunciated by\nthe Sophist Protagoras, introduced by him at the beginning of one\nof his treatises. [Greek: Peri\\ de\\ the\u00f4=n ou)/te ei) ei)si/n,\nou)/th' o(poi=oi/ tine/s ei)si, du/namai le/gein; polla\\ ga/r\ne)sti ta\\ k\u00f4lu/onta/ me] (Sextus Emp. adv. Mathem. ix. 56); a\ndeclaration which, circumspect as it was (see the remark of the\nsillographer Timon in Sextus), drew upon him the displeasure of\nthe Athenians, so that his books were burnt, and himself forced to\nleave the city.]\n\n[Side-note: Address and order of the Demiurgus to the\ngenerated Gods.]\n\nHaving thus, during one short paragraph, proclaimed his deference,\nif not his adhesion, to inspired traditions, Plato again resumes\nthe declaration of his own beliefs and his own book of Genesis,\nwithout any farther appeal to authority, and without any\nintimation that he is touching on mysteries too great for his\nreason. When these Gods, the visible as well as the invisible,[51]\nhad all been constructed or generated, he (or Tim\u00e6us) tells us\nthat the Demiurgus addressed them and informed them that they\nwould be of immortal duration--not indeed in their own nature, but\nthrough his determination: that to complete the perfection of the\nnewly-begotten Kosmos, there were three other distinct races of\nanimals, all mortal, to be added: that he could not himself\nundertake the construction of these three, because they would\nthereby be rendered immortal, but that he confided such\nconstruction to them (the Gods): that he would himself supply, for\nthe best of these three new races, an immortal element as guide\nand superintendent, and that they were to join along with it\nmortal and bodily accompaniments, to constitute men and animals;\nthus imitating the power which he had displayed in the generation\nof themselves.[52]\n\n[Footnote 51: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 41 A.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 41 C. [Greek: tre/pesthe kata\\\nphu/sin u(mei=s e)pi\\ t\u00ea\\n t\u00f4=n z\u00f4/\u00f4n d\u00eamiourgi/an,\nmimou/menoi t\u00ea\\n e)m\u00ea\\n du/namin peri\\ t\u00ea\\n u(mete/ran\nge/nesin.]]\n\n[Side-note: Preparations for the construction of man.\nConjunction of three souls and one body.]\n\nAfter this address (which Plato puts into the first person, in\nHomeric manner), the Demiurgus compounded together, again and in\nthe same bowl, the remnant of the same elements out of which he\nhad formed the kosmical soul, but in perfection and purity greatly\ninferior. The total mass thus formed was distributed into souls\nequal in number to the stars. The Demiurgus placed each soul\nin a star of its own, carried it round thus in the kosmical\nrotation, and explained to it the destiny intended for all. For\neach alike there was to be an appointed hour of birth, and of\nconjunction with a body, as well as with two inferior sorts or\nvarieties of soul or mind. From such conjunction would follow, as\na necessary consequence, implanted sensibility and motive power,\nwith all its accompaniments of pleasure, pain, desire, fear,\nanger, and such like. These were the irrational enemies, which the\nrational and immortal soul would have to controul and subdue, as a\ncondition of just life. If it succeeded in the combat so as to\nlive a good life, it would return after death to the abode of its\nown peculiar star. But if it failed, it would have a second birth\ninto the inferior nature and body of a female: if, here also, it\ncontinued to be evil, it would be transferred after death to the\nbody of some inferior animal. Such transmigration would be farther\ncontinued from animal to animal, until the rational soul should\nacquire thorough controul over the irrational and turbulent. When\nthis was attained, the rational soul would be allowed to return to\nits original privilege and happiness, residing in its own peculiar\nstar.[53]\n\n[Footnote 53: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 42 B-D.]\n\nIt was thus that the Demiurgus confided to the recently-generated\nGods the task of fabricating both mortal bodies, and mortal souls,\nto be joined with these immortal souls in their new stage of\nexistence--and of guiding and governing the new mortal animal in\nthe best manner, unless in so far as the latter should be the\ncause of mischief to himself. The Demiurgus decreed and proclaimed\nthis beforehand, in order (says Plato) that he might not himself\nbe the cause of any of the evil which might ensue[54] to\nindividual men.\n\n[Footnote 54: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 42 D-E. [Greek:\nDiathesmothet\u00ea/sas de\\ pa/nta au)toi=s tau=ta, i(/na t\u00ea=s\ne)/peita ei)/\u00ea kaki/as e(ka/st\u00f4n a)nai/tios . . . pare/d\u00f4ke\ntheoi=s s\u00f4/mata pla/ttein thn\u00eata/, to/ te e)pi/loipon o(/son\ne)/t' \u00ea)=n psuch\u00ea=s a)nthr\u00f4pi/n\u00eas de/on prosgene/sthai, tou=to\nkai\\ pa/nth' o(/sa a)ko/loutha e)kei/nois a)pergasame/nous\na)/rchein, kai\\ kata\\ du/namin o(/, ti ka/llista kai\\ a)/rista to\\\nthn\u00eato\\n diakuberna=|n z\u00f4=on, o(/, ti m\u00ea\\ kak\u00f4=n au)to\\\ne(aut\u00f4=| gi/gnoito ai)/tion.]\n\nWe have here the theory, intimated but not expanded by Plato, that\nman is, by misconduct or folly, the cause of all the evil suffered\non earth. That the Gods are not the cause of any evil, he tells us\nin Republ. ii. p. 379. It seems, however, that he did not remain\nsatisfied with the theory of the Tim\u00e6us, because we find a\ndifferent theory in the treatise De Legibus (x. p. 896 E)--two\nkosmical souls, one good, the other evil.\n\nMoreover, the recital of the Tim\u00e6us itself (besides another\nexpress passage in it, pp. 86 D-87 A) plainly contradicts the\ntheory, that man is the cause of his own sufferings and evil. The\nDemiurgus himself is described as the cause, by directing immortal\nsouls to be joined with mortal bodies. The Demiurgus had\nconstructed a beautiful Kosmos, with perfect and regular\nrotations--with the Gods, sidereal, planetary, and invisible--and\nwith immortal souls distributed throughout the stars and earth,\nunderstanding and appreciating the cosmical rotations. So far all\nis admirable and faultless. But he is not satisfied with this. He\ndetermines to join each of these immortal souls with two mortal\nsouls and with a mortal body. According to Plato's own showing,\nthe immortal soul incurs nothing but corruption, disturbance, and\nstupidity, by such junction: as Empedokles and Herakleitus had\nsaid before (Plut. Solert. Animal. 7, p. 964 E). It is at first\ndeprived of all intelligence ([Greek: a)/nous]); from this\nstupefaction it gradually but partially recovers; yet nothing\nshort of the best possible education and discipline will enable it\nto contend, and even then imperfectly, against the corruption and\nincumbrance arising out of its companion the body; lastly, if it\nshould contend with every success, the only recompense which\nawaits it is to be re-transferred to the star from whence it came\ndown. What reason was there for removing the immortal soul from\nits happy and privileged position, to be degraded by forced\ncompanionship with an unworthy body and two inferior souls? The\nreason assigned is, that the Demiurgus required the Kosmos to be\nenlarged into a full and exact copy of the [Greek: Au)to/z\u00f4on] or\nGeneric Animal, which comprehended four subordinate varieties of\nanimals; one of them good (the Gods)--the other three inferior and\ncorrupt, Men, Birds, Fishes. But here, according to Plato's own\nexposition, it was the Demiurgus himself and his plan that was at\nfault. What necessity was there to copy the worst parts of the\nGeneric Animal as well as the best? The Kosmos would have been\ndecidedly better, though it might have been less complete, without\nsuch unenviable accompaniments. When Plato constructs his own\ncommunity (Republic and Legg.) he does not knowingly train up\ndefective persons, or prepare the foundation for such, in order\nthat every variety of character may be included. We may add here,\naccording to Plato himself, [Greek: Nou=s] (intelligence or\nreason) belongs not to all human beings, but only to a small\nfraction of them (Tim\u00e6us, p. 51 E). Except in these few, the\nimmortal soul is therefore irrecoverably debased by its union with\nthe body.]\n\n[Side-note: Proceedings of the generated Gods--they\nfabricate the cranium, as miniature of the Kosmos, with the\nrational soul rotating within it.]\n\nAccordingly the Gods, sons of the Demiurgus, entered upon the\ntask, trying to imitate their father. Borrowing from the Kosmos\nportions of the four elements, with engagement that what was\nborrowed should one day be paid back, they glued them together,\nand fastened them by numerous minute invisible pegs into one body.\nInto this body, always decaying and requiring renovation, they\nintroduced the immortal soul, with its double circular\nrotations--the Circles of the Same and of the Diverse: embodying it\nin the cranium, which was made spherical in exterior form like the\nKosmos, and admitting within it no other motion but the rotatory.\nThe head, the most divine portion of the human system, was made\nmaster; while the body was admitted only as subject and\nministerial. The body was endowed with all the six varieties of\nmotive power, forward, backwards--upward, downward--to the right,\nto the left.[55] The phenomena of nutrition and sensation\nbegan. But all these irregular movements, and violent multifarious\nagitations, checked or disturbed the regular rotations of the\nimmortal soul in the cranium, perverting the arithmetical\nproportion, and harmony belonging to them. The rotations of the\nCircles of Same and Diverse were made to convey false and foolish\naffirmation. The soul became utterly destitute of intelligence, on\nbeing first joined to the body, and for some time afterwards.[56]\nBut in the course of time the violence of these disturbing\ncurrents abates, so that the rotations of the Circles in the head\ncan take place with more quiet and regularity. The man then\nbecomes more and more intelligent. If subjected to good education\nand discipline, he will be made gradually sound and whole, free\nfrom corruption: but if he neglect this precaution, his life\nremains a lame one, and he returns back to Hades incomplete and\nunprofitable.[57]\n\n[Footnote 55: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 43 B, 44 D.\n\nPlato supposes an etymological connection between [Greek:\nai)sth\u00ea/seis] and [Greek: a)i+/ss\u00f4], p. 43 C.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 44 B. [Greek: kai\\ dia\\ d\u00ea\\\npa/nta tau=ta ta\\ path\u00ea/mata nu=n kat' a)rcha/s te a)/nous\npsuch\u00ea\\ gi/gnetai to\\ pr\u00f4=ton, o(/tan ei)s s\u00f4=ma e)ndeth\u00ea=|\nthn\u00eato/n.]]\n\n[Footnote 57: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 44 C.]\n\n[Side-note: The cranium is mounted on a tall body--six\nvarieties of motion--organs of sense. Vision--Light.]\n\nThe Gods, when they undertook the fabrication of the body, foresaw\nthe inconvenience of allowing the head--with its intelligent\nrotations, and with the immortal soul enclosed in it--to roll\nalong the ground, unable to get over a height, or out of a\nhollow.[58] Accordingly they mounted it upon a tall body; with\narms and legs as instruments of movement, support, and defence.\nThey caused the movements to be generally directed forward and not\nbackward; since front is more honourable and more commanding than\nrear. For the same reason, they placed the face, with the organs\nof sense, in the fore part of the head. Within the eyes, they\nplanted that variety of fire which does not burn, but is called\nlight, homogeneous with the light without. We are enabled to see\nin the daytime, because the light within our eyes pours out\nthrough the centre of them, and commingles with the light without.\nThe two, being thus confounded together, transmit movements from\nevery object which they touch, through the eye inward to the soul;\nand thus bring about the sensation of sight. At night no vision\ntakes place: because the light from the interior of our eyes,\neven when it still comes out, finds no cognate light in the air\nwithout, and thus becomes extinguished in the darkness. All the\nlight within the eye would thus have been lost, if the Gods had\nnot provided a protection: they contrived the eyelids which drop\nand shut up the interior light within. This light, being prevented\nfrom egress, diffuses itself throughout the interior system, and\ntranquillises the movements within so as to bring on sleep:\nwithout dreams, if all the movements are quenched--with dreams,\ncorresponding to the movements which remain if there are any\nsuch.[59]\n\n[Footnote 58: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 44 D-E. [Greek: i(/n' ou)=n m\u00ea\\\nkulindou/menon e)pi\\ g\u00ea=s, u(/l\u00ea te kai\\ ba/th\u00ea pantodapa\\\ne)chou/s\u00eas, a)poroi= ta\\ me\\n u(perbai/nein, e)/nthen de\\\ne)kbai/nein, o)/ch\u00eam' au)t\u00f4=| tou=to kai\\ eu)pori/an\ne)/dosan.]]\n\n[Footnote 59: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 45. The theory of vision here\ngiven by Plato is interesting. A theory, similar in the main, had\nbeen propounded by Empedokl\u00eas before him. Aristotel. De Sensu, p.\n437 b.; Theophrast. De Sensu, cap. 5-9, p. 88 of Philipson's\n[Greek: U(/l\u00ea A)nthr\u00f4pi/n\u00ea]. Aristotle himself impugns the\ntheory. It is reported and discussed in Galen, De Hippocratis et\nPlatonis Dogmat. vii. 5, 6, p. 619 seqq. ed. K\u00fchn.\n\nThe different theories of vision among the ancient philosophers\nanterior to Aristotle are thus enumerated by E. H. von Baumhauer\n(De Sententiis Veterum Philosophorum Gr\u00e6corum de Visu, Lumine, et\nColoribus, Utrecht, 1843, p. 137):--\"De videndi modo tres apud\nantiquos primarias theorias invenimus: et primam quidem,\nemanatione lucis ex oculis ad corpora externa, ejusque reflexu ad\noculos (Pythagorei, Alcm\u00e6on): alteram emanationibus e corporibus,\nqu\u00e6 per oculos veluti per canales ad animum penetrent (Eleatici,\nHeraclitus, Gorgias): quam sententiam Anaxagoras et Diogenes\nApolloniates eatenus mutarunt, quod dicerent pupillam quasi\nspeculum esse quod imagines acceptas ad animum rejiciat. Tertia\ntheoria, orta \u00e8 conjunctione duarum priorum, statuebat tam ex\noculis quam corporibus emanationes fieri, et ambarum illarum\nconcursu visum effici, quum conformata imago per meatus ad animum\nperveniat (Empedocles, Protagoras, Plato). Huic sententi\u00e6 etiam\nDemocritus annumerari potest; qui eam plan\u00e8 secundum materiam, ut\ndicunt, exposuit.\"\n\nThe theory of Plato is described in the same treatise,\npp. 106-112.]\n\n[Side-note: Principal advantages of sight and hearing.\nObservations of the rotation of the Kosmos.]\n\nSuch are the auxiliary causes (continues Plato), often mistaken by\nothers for principal causes, which the Gods employed to bring\nabout sight. In themselves, they have no regularity of action: for\nnothing can be regular in action without mind and\nintelligence.[60] But the most important among all the advantages\nof sight is, that it enables us to observe and study the rotations\nof the Kosmos and of the sidereal and planetary bodies. It is the\nobserved rotations of days, months, and years, which impart to us\nthe ideas of time and number, and enable us to investigate the\nuniverse. Hence we derive philosophy, the greatest of all\nblessings. Hence too we learn to apply the celestial rotations as\na rule and model to amend the rotations of intelligence in our\nown cranium--since the first are regular and unerring, while\nthe second are disorderly and changeful.[61] It was for the like\npurpose, in view to the promotion of philosophy, that the Gods\ngave us voice and hearing. Both discourse and musical harmony are\nessential for this purpose. Harmony and rhythm are presents to us,\nfrom the Muses, not, as men now employ them, for unreflecting\npleasure and recreation--but for the same purpose of regulating\nand attuning the disorderly rotations of the soul, and of\ncorrecting the ungraceful and unmeasured movements natural to the\nbody.[62]\n\n[Footnote 60: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 46 D-E.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 47 B-C, 90 C.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 47 D-E. [Greek: \u00ea( de\\ a(rmoni/a\n. . . xu/mmachos u(po\\ Mous\u00f4=n de/dotai; kai\\ r(uthmo\\s au)= . . .\nu(po\\ t\u00f4=n au)t\u00f4=n e)do/th\u00ea.] Here we see Plato, in the usual\nHellenic vein, particularising the functions and attributes of the\ndifferent Gods and Goddesses.]\n\n[Side-note: The Kosmos is product of joint action of Reason\nand Necessity. The four visible and tangible elements are not\nprimitive.]\n\nAt this point of the exposition, the Platonic Tim\u00e6us breaks off\nthe thread, and takes up a new commencement. Thus far (he says) we\nhave proceeded in explaining the part of Reason or Intelligence in\nthe fabrication of the Kosmos. We must now explain the part of\nNecessity: for the genesis of the Kosmos results from co-operation\nof the two. By necessity (as has been said before) Plato means\nrandom, indeterminate, chaotic, pre-existent, spontaneity of\nmovement or force: spontaneity ([Greek: \u00ea( plan\u00f4me/n\u00ea ai)ti/a])\nupon which Reason works by persuasion up to a certain point,\nprevailing upon it to submit to some degree of fixity and\nregularity.[63] Tim\u00e6us had described the body of the Kosmos as\nbeing constructed by the Demiurgus out of the four elements; thus\nassuming fire, air, earth, water, as pre-existent. But he now\ncorrects himself, and tells us that such assumption is\nunwarranted. We must (he remarks) give a better and fuller\nexplanation of the Kosmos. No one of these four elements is either\nprimordial, or permanently distinct and definite in itself.\n\n[Footnote 63: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 48 A.]\n\nThe only primordial reality is, an indeterminate, all-recipient\n_fundamentum_: having no form or determination of its own,\nbut capable of receiving any form or determination from without.\n\n[Side-note: Forms or Ideas and Materia Prima--Forms of the\nElements--Place, or Receptivity.]\n\nIn the second explanation now given by Plato of the Kosmos and its\ngenesis, he assumes this invisible _fundamentum_ (which he\nhad not assumed before) as \"the mother or nurse of all\ngeneration\". He assumes, besides, the eternal Forms or Ideas, to\nact upon it and to bestow determination or quality. These forms\nfulfil the office of father: the offspring of the two is--the\ngenerated, concrete, visible, objects,[64] imitations of the Forms\nor Ideas, begotten out of this mother. How the Ideas act upon the\nMateria Prima, Plato cannot well explain: but each Form stamps an\nimitation or copy of itself upon portions of the common\n_Fundamentum_.[65]\n\n[Footnote 64: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 51 A. [Greek: t\u00ea\\n tou=\ngegono/tos o(ratou= kai\\ pa/nt\u00f4s ai)sth\u00eatou= m\u00eate/ra kai\\\nu(podoch\u00ea/n.]]\n\n[Footnote 65: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 50-51. 50 C: [Greek: tup\u00f4the/nta\na)p' au)t\u00f4=n tro/pon tina\\ du/sphraston kai\\ thaumasto/n.] 51 A:\n[Greek: a)no/raton ei)=do/s ti, kai\\ a)/morphon, pandeche/s,\n_metalamba/non de\\ a)por\u00f4/tata/ p\u00ea| tou= no\u00eatou=_ kai\\\ndusal\u00f4to/taton.]]\n\nBut do there really exist any such Forms or Ideas--as Fire _per\nse_, the Generic Fire--Water _per se_, the Generic Water,\ninvisible and intangible?[66] Or is this mere unfounded speech?\nDoes there exist nothing really anywhere, beyond the visible\nobjects which we see and touch?[67]\n\n[Footnote 66: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 51 C.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Ueberweg, in a learned Dissertation, Ueber die\nPlatonische Weltseele (pp. 52-53), seeks to establish a greater\ndistinction between the Ph\u00e6drus, Ph\u00e6don, and Tim\u00e6us, in respect to\nthe way in which Plato affirms the separate substantiality of\nIdeas, than the language of the dialogues warrants. He contends\nthat the separate substantiality of the Platonic Ideas is more\nperemptorily affirmed in the Tim\u00e6us than in the Ph\u00e6drus. But this\nwill not be found borne out if we look at Ph\u00e6drus, p. 247, where\nthe affirmation is quite as peremptory as that in the Tim\u00e6us;\ncorrelating too, as it does in the Tim\u00e6us, with [Greek: Nou=s] as\nthe contemplating subject. Indeed the point may be said to be\naffirmed more positively in the Ph\u00e6drus, because the [Greek:\nu(peroura/nios to/pos] is assigned to the Ideas, while in the\nTim\u00e6us all [Greek: to/pos] or local existence is denied to them\n(p. 52 B-C). Sensible objects are presented in the Ph\u00e6drus as\nfaint resemblances of the archetypal Ideas (p. 250 C), just as\nthey are in the Tim\u00e6us: on the other hand, [Greek: to\\\nmetalamba/nein tou= no\u00eatou=] occurs in the Tim\u00e6us (p. 51 A),\nequivalent to [Greek: to\\ mete/chein], which Ueberweg states to be\ndiscontinued.]\n\nWe must assume (says Plato, after a certain brief argument which\nhe himself does not regard as quite complete) the Forms or Ideas\nof Fire, Air, Water, Earth, as distinct and self-existent,\neternal, indestructible, unchangeable--neither visible nor\ntangible, but apprehended by Reason or Intellect alone--neither\nreceiving anything else from without, nor themselves moving to\nanything else. Distinct from these--images of these, and bearing\nthe same name--are the sensible objects called Fire, Water,\n&c.--objects of sense and opinion--always in a state of\ntransition--generated and destroyed, but always generated in some\nplace and destroyed out of some place. There is to be\nassumed, besides, distinct from the two preceding--as a third\n_fundamentum_--the place or receptacle in which these images\nare localised, generated, and nursed up. This place, or formless\nprimitive receptivity, is indestructible, but out of all reach of\nsense, and difficult to believe in, inasmuch as it is only\naccessible by a spurious sort of ratiocination.[68]\n\n[Footnote 68: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 52 B. [Greek: au)to\\ de\\ met'\na)naisth\u00easi/as a(pto\\n logism\u00f4=| tini\\ no/th\u00f4|, mo/gis\npisto/n.]]\n\n[Side-note: Primordial Chaos--Effect of intervention by the\nDemiurgus.]\n\nAnterior to the construction of the Kosmos, the Forms or Ideas of\nthe four elements had already begun to act upon this primitive\nrecipient or receptacle, but in a confused and irregular way.\nNeither of the four could impress itself in a special and definite\nmanner: there were some vestiges of each, but each was incomplete:\nall were in stir and agitation, yet without any measure or fixed\nrule. Thick and heavy, however, were tending to separate from thin\nand light, and each particle thus tending to occupy a place of its\nown.[69] In this condition (the primordial moving chaos of the\npoets and earlier philosophers), things were found by the\nDemiurgus, when he undertook to construct the Kosmos. There was no\nready made Fire, Water, &c. (as Plato had assumed at the\nopening of the Tim\u00e6us), but an agitated _imbroglio_ of all,\nwith the portions tending to separate from each other, and to\nagglomerate each in a place of its own. The Demiurgus brought\nthese four elements out of confusion into definite bodies and\nregular movements. He gave to each a body, constructed upon the\nmost beautiful proportions of arithmetic and geometry, as far as\nthis was possible.[70]\n\n[Footnote 69: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 52-53. 53 A: [Greek: ta\\ te/ttara\nge/n\u00ea seio/mena u(po\\ t\u00ea=s dexame/n\u00eas, kinoume/n\u00eas au)t\u00ea=s\noi(=on o)rga/nou seismo\\n pare/chontos, ta\\ me\\n a)nomoio/tata\nplei=ston au)ta\\ a)ph' au(t\u00f4=n o(ri/zein, ta\\ d' o(moio/tata\nma/lista ei)s tau)to\\n xun\u00f4thei=n; dio\\ d\u00ea\\ kai\\ ch\u00f4/ran tau=ta\na)/lla a)/ll\u00ean i)/schein, pri\\n kai\\ to\\ pa=n e)x au)t\u00f4=n\ndiakosm\u00eathe\\n gene/sthai.] 57 C: [Greek: die/st\u00eake me\\n ga\\r\ntou= ge/nous e(ka/stou ta\\ pl\u00ea/th\u00ea kata\\ to/pon i)/dion dia\\\nt\u00ea\\n t\u00ea=s dechome/n\u00eas ki/n\u00easin.] 58 C.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 53 B. [Greek: to\\ de\\ \u00ea(=|\ndunato\\n \u00f4(s ka/llista a)/rista/ te e)x ou)ch ou(/t\u00f4s\ne)cho/nt\u00f4n to\\n theo\\n au)ta\\ xunista/nai, para\\ pa/nta \u00ea(mi=n,\n\u00f4(s a)ei/, tou=to lego/menon u(parche/t\u00f4.]\n\nThis is the hypothesis pervading all the Tim\u00e6us--construction the\nbest and finest which the case admitted. The limitations accompany\nthe assumed purpose throughout.]\n\n[Side-note: Geometrical theory of the elements--fundamental\ntriangles--regular solids.]\n\nRespecting such proportions, the theory which Plato here lays out\nis admitted by himself to be a novel one; but it is doubtless\nborrowed, with more or less modification, from the Pythagoreans.\nEvery solid body is circumscribed by plane surfaces: every\nplane surface is composed of triangles: all triangles are\ngenerated out of two--the right-angled isoskeles triangle--and the\nright-angled scalene or oblong triangle. Of this oblong there are\ninfinite varieties: but the most beautiful is a right-angled\ntriangle, having the hypotenuse twice as long as the lesser of the\ntwo other sides.[71] From this sort of oblong triangle are\ngenerated the tetrahedron or pyramid--the octahedron--and the\neikosihedron: from the equilateral triangle is generated the cube.\nThe cube, as the most stable and solid, was assigned by the\nDemiurgus for the fundamental structure of earth: the pyramid for\nthat of fire: the octahedron for that of air: the eikosihedron for\nthat of water. The purpose was that the four should be in\ncontinuous geometrical proportion: as Fire to Air, so Air to\nWater: as Air to Water, so Water to Earth. Lastly, the\nDodekahedron was assigned as the basis of structure for the\nspherical Kosmos itself or universe.[72] Upon this arrangement\neach of the three elements--fire, water, air--passes into the\nother; being generated from the same radical triangle. But earth\ndoes not pass into either of the three (nor either of these into\nearth), being generated from a different radical triangle. The\npyramid, as thin, sharp, and cutting, was assigned to fire as\nthe quickest and most piercing of the four elements: the cube as\nmost solid and difficult to move, was allotted to earth, the\nstationary element. Fire was composed of pyramids of different\nsize, yet each too small to be visible by itself, and becoming\nvisible only when grouped together in masses: the earth was\ncomposed of cubes of different size, each invisible from\nsmallness: the other elements in like manner, each from its\nrespective solid,[73] in exact proportion and harmony, as far as\nNecessity could be persuaded to tolerate. All the five regular\nsolids were thus employed in the configuration and structure of\nthe Kosmos.[74]\n\n[Footnote 71: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 53-54. 53 C: [Greek: a)\u00eathei=\nlo/g\u00f4| d\u00ealou=n].]\n\n[Footnote 72: That Plato intended, by this elaborate geometrical\nconstruction, to arrive at a continuous geometrical proportion\nbetween the four elements, he tells us (p. 32 A-B), adding the\nqualifying words [Greek: kath' o(/son \u00ea)=n dunato/n]. M. Boeckh,\nhowever (De Platonic\u00e2 Corporis Mundani Fabric\u00e2, pp. viii.-xxvi.),\nhas shown that the geometrical proportion cannot be properly\nconcluded from the premisses assumed by Plato:--\"Platonis\nelementorum doctrinam et parum sibi constare, neque omnibus\nnumeris absolutam esse, immo multis incommodis laborare, et divini\ningenii lusui magis quam disciplin\u00e6 severitati originem debere\nfatebimur; nec profundiorem et abstrusiorem natur\u00e6 cognitionem in\ne\u00e2 sitam esse suspicabimur--in quem errorem etiam Joh. Keplerus,\nsummi ingenii homo, incidit\".\n\nRespecting the Dodekahedron, see Zeller, Gesch. der Philos. ii. p.\n513, ed. 2nd. There is some obscurity about it. In the Epinomis\n(p. 981 C) Plato gives the \u00c6ther as a fifth element, besides the\nfour commonly known and recited in the Tim\u00e6us. It appears that\nPhilolaus, as well as Xenokrates, conceived the Dodekahedron as\nthe structural form of \u00c6ther (Schol. ad Aristot. Physic. p. 427,\na. 16, Brandis): and Xenokrates expressly says, that Plato himself\nrecognised it as such. Zeller dissents from this view, and thinks\nthat nothing more is meant than the implication, that the\nDodekahedron can have a sphere described round it more readily\nthan any of the other figures named.\n\nOpponents of Plato remarked that he [Greek: katemath\u00eamatikeu/sato\nt\u00ea\\n phu/sin], Schol. ad Aristot. Metaph. A. 985, b. 23, p. 539,\nBrandis. Aristotle devotes himself in many places to the\nrefutation of the Platonic doctrine on this point; see De Coelo,\niii. 8, 306-307, and elsewhere.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 56 C. [Greek: o(/p\u00eaper \u00ea( t\u00ea=s\nA)na/gk\u00eas e(kou=sa peisthei=sa te phu/sis u(pei=ke.]]\n\n[Footnote 74: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 55-56.]\n\nSuch was the mode of formation of the four so-called elemental\nbodies.[75] Of each of the four, there are diverse species or\nvarieties: and that which distinguishes one variety of the same\nelement from another variety is, that the constituent triangles,\nthough all similar, are of different magnitudes. The diversity of\nthese combinations, though the primary triangles are similar, is\ninfinite: the student of Nature must follow it out, to obtain any\nprobable result.[76]\n\n[Footnote 75: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 57 C. [Greek: o(/sa a)/krata kai\\\npr\u00f4=ta s\u00f4/mata.]\n\nThe Platonist Attikus (ap. Eusebium, Pr\u00e6p. Ev. xv. 7) blames\nAristotle for dissenting from Plato on this point, and for\nrecognising the celestial matter as a fifth essence distinct from\nthe four elements. Plato (he says) followed both anterior\ntraditions and self-evident sense ([Greek: t\u00ea=| peri\\ au)ta\\\ne)nargei/a|]) in admitting only the four elements, and in\nregarding all things as either compounds or varieties of these.\nBut Aristotle, thinking to make parade of superior philosophical\nsagacity, [Greek: proskat\u00eari/thm\u00ease toi=s phainome/nois\nte/ttarsi s\u00f4/masi t\u00ea\\n pe/mpt\u00ean ou)si/an, pa/nu me\\n lampr\u00f4=s\nkai\\ philod\u00f4/r\u00f4s t\u00ea=| phu/sei chr\u00easa/menos, m\u00ea\\ sunid\u00f4\\n de\\\n_o(/ti ou) nomothetei=n dei= phusiologou=nta, ta\\ de\\ t\u00ea=s\nphu/se\u00f4s au)t\u00ea=s e)xistorei=n_.] This last precept is what we\nare surprised to read in a Platonist of the third century\nB.C. \"When you are philosophising upon Nature, do not lay\ndown the law, but search out the real facts of Nature.\" It is\ntruly Baconian: it is justly applicable as a caution to Aristotle,\nagainst whom Attikus directs it; but it is still more eminently\napplicable to Plato, against whom he does not direct it.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 57 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Varieties of each element.]\n\nPlato next enumerates the several varieties of each element--fire,\nwater, earth.[77] He then proceeds to mention the attributes,\nproperties, affections, &c., of each: which he characterises\nas essentially relative to a sentient Subject: nothing being\nabsolute except the constituent geometrical figures. You cannot\ndescribe these attributes (he says) without assuming (what has not\nyet been described) the sensitive or mortal soul, to which\nthey are relative.[78] Assuming this provisionally, Plato gives\naccount of Hot and Cold, Hard and Soft, Heavy and Light, Rough and\nSmooth, &c.[79] Then he describes, first, the sensations of\npleasure and pain, common to the whole body--next those of the\nspecial senses, sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch.[80] These\ndescriptions are very curious and interesting. I am compelled to\npass them over by want of space, and shall proceed to the\nstatements respecting the two mortal souls and the containing\norganism--which belong to a vein more analogous to that of the\nother Platonic dialogues.\n\n[Footnote 77: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 58-61 C.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 61 C-D. [Greek: Pr\u00f4=ton me\\n\nou)=n u(pa/rchein ai)/sth\u00easin dei= toi=s legome/nois (ge/nesin)\na)ei/; sarko\\s de\\ kai\\ t\u00f4=n peri\\ sa/rka ge/nesin, psuch\u00ea=s te\no(/son thn\u00eato/n, ou(/p\u00f4 diel\u00ealu/thamen. Tugcha/nei de\\ ou)/te\ntau=ta ch\u00f4ri\\s t\u00f4=n peri\\ ta\\ path\u00ea/mata o(/sa ai)sth\u00eatika/,\nou)/t' e)kei=na a)/neu tou/t\u00f4n dunata\\ i(kan\u00f4=s lechth\u00ea=nai;\nto\\ de\\ a(/ma schedo\\n ou) dunato/n. U(pothete/on d\u00ea\\ pro/teron\ntha/tera, ta\\ d' u(/stera u(potethe/nta e)pa/nimen au)=this. I(/na\nou)=n e(x\u00ea=s ta\\ path\u00ea/mata le/g\u00eatai toi=s ge/nesin, e)/st\u00f4\npro/tera \u00ea(mi=n ta\\ peri\\ s\u00f4=ma kai\\ psuch\u00ea\\n o)/nta.]]\n\n[Footnote 79: Plato, Tim. pp. 62-64 B. Demokritus appears to have\nheld on this point an opinion approaching to that of Plato. See\nDemocr. Frag. ed. Mullach, pp. 204-215: Aristot. Metaph. A. p.\n985, b. 15; De Sensu, s. 62-65; Sextus Empiric. adv. Math. vii.\n135.\n\n[Greek: Peri\\ me\\n ou)=n bare/os kai\\ kou/phou kai\\ skl\u00earou= kai\\\nmalakou=, e)n tou/tois a)phori/zei--t\u00f4=n d' a)/ll\u00f4n\nai)sth\u00eat\u00f4=n ou)deno\\s ei)=nai phu/sin, a)lla\\ pa/nta pa/th\u00ea\nt\u00ea=s ai)sth\u00ea/se\u00f4s a)lloioume/n\u00eas.] We may remark that Plato\nincludes hardness and softness, the different varieties of\nresistance, among the secondary or relative qualities of matter;\nall that he seems to conceive as absolute are extension and\nfigure, the geometrical conception of matter. In the view of most\nmodern philosophers, resistance is considered as the most\nobviously and undeniably _absolute_ of all the attributes of\nmatter, as that which serves to prove that matter itself is\nabsolute. Dr. Johnson refuted the doctrine of Berkeley by knocking\na stick against the ground; and a similar refutation is adopted in\nwords by Reid and Stewart (see Mill's System of Logic, Book vi. ad\nfinem, also Book i. ch. 3, s. 7-8). To me the fact appealed to by\nJohnson appears an evidence in favour of Berkeley's theory rather\nthan against it. The Resistant ([Greek: o(\\ pare/chei prosbol\u00ea\\n\nkai\\ e)paph\u00ea/n tina], Plato, Sophist. p. 246 A) can be understood\nonly as a correlate of something which is resisted: the fact of\nsense called Resistance is an indivisible fact, involving the\nimplication of the two. In the first instance it is the resistance\nexperienced to our own motions (A. Bain, The Senses and the\nIntellect, p. 91, 3rd ed.), and thus involves the feeling of our\nown spontaneous muscular energy.\n\nThe Tim\u00e6us of Plato is not noticed by Sir W. Hamilton in his very\nlearned and instructive Dissertation on the Primary and Secondary\nQualities of Body (notes to his edition of Reid's Works, p. 826),\nthough it bears upon his point more than the The\u00e6t\u00eatus, which he\nmentions.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 65-69 E.]\n\n[Side-note: Construction of man imposed by the Demiurgus\nupon the secondary Gods. Triple Soul. Distribution thereof in the\nbody.]\n\nThe Demiurgus, after having constructed the entire Kosmos,\ntogether with the generated Gods, as well as Necessity would\npermit--imposed upon these Gods the task of constructing Man: the\nsecond best of the four varieties of animals whom he considered it\nnecessary to include in the Kosmos. He furnished to them as a\nbasis an immortal rational soul (diluted remnant from the\nsoul of the Kosmos); with which they were directed to combine two\nmortal souls and a body.[81] They executed their task as well as\nthe conditions of the problem admitted. They were obliged to\ninclude in the mortal souls pleasure and pain, audacity and fear,\nanger, hope, appetite, sensation, &c., with all the\nconcomitant mischiefs. By such uncongenial adjuncts the immortal\nrational soul was unavoidably defiled. The constructing Gods\nhowever took care to defile it as little as possible.[82] They\nreserved the head as a separate abode for the immortal soul:\nplanting the mortal soul apart from it in the trunk, and\nestablishing the neck as an isthmus of separation between the two.\nAgain the mortal soul was itself not single but double: including\ntwo divisions, a better and a worse. The Gods kept the two parts\nseparate; placing the better portion in the thoracic cavity nearer\nto the head, and the worse portion lower down, in the abdominal\ncavity: the two being divided from each other by the diaphragm,\nbuilt across the body as a wall of partition: just as in a\ndwelling-house, the apartments of the women are separated from\nthose of the men. Above the diaphragm and near to the neck, was\nplanted the energetic, courageous, contentious, soul; so placed as\nto receive orders easily from the head, and to aid the rational\nsoul in keeping under constraint the mutinous soul of appetite,\nwhich was planted below the diaphragm.[83] The immortal soul[84]\nwas fastened or anchored in the brain, the two mortal souls in the\nline of the spinal marrow continuous with the brain: which line\nthus formed the thread of connection between the three. The heart\nwas established as an outer fortress for the exercise of influence\nby the immortal soul over the other two. It was at the same time\nmade the initial point of the veins, the fountain from whence the\ncurrent of blood proceeded to pass forcibly through the veins\nround to all parts of the body. The purpose of this arrangement\nis, that when the rational soul denounces some proceeding as wrong\n(either on the part of others without, or in the appetitive soul\nwithin), it may stimulate an ebullition of anger in the\nheart, and may transmit from thence its exhortations and threats\nthrough the many small blood channels to all the sensitive parts\nof the body: which may thus be rendered obedient everywhere to the\norders of our better nature.[85]\n\n[Footnote 81: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 69 C.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Plato, Tim. p. 69 D. [Greek: xugkerasa/menoi/ t'\nau)ta\\ a)nagkai/\u00f4s to\\ thn\u00eato\\n ge/nos xune/thesan. kai\\ dia\\\ntau=ta d\u00ea\\ sebo/menoi miai/nein to\\ thei=on, o(/ ti m\u00ea\\ pa=sa\n\u00ea)=n a)na/gk\u00ea], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 83: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 69-70.]\n\n[Footnote 84: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 73 B-D.]\n\n[Footnote 85: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 70 B-C.]\n\n[Side-note: Functions of the heart and lungs. Thoracic\nsoul.]\n\nIn such ebullitions of anger, as well as in moments of imminent\ndanger, the heart leaps violently, becoming overheated and\ndistended by excess of fire. The Gods foresaw this, and provided a\nsafeguard against it by placing the lungs close at hand with the\nwind-pipe and trachea. The lungs were constructed soft and full of\ninternal pores and cavities like a sponge; without any\nblood,[86]--but receiving, instead of blood, both the air inspired\nthrough the trachea, and the water swallowed to quench thirst. Being\nthus always cool, and soft like a cushion, the lungs received and\ndeadened the violent beating and leaping of the heart; at the same\ntime that they cooled down its excessive heat, and rendered it a\nmore equable minister for the orders of reason.[87]\n\n[Footnote 86: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 70 C. [Greek: t\u00ea\\n tou=\npleu/monos i)de/an e)nephu/teusan, pr\u00f4=ton me\\n malak\u00ea\\n kai\\\na)/naimon, ei)=ta s\u00ea/raggas e)nto\\s e)/chousan oi(=on spo/ggou\nkatatetr\u00eame/nas.]\n\nAristotle notices this opinion as held by some persons (not naming\nPlato), but impugns it as erroneous. He affirms that the lungs\nhave more blood in them than any of the other viscera (Histor.\nAnimal. i. 17, p. 496, b. 1-8; De Respirat. c. 15, p. 478, a.\n13).]\n\n[Footnote 87: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 70.]\n\n[Side-note: Abdominal Soul--difficulty of controuling\nit--functions of the liver.]\n\nThe third or lowest soul, of appetite and nutrition, was placed\nbetween the diaphragm and the navel. This region of the body was\nset apart like a manger for containing necessary food: and the\nappetitive soul was tied up to it like a wild beast; indispensable\nindeed for the continuance of the race, yet a troublesome adjunct,\nand therefore placed afar off, in order that its bellowings might\ndisturb as little as possible the deliberations of the rational\nsoul in the cranium, for the good of the whole. The Gods knew that\nthis appetitive soul would never listen to reason, and that it\nmust be kept under subjection altogether by the influence of\nphantoms and imagery. They provided an agency for this purpose in\nthe liver, which they placed close upon the abode of the\nappetitive soul.[88] They made the liver compact, smooth, and\nbrilliant, like a mirror reflecting images:--moreover, both\nsweet and bitter on occasions. The thoughts of the rational soul\nwere thus brought within view of the appetitive soul, in the form\nof phantoms or images exhibited on the mirror of the liver. When\nthe rational soul is displeased, not only images corresponding to\nthis feeling are impressed, but the bitter properties of the liver\nare all called forth. It becomes crumpled, discoloured, dark and\nrough; the gall bladder is compressed; the veins carrying the\nblood are blocked up, and pain as well as sickness arise. On the\ncontrary, when the rational soul is satisfied, so as to send forth\nmild and complacent inspirations,--all this bitterness of the\nliver is tranquillised, and all its native sweetness called forth.\nThe whole structure becomes straight and smooth; and the images\nimpressed upon it are rendered propitious. It is thus through the\nliver, and by means of these images, that the rational soul\nmaintains its ascendancy over the appetitive soul; either to\nterrify and subdue, or to comfort and encourage it.[89]\n\n[Footnote 88: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 71 A. [Greek: ei)do/tes de\\ au)to\\\n\u00f4(s lo/gou me\\n ou)/te xun\u00ea/sein e)/mellen, ei)/te p\u00ea| kai\\\nmetala/mbanoi tino\\s au)= t\u00f4=n ai)sth\u00ea/se\u00f4n, ou)k e)/mphuton\nau)t\u00f4=| to\\ me/lein tin\u00f4=n e)/soito lo/g\u00f4n, u(po\\ de\\\nei)d\u00f4/l\u00f4n kai\\ phantasma/t\u00f4n nukto/s te kai\\ meth' \u00ea(me/ran\nma/lista psuchag\u00f4g\u00ea/soito, tou/t\u00f4| d\u00ea\\ theo\\s e)pibouleu/sas\nau)t\u00f4=| t\u00ea\\n tou= \u00ea(/patos i)de/an xune/st\u00easen.]]\n\n[Footnote 89: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 71 C-D.]\n\n[Side-note: The liver is made the seat of the prophetic\nagency. Function of the spleen.]\n\nMoreover, the liver was made to serve another purpose. It was\nselected as the seat of the prophetic agency; which the Gods\nconsidered to be indispensable, as a refuge and aid for the\nirrational department of man. Though this portion of the soul had\nno concern with sense or reason, they would not shut it out\naltogether from some glimpse of truth. The revelations of prophecy\nwere accordingly signified on the liver, for the instruction and\nwithin the easy view of the appetitive soul: and chiefly at\nperiods when the functions of the rational soul are\nsuspended--either during sleep, or disease, or fits of temporary\necstasy. For no man in his perfect senses comes under the influence\nof a genuine prophetic inspiration. Sense and intelligence are often\nrequired to interpret prophecies, and to determine what is meant\nby dreams or signs or prognostics of other kinds: but such\nrevelations are received by men destitute of sense. To receive\nthem, is the business of one class of men: to interpret them, that\nof another. It is a grave mistake, though often committed, to\nconfound the two. It was in order to furnish prophecy to man,\ntherefore, that the Gods devised both the structure and the\nplace of the liver. During life, the prophetic indications are\nclearly marked upon it: but after death they become obscure and\nhard to decipher.[90]\n\n[Footnote 90: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 71-72. 71 E: [Greek: i(kano\\n de\\\ns\u00eamei=on, \u00f4(s mantik\u00ea\\n a)phrosu/n\u00ea| theo\\s a)nthr\u00f4pi/n\u00ea|\nde/d\u00f4ken; ou)dei\\s ga\\r e)/nnous e)pha/ptetai mantik\u00ea=s\ne)nthe/ou kai\\ a)l\u00eathou=s.]]\n\nThe spleen was placed near the liver, corresponding to it on the\nleft side, in order to take off from it any impure or excessive\naccretions or accumulations, and thus to preserve it clean and\npure.[91]\n\n[Footnote 91: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 72 D.]\n\nSuch was the distribution of the one immortal and the two mortal\nsouls, and such the purposes by which it was dictated. We cannot\nindeed (says Plato) proclaim this with full assurance as truth,\nunless the Gods would confirm our declarations. We must take the\nrisk of affirming what appears to us probable--and we shall\nproceed with this risk yet further.[92] The following is the plan\nand calculation according to which it was becoming that our\nremaining bodily frame should be put together.\n\n[Footnote 92: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 72 D-E. [Greek: to\\ me\\n\na)l\u00eathe/s, \u00f4(s ei)/r\u00eatai, theou= xumph\u00ea/santos to/t' a)\\n\nou(/t\u00f4 mo/n\u00f4s dii+schurizoi/metha; to/ ge m\u00ea\\n ei)ko\\s \u00ea(mi=n\nei)r\u00easthai kai\\ nu=n kai\\ e)/ti ma=llon a)naskopou=si\ndiakinduneute/on to\\ pha/nai, kai\\ pepha/sth\u00f4 . . . e)k d\u00ea\\\nlogismou= toiou=de xuni/stasthai ma/list' a)\\n au)to\\ pa/nt\u00f4n\npre/poi.]]\n\n[Side-note: Length of the intestinal canal, in order that\nfood might not be frequently needed.]\n\nThe Gods foresaw that we should be intemperate in our appetite for\nfood and drink, and that we should thus bring upon ourselves many\ndiseases injurious to life. To mitigate this mischief, they\nprovided us with a great length of intestinal canal, but twisted\nit round so as to occupy but a small space, in the belly. All the\nfood which we introduce remains thus a long time within us, before\nit passes away. A greater interval elapses before we need fresh\nsupplies of food. If the food passed away speedily, so that we\nwere constantly obliged to renew it, and were therefore always\neating--the human race would be utterly destitute of intelligence\nand philosophy. They would be beyond the controul of the rational\nsoul.[93]\n\n[Footnote 93: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 73 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Bone--Flesh--Marrow.]\n\nBone and flesh come next to be explained. Both of them derive\ntheir origin from the spinal marrow: in which the bonds of life\nare fastened, and soul is linked with body--the root of the human\nrace. The origin of the spinal marrow itself is special and\nexceptional. Among the triangles employed in the construction\nof all the four elements, the Gods singled out the very best of\neach sort. Those selected were combined harmoniously with each\nother, and employed in the formation of the spinal marrow, as the\nuniversal seed ground ([Greek: panspermi/an]) for all the human\nrace. In this marrow the Gods planted the different sorts of\nsouls; distributing and accommodating the figure of each portion\nof marrow to the requirements of each different soul. For that\nportion (called the encephalon, as being contained in the head)\nwhich was destined to receive the immortal soul, they employed the\nspherical figure and none other: for the remaining portion,\nwherein the mortal soul was to be received, they employed a\nmixture of the spherical and the oblong. All of it together was\ncalled by the same name _marrow_, covered and protected by\none continuous bony case, and established as the holding ground to\nfasten the whole extent of soul with the whole extent of body.[94]\n\n[Footnote 94: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 73 C-D.]\n\n[Side-note: Nails--Mouth--Teeth. Plants produced for\nnutrition of man.]\n\nPlato next explains the construction of ligaments and flesh--of\nthe mouth, tongue, teeth, and lips: of hair and nails.[95] These\nlast were produced with a long-sighted providence: for the Gods\nforesaw that the lower animals would be produced from the\ndegeneration of man, and that to them nails and claws would be\nabsolutely indispensable: accordingly, a sketch or rudiment of\nnails was introduced into the earliest organisation of man.[96]\nNutrition being indispensable to man, the Gods produced for this\npurpose plants (trees, shrubs, herbs, &c.)--with a nature\ncognate to that of man, but having only the lowest of the three\nhuman souls.[97] They then cut ducts and veins throughout the\nhuman body, in directions appropriate for distributing the\nnutriment everywhere. They provided proper structures (here\ncuriously described) for digestion, inspiration, and\nexpiration.[98] The constituent triangles within the body, when\nyoung and fresh, overpower the triangles, older and weaker,\ncontained in the nutritive matters swallowed, and then appropriate\npart of them to the support and growth of the body: in old age,\nthe triangles within are themselves overpowered, and the body\ndecays. When the fastenings, whereby the triangles in the\nspinal marrow have been fitted together, are worn out and give\nway, they let go the fastenings of the soul also. The soul, when\nthus released in a natural way, flies away with delight. Death in\nthis manner is pleasurable: though it is distressing, when brought\non violently, by disease or wounds.[99]\n\n[Footnote 95: Plato, Tim. pp. 75-76.]\n\n[Footnote 96: Plat. Tim. p. 76 E. [Greek: o(/then e)n\na)nthr\u00f4/pois eu)thu\\s gignome/nois _u(petup\u00f4/santo_ t\u00ea\\n\nt\u00f4=n o)nu/ch\u00f4n ge/nesin.]]\n\n[Footnote 97: Plat. Tim. p. 77 B-C.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Plat. Tim. pp. 78-79.]\n\n[Footnote 99: Plat. Tim. p. 81.]\n\n[Side-note: General view of Diseases and their Causes.]\n\nHere Plato passes into a general survey of diseases and the proper\ntreatment of them. \"As to the source from whence diseases arise\n(he says) this is a matter evident to every one. They arise from\nunnatural excess, deficiency, or displacement, of some one or more\nof the four elements (fire, air, water, earth) which go to compose\nthe body.\"[100] If the element in excess be fire, heat and\ncontinuous fever are produced: if air, the fever comes on\nalternate days: if water (a duller element), it is a tertian\nfever: if earth, it is a quartan--since earth is the dullest and\nmost sluggish of the four.[101]\n\n[Footnote 100: Plat. Tim. p. 81 E. [Greek: to\\ de\\ t\u00f4=n no/s\u00f4n\no(/then xuni/statai, d\u00ea=lo/n pou kai\\ panti/.]]\n\n[Footnote 101: Plat. Tim. p. 86 A. [Greek: to\\ de\\ g\u00ea=s,\nteta/rt\u00f4s o)\\n n\u00f4the/staton tou/t\u00f4n.]]\n\n[Side-note: Diseases of mind--wickedness is a disease--no\nman is voluntarily wicked.]\n\nHaving dwelt at considerable length on the distempers of the body,\nthe Platonic Tim\u00e6us next examines those of the soul, which proceed\nfrom the condition of the body.[102] The generic expression for\nall distemper of the soul is, irrationality--unreason--absence of\nreason or intelligence. Of this there are two sorts--madness and\nignorance. Intense pleasures and pains are the gravest cause of\nmadness.[103] A man under either of these two influences--either\ngrasping at the former, or running away from the latter, out of\nseason--can neither see nor hear any thing rightly. He is at that\nmoment mad and incapable of using his reason. When the flow of\nsperm round his marrow is overcharged and violent, so as to\nproduce desires with intense throes of uneasiness beforehand and\nintense pleasure when satisfaction arrives,--his soul is really\ndistempered and irrational, through the ascendancy of his body.\nYet such a man is erroneously looked upon in general not as\ndistempered, but as wicked voluntarily, of his own accord.\nThe truth is, that sexual intemperance is a disorder of the soul\narising from an abundant flow of one kind of liquid in the body,\ncombined with thin bones or deficiency in the solids. And nearly\nall those intemperate habits which are urged as matters of\nreproach against a man--as if he were bad willingly,--are urged\nonly from the assumption of an erroneous hypothesis. No man is bad\nwillingly, but only from some evil habit of body and from wrong or\nperverting treatment in youth; which is hostile to his nature, and\ncomes upon him against his own will.[104]\n\n[Footnote 102: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 86 B. [Greek: Kai\\ ta\\ me\\n peri\\\nto\\ s\u00f4=ma nos\u00ea/mata tau/t\u00ea| xumbai/nei gigno/mena, ta\\ de\\\nperi\\ psuch\u00ea\\n dia\\ s\u00f4/matos e(/xin t\u00ea=|de.]]\n\n[Footnote 103: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 86 B. [Greek: no/son me\\n d\u00ea\\\npsuch\u00ea=s a)/noian xugch\u00f4r\u00eate/on. Du/o d' a)noi/as ge/n\u00ea, to\\\nme\\n mani/an, to\\ de\\ a)mathi/an.]]\n\n[Footnote 104: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 86 C-D.]\n\n[Side-note: Badness of mind arises from body.]\n\nAgain, not merely by way of pleasures, but by way of pains also,\nthe body operates to entail evil or wickedness on the soul. When\nacid or salt phlegm--when bitter and bilious humours--come to\nspread through the body, remaining pent up therein, without being\nable to escape by exhalation,--the effluvia which ought to have\nbeen exhaled from them become confounded with the rotation of the\nsoul, producing in it all manner of distempers. These effluvia\nattack all the three different seats of the soul, occasioning\ngreat diversity of mischiefs according to the part\nattacked--irascibility, despondency, rashness, cowardice, forgetfulness,\nstupidity. Such bad constitution of the body serves as the\nfoundation of ulterior mischief. And when there supervene, in\naddition, bad systems of government and bad social maxims, without\nany means of correction furnished to youth through good social\ninstruction--it is from these two combined causes, both of them\nagainst our own will, that all of us who are wicked become wicked.\nParents and teachers are more in fault than children and pupils.\nWe must do our best to arrange the bringing up, the habits, and\nthe instruction, so as to eschew evil and attain good.[105]\n\n[Footnote 105: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 87 A-C.]\n\n[Side-note: Preservative and healing agencies against\ndisease--well-regulated exercise, of mind and body\nproportionally.]\n\nAfter thus describing the causes of corruption, both in body and\nmind, Plato adverts to the preservative and corrective agencies\napplicable to them. Between the one and the other, constant\nproportion and symmetry must be imperatively maintained. When the\none is strong, and the other weak, nothing but mischief can\nensue.[106] Mind must not be exercised alone, to the\nexclusion of body; nor body alone, without mind. Each must be\nexercised, so as to maintain adequate reaction and equilibrium\nagainst the other.[107] We ought never to let the body be at rest:\nwe must keep up within it a perpetual succession of moderate\nshocks, so that it may make suitable resistance against foreign\ncauses of movement, internal and external.[108] The best of all\nmovements is, that which is both in itself and made by itself:\nanalogous to the self-continuing rotation both of the Kosmos and\nof the rational soul in our cranium.[109] Movement in itself, but\nby an external agent, is less good. The worst of all is, movement\nneither in itself nor by itself. Among these three sorts of\nmovement, the first is, Gymnastic: the second, propulsion\nbackwards and forwards in a swing, gestation in a carriage: the\nthird is, purgation or medicinal disturbance.[110] This last is\nnever to be employed, except in extreme emergencies.\n\n[Footnote 106: Plat. Tim. pp. 87-88 A.]\n\n[Footnote 107: Plat. Tim. p. 88 C.]\n\n[Footnote 108: Plat. Tim. p. 88 D-E.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Plat. Tim. p. 89 A. [Greek: t\u00f4=n d' au)=\nkin\u00ea/se\u00f4n \u00ea( e)n e(aut\u00f4=| u(ph' e(autou= a)ri/st\u00ea ki/n\u00easis;\nma/lista ga\\r t\u00ea=| diano\u00eatik\u00ea=| kai\\ t\u00ea=| tou= panto\\s\nkin\u00ea/sei xuggen\u00ea/s; \u00ea( d' u(p' a)/llou chei/r\u00f4n.]]\n\n[Footnote 110: Plat. Tim. p. 89 A. [Greek: deute/ra de\\ \u00ea( dia\\\nt\u00f4=n ai)\u00f4r\u00ea/se\u00f4n].\n\nFoes, in the Oeconomia Hippocratica v. [Greek: Ai)\u00f4/ra], gives\ninformation about these _pensiles gestationes_, upon which\nthe ancient physicians bestowed much attention.]\n\n[Side-note: Treatment proper for mind alone, apart from\nbody--supremacy of the rational soul must be cultivated.]\n\nWe must now indicate the treatment necessary for mind alone, apart\nfrom body. It has been already stated, that there are in each of\nus three souls, or three distinct varieties of soul; each having\nits own separate place and special movements. Of these three, that\nwhich is most exercised must necessarily become the strongest:\nthat which is left unexercised, unmoved, at rest or in\nindolence,--will become the weakest. The object to be aimed at is,\nthat all three shall be exercised in harmony or proportion with each\nother. Respecting the soul in our head, the grandest and most\ncommanding of the three, we must bear in mind that it is this which\nthe Gods have assigned to each man as his own special D\u00e6mon or\npresiding Genius. Dwelling as it does in the highest region of the\nbody, it marks us and links us as akin with heaven--as a celestial\nand not a terrestrial plant, having root in heaven and not in earth.\nIt is this encephalic or head-soul, which, connected with and\nsuspended from the divine soul of the Kosmos, keeps our whole body\nin its erect attitude. Now if a man neglects this soul, directing\nall his favour and development towards the two others (the energetic\nor the appetitive),--all his judgments will infallibly become\nmortal and transient, and he himself will be degraded into a\nmortal being, as far as it is possible for man to become so. But\nif he devotes himself to study and meditation on truth, exercising\nthe encephalic soul more than the other two--he will assuredly, if\nhe seizes truth,[111] have his mind filled with immortal and\ndivine judgments, and will become himself immortal, as far as\nhuman nature admits of it. Cultivating as he does systematically\nthe divine element within him, and having his in-dwelling Genius\ndecorated as perfectly as possible, he will be eminently\nwell-inspired or happy.[112]\n\n[Footnote 111: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 90 C. [Greek: a)/n per\na)l\u00eathei/as e)pha/pt\u00eatai.]]\n\n[Footnote 112: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 90 B-D. [Greek: e)/chonta/ te\nau)to\\n eu)= ma/la kekosm\u00eame/non to\\n dai/mona xu/noikon e)n\nau(t\u00f4=|, diaphero/nt\u00f4s eu)dai/mona ei)=nai.]\n\nIt is hardly possible to translate this play upon the word [Greek:\neu)dai/m\u00f4n].]\n\n[Side-note: We must study and understand the rotations of\nthe Kosmos--this is the way to amend the rotations of the rational\nsoul.]\n\nThe mode of cultivating or developing each soul is the same--to\nassign to each the nourishment and the movement which is suitable\nto it. Now the movements which are kindred and congenial to our\ndivine encephalic soul, are--the rotations of the Kosmos and the\nintellections traversing the Kosmical soul. It is these that we\nought to follow and study. By learning and embracing in our minds\nthe rotations and proportions of the Kosmos, we shall assimilate\nthe comprehending subject to the comprehended object, and shall\nrectify that derangement of our own intra-cranial rotations, which\nwas entailed upon us by our birth into a body. By such\nassimilation, we shall attain the perfection of the life allotted\nto us, both at present and for the future.[113]\n\n[Footnote 113: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 90 D, 91 C-D. The phrase of\nPlato in describing the newly introduced mode of\nprocreation--[Greek: \u00f4(s ei)s a)/rouran t\u00ea\\n m\u00ea/tran a)o/rata\nu(po\\ smikro/t\u00eatos kai\\ a)dia/plasta z\u00f4=a kataspei/rantes]--is\nremarkable, as it might be applied to the spermatozoa, which\nnevertheless he cannot have known.]\n\n[Side-note: Construction of women, birds, quadrupeds,\nfishes, &c., all from the degradation of primitive man.]\n\nWe have thus--says the Platonic Tim\u00e6us in approaching his\nconclusion--gone through all those matters which we promised at\nthe beginning, from the first construction of the Kosmos to the\ngenesis of man. We must now devote a few words to the other\nanimals. All of these derive their origin from man, by\nsuccessive degradations. The first transition is from man into\nwoman. Men whose lives had been characterised by cowardice or\ninjustice, were after death and in their second birth born again\nas women. It was then that the Gods planted in us the sexual\nimpulse, reconstructing the bodily organism with suitable\nadjustment, on the double pattern, male and female.[114]\n\n[Footnote 114: Plat. Tim. p. 91 D. Whoever compares the step of\nmarked degeneration here indicated--in passing from men to\nwomen--with that which is affirmed by Plato in the fifth book of the\nRepublic about the character, attributes, and capacities of women,\nwill recognise a material difference between the two.]\n\nSuch was the genesis of women, by a partial transformation and\ndiversification of the male structure.\n\nWe next come to birds; who are likewise a degraded birth or\nformation, derived from one peculiar mode of degeneracy in man:\nhair being transmuted into feathers and wings. Birds were formed\nfrom the harmless, but light, airy, and superficial men; who,\nthough carrying their minds aloft to the study of kosmical\nphenomena, studied them by visual observation and not by reason,\nfoolishly imagining that they had discovered the way of reaching\ntruth.[115]\n\n[Footnote 115: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 91 E.]\n\nThe more brutal land animals proceeded from men totally destitute\nof philosophy, who neither looked up to the heavens nor cared for\ncelestial objects: from men making no use whatever of the\nrotations of their encephalic soul, but following exclusively the\nguidance of the lower soul in the trunk. Through such tastes and\noccupations, both their heads and their anterior limbs became\ndragged down to the earth by the force of affinity. Moreover, when\nthe rotations of the encephalic soul, from want of exercise,\nbecame slackened and fell into desuetude, the round form of the\ncranium was lost, and converted into an oblong or some other form.\nThese men thus degenerated into quadrupeds and multipeds: the Gods\nfurnishing a greater number of feet in proportion to the stupidity\nof each, in order that its approximations to earth might be\nmultiplied. To some of the more stupid, however, the Gods gave no\nfeet nor limbs at all; constraining them to drag the whole length\nof their bodies along the ground, and to become Reptiles.[116]\n\n[Footnote 116: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 91-92.]\n\nOut of the most stupid and senseless of mankind, by still\ngreater degeneracy, the Gods formed Fishes or Aquatic\nAnimals:--the fourth and lowest genus, after Men, Birds, Land-Animals.\nThis race of beings, from their extreme want of mind, were not\nconsidered worthy to live on earth, or to respire thin and pure\nair. They were condemned to respire nothing but deep and turbid\nwater, many of them, as oysters, and other descriptions of\nshellfish, being fixed down at the lowest depth or bottom.[117]\n\n[Footnote 117: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 92 B.]\n\nIt is by such transitions (concludes the Platonic Tim\u00e6us) that the\ndifferent races of animals passed originally, and still continue\nto pass, into each other. The interchange is determined by the\nacquisition or loss of reason or irrationality.[118]\n\n[Footnote 118: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 92 B. [Greek: kai\\ kata\\ tau=ta\nd\u00ea\\ pa/nta _to/te kai\\ nu=n diamei/betai ta\\ z\u00f4=a ei)s\na)/ll\u00eala_, nou= kai\\ a)noi/as a)pobol\u00ea=| kai\\ kt\u00ea/sei\nmetaballo/mena.]]\n\n*  *  *  *  *\n\n[Side-note: Large range of topics introduced in the Tim\u00e6us.]\n\nThe vast range of topics, included in this curious exposition, is\ntruly remarkable: Kosmogony or Theogony, First Philosophy, Physics\n(resting upon Geometry and Arithmetic), Zoology, Physiology,\nAnatomy, Pathology, Therapeutics, mental as well as physical. Of\nall these, I have not been able to furnish more than scanty\nillustrations; but the whole are well worthy of study, as the\nconjectures of a great and ingenious mind in the existing state of\nknowledge and belief among the Greeks: and all the more worthy,\nbecause they form in many respects a striking contrast with the\npoints of view prevalent in more recent times.\n\n[Side-note: The Demiurgus of the Platonic Tim\u00e6us--how\nconceived by other philosophers of the same century.]\n\nThe position and functions of the Demiurgus, in the Tim\u00e6us, form a\npeculiar phase in Grecian Philosophy, and even in the doctrine of\nPlato himself: for the theology and kosmology of the Tim\u00e6us differ\nconsiderably from what we read in the Ph\u00e6drus, Politikus,\nRepublic, Leges, &c. The Demiurgus is presented in Tim\u00e6us as a\npersonal agent, pre-kosmical and extra-kosmical: but he appears\nonly as initiating; he begets or fabricates, once for all, a most\nbeautiful Kosmos (employing all the available material, so\nthat nothing more could afterwards be added). The Kosmos having\nbody and soul, is itself a God, but with many separate Gods\nresident within it, or attached to it. The Demiurgus then retires,\nleaving it to be peopled and administered by the Gods thus\ngenerated, or by its own soul. His acting and speaking is\nrecounted in the manner of the ancient mythes: and many critics,\nancient as well as modern, have supposed that he is intended by\nPlato only as a mythical personification of the Idea Boni: the\nconstruction described being only an ideal process, like the\ngeneration of a geometrical figure.[119] Whatever may have been\nPlato's own intention, in this last sense his hypothesis was\ninterpreted by his immediate successors, Speusippus and\nXenokrates, as well as by Eud\u00eamus.[120] Aristotle in his comments\nupon Plato takes little notice of the Demiurgus: the hypothesis\n(of a distinct personal constructive agent) did not fit into his\n_principia_ of the Kosmos, and he probably ranked it among\nthose mythical modes of philosophising which he expressly\npronounces to be unworthy of serious criticism.[121] Various\nsucceeding philosophers also, especially the Stoics, while\nthey insisted much upon Providence, conceived this as residing in\nthe Kosmos itself, and in the divine intra-kosmical agencies.\n\n[Footnote 119: Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Tim\u00e6um, p. 47.\n\nZeller, Platonische Studien, pp. 207-215; also his Gesch. d. Phil.\nd. Griech. vol. ii. p. 508 seq. ed. 2nd; and Susemihl, Genetische\nEntwicklung der Platon. Philosophie, vol. ii. pp. 322-340.\nUeberweg, Ueber die Platon. Welt-seele, p. 69; Brandis, Gesch. der\nGriech. Philos. ii. cx. pp. 357-365.\n\nA good note of Ast (Platon's Leben und Schriften, p. 363 seq.)\nillustrates the analogy between the Platonic Tim\u00e6us and the old\nGreek cosmogonic poems.]\n\n[Footnote 120: Respecting Speusippus and Xenokrates, see\nAristotel. De Coelo, i. 10, pp. 279-280, with Scholia, 487, b.\n37, 488, b. 15, 489, a. 10, Brandis. Respecting Eudemus, Krantor,\nEudorus, and the majority of the Platonic followers, see Plutarch,\nDe Anim\u00e6 Procreatione in Tim\u00e6o, 1012 D, 1013 A, 1015 D, 1017 B,\n1028 B.\n\nPlutarch reasons against them; but he recognises their\ninterpretation as the predominant one.\n\nSee also the view ascribed to Speusippus and the Pythagoreans by\nAristotle (Metaphys. A. 1072, a. 1, b. 30).]\n\n[Footnote 121: Proklus ad Platon. Tim. ii. pp. 138 E, 328, ed.\nSchn.: [Greek: \u00ea)\\ ga\\r mo/nos \u00ea)\\ ma/lista, Pla/t\u00f4n t\u00ea=|\na)po\\ tou= pronoou=ntos ai)ti/a| katechr\u00ea/sato, ph\u00easi\\n o(\nTheo/phrastos, tou=to/ ge kal\u00f4=s au)t\u00f4=| martur\u00f4=n.] And\nanother reference to Theophrastus, in Proklus, pp. 117, 417 Schn.\nAlso pp. 118 E-F, 279 Schn.: [Greek: A)ristote/l\u00eas me\\n ou)=n\nt\u00ea\\n e)n t\u00f4=| d\u00eamiourg\u00f4=| ta/xin ou)k oi)=den . . . o( de\\\nPla/t\u00f4n O)rphei= sunepo/menos e)n t\u00f4=| d\u00eamiourg\u00f4=| pr\u00f4=ton\nei)=nai ph\u00easi t\u00ea\\n ta/xin, kai\\ to\\ pro\\ t\u00f4=n mer\u00f4=n o(/lon.]\nFor further coincidences between the Platonic Tim\u00e6us and Orpheus\n([Greek: o( theolo/gos]) see Proklus ad Tim\u00e6. pp. 233-235, Schn.\nThe passage of Aristotle respecting those who blended mythe and\nphilosophy is remarkable, Metaphys. B. 1000, a. 9-20. [Greek: Oi(\nme\\n ou)=n peri\\ \u00ca(si/odon, kai\\ pa/ntes o(/soi theolo/goi,\nmo/non e)phro/ntisan tou= pithanou= tou= pro\\s au)tou/s, \u00ea(m\u00f4=n\nd' \u00f4)lig\u00f4/r\u00easan . . . A)lla\\ peri\\ me\\n t\u00f4=n muthik\u00f4=s\nsophizome/n\u00f4n ou)k a)/xion meta\\ spoud\u00ea=s skopei=n; para\\ de\\\nt\u00f4=n di' a)podei/xe\u00f4s lego/nt\u00f4n dei= puntha/nesthai\ndier\u00f4t\u00f4=ntas], &c. About those whom Aristotle calls [Greek:\noi( memigme/noi] (partly mythe, partly philosophy), see Metaphys.\nN. 1091, b. 8.\n\nCompare, on Aristotle's non-recognition of the Platonic Demiurgus,\na remarkable note of Prantl, ad Aristot. Physica, viii. p. 524,\nalso p. 478, in his edition of that treatise, Leipsic, 1854.\nWeisse speaks to the same effect in his translation of the Physica\nof Aristotle, pp. 350-356, Leips. 1829.\n\nLichtenst\u00e4dt, in his ingenious work, (Ueber Platon's Lehren auf\ndem Gebiete der Natur-Forschung und der Heilkunde, Leipsic, 1826),\nranks several of the characteristic tenets of the Tim\u00e6us as only\nmythical: the pre-existent Chaos, the divinity of the entire\nKosmos, even the metempsychosis, though it is affirmed most\ndirectly,--see pp. 24, 46, 48, 86, &c. How much of all this\nPlato intended as purely mythical, appears to me impossible to\ndetermine. I agree with the opinion of Ueberweg, that Plato did\nnot draw any clear line in his own mind between the mythical and\nthe real (Ueber die Platon. Weltseele, pp. 70-71).]\n\n[Side-note: Adopted and welcomed by the Alexandrine Jews, as\na parallel to the Mosaic Genesis.]\n\nBut though the idea of a pre-kosmic Demiurgus found little favour\namong the Grecian schools of philosophy, before the Christian\nera--it was greatly welcomed among the Hellenising Jews at\nAlexandria, from Aristobulus (about B. C. 150) down to Philo. It\nformed the suitable point of conjunction, between Hellenic and\nJudaic speculation. The marked distinction drawn by Plato between\nthe Demiurgus, and the constructed or generated Kosmos, with its\nin-dwelling Gods--provided a suitable place for the Supreme God of\nthe Jews, degrading the Pagan Gods in comparison. The Tim\u00e6us was\ncompared with the book of Genesis, from which it was even affirmed\nthat Plato had copied. He received the denomination of the\natticising Moses: Moses writing in Attic Greek.[122] It was thus\nthat the Platonic Tim\u00e6us became the medium of transition, from the\nPolytheistic theology which served as philosophy among the\nearly ages of Greece, to the omnipotent Monotheism to which\nphilosophy became subordinated after the Christian era.]\n\n[Footnote 122: The learned work of Gfr\u00f6rer--Philo und die\nJ\u00fcdisch-Alexandrin. Theosophie--illustrates well this coalescence\nof Platonism with the Pentateuch in the minds of the Hellenising\nJews at Alexandria. \"Aristobulus maintained, 150 years earlier\nthan Philo, that not only the oldest Grecian poets, Homer, Hesiod,\nOrpheus, &c., but also the most celebrated thinkers,\nespecially Plato, had acquired all their wisdom from a very old\ntranslation of the Pentateuch\" (Gfr\u00f6rer, i. p. 308, also ii.\n111-118). The first form of Grecian philosophy which found favour\namong the Alexandrine Jews was the Platonic:--\"since a Jew could\nnot fail to be pleased--besides the magnificent style and high\nmoral tone--with a certain likeness between the Oriental\nKosmogonies and the Tim\u00e6us, the favourite treatise of all\nTheosophists,\" see p. 72. Compare the same work, pp.\n78-80-167-184-314.\n\nPhilo calls Sokrates [Greek: a)n\u00ea\\r para\\ M\u00f4u+sei= ta\\\nprote/leia t\u00ea=s sophi/as a)nadidachthei/s]: he refers to the\nterminology of the Platonic Tim\u00e6us (Gfr\u00f6rer, 308-327-328).\n\nEusebius (Pr\u00e6p. Ev. ix. 6, xi. 10), citing Aristobulus and\nNumenius, says [Greek: Ti/ ga\\r e)/sti Pla/t\u00f4n, \u00ea)\\ M\u00f4u+s\u00ea\\s\na)ttiki/z\u00f4n?] Compare also the same work, xi. 16-25-29, and xiii.\n18, where the harmony between Plato and Moses, and the preference\nof the author for Plato over other Greek philosophers, are\nearnestly declared.\n\nSee also Vacherot, Histoire Critique de l'\u00c9cole d'Alexandrie, vol.\ni. pp. 110-163-319-335.]\n\n[Side-note: Physiology of the Platonic Tim\u00e6us--subordinate\nto Plato's views of ethical teleology. Triple soul--each soul at\nonce material and mental.]\n\nOf the vast outline sketched in the Tim\u00e6us, no part illustrates\nbetter the point of view of the author, than what is said about\nhuman anatomy and physiology. The human body is conceived\naltogether as subservient to an ethical and \u00e6sthetical teleology:\nit is (like the Praxitelean statue of Eros[123]) a work adapted to\nan archetypal model in Plato's own heart--his emotions,\npreferences, antipathies.[124] The leading idea in his mind is,\nWhat purposes would be most suitable to the presumed character of\nthe Demiurgus, and to those generated Gods who are assumed to act\nas his ministers? The purposes which Plato ascribes, both to the\none and to the others, emanate from his own feelings: they are\nsuch as he would himself have aimed at accomplishing, if he had\npossessed demiurgic power: just as the Republic describes the\nprinciples on which he would have constituted a Commonwealth, had\nhe been lawgiver or Oekist. His inventive fancy depicts the\ninterior structure, both of the great Kosmos and of its little\nhuman miniature, in a way corresponding to these sublime purposes.\nThe three souls, each with its appropriate place and functions,\nform the cardinal principle of the organism:[125] the unity of\nwhich is maintained by the spinal marrow in continuity with,\nthe brain; all the three souls having their roots in different\nparts of this continuous line. Neither of these three souls is\nimmaterial, in the sense which that word now bears: even the\nencephalic rational soul--the most exalted in function, and\ncommander of the other two--has its own extension and rotatory\nmotion: as the kosmical soul has also, though yet more exalted in\nits endowments. All these souls have material properties, and are\nimplicated essentially with other material agents:[126] all are at\nonce material and mental. The encephalic or rational soul has its\nshare in material properties, while the abdominal or appetitive\nsoul also has its share in mental properties: even the liver has\nfor its function to exhibit images impressed by the rational soul,\nand to serve as the theatre of prophetic representations.[127]\n\n[Footnote 123: [Greek: Praxite/l\u00eas o(\\n e)/pasche\ndi\u00eakri/b\u00f4sen E)/r\u00f4ta\ne)x i)di/\u00eas e(/lk\u00f4n a)rche/tupon kradi/\u00eas]--(Anthologia).]\n\n[Footnote 124: Plato says (Tim. p. 53 E) that in investigating the\nfundamental configuration of the elements you must search for the\nmost beautiful: these will of course be the true ones. Again, p.\n72 E, [Greek: e)k d\u00ea\\ logismou= toi/oude xuni/stasthai ma/list'\na)\\n au(t\u00f4=| pa/nt\u00f4n pre/poi.] Galen applies an analogous\nprinciple of reasoning to explain the structure of apes, whom he\npronounces to be a caricature of man. Man having a rational and\nintelligent soul, Nature has properly attached to it an admirable\nbodily organism: with equal propriety she has assigned to the ape\na ridiculous bodily organism, because he has a ridiculous\nsoul--[Greek: le/xeien a)\\n \u00ea( phu/sis, geloi/\u00f4| t\u00ea\\n psuch\u00ea\\n\nz\u00f4/\u00f4| geloi/an e)chr\u00ea=n doth\u00ea=nai s\u00f4/matos kataskeu\u00ea/n] (De\nUsu Partium, i. c. 13, pp. 80-81, iii. 16, p. 284, xiii. 2, p.\n126, xv. 8, p. 252, K\u00fchn).]\n\n[Footnote 125: Respecting a view analogous to that of Plato, M.\nLittr\u00e9 observes, in his Proleg. to the Hippokratic treatise\n[Greek: Peri\\ Kardi/\u00eas] (OEuvres d'Hippocrate T. ix.\np. 77):--\"Deux fois l'auteur s'occupe des fins de la structure (du\ncoeur) et admire avec quelle habilet\u00e9 elles sont atteintes. La\npremi\u00e8re, c'est \u00e0 propos des valvules sigm\u00f6ides: il est instruit\nde leur usage, qui est de fermer le coeur du c\u00f4t\u00e9 de l'art\u00e8re; et\nd\u00e8s-lors, son admiration ne se m\u00e9prend pas, quand il fait remarquer\navec quelle exactitude ils accomplissent leur office. Mais elle se\nm\u00e9prend quand, se tournant vers les oreillettes, elle loue la main\nde l'artiste habile qui les a si bien arrang\u00e9es pour souffler\nl'air dans le coeur. Ces d\u00e9ceptions de la t\u00e9l\u00e9ologie sont\nperp\u00e9tuelles dans l'histoire de la science; \u00e0 chaque instant, on\ns'est extasi\u00e9 devant des structures que l'imagination seule\nappropriait \u00e0 certaines fonctions. 'Cet optimisme' (dit Condorcet\ndans son Fragment sur l'Atlantide) 'qui consiste \u00e0 trouver tout \u00e0\nmerveille dans la nature telle qu'on l'invente, \u00e0 condition\nd'admirer \u00e9galement sa sagesse, si par malheur on avait d\u00e9couvert\nqu'elle a suivi d'autres combinaisons; cet optimisme de d\u00e9tail\ndoit \u00eatre banni de la philosophie, dont le but n'est pas\nd'admirer, mais de conna\u00eetre; qui, dans l'\u00e9tude, cherche la\nv\u00e9rit\u00e9, et non des motifs de reconnaissance.'\"]\n\n[Footnote 126: Proklus could hardly make out that Plato recognised\nany [Greek: psuch\u00ea\\n a)me/thekton], ad Tim. ii. pp. 220, 94 A.]\n\n[Footnote 127: Plat. Tim. p. 71 B-C. The criticism of Aristotle\n(De Partibus Animal. iv. 2, 676, b. 21) is directed against this\ndoctrine, but without naming Plato. But when Aristotle says\n[Greek: Oi( le/gontes t\u00ea\\n phu/sin t\u00ea=s chol\u00ea=s ai)sth\u00ea/se\u00f4s\ntino\\s ei)=nai s\u00eamei=on, ou) kal\u00f4=s le/gousin], he substitutes\nthe _bile_ in place of the liver. In Aristotle's mind the two\nare intimately associated.]\n\n[Side-note: Triplicity of the soul--espoused afterwards by\nGalen.]\n\nThe Platonic doctrine, of three souls in one organism, derives a\npeculiar interest from the earnest way in which it is espoused\nafterwards by Galen. This last author represents Plato as agreeing\nin main doctrines with Hippokrates. He has composed nine distinct\nDissertations or Books, for the purpose of upholding their joint\ndoctrines. But the agreement which he shows between Hippokrates\nand Plato is very vague, and his own agreement with Plato is\nrather ethical than physiological. What is the essence of the\nthree souls, and whether they are immortal or not, Galen leaves\nundecided:[128] but that there must be three distinct souls in\neach human body, and that the supposition of one soul only is an\nabsurdity--he considers Plato to have positively demonstrated.\nHe rejects the doctrine of Aristotle, Theophrastus,\nPoseidonius, and others, who acknowledged only one soul, lodged in\nthe heart, but with distinct co-existent powers.[129]\n\n[Footnote 128: Galen, De Foetuum Formatione, p. 701, K\u00fchn.\n[Greek: Peri\\ Ou)si/as t\u00f4=n phusik\u00f4=n duna/me\u00f4n], p. 763.\n[Greek: Peri\\ t\u00f4=n t\u00ea=s psuch\u00ea=s \u00ca)th\u00f4=n], p. 773.]\n\n[Footnote 129: Galen, De Hipp. et Plat. Dogm. iii. pp. 337-347,\nK\u00fchn, vi. pp. 515-516, i. p. 200, iv. p. 363, ix. p. 727.]\n\n[Side-note: Admiration of Galen for Plato--his agreement\nwith Plato, and his dissension from Plato--his improved\nphysiology.]\n\nSo far Galen concurs with Plato. But he connects this triplicity\nof soul with a physiological theory of his own, which he professes\nto derive from, or at least to hold in common with, Hippokrates\nand Plato. Galen recognises three [Greek:\na)rcha\\s]--_principia_, beginnings, originating and governing\norgans--in the body: the brain, which is the origin of all the nerves,\nboth of sensation and motion: the heart, the origin of the arteries:\nthe liver, the sanguifacient organ, and the origin of the veins\nwhich distribute nourishment to all parts of the body. These three\nare respectively the organs of the rational, the energetic, and\nthe appetitive soul.[130]\n\n[Footnote 130: Galen, Hipp. et Plat. Dogm. viii. pp. 656-657,\nK\u00fchn. [Greek: e)x \u00f4(=n e)perai/neto \u00ea( t\u00f4=n phleb\u00f4=n a)rch\u00ea\\\nto\\ \u00ea(=par u(pa/rchein; \u00f4(=| pa/lin ei(/peto, kai\\ t\u00ea=s\nkoin\u00ea=s pro\\s ta\\ phuta\\ duna/me\u00f4s a)rch\u00ea\\n ei)=nai tou=to to\\\nspla/gchnon, \u00ea(/ntina du/namin o( Pla/t\u00f4n e)pithum\u00eatik\u00ea\\n\no)noma/zei.] Compare vi. 519-572, vii. 600-601.\n\nThe same triplicity of [Greek: a)rchai\\] in the organism had been\nrecognised by Erasistratus, later than Aristotle, though long\nbefore Galen. [Greek: Kai\\ E)rasi/stratos de\\ \u00f4(s a)rcha\\s kai\\\nstoichei=a o(/lou s\u00f4/matos u(potithe/menos t\u00ea\\n triploki/an\nt\u00f4=n a)ggei/\u00f4n, neu=ra, kai\\ phle/bas, kai\\ a)rt\u00eari/as] (Galen,\nT. iv. p. 375, ed. Basil). See Littr\u00e9, Introduction aux Oeuvres\nd'Hippocrate, T. i. p. 203.\n\nPlato does not say, as Galen declares him to say, that the\nappetitive soul has its primary seat or [Greek: a)rch\u00ea\\] in the\nliver. It has its seat between the diaphragm and the navel; the\nliver is placed in this region as an outlying fort, occupied by\nthe rational soul, and used for the purpose of controuling the\nrebellious tendencies of the appetitive soul. Chrysippus (ap.\nGalen, Hipp. et Plat. Dogm. iii. p. 288, K\u00fchn) stated Plato's\ndoctrine about the [Greek: trimer\u00ea\\s psuch\u00ea\\] more simply and\nfaithfully than Galen himself. Compare his words ib. viii. p. 651,\nvi. p. 519. Galen represents Plato as saying that nourishment is\nfurnished by the stomach first to the liver, to be there made into\nblood and sent round the body through the veins (pp. 576-578).\nThis is Galen's own theory (De Usu Partium, iv. p. 268, K\u00fchn), but\nit is not to be found in Plato. Whoever reads the Tim\u00e6us, pp.\n77-78, will see that Plato's theory of the conversion of food into\nblood, and its transmission as blood through the veins, is\naltogether different. It is here that he propounds his singular\nhypothesis--the interior network of air and fire, and the\noscillating ebb and flow of these intense agencies in the cavity\nof the abdomen. The liver has nothing to do with the process.\n\nSo again Galen (p. 573) puts upon the words of Plato about the\nheart--[Greek: p\u00eag\u00ea\\n tou= peripherome/nou sphodr\u00f4=s\nai(/matos]--an interpretation conformable to the Galenian theory,\nbut noway consistent with the statements of the Tim\u00e6us itself. And\nhe treats the comparison of the cranium and the rotations of the\nbrain within, to the rotations of the spherical Kosmos--which\ncomparison weighed greatly in Plato's mind--as an illustrative\nsimile without any philosophical value (Galen, H. et P. D. ii. 4,\np. 230, K\u00fchn; Plato, Tim. pp. 41 B, 90 A).]\n\nThe Galenian theory here propounded (which held its place in\nphysiology until Harvey's great discovery of the circulation of\nthe blood in the seventeenth century), though proved by\nfuller investigation to be altogether erroneous as to the\nliver--and partially erroneous as to the heart--is nevertheless\nmade by its author to rest upon plausible reasons, as well as upon\nmany anatomical facts, and results of experiments on the animal body,\nby tying or cutting nerves and arteries.[131] Its resemblance with\nthe Platonic theory is altogether superficial: while the Galenian\nreasoning, so far from resembling the Platonic, stands in striking\ncontrast with it. Anxious as Galen is to extol Plato, his manner\nof expounding and defending the Platonic thesis is such as to mark\nthe scientific progress realised during the five centuries\nintervening between the two. Plato himself, in the Tim\u00e6us,\ndisplays little interest or curiosity about the facts of\nphysiology: the connecting principles, whereby he explains to\nhimself the mechanism of the organs as known by ordinary\nexperience, are altogether psychological, ethical, teleological.\nIn the praise which Galen, with his very superior knowledge of the\nhuman organism, bestows upon the Tim\u00e6us, he unconsciously\nsubstitutes a new doctrine of his own, differing materially from\nthat of Plato.\n\n[Footnote 131: Galen (Hipp. et Plat. Dogm. ii. p. 233, K\u00fchn).\n[Greek: kai/toi ge \u00ea(mei=s, a(/per e)paggello/metha lo/g\u00f4|,\ntau=ta e)pi\\ tai=s t\u00f4=n z\u00f4=\u00f4n a)natomai=s e)pidei/knumen],\n&c. P. 220: [Greek: Po/then ou)=n tou=to deichth\u00ea/setai?\npo/then a)/llothen \u00ea)\\ e)k t\u00f4=n a)natom\u00f4=n?]]\n\n[Side-note: Physiology and pathology of Plato--compared with\nthat of Aristotle and the Hippokratic treatises.]\n\nI have no space here to touch on the interesting comparisons which\nmight be made between the physiology and pathology of the\nTim\u00e6us--and that which we read in other authors of the same\ncentury--Aristotle and the Hippokratic treatises. More than one\nallusion is made in the Tim\u00e6us to physicians: and Plato cites\nHippokrates in other dialogues with respect.[132] The study and\npractice of medicine was at that time greatly affected by the current\nspeculations respecting Nature as a whole: accomplished physicians\ncombined both lines of study, implicating kosmical and biological\ntheories:[133] and in the Platonic Tim\u00e6us, the former might\nproperly be comprised in the latter, since the entire Kosmos\nis regarded as one animated and rational being. Among the sixty\ntreatises in the Hippokratic collection, composed by different\nauthors, there are material differences--sometimes even positive\nopposition--both of doctrine and spirit. Some of them are the work\nof practitioners, familiar with the details of sickness and bodily\ninjuries, as well as with the various modes of treatment: others\nagain proceed from pure theorists, following out some speculative\ndogmas more or less plausible, but usually vague and\nindeterminate. It is to one of this last class of treatises that\nGalen chiefly refers, when he dwells upon the agreement between\nPlato and Hippokrates.[134] This is the point which the Platonic\nTim\u00e6us has in common with both Hippokrates and Aristotle. But on\nthe other hand, Tim\u00e6us appears entirely wanting in that element of\nobservation, and special care about matters of fact, which\nthese two last-mentioned authors very frequently display, even\nwhile confusing themselves by much vagueness of dogmatising\ntheory. The Tim\u00e6us evinces no special study of matters of fact: it\ncontains ingenious and fanciful combinations, dictated chiefly\nfrom the ethical and theological point of view, but brought to\nbear upon such limited amount of knowledge as an accomplished man\nof Plato's day could hardly fail to acquire without special study.\nIn the extreme importance which it assigns to diet, regimen, and\nbodily discipline, it agrees generally with Hippokrates: but for\nthe most part, the points of contrast are more notable than those\nof agreement.\n\n[Footnote 132: Plato, Ph\u00e6drus, p. 270; Protagoras, p. 311.]\n\n[Footnote 133: See a remarkable passage, Aristotel. De Sensu, 436,\na. 21, [Greek: t\u00f4=n i)atr\u00f4=n oi( philosoph\u00f4te/r\u00f4s t\u00ea\\n\nte/chn\u00ean metio/ntes], &c.: also De Respiratione, ad finem,\n480, b. 21, and [Greek: Peri\\ t\u00ea=s kath' u(/pnon mantik\u00ea=s], i.\np. 463, a. 5. [Greek: t\u00f4=n i)atr\u00f4=n oi( charie/ntes]. Compare\nHippokrat. De Aere, Locis, &c., c. 2.\n\nM. Littr\u00e9 observes:--\n\n\"La science antique, et par cons\u00e9quent la m\u00e9decine qui en formait\nune branche, \u00e9tait essentiellement synth\u00e9tique. Platon, dans le\nCharmide, dit qu'on ne peut gu\u00e9rir la partie sans le tout. Le\nphilosophe avait pris cette id\u00e9e \u00e0 l'enseignement m\u00e9dical qui se\ndonnait de son temps: cet enseignement partait donc du tout, de\nl'ensemble; nous en avons la preuve dans le livre m\u00eame du\nPronostic, qui nous montre d'une mani\u00e8re frappante comment la\ncomposition des \u00e9crits particuliers se subordonne \u00e0 la conception\ng\u00e9n\u00e9rale de la science; ce livre, tel qu'Hippocrate l'a compos\u00e9,\nne pouvait se faire qu'\u00e0 une \u00e9poque o\u00f9 la m\u00e9decine conservait\nencore l'empreinte des doctrines encyclop\u00e9diques qui avaient\nconstitu\u00e9 le fond de tout l'enseignement oriental.\" (Littr\u00e9,\nOEuvres D'Hippocrate, T. ii. p. 96. Argument prefixed to the\nPrognostikon.)]\n\n[Footnote 134: He alludes especially to the Hippokratic treatise\n[Greek: Peri\\ Phu/sios a)nthr\u00f4/pou], see De Hipp. et Plat. Dogm.\nviii. pp. 674-710, ed. K\u00fchn.\n\nIn the valuable Hippokratic composition--[Greek: Peri\\ A)rchai/\u00eas\nI)\u00eatrik\u00ea=s]--(vol. i. pp. 570-636, ed. Littr\u00e9) the author\ndistinguished [Greek: i)\u00eatroi/], properly so-called, from [Greek:\nsophistai/], who merely laid down general principles about\nmedicine. He enters a protest against the employment, in reference\nto medicine, of those large and indefinite assumptions which\ncharacterised the works of Sophists or physical philosophers such\nas Empedokles (pp. 570-620, Littr\u00e9). \"Such compositions,\" he says,\n\"belong less to the medical art than to the art of literary\ncomposition\"--[Greek: e)g\u00f4\\ de\\ toute/\u00f4n me\\n o(/sa tini\\\nei)/r\u00eatai sophist\u00ea=| \u00ea)\\ i)\u00eatr\u00f4=|, \u00ea)\\ ge/graptai peri\\\nphu/sios, \u00ea(=sson nomi/z\u00f4 t\u00ea=| i)\u00eatrik\u00ea=| te/chn\u00ea|\npros\u00ea/kein \u00ea)\\ t\u00ea=| graphik\u00ea=|] (p. 620). Such men cannot (he\nsays) deal with a case of actual sickness: they ought to speak\nintelligible language--[Greek: gn\u00f4sta\\ le/gein toi=si\nd\u00eamo/t\u00ea|si] (p. 572). Again, in the Treatise De Aere, Locis, et\nAquis, Hippokrates defends himself against the charge of entering\nupon topics which are [Greek: mete\u00f4rolo/ga] (vol. ii. p. 14,\nLittr\u00e9).\n\nThe Platonic Tim\u00e6us would have been considered by Hippokrates as\nthe work of a [Greek: sophist\u00ea/s]. It was composed not for\nprofessional readers alone, but for the public--[Greek:\ne)pi/stasthai e)s o(/son ei)ko\\s i)di\u00f4/t\u00ean]--(Hippokrat. [Greek:\nPeri\\ Path\u00f4=n], vol. vi. p. 208, Littr\u00e9).\n\nThe Hippokratic treatises afford evidence of an established art,\nwith traditions of tolerably long standing, a considerable medical\nliterature, and even much oral debate on medical subjects--[Greek:\ne)nanti/on a)kroate/\u00f4n] (Hipp. [Greek: Peri\\ Nou/s\u00f4n], vol. vi.\npp 140-142-150, Littr\u00e9). [Greek: O(\\s a)\\n peri\\ i)\u00ea/sios\ne)the/l\u00ea| e)r\u00f4ta=|n te o)rth\u00f4=s, kai\\ e)r\u00f4t\u00f4=nti\na)pokri/nesthai, kai\\ a)ntile/gein o)rth\u00f4=s, e)nthume/esthai\nchr\u00ea\\ ta/de] (p. 140) . . . [Greek: Tau=ta e)nthum\u00eathe/nta\ndiaphula/ssein dei= e)n toi=si lo/goisin; o(/, ti a)\\n de/ tis\ntou/t\u00f4n a(marta/n\u00ea|, \u00ea)\\ le/g\u00f4n \u00ea)\\ e)r\u00f4t\u00f4=n \u00ea)\\\na)pokrino/menos, . . . tau/t\u00ea| phula/ssonta chr\u00ea\\\ne)piti/thesthai e)n t\u00ea=| a)ntilogi/\u00ea|] (p. 142).\n\nThe method, which Sokrates and Plato applied to ethical topics was\nthus applied by others to medicine and medical dogmas. How the\ndogmas of the Platonic Tim\u00e6us would have fared, if scrutinised\nwith oral interrogations in this spirit, by men even far inferior\nto Sokrates himself in acuteness--I will not say.]\n\n[Side-note: Contrast between the admiration of Plato for the\nconstructors of the Kosmos, and the defective results which he\ndescribes.]\n\nFrom the glowing terms in which Plato describes the architectonic\nskill and foresight of those Gods who put together the three souls\nand the body of man, we should anticipate that the fabric would be\nperfect, and efficacious for all intended purposes, in spite of\ninterruptions or accidents. But Plato, when he passes from\npurposes to results, is constrained to draw a far darker picture.\nHe tells us that the mechanism of the human body will work well,\nonly so long as the juncture of the constituent triangles is fresh\nand tight: after that period of freshness has passed, it begins to\nfail.[135] But besides this, there exist a formidable catalogue of\ndiseases, attacking both body and mind: the cause of which (Plato\nsays) \"is plain to every one\": they proceed from excess, or\ndeficiency, or displacement, of some one among the four\nconstituent elements of the human body.[136] If we enquire why the\nwise Constructors put together their materials in so faulty a\nmanner, the only reply to be made is, that the counteracting hand\nof Necessity was too strong for them. In the Hesiodic and other\nlegends respecting anthropogony we find at least a happy\ncommencement, and the deterioration gradually supervening after\nit. But Plato opens the scene at once with all the suffering\nreality of the iron age--\n\n[Greek: Plei/\u00ea me\\n ga\\r gai=a kak\u00f4=n, plei/\u00ea de\\ tha/lassa;\nNou=soi d' a)nthr\u00f4/poisin e)ph' \u00ea(me/r\u00ea| \u00ea)\\d' e)pi\\ nukti\\\nAu)to/matoi phoit\u00f4=si]--[137]\n\n[Footnote 135: Plat. Tim. pp. 81-89 B.]\n\n[Footnote 136: Plat. Tim. p. 82. [Greek: d\u00ea=lo/n pou kai\\\npanti/].]\n\n[Footnote 137: Compare what Plato says in Republic, ii. p. 379 C,\nabout the prodigious preponderance of [Greek: kaka\\] over [Greek:\na)gatha\\] in the life of man.]\n\n[Side-note: Degeneration of the real tenants of Earth\nfrom their primitive type.]\n\nWhen Plato tells us that most part of the tenants of earth, air,\nand water--all women, birds, quadrupeds, reptiles, and fishes--are\nthe deteriorated representatives of primitive men, constructed at\nthe beginning with the most provident skill, but debased by\ndegeneracy in various directions--this doctrine (something\nanalogous to the theory of Darwin with its steps inverted)\nindicates that the original scheme of the Demiurgus, though\nmagnificent in its _ensemble_ with reference to the entire\nKosmos, was certain from the beginning to fail in its details. For\nwe are told that the introduction of birds, quadrupeds, &c.,\nas among the constituents of the Auto-z\u00f4on, was an essential part\nof the original scheme.[138] The constructing Gods, while forming\nmen upon a pure non-sexual type (such as that invoked by the\naustere Hippolytus) exempt from the temptations of the most\nviolent appetite,[139] foresaw that such an angelic type could not\nmaintain itself:--that they would be obliged to reconstruct the\nwhole human organism upon the bi-sexual principle, introducing the\ncomparatively lower type of woman:--and that they must make\npreparation for the still more degenerate varieties of birds and\nquadrupeds, into which the corrupt and stupid portion of mankind\nwould sink.[140] Plato does indeed tell us, that the primitive\nnon-sexual type had the option of maintaining itself; and that it\nperished by its own fault alone.[141] But since we find that not\none representative of it has been able to hold his ground:--and\nsince we also read in Plato, that no man is willingly corrupt, but\nthat corruption and stupidity of mind are like fevers and other\ndiseases, under which a man suffers against his own\nconsent[142]:--we see that the option was surrounded with insurmountable\ndifficulties: and that the steady and continued degradation, under\nwhich the human race has sunk from its original perfection into\nthe lower endowments of the animal world, can be ascribed only to\nthe impracticability of the original scheme: that is, in\nother words, to the obstacles interposed by implacable Necessity,\nfrustrating the benevolent purposes of the Constructors.\n\n[Footnote 138: Plat. Tim. p. 41 B-C.]\n\n[Footnote 139: Eurip. Hippol. 615; Medea, 573; Milton, Paradise\nLost, x. 888.\n\n     [Greek: chr\u00ea\\n a)/r' a)/llothe/n pothen brotou\\s\npai=das teknou=sthai, th\u00ea=lu d' ou)k ei)=nai ge/nos;\nchou(/t\u00f4s a)\\n ou)k \u00ea)=n ou)de\\n a)nthr\u00f4/pois kako/n.]]\n\n[Footnote 140: Plat. Tim. p. 76 D. [Greek: \u00f4(s ga/r pote e)x\na)ndr\u00f4=n gunai=kes kai\\ ta)/lla th\u00eari/a gen\u00ea/sointo,\n\u00ea)pi/stanto oi( xunista/ntes \u00ea(ma=s], &c. Compare pp. 90 E,\n91.]\n\n[Footnote 141: Plat. Tim. p. 42.]\n\n[Footnote 142: Plat. Tim. pp. 86-87.]\n\n[Side-note: Close of the Tim\u00e6us. Plato turns away from the\nshameful results, and reverts to the glorification of the\nprimitive types.]\n\nHowever, all these details, attesting the low and poor actual\ncondition of the tenants of earth, water, and air--and forming so\nmarked a contrast to the magnificent description of the Kosmos as\na whole, with the splendid type of men who were established at\nfirst alone in its central region--all these are hurried over by\nPlato, as unwelcome accompaniments which he cannot put out of\nsight. They have their analogies even in the kosmical agencies:\nthere are destructive kosmical forces, earthquakes, deluges,\nconflagrations, &c., noticed as occurring periodically, and as\ncausing the almost total extinction of different communities.[143]\nThough they must not be altogether omitted, he will nevertheless\ntouch them as briefly as possible.[144] He turns aside from this,\nthe shameful side of the Kosmos, to the sublime conception of it\nwith which he had begun, and which he now builds up again in the\nfollowing poetical doxology the concluding words of the Tim\u00e6us:--\n\n\"Let us now declare that the discourse respecting the Universe is\nbrought to its close. This Kosmos, having received its complement\nof animals, mortal and immortal, has become greatest, best, most\nbeautiful and most perfect: a visible animal comprehending all\nthings visible--a perceivable God the image of the cogitable God:\nthis Uranus, one and only begotten.\"[145]\n\n[Footnote 143: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 22, 23. Legg. iii. 677.\nPolitikus, pp. 272, 273.]\n\n[Footnote 144: Plat. Tim. p. 90 E. [Greek: ta\\ ga\\r a)/lla z\u00f4=a\n\u00ea(=| ge/gonen au)=, dia\\ brache/\u00f4n e)pimn\u00easte/on, o(/, ti m\u00ea/\ntis a)na/gk\u00ea m\u00eaku/nein; ou(/t\u00f4 ga\\r e)mmetro/tero/s tis a)\\n\nau)t\u00f4=| do/xeie peri\\ tou\\s tou/t\u00f4n lo/gous ei)=nai.]]\n\n[Footnote 145: Plat. Tim. p. 92 C. [Greek: Kai\\ d\u00ea\\ kai\\ te/los\nperi\\ tou= panto\\s nu=n \u00ea)/d\u00ea to\\n lo/gon \u00ea(mi=n ph\u00f4=men\ne)/chein; thn\u00eata\\ ga\\r kai\\ a)tha/nata z\u00f4=a lab\u00f4\\n kai\\\nxumpl\u00ear\u00f4thei\\s o(/de o( ko/smos, ou(/t\u00f4 z\u00f4=on o(rato\\n ta\\\no(rata\\ perie/chon, ei)k\u00f4\\n tou= no\u00eatou= theo\\s ai)sth\u00eato/s,\nme/gistos kai\\ a)/ristos ka/llisto/s te kai\\ tele\u00f4/tatos\nge/gonen,--ei(=s ou)rano\\s o(/de, monogen\u00ea\\s \u00f4)/n.]\n\nWeh! Weh!\nDu hast sie zerst\u00f6rt,\nDie sch\u00f6ne Welt,\nMit m\u00e4chtiger Faust;\nSie st\u00fcrzt, sie zerf\u00e4llt!\nEin Halb-Gott hat sie zerschlagen!\nWir tragen\nDie Tr\u00fcmmern ins Nichts hin\u00fcber,\nUnd klagen\nUeber die verlorne Sch\u00f6ne!\nM\u00e4chtiger\nDer Erdens\u00f6hne,\nPr\u00e4chtiger\nBaue sie wieder,\nIn deinem Busen baue sie auf!\n\n(The response of the Geister-Chor, in Goethe's Faust, after the\naccumulated imprecations uttered by Faust in his despair.)]\n\n\n\n\nKRITIAS.\n\n\n[Side-note: Kritias: a fragment.]\n\nThe dialogue Kritias exists only as a fragment, breaking off\nabruptly in the middle of a sentence. The ancient Platonists found\nit in the same condition, and it probably was never finished. We\nknow, however, the general scheme and purpose for which it was\ndestined.\n\n[Side-note: Prooemium to Tim\u00e6us. Intended Tetralogy for\nthe Republic. The Kritias was third piece in that Tetralogy.]\n\nThe prooemium to the Tim\u00e6us introduces us to three persons[146]:\nKritias and Hermokrates, along with Sokrates. It is to them (as we\nnow learn) that Sokrates had on the preceding day recited the\nRepublic: a fourth hearer having been present besides, whom\nSokrates expects to see now, but does not see--and who is said to\nbe absent from illness. In requital for the intellectual treat\nreceived from Sokrates, Tim\u00e6us delivers the discourse which we\nhave just passed in review: Kritias next enters upon his narrative\nor exposition, now lying before us as a fragment: and Hermokrates\nwas intended to follow it up with a fourth discourse, upon some\nother topic not specified. It appears as if Plato, after having\nfinished the Republic as a distinct dialogue, conceived\nsubsequently the idea of making it the basis of a Tetralogy, to be\ncomposed as follows: 1. _Tim\u00e6us_: describing the construction\nof the divine Kosmos, soul and body--with its tenants divine and\nhuman; \"the diapason ending full in man\"--but having its harmony\nspoiled by the degeneration of man, and the partial substitution\nof inferior animals. 2. _Republic_: Man in a constituted\nsociety, administered by a few skilful professional Rulers,\nsubject to perfect ethical training, and fortified by the most\ntutelary habits. 3. _Kritias_: this perfect society,\nexhibited in energetic action, and under pressure of terrible\nenemies. 4. _Hermokrates_--subject unknown: perhaps the same\nsociety, exhibited under circumstances calculated to try their\njustice and temperance, rather than their courage. Of this\nintended tetralogy the first two members alone exist: the third\nwas left unfinished: and the fourth was never commenced. But the\nRepublic appears to me to have been originally a distinct\ncomposition. An afterthought of Plato induced him to rank it as\nsecond piece in a projected tetralogy.[147]\n\n[Footnote 146: Plato, Tim. p. 17 A. [Greek: ei(=s, du/o, trei=s;\no( de\\ d\u00ea\\ te/tartos \u00ea(mi=n, \u00f4)= phi/le Ti/maie, pou=, t\u00f4=n\nchthe\\s me\\n daitumo/n\u00f4n, ta\\ nu=n d' e(stiato/r\u00f4n?]\n\nThese are the words with which the Platonic Sokrates opens this\ndialogue. Proklus, in his Commentary on the Tim\u00e6us (i. pp.\n5-10-14, ed. Schneider), notices a multiplicity of insignificant\nquestions raised by the ancient Platonic critics upon this\nexordium. The earliest whom he notices is Praxiphanes, the friend\nof Theophrastus, who blamed Plato for the absurdity of making\nSokrates count aloud one, two, three, &c. Porphyry replied to\nhim at length.\n\nWe see here that the habit of commenting on the Platonic dialogues\nbegan in the generation immediately after Plato's death, that is,\nthe generation of Demetrius Phalereus.\n\nWhom does Plato intend for the fourth person, unnamed and absent?\nUpon this point the Platonic critics indulged in a variety of\nconjectures, suggesting several different persons as intended.\nProklus (p. 14, Schn.) remarks upon these critics justly--[Greek:\n\u00f4(s ou)/te a)/xia z\u00eat\u00ea/se\u00f4s z\u00eatou=ntas, ou)/t' a)sphale/s ti\nle/gontas.] But the comments which he proceeds to cite from his\nmaster Syrianus are not at all more instructive (pp. 15-16,\nSchn.).]\n\n[Footnote 147: Socher (Ueber Platon's Schriften, pp. 370-371)\ndeclares the fragment of the Kritias now existing to be spurious\nand altogether unworthy of Plato. His opinion appears to me\nunfounded, and has not obtained assent; but his arguments are as\ngood as those upon which other critics reject so many other\ndialogues. He thinks the Kritias an inferior production: therefore\nit cannot have been composed by Plato. Socher also thinks that the\nwhole allusion, made by Plato in this dialogue to Solon, is a\nfiction by Plato himself. That the intended epic about Atlantis\nwould have been Plato's own fiction, I do not doubt, but it\nappears to me that Solon's poems (as they then existed, though\nfragmentary) must have contained allusions to Egyptian priests\nwith whom he had conversed in Egypt, and to their abundance of\nhistorical anecdote (Plutarch, Solon, c. 26-31). It is not\nimprobable that Solon did leave an unfinished Egyptian poem.]\n\n[Side-note: Subject of the Kritias. Solon and the Egyptian\npriests. Citizens of Platonic Republic are identified with ancient\nAthenians.]\n\nThe subject embraced by the Kritias is traced back to an\nunfinished epic poem of Solon, intended by that poet and lawgiver\nto celebrate a memorable exploit of Athenian antiquity, which he\nhad heard from the Priests of the Goddess Neith or Ath\u00ean\u00ea at\nSais in Egypt. These priests (Plato tells us) treated the Greeks\nas children, compared with the venerable antiquity of their own\nancestors; they despised the short backward reckoning of the\nheroic genealogies at Athens or Argos. There were in the temple of\nAth\u00ean\u00ea at Sais records of past time for 9000 years back: and\namong these records was one, of that date, commemorating a\nglorious exploit, of the Athenians as they then had been, unknown\nto Solon or any of his countrymen.[148] The Athens, of 9000 years\nanterior to Solon, had been great, powerful, courageous,\nadmirably governed, and distinguished for every kind of\nvirtue.[149] Ath\u00ean\u00ea, the presiding Goddess both of Athens and of\nSais, had bestowed upon the Athenians a salubrious climate,\nfertile soil, a healthy breed of citizens, and highly endowed\nintelligence. Under her auspices, they were excellent alike in war\nand in philosophy.[150] The separation of professions was fully\nrealised among them, according to the principle laid down in the\nRepublic as the only foundation for a good commonwealth. The\nmilitary class, composed of both sexes, was quartered in barrack\non the akropolis; which was at that time more spacious than it had\nsince become--and which possessed then, in common with the whole\nsurface of Attica, a rich soil covering that rocky bottom to which\nit had been reduced in the Platonic age, through successive\ndeluges.[151] These soldiers, male and female, were maintained by\ncontributions from the remaining community: they lived in\nperpetual drill, having neither separate property, nor separate\nfamilies, nor gold nor silver: lastly, their procreation was\nstrictly regulated, and their numbers kept from either increase or\ndiminution.[152] The husbandmen and the artizans were alike\nexcellent in their respective professions, to which they were\nexclusively confined:[153] Heph\u00e6stus being the partner of Ath\u00ean\u00ea\nin joint tutelary presidency, and joint occupation of the central\ntemple on the akropolis. Thus admirably administered, the\nAthenians were not only powerful at home, but also chiefs or\nleaders of all the cities comprised under the Hellenic name:\nchiefs by the voluntary choice and consent of the subordinates.\nBut the old Attic race by whom these achievements had been\nperformed, belonged to a former geological period: they had\nperished, nearly all, by violent catastrophe--leaving the actual\nAthenians as imperfect representatives.\n\n[Footnote 148: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 22-23. The great knowledge of\npast history (real or supposed) possessed by the Egyptian priests,\nand the length of their back chronology, alleged by themselves to\ndepend upon records preserved from a period of 17,000 years, are\nwell known from the interesting narrative of Herodotus (ii.\n37-43-77-145)--[Greek: mn\u00ea/m\u00ean a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n pa/nt\u00f4n e)paske/ontes]\n(the priests of Egypt) [Greek: ma/lista, logi\u00f4/tatoi/ ei)si\nmakr\u00f4=| t\u00f4=n e)g\u00f4\\ e)s dia/peiran a)phiko/m\u00ean] (ii. 77) . . .\n[Greek: kai\\ tau=ta a)treke/\u00f4s phasi\\n e)pi/stasthai, ai)ei/ te\nlogizo/menoi, kai\\ ai)ei\\ a)pographo/menoi ta\\ e)/tea] (ii. 145).\nHerodotus (ii. 143) tells us that the Egyptian priests at Thebes\nheld the same language to the historian Hekat\u00e6us, as Plato here\nsays that they held to Solon, when he talked about Grecian\nantiquity in the persons of Phor\u00f4neus and Niob\u00ea. Hekat\u00e6us laid\nbefore them his own genealogy--a dignified list of sixteen\nancestors, beginning from a God--upon which they out-bid him with\na counter-genealogy ([Greek: a)ntegenealo/g\u00easan]) of 345 chief\npriests, who had succeeded each other from father to son. Plato\nappears to have contracted great reverence for this long duration\nof unchanged regulations in Egypt, and for the fixed, consecrated,\ncustoms, with minute subdivision of professional castes and\nemployments: the hymns, psalmody, and music, having continued\nwithout alteration for 10,000 years (_literally_\n10,000--[Greek: ou)ch \u00f4(s e)/pos ei)pei=n muriosto/n, a)ll'\no)/nt\u00f4s], Plat. Legg. ii. p. 656 E).]\n\n[Footnote 149: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 23 C-D.]\n\n[Footnote 150: Plato, Tim. p. 24 D. [Greek: a(/te ou)=n\nphilopo/lemo/s te kai\\ philo/sophos \u00ea( theo\\s ou)=sa], &c.\nAlso p. 23 C.]\n\n[Footnote 151: Plato, Krit. pp. 110 C, 112 B-D.]\n\n[Footnote 152: Plato, Krit. p. 112 D. [Greek: pl\u00ea=thos de\\\ndiaphula/ttontes o(/, ti ma/lista tau)to\\n e(aut\u00f4=n ei)=nai pro\\s\nto\\n a)ei\\ chro/non a)ndr\u00f4=n kai\\ gunaik\u00f4=n], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 153: Plato, Krit. p. 111 E. [Greek: u(po\\ ge\u00f4rg\u00f4=n\nme\\n a)l\u00eathin\u00f4=n kai\\ pratto/nt\u00f4n au)to\\ tou=to, g\u00ea=n de\\\na)ri/st\u00ean kai\\ u(/d\u00f4r a)phthon\u00f4/taton e)cho/nt\u00f4n], &c.\nAlso p. 110 C.]\n\n[Side-note: Plato professes that what he is about to recount\nis matter of history, recorded by Egyptian priests.]\n\nSuch was the enviable condition of Athens and Attica, at a period\n9400 years before the Christian era. The Platonic Kritias takes\npains to assure us that the statement was true, both as to facts\nand as to dates: that he had heard it himself when a boy of ten\nyears old, from his grandfather Kritias, then ninety years old,\nwhose father Dropides had been the intimate friend of Solon: and\nthat Solon had heard it from the priests at Sais, who offered to\nshow him the contemporary record of all its details in their\ntemple archives.[154] Kritias now proposes to repeat this\nnarrative to Sokrates, as a fulfilment of the wish expressed by\nthe latter to see the citizens of the Platonic Republic exhibited\nin full action and movement. For the Athenians of 9000 years\nbefore, having been organised on the principles of that Republic,\nmay fairly be taken as representing its citizens. And it will be\nmore satisfactory to Sokrates to hear a recital of real history\nthan a series of imagined exploits.[155]\n\n[Footnote 154: Plat. Tim. pp. 23 E, 24 A-D. [Greek: to\\ d'\na)kribe\\s peri\\ pa/nt\u00f4n e)phex\u00ea=s ei)sau=this kata\\ schol\u00ea/n,\nau)ta\\ ta\\ gra/mmata labo/ntes die/ximen] (24 A).]\n\n[Footnote 155: Plat. Tim. p. 26 D-E.]\n\n[Side-note: Description of the vast island of Atlantis and\nits powerful kings.]\n\nAccordingly, Kritias proceeds to describe, in some detail, the\nformidable invaders against whom these old Athenians had\nsuccessfully contended: the inhabitants of the vast island\nAtlantis (larger than Libya and Asia united), which once occupied\nmost of the space now filled by the great ocean westward of Gades\nand the pillars of Herakl\u00eas. This prodigious island was governed\nby ten kings of a common ancestry: descending respectively from\nten sons (among whom Atlas was first-born and chief) of the God\nPoseidon by the indigenous Nymph Kleito.[156] We read an imposing\ndescription of its large population and abundant produce of every\nkind: grain for man, pasture for animals, elephants being abundant\namong them:[157] timber and metals of all varieties: besides which\nthe central city, with its works for defence, and its\nartificial canals, bridges, and harbour, is depicted as a\nwonder to behold.[158] The temple of Poseidon was magnificent and\nof vast dimensions, though in barbaric style.[159] The harbour,\nsurrounded by a dense and industrious population, was full of\ntrading vessels arriving with merchandise from all quarters.[160]\n\n[Footnote 156: Plat. Krit. pp. 113-114.]\n\n[Footnote 157: Plat. Krit. p. 114 E.]\n\n[Footnote 158: Plat. Krit. p. 115 D. [Greek: ei)s e)/kpl\u00eaxin\nmege/thesi ka/llesi/ te e)/rg\u00f4n i)dei=n], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 159: Plat. Krit. p. 116 D-E.]\n\n[Footnote 160: Plat. Krit. p. 117 E.]\n\n[Side-note: Corruption and wickedness of the Atlantid\npeople.]\n\nThe Atlantid kings, besides this great power and prosperity at\nhome, exercised dominion over all Libya as far as Egypt, and over\nall Europe as far as Tyrrhenia. The corrupting influence of such\nvast power was at first counteracted by their divine descent and\nthe attributes attached to it: but the divine attributes became\nmore and more adulterated at each successive generation, so that\nthe breed was no longer qualified to contend against corruption.\nThe kings came to be intoxicated with wealth, full of exorbitant\nambition and rapacity, reckless of temperance or justice. The\nmeasure of their iniquity at length became full; and Zeus was\nconstrained to take notice of it, for the purpose of inflicting\nthe chastisement which the case required.[161] He summoned a\nmeeting of the Gods, at his own Panoptikon in the centre of the\nKosmos and there addressed them.\n\n[Footnote 161: Plat. Krit. p. 121.]\n\n[Side-note: Conjectures as to what the Platonic Kritias\nwould have been--an ethical epic in prose.]\n\nAt this critical moment the fragment called Kritias breaks off. We\ndo not know what was the plan which Plato (in the true spirit of\nthe ancient epic) was about to put into the mouth of Zeus, for the\ninformation of the divine agora. We learn only that Plato intended\nto recount an invasion of Attica, by an army of Atlantids almost\nirresistible: and the glorious repulse thereof by Athens and her\nallies, with very inferior forces. The tale would have borne much\nresemblance to the Persian invasion of Greece, as recounted by\nHerodotus: but Plato, while employing the same religious agencies\nwhich that historian puts in the foreground, would probably have\ninvested them with a more ethical character, and would have\narranged the narrative so as to illustrate the triumph of\nphilosophical Reason and disciplined Energy, over gigantic,\nimpetuous, and reckless Strength. He would have described in\ndetail the heroic valour and endurance of the trained\nAthenian Soldiers, women as well as men: and he would have\nembodied the superior Reason of the philosophical Chiefs not\nmerely in prudent orders given to subordinates, but also in wise\ndiscourses[162] and deliberations such as we read in the Cyrop\u00e6dia\nof Xenophon. We should have had an edifying epic in prose, if\nPlato had completed his project. Unfortunately we know only two\nsmall fractions of it: first the introductory prologue (which I\nhave already noticed)--lastly, the concluding catastrophe. The\nconclusion was, that both the victors and the vanquished\ndisappeared altogether, and became extinct. Terrific earthquakes,\nand not less terrific deluges, shook and overspread the earth. The\nwhole military caste of Attica were, in one day and night,\nswallowed up into the bowels of the earth (the same release as\nZeus granted to the just Amphiaraus)[163] and no more heard of:\nwhile not only the population of Atlantis, but that entire island\nitself, was submerged beneath the ocean. The subsidence of this\nvast island has rendered navigation impossible; there is nothing\nin the Atlantic Ocean but shallow water and mud.[164]\n\n[Footnote 162: Plat. Tim. p. 19 C-E. [Greek: kata/ te ta\\s e)n\ntoi=s e)/rgois pra/xeis kai\\ kata\\ ta\\s e)n toi=s lo/gois\ndierm\u00eaneu/seis] (19 C).]\n\n[Footnote 163: Apollodorus, iii. 6, 6; Pausanias, ix. 8, 2.]\n\n[Footnote 164: Plat. Tim. p. 25 C-D. [Greek: seism\u00f4=n e)xaisi/\u00f4n\nkai\\ kataklusm\u00f4=n genome/n\u00f4n, mia=s \u00ea(me/ras kai\\ nukto\\s\nchalep\u00ea=s e)pelthou/s\u00eas . . . a)/poron kai\\ a)diereu/n\u00eaton\nge/gone to\\ e)kei= pe/lagos], &c.\n\nRespecting the shallow and muddy water of the Atlantic and its\nunnavigable character, as believed in the age of Plato, see a long\nnote in my 'History of Greece' (ch. xviii. vol. iii. p. 381).]\n\n[Side-note: Plato represents the epic Kritias as matter of\nrecorded history.]\n\nThe epic of Plato would thus have concluded with an appalling\ncatastrophe of physical agencies or divine prodigies (such as that\nwhich we read at the close of the \u00c6schylean Prometheus[165]),\nunder which both the contending parties perished. These gigantic\noutbursts of kosmical forces, along with the other facts, Plato\naffirms to have been recorded in the archives of the Egyptian\npriests. He wishes us to believe that the whole transaction is\nhistorical. As to particular narratives, the line between truth\nand fiction was obscurely drawn in his mind.\n\n[Footnote 165: \u00c6schyl. Prom. 1086.]\n\nAnother remark here deserving of notice is, That in this epic of\nthe Kritias, Plato introduces the violent and destructive kosmical\nagencies (earthquakes, deluges, and the like) as frequently\noccurring, and as one cause of the periodical destruction of\nmany races or communities. It is in this way that the Egyptian\npriest is made to explain to Solon the reason why no\nlong-continued past records were preserved in Attica, or anywhere\nelse, except in Egypt.[166] This last-mentioned country was exempt\nfrom such calamities: but in other countries, the thread of tradition\nwas frequently broken, because the whole race (except a few) were\nperiodically destroyed by deluges or conflagrations, leaving only\na few survivors miserably poor, without arts or letters. The\naffirmation of these frequent destructions stands in marked\ncontradiction with the chief thesis announced at the beginning of\nthe Tim\u00e6us--_viz._, the beauty and perfection of the Kosmos.\n\n[Footnote 166: Plato, Tim. pp. 22 C-D, 23 B-C.]\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIX.\n\nLEGES AND EPINOMIS.\n\n\n[Side-note: Leges, the longest of Plato's works--Persons of\nthe dialogue.]\n\nThe Dialogue, entitled Leges--De Legibus--The Laws--distributed\ninto twelve books, besides its Appendix the Epinomis, and longer\nthan any other of the Platonic compositions--is presented to us as\nheld in Krete during a walk from the town of Knossus to the temple\nof Zeus under Mount Ida--between three elderly persons: Megillus,\na Spartan--Kleinias, a Kretan of Knossus--and an Athenian who\nbears no name, but serves as the principal expositor and\nconductor. That this dialogue was composed by Plato after the\nRepublic, we know from the express deposition of Aristotle: that\nit was the work of Plato's old age--probably the last which he\never composed, and perhaps not completely finished at his\ndeath--is what we learn from the scanty amount of external evidence\naccessible to us. The internal evidence, as far as it goes, tends\nto bear out the same conclusion, and to show that it was written\nduring the last seven years of his life, when he was more than\nseventy years of age.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: The allusions of Aristotle to Plato as the author of\nthe Laws, after the Republic, occur in Politica, ii. b. 1264, b.\n26, 1267, b. 5, 1271, b. 1, 1274, b. 9. According to Diogenes\nLaertius (v. 22) Aristotle had composed separate works [Greek: Ta\\\ne)k No/m\u00f4n Pla/t\u00f4nos g--Ta\\ e)k t\u00ea=s Politei/as b].\n\nPlutarch (De Isid. et Osir. p. 370 E) ascribes the composition of\nthe Laws to Plato's old age. In the [Greek: Prolego/mena ei)s t\u00ea\\n\nPla/t\u00f4nos philosophi/an], it is said that the treatise was left\nunfinished at his death, and completed afterwards by his disciple\nthe Opuntian Philippus (Hermann's Edition of Plato's Works, vol.\nvi. p. 218).--Diog. Laert. iii. 37.\n\nSee the learned Prolegomena of Stallbaum, who collects all the\ninformation on this subject, and who gives his own judgment (p.\nlxxxi.) respecting the tone of senility pervading the Leges, in\nterms which deserve the more attention as coming from so\nunqualified an admirer of Plato: \"Totum Legum opus nescio quid\nsenile refert, ut profecto etiam hanc ob caussam a sene scriptum\nesse long\u00e9 verisimillimum videatur.\" The allusion in the Laws (i.\np. 638 B) to the conquest of the Epizephyrian Lokrians by the\nSyracusans, which occurred in 356 B.C., is pointed out by\nBoeckh as showing that the composition was posterior to that date\n(Boeckh, ad Platon. Minoem, pp. 72-73).\n\nIt is remarkable that Aristotle, in canvassing the opinions\ndelivered by the [Greek: A)th\u00eanai=os xe/nos] in the Laws, cites\nthem as the opinions of Sokrates (Politic. ii. 1265, b. 11), who,\nhowever, does not appear at all in the dialogue. Either this is a\nlapse of memory on the part of Aristotle; or else (which I think\nvery possible) the Laws were originally composed with Sokrates as\nthe expositor introduced, the change of name being subsequently\nmade from a feeling of impropriety in transporting Sokrates to\nKrete, and from the dogmatising anti-dialectic tone which pervades\nthe lectures ascribed to him. Some Platonic expositors regarded\nthe Athenian Stranger in Leges as Plato himself (Diog. Laert. iii.\n52; Schol. ad Legg. 1). Diogenes himself calls him a [Greek:\npla/sma a)n\u00f4/numon].]\n\n[Side-note: Abandonment of Plato's philosophical\nprojects prior to the Leges.]\n\nAll critics have remarked the many and important differences\nbetween the Republic and the Laws. And it seems certain, that\nduring the interval which separates the two, Plato's point of view\nmust have undergone a considerable change. We know from himself\nthat he intended the Kritias as a sequel to the Tim\u00e6us and\nRepublic: a portion of the Kritias still exists--as we have just\nseen--but it breaks off abruptly, and there is no ground for\nbelieving that it was ever completed. We know farther from himself\nthat he projected an ulterior dialogue or exposition, assigned to\nHermokrates, as sequel to the Kritias: both being destined to\nexhibit in actual working and manifestation, the political scheme,\nof which the Republic had described the constituent elements.[2]\nWhile the Kritias was prematurely arrested in its progress towards\nmaturity, the Hermokrates probably was never born. Yet we know\ncertainly that both the one and the other were conceived by Plato,\nas parts of one comprehensive project, afterwards abandoned. Nay,\nthe Kritias was so abruptly abandoned, that it terminates with an\nunfinished sentence: as I have stated in the last chapter.\n\n[Footnote 2: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 20-27. Plato, Kritias, p. 108.]\n\n[Side-note: Untoward circumstances of Plato's later life--His\naltered tone in regard to philosophy.]\n\nTo what extent such change of project was brought about by\nexternal circumstances in Plato's life, we cannot with certainty\ndetermine. But we know that there really occurred circumstances,\nwell calculated to produce a material change in his intellectual\ncharacter and point of view. His personal adventures and\nexperience, after his sixty-first year, and after the death of the\nelder Dionysius (B.C. 367), were of an eventful and\nmelancholy character. Among them were included his two visits\nto the younger Dionysius at Syracuse; together with the earnest\nsympathy and counsel which he bestowed on his friend Dion; whose\nchequered career terminated, after an interval of brilliant\npromise, in disappointment, disgrace, and violent death. Plato not\nonly suffered much distress, but incurred more or less of censure,\nfrom the share which he had taken, or was at least supposed to\nhave taken, in the tragedy. His own letters remain to attest the\nfact.[3] Considering the numerous enemies which philosophy has had\nat all times, we may be sure that such enemies would be furnished\nwith abundant materials for invidious remark--by the entire\nfailure of Plato himself at Syracuse as well as by the disgraceful\nproceedings first of Dion, next, of his assassin Kallippus: both\nof them pupils, and the former a favourite pupil, of Plato in the\nAcademy. The prospect, which accident had opened, of exalting\nphilosophy into active influence over mankind, had been closed in\na way no less mournful than dishonourable. Plato must have felt\nthis keenly enough, even apart from the taunts of opponents. We\nmight naturally expect that his latest written compositions would\nbe coloured by such a temper of mind: that he would contract, if\nnot an alienation from philosophy, at least a comparative mistrust\nof any practical good to come from it: and that if his senile\nfancy still continued to throw out any schemes of social\nconstruction, they would be made to rest upon other foundations,\neliminating or reducing to a minimum that ascendancy of the\nphilosophical mind, which he had once held to be omnipotent and\nindispensable.\n\n[Footnote 3: See especially the interesting and valuable Epistola\nvii. of Plato; also the life of Dion by Plutarch.\n\nThe reader will find a full account of Plato's proceedings in\nSicily, and of the adventures of Dion, in chap. 84 of my 'History\nof Greece'.\n\nThe passage of Plato in Legg. iv. 709-710 (alluding to the\nconcurrence and co-operation of a youthful despot, sober-minded\nand moderate, but not exalted up to the level of philosophy, with\na competent lawgiver for the purpose of constructing a civic\ncommunity, furnished with the best laws) is supposed by K. F.\nHermann (System der Platon. Philos. p. 69) and by Zeller (Phil. d.\nGriech. vol. ii. p. 310, ed. 2nd.) to allude to the hopes which\nPlato cherished when he undertook his first visit to the younger\nDionysius at Syracuse. See Epistol. vii. pp. 327 C, 330 A-B, 334\nC; Epistol. ii. 311 B.\n\nSuch allusion is sufficiently probable. Yet we must remember that\nthe Magnetic community, described by Plato in the Treatise De\nLegibus, does not derive its origin from any established despot or\nprince, but from a general resolution supposed to have been taken\nby the Kretan cities, and from a Decemviral executive Board of\nKnossian citizens nominated by them. Kleinias, as a chief member\nof this Board, solicits the suggestion of laws from the Athenian\nelder (Legg. iii. p. 702 C). This is more analogous to Plato's\nsubsequent counsel, _after_ his attempt to guide the younger\nDionysius had failed. See Epistol. vii. p. 337 C-E.]\n\n[Side-note: General comparison of Leges with Plato's earlier\nworks.]\n\nComparing the Laws with the earlier compositions of Plato, the\ndifference between them will be found to correspond pretty nearly\nwith the change thus indicated in his point of view. If we turn to\nthe Republic, we find Plato dividing the intelligible world\n([Greek: to\\ no\u00eato\\n]) into two sections: the higher, that of pure\nand absolute Ideas, with which philosophy and dialectics deal--the\nlower, that of Ideas not quite pure, but implicated more or less\nwith sensible illustration, to which the mathematician applies\nhimself: the chief use of the lower section is said to consist in\nits serving as preparation for a comprehension of the higher.[4]\nBut in the Laws, this higher or dialectical section--the last\nfinish or crowning result of the teaching process, is left out;\nwhile even the lower or mathematical section is wrapped up with\ntheology. Moreover, the teaching provided in the Laws, for the\nruling Elders, is presented as something new, which Plato has much\ndifficulty both in devising and in explaining: we must therefore\nunderstand him to distinguish it pointedly from the teaching which\nhe had before provided for the Elders in the Republic.[5] Again,\nliterary occupation is now kept down rather than encouraged: Plato\nis more afraid lest his citizens should have too much of it than\ntoo little.[6] As for the Sokratic Elenchus, it is not merely not\ncommended, but it is even proscribed and denounced by implication,\nsince free speech and criticism generally is barred out by the\nrigorous Platonic censorship. On the other hand, the ethical\nsentiment in the Leges, with its terms designating the varieties\nof virtue, is much the same as in other Platonic compositions: the\npolitical and social doctrine also, though different in some\nmaterial points, is yet very analogous on several others. But\nthese ethical and political doctrines appear in the Laws much\nmore merged in dogmatic theology than in other dialogues. This\ntheology is of Pythagorean character--implicated directly and\nintimately with astronomy--and indirectly with arithmetic and\ngeometry also. We have here an astronomical religion, or a\nreligious astronomy, by whichever of the two names it may be\ncalled. Right belief on astronomy is orthodoxy and virtue:\nerroneous belief on astronomy is heretical and criminal.\n\n[Footnote 4: See the passages, Plat. Legg. vii. pp. 811 B-819 A.\nPlato, Republic, vi. pp. 510-511. [Greek: ta\\ du/o tm\u00ea/mata] or\n[Greek: ei)/d\u00ea tou= no\u00eatou=]. vii. p. 534 E: [Greek: \u00f4(/sper\nthrigko\\s toi=s math\u00ea/masin \u00ea( dialektik\u00ea\\ \u00ea(mi=n e)pa/n\u00f4\nkei=sthai.]]\n\n[Footnote 5: Plat. Legg. p. 966 D, xii. pp. 968 C-E, 969 A.\nCompare vii. p. 818 E. In p. 966 D, the study of astronomy is\nenforced on the ground that it is one of the strongest evidence of\nnatural theology: in p. 818 C, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy\nare advocated as studies, because, without having gone through\nthem, a man cannot become a God, a D\u00e6mon, or a Hero, competent to\nexercise effective care over mankind. This is altogether different\nfrom the Republic.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Plat. Legg. vii. pp. 811 B, 819 A.]\n\nIn the Tim\u00e6us, Plato recommended the study of astronomy, in order\nthat the rotations of man's soul in his cranium, which were from\nthe beginning disturbed and irregular, might become regularised,\nand assimilated by continued contemplation to the perfect\nuniformity of the celestial and cosmical movements.[7] In the\nLeges, he recommends astronomy to be studied, because without it\nwe fall into blasphemous errors respecting the cosmical movements,\nand because such cosmical errors are among the three varieties of\nheresy, to one or other of which the commission of all crimes\nagainst society may be traced.[8] Hence we find Plato, in the city\nhere described, consecrating his astronomical views as a part of\nthe state-religion, and prohibiting dissent from them under the\nmost stringent penalties. In the general spirit of the Treatise de\nLegibus, Plato approximates to Xenophon and the Spartan model. He\nkeeps his eye fixed on the perpetual coercive discipline of the\naverage citizen. This discipline, prescribed in all its details by\nthe lawgiver, includes a modicum of literary teaching equal to\nall; small in quantity, and rigorously sifted as to quality,\nthrough the censorial sieve. The intellectual and speculative\ngenius of the community, which other Platonic dialogues bring into\nthe foreground, has disappeared from the Treatise de Legibus. We\nfind here no youths pregnant with undisclosed original thought,\nwhich Sokrates assists them in bringing forth: such as The\u00e6t\u00eatus,\nCharmid\u00eas, Kleinias, and others--pictures among the most\ninteresting which the ancient world presents, and lending peculiar\ncharm to the earlier dialogues. Not only no provision is made for\nthem, but severe precautions are taken against them. Even in the\nRepublic, Plato had banished poets, or had at least forbidden them\nto follow the free inspirations of the Muse, and had\nsubjected them to censorial controul. But such controul was\npresumed to be exercised by highly trained speculative and\nphilosophical minds, for the perpetual succession of whom express\nprovision was made. In the Treatise De Legibus, such speculative\nminds are no longer admitted. Philosophy is interdicted or put in\nchains as well as poetry. An orthodox religious creed is exalted\ninto exclusive ascendancy. All crime or immorality is ascribed to\na departure from this creed.[9] The early communities (Plato tells\nus[10]), who were simple and ignorant, destitute of arts and\nletters, but who at the same time believed implicitly all that\nthey heard from their seniors respecting Gods and men, and adopted\nthe dicta of their seniors respecting good and evil, without\nenquiry or suspicion--were decidedly superior to his\ncontemporaries in all the departments of virtue--justice,\ntemperance, and courage. This antithesis, between virtue and\nreligious faith on the one side, and arts and letters with an\ninquisitive spirit on the other, presenting the latter as a\ndepraving influence, antagonistic to the former--is analogous to\nthe Bacch\u00e6 of Euripides--the work of that poet's old age[11]--and\nanalogous also to the Nubes of Aristophanes, wherein the literary\nand philosophical teaching of Sokrates is represented as\nwithdrawing youth from the received religious creed, and as\nleading them by consequence to the commission of fraud and\ncrime.[12]\n\n[Footnote 7: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 47 B-C.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 821 D, 822 C; x. pp. 885 B, 886\nE.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Plato, Legg. x. p. 885 B.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 679. Compare p. 689 D.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Lobeck, Aglaophamus, p. 623. \"Superest fabula\n(Euripidis), Bacch\u00e6, dithyrambi quam tragoedi\u00e6 similior, totaque\nita comparata, ut contra illius temporis Rationalistas scripta\nvideatur; qua et Bacchicarum religionum sanctimonia commendatur . . .\net rerum divinarum disceptatio ab eruditorum judiciis ad\npopuli transfertur suffragia:--\n\n[Greek: sopha\\n d' a)/peche prapi/da phre/na te\nperiss\u00f4=n para\\ ph\u00f4t\u00f4=n;\nto\\ pl\u00ea=thos o(/, ti to\\ phaulo/teron\ne)no/mise chr\u00ea=tai/ te, to/de toi legoi/man.\n    [le/goim' a)/n], Matthi\u00e6] (427).\n\nCompare vv. 200-203 of the same drama.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Aristophan. Nubes, 116-875, &c.]\n\n[Side-note: Scene of the Leges, not in Athens, but in Krete.\nPersons Kretan and Spartan, comparatively illiterate.]\n\nThe submergence and discredit of letters and philosophy, which\npervades the Dialogue De Legibus, is farther indicated by the\npersonages introduced as conversing. In all the other Platonic\ndialogues, the scene is laid at Athens, and the speakers are\neducated citizens of Athens; sometimes visitors, equally or better\neducated, from other Grecian cities. Generally, they are\neither adults who have already acquired some intellectual\neminence, or youths anxious to acquire it. Nikias and Laches,\nMelesias and Lysimachus (in the Lach\u00eas), are among the leaders\n(past or present) of the Athenian public assembly. Anytus (in the\nMenon) is a man not so much ignorant of letters as despising\nletters.[13] Moreover Sokrates himself formally disclaims positive\nknowledge, professing to be only a searcher for truth along with\nthe rest.[14] But the scene of the Laws is laid in Krete, not at\nAthens: the three speakers are not merely all old men, but\nfrequently allude to their old age. One of them only is an\nAthenian, to whom the positive and expository duty is assigned:\nthe other two are Megillus, a Spartan, and Kleinias, a Kretan of\nKnossus. Now both Sparta, and the communities of Krete, were among\nthe most unlettered portions of the Hellenic name. They were not\nonly strangers to that impulse of rhetoric, dialectic, and\nphilosophical speculation which, having its chief domicile at\nAthens, had become diffused more or less over a large portion of\nGreece since the Persian war--but they were sparingly conversant\neven with that old poetical culture, epic and lyric, which\nbelonged to the age of Solon and the Seven Wise Men. The public\ntraining of youth at Sparta, equal for all the citizens, included\nnothing of letters and music, which in other cities were\nconsidered to be the characteristics of an educated Greek:[15]\nthough probably individual Spartans, more or fewer, acquired these\naccomplishments for themselves. Gymnastics, with a slight\nadmixture of simple chronic music and a still slighter admixture\nof poetry and letters, formed the characteristic culture of Sparta\nand Krete.[16] In the Leges, Plato not only notes the fact, but\ntreats it as indicating a better social condition, compared\nwith Athens and other Greeks--that both Spartans and Kretans were\nalike unacquainted with the old epic or theological poems (Hesiod,\nOrpheus, &c.), and with the modern philosophical\nspeculations.[17]\n\n[Footnote 13: Tacitus, Dialog. de Orator. c. 2. \"Aper, communi\neruditione imbutus, contemnebat potius literas quam nesciebat.\"\n\nNikias is said to have made his son Nik\u00earatus learn by heart the\nentire Iliad and Odyssey of Homer; at least this is the statement\nof Nik\u00earatus himself in the Symposion of Xenophon (iii. 5).]\n\n[Footnote 14: This profession appears even in the Gorgias (p. 506\nA) and in the Republic (v. p. 450 D).]\n\n[Footnote 15: See Xenophon, Republ. Laced. c. 2.\n\nCompare the description given by Xenophon in the Cyrop\u00e6dia (i. 2,\n6), of the public training of Persian youth, which passage bears\nstriking analogy to his description of the Spartan training. The\npublic [Greek: dida/skaloi] are not mentioned as teaching [Greek:\ngra/mmata], which belong to Athens and other cities, but as\nteaching justice, temperance, self-command, obedience, bodily\nendurance, the use of the bow and the javelin, &c.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 673 B.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Plato, Legg. x. p. 886 B-C. [Greek: ei)si\\n \u00ea(mi=n\ne)n gra/mmasi lo/goi kei/menoi, _oi(/ par' u(mi=n ou)k ei)si\\\ndi' a)ret\u00ea\\n politei/as_, \u00f4(s e)g\u00f4\\ mantha/n\u00f4, oi( me\\n e)/n\ntisi me/trois, oi( de\\ kai\\ a)/neu me/tr\u00f4n le/gontes peri\\ the\u00f4=n,\noi( me\\n palaio/tataoi, \u00f4(s ge/gonen \u00ea( pr\u00f4/t\u00ea phu/sis ou)ra/nou\nt\u00f4=n te a)/ll\u00f4n, proi+o/ntes de\\ t\u00ea=s a)rch\u00ea=s ou) polu\\\ntheogoni/an diexe/rchontai, geno/menoi/ te \u00f4(s pro\\s a)ll\u00ea/lous\n\u00f4(mi/l\u00easan. A(\\ toi=s a)kou/ousin ei) me\\n ei)s a)/llo ti kal\u00f4=s\n\u00ea)\\ m\u00ea\\ kal\u00f4=s e)/chei, ou) r(a/|dion e)pitima=|n palaioi=s\nou)=si], &c.]\n\n[Side-note: Gymnastic training, military drill, and public\nmess, in Krete and Sparta.]\n\nNot simply on this negative ground, but on another positive ground\nalso, Sparta and Kr\u00eate were well suited to furnish listeners for\nthe Laws.[18] Their gymnastic discipline and military drill,\nespecially the Spartan, were stricter and more continuous than\nanywhere else in Greece: including toilsome fatigue, endurance of\npain, heat, and cold, and frequent conflicts with and without arms\nbetween different factions of citizens. The individual and the\nfamily were more thoroughly merged in the community: the citizens\nwere trained for war, interdicted from industry, and forbidden to\ngo abroad without permission: attendance on the public mess-table\nwas compulsory on all citizens: the training of youth was uniform,\nunder official authority: the two systems were instituted, both of\nthem, by divine authority--the Spartan by Apollo, the Kretan by\nZeus--Lykurgus and Minos, semi-divine persons, being the\nrespective instruments and mediators. In neither of them was any\npublic criticism tolerated upon the laws and institutions (this is\na point capital in Plato's view[19]). No voice was allowed among\nthe young men except that of constant eulogy, extolling the system\nas not merely excellent but of divine origin, and resenting all\ncontradiction: none but an old man was permitted to suggest\ndoubts, and he only in private whisper to the Archon, when no\nyoung man was near. Both in Sparta and Krete the public\nauthorities stood forward as the conspicuous, positive, constant,\nagents; enforcing upon each individual a known type of character\nand habits. There was thus an intelligible purpose, political and\nsocial, as contrasted with other neighbouring societies, in which\nno special purpose revealed itself.[20] Both Sparta and Krete,\nmoreover, had continued in the main unchanged from a time\nimmemorial. In this, as in numerous other points, the two systems\nwere cognate and similar.[21]\n\n[Footnote 18: Ephorus, ap. Strabo, x. 480; Xenophon, Repub. Lac.\nc. 4-6; Isokrates, Busiris, Orat. xi. s. 19; Aristot. Politic. ii.\ncapp. 9 and 10, pp. 1270-1271, and viii. 9, p. 1338, b. 15; also\nchap. vi. of the second part of my 'History of Greece,' with the\nreferences there given.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Plato, Legg. i. p. 634 D-E. [Greek: u(mi=n me\\n\nga/r, ei)/per kai\\ metri/\u00f4s kateskeu/astai ta\\ t\u00f4=n no/m\u00f4n, ei(=s\nt\u00f4=n kalli/st\u00f4n a)\\n ei)/\u00ea no/m\u00f4n m\u00ea\\ z\u00eatei=n t\u00f4=n ne/\u00f4n m\u00eade/na\ne)a=|n poi=a kal\u00f4=s au)t\u00f4=n \u00ea)\\ m\u00ea\\ kal\u00f4=s e)/chei, mia=| de\\\nph\u00f4n\u00ea=| kai\\ e)x e(no\\s sto/matos pa/ntas sumph\u00f4nei=n \u00f4(s pa/nta\nkal\u00f4=s kei/tai the/nt\u00f4n the\u00f4=n, kai\\ e)a/n a)/ll\u00f4s le/g\u00ea|, m\u00ea\\\na)ne/chesthai to\\ para/pan a)kou/ontas], &c.\n\nCompare Demosthen. adv. Leptin. p. 489, where a similar\naffirmation is made respecting Sparta.]\n\n[Footnote 20: These other cities are what Plato calls [Greek: ai(\nt\u00f4=n ei)k\u00ea=| politeuome/n\u00f4n politei=ai] (Legg. i. p. 635 E), and\nwhat Aristotle calls [Greek: no/mima chu/d\u00ean kei/mena], Polit.\nvii. 1324, b. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Plato, Legg. i. p. 624, iii. pp. 691 E, 696 A, iii.\np. 683. Krete and Sparta, [Greek: a)delphoi\\ no/moi].\n\nK. F. Hermann (in his instructive Dissertation, De Vestigiis\nInstitutorum veterum imprimis Atticorum, per Platonis de Legibus\nlibros indagandis) represents Sparta and Krete as types of customs\nand institutions which had once been general in Greece, but had\nbeen discontinued in the other Grecian cities. \"Hoc imprimis in\nLaced\u00e6moniorum et Cretensium res publicas cadit, qu\u00e6 quum et\nantiquissimam Gr\u00e6ci\u00e6 indolem fidelissim\u00e9 servasse viderentur, et\nmoribus ac disciplin\u00e2 public\u00e2 optim\u00e9 fundat\u00e6 essent, non mirum est\neas Gr\u00e6co philosopho ade\u00f2 placuisse ut earum formam et libris de\nCivitate et Legibus quasi pro fundamento subjiceret\" (p. 19,\ncompare pp. 13-15-23) . . . \"unde (sc. a legitimis Gr\u00e6carum\ncivitatum principiis) licet plurimi temporum decursu descivissent\natque in ali\u00e2 omnia abiissent, nihil tamen Plato proposuit, nisi\nquod optimus quisque in Gr\u00e6ci\u00e2 semper expetierat ac persecutus\nerat\" (p. 15). I think this view is not correct, though it is\nadopted more or less by various critics. Sparta and Krete are not\nspecimens (in my judgment) of what all or most Grecian cities once\nhad been--nor of pure Dorism, as K. O. M\u00fcller affirms. On the\ncontrary I believe them to have been very peculiar, Sparta\nespecially. So far they resembled all early Greeks, that neither\nliterature nor luxury had grown up among them. But neither the\nSyssitia nor the _disciplina publica_ had ever subsisted\namong other Greeks: and these were the two characteristic features\nof Krete and Sparta, more especially of the latter. They were the\ntwo features which arrested Plato's attention, and upon which he\nbrought his constructive imagination to bear; constructing upon\none principle in his Republic, and upon a different principle in\nhis Dialogue de Legibus. While he copies these two main features\nfrom Sparta, he borrows many or most of his special laws from\nAthens; but the ends, with reference to which he puts these\nelements together, are his own. K. F. Hermann, in his anxiety to\nrescue Plato from the charge of rashness (\"temerario ingenii\nlusu,\" p. 18), understates Plato's originality.]\n\n[Side-note: Difference between Leges and Republic,\nillustrated by reference to the Politikus.]\n\nComparing the Platonic Leges with the Platonic Republic the\ndifference between them will be illustrated by the theory laid\ndown in the Politikus. We read therein,[22] that the process of\ngoverning mankind well is an art, depending upon scientific\nprinciples; like the art of the physician, the general, the\nsteersman: that it aims at the attainment of a given End, the\nwell-being of the governed--and that none except the scientific or\nartistic Ruler know either the end or the means of attaining\nit: that such rulers are the rarest of all artists, never more\nthan one or a very few, combining philosophical aptitude with\nphilosophical training: but that when they are found, society\nought to trust and obey their directions without any fixed law:\nthat no peremptory law can be made to fit all contingencies, and\nthat their art is the only law which they ought to follow in each\nparticular conjuncture. If no such persons can be found, good\ngovernment is an impossibility: but the next best thing to be done\nis, to establish fixed laws, as good as you can, and to ensure\nthat they shall be obeyed by every one. Now the Platonic Republic\naims at realising the first of these two ideal projects:\neverything in it turns upon the discretionary orders of the\nphilosophical King or Oligarchy, and even the elaborate training\nof the Guardians serves only to make them perfect instruments for\nthe execution of those orders. But the Platonic Leges or Treatise\non Laws corresponds only to the second or less ambitious project--a\ntolerable imitation of the first and best.[23] Instead of\nphilosophical rulers, one or a few invested with discretionary\npower, we have a scheme of political constitution--an alternation\nof powers temporary and responsible, an apportionment of functions\nand duties--a variety of laws enacted, with magistrates and\ndikasteries provided to apply them. Plato, or his Athenian\nspokesman, appears as adviser and as persuader; but the laws must\nbe such as the body of citizens can be persuaded to adopt. There\nis moreover a scheme of education embodied in the laws: the\nindividual citizen is placed under dominion at once spiritual and\ntemporal: but the infallibility resides in the laws, and authority\nis exercised over him only by periodical magistrates who enforce\nthem and determine in their name. It is the Laws which govern--not\nphilosophical Artists of King-Craft.\n\n[Footnote 22: See above, vol. iii. ch. xxx. p. 273, seq.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Plato, Politikus, pp. 293 C-297 C.]\n\n[Side-note: Large proportion of preliminary discussions and\ndidactic exhortation in the Leges.]\n\nThe three first books of the Leges are occupied with general\npreliminary discussions on the ends at which laws and political\ninstitutions ought to aim--on the means which they ought to\nemploy--and on the ethical effects of various institutions in\nmoulding the character of the citizens. \"For private citizens\"\n(the Athenian says), \"it is enough to say, in reply to the\ncriticism of strangers, This is the law or custom with us.\nBut what I propose to examine is, the wisdom of the lawgiver from\nwhom the law proceeds.\"[24] At the end of book three, Kleinias\nannounces that the Kretans are about to found a new colony on a\ndeserted site at one end of the island, and that they have\nconfided to a committee of ten Knossians (himself among the\nnumber), the task of establishing a constitution and laws for the\ncolony. He invites the Athenian to advise and co-operate with this\ncommittee. In the fourth book, we enter upon the special\nconditions of this colonial project, to which the constitution and\nlaws must conform. It is not until the fifth book that the\nAthenian speaker begins to declare what constitutional provisions,\nand what legal enactments, he recommends. His recommendations are\ncontinued throughout all the remaining Treatise--from the fifth\nbook, to the twelfth or last. They are however largely\ninterspersed with persuasive addresses, expositions, homilies, and\ncomminations, sometimes of extreme prolixity and vehemence,[25] on\nvarious topics of ethics and religion: which indeed occupy a much\nlarger space than the laws themselves.\n\n[Footnote 24: Plato, Legg. i. p. 637 C-D. [Greek: pa=s ga\\r\na)pokrino/menos e)rei= thauma/zonti xe/n\u00f4|, t\u00ea\\n par' au)toi=s\na)\u00ea/theian o(r\u00f4=nti, M\u00ea\\ thau/maze, \u00f4)= xe/ne; no/mos e)/sth'\n\u00ea(mi=n ou(=tos, i)/s\u00f4s d' u(mi=n peri\\ au)t\u00f4=n tou/t\u00f4n e(/teros;\n\u00ea(mi=n d' e)sti\\ nu=n ou) peri\\ t\u00f4=n a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n o(\nlo/gos, a)lla\\ peri\\ t\u00f4=n nomothet\u00f4=n au)t\u00f4=n kaki/as te kai\\\na)ret\u00ea=s.]]\n\n[Footnote 25: This is what Plato alludes to in the Politikus (p.\n304 A) as \"rhetoric enlisted in the service of the\nRuler,\"--[Greek: o(/s\u00ea basilik\u00ea=| koin\u00f4nou=sa r(\u00eatorei/a\nxugdiakuberna=| ta\\s e)n tai=s po/lesi pra/xeis.]]\n\n[Side-note: Scope of the discussion laid down by the Athenian\nspeaker--The Spartan institutions are framed only for war--This is\nnarrow and erroneous.]\n\nThe Athenian speaker avails himself of the privilege of old age to\ncriticise the Spartan and Kretan institutions more freely than is\napproved by his two companions; who feel bound to uphold against\nall dissentients the divine origin of their respective\npolities.[26] On enquiring from them what is the purpose of their\npeculiar institutions--the Syssitia or public mess-table--the\ngymnastic discipline--the military drill--he is informed by both,\nthat the purpose is to ensure habits of courage, strength, and\nskill, with a view to superiority in war over foreign enemies: war\nbeing, in their judgment, the usual and natural condition of the\ndifferent communities into which mankind are distributed.[27] Such\nis the test according to which they determine the good\nconstitution of a city. But the Athenian--proclaiming as the scope\nof his enquiry,[28] What is it which is _right or wrong by\nnature, in laws_?--will not admit the test as thus laid down.\nWar against foreign enemies (_i.e._ enemies foreign to the\ncity-community) is only one among many varieties of war. There\nexist other varieties besides:--war among the citizens of the same\ntown--among the constituent villages of the same\ncity-community--among the brethren of the same family--among the\nconstituent elements of the same individual man.[29] Though these\nvarieties of war or discord are of frequent occurrence, they are\nnot the less evils, inconsistent with that _id\u00e9al_ of the Best which\na wise lawgiver will seek to approach.[30] Whenever any of them\noccur, he ought to ensure to the good and wise elements victory\nover the evil and stupid. But his _id\u00e9al_ should be, to\nobviate the occurrence of war altogether--to adjust harmoniously\nthe relation between the better and worse elements, disposing the\nlatter towards a willing subordination and co-operation with the\nformer.[31] Though courage in war is one indispensable virtue, it\nstands only fourth on the list--wisdom, justice, and temperance,\nbeing before it. _Your_ aim is to inculcate not virtue, but\nonly one part of virtue.[32] Many mercenary soldiers, possessing\ncourage in perfection, are unjust, foolish, and worthless in all\nother respects.[33]\n\n[Footnote 26: Plato, Legg. i. p. 630 D, ii. p. 667 A.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Plato, Legg. i. pp. 625-626. [Greek: o(/ron t\u00ea=s\neu)= politeuome/n\u00eas po/le\u00f4s], &c. (p. 626 B).]\n\n[Footnote 28: Plato, Legg. i. p. 627 C. [Greek: o)rtho/t\u00eato/s te\nkai\\ a(marti/as pe/ri no/m\u00f4n, \u00ea(/tis pot' e)sti\\ phu/sei.] Also\n630 E.\n\nCompare the inquiry in the Kratylus respecting naming, wherein\nconsists the [Greek: o)rtho/t\u00eas phu/sei t\u00f4=n o)noma/t\u00f4n]. See\nabove, vol. iii. ch. xxxi. p. 285, seq.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Plato, Legg. i. p. 626.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Plato, Legg. i. p. 628 D.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Plato, Legg. i. p. 627 E. [Greek: o(\\s a)\\n tou\\s\nme\\n chr\u00eastou\\s a)/rchein, tou\\s chei/rous d' e)a/sas z\u00ea=|n\na)/rchesthai e(/kontas poi\u00ea/seie.]\n\nThe _id\u00e9al_ which Plato here sets forth coincides mainly with\nthat which Xenophon adopts as his theme both in the Cyrop\u00e6dia and\nin the Oeconomicus (see the beginning of the former and the\nclose of the latter) [Greek: to\\ e)thelo/nt\u00f4n a)/rchein].]\n\n[Footnote 32: Aristotle cites and approves this criticism of\nPlato, [Greek: e)n toi=s No/mois], Politic. ii. 9, p. 1271, b. 1.\nCompare vii. 14, 1333, b. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Plato, Legg. i. p. 630 A. The doctrine--that courage\nis possessed by many persons who have no other virtue--which is\nhere assigned by Plato to his leading speaker the Athenian,\nappears in the Protagoras as advocated by Protagoras and impugned\nby Sokrates (p. 349 D-E). But the arguments whereby Sokrates\nimpugns it are (according to Stallbaum) known by Plato himself to\nbe mere captious tricks (laquei dialetici--captios\u00e9 et argut\u00e9\nconclusa, ad sophistam ludendum et perturbandum comparata)\nemployed only for the purpose of puzzling and turning into\nridicule an eminent Sophist. (See Stallbaum, not. ad Protag. p.\n349 E. and Pr\u00e6f. ad Protag. p. 28.) I have already remarked\nelsewhere, that I think this supposition alike gratuitous and\nimprobable.]\n\n[Side-note: Principles on which the institutions of a state\nought to be defended--You must show that its ethical purpose and\nworking is good.]\n\nIf you wish (says the Athenian to Kleinias) to make out a\nplenary defence and advocacy of the Kretan system, you ought\nto do it in the following way:\n\nOur laws deserve the celebrity which they have acquired in Greece,\nbecause they make us happy, and provide us with all kinds of good\nthings: both with such as are divine and with such as are human.\nThe divine are, Wisdom or Prudence, Justice, Temperance, Courage:\nthe human are, Health, Beauty, Strength, Activity, Wealth. The\nhuman depend upon the divine, are certain to follow them, and are\nnot to be obtained without them. All the regulations and precepts\nof the lawgiver are directed to the attainment and protection of\nthese ends--to establish among the citizens a moral tone of praise\nand blame favourable to that purpose. He seeks to inculcate on the\ncitizens a body of sentiment, as to what is honourable and not\nhonourable--such as may guide their pleasures and pains, their\ndesires and aversions--and such as may keep their minds right\namidst all the disaster (disease, war, poverty, &c.) as well\nas the prosperity of life. He next regulates the properties, the\nacquisitions, and the expenditure of the citizens, together with\ntheir relations to each other on these heads, upon principles of\njustice enforced by suitable penalties. Lastly, he appoints\nmagistrates of approved wisdom and right judgment to enforce the\nregulations. The cementing authority is thus wisdom, following out\npurposes of temperance and justice, not of ambition or love of\nmoney.\n\nSuch is the course of exposition (says the Athenian) which ought\nto be adopted. Now tell me--In what manner are the objects here\ndefined ensured by the institutions of Apollo and Zeus at Sparta\nand Krete? You two ought to show me: for I myself cannot discern\nit.[34]\n\n[Footnote 34: Plato, Legg. i. p. 632.]\n\n[Side-note: Religious and ethical character postulated by\nPlato for a community.]\n\nThis passage is of some value, because it gives us, thus early in\nthe Treatise, a brief summary of that which Plato desiderates in\nthe two systems here noted--and of that which he intends to supply\nin his own. We see that he looks upon a political constitution and\nlaws as merely secondary and instrumental: that he postulates\nas the primary and fundamental fabric, a given religious and\nethical character implanted in the citizens: that the lawgiver, in\nhis view, combines the spiritual and temporal authority, making\nthe latter subordinate to the former, and determining not merely\nwhat laws the citizens shall obey, but how they shall distribute\ntheir approval and aversion--religious, ethical, and \u00e6sthetical.\nIt is the lawgiver alone who is responsible and who is open to\npraise or censure: for to the people, of each different community\nand different system, established custom is always a valid\nauthority.[35]\n\n[Footnote 35: Plato, Legg. i. p. 637 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Endurance of pain enforced as a part of the\npublic discipline at Sparta.]\n\nWe Spartans (says Megillus) implant courage in our citizens not\nmerely by our public mess-table and gymnastic, but also by inuring\nthem to support pain and hardship. We cause them to suffer severe\npain in the gymnop\u00e6dia, in pugilistic contests, and other ways: we\nput them to hardships and privations in the Kryptia and in\nhunting. We thus accustom them to endurance. Moreover, we strictly\nforbid all indulgences such as drunkenness. Nothing of the kind is\nseen at Sparta, not even at the festival of Dionysus; nothing like\nthe drinking which I have seen at Athens, and still more at\nTarentum.[36]\n\n[Footnote 36: Plato, Legg. i. pp. 633-B 637 A.\n\nPlato puts into the mouth of the Athenian a remark that in some\nother cities (not Sparta or Kretan) these [Greek: sussi/tia] or\npublic mess-tables had been found to lead to intestine sedition\nand disturbance (p. 636 B). He instances the cases of the\nBoeotians, the Milesians, and the Thurians. It is much to be\nlamented that we cannot assign the particular events and\nconjunctures here adverted to. The Spartan and Kretan Syssitia\nwere daily, compulsory, and universal among the citizens, besides\nthe strictness of the regulations: under such conditions they were\npeculiar to these two places, as far as our knowledge goes: the\nSyssitia in Southern Italy (noticed by Aristotle, Polit. vii. 10,\np. 1329 b.) are not known and seemingly unimportant. The Syssitia\nin Boeotia, &c., may probably have been occasional or\nperiodical banquets among members of the same tribe, deme, club,\nor [Greek: thi/asos]--and voluntary besides, neither prescribed\nnor regulated by law. Such meetings might very probably give\noccasion to disturbances under particular circumstances.]\n\n[Side-note: Why are not the citizens tested in like manner,\nin regard to resistance against the seductions of pleasure?]\n\nHow is it (says the Athenian) that you deal so differently with\npains and pleasures? To make your citizens firm against pain, you\nexpose them designedly to severe pains: if they were kept free\nfrom pains, you would have no confidence in their firmness against\npainful actualities, when any such shall occur. But in regard to\npleasures, you are content with simple prohibition. You provide no\nmeans for strengthening your citizens against the temptations\nof pleasure. Are you satisfied that their courage (or\nself-command) shall be lame or one-sided--good against pains, but\nnot good against pleasures?[37] In determining about laws, the whole\nenquiry turns upon pleasures and pains, both in the city and in\nindividual dispositions. These are the two natural fountains, from\nwhich he who draws such draughts as is proper, obtains happiness:\nwhile every one who draws unwisely and out of season, will fail of\nobtaining happiness.[38]\n\n[Footnote 37: Plato, Legg. i. pp. 633-634 A. [Greek: ch\u00f4l\u00ea\\n t\u00ea\\n\na)ndrei/an].]\n\n[Footnote 38: Plato, Legg. i. p. 636 D-E.]\n\n[Side-note: Drunkenness forbidden at Sparta, and blamed by\nthe Spartan converser. The Athenian proceeds to inquire how far\nsuch unqualified prohibition is justifiable.]\n\nBesides, as to drunkenness, we must not be too hasty in\ncondemnation of it. We must not pronounce generally respecting any\ninstitution without examining the circumstances, persons,\nregulations, &c., attending it. Such hasty praise and censure\nis very misleading. Many other nations act upon the opposite\npractice. But I (says Plato) shall not pretend to decide the point\nby witnesses and authority. I shall adopt another course of\ninvestigation, and shall show you, in this particular case, a\nspecimen of the way in which all such institutions ought to be\ncriticised and appreciated.[39]\n\n[Footnote 39: Plato, Legg. i. p. 638 D-E. [Greek: Tro/pon de\\\na)/llon, o(\\n e)moi\\ phai/netai dei=n, e)the/l\u00f4 le/gein peri\\\nau)tou= tou/tou, t\u00ea=s me/th\u00eas, _peir\u00f4/menos a)\\n a)/ra du/n\u00f4mai\nt\u00ea\\n peri\\ a(pa/nt\u00f4n tou/t\u00f4n o)rth\u00ea\\n me/thodon u(mi=n\nd\u00ealou=n_, e)peid\u00ea\\ kai\\ muri/a e)pi\\ muri/ois e)/thn\u00ea peri\\\nau)t\u00f4=n a)mphisb\u00eatou=nta u(mi=n po/lesi duei=n t\u00f4=| lo/g\u00f4|\ndiama/choit' a)/n.]\n\nHere Plato (as in the Sophist\u00eas, Politikus, and elsewhere)\nannounces that the special inquiry is intended to illustrate a\ngeneral method.]\n\nPlato here digresses[40] from his main purpose to examine the\nquestion of drunkenness. He will not allow it to be set aside\nabsolutely and offhand, by a self-justifying ethical sentiment,\nwithout reason assigned, defence tendered, accompanying\nprecautions discussed. Upon this, as upon the social functions\nproper for the female sex, he is a dissenter from the common view.\nHe selects the subject as a case for exhibiting the proper method\nof criticism respecting social institutions; not without some\nconsciousness that the discussion, if looked at in itself (like\nthe examples of scientific classification or di\u00e6resis in the\nSophist\u00eas and Politikus), would appear unduly prolonged.[41]\n\n[Footnote 40: He himself notes it as a digression, iii. p. 682\nE.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Plato, Legg. i. pp. 642 A, 645 D. Compare the\nPolitikus, pp. 264 A-286 C-E.]\n\n[Side-note: Description of Sokrates in the\nSymposion--his self-command under abundant potations.]\n\nTo illustrate his peculiar views[42] on the subject of\ndrunkenness, we may refer to the picture of Sokrates which he\npresents in the Symposion, more especially in the latter half of\nthat dialogue, after the appearance of Alkibiades. In this\ndialogue the occasion is supposed to be festive and joyous. Eros\nis in the ascendant, and is made the subject of a panegyric by\neach of the guests in succession. Sokrates partakes in the temper\nof the society, proclaiming himself to be ignorant of all other\nmatters except those relating to Love.[43] In all the Platonic\nwritings there is hardly anything more striking than the panegyric\nupon Eros there pronounced by Sokrates, blending the idea of love\nwith that of philosophical dialectics, and refining the erotic\nimpulse into an enthusiastic aspiration for that generation of new\ncontemplative power, by the colloquial intercourse of two minds\nreciprocally stimulating each other, which brings them at last\ninto a clear view of the objects of the ideal or intelligible\nworld. Until the appearance of Alkibiades, little wine is\nswallowed, and the guests are perfectly sober. But Alkibiades,\nbeing intoxicated when he first comes in, becomes at once the\nprominent character of the piece. He is represented as directing\nthe large wine-cooler to be filled with wine (about four pints),\nfirst swallowing the whole himself then ordering it to be filled\nagain for Sokrates, who does the like: Alkibiades observing,\n\"Whatever quantity of wine you prescribe to Sokrates, he will\ndrink it without becoming drunk\".[44] Alkibiades then, instead of\npanegyrising Eros, undertakes to pronounce a panegyric on\nSokrates: proclaiming that nothing shall be said but what is true,\nand being relieved from all reserve by his drunken condition.[45]\nIn this panegyric he describes emphatically the playful irony of\nSokrates, and the magical influence exercised by his conversation\nover young men. But though Sokrates thus acquired irresistible\nascendancy over others, himself (Alkibiades) included, no one else\nacquired the least hold over Sokrates. His will and character,\nunder a playful exterior, were self-sufficing and\nself-determining; independent of influences from without, to such\na degree as was almost insulting to any one who sought either to\ncaptivate or oblige him.[46] The self-command of Sokrates was\nunshaken either by seduction on one side, or by pain and hardship\non the other. He faced danger with a courage never surpassed; he\nendured hunger, fatigue, the extremities of heat and cold, in a\nmanner such as none of his comrades in the army could\nparallel.[47] He was indifferent to the gratifications of love,\neven when they were presented to him in a manner the most\nirresistible to Grecian imagination; while at festive banquets,\nthough he did not drink of his own accord, yet if the society\nimposed obligation to do so, he outdid all in respect to quantity\nof wine. No one ever saw Sokrates intoxicated.[48] Such is the\ntenor of the panegyric pronounced by Alkibiades upon Sokrates. A\ngeneral drinking-bout closes the Symposion, in which Sokrates\nswallows large draughts of wine along with the rest, but persists\nall the while in his dialectic cross-examination, with unabated\nclearness of head. One by one the guests drop asleep, and at\ndaybreak Sokrates alone is left awake. He rises and departs, goes\nforthwith to the Lykeum, and there passes the whole day in his\nusual colloquial occupation, without being at all affected by the\npotations of the preceding night.[49]\n\n[Footnote 42: Aristotle especially notes this as one among the\npeculiarities of Plato (Politic. ii. 9, 20).\n\n[Footnote 43: Plato, Symp. p. 177 D. [Greek: e)g\u00f4\\ o(\\s ou)de/n\nph\u00eami a)/llo e)pi/stasthai \u00ea)\\ ta\\ e)r\u00f4tika/], &c. 198 D:\n[Greek: e)/ph\u00ean ei)=nai deino\\s ta\\ e)r\u00f4tika/.]]\n\n[Footnote 44: Plato, Symp. pp. 213-214.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Plato, Symp. pp. 214-215-217 E.]\n\n[Footnote 46: Plato, Symp. pp. 219 C. [Greek: t\u00ea=s S\u00f4kra/tous\nu(per\u00eaphani/as]. Compare 222 A.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Plato, Symp. p. 220.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Plato, Symp. p. 220 A.\n\nWhat has been here briefly recapitulated will be found in my\ntwenty-sixth chapter, vol. iii. pp. 20-21, seq.]\n\n[Footnote 49: Plato, Sympos. p. 223. Compare what Plato puts into\nthe mouth of Sokrates in the Protagoras (p. 347 D): well educated\nmen will carry on a dialectic debate with intelligence and\npropriety, \"_though they may drink ever so much\nwine_,\"--[Greek: ka)\\n pa/nu polu\\n oi)=non pi/\u00f4sin].]\n\n[Side-note: Sokrates--an ideal of self-command, both as to\npain and as to pleasure.]\n\nI have thus cited the Symposion to illustrate Plato's view of the\nideal of character. The self-command of Sokrates is tested both by\npain and by pleasure. He resists both of them alike and equally:\nunder the one as well as under the other, his reason works with\nunimpaired efficacy, and his deliberate purposes are pursued with\nunclouded serenity. This is not because he keeps out of the way of\ntemptation and seduction: on the contrary, he is frequently\nexposed to situations of a tempting character, and is always found\nsuperior to them.\n\n[Side-note: Trials for testing the self-controul of the\ncitizen, under the influence of wine. Dionysiac banquets, under a\nsober president.]\n\nNow Plato's purpose is, to impart to his citizens the character\nwhich he here ascribes to Sokrates, and to make them capable of\nmaintaining unimpaired the controul of reason against the\ndisturbances both of pain and pleasure. He remarks that the\nSpartan training kept in check the first of these two enemies, but\nnot the second. He thinks that the citizen ought to be put through\na regulated system of trials for measuring and testing his\ncompetence to contend with pleasure, as the Spartans provided in\nregard to pain. The Dionysiac festivals[50] afforded occasions of\napplying these trials of pleasure, just as the Gymnop\u00e6dia at\nSparta were made to furnish deliberate inflictions of pain. But\nthe Dionysiac banquets ought to be conducted under the\nsuperintendence of a discreet president, himself perfectly sober\nthroughout the whole ceremony. All the guests would drink largely\nof wine, and each would show how far and how long he could resist\nits disturbing tendencies. As there was competition among the\nyouths at the Gymnop\u00e6dia, to show how much pain each could endure\nwithout flinching--honour being shown to those who endured most,\nand most successfully--so there would be competition at the\nDionysia to prove how much wine each could bear without having his\nreason and modesty overset. The sober president would decide as\njudge. Each man's self-command, as against seductive influences,\nwould be strengthened by a repetition of such trials, while proof\nwould be afforded how far each man could be counted on.[51]\n\n[Footnote 50: Plato, Legg. i. pp. 650 A, 637 A. 633 D.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Plato, Legg. i. pp. 647 D-E-649 D.\n\nCompare the Republic, iii. pp. 412-413, where the same general\ndoctrine is enforced.]\n\n[Side-note: The gifts of Dionysus may, by precautions, be\nrendered useful--Desultory manner of Plato.]\n\nThis is one mode in which the unmeasured potations (common\nthroughout the Grecian cities, with the exception of Sparta and\nKrete) might under proper regulation be rendered useful for civic\ntraining. But there is another mode also, connected with the\ngeneral musical and gymnastical training of the city. Plato will\nnot allow Dionysus--and wine, the special gift of that God to\nmankind--to be censured as absolutely mischievous.[52]\n\n[Footnote 52: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 672 A.]\n\nIn developing this second topic, he is led into a general\ntheory of ethical and \u00e6sthetical education for his city. This\nhappens frequently enough in the desultory manner of the Platonic\ndialogues. We are sometimes conducted from an incidental and\noutlying corollary, without warning and through a side door, into\nthe central theory from which it ramifies. The practice is noway\nfavourable to facility of comprehension, but it flows naturally\nfrom the unsystematic and spontaneous sequence of the dialogue.\n\n[Side-note: Theory of ethical and \u00e6sthetical\neducation--Training of the emotions of youth through the influence\nof the Muses, Apollo, and Dionysus. Choric practice and ceremonies.]\n\nEducation of youth consists mainly in giving proper direction to\ntheir pleasures and pains--their love and their hatred. Young\npersons are capable only of emotions, well or ill directed: in\nthis consists their virtue or vice. At that age they cannot bear\nserious teaching: they are incapable of acquiring reason, or true,\nfirm opinions, which constitute the perfection of the mature man;\nindeed, if a man acquires these even when old, he may be looked on\nas fortunate.[53] The young can only have their emotions\ncultivated so as to conform to reason: they may thus be made to\nlove what reason, personified in and enforced by the lawgiver,\nenjoins--and to hate what reason forbids--but without knowing\nwherefore. Unfortunately the hard realities of life are\nperpetually giving a wrong turn to the emotions. To counteract and\ncorrect this, the influence of the Muses, of Apollo, and of\nDionysus, are indispensable: together with the periodical\nfestivals of which these Deities are respectively presidents and\nauxiliaries. Their influence is exercised through the choric\nceremony--music, singing, dancing, blended together. Every young\nman is spontaneously disposed to constant indeterminate movement\nand exercise of various kinds--running, jumping, speaking, &c.\nThis belongs to man in common with the young of other animals:\nbut what is peculiar to man exclusively is, the sense of\nrhythm and harmony, as well as of the contrary, in these movements\nand sounds. Such rhythm and harmony, in song and dance united, is\nexpressed by the chorus at the festivals, in which the Muses and\nApollo take part along with the assembled youth. Here we find the\nonly way of properly schooling the emotions.[54] The unschooled\nman is he who has not gone through a good choric practice; which\nwill require that the matter which he sings shall be good and\nhonourable, while the movements of his frame and the tones of his\nvoice must be rhythmical and graceful. Such choric practice must\nbe universal among the citizens, distributed into three classes:\nyouths, mature men, elders.[55]\n\n[Footnote 53: Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 653-659 D-E. [Greek: paidei/a\nme/n e)sth' \u00ea( paid\u00f4=n o(lk\u00ea/ te kai\\ a)g\u00f4g\u00ea\\ pro\\s to\\n u(po\\\ntou= no/mou lo/gon o)rtho\\n ei)r\u00eame/non kai\\ toi=s\ne)pieikesta/tois kai\\ presbuta/tois di' e)mpeiri/an\nxundidogme/non, \u00f4(s o)/nt\u00f4s o)rtho/s e)stin; i(/n' ou)=n \u00ea(\npsuch\u00ea\\ tou= paido\\s m\u00ea\\ e)nanti/a chai/rein kai\\ lupei=sthai\ne)thi/z\u00eatai t\u00f4=| no/m\u00f4| kai\\ toi=s u(po\\ tou= no/mou\npepeisme/nois, a)lla\\ xune/p\u00eatai chai/rousa/ te kai\\ lupoume/n\u00ea\ntoi=s au)tois tou/tois oi(=sper o( ge/r\u00f4n, tou/t\u00f4n e(/neka, a(\\s\n\u00f4)|da\\s kalou=men, o)/nt\u00f4s me\\n e)p\u00f4|dai\\ tai\\s psuchai=s au(=tai\nnu=n gegone/nai, pro\\s t\u00ea\\n toiau/t\u00ean \u00ea\\n le/gomen xumph\u00f4ni/an\ne)spoudasme/nai, dia\\ de\\ to\\ spoud\u00ea\\n m\u00ea\\ du/nasthai phe/rein\nta\\s t\u00f4=n ne/\u00f4n psucha\\s paidiai/ te kai\\ \u00f4)|dai\\ kalei=sthai kai\\\npra/ttesthai], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 654-660 A.]\n\n[Footnote 55: This triple distribution of classes for choric\ninstruction and practice is borrowed from Spartan customs,\nPlutarch, Lykurgus, 21; Schol. ad Legg. p. 633 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Music and dancing--imitation of the voice and\nmovements of brave and virtuous men. Youth must be taught to take\ndelight in this.]\n\nBut what _is_ the good and honourable--or the bad and\ndishonourable? We must be able to settle this point:--otherwise we\ncannot know how far the chorus complies with the conditions\nabove-named. Suppose a brave man and a coward in the face of danger:\nthe gestures and speech of the former will be strikingly different\nfrom those of the latter. So with other virtues and vices. Now the\nmanifestations, bodily and mental, of the virtuous man, are\nbeautiful and honourable: those of the vicious man, are ugly and\nbase. These are the _really beautiful_,--the same\nuniversally, or what ought to be beautiful to all: this is the\nstandard of rectitude in music. But they do not always\n_appear_ beautiful to all. There is great diversity in the\ntastes and sentiments of different persons: what appears to one\nman agreeable and pleasurable, appears to another disgusting or\nindifferent.[56] Such diversity is either in the natural\ndisposition, or in the habits acquired. A man's pleasure depends\nupon the former, his judgment of approbation on the latter. If\nboth his nature and his acquired habits coincide with the standard\nof rectitude, he will both delight in what is really beautiful,\nand will approve it as beautiful. But if his nature be in\ndiscordance with the standard, while his habits coincide with that\nstandard he will approve of what is honourable, but he will\ntake no delight in it: he will delight in what is base, but will\nat the same time disapprove it as base. He will however be ashamed\nto proclaim his delight before persons whom he respects, and will\nnever indulge himself in the delightful music except when he is\nalone.[57]\n\n[Footnote 56: Plato, Legg. p. 655 B.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Plato, Legg. pp. 655-656.]\n\n[Side-note: Bad musical exhibitions and poetry forbidden by\nthe lawgiver. Songs and dances must be consecrated by public\nauthority. Prizes at the musical festivals to be awarded by select\njudges.]\n\nTo take delight in gestures or songs which are manifestations of\nbad qualities, produces the same kind of mischievous effect upon\nthe spectator as association with bad men in real life. His\ncharacter becomes assimilated to the qualities in the\nmanifestations of which he delights, although he may be ashamed to\ncommend them. This is a grievous corruption, arising from bad\nmusical and choric exhibitions, which the lawgiver must take care\nto prevent. He must not allow poets to exhibit what they may\nprefer or may think to be beautiful. He must follow the practice\nof Egypt, where both the music and the pictorial type has been\ndetermined by the Gods or by divine lawgivers from immemorial\nantiquity, according to the standard of natural rectitude and\nwhere the government allows neither poet nor painter to innovate\nor depart from this consecrated type.[58] Accordingly, Egyptian\ncompositions of the present day are exactly like what they were\nten thousand years ago: neither more nor less beautiful. The\nlawgiver must follow this example, and fix the type of his musical\nand choric exhibitions; forbidding all innovation introduced on\nthe plea of greater satisfaction either to the poet or to the\naudience. In the festivals where there is competition among poets,\nthe prize must not be awarded by the pleasure of the auditors,\nwhose acclamations tend only to corrupt and pervert the poets. The\nauditors ought to hear nothing but what is better than their own\ncharacters, in order that their tastes may thus be exalted. The\nprize must be awarded according to the preference of a few\nelders--or better still, of one single elder--eminent for excellent\ntraining and virtue. This judge ought not to follow the taste of\nthe auditors, but to consider himself as their teacher and\nimprover.[59]\n\n[Footnote 58: Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 656-657.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 659 A, 668 A.]\n\n[Side-note: The Spartan and Kretan agree with the Athenian,\nthat poets must be kept under a strict censorship. But they do not\nagree as to what the poets are required to conform to.]\n\nSuch is the exposition given by the Athenian speaker,\nrespecting the characteristic function, and proper regulating\nprinciples, of choric training (poems learnt, music and dancing)\nfor the youth. The Spartan and Kretan cordially concur with him:\nespecially with that provision which fixes and consecrates the old\nestablished type, forbidding all novelties and spontaneous\ninspiration of the poets. They claim this compulsory orthodoxy,\ntolerating no dissent from the ancient and consecrated canon of\nmusic and orchestic, as the special feature of their two states;\nas distinguishing Sparta and Krete from other Hellenic cities,\nwhich were invaded with impunity by novel compositions of every\nvariety.[60]\n\n[Footnote 60: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 660 C-D.]\n\nThe Athenian is thus in full agreement with his two companions, on\nthe general principle of subjecting the poets to an inflexible\ncensorship. But the agreement disappears, when he comes to specify\nthe dogmas which the poets are required to inculcate in their\nhymns. While complimenting his two friends upon their enforcement\nof an exclusive canon, he proceeds to assume that of course there\ncan be but ONE canon;--that there is no doubt what the\ndogmas contained in it are to be. He then unfolds briefly the\nPlatonic ethical creed. \"You Spartans and Kretans (he says)[61] of\ncourse constrain your poets to proclaim that the just and\ntemperate man is happy, whether he be tall, strong, and rich--or\nshort, feeble, and poor: and that the bad man is wretched and\nlives in suffering, though he be richer than Midas, and possessor\nbesides of every other advantage in life. Most men appreciate\nfalsely good and evil things. They esteem as good things, health,\nbeauty, strength, perfect sight and hearing, power, long life,\nimmortality: they account the contrary to be bad things. But you\nand I take a different view.[62] We agree in proclaiming, that all\nthese so-called good things are good only to the just man. To the\nunjust man, we affirm that health, strength, perfection of senses,\npower, long life, &c., are not good, but exceedingly bad.\nThis, I presume, is the doctrine which you compel your poets\nto proclaim, and no other--in suitable rhythm and harmony.[63] You\nagree with me in this, do you not?\"\n\n[Footnote 61: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 660 E.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 661 B. [Greek: u(mei=s de\\ kai\\\ne)g\u00f4/ pou ta/de le/gomen, \u00f4(s tau=ta/ e)sti xu/mpanta dikai/ois\nme\\n kai\\ o(si/ois a)ndra/sin a)/rista kt\u00ea/mata, a)di/kois de\\\nka/kista xu/mpanta, a)rxa/mena a)po\\ t\u00ea=s u(giei/as.]]\n\n[Footnote 63: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 661 C. [Greek: Tau=ta d\u00ea\\\nle/gein oi)=mai tou\\s par' u(mi=n poi\u00eata\\s pei/sete kai\\\na)nagka/sete], &c.]\n\n\"We agree with you (replies Kleinias) on some of your\naffirmations, but we disagree with you wholly on others.\"\n\n\"What? (says the Athenian.) Do you disagree with me when I affirm,\nthat a man healthy, rich, strong, powerful, fearless, long-lived,\nexempt from all the things commonly reputed to be evils, but at\nthe same time unjust and exorbitant--when I say that such a man is\nnot happy, but miserable?\"\n\n\"We _do_ disagree with you when you affirm this,\" answers the\nKretan.\n\n\"But will you not admit that such a man lives basely or\ndishonourably?\"\n\n\"Basely or dishonourably.--Yes, we grant it.\"\n\n\"What then--do you not grant farther, that he lives badly,\ndisagreeably, disadvantageously, to himself?\"\n\n\"No. We cannot possibly grant you that,\"--replies Kleinias.\n\n[Side-note: Ethical creed laid down by the Athenian--Poets\nrequired to conform to it.]\n\n\"Then (says the Athenian) you and I are in marked opposition.[64]\nFor to me what I have affirmed appears as necessary as the\nexistence of Krete is indisputable. If I were lawgiver, I should\nforce the poets and all the citizens to proclaim it with one\nvoice: and I should punish most severely every one[65] who\naffirmed that there could be any wicked men who lived\nagreeably--or that there could be any course advantageous or\nprofitable, which was not at the same time the most just. These\nand other matters equally at variance with the opinions received\namong Kretans, Spartans, and mankind generally--should persuade my\ncitizens to declare unanimously.--For let us assume for a moment\nyour opinion, and let us ask any lawgiver or any father\nadvising his son.--You say that the just course of life is one\nthing, and that the agreeable course is another: I ask you which\nof the two is the happiest? If you say that the agreeable course\nis the happiest, what do you mean by always exhorting me to be\njust? Do you wish me not to be happy?[66] If on the contrary you\ntell me that the just course of life is happier than the\nagreeable, I put another question--What is this Good and Beautiful\nwhich the lawgiver extols as superior to pleasure, and in which\nthe just man's happiness consists? What good _can_ he\npossess, apart from pleasure?[67] He obtains praise and\nhonour:--Is _that_ good, but disagreeable--and would the contrary,\ninfamy, be agreeable? A life in which a man neither does wrong to\nothers nor receives wrong from others,--is _that_\ndisagreeable, though good and honourable--and would the contrary\nlife be agreeable, but dishonourable? You will not affirm that it\nis.[68]\n\n[Footnote 64: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 662 A-B. [Greek: \u00ea)\\ tou=to me/n\ni)/s\u00f4s a)\\n xugch\u00f4r\u00ea/saite, to/ ge ai)schr\u00f4=s (z\u00ea=n)?\n_Kleini/as_. Pa/nu me\\n ou)=n. _A)th\u00eanai=os_. Ti/ de/?\nto\\ kai\\ kak\u00f4=s? _Klein_. Ou)k a)\\n e)/ti tou=th' o(moi/\u00f4s.\n_A)th\u00ean_. Ti/ de/? to\\ kai\\ a)\u00ead\u00f4/s kai\\ m\u00ea\\ xumphero/nt\u00f4s\nau)t\u00f4=|? _Klein_. Kai\\ p\u00f4/s a)\\n tau=ta/ g' e)/ti\nxugch\u00f4roi=men? _A)th\u00ean_. O(/p\u00f4s? ei) theo\\s \u00ea(mi=n \u00f4(s\ne)/oiken, \u00f4)= phi/loi, doi/\u00ea tis sumph\u00f4ni/an, \u00f4(s nu=n ge schedo\\n\na)pa/|domen a)p' a)ll\u00ea/l\u00f4n. E)moi\\ ga\\r d\u00ea\\ phai/netai tau=ta\nou(/t\u00f4s a)nagkai=a, \u00f4(s ou)de\\ Kr\u00ea/t\u00ea n\u00ea=sos saph\u00f4=s.]]\n\n[Footnote 65: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 662 B-C. [Greek: z\u00eami/an te\no)li/gou megi/st\u00ean e)pitithei/\u00ean a)\\n, ei) tis e)n t\u00ea=| ch\u00f4/ra|\nphthe/gxaito \u00f4(s ei)si/ tines a)/nthr\u00f4poi/ pote pon\u00earoi\\ me/n,\n\u00ea(de/\u00f4s de\\ z\u00f4=ntes], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 66: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 662 D-E.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 662 E. [Greek: ei) d' au)= to\\n\ndikaio/taton eu)daimone/staton a)pophai/noito bi/on ei)=nai,\nz\u00eatoi= pou pa=s a)\\n o( a)kou/\u00f4n, oi)=mai, ti/ pot' e)n au)t\u00f4=|\nto\\ t\u00ea=s \u00ea(don\u00ea=s krei=tton a)gatho/n te kai\\ kalo\\n o( no/mos\ne)no\\n e)painei=? ti/ ga\\r d\u00ea\\ dikai/\u00f4| ch\u00f4rizo/menon \u00ea(don\u00ea=s\na)gatho\\n a)\\n gi/gnoito?]]\n\n[Footnote 68: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 663 A.]\n\n\"Surely then, my doctrine--which regards the pleasurable, the\njust, the good, and the honourable, as indissolubly\nconnected,--has at least a certain force of persuasion, if it has\nnothing more, towards inducing men to live a just and holy life: so\nthat the lawgiver would be both base and wanting to his own purposes,\nif he did not proclaim it as a truth. For no one will be willingly\npersuaded to do anything which does not carry with it in its\nconsequences more pleasure than pain.[69] There is indeed\nconfusion in every man's vision, when he looks at these\nconsequences in distant outline: but it is the duty of the\nlawgiver to clear up such confusion, and to teach his citizens in\nthe best way he can, by habits, encouraging praises, discourses,\n&c., how they ought to judge amidst these deceptive outlines.\nInjustice, when looked at thus in prospect, seems to the unjust\nman pleasurable, while justice seems to him thoroughly\ndisagreeable. On the contrary, to the just man, the appearance is\nexactly contrary: to him justice seems pleasurable, injustice\nrepulsive. Now which of these two judgments shall we\npronounce to be the truth? That of the just man. The verdict of\nthe better soul is unquestionably more trustworthy than that of\nthe worse. We must therefore admit it to be a truth, that the\nunjust life is not merely viler and more dishonourable, but also\nin truth more disagreeable, than the just life.\"[70]\n\n[Footnote 69: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 663 B. [Greek: Ou)kou=n o( me\\n\nm\u00ea\\ ch\u00f4ri/z\u00f4n lo/gos \u00ea(du/ te kai\\ di/kaion kai\\ a)gatho/n te kai\\\nkalo/n, pithano\\s g', ei) m\u00eade\\n e(/teron, pro\\s to/ tina\ne)the/lein z\u00ea=n to\\n o(/sion kai\\ di/kaion bi/on; \u00f4(/ste\nnomothe/t\u00ea| ge ai)/schistos lo/g\u00f4n kai\\ e)nanti\u00f4/tatos, o(\\s a)\\n\nm\u00ea\\ ph\u00ea=| tau=ta ou(/t\u00f4s e)/chein; ou)dei\\s ga\\r a)\\n e(k\u00f4\\n\ne)/theloi pei/thesthai pra/ttein tou=to, o(/t\u00f4| m\u00ea\\ to\\ chai/rein\ntou= lupei=sthai ple/on e(/petai.]]\n\n[Footnote 70: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 663 C-D.]\n\n[Side-note: The Spartan and Kretan do not agree with him.]\n\nSuch is the course of proof which Plato's Athenian speaker\nconsiders sufficient to establish this ethical doctrine. But he\nproceeds to carry the reasoning a step farther, as follows:--\n\n\"Nay, even if this were not a true position--as I have just shown\nit to be--any lawgiver even of moderate worth, if ever he ventured\nto tell a falsehood to youth for useful purposes, could proclaim\nno falsehood more useful than this, nor more efficacious towards\nmaking them disposed to practise justice willingly, without\ncompulsory force.\"[71]\n\n[Footnote 71: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 663 D-E. [Greek: Nomothe/t\u00eas\nde/, ou(= ti kai\\ smikro\\n o)/phelos, ei) kai\\ m\u00ea\\ tou=to \u00ea)=n\nou(/t\u00f4s e)/chon, \u00f4(s kai\\ nu=n au)to\\ \u00ea(/|r\u00each' o( lo/gos\ne)/chein, ei)/per ti kai\\ a)/llo e)to/lm\u00easen a)\\n e)p' a)gath\u00f4=|\npseu/desthai pro\\s tou\\s ne/ous, e)/stin o(/, ti tou/ton pseu=dos\nlusitele/steron a)\\n e)pseu/sato/ pote, kai\\ duna/menon ma=llon\npoiei=n m\u00ea\\ bi/a| a)ll' e(ko/ntas pa/nta ta\\ di/kaia?]]\n\n\"Truth is honourable (observes the Kretan) and durable. You will\nnot find it easy to make them believe what you propose.\"\n\n\"Why, it was found easy (replies the Athenian) to make men believe\nthe mythe respecting Kadmus and the armed men who sprang out of\nthe earth after the sowing of the dragon's teeth--and many other\nmythes equally incredible. Such examples show conclusively that\nthe lawgiver can implant in youthful minds any beliefs which he\ntries to implant. He need therefore look to nothing, except to\ndetermine what are those beliefs which, if implanted, would be\nmost beneficial to the city. Having determined this, he will\nemploy all his machinery to make all his citizens proclaim these\nbeliefs constantly, with one voice, and without contradiction, in\nall hymns, stories, and discourses.\"[72]\n\n[Footnote 72: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 664 A.]\n\n\"This brings me to my own proposition. My three Choruses\n(youthful, mature, elderly) will be required to sing perpetually\nto the tender minds of children all the honourable and good\ndoctrines which I shall prescribe in detail. But the sum and\nsubstance of them will be--The best life has been declared by the\nGods to be also the most pleasurable, and it _is_ the most\npleasurable.[73] The whole city--man, boy, freeman, slave, male,\nfemale--will be always singing this doctrine to itself in choric\nsongs, diversified by the poets in such manner as to keep up the\ninterest and satisfaction of the singers.\"[74]\n\n[Footnote 73: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 664 B.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 665 C.\n\nIt will be understood that here, as elsewhere, I give the\nsubstance of Plato's reasoning without binding myself to the\ntranslation of the particular words.]\n\n[Side-note: Chorus of Elders are required to set an example\nin keeping up the purity of the music prescribed.]\n\nHere, then, we have the general doctrine, ethical and social,\nwhich is to be maintained in exclusive possession of the voice,\near, and mind, of the Platonic citizens. The imitative movements\nof the tripartite Chorus must be kept in perfect accordance with\nit:[75] for all music is imitative, and care must be taken to\nimitate the right things in a right manner. To ensure such\naccordance, magistrates must be specially chosen as censors over\nboth poets and singers. But this, in Plato's view, is not enough.\nHe requires, besides, that the choristers should themselves\nunderstand both what they ought to imitate, and how it should be\nimitated. Such understanding cannot be expected from the Chorus of\nyouths nor even from that of mature men. But it may be expected,\nand it must be required, in the chorus of Elders: which will thus\nset an example to the other two, of strict adherence to the\nrectitude of the musical standard.[76] The purity of the Platonic\nmusical training depends mainly upon the constant and efficacious\nchoric activity of the old citizens.\n\n[Footnote 75: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 668 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n\nmousik\u00ea/n ge pa=sa/n phamen ei)kastik\u00ea/n te ei)=nai kai\\\nmim\u00eatik\u00ea/n?]]\n\n[Footnote 76: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 670 B-D; vi. p. 764 C; vii. p.\n812 B.\n\nAristotle directs that the elders shall be relieved from active\nparticipation in choric duties, and confined to the function of\njudging or criticising (Politic. viii. 6, 1340, b. 38).]\n\nBut how is such activity to be obtained? Old men will not only\nfind it repugnant to their natural dispositions, but will even be\nashamed to exhibit themselves in choric music and dance before the\nyounger citizens.\n\n[Side-note: The Elders require the stimulus of wine, in\norder to go through the choric duties with spirit.]\n\nIt is here that Plato invokes the aid of wine-drinking and\nintoxication. The stimulus of wine, drunk by the old men at the\nDionysiac banquets, will revive in them a temporary fit of\nsomething like juvenile activity, and will supply an antidote to\ninconvenient diffidence.[77] Under such partial excitement, they\nwill stand forward freely to discharge their parts in the choric\nexhibitions; which, as performed by them, will be always in full\nconformity with the canon of musical rectitude, and will prevent\nit from becoming corrupted or relaxed by the younger choristers.\nTo ensure however that the excitement shall not overpass due\nlimits, Plato prescribes that the president of the banquet shall\nbe a grave person drinking no wine at all. The commendation or\nreproof of such a president will sustain the reason and\nself-command of the guests, at the pitch compatible with full\nexecution of their choric duty.[78] Plato interdicts wine altogether\nto youths, until 18 years of age--allows it only in small quantities\nuntil the age of 40--but permits and even encourages elders above\n40 to partake of the full inspiration of the Dionysiac\nbanquets.[79]\n\n[Footnote 77: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 666 B-C. [Greek: e)pi/kouron\nt\u00ea=s tou= g\u00ea/r\u00f4s au)st\u00earo/t\u00eatos e)d\u00f4r\u00ea/sato (Dio/nusos) to\\n\noi)=non, pha/rmakon, \u00f4(/ste a)n\u00eaba=|n \u00ea(ma=s . . . pr\u00f4=ton me\\n\nd\u00ea\\ diatethei\\s ou(/t\u00f4s e(/kastos a)=r' ou)k a)\\n e)/theloi\nprothumo/tero/n ge, \u00ea(=tton ai)schuno/menos . . . a)/|dein.]]\n\n[Footnote 78: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 671.]\n\n[Footnote 79: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 666 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Peculiar views of Plato about intoxication.]\n\nThis manner of regarding intoxication must probably have occurred\nto Plato at a time later than the composition of the Republic,\nwherein we find it differently handled.[80] It deserves attention\nas an illustration, both of his boldness in following out his own\nethical views, in spite of the consciousness[81] that they would\nappear strange to others--and of the prominent function which\nhe assigns to old men in this dialogue De Legibus. He condemns\nintoxication decidedly, when considered simply as a mode of\nenjoyment, and left to the taste of the company without any\npresident or regulation. But with most moralists such condemnation\nis an unreflecting and undistinguishing sentiment. Against this\nPlato enters his protest. He considers that intoxication, if\nproperly regulated, may be made conducive to valuable ends,\nethical and social. Without it the old men cannot be wound up to\nthe pitch of choric activity; without such activity, constant and\nunfaltering, the rectitude of the choric system has no adequate\nsecurity against corruption: without such security, the emotional\ntraining of the citizens generally will degenerate. Farthermore,\nPlato takes occasion from drunkenness to lay down a general\ndoctrine respecting pleasures. Men must be trained to self-command\nagainst pleasures, as they are against pains, not by keeping out\nof the way of temptation, but by regulated exposure to\ntemptations, with motives at hand to help them in the task of\nresistance. Both these views are original and suggestive, like so\nmany others in the Platonic writings: tending to rescue Ethics\nfrom that tissue of rhetorical and emotional commonplace in which\nit so frequently appears;--and to keep present before those who\nhandle it, those ideas of an end to be attained, and of\ndiscrimination as to means--which are essential to its pretensions\nas a science.\n\n[Footnote 80: In the Republic (iii. p. 398 E) Plato pronounced\nintoxication ([Greek: me/th\u00ea]) to be most unbecoming for his\nGuardians. He places it in the same class of defects as indolence\nand effeminacy. He also repudiates those varieties of musical\nharmony called _Ionic_ and _Lydian_, because they were\nlanguid, effeminate, symposiac, or suitable for a drinking society\n([Greek: malakai/ te kai\\ sumpotikai/, chalarai/]). Various\nmusical critics of the day ([Greek: t\u00f4=n peri\\ t\u00ea\\n mousik\u00ea/n\ntines]--we learn this curious fact from Aristotle, Polit. viii. 7,\nnear the end) impugned this opinion of Plato. They affirmed that\ndrunkenness was exciting and stimulating,--not relaxing nor\nfavourable to languor and heaviness: that the effeminate musical\nmodes were not congenial to drunkenness. When we read the Treatise\nDe Legibus, we observe that Plato altered his opinion respecting\n[Greek: me/th\u00ea], and had come round to agree with these musical\ncritics. He treats [Greek: me/th\u00ea] as exciting and stimulating,\nnot relaxing and indolent; he even applies it as a positive\nstimulus to wind up the Elders. Moreover, instead of repudiating\nit absolutely, he defends its usefulness under proper regulations.\nPerhaps the change of his opinion may have been partly owing to\nthese very criticisms.]\n\n[Footnote 81: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 665 B. Old Philokleon, in the\nVesp\u00e6 of Aristophanes (1320 seq.), under the influence of wine and\njovial excitement, is a pregnant subject for comic humour.]\n\n[Side-note: General ethical doctrine held by Plato in\nLeges.]\n\nBut the general ethical discussion--which Plato tells us[82] that\nhe introduces to establish premisses for his enactment respecting\ndrunkenness--is of greater importance than the enactment itself.\nHe prescribes imperatively the doctrine and matter which alone is\nto be tolerated in his choric hymns or heard in his city. I have\ngiven an abstract (p. 292-297) of the doctrine here laid down and\nthe reasonings connected therewith, because they admit of being\nplaced in instructive comparison with his manner of treating the\nsame subject in other dialogues.\n\n[Footnote 82: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 664 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Pleasure--Good--Happiness--What is the relation\nbetween them?]\n\nWhat is the relation between Pleasure, Good, and Happiness?\nPain, Evil, Unhappiness? Do the names in the first triplet\nmean substantially the same thing, only looked at in different\naspects and under different conditions? Or do they mean three\ndistinct things, separable and occurring the one without the\nother? This important question was much debated, and answered in\nmany different ways, by Grecian philosophers from the time of\nSokrates downward--and by Roman philosophers after them. Plato\nhandles it not merely in the dialogue now before us, but in\nseveral others--differently too in each: in Protagoras, Gorgias,\nRepublic, Phil\u00eabus, &c.[83]\n\n[Footnote 83: See above, vol. ii. ch. xxiv. pp. 353.]\n\n[Side-note: Comparison of the doctrine laid down in Leges.]\n\nHere, in the Dialogue De Legibus (by incidental allusion, too, in\nsome of the Epistles), we have the latest form in which these\ndoctrines about Pleasure, Happiness, Good--and their respective\ncontraries--found expression in Plato's compositions. Much of the\ndoctrines is the same--yet with some material variation. It is\nhere reasserted, by the Athenian, that the just and temperate man\nis happy, and that the unjust man is miserable, whatever may\nbefall him: moreover that good things (such as health, strength,\nsight, hearing, &c.) are good only to the just man, evil to\nthe unjust--while the contrary (such as sickness, weakness,\nblindness) are good things to the unjust, evil only to the just.\nTo this position both the Spartan and the Kretan distinctly refuse\ntheir assent: and Plato himself admits that mankind in general\nwould agree with them in such refusal.[84] He vindicates his own\nopinion by a new argument which had not before appeared. \"The just\nman himself\" (he urges), \"one who has been fully trained in just\ndispositions, will feel it to be as I say: the unjust man will\nfeel the contrary. But the just man is much more trustworthy than\nthe unjust: therefore we must believe what he says to be the\ntruth.\"[85] Appeal is here made, not to the Wise Man or Artist,\nbut to the just man: whose sentence is invested with a\nself-justifying authority, wherein Plato looks for his _aliquid\ninconcussum_. Now it is for philosophy, or for the true Artist,\nthat this pre-eminence is claimed in the Republic,[86] where\nSokrates declares, that each of the three souls combined in the\nindividual man (the rational or philosophical, in the head--the\npassionate or ambitious, between the neck and the diaphragm--and\nthe appetitive, below the diaphragm) has its special pleasures;\nthat each prefers its own; but that the judgment of the\nphilosophical man must be regarded as paramount over the other\ntwo.[87] Comparing this demonstration in the Republic with the\nunsupported inference here noted in the Leges--we perceive the\ncontrast of the oracular and ethical character of the latter, with\nthe intellectual and dialectic character of the former.\n\n[Footnote 84: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 662 C.]\n\n[Footnote 85: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 663 C.]\n\n[Footnote 86: Plato, Repub. ix. pp. 580 E-583 A.]\n\n[Footnote 87: Plato, Repub. ix. p. 583 A. [Greek: A)na/gk\u00ea a(\\ o(\nphilo/sopho/s te kai\\ o( philolo/gos e)painei=, a)l\u00eathe/stata\nei)=nai . . . ku/rios gou=n e)paine/t\u00eas \u00f4)\\n e)painei= to\\n\ne(autou= bi/on o( phro/nimos.]]\n\nAgain, here in the Leges, the Athenian puts it to his two\ncompanions, Whether the unjust man, assuming him to possess every\nimaginable endowment and advantage in life, will not live,\nnevertheless, both dishonourably and miserably? They admit that he\nwill live dishonourably: they deny that he will live\nmiserably.[88] The Athenian replies by reasserting emphatically\nhis own opinion, without any attempt to prove it. Now in the\nGorgias, the same issue is raised between Sokrates and Polus:\nSokrates refutes his opponent by a dialectic argument, showing\nthat if the first of the two doctrines (the living\ndishonourably--[Greek: ai)schr\u00f4=s]) be granted, the second (the\nliving miserably--[Greek: kak\u00f4=s]) cannot be consistently denied.[89]\nThe dialectic of Sokrates is indeed more ingenious than conclusive:\nbut still it _is_ dialectic--and thus stands contrasted with the\noracular emphasis which is substituted for it in Leges.\n\n[Footnote 88: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 662 A.]\n\n[Footnote 89: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 474 C, 478 E.]\n\n[Side-note: Doctrine in Leges about Pleasure and\nGood--approximates more nearly to the Protagoras than to Gorgias\nand Phil\u00eabus.]\n\nFarthermore, the distinction between Pleasure and Good, in the\nlanguage of the Athenian speaker in the Leges, approximates more\nnearly to the doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras, than to his\ndoctrine in the Gorgias, Phil\u00eabus, and Republic. The Athenian\nproclaims that he is dealing with men, and not with Gods, and that\nhe must therefore recognise the nature of man, with its\nfundamental characteristics: that no man will willingly do\nanything from which he does not anticipate more pleasure than\npain: that every man desires the maximum of pleasure and the\nminimum of pain, and desires nothing else: that there neither is\nnor can be any Good, apart from Pleasure or superior to Pleasure:\nthat to insist upon a man being just, if you believe that he will\nobtain more pleasure or less pain from an unjust mode of life, is\nabsurd and inconsistent: that the doctrine which declares the life\nof pleasure and the life of justice to lead in two distinct paths,\nis a heresy deserving not only censure but punishment.[90] Plato\nhere enunciates, as distinctly as Epikurus did after him, that\nPleasures and Pains must be regulated (here regulated by the\nlawgiver), so that each man may attain the maximum of the former\nwith the minimum of the latter: and that Good, apart from maximum\nof pleasure or minimum of pain accruing to the agent himself,[91]\ncannot be made consistent with the nature or aspirations of man.\n\n[Footnote 90: Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 662 C-D-E, 663 B.\n\nIn v. pp. 732 E to 734, the Athenian speaker delivers [Greek: ta\\\na)nthr\u00f4/pina] of the general preface or pro\u00ebm to his Laws, after\nhaving previously delivered [Greek: ta\\ thei=a] (v. pp. 727-732).\n\n[Greek: Ta\\ thei=a]. These are precepts respecting piety to the\nGods, and behaviour to parents, strangers, suppliants; and\nrespecting the duty of rendering due honour, first to the mind,\nnext to the body--of maintaining both the one and the other in a\nsound and honourable condition. Repeated exhortation is given to\nobey the enactments whereby the lawgiver regulates pleasures and\npains: the precepts are also enforced by insisting on the\nsuffering which will accrue to the agent if they be neglected. We\nalso read (what is said also in Gorgias) that the [Greek: di/k\u00ea\nkakourgi/as megi/st\u00ea] is [Greek: to\\ o(moiou=sthai kakoi=s\na)ndra/sin] (p. 728 B).\n\n[Greek: Ta\\ a)nthr\u00f4/pina], which follow [Greek: ta\\ thei=a],\nindicate the essential conditions of human character which limit\nand determine the application of such precepts to man. To love\npleasure--to hate pain--are the paramount and indefeasible\nattributes of man; but they admit of being regulated, and they\nought to be regulated by wisdom--the [Greek: metr\u00eatik\u00ea\\\nte/chn\u00ea]--insisted on by Sokrates in the Protagoras (p. 356 E).\nCompare Legg. i. p. 636 E, ii. p. 653 A.]\n\n[Footnote 91: It is among the tests of a well-disciplined army\n(according to Xenophon, Cyrop\u00e6d. i. 6, 26) [Greek: o(po/te to\\\npei/thesthai au)toi=s \u00ea(/dion ei)/\u00ea tou= a)peithei=n.]]\n\n[Side-note: Comparison of Leges with Republic and Gorgias.]\n\nThere is another point too in which the Athenian speaker here\nrecedes from the lofty pretensions of Sokrates in the\nRepublic and the Gorgias. In the second Book of the Republic, we\nsaw Glaukon and Adeimantus challenge Sokrates to prove that\njustice, apart from all its natural consequences, will suffice\n_per se_ to make the just man happy;[92] _per se_, that\nis, even though all the society misconceive his character, and\nrender no justice to him, but heap upon him nothing except obloquy\nand persecution. If (Glaukon urges) you can only recommend justice\nwhen taken in conjunction with the requiting esteem and\nreciprocating justice from others towards the just agent, this is\nno recommendation of justice at all. Your argument implies a tacit\nadmission, that it will be better still if he can pass himself off\nas just in the opinion of others, without really being just\nhimself: and you must be understood as recommending to him this\nlatter course--if he can do it successfully. Sokrates accepts the\nchallenge, and professes to demonstrate the thesis tendered to\nhim: which is in substance the cardinal dogma afterwards espoused\nby the Stoics. I have endeavoured to show (in a former\nchapter[93]), that his demonstration is altogether unsuccessful:\nand when we turn to the Treatise De Legibus, we shall see that the\nAthenian speaker recedes from the doctrine altogether: confining\nhimself to the defence of justice _with_ its requiting and\nreciprocating consequences, not _without_ them. The just man,\nas the Athenian speaker conceives him, is one who performs his\nobligations towards others, and towards whom others perform their\nobligations also: he is one who obtains from others that just\ndealing and that esteem which is his due: and when so conceived,\nhis existence is one of pleasure and happiness.[94] This is, in\nsubstance, the Epikurean doctrine substituted for the Stoic. It is\nthat which Glaukon and Adeimantus in the Republic deprecate as\nunworthy disparagement of justice; and which they adjure Sokrates,\nby his attachment to justice, to stand up and repel.[95] Now even\nthis, the Epikurean doctrine, is true only with certain\nqualifications: since there are various other conditions essential\nto happiness, over and above the ethical conditions. Still it is\nnot so utterly at variance with the truth as the doctrine which\nSokrates undertakes to prove, but never does prove, in the\nRepublic.\n\n[Footnote 92: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 359-367.]\n\n[Footnote 93: See above, chap. xxviii. p. 150,** seq.]\n\n[Footnote 94: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 663 A.]\n\n[Footnote 95: Plato, Republ. ii. p. 368 B. [Greek: de/doika ga\\r\nm\u00ea\\ ou)d' o(/sion \u00ea)=| parageno/menon dikaiosu/n\u00ea| kak\u00eagoroume/n\u00ea|\nm\u00ea\\ bo\u00eathei=n.]]\n\n[Side-note: Plato here mistrusts the goodness of his own\nproof. He falls back upon useful fiction.]\n\nThe last point which I shall here remark in this portion of the\nTreatise De Legibus is, the sort of mistrust manifested by Plato\nof the completeness of his own proof. Notwithstanding the vehement\nphrases in which the Athenian speaker proclaims his internal\npersuasion of the truth of his doctrine,** while acknowledging at\nthe same time that not only his two companions, but most\nother persons also, took the opposite view[96]--he finds it\nconvenient to reinforce the demonstration of the expositor by the\nomnipotent infallibility of the lawgiver. He descends from the\nregion of established truth to that of useful fiction. \"Even if\nthe doctrine (that the pleasurable, the just, the good, and the\nhonourable, are indissoluble) were not true, the lawgiver ought to\nadopt it as an useful fiction for youth, effective towards\ninducing them to behave justly without compulsion. The law giver\ncan obtain belief for any fiction which he pleases to circulate,\nas may be seen by the implicit belief obtained for the Theban\nmythe about the dragon's teeth, and a thousand other mythes\nequally difficult of credence. He must proclaim the doctrine as an\nimperative article of faith; carefully providing that it shall be\nperpetually recited, by one and all his citizens, in the public\nhymns, narratives, and discourses, without any voice being heard\nto call it in question.\"[97]\n\n[Footnote 96: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 662 B.]\n\n[Footnote 97: Plato, Legg. ii. p. 663 D. [Greek: e)p' a)gath\u00f4=|\npseu/desthai pro\\s tou\\s ne/ous], &c. Also 664 A. So, in the\nBacch\u00e6 of Euripides (332), the two old men, Kadmus and Teiresias,\nafter vainly attempting to inculcate upon Pentheus the belief in\nand the worship of Dionysus, at last appeal to his prudence, and\nadmonish him of the danger of unbelief:--\n\n[Greek: kei\\ m\u00ea\\ ga/r e)stin o( theo\\s ou(=tos, \u00f4(s su\\ ph\u00ea/s,\npara\\ soi\\ lege/sth\u00f4, kai\\ katapseu/dou kal\u00f4=s\n\u00f4(s e)/sti, Seme/l\u00ea th' i(/na dok\u00ea=| theo\\n tekei=n,\n\u00ea(mi=n te tim\u00ea\\ A)ktai/\u00f4nos a)/thlion mo/ron?\n. . . o(\\ m\u00ea\\ path\u00ea=|s su/.]]\n\n[Side-note: Deliberate ethical fiction employed as means of\ngoverning.]\n\nHere is a second attempt on the part of Plato, in addition to that\nwhich we have seen in the Republic,[98] to employ deliberate\nethical fiction as a means of governing his citizens: first to\nimplant and accredit it--next to prescribe its incessant iteration\nby all the citizens in the choric ceremonies--lastly to consecrate\nit, and to forbid all questioners or opponents: all application of\nthe Sokratic Elenchus to test it. In this treatise he speaks of\nthe task as easier to the lawgiver than he had described it to be\nin his Republic: in which latter we found him regarding a new\narticle of faith as difficult to implant, but as easy to uphold if\nonce it be implanted; while in the Treatise De Legibus both\nprocesses are treated as alike achievable and certain. The\nconception of dogmatic omnipotence had become stronger in Plato's\nmind during the interval between the two treatises. Intending to\npostulate for himself the complete regulation not merely of the\nactions, but also of the thoughts and feelings of his\ncitizens--intending moreover to exclude free or insubordinate\nintellects--he naturally looks upon all as docile recipients of\nany faith which he thinks it right to preach. When he appeals,\nhowever, as proofs of the facility of his plan, to the analogy of\nthe numerous mythes received with implicit faith throughout the\nworld around him--we see how low an estimate he formed of the\nprocess whereby beliefs are generated in the human mind, and of\ntheir evidentiary value as certifying the truth of what is\nbelieved. People believed what was told them at first by some\nimposing authority, and transmitted the belief to their\nsuccessors, even without the extraneous support of inquisitorial\nrestrictions such as the Platonic lawgiver throws round the\nMagn\u00eatic community in the Leges. It is in reference to such\nself-supporting beliefs that Sokrates stands forth, in the earlier\nPlatonic compositions, as an enquirer into the reasons on which\nthey rested--a task useful as well as unpleasant to those whom he\nquestioned--attracting unpopularity as well as reputation to\nhimself. Plato had then keenly felt the inestimable value of this\nElenchus or examining function personified in his master; but in\nthe Treatise De Legibus the master has no place, and the function\nis severely proscribed. Plato has come round to the dogmatic pole,\nextolling the virtue of passive recipient minds who have no other\nsentiment than that which the lawgiver issues to them. Yet while\nhe postulates in his own city the infallible authority of the\nlawgiver, and enforces it by penalties, as final and\nall-sufficient to determine the ethical beliefs of all the Platonic\ncitizens--we shall find in a subsequent book of this Treatise that\nhe denounces and punishes those who generalise this very\npostulate; and who declare the various ethical beliefs, actually\nexisting in communities of men, to have been planted each by some\nhuman authority--not to have sprung from any unseen oracle called\nNature.[99]\n\n[Footnote 98: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 414; v. p. 459 D.]\n\n[Footnote 99: Plato, Legg. x. pp. 889-890.]\n\n[Side-note: Importance of music and chorus as an engine of\nteaching for Plato. Views of Xenophon and Aristotle compared.]\n\nSuch is the ethical doctrine which Plato proclaims in the Leges,\nand which he directs to be sung by each Chorus among the three\n(boys, men, elders), with appropriate music and dancing. It is on\nthe constancy, strictness, and sameness of these choric and\nmusical influences, that he relies for the emotional training of\nyouth. If the musical training be either intermitted or allowed to\nvary from the orthodox canon--if the theatrical exhibitions be\nregulated by the taste of the general audience, and not by the\njudgment of a few discerning censors--the worst consequences will\narise: the character of the citizens will degenerate, and the\ninstitutions of his city will have no foundation to rest\nupon.[100] The important effects of music, as an instrument in the\nhands of the lawgiver for regulating the emotions of the citizens,\nand especially for inspiring a given emotional character to\nyouth--are among the characteristic features of Plato's point of\nview, common to both the Republic and the Laws. There is little\ntrace of this point of view either in Xenophon or in Isokrates; but\nAristotle embraces it to a considerable extent. It grew out of the\npractice and tradition of the Grecian cities, in most of which the\nliterary teaching of youth was imparted by making them read,\nlearn, recite, or chaunt the works of various poets; while the use\nof the lyre was also taught, together with regulated movements in\nthe dance. The powerful ethical effect of musical teaching (even\nwhen confined to the simplest choric psalmody and dance), enforced\nby perpetual drill both of boys and men, upon the unlettered\nArcadians--may be seen recognised even by a practical politician\nlike Polybius,[101] who considers it indispensable for the\nsoftening of violent and sanguinary tempers: the diversity of the\neffect, according to the different modes of music employed,\nis noted by Aristotle,[102] and was indeed matter of common\nrepute. Plato, as lawgiver, postulates poetry and music of his own\ndictation. He relies upon constant supplies of this wholesome\nnutriment, for generating in the youth such emotional dispositions\nand habits as will be in harmony, both with the doctrines which he\npreaches, and with the laws which he intends to impose upon them\nas adults. Here (as in Republic and Tim\u00e6us) he proclaims that the\nperfection of character consists in willing obedience or\nharmonious adjustment of the pleasures and pains, the desires and\naversions, to the paramount authority of reason or wisdom--or to\nthe rational conviction of each individual as to what is good and\nhonourable. If, instead of obedience and harmony, there be\ndiscord--if the individual, though rationally convinced that a\nproceeding is just and honourable, nevertheless hates it--or if,\nwhile convinced that a proceeding is unjust and dishonourable, he\nnevertheless loves it--such discord is the worst state of\nstupidity or mental incompetence.[103] We must recollect that\n(according to the postulate of Treatise De Legibus) the rational\nconvictions of each individual, respecting what is just and\nhonourable, are assumed to be accepted implicitly from the\nlawgiver, and never called in question by any one. There exists\ntherefore only one individual reason in the community--that of the\nlawgiver, or Plato himself.\n\n[Footnote 100: Plato, Republ. iv. p. 424 C-D; Legg. iii. pp.\n700-701.]\n\n[Footnote 101: Polybius, iv. pp. 20-21, about the rude Arcadians\nof Kyn\u00e6tha. He ascribes to this simple choric practice the same\neffect which Ovid ascribes to \"ingenu\u00e6 artes,\" or elegant\nliterature generally:--\n\nIngenuas didicisse fideliter artes\nEmollit mores, nec sinit esse feros.\n\nSee the remarkable contention between \u00c6schylus and Euripides in\nAristophan. Ran. 876 seq., about the function and comparative\nexcellence of poets (also Nubes, 955). Aristophanes, comparing\n\u00c6schylus with Euripides, denounces music as having degenerated,\nand poetry as having been corrupted, at Athens. So far he agrees\nwith Plato; but he ascribes this corruption in a great degree to\nthe conversation of Euripides with Sokrates (Ran\u00e6, 1487); and here\nPlato would not have gone along with him--at least not when Plato\ncomposed his earlier dialogues--though the [Greek: \u00ea)=thos] of the\nTreatise De Legibus is in harmony with this sentiment. Polybius\ncites, with some displeasure, the remark of the historian Ephorus,\nwho asserted that musical teaching was introduced among men for\npurposes of cheating and mystification--[Greek: e)p' a)pa/t\u00ea| kai\\\ngo\u00eatei/a| pareisk\u00ea=chthai toi=s a)nthr\u00f4/pois, ou)dam\u00f4=s\na(rmo/zonta lo/gon au)t\u00f4=| r(i/psas] (iv. 20). Polybius considers\nthis an unbecoming criticism.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Aristotle, Polit. viii. c. 4-5-7, p. 1340, a. 10,\n1341, a. 15, 1342, a. 30. We see by these chapters how much the\nsubject was discussed in his day.\n\nThe ethical and emotional effects conveyed by the sense of\nhearing, and distinguishing it from the other senses, are noticed\nin the Problemata of Aristotle, xix. 27-29, pp. 919-920.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 689 A. [Greek: \u00ea( megi/st\u00ea\na)mathi/a . . . o(/tan t\u00f4=| ti do/x\u00ea| kalo\\n \u00ea)\\ a)gatho\\n\nei)=nai, m\u00ea\\ phil\u00ea=| tou=to a)lla\\ mis\u00ea=|, to\\ de\\ pon\u00earo\\n kai\\\na)/dikon dokou=n ei)=nai phil\u00ea=| te kai\\ a)spa/z\u00eatai; tau/t\u00ean t\u00ea\\n\ndiaph\u00f4ni/an lu/p\u00eas te kai\\ \u00ea(don\u00ea=s pro\\s t\u00ea\\n kata\\ lo/gon\ndo/xan, a(mathi/an ph\u00eami\\ ei)=nai t\u00ea\\n e)scha/t\u00ean.] Compare p. 688\nA.]\n\n[Side-note: Historical retrospect as to the growth of\ncities--Frequent destruction of established communities, with only\na small remnant left.]\n\nBesides all the ethical prefatory matter, above noticed, Plato\ngives us also some historical and social prefatory matter, not\nessential to his constructive scheme (which after all takes its\nstart partly from theoretical principles laid down by himself,\npartly from a supposed opportunity of applying those principles in\nthe foundation of a new colony), but tending to illustrate the\ngrowth of political society, and the abuses into which it\nnaturally tends to lapse. There existed in his time a great\nvariety of distinct communities: some in the simplest, most\npatriarchal, Cyclopian condition, nothing more than families--some\nhighly advanced in civilization, with its accompanying good and\nevil--some in each intermediate stage between these two\nextremes.--The human race (Plato supposes) has perhaps had no beginning,\nand will have no end. At any rate it has existed from an indefinite\nantiquity, subject to periodical crises, destructive kosmical\noutbursts, deluges, epidemic distempers, &c.[104] A deluge,\nwhen it occurs, sweeps away all the existing communities with\ntheir property, arts, instruments, &c., leaving only a small\nremnant, who, finding shelter on the top of some high mountain not\ncovered with water, preserve only their lives. Society, he thinks,\nhas gone through a countless number of these cycles.[105] At the\nend of each, when the deluge recedes, each associated remnant has\nto begin its development anew, from the rudest and poorest\ncondition. Each little family or sept exists at first separately,\nwith a patriarch whom all implicitly obey, and peculiar customs of\nits own. Several of these septs gradually coalesce together into\none community, choosing one or a few lawgivers to adjust and\nmodify their respective customs into harmonious order, and\nsubmitting implicitly to the authority of such chosen few.[106] By\nsuccessive coalitions of this kind, operated in a vast length of\ntime,[107] large cities are gradually formed on the plain and on\nthe seaboard. Property and public force is again accumulated;\ntogether with letters, arts, and all the muniments of life.\n\n[Footnote 104: Plato, Legg. iii. pp. 677-678, vi. p. 782 A.]\n\n[Footnote 105: Plato, Legg. p. 680 A. [Greek: toi=s e)n tou/t\u00f4|\n_t\u00f4=| me/rei t\u00ea=s perio/dou_ gegono/sin], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 106: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 681 C-D.]\n\n[Footnote 107: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 683 A. [Greek: e)n chro/nou\ntino\\s m\u00ea/kesin a)ple/tois.]]\n\n[Side-note: Historical or legendary retrospect--The Trojan\nwar--The return of the Herakleids.]\n\nSuch is the idea which Plato here puts forth of the natural\ngenesis and development of human society. Having thus arrived at\nthe formation of considerable cities with powerful military\narmaments, he carries us into the midst of Hellenic legend--the\nTrojan War, the hostile reception which the victorious heroes\nfound on their return to Greece after the siege, the Return of the\nHerakleids to Peloponnesus, and the establishment of the three\nHerakleid brethren, T\u00eamenus, Kresphont\u00eas, Aristod\u00eamus, as kings of\nArgos, Mess\u00ean\u00ea, and Sparta. The triple Herakleid kingdom was\noriginally founded (he affirms) as a mode of uniting and\nconsolidating the force of Hellas against the Asiatics, who were\neager to avenge the capture of Troy. It received strong promises\nof permanence, both from prophets and from the Delphian\noracle.[108] But these hopes were frustrated by misconduct on the\npart of the kings of Argos and Mess\u00ean\u00ea: who, being youths\ndestitute of presiding reason, and without external checks, obeyed\nthe impulse of unmeasured ambition, oppressed their subjects, and\nbroke down their own power.\n\n[Footnote 108: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 685-686.]\n\n[Side-note: Difficulties of government--Conflicts about\ncommand--Seven distinct titles to command exist among mankind, all\nequally natural, and liable to conflict.]\n\nTo conduct a political community well is difficult; for there are\ninherent causes of discord and sedition which can only be\nneutralised in their effects, but can never be eradicated. Among\nthe foremost of these inherent causes, Plato numbers the many\ndistinct and conflicting titles to obedience which are found among\nmankind, all co-existent and co-ordinate. There are seven such\ntitles, all founded in the nature of man and the essential\nconditions of society:[109]--1. Parents over children. 2. Men of\nhigh birth and breed (such as the Herakleids at Sparta) over men\nof low birth. 3. Old over young. 4. Masters over slaves. 5. The\nstronger man over the weaker. 6. The wiser man over the man\ndestitute of wisdom. 7. The fortunate man, who enjoys the favour\nof the Gods (one case of this is indicated by drawing of the best\nlot), over the less fortunate man (who draws an inferior lot).\n\n[Footnote 109: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 690 A-D. [Greek:\n_a)xi\u00f4/mata_ tou= te a)/rchein kai\\ a)/rchesthai], &c. . . .\n[Greek: O(/sa e)sti\\ pro\\s a)/rchontas a)xi\u00f4/mata kai\\ o(/ti\npephuko/ta pro\\s a)ll\u00eala e)nanti/\u00f4s.]]\n\nOf these seven titles to command, coexisting, distinct, and\nconflicting with each other, Plato pronounces the sixth--that of\nsuperior reason and wisdom--to be the greatest, preferable to all\nthe rest, in his judgment: though he admits the fifth--that of\nsuperior force to be the most extensively prevalent in the actual\nworld.[110]\n\n[Footnote 110: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 690 C.\n\nThis enumeration by Plato of seven distinct and conflicting\n[Greek: a)xi\u00f4/mata tou= a)/rchein kai\\ a)/rchesthai], deserves\nnotice in many ways. All the seven are _natural_: nature is\nconsidered as including multifarious and conflicting titles\n(compare Xenophon, Memorab. ii. 6, 21), and therefore as not\nfurnishing in itself any justification or ground of preference for\none above the rest. The [Greek: a)xi/\u00f4ma] of superior force is\njust as _natural_ as the [Greek: a)xi/\u00f4ma] of superior\nwisdom, though Plato himself pronounces the latter to be the\ngreatest; that is--greatest, not [Greek: phu/sei] but [Greek:\nno/m\u00f4|] or [Greek: te/chn\u00ea|], according to his own rational and\ndeliberate estimation. Plato is not uniform in this view, for he\nuses elsewhere the phrases [Greek: phu/sei] and [Greek: kata\\\nphu/sin] as if they specially and exclusively belonged to that\nwhich he approves, and furnished a justification for it (see Legg.\nx. pp. 889-890, besides the Republic and the Gorgias). Again the\nlot, or the process of sortition, is here described as carrying\nwith it both the preference of the Gods and the principles of\njustice ([Greek: to\\ dikaio/taton ei)=nai/ phamen]). The Gods\ndetermine upon whom the lot should fall--compare Homer, Iliad,\nvii. 179. This is a remarkable view of the lot, and represents a\nfeeling much diffused among the ancient democracies.\n\nThe relation of master and slave counts, in Plato's view, among\nthe natural relations, with its consequent rights and obligations.\n\nThe force of [Greek: eu)tuchi/a], as a title to command, is\nillustrated in the speech addressed by Alkibiades to the Athenian\nassembly. Thucyd. vi. 16-17: he allows it even in his competitor\nNikias--[Greek: a)ll' e(/\u00f4s te e)/ti a)kma/z\u00f4 met' au)t\u00ea=s kai\\ o(\nNiki/as eu)tuch\u00ea\\s dokei= ei)=nai, a)pochr\u00ea/sasthe t\u00ea=| e(kate/rou\n\u00ea(m\u00f4=n \u00f4)pheli/a.] Compare also the language of Nikias himself in\nhis own last speech under the extreme distress of the Athenian\narmy in Sicily, Thucyd. vii. 77.\n\nIn the Politikus (p. 293 and elsewhere) Plato admits no [Greek:\na)xi/\u00f4ma tou= a)/rchein] as genuine or justifiable, except\nScience, Art, superior wisdom, in one or a few Artists of\ngoverning; the same in Republic, v. p. 474 C, respecting what he\nthere calls [Greek: philosophi/a].]\n\n[Side-note: Imprudence of founding government upon any\none of these titles separately--Governments of Argos and Mess\u00ean\u00ea\nruined by the single principle--Sparta avoided it.]\n\nPlato thinks it imprudent to found the government of society upon\nany one of these seven titles singly and separately. He requires\nthat each one of them shall be checked and modified by the\nconjoint operation of others. Mess\u00ean\u00ea and Argos were depraved and\nruined by the single principle: while Sparta was preserved and\nexalted by a mixture of different elements. The kings of Argos and\nMess\u00ean\u00ea, irrational youths with nothing to restrain them (except\noaths, which they despised), employed their power to abuse and\nmischief. Such was the consequence of trusting to the exclusive\ntitle of high breed, embodied in one individual person. But Apollo\nand Lykurgus provided better for Sparta. They softened regal\ninsolence by establishing the double line of co-ordinate kings:\nthey introduced the title of old age, along with that of high\nbreed, by founding the Senate of twenty-eight elders: they farther\nintroduced the title of sortition, or something near it, by\nnominating the annual Ephors. The mixed government of Sparta was\nthus made to work for good, while the unmixed systems of Argos and\nMess\u00ean\u00ea both went wrong.[111] Both the two latter states were in\nperpetual war with Sparta, so as to frustrate that purpose--union\nagainst Asiatics--with a view to which the triple Herakleid\nkingdom was originally erected in Peloponnesus. Had each of these\nthree kingdoms been temperately and moderately governed, like\nSparta, so as to maintain unimpaired the projected triple\nunion--the Persian invasions of Greece by Darius and Xerxes would\nnever have taken place.[112]\n\n[Footnote 111: Plato, Legg. iii. pp. 691-692.]\n\n[Footnote 112: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 692 C-D.]\n\n[Side-note: Plato casts Hellenic legend into accordance with\nhis own political theories.]\n\nSuch is the way in which Plato casts the legendary event, called\nthe Return of the Herakleids, into accordance with a political\ntheory of his own. That event, in his view, afforded the means of\nuniting Hellas internally, and of presenting such a defensive\ncombination as would have deterred all invasions from Asia, if\nonly the proper principles of legislation and government had been\nunderstood and applied. The lesson to be derived from this failure\nis, that we ought not to concentrate great authority in one hand;\nand that we ought to blend together several principles of\nauthority, instead of resorting to the exclusive action of one\nalone.[113] This lesson deserves attention, as a portion of\npolitical theory; but I feel convinced that neither Herodotus nor\nThucydides would have concurred in Plato's historical views.\nNeither of them would have admitted the disunion between Sparta,\nArgos, and Mess\u00ean\u00ea as a main cause of the Persian invasion of\nGreece.\n\n[Footnote 113: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 693 A. [Greek: \u00f4(s a)/ra ou)\ndei= mega/las a)rcha\\s ou)d' au)= a)mi/ktous nomothetei=n].\nCompare pp. 685-686.\n\nPlato here affirms not only that Mess\u00ean\u00ea and Argos were and had\nbeen constantly at war with Sparta, but that they were so at the\ntime of the Persian invasion of Greece--and that Mess\u00ean\u00ea thus\nhindered the Spartans from assisting the Athenians at Marathon,\npp. 692 E, 698 E. His statement that Argos was at least neutral,\nif not treacherous and philo-Persian, during the invasion of\nXerxes, is coincident with Herodotus; but not so his statement\nthat the Laced\u00e6monians were kept back by the war against Mess\u00ean\u00ea.\nIndeed at that time the Messenians had no separate domicile or\nindependent station in Peloponnesus. They had been conquered by\nSparta long before, and their descendants in the same territory\nwere Helots (Thucyd. i. 101). It is true that there always existed\nstruggling remnants of expatriated Messenians, who maintained the\nname, and whom Athens protected and favoured during the\nPeloponnesian war; but there was no independent Messenian\ngovernment in Peloponnesus until the foundation of the city of\nMess\u00ean\u00ea by Epaminondas in 369 B.C., two years after the\nbattle of Leuktra: there had never been any _city_ of that\nname in the Peloponnesus before.\n\nNow Plato wrote his Treatise De Legibus _after_ the\nfoundation of this city of Mess\u00ean\u00ea and the re-establishment of an\nindependent Messenian community in Peloponnesus. The new city was\npeopled partly by returning Messenian exiles, partly by\nenfranchised Helots. It is probable enough that both these classes\nmight be disposed to disguise (as far as they could) the past\nperiod of servitude--and to represent the Messenian name and\ncommunity as never having been wholly effaced in the neighbourhood\nof Ith\u00f4m\u00ea, though always struggling against an oppressive\nneighbour. Traditions of this tenor would become current, and\nPlato has adopted one of them in his historical sketch.\n\nIf we look back to what Plato says about the Kretan prophet\nEpimenides, we shall see that here too he must have followed\nerroneous traditions. He makes Epimenides contemporary with the\ninvasion of Greece by Darius, instead of contemporary with the\nKylonian sacrilege (B.C. 612). When a prophet had got\nreputation, a great many new prophecies were fathered upon him (as\nupon Bakis and Mus\u00e6us) with very little care about chronological\nconsistency. Plato may well have been misled by one of these\nfictions (Legg. i. p. 642, iii. p. 677).]\n\n[Side-note: Persia and Athens compared--Excess of despotism.\nExcess of liberty.]\n\nA lesson--analogous, though not exactly the same--is derived by\nPlato from the comparison of the Persian with the Athenian\ngovernment. Persia presents an excess of despotism: Athens an\nexcess of liberty. There are two distinct primordial forms of\ngovernment--_mother-polities_, Plato calls them--out of which\nall existing governments may be said to have been generated or\ndiversified. One of these is monarchy, of which the Persians\nmanifest the extreme: the other is democracy, of which Athens\nmanifests the extreme. Both extremes are mischievous. The wise\nlaw-giver must blend and combine the two together in proper\nproportion. Without such combination, he cannot attain good\ngovernment, with its three indispensable constituents--freedom,\nintelligence or temperance, and mutual attachment among the\ncitizens.[114]\n\n[Footnote 114: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 693 B-C. Aristotle (Politic.\nii. 6, pp. 1265-1266) alludes to this portion of Plato's doctrine,\nand approves what is said about the combination of diverse\npolitical elements; but he does not approve the doctrine which\ndeclares the two \"mother-forms\" of government to be extreme\ndespotism or extreme democracy. He says that these two are either\nno governments at all, or the very worst of governments. Plato\ngives the same opinion about them, yet he thinks it convenient to\nmake them the starting-points of his theory. The objection made by\nAristotle appears to be dictated by a sentiment which often\ninfluences his theories--[Greek: To\\ te/leion pro/tero/n e)sti\nt\u00ea=| phu/sei tou= a)telou=s]. The perfect is prior in order of\nnature to the imperfect. He does not choose to take his\ntheoretical point of departure from the worst or most imperfect.]\n\n[Side-note: Cyrus and Darius--Bad training of sons of\nkings.]\n\nThe Persians, according to Plato, at the time when they made their\nconquests under Cyrus, were not despotically governed, but enjoyed\na fair measure of freedom under a brave and patriotic military\nchief, who kept the people together in mutual attachment. But\nCyrus, though a great military chief, had neither received a good\ntraining himself, nor knew how to secure it for his own sons.[115]\nHe left them to be educated by the women in the harem, where\nthey were brought up with unmeasured indulgence, acquiring nothing\nbut habits of insolence and caprice. Kambyses became a despot; and\nafter committing great enormities, was ultimately deprived of\nempire by Smerdis and the Medians. Darius, not a born prince, but\nan usurper, renovated the Persian empire, and ruled it with as\nmuch ability and moderation as Cyrus. But he made the same mistake\nas Cyrus, in educating his sons in the harem. His son Xerxes\nbecame thoroughly corrupted, and ruled despotically. The same has\nbeen the case with all the successive kings, all brought up as\ndestined for the sceptre, and morally ruined by a wretched\neducation. The Persian government has been nothing but a despotism\never since Darius.[116] All freedom of action or speech has been\nextinguished, and the mutual attachment among the subjects exists\nno more.[117]\n\n[Footnote 115: Plato, Legg. p. 694 C. [Greek: Manteu/omai peri/ ge\nKu/rou ta\\ me\\n a)/ll' au)to\\n strat\u00eago/n te a)gatho\\n ei)=nai\nkai\\ philo/polin, paidei/as de\\ o)rth\u00ea=s ou)ch \u00ea(=phthai to\\\npara/pan.]\n\nI think it very probable that these words are intended to record\nPlato's dissent from the [Greek: Ku/rou Paidei/a] of Xenophon.\nAulus Gellius (xiv. 3) had read that Xenophon composed the\nCyrop\u00e6dia in opposition to the two first books of the Platonic\nRepublic, and that between Xenophon and Plato there existed a\ngrudge (_simultas_) or rivalry; so also Athen\u00e6us, xi. p. 504.\nIt is possible that this may have been the case but no evidence is\nproduced to prove it. Both of them selected Sokrates as the\nsubject of their descriptions; in so far there may have been a\nliterary competition between them: and various critics seem to\nhave presumed that there could not be _\u00e6mulatio_ without\n_simultas_. Each of them composed a Symposion for the purpose\nof exhibiting Sokrates in his joyous moments. The differences\nbetween the two handlings are interesting to notice; but the\nevidences which some authors produce, to show that Xenophon in his\nSymposion alluded to the Symposion of Plato, are altogether\nuncertain. See the Preface of Schneider to his edition of the\nXenophontic Symposion, and his extract from Cornarius.]\n\n[Footnote 116: Plato, Legg. iii. pp. 694-695.]\n\n[Footnote 117: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 697 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Changes for the worse in government of Athens,\nafter the Persian invasion of Greece.]\n\nWhile the Persian government thus exhibits despotism in excess,\nthat of Athens exhibits the contrary mischief--liberty in excess.\nThis has been the growth of the time subsequent to the Persian\ninvasion. At the time when that invasion occurred, the government\nof Athens was an ancient constitution with a quadruple scale of\nproperty, according to which scale political privilege and title\nto office were graduated: while the citizens generally were then\nfar more reverential to authority, and obedient to the laws, than\nthey are now. Moreover, the invasion itself, being dangerous and\nterrific in the extreme, was enough to make them obedient and\nunited among themselves, for their own personal safety.[118] But\nafter the invasion had been repelled, the government became\naltered. The people acquired a great increase of political power,\nassumed habits of independence and self-judgment, and became\nless reverential both to the magistrates and to the laws.\n\n[Footnote 118: Plato, Legg. iii. pp. 698-699.]\n\n[Side-note: This change began in music, and the poets\nintroduced new modes of composition--they appealed to the\nsentiment of the people, and corrupted them.]\n\nThe first department in which this change was wrought at Athens\nwas the department of music: from whence it gradually extended\nitself to the general habits of the people. Before the invasion,\nMusic had been distributed, according to ancient practice and\nunder the sanction of ancient authority, under four fixed\ncategories--Hymns, Dirges, P\u00e6ans, Dithyrambs.[119] The ancient\ncanons in regard to each were strictly enforced: the musical\nexhibitions were superintended, and the prizes adjudged by a few\nhighly-trained elders: while the general body of citizens listened\nin respectful silence, without uttering a word of acclamation, or\neven conceiving themselves competent to judge what they heard. Any\nmanifestations on their part were punished by blows from the\nsticks of the attendants.[120] But this docile submission of the\nAthenians to authority became gradually overthrown, after the\nrepulse of the Persians, first in the theatre, next throughout all\nsocial and political life. The originators of this corruption were\nthe poets: men indeed of poetical genius, but ignorant of the\nethical purpose which their compositions ought to aim at, as well\nas of the rightful canons by which they ought to be guided and\nlimited. These poets, looking to the pleasure of the audience as\ntheir true and only standard, exhibited pieces in which all the\nold musical distinctions were confounded together--hymns with\ndirges, the p\u00e6an with the dithyramb, and the flute with the harp.\nTo such irregular rhythm and melody, words equally irregular were\nadapted. The poet submitted his compositions to the assembled\naudience, appealing to them as competent judges, and practically\ndeclaring them to be such. The audience responded to the appeal.\nAcclamation in the theatre was substituted for silence; and\nthe judgment of the people became paramount instead of that\npronounced by the enlightened few according to antecedent custom.\nHence the people--having once shaken off the reverence for\nauthority, and learnt to exercise their own judgment, in the\ntheatre[121]--began speedily to do the same on other matters also.\nThey fancied themselves wise enough to decide everything for\nthemselves, and contracted a shameless disregard for the opinion\nof better and wiser men. An excessive measure of freedom was\nestablished, tending in its ultimate consequences to an anarchical\nor Titanic nature: indifferent to magistrates, laws, parents,\nelders, covenants, oaths, and the Gods themselves.[122]\n\n[Footnote 119: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 700 B.\n[Greek: u(/mnoi--thr\u00ea=noi--paia=nes--dithu/rambos].]\n\n[Footnote 120: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 700 C. [Greek: to\\ de\\ ku=ros\ntou/t\u00f4n gn\u00f4=nai/ te kai\\ a(/ma gno/nta dika/sai, z\u00eamiou=n te au)=\nto\\n m\u00ea\\ peitho/menon, ou) su/rigx \u00ea)=n ou)de/ tines a)/mousoi\nboai\\ pl\u00ea/thous, _katha/per ta\\ nu=n_, ou)d' au)= kro/toi\ne)pai/nous a)podido/ntes, a)lla\\ toi=s me\\n gegono/si peri\\\npai/deusin dedogme/non a)kou/ein \u00ea)=n au)toi=s meta\\ sig\u00ea=s dia\\\nte/lous, paisi\\ de\\ kai\\ paidag\u00f4goi=s kai\\ t\u00f4=| plei/st\u00f4| o)/chl\u00f4|\nr(a/bdou kosmou/s\u00eas \u00ea( nouthe/t\u00easis e)gi/gneto.]\n\nThe testimony here given by Plato respecting the practice of his\nown time is curious and deserves notice: respecting the practice\nof the times anterior to the Persian invasion he could have had no\nmeans of accurate knowledge.]\n\n[Footnote 121: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 701 A. [Greek: nu=n de\\ \u00ea)=rxe\nme\\n \u00ea(mi=n e)k mousik\u00ea=s \u00ea( pa/nt\u00f4n ei)s pa/nta sophi/as do/xa\nkai\\ paranomi/a, xunephe/speto de\\ e)leutheri/a.]]\n\n[Footnote 122: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 701 B. [Greek: _E)phex\u00ea=s\nd\u00ea\\ tau/t\u00ea|_ t\u00ea=| e)leutheri/a| \u00ea( tou= m\u00ea\\ e)the/lein toi=s\na)/rchousi douleu/ein _gi/gnoit' a)/n_.]\n\nThe phrase here employed by Plato affirms inferential\ntendencies--not facts realised. How much of the tendencies had passed\ninto reality at Athens, he leaves to the imagination of his readers to\nsupply. It is curious to contrast the faithless and lawless\ncharacter of Athens, here insinuated by Plato--with the oration of\nDemosthenes adv. Leptinem (delivered B.C. 355, near upon\nthe time when the Platonic Leges were composed), where the main\nargument which the orator brings to bear upon the Dikasts,\nemphatically and repeatedly, to induce them to reject the\nproposition of Leptines, is--[Greek: to\\ t\u00ea=s po/le\u00f4s \u00ea)=thos\na)pseude\\s kai\\ chr\u00easto/n, ou) to\\ lusitele/staton pro\\s\na)rgu/rion skopou=n, a)lla/ ti kai\\ kalo\\n pra=xai] (p. 461) . . .\n[Greek: ou)d' o( plei=stos lo/gos e)/moige peri\\ t\u00ea=s a)telei/as\ne)/stin, a)ll' u(pe\\r tou= pon\u00earo\\n e)/thos ei)sa/gein to\\n\nno/mon, kai\\ toiou=ton di' ou)= pant' a)/pist' o(/sa o( d\u00ea=mos\ndi/d\u00f4sin e)/stai], also pp. 500-507, and indeed throughout nearly\nthe whole oration. So also in the other discourses, not only of\nDemosthenes but of the other orators also--good faith, public and\nprivate, and respectful obedience to the laws, are constantly\ninvoked as primary and imperative necessities.\n\nIndeed, in order to find a contradiction to the picture here\npresented by Plato, of Athenian tendencies since the Persian war,\nwe need not go farther than Plato himself. We have only to read\nthe Menexenus, wherein he professes to describe and panegyrise the\nachievements of Athens during that very period which he paints in\nsuch gloomy colours in the Leges--the period succeeding the\nPersian invasion. Who is to believe that the people, upon whose\nvirtue he pronounces these encomiums, had thrown off all reverence\nfor good faith, obligation, and social authority? As for the\n[Greek: Titanik\u00ea\\ phu/sis], to which Plato represents the\nAthenians as approximating, the analogy is principally to be found\nin the person of the Titan Prom\u00eatheus, with his philanthropic\ndisposition (see Plato, Menexenus, pp. 243 E, 244 E), and the\nbeneficent suggestions which he imparted to mankind in the way of\nscience and art (\u00c6schyl. Prom. 440-507--[Greek: Pa=sai te/chnai\nbrotoi=sin e)k Prom\u00eathe/\u00f4s]).]\n\n[Side-note: Danger of changes in the national\nmusic--declared by Damon, the musical teacher.]\n\nThe opinion here expressed by Plato--that the political\nconstitution of Athens was too democratical, and that the changes\n(effected by Perikles and others during the half century\nsucceeding the Persian invasion) whereby it had been rendered more\ndemocratical, were mischievous--was held by him in common with a\nrespectable and intelligent minority at Athens. That minority had\nfull opportunity of expressing their disapprobation--as we may see\nby the language of Plato himself; though he commends the Spartans\nfor not allowing any such opportunity to dissenters at\nSparta, and expressly prohibits any open expression of dissent in\nhis own community. But his assertion, that the deterioration at\nAthens was introduced and originated by an innovation in the\nestablished canon of music and poetry--is more peculiarly his own.\nThe general doctrine of the powerful revolutionising effect\nwrought by changes in the national music, towards subverting the\npolitical constitution, was adopted by him from the distinguished\nmusical teacher Damon,[123] the contemporary and companion of\nPerikles. The fear of such danger to the national institutions is\nsaid to have operated on the authorities at Sparta, when they\nforbade the musical innovations of the poet Timotheus, and\ndestroyed the four new strings which he had just added to the\nestablished seven strings of his lyre.[124]\n\n[Footnote 123: Plato, Republ. iv. p. 424 D.]\n\n[Footnote 124: Cicero, De Legib. ii. 15; Pausanias, iii. 12.\n\nCicero agrees with Plato as to the mischievous tendency of changes\nin the national music.]\n\n[Side-note: Plato's aversion to the tragic and comic poetry\nat Athens.]\n\nOf this general doctrine, however, Plato makes a particular\napplication in the passage now before us, which he would have\nfound few Athenians, either oligarchical or democratical, to\nratify. What he really condemns is, the tragic and comic poetical\nrepresentations at Athens, which began to acquire importance only\nafter the Persian war, and continued to increase in importance for\nthe next half century. The greatest revolution which Grecian music\nand poetry ever underwent was that whereby Attic tragedy and\ncomedy were first constituted:--built up by distinguished poets\nfrom combination and enlargement of the simpler pre-existent\nforms--out of the dithyrambic and phallic choruses.[125] The first\nwho imparted to tragedy its grand development and its special\nnovelty of character was \u00c6schylus--a combatant at Marathon as well\nas one of the greatest among ancient poets: after him, Sophokles\ncarried improvement still further. It is them that Plato probably\nmeans, when he speaks of the authors of this revolution as\nmen of true poetical genius, but ignorant of the lawful purpose of\nthe Muse--as authors who did not recognise any rightful canon of\nmusic, nor any end to be aimed at beyond the emotional\nsatisfaction of a miscellaneous audience. The abundance of\ndramatic poetry existing in Plato's time must have been prodigious\n(a few choice specimens only have descended to us):--while its\nvariety of ingredients and its popularity outshone those four\nancient and simple manifestations, which alone he will tolerate as\nlegitimate. He censures the innovations of \u00c6schylus and Sophokles\nas a deplorable triumph of popular preference over rectitude of\nstandard and purpose. He tacitly assumes--what Aristotle certainly\ndoes not believe, and what, so far as I can see, there is no\nground for believing--that the earlier audience were passive,\nshowing no marks of favour or disfavour: and that the earlier\npoets had higher aims, adapting their compositions to the judgment\nof a wise few, and careless about giving satisfaction to the\ngeneral audience. This would be the practice in the Platonic city,\nbut it never was the practice at Athens. We may surely presume\nthat \u00c6schylus stood distinguished from his predecessors not by\ndesiring popularity more, but by greater success in attaining it:\nand that he attained it partly from his superior genius, partly\nfrom increasing splendour in the means of exhibition at Athens.\nThe simpler early compositions had been adapted to the taste of\nthe audience who heard them, and gave satisfaction for the time;\nuntil the loftier genius of \u00c6schylus and the other great\nconstructive dramatists was manifested.\n\n[Footnote 125: Aristotle, Poetic. c. 4. p. 1449 a.\n\nThe ethical repugnance expressed by Plato against the many-sided\nand deceptive spirit of tragic and comic compositions, is also\nexpressed in the censure said to have been pronounced by Solon\nagainst Thespis, when the latter first produced his dramas\n(Plutarch, Solon, 29; Diog. Laert. i. 59).]\n\n[Side-note: This aversion peculiar to himself, not shared\neither by oligarchical politicians, or by other philosophers.]\n\nHowever Plato--while he tolerates no poetry except in so far as it\nproduces ethical correction or regulation of the emotions, and\nblames as hurtful the poet who simply touches or kindles\nemotion--is in a peculiar manner averse to dramatic poetry, with\nits diversity of assumed characters and its obligation of giving\nspeech to different points of view. His aversion had been\nexhibited before, both in the Republic and in the Gorgias:[126]\nbut it reappears here in the Treatise De Legibus, with this\naggravating feature--that the revolution in music and poetry is\nrepresented as generating cause of a deteriorated character and an\nultra-democratical polity of Athens. This (as I have before\nremarked) is a sentiment peculiar to Plato. For undoubtedly,\noligarchical politicians (such as Thucydides, Nikias, Kritias),\nwho agreed with him in disliking the democracy, would never have\nthought of ascribing what they disliked to such a cause as\nalteration in the Athenian music and poetry. They would much more\nhave agreed with Aristotle,[127] when he attributes the important\nchange both in the character and polity of the Athenian people\nafter the Persian invasion, to the events of that invasion\nitself--to the heroic and universal efforts made by the citizens,\non shipboard as well as on land, against the invading host--and\nto the necessity for continuing those efforts by organising the\nconfederacy of Delos. Hence arose a new spirit of self-reliance\nand enterprise--or rather an intensification of what had already\nbegun after the expulsion of Hippias and the reform by\nKleisthenes--which rendered the previous constitutional forms too\nnarrow to give satisfaction.[128] The creation of new and grander\nforms of poetry may fairly be looked upon as one symptom of this\nenergetic general outburst: but it is in no way a primary or\ncausal fact, as Plato wishes us to believe. Nor can Plato himself\nhave supposed it to be so, at the time when he composed his\nMenexenus: wherein the events of the post-Xerxeian period are\npresented in a light very different from that in which he viewed\nthem when he wrote his Leges--presented with glowing commendations\non his countrymen.\n\n[Footnote 126: Plato, Republ. iii. pp. 395-396, x. p. 605 B;\nGorgias, p. 502 B; Legg. iv. p. 719 B.\n\nAristotle takes a view of tragedy quite opposed to that of Plato:\nhe considers it as calculated to purge or purify the emotions of\nfear, compassion, &c. (Aristot. Poet. c. 13. Compare Politic.\nviii. 7, 9). Unfortunately the Poetica exist only as a fragment,\nso that his doctrine about [Greek: ka/tharsis] is only declared\nand not fully developed.\n\nRousseau (in his Lettre \u00e0 d'Alembert Sur les Spectacles, p. 33\nseq.) impugns this doctrine of Aristotle, and condemns theatrical\nrepresentations, partly with arguments similar to those of Plato,\npartly with others of his own.]\n\n[Footnote 127: Aristotel. Politic. v. 4, p. 1304, a. 20; ii. 12,\np. 1274, a. 12; viii. 6, 1340, a. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 128: Herodot. v. 78.]\n\n[Side-note: Doctrines of Plato in this prefatory matter.]\n\nThe long ethical prefatory matter[129] which we have gone through,\nincludes these among other doctrines--1. That the life of justice,\nand the life of pleasure, are essentially coincident. 2. That\nReason, as declared by the lawgiver, ought to controul all our\npassions and emotions. 3. That intoxication, under certain\nconditions, is an useful stimulus to elderly men. 4. That the\npolitical constitution of society ought not to be founded upon one\nsingle principle of authority, but upon a combination of several.\n5. That the extreme of liberty, and the extreme of despotism, are\nboth bad.[130]\n\n[Footnote 129: What Aristotle calls [Greek: toi=s e)/x\u00f4then\nlo/gois], in reference to the Republic of Plato (Aristotel.\nPolitic. ii. 36, p. 1264, b. 39).]\n\n[Footnote 130: Compare on this point Plato's Epistol. viii. pp.\n354-355, where this same view is enforced.]\n\n[Side-note: Compared with those of the Republic and of the\nXenophontic Cyrop\u00e6dia.]\n\nOf these five positions, the two first are coincident with the\ndoctrines of the Republic: the third is not coincident compared\nwith them, but indirectly in opposition to them: the fourth and\nfifth put Plato on a standing point quite different from that of\nthe Republic, and different also from that of the Xenophontic\nCyrop\u00e6dia. In the Cyrop\u00e6dia, all government is strictly personal:\nthe subjects both obey willingly, and are rendered comfortable\nbecause of the supreme and manifold excellence of one\nperson--their chief, Cyrus--in every department of practical\nadministration, civil as well as military. In the Platonic\nRepublic, the government is also personal: to this extent--that\nPlato provides neither political checks, nor magistrates, nor\nlaws, nor judicature: but aims only at the perfect training of the\nGuardians, and the still more elaborate and philosophical training\nof those few chief or elder Guardians, who are to direct the rest.\nHe demands only a succession of these philosophers, corresponding\nto the regal Artist sketched in the Politikus: and he leaves all\nulterior directions to them. Upon their perfect dispositions and\ncompetence, all the weal or woe of the community depends. All is\npersonal government; but it is lodged in the hands of a few\nphilosophers, assumed to be super-excellent, like the one chief in\nthe Xenophontic Cyrop\u00e6dia. When however we come to the Leges, we\nfind that Plato ceases to presume upon such supreme personal\nexcellence. He drops it as something beyond the limit of human\nattainment, and as fit only for the golden or Saturnian age.[131]\nHe declares that power, without adequate restraints, is a\nprivilege with which no man can be trusted.[132] Nevertheless the\nmagistrates must be vested with sufficient power: since excess of\nliberty is equally dangerous. To steer between these two\nrocks,[133] you want not only a good despot but a sagacious\nlawgiver. It is he who must construct a constitutional system,\nhaving regard to the various natural foundations of authority in\nthe minds of the citizens. He must provide fixed laws,\nmagistrates, and a competent judicature: moreover, both the\nmagistrates and the judicature must be servants of the law, and\nnothing beyond.[134] The lawgiver must frame his laws with\nsingle-minded view, not to the happiness of any separate section\nof the city, but to that of the whole. He must look to the virtue\nof the whole, in its most comprehensive sense, and to all good\nthings, ranked in their triple subordination and their comparative\nvalue--that is, First, the good things belonging to the\nmind--Secondly, Those belonging to the body--Thirdly, Wealth and\nExternal acquisitions.[135]\n\n[Footnote 131: Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 713-714.]\n\n[Footnote 132: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 687 E--iv. p. 713 B, ix. p. 875\nC.]]\n\n[Footnote 133: Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 710-711.]\n\n[Footnote 134: Plato, Legg. iv. p. 715 C-D. [Greek: tou\\s d'\na)/rchontas legome/nous nu=n u(p\u00eare/tas toi=s no/mois e)ka/lesa,\nou)= ti kainotomi/as o)noma/t\u00f4n e(/neka, a)ll'], &c. It\nappears as if this phrase, calling \"magistrates the servants or\nministers of the law,\" was likely to be regarded as a harsh and\nnovel metaphor.]\n\n[Footnote 135: Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 707 B, 714 B; iii. p. 697 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Constructive scheme--Plato's new point of view.]\n\nWe now enter upon this constructive effort of Plato's old age.\nThat a political constitution with fixed laws (he makes the\nAthenian say) and with magistrates acting merely as servants of\nthe laws, is the only salvation for a city and its people--this is\na truth which every man sees most distinctly in his old age,\nthough when younger he was very dull in discerning it.[136]\nProbably enough what we here read represents the change in Plato's\nown mind: the acquisition of a new point of view, which was not\npresent to him when he composed his Republic and his Politikus.\n\n[Footnote 136: Plato, Legg. iv. p. 715 E. [Greek: Ne/os me\\n ga\\r\n\u00f4)\\n pa=s a)/nthr\u00f4pos ta\\ toiau=ta a)mblu/tata au)to\\s o(ra=|,\nge/r\u00f4n de\\ o)xu/tata.]\n\nCompare vii. pp. 819 D-821 D, for marks of Plato's old age and\nnewly acquired opinions.]\n\n[Side-note: New Colony to be founded in Krete--its general\nconditions.]\n\nHere the exposition assumes a definite shape. The Kretan Kleinias\napprises his Athenian companion, that the Knossians with other\nKretans are about to establish a new colony on an unsettled point\nin Krete; and that himself with nine others are named\ncommissioners for framing and applying the necessary regulations.\nHe invites the co-operation of the Athenian:[137] who accordingly\nsets himself to the task of suggesting such laws and measures\nas are best calculated to secure the march of the new Magnetic\nsettlement towards the great objects defined in the preceding\nprogramme.\n\n[Footnote 137: Plato, Legg. iii. p. 702 C.]\n\nThe new city is to be about nine English miles from the sea. The\nland round it is rough, poor, and without any timber for\nshipbuilding; but it is capable of producing all supplies\nabsolutely indispensable, so that little need will be felt of\nimportation from abroad. The Athenian wishes that the site were\nfarther from the sea. Yet he considers the general conditions to\nbe tolerably good; inasmuch as the city need not become commercial\nand maritime, and cannot have the means of acquiring much gold and\nsilver--which is among the greatest evils that can befall a city,\nsince it corrupts justice and goodness in the citizens.[138] The\nsettlers are all Greeks, from various towns of Krete and\nPeloponnesus. This (remarks the Athenian) is on the whole better\nthan if they came from one single city. Though it may introduce\nsome additional chance of discord, it will nevertheless render\nthem more open-minded and persuadable for the reception of new\ninstitutions.[139]\n\n[Footnote 138: Plato, Legg. iv. p. 705.]\n\n[Footnote 139: Plato, Legg. iv. p. 708.]\n\n[Side-note: The Athenian declares that he will not merely\npromulgate peremptory laws, but will recommend them to the\ncitizens by prologues or hortatory discourses.]\n\nThe colonists being supposed to be assembled in their new domicile\nand ready for settlement, Plato, or his Athenian spokesman,\naddresses to them a solemn exhortation, inculcating piety towards\nthe Gods, celestial and subterranean, as well as to the D\u00e6mons and\nHeroes--and also reverence to parents.[140] He then intimates\nthat, though he does not intend to consult the settlers on the\nacceptance or rejection of laws, but assumes to himself the power\nof prescribing such laws as he thinks best for them--he\nnevertheless will not content himself with promulgating his\nmandates in a naked and peremptory way. He will preface each law\nwith a pro\u00ebm or prologue (_i.e._ a string of preliminary\nrecommendations): in order to predispose their minds favourably,\nand to obtain from them a willing obedience.[141] He will employ\nnot command only, but persuasion along with or antecedent to\ncommand: as the physician treats his patients when they are\nfreemen, not as he sends his slaves to treat slave-patients,\nwith a simple compulsory order.[142] To begin with an introductory\npro\u00ebm or prelude, prior to the announcement of the positive law,\nis (he says) the natural course of proceeding. It is essential to\nall artistic vocal performances: it is carefully studied and\npractised both by the rhetor and the musician.[143] Yet in spite\nof this analogy, no lawgiver has ever yet been found to prefix\npro\u00ebms to his laws: every one has contented himself with issuing\nperemptory commands.[144] Here then Plato undertakes to set the\nexample of prefixing such prefatory introductions. The nature of\nthe case would prescribe that every law, every speech, every song,\nshould have its suitable pro\u00ebm: but such prolixity would be\nimpolitic. A discretion must be entrusted to the lawgiver, as it\nis to the orator and the musician. Pro\u00ebms or prologues must be\nconfined to the great and important laws.[145]\n\n[Footnote 140: Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 716-718.]\n\n[Footnote 141: Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 718-719-723.]\n\n[Footnote 142: Plato, Legg. iv. p. 720. This is a curious\nindication respecting the medical profession and practice at\nAthens.]\n\n[Footnote 143: Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 722 D-723 D. [Greek: t\u00f4=| te\nr(\u00ea/tori kai\\ t\u00f4=| mel\u00f4|d\u00f4=| kai\\ t\u00f4=| nomothe/t\u00ea| to\\ toiou=ton\ne(ka/stote e)pitrepte/on.]]\n\n[Footnote 144: Plato, Legg. iv. p. 722 B-E.\n\nThe [Greek: prooi/mia d\u00eam\u00eagorika/] of Demosthenes are well\nknown.]\n\n[Footnote 145: Plato, Legg. iv. p. 723 C-D. About [Greek: ta\\ t\u00f4=n\nno/m\u00f4n prooi/mia], compare what Plato says about his\ncommunications with the younger Dionysius, shortly after his\n(Plato's) second arrival at Syracuse, Plato, Epistol. iii. p. 316\nA.]\n\n[Side-note: General character of these prologues--didactic\nor rhetorical homilies.]\n\nAccordingly, from hence to the end of the Treatise De Legg., Plato\nproceeds upon the principle here laid down. He either prefixes a\nprologue to each of his laws--or blends the law with its pro\u00ebm--or\ngives what may be called a pro\u00ebm without a law, that is a string\nof hortatory or comminatory precepts. There are various points (he\nsays) on which the lawgiver cannot propose any distinct and\nperemptory enactment, but must confine himself to emphatic\ncensure[146] and declaration of opinion, with threats of\ndispleasure on the part of the Gods: the rather as he cannot hope\nto accomplish his public objects, without the largest interference\nwith private habits--nor without bringing his regulations to bear\nupon individual life, where positive law can hardly reach.[147]\nThe Platonic prologues are sometimes expositions of the reasons of\nthe law--_i. e._ of the dangers which it is intended to\nward off, or the advantages to be secured by it. But far more\nfrequently, they are morsels of rhetoric--lectures, discourses, or\nhomilies--addressed to the emotions and not to the reason,\ninsisting on the ethical and religious point of view, and destined\nto operate with persuasive or intimidating effect upon an\nuninstructed multitude.[148]\n\n[Footnote 146: Cicero (De Legg. ii. 6) professes to follow Plato\nin this practice of prefixing pro\u00ebms to his Laws. He calls the\npro\u00ebm an encomium upon the law, which in most cases it is--\"ut\npriusquam ipsam legem recitem, de ejus legis laude dicam\".]\n\n[Footnote 147: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 780 A.]\n\n[Footnote 148: Plato, Legg. iv. p. 722 B. [Greek: pro\\s tou/t\u00f4|\nde\\ ou)dei\\s e)/oike diano\u00eath\u00ea=nai p\u00f4/pote t\u00f4=n nomothet\u00f4=n, \u00f4(s\ne)xo\\n duoi=n chr\u00ea=sthai pro\\s ta\\s nomothesi/as, peithoi= kai\\\nbi/a|, kath' o(/son oi(=o/n te e)pi\\ to\\n a)/peiron paidei/as\no)/chlon t\u00f4=| e(te/r\u00f4| chr\u00f4=ntai mo/non.]]\n\n[Side-note: Great value set by Plato himself upon these\nprologues. They are to serve as type for all poets. No one is\nallowed to contradict them.]\n\nIt seems that Plato took credit to himself for what he thought a\nbeneficial innovation, in thus blending persuasive exhortation\nwith compulsory command. His assurance, that no Grecian lawgiver\nhad ever done so before, is doubtless trustworthy:[149] though we\nmay remark that the confusion of the two has been the general rule\nwith Oriental lawgivers--the Hindoos, the Jews, the Mahommedan\nArabs, &c. But with him the innovation serves a farther\npurpose. He makes it the means of turning rhetoric to account; and\nof enlisting in his service, as lawgiver, not only all the\nrhetoric but all the poetry, in his community. His Athenian\nspeaker is so well satisfied with these prologues, that he\nconsiders them to possess the charm of a poetical work, and\nsuspects them to have been dictated by inspiration from the\nGods.[150] He pronounces them the best and most suitable\ncompositions for the teaching of youth, and therefore prescribes\nthat teachers shall cause the youth to recite and learn them,\ninstead of the poetical and rhetorical works usually employed. He\nfarther enjoins that his prologues shall serve as type and canon\nwhereby all other poetical and rhetorical compositions shall be\ntried. If there be any compositions in full harmony and analogy\nwith this type, the teachers shall be compelled to learn them by\nheart, and teach them to pupils. Any teacher refusing to do so\nshall be dismissed.[151] Nor shall any poet be allowed to\ncompose and publish works containing sentiments contradictory\nto the declaration of the lawgiver.[152]\n\n[Footnote 149: The testimony of Plato shows that the [Greek:\nprooi/mia t\u00ea=s nomothesi/as] ascribed to Zaleukus and Charondas\n(Diodor. xii. 12-20) are composed by authors later than his time,\nand probably in imitation of his [Greek: prooi/mia]: which indeed\nis probable enough on other grounds. See Heyne, Opuscula, vol.\nii., Prolus i. vi., De Zaleuci et Charond\u00e6 Legibus.\n\nCicero read the pro\u00ebms ascribed to Zaleukus and Charondas as\ngenuine (Legg. ii. 6); so did Diod\u00f4rus, xii. 17-20; Stob\u00e6us, Serm.\nxlii.]\n\n[Footnote 150: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 811 C. [Greek: ou)k a)/neu\ntino\\s e)pipnoi/as the\u00f4=n, e)/doxan d' ou)=n moi panta/pasi\npoi\u00ea/sei tini\\ prosomoi/\u00f4s ei)r\u00ea=sthai.]]\n\n[Footnote 151: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 811 D-E.]\n\n[Footnote 152: Plato, Legg. p. 811 E.]\n\n[Side-note: Contrast of Leges with Gorgias and Ph\u00e6drus.]\n\nAs a contrast to this view of Plato in his later years, it is\ninteresting to turn to that which he entertained in an earlier\npart of his life, in the Gorgias and the Ph\u00e6drus, respecting\nrhetoric. In the former dialogue, Gorgias is recognised as a\nmaster of the art of persuasion, especially as addressed to a\nnumerous audience, and respecting ethical questions, What is just,\nand what is unjust? Sokrates, on the contrary, pointedly\ndistinguishes persuasion from teaching--discredits simple\npersuasion, without teaching, as merely deceptive--and contends\nthat rhetorical discourse addressed to a multitude, upon such\ntopics, can never convey any teaching.[153] But in the Leges we\nfind that the art of persuasion has risen greatly in Plato's\nestimation. Whether it be a true art, or a mere unartistic knack,\nhe now recognises its efficacy in modifying the dispositions of\nthe uninstructed multitude, and announces himself to be the first\nlawgiver who will employ it systematically for that purpose. He\ncombines the seductions of the rhetor with the unpalatable\nseverities of the lawgiver: the two distinct functions of Gorgias\nand his brother the physician Herodikus, when Gorgias accompanied\nhis brother to visit suffering patients, and succeeded by force of\nrhetoric in overcoming their repugnance to the cutting and burning\nindispensable for cure.[154] Again, in the Ph\u00e6drus, Plato treats\nthe art of persuasion, when applied at once to a mixed assemblage\nof persons, either by writing or discourse, as worthless and\nunavailing.[155] He affirms that it makes no durable impression on\nthe internal mind of the individuals: the same discourse will\nnever suit all. Individuals differ materially in their cast of\nmind; moreover, they differ in opinion upon ethical topics (just\nand unjust) more than upon any other. Some men are open to\npersuasion by topics which will have no effect on others.\nAccordingly, you must go through a laborious discrimination:\nfirst, you must discriminate generally the various classes of\nminds and the various classes of discourse--next, you must\nknow to which classes of minds the individuals of the multitude\nbefore you belong. You must then address to each mind the mode of\npersuasion specially adapted to it. The dialectic philosopher is\nthe only one who possesses the true art of persuasion. Such was\nPlato's point of view in the Ph\u00e6drus. I need hardly point out how\ncompletely it is dropped in his Leges: wherein he pours persuasion\ninto the ears of an indiscriminate multitude, through the common\nchannel of a rhetorical lecture, considering it of such impressive\nefficacy as to justify the supposition of inspiration from the\nGods.[156]\n\n[Footnote 153: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 454-456.]\n\n[Footnote 154: Plato, Gorgias, p. 456 B.]\n\n[Footnote 155: Plato, Ph\u00e6drus, pp. 263 A, 271-272-273 E--275 E--276\nA--277 C.]\n\n[Footnote 156: Zeller, in his 'Platonische Studien' (pp. 66-72-88,\n&c.), insists much on the rhetorical declamatory prolixity\nvisible throughout the Treatise De Legibus, as quite at variance\nwith the manner of Plato in his earlier and better dialogues, and\neven as specimens of what Plato there notes as the rhetorical or\nsophistical manner. He expresses his surprise that the Athenian\nshould be made to ascribe such discourses to the inspiration of\nthe Gods (p. 107). Zeller enumerates these and many other\ndissimilarities in the Treatise De Legibus, as compared with other\nPlatonic dialogues, as premisses to sustain his conclusion that\nthe treatise is not by Plato. In my judgment they do not bear out\nthat conclusion (which indeed Zeller has since renounced in his\nsubsequent work); but they are not the less real and notable,\nmarking the change in Plato's own mind.\n\nHow poor an opinion had Plato of the efficacy of the [Greek:\nnouthet\u00eatiko\\n ei)=dos lo/g\u00f4n] at the time when he composed the\nSophist\u00eas (p. 230 A)! What a superabundance of such discourse does\nhe deliver in the Treatise De Legibus, taking especial pride in\nthe peculiarity!]\n\n[Side-note: Regulations for the new colony--About religious\nworship, the oracles of Delphi and Dodona are to be consulted.]\n\nAfter this unusual length of preliminaries, Plato enters on the\npositive regulation of his colony. As to the worship of the Gods,\nhe directs little or nothing of his own authority. The colony must\nfollow the advice of the oracles of Delphi, Dodona, and\nAmmon--together with any consecrated traditions, epiphanies, or\ninspirations from the Gods belonging to the spot--as to the Gods\nwho shall be publicly worshipped, and the suitable temples and\nrites. Only he directs that to each portion of the territory set\napart for civil purposes, some God, D\u00e6mon, or Hero, shall be\nspecially assigned as Patron,[157] with a chapel and precinct\nwherein all meetings of the citizens of the district shall be\nheld, whether for religious ceremonies, or for recreation, or for\npolitical duties.\n\n[Footnote 157: Plato, Legg. v. p. 738 C-D. [Greek: o(/p\u00f4s a)\\n\nxu/llogoi e(ka/st\u00f4n t\u00f4=n mer\u00f4=n kata\\ chro/nous gigno/menoi tou\\s\nprostachthe/ntas . . . meta\\ thusi\u00f4=n.]\n\nThat such \"ordained seasons\" for meetings and sacrifices should be\npunctually attended to--was a matter of great moment, on religious\nno less than on civil grounds. It was with a view to that object\nprincipally that each Grecian city arranged its calendar and its\nsystem of intercalation. Plato himself states this (vii. p. 809\nD).\n\nSir George Lewis, in his Historical Survey of the Astronomy of the\nAncients, adverts to the passage of Plato here cited, and gives a\nvery instructive picture of the state of the Hellenic world as to\nCalendar and computation of time (see p. 19; also the greater part\nof chapter i. of his valuable work). The object of all the cities\nwas to adjust lunar time with solar time by convenient\nintercalations, but hardly any two cities agreed in the method of\ndoing so. Different schemes of intercalation and periods\n(triet\u00earic, octaet\u00earic, enneadekaet\u00earic) were either adopted by\ncivic authority or suggested by private astronomers, such as\nKleostratus and Meton. The practical dissonance and confusion was\ngreat, and the theoretical dissatisfaction also.\n\nNow in this dialogue De Legibus, Plato recognises both the\nimportance of the object and the problem to be solved, yet he\nsuggests no means of his own for solving it. He makes no\narrangement for the calendar of his new Magn\u00eatic city. I confess\nthat this is to me a matter of some surprise. To combine an\nexertion of authority with an effort of arithmetical calculation,\nis in his vein; and the exactness of observances as respects the\nGods, in harmony with the religious tone of the treatise, depended\non some tolerable solution of the problem.\n\nWe may perhaps presume that Plato refused to deal with the problem\nbecause he considered it as mathematically insoluble. Days,\nmonths, and years are not exactly commensurable with each other.\nIn the Tim\u00e6us (p. 36 C) Plato declares that the rotation of the\nCircle of the Same, or the outermost sidereal sphere, upon which\nthe succession of day and night depends, is according to the side\nof a parallelogram ([Greek: kata\\ pleura/n])--while the rotations\nof the Moon and Sun (two of the seven branches composing the\nCircle of the Different) are according to the diagonal thereof\n([Greek: kata\\ dia/metron]): now the side and the diagonal\nrepresented the type of incommensurable magnitudes among the\nancient reasoners. It would appear also that he considers the\nrotations of the Moon and Sun to be incommensurable with each\nother, both of them being members included in the Circle of the\nDifferent.\n\nSince an exact mathematical solution was thus unattainable, Plato\nmay probably have despised a merely approximative solution,\nsufficient for practical convenience--to which last object he\ngenerally pays little attention. He might also fancy that even the\nattempt to meddle with the problem betokened that confusion of the\nincommensurable with the commensurable, which he denounces in this\nvery treatise (vii. pp. 819-820).]\n\n[Side-note: Perpetuity of number of citizens, and of lots of\nland, one to each, inalienable and indivisible.]\n\nPlato requires for his community a fixed and peremptory total of\n5040 citizens, never to be increased, and never to be diminished:\na total sufficient, in his judgment, to defend the territory\nagainst invaders, and to lend aid on occasion to an oppressed\nneighbour. He distributes the whole territory into 5040 lots of\nland, each of equal value, assigning one lot to each citizen. Each\nlot is assumed to be sufficient for the maintenance of a family of\nsober habits, and no more. The total number (5040) is selected\nbecause of the great variety of divisors by which it may be\ndivided without remainder.[158]\n\n[Footnote 158: Plato, Legg. v. pp. 737-738, vi. p. 771 C.\n\nAristotle declares this total of 5040 to be extravagantly great,\ninasmuch as it would require an amount of territory beyond the\nscale which can be reckoned upon for a Grecian city, to maintain\nso many unproductive persons, including not merely the 5040 adult\ncitizens, but also their wives, children, and personal attendants,\nnone of whom would take part in any productive industry (Politic.\nii. 6, p. 1265, b. 16).\n\nThe remark here cited indicates the small numerical scale upon\nwhich the calculations of a Greek politician were framed. But we\ncan hardly be surprised at it, seeing that the new city is\nintended for the Island of Krete, where none even of the existing\ncities were considerable. Moreover Aristotle had probably present\nto his mind the analogy of Sparta. The Spartan citizens were in a\nsituation more analogous to the 5040 than any other Grecian\nresidents. But the Spartan citizens could not have been near so\nnumerous as 5040 at that time; not even one-fifth of it--Aristotle\ntells us, Politic. ii. 9, 1270, a. 31. Aristotle goes on to remark\non the definition given by Plato of the size and value of each lot\nof land sufficient for the citizen and his family to live [Greek:\ns\u00f4phro/n\u00f4s]: it ought to be (says Aristotle) [Greek: s\u00f4phro/n\u00f4s\nkai\\ e)leutheri/\u00f4s]. These are the two modes of excellence, and\nthe only two, which a man can display in the use of his property\n(1265, a. 35). But this change would only aggravate the difficulty\nas to the total area of land required for the 5040. Compare the\nremark of Aristotle on the scheme of Hippodamus, Politic. ii. 8,\n1268, a. 42.]\n\n[Side-note: Plato reasserts his adherence to the\nprinciple of the Republic, though the repugnance of others hinders\nhim from realising it.]\n\nWe thus see that Plato, in laying down his fundamental principle\n([Greek: u(po/thesin]), recognises separate individual property\nand separate family among his citizens: both of which had been\nstrenuously condemned and strictly excluded, in respect to the\nGuardians of his Republic. But he admits the principle only with\nthe proviso that there shall be a peremptory limit to number of\ncitizens, to individual wealth, and to individual poverty:\nmoreover, even with this proviso, he admits it only as a\nsecond-best, because mankind will not accept, and are not\nsufficiently exalted to work out, what is in itself the best. He\nreasserts the principle of the Republic, that separate property\nand separate family are both essentially mischievous: that all\nindividuality, either of interest or sympathy or sentiment, ought\nto be extinguished as far as possible.[159] Though constrained\nagainst his will to renounce this object, he will still approximate\nto it as near as he can in his second-best. Moreover, he may\npossibly, at some future time (D.V.), propose a third-best. When\nonce departure from the genuine standard is allowed, the departure\nmay be made in many different ways.\n\n[Footnote 159: Plato, Legg. v. pp. 739-740; vii. p. 807 B.]\n\nThis declaration deserves notice as attesting the undiminished\nadhesion of Plato to the main doctrines of his Republic. The point\nhere noted is one main difference of principle between the\nTreatise De Legibus and the Republic: the enactment of written\nfundamental laws with prologues serving as homilies to be preached\nto the citizens, is another. Both of them are differences of\nprinciple: each gives rise to many subordinate differences or\ncorollaries.[160]\n\n[Footnote 160: Plato, Legg. v. p. 739 E. [Greek: \u00ea(\\n de\\ nu=n\n\u00ea(mei=s e)pikecheir\u00ea/kamen, ei)/\u00ea te a)\\n genome/n\u00ea p\u00f4s\na)thanasi/as e)ggu/tata kai\\ \u00ea( mi/a deute/r\u00f4s; tri/t\u00ean de\\ meta\\\ntau=ta, e)a\\n theo\\s e)the/l\u00ea|, diaperanou/metha.] Upon this\npassage K. F. Hermann observes: \"H\u00e6c enim est quam ordine tertiam\nappellat Plato, qu\u00e6 Aristoteli [Politic. iv. 1, 2] [Greek: e)x\nu(pothe/se\u00f4s politei/a] dicitur: quod tamen nolim ita accipi, ut \u00e0\nnonnullis factum est, ut hanc quoque olim singulari scripto\npersecuturum fuisse philosophum credamus, quasi tribus exemplis\nabsolvi rerum publicarum formas censuisset; innumer\u00e6 enim pro\nsingularum nationum et urbium fortuna esse possunt,\" &c. (De\nVestigiis Instit. Vet. imprimis Attic. per Plat. de Legg. libros\nindag., p. 16).\n\nThat Plato _did_ intend to compose a _third_ work upon\nan analogous subject appears to me clear from the words,--but it\ndoes not at all follow that he thought that three varieties would\nexhaust all possibility. Upon this point I dissent from Hermann,\nand also upon his interpretation of Aristotle's phrase [Greek: \u00ea(\ne)x u(pothe/se\u00f4s politei/a]. Aristotle distinguishes three\ndistinct varieties of end which the political constructor may\npropose to himself:--1. [Greek: t\u00ea\\n politei/an t\u00ea\\n a(pl\u00f4=s\na)ri/st\u00ean, t\u00ea\\n ma/lista kat' eu)ch\u00ea/n]. 2. [Greek: T\u00ea\\n e)k t\u00f4=n\nu(pokeime/n\u00f4n a)ri/st\u00ean]. 3. [Greek: T\u00ea\\n e)x u(pothe/se\u00f4s\na)ri/st\u00ean]. Now K. F. Hermann here maintains, and Boeckh had\nalready maintained before him (ad Platonis Minoem et de Legibus,\npp. 66-67), that the city sketched in Plato's treatise De Legibus\ncoincides with No. 2 in Aristotle's enumeration, and that the\nprojected [Greek: tri/t\u00ea] in Plato coincides with No. 3--[Greek:\nt\u00ea\\n e)x u(pothe/se\u00f4s]. I differ from them here. There is no\nground for presuming that what Plato puts _third_ must also\nbe put by Aristotle _third_. I think that the Platonic city\nDe Legibus corresponds to No. 3 in Aristotle and not to No. 2. It\nis a city [Greek: e)x u(pothe/se\u00f4s], not [Greek: e)k t\u00f4=n\nu(pokeime/n\u00f4n a)ri/st\u00ean]. Plato borrows little or nothing from\n[Greek: ta\\ u(pokei/mena], and almost everything from his own\n[Greek: u(po/thesis] or assumed principle, which in this case is\nthe fixed number of the citizens as well as of the lots of land,\nthe imposition of a limit on each man's proprietary acquisitions,\nand the recognition of separate family establishments subject to\nthese limits. This is the [Greek: u(po/thesis] of Plato's second\ncity, to which all his regulations of detail are accommodated: it\nis substituted by him (unwillingly, because of the repugnance of\nothers) in place of the [Greek: u(po/thesis] of his first city or\nthe Republic, which [Greek: u(po/thesis] is perfect communism\namong the [Greek: phu/lakes], without either separate property or\nseparate family. This last is Plato's [Greek: a(pl\u00f4s a)ri/st\u00ea].]\n\n[Side-note: Regulations about land, successions,\nmarriages, &c. The number of citizens must not be allowed to\nincrease.]\n\nEach citizen proprietor shall hold his lot of land, not as his\nown, but as part and parcel of the entire territory, which, taken\nas a whole, is Goddess and Mistress--conjointly with all the local\nGods and Heroes--of the body of citizens generally. No citizen\nshall either sell or otherwise alienate his lot, nor divide it,\nnor trench upon its integrity. The total number of lots, the\nintegrity of each lot, and the total number of citizens, shall all\nremain consecrated in perpetuity, without increase or diminution.\nEach citizen in dying shall leave one son as successor to his lot:\nif he has more than one, he may choose which of them he will\nprefer. The successor so chosen shall maintain the perpetuity of\nworship of the Gods, reverential rites to the family and deceased\nancestors, and obligations towards the city.[161] If the citizen\nhas other sons, they will be adopted into the families of other\ncitizens who happen to be childless: if he has daughters, he will\ngive them out in marriage, but without any dowry. Such family\nrelations will be watched over by a special board of magistrates:\nwith this peremptory condition, that they shall on no account\npermit either the number of citizen proprietors, or the number of\nseparate lots, to depart from the consecrated 5040.[162] Each\ncitizen's name, and each lot of land, will be registered on\ntablets of cypress wood. These registers will be preserved in the\ntemples, in order that the magistrates may be able to prevent\nfraud.[163]\n\n[Footnote 161: Plato, Legg. v. p. 740 A-B.]\n\n[Footnote 162: Plato, Legg. v. pp. 740 D-742 C. Aristotle remarks\nthat in order to attain the object which Plato here proclaims,\nrestriction ought to be imposed on [Greek: teknopoii+/a]. No\ncitizen ought to be allowed to beget more than a certain number of\nchildren. He observes that this last-mentioned restriction, if\nimposed alone and without any others, would do more than all the\nrest to maintain the permanent 5040 lots, and that without this no\nother restrictions could be efficacious (Politic. ii. 6, 1265, a.\n37, 1266, b. 9).\n\nPlato concurs in this opinion, though he trusts to prudence and\nthe admonition of elders for bringing about this indispensable\nlimitation of births in a family, without legal prohibition. I\nhave already touched upon this matter in my review of Plato's\nRepublic. See above--chap. xxxvii. p. 198 seq.\n\nThe [Greek: no/moi thetikoi\\] of Philolaus at Thebes, regulating\n[Greek: t\u00ea\\n paidopoii+/an] with a view to keep the lots of land\nunchanged, are only known by the brief allusion of Aristotle,\nPolit. ii. 12, 1274, b. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 163: Plato, Legg. v. p. 741 C. [Greek: kuparitti/nas\nmn\u00ea/mas], &c.]\n\n[Side-note: Position of the city and akropolis--Distribution\nof the territory and citizens into twelve equal sections or\ntribes.]\n\nThe city, with its appropriate accessories, shall be placed as\nnearly as possible in the middle of the territory. The akropolis,\nsacred to Hestia and Ath\u00ean\u00ea, will be taken as a centre from whence\ntwelve radiating lines will be drawn to the extremity of the\nterritory, so as to distribute the whole area into twelve\nsections, not all equal in magnitude, but equalised in value by\ndiminishing the area in proportion to superior goodness of land.\nThe total number of citizens will be distributed also in twelve\nsections, of 420 each (5040/12), among whom the lots of land\ncontained in each twelfth will be apportioned. This duodecimal\ndivision, the fundamental canon of Plato's municipal arrangements,\nis a sanctified present from the Gods, in harmony with the months\nand with the kosmical revolutions.[164] Each twelfth, land and\ncitizens together, will be constituted a Tribe, and will be\nconsecrated to some God (determined by lot) whose name it will\nbear, and at whose altar two monthly festivals will be celebrated:\none for the tribe, the other for the entire city. The tribes are\nperemptorily equal in respect to number of citizens; but care\nshall also be taken to make them as nearly equal as possible in\nrespect to registered property: that is, in respect to property\nother than land, which each citizen brings with him to the\nsettlement, and which will all be recorded (as well as the land)\nin the public registers.[165] The lot of land assigned to each\ncitizen will include a portion near the centre, and a portion near\nthe circumference: the most central portion being coupled with the\nmost outlying, and so on in order. Each citizen will thus have two\nseparate residences:[166] one nearer to the city, the other more\ndistant from it.\n\n[Footnote 164: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 771 B. Plato here reckons the\ndifferent numerical divisions adopted in different cities as being\nall both natural and consecrated, but he considers his own as the\nmost fortunate and right. He insists much upon the importance of\nsymmetrical distribution, with definite numerical ratio, in all\nthe departments of life: in the various civil subdivisions of the\nTribe, such as Phratries, D\u00eames, Villages--in the arrangements of\nthe citizens for military service, [Greek: ta/xeis kai\\\na)g\u00f4ga/s]--in the coins, weights and measures--in the modulations\nof the voice, and in the direction of movements either rectilinear\nor rotatory. (Whoever looks at Aristophanes, Aves, 1010 seq., will\nsee all such regularity and symmetry derided in the person of\nMeton.) Nay, he enjoins that all the vessels made for common use\nshall be exact fractions or exact multiples of each other. This\nwill make it necessary for all the citizens to learn elementary\narithmetic, which Plato considers to be of essential value, not\nonly for practical use but as a stimulus to the dormant\nintelligence. On this point he notes the Egyptians and Phenicians\nas standing higher than the Greeks (vii. p. 818), but as applying\ntheir superior arithmetical knowledge only to a mean and\ndisgraceful thirst for wealth. Against this last defect Plato\nreckons upon guarding his citizens by other precautions, while he\nencourages in them the learning of arithmetic (Legg. v. p. 747).\nPlato here speaks of the Egyptians and Phenicians, much as the\nJews have been spoken of in later times. And it is curious that he\nseems to consider their peculiarities of character as referable to\ntheir local domicile. He maintains that one place is intrinsically\ndifferent from another in respect to producing good and bad\ncharacters; some places are even privileged by [Greek: thei/a\ne)pi/pnoia kai\\ daimo/n\u00f4n l\u00ea/xeis] &c.]\n\n[Footnote 165: Plato, Legg. v. p. 745.]\n\n[Footnote 166: Plato, Legg. v. p. 745, vi. p. 771 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Movable property--Inequality therein reluctantly\nallowed, as far as four to one, but no farther.]\n\nPlato would be glad if he were able to establish among all the\ncitizens, equality not merely of landed property, but property of\nall other property besides. This, however, he recognises his\ninability to exact. The colonists will bring with them movable\nproperty--some more, some less: and inequality must be tolerated\nup to a certain limit. Each citizen is allowed to possess movable\nproperty as far as four times the value of his lot of land, but no\nmore. The maximum of wealth possessed by any citizen will thus be\nequal to five times the value of his lot of land: the minimum of\nthe poorest citizen will be the lot of land itself, which cannot,\nunder the worst circumstances, be alienated or diminished. If any\ncitizen shall in any way acquire property above the maximum here\nnamed, he is directed to make it over to the city and to the\nGods. In case of disobedience, he may be indicted before the\nNomophylakes; and if found guilty, shall be disgraced, excluded\nfrom his share of public distributions, and condemned to pay twice\nas much--half being assigned as recompense to the prosecutor.[167]\nThe public register kept by the magistrates, in which is\nenrolled all the property of every kind belonging to each citizen,\nwill enable them to enforce this regulation, and will be farther\nuseful in all individual suits respecting money.\n\n[Footnote 167: Plato, Legg. v. pp. 744-745, vi. p. 754 E.]\n\n[Side-note: Census of the citizens--four classes, with\ngraduated scale of property. No citizen to possess gold or silver.\nNo loans or interest. No debts enforced by law.]\n\nIn the public census of the city, the citizens will be distributed\ninto four classes, according to their different scales of\nproperty. The richest will be four min\u00e6: the other three min\u00e6,\ntwo, and one mina, respectively. Direct taxation will be assessed\nupon them according to the difference of wealth: to which also a\ncertain reference will be had in the apportionment of\nmagistracies, and in the regulation of the voting privilege.[168]\n\n[Footnote 168: Plato, Legg. v. p. 744 B, vi. p. 754 E.]\n\nBy this determination of a maximum and minimum, coupled with a\ncertain admitted preference to wealth in the assignment of\npolitical power, Plato considers that he has guarded against the\nintestine dissensions and other evils likely to arise from\ninequality of property. He accounts great poverty to be a serious\ncause of evil; yet he is very far from looking upon wealth as a\ncause of good. On the contrary, he proclaims that great wealth is\nabsolutely incompatible either with great virtue or great\nhappiness.[169] Accordingly, while he aims at preserving every\nindividual citizen from poverty, he at the same time disclaims all\npurpose of making his community either richer or more\npowerful.[170] He forbids every private citizen to possess gold\nand silver. The magistrates must hold a certain stock of it in\nreserve, in case of public dealing with foreign cities: but they\nwill provide for the daily wants of the community by a special\ncheap currency, having no value beyond the limits of the\nterritory.[171] Moreover, Plato prohibits all loans on interest.\nHe refuses to enforce by law the restoration even of a\ndeposit. He interdicts all dowry or marriage portion with\ndaughters.[172]\n\n[Footnote 169: Plato, Legg. v. pp. 742 E, 743 A, 744 E.]\n\n[Footnote 170: Plato, Legg. v. p. 742 D.]\n\n[Footnote 171: Plato, Legg. v. p. 742 A.]\n\n[Footnote 172: Plato, Legg. v. p. 742 C.]\n\n[Side-note: Board of thirty-seven Nomophylakes--general\nsupervisors of the laws and their execution--how elected.]\n\nHow is the Platonic colony to be first set on its march, and by\nwhom are its first magistrates to be named? By the inhabitants of\nKn\u00f4ssus, its mother city--replies Plato. The Knossians will\nappoint a provisional Board of two hundred: half from their own\ncitizens, half from the elders and most respected men among the\ncolonists themselves.[173] This Board will choose the first\nNomophylakes, consisting of thirty-seven persons, half Knossians,\nhalf colonists. These Nomophylakes are intended as a Council of\nState, and will be elected by the citizens in the following way,\nwhen the colony is once in full march:--All the citizens who\nperform or have performed military service, either as hoplites or\ncavalry, will be electors. They will vote by tablets laid upon the\naltar, and inscribed with the name both of the voter himself and\nof the person whom he prefers. First, three hundred persons will\nbe chosen by the majority of votes according to this process.\nNext, out of these three hundred, one hundred will be chosen by a\nsecond process of the same kind. Lastly, out of these one hundred,\nthirty-seven will be chosen by a third similar process, but with\nincreased solemnity: these thirty-seven will constitute the Board\nof Nomophylakes, or Guardians of the Laws.[174] No person shall be\neligible for Guardian until he has attained the age of fifty. When\nelected, he shall continue to serve until he is seventy, and no\nlonger: so that if elected at sixty, he will have ten years of\nservice.[175] The duties of this Board will be to see that all the\nlaws are faithfully executed: in which function they will have\nsuperintendence over all special magistrates and officers.\n\n[Footnote 173: Plato, Legg. vi. pp. 752 D, 754 C.]\n\n[Footnote 174: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 753 C-D.]\n\n[Footnote 175: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 755 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Military commanders--General council of\n360--complicated mode of election.]\n\nFor the office of General and Minister of War, three persons shall\nbe chosen by show of hands of the military citizens. It shall be\nthe duty of the Nomophylakes to propose three names for this\noffice: but other citizens may also propose different names, and\nthe show of hands will decide. The three Generals, when chosen,\nshall propose twelve names as Taxiarchs, one for each tribe:\nother names may also be proposed, and the show of hands of each\ntribe will determine.[176]\n\n[Footnote 176: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 755 E.]\n\nA Council shall be annually chosen, consisting of 360 members,\nninety from each of the four proprietary scales in the Census. The\nmode of electing this Council is highly complicated. First, Plato\nprovides that 360 Councillors shall be chosen out of the first (or\nrichest) class, and as many out of the second class, by universal\nsuffrage, every citizen being compelled to give his vote: then\nthat 360 Councillors shall be chosen out of the third class, by\nuniversal suffrage, but under this condition, that the three\nrichest classes are compelled to vote, while the fourth class may\nabstain from voting, if they please: next, that 360 Councillors\nshall be chosen out of the fourth class, still by universal\nsuffrage, but with liberty to the third and fourth classes to\nabstain from voting, while the first and second classes are\ncompelled to vote. Out of the four batches, of 360 names from each\nclass, 180 names from each class are to be chosen by universal\nsuffrage compulsory on all. This last list of 180 names is to be\nreduced, by drawing lots, to 90 from each class, or 360 in all:\nwho constitute the Council for the year.[177]\n\n[Footnote 177: Plato, Legg vi. p. 756. Compare Aristot. Politic.\nii. 6, p. 1266, a. 14.\n\nThe passage of Plato is not perspicuous. It appears to me to have\nbeen misunderstood by some commentators, who suppose that only 90\n[Greek: bouleutai\\] are to be chosen out of each census in the\noriginal voting (see Schneider's Comment. on the passage of\nAristotle above alluded to, p. 99). The number originally chosen\nfrom each class must be 360, because it is directed, in the final\nprocess, to be reduced first (by election) to 180 from each class,\nand next (by sortition) to 90 from each class.]\n\n[Side-note: Character of the electoral scheme--Plato's views\nabout wealth--he caters partly for the oligarchical sentiment,\npartly for the democratical.]\n\nHere the evident purpose of Plato is to obtain in the last result\na greater number of votes from the rich than from the poor,\nwithout absolutely disfranchising the poor. Where the persons to\nbe voted for are all of the richer classes, there the poor are\ncompelled to come and vote as well as the rich: where the persons\nto be voted for are all of the poorer class, there the rich are\ncompelled to vote, while the poor are allowed to stay away. He\nseems to look on the vote, not as a privilege which citizens will\nwish to exercise, but as a duty which they must be compelled by\nfine to discharge. This is (as Aristotle calls it) an oligarchical\nprovision. It exhibits Plato's mode of attaining the end\nstated by Livy as proposed in the Servian constitution at Rome,\nand the end contemplated (without being announced) by the framers\nof most other political constitutions recorded in\nhistory--\"_Gradus facti, ut neque exclusus quisquam suffragio\nvideretur, et vis omnis penes primores civitatis esset_\".[178]\nPlato defends it by distinguishing two sorts of equality: one complete\nand undistinguishing, in which all the citizens are put upon a\nlevel: the other in which the good and able citizen is\ndistinguished from the bad and incapable citizen, so that he\nacquires power and honour in proportion to his superior\nmerit.[179] This second sort of equality Plato approves,\npronouncing it to be political justice. But such defence tacitly\nassumes that superiority in wealth, as between the four classes of\nhis census, is to count as evidence of, or as an equivalent for,\nsuperior merit: an assumption doubtless received by many Grecian\npoliticians, and admitted in the general opinion of Greece--but\naltogether at variance with the declared judgment of Plato himself\nas to the effect of wealth upon the character of the wealthy man.\nThe poorest citizen in the Platonic community must have his lot of\nland, which Plato considers sufficient for a sober-minded family:\nthe richest citizen can possess** only five times as much: and all\nreceive the same public instruction. Here, therefore, there can be\nno presumption of superior merit in the richer citizen as compared\nwith the poorer, whatever might be said about the case as it stood\nin actual Grecian communities. We see that Plato in this case\nforgets his own peculiar mode of thought, and accommodates himself\nto received distinctions, without reflecting that the principles\nof _his_ own political system rendered such distinctions\ninapplicable. He bows to the oligarchical sentiment of his\ncontemporaries, by his preferential encouragement to the votes of\nthe rich: he bows to the democratical sentiment, when he consents\nto employ to a small extent the principle of the lot.[180]\n\n[Footnote 178: Livy i. 43.\n\nAristotle characterises these regulations of the Platonic\ncommunity as oligarchical, and remarks that this is in\ncontradiction to the principle with which Plato set out--that it\nought to be a compound of monarchy and democracy. Aristotle\nunderstands this last principle somewhat differently from what\nPlato seems to have intended (Politic. ii. 6, 1266, a. 10).]\n\n[Footnote 179: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 757 A-B.\n\nCompare a like distinction drawn between two sorts of [Greek:\ni)so/t\u00eas] in Isokrates, Areiopagitic. Orat. vii. s. 23-24; also\nAristotel. Politic.]\n\n[Footnote 180: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 757 E. [Greek: dio\\ t\u00f4=| tou=\nkl\u00ea/rou i)/s\u00f4| a)na/gk\u00ea proschr\u00ea/sasthai, duskoli/as t\u00f4=n poll\u00f4=n\ne(/neka], &c.]\n\n[Side-note: Meetings of council--other\nmagistrates--Agoranomi--Astynomi, &c.]\n\nOf the annually-chosen Council, one twelfth part only (or thirty\nCouncillors) will be in constant session in the city: each of\ntheir sessions lasting for one month, and the total thus covering\nthe year. The remaining eleven twelfths will be attending to their\nprivate affairs, except when special necessities arise. The\nCouncil will have the general superintendence of the city, and\ncontroul over all meetings of the citizens.[181] Provision is made\nfor three magistrates called Astynomi, to regulate the streets,\nroads, public buildings, water-courses, &c.: and for five\nAgoranomi, to watch over the public market with its appertaining\ntemples and fountains, and to take cognisance of disputes or\noffences occurring therein. None but citizens of the two richest\nclasses of the census are eligible as Astynomi or Agoranomi:\nfirst, twice the number required are chosen by public show of\nhands--next, half of the number so chosen are drawn off by lot. In\nregard to the show of hands, Plato again decrees, that all\ncitizens of the two richer classes shall be compelled to take part\nin it, under fine: all citizens of the two poorer classes may take\npart if they choose, but are not compelled.[182] By this\nprovision, as before, Plato baits for the oligarchical sentiment:\nby the partial use of the lot, for the democratical.\n\n[Footnote 181: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 758 C-D.]\n\n[Footnote 182: Plato, Legg. vi. pp. 763-764.]\n\n[Side-note: Defence of the territory--rural\npolice--Agronomi, &c.]\n\nThe defence of the territory is entrusted to the Agronomi, five\npersons selected from each of the twelve tribes, making sixty in\nall; and assisted by sixty other junior subordinates, selected by\nthe five Agronomi (those of each tribe choosing twelve) from their\nrespective tribes. Each of these companies of seventeen will be\ncharged with the care of one of the twelve territorial districts,\nas may be determined by lot. Each will then pass by monthly change\nfrom one district to another, so as to make the entire circuit of\nthe twelve districts in one year, going round in an easterly\ndirection or to the right: each will then make the same circuit\nbackward, during a second year, in a westerly direction or to the\nleft.[183] Their term of service will be two years in all,\nduring which all of them will have become familiarly acquainted\nwith every portion of the territory. A public mess will be\nprovided for these companies, and each man among them will be held\nto strict continuity of service. Their duties will be, not merely\nto keep each district in a condition of defence against a foreign\nenemy, but also to improve its internal condition: to facilitate\nthe outflow of water where there is too much, and to retard it\nwhere there is too little: to maintain, in the precincts sacred to\nthe Gods, reservoirs of spring-water, partly as ornament, partly\nalso as warm baths (for the heating of which large stocks of dry\nwood must be collected)--to benefit the old, the sick, and the\noverworked husbandman.[184] Farthermore, these Agronomi will\nadjudicate upon disputes and offences among the rural population,\nboth slave and free. If they abuse their trust, they will be\naccountable, first to the assembled citizens of the district, next\nto the public tribunals in the city.\n\n[Footnote 183: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 760 D. [Greek: tou\\s t\u00ea=s\nch\u00f4/ras to/pous metalla/ttontas a)ei\\ t\u00f4=n e(x\u00ea=s to/p\u00f4n e(ka/stou\nm\u00eano\\s \u00ea(gei=sthai tou\\s phroura/rchous e)pi\\ dexia\\ ku/kl\u00f4|; to\\\nd' e)pide/xia gigne/sth\u00f4 to\\ pro\\s e(/\u00f4.]\n\nIn reference to omens and auguries the Greek spectator looked\ntowards the north, so that he had the east on his right hand.]\n\n[Footnote 184: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 761 A-D.\n\nAgreeable and refreshing combinations of springs with shady trees\nnear the precincts of the Gods were frequent. See Xenophon,\nHellen. v. 3, 19.\n\nThe thermal waters were also generally connected with some\nprecinct of H\u00earakl\u00eas or Askl\u00eapius.\n\nIn some temples it was forbidden to use this adjoining water\nexcept for sacred rites, Thucyd. iv. 97.]\n\n[Side-note: Comparison with the Laced\u00e6monian Kryptia.]\n\nPlato considers that these Agronomi will go through hard work\nduring their two years of service, inasmuch as they will have no\nslaves, and will have to do everything for themselves: though in\nthe performance of any public work they are empowered to put in\nrequisition both men and cattle from the neighbourhood.[185] He\npronounces it to be a salutary discipline for the young men, whom\nhe admonishes that an apprenticeship in obedience is indispensable\nto qualify them for command, and that exact obedience to the laws\nand magistrates will be their best title to posts of authority\nwhen older.[186] Moreover, he insists on the necessity that all\ncitizens should become minutely acquainted with the whole\nterritory: towards which purpose he encourages young men in the\nexercise of hunting. He compares (indirectly) his movable guard of\nAgronomi to the Laced\u00e6monian Krypti, who maintained the police of\nLaconia, and kept watch over the Helots:[187] though they are\nalso the parallel of the youthful Peripoli at Athens, who were\nemployed as Guards for two years round various parts of Attica.\n\n[Footnote 185: Plato, Legg. vi. pp. 760 E-763 A.]\n\n[Footnote 186: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 762 E.]\n\n[Footnote 187: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 763 A-B. [Greek: ei)/te tis\nkruptou\\s ei)/te a)grono/mous ei)/th' o(/, ti kal\u00f4=n chai/rei],\n&c. He notes the hardships endured by these [Greek: Kruptoi\\]\nin their [Greek: Kruptei/a], i. p. 633 C.\n\nThe phrase seems however to indicate that Plato did not much like\nto call his Agronomi by the name of [Greek: Kruptoi/]. The duties\nperformed by the Laced\u00e6monian [Greek: Kruptoi\\] against the Helots\nwere of the harshest character. See chap. vi. p. 509 of my\n'History of Greece'. Sch\u00f6mann, Antiq. Juris Publ. Gr\u00e6c. iv. 1-4,\np. 111, v. 1, 21, p. 199.]\n\n[Side-note: Priests--Ex\u00eag\u00eat\u00e6--Property belonging to\ntemples.]\n\nBesides Astynomi and Agoranomi, Plato provides priests for the\ncare of the sacred buildings in the city, and for the service of\nthe Gods. In choosing these priests, as in choosing the other\nmagistrates, election and sortition are to be combined: to satisfy\nat once the oligarchical and the democratical sentiment. The lot\nwill be peculiarly suitable in a case where priests are to be\nchosen--because the God may be expected to guide it in a manner\nagreeable to himself.[188] Plato himself however is not confident\non this point, for he enjoins additional precautions: the person\nchosen must be sixty years old at least, free from all bodily\ndefect, of legitimate birth, and of a family untainted by previous\ncrime. Plato prescribes farther, that laws or canons respecting\nmatters of divine concern shall be obtained from the Delphian\noracle: and that certain Ex\u00eag\u00eat\u00e6 shall be named as authorised\ninterpreters of these canons, as long as they live.[189]\nTreasurers or stewards shall also be chosen, out of the two richer\nclasses of the census, to administer the landed property and\nproduce belonging to the various temples.[190]\n\n[Footnote 188: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 749 D.]\n\n[Footnote 189: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 759 E.]\n\n[Footnote 190: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 760 A.]\n\nIn the execution of the duties imposed upon them, the Agoranomi\nand Astynomi are empowered to fine an offender to the extent of\none mina (one hundred drachm\u00e6), each of them separately--and when\nboth sit together, to the extent of two min\u00e6.[191]\n\n[Footnote 191: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 764 B.\n\nHere, as in other provisions, Plato copies the practice at Athens,\nwhere each individual magistrate was empowered to impose a fine of\ndefinite amount ([Greek: e)pibol\u00ea\\n e)piba/llein]), though we do\nnot know what that amount was. The Proedri could impose a fine as\nhigh as one mina, the Senate as high as five min\u00e6 (Meier und\nSch\u00f6mann, Der Attische Prozess, p. 34).]\n\n[Side-note: Superintendence of Music and Gymnastic.\nEducational function.]\n\n_Music and Gymnastic._--For each of these, two magisterial\nfunctions must be constituted: one to superintend the\nteaching and training--the other, to preside over the matches and\ndistribution of prizes. In regard to the musical matches, one\nPresident must be appointed for the mon\u00f4dic single-headed\nexhibitions, another for the choric exhibitions. The President of\nthe former must be not less than thirty years of age. The\nPresident of the latter must be not less than forty years of age.\nIn order to appoint a fit person, the Nomophylakes shall constrain\nall the citizens whom they believe to be conversant with mon\u00f4dic\nor choric matters, to assemble and agree on a preliminary list of\nten candidates, who shall undergo a Dokimasy or examination, upon\nthe single point of skill and competency, and no other. If they\nall pass, recourse shall be had to lot, and the one who draws the\nfirst lot shall be President for the year. In regard to the\ngymnastic matches, of men as well as of horses, the citizens of\nthe three richest classes shall be constrained to come together\n(those of the fourth class may come, or stay away, as they\nplease), and to fix upon twenty suitable persons; who shall\nundergo the Dokimasy, and out of whom three shall be selected by\nlot as Presidents of gymnastic contests for the year.[192]\n\n[Footnote 192: Plato, Legg. vi. pp. 764-765.]\n\n[Side-note: Grave duties of the Minister of\nEducation--precautions in electing him.]\n\nWe observe that in the nomination of Presidents for the musical\nand gymnastic contests, Plato adopts the same double-faced\nmachinery as before--To please the oligarchical sentiment by\ntreating the votes of the rich as indispensable, the votes of the\npoor as indifferent--To please the democratical sentiment by a\npartial application of the lot. But in regard to the President of\nmusical and gymnastic education or training, he prescribes a very\ndifferent manner of choice. He declares this to be the most\nimportant function in the city. Upon the way in which the Minister\nof Education discharges his functions, the ultimate character of\nthe citizens will mainly turn. Accordingly, this magistrate must\nbe a man of fifty years of age, father of legitimate\nchildren--and, if possible, of daughters as well as sons. He must\nalso be one of the thirty-seven Nomophylakes. He will be selected,\nnot by the votes of the citizens generally, but by the votes of all\nthe magistrates (except the annual Councillors and the Prytanes):\nsuch votes being deposited secretly in the temple of Apollo. The\nperson who obtains the most of these secret votes will be\nsubmitted to a farther Dokimasy by all the voting magistrates\n(except the Nomophylakes themselves), and will, if approved, be\nconstituted President of musical and gymnastic education for five\nyears.[193]\n\n[Footnote 193: Plato, Legg. vi. pp. 765-766.]\n\n[Side-note: Judicial duties.]\n\nFrom the magisterial authority in his city, Plato now passes to\nthe judicial or dikastic. He remarks that no peremptory line of\nseparation can be drawn between the two. Every magistrate\nexercises judicial functions on some matters: every dikast, on the\ndays when he sits, decides magisterially.[194] He then proceeds to\ndistinguish (as the Attic forum did) between two sorts of\ncauses:--Private, disputes between man and man, where the persons\ncomplaining of being wronged are one or a few individuals--Public,\nwhere the party wronged or alleged to be wronged is the\nstate.[195]\n\n[Footnote 194: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 767 A.]\n\n[Footnote 195: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 767 B.\n\nThis was the main distinction adopted in the Attic law. 1.\nComplaint, founded upon injury alleged to be done to the interest\nof some individual--[Greek: a)g\u00f4\\n i)/dios, di/k\u00ea i)di/a, di/k\u00ea]\nin the narrow sense. 2. Complaint, founded upon injury alleged to\nbe done towards some interest not strictly individual--[Greek:\na)g\u00f4\\n d\u00eamo/sios, di/k\u00ea d\u00eamosi/a, graph\u00ea/] (Meier und Sch\u00f6mann,\nder Attische Prozess, p. 162).]\n\n[Side-note: Private Causes--how tried.]\n\nIn regard to the private causes, he institutes Tribe-Dikasteries,\ntaken by lot out of the citizens of each tribe, and applied\nwithout notice to each particular cause as it comes on, so that no\none can know beforehand in what cause he is to adjudicate, nor can\nany one be solicited or bribed.[196] He institutes farthermore a\nsuperior court of appeal, formed every year by the various Boards\nof Magistrates, each choosing out of its own body the most\nesteemed member, subject to approval by an ensuing Dokimasy.[197]\nWhen one citizen believes himself to be wronged by another, he\nmust first submit the complaint to arbitration by neighbours and\ncommon friends. If this arbitration fails to prove satisfactory,\nhe must next bring the complaint before the Tribe-Dikastery.\nShould their decision prove unsatisfactory, the case may be\nbrought (seemingly by either of the parties) before the\nsuperior court of appeal, whose decision will be final. Plato\ndirects that this superior Court shall hold its sittings publicly,\nin presence of all the Magistrates and all the Councillors, as\nwell as of any other citizen who may choose to attend. The members\nof the Court are to give their votes openly.[198] Should they be\nsuspected of injustice or corruption, they may be impeached before\nthe Nomophylakes; who, if convinced of their guilt, shall compel\nthem to make good the wrong done, and shall impose penalties\nbesides, if the case requires.[199]\n\n[Footnote 196: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 768 B.]\n\n[Footnote 197: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 767-C-D. [Greek: gigne/sth\u00f4\nkoino\\n a(/pasi toi=s to\\ tri/ton a)mphisb\u00eatou=sin i)di\u00f4/tais\npro\\s a)ll\u00ea/lous.]]\n\n[Footnote 198: Plato, Legg. vi. pp. 767 A-D, 768 B. Compare xii.\np. 956.]\n\n[Footnote 199: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 767 E.]\n\n[Side-note: Public Causes must be tried directly by the\ncitizens--strong feeling among Greeks about this.]\n\nIn regard to Public Causes, Plato makes unusual concession to a\nfeeling much prevalent in Greece, and especially potent at Athens.\nWhere the wrong done is to the public, he recognises that the\ncitizens generally will not submit to be excluded from the\npersonal cognizance of it: the citizen excluded from that\nprivilege feels as if he had no share in the city.[200] If one\ncitizen accuses another of treason, or peculation, or other wrong\ntowards the public, the accusation shall be originated at first,\nand decided at last, before the general body of citizens. But\nafter having been originated before this general assembly, the\ncharge must be submitted to an intermediate stage of examination,\nbefore three of the principal Boards of Magistrates; who shall\nsift the allegations of the accuser, as well as the defence of the\naccused. These commissioners (we must presume) will make a report\non the case, which report will be brought before the general\nassembly; who will then adjudicate upon it finally, and condemn or\nacquit as they think right.[201]\n\n[Footnote 200: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 768 B. [Greek: o( ga\\r\na)koin\u00f4/n\u00eatos \u00f4)\\n e)xousi/as tou= sundika/zein, \u00ea(gei=tai to\\\npara/pan t\u00ea=s po/le\u00f4s ou) me/tochos ei)=nai.] This is a remarkable\nindication about the tone of Grecian feeling from a very adverse\nwitness.]\n\n[Footnote 201: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 768 A. [Greek: t\u00ea\\n de\\\nba/sanon e)n tai=s megi/stais a)rchai=s trisi/n], &c.\n\nHere the word [Greek: ba/sanos] is used in a much more extended\nsense than usual, so as to include the whole process of judicial\nenquiry.]\n\n[Side-note: Plato's way of meeting this\nfeeling--intermediate inquiry and report by a special Commissioner.]\n\nThis proposition deserves notice. Plato proclaims his\ndisapprobation of the numerous Dikasteries in Athens, wherein the\nDikasts sat, heard, and voted--perhaps with applause or murmurs,\nbut with no searching questions of their own--leaving the\nwhole speech to the parties and their witnesses. To decide justly\n(he says), the judicial authority must not remain silent, but must\nspeak more than the parties, and must undertake the substantial\nconduct of the inquiry. No numerous assembly--nor even any few,\nunless they be intelligent--are competent to such a duty: nor even\nan intelligent few, without much time and patience.[202] To secure\nsuch an inquiry on these public causes--as far as is possible\nconsistent with the necessity of leaving the final decision to the\ngeneral assembly--is the object of Plato's last-mentioned\nproposition. It is one of the most judicious propositions in his\nwhole scheme.\n\n[Footnote 202: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 766 E.]\n\n*  *  *  *  *\n\n[Side-note: What laws the magistrates are to enforce--Many\ndetails must be left to the Nomophylakes.]\n\nPlato has now constituted the magistrates and the judicial\nmachinery. It is time to specify the laws which they are to obey\nand to enforce.[203]\n\n[Footnote 203: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 768 E.]\n\nPlato considers the Nomophylakes (together with another board\ncalled the Nocturnal Council, to be hereafter described) as the\npermanent representatives of himself: destined to ensure that the\ngrand ethical purpose of the lawgiver shall be constantly kept in\nview, and to supply what may have been left wanting in the\noriginal programme.[204] Especially at the first beginning,\nprovision will be found wanting in many details, which the\nNomophylakes will take care to supply. In respect to the choric\nfestivals, which are of so much importance for the training and\nintercourse of young men and maidens, the lawgiver must trust to\nthe Choric Superintendents and the Nomophylakes for regulating, by\ntheir experience, much which he cannot foresee. But an experience\nof ten years will enable them to make all the modifications and\nadditions required; and after that period they shall fix and\nconsecrate in perpetuity the ceremonies as they then stand,\nforbidding all farther change. Neither in that nor in any other\narrangement shall any subsequent change be allowed, except on\nthe unanimous requisition of all the magistrates, all the people,\nand all the oracles of the Gods.[205]\n\n[Footnote 204: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 770 C-E.]\n\n[Footnote 205: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 772 C-D.]\n\n[Side-note: Marriage-Laws--Rich husbands to choose poor\nwives--No dowries--costly marriage festivals are forbidden.]\n\nThe choric festivals, in which the youths and maidens will take\npart, both of them naked as far as a sober modesty will allow,\npresent occasions for mutual acquaintance between them, which\nserves as foundation for marriage.[206] At the age of twenty-five\na young man is permitted to marry; and before the age of\nthirty-five he is required to marry, under penalty of fine and\ndisgrace, if he does not.[207] Plato introduces here a discourse,\nin the form of a prologue to his marriage law, wherein he impresses\non young men the general principles according to which they ought\nto choose their wives. The received sentiment, which disposes a rich\nyouth to choose his wife from a rich family, is (in Plato's view)\naltogether wrong. Rich husbands ought to assort themselves with\npoor wives; and in general the characters of husband and wife\nought to be opposite rather than similar, in order that the\noffspring may not inherit the defects of either.[208] The\nreligious ceremonies antecedent to marriage are to be regulated by\nthe Ex\u00eag\u00eat\u00e6. A costly marriage feast--and, above all, drunkenness\nat that feast--are emphatically forbidden. Any offspring begotten\nwhen the parent is in this disorderly and insane condition,[209]\nwill probably be vitiated from the beginning. Out of the two\nresidences which every citizen's lot will comprise, one must be\nallotted to the son when the son marries.[210]\n\n[Footnote 206: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 772 A. [Greek: gumnou\\s kai\\\ngumna\\s me/chri per ai)dou=s s\u00f4/phronos e(ka/st\u00f4n], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 207: Plato, Legg. vi. pp. 772 E, 774 A.]\n\n[Footnote 208: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 773 C-D.\n\nCompare the Politikus, pp. 310-311, where the necessity is\ninsisted on of coupling in marriage two persons of opposite\ndispositions--[Greek: to\\ a)ndrei=on \u00ea)=thos] with [Greek: to\\\nko/smion \u00ea)=thos]. There is a natural inclination (Plato says) for\nthe [Greek: a)ndrei=oi] to intermarry with each other, and for the\n[Greek: ko/smioi] to do the like: but the lawgiver must contend\nagainst this. If this be permitted, each of the breeds will\ndegenerate through excess of its own peculiarity.]\n\n[Footnote 209: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 775.]\n\n[Footnote 210: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 776 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Laws about slavery. Slaves to be well fed, and\nnever treated with cruelty or insolence. The master must not\nconverse with them.]\n\nPlato now enters upon his laws respecting property; and first of\nall upon the most critical variety of property; that in human\nbeings, or slavery. This he declares to be a subject full of\ndifficulty. There is much difference of opinion on the subject.\nSome speak of slaves as deserving trust and good treatment,\nin proof of which various anecdotes of exemplary fidelity on their\npart are cited: others again regard them as incorrigibly debased,\nfit for nothing better than the whip and spur, like cattle. Then\nmoreover the modified form of slavery, such as that of the Helots\nin Laconia, and the Penest\u00e6 in Thessaly, has been found full of\ndanger and embarrassment, though the Spartans themselves are well\nsatisfied with it.[211] (It will be recollected that the Helots\nand Penest\u00e6 were not slaves bought and imported from abroad, as\nthe slaves in Attica were, but conquered Hellenic communities who\nhad been degraded from freedom into slavery, and from the\ncondition of independent proprietorship into that of tributary\ntenants or serfs; but with the right to remain permanently on\ntheir lands, without ever being sold for exportation.) This form\nof slavery (where the slaves are of the same race and language,\nwith reciprocal bonds of sympathy towards each other) Plato\ndenounces as especially dangerous. Care must be taken that there\nshall be among the slaves as little fellowship of language and\nfeelings as possible; but they must be well fed: moreover\neverything like cruelty and insolence in dealing with them must be\navoided, even more carefully than in dealing with freemen. This he\nprescribes partly for the protection of the slave himself, but\nstill more for the interest of the master: whose intrinsic virtue,\nor want of virtue, will be best tested by his behaviour as a\nmaster. The slaves must be punished judicially, when they deserve\nit. But the master must never exhort or admonish them, as he would\naddress himself to a freeman: he must never say a word to them,\nexcept to give an order: above all, he must abstain from all\nbanter and joking, either with male or female slaves.[212] Many\nfoolish masters indulge in such behaviour, which emboldens\nthe slaves to give themselves airs, and renders the task of\ngoverning them almost impracticable.[213]\n\n[Footnote 211: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 777. He alludes also to the\nenslavement of the indigenous population called the Mariandyni, by\nthe Grecian colonists of Herakleia on the southern coast of the\nEuxine; and to the disturbances and disorders which had occurred\nthrough movements of the slaves in Southern Italy. Probably this\nlast may be connected with that revolt whereby the Bruttians\nbecame enfranchised; but we can make out nothing definite from\nPlato's language.]\n\n[Footnote 212: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 777 D-E. [Greek: kola/zein ge\nm\u00ea\\n e)n di/k\u00ea dou/lous a)ei\\, kai\\ m\u00ea\\ nouthetou=ntas \u00f4(s\ne)leuthe/rous thru/ptesthai poiei=n. T\u00ea\\n de\\ oi)ketou= pro/sr\u00easin\nchr\u00ea\\ schedo\\n e)pi/taxin pa=san gi/gnesthai, m\u00ea\\ prospai/zontas\nm\u00eadam\u00ea=| m\u00eadam\u00f4=s oi)ketai=s, m\u00ea/t' ou)=n th\u00ealei/ais m\u00ea/t'\na)/r)r(esin.]]\n\n[Footnote 213: Aristotle (Polit. vii. p. 1330, a. 27; Oeconom.\ni. p. 1344, b. 18) agrees with Plato as to the danger of having\nslaves who speak the same language and are of the same tribes,\nwith common lineage and sympathies. He disapproves of anything\nwhich tends to impart spirit and independence to the slave's\ncharacter; and he takes occasion from hence to deduce some\nobjections against various arrangements of the Platonic Republic\n(Politic. ii. p. 1264, a. 35). These are precautions--[Greek:\npro\\s to\\ m\u00eade\\n ne\u00f4teri/zein]. But Aristotle dissents from Plato\non another point--where Plato enjoins that the master shall not\nexhort or admonish his slave, but shall address to him no word\nexcept the word of command (Aristot. Politic. i. p. 1260, b. 5).\nAristotle says that there is a certain special and inferior kind\nof [Greek: a)ret\u00ea\\] which the slave can possess and ought to\npossess; that this ought to be communicated to him by the\nadmonition and exhortation of the master; and that the master\nought to admonish his slaves even more than he admonishes his\nchildren. The slave requires a certain [Greek: \u00ea)thik\u00ea\\n\na)ret\u00ea/n], so that he may not be hindered from his duty by [Greek:\na)kolasi/a] or [Greek: deili/a]: but it is an [Greek: a)ret\u00ea\\\nmikra/]: the courage required for the slave is [Greek:\nu(p\u00earetik\u00ea/], that for the master [Greek: a)rchik\u00ea/] (ib. p. 1260,\na. 22-35). This measure of virtue the master must impart to the\nslave by exhortation, over and above the orders which he gives as\nto the performance of work. It would appear, however, that in\nAristotle's time there were various persons who denied that there\nwas any [Greek: a)ret\u00ea\\] belonging to a slave--[Greek: para\\ ta\\s\no)rganika\\s kai\\ diakonika/s] (p. 1259, b. 23). Upon this last\ntheory is founded the injunction of Plato which Aristotle here\ncontroverts.\n\nWhat Aristotle says about slaves in the fifth chapter of the first\nbook of his Oeconomica, is superior to what he says in the\nPolitica, and superior to anything which we read in the Platonic\nTreatise De Legibus.]\n\n[Side-note: Circular form for the city--Temples in the\ncentre--No walls round it.]\n\nAs to the construction of the city, Plato prescribes that its\nexternal contour shall be of circular form, encircling the summit\nof an eminence, with the agora near the centre. The temples of the\nGods shall be planted around the agora, and the buildings for\ngymnasia and schooling, for theatrical representation, for\nmagistrative, administrative, and judicial business, near at hand.\nPlato follows the example of Sparta in prohibiting any special\nouter wall for the fortification of the city, which he treats as\nan indication of weakness and timidity: nevertheless he suggests\nthat the houses constituting the city may be erected on such a\nplan, and in such connection, as to be equivalent to a\nfortification.[214] When once the city is erected, the Astynomi or\n\u00c6diles are to be charged with the duty of maintaining its\nintegrity and cleanliness.\n\n[Footnote 214: Plato, Legg. vi. pp. 778-779.]\n\n[Side-note: Mode of life prescribed to new-married couples\nThey are to take the best care about good procreation for the\ncity.]\n\nPlato next proceeds to regulate the mode of life proper for all\nhis new-married couples. He proclaims broadly that large\ninterference with private and individual life is unavoidable; and\nthat no great public reform can be accomplished without it.[215]\nHe points out that this principle was nowhere sufficiently\nadmitted: not even at Sparta, where it was carried farther than\nanywhere else. Even the Spartans and Kretans adopted the public\nmess-table only for males, and not for females.[216] In Plato's\nview, it is essential for both. He would greatly prefer (as\nannounced already in his Republic) that it should be one and the\nsame for both--males and females taking their meals together.\n\n[Footnote 215: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 780 A, vii. p. 790 A.]\n\n[Footnote 216: Plato. Legg. vi. p. 781 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Board of superintending matrons.]\n\nThe newly-married couples are enjoined to bestow their best\nattention upon the production of handsome and well-constituted\nchildren: this being their primary duty to the city for ten years\nafter their marriage. Their conduct will be watched by a Board of\nMatrons, chosen for the purpose by the Nomophylakes, and\nassembling every day in the temple of Eileithuia. In case of any\ndispute, or unfaithful or unseemly conduct, these Matrons will\nvisit them to admonish or threaten, if they see reason. Should\nsuch interference fail of effect, the Matrons will apprise the\nNomophylakes, who will on their parts admonish and censure, and\nwill at last denounce the delinquents, if still refractory, to the\npublic authority. The delinquents will then be disgraced, and\ndebarred from the public ceremonies, unless they can clear\nthemselves by indicting and convicting their accusers before the\npublic tribunal.[217]\n\n[Footnote 217: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 784.]\n\n[Side-note: Age fixed for marriage. During the first ten\nyears the couple are under obligation to procreate for the\ncity--Restrictions during these ten years.]\n\nThe age of marriage is fixed at from thirty to thirty-five for\nmales, from sixteen to twenty for females. The first ten years\nafter marriage are considered as appropriated to the production of\nchildren _for the city_, and are subject to the strict\nsupervision above mentioned. If any couple have no offspring for\nten years, the marriage shall be dissolved by authority. After ten\nyears the supervision is suspended, and the couple are left to\nthemselves. If either of them shall commit an infidelity with\nanother person still under the decennial restriction, the party so\noffending is liable to the same penalty as if he were still\nhimself also under it.[218] But if the person with whom infidelity\nis committed be not under that restriction, no penalty will be\nincurred beyond a certain general discredit, as compared with\nothers whose conduct is blameless, and who will receive greater\nhonour. However, Plato advises that nothing shall be said in the\nlaw respecting the conduct of married couples after the period of\ndecennial restriction has elapsed, unless there be some grave\nscandal to call attention to the subject.[219]\n\n[Footnote 218: Plato, Legg. vi. pp. 784-785.]\n\n[Footnote 219: Plato, Legg. vi. p. 785 A. [Greek: kai\\\nmetriazo/nt\u00f4n me\\n peri\\ ta\\ toiau=ta t\u00f4=n pleio/n\u00f4n\na)nomothe/t\u00eata sig\u00ea=| kei/sth\u00f4, a)kosmou/nt\u00f4n de\\ nomothet\u00eathe/nta\ntau/t\u00ea| pratte/sth\u00f4], &c.]\n\n[Side-note: How infants are to be brought\nup--Nurses--Perpetual regulated movements--useful for toning\ndown violent emotions.]\n\nPlato now proceeds to treat about the children just born. The\nprinciple of separate family being admitted in the Treatise De\nLegibus, he refrains from promulgating any peremptory laws on this\nsubject, because it is impossible for the lawgiver or the\nmagistrate to enter into each private house, and to enforce\nobedience on such minute and numerous details: while it would be\ndiscreditable for him to command what he could not enforce, and it\nwould moreover accustom citizens to disobey the law with impunity.\nStill, however, Plato[220] thinks it useful to deliver some\ngeneral advice, which he hopes that fathers and mothers will\nspontaneously follow. He begins with the infant as soon as born,\nand even before birth. The mother during pregnancy is admonished\nto take regular exercise; the infant when born must be carried\nabout constantly in the nurse's arms. The invigorating effects of\nsuch gestation are illustrated by the practice of Athenian\ncock-fighters, who cause the cocks while under training to be carried\nabout under the arms of attendants in long walks.[221] Besides\nthat the nurses (slaves) must be strong women, there must also be\nmore than one to each infant, in order that he may be sufficiently\ncarried about. He must be kept in swaddling-clothes for the first\ntwo years, and must not be allowed to walk until he is three years\nof age.[222] The perpetual movement and dandling, in the arms of\nthe nurse, produces a good effect not only on the health and\nbodily force of the infant, but also upon his emotions.[223] The\ninfant ought to be kept (if it were possible) in movement as\nconstant and unceasing as if he were on shipboard. Nurses know\nthis by experience, when they lull to sleep an insomnious child,\nnot by holding him still, but by swinging him about in their arms,\nand by singing a ditty. So likewise the insane and furious\nemotions inspired by Dionysus (also by Zeus, by the mother of the\nGods, &c.) are appeased by the regulated movement, dance and\nmusic, solemnly performed at the ceremonial worship of the God who\nexcited the emotions. These are different varieties of fear and\nperturbation: they are morbid internal movements, which we\noverpower and heal by muscular and rhythmical movements impressed\nfrom without, with appropriate music and religious\nsolemnities.[224]\n\n[Footnote 220: Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 788-790 A.]\n\n[Footnote 221: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 789.]\n\n[Footnote 222: Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 789 E, 790 A.]\n\n[Footnote 223: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 790 C-D. [Greek: la/b\u00f4men\ntoi/nun tou=to oi(=on stoichei=on e)p' a)mpho/tera s\u00f4/mato/s te\nkai\\ psuch\u00ea=s t\u00f4=n pa/nu ne/\u00f4n, t\u00ea\\n tith\u00ea/n\u00easin kai\\ ki/n\u00easin,\ngignome/n\u00ean o(/ti ma/lista dia\\ pa/s\u00eas nukto/s te kai\\ \u00ea(me/ras,\n\u00f4(s e)/sti xu/mphoros a(/pasi me/n, ou)ch \u00ea(/kista de\\ toi=s o(/,\nti ne\u00f4ta/toisi, kai\\ oi)kei=n, ei) dunato\\n \u00ea)=n, oi(=on a)ei\\\nple/ontas; nu=n d' \u00f4(s e)ggu/tata tou/tou poiei=n dei= peri\\ ta\\\nneogen\u00ea= pai/d\u00f4n thre/mmata.]]\n\n[Footnote 224: Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 790 E-791 A. [Greek:\ndeimai/nein e)sti/ pou tau=t' a)mpho/tera ta\\ pa/th\u00ea, kai\\ e)/sti\ndei/mata di' e(/xin phau/l\u00ean t\u00ea=s psuch\u00ea=s tina/. o(/tan ou)=n\ne)/x\u00f4the/n tis prosphe/r\u00ea toi=s toiou/tois pa/thesi seismo/n, \u00ea(\nt\u00f4=n e)/x\u00f4then kratei= ki/n\u00easis prospherome/n\u00ea t\u00ea\\n e)nto\\s\nphobera\\n ou)=san kai\\ manik\u00ea\\n ki/n\u00easin, krat\u00ea/sasa de\\ gal\u00ea/n\u00ean\n\u00ea(suchi/an t\u00ea=s peri\\ ta\\ t\u00ea=s kardi/as chalep\u00ea=s genome/n\u00eas\ne(ka/st\u00f4n p\u00ead\u00ea/se\u00f4s.]\n\nAbout the effect of the movement, bustle, noise, and solemn\nexhibitions, &c., of a Grecian festival, in appeasing the\nover-wrought internal excitement of those who took part in it, see\nLobeck, Aglaophamus, p. 689.\n\nCompare Euripid. Hippolyt. 141, where the Chorus addresses the\nlove-sick Ph\u00e6dra:--\n\n[Greek: su\\ ta)/r' e)/ntheos, \u00f4)= kou/ra,\nei)/t' e)k Pano\\s ei)/th' E(ka/tas,\n\u00ea)\\ semn\u00f4=n Koruba/nt\u00f4n,\n\u00ea)\\ matro\\s o)rei/as phoita=|s.]\n\nAlso Eurip. Medea, 1172 about [Greek: Pano\\s o)rga/s].]\n\nTo guard the child, during the first three years of his life,\nagainst disturbing fears, or at least to teach him to conquer them\nwhen they may spring up, is to lay the best foundation of a\nfearless character for the future.[225] By extreme indulgence he\nwould be rendered wayward: by extreme harshness his spirit would\nbe broken.[226] A middle course ought to be pursued, guarding him\nagainst pains as far as may be, yet at the same time keeping\npleasures out of his reach, especially the stronger pleasures:\nthus shall we form in him a gentle and propitious disposition,\nsuch as that which we ascribe to the Gods.[227]\n\n[Footnote 225: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 791 C.]\n\n[Footnote 226: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 791 D.]\n\n[Footnote 227: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 792 C-D.]\n\n[Side-note: Choric and orchestic movements, their effect in\ndischarging strong emotions.]\n\nThe comparison made here by Plato between the effect produced by\nthese various religious ceremonies upon the mind of the votary,\nand that produced by the dandling of the nurse upon the perturbed\nchild in her arms, is remarkable. In both, the evil is the\nsame--unfounded and irrational fear--an emotional disturbance within:\nin both, the remedy is the same--regulated muscular movement and\nexcitement from without: more gentle in the case of the infant,\nmore violent in the case of the adult. Emotion is a complex fact,\nphysical as well as mental; and the physical aspect and basis of\nit (known to Aristotle[228] as well as to Plato) is here brought\nto view. To speak the language of modern science (with which their\nviews here harmonise, in spite of their imperfect acquaintance\nwith human anatomy), if the energies of the nervous system are\noverwrought within, they may be diverted into a new channel by\nbodily movements at once strenuous and measured, and may thus be\ndischarged in a way tranquillising to the emotions. This is\nPlato's theory about the healing effects of the choric and\norchestic religious ceremonies of his day. The God was believed\nfirst to produce the distressing excitement within--then to\nsuggest and enjoin (even to share in) the ceremonial movements for\nthe purpose of relieving it. The votary is brought back from the\ncondition of comparative madness to that of sober reason.[229]\nStrong emotion of any kind is, in Plato's view, a state of\ndistemper. The observances here prescribed respecting wise\nregulation of the emotions, especially in young children, are\nconsidered by Plato as not being laws in the proper and positive\nsense, but as the unwritten customs, habits, rules, discipline,\n&c., upon which all positive laws repose and depend. Though\nthey appear to go into excessive and petty details, yet unless\nthey be well understood and efficaciously realised, the laws\nenacted will fail to attain their purpose.[230]\n\n[Footnote 228: Aristot. De Anim\u00e2, i. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 229: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 791 B. [Greek: kateirga/sato\na)nti\\ manik\u00f4=n \u00ea(mi=n diathe/se\u00f4n e(/xeis e)/mphronas e)/chein.]\n\nServius observes (Not. ad Virgil. Bucol. v. 73):--\"Sane, ut in\nreligionibus saltaretur, h\u00e6c ratio est, quod nullam majores nostri\npartem corporis esse voluerunt, qu\u00e6 non sentiret religionem. Nam\ncantus ad animam, saltatio ad mobilitatem pertinet corporis.\"]\n\n[Footnote 230: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 793 C-D.]\n\n[Side-note: Training of boys and girls.]\n\nPursuant to this view of the essential dependence of _leges_\nupon _mores_, Plato continues his directions about the\ntraining of children. From the age of three to six, the child must\nbe supplied with amusements, under a gentle but sufficient\ncontroul. The children of both sexes will meet daily at the\nvarious temples near at hand, with discreet matrons to preside\nover them, and will find amusement for each other. At six years of\nage the boys and girls will be separated, and will be consigned to\ndifferent male and female tutors. The boys shall learn\nriding, military exercise, and the use of the various weapons of\nwar. The girls shall learn these very same things also, if it be\npossible. Plato is most anxious that they should learn, but he\nfears that the feelings of the community will not tolerate the\npractice.[231] All the teaching will be conducted under the\nsuperintendence of teachers, female as well as male: competent\nindividuals, of both sexes, being appointed to the functions of\ncommand without distinction.[232] The children will be taught to\nuse their left hands as effectively as their right.[233] Wrestling\nshall be taught up to a certain point, to improve the strength and\nflexibility of the limbs; but elaborate wrestling and pugilism is\ndisapproved. Imitative dancing, choric movements, and procession,\nshall also be taught, but always in arms, to familiarise the youth\nwith military details.[234]\n\n[Footnote 231: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 794 B-D.]\n\n[Footnote 232: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 795 D. [Greek: a)rchou/sais te\nkai\\ a)/rchousi]. Also p. 806 E.]\n\n[Footnote 233: Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 794-795, 804 D.]\n\n[Footnote 234: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 796 C-D.]\n\n[Side-note: Musical and literary teaching for youth--Poetry,\nsongs, music, dances, must all be fixed by authority, and never\nchanged--Mischief done by poets aiming to please.]\n\nPlato now enters upon the musical and literary teaching proper for\nthe youthful portion of his community. Poetry, music, and dancing,\nas connected with the service and propitiation of the Gods, are in\nthe first instance recreative and amusing; but they also involve\nserious consequences.[235] It is most important to the community\nthat these exercises should not only be well arranged, but that\nwhen arranged they should be fixed by authority, so as to prevent\nall innovations or deviations by individual taste. Plato here\nrepeats, with emphasis, his commendation of the Egyptian practice\nto consecrate all the songs, dances, and festive ceremonies, and\nto tolerate no others whatever.[236] Change is in itself a most\nserious evil, and change in one department provokes an appetite\nfor change in all. Plato forbids all innovation, even in matters\nof detail, such as the shape of vessels or articles of\nfurniture.[237] He allows no poet to circulate any ode except such\nas is in full harmony with the declaration of the lawgiver\nrespecting good and evil. All the old poems must be sifted and\nweeded. All new hymns and prayers to the Gods, even before they\nare shown to a single individual, must be examined by Censors\nabove fifty years of age, in order that it may be seen whether the\npoet knows what he ought to praise or blame, and what he ought to\npray for. In general, the poets do not know what is good and what\nis evil. By mistaken prayers--especially for wealth, which the\nlawgiver discountenances as prejudicial--they may bring down great\nmischief upon the city.[238] Different songs must be composed for\nthe two sexes: songs of a bold and martial character for males--of\na sober and quiet character for females.[239] But the poet must on\nno account cultivate \"the sweet Muse,\" or make it his direct aim\nto produce emotions delightful to the audience. The sound and\nuseful music will always in the end become agreeable, provided the\npupils hear it from their earliest childhood, and hear nothing\nelse.[240] Plato censures the tragic representations exhibited in\nthe Grecian cities (at Athens, more than anywhere else) as being\nunseemly, and even impious, because, close to the altar where\nsacrifice was offered to the Gods, choric and dramatic\nperformances of the most touching and pathetic character were\nexhibited. The poet who gained the prize was he who touched most\ndeeply the tender emotions of the audience, and caused the\ngreatest flow of tears among them. Now, in the opinion of Plato,\nthe exhibition of so much human misery, and the communication of\nso much sorrowful sympathy, was most unsuitable to the festival\nday, and offensive to the Gods. It was tolerable only on the\ninauspicious days of the year, and when exhibited by hired Karian\nmourners, such as those who wailed loudly at funerals. The music\nat the festivals ought to have no emotional character, except that\nof gentle, kindly, auspicious cheerfulness.[241]\n\n[Footnote 235: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 803 C-E.]\n\n[Footnote 236: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 799.]\n\n[Footnote 237: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 797.]\n\n[Footnote 238: Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 800 A, 801 B, 802 B.]\n\n[Footnote 239: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 802 D-E.]\n\n[Footnote 240: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 802 C. [Greek: kai\\ m\u00ea\\\nparatitheme/n\u00eas t\u00ea=s glukei/as Mou/s\u00eas.]]\n\n[Footnote 241: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 800 B-E. 801 A: [Greek:\neu)ph\u00eami/a, kai\\ d\u00ea\\ kai\\ to\\ t\u00ea=s \u00f4)|d\u00ea=s ge/nos eu)/ph\u00eamon\n\u00ea(mi=n pa/nt\u00ea| pa/nt\u00f4s u(parche/t\u00f4.]\n\nThis is a remarkable declaration of Plato, condemning the tragic\nrepresentations at Athens. Compare Gorgias, p. 501; Republic, x.\np. 605; also about the effect on the spectators, Ion, p. 535 E.\n\nThe idea of [Greek: eu)ph\u00eami/a] is more negative than positive; it\nis often shown by silence. The [Greek: dusph\u00ea/miai] (Soph. Phil.\n10), or [Greek: blasph\u00eami/a], as Plato calls it, are the positive\nact or ill-omened manifestation. Plato, Ph\u00e6don, p. 117: [Greek:\ne)n eu)ph\u00eami/a| chr\u00ea\\ teleuta=|n.]]\n\n[Side-note: Boys and girls to learn letters and the lyre,\nfrom ten to thirteen years of age. Masters will teach the laws and\nhomilies of the lawgiver, and licensed extracts from the poets.]\n\nAt ten years old, the boys and girls (who have hitherto been\nexercised in recitation, singing, dancing, &c.) are to learn\ntheir letters, or reading and writing. They will continue\nthis process until thirteen years old. They will learn the use of\nthe lyre, for three years. The same period and duration is fixed\nfor all of them, not depending at all upon the judgment or\npreference of the parents.[242] It is sufficient if they learn to\nread and and write tolerably, without aiming to do it either\nquickly or very well. The boys will be marched to school at\ndaybreak every morning, under the care of a tutor, who is chosen\nby the magistrate for the purpose of keeping them under constant\nsupervision and discipline.[243] The masters for teaching will be\nspecial persons paid for the duty, usually foreigners.[244] They\nwill be allowed to teach nothing except the laws and homilies of\nthe lawgiver, together with any selections from existing poets\nwhich may be in full harmony with these.[245] Plato here proclaims\nhow highly he is himself delighted with his own string of\nhomilies: which are not merely exhortations useful to be heard,\nbut also have the charm of poetry, and have been aided by\ninspirations from the Gods.[246] As for the poets themselves,\nwhether serious or comic, whose works were commonly employed in\nteaching, being committed wholly or partially to memory--Plato\nrepudiates them as embodying a large proportion of mischievous\ndoctrine which his pupils ought never to hear. Much reading, or\nmuch learning, he discountenances as dangerous to youths.[247]\n\n[Footnote 242: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 810 A.]\n\n[Footnote 243: Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 808 C, 809 B.]\n\n[Footnote 244: Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 804 D, 813 E.]\n\n[Footnote 245: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 811 E. Any new poet who wishes\nto exhibit must submit his compositions to the Censors. P. 817\nC-D.]\n\n[Footnote 246: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 811 C-D. [Greek: ou)k a)/neu\ntino\\s e)pipnoi/as the\u00f4=n . . . ma/la \u00ea(sth\u00ea=nai.] Stallbaum in\nhis note (p. 337) treats this as said in jest (_facet\u00e9_\ndicit). To me it seems sober earnest, and quite in character with\nthe didactic solemnity of the whole treatise. Plato himself would\nhave been astonished (I think) at the note of his commentator.]\n\n[Footnote 247: Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 810-811. [Greek: ki/nduno/n\nph\u00eami ei)=nai phe/rousan toi=s paisi\\ t\u00ea\\n polumathi/an] (811 B).\nCompare p. 819 A.]\n\n[Side-note: The teaching is to be simple, and common to both\nsexes.]\n\nThe teaching of the harp and of music (occupying the three years\nfrom thirteen to sixteen, after the three preceding years of\nteaching letters) will not be suffered to extend to any elaborate\nor complicated combinations. The melody will be simple: the\nmeasure grave and dignified. The imitative movement or dancing\nwill exhibit only the gestures and demeanour suitable to the\nvirtuous man in the various situations of life, whether\nwarlike or pacific:[248] the subject-matter of the songs or hymns\nwill be regulated (as above described) by censorial authority. The\npractice will be consecrated and unchangeable, under the\nsupervision of a magistrate for education.[249]\n\n[Footnote 248: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 812 C-D. Still Plato allows\nthe exhibition, under certain conditions, of low, comic, ludicrous\ndances; yet not by any freemen or citizens, but by slaves and\nhired persons of mean character. He even considers it necessary\nthat the citizens should see such low exhibitions occasionally, in\norder to appreciate by contrast the excellence of their own\ndignified exhibitions. Of two opposites you cannot know the one\nunless you also learn to know the other--[Greek: a)/neu ga\\r\ngeloi/\u00f4n ta\\ spoudai=a kai\\ pa/nt\u00f4n t\u00f4=n e)nanti/\u00f4n ta\\ e)nanti/a\nmathei=n me\\n ou) dunato/n, ei) me/llei tis phro/nimos e)/sesthai,\npoiei=n de\\ ou)k a)\\n dunato\\n a)mpho/tera], &c. (p. 816 E).]\n\n[Footnote 249: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 813 A.]\n\nAll this teaching is imparted to the youth of both sexes: to boys,\nby male teachers--to girls, by female teachers, both of them paid.\nThe training in gymnastic and military exercises and in arms, is\nalso common to girls and boys.[250] Plato deems it disgraceful\nthat the females shall be brought up timorous and helpless--unable\nto aid in defending the city when it is menaced, and even\nunmanning the male citizens by demonstrations of terror.[251]\n\n[Footnote 250: Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 813 C-E, 814-815. [Greek:\npolemik\u00ea\\ o)/rch\u00easis--ei)r\u00eanik\u00ea/] or [Greek: a)po/lemos\no)/rch\u00easis.]]\n\n[Footnote 251: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 814 B. See \u00c6schylus, Sept.\nadv. Thebas, 172-220.]\n\n[Side-note: Rudiments of arithmetic and geometry to be\ntaught.]\n\nWe next come to arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy. Plato directs\nthat all his citizens shall learn the rudiments of these\nsciences--not for the reason urged by most persons, because of the\nnecessities of practical life (which reason he discards as\nextravagantly silly, though his master Sokrates was among those\nwho urged it)--but because these are endowments belonging to the\ndivine nature, and because without them no man can become a God,\nD\u00e6mon, or Hero, capable of watching over mankind.[252] In Egypt\nelementary arithmetic and geometry were extensively taught to\nboys--but very little in Greece:[253] though he intimates that\nboth in Egypt, and in the Phenician towns, they were turned\nonly to purposes of traffic, and were joined with sordid\ndispositions which a good lawgiver ought to correct by other\nprovisions. In the Platonic city, both arithmetic and geometry\nwill be taught, so far as to guard the youth against absurd\nblunders about measurement, and against confusion of\nincommensurable lines and spaces with commensurable. Such blunders\nare now often made by Greeks.[254] By a good method, the teaching\nof these sciences may be made attractive and interesting; so that\nno force will be required to compel youth to learn.[255]\n\n[Footnote 252: Plato. Legg. vii. p. 812 B-C. [Greek: ou(=tos\npa/nt\u00f4s t\u00f4=n lo/g\u00f4n eu)\u00eathe/stato/s e)sti makr\u00f4=|.] In\ninterpreting this curious passage we must remember that\nregularity, symmetry, exact numerical proportion, &c., are the\nprimary characteristics of the divine agents in Plato's view: of\nUranus and the Stars, as the first of them, compare \u00c6schyl.\nPrometh. 460.]\n\n[Footnote 253: Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 818 E, 819 B-D. [Greek:\n\u00ea)|schu/nth\u00ean . . . u(pe\\r a(pa/nt\u00f4n t\u00f4=n E(ll\u00ea/n\u00f4n.] Compare\nLegg. v. p. 747 C, and Republic, iv. p. 436 A.\n\nRespecting the distinction between [Greek: theoi/, dai/mones,\n\u00ea(/r\u00f4es], see N\u00e4gelsbach, Nach-Homerische Theologie, pp.\n104-115.]\n\n[Footnote 254: Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 819 E, 820 A-C.]\n\n[Footnote 255: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 820 D. [Greek: meta\\ paidia=s\na(/ma manthano/mena \u00f4)phel\u00ea/sei.]\n\nI transcribe here the curious passage which we read a little\nbefore.\n\nPlat. Legg. vii. p. 819 A-C. [Greek: Tosa/de toi/nun e(/kasta\nchr\u00ea\\ pha/nai mantha/nein dei=n tou\\s e)leuthe/rous, _o(/sa kai\\\npa/mpolus_ e)n Ai)gu/pt\u00f4| _pai/d\u00f4n o)/chlos a(/ma gra/mmasi\nmantha/nei_. Pr\u00f4=ton me\\n ga\\r peri\\ logismou\\s a)techn\u00f4=s\npaisi\\n e)xeur\u00eame/na math\u00ea/mata, meta\\ paidia=s te kai\\ \u00ea(don\u00ea=s\nmantha/nein; _ m\u00ea/l\u00f4n te/ tin\u00f4=n dianomai\\ kai\\ stepha/n\u00f4n_\nplei/osin a(/ma kai\\ e)la/ttosin, a(rmotto/nt\u00f4n a)rithm\u00f4=n t\u00f4=n\nau)t\u00f4=n . . . kai\\ d\u00ea\\ kai\\ pai/zontes, phia/las a(/ma chrusou=\nkai\\ chalkou= kai\\ a)rgu/rou kai\\ toiou/t\u00f4n tin\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n\nkerannu/ntes, oi( de\\ kai\\ o(/las p\u00f4s diadido/ntes, o(/per\nei)=pon, ei)s _paidia\\n e)narmo/ttontes ta\\s t\u00f4=n a)nagkai/\u00f4n\na)rithm\u00f4=n chr\u00ea/seis, \u00f4)phelou=si tou\\s mantha/nontas ei)s_ te\nta\\s t\u00f4=n stratope/d\u00f4n ta/xeis kai\\ a)g\u00f4ga\\s kai\\ stratei/as kai\\\nei)s oi)konomi/as au)=; kai\\ pa/nt\u00f4s _chr\u00easim\u00f4te/rous au)tou\\s\nau)toi=s kai\\ e)gr\u00eagoro/tas ma=llon tou\\s a)nthr\u00f4/pous_\na)perga/zontai.]\n\nThe information here given is valuable respecting the extensive\nteaching of elementary arithmetic as well as of letters among\nEgyptian boys, far more extensive than among Hellenic boys. The\npriests especially, in Egypt a numerous order, taught these\nmatters to their own sons (Diodor. i. 81), probably to other boys\nalso. The information is valuable too in another point of view, as\nrespects the _method_ of teaching arithmetic to boys; not by\nabstract numbers, nor by simple effort of memory in the repetition\nof a multiplication-table, but by concrete examples and\nillustrations exhibited to sense in familiar objects. The\nimportance of this concrete method, both in facilitating\ncomprehension and in interesting the youthful learner, are\nstrongly insisted on by Plato, as they have been also by some of\nthe ablest modern teachers of elementary arithmetic: see Professor\nLeslie's Philosophy of Arithmetic, and Mr. Horace Grant's\nArithmetic for Young Children and Second Stage of Arithmetic. The\nfollowing passage from a work of Sir John Herschel (Review of\nWhewell's History of Inductive Sciences, in the Quarterly Review,\nJune, 1841) bears a striking and curious analogy to the sentences\nabove transcribed from Plato:--\"_Number_ we cannot help\nregarding as an abstraction, and consequently its general\nproperties or its axioms to be of necessity inductively concluded\nfrom the consideration of particular cases. And surely this is the\nway in which children do acquire their knowledge of number, and in\nwhich they learn its axioms. The apples and the marbles are put in\nrequisition ([Greek: m\u00ea/l\u00f4n dianomai\\ kai\\ stepha/n\u00f4n],\n_Plato_), and through the multitude of gingerbread nuts their\nideas acquire clearness, precision, and generality.\"\n\nI borrow the above references from Mr. John Stuart Mill, System of\nLogic, Book ii. ch. vi. p. 335, ed. 1. They are annexed as a note\nto the valuable chapters of his work on Demonstration and\nNecessary Truths, in which he shows that the truth so-called, both\nin Geometry and Arithmetic, rest upon inductive evidence.\n\n\"The fundamental truths of the Science of Number all rest upon the\nevidence of sense: they are proved by showing to our eyes and to\nour fingers that any given number of objects, ten balls for\nexample, may by separation and re-arrangement exhibit to our\nsenses all the different sets of numbers, the sum of which is\nequal to ten. All the improved methods of teaching arithmetic to\nchildren proceed upon a knowledge of this fact. All who wish to\ncarry the child's _mind_ along with them in learning\narithmetic--all who (as Dr. Biber in his remarkable Letters on\nEducation expresses it) wish to teach numbers and not mere\nciphers--now teach it through the evidence of the senses, in the\nmanner we have described\" (p. 335).]\n\n[Side-note: Astronomy must be taught, in order that the\ncitizens may not assert libellous falsehoods respecting the\nheavenly bodies.]\n\nAstronomy must also be taught up to a certain point, in order that\nthe youth may imbibe correct belief respecting those great\nDivinities--H\u00ealios, Sel\u00ean\u00ea, and the Planets--or may at any rate be\nprotected from the danger of unconsciously advancing false\naffirmations about them, discreditable to their dignity. The\ngeneral public consider it impious to study the Kosmos and the\ncelestial bodies, with a view to detect the causes of what\noccurs:[256] while at the same time they assert that the movements\nof H\u00ealios and Sel\u00ean\u00ea are irregular, and they call the planets\nWanderers. Regular action is (in Plato's view) the characteristic\nmark of what is good and perfect: irregularity is the foremost of\nall defects, and cannot without blasphemy be imputed to any of the\ncelestial bodies. Moreover, many persons also assert untruly, that\namong the celestial bodies the one which is really the slowest\nmover, moves the fastest--and that the one which is really the\nfastest mover, moves the slowest. How foolish would it appear\n(continues Plato) if they made the like mistake about the Olympic\nrunners, and if they selected the defeated competitor, instead of\nthe victor, to be crowned and celebrated in panegyrical odes! How\noffensive is such falsehood, when applied to the great Gods in the\nheavens! Each of them has in reality one uniform circular\nmovement, though they appear to have many and variable movements.\nOur youth must be taught enough of astronomy to guard against such\nheresies. The study of astronomy up to this point, far from being\nimpious, is indispensable as a safeguard against impiety.[257]\nPlato intimates that these astronomical truths were of recent\nacquisition, even to himself.[258]\n\n[Footnote 256: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 821 A. We must observe that\nthe Athenian (who here represents Plato himself) does not give\nthis repugnance to astronomical study as his own feeling, but, on\nthe contrary, as a prejudice from which he dissents. There is no\nground, therefore, so far as this passage is concerned, for the\ncharge of contradiction advanced by Velleius against Plato in\nCicero De Nat. Deor. i. 12, 30.]\n\n[Footnote 257: Plat. Legg. vii. pp. 821 B-822 C. [Greek:\nkatapseudo/metha nu=n, \u00f4(s e)/pos ei)pei=n, E(/ll\u00eanes pa/ntes\nmega/l\u00f4n the\u00f4=n, \u00ca(li/ou te a(/ma kai\\ Sel\u00ea/n\u00eas] (821 B) . . .\n[Greek: peri\\ the\u00f4=n t\u00f4=n kat' ou)/ranon tou/s ge \u00ea(mete/rous\npoli/tas te kai\\ tou\\s ne/ous to\\ me/chri tosou/tou mathei=n peri\\\na(pa/nt\u00f4n tou/t\u00f4n, me/chri tou= m\u00ea\\ blasph\u00eamei=n peri\\ au)ta/,\neu)ph\u00eamei=n de\\ a)ei\\ thu/ontas te kai\\ e)n eu)chai=s\neu)chome/nous eu)seb\u00f4s] (821C-D). The five Planets were\ndistinguished and named, and their periods to a certain extent\nunderstood, by Plato; but by many persons in his day the word\nPlanet was understood more generally as comprehending all the\ncelestial bodies, sun and moon among them--(except fixed stars)\ntherefore comets also--[Greek: ta\\ m\u00ea\\ e)n t\u00ea=| au)t\u00ea=|\nperiphora=| o)/nta], Xenoph. Memor. iv. 7, 5, where an opinion is\nascribed to Sokrates quite opposed to that which Plato here\nexpresses. See Schaubach, Geschichte der Astronomie, pp.\n212-477.]\n\n[Footnote 258: Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 819 D, 821 E.\n\nThis portion of the Leges is obscure, and would be hardly\nintelligible if it were not illustrated by a passage in the Tim\u00e6us\n(p. 38). Even with such help it is difficult, and has been\nunderstood differently by different interpreters. Proklus (in\nTim\u00e6um, pp. 262-263) and Martin (\u00c9tudes sur le Tim\u00e9e, ii. note 36,\np. 84) interpret it as alluding to the spiral line ([Greek:\ne(/lika]) described by each planet (Sun and Moon are each counted\nas planets) round the Earth, arising from the combination of the\nforce of the revolving sidereal sphere or Aplan\u00eas, carrying all\nthe planets round along with it from East to West, with the\ncounter-movement (contrary, but obliquely contrary) inherent in\neach planet. The spiral movement of each planet, resulting from\ncombination of these two distinct forces, is a regular movement\ngoverned by law; though to an observer who does not understand the\nlaw, the movements appear irregular. Compare Derkyllides ap. Theon\nSmyrn. c. 41, f. 27, p. 330, ed. Martin.\n\nThe point here discussed forms one of the items of controversy\nbetween Gruppe and Boeckh, in the recent discussion about Plato's\nastronomical views. _Gruppe_, Die Kosmischen Systeme der\nGriechen, pp. 157-168: _Boeckh_, Untersuchungen \u00fcber das\nKosmische System des Platon, pp. 45-57.\n\nGruppe has an ingenious argument to show that the novelty ([Greek:\npara/doxon]) which Plato had in his mind, but was afraid to\ndeclare openly because of existing prejudices, was the\nheliocentric or Copernican system, which he believes to have been\nPlato's discovery. Boeckh refutes Gruppe's reasoning; and refutes\nit, in my judgment, completely. He sustains the interpretation\ngiven by Proklus and Martin.\n\nBoeckh also illustrates (pp. 35-38-49-54), in a manner more\nsatisfactory than Gruppe, the dicta of Plato about the comparative\nvelocity of the Planets (Sun and Moon counted among them).\n\nPlato declares the Moon to be the quickest mover among the\nplanets, and Saturn to be the slowest. On the contrary Demokritus\npronounced the Moon to be the slowest mover of all; slower than\nthe Sun, because the Sun was farther from the Earth and nearer to\nthe outermost or sidereal sphere. It was the rotation of this\nlast-mentioned sphere (according to Demokritus) which carried\nround along with it the Sun, the Moon, and all the planets: the\nbodies near to it were more forcibly acted upon by its rotation,\nand carried round more rapidly, than the bodies distant from\nit--hence the Moon was the least rapid mover of all (Lucretius, v.\n615-635. See Sir George Lewis's Historical Survey of the Astronomy\nof the Ancients, ch. ii. pp. 139-140).\n\nIt appears to me probable that Plato, in the severe remarks which\nhe makes on persons who falsely affirmed the quickest mover in the\nheavens to be the slowest, had in view these doctrines of\nDemokritus. Plato never once mentions Demokritus by name (see\nMullach, Fragment. Demokrit. p. 25); but he is very sparing in\nmentioning by name _any_ contemporaries. It illustrates the\ndifference between the manner of Aristotle and Plato, that\nAristotle frequently names Demokritus--seventy-eight times\naccording to Mullach (p. 107)--even in the works which we\npossess.]\n\n[Side-note: Hunting--how far permitted or advised.]\n\nIn regard to hunting, Plato thinks that it is a subject on which\npositive laws are unsuitable or insufficient, and he therefore\ngives certain general directions which partake of the nature both\nof advice and of law. The good citizen (he says) is one who not\nonly obeys the positive laws prescribed by the lawgiver, but\nwho also conforms his conduct to the general cast of the\nlawgiver's opinions: practising what is commended therein,\nabstaining from what is blamed.[259] Plato commends one mode of\nhunting--the chase after quadrupeds: yet only with horses, dogs,\njavelins, &c., wherein both courage and bodily strength are\nimproved--but not with nets or snares, where no such result is\nproduced. He blames other modes--such as fishing and bird-snaring\n(especially by night). He blames still more emphatically theft and\npiracy, which he regards also as various modes of hunting.[260]\n\n[Footnote 259: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 822 E.]\n\n[Footnote 260: Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 823-824.]\n\n[Side-note: Large general sense which Plato gives to the\nword hunting.]\n\nWhat principally deserves notice here is, the large general idea\nwhich Plato conceives to himself under the term Hunting, and the\nnumber of diverse particulars comprehended therein. 1. Hunting of\nquadrupeds; either with dogs and javelins openly, or with snares,\nby stratagem. 2. Hunting of birds, in the air. 3. Hunting of\nfishes, in the water. 4. Hunting after the property of other men,\nin the city or country. 5. Hunting after men as slaves, or after\nother valuables, by means of piratical vessels. 6. Hunting of\npublic enemies, by one army against an opposite one. 7. Hunting of\nmen to conciliate their friendship or affection, sometimes by fair\nmeans, sometimes by foul.[261]\n\n[Footnote 261: Plato, Legg. vii. p. 823. [Greek: th\u00ea/ra ga\\r\npampolu/ ti pra=gma/ e)sti, perieil\u00eamme/non o)no/mati schedo\\n\ne(ni\\ . . . poll\u00ea\\ de\\ \u00ea( kata\\ phili/an th\u00eareu/ousa] (823 B) . . .\n[Greek: a)/gras a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n kata\\ tha/lattan . . . kl\u00f4pei/as e)n\nch\u00f4/ra| kai\\ po/lei] (823 E). Compare the Epinomis, p. 975 C.\n\nSo also in the Sophist\u00eas (pp. 221-222) Plato analyses and\ndistributes the general idea of [Greek: th\u00eareutik\u00ea/]: including\nunder it, as one variety, the hunting after men by violent means\n([Greek: t\u00ea\\n bi/aion th\u00ea/ran, t\u00ea\\n l\u00ea|stik\u00ea/n, a)ndrapodistik\u00ea\\n,\nturannik\u00ea/n, kai\\ xu/mpasan t\u00ea\\n polemik\u00ea/n])--and as another\nvariety, the hunting after men by persuasive or seductive means\n([Greek: t\u00ea\\n pithanourgik\u00ea/n, e)r\u00f4tik\u00ea/n, kolakik\u00ea/n]). In the\nMemorabilia of Xenophon also (ii. 6, 29-33), Sokrates expands this\nsame idea--[Greek: t\u00ea\\n th\u00ea/ran a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n--ta\\ t\u00f4=n phi/l\u00f4n\nth\u00earatika/], &c. Compare also the conversation between\nSokrates and Theodot\u00ea (iii. 11, 8-15)--[Greek: th\u00ear\u00f4/menos], ib.\ni. 2, 24--and Plato Protag. init.]\n\nThat all these processes--which Plato here includes as so many\nvarieties of hunting--present to the mind, when they are compared,\na common point of analogy, is not to be denied. The number of\ndifferent comparisons which the mind can make between phenomena,\nis almost unlimited. Analogies may be followed from one to\nanother, until at last, after successive steps, the analogy\nbetween the first and the last becomes faint or\nimperceptible. Yet the same word, transferred successively\nfrom the first to the last, conceals this faintness of analogy and\nkeeps them all before the mind as one. To us, this extension of\nthe word _hunting_ to particular cases dissimilar in so many\nrespects, appears more as poetical metaphor: to intelligent Greeks\nof the Sokratic school, it seemed a serious comparison: and to\nPlato, with his theory of Ideas, it ought to have presented a Real\nIdea or permanent One, which alone remained constant amidst an\nindefinite multitude of fugitive, shadowy, and deceptive,\nparticulars. But though this is the consistent corollary, from\nPlato's theory of Ideas, he does not so state it in the Treatise\nDe Legibus, and probably he did not so conceive it. Critics have\nalready observed that in this Treatise scarce any mention is made\nof the theory of Ideas. Plato had passed into other points of\nview: yet he neither formally renounces the points of view which\nwe find in anterior dialogues, nor takes the trouble of\nreconciling them with the thoughts of the later dialogues. Whether\nthere exists any Real, Abstract, Idea of Hunting, apart from the\nparticular acts and varieties of hunting--is a question which he\ndoes not touch upon. Yet this is the main feature of the Platonic\nphilosophy, and the main doctrine most frequently impugned by\nAristotle as Platonic.\n\n[Side-note: Number of religious sacrifices to be determined\nby lawgiver.]\n\nAlthough, in regard to the religious worship of his community, the\noracle of Delphi is asked to prescribe what sacrifices are to be\noffered, and to what Gods--yet the religious lawgiver will\ndetermine the number of such sacrifices and festivals, as well as\nthe times and seasons.[262] Each day in the year, sacrifice will\nbe offered by one of the magistrates to some God or D\u00e6mon. Once in\nevery month, there will be a solemn sacrifice and festival, with\nmatches of music and gymnastics, offered by each tribe to its\neponymous God. The offerings to the celestial Gods will be kept\ndistinct from the offerings to the subterranean Gods. Among these\nlast, Pluto will be especially worshipped during the twelfth month\nof the year. The festivals will be adjusted to the seasons, and\nthere will on proper occasions be festivals for women separately\nand exclusively.[263]\n\n[Footnote 262: Plato, Legg. viii. p. 828.]\n\n[Footnote 263: Plato, Legg. viii. p. 828.]\n\n[Side-note: Military muster of the whole citizen\npopulation once in each month--men, women, and children.]\n\nOnce a month certainly--and more than once, if the magistrates\ncommand--on occasion of one of these festivals, all the citizen\npopulation are ordered to attend in military muster--men, women\nand children. They will be brought together in such divisions and\ndetachments as the magistrate shall direct. They will here go\nthrough gymnastic and military exercises. They will also have\nfights, with warlike weapons not likely to inflict mortal wounds,\nyet involving sufficient danger to test their bravery and\nendurance: one against one, two against two, ten against ten.[264]\nThe victors will receive honorary wreaths, and public encomium in\nappropriate songs. Both men and women will take part alike in\nthese exercises and contests, and in the composition of the odes\nto celebrate the victors.[265]\n\n[Footnote 264: Plat. Legg. viii. p. 833 E.]\n\n[Footnote 265: Plat. Legg. viii. p. 829 B-E. [Greek: Ta\\ au)ta\\\nde\\ le/g\u00f4 stratei/as te peri\\ kai\\ t\u00ea=s e)n poi\u00ea/sesi par)r(\u00easi/as\ngunaixi/ te kai\\ a)ndra/sin o(moi/\u00f4s gi/gnesthai dei=n.] 830 E:\n[Greek: chr\u00f4me/nous u(pokindu/nois be/lesin.]]\n\nSuch monthly musters, over and above the constant daily gymnastics\nof the youthful population, are indispensable as preliminary\ntraining; without which the citizens cannot fight with efficiency\nand success, in the event of a real foreign enemy invading the\nterritory.[266] No athlete ever feels himself qualified to contend\nat the public games without the most laborious special training\nbeforehand. Yet Plato expresses apprehension that his proposal of\nregular musters for warlike exercises with sham-battles, will\nappear ridiculous. He states that nothing of the kind existed in\nany Grecian city, by reason of two great corruptions:--First, the\ngeneral love of riches and money-getting: Secondly, the bad\ngovernments everywhere existing, whether democracy, oligarchy, or\ndespotism--each of which was in reality a faction or\nparty-government, _i.e._, government by one part over another\nunwilling part.[267]\n\n[Footnote 266: Plat. Legg. viii. p. 830.]\n\n[Footnote 267: Plat. Legg. viii. pp. 831-832.\n\nI read with surprise the declaration of Plato, that no such\nmilitary training exercises existed _anywhere_ in Greece. How\nis this to be reconciled with the statements of Xenophon in his\nTreatise on the Republic of the Laced\u00e6monians, wherein he\nexpressly calls the Spartans [Greek: techni/tas t\u00f4=n\npolemik\u00f4=n]--or even with statement of Plato himself about Sparta\nin the first book of this Treatise De Legibus? Compare Thucyd. v. 69.]\n\n[Side-note: Gymnastic training must have reference to war,\nnot to athletic prizes.]\n\nPlato prescribes that the gymnastic training in his community\nshall be such as to have a constant reference to war; and that\nelaborate bodily excellence, for the purpose simply of\nobtaining prizes at the public games, shall be discouraged. There\nwill be foot-races, for men, for boys, and for young women up to\ntwenty years of age--the men always running in full panoply.[268]\nHorse-racing is permitted, but chariot-racing is\ndiscountenanced.[269] There will also be practice with the bow and\nwith other weapons of light warfare, in which the young women are\nencouraged to take part--yet not constrained, in deference to\nprevalent sentiment.[270]\n\n[Footnote 268: Plat. Legg. viii. p. 833 B-C.]\n\n[Footnote 269: Plat. Legg. viii. p. 834 B.]\n\n[Footnote 270: Plat. Legg. viii. p. 834 C-D.]\n\n[Side-note: Regulation of sexual intercourse. Syssitia or\npublic mess.]\n\nIn regard to sexual intercourse, Plato recognises that the\ndifficulty of regulating it according to the wisdom of the\nlawgiver is greater in his city than** in any actual city, because\nof the more free and public life of the women. Neither Krete nor\nSparta furnish a good example to follow on this point.[271] He\nthinks however that by causing one doctrine on the subject to be\ncontinually preached, and by preventing any other from being even\nmentioned, the lawgiver may be able so to consecrate this doctrine\nas to procure for it pretty universal obedience. The lawgiver may\nthus be able to suppress p\u00e6derasty altogether, and to restrict\ngenerally the sexual intercourse to that of persons legally\nmarried--or to enforce at least the restriction, that the\nexceptional cases of sexual intercourse departing from these\nconditions shall be covered with the veil of secrecy.[272] The\nconstant bodily exercises prescribed in the Platonic community\nwill tend to diminish the influence of such appetites in the\ncitizens: while the example of the distinguished prize combatants\nat the Olympic games, in whose long-continued training strict\ncontinence was practised, shows that even more than what Plato\nanticipates can be obtained, under the stimulus of sufficient\nmotive.[273]\n\n[Footnote 271: Plat. Legg. viii. p. 836 B.]\n\n[Footnote 272: Plato, Legg. viii. p. 841.]\n\n[Footnote 273: Plato, Legg. viii. pp. 840 A, 841 A.\n\nCompare the remarks which I have made above in this volume (p.\n197) respecting the small probable influence of Aphrodit\u00ea in the\nPlatonic Republic. A like remark may be made, though not so\nemphatically, respecting the Platonic community in the Leges.]\n\nWhat is here proposed respecting the sexual appetite finds no\napprobation from Kleinias, since the customs in Krete were\naltogether different. But the Syssitia, or public mess-table for\nthe citizens, are welcomed readily both by the Kretan and the\nSpartan. The Syssitia existed both in Krete and at Sparta; but\nwere regulated on very different principles in one and in the\nother. Plato declines to discuss this difference, pronouncing it\nto be unimportant. But Aristotle informs us what it was; and shows\nthat material consequences turned upon it, in reference to the\ncitizenship at Sparta.[274]\n\n[Footnote 274: Plato, Legg. viii. p. 842 B; Aristot. Politic. ii.\n9-10, p. 1271, a. 26, 1272, a. 12. The statement of Aristotle,\nabout the manner in which the cost of the Kretan Syssitia was\nprovided, while substantially agreeing with Ephorus (ap. Strabo.\nx. p. 480), does not exactly coincide with the account given by\nDosiadas of the Kretans in Lyktus (ap. Athen\u00e6um, iv. p. 143).\nCompare Hoeckh, Kreta, vol. iii. pp. 134-138.]\n\n[Side-note: Regulations about landed\nproperty--Boundaries--Limited power of fining by magistrates.]\n\nPlato enters now upon the economical and proprietary rules proper\nfor his community. As there will be neither gold and silver nor\nforeign commerce, he is dispensed from the necessity of making\nlaws about shipments, retailing, interest, mine-digging,\ncollectors of taxes, &c. The persons under his charge will be\nhusbandmen, shepherds, bee-keepers, &c., with those who work\nunder them, and with the artisans who supply implements to\nthem.[275] The first and most important of all regulations is, the\nlaw of Zeus Horius or Terminalis--Not to disturb or transgress the\nboundary marks between different properties. Upon this depends the\nmaintenance of those unalterable _fundi_ or lots, which is\nthe cardinal principle of the Platonic community. Severe\npenalties, religious as well as civil, are prescribed for\noffenders against this rule.[276] Each proprietor is directed to\nhave proper regard to the convenience of neighbours, and above all\nto abstain from annoying or damaging them, especially in regard to\nthe transit, or retention, or distribution, of water. To intercept\nthe supply, or corrupt the quality of water, is a high crime.[277]\nRegulations are made about the carrying of the harvest, both of\ngrain and fruit. Disputes arising upon these points are to be\ndecided by the magistrates, up to the sum of three min\u00e6: above\nthat sum, by the public Dikasteries. Many rules of detail will\nrequire to be made by the magistrates themselves with a view to\nfulfil the purposes of the lawgiver. So soon as the magistrates\nthink that enough of these regulations have been introduced, they\nwill consecrate the system as it stands, rendering it perpetual\nand unalterable.[278]\n\n[Footnote 275: Plato, Legg. viii. pp. 842 D, 846 D.]\n\n[Footnote 276: Plato, Legg. viii. pp. 842-843.]\n\n[Footnote 277: Plat. Legg. viii. pp. 844 A, 845 E.]\n\n[Footnote 278: Plat. Legg. viii. p. 846 A-D.]\n\n[Side-note: Regulations about artisans--Distribution of\nthe annual landed produce.]\n\nNext, Plato passes to the Demiurgi or Artisans. These are all\nnon-citizens or metics: for it is a peremptory law, that no citizen\nshall be an artisan in any branch. Nor is any artisan permitted to\ncarry on two crafts trades at once.[279] If any article be\nimperatively required from abroad, either for implements of war or\nfor religious purposes, the magistrates shall cause it to be\nimported. But there shall be no retailing, nor reselling with\nprofit, of any article.[280]\n\n[Footnote 279: Plato, Legg. viii. p. 846 D-E.]\n\n[Footnote 280: Plato, Legg. viii. p. 847.]\n\nThe distribution of the produce of land shall be made on a\nprinciple approaching to that which prevails in Krete.[281] The\ntotal produce raised will be distributed into twelve portions,\neach equivalent to one month's consumption. Each twelfth portion\nwill then be divided into equal thirds. Two of these thirds will\nbe consumed by the citizens, their families, their slaves, and\ntheir agricultural animals: the other third will be sold in the\nmarket for the consumption of artisans and strangers, who alone\nare permitted to buy it, all citizens being forbidden to do so.\nEach citizen will make the apportionment of his own two-thirds\namong freemen and slaves: a measured quantity shall then be given\nto each of the working animals.[282] On the first of each month,\nthe sale of barley and wheat will be made in the market-place, and\nevery artisan or stranger will then purchase enough for his\nmonthly consumption: the like on the twelfth of each month, for\nwine and other liquids--and on the twentieth of each month, for\nanimals and animal products, such as wool and hides. Firewood may\nbe purchased daily by any stranger or artisan, from the\nproprietors on whose lands the trees grow, and may be resold by\nhim to other artisans: other articles can only be sold at the\nmonthly market-days. The Agoranomi, or regulators of the market,\nwill preside on those days, and will fix the spots on which the\ndifferent goods shall be exposed for sale. They will also take\naccount of the quantity which each man has for sale, fixing a\ncertain price for each article. They will then adjust the entries\nof each man's property in the public registers according to these\nnew transactions. But if the actual purchases and sales be\nmade at any rate different from what is thus fixed, the Agoranomi\nwill modify their entries in the register according to the actual\nrate, either in plus or in minus. These entries of individual\nproperty in the public register will be made both for citizens and\nresident strangers alike.[283]\n\n[Footnote 281: Plato, Legg. viii. p. 847 E. [Greek: e)ggu\\s t\u00ea=\ntou= Kr\u00eatikou= no/mou.]]\n\n[Footnote 282: Plato, Legg. viii. pp. 847-848.]\n\n[Footnote 283: Plato, Legg. viii. pp. 849-850.\n\nThese regulations are given both briefly and obscurely.]\n\n[Side-note: Admission of resident Metics--conditions\nattached.]\n\nIt shall be open to any one who chooses, to come and reside in the\ncity as a stranger or artisan to exercise his craft, without\npayment of any fee, simply on condition of good conduct; and of\nbeing enrolled with his property in the register. But he shall not\nacquire any fixed settlement. After twenty years, he must depart\nand take away his property. When he departs, the entries belonging\nto his name, in the proprietary register, shall be cancelled. If\nhe has a son, the son may also exercise the same art and reside as\na metic in the city for twenty years, but no longer; beginning\nfrom the age of fifteen. Any metic who may render special service\nto the city, may have his term prolonged, the magistrates and the\ncitizens consenting.[284]\n\n[Footnote 284: Plato, Legg. viii. p. 850.]\n\n[Side-note: Offences and penal judicature--Procedure of the\nDikasts.]\n\nPlato now passes to the criminal code of his community: the\ndetermination of offences, penalties, and penal judicature.\nSerious and capital offences will be judged by the thirty-seven\nNomophylakes, in conjunction with a Board of Select Dikasts,\ncomposed of the best among the magistrates of the preceding\nyear.[285] They will hear first the pleading of the accuser, next\nthat of the accused: they will then proceed, in the order of\nseniority, to put questions to both these persons, sifting the\nmatter of charge. Plato requires them to be active in this\nexamination, and to get at the facts by mental effort of their\nown. They will take notes of the examination, then seal up the\ntablet, and deposit it upon the altar of Hestia. On the morrow\nthey will reassemble and repeat their examination, hearing\nwitnesses and calling for information respecting the affair. On\nthe third day, again the like: after which they will deliver their\nverdict on the altar of Hestia. Upon this altar two urns will\nbe placed, for condemnation and acquittal: each Dikast will\ndeposit his pebble in one or other of these, openly before the\naccuser and accused, and before the assembled citizens.[286]\n\n[Footnote 285: Plato, Legg. ix. pp. 855-856. This judicial Board\nis mentioned also in xi. pp. 926 D, 928 B, 938 B, under the title\nof [Greek: to\\ t\u00f4=n e)kkri/t\u00f4n dikast\u00ea/rion--to\\ t\u00f4=n e)klekt\u00f4=n\ndikast\u00ea/rion]. It forms the parallel to the Areiopagus at Athens.\nSee K. F. Hermann, De Vestigiis Institut. Attic., &c., pp.\n45-46, &c.]\n\n[Footnote 286: Plato, Legg. ix. pp. 855-856. Compare the procedure\nbefore the Areiopagus at Athens, as described by Sch\u00f6mann, Antiq.\nJuris Publ. Gr\u00e6c. Part v. s. 63, p. 292. It does not appear that\nthe Areiopagites at Athens were in the practice of exercising any\nsuch [Greek: a)na/krisis] of the parties before them, as Plato\nenjoins upon his [Greek: e)klektoi\\ dikastai/]: though it was\ncompetent to the Dikasts at Athens to put questions if they chose.\nMeier und Sch\u00f6mann, Der Attische Prozess, p. 718.]\n\nConformably to the general sentiment announced still more\ndistinctly in the Republic, Plato speaks here also of penal\nlegislation as if it were hardly required. He regards it as almost\nan insult to assume that any of his citizens can grow up capable\nof committing grave crimes, when they have been subjected to such\na training, discipline, and government as he institutes. Still\nhuman nature is perverse: we must provide for the occurrence of\nsome exceptional criminals among our citizens, even after all our\nprecautionary supervision: besides, over and above the citizens,\nwe have metics and slaves to watch over.[287]\n\n[Footnote 287: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 853 C-D-E.]\n\n[Side-note: Sacrilege, the gravest of all crimes. High\nTreason.]\n\nThe first and gravest of all crimes is Sacrilege: pillage or\ndestruction of places or objects consecrated to the Gods. Next\ncomes high treason: either betrayal of the city to foreign\nenemies, or overthrow of the established laws and government.\nPersons charged with these crimes shall be tried before the Select\nDikasts, or High Court above constituted. If found guilty, they\nshall be punished either capitally or by such other sentence as\nthe court may award. But no sentence either of complete\ndisfranchisement or of perpetual banishment can be passed against\nany citizen, because every one of the 5040 lots of land must\nalways remain occupied.[288] Nor can any citizen be fined to any\ngreater extent than what he possesses over and above his lot of\nland. He may be imprisoned, or flogged, or exposed in the pillory,\nor put to do penance in some sacred precinct. But his\npunishment shall noway extend to his children, unless persons of\nthe same family shall be condemned to death for three successive\ngenerations. Should this occur, the family shall be held as\ntainted. Their lot of land shall be considered vacant, and\nassigned to some deserving young man of another citizen\nfamily.[289]\n\n[Footnote 288: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 855 C.\n\nCompare the penalties inflicted by Plato with those which were\ninflicted in Attic procedure. Meier und Sch\u00f6mann, Der Attische\nProzess, pp. 739-740 seq. There is considerable difference between\nthe two, arising to a great degree out of Plato's peculiar\ninstitution about the unalterable number of lots of land (5040)\nand of citizen families--as well as out of his fixation of maximum\nand minimum of property. Flogging or beating is prescribed by\nPlato, but had no place at Athens: [Greek: a)timi/a] was a\nfrequent punishment at Athens: Plato's substitute for it seems to\nbe the pillory--[Greek: tina\\s a)mo/rphous e(/dras]. Fine was\nfrequent at Athens as a punishment: Plato is obliged to employ it\nsparingly.]\n\n[Footnote 289: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 856 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Theft punished by _poena dupli_. General\nexhortation founded by Plato upon this enactment.]\n\n_Theft._--Plato next adverts to theft, and prescribes that\nthe punishment for a convicted thief shall be one and the same in\nall cases--to compensate the party robbed to the extent of double\nthe value of the property, or to be imprisoned until he does\nso.[290] But upon a question upon this being raised, how far one\nand the same _poena dupli_, neither more nor less, can be\nproperly applied to all cases of theft, we are carried (according\nto the usual unsystematic manner of the Platonic dialogue) into a\ngeneral discussion on the principles of penal legislation. We are\nreminded that the Platonic lawgiver looks beyond the narrow and\ndefective objects to which all other lawgivers have hitherto\nunwisely confined themselves.[291] He is under no pressing\nnecessity to legislate at once: he can afford time for preliminary\ndiscussion and exposition: he desires to instruct his citizens\nrespecting right and wrong, as well as to constrain their acts by\npenalty.[292] As he is better qualified than the poets to\nenlighten them about the just and honourable, so the principles\nwhich he lays down ought to have more weight than the verses of\nHomer or Tyrt\u00e6us.[293] In regard to Justice and Injustice\ngenerally, there are points on which Plato differs from the\npublic, and also points on which the public are at variance with\nthemselves. For example, every one is unanimous in affirming that\nwhatever is just is also beautiful or honourable. But if this be\ntrue, then not only what is justly done, but also what is justly\nsuffered, is beautiful or honourable. Now the penalty of death,\ninflicted on the sacrilegious person, is justly inflicted. It\nmust therefore be beautiful or honourable: yet every one agrees in\ndeclaring it to be shocking and infamous. Here there is an\ninconsistency or contradiction in the opinions of the public\nthemselves.[294]\n\n[Footnote 290: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 857 A, xii. p. 941. The\nSolonian Law at Athens provided, that if a man was sued for theft\nunder the [Greek: i)di/a di/k\u00ea klop\u00ea=s], he should be condemned to\nthe _poena dupli_ and to a certain [Greek: prosti/m\u00eama]\nbesides (Demosthen. cont. Timokrat. 733-736). But it seems that\nthe thief might be indicted by a [Greek: graph\u00ea/], and then the\npunishment might be heavier. See Aulus Gellius, xi. 18, and chap.\nxi. of my 'History of Greece,' p. 189.]\n\n[Footnote 291: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 857 C. [Greek: ta\\ peri\\ t\u00ea\\n\nt\u00f4=n no/m\u00f4n the/sin ou)deni\\ tro/p\u00f4| p\u00f4/pote ge/gonen o)rth\u00f4=s\ndiapepon\u00eame/na], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 292: Plato, Legg. ix. pp. 857 E, 858 A.]\n\n[Footnote 293: Plato, Legg. ix. pp. 858-859.]\n\n[Footnote 294: Plato, Legg. ix. pp. 859-860.\n\nThe same argument is employed by Sokrates in the Gorgias, p. 476\nE.]\n\n[Side-note: All unjust men are unjust involuntarily.--No\nsuch thing as voluntary injustice. Injustice depends upon the\ntemper of the agent--Distinction between damage and injury.]\n\nBut Plato differs from the public on another point also. He\naffirms all wicked or unjust men to be unwillingly wicked or\nunjust: he affirms that no man does injustice willingly.[295] How\nis he to carry out this maxim in his laws? He cannot make any\ndistinction (as all existing cities make it) in the penalties\nprescribed for voluntary injustice, and for involuntary injustice;\nfor he does not recognise the former as real.[296] He must explain\nupon what foundation his dissent from the public rests. He\ndiscriminates between _Damnum_ and _Injuria_--between\nDamage or Hurt, and Injustice. When damage is done, it is\nsometimes done voluntarily--sometimes, and quite as often,\ninvoluntarily. The public call this latter by the name of\ninvoluntary injustice; but in Plato's view it is no injustice at\nall. Injustice is essentially distinct from damage: it depends on\nthe temper, purpose, or disposition of the agent, not on the\nresult as affecting the patient. A man may be unjust when he is\nconferring benefit upon another, as well as when he is doing hurt\nto another. Whether the result be beneficial or hurtful, the\naction will be right or wrong, and the agent just or unjust,\naccording to the condition of his own mind in doing it.[297]\n\n[Footnote 295: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 860 D-E.]\n\n[Footnote 296: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 861 B. [Greek: a(\\ d\u00ea\\ kata\\\npa/sas ta\\s po/leis u(po\\ nomothet\u00f4=n pa/nt\u00f4n t\u00f4=n p\u00f4/pote\ngenome/n\u00f4n \u00f4(s du/o ei)/d\u00ea t\u00f4=n a)dik\u00eama/t\u00f4n o)/nta, ta\\ me\\n\ne(kou/sia, ta\\ de\\ a)kou/sia, tau/t\u00ea| kai\\ nomothetei=tai.]\n\nThe eighth chapter, fifth Book, of Aristotle's Nikomachean Ethics,\ndiscusses this question more instructively than Plato.]\n\n[Footnote 297: Plato, Legg. ix. pp. 861-862.]\n\n[Side-note: Damage may be voluntary or\ninvoluntary--Injustice is shown often by conferring corrupt profit\nupon another--Purpose of punishment, to heal the distemper of the\ncriminal.]\n\nThe real distinction therefore (according to Plato) is not between\nvoluntary and involuntary injustice, but between voluntary and\ninvoluntary damage. Voluntary damage is injustice, but it is not\nvoluntary injustice. The unjust agent, so far forth as unjust,\nacts involuntarily: he is under the perverting influence of\nmental distemper. He must be compelled to make good the damage\nwhich he has done, or to offer such requital as may satisfy the\nfeelings of the person damaged: and he must besides be subjected\nto such treatment as will heal the distemper of his mind, so that\nhe will not be disposed to do farther voluntary damage in future.\nAnd he ought to be subjected to this treatment equally, whether\nhis mental distemper (injustice) has shown itself in doing wilful\ndamage to another, or in conferring corrupt profit on another--in\ntaking away another man's property, or in giving away his own\nproperty wrongfully.[298] The healing treatment may be different\nin different cases: discourses addressed, or works\nimposed--pleasures or pains, honour or disgrace, fine or otherwise.\nBut in all cases the purpose is one and the same--to heal the\ndistemper of his mind, and to make him hate injustice. If he be found\nincurable, he must be put to death. It is a gain for himself to\ndie, and a still greater gain for society that he should die,\nsince his execution will serve as a warning to others.[299]\n\n[Footnote 298: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 862 B. [Greek: ou)/t' ei)/ ti/s\nt\u00f4| di/d\u00f4si/ ti t\u00f4=n o)/nt\u00f4n ou)/t' ei) tou)nanti/on\na)phairei=tai, di/kaion a(pl\u00f4=s \u00ea)\\ a)/dikon chr\u00ea\\ to\\ toiou=ton\nou(/t\u00f4 le/gein, a)ll' e)a\\n \u00ea)/thei kai\\ dikai/\u00f4| tro/p\u00f4|\nchr\u00f4/meno/s tis \u00f4)phel\u00ea=| tina/ ti kai\\ bla/pt\u00ea|, tou=to/ e)sti\nt\u00f4=| nomothe/t\u00ea| theate/on, kai\\ pro\\s du/o tau=ta d\u00ea\\ blepte/on,\npro/s te a)diki/an kai\\ blab\u00ea/n.]]\n\n[Footnote 299: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 862 C-E.]\n\n[Side-note: Three distinct causes of misguided proceedings.\n1. Painful stimulus. 2. Pleasurable stimulus. 3. Ignorance.]\n\nOf misguided or erroneous proceeding there are in the human mind\nthree producing causes, acting separately or conjointly:--1. The\npainful stimulus--Anger, Envy, Hatred, or Fear. 2. The seductive\nstimulus, of Pleasure or Desire. 3. Ignorance. Ignorance is\ntwofold:--1. Ignorance pure and simple. 2. Ignorance combined with\nthe false persuasion of knowledge. This last again is exhibited\nunder two distinguishable cases:--1. When combined with power; and\nin this case it produces grave and enormous crimes. 2. When found\nin weak persons, children or old men, in which case it produces,\nnothing worse than slight and venial offences, giving little\ntrouble to the lawgiver.[300]\n\n[Footnote 300: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 863 C. [Greek: Tri/ton m\u00ea\\n\na)/gnoian le/g\u00f4n a)/n tis t\u00f4=n a(mart\u00eama/t\u00f4n ai)ti/an ou)k a)\\n\npseu/doito.]]\n\n[Side-note: The unjust man is under the influence either of\nthe first or second of these causes, without controul of Reason.\nIf he acts under controul of Reason, though the Reason be bad, he\nis not unjust.]\n\nNow the unjust man (Plato tells us) is he in whose mind\neither one or other of the two first causes are paramount,\nand not controuled by Reason: either Hatred, Anger, Fear--or else\nAppetite and the Desire of Pleasure. What he does under either of\nthese two stimuli is unjust, whether he damages any one else or\nnot. But if neither of these two stimuli be prevalent in his\nmind--if, on the contrary, both of them are subordinated to the opinion\nwhich he entertains about what is good and right--then everything\nwhich he does is just, even though he falls into error. If in this\nstate of mind he hurts any one else, it will be simply\n_hurt_, not injustice. Those persons are incorrect who speak\nof it as injustice, but as involuntary injustice. The proceedings\nof such a man may be misguided or erroneous, but they will never\nbe unjust.[301]\n\n[Footnote 301: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 864 A. [Greek: t\u00ea\\n de\\ tou=\na)ri/stou do/xan, o(/p\u00ea| per a)\\n e)/sesthai tou=to \u00ea(g\u00ea/s\u00f4ntai\npo/lis ei)/te i)di\u00f4=tai/ tines, e)a\\n au)/t\u00ea kratou=sa e)n\npsuch\u00ea=| diakosm\u00ea=| pa/nta a)/ndra, ka)\\n spha/ll\u00eatai/ ti,\ndi/kaion me\\n pa=n ei)=nai to\\ tau/t\u00ea| prachthe\\n kai\\ to\\ t\u00ea=s\ntoiau/t\u00eas a)rch\u00ea=s gigno/menon u(p\u00ea/koon e(ka/st\u00f4n, kai\\ e)pi\\\nto\\n a(/panta a)/nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n bi/on a)/riston.]]\n\nAll these three causes may realise themselves in act under three\nvarieties of circumstances: 1. By open and violent deeds. 2. By\nsecret, deceitful, premeditated contrivance. 3. By a combination\nof both the two. Our laws must make provision for all the\nthree.[302]\n\n[Footnote 302: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 864 C.]\n\n[Side-note: Reasoning of Plato to save his doctrine--That\nno man commits injustice voluntarily.]\n\nSuch is the theory here advanced by Plato to reconcile his views\nand recommendations in the Leges with a doctrine which he had\npropounded and insisted upon elsewhere:--That no man commits\ninjustice voluntarily--That all injustice is involuntary, arising\nfrom ignorance--That every one would be just, if he only knew\nwherein justice consists--That knowledge, when it exists in the\nmind, will exercise controul and preponderance over the passions\nand appetites.[303]\n\n[Footnote 303: Compare Legg. v. p. 731 C; Tim\u00e6us, p. 86 D;\nRepublic, ix. p. 589 C; Protagoras, pp. 345 D--352 D.]\n\nThe distinction whereby Plato here proposes to save all\ninconsistency, is a distinction between misconduct or misguided\nactions ([Greek: a(mart\u00ea/mata], or [Greek: a(martano/mena]), and\nunjust actions ([Greek: a)dik\u00ea/mata]). The last of these\ncategories is comprised by him in the first, as one species\nor variety thereof. That is, all [Greek: a)dik\u00ea/mata] are [Greek:\na(mart\u00ea/mata]: but all [Greek: a(mart\u00ea/mata] are not [Greek:\na)dik\u00ea/mata]. He reckons three distinct causes of [Greek:\na(mart\u00ea/mata]: two belonging to the emotional department of mind;\none to the intellectual. Those [Greek: a(mart\u00ea/mata] which arise\nfrom either of the two first causes are also [Greek: a)dik\u00ea/mata]:\nthose which arise from the third are not [Greek: a)dik\u00ea/mata].\n\nThis is the distinction which Plato here draws, with a view to\nsave consistency in his own doctrine--at least as far as I can\nunderstand it, for the reasoning is not clear. It proceeds upon a\nrestricted definition, peculiar to himself, of the word\n_injustice_--a restriction, however, which coincides in part\nwith that which he gives of Justice in the Republic,[304] where he\ntreats Justice as consisting in the controul exercised over\nPassion and Appetite (the emotional department) by Reason (the\nintellectual): each of the three departments of the soul or each\nof the three separate souls, keeping in its own place, and\ndischarging its own appropriate functions. Every act which a man\ndoes under the influence of persuasion or opinion of the best, is\nheld by Plato to be _just_--whatever his persuasion may\nbe--whether it be true or false[305] If he be sincerely persuaded\nthat he is acting for the best, he cannot commit injustice.\n\n[Footnote 304: Plato, Republ. iv. pp. 443-444.]\n\n[Footnote 305: Plato, Legg. ix. pp. 863 C, 864 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Peculiar definition of Injustice. A man may do\ngreat voluntary hurt to others, and yet not be unjust, provided he\ndoes it under the influence of Reason, and not of Appetite.]\n\nInjustice being thus restricted to mean the separate and\nunregulated action of emotional impulse--and such unregulated\naction being, as a general fact, a cause of misery to the\nagent--Plato's view is, that no man is voluntarily unjust: for no\nman wishes to be miserable. Every man wishes to be happy: therefore\nevery man wishes to be just: because some controul of impulse by\nreason is absolutely essential to happiness. When once such\ncontroul is established, a man becomes just: he no longer commits\ninjustice. But he may still commit misconduct, and very gross\nmisconduct: moreover, this misconduct will be, or may be,\nvoluntary. For though the rational soul be now preponderant and\ncontrouling over the emotional (which controul constitutes\n_justice_), yet the rational soul itself may be\nimperfectly informed (ignorance simple); or may not only be\nignorant, but preoccupied besides with false persuasions and\nprejudices. Under such circumstances the just man may commit\nmisconduct, and do serious hurt to others. What he does may be\ndone voluntarily, in full coincidence with his own will: for the\nwill postulates only the controul of reason over emotion, and here\nthat condition is fulfilled, the fault lying with the controuling\nreason itself.\n\n[Side-note: Plato's purpose in the Laws is to prevent or\nremedy not only injustice but misconduct.]\n\nPlato's reasoning here (obscure and difficult to follow) is\nintended to show that there can be no voluntary _injustice_,\nbut that there is much both of voluntary _misconduct_, and\nvoluntary _mischief_. His purpose as lawgiver is to prevent\nor remedy not only (what he calls) _injustice_, but also\nmisconduct and mischief. As a remedy for mischief done, he\nprescribes that the agent thereof shall make full compensation to\nthe sufferer. As an antidote to injustice, he applies his\neducational discipline as well as his penal and remuneratory\ntreatment, to the emotions, with a view to subdue some and develop\nothers.[306] As a corrective to misconduct in all its branches, he\nassumes to himself as lawgiver a spiritual power, applied to the\nimprovement of the rational or intellectual man: prescribing what\ndoctrines and beliefs shall be accredited in his city, tolerating\nno others, and forbidding all contradiction, or dissentient\nindividuality of judgment.[307] He thus ensures that every man s\nindividual reason shall be in harmony with the infallible reason.\n\n[Footnote 306: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 862 C-D.]\n\n[Footnote 307: K. F. Hermann, in his valuable Dissertation, De\nVestigiis Institutorum Veterum, imprimis Atticorum, per Platonis\nde Legibus libros indagandis, Marburg, 1836, p. 55,\nsays:--\"Philosophi [Platonis] manum novatricem in iis tantum agnosco,\nqu\u00e6 de exsilii tempore pro diversis criminum fontibus diverso\nargutatur; qui quum omnino omnium, nisi fallor, primus in hoc ipso\nLegum Opere veterem usuque receptam criminum divisionem in\nvoluntaria et invita reprehenderit, eaque secundum tres animi\npartes trifariam distribuerit, ita hic quoque mediam inter\nimprudentiam et dolum malum iracundiam inseruit, qu\u00e2 quis motus\nc\u00e6dem vel extemplo committeret vel etiam posterius animum suum\nsanguine expl\u00earet.\"\n\nI do not conceive Plato's reasoning exactly in the same way as\nHermann. Plato denies only the reality of [Greek: e(kou/sia\na)dik\u00ea/mata]: he considers all [Greek: a)dik\u00ea/mata] as essentially\n[Greek: a)kou/sia]. But he does not deny [Greek: e(kou/sia\na)dik\u00ea/mata] (which is the large genus comprehending [Greek:\na)dik\u00ea/mata] as one species): he recognises both [Greek:\na(mart\u00ea/mata e(kou/sia] and [Greek: a(mart\u00ea/mata a)kou/sia]. And\nhe considers the [Greek: a(mart\u00ea/mata] arising from [Greek:\nthumo\\s] to be midway between the two. But he also recognises\n[Greek: a(mart\u00ea/mata] as springing from the three different\nsources in the human mind. The two positions are not incompatible;\nthough the whole discussion is obscured by the perplexing\ndistinction between [Greek: a(mart\u00ea/mata] and [Greek:\na)dik\u00ea/mata].]\n\nThe peculiar sense in which Plato uses the words justice and\ninjustice is perplexing throughout this discussion. The words, as\nhe uses them, coincide only in part with the ordinary meaning.\nThey comprehend more in one direction, and less in another.\n\nPlato now proceeds to promulgate laws in respect to homicide,\nwounds, beating, &c.\n\n[Side-note: Varieties of homicide--modes of dealing with\nthem penally.]\n\nHomicide, however involuntary and unintentional, taints the person\nby whose hands it is committed. He must undergo purification,\npartly by such expiatory ceremonies as the Ex\u00eag\u00eat\u00e6 may appoint,\npartly by a temporary exile from the places habitually frequented\nby the person slain: who even after death (according to the\ndoctrine of an ancient fable, which Plato here ratifies[308]), if\nhe saw the homicidal agent among his prior haunts, while the\noccurrence was yet recent, would be himself disturbed, and would\ncommunicate tormenting disturbance to the agent. This latter\naccordingly is commanded to leave the territory for a year, and to\nrefrain from visiting any of the sacred precincts until he has\nbeen purified. If he obeys, the relatives of the person slain\nshall forgive him; and he shall, after his year's exile, return to\nhis ordinary abode and citizenship. But if he evades obedience,\nthese relatives shall indict him for the act, and he shall incur\ndouble penalties. Should the nearest relative, under these\ncircumstances, neglect to indict, he may himself be indicted by\nany one who chooses, and shall be condemned to an exile of five\nyears.[309]\n\n[Footnote 308: Plato, Legg. ix. pp. 865 A-D--866 B.\n\nCompare Antiphon. Accus. C\u00e6d. p. 116, and Lobeck, Aglaophamus, p.\n301. The old law of Drako is given in substance in Demosthen. adv.\nLeptin. p. 505. [Greek: A)peniautismo/s], compulsory year of\nexile. K. F. Hermann, Griechische Privat-Alterth\u00fcmer, s. 61, not.\n23.]\n\n[Footnote 309: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 866.]\n\n[Side-note: Homicide involuntary--Homicide under\nprovocation.]\n\nPlato provides distinct modes of proceeding for this same act of\ninvoluntary homicide, under varieties of persons and\ncircumstances--citizens, metics, strangers, slaves, &c. He\nespecially lays it down that physicians, if a patient dies under\ntheir hands, they being unwilling--shall be held innocent, and\nshall not need purification.[310]\n\n[Footnote 310: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 865 B.]\n\nAfter involuntary homicide, Plato passes to the case of homicide\ncommitted under violent passion or provocation; which he ranks as\nintermediate between the involuntary and the\nvoluntary--approaching the one or the other, according to\ncircumstances:[311] according as it is done instantaneously, or\nwith more or less of interval and premeditation. If the act be\ncommitted instantaneously, the homicide shall undergo two years'\nexile: if after time for deliberation, the time of exile must be\nextended to three years.[312] But if the slain person before his\ndeath shall have expressed forgiveness, the case shall be dealt\nwith as one of involuntary homicide.[313] Special enactments are\nmade for the case of a slave killed by a citizen, a citizen killed\nby a slave, a son killed by his father, a wife by her husband,\n&c., under the influence of passion or strong provocation.\nHomicide in self-defence against a previous aggressor is allowed\nuniversally.[314]\n\n[Footnote 311: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 866 E. [Greek: thum\u00f4=| kai\\\no(/soi prop\u00ealakisthe/ntes lo/gois \u00ea)\\ kai\\ a)ti/mois e)/rgois . . .\nmetaxu/ pou tou= te e(kousi/ou kai\\ a)kousi/ou.]]\n\n[Footnote 312: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 867 D.]\n\n[Footnote 313: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 869 D.]\n\n[Footnote 314: Plato, Legg. ix. pp. 868-869 C.]\n\n[Side-note: Homicide voluntary.]\n\nThirdly, Plato passes to the case of homicide voluntary, the\nextreme of injustice, committed under the influence of pleasure,\nappetite, envy, jealousy, ambition, fear of voluntary divulgation\nof dangerous secrets, &c.--homicide premeditated and unjust.\nAmong all these causes, the chief and most frequent is love of\nwealth; which gets possession of most men, in consequence of the\nuntrue and preposterous admiration of wealth** imbibed in their\nyouth from the current talk and literature. The next in frequency\nis the competition of ambitious men for power or rank.[315]\nWhoever has committed homicide upon a fellow-citizen, under these\ncircumstances, shall be interdicted from all the temples and other\npublic places, and shall be indicted by the nearest relatives of\nthe deceased. If found guilty, he shall be put to death: if he\nleave the country to evade trial, he must be banished in\nperpetuity. The nearest relative is bound to indict, otherwise he\ndraws down upon himself the taint, and may himself be indicted.\nCertain sacrifices and religious ceremonies will be required in\nsuch cases, to accompany the legal procedure. These, together with\nthe names of the Gods proper to invoke, will be prescribed by the\nNomophylakes, in conjunction with the prophets and the Ex\u00eag\u00eat\u00e6, or\nreligious interpreters.[316] The Dikasts before whom such trials\nwill take place are the Nomophylakes, together with some select\npersons from the magistrates of the past year: the same as in the\ncase of sacrilege and treason.[317] The like procedure and\npenalty will be employed against any one who has contrived the\ndeath of another, not with his own hands, but by suborning some\nthird person: except that this contriver may be buried within the\nlimits of the territory, while the man whose hands are stained\nwith blood cannot be buried therein.[318]\n\n[Footnote 315: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 870.]\n\n[Footnote 316: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 871.]\n\n[Footnote 317: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 871 D.]\n\n[Footnote 318: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 872 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Homicide between kinsmen.]\n\nFor the cases of homicide between kinsmen or relatives, Plato\nprovides a form of procedure still more solemn, and a still graver\nmeasure of punishment. He also declares suicide to leave a taint\nupon the country, which requires to be purified as the Ex\u00eag\u00eat\u00e6 may\nprescribe: unless the act has been committed under extreme pain or\nextreme disgrace. The person who has killed himself must be buried\napart without honour, not in the regular family burying\nplaces.[319] The most cruel mode of death is directed to be\ninflicted upon a slave who has voluntarily slain, or procured to\nbe slain, a freeman. If a slave be put to death without any fault\nof his own, but only from apprehension of secrets which he may\ndivulge, the person who kills him shall be subjected to the same\ntrial and sentence as if he had killed a citizen.[320] If any\nanimal, or even any lifeless object, has caused the death of a\nman, the surviving relatives must prosecute, and the animal or the\nobject must be taken away from the country.[321]\n\n[Footnote 319: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 873.]\n\n[Footnote 320: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 872 D.]\n\n[Footnote 321: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 873 E. He makes exception of\nthe cases in which death of a man is caused by thunder or some\nsuch other missile from the Gods--[Greek: pl\u00ea\\n o(/sa kerauno\\s\n\u00ea)\\ ti para\\ theou= toiou=ton be/los i)o/n.]]\n\n[Side-note: Homicide justifiable--in what cases.]\n\n_Justifiable Homicide._--Some special cases are named in\nwhich he who voluntarily kills another, is nevertheless perfectly\nuntainted. A housebreaker caught in act may thus be rightfully\nslain: so also a clothes-stealer, a ravisher, a person who attacks\nthe life of any man's father, mother, or children.[322]\n\n[Footnote 322: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 874 C.]\n\n[Side-note: Infliction of wounds.]\n\n_Wounds._--Next to homicide, Plato deals with wounds\ninflicted: introducing his enactments by a preface on the general\nnecessity of obedience to law.[323] Whosoever, having intended to\nkill another (except in the special cases wherein homicide is\njustifiable), inflicts a wound which proves not mortal, is as\ncriminal as if he had killed him. Nevertheless he is not required\nto suffer so severe a punishment, inasmuch as an auspicious D\u00e6mon\nand Fortune have interposed to ward off the worst results of his\ncriminal purpose. He must make full compensation to the sufferer,\nand then be exiled in perpetuity.[324] The Dikastery will decide\nhow much compensation he shall furnish. In general, Plato trusts\nmuch to the discretion of the Dikastery, under the great diversity\nof the cases of wounds inflicted. He would not have allowed so\nmuch discretion to the numerous and turbulent Dikasteries of\nAthens: but he regards his select Dikastery as perfectly\ntrustworthy.[325] Peculiar provision is made for cases in which\nthe person inflicting the wound is kinsman or relative of the\nsufferer--also for homicide under the same circumstances. Plato\nalso directs how to supply the vacancy which perpetual banishment\nwill occasion in the occupation of one among the 5040\ncitizen-lots.[326] If one man wounds another in a fit of passion,\nhe must pay simple, double, or triple, compensation according as the\nDikasts may award: he must farther do all the military duty which\nwould have been incumbent on the wounded man, should the latter be\ndisabled.[327] But if the person inflicting the wound be a slave\nand the wounded man a freeman, the slave shall be handed over to\nthe wounded freeman to deal with as he pleases. If the master of\nthe slave will not give him up, he must himself make compensation\nfor the wound, unless he can prove before the Dikastery that the\ncase is one of collusion between the wounded freeman and the\nslave; in which case the wounded freeman will become liable to the\ncharge of unlawfully suborning away the slave from his\nmaster.[328]\n\n[Footnote 323: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 875.]\n\n[Footnote 324: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 877 A.]\n\n[Footnote 325: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 876 A.]\n\n[Footnote 326: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 877.]\n\n[Footnote 327: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 878 C.]\n\n[Footnote 328: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 879 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Infliction of blows.]\n\n_Beating._--The laws of Plato on the subject of beating are\nmore peculiar. They are mainly founded in reverence for age. One\nwho strikes a person twenty years older than himself, is severely\npunished: but if he strikes a person of the same age with himself,\nthat person must defend himself as he can with his own hands--no\npunishment being provided.[329] For him who strikes his\nfather or mother, the heaviest penalty, excommunication and\nperpetual banishment, is provided.[330] If a slave strike a\nfreeman, he shall be punished with as many blows as the person\nstricken directs, nevertheless in such manner as not to diminish\nhis value to his master.[331]\n\n[Footnote 329: Plato, Legg. ix. pp. 879-880.\n\nThe person who struck first blow was guilty of [Greek: ai)ki/a],\nDemosth. adv. Euerg. and Mnesibul. pp. 1141-1151.]\n\n[Footnote 330: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 881.]\n\n[Footnote 331: Plato, Legg. p. 882 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Plato has borrowed much from Attic procedure,\nespecially in regard to Homicide--Peculiar view of Homicide at\nAthens, as to procedure.]\n\nThroughout all this Treatise De Legibus, in regard both to civil\nand criminal enactments, Plato has borrowed largely from Attic\nlaws and procedure. But in regard to homicide and wounds, he has\nborrowed more largely than in any other department. Both the\ngeneral character, and the particular details, of his provisions\nrespecting homicide, are in close harmony with ancient Athenian\nsentiment, and with the embodiments of that sentiment by the\nlawgivers Drako and Solon. At Athens, though the judicial\nprocedure generally, as well as the political constitution,\nunderwent great modification between the time of Solon and that of\nDemosthenes, yet the procedure in the case of homicide remained\nwithout any material change. It was of a sanctified character,\ndepending mainly upon ancient religious tradition. The person\ncharged with homicide was not tried before the general body of\nDikasts, drawn by lot, but before special ancient tribunals and in\ncertain consecrated places, according to the circumstances under\nwhich the act of homicide was charged. The principal object\ncontemplated, was to protect the city and its public buildings\nagainst the injurious consequences arising from the presence of a\ntainted man--and to mollify the posthumous wrath of the person\nslain. This view of the Attic procedure[332] against homicide is\ncopied by the Platonic. Plato keeps prominently in view the\nreligious bearing and consequences of such an act; he touches\ncomparatively little upon its consequences in causing distress and\ndiminishing the security of life. He copies the Attic law both in\nthe justifications which he admits for homicide, and in the\nsentence of banishment which he passes against both animals and\ninanimate objects to whom any man owes his death. He goes beyond\nthe Attic law in the solemnity and emphasis of his details about\nhomicide among members of the same family and relatives: as well\nas in the severe punishment which he imposes upon the surviving\nrelatives of the person slain, if they should neglect their\nobligation of indicting.[333] Throughout all this chapter, Plato\nnot only follows the Attic law, but overpasses it, in dealing with\nhomicide as a portion of the Jus Sacrum rather than of the Jus\nCivile.\n\n[Footnote 332: The oration of Demosthenes against Aristokrates\ntreats copiously of this subject, pp. 627-646. [Greek: ei)/rgein\nt\u00ea=s tou= patho/ntos patri/dos, di/kaion ei)=nai--o(/s\u00f4n t\u00f4=|\npatho/nti z\u00f4=nti met\u00ea=n, tou/t\u00f4n ei)/rgei to\\n dedrako/ta, pr\u00f4=ton\nme\\n t\u00ea=s patri/dos] (632-633).\n\nThe first of Matthi\u00e6's Dissertations, De Judiciis Atheniensium\n(Miscellanea Philologica, vol. i. pp. 145-176), collects the\ninformation on these matters: and K. F. Hermann (De Vestigiis\nInstitutorum Veterum, imprimis Atticorum, per Platonis De Legibus\nLibros indagandis, Marburg, 1836) gives a detailed comparison of\nPlato's directions with what we know about the Attic Law:--\"Ipsas\nhomicidiorum religiones (Plato) ex antiquissimo jure patrio in\nsuum ita transtulit, ut nihil opportunius ad illustranda illius\nvestigia inveniri posse videatur\" (p. 49). . . . \"qu\u00e6 omnia\nSolonis Draconisve in legibus fer\u00e8 ad verbum eadem inveniuntur\"\n(p. 50). The same about [Greek: trau/mata e)k pronoi/as], pp.\n58-59.]\n\n[Footnote 333: K. F. Hermann, De Vestigiis, ut supr\u00e0, p. 54.\nCompare Demosthenes adv. Theokrin. p. 1331.]\n\nIn respect to the offence of beating, he does not follow the Attic\nlaw, when he permits it between citizens of the same age, and\nthrows the beaten person upon his powers of self-defence. This is\nSpartan, not Athenian. It is also Spartan when he makes the\ncriminality, in giving blows, to turn upon the want of reverence\nfor age: upon the circumstance, that the person beaten is twenty\nyears older than the beater.[334]\n\n[Footnote 334: Plato, Legg. ix. p. 879 C. He admits the same\nprovision as to blows between [Greek: \u00ea(/likes] into his Republic\n(v. p. 464 E).\n\nCompare, about Sparta, Xenophon, Rep. Laced. iv. 5; Cicero, Tusc.\nDisp. v. 27; Pausanias, iii. 14: Dionys. Halikarnass. Arch. Rom.\nxx. 2. [Greek: Lakedaimo/nioi o(/ti toi=s presbute/rois\ne)pe/trepon tou\\s a)kosmou=ntas t\u00f4=n polit\u00f4=n e)n o(/t\u00f4| d\u00ea/ tini\nt\u00f4=n d\u00eamosi/\u00f4n to/p\u00f4n tai=s bakt\u00eari/ais pai/ein.]]\n\n[Side-note: Impiety or outrage offered to divine things or\nplaces.]\n\nFrom these various crimes--sacrilege or plunder of holy places,\ntheft, homicide, wounding, beating--Plato passes in the tenth book\nto insult or outrage ([Greek: u(/bris]). These outrages (he\nconsiders) are essentially the acts of wild young men. Outrage may\nbe offered towards five different subjects. 1. Public temples. 2.\nPrivate chapels and sepulchres. 3. Parents. 4. The magistrates, in\ntheir dignity or their possessions. 5. Private citizens, in\nrespect of their civic rights and dignity.[335] The tenth book is\ndevoted entirely to the two first-mentioned heads, or to impiety\nand its alleged sources: the others come elsewhere, not in any\ndefinite order.[336]\n\n[Footnote 335: Plato, Legg. x. pp. 884-885.]\n\n[Footnote 336: Treatment of parents comes xi. pp. 930-931.]\n\n[Side-note: All impiety arises from one or other of\nthree heresies. 1. No belief in the Gods. 2. Belief that the Gods\ninterfere very little. 3. Belief that they may be appeased by\nprayer and sacrifice.]\n\nPlato declares that all impiety, either in word or deed, springs\nfrom one of three heretical doctrines. 1. The heretic does not\nbelieve in the Gods at all. 2. He believes the Gods to exist, but\nbelieves also that they do not interest themselves about human\naffairs; or at least that they interfere only to a small extent.\n3. He believes that they exist, and that they direct every thing;\nbut that it is perfectly practicable to appease their displeasure,\nand to conciliate their favour, by means of prayer and\nsacrifice.[337]\n\n[Footnote 337: Plato, Legg. x. p. 885.]\n\n[Side-note: Punishment for these three heretical beliefs,\nwith or without overt act.]\n\nIf a person displays impiety, either by word or deed, in either of\nthese three ways, he shall be denounced to the archons by any\ncitizen who becomes acquainted with the fact. The archons, on pain\nof taking the impiety on themselves, shall assemble the dikastery,\nand put the person accused on trial. If found guilty, he shall be\nput in chains and confined in one or other of the public prisons.\nThese public prisons are three in number: one in the market-place,\nfor ordinary offenders: a second, called the House of Correction\n([Greek: s\u00f4phronist\u00ea/rion]), attached to the building in which the\nSupreme Board of Magistrates hold their nocturnal sittings: a\nthird, known by some designation of solemn penalty, in the centre\nof the territory, but in some savage and desolate spot.[338]\n\n[Footnote 338: Plato, Legg. x. p. 908. [Greek: desmo\\s me\\n ou)=n\nu(parche/t\u00f4 pa=si; desm\u00f4t\u00eari/\u00f4n de\\ o)/nt\u00f4n e)n t\u00ea=| po/lei\ntri\u00f4=n], &c.\n\nImprisonment included chains round the prisoner's legs. Sokrates\nwas put in chains during his thirty days' confinement, arising\nfrom the voyage of the The\u00f4ric ship to Delos (Plat. Ph\u00e6don, p. 60\nB).]\n\n[Side-note: Heretic, whose conduct has been virtuous and\nfaultless, to be imprisoned for five years, perhaps more.]\n\nSuppose the heretic, under either one of the three heads, to be\nfound guilty of heresy pure and simple--but that his conduct has\nbeen just, temperate, unexceptionable, and his social dispositions\nsteadily manifested, esteeming the society of just men, and\nshunning that of the unjust.[339] There is still danger that by\nopen speech or scoffing he should shake the orthodox belief of\nothers: he must therefore be chained in the house of Correction\nfor a term not less than five years. During this term no\ncitizen whatever shall be admitted to see him, except the members\nof the Nocturnal Council of Magistrates. These men will constantly\ncommune with him, administering exhortations for the safety of his\nsoul and for his improvement. If at the expiration of the five\nyears, he appears to be cured of his heresy and restored to a\nproper state of mind, he shall be set at liberty, and allowed to\nlive with other proper-minded persons. But if no such cure be\noperated, and if he shall be found guilty a second time of the\nsame offence, he shall suffer the penalty of death.[340]\n\n[Footnote 339: Plato, Legg. p. 908 B-E. [Greek: \u00f4(=| ga\\r a)/n,\nm\u00ea\\ nomi/zonti theou\\s ei)=nai to\\ para/pan, \u00ea)=thos phu/sei\nprosge/n\u00eatai di/kaion, misou=nte/s te gi/gnontai tou\\s kakou/s,\nkai\\ t\u00f4=| duscherai/nein t\u00ea\\n a)diki/an ou)/te ta\\s toiau/tas\npra/xeis prosi/entai pra/ttein, tou/s te m\u00ea\\ dikai/ous t\u00f4=n\na)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n pheu/gousi, kai\\ tou\\s dikai/ous ste/rgousi],\n&c.]\n\n[Footnote 340: Plato, Legg. x. p. 909 A. [Greek: e)n tou/t\u00f4| de\\\nt\u00f4=| chro/n\u00f4| m\u00eadei\\s t\u00f4=n polit\u00f4=n au)toi=s a)/llos\nxuggigne/sth\u00f4, pl\u00ea\\n oi( tou= nukterinou= xullo/gou koin\u00f4nou=ntes,\ne)pi\\ nouthet\u00ea/sei te kai\\ t\u00ea=| t\u00ea=s psuch\u00ea=s s\u00f4t\u00eari/a|\no(milou=ntes.]]\n\n[Side-note: Heretic with bad conduct--punishment to be\ninflicted.]\n\nAgain--the heretic may be found guilty, not of heresy pure and\nsimple in one of its three varieties, but of heresy manifesting\nitself in bad conduct and with aggravating circumstances. He may\nconceal his real opinion, and acquire the reputation of the best\ndispositions, employing that reputation to overreach others, and\ncombining dissolute purposes with superior acuteness and\nintelligence: he may practise stratagems to succeed as a despot, a\npublic orator, a general, or a sophist: he may take up, and will\nmore frequently take up, the profession of a prophet or religious\nritualist or sorcerer, professing to invoke the dead or to command\nthe aid of the Gods by prayer and sacrifice. He may thus try to\nbring ruin upon citizens, families, and cities.[341] A heretic of\nthis description (says Plato) deserves death not once or twice\nonly, but several times over, if it were possible.[342] If found\nguilty he must be kept in chains for life in the central penal\nprison--not allowed to see any freemen--not visited by any one,\nexcept the slave who brings to him his daily rations. When he\ndies, his body must be cast out of the territory without burial:\nand any freeman who may assist in burying it, shall himself incur\nthe penalty of impiety. From the day that the heretic is\nimprisoned, he shall be considered as civilly dead; his children\nbeing placed under wardship as orphans.[343]\n\n[Footnote 341: Plato, Legg. x. pp. 908-909.]\n\n[Footnote 342: Plato, Legg. x. p. 908 E. [Greek: \u00f4(=n to\\ me\\n\nei)r\u00f4niko\\n ou)ch e(no\\s ou)de\\ duoi=n a)/xia thana/toin\na(marta/non], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 343: Plato, Legg. x. p. 909 C.]\n\n[Side-note: No private worship or religious rites allowed.\nEvery citizen must worship at the public temples.]\n\nAs a still farther assurance for reaching and punishing these\ndangerous heretics, Plato enacts--No one shall erect any\ntemple or altar, no one shall establish any separate worship or\nsacrifice, in his own private precincts. No one shall propitiate\nthe Gods by secret prayer and sacrifice of his own. When a man\nthinks fit to offer prayer and sacrifice, he must do it at the\npublic temples, through and along with recognised priests and\npriestesses. If a man keep in his house any sacred object to which\nhe offers sacrifice, the archons shall require him to bring it\ninto the public temples, and shall punish him until he does so.\nBut if he be found guilty of sacrificing either at home or in the\npublic temples, after the commission of any act which the\nDikastery may consider grave impiety--he shall be condemned to\ndeath.[344]\n\n[Footnote 344: Plato, Legg. x. pp. 909-910.]\n\n[Side-note: Uncertain and mischievous action of the\nreligious sentiment upon individuals, if not controuled by public\nauthority.]\n\nIn justifying this stringent enactment, Plato not only proclaims\nthat the proper establishment of temples and worship can only be\ndictated by a man of the highest intelligence, but he also\ncomplains of the violent and irregular working of the religious\nfeeling in the minds of individuals. Many men (he says) when sick,\nor in danger and troubles of what kind soever, or when alarmed by\ndreams or by spectres seen in their waking hours, or when calling\nto mind and recounting similar narratives respecting the past, or\nwhen again experiencing unexpected good fortune--many men under\nsuch circumstances, and all women, are accustomed to give a\nreligious colour to the situation, and to seek relief by vows,\nsacrifices, and altars to the Gods. Hence the private houses and\nvillages become full of such foundations and proceedings.[345]\nSuch religious sentiments and fears, springing up spontaneously in\nthe minds of individuals, are considered by Plato to require\nstrict repression. He will allow no religious worship or\nmanifestation, except that which is public and officially\nauthorised.\n\n[Footnote 345: Plato, Legg. x. p. 909 E-910 A. [Greek: e)/thos te\ngunaixi/ te d\u00ea\\ diaphero/nt\u00f4s pa/sais kai\\ toi=s a)sthenou=si\npa/nt\u00ea| kai\\ kinduneu/ousi kai\\ a)porou=sin, o(/p\u00ea| tis a)\\n\na)por\u00ea=|, . . . kathierou=n te to\\ paro\\n a)ei/, kai\\ thusi/as\neu)/chesthai kai\\ i(dru/seis u(pischnei=sthai theoi=s], &c.\n\nIf, however, we turn back to v. p.738 C, we shall see that Plato\nratifies these [Greek: kathier\u00f4/seis], when they have once got\nfooting, and rejects only the new ones. The rites, worship, and\nsacrifices, in his city, are assumed to have been determined by\nlocal or oracular inspiration (v. p. 738 B): the orthodox creed is\nset out by himself.]\n\n[Side-note: Intolerant spirit of Plato's legislation\nrespecting uniformity of belief.]\n\nSuch is the Act of Uniformity promulgated by Plato for his new\ncommunity of the Magn\u00eates, and such the terrible sanctions by\nwhich it is enforced. The lawgiver is the supreme and exclusive\nauthority, spiritual as well as temporal, on matters religious as\nwell as on matters secular. No dissenters from the orthodoxy\nprescribed by him are admitted. Those who believe more than he\ndoes, and those who believe less, however blameless their conduct,\nare condemned alike to pass through a long solitary imprisonment\nto execution. Not only the speculations of enquiring individual\nreason, but also the spontaneous inspirations of religious\ndisquietude or terror, are suppressed and punished.[346]\n\n[Footnote 346: Plato himself is here the [Greek: No/mos Po/le\u00f4s],\nwhich the Delphian oracle, in its responses, sanctioned as the\nproper rule for individual citizens, Xenophon, Memor. iv. 3, 16.\nCompare iv. 6. 2, and i. 3, 1; Lysias, Or. xxx. 21-26. [Greek:\nthu/ein ta\\ pa/tria--thu/ein ta\\ e)k t\u00f4=n ku/rbe\u00f4n], is [Greek:\neu)sebei/a].\n\nSee K. F. Hermann, Gottesdienstliche Alterth\u00fcmer der Griechen,\nsect. 10: N\u00e4gelsbach, Nach-Homerische Theologie, pp. 201-204.\n\nCicero also enacts, in his Treatise De Legibus (ii.\n8-10):--\"Separatim nemo habessit Deos: neve novos, sed ne advenas,\nnisi public\u00e9 adscitos, privatim colunto.\" Compare Livy, xxxix. 16,\nabout the Roman prohibitions of _sacra externa_. But Cicero\ndoes not propose to inflict such severe penalties as Plato.]\n\nWe seem to be under a legislation imbued with the persecuting\nspirit and self-satisfied infallibility of mediaeval Catholicism\nand the Inquisition. The dissenter is a criminal, and among the\nworst of criminals, even if he do nothing more than proclaim his\nopinions.[347] How striking is the contradiction between this\nspirit and that in which Plato depicts the Sokrates of the Ph\u00e6don,\nthe Apology, and the Gorgias! How fully does Sokrates in the\nPh\u00e6don[348] recognise and respect the individual reason of his two\nfriends, though dissenting from his own! How emphatically\ndoes he proclaim, in the Apology and Gorgias, not merely his own\nindividual dissent from his fellow-citizens, but also his\nresolution to avow and maintain it against one and all, until he\nshould hear such reasons as convinced him that it was untrue! How\nearnestly does he declare (in the Apology) that he has received\nfrom the Delphian God a mission to cross-examine the people of\nAthens, and that he will obey the God in preference to them:[349]\nthus claiming to himself that special religious privilege which\nhis accuser Mel\u00eatus imputes to him as a crime, and which Plato, in\nhis Magn\u00eatic colony, also treats as a crime, interdicting it under\nthe severest penalties! During the interval of forty-five years\n(probably) between the trial of Sokrates and the composition of\nthe Leges, Plato had passed from sympathy with the free-spoken\ndissenter to an opposite feeling--hatred of all dissent, and an\nunsparing employment of penalties for upholding orthodoxy. I have\nalready remarked on the Republic, and I here remark it again--if\nMel\u00eatus lived long enough to read the Leges, he would have found\nhis own accusation of Sokrates amply warranted by the enactments\nand doctrines of the most distinguished Sokratic Companion.[350]\n\n[Footnote 347: Milton, in his Areopagitica, or Argument for\nUnlicensed Printing (vol. i. p. 149, Birch's edition of Milton's\nProse Works), has some strenuous protestations against the rigour\nof the Platonic censorship in this tenth Book. In the year 1480\nHermolaus Barbarus wrote to George Merula as follows:--\"Plato, in\nInstitutione De Legibus, inter prima commemorat, in omni republic\u00e2\npr\u00e6scribi caverique oportere, ne cui liceat, qu\u00e6 composuerit, aut\nprivatim ostendere, aut in usum publicum edere, antequam ea\nconstitute super id judices viderint, nec damnarint. Utinam\nhodieque haberetur h\u00e6c lex: neque enim tam multi scriberent, neque\ntam pauci bonas litteras discerent. Nunc et copi\u00e2 malorum librorum\noffundimur, et omissis eminentissimis autoribus, plebeios et\nminutulos consectamur. Et, quod calamitosissimum est, periti juxta\nimperitique de studiis impun\u00e9 ac promiscu\u00e9 judicant\" (Politiani\nOpera, 1553, p. 197).\n\nI transcribe the above passage from an interesting article upon\nBook-Censors, in Beckmann's History of Inventions (Ed. 1817, vol.\niii. p. 93 seq.), where numerous examples are cited of the\nprohibition, combustion, or licensing of books by authority, from\nthe burning of the work of Protagoras by decree of the Athenian\nassembly, down to modern times; illustrating the tendency of\ndifferent sects and creeds, in proportion as they acquired power,\nto silence all open contradiction. The Christian Arnobius, at a\ntime when his creed was under disfavour by the Emperors, protests\nagainst this practice, in a liberal and comprehensive phrase which\nwould have much offended Plato (at the time when he wrote the\nLeges) and Hermolaus:--\"Alios audio mussitare indignanter et\ndicere:--Oportere statui per Senatum, aboleantur ut h\u00e6c scripta\nquibus Christiana religio comprobetur et vetustatis opprimatur\nauctoritas. . . . Nam intercipere scripta, et publicatam velle\nsubmergere lectionem, non est Deos defendere, sed veritatis\ntestificationem timere\" (Arnob. adv. Gentes, iii. p. 104. Also iv.\np. 152).\n\n\"We are told by Eusebius (Beckmann, ed. 1817, vol. iii. p. 96;\nBohn's ed., vol. ii. p. 514) that Diocletian caused the sacred\nScriptures to be burnt. After the spreading of the Christian\nreligion, the clergy exercised against books that were either\nunfavourable or disagreeable to them, the same severity which they\nhad censured in the heathens as foolish and prejudicial to their\nown cause. Thus were the writings of Arius condemned to the flames\nat the Council of Nice; and Constantine threatened with the\npunishment of death those who should conceal them. The clergy\nassembled at the Council of Ephesus requested the Emperor\nTheodosius II. to cause the works of Nestorius to be burnt; and\nthis desire was complied with. The writings of Eutyches shared the\nlike fate at the Council of Chalcedon: and it would not be\ndifficult to collect examples of the same kind from each of the\nfollowing centuries.\"\n\nDr. Vaughan observes, in criticising the virtuous character and\nsincere persecuting spirit of Sir Thomas More:--\"If there be any\n_opinion_ which it would be just to punish as a _crime_,\nit is the opinion which makes it to be _a virtue not to tolerate\nopinion_.\" (Revolutions in English History, vol. ii. p. 178.)\n\nI find the following striking anecdote in the transactions of the\nAcad\u00e9mie Royale de Belgique, 1862; Bulletins, 2me S\u00e9r., tom. xiii.\np. 567 seq.; Vie et Travaux de _Nicolas Cleynaerts_ par M.\nThonissen. Cleynaerts (or Clenardus) was a learned Belgian (born\n1495--died 1543), professor both at Louvain and at Salamanca, and\nauthor of _Grammatic\u00e6 Institutiones_, both of the Greek and\nthe Hebrew languages. He acquired, under prodigious difficulties\nand disadvantages, a knowledge of the Arabic language; and he\nemployed great efforts to organise a course of regular instruction\nin that language at Louvain, with a view to the formation of\nmissionaries who would combat the doctrines of Islam.\n\nAt Grenada, in Spain (1538), \"Clenardus ne r\u00e9ussit pas mieux \u00e0\narracher aux b\u00fbchers de l'inquisition les manuscrits et les\nlivres\" (Moorish and Arabic books which had been seized after the\nconquest of Grenada by the Spaniards) \"qu'elle avait entass\u00e9s dans\nsa succursale de Grenade. Ce fut en vain que Cleynaerts, faisant\nvaloir le but \u00e9minemment chr\u00e9tien qu'il voulait atteindre,\nprodigua les d\u00e9marches et les pri\u00e8res, pour se faire remettre 'ces\npapiers plus n\u00e9cessaires \u00e0 lui qu'\u00e0 Vulcain'. . . . L'inexorable\ninquisition refusa de l\u00e2cher sa proie. Un savant th\u00e9ologien,\nJean-Martin Silic\u00e6us, pr\u00e9cepteur de Philippe II., fit cependant\nentendre \u00e0 notre compatriote, que ses voeux pourraient \u00eatre\nexauc\u00e9s, s'il consentait \u00e0 fonder son \u00e9cole, non \u00e0 Louvain, mais \u00e0\nGrenade, o\u00f9 une multitude de n\u00e9ophytes faisaient semblant de\nprofesser le Christianisme, tout en conservant les pr\u00e9ceptes de\nMahomet au fond du coeur. Mais le linguiste Belge lui fit cette\nr\u00e9ponse, doublement remarquable \u00e0 cause du pays et de l'\u00e9poque o\u00f9\nelle fut \u00e9mise: 'C'est en Brabant, et nullement en Espagne, que je\nposerai les fondements de mon oeuvre. Je cherche des\n_compagnons d'armes pour lutter l\u00e0 o\u00f9 la lutte peut \u00eatre loyale\net franche_. Les habitants du royaume de Grenade n'oseraient\npas me r\u00e9pondre, puisque la terreur de l'inquisition les force \u00e0\nse dire chr\u00e9tiens. Le combat est impossible, l\u00e0 o\u00f9 personne n'ose\nassumer le r\u00f4le de l'ennemi'--.\" Galen calls for a strict\ncensorship, even over medical books--ad Julianum--Vol. xviii. p.\n247 K\u00fchn.]\n\n[Footnote 348: Plato, Apol. Sokr. p. 29. Gorgias, p. 472 A-B:\n[Greek: kai\\ nu=n peri\\ \u00f4(=n su\\ le/geis o)li/gou soi pa/ntes\nsumph\u00ea/sousi tau)ta\\ A)th\u00eanai=oi kai\\ xe/noi . . . _A)ll' e)g\u00f4/\nsoi ei(=s \u00f4)\\n ou)ch o(molog\u00f4=_.]\n\nCompare also p. 482 B of the same dialogue, where Sokrates\ndeclares his anxiety to maintain consistency with himself, and his\nindifference to other authority.]\n\n[Footnote 349: Plato, Apol. Sokr. p. 29 D. [Greek: pei/somai de\\\nma=llon t\u00f4=| the\u00f4=| \u00ea)\\ u(mi=n]. Comp. pp. 30 A, 31 D, 33 C.]\n\n[Footnote 350: The indictment of Mel\u00eatus against Sokrates ran\nthus--[Greek: A)dikei= S\u00f4kra/t\u00eas, ou(\\s me\\n \u00ea( po/lis nomi/zei\ntheou/s, ou) nomi/z\u00f4n, _e(/tera_ de\\ _kaina\\ daimo/nia_\nei)s\u00eagou/menos; a)dikei= de\\ kai\\ tou\\s ne/ous diaphthei/r\u00f4n;\nti/m\u00eama, tha/natos] (Diog. Laert. ii. 40; Xenoph. Memor. i. 1).\nThe charge as to introduction of [Greek: kaina\\ daimo/nia] was\ncertainly well founded against Sokrates (compare Plato, Republic,\nvi. p. 496 C). Whoever was guilty of promulgating [Greek: kaina\\\ndaimo/nia] in the Platonic city De Legibus, would have perished\nmiserably long before he reached the age of 70; which Sokrates\nattained at Athens.\n\nCompare my 'History of Greece,' ch. xxviii.\n\nI have in one passage greatly understated the amount of severity\nwhich Plato employs against heretics. I there affirm that he\nbanishes them: whereas the truth is, that he imprisons them, and\nultimately, unless they recant, puts them to death.]\n\n[Side-note: The persons denounced by Plato as heretics, and\npunished as such, would have included a majority of the Grecian\nworld.]\n\nIt is true that the orthodoxy which Plato promulgates, and forbids\nto be impugned, in the Magn\u00eatic community, is an orthodoxy of his\nown, different from that which was recognised at Athens; but this\nonly makes the case more remarkable, and shows the deep root of\nintolerance in the human bosom--esteemed as it frequently is, by a\nsincere man, among the foremost of his own virtues. Plato marks\nout three varieties of heresy, punishable by long\nimprisonment, and subsequent death in case of obstinate\npersistence. Now under one or other of the three varieties, a\nlarge majority of actual Greeks would have been included. The\nfirst variety--those who did not believe the Gods to exist--was\ndoubtless confined to a small minority of reflecting men; though\nthis minority (according to Plato[351]), not contemptible even in\nnumber, was distinguished in respect to intellectual\naccomplishments. The second variety--that of those who believed\nthe Gods to exist, but believed them to produce some results only,\nnot all--was more numerous. And the third variety--that of those\nwho believed them to be capable of being appeased or won over by\nprayer and sacrifice--was the most numerous of all. Plato himself\ninforms us[352] that this last doctrine was proclaimed by the most\neminent poets, rhetors, prophets, and priests, as well as by\nthousands and tens of thousands besides. That prayer and sacrifice\nwere means of appeasing the displeasure or unfavourable\ndispositions of the Gods--was the general belief of the Grecian\nworld, from the Homeric times downwards. The oracles or individual\nprophets were constantly entreated to inform petitioners, what was\nthe nature or amount of expiatory ceremony which would prove\nsufficient for any specific case; but that there was _some_\nsort of expiatory ceremony which would avail, was questioned by\nfew sincere believers.[353] All these would have been ranked as\nheretics by Plato. If the Magn\u00eatic community had become a reality,\nthe solitary cells of the Platonic Inquisition might have been\nfound to include Anaxagoras, and most of the Ionic philosophers,\nunder the first head of heresy; Aristotle and Epikurus under the\nsecond; Herodotus and Nikias under the third. Indeed most of the\n5040 Magn\u00eatic colonists must have adjusted anew their canon of\northodoxy in order to satisfy the exigence of the Platonic\nCensors.\n\n[Footnote 351: Plato, Legg. x. p. 886 E. [Greek: pa/mpolloi]. Also\npp. 888 E, 891 B.\n\nFabricius tells us that Plato himself has been considered and\ndesignated as an atheist, by various critics:--\"Alii Platonem\natheis, alii Spinoz\u00e6 pr\u00e6cursoribus, adnumerarunt. Utriusque\ncriminis reum eum fecit Nic. Henr. Gundling. . . At alii ben\u00e9\ndefenderunt philosophum ab illo crimine.\" (Bibliothec. Gr\u00e6c. tom.\niii. pp. 69, not. _hh_, ed. Harles.)\n\nThis illustrates the loose manner in which the epithet [Greek:\na)/theos] has been applied in philosophical and theological\ncontroversies: a practice forcibly exposed in the following acute\nnote of Wyttenbach.\n\nWyttenbach, Pr\u00e6f. ad Plutarch. De Superstit. vol. vi. pars ii. p.\n995. \"Nam qu\u00e6 est superstitio? qu\u00e6 [Greek: a)theo/t\u00eas]? qu\u00e6 harum\nspecies? qui gradus? His demum explicitis et inter se comparatis\nintelligi poterit, qu\u00e6 [Greek: a)theo/t\u00eatos] species cui\nsuperstitionis speciei, qui gradus hujus cui gradui illius,\nanteferri aut postponi debeat. Ac primum in ipsis illis de quibus\nagitur rebus definiendis magna est difficultas. Quamquam\n_atheum_ quidem definire non difficile videtur; quippe quo\nipso nomine significetur is _qui nullum esse deum putet_.\nAtqui h\u00e6c etiam definitio non intelligatur, nisi antea declaretur\nquid sit id quod _Dei_ vocabulo significemus--omnino qu\u00e6 sit\ndefinitio _Dei_. Jam nemo ignorat quantopere in notione ac\ndefinitione Dei dissentiant non modo universi populi, sed et\nsinguli homines: nec solum vulgus, sed et sapientes: ita quidem,\nut quo plures partes sint, ex quibus h\u00e6c notio constituatur, eo\nminus in ea consentiant. Sed fac esse qui eam paucissimis\ncomplectatur proprietatibus, ut dicat _Deum esse mentem \u00e6ternam,\nomnium rerum creatricem et gubernatricem_. Erunt qui eum parum,\nerunt qui nimium, dixisse putent: neutri se atheos volent, utrique\net hunc et se invicem atheos dicent. . . Ita se res habet.\nQuotidi\u00e9 jactatur tralatitium illud, _verus Deus_: quo suam\nquisque de Deo notionem significat, s\u00e6pe illam ineptam et summi\nnuminis majestate indignam. Et bene nobiscum ageretur, si non\nnisi ab indocto vulgo jactaretur. Nunc philosophi, certe qui se\nphilosophos haberi volunt, item crepant. Disputant de _vero\nDeo_, nec ab ejus definitione proficiscuntur, quasi vero h\u00e6c\nnemini ignota sit. . . . Pervulgata illa _veri Dei_\nappellatio nobis venit a consuetudine Ecclesi\u00e6, cujus divers\u00e6\nquondam sect\u00e6 notionem Dei diverso modo informantes, ejus\nignorationem et [Greek: a)theo/t\u00eata] non modo profanis, sed\ninvicem ali\u00e6 aliis sectis exprobrare solebant. H\u00e6c de notione\n_athei_: qu\u00e6 profecto, nisi constitut\u00e2 notione Dei, constitui\nipsa nequit.\"]\n\n[Footnote 352: Plato, Legg. x. p. 885 D. [Greek: nu=n me\\n ga\\r\ntau=ta a)kou/onte/s te kai\\ toiau=th' e(/tera t\u00f4=n legome/n\u00f4n\na)ri/st\u00f4n ei)=nai poi\u00eat\u00f4=n te kai\\ r(\u00eato/r\u00f4n kai\\ ma/nte\u00f4n kai\\\ni(ere/\u00f4n kai\\ a)/ll\u00f4n muria/kis muri/\u00f4n], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 353: See the sections 23 and 24 of the Lehrbuch of K. F.\nHermann, \u00dcber die Gottesdienstlichen Alterth\u00fcmer der Griechen:\nHerodot. vi. 91; Thucydid. i. 134.--Respecting Plato's aversion\nfor Anaxagoras--and the physical philosophers--see Legg. x. 888 E.\nxii. 967 A., with Stallbaum's notes.]\n\n[Side-note: Pro\u00ebm or prefatory discourse of Plato, for\nthese severe laws against heretics.]\n\nTo these severe laws and penalties against heretics, Plato\nprefixes a Pro\u00ebm or Prologue of considerable length, commenting\nupon and refuting their doctrines. In the earlier part of this\ndialogue he had taken credit to himself for having been the first\nto introduce his legal mandates by a prefatory harangue, intended\nto persuade and conciliate the persons upon whom the mandate was\nimposed, and to procure cheerful obedience.[354] For such a\npurpose the Pro\u00ebm in the tenth Book would be badly calculated. But\nPlato here introduces it with a different view:[355] partly to\ndemonstrate a kosmical and theological theory, partly to excite\nalarm and repugnance in the heretics whom he marks out and\ncondemns. How many among them might be convinced by Plato's\nreasonings, I do not know; but the large majority of them could\nnot fail to be offended and exasperated by the tone of his Pro\u00ebm\nor prefatory discourse. Confessing his inability to maintain\ncompletely the calmness and dignity of philosophical discussion,\nhe addresses them partly with passionate asperity, partly with the\narrogant condescension of a schoolmaster lecturing indocile\npupils. He describes them now as hateful and unprincipled men--now\nas presumptuous youths daring to form opinions before they are\ncompetent, and labouring under a distemper of reason;[356] and\nthis too, although he intimates that the first-named variety of\nheresy was adopted by most of the physical philosophers; and the\nthird variety by many of the best poets, rhetors, prophets, and\npriests.[357] Such unusual vehemence is justified by Plato on the\nground of a virtuous indignation against the impugners of orthodox\nbelief. We learn from the Platonic and Xenophontic Apologies, that\nMel\u00eatus and Anytus, when they accused Sokrates of impiety before\nthe Dikastery, indulged in the same invective, announced the same\njustification, and felt the same confidence that they were\nrighteous champions of the national faith, against an impious and\nguilty assailant.\n\n[Footnote 354: Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 722-723. 723 A: [Greek: i(/na\nga\\r eu)men\u00f4=s kai\\ dia\\ t\u00ea\\n eu)me/neian eu)mathe/steron t\u00ea\\n\ne)pi/taxin, o(\\ d\u00ea/ e)stin o( no/mos, de/x\u00eatai \u00f4(=| to\\n no/mon o(\nnomothe/t\u00eas le/gei], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 355: Plato, Legg. x. p. 887 A.]\n\n[Footnote 356: Plato, Legg. x. pp. 887 B-E, 888 B, 891 B, 900 B,\n907 A-C. [Greek: kai\\ m\u00ea\\n ei)/r\u00eantai/ ge/ p\u00f4s\n_sphodro/teron_ (oi( lo/goi) dia\\ philoneiki/an t\u00f4=n kak\u00f4=n\na)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n--prothumi/a me\\n d\u00ea\\ dia\\ tau=ta _ne\u00f4te/r\u00f4s_\nei)pei=n \u00ea(mi=n ge/gonen.]]\n\n[Footnote 357: Plato, Legg. x. pp. 891 D, 885 D.]\n\n[Side-note: The third variety of heresy is declared to be\nthe worst--the belief in Gods persuadable by prayer and\nsacrifice.]\n\nAmong the three varieties of heresy, Plato considers the third to\nbe the worst. He accounts it a greater crime to believe in\nindulgent and persuadeable Gods, than not to believe in any Gods\nat all.[358] Respecting the entire unbelievers, he acknowledges\nthat a certain proportion are so from intellectual, not from\nmoral, default: and that there are, among them, persons of\nblameless life and disposition.[359] It must be remembered that\nthe foremost of these unbelievers, and the most obnoxious to\nPlato, were the physical astronomers: those who did not agree with\nhim in recognising the Sun, Moon, and Stars as animated and divine\nBeings--those who studied their movements as if they were\nmechanical agents. Plato gives a brief summary of various\ncosmogonic doctrines professed by these heretics, who did not\nrecognise (he says) either God, or reason, or art, in the\ncosmogonic process; but ascribed to nature, chance, and necessity,\nthe genesis of celestial and terrestrial substances, which\nwere afterwards modified by human art and reason. Among these\nmatters regulated by human art and reason, were included (these\nmen said) the beliefs of each society respecting the Gods and\nreligion, respecting political and social arrangements, respecting\nthe just and the beautiful: though there were (they admitted)\ncertain things beautiful by nature, yet not those which the\nlawgiver declared to be such. Lastly, these persons affirmed\n(Plato tells us) that the course of life naturally right was, for\neach man to seize all the wealth, and all the power over others,\nwhich his strength enabled him to secure, without any regard to\nthe requirements of the law. And by such teaching they corrupted\nthe minds of youth.[360]\n\n[Footnote 358: Plato, Legg. x. pp. 907 A, 906 B.]\n\n[Footnote 359: Plato, Legg. x. pp. 886 A, 908 B.]\n\n[Footnote 360: Plato, Legg. x. pp. 889-890.]\n\n[Side-note: Heretics censured by Plato--Sokrates censured\nbefore the Athenian Dikasts.]\n\nWho these teachers were, whom Plato groups together as if they\ntaught the same doctrine, we do not know. Having no memorials from\nthemselves, we cannot fully trust the description of their\nteaching given by an opponent: especially when we reflect, that it\ncoincides substantially with the accusation which Mel\u00eatus and\nAnytus urged against Sokrates before the Athenian\nDikastery--_viz._: that he was irreligious, and that he corrupted\nyouth by teaching them to despise both the laws and their senior\nrelatives--of which corruption Kritias and Alkibiades were cited\nas examples. Such allegations, when advanced against Sokrates, are\nnoted both by Plato and Xenophon as the stock-topics, always ready\nat hand for those who wished to depreciate philosophers.[361]\n\n[Footnote 361: Plato, Apol. Sokr. p. 23. [Greek: ta\\ kata\\ pa/nt\u00f4n\nt\u00f4=n philosophou/nt\u00f4n pro/cheira tau=ta le/gousin, o(/ti ta\\\nmete/\u00f4ra kai\\ ta\\ u(po\\ g\u00ea=s kai\\ theou\\s m\u00ea\\ nomi/zein kai\\ to\\n\n\u00ea(/tt\u00f4 lo/gon krei/tt\u00f4 poiei=n.] Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 31. See\ngenerally the first two chapters of the Memorabilia, where\nXenophon intimates that Sokrates was accused of training youth to\na life of lawless and unprincipled ambition and selfishness, and\nespecially of having trained Kritias and Alkibiades.]\n\nIn so far as these heretics affirmed that right as opposed to\nwrong, just as opposed to unjust, true belief as opposed to false\nrespecting the Gods, were determined by the lawgiver and not by\nany other authority--Plato has little pretence for blaming them:\nbecause he himself claims such authority explicitly in his\nMagn\u00eatic community, and punishes severely not merely those who\ndisobey his laws in act, but those who contradict his dogmas in\nspeech or argument. Before he proclaims his intended\npunishments in a penal law, he addresses the heretics in a\npro\u00ebm or prefatory discourse intended to persuade or win them\nover: a discourse which was the more indispensable, since their\ndoctrines (he tells us) were disseminated everywhere.[362] If he\nseriously intended to persuade real dissentients, his attempt is\ncertainly a failure: for the premisses on which he reasons are\nsuch as would not have been granted by them--nor indeed by many\nwho agreed in the conclusion which he was himself trying to prove.\n\n[Footnote 362: Plato, Legg. x. pp. 890 D, 891 A.]\n\n[Side-note: Kosmological and Kosmogonical theory announced\nin Leges.]\n\nThe theory here given by Plato, represents the state of his own\nconvictions at the time when the Leges were composed. It is a\ntheory of kosmology of universal genesis: different in many\nrespects from what he propounds in the Tim\u00e6us, since it comprises\nno mention of the extra-kosmical Demiurgus--nor of the eternal\nIdeas--nor of the primordial chaotic movements called\nNecessity--while it contains (what we do not find in the Tim\u00e6us)\nthe allegation of a twofold or multiple soul pervading the\nuniverse--the good soul (one or more), being co-existent and\nco-eternal with others (one or more), that are bad.[363]\n\n[Footnote 363: Plato, Legg. x. p. 896 E.]\n\n[Side-note: Soul--older, more powerful in the universe than\nBody. Different souls are at work in the universe--the good soul\nand the bad soul.]\n\nThe fundamental principle which he lays down (in this tenth Book\nDe Legibus) is--That soul or mind is older, prior, and more\npowerful, than body. Soul is the principle of self-movement,\nactivity, spontaneous change. Body cannot originate any movement\nor change by itself. It is simply passive, receiving movement from\nsoul, and transmitting movement onward. The movement or change\nwhich we witness in the universe could never have begun at first,\nexcept through the originating spontaneity of soul. None of the\nfour elements--earth, water, air, or fire--is endowed with any\nself-moving power.[364] As soul is older and more powerful than\nbody, so the attributes of soul are older and more powerful than\nthose of body: that is, pleasure, pain, desire, fear, love,\nhatred, volition, deliberation, reason, reflection, judgment true\nor false--are older and more powerful than heat, cold, heaviness,\nlightness, hardness, softness, whiteness, sweetness, &c.[365]\nThe attributes and changes of body are all secondary effects,\nbrought about, determined, modified, or suspended, by the prior\nand primitive attributes and changes of soul. In all things that\nare moved there dwells a determining soul: which is thus the cause\nof all effects however contrary--good and bad, just and unjust,\nhonourable and base. But it is one variety of soul which works to\ngood, another variety which works to evil.[366] The good variety\nof soul works under the guidance of [Greek: Nou=s] or Reason--the\nbad variety works irrationally.[367] Now which of the two (asks\nPlato) directs the movements of the celestial sphere, the Sun,\nMoon, and Stars? Certainly, the good soul, and not the bad. This\nis proved by the nature and character of their movements: which\nmovements are rotatory in a circle, and exactly uniform and\nequable. Now among all the ten different sorts of motion or\nchange, rotatory motion in a circle is the one which is most akin\nor congenial to Reason.[368] The motion of Reason, and the\nmotion of the stars, is alike rotatory, and the same, and\nunchangeable--in the same place, round the same centre, and\nreturning into itself. The bad soul, acting without reason,\nproduces only irregular movements, intermittent, and accompanied\nby constant change of place.[369] Though it is the good variety of\nsoul which produces the celestial rotation, yet there are many\ndistinct and separate souls, all of this same variety, which\nconcur to the production of the result. The Sun, the Moon, and\neach of the Stars, has a distinct soul inherent in itself or\npeculiar to its own body.[370] Each of these souls, invested in\nthe celestial substance and in each of the visible celestial\nbodies, is a God: and thus all things are full of Gods.[371]\n\n[Footnote 364: Plato, Legg. x. pp. 894 D, 895 B.]\n\n[Footnote 365: Plato, Legg. x. pp. 896 A, 897 A. The [Greek:\nkin\u00ea/seis] of soul are [Greek: pr\u00f4tourgoi/]--those of body are\n[Greek: deuterourgoi/].]\n\n[Footnote 366: Plato, Legg. x. p. 896 E. [Greek: psuch\u00ea\\n d\u00ea\\\ndioikou=san kai\\ e)noikou=san e)n a(/pasi toi=s pa/nt\u00ea|\nkinoume/nois.]\n\nAs an illustration or comment on this portion of Plato De Legibus,\nLord Monboddo's _Ancient Metaphysics_ are instructive. See\nvol. i. pp. 2-7-9-25. He adopts the distinction between Mind and\nBody made both in the tenth Book De Legg., and in the Epinomis. He\nconsiders that Body and Mind are mixed together in each part of\nnature; and in the material world never separated: that motion is\nperpetual; and \"Where there is _motion_, there must be there\nsomething that _moves_. What is _moved_, I call\n_body_; what _moves_, I call _mind_.\n\n\"Under _mind_, in this definition, I include:--1. The\nrational and intellectual; 2. The animal life; 3. That principle\nin the vegetable, by which it is nourished, grows, and produces\nits like, and which therefore is commonly called the _vegetable\nlife_; and 4. That _motive principle_ which I understand\nto be in all bodies, even such as are thought to be inanimate.\nThis is the distinction between _body_ and _mind_ made\nby Plato in his tenth Book of Laws\" (pp. 8-9).\n\n\"The Greek word [Greek: psuch\u00ea/] denotes the three first kinds I\nhave mentioned, which are not expressed by any one word that I\nknow in English; for the word _mind_, that I have used to\nexpress them, denotes in common use only the _rational mind_\nor _soul_, as it is otherwise called. The fourth kind that I\nhave mentioned, _viz._, the _motive principle_ in all\nbodies, is not commonly in Greek called [Greek: psuch\u00ea/]. But\nAristotle, in a passage which I shall afterwards quote, says that\nit is [Greek: \u00f4(/sper psuch\u00ea/] (p. 8, note).\n\n\"As to the _principle of motion_ or _moving principle_,\nwhich Aristotle supposes to be in all bodies, it is what he calls\n_nature_ (p. 9). . . . He makes Nature also to be the\nprinciple of _rest_ in bodies; by which I suppose he means,\nthat those bodies which he calls _heavy_, that is, which move\ntowards the centre of the earth, would _rest_ if they were\nthere\" (p. 9, note).\n\n\"From the account here given of motion, it is evident that by it\nthe whole business of nature, above, below, and round about us, is\ncarried on. . . . To those who hold that _mind_ is the first\nof things, and principal in the universe, it will not appear\nsurprising that I have made _moving_, or _producing\nmotion_, an essential attribute of _mind_\" (p. 25).\n\nIn the same Treatise--which exhibits very careful study both of\nPlato and of Aristotle--Lord Monboddo analyses the ten varieties\nof motion here recognised by Plato, and shows that Plato's account\nis confused and unsatisfactory. Ancient Metaphysics, vol. i. pp.\n23-230-252.]\n\n[Footnote 367: Plato, Legg. x. p. 897 B.]\n\n[Footnote 368: Plato, Legg. x. pp. 897 E-898 A. [Greek: \u00ea(=|\nprose/oike kin\u00ea/sei nou=s t\u00f4=n de/ka e)kei/n\u00f4n kin\u00ea/se\u00f4n t\u00ea\\n\nei)ko/na la/b\u00f4men . . . tou/toin d\u00ea\\ toi=n kin\u00ea/seoin t\u00ea\\n e)n\ne(ni\\ pherome/n\u00ean a)ei\\ peri/ ge/ ti me/son a)na/gk\u00ea kinei=sthai,\nt\u00f4=n e)nto/rn\u00f4n ou)s\u00f4=n] [al. [Greek: ou)=san]] [Greek: mi/m\u00eama/\nti ku/kl\u00f4n, ei)=nai/ te au)t\u00ea\\n t\u00ea=| tou= nou= perio/d\u00f4| pa/nt\u00f4s\n\u00f4(s dunato\\n oi)keiota/t\u00ean te kai\\ o(moi/an.]]\n\n[Footnote 369: Plato, Legg. x. p. 898 B-C.]\n\n[Footnote 370: Plato, Legg. x. p. 898 D.]\n\n[Footnote 371: Plato, Legg. x. p. 899 B. [Greek: ei)/th' o(/stis\no(mologei= tau=ta, u(pome/nei m\u00ea\\ the\u00f4=n ei)=nai pl\u00ea/r\u00ea pa/nta?]]\n\n[Side-note: Plato's argument is unsatisfactory and\ninconsistent.]\n\nIn this argument--which Plato tells us that no man will be insane\nenough to dispute,[372] and which he proclaims to be a triumphant\nrefutation of the unbelievers--we find, instead of the\nextra-kosmical Demiurgus and pre-kosmical Chaos or necessity (the\ndoctrine of the Platonic Tim\u00e6us[373]), two opposing primordial\nforces both intra-kosmical: the good soul and the bad soul, there\nbeing a multiplicity of each. Though Plato here proclaims his\nconclusion with an unqualified confidence which contrasts greatly\nwith the modest reserve often expressed in his Tim\u00e6us--yet the\nconclusion is rather disproved than proved by his own premisses.\nIt cannot be true that all things are full of Gods, since there\nare two varieties of soul existing and acting, the bad as well as\nthe good: and Plato calls the celestial bodies Gods, as endowed\nwith and moved by good and rational souls. Aristotle in his theory\ndraws a marked distinction between the regularity and perfection\nof the celestial region, and the irregularity and imperfection of\nthe terrestrial and sublunary: Plato's premisses as here laid out\nwould have called upon him to do the same, and to designate the\nKosmos as the theatre of counteracting agencies, partly\ndivine, partly not divine. So he terms it indeed in the\nTim\u00e6us.[374]\n\n[Footnote 372: Plato, Legg. x. p. 899 C. [Greek: ou)k e)/stin\nou(/t\u00f4s paraphron\u00f4=n ou)dei/s.]]\n\n[Footnote 373: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 48 A, 69 A-B.]\n\n[Footnote 374: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, p. 48 A.\n\nThe remarks of Zeller, in the second edition of his work, Die\nPhilosophie der Griechen (vol. ii. p. 634 seq.), upon this portion\nof the Treatise De Legibus, are very acute and instructive. He\nexposes the fallacy of the attempt made by various critics to\nexplain away the Manich\u00e6an doctrine declared in this treatise, and\nto reconcile the Leges with the Tim\u00e6us. The subject is handled in\na manner superior to the Platonische Studien of the same author\n(wherein the Leges are pronounced to be spurious, while in the\nHistory of Philosophy Zeller retracts this opinion), though in\nthat work also there is much instruction.--Stallbaum's copious\nnotes on these passages (pp. 188-189-195-207-213 of his edition of\nLeges), while admitting the discrepancy between Leges and Tim\u00e6us,\nfurnish what he thinks a satisfactory explanation. One portion of\nhis explanation is, that Plato here accommodates himself \"ad\ncaptum hominum vulgarem (p. 189) . . . ad captum civium communem\naccommodat\u00e9 et populari ratione explicari\" (p. 207). I dissent\nfrom this as a matter of fact. I think that the heretics of the\nsecond and third class coincide rather with the \"captus vulgaris\".\nSo Plato himself intimates.]\n\n[Side-note: Reverence of Plato for uniform circular\nrotation.]\n\nThere is another feature, common both to the Tim\u00e6us and the Leges,\nwhich deserves attention as illustrating Plato's point of view. It\nis the reverential sentiment with which he regards uniform\nrotatory movement in the same place. This he pronounces to be the\nperfect, regular, movement appertaining and congenial to Reason\nand the good variety of soul. Because the celestial bodies move\nthus and only thus, he declares them to be Gods. It is this\ncircular rotation which continues with perfect and unchangeable\nregularity in the celestial sphere of the Kosmos, and also, though\nimperfect and perturbed, in the spherical cranium of man.[375]\nAristotle in his theory maintains unabated the reverence for this\nmode of motion, as the perfection of reason and regularity. The\nfeeling here noted exercised a powerful and long-continued\ninfluence over the course of astronomical speculations.\n\n[Footnote 375: Plato, Tim\u00e6us, pp. 44 B, 47 C.]\n\n[Side-note: Argument of Plato to confute the second class\nof heretics.]\n\nHaving demonstrated to his own full satisfaction, from the\nregularity of the celestial rotations, that the heavenly bodies\nare wise and good Gods, and that all things are full of\nGods--Plato applies this conclusion to refute the second class of\nheretics--those who did not believe that the Gods directed all\nhuman affairs, the small things as well as the great;[376] that\nis, the lot of each individual person as well as that of the\nspecies or of its component aggregates. He himself affirms that\nthey direct all things. It is inconsistent with their attributes\nof perfect intelligence, power, and goodness (he maintains) that\nthey should leave anything, either small or great, without\nregulation. All good human administrators, generals, physicians,\npilots, &c., regulate all things, small and great, in their\nrespective provinces: the Gods cannot be inferior to them, and\nmust be held to do the same. They regulate every thing with a view\nto the happiness of the whole, in which each man has his share and\ninterest; and each man has his special controuling Deity watching\nover his minutest proceedings, whether the individual sees it or\nnot.[377] Soul, both in its good variety and its bad variety, is\nessentially in change from one state to another, and passes from\ntime to time out of one body into another. In the perpetual\nconflict between the good and the bad variety of soul, according\nas each man's soul inclines to the better or to the worse, the\nGods or Fate exalt it to a higher region or degrade it to a lower.\nBy this means the Gods do the best they can to ensure triumph to\nvirtue, and defeat to vice, in the entire Kosmos. This reference\nto the entire Kosmos is overlooked by the heretics who deny the\nall-pervading management of the Gods.[378]\n\n[Footnote 376: The language of Plato sometimes implies, that the\nopponents whom he is controverting disbelieve altogether the\nintervention of the Gods in human affairs, pp. 899 E, 900 A, 885\nB. But the main stress of his argument is directed against those\nwho, admitting the intervention of the Gods in great things, deny\nit in small, pp. 900 D, 901 A-B-C-D, 902 A-B.]\n\n[Footnote 377: Plato, Legg. x. pp. 902-903 B-C.]\n\n[Footnote 378: This argument is set forth from p. 903 B to 905 B.\nIt is obscure and difficult to follow.]\n\n[Side-note: Contrary doctrine of Plato in Republic.]\n\nPlato gives here an outburst of religious eloquence which might\nprove impressive when addressed to fellow-believers--but which, if\nemployed for the avowed purpose of convincing dissentients, would\nfail of its purpose, as involving assumptions to which they would\nnot subscribe. As to the actual realities of human life, past as\nwell as present, Plato himself always gives a very melancholy\npicture of them. \"The heaven is full of good things, and also full\nof things opposite to good: but mostly of things not good.\"[379]\nMoreover, when we turn back to the Republic, we find Plato\ntherein expressly blaming a doctrine very similar to what he\ndeclares true here in the Leges--as a dangerous heresy, although\nextensively believed, from the time of Homer downward. \"Since God\nis good\" (Plato had there affirmed[380]) \"he cannot be the cause\nof all things, as most men pronounce him to be. He is the cause of\na few things, but of most things he is not the cause: for the good\nthings in our lot are much fewer than the evil. We must ascribe\nall the good things to him, but for the evil things we must seek\nsome other cause, and not God.\" The confessed imperfection of the\nactual result[381] was one of the main circumstances urged by\nthose heretics, who denied that all-pervading administration of\nthe Gods which Plato in the Leges affirms.[382] If he undertook to\nconvince them at all, he would have done well to state and answer\nmore fully their arguments, and to clear up the apparent\ninconsistencies in his own creed.\n\n[Footnote 379: Plato, Legg. x. p. 906 A. [Greek: e)peid\u00ea\\ ga\\r\nsugkech\u00f4r\u00ea/kamen \u00ea(mi=n au)toi=s ei)=nai me\\n to\\n ou)rano\\n\npoll\u00f4=n mesto\\n a)gath\u00f4=n, ei)=nai de\\ kai\\ t\u00f4=n e)nanti/\u00f4n,\npleio/n\u00f4n de\\ t\u00f4=n m\u00ea/, ma/ch\u00ea d\u00ea/, phame/n, a)tha/nato/s e)stin\n\u00ea( toiau/t\u00ea kai\\ phulak\u00ea=s thaumast\u00ea=s deome/n\u00ea.] Ast in his note\naffirms that after [Greek: m\u00ea\\] is understood [Greek: a)gath\u00f4=n].\nStallbaum thinks, though with some hesitation, that [Greek:\ne)nanti/\u00f4n] is understood after [Greek: m\u00ea/]. I agree with Ast.\n\nCompare iii. pp. 676-677, where Plato states that in the earlier\nhistory of the human race, a countless number of different\nsocieties ([Greek: muri/ai e)pi\\ muri/ais]) have all successively\ngrown up and successively perished, with extinction of all their\ncomforts and civilization.]\n\n[Footnote 380: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 379 C. [Greek: Ou)d' a)/ra\no( theo\\s, e)peid\u00ea\\ a)gatho\\s, pa/nt\u00f4n a)\\n ei)/\u00ea ai)/tios, \u00f4(s\noi( polloi\\ le/gousin; a)ll' o)li/g\u00f4n me\\n toi=s a)nthr\u00f4/pois\nai)/tios, poll\u00f4=n de\\ a)nai/tios; polu\\ ga\\r e)la/tt\u00f4 ta)gatha\\\nt\u00f4=n kak\u00f4=n \u00ea(mi=n; kai\\ t\u00f4=n me\\n a)gath\u00f4=n ou)de/na a)/llon\nai)tiate/on, t\u00f4=n de\\ kak\u00f4=n a)/ll' a(/tta z\u00eatei=n dei= ta\\\nai)/tia, a)ll' ou) to\\n theo/n.] See a striking passage in\nArnobius, adv. Gentes, ii. 46.]\n\n[Footnote 381: Plato, Legg. x. p. 903 A-B. [Greek: Pei/th\u00f4men to\\n\nneani/an toi=s lo/gois . . . \u00f4(=n e(\\n kai\\ to\\ so/n, \u00f4)=\nsche/tlie, mo/rion ei)s to\\ pa=n xuntei/nei ble/pon a)ei/.]]\n\n[Footnote 382: Lucretius, v. 197:--\n\nNequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam\nNaturam mundi: tant\u00e2 stat pr\u00e6dita culp\u00e2.]\n\n[Side-note: Argument of Plato to refute the third class of\nheretics.]\n\nA similar criticism may be made still more forcibly, upon the\ndemonstration whereby he professes to refute the third and most\nculpable class of heretics--\"Those who believe that the Gods\nexercise an universal agency, but that they can be persuaded by\nprayer and conciliated by sacrifice\". Here he was treading on\ndangerous ground: for he was himself a heretic, by his own\nconfession, if compared with Grecian belief generally. Not merely\nthe ordinary public, but the most esteemed and religious persons\namong the public[383]--poets, rhetors, prophets, and\npriests--believed the doctrine which he here so vehemently condemns.\nMoreover it was the received doctrine of the city[384]--that is,\nit was assumed as the basis of the official and authorised\nreligious manifestations: and the law of the city was\nrecognised by the Delphian oracle[385] as the proper standard of\nreference for individual enquirers who came there to ask for\ninformation on matters of doubtful religious propriety. In the\nreceived Grecian conception of religious worship, prayer and\nsacrifice were correlative and inseparable: sacrifice was the gift\nof man to the Gods, accompanying the prayer for gifts from the\nGods to man, and accounted necessary to render the prayer\nefficacious.[386] The priest was the professional person competent\nand necessary to give advice as to the details: but as a general\nprinciple, it was considered disrespectful to ask favours from the\nGods without tendering to them some present, suitable to the means\nof the petitioner.\n\n[Footnote 383: Plato, Legg. x. p. 885 D; Republic, ii. pp.\n364-365-366.]\n\n[Footnote 384: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 366 A-B. [Greek: a)ll'\n\u00f4)phel\u00ea/sousin a(gnizome/nous ai( teletai\\ kai\\ oi( lu/sioi\ntheoi/, \u00f4(s ai( me/gistai po/leis le/gousi kai\\ oi( the\u00f4=n\npai=des, poi\u00eatai\\ kai\\ proph\u00ea=tai t\u00f4=n the\u00f4=n geno/menoi, oi(\\\ntau=ta ou(/t\u00f4s e)/chein m\u00eanu/ousin.]]\n\n[Footnote 385: Xenophon, Memor. i. 3, 1, iv. 3, 16; Cicero, Legg.\nii. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 386: See N\u00e4gelsbach, Nach-Homerische Theologie, Part 5,\n1, p. 194 seq., where this doctrine is set forth and largely\nillustrated.\n\nIn approaching a king a satrap or any other person of exalted\nposition above the level of ordinary men, it was the custom to\ncome with a present. Thucyd. ii. 97; Xenoph. Anab. vii. 3, 26;\nXenoph. Hellen. iii. 1, 10-12.\n\nThe great person, to whom the presents were made, usually requited\nthem magnificently.]\n\n[Side-note: General belief in Greece about the efficacy of\nprayer and sacrifice to appease the Gods.]\n\nPlato himself states this view explicitly in his Politikus.[387]\nMoreover, when a man desired information from the Gods on any\ncontemplated project or on any grave matter of doubt, he sought it\nby means of sacrifice.[388] Such sacrifice was a debt to the God:\nand if it remained unpaid, his displeasure was incurred.[389] The\nmotive for sacrificing to the Gods was thus, not simply to ensure\nthe granting of prayers, but to pay a debt: and thus either to\nprevent or to appease the wrath of the Gods. The religious\npractice of Greece rested upon the received belief that the Gods\nwere not merely pleased with presents, but exacted them as a mark\nof respect, and were angry if they were not offered: yet that\nbeing angry, their wrath might be appeased by acceptable presents\nand supplications.[390] To learn what proceedings of this kind\n_were_ suitable, a man went to consult the oracle, the\npriests, or the Ex\u00eag\u00eat\u00e6: in cases wherein he believed that he\nhad incurred the displeasure of the Gods by any wrong or\nomission.[391]\n\n[Footnote 387: Plato, Politikus, p. 290 D. [Greek: kai\\ m\u00ea\\n kai\\\nto\\ t\u00f4=n i(ere/\u00f4n au)= ge/nos, \u00f4(s to\\ no/mimo/n ph\u00easi, para\\ me\\n\n\u00ea(m\u00f4=n d\u00f4rea\\s theoi=s dia\\ thusi\u00f4=n e)pist\u00ea=mo/n e)sti kata\\\nnou=n e)kei/nois d\u00f4rei=sthai, para\\ de\\ e)kei/n\u00f4n \u00ea(mi=n eu)chai=s\nkt\u00ea=sin a)gath\u00f4=n ai)t\u00ea/sasthai.] Compare Euthyphron, p. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 388: Xenophon, Anab. vii. 6, 44; Euripid. Ion. 234.]\n\n[Footnote 389: Plato, Republic, i. p. 331 B. Compare also Ph\u00e6don,\np. 118, the last words spoken by Sokrates before his\ndecease--[Greek: o)phei/lomen A)skl\u00eapi\u00f4=| a)lektru/ona;\na)ll' a)po/dote kai\\ m\u00ea\\ a)mel\u00ea/s\u00eate.]]\n\n[Footnote 390: See N\u00e4gelsbach, Nach-Homerische Theologie, pp.\n211-213.]\n\n[Footnote 391: See, as one example among a thousand, the\nproceeding of the Spartan government, Thucyd. i. 134; also ii.\n48-54.]\n\n[Side-note: Incongruities of Plato's own doctrine.]\n\nNow it is against this latter sentiment--that which recognised the\nGods as placable or forgiving[392]--that Plato declares war as the\nworst of all heresies. He admits indeed, implicitly, that the Gods\nare influenced by prayer and sacrifice; since he directs both the\none and the other to be constantly offered up, by the citizens of\nhis Magn\u00eatic city, in this very Treatise. He even implies that the\nGods are too facile and compliant: for in his second Alkibiad\u00eas,\nSokrates is made to remark that it was dangerous for an ignorant\nman to pray for specific advantages, because he might very\nprobably bring ruin upon himself by having his prayers granted--\n\n\"Evert\u00eare domos totas, optantibus ipsis,\nDi faciles.\"\n\nFarthermore Plato does not scruple to notice[393] it as a real\nproceeding of the Gods, that they executed the prayer or curse of\nTheseus, by bringing a cruel death upon the blameless youth\nHippolytus; which Theseus himself is the first to deplore when he\nbecomes acquainted with the true facts. That the Gods should\ninflict punishment on a person who did not deserve it, Plato\naccounts not unworthy of their dignity: but that they should remit\npunishment in any case where he conceives it to have been\ndeserved, he repudiates with indignation. Though accessible and\neasily influenced by prayer and sacrifice from other persons, they\nare deaf and inexorable to those who have incurred their\ndispleasure by wrong-doing.[394] The prayer so offered is called\nby Plato a treacherous cajolery, the sacrifice a guilty bribe, to\npurchase their indulgence.[395] Since, in human affairs, no good\nmagistrate, general, physician, pilot, &c., will allow himself\nto be persuaded by prayers or presents to betray his trust:\nmuch less can we suppose (he argues) the Gods to be capable of\nsuch betrayal.[396]\n\n[Footnote 392: The common sentiment is expressed in a verse of\nEuripides--[Greek: Ti/na dei= maka/r\u00f4n e)kthusame/nous Eu(rei=n\nmo/chth\u00f4n a)na/paulan]--(Fragm. Ino 155); compare Eurip. Hippol.\n1323.]\n\n[Footnote 393: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 931 C. [Greek: a)rai=os ga\\r\ngoneu\\s e)kgo/nois \u00f4(s ou)dei\\s e(/teros a)/llois,\n_dikaio/tata_.] Also iii. p. 687 D.]\n\n[Footnote 394: Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 716-717.]\n\n[Footnote 395: Plato, Legg. x. p. 906 B. [Greek: th\u00f4pei/ais\nlo/g\u00f4n].]\n\n[Footnote 396: Plato, Legg. x. pp. 906-907.]\n\n[Side-note: Both Herodotus and Sokrates dissented from\nPlato's doctrine.]\n\nThe general doctrine, upon which Plato here lays so much stress,\nand the dissent from which he pronounces to be a capital\noffence--that the Gods, though persuadeable by every one else, were\nthoroughly unforgiving, deaf to any prayer or sacrifice from one\nwho had done wrong--is a doctrine from which Sokrates[397] himself\ndissented; and to which few of Plato's contemporaries, perhaps\nhardly even himself, consistently adhered. The argument, upon\nwhich Plato rests for convincing all these numerous dissentients,\nis derived from his conception of the character and functions of\nthe Gods. But this, though satisfactory to himself, would not have\nbeen granted by his opponents. The Gods were conceived by\nHerodotus as jealous, meddlesome, intolerant of human happiness\nbeyond a narrow limit, and keeping all human calculations in a\nstate of uncertainty:[398] in this latter attribute Sokrates also\nagreed. He affirmed that the Gods kept all the important results\nessentially unpredictable by human study, reserving them for\nspecial revelations by way of prophecy to those whom they\npreferred. These were privileged and exclusive communications to\nfavoured individuals, among whom Sokrates was one:[399] and Plato,\nthough not made a recipient of the same favour as Sokrates,\ndeclares his own full belief in the reality of such special\nrevelations from the Gods, to particular persons and at particular\nplaces.[400] Aristotle, on the other hand, pronounces action\nand construction, especially action in details, to be petty and\nunworthy of the Gods; whom he regards as employed in perpetual\ncontemplation and theorising, as the only occupation worthy to\ncharacterise their blessed immortality.[401] Epikurus and his\nnumerous followers, though not agreeing with Aristotle in\nregarding the Gods as occupied in intellectual contemplation,\nagreed with him fully in considering the existence of the Gods as\ntoo dignified and enviable to be disturbed by the vexation of\nmeddling with human affairs, or to take on the anxieties of regard\nfor one man, displeasure towards another.\n\n[Footnote 397: Xenophon, Memorab. ii. 2, 14. [Greek: Su\\ ou)=n,\n\u00f4)= pai=, a)\\n s\u00f4phron\u00ea=|s, tou\\s me\\n theou\\s parait\u00ea/s\u00ea|\nsuggn\u00f4/mona/s soi ei)=nai, ei)/ ti par\u00eame/l\u00eakas t\u00ea=s m\u00eatro/s, m\u00ea/\nse kai\\ ou(=toi nomi/santes a)cha/riston ei)=nai ou)k e)the/l\u00f4sin\neu)= poiei=n.]\n\nAt the same time, Sokrates maintains that the Gods accepted\nsacrifices from good men with greater favour than sacrifices from\nbad men. Xenoph. Mem. i. 3, 3.]\n\n[Footnote 398: Herodotus, i. 32, iii. 40.]\n\n[Footnote 399: Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, 8-9. [Greek: tou\\s theou\\s ga/r,\noi(=s a)\\n \u00f4)=sin i(/le\u00f4|, s\u00eamai/nein.] Also i. 3, 4, iv. 3, 12;\nCyrop\u00e6d. i. 6, 5-23-46. [Greek: theoi\\ a)ei\\ o)/ntes pa/nta\ni)/sasi . . . kai\\ t\u00f4=n sumbouleuome/n\u00f4n a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n oi(=s a)\\n\ni(/le\u00f4| \u00f4)=si, pros\u00eamai/nousin a(/ te chr\u00ea\\ poiei=n kai\\ a(\\ ou)\nchr\u00ea/. Ei) de\\ m\u00ea\\ pa=sin e)the/lousi sumbouleu/ein, ou)de\\n\nthaumasto/n; ou) ga\\r a)na/gk\u00ea au)toi=s e)stin, \u00f4(=n a)\\n m\u00ea\\\nthe/l\u00f4sin, e)pimelei=sthai] (Cyrop. i. 6, 46).\n\nSolon. Frag. v. 53, ed. Gaisf.:--\n\n[Greek: A)/llon ma/nten e)/th\u00eakin a)/nax e(ka/ergos A)po/ll\u00f4n;\nE)/gn\u00f4 d' a)ndri\\ kako\\n t\u00ea/lothen e)rcho/menon.]\n\nSee the curious narrative in Herodotus ix. 94 seq. about the\nprophetic gifts bestowed on Euenius. The same narrative attests\nthe full belief prevalent respecting both the displeasure of the\nGods and their placability on the proper expiation being made. It\nconflicts signally in every respect with the canon of orthodoxy\nset up by Plato.]\n\n[Footnote 400: Plato, Legg. v. pp. 738 C, 747 E, vii. p. 811 D;\nRepublic, vi. pp. 496 C, 499 C.]\n\n[Footnote 401: Aristotle, Ethic. Nikom. x. 8, p. 1178 b. 21.\n[Greek: \u00f4(/ste \u00ea( tou= theou= e)ne/rgeia, makario/t\u00eati\ndiaphe/rousa, the\u00f4r\u00eatik\u00ea\\ a)\\n ei)/\u00ea.]]\n\n[Side-note: Great opposition which Plato's doctrine would\nhave encountered in Greece.]\n\nThe orthodox religious belief, which Plato imposes upon his 5040\nMagn\u00eatic citizens under the severest penalties, would thus be\nfound inconsistent with the general belief, not merely of ordinary\nGreeks, but also of the various lettered and philosophical\nindividuals who thought for themselves. Most of these latter would\nhave passed, under one of the three heads of Platonic heresy, into\nthe Platonic prison for five years, and from thence either to\nrecantation or death. The arguments which Plato considered so\nirresistible, that none but silly youths could be deaf to\nthem--did not appear conclusive to Aristotle and other intelligent\ncontemporaries. Plato makes up his own mind, what proceedings he\nthinks worthy and unworthy of the Gods, and then proclaims with\nconfidence as a matter of indisputable fact, that they act\nconformably. But neither Herodotus, nor Aristotle, would have\ngranted his premisses: they conceived the attributes and character\nof the Gods differently from him, and differently from each other.\nAnd if we turn to the Kratylus of Plato, we find Sokrates there\ndeclaring, that men knew nothing about the Gods: that speculations\nabout the Gods were in reality speculations about the opinions of\nmen respecting the Gods.[402]\n\n[Footnote 402: Plato, Kratylus, pp. 400-401. [Greek: Peri\\ the\u00f4=n\nou)de\\n i)/smen, ou)/te peri\\ au)t\u00f4=n, ou)/te peri\\ t\u00f4=n\no)noma/t\u00f4n, a(/tta pote\\ au)toi\\ e(autou\\s kalou=si] (400 D) . . .\n[Greek: skop\u00f4=men \u00f4(/sper proeipo/ntes toi=s theoi=s o(/ti peri\\\nau)t\u00f4=n ou)de\\n \u00ea(mei=s skepso/metha, ou) ga\\r a)xiou=men oi(=oi/\nt' a)\\n ei)=nai skopei=n, a)lla\\ peri\\ t\u00f4=n a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n, \u00ea(/ntina/\npote do/xan e)/chontes e)ti/thento au)toi=s ta\\ o)no/mata; tou=to\nga\\r a)neme/s\u00eaton] (401 A). Compare also Kratyl. p. 425 B.]\n\n[Side-note: Local infallibility was claimed as a rule\nin each community, though rarely enforced with severity: Plato\nboth claims it more emphatically, and enforces it more\nrigorously.]\n\nSuch opinions were local, traditional, and dissentient, among the\nnumerous distinct cities and tribes which divided the inhabited\nearth between them in Plato's time.[403] Each of these claimed a\nlocal infallibility, principally as to religious rites and\ncustoms, indirectly also as to dogmas and creed: and Plato's\nMagn\u00eatic community, if it had come into existence, would have\nadded one to the number of distinct varieties. To this general\nsentiment, deeply rooted in the emotions and unused to the\nscrutiny of reason, the philosophers were always more or less\nodious, as dissenters, enquirers, and critics, each on his own\nground.[404] At Athens the sentiment manifested itself\noccasionally in severe decrees and judicial sentences against\nobnoxious freethinkers, especially in the case of Sokrates. If the\nAthenians had carried out consistently and systematically the\nprinciple involved in their sentence against Sokrates, philosophy\nmust have been banished from Athens.[405] The school of Plato\ncould never have been maintained. But the principle of intolerance\nwas usually left dormant at Athens: philosophical debate continued\nactive and unshackled, so that the school of Plato subsisted in\nthe city without interruption for nearly forty years until his\ndeath. We might have expected that the philosophers, to whose\nsecurity toleration of free dissent and debate was essential,\nwould have upheld it as a general principle against the public.\nBut here we find the most eminent among them, at the close of a\nlong life, not only disallowing all liberty of philosophising to\nothers, and assuming to himself the exclusive right of dictating\nthe belief, as well as the conduct, of his imaginary citizens--but\nalso enforcing this exclusive principle with an amount of\nsystematic rigour, which I do not believe to have been equalled in\nany actual Grecian city. This is a memorable fact in the history\nof Grecian philosophy. The Stoic Kleanthes, in the century\nafter Plato's death, declared that the Samian astronomer\nAristarchus ought to be indicted for impiety, because he had\npublicly advocated the doctrine of the Earth's rotation round the\nSun. Kleanth\u00eas and Plato thus stand out as known examples, among\nGrecian philosophers before the Christian era, of that intolerance\nwhich would apply legal penalties against individual dissenters\nand competitors.[406]\n\n[Footnote 403: Plato, Politikus, p. 262 D. [Greek: ge/nesin\na)pei/rois ou)=si kai\\ a)mi/ktois kai\\ a)sumph\u00f4/nois pro\\s\na)/ll\u00eala.] Herodot. iii. 39.]\n\n[Footnote 404: Plato, Euthyphron, p. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 405: See the Apologies both of Plato and Xenophon. In\none of the rhetorical discourses cited by Aristotle, on the\nsubject of the trial of Sokrates (seemingly that by the Rhetor\nTheodekt\u00eas), the point is put thus:--[Greek: Me/llete de\\\nkri/nein, ou) peri\\ S\u00f4kra/tous, a)lla\\ peri\\ e)pit\u00eadeu/matos, ei)\nchr\u00ea\\ philosophei=n] (Aristot. Rhetor. ii. 1399, a. 8, b. 10).]\n\n[Footnote 406: The Platonist and astronomer Derkyllides afterwards\n(about 100-120 A.D.) declares those who affirm the\ndoctrine, that the earth moves and that the stars are stationary,\nto be accursed and impious--[Greek: tou\\s de\\ ta\\ kin\u00eata\\\nst\u00ea/santas, ta\\ de\\ a)ki/n\u00eata phu/sei kai\\ e(/dra| kin\u00ea/santas,\n\u00f4(s para\\ ta\\s t\u00ea=s mantik\u00ea=s u(pothe/seis, a)podiopompei=tai.]\n(Theon Smyrn\u00e6us, De Astronomi\u00e2, ch. 41, p. 328, fol. 26, ed.\nMartin.)]\n\n[Side-note: Farther civil and political regulations for the\nMagn\u00eatic community. No evidence that Plato had studied the working\nof different institutions in practice.]\n\nThe eleventh Book of the Treatise De Legibus, and the larger\nportion of the twelfth, are devoted to a string of civil and\npolitical regulations for the Magn\u00eatic community. Each regulation\nis ushered in with an expository prologue, often with severe\nreproof towards persons committing the various forbidden acts.\nThere is little of systematic order in the enumeration of\nsubjects. In general we may remark that neither here nor elsewhere\nin the Treatise is there any proof, that Plato--though doubtless\nhe had visited Italy, Sicily, and Egypt, perhaps other\ncountries--had taken much pains to acquaint himself with the practice\nof human life, or that he had studied and compared the working of\ndifferent institutions in different communities. His experience\nseems all derived from Athenian law and practice: the criticisms\nand modifications which he applies to it flow from his own\nsentiment and theory: from his religious or ethical likings or\ndislikings. He sets up a type of character which he desires to\nenforce among his citizens, and which he guards against\nadulteration by very stringent interference. The displeasure of\nthe Gods is constantly appealed to, as a justification for the\npenalties which he proposed: sometimes even the current mythes are\ninvoked as authority, though in other places Plato so greatly\ndisparages them.[407]\n\n[Footnote 407: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 913 D.]\n\n[Side-note: Modes of acquiring property--legitimate and\nillegitimate.]\n\nVarious modes of acquiring property are first forbidden as\nillegitimate. The maxim[408]--\"That which you have not put down,\ndo not take up\"--is rigorously enforced: any man who finds a\nburied treasure is prohibited from touching it, though he find it\nby accident and though the person who buried it be unknown. If a\nman violates this law, every one, freeman or slave, is invited and\ncommanded to inform against him. Should he be found guilty, a\nspecial message must be sent to the Delphian oracle, to ask what\nis to be done both with the treasure and with the offender. So\nagain, an article of property left on the highway is declared to\nbe under protection of the Goddess or D\u00e6mon of the Highway:\nwhoever finds and takes it, if he be a slave, shall be severely\nflogged by any freeman above thirty years of age who meets him: if\nhe be a freeman, he shall be disgraced and shall pay, besides, ten\ntimes its value to the person who left it.[409] These are average\nspecimens of Plato's point of view and manner of handling offences\nrespecting property.\n\n[Footnote 408: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 913 C. [Greek: A(\\ m\u00ea\\\nkate/thou, m\u00ea\\ a)nel\u00ea=|.] This does not include, however, what has\nbeen deposited by a man's father or grandfather.]\n\n[Footnote 409: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 914. Seemingly, if any man\nfound a treasure buried in the ground, or a purse lying on the\nroad without an owner, he was not considered by most persons\ndishonest if he appropriated it; to do so was looked upon as an\nadmissible piece of good luck. See Theophrastus, [Greek: peri\\\nMempsimoiri/as]. From Plato's language we gather that the finder\nsometimes went to consult the prophets what he should do, p. 913\nB--[Greek: m\u00ea/te toi=s legome/nois ma/ntesin a)nakoin\u00f4/saimi]: his\nphrase is not very respectful towards the prophets.]\n\n[Side-note: Plato's general regulations leave little room\nfor disputes about ownership.]\n\nThe general constitution of Plato's community restricts within\ncomparatively narrow limits the occasions of proprietary dispute.\nHis 5040 lots of land are all marked out, unchangeable, and\nindivisible, each possessed by one citizen. No man is allowed to\nacquire or possess movable property to a greater value than four\ntimes the lot of land: every article of property possessed by\nevery man is registered by the magistrates. Disputes as to\nownership, if they arise, are settled by reference to this\nregister.[410] If the disputed article be not registered, the\npossessor is bound to produce the seller or donor from whom he\nreceived it. All purchases and sales are required to take place in\nthe public market before the Agoranomi: and all for ready-money,\nor by immediate interchange and delivery. If a man chooses to\ndeliver his property, without receiving the consideration, or in\nany private place, he does so at his own risk: he has no legal\nclaim against the receiver.[411] So likewise respecting the\nEranoi or Associations for mutual Succour and Benefit. Plato gives\nno legal remedy to a contributor or complainant respecting any\nmatter arising out of these associations. He requires that every\nman shall contribute at his own risk: and trust for requital to\nthe honesty or equity of his fellow-contributors.[412]\n\n[Footnote 410: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 914 D.]\n\n[Footnote 411: The same principle is laid down by Plato, Republic,\nviii. p. 556 A, and was also laid down by Charondas (Theophrast.\nap. Stob\u00e6um Serm. xliv. 21, p. 204). Aristotle alludes to some\nGrecian cities in which it was the established law. K. F. Hermann,\nPrivat-Alterth\u00fcmer der Griechen, s. 71, n. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 412: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 915 D-E.]\n\n[Side-note: Plato's principles of legislation, not\nconsistent--comparison of them with the Attic law about Eranoi.]\n\nA remark must here be made upon Plato's refusal to allow any legal\nredress in such matters as sale on credit, or payments for the\npurpose of mutual succour and relief. Such refusal appears to\ncontradict his general manner of proceeding: for his usual\npractice is, to estimate offences not according to the mischief\nwhich they inflict, but according to the degree of wickedness or\nimpiety which he supposes them to imply in the doer. Now the\ncontributor to an association for mutual succour, who, after\npaying his contributions for the aid of his associates, finds that\nthey refuse to contribute to his aid when the hour of his\nnecessity arrives--suffers not only heavy calamity but grievous\ndisappointment: which implies very bad dispositions on the part of\nthose who, not being themselves distressed, nevertheless refuse.\nOf such dispositions Plato takes no notice in the present case. He\ndoes not expatiate (as he does in many other cases far more\ntrifling and disputable) upon the displeasure of the Gods when\nthey see a man who has been benefited in distress by his\nneighbour's contributions, refusing all requital at the time of\nthat neighbour's need. Plato indeed treats it as a private affair\nbetween friends. You do a service to your friend, and you must\ntake your chance whether he will do you a service in return: you\nmust not ask for legal redress, if he refuses: what you have\ncontributed was a present voluntarily given, not a loan lent to be\nrepaid. This is an intelligible point of view, but it excludes\nthose ethical and sentimental considerations which Plato usually\ndelights in enforcing.[413] His ethics here show themselves by\nleading him to turn aside from that which takes the form of a\npecuniary contract. It was in this form that the Eranoi or Mutual\nAssurance Associations were regarded by Attic judicature: that is,\nthey seem to have been considered as a sort of imperfect\nobligation, which the Dikastery would enforce against any citizen\nwhose circumstances were tolerably prosperous, but not against one\nin bad circumstances. Such Eranic actions before the Attic\nDikastery were among those that enjoyed the privilege of speedy\nadjudication ([Greek: e)/mm\u00eanoi di/kai]).[414]\n\n[Footnote 413: In Xenophon's ideal legislation, or rather\neducation of the Persian youth, in the Cyrop\u00e6dia, he introduces\nlegal trial and punishment for ingratitude generally (Cyrop\u00e6d. i.\n2, 7). The Attic judicature took cognizance of neglect or bad\nconduct towards parents, which Xenophon ranks as a sort of\ningratitude--but not of ingratitude towards any one else (Xenoph.\nMemor. ii. 2, 13). There is an interesting discussion in Seneca\n(De Beneficiis, iii. 6-18) about the propriety of treating\ningratitude as a legal offence.]\n\n[Footnote 414: Respecting the [Greek: e)ranikai\\ di/kai] at\nAthens, see Heraldus, Animadversiones in Salmasium, vi. 1, p. 407\nseq.; Meier und Sch\u00f6mann, Der Attische Prozess, p. 540 seq.; K. F.\nHermann, Staats Alterth. s. 146, not. 9.\n\nThe word [Greek: e)/ranos] meant very different things--a pic-nic\nbanquet, a club for festive meetings kept up by subscription with\na common purse, a contribution made to relieve a friend in\ndistress, carrying obligation on the receiver to requite it if the\ndonor fell into equal distress. This last sense is the prevalent\none in the Attic orators, and is brought out well in the passage\nof Theophrastus--[Greek: Peri\\ Mempsimoiri/as]. Probably the Attic\n[Greek: e)ranikai\\ di/kai] took cognizance of complaints arising\nout of [Greek: e)/ranos] in all its senses.]\n\n[Side-note: Regulations about slaves, and about freedmen.]\n\nAs to property in slaves, Plato allows any owner to lay hold of a\nfugitive slave belonging either to himself or to any friend. If a\nthird party reclaims the slave as being not rightfully in\nservitude, he must provide three competent sureties, and the slave\nwill then be set free until legal trial can be had. Moreover,\nPlato enacts, respecting one who has been a slave, but has been\nmanumitted, that such freedman ([Greek: a)peleu/thros]), if he\nomits to pay \"proper attention\" to his manumitter, may be laid\nhold of by the latter and re-enslaved. Proper attention consists\nin: 1. Going three times per month to the house of his former\nmaster, to tender service in all lawful ways. 2. Not contracting\nmarriage without consulting his former master. 3. Not acquiring so\nmuch wealth as to become richer than his former master: if he\nshould do so the latter may appropriate all that is above the\nlimit. The freed man, when liberated, does not become a citizen,\nbut is only a non-citizen or metic. He is therefore subject to the\nsame necessity as all other metics--of departing from the\nterritory after a residence of twenty years,[415] and of never\nacquiring more wealth than is possessed by the second class of\ncitizens enrolled in the Schedule.\n\n[Footnote 415: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 915 A-B.]\n\nThe duties imposed by Plato on the freedman towards his\nformer master--involving a formal recognition at least of the\nprior dependence, and some positive duties besides--are deserving\nof remark, as we know so little of the condition or treatment of\nthis class of persons in antiquity.\n\n[Side-note: Provisions in case a slave is sold, having a\ndistemper upon him.]\n\nRegulations are made to provide for the case where a slave, sold\nby his master, is found to be distempered or mad, or to have\ncommitted a murder. If the sale has been made to a physician or a\ngymnast, Plato holds that these persons ought to judge for\nthemselves about the bodily condition of the slave bought: he\ntherefore grants them no redress. But if the buyer be a\nnon-professional man, he may within one month restore the\ndistempered slave (or within one year, if the distemper be the\nMorbus Sacer), and may cause a jury of physicians to examine the\ncase. Should they decide the distemper of the slave to be undoubted,\nthe seller must take him back: repaying the full price, if he be a\nprivate man--double the price, if he be a professional man, who\nought to have known, and perhaps did know, the real condition of\nthe slave sold.[416]\n\n[Footnote 416: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 916 B-C.]\n\n[Side-note: Retailers. Strict regulations about them. No\ncitizen can be a retailer.]\n\nIn regard to Retail Selling, and to frauds committed either in\nsale or in barter, Plato provides or enjoins strict regulations.\nThe profession of the retailer, and the function of money as\nauxiliary to it, he pronounces to be useful and almost\nindispensable to society, for the purpose of rendering different\narticles of value commensurable with each other, and of ensuring a\ndistribution suitable to the requirements of individuals. This\ncould not be done without retailers, merchants, hired agents,\n&c.[417] But though retailing is thus useful, if properly\nconducted, it slides easily and almost naturally into cheating,\nlying, extortion, &c., from the love of money inherent in most\nmen. Such abuses must be restrained: at any rate they must not be\nallowed to corrupt the best part of the community. Accordingly,\nnone of the 5040 citizens will be allowed either to practise\nretailing, or to exercise any hired function, except under his own\nsenior relatives, and of a dignified character. The discrimination\nof what is dignified and not dignified must be made according\nto the liking or antipathy of a court of honour, composed of such\ncitizens as have obtained prizes for virtue.[418] None must be\npermitted to sell by retail except metics or non-citizens: and\nthese must be kept under strict watch by the Nomophylakes, who,\nafter enquiring into the details of each article, will fix its\nprice at such sum as will afford to the dealer a moderate\nprofit.[419]\n\n[Footnote 417: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 918 B. The like view of retail\ntrade is given in the Republic, ii. p. 371. It indicates just and\npenetrating social observation, taken in reference to Plato's\nage.]\n\n[Footnote 418: Plato, Legg. xi. pp. 918-919. 919 E: [Greek: to\\ d'\ne)leutheriko\\n kai\\ a)neleu/theron a)krib\u00f4=s me\\n ou) r(a/|dion\nnomothetei=n, krine/sth\u00f4 ge m\u00ea\\n u(po\\ t\u00f4=n ta\\ a)ristei=a\nei)l\u00eapho/t\u00f4n t\u00f4=| e)kei/n\u00f4n _mi/sei te kai\\ a)spasm\u00f4=|_.]]\n\n[Footnote 419: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 920 B-C.]\n\n[Side-note: Frauds committed by sellers--severe punishments\non them.]\n\nIf there be any fraud committed by the seller (which is nearly\nakin to retailing),[420] Plato prescribes severe penalty. The\nseller must never name two prices for his article during the same\nday. He must declare his price: and if no one will give it, he\nmust withdraw the article for the day.[421] He is not allowed to\npraise his own articles, or to take any oath respecting them. If\nhe shall take any oath, any citizen above thirty years of age\nshall be held bound to thrash him, and may do so with impunity:\nsuch citizen, if he neglect to thrash the swearer, will himself be\namenable to censure for betraying the laws. If the seller shall\nsell a spurious or fraudulent article, the magistrates must be\ninformed of it by any one cognizant. The informer, if a slave or a\nmetic, shall be rewarded by having the article made over to him.\nIf he be a citizen, he will receive the article, but is bound to\nconsecrate it to the Gods who preside over the market: if being\ncognizant he omits to inform, he shall be proclaimed a wicked man,\nfor defrauding the Gods of that to which they are entitled. The\nmagistrates, on receiving information, will not only deprive the\nseller of the spurious article, but will cause him to be flogged\nby the herald in the market-place--one stripe for every drachma\ncontained in the price demanded. The herald will publicly proclaim\nthe reason why the flogging is given. Besides this, the\nmagistrates will collect and write up in the market-place both\nregulations of detail for the sellers, and information to put\nbuyers on their guard.[422]\n\n[Footnote 420: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 920 C. [Greek: t\u00ea=s kibd\u00ealei/as\npe/ri, xuggenou=s tou/t\u00f4| (kap\u00ealei/a|) pra/gmatos], &c.\n\nPlato is more rigorous on these matters than the Attic law. See K.\nF. Hermann, Griech. Privat-Alterth\u00fcmer, s. 62.]\n\n[Footnote 421: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 917 B-C. I do not quite see how\nthis is to be reconciled with Plato's direction that the prices of\narticles sold shall be fixed by the magistrates; but both of the\ntwo are here found.]\n\n[Footnote 422: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 917 B-D.]\n\n[Side-note: Comparison with the lighter punishment\ninflicted by Attic law.]\n\nCompare this enactment in Plato with the manner in which the Attic\nlaw would have dealt with the like offence. The defrauded buyer\nwould have brought his action before the Dikastery against the\nfraudulent seller, who, if found guilty, would have been condemned\nin damages to make good the wrong: perhaps fined besides. The\npenalties inflicted by the usual course of law at Athens were\nfine, disfranchisement, civil disability of one kind or other,\nbanishment, confiscation of property: occasionally\nimprisonment--sometimes, though rarely, death by the cup of hemlock\nin prison.[423] Except in very rare cases, an accused person might\nretire into banishment if he chose, and might thus escape any\npenalty worse than banishment and confiscation of property. But\ncorporal punishment was never inflicted by the law at Athens. The\npeople, especially the poorer citizens, were very sensitive on\nthis point,[424] regarding it as one great line of distinction\nbetween the freeman and the slave. At Sparta, on the contrary,\ncorporal chastisement was largely employed as a penalty: moreover\nthe use of the fist in private contentions, by the younger\ncitizens, was encouraged rather than forbidden.[425]\n\n[Footnote 423: See Meier und Sch\u00f6mann, Der Attische Prozess, B.\niv. Chap. 13, 740.]\n\n[Footnote 424: See Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 58.]\n\n[Footnote 425: Xenophon, Hellen. iii. 3, 11: De Republ. Laced. ii.\n8, iv. 6, ix. 5; Aristophanes, Aves, 1013.]\n\nPlato follows the analogy of Sparta in preference to that of\nAthens. Here, as elsewhere, he employs corporal punishment\nabundantly as a penalty. Here, as elsewhere, he not only\nprescribes that it shall be inflicted by a public agent under the\nsupervision of magistrates, but also directs it to be\nadministered, against certain offenders, by private unofficial\ncitizens. I believe that this feature of his system would have\nbeen more repugnant than any other, to the feelings of all classes\nof Athenian citizens--to all the different types of character\nrepresented by Perikles, Nikias, Kleon, Isokrates, Demosthenes,\nand Sokrates. Abstinence from manual violence was characteristic\nof Athenian manners. Whatever licence might be allowed to the\ntongue, it was at least a substitute for the aggressive employment\nof the arm and hand. Athens exhibited marked respect for the\nsanctity of the person against blows--much equality of dealing\nbetween man and man--much tolerance, public as well as private, of\nindividual diversity in taste and character--much keenness of\nintellectual and oral competition, liable to degenerate into\nunfair stratagem in political, forensic, professional, and\ncommercial life, as well as in rhetorical, dialectical, and\nphilosophical exercises. All these elements, not excepting even\nthe first, were distasteful to Plato. But those who copy the\ndisparaging judgment which he pronounces against Athenian manners,\nought in fairness to take account of the point of view from which\nthat judgment is delivered. To a philosopher whose ideal is\ndepicted in the two treatises De Republic\u00e2 and De Legibus,\nAthenian society would appear repulsive enough. We learn from\nthese two treatises what it was that a great speculative\npolitician of the day desired to establish as a substitute.\n\n[Side-note: Regulations about Orphans and Guardians: also\nabout Testamentary powers.]\n\nPlato next goes on to make regulations about orphans and\nguardians, and in general for cases arising out of the death of a\ncitizen. The first question presenting itself naturally is, How\nfar is the citizen to be allowed to direct by testament the\ndisposition of his family and property? What restriction is to be\nplaced upon his power of making a valid will? Many persons (Plato\nsays) affirmed that it was unjust to impose any restriction: that\nthe dying man had a right to make such dispositions as he chose,\nfor his property and family after his death. Against this view\nPlato enters his decided protest. Each man--and still more each\nman's property--belongs not to himself, but to his family and to\nthe city: besides which, an old man's judgment is constantly\nliable to be perverted by decline of faculties, disease, or the\ncajoleries of those around him.[426] Accordingly Plato grants only\na limited liberty of testation. Here, as elsewhere, he adopts the\nmain provisions of the Attic law, with such modifications as were\nrequired by the fundamental principles of his Magn\u00eatic city:\nespecially by the fixed total of 5040 lots or _fundi_, each\nuntransferable and indivisible. The lot, together with the plant\nor stock for cultivating it,[427] must descend entire to one\nson: but the father, if he has more than one son, may determine by\nwill to which of them it shall descend. If there be any one among\nthe sons whom another citizen (being childless) is disposed to\nadopt, such adoption can only take place with the father's\nconsent. But if the father gives his consent, he cannot bequeath\nhis own lot to the son so adopted, because two lots cannot be\nunited in the same possessor. Whatever property the father\npossesses over and above his lot and its appurtenances, he may\ndistribute by will among his other sons, in any proportion he\npleases. If he dies, leaving no sons, but only daughters, he may\nselect which of them he pleases; and may appoint by will some\nsuitable husband, of a citizen family, to marry her and inherit\nhis lot. If a citizen (being childless) has adopted a son out of\nany other family, he must bequeath to that son the whole of his\nproperty, except one-tenth part of what he possesses over and\nabove his lot and its appurtenances: this tenth he may bequeath to\nany one whom he chooses.[428]\n\n[Footnote 426: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 923 B.\n\nIt is to be observed that Plato does not make any allusion to\nthese misguiding influences operating upon an aged man, when he\ntalks about the curse of a father against his son being constantly\nexecuted by the Gods: xi. p. 931 B.]\n\n[Footnote 427: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 923 D. [Greek: pl\u00ea\\n tou=\npatr\u00f4/|ou kl\u00ea/rou kai\\ t\u00ea=s peri\\ to\\n kl\u00ea=ron kataskeu/\u00eas\npa/s\u00eas.]]\n\n[Footnote 428: Plato, Legg. xi. pp. 923-924. The language of Plato\nseems to imply that this childless citizen would not be likely to\nmake any will, but that having adopted a son, the son so adopted\nwould hardly be satisfied unless he inherited the whole.]\n\nIf the father dies intestate, leaving only daughters, the nearest\nrelative who has no lot of his own shall marry one of the\ndaughters, and succeed to the lot. The nearest is the brother of\nthe deceased; next, the brother of the deceased's wife (paternal\nand maternal uncles of the maiden); next, their sons; next, the\nparental and maternal uncle of the deceased father, and their\nsons. If all these relatives be wanting, the magistrates will\nprovide a suitable husband, in order that the lot of land may not\nremain unoccupied.[429] If a citizen die both intestate and\nchildless, two of his nearest unmarried relatives, male and\nfemale, shall intermarry and succeed to his property: reckoning in\nthe order of kinship above mentioned.[430] In thus imposing\nmarriage as a legal obligation upon persons in a certain degree of\nkinship, Plato is aware that there will be individual cases of\ngreat hardship and of repugnance almost insurmountable. He\ntreats this as unavoidable: providing however that there shall be\na select judicial Board of Appeal, before which persons who feel\naggrieved by the law may bring their complaints, and submit their\ngrounds for dispensation.[431]\n\n[Footnote 429: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 924-925.]\n\n[Footnote 430: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 925 C-D. These provisions\nappear to me not very clear.]\n\n[Footnote 431: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 926 B-D. He directs also (p.\n925 A) that the Dikasts shall determine the fit season when these\nyoung persons become marriageable by examining their naked bodies:\nthat is, the males quite naked, the females half naked. A\ndirection seemingly copied from Athenian practice, and\nillustrating curiously the language of Philokleon in Aristophanes,\nVesp. 598. See K. F. Hermann, Vestig. Juris Domestici ap. Platonem\ncum Gr\u00e6ci\u00e6 Institutis Comparata, p. 27.]\n\n[Side-note: Plato's general coincidence with Attic law and\nits sentiment.]\n\nThese provisions deserve notice as showing how largely Plato\ncoincides with the prevalent Attic sentiment respecting family and\nrelationship. He does not award the slightest preference to\nprimogeniture, among brothers: he grants to agnates a preference\nover cognates: he regards it as a public misfortune that any house\nshall be left empty, so as to cause interruption of the sacred\nrites of the family: lastly, he ensures that the family, in\ndefault of lineal male heirs, shall be continued by inter-marriage\nwith the nearest relatives--and he especially approves the\nmarriage of an heiress with her paternal or maternal uncle. On\nthese points Plato is in full harmony with his countrymen, though\nhe dissents widely from modern sentiment.\n\n[Side-note: Tutelage of Orphans--Disagreement of Married\nCouples--Divorce.]\n\nRespecting tutelage of orphans, he makes careful provision against\nabuse, as the Attic law also did: he tries also to meet the cases\nof family discord, where father and son are in bitter wrath\nagainst each other. A father may formally renounce his son, but\nnot without previously obtaining the concurrence of a _conseil\nde famille_: if the father has become imbecile with age, and\nwastes his substance, the son may institute a suit as for lunacy,\nbut not without the permission of the Nomophylakes.[432]\nRespecting disagreement between married couples, ten of the\nNomophylakes, together with ten women chosen as supervisors of\nmarriages, are constituted a Board of reference,[433] to obtain a\nreconciliation, if it be possible: but if this be impossible, then\nto divorce the couple, and unite each with some more suitable\npartner. The lawgiver must keep in view, as far as he can, to\nobtain from each married couple a sufficiency of\nchildren--that is, one male and one female child from each, whereby\nthe total of 5040 lots may be kept up.[434] If a husband loses his\nwife before he has these two children, the law requires him to\nmarry another wife: but if he becomes a widower, having already\nthe sufficiency of children, he is advised not to marry a second\nwife (who will become stepmother), though not prohibited from\ndoing so, if he chooses. So also, if a woman becomes a widow, not\nhaving the sufficient number of children, she must be compelled to\nmarry again: if she already has the sufficient number, she is\ndirected to remain in the house, and to bring them up. In case she\nis still young, and her health requires a husband, her relatives\nwill apply to the Female Supervisors of Marriage, and will make\nsuch arrangements as may seem advisable.[435]\n\n[Footnote 432: Plato, Legg. xi. pp. 928-929.]\n\n[Footnote 433: Plato, Legg. xi. pp. 929-930.]\n\n[Footnote 434: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 930 D. [Greek: pai/d\u00f4n de\\\ni(kano/t\u00eas a)krib\u00ea\\s a)/r)r(\u00ean kai\\ th\u00ea/leia e)/st\u00f4 t\u00f4=|\nno/m\u00f4|.]]\n\n[Footnote 435: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 930 C.]\n\n[Side-note: Neglect of Parents.]\n\nAgainst neglect of aged parents by their children, Plato both\ndenounces the most stringent legal penalties, and delivers the\nmost emphatic reproofs: commending with full faith the ancient\ntraditional narratives, that the curse of an offended parent\nagainst his sons was always executed by the Gods, as in the cases\nof Oedipus, Theseus, Amyntor, &c.[436] In the event of\nlunacy, he directs that the lunatic shall be kept in private\ncustody by his relatives, who will be fined if they neglect the\nduty.[437]\n\n[Footnote 436: Plato, Legg, xi. p. 931-932.]\n\n[Footnote 437: Plato, Legg, xi. p. 934 D.]\n\n_Hurt or damage_, not deadly, done by one man to\nanother.--Plato enumerates two different modes of inflicting\ndamage:--1. By drugs (applied externally or internally), magic, or\nsorcery. 2. By theft or force.[438]\n\n[Footnote 438: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 932 E-933 E. Both these come\nunder the general head [Greek: o(/sa tis a)/llos a)/llon\n_p\u00eamai/nei_.]]\n\n[Side-note: Poison--Magic--Incantations--Severe\npunishment.]\n\nAs to the first mode, if the drug be administered by a physician,\nhe must be put to death: if by one not a physician, the Dikasts\nwill determine the nature of his punishment. And in the case of\nmagical arts, or incantations, if the person who resorts to them\nbe a prophet, or an inspector of prodigies, he must be put to\ndeath: another person doing the same will be punished at the\ndiscretion of the Dikasts. Here we see that the prophet is\nranked as a professional person (the like appears in Homer) along\nwith the physician,[439]--who must know what he is about, while\nanother person perhaps may not know. But Plato's own opinion\nrespecting magical incantations is delivered with singular\nreserve. He will neither avouch them nor reject them. He intimates\nthat a man can hardly find out what is true on the subject; and\neven if he could, it would be harder still to convince others.\nMost men are in serious alarm when they see waxen statuettes hung\nat their doors or at their family tombs; and it is useless to\nattempt to tranquillise them by reminding them that they have no\ncertain evidence on the subject.[440] Here we see how Plato\ndiscourages the received legends and the current faith, when he\nbelieves them to be hurtful--as contrasted with his vehemence in\nupholding them when he thinks them useful: as in the case of the\npaternal curse, and the judgments of the Gods. The question of\ntheir truth is made to depend on their usefulness.[441] The Gods\nare made to act exactly as he thinks they ought to act. They are\nnot merely invoked, but positively counted on, as executioners of\nPlato's ethical sentences.\n\n[Footnote 439: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 933 C. [Greek: \u00f4(s pr\u00f4=ton me\\n\nto\\n e)picheirou=nta pharma/ttein ou)k ei)do/ta ti/ dra=|, ta/ te\nkata\\ s\u00f4/mata, e)a\\n m\u00ea\\ tugcha/n\u00ea| e)pist\u00ea/m\u00f4n \u00f4)\\n i)atrik\u00ea=s,\nta/ te au)= peri\\ ta\\ magganeu/mata, e)a\\n m\u00ea\\ ma/ntis \u00ea)\\\nteratosko/pos \u00f4)\\n tugcha/n\u00ea|.]\n\nHomer, Odys. Xvii. 383:--\n\n . . . [Greek: t\u00f4=n oi(\\ d\u00eamioergoi\\ e)/asi,\nma/ntin, \u00ea)\\ i)\u00ea/t\u00eara kak\u00f4=n, \u00ea)\\ te/ktona dou/r\u00f4n,\n\u00ea)\\ kai\\ the/spin a)oido/n], &c.]\n\n[Footnote 440: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 933 B. [Greek: a)/n pote\ni)/d\u00f4si/ pou k\u00ea/rina mim\u00ea/mata peplasme/na.] Compare Theokritus,\nIdyll, ii. 28-59.\n\nSee the remarkable narrative of the death of Germanicus in Syria,\nsupposed to have been brought about by the magical artifices\nwrought under the auspices of Piso (Tacitus, Ann. ii. 69).]\n\n[Footnote 441: Cicero, Legg, ii. 7, 16. \"Utiles autem esse has\nopiniones, quis neget, cum intelligat, quam multa firmentur\njurejurando,\" &c.]\n\n[Side-note: Punishment is inflicted with a view to future\nprevention or amendment.]\n\nRespecting the second mode of damage--by theft or\nviolence--Plato's law forms a striking contrast to that which has\nbeen just set forth. The person who inflicts damage must repay it,\nor make full compensation for it, to the sufferer: small, if the\ndamage be small--great, if it be great. Besides this, the guilty\nperson must undergo some farther punishment with a view to correction\nor reformation. This will be smaller, if he be young and seduced by\nthe persuasion of others; but it must be graver, if he be\nself-impelled by his own desires, fears, wrath, jealousy, &c.\nUnderstand, however (adds Plato), that such ulterior punishment is\nnot imposed on account of the past misdeed--for the past cannot be\nrecalled or undone--but on account of the future: to ensure that\nhe shall afterwards hate wrong-doing, and that those who see him\npunished shall hate it also. The Dikasts must follow out in detail\nthe general principle here laid down.[442]\n\n[Footnote 442: Plato, Legg. xi. pp. 933-934. Compare Plato,\nProtagor. p. 324 B.]\n\nThis passage proclaims distinctly an important principle in regard\nto the infliction of legal penalties: which principle, if kept in\nmind, might have lead Plato to alter or omit a large portion of\nthe Leges.\n\n[Side-note: Penalty for abusive words--for libellous\ncomedy. Mendicity forbidden.]\n\nRespecting _words of abuse, or revilement_, or insulting\nderision.--These are altogether forbidden. If used in any temple,\nmarket, or public and frequented place, the magistrate presiding\nmust punish the offender forthwith, as he thinks fit: if\nelsewhere, any citizen by-stander, being older than the offender,\nis authorised thrash him.[443] No writer of comedy is allowed to\nridicule or libel any citizen.\n\n[Footnote 443: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 935 C-D. The Attic law\nexpressly forbade the utterance of abusive words against any\nindividual _in an office or public place_ upon any pretence\n(Lysias, Or. ix. Pro Milite, s. 6-9). Demosthenes (contra Konon.\np. 1263) speaks of [Greek: kak\u00eagori/a] or [Greek: loidori/a] as in\nitself trifling, but as forbidden by the law, lest it should lead\nto violence and blows.]\n\nMendicity is strictly prohibited. Every mendicant must be sent\naway at once, in order that the territory may be rid of such a\ncreature.[444] Every man, who has passed an honest life, will be\nsure to have made friends who will protect him against the\nextremity of want.\n\n[Footnote 444: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 936 C. [Greek: o(/p\u00f4s \u00ea( ch\u00f4/ra\ntou= toiou/tou z\u00f4/ou kathara\\ gi/gn\u00eatai to\\ para/pan.]]\n\n[Side-note: Regulations about witnesses on judicial\ntrials.]\n\nThe rules provided by Plato about witnesses in judicial trials and\nindictments for perjury, are pretty much the same as those\nprevalent at Athens: with some peculiarities. Thus he permits a\nfree woman to bear witness, and to address the court in support of\na party interested, provided she be above forty years of age.\nMoreover, she may institute a suit, if she have no husband: but\nnot if she be married.[445] A slave or a child may bear witness at\na trial for murder; provided security be given that they will\nremain in the city to await an indictment for perjury, if\npresented against them.\n\n[Footnote 445: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 937 A-B.\n\nIt appears that women were not admitted as witnesses before the\nAthenian Dikasteries. Meier und Sch\u00f6mann, Der Attische Prozess,\npp. 667-668. The testimony of slaves was received after they had\nbeen tortured; which was considered as a guarantee for truth,\nrequired in regard to them, but not required in regard to a\nfree-man. The torture is not mentioned in this Platonic treatise.\nPlato treats a male as _young_ up to the age of thirty (compare\nXenoph. Memor. i. 2, 35), a female as _young_ up to the age\nof forty (pp. 932 B-C, 961 B).]\n\n[Side-note: Censure of forensic eloquence, and the teachers\nof it. Penalties against contentious litigation.]\n\nAmong Plato's prohibitions, we are not surprised to find one\ndirected emphatically against forensic eloquence, and against\nthose who professed to teach it. Every thing beneficial to man\n(says he) has its accompanying poison and corruption. Justice is a\nnoble thing, the great civilising agent in human affairs: to aid\nany one in obtaining justice, is of course a noble thing also. But\nthese benefits are grossly abused by men, who pretend to possess\nan art, whereby every one may be sure of judicial victory, either\nas principal or as auxiliary, whether his cause be just or\nunjust:--and who offer to teach this art to all who pay a\nstipulated price. Whether this be (as they pretend) a real art, or\na mere inartificial knack--it would be a disgrace to our city, and\nmust be severely punished. Whoever gives show of trying to pervert\nthe force of justice in the minds of the Dikasts, or indulges in\nunseasonable and frequent litigation, or even lends his aid to\nother litigants--may be indicted by any citizen as guilty of abuse\nof justice, either as principal or auxiliary. He shall be tried\nbefore the Court of Select Judges: who, if they find him guilty,\nwill decide whether he has committed the offence from love of\nmoney, or from love of contention and ambitious objects. If from\nlove of contention, he shall be interdicted, for such time as the\nCourt may determine, from instituting any suit at law on his own\naccount as well as from aiding in any suit instituted by\nothers.[446] If from love of money, the citizen found guilty shall\nbe capitally punished, the non-citizen shall be banished in\nperpetuity. Moreover the citizen convicted of committing this\noffence even from love of contention, if it be a second\nconviction for the offence, shall be put to death also.[447]\n\n[Footnote 446: Plato, Legg. xi. p. 938 B. [Greek: tima=|n au)t\u00f4=|\nto\\ dikast\u00ea/riou o(/sou chr\u00ea\\ chro/nou to\\n toiou=ton m\u00eadeni\\\nlachei=n di/k\u00ean m\u00eade\\ xundik\u00ea=sai.] I cannot understand why\nStallbaum, in his very useful notes on the Leges, observes upon\nthis passage (p. 330):--\"[Greek: lagcha/nein di/k\u00ean] de\ncaussidicis accipiendum, qui caussam aliquam pro aliis in foro\nagendam ac defendendam suscipiunt\". This is the explanation\nbelonging to [Greek: xundik\u00ea=sai]: [Greek: lachei=n di/k\u00ean] is the\nwell known phrase for a plaintiff or a prosecutor as principal.]\n\n[Footnote 447: Plato, Legg. xi. pp. 937 E, 938 C.]\n\n[Side-note: Many of Plato's laws are discharges of ethical\nantipathy. The antipathy of Mel\u00eatus against Sokrates was of the\nsame character.]\n\nThe vague and undefined character of this offence, for which Plato\ndenounces capital punishment, shows how much his penal laws are\ndischarges of ethical antipathy and hostility against types of\ncharacter conceived by himself--rather than measures intended for\napplication, in which he had weighed beforehand the practical\ndifficulties of singling out and striking the right individual. On\nthis matter the Athenian public had the same ethical antipathy as\nhimself; and Mel\u00eatus took full advantage of it, when he brought\nhis accusation against Sokrates. We know both from the Apologies\nof Plato and Xenophon, and from the Nubes of Aristophanes--that\nSokrates was rendered odious to the Athenian people and Dikasts,\npartly as heterodox and irreligious, but partly also as one who\ntaught the art of using speech so as to make the worse appear the\nbetter reason. Both Aristophanes and Mel\u00eatus would have\nsympathised warmly with the Platonic law. If there had been any\nSolonian law to the same effect, which Mel\u00eatus could have quoted\nin his accusatory speech, his case against Sokrates would have\nbeen materially strengthened. Especially, he would have had the\nexpress sanction of law for his proposition of death as the\npenalty: a proposition to which the Athenian Dikasts would not\nhave consented, had they not been affronted and driven to it by\nthe singular demeanour of Sokrates himself when before them. It\nwould be irrelevant here to say that Sokrates was not guilty of\nwhat was imputed to him: that he never came before the Dikastery\nuntil the time of his trial--and that he did not teach \"the art of\nwords\". If he did not teach it, he was at least believed to teach\nit, not merely by Aristophanes and by the Athenian Dikasts, but\nalso by intelligent men like Kritias and Charikles,[448] who knew\nhim perfectly well: while the example of Antiphon shows that a man\nmight be most acute and efficacious as a forensic adviser, without\ncoming in person before the Dikastery.[449] What the defence\nreally makes us feel is, the indefinite nature of the charge:\nwhich is neither provable nor disprovable, and which is\ncharacterised, both by Xenophon and in the Platonic Apology, as\none of the standing calumnies against all philosophising men.[450]\nHere, in the Platonic Leges, this same unprovable offence is\nadopted and made capital: the Select Platonic Dikasts being\ndirected to ascertain, not only whether a man has really committed\nit, but whether he has been impelled to commit it by love of\nmoney, or by love of victory and personal consequence.\n\n[Footnote 448: Xenophon, Memor. i. 2, 31 seq.]\n\n[Footnote 449: Thucydid. viii. 68.]\n\n[Footnote 450: Plato, Apol. Sokr. p. 23.\n\nSuch was the colloquial power of Sokrates, in the portrait drawn\nby Xenophon (Mem. i. 2, 14), \"that he handled all who conversed\nwith him just as he pleased--[Greek: toi=s de\\ dialegome/nois\nau)t\u00f4=| pa=si chr\u00f4/menon e)n toi=s lo/gois o(/p\u00f4s bou/loito.]\nKritias and Alkibiades (Xenophon tells us) sought his society for\nthe purpose of strengthening their own oratorical powers as\npolitical men, and of becoming [Greek: krei/ttone t\u00f4=n\nsuggignome/n\u00f4n] (i. 2, 16). Looked at from the point of view of\nopponents, this would be described as the proceeding of one who\nhimself both could pervert justice--and who taught others to\npervert it also. This was the picture of Sokrates which the\naccusers presented to the Athenian Dikastery: as we may see by the\nlanguage of Sokrates himself at the beginning of the Platonic\nApology.]\n\n[Side-note: Penalty for abuse of public trust--wrongful\nappropriation of public money--evasion of military service.]\n\nThe twelfth and last Book of the Treatise De Legibus deals with\nvarious cases of obligation, not towards individuals, but towards\nthe public or the city. Abuse of trust in the character of a\npublic envoy is declared punishable. This offence (familiar to us\nat Athens through the two harangues of Demosthenes and \u00c6schines)\nis invested by Plato with a religious colouring, as desecrating\nthe missions and commands of Herm\u00eas and Zeus.[451] Wrongful\nappropriation of the public money by a citizen is also made\ncapital. The penalty is to be inflicted equally whether the sum\nappropriated be large or small: in either case the guilt is equal,\nand the evidence of wicked disposition the same, for one who has\ngone through the public education and training.[452] This is quite\ndifferent from Plato's principle of dealing with theft or wrongful\nabstraction of property from private persons: in which case, the\nsentence of Plato was, that the amount of damage done, small or\ngreat, should be made good by the offender, and that a certain\nulterior penalty should be inflicted sufficient to deter him as\nwell as others from a repetition.\n\n[Footnote 451: Plato, Legg. xii. p. 941 A.]\n\n[Footnote 452: Plato, Legg. xii. p. 941: compare xi. p. 934 A.]\n\nProvision is farther made for punishing any omission of military\nservice either by males or females, or any discreditable\nabandonment of arms.[453] The orders of the military\ncommander must be implicitly and exactly obeyed. The actions of\nall must be orderly, uniform, and simultaneous. Nothing can be\nmore mischievous than that each should act for himself, separately\nand apart from others. This is confessedly true as to war; but it\nis no less essential as to the proceedings in peace.[454]\nSuppression of individuality, and conversion of life into a\nperpetual, all-pervading, drill and discipline--is a favourite\naspiration always present to Plato.\n\n[Footnote 453: Plato, Legg. xii. p. 944. It is curious to compare\nthis passage of Plato with the two orations of Lysias [Greek:\nkata\\ Theomn\u00ea/stou] A and B (Oratt. x.-xi.). Plato enjoins upon\nall accusers the greatest caution and precision in the terms used\nto indicate what they intended to charge upon the accused. To call\na man [Greek: r(i/psaspis] is a more aggravated offensive\ndesignation than to call him [Greek: a)poboleu\\s o(/pl\u00f4n], which\nlatter term is more general, and may possibly be applied to those\nwho have lost their arms under the pressure of irresistible\nnecessity, without any disgrace. On the other hand, we read in\nLysias, that the offence which was punishable under the Attic law\nwas [Greek: o(/pl\u00f4n a)pobol\u00ea/], and that to assert falsely\nrespecting any citizen, [Greek: ta\\ o(/pla a)pobe/bl\u00eake], was an\n[Greek: a)po/r)r(\u00eaton] or forbidden phrase, which exposed the\nspeaker to a fine of 500 drachm\u00e6 (sect. 1-12). But to assert\nrespecting any man that he was [Greek: r(i/psaspis] was not\nexpressly [Greek: a)po/r)r(\u00eaton] (compare Lysias cont. Agorat.,\nOr. xiii. ss. 87-89), and the speaker might argue (successfully or\nnot) that he had said nothing [Greek: a)po/r)r(\u00eaton], and was not\nguilty of legal [Greek: kak\u00eagori/a].--There is another phrase in\nthis section of Plato to which I would call attention. He\nenumerates the excusable cases of losing arms as follows--[Greek:\no(po/soi kata\\ kr\u00eamn\u00f4=n r(iphe/ntes a)p\u00f4/lesan o(/pla \u00ea)\\ kata\\\ntha/lattan] (p. 944 A). Now the cases of soldiers being thrown\ndown cliffs are, I believe, unknown until the Phokian prisoners\nwere so dealt with in the Sacred War, as sacrilegious offenders\nagainst Apollo and the Delphian temple. Hence we may probably\ninfer that this was composed after the Sacred War began,\nB.C. 356. See Diodorus and my 'Hist. of Greece,' chap.\n87, p. 350 seq.]\n\n[Footnote 454: Plato, Legg. xii. pp. 942 B-945. [Greek: e(ni/ te\nlo/g\u00f4| to\\ ch\u00f4ri/s ti t\u00f4=n a)/ll\u00f4n pra/ttein dida/xai t\u00ea\\n\npsuch\u00ea\\n e)/thesi m\u00ea/te gign\u00f4/skein m\u00ea/t' e)pi/stasthai to\\\npara/pan, a)ll' a)thro/on a)ei\\ kai\\ a(/ma kai\\ koino\\n to\\n bi/on\no(/, ti ma/lista pa=si pa/nt\u00f4n gi/gnesthai.]]\n\nA Board of Elders is constituted by Plato, as auditors of the\nproceedings of all Magistrates after their term of office.[455]\nThe mode of choosing these Elders, as well as their duties,\nliabilities, privileges, and honours, both during life and after\ndeath, are prescribed with the utmost solemnity.\n\n[Footnote 455: Plato, Legg. xii. pp. 946-948.]\n\n[Side-note: Oaths. Dikasts, Judges, Electors, are to be\nsworn: but no parties to a suit, or interested witnesses, can be\nsworn.]\n\nPlato forbids the parties in any judicial suit from swearing: they\nwill present their case to the court, but not upon oath. No\njudicial oath is allowed to be taken by any one who has a\npecuniary interest in the matter on hand. The Dikasts--the judges\nin all public competitions--the Electors before they elect to a\npublic trust--are all to be sworn: but neither the parties to\nany cause, nor (seemingly) the witnesses. If oaths were taken\non both sides, one or other of the parties must be perjured: and\nPlato considers it dreadful, that they should go on living with\neach other afterwards in the same city. In aforetime Rhadamanthus\n(he tells us) used to settle all disputes simply, by administering\nan oath to the parties: for in his time no one would take a false\noath: men were then not only pious, but even sons or descendants\nof the Gods. But now (in the Platonic days) impiety has gained\nground, and men's oaths are no longer to be trusted, where\nanything is to be gained by perjury.[456]\n\n[Footnote 456: Plato, Legg. xii. pp. 948-949.]\n\n[Side-note: Regulations about admission of strangers, and\nforeign travel of citizens.]\n\nStrict regulations are provided, as to exit from the Platonic\ncity, and ingress into it. Plato fears contamination to his\ncitizens from converse with the outer world. He would introduce\nthe peremptory Spartan Xenelasy, if he were not afraid of the\nobloquy attending it. He strictly defines the conditions on which\nthe foreigner will be allowed to come in, or the citizen to go\nout. No citizen is allowed to go out before he is forty years of\nage.[457] Envoys must be sent on public missions; and sacred\nlegations (the\u00f4ries) must be despatched to the four great Hellenic\nfestivals--Olympic, Pythian, Nemean, and Isthmian. But private\ncitizens are not permitted to visit even these great festivals at\ntheir own pleasure. The envoys sent must be chosen and trustworthy\nmen: moreover, on returning, they will assure their youthful\nfellow-citizens, that the home institutions are better than\nanything that can be seen abroad.[458]\n\n[Footnote 457: Plato, Legg. xii. p. 950.]\n\n[Footnote 458: Plato, Legg. xii. p. 951.]\n\nSpecial travellers, between the ages of fifty and sixty, will also\nbe permitted to go abroad, and will bring back reports to the\nMagistrates of what they have observed. Strangers are admitted\ninto the city or its neighbourhood, under strict supervision;\npartly as observers, partly as traders, for the limited amount of\ntraffic which the lawgiver tolerates.[459] Thus scanty is the\nworship which Plato will allow his Magn\u00eates to pay to Zeus\nXenius.[460] He seems however to take credit for it as liberal\ndealing.\n\n[Footnote 459: Plato, Legg. xii. pp. 952-953.]\n\n[Footnote 460: Plato, Legg. xii. p. 953 D-E. [Greek: Tou/tois d\u00ea\\\ntoi=s no/mois u(pode/chesthai/ te chr\u00ea\\ pa/ntas xe/nous te kai\\\nxe/nas kai\\ tou\\s au(t\u00f4=n e)kpe/mpein, tim\u00f4=ntas xe/nion Di/a, m\u00ea\\\nbr\u00f4/masi kai\\ thu/masi ta\\s xen\u00ealasi/as poioume/nous, katha/per\npoiou=si nu=n thre/mmata Nei/lou, m\u00eade\\ k\u00earu/gmasin a)gri/ois.]\nStallbaum says in his note (p. 384):--\"[Greek: m\u00ea\\ br\u00f4/masi kai\\\nthu/masi]--peregrinos non expellentes coenis et sacrificiis, h.\ne. eorum usu iis interdicentes\". This surely is not the right\nexplanation. Plato means to say that the Egyptian habits as to\neating and sacrifice were intolerably repulsive to a foreigner. We\nmay see this from [Greek: k\u00earu/gmasi], which follows. The\npeculiarities of Egypt, which Herodotus merely remarks upon with\nastonishment, may well have given offence to the fastidious and\ndictatorial spirit of Plato.]\n\n[Side-note: Suretyship--Length of prescription for\nownership, &c.]\n\nPlato proceeds with various enactments respecting suretyship--time\nof prescription for ownership--keeping men away by force either\nfrom giving testimony in court or from contending at the public\nmatches--receiving of stolen goods--private war or alliance on the\npart of any individual citizen, without the consent of the\ncity--receipt of bribes by functionaries--return and registration\nof each citizen's property--dedications and offerings to the\nGods.[461] No systematic order or classification can be traced in\nthe successive subjects.\n\n[Footnote 461: Plato, Legg. xii. pp. 954-956.]\n\n[Side-note: Judicial trial--three stages. 1. Arbitrators.\n2. Tribe-Dikasteries. 3. Select Dikastery.]\n\nIn respect to judiciary matters, he repeats (what had before been\ndirected) his constitution of three stages of tribunals. First,\nArbitrators, chosen by both parties in the dispute. From their\ndecision, either party may appeal to the Tribe-Dikasteries,\ncomposed of all the citizens of the Tribe or D\u00eame: or at least,\ncomposed of a jury taken from these. After this, there is a final\nappeal to the Select Dikastery, chosen among all the Magistrates\nfor the time being.[462] Plato leaves to his successors the\nregulations of details, respecting the mode of impannelling and\nthe procedure of these Juries.\n\n[Footnote 462: Plato, Legg. xii. p. 956.]\n\n[Side-note: Funerals--proceedings prescribed--expense\nlimited.]\n\nLastly come the regulations respecting funerals--the cost,\nceremonies, religious proceedings, mode of showing sorrow and\nreverence, &c.[463] These are given in considerable detail,\nand with much solemnity of religious exhortation.\n\n[Footnote 463: Plato, Legg. xii. pp. 957-958.]\n\n[Side-note: Conservative organ to keep up the original\nscheme of the lawgiver. Nocturnal Council for this purpose--how\nconstituted.]\n\nWe have now reached the close. The city has received its full\npolitical and civil outfit: as much legal regulation as it is\ncompetent for the lawgiver to provide at the beginning. One\nguarantee alone is wanting. Some security must be provided for the\ncontinuance and durability of the enactments.[464] We must\nhave a special conservative organ, watching over and keeping up\nthe scheme of the original lawgiver. For this function, Plato\nconstitutes a Board, which, from its rule of always beginning its\nsittings before daybreak, he calls the Nocturnal council. It will\ncomprise ten of the oldest Nomophylakes: all those who have\nobtained prizes for good conduct or orderly discipline: all those\nwho have been authorised to go abroad, and have been approved on\ntheir return. Each of these members will introduce into the Synod\none young man of thirty years of age, chosen by himself, but\napproved by the others.[465] The members will thus be partly old,\npartly young.\n\n[Footnote 464: Plato, Legg. xii. p. 960 C-D. Compare Plato,\nRepubl. vi. p. 497 D: [Greek: o(/ti de/\u00easoi/ ti a)ei\\ e)nei=nai\ne)n t\u00ea=| po/lei, lo/gon e)/chon t\u00ea=s politei/as to\\n au)to\\n\no(/nper kai\\ su\\ o( nomothe/t\u00eas e)/ch\u00f4n tou\\s no/mous\ne)ti/th\u00eas.]]\n\n[Footnote 465: Plato, Legg. xii. p. 961 A-B.]\n\nThis Nocturnal council is intended as the conservative organ of\nthe Platonic city. It is, in the city, what the soul and head are\nin an animal. The soul includes Reason: the head includes the two\nmost perfect senses--Sight and Hearing. The fusion, in one, of\nReason with these two senses ensures the preservation of the\nanimal.[466] In the Nocturnal council, the old members represent\nReason, the young members represent the two superior senses,\nserving as instruments and means of communication between Reason\nand the outer world. The Nocturnal council, embracing the agency\nof both, maintains thereby the life and continuity of the\ncity.[467]\n\n[Footnote 466: Plato, Legg. xii. p. 961 D.]\n\n[Footnote 467: Plato, Legg. xii. pp. 964 D-965 A.]\n\nIt is the special duty of this council, to serve as a perpetual\nembodiment of the original lawgiver, and to comprehend as well as\nto realise the main purpose for which the city was put together.\nThe councillors must keep constantly in view this grand political\nend, as the pilot keeps in view safe termination of the voyage--as\nthe military commander keeps in view victory, and the physician,\nrecovery of health. Should the physician or the pilot either not\nknow his end, or not know the conditions under which it may be\nattained--his labour will be in vain. So, if there does not exist\nin the city an authority understanding the great political end and\nthe means (either by laws or human agents) of accomplishing it,\nthe city will be a failure. Hence the indispensable necessity\nof the Nocturnal council, with members properly taught and\norganised.[468]\n\n[Footnote 468: Plato, Legg. xii. p. 962 B. [Greek: dei= . . .\nei)=nai/ ti to\\ gign\u00f4=skon e)n au)t\u00f4=|] (the city) [Greek: pr\u00f4=ton\nme\\n tou=to o(\\ le/gomen, to\\n skopo/n, o(/stis pote\\ o(\npolitiko\\s \u00f4)\\n \u00ea(mi=n tugcha/nei, e)/peita o(/ntina tro/pon dei=\nmetaschei=n tou/tou kai\\ ti/s au)t\u00f4=| kal\u00f4=s \u00ea)\\ m\u00ea\\ sumbouleu/ei\nt\u00f4=n no/m\u00f4n au)t\u00f4=n pr\u00f4=ton, e)/peita a)nthr\u00f4/p\u00f4n.]\n\n[Side-note: This Council must keep steadily in view the one\ngreat end of the city--Mistakes made by existing cities about the\nright end.]\n\nThe great political end must be one, and not many. All the arrows\naimed by the central Conservative organ must be aimed at one and\nthe same point.[469] This is the chief excellence of a\nwell-constituted conservative authority. Existing cities err all\nof them in one of two ways. Either they aim at one single End, but\nthat End bad or wrong: or they aim at a variety of Ends without\ngiving exclusive attention to any one. Survey existing cities: you\nwill find that in one, the great purpose, and the main feature of\nwhat passes for justice, is, that some party or faction shall\nobtain or keep political power, whether its members be better or\nworse than their fellow-citizens: in a second city, it is\nwealth--in a third freedom of individuals--in a fourth, freedom\ncombined with power over foreigners. Some cities, again, considering\nthemselves wiser than the rest, strive for all these objects at\nonce or for a variety of others, without exclusive attention to\nany one.[470] Amidst such divergence and error in regard to the\nmain end, we cannot wonder that all cities fail in attaining it.\n\n[Footnote 469: Plato, Legg. xii. p. 962 D. [Greek: dei= d\u00ea\\\ntou=ton] (the nocturnal synod) . . . [Greek: pa=san a)ret\u00ea\\n\ne)/chein, \u00ea(=s a)/rchei to\\ m\u00ea\\ plana=sthai pro\\s polla\\\nstochazo/menon, a)ll' ei)s e(\\n ble/ponta pro\\s tou=to a)ei\\ ta\\\npa/nta oi(=on be/l\u00ea a)phie/nai.]]\n\n[Footnote 470: Plato, Legg. xii. p. 962 D-E. Compare Aristot. Eth.\nNikom. x. 1180, a. 26.]\n\n[Side-note: The one end of the city is the virtue of its\ncitizens--that property which is common to the four varieties of\nVirtue--Reason, Courage, Temperance, Justice.]\n\nThe One End proposed by _our_ city is, the virtue of its\ncitizens. But virtue is fourfold, or includes four\nvarieties--Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice. Our End is and\nmust be One. The medical Reason has its One End, Good Health:[471]\nthe strat\u00eagic Reason has its One End--Victory: What is that One End\n(analogous to these) which the political Reason aims at? It must\nbe that in which the four cardinal virtues--Courage, Prudence,\nTemperance, Justice--are One, or coincide: that common\nproperty, possessed by all and by each, which makes them to be\nvirtue, and constitutes the essential meaning of the name, Virtue.\nWe must know the four as four, that is, the points of difference\nbetween them: but it is yet more important to know them as One--to\ndiscern the point of essential coincidence and union between\nthem.[472]\n\n[Footnote 471: Plato, Legg. xii. p. 963 A-B. [Greek: nou=n ga\\r\nd\u00ea\\ kubern\u00eatiko\\n me\\n kai\\ i)atriko\\n kai\\ strat\u00eagiko\\n ei)/pomen\nei)s to\\ e(\\n e)kei=no oi(= dei= ble/pein, to\\n de\\ politiko\\n\ne)le/gchontes e)ntau=th' e)sme\\n nu=n . . . \u00d4)= thauma/sie, su\\\nde\\ d\u00ea\\ poi= skopei=s? Ti/ pot' e)kei=no/ e)sti to\\ e(\\n, o(\\ d\u00ea\\\nsaph\u00f4=s o( me\\n i)atriko\\s nou=s e)/chei phra/zein, su\\ d' \u00f4)\\n\nd\u00ea\\ diaphe/r\u00f4n, \u00f4(s phai/\u00eas a)/n, pa/nt\u00f4n t\u00f4=n e)mphro/n\u00f4n, ou)ch\ne(/xeis ei)pei=n?]]\n\n[Footnote 472: Plato, Legg. xii. pp. 963 E-964 A.]\n\n[Side-note: The Nocturnal Council must comprehend this\nunity of Virtue, explain it to others, and watch that it be\ncarried out in detail.]\n\nTo understand thoroughly this unity of virtue, so as to act upon\nit themselves, to explain it to others and to embody it in all\ntheir orders--is the grand requisite for the supreme Guardians of\nour city--the Nocturnal council. We cannot trust such a function\nin the hands of poets, or of visiting discoursers who announce\nthemselves as competent to instruct youth. It cannot be confided\nto any less authority than the chosen men--the head and senses--of\nour city, properly and specially trained to exercise it.[473] Upon\nthis depends the entire success or failure of our results. Our\nguardians must be taught to see that one Idea which pervades the\nMultiple and the Diverse:[474] to keep it steadily before their\nown eyes, and to explain and illustrate it in discourse to others.\nThey must contemplate the point of coincidence and unity between\nCourage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice: as well as between the\nmany different things called Beautiful, and the many different\nthings called Good.[475] They must declare whether the name\nVirtue, common to all the four, means something One--or a Whole or\nAggregate--or both together.[476] If they cannot explain to us\nwhether Virtue is Manifold or Fourfold, or in what manner it is\nOne--they are unfit for their task, and our city will prove a\nfailure. To know the truth about these important matters--to be\ncompetent to explain and defend it to others--to follow it out in\npractice, and to apply it in discriminating what is well done\nand what is ill done--these are the imperative and\nindispensable duties of our Guardians.[477]\n\n[Footnote 473: Plato, Legg. xii. p. 964 D.]\n\n[Footnote 474: Plato, Legg. xii. p. 965 C. [Greek: to\\ pro\\s mi/an\ni)de/an e)k t\u00f4=n poll\u00f4=n kai\\ a)nomoi/\u00f4n dunato\\n ei)=nai\nble/pein.]]\n\n[Footnote 475: Plato, Legg. xii. pp. 965 D, 966 A-B.]\n\n[Footnote 476: Plato, Legg. xii. p. 965 D. [Greek: pri\\n a)\\n\ni(kan\u00f4=s ei)/p\u00f4men ti/ pote/ e)stin, ei)s o(\\ blepte/on, _ei)/te\n\u00f4(s e(\\n, ei)/te \u00f4(s o(/lon_, ei)/te _a)mpho/tera_, ei)/te\no(/p\u00f4s pote\\ pe/phuken; \u00ea)\\ tou/tou diaphugo/ntos \u00ea(ma=s\noi)o/metha/ pote \u00ea(mi=n i(kan\u00f4=s e(/xein ta\\ pro\\s a)ret\u00ea/n, peri\\\n\u00ea(=s ou)/t' ei) polla/ e)st', ou)/t' ei) te/ttara, ou)/th' \u00f4(s\ne(/n, dunatoi\\ phra/zein e)so/metha?]]\n\n[Footnote 477: Plato, Legg. xii. p. 966 B.]\n\n[Side-note: They must also adopt, explain, and enforce upon\nthe citizens, an orthodox religious creed. Fundamental dogmas of\nsuch creed.]\n\nFarthermore it is also essential that they should adopt an\northodox religious creed, and should be competent to explain and\ndefend it. The citizens generally must believe without scrutiny\nsuch dogmas as the lawgiver enjoins; but the Guardians must master\nthe proofs of them.[478] The proofs upon which, in Plato's view,\nall true piety rests, are two[479] (he here repeats them):--1.\nMind or soul is older than Body--anterior to Body as a moving\npower--and invested with power to impel, direct, and controul\nBody. 2. When we contemplate the celestial rotation, we perceive\nsuch extreme exactness and regularity in the movement of the stars\n(each one of the vast multitude maintaining its relative position\nin the midst of prodigious velocity of movement) that we cannot\nexplain it except by supposing a Reason or Intelligence pervading\nand guiding them all. Many astronomers have ascribed this regular\nmovement to an inherent Necessity, and have hereby drawn upon\nscience reproaches from poets and others, as if it were\nirreligious. But these astronomers (Plato affirms) were quite\nmistaken in excluding Mind and Reason from the celestial bodies,\nand in pronouncing the stars to be bodies without mind, like earth\nor stones. Necessity cannot account for their exact and regular\nmovements: no other supposition is admissible except the constant\nvolition of mind in-dwelling in each, impelling and guiding them\ntowards exact goodness of result. Astronomy well understood is, in\nPlato's view, the foundation of true piety. It is only the\nerroneous astronomical doctrines which are open to the current\nimputations of irreligion.[480]\n\n[Footnote 478: Plato, Legg. xii. p. 966 D.]\n\n[Footnote 479: Plato, Legg. xii. p. 967 E.]\n\n[Footnote 480: Plato, Legg. xii. p. 967 A-D. [Greek: dianoi/ais\nboul\u00ea/se\u00f4s a)gath\u00f4=n peri\\ teloume/n\u00f4n . . . m\u00ea/pot' a)\\n\na)/psucha o)/nta ou(/t\u00f4s ei)s a)kri/beian thaumastoi=s logismoi=s\na)\\n e)chr\u00ea=to, nou=n m\u00ea\\ kekt\u00eame/na . . . to/n te ei)r\u00eame/non e)n\ntoi=s a)/strois nou=n t\u00f4=n o)/nt\u00f4n.]]\n\nThese are the capital religious or kosmical dogmas which the\nmembers of the Nocturnal Council must embrace and expound to\nothers, together with the mathematical and musical teaching\nsuitable to illustrate them. Application must be made of these\ndogmas to improve the laws and customs of the city, and the\ndispositions of the citizens.[481]\n\n[Footnote 481: Plato, Legg. xii. p. 967 E.]\n\nWhen this Nocturnal Council, with its members properly trained and\nqualified, shall be established in the akropolis--symbolising the\nconjunction of Reason with the head or with the two\nknowledge-giving senses--the Magn\u00eatic City may securely be\nentrusted to it, with certainty of an admirable result.[482]\n\n[Footnote 482: Plato, Legg. xii. p. 969 B.]\n\n*  *  *  *  *\n\n\nEPINOMIS.\n\n[Side-note: Leges close, without describing the education\nproper for the Nocturnal Counsellors. _Epinomis_--supplying\nthis defect.]\n\nHere closes the dialogue called Leges: somewhat prematurely, since\nthe peculiar training indispensable for these Nocturnal\nCounsellors has not yet been declared. The short dialogue called\nEpinomis supplies this defect. It purports to be a second day's\nconversation between the same trio.\n\n[Side-note: The Athenian declares his plan of\neducation--Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy.]\n\nThe Athenian--adverting to the circumstances of human life\ngenerally, as full of toil and suffering, with few and transient\nmoments of happiness--remarks that none except the wise have any\nchance of happiness; and that few can understand what real wisdom\nis, though every one presumes that there must be something of the\nkind discoverable.[483] He first enumerates what _it is not_.\nIt is not any of the useful arts--husbandry, house-building,\nmetallurgy, weaving, pottery, hunting, &c.: nor is it\nprophecy, or the understanding of omens: nor any of the elegant\narts--music, poetry, painting: nor the art of war, or navigation,\nor medicine, or forensic eloquence: nor does it consist in the\nnatural endowments of quick wit and good memory.[484] True wisdom\nis something different from all these. It consists in arithmetic,\ngeometry, astronomy, leading to a full comprehension of the\nregular movements of the Kosmos--combined with a correct religious\ncreed as to the divine attributes of the Kosmos and its planetary\nbodies which are all pervaded and kept in harmonious rotation\nby divine, in-dwelling, soul or mind.[485] It is the God\nUranus (or Olympus, or Kosmos), with the visible Gods included\ntherein, who furnishes to us not only the gifts of the seasons and\nthe growth of food, but also varied intelligence, especially the\nknowledge of number, without which no other knowledge would be\nattainable.[486] Number and proportion are essential conditions of\nevery variety of art. The regular succession of night and day, and\nthe regularly changing phases of the moon--the comparison of\nmonths with the year--first taught us to count, and to observe the\nproportions of numbers to each other.[487]\n\n[Footnote 483: Plato, Epinom. pp. 973-974.]\n\n[Footnote 484: Plato, Epinom. pp. 975-976.]\n\n[Footnote 485: Plato, Epinom. pp. 976-977.]\n\n[Footnote 486: Plato, Epinom. pp. 977-978.]\n\n[Footnote 487: Plato, Epinom. pp. 978-979.]\n\n[Side-note: Theological view of Astronomy--Divine\nKosmos--Soul more ancient and more sovereign than Body.]\n\nThe Athenian now enters upon the directly theological point of\nview, and re-asserts the three articles of orthodoxy which he had\nlaid down in the tenth book of Leges: together with the other\npoint of faith also--That Soul or Mind is older than body: soul is\nactive and ruling--body, passive and subject. An animal is a\ncompound of both. There are five elementary bodies--fire, air,\n\u00e6ther, water, earth[488]--which the kosmical soul moulded, in\nvarying proportions, so as to form different animals and plants.\nMan, animals, and plants were moulded chiefly of earth, yet with\nsome intermixture of the other elements: the stars were moulded\nchiefly from fire, having the most beautiful bodies, endowed with\ndivine and happy souls, and immortal, or very long-lived.[489]\nNext to the stars were moulded the D\u00e6mons, out of \u00e6ther, and\ninhabitants of that element: after them, the animals inhabiting\nair, and Nymphs inhabiting water. These three occupy intermediate\nplace between the stars above and man below.[490] They serve as\nmedia of communication between man and the Gods: and also for the\ndiffusion of thought and intelligence among all parts of the\nKosmos.[491] The Gods of the ordinary faith--Zeus, H\u00ear\u00ea, and\nothers--must be left to each person's disposition, if he be\ninclined to worship them: but the great visible Kosmos, and the\nsidereal Gods, must be solemnly exalted and sanctified, with\nprayer and the holiest rites.[492] Those astronomers who ignore\nthis divine nature, and profess to explain their movements by\nphysical or mechanical forces, are guilty of grave impiety. The\nregularity of their movements is a proof of their divine nature,\nnot a proof of the contrary, as some misguided persons\naffirm.[493]\n\n[Footnote 488: Plato, Epinom. pp. 980-981. We know, from a curious\nstatement of Xenokrates (see Fragm. of his work [Greek: Peri\\ tou=\nPla/t\u00f4nos bi/ou], cited by Simplikius, ad Aristot. Physic. p. 427,\na. 17, Schol. Brandis), that this quintuple elementary scale was a\ndoctrine of Plato. But it is not the doctrine of the Tim\u00e6us. The\nassertion of Xenokrates (good evidence) warrants us in believing\nthat Plato altered his views after the composition of Tim\u00e6us, and\nthat his latest opinions are represented in the Epinomis. Zeller\nindeed thinks that the dodekahedron in the Tim\u00e6us might be\nconstrued as a fifth element, but this is scarcely tenable.\nZeller, Philos. der Griechen, vol. ii. p. 513, ed. 2nd.]\n\n[Footnote 489: Plat. Epinom. pp. 981-982.]\n\n[Footnote 490: Plat. Epinom. pp. 983-984.]\n\n[Footnote 491: Plat. Epinom. p. 984.]\n\n[Footnote 492: Plat. Epinom. pp. 984 D-985 D.]\n\n[Footnote 493: Plat. Epinom. pp. 982 D, 983 C.]\n\n[Side-note: Improving effects of the study of Astronomy in\nthis spirit.]\n\nNext, the Athenian intimates that the Greeks have obtained their\nastronomical knowledge, in the first instance, from Egypt and\nAssyria, but have much improved upon what they learnt (p. 987):\nthat the Greeks at first were acquainted only with the three\n[Greek: phorai\\]--the outer or sidereal sphere ([Greek:\nA)plan\u00ea\\s]), the Sun, and the Moon--but unacquainted with the\nother five or planetary [Greek: phorai\\], which they first learned\nfrom these foreigners, though not the names of the planets (p.\n986): that all these eight were alike divine, fraternal agents,\npartakers in the same rational nature, and making up altogether\nthe divine [Greek: Ko/smos]: that those who did not recognise all\nthe eight as divine, consummately rational, and revolving with\nperfectly uniform movement, were guilty of impiety (p. 985 E):\nthat these kosmical, divine, rational agents taught to mankind\narithmetic and the art of numeration (p. 988 B): that soul, or\nplastic, demiurgic, cognitive force (p. 981 C), was an older and\nmore powerful agent in the universe than body--but that there were\ntwo varieties of soul, a good and bad, of which the good variety\nwas the stronger: the good variety of soul produced all the good\nmovements, the bad variety produced all the bad movements (p. 988\nD, E): that in studying astronomy, a man submitted himself to the\nteaching of this good soul and these divine agents, from whom\nalone he could learn true wisdom and piety (pp. 989 B-990 A): that\nthis study, however, must be conducted not with a view to know the\ntimes of rising and setting of different stars (like Hesiod) but\nto be able to understand and follow the eight [Greek: periphora/s]\n(p. 990 B).\n\n[Side-note: Study of arithmetic and geometry:\nvarieties of proportion.]\n\nTo understand these--especially the five planetary and difficult\n[Greek: periphora\\s]--arithmetic must also be taught, not in the\nconcrete, but in the abstract (p. 990 C, D), to understand how\nmuch the real nature of things is determined by the generative\npowers and combination of Odd and Even Number. Next, geometry also\nmust be studied, so as to compare numbers with plane and solid\nfigures, and thus to determine proportions between two numbers\nwhich are not directly commensurable. The varieties of proportion,\nwhich are marvellously combined, must be understood--first\narithmetical and geometrical proportions, the arithmetical\nproportion increasing by equal addition (1 + 1 = 2), or the point\ninto a line--then the geometrical proportion by way of\nmultiplication (2 \u00d7 2 = 4; 4 \u00d7 2 = 8), or the line raised into a\nsurface, and the surface raised into a cube. Moreover there are\ntwo other varieties of proportion ([Greek: to\\ \u00ea(mio/lion] or\nsesquialterum, and [Greek: to\\ e)pi/triton] or sesquitertium) both\nof which occur in the numbers between the ratio of 6 to 12\n(_i.e._ 9 is [Greek: to\\ \u00ea(mio/lion] of 6, or 9 = 6 + 6/2;\nagain 8 is, [Greek: to\\ e)pi/triton] of 6, or 8 = 6 + 6/3). This\nlast is _harmonic proportion_, when there are three terms, of\nwhich the third is as much greater than the middle, as the middle\nis greater than the first (3 : 4 : 6)--six is greater than four by\none-third of six, while four is greater than three by one-third of\nthree (p. 991 A).\n\n[Side-note: When the general forms of things have thus been\nlearnt, particular individuals in nature must be brought under\nthem.]\n\nLastly, having thus come to comprehend the general forms of\nthings, we must bring under them properly the visible individuals\nin nature; and in this process interrogation and cross-examination\nmust be applied (p. 991 C). We must learn to note the accurate\nregularity with which time brings all things to maturity, and we\nshall find reason to believe that all things are full of Gods (p.\n991 D). We shall come to perceive that there is one law of\nproportion pervading every geometrical figure, every numerical\nseries, every harmonic combination, and all the celestial\nrotations: one and the same bond of union among all (p. 991 E).\nThese sciences, whether difficult or easy, must be learnt: for\nwithout them no happy nature will be ever planted in our cities\n(p. 992 A). The man who learns all this will be the truly wise and\nhappy man, both in this life and after it; only a few men can\npossibly arrive at such happiness (p. 992 C). But it is these\nchosen few who, when they become Elders, will compose our\nNocturnal Council, and maintain unimpaired the perpetual purity of\nthe Platonic City.\n\n[Side-note: Question as to education of the Nocturnal\nCouncil is answered in the Epinomis.]\n\nSuch then is the answer given by the Epinomis, to the question\nleft unanswered in the Leges. However unsatisfactory it may\nappear, to those who look for nothing but what is admirable in\nPlato--I believe it to represent the latest views of his old age,\nwhen dialectic had given place in his mind to the joint ascendancy\nof theological sentiment and Pythagorean arithmetic.[494]\n\n[Footnote 494: In connection with the treatise called Epinomis,\nthe question arises, What were the modifications which Plato's\nastronomical doctrines underwent during the latter years of his\nlife? In what respect did they come to differ from what we read in\nthe Platonic Tim\u00e6us, where a geocentric system is proclaimed:\nwhether we suppose (as Boeckh and others do) that the Earth is\nrepresented as stationary at the centre--or (as I suppose) that\nthe Earth is represented as fastened to the centre of the kosmical\naxis, and revolving with it. The Epinomis delivers a geocentric\nsystem also.\n\nNow it is upon this very point that Plato's opinions are said to\nhave changed towards the close of his life. He came to repent that\nhe had assigned to the Earth the central place in the system; and\nto conceive that place as belonging properly to something else,\nsome other better (or more powerful) body. This is a curious\nstatement, made in two separate passages by Plutarch, and in one\nof the two passages with reference to Theophrastus as his witness\n(Plutarch, Vit. Num\u00e6, c. 11; Platonic. Qu\u00e6st. 8, p. 1006 C).\n\nBoeckh (Untersuchungen \u00fcber das Kosmische System des Platon, pp.\n144-149) and Martin (\u00c9tudes sur le Tim\u00e9e, ii. 91) discredit the\nstatement ascribed by Plutarch to Theophrastus. But I see no\nsufficient ground for such discredit. Sir George Lewis remarks\nvery truly (Historical Survey of the Astronomy of the Ancients, p.\n143):--\"The testimony of Theophrastus, the disciple of Aristotle,\nand nearly his contemporary, has great weight on this point. The\nground of the opinion alludes to the Pythagorean doctrine\nmentioned by Aristotle, that the centre is the most dignified\nplace, and that the earth is not the first in dignity among the\nheavenly bodies. It has no reference to observed phenomena, and is\nnot founded on inductive scientific arguments. . . . The doctrine\nas to the superior dignity of the central place, and of the\nimpropriety of assigning the most dignified station to the earth,\nwas of Pythagorean origin and was probably combined with the\nPhilolaic cosmology.\"\n\nThis remark of Sir George Lewis deserves attention, not merely\nfrom the proper value which he assigns to the testimony of\nTheophrastus, but because he confines himself to the exact matter\nwhich Theophrastus affirmed; _viz._, that Plato in his old\nage came to repent of his own cosmical views on one particular\npoint and on one special ground. Theophrastus does not tell us\nwhat it was that Plato supposed to be in the centre, after he had\nbecome convinced that it was too dignified a place for the earth.\nPlato _may_ have come to adopt the positive opinion of\nPhilolaus (that of a central fire) as well as the negative opinion\n(that the Earth was not the central body). But we cannot affirm\nthat he _did_ adopt either this positive opinion or any other\npositive opinion upon that point. I take Theophrastus to have\naffirmed exactly what Plutarch makes him affirm, and no more: that\nPlato came to repent of having assigned to the earth the central\nplace which did not befit it, and to account the centre the fit\nplace \"for some other body better than the Earth,\" yet without\ndefining what that other body was. If Theophrastus had named what\nthe other body was, surely Plutarch would never have suppressed\nthe specific designation to make room for the vague [Greek:\ne(te/r\u00f4| tini\\ krei/ttoni].\n\nThere is thus, in my judgment, ground for believing that Plato in\nhis old age (after the publication of the Treatise De Legibus)\ncame to distrust the geocentric dogma which he had previously\nsupported; but we do not know whether he adopted any other dogma\nin place of it. The geocentric doctrine passed to the Epinomis as\na continuation of the Treatise De Legibus. The phrase which\nPlutarch cites from Theophrastus deserves notice--[Greek:\nTheo/phrastos de\\ kai\\ prosistorei= t\u00f4=| Pla/t\u00f4ni presbute/r\u00f4|\ngenome/n\u00f4| _metamelei=n_, \u00f4(s ou) pros\u00ea/kousan a)podo/nti\nt\u00ea=| g\u00ea=| t\u00ea\\n me/s\u00ean ch\u00f4/ran tou= panto/s.] Plato\n_repented_. Whoever reads the Treatise De Legibus (especially\nBooks vii. and x.) will see that Plato at that period of his life\nconsidered astronomical errors as not merely errors, but heresies\noffensive to the Gods; and that he denounced those who supported\nsuch errors as impious. If Plato came afterwards to alter his\nastronomical views, he would _repent_ of his own previous\nviews as of a heresy. He came to believe that he had rated the\ndignity of the Earth too high; and we can see how this change of\nview may have been occasioned. Earth was looked upon by him, as\nwell as by many others, in two distinct points of view. 1. As a\ncosmical body, divine, and including [Greek: tou\\s chthoni/ous\ntheou/s]. 2. As one of the four elements, along with water, air,\nand fire; in which sense it was strung together with [Greek:\nli/thoi], and had degrading ideas associated with it (Plato, Apol.\nSokr. p. 26 D). These two meanings, not merely distinct but even\nopposed to each other, occur in the very same sentence of De\nLegibus, x. p. 886 D. The elemental sense of Earth was brought\nprominently forward by those reasoners whom Plato refutes in Book\nx.: and the effect of such reasonings upon him was, that though he\nstill regarded Earth as a Deity, he no longer continued to regard\nEarth as worthy of the cosmical post of honour. At that age,\nhowever, he might well consider himself excused from broaching any\nnew positive theory.]\n\n[Side-note: Problem which the Nocturnal Council are\nrequired to solve, What is the common property of Prudence,\nCourage, Temperance, Justice, by reason of which each is called\nVirtue?]\n\nAssuming that the magistrates of the Nocturnal Council have gone\nthrough the course of education prescribed in the Epinomis, and\nhave proved themselves unimpeachable on the score of\northodoxy--will they be able to solve the main problem which he has\nimposed upon them at the close of the Leges? There, as elsewhere,\nhe proclaims a problem as indispensable to be solved, but does not\nhimself furnish any solution. What is the common property, or\npoint of similarity between Prudence, Courage, Temperance,\nJustice--by reason of which each is termed Virtue? What are the\ncharacteristic points of difference, by reason of which Virtue\nsometimes receives one of these names, sometimes another?\n\n[Side-note: The only common property is that all of them\nare essential to the maintenance of society, and tend to promote\nhuman security and happiness.]\n\nThe proper way of answering this question has been much debated,\nfrom Plato's day down to the present. It is one of the fundamental\nproblems of Ethical Philosophy.\n\nThe subjective matter of fact, implied by every one who designates\nan act or a person as virtuous, is an approving or admiring\nsentiment which each man knows in his own bosom. But Plato assumes\nthat there is, besides this, an objective connotation: a\ncommon object or property to which such sentiment refers. What is\nthat common object? I see no other except that which is indicated\nby the principle of Utility: I mean that principle which points\nout Happiness and Unhappiness, not merely of the agent himself,\nbut also of others affected or liable to be affected by his\nbehaviour, as the standard to which these denominations refer.\nCourage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice, all tend to prevention and\nmitigation of unhappiness, and to increase of happiness, as well\nfor the agent himself as for the society surrounding him. The\nopposite qualities--Timidity, Imprudence, Intemperance,\nInjustice--tend with equal certainty either to increase positively\nthe unhappiness of the agent and of society, or to remove the\nmeans for warding it off or abating it. Indeed there is a certain\nminimum of all the four--Courage, Prudence, Temperance,\nJustice--without which or below which neither society could hold\ntogether, nor the life of the individual agent himself could be\ncontinued.\n\n[Side-note: Tendency of the four opposite qualities to\nlessen human happiness.]\n\nHere then is one answer at least to the question of Plato.\nCourage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice--all of them mental\nattributes of rational voluntary agents--have also the common\nproperty of being, in a certain minimum degree, absolutely\nessential to the life of the agent and the maintenance of\nsociety--and of being, above that degree, tutelary against the\nsuffering, and beneficial to the happiness, of both. This tutelary\nor beneficent tendency is the common objective property signified\nby the general term Virtue; and is implicated with the subjective\nproperty before mentioned--the sentiment of approbation. The four\nopposite qualities are designated by the general term Vice or\nDefect, connoting both maleficent tendency and the sentiment of\ndisapprobation.\n\n[Side-note: A certain measure of all the four virtues is\nrequired. In judging of particular acts instigated by each, there\nis always a tacit reference to the hurt or benefit in the special\ncase.]\n\nThis proposition will be farther confirmed, if we look at all the\nfour qualities--Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice--in another\npoint of view. Taking them in their reference to Virtue, each of\nthem belongs to Virtue as a part to the whole,[495] not as one\nspecies contradistinguished from and excluding other species.\nThe same person may have, and ought to have, a certain measure of\nall: he will not be called virtuous unless he has a measure of\nall. Excellence in any one will not compensate for the entire\nabsence of the others.\n\n[Footnote 495: Compare Plato, Legg. i. p. 629 B, where he\ndescribes [Greek: t\u00ea\\n xu/mpasan a)ret\u00ea\\n--dikaiosu/n\u00ea kai\\\ns\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ea kai\\ phro/n\u00easis ei)s tau)to\\n e)lthou=sa met'\na)ndrei/as]: also pp. 630 C-E, 631 A, where he considers all these\nas [Greek: mo/ria a)ret\u00ea=s], but [Greek: phro/n\u00easis] as the first\nof the four and [Greek: a)ndrei/a] as the last.\n\nSee also iii. pp. 688 B, 696 C-D, iv. p. 705 D.]\n\nA just and temperate man will not be accounted virtuous, if (to\nuse an Aristotelian simile) he be so extravagantly timid as to\nfear every insect that flits by, or the noise of a mouse.[496] All\nprobability of beneficent results from his agency is effaced by\nthis capital defect: and it is the probability of such results\nwhich constitute his title to be called virtuous.\n\n[Footnote 496: Aristot. Ethic. Nikomach. vii. 6, p. 1148, a. 8;\nPolitic. vii. 1, p. 1323, a. 29. [Greek: ka)\\n psoph\u00ea/s\u00ea| mu=s . . .\ndedi\u00f4\\s ta\\s parapetome/nas mui/as.]]\n\nWhen we speak of the four as qualities or attributes of men (as\nPlato does in this treatise, while considering the proper type of\ncharacter which the lawgiver should aim at forming) we speak of\nthem in the abstract--that is, making abstraction of particular\ncircumstances, and regarding only what is common to most men in\nmost situations. But in the realities of life these particulars\nare always present: there is a series of individual agents and\npatients, acts and sufferings, each surrounded by its own distinct\ncircumstances and situation. Now in each of these situations an\nagent is held responsible for the consequences of his acts, when\nthey are such as he knows and foresees, or might by reasonable\ncare know and foresee. An officer who (like Charles XII. at\nBender) marches up without necessity at the head of a corporal's\nguard to attack a powerful hostile army of good soldiers, exhibits\nthe maximum of courage: but his act, far from being commended as\nvirtue, must be blamed as rashness, or pitied as folly. If a\nfriend has deposited in my care a sword or other deadly weapon (to\nrepeat the very case put by Sokrates[497]), justice requires me to\ngive it back to him when he asks for it. Yet if, at the time when\nhe asks, he be insane, and exhibits plain indications of being\nabout to employ it for murderous purposes, my just restoration of\nit will not be commended as an act of virtue. When we look at\nthese four qualities--Courage, Prudence, Temperance,\nJustice--not in the abstract, but in reference to particular acts,\nagents, and situations--we find that before a just or courageous\nact can be considered to deserve the name of Virtue, there is always\na tacit supposition, that no considerable hurt to innocent persons\nis likely or predictable from it in the particular case. The\nsentiment of approbation, implied in the name Virtue, will not go\nalong with the act, if in the particular case it produce a certain\namount of predictable mischief. This is another property common to\nall the four attributes of mind--Courage, Prudence, Temperance,\nJustice:--and forming one of the conditions under which they\nbecome entitled to the denomination of Virtue.\n\n[Footnote 497: Plato, Republic, i. p. 331 C; Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2,\n17; Cicero, De Officiis, iii. 25.]\n\n[Side-note: Plato places these four virtues in the highest\nscale of Expetenda or Bona, on the ground that all the other Bona\nare sure to flow from them.]\n\nIn the first books of the Leges, Plato[498] puts forward Courage,\nPrudence, Temperance, Justice, as the parts or sorts of Virtue:\ntelling us that the natural rectitude of laws consists in\npromoting, not any one of the four separately, but all the four\ntogether in their due subordination. He classifies good things\n(Bona or Expetenda) in a triple scale of value.[499] First, and\nbest of all, come the mental attributes--which he calls\ndivine--Prudence or Intelligence, Temperance, Justice, and\nCourage: Second, or second best, come the attributes of\nbody--health, strength, beauty, activity, manual dexterity: Third,\nor last, come the extraneous advantages, Wealth, Power,\nFamily-Position, &c. It is the duty of the lawgiver to employ his utmost\ncare to ensure to his citizens the first description of Bona\n(the mental attributes)--upon which (Plato says) the second and third\ndescription depend, so that if the first are ensured, the second\nand third will be certain to follow: while if the lawgiver,\nneglecting the first, aims at the second and third exclusively or\nprincipally, he will miss all three.[500] Here we see, that while\nPlato assigns the highest scale of value to the mental\nattributes, he justifies such preference by assuring us that they\nare the essential producing causes of the other sorts of Bona. His\nassurance is even given in terms more unqualified than the\nrealities of life will bear out.\n\n[Footnote 498: Plato, Legg. i. pp. 627 D, 631 A-C.]\n\n[Footnote 499: Plato, Legg. i. p. 631 B-D, iii. p. 697 B. This\ntripartite classification of Bona differs altogether from the\ntripartite classification of Bona given at the commencement of the\nsecond book of the Republic. But it agrees with that, the \"tria\ngenera Bonorum,\" distinguished by Aristotle in the first Book of\nthe Nikomachean Ethics (p. 1098, b. 12), among which [Greek: ta\\\nperi\\ psuch\u00ea/n] were [Greek: kuri\u00f4/tata kai\\ ma/lista a)gatha/].\nThis recognition of \"tria genera Bonorum\" is sometimes quoted as\nan opinion characteristic of the Peripatetics; but Aristotle\nhimself declares it to be ancient and acknowledged, and we\ncertainly have it here in Plato.]\n\n[Footnote 500: Plato, Legg. i. p. 631 C. [Greek: \u00ea)/rt\u00eatai d' e)k\nt\u00f4=n thei/\u00f4n tha/tera, kai\\ e)a\\n me\\n de/ch\u00eatai/ tis ta\\ mei/zona\npo/lis, kta=tai kai\\ ta\\ e)la/ttona; ei) de\\ m\u00ea/, ste/retai\na)mphoi=n.]\n\nThe same doctrine is declared by Sokrates in the Platonic Apology,\npp. 29-30. [Greek: le/g\u00f4n, o(/ti ou)k e)k chr\u00eama/t\u00f4n a)ret\u00ea\\\ngi/gnetai, a)ll' e)x a)ret\u00ea=s chr\u00ea/mata kai\\ ta)/lla a)gatha\\\ntoi=s a)nthr\u00f4/pois a(/panta kai\\ i)di/a| kai\\ d\u00eamosi/a|] (30 B).]\n\n[Side-note: In thus directing the attention of the Council\nto the common property of the four virtues, Plato enforces upon\nthem the necessity of looking to the security and happiness of\ntheir community as the paramount end.]\n\nWhen Plato therefore proclaims it as the great desideratum for his\nSupreme Council, that they shall understand the common relation of\nthe four great mental attributes (Courage, Prudence, Temperance,\nJustice) to each other as well as to the comprehensive whole,\nVirtue--he fastens their attention on the only common property\nwhich the four can be found to possess: _i.e._ that they are\nmental attributes required in every one for the security and\ncomfort of himself and of society. To ward off or mitigate the\nsuffering, and to improve the comfort of society, is thus\ninculcated as the main and constant end for them to keep in view.\nIt is their prescribed task, to preserve and carry forward that\nwhich he as lawgiver had announced as his purpose in the beginning\nof the Leges.\n\n[Side-note: But he enjoins also other objectionable ends.]\n\nIn thus taking leave of Plato, at the close of his longest,\nlatest, and most affirmative composition, it is satisfactory to be\nable to express unqualified sympathy with this main purpose which,\nas departing lawgiver, he directs his successors to promote. But\nto these salutary directions, unfortunately, he has attached\nothers noway connected with them except by common feelings of\nreverence in his own mind and far less deserving of sympathy. He\nrequires that his own religious belief shall be erected into a\nperemptory orthodoxy, and that heretics shall be put down by the\nseverest penalties. Now a citizen might be perfectly just,\ntemperate, brave, and prudent--and yet dissent altogether from the\nPlatonic creed. For such a citizen--the counterpart of Sokrates at\nAthens--no existence would be possible in the Platonic community.\n\n[Side-note: Intolerance of Plato--Comparison of the\nPlatonic community with Athens.]\n\nWe must farther remark that, even when Plato's ends are\nunexceptionable, the amount of interference which he employs\nto accomplish them is often extravagant. As a Constructor, he\ncarries the sentiment of his own infallibility--which in a certain\nmeasure every lawgiver must assume--to an extreme worthy only of\nthe kings of the Saturnian age:[501] manifesting the very minimum\nof tolerance for that enquiring individual reason of which his own\nnegative dialogues remain as immortal masterpieces. We trace this\nintolerance through all the dialogue Leges. Even when he\ncondescends to advise and persuade, he speaks rather in the tone\nof an encyclical censor, than of one who has before him a\nreasonable opponent to be convinced. The separate laws proposed by\nPlato are interesting to read, as illustrating antiquity: but most\nof them are founded on existing Athenian law. Where they depart\nfrom it, they depart as often for the worse as for the better--so\nfar as I can pretend to judge. And in spite of all the\nindisputable defects, political and judicial, of that glorious\ncity, where Plato was born and passed most of his days--it was, in\nmy judgment, preferable to his Magn\u00eatic city, as to all the great\nobjects of security, comfort, recreation, and enjoyment. Athens\nwas preferable, even for the ordinary citizen: but for the men of\nfree, inquisitive, self-thinking, minds--the dissentient minority,\nwho lived upon that open speech of which Athenian orators and\npoets boasted--it was a condition of existence: since the Platonic\ncensorship would have tolerated neither their doctrines nor their\npersons.\n\n[Footnote 501: Plato, Politikus, pp. 271 E, 275 A-C.]\n\n\nAPPENDIX.\n\n\nSince the commencement of the present century, with its increased\ncritical study of Plato, different and opposite opinions have been\nmaintained by various authors respecting the genuineness or\nspuriousness of the Treatise De Legibus. Schleiermacher (Platons\nWerke, I. i. p. 51) admitted it as a genuine work of Plato, but\nranked it among the Nebenwerke, or outlying dialogues:\n_i.e._, as a work that did not form an item or stepping-stone\nin the main Platonic philosophical series (which Schleiermacher\nattempts to lay out according to a system of internal sequence and\ngradual development), but was composed separately, in general\nanalogy with the later or more constructive portion of that\nseries. On the other hand, Ast (Platons Leben und Schriften, pp.\n376-392) distinctly maintains that the Treatise De Legibus is not\nthe composition of Plato, but of one of his scholars and\ncontemporaries, perhaps Xenokrates or the Opuntian Philippus. Ast\nsupports this opinion by many internal grounds, derived from a\ncomparison of the treatise with other Platonic dialogues.\n\nZeller (in his Platonische Studien, T\u00fcbingen, 1839, pp. 1-144)\ndiscussed the same question in a more copious and elaborate\nmanner, and declared himself decidedly in favour of Ast's\nopinion--that the Treatise De Legibus was not the work of Plato,\nbut of one among his immediate scholars. But in his History of\nGrecian Philosophy (vol. ii. pp. 348-615-641, second edition),\nZeller departs from this judgment, and pronounces the Treatise to\nbe a genuine work of Plato--the last form of his philosophy,\nmodified in various ways.\n\nAgain Suckow (in his work, Die wissenschaftliche und k\u00fcnstlerische\nForm der Platonischen Schriften, Berlin, 1855, I. pp. 111-118\nseq.) advocates Zeller's first opinion--that the Treatise De\nLegibus is not the work of Plato.\n\nLastly Stallbaum, in the Prolegomena prefixed to his edition of\nthe Treatise, strenuously vindicates its Platonic authorship. This\nis also the opinion of Boeckh and K. F. Hermann; and was,\nmoreover, the opinion of all critics (I believe) anterior to Ast.\n\nTo me, I confess, it appears that the Treatise De Legibus is\namong the best authenticated works of the Platonic collection. I\ndo not know what better positive proof can be tendered than the\naffirmation of Aristotle in his Politics--distinct and\nunqualified, mentioning both the name of the author and the title\nof the work, noting also the relation in which it stood to the\nRepublic, both as a later composition of the same author, and as\ndiscrepant on some points of doctrine, analogous on others. This\nin itself is the strongest _prim\u00e2 facie_ evidence, not to be\nrebutted, except by some counter-testimony, or by some internal\nmark of chronological impossibility: moreover, it coincides with\nthe consentient belief of all the known ancient authors later than\nAristotle--such as Zeno the Stoic, who composed a treatise in\nseven books--[Greek: Pro\\s tou\\s Pla/t\u00f4nos No/mous] (Diog. Laert.\nvii. 36), Pers\u00e6us, the Alexandrine critics, Cicero, Plutarch,\n&c. (Stallbaum, Prolegg. p. xliv.) Aristophanes Grammaticus\nclassified both Leges and Epinomis as Plato's works. The arguments\nproduced in Zeller's Platonische Studien, to show that Aristotle\nmay have been mistaken in his assertion, are of little or no\nforce. Nor will it be material to the present question, even if we\nconcede to Zeller and Suckow another point which they contend\nfor--that the remarks of Aristotle upon Plato's opinions are often\ninaccurate at least, if not unfair. For here Aristotle is produced\nin court only as a witness to authenticity.\n\nAmong the points raised by Suckow, there is indeed one, which if\nit were made out, would greatly invalidate, if not counterbalance,\nthe testimony of Aristotle. Suckow construes the passage in the\nOration of Isokrates ad Philippum (p. 84, \u00a7 14)--[Greek: o(moi/\u00f4s\noi( toiou=toi t\u00f4=n lo/g\u00f4n a)/kuroi tugcha/nousin o)/ntes toi=s\nno/mois kai\\ tai=s politei/ais tai=s u(po\\ t\u00f4=n sophist\u00f4=n\ngegramme/nais]--as if it alluded to the Platonic Republic, and to\nthe Treatise De Legibus; but as if it implied, at the same time,\nthat the two treatises were not composed by the same author, but\nby different authors, indicated by the plural [Greek: sophist\u00f4=n].\nIf this were the true meaning of Isokrates, we should then have\nAristotle distinctly contradicted by another respectable\ncontemporary witness, which would of course much impair the value\nof his testimony.\n\nBut Stallbaum (p. lii.) disputes altogether the meaning ascribed\nby Suckow to the words of Isokrates, and contends that the plural\n[Greek: sophist\u00f4=n] noway justifies the hypothesis of a double\nauthorship. So far, I think, he is decidedly right: and this\nclears away the only one item of counter-testimony which has yet\nbeen alleged against Aristotle as a witness. Stallbaum, indeed,\ngoes a step farther. He contends that the passage above cited from\nIsokrates is an evidence on his side, and against Suckow:\nthat Isokrates alludes to Plato as author of both Republic and\nLeges, and thus becomes available as a second contemporary\nwitness, confirming the testimony of Aristotle. This is less\ncertain; yet perhaps supposable. We may imagine that Isokrates,\nwhen he composed the passage, had in his mind Plato\npre-eminently--then recently dead at a great age, and the most\nillustrious of all the Sophists who had written upon political theory.\nThe vague and undefined language in which Isokrates speaks, however,\nsets forth, by contrast, the great evidentiary value of Aristotle's\naffirmation, which is distinct and specific in the highest degree,\ndeclaring Plato to be the author of Leges.\n\nTo contradict this affirmation--an external guarantee of unusual\nforce--Zeller produces a case of internal incredibility. The Legg.\ncannot be the work of Plato (he argues) because of the numerous\ndisparities and marked inferiority of style, handling, and\ndoctrine, which are very frequently un-Platonic, and not seldom\nanti-Platonic. Whoever will read the Platonische Studien, will see\nthat Zeller has made out a strong case of this sort, set forth\nwith remarkable ability and ingenuity. Indeed, the strength of the\ncase, as to internal discrepancy, is fully admitted by his\nopponent Stallbaum, who says in general terms (Prolegg. vol. ii.\np. v.)--\"Argumentatio quidem ac disserendi ratio, qu\u00e6 in Legibus\nregnat, ubi considerata fuerit paullo accuratius, dubitare nemo\nsan\u00e8 poterit, quin multa propria ac peculiaria habere judicanda\nsit, qu\u00e6 ab aliorum librorum Platonicorum usu et consuetudine\nlongissim\u00e9 recedant\". He then proceeds to enumerate in detail many\nserious points of discrepancy. See the second part (ch. xv.) of\nhis Prolegomena, prefixed to Book v. Legg., and in Prolegg. to his\nedition of 1859, pp. lv.-lix. But in spite of such undeniable\nforce of internal improbability, Stallbaum still maintains that\nthe Treatise is really the work of Plato. Of course, he does not\nadmit that the whole of the internal evidence is nothing but\ndiscrepancy. He points out also much that is homogeneous and\nPlatonic.\n\nI agree with his conclusion (which is also the subsequent\nconclusion of Zeller) respecting the authorship of Legg. To me the\ntestimony of Aristotle appears conclusive. But when I perceive how\nstrong are the grounds for doubt, so long as we discuss the\nquestion on grounds of internal evidence simply (that is, by\ncomparison with other Platonic dialogues) while yet such doubts\nare over-ruled, by our fortunately possessing incontestable\nauthenticating evidence _ab extra_--an inference suggests\nitself to me, of which Platonic critics seem for the most part\nunconscious. I mean the great fallibility of reasonings founded\nsimply on internal evidence, for the purpose of disproving\nauthenticity, where we have no external evidence,\ncontemporary or nearly contemporary, to controul them. In this\ncondition are the large majority of the dialogues. I do not affirm\nthat such reasonings are never to be trusted; but I consider them\neminently fallible. To compare together the various dialogues,\nindeed, and to number as well as to weigh the various instances of\nanalogy and discrepancy between them, is a process always\ninstructive. It is among the direct tasks and obligations of the\ncritic. But when, after detecting discrepancies, more or less\ngrave and numerous, he proceeds to conclude, that the dialogue in\nwhich they occur cannot have been composed by Plato, he steps upon\nground full of hypothesis and uncertainty. Who is to fix the limit\nof admissible divergence between the various compositions of a man\nlike Plato? Who can determine what changes may have taken place in\nPlato's opinions, or point of view, or intellectual powers--during\na long literary life of more than fifty years, which we know only\nin mere outline? Considering that Plato systematically lays aside\nhis own personal identity, and speaks only under the assumed names\nof different expositors, opponents, and respondents--which of us\ncan claim to possess a full and exhaustive catalogue of all the\ndiverse phases of Platonism, so as to make sure that some\nunexpected variety has no legitimate title to be ranked among\nthem?\n\nFor my part, I confess that these questions appear to me full of\ndoubt and difficulty. I am often surprised at the confidence with\nwhich critics, upon the faith of internal evidence purely and\nsimply, pronounce various dialogues of the Platonic collection to\nbe spurious. A lesson of diffidence may be learnt from the Leges:\nwhich, if internal evidence alone were accessible, would stand\namong the questionable items of the Platonic catalogue--while it\nnow takes rank among the most unquestionable, from the complete\nexternal certificate which has been fortunately preserved to us.\n\nStallbaum, who maintains the authenticity of the Platonic Leges,\ndisallows altogether that of the Epinomis. In his long and learned\nProlegg. (vol. iii. p. 441-470), he has gone over the whole case,\nand stated at length his reasons for this opinion. I confess that\nhis reasons do not satisfy me. If, on the faith of those reasons,\nI rejected the Epinomis, I should also on the grounds stated by\nAst and Zeller reject the Leges. The reasons against the Leges are\nof the same character and tenor as those against the Epinomis, and\nscarce at all less weighty. Respecting both of them, it may be\nshown that they are greatly inferior in excellence to the Republic\nand the other masterpieces of the Platonic genius, and that they\ncontain points of doctrine and reasoning different from what we\nread in other Platonic works. But when, from these premisses,\nI am called upon to admit that they are not the works of Plato, I\ncannot assent either about the one or the other. I have already\nobserved that I expect to find among his genuine compositions,\nsome inferior in merit, others dissentient in doctrine--especially\nin compositions admitted to belong to his oldest age. All critics\nfrom Aristophanes down to Tennemann, have admitted the Epinomis as\ngenuine: and when Stallbaum contends that Diogenes mentions doubts\non the point entertained even in antiquity--I think he is not\nwarranted by the words of that author, iii. 37: [Greek: e)/nioi/\nte phasi\\n o(/ti Phi/lippos o( O)pou/ntios tou\\s No/mous au)tou=\n(Pla/t\u00f4nos) mete/grapsen o)/ntas e)n k\u00ear\u00f4=|; tou/tou de\\ kai\\ t\u00ea\\n\nE)pinomi/da phasi\\n ei)=nai.] I do not think we can infer from\nthese words anything more than this--that \"Philippus transcribed\nthe Epinomis also out of the waxen tablet as he had transcribed\nthe Leges\". The persons (whosoever they were--[Greek: e)/nioi]) to\nwhom Diogenes refers, considered Philippus as in part the author\nof the [Greek: No/moi]; because he had first transcribed them in a\nlegible form from the rough original, and might possibly have\nintroduced changes of his own in the transcription. If they had\nmeant to distinguish what he did in respect to the Leges, from\nwhat he did in respect to the Epinomis: if they had meant to\nassert that he transcribed the Leges, but that he composed the\nEpinomis as an original addition of his own; I think they would\nhave employed, not the conjunction [Greek: kai\\], but some word\nindicating contrast and antithesis.\n\nBut even if we concede that the persons here alluded to by\nDiogenes did really believe, that the Epinomis was the original\ncomposition of Philippus and not of Plato--we must remember that\nall the critics of antiquity known to us believed the\ncontrary--that it was the genuine work of Plato. In particular,\nAristophanes Grammaticus acknowledges it as such; enrolling it in\none trilogy with the Minos and the Leges. The testimony of\nAristophanes, and the records of the Alexandrine Library in his time,\ngreatly outweigh the suspicions of the unknown critics alluded to by\nDiogenes; even if we admit that those critics did really conceive\nthe Epinomis as an actual composition of Philippus.\n\n\n\n\nTHE END.\n\n\n\n\nGENERAL INDEX.\n\n\nA.\n\nAbsolute and relative, radically distinct points of view, i. 23\n_n._;\n  of Xenophanes, 18;\n  of Parmenides, 20-24, 66;\n  agrees with Kant's, 21;\n  of Herakleitus, 29;\n  and Parmenides opposed, 37;\n  of Anaxagoras, homoeomeries, 59 _n._;\n  of Demokritus, 71, 80;\n  of Zeno, 93, 101;\n  Gorgias the Leontine reasoned against, as ens or entia, 103;\n  and relative, antithetised by Plato in regard to the beautiful,\nii. 54;\n  Plato's argument against, iii. 204, 227;\n  to Plato the only real, 385;\n  an objective, impossible, 294 _n._, 298 _n._;\n  see _Relative_.\n\nAbstract, dialectic deals with, rhetoric with concrete, ii. 52,\n53;\n  and concrete aggregates, _ib._;\n  terms, debates about meaning, iii. 76-78;\n  different views of Aristotle and Plato, 76;\n  and concrete, difference not conspicuous in Plato's time, 229.\n\nAcademy, the, i. 254;\n  decorations, 269 _n._;\n  Platonic school removed, 87 B.C., 265 _n._;\n  library founded for use of inmates and special visitors, 278\n_n._;\n  Cicero on negative vein of, 131 _n._\n\nAchilleus, and the tortoise, i. 97;\n  preferred by Hippias to Odysseus, ii. 56.\n\nAcoustics, to be studied by applying arithmetical relations and\ntheories, iv. 74.\n\nActual and potential, Aristotle's distinction, iii. 135 _n._,\ni.** 139.\n\n[Greek: A)dik\u00ea/mata], iv. 367, 368.\n\n\u00c6lian, ii. 85 _n._\n\n\u00c6schines, Sokraticus, dialogues of, i. 112, 114 _n._, 115,\n211 _n._;\n  Lysias' oration against, 112.\n\n\u00c6sculapius, belief in, ii. 418 _n._\n\n\u00c6thiops, i. 195.\n\nAffirmative, see _Negative_.\n\nAggregate, see _Whole_.\n\n[Greek: Ai)d\u00f4/s], meaning, ii. 269 _n._\n\n[Greek: Ai)/sth\u00easis], relation to [Greek: e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea], iii. 164\n_n._;\n  conceptions of Aristotle and Plato compared, _ib._;\n  connected by Plato with [Greek: a)i+/ss\u00f4], iv. 235 _n._;\n  see _Sense_.\n\n[Greek: A)kolasi/a], derivation, iii. 302 _n._\n\n[Greek: A)l\u00ea/theia], derivation, iii. 302 _n._\n\nAlexander of Aphrodisias, on Chance, i. 143 _n._\n\nAlexandrian Museum founded as a copy of the Platonic and\nAristotelic [Greek: mousei=a] at Athens, i. 277;\n  date of foundation, 280;\n  Demetrius Phalereus chief agent in its establishment,\n_ib._;\n  its contents, 275;\n  rapid accumulation of books, _ib._;\n  under charge of Aristophanes, 273;\n  contained Plato's works before time of Aristophanes, 274;\n  editions of Plato issued, 295;\n  its authority followed by ancient critics, 297, 299.\n\nAlexis, iii. 387 _n._\n\nAlkibiad\u00eas, when young, frequented Sokrates' society, ii. 21;\n  attachment of Sokrates to, iii. 8;\n  fitness as ideal in _Alkibiad\u00eas I._ and _II._, ii. 22;\n  see _Alkibiad\u00eas I._ and _II._ and _Symposion._\n\n_Alkibiad\u00eas_ I. and II., different critical opinions, ii. 17;\n  date, i. 306, 308-11, ii. 22;\n  authenticity, i. 306-7, 309-10, ii. 2 _n._, 17;\n  prolixity, 26;\n  circumstances and interlocutors, 1;\n  fitness of historical Alkibiad\u00eas for ideal, 22;\n  no bearing on the historical Alkibiad\u00eas, 20 _n._;\n  the Platonic picture an ideal, 22;\n  illustrates Sokratico-Platonic method in negative and positive\naspect, 7;\n  actual and anticipated effects of dialectic, 11;\n  analogy with Xenophontic dialogues, 21, 29;\n  Alkibiad\u00eas as Athenian adviser, 2;\n  advises on war and peace, his standard the just and unjust, 3;\n  whence knowledge of it, 4;\n  from the multitude, their judgment worthless, 5;\n  the expedient and inexpedient substituted, 6;\n  the just identified with the good, honourable, expedient, 7;\n  ignorance of Athenian statesmen, eulogy of Spartan and Persian\nkings, 8;\n  Alkibiad\u00eas must become good--for what end and how, 8-10;\n  confesses his ignorance, 10;\n  will never leave Sokrates, 12;\n  Delphian maxim--the mind the self, 11;\n  self-knowledge, from looking into other minds is temperance, 11;\n  situation in _Second_, 12;\n  danger of prayer for mischievous gifts--most men unwise,\n_ib._;\n  instances of injurious gifts--mischiefs of ignorance, 14;\n  depend on the subject-matter, _ib._;\n  few wise public counsellors, why called wise, 15;\n  special accomplishments often hurtful, if no knowledge of the\ngood, 16;\n  Sokrates on prayer and sacrifice, _ib._;\n  Sokrates' purpose, to humble presumptuous youths, 21;\n  his mission against false persuasion of knowledge, 24;\n  his positive solutions illusory, 26-7;\n  opinion embraces all varieties of knowledge save of the good,\n30;\n  the good, how known--unsolved, 31.\n\nAllegorical interpretation of poets, ii. 285;\n  see _Mythe_.\n\n[Greek: A)lupi/a], the Good, iii. 338 _n._;\n  not identical with pleasure, 353, 377;\n  and pleasure included in Hedonists' end, _ib._;\n  is a negative condition intermediate between pleasure and pain,\niv. 86.\n\nAmabile primum, ii. 181, 191;\n  approximates to Idea of Good, 192;\n  the Good, 194;\n  compared with Aristotle's _prima amicitia_, _ib._\n\n[Greek:  A(mart\u00ea/mata], iv. 367, 368.\n\nAmazons, iv. 196.\n\nAna of philosophers, i. 153 _n._\n\nAnalogical and generic wholes, ii. 47, 193 _n._, iii. 365.\n\nAnalogy, Aristotle first distinguished [Greek: o(m\u00f4/numa], [Greek:\nsun\u00f4/numa], and [Greek: kat' a)nalogi/an]**, iii. 94 _n._;\n  see _Metaphor_.\n\n[Greek: A)na/mn\u00easis] different from [Greek: mn\u00ea/m\u00ea], iii. 350\n_n._;\n  see _Reminiscence_.\n\n[Greek: A)nathumi/asis], i. 35 _n._\n\nAnaxagoras, chiefly physical, i. 48;\n  physics, 49;\n  homoeomeries, 48, 52 _n._, 53, 55-6, 58 _n._;\n  essential intermixture of Demokritean atoms analogous, 79\n_n._;\n  denied generation and destruction, 48;\n  and simple bodies, 52 _n._;\n  chaos, 50, 50 _n._, 54;\n  Nous, relation to the homoeomeries, 54-57;\n  originates rotatory movement in chaotic mass, 50;\n  exercised only a catalytic agency, 55;\n  alone pure and unmixed, 50;\n  immaterial and impersonal, 56 _n._;\n  its two attributes, to _move_ and to _know_,\n_ib._;\n  compared with Herakleitus' [Greek: perie/chon], _ib._;\n  Plato's Idea of Good, ii. 412;\n  represented later as a god, i. 54;\n  his own view of it. _ib._;\n  theory as understood by Sokrates, ii. 393, 400, 402 _n._;\n  Hegel on, 403 _n._;\n  erroneously charged with inconsistency, i. 56, ii. 394, 407;\n  animal bodies purer than air or earth, i. 51;\n  suggested partly by the phenomenon of animal nutrition, 53;\n  air and fire, 52, 56 _n._;\n  astronomy, 57;\n  his geology, meteorology, and physiology, 58;\n  his heresy, Sokrates on, 413;\n  threatened prosecution for impiety, 59;\n  accused of substituting physical for mental causes, ii. 401;\n  opposed Empedokles' theory of sensation, i. 58;\n  theory of vision, iv. 237 _n._;\n  illusions of sense, i. 59 _n._;\n  compared with Empedokles, 52;\n  relation to Anaximander, 54;\n  agreement with Diogenes of Apollonia, 64;\n  influence on Aristotle, 89.\n\nAnaximander, philosophy, i. 5;\n  Infinite reproduced in chaos of Anaxagoras, 54;\n  relation to Empedokles, _ib._\n\nAnaximenes, i. 7.\n\nAngler, definition of, iii. 189.\n\nAnimal bodies purer than air or earth, i. 51;\n  generation, Empedokles on, 42;\n  Demokritus' researches in, 75;\n  kosmos the copy of the [Greek: Au)to/z\u00f4on]**, iv. 223, 235\n_n._, 263;\n  genesis of inferior from degenerate man, 252;\n  genesis of, 421.\n\nAnnikeris, i. 202.\n\n[Greek: A)no/\u00eata], meaning, iii. 65 _n._\n\nAntalkidas, peace of, iii. 404.\n\n_Anterast\u00e6_, see _Erast\u00e6_.\n\n[Greek: A)nthr\u00f4/pina, ta/], iv. 302 _n._\n\nAntipater, i. 195.\n\nAntisthenes, works, i. 111, 115, 163 _n._;\n  constant friend of Sokrates, 152;\n  copied manner of Sokrates in plainness and rigour, 150, 158\n_n._;\n  ethical, not transcendental, 122, 149;\n  and ascetic, 151, 160;\n  did not borrow from the Veda, 159 _n._;\n  only identical predication possible, iii. 221, 223, 232\n_n._, 252, i. 165;\n  coincidence with Plato, ii. 47 _n._;\n  refutation of, in _Sophist\u00eas_, iii. 223, 390 _n._, i.\n163, 165;\n  misconceived the function of the copula, iii. 221;\n  errors due to the then imperfect logic, 241;\n  fallacies of, ii. 215;\n  not caricatured in _Kratylus_, iii. 304 _n._, 322\n_n._;\n  on pleasure, 389 _n._;\n  compared with Aristippus, i. 190;\n  antipathy to Plato, 151, 152 _n._, 165;\n  opposed Platonic ideas, 164;\n  the first protest of Nominalism against Realism, _ib._;\n  qualities non-existent without the mind, iii. 74 _n._;\n  distinction of simple and complex objects, i. 171;\n  simple undefinable, _ib._;\n  Aristotle on, 172;\n  Plato, _ib._;\n  Mill, _ib._ _n._;\n  Aristotle on school of, 115;\n  doctrines developed by Stoics, 198.\n\nAntoninus, Marcus, view of death, i.\n422 _n._;\n  etymologies, iii. 308 _n._;\n  _Pius_, compared to Sokrates, ii. 382 _n._, iii. 21\n_n._\n\nAnytus, hostility to Sophists, ii. 240;\n  and philosophy generally, 255.\n\n[Greek: A)/peiron], see _Infinite_.\n\nAphorisms of Herakleitus and the Pythagoreans, i. 106.\n\nAphrodit\u00ea, influence very small in Platonic state, iv. 197, 359\n_n._\n\n[Greek: A)phrosu/n\u00ea], equivoque, ii. 279.\n\nApollo, to be consulted for religious legislation, iv. 34, 137\n_n._, 325, 337;\n  Xenophon on, i. 237;\n  consulted by Xenophon under Sokrates' advice, 208.\n\nApology, naturally the first dialogue for review, i. 411;\n  authenticity, 304, 306, 410, 422 _n._, ii. 421 _n._;\n  date, i. 306-8, 311, 313, 330;\n  Zeno, the Stoic, attracted to Athens by perusal of, 418;\n  its general character, 412;\n  is Sokrates' real defence not intentionally altered 410;\n  testimony to truth of general features of Sokrates' character\nin, 419 _n._;\n  differently set forth in _Kriton_, 428;\n  Sokrates' mission, to combat false persuasion of knowledge, 374,\nii. 24;\n  influence of public beliefs, generated without any ostensible\nauthor, i. 424;\n  Sokrates' judgment on poets, expanded, ii. 129;\n  compared with _Gorgias_, 362 _n._, 368;\n  _Ph\u00e6don_, 419;\n  _Kleitophon_, iii. 421;\n  _Antigone_ of Sophokles, i. 429, _n._\n\nAppetite subordinated by Plato and Aristotle to reason and duty,\niv. 204;\n  soul, 245;\n  analogous to craftsmen in state, 39.\n\n\u00c0 priori, Plato's dogmas are, i. 399;\n  reasonings, Plato differs from moderns, ii. 251;\n  element of cognition, iii. 118.\n\nArchelaus of Macedonia, ii. 325, 333 _n._, 334, 336.\n\nArchilochus, censured by Herakleitus, i. 26.\n\n[Greek: A)ret\u00ea/], derivation, iii. 301 _n._\n\nAr\u00eat\u00ea, i. 195.\n\nArgos, bad basis of government, iv. 310.\n\nArgumenta ad Hominem, i. 98.\n\nAristeides, pupil of Sokrates, ii. 102;\n  reply to _Gorgias_, 371 _n._, i. 243 _n._;\n  belief in dreams, iii. 146 _n._\n\nAristippus, works, i. 111, 116;\n  ethical, not transcendental, 122;\n  discourse of Sokrates with, 175;\n  the choice of Herakles, 177;\n  Sokrates on the Good and Beautiful, 184;\n  good is relative to human beings and wants, 185;\n  relativity of knowledge, iii. 126 _n._, i. 198, 204;\n  the just and honourable, by law, not nature, 197;\n  prudence, a good from its consequent pleasures, _ib._;\n  acted on Sokrates' advice, 187, 199, 201;\n  aspiration for self-mastery, 188;\n  ethical theory, 195, 200 _n._;\n  compared with Diogenes and Antisthenes, 190;\n  developed by Epikurus, 198;\n  scheme of life, 181, 188;\n  Horace's analogous, 192 _n._;\n  pleasure a generation, iii. 378 _n._;\n  communism of wives, i. 189 _n._;\n  contempt for geometry and physics, 186, 192;\n  taught as a Sophist, 193;\n  intercourse with Dionysius, _ib._;\n  antipathy to Xenophon, 182 _n._\n\nAristogeiton, iii. 4 _n._\n\nAristophanes, the _Euthyphron_ a retort against, i. 442;\n  connects idea of immorality with free thought, iv. 166;\n  Sokrates in the _Nubes_, 230 _n._;\n  function of poet, 306 _n._;\n  _Nubes_ analogous to Plato's _Leges_, 277;\n  _Vesp\u00e6_, 298 _n._;\n  _Aves_, 329 _n._\n\nAristophanes [Greek: grammatiko/s], librarian at Alexandria, i.\n273;\n  labours, _ib._ _n._;\n  first to arrange Platonic canon, 286;\n  catalogue of Plato trustworthy, 285;\n  division of Plato into trilogies, 273;\n  principle followed by Thrasyllus, 295, 299.\n\nAristotle and Plato represent pure Hellenic philosophy, i.\n_xiv_;\n  St. Jerome on, _xv_;\n  MSS., 270, 283;\n  Arabic translation, iv. 213 _n._;\n  zoological works, iii. 62 _n._;\n  lost Dialogues, i. 262 _n._;\n  different in form from Plato's, 356 _n._;\n  style, 405;\n  no uniform consistency, 340 _n._;\n  relation to predecessors, 85, 91;\n  importance of his information about early Greek philosophy, 85;\n  as historian, misled by his own conceptions, 24 _n._;\n  contrasts \"human wisdom\" with primitive theology, 3 _n._;\n  treatment of his predecessors compared by Bacon to conduct of a\nSultan, 85 _n._;\n  blames Ionic philosophy for attending to _material_ cause\nalone, 87;\n  abstractions of, compared with Ionians, _ib._;\n  erroneously identified heat with Parmenides' ens, 24 _n._;\n  on Zeno's arguments, 93;\n  on Anaxagorean homoeomeries, 52 _n._;\n  charges Anaxagoras with inconsistency, 56;\n  relation to Empedokles and Anaxagoras, 89;\n  approves of fundamental tenet of Diogenes of Apollonia, 61\n_n._;\n  Demokritus often mentioned in, iv. 355 _n._;\n  blames Demokritus for omitting final causes, i. 73 _n._;\n  on flux of Herakleitus, iii. 154 _n._;\n  accused of substituting physical for mental causes, ii. 401\n_n._;\n  _cause_, difference from Plato, 407;\n  controversy with Megarics about Power, i. 135;\n  depends on question of universal regularity of sequence, 141;\n  Megarics defended by Hobbes, 143;\n  Aristotle's arguments not valid, 136-9;\n  himself concedes the doctrine, 139 _n._;\n  distinction of actual and potential, iii. 135 _n._, i. 139;\n  graduation of causes, 142;\n  motion, coincides nearly with Diod\u00f4rus Kronus, 146;\n  and Hobbes, _ib._;\n  chance, 142;\n  physics retrograded with, 89 _n._;\n  sphericity of kosmos, 25 _n._, iv. 225 _n._;\n  _Demiurgus_ little noticed in, 255;\n  Plato's geometrical theory of the elements, 241 _n._;\n  espoused and enlarged astronomical theory of Eudoxus, i. 257\n_n._;\n  reason of the kosmos, different from Sokrates' conception, ii.\n402 _n._;\n  on Eudoxus, iii. 375 _n._, 379 _n._;\n  time, 103;\n  friend of Ptolemy Soter, i. 279;\n  pupil of Plato, 260;\n  opposition during Plato's lifetime, 360 _n._;\n  mode of alluding to Plato, iii. 186 _n._;\n  on Plato's lectures, i. 347;\n  on poetical vein in Plato, 343, iv. 255 _n._;\n  Plato's tendency to found arguments on metaphor, ii. 337\n_n._;\n  ontology substratum for phenomenology, i. 24 _n._;\n  _philosophia prima_, 358 _n._, iii. 230 _n._,\n382;\n  _materia prima_, i. 72;\n  view of logic of a science, different from Plato's, 358\n_n._;\n  on Plato's ideas, 348, 360 _n._, ii. 192, 194 _n._,\n410 _n._, iii. 64 _n._, 65 _n._, 66 _n._, 67\n_n._, 77 _n._, 78, 245, 367 _n._, iv. 214\n_n._, i. 120 _n._;\n  generic and analogical aggregates, ii. 193, iii. 365 _n._;\n  _Sophist\u00eas_ an approximation to Aristotle's view, 247;\n  definition of _ens_, 230 _n._, 242 _n._;\n  on _the different_, 238 _n._;\n  partly successful in fitting on the ideas to facts of sense, 78;\n  percept prior to the percipient, 76 _n._;\n  conception of [Greek: ai)/sth\u00easis], 165 _n._;\n  Plato's theory of vision, iv. 237 _n._;\n  Plato's doctrine of naming, iii. 286 _n._, 294 _n._,\n325 _n._;\n  etymologies, 301 _n._, 307 _n._, 308 _n._;\n  no analysis or classification of propositions before, 222;\n  propositions, some true, others false, assumed, 249;\n  definition of simple objects, i. 172;\n  on only identical predication possible, 166, 171;\n  more careful than Plato in distinguishing equivoques, ii. 170,\n279 _n._;\n  equivocal meaning of _know_, 213 _n._;\n  indeterminate predicates Ens, Unum, Idem, &c., iii. 94;\n  first to attempt classification of fallacies, ii. 212;\n  De Sophisticis Elenchis, 222;\n  first distinguished [Greek: o(m\u00f4/numa], [Greek: sun\u00f4/numa], and\n[Greek: kat' a)nalogi/an], iii. 94 _n._;\n  two methods, coincide with Thrasyllus' classification, i. 303;\n  basis of dialectic, 133 _n._;\n  negative method, its necessity as a condition of reasoned truth,\n372 _n._;\n  distinct aptitudes required for dialectic, ii. 54;\n  on dissecting function of dialectic, 70 _n._;\n  distinction of dialectic and eristic, 221 _n._;\n  precepts for debate, iii. 91 _n._;\n  Rhetoric, 43;\n  on _Menexenus_, 409 _n._, 412 _n._;\n  distinction of ends, 374 _n._;\n  good the object of universal desire, 372 _n._;\n  threefold division of good, iv. 428 _n._;\n  no common end among established [Greek: no/mima], iii. 282\n_n._;\n  combats Sokrates' thesis in _Memorabilia_ and _Hippias\nMinor_, ii. 67;\n  lying not justifiable, iii. 386 _n._;\n  meanings of justice, iv. 102;\n  meaning of [Greek: phu/sei], iii. 294 _n._;\n  on opposition of natural and legal justice, ii. 340 _n._;\n  nature, iv. 387 _n._;\n  on Law, ii. 92 _n._;\n  theory of politics to resist King Nomos, i. 392;\n  on virtue is knowledge, ii. 67 _n._, 290 _n._;\n  divine inspiration, 131 _n._;\n  [Greek: sophi/a] and [Greek: phro/n\u00easis], 120 _n._;\n  on [Greek: to\\ a)dikei=n be/ltion tou= a)dikei=sthai], 333\n_n._;\n  treatment of courage and temperance, compared with Plato's, 170;\n  derivation of [Greek: s\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ea], iii. 301 _n._;\n  on pleasure, 383 _n._, 386 _n._;\n  pleasure not a generation, 378 _n._;\n  painless pleasures of geometry, 357, 388 _n._;\n  on intense pleasures, 376 _n._;\n  on Antisthenes, 253 _n._;\n  school of Antisthenes, i. 115;\n  on friendship, ii. 186;\n  _prima amicitia_, compared with Sokrates' _amabile\nprimum_, 194;\n  on Plato's reminiscence, 250 _n._;\n  immortality of soul, 420 _n._;\n  relation of body to soul, iii. 389 _n._;\n  on function of lungs, iv. 245 _n._;\n  liver, 258 _n._;\n  Plato's physiology and pathology compared with, 260;\n  definition of _sophist_, ii. 210;\n  equally with Sophists, laid claim to universal knowledge, iii.\n219;\n  on _Homo mensura_, 120 _n._, 128 _n._, 131\n_n._, 132 _n._, 149 _n._, 152;\n  cites from the _Protagoras_, ii. 290 _n._;\n  category of relation, iii. 128 _n._;\n  the Axioms of Mathematics, i. 358 _n._;\n  ethics and politics treated apart, iv. 138;\n  three ends of political constructor, 328 _n._;\n  education combined with polity, 142, 184;\n  on principle that every citizen belongs to the city, 187, 189\n_n._;\n  training of Spartan women, 188;\n  views on teaching, iii. 53 _n._;\n  chorus of elders only criticise, iv. 297 _n._;\n  importance of music in education, 151 _n._, 305;\n  ethical and emotional effects conveyed by sense of hearing, 307\n_n._;\n  implication of intelligence and emotion, iii. 374 _n._;\n  view of tragic poetry, iv. 317 _n._;\n  Plato's ideal state, 139 _n._;\n  it is two states, 185;\n  objection valid against his own ideal, 186 _n._;\n  the Demos adjuncts, not members of state, 184;\n  Plato's state impossible, in what sense true, 189;\n  democracy and monarchy _not_ mother-polities, 312\n_n._;\n  oligarchical character of Plato's second _id\u00e9al_, 334\n_n._;\n  _id\u00e9al_ of character, different from Spartan, 182;\n  differs from Plato on slavery, 344 _n._;\n  land of citizens, 327 _n._;\n  number of citizens limited, 198-201, 326 _n._;\n  communism, 180** _n._;\n  Plato's family restrictions, 329 _n._;\n  on marriage, 189, 198-202;\n  on infanticide, 202;\n  recognised Malthus' law of population, _ib._;\n  allusions to _Leges_, 272 _n._, 432;\n  prayer and sacrifice, 394.\n\nArithmetic, Pythagorean, i. 15;\n  modern application of their principle, 10 _n._;\n  subject of Plato's lectures, 349 _n._;\n  twofold, iii. 359, 394;\n  to be studied, iv. 423;\n  awakening power of, 71, 72;\n  value of, 329 _n._, 352;\n  acoustics to be studied by relations and theories of, 74;\n  proportionals, 224 _n._, 423;\n  its axioms from induction, 353 _n._;\n  Mill on assumption in axioms of, iii. 396 _n._\n\nArt, the supreme, is philosophy, ii. 119, 120;\n  disparaged by Plato, 355;\n  relation to science, iii. 43 _n._, 45, 155, 263;\n  relation to morality, see _Education_, _Poets_**.\n\nAscetic life of philosopher, ii. 386;\n  Pythagoreans, iii. 390 _n._;\n  Orphics, _ib._;\n  Cynics, i. 151, 157;\n  Diogenes compared with Indian Gymnosophists and Selli, 157, 159\n_n._, 163 _n._;\n  Indian Gynmosophists, antiquity of, 159 _n._;\n  Selli, 163 _n._\n\nAspasia, iii. 402, i. 112, 211 _n._\n\nAssociation of Ideas, i. 423 _n._;\n  Plato's statement of general law of, ii. 191;\n  Aristotle, _ib._ _n._;\n  Straton on, iii. 166 _n._\n\nAst, theory of Platonic canon, i. 304;\n  admits only fourteen, 305;\n  on _Apology_, 422 _n._;\n  _Lach\u00eas_, ii. 151;\n  _Hippias Major_, 33 _n._;\n  _Kratylus_, iii. 310 _n._;\n  _Menexenus_, 412 _n._;\n  _Tim\u00e6us_, iv. 255 _n._;\n  _Leges_, 431, 434.\n\nAstronomy, ancient, i. 3;\n  of Anaxagoras, 57;\n  modern, doctrine of aerolithes anticipated by Diogenes of\nApollonia, 64 _n._;\n  first systematic Greek hypothesis propounded by Eudoxus, 255;\n  Planets, meaning in Plato's age, iv. 354 _n._, 422;\n  Demokritus' idea of motions of, 355 _n._;\n  Plato's idea of motions of, _ib._;\n  Sokrates avoided, i. 376;\n  Plato's relation to theory of Eudoxus, 257 _n._;\n  theological view of, iv. 421;\n  advantages of this view, 422;\n  object of instruction in, 354;\n  must be studied by ideal figures, not observation, 73.\n\nAtheist, loose use of term, iv. 382 _n._\n\nAthenians, proceedings of Sokrates repugnant to, i. 387;\n  statesmen, ignorance of, ii. 8, 360;\n  characteristics of, 118;\n  customs of, iii. 24 _n._;\n  intellect predominant in, iv. 38;\n  Plato's _id\u00e9al_ of character, 147, 151;\n  ancient, citizens of Plato's state identified with, 266;\n  general coincidence of Platonic and Attic law, 364, 374\n_n._, 403, 406, 430;\n  taxes of, i. 242 _n._\n\nAthens, less intolerance at, than elsewhere, iii. 277, iv. 396;\n  lauded, iii. 405, 409 _n._;\n  by Xenophon, i. 238;\n  funeral harangues at, iii. 401-5;\n  hatred to [Greek: ba/rbaroi], 406 _n._;\n  and Persia compared, iv. 312;\n  excess of liberty at, _ib._;\n  change for worse at, after Persian invasion, 313;\n  contrast in Demosthenes and _Menexenus_, 315 _n._,\n318;\n  Plato's aversion to dramatic poetry at, 316;\n  peculiar to himself, 317;\n  Aristotle differs, _ib._ _n._;\n  Plato's ideal compared with, 430;\n  secession of philosophers from, i. 111 _n._\n\nAtlantic, unnavigable, the belief in Plato's age, iv. 270.\n\nAtlantis, iv. 215;\n  description of, 268;\n  corruption and wickedness of people, 269;\n  address of Zeus, _ib._;\n  submergence, 270.\n\nAtoms, atomic theory, i. 65;\n  relation to Eleatics, 66;\n  of Demokritus, differ, only in magnitude, figure, position, and\narrangement, 69;\n  generate qualities by movements and combinations, _ib._,\n70;\n  possess inherent force, 73;\n  not really objects of sense, 72 _n._;\n  essentially separate from each other, 71;\n  yet analogous to the homoeomeries of Anaxagoras, 79 _n._;\n  different from Platonic _Idea_ and Aristotle's _materia\nprima_, 72;\n  mental, 75;\n  thought produced by influx of, 79.\n\nAttikus, iv. 242 _n._\n\nAugustine, St., iii. 303 _n._\n\nAustin, meaning of law, ii. 92 _n._\n\nAuthority, early appearance in Greece of a few freethinkers, i.\n384;\n  multiplicity of individual authorities characteristic of Greek\nphilosophy, 84;\n  distinguished them from contemporary nations, 90;\n  advantages, _ib._;\n  influence of, on most men, 378-82, 392, 424, ii. 333, iv. 351;\n  Aristophanes connects idea of immorality with free thought, 166;\n  freedom of thought essential to philosophy, i. 383, 394\n_n._, ii. 368, iii. 151 _n._;\n  the basis of dialectic, 147, 297, 337 _n._;\n  all exposition an assemblage of individual judgments, 139;\n  belief on, relation to _Homo mensura_, 142, 143, 293;\n  Sokrates asserts right of satisfaction for his own individual\nreason, i. 386, 423, 436, ii. 233;\n  individual reason authoritative to each, i. 432;\n  Plato on difficulty of resisting, 392 _n._;\n  combated by Plato, 398 _n._;\n  Plato's dissent from established religious doctrine, iv. 161,\n163;\n  danger of one who dissents from the public, ii. 359, 364, 366;\n  dignity and independence of philosophic dissenter, upheld, 375;\n  individual reason worthless, Herakleitus, i. 34;\n  of public judgment, nothing, of expert, everything, 426, 435;\n  different view, 446 _n._;\n  Sokrates does not name, but himself acts as, expert, 435;\n  appeal to, suppressed in Academic sect, 368 _n._;\n  Epiktetus on, 388 _n._;\n  Cicero, 369, 384 _n._;\n  Bishop Huet, _ib._;\n  Council of Trent, 390 _n._;\n  Dr. Vaughan, iv. 380 _n._;\n  see _Orthodoxy_.\n\nAverroism, iii. 68 _n._\n\nAxiomata media, iii. 52, 369.\n\nAxioms of Mathematics, Aristotle's view, i. 358 _n._;\n  of Arithmetic and Geometry, from induction, iii. 396 _n._,\niv. 353 _n._\n\n\nB.\n\nBacon, importance of negative method, i. 373 _n._, 386;\n  on doubt, 394 _n._;\n  misrepresents Aristotle's treatment of his predecessors, 85\n_n._;\n  contrasts Plato and Aristotle with Pre-Sokratic philosophy, 88\n_n._;\n  _Idola_, ii. 218;\n  anticipation of nature, 219 _n._;\n  relativity of mental and sensational processes, iii. 122\n_n._;\n  axiomata media, 52, 369.\n\nBadham, Dr., on _Phil\u00eabus_, iii. 365 _n._, 381 _n._,\n389 _n._, 392 _n._, 396 _n._\n\nBain, Prof., on the Beautiful, ii. 50 _n._;\n  the Tender Emotion, 188 _n._;\n  law of mental association, 192 _n._;\n  analysis of Belief, 218;\n  reciprocity of regard indispensable to society, 312 _n._;\n  relativity of knowledge, iii. 123 _n._;\n  on pleasures, 383 _n._\n\nBatteux, iv. 229 _n._\n\nBayle, iv. 233.\n\nBeautiful, the, as translation of [Greek: to\\ kalo/n], ii. 49\n_n._;\n  Hippias' lectures at Sparta on, 39;\n  what is, _ib._;\n  instances given, 40;\n  gold makes all things beautiful, 41;\n  not the becoming or the profitable, 43, 50 _n._;\n  a variety of the pleasurable, 45;\n  inadmissible, _ib._;\n  Dugald Stewart, Mill, and Bain on, 50 _n._;\n  Plato's antithesis of relative and absolute, 54;\n  difference of Sokrates and Plato, 55;\n  as object of attachment, 194;\n  aspect of physical, awakens reminiscence of Ideas, 422, iii. 4,\n14;\n  Greek sentiment towards youths, 1;\n  stimulus to mental procreation, 4, 6, 18;\n  different view, _Ph\u00e6don_, _The\u00e6t\u00eatus_,\n_Sophist\u00eas_, _Republic_, _ib._;\n  exaltation of Eros in a few, love of beauty _in genere_, 7,\n16;\n  love of, excited by musical training, iv. 27;\n  and the good, iii. 5 _n._;\n  Idea of, exclusively presented in _Symposion_, 18;\n  discourse of Sokrates with Aristippus, i. 184.\n\nBeckmann, book-censors, iv. 379 _n._\n\nBelief, Prof. Bain's analysis, ii. 218;\n  causes of, variable, iii. 150;\n  always relative to the believer's mind, 292, 297;\n  sentiments of disbelief and, common, but grounds different with\ndifferent men and ages, 296;\n  and conjecture, two grades of opinion, iv. 67;\n  Plato's canon of, 231.\n\nBentham, meaning of Law, ii. 92 _n._\n\nBerkeley, theory of, iv. 243 _n._;\n  implication of subject and object, iii. 123 _n._;\n  his use of _sensation_, 165 _n._\n\nBion, on Plato's doctrine of reminiscence, ii. 249 _n._\n\nBody, animal bodies purer than air or earth, Anaxagoras doctrine,\ni. 51;\n  Plato's antithesis of soul to, ii. 384;\n  soul prior to and more powerful than, iv. 386, 419, 421;\n  relation of mind to organs of, iii. 159;\n  Aristotle, 389 _n._;\n  Monboddo, iv. 387 _n._;\n  discredit of, in _Ph\u00e6don_, ii. 422;\n  life a struggle between soul and, 386, 388, iv. 233, 235\n_n._;\n  derivation of [Greek: s\u00f4=ma], iii. 301 _n._;\n  alone reflects beauty of ideal world, ii. 422, iii. 4, 14;\n  Ideas gained through bodily senses, ii. 422;\n  of kosmos, iv. 225;\n  genesis of, 421;\n  Demiurgus prepares for man's construction, places a soul in each\nstar, 235;\n  Demiurgus conjoins three souls and one body, 233;\n  generated gods fabricate cranium as miniature of kosmos with\nrational soul rotating within, 235;\n  generated gods mount cranium on a tall body, 236;\n  genesis of women and inferior animals from degenerate man, 252;\n  this degeneracy originally intended, 263;\n  organs of sense, 236;\n  vision, sleep, dreams, _ib._;\n  sleep, doctrine of Herakleitus, i. 34;\n  principal advantages of sight and hearing, iv. 237;\n  each part of the soul is at once material and mental, 257;\n  thoracic soul, function of heart and lungs, 245;\n  Empedokles' belief as to the movement of the blood, i. 43;\n  Empedokles illustrated respiration by _klepsydra_, 44\n_n._;\n  abdominal soul, function of liver, iv. 245, 258;\n  seat of prophetic agency, 246;\n  function of spleen, _ib._;\n  object of length of intestinal canal, 247;\n  bone, flesh, marrow, nails, mouth, teeth, _ib._;\n  general survey of diseases, 249;\n  diseases of mind from, _ib._;\n  intense pleasures belong to distempered, iii. 355, 391;\n  preservative and healing agencies, iv. 250;\n  training should be simple, 28.\n\nBoeckh, on _Minos_ and _Hipparchus_, i. 337 _n._,\nii. 93;\n  _Kleitophon_, iii. 419 _n._;\n  _Tim\u00e6us_, iv. 224 _n._, 226 _n._, 227 _n._,\n241 _n._;\n  _Leges_, 273 _n._, 355 _n._;\n  _Epinomis_, 424 _n._;\n  Xenophon's financial schemes, i. 242 _n._\n\nBoethius, on Plato's reminiscence, ii. 250 _n._\n\nB\u00f6hme, lingua Adamica, iii. 322 _n._\n\nBoissier, Gaston, on Varro's etymologies, iii. 311 _n._;\n  influence of belief on practice, i. 157 _n._\n\nBonitz, on _The\u00e6t\u00eatus_, iii. 184 _n._\n\nBooks, writing as an art, iii. 27;\n  is it teachable by system? 28;\n  worthless for teaching, ii. 136, 233 _n._, iii. 33-35, 49,\n52, 54, 337 _n._;\n  may _remind_, 50, 53;\n  censorship, iv. 379 _n._;\n  ancient bookselling, i. 278 _n._, 281 _n._;\n  ancient libraries, official MSS., 284 _n._;\n  making copies, _ib._ _n._;\n  forgeries of books, 287 _n._\n\nBrandis, on _Parmenid\u00eas_, iii. 88 _n._\n\nBrown, on power, i. 138 _n._\n\nBryson, dialogues, i. 112 _n._\n\nBuddhism, i. 378 _n._\n\nBuffon, iv. 232 _n._\n\nButler, Bp., iv. 166 _n._\n\n\nC.\n\nCabanis, i. 168 _n._\n\nCalendar, ancients', iv. 325 _n._\n\nCampbell, Dr. George, iii. 391 _n._\n\nCampbell, Prof. Lewis, on _The\u00e6t\u00eatus_, iii. 111 _n._, 112\n_n._, 146 _n._, 158 _n._;\n  advance of modern experimental science, 155 _n._\n\nCanon of Plato, ancient discussions, i. 264;\n  works in Alexandrine library at the time of Kallimachus, 276;\n  probability of being in Alexandrine library at formation, 283;\n  editions from Alexandrine library, 295;\n  spurious works possibly in other libraries, 286;\n  Aristophanes, the grammarian, first arranged Platonic canon,\n_ib._;\n  in trilogies, 273;\n  indicated by Plato himself, 325;\n  catalogue by Aristophanes trustworthy,  285;\n  ten dialogues rejected by all ancient critics, following\nAlexandrine authorities, 297;\n  Thrasyllus follows Aristophanes' classification, 295, 299;\n  Tetralogies, 273 _n._;\n  not the order established by Plato, 335 _n._;\n  his classification, 289;\n  its principle, 295 _n._;\n  division into _dramatic_ and _diegematic_, 288;\n  incongruity of divisions, 294;\n  classification, defective but useful--dialogues of Search, of\nExposition, 361;\n  erroneously applied, 364;\n  the scheme, when its principles correctly applied, 365;\n  sub-classes recognised, 366;\n  coincides with Aristotle's two methods, Dialectic,\nDemonstrative, 363;\n  Thrasyllus did not doubt _Hipparchus_, 297 _n._;\n  authority acknowledged till 16th century, 301;\n  more trustworthy than modern critics, 299 _n._, 335;\n  Diogenes Laertius, 291 _n._, 294;\n  Serranus, 302;\n  _Ph\u00e6drus_ considered by Tennemann keynote of series, 303;\n  Schleiermacher, _ib._;\n  proofs slender, 317, 324;\n  includes a preconceived scheme and an order of interdependence,\n318;\n  assumptions as to _Ph\u00e6drus_ inadmissible, 319;\n  his reasons internal, _ib._, 337, iv. 431;\n  _Ph\u00e6don_, the first dialogue disallowed upon internal\ngrounds, i. 288;\n  considered spurious by Pan\u00e6tius the Stoic, _ib._;\n  no internal theory yet established, 319;\n  Ast, 304;\n  admits only fourteen, 305;\n  Socher, 306;\n  Stallbaum, 307;\n  K. F. Hermann, _ib._;\n  coincides with Susemihl, 310;\n  principle reasonable, 322;\n  more tenable than Schleiermacher's, 324;\n  Ueberweg attempts reconcilement of Schleiermacher and Hermann,\n313;\n  Steinhart rejects several, 309;\n  Munk, 311;\n  next to Schleiermacher's in ambition, 320;\n  Trendelenburg, 345 _n._;\n  other critics, 316;\n  the problem incapable of solution, 317;\n  few certainties or reasonable presumptions for fixing date or\norder of dialogues, 324;\n  positive date of any dialogue unknown, 326;\n  age of Sokrates in a dialogue, of no moment, 320;\n  no sequence or interdependence of the dialogues provable, 322,\n407;\n  circumstances of Plato's intellectual and philosophical\ndevelopment little known, 323 _n._;\n  Plato did not write till after death of Sokrates, 326, 334, 443\n_n._;\n  proofs, 327-334;\n  unsafe ground of modern theories, 336;\n  shown by Schleiermacher, 337;\n  a true theory must recognise Plato's varieties and be based on\nall the works in the canon, 339;\n  dialogues may be grouped, 361;\n  inconsistency no proof of spuriousness, _xiii._, 344, 375,\n400 _n._, ii. 299, iii. 71, 85, 93, 176, 179, 182 _n._,\n284, 332, 400, 420, iv. 138;\n  see _Dialogues_, _Epistles_.\n\nCategory of relation, iii. 128 _n._\n\nCause, Aristotle blames Demokritus for omitting _final_, i.\n73 _n._;\n  only the _material_ attended to by Ionic philosophy, 88;\n  designing cause, 74 _n._;\n  Sokrates' intellectual development turned on different views as\nto a true, ii. 398;\n  first doctrine, rejected, 391, 399;\n  second principle, optimistic, renounced, 395, 403;\n  efficient and co-efficient, 394, 400;\n  third doctrine, assumption of ideas as separate entia, 396, 403;\n  ideas the only true, 396;\n  substitution of physical for mental, Anaxagoras, Sokrates,\nAristotle, Descartes, Newton, 401;\n  tendency to embrace logical phantoms as real, 404 _n._;\n  no common idea of, 405, 407, 410 _n._;\n  but common search for, 406;\n  Aristotle and Plato differ, 407;\n  Plato's _formal_ and _final_, 408 _n._;\n  principal and auxiliary, iii. 266;\n  controversy of Megarics and Aristotle, i. 135-141;\n  depends on question of universal regularity of sequence, 141;\n  potential as distinguished from actual, 139;\n  meaning of, Hobbes, _ib._ _n._, 144;\n  regular and irregular, ii. 408;\n  no regular sequence of antecedent on consequent, doctrine of\nSokrates, Plato, Aristotle, i. 142;\n  Aristotle's graduation of, _ib._;\n  Aristotle's notion of _Chance_, _ib._;\n  Stoics, 143 _n._;\n  Aristotle's four, in middle ages, ii. 409 _n._;\n  More's Emanative, 403 _n._;\n  modern inductive theory, 408;\n  chief point of divergence of modern schools, 409 _n._\n\nCave, simile of, iv. 67-70.\n\nCavendish, discovery of composition of water, ii. 163 _n._\n\nChance, of Demokritus and the Epikureans, i. 73 _n._;\n  Aristotle's notion of, 142;\n  Theophrastus, 143 _n._;\n  Stoics, _ib._\n\nChaos, Hesiod, i. 4 _n._;\n  Empedokles, 39, 54;\n  Anaxagoras, 50, _ib._ _n._;\n  postulated in _Tim\u00e6us_, iv. 220, 240.\n\n_Charmid\u00eas_, authenticity, i. 306-7, ii. 171;\n  date, i. 308-10, 312, 315, 328, 331;\n  excellent specimen of dialogues of search, ii. 163;\n  scene and interlocutors, 153;\n  temperance, a kind of sedateness, objections, 154;\n  a variety of feeling of shame, refuted, _ib._;\n  doing one's own business, refuted, 155, iv. 136, 137;\n  distinction of _making_ and _doing_, ii. 155;\n  self-knowledge, _ib._;\n  is impossible, 167;\n  no object of knowledge distinct from the knowledge itself, 156;\n  knowledge of knowledge impossible, analogies, _ib._;\n  all properties relative, 157;\n  all knowledge relative to some object, _ib._;\n  if cognition of cognition possible, yet cognition of\nnon-cognition impossible, 158;\n  temperance as cognition of cognition and of non-cognition, of no\navail for happiness, 159, 161;\n  knowledge of good and evil contributes most to happiness, 160;\n  different from other sciences, 168;\n  temperance not the science of good and evil, 161;\n  temperance undiscovered, but a good, 162;\n  compared with _Lach\u00eas_, 168;\n  _Lysis_, 172, 184 _n._;\n  _Politikus_, iii. 282;\n  _Republic_, iv. 137, 138.\n\nCharondas, iv. 323 _n._, 398 _n._\n\nChinese compared with Pythagorean philosophers, i. 159 _n._\n\nChrysippus, sophisms, i. 128 _n._, 141;\n  communism of wives, 189 _n._\n\nCicero, on freedom of thought, i. 384 _n._;\n  state religion alone allowed, iv. 379 _n._;\n  _De Amicitia_ compared with _Lysis_, ii. 189\n_n._;\n  Plato's reminiscence, 250 _n._;\n  immortality of the soul, 423 _n._;\n  pleasure, iii. 389 _n._;\n  _Menexenus_, 407 _n._;\n  Sokrates, _concitatio_, 423 _n._;\n  pro\u00ebms to laws, iv. 322 _n._;\n  Stoics, i. 130 _n._, 157 _n._;\n  Academics, 131 _n._;\n  Megarics, 135 _n._\n\nClasses, fiction as to origin of, iv. 30;\n  see _Demos_, _State_.\n\nClassification, emotional and scientific contrasted, iii. 61, 195,\n196 _n._;\n  conscious and unconscious, 345;\n  the feeling of Plato's age respecting, 192 _n._, 344;\n  dialogues of search a lesson in, 177, 188;\n  novelty and value of this, 190;\n  all particulars of equal value, 195;\n  tendency to omit sub-classes, 255, 342;\n  well illustrated in _Phil\u00eabus_, 254, 344;\n  but feebly applied, 369;\n  importance of founding it on sensible resemblances, 255;\n  Plato's doctrine not necessarily connected with that of Ideas,\n345;\n  Plato enlarges Pythagorean doctrine, 368;\n  same principle of, applied to cognitions and pleasures in\n_Phil\u00eabus_, 382, 394;\n  its valuable principles, 395;\n  of sciences as more or less true, dialectic the standard, 382;\n  of Megarics, over-refined, 196 _n._\n\nCleynaerts, iv. 380 _n._\n\nClimate, influence of, iv. 330 _n._\n\nColenso, Bp., iii. 303 _n._\n\nCollard, Royer, iii. 165 _n._\n\nColour, Demokritean theory, i. 77;\n  defined, ii. 235;\n  pleasures of, true, iii. 356.\n\nComedy, mixed pleasure and pain excited, iii. 355 _n._;\n  Plato's aversion to Athenian, iv. 316;\n  peculiar to himself, 317;\n  Aristotle differs, _ib._ _n._\n\nCommerce, each artisan only one trade, iv. 361;\n  importation, by magistrates, of what is imperatively necessary\nonly, _ib._;\n  Benefit Societies,g 399;\n  retailers, 21, 361, 401;\n  punishment for fraud, 492;\n  Attic law compared, 403;\n  Xenophon inexperienced in, i. 236;\n  admired by Xenophon, _ib._;\n  Metics, iv. 362;\n  Xenophon on encouragement of, i. 238.\n\nCommunism of guardians, iv. 140, 169, 198;\n  necessary to maintenance of state, 170, 178;\n  peculiarity of Plato's, 179;\n  Aristotle on, 189 _n._;\n  acknowledged impracticable, 327;\n  of wives, opinions of Aristippus, Diogenes, Zeno, and\nChrysippus, i. 189, _ib._ _n._\n\nComte, three stages of progress, ii. 407.\n\nConcrete, its Greek equivalent, ii. 52\n_n._;\n  see _Abstract_.\n\nCondorcet, iv. 232 _n._, 258 _n._\n\nConnotation, or essence, to be known before accidents and\nantecedents, ii. 242.\n\nConsciousness, judgment implied in every act of, iii. 165\n_n._;\n  the facts of, not explicable by independent Subject and Object,\n131.\n\nContradiction, principle of, in Plato, iii. 99 _n._;\n  logical maxim of, 239;\n  necessity of setting forth counter-propositions, 149 _n._,\n150;\n  contradictory propositions not possible, i. 166 _n._\n\nContraries, ten pairs of opposing, Pythagorean, i. 15;\n  the Pythagorean \"principia of existing things,\" _ib._\n_n._;\n  Herakleitus, 29, 31;\n  excluded in nothing save the self-existent Idea, ii. 7 _n._\n\nCopula, logical function of, i. 169;\n  misconceived by Antisthenes, iii. 221, 232 _n._, 251\n_n._, ii. 47 _n._\n\nCornutus, i. 128, 133.\n\nCouncil, Nocturnal, to conserve the original scheme of State, iv.\n416, 418;\n  to comprehend and carry out the end of the State, _ib._,\n425, 429;\n  training in _Epinomis_, 420, 424.\n\nCourage, what is, ii. 143;\n  not endurance, 144;\n  is knowledge, 288;\n  a right estimate of terrible things, 144, 296, 307, iv. 138;\n  such intelligence not possessed by professional artists, ii.\n148;\n  the intelligence of good and evil generally, too wide, 146;\n  relation to rest of virtue, 288, 304 _n._, iv. 426, 283\n_n._;\n  of philosopher and ordinary citizen, different principles, ii.\n308 _n._;\n  in state, iv. 34-5;\n  imparted by gymnastic, 29;\n  _Lach\u00eas_ difficulties ignored in _Politikus_, iii.\n282;\n  Plato and Aristotle compared, ii. 170.\n\nCousin, the absolute, iii. 298 _n._;\n  on _Sophist\u00eas_, 244;\n  _Tim\u00e6us_, iv. 224 _n._\n\nCreation out of nothing denied by all ancient physical\nphilosophers, i. 52;\n  see _Body_, _Kosmos_.\n\nCrime, distinction of damage and injury, iv. 365, 367-9;\n  three causes of misguided proceedings, 366;\n  purpose of punishment, to heal criminals' distemper or deter,\n_ib._, 408;\n  sacrilege and high treason the gravest, 363;\n  see _Law-administration_.\n\nCriticism, value of, ii. 118.\n\nCudworth, entities, iii. 74 _n._\n\nCynics, origin of name, i. 150 _n._;\n  a [Greek: ai(/resis], 160 _n._;\n  asceticism, 157;\n  Sokrates' precepts fullest carried out by, 160;\n  suicide, 161 _n._;\n  coincidence of Hegesias with, 203;\n  an order of mendicant friars, 163;\n  connection with Christian monks, _ib._ _n._;\n  the decorous and the indecorous, iii. 390 _n._\n\nCyrus, iv. 312,** i. 223.\n\n\nD.\n\nD\u00e6mon, of Sokrates, i. 437, ii. 104, i. 115;\n  his experience of, ii. 102;\n  explains his eccentricity, 104;\n  variously alluded to in Plato--its character and working\nimpenetrable, 107, 108;\n  in _Theag\u00eas_ and _The\u00e6t\u00eatus_, 107;\n  a special revelation, 108, 131 _n._;\n  privileged communications common, 130, 131 _n._;\n  see _Inspiration_;\n  belief of Empedokles, i. 47;\n  etymology, iii. 301 _n._;\n  Eros, intermediate between gods and men, 9;\n  subordinate to divine steersman of kosmos, 265 _n._;\n  intermediate, iv. 421.\n\nD\u00e4hne, on _Philo-Jud\u00e6us_, iii. 308 _n._, iv. 157\n_n._\n\nDamon, a teacher of [Greek: mousik\u00ea/], ii. 139 _n._;\n  dangers of change in national music, iv. 315.\n\nDancing to be regulated by authority, iv. 292;\n  laws, 291;\n  three choruses, youths, mature men, elders, 296, 305;\n  and music, effect on emotions, 347;\n  comic, by slaves or mean persons only, 352 _n._\n\nDarius, iv. 312.\n\nDeath, doctrine of Parmenides, i. 26 _n._;\n  Herakleitus, 34;\n  Sokrates, 422, 430 _n._;\n  emancipates soul from struggle with body, ii. 386, 388, iv. 234,\n235** _n._;\n  guardians must not fear, 25;\n  see _Immortality_.\n\nDebate of secondary questions before settling fundamental notions,\nmischief of, ii. 242;\n  see _Dialectic_.\n\nDefinition gives classes, Type, natural groups, ii. 47, 193\n_n._;\n  Sokrates introduced search for, 47;\n  frequent mistake of giving a particular example, i. 444, ii.\n143;\n  dialogues of search illustrate process of, iii. 29, 176, 188;\n  novelty and value of this, 190;\n  importance in Plato's time of bringing forward logical\nsubordinations and distinctions, ii. 235;\n  tested by clothing it in particulars, iv. 3 _n._;\n  of common and vague terms, hopelessness of, ii. 186 _n._;\n  Aristotle on, 234 _n._;\n  none of a general word, Sextus Empiricus, i. 168, _n._;\n  none of simple objects, Antisthenes, 171;\n  Plato on, 172;\n  Aristotle, _ib._;\n  Mill, _ib._ _n._;\n  and division, the two processes of dialectic, iii. 29, 39;\n  necessity for, 29;\n  conditions of a good, ii. 318.\n\nDeg\u00e9rando, M., iii. 140 _n._, 152 _n._\n\n[Greek: Deino/s], meaning, ii. 145 _n._\n\nDekad, the Pythagorean perfect number, i. 11.\n\n[Greek: Dektiko/n, to/], see _Matter_.\n\nDelphian oracle, reply to Sokrates, i. 413;\n  maxim, _Know thyself_, ii. 11, 25;\n  to be consulted for religious legislation, iv. 34, 137\n_n._, 325.\n\nDemetrius Phalereus, Alexandrine librarian, i. 274 _n._;\n  chief agent in establishment of Alexandrine library, 280;\n  history and character, 279;\n  _Apology_, 111 _n._\n\nDemiurgus, opposed to [Greek: i)di\u00f4/t\u00eas], ii. 272 _n._;\n  of kosmos, iii. 265 _n._;\n  postulated, iv. 220;\n  is not a creator, _ib._;\n  produces kosmos, by persuading Necessity, _ib._, 222;\n  on pattern of ideas, 227;\n  evolved the four elements from primordial chaos, 240;\n  addresses generated gods, 233;\n  prepares for man's construction, places a soul in each star,\n_ib._;\n  conjoins three souls and one body, 234;\n  how conceived by other philosophers of same century, 254;\n  little noticed in Aristotle, 255;\n  degeneracy of man originally intended by, 263.\n\nDemochares, law against philosophers, i. 111 _n._\n\nDemocracy, least bad of unscientific governments, iii. 270, 278;\n  origin, iv. 80;\n  monarchy and, the _mother-polities_, 312;\n  dissent of Aristotle, _ib._ _n._;\n  Plato's second ideal state a compromise of oligarchy and, 333,\n337.\n\nDemokritus, life and travels, i. 65;\n  Plato's antipathy to, 66 _n._, 82 _n._, ii. 118, iv.\n355 _n._;\n  often mentioned in Aristotle, _ib._;\n  opinions of ancients on, i. 82 _n._;\n  his universality, 82;\n  relation to Parmenidean theory, 66;\n  plena and vacua, ens and non-ens, 67, iii. 243 _n._;\n  his absolute and relative, i. 71, 80;\n  atoms differ only in magnitude, figure, position, and\narrangement, 69;\n  different from Plato's Idea, and Aristotle's _materia\nprima_, 72;\n  not really objects of sense, _ib._ _n._;\n  inherent force, 73;\n  his ultimatum, the course of nature, _ib._;\n  primary and secondary qualities, iv. 243 _n._;\n  air, i. 76, 78;\n  theory of colour, 77;\n  theory of vision, combated by Theophrastus, 78 _n._;\n  hearing and taste, 78;\n  motions of planets, iv. 355 _n._;\n  blamed by Aristotle for omitting final causes, i. 73 _n._;\n  chance, _ib._;\n  [Greek: phu/sis], 70 _n._;\n  mind is heat throughout nature, 75;\n  parts of the soul, 76;\n  on its immortality, ii. 425 _n._;\n  truth obtainable by reason only, i. 72;\n  thought produced by influx of atoms, 79;\n  on _Homo mensura_, 82, iii. 152;\n  knowledge is _obscure_, or sensation, and _genuine_,\nor thought, i. 80;\n  the gods, 81;\n  ethical views, 82;\n  treatise on Pythagoras, _ib._ _n._;\n  researches in zoology and animal generation, 75;\n  influence on growth of dialectic, 82;\n  works of, 65;\n  in Alexandrine library, 276;\n  divided into Tetralogies by Thrasyllus, 273 _n._, 295\n_n._\n\nD\u00eamos, in state, analogous to appetite in individual mind, iv. 39;\n  Plato more anxious for good treatment of, than Xenophon and\nAristotle, 183;\n  in Aristotle adjuncts, not members, of state, 184;\n  Plato's scheme fails from no training for, 186;\n  see _State_.\n\nDemosthenes, pupil of Plato, i. 261 _n._;\n  rhetorical powers, iii. 408 _n._;\n  teaching of Isokrates, iv. 150 _n._;\n  _adv. Leptinem_ contrasted with _Leges_, 315 _n._\n\nDescartes, advantages of protracted study, i. 404 _n._;\n  accused of substituting physical for mental causes, ii. 401\n_n._;\n  argument for being of God, a \"fallacy of confusion,\" iii. 297\n_n._;\n  on criticism by report, i. 118 _n._\n\nDesire for what is akin to us or our own, cause of friendship, ii.\n182;\n  good, object of universal, 243, iii. 335, 371, 392 _n._;\n  largest measure and all varieties of, are good, ii. 344;\n  belongs to the mind, presupposes a bodily want and memory of\nprevious satisfaction, iii. 350;\n  exception, 351 _n._, 387 _n._\n\nDespot, has no real power, ii. 324;\n  worst of unscientific governments, iii. 270, 278;\n  origin, iv. 81;\n  excess of despotism in Persia, 312;\n  Solon on, i. 219 _n._;\n  Xenophon on interior life of, 218, 220;\n  Xenophon's scheme of government, a wisely arranged Oriental\ndespotism, 234.\n\nDetermining, Pythagorean doctrine of the, i. 11;\n  the, iii. 346;\n  it is intelligence, 348.\n\nDeuschle, on Kratylus, iii. 325 _n._\n\nDeycks, on Megarics, i. 127 _n._, 136 _n._\n\nDialectic, little or none in earliest theorists, i. 93;\n  Demokritus' influence on its growth, 82;\n  of Zeno the Eleate, 93; iii. 107;\n  its purpose and result, i. 98;\n  compared with _Parmenid\u00eas_, 100;\n  early physics discredited by growth of, 91;\n  its introduction changes the character of philosophy, 105, 107;\n  repugnant to Herakleiteans, 106 _n._;\n  influence of Drama and Dikastery, 385;\n  debate common in Sokratic age, 370, ii. 284;\n  died out in later philosophy, i. 394 _n._;\n  disputations in the Middle Ages, 397 _n._;\n  modern search for truth goes on silently, 369;\n  process _per se_ interesting to Plato, 403, 406;\n  has done more than any one else to interest others in it, 405;\n  its importance, 91, 354, 372, ii. 167, 221;\n  debate a generating cause of friendship, 188 _n._;\n  and Eristic, 210, 221 _n._;\n  of Sokrates, _x_;\n  contrasted with Sophists',  197, i. 124;\n  Sokrates first applied negative analysis to the common\nconsciousness, 385, 389 _n._;\n  to social, political, ethical, topics, 385;\n  necessity of negative vein, 91, 371, 373, 386, 394 _n._,\n421, 444, 130;\n  a value by itself, iii. 51, 70, 85, 149-50, 176, 184 _n._,\n284, 422;\n  see _Negative Method_;\n  procedure of Sokrates repugnant to Athenian public, i. 387, ii.\n305;\n  colloquial companion necessary to Sokrates, 287;\n  Sokrates asserts right of satisfaction for his own individual\nreason, i. 386;\n  Sokrates' reason for attachment to, iii. 258 _n._;\n  Sokrates to the last insists on freedom of, ii. 379;\n  stimulates, i. 420, 449, iv. 52 _n._;\n  as stimulating, not noticed in _Republic_ training, 208;\n  its negative and positive aspect, illustrated in _Alkibiad\u00eas\nI._ and _II._, ii. 7;\n  indiscriminate, not insisted on in _Gorgias_, 367;\n  protest against, iii. 335;\n  _Euthydemus_ popular among enemies of, ii. 222;\n  common want of scrutiny, i. 398 _n._;\n  value of formal debate, as corrective of fallacies, ii. 221;\n  its actual and anticipated effects, 11;\n  Sokrates' positive solutions illusory, 26;\n  its ethical basis, iii. 113;\n  autonomy of the individual mind, 147, 297, 298;\n  contrast with the _Leges_, 148;\n  Aristotle on, i. 133 _n._;\n  obstetric method, lead of the respondent followed, 368;\n  the respondent makes the discoveries for himself, 367;\n  assumptions necessary in, iii. 251;\n  precepts for, 91 _n._;\n  long answers inadmissible, ii. 281;\n  brought to bear on Sokrates himself, iii. 57, 89;\n  the sovereign purifier, 197;\n  its result, _Knowledge_, i. 396;\n  contrasted with lectures, ii. 277, iii. 337 _n._;\n  alone useful for teaching, 34, 49, 53;\n  a test of the expository process, i. 358, 396;\n  attainment of dialectical aptitude, purpose of _Sophist\u00eas_\nand _Politikus_, iii. 261;\n  antithesis of rhetoric and, i. 433, ii. 52-3, 70, 277, 278\n_n._, 282, 303;\n  difference of method, illustrated in _Protagoras_, 300;\n  superiority over rhetoric, claimed, 282;\n  issue unsatisfactorily put, 369;\n  rhetoric, as a real art, is comprised in, iii. 30, 34;\n  rhetoric superior in usefulness and celebrity, 360, 380;\n  Plato's desire for celebrity in rhetoric and, 408;\n  its object, definition, i. 452, ii. 318;\n  its two processes, definition and division, iii. 29, 39;\n  testing of definitions by clothing them in particulars, iv. 7\n_n._;\n  Inductive and Syllogistic, ii. 27;\n  and Demonstrative, Aristotle's two intellectual methods, 363;\n  the purest of all cognitions, iii. 360;\n  and geometry, two modes of mind's procedure applicable to ideal\nworld, iv. 65;\n  requires no diagrams, deals with forms only, descending from\nhighest, 66;\n  is the consummation of all the sciences, gives the contemplation\nof the ideas, 75;\n  one of the manifestations [Greek: tou= philosophei=n], 150\n_n._;\n  standard for classifying sciences, iii. 382-3, 394;\n  valuable principle, 395;\n  exercises in, iv. 76;\n  _Republic_ contradicts other dialogues, 207-212;\n  difference of Aristotle's and Plato's view, i. 363;\n  mixture in Plato of poetical fancy and religious mysticism with\ndialectic theory, iii. 16;\n  distinct aptitudes required by Aristotle for, ii. 54;\n  Aristotle on its dissecting function, 70 _n._;\n  Stoic View, i. 371 _n._;\n  Theopompus, 450.\n\nDialogues, the Sokratic, i. _x_, _xi_;\n  the lost, of Aristotle, 262 _n._, 356 _n._;\n  of _Sokratici viri_, 111, 114;\n  of Plato, give little information about him personally, 262;\n  different in form from Aristotle's, 356 _n._;\n  vary in value, ii. 19;\n  variety of Plato, i. 344;\n  dramatic pictures, not historical, 419 _n._, ii. 33\n_n._, 150, 155 _n._, 163, 172, 195, 199, 203, 265\n_n._, iii. 9 _n._, 19, 25;\n  of common form--Plato never speaks in his own name, i. 344;\n  reluctant to publish doctrines on his own responsibility, 350,\n352, 355, 361 _n._;\n  may have published under the name of others, 360;\n  his lectures differ from, in being given in his own name, 402;\n  Plato assumed impossibility of teaching by written exposition,\n350, 355, ii. 56 _n._, 64;\n  assumption intelligible in his day, i. 357;\n  Sokratic elenchus, a test of the expository process, 358;\n  of _Search_ predominate, 366;\n  a necessary preliminary to those of _Exposition_, ii. 201;\n  their basis, Sokratic doctrine that false persuasion of\nknowledge is universal, i. 367, 393;\n  illustrated by _Hippias_ and _Charmid\u00eas_, ii. 64, 163;\n  appeal to authority, suppressed in Academics, i. 368;\n  debate common in the Sokratic age, 370;\n  process _per se_ interesting to Plato, 403;\n  the obstetric method--lead of the respondent followed, 368;\n  modern search for truth goes on silently, 369;\n  purpose to stimulate intellect, and form verifying power, iii.\n177, 188, 284;\n  novelty and value of this, 190;\n  process of generalisation always kept in view in, i. 406;\n  affirmative and negative veins distinct, 399, 402, 420;\n  often no ulterior affirmative end, 375;\n  but Plato presumes the search will be renewed, 395;\n  value as suggestive, and reviewing under different aspects, ii.\n69;\n  untenable hypothesis that Plato communicated solutions to a few,\ni. _xii_, 360, 401;\n  no assignable interdependence, 407;\n  each has its end in itself, _xii_, 344, 375, 400 _n._,\nii. 300 _n._, iii. 71, 85, 93, 176, 179, 184 _n._, 284,\n332, 400, 420, iv. 138;\n  of _Exposition_, pedagogic tone, iii. 368 _n._;\n  Plato's change in old age, iv. 273, 320, 380, 424, i. 244;\n  Xenophon compared, _ib._;\n  order for review, i. 408;\n  see _Canon_.\n\nDianoia, Nous and, two grades of intelligence, iv. 66.\n\nDik\u00e6archus, ii. 425 _n._\n\nDikasts, opposition of feeling between Sokrates and, i. 375;\n  influence of dikastery on growth of Dialectic, 385.\n\nDiodorus Kronus, doctrine of Power, i. 140;\n  defended by Hobbes, 143;\n  hypothetical propositions, 145;\n  time, difficulties of _Now_, _ib._;\n  motion, 146;\n  Aristotle nearly coincides with, _ib._;\n  and Hobbes, _ib._;\n  his death, 147.\n\nDiogenes of Apollonia, life and doctrines, i. 60;\n  air his primordial element, 61;\n  many properties of, _ib._;\n  physiology, 60 _n._, 62;\n  cosmology and meteorology, 64;\n  often followed Herakleitus, _ib._ _n._;\n  anticipated modern doctrine of aerolithes, _ib._;\n  Agreement with Anaxagoras, 65;\n  fundamental tenet, agreement with Aristotle and Demokritus, 69\n_n._;\n  theory of vision, iv. 237 _n._\n\nDiogenes of Sin\u00f4p\u00ea, i. 152;\n  works, 155;\n  doctrines, 154;\n  Sokrates' precepts fullest carried out by, 160;\n  asceticism, 157;\n  compared with Indian Gymnosophists and Selli, _ib._, 160\n_n._, 163 _n._;\n  with Aristippus, 190;\n  Communism of wives, 189 _n._;\n  opposed Platonic ideas, 163;\n  the first protest of Nominalism against Realism, 164.\n\nDiogenes Laertius, i. 291 _n._, 294.\n\nDion Chrysostom, i. 112 _n._\n\nDionysius, the elder, Aristippus' intercourse with, i. 193;\n  visited by Plato, 351;\n  the younger, visited by Plato, 258, 355;\n  expedition of Dion against, 259.\n\nDionysius Hal., on _Apology_, i. 411 _n._;\n  rhetorical powers of Plato and Demosthenes, iii. 407 _n._;\n  rivalry of Plato and Lysias, 411 _n._;\n  contrasts Plato's with [Greek: S\u00f4kratikoi\\ dia/logoi], i. 110\n_n._;\n  Plato's jealousy and love of supremacy, 117 _n._\n\nDiotima, iii. 8 _n._, 9.\n\nDisease, general survey of, iv. 249;\n  preservative and healing agencies, 250.\n\nDittrich on _Kratylus_, iii. 303 _n._\n\nDiversum, iv. 226;\n  form of, pervades all others, iii. 209, 232;\n  Aristotle on, 238 _n._\n\nDivision, logical, ii. 27;\n  and definition, the two processes of dialectic, iii. 29, 39;\n  dialogues of search illustrate process, 29, 177, 188;\n  novelty and value of this, ii. 235, iii. 190;\n  by dichotomy, 254;\n  importance of founding on sensible resemblances, 255;\n  sub-classes often overlooked, 341;\n  well illustrated in _Phil\u00eabus_, 344;\n  but feebly applied, 369;\n  Plato enlarges Pythagorean doctrine, 368.\n\nDivorce, iv. 406.\n\nDodona, oracle to be consulted, iv. 325;\n  Xenophon, i. 237.\n\nDoing and _making_, ii. 155;\n  use of [Greek: eu)= z\u00ea=n] and [Greek: eu)= pra/ttein] in\n_Charmid\u00eas_, 216 _n._\n\nDrama, influence on growth of Dialectic, i. 385;\n  mixed pleasure and pain excited by, iii. 355 _n._;\n  Plato's aversion to Athenian, iv. 316, 350;\n  peculiar to himself, 317;\n  Aristotle differs, _ib._ _n._;\n  see _Poetry_.\n\nDreams, doctrine of Demokritus, caused by images from objects, i.\n81;\n  Plato's theory of, iv. 237;\n  as affecting doctrine _Homo mensura_, iii. 130;\n  belief of rhetor Aristeides in, 146 _n._\n\nDrunkenness, Sokrates proof against, iii. 21, 23, iv. 287;\n  is test of self-control, iii. 21 _n._, iv. 289, 298;\n  forbidden at Sparta, how far justifiable, 286;\n  chorus of elders require, 297;\n  unbecoming the guardians, 298 _n._\n\n\nE.\n\nEberhard, ii. 300 _n._\n\nEclipse, foretold by Thales, i. 4 _n._;\n  Anaximander's doctrine, 6 _n._;\n  Pythagoras', 14 _n._;\n  Herakleitus', 32.\n\nEducation, who is to judge what constitutes, ii. 142;\n  combined with polity by Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, iv. 142,\n185, 337;\n  on principle that every citizen belongs to the city, 186;\n  precautions in electing Minister of, 338;\n  of men compared by Sokrates with training of inferior animals,\niii. 62 _n._;\n  bad, of kings' sons, iv. 312;\n  training of boys and girls, 348;\n  by music and gymnastic, 23;\n  musical training excites love of the beautiful, 27;\n  importance of music, 305;\n  views of Xenophon, Polybius, Aristotle, _ib._;\n  _music_, Platonic sense, 149;\n  by fictions as well as by truth, 24;\n  actual place of poetry in Greek, compared with Plato's ideal,\n149-153;\n  type for narratives about men, 26;\n  songs, music, and dancing to be regulated, 25, 289, 291, 349;\n  to keep emotions in a proper state, 169;\n  prizes at festivals, 292, 337;\n  but object of training, war, not prizes, 358;\n  only grave music allowed, 26, 168;\n  music and gymnastic necessary to correct each other, 29;\n  gymnastic imparts courage, _ib._;\n  training to ascend to the idea of good, 61;\n  purpose, 69;\n  studies introductory to philosophy, 70-74, 206;\n  difference in _Leges_, 275 _n._;\n  arithmetic, 423;\n  awakening power, 70;\n  stimulus from contradiction of one and many, 72;\n  geometry, 423;\n  conducts mind towards universal ens, 72;\n  value of arithmetic and geometry, 352;\n  by concrete method, 353 _n._;\n  particulars to be brought under the general forms, 423;\n  astronomy, 422;\n  object of teaching, 354;\n  by ideal figures, not observation, 72;\n  acoustics, by applying arithmetical relations and theories, 74;\n  of Nocturnal Counsellors, 420, 424;\n  exercises in dialectic, 76;\n  Plato's remarks on effect of, 207;\n  age for studies, 76, 350;\n  philosophy should not be taught at a very early age, 60, 76;\n  _Republic_ contradicts other dialogues, 207-211;\n  same training for men and women, 77;\n  maintained in _Leges_, and harmonises with ancient legends,\n195;\n  contrast with Aristotle, 194;\n  public training at Sparta and Krete, 279;\n  Plato's scheme fails from no training for Demos, 186;\n  Xenophon's scheme, i. 226-31;\n  geometry and physics, Aristippus' contempt for, 186, 192.\n\nEgger, i. 376 _n._\n\nEgo, and Mecum or non-ego, antithesis of, iii. 132 _n._, 144\n_n._\n\nEgyptians, iv. 330 _n._, 352, 353 _n._, 415 _n._;\n  priests, historical knowledge of, 266, 268;\n  causes, 271;\n  Plato's reverence for regulations of, 267 _n._\n\n[Greek: Ei)r\u00f4nei/a], characteristic of Sokrates and Sophists, iii.\n217 _n._\n\nEleatic philosophy, i. 16-26, 93-103;\n  Leukippus, 65;\n  relation to atomic theory, _ib._;\n  theory of vision, iv. 237** _n._;\n  compared with Hindoo philosophers, i. 160 _n._\n\nEleians, iii. 24 _n._\n\nElements, the four, not primitive, iv. 238;\n  varieties of each, 242;\n  forms of the, 238;\n  geometrical theory of, 240;\n  Aristotle on, 241 _n._;\n  a fifth added, _ib._ _n._, 421.\n\nEmotions, appealed to in the _Kriton_, i. 433;\n  Bain on the Tender, ii. 188 _n._;\n  a degenerate appendage of human nature, 126, iii. 389;\n  implication of intelligence and, 374;\n  antithesis of science and, 61, 195, 196 _n._;\n  the tender and aesthetic, no place for, in tripartite division\nof soul, iv. 149 _n._;\n  poet's appeal to, disturbs the rational government of the mind,\n92, 152, 349;\n  restrictions on music and poetry, to keep emotions in a proper\nstate, 169, 347;\n  similitude of, in all, but dissimilarity of objects, i. 452\n_n._\n\nEmpedokles, of universal pretensions, i. 47;\n  doctrines, 38;\n  four principles, _ib._;\n  dissents from Ionic School and Herakleitus, _ib._, 48;\n  denies [Greek: phu/sis] (in sense of [Greek: ge/nesis]), 38\n_n._;\n  compared with Anaxagoras, 52;\n  Anaximander, 54;\n  the moving forces, Love and Enmity, 39;\n  modern _attraction_ and _repulsion_, 40 _n._;\n  physics, 38;\n  predestined cycle, 39;\n  Chaos, _ib._, 54;\n  was aware of effect of pressure of air, 44 _n._;\n  movements of the blood, 43;\n  illustrated respiration by Klepsydra, 44 _n._;\n  perception, 44, iv. 235 _n._;\n  contrary to Anaxagoras, i. 58;\n  knowledge of like by like, 44;\n  God, 40 _n._, 42;\n  d\u00e6mons, 47;\n  religious mysticism in, 47 _n._;\n  claims magical powers, 47;\n  sacredness of life, metempsychosis, 46;\n  friendship, ii. 179;\n  deplores impossibility of finding out truth from shortness of\nlife, i. 47;\n  influence on Aristotle, 91;\n  doctrines identified by Plato with _Homo Mensura_, iii.\n114, 115.\n\nEnds, science of, postulated, ii. 32, 169;\n  dimly indicated by Plato, 148;\n  correlation with the unknown Wise Man, 149;\n  distinction of, iii. 374 _n._;\n  no common, among established [Greek: no/mima], 282 _n._\n\nEnergy, analogous to guardians in state, iv. 39;\n  Aristotle's [Greek: e)ne/rgeia], ii. 355.\n\nEns, of Xenophanes, i. 17;\n  of Parmenides, 66, iii. 58;\n  combines extension and duration, i. 19;\n  and Non-Ens, an inherent contradiction in human mind, 20;\n  alone contains truth--phenomena, probability, 24;\n  erroneously identified by Aristotle with Heat, _ib._\n_n._;\n  Zeno, 93;\n  Gorgias the Leontine, 103-4;\n  Demokritus, 67;\n  contraries the Pythagorean principles of, 15 _n._;\n  an intermediate predicate, iii. 94;\n  theories of philosophers about, 200, 231;\n  materialists and idealists, 202;\n  of Plato, comprehends objects of perception and of conception,\n229, 231;\n  is _ens_ one or many, 201;\n  difficulties about _non-ens_ and _ens_ equally great,\n_ib._, 206;\n  is equivalent to potentiality, 204;\n  includes both the unchangeable and the changeable, 205;\n  a _tertium quid_, distinct from motion and rest, 206;\n  philosopher lives in region of _ens_,--Sophist, of\n_non-ens_, 208;\n  _non-ens_, 331;\n  different views about, 243 _n._;\n  its different meanings in Plato, 181 _n._;\n  _non-ens_ inconceivable, 200;\n  five forms examined, 208, 231-5;\n  a real form, not contrary to, but different from, ens, 211, 233;\n  inter-communion of forms of _non-ens_ and of proposition,\nopinion, judgment, 213, 214, 235;\n  non-ens in _Sophist\u00eas_ different from other dialogues, 242;\n  Plato's view of non-ens, _ib._ _n._, 249 _n._;\n  unsatisfactory, _ib._ _n._;\n  alone knowable, non-ens unknowable, iv. 49;\n  what is between ens and non-ens, the object of opinion,\n_ib._;\n  fundamental distinction of _ens_ from _fientia_, 219;\n  see _Relativity_, _Ontology_.\n\nEntities, quadruple distribution of, iii. 346;\n  Cudworth's immutable, 74 _n._\n\nEpicharmus, i. 9.\n\nEpikt\u00eatus, on authority, i. 388 _n._;\n  objective and subjective, 451 _n._;\n  [Greek: philo/sophos] and [Greek: i)di\u00f4/t\u00eas], iv. 104 _n._;\n  scheme conformable to nature, i. 162 _n._\n\nEpikurus, garden, i. 255 _n._;\n  school and library, 269 _n._;\n  _Symposion_ of, iii. 22 _n._;\n  developed Aristippus' doctrines, i. 198;\n  identity of good and pleasure, ii. 315 _n._, 355 _n._,\niii. 374, 377 _n._, 387 _n._, iv. 301;\n  scheme conformable to nature, i. 163 _n._;\n  on justice, iv. 130 _n._;\n  antithesis of speculative and political life, ii. 368 _n._;\n  immortality of the soul, 425 _n._;\n  against repulsive pictures of Hades, iv. 155 _n._;\n  prayer and sacrifice, 395;\n  agreement with Demokritean doctrine of chance, i. 73 _n._;\n  Plato's theology compared with, iv. 161.\n\nEpimenid\u00eas, date, iv. 311 _n._\n\nEpim\u00eatheus, ii. 268.\n\n_Epinomis_, its authorship, i. 299 _n._, 306, 307, 309;\n  represents Plato's latest opinions, iv. 421 _n._, 424\n_n._;\n  gives education of Nocturnal Counsellors, 420, 424;\n  soul prior to and more powerful than body, 421;\n  genesis of kosmos, _ib._;\n  _five_ elements, 240 _n._, 421;\n  wisdom, _ib._;\n  theological view of astronomy, _ib._;\n  arithmetic and geometry, proportionals, 423;\n  particulars to be brought under the general forms, 423.\n\n[Greek: E)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea], relation to [Greek: ai)/sth\u00easis], iii. 164\n_n._;\n  see _Science_.\n\nEpistles, Plato's, i. 333 _n._;\n  genuineness, 306-7, 309, 349 _n._;\n  written when old, 262;\n  valuable illustrations of his character, 339 _n._;\n  intentional obscurity as to philosophical doctrine, 350, 353\n_n._\n\n[Greek: E)pithumi/a], derivation, iii. 302 _n._\n\nEquivoques, ii. 8 _n._, 214, iii. 29;\n  Sokrates does not distinguish, ii. 279;\n  Aristotle more careful than Plato, 170, 279 _n._;\n  fallacies of equivocation, 212, 352 _n._;\n  _gain_, 82;\n  _know_, 213 _n._;\n  [Greek: eu)= z\u00ea=n] and [Greek: eu)= pra/ttein], 216 _n._,\n352 _n._;\n  _Nature_, 341 _n._, iv. 194;\n  _Cause_, ii. 404, 409, 410 _n._;\n  _Good_, 406, iii. 370;\n  _Ens_, 231;\n  _Unum_, _Ens_, _Idem_, _Diversum_, &c.,\n94;\n  _Pleasure_, 379 _n._;\n  _Justice_, iv. 102, 120, 123, 125.\n\nEranos, meaning, iv. 400 _n._;\n  Plato inconsistent, 399.\n\nErasistratus, iv. 259 _n._\n\n_Erast\u00e6_, authenticity, i. 306-7, 309, 315, ii. 121;\n  subject and interlocutors, 111;\n  vivacity, 116;\n  philosophy the perpetual accumulation of knowledge, 112;\n  how to fix the quantity, 113;\n  philosophy not multiplication of learned acquirements, 114;\n  special art for discriminating bad and good, 115, 119;\n  supreme, 120;\n  the philosopher its regular practitioner, 115;\n  the philosopher, second best in several arts, 114;\n  Aristotle's [Greek: sophi/a] and [Greek: phro/n\u00easis], 120\n_n._;\n  relation of second-best man to regular practitioner, 113, 115,\n118;\n  supposed to point at Demokritus, _ib._;\n  humiliation of literary _erastes_, 116.\n\nEretrian school, transcendental, not ethical, i. 121;\n  qualities non-existent without the mind, iii. 74 _n._;\n  Ph\u00e6don, i. 148;\n  Mened\u00eamus, _ib._, 149.\n\nEristic and dialectic, ii. 221 _n._;\n  Aristotle's definition, 210.\n\nEros, differently understood, necessity for definition, iii. 29;\n  derivation, 308 _n._;\n  contrast of Hellenic and modern sentiment, 1;\n  erotic dialogues, _Ph\u00e6drus_ and _Symposion_,\n_ib._;\n  as conceived by Plato, _ib._, 4, 11;\n  inconsistent with expulsion of poets, 3 _n._;\n  purpose of _Symposion_, to contrast Plato's with other\nviews, 8;\n  views of interlocutors in _Symposion_, 9;\n  a D\u00e6mon intermediate between gods and men, 9;\n  but in _Ph\u00e6drus_ a powerful god, _ib._ _n._, 11\n_n._;\n  the stimulus to improving philosophical communion, 4, 6, 18;\n  _Ph\u00e6don_, _The\u00e6t\u00eatus_, _Sophist\u00eas_,\n_Republic_, _ib._;\n  exaltation of, in a few, love of Beauty _in genere_, 7, 15;\n  analogy to philosophy, 10, 11, 14;\n  disparaged, then panegyrised, by Sokrates in _Ph\u00e6drus_, 11;\n  a variety of madness, _ib._;\n  Sokrates as representative of _Eros Philosophus_, 15, 25;\n  Xenophon's view, _ib._\n\nEthics, diversity of beliefs, noticed by the ancients, i. 378,\niii. 282 _n._;\n  hostility to novel attempts at analysis, i. 387 _n._;\n  Sokrates distinguished objective and subjective views, 451;\n  subjective unanimity coincident with objective dissent,\n_ib._;\n  Aristophanes connects idea of immorality with free thought, iv.\n166;\n  the _matter_ of ethical sentiment variable, the _form_\npermanent, 203;\n  Pascal on, i. 231 _n._;\n  with political and social life, topic of Sokrates, 376, ii. 362,\niii. 113;\n  self-regarding doctrine of Sokrates, ii. 349, 354 _n._;\n  order of problems as conceived by Sokrates, 299;\n  to do, worse than to suffer, evil, 326, 332, 338, 359;\n  no man voluntarily does, iv. 249, 365-7;\n  [Greek: a(mart\u00ea/mata] and [Greek: a)dik\u00ea/mata] distinguished,\n365, 367;\n  and politics treated together by Plato, 133;\n  apart by Aristotle, 138;\n  Sokrates and Plato dwell too exclusively on intellectual\nconditions, ii. 67, 83;\n  rely too much on analogy of arts, and do not note what underlies\nepithets, 68;\n  Plato blends ontology with, iii. 365;\n  forced conjunction of kosmology and, 391;\n  physiology of _Tim\u00e6us_ subordinated to ethical teleology,\niv. 257;\n  different points of view in Plato, ii. 167;\n  modern theories, intuition, 348;\n  moral sense, not recognised in _Gorgias_ and\n_Protagoras_, _ib._;\n  permanent and transient elements of human agency, 353-5;\n  [Greek: ta\\ anthr\u00f4/pina],** iv. 302 _n._;\n  the permanent, and not immediate satisfaction, the end, ii. 360;\n  [Greek: to\\ e(/neka/ tou] confused with [Greek: to\\ dia/ ti],\n182 _n._;\n  basis in _Republic_ imperfect, iv. 127-32;\n  Plato more a preacher than philosopher in the _Republic_,\n131, 132;\n  purpose in _Leges_, to remedy all misconduct, 369;\n  of Demokritus, i. 82;\n  see _Cynics_, _Kyrenaics_, _Epikurus_, &c.\n\nEtymology, see _Name_.\n\nEubulides, sophisms of, i. 128, 133.\n\nEudemus, iv. 255;\n  Proklus borrowed from, i. 85 _n._\n\nEudoxus, i. 255;\n  identity of good and pleasure, ii. 315 _n._, iii. 375\n_n._, 379 _n._\n\nEukleides, i. 116;\n  enlarged summum genus of Parmenides, iii. 196 _n._;\n  blended Parmenides with Sokrates, i. 118;\n  Good, iii. 365, i. 119, 127 _n._;\n  nearly Plato's last view, 120.\n\n[Greek: Eu)pragi/a], equivoque, ii. 8 _n._, 352 _n._\n\nEuripides, _Bacch\u00e6_ analogous to _Leges_, iv. 277, 304\n_n._;\n  _Hippolytus_ illustrates popular Greek religious belief,\n163 _n._\n\nEusebius, i. 384 _n._, iv. 160 _n._, 256 _n._\n\n_Euthyd\u00eamus_, authenticity, i. 306, ii. 195;\n  date, i. 308-11, 312, 315, 320, 325 _n._, ii. 227\n_n._, iii. 36 _n._;\n  scenery and personages, ii. 195;\n  dramatic and comic exuberance, _ib._;\n  purpose, i. 309 _n._, ii. 198, 204 _n._, 211, i. 128;\n  Euthyd\u00eamus and Dionysodorus do not represent Protagoras and\nGorgias, ii. 202;\n  ironical admiration of Sophists, 208;\n  earliest known attempt to expose fallacies, 216;\n  the result of habits of formal debate, 221;\n  character drawn of Sokrates suitable to its purpose, 203;\n  possession of good things, without intelligence, useless, 204;\n  intelligence must include making and use, 205;\n  fallacies of equivocation, 212, iii. 238 _n._;\n  _\u00e0 dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter_, ii. 213,\n214;\n  _extra dictionem_, 215;\n  involving deeper logical principles, _ib._;\n  its popularity among enemies of dialectic, 222;\n  the epilogue to obviate this inference, 223;\n  Euthyd\u00eamus the representative of dialectic and philosophy, 226;\n  disparagement of half-philosophers, half-politicians, 224;\n  Plato's view untenable, 229;\n  is Isokrates meant? 227, iii. 38 _n._;\n  no teacher can be indicated, ii. 225;\n  compared with _Parmenid\u00eas_, 200;\n  _Republic_, _Phil\u00eabus_, _Protagoras_, 208, iii.\n373 _n._\n\n_Euthyphron_, date of, i. 457 _n._;\n  its Sokratic spirit, 449;\n  gives Platonic Sokrates' reply to Mel\u00eatus, Xenophontic compared,\n441, 455;\n  a retort against Aristophanes, 442;\n  interlocutors, 437;\n  Euthyphron indicts his father for homicide, 438, ii. 329\n_n._;\n  as warranted by piety, i. 439;\n  acts on Sokratic principle of making oneself like the gods, 440;\n  Holiness, 439;\n  answer by a particular example, 444;\n  not what pleases the gods, 445, 448, 454;\n  Sokrates disbelieves discord among gods, 440;\n  why gods love the Holy, 446;\n  not a branch of justice, 447;\n  for gods gain nothing, 448;\n  holiness not a right traffic between men and gods, _ib._;\n  dialogue useful as showing the subordination of logical terms,\n455.\n\nEvil, to do, worse than to suffer, ii. 326, 332, 338, 359;\n  contrast of usual with Platonic meaning, 331;\n  the greatest, ignorance mistaking itself for knowledge, iii.\n197;\n  great preponderance of, iv. 25, 262 _n._, 390;\n  gods not the cause of, 24;\n  the good and the bad souls at work in the universe, 386;\n  man the cause of, 234;\n  inconsistency, _ib._, _n._;\n  diseases of mind arise from body, 250;\n  no man voluntarily wicked, ii. 292, iv. 249, 365-7;\n  done by the good man wilfully, by the bad unwillingly, ii. 61;\n  three causes of misguided proceedings, iv. 366;\n  see _Good_, _Virtue_, _Body_.\n\n[Greek: E(/xis], Aristotelic, ii. 355.\n\nExistence, notion of, iii. 135 _n._, 205, 226, 229, 231.\n\nExperience, Zeno's arguments not contradictions of data\ngeneralized from, i. 100;\n  Plato's theory of pre-natal, ii. 252;\n  operation of pre-natal on man's intellectual faculties, iii. 13;\n  reminiscence of pre-natal knowledge gained by, 17;\n  post-natal not ascertained and measured by him, ii. 252;\n  no appeal to observation or, in studying astronomy and\nacoustics, iv. 73, 74;\n  see _Sense_.\n\nExpert, authority of public judgment, nothing, of Expert,\neverything, i. 426, 435;\n  opposition to _Homo mensura_, iii. 135, 143;\n  different view, i. 446 _n._;\n  correlation with undiscovered science of ends, ii. 149;\n  is never seen or identified, 117, 142;\n  how known, 141;\n  Sokrates himself acts as, i. 436;\n  the pentathlos of _Erast\u00e6_, ii. 119 _n._;\n  finds out and certifies truth and reality, 87, 88;\n  badness of all reality, iii. 330;\n  required to discriminate pleasures, ii. 345;\n  as dialectician and rhetorician, iii. 39;\n  impracticable, 42;\n  true government by, 268;\n  postulated for _names_ in _Kratylus_, 329.\n\n\nF.\n\nFabricius, iv. 382 _n._\n\nFaith and Conjecture, two grades of opinion, iv. 67.\n\nFallacies, Sophists abused, ii. 199;\n  did not invent, 217, i. 133 _n._;\n  inherent liabilities to error in ordinary process of thinking,\nii. 217, i. 129;\n  corrected by formal debate, ii. 217, 220 _n._, 221;\n  exposure of, by multiplication of particular examples, 211;\n  by conclusion shown _aliunde_ to be false, 216;\n  Plato enumerates, Aristotle tries to classify, 212;\n  _Euthyd\u00eamus_, earliest known attempt to expose, 216;\n  Bacon's _Idola_, 218;\n  Mill's complete enumeration of heads of, 218;\n  of sufficient Reason, i. 6 _n._;\n  of equivocation, ii. 212, 352 _n._;\n  _extra dictionem_, 214;\n  _\u00e0 dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter_, 213, 214;\n  Plato and Aristotle fall into, iii. 138, 158;\n  of confusion, 297 _n._;\n  arguing in a circle, ii. 428 _n._;\n  of Ratiocination, 213, 219;\n  of Megarics and Antisthenes, 215;\n  see _Sophisms_, _Equivoques_.\n\nFamily, Greek views of, iii. 1 _n._;\n  restrictions at Thebes, iv. 329 _n._;\n  no separate families for guardians, 41, 174, 178;\n  ties mischievous, but can not practically be got rid of, 327;\n  to be watched over by magistrates, 328;\n  treatment of infants, 346;\n  see _Education_, _Communism_, _Woman_,\n_Infanticide_.\n\nFarrar, F. W., iii. 326 _n._\n\nFate, relation to gods, iv. 221 _n._, i. 142;\n  see _Chance_.\n\nFerrier, on scope and purpose of philosophy, i. _viii_,\n_n._;\n  relativity of knowledge, iii. 123 _n._;\n  antithesis of Ego and Mecum, 132 _n._;\n  necessity of setting forth counter-propositions, 148.\n\nFicinus, interpretation of Plato, i. _xi_;\n  followed Thrasyllean classification, 301;\n  on Good and Beauty, iii. 5 _n._;\n  on _Parmenid\u00eas_, 84 _n._;\n  mystic sanctity of names, 323 _n._\n\nFigure, defined, ii. 235;\n  pleasures of, true, iii. 356.\n\nFinance, see _Xenophon_.\n\nFinite, Zeno's reductiones ad Absurdum, i. 93;\n  natural coalescence of infinite and, iii. 340;\n  illustration from speech and music, 342;\n  insufficient, 343.\n\nFire, doctrine of Anaximander, i. 5;\n  Anaximenes, 7;\n  Pythagoras, 13;\n  Herakleitus, 27, 30 _n._, 32;\n  soul compared to, 34;\n  Empedokles, 38;\n  Anaxagoras, 50, 52, 56 _n._;\n  identified with mind by Demokritus, 75.\n\nFischer, Kuno, iii. 84 _n._\n\nFoes, iv. 251 _n._\n\nFreewill, the Necessity of Plato, iv. 221.\n\nFriendship, a moving force, in Empedokles, i. 38;\n  problem in _Lysis_ too general, ii. 186;\n  causes of enmity and, exist _by nature_, 341 _n._;\n  colloquial debate as a generating cause, 188 _n._;\n  desire for what is akin to us or our own, 182;\n  not likeness and unlikeness, 179, 180, 359;\n  physical analogy 188 _n._;\n  the Indifferent friend to Good, 180, 189;\n  illustrated by philosopher, 181;\n  the _primum amabile_, _ib._, 192;\n  _prima amicitia_ of Aristotle, compared, 194;\n  Xenophontic Sokrates and Aristotle, 186.\n\n\nG.\n\nGain, double meaning of, ii. 82;\n  no tenable definition found, _ib._, 83;\n  see _Hipparchus_.\n\nGalen, relation to Plato, iv. 258;\n  soul threefold, _ib._;\n  a [Greek: kra=sis] of bodily elements, ii. 391 _n._;\n  immortal, 423 _n._, 427;\n  on _Phil\u00eabus_, iii. 365 _n._;\n  belief in legends, iv. 153 _n._;\n  Plato's theory of vision, 237 _n._;\n  structure of apes, 257 _n._\n\nGaluppi, Pascal, iii. 118.\n\nGeneral maxims readily laid down by pre-Sokratic philosophers, i.\n69 _n._;\n  terms vaguely understood, 398 _n._, 452 _n._, ii. 49\n_n._, 166, 242, 279 _n._, 279, 341 _n._;\n  Mill on, 48 _n._;\n  hopelessness of defining, 186 _n._\n\nGenerals, Greek, no professional experience, ii. 134.\n\nGeneric and specific terms, distinction unfamiliar in Plato's\ntime, ii. 13;\n  and analogical wholes, 48, 193 _n._, iii. 365;\n  unity, how distributed among species and individuals, 339, 346.\n\nGenius, why not hereditary, ii. 271, 272, 274.\n\nGeometry, Pythagorean, i. 12;\n  modern application, 10 _n._;\n  subject of Plato's lectures, 349 _n._;\n  value of, iv. 352, 423;\n  Lucian against, i. 385 _n._;\n  successive stages of its teaching illustrate Platonic doctrine,\n353;\n  twofold, iii. 359, 395;\n  pure and applied mathematics, 396 _n._;\n  Aristotle's view of axioms of, i. 358 _n._;\n  from induction, iv. 353 _n._;\n  painless pleasures of, iii. 356, 388 _n._;\n  and dialectic, two modes of mind's procedure applicable to ideal\nworld, iv. 65;\n  geometry, assumes diagrams, _ib._;\n  conducts mind towards universal ens, 72;\n  uselessness of written treatises, ii. 136;\n  proportionals, iv. 224 _n._, 241 _n._, 423;\n  geometrical theory of the elements, i. 349 _n._, iv. 240;\n  Aristotle on, 241 _n._;\n  Kyrenaic and Cynic contempt for, i. 155, 186, 192.\n\nGfr\u00f6rer, iv. 256 _n._\n\nGods, derivation of [Greek: theoi/], iii. 300 _n._;\n  Xenophanes, i. 16, 119 _n._;\n  Parmenides, 19, 24;\n  Empedokles, 40 _n._, 42, 47;\n  Anaxagorean Nous represented later as a god, 54;\n  Diogenes of Apollonia, 64 _n._;\n  Demokritus, 81;\n  Sokrates, 414, 440, ii. 28;\n  Plato's proofs of existence of, iv. 385, 389, 419;\n  locality assigned to, 230 _n._;\n  fabricated men and animals, ii. 268;\n  possess the Idea of cognition, iii. 66, 67 _n._;\n  free from pleasure and pain, 389;\n  do not assume man's form, iv. 25, 154 _n._;\n  Lucretius on, _ib._;\n  cause good only, 24;\n  no repulsive fictions to be tolerated about, 25, 154;\n  Dodona and Delphi to be consulted for religious legislation, 34,\n137 _n._, 325, 337;\n  [Greek: ta\\ thei=a], 302 _n._;\n  primary and visible gods, 229;\n  secondary and generated gods, 230;\n  Plato's dissent from established religious doctrine, 161, 163;\n  Plato compared with Epikurus, 161, 395;\n  Plato's view of popular theology, 238 _n._, 328, 337;\n  popular Greek belief, well illustrated in Euripides'\n_Hippolytus_, 163 _n._;\n  God's [Greek: phtho/nos], 164 _n._;\n  Aristotle, 395;\n  see _Demiurgus_, _Religion_, _Inspiration_.\n\nGold, makes all things beautiful, ii. 41.\n\nGood, Demokritus' theory, i. 82;\n  the Pythagorean [Greek:  kairo/s], first cause of, iii. 397\n_n._;\n  an equivoque, 370;\n  and pleasurable, as conceived by the Athenians, ii. 371;\n  contrast of usual with Platonic meaning, 331, 335;\n  universal desire of, 243, 324, iii. 5, 335, 371, 392 _n._;\n  akin, evil alien, to every one, ii. 183;\n  alone caused by gods, iv. 24;\n  its three varieties, ii. 306 _n._, 350 _n._, iv. 12,\n116, 428;\n  Eros one, iii. 5;\n  as object of attachment, ii. 194;\n  the four virtues the highest, and source of all other goods, iv.\n428;\n  is the just, honourable, expedient, ii. 7;\n  not knowledge, 29;\n  is gain, 72-6;\n  True and Real coalesce in Plato's mind, 88;\n  Campbell on erroneous identification of truth and, iii. 391\n_n._;\n  the _primum amabile_, ii. 181, 191;\n  approximation to Idea, 192;\n  Indifferent friend to, 180, 189;\n  pleasure is, 289, 306 _n._, 347 _n._;\n  agreement with Aristippus, i. 199-202;\n  meaning of pleasure as the _summum bonum_, iii. 338;\n  the permanent, and not immediate satisfaction, the end, ii. 360;\n  Sokrates' reasoning, 307;\n  too narrow and exclusively prudential, 309;\n  not Utilitarianism, 310 _n._;\n  not ironical, 314;\n  compared with _Republic_, 310;\n  _Protagoras_, 345;\n  coincidence of _Republic_ and _Protagoras_, 350\n_n._;\n  inconsistent with _Gorgias_, 306, 345;\n  argument in _Gorgias_ untenable, 351;\n  Platonic _id\u00e9al_, view of Order, undefined results, 374;\n  Plato's view of rhetoric dependent on his _id\u00e9al_ of, 374;\n  is [Greek: a)lupi/a], iii. 338 _n._;\n  is maximum of pleasure and minimum of pain, iv. 293-97, 299-303;\n  at least an useful fiction, 303;\n  not intelligence nor pleasure, 62;\n  and happiness, correlative terms in _Phil\u00eabus_, iii. 335;\n  is it intense pleasure without any intelligence, 338;\n  or intelligence without pleasure or pain, _ib._;\n  intelligence more cognate than pleasure to, 347, 361;\n  pleasure a generation, therefore not an end, nor the good, 357;\n  a _tertium quid_, 339, 361;\n  intelligence the determining, pleasure the indeterminate, 348;\n  a mixture, 361;\n  five constituents, 362;\n  the answer as to, does not satisfy the tests Plato lays down,\n371;\n  has not the unity of an idea, 365;\n  Plato's in part an eclectic doctrine, 366;\n  special accomplishments oftener hurtful, if no knowledge of the\ngood, ii. 16;\n  man who has knowledge of, can alone do evil wilfully, 61;\n  knowledge of, identified with [Greek: nou=s], 30;\n  postulated under different titles, 31;\n  special art for discriminating, 115;\n  how known, undetermined, 31, 206;\n  only distinct answer in _Protagoras_, 208, 308, 347;\n  the profitable, general but not constant explanation of Plato,\n38;\n  is essentially relative, iv. 213 _n._, i. 185;\n  Idea of, rules the world of Ideas, as sun the visible, iv. 63,\n64;\n  Aristotle on, 214 _n._;\n  Anaxagoras' nous, ii. 412;\n  training to ascend to Idea, iv. 62;\n  dialectic gives the contemplation of, 75;\n  rulers alone know, 212;\n  Idea of, left unknown, 213;\n  changes in Plato's views, i. 119;\n  Eukleides, iii. 365, i. 119, 127 _n._;\n  nearly same as Plato's last doctrine, 120;\n  discourse of Sokrates with Aristippus, 184, 185;\n  Xenophontic Sokrates, iii. 366.\n\nGorgias the Leontine, reasoned against the Absolute as either Ens\nor Entia, i. 103;\n  Ens incogitable and unknowable, 104;\n  contrasted with earlier philosophers, 105;\n  not represented by Dionysodorus in Euthydemus, ii. 202;\n  celebrity, 317;\n  theory of vision, iv. 237 _n._\n\n_Gorgias_, the date, i. 305-7, 308-10, 312, 315, ii. 228\n_n._, 318 _n._, 367;\n  its general character, discrediting the actualities of life,\n355;\n  reply to, by Aristeides, 371 _n._;\n  upholds independence and dignity of philosophic dissenter, 375;\n  scenery and person ages, 317;\n  rhetoric the artisan of persuasion, 319;\n  a branch of flattery, 321, 370;\n  citation of four statesmen, 358, 362;\n  true and counterfeit arts, 322;\n  multifarious arts of flattery, aiming at immediate pleasure,\n357;\n  despots and rhetors have no _real_ power, 324;\n  description of rhetors, untrue, 369;\n  rhetoric is of little use, 329, iii. 410;\n  Sokrates' view different in Xenophon, ii. 371 _n._;\n  issue unsatisfactorily put by Plato, 369;\n  view stands or falls with _id\u00e9al_ of Good, 374;\n  all men wish for Good, 324;\n  illustration from Archelaus, 325, 333 _n._, 334, 336, i.\n179;\n  Plato's peculiar view of Good, ii. 331, 335;\n  contrasted with usual meaning, 331;\n  [Greek: kalo\\n] and [Greek: ai)schro\\n] defined, 327, 334;\n  definition untenable, 334;\n  to do, a greater evil than to suffer, wrong, 326, 359;\n  inconsistent with description of Archelaus, 333;\n  reciprocity of regard indispensable, _ib._;\n  opposition of Law and Nature, _ib._, 338;\n  no allusion to Sophists, 339;\n  uncertainty of referring to nature, 340;\n  punishment a relief to the wrong-doer, 327, 328, 335;\n  the only cure for criminals' mental distemper, 328;\n  consequences of theory, 336;\n  analogy of mental and bodily distemper pushed too far, 337;\n  its incompleteness, 363;\n  are largest measure, and all varieties, of desire, good, 344;\n  good and pleasurable as conceived by the Athenians, 371;\n  good and pleasurable not identical, 345, iii. 380 _n._;\n  argument untenable, ii. 351;\n  expert required to discriminate pleasures, 345, 347;\n  _id\u00e9al_ of measure, view of order, undefined results, 374;\n  permanent and transient elements of human agency 353-5;\n  psychology defective, 354;\n  temperance the condition of virtue and happiness, 358;\n  Sokrates resolves on scheme of life, 360;\n  agreement of Sokrates with Aristippus, i. 200 _n._;\n  Sokrates alone follows the true political art, ii. 361-2;\n  condition of success in life, 359;\n  danger of dissenter, _ib._;\n  Sokrates as a dissenter, 364;\n  claim of _locus standi_ for philosophy, 367;\n  but indiscriminate cross-examination given up, 368;\n  mythe respecting Hades, 361;\n  compared with _Protagoras_, 270 _n._, 306 _n._,\n345-8, 349-55, iii. 379;\n  _Phil\u00eabus_, _ib._, 380;\n  _Apology_, _Kriton_, _Republic_, ii. 362;\n  _Leges_, _ib._, iv. 301, 302, 324;\n  _Menexenus_, 409;\n  Xenophontic Sokrates, i. 178, 221.\n\nGovernment, natural rectitude of, ii. 89;\n  Plato does not admit the received classification, iii. 267;\n  true classification, scientific or unscientific, 268;\n  monarchy and democracy the _mother-polities_, iv. 312;\n  dissent of Aristotle, _ib._ _n._;\n  seven distinct natural titles to, 309;\n  illustrated by Argos, Mess\u00ean\u00ea, Sparta, 310;\n  imprudent to found on any one title only, _ib._;\n  five types of, 78-84;\n  three constituents of good, 312;\n  Plato's _id\u00e9al_, ii. 363;\n  unscientific, or by many, counterfeit, iii. 268;\n  genuine, by the one scientific man, _ib._, 273, iv. 280;\n  counter-theory in _Protagoras_, ii. 268, iii. 275;\n  distinguished from general, &c., 271;\n  no laws, 269;\n  practicable only in golden age, iv. 319;\n  by fixed laws the second best, iii. 270;\n  excess of energetic virtues entails death or banishment, of\ngentle, slavery, 273;\n  true ruler aims at forming virtuous citizens, 272;\n  standard of ethical orthodoxy to be maintained, 273;\n  of unscientific forms despotism worst, democracy least bad, 270,\n278;\n  a bad government no government, 281 _n._;\n  timocracy, iv. 79;\n  oligarchy, _ib._;\n  democracy, 80;\n  despot, 81;\n  education combined with, by Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, 142;\n  Sokratic ideal differently worked out by Plato and Xenophon,\niii. 273;\n  Xenophon's _id\u00e9al_, citizen willing to be ruled, i. 215,\n218, 219;\n  and scientific ruler, 224;\n  Xenophon's scheme of, a wisely arranged Oriental despotism, 234;\n  see _State_.\n\nGr\u00e4fenhahn, iii. 312 _n._\n\nGrammar, no formal, existed in Plato's time, ii. 34 _n._,\niii. 222.\n\nGreece, political changes in, during Plato's life, i. 1;\n  Greeks all by nature kinsmen, iv. 47.\n\nGrimm, iii. 314 _n._, 329 _n._\n\nGruppe, on _Leges_, iv. 355 _n._\n\nGuardians, characteristics, iv. 23, 25;\n  drunkenness unbecoming, 298 _n._;\n  consist of men and women, 41, 46;\n  syssitia, 359;\n  communism of, _ib._, 44, 140, 169;\n  maintenance of city dependent on their habits, character,\neducation, 32, 34, 139, 170, 178;\n  no family ties, 41, 174-8;\n  temporary marriages, 44, 175;\n  object, 198;\n  number limited, Plato and Aristotle, 178, 198-200;\n  age for studies, 76;\n  studies introductory to philosophy, 70-4;\n  courage seated in, 35;\n  analogous to reason and energy in individuals, 39;\n  divided into rulers and auxiliaries, 29;\n  compared with modern soldiers, 148, 180.\n\nGymnastic, art reducible to rule, ii. 372 _n._;\n  measured quantity alone good, 112;\n  education in, necessary for guardians, iv. 23;\n  should be simple, 28;\n  imparts courage, 29;\n  prizes at festivals, 338;\n  but object of training, war, not prizes, 358;\n  music necessary to correct, 29.\n\n\nH.\n\nHades, no repulsive fictions tolerated of, iv. 25, 154;\n  mythe of, in _Republic_, 94;\n  in _Gorgias_, ii. 361.\n\nHamilton, Sir Wm., doctrines inconsistent, i. _xiii_.\n_n._;\n  Plato's reasonings on the soul, ii. 250 _n._, 428\n_n._;\n  Reid and Berkeley, iii. 165 _n._;\n  Judgment implied in every act of Consciousness, 166 _n._;\n  relativity of knowledge, 133 _n._;\n  primary and secondary qualities, iv. 243 _n._\n\nHappiness, relation to knowledge, ii. 159, 160;\n  Plato's peculiar view of, 335;\n  contrasted with usual meaning, 331;\n  its elements depreciated, 353;\n  temperance the condition of, 358;\n  all men love Good as means to, iii. 5;\n  and good, correlative terms in _Phil\u00eabus_, 335;\n  Sydenham on seat of, 372 _n._;\n  the end of the state and individual, iv. 98;\n  flowing from justice, 20, 84, 90;\n  see _Good_, _Pleasure_.\n\nHarmodius, iii. 4 _n._\n\nHarris, James, on _Homo Mensura_, iii. 139 _n._;\n  Plato's etymologies, 302 _n._;\n  on Stoical doctrine of virtue, iv. 106 _n._;\n  on sophism [Greek: Kurieu/\u00f4n], i. 141 _n._;\n  time, 146 _n._\n\nHarvey, Dr. Wm., iv. 259.\n\nHebrew studies, their effect on classical scholarship, i.\n_xv_. _n._;\n  uniformity of tradition contrasted with diversity of Greek\nphilosophy, 384 _n._;\n  allegorical interpretation of prophets, ii. 286 _n._;\n  writers, Plato's resemblance to, iv. 160 _n._, 256.\n\nHedonists, doctrine, iii. 374;\n  included [Greek: a)lupi/a] in end, 377;\n  did not set aside all idea of limit, 392 _n._;\n  basis adopted in Plato's argument, 375, 387 _n._;\n  enforced same view as Plato on intense pleasures, 378;\n  see _Pleasure_.\n\nHegel, origin of philosophy, i. 382 _n._;\n  ideal expert, _ib._;\n  Plato's view of the soul, ii. 414 _n._;\n  Anaxagoras' nous, 403 _n._\n\nHegesias, the \"death-persuader,\" i. 202;\n  coincidence with Cynics, 203;\n  doctrine of relativity, 204.\n\nHeindorf, on _Kratylus_, iii. 310 _n._;\n  _Charmid\u00eas_, iv. 136 _n._;\n  _Republic_, _ib._\n\nHekat\u00e6us, censured by Herakleitus, i. 26.\n\nHerakleitus, works and obscure style, i. 26;\n  dogmatism and censure of his predecessors, _ib._;\n  metaphysical, 27;\n  physics, _ib._, 32;\n  did not rest proof of a principle on induction of particulars,\niii. 309 _n._;\n  _Fieri_ his principle, i. 28;\n  Parmenides' opposed, 37;\n  the law of _Fieri_ alone permanent, 29;\n  no substratum, 30;\n  identified with _Homo Mensura_, iii. 114, 115, 126, 128;\n  rejected by Aristotle, but approved by modern science, i. 37\n_n._, iii. 126 _n._, 154 _n._;\n  exposition by metaphors, i. 28, 30;\n  fire and air, 27, 31;\n  fire a symbol for the universal force or law, 30 _n._;\n  distinction of _ideal_ and _elementary_ fire, 32\n_n._;\n  doctrine of contraries, 30, 31, iii. 101 _n._;\n  the soul an effluence of the Universal, i. 34;\n  individual reason worthless, _ib._;\n  Universal Reason, the reason of most men as it ought to be, 35;\n  [Greek: perie/chon] compared with Anaxagorean Nous, 56\n_n._;\n  sleep, 34;\n  theory of vision, iv. 237 _n._;\n  time, 228 _n._;\n  paradoxes, i. 37 _n._;\n  [Greek: Polumathi/\u00ea no/on ou) dida/skei], 26;\n  reappears in Plato, ii. 30;\n  enigmatical doctrine of his followers, iii. _ 159 _n._;\n  their repugnance to dialectic, i. 106 _n._;\n  names first imposed in accordance with his theory, iii. 301\n_n._, 314-7;\n  names the essence of things, 324 _n._, 325;\n  theory admitted, 316;\n  some names not consistent with it, 318;\n  the theory uncertain, 321;\n  flux, true of particulars, not of Ideas, 320;\n  antipathy to Pythagoras, 316 _n._;\n  influence on the development of logic, i. 37;\n  on Diogenes of Apollonia, 64 _n._;\n  Protagoras, iii. 159 _n._;\n  Plato, i. 27;\n  Stoics, 27, 34 _n._\n\nHerakleitus the Allegorist, iii. 3 _n._, iv. 157 _n._\n\nH\u00earakl\u00eas, the choice of, ii. 267 _n._, i. 177.\n\nHeresy, see _Orthodoxy_.\n\nHermann, Godfrey, natural rectitude of names, iii. 300 _n._\n\nHermann, K. F., theory of Platonic canon, i. 307;\n  Susemihl coincides, 310;\n  principle of arrangement reasonable, 322;\n  more tenable than Schleiermacher's, 324;\n  Ueberweg attempts to reconcile Schleiermacher with, 313;\n  on _Hippias Major_, ii. 34 _n._;\n  _Kratylus_, iii. 309 _n._;\n  _Republic_, 244 _n._;\n  _Leges_, iv. 274 _n._, 328 _n._, 369 _n._,\n374 _n._\n\nHermokrates, intended as last in _Republic_ tetralogy, i.\n325, iv. 266, 273.\n\nHerodotus, infers original aqueous state of earth from prints of\nshells and fishes, i. 19 _n._;\n  Psammetichus' experiment, iii. 289 _n._;\n  the gods' jealousy, iv. 164 _n._;\n  sacrifice and prayer, 394, _ib._ _n._\n\nHerschel, Sir John, axioms of arithmetic from induction, iv. 353\n_n._\n\nHesiod, cosmology, i. 2-3, 4 _n._;\n  censured by Xenophanes, 16;\n  by Herakleitus, 26.\n\nHet\u00e6r\u00e6, iv. 359, i. 188-90.\n\nHindoos, Sleeman on grounds of belief among, iii. 150 _n._;\n  philosophers compared with Eleatics, i. 159 _n._\n\nHipparchia, wife of Krates, i. 173.\n\n_Hipparchus_, authenticity, i. 297 _n._, 307, 309, 337\n_n._, ii. 82, 93;\n  and _Minos_ analogous and inferior to other works, 82;\n  purpose, 84;\n  subject--definition of lover of gain, 71;\n  double meaning of _gain_, 82;\n  first definition, rejected, 71;\n  character and precept of Hipparchus the Peisistratid, eulogy of\nSokrates, 73;\n  Gain is good--apparent contradiction, _ib._;\n  gain the valuable, the profitable, and therefore the good, 75;\n  some gain is good, some evil, 74;\n  objections, _ib._;\n  no tenable definition of gain found, 82, 83.\n\n_Hippias Major_, authenticity, i. 306, 315, ii. 33 _n._;\n  date, i. 307, 308-10, 313;\n  situation and interlocutors, ii. 33;\n  Hippias lectured at Sparta on the beautiful, the fine, the\nhonourable, 35, 39;\n  no success at Sparta--law forbids, 35;\n  the lawful is the profitable, 36;\n  comparison with Xenophon, 34, 37;\n  the beautiful? 39;\n  instances, 40;\n  Gold makes all things beautiful, 41;\n  complaint of vulgar analogies, 42;\n  answer fails of universal application, _ib._;\n  the becoming, and the useful--objections, 43-4;\n  a variety of the pleasurable, 45;\n  inadmissible, _ib._;\n  Sokrates attempts to assign some general concept, 47, 193\n_n._, iii. 365;\n  analogy of Sokrates' explanations in _Memorabilia_, ii. 49;\n  and _Minor_ illustrate general theory of the dialogues of\nSearch, 63;\n  antithetise rhetoric and dialectic, 70.\n\n_Hippias Minor_, authenticity, i. 306, ii. 55 _n._, 57\n_n._;\n  date, i. 306, 308-10, 310, 315;\n  and _Major_ illustrate general theory of dialogues of\nSearch, ii. 63;\n  antithetise rhetoric and dialectic, 70;\n  polemical and philosophical purpose, 63;\n  its thesis maintained by Sokrates in _Memorabilia_, 66;\n  combated by Aristotle, 67;\n  characters and situation, 55;\n  Achilleus preferred by Hippias to Odysseus, veracity to\nmendacity, 56, 58;\n  contested by Sokrates veracious and mendacious man the same, 57;\n  to hurt _wilfully_ better than to do so unwillingly, 58;\n  Hippias dissents, 60;\n  good man alone does evil wilfully, Sokrates' perplexity, 61;\n  critics on the sophistry of Sokrates, 62.\n\nHippokrates, iv. 260.\n\nHobbes on similitude of passions in all, but dissimilarity of\nobjects, i. 452 _n._;\n  exercises for students, iii. 80 _n._, 90 _n._;\n  subject and object, 117 _n._;\n  analogy of state to individual, iv. 96;\n  cause, i. 139 _n._, 144;\n  Diodorus' doctrine defended, 143;\n  coincides with Aristotle on motion, 146.\n\nHoliness, what is? i. 439;\n  not what gods love, 445, 448, 454;\n  why the gods love it, 446;\n  how far like justice, ii. 278;\n  not a branch of justice, i. 447;\n  not a right traffic between men and gods, 448;\n  is it holy? ii. 278;\n  the holy, one type in Platonic, various in Xenophontic,\nSokrates, i. 454.\n\nHomer, cosmology, i. 2;\n  censured by Xenophanes, 16;\n  Herakleitus, 26;\n  considered more as an instructor than as a poet, ii. 126;\n  and poets, the great teachers, 135;\n  picture in _Republic_, as really knowing nothing\n_ib._, iv. 92;\n  Strabo on, 152 _n._;\n  Herakleitus the allegorist, iii. 3 _n._, iv. 157 _n._;\n  Plato's fictions contrasted with, 153 _n._;\n  diversity of subjects, ii. 132;\n  inspired by gods, 128;\n  analogy of _Magnet_, _ib._;\n  on friendship, 179;\n  identified by Plato with _Homo Mensura_, iii. 114.\n\nHomo Mensura, see _Relativity_.\n\nHomoeomeries, see _Anaxagoras_.\n\nHomicide, varieties of, iv. 370-4;\n  penalties, 370;\n  Plato follows peculiar Attic view, 374.\n\nHonourable, the, Hippias' lectures at Sparta on, ii. 39;\n  identified with the just, good, expedient, 7;\n  actions conducive to pleasure are, 295;\n  by law, not nature, Aristippus' doctrine, i. 197.\n\nHorace, scheme of life, i. 191 _n._, 192 _n._\n\nHuet, Bp., i. 384 _n._\n\nHumboldt, Wm. von, origin of language, iii. 326 _n._\n\nHume, Athenian taxation, i. 242 _n._\n\nHunting, meaning of, iv. 356;\n  how far permitted, 355.\n\nHutcheson, Francis, iv. 105 _n._\n\nHypothesis, discussion of, distinct from discussion of its\nconsequences, ii. 397, 411;\n  ultimate appeal to extremely general hypothesis, _ib._;\n  in _Republic_, only a stepping-stone to the first\nprinciple, 412;\n  provisional assumption of, and consequences traced, exercise for\nstudents, iii. 79;\n  illustration, 81.\n\n\nI.\n\nIdeas, Plato's, differ from Pythagorean Number, i. 10;\n  identified by Plato with the Pythagorean symbols, 348, iii. 71\n_n._, 368;\n  differ from Demokritean atoms, i. 72;\n  the definitions Sokrates sought for, 453;\n  Plato assumed the common characteristic, by objectivising the\nword itself, _ib._;\n  doctrine derived its plausibility from metaphors, 343;\n  soul's immortality rests on assumption of, ii. 412;\n  reminiscence of the, iii. 13;\n  as Forms, ii. 412;\n  the only causes, 396;\n  formal, 408 _n._;\n  logical phantoms as real causes, 404 _n._;\n  truth resides in, 411;\n  alone exclude contrary, 7 _n._;\n  unchangeable, iii. 246 _n._, iv. 50;\n  Herakleitean flux not true of, iii. 320;\n  partly changeable and partly unchangeable, 228;\n  disguised in particulars, iv. 3 _n._;\n  fundamental distinction of particulars, and, 219;\n  alone knowable, 49;\n  _opinion_, of what is between ens and non-ens, _ib._;\n  assumption of, as separate entia, ii. 396, 403;\n  great multitude of, 410;\n  characteristics of world of, iii. 63;\n  Ideas separate from, but participable by, sensible objects, 59;\n  objections, 60-7;\n  the genuine Platonic theory attacked, 68;\n  none of some objects, 60;\n  how participable by objects, 63, 65, 72, iv. 138;\n  not fitted on to the facts of sense, iii. 78;\n  Aristotle partly successful in attempt, 76.;\n  analogous difficulty of predication, i. 169;\n  \"the third man,\" iii. 64 _n._;\n  not merely conceptions, 64, 73;\n  not mere types, 65;\n  not cognizable, since not relative to ourselves, _ib._, 72;\n  gods have Idea of cognition, 67, 68 _n._;\n  dilemma, ideas exist or philosophy impossible, 68;\n  intercommunion of some forms, 207, 250 _n._;\n  analogy of letters and syllables, 208;\n  what forms, determined by philosopher, _ib._;\n  of _non-ens_, and _proposition_, _opinion_,\n_judgment_, 213, 214;\n  of _Diversum_ pervades all others, 209;\n  [Greek: t\u00f4=n a)popha/se\u00f4n], 238 _n._;\n  of Animal, iv. 223, 235 _n._, 263;\n  kosmos on pattern of, 223;\n  action on Materia Prima, 238;\n  of the elements, 239;\n  of insects, &c., iii. 195 _n._;\n  of names and things nameable, 286 _n._, 289, 326 _n._;\n  names fabricated by lawgiver on type of, 287, 290, 325;\n  names the essence of things, 324 _n._;\n  doctrine about classification not necessarily connected with,\n345;\n  of Beauty exclusively presented in _Symposion_, 18;\n  of Good, approximation of _primum amabile_, ii. 192;\n  training to ascend to the idea of good, iv. 61, 66;\n  comparison of idea of good to sun, 63, 64;\n  of Good, in _Ph\u00e6don_, Anaxagoras' nous, ii. 412;\n  known to the rulers alone, iv. 212;\n  left unsolved, 213;\n  the contemplation of, by dialectic, 75;\n  reluctance to undertake active duties, of those who have\ncontemplated, 70;\n  philosopher lives in region of, sophist in region of non-ens,\niii. 208, iv. 48;\n  little said of, in _Menon_, ii. 253, 254 _n._;\n  postulated in _Tim\u00e6us_, iv. 220;\n  discrepancy of _Sophist\u00eas_ and other dialogues, iii. 244;\n  the idealists' doctrine the same as Plato's in _Ph\u00e6don_,\n&c., _ib._, 246;\n  _Ph\u00e6drus_, _Ph\u00e6don_, and _Tim\u00e6us_ compared, iv.\n239 _n._;\n  Plato's various views, ii. 404, i. 119;\n  the last, 120;\n  Aristotle on, 360 _n._, ii. 192, 193 _n._, 410\n_n._, iii. 76, 245, 365 _n._, 367, iv. 214 _n._,\ni. 120 _n._;\n  _Sophist\u00eas_ approximates to Aristotle's view, iii. 247;\n  generic and analogical aggregates, ii. 48, 193 _n._, iii.\n365;\n  Antisthenes and Diogenes on, i. 163;\n  the first protest of Nominalism against Realism, 164;\n  see _Particulars_, _Phenomena_, _Universal_.\n\nIdeal, to Plato the only real, ii. 89.\n\nIdealists, iii. 201;\n  meaning of _ens_, 231;\n  argument against, 204, 225, 244;\n  doctrine of, the same as Plato's in _Ph\u00e6don_, &c.,\n_ib._, 246.\n\nIdentity, personal, ii. 11, 25, iii. 6;\n  and contradiction, principle of, 101.\n\n[Greek: I)di\u00f4/t\u00eas] distinguished from [Greek: philo/sophos], iv.\n104 _n._;\n  [Greek: techni/t\u00eas], ii. 272 _n._\n\nIgnorance, mischiefs of, ii. 12;\n  depend on the subject-matter, 14;\n  to hurt _knowingly_, better than _ignorantly_, 58, 59;\n  evil done by bad man unwillingly, by good wilfully, 61;\n  not pleasure, the cause of wrongdoing, 294;\n  mistaking itself for knowledge, the worst evil, iii. 197;\n  see _Knowledge_.\n\nImitator, logical classification of, iii. 215;\n  of the wise man, sophist is, 216;\n  poets' mischievous _imitation of imitation_, iv. 91.\n\nImmortality, beliefs as to partial, ii. 385 _n._;\n  popular Greek belief,  427;\n  metempsychosis a general element in all old doctrines, 425\n_n._;\n  of rational soul only, iv. 243;\n  of all three parts of soul? ii. 385;\n  Plato's demonstration rests on assumption of ideas, 412;\n  includes pre-existence of all animals, and metempsychosis, 414;\n  fails, 423, 428, iii. 15;\n  leaves undetermined mode of pre-existence and post-existence,\nii. 424;\n  was not generally accepted, 426;\n  Xenophon's doctrine, 420 _n._;\n  Aristotle's, _ib._;\n  common desire for, iii. 6;\n  attained through mental procreation, beauty the stimulus,\n_ib._;\n  only metaphorical in _Symposion_, 17.\n\nIndeterminate, Pythagorean doctrine of the, i. 11;\n  pleasure the, iii. 348;\n  see _Infinite_.\n\nIndian philosophy, compared with Greek, i. 107, 378 _n._, 160\n_n._, 162;\n  analogy of Plato's doctrine of the soul, ii. 389 _n._, 426\n_n._;\n  Gymnosophists, compared with Diogenes, i. 157, 160 _n._;\n  antiquity of, 159 _n._;\n  suicide, 162 _n._;\n  Antisthenes did not borrow from, 159 _n._;\n  antithesis of law and nature, 162.\n\nIndifferent, the, ii. 180, 189.\n\nIndividual, analogy to kosmical process, i. 36 _n._;\n  tripartite division of mind, iv. 37;\n  analogous to three classes in state, 39;\n  analogy to state, 11, 20, 37, 79-84, 96;\n  Hobbes on, _ib._;\n  parallelism exaggerated, 114, 121, 124;\n  dependent on society, 21, 121, 123;\n  four stages of degeneracy, 79-84;\n  proportions of happiness and misery in them, 83;\n  happiness of, through justice, 20, 84, 90;\n  one man can do only one thing well, 23, 33, 97, 98, 183;\n  Xenophon on, 139 _n._\n\nIndividualism, see _Authority_.\n\nInductive and syllogistic dialectic, ii. 27;\n  process of, always kept in view in dialogues of search, i. 406;\n  illustrated in history of science, ii. 163;\n  trial and error the natural process of the human mind, 165;\n  length of Plato's process, 100 _n._;\n  usefulness of negative result, 186;\n  the mind rises from sensation to opinion, then cognition, iii.\n164;\n  verification from experience, not recognised as necessary or\npossible, 168.\n\nInfanticide, iv. 43, 44, 177;\n  Aristotle on, 202;\n  contrast of modern sentiment, 203.\n\nInfinite, of Anaximander, i. 5;\n  reproduced in chaos of Anaxagoras, 54;\n  Zeno's reductiones ad Absurdum, 93;\n  natural coalescence of finite and, iii. 340, 346, 348 _n._;\n  illustration from speech and music, 341;\n  explanation insufficient, 343;\n  see _Indeterminate_.\n\nIngratitude, iv. 399.\n\nInspiration, special, a familiar fact in Greek life, ii. 130, iii.\n352, iv. 15;\n  in rhapsode and poet, ii. 127;\n  of rhapsode through medium of poets, 128, 129, 134;\n  of philosopher, 383;\n  see _D\u00e6mon_;\n  Plato's view, 131;\n  the reason temporarily withdrawn, 132, iii. 11, 309 _n._;\n  opposed to knowledge, ii. 136;\n  right opinion of good statesmen from, 241;\n  all existing virtue is from, 242.\n\nInstantaneous, Plato's imagination of the, iii. 100;\n  found no favour, 102.\n\nInterest, forbidden, iv. 331.\n\n_Ion_, authenticity, i. 306, ii. 124;\n  date, i. 307, 308-9, 311, 312, 315;\n  interlocutors, ii. 124;\n  Ion as a rhapsode, 126;\n  devoted himself to Homer, 127;\n  the poetic art is one, _ib._;\n  inspiration of rhapsodes and poets, _ib._;\n  inspiration of Ion through Homer, 128;\n  analogy of magnet, _ib._, 129;\n  Plato's contrast of systematic with unsystematic procedure,\n_ib._;\n  Ion does not admit his own inspiration, 132;\n  province of rhapsode, _ib._;\n  the rhapsode the best general, 133;\n  exposition through divine inspiration, 134.\n\nIonic philosophy compared with the abstractions of Plato and\nAristotle, i. 87;\n  defect of, 88;\n  attended to material cause only, _ib._;\n  see _Philosophy--Pre-Sokratic_.\n\nIslands of the Blest, ii. 416.\n\nIsokrates, probably the half-philosopher, half-politician of\n_Euthyd\u00eamus_, ii. 227, iii. 35;\n  variable feeling between, and Plato, ii. 228, 331 _n._,\niii. 36;\n  praised in _Ph\u00e6drus_, 35;\n  compared with Lysias, _ib._ 38;\n  his school at Athens, 36;\n  teaching of, iv. 150 _n._;\n  as Sophist, i. 212 _n._;\n  teachableness of virtue, ii. 240 _n._;\n  age for dialectic exercises, iv. 211 _n._;\n  criticism on other philosophers, iii. 38 _n._;\n  on aspersions of rivals, 408 _n._;\n  on the poets, iv. 157 _n._;\n  contrasted with Plato in _Tim\u00e6us_, 217;\n  on _Leges_, 432;\n  oratio panegyrica, iii. 406 _n._;\n  great age of, i. 245.\n\nItaly, slaves in, iv. 343 _n._\n\n\nJ.\n\nJamblichus on metempsychosis, ii. 426 _n._\n\nJason, of Pher\u00e6, iii. 388 _n._\n\nJerome, St., on Plato and Aristotle, i. _xv_.\n\nJohnson, Dr., on Berkeley, iv. 243 _n._\n\nJouffroy, \u00e0 priori element of cognition, iii. 119 _n._\n\nJudgment, akin to proposition, and may be false, by partnership\nwith form _non-ens_, iii. 213-4;\n  implied in every act of consciousness, 165 _n._\n\nJust, the holy a branch of the, i. 447;\n  and unjust, standard of the better, ii. 3;\n  whence knowledge of it, 4;\n  identified with the good, honourable, expedient, 7;\n  or Good is the profitable--general, but not constant,\nexplanation of Plato, 38;\n  the just, by law, not nature, Aristippus' doctrine, i. 197.\n\nJustice, is it just, ii. 278;\n  varieties of meaning, i. 452 _n._, iv. 102, 120, 123, 125;\n  derivation of [Greek: dikaiosu/n\u00ea], iii. 301 _n._;\n  of [Greek: di/kaion], 308 _n._;\n  with temperance, the condition of happiness and freedom, ii. 12;\n  and sense of shame possessed and taught by all citizens, 269;\n  how far like holiness, i. 447, ii. 278;\n  opposition of natural and legal, 338, i. 197;\n  what is, iii. 416;\n  unsatisfactory answers of Sokrates and his friends, _ib._;\n  is rendering what is owing, iv. 2;\n  rejected, 6;\n  is what is advantageous to the most powerful, 8;\n  modified, 9;\n  is the good of another, 10;\n  necessary to society and individual, injustice a source of\nweakness, 11;\n  is a source of happiness, 12, 14, 18;\n  is a compromise, 13;\n  good only from consequences, 15, 16, 99;\n  Xenophon on, 114 _n._;\n  the received view anterior to Plato, 100;\n  a good _per se_, 20, 40, 84, 90, 116;\n  and from its consequences, 94, 121, 123, 294;\n  proved also by superiority of pleasures of intelligence, 84;\n  proof fails, 116, 118-21;\n  all-sufficient for happiness, germ of Stoical doctrine, 102;\n  inconsistent with actual facts, 106;\n  incorrect, for individual dependent on society, _ib._, 123;\n  Plato's affirmation true in a qualified sense, 125;\n  orthodoxy or dissent of just man must be taken into account,\n126, 131;\n  in state, 34;\n  is in all classes, 36;\n  is performing one's own function, _ib._, 37, 39;\n  analogy to bodily health, 40;\n  what constitutes injustice, 367-9;\n  no man voluntarily wicked, 249, 365-7;\n  distinction of damage and injury, 366;\n  relation to rest of virtue, 428;\n  distinction effaced between temperance and, 135;\n  ethical basis imperfect, 127;\n  view peculiar to Plato, 99;\n  Platonic conception is self-regarding, 104;\n  motives to it arise from internal happiness of the just, 105;\n  view substantially maintained since, _ib._;\n  essential reciprocity in society, ii. 312, 333, iv. 100, 133;\n  the basis of Plato's own theory of city's genesis, 111;\n  incompletely stated, 112 _n._;\n  any theory of society must present antithesis and correlation of\nobligation and right, 112;\n  Xenophon's definition unsatisfactory, i. 231;\n  Karneades, iv. 118 _n._;\n  Epikurus, 130 _n._;\n  Lucretius, _ib._;\n  Pascal, i. 231 _n._\n\n\nK.\n\n[Greek: Kaki/a], derivation, iii. 301 _n._\n\nKallikles, rhetor and politician, ii. 340.\n\nKallimachus, Plato's works known to, i. 276, 296 _n._;\n  issued catalogue of Alexandrine library, 275.\n\n[Greek: Kalo/n, to/], translated by beautiful, ii. 49 _n._;\n  defined, 327, 334;\n  rejected, _ib._;\n  see _Beautiful_, _Honourable_.\n\nKant, his Noumenon agrees with Ens of Parmenides, i. 21.\n\nKapila, i. 378 _n._;\n  analogy to Plato, ii. 389 _n._\n\nKarneades, on justice, iv. 118 _n._\n\nKepler, applied Pythagorean conception, i. 14 _n._;\n  devotion to mathematics, iii. 388 _n._\n\nKing, see _Monarch_.\n\n_Kleitophon_, fragmentary, i. 268, iii. 419, 424;\n  authenticity, i. 305-7, 309, 315, iii. 419 _n._, 420, 426\n_n._;\n  posthumous, 420;\n  in _Republic_ tetralogy, i. 406 _n._, iii. 419, 425;\n  represents the point of view of many objectors, 424;\n  scenery and persons, 413;\n  Sokrates has power in awakening ardour for virtue, 415;\n  but does not explain what virtue is, _ib._, 421-24;\n  what is justice or virtue, 416;\n  unsatisfactory replies of Sokrates' friends, _ib._;\n  Kleitophon believes Sokrates knows but will not tell, 418;\n  compared with _Republic_, 425;\n  _Apology_, 421.\n\nKnow, Aristotle on equivocal meaning of, ii. 213 _n._;\n  to know and be known is action and passion, iii. 287 _n._\n\nKnowledge, claim to universal, common to ancient philosophers,\niii. 219;\n  kinds of, i. _xii_. _n._;\n  of like by like, 44, iv. 227;\n  Demokritus' theory, i. 72, 76, 80;\n  Zeno, 98;\n  Gorgias the Leontine, 104;\n  Kyrenaics, 199, 204;\n  false persuasion of, the natural state of human mind, Sokrates'\ntheory, 374, 414, ii. 166 _n._, 218, 243, 263;\n  regarded as an ethical defect, iii. 177;\n  Sokrates' mission, i. 374, 376, ii. 24, 146, 419, iii. 422, iv.\n219;\n  search after, the business of life to Sokrates and Plato, i.\n396;\n  _per se_ interesting, 403;\n  necessity of scrutiny, 398 _n._;\n  Mill on vagueness of common words, ii. 48 _n._;\n  omnipotence of King Nomos, i. 378-84**;\n  different views of Plato, iii. 163, 164 _n._;\n  evolution of indwelling conceptions, i. 359 _n._, ii. 249,\niii. 17;\n  Sokrates' mental obstetric, 112;\n  attained only by dialectic, i. 396;\n  its test, power of going through a Sokratic cross-examination,\n_ib._, ii. 64;\n  genesis of, 391;\n  _reminiscence_ of the ideas, 237, iii. 13, 17;\n  gods possess the Idea of, 67, 68 _n._;\n  philosophy the perpetual accumulation of, ii. 112;\n  of good and evil, distinct from other sciences, 168;\n  necessary to use of good things, 205;\n  must include both making and right use 205;\n  no action contrary to, 291;\n  virtue is, 239, 321, 67 _n._, 149;\n  of _what_ unsolved, 244;\n  to hurt knowingly or wilfully better than unwillingly, 58;\n  analogies from the arts, 59;\n  evil done by good man with, by bad without, 61;\n  as condition of human conduct, Sokrates and Plato dwell too\nexclusively on, 67, 83;\n  rely too much on analogy of arts, and do not note what underlies\nepithets, 68;\n  and moderation identical, having same contrary, 280;\n  of self, Delphian maxim, 11, 25;\n  from looking into other minds, is temperance, 12;\n  opposed to divine inspiration, 136;\n  no object of, distinct from knowledge itself, 156;\n  of _ens_ alone, iv. 49;\n  all, relative to some object, ii. 157, 169;\n  is sensible perception, iii. 111, 113, 154, 172 _n._;\n  erroneously identified with _Homo Mensura_, 113, 118, 120\n_n._, 125, 162 _n._;\n  objections, sensible facts, different to different percipients,\n153;\n  sensible perception does not include memory, 157;\n  argument from analogy of seeing and not seeing at the same time,\n_ib._;\n  lies in the mind's comparisons respecting sensible perceptions,\n161;\n  difference from modern views, 162;\n  the mind rises from sensation to opinion, then cognition, 164;\n  verification from experience, not recognised as necessary or\npossible, 168;\n  of good, identified with [Greek: nou=s], of other things with\n[Greek: do/xa], ii. 30;\n  relation to opinion, iii. 167 _n._, 172, 184 _n._;\n  are false opinions possible, 169;\n  waxen memorial tablet in the mind, _ib._;\n  distinction of possessing and having actually in hand, 170;\n  simile of pigeon-cage, 171;\n  false opinion is the confusion of cognitions and non-cognitions,\nrefuted, _ib._;\n  distinguished from right opinion, ii. 253, 255 _n._, iii.\n168;\n  rhetor communicates true opinion, not knowledge, 172;\n  Plato's compared with modern views, ii. 254;\n  is true opinion _plus_ rational explanation, iii. 173;\n  analogy of elements and compounds, _ib._;\n  three meanings of _rational explanation_, 174;\n  definition rejected, 175;\n  antithesis of opinion and, not so marked in _Politikus_ as\n_The\u00e6t\u00eatus_, 256;\n  opposite cognitions unlike each other, 336, 396;\n  pleasures of, true, 356, 387 _n._;\n  good a mixture of pleasure and, 361;\n  same principle of classification applied to pleasure as to, 382;\n  classification of true and false, how applied to cognitions,\n394;\n  its valuable principles, 395;\n  see _Relativity_, _Science_, _Self-knowledge_.\n\nKosmos, the first topic of Greek speculation, i. _ix_.;\n  primitive belief, 2;\n  early explanation by Polytheism, _ib._;\n  Homer and Hesiod, _ib._;\n  Thales, 4;\n  water once covered the earth, notices of the argument from\nprints of shells and fishes, 18;\n  Anaximander, 5-7;\n  Anaximenes, 7-8;\n  Pythagoras, 12;\n  Pythagorean music of the spheres, 14;\n  Xenophanes, 18, 119 _n._;\n  Parmenides, 24, 90 _n._;\n  Herakleitus, 32;\n  Empedokles, 39, 41;\n  Diogenes of Apollonia, 64;\n  its Reason, different conceptions of Sokrates and Aristotle, ii.\n402 _n._;\n  soul prior to and more powerful than body, iv. 386, 419, 421;\n  the good and the bad souls at work in the universe, 386;\n  all things full of gods, 388;\n  soul of, iii. 265 _n._, iv. 421;\n  its position and elements, 225;\n  affinity of soul of, and human, iii. 366 _n._;\n  mythe in _Politikus_, 265 _n._;\n  divine steersman and d\u00e6mons, _ib._;\n  analogy of individual mind and cosmical process, i. 36\n_n._;\n  comparison of man to kosmos unnecessary and confusing, iii.\n367;\n  free from pleasure and pain, 389;\n  forced conjunction of kosmology and ethics, 391;\n  idea of good rules the ideal, as sun the visible, iv. 64;\n  simile of, absolute height and depth, 87;\n  unchangeable essences of, rarely studied, iii. 361;\n  aversion to studying, on ground of impiety, iv. 219 _n._;\n  no _knowledge_ of, obtainable, 220;\n  theory in _Tim\u00e6us_ acknowledged to be merely an [Greek:\nei)k\u00f4\\s lo/gos], 217;\n  Demiurgus, ideas, chaos postulated, 220;\n  Time began with the, 227;\n  is a living being and a god, 220, 223;\n  Demiurgus produces, by persuading Necessity, 220;\n  process of demiurgic construction, 223;\n  the copy of the [Greek: Au)to/z\u00f4on], _ib._, 227, 235\n_n._, 264;\n  product of joint action of reason and necessity, 238;\n  body, spherical form, and rotations, i. 25 _n._, iv. 225,\n229, 237, 252, 325 _n._, 388-9;\n  to be studied for mental hygienic, 252;\n  primary and visible gods, 229;\n  secondary and generated gods, 230;\n  construction of man, 243;\n  generated gods fabricate cranium as miniature of kosmos, with\nrational soul rotating within, 235;\n  four elements not primitive, 238;\n  action of Ideas on prime matter, 238;\n  Forms of the elements, _ib._;\n  primordial chaos, 240;\n  geometrical theory of the elements, _ib._;\n  borrowed from Pythagoreans, i. 349 _n._;\n  Aristotle on, iv. 241 _n._;\n  varieties of each element, 242;\n  contrast of Plato's admiration, with degenerate realities, 262,\n264;\n  degeneracy originally intended, 263;\n  recurrence of destructive agencies, 270, 307;\n  change of view in _Epinomis_, 421, 424 _n._\n\nKrates, the \"door-opener,\" i. 173;\n  Sokrates' precepts fully carried out by Diogenes and, 160, 174.\n\nKratippus, the Peripatetic, i. 258 _n._\n\n_Kratylus_, purpose, iii. 302-8, 309 _n._, 321, 323, 325\n_n._;\n  authenticity, i. 316;\n  date, 306, 309, 310, 312;\n  subject and personages, iii. 285;\n  speaking and naming conducted according to fixed laws, 286;\n  names distinguished by Plato as true or false, _ib._\n_n._;\n  connected with doctrine of Ideas, 326 _n._;\n  the thing spoken of _suffers_, 287 _n._;\n  name, a didactic instrument, made by lawgiver on type of\nname-form, 287, 312, 329;\n  Plato's _id\u00e9al_, 325, 328 _n._, 329;\n  compared with his views on social institutions, 327;\n  natural rectitude of names, 289, 300 _n._,  305 _n._;\n  names vary in degree of aptitude, 319;\n  aptitude consists in resemblance, 313;\n  difficult to harmonise with facts, 323;\n  forms of names and of things nameable, 289;\n  lawgiver alone discerns essences of names, and assigns them\ncorrectly, 290;\n  proofs cited from etymology, 299, 300 _n._, 307 _n._;\n  not caricatures of sophists, 302, 304, 310 _n._, 314\n_n._, 321, 323;\n  the etymologies serious, 306-12, 317 _n._;\n  counter-theory, _Homo Mensura_, 291, 326 _n._;\n  objection, it levels all animals, 292;\n  analogy of physical processes, unsuitable, 294;\n  belief not dependent on will, 297;\n  first imposer of names a Herakleitean, 301 _n._, 314-5, 320\n_n._;\n  how names have become disguised, 312;\n  changes hard to follow, 315;\n  onomastic art, letters as well as things must be distinguished\nwith their essential properties, 313;\n  Herakleitean theory admitted, 317;\n  some names not consistent with it, 319;\n  things known only through names, not true, 320;\n  Herakleitean flux, true of particulars, not of Ideas,\n_ib._;\n  the theory uncertain, implicit trust not to be put in names,\n321, 324;\n  compared with _Politikus_, 281, 329;\n  _Sophist\u00eas_. 331;\n  _Tim\u00e6us_, _ib._;\n  various reading in, p. 429C, 317 _n._\n\nKrete, unlettered community, iv. 277;\n  public training and mess, 279;\n  its customs peculiar to itself and Sparta, 280 _n._\n\n_Kritias_, a fragment, i. 268, iv. 265;\n  probably would have been an ethical epic in prose, 269;\n  in _Republic_ tetralogy, 215, 265;\n  date, i. 309, 311-3, 315, 325;\n  authenticity, 307, iv. 266 _n._;\n  subject, 266;\n  citizens of Plato's state identified with ancient Athenians,\n_ib._;\n  Solon and Egyptian priests, _ib._, 268;\n  explanation of their learning, 271;\n  island Atlantis and its kings, 268;\n  address of Zeus, 269;\n  corruption and wickedness of people, _ib._;\n  submergence, 270;\n  mythe incomplete, iii. 409 _n._;\n  presented as matter of history, iv. 270;\n  recurrence of destructive kosmical agencies, _ib._\n\n_Kriton_, rhetorical, not dialectical, i. 433;\n  compared with _Gorgias_, ii. 362;\n  general purpose, subject, and interlocutors, i. 425, 428;\n  authority of public judgment, nothing, of Expert, everything,\n420, 435;\n  Sokrates does not name, but himself acts as, expert, 436;\n  Sokrates' answer to Kriton's appeal to flee, 426;\n  Sokrates' principle, Never act unjustly, 427;\n  this a cardinal point, though most men differ from him,\n_ib._;\n  character and disposition of Sokrates, differently set forth,\n428;\n  imaginary pleading of the Laws of Athens, _ib._;\n  agreement with Athenian democratic sentiment, 430, 432;\n  Plato's purpose in this, 428;\n  attempts reconciliation of constitutional allegiance with\nSokrates' individuality, 432;\n  Sokrates characteristics overlooked in the harangue, 431;\n  maintained by his obedience from conviction, _ib._\n\nKyrenaics, scheme of life, i. 188;\n  ethical theory, 195;\n  logical theory, 197;\n  doctrine of relativity, _ib._, 204;\n  \u00c6thiops, Antipater, and Ar\u00eat\u00ea, 195;\n  Theodorus on the gods, 202;\n  see _Aristippus_, _Hegesias_.\n\n\nL.\n\nLabour, division of, iv. 138.\n\n_Lach\u00eas_, authenticity, i. 305, ii. 151;\n  date, i. 304, 306, 308-10, 312, 315, 328, 331 _n._;\n  subject and interlocutors, ii. 138;\n  dramatic contrast of Lach\u00eas and Sokrates, 150;\n  should lessons be received from a master of arms, 138;\n  Sokrates refers to a professional judge, 139;\n  the judge must prove his competence, Sokrates confesses\nincompetence, 140;\n  marks of the Expert, 141;\n  education--virtue must first be known, 142;\n  courage, 143;\n  example instead of definition, _ib._;\n  not endurance, 144;\n  intelligence of things terrible and not terrible, 145, iv. 138;\n  such intelligence not possessed by professional artists, ii.\n148;\n  but is an inseparable part of knowledge of good and evil\ngenerally, 149;\n  intelligence of good and evil generally--too wide, 146;\n  apparent tendency of Plato's mind in looking for a solution,\n147;\n  compared with _Theag\u00eas_, 104;\n  _Charmid\u00eas_, 168;\n  _Politikus_, iii. 282-4;\n  _Republic_, iv. 138.\n\nLactantius, the soul, ii. 425 _n._\n\nLand, division of, twelve tribes, iv. 329;\n  perpetuity of lots of, 326, 360;\n  Aristotle on, 326 _n._;\n  succession, 328, 404;\n  distribution of annual produce, 361.\n\nLanguage, _natural_ rectitude of, ii. 89;\n  origin of, iii. 326 _n._, 328 _n._, 329 _n._;\n  Leibnitz on a philosophical, 322 _n._;\n  see _Names_.\n\nLassalle, on Herakleitus, iii. 101 _n._, 159 _n._, 309 _n._,\n324 _n._;\n  _Homo Mensura_, 297 _n._;\n  _Kratylus_, 306 _n._, 307 _n._;\n  _Tim\u00e6us_, iv. 228 _n._\n\nLavoisier, discovery of composition of water, ii. 164 _n._\n\nLaw, its various meanings, ii. 91, 92 _n._;\n  our idea of, less extensive than _Nomos_ (q. v.), i. 380\n_n._, 382 _n._, ii. 92 _n._;\n  and Nature, antithesis of, 333, 338, i. 197;\n  also in Indian philosophy, 162;\n  Sokrates' disobedience of, 434 _n._;\n  the lawful is the profitable, ii. 36;\n  the consecrated and binding customs, the decree of the city,\nsocial or civic opinion, 76;\n  objection, discordance of, 78;\n  is _good_ opinion of the city, true opinion, or finding out\nof reality, 77;\n  real things are always accounted real, analogies, 79;\n  of Cretan Minos divine and excellent, extant, 80, 90;\n  to Plato only what _ought to be_ law, _is_, 88-90,\niii. 317 _n._;\n  reality found out by the Expert, ii. 87-88;\n  fixed, recognised by Demokritus, i. 73;\n  all proceedings of nature conducted according to fixed, iii.\n286;\n  of nature, Mill on number of ultimate, 132 _n._;\n  no laws to limit scientific governor, 269;\n  different view, iv. 319;\n  government by fixed, the second-best, iii. 270;\n  test of, goodness of ethical purpose and working, iv. 384;\n  pro\u00ebm to every important, 321;\n  Cicero coincides, 322 _n._;\n  the pro\u00ebms, didactic or rhetorical homilies, 322;\n  to serve as type for poets, 323;\n  pro\u00ebm to laws against heresy, 383;\n  of Zaleukus and Charondas, 323 _n._\n\nLaw-administration, objects of punishment, to deter or reform, ii.\n270, iv. 408;\n  general coincidence of Platonic and Attic, 363 _n._, 374,\n374 _n._, 403, 406, 430;\n  many of Plato's laws are discharges of ethical antipathy, 411;\n  penalties against contentious litigation, 410;\n  oaths for dikasts, judges, and electors only, 413;\n  thirty-seven nomophylakes, 332;\n  many details left to nomophylakes, 341;\n  assisted by select Dikasts, 362;\n  limited power of fining, 360;\n  necessity of precision in terms of accusation, 413 _n._;\n  public and private causes, 339;\n  public, three stages, 340, 415;\n  criminal procedure, 362;\n  distinction of damage and injury, 365;\n  witnesses, 409;\n  abuse of public trust, 412;\n  evasion of military service, _ib._;\n  varieties of homicide, 370-2;\n  penalties, 370;\n  wounds and beating, 372, 374, 408;\n  heresy, and [Greek: u(/bris] to divine things or places,\n375-386;\n  neglect of parents, 399 _n._, 407;\n  testaments, 404;\n  divorce, 408;\n  lunacy, 407;\n  poison and sorcery, 407;\n  libels, 409;\n  fugitive slaves, 400;\n  theft, 364, 409;\n  property found, 398;\n  fraudulent traders, 402;\n  mendicants, 409;\n  Benefit societies, 399;\n  suretyship, 415;\n  funerals, _ib._\n\nLaws, the, see _Leges_.\n\nLectures, Plato's revealed solution of difficulties, an untenable\nhypothesis, i. 401;\n  differ from dialogues in being given in his own name, 402;\n  of Protagoras, ii. 301;\n  contrasted with cross-examination, 277, 303;\n  dialectic a test of the efficacy of the expository process, i.\n358;\n  worthless for instruction, ii. 136, 233 _n._, iii. 33-5,\n49, 52, 54, 337 _n._;\n  difference in _Tim\u00e6us_ and _Kritias_, 53.\n\n_Leges_, authenticity, i. 304, 306, 338, iv. 325 _n._,\n389 _n._, 429;\n  date, i. 313, 315, 324, iv. 272, 413 _n._;\n  scene and persons, 272, 277;\n  change in Plato's circumstances and feelings, 273, 320;\n  analogous to Euripides' _Bacch\u00e6_ and Aristophanes'\n_Nubes_, 277;\n  Xenophon compared, i. 244;\n  Plato's purpose, to remedy all misconduct, iv. 369;\n  no evidence of Plato's study of practical working of different\ninstitutions, 397;\n  large proportion of preliminary discussions and didactic\nexhortation, 281;\n  soul prior to and more powerful than body, 386, 419;\n  the good and the bad souls at work in universe, 386;\n  all things full of gods, 388;\n  Manich\u00e6anism in, 389 _n._;\n  good identical with maximum of pleasure and minimum of pain,\n292-297, 299-303;\n  at least an useful fiction, 333;\n  justice a good _per se_ and from its _consequences_,\n294;\n  what constitutes injustice, 367-9;\n  no man voluntarily wicked, 365, 367;\n  three causes of misguided proceedings, 366;\n  punishment, to deter or reform, _ib._, 408;\n  threefold division of good, 428;\n  virtue fourfold, 417;\n  the four virtues the highest, and source of all other, goods,\n428;\n  unity of state's end to be kept in view, 417;\n  the end is the virtue of the citizens, _ib._;\n  Nocturnal Council to comprehend and carry out this end, 416,\n418, 425, 429;\n  and enforce orthodox creed, 419;\n  training of counsellors in _Epinomis_, 420, 424;\n  basis of Spartan institutions too narrow, 282;\n  Plato's state, a compromise of oligarchical and democratical\nsentiment, 333, 337;\n  historical retrospect of society, 307-315;\n  frequent destruction of communities, 307;\n  difficulties of government, seven distinct natural titles to,\n309;\n  view of _the lot_, 310;\n  imprudent to found government on any one title only, _ib._;\n  illustrated by Argos, Mess\u00ean\u00ea, Sparta, _ib._;\n  Persia and Athens compared, 312;\n  monarchy and democracy the _mother-polities_, _ib._;\n  bad training of king's sons, _ib._;\n  the Magnetic community, origin of, 274 _n._;\n  its [Greek: u(po/thesis], 328 _n._;\n  site and settlers, 320, 329, 336;\n  circular form, unwalled, 344;\n  defence of territory, rural police, 335;\n  Spartan _Kryptia_ compared, 336;\n  test of laws, goodness of ethical purpose and working, 284;\n  general coincidence of Platonic and Attic law, 363 _n._,\n374, 374 _n._, 403, 406, 430;\n  many of Plato's laws are discharges of ethical antipathy, 411;\n  state's laws, with their pro\u00ebms, 321;\n  the pro\u00ebms, didactic or rhetorical homilies, 322;\n  Cicero on, _ib._ _n._;\n  to serve as type for poets, 323;\n  training of the emotions through influence of the Muses, Apollo\nand Dionysus, 290, 347;\n  endurance of pain in Spartan discipline, 285;\n  drunkenness forbidden at Sparta, how far justifiable, 286;\n  citizens tested against pleasure, 285;\n  Dionysiac banquets, under a sober president, 289;\n  elders require stimulus of wine, 297;\n  precautions in electing minister of education, 338;\n  age, and matter of teaching, 348, 350;\n  the teaching simple and common to both sexes, 351;\n  music and dancing, 291;\n  three choruses, youths, mature men, and elders, 296, 305;\n  elders, by example, to keep up purity of music, 297;\n  prizes at musical and gymnastic festivals, 292, 337;\n  but object of training, war, not prizes, 358;\n  importance of music in education, 305;\n  musical and literary education, fixed type, 292, 338, 349;\n  poets to conform to ethical creed, 292-7;\n  change for worse at Athens after Persian invasion, 313;\n  this change began in music, 314;\n  contrast in Demosthenes and _Menexenus_, 315 _n._,\n318;\n  dangers of change in national music, doctrine also of Damon,\n315;\n  Plato's aversion to dramatic poetry of Athens, 316, 350;\n  peculiar to himself, 317;\n  value of arithmetic, 330 _n._;\n  purpose of teaching astronomy, 354;\n  planets, Plato's idea of motions of, _ib._;\n  circular motion best, 388, 389;\n  hunting, meaning of, 356;\n  hunting, how far permitted, 355;\n  for religion, oracles of Dodona and Delphi to be consulted, 325,\n337;\n  temples and priests, 337;\n  number of sacrifices determined by lawgiver, 357;\n  only state worship allowed,  378;\n  contrast with Sokratic teaching, iii. 148;\n  Milton on, iv. 379 _n._;\n  necessity of enforcing state religion, 378;\n  [Greek: u(/bris] to divine things or places, 375;\n  pro\u00ebm to laws against, 383;\n  impiety, from one of three heresies, 376;\n  punishment, 376-9;\n  majority of Greek world would have been included in one of the\nthree varieties, 381;\n  first heresy confuted, 386;\n  argument inconsistent and unsatisfactory, 388;\n  second confuted, 389;\n  the third the worst, 384;\n  confuted, 391;\n  incongruity of Plato's doctrine, 393;\n  dissent of Herodotus and Sokrates, 394;\n  opposition to Plato's doctrine in Greece, 395;\n  general Greek belief, 392, 394;\n  division of citizens and land, twelve tribes, 329;\n  four classes, property qualification for magistracies and\nvoters, 331;\n  perpetuity of lots of land, 326, 360;\n  Aristotle on, 326 _n._;\n  succession, 328;\n  number of citizens, 326, 328;\n  Aristotle on, 326 _n._;\n  syssitia, 344, 359;\n  same duties and training for women as men, 195;\n  family ties mischievous, but cannot practically be got rid of,\n327;\n  to be watched over by magistrates, 328;\n  marriage, _ib._, 332, 342, 344, 359, 405, 406;\n  board of Matrons, 345;\n  divorce, 406;\n  treatment of infants, 346;\n  orphans, guardians, 404, 406;\n  limited inequality tolerated as to movable property, 330;\n  modes of acquiring property, 397;\n  length of prescription for ownership, 415;\n  no private possession of gold or silver, no loans or interest,\n331;\n  slavery, 342, 400;\n  Aristotle differs, 343 _n._;\n  distribution of annual produce, 361;\n  each artisan only one trade, _ib._;\n  retailers, regulations about, _ib._, 401;\n  punishment for fraud, 402;\n  Benefit Societies, 399;\n  Metics, 362;\n  strangers and foreign travel of citizens, 414;\n  electoral scheme, 333;\n  thirty-seven nomophylakes, 332;\n  assisted by select Dikasts, 362;\n  many details left to, 341;\n  the council, and other magistrates, 335;\n  limited power of fining, 360;\n  military commanders and council, 332;\n  monthly military muster of whole population, 358;\n  oaths for dikasts, judges, and electors only, 413;\n  penal ties against contentious litigation, 410;\n  judicial duties, public and private causes, 339;\n  public, three stages, 340, 415;\n  witnesses, 409;\n  distinction of damage and injury, 365;\n  sacrilege and high treason the gravest crimes, 363;\n  abuse of public trust, 412;\n  evasion of military service, 412;\n  homicide, penalties, 370;\n  varieties of, 370-2;\n  wounds and beating, 372, 373, 408;\n  poison and sorcery, 407;\n  neglect of parents, _ib._;\n  lunacy, _ib._;\n  libels, 409;\n  theft, 364, 409;\n  suretyship, 415;\n  mendicants, 409;\n  funerals, 415;\n  compared with earlier works, 275, 280;\n  _Cyrop\u00e6dia_, 319;\n  _Protagoras_, 301;\n  _Gorgias_, ii. 362, iv. 301-2, 324;\n  _Ph\u00e6drus_, _ib._;\n  _Phil\u00eabus_, 301;\n  _Republic_, 298 _n._, 302, 319, 327, 390, 429;\n  _Tim\u00e6us_, 389 _n._\n\nLehrsch, iii. 308 _n._, 309 _n._\n\nLeibnitz, interdependence of nature, ii. 248 _n._;\n  agreement with Plato's metaphysics, _ib._;\n  pre-existence of soul, _ib._;\n  natural significant aptitude of letters, iii. 313 _n._;\n  on a philosophical language, 322 _n._\n\nLenormant, iii. 306 _n._\n\nLeukippus, i. 65, 66, iii. 243 _n._\n\nLewis, Sir G. C., ancient astronomy, iv. 355 _n._, 424\n_n._\n\nLiberty, excess of, at Athens, iv. 312.\n\nLibraries, ancient, i. 270, 278 _n._, 280, 286;\n  copying by _librarii_ and private friends, 281 _n._,\n284 _n._;\n  official MSS., _ib._;\n  see _Alexandrine_, _Lykeum_, _Academy_.\n\nLichtenst\u00e4dt, iv. 256 _n._\n\nLight, Plato's theory, iv. 236.\n\nLike known by like, i. 354 _n._, ii. 359 _n._;\n  friend to like, 359.\n\nLittr\u00e9, the soul, iv. 257 _n._;\n  synthetic character of ancient medicine, 260 _n._\n\nLoans, disallowed, iii. 331.\n\nLobeck, iii. 304 _n._, 311 _n._, 312 _n._\n\nLocke, atomic doctrine of primary and secondary qualities, i. 70;\n  good identical with pleasure, ii. 306 _n._\n\nLogic, influence of Herakleitus on development of, i. 37;\n  of a science, Plato's different from Aristotelic and modern\nview, 358 _n._;\n  objects of perception and of conception, comprised in Plato's\n_ens_, iii. 229, 231;\n  concepts and percepts, relative, 75;\n  in Sokrates, the subordination of terms, i. 455;\n  position of Megarics in history of, 131 _n._;\n  negative, of Antisthenes' school, 149;\n  Kyrenaic theory, 197;\n  elementary distinctions unfamiliar in Plato's time, ii. 13, 34\n_n._, 235, 319, iii. 190, 222, 229, 241;\n  the dialogues of search are lessons in method, 177, 188;\n  collection of sophisms necessary for a theory of, i. 131;\n  Aristotle first distinguished [Greek: o(m\u00f4/numa], [Greek:\nsun\u00f4/numa],  and [Greek: kat' a)nalogi/an], iii. 94\n_n._;\n  generalisation and division, ii. 27;\n  process of classification not much attended to, iii. 344;\n  definition and division illustrated in _Ph\u00e6drus_ and\n_Phil\u00eabus_, 29, 344;\n  names relative and non-relative, 232;\n  connotation of a word, to be known before its accidents and\nantecedents, ii. 242;\n  logical subject has no real essence apart from predicates, i.\n168 _n._;\n  logical and concrete aggregates, ii. 52, 53;\n  _concrete_, its Greek equivalent, 52 _n._;\n  opposites, only one to each thing, 13 _n._;\n  contraries, the Pythagorean \"principia of existing things,\" i.\n15 _n._;\n  Herakleitus' theory, 30, 31;\n  are excluded in nothing save the self-existent Idea, ii. 7\n_n._;\n  judgment, akin to proposition, and may be false by partnership\nwith form _non-ens_, iii. 213-4;\n  implied in every act of consciousness, 165 _n._;\n  Plato's canon of belief, iv. 231;\n  contradictory propositions not possible, i. 166 _n._;\n  principle of contradiction, not laid down in Plato's time, iii.\n99;\n  logical maxim of, 239;\n  function of copula, i. 170 _n._;\n  misconceived by Antisthenes, iii. 221, 232 _n._, 251\n_n._;\n  Plato's view of causal reasoning, ii. 253;\n  modern views on _\u00e0 priori_ reasonings, difference of\nPlato's, 251;\n  see _Fallacies_, _Predication_, _Proposition_.\n\nLogographers, iii. 27 _n._, 36 _n._\n\nLot, principle of the, iv. 309, 310 _n._\n\nLove, a moving force in Empedokles, i. 38;\n  cause of, desire for what is akin to us or our own, ii. 182;\n  see _Eros_.\n\nLucian, worthlessness of geometry, i. 384 _n._;\n  on time wasted in philosophic training, 404 _n._\n\nLucretius, on Anaxagorean homoeomeries, i. 52 _n._;\n  origin of language, iii. 329 _n._;\n  on pleasure, 379 _n._, 387 _n._, i. 163 _n._;\n  on justice, iv. 130 _n._;\n  appearances of gods to men, 155 _n._;\n  theology of, 162 _n._\n\n[Greek: Lusite/loun], derivation, iii. 301 _n._\n\nLuther, on music, iv. 151 _n._\n\nLykeum, Peripatetic school, i. 269;\n  the library, founded for use of inmates and special visitors,\n279 _n._;\n  loss of library, 270.\n\nLykurgus, relation to Plato, i. 344 _n._\n\nLysias, rhetorical powers, iii. 48 _n._;\n  Isokrates compared, 35, 37;\n  unfairly treated in _Ph\u00e6drus_, 47-8;\n  rivalry with Plato, 408, 410 _n._, 411 _n._;\n  oration against \u00c6schines, i. 112.\n\n_Lysis_, authenticity, i. 306, ii. 184 _n._;\n  date, i. 308-10, 313, 326, ii. 184 _n._;\n  subject suited for dialogue of search, 185;\n  problem of _friendship_ too general, 186;\n  debate partly real, partly verbal, 188;\n  scenery and personages, 172;\n  mode of talking with youth, 173;\n  servitude of the ignorant, 176;\n  lesson of humility, 177;\n  illustrates Sokratic manner, _ib._;\n  what is a friend, 178;\n  appeal to maxims of poets, 179;\n  likeness and unlikeness, _ib._, 188 _n._;\n  the Indifferent, friend to Good, 180, 189;\n  anxious to escape from felt evil, 180;\n  illustrated by philosopher's condition, 181, 190;\n  the _primum amabile_, _ib._, 191;\n  cause of friendship, desire for what is akin to us or our own,\n182;\n  good akin, evil alien, to every one, 183;\n  the Good and Beautiful as objects of attachment, 194;\n  failure of enquiry, 184;\n  compared with Cicero _De Amicitia_, 189 _n._;\n  _Charmid\u00eas_, 172, 184 _n._\n\n\nM.\n\nMacaulay, Lord, Theology not a progressive science, ii. 428.\n\nMackintosh, Sir J., iv. 105 _n._\n\nMadness, Plato's view, ii. 129;\n  of philosophers, 383;\n  varieties of, Eros one, iii. 11;\n  see _Inspiration_.\n\nMagic, Empedokles claims powers of, i. 47;\n  Plato's laws against, iv. 407.\n\nMagnet, analogy to poetic inspiration, ii. 128, 129.\n\nMagnetic colony, see _Leges_.\n\nMaine, meaning of natural justice, ii. 342 _n._;\n  influence of Law in early societies, i. 382 _n._\n\nMaking and _doing_, ii. 155.\n\nMalebranche, ii. 404 _n._, iv. 233.\n\nMallet, on _Sophist\u00eas_, iii. 245 _n._\n\nMalthus, law of population, iv. 201;\n  recognised by Plato and Aristotle, 202.\n\nMan, Plato on antiquity of, iv. 307;\n  construction of, 243;\n  the cause of evil, 234;\n  inconsistency _ib._ _n._;\n  see _Body_, _Soul_, _Immortality_.\n\nManich\u00e6anism of _Leges_, iv. 389 _n._\n\nMansel, Dr., iii. 124 _n._\n\nMantineia, i. 211.\n\nMarathon, iii. 406.\n\nMarbach, i. 132 _n._\n\nMariandyni, iv. 343 _n._\n\nMarriage, temporary for guardians, iv. 43, 175-8;\n  object, 198;\n  Plato's and modern sentiments, 192;\n  Aristotle, 188, 198-201;\n  laws in second _id\u00e9al_, 328, 332, 341, 344, 359, 405, 406;\n  board of Matrons, 345;\n  Malthus' law recognised by Plato and Aristotle, 202;\n  divorce, 406.\n\nMartin on _Tim\u00e6us_, iv.** 218 _n._, 224 _n._, 233\n_n._, 424 _n._;\n  _Leges_, 355 _n._\n\nMaterialists, iii. 203, 223;\n  meaning of _ens_, 231;\n  argument against, 203, 224, 226, 228;\n  reply open to, 224, 229.\n\nMatter, Aristotle's _materia prima_, i. 72, iii. 397\n_n._;\n  [Greek: to\\ dektiko\\n] of _Tim\u00e6us_, _ib._;\n  four elements not primitive, iv. 238;\n  prime, action of Ideas on, _ib._;\n  Voltaire on, i. 168 _n._\n\nMaximus Tyrius, on Plato's reminiscence, ii. 250 _n._;\n  variety, iii. 400 _n._\n\nMeasure, Plato's conception, ii. 112, 117, iii. 260;\n  [Greek: to\\ me/trion] of Plato, 397 _n._;\n  Platonic _id\u00e9al_, undefined results, ii. 374;\n  Pythagorean [Greek: kairo/s], iii. 397 _n._;\n  necessary, to choose pleasures rightly, ii. 293, 357 _n._,\niii. 391;\n  virtue a right estimate of pleasure and pain, ii. 293, 305;\n  courage a just estimate of things terrible, 307;\n  false estimates of pleasures habitual, iii. 353;\n  true pleasures admit of, 357;\n  directive sovereignty of, 391;\n  how applied in _Protagoras_, _ib._;\n  how explained in _Phil\u00eabus_, 393.\n\nMedical Art, analogy of rhetoric to, iii. 31;\n  reducible to rule, ii. 372 _n._;\n  physician not bound by peremptory rules, iii. 269;\n  no refined, allowed, iv. 28;\n  Plato's view of, 250;\n  synthetic character of ancient, 260 _n._\n\nMegarics, transcendental, not ethical, i. 122;\n  shared with Plato the eristic of Sokrates, 124, 126;\n  logical position misrepresented by historians, 131;\n  negative dialectic attributed by historians to, 371;\n  not peculiar to, 387;\n  the charge brought by contemporaries against Sokrates, 388;\n  fallacies of, ii. 215, iii. 92;\n  sophisms of Eubulides, i. 133;\n  real character of, 135;\n  alleged over-refinement in classification of, iii. 196\n_n._;\n  not the idealists of _Sophist\u00eas_, 244;\n  controversy with Aristotle about Power, i. 135;\n  Aristotle's arguments not valid, 136-8;\n  Aristotle himself concedes the doctrine, 139 _n._;\n  doctrine of Diod\u00f4rus Kronus, 140, 143;\n  defended by Hobbes, _ib._;\n  depends on question of universal regularity of sequence, 141;\n  sophism of Diod\u00f4rus Kronus, _ib._, 143;\n  Stilpon, 147;\n  Cicero on, 135 _n._;\n  Ritter, 129 _n._;\n  Prantl, _ib._, 132 _n._;\n  Zeller, 131 _n._;\n  Winckelmann, 132 _n._;\n  Marbach, _ib._;\n  Tiedemann, _ib._;\n  Stallbaum, _ib._;\n  Deycks, 136 _n._;\n  see _Eukleides_.\n\nMel\u00eatus, reply of Sokrates to, Plato and Xenophon compared, i.\n456;\n  Plato's views coincide with, iv. 211, 230 _n._, 381, 385,\n411, i. 113.\n\nMelissus of Samos, i. 93.\n\nMemory, difference of [Greek: mn\u00ea/m\u00ea] and [Greek: a)na/mn\u00easis],\niii. 350 _n._;\n  see _Association_.\n\nM\u00e9nage, on etymology, iii. 303 _n._\n\nMened\u00eamus the Eretrian, i. 148;\n  disallowed negative predications, 170.\n\n_Menexenus_, its authenticity, i. 316, 338, iii. 412\n_n._;\n  date, i. 307, 309, 313, 324;\n  anachronism, iii. 411;\n  scenery and persons, 401;\n  funeral harangues at Athens, _ib._, 404;\n  Sokrates recites harangue learnt from Aspasia, 402;\n  framed on the established type, 405;\n  excited much admiration, 407;\n  probable motives of Plato, _ib._, 410;\n  contrast with _Leges_, iv. 315 _n._, 318;\n  _Gorgias_, ii. 374, iii. 409.\n\n_Menon_, date, i. 306-7, 308-10, 313, 315, 325 _n._, ii.\n228 _n._, 246 _n._;\n  purpose, 235;\n  gives points in common between Sokrates and Sophists, 257;\n  scenery and persons, 232;\n  is virtue teachable, _ib._, 239, iii. 330 _n._;\n  plurality of virtues, ii. 233;\n  search for common property, 234;\n  how is process of search useful, 237;\n  Sokrates' cross-examination like effect of torpedo, _ib._;\n  analogies, definitions of figure and colour, 235;\n  Menon's definition, refuted, 236;\n  theory of reminiscence, 237;\n  illustrated by questioning Menon's slave, 238, 249 _n._,\n251;\n  metempsychosis, 249;\n  little said of the _Ideas_, 253, 255 _n._;\n  virtue is knowledge, 239;\n  and so teachable, 240;\n  relation of opinion to knowledge, 241, 255 _n._, 392\n_n._, iii. 172 _n._;\n  right opinion of good statesmen, from inspiration, ii. 242;\n  highest virtue teachable, but all existing virtue is from\ninspiration, _ib._;\n  virtue itself remains unknown, _ib._, 245;\n  Sokrates' doctrine, universal desire of good, 243;\n  compared with _Ph\u00e6drus_ and _Ph\u00e6don_, 249;\n  _Protagoras_, 244;\n  _Politikus_, iii. 283;\n  _Tim\u00e6us_, _Gorgias_, _Republic_, ii. 254\n_n._\n\nMentiens, sophism, i. 128, 133.\n\nMess\u00ean\u00ea, bad basis of government, iv. 310.\n\nMetaphor, Herakleitus' exposition by, i. 28, 30, 37\n_n._;\n  Plato's tendency to found arguments on, 343, 353, _n._, ii.\n337 _n._, iii. 65 _n._, 173, 207, 351, 364;\n  doctrine of Ideas derived its plausibility from, i. 343;\n  waxen memorial tablet in the mind, iii. 169;\n  pigeon-cage, 171;\n  souls' [Greek: kn\u00ea=sis] compared to children's teething, 399\n_n._;\n  the steersman, iv. 53;\n  Idea of Good in intellectual, as sun in visible, 63;\n  the cave, iii. 257 _n._, iv. 67-70;\n  analogy of state and individual, 11, 20, 39, 79-84, 96;\n  exaggerated, 115, 121, 124;\n  kosmos, absolute height and depth, 87.\n\nMetaphysics, see _Ontology_.\n\nMeteorology, of Anaxagoras, i. 58;\n  Diogenes of Apollonia, 64;\n  Sokrates avoided, 376.\n\nMetempsychosis, included in all ancient speculations, ii. 390, 425\n_n._;\n  belief of Empedokles, i. 46;\n  included in Plato's proof of soul's immortality, ii. 414;\n  theory of, 237, 247, iv. 234;\n  of ordinary men only, ii. 390, 416, 425;\n  mythe, iii. 12, 14 _n._;\n  general doctrine in Virgil, ii. 425 _n._\n\nMethod, revolutionised by Sokrates, i. _x_;\n  obstetric, 367, ii. 251, iii. 112, 176;\n  Aristotle's Dialectic and Demonstrative, i. 363;\n  see _Dialectic_, _Negative_, _Inductive_.\n\nMetics, admission of, iv. 362;\n  Xenophon on, i. 238.\n\n[Greek: Me/trion, to/], of Plato, iii. 397 _n._\n\nMichelet, iv. 151 _n._\n\nMiddle ages, disputations in the, i. 397 _n._;\n  views on causation, ii. 409 _n._\n\n[Greek: Mi/gma], see _Chaos_.\n\nMill, Jas., on law of mental association, ii. 192 _n._;\n  transmission of established morality of a society, 275\n_n._;\n  on the moral sense, iv. 128 _n._;\n  ethical end, 105 _n._\n\nMill, J. S., on vague connotation of general terms, ii. 48\n_n._;\n  evils of informal debate, 220 _n._, 222 _n._;\n  definition of fallacy, i. 129;\n  heads of fallacies, ii. 218;\n  fallacies of confusion, Descartes' argument, iii. 297 _n._;\n  of Sufficient Reason, earliest example of, i. 6 _n._;\n  relativity of knowledge, iii. 128 _n._;\n  abstract names, 78 _n._;\n  simple objects undefinable, i. 172 _n._;\n  comparison of Form with particular phenomena, iii. 64 _n._;\n  necessity of Verification, 168 _n._;\n  _antecedent_, _consequent_, _simultaneous_, 165\n_n._;\n  assumption in axioms of arithmetic, 396 _n._;\n  axioms of arithmetic and geometry, from induction, iv. 353\n_n._;\n  ultimate laws of nature, iii. 132 _n._;\n  relation of art to science, 43 _n._;\n  the beautiful, ii. 50 _n._;\n  hostility to novel attempts at analysis of ethics, i. 387\n_n._;\n  _Liberty_, 395 _n._, ii. 367 _n._;\n  Sokrates' Utilitarianism, 310 _n._;\n  theory of syllogism, 255 _n._;\n  approximation to Plato and Aristotle as to ideal state of\nsociety, iv. 199 _n._\n\nMilton, on Plato's intolerance, iv. 379 _n._\n\nMind, doctrine of Parmenides, i. 26;\n  identified with heat by Demokritus, 75;\n  its seat in various parts of the body, Demokritus, 76;\n  Sokrates' theory of natural state of human, 373;\n  elenchus the sovereign purifier of, iii. 197;\n  Sokrates' obstetric, 112;\n  the self, ii. 11, 25;\n  state of agent's, as to knowledge, frequent enquiry in Plato,\n83;\n  Plato's view, an assemblage of latent capacities, 164;\n  knowledge is dominant agency in, 290;\n  usefulness of negative result for training, 186;\n  operation of pre-natal experience on, iii. 13;\n  rhetoric should include a classification of minds and\ndiscourses, 32;\n  _id\u00e9al_ unattainable, 42, 45;\n  compared to paper, 169, 351;\n  of each individual, tripartite, iv. 37;\n  analogous to rulers, guardians, craftsmen, 39;\n  high development of body and, equally necessary, ii. 422\n_n._;\n  relation to bodily organs, iii. 159, iv. 387 _n._;\n  diseases of, from body, 250;\n  no man voluntarily wicked, 249, 365-8;\n  preservative and healing agencies, 250;\n  treatment of, by itself, 251;\n  rotations of kosmos to be studied, 252;\n  see _Reason_, _Soul_.\n\n_Minos_, authenticity, i. 306-7, 309, 336, 337 _n._, ii.\n82, 93;\n  in _Leges_ trilogy, 91;\n  and _Hipparchus_ analogous and inferior to other works, 82;\n  subject the characteristic property connoted by _law_, 76,\n86;\n  discussed by historical Sokrates, _ib._;\n  its meanings, 91;\n  three parts, objections, 76;\n  is _good_ opinion of the city, true opinion, or finding out\nof reality, 77;\n  real things always accounted real, analogies, 79;\n  only what _ought to be_ law, _is_, 80, 88-9, iii. 281\n_n._, 317 _n._;\n  Expert finds out and certifies truth, ii. 87-9;\n  laws of Cretan Minos divine and excellent, extant, 80, 90;\n  Minos' character variously represented, 81;\n  what does the lawgiver prescribe for health of mind--unanswered,\n_ib._;\n  bad definitions of law, 86;\n  Sokrates' reasoning unsound but Platonic, 88.\n\n[Greek: Mn\u00ea/m\u00ea], derivation, iii. 302 _n._;\n  difference of [Greek: a)na/mn\u00easis], 350 _n._\n\nMohl, Prof., on Hafiz, iii. 16 _n._\n\n[Greek: Moi=rai], relation to Gods, iv. 221 _n._\n\nMonad, the Pythagorean, i. 11-12;\n  Platonic form of Pythagorean doctrine, 15 _n._;\n  see _Number_.\n\nMonarchy, and democracy the _mother-polities_, iv. 312;\n  dissent of Aristotle, _ib._ _n._;\n  monarch a Principal Cause, iii. 266;\n  true government by the one scientific man, 268, 273;\n  no laws to limit scientific governor, 269;\n  _id\u00e9al_ attainable only in Saturnian period, 264, iv. 319;\n  distinguished from general, rhetor, &c., iii. 271;\n  aims at forming virtuous citizens, 272;\n  Sokratic ideal differently worked out by Plato and Xenophon,\n273;\n  of Atlantis, iv. 268;\n  bad education of kings' son, 312.\n\nMonboddo, on Cartesian and Newtonian theories, ii. 402 _n._;\n  on Ideas, 408 _n._;\n  mind and body, iv. 387 _n._\n\nMonkeys, Galen on structure of, iv. 257 _n._\n\nMorality of a society, how transmitted, ii. 274;\n  relation of art to, see _Education_, _Poetry_;\n_Ethics_.\n\nMore, Dr. Henry, emanative cause, ii. 403 _n._;\n  metempsychosis, 427 _n._;\n  relativity of knowledge, iii. 124 _n._\n\nMoses, Plato compared to, iv. 256.\n\nMotion, of atoms, the capital fact of Demokritean kosmos, i. 72;\n  Zeno's arguments, 97;\n  not denied as a phenomenal and relative fact, 102;\n  form of, iii. 209-10, 232, 245 _n._;\n  varieties of rectilinear, iv. 225 _n._;\n  circular, the best, 225, 388-9;\n  Diod\u00f4rus Kronus, i. 145;\n  Aristotle nearly coincides with, 146;\n  and Hobbes, _ib._;\n  Monboddo on Aristotle and Plato, iv. 386 _n._\n\nMotives, distinction of, ii. 357 _n._\n\nM\u00fcller, Prof. Max, origin of language, iii. 326 _n._;\n  vague use of words, i. 398 _n._\n\nMunk, Dr. Edward, i. 311, 320, 401 _n._\n\nMusic, Pythagorean, of the spheres, i. 14;\n  and speech illustrate coalescence of finite and infinite, iii.\n340;\n  Cynics' contempt for, i. 151, 155;\n  Platonic sense, iv. 149;\n  disparaged, ii. 355;\n  education in, necessary for guardians, iv. 23;\n  and dancing, effect on emotions, 347;\n  excites love of the beautiful, 27;\n  importance of, in education, 305;\n  Aristotle on, 151 _n._, 306;\n  Xenophon, _ib._, i. 228;\n  Luther, iv. 151 _n._;\n  gymnastic necessary to correct, 29;\n  prizes at festivals, 292, 337, 358;\n  three choruses, youths, mature men, elders, 296, 305;\n  only grave allowed, 32, 168, 298 _n._;\n  regulated by authority, 292-4, 349;\n  to keep emotions in a proper state, 169;\n  elders, by example, to keep up purity of music, 297;\n  change for worse at Athens began in, 313, 314 _n._, 318;\n  dangers of change in national, doctrine also of Damon, 315.\n\nMysticism, religious, in Empedokles, i. 47 _n._;\n  mixture in Plato of poetical fancy and religious, with dialectic\ntheory, iii. 16.\n\nMythe, general character of Plato's, ii. 415, iii. 310, iv. 255\n_n._;\n  disparaged, in _Sophist\u00eas_, iii. 265 _n._;\n  Plato's resemblance to Hebrew writers, iv. 160 _n._;\n  Aristotle on blending philosophy with, 255 _n._;\n  probably often used by Sophists, ii. 267 _n._;\n  of Prometheus and Epimetheus, 267;\n  value of, 276;\n  of Hades in _Gorgias_, 361;\n  of soul in _Ph\u00e6don_, 415;\n  of pre-existent soul, iii. 12, 14 _n._;\n  of the kosmos in _Politikus_, 265 _n._;\n  _Tim\u00e6us_, 409 _n._;\n  _Kritias_, _ib._, iv. 268;\n  of departed souls in _Republic_, 94;\n  the choice of Herakles, i. 177;\n  training by fictions, iv. 24, 154;\n  Plato's view of the purpose of, _ib._, 303-5;\n  Plato's and Homer's fictions contrasted, 153 _n._;\n  retort open to poets, _ib._, 154 _n._;\n  no repulsive fictions to be tolerated about gods or Hades, 25,\n154;\n  a better class to be substituted from religion for the existing\nfictions, 160;\n  poet must avoid variety of imitation, 26, 155;\n  type for narratives about men, 26;\n  fiction as to origin of classes, 30;\n  difficulty of procuring first admission for fiction, 158.\n\nMythology, prolonged belief in, iv. 152 _n._;\n  Xenophanes' censure of, i. 16;\n  Herakleitus', 26;\n  Plato and the popular, 441 _n._, ii. 415, iii. 265\n_n._, iv. 24, 155 _n._, 196, 238 _n._, 325, 328,\n337, 398.\n\n\nN.\n\nNames, _relative_ and _non-relative_, iii. 232\n_n._;\n  Pythagorean theory, 304 _n._, 316 _n._;\n  mystic sanctity of, 323 _n._;\n  distinction of divine and human, 300 _n._;\n  natural rectitude of, ii. 89, iii. 286 _n._, 300 _n._,\n306 _n._;\n  connected with doctrine of _Ideas_, 286 _n._, 327\n_n._;\n  difficult to harmonise with facts, 323;\n  the essence of things, 305 _n._;\n  things known only through names, not true, 320;\n  the thing spoken of _suffers_, 287 _n._;\n  forms of names and of things nameable, 289;\n  didactic instruments made by law-giver on type of name-forms,\n287, 290, 313;\n  onomastic art, _ib._;\n  proofs cited from etymology, 299, 300 _n._, 307 _n._;\n  specimens of ancient etymologies, 307 _n._, 308 _n._,\n309 _n._, 310 _n._, 311 _n._;\n  not caricatures of sophists, 302, 304, 306-12, 314 _n._,\n317 _n._, 321, 324;\n  Plato's _id\u00e9al_, 325, 328 _n._, 330;\n  compared with his views on social institutions, 327;\n  _Homo Mensura_ the counter theory of language, 326\n_n._;\n  intrinsic aptitude of, for particular things, 289;\n  consists in resemblance, 313;\n  vary in degree of aptitude, 318;\n  first imposer of, a Herakleitean, 302 _n._, 314-7, 319\n_n._;\n  how they have become disguised, 312;\n  changes hard to follow, 315;\n  Herakleitean theory admitted, 310;\n  some names not consistent with it, 319;\n  the theory uncertain, implicit trust not to be put in names,\n321, 325;\n  see _Language_.\n\nNature, course of, the ultimatum of Demokritus and moderns, i. 73,\n_ib._ _n._;\n  all proceedings of, conducted according to fixed laws, iii. 286;\n  Greek view of, hostile to philosophical speculation, i. 86;\n  interdependence of, ii. 247;\n  antithesis of law and, 333, 338, i. 197;\n  also in Indian philosophy, 162;\n  [Greek: phu/sei] and [Greek: kata\\ phu/sin], iii. 294 _n._,\niv. 309 _n._;\n  Aristotle, 387 _n._;\n  uncertainty of referring to, ii. 340, iv. 194, i. 162;\n  meaning of law of, ii. 341 _n._;\n  Mill on number of ultimate Laws of, iii. 132;\n  no object in, mean to the philosopher, 61.\n\nNecessary truth, iii. 253 _n._\n\nNecessity, means _Freewill_ in Plato, iv. 221;\n  kosmos produced by joint action of reason and, 238.\n\nNegative, Plato's view of the, erroneous, iii. 236. 239;\n  predications disallowed by Mened\u00eamus, i. 170.\n\nNegative Method, harshly censured by historians of philosophy, i.\n123;\n  preponderated in Plato's age, _ib._;\n  erroneously attributed to Sophists and Megarics, 371, 387;\n  the charge brought by contemporary Athenians against Sokrates,\n388;\n  Sokrates and Plato its champions, _vii_, _x_, 372;\n  Sokrates the greatest Eristic of his age, 124;\n  first applied negative analysis to the common consciousness,\n385, 389 _n._;\n  to social, political, ethical topics, 385;\n  the Megarics shared with Plato the negative impulse of Sokrates,\n126;\n  Academics, 131 _n._;\n  negative and affirmative veins in Plato distinct, 399, 403, 420;\n  the negative extreme in _Parmenid\u00eas_, iii. 71, i. 125;\n  overlooked in _Kriton_, 433;\n  well illustrated in _Lysis_, ii. 177;\n  the affirmative prominent in his old age, i. 408;\n  its necessity as a condition of reasoned truth, 91, 371, 373,\n387, 395 _n._, 421, ii. 186, i. 130;\n  a value by itself, iii. 51, 70, 85, 149-50, 176, 184 _n._,\n284, 422;\n  a necessary preliminary to the affirmative, ii. 186, 201;\n  essential to control of the affirmative, iii. 92 _n._, i.\n123;\n  its difficulties never solved, iii. 51;\n  see _Dialectic_.\n\nNemesius, relativity of mental and sensational processes, iii. 122\n_n._\n\nNewton, accused of substituting physical for mental causes, ii.\n402 _n._\n\nNile, inundation of, explanation of Anaxagoras, i. 58 _n._\n\n[Greek: No/mimon], equivocal use, ii. 38.\n\nNominalism, first protest against Realism, Antisthenes, i. 164;\n  of Stilpon, 167.\n\nNomos, idea of law less extensive than, i. 380 _n._, 382\n_n._, ii. 92 _n._;\n  omnipotence of King, i. 378, 380, 392 _n._, 424, ii. 333;\n  Sokrates an exception, _ib._;\n  Plato's and Aristotle's theory of politics to resist King, i.\n393 _n._;\n  Plato appeals to, iv. 24 _n._;\n  Epikt\u00eatus, i. 388 _n._;\n  common sense of a community, its propagation, ii. 274;\n  no common End among established [Greek: no/mima], iii. 282\n_n._, iv. 204 _n._;\n  see _Authority_, _Orthodoxy_.\n\nNon-ens, see _Ens_.\n\nNoumenon of Kant agrees with Parmenid\u00eas' ens, i. 21.\n\nNous, see _Reason_.\n\nNumber, the _principle_ of Pythagoreans, i. 9-12, 14;\n  differs from Plato's Idea, 10;\n  its modern application, _ib._ _n._, 14 _n._;\n  limited to ten, according to Plato and Pythagoreans, 11\n_n._;\n  the Greek geometrical conception of, iii. 112 _n._;\n  mean proportionals, iv. 224 _n._;\n  see _Arithmetic_.\n\n\nO.\n\nOaths, iv. 413.\n\nObjective, and subjective views of ethics, Sokrates distinguished,\ni. 451;\n  dissent coincident with subjective unanimity, _ib._;\n  see _Relativity_.\n\nObservation, astronomy must not be studied by, iv. 73;\n  nor acoustics, 74.\n\nObstetric, of Sokrates, i. 367, ii. 251, iii. 112, 176.\n\nOdysseus, ii. 56.\n\nOken, Pythagoreanism, i. 10 _n._\n\nOld Age, iv. 2.\n\nOligarchy, iv. 79;\n  Plato's second state a compromise of democracy and, 333, 337.\n\n[Greek: O(m\u00f4/numa], first distinguished from [Greek: sun\u00f4/numa] by\nAristotle, iii. 94 _n._\n\n[Greek: O(m\u00f4nu/m\u00f4s], ii. 193.\n\nOne, in the Many, and Many in the One, aim of philosophy, i. 407;\n  difficulties about many and, iii. 339;\n  see _Idea_.\n\nOntology and physics, radically distinct points of view, i. 23\n_n._;\n  the science of Ens, first appears in the Eleates, 22;\n  reconciliation of physics with, attempted unsuccessfully after\nParmenides, 23 _n._;\n  Plato blends ethics with, iii. 306;\n  Aristotle's substratum for phenomenology, i. 24 _n._;\n  tendency to embrace logical phantoms as real causes, ii. 404\n_n._;\n  see _Ens_, _Philosophy_.\n\nOpinion, public, see _Authority_.\n\nOpinion, Xenophanes' doctrine, i. 18;\n  Parmenides', 20;\n  Demokritus', 72;\n  embraces all varieties of knowledge save of the Good, ii. 30;\n  right, of good statesmen, derived from inspiration, 242;\n  compared with knowledge, 241, 253, 255 _n._, iii. 167\n_n._, 181 _n._;\n  antithesis less marked in _The\u00e6t\u00eatus_ than\n_Politikus_, 257;\n  Plato's compared with modern views, ii. 254;\n  the mind rises from sensation to opinion, then cognition, iii.\n164;\n  distinct from sensation, 166;\n  true, knowledge is, 168;\n  verification from experience, not recognised as necessary or\npossible, _ib._;\n  if false, possible, 169, 181 _n._, 351;\n  waxen memorial tablet in the mind, 169;\n  false, is the confusion of cognitions and non-cognitions,\nrefuted, 171;\n  wherein different from knowledge, 172;\n  true, not knowledge, communicated by rhetor, _ib._;\n  true, _plus_ rational explanation, is knowledge, 173;\n  analogy of elements and compounds, _ib._;\n  rejected, 174;\n  intercommunion of forms of _non-ens_ and of proposition,\nopinion, judgment, 213, 214;\n  akin to proposition, and may be false, by partnership with form\n_non-ens_, 214;\n  relation to kosmical soul, iv. 227;\n  its matter, what is between ens and non-ens, 49;\n  two grades of, Faith or Belief, and Conjecture, 67;\n  true pleasure attached to true, iii. 351.\n\nOpposites, only one to each thing, ii. 13 _n._\n\nOptimism, ii. 393-6.\n\nOrphans, iv. 406-7.\n\nOrphic canon of life, iii. 390 _n._, iv. 15;\n  coincidence of _Tim\u00e6us_ with, 255 _n._\n\nOrthodoxy, local infallibility claimed, but rarely severely\nenforced in Greece, iv. 396;\n  less intolerance at Athens than elsewhere, iii. 277, iv. 126;\n  Sophists conform to prevalent, 56;\n  irresistible effect of public opinion in producing, i. 392, iv.\n55;\n  common sense of a community, its propagation, ii. 274;\n  Plato on, i. _xi_, 342, 392 _n._, 424, iv. 69\n_n._, 165;\n  probable feelings of Plato, ii. 367;\n  Sokrates in _Ph\u00e6don_ contrasted with _Apology_, 421;\n  inconsistently exacted in Plato's state, iii. 277-8, iv. 24,\n156, 160, 327, 379, 430;\n  three varieties of heresy, 376;\n  pro\u00ebm to laws against, 383;\n  first confuted, 386;\n  argument inconsistent and unsatisfactory, 388;\n  second confuted, 389;\n  contradicts _Republic_, 390;\n  the third the worst, 384;\n  confuted, 391;\n  general Greek belief, 381, 391, 394;\n  incongruity of Plato's doctrine, 393;\n  opposition to Plato's doctrine in Greece, 395;\n  Cicero, 379 _n._;\n  Milton, _ib._;\n  Bp. Butler, 166 _n._;\n  book-burning, 379 _n._;\n  see _Authority_.\n\n[Greek: Ou)si/a], must be known before [Greek: pa/th\u00ea], ii. 243\n_n._\n\n\nP.\n\n[Greek: Paiderasti/a], iii. 20 _n._, iv. 359.\n\nPain, see [Greek: a)lupi/a], _Pleasure_.\n\nPaley, remarks illustrative of Sokratic dialectic, i. 377\n_n._\n\nPan\u00e6tius, style, i. 406 _n._;\n  on _Ph\u00e6don_, 288, 334 _n._;\n  Plato's immortality of the soul, ii. 423 _n._;\n  dialogues of _Sokratici viri_, i. 112 _n._\n\nParmenid\u00eas, metaphysical and geometrical rather than physical, i.\n23 _n._, 89;\n  the absolute, 19-24, iii. 104;\n  Herakleitus opposed to, i. 37;\n  ens and non-ens, an inherent contradiction in human mind, 19;\n  ens alone contains truth, phenomena probability, 24;\n  ens erroneously identified by Aristotle with heat, _ib._\n_n._;\n  non-ens, iii. 243 _n._;\n  opposition to _Homo Mensura_, 113;\n  phenomena of, the object of modern physics, i. 23 _n._;\n  mind, 26;\n  theology, 19, 25;\n  physics, 7 _n._, 90 _n._;\n  two physical principles, 24;\n  doctrine defended by Zeno, 93, 99, iii. 58;\n  relation of Demokritus to, i. 66;\n  with Pythagoras supplied basis of Platonic philosophy, 89;\n  refutation of, in _Sophist\u00eas_, iii. 211, 223;\n  summum genus enlarged by Eukleides, 196 _n._;\n  and Sokrates blended by Eukleides, i. 118.\n\n_Parmenid\u00eas_, the, date, i. 309, 315, 316 _n._, 338\n_n._, iii. 71 _n._, 244 _n._;\n  authenticity, i. 307-11, 320, 327, 338 _n._, 401 _n._,\niii. 68 _n._, 69, 88 _n._, 185 _n._;\n  criticism of dialogue generally, 82;\n  its character, 56;\n  purpose negative, 71, 85 _n._, 85, 93, 97, 108, i. 125;\n  the genuine Platonic theory attacked, iii. 68;\n  attack not unnatural, 71;\n  its dialectic, compared with Zeno's, i. 100;\n  scenery and personages, iii. 58;\n  Sokrates impugns Zeno's doctrine, 59;\n  and affirms Ideas separate from, but participable by, sensible\nobjects, _ib._;\n  objections, 60-7;\n  no object in nature mean to the philosopher, 61, 195 _n._;\n  ideas, how participable by objects, 63, 72, iv. 138;\n  analogous difficulty of predication, i. 169;\n  not merely conceptions, iii. 64, 74;\n  \"the third man,\" 64 _n._;\n  not mere types, 65;\n  not cognizable, since not relative to ourselves, _ib._, 72;\n  cognizable only through unattained Idea of cognition, 66;\n  which gods have, 67, 68 _n._;\n  dilemma, ideas exist or philosophy impossible, 68;\n  exercises required from students, 79;\n  provisional assumption of hypotheses, and their consequences\ntraced, _ib._;\n  nine demonstrations from _unum est_ and _unum non\nest_, 81, 340;\n  criticism of antinomies, 82, 85 _n._, 88 _n._, 99\n_n._;\n  exercises only specimens of method applicable to other\nantinomies, 91;\n  more formidable than problems of Megarics, 92;\n  these assumptions convey the minimum of determinate meaning, 94;\n  different meanings of the same proposition in words, 95, 97\n_n._;\n  first demonstration a Reductio ad absurdum of _Unum non\nmulta_, 96, 101;\n  second, demonstrates _Both_ of what the first demonstrated\n_Neither_, 98, 101;\n  third mediates, 100, 101;\n  but unsatisfactory, 102;\n  Plato's imagination of the _Instantaneous_, 100;\n  found no favour, 102;\n  the fourth and fifth, 101, 102;\n  the sixth and seventh, 103;\n  unwarranted steps in the reasoning, 105;\n  seventh is founded on genuine doctrine of Parmenid\u00eas, 104;\n  eighth and ninth, 106;\n  conclusion compared to enigma in _Republic_, 108;\n  compared with _Sophist\u00eas_ and _Politikus_, 187\n_n._, 259;\n  _Phil\u00eabus_, 97 _n._, 340 _n._, 343;\n  _Republic_, iv. 138;\n  _Euthyd\u00eamus_, ii. 200.\n\nParticulars, doctrine of Herakleitus, i. 29;\n  the one in the many, and many in one, aim of philosophy, 407;\n  Herakleitean flux true of, but not of Ideas, iii. 320;\n  universals amidst, 257;\n  and universals, different dialogues compared, _ib._;\n  difficulties about one and many, 339;\n  natural coalescence of finite and infinite, 340;\n  illustration from speech and music, 342;\n  explanation insufficient, 343;\n  no constant truth in, iv. 3 _n._;\n  fluctuate, 50;\n  ordinary men discern only, 49, 51;\n  see _Phenomena_.\n\nPascal, on King _Nomos_, i. 381 _n._;\n  Cartesian theory, ii. 401 _n._;\n  justice, i. 231 _n._;\n  authority, iv. 232.\n\n[Greek: Pa/th\u00ea], must be known after [Greek: ou)si/a], ii. 243\n_n._\n\nPathology of Plato, compared with Aristotle and Hippokrates, iv.\n260.\n\nPausanias, the gods jealousy, iv. 164 _n._\n\nPeloponnesian war, iii. 406.\n\nPentateuch, allegorical interpretation of, iv. 157 _n._;\n  relation to Greek schemes, 256.\n\nPentathlos, the, ii. 114;\n  expert of Plato and Aristotle, 119 _n._\n\nPercept and concept, relative, iii. 75;\n  prior to the percipient, 76 _n._\n\nPerception, doctrine of Parmenides, i. 26;\n  Empedokles, 44;\n  Theophrastus, 46 _n._;\n  Anaxagoras, opposed to Empedokles, 58;\n  Diogenes of Apollonia, 62;\n  Demokritus, 77;\n  Plato, iii. 159;\n  different views of Plato, 163;\n  sensible, province wider in _Politikus_ than\n_The\u00e6t\u00eatus_, 256;\n  knowledge is sensible, 111, 113, 154, 173 _n._;\n  identified with _Homo Mensura_, 123, 162 _n._;\n  sensible perception does not include memory, 157;\n  argument from analogy of seeing and not seeing at the same time,\n_ib._;\n  knowledge lies in the mind's comparisons respecting sensible\nperceptions, 161;\n  difference from modern views, 162;\n  objects of conception and of, comprised in Plato's _ens_,\n229, 231.\n\nPergamus, library of, i. 270 _n._, 280 _n._\n\nPeriander, iv. 7.\n\n[Greek: Perie/chon] of Herakleitus, i. 35 _n._;\n  compared with Nous of Anaxagoras, 56 _n._\n\nPerikles, upheld the claims of intellect, ii. 373;\n  rhetorical power, 370, 371.\n\nPeripatetic school at the Lykeum, i. 269;\n  change after death of Theophrastus, 272;\n  loss of library, 270;\n  see _Lykeum_.\n\nPersian and Spartan kings eulogised, ii. 8;\n  and Athens compared, iv. 312;\n  invasion, 311, 313;\n  customs blended with Spartan in _Cyrop\u00e6dia_, i. 222;\n  government, 235.\n\nPh\u00e6don the Eretrian, i. 148.\n\n_Ph\u00e6don_, the, authenticity, i. 334 _n._;\n  first dialogue disallowed upon internal grounds, 288;\n  date, 309-313, 315, ii. 377 _n._;\n  affirmative and expository, 377;\n  much transcendental assertion, iii. 56;\n  purpose, ii. 382 _n._;\n  antithesis and complement of _Symposion_, iii. 22;\n  scenery and interlocutors, ii. 377;\n  Sokrates to the last insists on freedom of debate, 379;\n  value of exposition, 398;\n  no tripartite soul, antithesis of soul and body, 384;\n  life a struggle between soul and body, 386, 388, 422;\n  emotions, a degenerate appendage of human nature, iii. 389;\n  death emancipates, ii. 386, 388;\n  yet soul may suffer punishment, inconsistency, 415;\n  philosophy gives partial emancipation, 387;\n  purification of soul, 388, i. 159;\n  inseparable conjunction of pleasure with pain, iii. 38-9 71.;\n  pleasures to be estimated by intelligence, 375;\n  pleasures of intelligence more valuable than of sense,\n_ib._;\n  courage of philosopher and ordinary citizens, different\nprinciples, ii. 308 _n._;\n  the soul a mixture, refuted, 390;\n  soul's pre-existence admitted, _ib._, iii. 122;\n  soul is _essentially_ living and therefore immortal, ii.\n413;\n  proof of immortality includes pre-existence of all animals, and\nmetempsychosis, 414;\n  depends on assumption of Ideas, 412;\n  metempsychosis of ordinary men only, 387, 415, 425;\n  Plato's demonstration fails, iii. 16;\n  not generally accepted, ii. 426;\n  Sokrates' intellectual development, 391;\n  turned on different views as to a true cause, 398;\n  illustration of Comte's three stages of progress, 407;\n  Sokrates' early study, 391;\n  genesis of knowledge, _ib._;\n  first doctrine of Cause, rejected, _ib._, 399;\n  second doctrine, from Anaxagoras, 393, 401, 403;\n  doctrine laid down in _Phil\u00eabus_, 407 _n._;\n  Anaxagoras did not carry out his principle, 394, 407;\n  Anaxagoras' _nous_, as understood by Sokrates, 402\n_n._;\n  causes efficient and co-efficient, 394, 400;\n  third principle, assumption of Ideas as separate entia, 396,\n403, 407, iv. 239 _n._;\n  multitude of ideas, ii. 410;\n  the only causes, 396;\n  truth resides in ideas, 411;\n  discussion of hypothesis, and of its consequences, distinct,\n397, 411;\n  ultimate appeal to extremely general hypothesis, _ib._;\n  Sokrates' equanimity before death, 416, 417;\n  Sokrates' soul--islands of the blest, 416;\n  Sokrates' last words and death, 417;\n  burial, 416;\n  compared with _Apology_, i. 422 _n._, ii. 419-21;\n  _Symposion_, 382, iii. 16-19;\n  _Menon_, ii. 249;\n  _Ph\u00e6drus_, _ib._, iii. 16-19;\n  _Politikus_, 262, 265 _n._;\n  _Republic_, ii. 383, 412, 414 _n._;\n  _Tim\u00e6us_, 383, 407 _n._, 411-12.\n\n_Ph\u00e6drus_, its date, i. 263, 304-10, 313-4, 315, 319,\n_ib._ _n._, 323, 326 _n._, 327, 330, ii. 227, 228\n_n._, iii. 36 _n._, 38;\n  ancient criticism on, i. 319 _n._;\n  considered by Tennemann as keynote of series, 302;\n  assumptions of Schleiermacher inadmissible, 319, 329 _n._;\n  much transcendental assertion, iii. 56;\n  Eros differently understood, necessity for definition, 29;\n  derivation of [Greek: e)/r\u00f4s], 308 _n._;\n  of [Greek: mantik\u00ea\\] and [Greek: oi)\u00f4nistik\u00ea/], 310 _n._;\n  Eros, a variety of madness, 11;\n  Eros disparaged, then panegyrised, by Sokrates, _ib._;\n  mythe of pre-existent soul, 12, 14 _n._;\n  soul's [Greek: kn\u00ea=sis] compared to children's teething, 399\n_n._;\n  reminiscence of the Ideas, 13, 17, iv. 239 _n._;\n  operation of pre-natal experience on man's intellectual\nfaculties, iii. 13;\n  reminiscence kindled by aspect of physical beauty, ii. 422, iii.\n4, 14;\n  debate on Rhetoric, 26;\n  Sokrates' theory, all persuasion founded on a knowledge of the\ntruth, 28;\n  writing and speaking, as art, 27;\n  is it teachable by system, 28;\n  Sokrates compares himself with Lysias, 29;\n  Lysias unfairly treated in, 47-8,  408, 410 _n._, 411\n_n._;\n  Sokrates' reason for attachment to dialectic, 258 _n._;\n  the two processes of dialectic, 29, 39;\n  exemplified in Sokrates' discourses, 29;\n  essential to genuine rhetoric, 30, 34;\n  rhetoric as a real art, is comprised in dialectic, 30, 34;\n  analogy to medical art, 31;\n  includes a classification of minds and discourses, and their\nmutual application, 32, 41, 45;\n  books and lectures useless, 33, 34, 49, 51, 53-5;\n  may _remind_, 33, 50;\n  rhetorician must acquire real truth, 33, 34;\n  theory more Platonic than Sokratic, 38;\n  rhetorician insufficiently rewarded, 33;\n  dialectician alone can teach, 37;\n  _id\u00e9al_, cannot be realised, 51;\n  except under hypothesis of pre-existence and reminiscence, 52;\n  dialectic teaches minds unoccupied, rhetoric minds pre-occupied,\n40;\n  Plato's _id\u00e9al_ a philosophy, not an art, of rhetoric, 45;\n  unattainable, 42, 46;\n  comparison with the rhetorical teachers, 44;\n  charge against rhetorical teachers not established, 47;\n  compared with _Republic_, _Gorgias_,\n_Euthyd\u00eamus_, ii. 229;\n  _Menon_, 249;\n  _Ph\u00e6don_, _ib._, 423, iii. 17-8, iv. 239 _n._;\n  _Symposion_, iii. 1, 11, 15, 17-19;\n  _Sophist\u00eas_, 257;\n  _Politikus_, _ib._, 265 _n._;\n  _Phil\u00eabus_, 398;\n  _Tim\u00e6us_ and _Kritias_, 53;\n  _Leges_, iv. 324.\n\nPhenicians, iv. 330 _n._, 352;\n  appetite predominant in, 38.\n\nPhenomena, early Greek explanation of, by polytheism, i. 2;\n  doctrine of Xenophanes, 18;\n  Parmenides, 20, 24, 66;\n  of Parmenides, the object of modern physics, 23 _n._;\n  of Parmenides contain only probability, not truth, 24;\n  doctrine of Zeno, 93;\n  Leontine Gorgias, 104 _n._;\n  Herakleitus, 29;\n  Anaxagoras, 59 _n._;\n  Demokritus, 68;\n  Kyrenaics, 197;\n  the Ideas not fitted on to, iii. 78;\n  Aristotle, i. 24 _n._;\n  see _Particulars_.\n\n_Phil\u00eabus_, authenticity, iii. 369 _n._;\n  date, i. 307-9, 311-3, 315, iii. 369 _n._;\n  peculiarity, 382;\n  illustrates logical partition, 254, 344;\n  merit as a didactic composition, 365, 368 _n._;\n  method contrasted with _The\u00e6t\u00eatus_, 335 _n._;\n  recent editions, 365 _n._;\n  reading in p. 17A, 341 _n._;\n  subject and persons, 334;\n  protest against Sokratic elenchus, 335;\n  happiness and good used as correlative terms, _ib._;\n  good, object of universal desire, _ib._, 371, 392\n_n._;\n  what mental condition will ensure happiness, 335;\n  is it pleasure or wisdom, _ib._, 337;\n  pleasures, and opposite cognitions, unlike each other, 336, 396;\n  is good intense pleasure without any intelligence, 338;\n  or intelligence without pleasure or pain, 339;\n  such a life conceivable, at least second-best, 349;\n  Plato inconsistent in putting the alternative, 372;\n  emotions, a degenerate appendage of human nature, 389;\n  contrast with other dialogues, 398;\n  good a _tertium quid_, 339, 361;\n  pleasure, of the infinite, intelligence a combining cause, 347;\n  intelligence the determining, pleasure the indeterminate, 348,\niv. 221;\n  intelligence postulated by the Hedonists, iii. 374;\n  analogy of intelligence and pleasure, 360;\n  intelligence more cognate to good than pleasure is, 348, 361;\n  pain, disturbance of system's fundamental harmony, pleasure the\nrestoration, 348;\n  pleasure pre-supposes pain, 349;\n  except in the derivative pleasures of memory and expectation,\n_ib._;\n  desire presupposes a bodily want and memory of previous\nsatisfaction, 350;\n  true pleasures attached to true opinions, 351;\n  can pleasure be true or false, 286 _n._, 351, 352, 356,\n380, _ib._ _n._, 382;\n  false pleasures are pleasures falsely estimated, 353, 369\n_n._;\n  to Plato the absolute the only real, 385;\n  true pleasures of beautiful colours, odours, sounds, acquisition\nof knowledge, &c., 356;\n  pure pleasures admit of measure, 357;\n  directive sovereignty of measure, 391, 393;\n  pleasure not identical with [Greek: a)lupi/a], 353, 377;\n  theory of pleasure-haters, partly true, 354;\n  allusion in [Greek: oi( duscherei=s], 389 _n._;\n  intense pleasures connected with bodily or mental distemper,\n355, 391;\n  but more pleasure in health, 356;\n  intense pleasures not compatible with cognition, 362;\n  same view enforced by Hedonists, 378, 387 _n._;\n  Aristotle on, 376 _n._;\n  drama, feelings excited by--[Greek: phtho/nos], 355 _n._;\n  pleasure is generation, therefore not an End, nor the Good, 357;\n  Aristippus and Aristotle on, 378 _n._;\n  pleasure is an end, and cannot be compared with intelligence, a\nmeans. 373, 377 _n._;\n  Plato's doctrine not defensible against pleasure-haters, 387,\n390 _n._;\n  Sokrates differs little from pleasure-haters, 389;\n  gods and kosmos free from pleasure and pain, _ib._;\n  comparison of man to kosmos unnecessary and confusing, 367;\n  forced conjunction of kosmology and ethics, 391;\n  difficulties about one and many, 339;\n  natural coalescence of finite and infinite, 340;\n  illustration from speech and music, 342;\n  explanation insufficient, 343;\n  classes between one and infinite many often overlooked, 341;\n  Plato enlarges Pythagorean doctrine, 368;\n  but feebly applies, 369;\n  quadruple distribution of existences, 346;\n  varieties of intelligence, classified, 358;\n  dialectic the purest, 360;\n  classification of true and false, how applied to cognitions,\n394;\n  difference from other dialogues, 395;\n  rhetoric superior in usefulness and celebrity, 360, 380;\n  arithmetic and geometry are two-fold, 359, 394;\n  unchangeable essences of the kosmos rarely studied, 361;\n  good a mixture, _ib._;\n  this good has not the unity of an idea, ii. 407 _n._, iii.\n365;\n  all cognitions included, 362;\n  but only true, pure, and necessary pleasures, _ib._;\n  five graduated constituents of good, 364, 397;\n  Plato's in part an eclectic doctrine, 366;\n  blends ontology with ethics, _ib._;\n  does not satisfy the tests himself lays down, 371;\n  compared with _Euthyd\u00eamus_, 374 _n._;\n  _Protagoras_, 379, 391;\n  _Gorgias_, 379-81;\n  _Ph\u00e6drus_, 398;\n  _Symposion_, 370 _n._, 398;\n  _Parmenid\u00eas_, 97 _n._, 340 _n._, 343;\n  _Sophist\u00eas_, 369 _n._;\n  _Politikus_, 263, 369 _n._;\n  _Republic_, 370, 373 _n._, 395;\n  _Tim\u00e6us_, 397 _n._;\n  _Leges_, iv. 301.\n\nPhilo, etymologies, iii. 308 _n._;\n  hypothetical propositions, i. 145 _n._;\n  allegorical interpretation, iv. 157 _n._\n\nPhilolaus, i. 9.\n\n[Greek: Phi/lon, pr\u00f4/ton], see _Amabile primum_.\n\nPhilosophers, ancient, common claim to universal knowledge, iii.\n219;\n  charged with pride, i. 153 _n._;\n  secession from Athens, 111 _n._;\n  contrast of philosopher with practical men, ii. 52, 145\n_n._, iii. 183, 274, iv. 51-4;\n  uselessness in practical life due to not being called in by\ncitizens, 54;\n  disparagement of half-philosophers, half-politicians, ii. 224;\n  forced seclusion of, iv. 59;\n  require a community suitable, _ib._;\n  philosophical aptitude perverted under misguiding public\nopinion, 54;\n  model city practicable if philosophy and political power united,\n47;\n  divine men, iii. 187;\n  the fully qualified practitioner, ii. 114, 116, 119;\n  not wise, yet painfully feeling ignorance, 181;\n  value set by Sokrates and Plato on this attribute, 190;\n  dissenters, upheld, 375;\n  life, a struggle between soul and body, 386;\n  ascetic life, 388, i. 158;\n  exempted from metempsychosis, ii. 387, 416, 425;\n  rewarded in Hades--mythe in _Gorgias_, 361;\n  stages of intellectual development, 391;\n  value of exposition, 398;\n  Eros the stimulus to improving philosophical communion, iii. 4,\n6;\n  Sokrates as representative of _Eros Philosophus_, 15, 25;\n  distinguished from [Greek: i)di\u00f4/t\u00eas], iv. 104 _n._;\n  not distinguishable from sophists, ii. 210, 211 _n._;\n  alone can teach, iii. 37, 40;\n  as expositors, teach minds unoccupied, as rhetoricians, minds\npre-occupied, 39;\n  realisable only under hypothesis of pre-existence and\nreminiscence, 52;\n  alone grasp Ideas in reasoning, 290 _n._;\n  test of, the synoptic view, iv. 76;\n  compared with rhetors, iii. 178;\n  masters of debates, 179;\n  determine what forms admit of intercommunion, 208;\n  live in region of _ens_, _ib._;\n  contemplate unchangeable forms, iv. 48;\n  distinction of ordinary men and, illustrated by simile of Cave,\n67-70;\n  distinctive marks of, 51;\n  no object in nature mean to, iii. 61.\n\nPhilosophia prima of Aristotle, i. 358 _n._, iii. 230\n_n._, 382.\n\nPhilosophy, is reasoned truth, i. _vii-x_;\n  Ferrier on scope and purpose of, _viii_ _n._;\n  necessarily polemical, _viii_;\n  modern idea of, includes authoritative teaching, positive\nresults, direct proofs, 366;\n  usually positive systems advocated, iii. 70;\n  difference of ancient and modern problems, 52;\n  chief point of divergence of modern schools, ii. 409 _n._;\n  its beginning, i. 375 _n._, 382, ii. 404, 407 _n._;\n  free judgment the first condition for, i. 382, 395 _n._,\nii. 368, iii. 152 _n._;\n  negative vein as necessary as affirmative for, i. 130;\n  preponderated in Plato's age, 123;\n  early appearance of a few free thinkers in Greece, 384;\n  brought down from heaven by Sokrates, _x_;\n  Greek, in its purity, _xiv_;\n  Greek, characterised by multiplicity of individual authorities,\n84, 90, 340 _n._;\n  advantages, 90;\n  contrasted with uniform tradition of Jews and Christians, 384\n_n._;\n  early Christian view of, affected by Hebrew studies, _xv_\n_n._;\n  polytheism the first form of, 2;\n  Aristotle contrasts \"human wisdom\" with primitive theology, 3\n_n._;\n  Indian, 378 _n._;\n  compared with Pre-Sokratic, 107;\n  analogy of Greek with Indian, 160 _n._, 162;\n  difficulties of early, iii. 184 _n._;\n  opposition from prevalent views of Nature, &c., i. 86;\n  common repugnance to its rationalistic element, 3, 59-60, 261\n_n._, 279 _n._, 387 _n._, 388, 437, 441, iv. 57;\n  encyclop\u00e6dic character of Greek, iii. 219;\n  new epoch, by Plato's establishment of a school, i. 266;\n  its march up to or down from _principia_, 403;\n  the protracted study necessary, an advantage, _ib._;\n  definition first sought for in _Erast\u00e6_, ii. 117;\n  the perpetual accumulation of knowledge, 112;\n  a province by itself, 119;\n  the supreme art, 120;\n  to be studied by itself exclusively, 229;\n  claim of _locus standi_ for, 367;\n  relation to politics, 224, 227, 229, 230 _n._;\n  comparative value of, and of _practical_ (q.v.) life, 365\n_n._, 368 _n._, _ib._, iii. 182, i. 204;\n  antithesis of rhetoric and, ii. 365;\n  issue unsatisfactorily put by Plato, 369;\n  ancient quarrel between poetry and, iv. 93, 152, 309;\n  Aristotle on blending mythe with, 255 _n._;\n  gives a partial emancipation of soul, ii. 386;\n  analogy of Eros to, iii. 10, 11, 14;\n  Eros the stimulus to, 18;\n  different view, _Ph\u00e6don_, _The\u00e6t\u00eatus_,\n_Sophist\u00eas_, _Republic_, _ib._;\n  antithesis of emotion and science, 61;\n  ideas exist or philosophy impossible, 68;\n  should be confined to discussion among select minds, i. 351;\n  should not be taught at a very early age, iv. 60, 76;\n  studies introductory to, 70-75;\n  difference in _Leges_, 275 _n._;\n  Plato's remarks on effect of, 207;\n  _Republic_ contradicts other dialogues, 207-11;\n  Plato more a preacher than philosopher in _Republic_, 129,\n131;\n  difference between theorist and preceptor, _ib._;\n  Plato's altered tone in regard to, in later life, 273.\n\nPhilosophy, Pre-Sokratic, i. 1-83;\n  value, _xiv_;\n  form compared with the Indian, 107;\n  studied in the third and second centuries B. C., 92;\n  importance of Aristotle's information about, 85;\n  Plato's criticism on, 87 _n._;\n  relation of early schemes, 86;\n  Aristotle's relation to, 85;\n  abstractions of Plato and Aristotle compared with Ionians, 87;\n  _Tim\u00e6us_ resembled Ionic philosophy, 88 _n._;\n  theories in circulation in Platonic period, 91;\n  Ionians attended to material cause only, 88;\n  defect of Ionic _principles_, 89;\n  little or no dialectic in earliest theorists, 93;\n  physics discredited by growth of dialectic, 91;\n  new characteristic with Zeno and Gorgias, 105.\n\nPhlogiston theory, ii. 164 _n._\n\n[Greek: Phro/n\u00easis], ii. 120 _n._, iii. 301 _n._, 370\n_n._\n\n[Greek: Phtho/nos], meaning, iii. 356 _n._\n\n[Greek: Phu/sis], of Demokritus, i. 70 _n._;\n  in sense of [Greek: ge/nesis], denied by Empedokles, 38\n_n._;\n  [Greek: phu/sei] and [Greek: kata\\ phu/sin], iii. 294 _n._,\niv. 310 _n._;\n  see _Nature_.\n\nPhysics, transcendentalism in modern, i. 400 _n._;\n  creation out of nothing, denied by all ancient physical\nphilosophers, 52;\n  aversion to studying, on ground of impiety, iv. 219 _n._,\n397** _n._;\n  Thales, i. 4;\n  Anaximander, 4-7;\n  Anaximenes, 7;\n  Pythagorean, 12;\n  Xenophanes, 18;\n  Parmenides, 24, 90** _n._;\n  his phenomena the object of modern, 23 _n._;\n  and ontology, radically distinct points of view, _ib._;\n  reconciliation of ontology with, attempted unsuccessfully after\nParmenides, _ib._;\n  Herakleitus, 27, 32;\n  Empedokles, 38;\n  _attraction_ and _repulsion_ illustrate his\n_love_ and _enmity_, 40 _n._;\n  Anaxagoras, 49, 57;\n  denied simple bodies, 52 _n._;\n  atomic doctrine, 65, 67;\n  early, discredited by growth of dialectic, 91;\n  retrograded in Plato and Aristotle, 88 _n._;\n  theories in circulation in Platonic period, 91;\n  Eudoxus, 255 _n._;\n  early study of Sokrates, ii. 391;\n  Sokrates avoided, i. 376;\n  Cynics' contempt for, 151;\n  and Aristippus', 192;\n  see _Kosmos_.\n\nPhysiology, of Empedokles, i. 43;\n  Theophrastus, 46 _n._;\n  Anaxagoras, 58;\n  Diogenes of Apollonia, 60 _n._, 62;\n  Demokritus, 76;\n  of _Tim\u00e6us_ subordinated to ethical teleology, iv. 256;\n  of Plato, see _Body_;\n  compared with Aristotle and Hippokrates, 260.\n\nPlants for man's nutrition, iv. 248;\n  soul of, _ib._\n\nPlat\u00e6a, iii. 406.\n\nPlato, life, little known, i. 246;\n  birth, parentage, and education, 247, 306 _n._;\n  early relations with Sokrates, 248;\n  service as a citizen and soldier, 249;\n  political life, 251;\n  political changes in Greece during life, 1;\n  travels alter death of Sokrates, 253;\n  permanently established at Athens, 254;\n  teaches at the Academy, _ib._;\n  received presents, not fees, iii. 218 _n._;\n  his pupils, numerous, wealthy, and from different cities, i.\n255;\n  many subsequently politicians, 261 _n._;\n  Eudoxus, 255;\n  Aristotle, 260;\n  Demosthenes, 261 _n._;\n  visits the younger Dionysius, 258, 351, 194 _n._;\n  relations with Dionysius, 255;\n  disappointments, 280;\n  varying relations with Isokrates, ii. 331 _n._, iii. 35;\n  his jealousy and love of supremacy, i. 117 _n._, 153\n_n._;\n  alleged ill-nature, 117 _n._;\n  antipathy to Antisthenes, 151, 152 _n._, 165;\n  alleged enmity between Xenophon and, iii. 22 _n._, iv. 146\n_n._, 312 _n._;\n  rivalry with Lysias, iii. 408, 410 _n._, 411 _n._;\n  death, i. 200;\n  Plato and Aristotle represent pure Hellenic philosophy,\n_xiv_;\n  St. Jerome on, _xv_;\n  criticism on early Greek philosophy, 87 _n._;\n  relation to predecessors, 91;\n  theories in circulation in his time, _ib._;\n  Parmenid\u00eas and Pythagoras supplied basis for, 89;\n  relation to Sokrates, 344 _n._, ii. 303;\n  Pythagoreanism, i. 10 _n._, 15 _n._, 87, 344\n_n._, 346 _n._, 347, 349 _n._, ii. 426 _n._,\niii. 368, iv. 424 _n._;\n  Herakleitus, i. 27, ii. 30;\n  Demokritus, i. 66 _n._, 82 _n._, iv. 355 _n._;\n  abstractions of Plato and Aristotle compared with Ionic\nphilosophy, i. 87;\n  physics retrograded with, 88 _n._;\n  analogy to Indian philosophy, ii. 389 _n._;\n  resemblance to Hebrew writers, iv. 157 _n._, 256;\n  little known of him from his Dialogues, i. 260, 339;\n  personality only in his Epistles, 349;\n  valuable illustrations of his character from Epistles, 339\n_n._;\n  his school fixed at Athens and transmitted to successors, 265;\n  scarcely known to us in his function of a lecturer and president\nof a school, 346;\n  lectures at the Academy, never published, 360;\n  miscellaneous character of audience, effect, 348;\n  lectures, 347;\n  De Bono, _ib._, 349;\n  on principles of geometry, 349 _n._;\n  circumstances of his intellectual and philosophical development\nlittle known, 323 _n._;\n  did not write till after death of Sokrates, 326, 334, 443\n_n._;\n  proofs, 327-334;\n  variety, 339, 342, 344, ii. 155 _n._, iii. 26 _n._,\n54, 179 _n._, 259, 265 _n._, 400, 420;\n  style, i. 405;\n  prolixity, ii. 100 _n._, 276, iii. 259, 369 _n._, iv.\n325 _n._;\n  poetical vein predominant in some works, i. 343, iv. 153\n_n._;\n  mixture of poetical fancy and religious mysticism with dialectic\ntheory, iii. 16;\n  comic vein, 410 _n._;\n  builds on metaphor, i. 353 _n._, iii. 65 _n._, 351,\n364;\n  rhetorical powers, 178** _n._, 392 _n._, 408, 409, 410;\n  irony, ii. 208;\n  tendency to embrace logical phantoms as real causes, 404\n_n._;\n  both sceptical and dogmatical, i. 342;\n  his affirmative and negative veins distinct, 399, 400 _n._,\n403, 420;\n  in old age the affirmative vein, 408;\n  altered tone in regard to philosophy in later life, iv. 273,\n320, 379, 424, i. 244;\n  intolerance, 423, iii. 277, iv. 157, 159, 379, 430;\n  inconsistencies, i. _xiii_, ii. 29, 303, 345, 416 _n._, iii.\n17, 172 _n._, 273, 277, 332, 372, iv. 24, 219, 379-86, 396;\n  absence of system, i. _xiii_, 340 _n._, 344, 375;\n  untenable hypothesis that he communicated solutions to a few,\n_xi_, 360, 401;\n  assumed impossibility of teaching by written exposition, 349,\n357, ii. 56 _n._;\n  this assumption intelligible in his day, i. 357;\n  a champion of the negative dialectic, 372;\n  devoted to philosophy, 333;\n  his aim, 406;\n  is a searcher, 375, iii. 158 _n._;\n  search after knowledge the business of his life, i. 396;\n  has done more than any one else to interest others in it, 405;\n  anxiety to keep up research, ii. 246;\n  combated commonplace, i. 398 _n._;\n  equally with Sophists, laid claim to universal knowledge, iii.\n219;\n  anachronisms, i. 335, ii. 20 _n._, iii. 411;\n  colours facts to serve his arguments, ii. 356 _n._, 369,\niii. 46, iv. 311;\n  probably never read Thucydides, iii. 410 _n._;\n  acquiescence in tradition, iv. 230-3, 242 _n._;\n  relation to popular mythology, i. 441 _n._, ii. 416, iii.\n265 _n._, iv. 24, 155 _n._, 196, 238 _n._, 325,\n328, 337, 398;\n  theory of politics to resist King Nomos, i. 393;\n  reverence for Egyptian regulations, iv. 266 _n._;\n  latest opinion in Epinomis, 421 _n._, 424 _n._;\n  agreement of Leibnitz with, ii. 248 _n._;\n  see _Canon_, _Dialogue_, _Epistles_, &c.\n\nPlatonists, influenced by Pythagoreans, iii. 390 _n._;\n  pleasure a form of evil, _ib._;\n  erroneous identification of truth and good, 391 _n._\n\nPleasurable, Beautiful a variety of, ii. 45;\n  inadmissible, 45-7;\n  and Good, as conceived by the Athenians, 371;\n  is it identical with good, 289.\n\nPleasure, an equivoque, iii. 377 _n._;\n  meaning as the _summum bonum_, 338;\n  Plato's various doctrines compared, 385 _n._;\n  is the good, ii. 292, 305, 347 _n._;\n  agreement with Aristippus, i. 199-201;\n  right comparison of pains and, necessary, ii. 293;\n  virtue a right comparison of pain and, _ib._, 305;\n  ignorance, not pleasure, the cause of wrongdoing, 294;\n  actions conducive to, are honourable, 295;\n  Sokrates' reasoning, 307;\n  not ironical, 314;\n  not Utilitarianism, 310 _n._;\n  theory more distinct than any in other dialogues, 308, 347;\n  but too narrow and exclusively prudential, 309;\n  compared with _Gorgias_, 306 _n._, 345-6;\n  _Republic_, 210, 350 _n._;\n  not identical with Good, 345, iii. 380 _n._, iv. 62;\n  Sokrates' argument untenable, ii. 351;\n  its elements depreciated, 355;\n  arts of flattery aiming at immediate, 357;\n  Expert required to discriminate, 345, 347;\n  science of measure necessary to estimate pleasures, 357\n_n._, iii. 357, 369 _n._, 376** _n._, 391, iv. 301;\n  is it good, iii. 335, 337;\n  pleasures unlike each other, 336, 396;\n  is good intense pleasure without any intelligence, 338;\n  life without pain or pleasure conceivable, at least second-best,\n349, 372;\n  less cognate than intelligence to good, 339, 347, 361;\n  not identical with [Greek: a)lupi/a], 338 _n._, 353, 377;\n  is of the infinite, 347;\n  is the indeterminate, 348;\n  pre-supposes pain, 349, 389 _n._;\n  except in the derivative pleasures of memory and expectation,\n349;\n  is the restoration of the system's harmony, 348;\n  antithesis of body and mind in desire, no true pleasure, 350;\n  true, attached to true opinion, 351;\n  same principle of classification applied to cognitions as to,\n382;\n  can they be true or false, 351, 352, 385, 380 _n._, 382;\n  false, are pleasures falsely estimated, 352, 384;\n  theory of pleasure-haters, partly true, 354;\n  intense, not compatible with cognition, 363;\n  Aristotle on, 376 _n._;\n  same view enforced by Hedonists, 378, 387 _n._;\n  intense, connected with bodily or mental distemper, 356, 391;\n  but more pleasure in health, 356;\n  feelings excited by drama, [Greek: phtho/nos], 355 _n._;\n  true, of beautiful colours, odours, sounds, acquisition of\nknowledge, 356;\n  of geometry, painless, _ib._, 387 _n._;\n  of intelligence more valuable than of sense, 375 _n._, 386\n_n._, iv. 85, 89, 118;\n  analogy of cognition and, iii. 360;\n  true, admit of measure, 357, 369 _n._;\n  is generation, therefore, not an end, nor the good, 357;\n  Aristippus and Aristotle on, 378 _n._;\n  is an end, and cannot be compared with intelligence, a means,\n373, 377 _n._;\n  good a mixture of pleasure and cognition, 361;\n  only true, pure, and necessary pleasures included in good, 362;\n  gods and kosmos free from pleasure and pain, 389;\n  intelligence postulated by the Hedonists, 374;\n  Plato argues on Hedonistic basis by comparing, 375;\n  both [Greek: a)lupi/a] and pleasure included in Hedonists' end,\n377;\n  Sokrates differs little from pleasure-haters, 389;\n  doctrine not defensible against pleasure-haters, 387, 390\n_n._;\n  of intelligence, the best, and alone pure, iv. 85, 89;\n  of [Greek: philoma/theia] superior to [Greek: philoke/rdeia] and\n[Greek: philotimi/a], 85, 89, 118;\n  neutral condition of mind intermediate between pain and\npleasure, 86;\n  pure pleasure, unknown to most men, 87;\n  more from replenishment of mind than of body, 88;\n  citizens should be tested against, 285;\n  Sokrates the ideal of self-command as to, 288;\n  good identical with maximum of, and minimum of pain, 292-7, 299,\n303;\n  at least an useful fiction, _ib._;\n  a form of evil, Platonists' doctrine, iii. 390 _n._;\n  Speusippus on, 386 _n._, 390 _n._;\n  Kyrenaic theory, i. 196;\n  Antisthenes, iii. 390 _n._;\n  Cynics' contempt for, i. 154;\n  Aristotle, iii. 386 _n._;\n  Epikurus, ii. 355 _n._, iii. 387 _n._;\n  Lucretius, 387 _n._;\n  Cicero, 389 _n._;\n  Prof. Bain, 383 _n._\n\nPlotinus, i. 376 _n._, iii. 84 _n._\n\nPoets, censured by Herakleitus, i. 26;\n  Xenophanes, 16;\n  the art is _one_, ii. 127;\n  arbitrary exposition by the rhapsodes, 125;\n  and rhapsodes work by divine inspiration, 127, 129;\n  deliver wisdom without knowing it, 285;\n  the great teachers, 135;\n  really know nothing, _ib._;\n  Strabo against, iv. 152 _n._;\n  appeal to maxims of, ii. 178;\n  importance of knowledge of, 283;\n  Plato's forced interpretations of, 286, _ib._ _n._;\n  relation of sophists, rhetors, philosophers to, iv. 149;\n  ancient quarrel between philosophy and, 93, 151;\n  Plato's feelings enlisted for, 93;\n  Plato's aversion to Athenian dramatic, 316, 350;\n  peculiar to himself, 317;\n  Aristotle differs, _ib._ _n._;\n  change for worse at Athens began in, 313;\n  censured, ii. 355, iv. 91, 130 _n._;\n  their mischievous _imitation of imitation_, 91;\n  retort open to, 153 _n._, 154 _n._;\n  mischievous appeal to emotions, ii. 126, iv. 92, 152, 349;\n  only deceive their hearers, 91;\n  credibility upheld by Plato, 161;\n  must avoid variety of imitation, 26;\n  orthodox type imposed on, 24, 153, 155, 292-6, 323, 349;\n  to keep emotions in a proper state, 169;\n  Plato's expulsion of, censured, iii. 3;\n  actual place of, in Greek education, compared with Plato's\n_id\u00e9al_, iv. 149-53;\n  mixture in Plato of poetry with religious mysticism and\ndialectic theory, iii. 16;\n  poetic vein of Sokrates in _Ph\u00e6don_ contrasted with\n_Apology_, ii. 421;\n  Aristophanes on function of, iv. 306 _n._\n\nPolitical art, its use, ii. 206, iii. 415;\n  Sokrates declares he alone follows the true, ii. 361;\n  society and ethics, topic of Sokrates, i. 376;\n  ethics merged by Sokrates in, ii. 362;\n  treated together by Plato, iv. 133;\n  apart by Aristotle, 138;\n  Plato's and Aristotle's new theory of, to resist King\n_Nomos_, i. 393;\n  relation to philosophy, ii. 224, 227, 229, 230 _n._, 365\n_n._, 368 _n._, _ib._, iii. 179, 183, iv. 51-4,\ni. 181 _n._, 182;\n  to be studied by itself exclusively, ii. 229;\n  Lewis on ideals, iv. 139 _n._;\n  see _Government_, _Monarchy_, _Ruler_.\n\n_Politikus_, authenticity, i. 307, 316 _n._, iii. 185\n_n._, 265 _n._;\n  date, i. 309, 410, 313, 315, 325;\n  purpose, iii. 188, 253, 257 _n._, 261;\n  value, 190;\n  relation to _The\u00e6t\u00eatus_, 187;\n  scenery and personages, 185;\n  in a logical classification all particulars of equal value, 195;\n  province of sensible perception narrower in _The\u00e6t\u00eatus_,\n256;\n  importance of founding logical partition on sensible\nresemblances, 255;\n  the attainment of the standard the purpose of each art, 260;\n  necessity of declaring standard, 262;\n  Plato's views on mensuration, 260;\n  Plato's defence against critics, 262;\n  the mythe of the kosmos, 265 _n._;\n  causes principal and auxiliary, 266;\n  the king the principal cause, _ib._;\n  Plato does not admit received classification of governments,\n267;\n  three kinds of polity, 278;\n  true classification of governments, scientific or unscientific,\n268;\n  unscientific government, or by many, counterfeit, _ib._;\n  of unscientific governments, despot worst, democracy least bad,\n270, 278;\n  true government, by the one scientific** man, i. 273, iv. 280,\n310 _n._;\n  counter-theory in _Protagoras_, iii. 275;\n  government by fixed laws the second-best, 269;\n  scientific governor, unlimited by laws, 269;\n  distinguished from general, &c., 271;\n  aims at forming virtuous citizens, 272;\n  maintains ethical standard, 273;\n  natural dissidence of gentle and energetic virtues, _ib._;\n  excess of the energetic entails death or banishment, of the\ngentle, slavery, _ib._;\n  courage and temperance assumed, 282;\n  compared with _Lach\u00eas_, 282-4;\n  _Charmid\u00eas_, _ib._;\n  _Menon_, 283;\n  _Protagoras_, 262, 275;\n  _Ph\u00e6don_, 262, 265 _n._;\n  _Ph\u00e6drus_, 257, 265 _n._;\n  _Parmenid\u00eas_, 259;\n  _The\u00e6t\u00eatus_, 184 _n._, 187, 256;\n  _Kratylus_, 281, 329;\n  _Phil\u00eabus_, 262, 369 _n._;\n  _Republic_, 257 _n._, 279.\n\n[Greek: Polupra/gm\u00f4n], ii. 362 _n._\n\nPolybius, on music, iv. 306.\n\nPolytheism, early Greek explanation of phenomena by, i. 2;\n  believed in after genesis of philosophy, 3;\n  hostile to philosophy, 86;\n  substitution of physical forces for, ii. 402;\n  Euripides' _Hippolytus_ illustrates popular Greek religious\nbelief, iv. 163 _n._\n\nPopulation, Malthus' law of, iv. 201;\n  recognised by Plato and Aristotle, 202.\n\nPorphyry, on Metempsychosis, ii. 426 _n._\n\nPoste, Mr., on _Phil\u00eabus_, iii. 365 _n._, 369 _n._,\n381 _n._, 384 _n._, 390 _n._, 396 _n._, 397\n_n._;\n  abstract theories of Plato and Aristotle compared, _ib._\n\nPotential and actual, Aristotle's distinction, iii. 134;\n  _ens_ equivalent to, 204.\n\nPower, controversy of Aristotle with Megarics, i. 135;\n  Aristotle's arguments not valid, 136-8;\n  Aristotle himself concedes the doctrine, 139 _n._;\n  doctrine of Diod\u00f4rus Kronus, 140, 143;\n  defended by Hobbes, 143;\n  Brown on, 138 _n._\n\nPractical life disparaged, ii. 355, iii. 329;\n  and philosophy, ii. 365 _n._, 368 _n._, _ib._,\niii. 179, 183, iv. 51-4, i. 181 _n._, 182;\n  uselessness of philosopher in, due to his not being called in by\ncitizens, iv. 54;\n  condition of success in, ii. 359;\n  influence of belief on, i. 180 _n._;\n  Boissier on, 157 _n._\n\nPrantl, objection to _Homo Mensura_, iii. 151 _n._;\n  _Tim\u00e6us_, iv. 255 _n._;\n  Megarics, i. 129 _n._, 132 _n._\n\nPraxiphanes, on _Kritias_, iv. 265** _n._\n\nPrayer, danger of, for mischievous gifts, ii. 12;\n  Sokrates on, and sacrifice, 17, 417, 419;\n  Sokrates prays for undefined favours--premonitions, 28;\n  Sokrates' belief, iv. 394;\n  heresy that gods appeased by, 376, 384;\n  general Greek belief, 392, 394;\n  Herodotus, _ib._;\n  Epikurus, 395;\n  Aristotle, _ib._\n\nPredicables, iii. 77 _n._\n\nPredication, predicate not recognised in Plato's analysis, iii.\n235;\n  only identical, legitimate, 223, 232 _n._, 251;\n  coincidence in Plato, ii. 46 _n._;\n  analogous difficulty in _Parmenid\u00eas_, i. 169;\n  error due to the then imperfect logic, iii. 241;\n  misconception of function of copula, 221, i. 170 _n._;\n  arguments against, iii. 206, 212, 221;\n  Aristotle on, i. 166, 170;\n  after Aristotle, asserted by Stilpon, 166, 169;\n  Stilpon against accidental, 167;\n  logical subject has no real essence apart from predicates, 168\n_n._;\n  Mened\u00eamus disallowed negative, 170;\n  see _Proposition_.\n\nPre-existence of all animals, included in Plato's proof of soul's\nimmortality, ii. 414.\n\nPre-Sokratic, see _Philosophy_.\n\nPriestley, Dr., character of, i. 403 _n._\n\nPrinciple, march of philosophy up to or down from, i. 403;\n  of Thales, 4;\n  Anaximander, 5;\n  Anaximenes, 7;\n  Pythagoreans, 9-12, 14;\n  Parmenides, 24;\n  Herakleitos, 27;\n  Empedokles, 38;\n  Diogenes of Apollonia, 60;\n  defect of the Ionic philosophers, 38.\n\nPrinsterer, G. van, iii. 412 _n._\n\nProdikus, as a writer and critic, iii. 304, 308 _n._;\n  less a sophist than Sokrates, 219;\n  the choice of Herakles, ii. 267 _n._\n\nPro\u00ebms, of Zaleukus and Charondas, iv. 323 _n._;\n  didactic or rhetorical homilies, 322;\n  to every important law, 321, 383;\n  as type for poets, 323.\n\nProklus, borrowed from Rhodian Eudemus, i. 85 _n._;\n  interpretation of Plato, _xi_;\n  on _Leges_, iv. 355 _n._;\n  _Kritias_, 265 _n._;\n  _Parmenid\u00eas_, iii. 64 _n._, 80 _n._, 80, 90\n_n._;\n  _Kratylus_, 294 _n._, 310 _n._, 323 _n._;\n  distinction of divine and human names, 300 _n._;\n  analysis of propositions, 237 _n._\n\nPrometheus, mythe, ii. 267.\n\nProperty, private, an evil, iv. 327, 333;\n  perpetuity of lots of land, 326;\n  succession, 405;\n  modes of acquiring, 397;\n  length of prescription, 415;\n  direct taxation according to, 331;\n  qualification for magistracies and votes, _ib._, 333;\n  limited inequality tolerated as to movable, 330;\n  no private possession of gold or silver, no loans or interest,\n331;\n  see _Communism_.\n\nProphesy, Plato's theory of liver's function, iv. 246;\n  see _Inspiration_.\n\nProposition, analysis of, iii. 213;\n  imperfect, 230, 235;\n  intercommunion of forms of _non-ens_ and of proposition,\nopinion, judgment, 213-4;\n  no analysis or classification of, before Aristotle, 222;\n  quality of, 235, 248;\n  Plato's view of the negative erroneous, 236, 239;\n  Ideas [Greek: t\u00f4=n a)popha/se\u00f4n], 238 _n._;\n  are false possible, 232;\n  Plato undertakes impossible task, 249;\n  some true, others false, assumed by Aristotle, _ib._;\n  hypothetical, Diod\u00f4rus Kronus on, i. 145;\n  Philo, _ib._ _n._;\n  contradictory, impossible, 166;\n  the subject, no real essence apart from predicates, 168\n_n._;\n  see _Copula_, _Predication_.\n\nProtagoras, character of, ii. 265 _n._;\n  not represented in _Euthyd\u00eamus_, 202;\n  less a sophist than Sokrates, iii. 219;\n  not disparagingly viewed by Plato, ii. 288 _n._, 290\n_n._, 296 _n._, 303, 314;\n  relation to Herakleitus, iii. 159 _n._;\n  _Homo Mensura_, 113;\n  see _Relativity_;\n  combated by Demokritus, i. 82;\n  taught by lectures, ii. 203, 301;\n  [Greek: Peri\\ tou= o)/ntos], iii. 153 _n._;\n  as a writer and critic, 304, 308 _n._;\n  treatise on eristic, i. 125 _n._;\n  theory of vision, iv. 237 _n._;\n  on the gods, 233 _n._\n\n_Protagoras_, the, date, i. 304-7, 308, 77, 312, 315, 321,\n327, 328, 331 _n._, ii. 228 _n._, 298 _n._;\n  purpose, 277, 278 _n._;\n  two distinct aspects of ethics and politics, 299;\n  difference of rhetorical and dialectical method, 300;\n  introduction illustrates Sokrates' mission, 263;\n  question unsolved, 297, 316;\n  scenery and personages, 259;\n  Hippokrates eager for acquaintance with Protagoras, 260, iii.\n217 _n._;\n  not noticed at the close, ii. 298;\n  Sophists as teachers, 261;\n  danger of going to sophist, without knowing what he is about to\nteach, 262;\n  visit to Kallias, respect for Protagoras, 264;\n  Protagoras questioned, _ib._;\n  is virtue, teachable, 266;\n  intends to train youths as virtuous citizens, _ib._;\n  Protagoras' mythe, first fabrication of animals by gods, 267;\n  its value, 276;\n  social art conferred by Zeus, 268, iii. 275;\n  Protagoras' discourse, ii. 269;\n  its purpose, 274;\n  prolix, 275;\n  parodied by Sokrates, 283;\n  mythe and discourse explain propagation of established sentiment\nof a community, 274, iii. 274;\n  justice and sense of shame possessed and taught by all citizens,\nii. 269;\n  virtue taught by parents, &c., 272;\n  quantity acquired depends on individual aptitude, _ib._;\n  analogy of learning the vernacular, 273;\n  theory of punishment, 270;\n  combines the two modern theories, 270 _n._;\n  why genius not hereditary, 271, 272, 274;\n  Sokrates analyses, 276;\n  how far is justice like holiness, 278;\n  intelligence and moderation identical, having same contrary,\n279;\n  Sokrates' reasons insufficient, _ib._;\n  Protagoras' prolix reply, 280, 281, 284;\n  Alkibiades claims superiority for Sokrates, 282, 287;\n  dialectic superior to rhetoric, 282;\n  Sokrates inferior in continuous debate, 284;\n  Sokrates on song, and concealed Sophists at Krete and Sparta,\n283;\n  Protagoras on importance of knowledge of poets, _ib._;\n  interpretation of a song of Simonides, _ib._;\n  forced interpretation of poets, 285;\n  poets deliver wisdom without knowing it, 285;\n  Sokrates depreciates value of debates on poets, _ib._;\n  colloquial companion necessary to Sokrates, 287;\n  courage differs materially from rest of virtue, 285, 304\n_n._, iv. 283 _n._;\n  Sokrates argues that courage is knowledge, ii. 288;\n  Aristotle on, 170 _n._;\n  courage a right estimate of terrible things, 296, 307;\n  the reasoning unsatisfactory, 313;\n  knowledge is dominant agency in mind, 290;\n  no man does evil voluntarily, 292;\n  ignorance, not pleasure, the cause of wrongdoing, 294;\n  pleasure the good, 289, 292, 305, 344-50;\n  agreement with Aristippus, i. 199-201;\n  right comparison of pleasures and pains necessary, ii. 293, iii.\n391;\n  virtue a right comparison of pleasures and pains, ii. 293, 305;\n  actions conducive to pleasure are honourable, 295;\n  reasoning of Sokrates, 307;\n  not ironical, 314;\n  not Utilitarianism, 310 _n._;\n  theory more distinct than any in other dialogues, 308;\n  but too narrow and exclusively prudential, 309-11, 313, 350\n_n._;\n  reciprocity of regard indispensable, 311;\n  ethical end involves regard for pleasures and pains of others,\n312;\n  permanent and transient elements of human agency, 353-5;\n  compared with _Menon_, 245;\n  _Gorgias_, 306 _n._, 345-8, 349-57, iii. 379;\n  _Politikus_, 262, 275, 276;\n  _Phil\u00eabus_, 380, 391;\n  _Republic_, ii. 310, 350 _n._;\n  _Tim\u00e6us_, 268 _n._;\n  _Leges_, iv. 301.\n\nPrudence, relation to rest of virtue, iv. 426;\n  a good from its consequent pleasures, Aristippus' doctrine, i.\n197.\n\nPsammetichus, iii. 289 _n._\n\n[Greek: Pseu=dos], derivation, iii. 301 _n._\n\n[Greek: Psuch\u00ea/], meaning, iv. 387 _n._;\n  see _Mind_, _Soul_, _Reason_.\n\nPsychology, defective in _Gorgias_, ii. 354;\n  great advance by Plato in analytical, iii. 164;\n  classification of minds and aptitudes required in true rhetoric,\n32, 43.\n\nPtolemies, i. 279, 284 _n._, 285.\n\nPunishment, theory of, ii. 270;\n  combines the two modern theories, _ib._ _n._;\n  a relief to the wrongdoer, 326, 328, 335, iv. 366;\n  consequences of theory, ii. 336;\n  its incompleteness, 363;\n  analogy of mental and bodily distemper pushed too far, 337;\n  objects to deter or reform, iv. 408;\n  corporal, 403.\n\nPyrrho the Sceptic, i. 154 _n._\n\nPythagoras, life and doctrines, i. 8;\n  metaphysical and geometrical rather than physical, 89;\n  censured by Herakleitus, 26;\n  Demokritus on, 82 _n._;\n  antipathy of Herakleitus, iii. 316 _n._;\n  see _Pythagoreans_.\n\nPythagoreans, the brotherhood, i. 8, ii. 374;\n  absence of individuality, i. 8;\n  divergences of doctrine, 9 _n._, 14 _n._;\n  canon of life, iii. 390 _n._;\n  compared with Chinese philosophers, i. 159 _n._;\n  Number, differs from Plato's Idea, 10, 348;\n  modern application of the principle, 10 _n._;\n  fundamental conception applied by Kepler, 14 _n._;\n  Platonic form of doctrine of Monas and Duas, 15 _n._;\n  number limited to ten, 11 _n._;\n  [Greek: kairo/s], the first cause of good, iii. 397 _n._;\n  music of the spheres, i. 14;\n  harmonies, 16;\n  geometrical construction of kosmos, re-appears in _Tim\u00e6us_,\n349 _n._;\n  vacuum extraneous to the kosmos, iv. 225 _n._;\n  doctrine of one cosmical soul, ii. 248 _n._;\n  metempsychosis, 426 _n._;\n  Contraries, the principles of [Greek: o)/nta], i. 15 _n._;\n  theory of vision, iv. 237 _n._;\n  not the idealists of _Sophist\u00eas_, iii. 245 _n._;\n  doctrine of classification, enlarged by Plato, 368;\n  on etymology, 304 _n._, 316 _n._, 323 _n._;\n  doctrines in Plato, i. 11 _n._, 16 _n._, 88, 344\n_n._, 346 _n._, 347, 349 _n._, ii. 426 _n._,\niii. 368, iv. 424 _n._;\n  Platonists, iii. 390 _n._\n\n\nQ.\n\nQualities, primary and secondary, i. 70, iv. 243 _n._;\n  all are relative, ii. 157;\n  no existence without the mind, iii. 73 _n._;\n  [Greek: a)lloi/\u00f4sis], 103 _n._\n\nQuality of propositions, iii. 235 _n._, 248.\n\nQuintilian, iii. 311 _n._\n\n\nR.\n\nRavaisson, M., iii. 242 _n._\n\nRealism, first protest against, Antisthenes, i. 164.\n\nReason, the universal, of Herakleitus, i. 34;\n  is the reason of most men as it ought to be, 35;\n  the individual, worthless, 34;\n  of Anaxagoras, identical with the vital principle, 54;\n  alone pure and unmixed, 51;\n  immaterial and impersonal, 56 _n._;\n  two attributive to _move_ and to _know_, _ib._;\n  relation to the homoeomeries, 55-7;\n  originates rotatory movement in chaotic mass, 50;\n  exercised only a catalytic agency, 89;\n  compared with Herakleitus' [Greek: perie/chon], 56 _n._;\n  not used as a cause, ii. 394;\n  of Demokritus, produced by influx of atoms, i. 79;\n  relation to sense, 68 _n._;\n  alone gives true knowledge, 72;\n  worlds of sense and, distinct, 403;\n  varieties of, classified, iii. 358;\n  dialectic the purest, 360;\n  two grades of, Nous and Dianoia, iv. 66;\n  relation to [Greek: no\u00eato/n], i. 354 _n._;\n  the Universal, assigned as measure of truth, iii. 151 _n._;\n  relation to kosmical soul, iv. 226;\n  kosmos produced by joint action of necessity and, 237;\n  in individual, analogous to ruler in state, 39;\n  temporarily withdrawn under inspiration, ii. 131, iii. 11;\n  belongs only to gods and a few men, 121 _n._, iv. 234, 235\n_n._;\n  is the determining, iii. 348;\n  a combining cause, 347;\n  postulated by the Hedonists, 374;\n  analogy of pleasure and, 360;\n  more cognate than pleasure with good, 339, 347, 361;\n  is it happiness, 335, 337;\n  is good a life of, without pleasure or pain, 338, 349, 372;\n  pleasure an end, and cannot be compared with intelligence, a\nmeans, 373, 377 _n._;\n  all cognitions included in good, 362;\n  good is not, iv. 62;\n  implication of emotion and, iii. 374;\n  knowledge of good identical with, of other things with [Greek:\ndo/xa], ii. 30;\n  perfect state of, the one sufficient condition of virtue, 149;\n  earliest example of fallacy of Sufficient, i. 6 _n._\n\nReid, on Berkeley, iv. 243** _n._;\n  atomic doctrine of primary and secondary qualities, i. 70.\n\nRelation, category of, iii. 128 _n._\n\nRelative and non-relative names, iii. 232 _n._;\n  and absolute, radically distinct points of view, i. 23\n_n._;\n  antithetised by Plato in regard to the beautiful, ii. 54;\n  the, of Xenophanes, i. 18;\n  doctrine of Parmenides, 20-24, 66;\n  alone knowable, Zeno, 98, 101;\n  incommunicable, Gorgias the Leontine, 104 _n._;\n  doctrine of Anaxagoras, 59 _n._;\n  Demokritus, 71, 80;\n  alone knowable, iii. 63, 73;\n  Idea of Good is essentially, iv. 214 _n._, i. 185;\n  see _Absolute_, _Relativity_.\n\nRelativity, perpetual implication of subject and object, iii. 118,\n123 _n._, 122 seq., 128-9, 287 _n._, i. 204 _n._;\n  true both in regard to ratiocinative combinations and percipient\nfaculties of each individual, iii. 118;\n  the doctrine of Sokrates, i. 432, iii. 140 _n._, 147, 162\n_n._;\n  in regard to intelligible world, proved from Plato, 121, 125,\n227, 322 _n._, 337 _n._;\n  shown more easily than in reference to sense, 122;\n  of some sensible facts, 126, 298, iv. 242;\n  two-fold, to comparing subject, and to another object, besides\nthe one directly described, iii. 127;\n  relations are nothing in the object without a comparing subject,\n_ib._;\n  the facts of consciousness not explicable by independent subject\nand object, 131;\n  _Homo Mensura_, formula unpopular, 150;\n  objected to as \"Subjectivism,\" 151;\n  true meaning, ii. 341 _n._, iii. 116, 137, 143, 292, 297;\n  its counter-proposition, 148;\n  its value, 131, 164 _n._;\n  relation to belief on authority, 142, 143, 146, 293;\n  counter-theory of naming, 291, 326 _n._;\n  all exposition an assemblage of individual judgments, 139;\n  sentiments of belief and disbelief common, but grounds different\nwith different men and ages, 296;\n  belief not dependent on will but relative to circumstances of\nindividual mind, 297;\n  _Homo Mensura_, an objection to cognisability of Ideas, 72;\n  identified with Herakleiteanism, 128;\n  Demokritus on, i. 82, iii. 152;\n  Plato's arguments against, 135;\n  identified erroneously by Plato with knowledge is sensible\nperception, 114 _n._, 118, 120 _n._, 125, 162 _n._;\n  Plato ignores the proper qualification, 137;\n  the doctrine equalises all animals, 135, 292;\n  analogy of physical processes, 294;\n  not true in the sense meant, 141, 296;\n  it annuls dialectic--not true, 146;\n  the wise man alone a measure, 145;\n  divergences of men, from mental and associative differences,\n155;\n  Aristotle on, 128 _n._, 131 _n._, 132 _n._, 149\n_n._, 152;\n  Kyrenaics, i. 197. 204;\n  Hamilton, iii. 133 _n._;\n  Dugald Stewart, 156 _n._;\n  see _Relative_.\n\nReligion, Greek, hostile to philosophy, i. 86;\n  mysticism in Empedokles, 47 _n._;\n  Xenophanes, 16-18;\n  loose meaning of [Greek: a)/theos], iv. 382 _n._;\n  Manich\u00e6anism of _Leges_, 389 _n._;\n  Plato's relation to popular mythology, i. 441 _n._, ii.\n416, iii. 265 _n._,  iv. 24, 155 _n._, 195, 238\n_n._, 325, 328, 337, 398;\n  dissent from his country's, 161, 163;\n  fundamental dogmas, 419;\n  doctrines had emanated from lawgivers, 160;\n  temples and priests, regulations, 337;\n  number of sacrifices determined by lawgiver, 357;\n  sacrilege, gravest of all crimes, 363;\n  heresy, and [Greek: u(/bris] to divine things, or places,\n375-86;\n  [Greek: eu)ph\u00eami/a] and [Greek: blasph\u00eami/a], 350 _n._;\n  only state worship allowed,  24, 159, 337, 419, 430;\n  Cicero, 379 _n._;\n  Delphi and Dodona to be consulted, 34, 137 _n._, 325, 337;\n  Xenophon, i. 237;\n  communications common in Plato's age, ii. 130, 131 _n._, i.\n225 _n._;\n  see _Orthodoxy_, _Prayer_, _Polytheism_,\n_Sacrifice_, _Theology_.\n\nReminiscence, theory of, ii. 237, 249, 252, iii. 13, 17;\n  kindled by aspect of physical beauty, 14;\n  not accepted, ii. 247;\n  Bion and Straton on, 249 _n._;\n  purification of soul for, 389;\n  necessary hypothesis for didactic _id\u00e9al_, iii. 52;\n  not recognised in _Symposion_, 17;\n  nor in _Republic_ training, iv. 207.\n\nRenan, on absence of system in ancient philosophy, i. 340\n_n._;\n  influence of professorial lectures, 346 _n._;\n  Averroism, iii. 68 _n._;\n  _Kratylus_, 290 _n._;\n  origin of language, 326 _n._, 328 _n._, 329 _n._;\n  _Almamuns' dream_, iv. 213 _n._\n\n_Republic_, date, i. 307, 309, 311-3, 315, 324, ii. 318\n_n._;\n  title only partially applicable, iv. 96;\n  _Kleitophon_ intended as first book, i. 406 _n._, iii.\n419, 425;\n  _Hermokrates_ projected as last in tetralogy, i. 325, iv.\n266, 273;\n  _Tim\u00e6us_ and _Kritias_, sequel to, 215, 265;\n  overleaps difficulties of other dialogues, 138;\n  summarised, 1, 95;\n  double purpose, ethical and political, 133, 138;\n  polity and education combined, 185;\n  Plato more a preacher than philosopher in, 129-31;\n  scenery and persons, 2;\n  Kephalus' views about old age, _ib._;\n  preponderance of evil, 262 _n._;\n  tripartite division of goods, 12, 116;\n  Good, not intelligence nor pleasure, 62;\n  the four cardinal virtues assumed as an exhaustive\nclassification, 135;\n  as constituting all Virtue where each resides, 134;\n  difference in other dialogues, 137;\n  justice an equivocal word, 120, 123-6;\n  Simonides' definition of justice, rendering what is owing, 2;\n  objections, 3;\n  defective explanations, 4;\n  definition rejected, 6;\n  Thrasymachus' definition, justice what is advantageous to the\nmost powerful, 8;\n  modified, 9;\n  ruler _qua_ ruler infallible, _ib._;\n  justice the good of another, 10;\n  a good to society and individual, injustice a source of\nweakness, 11;\n  justice a source of happiness, 12;\n  a compromise, 13;\n  recommended by fathers from its consequences, 15, 16, 99;\n  the received view anterior to Plato, 100;\n  Xenophon on, 114 _n._;\n  arguments compared, and question stated, 18;\n  the real issue, 117;\n  justice a good _per se_, 20, 40, 84, 90;\n  not demonstrated, 116;\n  is performing one's own function, 36, 37;\n  in individual, when each mental part performs its own function,\n40;\n  analogy to bodily health, _ib._;\n  distinction between temperance and justice effaced, 135;\n  view peculiar to Plato, 99;\n  happiness of just and unjust compared, 14;\n  neutral condition of mind intermediate between pain and\npleasure, 86;\n  pure pleasure unknown to most men, iii. 387 _n._, iv. 87;\n  simile of kosmos, absolute height and depth, 87;\n  more pleasure from replenishment of mind than of body, 88;\n  proved also by superiority of pleasures of intelligence, iii.\n375 _n._, iv. 85, 89;\n  the arguments do not establish the point aimed at, 118-20;\n  a good _per se_, and from its consequences, 94, 121-3;\n  all-sufficient for happiness, germ of Stoical doctrine, 102;\n  inconsistent with actual facts, 103, 123;\n  individual dependent on society, _ib._;\n  essential reciprocity in society, 109;\n  the basis of Plato's own theory of city's genesis, 111;\n  but incompletely stated, 112 _n._;\n  any theory of society must present antithesis and correlation of\nobligation and right, 112;\n  Plato's affirmation true in a qualified sense, 125;\n  orthodoxy or dissent of just man must be taken into account,\n126, 131;\n  Plato's ethical basis imperfect, 127;\n  his conception is self-regarding, 3 _n._, 104;\n  motives to it arise from internal happiness of the just, 105;\n  view substantially maintained since, _ib._;\n  each individual mind tripartite, ii. 384, iv. 37;\n  the gentle, tender, and \u00e6sthetical emotions omitted, 149\n_n._;\n  reason, energy, appetite, analogous to rulers, guardians,\ncraftsmen, 39;\n  analogy of city and individual, 20, 37, 79-84, 96;\n  parallelism exaggerated, 114, 121, 124;\n  unity of the city, every man does one thing well, 23, 33, 183;\n  Xenophon on, 139 _n._;\n  perfection of state and individual, each part performing its own\nfunction, 97;\n  happiness of entire state the end, 98, 139 _n._;\n  origin of society, common want, ii. 343, iii. 327 _n._, iv.\n21, 111, 112 _n._, 133;\n  ideal state--only an outline, 139;\n  a military _bureaucracy_, 183;\n  type of character is Athenian, Xenophontic is Spartan, 147, 151;\n  Plato more anxious for good treatment of Demos, 183;\n  Plato carries abstraction farther than Xenophon or\nAristotle, _ib._;\n  Aristotle objects, it is two states, 185, 189;\n  healthy city has few wants, enlargement of city's wants, 22;\n  war, from multiplied wants, _ib._;\n  good state possesses wisdom, courage, temperance, justice, 34,\n35;\n  fiction as to origin of classes, 30;\n  difficulty of procuring first admission for fiction, 158;\n  this the introduction of a new religious creed, 156;\n  class of soldiers or guardians, characteristics, 23, 25, 298\n_n._;\n  division of guardians into rulers and auxiliaries, 29;\n  maintenance of city dependent on guardians' habits, character,\neducation, 32, 34, 140, 170, 178;\n  musical and gymnastical education necessary, 23;\n  compared with that of modern soldiers, 148, 180;\n  Xenophon compared, 141-8;\n  musical training excites love of the beautiful, 27;\n  music, Platonic sense, 149;\n  by fictions as well as by truth, 24, 154;\n  ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry, 93, 151;\n  Plato fights for philosophy, but his feelings enlisted for\npoetry, 93;\n  poets censured, 91, 130 _n._;\n  Homer not educator of Greek world, 92;\n  Herakleitus the Allegorist on, iii. 3 _n._;\n  actual place of poetry in Greek education compared with Plato's\n_id\u00e9al_, iv. 150-2;\n  poets' mischievous appeal to emotions, 92, 152;\n  their mischievous _imitation of imitation_, 91;\n  retort open to poets, 153 _n._, 154 _n._;\n  censorship of mythology, 24;\n  religion in connection with state, _ib._,\n159;\n  Delphian Apollo to be consulted for religious legislation, 34,\n137 _n._;\n  Sokrates of _Republic_ compared with the real, 211;\n  Plato compared with Epikurus, 161;\n  poets must conform to orthodox standard, 24, 153, 155;\n  must avoid variety of imitation, 20;\n  gods cause good only, do not assume man's form, 24;\n  no repulsive fictions tolerated about gods or Hades, 25, 154;\n  a better class to be substituted from religion for the existing\nfictions, 159;\n  type for narratives about men, 26;\n  only grave music allowed, 26, 168;\n  restrictions on music and poetry to keep emotions in a proper\nstate, 169;\n  gymnastic and music necessary to correct each other, 29;\n  gymnastic imparts courage, _ib._;\n  bodily training simple, 28;\n  no refined medical art allowed, _ib._;\n  [Greek: sussi/tia] of guardians, 32;\n  their communism, _ib._, 44, 140, 169;\n  its peculiarity, 179;\n  Plato's view of wealth, 199 _n._;\n  the guardians consist of men and women, 41, 46;\n  both sexes to go together to battle, 46;\n  best women equal by nature to second best men, 42, 171-4;\n  same duties and training for women as men, 41, 77;\n  on principle that every citizen belongs to the city, 187;\n  maintained in _Leges_, and harmonises with ancient legends,\n195;\n  contrast with Aristotle, _ib._;\n  no family ties, 32, 174;\n  temporary marriages, 43, 175-8, 194 _n._;\n  Plato's and modern sentiments, 192;\n  in Platonic state, influence of Aphrodit\u00e9 very small, 197, 359\n_n._;\n  infanticide, 43, 44, 177, 203;\n  contrast of modern sentiment, _ib._;\n  number of guardians, 178;\n  checks on population, 198-202;\n  Malthus' law recognised, 202;\n  approximation in Mill, 199 _n._;\n  scheme practicable if philosophy and political power united, 47;\n  how to be realised, 78, 190 _n._;\n  of state and individual, four stages of degeneracy, 78-84;\n  timocracy, 79;\n  oligarchy, _ib._;\n  democracy, 80;\n  despotism, 81;\n  proportions of happiness and misery in them, 83;\n  Plato's state impossible, in what sense true, 189;\n  its real impossibility, adverse established sentiments, 191;\n  fails from no training for Demos, 186;\n  perpetual succession maintained of philosopher-rulers, 60;\n  philosophers true rulers, 310 _n._;\n  hated by the people, 57;\n  whence pretenders, and forced seclusion of philosophers, 58, 90;\n  distinctive marks of philosopher, 51;\n  the philosopher contemplates unchangeable forms, 48;\n  ens alone knowable, 49;\n  _opinion_, of what is between ens and non-ens, iii. 184\n_n._, iv. 49;\n  two grades of opinion, Faith or Belief, and Conjecture, 67;\n  and of intelligence, Nous and Dianoia, 66;\n  ordinary men discern only particulars, 49, 51;\n  particulars fluctuate, 50;\n  simile of Cave, iii. 257 _n._, iv. 67-70;\n  those who have contemplated forms reluctant to undertake active\nduties, 70;\n  relation of philosopher to practical life, 51-4;\n  simile of the steersman, 53;\n  philosopher requires a community suitable to himself, 59;\n  uselessness of philosopher in practical life, due to his not\nbeing called in by citizens, 54;\n  philosophical aptitude perverted under misguiding public\nopinion, _ib._;\n  irresistible effect of public opinion in producing orthodoxy,\n55;\n  perversion not due to Sophists, _ib._;\n  the Sophists conform to prevalent orthodoxy, 56;\n  studies introductory to philosophy, 61, 70-5, 206;\n  object, 69;\n  no mention of Reminiscence, or of negative Elenchus, 207;\n  age for studies, 76;\n  dialectic and geometry, two modes of mind's procedure applicable\nto ideal world, 65;\n  geometry assumes diagrams, _ib._;\n  dialectic requires no diagrams, deals with forms only,\ndescending from highest, 66;\n  awakening power of arithmetic, 71;\n  stimulus from contradiction of one and many, 72;\n  astronomy must be studied by ideal figures, not observation, 73;\n  geometry conducts mind towards universal ens, 72;\n  acoustics, by applying arithmetical relations and theories, 74;\n  exercises in dialectic, 76;\n  effect of, 207;\n  philosophy should not be taught to youths, 60, 76;\n  opposition to other dialogues and Sokrates' character, 208-12;\n  dialectic the consummation of all the sciences, 75;\n  the standard for classifying sciences as more or less true, iii.\n383 _n._;\n  the synoptic view the test of the dialectician, 290 _n._,\niv. 76;\n  Idea of Good compared to sun, 63, 64;\n  known to the rulers alone, 212;\n  what Good is, is unsolved, 213;\n  mythe of Hades, 94;\n  compared with _Lach\u00eas_, 138;\n  _Charmid\u00eas_, 136, 138;\n  _Protagoras_, ii. 310, 350 _n._;\n  _Gorgias_, 353, iii. 380 _n._;\n  _Ph\u00e6don_, ii. 412, 414 _n._;\n  _Ph\u00e6drus_, iii. 18;\n  _Parmenid\u00eas_, 108, iv. 138;\n  _Sophist\u00eas_, iii. 18, 242, 257;\n  _Politikus_, 257, 279;\n  _Phil\u00eabus_, 273, 277 _n._, 395;\n  _Kleitophon_, 425;\n  _Tim\u00e6us_, iv. 38 _n._, 234 _n._, 252;\n  _Leges_, 195, 275, 280, 298 _n._, 302, 318, 319, 327,\n390, 428 _n._\n\nRest, form of, iii. 206, 209-10, 231, 245 _n._\n\nRhapsodes, as a class, ii. 124;\n  functions, 125, 132, 320;\n  popularity, 126;\n  and poet work by divine inspiration, 127;\n  inspired through medium of poets, 128, 129, 134.\n\nRhetor, has no real power, ii. 324;\n  aims at flattering the public, 357;\n  practical value of instruction of, iii. 44;\n  the genuine, must acquire real truth, 33, 34;\n  is insufficiently rewarded, 33;\n  guides methodically from error to truth, 40;\n  compared with philosopher, ii. 52, iii. 178;\n  auxiliary of true governor, 271;\n  relation to poets, iv. 150;\n  Plato's desire for celebrity as dialectician, and, iii. 408;\n  see _Rhetoric_.\n\nRhetoric, popularly preferred to dialectic, i. 451;\n  how employed at Athens, ii. 373;\n  [Greek: a)kriboli/a] distasteful to rhetors, 278 _n._;\n  antithesis of dialectic and, i. 433, ii. 70, 275, 365;\n  deals with the concrete, dialectic with the abstract, 52, 53;\n  difference of method illustrated in _Protagoras_, 300;\n  superior to dialectic in usefulness and celebrity, iii. 360,\n380;\n  superiority of dialectic over, claimed, ii. 282, 285, iii. 337\n_n._;\n  communicates true opinion, not knowledge, 172;\n  the artisan of persuasion, ii. 319;\n  a branch of flattery, 321, 370;\n  is of little use, 329, iii. 411;\n  and dialectic, issue unsatisfactorily put, ii. 369;\n  view stands or falls with _id\u00e9al_ of good, 374;\n  Sokrates' view different in Xenophon, 371 _n._;\n  compared with _Menexenus_, iii. 409;\n  and _Leges_, iv. 322, 324;\n  Aristotle on, i. 133 _n._;\n  Aristeides, 243 _n._;\n  Sokrates' theory, all persuasion founded on a knowledge of the\ntruth, iii. 28;\n  as art, 27;\n  is comprised in dialectic, 30, 34;\n  analogy to medical art, 31;\n  theory more Platonic than Sokratic, 39;\n  is it teachable by system, 28;\n  definition and division essential to genuine, 30, 35;\n  should include a classification of minds and discourses, and\ntheir mutual application, 32, 41, 45;\n  Plato's _id\u00e9al_ a philosophy, not an art, 46;\n  involves impracticable conditions, 41-3, 46;\n  comparison with the rhetorical teachers, 44;\n  charge against its teachers not established, 47;\n  censure of forensic eloquence, iv. 410;\n  rhetorical powers of Plato, i. 433, ii. 356 _n._, iii. 392\n_n._, 408, 409, 411;\n  see _Rhetor_.\n\nRitter, on _Sophist\u00eas_, iii. 244 _n._, 247 _n._;\n  Eukleides, i. 127 _n._;\n  Megarics, 129 _n._\n\nRivales, see _Erast\u00e6_.\n\nRose, Valentine, on the dates of Plato's compositions, i. 326\n_n._, 329 _n._\n\nRoyer-Collard, iii. 165 _n._\n\nRuler, of a superior breed in the Saturnian period, iii. 264, 266\n_n._;\n  a principle cause, 266;\n  scientific alone good, iv. 280;\n  _qua_ ruler infallible, 9;\n  division of guardians into, and auxiliaries, 29;\n  wisdom is seated in, 34;\n  analogous to reason in individual, 39;\n  perpetual succession maintained of philosopher-rulers, 60;\n  alone know the Idea of Good, 212;\n  see _Government_, _Political Art_.\n\nRutherford, iv. 105 _n._\n\n\nS.\n\nSacrifice, Sokrates on, ii. 17, 417-9, iv. 394;\n  heresy that gods appeased by, 376, 384;\n  general Greek belief, 392, 394;\n  Herodotus, _ib._;\n  Aristotle, 395;\n  Epikurus, _ib._;\n  number determined by lawgiver, 357.\n\nSacrilege, gravest of all crimes, iv. 363.\n\nSt.-Hilaire, Barth\u00e9lemy, on _Sankhya_ and Buddhism, i. 378\n_n._;\n  metempsychosis, ii. 426 _n._;\n  fallacies, i. 133 _n._\n\nSalamis, iii. 406.\n\nSame, form of, iii. 209, 231, iv. 226.\n\nSankhya, i. 378 _n._, ii. 389 _n._, 426 _n._\n\nSalvador, Jacob, iii. 300 _n._\n\nScepticism, of Xenophanes, i. 18;\n  Plato, 342;\n  Greek sceptics, iii. 293 _n._\n\nSchleiermacher, on Plato's view of knowledge and opinion, iii. 167\n_n._;\n  theory of Platonic canon, i. 303;\n  includes a preconceived scheme, and an order of interdependence,\n318;\n  proofs slender, 317, 325 _n._;\n  assumptions as to _Ph\u00e6drus_ inadmissible, 319, 329\n_n._;\n  reasons internal, 319, 337, iv. 431;\n  himself shows the unsafe grounds of modern critics, i. 336;\n  Ueberweg attempts to reconcile Hermann with, 313;\n  theory adopted by Trendelenburg, 345 _n._;\n  on relation of _Euthyphron_ to _Protagoras_ and\n_Parmenid\u00eas_, 443 _n._;\n  _Menon_, ii. 247 _n._;\n  _Parmenid\u00eas_, iii. 85 _n._;\n  _Sophist\u00eas_, 244 _n._, i. 127;\n  _Kratylus_, iii. 303 _n._, 304 _n._; 307\n_n._, 310 _n._, 321, 321 _n._;\n  _Phil\u00eabus_, 334 _n._, 365 _n._, 369 _n._,\n398 _n._;\n  _Euthyd\u00eamus_, i. 127;\n  _Menexenus_, iii. 408;\n  _Kleitophon_, 426 _n._;\n  _Republic_, iv. 38 _n._;\n  _Leges_, 430.\n\nSchneider, on Xenophon's _Symposion_, iv. 313 _n._\n\nSchool, [Greek: schol\u00ea/], i. 121 _n._, 127 _n._;\n  Plato's establishment of, a new epoch in philosophy, 266;\n  of Plato fixed at Athens, 254;\n  and transmitted to successors, 265;\n  its importance for his manuscripts, 266, 267;\n  decorations of the Academy and Lykeum, 209;\n  Peripatetic at Lykeum, _ib._;\n  of Isokrates, iii. 35;\n  Eretrian, i. 121, 148;\n  Megaric, 121.\n\nSch\u00f6ne, on the dates of Plato's compositions, i. 326 _n._\n\nSchwegler, on _Parmenid\u00eas_, iii. 86 _n._;\n  _Homo Mensura_, 151 _n._\n\nScience, derivation of [Greek: e)pist\u00ea/m\u00ea], iii. 301 _n._;\n  _scientia_, 302 _n._;\n  logic of a, Plato's different from Aristotelic and modern view,\ni. 358 _n._;\n  science of good and evil distinct from others, ii. 161, 168;\n  relation to art, iii. 43 _n._, 46, 263;\n  antithesis of emotion and, 61, 195, 197 _n._;\n  dialectic the standard for classifying, as more or less true,\n382;\n  dialectic the consummation of, iv. 75;\n  relation to kosmical soul, 227;\n  see _Knowledge_.\n\nSelf-knowledge, temperance is, ii. 155;\n  what is the object known in, 156;\n  in _Charmid\u00eas_ declared impossible, elsewhere essential and\ninestimable, 167.\n\nSelli, asceticism of, i. 163 _n._\n\nSeneca, on the Good, iii. 372 _n._;\n  filial ingratitude, iv. 400 _n._;\n  Diogenes of Sin\u00f4p\u00ea, i. 156 _n._\n\nSensation, Empedokles' theory, i. 44;\n  Theophrastus, 46 _n._;\n  theory of Anaxagoras, opposed to Empedokles', 58;\n  Diogenes of Apollonia, 62;\n  Demokritus, 71, 76, 77, 80;\n  the mind rises from sensation to opinion, then cognition, iii.\n164;\n  distinct from opinion, 167;\n  verification from experience, not recognised as necessary or\npossible, 168.\n\nSense, derivation of [Greek: ai)/sth\u00easis], iii. 308 _n._;\n  doctrine of Empedokles, i. 44;\n  illusions of, belief of Anaxagoras, 59 _n._;\n  defects of, belief of Demokritus, 68 _n._, 71;\n  Zeno's arguments, 93;\n  Plato's conception of, iii. 164 _n._;\n  worlds of intellect and, distinct, i. 403;\n  organs of, iv. 236;\n  principal advantages of sight and hearing, 238;\n  hearing, i. 46, 62, 78;\n  ethical and emotional effects conveyed by, iv. 307 _n._;\n  smell, i. 46;\n  pleasures of, true, iii. 356;\n  _Homo Mensura_, 122;\n  relativity of sensible facts, 126, 154, 298;\n  its verifications recognised by Plato as the main guarantee for\naccuracy, 155 _n._, 240;\n  fundamental distinction of _ens_ and _fientia_, iv.\n219;\n  relation to kosmical soul, 227;\n  see _Particulars_, _Phenomena_, _Sensation_.\n\nSerranus, on Platonic canon, i. 302.\n\nSextus Empiricus, doctrine, iii. 292 _n._;\n  no definition of a general word, i. 168 _n._;\n  on poets, iv. 24 _n._\n\nShaftesbury, Lord, iv. 105 _n._\n\nSimonides, interpretation of a song of, ii. 283;\n  definition of justice, iv. 2, 7.\n\nSlavery, iv. 309, 342, 400;\n  Aristotle differs, 344 _n._;\n  evidence of slaves. 410 _n._\n\nSleeman, Sir Wm., grounds of belief among Hindoos, iii. 150\n_n._\n\nSleep, doctrine of Herakleitus, i. 34;\n  Plato, iv. 237.\n\nSmith, Adam, _Moral Sentiments_, iii. 333.\n\nSocher, theory of Platonic canon, i. 306;\n  _Parmenid\u00eas_, 338 _n._, iii. 88 _n._, 185\n_n._;\n  _Politikus_, _ib._, 196 _n._, 265 _n._;\n  _Sophist\u00eas_, 185 _n._, 196 _n._, 243 _n._,\n244;\n  _Phil\u00eabus_, 369 _n._;\n  _Kritias_, iv. 266 _n._\n\nSocieties, Benefit, iv. 399.\n\nSociety, ethics and politics, topic of Sokrates, i. 376;\n  genesis of, common want, ii. 343, iii. 327, iv. 21, 111, 112\n_n._, 133;\n  social art conferred by Zeus, ii. 268;\n  dissent a necessary condition of its progressiveness, 367\n_n._;\n  frequent destruction of communities, iv. 307;\n  historical retrospect of, 307-314;\n  see _State_.\n\nSokrates, life, character, and surroundings, i. 410 _n._;\n  character unparalleled in history, _vi_;\n  personal appearance and peculiar character, iii. 19;\n  patience, 24 _n._;\n  courage and equanimity, 21 _n._;\n  compared to Antoninus Pius, ii. 382 _n._;\n  proof against temptation, iii. 20, 22, 23, iv. 287, 288;\n  sensibility to youthful beauty, ii. 22 _n._;\n  as representative of _Eros Philosophus_, iii. 15, 25;\n  income, i. 192 _n._;\n  procedure of, repugnant to Athenian public, 387, 412, 441, iv.\n127;\n  aggravated by his extreme publicity of speech, i. 393;\n  feels his own isolation as a dissenter, ii. 365;\n  accused of corrupting the youths, i. 391 _n._, 183\n_n._;\n  Plato's reply, magical influence ascribed to his conversation,\nii. 23, iii. 19, 21 _n._, 24 _n._, 113 _n._, 388\n_n._, iv. 412 _n._, i. 110;\n  influence he claims, enlarged by Plato and Xenophon, 418;\n  disobedience of the laws, 434 _n._;\n  imprisonment, 425;\n  indictment, against, 412, 418 _n._, 437, iv. 230, i. 113;\n  grounds for his indictment, iv. 162 _n._, 211, 381, 385;\n  reply to Mel\u00eatus, Plato and Xenophon compared, i. 456, ii. 421\n_n._;\n  opposition of feeling between, and the Dikasts, i. 375;\n  trial and death might have been avoided without dishonour, 426\n_n._;\n  equanimity before death, ii. 417, 418;\n  answer to Kriton's appeal to fly, i. 426;\n  last words and death, ii. 377, 418;\n  general features of character in _Apology_ confirmed, i.\n419 _n._;\n  character and disposition, differently set forth in\n_Kriton_, 428, 431-2;\n  of _Apology_ and _Ph\u00e6don_ contrasted, ii. 421;\n  the real compared with character in _Republic_, iv. 211;\n  Plato's early relations with, i. 248;\n  of Xenophon and Plato compared, ii. 37, i. 178, 199;\n  Xenophon's relations with, 206-10;\n  uniform description of, in dialogues of _viri Sokratici_,\n115;\n  brought down philosophy from heaven, _x_;\n  revolutionised method, _ib._;\n  progenitor of philosophy of 4th century B.C., 111\n_n._;\n  theory of natural state of human mind, 373, 414;\n  false persuasion of knowledge, an ethical defect, iii. 177;\n  omnipotence of King Nomos, i. 378-84;\n  differs from others by consciousness of ignorance, 413, 416;\n  Delphian oracle, on his wisdom, 413;\n  combated _commonplace_, 398 _n._;\n  in reference to social, political, ethical, topics, 376;\n  mission, _x_, 374, 395, ii. 146, 419, iii. 219, 422, iv.\n219, 381;\n  declared in _Alkibiad\u00eas I._ and _Apology_, ii. 24;\n  imposed on him by the gods, i. 415;\n  his _d\u00e6mon_, 437, ii. 104, i. 115;\n  his experience of it, ii. 102;\n  explains his eccentricity, 105;\n  a special revelation, 110, 130-1;\n  variously alluded to, 106-11;\n  determined to persevere in mission, i. 416;\n  not a teacher, 417, ii. 140, 146, 162, 165, 184, 232, 237, 242;\n  only stimulates, i. 449, iii. 415, 421-24, iv. 52 _n._;\n  his excuse, ii. 106;\n  knows of no teacher, i. 417, ii. 225;\n  a positive teacher, employing indirect methods, modern\nassumption, i. 419;\n  incorrect, for his Elenchus does not furnish a solution, 420;\n  his positive solutions illusory, ii. 26;\n  _obstetric_, i. 367, ii. 251, iii. 112, 176;\n  the Sokratic dialogue, i. _x_, _xi_;\n  usefulness of, ii. 186, 207;\n  effect like shock of torpedo, 237;\n  diversified conversations, i. 182;\n  humbles presumptuous youths, ii. 21;\n  manner well illustrated in _Lysis_, 177;\n  asserts right of satisfaction for his own individual reason, i.\n386, 423, 436, ii. 379;\n  on _Homo Mensura_, i. 432, iii. 162 _n._;\n  his Eristic character, ii. 203;\n  the greatest Eristic of his age, i. 124;\n  followed by Plato and Megarics, _ib._, 126;\n  resemblance to Sophists, ii. 280, iii. 198 _n._, 216, iv.\n165, 412 _n._;\n  _Menon_ gives points in common between Sophists and, ii.\n257;\n  the \"sophistic art\" peculiar to him, iii. 218;\n  negative vein, i. _viii_, _x_, 370, 372, 373\n_n._, 375, 387;\n  affirmative and negative veins distinct, 420;\n  charge against him of negative method, by his contemporaries,\n371, 388;\n  first applied negative analysis to the common consciousness, 389\n_n._;\n  to social, political, ethical topics, 376, 385;\n  value and importance of Elenchus, 421;\n  see _Negative_;\n  introduced search for definitions, ii. 48;\n  authority of public judgment nothing--of Expert, everything, i.\n426, 435;\n  does not name, but himself acts as, Expert, _ib._;\n  early study, ii. 391;\n  stages of intellectual development, _ib._;\n  turned on different views as to a true cause, 398;\n  accused of substituting physical for mental causes, 401;\n  does not distinguish different meanings of same term, 279;\n  not always consistent, 29, 303;\n  sophistry in _Hippias Minor_, 62;\n  avoided physics, i. 376;\n  the Reason of the kosmos, ii. 402 _n._;\n  distinguished objective and subjective views of Ethics, i. 451;\n  proper study of mankind, 122;\n  order of ethical problems as conceived by, ii. 299;\n  not observed by Xenophon, i. 230;\n  and Plato dwell too exclusively on intellectual conditions of\nhuman conduct, ii. 67;\n  fruits of virtue, i. 415;\n  Utilitarianism, ii. 310 _n._, i. 185 _n._;\n  belief in the deity, 413, 414;\n  disbelieves discord among gods, 440;\n  principle of making oneself like the gods, _ib._;\n  on the holy, difference in Plato and Xenophon, 454;\n  on prayer and sacrifice, ii. 17, 418-9, iv. 394;\n  much influenced by prophecies, dreams, &c., ii. 418\n_n._, 420, iii. 351, iv. 395, i. 225 _n._;\n  on death, 422, 429 _n._;\n  and Plato, difference on subject of beauty, ii. 54;\n  companions of, i. 111;\n  their proceedings after his death, 116;\n  no Sokratic school, 117;\n  Antisthenes constant friend of, 152;\n  manner copied by Antisthenes, 150, 159 _n._;\n  precepts fullest carried out by Diogenes and Krates, 160, 174;\n  and Parmenides, blended by Eukleides, 118;\n  discourse with Aristippus, 175;\n  the choice of Herakl\u00eas, 177;\n  the Good and Beautiful, 184.\n\nSoldiers, class of, characteristics, iv. 23;\n  division of guardians into rulers and, 29;\n  Plato's training compared with modern, 148;\n  modern development of military profession, 180.\n\nSolon, on despotism, i. 219 _n._;\n  unfinished poem of, subject of _Kritias_, iv. 266.\n\n[Greek: Sophi/a] and [Greek: phro/n\u00easis] of Aristotle, ii. 120\n_n._;\n  identical with [Greek: s\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ea], ii. 280.\n\nSophisms, a collection of, necessary for a logical theory, i. 131;\n  discussion of popular at philosophers' banquets, 134 _n._;\n  of Eubulides, 128, 133;\n  Theophrastus on, 134 _n._;\n  Diod\u00f4rus Kronus, 141, 143;\n  real character of, 135;\n  of Stoics, 128 _n._, 138;\n  see _Fallacy_.\n\nSophist, meaning of [Greek: sophist\u00ea/s], i. 256 _n._, 391\n_n._, ii. 261, iii. 27 _n._;\n  compared to an angler, 191;\n  Plato's definition, 191-4, 196 _n._;\n  a juggler, 198;\n  imitator of the wise man, 216;\n  Plato's ironical admiration, ii. 208, 283;\n  no real class, 210, 341 _n._, iii. 249 _n._, iv. 136\n_n._, i. 178;\n  Theopompus on profession of, 212 _n._;\n  usually depicted from opponents'  misrepresentations, 308\n_n._, ii. 210;\n  accused of generating scepticism and uncertainty, 64 _n._;\n  negative dialectic attributed by historians to, i. 371;\n  did not first apply negative analysis to the common\nconsciousness, 389 _n._;\n  negative dialectic not peculiar to, 387;\n  the charge brought by contemporaries against Sokrates, 388;\n  dialectic contrasted with Sokrates', ii. 197;\n  Sokrates the greatest Eristic of his age, i. 124;\n  Sokrates a, ii. 183 _n._, 185 _n._, 188, 199, iv. 165,\n412 _n._;\n  _Menon_ gives point in common between Sokrates and, ii.\n257;\n  in _Euthyd\u00eamus_, 196;\n  not represented by Kallikles, 339;\n  lives in region of _non-ens_, iii. 208;\n  devoted to the production of falsehood, 215;\n  is [Greek: e)nantiopoiologiko\\s] and [Greek: ei)/r\u00f4n], 216;\n  those the characteristics of Sokrates, _ib._;\n  the \"sophistic art\" peculiar to Sokrates, 218;\n  their alleged claim to universal knowledge--common to all\nphilosophers then, 219;\n  etymologies in _Kratylus_ not caricatures of, 302, 310\n_n._, 314 _n._, 317 _n._, 321, 323;\n  no proof of their etymologising, 304;\n  as teachers, ii. 261;\n  motives of pupils, _ib._ _n._, 264 _n._;\n  as corruptors of public mind, 288 _n._;\n  jealousy of parents towards influential teachers, 265 _n._;\n  probably often used illustrative mythes, 267 _n._;\n  money-making, 210, _ib._ _n._, iii. 27 _n._, i.\n212 _n._;\n  not distinguishable from dialectician, ii. 210, 211 _n._;\n  raised question of criterion of truth, 246;\n  logical distinctions, 236 _n._;\n  did not invent fallacies, 217, i. 133 _n._;\n  abuse of fallacies, biddings for popularity, ii. 199;\n  did not deny natural justice, 341 _n._;\n  not the perverters of philosophy, iv. 55;\n  conform to prevalent orthodoxy, 56;\n  relation to poets, 150;\n  Demochares' law against, i. 111 _n._;\n  Aristippus taught as a, 193.\n\n_Sophist\u00eas_, date, i. 305-11, 313, 315, 324-5, iii. 369\n_n._;\n  authenticity, i. 307, 316 _n._, iii. 185 _n._, 243\n_n._;\n  purpose, 188, 190, 223, 253, 261, 267;\n  relation to _The\u00e6t\u00eatus_, 187;\n  scenery and personages, 185;\n  in a logical classification all particulars of equal value, 195;\n  definition of angler, 189;\n  sophist compared to an angler, 192;\n  defined, 191-5, 196 _n._;\n  a juggler, 198, 200;\n  imitator of the wise man, 216;\n  classification of imitators, 215;\n  philosopher lives in region of _ens_, sophist, of\n_non-ens_, 208;\n  bodily and mental evil, 197;\n  the worst, ignorance mistaking itself for knowledge, _ib._;\n  Elenchus the sovereign purifier, _ib._;\n  is false thought or speech possible, 172 _n._, 199, 249;\n  falsehood possible, and object of sophists' profession, 181\n_n._, 214;\n  imperfect analysis of propositions, 235, 238;\n  view of the negative erroneous, 237, 239;\n  theories of philosophers about _ens_, 201;\n  _non-ens_ inconceivable, 200;\n  is _ens_ one or many, 201;\n  difficulties about _ens_ and _non-ens_ equally great,\n_ib._, 206;\n  the materialists and the idealists, 203;\n  argument against materialists, _ib._, 223, 226, 228;\n  reply open to materialists, 224, 230;\n  argument against idealists, 204, 225;\n  their doctrine the same as Plato's in _Ph\u00e6don_, &c.,\n244, 246;\n  no allusion intended to Megarics or Pythagoreans, 244, 390\n_n._;\n  communion implies relativity, 125, 205;\n  to know and to be known is action and passion, 205, 226, 287\n_n._;\n  motion and rest both agree in _ens_, which is therefore a\n_tertium quid_, 206;\n  argument against \"only identical predication legitimate,\"\n_ib._, 212, 221, 251;\n  Antisthenes meant, i. 163, 165;\n  intercommunion of _some_ Forms, iii. 207, 228, 246\n_n._, 251 _n._;\n  analogy of letters and syllables, 207;\n  what forms admit of it, determined by philosopher, 208;\n  of _non-ens_ and of proposition, opinion, judgment, 213,\n214, 235;\n  [Greek: to\\ m\u00ea\\ o)/n], meaning, 181 _n._;\n  five forms examined, 208, 231, 233;\n  Plato's view of _non-ens_ unsatisfactory, 236, 239, 242\n_n._, 248 _n._;\n  an approximation to Aristotle's view, 247;\n  different from other dialogues, 242;\n  compared with _Ph\u00e6don_, 244, 246;\n  _Ph\u00e6drus_, 18, 257;\n  _Symposion_, 19;\n  _The\u00e6t\u00eatus_, 182 _n._, 187, 242, 256, 332;\n  _Kratylus_, _ib._;\n  _Phil\u00eabus_, 369 _n._;\n  _Republic_, 242, 257.\n\nSophokles, Antigone, compared with _Apology_, i. 429\n_n._;\n  its popularity, ii. 135 _n._;\n  as a general, 135.\n\n[Greek: S\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ea], ii. 153 _n._;\n  see _Temperance_;\n  derivation, iii. 301 _n._;\n  identical with [Greek: sophi/a], ii. 279;\n  and [Greek: ai)d\u00f4/s], 269 _n._\n\nSorites, i. 128, 133, 135 _n._\n\nSoul, derivation of [Greek: psuch\u00ea/], iii. 301 _n._;\n  meaning, iv. 387 _n._;\n  prior to and more powerful than body, 386, 419-20;\n  the good and the bad souls at work in the universe, 386;\n  one continuous cosmical, ii. 248 _n._;\n  of the kosmos, iii.** 265 _n._, iv. 220, 421;\n  affinity to human, iii. 366 _n._;\n  of kosmos, position and elements of, iv. 225;\n  of plants, 248;\n  doctrine of Herakleitus, i. 34;\n  Empedokles, 44;\n  Anaxagoras, 54;\n  Demokritus, 75;\n  Plato's conception of existence, iii. 205, 226, 229, 231;\n  not tripartite, antithesis to body, ii. 384;\n  Hegel on Plato's view, 414 _n._;\n  a mixture, refuted, 390;\n  life a struggle between body and, 386, 388, iv. 234, 235\n_n._;\n  partial emancipation of, by philosophy, ii. 386;\n  purification of, 388;\n  [Greek: kn\u00ea=sis] compared to children's teething, iii. 399\n_n._;\n  pre-existence admitted, ii. 390;\n  mythe, iii. 12, 15 _n._;\n  Leibnitz on, ii. 248 _n._;\n  pre-existence of, necessary hypothesis for didactic\n_id\u00e9al_, iii. 52;\n  metempsychosis of ordinary men only, ii. 387, iv. 234;\n  mythe of departed, in _Republic_, 94;\n  state after emancipation from body, ii. 416;\n  yet may suffer punishment, inconsistency, _ib._;\n  three constituent elements of, iii. 232 _n._;\n  Galen, iv. 258;\n  are the three parts immortal, ii. 385, iv. 243;\n  no place for tender and \u00e6sthetic emotions in tripartite division\nof, 149 _n._;\n  each part at once material and mental, 257;\n  supremacy of rational, to be cultivated, 251;\n  Demiurgus conjoins three souls and one body, 233, 243;\n  Demiurgus prepares for man's construction, places a soul in each\nstar, 233;\n  generated gods fabricate cranium as miniature of kosmos with\nrational soul rotating within, _ib._;\n  mount cranium on a tall body, 236;\n  seat of, 235-7, 243-7, 259 _n._;\n  Littr\u00e9, 257 _n._;\n  abdominal, function of liver, 245, 259;\n  seat of prophetic agency, 246;\n  thoracic, function of heart and lungs, 245, 259 _n._;\n  of spleen, 246;\n  vision, sleep, dreams, 236;\n  Aristotle on relation of body to, iii. 389 _n._;\n  Monboddo, iv. 387 _n._;\n  see _Body_, _Immortality_, _Mind_, _Reason_.\n\nSound, Zeno's arguments, i. 96;\n  pleasures of, true, iii. 356.\n\nSpace, and time comprised in Parmenides' ens, i. 19;\n  Zeno's reductiones ad absurdum, 94;\n  contents of the idea of, 20 _n._\n\nSparta, unlettered community, iv. 278;\n  law forbids introduction of foreign instruction, ii. 35;\n  Hippias lectures at, 39;\n  mixed government, iv. 310;\n  kings eulogised, ii. 8;\n  customs of, iii. 24 _n._;\n  peculiar to itself and Krete, iv. 280 _n._;\n  blended with Persian in _Cyrop\u00e6dia_, i. 222;\n  influence on philosopher's theories, iv. 181;\n  Xenophon's _id\u00e9al_ of character, 147, 148, 182;\n  Plato's in _Leges_, 276, 280 _n._, 403;\n  basis of institutions too narrow, 282;\n  endurance of pain in discipline of, 285;\n  public training and mess, 279, 280 _n._, 285 _n._;\n  no training for women, censured, 188;\n  infanticide, 203;\n  number of citizens, 327 _n._;\n  drunkenness forbidden at, 286;\n  _kryptia_, Plato's agronomi compared, 336.\n\nSpecific and generic terms, distinction unfamiliar in Plato's\ntime, ii. 13.\n\nSpeech, conducted according to fixed laws, iii. 286;\n  the thing spoken of _suffers_, 287 _n._;\n  Psammetichus' experiment, 289 _n._;\n  and music illustrate coalescence of finite and infinite, 340-3.\n\nSpencer, Herbert, abstract names, iii. 78 _n._\n\nSpengel, on Thrasymachus, iv. 7 _n._;\n  _Kratylus_, iii. 309 _n._\n\nSpeusippus, borrowed from Pythagoreans, iii. 390 _n._;\n  on pleasure, 386 _n._, 389 _n._;\n  on the Demiurgus, iv. 255.\n\nSphere, the earth a, early views, i. 25 _n._;\n  Pythagorean music of the spheres, 14;\n  _Sph\u00e6rus_ of Empedokles, 39.\n\nStallbaum, on Platonic canon, i. 307, 443 _n._;\n  _Erast\u00e6_, ii. 121;\n  _Theag\u00eas_, 100 _n._;\n  _Euthyd\u00eamus_, 202;\n  _Protagoras_, 314, iv. 284 _n._;\n  _The\u00e6t\u00eatus_, iii. 158 _n._;\n  _Sophist\u00eas_ and _Politikus_, 196 _n._, 257\n_n._;\n  _Kratylus_, 303 _n._, 305 _n._, 310 _n._,\n321, 323 _n._;\n  _Phil\u00eabus_, 342 _n._, 343 _n._, 347 _n._,\n356 _n._, 389 _n._, 398 _n._;\n  _Menexenus_, 408, 409;\n  _Republic_ iv. 106 _n._;\n  _Tim\u00e6us_, 219 _n._;\n  _Leges_, 188 _n._, 272 _n._, 410 _n._, 431;\n  theory of Ideas, iii. 69 _n._;\n  Sophists, ii. 209 _n._;\n  Megarics, i. 132 _n._\n\nStars, iv. 229.\n\nState, Lewis on _id\u00e9als_, iv. 139 _n._;\n  realisation of _id\u00e9als_, 190 _n._;\n  three ends of political constructor, 328 _n._;\n  influence of Spartan institutions, on theories, 181;\n  no evidence of Plato's study of practical working of different\ninstitutions, 397;\n  Aristeides on, i. 243 _n._;\n  citizens willing to be ruled, _id\u00e9al_ of Plato and\nXenophon, iv. 283 _n._;\n  Platonic type of character is Athenian, Xenophontic is Spartan,\n147, 148, 182;\n  its religious and ethical character primary, constitution and\nlaws secondary, 284;\n  religion in connection with, 24, 160;\n  and education combined, 185;\n  Plato's ideal, compared with Athens, 430;\n  the Spartan adopted in _Leges_, 276, 280 _n._, 403;\n  Plato carries abstraction farther than Xenophon or Aristotle,\n183;\n  more anxious for good treatment of Demos, _ib._;\n  in Aristotle the Demos adjuncts, not members, of state, 184;\n  model city practicable if philosophy and political power united,\n47;\n  perpetual succession maintained of philosopher-rulers, 60;\n  those who have contemplated Ideas are reluctant to undertake\nactive duties. 70;\n  as at present constituted, the just man stands aloof from, 90;\n  ideal, how to be realised, 78, 190 _n._;\n  admitted only partially realisable, 327;\n  only an outline, 139;\n  a military _bureaucracy_, 183;\n  second, a compromise of oligarchical and democratical sentiment,\n333, 337;\n  Aristotle objects to Plato's ideal, it is two states, 185;\n  objection valid against his own ideal, 186 _n._;\n  Plato fails from no training for Demos, 186;\n  Plato's state impossible, in what sense true, 189;\n  from adverse established sentiments, 191;\n  genesis, common want, ii. 343, iii. 327, iv. 20, 111, 112\n_n._, 133;\n  historical retrospect of society, 307-314;\n  analogy of individual and, 11, 21, 37, 79-84, 96;\n  Hobbes on, _ib._;\n  parallelism exaggerated, 114, 121, 123;\n  its [Greek: u(po/thesis], 328 _n._;\n  basis of Spartan institutions too narrow, 282;\n  site, 320, 329, 336;\n  circular form, unwalled, 344;\n  influence of climate, 330 _n._;\n  wisdom and courage in the guardians, 34;\n  justice and temperance in all classes, 35;\n  class of guardians, characteristics, 23;\n  divided into rulers and soldiers, 29;\n  same duties and training for women as men, 41, 46, 77, 171-4;\n  on principle that every citizen belongs to the city, 187;\n  maintained in _Leges_, and harmonises with ancient legends,\n195;\n  contrast with Aristotle, 194;\n  [Greek: sussi/tia], 32, 345, 359;\n  communism of guardians, _ib._, 140, 169;\n  necessary to city's safety, 32, 34, 44, 140, 170-179;\n  peculiarity of Plato's communism, 179;\n  Plato's view of wealth, 199 _n._;\n  no family ties, 41, 174, 178;\n  temporary marriages for guardians, 175-8;\n  Plato's and modern sentiments, 192, 194;\n  influence of Aphrodit\u00ea very small in Platonic, 197, 359;\n  citizens should be tested against pleasure, 285;\n  self-control tested by wine, 289;\n  healthy, has few wants, enlargement of city's wants, 22;\n  from multiplied wants, war, _ib._;\n  perfection of, each part performing its own function, 97;\n  one man can do only one thing well, 23, 33, 183, 361;\n  unity of end to be kept in view, 417;\n  end, happiness of entire state, 98, 139 _n._;\n  and virtue of the citizens, 417;\n  three classes in, analogous to reason, energy, appetite, in\nindividual, 39;\n  fiction as to origin of classes, 30;\n  four stages of degeneracy, 79-84;\n  proportions of happiness and misery in them, 83;\n  in healthy condition, possesses wisdom, courage, temperance,\njustice, 34;\n  laws about marriage, 328, 331, 341, 344;\n  Aristotle, 198-201;\n  Malthus' law recognised by Plato and Aristotle, 202;\n  number of citizens, 178, 326, 328;\n  limited, Plato and Aristotle, 198-201;\n  Aristotle, 326 _n._;\n  approximation in Mill, 199 _n._;\n  rearing of children, 43, 44;\n  infanticide, _ib._, 177;\n  Aristotle, 202;\n  contrast of modern sentiment, 203;\n  citizens of Plato's ideal, identified with ancient Athenians,\n266;\n  division of citizens and land, twelve tribes, 329;\n  perpetuity of lots of land, 320, 360;\n  Aristotle, 326 _n._;\n  succession, 328;\n  orphans, guardians, 404, 406;\n  limited inequality tolerated as to movable property, 330;\n  no private possession of gold or silver, no loans or interest,\n331;\n  distribution of annual produce, 361;\n  state importation of necessary articles, _ib._;\n  regulations for retailers, 21, 361, 401;\n  admission of Metics, 362, i. 238;\n  of strangers, and foreign travel of citizens, iv.** 414;\n  slavery, 342;\n  Aristotle differs, 344 _n._;\n  direct taxation, according to wealth, 331;\n  four classes, property classification for magistracies and\nvotes, _ib._;\n  thirty-seven nomophylakes, 332;\n  military commanders and council, _ib._;\n  monthly military muster of whole population, 358;\n  electoral scheme, 333;\n  the council, and other magistrates, 335;\n  Nocturnal Council to comprehend and carry out the end, 418, 425,\n429;\n  and enforce orthodox creed, 419;\n  most important magistrate, minister of education, 338;\n  defence of territory, rural police, 335;\n  Spartan _kryptia_ compared, 336;\n  _Xenophon's_ ideal of an active citizen, i. 214;\n  he admires active commerce and variety of pursuits, 236;\n  encouragement of metics, 238;\n  training of citizens, 226;\n  formation of treasury funds, 238;\n  distribution among citizens, three oboli each, daily, 239;\n  its purpose and principle, 240, 241 _n._;\n  see _Government_, _Political Art_, &c.\n\nStatesmen, ignorant of the true, the ideal, ii. 89;\n  incompetent to teach. 100, 357, 360, 369;\n  the philosopher the fully qualified practitioner, 114, 116, 118;\n  disparagement of half-philosophers, half-politicians, 224;\n  dislike of Sokrates and Sophists, 256;\n  their right opinion, from inspiration, 242;\n  defects of best Athenian, 360;\n  considered by Sokrates as spiritual teachers and trainers, 362;\n  Plato's _id\u00e9al_, 363;\n  relation of philosopher to practical, iii. 179, 183, 273;\n  definition of, 263.\n\nSteersman, simile of, iv. 53.\n\nSteinhart, on Platonic canon, rejects several, i. 309;\n  [Greek: to\\ e)xai/phn\u00eas], iii. 103 _n._;\n  _Parmenid\u00eas_, 109 _n._, 245 _n._;\n  _The\u00e6t\u00eatus_, 167 _n._;\n  _Sophist\u00eas_, 245 _n._;\n  _Kratylus_, 307 _n._;\n  _Menexenus_, 412 _n._\n\nSteinthal, no objective absolute, iii. 296 _n._\n\nStewart, Dugald, on the beautiful, ii. 50 _n._;\n  relativity of knowledge, iii. 156 _n._;\n  Berkeley, iv. 243 _n._\n\nStilpon, nominalism of, i. 167;\n  only identical predication possible, 166, 168;\n  _of Megara_, 148.\n\nStoics, influenced by Herakleitus, i. 27, 34 _n._;\n  developed Antisthenes' doctrines, 198;\n  practical life preferable, 181 _n._;\n  [Greek: pa/nta au(tou= e(/neka pra/ttein], iv. 106 _n._;\n  all-sufficiency of virtue, germ of doctrine in _Republic_,\n102;\n  fate, i. 143 _n._;\n  view of Dialectic, 371 _n._;\n  style of their works, 406;\n  doctrine of one cosmical soul, ii. 248 _n._;\n  notion of time, iii. 101 _n._;\n  natural rectitude of signification of names, 286 _n._;\n  etymologies, 308 _n._;\n  sophisms of, i. 128 _n._, 138;\n  minute reasons of, 130 _n._;\n  Cicero on, 157.\n\nStrabo, value of poets, iv. 152 _n._\n\nStraton, theory of sensation, i. 63 _n._, iii. 166 _n._;\n  Plato's doctrine of reminiscence, ii. 250 _n._\n\nStr\u00fcmpell, on _Parmenid\u00eas_, iii. 71 _n._, 75 _n._\n\nSubject, independent object and, do not explain facts of\nconsciousness, iii. 131;\n  perpetually implicated with object, 118, 122 _n._, 123,\n128;\n  in regard to intelligible world, proved from Plato, 121, 125;\n  shown more easily than in reference to sense, 122;\n  Hobbes on, 117 _n._;\n  relations are nothing in the object without a comparing subject,\n127;\n  see _Relativity_.\n\nSubjective, of Xenophanes, i. 18;\n  and objective views of ethics, Sokrates distinguished, 451;\n  unanimity coincident with objective dissent, _ib._;\n  Plato's reference to objective and, iii. 134.\n\nSubjectivism, an objection to _Homo Mensura_, iii. 151.\n\nSuckow, on _Menexenus_, iii. 412 _n._;\n  _Sophist\u00eas_ and _Politikus_, 185 _n._;\n  _Leges_, iv. 431, 432.\n\nSuicide, Hegesias, the death-persuader, i. 202;\n  Cynics, and Indian Gymnosophists, 161 _n._\n\n[Greek: Sumphe/ron], derivation, iii. 301 _n._\n\n[Greek: Sun\u00f4/numa] and [Greek: o(m\u00f4/numa] first distinguished by\nAristotle, iii. 94 _n._;\n  [Greek: sun\u00f4nu/m\u00f4s], ii. 194.\n\nSusemihl, on Platonic canon, coincides with Hermann, i. 310;\n  _Tim\u00e6us_, iv. 218 _n._\n\nSydenham, on Aristippus and Eudoxus, i. 202 _n._;\n  seat of happiness, iii. 372 _n._;\n  _Phil\u00eabus_, 376 _n._\n\nSyllogistic and Inductive Dialectic, ii. 27.\n\nSymposion, of Xenophon, i. 152;\n  date, iii. 26 _n._;\n  compared with Plato's, 22;\n  of Epikurus, _ib._ _n._\n\n_Symposion_, the, date, i. 307, 309, 311, 312, 324, iii. 26\n_n._;\n  purpose, ii. 382 _n._, iii. 8;\n  antithesis and complement of _Ph\u00e6don_, 22;\n  contains much transcendental assertion, 56;\n  censured for erotic character, 3 _n._;\n  Idea of Beauty exclusively presented in, 18;\n  Eros, views of interlocutors, 9;\n  a D\u00e6mon intermediate between gods and men, _ib._;\n  but in _Ph\u00e6drus_ a powerful god, _ib._ _n._, 11\n_n._;\n  amends empire of Necessity, iv. 222 _n._;\n  discourse of Sokrates, iii. 11;\n  analogy of Eros to philosophy, 10, 11;\n  the stimulus to mental procreation, 4, 6;\n  knowledge, by evolution of indwelling conceptions, 17;\n  exaltation of Eros in a few, love of beauty _in genere_, 7;\n  common desire for immortality, 6;\n  attained through mental procreation, beauty the stimulus,\n_ib._;\n  only metaphorical immortality recognised in, 17;\n  Sokrates' personal appearance and peculiar character, 19;\n  proof against temptation, 20, iv. 287;\n  concluding scene, iii. 19;\n  compared with Xenophon, 22;\n  _Ph\u00e6don_, ii. 382, iii. 17-8, 22;\n  _Ph\u00e6drus_, 11 _n._, 11, 15, 16-8;\n  _Phil\u00eabus_, 370 _n._, 399;\n  reading in p. 201D, [Greek: mantik\u00ea=s], 8 _n._\n\nSyracuse, the Athenian expedition against, iii. 406.\n\nSyssitia, iv. 280 _n._, 285 _n._, 335, 345.\n\n\nT.\n\nTacitus, iv. 408 _n._, i. 245 _n._\n\nTaste, Empedokles, i. 46;\n  Demokritus, 78.\n\nTaxation, direct, according to wealth, iv. 331.\n\nTeaching, denied in Menon, ii. 254 _n._;\n  [Greek: didach\u00ea\\] and [Greek: peith\u00f4/], distinct, _ib._,\niii. 172 _n._;\n  knowledge to be elicited out of untutored mind, how far correct,\nii. 249;\n  dialectician alone can teach, iii. 37;\n  _id\u00e9al_ unrealisable, 51;\n  books (q. v.) and lectures of little use, 34;\n  proper use of dialectic and rhetoric, 40;\n  of rhetoricians, practical value of, 45;\n  Sokrates' and Aristotle's views, 53 _n._;\n  exercises for students, 79, 80 _n._, 90 _n._;\n  parents' jealousy towards influential teachers, ii. 265\n_n._\n\n[Greek: Techni/t\u00eas], ii. 272 _n._\n\nTeleology, physiology of _Tim\u00e6us_ subordinated to ethical,\niv. 257;\n  see _Ends_.\n\nTemperance, [Greek: s\u00f4phrosu/n\u00ea], ii. 153 _n._;\n  as treated by Plato and Aristotle, 170;\n  is self-knowledge, 155;\n  and with justice the condition of happiness and freedom, 12;\n  the condition of virtue and happiness, 358;\n  and intelligence identical, having same contrary, 279;\n  a kind of sedateness, objections, 154;\n  a variety of feeling of shame, refuted, _ib._;\n  doing one's own business, refuted, 155;\n  as cognition of cognition and of non-cognition, of no avail\nfor our end, happiness, 159, 160;\n  not the science of good and evil, and of little service, 161;\n  undiscovered, but a good, 162;\n  _Charmid\u00eas_, difficulties unnoticed in _Politikus_,\niii. 282;\n  in state, iv. 34-5;\n  distinction effaced between justice and, 135;\n  relation to rest of virtue, 425.\n\nTennemann, i. 302.\n\nThales, philosophy, i. 4;\n  doctrine of eclipses, 6 _n._;\n  foretold eclipse, 4 _n._;\n  misrepresented by Cicero, _ib._\n\n[Greek: Tharra/leos], ii. 145 _n._\n\n_The\u00e6t\u00eatus_, date, i. 307-10, 313, 315, 324, 325 _n._,\nii. 228 _n._, iii. 111 _n._;\n  purpose, 167 _n._, 176;\n  value, 177;\n  great advance in analytical psychology, 164;\n  negative result, 176;\n  difficulties not solved in any other dialogue, 180;\n  sophisms in, 158 _n._;\n  like Megarics, i. 134 _n._;\n  method contrasted with _Phil\u00eabus_, iii. 335 _n._;\n  scenery and personages, 110;\n  Sokrates' mental obstetric, 112;\n  what is knowledge, 111;\n  sensible perception, _ib._, 113, 154, 256;\n  doctrine erroneously identified with _Homo Mensura_, 113,\n118, 120 _n._, 122, 162 _n._;\n  Herakleitean flux, 114, 115, 126, 128;\n  Empedokles' doctrine, 114, 115;\n  Plato's exposition confused, 114;\n  relativity of sensible facts, 126, 154;\n  divergences of men, from mental and associative difference, 155;\n  statesman and philosopher contrasted, 183;\n  the genuine ruler a shepherd, iv. 10;\n  relativity twofold, to comparing subject, and to another object,\nbesides the one directly described, iii. 127;\n  relations are nothing in the object without a comparing subject,\n_ib._;\n  no absolute ens, 129;\n  arguments from dreams, &c., answered, 130;\n  Plato's reference to subjective and objective, 134;\n  _Homo Mensura_, true meaning, 137, 164 _n._;\n  its counter-proposition, 148;\n  Plato's arguments against _Homo Mensura_, 135;\n  he ignores the proper qualification, 137;\n  the doctrine equalises all animals, 135, 292;\n  not true in the sense meant, 141;\n  the wise man alone a measure, 136;\n  reply, 143;\n  special knowledge required, where future consequences involved,\n136;\n  but Relativity does not imply that every man believes himself to\nbe infallible, 145;\n  it annuls dialectic--not true, 146;\n  sensible perception does not include memory, 157;\n  argument from analogy of seeing and not seeing at the same time,\n_ib._;\n  the mind sees not _with_ but _through_ the eyes, 159;\n  the mind makes several judgments by itself, 160;\n  knowledge lies in the mind's comparisons respecting sensible\nperceptions, 161;\n  difference from modern views, 162;\n  cognition is true opinion--objections, 168, 184 _n._;\n  are false opinions possible, 169, 181 _n._;\n  waxen memorial tablet in the mind, 169;\n  distinction of possessing, and having actually in hand,\nknowledge, 170;\n  simile of pigeon-cage, 171;\n  false opinion impossible or a man may know what he does not\nknow, 170;\n  the confusions of cognitions and non-cognitions, refuted, 171;\n  for rhetors communicate true opinion, not knowledge, 172;\n  knowledge is true opinion _plus_ rational explanation, 173;\n  analogy of elements and compounds, _ib._;\n  rejected, 175;\n  compared with _Ph\u00e6drus_, 18;\n  _Symposion_, _ib._;\n  _Sophist\u00eas_, 181 _n._, 187, 227, 242, 258, 332;\n  _Politikus_, 185 _n._, 187, 256;\n  _Kratylus_, 332;\n  _Phil\u00eabus_, 335 _n._\n\n_Theag\u00eas_, authenticity, i. 306, 309, 319, ii. 98, 100\n_n._, 107;\n  prolixity, 100 _n._;\n  analogy with _Lach\u00eas_, 104;\n  its peculiarity, the _d\u00e6mon_, _ib._;\n  explains eccentricity of Sokrates, 105;\n  Theag\u00eas desires a teacher of wisdom, 99;\n  incompetence of best statesmen for teaching, 100;\n  Sokrates asked to teach--declares inability, 101;\n  excuse, 105;\n  sometimes useful--his experience of his _d\u00e6mon_, 102;\n  Theag\u00eas anxious to be Sokrates' companion, 103.\n\nThebans, iii. 24 _n._\n\nThemistius, i. 388 _n._\n\nTheodorus, i. 202.\n\nTheology, not a progressive science, ii. 428;\n  primitive, contrasted by Aristotle with \"human wisdom,\" i. 3\n_n._;\n  see _God_, _Religion_.\n\nTheophrastus, friend of Ptolemy Soter, i. 279;\n  banished from Athens, _ib._ _n._;\n  change in Peripatetic school after death of, 272;\n  physiology, 46 _n._;\n  combated Demokritus' theory of vision_, 78 _n._;\n  criticises Demokritean division of qualities, 80 _n._;\n  astronomy, 257 _n._;\n  Plato's doctrine of earth's position, iv. 424 _n._;\n  sophism, _Mentiens_, i. 134 _n._;\n  fate, 143 _n._\n\nTheopompus, view of dialectic, i. 450;\n  qualities non-existent without the mind, iii. 74 _n._;\n  on profession of Sophist, i. 212 _n._;\n  authorship of Plato's dialogues, 112 _n._, 115.\n\nTheory, difference between precepts and, iv. 131.\n\nThomson, on _Parmenid\u00eas_, iii. 84 _n._\n\nThonissen, iv. 380 _n._\n\nThracians, iv. 38.\n\nThrasyllus, on Platonic canon, i. 265;\n  follows Aristophanes' classification, 295, 299;\n  not an internal sentiment, 298;\n  trustworthiness, 299;\n  acknowledged till 16th century, 301;\n  more trustworthy than moderns, 335;\n  classifies in Tetralogies works of Plato and Demokritus, 273\n_n._;\n  not the order established by Plato, 335 _n._;\n  classification of Demokritus, 295 _n._;\n  Plato's works--dramatic, philosophical, 289;\n  his principle, 294 _n._;\n  incongruity, 294;\n  of Search, of Exposition defective but useful, 361;\n  erroneously applied, 364;\n  coincides with Aristotle's two methods, Dialectic,\nDemonstrative, 362;\n  sub-classes recognised, 366;\n  the scheme, when principles correctly applied, 365;\n  did not doubt _Hipparchus_, 297 _n._;\n  nor _Erast\u00e6_, ii. 121;\n  _Kleitophon_ in _Republic_ tetralogy, iii. 419.\n\nThrasymachus, iii. 419, iv. 7.\n\nThucydides, pupil of Sokrates, ii. 102;\n  probably never read by Plato, iii. 411 _n._;\n  the gods' jealousy, iv. 165 _n._;\n  speeches of Perikles, ii. 373 _n._, 373, iv. 148 _n._;\n  Melian dialogue, ii. 341 _n._, i. 180 _n._\n\n[Greek: Thumo/s], derivation, iii. 301 _n._\n\nThurot, on Sophists, i. 389 _n._\n\nTiedemann, i. 132 _n._\n\n_Tim\u00e6us_, date, i. 307, 309, 311-3, 315, 325, iii. 368\n_n._;\n  sequel to _Republic_, iv. 215;\n  is earliest physical theory extant in its author's words, 216;\n  how much mythical, 255 _n._;\n  relation to old Greek cosmogonies, i. 87, iv. 255 _n._;\n  coincidence with Orpheus, _ib._;\n  adopted by Alexandrine Jews as a parallel to Mosaic Genesis,\n256;\n  physiology subordinated to ethical teleology, 257;\n  Plato's theory, acknowledged to be merely an [Greek: ei)k\u00f4\\s\nlo/gos], 217;\n  contrast with Sokrates, Isokrates, Xenophon, _ib._;\n  subject and persons, 215;\n  position and character of Pythagorean Tim\u00e6us, 216;\n  fundamental distinction of _ens_ and _fientia_, 219;\n  no knowledge of kosmos obtainable, 220;\n  Demiurgus, Ideas, and Chaos postulated, _ib._, iii. 121;\n  Demiurgus, how conceived by other philosophers of same century,\niv. 254;\n  kosmos a living being and a god, 220, 223;\n  Time began with, 227;\n  Demiurgus produces kosmos by persuading Necessity, 220, 238;\n  process of demiurgic construction, iii. 409 _n._, iv. 223;\n  copy of the [Greek: Au)to/z\u00f4on], 223, 227, 235 _n._, 263;\n  body, form, and rotation of kosmos, 225, 229, 237, 252;\n  change of view in _Epinomis_, 424 _n._;\n  position and elements of soul of kosmos, 225;\n  affinity to human, iii. 366 _n._;\n  four elements not primitive, iv. 238;\n  varieties of each element, 242;\n  forms of the elements, 239;\n  Ideas and Materia Prima, iii. 397 _n._, iv. 239;\n  primordial chaos, 240;\n  geometrical theory of the elements, _ib._;\n  borrowed from Pythagoreans, i. 349 _n._;\n  Aristotle on, iv. 241 _n._;\n  primary and visible gods, 229;\n  secondary and generated gods, 230;\n  Plato's acquiescence in tradition, 230-3, 241 _n._;\n  address of Demiurgus to generated gods, 233;\n  preparations for man's construction, a soul placed in each star,\n235;\n  construction of man, 243;\n  Demiurgus conjoins three souls and one body, 233;\n  generated gods fabricate cranium as miniature of kosmos, with\nrational soul rotating within, 235;\n  mount cranium on a tall body, 236;\n  man the cause of evil, 234;\n  inconsistency, _ib._ _n._;\n  organs of sense, 236;\n  soul tripartite, compared with _Ph\u00e6don_, ii. 384;\n  the gentle, tender, and \u00e6sthetical emotions omitted, iv. 149\n_n._;\n  each part at once material and mental, 257;\n  seat of, 259 _n._;\n  thoracic, function of heart and lungs, 245, 259 _n._;\n  abdominal, function of liver, 245, 259;\n  seat of prophetic agency, 246;\n  function of spleen, _ib._;\n  object of length of intestinal canal, 247;\n  bone, flesh, marrow, nails, mouth, teeth, 247;\n  vision, sleep, dreams, 237;\n  advantages of sight and hearing, _ib._;\n  mortal soul of plants, 248;\n  plants for man's nutrition, _ib._;\n  general survey of diseases, 249;\n  Plato compared with Aristotle and Hippokrates, 260;\n  mental diseases arise from body, 250;\n  no man voluntarily wicked, 249;\n  preservative and healing agencies, 260;\n  treatment of mind by itself, 251;\n  rotations of kosmos to be studied, 252;\n  contrast of Plato's admiration, with degenerate realities, 262,\n264;\n  genesis of women and inferior animals from degenerate man, 252;\n  degeneracy originally intended, 263;\n  poetical close, 264;\n  compared with _Protagoras_, ii. 268 _n._;\n  _Ph\u00e6don_, 383, 407 _n._, 411, 412, 422, iv. 239\n_n._;\n  _Ph\u00e6drus_, _ib._;\n  _The\u00e6t\u00eatus_, iii. 163;\n  _Phil\u00eabus_, 397 _n._;\n  _Republic_, iv. 38 _n._, 253 _n._;\n  _Leges_, 276, 389 _n._;\n  _Epinomis_, 424 _n._\n\nTime, contents of the idea of, i. 20 _n._;\n  and space comprised in Parmenides' ens, 19;\n  Herakleitus' doctrine, iv. 228 _n._;\n  Plato's imagination of momentary stoppages in, iii. 100, 102;\n  Aristotle, 103;\n  began with the kosmos, iv. 227;\n  difficulties of Diod\u00f4rus Kronus, i. 145;\n  Stoical belief, iii. 101 _n._;\n  Harris, i. 146 _n._;\n  calendar of ancients, iv. 325 _n._\n\nTimocracy, iv. 79.\n\nTracy, Destutt, _Homo Mensura_, iii. 292 _n._;\n  individualism, 139 _n._;\n  origin of language, 328 _n._\n\nTrade, see _Commerce_.\n\nTragedy, mixed pleasure and pain excited by, iii. 355 _n._;\n  Plato's aversion to Athenian, iv. 316, 350;\n  peculiar to himself, 317;\n  Aristotle differs, _ib._ _n._\n\nTrendelenburg, on Platonic canon, i. 345 _n._;\n  _Phil\u00eabus_, iii. 398 _n._;\n  relativity of knowledge, 124 _n._\n\nTrent, Council of, i. 390 _n._\n\nTruth, and Good and Real, coalesce in Plato's mind, ii. 88, iii.\n391;\n  obtainable by reason only, Demokritus' doctrine, i. 72;\n  the search after, the business of life to Sokrates and Plato,\n396;\n  _per se_ interesting, 403;\n  modern search goes on silently, 369;\n  philosophy is reasoned, _vii-ix_;\n  its criterion, ii. 247;\n  resides in universals, 411, 412, iv. 3 _n._;\n  necessary, iii. 253 _n._;\n  all persuasion founded on a knowledge of, 28;\n  generating cause of error, 33;\n  dialectic the standard for classifying sciences as more or less\ntrue, 383;\n  classification of true and false, how applied to cognitions,\n394;\n  its valuable principles, 395;\n  is falsehood possible? 199;\n  is theoretically possible, and its production may be object of\nsuch a profession as Sophists, 214;\n  lie for useful end, justifiable, ii. 347 _n._, iv. 3\n_n._;\n  Aristotle on, iii. 386 _n._;\n  see _Mythe_.\n\nTurgot, on etymology, iii. 303 _n._;\n  _Existence_, 135 _n._;\n  hopelessness of defining common and vague terms, ii. 186\n_n._\n\nTyndall, Prof., i. 373 _n._\n\nType gives natural groups, definition classes, ii. 48, 193\n_n._\n\n\nU.\n\nUeberweg, on Platonic canon, attempts reconcilement of\nSchleiermacher and Hermann, i. 313;\n  the Dialogues, 401 _n._;\n  _The\u00e6t\u00eatus_, iii. 167 _n._;\n  _Sophist\u00eas_, 186 _n._, 253, 369 _n._;\n  _Politikus_, 186 _n._;\n  _Phil\u00eabus_, 368 _n._;\n  _Tim\u00e6us_, _ib._, iv. 255 _n._;\n  _Menexenus_, iii. 412 _n._;\n  Ideas, iv. 239 _n._\n\nUniversals, debates about meaning, iii. 76-7;\n  different views of Aristotle and Plato, 76;\n  definition of, the object of the Sokratic dialectic, i. 452;\n  Sokrates sought the common characteristic, Plato found it in his\nIdea, 454;\n  process of forming, ii. 27;\n  truth resides in, 411-2, iv. 3 _n._;\n  amidst particulars, iii. 257;\n  different dialogues compared, _ib._;\n  how is generic unity distributed among species and individuals,\n339;\n  natural coalescence of finite and infinite, 340;\n  illustration from speech and music, 342;\n  explanation insufficient, 343;\n  see _Ideas_, _One_.\n\nUpton, sophism [Greek: Kurieu/\u00f4n], i. 141 _n._\n\nUseful, the Good, ii. 30;\n  the Just or Good--general but not constant explanation in Plato,\n38;\n  the lawful is the, 36;\n  not identical with the beautiful, 44, 50 _n._\n\nUtilitarianism, its standard, ii. 310 _n._;\n  doctrine of Sokrates, 349, 354 _n._;\n  theory in _Protagoras_, 308;\n  _Republic_, iv. 3 _n._, 12, 14, 104.\n\n\nV.\n\nVacherot, i. 376 _n._\n\nVacuum, theory of Demokritus, i. 67;\n  Pythagorean different from Plato's doctrine, iv. 225 _n._\n\nVarro, etymologies, iii. 311 _n._\n\nVaughan, Dr., iv. 380 _n._\n\nVeron, M., Relativity, iii. 144 _n._\n\nVirgil, general doctrine of metempsychosis in, ii. 425 _n._\n\nVirtue, identified with knowledge by Sokrates, ii. 67 _n._,\n239, 240, 321;\n  of what, unsolved, 244;\n  Sokrates and Plato dwell too exclusively on intellectual\nconditions, 67-8, 83;\n  its one sufficient condition, perfect state of the intelligence,\n149;\n  is it teachable, 232, 239, 240, 266, 275, iii. 330 _n._;\n  Xenophon on, i. 230;\n  plurality of virtues, ii. 233;\n  the highest, teachable, but all existing virtue is from\ninspiration, 242;\n  problem unsolved, _ib._;\n  taught by citizens, 269, 272;\n  quantity acquired depends on individual aptitude, _ib._;\n  analogy of learning the vernacular, 273;\n  is it in divisible, or of parts, homogeneous or heterogeneous,\n277;\n  no man does evil voluntarily, 292, iv. 249, 365-7;\n  a right comparison of pleasure and pain, ii. 293, 305;\n  temperance the condition of, 358;\n  natural dissidence of the gentle and the energetic, iii. 272;\n  excess of the energetic entail death or banishment, of the\ngentle, slavery, 273;\n  Sokrates' power in awakening ardour for, 415;\n  but he does not explain what it is, _ib._;\n  unsatisfactory answers of Sokrates and his friends, 416;\n  quadruple distribution in city, iv. 34;\n  Platonic conception is self-regarding, 104;\n  motives to it arise from internal happiness of the just, 105;\n  view substantially maintained since, _ib._;\n  four cardinal virtues assumed as constituting all virtue where\neach resides, 134;\n  as an exhaustive classification, 135, 417;\n  difference in other dialogues, 137;\n  the four, source of all other goods, 428;\n  the only common property of, 425;\n  and of vice, 426;\n  of the citizens, the end of the state, 417;\n  Xenophon on motive to practice of, 101 _n._, 135 _n._;\n  Sokrates on its fruits, i. 415;\n  all-sufficiency of, germ in _Republic_ of Stoical doctrine,\niv. 102;\n  see _Courage_, _Holiness_, _Justice_,\n_Temperance_, _Wisdom_.\n\nVision, doctrine of Empedokles, i. 45;\n  caused by images from objects, Demokritus, 78;\n  Plato's conception of the act of, iii. 129 _n._, 159;\n  Plato's theory, iv. 236;\n  Aristotle on, 237 _n._;\n  ancient theories of, _ib._;\n  principal advantages of, 237.\n\nVoltaire, iv. 233, i. 168 _n._\n\n\nW.\n\nWar, from city's increased wants, iv. 22;\n  class of soldiers, characteristics, 23;\n  both sexes to go together to battle, 46;\n  against Greek enemies to be carried on mildly, 47;\n  Spartan institutions adapted to, 282;\n  military commanders and council, 332;\n  military training of youths, 349;\n  Sokrates on qualities for, i. 133 _n._\n\nWater, the Chaos of Hesiod, i. 4 _n._;\n  principle of Thales, 4;\n  originally covered the earth, according to Xenophanes, &c.,\n18;\n  Empedokles, 38;\n  discovery of the composition of, ii. 163 _n._\n\nWatt, discovery of composition of water, ii. 163 _n._\n\nWealth, Plato's view of, iv. 199 _n._\n\nWedgwood, H., iii. 326 _n._\n\nWeisse, on _Tim\u00e6us_, iv. 256 _n._\n\nWestermann, on _Menexenus_, iii. 408 _n._\n\nWhately, Abp., on Fallacies, ii. 217.\n\nWhewell, Dr., ii. 48, 193 _n._\n\nWholes, abstract and concrete, ii. 52, 53;\n  generic and analogical, 48, 193 _n._, iii. 365.\n\nWilson, Dr. Geo., ii. 163 _n._\n\nWinckelmann, i. 132 _n._\n\nWisdom, no positive knowledge of, i. 414, 416;\n  in state, iv. 34-5;\n  what it is, 421, 423;\n  see _Knowledge_.\n\nWise, term applied when men know when and how far to use their\naccomplishments, ii. 15.\n\nWise man, the Ideal, see _Expert_.\n\nWomen, position of Greek, iii. 1;\n  genesis from degenerate man, iv. 252;\n  inferiority to men, 234, 252;\n  best, equal by nature to second-best men, 42, 171-4;\n  not superior in weaving and cookery, 172 _n._;\n  temporary marriages, 43, 175-8;\n  object, 198;\n  Plato's and modern sentiments, 192, 194 _n._;\n  influence of Aphrodit\u00ea very small in Platonic state, 197;\n  both sexes to go together to battle, 46;\n  same duties and training for women as men, 41, 46;\n  same duties and training as men, 77;\n  on principle that every citizen belongs to the city, 187;\n  maintained in _Leges_, and harmonises with ancient legends,\n196;\n  contrast with Aristotle, 195.\n\nWordsworth, ii. 250 _n._\n\nWriting, see _Books_.\n\nWyttenbach, on meaning of _Atheist_, iv. 382 _n._;\n  Plato's immortality of the soul, ii. 423 _n._\n\n\nX.\n\nXanthipp\u00ea, iii. 23 _n._\n\nXanthus, i. 19 _n._\n\nXenokrates, iv. 255.\n\nXenophanes, life, i. 16;\n  doctrines, _ib._;\n  unsatisfactory, 18;\n  held Non-Ens inadmissible, _ib._;\n  the relative and absolute, 19;\n  infers original aqueous state of earth from prints of shells and\nfishes, _ib._;\n  censured by Herakleitus, 26;\n  scepticism, 18;\n  popular mythology censured, 16;\n  religious element in, _ib._, 18;\n  the Universe God, 119 _n._\n\nXenophon, date of, i. 207;\n  Sokratic element an accessory in, 206;\n  essentially a man of action, _ib._;\n  personal history, 207-12, 215, 220;\n  alleged enmity between Plato and, iii. 22 _n._, iv. 146\n_n._, 312 _n._;\n  antipathy to Aristippus, i. 182 _n._;\n  enlarges the influence claimed by Sokrates, 418;\n  Sokrates of Plato and, 178, 199;\n  Sokrates on the Holy, different from Platonic Sokrates, 454;\n  and Plato compared, on Sokrates' reply to Mel\u00eatus, 456, ii. 420\n_n._;\n  Sokrates' character one-sided, iii. 423;\n  discussion of _law_, ii. 86;\n  the ideal the only real, 88 _n._;\n  Sokrates on friendship, 186;\n  _natural_ causes of friendship, 341 _n._;\n  view of Eros, iii. 25;\n  [Greek: paiderasti/a], 20 _n._;\n  Sokrates' identification of Good with pleasure, ii. 305;\n  Sokrates' doctrine of good, iii. 365;\n  motive to practice of virtue, iv. 99, 101 _n._, 135\n_n._;\n  immortality of soul, ii. 420 _n._;\n  on filial ingratitude, iv. 399 _n._;\n  Sokrates on qualities for war, i. 133 _n._;\n  Sokrates' view of rhetoric, ii. 371 _n._;\n  relation of mind to kosmos, iii. 368;\n  the gods' jealousy, iv. 165 _n._;\n  change in old age, Plato compared, i. 244;\n  contrasted with Plato in _Tim\u00e6us_, iv. 219;\n  works, i. 213;\n  analogy with _Alkibiad\u00eas I._ and _II._, ii. 21;\n  Sokrates' order of problems not observed, i. 230;\n  _Symposion_ of, 152;\n  date, iii. 26 _n._;\n  compared with Plato's, 22;\n  _Memorabilia_ compared with _Alkibiad\u00eas II._, ii. 29;\n  debate of Sokrates and Hippias, 34, 37, 49, 66;\n  _OEkonomikus_, ideal of an active citizen, i. 214;\n  _Hieron_, contents, 216-20;\n  Sokrates not introduced in _Hieron_ and _Cyrop\u00e6dia_,\n216;\n  _Hieron_ compared with _Gorgias_, 221;\n  why Syracusan despot taken for subject, 220-2;\n  interior life of despot, 218, 220;\n  Sokratic ideal of government differently worked out by Plato,\nand, iii. 273;\n  _id\u00e9al_, citizens willing to be ruled, iv. 283 _n._,\ni. 215, 218, 225;\n  love of subjects obtainable by good government, 220;\n  _Cyrop\u00e6dia_, a romance, blending Persian and Spartan\ncustoms, 222;\n  compared with _Leges_, iv. 319;\n  contents, i. 223-35;\n  his experience of younger Cyrus, 222;\n  education of Cyrus the Great, 223;\n  scientific ruler best, 224;\n  _Cyrop\u00e6dia_ does not solve the problem, 225;\n  Cyrus, of heroic genius, _ib._;\n  biography, 232;\n  generous and amiable qualities, 234;\n  scheme of government, a wisely arranged Oriental despotism,\n_ib._;\n  position of the Demos, iv. 183;\n  ideal state wants unity, 186 _n._;\n  training of citizens, i. 226;\n  Plato's training of guardians compared, iv. 141-7;\n  _id\u00e9al_ of character is Spartan, Plato's is Athenian, 147,\n151, 182, 276, 280 _n._, 403;\n  Persian training, 278 _n._;\n  details of education, i. 227;\n  its good effects, 228;\n  tuition in justice, 229;\n  definition of justice unsatisfactory, 231;\n  Sokrates on justice, iv. 3 _n._;\n  music omitted in education, 305, i. 229;\n  theoretical and practical geometry, iii. 395;\n  relation of sexes, iv. 194 _n._;\n  division of labour, 139 _n._;\n  inexperienced in finance and commerce, i. 236;\n  admires active commerce and variety of pursuits, _ib._;\n  formation of treasury funds, 238;\n  encouragement of Metics, _ib._;\n  distribution among citizens, three oboli each, daily, 239;\n  its purpose and principle, 240, 241 _n._;\n  visionary anticipations, 241;\n  financial scheme, Boeckh on, 242 _n._;\n  exhortation to peace, 243.\n\nXerxes, iv. 7.\n\n\nY.\n\nYxem, on _Kleitophon_, iii. 419 _n._;\n  _Hipparchus_, ii. 97;\n  _Erast\u00e6_, 121.\n\n\nZ.\n\nZaleukus, laws of, iv. 323 _n._\n\nZeller, on Plato, iii. 245 _n._;\n  _Parmenid\u00eas_, 84 _n._;\n  _Leges_, i. 338 _n._, iv. 274 _n._, 325\n_n._, 389 _n._, 431-3;\n  Ideas, i. 120 _n._;\n  Eukleides, 127 _n._;\n  Megarics, 131 _n._;\n  Sophists, 389 _n._\n\nZeno of Elea, i. 93;\n  contrasted with earlier philosophers, 105;\n  modern critics on, 101;\n  defended Parmenidean doctrine, 93, 98, iii. 8;\n  the relative alone knowable, i. 98;\n  two worlds, impugned by Sokrates, iii. 59;\n  arguments in regard to space, i. 95;\n  motion, 97;\n  not denied as a phenomenal and relative fact, 102;\n  Sorites, 135 _n._;\n  reductiones ad absurdum, 94, 121 _n._;\n  not contradictions of data generalised from experience, 100;\n  no systematic theory of scepticism, iii. 93;\n  dialectic, 107;\n  purpose and result, i. 98;\n  carried out by Sokrates, 371;\n  compared with Platonic _Parmenid\u00eas_, 100.\n\nZeno the Stoic, i. 160;\n  attracted to Athens by perusal of _Apology_, 418;\n  eclectic, 174;\n  communism of wives, 189 _n._\n\nZenodotus, Alexandrine librarian, i. 274 _n._\n\nZeus conferred social art on men, ii. 268.\n\n\n*  *  *  *  *\n\nABERDEEN UNIVERSITY PRESS.\n\n\n\n\n*************************************\nTranscriber's Note\n\nThe text is based on versions made available by the Internet Archive.\n\nFor the Greek transcriptions the following conventions have been used:\n) is for smooth breathing; ( for hard; + for diaeresis; / for acute\naccent; \\ for grave; = for circumflex; | for iota subscript.\nch is used for chi, ph for phi, ps for psi, th for theta;\n\u00ea for eta and \u00f4 for omega; u is used for upsilon in all cases.\n\nCorrections to the text, indicated in text with **:\n\nLocation         Text of scan of 3rd edition   Correction\nToC p. 272       The heading -- CHAPTER XXXIX. LEGES AND\n                 EPINOMIS -- is missing\nToC p. 418       Noctural                      Nocturnal\nCh. 35 before    extreme                       extremes\n fn. 304\nCh. 37 before\n fn. 18          convinced that \"if they       convinced that if they\nCh. 37 fn. 26    Cyrop. viii. i. 40            Cyrop. viii. 1, 40\nCh. 37 fn. 51    gout                          go\u00fbt\nCh. 37 fn. 80    proh sancta                   pro sancta\nCh. 37 fn. 136   nsmothe/t\u00eas                   nomothe/t\u00eas\nCh. 37 fn. 157   )xxxiv. 8, 19)                (xxxiv. 8, 19)\nCh. 37 fn. 165   a)o/ri ston                   a)o/riston\nCh. 38 3rd sn    and character of the          Position and character of\n                                               the\nCh. 38 fn. 25    members                       numbers\nCh. 38 fn. 40    that                          than\nCh. 39 p. 299    The one footnote on this page is numbered 3 at the foot,\n                 1 in the text\nCh. 39 fn. 93    xxviii. p. 150, seq.          xxxvi. p. 100, seq.\nCh. 39 p. 303    docrine                       doctrine\nCh. 39 p. 334    possses                       possess\nCh. 39 p. 359    that                          than\nCh. 39 p. 371    weath                         wealth\nIndex, s.v. Actual      iv.                    i.\nIndex, s.v. Analogy     a)nalogi/am            a)nalogi/an\nIndex, s.v. Animal      A)utozo/z\u00f4on           Au)to/z\u00f4on\nIndex, s.v. Apology     i. 429, n.             i. 429 n.\nIndex, s.v. Aristotle   189                    180\nIndex, s.v. Art         see Poetry             see Poets\nIndex, s.v. Cyrus       iv. 312;               iv. 312,\nIndex, s.v. Death       235, n.                235 n.\nIndex, s.v. Eleatic     234, n.                237 n.\nIndex, s.v. Ethics      a)thr\u00f4/pina            a)nthr\u00f4/pina\nIndex, s.v. Knowledge   i. 37, 8-84;           i. 378-84;\nIndex, s.v. Martin      on Tim\u00e6us, iii.        on Tim\u00e6us, iv.\nIndex, s.v. Physics     241 n.                 397 n.\nIndex, s.v. Physics     89 n.                  90 n.\nIndex, s.v. Plato       369 n.                 178 n.\nIndex, s.v. Pleasure    374 n.                 376 n.\nIndex, s.v. Politikus   scienific man          scientific man\nIndex, s.v. Praxiphanes 268 n.                 265 n.\nIndex, s.v. Reid        241 n.                 243 n.\nIndex, s.v. Soul        kosmos, 265            kosmos, iii. 265\nIndex, s.v. State       414                    iv. 414\nIndex, s.v. Virtue      330, n.                330 n.","title":"Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 4","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":242962}