{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_40794/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_40794","id":"gutenberg_40794","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40794","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Logic","Realism","Thought and thinking"],"text":"[Transcriber's Note:\n\nOn P. 435, there are four instances of \"2\" in brackets. {2} indicates a\nsubscript 2. ^{2} indicates a superscript 2.\n\n[+] in Footnote 69 indicates a larger than normal plus sign.\n\nRemaining transcriber's notes are at the end of the text.]\n\n\n\n\n               ESSAYS IN\n          EXPERIMENTAL LOGIC\n\n                 _By_\n\n              JOHN DEWEY\n\n\n    THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS\n           CHICAGO, ILLINOIS\n\n\n\n\n           COPYRIGHT 1916 BY\n       THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO\n\n          All Rights Reserved\n\n          Published June 1916\n       Second Impression May 1918\n      Third Impression October 1920\n\n\n        Composed and Printed By\n    The University of Chicago Press\n       Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.\n\n\n\n\nPREFATORY NOTE\n\n\nIn 1903 a volume was published by the University of Chicago Press,\nentitled _Studies in Logical Theory_, as a part of the \"Decennial\nPublications\" of the University. The volume contained contributions by\nDrs. Thompson (now Mrs. Woolley), McLennan, Ashley, Gore, Heidel,\nStuart, and Moore, in addition to four essays by the present writer\nwho was also general editor of the volume. The edition of the\n_Studies_ being recently exhausted, the Director of the Press\nsuggested that my own essays be reprinted, together with other studies\nof mine in the same field. The various contributors to the original\nvolume cordially gave assent, and the present volume is the outcome.\nChaps. ii-v, inclusive, represent (with editorial revisions, mostly\nomissions) the essays taken from the old volume. The first and\nintroductory chapter has been especially written for the volume. The\nother essays are in part reprinted and in part rewritten, with\nadditions, from various contributions to philosophical periodicals. I\nshould like to point out that the essay on \"Some Stages of Logical\nThought\" antedates the essays taken from the volume of _Studies_,\nhaving been published in 1900; the other essays have been written\nsince then. I should also like to point out that the essays in their\npsychological phases are written from the standpoint of what is now\ntermed a behavioristic psychology, though some of them antedate the\nuse of that term as a descriptive epithet.\n\n                                                       J. D.\n    COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY\n       April 3, 1916\n\n\n\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n\n                                                               PAGE\n\n       I. INTRODUCTION                                            1\n\n      II. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THOUGHT AND ITS SUBJECT-MATTER     75\n\n     III. THE ANTECEDENTS AND STIMULI OF THINKING               103\n\n      IV. DATA AND MEANINGS                                     136\n\n       V. THE OBJECTS OF THOUGHT                                157\n\n      VI. SOME STAGES OF LOGICAL THOUGHT                        183\n\n     VII. THE LOGICAL CHARACTER OF IDEAS                        220\n\n    VIII. THE CONTROL OF IDEAS BY FACTS                         230\n\n      IX. NA\u00cfVE REALISM VS. PRESENTATIVE REALISM                250\n\n       X. EPISTEMOLOGICAL REALISM: THE ALLEGED UBIQUITY\n            OF THE KNOWLEDGE RELATION                           264\n\n      XI. THE EXISTENCE OF THE WORLD AS A LOGICAL PROBLEM       281\n\n     XII. WHAT PRAGMATISM MEANS BY PRACTICAL                    303\n\n    XIII. AN ADDED NOTE AS TO THE \"PRACTICAL\"                   330\n\n     XIV. THE LOGIC OF JUDGMENTS OF PRACTICE                    335\n\n    Index                                                       443\n\n\n\n\nI\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nThe key to understanding the doctrine of the essays which are herewith\nreprinted lies in the passages regarding the temporal development of\nexperience. Setting out from a conviction (more current at the time\nwhen the essays were written than it now is) that knowledge implies\njudgment (and hence, thinking) the essays try to show (1) that such\nterms as \"thinking,\" \"reflection,\" \"judgment\" denote inquiries or the\nresults of inquiry, and (2) that inquiry occupies an intermediate and\nmediating place in the development of an experience. If this be\ngranted, it follows at once that a philosophical discussion of the\ndistinctions and relations which figure most largely in logical\ntheories depends upon a proper placing of them in their temporal\ncontext; and that in default of such placing we are prone to transfer\nthe traits of the subject-matter of one phase to that of another--with\na confusing outcome.\n\n\nI\n\n1. An intermediary stage for knowledge (that is, for knowledge\ncomprising reflection and having a distinctively intellectual quality)\nimplies a prior stage of a different kind, a kind variously\ncharacterized in the essays as social, affectional, technological,\naesthetic, etc. It may most easily be described from a negative point\nof view: it is a type of experience which cannot be called a knowledge\nexperience without doing violence to the term \"knowledge\" and to\nexperience. It may contain knowledge resulting from prior inquiries;\nit may include thinking within itself; but not so that they dominate\nthe situation and give it its peculiar flavor. Positively, anyone\nrecognizes the difference between an experience of quenching thirst\nwhere the perception of water is a mere incident, and an experience of\nwater where knowledge of what water is, is the controlling interest;\nor between the enjoyment of social converse among friends and a study\ndeliberately made of the character of one of the participants; between\naesthetic appreciation of a picture and an examination of it by a\nconnoisseur to establish the artist, or by a dealer who has a\ncommercial interest in determining its probable selling value. The\ndistinction between the two types of experience is evident to anyone\nwho will take the trouble to recall what he does most of the time when\nnot engaged in meditation or inquiry.\n\nBut since one does not think about knowledge except when he is\n_thinking_, except, that is, when the intellectual or cognitional\ninterest is dominant, the professional philosopher is only too prone\nto think of all experiences as if they were of the type he is\nspecially engaged in, and hence unconsciously or intentionally to\nproject _its_ traits into experiences to which they are alien. Unless\nhe takes the simple precaution of holding before his mind contrasting\nexperiences like those just mentioned, he generally forms a habit of\nsupposing that no qualities or things at all are present in experience\nexcept as objects of some kind of apprehension or awareness.\nOverlooking, and afterward denying, that things and qualities are\npresent to most men most of the time as things and qualities in\nsituations of prizing and aversion, of seeking and finding, of\nconverse, enjoyment and suffering, of production and employment, of\nmanipulation and destruction, he thinks of things as either totally\nabsent from experience or else there as objects of \"consciousness\" or\nknowing. This habit is a tribute to the _importance_ of reflection and\nof the knowledge which accrues from it. But a discussion of knowledge\nperverted at the outset by such a misconception is not likely to\nproceed prosperously.\n\nAll this is not to deny that some element of reflection or inference\nmay be required in any situation to which the term \"experience\" is\napplicable in any way which contrasts with, say, the \"experience\" of\nan oyster or a growing bean vine. Men experience illness. What they\nexperience is certainly something very different from an object of\napprehension, yet it is quite possible that what makes an illness into\na _conscious_ experience is precisely the intellectual elements which\nintervene--a certain taking of some things as representative of other\nthings. My thesis about the primary character of non-reflectional\nexperience is not intended to preclude this hypothesis--which appears\nto me a highly plausible one. But it is indispensable to note that,\neven in such cases, the intellectual element is set in a context which\nis non-cognitive and which holds within it in suspense a vast complex\nof other qualities and things that in the experience itself are\nobjects of esteem or aversion, of decision, of use, of suffering, of\nendeavor and revolt, not of knowledge. When, in a subsequent\nreflective experience, we look back and find these things and\nqualities (quales would be a better word, or values, if the latter word\nwere not so open to misconstruction), we are only too prone to suppose\nthat they were then what they are now--objects of a cognitive regard,\nthemes of an intellectual gesture. Hence, the erroneous conclusion\nthat things are either just out of experience, or else are (more or\nless badly) known objects.\n\nIn any case the best way to study the character of those cognitional\nfactors which are merely incidental in so many of our experiences is\nto study them in the type of experience where they are most prominent,\nwhere they dominate; where knowing, in short, is the prime concern.\nSuch study will also, by a reflex reference, throw into greater relief\nthe contrasted characteristic traits of the non-reflectional types of\nexperience. In such contrast the significant traits of the latter are\nseen to be internal organization: (1) the factors and qualities hang\ntogether; there is a great variety of them but they are saturated with\na pervasive quality. Being ill with the grippe is an experience which\nincludes an immense diversity of factors, but none the less is the one\nqualitatively unique experience which it is. Philosophers in their\nexclusively intellectual preoccupation with analytic knowing are only\ntoo much given to overlooking the primary import of the term \"thing\":\nnamely, _res_, an affair, an occupation, a \"cause\"; something which is\nsimilar to having the grippe, or conducting a political campaign, or\ngetting rid of an overstock of canned tomatoes, or going to school, or\npaying attention to a young woman:--in short, just what is meant in\nnon-philosophic discourse by \"an experience.\" Noting things only as if\nthey were objects--that is, objects of knowledge--continuity is\nrendered a mystery; qualitative, pervasive unity is too often regarded\nas a subjective state injected into an object which does not possess\nit, as a mental \"construct,\" or else as a trait of being to be\nattained to only by recourse to some curious organ of knowledge termed\nintuition. In like fashion, organization is thought of as the achieved\noutcome of a highly scientific knowledge, or as the result of\ntranscendental rational synthesis, or as a fiction superinduced by\nassociation, upon elements each of which in its own right \"is a\nseparate existence.\" One advantage of an excursion by one who\nphilosophizes upon knowledge into primary non-reflectional experience\nis that the excursion serves to remind him that every empirical\nsituation has its own organization of a direct, non-logical character.\n\n(2) Another trait of every _res_ is that it has focus and context:\nbrilliancy and obscurity, conspicuousness or apparency, and\nconcealment or reserve, with a constant movement of redistribution.\nMovement about an axis persists, but what is in focus constantly\nchanges. \"Consciousness,\" in other words, is only a very small and\nshifting portion of experience. The scope and content of the focused\napparency have immediate dynamic connections with portions of\nexperience not at the time obvious. The word which I have just written\nis momentarily focal; around it there shade off into vagueness my\ntypewriter, the desk, the room, the building, the campus, the town,\nand so on. _In_ the experience, and in it in such a way as to\n_qualify_ even what is shiningly apparent, are all the physical\nfeatures of the environment extending out into space no one can say\nhow far, and all the habits and interests extending backward and\nforward in time, of the organism which uses the typewriter and which\nnotes the written form of the word only as temporary focus in a vast\nand changing scene. I shall not dwell upon the import of this fact in\nits critical bearings upon theories of experience which have been\ncurrent. I shall only point out that when the word \"experience\" is\nemployed in the text it means just such an immense and operative world\nof diverse and interacting elements.\n\nIt might seem wiser, in view of the fact that the term \"experience\" is\nso frequently used by philosophers to denote something very different\nfrom such a world, to use an acknowledgedly objective term: to talk\nabout the typewriter, for example. But experience in ordinary usage\n(as distinct from its technical use in psychology and philosophy)\nexpressly denotes something which a specific term like \"typewriter\"\ndoes _not_ designate: namely, the indefinite range of context in which\nthe typewriter is _actually_ set, its spatial and temporal\nenvironment, including the habitudes, plans, and activities of its\noperator. And if we are asked why not then use a general objective\nterm like \"world,\" or \"environment,\" the answer is that the word\n\"experience\" suggests something indispensable which these terms omit:\nnamely, an actual focusing of the world at one point in a focus of\nimmediate shining apparency. In other words, in its ordinary human\nusage, the term \"experience\" was invented and employed previously\nbecause of the necessity of having some way to refer peremptorily to\nwhat is indicated in only a roundabout and divided way by such terms\nas \"organism\" and \"environment,\" \"subject\" and \"object,\" \"persons\"\nand \"things,\" \"mind\" and \"nature,\" and so on.[1]\n\n\nII\n\nHad this background of the essays been more explicitly depicted, I do\nnot know whether they would have met with more acceptance, but it is\nlikely that they would not have met with so many misunderstandings.\nBut the essays, save for slight incidental references, took this\nbackground for granted in the allusions to the universe of\nnon-reflectional experience of our doings, sufferings, enjoyments of\nthe world and of one another. It was their purpose to point out that\nreflection (and, hence, knowledge having logical properties) arises\nbecause of the appearance of incompatible factors within the empirical\nsituation just pointed at: incompatible not in a mere structural or\nstatic sense, but in an active and progressive sense. Then opposed\nresponses are provoked which cannot be taken simultaneously in overt\naction, and which accordingly can be dealt with, whether\nsimultaneously or successively, only after they have been brought into\na plan of organized action by means of analytic resolution and\nsynthetic imaginative conspectus; in short, by means of being taken\ncognizance of. In other words, reflection appears as the dominant\ntrait of a situation when there is something seriously the matter,\nsome trouble, due to active discordance, dissentiency, conflict among\nthe factors of a prior non-intellectual experience; when, in the\nphraseology of the essays, a situation becomes tensional.[2]\n\nGiven such a situation, it is obvious that the meaning of the\nsituation as a whole is uncertain. Through calling out two opposed\nmodes of behavior, it presents itself as meaning two incompatible\nthings. The only way out is through careful inspection of the\nsituation, involving resolution into elements, and a going out beyond\nwhat is found upon such inspection to be given, to something else to\nget a leverage for understanding it. That is, we have (_a_) to locate\nthe difficulty, and (_b_) to devise a method of coping with it. Any\nsuch way of looking at thinking demands moreover that the difficulty\nbe located _in_ the situation in question (very literally in\nquestion). Knowing always has a _particular_ purpose, and its solution\nmust be a function of its conditions in connection with _additional_\nones which are brought to bear. Every reflective knowledge, in other\nwords, has a specific task which is set by a concrete and empirical\nsituation, so that it can perform that task only by detecting and\nremaining faithful to the conditions in the situation in which the\ndifficulty arises, while its purpose is a reorganization of its\nfactors in order to get unity.\n\nSo far, however, there is no accomplished knowledge, but only knowledge\ncoming to be--learning, in the classic Greek conception. Thinking gets\nno farther, as _thinking_, than a statement of elements constituting\nthe difficulty at hand and a statement--a propounding, a\nproposition--of a method for resolving them. In fixing the framework of\nevery reflective situation, this state of affairs also determines the\nfurther step which is needed if there is to be knowledge--knowledge in\nthe eulogistic sense, as distinct from opinion, dogma, and guesswork,\nor from what casually passes current as knowledge. Overt action is\ndemanded if the worth or validity of the reflective considerations is\nto be determined. Otherwise, we have, at most, only a hypothesis that\nthe conditions of the difficulty are such and such, and that the way to\ngo at them so as to get over or through them is thus and so. This way\nmust be tried in action; it must be applied, physically, in the\nsituation. By finding out what then happens, we test our intellectual\nfindings--our logical terms or projected metes and bounds. If the\nrequired reorganization is effected, they are confirmed, and reflection\n(on that topic) ceases; if not, there is frustration, and inquiry\ncontinues. That all knowledge, as issuing from reflection, is\nexperimental (in the literal physical sense of experimental) is then a\nconstituent proposition of this doctrine.\n\nUpon this view, thinking, or knowledge-getting, is far from being the\narmchair thing it is often supposed to be. The reason it is not an\narmchair thing is that it is not an event going on exclusively within\nthe cortex or the cortex and vocal organs. It involves the\nexplorations by which relevant data are procured and the physical\nanalyses by which they are refined and made precise; it comprises the\nreadings by which information is got hold of, the words which are\nexperimented with, and the calculations by which the significance of\nentertained conceptions or hypotheses is elaborated. Hands and feet,\napparatus and appliances of all kinds are as much a part of it as\nchanges in the brain. Since these physical operations (including the\ncerebral events) and equipments are a part of thinking, thinking is\nmental, not because of a peculiar stuff which enters into it or of\npeculiar non-natural activities which constitute it, but because of\nwhat physical acts and appliances _do_: the distinctive purpose for\nwhich they are employed and the distinctive results which they\naccomplish.\n\nThat reflection terminates, through a definitive overt act,[3] in\nanother non-reflectional situation, within which incompatible\nresponses may again in time be aroused, and so another problem in\nreflection be set, goes without saying. Certain things about this\nsituation, however, do not at the present time speak for themselves\nand need to be set forth. Let me in the first place call attention to\nan ambiguity in the term \"knowledge.\" The statement that all\nknowledge involves reflection--or, more concretely, that it denotes\nan inference from evidence--gives offense to many; it seems a\ndeparture from fact as well as a wilful limitation of the word\n\"knowledge.\" I have in this Introduction endeavored to mitigate the\nobnoxiousness of the doctrine by referring to \"knowledge which is\nintellectual or logical in character.\" Lest this expression be\nregarded as a futile evasion of a real issue, I shall now be more\nexplicit. (1) It may well be admitted that there is a real sense in\nwhich knowledge (as distinct from thinking or inquiring with a guess\nattached) does not come into existence till thinking has terminated in\nthe experimental act which fulfils the specifications set forth in\nthinking. But what is also true is that the object thus determined is\nan object of _knowledge_ only because of the thinking which has\npreceded it and to which it sets a happy term. To run against a hard\nand painful stone is not of itself, I should say, an act of knowing;\nbut if running into a hard and painful thing is an outcome predicted\nafter inspection of data and elaboration of a hypothesis, then the\nhardness and the painful bruise which define the thing as a stone also\nconstitute it emphatically an object of knowledge. In short, the\nobject of knowledge in the strict sense is its objective; and this\nobjective is not constituted till it is reached. Now this\nconclusion--as the word denotes--is thinking brought to a close, done\nwith. If the reader does not find this statement satisfactory, he\nmay, pending further discussion, at least recognize that the doctrine\nset forth has no difficulty in connecting knowledge with inference,\nand at the same time admitting that knowledge in the emphatic sense\ndoes not exist till inference has ceased. Seen from this point of\nview, so-called immediate knowledge or simple apprehension or\nacquaintance-knowledge represents a critical skill, a certainty of\nresponse which has accrued in consequence of reflection. A like\nsureness of footing apart from prior investigations and testings is\nfound in instinct and habit. I do not deny that these may be better\nthan knowing, but I see no reason for complicating an already too\nconfused situation by giving them the name \"knowledge\" with its usual\nintellectual implications. From this point of view, the subject-matter\nof knowledge is precisely that which we do _not_ think of, or mentally\nrefer to in any way, being that which is taken as matter of course,\nbut it is nevertheless knowledge in virtue of the inquiry which has\nled up to it.\n\n(2) Definiteness, depth, and variety of meaning attach to the objects\nof an experience just in the degree in which they have been previously\nthought about, even when present in an experience in which they do not\nevoke inferential procedures at all. Such terms as \"meaning,\"\n\"significance,\" \"value,\" have a double sense. Sometimes they mean a\nfunction: the office of one thing representing another, or pointing to\nit as implied; the operation, in short, of serving as sign. In the\nword \"symbol\" this meaning is practically exhaustive. But the terms\nalso sometimes mean an inherent quality, a quality intrinsically\ncharacterizing the thing experienced and making it worth while. The\nword \"sense,\" as in the phrase \"sense of a thing\" (and non-sense) is\ndevoted to this use as definitely as are the words \"sign\" and \"symbol\"\nto the other. In such a pair as \"import\" and \"importance,\" the first\ntends to select the reference to another thing while the second names\nan intrinsic content. In reflection, the extrinsic reference is always\nprimary. The height of the mercury means rain; the color of the flame\nmeans sodium; the form of the curve means factors distributed\naccidentally. In the situation which follows upon reflection, meanings\nare intrinsic; they have no instrumental or subservient office,\nbecause they have no office at all. They are as much qualities of the\nobjects in the situation as are red and black, hard and soft, square\nand round. And every reflective experience adds new shades of such\nintrinsic qualifications. In other words, while reflective knowing is\ninstrumental to gaining control in a troubled situation (and thus has\na practical or utilitarian force), it is also instrumental to the\nenrichment of the immediate significance of subsequent experiences.\nAnd it may well be that this by-product, this gift of the gods, is\nincomparably more valuable for living a life than is the primary and\nintended result of control, essential as is that control to having a\nlife to live. Words are treacherous in this field; there are no\naccepted criteria for assigning or measuring their meanings; but if\none use the term \"consciousness\" to denote immediate values of\nobjects, then it is certainly true that \"consciousness is a lyric cry\neven in the midst of business.\" But it is equally true that if someone\nelse understands by consciousness the function of effective\nreflection, then consciousness is a business--even in the midst of\nwriting or singing lyrics. But the statement remains inadequate until\nwe add that knowing as a business, inquiry and invention as\nenterprises, as practical acts, become themselves charged with the\nmeaning of what they accomplish as _their_ own immediate quality.\nThere exists no disjunction between aesthetic qualities which are\nfinal yet idle, and acts which are practical or instrumental. The\nlatter have their own delights and sorrows.\n\n\nIII\n\nSpeaking, then, from the standpoint of temporal order, we find\nreflection, or thought, occupying an intermediate and reconstructive\nposition. It comes between a temporally prior situation (an organized\ninteraction of factors) of active and appreciative experience, wherein\nsome of the factors have become discordant and incompatible, and a\nlater situation, which has been constituted out of the first\nsituation by means of acting on the findings of reflective inquiry.\nThis final situation therefore has a richness of meaning, as well as a\ncontrolled character lacking to its original. By it is fixed the\nlogical validity or intellectual force of the terms and relations\ndistinguished by reflection. Owing to the continuity of experience\n(the overlapping and recurrence of like problems), these logical\nfixations become of the greatest assistance to subsequent inquiries;\nthey are its working means. In such further uses, they get further\ntested, defined, and elaborated, until the vast and refined systems of\nthe technical objects and formulae of the sciences come into\nexistence--a point to which we shall return later.\n\nOwing to circumstances upon which it is unnecessary to dwell, the\nposition thus sketched was not developed primarily upon its own\nindependent account, but rather in the course of a criticism of\nanother type of logic, the idealistic logic found in Lotze. It is\nobvious that the theory in question has critical bearings. According\nto it, reflection in its distinctions and processes can be understood\nonly when placed in its intermediate pivotal temporal position--as a\nprocess of control, through reorganization, of material alogical in\ncharacter. It intimates that thinking would not exist, and hence\nknowledge would not be found, in a world which presented no troubles\nor where there are no \"problems of evil\"; and on the other hand that a\nreflective method is the only sure way of dealing with these\ntroubles. It intimates that while the results of reflection, because\nof the continuity of experience, may be of wider scope than the\nsituation which calls out a particular inquiry and invention,\nreflection itself is always specific in origin and aim; it always has\nsomething special to cope with. For troubles are concretely specific.\nIt intimates also that thinking and reflective knowledge are never an\nend-all, never their own purpose nor justification, but that they pass\nnaturally into a more direct and vital type of experience, whether\ntechnological or appreciative or social. This doctrine implies,\nmoreover, that logical theory in its usual sense is essentially a\ndescriptive study; that it is an account of the processes and tools\nwhich have actually been found effective in inquiry, comprising in the\nterm \"inquiry\" both deliberate discovery and deliberate invention.\n\nSince the doctrine was propounded in an intellectual environment where\nsuch statements were not commonplaces, where in fact a logic was\nreigning which challenged these convictions at every point, it is not\nsurprising that it was put forth with a controversial coloring, being\ndirected particularly at the dominant idealistic logic. The point of\ncontact and hence the point of conflict between the logic set forth\nand the idealistic logic are not far to seek. The logic based on\nidealism had, as a matter of fact, treated knowledge from the\nstandpoint of an account of thought--of thought in the sense of\nconception, judgment, and inferential reasoning. But while it had\ninherited this view from the older rationalism, it had also learned\nfrom Hume, via Kant, that direct sense or perceptual material must be\ntaken into account. Hence it had, in effect, formulated the problem of\nlogic as the problem of the connection of logical thought with\nsense-material, and had attempted to set forth a metaphysics of\nreality based upon various ascending stages of the completeness of the\nrationalization or idealization of given, brute, fragmentary sense\nmaterial by synthetic activity of thought. While considerations of a\nmuch less formal kind were chiefly influential in bringing idealism to\nits modern vogue, such as the conciliation of a scientific with a\nreligious and moral point of view and the need of rationalizing social\nand historic institutions so as to explain their cultural effect, yet\nthis logic constituted the _technique_ of idealism--its strictly\nintellectual claim for acceptance.\n\nThe point of contact, and hence of conflict, between it and such a\ndoctrine of logic and reflective thought as is set forth above is, I\nrepeat, fairly obvious. Both fix upon thinking as the key to the\nsituation. I still believe (what I believed when I wrote the essays)\nthat under the influence of idealism valuable analyses and\nformulations of the work of reflective thought, in its relation to\nsecuring knowledge of objects, were executed. But--and the but is one\nof exceptional gravity--the idealistic logic started from the\ndistinction between immediate plural data and unifying, rationalizing\nmeanings as a distinction ready-made in experience, and it set up as\nthe goal of knowledge (and hence as the definition of true reality) a\ncomplete, exhaustive, comprehensive, and eternal system in which\nplural and immediate data are forever woven into a fabric and pattern\nof self-luminous meaning. In short, it ignored the temporally\nintermediate and instrumental place of reflection; and because it\nignored and denied this place, it overlooked its essential feature:\ncontrol of the environment in behalf of human progress and well-being,\nthe effort at control being stimulated by the needs, the defects, the\ntroubles, which accrue when the environment coerces and suppresses man\nor when man endeavors in ignorance to override the environment. Hence\nit misconstrued the criterion of the work of intelligence; it set up\nas its criterion an Absolute and Non-temporal reality at large,\ninstead of using the criterion of specific temporal achievement of\nconsequences through a control supplied by reflection. And with this\noutcome, it proved faithless to the cause which had generated it and\ngiven it its reason for being: the magnification of the work of\nintelligence in our actual physical and social world. For a theory\nwhich ends by declaring that everything is, really and eternally,\nthoroughly ideal and rational, cuts the nerve of the specific demand\nand work of intelligence.\n\nFrom this general statement, let me descend to the technical point\nupon which turns the criticism of idealistic logic by the essays.\nGrant, for a moment, as a hypothesis, that thinking starts neither\nfrom an implicit force of rationality desiring to realize itself\ncompletely in and through and against the limitations which are\nimposed upon it by the conditions of our human experience (as all\nidealisms have taught), nor from the fact that in each human being is\na \"mind\" whose business it is just to \"know\"--to theorize in the\nAristotelian sense; but, rather, that it starts from an effort to get\nout of some trouble, actual or menacing. It is quite clear that the\nhuman race has tried many another way out besides reflective inquiry.\nIts favorite resort has been a combination of magic and poetry, the\nformer to get the needed relief and control; the latter to import into\nimagination, and hence into emotional consummation, the realizations\ndenied in fact. But as far as reflection does emerge and gets a\nworking foothold, the nature of its job is set for it. On the one\nhand, it must discover, it must find out, it must detect; it must\ninventory what is there. All this, or else it will never know what the\nmatter is; the human being will not find out what \"struck him,\" and\nhence will have no idea of where to seek for a remedy--for the needed\ncontrol. On the other hand, it must invent, it must project, it must\nbring to bear upon the given situation what is not, as it exists,\ngiven as a part of it.\n\nThis seems to be quite empirical and quite evident. The essays\nsubmitted the thesis that this simple dichotomization of the practical\nsituation of power and enjoyment, when menaced, into what is there\n(whether as obstacle or as resource), and into suggested\ninventions--projections of something else to be brought to bear upon\nit, ways of dealing with it--is the explanation of the time-honored\nlogical determinations of brute fact, datum and meaning or ideal\nquality; of (in more psychological terminology) sense-perception and\nconception; of particulars (parts, fragments) and universals-generics;\nand also of whatever there is of intrinsic significance in the\ntraditional subject-predicate scheme of logic. It held, less formally,\nthat this view explained the eulogistic connotations always attaching\nto \"reason\" and to the work of reason in effecting unity, harmony,\ncomprehension, or synthesis, and to the traditional combination of a\ndepreciatory attitude toward brute facts with a grudging concession of\nthe necessity which thought is under of accepting them and taking them\nfor its own subject-matter and checks. More specifically, it is held\nthat this view supplied (and I should venture to say for the first\ntime) an explanation of the traditional theory of truth as a\ncorrespondence or agreement of existence and mind or thought. It showed\nthat the correspondence or agreement was like that between an invention\nand the conditions which the invention is intended to meet. Thereby a\nlot of epistemological hangers-on to logic were eliminated; for the\ndistinctions which epistemology had misunderstood were located where\nthey belong:--in the art of inquiry, considered as a joint process of\nascertainment and invention, projection, or \"hypothesizing\"--of which\nmore below.\n\n\nIV\n\nThe essays were published in 1903. At that time (as has been noted)\nidealism was in practical command of the philosophic field in both\nEngland and this country; the logics in vogue were profoundly\ninfluenced by Kantian and post-Kantian thought. Empirical logics,\nthose conceived under the influence of Mill, still existed, but their\nlight was dimmed by the radiance of the regnant idealism. Moreover,\nfrom the standpoint of the doctrine expounded in the essays, the\nempirical logic committed the same logical fault as did the\nidealistic, in taking sense-data to be primitive (instead of being\nresolutions of the _things_ of prior experiences into elements for the\naim of securing evidence); while it had no recognition of the specific\nservice rendered by intelligence in the development of new meanings\nand plans of new actions. This state of things may explain the\ncontroversial nature of the essays, and their selection in particular\nof an idealistic logic for animadversion.\n\nSince the essays were written, there has been an impressive revival of\nrealism, and also a development of a type of logical theory--the\nso-called Analytic Logic--corresponding to the philosophical\naspirations of the new realism. This marked alteration of intellectual\nenvironment subjects the doctrine of the essays to a test not\ncontemplated when they were written. It is one thing to develop a\nhypothesis in view of a particular situation; it is another to test\nits worth in view of procedures and results having a radically\ndifferent motivation and direction. It is, of course, impossible to\ndiscuss the analytic logic in this place. A consideration of how some\nof its main tenets compare with the conclusions outlined above will,\nhowever, throw some light upon the meaning and the worth of the\nlatter. Although this was formulated with the idealistic and\nsensationalistic logics in mind, the hypothesis that knowledge can be\nrightly understood only in connection with considerations of time and\ntemporal position is a general one. If it is valid, it should be\nreadily applicable to a critical placing of any theory which ignores\nand denies such temporal considerations. And while I have learned much\nfrom the realistic movement about the full force of the position\nsketched in the essays when adequately developed; and while later\ndiscussions have made it clear that the language employed in the\nessays was sometimes unnecessarily (though naturally) infected by the\nsubjectivism of the positions against which it was directed, I find\nthat the analytic logic is also guilty of the fault of temporal\ndislocation.\n\nIn one respect, idealistic logic takes cognizance of a temporal\ncontrast; indeed, it may fairly be said to be based upon it. It seizes\nupon the contrast in intellectual force, consistency, and\ncomprehensiveness between the crude or raw data with which science\nsets out and the defined, ordered, and systematic totality at which it\naims--and which in part it achieves. This difference is a genuine\nempirical difference. Idealism noted that the difference may properly\nbe ascribed to the intervention of thinking--that thought is what\nmakes the difference. Now since the outcome of science is of higher\nintellectual rank than its data, and since the intellectualistic\ntradition in philosophy has always identified degrees of logical\nadequacy with degrees of reality, the conclusion was naturally drawn\nthat _the_ real world--absolute reality--was an ideal or\nthought-world, and that the sense-world, the commonsense-world, the\nworld of actual and historic experience, is simply a phenomenal world\npresenting a fragmentary manifestation of that thought which the\nprocess of human thinking makes progressively explicit and articulate.\n\nThis perception of the intellectual superiority of objects which are\nconstituted at the conclusion of thinking over those which formed its\ndata may fairly be termed the empirical factor in the idealistic\nlogic. The essence of the realistic reaction, on its logical side, is\nexceedingly simple. It starts from those objects with which science,\napproved science, ends. Since they are the objects which are _known_,\nwhich are true, they are the real objects. That they are also objects\nfor intervening thinking is an interesting enough historical and\npsychological fact, but one quite irrelevant to their natures, which\nare precisely what knowledge finds them to be. In the biography of\nhuman beings it may hold good that apprehension of objects is arrived\nat only through certain wanderings, endeavors, exercises, experiments;\npossibly acts called sensation, memory, reflection may be needed by\nmen in reaching a grasp of the objects. But such things denote facts\nabout the history of the knower, not about the nature of the known\nobject. Analysis will show, moreover, that any intelligible account of\nthis history, any verified statement of the psychology of knowing\nassumes objects which are unaffected by the knowing--otherwise the\npretended history is merely pretense and not to be trusted. The\nhistory of the process of knowing, moreover, implies also the terms\nand propositions--truths--of logic. That logic must therefore be\nassumed as a science of objects real and true, quite apart from any\nprocess of thinking them. In short, the requirement is that we shall\nthink things as they are themselves, not make them into objects\nconstructed by thinking.\n\nThis revival of realism coincided also with an important movement in\nmathematics and logic: the attempt to treat logical distinctions by\nmathematical methods; while at the same time mathematical\nsubject-matter had become so generalized that it was a theory of types\nand orders of terms and propositions--in short, a logic. Certain minds\nhave always found mathematics the type of knowledge, because of its\ndefiniteness, order, and comprehensiveness. The wonderful\naccomplishments of modern mathematics, including its development into\na type of highly generalized logic, was not calculated to lessen the\ntendency. And while prior philosophers have generally played their\nadmiration of mathematics into the hands of idealism (regarding\nmathematical subject-matter as the embodiment or manifestation of pure\nthought), the new philosophy insisted that the terms and types of\norder constituting mathematical and logical subject-matter were real\nin their own right, and (at most) merely led up to and discovered by\nthinking--an operation, moreover, itself subjected (as has been\npointed out) to the entities and relationships set forth by logic.\n\nThe inadequacy of this summary account may be pardoned in view of the\nfact that no adequate exposition is intended; all that is wanted is\nsuch a statement of the general relationship of idealism to realism as\nmay serve as the point of departure for a comparison with the\ninstrumentalism of the essays. In bare outline, it is obvious that the\ntwo latter agree in regarding thinking as instrumental, not as\nconstitutive. But this agreement turns out to be a formal matter in\ncontrast with a disagreement concerning that _to which_ thinking is\ninstrumental. The new realism finds that it is instrumental simply to\nknowledge of objects. From this it infers (with perfect correctness and\ninevitableness) that thinking (including all the operations of discovery\nand testing as they might be set forth in an inductive logic) is a mere\npsychological preliminary, utterly irrelevant to any conclusions\nregarding the nature of objects known. The thesis of the essays is that\nthinking is instrumental to a control of the environment, a control\neffected through acts which would not be undertaken without the prior\nresolution of a complex situation into assured elements and an\naccompanying projection of possibilities--without, that is to say,\nthinking.\n\nSuch an instrumentalism seems to analytic realism but a variant of\nidealism. For it asserts that processes of reflective inquiry play a\npart in shaping the objects--namely, terms and propositions--which\nconstitute the bodies of scientific knowledge. Now it must not only be\nadmitted but proclaimed that the doctrine of the essays holds that\nintelligence is not an otiose affair, nor yet a mere preliminary to a\nspectator-like apprehension of terms and propositions. In so far as it\nis idealistic to hold that objects of knowledge _in their capacity of\ndistinctive objects of knowledge_ are determined by intelligence, it\nis idealistic. It believes that faith in the constructive, the\ncreative, competency of intelligence was the redeeming element in\nhistoric idealisms. Lest, however, we be misled by general terms, the\nscope and limits of this \"idealism\" must be formulated.\n\n(1) Its distinguishing trait is that it defines thought or\nintelligence by function, by work done, by consequences effected. It\ndoes not start with a power, an entity or substance or activity which\nis ready-made thought or reason and which as such constitutes the\nworld. Thought, intelligence, is to it just a name for the events and\nacts which make up the processes of analytic inspection and projected\ninvention and testing which have been described. These events, these\nacts, are wholly natural; they are \"realistic\"; they comprise the\nsticks and stones, the bread and butter, the trees and horses, the\neyes and ears, the lovers and haters, the sighs and delights of\nordinary experience. Thinking is what some of the actual existences\n_do_. _They_ are in no sense constituted by thinking; on the contrary,\nthe problems of thought are set by _their_ difficulties and its\nresources are furnished by _their_ efficacies; its acts are _their_\ndoings adapted to a distinctive end.\n\n(2) The reorganization, the modification, effected by thinking is, by\nthis hypothesis, a physical one. Thinking ends in experiment and\nexperiment is an _actual_ alteration of a physically antecedent\nsituation in those details or respects which called for thought in\norder to do away with some evil. To suffer a disease and to try to do\nsomething for it is a primal experience; to look into the disease, to\ntry and find out just what makes it a disease, to invent--or\nhypothecate--remedies is a reflective experience; to try the suggested\nremedy and see whether the disease is helped is the act which\ntransforms the data and the intended remedy into _knowledge objects_.\nAnd this transformation into knowledge objects is also effected by\nchanging physical things by physical means.\n\nSpeaking from this point of view, the decisive consideration as\nbetween instrumentalism and analytic realism is whether the operation\nof experimentation is or is not necessary to knowledge. The\ninstrumental theory holds that it is; analytic realism holds that even\nthough it were essential in _getting_ knowledge (or in learning), it\nhas nothing to do with knowledge itself, and hence nothing to do with\nthe known object: that it makes a change only in the knower, not in\nwhat is to be known. And for precisely the same reason,\ninstrumentalism holds that an object as a knowledge-object is never a\nwhole; that it is surrounded with and inclosed by things which are\nquite other than objects of knowledge, so that knowledge cannot be\nunderstood in isolation or when taken as mere beholding or grasping of\nobjects. That is to say, while it is making the sick man better or\nworse (or leaving him just the same) which determines the\nknowledge-value of certain findings of fact and certain conceptions as\nto mode of treatment (so that by the treatment they become definitely\nknowledge-objects), yet improvement or deterioration of the patient is\nother than an object of cognitive apprehension. Its knowledge-object\nphase is a selection in reference to prior reflections. So the\nlaboratory experiment of a chemist which brings to a head a long\nreflective inquiry and settles the intellectual status of its findings\nand theorizings (thereby making them into cognitive concerns or terms\nand propositions) is itself much more than a knowledge of terms and\npropositions, and only by virtue of this surplusage is it even\ncontemplative knowledge. He knows, say, tin, when he has made tin into\nan outcome of his investigating procedures, but tin is much more than\na term of knowledge.\n\nPutting the matter in a slightly different way, logical (as distinct\nfrom na\u00efve) realism confuses means of knowledge with objects of\nknowledge. The means are twofold: they are (_a_) the data of a\nparticular inquiry so far as they are significant because of prior\nexperimental inquiries; and (_b_) they are the meanings which have\nbeen settled in consequence of prior intellectual undertakings: on the\none hand, particular things or qualities as signs; on the other,\ngeneral meanings as possibilities of what is signified by given data.\nOur physician has in advance a technique for telling that certain\nparticular traits, if he finds them, are symptoms, signs; and he has a\nstore of diseases and remedies in mind which may possibly be meant in\nany given case. From prior reflective experiments he has learned to\nlook for temperature, for rate of heartbeats, for sore spots in\ncertain places; to take specimens of blood, sputum, of membrane, and\nsubject them to cultures, microscopic examination, etc. He has\nacquired certain habits, in other words, in virtue of which certain\nphysical qualities and events are more than physical, in virtue of\nwhich they are signs or indications of something else.\n\nOn the other hand, this something else is a somewhat not physically\npresent at the time: it is a series of events still to happen. It is\nsuggested by what is given, but is no part of the given. Now, in the\ndegree in which the physician comes to the examination of what is\nthere with a large and comprehensive stock of such possibilities or\nmeanings in mind, he will be intellectually resourceful in dealing\nwith a particular case. They (the concepts or universals of the\nsituation) are (together with the sign-capacity of the data) the\n_means_ of knowing the case in hand; they are the agencies of\ntransforming it, through the actions which they call for, into an\nobject--an object of knowledge, a truth to be stated in propositions.\nBut since the professional (as distinct from the human) knower is\nparticularly concerned with the elaboration of these tools, the\nprofessional knower--of which the class philosopher presents of course\none case--ungenerously drops from sight the situation in its integrity\nand treats these instrumentalities of knowledge as objects of\nknowledge. Each of these aspects--signs and things signified--is\nsufficiently important to deserve a section on its own account.\n\n\nV\n\nThe position taken in the essays is frankly realistic in acknowledging\nthat certain brute existences, detected or laid bare by thinking but\nin no way constituted out of thought or any mental process, set every\nproblem for reflection and hence serve to test its otherwise merely\nspeculative results. It is simply insisted that as a matter of fact\nthese brute existences are equivalent neither to the objective content\nof the situations, technological or artistic or social, in which\nthinking originates, nor to the things to be known--to the objects of\nknowledge. Let us take the sequence of mineral rock in place, pig iron\nand the manufactured article, comparing the raw material in its\nundisturbed place in nature to the original _res_ of experience,\ncompare the manufactured article to the objective and object of\nknowledge, and the brute datum to the metal undergoing extraction from\nraw ore for the sake of being wrought into a useful thing. And we\nshould add that just as the manufacturer always has a lot of already\nextracted ore on hand for use in machine processes as it is wanted, so\nevery person of any maturity, especially if he lives in an environment\naffected by previous scientific work, has a lot of extracted data--or,\nwhat comes to the same thing, of ready-made tools of extraction--for\nuse in inference as they are required. We go about with a disposition\nto identify certain shapes as tables, certain sounds as words of the\nFrench language, certain cries as evidences of distress, certain\nmassed colors as woods in the distance, certain empty spaces as\nbuttonholes, and so on indefinitely. The examples are trivial enough.\nBut if more complicated matters were taken, it would be seen that a\nlarge part of the technique of science (all of science which is\nspecifically \"inductive\" in character) consists of methods of finding\nout just what qualities are unambiguous, economical, and dependable\nsigns of those other things which cannot be got at as directly as can\nthe sign-bearing elements. And if we started from the more obscure and\ncomplex difficulties of identification and diagnosis with which the\nsciences of physiology, botany, astronomy, chemistry, etc., deal, we\nshould be forced to recognize that the identifications of everyday\nlife--our \"perceptions\" of chairs, tables, trees, friends--differ only\nin presenting questions much easier of solution.\n\nIn every case, it is a matter of fixing some given physical existence\nas a sign of some other existences not given in the same way as is\nthat which serves as a sign. These words of Mill might well be made\nthe motto of every logic: \"To draw inferences has been said to be the\ngreat business of life. Everyone has daily, hourly, and momentary need\nof ascertaining facts which he has not directly observed.... It is\nthe only occupation in which the mind never ceases to be engaged.\"\nSuch being the case, the indispensable condition of doing the business\nwell is the careful determination of the sign-force of specific things\nin experience. And this condition can never be fulfilled as long as a\nthing is presented to us, so to say, in bulk. The complex\norganizations which are the subject-matter of our direct activities\nand enjoyments are grossly unfit to serve as intellectual indications\nor evidence. Their testimony is almost worthless, they speak so many\nlanguages. In their complexity, they point equally in all directions;\nin their unity, they run in a groove and point to whatever is most\ncustomary. To break up the complexity, to resolve it into a number of\nindependent variables each as irreducible as it is possible to make\nit, is the only way of getting secure pointers as to what is indicated\nby the occurrence of the situation in question. The \"objects\" of\nordinary life, stones, plants, cats, rocks, moon, etc., are neither\nthe data of science nor the objects at which science arrives.\n\nWe are here face to face with a crucial point in analytic realism.\nRealism argues that we have no alternative except either to regard\nanalysis as falsifying (\u00e0 la Bergson), and thus commit ourselves to\ndistrust of science as an organ of knowledge, or else to admit that\nsomething eulogistically termed Reality (especially as _Existence_,\nBeing as subject to space and time determinations) is but a complex\nmade up of fixed, mutually independent simples: viz., that Reality is\ntruly conceived only under the caption of whole and parts, where the\nparts are independent of each other and consequently of the whole. For\ninstrumentalism, however, the alleged dilemma simply does not exist.\nThe results of abstraction and analysis are perfectly real; but they\nare real, like everything else, _where_ they are real: that is to say,\nin some _particular_ _co_existence in the situation where they\noriginate and operate.\n\nThe remark is perhaps more cryptic than enlightening. Its intent is\nthat reflection is an actual occurrence as much so as a thunderstorm\nor a growing plant, and as an actual existence it is characterized by\nspecific existential traits uniquely belonging to it: the entities of\nsimple data as such. It is in control of the evidential function that\nirreducible and independent simples or elements exist. They certainly\nare found there; as we have seen they _are_ \"common-sense\" objects\nbroken up into expeditious and unambiguous signs of conclusions to be\ndrawn, conclusions about other things with which they--the\nelements--are continuous in some respects, although discrete[4] with\nrespect to their sensory conditions. But there is no more reason for\nsupposing that they exist _elsewhere_ in the same manner than there is\nfor supposing that centaurs coexist along with domestic horses and\ncows because they coexist with the material of folk-tales or rites, or\nfor supposing that pigs of iron pre-existed as pigs in the mine. There\nis no falsifying in analysis _because_ the analysis is carried on\nwithin a situation which controls it. The fallacy and falsifying is on\nthe part of the philosopher who ignores the contextual situation and\nwho transfers the properties which things have as dependable\nevidential signs over to things in other modes of behavior.\n\nIt is no reply to this position to say that the \"elements\" or simples\nwere there prior to inquiry and to analysis and abstraction. Of course\ntheir subject-matter was in some sense \"there\"; and, being there, was\nfound, discovered, or detected--hit upon. I am not questioning this\nstatement; rather, I have been asserting it. But I am asking for\npatience and industry to consider the matter somewhat further. I would\nask the man who takes the terms of logical analysis (physical\nresolution for the sake of getting assured evidential indications of\nobjects as yet unknown) to be things which coexist with the things of\na non-inferential situation, to inquire _in what way_ his independent\ngiven ultimates were there prior to analysis. I would point out that\nin any case they did _not_ pre-exist _as_ signs. (_a_) Consequently,\nwhatever traits or properties they possess as signs must at least be\nreferred exclusively to the reflective situation. And they must\npossess some distinguishing traits _as_ signs; otherwise they would\nbe indistinguishable from anything else which happens to be thought\nof, and could not be employed as evidence: could not be, in short,\nwhat they are. If the reader will seriously ask just what traits data\ndo possess as signs, or evidence, I shall be quite content to leave\nthe issue to the results of his own inquiries. (_b_) Any inquiry as to\n_how_ the data antecedently exist will, I am confident, show that they\ndo not exist in the same purity, the same external exclusiveness and\ninternal homogeneity, which they present within the situation of\ninference, any more than the iron which pre-existed in the rocks in\nthe mountains was just the same as the fluxed and extracted ore. Hence\nthey did not exist in the same isolated simplicity. I have not the\nslightest interest in exaggerating the scope of this difference. The\nimportant matter is not its extent or range, but what such a\nchange--however small--indicates: namely, that the material is\nentering into a new environment, and has been subjected to the changes\nwhich will make it useful and effective in that environment. It is\ntrivial to suppose that the sole or even the primary difficulty which\nan analytic realism has to face is the occurrence of error and\nillusions, of \"secondary\" qualities, etc. The difficulty resides in\nthe contrast of the world of a na\u00efve, say Aristotelian, realism with\nthat of a highly intellectualized and analytic disintegration of the\neveryday world of things. If realism is generous enough to have a\nplace _within_ its world (as a _res_ having social and temporal\nqualities as well as spatial ones) for data in process of construction\nof _new_ objects, the outlook is radically different from the case\nwhere, in the interests of a theory, a realism insists that analytic\ndeterminations are the sole real things.[5]\n\nIf it be not only conceded but asserted that the subject-matter\ngenerating the data of scientific procedure antedates the procedure,\nit may be asked: what is the point of insisting so much upon the fact\nthat data exist only within the procedure? Is not the statement either\na trivial tautology or else an attempt to inject, _sub rosa_, a\ncertain idealistic dependence upon thought into even brute facts? The\nquestion is a fair one. And the clew to the reply may be found in the\nconsideration that it was not historically an easy matter to reduce\nthe iron of the rocks to the iron which could freely and effectively\nbe used in the manufacture of articles. It involved hitting upon a\nhighly complicated art, but an art, nevertheless, which anyone with\nthe necessary capital and education can command today as a matter of\ncourse, giving no thought to the fact that one is using an art\nconstructed originally with vast pains. Similarly it is by art, by a\ncarefully determined technique, that the things of our primary\nexperience are resolved into unquestioned and irreducible data,\nlacking in inner complexity and hence unambiguous. There is no call\nfor the scientific man in the pursuit of his calling to take account\nof this fact, any more than the manufacturer need reckon with the arts\nwhich are required to deliver him his material. But a logician, a\nphilosopher, is supposed to take a somewhat broader survey; and for\nhis purposes the fact which the scientific inquirer can leave out of\naccount, because it is no part of his business, may be the important\nfact. For the logician, it would seem, is concerned not with the\nsignificance of these or those data, but with the significance of\nthere being such things as data, with their traits of irreducibleness,\nbruteness, simplicity, etc. Now, as the special scientific inquirer\nanswers the question as to the significance of his special brute facts\nby discovering other facts with which they are connected, so it would\nseem that the logician can find out the significance of the existence\nof data (the fact which concerns him) only by finding out the other\nfacts with which _they_ coexist--their significance being their\nfactual continuities. And the first step in the search for these other\nfacts which supply significance is the recognition that they have been\nextracted for a purpose--for the purpose of guiding inference. It is\nthis purposeful situation of inquiry which supplies the _other_ facts\nwhich give the existence of brute data their significance. And unless\nthere is such a discovery (or some better one), the logician will\ninevitably fail in conceiving the import of the existence of brute\ndata. And this misconception is, I repeat, just the defect from which\nan analytic presentative realism suffers. To perceive that the brute\ndata laid bare in scientific proceedings are always traits of an\nextensive situation, and of that situation as one which needs control\nand which is to undergo modification in some respects, is to be\nprotected from any temptation to turn logical specification into\nmetaphysical atomism. The need for the protection is sufficiently\ngreat to justify spending some energy in pointing out that the brute\nobjective facts of scientific discovery are discovered facts,\ndiscovered by physical manipulations which detach them from their\nordinary setting.\n\nWe have stated that, strictly speaking, data (as the immediate\nconsiderations from which controlled inference proceeds) are not\nobjects but means, instrumentalities, of knowledge: things by which we\nknow rather than things known. It is by the color stain that we know a\ncellular structure; it is by marks on a page that we know what some\nman believes; it is by the height of the barometer that we know the\nprobability of rain; it is by the scratches on the rock that we know\nthat ice was once there; it is by qualities detected in chemical and\nmicroscopic examination that we know that a thing is human blood and\nnot paint. Just what the realist asserts about so-called mental states\nof sensations, images, and ideas, namely, that they are not the\nsubject-matter of knowledge but its agencies, holds of the chairs and\ntables to which he appeals in support of his doctrine of an immediate\ncognitive presentation, apart from any problem and any reflection. And\nthere is very solid ground for instituting the comparison: the\nsensations, images, etc., of the idealist are nothing but the chairs,\ntables, etc., of the realist in their ultimate irreducible\nqualities.[6] The problem in which the realist appeals to the\nimmediate apprehension of the table is the epistemological problem,\nand he appeals to the table not as an object of knowledge (as he\nthinks he does), but as evidence, as a means of knowing his\nconclusion--his real _object_ of knowledge. He has only to examine his\nown evidence to see that it is evidence, and hence a term in a\nreflective inquiry, while the nature of knowledge is the _object_ of\nhis knowledge.\n\nAgain, the question may be asked: Since instrumentalism admits that\nthe table is really \"there,\" why make such a fuss about whether it is\nthere as a means or as an object of knowledge? Is not the distinction\nmere hair-splitting unless it is a way of smuggling in a\nquasi-idealistic dependence upon thought? The reply will, I hope,\nclinch the significance of the distinction, whether or no it makes it\nacceptable. Respect for knowledge and its object is the ground for\ninsisting upon the distinction. The object of knowledge is, so to\nspeak, a more dignified, a more complete, sufficient, and\nself-sufficing thing than any datum can be. To transfer the traits of\nthe object as known to the datum of reaching it, is a material, not a\nmerely verbal, affair. It is precisely this shift which leads the\npresentative realist to substitute for irreducibility and unambiguity\nof logical function (use in inference) physical and metaphysical\nisolation and elementariness. It is this shift which generates the\nneed of reconciling the deliverances of science with the structure and\nqualities of the world in which we directly live, since it sets up a\nrivalry between the claims of the data, of common-sense objects, and\nof scientific objects (the results of adequate inquiry). Above all it\ncommits us to a view that change is in some sense unreal, since\nultimate and primary entities, being simple, do not permit of change.\nNo; whatever is to be said about the validity of the distinction\ncontended for, it cannot be said to be insignificant. A theory which\ncommits us to the conception of a world of Eleatic fixities as primary\nand which regards alteration and organization as secondary has such\nprofound consequences for thought and conduct that a detection of its\nmotivating fallacy makes a substantial difference. No more fundamental\nquestion can be raised than the range and force of the applicability\nto nature, life, and society of the whole-and-part conception. And if\nwe confuse our premises by taking the existential instrumentalities of\nknowledge for its real objects, all distinctions and relations in\nnature, life, and society are thereby requisitioned to be really only\ncases of the whole-and-part nature of things.\n\n\nVI\n\nThe instrumental theory acknowledges the objectivity of _meanings_ as\nwell as of data. They are referred to and employed in reflective\ninquiry with the confidence attached to the hard facts of sense.\nPragmatic, as distinct from sensational, empiricism may claim to have\nantedated neo-realism in criticism of resolution of meanings into\nstates or acts of consciousness. As previously noted, meanings are\nindispensable instrumentalities of reflection, strictly coincident\nwith and correlative to what is analytically detected to be given, or\nirremovably there. Data in their fragmentary character pose a problem;\nthey also define it. They suggest possible meanings. Whether they\n_indicate_ them as well as suggest them is a question to be resolved.\nBut the meanings suggested are genuinely and existentially suggested,\nand the problem described by the data cannot be solved without their\nacknowledgment and use. That this instrumental necessity has led to a\nmetaphysical hypostatizing of meanings into essences or subsistences\nhaving some sort of mysterious being apart from qualitative things\nand changes is a source of regret; it is hardly an occasion for\nsurprise.\n\nTo be sure of our footing, let us return to empirical ground. It is as\ncertain an empirical fact that one thing suggests another as that fire\nalters the thing burned. The suggesting thing has to be there or\ngiven; something has to be there to do the suggesting. The suggested\nthing is obviously not \"there\" in the same way as that which suggests;\nif it were, it would not have to be suggested. A suggestion tends, in\nthe natural man, to excite action, to operate as a stimulus. I may\nrespond more readily and energetically to a suggested fire than to the\nthing from which the suggestion sprang: that is, the thing by itself\nmay leave me cold, the thing as suggesting something else may move me\nvigorously. The response if effected has all the force of a belief or\nconviction. It is _as if_ we believed, on intellectual grounds, that\nthe thing _is_ a fire. But it is discovered that not all suggestions\nare indications, or signifiers. The whale suggested by the cloud form\ndoes not stand on the same level as the fire suggested by smoke, and\nthe suggested fire does not always turn out fire in fact. We are led\nto examine the original point of departure and we find out that it was\nnot really smoke. In a world where skim-milk and cream suggestions,\nacted upon, have respectively different consequences, and where a\nthing suggests one as readily as the other (or skim-milk masquerades\nas cream), the importance of examination of the thing exercising the\nsuggestive force prior to acting upon what it suggests is obvious.\nHence the act of response naturally stimulated is turned into channels\nof inspection and experimental (physical) analysis. We move our body\nto get a better hold on it, and we pick it to pieces to see what it\nis.\n\nThis is the operation which we have been discussing in the last\nsection. But experience also testifies that the thing suggested is\nworth attention on its own account. Perhaps we cannot get very readily\nat the thing which, suggesting flame, suggests fire. It may be that\nreflection upon the meaning (or conception), \"fire,\" will help us.\nFire--here, there, or anywhere, the \"essence\" fire--means thus and so;\n_if_ this thing really means fire, it will have certain traits,\ncertain attributes. Are they there? There are \"flames\" on the stage as\npart of the scenery. Do they really indicate fire? Fire would mean\ndanger; but it is not possible that such a risk would be taken with an\naudience (other meanings, risk, audience, danger, being brought in).\nIt must be something else. Well, it is probably colored tissue-paper\nin strips rapidly blown about. This meaning leads us to closer\ninspection; it directs our observations to hunt for corroborations or\nnegations. If conditions permitted, it would lead us to walk up and\nget at the thing in close quarters. In short, devotion to a\nsuggestion, prior to accepting it as stimulus, leads first to other\nsuggestions which may be more applicable; and, secondly, it affords\nthe standpoint and the procedure of a physical experimentation to\ndetect those elements which are the more reliable signs, indicators\n(evidence). _Suggestions thus treated are precisely what constitute\nmeanings, subsistences, essences_, etc. Without such development and\nhandling of what is suggested, the process of analyzing the situation\nto get at its hard facts, and especially to get at just those which\nhave a right to determine inference, is haphazard--ineffectively done.\nIn the actual stress of any such needed determination it is of the\ngreatest importance to have a large stock of possible meanings to draw\non, and to have them ordered in such a way that we can develop each\npromptly and accurately, and move quickly from one to another. It is\nnot to be wondered at then that we not only conserve such suggestions\nas have been previously converted successfully into meanings, but also\nthat we (or some men at least) turn professional inquirers and\nthinkers; that meanings are elaborated and ordered in related systems\nquite apart from any immediately urgent situation; or that a realm of\n\"essences\" is built up apart from that of existences.\n\nThat suggestion occurs is doubtless a mystery, but so is it a mystery\nthat hydrogen and oxygen make water. It is one of the hard, brute\nfacts that we have to take account of. We can investigate the\nconditions under which the happening takes place, we can trace the\nconsequences which flow from the happening. By these means we can so\ncontrol the happening that it will take place in a more secure and\nfruitful manner. But all this depends upon the hearty acceptance of\nthe happening as fact. Suggestion does not of itself yield meanings;\nit yields only suggested things. But the moment we take a suggested\nthing and develop it in connection with other meanings and employ it\nas a guide of investigation (a method of inquiry), that moment we have\na full-fledged meaning on our hands, possessing all the verifiable\nfeatures which have been imported at any time to ideas, forms,\nspecies, essences, subsistences. This empirical identification of\nmeaning by means of the specific fact of suggestion cuts deep--if\nOccam's razor still cuts.\n\nA suggestion lies between adequate stimulation and logical indication.\nA cry of fire may start us running without reflection; we may have\nlearned, as children are taught in school, to react without\nquestioning. There is overt stimulation, but no suggesting. But if the\nresponse is held off or postponed, it may persist as suggestion: the\ncry suggests fire and suggests the advisability of flight. We may, in\na sense we must, call suggestion \"mental.\" But it is important to note\nwhat is meant by this term. Fire, running, getting burned, are not\nmental; they are physical. But in their status of being suggested they\nmay be called mental when we recognize this distinctive status. This\nmeans no more than that they are implicated in a specific way in a\nreflective situation, in virtue of which they are susceptible of\ncertain modes of treatment. Their status as suggested by certain\nfeatures of the actual situation (and possibly meant or indicated as\nwell as suggested) may be definitely fixed; then we get meanings,\nlogical terms--determinations.[7]\n\nWords are of course the agencies of fixation chiefly employed, though\nany kind of physical existence--a gesture, a muscular contraction in\nthe finger or leg or chest--under ready command may be used. What is\nessential is that there be a specific physical existence at hand which\nmay be used to concrete and hold on to the suggestion, so that the\nlatter may be handled on its own account. Until thus detached and\nrefixed there are things suggested, but hardly _a_ suggestion; things\nmeant, but hardly a meaning; things ideated, but hardly an idea. And\nthe suggested thing until detached is still too literal, too tied up\nwith other things, to be further developed or to be successfully used\nas a method of experimentation in new directions so as to bring to\nlight new traits.\n\nAs data are signs which _indicate_ other existences, so meanings are\nsigns which _imply_ other meanings.[8] I am doubtful, for example,\nwhether _this_ is a man or not; that is, I am doubtful as to some given\ntraits when they are taken as signs or evidences, but I am inclined to\nthe hypothesis of a man. Having such a tentative or conceptual object\nin mind, I am enabled to explore economically and effectively, instead\nof at random, what is present, _provided_ I can elaborate the\nimplications of the term \"man.\" To develop its implications is all one\nwith telling its meaning in connection with other meanings. Being a man\nmeans, for example, speaking when spoken to--another meaning which need\nhave been no part of \"man\" as originally suggested. This meaning of\n\"answering questions\" will then suggest a procedure which the term\n\"man\" in its first meaning did not possess; it is an implication or\nimplied meaning which puts me in a new and possibly more fruitful\nrelation to the thing. (The process of developing implications is\nusually termed \"discourse\" or ratiocination.) Now, be it noted,\nreplying to questions is no part of the _definition_ of man; it would\nnot be now an implication of Plato or of the Russian Czar for me. In\nother words, there is something in the actual situation which suggests\n_inquiring_ as well as _man_; and it is the interaction between these\ntwo suggestions which is fruitful. There is consequently no mystery\nabout the fruitfulness of deduction--though this fruitfulness has been\nurged as though it offered an insuperable objection to instrumentalism.\nOn the contrary, instrumentalism is the only theory to which deduction\nis not a mystery. If a variety of wheels and cams and rods which have\nbeen invented with reference to doing a given task are put together,\none expects from the assembled parts a result which could not have been\ngot from any one of them separately or from all of them together in a\nheap. Because they are independent and unlike structures, working on\none another, something new happens. The same is true of terms in\nrelation to one another. When these are brought to bear upon one\nanother, something new, something quite unexpected happens, quite as\nwhen one tries an acid with which he is not familiar upon a rock with\nwhich he is unfamiliar--that is, unfamiliar in such a conjunction, in\nspite of intimate acquaintance elsewhere. A definition may fix a\ncertain modicum of meaning in the abstract, as we say; it is a\nspecification of a minimum which gives the point of departure in every\ninteraction of a term with other terms. But nothing follows from the\ndefinition by itself or in isolation. It is explicit (boringly so) and\nhas no implications. But bring it in connection with another term with\nwhich it has not previously interacted and it may behave in the most\ndelightful or in the most disgustingly disappointing way. The\nnecessity for independent terms is made obvious in the modern theory of\naxioms. It escapes attention in much of the contemporary logic of\ntransitive and non-transitive, symmetrical and non-symmetrical relations,\nbecause the terms are so loaded that there are no propositions at all,\nbut only discriminations of orders of terms. The terms which figure\nin the discussions, in other words, are correlatives--\"brother,\"\n\"parent,\" \"up,\" \"to the right of,\" \"like,\" \"greater,\" \"after.\"\nSuch terms are not logical terms; they are _halves_ of such terms as\n\"brother-other-offspring-of-the-same-parents\"; \"parent-child\";\n\"up-down\"; \"right-left\"; \"thing-similar-to-another-thing\";\n\"greater-less\"; \"after-before.\" They express positions in a\n_determined_ situation; they are _relatives_, not relations. They lack\nimplications, being explicit. But a man who is a brother and also a\nrival in love, and a poorer man than his rival brother, expresses an\ninteraction of different terms from which something might happen: terms\nwith implications, terms constituting a proposition, which a\ncorrelative term never does--till brought into conjunction with a term\nof which it is not a relative. To have called a thing \"up\" or \"brother\"\nis to have already solved its import in some situation. It is dead till\nset to work in some _other_ situation.\n\nExperience shows, moreover, that certain qualities of things are much\nmore fruitful and much more controllable than others when taken as\nmeanings to be used in drawing conclusions. The term must be of a\nnature to develop a method of behavior by which to test whether it is\nthe meaning of the situation. Since it is desirable to have a stock of\nmeanings on hand which are so connected that we can move readily from\none to another in any direction, the stock is effective in just the\ndegree in which it has been worked into a system--a comprehensive and\norderly arrangement. Hence, while all meanings are derived from things\nwhich antedate suggestion--or thinking or \"consciousness\"--not all\nqualities are equally fitted to be meanings of a wide efficiency, and\nit is a work of art to select the proper qualities for doing the work.\nThis corresponds to the working over of raw material into an effective\ntool. A spade or a watchspring is made out of antecedent material, but\ndoes not pre-exist as a ready-made tool; and, the more delicate and\ncomplicated the work which it has to do, the more art intervenes.\nThese summary remarks will have to pass muster as indicating what a\nmore extensive treatment of a mathematical system of terms would show.\nMan began by working such qualities as hate and love and fear and\nbeauty into the meanings by which to interpret and control the\nperplexities of life. When they demonstrated their inefficacy, he had\nrecourse to such qualities as heavy and light, wet and dry, making\nthem into natural essences or explanatory and regulatory meanings.\nThat Greek mediaeval science did not get very far on these lines is a\ncommonplace. Scientific progress and practical control as systematic\nand deliberate matters date from the century of Galileo, when\nqualities which lend themselves to mathematical treatment were seized\nupon. \"The most promising of these ideal systems at first were of\ncourse the richer ones, the sentimental ones. The baldest and least\npromising ones were the mathematical ones; but the history of the\nlatter's application is a history of steadily advancing successes,\nwhile that of the sentimentally richer ones is one of relative\nsterility and failure.\"[9]\n\nThere is no problem of why and how the plow fits, or applies to, the\ngarden, or the watchspring to time-keeping. They were made for those\nrespective purposes; the question is how well they do their work, and\nhow they can be reshaped to do it better. Yet they were made out of\nphysical material; men used ready limbs or roots of trees with which\nto plow before they used metal. We do not measure the worth or reality\nof the tool by its closeness to its natural prototype, but by its\nefficiency in doing its work--which connotes a great deal of\nintervening art. The theory proposed for mathematical distinctions and\nrelations is precisely analogous. They are not the creations of mind\nexcept in the sense in which a telephone is a creation of mind. They\nfit nature because they are derived from natural conditions. Things\nnaturally bulge, so to speak, and naturally alter. To seize upon\nthese qualities, to develop them into keys for discovering the\nmeanings of brute, isolated events, and to accomplish this\neffectively, to develop and order them till they become economical\ntools (and tools upon tools) for making an unknown and uncertain\nsituation into a known and certain one, is the recorded triumph of\nhuman intelligence. The terms and propositions of mathematics are not\nfictions; they are not called into being by that particular act of\nmind in which they are used. No more is a self-binding reaper a\nfigment, nor is it called momentarily into being by the man who wants\nto harvest his grain. But both alike are works of art, constructed for\na purpose in doing the things which have to be done.\n\nWe may say of terms what Santayana so happily said of expression:\n\"Expression is a misleading term which suggests that something\npreviously known is imitated or rendered; whereas the expression is\nitself an original fact, the values of which are then referred to the\nthing expressed, much as the honors of a Chinese mandarin are\nattributed retroactively to his parents.\" The natural history of\nimputation of virtue should prove to the philosopher a profitable\ntheme. Even in its most superstitious forms (perhaps more _obviously_\nin them than elsewhere) it testifies to the sense of a service to be\nperformed and to a demand for application. The superstition lies in\nmaking the application to antecedents and to ancestors, where it is\nbut a shroud, instead of to descendants, where it is a generating\nfactor.\n\nEvery reflection leaves behind it a double effect. Its immediate\noutcome is (as I tried to show earlier) the direct reorganization of a\nsituation, a reorganization which confers upon its contents new\nincrements of intrinsic meaning. Its indirect and intellectual product\nis the defining of a meaning which (when fixed by a suitable\nexistence) is a resource in subsequent investigations. I would not\ndespise the assistance lent by the words \"term\" and \"proposition.\" As\nslang has it, a pitched baseball is to the batter a \"proposition\"; it\nstates, or makes explicit, what he has to deal with next amid all the\nsurrounding and momentarily irrelevant circumstance. Every statement\nextracts and sets forth the net result of reflection up to date as a\ncondition of subsequent reflection. This extraction of the kernel of\npast reflections makes possible a throwing to one side of all the\nconsequences of prior false and futile steps; it enables one to\ndispense with the experiences themselves and to deal only with their\n_net_ profit. In a favorite phrase of realism, it gives an object \"as\nif there were no experience.\" It is unnecessary to descant upon the\neconomy of this procedure. It eliminates everything which in spite of\nits immediate urgency, or vividness, or weight of past authority, is\nrubbish for the purpose in hand. It enables one to get down to\nbusiness with just that which (presumably) is of importance in\nsubsequent procedure. It is no wonder that these logical kernels have\nbeen elevated into metaphysical essences.\n\nThe word \"term\" suggests the limiting condition of every process of\nreflection. It sets a fence beyond which it is, presumably, a waste to\nwander--an error. It sets forth that which _must_ be taken into\naccount--a limit which is inescapable, something which is to\nratiocination what the brute datum is to observation. In classic\nphrase, it is a notion, that is, a _noting_, of the distinctions which\nhave been fixed for the purposes of the kind of inquiry now engaged\nin. One has only to compare the terms of present scientific discourse\nwith those of, say, Aristotle, to see that the importance of terms as\ninstruments of a proper survey of and attack upon existential\nsituations is such that the terms resulting naturally and\nspontaneously from reflection have been dropped and more effective\nones substituted. In one sense, they are all equally objective;\naquosity is as genuine, as well as more obvious, a notion as the\npresent chemical conception. But the latter is able to enter a much\nwider scope of inquiries and to figure in them more prosperously.\n\nAs a special class of scientific inquirers develops, terms that were\noriginally _by-products_ of reflection become primary objects for the\nintellectual class. The \"troubles\" which occasion reflection are then\n_intellectual_ troubles, discrepancies within some current scheme of\npropositions and terms. The situation which undergoes reorganization\nand increase of comprised significance is that of the subject-matter\nof specialized investigation. Nevertheless the same general method\nrecurs within it, and the resulting objects--the terms and\npropositions--are for all, except those who produce them, instruments,\nnot terminal objects. The objection to analytic realism as a\nmetaphysics of existence is not so much an undue formalism as its\naffront to the commonsense-world of action, appreciation, and\naffection. The affront, due to hypostatizing terms into objects, is as\ngreat as that of idealism. A na\u00efve realism withstands both affronts.\n\nMy interest, however, is not to animadvert upon analytic realism. It\nis to show how the main tenets of instrumental logic stand in relation\nto considerations which, although ignored by the idealism which was\ncurrent when the theory received its first formulation, demand\nattention: the objective status of data and terms with respect to\nstates of mind or acts of awareness. I have tried to show that the\ntheory, without mutilation or torturing, makes provision for these\nconsiderations. They are not objections to it; they are considerations\nwhich are involved in it. There are questions at issue, but they\nconcern not matters of logic but matters of fact. They are questions\nof the _existential_ setting of certain logical distinctions and\nrelations. As to the comparative merits of the two schemes, I have\nnothing to say beyond what has been said, save that the tendency of\nthe analytic realism is inevitably to treat a difference between the\nlogic of inquiry and of dialectic as if it were itself a matter to be\nsettled by the logic of dialectic. I confess to some fear that a\nphilosophy which fails to identify science with terms and propositions\nabout things which are not terms and propositions, will first\nexaggerate and then misconstrue the function of dialectics, and land\nphilosophy in a formalism like unto the scholasticism from which the\nolder empiricism with all its defects emancipated those who took it to\nheart.\n\n\nVII\n\nReturn with me, if you please, to fundamentals. The word \"experience\"\nis used freely in the essays and without much explanation. In view of\nthe currency of subjectivistic interpretations of that term, the chief\nwonder is probably that the doctrine of the essays was not more\nmisunderstood than was actually the case. I have already said\nsomething designed to clarify the sense in which the term was used. I\nnow come back to the matter. What is the reason for using the term at\nall in philosophy? The history of philosophy supplies, I think, the\nanswer. No matter how subjective a turn was given to the word by Hume\nand Kant, we have only to go to an earlier period to see that the\nappeal to experience in philosophy was coincident with the\nemancipation of science from occult essences and causes, and with the\nsubstitution of methods of observation, controlled by experimentation\nand employing mathematical considerations, for methods of mere\ndialectic definition and classification. The appeal to experience was\nthe cry of the man from Missouri--the demand to be shown. It sprang\nfrom the desire to command nature by observing her, instead of\nanticipating her in order to deck her with aesthetic garlands and hold\nher with theological chains. The significance of experience was not\nthat sun and moon, stick and stone, are creatures of the senses, but\nthat men would not put their trust any longer in things which are\nsaid, however authoritatively, to exist, unless these things are\ncapable of entering into specifiable connections with the organism and\nthe organism with them. It was an emphatic assertion that until men\ncould see _how_ things got into belief, and what they did when they\ngot there, intellectual acceptance would be withheld.\n\nHas not the lesson, however, been so well learned that we can drop\nreference to experience? Would that such were the case. But the time\ndoes not seem to have come. Some things enter by way of the\nimagination, stimulated by emotional preferences and biases. For\n_certain_ purposes, they are not the worse for having entered by that\ngate, instead of through sensory-motor adjustments. Or they may have\nentered because of the love of man for logical form and symmetry and\nsystem, and because of the emotional satisfaction which harmony\nawakens in a sensitive soul. They too need not be any worse for all\nthat. But surely it is among the businesses of philosophy to\ndiscriminate between the kinds of goodness possessed by different\nkinds of things. And how can it discriminate unless by telling by what\nroad they got into our experience and what they do after they get\nthere? Assuredly the difference is not in _intrinsic_ content. It is\nnot because of self-obvious and self-contained traits of the immediate\nterms that Dante's world belongs to poetry and Newton's to scientific\nastronomy. No amount of pure inspection and excogitation could decide\nwhich belongs to which world. The difference in status and claim is\nmade by what we call experience: by the place of the two systems in\nexperience with respect to their generation and consequences. And\nassuredly any philosophy which takes science to be not an _account_ of\nthe world (which it is), but a literal and exhaustive apprehension of\nit in its full reality, a philosophy which therefore has no place for\npoetry or possibilities, still needs a theory of experience.\n\nIf a scientific man be asked what is truth, he will reply--if he frame\nhis reply in terms of his practice and not of some convention--that\nwhich is accepted upon adequate evidence. And if he is asked for a\ndescription of adequacy of evidence, he certainly will refer to\nmatters of observation and experiment. It is not the self-inclosed\ncharacter of the terms and propositions nor their systematic ordering\nwhich settles the case for him; it is the way they were obtained and\nwhat he can do with them in getting other things. And when a\nmathematician or logician asks philosophy to abandon this method, then\nis just the time to be most vigorous in insisting upon the necessity\nof reference to \"experience\" in order to fix the import of\nmathematical and logical pretensions. When students influenced by the\nsymmetry and system of mathematics cease building up their\nphilosophies in terms of traits of mathematical subject-matter in\nisolation, then empirical philosophers will have less call to mention\nexperience. Meantime, I know of no way of fixing the scope and claims\nof mathematics in philosophy save to try to point out just at what\njuncture it enters experience and what work it does after it has got\nentrance. I have made such an attempt in my account of the fixation\nand handling of suggestions as meanings. It is defective enough, but\nthe defects are to be remedied by a better empirical account and not\nby setting up against experience the claims of a logic aloof from\nexperience.\n\nThe objection then to a logic which rules out knowledge getting, and\nwhich bases logic exclusively upon the traits of known objects, is\nthat it is self-contradictory. There is no way to know what are the\ntraits of known objects, as distinct from imaginary objects, or\nobjects of opinion, or objects of unanalytic common-sense, save by\nreferring to the operations of getting, using, and testing\nevidence--the processes of knowledge getting. I am making no appeal\nfor skepticism at large; I am not questioning the right of the\nphysicist, the mathematician, or the symbolic logicist to go ahead\nwith accepted objects and do what he can with them. I am pointing out\nthat anyone who professes to be concerned with finding out what\nknowledge _is_, has for his primary work the job of finding out why it\nis so much safer to proceed with just these objects, than with those,\nsay, of Aristotelian science. Aristotle was not lacking in acuteness\nnor in learning. To him it was clear that objects of knowledge are the\nthings of ordinary perception, so far as they are referred to a form\nwhich comparison of perceived things, in the light of a final cause,\nmakes evident. If this view of the objects of knowledge has gone into\nthe discard, if quite other objects of knowledge are now received and\nemployed, it is because the methods of _getting_ knowledge have been\ntransformed, till, for the working scientist, \"objects of knowledge\"\nmean precisely the objects which have been obtained by approved\nprocesses of inquiry. To exclude consideration of these processes is\nthus to throw away the key to understanding knowledge and its objects.\nThere is a certain ironical humor in taking advantage of all the\nimproved methods of experimental inquiry with respect to all objects\nof knowledge--save one, knowledge itself; in denying their relevancy\nto knowing knowledge, and falling back upon the method everywhere else\ndisavowed--the method of relying upon isolated, self-contained\nproperties of subject-matter.\n\nOne of the points which gave much offense in the essays was the\nreference to genetic method--to a natural history of knowledge. I hope\nwhat has now been said makes clearer the nature of that reference. I\nwas to blame for not making the point more explicit; but I cannot\naltogether blame myself for my na\u00efvet\u00e9 in supposing that others\nunderstood by a natural history of knowledge what I understood by it.\nIt had not occurred to me that anyone would think that the history by\nwhich human ignorance, error, dogma, and superstition had been\ntransformed, even in its present degree of transformation, into\nknowledge was something which had gone on exclusively inside of men's\nheads, or in an inner consciousness. I thought of it as something\ngoing on in the world, in the observatory and the laboratory, and in\nthe application of laboratory results to the control of human health,\nwell-being, and progress. When a biologist says that the way to\nunderstand an organ, or the sociologist that the way to know an\ninstitution, resides in its genesis and history, he is understood to\nmean _its_ history. I took the same liberty for knowledge, that is,\nfor science. The accusation of \"subjectivisim\" taken in this light\nappears as a depressing revelation of what the current opinion about\nthe processes of knowledge is. To stumble on a stone need not be a\nprocess of knowledge; to hit it with a hammer, to pour acid upon it,\nto put pieces in the crucible, to subject things to heat and pressure\nto see if one can make a similar stone, _are_ processes of knowledge.\nSo is fixing suggestions by attaching names, and so is devising ways\nof putting these terms together so that new suggestions will arise, or\nso that suggestions may be transferred from one situation to another.\nBut not one of these processes is \"subjective\" in any sense which puts\nsubjectivity in opposition to the public out-of-doors world of nature\nand human companionship. To set genesis in opposition to analysis is\nmerely to overlook the fact that the sciences of existence have found\nthat considerations of genesis afford their most effective methods of\nanalysis.[10]\n\nThe same kind of consideration applies to the favorable view taken of\npsychology. If reference to modes and ways of experience--to\nexperiencing--is important for understanding the things with which\nphilosophy deals, then psychology is useful as a matter of course. For\nwhat is meant by psychology is  precisely a discrimination of the\nacts and attitudes of the organism which have a bearing upon\nrespective subject-matters and which have accordingly to be taken\naccount of before the subject-matters can be properly discriminated.\nThe matter was especially striking in the case of Lotze. He protested\nconstantly against the use of psychology, and yet his own data and\nprocedures were infected at every turn by psychology, and, if I am at\nall correct, by a false psychology. The particular separation which he\nmade between psychology and logic rested indeed upon a particular\npsychological assumption. The question is worth asking: Is not the\nmarked aversion on the part of some philosophers to any reference to\npsychology a Freudian symptom?\n\nA word more upon the place assigned by the essays to _need_ and\n_purpose_ and the humanistic factor generally. To save time I may\nquote a sentence from an early review which attributes to the essays\nthe following doctrine: \"If the plan turns out to be useful for our\nneed, it is correct--the judgment is true. The real-ideal distinction\nis that between stimulus of environment and plan of action or\ntentative response. Both real and ideal are equally experiences of the\nindividual man.\" These words can be interpreted either so as to convey\nthe position fairly, or so as radically to misconceive it; the latter\ncourse is a little easier, as the words stand. That \"real and ideal\"\nare experiences of the individual man in the sense that they actually\npresent themselves as specifications which can be studied by any man\nwho desires to study them is true enough. That such a study is as much\nrequired for determining their characters as it is for determining\nthose of carbon dioxide or of the constitution of Great Britain is\nalso the contention of the paper. But if the words quoted suggest to\nanyone that the real or even the ideal are somehow possessions of an\nindividual man, things secreted somewhere about him and then ejected,\nI can only say that I cannot understand the doctrine. I know of no\nready-made and antecedent conception of \"the individual man.\" Instead\nof telling about the nature of experience by means of a prior\nconception of individual man, I find it necessary to go to experience\nto find out what is meant by \"individual\" and by \"man\"; and also by\n\"the.\" Consequently even in such an expression as \"my experience,\" I\nshould wish not to contradict this idea of method by using the term\n\"my\" to swallow up the term \"experience,\" any more than if I said \"my\nhouse,\" or \"my country.\" On the contrary, I should expect that any\nintelligible and definite use of such phrases would throw much more\nlight upon \"me\" than upon \"house\" or \"country\"--or \"experience.\"\n\nThe possible misunderstanding is, I think, actual in the reference to\n\"our needs\" as a criterion of the correctness of truth of an idea or\nplan. According to the essays, it is the needs of a _situation_ which\nare determinative. They evoke thought and the need of knowing, and it\nis only within the situation that the identification of the needs with\na self occurs; and it is only by reflection upon the place of the\nagent in the encompassing situation that the nature of _his_ needs can\nbe determined. In fact, the actual occurrence of a disturbed,\nincomplete, and needy _situation_ indicates that _my_ present need is\nprecisely to investigate, to explore, to hunt, to pull apart things\nnow tied together, to project, to plan, to invent, and then to test\nthe outcome by seeing how it works as a method of dealing with hard\nfacts. One source of the demand, in short, for reference to experience\nas the encompassing universe of discourse is to keep us from taking\nsuch terms as \"self,\" \"my,\" \"need,\" \"satisfaction,\" etc., as terms\nwhose meanings can be accepted and proved either by themselves or by\neven the most extensive dialectic reference to other terms.\n\nTerms like \"real\" and \"ideal,\" \"individual,\" \"man,\" \"my,\" certainly\nallow of profitable dialectic (or purely prepositional) clarification\nand elaboration. But nothing is settled until these discursive\nfindings have been applied, through action, to things, and an\nexperience has been effected, which either meets or evades the\nspecification conceptually laid down. To suppose, for example, that\nthe import of the term \"ideal\" can be settled apart from exhibiting\nin experience some specific affair, is to maintain in philosophy that\nbelief in the occult essence and hidden cause which science had to get\nrid of before it got on the right track. The idealistic misconception\nof experience is no reason for throwing away its significant point of\ncontact with modern science and for having recourse then to objects\ndistinguished from old-fashioned _Dinge an Sich_ only because they\ninvolve just that reference to those experiences by which they were\nestablished and to which they are applied that propositional or\nanalytic realism professedly and elaborately ignores. In revenge, this\nignoring leaves on our hands the \"me,\" or knowing self, as a separate\nthing within which experience falls (instead of its falling in a\nspecifiable place within experience), and generates the insoluble\nproblem of how a subjective experience can beget objective knowledge.\n\nIn concluding, let me say that reference to experience seems at\npresent to be the easiest way of realizing the continuities among\nsubject-matters that are always getting split up into dualisms. A\ncreation of a world of subsistences or essences which are quite other\nthan the world of natural existences (which are other than natural\nexistences adapted to the successful performance of inference) is in\nitself a technical matter, though a discouraging one to a philosopher\nexpertly acquainted with all the difficulties which that view has\ngenerated from the time of Plato down. But the assistance which such\na philosophy lends to the practical and current divorce of the\n\"ideal\" from the natural world makes it a thing to be dreaded for\nother than professional reasons. God only knows how many of the\nsufferings of life are due to a belief that the natural scene and\noperations of our life are lacking in ideal import, and to the\nconsequent tendency to flee for the lacking ideal factors to some\nother world inhabited exclusively by ideals. That such a cut-off,\nideal world is impotent for direction and control and change of the\nnatural world follows as a matter of course. It is a luxury; it\nbelongs to the \"genteel tradition\" of life, the persistence of an\n\"upper\" class given to a detached and parasitic life. Moreover, it\nplaces the scientific inquirer within that irresponsible class. If\nphilosophers could aid in making it clear to a troubled humanity that\nideals are continuous with natural events, that they but represent\ntheir possibilities, and that recognized possibilities form methods\nfor a conduct which may realize them in fact, philosophers would\nenforce the sense of a social calling and responsibility. I do not say\nthat pointing out the continuity and interaction of various attitudes\nand interests in experience is the only way of effecting this\nconsummation. But for a large number of persons today it is the\nreadiest way.\n\nMuch may be said about that other great rupture of continuity which\nanalytic realism would maintain: that between the world and the knower\nas something outside of it, engaged in an otiose contemplative survey\nof it. I can understand the social conditions which generated this\nconception of an aloof knower. I can see how it protected the growth\nof responsible inquiry which takes effect in change of the\nenvironment, by cultivating a sense of the innocuousness of knowing,\nand thus lulling to sleep the animosity of those who, being in\ncontrol, had no desire to permit reflection which had practical\nimport. I can see how specialists at any time, professional knowers,\nso to speak, find in this doctrine a salve for conscience--a solace\nwhich all thinkers need as long as an effective share in the conduct\nof affairs is not permitted them. Above all, I can see how seclusion\nand the absence of the pressure of immediate action developed a more\nvaried curiosity, greater impartiality, and a more generous outlook.\nBut all this is no reason for continuing the idealization of a remote\nand separate mind or knower now that the method of intelligence is\nperfected, and changed social conditions not only permit but demand\nthat intelligence be placed within the procession of events. An\nintellectual integrity, an impartiality and detachment, which is\nmaintained only in seclusion is unpleasantly reminiscent of other\nidentifications of virtue with the innocence of ignorance. To place\nknowledge where it arises and operates in experience is to know that,\nas it arose because of the troubles of man, it is confirmed in\nreconstructing the conditions which occasioned those troubles.\nGenuine intellectual integrity is found in experimental knowing. Until\nthis lesson is fully learned, it is not safe to dissociate knowledge\nfrom experiment nor experiment from experience.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] I am indebted to an unpublished manuscript of Mr. S. Klyce of\nWinchester, Massachusetts, for the significance of the fact that our\nwords divide into _terms_ (of which more in the sequel) and into names\nwhich are not (strictly speaking) terms at all, but which serve to\nremind us of the vast and vague continuum, select portions of which\nonly are designated by words as _terms_. He calls such words \"infinity\nand zero\" words. The word \"experience\" is a typical instance of an\n\"infinity word.\" Mr. Klyce has brought out very clearly that a direct\nsituation of experience (\"situation\" as I employ it is another such\nword) has no need of any word for itself, the thing to which the word\nwould point being so egregiously there on its own behalf. But when\ncommunication about it takes place (as it does, not only in converse\nwith others, but when a man attempts a mutual reference of different\nperiods of his own life) a word is needed to remind both parties of\nthis taken-for-granted whole (another infinity term), while confusion\narises if explicit attention is not called to the fact that it is a\nvery different sort of word from the definite terms of discourse which\ndenote distinctions and their relations to one another. In the text,\nattention is called to the fact that the business man wrestling with a\ndifficulty or a scientific man engaged in an inquiry finds his checks\nand control specifically in the situation in which he is employed,\nwhile the theorizer at large leaves out these checks and limits, and\nso loses his clews. Well, the words \"experience,\" \"situation,\" etc.,\nare used to _remind_ the thinker of the need of reversion to precisely\nsomething which never can be one of the terms of his reflection but\nwhich nevertheless furnishes the existential meaning and status of\nthem all. \"Intuition,\" mysticism, philosophized or sophisticated\nmonism, are all of them aberrant ways of protesting against the\nconsequences which result from failing to note what is conveyed by\nwords which are not terms. Were I rewriting these essays _in toto_ I\nshould try to take advantage of these and other indispensable\nconsiderations advanced by Mr. Klyce; but as the essays must stand\nsubstantially as they were originally written, and as an Introduction\nto them must, in order to be intelligible, be stated in not\nincongruous phraseology, I wish simply to ask the reader to bear in\nmind this radical difference between such words as \"experience,\"\n\"reality,\" \"universe,\" \"situation,\" and such terms as \"typewriter,\"\n\"me,\" \"consciousness,\" \"existence,\" when used (as they must be used if\nthey are to be terms) in a differential sense. The term \"reality\" is\nparticularly treacherous, for the careless tradition of philosophy (a\ncarelessness fostered, I am sure, by failure to make verbally explicit\nthe distinction to which Mr. Klyce has called attention) uses\n\"reality\" both as a term of indifferent reference, equivalent to\neverything taken together or referred to _en masse_ as over against\nsome discrimination, and also as a discriminative term with a highly\neulogistic flavor: as _real_ money in distinction from counterfeit\nmoney. Then, although every inquiry in daily life, whether\ntechnological or scientific, asks _whether_ a thing is real only in\nthe sense of asking _what_ thing is real, philosophy concludes to a\nwholesale distinction between the real and the unreal, the real and\nthe apparent, and so creates a wholly artificial problem.\n\nIf the philosopher, whether idealistic or realistic, who holds that it\nis self-contradictory to criticize purely intellectualistic\nconceptions of the world, because the criticism itself goes on\nintellectualistic terms, so that its validity depends upon\nintellectual (or cognitive) conditions, will but think of the very\nbrute doings in which a chemist engages to fix the meanings of his\nterms and to test his theories and conceptions, he will perceive that\nall intellectual knowing is but a method for conducting an experiment,\nand that arguments and objections are but stimuli to induce somebody\nto try a certain experiment--to have recourse, that is, to a\nnon-logical non-intellectual affair. Or again, the argument is an\ninvitation to him to note that at the very time in which he is\nthinking, his thinking is set in a continuum which is not an object of\nthought. The importance attached to the word \"experience,\" then, both\nin the essays and in this Introduction, is to be understood as an\ninvitation to employ thought and discriminative knowledge as a means\nof plunging into something which no argument and no term can express;\nor rather as an invitation to note the fact that no plunge is needed,\nsince one's own thinking and explicit knowledge are already\nconstituted by and within something which does not need to be\nexpressed or made explicit. And finally, there is nothing mystical\nabout this, though mysticism doubtless roots in this fact. Its import\nis only to call notice to the meaning of, say, formulae communicated\nby a chemist to others as the result of his experiment. All that can\nbe communicated or expressed is that one believes such and such a\nthing. The communication has scientific instead of merely social\nsignificance because the communicated formula is a direction to other\nchemists to try certain procedures and see what they get. The\n_direction_ is capable of expression; the result of the experiment,\nthe experience, to which the propositions refer and by which they are\ntested, is not expressible. (Poetry, of course, is a more competent\norgan of suggesting it than scientific prose.) The word \"experience\"\nis, I repeat, a notation of an inexpressible as that which decides the\nultimate status of all which is expressed; inexpressible not because\nit is so remote and transcendent, but because it is so immediately\nengrossing and matter of course.\n\n[2] There are certain points of similarity between this doctrine and\nthat of Holt regarding contradictions and that of Montague regarding\n\"consciousness\" as a case of potential energy. But the latter doctrine\nseems to me to suffer, first, from an isolation of the brain from the\norganism, which leads to ignoring the active doing, and, secondly,\nfrom an isolation of the \"moment\" of reduction of actual to potential\nenergy. It appears as a curiously isolated and self-sufficient event,\ninstead of as the focus of readjustment in an organized activity at\nthe pivotal point of maximum \"tension\"--that is, of greatest\ninhibition in connection with greatest tendency to discharge. And\nwhile I think Holt is wholly right in connecting the possibility of\nerror with objectively plural and conflicting forces, I should hardly\nregard it as linguistically expedient to call counterbalancing forces\n\"contradictory.\" The counterbalancing forces of the vaulting do not\nseem to me contradictory in the arch. But if their presence led me to\nattempt to say \"up\" and \"down\" at the same time there would be\ncontradiction. But even admitting that contradictory propositions are\nmerely about forces which are contradictory--heating and cooling--it\nis still a long way to error. For propositions about such\n\"contradictions\" are obviously true propositions. It is only when we\nmake that reaction to one factor which is appropriate to dealing with\nthe other that there is error; and this can happen where there are no\ncontradictory forces at all beyond the fact that the _agent_ is pulled\ntwo incompatible and opposed ways at the same time.\n\n[3] For emphasis I am here exaggerating by condensing into a single\ndecisive act an operation which is continuously going on.\n\n[4] I would remark in passing that a recognition that a thing may be\ncontinuous in one respect and discrete in another would obviate a good\nmany difficulties.\n\n[5] In effect, the fallacy is the same as that of an idealistic theory\nwhich holds that all objects are \"really\" associations of sensations.\n\n[6] This statement is meant literally. The \"sensations\" of color,\nsound, etc., to which appeal is made in a scientific inquiry are\nnothing mental in structure or stuff; they are actual, extra-organic\nthings analyzed down to what is so indubitably there that it may\nsafely be taken as a basis of inference.\n\n[7] A term is not of course a mere word; a mere word is non-sense, for\na sound by itself is not a word at all. Nor is it a mere meaning,\nwhich is not even natural non-sense, being (if it be at all)\nsupernatural or transcendental nonsense. \"Terms\" signify that certain\nabsent existences are indicated by certain given existences, in the\nrespect that they are abstracted and fixed for intellectual use by\nsome physically convenient means, such as a sound or a muscular\ncontraction of the vocal organs.\n\n[8] This distinction of indication as existential and implication as\nconceptual or essential, I owe to Mr. Alfred Sidgwick. See his\n_Fallacies_, p. 50.\n\n[9] James, _Psychology_, II, 665.\n\n[10] I have even seen, in a criticism of the essays, the method of\ngenesis opposed to the method of experimentation--as if\nexperimentation were anything but the generation of some special\nobject!\n\n\n\n\nII\n\nTHE RELATIONSHIP OF THOUGHT AND ITS SUBJECT-MATTER\n\n\nNo one doubts that thought, at least reflective as distinct from what\nis sometimes called constitutive thought, is derivative and secondary.\nIt comes after something and out of something, and for the sake of\nsomething. No one doubts that the thinking of everyday practical life\nand of science is of this reflective type. We think about; we reflect\nover. If we ask what it is which is primary and radical to thought; if\nwe ask what is the final objective for the sake of which thought\nintervenes; if we ask in what sense we are to understand thought as a\nderived procedure, we are plunging ourselves into the very heart of\nthe logical problem: the relation of thought to its empirical\nantecedents and to its consequent, truth, and the relation of truth to\nreality.\n\nYet from the na\u00efve point of view no difficulty attaches to these\nquestions. The antecedents of thought are our universe of life and\nlove; of appreciation and struggle. We think about anything and\neverything: snow on the ground; the alternating clanks and thuds that\nrise from below; the relation of the Monroe Doctrine to the embroglio\nin Venezuela; the relation of art to industry; the poetic quality of\na painting by Botticelli; the battle of Marathon; the economic\ninterpretation of history; the proper definition of cause; the best\nmethod of reducing expenses; whether and how to renew the ties of a\nbroken friendship; the interpretation of an equation in hydrodynamics,\netc.\n\nThrough the madness of this miscellaneous citation there appears so\nmuch of method: anything--event, act, value, ideal, person, or\nplace--may be an object of thought. Reflection busies itself alike\nwith physical nature, the record of social achievement, and the\nendeavors of social aspiration. It is with reference to _such_ affairs\nthat thought is derivative; it is with reference to them that it\nintervenes or mediates. Taking some part of the universe of action, of\naffection, of social construction, under its special charge, and\nhaving busied itself therewith sufficiently to meet the special\ndifficulty presented, thought releases that topic and enters into\nfurther more direct experience.\n\nSticking for a moment to this na\u00efve standpoint, we recognize a certain\nrhythm of direct practice and derived theory; of primary construction\nand of secondary criticism; of living appreciation and of abstract\ndescription; of active endeavor and of pale reflection. We find that\nevery more direct primary attitude passes upon occasion into its\nsecondary deliberative and discursive counterpart. We find that when\nthe latter has done its work it passes away and passes on. From the\nna\u00efve standpoint such rhythm is taken as a matter of course. There is\nno attempt either to state the nature of the occasion which demands\nthe thinking attitude, or to formulate a theory of the standard by\nwhich is judged its success. No general theory is propounded as to the\nexact relationship between thinking and what antecedes and succeeds\nit. Much less do we ask how empirical circumstances can generate\nrationality of thought; nor how it is possible for reflection to lay\nclaim to power of determining truth and thereby of constructing\nfurther reality.\n\nIf we were to ask the thinking of na\u00efve life to present, with a\nminimum of theoretical elaboration, its conception of its own\npractice, we should get an answer running not unlike this: Thinking is\na kind of activity which we perform at specific need, just as at other\nneed we engage in other sorts of activity: as converse with a friend;\ndraw a plan for a house; take a walk; eat a dinner; purchase a suit of\nclothes, etc. In general, its material is anything in the wide\nuniverse which seems to be relevant to this need--anything which may\nserve as a resource in defining the difficulty or in suggesting modes\nof dealing effectively with it. The measure of its success, the\nstandard of its validity, is precisely the degree in which the\nthinking actually disposes of the difficulty and allows us to proceed\nwith more direct modes of experiencing, that are forthwith possessed\nof more assured and deepened value.\n\nIf we inquire why the na\u00efve attitude does not go on to elaborate these\nimplications of its own practice into a systematic theory, the answer,\non its own basis, is obvious. Thought arises in response to its own\noccasion. And this occasion is so exacting that there is time, as\nthere is need, only to do the thinking which is needed in that\noccasion--not to reflect upon the thinking itself. Reflection follows\nso naturally upon its appropriate cue, its issue is so obvious, so\npractical, the entire relationship is so organic, that once grant the\nposition that thought arises in reaction to specific demand, and there\nis not the particular type of thinking called logical theory because\nthere is not the practical demand for reflection of that sort. Our\nattention is taken up with particular questions and specific answers.\nWhat we have to reckon with is not the problem of, How can I think\n_\u00fcberhaupt_? but, How shall I think right _here and now_? Not what is\nthe test of thought at large, but what validates and confirms _this_\nthought?\n\nIn conformity with this view, it follows that a generic account of our\nthinking behavior, the generic account termed logical theory, arises\nat historic periods in which the situation has lost the organic\ncharacter above described. The general theory of reflection, as over\nagainst its concrete exercise, appears when occasions for reflection\nare so overwhelming and so mutually conflicting that specific adequate\nresponse in thought is blocked. Again, it shows itself when practical\naffairs are so multifarious, complicated, and remote from control that\nthinking is held off from successful passage into them.\n\nAnyhow (sticking to the na\u00efve standpoint), it is true that the\nstimulus to that particular form of reflective thinking termed logical\ntheory is found when circumstances require the act of thinking and\nnevertheless impede clear and coherent thinking in detail; or when\nthey occasion thought and then prevent the results of thinking from\nexercising directive influence upon the immediate concerns of life.\nUnder these conditions we get such questions as the following: What is\nthe relation of rational thought to crude or unreflective experience?\nWhat is the relation of thought to reality? What is the barrier which\nprevents reason from complete penetration into the world of truth?\nWhat is it that makes us live alternately in a concrete world of\nexperience in which thought as such finds not satisfaction, and in a\nworld of ordered thought which is yet only abstract and ideal?\n\nIt is not my intention here to pursue the line of historical inquiry\nthus suggested. Indeed, the point would not be mentioned did it not\nserve to fix attention upon the nature of the logical problem.\n\nIt is in dealing with this latter type of question that logical theory\nhas taken a turn which separates it widely from the theoretical\nimplications of practical deliberation and of scientific research.\nThe two latter, however much they differ from each other in detail,\nagree in a fundamental principle. They both assume that every\nreflective problem and operation arises with reference to some\n_specific_ situation, and has to subserve a _specific_ purpose\ndependent upon its own occasion. They assume and observe distinct\nlimits--limits from which and to which. There is the limit of origin\nin the needs of the particular situation which evokes reflection.\nThere is the limit of terminus in successful dealing with the\nparticular problem presented--or in retiring, baffled, to take up some\nother question. The query that at once faces us regarding the nature\nof logical theory is whether reflection upon reflection shall\nrecognize these limits, endeavoring to formulate them more exactly and\nto define their relationships to each other more adequately; or shall\nit abolish limits, do away with the matter of specific conditions and\nspecific aims of thought, and discuss thought and its relation to\nempirical antecedents and rational consequents (truth) at large?\n\nAt first blush, it might seem as if the very nature of logical theory\nas generalization of the reflective process must of necessity\ndisregard the matter of particular conditions and particular results\nas irrelevant. How, the implication runs, could reflection become\ngeneralized save by elimination of details as irrelevant? Such a\nconception in fixing the central problem of logic fixes once for all\nits future career and material. The essential business of logic is\nhenceforth to discuss the relation of thought as such to reality as\nsuch. It may, indeed, involve much psychological material,\nparticularly in the discussion of the processes which antecede\nthinking and which call it out. It may involve much discussion of the\nconcrete methods of investigation and verification employed in the\nvarious sciences. It may busily concern itself with the\ndifferentiation of various types and forms of thought--different modes\nof conceiving, various conformations of judgment, various types of\ninferential reasoning. But it concerns itself with any and all of\nthese three fields, not on their own account or as ultimate, but as\nsubsidiary to the main problem: the relation of thought as such, or at\nlarge, to reality as such, or at large. Some of the detailed\nconsiderations referred to may throw light upon the terms under which\nthought transacts its business with reality; upon, say, certain\npeculiar limitations it has to submit to as best it may. Other\nconsiderations throw light upon the ways in which thought gets at\nreality. Still other considerations throw light upon the forms which\nthought assumes in attacking and apprehending reality. But in the end\nall this is incidental. In the end the one problem holds: How do the\nspecifications of thought as such hold good of reality as such? In\nfine, logic is supposed to grow out of the epistemological inquiry and\nto lead up to its solution.\n\nFrom this point of view various aspects of logical theory are well\nstated by an author whom later on we shall consider in some detail.\nLotze[11] refers to \"universal forms and principles of thought which\nhold good everywhere both in judging of reality and in weighing\npossibility, _irrespective of any difference in the objects_.\" This\ndefines the business of _pure_ logic. This is clearly the question of\nthought as such--of thought at large or in general. Then we have the\nquestion \"of how far the most complete structure of thought ... can\nclaim to be an adequate account of that which we seem compelled to\nassume as the object and occasion of our ideas.\" This is clearly the\nquestion of the relation of thought at large to reality at large. It\nis epistemology. Then comes \"applied logic,\" having to do with the\nactual employment of concrete forms of thought with reference to\ninvestigation of specific topics and subjects. This \"applied\" logic\nwould, if the standpoint of practical deliberation and of scientific\nresearch were adopted, be the sole genuine logic. But the existence of\nthought _in itself_ having been agreed upon, we have in this \"applied\"\nlogic only an incidental inquiry of how the particular resistances and\noppositions which \"pure\" thought meets from particular matters may\nbest be discounted. It is concerned with methods of investigation\nwhich obviate defects in the relationship of thought at large to\nreality at large, as these present themselves under the limitations\nof human experience. It deals merely with hindrances, and with devices\nfor overcoming them; it is directed by considerations of utility. When\nwe reflect that this field includes the entire procedure of practical\ndeliberation and of concrete scientific research, we begin to realize\nsomething of the significance of the theory of logic which regards the\nlimitations of specific origination and specific outcome as irrelevant\nto its main problem, which assumes an activity of thought \"pure\" or\n\"in itself,\" that is, \"irrespective of any difference in its objects.\"\n\nThis suggests, by contrast, the opposite mode of stating the problem\nof logical theory. Generalization of the nature of the reflective\nprocess certainly involves elimination of much of the specific\nmaterial and contents of the thought-situations of daily life and of\ncritical science. Quite compatible with this, however, is the notion\nthat it seizes upon _certain_ specific conditions and factors, and\naims to bring them to clear consciousness--not to abolish them. While\neliminating the particular material of particular practical and\nscientific pursuits, (1) it may strive to hit upon the common\ndenominator in the various situations which are antecedent or primary\nto thought and which evoke it; (2) it may attempt to show how typical\nfeatures in the specific antecedents of thought call out diverse\ntypical modes of thought-reaction; (3) it may attempt to state the\nnature of the specific consequences in which thought fulfils its\ncareer.\n\n(1) It does not eliminate dependence upon specific occasions as\nprovocative of thought, but endeavors to define _what_ in the various\noccasions renders them thought-provoking. The specific occasion is not\neliminated, but insisted upon and brought into the foreground.\nConsequently, empirical considerations are not subsidiary incidents,\nbut are of essential importance so far as they enable us to trace the\ngeneration of the thought-situation. (2) From this point of view the\nvarious types and modes of conceiving, judging, and inference are\ntreated, not as qualifications of thought _per se_ or at large, but of\nreflection engaged in its specific, most economic, effective response\nto its own particular occasion; they are adaptations for control of\nstimuli. The distinctions and classifications that have been\naccumulated in \"formal\" logic are relevant data; but they demand\ninterpretation from the standpoint of use as organs of adjustment to\nmaterial antecedents and stimuli. (3) Finally the question of\nvalidity, or ultimate objective of thought, is relevant; but relevant\nas a matter of the specific issue of the specific career of a\nthought-function. All the typical investigatory and verificatory\nprocedures of the various sciences indicate the ways in which thought\nactually brings to successful fulfilment its dealing with various\ntypes of problems.\n\nWhile the epistemological type of logic may, as we have seen, leave\n(under the name of applied logic) a subsidiary place open for the\ninstrumental type, the type which deals with thinking as a specific\nprocedure relative to a specific antecedent occasion and to a\nsubsequent specific fulfilment is not able to reciprocate the favor.\nFrom its point of view, an attempt to discuss the antecedents, data,\nforms, and objectives of thought, apart from reference to particular\nposition occupied and particular part played in the growth of\nexperience, is to reach results which are not so much either true or\nfalse as they are radically meaningless--because they are considered\napart from limits. Its results are not only abstractions (for all\ntheorizing ends in abstractions), but abstractions without possible\nreference or bearing. From this point of view, the taking of something\n(whether that something be a thinking activity, its empirical\nstimulus, or its objective goal), apart from the limits of a historic\nor developing situation, is the essence of _metaphysical_\nprocedure--in that sense of metaphysics which makes a gulf between it\nand science.\n\nAs the reader has doubtless anticipated, it is the object of this\nchapter to present the problem and industry of reflective thought from\nthe standpoint of na\u00efve experience, using the term in a sense wide\nenough to cover both practical procedure and concrete scientific\nresearch. I resume by saying that this point of view knows no fixed\ndistinction between the empirical things and values of unreflective\nlife and the most abstract process of rational thought. It knows no\nfixed gulf between the highest flight of theory and a control of the\ndetails of practical construction and behavior. It passes, according\nto the occasion and opportunity of the moment, from the attitude of\nloving and struggling and doing to that of thinking and the reverse.\nIts contents or material shift their values back and forth from\ntechnological or utilitarian to aesthetic, ethical, or affectional. It\nutilizes data of perception, of meaning or of discursive ideation as\nneed calls, just as an inventor now utilizes heat, now mechanical\nstrain, now electricity, according to the demands set by his aim.\nAnything from past experience may be taken which appears to be an\nelement in either the statement or the solution of the present\nproblem. Thus we understand the coexistence, without contradiction, of\nan indeterminate possible field and a limited actual field. The\nundefined range of possible materials becomes specific through\nreference to an end.\n\nIn all this, there is no difference of kind between the methods of\nscience and those of the plain man. The difference is the greater\ncontrol by science of the statement of the problem, and of the\nselection and use of relevant material, both sensible and conceptual.\nThe two are related to each other just as the hit-or-miss,\ntrial-and-error inventions of uncivilized man stand to the deliberate\nand consecutively persistent efforts of a modern inventor to produce\na certain complicated device for doing a comprehensive piece of work.\nNeither the plain man nor the scientific inquirer is aware, as he\nengages in his reflective activity, of any transition from one sphere\nof existence to another. He knows no two fixed worlds--reality on one\nside and mere subjective ideas on the other; he is aware of no gulf to\ncross. He assumes uninterrupted, free, and fluid passage from ordinary\nexperience to abstract thinking, from thought to fact, from things to\ntheories and back again. Observation passes into development of\nhypothesis; deductive methods pass into use in description of the\nparticular; inference passes into action, all with no sense of\ndifficulty save those found in the particular task in question. The\nfundamental assumption is _continuity_.\n\nThis does not mean that fact is confused with idea, or observed datum\nwith voluntary hypothesis, theory with doing, any more than a traveler\nconfuses land and water when he journeys from one to the other. It\nsimply means that each is placed and used with reference to service\nrendered the other, and with reference to the future use of the other.\n\nOnly the epistemological spectator of traditional controversies is\naware of the fact that the everyday man and the scientific man in this\nfree and easy intercourse are rashly assuming the right to glide over\na cleft in the very structure of reality. This fact raises a query not\nfavorable to the epistemologist. Why is it that the scientific man,\nwho is constantly plying his venturous traffic of exchange of facts\nfor ideas, of theories for laws, of real things for hypotheses, should\nbe so wholly unaware of the radical and generic (as distinct from\nspecific) difficulty of the undertakings in which he is engaged? We\nthus come afresh to our inquiry: Does not the epistemological logician\nunwittingly transfer the specific difficulty which always faces the\nscientific man--the difficulty in detail of correct and adequate\ntranslation back and forth of _this_ set of facts and _this_ group of\nreflective consideration--into a totally different problem of the\nwholesale relation of thought at large to reality in general? If such\nbe the case, it is clear that the very way in which the\nepistemological type of logic states the problem of thinking, in\nrelation both to empirical antecedents and to objective truth, makes\nthat problem insoluble. Working terms, terms which as working are\nflexible and historic, relative and methodological, are transformed\ninto absolute, fixed, and predetermined properties of being.\n\nWe come a little closer to the problem when we recognize that every\nscientific inquiry passes historically through at least four stages.\n(_a_) The first of these stages is, if I may be allowed the bull, that\nin which scientific inquiry does not take place at all, because no\nproblem or difficulty in the quality of the experience presents itself\nto provoke reflection. We have only to cast our eye back from the\nexisting status of any science, or back from the status of any\nparticular topic in any science, to discover a time when no reflective\nor critical thinking busied itself with the matter--when the facts and\nrelations were taken for granted and thus were lost and absorbed in\nthe net meaning which accrued from the experience. (_b_) After the\ndawning of the problem there comes a period of occupation with\nrelatively crude and unorganized facts--hunting for, locating, and\ncollecting raw material. This is the empiric stage, which no existing\nscience, however proud in its attained rationality, can disavow as its\nown progenitor. (_c_) Then there is also a speculative stage: a period\nof guessing, of making hypotheses, of framing ideas which later on are\nlabeled and condemned as only ideas. There is a period of\ndistinction-making and classification-making which later on is\nregarded as only mentally gymnastic in character. And no science,\nhowever proud in its present security of experimental assurance, can\ndisavow a scholastic ancestor. (_d_) Finally, there comes a period of\nfruitful interaction between the mere ideas and the mere facts: a\nperiod when observation is determined by experimental conditions\ndepending upon the use of certain guiding conceptions; when reflection\nis directed and checked at every point by the use of experimental\ndata, and by the necessity of finding such a form for itself as will\nenable it to serve in a deduction leading to evolution of new\nmeanings, and ultimately to experimental inquiry which brings to\nlight new facts. In the emerging of a more orderly and significant\nregion of fact, and of a more coherent and self-luminous system of\nmeaning, we have the natural limit of evolution of the logic of a\ngiven science.\n\nBut consider what has happened in this historic record. Unanalyzed\nexperience has broken up into distinctions of facts and ideas; the\nfactual side has been developed by indefinite and almost miscellaneous\ndescriptions and cumulative listings; the conceptual side has been\ndeveloped by unchecked and speculative elaboration of definitions,\nclassifications, etc. Then there has been a relegation of accepted\nmeanings to the limbo of mere ideas; there has been a passage of some\nof the accepted facts into the region of mere hypothesis and opinion.\nConversely, there has been a continued issuing of ideas from the\nregion of hypotheses and theories into that of facts, of accepted\nobjective and meaningful objects. Out of a world of only _seeming_\nfacts, and of only _doubtful_ ideas, there emerges a world continually\ngrowing in definiteness, order, and luminosity.\n\nThis progress, verified in every record of science, is an absolute\nmonstrosity from the standpoint of the epistemology which assumes a\nthought in general, on one side, and a reality in general, on the\nother. The reason that it does not present itself as such a monster\nand miracle to those actually concerned with it is because\n_continuity_ of reference and of use controls all diversities in the\nmodes of existence specified and the types of significance assigned.\nThe distinction of meaning and fact is treated in the growth of a\nscience, or of any particular scientific problem, as an _induced_ and\n_intentional_ practical division of labor; as assignments of relative\nposition with reference to performance of a task; as deliberate\ndistribution of forces at command for their more economic use. The\nabsorption of bald fact and hypothetical idea into the formation of a\nsingle world of scientific apprehension and comprehension is but the\nsuccessful achieving of the aim on account of which the distinctions\nin question were instituted.\n\nThus we come back to the problem of logical theory. To take the\ndistinctions of thought and fact, etc., as ontological, as inherently\nfixed in the makeup of the structure of being, results in treating the\nactual technique of scientific inquiry and scientific control as a\nmere subsidiary topic--ultimately of only utilitarian worth. It also\nstates the terms upon which thought and being transact business in a\nway so totally alien to concrete experience that it creates a problem\nwhich can be discussed only in terms of itself--not in terms of the\nconduct of life. As against this, the logic which aligns itself with\nthe origin and employ of reflective thought in everyday life and\ncritical science follows the natural history of thinking as a\nlife-process having its own generating antecedents and stimuli, its\nown states and career, and its own specific objective or limit.\n\nThis point of view makes it possible for logical theory to come to\nterms with psychology. When logic is considered as having to do with\nthe wholesale activity of thought _per se_, the question of the\nhistoric process by which this or that particular thought came to be,\nof how its object happens to present itself as sensory, or perceptual,\nor conceptual, is quite irrelevant. These things are mere temporal\naccidents. The psychologist (not lifting his gaze from the realm of\nthe changeable) may find in them matters of interest. His whole\nindustry is just with natural history--to trace events as they\nmutually excite and inhibit one another. But the logician, we are\ntold, has a deeper problem and an outlook of more unbounded horizon.\nHe deals with the question of the eternal nature of thought and its\neternal validity in relation to an eternal reality. He is concerned,\nnot with genesis, but with value, not with a historic cycle, but with\nabsolute entities and relations.\n\nStill the query haunts us: Is this so in truth? Or has the logician of\na certain type arbitrarily made it so by taking his terms apart from\nreference to the specific occasions in which they arise and situations\nin which they function? If the latter, then the very denial of\nhistoric relationship, the denial of the significance of historic\nmethod, is indicative of the unreal character of his own abstraction.\nIt means in effect that the affairs under consideration have been\nisolated from the conditions in which alone they have determinable\nmeaning and assignable worth. It is astonishing that, in the face of\nthe advance of the evolutionary method in natural science, any\nlogician can persist in the assertion of a rigid difference between\nthe problem of origin and of nature; between genesis and analysis;\nbetween history and validity. Such assertion simply reiterates as\nfinal a distinction which grew up and had meaning in pre-evolutionary\nscience. It asserts, against the most marked advance which scientific\nmethod has yet made, a survival of a crude period of logical\nscientific procedure. We have no choice save either to conceive of\nthinking as a response to a specific stimulus, or else to regard it as\nsomething \"in itself,\" having just in and of itself certain traits,\nelements, and laws. If we give up the last view, we must take the\nformer. In this case it will still possess distinctive traits, but\nthey will be traits of a specific response to a specific stimulus.\n\nThe significance of the evolutionary method in biology and social\nhistory is that every distinct organ, structure, or formation, every\ngrouping of cells or elements, is to be treated as an instrument of\nadjustment or adaptation to a particular environing situation. Its\nmeaning, its character, its force, is known when, and only when, it is\nconsidered as an arrangement for meeting the conditions involved in\nsome specific situation. This analysis is carried out by tracing\nsuccessive stages of development--by endeavoring to locate the\nparticular situation in which each structure has its origin, and by\ntracing the successive modifications through which, in response to\nchanging media, it has reached its present conformation.[12] To\npersist in condemning natural history from the standpoint of what\nnatural history meant before it identified itself with an evolutionary\nprocess is not so much to exclude the natural-history standpoint from\nphilosophic consideration as it is to evince ignorance of what it\nsignifies.\n\nPsychology as the natural history of the various attitudes and\nstructures through which experiencing passes, as an account of the\nconditions under which this or that attitude emerges, and of the way\nin which it influences, by stimulation or inhibition, production of\nother states or conformations of reflection, is indispensable to\nlogical evaluation the moment we treat logical theory as an account of\nthinking as a response to its own generating conditions, and\nconsequently judge its validity by reference to its efficiency in\nmeeting its problems. The historical point of view describes the\nsequence; the normative follows the history to its conclusion, and\nthen turns back and judges each historical step by viewing it in\nreference to its own outcome.\n\nIn the course of changing experience we keep our balance in moving\nfrom situations of an affectional quality to those which are\npractical or appreciative or reflective, because we bear constantly in\nmind the context in which any particular distinction presents itself.\nAs we submit each characteristic function and situation of experience\nto our gaze, we find it has a dual aspect. Wherever there is striving\nthere are obstacles; wherever there is affection there are persons who\nare attached; wherever there is doing there is accomplishment;\nwherever there is appreciation there is value; wherever there is\nthinking there is material-in-question. We keep our footing as we move\nfrom one attitude to another, from one characteristic quality to\nanother, because of the position occupied in the whole movement by the\nparticular function in which we are engaged.\n\nThe distinction _between_ each attitude and function and its\npredecessor and successor is serial, dynamic, operative. The\ndistinctions _within_ any given operation or function are structural,\ncontemporaneous, and distributive. Thinking follows, we will say,\nstriving, and doing follows thinking. Each in the fulfilment of its\nown function inevitably calls out its successor. But coincident,\nsimultaneous, and correspondent _within_ doing is the distinction of\ndoer and of deed; _within_ the function of thought, of thinking and\nmaterial thought upon; within the function of striving, of obstacle\nand aim, of means and end. We keep our paths straight because we do\nnot confuse the sequential and functional relationship of types of\nexperience with the contemporaneous and structural distinctions of\nelements within a given function. In the seeming maze of endless\nconfusion and unlimited shiftings, we find our way by the means of the\nstimulations and checks occurring within the process in which we are\nactually engaged. Operating within empirical situations we do not\ncontrast or confuse a condition which is an element in the formation\nof one operation with the status which is one of the distributive\nterms of another function. When we ignore these specific empirical\nclues and limitations, we have at once an insoluble, because\nmeaningless, problem upon our hands.\n\nNow the epistemological logician deliberately shuts himself off from\nthose cues and checks upon which the plain man instinctively relies,\nand which the scientific man deliberately searches for and adopts as\nconstituting his technique. Consequently he is likely to set the\nattitude which has place and significance only in one of the serial\nfunctional situations of experience over against the active attitude\nwhich describes part of the structural constitution of another\nsituation; or with equal lack of justification to assimilate materials\ncharacteristic of different stages to one another. He sets the agent,\nas he is found in the intimacy of love or appreciation, over against\nthe externality of the fact, as that is defined within the reflective\nprocess. He takes the material which thought selects as its\nproblematic data as identical with the significant content which\nresults from successful pursuit of inquiry; and this in turn he\nregards as the material which was presented before thinking began,\nwhose peculiarities were the means of awakening thought. He identifies\nthe final deposit of the thought-function with its own generating\nantecedent, and then disposes of the resulting surd by reference to\nsome metaphysical consideration, which remains when logical inquiry,\nwhen science (as interpreted by him), has done its work. He does this,\nnot because he prefers confusion to order, or error to truth, but\nsimply because, when the chain of historic sequence is cut, the vessel\nof thought is afloat to veer upon a sea without soundings or moorings.\nThere are but two alternatives: either there is an object \"in itself\"\nof mind \"in itself,\" or else there are a series of situations where\nelements vary with the varying functions to which they belong. If the\nlatter, the only way in which the characteristic terms of situations\ncan be defined is by discriminating the functions to which they\nbelong. And the epistemological logician, in choosing to take his\nquestion as one of thought which has its own form just as \"thought,\"\napart from the limits of the special work it has to do, has deprived\nhimself of these supports and stays.\n\nThe problem of logic has a more general and a more specific phase. In\nits generic form, it deals with this question: How does one type of\nfunctional situation and attitude in experience pass out of and into\nanother; for example, the technological or utilitarian into the\naesthetic, the aesthetic into the religious, the religious into the\nscientific, and this into the socio-ethical and so on? The more\nspecific question is: How does the particular functional situation\ntermed the reflective behave? How shall we describe it? What in detail\nare its diverse contemporaneous distinctions, or divisions of labor,\nits correspondent _statuses_; in what specific ways do these operate\nwith reference to each other so as to effect the specific aim which is\nproposed by the needs of the affair?\n\nThis chapter may be brought to conclusion by reference to the more\nultimate value of the logic of experience, of logic taken in its wider\nsense; that is, as an account of the sequence of the various typical\nfunctions or situations of experience in their determining relations\nto one another. Philosophy, defined as such a logic, makes no pretense\nto be an account of a closed and finished universe. Its business is\nnot to secure or guarantee any particular reality or value. _Per\ncontra_, it gets the significance of a method. The right relationship\nand adjustment of the various typical phases of experience to one\nanother is a problem felt in every department of life. Intellectual\nrectification and control of these adjustments cannot fail to reflect\nitself in an added clearness and security on the practical side. It\nmay be that general logic cannot become an instrument in the immediate\ndirection of the activities of science or art or industry; but it is\nof value in criticizing and organizing tools of immediate research.\nIt also has direct significance in the valuation for social or\nlife-purposes of results achieved in particular branches. Much of the\nimmediate business of life is badly done because we do not know the\ngenesis and outcome of the work that occupies us. The manner and\ndegree of appropriation of the goods achieved in various departments\nof social interest and vocation are partial and faulty because we are\nnot clear as to the due rights and responsibilities of one function of\nexperience in reference to others.\n\nThe value of research for social progress; the bearing of psychology\nupon educational procedure; the mutual relations of fine and\nindustrial art; the question of the extent and nature of\nspecialization in science in comparison with the claims of applied\nscience; the adjustment of religious aspirations to scientific\nstatements; the justification of a refined culture for a few in face\nof economic insufficiency for the mass; the relation of organization\nto individuality--such are a few of the many social questions whose\nanswer depends upon the possession and use of a general logic of\nexperience as a method of inquiry and interpretation. I do not say\nthat headway cannot be made in such questions apart from the method\nindicated: a logic of experience. But unless we have a critical and\nassured view of the juncture in which and with reference to which a\ngiven attitude or interest arises, unless we know the service it is\nthereby called upon to perform, and hence the organs or methods by\nwhich it best functions in that service, our progress is impeded and\nirregular. We take a part for a whole, a means for an end; or we\nattack wholesale some interest because it interferes with the deified\nsway of the one we have selected as ultimate. A clear and\ncomprehensive consensus of social conviction and a consequent\nconcentrated and economical direction of effort are assured only as\nthere is some way of locating the position and r\u00f4le of each typical\ninterest and occupation. The domain of opinion is one of conflict; its\nrule is arbitrary and costly. Only intellectual method affords a\nsubstitute for opinion. A general logic of experience alone can do for\nsocial qualities and aims what the natural sciences after centuries of\nstruggle are doing for activity in the physical realm.\n\nThis does not mean that systems of philosophy which have attempted to\nstate the nature of thought and of reality at large, apart from limits\nof particular situations in the movement of experience, have been\nworthless--though it does mean that their industry has been somewhat\nmisapplied. The unfolding of metaphysical theory has made large\ncontributions to positive evaluations of the typical situations and\nrelationships of experience--even when its conscious intention has\nbeen quite otherwise. Every system of philosophy is itself a mode of\nreflection; consequently (if our main contention be true), it too has\nbeen evoked out of specific social antecedents, and has had its use\nas a response to them. It has effected something in modifying the\nsituation within which it found its origin. It may not have solved the\nproblem which it consciously put itself; in many cases we may freely\nadmit that the question put has been found afterward to be so wrongly\nput as to be insoluble. Yet exactly the same thing is true, in\nprecisely the same sense, in the history of science. For this reason,\nif for no other, it is impossible for the scientific man to cast the\nfirst stone at the philosopher.\n\nThe progress of science in any branch continually brings with it a\nrealization that problems in their previous form of statement are\ninsoluble because put in terms of unreal conditions; because the\nreal conditions have been mixed up with mental artifacts or\nmisconstructions. Every science is continually learning that its\nsupposed solutions are only apparent because the \"solution\" solves, not\nthe actual problem, but one which has been made up. But the very\nputting of the question, the very giving of the wrong answer, induces\nmodification of existing intellectual habits, standpoints, and aims.\nWrestling with the problem, there is evolution of new technique to\ncontrol inquiry, there is search for new facts, institution of new\ntypes of experimentation; there is gain in the methodic control of\nexperience. And all this is progress. It is only the worn-out cynic,\nthe de-vitalized sensualist, and the fanatical dogmatist who interpret\nthe continuous change of science as proving that, since each successive\nstatement is wrong, the whole record is error and folly; and that the\npresent truth is only the error not yet found out. Such draw the moral\nof caring naught for all these things, or of flying to some external\nauthority which will deliver once for all the fixed and unchangeable\ntruth. But historic philosophy even in its aberrant forms has proved a\nfactor in the valuation of experience; it has brought problems to\nlight, it has provoked intellectual conflicts without which values are\nonly nominal; even through its would-be absolutistic isolations it has\nsecured recognition of mutual dependencies and reciprocal\nreinforcements. Yet if it can define its work more clearly, it can\nconcentrate its energy upon its own characteristic problem: the genesis\nand functioning in experience of various typical interests and\noccupations with reference to one another.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[11] _Logic_ (translation, Oxford, 1888), I, 10, 11. Italics mine.\n\n[12] See _Philosophical Review_, XI, 117-20.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\nTHE ANTECEDENTS AND STIMULI OF THINKING\n\n\nWe have discriminated logic in its wider sense--concerned with the\nsequence of characteristic functions and attitudes in experience--from\nlogic in its stricter meaning, concerned with the function of\nreflective thought. We must avoid yielding to the temptation of\nidentifying logic with either of these to the exclusion of the other;\nor of supposing that it is possible to isolate one finally from the\nother. The more detailed treatment of the organs and methods of\nreflection cannot be carried on with security save as we have a\ncorrect idea of the position of reflection amid the typical functions\nof experience. Yet it is impossible to determine this larger placing,\nsave as we have a defined and analytic, as distinct from a merely\nvague and gross, view of what we mean by reflection--what is its\nactual constitution. It is necessary to work back and forth between\nthe larger and the narrower fields, transforming every increment upon\none side into a method of work upon the other, and thereby testing it.\nThe evident confusion of existing logical theory, its uncertainty as\nto its own bounds and limits, its tendency to oscillate from larger\nquestions of the meaning of judgment and the validity of inference\nover to details of scientific technique, and to translate distinctions\nof formal logic into acts in an investigatory or verificatory process,\nare indications of the need of this double movement.\n\nIn the next three chapters it is proposed to take up some of the\nconsiderations that lie on the borderland between the larger and the\nnarrower conceptions of logical theory. I shall discuss the _locus_ of\nthe function of thought in experience so far as such _locus_ enables\nus to characterize some of the most fundamental distinctions, or\ndivisions of labor, within the reflective process. In taking up the\nproblem of the subject-matter of thought, I shall try to make clear\nthat it assumes three quite distinct forms according to the epochal\nmoment reached in control of experience. I shall attempt to show that\nwe must consider subject-matter from the standpoint, first, of the\n_antecedents_ or conditions that evoke thought; secondly, of the\n_datum_ or _immediate material_ presented to thought; and, thirdly, of\nthe _proper objective_ of thought. Of these three distinctions the\nfirst, that of antecedent and stimulus, clearly refers to the\nsituation that is immediately prior to the thought-function as such.\nThe second, that of datum or immediately given matter, refers to a\ndistinction which is made within the thought-process as a part of and\nfor the sake of its own _modus operandi_. It is a status in the scheme\nof thinking. The third, that of content or object, refers to the\nprogress actually made in any thought-function; material which is\norganized by inquiry so far as inquiry has fulfilled its purpose. This\nchapter will get at the matter of preliminary conditions of thought\nindirectly rather than directly, by indicating the contradictory\npositions into which one of the most vigorous and acute of modern\nlogicians, Lotze, has been forced through failing to define logical\ndistinctions in terms of the history of readjustment and control of\nthings in experience, and being thereby compelled to interpret certain\nnotions as absolute instead of as historic and methodological.\n\nBefore passing directly to the exposition and criticism of Lotze, it\nwill be well, however, to take the matter in a somewhat freer way. We\ncannot approach logical inquiry in a wholly direct and uncompromised\nmanner. Of necessity we bring to it certain distinctions--distinctions\npartly the outcome of concrete experience; partly due to the logical\ntheory which has got embodied in ordinary language and in current\nintellectual habits; partly results of deliberate scientific and\nphilosophic inquiry. These more or less ready-made results are\nresources; they are the only weapons with which we can attack the new\nproblem. Yet they are full of unexamined assumptions; they commit us\nto all sorts of logically predetermined conclusions. In one sense our\nstudy of the new subject-matter, let us say logical theory, is in\ntruth only a review, a retesting and criticizing of the intellectual\nstandpoints and methods which we bring with us to the study.\n\nNowadays everyone comes with certain distinctions already made between\nthe subjective and the objective, between the physical and the mental,\nbetween the intellectual and the factual. (1) We have learned to\nregard the region of emotional disturbance, of uncertainty and\naspiration, as belonging peculiarly to ourselves; we have learned to\nset over against this the world of observation and of valid thought as\nsomething unaffected by our moods, hopes, fears, and opinions. (2) We\nhave also come to distinguish between what is immediately present in\nour experience and the past and the future; we contrast the realms of\nmemory and anticipation with that of sense perception; more generally\nwe contrast the given with the inferential. (3) We are confirmed in a\nhabit of distinguishing between what we call actual fact and our\nmental attitude toward that fact--the attitude of surmise or wonder or\nreflective investigation. While one of the aims of logical theory is\nprecisely to make us critically conscious of the significance and\nbearing of these various distinctions, to change them from ready-made\nassumptions into controlled conceptions, our mental habits are so set\nthat they tend to have their own way with us; we read into logical\ntheory conceptions that were formed before we had even dreamed of the\nlogical undertaking which after all has for its business to assign to\nthe terms in question their proper meaning. Our conclusions are thus\ncontrolled by the very notions which need criticism and revision.\n\nWe find in Lotze an unusually explicit inventory of these various\npreliminary distinctions, and an unusually serious effort to deal with\nthe problems which arise from introducing them into the structure of\nlogical theory. (1) He expressly separates the matter of logical worth\nfrom that of psychological genesis. He consequently abstracts the\nsubject-matter of logic as such wholly from the question of historic\n_locus_ and _situs_. (2) He agrees with common-sense in holding that\nlogical thought is reflective and thus presupposes a given material.\nHe occupies himself with the nature of the antecedent conditions. (3)\nHe wrestles with the problem of how a material formed prior to thought\nand irrespective of it can yet afford stuff upon which thought may\nexercise itself. (4) He expressly raises the question of how thought\nworking independently and from without upon a foreign material can\nshape the latter into results which are valid--that is, objective.\n\nIf this discussion is successful; if Lotze can provide the\nintermediaries which span the gulf between the exercise of logical\nfunctions by thought upon a material wholly external to it; if he can\nshow that the question of the origin of subject-matter of thought and\nof thought-activity is irrelevant to the question of its meaning and\nvalidity, we shall have to surrender the position already taken. But\nif we find that Lotze's elaborations only elaborate the fundamental\ndifficulty, presenting it now in this light and now in that, but\nalways presenting the problem as if it were its own solution, we shall\nbe confirmed in our idea of the need of considering logical questions\nfrom a different point of view. If we find that, whatever his formal\ntreatment, he always, as a matter of fact, falls back upon some\norganized situation or function as the source of both the material and\nthe process of inquiry, we shall have in so far an elucidation and\neven a corroboration of our theory.\n\nWe begin with the question of the material antecedents of\nthought--antecedents which condition reflection, and which call it out\nas reaction or response, by giving its cue. Lotze differs from many\nlogicians of the same type in furnishing an explicit account of these\nantecedents.\n\n1. The ultimate material antecedents of thought are found in\nimpressions which are due to external objects as stimuli. Taken in\nthemselves, these impressions are mere psychical states or events.\nThey exist in us side by side, or one after the other, according as\nthe objects which excite them operate simultaneously or successively.\nThe occurrence of these various psychical states is not, however,\nentirely dependent upon the presence of the exciting thing. After a\nstate has once been excited, it gets the power of reawakening other\nstates which have accompanied it or followed it. The associative\nmechanism of revival plays a part. If we had a complete knowledge of\nboth the stimulating object and its effects, and of the details of the\nassociative mechanism, we should be able from given data to predict\nthe whole course of any given train or current of ideas (for the\nimpressions as conjoined simultaneously or successively become ideas\nand a current of ideas).\n\nTaken in itself, a sensation or impression is nothing but a \"state of\nour consciousness, a mood of ourselves.\" Any given current of ideas is\na necessary sequence of existences (just as necessary as any\nsuccession of material events), happening in some particular sensitive\nsoul or organism. \"Just because, under their respective conditions,\nevery such series of ideas hangs together by the same necessity and\nlaw as every other, there would be no ground for making any such\ndistinction of value as that between truth and untruth, thus placing\none group in opposition to all the others.\"[13]\n\n2. Thus far, as the last quotation clearly indicates, there is no\nquestion of reflective thought, and hence no question of logical\ntheory. But further examination reveals a peculiar property of the\ncurrent of ideas. Some ideas are merely coincident, while others may\nbe termed coherent. That is to say, the exciting causes of some of\nour simultaneous and successive ideas really belong together; while in\nother cases they simply happen to act at the same time, without there\nbeing a real connection between them. By the associative mechanism,\nhowever, both the coherent and the merely coincident combinations\nrecur. The first type of recurrence supplies positive material for\nknowledge; the second gives occasion for error.\n\n3. It is a peculiar mixture of the coincident and the coherent which\nsets the peculiar problem of reflective thought. The business of\nthought is to recover and confirm the coherent, the really connected,\nadding to its reinstatement an accessory justifying notion of the real\nground of coherence, while it eliminates the coincident as such. While\nthe mere current of ideas is something which just happens within us,\nthe process of elimination and of confirmation by means of statement\nof real ground and basis of connection is an activity which mind, as\nsuch, exercises. This distinction marks off thought as activity from\nany psychical event and from the associative mechanism as mere\nhappenings. One is concerned with mere _de facto_ coexistences and\nsequences; the other with the cognitive _worth_ of these\ncombinations.[14]\n\nConsideration of the peculiar work of thought in going over, sorting\nout, and determining various ideas according to a standard of value\nwill occupy us in our next chapter. Here we are concerned with the\nmaterial antecedents of thought as they are described by Lotze. At\nfirst glance, he seems to propound a satisfactory theory. He avoids\nthe extravagancies of transcendental logic, which assumes that all the\nmatter of experience is determined from the very start by rational\nthought; and he also avoids the pitfall of purely empirical logic,\nwhich makes no distinction between the mere occurrence and association\nof ideas and the real worth and validity of the various conjunctions\nthus produced. He allows unreflective experience, defined in terms of\nsensations and their combinations, to provide material conditions for\nthinking, while he reserves for thought a distinctive work and dignity\nof its own. Sense experience furnishes the antecedents; thought has to\nintroduce and develop systematic connection--rationality.\n\nA further analysis of Lotze's treatment may, however, lead us to\nbelieve that his statement is riddled through and through with\ninconsistencies and self-contradictions; that, indeed, any one part of\nit can be maintained only by the denial of some other portion.\n\n1. The impression is the ultimate antecedent in its purest or crudest\nform (according to the angle from which one views it). It is that\nwhich has never felt, for good or for bad, the influence of thought.\nCombined into ideas, these impressions stimulate or arouse the\nactivities of thought, which are forthwith directed upon them. As the\nrecipient of the activity which they have excited and brought to bear\nupon themselves, they furnish also the material content of\nthought--its actual stuff. As Lotze says over and over again: \"It is\nthe relations themselves already subsisting between impressions, when\nwe become conscious of them, by which the action of thought which is\nnever anything but reaction, is attracted; and this action consists\nmerely in interpreting relations which we find existing between our\npassive impressions into aspects of the matter of impressions.\"[15]\nAnd again: \"Thought can make no difference where it finds none already\nin the matter of the impressions.\"[16] And again: \"The possibility and\nthe success of thought's procedure depends upon this original\nconstitution and organization of the whole world of ideas, a\nconstitution which, though not necessary in thought, is all the more\nnecessary to make thinking possible.\"[17]\n\nThe impressions and ideas thus play a versatile r\u00f4le; they now assume\nthe part of ultimate antecedents and provocative conditions; of crude\nmaterial; and somehow, when arranged, of content for thought. This\nvery versatility awakens suspicion.\n\nWhile the impression is merely subjective and a bare state of our own\nconsciousness, yet it is determined, both as to its existence and as\nto its relation to other similar existences, by external objects as\nstimuli, if not as causes. It is also determined by a psychical\nmechanism so thoroughly objective or regular in its workings as to\ngive the same necessary character to the current of ideas that is\npossessed by any physical sequence. Thus that which is \"nothing but a\nstate of our consciousness\" turns out straightway to be a specifically\ndetermined objective fact in a system of facts.\n\nThat this absolute transformation is a contradiction is no clearer\nthan that just such a contradiction is indispensable to Lotze. If\nimpressions were nothing but states of consciousness, moods of\nourselves, bare psychical existences, it is sure enough that we should\nnever even know them to be such, to say nothing of conserving them as\nadequate conditions and material for thought. It is only by treating\nthem as real facts in a real world, and only by carrying over into\nthem, in some assumed and unexplained way, the capacity of\nrepresenting the cosmic facts which cause them, that impressions or\nideas come in any sense within the scope of thought. But if the\nantecedents are really impressions-in-their-objective-setting, then\nLotze's whole way of distinguishing thought-worth from _mere_\nexistence or event without objective significance must be radically\nmodified.\n\nThe implication that impressions have actually a quality or meaning of\ntheir own becomes explicit when we refer to Lotze's theory that the\nimmediate antecedent of thought is found in the _matter_ of ideas.\nWhen thought is said to \"take cognizance of _relations_ which its own\nactivity does not originate, but which have been prepared for it by\nthe unconscious mechanism of the psychic states,\"[18] the attribution\nof objective content, of reference and meaning to ideas, is\nunambiguous. The idea forms a most convenient halfway house for Lotze.\nOn one hand, as absolutely prior to thought, as material antecedent\ncondition, it is merely psychical, bald subjective event. But as\nsubject-matter for thought, as antecedent which affords stuff for\nthought's exercise, it characteristically qualifies content.\n\nAlthough we have been told that the impression is a mere receptive\nirritation without participation of mental activity, we are not\nsurprised, in view of this capacity of ideas, to learn that the mind\nactually has a determining share in both the reception of stimuli and\nin their further associative combinations. The subject always enters\ninto the presentation of any mental object, even the sensational, to\nsay nothing of the perceptional and the imaged. The perception of a\ngiven state of things is possible only on the assumption that \"the\nperceiving subject is at once enabled and compelled by its own nature\nto combine the excitations which reach it from objects into those\nforms which it is to perceive in the objects, and which it supposes\nitself simply to _receive_ from them.\"[19]\n\nIt is only by continual transition from impression and ideas as mental\nstates and events to ideas as logical _objects or contents_, that\nLotze bridges the gulf from bare exciting antecedent to concrete\nmaterial conditions of thought. This contradiction, again, is\nnecessary to Lotze's standpoint. To set out frankly with objects as\nantecedents would demand reconsideration of the whole viewpoint, which\nsupposes that the difference between the logical and its antecedent is\na matter of the difference between _worth_ and mere _existence_ or\n_occurrence_. It would indicate that since meaning or value is already\nthere, the task of thought must be that of the transformation or\n_reconstruction of meaning_ through an intermediary process. On the\nother hand, to stick by the standpoint of _mere_ existence is not to\nget anything which can be called even antecedent of thought.\n\n2. Why is there a task of transformation? Consideration of the\nmaterial in its function of evoking thought, giving it its cue, will\nserve to complete the picture of the contradiction and of the real\nfacts. It is the conflict between ideas as merely coincident and ideas\nas coherent which constitutes the need that provokes the response of\nthought. Here Lotze vibrates (_a_) between considering both\ncoincidence and coherence as psychical events; (_b_) considering\ncoincidence as purely psychical and coherence as at least\nquasi-logical, and (_c_) making them both determinations within the\nsphere of reflective thought. In strict accordance with his own\npremises, coincidence and coherence ought both to be mere\npeculiarities of the current of ideas as events within ourselves. But\nso taken the distinction becomes absolutely meaningless. Events do not\ncohere; at the most certain sets of them happen more or less\nfrequently than other sets; the only intelligible difference is one of\nfrequency of coincidence. And even this attributes to an event the\nsupernatural trait of reappearing after it has disappeared. Even\ncoincidence has to be defined in terms of relation of the _objects_\nwhich are supposed to excite the psychical events that happen\ntogether.\n\nAs recent psychological discussion has made clear enough, it is\nthe matter, meaning, or content of ideas that is associated,\nnot the ideas as states or existences. Take such an idea as\nsun-revolving-about-earth. We may _say_ it means the conjunction of\nvarious sense impressions, but it is connection, or mutual reference,\nof _attributes_ that we have in mind in the assertion. It is\nabsolutely certain that our psychical image of the sun is not\npsychically engaged in revolving about our psychical image of the\nearth. It would be amusing if such were the case; theaters and all\ndramatic representations would be at a discount. But in truth,\nsun-revolving-about-earth is a single meaning or intellectual object;\nit is a unified subject-matter within which certain distinctions of\nreference appear. It is concerned with what we intend when we think\nearth and sun, and think them in their relation to each other. It is a\nrule, specification, or direction of how to think when we have\noccasion to think a certain subject-matter. To treat this mutual\nreference as if it were simply a case of conjunction of mental events\nproduced by psycho-physical irritation and association is a profound\ncase of the psychological fallacy. We may, indeed, analyze an\nexperience involving belief in an object of a certain kind and find\nthat it had its origin in certain conditions of the sensitive\norganism, in certain peculiarities of perception and of association,\nand hence conclude that the belief involved in it was not justified by\nthe facts themselves. But the significance of the belief in\nsun-revolving-about-earth by those who held it, consisted precisely in\nthe fact that it was taken not as a mere association of feelings, but\nas a definite portion of the whole structure of objective experience,\nguaranteed by other parts of the fabric, and lending its support and\ngiving its tone to them. It was to them part of the experienced frame\nof things--of the real world.\n\nPut the other way, if such an instance meant a mere conjunction of\npsychical states, there would be in it absolutely nothing to evoke\nthought. Each idea as event, as Lotze himself points out (I, 2), may\nbe regarded as adequately and necessarily determined to the place it\noccupies. There is absolutely no question on the side of events of\nmere coincidence _versus_ genuine connection. As event, it is there\nand it belongs there. We cannot treat something as at once a bare fact\nof existence and a problematic subject-matter of logical inquiry. To\ntake the reflective point of view is to consider the matter in a\ntotally new light; as Lotze says, it is to raise the question of\nrightful claims to a position or relation.\n\nThe point becomes clearer when we contrast coincidence with\nconnection. To consider coincidence as simply psychical, and coherence\nas at least quasi-logical, is to put the two on such different bases\nthat no question of contrasting them can arise. The coincidence which\nprecedes a valid or grounded coherence (the conjunction which as\ncoexistence of objects and sequence of acts is perfectly adequate)\nnever is, as antecedent, the coincidence which is set over against\ncoherence. The side-by-sideness of books on my bookshelf, the\nsuccession of noises that rise through my window, do not trouble me\nlogically. They do not appear as errors or even as problems. One\ncoexistence is just as good as any other until some new point of view,\nor new end, presents itself. If it is a question of the convenience of\narrangement of books, then the value of their present collocation\nbecomes a problem. Then I contrast their present state as bare\nconjunction over against another scheme as one which is coherent. If I\nregard the sequence of noises as a case of articulate speech, their\norder becomes important--it is a problem to be determined. The inquiry\nwhether a given combination presents apparent or real connection shows\nthat reflective inquiry is already going on. Does this phase of the\nmoon really mean rain, or does it just happen that the rain-storm\ncomes when the moon has reached this phase? To ask such questions\nshows that a certain portion of the universe of objective experience\nis subjected to critical analysis for purposes of definitive\nrestatement. The tendency to regard some combination as mere\ncoincidence is absolutely a _part_ of the movement of mind in its\nsearch for the real connection.\n\nIf coexistence as such is to be set against coherence as such, as the\nnon-logical against the logical, then, since our whole spatial\nuniverse is one of collocation, and since thought in this universe can\nnever get farther than substituting one collocation for another, the\nwhole realm of space-experience is condemned offhand and in perpetuity\nto anti-rationality. But, in truth, coincidence as over against\ncoherence, conjunction as over against connection, is just _suspected_\ncoherence, one which is under the fire of active inquiry. The\ndistinction is one which arises only within the logical or reflective\nfunction.\n\n3. This brings us explicitly to the fact that there is neither\ncoincidence nor coherence in terms of the elements or meanings\ncontained in any couple or pair of ideas taken by itself. It is only\nwhen they are co-factors in a situation or function which includes\nmore than either the \"coincident\" or the \"coherent\" and more than the\narithmetical sum of the two, that thought's activity can be evoked.\nLotze is continually in this dilemma: Thought either shapes its own\nmaterial or else just accepts it. In the first case (since Lotze\ncannot rid himself of the presumption that thought must have a fixed\nready-made antecedent) its activity can only alter this stuff and thus\nlead the mind farther away from reality. But if thought just accepts\nits material, how can there be any distinctive aim or activity of\nthought at all? As we have seen, Lotze endeavors to escape this\ndilemma by supposing that, while thought receives its material yet\nchecks it up, it eliminates certain portions of it and reinstates\nothers, plus the stamp and seal of its own validity.\n\nLotze objects most strenuously to the Kantian notion that thought\nawaits its subject-matter with certain ready-made modes of\napprehension. This notion would raise the insoluble question of how\nthought contrives to bring the matter of each impression under that\nparticular form which is appropriate to it (I, 24). But he has not\navoided the difficulty. How does thought know which of the\ncombinations are merely coincident and which are merely coherent? How\ndoes it know which to eliminate as irrelevant and which to confirm as\ngrounded? Either this evaluation is an imposition of its own, or else\ngets its cue and clue from the subject-matter. Now, if the coincident\nand the coherent taken in and of themselves are competent to give this\ndirection, they are already labeled. The further work of thought is\none of supererogation. It has at most barely to note and seal the\nmaterial combinations that are already there. Such a view clearly\nrenders thought's work as unnecessary in form as it is futile in\nforce.\n\nBut there is no alternative except to recognize that an entire\nsituation or environment, within which exist both that which is\nafterward found to be mere coincidence and that found to be real\nconnection, actually provokes thought. It is only as an experience\npreviously accepted comes up in its wholeness against another one\nequally integral; and only as some larger experience dawns which\nrequires each as a part of itself and yet within which the required\nfactors show themselves mutually incompatible, that thought arises. It\nis not bare coincidence, or bare connection, or bare addition of one\nto the other, that excites thought. The stimulus is a situation which\nis organized or constituted as a whole, and yet which is falling to\npieces in its parts--a situation which is in conflict within\nitself--that arouses the search to find what really goes together, and\na correspondent effort to shut out what only seemingly goes together.\nAnd real coherence means precisely capacity to exist within the\ncomprehending whole. To read back into the preliminary situation\nthose distinctions of mere conjunction of material and of valid\ncoherence which get existence, to say nothing of fixation, only within\nthe process of inquiry is a fallacy.\n\nWe must not leave this phase of the discussion, however, until it is\nquite clear that our objection is not to Lotze's position that\nreflective thought arises from an antecedent which is not reflectional\nin character; nor yet to his idea that this antecedent has a certain\nstructure and content of its own setting the peculiar problem of\nthought, giving the cue to its specific activities and determining its\nobject. On the contrary, it is this latter point upon which we would\ninsist; so as (by insisting) to point out, negatively, that this view\nis absolutely inconsistent with Lotze's theory that psychical\nimpressions and ideas are the true antecedents of thought; and,\npositively, to show that it is the _situation as a whole_, and not any\none isolated part of it, or distinction within it, that calls forth\nand directs thinking. We must beware the fallacy of assuming that some\none element in the prior situation in isolation or detachment induces\nthe reflection which in reality comes forth only from the whole\ndisturbed situation. On the negative side, characterizations of\nimpression and idea are distinctions which arise only within\nreflection upon that situation which is the genuine antecedent of\nthought. Positively, it is the whole dynamic experience with its\nqualitative and pervasive continuity, and its inner active\ndistraction, its elements at odds with each other, in tension against\neach other, each contending for its proper placing and relationship,\nwhich generates the thought-situation.\n\nFrom this point of view, at this period of development, the\ndistinctions of objective and subjective have a characteristic\nmeaning. The antecedent, to repeat, is a situation in which the\nvarious factors are actively incompatible with each other, and yet in\nand through the striving tend to a re-formation of the whole and to a\nrestatement of the parts. This situation as such is clearly\n'objective.' It is there; it is there as a whole; the various parts\nare there; and their active incompatibility with one another is there.\nNothing is conveyed at this point by asserting that any particular\npart of the situation is illusory or subjective, or mere appearance;\nor that any other is truly real. The experience exists as one of vital\nand active confusion and conflict among its elements. The conflict is\nnot only objective in a _de facto_ sense (that is, really existent),\nbut is objective in a logical sense as well; it is just this conflict\nwhich effects a transition into the thought-situation--this, in turn,\nbeing only a constant movement toward a defined equilibrium. The\nconflict has objective worth because it is the antecedent condition\nand cue of thought. Deny an organization of things within which\ncompeting incompatible tendencies appear and thinking becomes merely\n\"mental.\"\n\nEvery reflective attitude and function, whether of na\u00efve life,\ndeliberate invention, or controlled scientific research, has risen\nthrough the medium of some such total objective situation. The\nabstract logician may tell us that sensations or impressions, or\nassociated ideas, or bare physical things, or conventional symbols,\nare antecedent conditions. But such statements cannot be verified by\nreference to a single instance of thought in connection with actual\npractice or actual scientific research. Of course, by extreme\nmediation symbols may become conditions of evoking thought. They get\nto be objects in an active experience. But they are stimuli to\nthinking only in case their manipulation to form a new whole occasions\nresistance, and thus reciprocal tension. Symbols and their definitions\ndevelop to a point where dealing with them becomes itself an\nexperience, having its own identity; just as the handling of\ncommercial commodities, or arrangement of parts of an invention, is a\nspecific experience.\n\nThere is always as antecedent to thought an experience of\nsubject-matter of the physical or social world, or the previously\norganized intellectual world, whose parts are actively at war with\neach other--so much so that they threaten to disrupt the situation,\nwhich accordingly for its own maintenance requires deliberate\nredefinition and re-relation of its tensional parts. This redefining\nand re-relating is the constructive process termed thinking: the\nreconstructive situation, with its parts in tension and in such\nmovement toward each other as tends to a unified arrangement of\nthings, is the thought-situation.\n\nThis at once suggests the subjective phase. The situation, the\nexperience as such, is objective. There is an experience of the\nconfused and conflicting tendencies. But just _what in particular_ is\nobjective, just _what_ form the situation shall take as an organized\nharmonious whole, is unknown; that is the problem. It is the\nuncertainty as to the _what_ of the experience together with the\ncertainty _that_ there is such an experience, that evokes the\nthought-function. Viewed from this standpoint of uncertainty, the\nsituation as a whole is subjective. No particular content or reference\ncan be asserted offhand. Definite assertion is expressly reserved--it\nis to be the outcome of the procedure of reflective inquiry now\nundertaken. This holding off of contents from definitely asserted\nposition, this viewing them as candidates for reform, is what we mean,\nat this stage of the natural history of thought, by the subjective.\n\nWe have followed Lotze through his tortuous course of inconsistencies.\nIt is better, perhaps, to run the risk of vain repetition than that of\nleaving the impression that these are _mere_ dialectical\ncontradictions. It is an idle task to expose contradictions unless we\nrealize them in relation to the fundamental assumption which breeds\nthem. Lotze is bound to differentiate thought from its antecedents. He\nis intent upon doing this, however, through a preconception that\nmarks off the thought-situation radically from its predecessor,\nthrough a difference that is complete, fixed and absolute, or at\nlarge. It is a total contrast of thought as such to something else as\nsuch that he requires, not a contrast within experience of one\ntemporal phase of a process, one period of a rhythm, from others.\n\nThis complete and rigid difference Lotze finds in the difference\nbetween an experience which is _mere existence_ or occurrence, and one\nwhich has to do with worth, truth, right relationship. Now things have\nconnection, organization, value or force, practical and aesthetic\nmeaning, on their own account. The same is true of deeds, affections,\netc. Only states of feelings, bare impressions, etc., seem to fulfil\nthe prerequisite of being given as existence, and yet without\nqualification as to worth, etc. Then the current of ideas offers\nitself, a ready-made stream of events, of existences, which can be\ncharacterized as wholly innocent of reflective determination, and as\nthe natural predecessor of thought.\n\nBut this stream of existences is no sooner regarded than its total\nincapacity to officiate as material condition and cue of thought\nappears. It is about as relevant to thinking as are changes that may\nbe happening on the other side of the moon. So, one by one, the whole\nseries of determinations of force and worth already traced are\nintroduced _into_ the very make-up, the inner structure, of what was\nto be _mere_ existence: viz., (1) things of whose spatial and temporal\nrelations the mere impressions are somehow _representative_; (2)\n_meaning_--the idea as significant, possessed of quality, and not a\nmere event; (3) distinguished traits of coincidence and coherence\nwithin the stream. All these features are explicitly asserted, as we\nhave seen; underlying and running through them all is the recognition\nof the supreme value of a situation which has been organized as a\nwhole, yet is now conflicting in its inner constitution.\n\nThese contradictions all arise in the attempt to put thought's work,\nas concerned with objective validity, over against experience as a\nmere antecedent happening, or occurrence. This contrast arises because\nof the attempt to consider thought as an independent somewhat in\ngeneral which nevertheless, in _our_ experience, is dependent upon a\nraw material of mere impressions given to it. Hence the sole radical\navoidance of the contradictions can be secured only when thinking is\nseen to be a specific event in the movement of experienced things,\nhaving its own specific occasion or demand, and its own specific\nplace.\n\nThe nature of the organization and force that the antecedent\nconditions of the thought-function possess is too large a question\nhere to enter upon in detail. Lotze himself suggests the answer. He\nspeaks of the current of ideas, just as a current, supplying us with\nthe \"mass of well-grounded information which _regulates daily life_\"\n(I, 4). It gives rise to \"useful combinations,\" \"correct\nexpectations,\" \"seasonable reactions\" (I, 7). He speaks of it, indeed,\nas if it were just the ordinary world of na\u00efve experience, the\nso-called empirical world, as distinct from the world as critically\nrevised and rationalized in scientific and philosophic inquiry. The\ncontradiction between this interpretation and that of a mere stream of\npsychical impressions is only another instance of the difficulty\nalready discussed. But the phraseology suggests the real state of\nthings. The unreflective world is a world of practical things; of ends\nand means, of their effective adaptations; of control and regulation\nof conduct in view of results. The world of uncritical experience also\nis a world of social aims and means, involving at every turn the goods\nand objects of affection and attachment, of competition and\nco-operation. It has incorporate also in its own being the surprise of\naesthetic values--the sudden joy of light, the gracious wonder of tone\nand form.\n\nI do not mean that this holds in gross of the unreflective world of\nexperience over against the critical thought-situation--such a\ncontrast implies the very wholesale, at large, consideration of\nthought which I am striving to avoid. Doubtless many and many an act\nof thought has intervened in effecting the organization of our\ncommonest practical-affectional-aesthetic environment. I only mean to\nindicate that thought does take place _in_ such a world; not _after_\na world of bare existences; and that while the more systematic\nreflection we call organized science may, in some fair sense, be said\nto come _after_, it comes after affectional, artistic, and\ntechnological interests which have found realization.\n\nHaving entered so far upon a suggestion which cannot be followed out,\nI venture one other digression. The notion that value or significance\nas distinct from mere existentiality is the product of thought or\nreason, and that the source of Lotze's contradictions lies in the\neffort to find _any_ situation prior or antecedent to thought, is a\nfamiliar one--it is even possible that my criticisms of Lotze have\nbeen interpreted by some readers in this sense.[20] This is the\nposition frequently called neo-Hegelian (though, I think, with\nquestionable accuracy), and has been developed by many writers in\ncriticizing Kant. This position and that taken in this chapter do\nindeed agree in certain general regards. They are at one in denial of\nthe factuality and the possibility of developing fruitful reflection\nout of antecedent bare existence or mere events. They unite in denying\nthat there is or can be any such thing as _mere_ existence--phenomenon\nunqualified as respects organization and force, whether such\nphenomenon be psychic or cosmic. They agree that reflective thought\ngrows organically out of an experience which is already organized, and\nthat it functions within such an organism. But they part company when\na fundamental question is raised: Is all organized meaning the work of\nthought? Does it therefore follow that the organization out of which\nreflective thought grows is the work of thought of some other type--of\nPure Thought, Creative or Constitutive Thought, Intuitive Reason,\netc.? I shall indicate briefly the reasons for divergence at this\npoint.\n\nTo cover all the practical-social-aesthetic objects involved, the term\n\"thought\" has to be so stretched that the situation might as well be\ncalled by any other name that describes a typical form of experience.\nMore specifically, when the difference is minimized between the\norganized and arranged scheme out of which reflective inquiry\nproceeds, and reflective inquiry itself (and there can be no other\nreason for insisting that the antecedent of reflective thought is\nitself somehow thought), exactly the same type of problem recurs\nwhich presents itself when the distinction is exaggerated into one\nbetween bare existences and rational coherent meanings.\n\nFor the more one insists that the antecedent situation is constituted\nby thought, the more one has to wonder why another type of thought is\nrequired; what need arouses it, and how it is possible for it to\nimprove upon the work of previous constitutive thought. This\ndifficulty at once forces idealists from a logic of experience as it\nis concretely experienced into a metaphysic of a purely hypothetical\nexperience. Constitutive thought precedes _our_ conscious\nthought-operations; hence it must be the working of some absolute\nuniversal thought which, unconsciously to our reflection, builds up an\norganized world. But this recourse only deepens the difficulty. How\ndoes it happen that the absolute constitutive and intuitive Thought\ndoes such a poor and bungling job that it requires a finite discursive\nactivity to patch up its products? Here more metaphysic is called for:\nThe Absolute Reason is now supposed to work under limiting conditions\nof finitude, of a sensitive and temporal organism. The antecedents of\nreflective thought are not, therefore, determinations of thought pure\nand undefiled, but of what thought can do when it stoops to assume the\nyoke of change and of feeling. I pass by the metaphysical problem left\nunsolved by this flight: Why and how should a perfect, absolute,\ncomplete, finished thought find it necessary to submit to alien,\ndisturbing, and corrupting conditions in order, in the end, to recover\nthrough reflective thought in a partial, piecemeal, wholly inadequate\nway what it possessed at the outset in a much more satisfactory way?\n\nI confine myself to the logical difficulty. How can thought relate\nitself to the fragmentary sensations, impressions, feelings, which, in\ntheir contrast with and disparity from the workings of constitutive\nthought, mark it off from the latter; and which in their connection\nwith its products give the cue to reflective thinking? _Here we have\nagain exactly the problem with which Lotze has been wrestling_: we\nhave the same insoluble question of the reference of thought-activity\nto a wholly indeterminate unrationalized, independent, prior\nexistence. The absolute idealist who takes up the problem at this\npoint will find himself forced into the same continuous seesaw, the\nsame scheme of alternate rude robbery and gratuitous gift, that Lotze\nengaged in. The simple fact is that here _is_ just where Lotze began;\nhe saw that previous transcendental logicians had left untouched the\nspecific question of relation of _our_ supposedly finite, reflective\nthought to its own antecedents, and he set out to make good the\ndefect. If reflective thought is required because constitutive thought\nworks under externally limiting conditions of sense, then we have some\nelements which are, after all, mere existences, events, etc. Or, if\nthey have organization from some other source than thought, and\ninduce reflective thought not as bare impressions, etc., but through\ntheir place in some whole, then we have admitted the possibility of\norganization in experience, apart from Reason, and the ground for\nassuming Pure Constitutive Thought is abandoned.\n\nThe contradiction appears equally when viewed from the side of\nthought-activity and its characteristic forms. All our knowledge,\nafter all, of thought as constitutive is gained by consideration of\nthe operations of reflective thought. The perfect system of thought is\nso perfect that it is a luminous, harmonious whole, without definite\nparts or distinctions--or, if there are such, it is only reflection\nthat brings them out. The categories and methods of constitutive\nthought itself must therefore be characterized in terms of the _modus\noperandi_ of reflective thought. Yet the latter takes place just\nbecause of the peculiar problem of the peculiar conditions under which\nit arises. Its work is progressive, reformatory, reconstructive,\nsynthetic, in the terminology made familiar by Kant. We are not only\n_not_ justified, accordingly, in transferring its determinations over\nto \"constitutive\" thought, but are prohibited from attempting any such\ntransfer. To identify logical processes, states, devices, results\nwhich are conditioned upon the primary fact of resistance to thought\nas constitutive with the structure of constitutive thought is as\ncomplete an instance of the fallacy of recourse from one genus to\nanother as could well be found. Constitutive and reflective thought\nare, first, defined in terms of their dissimilarity and even\nopposition, and then without more ado the forms of the description of\nthe latter are carried over bodily to the former!\n\nThis is not a merely controversial criticism. It points positively\ntoward the fundamental thesis of these chapters: All the distinctions\ndiscovered within thinking, of conception as over against sense\nperception, of various modes and forms of judgment, of inference in\nits vast diversity of operation--all these distinctions come within\nthe thought-situation as growing out of a characteristic antecedent\ntypical formation of experience; and have for their purpose the\nsolution of the peculiar problem with respect to which the\nthought-function is generated or evolved: the restoration of a\ndeliberately integrated experience from the inherent conflict into\nwhich it has fallen.\n\nThe failure of transcendental logic has the same origin as the failure\nof the empiristic (whether taken pure or in the mixed form in which\nLotze presents it). It makes into absolute and fixed distinctions of\nexistence and meaning, and of one kind of meaning and another kind,\nthings which are historic or temporal in their origin and their\nsignificance. It views thought as attempting to represent or state\nreality once for all, instead of trying to determine some phases or\ncontents of it with reference to their more effective and significant\nemploy--instead of as reconstructive. The rock against which every\nsuch logic splits is that either existence already has the statement\nwhich thought is endeavoring to give it, or else it has not. In the\nformer case, thought is futilely reiterative; in the latter, it is\nfalsificatory.\n\nThe significance of Lotze for critical purposes is that his peculiar\neffort to combine a transcendental view of thought (i.e., of Thought\nas active in forms of its own, pure in and of themselves) with certain\nobvious facts of the dependence of our thought upon specific empirical\nantecedents, brings to light fundamental defects in both the\nempiristic and the transcendental logics. We discover a common failure\nin both: the failure to view logical terms and distinctions with\nrespect to their necessary function in the redintegration of\nexperience.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[13] Lotze, _Logic_ (translation, Oxford, 1888), I, 2. For the\npreceding exposition see I, 1, 2, 13, 14, 37, 38; also _Microkosmus_,\nBook V, chap. iv.\n\n[14] Lotze, _Logic_, I, 6, 7.\n\n[15] Lotze, _Logic_ (translation, Oxford, 1888), I, 25.\n\n[16] _Ibid._, 36.\n\n[17] _Ibid._\n\n[18] _Microkosmus_, Book V, chap. iv.\n\n[19] _Logic_, II, 235; see the whole discussion, \u00a7\u00a7 325-327.\n\n[20] We have a most acute and valuable criticism of Lotze from this\npoint of view in Professor Henry Jones, _Philosophy of Lotze_, 1895.\nMy specific criticisms agree in the main with his, and I am glad to\nacknowledge my indebtedness. But I cannot agree in the belief that the\nbusiness of thought is to qualify reality as such; its occupation\nappears to me to be determining the reconstruction of some aspect or\nportion of reality, and to fall within the course of reality itself;\nbeing, indeed, the characteristic medium of its activity. And I cannot\nagree that reality as such, with increasing fulness of knowledge,\npresents itself as a thought-system, though, as just indicated, I have\nno doubt that practical existence presents itself in its temporal\ncourse as thought-specifications, just as it does as affectional and\naesthetic and the rest of them.\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\nDATA AND MEANINGS\n\n\nWe have reached the point of conflict in the matters of an experience.\nIt is _in_ this conflict and because of it that the matters, or\nsignificant quales, stand out _as_ matters. As long as the sun\nrevolves about earth without question, this \"content\" is not in any\nway abstracted. Its distinction from the form or mode of experience as\nits matter is the work of reflection. The same conflict makes other\nexperiences assume discriminated objectification; they, too, cease to\nbe ways of living, and become distinct objects of observation and\nconsideration. The movements of planets, eclipses, etc., are cases in\npoint.[21] The maintenance of a unified experience has become a\nproblem, an end, for it is no longer secure. But this involves such\nrestatement of the conflicting elements as will enable them to take a\nplace somewhere in the world of the new experience; they must be\ndisposed of somehow, and they can be disposed of finally only as they\nare provided for. That is, they cannot be simply denied or excluded or\neliminated; they must be taken into the fold. But such introduction\nclearly demands more or less modification or transformation on their\npart. The thought-situation is the deliberate maintenance of an\norganization in experience, with a critical consideration of the\nclaims of the various conflicting contents to a place, and a final\nassignment of position.\n\nThe conflicting situation inevitably polarizes or dichotomizes itself.\nThere is somewhat which is untouched in the contention of\nincompatibles. There is something which remains secure, unquestioned.\nOn the other hand, there are elements which are doubtful and\nprecarious. This gives the framework of the general distribution of\nthe field into \"facts,\" the given, the presented, the Datum; and\nideas, the _Quaesitum_, the conceived, the Inferential.\n\n_a_) There is always something unquestioned in any problematic\nsituation at any stage of its process,[22] even if it be only the\nfact of conflict or tension. For this is never _mere_ tension at\nlarge. It is thoroughly qualified, or characteristically toned and\ncolored, by the particular elements which are in strife. Hence it is\n_this_ conflict, unique and irreplaceable. That it comes now means\nprecisely that it has never come before; that it is now passed in\nreview and some sort of a settlement reached, means that just _this_\nconflict will never recur. In a word, the conflict is immediately of\njust this and no other sort, and this immediately given quality is an\nirreducible datum. _It_ is fact, even if all else be _doubtful_. As it\nis subjected to examination, it loses vagueness and assumes more\ndefinite form.\n\nOnly in very extreme cases, however, does the assured, unquestioned\nelement reduce to terms as low as we have here imagined. Certain\nthings come to stand forth as facts, no matter what else may be\ndoubted. There are certain _apparent_ diurnal changes of the sun;\nthere is a certain annual course or track. There are certain nocturnal\nchanges in the planets, and certain seasonal rhythmic paths. The\nsignificance of these may be doubted: Do they _mean_ real change in\nthe sun or in the earth? But change, and change of a certain definite\nand numerically determinate character, is there. It is clear that\nsuch out-standing facts (ex-istences) constitute the data, the given\nor presented, in the thought-function.\n\n_b_) It is obvious that this is only one correspondent, or status, in\nthe total situation. With the consciousness of _this_ as certain, as\ngiven to be reckoned with, goes the consciousness of uncertainty as to\n_what it means_--of how it is to be understood or interpreted, that\nis, of its reference and connection. The facts qua presentations or\nexistences are sure; _qua_ meanings (position and relationship in an\nexperience yet to be secured) they are doubtful. Yet doubt does not\npreclude memory or anticipation. Indeed, it is possible only through\nthem. The memory of past experience makes sun-revolving-about-earth an\nobject of attentive regard. The recollection of certain other\nexperiences suggests the idea of earth-rotating-daily-on-axis and\nrevolving-annually-about-sun. These contents are as much present as is\nthe observation of change, but as respects connection they are only\npossibilities. Accordingly, they are categorized or disposed of as\nideas, meanings, thoughts, ways of conceiving, comprehending,\ninterpreting facts.\n\nCorrespondence of reference here is as obvious as correlation of\nexistence. In the logical process, the datum is not just external\nexistence, and the idea mere psychical existence. Both are modes of\nexistence--one of _given_ existence, the other of _possible_, of\ninferred existence. And if the latter is regarded, from the standpoint\nof the unified experience aimed at, as having only _possible_\nexistence, the datum also is regarded as incomplete and unassured. Or,\nas we commonly put it, while the ideas are impressions, suggestions,\nguesses, theories, estimates, etc., facts are crude, raw, unorganized,\nbrute. They lack relationship, that is, assured place; they are\ndeficient as to continuity. Mere change of relative position of sun,\nwhich is absolutely unquestioned as datum, is a sheer abstraction from\nthe standpoint either of the organized experience left behind, or of\nthe reorganized experience which is the end--the objective. It is\nimpossible as a persistent object. In other words, datum and ideatum\nare divisions of labor, co-operative instrumentalities, for economical\ndealing with the problem of the maintenance of the integrity of\nexperience.\n\nOnce more, and briefly, both datum and ideatum may (and positively,\nveritably, do) break up, each for itself, into physical and mental. In\nso far as the conviction gains ground that the earth revolves about\nthe sun, the old fact is broken up into a new cosmic existence, and a\nnew psychological condition--the recognition of a process in virtue of\nwhich movements of smaller bodies in relation to very remote larger\nbodies are interpreted in a reverse sense. We do not just eliminate\nthe source of error in the old content. We reinterpret it as valid in\nits own place, viz., a case of the psychology of perception, although\ninvalid as a matter of cosmic structure. Until we have detected the\nsource of error as itself a perfectly genuine existence, we are not,\nscientifically, satisfied. If we decide that the snake is but a\nhallucination, our reflection is not, in purport, complete until we\nhave found some fact just as existential as the snake would have been\nhad it been there, which accounts for the hallucination. We never\nstop, except temporarily, with a reference to the mind or knower as\nsource of an error. We hunt for a specific existence. In other words,\nwith increasing accuracy of determination of the given, there comes a\ndistinction, for methodological purposes, between the _quality_ or\nmatter of the sense experience and its _form_--the sense perceiving,\nas itself a psychological fact, having its own place and laws or\nrelations. Moreover, the old experience, that of sun-revolving,\nabides. But it is regarded as belonging to \"me\"--to this experiencing\nindividual rather than to the cosmic world.\n\nHere, then, _within_ the growth of the thought-situation and as a part\nof the process of determining _specific_ truth under _specific_\nconditions, we get for the first time the clue to that distinction\nwith which, as ready-made and prior to all thinking, Lotze started\nout, namely, the separation of the matter of impression from\nimpression as a personal event. The separation which, taken at large,\nengenders an insoluble problem, appears within a particular reflective\ninquiry, as an inevitable differentiation of a scheme of existence.\n\nThe same sort of thing occurs on the side of thought, or meaning. The\nmeaning or idea which is growing in acceptance, which is gaining ground\nas meaning-of-datum, gets logical or intellectual or objective force;\nthat which is losing standing, which is increasingly doubtful, gets\nqualified as just a notion, a fancy, a prejudice, misconception--or\nfinally just an error, a mental slip.\n\nEvaluated as fanciful in _validity_ it becomes a mere fancy in its\nexistence.[23] It is not eliminated, but receives a new reference or\nmeaning. Thus the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is\nnot one between meaning as such and datum as such. It is a\nspecification that emerges, correspondently, in _both_ datum and\nideatum. That which is left behind in the evolution of accepted\nmeaning is still characterized as real, but real now in relation only\nto a way of experiencing--to a peculiarity of the organism. That which\nis moved toward is regarded as real in a cosmic or extra-organic\nsense.\n\n1. _The data of thought._--When we turn to Lotze, we find that he\nmakes a clear distinction between the presented material of thought,\nits datum, and the typical characteristic modes of thinking in virtue\nof which the datum gets organization or system. It is interesting to\nnote also that he states the datum in terms different from those in\nwhich the antecedents of thought are defined. From the point of view\nof the data or material upon which ideas exercise themselves, it is\nnot coincidence, collocation, or succession that counts, but gradation\nof degrees in a scale. It is not things in spatial or temporal\narrangement that are emphasized, but qualities as mutually\ndistinguished, yet resembling and classed. There is no inherent\ninconceivability in the idea that every impression should be as\nincomparably different from every other as sweet is from warm. But by\na remarkable circumstance such is not the case. We have series, and\nnetworks of series. We have diversity of a common--diverse colors,\nsounds, smells, tastes, etc. In other words, the data are sense\nqualities which, fortunately for thought, are given arranged as\nshades, degrees, variations, or qualities of somewhat that is\nidentical.[24]\n\nAll this is given, presented, to our ideational activities. Even the\nuniversal, the common color which runs through the various qualities\nof blue, green, white, etc., is not a product of thought, but\nsomething which thought finds already in existence. It conditions\ncomparison and reciprocal distinction. Particularly all mathematical\ndeterminations, whether of counting (number), degree (more or less),\nand quantity (greatness and smallness), come back to this peculiarity\nof the datum. Here Lotze dwells at considerable length upon the fact\nthat the very possibility, as well as the success, of thought is due\nto this peculiar universalization or _prima facie_ ordering with which\nits material is given to it. Such pre-established fitness in the\nmeeting of two things that have nothing to do with each other is\ncertainly cause enough for wonder and congratulation.\n\nIt should not be difficult to see why Lotze uses different categories\nin describing the material of thought from those employed in\ndescribing its antecedent conditions, even though, according to him,\nthe two are absolutely the same.[25] He has different _functions_ in\nmind. In one case, the material must be characterized as evoking, as\nincentive, as stimulus--from this point of view the peculiar feature\nof spatial and temporal arrangement in contrast with coherence or\nconnection is emphasized. But in the other case the material must be\ncharacterized as affording stuff, actual subject-matter. Data are not\nonly what is given _to_ thought, but they are also the food, the raw\nmaterial, _of_ thought. They must be described as, on the one hand,\nwholly outside of thought. This clearly puts them into the region of\nsense perception. They are matters of _sensation_ given free from all\ninferring, judging, relating influence. Sensation is just what is\n_not_ called up in memory or in anticipated projection--it is the\nimmediate, the irreducible. On the other hand, sensory-_matter_ is\nqualitative, and quales are made up on a common basis. They are\ndegrees or grades of a common quality. Thus they have a certain\nready-made setting of mutual distinction and reference which is\nalready almost, if not quite, the effect of comparing, of relating,\neffects which are the express traits of thinking.\n\nIt is easy to interpret this miraculous gift of grace in the light of\nwhat has been said. The data are in truth precisely that which is\nselected and set aside as present, as immediate. Thus they are _given_\nto _further_ thought. But the selection has occurred in view of the\nneed for thought; it is a listing of the capital in the way of the\nundisturbed, the undiscussed, which thought can count upon in this\nparticular problem. Hence it is not strange that it has a peculiar\nfitness of adaptation for thought's further work. Having been selected\nwith precisely that end in view, the wonder would be if it were not so\nfitted. A man may coin counterfeit money for use upon others, but\nhardly with the intent of passing it off upon himself.\n\nOur only difficulty here is that the mind flies away from the logical\ninterpretation of sense datum to a ready-made notion of it brought\nover from abstract psychological inquiry. The belief in isolated\nsensory quales which are somehow forced upon us, and forced upon us at\nlarge, and thus conditioning thought wholly _ab extra_, instead of\ndetermining it as instrumentalities or elements selected from\nexperienced things for that very purpose, is too fixed. Sensory\nqualities _are_ forced upon us, but _not_ at large. The sensory data\nof experience always come _in a context_; they always appear as\nvariations in a continuum. Even the thunder which breaks in upon me\n(to take the extreme of apparent discontinuity and irrelevancy)\ndisturbs me because it is taken as thunder: as a part of the same\nspace-world as that in which my chair and room and house are located;\nand it is taken as an influence which interrupts and disturbs,\n_because_ it is part of a common world of causes and effects. The\nsolution of continuity is itself practical or teleological, and thus\npresupposes and affects continuity of purpose, occupations, and means\nin a life-process. It is not metaphysics, it is biology which enforces\nthe idea that actual sensation is not only determined as an event in a\nworld of events,[26] but is an occurrence occurring at a certain\nperiod in the control and use of stimuli.[27]\n\n2. _Forms of thinking data._--As sensory datum is material set for\nwork of thought, so the ideational forms with which thought does its\nwork are apt and prompt to meet the needs of the material. The\n\"accessory\"[28] notion of ground of coherence turns out, in truth, not\nto be a formal, or external, addition to the data, but a\nrequalification of them. Thought is accessory as accomplice, not as\naddendum. \"Thought\" is to eliminate mere coincidence, and to assert\ngrounded coherence. Lotze makes it clear that he does not at bottom\nconceive of \"thought\" as an activity \"in itself\" imposing a form of\ncoherence; but that the organizing work of \"thought\" is only the\nprogressive realization of an inherent unity, or system, in the\nmaterial experienced. The specific modes in which thought brings its\n\"accessory\" power to bear--names, conception, judgment, and\ninference--are successive stages in the adequate organization of the\nmatter which comes to us first as data; they are successive stages of\nthe effort to overcome the original defects of the data. Conception\nstarts from the universal (the common element) of sense. Yet (and this\nis the significant point) it does not simply abstract this common\nelement, and consciously generalize it over against its own\ndifferences. Such a \"universal\" is _not_ coherence just because it\ndoes not _include_ and dominate the temporal and local heterogeneity.\nThe _true_ concept (see I, 38) is a system of attributes, held\ntogether on the basis of some ground, or determining, dominating\nprinciple--a ground which so controls all its own instances as to make\nthem into an inwardly connected whole, and which so specifies its own\nlimits as to be exclusive of all else. If we abstract color as the\ncommon element of various colors, the result is not a scientific idea\nor concept. Discovery of a process of light-waves whose various rates\nconstitute the various colors of the spectrum gives the concept. And\nwhen we get such a concept, the former mere temporal abruptness of\ncolor experiences gives way to ordered parts of a color system. The\nlogical product--the concept, in other words--is not a formal seal or\nstamp; it is a thoroughgoing connection of data in a dynamic\ncontinuity of existence.\n\nThe form or mode of thought which marks the continued transformation\nof the data and the idea in reference to each other is judgment.\nJudgment makes explicit the assumption of a principle which determines\nconnection within an individualized whole. It definitely states red as\n_this_ case or instance of the law or process of color, and thus\nfurther overcomes the defect in _subject-matter_ or data still left by\nconception.[29] Now judgment logically terminates in disjunction. It\ngives a universal which may determine any one of a number of\nalternative defined particulars, but which is arbitrary as to _what_\none is selected. Systematic _inference_ brings to light the material\nconditions under which the law, or dominating universal, applies to\nthis, rather than that alternative particular, and so completes the\nideal organization of the subject-matter. If this act were complete,\nwe should finally have present to us a whole on which we should know\nthe determining and effective or authorizing elements, and the order\nof development or hierarchy of dependence, in which others follow from\nthem.[30]\n\nIn this account by Lotze of the operations of the forms of thought,\nthere is clearly put before us the picture of a continuous correlative\ndetermination of datum on one side and of idea or meaning on the\nother, till experience is again integral, data being thoroughly\ndefined and connected, and ideas being the relevant meanings of\nsubject-matter. That we have here in outline a description of what\nactually occurs there can be no doubt. But there is as little doubt\nthat the description is thoroughly inconsistent with Lotze's\nsupposition that the material or data of thought is precisely the same\nas the antecedent of thought; or that ideas, conceptions, are purely\nmental somewhats extraneously brought to bear, as the sole essential\ncharacteristics of thought, upon a material provided ready-made. It\nmeans but one thing: The maintenance of unity and wholeness in\nexperience through conflicting contents occurs by means of a strictly\ncorrespondent setting apart of facts to be accurately described and\nproperly related, and meanings to be adequately construed and properly\nreferred. The datum is given _in_ the thought-situation, and _to_\nfurther qualification of ideas or meanings. But even in this aspect\nit presents a problem. To find out _what is_ given is an inquiry which\ntaxes reflection to the uttermost. Every important advance in\nscientific method means better agencies, more skilled technique for\nsimply detaching and describing what is barely there, or given. To be\nable to find out what can safely be taken as _there_, as given in any\nparticular inquiry, and hence be taken as material for orderly and\nverifiable inference, for fruitful hypothesis-making, for entertaining\nof explanatory and interpretative ideas, is one phase of the effort of\nsystematic scientific inquiry. It marks its inductive phase. To take\nwhat is discovered to be reliable evidence within a more complex\n_situation_ as if it were given absolutely and in isolation, or apart\nfrom a particular historic situs and context, is the fallacy of\nempiricism as a logical theory. To regard the thought-forms of\nconception, judgment, and inference as qualifications of \"pure\nthought, apart from any difference in objects,\" instead of as\nsuccessive dispositions in the progressive organization of the\nmaterial (or objects), is the fallacy of rationalism. Lotze, like\nKant, attempts to combine the two, thinking thereby to correct each by\nthe other.\n\nLotze recognizes the futility of thought if the sense data as data are\nfinal, if they alone are real, the truly existent, self-justificatory\nand valid. He sees that, if the empiricist were right in his\nassumption as to the real worth of the given data, thinking would be a\nridiculous pretender, either toilfully and poorly doing over again\nwhat needs no doing, or making a wilful departure from truth. He\nrealizes that thought is evoked because it is needed; and that it has\na work to do which is not merely formal, but which effects a\nmodification of the subject-matter of experience. Consequently he\nassumes a thought-in-itself, with certain forms and modes of action of\nits own, a realm of meaning possessed of a directive and normative\nworth of its own--the root-fallacy of rationalism. His attempted\ncompromise between the two turns out to be based on the assumption of\nthe indefensible ideas of both--the notion of an independent matter\ngiven to thought, on one side, and of an independent worth or force of\nthought-forms, on the other.\n\nThis pointing out of inconsistencies becomes stale and unprofitable\nsave as we bring them back into connection with their root-origin--the\nerection of distinctions that are genetic and historic, and working or\ninstrumental divisions of labor, into rigid and ready-made structural\ndifferences of reality. Lotze clearly recognizes that thought's nature\nis dependent upon its aim, its aim upon its problem, and this upon the\nsituation in which it finds its incentive and excuse. Its work is cut\nout for it. It does not what it would, but what it must. As Lotze puts\nit, \"Logic has to do with thought, not as it would be under\nhypothetical conditions, but as it is\" (I, 33), and this statement is\nmade in explicit combination with statements to the effect that the\npeculiarity of the material of thought conditions its activity.\nSimilarly he says, in a passage already referred to: \"The possibility\nand the success of thought's production in general depends upon this\noriginal constitution and organization of the whole world of ideas, a\nconstitution which, though not necessary in thought, is all the more\nnecessary to make thought possible.\"[31]\n\nAs we have seen, the essential nature of conception, judgment, and\ninference is dependent upon peculiarities of the propounded material,\nthey being forms dependent for their significance upon the stage of\norganization in which they begin.\n\nFrom this only one conclusion is possible. If thought's nature is\ndependent upon its actual conditions and circumstances, the primary\nlogical problem is to study thought-in-its-conditioning; it is to\ndetect the crisis within which thought and its subject-matter present\nthemselves in their mutual distinction and cross-reference. But Lotze\nis so thoroughly committed to a ready-made antecedent of some sort,\nthat this genetic consideration is of no account to him. The historic\nmethod is a mere matter of psychology, and has no logical worth (I,\n2). We must presuppose a psychological mechanism and psychological\nmaterial, but logic is concerned not with origin or history, but with\nauthority, worth, value (I, 10). Again: \"Logic is not concerned with\nthe manner in which the elements utilized by thought come into\nexistence, but their value _after_ they have somehow come into\nexistence, for the carrying out of intellectual operations\" (I, 34).\nAnd finally: \"I have maintained throughout my work that logic cannot\nderive any serious advantage from a discussion of _the conditions\nunder which thought as a psychological process comes about_. The\nsignificance of logical forms ... is to be found in the utterances of\nthought, the laws which it imposes, after or during the act of\nthinking, not in the conditions which lie back of any which produce\nthought.\"[32]\n\nLotze, in truth, represents a halting-stage in the evolution of\nlogical theory. He is too far along to be contented with the\nreiteration of the purely formal distinctions of a merely formal\nthought-by-itself. He recognizes that thought as formal is the form of\nsome matter, and has its worth only as organizing that matter to meet\nthe ideal demands of reason; and that \"reason\" is in truth only an\nadequate systematization of the matter or content. Consequently he has\nto open the door to admit \"psychical processes\" which furnish this\nmaterial. Having let in the material, he is bound to shut the door\nagain in the face of the processes from which the material\nproceeded--to dismiss them as impertinent intruders. If thought gets\nits data in such a surreptitious manner, there is no occasion for\nwonder that the legitimacy of its dealings with the material remains\nan open question. Logical theory, like every branch of the philosophic\ndisciplines, waits upon a surrender of the obstinate conviction that,\nwhile the work and aim of thought is conditioned by the material\nsupplied to it, yet the _worth_ of its performances is something to be\npassed upon in complete abstraction from conditions of origin and\ndevelopment.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[21] This is but to say that the presentation of objects as\nspecifically different things in experience is the work of reflection,\nand that the discrimination of something experienc_ed_ from modes of\nexperienc_ing_ is also the work of reflection. The latter statement\nis, of course, but a particular case of the first; for an act of\nexperiencing is one object, among others, which may be discriminated\nout of the original experience. When so discriminated, it has exactly\nthe same existential status as any other discriminated object; seeing\nand thing seen stand on the same level of existentiality. But primary\nexperience is innocent of the discrimination of the _what_ experienced\nand the _how_, or mode, of experiencing. We are not in it aware of the\nseeing, nor yet of objects _as_ something seen. Any experience in all\nof its non-reflective phases is innocent of any discrimination of\nsubject and object. It involves within itself what may be reflectively\ndiscriminated into objects located outside the organism and objects\nreferred to the organism. [Note added in revision.]\n\n[22] Of course, this very element may be the precarious, the ideal,\nand possibly fanciful of some other situation. But it is to change the\nhistoric into the absolute to conclude that therefore everything is\nuncertain, all at once, or as such. This gives metaphysical skepticism\nas distinct from the working skepticism which is an inherent factor in\nall reflection and scientific inquiry.\n\n[23] But this is a slow progress within reflection. Plato, who was\ninfluential in bringing this general distinction to consciousness,\nstill thought and wrote as if \"image\" were itself a queer sort of\nobjective existence; it was only gradually that it was disposed of as\na phase of personal experiencing.\n\n[24] I, 28-34.\n\n[25] It is interesting to see how explicitly Lotze is compelled\nfinally to differentiate two aspects in the antecedents of thoughts,\none of which is necessary in order that there may be anything to call\nout thought (a lack, or problem); the other in order that when thought\nis evoked it may find data at hand--that is, material in shape to\nreceive and respond to its exercise. \"The manifold matter of ideas is\nbrought before us, not only in the _systematic order of its\nqualitative relationships_, but in the rich _variety of local and\ntemporal combinations_.... The _combinations of heterogeneous ideas_\n... form the _problems_, in connection with which the efforts of\nthought to reduce coexistence to coherence will _subsequently_ be\nmade. The _homogeneous or similar_ ideas, on the other hand, give\noccasion to separate, to connect, and to count their repetitions\" (I,\n33, 34; italics mine). Without the heterogeneous variety of the local\nand temporal juxtapositions there would be nothing to excite thought.\nWithout the systematic arrangement of quality there would be nothing\nto meet thought and reward it for its efforts. The homogeneity of\nqualitative relationships, _in the pre-thought material_, gives the\ntools or instruments by which thought is enabled successfully to\ntackle the heterogeneity of collocations and conjunctions also found\nin the same material! One would suppose that when Lotze reached this\npoint he might have been led to suspect that in his remarkable\nadjustment of thought-stimuli, thought-material, and thought-tools to\none another, he must after all be dealing, not with something prior to\nthe thought-function, but with the necessary structures and tools of\nthe thought-situation.\n\n[26] _Supra_, p. 113.\n\n[27] For the identity of sensory experience with the point of greatest\nstrain and stress in conflicting or tensional experience, see \"The\nReflex Arc Concept in Psychology,\" _Psychological Review_, III, 57.\n\n[28] For the \"accessory\" character of thought, see Lotze, I, 7, 25-27,\n61, etc.\n\n[29] Bosanquet (_Logic_, I, 30-34) and Jones (_Philosophy of Lotze_,\n1895, chap. iv) have called attention to a curious inconsistency in\nLotze's treatment of judgment. On one hand, the statement is as given\nabove. Judgment grows out of conception in making explicit the\ndetermining relation of universal to its own particular, implied in\nconception. But, on the other hand, judgment grows not out of\nconception at all, but out of the question of determining connection\nin change. Lotze's nominal reason for this latter view is that the\nconceptual world is purely static; since the actual world is one of\nchange, we need to pass upon what really goes together (is causal) in\nthe change as distinct from such as are merely coincident. But, as\nJones clearly shows, it is also connected with the fact that, while\nLotze nominally asserts that judgment grows out of conception, he\ntreats conception as the result of judgment since the first view makes\njudgment a mere explication of the content of an idea, and hence\nmerely expository or analytic (in the Kantian sense) and so of more\nthan doubtful applicability to reality. The affair is too large to\ndiscuss here, and I will content myself with referring to the\noscillation between conflicting contents and gradation of sensory\nqualities already discussed (p. 144, note). It is judgment which grows\nout of the former, because judgment is the whole situation as such;\nconception is referable to the latter because it _is_ one abstraction\nwithin the whole (the solution of possible meanings of the data) just\nas the datum is another. In truth, since the sensory datum is not\nabsolute, but comes in a historical context, the qualities apprehended\nas constituting the datum simply define the locus of conflict in the\nentire situation. They are attributives of the contents-in-tension of\nthe colliding things, not calm untroubled ultimates. On pp. 33 and 34\nof Vol. I, Lotze recognizes (as we have just seen) that, as matter of\nfact, it is both sensory qualities in their systematic grading, or\nquantitative determinations (see I, 43, for the recognition of the\nnecessary place of the quantitative in the true concept), and the\n\"rich variety of local and temporal combinations,\" that provoke\nthought and supply it with material. But, as usual, he treats this\nsimply as a historical accident, not as furnishing the key to the\nwhole matter. In fine, while the heterogeneous collocations and\nsuccessions constitute the problematic element that stimulates\nthought, quantitative determination of the sensory quality furnishes\none of the two chief means through which thought deals with the\nproblem. It is a reduction of the original colliding contents to a\nform in which the effort at redintegration gets maximum efficiency.\nThe concept, as ideal meaning, is of course the other partner to the\ntransaction. It is getting the various possible meanings-of-the-data\ninto such shape as to make them most useful in construing the data.\nThe bearing of this upon the subject and predicate of judgment cannot\nbe discussed here.\n\n[30] See I, 38, 59, 61, 105, 129, 197, for Lotze's treatment of these\ndistinctions.\n\n[31] I, 36; see also II, 290, 291.\n\n[32] II, 246; the same is reiterated in II, 250, where the question of\norigin is referred to as a corruption in logic. Certain psychical acts\nare necessary as \"conditions and occasions\" of logical operations, but\nthe \"deep gulf between psychical mechanism and thought remains\nunfilled.\"\n\n\n\n\nV\n\nTHE OBJECTS OF THOUGHT\n\n\nIn the foregoing discussion, particularly in the last chapter, we were\nrepeatedly led to recognize that thought has its own distinctive\nobjects. At times Lotze gives way to the tendency to define thought\nentirely in terms of modes and forms of activity which are exercised\nby it upon a strictly foreign material. But two motives continually\npush him in the other direction. (1) Thought has a distinctive work to\ndo, one which involves a qualitative transformation of (at least) the\n_relationships_ of the presented matter; as fast as it accomplishes\nthis work, the subject-matter becomes somehow thought's\nsubject-matter. As we have just seen, the data are progressively\norganized to meet thought's ideal of a complete whole, with its\nmembers interconnected according to a determining principle. Such\nprogressive organization throws backward doubt upon the assumption of\nthe original total irrelevancy of the data and thought-forms to each\nother. (2) A like motive operates from the side of the subject-matter.\nAs merely foreign and external, it is too heterogeneous to lend itself\nto thought's exercise and influence. The idea, as we saw in the first\nchapter, is the convenient medium through which Lotze passes from the\npurely heterogeneous psychical impression or event, which is totally\nirrelevant to thought's purpose and working, over to a state of\naffairs which can reward thought. Idea as meaning forms the bridge\nover from the brute factuality of the psychical impression to the\ncoherent value of thought's own content.\n\nWe have, in this chapter, to consider the question of the idea or\ncontent of thought from two points of view: first the _possibility_ of\nsuch a content--its consistency with Lotze's fundamental premises;\nsecondly, its _objective_ character--its validity and test.\n\nI. The question of the possibility of a specific content of thought is\nthe question of the nature of the idea as meaning. _Meaning_ is the\ncharacteristic object of thought. We have thus far left unquestioned\nLotze's continual assumption of meaning as a sort of thought-unit; the\nbuilding-stone of thought's construction. In his treatment of meaning,\nLotze's contradictions regarding the antecedents, data, and content of\nthought reach their full conclusion. He expressly makes meaning to be\nthe product of thought's activity and also the unreflective material\nout of which thought's operations grow.\n\nThis contradiction has been worked out in accurate and complete detail\nby Professor Jones.[33] He summarizes it as follows (p. 99): \"No other\nway was left to him [Lotze] excepting this of first attributing all\nto sense and afterwards attributing all to thought, and, finally, of\nattributing it to thought only because it was already in its material.\nThis _seesaw_ is essential to his theory; the elements of knowledge as\nhe describes them can subsist only by the alternate robbery of each\nother.\" We have already seen how strenuously Lotze insists upon the\nfact that the given subject-matter of thought is to be regarded wholly\nas the work of a physical mechanism, \"without any action of\nthought.\"[34] But Lotze also states that if the products of the\npsychical mechanism \"are to admit of combination in the definite form\nof a _thought_, they each require some previous shaping to make them\ninto logical building-stones and to convert them from _impressions_\ninto _ideas_. Nothing is really more familiar to us than this first\noperation of thought; the only reason why we usually overlook it is\nthat in the language which we inherit, it is already carried out, and\nit seems, therefore, to belong to the self-evident presuppositions of\nthought, _not to its own specific work_.\"[35] And again (I, 23),\njudgments \"can consist of nothing but combinations of ideas which are\nno longer mere impressions: every such idea must have undergone at\nleast the simple formation mentioned above.\" Such ideas are, Lotze\ngoes on to urge, already rudimentary concepts--that is to say, logical\ndeterminations.\n\nThe obviousness of the logical contradiction of attributing to a\npreliminary specific work of thought exactly the condition of affairs\nwhich is elsewhere explicitly attributed to a psychical mechanism\nprior to any thought-activity, should not blind us to its import and\nrelative necessity. The impression, it will be recalled, is a mere\nstate of our own consciousness--a mood of ourselves. As such it has\nsimply _de facto_ relations as an event to other similar events. But\nreflective thought is concerned with the relationship of a content or\nmatter to other contents. Hence the impression must have a matter\nbefore it can come at all within the sphere of thought's exercise. How\nshall it secure this? Why, by a preliminary activity of thought which\nobjectifies the impression. Blue as a mere sensuous irritation or\nfeeling is given a quality, the meaning \"blue\"--blueness; the sense\nimpression is objectified; it is presented \"no longer as a condition\nwhich we undergo, but as a something which has its being and its\nmeaning in itself, and which continues to be what it is, and to mean\nwhat it means whether we are conscious of it or not. It is easy to see\nhere the _necessary beginning of that activity which we above\nappropriated to thought as such_: it has not yet got so far as\nconverting coexistence into coherence. It has first to perform the\nprevious task of investing each single impression with an independent\nvalidity, without which the later opposition of their real coherence\nto mere coexistence could not be made in any intelligible sense.\"[36]\n\nThis objectification, which converts a sensitive state into a sensible\nmatter to which the sensitive state is referred, also gives this\nmatter \"position,\" a certain typical character. It is not objectified\nin a merely general way, but is given a specific sort of objectivity.\nOf these sorts of objectivity there are three mentioned: that of a\nsubstantive content; that of an attached dependent content; that of an\nactive relationship connecting the various contents with each other.\nIn short, we have the types of meaning embodied in language in the\nform of nouns, adjectives, and verbs. It is through this preliminary\nformative activity of thought that reflective or _logical_ thought has\npresented to it a world of meanings ranged in an order of relative\nindependence and dependence, and arranged as elements in a complex of\nmeanings whose various constituent parts mutually influence one\nanother's meanings.[37]\n\nAs usual, Lotze mediates the contradiction between material\nconstituted _by_ thought and the same material just presented _to_\nthought, by a further position so disparate to each that, taken in\nconnection with each by turns, it seems to bridge the gulf. After\ndescribing the prior constitutive work of thought as above, he goes on\nto discuss a _second_ phase of thought which is intermediary between\nthis and the third phase, viz., reflective thought proper. This second\nactivity is that of arranging experienced quales in series and\ngroups, thus ascribing a sort of universal or common somewhat to\nvarious instances (as already described; see p. 144). On one hand, it\nis clearly stated that this second phase of thought's activity is in\nreality the _same_ as the first phase: since all objectification\ninvolves positing, since positing involves distinction of one matter\nfrom others, and since this involves placing it in a series or group\nin which each is measurably marked off, as to the degree and nature of\nits diversity, from every other. We are told that we are only\nconsidering \"a really inseparable operation\" of thought from two\ndifferent sides: first, as to the effect which objectifying thought\nhas upon the matter as set over against the feeling _subject_;\nsecondly, the effect which this objectification has upon the matter in\nrelation to _other matters_.[38] Afterward, however, these two\noperations are declared to be radically different in type and nature.\nThe first is determinant and formative; it gives ideas \"the shape\nwithout which the logical spirit could not accept them.\" In a way it\ndictates \"its own laws to its object-matter.\"[39] The second activity\nof thought is rather passive and receptive. It simply recognizes what\nis already there. \"Thought can make no difference where it finds none\nalready in the matter of impressions.\"[40] \"The first universal, as we\nsaw, can only be experienced in immediate sensation. It is no product\nof thought, but something that thought finds already in\nexistence.\"[41]\n\nThe obviousness of this further contradiction is paralleled only by\nits inevitableness. Thought is in the air, is arbitrary and wild in\ndealing with meanings, unless it gets its start and cue from actual\nexperience. Hence the necessity of insisting upon thought's activity\nas just recognizing the contents already given. But, on the other\nhand, prior to the work of thought there is to Lotze no content or\nmeaning. It requires a work of thought to detach anything from the\nflux of sense irritations and invest it with a meaning of its own.\nThis dilemma is inevitable to any writer who declines to consider as\ncorrelative the nature of thought-activity and thought-content from\nthe standpoint of their generating conditions in the movement of\nexperience. Viewed from such a standpoint the principle of solution is\nclear enough. As we have already seen (p. 121), the internal\ndissension of an experience leads to detaching certain factors\npreviously integrated in the concrete experience as aspects of its own\nqualitative coloring, and to relegating them, for the time being\n(pending integration into further immediate qualities of a\nreconstituted experience), into a world of bare meanings, a sphere\nqualified as ideal throughout. These meanings then become the tools of\nthought in interpreting the data, just as the sense qualities which\ndefine the presented situation are the immediate matter for thought.\nThe two _as mutually referred_ are content. That is, the datum and the\nmeaning as reciprocally qualified by each other constitute the\nobjective of thought.\n\nTo reach this unification is thought's objective or goal. Every\nsuccessive cross-section of reflective inquiry presents what may be\ntaken for granted as the outcome of previous thinking, and as the\ndeterminant of further reflective procedure. Taken as defining the\npoint reached in the thought-function and serving as constituent unit\nin further thought, it is content or logical object. Lotze's instinct\nis sure in identifying and setting over against each other the\nmaterial given to thought and the content which is thought's own\n\"building-stone.\" His contradictions arise simply from the fact that\nhis absolute, non-historic method does not permit him to interpret\nthis joint identity and distinction in a working, and hence relative,\nsense.\n\nII. The question of how the existence of meanings, or\nthought-contents, is to be understood merges imperceptibly into the\nquestion of the real objectivity or validity of such contents. The\ndifficulty for Lotze is the now familiar one: So far as his logic\ncompels him to insist that these meanings are the possession and\nproduct of thought (since thought is an independent activity), the\nideas are merely ideas; there is no test of objectivity beyond the\nthoroughly unsatisfactory and formal one of their own mutual\nconsistency. In reaction from this Lotze is thrown back upon the idea\nof these contents as the original matter given in the impressions\nthemselves. Here there seems to be an objective or external test by\nwhich the reality of thought's operations may be tried; a given idea\nis verified or found false according to its measure of correspondence\nwith the matter of experience as such. But now we are no better off.\nThe original independence and heterogeneity of impressions and of\nthought is so great that there is no way to compare the results of the\nlatter with the former. We cannot compare or contrast distinctions of\nworth with bare differences of factual existence (I, 2). The standard\nor test of objectivity is so thoroughly external that by original\ndefinition it is wholly outside the realm of thought. How can thought\ncompare meanings with existences?\n\nOr again, the given material of experience apart from thought is\nprecisely the relatively chaotic and unorganized; it even reduces\nitself to a mere sequence of psychical events. What sense is there in\ndirecting us to compare the highest results of scientific inquiry with\nthe bare sequence of our own states of feeling; or even with the\noriginal data whose fragmentary and uncertain character was the exact\nmotive for entering upon scientific inquiry? How can the former in any\nsense give a check or test of the value of the latter? This is\nprofessedly to test the validity of a system of meanings by comparison\nwith that whose defects call forth the construction of the system of\nmeanings.\n\nOur subsequent inquiry simply consists in tracing some of the phases\nof the characteristic seesaw from one to the other of the two horns of\nthe now familiar dilemma: either thought is separate from the matter\nof experience, and then its validity is wholly its own private\nbusiness, or else the objective results of thought are already in the\nantecedent material, and then thought is either unnecessary or else\nhas no way of checking its own performances.\n\n1. Lotze assumes, as we have seen, a certain independent validity in\neach meaning or qualified content, taken in and of itself. \"Blue\" has\na certain meaning, in and of itself; it is an _object_ for\nconsciousness as such, not merely its state or mood. After the\noriginal sense irritation through which it was mediated has entirely\ndisappeared, it persists as a valid meaning. Moreover, it is an object\nor content of thought for others as well. Thus it has a double mark\nof validity: in the comparison of one part of my own experience with\nanother, and in the comparison of my experience as a whole with that\nof others. Here we have a sort of validity which does not raise at all\nthe question of _metaphysical_ reality (I, 14, 15). Lotze thus seems\nto have escaped from the necessity of employing as check or test for\nthe validity of ideas any reference to a real outside the sphere of\nthought itself. Such terms as \"conjunction,\" \"franchise,\"\n\"constitution,\" \"algebraic zero,\" etc., claim to possess objective\nvalidity. Yet none of these professes to refer to a reality beyond\nthought. Generalizing this point of view, validity or objectivity of\nmeaning means simply that which is \"identical for all consciousness\"\n(I, 3); \"it is quite indifferent whether certain parts of the world of\nthought indicate something which has beside an independent reality\noutside of thinking minds, or whether all that it contains exists only\nin the thoughts of those who think it, but with equal validity for\nthem all\" (I, 16).\n\nSo far it seems clear sailing. Difficulties, however, show themselves\nthe moment we inquire what is meant by a self-identical content for\nall thought. Is this to be taken in a static or in a dynamic way? That\nis to say: Does it express the fact that a given content or meaning is\n_de facto_ presented to the consciousness of all alike? Does this\ncoequal presence guarantee an objectivity? Or does validity attach to\na given meaning or content in the sense that it directs and controls\nthe further exercise of thinking, and thus the formation of further\n_new_ objects of knowledge?\n\nThe former interpretation is alone consistent with Lotze's notion that\nthe independent idea as such is invested with a certain validity or\nobjectivity. It alone is consistent with his assertion that concepts\nprecede judgments. It alone, that is to say, is consistent with the\nnotion that reflective thinking has a sphere of ideas or meanings\nsupplied to it at the outset. But it is impossible to entertain this\nbelief. The stimulus which, according to Lotze, goads thought on from\nideas or concepts to judgments and inferences is in truth simply the\nlack of validity, of objectivity in its original independent meanings\nor contents. A meaning as independent is precisely that which is not\ninvested with validity, but which is a mere idea, a \"notion,\" a fancy,\nat best a surmise which may turn out to be valid (and of course this\nindicates possible reference); a standpoint to have its value\ndetermined by its further active use. \"Blue\" as a mere detached\nfloating meaning, an idea at large, would not gain in validity simply\nby being entertained continuously in a given consciousness, or by\nbeing made at one and the same time the persistent object of attentive\nregard by all human consciousnesses. If this were all that were\nrequired, the chimera, the centaur, or any other subjective\nconstruction could easily gain validity. \"Christian Science\" has made\njust this notion the basis of its philosophy.\n\nThe simple fact is that in such illustrations as \"blue,\" \"franchise,\"\n\"conjunction,\" Lotze instinctively takes cases which are not mere\nindependent and detached meanings, but which involve reference to a\n_region_ of experience, to a region of mutually determining social\nactivities. The conception that reference to a _social_ activity does\nnot involve the same sort of reference of a meaning beyond itself that\nis found in physical matters, and hence may be taken quite innocent\nand free of the problem of reference to existence beyond meaning, is\none of the strangest that has ever found lodgment in human thinking.\nEither both physical and social reference or neither is logical; if\nneither, then it is because the meaning functions, as it originates,\nin a specific situation which carries with it its own tests (see p.\n96). Lotze's conception is made possible only by unconsciously\nsubstituting the idea of an object as a content of thought for a large\nnumber of persons (or a _de facto_ somewhat for every consciousness),\nfor the genuine definition of object as a _determinant_ in a scheme of\nactivity. The former is consistent with Lotze's conception of thought,\nbut wholly indeterminate as to validity or intent. The latter is the\ntest used experimentally in all concrete thinking, but involves a\nradical transformation of all Lotze's assumptions. A given idea of\nthe conjunction of the franchise, or of blue, is valid, not because\neverybody happens to entertain it, but because it expresses the factor\nof control or direction in a given movement of experience. The test of\nvalidity of idea[42] is its functional or instrumental use in\neffecting the transition from a relatively conflicting experience to a\nrelatively integrated one. If Lotze's view were correct, \"blue\" valid\nonce would be valid always--even when red or green were actually\ncalled for to fulfil specific conditions. This is to say validity\nreally refers to rightfulness or adequacy of performance in an\nasserting of connection--not to a meaning as contemplated in\ndetachment.\n\nIf we refer again to the fact that the genuine antecedent of thought\nis a situation which is disorganized in its structural elements, we\ncan easily understand how certain contents may be detached and _held_\napart as meanings or references, actual or possible. We can understand\nhow such detached contents may be of use in effecting a review of the\nentire experience, and as affording standpoints and methods of a\nreconstruction which will maintain the integrity of behavior. We can\nunderstand how validity of meaning is measured by reference to\nsomething which is not mere meaning; by reference to something which\nlies beyond it as such--viz., the reconstitution of an experience\ninto which it enters as method of control. That paradox of ordinary\nexperience and of scientific inquiry by which objectivity is given\nalike to matter of perception and to conceived relations--to facts and\nto laws--affords no peculiar difficulty because the test of\nobjectivity is everywhere the same: anything is objective in so far\nas, through the medium of conflict, it controls the movement of\nexperience in its reconstructive transition. There is not first an\nobject, whether of sense perception or of conception, which afterward\nsomehow exercises this controlling influence; but the objective is\n_any_ existence exercising the function of control. It may only\ncontrol the act of inquiry; it may only set on foot doubt, but this is\ndirection of subsequent experience, and, in so far, is a token of\nobjectivity. It has to be reckoned with.\n\nSo much for the thought-content or meaning as having a validity of its\nown. It does not have it as isolated or given or static; it has it in\nits dynamic reference, its use in determining further movement of\nexperience. In other words, the \"meaning,\" having been selected and\nmade up with reference to performing a certain office in the evolution\nof a unified experience, can be tested in no other way than by\ndiscovering whether it does what it was intended to do and what it\npurports to do.[43]\n\n2. Lotze has to wrestle with this question of validity in a further\nrespect: What constitutes the objectivity of thinking as a total\nattitude, activity, or function? According to his own statement, the\nmeanings or valid ideas are after all only building-stones for logical\nthought. Validity is thus not a property of them in their independent\nexistences, but of their mutual reference to each other. Thinking is\nthe process of instituting these mutual references; of building up the\nvarious scattered and independent building-stones into the coherent\nsystem of thought. What is the validity of the various forms of\nthinking which find expression in the various types of judgment and in\nthe various forms of inference? Categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive\njudgment; inference by induction, by analogy, by mathematical\nequation; classification, theory of explanation--all these are\nprocesses of reflection by which connection in an organized whole is\ngiven to the fragmentary meanings with which thought sets out. What\nshall we say of the validity of such processes?\n\nOn one point Lotze is quite clear. These various logical acts do not\nreally enter into the constitution of the valid world. The logical\nforms as such are maintained _only_ in the process of thinking. The\nworld of valid truth does not undergo a series of contortions and\nevolutions, paralleling in any way the successive steps and missteps,\nthe succession of tentative trials, withdrawals, and retracings, which\nmark the course of our own thinking.[44]\n\nLotze is explicit upon the point that only the thought-content in\nwhich the process of thinking issues has objective validity; the act\nof thinking is \"purely and simply an inner movement of our own minds,\nmade necessary to us by reason of the constitution of our nature and\nof our place in the world\" (II, 279).\n\nHere the problem of validity presents itself as the problem of the\nrelation of the act of thinking to its own product. In his solution\nLotze uses two metaphors: one derived from building operations, the\nother from traveling. The construction of a building requires of\nnecessity certain tools and extraneous constructions, stagings,\nscaffoldings, etc., which are necessary to effect the final\nconstruction, but which do not enter into the building as such. The\nactivity has an instrumental, though not a constitutive, value as\nregards its product. Similarly, in order to get a view from the top of\na mountain--this view being the objective--the traveler has to go\nthrough preliminary movements along devious courses. These again are\nantecedent prerequisites, but do not constitute a portion of the\nattained view.\n\nThe problem of thought as activity, as distinct from thought as\ncontent, opens up altogether too large a question to receive complete\nconsideration at this point. Fortunately, however, the previous\ndiscussion enables us to narrow the point which is in issue just here.\nThe question is whether the activity of thought is to be regarded as\nan independent function supervening entirely from without upon\nantecedents, and directed from without upon data, or whether it marks\nthe phase of the transformation which the course of experience\n(whether practical, or artistic, or socially affectional or whatever)\nundergoes for the sake of its deliberate control. If it be the latter,\na thoroughly intelligent sense can be given to the proposition that\nthe activity of thinking is instrumental, and that its worth is found,\nnot in its own successive states as such, but in the result in which\nit comes to conclusion. But the conception of thinking as an\nindependent activity somehow occurring after an independent\nantecedent, playing upon an independent subject-matter, and finally\neffecting an independent result, presents us with just one miracle\nthe more.\n\nI do not question the strictly instrumental character of thinking.\nThe problem lies not here, but in the interpretation of the nature\nof the instrument. The difficulty with Lotze's position is that it\nforces us into the assumption of a means and an end which are simply\nand only external to each other, and yet necessarily dependent upon\neach other--a position which, whenever found, is thoroughly\nself-contradictory. Lotze vibrates between the notion of thought as a\ntool in the external sense, a mere scaffolding to a finished building\nin which it has no part nor lot, and the notion of thought as an\nimmanent tool, as a scaffolding which is an integral part of the very\noperation of building, and which is set up for the sake of the\nbuilding-activity which is carried on effectively only with and through\na scaffolding. Only in the former case can the scaffolding be\nconsidered as a _mere_ tool. In the latter case the external\nscaffolding is _not_ the instrumentality; the actual tool is the\n_action_ of erecting the building, and this action involves the\nscaffolding as a constituent part of itself. The work of building is\nnot set over against the completed building as mere means to an end; it\n_is_ the end taken in process or historically, longitudinally,\ntemporally viewed. The scaffolding, moreover, is not an external means\nto the process of erecting, but an organic member of it. It is no mere\naccident of language that \"building\" has a double sense--meaning at\nonce the process and the finished product. The outcome of thought is\nthe thinking activity carried on to its own completion; the activity,\non the other hand, _is_ the outcome taken anywhere short of its own\nrealization, and thereby still going on.\n\nThe only consideration which prevents easy and immediate acceptance of\nthis view is the notion of thinking as something purely formal. It is\nstrange that the empiricist does not see that his insistence upon a\nmatter accidentally given to thought only strengthens the hands of the\nrationalist with his claim of thinking as an independent activity,\nseparate from the actual make-up of the affairs of experience.\nThinking as a merely formal activity exercised upon certain sensations\nor images or objects sets forth an absolutely meaningless proposition.\nThe psychological identification of thinking with the process of\nassociation is much nearer the truth. It is, indeed, on the way to the\ntruth. We need only to recognize that association is of matters or\nmeanings, not of ideas as existences or events; and that the type of\nassociation we call thinking differs from casual fancy and revery by\ncontrol in reference to an end, to apprehend how completely thinking\nis a reconstructive movement of actual contents of experience in\nrelation to each other.\n\nThere is no miracle in the fact that tool and material are adapted to\neach other in the process of reaching a valid conclusion. Were they\nexternal in origin to each other and to the result, the whole affair\nwould, indeed, present an insoluble problem--so insoluble that, if\nthis were the true condition of affairs, we never should even know\nthat there was a problem. But, in truth, both material and tool have\nbeen secured and determined with reference to economy and efficiency\nin effecting the end desired--the maintenance of a harmonious\nexperience. The builder has discovered that his building means\nbuilding tools, and also building material. Each has been slowly\nevolved with reference to its fit employ in the entire function; and\nthis evolution has been checked at every point by reference to its own\ncorrespondent. The carpenter has not thought at large on his building\nand then constructed tools at large, but has thought of his building\nin terms of the material which enters into it, and through that medium\nhas come to the consideration of the tools which are helpful.\n\nThis is not a formal question, but one of the place and relations of\nthe matters actually entering into experience. And they in turn\ndetermine the taking up of just those mental attitudes, and the\nemploying of just those intellectual operations which most effectively\nhandle and organize the material. Thinking is adaptation _to_ an end\n_through_ the adjustment of particular objective contents.\n\nThe thinker, like the carpenter, is at once stimulated and checked in\nevery stage of his procedure by the particular situation which\nconfronts him. A person is at the stage of wanting a new house: well,\nthen, his materials are available resources, the price of labor, the\ncost of building, the state and needs of his family, profession, etc.;\nhis tools are paper and pencil and compass, or possibly the bank as a\ncredit instrumentality, etc. Again, the work is beginning. The\nfoundations are laid. This in turn determines its own specific\nmaterials and tools. Again, the building is almost ready for\noccupancy. The concrete process is that of taking away the\nscaffolding, clearing up the grounds, furnishing and decorating rooms,\netc. This specific operation again determines its own fit or relevant\nmaterials and tools. It defines the time and mode and manner of\nbeginning and ceasing to use them. Logical theory will get along as\nwell as does the practice of knowing when it sticks close by and\nobserves the directions and checks inherent in each successive phase\nof the evolution of the cycle of experience. The problem in general of\nvalidity of the thinking process as distinct from the validity of this\nor that process arises only when thinking is isolated from its\nhistoric position and its material context (see _ante_, p. 95).\n\n3. But Lotze is not yet done with the problem of validity, even from\nhis own standpoint. The ground shifts again under his feet. It is no\nlonger a question of the validity of the idea or meaning with which\nthought is supposed to set out; it is no longer a question of the\nvalidity of the process of thinking in reference to its own product;\nit is the question of the validity of the product. Supposing, after\nall, that the final meaning, or logical idea, is thoroughly coherent\nand organized; supposing it is an object for all consciousness as\nsuch. Once more arises the question: What is the validity of even the\nmost coherent and complete idea?--a question which arises and will not\ndown. We may reconstruct the notion of the chimera until it ceases to\nbe an independent idea and becomes a part of the system of Greek\nmythology. Has it gained in validity in ceasing to be an independent\nmyth, in becoming an element in systematized myth? Myth it was and\nmyth it remains. Mythology does not get validity by growing bigger.\nHow do we know the same is not the case with the ideas which are the\nproduct of our most deliberate and extended scientific inquiry? The\nreference again to the content as the self-identical object of all\nconsciousness proves nothing; the subject-matter of a hallucination\ndoes not gain validity in proportion to its social contagiousness.\n\nAccording to Lotze, the final product is, after all, still thought.\nNow, Lotze is committed once for all to the notion that thought, in\nany form, is directed by and at an outside reality. The ghost haunts\nhim to the last. How, after all, does even the ideally perfect valid\nthought apply or refer to reality? Its genuine subject is still beyond\nitself. At the last Lotze can dispose of this question only by\nregarding it as a metaphysical, not a logical, problem (II, 281, 282).\nIn other words, _logically_ speaking, we are at the end just exactly\nwhere we were at the beginning--in the sphere of ideas, and of ideas\nonly, plus a consciousness of the necessity of referring these ideas\nto a reality which is beyond them, which is utterly inaccessible to\nthem, which is out of reach of any influence which they may exercise,\nand which transcends any possible comparison with their results. \"It\nis vain,\" says Lotze, \"to shrink from acknowledging the circle here\ninvolved ... all we know of the external world depends upon the ideas\nof it which are within us\" (II, 185). \"It is then this varied world of\nideas within us which forms the sole material directly given to us\"\n(II, 186). As it is the only material given to us, so it is the only\nmaterial with which thought can end. To talk about knowing the\nexternal world through ideas which are merely within us is to talk of\nan inherent self-contradiction. There is no common ground in which the\nexternal world and our ideas can meet. In other words, the original\nseparation between an independent thought-material and an independent\nthought-function and purpose lands us inevitably in the metaphysics of\nsubjective idealism, plus a belief in an unknown reality beyond, which\nalthough unknowable is yet taken as the ultimate test of the value of\nour ideas. At the end, after all our maneuvering we are where we\nbegan: with two separate disparates, one of meaning, but no existence,\nthe other of existence, but no meaning.\n\nThe other aspect of Lotze's contradiction which completes the circle\nis clear when we refer to his original propositions, and recall that\nat the outset he was compelled to regard the origination and\nconjunctions of the impressions, the elements of ideas, as themselves\nthe effects exercised by a world of things already in existence (see\np. 31). He sets up an independent world of thought, and yet has to\nconfess that both at its origin and at its termination it points with\nabsolute necessity to a world beyond itself. Only the stubborn refusal\nto take this initial and terminal reference of thought beyond itself\nas having a _historic_ or temporal meaning, indicating a particular\nplace of generation and a particular point of fulfilment, compels\nLotze to give such objective references a transcendental turn.\n\nWhen Lotze goes on to say (II, 191) that the measure of truth of\nparticular parts of experience is found in asking whether, when judged\nby thought, they are in harmony with other parts of experience; when\nhe goes on to say that there is no sense in trying to compare the\nentire world of ideas with a reality which is non-existent (excepting\nas it itself should become an idea), he lands where he might better\nhave frankly commenced.[45] He saves himself from utter skepticism\nonly by claiming that the explicit assumption of skepticism--the need\nof agreement of a ready-made idea as such with an extraneous\nready-made material as such--is meaningless. He defines correctly the\nwork of thought as consisting in harmonizing the various portions of\nexperience with each other. In this case the test of thought is the\nharmony or unity of experience actually effected. The test of validity\nof thought is beyond thought, just as at the other limit thought\noriginates out of a situation which is not dependent upon thought.\nInterpret this before and beyond in a historic sense, as an affair of\nthe place occupied and r\u00f4le played by thinking as a function in\nexperience in relation to other non-intellectual experiences of\nthings, and then the intermediate and instrumental character of\nthought, its dependence upon unreflective antecedents for its\nexistence, and upon a consequent experience for its final test,\nbecomes significant and necessary. Taken at large, apart from temporal\ndevelopment and control, it plunges us in the depths of a hopelessly\ncomplicated and self-revolving metaphysic.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[33] _Philosophy of Lotze_, chap. iii, \"Thought and the Preliminary\nProcess of Experience.\"\n\n[34] I, 38.\n\n[35] I, 13; last italics mine.\n\n[36] I, 14; italics mine.\n\n[37] See I, 16-20. On p. 22 this work is declared to be not only the\nfirst but the most indispensable of all thought's operations.\n\n[38] I, 26.\n\n[39] I, 35.\n\n[40] I, 36; see the strong statements already quoted, p. 112. What if\nthis canon were applied in the first act of thought referred to above:\nthe original objectification which transforms the mere state into an\nabiding quality or meaning? Suppose, that is, it were said that the\nfirst objectifying act cannot make a substantial (or attached) quale\nout of a mere state of feeling; it must _find_ the distinction it\nmakes there already! It is clear we should at once get a _regressus ad\ninfinitum_. We here find Lotze face to face with this fundamental\ndilemma: thought either arbitrarily forces in its own distinctions, or\nelse just repeats what is already there--is either falsifying or\nfutile. This same contradiction, so far as it affects the impression,\nhas already been discussed. See p. 114.\n\n[41] I, 31.\n\n[42] As we have already seen, the concept, the meaning as such, is\nalways a factor or status in a reflective situation; it is always a\npredicate of judgment, in use in interpreting and developing the\nlogical subject, or datum of perception.\n\n[43] Royce, in his _World and Individual_, I, chaps. vi and vii, has\ncriticized the conception of meaning as valid, but in a way which\nimplies that there is a difference between validity and reality, in\nthe sense that the meaning or content of the valid idea becomes real\nonly when it is experienced in direct _feeling_. The foregoing\nimplies, of course, a difference between validity and reality, but\nfinds the test of validity in exercise of the function of direction or\ncontrol to which the idea makes pretension or claim. The same point of\nview would profoundly modify Royce's interpretation of what he terms\n\"inner\" and \"outer\" meaning. See Moore, _University of Chicago\nDecennial Publications_, III, on \"Existence, Meaning, and Reality.\"\n\n[44] II, 257, 265, and in general Book III, chap. iv. It is\nsignificant that thought itself, appearing as an act of thinking over\nagainst its own content, is here treated as psychical rather than as\nlogical. Consequently, as we see in the text, it gives him one more\ndifficulty to wrestle with: how a process which is ex officio purely\npsychical and subjective can yet yield results which are valid in a\nlogical, to say nothing of an ontological, sense.\n\n[45] Lotze even goes so far in this connection as to say that the\nantithesis between our ideas and the objects to which they are\ndirected is itself a part of the world of ideas (II, 192). Barring the\nphrase \"world of _ideas_\" (as against world of continuous experience),\nhe need only have commenced at this point to have traveled straight\nand arrived somewhere. But it is absolutely impossible to hold both\nthis view and that of the original independent existence of something\ngiven to and in thought and an independent existence of a\nthought-activity, thought-forms, and thought-contents.\n\n\n\n\nVI\n\nSOME STAGES OF LOGICAL THOUGHT\n\n\nThe man in the street, when asked what he thinks about a certain\nmatter, often replies that he does not think at all; he knows. The\nsuggestion is that thinking is a case of active uncertainty set over\nagainst conviction or unquestioning assurance. When he adds that he\ndoes not have to think, but knows, the further implication is that\nthinking, when needed, leads to knowledge; that its purpose or object\nis to secure stable equilibrium. It is the purpose of this paper to\nshow some of the main stages through which thinking, understood in\nthis way, actually passes in its attempt to reach its most effective\nworking; that is, the maximum of reasonable certainty.\n\nI wish to show how a variety of modes of thinking, easily recognizable\nin the progress of both the race and the individual, may be identified\nand arranged as successive species of the relationship which doubting\nbears to assurance; as various ratios, so to speak, which the vigor of\ndoubting bears to mere acquiescence. The presumption is that the\nfunction of questioning is one which has continually grown in\nintensity and range, that doubt is continually chased back, and, being\ncornered, fights more desperately, and thus clears the ground more\nthoroughly. Its successive stations or arrests constitute stages of\nthinking. Or to change the metaphor, just in the degree that what has\nbeen accepted as fact--the object of assurance--loses stable\nequilibrium, the tension involved in the questioning attitude\nincreases, until a readjustment gives a new and less easily shaken\nequilibrium.\n\nThe natural tendency of man is not to press home a doubt, but to cut\ninquiry as short as possible. The practical man's impatience with\ntheory has become a proverb; it expresses just the feeling that, since\nthe thinking process is of use only in substituting certainty for\ndoubt, any apparent prolongation of it is useless speculation, wasting\ntime and diverting the mind from important issues. To follow the line\nof least resistance is to cut short the stay in the sphere of doubts\nand suggestions, and to make the speediest return into the world where\none can act. The result, of course, is that difficulties are evaded or\nsurmounted rather than really disposed of. Hence, in spite of the\nopposition of the would-be practical man, the needs of practice, of\neconomy, and of efficiency have themselves compelled a continual\ndeepening of doubt and widening of the area of investigation.\n\nIt is within this evolution that we have to find our stages of\nthinking. The initial stage is where the doubt is hardly endured but\nnot entertained; it is no welcome guest but an intruder, to be got rid\nof as speedily as possible. Development of alternative and competitive\nsuggestions, the forming of suppositions (of ideas), goes but a little\nway. The mind seizes upon the nearest or most convenient instrument of\ndismissing doubt and reattaining security. At the other end is the\ndefinitive and conscious search for problems, and the development of\nelaborate and systematized methods of investigation--the industry and\ntechnique of science. Between these limits come processes which have\nstarted out upon the path of doubt and inquiry, and then halted by the\nway.\n\nIn the first stage of the journey, beliefs are treated as something\nfixed and static. To those who are using them they are simply another\nkind of fact. They are used to settle doubts, but the doubts are\ntreated as arising quite outside the ideas themselves. Nothing is\nfurther from recognition than that ideas themselves are open to doubt,\nor need criticism and revision. Indeed, the one who uses static\nmeanings is not even aware that they originated and have been\nelaborated for the sake of dealing with conflicts and problems. The\nideas are just \"there,\" and they may be used like any providential\ndispensation to help men out of the troubles into which they have\nfallen.\n\nWords are generally held responsible for this fixation of the idea,\nfor this substantiation of it into a kind of thing. A long line of\ncritics has made us familiar with the invincible habit \"of supposing\nthat wherever there is a name there is some reality corresponding to\nit\"; of supposing that general and abstract words have their\nequivalent objects somewhere _in rerum natura_, as have also singular\nand proper names. We know with what simplicity of self-confidence the\nEnglish empirical school has accounted for the ontological speculation\nof Plato. Words tend to fix intellectual contents, and give them a\ncertain air of independence and individuality. That some truth is here\nexpressed there can be no question. Indeed, the attitude of mind of\nwhich we are speaking is well illustrated in the person who goes to\nthe dictionary in order to settle some problem in morals, politics, or\nscience; who would end some discussion regarding a material point by\nlearning what meaning is attached to terms by the dictionary as\nauthority. The question is taken as lying outside of the sphere of\nscience or intellectual inquiry, since the meaning of the word--the\nidea--is unquestionable and fixed.\n\nBut this petrifying influence of words is after all only a superficial\nexplanation. There must be some meaning present or the word could not\nfix it; there must be something which accounts for the disposition to\nuse names as a medium of fossilization. There is, in truth, a certain\nreal fact--an existent reality--behind both the word and the meaning\nit stands for. This reality is social usage. The person who consults a\ndictionary is getting an established fact when he turns there for the\ndefinition of a term. He finds the sense in which the word is\ncurrently used. Social customs are no less real than physical events.\nIt is not possible to dispose of this fact of common usage by\nreference to mere convention, or any other arbitrary device. A form of\nsocial usage is no more an express invention than any other social\ninstitution. It embodies the permanent attitude, the habit taken\ntoward certain recurring difficulties or problems in experience.\nIdeas, or meanings fixed in terms, show the scheme of values which the\ncommunity uses in appraising matters that need consideration and which\nare indeterminate or unassured. They are held up as standards for all\nits members to follow. Here is the solution of the paradox. The fixed\nor static idea is a fact expressing an established social attitude, a\ncustom. It is not merely verbal, because it denotes a force which\noperates, as all customs do, in controlling particular cases. But\nsince it marks a mode of interpretation, a scheme for assigning\nvalues, a way of dealing with doubtful cases, it falls within the\nsphere of ideas. Or, coming to the life of the individual, the fixed\nmeaning represents, not a state of consciousness fixed by a name, but\na recognition of a habitual way of belief: a habit of understanding.\n\nWe find an apt illustration of fixed ideas in the rules prevalent in\nprimitive communities, rules which minutely determine all acts in\nwhich the community as a whole is felt to have an interest. These\nrules are facts because they express customs, and carry with them\ncertain sanctions. Their meaning does not cease with judicial\nutterance. They are made valid at once in a practical way against\nanyone who departs from them. Yet as rules they are ideas, for they\nexpress general ways of defining doubtful matters in experience and of\nre-establishing certainty. An individual may fail in acknowledgment of\nthem and explicit reference is then necessary. For one who has lost\nhimself in the notion that ideas are psychical and subjective, I know\nof no better way to appreciate the significance of an idea than to\nconsider that a social rule of judgment is nothing but a certain way\nof viewing or interpreting facts; as such it is an idea.\n\nThe point that is of special interest to us here, however, is that\nthese ideas are taken as fixed and unquestionable, and that the cases\nto which they are to apply are regarded as in themselves equally\nfixed. So far as concerns the attitude of those who employ this sort\nof ideas, the doubt is simply as to what idea should be in a\nparticular case. Even the Athenian Greeks, for instance, long kept up\nthe form of indicting and trying a tree or implement through which\nsome individual had been killed. There was a rule--a fixed idea--for\ndealing with all who offended against the community by destroying one\nof its citizens. The fact that an inanimate object, a thing without\nintention or volition, offended was not a material circumstance. It\nmade no difference in the case; that is, there was no doubt as to the\nnature of the fact. It was as fixed as was the rule.\n\nWith advance in the complexity of life, however, rules accumulate, and\ndiscrimination--that is, a certain degree of inquiring and critical\nattitude--enters in. Inquiry takes effect, however, in seeking among a\ncollection of fixed ideas just the one to be used, rather than in\ndirecting suspicion against any rule or idea as such, or in an attempt\nto discover or constitute a new one. It is hardly necessary to refer\nto the development of casuistry, or to the multiplication of\ndistinctions within dogmas, or to the growth of ceremonial law in\ncumbrous detail, to indicate what the outcome of this logical stage is\nlikely to be. The essential thing is that doubt and inquiry are\ndirected neither at the nature of the intrinsic fact itself, nor at\nthe value of the idea as such, but simply at the manner in which one\nis attached to the other. Thinking falls outside both fact and idea,\nand into the sphere of their external connection. It is still a\nfiction of judicial procedure that there is already in existence some\ncustom or law under which every possible dispute--that is, every\ndoubtful or unassured case--falls, and that the judge only declares\nwhich law is applicable in the particular case. This point of view has\ntremendously affected the theory of logic in its historic development.\n\nOne of the chief, perhaps the most important, instrumentalities in\ndeveloping and maintaining fixed ideas is the need of instruction and\nthe way in which it is given. If ideas were called into play only\nwhen doubtful cases actually arise, they could not help retaining a\ncertain amount of vitality and flexibility; but the community always\ninstructs its new members as to its way of disposing of these cases\nbefore they present themselves. Ideas are proffered, in other words,\nseparated from present doubt and remote from application, in order to\nescape future difficulties and the need of any thinking. In primitive\ncommunities this is the main purport of instruction, and it remains\nsuch to a very considerable degree. There is a prejudgment rather than\njudgment proper. When the community uses its resources to fix certain\nideas in the mind--that is, certain ways of interpreting and regarding\nexperience--ideas are necessarily formulated so as to assume a rigid\nand independent form. They are doubly removed from the sphere of\ndoubt. The attitude is uncritical and dogmatic in the extreme--so much\nso that one might question whether it is to be properly designated as\na stage of thinking.\n\nIn this form ideas become the chief instruments of social\nconservation. Judicial decision and penal correction are restricted\nand ineffective methods of maintaining social institutions unchanged,\ncompared with instilling in advance uniform ideas--fixed modes of\nappraising all social questions and issues. These set ideas thus\nbecome the embodiment of the values which any group has realized and\nintends to perpetuate. The fixation supports them against dissipation\nthrough attrition of circumstance, and against destruction through\nhostile attack. It would be interesting to follow out the ways in\nwhich such values are put under the protection of the gods and of\nreligious rites, or themselves erected into quasi-divinities--as among\nthe Romans. This, however, would hardly add anything to the logic of\nthe discussion, although it would indicate the importance attached to\nthe fixation of ideas, and the thoroughgoing character of the means\nused to secure immobilization.\n\nThe conserving value of the dogmatic attitude, the point of view which\ntakes ideas as fixed, is not to be ignored. When society has no methods\nof science for protecting and perpetuating its achieved values, there\nis practically no other resort than such crystallization. Moreover,\nwith any possible scientific progress, some equivalent of the fixed\nidea must remain. The nearer we get to the needs of action the greater\nabsoluteness must attach to ideas. The necessities of action do not\nawait our convenience. Emergencies continually present themselves where\nthe fixity required for successful activity cannot be attained through\nthe medium of investigation. The alternative to vacillation, confusion,\nand futility of action is importation to ideas of a positive and\nsecured character, not in strict logic belonging to them. It is this\nsort of determination that Hegel seems to have in mind in what he terms\n_Verstand_--the understanding. \"Apart from _Verstand_,\" he says,\n\"there is no fixity or accuracy in the region either of theory or\npractice\"; and, again, \"_Verstand_ sticks to fixity of characters and\ntheir distinctions from one another; it treats every meaning as having\na subsistence of its own.\" In technical terminology, also, this is what\nis meant by \"positing\" ideas--hardening meanings.\n\nIn recognizing, however, that fixation of intellectual content is a\nprecondition of effective action, we must not overlook the\nmodification that comes with the advance of thinking into more\ncritical forms. At the outset fixity is taken as the rightful\npossession of the ideas themselves; it belongs to them and is their\n\"essence.\" As the scientific spirit develops, we see that it is we who\nlend fixity to the ideas, and that this loan is for a purpose to which\nthe meaning of the ideas is accommodated. Fixity ceases to be a matter\nof intrinsic structure of ideas, and becomes an affair of security in\nusing them. Hence the important thing is the _way_ in which we fix the\nidea--the manner of the inquiry which results in definition. We _take_\nthe idea as if it were fixed, in order to secure the necessary\nstability of action. The crisis past, the idea drops its borrowed\ninvestiture, and reappears as surmise.\n\nWhen we substitute for ideas as uniform rules by which to decide\ndoubtful cases that making over of ideas which is requisite to make\nthem fit, the quality of thought alters. We may fairly say that we\nhave come into another stage. The idea is now regarded as essentially\nsubject to change, as a manufactured article needing to be made ready\nfor use. To determine the conditions of this transition lies beyond my\npurpose, since I have in mind only a descriptive setting forth of the\nperiods through which, as a matter of fact, thought has passed in the\ndevelopment of the inquiry function, without raising the problem of\nits \"why\" and \"how.\" At this point we shall not do more than note\nthat, as the scheduled stock of fixed ideas grows larger, their\napplication to specific questions becomes more difficult, prolonged,\nand roundabout. There has to be a definite hunting for the specific\nidea which is appropriate; there has to be comparison of it with other\nideas. This comes to involve a certain amount of mutual compromise and\nmodification before selection is possible. The idea thus gets somewhat\nshaken. It has to be made over so that it may harmonize with other\nideas possessing equal worth. Often the very accumulation of fixed\nideas commands this reconstruction. The dead weight of the material\nbecomes so great that it cannot sustain itself without a readjustment\nof the center of gravity. Simplification and systematization are\nrequired, and these call for reflection. Critical cases come up in\nwhich the fiction of an idea or rule already in existence cannot be\nmaintained. It is impossible to conceal that old ideas have to be\nradically modified before the situation can be dealt with. The\nfriction of circumstance melts away their congealed fixity. Judgment\nbecomes legislative.\n\nSeeking illustrations at large, we find this change typified in Hebrew\nhistory in the growing importance of the prophet over the judge, in\nthe transition from a justification of conduct through bringing\nparticular cases into conformity with existent laws, into that\neffected by personal right-mindedness enabling the individual to see\nthe law in each case for himself. Profoundly as this changed\nconception of the relation between law and particular case affected\nmoral life, it did not, among Semites, directly influence the logical\nsphere. With the Greeks, however, we find a continuous and marked\ndeparture from positive declaration of custom. We have assemblies\nmeeting to discuss and dispute, and finally, upon the basis of the\nconsiderations thus brought to view, to decide. The man of counsel is\nset side by side with the man of deed. Odysseus was much experienced,\nnot only because he knew the customs and ways of old, but even more\nbecause from the richness of his experience he could make the pregnant\nsuggestion to meet the new crisis. It is hardly too much to say that\nit was the emphasis put by the Greek mind upon discussion--at first as\npreliminary to decision, and afterward to legislation--which generated\nlogical theory.\n\nDiscussion is thus an apt name for this attitude of thought. It is\nbringing various beliefs together; shaking one against another and\ntearing down their rigidity. It is conversation of thoughts; it is\ndialogue--the mother of dialectic in more than the etymological sense.\nNo process is more recurrent in history than the transfer of\noperations carried on between different persons into the arena of the\nindividual's own consciousness. The discussion which at first took\nplace by bringing ideas from different persons into contact, by\nintroducing them into the forum of competition, and by subjecting them\nto critical comparison and selective decision, finally became a habit\nof the individual with himself. He became a miniature social\nassemblage, in which pros and cons were brought into play struggling\nfor the mastery--for final conclusion. In some such way we conceive\nreflection to be born.\n\nIt is evident that discussion, the agitation of ideas, if judged from\nthe standpoint of the older fixed ideas, is a destructive process.\nIdeas are not only shaken together and apart, they are so shaken in\nthemselves that their whole validity becomes doubtful. Mind, and not\nmerely beliefs, becomes uncertain. The attempt to harmonize different\nideas means that in themselves they are discrepant. The search for a\nconclusion means that accepted ideas are only points of view, and\nhence personal affairs. Needless to say it was the Sophists who\nemphasized and generalized this negative aspect--this presupposition\nof loss of assurance, of inconsistency, of \"subjectivity.\" They took\nit as applying not only to this, that, and the other idea, but to\nideas as ideas. Since ideas are no longer fixed contents, they are\njust expressions of an individual's way of thinking. Lacking inherent\nvalue, they merely express the interests that induce the individual to\nlook this way rather than that. They are made by the individual's\npoint of view, and hence will be unmade if he can be led to change his\npoint of view. Where all was fixity, now all is instability: where all\nwas certitude, nothing now exists save opinion based on prejudice,\ninterest, or arbitrary choice.\n\nThe modern point of view, while condemning sophistry, yet often agrees\nwith it in limiting the reflective attitude as such to self-involution\nand self-conceit. From Bacon down, the appeal is to observation, to\nattention to facts, to concern with the external world. The sole\ngenuine guaranty of truth is taken to be appeal to facts, and thinking\nas such is something different. If reflection is not considered to be\nmerely variable matter, it is considered to be at least an endless\nmulling over of things. It is the futile attempt to spin truth out of\ninner consciousness. It is introspection, and theorizing, and mere\nspeculation.\n\nSuch wholesale depreciation ignores the value inherent even in the\nmost subjective reflection, for it takes the settled estate which is\nproof that thought is not needed, or that it has done its work, as if\nit supplied the standard for the occasions in which problems are hard\nupon us, and doubt is rife. It takes the conditions which come about\nafter and because we have thought to measure the conditions which call\nout thinking. Whenever we really need to reflect, we cannot appeal\ndirectly to the \"fact,\" for the adequate reason that the stimulus to\nthinking arises just because \"facts\" have slipped away from us. The\nfallacy is neatly committed by Mill in his discussion of Whewell's\naccount of the need of mental conception or hypothesis in\n\"colligating\" facts. He insists that the conception is \"obtained\" from\nthe \"facts\" in which \"it exists,\" is \"impressed upon us from without,\"\nand also that it is the \"darkness and confusion\" of the facts that\nmake us want the conception in order to create \"light and order.\"[46]\n\nReflection involves running over various ideas, sorting them out,\ncomparing one with another, trying to get one which will unite in\nitself the strength of two, searching for new points of view,\ndeveloping new suggestions; guessing, suggesting, selecting, and\nrejecting. The greater the problem, and the greater the shock of doubt\nand resultant confusion and uncertainty, the more prolonged and more\nnecessary is the process of \"mere thinking.\" It is a more obvious\nphase of biology than of physics, of sociology than of chemistry; but\nit persists in established sciences. If we take even a mathematical\nproposition, not _after_ it has been demonstrated--and is thus capable\nof statement in adequate logical form--but while in process of\ndiscovery and proof, the operation of this subjective phase is\nmanifest, so much so, indeed, that a distinguished modern\nmathematician has said that the paths which the mathematical inquirer\ntraverses in any new field are more akin to those of the\nexperimentalist, and even to those of the poet and artist, than to\nthose of the Euclidean geometer.\n\nWhat makes the essential difference between modern research and the\nreflection of, say, the Greeks, is not the absence of \"mere thinking,\"\nbut the presence of conditions for testing its results; the elaborate\nsystem of checks and balances found in the technique of modern\nexperimentation. The thinking process does not now go on endlessly in\nterms of itself, but seeks outlet through reference to particular\nexperiences. It is tested by this reference; not, however, as if a\ntheory could be tested by directly comparing it with facts--an obvious\nimpossibility--but through use in facilitating commerce with facts. It\nis tested as glasses are tested; things are looked at through the\nmedium of specific meanings to see if thereby they assume a more\norderly and clearer aspect, if they are less blurred and obscure.\n\nThe reaction of the Socratic school against the Sophistic may serve to\nillustrate the third stage of thinking. This movement was not\ninterested in the _de facto_ shaking of received ideas and a\ndiscrediting of all thinking. It was concerned rather with the\nvirtual appeal to a common denominator involved in bringing different\nideas into relation with one another. In their comparison and mutual\nmodification it saw evidence of the operation of a standard permanent\nmeaning passing judgment upon their conflict, and revealing a common\nprinciple and standard of reference. It dealt not with the shaking and\ndissolution, but with a comprehensive permanent Idea finally to\nemerge. Controversy and discussion among different individuals may\nresult in extending doubt, manifesting the incoherency of accepted\nideas, and so throwing an individual into an attitude of distrust. But\nit also involves an appeal to a single thought to be accepted by both\nparties, thus putting an end to the dispute. This appeal to a higher\ncourt, this possibility of attaining a total and abiding intellectual\nobject, which should bring into relief the agreeing elements in\ncontending thoughts, and banish the incompatible factors, animated the\nSocratic search for the concept, the elaboration of the Platonic\nhierarchy of Ideas in which the higher substantiate the lower, and the\nAristotelian exposition of the systematized methods by which general\ntruths may be employed to prove propositions otherwise doubtful. At\nleast, this historic development will serve to illustrate what is\ninvolved in the transition from the second to the third stage; the\ntransformation of discussion into reasoning, of subjective reflection\ninto method of proof.\n\nDiscussion, whether with ourselves or others, goes on by suggestion of\nclues, as the uppermost object of interest opens a way here or there.\nIt is discursive and haphazard. This gives it the devious tendency\nindicated in Plato's remark that it needs to be tied to the post of\nreason. It needs, that is, to have the ground or basis of its various\ncomponent statements brought to consciousness in such a way as to\ndefine the exact value of each. The Socratic contention is the need of\ncompelling the common denominator, the common subject, underlying the\ndiversity of views to exhibit itself. It alone gives a sure standard\nby which the claims of all assertions may be measured. Until this need\nis met, discussion is a self-deceiving play with unjudged, unexamined\nmatters, which, confused and shifting, impose themselves upon us.\n\nWe are familiar enough with the theory that the Socratic universal,\nthe Platonic idea, was generated by an ignorant transformation of\npsychological abstractions into self-existent entities. To insist upon\nthis as the key to the Socratic logic is mere caricature. The\nobjectivity of the universal stood for the sense of something decisive\nand controlling in all reflection, which otherwise is just\nmanipulation of personal prejudices. This sense is as active in modern\nscience as it was in the Platonic dialectic. What Socrates felt was\nthe opinionated, conceited quality of the terms used in the moral and\npolitical discussion of his day, as that contrasted with the\nsubject-matter, which, if rightly grasped, would put an end to mere\nviews and argumentations.\n\nBy Aristotle's time the interest was not so much in the existence of\nstandards of decision in cases of doubt and dispute as in the\ntechnique of their use. The judge was firmly seated on the bench. The\nparties in controversy recognized his jurisdiction, and their\nrespective claims were submitted for adjudicature. The need was for\nrules of procedure by which the judge might, in an obvious and\nimpartial way, bring the recognized universal or decisive law to bear\nupon particular matters. Hence the elaboration of those rules of\nevidence, those canons of demonstrative force, which are the backbone\nof the Aristotelian logic. There was a code by which to decide upon\nthe admissibility and value of proffered testimony--the rules of the\nsyllogism. The figures and terms of the syllogism provided a scheme\nfor deciding upon the exact bearing of every statement propounded. The\nplan of arrangement of major and minor premises, of major, minor, and\nmiddle terms, furnished a manifesto of the exact procedure to be\nfollowed in determining the probative force of each element in\nreasoning. The judge knew what testimony to permit, when and how it\nshould be introduced, how it could be impeached or have its competence\nlessened, and how the evidence was to be arranged so that a summary\nwould also be an exhibit of its value in establishing a conclusion.\n\nThis means that there now is a distinctive type of thinking marked off\nfrom mere discussion and reflection. It may be called either reasoning\nor proof. It is reasoning when we think of the regularity of the\nmethod for getting at and employing the unquestioned grounds which\ngive validity to other statements. It is proof as regards the degree\nof logical desert thereby measured out to such propositions. Proof is\nthe acceptance or rejection justified through the reasoning. To quote\nfrom Mill: \"To give credence to a proposition as a conclusion from\nsomething else is to reason in the most extensive sense of the term.\nWe say of a fact or statement, it is proved, when we believe its truth\nby reason of some other fact or statement from which it is said to\nfollow.\"[47] Reasoning is marshaling a series of terms and\npropositions until we can bind some doubtful fact firmly to an\nunquestioned, although remote, truth; it is the regular way in which a\ncertain proposition is brought to bear on a precarious one, clothing\nthe latter with something of the peremptory quality of the former. So\nfar as we reach this result, and so far as we can exhibit each step in\nthe nexus and be sure it has been rightly performed, we have proof.\n\nBut questions still face us. How about that truth upon which we fall\nback as guaranteeing the credibility of other statements--how about\nour major premise? Whence does it derive its guaranty? _Quis custodes\ncustodiet?_\n\nWe may, of course, in turn subsume it under some further major\npremise, but an infinite regress is impossible, and on this track we\nare finally left hanging in the air. For _practical_ purposes the\nunquestioned principle may be taken as signifying mutual concession or\nagreement--it denotes that as a matter of fact its truth is not called\nin question by the parties concerned. This does admirably for settling\narguments and controversies. It is a good way of amicably arranging\nmatters among those already friends and fellow-citizens. But\nscientifically the widespread acceptance of an idea seems to testify\nto custom rather than to truth; prejudice is strengthened in\ninfluence, but hardly in value, by the number who share it; conceit is\nnone the less self-conceit because it turns the heads of many.\n\nGreat interest was indeed afterward taken in the range of persons who\nhold truths in common. The _quod semper ubique omnibus_ became of\ngreat importance. This, however, was not, in theory at least, because\ncommon agreement was supposed to constitute the major premise, but\nbecause it afforded confirmatory evidence of its self-evident and\nuniversal character.\n\nHence the Aristotelian logic necessarily assumes certain first or\nfundamental truths unquestioned and unquestionable, self-evident and\nself-evidencing, neither established nor modified by thought, but\nstanding firm in their own right. This assumption was not, as modern\ndealers in formal logic would sometimes have it, an external\npsychological or metaphysical attachment to the theory of reasoning,\nto be omitted at will from logic as such. It was an essential factor\nof knowledge that there should be necessary propositions directly\napprehended by reason and particular ones directly apprehended by\nsense. Reasoning could then join them. Without the truths we have only\nthe play of subjective, arbitrary, futile opinion. _Judgment_ has not\ntaken place, and assertion is without warrant. Hence the scheduling of\nfirst truths is an organic part of any reasoning which is occupied\nwith securing demonstration, surety of assent, or valid conviction. To\ndeny the necessary place of ultimate truths in the logical system of\nAristotle and his followers is to make them players in a game of\nsocial convention. It is to overlook, to invert, the fact that they\nwere sincerely concerned with the question of attaining the grounds\nand process of assurance. Hence they were obliged to assume primary\nintuitions, metaphysical, physical, moral, and mathematical axioms, in\norder to get the pegs of certainty to which to tie the bundles of\notherwise contingent propositions.\n\nIt would be going too far to claim that the regard for the authority\nof the church, of the fathers, of the Scriptures, of ancient writers,\nof Aristotle himself, so characteristic of the Middle Ages, was the\ndirect outcome of this presupposition of truths fixed and\nunquestionable in themselves. But the logical connection is sure. The\nsupply of absolute premises that Aristotle was able to proffer was\nscant. In his own generation and situation this paucity made\ncomparatively little difference; for to the mass of men the great bulk\nof values was still carried by custom, by religious belief, and social\ninstitution. It was only in the comparatively small sphere of persons\nwho had come under the philosophic influence that need for the logical\nmode of confirmation was felt. In the mediaeval period, however, all\nimportant beliefs required to be concentrated by some fixed principle\ngiving them stay and power, for they were contrary to obvious\ncommon-sense and natural tradition. The situation was exactly such as\nto call into active use the Aristotelian scheme of thought. Authority\nsupplemented the meagerness of the store of universals known by direct\nintuition, the Aristotelian plan of reasoning afforded the precise\ninstrumentality through which the vague and chaotic details of life\ncould be reduced to order by subjecting them to authoritative rules.\n\nIt is not enough, however, to account for the ultimate major premises,\nfor the unconditioned grounds upon which credibility is assigned. We\nhave also to report where the other side comes from: matters so\nuncertain in themselves as to require that they have their grounds\nsupplied from outside. The answer in the Aristotelian scheme is an\nobvious one. It is the very nature of sense, of ordinary experience,\nto supply us with matters which in themselves are only contingent.\nThere is a certain portion of the intellectual sphere, that derived\nfrom experience, which is infected throughout by its unworthy origin.\nIt stands forever condemned to be merely empirical--particular, more\nor less accidental, inherently irrational. You cannot make gold from\ndross, and the best that can be done for and with material of this\nsort is to bring it under the protection of truth which has warrant\nand weight in itself.\n\nWe may now characterize this stage of thinking with reference to our\noriginal remark that different stages denote various degrees in the\nevolution of the doubt-inquiry function. As compared with the period\nof fixed ideas, doubt is awake, and inquiry is active, but in itself\nit is rigidly limited. On one side it is bounded by fixed ultimate\ntruths, whose very nature is that they cannot be doubted, which are\nnot products or functions in inquiry, but bases that investigation\nfortunately rests upon. In the other direction all \"matters of fact,\"\nall \"empirical truths\" belong to a particular sphere or kind of\nexistence, and one intrinsically open to suspicion. The region is\ncondemned in a wholesale way. In itself it exhales doubt; it cannot be\nreformed; it is to be shunned, or, if this is not possible, to be\nescaped from by climbing up a ladder of intermediate terms until we\nlay hold on the universal. The very way in which doubt is objectified,\ntaken all in a piece, marks its lack of vitality. It is arrested and\ncooped up in a particular place. As with any doubtful character, the\nless of its company the better. Uncertainty is not realized as a\nnecessary instrument in compelling experienced matters to reveal their\nmeaning and inherent order.\n\nThis limitation upon inquiry settles the interpretation to be given\nthought at this stage--it is of necessity merely connective, merely\nmediating. It goes between the first principles--themselves, as to\ntheir validity, outside the province of thought--and the particulars\nof sense--also, as to their status and worth, beyond the dominion of\nthought. Thinking is subsumption--just placing a particular\nproposition under its universal. It is inclusion, finding a place for\nsome questioned matter within a region taken as more certain. It is\nuse of general truths to afford support to things otherwise shaky--an\napplication that improves their standing, while leaving their content\nunchanged. This means that thought has only a formal value. It is of\nservice in exhibiting and arranging grounds upon which any particular\nproposition may be acquitted or condemned, upon which anything already\ncurrent may be assented to, or upon which belief may reasonably be\nwithheld.\n\nThe metaphor of the law court is apt. There is assumed some matter to\nbe either proved or disproved. As matter, as content, it is\nfurnished. It is not to be found out. In the law court it is not a\nquestion of discovering what a man specifically is, but simply of\nfinding reasons for regarding him as guilty or innocent. There is no\nall-around play of thought directed to the institution of something as\nfact, but a question of whether grounds can be adduced justifying\nacceptance of some proposition already set forth. The significance of\nsuch an attitude comes into relief when we contrast it with what is\ndone in the laboratory. In the laboratory there is no question of\nproving that things are just thus and so, or that we must accept or\nreject a given statement; there is simply an interest in finding out\nwhat sort of things we are dealing with. Any quality or change that\npresents itself may be an object of investigation, or may suggest a\nconclusion; for it is judged, not by reference to pre-existent truths,\nbut by its suggestiveness, by what it may lead to. The mind is open to\ninquiry in any direction. Or we may illustrate by the difference\nbetween the auditor and an actuary in an insurance company. One simply\npasses and rejects, issues vouchers, compares and balances statements\nalready made out. The other investigates any one of the items of\nexpense or receipt; inquires how it comes to be what it is, what\nfacts, as regards, say, length of life, condition of money market,\nactivity of agents, are involved, and what further researches and\nactivities are indicated.\n\nThe illustrations of the laboratory and the expert remind us of\nanother attitude of thought in which investigation attacks matters\nhitherto reserved. The growth, for example, of freedom of thought\nduring the Renaissance was a revelation of the intrinsic momentum of\nthe thought-process itself. It was not a mere reaction from and\nagainst mediaeval scholasticism. It was the continued operation of the\nmachinery which the scholastics had set a-going. Doubt and inquiry\nwere extended into the region of particulars, of matters of fact, with\nthe view of reconstituting them through discovery of their own\nstructure, no longer with the intention of leaving that unchanged\nwhile transforming their claim to credence by connecting them with\nsome authoritative principles. Thought no longer found satisfaction in\nappraising them in a scale of values according to their nearness to,\nor remoteness from, fixed truths. Such work had been done to a nicety,\nand it was futile to repeat it. Thinking must find a new outlet. It\nwas out of employment, and set to discover new lands. Galileo and\nCopernicus were travelers--as much so as the crusader, Marco Polo, and\nColumbus.\n\nHence the fourth stage--covering what is popularly known as inductive\nand empirical science. Thought takes the form of inference instead of\nproof. Proof, as we have already seen, is accepting or rejecting a\ngiven proposition on the ground of its connection or lack of\nconnection with some other proposition conceded or established. But\ninference does not terminate in any given proposition; it is after\nprecisely those not given. It wants more facts, different facts.\nThinking in the mode of inference insists upon terminating in an\nintellectual advance, in a consciousness of truths hitherto escaping\nus. Our thinking must not now \"pass\" certain propositions after\nchallenging them, must not admit them because they exhibit certain\ncredentials, showing a right to be received into the upper circle of\nintellectual society. Thinking endeavors to compel things as they\npresent themselves, to yield up something hitherto obscure or\nconcealed. This advance and extension of knowledge through thinking\nseems to be well designated by the term \"inference.\" It does not\ncertify what is otherwise doubtful, but \"goes from the known to the\nunknown.\" It aims at pushing out the frontiers of knowledge, not at\nmarking those already attained with signposts. Its technique is not a\nscheme for assigning status to beliefs already possessed, but is a\nmethod for making friends with facts and ideas hitherto alien.\nInference reaches out, fills in gaps. Its work is measured not by the\npatents of standing it issues, but by the material increments of\nknowledge it yields. _Inventio_ is more important than _judicium_,\ndiscovery than \"proof.\"\n\nWith the development of empirical research, uncertainty or contingency\nis no longer regarded as infecting in a wholesale way an entire\nregion, discrediting it save as it can be brought under the\nprotecting aegis of universal truths as major premises. Uncertainty is\nnow a matter of detail. It is the question whether the particular fact\nis really what it has been taken to be. It involves contrast, not of a\nfact as a fixed particular over against some fixed universal, but of\nthe existing mode of apprehension with another possible better\napprehension.\n\nFrom the standpoint of reasoning and proof the intellectual field is\nabsolutely measured out in advance. Certainty is located in one part,\nintellectual indeterminateness or uncertainty in another. But when\nthinking becomes research, when the doubt-inquiry function comes to\nits own, the problem is just: What is the fact?\n\nHence the extreme interest in details as such; in observing,\ncollecting, and comparing particular causes, in analysis of structure\ndown to its constituent elements, interest in atoms, cells, and in all\nmatters of arrangement in space and time. The microscope, telescope,\nand spectroscope, the scalpel and microtome, the kymograph and the\ncamera are not mere material appendages to thinking; they are as\nintegral parts of investigative thought as were _Barbara_, _Celarent_,\netc., of the logic of reasoning. Facts must be discovered, and to\naccomplish this, apparent \"facts\" must be resolved into their\nelements. Things must be readjusted in order to be held free from\nintrusion of impertinent circumstance and misleading suggestion.\nInstrumentalities of extending and rectifying research are, therefore,\nof themselves organs of thinking. The specialization of the sciences,\nthe almost daily birth of a new science, is a logical necessity--not a\nmere historical episode. Every phase of experience must be\ninvestigated, and each characteristic aspect presents its own peculiar\nproblems which demand, therefore, their own technique of\ninvestigation. The discovery of difficulties, the substitution of\ndoubt for quiescent acceptance, are more important than the\nsanctioning of belief through proof. Hence the importance of noting\napparent exceptions, negative instances, extreme cases, anomalies. The\ninterest is in the discrepant because that stimulates inquiry, not in\nthe fixed universal which would terminate it once for all. Hence the\nroaming over the earth and through the skies for new facts which may\nbe incompatible with old theories, and which may suggest new points of\nview.\n\nTo illustrate these matters in detail would be to write the history of\nevery modern science. The interest in multiplying phenomena, in\nincreasing the area of facts, in developing new distinctions of\nquantity, structure, and form, is obviously characteristic of modern\nscience. But we do not always heed its logical significance--that it\nmakes thinking to consist in the extension and control of contact with\nnew material so as to lead regularly to the development of new\nexperience.\n\nThe elevation of the region of facts--the formerly condemned region of\nthe inherently contingent and variable--to something that invites and\nrewards inquiry, defines the import, therefore, of the larger aspects\nof modern science. This spirit prides itself upon being\npositivistic--it deals with the observed and the observable. It will\nhave naught to do with ideas that cannot verify themselves by showing\nthemselves _in propria persona_. It is not enough to present\ncredentials from more sovereign truths. These are hardly acceptable\neven as letters of introduction. Refutation of Newton's claim, that he\ndid not make hypotheses, by pointing out that no one was busier in\nthis direction than he, and that scientific power is generally in\ndirect ratio to ability to imagine possibilities, is as easy as it is\nirrelevant. The hypotheses, the thoughts, that Newton employed were of\nand about fact; they were for the sake of exacting and extending what\ncan be apprehended. Instead of being sacrosanct truths affording a\nredemption by grace to facts otherwise ambiguous, they were the\narticulating of ordinary facts. Hence the notion of law changes. It is\nno longer something governing things and events from on high; it is\nthe statement of their own order.\n\nThus the exiling of occult forces and qualities is not so much a\nspecific achievement as it is a demand of the changed attitude. When\nthinking consists in the detection and determination of observable\ndetail, forces, forms, qualities at large, are thrown out of\nemployment. They are not so much proved non-existent as rendered\nnugatory. Disuse breeds their degeneration. When the universal is but\nthe order of the facts themselves, the mediating machinery disappears\nalong with the essences. There is substituted for the hierarchical\nworld in which each degree in the scale has its righteousness imputed\nfrom above a world homogeneous in structure and in the scheme of its\nparts; the same in heaven, earth, and the uttermost parts of the sea.\nThe ladder of values from the sublunary world with its irregular,\nextravagant, imperfect motion up to the stellar universe, with its\nself-returning perfect order, corresponded to the middle terms of the\nolder logic. The steps were graduated, ascending from the\nindeterminate, unassured matter of sense up to the eternal,\nunquestionable truths of rational perception. But when interest is\noccupied in finding out what anything and everything is, any fact is\njust as good as its fellow. The observable world is a democracy. The\ndifference which makes a fact what it is is not an exclusive\ndistinction, but a matter of position and quantity, an affair of\nlocality and aggregation, traits which place all facts upon the same\nlevel, since all other observable facts also possess them and are,\nindeed, conjointly responsible for them. Laws are not edicts of a\nsovereign binding a world of subjects otherwise lawless; they are the\nagreements, the compacts of facts themselves, or, in the familiar\nlanguage of Mill, the common attributes, the resemblances.\n\nThe emphasis of modern science upon control flows from the same\nsource. Interest is in the new, in extension, in discovery. Inference\nis the advance into the unknown, the use of the established to win new\nworlds from the void. This requires and employs regulation--that is,\nmethod--in procedure. There cannot be a blind attack. A plan of\ncampaign is needed. Hence the so-called practical applications of\nscience, the Baconian \"knowledge is power,\" the Comteian \"science is\nprevision,\" are not extra-logical addenda or supererogatory benefits.\nThey are intrinsic to the logical method itself, which is just the\norderly way of approaching new experiences so as to grasp and hold\nthem.\n\nThe attitude of research is necessarily toward the future. The\napplication of science to the practical affairs of life, as in the\nstationary engine, or telephone, does not differ in principle from the\ndetermination of wave-lengths of light through the experimental\ncontrol of the laboratory. Science lives only in arranging for new\ncontacts, new insights. The school of Kant agrees with that of Mill in\nasserting that judgment must, in order to be judgment, be synthetic or\ninstructive; it must extend, inform, and purvey. When we recognize\nthat this service of judgment in effecting growth of experience is not\naccidental, but that judgment means exactly the devising and using of\nsuitable instrumentalities for this end, we remark that the so-called\npractical uses of science are only the further and freer play of the\nintrinsic movement of discovery itself.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWe began with the assumption that thought is to be interpreted as a\ndoubt-inquiry function, conducted for the purpose of arriving at that\nmental equilibrium known as assurance or knowledge. We assumed that\nvarious stages of thinking could be marked out according to the amount\nof play which they give to doubt, and the consequent sincerity with\nwhich thinking is identified with free inquiry. Modern scientific\nprocedure, as just set forth, seems to define the ideal or limit of\nthis process. It is inquiry emancipated, universalized, whose sole aim\nand criterion is discovery, and hence it marks the terminus of our\ndescription. It is idle to conceal from ourselves, however, that\nscientific procedure as a practical undertaking, has not as yet\nreflected itself into any coherent and generally accepted theory of\nthinking, into any accepted doctrine of logic which is comparable to\nthe Aristotelian. Kant's conviction that logic is a \"complete and\nsettled\" science, which with absolutely \"certain boundaries has gained\nnothing and lost nothing since Aristotle,\" is startlingly contradicted\nby the existing state of discussion of logical doctrine. The simple\nfact of the case is that there are at least three rival theories on\nthe ground, each claiming to furnish the sole proper interpretation of\nthe actual procedure of thought.\n\nThe Aristotelian logic is far from having withdrawn its claim. It\nstill offers its framework as that into which the merely \"empirical\"\nresults of observation and experimental inquiry must be fitted if they\nare to be regarded as really \"proved.\" Another school of logicians,\nstarting professedly from modern psychology, discredits the whole\ntraditional industry and reverses the Aristotelian theory of validity;\nit holds that only particular facts are self-supporting, and that the\nauthority allowed to general principles is derivative and second hand.\nA third school of philosophy claims, by analysis of science and\nexperience, to justify the conclusion that the universe itself is a\nconstruction of thought, giving evidence throughout of the pervasive\nand constitutive action of reason, and holds, consequently, that our\nlogical processes are simply the reading off or coming to\nconsciousness of the inherently rational structure already possessed\nby the universe in virtue of the presence within it of this pervasive\nand constitutive action of thought. It thus denies both the claim of\nthe traditional logic, that matters of experienced fact are mere\nparticulars having their rationality in an external ground, and the\nclaim of the empirical logic, that thought is just a gymnastic by\nwhich we vault from one presented fact to another remote in space and\ntime.\n\nWhich of the three doctrines is to be regarded as the legitimate\nexponent of the procedure of thought manifested in modern science?\nWhile the Aristotelian logic is willing to waive a claim to be\nregarded as expounder of the actual procedure, it still insists upon\nits right to be regarded as the sole ultimate umpire of the validity\nor _proved_ character of the results reached. But the empirical and\ntranscendental logics stand face to face as rivals, each asserting\nthat it alone tells the story of what science does and how it does it.\n\nWith the consciousness of this conflict my discussion in its present,\nor descriptive, phase must cease. Its close, however, suggests a\nfurther question. In so far as we adopt the conception that thinking\nis itself a doubt-inquiry process, must we not deny the claims of all\nof the three doctrines to be the articulate voicing of the methods of\nexperimental science? Do they not all agree in setting up something\nfixed outside inquiry, supplying both its material and its limit? That\nthe first principle and the empirical matters of fact of the\nAristotelian logic fall outside the thinking process, and condemn the\nlatter to a purely external and go-between agency, has been already\nsufficiently descanted upon. But it is also true that the fixed\nparticulars, given facts, or sensations--whatever the empirical\nlogician starts from--are material given ready-made to the\nthought-process, and externally limiting inquiry, instead of being\ndistinctions arising within and because of search for truth. Nor, as\nregards this point, is the transcendental in any position to throw\nstones at the empirical logic. Thought \"in itself\" is so far from a\nprocess of inquiry that it is taken to be the eternal, fixed structure\nof the universe; _our_ thinking, involving doubt and investigation, is\ndue wholly to our \"finite,\" imperfect character, which condemns us to\nthe task of merely imitating and reinstating \"thought\" in itself, once\nand forever complete, ready-made, fixed.\n\nThe practical procedure and practical assumptions of modern\nexperimental science, since they make thinking essentially and not\nmerely accidentally a process of discovery, seem irreconcilable with\nboth the empirical and transcendental interpretations. At all events\nthere is here sufficient discrepancy to give occasion for further\nsearch: Does not an account of thinking, basing itself on modern\nscientific procedure, demand a statement in which all the distinctions\nand terms of thought--judgment, concept, inference, subject,\npredicate, and copula of judgment, etc., _ad infinitum_--shall be\ninterpreted simply and entirely as distinctive functions or divisions\nof labor within the doubt-inquiry process?\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[46] _Logic_, Book IV, chap. ii, \u00a7 2.\n\n[47] _Logic_, Book II, chap. i, \u00a7 1. I have changed the order of the\nsentences quoted, and have omitted some phrases.\n\n\n\n\nVII\n\nTHE LOGICAL CHARACTER OF IDEAS\n\n\nSaid John Stuart Mill: \"To draw inferences has been said to be the\ngreat business of life.... It is the only occupation in which the mind\nnever ceases to be engaged.\" If this be so, it seems a pity that Mill\ndid not recognize that this business identifies what we mean when we\nsay \"mind.\" If he had recognized this, he would have cast the weight\nof his immense influence not only against the conception that mind is\na substance, but also against the conception that it is a collection\nof existential states or attributes without any substance in which to\ninhere; and he would thereby have done much to free logic from\nepistemological metaphysics. In any case, an account of intellectual\noperations and conditions from the standpoint of the r\u00f4le played and\nposition occupied by them in the business of drawing inferences is a\ndifferent sort of thing from an account of them as having an existence\n_per se_, from treating them as making up some sort of existential\nmaterial distinct from the _things_ which figure in inference-drawing.\nThis latter type of treatment is that which underlies the psychology\nwhich itself has adopted uncritically the remnants of the metaphysics\nof soul substance: the idea of accidents without the substance.[48]\nThis assumption from metaphysical psychology--the assumption of\nconsciousness as an existent stuff or existent process--is then\ncarried over into an examination of knowledge, so as to make the\ntheory of knowledge not logic (an account of the ways in which valid\ninferences or conclusions from things to other things are made), but\nepistemology.\n\nWe have, therefore, the result (so unfortunate for logic) that logic\nis not free to go its own way, but is compromised by the assumption\nthat knowledge goes on not in terms of things (I use \"things\" in the\nbroadest sense, as equaling _res_, and covering affairs, concerns,\nacts, as well as \"things\" in the narrower sense), but in terms of a\nrelation _between_ things and a peculiar existence made up of\nconsciousness, or else between things and functional operations of\nthis existence. If it could be shown that psychology is essentially\nnot a science of states of consciousness, but of behavior, conceived\nas a process of continuous readjustment, then the undoubted facts\nwhich go by the name of sensation, perception, image, emotion,\nconcept, would be interpreted to mean peculiar (i.e., specifically\nqualitative) epochs, phases, and crises in the scheme of behavior. The\nsupposedly scientific basis for the belief that states of\nconsciousness inherently define a separate type of existence would be\ndone away with. Inferential knowledge, knowledge involving reflection,\n_psychologically_ viewed, would be assimilated to a certain mode of\nreadaptation of functions, involving shock and the need of control;\n'knowledge' in the sense of direct non-reflective presence of things\nwould be identified (psychologically) with relatively stable or\ncompleted adjustments. I can not profess to speak for psychologists,\nbut it is an obvious characteristic of the contemporary status of\npsychology that one school (the so-called functional or dynamic)\noperates with nothing more than a conventional and perfunctory\nreference to \"states of consciousness\"; while the orthodox school\nmakes constant concessions to ideas of the behavior type. It\nintroduces the conceptions of fatigue, practice, and habituation. It\nmakes its fundamental classifications on the basis of physiological\ndistinctions (e.g., the centrally initiated and the peripherally\ninitiated), which, from a biological standpoint, are certainly\ndistinctions of structures involved in the performance of acts.\n\nOne of the aims of the _Studies in Logical Theory_ was to show, on the\nnegative or critical side, that the type of logical theory which\nprofessedly starts its account of knowledge from mere states of\nconsciousness is compelled at every crucial juncture to assume\n_things_, and to define its so-called mental states in terms of\nthings;[49] and, on the positive side, to show that, logically\nconsidered, such distinctions as sensation, image, etc., mark\ninstruments and crises in the development of controlled judgment,\ni.e., of inferential conclusions. It was perhaps not surprising that\nthis effort should have been criticized not on its own merits, but on\nthe assumption that this correspondence of the (functional)\npsychological and the logical points of view was intended in terms of\nthe psychology which obtained in the _critic's_ mind--to wit, the\npsychology based on the assumption of consciousness as a separate\nexistence or process.\n\nThese considerations suggest that before we can intelligently raise\nthe question of the truth of ideas we must consider their status in\njudgment, judgment being regarded as the typical expression of the\ninferential operation. (1) Do ideas present themselves except in\nsituations which are doubtful and inquired into? Do they exist side by\nside with the facts when the facts are themselves known? Do they exist\nexcept when judgment is in suspense? (2) Are \"ideas\" anything else\nexcept the suggestions, conjectures, hypotheses, theories (I use an\nascending scale of terms) tentatively entertained during a suspended\nconclusion? (3) Do they have any part to play in the conduct of\ninquiry? Do they serve to direct observation, colligate data, and\nguide experimentation, or are they otiose?[50] (4) If the ideas have a\nfunction in directing the reflective process (expressed in judgment),\ndoes success in performing the function (that is, in directing to a\nconclusion which is stable) have anything to do with the logical worth\nor validity of the ideas? (5) And, finally, does validity have\nanything to do with truth? Does \"truth\" mean something inherently\ndifferent from the fact that the conclusion of one judgment (the known\nfact, previously unknown, in which judging terminates) is itself\napplicable in further situations of doubt and inquiry? And is judgment\nproperly more than tentative save as it terminates in a known fact,\ni.e., a fact present without the intermediary of reflection?\n\nWhen these questions--I mean, of course, questions which are\nexemplified in these queries--are answered, we shall, perhaps, have\ngone as far as it is possible to go with reference to the _logical_\ncharacter of ideas. The question may then recur as to whether the\n\"ideas\" of the epistemologist (that is, existences in a purely\n\"private stream of consciousness\") remain as something over and above,\nnot yet accounted for; or whether they are perversions and\nmisrepresentations of logical characters. I propose to give a brief\ndogmatic reply in the latter sense. Where, and in so far as, there are\nunquestioned objects, there is no \"consciousness.\" There are just\nthings. When there is uncertainty, there are dubious, suspected\nobjects--things hinted at, guessed at. Such objects have a distinct\nstatus, and it is the part of good sense to give them, as occupying\nthat status, a distinct caption. \"Consciousness\" is a term often used\nfor this purpose; and I see no objection to that term, _provided_ it\nis recognized to mean such objects as are problematic, plus the fact\nthat in their problematic character they may be used, as effectively\nas accredited objects, to direct observations and experiments which\nfinally relieve the doubtful features of the situation. Such \"objects\"\nmay turn out to be valid, or they may not. But, in any case, they may\nbe used. They may be internally manipulated and developed through\nratiocination into explicit statement of their implications; they may\nbe employed as standpoints for selecting and arranging data, and as\nmethods for conducting experiments. In short, they are not merely\nhypothetical; they are _working_ hypotheses. Meanwhile, their\naloofness from accredited objectivity may lead us to characterize them\nas merely ideas, or even as \"mental states,\" provided once more we\nmean by mental state just this logical status.\n\nWe have examples of such ideas in symbols. A symbol, I take it, is\nalways itself, existentially, a particular object. A word, an\nalgebraic sign, is just as much a concrete existence as is a horse, a\nfire-engine, or a flyspeck. But its value resides in its\nrepresentative character: in its suggestive and directive force for\noperations that when performed lead us to non-symbolic objects, which\nwithout symbolic operations would not be apprehended, or at least\nwould not be so easily apprehended. It is, I think, worth noting that\nthe capacity (_a_) for regarding objects as mere symbols and (_b_) for\nemploying symbols instrumentally furnishes the only safeguard against\ndogmatism, i.e., uncritical acceptance of any suggestion that comes to\nus vividly; and also that it furnishes the only basis for\nintelligently controlled experiments.\n\nI do not think, however, that we should have the tendency to regard\nideas as _private_, as personal, if we stopped short at this point. If\nwe had only words or other symbols uttered by others, or written, or\nprinted, we might call them, when in objective suspense, mere ideas.\nBut we should hardly think of these ideas as our own. Such\nextra-organic stimuli, however, are not adequate logical devices. They\nare too rigid, too \"objective\" in their own existential status. Their\nmeaning and character are too definitely fixed. For effective\ndiscovery we need things which are more easily manipulated, which are\nmore transitive, more easily dropped and changed. Intra-organic\nevents, adjustments _within_ the organism, that is, adjustments of the\norganism considered not with reference to the environment but with\nreference to one another, are much better suited to stand as\nrepresentatives of genuinely dubious objects. An object which is\n_really_ doubted is by its nature precarious and inchoate, vague. What\n_is_ a thing when it is not yet discovered and yet is tentatively\nentertained and tested?\n\nAncient logic never got beyond the conception of an object whose\nlogical _place_, whose subsumptive position as a particular with\nreference to some universal, was doubtful. It never got to the point\nwhere it could search for particulars which in themselves as\nparticulars are doubtful. Hence it was a logic of proof, of deduction,\nnot of inquiry, of discovery, and of induction. It was hard up against\nits own dilemma: How can a man inquire? For either he knows that for\nwhich he seeks, and hence does not seek: or he does not know, in which\ncase he can not seek, nor could he tell if he found. The\nindividualistic movement of modern life detached, as it were, the\nindividual, and allowed personal (i.e., intra-organic) events to have,\ntransitively and temporarily, a worth of their own. These events are\ncontinuous with extra-organic events (in origin and eventual\noutcome); but they may be considered in temporary displacement as\nuniquely existential. In this capacity they serve as means for the\nelaboration of a delayed but more adequate response in a radically\ndifferent direction. So treated, they are tentative, dubious but\nexperimental, anticipations of an object. They are \"subjective\" (i.e.,\nindividualistic) surrogates of public, cosmic things, which may be so\nmanipulated and elaborated as to terminate in public things which\nwithout them would not exist as empirical objects.[51]\n\nThe recognition then of intra-organic events, which are not merely\neffects nor distorted refractions of cosmic objects, but inchoate\n_future_ cosmic objects in process of experimental construction,\nresolves, to my mind, the paradox of so-called subjective and private\nthings that have objective and universal reference, and that operate\nso as to lead to objective consequences which test their own value.\nWhen a man can say: This color is not necessarily the color of the\nglass nor the picture nor even of an object reflected but is at least\nan event in my nervous system, an event which I may refer to my\norganism till I get _surety of other reference_--he is for the first\ntime emancipated from the dogmatism of unquestioned reference, and is\nset upon a path of experimental inquiry.\n\nI am not here concerned with trying to demonstrate that this is the\ncorrect mode of interpretation. I am only concerned with pointing out\nits radical difference from the view of a critic who, holding to the\ntwo-world theory of existences which from the start are divided into\nthe fixedly objective and the fixedly psychical, interprets in terms\nof his own theory the view that the distinction between the objective\nand the subjective is a logical-practical distinction. Whether the\nlogical, as against the ontological, theory be true or false, it can\nhardly be fruitfully discussed without a preliminary apprehension of\nit as a logical conception.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[48] This conception of \"consciousness\" as a sort of reduplicate world\nof things comes to us, I think, chiefly from Hume's conception that\nthe \"_mind_ is nothing but a heap, a collection of different\nperceptions, united together by certain relations.\"--_Treatise of\nHuman Nature_, Book I, Part IV, sec. 2. For the evolution of this sort\nof notion out of the immaterial substance notion, see Bush, \"A Factor\nin the Genesis of Idealism,\" in the James _Festschrift_.\n\n[49] See, for example, p. 113. \"Thus that which is 'nothing but a\nstate of our consciousness' turns out straightway to be a specifically\ndetermined objective fact in a system of facts,\" and, p. 147, \"actual\nsensation is determined as an event in a world of events.\"\n\n[50] When it is said that an idea is a \"plan of action,\" it must be\nremembered that the term \"plan of action\" is a formal term. It throws\nno light upon _what_ the action is with respect to which an idea is\nthe plan. It may be chopping down a tree, finding a trail, or\nconducting a scientific research in mathematics, history, or\nchemistry.\n\n[51] I owe this idea, both in its historical and in its logical\naspects, to my former colleague, Professor Mead, of the University of\nChicago.\n\n\n\n\nVIII\n\nTHE CONTROL OF IDEAS BY FACTS\n\n\nI\n\nThere is something a little baffling in much of the current discussion\nregarding the reference of ideas to facts. The not uncommon assumption\nis that there was a satisfactory and consistent theory of their\nrelation in existence prior to the somewhat impertinent intrusion of a\nfunctional and practical interpretation of them. The way the\ninstrumental logician has been turned upon by both idealist and\nrealist is suggestive of the way in which the outsider who intervenes\nin a family jar is proverbially treated by both husband and wife, who\nmanifest their unity by berating the third party.\n\nI feel that the situation is due partly to various misapprehensions,\ninevitable perhaps in the first presentation of a new point of\nview[52] and multiplied in this instance by the coincidence of the\npresentation of this logical point of view with that of the larger\nphilosophical movements, humanism and pragmatism. I wish here to\nundertake a summary statement of the logical view on its own account,\nhoping it may receive clearer understanding on its own merits.\n\nIn the first place it was (apart from the frightful confusion of\nlogical theories) precisely the lack of an adequate and generally\naccepted theory of the nature of fact and idea, and of the kind of\nagreement or correspondence between them which constitutes the truth\nof the idea, that led to the development of a functional theory of\nlogic. A brief statement of the difficulties in the traditional views\nmay therefore be pertinent. That fruitful thinking--thought that\nterminates in valid knowledge--goes on in terms of the distinction of\nfacts and judgment, and that valid knowledge is precisely genuine\ncorrespondence or agreement, _of some sort_, of fact and judgment, is\nthe common and undeniable assumption. But the discussions are largely\ncarried on in terms of an epistemological dualism, rendering the\nsolution of the problem impossible in virtue of the very terms in\nwhich it is stated. The distinction is at once identified with that\nbetween mind and matter, consciousness and objects, the psychical and\nthe physical, where each of these terms is supposed to refer to some\nfixed order of existence, a world in itself. Then, of course, there\ncomes up the question of the nature of the agreement, and of the\nrecognition of it. What is the experience in which the survey of both\nidea and existence is made and their agreement recognized? Is it an\nidea? Is the agreement ultimately a matter of self-consistency of\nideas? Then what has become of the postulate that truth is agreement\nof idea with existence beyond idea? Is it an absolute which\ntranscends and absorbs the difference? Then, once more, what is the\ntest of any specific judgment? What has become of the correspondence\nof fact and thought? Or, more urgently, since the pressing problem of\nlife, of practice and of science, is the discrimination of the\n_relative_, or _superior_, validity of this or that theory, plan, or\ninterpretation, what is the criterion of truth within present\nnon-absolutistic experience, where the distinction between factual\nconditions and thoughts and the necessity of some working adjustment\npersist?\n\nPutting the problem in yet another way, either both fact and idea are\npresent all the time or else only one of them is present. But if the\nformer, why should there be an idea at all, and why should it have to\nbe tested by the fact? When we already have what we want, namely,\nexistence, reality, why should we take up the wholly supernumerary\ntask of forming more or less imperfect ideas of those facts, and then\nengage in the idle performance of testing them by what we already know\nto be? But if only ideas are present, it is idle to speak of comparing\nan idea with facts and testing its validity by its agreement. The\nelaboration and refinement of ideas to the uttermost still leaves us\nwith an idea, and while a self-consistent idea stands a show of being\ntrue in a way in which an incoherent one does not, a self-consistent\nidea is still but a hypothesis, a candidate for truth. Ideas are not\nmade true by getting bigger. But if only 'facts' are present, the\nwhole conception of agreement is once more given up--not to mention\nthat such a situation is one in which there is by definition no\nthinking or reflective factor at all.\n\nThis suggests that a strictly monistic epistemology, whether\nidealistic or realistic, does not get rid of the problem. Suppose for\nexample we take a sensationalistic idealism. It does away with the\nontological gulf between ideas and facts, and by reducing both terms\nto a common denominator seems to facilitate fruitful discussion of the\nproblem. But the problem of the distinction and reference (agreement,\ncorrespondence) of two types or sorts of sensations still persists. If\nI say the box there is square, and call \"box\" one of a group of ideas\nor sensations and \"square\" another sensation or \"idea,\" the old\nquestion comes up: Is \"square\" already a part of the \"facts\" of the\nbox, or is it not? If it is, it is a supernumerary, an idle thing,\nboth as an idea and as an assertion of fact; if it is not, how can we\ncompare the two ideas, and what on earth or in heaven does their\nagreement or correspondence mean? If it means simply that we\nexperience the two \"sensations\" in juxtaposition, then the same is\ntrue, of course, of any casual association or hallucination. On the\nsensational basis, accordingly, there is still a distinction of\nsomething \"given,\" \"there,\" brutally factual, the box, and something\nelse which stands on a different level, ideal, absent, intended,\ndemanded, the \"square,\" which is asserted to hold good or be true of\nthe thing \"box.\" The fact that both are sensations throws no light on\nthe logical validity of any proposition or belief, because by theory a\nlike statement holds of every possible proposition.[53]\n\nThe same problem recurs on a realistic basis. For example, there has\nrecently been propounded[54] the doctrine of the distinction between\nrelations of space and time and relations of meaning or significance,\nas a key to the problem of knowledge. Things exist in their own\ncharacters, in their temporal and spatial relations. When knowledge\nintervenes, there is nothing new of a subjective or psychical sort,\nbut simply a new relation of the things--the suggesting or signifying\nof one thing by another. Now this seems to be an excellent way of\nstating the logical problem, but, I take it, it states and does not\nsolve. For the characteristic of such situations, claiming to\nterminate in knowledge, is precisely that the meaning-relation is\npredicated _of_ the other relations; it is referred to them; it is not\nsimply a supervention existing side by side with them, like casual\nsuggestions or the play of phantasy. It is something which the facts,\nthe qualitative space and time things, must bear the burden of, must\naccept and take unto themselves as part of themselves. Until this\nhappens, we have only \"thinking,\" not accomplished knowledge. Hence,\nlogically, the existential relations play the r\u00f4le of fact, and the\nrelation of signification that of idea,[55] distinguished from fact\nand yet, if valid, to hold _of_ fact.\n\nThis appears quite clearly in the following quotation: \"It is the ice\nwhich means that it will cool the water, just as much as it is the ice\nwhich does cool the water when put into it.\" There is, however, a\npossible ambiguity in the statement, to which we shall return later.\nThat the \"ice\" (the thing regarded as ice) _suggests_ cooling is as\nreal as is a case of actual cooling. But, of course, not every\nsuggestion is valid. The \"ice\" may be a crystal, and it will not cool\nwater at all. So far as it is already certain that this _is_ ice, and\nalso certain that ice, under all circumstances, cools water, the\nmeaning-relation stands on the same level as the physical, being not\nmerely suggested, but part of the facts ascertained. It is not a\nmeaning-relation as such at all. We already have truth; the entire\nwork of knowing as logical is done; we have no longer the relation\ncharacteristic of reflective situations. Here again the implication of\nthe thinking situation is of some \"correspondence\" or \"agreement\"\nbetween two sets of distinguished relations; the problem of valid\ndetermination remains the central question of any theory of knowing in\nits relation to facts and truth.[56]\n\n\nII\n\nI hope this statement of the difficulty, however inadequate, will\nserve at least to indicate that a functional logic inherits the\nproblem in question and does not create it; that it has never for a\nmoment denied the prima facie working distinction between \"ideas,\"\n\"thoughts,\" \"meanings,\" and \"facts,\" \"existences,\" \"the environment,\"\nnor the necessity of a control of meaning by facts. It is concerned\nnot with denying, but with understanding. What is denied is not the\ngenuineness of the problem of the terms in which it is stated, but\nthe reality and value of the orthodox interpretation. What is insisted\nupon is the relative, instrumental, or working character of the\ndistinction--that it _is_ a _logical_ distinction, instituted and\nmaintained in the interests of intelligence, with all that\nintelligence imports in the exercise of the life functions. To this\npositive side I now turn.\n\nIn the analysis it may prove convenient to take an illustration of a\nman lost in the woods, taking this case as typical of any reflective\nsituation in so far as it involves perplexity--a problem to be solved.\nThe problem is to find a correct idea of the way home--a practical\nidea or plan of action which will lead to success, or the realization\nof the purpose to get home. Now the critics of the experimental theory\nof logic make the point that this practical idea, the truth of which\nis evidenced in the successful meeting of a need, is dependent for its\nsuccess upon a purely presentative idea, that of the existent\nenvironment, whose validity has nothing to do with success but depends\non agreement with the given state of affairs. It is said that what\nmakes a man's idea of his environment true is its agreement with the\nactual environment, and \"generally a true idea in any situation\nconsists in its agreement with reality.\" I have already indicated my\nacceptance of this formula. But it was long my misfortune not to be\npossessed offhand of those perfectly clear notions of just what is\nmeant in this formula by the terms \"idea,\" \"existence,\" and\n\"agreement\" which are possessed by other writers on epistemology; and\nwhen I analyzed these notions I found the distinction between the\npractical idea and the theoretical not fixed nor final, and I found a\nsomewhat startling similarity between the notions of \"success\" and\n\"agreement.\"\n\nJust what is the environment of which an idea is to be formed: i.e.,\nwhat is the intellectual content or objective detail to be assigned to\nthe term \"environment\"? It can hardly mean the actual visible\nenvironment--the trees, rocks, etc., which a man is actually looking\nat. These things are there and it seems superfluous to form an idea of\nthem; moreover, the wayfaring man, though lost, would have to be an\nunusually perverse fool if under such circumstances he were unable to\nform an idea (supposing he chose to engage in this luxury) in agreement\nwith these facts. The environment must be a larger environment than the\nvisible facts; it must include things not within the direct ken of the\nlost man; it must, for instance, extend from where he is now to his\nhome, or to the point from which he started. It must include\nunperceived elements in their contrast with the perceived. Otherwise\nthe man would not be lost. Now we are at once struck with the facts\nthat the lost man has no alternative except either to wander aimlessly\nor else to _conceive_ this inclusive environment; and that this\nconception is just what is meant by idea. It is not some little\npsychical entity or piece of consciousness-stuff, but is _the\ninterpretation of the locally present environment in reference to its\nabsent portion_, that part to which it is referred as another part so\nas to give a view of a whole. Just how such an idea would differ from\none's plan of action in finding one's way, I do not know. For one's\nplan (if it be really a plan, a method) is a conception of what is\ngiven in its hypothetical relations to what is not given, employed as a\nguide to that act which results in the absent being also given. It is a\nmap constructed with one's self lost and one's self found, whether at\nstarting or at home again, as its two limits. If this map in its\nspecific character is not also the only guide to the way home, one's\nonly plan of action, then I hope I may never be lost. It is the\n_practical_ facts of being lost and desiring to be found which\nconstitute the limits and the content of the \"environment.\"\n\nThen comes the test of _agreement_ of the idea and the environment.\nSupposing the individual stands still and attempts to compare his idea\nwith the reality, with what reality is he to compare it? Not with the\npresented reality, for _that_ reality is the reality of himself lost;\nnot with the complete reality, for at this stage of proceedings he has\nonly the idea to stand for the complete theory. What kind of\ncomparison is possible or desirable then, save to treat the mental\nlayout of the whole situation as a working hypothesis, as a plan of\naction, and proceed to _act_ upon it, to use it as a director and\ncontroller of one's divagations instead of stumbling blindly around\nuntil one is either exhausted or accidentally gets out? Now suppose\none uses the idea--that is to say, the present facts projected into a\nwhole in the light of absent facts--as a guide of action. Suppose, by\nmeans of its specifications, one works one's way along until one comes\nupon familiar ground--finds one's self. _Now_, one may say, my idea\nwas right, it was in accord with facts; it agrees with reality. That\nis, acted upon sincerely, it has led to the desired conclusion; it\nhas, _through action_, worked out the state of things which it\ncontemplated or intended. The agreement, correspondence, is between\npurpose, plan, and its own execution, fulfillment; between a map of a\ncourse constructed for the sake of guiding behavior and the result\nattained in acting upon the indications of the map. Just how does such\nagreement differ from success?\n\n\nIII\n\nIf we exclude acting upon the idea, no conceivable amount or kind of\nintellectualistic procedure can confirm or refute an idea, or throw\nany light upon its validity. How does the non-pragmatic view consider\nthat verification takes place? Does it suppose that we first look a\nlong while at the facts and then a long time at the idea, until by\nsome magical process the degree and kind of their agreement become\nvisible? Unless there is some such conception as this, what conception\nof agreement is possible except the experimental or practical one? And\nif it be admitted that verification involves action, how can that\naction be relevant to the truth of an idea, unless the idea is itself\nalready relevant to action? If by acting in accordance with the\nexperimental definition of facts, viz., as obstacles and conditions,\nand the experimental definition of the end or intent, viz., as plan\nand method of action, a harmonized situation effectually presents\nitself, we have the adequate and the only conceivable verification of\nthe intellectual factors. If the action indicated be carried out and\nthe disordered or disturbed situation persists, then we have not\nmerely confuted the tentative positions of intelligence, but we have\nin the very process of acting introduced new data and eliminated some\nof the old ones, and thus afforded an opportunity for the resurvey of\nthe facts and the revision of the plan of action. By acting faithfully\nupon an inadequate reflective presentation, we have at least secured\nthe elements for its improvement. This, of course, gives no absolute\nguaranty that the reflection will at any time be so performed as to\nprove its validity in fact. But the self-rectification of intellectual\ncontent through acting upon it in good faith is the \"absolute\" of\nknowledge, loyalty to which is the religion of intellect.\n\nThe intellectual definition or delimitation assigned to the \"given\" is\nthus as tentative and experimental as that ascribed to the idea. In\nform both are categorical, and in content both are hypothetical. Facts\nreally exist just as facts, and meanings exist as meanings. One is no\nmore superfluous, more subjective, or less necessitated than the\nother. In and of themselves as existences both are equally realistic\nand compulsive. But on the basis of existence, there is no element in\neither which may be strictly described as intellectual or cognitional.\nThere is only a practical situation in its brute and unrationalized\nform. What is uncertain about the facts as given at any moment is\nwhether the right exclusions and selections have been made. Since that\nis a question which can be decided finally only by the experimental\nissue, this ascription of character is itself tentative and\nexperimental. If it works, the characterization and delineation are\nfound to be proper ones; but every admission prior to inquiry, of\nunquestioned, categorical, rigid objectivity, compromises the\nprobability that it will work. The character assigned to the datum\nmust be taken as hypothetically as possible in order to preserve the\nelasticity needed for easy and prompt reconsideration. Any other\nprocedure virtually insists that all facts and details anywhere\nhappening to exist and happening to present themselves (all being\nequally real) must all be given equal status and equal weight, and\nthat their outer ramifications and internal complexities must be\nindefinitely followed up. The worthlessness of this sheer accumulation\nof realities, its total irrelevancy, the lack of any way of judging\nthe significance of the accumulations, are good proofs of the fallacy\nof any theory which ascribes objective logical content to facts wholly\napart from the needs and possibilities of a situation.\n\nThe more stubbornly one maintains the _full_ reality of either his\nfacts or his ideas, just as they stand, the more accidental is the\ndiscovery of relevantly significant facts and of valid ideas--the more\naccidental, the less rational, is the issue of the knowledge\nsituation. Due progress is reasonably probable in just the degree in\nwhich the meaning, categorical in its existing imperativeness, and the\nfact, equally categorical in its brute coerciveness, are assigned only\na provisional and tentative nature with reference to control of the\nsituation. That this surrender of a rigid and final character for the\ncontent of knowledge on the sides both of fact and of meaning, in\nfavor of experimental and functioning estimations, is precisely the\nchange which has marked the development of modern from mediaeval and\nGreek science, seems undoubted. To learn the lesson one has only to\ncontrast the rigidity of phenomena and conceptions in Greek thought\n(Platonic ideas, Aristotelian forms) with the modern experimental\nselection and determining of facts and experimental employment of\nhypotheses. The former have ceased to be ultimate realities of a\nnondescript sort and have become provisional data; the latter have\nceased to be eternal meanings and have become working theories. The\nfruitful application of mathematics and the evolution of a technique\nof experimental inquiry have coincided with this change. That\nrealities exist independently of their use as intellectual data, and\nthat meanings exist apart from their utilization as hypotheses, are\nthe permanent truths of Greek realism as against the exaggerated\nsubjectivism of modern philosophy; but the conception that this\nexistence is to be defined in the same way as are contents of\nknowledge, so that perfect being is object of perfect knowledge and\nimperfect being object of imperfect knowledge, is the fallacy which\nGreek thought projected into modern. Science has advanced in its\nmethods in just the degree in which it has ceased to assume that prior\nrealities and prior meanings retain fixedly and finally, when entering\ninto reflective situations, the characters they had prior to this\nentrance, and in which it has realized that their very presence within\nthe knowledge situation signifies that they have to be redefined and\nrevalued from the standpoint of the new situation.\n\n\nIV\n\nThis conception does not, however, commit us to the view that there is\nany conscious situation which is totally non-reflective. It may be\ntrue that any experience which can properly be termed such comprises\nsomething which is _meant_ over and against what is given or there.\nBut there are many situations into which the rational factor--the\nmutual distinction and mutual reference of fact and meaning--enters\nonly incidentally and is slurred, not accentuated. Many disturbances\nare relatively trivial and induce only a slight and superficial\nredefinition of contents. This passing tension of facts against\nmeaning may suffice to call up and carry a wide range of meaningful\nfacts which are quite irrelevant to the intellectual problem. Such is\nthe case where the individual is finding his way through any field\nwhich is upon the whole familiar, and which, accordingly, requires\nonly an occasional resurvey and revaluation at moments of slight\nperplexity. We may call these situations, if we will, knowledge\nsituations (for the reflective function characteristic of knowledge is\npresent), but so denominating them does not do away with their sharp\ndifference from those situations in which the critical qualification\nof facts and definition of meanings constitute the main business. To\nspeak of the passing attention which a traveler has occasionally to\ngive to the indications of his proper path in a fairly familiar and\nbeaten highway as knowledge, in just the same sense in which the\ndeliberate inquiry of a mathematician or a chemist or a logician is\nknowledge, is as confusing to the real issue involved as would be the\ndenial to it of _any_ reflective factor. If, then, one bears in mind\nthese two considerations--(1) the unique problem and purpose of every\nreflective situation, and (2) the difference as to range and\nthoroughness of logical function in different types of reflective\nsituations--one need have no difficulty with the doctrine that the\ngreat obstacle in the development of scientific knowing is that facts\nand meanings enter such situations with stubborn and alien\ncharacteristics imported from other situations.\n\nThis affords an opportunity to speak again of the logical problem to\nwhich reference and promise of return were made earlier in this paper.\nFacts may be regarded as existing qualitatively and in certain spatial\nand temporal relations; when there is knowledge another relation is\nadded, that of one thing meaning or signifying another. Water exists,\nfor example, as water, in a certain place, in a certain temporal\nsequence. But it may signify the quenching of thirst; and this\nsignification-relation constitutes knowledge.[57] This statement may\nbe taken in a way congruous with the account developed in this paper.\nBut it may also be taken in another sense, consideration of which will\nserve to enforce the point regarding the tentative nature of the\ncharacterization of the given, as distinct from the intended and\nabsent. Water means quenching thirst; it is drunk, and death follows.\nIt was not water, but a poison which \"looked like\" water. Or it is\ndrunk, and is water, but does not quench thirst, for the drinker is in\nan abnormal condition and drinking water only intensifies the thirst.\nOr it is drunk and quenches thirst; but it also brings on typhoid\nfever, being not merely water, but water plus germs. Now all these\nevents demonstrate that error may appertain quite as much to the\ncharacterization of existing things, suggesting or suggested, as to\nthe suggestion _qua_ suggestion. There is no ground for giving the\n\"things\" any superior reality. In these cases, indeed, it may fairly\nbe said that the mistake is made because qualitative thing and\nsuggested or meaning-relation were _not_ discriminated. The\n\"signifying\" force was regarded as a part of the direct quality of the\ngiven fact, quite as much as its color, liquidity, etc.; it is only in\nanother situation that it is discriminated as a relation instead of\nbeing regarded as an element.\n\nIt is quite as true to say that a thing is called water because it\nsuggests thirst-quenching as to say that it suggests thirst-quenching\nbecause it is characterized as water. _The knowledge function becomes\nprominent or dominant in the degree in which there is a conscious\ndiscrimination between the fact-relations and the meaning-relations._\nAnd this inevitably means that the \"water\" ceases to be _surely_\nwater, just as it becomes doubtful or hypothetical whether this thing,\nwhatever it is, really means thirst-quenching. If it really means\nthirst-quenching, it is water; so far as it may not mean it, it\nperhaps is not water. It is now just as much a question _what_ this\n_is_ as what it means. Whatever will resolve one question will resolve\nthe other. In just the degree, then, in which an existence or thing\ngets intellectualized force or function, it becomes a fragmentary and\ndubious thing, to be circumscribed and described for the sake of\noperating as _sign_, or clue of a _future_ reality to be realized\nthrough action. Only as \"reality\" is reduced to a sign, and questions\nof its nature as sign are considered, does it get intellectual or\ncognitional status. The bearing of this upon the question of practical\ncharacter of the distinctions of fact and idea is obvious. No one, I\ntake it, would deny that action of some sort _does_ follow upon\njudgment; no one would deny that this action _does_ somehow serve to\ntest the value of the intellectual operations upon which it follows.\nBut if this subsequent action is _merely_ subsequent, if the\nintellectual categories, operations, and distinctions are complete in\nthemselves, without inherent reference to it, what guaranty is there\nthat they pass into relevant action, and by what miracle does the\naction manage to test the worth of the idea? But if the intellectual\nidentification and description of the thing are as tentative and\ninstrumental as is the ascription of significance, then the\nexigencies of the active situation are operative in all the categories\nof the knowledge situation. Action is not a more or less accidental\nappendage or afterthought, but is undergoing development and giving\ndirection in the entire knowledge function.\n\nIn conclusion, I remark that the ease with which the practical\ncharacter of these fundamental logical categories, fact, meaning, and\nagreement, may be overlooked or denied is due to the organic way in\nwhich practical import is incarnate in them. It can be overlooked\nbecause it is so involved in the terms themselves that it is assumed\nat every turn. The pragmatist is in the position of one who is charged\nwith denying the existence of something because, in pointing out a\ncertain fundamental feature of it, he puts it in a strange light. Such\nconfusion always occurs when the familiar is brought to definition.\nThe difficulties are more psychological--difficulties of orientation\nand mental adjustment--than logical, and in the long run will be done\naway with by our getting used to the different viewpoint, rather than\nby argument.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[52] _Studies in Logical Theory_, University of Chicago Press, 1903.\n\n[53] Mill's doctrine of the ambiguity of the copula (_Logic_, Book I,\nchap. IV, \u00a7 1) is an instance of one typical way of evading the\nproblem. After insisting with proper force and clearness upon the\nobjective character of our intellectual beliefs and propositions,\nviz., that when we say fire causes heat we mean actual phenomena, not\nour ideas of fire and heat (Book I, chap. II and chap. XI, \u00a7 1, and\nchap. V, \u00a7 1), he thinks to dispose of the whole problem of the \"is\"\nin judgment by saying that it is only a sign of affirmation (chap. I,\n\u00a7 2, and chap. IV, \u00a7 1). Of course it is. But unless the affirmation\n(the sign of thought) \"agrees\" or \"corresponds with\" the relations of\nthe phenomena, what becomes of the doctrine of the objective import of\npropositions? How otherwise shall we maintain with Mill (and with\ncommon-sense and science) the difference between asserting \"a fact of\nexternal nature\" and \"a fact in my mental history\"?\n\n[54] _Studies in Philosophy and Psychology_, article by Woodbridge on\n\"The Problem of Consciousness,\" especially pp. 159-60.\n\n[55] In other words, \"ideas\" is a term capable of assuming any\ndefinition which is logically appropriate--say, meaning. It need not\nhave anything to do with the conception of little subjective entities\nor psychical stuffs.\n\n[56] Of course, the monistic epistemologies have an advantage in the\nstatement of the problem over the dualistic--they do not state it in\nterms which presuppose the impossibility of the solution.\n\n[57] This view was originally advanced in the discussion of quite\nanother problem than the one here discussed, viz., the problem of\nconsciousness; and it may not be quite just to dissever it from that\ncontext. But as a formula for knowledge it has enough similarity with\nthe one brought out in this paper to suggest further treatment; it is\nnot intended that the results reached here shall apply to the problem\nof consciousness as such.\n\n\n\n\nIX\n\nNA\u00cfVE REALISM VS. PRESENTATIVE REALISM[58]\n\n\nI\n\nIn spite of the elucidations of contemporary realists, a number of\nidealists continue to adduce in behalf of idealism certain facts\nhaving an obvious physical nature and explanation. The visible\nconvergence of the railway tracks, for example, is cited as evidence\nthat what is seen is a mental \"content.\" Yet this convergence follows\nfrom the physical properties of light and a lens, and is physically\ndemonstrated in a camera. Is the photograph, then, to be conceived as\na psychical somewhat? That the time of the visibility of a light does\nnot coincide with the time at which a distant body emitted the light\nis employed to support a similar idealistic conclusion, in spite of\nthe fact that the exact difference in time may be deduced from a\nphysical property of light--its rate. The dislocation in space of the\nlight seen and the astronomical star is used as evidence of the mental\nnature of the former, though the exact angular difference is a matter\nof simple computation from purely physical data. The doubling of\nimages of, say, the finger when the eyeball is pressed, is frequently\nproffered as a clincher. Yet it is a simple matter to take any body\nthat reflects light, and by a suitable arrangement of lenses to\nproduce not only two but many images, projected into space. If the\nfact that under definite _physical_ conditions (misplacement of\nlenses), a finger yields two images proves the psychical character of\nthe latter, then the fact that under certain conditions a sounding\nbody yields one or more echoes is, by parity of reasoning, proof that\nthe echo is made of mental stuff.[59]\n\nIf, once more, the differences in form and color of a table to\ndifferent observers, occupying different physical positions, is proof\nthat what each sees is a psychical, private, isolated somewhat, then\nthe fact that one and the same physical body has different effects\nupon, or relations with, different physical media is proof of the\nmental nature of these effects. Take a lump of wax and subject it to\nthe same heat, located at different positions; now the wax is solid,\nnow liquid--it might even be gaseous. How \"psychical\" these phenomena!\nIt almost seems as if the transformation of the physical into the\nmental in the cases cited exemplifies an interesting psychological\nphenomenon. In each case the beginning is with a real and physical\nexistence. Taking \"the real object,\" the astronomical star, on the\nbasis of its physical reality, the idealist concludes to a psychical\nobject, radically different! Taking the _single_ object, the finger,\nfrom the premise of its real singleness, he concludes to a double\nmental content, which then takes the place of the original single\nthing! Taking one-and-the-same-object, the table, presenting _its_\ndifferent surfaces and reflections of light to different real\norganisms, he eliminates the one-table-in-its-different-relations in\nbehalf of a multiplicity of totally separate psychical tables! The\nlogic reminds us of the story of the countryman who, after gazing at\nthe giraffe, remarked, \"There ain't no such animal.\" It almost seems,\nI repeat, as if this self-contradiction in the argument creates in\nsome minds the impression that the object--not the argument--is\nundergoing the extraordinary reversal of form.\n\nHowever this may be, the problem indicated in the foregoing cases is\nsimply the good old problem of the many in one, or, less cryptically,\nthe problem of the maintenance of a continuity of process throughout\ndifferences. I do not pretend that this situation, though the most\nfamiliar thing in life, is wholly without difficulties. But its\ndifficulty is not one of epistemology, that is, of the relation of\nknown to a knower; to take it as such, and then to use it as proof of\nthe psychical nature of a final term, is also to prove that the trail\nthe rocket stick leaves behind is psychical, or that the flower which\ncomes in a continuity of process from a seed is mental.\n\n\nII\n\nContemporary realists have so frequently and clearly expounded the\nphysical explanation of such cases as have been cited that one is at a\nloss as to why idealists go on repeating the cases without even\nalluding to the realistic explanation. One is moved to wonder whether\nthis neglect is just one of those circumstances which persistently dog\nphilosophical discussions, or whether something in the realistic\nposition gives ground (from at least an _ad hominem_ point of view)\nfor the neglect. There is a reason for adopting the latter\nalternative. Many realists, in offering the type of explanation\nadduced above, have treated the cases of seen light, doubled imagery,\nas perception in a way that ascribes to perception an inherent\ncognitive status. They have treated the perceptions as _cases of\nknowledge_, instead of as simply natural events having, in themselves\n(apart from a _use_ that may be made of them), no more knowledge\nstatus or worth than, say, a shower or a fever. What I intend to show\nis that if \"perceptions\" are regarded as cases of knowledge, the gate\nis opened to the idealistic interpretation. The physical explanation\nholds of them as long as they are regarded simply as natural events--a\ndoctrine I shall call na\u00efve realism; it does not hold of them\nconsidered as cases of knowledge--the view I call presentative\nrealism.\n\nThe idealists attribute to the realists the doctrine that \"the\nperceived object is the real object.\" Please note the wording; it\nassumes that there is _the_ real object, something which stands in a\ncontrasting relation with objects not real or else less real. Since it\nis easily demonstrable that there is a numerical duplicity between the\nastronomical star and its effect of visible light, between the single\nfinger and the doubled images, the latter evidently, when the former\nis dubbed \"_the_\" real object, stands in disparaging contrast to its\nreality. _If_ it is a case of knowledge, the knowledge refers to the\nstar; and yet not the star, but something more or less unreal (that\nis, if the star be \"the\" real object), is known.\n\nConsider how simply the matter stands in what I have called na\u00efve\nrealism. The astronomical star is _a_ real object, but not \"the\" real\nobject; the visible light is another real object, found, when\nknowledge supervenes, to be an occurrence standing in a process\ncontinuous with the star. Since the seen light is an event within a\ncontinuous process, there is no point of view from which its\n\"reality\" contrasts with that of the star.\n\nBut suppose that the realist accepts the traditionary psychology\naccording to which every event in the way of a perception is also a\ncase of knowing something. Is the way out now so simple? In the case\nof the doubled fingers or the seen light, the thing known in\nperception contrasts with the physical source and cause of the\nknowledge. There _is_ a numerical duplicity. Moreover the thing known\nby perception is by this hypothesis in relation to a knower, while the\nphysical cause is not. Is not the most plausible account of the\ndifference between the physical cause of the perceptive knowledge and\nwhat the latter presents precisely this latter difference--namely,\npresentation to a knower? If perception is a case of knowing, it must\nbe a case of knowing the star; but since the \"real\" star is not known\nin the perception, the knowledge relation must somehow have changed\nthe \"object\" into a \"content.\" Thus when the realist conceives the\nperceptual occurrence as an intrinsic case of knowledge or of\npresentation to a mind or knower, he lets the nose of the idealist\ncamel into the tent. He has then no great cause for surprise when the\ncamel comes in--and devours the tent.\n\nPerhaps it will seem as if in this last paragraph I had gone back on\nwhat I said earlier regarding the physical explanation of the\ndifference between the visible light and the astronomical star. On\nthe contrary, my point is that this explanation, though wholly\nadequate as long as we conceive the perception to be itself simply a\nnatural event, is not at all available when we conceive it to be an\nattempt at knowing its cause. In the former case, we are dealing with\na relation between natural events. In the latter case, we are dealing\nwith the difference between an object as a cause of knowledge and an\nobject as known, and hence in relation to mind. By the \"method of\ndifference\" the sole explanation of the difference between the two\nobjects is then the absence or presence of relation to a knower.\n\nIn the case of the seen light,[60] reference to the velocity of light\nis quite adequate to account for its time and space differences from\nthe star. But viewed as a case of what is known (on the supposition\nthat perception is knowing), reference to it only increases the\ncontrast between the real object and the object known in perception.\nFor, being just as much a part of the object that causes the\nperception as is the star itself, it (the velocity of light) _ought_\nlogically to be part of what is known in the perception, while it is\nnot. Since the velocity of light is a constituent element in the\nstar, it should be known in the perception; since it is not so known,\nreference to it only increases the discrepancy between the object of\nthe perception--the seen light--and the real, astronomical star. The\nsame is true of any physical condition that might be referred to: _The\nvery things that, from the standpoint of perception as a natural\nevent, are conditions that account for its happening are, from the\nstandpoint of perception as a case of knowledge, part of the object\nwhich, if knowledge is to be valid, ought to be known, but is not._\n\nIn this fact we have, perhaps, the ground of the idealist's disregard\nof the oft-proffered physical explanation of the difference between\nthe perceptual event and _the_ (so-called) real object. And it is\nquite possible that some realists who read these lines will feel that\nin my last paragraphs I have been making a covert argument for\nidealism. Not so, I repeat; they are an argument for a truly na\u00efve\nrealism. The presentative realist, in his appeal to \"common-sense\" and\nthe \"plain man,\" first sophisticates the umpire and then appeals. He\nstops a good way short of a genuine na\u00efvet\u00e9. The plain man, for a\nsurety, does not regard noises heard, lights seen, etc., as mental\nexistences; but neither does he regard them as things _known_. That\nthey are just things is good enough for him. That they are in relation\nto mind, or in relation to mind as their \"knower,\" no more occurs to\nhim than that they are mental. By this I mean much more than that the\nformulae of epistemology are foreign to him; I mean that his attitude\nto these things _as_ things involves their _not_ being in relation to\nhim as a mind or a knower. He is in the attitude of a liker or hater,\na doer or an appreciator. When he takes the attitude of a knower he\nbegins to inquire. Once depart from thorough na\u00efvet\u00e9, and substitute\nfor it the psychological theory that perception is a cognitive\npresentation to a mind of a causal object, and the first step is taken\non the road which ends in an idealistic system.\n\n\nIII\n\nFor simplicity's sake, I have written as if my main problem were to\nshow how, in the face of a supposed difficulty, a strictly realistic\ntheory of the perceptual event may be maintained. But my interest is\nprimarily in the facts, and in the theory only because of the facts it\nformulates. The significance of the facts of the case may, perhaps, be\nindicated by a consideration which has thus far been ignored. In\nregarding a perception as a case of knowledge, the presentative\nrealist does more than shove into it a relation to mind which then,\nnaturally and inevitably, becomes the explanation of any differences\nthat exist between its subject-matter and some causal object with\nwhich it contrasts. In many cases--very important cases, too, in the\nphysical sciences--the contrasting \"real object\" becomes known by a\nlogical process, by inference--as the contemporary position of the\nstar is determined by calculations from data, not by perception. This,\nthen, is the situation of the presentative realist: If perception is\nknowledge of its cause, it stands in unfavorable contrast with another\nindirect mode of knowledge; _its_ object is less valid than the object\nof inference. I do not adduce these considerations as showing that the\ncase is hopeless for the presentative realist;[61] I am willing to\nconcede he can find a satisfactory way out. But the difficulty exists;\nand in existing it calls emphatic attention to a case which is\ncertainly and indisputably a case of knowledge--namely, propositions\narrived at through inference, judgments as logical assertions.\n\nWith relation to the unquestionable case of knowledge, the logical or\ninferential case, perceptions occupy a unique status, one which\nreadily accounts for their being regarded as cases of knowledge,\nalthough in themselves they are natural events. (1) They are the sole\nultimate data, the sole media, of inference to all natural objects and\nprocesses. While we do not, in any intelligible or verifiable sense,\nknow _them_, we know all things that we do know _with_ or _by_ them.\nThey furnish the only ultimate evidence of the existence and nature\nof the objects which we infer, and they are the sole ultimate checks\nand tests of the inferences. The visible light is a necessary part of\nthe evidence on the basis of which we infer the existence, place, and\nstructure of the astronomical star, and some other perception is the\nverifying check on the value of the inference. Because of this\ncharacteristic use of perceptions, the perceptions themselves acquire,\nby \"second intention,\" a knowledge status. They _become_ objects of\nminute, accurate, and experimental scrutiny. Since the body of\npropositions that forms natural science hangs upon them, _for\nscientific purposes_ their nature _as_ evidence, _as_ signs, entirely\novershadows their natural status, that of being simply natural events.\nThe scientific man, as scientific, cares for perceptions not in\nthemselves, but as they throw light upon the nature of some object\nreached by evidence. And since every such inference tries to terminate\nin a further perception (as its test of validity), the value of\ninferential knowing depends on perception. (2) Independently of\nscience, daily life uses perceptions as signs of other perceptions.\nWhen a perception of a certain kind frequently recurs and is\nconstantly used as evidence of some other impending perceptual event,\nthe function of habit (a natural function, be it noted, not a\npsychical or epistemological function) often brings it about that the\nperception loses its original quality in acquiring a sign-value.\nLanguage is, of course, the typical case. Noises, in themselves mere\nnatural events, through habitual use as signs of other natural events\nbecome integrated with what they mean. What they stand for is\ntelescoped, as it were, into what they are. This happens also with\nother natural events, colors, tastes, etc. Thus, _for practical\npurposes_, many perceptual events are cases of knowledge; that is,\nthey have been _used_ as such so often that the habit of so using them\nis established or automatic.\n\nIn this brief reference to facts that are perfectly familiar, I have\ntried to suggest three points of crucial importance for a na\u00efve\nrealism: first, that inferential or evidential knowledge (that\ninvolving logical relation) is in the field as an obvious and\nundisputed case of knowledge; second, that this function, although\nembodying the logical relation, is itself a natural and specifically\ndetectable process among natural things--it is not a non-natural or\nepistemological relation; third, that the _use_, practical and\nscientific, of perceptual events in the evidential or inferential\nfunction is such as to make them _become_ objects of inquiry and\nlimits of knowledge, and to such a degree that this acquired\ncharacteristic quite overshadows, in many cases, their primary nature.\n\nIf we add to what has been said the fact that, like every natural\nfunction, the inferential function turns out better in some cases and\nworse in others, we get a naturalistic or na\u00efvely realistic conception\nof the \"_problem_ of knowledge\": Control of the conditions of\ninference--the only type of knowledge detectable in direct\nexistence--so as to guide it toward better conclusions.\n\n\nIV\n\nI do not flatter myself that I will receive much gratitude from\nrealists for attempting to rescue them from that error of fact which\nexposes their doctrine to an idealistic interpretation. The\nsuperstition, growing up in a false physics and physiology and\nperpetuated by psychology, that sensations-perceptions are cases of\nknowledge, is too ingrained. But--_crede experto_--let them try the\nexperiment of conceiving perceptions as pure natural events, not as\ncases of awareness or apprehension, and they will be surprised to see\nhow little they miss--save the burden of carrying traditionary\nproblems. Meantime, while philosophic argument, such as this, will do\nlittle to change the state of belief regarding perceptions, the\ndevelopment of biology and the refinement of physiology will, in due\nseason, do the work.\n\nIn concluding my article, I ought to refer, in order to guard against\nmisapprehension, to a reply that the presentative realist might make\nto my objection. He might say that while the seen light is a case of\nknowledge or presentative awareness, it is not a case of knowledge of\nthe star, but simply of the seen light, just as it is. In this case\nthe appeal to the physical explanations of the difference of the seen\nlight from its objective source is quite legitimate. At first sight,\nsuch a position seems innocent and tenable. Even if innocent, it\nwould, however, be ungrounded, since there is no evidence of the\nexistence of a knower, and of its relation to the seen light. But\nfurther consideration will reveal that there is a most fundamental\nobjection. If the notion of perception as a case of adequate knowledge\nof its own object-matter be accepted, the knowledge relation is\nabsolutely ubiquitous; it is an all-inclusive net. The \"ego-centric\npredicament\" is inevitable. This result of making perception a case of\nknowing will now occupy us.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[58] I am indebted to Dr. Bush's article on \"Knowledge and\nPerception,\" _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific\nMethods_, Vol. VI, p. 393, and to Professor Woodbridge's article on\n\"Perception and Epistemology\" in the _James Memorial Volume_, as well\nas to his paper on \"Sensations,\" read at the 1910 meeting of the\nAmerican Philosophical Association. Since my point of departure and\naim are somewhat different, I make this general acknowledgment in lieu\nof more specific references.\n\n[59] Plato's use of shadows, of reflections in the water, and other\n\"images\" or \"imitations\" to prove the presence in nature of non-being\nwas, considering the state of physical science in his day, a much more\nsensible conclusion than the modern use of certain images as proof\nthat the object in perception is a psychical content. Hobbes expressly\ntreats all images as physical, as on the same plane as reflections in\nthe water and echoes; the comparison is his.\n\n[60] It is impossible, in this brief treatment, to forestall every\nmisapprehension and objection. Yet to many the use of the term \"seen\"\nwill appear to be an admission that a case of knowledge is involved.\nBut is smelling a case of knowledge? Or (if the superstition persists\nas to smell) is gnawing or poking a case of knowledge? My point, of\ncourse, is that \"seen\" involves a relation to organic activity, not to\na knower, or mind.\n\n[61] This is the phase of the matter, of course, which the\nrationalistic or objective realist, the realist of the type of T. H.\nGreen, emphasizes. Put in terms of systems, the difficulty is that in\nescaping the subjectivism latent in treating perception as a case of\nknowledge, the realist runs into the waiting arms of the objective\nidealist.\n\n\n\n\nX\n\nEPISTEMOLOGICAL REALISM: THE ALLEGED UBIQUITY OF THE KNOWLEDGE\nRELATION\n\n\nI have pointed out that if perception be treated as a case of\nknowledge, knowledge of every form and kind must be treated as a case\nof a presentation to a knower. The alleged discipline of epistemology\nis then inevitable. In common usage, the term \"knowledge\" tends to be\nemployed eulogistically; its meaning approaches the connotation of the\nterm \"science.\" More loosely, it is used, of course, to designate all\nbeliefs and propositions that are held with assurance, especially with\nthe implication that the assurance is reasonable, or grounded. In its\npractical sense, it is used as the equivalent of \"knowing _how_,\" of\nskill or ability involving such acquaintance with things and persons\nas enables one to anticipate how they behave under certain conditions\nand to take steps accordingly. Such usages of the term are all\ndifferential; they all involve definite contrasts--with ungrounded\nconviction, or with doubt and mere guesswork, or with the inexpertness\nthat accompanies lack of familiarity. In its epistemological use, the\nterm \"knowledge\" has a blanket value which is absolutely unknown in\ncommon life. It covers any and every \"presentation\" of any and every\nthing to a knower, to an \"awarer,\" if I may coin a word for the sake\nof avoiding some of the pitfalls of the term \"consciousness.\" And, I\nrepeat, this indiscriminate use of the term \"knowledge,\" so foreign to\nscience and daily life, is absolutely unavoidable if perception be\nregarded as, in itself, a mode of knowledge. And then--and only\nthen--the problem of \"the possibility, nature, and extent of knowledge\n_in general_\" is also inevitable. I hope I shall not be regarded as\noffensively pragmatic if I suggest that this undesirable consequence\nis a good reason for not accepting the premise from which it follows,\nunless that premise be absolutely forced upon us.\n\nAt all events, upon the supposition of the ubiquity of the knowledge\nrelation in respect to a self, presentative realism is compelled to\naccept the genuineness of the epistemological problem, and thus to\nconvert itself into an epistemological realism, getting one more step\naway from both na\u00efve and naturalistic realism. The problem is\nespecially acute for a presentative realism because idealism has made\nprecisely this ubiquity of relationship its axiom, its short-cut. One\nsample is as good as a thousand. Says Bain: \"There is no possible\nknowledge of a world except in relation to our minds. Knowledge means\na state of mind; the notion of material things is a mental fact. We\nare incapable even of discussing the existence of an independent\nmaterial world; the very act is a contradiction. We can speak only of\na world presented to our own minds.\"\n\nOn the supposition of the ubiquity of the relation, realism and\nidealism exhaust the alternatives; if the ubiquity of the relation is\na myth, both doctrines are unreal, because there is no problem of\nwhich they are the solution. My first step in indicating the unreality\nof both \"solutions\" is formal. I shall try to show that _if_ the\nknowledge relation of things to a self is the exhaustive and inclusive\nrelation, there is no intelligible point at issue between idealism and\nrealism; the differences between them are either verbal or else due to\na failure on the part of one or the other to stick to their _common_\npremise.\n\n\nI\n\nTo my mind, Professor Perry rendered philosophic discussion a real\nservice when he coined the phrase \"ego-centric predicament.\" The\nphrase designated something which, whether or no it be real in itself,\nis very real in current discussion, and designating it rendered it\nmore accessible to examination. In terming the alleged uniform\ncomplicity of a knower a predicament, it is intended, I take it, to\nsuggest, among other things, that we have here a difficulty with which\nall schools of thought alike must reckon, so that it is a difficulty\nthat cannot be used as an argument in behalf of one school and against\nanother. If the relation be ubiquitous, it affects alike every view,\nevery theory, every object experienced; it is no respecter of persons,\nno respecter of doctrines. Since it cannot make any difference to any\nparticular object, to any particular logical assertion, or to any\nparticular theory, it does not support an idealistic as against a\nrealistic theory. Being a universal common denominator of all\ntheories, it cancels out of all of them alike. It leaves the issue one\nof _subject-matter_, to be decided on the basis of that\nsubject-matter, not on the basis of an unescapable attendant\nconsideration that the subject-matter must be known in order to be\ndiscussed. In short, the moral is quite literally, \"Forget it,\" or\n\"Cut it out.\"\n\nBut the idealist may be imagined to reply somewhat as follows: \"If the\nubiquity were of any kind other than precisely the kind it is, the\nadvice to disregard it as a mere attendant circumstance of discussion\nwould be relevant. Thus, for example, we disregard gravitation when we\nare considering a particular chemical reaction; there is no ground for\nsupposing that it affects a reaction in any way that modifies it as a\nchemical reaction. And if the 'ego-centric' relation were cited when\nthe point at issue is something about one group of facts in\ndistinction from another group, it ought certainly to be canceled from\nany statement about them. But since the point at issue is precisely\nthe most universally defining trait of existence as known, the\ninvitation deliberately to disregard the most universal trait is\nnothing more or less than an invitation to philosophic suicide.\"\n\nIf the idealist I have imagined as making the foregoing retort were up\nin recent realistic literature, he might add the following argument\n_ad hominem_: \"You, my realistic opponent, say that the doctrine of\nthe external relation of terms expresses a ubiquitous mark of every\ngenuine proposition or relational complex, and that this ubiquity is a\nstrong presumption in favor of realism. Why so uneven, so partial, in\nyour attitude toward ubiquitous relations? Is it perchance that you\nwere so uneasy at our possession of a ubiquitous relation that gives a\nshort cut to idealism that you felt you must also have a short cut to\nrealism?\"\n\nIf I terminate the controversy at this point, it is not because I\nthink the realist is unable to \"come back.\" On the contrary, I stop\nhere because I believe (for reasons that will come out shortly) that\nboth realist and idealist, having the same primary assumption, can\ncome back at each other indefinitely. Consequently, I wish to employ\nthe existence of this _tu quoque_ controversy to raise the question:\nUnder what conditions is the relation of knower to known an\nintelligible question? And I wish to show that it is _not_\nintelligible, if the knowledge relation be ubiquitous and homogeneous.\n\nThe controversy back and forth is in fact a warning of each side by\nthe other not to depart from their _common_ premise. If the idealist\nbegins to argue (as he constantly does) as if the relation to \"mind\"\nor to \"consciousness\" made some difference of a specific sort, like\nthat between error and fact, or between sound perception and\nhallucination, he may be reminded that, since this relation is\nuniform, it substantiates and nullifies all things alike. And the\nrealist is quite within the common premise when he points out that\nevery special fact must be admitted for what it is specifically known\nto be; no idealistic doctrine can turn the edge of the fact that\nknowledge has evolved historically out of a state in which there was\nno mind, or of the fact that knowledge is even now dependent on the\nbrain, provided that specific evidence shows these to be facts. The\nrealist, on the other hand, must admit that, after all, the entire\nbody of known facts, or of science, including such facts as the above,\nis held fast and tight in the net of relation to a mind or\nconsciousness. In specific cases this relation may be ignored, but the\nexact ground for such an ignoring is precisely that the relation is\nnot a specific fact, but a uniform relation of facts. And to call it\nan external relation makes no practical difference if it is universal\nand uniform. So the idealist might reply.\n\nImagine a situation like the following: The sole relation an organism\nbears to things is that of eater; the sole relation the environment\nbears to the organism is that of food, that is, things-to-eat. This\nrelation, then, is exhaustive. It defines, or identifies, each term in\nrelation to the other. But this means that there are not, as respects\norganism and environment, two terms at all. Eater-of-food and\nfood-being-eaten are two names for one and the same situation. Could\nthere be imagined a greater absurdity than to set to work to discuss\nthe relation _of_ eater _to_ food, _of_ organism _to_ the environment,\nor to argue as to whether one modifies the other or not? Given the\npremise, the statements in such a discussion could have only a verbal\ndifference from one another.\n\nSuppose, however, the discussion has somehow got under way. Sides have\nbeen taken; the philosophical world is divided into two great camps,\n\"foodists\" and \"eaterists.\" The eaterists (idealists) contend that no\nobject exists except in relation to eating; hence that everything is\nconstituted a thing by its relation to eating. Special sciences exist\nindeed which discuss the nature of various sorts of things in relation\nto _one another_, and hence in legitimate abstraction from the fact\nthat they are all foods. But the discussion of their nature _an sich_\ndepends upon \"eatology,\" which deals primarily with the problem of the\npossibility, nature, and extent (or limits) of eating food in general,\nand thereby determines what food in general, _\u00fcberhaupt_, is and\nmeans.\n\nNay, replies the foodist (realist). Since the eating relation is\nuniform, it is negligible. All propositions which have any\nintelligible meaning are about objects just as they are, and in the\nrelations they bear to one another. Foods pass in and out of the\nrelation to eater with no change in their own traits. Moreover, the\nposition of the eaterists is self-contradictory. How can a thing be\neaten unless it is, in and of itself, a food? To suppose that a food\nis constituted by eating is to presuppose that eating eats eating, and\nso on in infinite regress. In short, to be an eater is to be an eater\nof food; take away the independent existence of foods, and you deny\nthe existence and the possibility of an eater.\n\nI respectfully submit that there is no terminus to such a discussion.\nFor either both sides are saying the same thing in different words, or\nelse both of them depart from their common premise, and unwittingly\nsmuggle in some relations between the organism and environment other\nthan that of food-eater. If to be an eater means that an organism\nwhich is more and other than an eater is doing something\n_distinctive_, because contrasting with its other functions, in eating\nthen, and then only, is there an issue. In this latter case, the thing\nwhich is food may, of course, be _proved_ to be something besides\nfood, because of some different relation to the organism than that of\neating. But if both stick consistently to their common premise, we get\nthe following trivial situation. The idealist says: \"Every philosophy\npurports to be knowledge, knowledge of objects; all knowledge implies\nrelation to mind; therefore every object with which philosophy deals\nis object-in-relation-to-mind.\" The realist says: \"To be a mind is to\nbe a knower; to be a knower is to be a knower-of-objects. Without the\nobjects to be known, mind, the knower, is and means nothing.\"\n\nThe difficulties attending the discussion of epistemology are in no\nway attendant upon the special subject-matter of \"epistemology.\" They\nare found wherever any reciprocal relation is taken to define,\nexclusively and exhaustively, all the connections between any pair of\nthings. If there are two things that stand solely as buyer and seller\nto each other, or as husband and wife, then that relation is \"unique,\"\nand undefinable; to discuss the relation _of_ the relation _to_ the\nterms of which it is the relation, is an obvious absurdity; to assert\nthat the relation does _not_ modify the \"seller,\" the \"wife,\" or the\n\"object known,\" is to discuss the relation _of_ the relation just as\nmuch as to assert the opposite. The only reason, I think, why anyone\nhas ever supposed the case of knower-known to differ from any case of\nan alleged exhaustive and exclusive correlation is that while the\nknower is only one--just knower--the objects known are obviously many,\nand sustain many relations to one another which vary independently of\ntheir relation to the knower. This is the undoubted fact at the bottom\nof epistemological realism. But the idealist is entitled to reply that\nthe objects in their variable relations to one another nevertheless\nfall within a relation to a knower, _as long as_ that relation is\nregarded by both as exhaustive or ubiquitous.\n\n\nII\n\nNevertheless, I do not conceive that the realistic assertion and the\nidealistic assertion in this dilemma stand on the same level, or have\nthe same value. The fact that objects vary in relation to one another\nindependently of their relation to the \"knower\" _is_ a fact, and a\nfact recognized by all schools. The idealistic assertion rests simply\nupon the presupposition of the ubiquity of the knowledge relation, and\nconsequently has only an _ad hominem_ force, that is a force as\nagainst epistemological realists--against those who admit that the\nsole and exhaustive relation of the \"self\" or \"ego\" to objects is that\nof knower of them.[62] The relation of buyer and seller is a\ndiscussable relation; for buyer does not exhaust one party and seller\ndoes not exhaust the other. Each is a man or a woman, a consumer or a\nproducer or a middleman, a green-grocer or a dry-goods merchant, a\ntaxpayer or a voter, and so on indefinitely. Nor is it true that such\nadditional relations are borne merely to _other_ things; the\nbuyer-sellers are more than and other than buyer-seller to _each\nother_. They may be fellow-clubmen, belong to opposite political\nparties, dislike each other's looks, and be second cousins. Hence the\nbuyer-seller relation stands in intelligent connection and contrast\nwith other relations, so that it can be discriminated, defined,\nanalyzed. Moreover, there are specific differences _in_ the\nbuying-selling relation. Because it is not ubiquitous, it is not\nhomogeneous. If wealthy and a householder, the one who buys is a\ndifferent buyer--i.e., buys differently--than if poor and a boarder.\nConsequently, the seller sells differently, has more or less goods\nleft to sell, more or less income to expend on other things, and so on\nindefinitely. Moreover, in order to be a buyer the man has to _have\nbeen_ other things; i.e., he is not a buyer _per se_, but _becomes_ a\nbuyer because he is an eater, wears clothes, is married, etc.\n\nIt is also quite clear that the organism is something else than an\neater, or something in relation to food alone. I will not again call\nthe roll of perfectly familiar facts; I will lessen my appeal to the\nreader's patience by confining my reiteration to one point. Even in\nrelation to the things that are food, the organism is something more\nthan their eater. He is their acquirer, their pursuer, their\ncultivator, their beholder, taster, etc.; he _becomes_ their eater\n_only_ because he is so many other things, and his becoming an eater\nis a natural episode in the natural unfolding of these other things.\n\nPrecisely the same sort of assertions may be made about the\nknower-known relation. If the one who is knower is something else and\nmore than the knower of objects, and if objects are, _in relation to\nthe one who knows them_, something else and other than things in a\nknowledge relation, there is somewhat to define and discuss; otherwise\nwe are raising, as we have already seen, the quite foolish question as\nto what is the relation of a relation to itself, or the equally\nfoolish question of whether being a thing modifies the thing that it\nis. And, moreover, epistemological realism and idealism both say the\nsame thing: realism that a thing does not modify itself, idealism\nthat, since the thing is what it is, it stands in the relation that it\ndoes stand in.\n\nThere are many facts which, prima facie, support the claim that\nknowing is a connection of things which depends upon other and more\nprimary connections between a self and things; a connection which\ngrows out of these more fundamental connections and which operates in\ntheir interests at specifiable crises. I will not repeat what is so\ngenerally admitted and so little taken into account, that knowing is,\nbiologically, a differentiation of organic behavior, but will cite\nsome facts that are even more obvious and even more neglected.\n\n1. If we take a case of perception, we find upon analysis that, so far\nas a self or organism is concerned in it at all, the self is, so to\nsay, inside of it rather than outside of it. It would be much more\ncorrect to say that a self is contained in a perception than that a\nperception is presented to a self. That is to say, the organism is\ninvolved in the occurrence of the perception in the same sort of way\nthat hydrogen is involved in the happening--producing--of water. We\nmight about as well talk of the production of a specimen of water as a\npresentation of water to hydrogen as talk in the way we are only too\naccustomed to talk about perceptions and the organism. When we\nconsider a perception as a case of \"apperception,\" the same thing\nholds good. Habits enter into the _constitution_ of the situation;\nthey are in and of it, not, so far as it is concerned, something\noutside of it. Here, if you please, is a unique relation of self and\nthings, but it is unique not in being wholly incomparable to all\nnatural relations among events, but in the sense of being distinctive\nor just the relation that it is.\n\n2. Taking the many cases where the self may be said, in an\nintelligible sense, to lie _outside_ a thing and hence to have\ndealings with it, we find that they are extensively and primarily\ncases where the self is agent-patient, doer, sufferer, and enjoyer.\nThis means, of course, that things, the things that later come to be\nknown, are primarily not objects of awareness, but causes of weal and\nwoe, things to get and things to avoid, means and obstacles, tools and\nresults. To a na\u00efve spectator, the ordinary assumption that a thing is\n\"in\" experience only when it is an object of awareness (or even only\nwhen a perception), is nothing less than extraordinary. The self\nexperiences whatever it undergoes, and there is no fact about life\nmore assured or more tragic than that what we are aware of is\ndetermined by things that we are undergoing but of which we are not\nconscious and which we cannot be conscious of under the particular\nconditions.\n\n3. So far as the question of the relation of the self to known objects\nis concerned, knowing is but one special case of the agent-patient, of\nthe behaver-enjoyer-sufferer situation. It is, however, the case\nconstantly increasing in relative importance. The connections of the\nself with things by way of weal or woe are progressively found to\ndepend upon the connections established in knowing things; on the\nother hand, the progress, the advance, of science is found to depend\nmore and more upon the courage and patience of the agent in making the\nwidening and buttressing of knowledge a business.\n\nIt is impossible to overstate the significance, the reality, of the\nrelation of self as knower to things when it is thought of as a\n_moral_ relation, a deliberate and responsible undertaking of a self.\nUltimately the modern insistence upon the self in reference to\nknowledge (in contrast with the classic Greek view) will be found to\nreside precisely here.\n\nMy purpose in citing the foregoing facts is not to prove a positive\npoint, viz., that there are many relations of self and things, of\nwhich knowing is but one differentiated case. It concerns something\nless obvious: viz., showing what is meant by saying that the problems\nat issue concern matters of fact, and are not matters to be decided by\nassumption, definition, and deduction. I mean also to suggest what\nkind of matters of fact would naturally be adduced as evidential in\nsuch a discussion. Negatively put, my point is that the whole question\nof the relation of knower to known is radically misconceived in what\npasses as epistemology, because of an underlying unexamined\nassumption, an assumption which, moreover, when examined, makes the\ncontroversy verbal or absurd. Positively put, my point is that since,\nprima facie, plenty of connections other than the knower-known one\nexist between self and things, there is a context in which the\n\"problem\" of their relation concerns matters of fact capable of\nempirical determination by matter-of-fact inquiry. The point about a\ndifference being made (or rather making) in things when known is\nprecisely of this sort.\n\n\nIII\n\nThat question is not, _save upon the assumption of the ubiquity of the\nknowledge relation_, the absurd question of whether knowledge makes\nany difference to things already known or to things _as_\nknowledge-objects, _as_ facts or truths. Until the epistemological\nrealists have seriously considered the main propositions of the\npragmatic realists, viz., that knowing is something that happens to\nthings in the natural course of their career, not the sudden\nintroduction of a \"unique\" non-natural type of relation--that to a\nmind or consciousness--they are hardly in a position to discuss the\nsecond and derived pragmatic proposition that, in this natural\ncontinuity, things in becoming known undergo a specific and detectable\nqualitative change.\n\nI had occasion earlier to remark that if one identifies \"knowledge\"\nwith situations involving the function of inference, the _problem_ of\nknowledge means the art of guiding this function most effectively.\nThat statement holds when we take knowledge as a relation of the\nthings _in_ the knowledge situation. If we are once convinced of the\nartificiality of the notion that the knowledge relation is ubiquitous,\nthere will be an existential problem as to the self and knowledge; but\nit will be a radically different problem from that discussed in\nepistemology. The relation of knowing to existence will be recognized\nto form the subject-matter of no problem, because involving an\nungrounded and even absurd preconception. But the problem of the\nrelation of an existence in the way of knowing to other existences--or\nevents--with which it forms a continuous process will then be seen to\nbe a natural problem to be attacked by natural methods.\n\nFOOTNOTE:\n\n[62] Professor Perry says (_The New Realism_, p. 115): \"Professor\nDewey is mistaken in supposing that realism assumes 'the _ubiquity of\nthe knowledge-relation_.' Realism does not argue from the 'ego-centric\npredicament,' i.e., from the bare presence of the knowledge-relation\nin all cases of knowledge.\" If the text has not made my point clear,\nit is probably too much to expect that a footnote will do so. But I\nhave not accused the realist of arguing from the ego-centric\npredicament. I have said that _if_ any realist holds that the sole and\nexclusive relation of the one who is knower to things is that of being\ntheir knower, then the realist cannot _escape_ the impact of the\npredicament. But if the one who knows things also stands in other\nconnections with them, then it is possible to make an intelligible\ncontrast between things as known and things as loved or hated or\nappreciated, or seen or heard or whatever. The argument, it should be\nnoted, stands in connection with that of the last section as to\nwhether hearing a sound and seeing a color are of themselves (apart\nfrom the use made of them in inference) cases of knowledge. It is\nsignificant that Perry holds (_New Realism_, p. 150) that \"sensing\" is\n_per se_ a case of knowing. Hence it must be in relation to a knower;\nit must fall within the \"predicament,\" for \"it makes the mind aware of\na characteristic of the environment.\" That it is _used_ (or may be\nused) to make us aware of some characteristic of the environment, I of\ncourse hold. To say that it _is_ an awareness by the mind of a\ncharacteristic of the environment is at once to involve a philosopher\nimmediately in the discussion of whether red qualities, or only\ncertain vibrations, are \"really\" characteristics of the environment.\nThen, when the authority of physics is invoked in behalf of the latter\nproposition, the epistemologist (however realistic in his intention)\nis forced to consider color as a misapprehension of the environment, a\ncase of error or illusion, while the idealist triumphantly flourishes\nit as a case of the transformative or constitutive efficacy of \"mind\"\nin knowing. But if the color is simply a natural event, and if \"mind\"\ndoes not enter except when color is made the basis of inference to\nsome characteristic of the environment, then there is no predicament;\nand there is no problem of error save as a false inference is made.\nMoreover, since errors in inference are an undoubted fact, the\nprinciple that entities are not to be multiplied beyond need gives a\nprima facie superiority to any theory which connects all error with\ninference till adequate evidence to the contrary is produced.\n\n\n\n\nXI\n\nTHE EXISTENCE OF THE WORLD AS A LOGICAL PROBLEM\n\n\nOf the two parts of this paper the first is a study in formal analysis.\nIt attempts to show that there is no problem, logically speaking, of\nthe existence of an external world. Its point is to show that the very\nattempt to state the problem involves a self-contradiction: that the\nterms cannot be stated so as to generate a problem without assuming\nwhat is professedly brought into question. The second part is a summary\nendeavor to state the actual question which has given rise to the\nunreal problem and the conditions which have led to its being\nmisconstrued. So far as subject-matter is concerned, it supplements the\nfirst part; but the argument of the first part in no way depends upon\nanything said in the second. The latter may be false and its falsity\nhave no implications for the first.\n\n\nI\n\nThere are many ways of stating the problem of the existence of an\nexternal world. I shall make that of Mr. Bertrand Russell the basis of\nmy examinations, as it is set forth in his recent book _Our Knowledge\nof the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy_.\nI do this both because his statement is one recently made in a book\nof commanding importance, and because it seems to me to be a more\ncareful statement than most of those in vogue. If my point can be made\nout for his statement, it will apply, a fortiori, to other statements.\nEven if there be those to whom this does not seem to be the case, it\nwill be admitted that my analysis must begin somewhere. I cannot take\nthe space to repeat the analysis in application to differing modes of\nstatement with a view to showing that the method employed will yield\nlike results in all cases. But I take the liberty of throwing the\nburden upon the reader and asking him to show cause why it does not so\napply.\n\nAfter rejecting certain familiar formulations of the question because\nthey employ the not easily definable notions of the self and\nindependence, Mr. Russell makes the following formulation: Can we\n\"know that objects of sense ... exist at times when we are not\nperceiving them?\" (_op. cit._, p. 75). Or, in another mode of\nstatement: \"Can the existence of anything other than our own[63] hard\ndata be inferred from the existence of those data?\" (pp. 73 and 83).\n\nI shall try to show that identification of the \"data of sense\" as the\nsort of term which will generate the problem involves an affirmative\nanswer to the question--that it must have been answered in the\naffirmative before the question can be asked. And this, I take it, is\nto say that it is not a question at all. A point of departure may be\nfound in the following passage: \"I think it must be admitted as\nprobable that the immediate objects of sense depend for their\nexistence upon physiological conditions in ourselves, and that, for\nexample, the colored surfaces which we see cease to exist when we shut\nour eyes\" (p. 64). I have not quoted the passage for the sake of\ngaining an easy victory by pointing out that this statement involves\nthe existence of physiological conditions. For Mr. Russell himself\naffirms that fact. As he points out, such arguments assume precisely\nthe \"common sense world of stable objects\" professedly put in doubt\n(p. 85). My purpose is to ask what justification there is for calling\nimmediate data \"objects of sense.\" Statements of this type always call\ncolor visual, sound auditory, and so on. If it were merely a matter of\nmaking certain admissions for the sake of being able to play a certain\ngame, there would be no objection. But if we are concerned with a\nmatter of serious analysis, one is bound to ask, Whence come these\nadjectives? That color is visual in the sense of being an object of\nvision is certainly admitted in the common-sense world, but this is\nthe world we have left. That color is visual is a proposition about\ncolor and it is a proposition which color itself does not utter.\nVisible or visual color is already a \"synthetic\" proposition, not a\nterm nor an analysis of a single term. That color is seen, or is\nvisible, I do not call in question; but I insist that fact already\nassumes an answer to the question which Mr. Russell has put. It\npresupposes existence beyond the color itself. To call the color a\n\"sensory\" object involves another assumption of the same kind but even\nmore complex--involving, that is, even more existence beyond the\ncolor.\n\nI see no reply to this statement except to urge that the terms\n\"visual\" and \"sensory\" as applied to the object are pieces of verbal\nsupererogation having no force in the statement. This supposititious\nanswer brings the matter to a focus. Is it possible to institute even\na preliminary disparaging contrast between immediate objects and a\nworld external to them unless the term \"sensory\" has a definite effect\nupon the meaning assigned to immediate data or objects? Before taking\nup this question I shall, however, call attention to another\nimplication of the passage quoted. It appears to be implied that\nexistence of color and \"being seen\" are equivalent terms. At all\nevents, in similar arguments the identification is frequently made.\nBut by description all that is required for the existence of color is\ncertain physiological conditions. They may be present and color exist\nand yet not be seen. Things constantly act upon the optical apparatus\nin a way which fulfils the conditions of the existence of color\nwithout color being seen. This statement does not involve any dubious\npsychology about an act of attention. I only mean that the argument\nimplies over and above the existence of color something called seeing\nor perceiving--noting is perhaps a convenient neutral term. And this\nclearly involves an assumption of something beyond the existence of\nthe datum--and this datum is by definition an external world. Without\nthis assumption the term \"immediate\" could not be introduced. Is the\n_object_ immediate or is it the object of an immediate noting? If the\nlatter, then the hard datum already stands in connection with\nsomething beyond itself.\n\nAnd this brings us to a further point. The sense objects are\nrepeatedly spoken of as \"known.\" For example: \"It is obvious that\nsince the senses give knowledge of the latter kind [believed on their\nown account, without the support of any outside evidence] the\nimmediate facts perceived by sight or touch or hearing do not need to\nbe proved by argument but are completely self-evident\" (p. 68). Again,\nthey are spoken of as \"facts of sense\"[64] (p. 70), and as facts going\nalong, for knowledge, with the laws of logic (p. 72). I do not know\nwhat belief or knowledge means here: nor do I understand what is meant\nby a _fact_ being evidence for itself.[65] But obviously Mr. Russell\nknows, and knows their application to the sense object. And here is a\nfurther assumption of what, by definition, is a world external to the\ndatum. Again, we have assumed in getting a question stated just what\nis professedly called into question. And the assumption is not made\nthe less simple in that Mr. Russell has defined belief as a case of a\ntriadic relation, and said that without the recognition of the\nthree-term relation the difference between perception and belief is\ninexplicable (p. 50).\n\nWe come to the question passed over. Can such terms as \"visual,\"\n\"sensory,\" be neglected without modifying the force of the\nquestion--that is, without affecting the implications which give it\nthe force of a problem? Can we \"know that objects of sense, or very\nsimilar objects, exist at times when we are not perceiving them?\nSecondly, if this cannot be known, can we know that other objects,\ninferable from objects of sense but not necessarily resembling them,\nexist either when we are perceiving the objects of sense or at any\nother time\" (p. 75)?\n\nI think a little reflection will make it clear that without the\nlimitation of the term \"perceiving\" by the term \"sense\" no _problem_\nas to existence _at other times_ can possibly arise. For neither\n(_a_) reference to time nor (_b_) limitation to a particular time is\ngiven either in the fact of existence of color or of perceiving color.\nMr. Russell, for example, makes allusion to \"a patch of color which is\nmomentarily seen\" (p. 76). This is the sort of thing that may pass\nwithout challenge in the common-sense world, but hardly in an analysis\nwhich professes to call that world in question. Mr. Russell makes the\nallusion in connection with discriminating between sensation as\nsignifying \"the mental event of our being aware\" and the sensation as\nobject of which we are aware--the sense object. He can hardly be\nguilty, then, in the immediate context, of proceeding to identify the\nmomentariness of the event with the momentariness of the object. There\nmust be some grounds for assuming the temporal quality of the\nobject--and that \"immediateness\" belongs to it in any other way than\nas an object of immediate seeing. What are these grounds?\n\nHow is it, moreover, that even the act of being aware is describable\nas \"momentary\"? I know of no way of so identifying it except by\ndiscovering that it is delimited in a time continuum. And if this be\nthe case, it is surely superfluous to bother about _inference_ to\n\"other times.\" They are assumed in stating the question--which thus\nturns out again to be no question. It may be only a trivial matter\nthat Mr. Russell speaks of \"that patch of color which is momentarily\nseen when we _look at the table_\" (p. 76, italics mine). I would not\nattach undue importance to such phrases. But the frequency with which\nthey present themselves in discussions of this type suggests the\nquestion whether as matter of fact \"the patch of color\" is not\ndetermined by reference to an object--the table--and not vice versa.\nAs we shall see later, there is good ground for thinking that Mr.\nRussell is really engaged, not in bringing into question the existence\nof an object beyond the datum, but in _re_defining the nature of an\nobject, and that the reference to the patch of color as something more\nprimitive than the table is really relevant to this reconstruction of\ntraditional metaphysics. In other words, it is relevant to defining an\nobject as a constant correlation of variations in qualities, instead\nof defining it as a substance in which attributes inhere--or a subject\nof predicates.\n\n_a_) If anything is an eternal essence, it is surely such a thing as\ncolor taken by itself, as by definition it must be taken in the\nstatement of the question by Mr. Russell. Anything more simple,\ntimeless, and absolute than a red can hardly be thought of. One might\nquestion the eternal character of the received statement of, say, the\nlaw of gravitation on the ground that it is so complex that it may\ndepend upon conditions not yet discovered and the discovery of which\nwould involve an alteration in the statement. If 2 plus 2 equal 4 be\ntaken as an isolated statement, it might be conceived to depend upon\nhidden conditions and to be alterable with them. But by conception we\nare dealing in the case of the colored surface with an ultimate,\nsimple datum. It can have no implications beyond itself, no concealed\ndependencies. How then can its existence, even if its perception be\nbut momentary, raise a question of \"other times\" at all?\n\n_b_) Suppose a perceived blue surface to be replaced by a perceived\nred surface--and it will be conceded that the change, or replacement,\nis also perceived. There is still no ground for a belief in the\ntemporally limited duration of either the red or the blue surface.\nAnything that leads to this conclusion would lead to the conclusion\nthat the number two ceases when we turn to think of an atom. There is\nno way then of escaping the conclusion that the adjective \"sense\" in\nthe term \"sense object\" is not taken innocently. It is taken as\nqualifying (for the purposes of statement of the problem) the nature\nof the object. Aside from reference to the momentariness of the\n_mental_ event--a reference which is expressly ruled out--there is no\nway of introducing delimited temporal existence into the object save\nby reference to one and the same object which is perceived at\ndifferent times to have different qualities. If the same\nobject--however object be defined--is perceived to be of one color at\none time and of another color at another time, then as a matter of\ncourse the color-datum of either the earlier or later time is\nidentified as of transitory duration. But equally, of course, there is\nno question of _inference_ to \"other times.\" Other times have already\nbeen used to describe, define, and delimit _this_ (brief) time. A\nmoderate amount of unbiased reflection will, I am confident, convince\nanyone that apart from a reference to the same existence perduring\nthrough different times while changing in _some_ respect, no temporal\ndelimitation of the existence of such a thing as sound or color can be\nmade. Even Plato never doubted the eternal nature of red; he only\nargued from the fact that a _thing_ is red at one time and blue at\nanother to the unstable, and hence phenomenal, character of the\n_thing_. Or, put in a different way, we can know that a red is a\nmomentary or transitory existence only if we know of other things\nwhich determine its beginning and cessation.\n\nMr. Russell gives a specific illustration of what he takes to be the\ncorrect way of stating the question in an account of what, in the\ncommon-sense universe of discourse, would be termed walking around a\ntable. If we exclude considerations to which we have (apart from\nassuming just the things which are doubtful) no right, the datum turns\nout to be something to be stated as follows: \"What is really known[66]\nis a correlation of muscular and other bodily sensations with changes\nin visual sensations\" (p. 77). By \"sensations\" must be meant sensible\nobjects, not mental events. This statement repeats the point already\ndealt with: \"muscular,\" \"visual,\" and \"other bodily\" are all terms\nwhich are indispensable and which also assume the very thing\nprofessedly brought into question: the external world as that was\ndefined. \"Really known\" assumes both noting and belief, with whatever\ncomplex implications they may involve--implications which, for all\nthat appears to the contrary, may be indefinitely complex, and which,\nby Mr. Russell's own statement, involve relationship to at least two\nother terms besides the datum. But in addition there appears the new\nterm \"correlation.\" I cannot avoid the conclusion that this term\ninvolves an _explicit_ acknowledgment of the external world.\n\nNote, in the first place, that the correlation in question is not\nsimple: it is threefold, being a correlation of correlations. The\n\"changes in visual sensations\" (objects) must be correlated in a\ntemporal continuum; the \"muscular and other bodily sensations\"\n(objects) must also constitute a connected series. One set of changes\nbelongs to the serial class \"visual\"; the other set to the serial\nclass \"muscular.\" And these two classes sustain a point-to-point\ncorrespondence to each other--they are correlated.\n\nI am not raising the old question of how such complex correlations can\nbe said to be either \"given\" or \"known\" in sense, though it is worth a\npassing notice that it was on account of this sort of phenomenon that\nKant postulated his threefold intellectual synthesis of apprehension,\nreproduction, and recognition in conception; and that it is upon the\nbasis of necessity for such correlations that the rationalists have\nalways criticized sensationalist empiricism. Personally I agree that\ntemporal and spatial qualities are quite as much given in experience\nas are particulars--in fact, as I have been trying to show,\nparticulars can be identified _as_ particulars only in a relational\ncomplex. My point is rather (i) that any such given is already\nprecisely what is meant by the \"world\"; and (ii) that such a highly\nspecified correlation as Mr. Russell here sets forth is in no case a\npsychological, or historical, primitive, but is a _logical_ primitive\narrived at by an analysis of an empirical complex.\n\n(i) The statement involves the assumption of two temporal \"spreads\"\nwhich, moreover, are determinately specified as to their constituent\nelements and as to their order. And these sustain to each other a\ncorrelation, element to element. The elements, moreover, are all\nspecifically qualitative and some of them, at least, are spatial. How\nthis differs from the external world of common-sense I am totally\nunable to see. It may not be a very big external world, but having\nbegged a small external world, I do not see why one should be too\nsqueamish about extending it over the edges. The reply, I suppose, is\nthat this complex defined and ordered object is by conception the\nobject of a single perception, so that the question remains as to the\npossibility of inferring from it to something beyond.[67] But the\nreply only throws us back upon the point previously made. A particular\nor single event of perceptual awareness can be _determined_ as to its\ningredients and structure only in a continuum of objects. That is, the\nseries of changes in color and shape can be determined as just such and\nsuch an ordered series of specific elements, with a determinate\nbeginning and end, only in respect to a temporal continuum of things\nanteceding and succeeding. Moreover, the determination involves an\nanalysis which disentangles qualities and shapes from contemporaneously\ngiven objects which are irrelevant. In a word, Mr. Russell's object\nalready extends beyond itself; it already belongs to a larger world.\n\n(ii) A sensible object which can be described as a correlation of an\nordered series of shapes and colors with an ordered series of muscular\nand other bodily objects presents a definition of an object, not a\npsychological datum. What is stated is the definition of an object, of\nany object in the world. Barring ambiguities[68] in the terms\n\"muscular\" and \"bodily,\" it seems to be an excellent definition. But\ngood definition or poor, it states what a datum is _known_ to be as an\nobject in a known system; viz., definite correlations of specified and\nordered elements. As a definition, it is general. It is not made from\nthe standpoint of any particular percipient. It says: _If_ there be\nany percipient at a specified position in a space continuum, _then_\nthe object may be perceived as such and such. And this implies that a\npercipient at any _other_ position in the space continuum can deduce\nfrom the known system of correlations just what the series of shapes\nand colors will be from another position. For, as we have seen, the\ncorrelation of the series of changes of shape assumes a spatial\ncontinuum; hence one perspective projection may be correlated with\nthat of any position in the continuum.\n\nI have no direct concern with Mr. Russell's solution of his problem.\nBut if the prior analysis is correct, one may anticipate in advance\nthat it will consist simply in making explicit the assumptions which\nhave tacitly been made in stating the problem--subject to the\nconditions involved in failure to recognize that they have been made.\nAnd I think an analytic reading of the solution will bear out the\nfollowing statement. His various \"peculiar,\" \"private\" points of view\nand their perspectives are nothing but names for the positions and\nprojectional perspectives of the ordinary space of the public worlds.\nTheir correlation by likeness is nothing but the explicit recognition\nthat they are all defined and located, from the start, in one common\nspatial continuum. One quotation must suffice. \"If two men are sitting\nin a room, two somewhat similar worlds are perceived by them; if a\nthird man enters and sits between them, a third world, intermediate\nbetween the two others, begins to be perceived\" (pp. 87-88). Pray what\nis this room and what defines the position (standpoint and\nperspective) of the two men and the standpoint \"intermediate\" between\nthem? If the room and all the positions and perspectives which they\ndetermine are only within, say, Mr. Russell's private world, that\nprivate world is interestingly complex, but it gives only the original\nproblem over again, not a \"solution\" of it. It is a long way from\nlikenesses _within_ a private world to likenesses _between_ private\nworlds. And if the worlds are all private, pray who judges their\nlikeness or unlikeness? This sort of thing makes one conclude that Mr.\nRussell's actual procedure is the reverse of his professed one. He\nreally starts with one room as a spatial continuum within which\ndifferent positions and projections are determined, and which are\nreadily correlated with one another just because they are projections\nfrom positions within one and the same space-room. Having employed\nthis, he, then, can assign different positions to different\npercipients and institute a comparison between what each perceives and\npass upon the extent of the likeness which exists between them.\n\nWhat is the bearing of this account upon the \"empirical datum\"? Just\nthis: The correlation of correlative series of changes which defines\nthe object of sense perception is in no sense an original historic or\npsychologic datum. It signifies the result of an analysis of the usual\ncrude empirical data, and an analysis which is made possible only by a\nvery complex knowledge of the world. It marks not a primitive\npsychologic datum but an outcome, a limit, of analysis of a vast\namount of empirical objects. The definition of an object as a\ncorrelation of various subcorrelations of changes represents a great\nadvance--so it seems to me--over the definition of an object as a\nnumber of adjectives stuck into a substantive; but it represents an\nimproved definition made possible by the advance of scientific\nknowledge about the common-sense world. It is a definition not only\nwholly independent of the context in which Mr. Russell arrives at it,\nbut is one which (once more and finally) assumes extensive and\naccurate knowledge of just the world professedly called into question.\n\n\nII\n\nI have come to the point of transition to the other part of my paper.\nA formal analysis is necessarily dialectical in character. As an\nempiricist I share in the dissatisfaction which even the most correct\ndialectical discussion is likely to arouse when brought to bear on\nmatters of fact. I do not doubt that readers will feel that some\n_fact_ of an important character in Mr. Russell's statement has been\nleft untouched by the previous analysis--even upon the supposition\nthat the criticisms are just. Particularly will it be felt, I think,\nthat psychology affords to his statement of the problem a support of\nfact not affected by any logical treatment. For this reason I append a\nsummary statement as to the facts which are misconstrued by any\nstatement which makes the existence of the world problematic.\n\nI do not believe a psychologist would go as far as to admit that a\ndefinite correlation of elements as specific and ordered as that of\nMr. Russell's statement is a primitive psychological datum. Many would\ndoubtless hold that patches of colored extensity, sounds, kinaesthetic\nqualities, etc., are psychologically much more primitive than, say, a\ntable, to say nothing of a group of objects in space or a series of\nevents in time; they would say, accordingly, that there is a real\nproblem as to how we infer or construct the latter on the basis of the\nformer. At the same time I do not believe that they would deny that\ntheir own knowledge of the existence and nature of the ultimate and\nirreducible qualities of sense is the product of a long, careful, and\nelaborate analysis to which the sciences of physiology, anatomy, and\ncontrolled processes of experimental observation have contributed. The\nordinary method of reconciling these two seemingly inconsistent\npositions is to assume that the original sensible data of experience,\nas they occurred in infancy, have been overlaid by all kinds of\nassociations and inferential constructions so that it is now a work of\nintellectual art to recover them in their innocent purity.\n\nNow I might urge that as matter of fact the reconstruction of the\nexperience of infancy is itself an inference from present experience\nof an objective world, and hence cannot be employed to make a problem\nout of the knowledge of the existence of that world. But such a retort\ninvolves just the dialectic excursus which I am here anxious to avoid.\nI am on matter-of-fact ground when I point out that the assumption\nthat even infancy begins with such highly discriminated particulars as\nthose enumerated is not only highly dubious but has been challenged by\neminent psychologists. According to Mr. James, for example, the\noriginal datum is large but confused, and specific sensible qualities\nrepresent the result of discriminations. In this case, the elementary\ndata, instead of being primitive empirical data, are the last terms,\nthe limits, of the discriminations we have been able to make. That\nknowledge grows from a confusedly experienced external world to a\nworld experienced as ordered and specified would then be the teaching\nof psychological science, but at no point would the mind be confronted\nwith the problem of inferring a world. Into the arguments in behalf of\nsuch a psychology of original experience I shall not go, beyond\npointing out the extreme improbability (in view of what is known about\ninstincts and about the nervous system) that the starting-point is a\nquality corresponding to the functioning of a single sense organ, much\nless of a single neuronic unit of a sense organ. If one adds, as a\nhypothesis, that even the most rudimentary conscious experience\ncontains within itself the element of suggestion or expectation, it\nwill be granted that the object of conscious experience even with an\ninfant is homogeneous with the world of the adult. One may be\nunwilling to concede the hypothesis. But no one can deny that\ninference from one thing to another is itself an empirical event, and\nthat just as soon as such inference occurs, even in the simplest form\nof anticipation and prevision, a world exists like in kind to that of\nthe adult.\n\nI cannot think that it is a trivial coincidence that psychological\nanalysis of sense perception came into existence along with that\nmethod of experimentally controlled observation which marks the\nbeginning of modern science. Modern science did not begin with\ndiscovery of any new kind of inference. It began with the recognition\nof the need of different data if inference is to proceed safely. It\nwas contended that starting with the ordinary--or customary--objects\nof perception hopelessly compromised in advance the work of inference\nand classification. Hence the demand for an experimental resolution of\nthe common-sense objects in order to get data less ambiguous, more\nminute, and more extensive. Increasing knowledge of the structure of\nthe nervous system fell in with increased knowledge of other objects\nto make possible a discrimination of specific qualities in all their\ndiversity; it brought to light that habits, individual and social\n(through influence on the formation of individual habits), were large\nfactors in determining the accepted or current system of objects. It\nwas brought to light, in other words, that factors of chance, habit,\nand other non-rational factors were greater influences than\nintellectual inquiry in determining what men currently believed about\nthe world. What psychological analysis contributed was, then, not\nprimitive historic data out of which a world had somehow to be\nextracted, but an analysis of the world which had been previously\nthought of and believed in, into data making possible better\ninferences and beliefs about the world. Analysis of the influences\ncustomarily determining belief and inference was a powerful force in\nthe movement to improve knowledge of the world.\n\nThis statement of matters of fact bears out, it will be observed, the\nconclusions of the dialectical analysis. That brought out the fact\nthat the ultimate and elementary data of sense perception are\nidentified and described as limiting elements in a complex world. What\nis now added is that such an identification of elements marks a\nsignificant addition to the resources of the technique of inquiry\ndevoted to improving knowledge of the world. When these data are\nisolated from their logical status and office, they are inevitably\ntreated as self-sufficient, and they leave upon our hands the\ninsoluble, because self-contradictory, problem of deriving from them\nthe world of common-sense and science. Taken for what they really are,\nthey are elements detected _in_ the world and serving to guide and\ncheck our inferences about it. They are never self-inclosed\nparticulars; they are always--even as crudely given--connected with\nother things in experience. But analysis gets them in the form where\nthey are keys to much more significant relations. In short, the\nparticulars of perception, taken as complete and independent, make\nnonsense. Taken as objects discriminated for the purposes of\nimproving, reorganizing, and testing knowledge of the world they are\ninvaluable assets. The material fallacy lying behind the formal\nfallacy which the first part of this paper noted is the failure to\nrecognize that what is doubtful is not the existence of the world but\nthe validity of certain customary yet inferential beliefs about things\nin it. It is not the common-sense _world_ which is doubtful, or which\nis inferential, but _common-sense_ as a complex of beliefs about\nspecific things and relations _in_ the world. Hence never in any\nactual procedure of inquiry do we throw the existence of the world\ninto doubt, nor can we do so without self-contradiction. We doubt some\nreceived piece of \"knowledge\" about some specific thing of that world,\nand then set to work, as best we can, to rectify it. The contribution\nof psychological science to determining unambiguous data and\neliminating the irrelevant influences of passion and habit which\ncontrol the inferences of common-sense is an important aid in the\ntechnique of such rectifications.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[63] I shall pass over the terms \"our own\" so far as specific\nreference is concerned, but the method employed applies equally to\nthem. Who are the \"we,\" and what does \"own\" mean, and how is ownership\nestablished?\n\n[64] Contrast the statement: \"When I speak of a fact, I do not mean\none of the simple things of the world, I mean that a certain thing has\na certain quality, or that certain things have a certain relation\" (p.\n51).\n\n[65] In view of the assumption, shared by Mr. Russell, that there is\nsuch a thing as non-inferential knowledge, the conception that a thing\noffers evidence for itself needs analysis. Self-evidence is merely a\nconvenient term for disguising the difference between the indubitably\ngiven and the believed in. Hypotheses, for example, are self-evident\nsometimes, that is, obviously present for just what they are, but they\nare still hypotheses, and to offer their self-evident character as\n\"evidence\" would expose one to ridicule. Meanings may be self-evident\n(the Cartesian \"clear and distinct\") and truth dubious.\n\n[66] \"Really known\" is an ambiguous term. It may signify _understood_,\nor it may signify known to be _there_ or _given_. Either meaning\nimplies reference beyond.\n\n[67] The reply implies that the exhaustive, all-at-once perception of\nthe entire universe assumed by some idealistic writers does not\ninvolve any external world. I do not make this remark for the sake of\nidentifying myself with this school of thinkers, but to suggest that\nthe limited character of empirical data is what occasions inference.\nBut it is a fallacy to suppose that the nature of the limitations is\npsychologically given. On the contrary, they have to be determined by\ndescriptive identifications which involve reference to the more\nextensive world. Hence no matter how \"self-evident\" the existence of\nthe data may be, it is never self-evident that they are rightly\ndelimited with respect to the specific inference in process of making.\n\n[68] The ambiguities reside in the possibility of treating the\n\"muscular and other bodily sensations\" as meaning something other than\ndata of motion and corporealness--however these be defined. Muscular\nsensation may be an awareness of motion of the muscles, but the phrase\n\"of the muscles\" does not alter the nature of motion as motion; it\nonly specifies _what_ motion is involved. And the long controversy\nabout the existence of immediate \"muscular sensations\" testifies to\nwhat a complex cognitive determination we are here dealing with.\nAnatomical directions and long experimentation were required to answer\nthe question. Were they psychologically primitive data no such\nquestions could ever have arisen.\n\n\n\n\nXII\n\nWHAT PRAGMATISM MEANS BY PRACTICAL\n\n\nPragmatism, according to Mr. James, is a temper of mind, an attitude;\nit is also a theory of the nature of ideas and truth; and, finally, it\nis a theory about reality. It is pragmatism as method which is\nemphasized, I take it, in the subtitle, \"a new name for some old ways\nof thinking.\"[69] It is this aspect which I suppose to be uppermost in\nMr. James's own mind; one frequently gets the impression that he\nconceives the discussion of the other two points to be illustrative\nmaterial, more or less hypothetical, of the method. The briefest and\nat the same time the most comprehensive formula for the method is:\n\"The attitude of looking away from first things, principles,\n'categories,' supposed necessities; and of looking towards last\nthings, fruits, consequences, facts\" (pp. 54-55). And as the attitude\nlooked \"away from\" is the rationalistic, perhaps the chief aim of the\nlectures is to exemplify some typical differences resulting from\ntaking one outlook or the other.\n\nBut pragmatism is \"used in a still wider sense, as meaning also a\ncertain theory of truth\" (p. 55); it is \"a genetic theory of what is\nmeant by truth\" (p. 65). Truth means, as a matter of course,\nagreement, correspondence, of idea and fact (p. 198), but what do\nagreement, correspondence, mean? With rationalism they mean \"a static,\ninert relation,\" which is so ultimate that of it nothing more can be\nsaid. With pragmatism they signify the guiding or leading power of\nideas by which we \"dip into the particulars of experience again,\" and\nif by its aid we set up the arrangements and connections among\nexperienced objects which the idea intends, the idea is verified; it\ncorresponds with the things it means to square with (pp. 205-6). The\nidea is true which works in leading us to what it purports (p.\n80).[70] Or, \"any idea that will carry us prosperously from any one\npart of experience to any other part, linking things satisfactorily,\nworking securely, simplifying, saving labor, is true for just so much,\ntrue in so far forth\" (p. 58). This notion presupposes that ideas are\nessentially intentions (plans and methods), and that what they, as\nideas, ultimately intend is _prospective_--certain changes in prior\nexisting things. This contrasts again with rationalism, with its copy\ntheory, where ideas, _as_ ideas, are ineffective and impotent, since\nthey mean only to mirror a reality (p. 69) complete without them. Thus\nwe are led to the third aspect of pragmatism. The alternative between\nrationalism and pragmatism \"concerns the structure of the universe\nitself\" (p. 258). \"The essential contrast is that reality ... for\npragmatism is still in the making\" (p. 257). And in a recent number of\nthe _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods_,[71]\nhe says: \"I was primarily concerned in my lectures with contrasting\nthe belief that the world is still in the process of making with the\nbelief that there is an eternal edition of it ready-made and\ncomplete.\"\n\n\nI\n\nIt will be following Mr. James's example, I think, if we here regard\npragmatism as primarily a method, and treat the account of ideas and\ntheir truth and of reality somewhat incidentally so far as the\ndiscussion of them serves to exemplify or enforce the method.\nRegarding the attitude of orientation which looks to outcomes and\nconsequences, one readily sees that it has, as Mr. James points out,\npoints of contact with historic empiricism, nominalism, and\nutilitarianism. It insists that general notions shall \"cash in\" as\nparticular objects and qualities in experience; that \"principles\" are\nultimately subsumed under facts, rather than the reverse; that the\nempirical consequence rather than the a priori basis is the\nsanctioning and warranting factor. But all of these ideas are colored\nand transformed by the dominant influence of experimental science: the\nmethod of treating conceptions, theories, etc., as working hypotheses,\nas directors for certain experiments and experimental observations.\nPragmatism as attitude represents what Mr. Peirce has happily termed\nthe \"laboratory habit of mind\" extended into every area where inquiry\nmay fruitfully be carried on. A scientist would, I think, wonder not\nso much at the method as at the lateness of philosophy's conversion to\nwhat has made science what it is. Nevertheless it is impossible to\nforecast the intellectual change that would proceed from carrying the\nmethod sincerely and unreservedly into all fields of inquiry. Leaving\nphilosophy out of account, what a change would be wrought in the\nhistorical and social sciences--in the conceptions of politics and law\nand political economy! Mr. James does not claim too much when he says:\n\"The center of gravity of philosophy must alter its place. The earth\nof things, long thrown into shadow by the glories of the upper ether,\nmust resume its rights.... It will be an alteration in the 'seat of\nauthority' that reminds one almost of the Protestant Reformation\" (p.\n123).\n\nI can imagine that many would not accept this method in philosophy for\nvery diverse reasons, perhaps among the most potent of which is lack\nof faith in the power of the elements and processes of experience and\nlife to guarantee their own security and prosperity; because, that is,\nof the feeling that the world of experience is so unstable, mistaken,\nand fragmentary that it must have an absolutely permanent, true, and\ncomplete ground. I cannot imagine, however, that so much uncertainty\nand controversy as actually exists should arise about the content and\nimport of the doctrine on the basis of the general formula. It is when\nthe method is applied to special points that questions arise. Mr.\nJames reminds us in his preface that the pragmatic movement has found\nexpression \"from so many points of view, that much unconcerted\nstatement has resulted.\" And speaking of his lectures he goes on to\nsay: \"I have sought to unify the picture as it presents itself to my\nown eyes, dealing in broad strokes.\" The \"different points of view\"\nhere spoken of have concerned themselves with viewing pragmatically a\nnumber of different things. And it is, I think, Mr. James's effort to\ncombine them, as they stand, which occasions misunderstanding among\nMr. James's readers. Mr. James himself applied it, for example, in\n1898 to philosophic controversies to indicate what they mean in terms\nof practical issues at stake. Before that, Mr. Peirce himself (in\n1878) had applied the method to the proper way of _conceiving_ and\ndefining objects. Then it has been applied to _ideas_ in order to find\nout what they mean in terms of what they intend, and what and how they\nmust intend in order to be true. Again, it has been applied to\n_beliefs_, to what men actually accept, hold to, and affirm. Indeed,\nit lies in the nature of pragmatism that it should be applied as\nwidely as possible; and to things as diverse as controversies,\nbeliefs, truths, ideas, and objects. But yet the situations and\nproblems _are_ diverse; so much so that, while the meaning of each may\nbe told on the basis of \"last things,\" \"fruits,\" \"consequences,\"\n\"facts,\" _it is quite certain that the specific last things and facts\nwill be very different in the diverse cases, and that very different\ntypes of meaning will stand out_. \"Meaning\" will itself _mean_\nsomething quite different in the case of \"objects\" from what it will\nmean in the case of \"ideas,\" and for \"ideas\" something different from\n\"truths.\" Now the explanation to which I have been led of the\nunsatisfactory condition of contemporary pragmatic discussion is that\nin composing these \"different points of view\" into a single pictorial\nwhole, the distinct type of consequence and hence of meaning of\n\"practical\" appropriate to each has not been sufficiently emphasized.\n\n1. When we consider separately the subjects to which the pragmatic\nmethod has been applied, we find that Mr. James has provided the\nnecessary formula for each--with his never-failing instinct for the\nconcrete. We take first the question of the significance of an object:\nthe meaning which should properly be contained in its conception or\ndefinition. \"To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object,\nthen, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical\nkind the object may involve--what sensations we are to expect from it\nand what reactions we must prepare\" (pp. 46-47). Or, more shortly, as\nit is quoted from Ostwald, \"All realities influence our practice, and\nthat influence is their meaning for us\" (p. 48). Here it will be noted\nthat the start is from objects already empirically given or presented,\nexistentially vouched for, and the question is as to their proper\nconception--What is the proper meaning, or idea, of an object? And the\nmeaning is the effects _these given objects produce_. One might doubt\nthe correctness of this theory, but I do not see how one could doubt\nits import, or could accuse it of subjectivism or idealism, since the\nobject with its power to produce effects is assumed. Meaning is\nexpressly distinguished from objects, not confused with them (as in\nidealism), and is said to consist in the practical reactions objects\nexact of us or impose upon us. When, then, it is a question of an\nobject, \"meaning\" signifies its _conceptual content or connotation,\nand \"practical\" means the future responses which an object requires of\nus or commits us to_.\n\n2. But we may also start from a given idea, and ask what the _idea_\nmeans. Pragmatism will, of course, look to future consequences, but\nthey will clearly be of a different sort when we start from an idea as\nidea, than when we start from an object. For what an idea as idea\nmeans, is precisely that an object is _not_ given. The pragmatic\nprocedure here is to set the idea \"at work within the stream of\nexperience. It appears less as a solution than as a program for more\nwork, and particularly as an indication of the ways in which existing\nrealities may be changed. Theories, thus, become instruments.... We\ndon't lie back on them, we move forward, and, on occasion, make nature\nover again by their aid\" (p. 53). In other words, an idea is a draft\ndrawn upon existing things, and intention to act so as to arrange them\nin a certain way. From which it follows that if the draft is honored,\nif existences, following upon the actions, rearrange or readjust\nthemselves in the way the idea intends, the idea is true. When, then,\nit is a question of an idea, it is the idea itself which is practical\n(being an intent) and its _meaning_ resides in the existences which,\nas changed, it intends. While the meaning of an object is the changes\nit requires in our attitude,[72] the meaning of an idea is the changes\nit, as our attitude, effects in objects.\n\n3. Then we have another formula, applicable not to objects nor ideas\nas objects and ideas, but to _truths_--to things, that is, where the\nmeaning of the object and of the idea is assumed to be already\nascertained. It reads: \"What difference would it practically make to\nanyone if this notion rather than that notion were true? If no\npractical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives\nmean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle\" (p. 45).\nThere can be \"no difference in abstract truth that doesn't express\nitself in a difference in concrete fact, and in conduct consequent\nupon the fact, imposed on somebody\" (p. 50).[73] Now when we start\nwith something which is already a truth (or taken to be truth), and\nask for its meaning in terms of its consequences, it is implied that\nthe conception, or conceptual significance, is already clear, and that\nthe existences it refers to are already in hand. Meaning here, then,\ncan be neither the connotative nor denotative reference of a term;\nthey are covered by the two prior formulae. Meaning here means\n_value_, importance. The practical factor is, then, the worth\ncharacter of these consequences: they are good or bad; desirable or\nundesirable; or merely _nil_, indifferent, in which latter case belief\nis idle, the controversy a vain and conventional, or verbal, one.\n\nThe term \"meaning\" and the term \"practical\" taken in isolation, and\nwithout explicit definition from their specific context and problem,\nare triply ambiguous. The meaning may be the conception or definition\nof an _object_; it may be the denotative existential reference of an\n_idea_; it may be actual value or _importance_. So practical in the\ncorresponding cases may mean the attitudes and conduct exacted of us\nby objects; or the capacity and tendency of an idea to effect changes\nin prior existences; or the desirable and undesirable quality of\ncertain ends. The general pragmatic attitude, none the less, is\napplied in all cases.\n\nIf the differing problems and the correlative diverse significations\nof the terms \"meaning\" and \"practical\" are borne in mind, not all will\nbe converted to pragmatism, but the present uncertainty as to what\npragmatism is, anyway, and the present constant complaints on both\nsides of misunderstanding will, I think, be minimized. At all events,\nI have reached the conclusion that what the pragmatic movement just\nnow wants is a clear and consistent bearing in mind of these different\nproblems and of what is meant by practical in each. Accordingly the\nrest of this paper is an endeavor to elucidate from the standpoint of\npragmatic method the importance of enforcing these distinctions.\n\n\nII\n\nFirst, as to the problems of philosophy when pragmatically approached,\nMr. James says: \"The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find\nout what definite difference it will make to you and me, at definite\ninstants of our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be\ntrue\" (p. 50). Here the world-formula is assumed as already given; it\nis there, defined and constituted, and the question is as to its\nimport if believed. But from the second standpoint, that of idea as\nworking hypothesis, the chief function of philosophy is not to find\nout what difference ready-made formulae make, _if true_, but to\narrive at and to clarify their _meaning as programs of behavior for\nmodifying the existent world_. From this standpoint, the meaning of a\nworld-formula is practical and moral, not merely in the consequences\nwhich flow from accepting a certain conceptual content as true, but as\nregards that content itself. And thus at the very outset we are\ncompelled to face this question: Does Mr. James employ the pragmatic\nmethod to discover the value in terms of consequences in life of some\nformula which has its logical content already fixed; or does he employ\nit to criticize and revise and, ultimately, to constitute the meaning\nof that formula? If it is the first, there is danger that the\npragmatic method will be employed only to vivify, if not validate,\ndoctrines which in themselves are pieces of rationalistic metaphysics,\nnot inherently pragmatic. If the last, there is danger that some\nreaders will think old notions are being confirmed, when in truth they\nare being translated into new and inconsistent notions.\n\nConsider the case of design. Mr. James begins with accepting a\nready-made notion, to which he then applies the pragmatic criterion.\nThe traditional notion is that of a \"seeing force that runs things.\"\nThis is rationalistically and retrospectively empty; its being there\nmakes no difference. (This seems to overlook the fact that the past\nworld may be just what it is in virtue of the difference which a blind\nforce or a seeing force has already made in it. A pragmatist as well\nas a rationalist may reply that it makes no difference retrospectively\nonly because we leave out the most important retrospective\ndifference). But \"returning with it into experience, we gain a more\nconfiding outlook on the future. If not a blind force, but a seeing\nforce, runs things, we may reasonably expect better issues. _This\nvague confidence in the future is the sole pragmatic meaning at\npresent discernible in the terms design and designer_\" (p. 115,\nitalics mine). Now is this meaning intended to _replace_ the meaning\nof a \"seeing force which runs things\"? Or is it intended to superadd a\npragmatic value and validation to that concept of a seeing force? Or\ndoes it mean that, irrespective of the existence of any such object, a\nbelief in it has that value? Strict pragmatism would seem to require\nthe first interpretation.\n\nThe same difficulties arise in the discussion of spiritualistic theism\n_versus_ materialism. Compare the two following statements: \"The\nnotion of God ... guarantees an ideal order that shall be permanently\npreserved\" (p. 106). \"Here, then, in these different emotional and\npractical appeals, in these adjustments of our attitudes of hope and\nexpectation, and all the delicate consequences which their differences\nentail, _lie the real meanings of materialism and spiritualism_\" (p.\n107, italics mine). Does the latter method of determining the meaning\nof, say, a spiritual God afford the substitute for the conception of\nhim as a \"superhuman power\" effecting the eternal preservation of\nsomething; does it, that is, define God, supply the content for our\nnotion of God? Or does it merely superadd a value to a meaning already\nfixed? And, if the latter, does the object, God as defined, or the\nnotion, or the belief (the acceptance of the notion) effect these\nconsequent values? In either of the latter alternatives, the good or\nvaluable consequences cannot clarify the meaning or conception of God;\nfor, by the argument, they proceed from a prior definition of God.\nThey cannot prove, or render more probable, the existence of such a\nbeing, for, by the argument, these desirable consequences depend upon\naccepting such an existence; and not even pragmatism can prove an\nexistence from desirable consequences which themselves exist only when\nand if that other existence is there. On the other hand, if the\npragmatic method is not applied simply to tell the value of a belief\nor controversy, but to fix the meaning of the terms involved in the\nbelief, resulting consequences would serve to constitute the entire\nmeaning, intellectual as well as practical, of the terms; and hence\nthe pragmatic method would simply abolish the meaning of an antecedent\npower which will perpetuate eternally some existence. For that\nconsequence flows not from the belief or idea, but from the existence,\nthe power. It is not pragmatic at all.\n\nAccordingly, when Mr. James says: \"Other than this _practical_\nsignificance, the words God, free will, design, _have none_. Yet dark\nthough they be in themselves, or intellectualistically taken, when we\nbear them on to life's thicket with us, the darkness then grows light\nabout us\" (p. 121, italics mine), what is meant? Is it meant that when\nwe take the intellectualistic notion and employ it, it gets value in\nthe way of results, and hence then has some value of its own; or is it\nmeant that the intellectual content itself must be determined in terms\nof the changes effected in the ordering of life's thicket? An explicit\ndeclaration on this point would settle, I think, not merely a point\ninteresting in itself, but one essential to the determination of what\nis pragmatic method. For myself, I have no hesitation in saying that\nit seems unpragmatic for pragmatism to content itself with finding out\nthe value of a conception whose own inherent significance pragmatism\nhas not first determined; a fact which entails that it be taken not as\na truth but simply as a working hypothesis. In the particular case in\nquestion, moreover, it is difficult to see how the pragmatic method\ncould possibly be applied to a notion of \"eternal perpetuation,\"\nwhich, by its nature, can never be empirically verified, or cashed in\nany particular case.\n\nThis brings us to the question of truth. The problem here is also\nambiguous in advance of definition. Does the problem of what is truth\nrefer to discovering the \"true meaning\" of something; or to\ndiscovering what an idea has to effect, and how, in order to be true;\nor to discovering what the value of truth is when it is an existent\nand accomplished fact? (1) We may, of course, find the \"true meaning\"\nof a thing, as distinct from its incorrect interpretation, without\nthereby establishing the truth of the \"true meaning\"--as we may\ndispute about the \"true meaning\" of a passage in the classics\nconcerning Centaurs, without the determination of its true sense\nestablishing the truth of the notion that there are Centaurs.\nOccasionally this \"true meaning\" seems to be what Mr. James has in\nmind, as when, after the passage upon design already quoted, he goes\non: \"But if cosmic confidence is right, not wrong, better, not worse,\nthat [vague confidence in the future] is a most important meaning.\nThat much at least of possible 'truth' the terms will then have in\nthem\" (p. 115). \"Truth\" here seems to mean that design has a genuine,\nnot merely conventional or verbal, meaning: that something is at\nstake. And there are frequently points where \"truth\" seems to mean\njust meaning that is genuine as distinct from empty or verbal. (2) But\nthe problem of the meaning of truth may also refer to the meaning or\nvalue of truths that already exist as truths. We have them; they\nexist; now what do they mean? The answer is: \"True ideas lead us into\nuseful verbal and conceptual quarters as well as directly up to useful\nsensible termini. They lead to consistency, stability, and flowing\nhuman intercourse\" (p. 215). This, referring to things already true, I\ndo not suppose the most case-hardened rationalist would question; and\neven if he questions the pragmatic contention that these consequences\ndefine the meaning of truth, he should see that here is not given an\naccount of what it means for an idea to _become true_, but only of\nwhat it means _after_ it has become true, truth as _fait accompli_. It\nis the meaning of truth as _fait accompli_ which is here defined.\n\nBearing this in mind, I do not know why a mild-tempered rationalist\nshould object to the doctrine that truth is valuable not _per se_, but\nbecause, when given, it leads to desirable consequences. \"The true\nthought is useful here because the home which is its object is useful.\nThe practical value of true ideas is thus primarily derived from the\npractical importance of their objects to us\" (p. 203). And many\nbesides confirmed pragmatists, any utilitarian, for example, would be\nwilling to say that our duty to pursue \"truth\" is conditioned upon its\nleading to objects which upon the whole are valuable. \"The concrete\nbenefits we gain are what we mean by calling the pursuit a duty\" (p.\n231, compare p. 76). (3) Difficulties have arisen chiefly because Mr.\nJames is charged with converting simply the foregoing proposition, and\narguing that since true ideas are good, any idea if good in any way is\ntrue. Certainly transition from one of these conceptions to the other\nis facilitated by the fact that ideas are tested as to their validity\nby a certain goodness, viz., whether they are good for accomplishing\nwhat they intend, for what they claim to be good for, that is,\ncertain modifications in prior given existences. In this case, it is\nthe idea which is practical, since it is essentially an intent and\nplan of altering prior existences in a specific situation, which is\nindicated to be unsatisfactory by the very fact that it needs or\nsuggests a specific modification. Then arises the theory that ideas as\nideas are always working hypotheses concerning the attaining of\nparticular empirical results, and are tentative programs (or sketches\nof method) for attaining them. If we stick consistently to this notion\nof ideas, only _consequences which are actually produced by the\nworking of the idea in co-operation with, or application to, prior\nexistences are good consequences in the specific sense of good which\nis relevant to establishing the truth of an idea_. This is, at times,\nunequivocally recognized by Mr. James. (See, for example, the\nreference to veri-_fication_, on p. 201; the acceptance of the idea\nthat verification means the advent of the object intended, on p. 205.)\n\nBut at other times any good which flows from acceptance of a belief is\ntreated as if it were an evidence, _in so far_, of the truth of the\nidea. This holds particularly when theological notions are under\nconsideration. Light would be thrown upon how Mr. James conceives this\nmatter by statements on such points as these: If ideas terminate in\ngood consequences, but yet the goodness of the consequences was no\npart of the intention of an idea, does the goodness have any verifying\nforce? If the goodness of consequences arises from the context of the\nidea in belief rather than from the idea itself, does it have any\nverifying force?[74] If an idea leads to consequences which are good\nin the _one_ respect only of fulfilling the intent of the idea (as\nwhen one drinks a liquid to test the idea that it is a poison), does\nthe badness of the consequences in every other respect detract from\nthe verifying force of consequences?\n\nSince Mr. James has referred to me as saying \"truth is what gives\nsatisfaction\" (p. 234), I may remark (apart from the fact that I do\nnot think I ever said that truth is what _gives_ satisfaction) that I\nhave never identified any satisfaction with the truth of an idea, save\n_that_ satisfaction which arises when the idea as working hypothesis\nor tentative method is applied to prior existences in such a way as to\nfulfil what it intends.\n\nMy final impression (which I cannot adequately prove) is that upon the\nwhole Mr. James is most concerned to enforce, as against rationalism,\ntwo conclusions about the character of truths as _faits accomplis_:\nnamely, that they are made, not a priori, or eternally in\nexistence,[75] and that their value or importance is not static, but\ndynamic and practical. The special question of _how_ truths are made\nis not particularly relevant to this anti-rationalistic crusade, while\nit is the chief question of interest to many. Because of this conflict\nof problems, what Mr. James says about the value of truth when\naccomplished is likely to be interpreted by some as a criterion of the\ntruth of ideas; while, on the other hand, Mr. James himself is likely\nto pass lightly from the consequences that determine the worth of a\nbelief to those which decide the worth of an idea. When Mr. James says\nthe function of giving \"satisfaction in marrying previous parts of\nexperience with newer parts\" is necessary in order to establish truth,\nthe doctrine is unambiguous. The satisfactory character of\nconsequences is itself measured and defined by the conditions which\nled up to it; the inherently satisfactory quality of results is not\ntaken as validating the antecedent intellectual operations. But when\nhe says (not of his own position, but of an opponent's[76]) of the\nidea of an absolute, \"so far as it affords such comfort it surely is\nnot sterile, it has that amount of value; it performs a concrete\nfunction. As a good pragmatist I myself ought to call the absolute\ntrue _in so far forth_ then; and I unhesitatingly now do so\" (p. 73),\nthe doctrine seems to be as unambiguous in the other direction: that\nany good, consequent upon acceptance of a belief is, in so far\nforth,[77] a warrant of truth. In such passages as the following\n(which are of the common type) the two notions seem blended together:\n\"Ideas become true just in so far as they help us to get into\nsatisfactory relations with other parts of our experience\" (p. 58);\nand, again, on the same page: \"Any idea that will carry us\n_prosperously_ from any one part of our experience to any other part,\nlinking things _satisfactorily_, working securely, simplifying, saving\nlabor, is true for just so much\" (italics mine). An explicit statement\nas to whether the carrying function, the linking of things, is\nsatisfactory and prosperous and hence true in so far as it executes\nthe intent of an idea; or whether the satisfaction and prosperity\nreside in the material consequences on their own account and in that\naspect make the idea true, would, I am sure, locate the point at issue\nand economize and fructify future discussion. At present pragmatism is\naccepted by those whose own notions are thoroughly rationalistic in\nmake-up as a means of refurbishing, galvanizing, and justifying those\nvery notions. It is rejected by non-rationalists (empiricists and\nnaturalistic idealists) because it seems to them identified with the\nnotion that pragmatism holds that the desirability of certain beliefs\noverrides the question of the meaning of the ideas involved in them\nand the existence of objects denoted by them. Others (like myself),\nwho believe thoroughly in pragmatism as a method of orientation, as\ndefined by Mr. James, and who would apply the method to the\ndetermination of the meaning of objects, the intent and worth of ideas\nas ideas, and to the human and moral value of beliefs, when these\nvarious problems are carefully distinguished from one another, do not\nknow whether they are pragmatists in some other sense, because they\nare not sure whether the practical, in the sense of desirable facts\nwhich define the worth of a belief, is confused with the practical as\nan attitude imposed by objects, and with the practical as a power and\nfunction of ideas to effect changes in prior existences. Hence the\nimportance of knowing which one of the three senses of practical is\nconveyed in any given passage.\n\nIt would do Mr. James an injustice, however, to stop here. His real\ndoctrine is that a belief is true when it satisfies both personal\nneeds and the requirements of objective things. Speaking of\npragmatism, he says, \"Her only test of probable truth is what works\nbest in the way of _leading us_, what fits every part of life best and\n_combines with the collectivity of experience's demands_, nothing\nbeing omitted\" (p. 80, italics mine). And again, \"That new idea is\ntruest which performs most felicitously its function of satisfying\n_our double urgency_\" (p. 64). It does not appear certain from the\ncontext that this \"double urgency\" is that of the personal and the\nobjective demands, respectively, but it is probable (see, also, p.\n217, where \"consistency with previous truth and novel fact\" is said to\nbe \"always the most imperious claimant\"). On this basis, the \"in so\nfar forth\" of the truth of the absolute because of the comfort it\nsupplies, means that one of the two conditions which need to be\nsatisfied has been met, so that if the idea of the absolute met the\nother one also, it would be quite true. I have no doubt this is Mr.\nJames's meaning, and it sufficiently safeguards him from the charge\nthat pragmatism means that anything which is agreeable is true. At the\nsame time, I do not think, in logical strictness, that satisfying one\nof two tests, when satisfaction of both is required, can be said to\nconstitute a belief true even \"in so far forth.\"\n\n\nIII\n\nAt all events this raises a question not touched so far: the place of\nthe personal in the determination of truth. Mr. James, for example,\nemphasizes the doctrine suggested in the following words: \"We say this\ntheory solves it [the problem] more satisfactorily than that theory;\nbut that means more satisfactorily _to ourselves_, and individuals will\nemphasize their points of satisfaction differently\" (p. 61, italics\nmine). This opens out into a question which, in its larger aspects--the\nplace of the personal factor in the constitution of knowledge systems\nand of reality--I cannot here enter upon, save to say that a synthetic\npragmatism such as Mr. James has ventured upon will take a very\ndifferent form according as the point of view of what he calls the\n\"Chicago School\" or that of humanism is taken as a basis for\ninterpreting the nature of the personal. According to the latter view,\nthe personal appears to be ultimate and unanalyzable, the\nmetaphysically real. Associations with idealism, moreover, give\nit an idealistic turn, a translation, in effect, of monistic\nintellectualistic idealism into pluralistic, voluntaristic idealism.\nBut, according to the former, the personal is not ultimate, but is to\nbe analyzed and defined, biologically on its genetic side, ethically on\nits prospective and functioning side.\n\nThere is, however, one phase of the teaching illustrated by the\nquotation which is directly relevant here. Because Mr. James\nrecognizes that the personal element enters into judgments passed upon\nwhether a problem has or has not been satisfactorily solved, he is\ncharged with extreme subjectivism, with encouraging the element of\npersonal preference to run rough-shod over all objective controls. Now\nthe question raised in the quotation is primarily one of fact, not of\ndoctrine. Is or is not a personal factor found in truth evaluations?\nIf it is, pragmatism is not responsible for introducing it. If it is\nnot, it ought to be possible to refute pragmatism by appeal to\nempirical fact, rather than by reviling it for subjectivism. Now it is\nan old story that philosophers, in common with theologians and social\ntheorists, are as sure that personal habits and interests shape their\nopponents' doctrines as they are that their own beliefs are\n\"absolutely\" universal and objective in quality. Hence arises that\ndishonesty, that insincerity characteristic of philosophic discussion.\nAs Mr. James says (p. 8), \"The most potential of all our premises is\nnever mentioned.\" Now the moment the complicity of the personal\nfactor in our philosophic valuations is recognized, is recognized\nfully, frankly, and generally, that moment a new era in philosophy\nwill begin. We shall have to discover the personal factors that now\ninfluence us unconsciously, and begin to accept a new and moral\nresponsibility for them, a responsibility for judging and testing them\nby their consequences. So long as we ignore this factor, its deeds\nwill be largely evil, not because _it_ is evil, but because,\nflourishing in the dark, it is without responsibility and without\ncheck. The only way to control it is by recognizing it. And while I\nwould not prophesy of pragmatism's future, I would say that this\nelement which is now so generally condemned as intellectual dishonesty\n(perhaps because of an uneasy, instinctive recognition of the\nsearching of hearts its acceptance would involve) will in the future\nbe accounted unto philosophy for righteousness' sake.\n\nSo much in general. In particular cases, it is possible that Mr.\nJames's language occasionally leaves the impression that the fact of\nthe inevitable involution of the personal factor in every belief gives\nsome special sanction to some special belief. Mr. James says that his\nessay on the _right_ to believe was unluckily entitled the \"_Will_ to\nbelieve\" (p. 258). Well, even the term \"right\" is unfortunate, if the\npersonal or belief factor is inevitable--unfortunate because it seems\nto indicate a privilege which might be exercised in special cases, in\nreligion, for example, though not in science; or, because it suggests\nto some minds that the fact of the personal complicity involved in\nbelief is a warrant for this or that special personal attitude,\ninstead of being a warning to locate and define it so as to accept\nresponsibility for it. If we mean by \"will\" not something deliberate\nand consciously intentional (much less, something insincere), but an\nactive personal participation, then belief _as_ will, rather than\neither the right or the will to believe seems to phrase the matter\ncorrectly.\n\nI have attempted to review not so much Mr. James's book as the present\nstatus of the pragmatic movement which is expressed in the book; and I\nhave selected only those points which seem to bear directly upon\nmatters of contemporary controversy. Even as an account of this\nlimited field, the foregoing pages do an injustice to Mr. James, save\nas it is recognized that his lectures were \"popular lectures,\" as the\ntitle-page advises us. We cannot expect in such lectures the kind of\nexplicitness which would satisfy the professional and technical\ninterests that have inspired this review. Moreover, it is inevitable\nthat the attempt to compose different points of view, hitherto\nunco-ordinated, into a single whole should give rise to problems\nforeign to any one factor of the synthesis, left to itself. The need\nand possibility of the discrimination of various elements in the\npragmatic meaning of \"practical,\" attempted in this review, would\nhardly have been recognized by me were it not for by-products of\nperplexity and confusion which Mr. James's combination has effected.\nMr. James has given so many evidences of the sincerity of his\nintellectual aims, that I trust to his pardon for the injustice which\nthe character of my review may have done _him_, in view of whatever\nservice it may render in clarifying the problem to which he is\ndevoted.\n\nAs for the book itself, it is in any case beyond a critic's praise or\nblame. It is more likely to take place as a philosophical classic than\nany other writing of our day. A critic who should attempt to appraise\nit would probably give one more illustration of the sterility of\ncriticism compared with the productiveness of creative genius. Even\nthose who dislike pragmatism can hardly fail to find much of profit in\nthe exhibition of Mr. James's instinct for concrete facts, the breadth\nof his sympathies, and his illuminating insights. Unreserved\nfrankness, lucid imagination, varied contacts with life digested into\nsummary and trenchant conclusions, keen perceptions of human nature in\nthe concrete, a constant sense of the subordination of philosophy to\nlife, capacity to put things into an English which projects ideas as\nif bodily into space till they are solid things to walk around and\nsurvey from different sides--these things are not so common in\nphilosophy that they may not smell sweet even by the name of\npragmatism.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[69] William James, _Pragmatism. A New Name for Some Old Ways of\nThinking._ (Popular Lectures on Philosophy.) New York: Longmans,\nGreen, & Co., 1907. Pp. xiii[+]309.\n\n[70] Certain aspects of the doctrine are here purposely omitted, and\nwill meet us later.\n\n[71] Vol. IV, p. 547.\n\n[72] Only those who have already lost in the idealistic confusion of\nexistence and meaning will take this to mean that the object is those\nchanges in our reactions.\n\n[73] I assume that the reader is sufficiently familiar with Mr.\nJames's book not to be misled by the text into thinking that Mr. James\nhimself discriminates as I have done these three types of problems\nfrom one another. He does not; but, none the less, the three formulae\nfor the three situations are there.\n\n[74] The idea of immortality, or the traditional theistic idea of God,\nfor example, may produce its good consequences, not in virtue of the\nidea as idea, but from the character of the person who entertains the\nbelief; or it may be the idea of the supreme value of ideal\nconsiderations, rather than that of their temporal duration, which\nworks.\n\n[75] \"Eternal truth\" is one of the most ambiguous phrases that\nphilosophers trip over. It may mean eternally in existence; or that a\nstatement which is ever true is always true (if it is true a fly is\nbuzzing, it is eternally true that just now a fly buzzed); or it may\nmean that some truths, _in so far as wholly conceptual_, are\nirrelevant to any particular time determination, since they are\nnon-existential in import--e.g., the truth of geometry dialectically\ntaken--that is, without asking whether any particular existence\nexemplifies them.\n\n[76] Such statements, it ought in fairness to be said, generally come\nwhen Mr. James is speaking of a doctrine which he does not himself\nbelieve, and arise, I think, in that fairness and frankness of Mr.\nJames, so unusual in philosophers, which cause him to lean over\nbackward--unpragmatically, it seems to me. As to the claim of his own\ndoctrine, he consistently sticks to his statement: \"Pent in, as the\npragmatist, more than any one, sees himself to be, between the whole\nbody of funded truths squeezed from the past and the coercions of the\nworld of sense about him, who, so well as he, feels the immense\npressure of objective control under which our minds perform their\noperations? If anyone imagines that this law is lax, let him keep its\ncommandments one day, says Emerson\" (p. 233).\n\n[77] Of course, Mr. James holds that this \"in so far\" goes a very\nsmall way. See pp. 77-79. But even the slightest concession is, I\nthink, non-pragmatic unless the satisfaction is relevant to the idea\nas intent. Now the satisfaction in question comes not from the idea as\n_idea_, but from its acceptance as _true_. Can a satisfaction\ndependent on an assumption that an idea is already true be relevant to\ntesting the truth of an idea? And can an idea, like that of the\nabsolute, which, if true, \"absolutely\" precludes any appeal to\nconsequences as test of truth, be confirmed by use of the pragmatic\ntest without sheer self-contradiction? In other words, we have a\nconfusion of the test of an idea as idea, with that of the value of a\nbelief as belief. On the other hand, it is quite possible that all Mr.\nJames intends by truth here is true (i.e., genuine) meaning at stake\nin the issue--true not as distinct from false, but from meaningless or\nverbal.\n\n\n\n\nXIII\n\nAN ADDED NOTE AS TO THE \"PRACTICAL\"\n\n\nIt is easier to start a legend than to prevent its continued\ncirculation. No misconception of the instrumental logic has been more\npersistent than the belief that it makes knowledge merely a means to a\npractical end, or to the satisfaction of practical needs--practical\nbeing taking to signify some quite definite utilities of a material or\nbread-and-butter type. Habitual associations aroused by the word\n\"pragmatic\" have been stronger than the most explicit and emphatic\nstatements which any pragmatist has been able to make. But I again\naffirm that the term \"pragmatic\" means only the rule of referring all\nthinking, all reflective considerations, to _consequences_ for final\nmeaning and test. Nothing is said about the nature of the\nconsequences; they may be aesthetic, or moral, or political, or\nreligious in quality--anything you please. All that the theory\nrequires is that they be in some way consequences of thinking; not,\nindeed, of it alone, but of it acted upon in connection with other\nthings. This is no after-thought inserted to lessen the force of\nobjections. Mr. Peirce explained that he took the term \"pragmatic\"\nfrom Kant, in order to denote empirical consequences. When he refers\nto their practical character it is only to indicate a criterion by\nwhich to avoid purely verbal disputes. Different consequences are\nalleged to constitute rival meanings of a term. Is a difference more\nthan merely one of formulation? The way to get an answer is to ask\nwhether, if realized, these consequences would exact of us different\nmodes of behavior. If they do not make such a difference in conduct\nthe difference between them is conventional. It is not that\nconsequences are themselves practical, but that practical consequences\nfrom them may at times be appealed to in order to decide the specific\nquestion of whether two proposed meanings differ save in words. Mr.\nJames says expressly that what is important is that the consequences\nshould be specific, not that they should be active. When he said that\ngeneral notions must \"cash in,\" he meant of course that they must be\ntranslatable into verifiable specific things. But the words \"cash in\"\nwere enough for some of his critics, who pride themselves upon a\nlogical rigor unattainable by mere pragmatists.\n\nIn the logical version of pragmatism termed instrumentalism, action or\npractice does indeed play a fundamental r\u00f4le. But it concerns not the\nnature of consequences but the nature of knowing. To use a term which\nis now more fashionable (and surely to some extent in consequence of\npragmatism) than it was earlier, instrumentalism means a behaviorist\ntheory of thinking and knowing. It means that knowing is literally\nsomething which we do; that analysis is ultimately physical and\nactive; that meanings in their logical quality are standpoints,\nattitudes, and methods of behaving toward facts, and that active\nexperimentation is essential to verification. Put in another way it\nholds that thinking does not mean any transcendent states or acts\nsuddenly introduced into a previously natural scene, but that the\noperations of knowing are (or are artfully derived from) natural\nresponses of the organism, which constitute knowing in virtue of the\nsituation of doubt in which they arise and in virtue of the uses of\ninquiry, reconstruction, and control to which they are put. There is\nno warrant in the doctrine for carrying over _this_ practical quality\ninto the consequences in which action culminates, and by which it is\ntested and corrected. A knowing as an act is instrumental to the\nresultant controlled and more significant situation; this does not\nimply anything about the intrinsic or the instrumental character of\nthe consequent situation. That is whatever it may be in a given case.\n\nThere is nothing novel nor heterodox in the notion that thinking is\ninstrumental. The very word is redolent of an _Organum_--whether\n_novum_ or _veterum_. The term \"instrumentality,\" applied to thinking,\nraises at once, however, the question of whether thinking as a tool\nfalls within or without the subject-matter which it shapes into\nknowledge. The answer of formal logic (adopted moreover by Kant and\nfollowed in some way by all neo-Kantian logics) is unambiguous. To\ncall logic \"formal\" means precisely that mind or thought supplies\nforms foreign to the original subject-matter, but yet required in\norder that it should have the appropriate form of knowledge. In this\nregard it deviates from the Aristotelian _Organon_ which it professes\nto follow. For according to Aristotle, the processes of knowing--of\nteaching and learning--which lead up to knowledge are but the\nactualization through the potentialities of the human body of the\n_same_ forms or natures which are previously actualized in Nature\nthrough the potentialities of extra-organic bodies. Thinking which is\nnot instrumental to truth, which is merely formal in the modern sense,\nwould have been a monstrosity inconceivable to him. But the discarding\nof the metaphysics of form and matter, of cyclic actualizations and\neternal species, deprived the Aristotelian \"thought\" of any place\nwithin the scheme of things, and left it an activity with forms alien\nto subject-matter. To conceive of thinking as instrumental to truth or\nknowledge, and as a tool shaped out of the same subject-matter as that\nto which it is applied, is but to return to the Aristotelian tradition\nabout logic. That the practice of science has in the meantime\nsubstituted a logic of experimental discovery (of which definition and\nclassification are themselves but auxiliary tools) for a logic of\narrangement and exposition of what is already known, necessitates,\nhowever, a very different sort of _Organon_. It makes necessary the\nconception that the object of knowledge is not something with which\nthinking sets out, but something with which it ends: something which\nthe processes of inquiry and testing, that constitute thinking,\nthemselves produce. Thus the object of knowledge is practical in the\nsense that it depends upon a specific kind of practice for its\nexistence--for its existence as an object of knowledge. How practical\nit may be in any other sense than this is quite another story. The\n_object of knowledge_ marks an achieved triumph, a secured\ncontrol--that holds by the very nature of knowledge. What other uses\nit may have depends upon its own inherent character, not upon anything\nin the nature of knowledge. We do not know the origin and nature and\nthe cure of malaria till we can both produce and eliminate malaria;\nthe _value_ of either the production or the removal depends upon the\ncharacter of malaria in relation to other things. And so it is with\nmathematical knowledge, or with knowledge of politics or art. Their\nrespective objects are not known till they are made in course of the\nprocess of experimental thinking. Their usefulness when made is\nwhatever, from infinity to zero, experience may subsequently determine\nit to be.\n\n\n\n\nXIV\n\nTHE LOGIC OF JUDGMENTS OF PRACTICE\n\n\nTHEIR NATURE\n\nIn introducing the discussion, I shall first say a word to avoid\npossible misunderstandings. It may be objected that such a term as\n\"practical judgment\" is misleading; that the term \"practical judgment\"\nis a misnomer, and a dangerous one, since all judgments by their very\nnature are intellectual or theoretical. Consequently, there is a\ndanger that the term will lead us to treat as judgment and knowledge\nsomething which is not really knowledge at all and thus start us on\nthe road which ends in mysticism or obscurantism. All this is\nadmitted. I do not mean by practical judgment a type of judgment\nhaving a different organ and source from other judgments. I mean\nsimply a kind of judgment having a specific type of subject-matter.\nPropositions exist relating to _agenda_--to things to do or be done,\njudgments of a situation demanding action. There are, for example,\npropositions of the form: M. N. should do thus and so; it is better,\nwiser, more prudent, right, advisable, opportune, expedient, etc., to\nact thus and so. And this is the type of judgment I denote practical.\n\nIt may also be objected that this type of subject-matter is not\ndistinctive; that there is no ground for marking it off from\njudgments of the form _SP_, or _mRn_. I am willing, again, to admit\nthat such may turn out to be the fact. But meanwhile the prima facie\ndifference is worth considering, if only for the sake of reaching a\nconclusion as to whether or no there is a kind of subject-matter so\ndistinctive as to imply a distinctive logical form. To assume in\nadvance that the subject-matter of practical judgments _must_ be\nreducible to the form _SP_ or _mRn_ is assuredly as gratuitous as the\ncontrary assumption. It begs one of the most important questions about\nthe world which can be asked: the nature of time. Moreover, current\ndiscussion exhibits, if not a complete void, at least a decided lacuna\nas to propositions of this type. Mr. Russell has recently said that of\nthe two parts of logic the first enumerates or inventories the\ndifferent kinds or forms of propositions.[78] It is noticeable that he\ndoes not even mention this kind as a possible kind. Yet it is\nconceivable that this omission seriously compromises the discussion of\nother kinds.\n\nAdditional specimens of practical judgments may be given: He had\nbetter consult a physician; it would not be advisable for you to\ninvest in those bonds; the United States should either modify its\nMonroe Doctrine or else make more efficient military preparations;\nthis is a good time to build a house; if I do that I shall be doing\nwrong, etc. It is silly to dwell upon the practical importance of\njudgments of this sort, but not wholly silly to say that their\npractical importance arouses suspicion as to the grounds of their\nneglect in discussion of logical forms in general. Regarding them, we\nmay say:\n\n1. Their subject-matter implies an incomplete situation. This\nincompleteness is not psychical. Something is \"there,\" but what is\nthere does not constitute the entire objective situation. _As_ there,\nit requires something else. Only after this something else has been\nsupplied will the given coincide with the full subject-matter. This\nconsideration has an important bearing upon the conception of the\nindeterminate and contingent. It is sometimes assumed (both by\nadherents and by opponents) that the validity of these notions entails\nthat the _given_ is itself indeterminate--which appears to be\nnonsense. The logical implication is that of a subject-matter as yet\n_unterminated_, unfinished, or not wholly given. The implication is of\nfuture things. Moreover, the incompleteness is not personal. I mean by\nthis that the situation is not confined _within_ the one making the\njudgment; the practical judgment is neither exclusively nor primarily\nabout one's self. On the contrary, it is a judgment about one's self\nonly as it is a judgment about the situation in which one is included,\nand in which a multitude of other factors external to self are\nincluded. The contrary assumption is so constantly made about moral\njudgments that this statement must appear dogmatic. But surely the\nprima facie case is that when I judge that I should not give money to\nthe street beggar I am judging the nature of an objective situation,\nand that the conclusion about myself is governed by the proposition\nabout the situation in which I happen to be included. The full,\ncomplex proposition includes the beggar, social conditions and\nconsequences, a charity organization society, etc., on exactly the\nsame footing as it contains myself. Aside from the fact that it seems\nimpossible to defend the \"objectivity\" of moral propositions on any\nother ground, we may at least point to the fact that judgments of\npolicy, whether made about ourselves or some other agent, are\ncertainly judgments of a _situation_ which is temporarily unfinished.\n\"Now is a good time for me to buy certain railway bonds\" is a judgment\nabout myself only because it is primarily a judgment about hundreds of\nfactors wholly external to myself. If the genuine existence of such\npropositions be admitted, the only question about moral judgments is\nwhether or no they are cases of practical judgments as the latter have\nbeen defined--a question of utmost importance for moral theory, but\nnot of crucial import for our logical discussion.\n\n2. Their subject-matter implies that the proposition is itself a\nfactor in the completion of the situation, carrying it forward to its\nconclusion. According as the judgment is that this or that should be\ndone, the situation will, when completed, have this or that\nsubject-matter. The proposition that it is well to do this is a\nproposition to treat the given in a certain way. Since the way is\nestablished by the proposition, the proposition is _a_ determining\nfactor in the outcome. As a proposition about the supplementation of\nthe given, it is a factor _in_ the supplementation--and this not as an\nextraneous matter, something subsequent to the proposition, but in its\nown logical force. Here is found, prima facie at least, a marked\ndistinction of the practical proposition from descriptive and\nnarrative propositions, from the familiar _SP_ propositions and from\nthose of pure mathematics. The latter imply that the proposition does\nnot enter into the constitution of the subject-matter of the\nproposition. There also is a distinction from another kind of\ncontingent proposition, namely, that which has the form: \"He has\nstarted for your house\"; \"The house is still burning\"; \"It will\nprobably rain.\" The unfinishedness of the given is implied in these\npropositions, but it is not implied that the proposition is a factor\nin determining their completion.\n\n3. The subject-matter implies that it makes a difference how the given\nis terminated: that one outcome is better than another, and that the\nproposition is to be a factor in securing (as far as may be) the\nbetter. In other words, there is something objectively at stake in the\nforming of the proposition. A right or wrong _descriptive_ judgment (a\njudgment confined to the given, whether temporal, spatial, or\nsubsistent) does not affect its subject-matter; it does not help or\nhinder its development, for by hypothesis it has no development. But a\npractical proposition affects the subject-matter for better or worse,\nfor it is a judgment as to the condition (the thing to be done) of the\nexistence of the complete subject-matter.[79]\n\n4. A practical proposition is binary. It is a judgment that the given\nis to be treated in a specified way; it is also a judgment that the\ngiven admits of such treatment, that it admits of a specified\nobjective termination. It is a judgment, at the same stroke, of\nend--the result to be brought about--and of means. Ethical theories\nwhich disconnect the discussion of ends--as so many of them do--from\ndetermination of means, thereby take discussion of ends out of the\nregion of judgment. If there be such ends, they have no intellectual\nstatus.\n\nTo judge that I should see a physician implies that the given elements\nof the situation should be completed in a specific way and also that\nthey afford the conditions which make the proposed completion\npracticable. The proposition concerns both resources and\nobstacles--intellectual determination of elements lying in the way of,\nsay, proper vigor, and of elements which can be utilized to get around\nor surmount these obstacles. The judgment regarding the need of a\nphysician implies the existence of hindrances in the pursuit of the\nnormal occupations of life, but it equally implies the existence of\npositive factors which may be set in motion to surmount the hindrances\nand reinstate normal pursuits.\n\nIt is worth while to call attention to the reciprocal character of the\npractical judgment in its bearing upon the statement of means. From the\nside of the end, the reciprocal nature locates and condemns utopianism\nand romanticism: what is sometimes called idealism. From the side of\nmeans, it locates and condemns materialism and predeterminism: what is\nsometimes called mechanism. By materialism I mean the conception that\nthe given contains exhaustively the entire subject-matter of practical\njudgment: that the facts in their givenness are all \"there is to it.\"\nThe given is undoubtedly just what it is; it is determinate throughout.\nBut it is the given _of_ something to be done. The survey and inventory\nof present conditions (of facts) are not something complete in\nthemselves; they exist for the sake of an intelligent determination of\nwhat is to be done, of what is required to complete the given. To\nconceive the given in any such way, then, as to imply that it negates\nin its given character the possibility of any doing, of any\nmodification, is self-contradictory. As a part of a practical judgment,\nthe discovery that a man is suffering from an illness is not a\ndiscovery that he must suffer, or that the subsequent course of events\nis determined by his illness; it is the indication of a needed and a\npossible course by which to restore health. Even the discovery that the\nillness is hopeless falls within this principle. It is an indication\nnot to waste time and money on certain fruitless endeavors, to prepare\naffairs with respect to death, etc. It is also an indication of search\nfor conditions which will render in the future similar cases\nremediable, not hopeless. The whole case for the genuineness of\npractical judgments stands or falls with this principle. It is open to\nquestion. But decision as to its validity must rest upon empirical\nevidence. It cannot be ruled out of court by a dialectic development of\nthe implications of propositions about what is already given or what\nhas already happened. That is, its invalidity cannot be deduced from an\nassertion that the character of the scientific judgment as a discovery\nand statement of what is forbids it, much less from an analysis of\nmathematical propositions. For this method only begs the question.\nUnless the facts are complicated by the surreptitious introduction of\nsome preconception, the prima facie empirical case is that the\nscientific judgment--the determinate diagnosis--favors instead of\nforbidding the doctrine of a possibility of change of the given. To\noverthrow this presumption means, I repeat, to discover specific\nevidence which makes it impossible. And in view of the immense body of\nempirical evidence showing that we add to control of what is given (the\nsubject-matter of scientific judgment) by means of scientific judgment,\nthe likelihood of any such discovery seems slight.\n\nThese considerations throw light upon the proper meaning of\n(practical) idealism and of mechanism. Idealism in action does not\nseem to be anything except an explicit recognition of just the\nimplications we have been considering. It signifies a recognition that\nthe given is given _as_ obstacles to one course of active development\nor completion and _as_ resources for another course by which\ndevelopment of the situation directly blocked may be indirectly\nsecured. It is not a blind instinct of hopefulness or that\nmiscellaneous obscurantist emotionalism often called optimism, any\nmore than it is utopianism. It is recognition of the increased\nliberation and redirection of the course of events achieved through\naccurate discovery. Or, more specifically, it is this recognition\noperating as a ruling motive in extending the work of discovery and\nutilizing its results.\n\n\"Mechanism\" means the reciprocal recognition on the side of means. It\nis the recognition of the import within the practical judgment, of the\ngiven, of fact, in its determinate character. The facts in their\nisolation, taken as complete in themselves, are not mechanistic. At\nmost, they just are, and that is the end of them. They are mechanistic\nas indicating the mechanism, the means, of accomplishing the\npossibilities which they indicate. Apart from a forward look (the\nanticipation of the future movement of affairs) mechanism is a\nmeaningless conception. There is no sense in applying the conception\nto a finished world, to any scene which is simply and only done with.\nPropositions regarding a past world, just as past (not as furnishing\nthe conditions of what is to be done), might be complete and accurate,\nbut they would be of the nature of a complex catalogue. To introduce,\nin addition, the conception of mechanism is to introduce the\nimplication of possibilities of future accomplishment.[80]\n\n5. The judgment of what is to be done implies, as we have just seen, a\nstatement of what the given facts of the situation are, taken as\nindications of the course to pursue and of the means to be employed in\nits pursuit. Such a statement demands accuracy. Completeness is not so\nmuch an additional requirement as it is a condition of accuracy. For\naccuracy depends fundamentally upon relevancy to the determination of\nwhat is to be done. Completeness does not mean exhaustiveness _per\nse_, but adequacy as respects end and its means. To include too much,\nor what is irrelevant, is a violation of the demand for accuracy quite\nas well as to leave out--to fail to discover--what is important.\n\nClear recognition of this fact will enable one to avoid certain\ndialectic confusions. It has been argued that a judgment of given\nexistence, or fact, cannot be hypothetical; that factuality and\nhypothetical character are contradictions in terms. They would be if\nthe two qualifications were used in the same respect. But they are\nnot. The hypothesis is that the facts which constitute the terms of\nthe proposition of the given are relevant and adequate for the purpose\nin hand--the determination of a possibility to be accomplished in\naction. The data may be as factual, as absolute as you please, and yet\nin no way guarantee that they are the data _of_ this particular\njudgment. Suppose the thing to be done is the formation of a\nprediction regarding the return of a comet. The prime difficulty is\nnot in making observations, or in the mathematical calculations based\nupon them--difficult as these things may be. It is making sure that we\nhave taken as data the observations really implicated in the doing\nrightly of this particular thing: that we have not left out something\nwhich is relevant, or included something which has nothing to do with\nthe further movement of the comet. Darwin's hypothesis of natural\nselection does not stand or fall with the correctness of his\npropositions regarding breeding of animals in domestication. The facts\nof artificial selection may be as stated--in themselves there may be\nnothing hypothetical about them. But their bearing upon the origin of\nspecies _is_ a hypothesis. Logically, any factual proposition is a\nhypothetical proposition when it is made the basis of any inference.\n\n6. The bearing of this remark upon the nature of the truth of practical\njudgments (including the judgment of what is given) is obvious. Their\ntruth or falsity is constituted by the issue. The determination of\nend-means (constituting the terms and relations of the practical\nproposition) is hypothetical until the course of action indicated has\nbeen tried. The event or issue of such action _is_ the truth or falsity\nof the judgment. This is an immediate conclusion from the fact that\nonly the issue gives the complete subject-matter. In this case, at\nleast, verification and truth completely coincide--unless there is some\nserious error in the prior analysis.\n\nThis completes the account, preliminary to a consideration of other\nmatters. But the account suggests another and independent question\nwith respect to which I shall make an excursus. How far is it possible\nand legitimate to extend or generalize the results reached to apply to\nall propositions of facts? That is to say, is it possible and\nlegitimate to treat all scientific or descriptive statements of\nmatters of fact as implying indirectly if not directly, something to\nbe done, future possibilities to be realized in action? The question\nas to legitimacy is too complicated to be discussed in an incidental\nway. But it cannot be denied that there is a possibility of such\napplication, nor that the possibility is worth careful examination. We\nmay frame at least a hypothesis that all judgments of fact have\nreference to a determination of courses of action to be tried and to\nthe discovery of means for their realization. In the sense already\nexplained all propositions which state discoveries or ascertainments,\nall categorical propositions, would be hypothetical, and their truth\nwould coincide with their tested consequences effected by intelligent\naction.\n\nThis theory may be called pragmatism. But it is a type of pragmatism\nquite free from dependence upon a voluntaristic psychology. It is not\ncomplicated by reference to emotional satisfactions or the play of\ndesires.\n\nI am not arguing the point. But possibly critics of pragmatism would\nget a new light upon its meaning were they to set out with an\nanalysis of ordinary practical judgments and then proceed to consider\nthe bearing of its result upon judgments of facts and essences. Mr.\nBertrand Russell has remarked[81] that pragmatism originated as a\ntheory about the truth of theories, but ignored the \"truths of fact\"\nupon which theories rest and by which they are tested. I am not\nconcerned to question this so far as the origin of pragmatism is\nconcerned. Philosophy, at least, has been mainly a matter of theories;\nand Mr. James was conscientious enough to be troubled about the way in\nwhich the meaning of such theories is to be settled and the way in\nwhich they are to be tested. His pragmatism was in effect (as Mr.\nRussell recognizes) a statement of the need of applying to philosophic\ntheories the same kinds of test as are used in the theories of the\ninductive sciences. But this does not preclude the application of a\nlike method to dealing with so-called \"truths of fact.\" Facts may be\nfacts, and yet not be the facts _of_ the inquiry in hand. In all\nscientific inquiry, however, to call them facts or data or truths of\nfact signifies that they are taken as the _relevant_ facts of the\ninference to be made. _If_ (as this would seem to indicate) they are\nthen implicated however indirectly in a proposition about what is to\nbe done, they are themselves theoretical in logical quality. Accuracy\nof statement and correctness of reasoning would then be factors in\ntruth, but so also would be verification. Truth would be a triadic\nrelation, but of a different sort from that expounded by Mr. Russell.\nFor accuracy and correctness would both be functions of verifiability.\n\n\nJUDGMENTS OF VALUE\n\nI\n\nIt is my purpose to apply the conclusions previously drawn as to the\nimplications of practical judgment to the subject of judgments of\nvalue. First, I shall try to clear away some sources of\nmisunderstanding.\n\nUnfortunately, however, there is a deep-seated ambiguity which makes\nit difficult to dismiss the matter of value summarily. The\n_experience_ of a good and the _judgment_ that something is a value of\na certain kind and amount have been almost inextricably confused. The\nconfusion has a long history. It is found in mediaeval thought; it is\nrevived by Descartes; recent psychology has given it a new career. The\nsenses were regarded as modes of knowledge of greater or less\nadequacy, and the feelings were regarded as modes of sense, and hence\nas modes of cognitive apprehension. Descartes was interested in\nshowing, for scientific purposes, that the senses are not organs of\napprehending the qualities of bodies as such, but only of apprehending\ntheir relation to the well-being of the sentient organism. Sensations\nof pleasure and pain, along with those of hunger, thirst, etc., most\neasily lent themselves to this treatment; colors, tones, etc., were\nthem assimilated. Of them all he says: \"These perceptions of sense\nhave been placed within me by nature for the purpose of _signifying_\nwhat things are beneficial or harmful.\"[82] Thus it was possible to\nidentify the real properties of bodies with their geometrical ones,\nwithout exposing himself to the conclusion that God (or nature)\ndeceives us in the perception of color, sound, etc. These perceptions\nare only intended to teach us what things to pursue and avoid, and as\n_such_ apprehensions they are adequate. His identification of any and\nevery experience of good with a judgment or cognitive apprehension is\nclear in the following words: \"When we are given news the mind first\njudges of it and if it is good it rejoices.\"[83]\n\nThis is a survival of the scholastic psychology of the _vis\naestimativa_. Lotze's theory that the emotions, as involving pleasure\nand pain, are organs of value judgments, or in more recent\nterminology, that they are cognitive appreciations of worth\n(corresponding to immediate apprehensions of sensory qualities)\npresents the same tradition in a new terminology.\n\nAs against all this, the present paper takes its stand with the\nposition stated by Hume, in the following words: \"A passion is an\noriginal existence, or, if you will, modification of existence; and\ncontains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of\nany other existence or modification. When I am angry I am actually\npossest with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference\nto any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than\nfive feet high.\"[84] In so doing, I may seem to some to be begging the\nquestion at issue. But such is surely the prima facie fact of the\nmatter. Only a prior dogma to the effect that every conscious\nexperience _is_, _ipso facto_, a form of cognition leads to any\nobscuration of the fact, and the burden of proof is upon those who\nuphold the dogma.[85]\n\nA further word upon \"appreciation\" seems specially called for in view\nof the currency of the doctrine that \"appreciation\" is a peculiar kind\nof knowledge, or cognitive revelation of reality: peculiar in having a\ndistinct type of reality for its object and in having for its organ a\npeculiar mental condition differing from the intelligence of everyday\nknowledge and of science. Actually, there do not seem to be any\ngrounds for regarding appreciation as anything but an intentionally\nenhanced or intensified experience of an object. Its opposite is not\ndescriptive or explanatory knowledge, but _de_preciation--a degraded\nrealization of an object. A man may climb a mountain to get a better\nrealization of a landscape; he may travel to Greece to get a\nrealization of the Parthenon more full than that which he has had from\npictures. Intelligence, knowledge, may be involved in the steps taken\nto get the enhanced experience, but that does not make the landscape\nor the Parthenon as fully savored a cognitive object. So the fulness\nof a musical experience may depend upon prior critical analysis, but\nthat does not necessarily make the hearing of music a kind of\nnon-analytic cognitive act. Either appreciation means just an\nintensified experience, or it means a kind of criticism, and then it\nfalls within the sphere of ordinary judgment, differing in being\napplied to a work of art instead of to some other subject-matter. The\nsame mode of analysis may be applied to the older but cognate term\n\"intuition.\" The terms \"acquaintance\" and \"familiarity\" and\n\"recognition\" (acknowledgment) are full of like pitfalls of ambiguity.\n\nIn contemporary discussion of value-judgments, however, appreciation\nis a peculiarly treacherous term. It is first asserted (or assumed)\nthat all experiences of good are modes of knowing: that good is a\nterm of a proposition. Then when experience forces home the immense\ndifference between evaluation as a critical process (a process of\ninquiry for the determination of a good precisely similar to that\nwhich is undertaken in science in the determination of the nature of\nan event) and ordinary experience of good and evil, appeal is made to\nthe difference between direct apprehension and indirect or inferential\nknowledge, and \"appreciation\" is called in to play the convenient r\u00f4le\nof an immediate cognitive apprehension. Thus a second error is used to\ncover up and protect a primary one. To savor a thing fully--as Arnold\nBennett's heroines are wont to do--is no more a knowing than is the\nchance savoring which arises when things smelled are found good, or\nthan is being angry or thirsty or more than five feet high. All the\nlanguage which we can employ is charged with a force acquired through\nreflection. Even when I speak of a direct experience of a good or bad,\none is only too likely to read in traits characterizing a thing which\nis found in consequence of thinking, to be good; one has to use\nlanguage simply to stimulate a recourse to a direct experiencing in\nwhich language is not depended upon. If one is willing to make such an\nimaginative excursion--no one can be compelled--he will note that\n_finding_ a thing good apart from reflective judgment means simply\ntreating the thing in a certain way, hanging on to it, dwelling upon\nit, welcoming it and acting to perpetuate its presence, taking delight\nin it. It is a way of behaving toward it, a mode of organic reaction.\nA psychologist may, indeed, bring in the emotions, but if his\ncontribution is relevant it will be because the emotions which figure\nin his account are just part of the primary organic reaction to the\nobject. In contrary fashion, to find a thing bad (in a direct\nexperience as distinct from the result of a reflective examination) is\nto be moved to reject it, to try to get away from it, to destroy or at\nleast to displace it. It connotes not an act of apprehension but an\nact of repugning, of repelling. To term the thing good or evil is to\nstate the fact (noted in recollection) that it was actually involved\nin a situation of organic acceptance or rejection, with whatever\nqualities specifically characterize the act.\n\nAll this is said because I am convinced that contemporary discussion\nof values and valuation suffers from confusion of the two radically\ndifferent attitudes--that of direct, active, non-cognitive experience\nof goods and bads and that of valuation, the latter being simply a\nmode of judgment like any other form of judgment, differing in that\nits subject-matter happens to be a good or a bad instead of a horse or\nplanet or curve. But unfortunately for discussions, \"to value\" means\ntwo radically different things: to prize and appraise; to esteem and\nto estimate: to find good in the sense described above, and to judge\nit to be good, to _know_ it as good. I call them radically different\nbecause to prize names a practical, non-intellectual attitude, and to\nappraise names a judgment. That men love and hold things dear, that\nthey cherish and care for some things, and neglect and contemn other\nthings, is an undoubted fact. To call these things values is just to\nrepeat that they are loved and cherished; it is not to give a reason\nfor their being loved and cherished. To call them values and then\nimport into them the traits of objects of valuation; or to import into\nvalues, meaning valuated objects, the traits which things possess as\nheld dear, is to confuse the theory of judgments of value past all\nremedy.\n\nAnd before coming to the more technical discussion, the currency of\nthe confusion and the bad result consequences may justify dwelling\nupon the matter. The distinction may be compared to that between\neating something and investigating the food properties of the thing\neaten. A man eats something; it may be said that his very eating\nimplies that he _took_ it to be food, that he judged it, or regarded\nit cognitively, and that the question is just whether he judged truly\nor made a false proposition. Now if anybody will condescend to a\nconcrete experience he will perceive how often a man eats _without_\nthinking; that he puts into his mouth what is set before him from\nhabit, as an infant does from instinct. An onlooker or anyone who\nreflects is justified in saying that he _acts as if_ he judged the\nmaterial to be food. He is not justified in saying that any judgment\nor intellectual determination has entered in. He has acted; he has\nbehaved toward something as food: that is only to say that he has put\nit in his mouth and swallowed it instead of spewing it forth. The\nobject may then be called food. But this does not mean either that it\n_is_ food (namely, digestible and nourishing material) or that the\neater judged it to be food and so formed a proposition which is true\nor false. The proposition would arise only in case he is in some\ndoubt, or if he reflects that in spite of his immediate attitude of\naversion the thing is wholesome and his system needs recuperation,\netc. Or later, if the man is ill, a physician may inquire what he ate,\nand pronounce that something not food at all, but poison.\n\nIn the illustration employed, there is no danger of any harm arising\nfrom using the retroactive term \"food\"; there is no likelihood of\nconfusing the two senses \"actually eaten\" and \"nourishing article.\"\nBut with the terms \"value\" and \"good\" there is a standing danger of\njust such a confusion. Overlooking the fact that good and bad as\n_reasonable_ terms involve a _relationship to other things_ (exactly\nsimilar to that implied in calling a particular article food or\npoison), we suppose that when we are reflecting upon or inquiring into\nthe good or value of some act or object, we are dealing with something\nas simple, as self-inclosed, as the simple act of immediate prizing or\nwelcoming or cherishing performed without rhyme or reason, from\ninstinct or habit. In truth just as determining a thing _to be_ food\nmeans considering its relations to digestive organs, to its\ndistribution and ultimate destination in the system, so determining a\nthing found good (namely, treated in a certain way) _to be_ good means\nprecisely ceasing to look at it as a direct, self-sufficient thing and\nconsidering it in its consequences--that is, in its relations to a\nlarge set of other things. If the man in eating consciously implies\nthat what he eats is food, he anticipates or predicts certain\nconsequences, with more or less adequate grounds for so doing. He\npasses a judgment or apprehends or knows--truly or falsely. So a man\nmay not only enjoy a thing, but he may judge the thing enjoyed to be\ngood, to be a value. But in so doing he is going beyond the thing\nimmediately present and making an inference to other things, which, he\nimplies, are connected with it. The thing taken into the mouth and\nstomach _has_ consequences whether a man thinks of them or not. But he\ndoes not _know_ the thing he eats--he does not make it a term of a\ncertain character--unless he thinks of the consequences and connects\nthem with the thing he eats. If he just stops and says \"Oh, how good\nthis is,\" he is not saying anything about the object except the fact\nthat he enjoys eating it. We may if we choose regard this exclamation\nas a reflection or judgment. But if it is intellectual, it is asserted\nfor the sake of enhancing the enjoyment; it is a means to an end. A\nvery hungry man will generally satisfy his appetite to some extent\nbefore he indulges in even such rudimentary propositions.[86]\n\nII\n\nBut we must return to a placing of our problem in this context. My\ntheme is that a judgment of value is simply a case of a practical\njudgment, a judgment about the doing of something. This conflicts with\nthe assumption that it is a judgment about a particular kind of\nexistence independent of action, concerning which the main problem is\nwhether it is subjective or objective. It conflicts with every\ntendency to make the determination of the right or wrong course of\naction (whether in morals, technology, or scientific inquiry)\ndependent upon an independent determination of some ghostly things\ncalled value-objects--whether their ghostly character is attributed to\ntheir existing in some transcendental eternal realm or in some realm\ncalled states of mind. It asserts that value-objects mean simply\nobjects as judged to possess a certain _force_ within a situation\ntemporally developing toward a determinate result. To _find_ a thing\ngood is, I repeat, to attribute or impute nothing to it. It is just to\ndo something to it. But to consider _whether_ it is good and how good\nit is, is to ask how it, _as if acted upon_, will operate in promoting\na course of action.\n\nHence the great contrast which may exist between a good or an\nimmediate experience and an evaluated or judged good. The rain may be\nmost uncomfortable (just _be_ it, as a man is more than five feet\ntall) and yet be \"good\" for growing crops--that is, favor or promote\ntheir movement in a given direction. This does not mean that two\ncontrasting judgments of value are passed. It means that _no_ judgment\nhas yet taken place. If, however, I am moved to pass a value-judgment\nI should probably say that in spite of the disagreeableness of getting\nwet, the shower is a good thing. I am now judging it as a _means_ in\ntwo contrasting situations, as a means with respect to two ends. I\ncompare my discomfort as a _consequence_ of the rain with the\nprospective crops as another consequence, and say \"let the latter\nconsequence be.\" I identify myself as agent with it, rather than with\nthe immediate discomfort of the wetting. It is quite true that in this\ncase I cannot do anything about it; my identification is, so to speak,\nsentimental rather than practical so far as stopping the rain or\ngrowing the crops is concerned. But in effect it is an assertion that\none would not on account of the discomfort of the rain stop it; that\none would, if one could, encourage its continuance. Go it, rain, one\nsays.\n\nThe specific intervention of action is obvious enough in plenty of\nother cases. It occurs to me that this agreeable \"food\" which I am\neating isn't a food for me; it brings on indigestion. It functions no\nlonger as an _immediate_ good; as something to be accepted. If I\ncontinue eating, it will be after I have deliberated. I have\nconsidered it as a means to two conflicting possible consequences, the\npresent enjoyment of eating and the later state of health. One or\nother is possible, not both--though of course I may \"solve\" the\nproblem by persuading myself that in this instance they are congruent.\nThe value-object now means thing judged to be a means of procuring\nthis or that end. As prizing, esteeming, holding dear denote ways of\nacting, so valuing denotes a passing judgment upon such acts with\nreference to their connection with other acts, or with respect to the\ncontinuum of behavior in which they fall. Valuation means change of\nmode of behavior from direct acceptance and welcoming to doubting and\nlooking into--acts which involve postponement of direct (or so-called\novert) action and which imply a future act having a different\n_meaning_ from that just now occurring--for even if one decides to\ncontinue in the previous act its meaning-content is different when it\nis chosen after reflective examination.\n\nA practical judgment has been defined as a judgment of what to do, or\nwhat is to be done: a judgment respecting the future termination of an\nincomplete and in so far indeterminate situation. To say that\njudgments of value fall within this field is to say two things: one,\nthat the judgment of value is never complete in itself, but always in\nbehalf of determining what is to be done; the other, that judgments of\nvalue (as distinct from the direct experience of something as good)\nimply that value is not anything previously given, but is something to\nbe given by future action, itself conditioned upon (varying with) the\njudgment. This statement may appear to contradict the recent assertion\nthat a value-object for knowledge means one investigated as a means to\ncompeting ends. For such a means it already is; the lobster _will_\ngive me present enjoyment and future indigestion _if_ I eat it. But as\nlong as I judge, _value_ is indeterminate. The question is not what\nthe thing will do--I may be quite clear about that: it is whether to\nperform the act which will actualize its potentiality. What will I\nhave the situation _become_ as between alternatives? And that means\nwhat force shall the thing as means be given? Shall I take it as means\nto present enjoyment, or as a (negative) condition of future health?\nWhen its status in these respects is determined, its value is\ndetermined; judgment ceases, action goes on.\n\nPractical judgments do not therefore primarily concern themselves with\nthe value of _objects_; but with the course of action demanded to\ncarry an incomplete situation to its fulfilment. The adequate control\nof such judgments may, however, be facilitated by judgment of the\nworth of objects which enter as ends and means into the action\ncontemplated. For example, my primary (and ultimate) judgment has to\ndo, say, with buying a suit of clothes: whether to buy and, if so,\nwhat? The question is of better and worse with respect to alternative\ncourses of action, not with respect to various objects. But the\njudgment will be a judgment (and not a chance reaction) in the degree\nin which it takes for its intervening subject-matter the value-status\nof various objects. What are the prices of given suits? What are their\nstyles in respect to current fashion? How do their patterns compare?\nWhat about their durability? How about their respective adaptability\nto the chief wearing use I have in mind? Relative, or comparative,\ndurability, cheapness, suitability, style, aesthetic attractiveness\nconstitute value traits. They are traits of objects not _per se_, but\n_as entering into a possible and foreseen completing of the\nsituation_. Their value is their force in precisely this function. The\ndecision of better and worse is the determination of their respective\ncapacities and intensities _in this regard_. Apart from their status\nin this office, they have no traits of value for knowledge. A\ndetermination of better value as found in some one suit is equivalent\nto (has the force of) a decision as to what it is better to do. It\nprovided the lacking stimulus so that action occurs, or passes from\nits indeterminate-indecisive-state into decision.\n\nReference to the terms \"subjective\" and \"objective\" will, perhaps,\nraise a cloud of ambiguities. But for this very reason it may be worth\nwhile to point out the ambiguous nature of the term objective as\napplied to valuations. Objective may be identified, quite erroneously,\nwith qualities existing outside of and independently of the situation\nin which a decision as to a future course of action has to be reached.\nOr, objective may denote the status of qualities of an object _in\nrespect_ to the situation to be completed through judgment.\nIndependently of the situation requiring practical judgment, clothes\nalready have a given price, durability, pattern, etc. These traits are\nnot affected by the judgment. They exist; they are given. But as given\nthey are _not_ determinate values. They are not _objects_ of\nvaluation; they are _data for_ a valuation. We may have to take pains\nto discover that these given qualities are, but their discovery is in\norder that there may be a subsequent judgment of value. Were they\nalready definite values, they would not be estimated; they would be\nstimuli to direct response. If a man had already decided that\ncheapness constituted value, he would simply take the cheapest suit\noffered. What he judges is the value of cheapness, and this depends\nupon its weight or importance in the situation requiring action, as\ncompared with durability, style, adaptability, etc. Discovery of\nshoddy would not affect the _de facto_ durability of the goods, but it\nwould affect the value of cheapness--that is, _the weight assigned\nthat trait in influencing judgment_--which it would not do, if\ncheapness already had a definite value. A value, in short, means a\n_consideration_, and a consideration does not mean an existence\nmerely, but an existence having a claim upon judgment. Value judged is\nnot existential quality noted, but is the influence attached by\njudgment to a given existential quality in determining judgment.\n\nThe conclusion is not that value is subjective, but that it is\npractical. The situation in which judgment of value is required is not\nmental, much less fanciful. I can but think that much of the recent\ndiscussion of the objectivity of value and of value-judgments rests\nupon a false psychological theory. It rests upon giving certain terms\nmeanings that flow from an introspective psychology which accepts a\nrealm of purely private states of consciousness, private not in a\nsocial sense (a sense implying courtesy or mayhap secrecy toward\nothers), but existential independence and separateness. To refer value\nto choice or desire, for example, is in that case to say that value is\nsubjectively conditioned. Quite otherwise, if we have steered clear\nfrom such a psychology. Choice, decision, means primarily a certain\nact, a piece of behavior on the part of a particular thing. That a\nhorse chooses to eat hay means only that it eats hay; that the man\nchooses to steal means (at least) that he tries to steal. This trial\nmay come, however, _after_ an intervening act of reflection. It then\nhas a certain intellectual or cognitive quality. But it may mean\nsimply the bare fact of an action which is retrospectively called a\nchoice: as a man, in spite of all temptation to belong to another\nnation, chooses to be born an Englishman, which, if it has any sense\nat all, signifies a choice to continue in a line adopted without\nchoice. Taken in this latter sense (in which case, terms like choice\nand desire refer to ways of behavior), their use is only a\nspecification of the general doctrine that all valuation has to do\nwith the determination of a course of action. Choice, preference, is\noriginally only a bias in a given direction, a bias which is no more\nsubjective or psychical than is the fact that a ball thrown is\nswerving in a particular direction rather than in some other curve. It\nis just a name for the differential character of the action. But let\ncontinuance in a certain line of action become questionable, let, that\nis to say, it be regarded as a means to a future consequence, which\nconsequence has alternatives, and then choice gets a logical or\nintellectual sense; a _mental_ status if the term \"mental\" is reserved\nfor acts having this intellectualized quality. Choice still means the\nfixing of a course of action; it means at least a _set_ to be released\nas soon as physically possible. Otherwise man has not chosen, but has\nquieted himself into a belief that he has chosen in order to relieve\nhimself of the strain of suspense.\n\nExactly the same analysis applies to desire. Diverse anticipated ends\nmay provoke divided and competing present reactions; the organism may\nbe torn between different courses, each interfering with the\ncompletion of the other. This intra-organic pulling and hauling, this\nstrife of active tendencies, is a genuine phenomenon. The pull in a\ngiven direction measures the immediate hold of an anticipated\ntermination or end upon us, as compared with that of some other. If\none asked after the mechanism of the valuing process, I have no doubt\nthat the answer would be in terms of desires thus conceived. But\nunless everything relating to the activity of a highly organized being\nis to be denominated subjective, I see no ground for calling it\nsubjective. So far as I can make out, the emphasis upon a\npsychological treatment of value and valuation in a subjective sense\nis but a highly awkward and negative way of maintaining a positive\ntruth: that value and valuation fall within the universe of _action_:\nthat as welcoming, accepting, is an act, so valuation is a present act\ndetermining an act _to be_ done, a present act taking place because\nthe future act is uncertain and incomplete.\n\nIt does follow from this fact that valuation is not simply a\n_recognition_ of the force or efficiency of a means with respect to\ncontinuing a process. For unless there is _question_ about its\ncontinuation, about its termination, valuation will not occur. And\nthere is no question save where activity is hesitant in direction\nbecause of conflict within it. Metaphorically we may say that rain is\ngood to lay the dust, identifying force or efficiency with value. I do\nnot believe that valuations occur and values are brought into being\nsave in a continuing situation where things have potency for carrying\nforward processes. There is a close relationship between prevailing,\nvaliancy, valency, and value. But the term \"value\" is not a mere\nreduplication of the term \"efficiency\": it adds something. When we are\nmoving toward a result and at the same time are stimulated to move\ntoward something else which is incompatible with it (as in the case of\nthe lobster as a cause of both enjoyment and indigestion), a thing has\na dual potency. Not until the end has been established is the value of\nthe lobster settled, although there need be no doubt about its\nefficiencies. As was pointed out earlier, the practical judgment\ndetermines means and end at the same time. How then can value be\ngiven, as efficiency is given, until the end is chosen? The rain is\n(metaphorically) valuable for laying dust. Whether it is valuable for\nus to have the dust laid--and if so, how valuable--we shall never know\nuntil some activity of our own which is a factor in dust-laying comes\ninto conflict with an incompatible activity. Its value is its force,\nindeed, but it is its force in moving us to one end _rather_ than to\nanother. Not every potency, in other words, but potency with the\nspecific qualification of falling within judgment about future action,\nmeans value or valuable thing. Consequently there is no value save in\nsituations where desires and the need of deliberation in order to\nchoose are found, and yet this fact gives no excuse for regarding\ndesire and deliberation and decision as subjective phenomena.\n\nTo use an Irish bull, as long as a man _knows_ what he desires there\nis no desire; there is movement or endeavor in a given direction.\nDesire is desires, and simultaneous desires are incompatible; they\nmark, as we have noted, competing activities, movements in directions,\nwhich cannot both be extended. Reflection is a process of finding out\nwhat we want, what, as we say, we _really_ want, and this means the\nformation of new desire, a new direction of action. In this process,\nthings _get_ values--something they did not possess before, although\nthey had their efficiencies.\n\nAt whatever risk of shock, this doctrine should be exposed in all its\nnakedness. To judge value is to engage in instituting a determinate\nvalue where none is given. It is not necessary that antecedently given\nvalues should be the data of the valuation; and where they are given\ndata they are only terms in the determination of a not yet existing\nvalue. When a man is ill and after deliberation concludes that it be\nwell to see a doctor, the doctor doubtless exists antecedently. But\nit is not the doctor who is judged to be the good of the situation,\nbut the _seeing_ of the doctor: a thing which, by description, exists\nonly because of an act dependent upon a judgment. Nor is the health\nthe man antecedently possessed (or which somebody has) the thing which\nhe judges to be a value; the thing judged to be a value is the\nrestoring of health--something by description not yet existing. The\nresults flowing from his past health will doubtless influence him in\nreaching his judgment that it will be a good to have restored health,\nbut they do not constitute the good which forms his subject-matter and\nobject of his judgment. He may judge that they _were_ good without\njudging that they are now good, for to be judged now good means to be\njudged to be the object of a course of action still to be undertaken.\nAnd to _judge_ that they were good (as distinct from merely recalling\ncertain benefits which accrued from health) is to judge that _if_ the\nsituation had required a reflective determination of a course of\naction one would have judged health an existence to be attained or\npreserved by action. There are dialectic difficulties which may be\nraised about judgments of this sort. For they imply the seeming\nparadox of a judgment whose proper subject-matter is its own\ndeterminate formation. But nothing is gained by obscuring the fact\nthat such is the nature of the practical judgment: it is a judgment of\nwhat and how to judge--of the weight to be assigned to various\nfactors in the determination of judgment. It would be interesting to\ninquire into the question whether this peculiarity may not throw light\nupon the nature of \"consciousness,\" but into that field we cannot now\ngo.\n\nIII\n\nFrom what has been said, it immediately follows, of course, that a\ndeterminate value is instituted as a decisive factor with respect to\nwhat is to be done. Wherever a determinate good exists, there is an\nadequate stimulus to action, and no judgment of what is to be done or\nof the value of an object is called for. It is frequently assumed,\nhowever, that valuation is a process of applying some fixed or\ndeterminate value to the various competing goods of a situation; that\nvaluation implies a prior standard of value and consists in comparing\nvarious goods with the standard as the supreme value. This assumption\nrequires examination. If it is sound it deprives the position which\nhas been taken of any validity. For it renders the judgment of what to\ndo a matter of applying a value existing ready-made, instead of\nmaking--as we have done--the valuation a determination within the\npractical judgment. The argument would run this way: Every practical\njudgment depends upon a judgment of the value of the end to be\nattained; this end may be such only proximately, but that implies\nsomething else judged to be good, and so, logically, till we have\narrived at the judgment of a supreme good, a final end or _summum\nbonum_. If this statement correctly describes the state of the case\nthere can be no doubt that a practical judgment depends upon a prior\nrecognition of value; consequently the hypothesis upon which we have\nbeen proceeding reverses the actual facts.\n\nThe first thing by way of critical comment is to point out the\nambiguity in the term \"end.\" I should like to fall back upon what was\nsaid earlier about the thoroughly reciprocal character of means and\nend in the practical judgment. If this be admitted it is also admitted\nthat only by a judgment of means--things having value in the carrying\nof an indeterminate situation to a completion--is the end\ndeterminately made out in judgment. But I fear I cannot count upon\nthis as granted. So I will point out that \"end\" may mean either the\n_de facto_ limit to judgment, which by definition does not enter into\njudgment at all, or it may mean the last and completing object of\njudgment, the conception of that object in which a transitive\nincompletely given situation would come to rest. Of end in the first\nsense, it is to be said that it is not a value at all; of end in the\nsecond sense, that it is identical with a finale of the kind we have\njust been discussing or that it is determined in judgment, not a value\ngiven by which to control the judgment. It may be asserted that in the\nillustration used some typical suit of clothes is the value which\naffords the standard of valuation of all the suits which are offered\nto the buyer; that he passes judgment on their value as compared with\nthe standard suit as an end and supreme value. This statement brings\nout the ambiguity just referred to. The need of something to wear is\nthe _stimulus_ to the judgment of the value of suits offered, and\npossession of a suit puts an end _to_ judgment. It is an end _of_\njudgment in the objective, not in the possessive, sense of the\npreposition \"of\"; it is an end not in the sense of aim, but in the\nsense of a terminating limit. When possession begins, judgment has\nalready ceased. And if argument _ad verucundiam_ has any weight I may\npoint out that this is the doctrine of Aristotle when he says we never\ndeliberate about ends, but only about means. That is to say, in all\ndeliberation (or practical judgment or inquiry) there is always\nsomething outside of judgment which fixes its beginning and end or\nterminus. And I would add that, according to Aristotle, deliberation\nalways ceases when we have come to the \"first link in the chain of\ncauses, which is last in the order of discovery,\" and this means \"when\nwe have traced back the chain of causes [means] to ourselves.\" In\nother words, the last end-in-view is always that which operates as the\ndirect or immediate means of setting our own powers in operation. The\nend-in-view upon which judgment of action settles down is simply the\nadequate or complete means to the doing of something.\n\nWe do deliberate, however, about _aims_, about ends-in-view--a fact\nwhich shows their radically different nature from ends as limits to\ndeliberation. The aim in the present instance is not the suit of\nclothes, but the _getting of a proper_ suit. That is what is precisely\nestimated or valuated; and I think I may claim to have shown that the\ndetermination of this aim is identical with the determination of the\nvalue of a suit through comparison of the values of cheapness,\ndurability, style, pattern of different suits offered. Value is not\ndetermined by comparing various suits with an ideal model, but by\ncomparing various suits with respect to cheapness, durability,\nadaptability _with one another_--involving, of course, reference also\nto length of purse, suits already possessed, etc., and other specific\nelements in the situation which demands that something be done. The\npurchaser may, of course, have settled upon something which serves as\na model before he goes to buy; but that only means that his judging\nhas been done beforehand; the model does not then function in\njudgment, but in his act as stimulus to immediate action. And there is\na consideration here involved of the utmost importance as to practical\njudgments of the moral type: The more completely the notion of the\nmodel is formed outside and irrespective of the specific conditions\nwhich the situation of action presents, the less intelligent is the\nact. Most men might have their ideals of the model changed somewhat in\nthe face of the actual offering, even in the case of buying clothes.\nThe man who is not accessible to such change in the case of moral\nsituations has ceased to be a moral agent and become a reacting\nmachine. In short, the standard of valuation is formed in the process\nof practical judgment or valuation. It is not something taken from\noutside and applied within it--such application means there is no\njudgment.\n\nIV\n\nNothing has been said thus far about a standard. Yet the conception of\na standard, or a measure, is so closely connected with valuation that\nits consideration affords a test of the conclusions reached. It must\nbe admitted that the concepts of the nature of a standard pointed to\nby the course of the prior discussion is not in conformity with\ncurrent conceptions. For the argument points to a standard which is\ndetermined within the process of valuation, not outside of it, and\nhence not capable of being employed ready-made, therefore, to settle\nthe valuing process. To many persons, this will seem absurd to the\npoint of self-contradiction. The prevailing conception, however, has\nbeen adopted without examination; it is a preconception. If accepted,\nit deprives judgment and knowledge of all significant import in\nconnection with moral action. If the standard is already given, all\nthat remains is its mechanical application to the case in hand--as one\nwould apply a yard rule to dry-goods. Genuine moral uncertainty is\nthen impossible; where it seems to exist, it is only a name for a\nmoral unwillingness, due to inherent viciousness, to recognize and\napply the rules already made and provided, or else for a moral\ncorruption which has enfeebled man's power of moral apprehension. When\nthe doctrine of standards prior to and independent of moral judgments\nis accompanied by these other doctrines of original sin and\ncorruption, one must respect the thoroughgoing logic of the doctrine.\nSuch is not, however, the case with the modern theories which make the\nsame assumption of standards preceding instead of resulting from moral\njudgments, and which ignore the question of uncertainty and error in\ntheir apprehension. Such considerations do not, indeed, decide\nanything, but they may serve to get a more unprejudiced hearing for a\nhypothesis which runs counter to current theories, since it but\nformulates the trend of current practices in their increasing tendency\nto make the act of intelligence the central factor in morals.\n\nLet us, accordingly, consider the alternatives to regarding the\nstandard of value as something evolved in the process of reflective\nvaluation. How can such a standard be known? Either by an a priori\nmethod of intuition, or by abstraction from prior cases. The latter\nconception throws us into the arms of hedonism. For the hedonistic\ntheory of the standard of value derives its logical efficiency from\nthe consideration that the notion of a prior and fixed standard (one\nwhich is not determined within the situation by reflection) forces us\nback upon antecedent irreducible pleasures and pains which alone are\nvalues definite and certain enough to supply standards. They alone are\nsimple enough to be independent and ultimate. The apparently\ncommon-sense alternative would be to take the \"value\" of prior\nsituations _in toto_, say, the value of an act of kindness to a\nsufferer. But any such good is a function of the total unanalyzed\nsituation; it has, consequently, no application to a new situation\nunless the new exactly repeats the old one. Only when the \"good\" is\nresolved into simple and unalterable units, in terms of which old\nsituations can be equated to new ones on the basis of the number of\nunits contained, can an unambiguous standard be found.\n\nThe logic is unimpeachable, and points to irreducible pleasures and\npains as the standard of valuation. The difficulty is not in the logic\nbut in empirical facts, facts which verify our prior contention.\nConceding, for the sake of argument, that there are definite\nexistences such as are called pleasures and pains, they are _not_\nvalue-objects, but are only things to be valued. Exactly the same\npleasure or pain, as an existence, has different values at different\ntimes according to the way in which it is judged. What is the value of\nthe pleasure of eating the lobster as compared with the pains of\nindigestion? The rule tells us, of course, to break up the pleasure\nand pain into elementary units and count.[87] Such ultimate simple\nunits seem, however, to be about as much within the reach of ordinary\nknowledge as atoms or electrons are within the grasp of the man of the\nstreet. Their resemblance to the ultimate, neutral units which\nanalytic psychologists have postulated as a methodological necessity\nis evident. Since the value of even such a definite entity as a\ntoothache varies according to the organization constructed and\npresented in reflection, it is clear that ordinary empirical pleasures\nand pains are highly complex.\n\nThis difficulty, however, may be waived. We may even waive the fact\nthat a theory which set out to be ultra-empirical is now enmeshed in\nthe need for making empirical facts meet dialectical requirements.\nAnother difficulty is too insuperable to be waived. In any case the\nquantity of elementary existences which constitutes the criterion of\nmeasurement is dependent upon the very judgment which is assumed to be\nregulated by it. The standard of valuation is the units which will\n_result_ from an act; they are future consequences. Now the character\nof the agent judging is one of the conditions of the production of\nthese consequences. A callous person not only will not foresee certain\nconsequences, and will not be able to give them proper weight, but he\ndoes not afford the same condition of their occurrence which is\nconstituted by a sensitive man. It is quite possible to employ\njudgment so as to produce acts which will increase this organic\ncallousness. The analytic conception of the moral criterion\nprovides--logically--for deliberate blunting of susceptibilities. If\nthe matter at issue is simply one of number of units of pleasure over\npain, arrange matters so that certain pains will not, as matter of\nfact, be felt. While this result may be achieved by manipulation of\nextra-organic conditions, it may also be effected by rendering the\norganism insensitive. Persistence in a course which in the short run\nyields uneasiness and sympathetic pangs, will in the long run\neliminate these pains and leave a net pleasure balance.\n\nThis is a time-honored criticism of hedonism. My present concern with\nit is purely logical. It shows that the attempt to bring over from\npast objects the elements of a standard for valuing future\nconsequences is a hopeless one. The express object of a\nvaluation-judgment is to release factors which being new, cannot be\nmeasured on the basis of the past alone. This discussion of the\nanalytic logic as applied in morals would, however, probably not be\nworth while did it not serve to throw into relief the significance of\nany appeal to fulfilment of a system or organization as _the_ moral\ngood--the standard. Such an appeal, if it is wary, is an appeal to the\npresent situation as _undergoing that reorganization that will confer\nupon it the unification which it lacks_; to organization as something\nto be brought about, to be made. And it is clear that this appeal\nmeets all the specifications of judgments of practice as they have\nbeen described. The organization which is to be fulfilled through\naction is an organization which, at the time of judging, is present in\nconception, in idea--in, that is, reflective inquiry as a phase of\nreorganizing activity. And since its presence in conception is both a\ncondition of the organization aimed at _and_ a function of the\nadequacy of the reflective inquiry, it is evident that there is here a\nconfirmation of our statement that the practical judgment is a\njudgment of what and how to judge as an integral part of the\ncompletion of an incomplete temporal situation. More specifically, it\nalso appears that the standard is a rule for conducting inquiry to its\ncompletion: it is a counsel to make examination of the operative\nfactors complete, a warning against suppressing recognition of any of\nthem. However a man may impose upon himself or upon others, a man's\nreal measure of value is exhibited in what he _does_, not in what he\nconsciously thinks or says. For the doing is the _actual_ choice. It\nis the completed reflection.\n\nIt is comparatively easy at the present time in moral theory to slam\nboth hedonism and apriorism. It is not so easy to see the logical\nimplications of the alternative to them. The conception of an\norganization of interests or tendencies is often treated as if it were\na conception which is definite in subject-matter as well as clear-cut\nin form. It is taken not as a rule for procedure in inquiry, a\ndirection and a warning (which it is), but as something all of whose\nconstituents are already given for _knowledge_, even though not given\nin fact. The act of fulfilling or realizing must then be treated as\ndevoid of intellectual import. It is a mere doing, not a learning and\na testing. But how can a situation which is incomplete in fact be\ncompletely known until it _is_ complete? Short of the fulfilment of a\nconceived organization, how can the conception of the proposed\norganization be anything more than a working hypothesis, a method of\ntreating the given elements in order to see what happens? Does not\nevery notion which implies the possibility of an apprehension of\nknowledge of the end to be reached[88] also imply either an a priori\nrevelation of the nature of that end, or else that organization is\nnothing but a whole composed of elementary parts already given--the\nlogic of hedonism?\n\nThe logic of subsumption in the physical sciences meant that a given\nstate of things could be compared with a ready-made concept as a\nmodel--the phenomena of the heavens with the implications of, say, the\ncircle. The methods of experimental science broke down this motion;\nthey substituted for an alleged regulative model a formula which was\nthe integrated function of the particular phenomena themselves, a\nformula to be used as a method of further observations and experiments\nand thereby tested and developed. The unwillingness to believe that,\nin a similar fashion, moral standards or models can be trusted to\ndevelop out of the specific situations of action shows how little the\ngeneral logical force of the method of science has been grasped.\nPhysical knowledge did not as matter of fact advance till the dogma of\nmodels or forms as standards of knowledge had been ousted. Yet we hang\ntenaciously to a like doctrine in morals for fear of moral chaos. It\nonce seemed to be impossible that the disordered phenomena of\nperception could generate a knowledge of law and order; it was\nsupposed that independent principles of order must be supplied and the\nphenomena measured by approach to or deviation from the fixed models.\nThe ordinary conception of a standard in practical affairs is a\nprecise analogue. Physical knowledge started on a secure career when\nmen had courage to start from the irregular scene and to treat the\nsuggestions to which it gave rise as methods for instituting new\nobservations and experiences. Acting upon the suggested conceptions\nanalyzed, extended, and ordered phenomena and thus made improved\nconceptions--methods of inquiry--possible. It is reasonable to believe\nthat what holds moral knowledge back is above all the conception that\nthere are standards of good given to knowledge apart from the work of\nreflection in constructing methods of action. As the bringer of bad\nnews gets a bad name, being made to share in the production of the\nevil which he reports, so honest acknowledgment of the uncertainty of\nthe moral situation and of the hypothetical character of all rules of\nmoral mensuration prior to acting upon them, is treated as if it\noriginated the uncertainty and created the skepticism.\n\nIt may be contended, however, that all this does not justify the\nearlier statement that the limiting situation which occasions and cuts\noff judgment is not itself a value. Why, it will be asked, does a man\nbuy a suit of clothes unless that is a value, or at least a proximate\nmeans to a further value? The answer is short and simple: Because he\nhas to; because the situation in which he lives demands it. The\nanswer probably seems too summary. But it may suggest that while a man\nlives, he never is called upon to judge whether he shall act, but\nsimply _how_ he shall act. A decision not to act is a decision to act\nin a certain way; it is never a judgment not to act, unqualifiedly. It\nis a judgment to do something else--to wait, for example. A judgment\nthat the best thing to do is to retire from active life, to become a\nSimon Stylites, is a judgment to act in a certain way, conditioned\nupon the necessity that, irrespective of judging, a man will have to\nact somehow anyway. A decision to commit suicide is not a decision to\nbe dead; it is a decision to perform a certain act. The act may depend\nupon reaching the conclusion that life is not worth living. But as a\njudgment, this is a conclusion to act in a way to terminate the\npossibility of further situations requiring judgment and action. And\nit does not imply that a judgment about life as a supreme value and\nstandard underlies all judgments as to how to live. More specifically,\nit is not a judgment upon the value of life _per se_, but a judgment\nthat one does not find at hand the specific means of making life worth\nwhile. As an act to be done, it falls within and assumes life. As a\njudgment upon the value of life, by definition it evades the issue. No\none ever influenced a person considering committing suicide by\narguments concerning the value of life, but only by suggesting or\nsupplying conditions and means which make life worth living; in other\nwords, by furnishing _direct_ stimuli to living.\n\nHowever, I fear that all this argument may only obscure a point\nobvious without argument, namely, that all deliberation upon what to\ndo is concerned with the completion and determination of a situation\nin some respect incomplete and so indeterminate. Every such situation\nis specific; it is not _merely_ incomplete; the incompleteness is _of_\na specific situation. Hence the situation sets limits to the\nreflective process; what is judged has reference to it and that which\nlimits never is judged in the particular situation in which it is\nlimiting. Now we have in ordinary speech a word which expresses the\nnature of the conditions which limit the judgments of value. It is the\nword \"invaluable.\" The word does not mean something of supreme value\nas compared with other things any more than it means something of zero\nvalue. It means something out of the scope of valuation--something out\nof the range of judgment; whatever in the situation at hand is not and\ncannot be any part of the subject-matter of judgment and which yet\ninstigates and cuts short the judgment. It means, in short, that\njudgment at some point runs against the brute act of holding something\ndear as its limit.\n\nV\n\nThe statement that values are determined in the process of judgment of\nwhat to do (that is, in situations where preference depends upon\nreflection upon the conditions and possibilities of a situation\nrequiring action) will be met by the objection that our practical\ndeliberations usually assume precedent specific values and also a\ncertain order or grade among them. There is a sense in which I am not\nconcerned to deny this. Our deliberate choices go on in situations\nmore or less like those in which we have previously chosen. When\ndeliberation has reached a valuation, and action has confirmed or\nverified the conclusion, the result remains. Situations overlap. The\n_m_ which is judged better than _n_ in one situation is found worse\nthan _l_ in another, and so on; thus a certain order of precedence is\nestablished. And we have to broaden the field to cover the habitual\norder of reflective preferences in the community to which we belong.\nThe valu-eds or valuables thus constituted present themselves as facts\nin subsequent situations. Moreover, by the same kind of operation, the\ndominating objects of past valuations present themselves as\nstandardized values.\n\nBut we have to note that such value-standards are only presumptive.\nTheir status depends, on one hand, upon the extent in which the\npresent situation is like the past. In a progressive or rapidly\naltering social life, the presumption of identical present value is\nweakened. And while it would be foolish not to avail one's self of the\nassistance in present valuations of the valuables established in other\nsituations, we have to remember that habit operates to make us\noverlook differences and presume identity where it does not exist--to\nthe misleading of judgment. On the other hand, the contributory worth\nof past determinations of value is dependent upon the extent in which\n_they_ were critically made; especially upon the extent in which the\nconsequences brought about through acting upon them have been\ncarefully noted. In other words, the presumptive force of a past value\nin present judgment depends upon the pains taken with its\nverification.\n\nIn any case, so far as judgment takes place (instead of the\nreminiscence of a prior good operating as a direct stimulus to present\naction) all valuation is in some degree a revaluation. Nietzsche would\nprobably not have made so much of a sensation, but he would have been\nwithin the limits of wisdom, if he had confined himself to the\nassertion that all judgment, in the degree in which it is critically\nintelligent, is a transvaluation of prior values. I cannot escape\nrecognition that any allusion to modification or transformation of an\nobject through judgment arouses partisan suspicion and hostility. To\nmany it appears to be a survival of an idealistic epistemology. But I\nsee only three alternatives. Either there are no practical\njudgments--as judgments they are wholly illusory; or the future is\nbound to be but a repetition of the past or a reproduction of\nsomething eternally existent in some transcendent realm (which is the\nsame thing logically),[89] or the object of a practical judgment is\nsome change, some alteration, to be brought about in the given, the\nnature of the change depending upon the judgment and yet constituting\nits subject-matter. Unless the epistemological realist accepts one of\nthe two first alternatives, he seems bound, in accepting the third, to\nadmit not merely that practical judgments make a difference in things\nas an after-effect (this he seems ready enough to admit), but that the\nimport and validity of judgments is a matter of the difference thus\nmade. One may, of course, hold that this is just what marks the\ndistinction of the practical judgment from the scientific judgment.\nBut one who admits this fact as respects a practical judgment can no\nlonger claim that it is fatal to the very idea of judgment to suppose\nthat its proper object is some difference to be brought about in\nthings, and that the truth of the judgment is constituted by the\ndifferences in consequences actually made. And a logical realist who\ntakes seriously the notion that moral good is a fulfilment of an\norganization or integration must admit that any proposition about such\nan object is prospective (for it is something _to be_ attained through\naction), and that the proposition is made for the sake of furthering\nthe fulfilment. Let one start at this point and carry back the\nconception into a consideration of other kinds of propositions, and\none will have, I think, the readiest means of apprehending the intent\nof the theory that all propositions are but the propoundings of\npossible knowledge, not knowledge itself. For unless one marks off the\njudgment of good from other judgment by means of an arbitrary division\nof the organism from the environment, or of the subjective from the\nobjective, no ground for any sharp line of division in the\npropositional-continuum will appear.\n\nBut (to obviate misunderstanding) this does not mean that some psychic\nstate or act makes the difference in things. In the first place, the\nsubject-matter of the judgment is a change to be brought about; and,\nin the second place, this subject-matter does not become an _object_\nuntil the judgment has issued in act. It is the act which makes the\ndifference, but nevertheless the act is but the complete object of\njudgment and the judgment is complete as a judgment only in the act.\nThe anti-pragmatists have been asked (notably by Professor A. W.\nMoore) how they sharply distinguish between judgment--or\nknowledge--and act and yet freely admit and insist that knowledge\nmakes a difference in action and hence in existence. This is the crux\nof the whole matter. And it is a logical question. It is not a query\n(as it seems to have been considered) as to how the mental can\ninfluence a physical thing like action--a variant of the old question\nof how the mind affects the body. On the contrary, the implication is\nthat the relation of knowledge to action becomes a problem of the\naction of a mental (or logical) entity upon a physical one only when\nthe logical import of judgment has been misconceived. The positive\ncontention is that the realm of logical propositions presents in a\nrealm of _possibility_ the specific rearrangement of things which\novert action presents in actuality. Hence the passage of a proposition\ninto action is not a miracle, but the realization of its own\ncharacter--its own meaning as logical. I do not profess, of course, to\nhave shown that such is the case for _all_ propositions; that is a\nmatter which I have not discussed. But in showing the tenability of\nthe hypothesis that practical judgments are of that nature, I have at\nleast ruled out any purely dialectic proof that the _nature_ of\nknowledge as such forbids entertaining the hypothesis that the\nimport--indirect if not direct--of all logical propositions is some\ndifference to be brought about. The road is at least cleared for a\nmore unprejudiced consideration of this hypothesis on its own merits.\n\n\nSENSE PERCEPTION AS KNOWLEDGE\n\nI mentioned incidentally in the first section that it is conceivable\nthat failure to give adequate consideration to practical judgments may\nhave a compromising effect upon the consideration of other types. I\nnow intend to develop this remark with regard to sense perception as a\nform of knowledge. The topic is so bound up with a multitude of\nperplexing psychological and epistemological traditions that I have\nfirst to make it reasonably clear what it is and what it is not which\nI propose to discuss. I endeavored in an earlier series of papers[90]\nto point out that the question of the _material_ of sense perception\nis not, as such, a problem of the theory of knowledge at all, but\nsimply a problem of the occurrence of a certain material--a problem of\ncausal conditions and consequences. That is to say, the problem\npresented by an image[91] of a bent stick, or by a dream, or by\n\"secondary\" sensory qualities is properly a problem of physics--of\nconditions of occurrence, and not of logic, of truth or falsity, fact\nor fiction. That the existence of a red _quale_ is dependent upon\ndisturbances of a certain velocity of a medium in connection with\ncertain changes of the organism is not to be confused with the notion\nthat red is a way of knowing, in some more or less adequate fashion,\nsome more \"real\" object or else of knowing itself. The fact of\ncausation--or functional dependence--no more makes the _quale_ an\n\"appearance\" to the mind of something more real than itself or of\nitself than it makes bubbles on the water a real fish transferred by\nsome cognitive distortion into a region of appearance. With a little\nstretching we may use the term appearance in either case, but the term\nonly means that the red _quale_ or the water-bubble is an _obvious_ or\nconspicuous thing from which we infer something else not so obvious.\n\nThis position thus freely resumed here needs to be adequately guarded\non all sides. It implies that the question of the existence or\npresence of the _subject-matter_ of even a complex sense perception\nmay be treated as a question of physics. It also implies that the\n_existence_ of a sense perception may be treated as a problem of\nphysics. But the position is not that _all_ the problems of sense\nperception are thereby exhausted. There is still, on the contrary, the\nproblem of the cognitive status of sense perception. So far from\ndenying this fact, I mean rather to emphasize it in holding that this\nknowledge aspect is not to be identified--as it has been in both\nrealistic and idealistic epistemologies--with the simple _occurrence_\nof presented subject-matter and with the _occurrence_ of a perceptive\nact. It is often stated, for example, that primitive sense objects\nwhen they are stripped of all inferential material cannot possibly be\nfalse--but with the implication that they, therefore, must be true.\nWell, I meant to go this statement one better--to state that they are\nneither true nor false--that is, that the distinction of true-or-false\nis as irrelevant and inapplicable as to any other existence, as it is,\nsay, to being more than five feet high or having a low blood pressure.\nThis position when taken leaves over the question of sense perception\nas knowledge, as capable of truth or falsity. It is this question,\nthen, which I intend to discuss in this paper.\n\nI\n\nMy first point is that some sense perceptions at least (as matter of\nfact the great bulk of them), are without any doubt forms of practical\njudgment--or, more accurately, are terms in practical judgments as\npropositions of what to do. When in walking down a street I see a sign\non the lamp-post at the corner, I assuredly see a sign. Now in\nordinary context (I do not say always or necessarily) this is a sign\nof what to do--to continue walking or to turn. The other term of the\nproposition may not be stated or it may be; it is probably more often\ntacit. Of course, I have taken the case of the sign purposely. But the\ncase may be extended. The lamp-post as perceived is to a lamp-lighter\na sign of something else than a turn, but still a sign of something to\nbe done. To another man, it may be a sign of a possible support. I am\nanxious not to force the scope of cases of this class beyond what\nwould be accepted by an unbiased person, but I wish to point out that\ncertain features of the perceived object, as a cognitive term, which\ndo not seem at first sight to fall within this conception of the\nobject, as, an intellectual sign of what to do, turn out upon analysis\nto be covered by it. It may be said, for example, that our supposed\npedestrian perceives much besides that which serves as evidence of the\nthing to be done. He perceives the lamp-_post_, for example, and\npossibly the carbons of the arc. And these assuredly do not enter into\nthe indication of what to do or how to do it.\n\nThe reply is threefold. In the first place, it is easy--and usual--to\nread back into the sense perception more than was actually in it. It\nis easy to _recall_ the familiar features of the lamp-post; it is\npractically impossible--or at least very unusual--to recall what was\nactually perceived. So we read the former into the latter. The\n_tendency_ is for actual perception to limit itself to the minimum\nwhich will serve as sign. But, in the second place, since it is never\nwholly so limited, since there is always a surplusage of perceived\nobject, the fact stated in the objection is admitted. But it is\nprecisely this surplusage which has not _cognitive_ status. It does\nnot serve as a sign, but neither is it _known_, or a term in\nknowledge. A child, walking by his father's side, with no aim and\nhence no reason for securing indications of what to do, will probably\nsee more in his idle curiosity than his parent. He will have more\npresented material. But this does not mean that he is making more\npropositions, but only that he is getting more material for possible\npropositions. It means, in short, that he is in an aesthetic attitude\nof realization rather than in a cognitive attitude. But even the most\neconomical observer has some aesthetic, non-cognitive surplusage.[92]\nIn the third place, surplusage is necessary for the operation of the\nsignifying function. Independently of the fact that surplusage may be\nrequired to render the sign specific, action is free (its variation is\nunder control) in the degree in which _alternatives_ are present. The\npedestrian has probably the two alternatives in mind: to go straight\non or to turn. The perceived object might indicate to him another\nalternative--to stop and inquire of a passer-by. And, as is obvious in\na more complicated case, it is the extent of the perceived object\nwhich both multiplies alternative ways of acting and gives the grounds\nfor selecting among them. A physician, for example, deliberately\navoids such hard-and-fast alternatives as have been postulated in our\ninstance. He does not observe simply to get an indication of whether\nthe man is well or ill; but in order to determine what to do he\nextends his explorations over a wide field. Much of his perceived\nobject field is immaterial to what he finally does; that is, does not\nserve as sign. But it is all relevant to _judging_ what he is to do.\nSense perception as a term in practical judgment _must_ include more\nthan the element which finally serves as sign. If it did not, there\nwould be no perception, but only a direct stimulus to action.[93]\n\nThe conclusion that such perceptions as we have been considering are\nterms in an inference is to be carefully discriminated from the loose\nstatement that sense perceptions are unconscious inferences. There is\na great difference between saying that the perception of a shape\naffords an indication for an inference and saying that the perception\nof shape is itself an inference. That definite shapes would not be\nperceived, were it not for neural changes brought about in prior\ninferences, is a possibility; it may be, for aught I know, an\nascertained fact. Such telescoping of a perceived object with the\nobject inferred from it may be a constant function; but in any case\nthe telescoping is not a matter of a present inference going on\nunconsciously, but is the result of an organic modification which has\noccurred in consequence of prior inferences. In similar fashion, to\nsay that to see a table is to get an indication of something to write\non is in no way to say that the perception of a table is an inference\nfrom sensory data. To say that certain earlier perceived objects not\nhaving as perceived the character of a table have now \"fused\" with the\nresults of inferences drawn from them is not to say that the\nperception of the table is now an inference. Suppose we say that the\nfirst perception was of colored patches; that we inferred from this\nthe possibility of reaching and touching, and that on performing these\nacts we secured certain qualities of hardness, smoothness, etc., and\nthat these are now all fused with the color-patches. At most this only\nsignifies that certain _previously_ inferred qualities have now become\nconsolidated with qualities from which they were formerly inferred.\nAnd such fusion or consolidation is precisely _not inference_. As\nmatter of fact, such \"fusion\" of qualities, given and _formerly_\ninferred, is but a matter of speaking. What has really happened is\nthat _brain_ processes which formerly happened successively now happen\nsimultaneously. What we are dealing with is not a fact of cognition,\nbut a fact of the organic conditions of the occurrence of an act of\nperception.\n\nLet us apply the results to the question of sense \"illusions.\" The\nbent reed in the water comes naturally to mind. Purely physical\nconsiderations account for the refraction of the light which produces\nan optical image of a bent stick. This has nothing to do with\nknowledge or with sense perception--with seeing. It is simply and\nwholly a matter of the properties of light and a lens. Such\nrefractions are constantly produced without our noting them. In the\npast, however, light refracted and unrefracted has been a constant\nstimulus to responsive actions. It is a matter of the native\nconstitution of the organism that light stimulates the eyes to follow\nand the arms to reach and the hands to clutch and handle. As a\nconsequence, certain arrangements of reflected and refracted light\nhave become a sign to perform certain specific acts of handling and\ntouching. As a rule, stimuli and reactions occur in an approximately\nhomogeneous medium--the air. The system of signs or indexes of action\nset up has been based upon this fact and accommodated to it. A habit\nor bias in favor of a certain kind of inference has been set up. We\ninfer from a bent ray of light that the hand, in touching the\nreflecting object, will, at a certain point, have to change its\ndirection. This habit is carried over to a medium in which the\nconclusion does not hold. Instead of saying that light is bent--which\nit is--we _infer_ that the stick is bent: we infer that the hand could\nnot protract a straight course in handling the object. But an expert\nfisherman never makes such an error in spearing fish. Reacting in\nmedia of different refractive capacities, he bases his signs and\ninferences upon the conditions and results of his media. I see no\ndifference between these cases and that of a man who can read his own\ntongue. He sees the word \"pain\" and infers it means a certain physical\ndiscomfort. As matter of fact, the thing perceived exists in an\nunfamiliar medium and signifies bread. To the one accustomed to the\nFrench language the right inference occurs.[94] There is neither error\nnor truth in the optical image: It just exists physically. But we take\nit for something else, we behave to it as if it were something else.\nWe _mis_-take it.\n\nII\n\nSo far as I can see, the pronounced tendency to regard the perceived\nobject as itself the object of a peculiar kind of knowledge instead of\nas a term in knowledge of the practical kind has two causes. One is\nthe confirmed habit of neglecting the wide scope and import of\npractical judgments. This leads to overlooking the responsive act as\nthe other term indicated by the perception, and to taking the\nperceived object as the whole of the situation just by itself. The\nother cause is the fact that because perceived objects are constantly\nemployed as evidence of what is to be done--or how to do\nsomething--they themselves become the objects of prolonged and\ncareful scrutiny. We pass naturally and inevitably from recognition to\n_observation_. Inference will usually take care of itself if the datum\nis properly determined. At the present day, a skilled physician will\nhave little difficulty in inferring typhoid instead of malaria from\ncertain symptoms provided he can make certain observations--that is,\nsecure certain data from which to infer. The labor of intelligence is\nthus transferred from inference to the determination of data, the data\nbeing determined, however, in the interests of inference and as parts\nof an inference.\n\nAt this point, a significant complication enters in. The ordinary\nassumption in the discussion of the relation of perceived objects to\nknowledge is that \"the\" object--the real object--of knowledge in\nperception is the thing which _caused_ the qualities which are given.\nIt is assumed, that is, that the other term of a proposition in which\na sense datum is one term must be the thing which produced it. Since\nthis producing object does not for the most part appear in ordinary\nsense perception, we have on our hands perception as an\nepistemological problem--the relation of an appearance to some reality\nwhich it, somehow, conceals rather than indicates. Hence also the\ndifficulties of \"reconciling\" scientific knowledge in physics where\nthese causes are the terms of the propositions with \"empirical\" or\nsense perception knowledge where they do not even appear. Here is\nwhere the primary advantage of recognizing that ordinary sense\nperceptions are forms of practical judgment comes in. In practical\njudgments, the other term is as open and aboveboard as is the sensory\nquality: it is the thing to be done, the response to be selected. To\nborrow an illustration of Professor Woodbridge's: A certain sound\nindicates to the mother that her baby needs attention. If she turns\nout to be in error, it is not because sound ought to mean so many\nvibrations of the air, and as matter of fact doesn't even suggest air\nvibrations, but because there is wrong inference as to the act to be\nperformed.\n\nI imagine that if error never occurred in inferences of this practical\nsort the human race would have gone on quite contented with them.\nHowever that may be, errors _do_ occur and the endeavor to control\ninference as to consequences (so as to reduce their likelihood of\nerror) leads to propositions where the knowledge-object of the\nperceived thing is not something to be done, but the cause which\nproduced it. The mother finds her baby peacefully sleeping and says\nthe baby didn't _make_ the noise. She investigates and decides a\nswinging door _made_ it. Instead of inferring a consequence, she\ninfers a cause. If she had identified the noise in the first place,\nshe would have concluded that the hinges needed oiling.\n\nNow where does the argument stand? The proper control of inference in\nspecific cases is found (_a_) to lie in the proper identification of\nthe datum. If the perception is of a certain kind, the inference\ntakes place as a matter of course; or else inference can be suspended\nuntil more adequate data are found, and thus error is avoided even if\ntruth be not found. Furthermore (_b_) it is discovered that the most\neffective way of identifying datum (and securing adequate data) is by\ninference to its cause. The mother stops short with the baby and the\ndoor as causes. But the same motives which made her transfer her\ninference from consequences to conditions are the motives which lead\nothers to inferring from sounds to vibrations of air. Hence our\nscientific propositions about sensory data. They are not, as such,\nabout things to do, but about things which have been done, have\nhappened--\"facts.\" But they have reference, nevertheless, to\ninferences regarding consequences to be effected. They are the means\nof securing data which will prevent errors which would otherwise\noccur, and which facilitate an entirely new crop of inferences as to\npossibilities--means and ends--of action. That scientific men should\nbe conscious of this reference or even interested in it is not at all\nnecessary, for I am talking about the logic of propositions, not about\nbiography nor psychology. If I reverted to psychology, it would be to\npoint out that there is no reason in the world why the practical\nactivity of some men should not be predominantly directed into the\npursuits connected with discovery. The extent in which they actually\nare so directed depends upon social conditions.\n\nIII\n\nWe are brought to a consideration of the notion of \"primitive\" sense\ndata. It was long customary to treat the attempt to define true\nknowledge in terms derived from sense data as a confusion of\npsychology--or the history of the growth of knowledge--with logic, the\ntheory of the character of knowledge as knowledge. As matter of fact,\nthere _is_ confusion, but in the opposite direction. The attempt\ninvolved a confusion of logic with psychology--that is, it treated a\nphase of the technique of inference as if it were a natural history of\nthe growth of ideas and beliefs.\n\nThe chief source of error in ordinary inference is an unrecognized\ncomplexity of data. Perception which is not experimentally controlled\nfails to present sufficiently wide data to secure differentia of\npossible inferences, and it fails to present, even in what is given,\nlines of cleavage which are important for proper inference. This is\nonly an elaborate way of saying what scientific inquiry has made\nclear, that, for purposes of inference as to conditions of production\nof what is present, _ordinary_ sense perception is too narrow, too\nconfused, too vivid as to some _quales_ and too blurred as to some\nothers. Let us confine our attention for the moment to confusion. It\nhas often been pointed out that sense qualities being just what they\nare, it is illegitimate to introduce such notions as obscurity or\nconfusion into them: a slightly illuminated color is just as\nirretrievably what it is, as clearly itself, as an object in the broad\nglare of noonday. But the case stands otherwise when the _quale_ is\ntaken as a datum for inference. It is not so easy to identify a\nperceived object _for purposes of inference_ in the dusk as in bright\nlight. From the standpoint of an inference to be effected, the\nconfusion is the same as an unjustifiable simplification. This\nover-simplification has the effect of making the _quale_, as a term of\ninference, ambiguous. To infer from it is to subject ourselves to the\ndanger of all fallacies of ambiguity which are expounded in the\ntextbooks. The remedy is clearly the resolution, by experimental\nmeans, of what seems to be a simple datum into its \"elements.\" This is\na case of analysis; it differs from other modes of analysis only in\nthe subject-matter upon which it is directed, viz., something which\nhad been previously accepted as a simple whole. The result of this\nanalysis is the existence as objects of perception of isolated\nqualities like the colors of the spectrum scientifically determined,\nthe tones of the scale in all their varying intensities, etc., in\nshort, the \"sensations\" or sense qualities of contemporary psychology\ntextbooks or the \"simple ideas\" of sensation of Locke or the \"objects\nof sense\" of Russell. They are the material of sense perception\ndiscriminated for the purpose of better inferences.\n\nNote that these simple data or elements are not original,\npsychologically or historically; they are _logical_ primitives--that\nis, irreducible for purposes of inference. They are simply the most\nunambiguous and best defined objects of perception which can be\nsecured to serve as _signs_. They are experimentally determined, with\ngreat art, precisely because the naturally given, the customary,\nobjects in perception have been ambiguous or confused terms in\ninference. Hence they are replaced, through experimental means\ninvolving the use of wide scientific knowledge deductively employed,\nby simpler sense objects. Stated in current phraseology, \"sensations\"\n(i.e., qualities present to sense) are not the elements out of which\nperceptions are composed, constituted, or constructed; they are the\nfinest, most carefully discriminated objects of perception. We do not\nfirst perceive a single, thoroughly defined shade, a tint and hue of\nred; its perception is the last refinement of observation. Such things\nare the limits of perception, but they are final, not initial, limits.\nThey are what is perceived to be given under the most favorable\npossible conditions; conditions, moreover, which do not present\nthemselves accidentally, but which have to be intentionally and\nexperimentally established, and detection of which exacts the use of a\nvast body of scientific propositions.\n\nI hope it is now evident what was meant by saying that current logic\npresents us not with a confusion of psychology with logic, but with a\nwholesale mistaking of logical determinations for facts of\npsychology. The confusion was begun by Locke--or rather made\ncompletely current through the enormous influence exercised by\nLocke--and some reference to Locke may be of aid in clearing up the\npoint. Locke's conception of knowledge was logical, not psychological.\nHe meant by knowledge thoroughly justified beliefs or propositions,\n\"certainty,\" and carefully distinguished it from what passed current\nas knowledge at a given time. The latter he called \"assent,\" opinion,\nbelief, or judgment. Moreover, his interest in the latter was logical.\nHe was after an art of controlling the proper degree of assent to be\ngiven in matters of probability. In short, his sole aim was to\ndetermine certainty where certainty is possible and to determine the\ndue degree of probability in the much vaster range of cases where only\nprobability is attainable. A natural history of the growth of\n\"knowledge\" in the sense of what happens to pass for knowledge was the\nlast of his interests. But he was completely under the domination of\nthe ruling idea of his time; namely, that _Nature_ is the norm of\ntruth. Now the earliest period of human life presents the \"work of\nnature\" in its pure and unadulterated form. The normal is the\noriginal, and the original is the normative. Nature is both beneficent\nand truthful in its work; it retains all the properties of the Supreme\nBeing whose vice-regent it is. To get the logical ultimates we have\nonly, therefore, to get back to the natural primitives. Under the\ninfluence of such deistic ideas, Locke writes a mythology of the\nhistory of knowledge, starting from clear and distinct meanings, each\nsimple, well defined, sharply and unambiguously just what it is on its\nface, without concealments and complications, and proceeds by\n\"natural\" compoundings up to the store of complex ideas, and to the\nperception of simple relations of agreement among ideas: a perception\nalways certain if the ideas are simple, and always controllable in the\ncase of complex ideas if we consider the simple ideas and their\ncompoundings. Thus he established the habit of taking logical\ndiscriminations as historical or psychological primitives--as\n\"sources\" of beliefs and knowledge instead of as checks upon inference\nand as means of knowing.\n\nI hope reference to Locke will not make a scapegoat. I should not have\nmentioned him if it were not that this way of looking at things found\nits way over into orthodox psychology and then back again into the\nfoundations of logical theory. It may be said to be the stock in trade\nof the school of empiricist logicians, and (what is even more\nimportant) of the other schools of logic whenever they are dealing\nwith propositions of perception and observation: _vide_ Russell's\ntrusting confidence in \"atomic\" propositions as psychological\nprimitives. It led to the supposition that there is a kind of\n_knowledge_ or simple apprehension (or sense acquaintance) implying no\ninference and yet basic to inference. Note, if you please, the\nmultitude of problems generated by thinking of whatever is present in\nexperience (as sensory qualities are present) as if it were\nintrinsically and apart from the use made of its subject-matter of\nknowledge.\n\n_a_) The mind-body problem becomes an integral part of the problem of\nknowledge. Sense organs, neurones, and neuronic connections are\ncertainly involved in the occurrence of a sense quality. If the\noccurrence of the latter is in and of itself a mode of knowledge, it\nbecomes a matter of utmost importance to determine just how the sense\norgans take part in it. If one is an idealist he responds with joy to\nany intimation that the \"process of apprehension\" (that is, speaking\ntruly, the physical conditions of the occurrence of the sensory datum)\ntransforms the extra-organic stimulus: the alteration is testimony\nsomehow to the constitutive nature of mind! But if he is a realist he\nconceives himself under obligation to show that the external stimulus\nis transmitted without any alteration and is apprehended just as it\nis; color must be shown to be simply, after all, a compacting of\nvibrations--or else the validity of knowledge is impugned! Recognize\nthat knowledge is something _about_ the color, whether about its\nconditions or causes or consequences or whatever, and that we don't\nhave to identify color itself with a mode of knowing, and the\nsituation changes. We know a color when we understand, just as we know\na thunder-storm when we understand. More generally speaking, the\nrelation of brain-change to consciousness is thought to be an\nessential part of the problem of knowledge. But if the brain is\ninvolved in knowing simply as part of the mechanism of acting, as the\nmechanism for co-ordinating partial and competing stimuli into a\nsingle scheme of response, as part of the mechanism of actual\nexperimental inquiry, there is no miracle about the participation of\nthe brain in knowing. One might as well make a problem of the fact\nthat it takes a hammer to drive a nail and takes a hand to hold the\nhammer as to make a problem out of the fact that it also requires a\nphysical structure to discover and to adapt the particular acts of\nholding and striking which are needed.\n\n_b_) The propositions of physical science are not found among the data\nof apprehension. Mathematical propositions may be disposed of by\nmaking them purely a priori; propositions about sense objects by\nmaking them purely a posteriori.[95] But physical propositions, such\nas make up physics, chemistry, biology, to say nothing of propositions\nof history, anthropology, and society, are neither one nor the other.\nI cannot state the case better than Mr. Russell has stated it,\nalthough, I am bound to add, the stating did not arouse in Mr. Russell\nany suspicion of the premises with which he was operating. \"Men of\nscience, for the most part, are willing to condemn immediate data as\n'merely subjective,' while yet maintaining the truth of the physics\ninferred from those data. But such an attitude, though it may be\n_capable_ of justification, obviously stands in need of it; and the\nonly justification possible must be one which exhibits matter as a\nlogical construction from sense data.... It is therefore necessary to\nfind some way of bridging the gulf between the world of physics and\nthe world of sense.\"[96] I do not see how anyone familiar with the\ntwo-world schemes which have played such a part in the history of\nhumanity can read this statement without depression. And if it\noccurred to one that the sole generating condition of _these_ two\nworlds is the assumption that sense objects are modes of apprehension\nor knowledge (are so intrinsically and not in the use made of them),\nhe might think it a small price to pay to inquire into the standing of\nthis assumption. For it was precisely the fact that sense perception\nand physical science appeared historically (in the seventeenth\ncentury) as rival modes of knowing the same world which led to the\nconception of sense objects as \"subjective\"--since they were so\ndifferent from the objects of science. Unless sense and science had\nboth first been thought of as modes of knowing and then as modes of\nknowing the same things, there would not have been the slightest\nreason for regarding immediate data, as \"merely subjective.\" They\nwould have been natural phenomena, like any other. That they are\nphenomena which involve the interaction of an organism with other\nthings is just an important discovery about them, as is also a\ndiscovery about starch in plants.\n\nPhysical science is the _knowledge_ of the world by their means. It is\na rival, not of them, but of the medley of prior dogmas,\nsuperstitions, and chance opinions about the world--a medley which\ngrew up and nourished precisely because of absence of a will to\nexplore and of a technique for detecting unambiguous data. That Mr.\nRussell, who is a professed realist, can do no better with the problem\n(once committed to the notion that sense objects are of themselves\n_objects_ of knowledge) than to hold that although the world of\nphysics is not a legitimate inference from sense data, it is a\npermissible logical construction from them--permissible in that it\ninvolves no logical inconsistencies--suggests that the pragmatic\ndifference between idealist and realist--of this type--is not very\ngreat. From necessary ideal constructions to permissible logical\nconstructions involves considerable difference in technique but no\nperceptible practical difference. And the point of this family\nlikeness is that both views spring from regarding sense perception and\nscience as ways of knowing the same objects, and hence as rivals until\nsome scheme of conciliation has been devised.\n\n_c_) It is but a variant of this problem to pass to what may be called\neither the ego-centric predicament or the private-public problem.\nSense data differ from individual to individual. If they are\nrecognized to be natural events, this variation is no more significant\nthan any change depending upon variation of generating conditions. One\ndoes not expect two lumps of wax at different distances from a hot\nbody to be affected exactly alike; the upsetting thing would be if\nthey were. Neither does one expect cast-iron to react exactly as does\nsteel. That organisms, because of different positions or different\ninternal structures, should introduce differences in the phenomena\nwhich they respectively have a share in producing is a fact of the\nsame nature. But make the sense qualities thus produced not natural\nevents (which may then be made either objects of inquiry or means of\ninquiry into something else) but modes of knowing, and every such\ndeviation marks a departure from true knowing: it constitutes an\nanomaly. Taken _en masse_ the deviations are so marked as to lead to\nthe conclusion (even on the part of a realist like Mr. Russell) that\nthey constitute a world of private existences, which, however, may be\ncorrelated without logical inconsistency with other such worlds. Not\nall realists are Leibnizian monadists as is Mr. Russell; I do not wish\nto leave the impression that all come to just this solution. But all\nwho regard sense data as apprehensions have on their hands in some\nform the problem of the seemingly distorting action exercised by the\nindividual knower upon a public or common thing known or believed in.\n\nIV\n\nI am not trying to discuss or solve these problems. On the contrary, I\nam trying to show that these problems exist only because of the\nidentification of a datum determined with reference to control of\ninference with a self-sufficient knowledge-object. As against this\nassumption I point to the following facts. What is actually given as\nmatter of empirical fact may be indefinitely complicated and diffused.\nAs empirically existent, perceived objects never constitute the whole\nscope of the given; they have a context of indefinite extent in which\nthey are set. To control inference it is necessary to analyze this\ncomplex situation--to determine what is data for inference and what is\nirrelevant. This analysis involves discriminative resolution into more\nultimate simples. The resources of experimentation, all sorts of\nmicroscopic, telescopic, and registering apparatus, are called in to\nperform that analysis. As a result we differentiate not merely visual\ndata from auditory--a discrimination effected by experiments within\nthe reach of everybody--but a vast multitude of visual and auditory\ndata. Physics and physiology and anatomy all play a part in the\nanalysis. We even carry the analysis to the point of regarding, say, a\ncolor as a self-included object unreferred to any other object. We may\navoid a false inference by conceiving it, not as a quality of any\nobject, but as merely a product of a nervous stimulation and\nreaction. Instead of referring it to a ribbon or piece of paper we may\nrefer it to the organism. But this is only as a part of the technique\nof suspended inference. We avoid some habitual inference in order to\nmake a more careful inference.\n\nThus we escape, by a straightening out of our logic (by avoiding\nerecting a system of logical distinctions and checks into a\nmythological natural history), the epistemological problems. We also\navoid the contradiction which haunts every epistemological scheme so\nfar propounded. As matter of fact every proposition regarding what is\n\"given\" to sensation or perception is dependent upon the assumption of\na vast amount of scientific knowledge which is the result of a\nmultitude of prior analyses, verifications, and inferences. What a\ncombination of Tantalus and Sisyphus we get when we fancy that we have\ncleared the slate of all these material implications, fancy that we\nhave really started with simple and independent givens, and then try\nto show how from these original givens we can arrive at the very\nknowledge which we have all the time employed in the discovery and\nfixation of the simple sense data![97]\n\n\nSCIENCE AS A PRACTICAL ART\n\nNo one will deny that, as seen from one angle science is a pursuit, an\nenterprise--a mode of practice. It is at least that, no matter how\nmuch more or else it is. In course of the practice of knowing\ndistinctive practical judgments will then naturally be made.\nEspecially does this hold good when an intellectual class is\ndeveloped, when there is a body of persons working at knowing as\nanother body is working at farming or engineering. Moreover, the\ninstrumentalities of this inquiring class gain in importance for all\nclasses in the degree in which it is realized that success in the\nconduct of the practice of farming or engineering or medicine depends\nupon use of the successes achieved in the business of knowing. The\nimportance of the latter is thrown into relief from another angle if\nwe consider the enterprises, like diplomacy, politics, and, to a\nconsiderable extent, morals, which do not acknowledge a thoroughgoing\nand constant dependence upon the practice of science. As Hobbes was\nwont to say, the advantages of a science of morals are most obvious in\nthe evils which we suffer from its lack.\n\nTo say that something is to be learned, is to be found out, is to be\nascertained or proved or believed, is to say that something is to be\ndone. Every such proposition in the concrete is a practical\nproposition. Every such proposition of inquiry, discovery and testing\nwill have then the traits assigned to the class of practical\npropositions. They imply an incomplete situation going forward to\ncompletion, and the proposition as a specific organ of carrying on the\nmovement. I have not the intention of dwelling at length upon this\ntheme. I wish to raise in as definite and emphatic a way as possible a\ncertain question. Suppose that the propositions arising within the\n_practice_ of knowing and functioning as agencies in its conduct could\nbe shown to present all the distinctions and relations characteristic\nof the subject-matter of logic: what would be the conclusion? To an\nunbiased mind the question probably answers itself: All purely logical\nterms and propositions fall within the scope of the class of\npropositions of inquiry as a special form of propositions of practice.\nMy further remarks are not aimed at _proving_ that the case accords\nwith the hypothesis propounded, but are intended to procure\nhospitality for the hypothesis.\n\nIf thinking is the art by which knowledge is practiced, then the\nmaterials with which thinking deals may be supposed, by analogy with\nthe other arts, to take on in consequence special shapes. The man who\nis making a boat will give wood a form which it did not have, in order\nthat it may serve the purposes to which it is to be put. Thinking may\nthen be supposed to give its material the form which will make it\namenable to its purpose--attaining knowledge, or, as it is ordinarily\nput, going from the unknown to the known. That physical analysis and\nsynthesis are included in the processes of investigation of natural\nobjects makes them a part of the practice of knowing. And it makes any\ngeneral traits which result in consequence of such treatment\ncharacters of _objects as they are involved in knowledge-getting_.\nThat is to say, if there are any features which natural existences\nassume in order that inference may be more fertile and more safe than\nit would otherwise be, those features correspond to the special traits\nwhich would be given to wood in process of constructing a boat. They\nare manufactured, without being any worse because of it. The question\nwhich I raised in the last paragraph may then be restated in this\nfashion: Are there such features? If there are, are they like those\ncharacters which books on logic talk about?\n\nComparison with language may help us. Language--I confine myself for\nconvenience to spoken language--consists of sounds. But it does not\nconsist simply of those sounds which issue from the human organs prior\nto the attempt to communicate. It has been said that an American baby\nbefore talking makes almost every sound found in any language. But\nelimination takes place. And so does intensification. Certain sounds\noriginally slurred over are made prominent; the baby has to work for\nthem and the work is one which he neither undertakes nor accomplishes\nexcept under the incitation of others. Language is chiefly marked off,\nhowever, by articulation; by the arrangement of what is selected into\nan orderly sequence of vowels and consonants with certain rules of\nstress, etc. It may fairly be said that speech is a manufactured\narticle: it consists of natural ebullitions of sound which have been\nshaped for the sake of being effective instrumentalities of a purpose.\nFor the most part the making has gone on under the stress of the\nnecessities of communication with little deliberate control. Works on\nphonetics, dictionaries, grammars, rhetorics, etc., mark some\nparticipation of deliberate intention in the process of manufacture.\nIf we bring written language into the account, we should find the\nconscious factor extended somewhat. But making, shaping for an end,\nthere is, whether with or without conscious control.\n\nNow while there is something in the antecedent properties of sound\nwhich enters into the determination of speech, the _worth_ of speech\nis in no way measured by faithfulness to these antecedent properties.\nIt is measured only by its efficiency and economy in realizing the\nspecial results for which it is constructed. Written language need not\nlook like sounds any more than sounds look like objects. It must\n_represent_ articulate sounds, but faithful representation is wholly a\nmatter of carrying the mind to the same outcome, of exercising the\nsame function, not of resemblance or copying. Original structure\n_limits_ what may be made out of anything: one cannot (at least at\npresent) make a silk purse out of pigs' bristles. But this\nconditioning relationship is very different from one in which the\nantecedent existences are a model or prototype to which the\nconsequent must be servilely faithful. The boatmaker must take account\nof the grain and strength of his wood. To take account of, to reckon\nwith, is a very different matter, however, from repetition or literal\nloyalty. The measure is found in the consequences for which existences\nare used.\n\nI wish, of course, to suggest that logical traits are just features of\noriginal existences as they have been worked over for use in\ninference, as the traits of manufactured articles are qualities of\ncrude materials modified for specific purposes. Upon the whole, past\ntheories have vibrated between treating logical traits as\n\"subjective,\" something resident in \"mind\" (mind being thought of as\nan immaterial or psychical existence independent of natural things and\nevents), and ascribing ontological pre-existence to them. Thus far in\nthe history of thought, each method has flourished awhile and then\ncalled out a reaction to its opposite. The reification (I use the word\nhere without prejudice) of logical traits has taken both an Idealistic\nform (because of emphasis upon their spiritual or ideal nature and\nstuff) and a Realistic one, due to emphasis upon their immediate\napprehension and givenness. That mathematics have been from Plato to\nDescartes and contemporary analytic realism the great provocative of\nRealistic Idealisms is a familiar fact. The hypothesis here propounded\nis a _via media_. What has been overlooked is the reality and\nimportance of art and its works. The tools and works of art are\nneither mental, subjective things, nor are they antecedent entities\nlike crude or raw material. They are the latter shaped for a purpose.\nIt is impossible to overstate their objectivity from the standpoint of\ntheir existence and their efficacy within the operations in question;\nnor their objectivity in the sense of their dependence upon prior\nnatural existences whose traits have to be taken account of, or\nreckoned with, by the operations of art. In the case of the art of\ninference, the art securely of going from the given to the absent, the\ndependence of mind upon inference, the fact that wherever inference\noccurs we have a conscious agent--one who recognizes, plans, invents,\nseeks out, deliberates, anticipates, and who, reacting to\nanticipations, fears, hates, desires, etc.--explains the theories\nwhich, because of misconception of the nature of mind and\nconsciousness, have labeled logical distinctions psychical and\nsubjective. In short, the theory shows why logical features have been\nmade into ontological entities and into mental states.\n\nTo elaborate this thesis would be to repeat what has been said in all\nthe essays of this volume. I wish only to call attention to certain\nconsiderations which may focus other discussions upon this hypothesis.\n\n1. The existence of inference is a fact, a fact as certain and\nunquestioned as the existence of eyes or ears or the growth of plants,\nor the circulation of the blood. One observes it taking place\neverywhere where human beings exist. A student of the history of man\nfinds that history is composed of beliefs, institutions, and customs\nwhich are inexplicable without acts of inference. This fact of\ninference is as much a datum--a hard fact--for logical theory as any\nsensory quality whatsoever. It is something men do as they walk, chew,\nor jump. There is nothing a priori or ideological about it. It is just\na brute empirically observable event.\n\n2. Its importance is almost as conspicuous as its existence. Every act\nof human life, not springing from instinct or mechanical habit,\ncontains it; most habits are dependent upon some amount of it for\ntheir formation, as they are dependent upon it for their readaptation\nto novel circumstances. From the humblest act of daily life to the\nmost intricate calculations of science and the determination and\nexecution of social, legal, and political policies, things are used as\nsigns, indications, or evidence from which one proceeds to something\nelse not yet directly given.\n\n3. The act of inferring takes place naturally, i.e., without\nintention. It is at first something we do, not something which we\n_mean_ to do. We do it as we breathe or walk or gesture. Only after it\nis done do we notice it and reflect upon it--and the great mass of men\nno more reflect upon it after its occurrence than they reflect upon\nthe process of walking and try to discover its conditions and\nmechanism. That an individual, an animal organism, a man or a woman\nperforms the acts is to say something capable of direct proof through\nappeal to observation; to say that something called mind, or\nconsciousness does it is itself to employ inference and dubious\ninference. The fact of inference is much surer, in other words, than\nthat of a particular inference, such as that to something called\nreason or consciousness, in connection with it; save as mind is but\nanother word for the fact of inference, in which case of course it\ncannot be re-referred to as its cause, source, or author. Moreover, by\nall principles of science, inference cannot be referred to mind or\nconsciousness as its condition, unless there is _independent_ proof of\nthe existence of that mind to which it is referred. Prima facie we are\nconscious or aware _of_ inference precisely as we are of anything\nelse, not by introspection of something within the very consciousness\nwhich is supposed to be its source, but by observation of something\ntaking place in the world--as we are conscious of walking _after_ we\nhave walked. After it has been done naturally--or \"unconsciously\"--it\nmay be done \"consciously,\" that is, with intent or on purpose. But\nthis means that it is done _with_ consciousness (whatever\nconsciousness may be discovered to mean), not that it is done _by_\nconsciousness. Now if other natural events characteristic only (so far\nas can be ascertained) of highly organized beings are marked by unique\nor by distinctive traits, there is good ground for the assumption\nthat inference will be so marked. As we do not find the circulation of\nblood or the stimulation of nerves in a stone, and as we expect as a\nmatter of course to find peculiar conditions, qualities, and\nconsequences in the being where such operations occur, so we do not\nfind the act of inference in a stone, and we expect peculiar\nconditions, qualities, and consequences in whatever beings perform the\nact. Unless, in other words, all the ordinary canons of inquiry are\nsuspended, inference is not an isolated nor a merely formal event. As\nagainst the latter, it has its own distinctive structure and\nproperties; as against the former, it has specific generating\nconditions and specific results.\n\n4. Possibly all this seems too obvious for mention. But there is often\na virtual conspiracy in philosophy, not to mention obvious things nor\nto dwell upon them: otherwise remote speculations might be brought to\na sudden halt. The point of these commonplaces resides in the push\nthey may give anyone to engage in a search for _distinctive features\nin the act of inference_. The search may perhaps be best initiated by\nnoting the seeming inconsistency between what has been said about\ninference as an art and inference as a natural, unpremeditated\noccurrence. The obvious function of spontaneous inference is to bring\nbefore an agent absent considerations to which he may respond as he\notherwise responds to the stimulating force of the given situation. To\ninfer rain is to enable one to behave _now_ as given conditions would\nnot otherwise enable him to conduct himself. This instigation to\nbehave toward the remote in space or time is the primary trait of the\ninferential act; descriptively speaking, the act consists in taking up\nan attitude of response to an absent thing as if it were present. But\njust because the thing is absent, the attitude taken may be either\nirrelevant and positively harmful or extremely pertinent and\nadvantageous. We may infer rain when rain is not going to happen, and\nacting upon the inference be worse off than if there had been no\ninference. Or we may make preparations, which we would not otherwise\nhave made; the rain may come, and the inference save our lives--as the\nark saved Noah. Inference brings, in short, truth and falsity into the\nworld, just as definitely as the circulation of the blood brings its\ndistinctive consequences, both advantages and liabilities into the\nworld, or as the existence of banking brings with it consequences of\nbusiness extension and of bankruptcy not previously existent. If the\nreader objects to the introduction of the terms \"truth\" and \"falsity\",\nI am perfectly willing to leave the choice of words to him, provided\nthe fact is recognized that through inference men are capable of a\nkind of success and exposed to a kind of failure not otherwise\npossible: dependent upon the fact that inference takes absent things\nas being in a certain real continuum with present things, so that our\nattitude toward the latter is bound up with our reaction to the\nformer as parts of the same situation. And in any event, I wish to\nprotest against a possible objection to the introduction of the terms\n\"false\" and \"true.\" It may be said that inference is not responsible\nfor the occurrence of errors and truths, because these accompany\nsimple apprehensions where there is no inference: as when I see a\nsnake which isn't there--or any other case which may appear to the\nobjector to afford an illustration of his point. The objection\nillustrates my point. To affirm a snake is to affirm potentialities\ngoing beyond what is actually given; it says that what is given is\n_going_ to do something--the doing characteristic of a snake, so that\nwe are to react to the given as to a snake. Or if we take the case of\na face in the cloud recognized as a phantasy; then (to say nothing of\n\"in the cloud\" which involves reference beyond the given) \"phantasy,\"\n\"dream,\" equally means a reference to objects and considerations _not_\ngiven as the actual datum is given.\n\nWe have not got very far with our question of distinctive, unique\ntraits called into existence by inference, but we have got far enough\nto have light upon what is called the \"transcendence\" of knowledge.\nAll inference is a _going beyond_ the assuredly present to an absent.\nHence it is a more or less precarious journey. It is transcending\nlimits of security of immediate response. The stone which reacts only\nto stimuli of the present, not of the future, cannot make the\nmistakes which a being reacting to a future taken to be connected with\nthe present is sure to make. But it is important to note just what\nthis transcendence consists in. It has nothing to do with transcending\nmental states to arrive at an external object. _It is behaving to the\ngiven situation as involving something not given._ It is Robinson\nCrusoe going from a seen foot to an unseen man, not from a mental\nstate to something unmental.\n\n5. The mistakes and failures resulting from inference constitute the\nground for transition from natural spontaneous performance to a\ntechnique or deliberate art of inference. There is something humorous\nabout the discussion of the problem of error as if it were a rare or\nexceptional thing--an anomaly--when the barest glance at human history\nshows that mistakes have been the rule, and that truth lies at the\nbottom of a well. As to inferences bound up with barely keeping alive,\nman has had to effect a considerable balance of good guesses over bad.\nAside from this somewhat narrow field, the original appearance of\ninference upon the scene probably added to the interest of life rather\nthan to its efficiency. If the classic definition of man as a rational\nanimal means simply an inferring or guessing animal, it applies to the\nnatural man, for it allows for the guesses being mostly wrong. If it\nis used with its customary eulogistic connotations, it applies only to\nman chastened to the use of a hardly won and toilsome art. If it\nalleges that man has any natural preference for a reasonable inference\nor that the rationality of an inference is a measure of its hold upon\nhim, it is grotesquely wrong. To propagate this error is to encourage\nman in his most baleful illusion, and to postpone the day of an\neffective and widespread adoption of a perfected art of knowing.\n\nSummarily put, the waste and loss consequent upon the natural\nhappening of inference led man, slowly and grudgingly, to the adoption\nof safeguards in its performance. In some part, the scope of which is\neasily exaggerated, man has come to attribute many of the ills from\nwhich he suffers to his own premature, inept, and unguarded performing\nof inference, instead of to fate, bad luck, and accident. In some\nthings, and to some extent in all things, he has invented and\nperfected an art of inquiry: a system of checks and tests to be used\nbefore the conclusion of inference is categorically affirmed. Its\nnature has been considered in many other places in these pages, but it\nmay prove instructive to restate it in this context.\n\n_a_) Nothing is less adapted to a successful accomplishing of an\ninference than the subject-matter from which it ordinarily fares\nforth. That subject-matter is a nest of obscurities and ambiguities.\nThe ordinary warnings against trusting to imagination, the bad name\nwhich has come intellectually to attach to fancy, are evidences that\nanything may suggest anything. Regarding most of the important\nhappenings in life no inference has been too extravagant to obtain\nfollowers and influence action, because subject-matter was so\nvariegated and complex that any objects which it suggested had a prima\nfacie plausibility. That every advance in knowledge has been effected\nby using agencies which break up a complex subject-matter into\nindependent variables (from each of which a distinct inference may be\ndrawn), and by attacking each one of these things by every conceivable\ntool for further resolution so as to make sure we are dealing with\nsomething so simple as to be unambiguous, is the report of the history\nof science. It is sometimes held that knowledge comes ultimately to a\nnecessity of belief, or acceptance, which is the equivalent of an\nincapacity to think otherwise than so and so. Well, even in the case\nof such an apparently simple \"self-evident\" thing as a red, this\ninability, if it is worth anything, is a residuum from experimental\nanalysis. We do not believe in the thing as red (whenever there is a\nneed of scientific testing) till we have exhausted all kinds of active\nattack and find the red still resisting and persisting. Ordinarily we\nmove the head; we shade the eyes; we turn the thing over; we take it\nto a different light. The use of lens, prism, or whatever device, is\nsimply carrying farther the use of like methods as of physical\nresolution. Whatever endures all these active (not mental) attacks, we\naccept--pending invention of more effective weapons. To make sure\nthat a given fact _is_ just and such a shade of red is, one may say, a\nfinal triumph of scientific method. To turn around and treat it as\nsomething naturally or psychologically given is a monstrous\nsuperstition.\n\nWhen assured, such a simple datum is for the sake of guarding the act\nof inference. Color may mean a lot of things; any red may mean a lot\nof things; such things are ambiguous; they afford unreliable evidence\nor signs. To get the color down to the last touch of possible\ndiscrimination is to limit its range of testimony; ideally, it is to\nsecure a voice which says but one thing and says that unmistakably.\nIts simplicity is not identical with isolation, but with _specified_\nrelationship. Thus the hard \"facts,\" the brute data, the simple\nqualities or ideas, the sense elements of traditional and of\ncontemporary logic, get placed and identified within the art of\ncontrolling inference. The allied terms \"self-evident,\" \"sensory\ntruths,\" \"simple apprehensions\" have their meanings unambiguously\ndetermined in this same context; while apart from it they are the\nsource of all kinds of error. They are no longer notions to conjure\nwith. They express the last results attainable by present physical\nmethods of discriminative analysis employed in the search for\ndependable data for inference. Improve the physical means of\nexperimentation, improve the microscope or the registering apparatus\nor the chemical reagent, and they may be replaced tomorrow by new,\nsimple apprehensions of simple and ultimate data.\n\n_b_) Natural or spontaneous inference depends very largely upon the\nhabits of the individual in whom inferring takes place. These habits\ndepend in turn very largely upon the customs of the social group in\nwhich he has been brought up. An eclipse suggests very different\nthings according to the rites, ceremonies, legends, traditions, etc.,\nof the group to which the spectator belongs. The average layman in a\ncivilized group may have no more personal science than an Australian\nBushman, but the legends which determine his reactions are different.\nHis inference is better, neither because of superior intellectual\ncapacity, nor because of more careful personal methods of knowing, but\nbecause his instruction has been superior. The instruction of a\nscientific inquirer in the best scientific knowledge of his day is\njust as much a part of the control (or art) of inference as is the\ntechnique of observational analysis which he uses. As the bulk of\nprior ascertainments increases, the tendency is to identify this stock\nof learning, this store of achieved truth, with knowledge. There is no\nobjection to this identification save as it leads the logician or\nepistemologist to ignore that which _made_ it \"knowledge\" (that which\ngives it a right to the title), and as a consequence to fall into two\nerrors: one, overlooking its function in the guidance and handling of\nfuture inferences; the other, confusing the mere act of reference to\nwhat is known (known so far as it has accrued from prior tested\ninquiries) with knowing. To remind myself of what is known as to the\ntopic with which I am dealing is an indispensable performance, but to\ncall this reminder \"knowing\" (as the presentative realist usually\ndoes) is to confuse a psychological event with a logical achievement.\nIt is from misconception of this act of reminding one's self of what\nis known, as a check in some actual inquiry, that arise most of the\nfallacies about simple acquaintance, mere apprehension, etc.--the\nfallacies which eliminate inquiry and inferring from knowledge.\n\n_c_) The art of inference gives rise to specific features\ncharacterizing the _inferred_ thing. The natural man reacts to the\nsuggested thing as he would to something present. That is, he tends to\naccept it uncritically. The man called up by the footprint on the sand\nis just as real a man as the footprint is a real footprint. It is a\n_man_, not the idea of a man, which is indicated. What a thing means\nis another _thing_; it doesn't mean a meaning. The only difference is\nthat the thing indicated is farther off, or more concealed, and hence\n(probably) more mysterious, more powerful and awesome, on that\naccount. The man indicated to Crusoe by the footprints was like a man\nof menacing powers seen at a distance through a telescope. Things\nnaturally inferred are accepted, in other words, by the natural man on\naltogether too realistic a basis for adequate control; they impose\nthemselves too directly and irretrievably. There are no alternatives\nsave either acceptance or rejection _in toto_. What is needed for\ncontrol is some device by which they can be treated for just what they\nare, namely, _inferred_ objects which, however assured as objects of\n_prior_ experiences, are uncertain as to their existence in connection\nwith the object from which present inference sets out. While more\ncareful inspection of the given object--to see if it be really a\nfootprint, how fresh, etc.--may do much for safe-guarding inference;\nand while forays into whatever else is known may help, there is still\nneed for something else. We need some method of freely examining and\nhandling the object in its status as an inferred object. This means\nsome way of detaching it, as it were, from the particular act of\ninference in which it presents itself. Without some such detachment,\nCrusoe can never get into a free and effective relation with the man\nindicated by the footprint. He can only, so to speak, go on repeating,\nwith continuously increasing fright, \"There's a man about, there's a\nman about.\" The \"man\" needs to be treated, not as man, but as\nsomething having a merely inferred and hence potential status; as a\nmeaning or thought, or \"idea.\" There is a great difference between\nmeaning and _a_ meaning. Meaning is simply a function of the\nsituation: this thing means that thing: meaning is this relationship.\nA meaning is something quite different; it is not a function, but a\nspecific entity, a peculiar thing, namely the man _as_ suggested.\n\nWords are the great instrument of translating a relation of inference\nexisting between two things into a new kind of thing which can be\noperated with on its own account; the term of discourse or reflection\nis the solution of the requirement for greater flexibility and\nliberation. Let me repeat: Crusoe's inquiry can play freely around and\nabout the man inferred from the footprint only as he can, so to say,\nget away from the immediate suggestive force of the footprint. As it\noriginally stands, the man suggested is on the same coercive level as\nthe suggestive footprint. They are related, tied together. But a\ngesture, a sound, may be used as a _substitute_ for the thing\ninferred. It exists independently of the footprint and may therefore\nbe thought about and ideally experimented with irrespective of the\nfootprint. It at once preserves the meaning-force of the situation and\ndetaches it from the immediacy of the situation. It is a meaning, an\nidea.\n\nHere we have, I submit, the explanation of notions, forms, essences,\nterms, subsistences, ideas, meanings, etc. They are surrogates of the\nobjects of inference of such a character that they may be elaborated\nand manipulated exactly as primary things may be, so far as inference\nis concerned. They can be brought into relation with one another,\nquite irrespective of the things which originally suggested them.\nWithout such free play reflective inquiry is mockery, and control of\ninference an impossibility. When a speck of light suggests to the\nastronomer a comet, he would have nothing to do but either to accept\nthe inferred object as a real one, or to reject it as a mere fancy\nunless he could treat \"comet\" for the time being not as a thing at\nall, but as a meaning, a conception; a meaning having, moreover, by\nconnection with other meanings, implications--meanings consequent from\nit. Unless a meaning is an inferred object, detached and fixed as a\nterm capable of independent development, what sort of a ghostly Being\nis it? Except on the basis stated, what is the transition from the\nfunction of meaning to _a_ meaning as an entity in reasoning? And,\nonce more, unless there is such a transition, is reasoning possible?\n\nCats have claws and teeth and fur. They do not have implications. No\nphysical thing has implications. The _term_ \"cat\" has implications.\nHow can this difference be explained? On the ground that we cannot use\nthe \"cat\" object inferred from given indications in such a way as will\ntest the inference and make it fruitful, helpful, unless we can detach\nit from its existential dependence upon the particular things which\nsuggest it. We need to know what a cat would be _if_ it were there;\nwhat other things would also be indicated if the cat is really\nindicated. We therefore create a _new_ object: we take something to\nstand for the cat-in-its-status-as-inferred in contrast with the cat\nas a live thing. A sound or a visible mark is the ordinary mechanism\nfor producing such a new object. Whatever the physical means employed,\nwe now have a new object; a term, a meaning, a notion, an essence, a\nform or species, according to the terminology which may be in vogue.\nIt is as much a specific existence as any sound or mark is. But it is\na mark which notes, concentrates, and records an outcome of an\ninference which is not yet accepted and affirmed. That is to say, it\ndesignates an object which is _not yet_ to be reacted to as one reacts\nto the given stimulus, but which is an object of further examination\nand inquiry, a medium of a postponed conclusion and of investigation\ncontinued till better grounds for affirming an object (making a\ndefinite, unified response) are given. _A term is an object so far as\nthat object is undergoing shaping in a directed act of inquiry._ It\nmay be called a possible object or a hypothetical object. Such objects\ndo not walk or bite or scratch, but they are nevertheless actually\npresent as the vital agencies of reflection. If we but forget where\nthey live and operate--within the event of controlled inference--we\nhave on our hands all the mysteries of the double world of existence\nand essence, particular and universal, thing and idea, ordinary life\nand science. For the world of science, especially of mathematical\nscience, is the world of considerations which have approved themselves\nto be effectively regulative of the operations of inference. It is\neasier to wash with ordinary water than with H{2}O, and there is a\nmarked difference between falling off a building and 1/2_gt_^{2}. But\nH{2}O and 1/2_gt_^{2} are as potent for the distinctive act of\ninference--as genuine and distinctive an act as washing the hands or\nrolling down hill--as ordinary water and falling are impotent.\n\nScientific men can handle these things-of-inference precisely as the\nblacksmith handles his tools. They are not thoughts as they are\nordinarily used, not even in the logical sense of thought. They are\nrather things whose manipulation (as the blacksmith manipulates his\ntools) yield knowledge--or methods of knowledge--with a minimum of\nrecourse to thinking and a maximum of efficiency. When one considers\nthe importance of the enterprise of knowledge, it is not surprising\nthat appropriate tools have been devised for carrying it on, and that\nthese tools have no prototypes in pre-existent materials. They are\nreal objects, but they are just the real objects which they are and\nnot some other objects.\n\n\nTHEORY AND PRACTICE\n\nOur last paragraphs have touched upon the nature of science. They\ncontain, by way of intimation, an explanation of the distance which\nlies between the things of daily intercourse and the terms of science.\nControlled inference is science, and science is, accordingly, a highly\nspecialized industry. It is such a specialized mode of practice that\nit does not appear to be a mode of practice at all. This high\nspecialization is part of the reason for the current antithesis of\ntheory and practice, knowledge and conduct, the other part being the\nsurvival of the ancient conception of knowledge as intuitive and\ndialectical--the conception which is set forth in the Aristotelian\nlogic.\n\nStarting from the hypothesis that the art of controlled inference\nrequires for its efficient exercise specially adapted entities, it\nfollows that the various sciences are the various forms which the\nindustry of controlled inquiry assumes. It follows that the\nconceptions and formulations of the sciences--physical and\nmathematical--concern things which have been reshaped in view of the\nexigencies of regulated and fertile inference. To get things into the\nestate where such inference is practicable, many qualities of the\nwater and air, cats and dogs, stones and stars, of daily intercourse\nwith the world have been dropped or depressed. Much that was trivial\nor remote has been elevated and exaggerated. Neither the omissions nor\nthe accentuations are arbitrary. They are purposeful. They represent\nthe changes in the things of ordinary life which are needed to\nsafeguard the important business of inference.\n\nThere is then a great difference between the entities of science and\nthe things of daily life. This may be fully acknowledged. But unless\nthe admission is accompanied by an ignoring of the function of\ninference, it creates no problem of conciliation, no need of\napologizing for either one or the other. It generates no problem of\nthe real and the apparent. The \"real\" or \"true\" objects of science are\nthose which best fulfil the demands of secure and fertile inference.\nTo arrive at them is such a difficult operation, there are so many\nspecious candidates clamoring for the office, that it is no wonder\nthat when the objects suitable for inference are constituted, they\ntend to impose themselves as _the_ real objects, in comparison with\nwhich the things of ordinary life are but impressions made upon us\n(according to much modern thought), or defective samples of\nBeing--according to much of ancient thought. But one has only to note\nthat their genuinely characteristic feature is fitness for the aims of\ninference to awaken from the nightmare of all such problems. They\ndiffer from the things of the common world of action and association\nas the means and ends of one occupation differ from those of another.\nThe difference is not that which exists between reality and\nappearance, but is that between the subject-matter of crude\noccupations and of a highly specialized and difficult art, upon the\nsuccess of which (so it is discovered) the progress of other\noccupations ultimately depends.\n\nThe entities of science are not only _from_ the scientist; they are\nalso _for_ him. They express, that is, not only the outcome of\nreflective inquiries, but express them in the particular form in\nwhich they can enter most directly and efficiently into subsequent\ninquiries. The fact that they are sustained within the universe of\ninquiry accounts for their remoteness from the things of daily life,\nthe latter being promptly precipitated out of suspense in such\nsolutions. That most of the immediate qualities of things (including\nthe so-called secondary qualities) are dropped signifies that such\nqualities have not turned out to be fruitful for inference. That\nmathematical, mechanical, and \"primary\" distinctions and relations\nhave come to constitute the proper subject-matter of science signifies\nthat they represent such qualities of original things as are most\nmanipular for knowledge-getting or assured and extensive inference.\nConsider what a hard time the scientific man had in getting away from\nother qualities, and how the more immediate qualities have been\npressed upon him from all quarters, and it is not surprising that he\ninclines to think of the intellectually useful properties as alone\n\"real\" and to relegate all others to a quasi-illusory field. But his\nvictory is now sufficiently achieved so that this tension may well\nrelax; it may be acknowledged that the difference between scientific\nentities and ordinary things is one of function, the former being\nselected and arranged for the successful conduct of inferential\nknowings.\n\nI conclude with an attempt to show how bootless the ordinary\nantithesis between knowledge (or theory) and practice becomes when we\nrecognize that it really involves only a contrast between the kinds of\njudgments appropriate to ordinary modes of practice and those\nappropriate to the specialized industry of knowledge-getting.\n\nIt is not true that to insist that scientific propositions fall within\nthe domain of practice is to depreciate them. On its face, the\ninsistence means simply that all knowledge involves experimentation,\nwith whatever appliances are suited to the problem in hand, of an\nactive and physical type. Instead of this doctrine leading to a low\nestimate of knowledge, the contrary is the case. This art of\nexperimental thinking turns out to give the key to the control and\ndevelopment of other modes of practice. I have touched elsewhere in\nthese essays upon the way in which knowledge is the instrument of\nregulation of our human undertakings, and I have also pointed out that\nintrinsic increments of meaning accrue in consequence of thinking. I\nwish here to point how that mode of practice which is called\ntheorizing emancipates experience--how it makes for steady progress.\nNo matter how much specialized skill improves, we are restricted in\nthe degree in which our ends remain constant or fixed. Significant\nprogress, progress which is more than technical, depends upon ability\nto foresee new and different results and to arrange conditions for\ntheir effectuation. Science is the instrument of increasing our\ntechnique in attaining results already known and cherished. More\nimportant yet, it is the method of emancipating us from enslavement to\ncustomary ends, the ends established in the past.\n\nLet me borrow from political philosophy a kind of caricature of the\nfacts. As social philosophers used to say that the state came into\nexistence when individuals agreed to surrender some of their native\npersonal rights for the sake of getting the advantages of\nnon-interference and aid from others who made a like surrender, so we\nmight say that science began when men gave up the claim to form the\nstructure of knowledge each from himself as a center and measure of\nmeaning--when there was an agreement to take an impersonal standpoint.\nNon-scientific modes of practice, left to their natural growth,\nrepresent, in other words, arrangements of objects which cluster about\nthe self, and which are closely tied down to the habits of the self.\nScience or theory means a system of objects detached from any\nparticular personal standpoint, and therefore available for any and\nevery possible personal standpoint. Even the exigencies of ordinary\nsocial life require a slight amount of such detachment or abstraction.\nI must neglect my own peculiar ends enough to take some account of my\nneighbor if I am going to be intelligible to him. I must at least find\ncommon ground. Science systematizes and indefinitely extends this\nprinciple. It takes its stand, not with what is common with some\nparticular neighbor living at this especial date in this particular\nvillage, but with any possible neighbor in the wide stretches of time\nand space. And it does so by the mere fact that it is continually\nreshaping its peculiar objects with an eye single to availability in\ninference. The more abstract, the more impersonal, the more\nimpartially objective are _its_ objects, the greater the variety and\nscope of inference made possible. Every street of experience which is\nlaid out by science has its tracks for transportation, and every line\nissues transfer checks to every other line. You and I may keep running\nin certain particular ruts, but conditions are provided for somebody\nelse to foresee--or infer--new combinations and new results. The\ndepersonalizing of the things of everyday practice becomes the chief\nagency of their repersonalizing in new and more fruitful modes of\npractice. The paradox of theory and practice is that theory is with\nrespect to all other modes of practice the most practical of all\nthings, and the more impartial and impersonal it is, the more truly\npractical it is. And this is the sole paradox.\n\nBut lest the man of science, the man of dominantly reflective habits,\nbe puffed up with his own conceits, he must bear in mind that\npractical application--that is, experiment--is a condition of his own\ncalling, that it is indispensable to the institution of knowledge or\ntruth. Consequently, in order that he keep his own balance, it is\nneeded that his findings be everywhere applied. The more their\napplication is confined within his own special calling, the less\nmeaning do the conceptions possess, and the more exposed they are to\nerror. The widest possible range of application is the means of the\ndeepest verification. As long as the specialist hugs his own results\nthey are vague in meaning and unsafe in content. That individuals in\nevery branch of human endeavor should be experimentalists engaged in\ntesting the findings of the theorist is the sole final guaranty for\nthe sanity of the theorist.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[78] _Scientific Method in Philosophy_, p. 57.\n\n[79] The analytic realists have shown a peculiar disinclination to\ndiscuss the nature of future consequences as terms of propositions.\nThey certainly are not identical with the mental act of referring to\nthem; they are \"objective\" to it. Do they, therefore, already subsist\nin some realm of subsistence? Or is subsistence but a name for the\nfact of logical reference, leaving the determination of the meaning of\n\"subsistence\" dependent upon a determination of the meaning of\n\"logical\"? More generally, what is the position of analytic realism\nabout the future?\n\n[80] Supposing the question to be that of some molten state of the\nearth in past geologic ages. Taken as the complete subject-matter of a\nproposition--or science--the facts discovered cannot be regarded as\ncausative of, or a mechanism of, the appearance of life. For by\ndefinition they form a closed system; to introduce reference to a\nfuture event is to deny the definition. Contrariwise, a statement of\nthat past condition of the earth as a mechanical condition of the\nlater emergence of life means that that past stage is taken not merely\nas past, but as in process of transition to its future, as in process\nof alteration in the direction of life. Change in this direction is an\nintegral part of a statement of the early stage of the earth's\nhistory. A purely geologic statement may be quite accurate in its own\nuniverse of discourse and yet quite incomplete and hence inaccurate in\nanother universe of discourse. That is to say, a geologist's\npropositions may accurately set forth a prior state of things, while\nignoring any reference to a later state entailed by them. But a\nwould-be philosophy may not ignore the implied future.\n\n[81] _Philosophical Essays_, pp. 104, 105.\n\n[82] _Sixth Meditation._\n\n[83] _Principles of Philosophy_, p. 90.\n\n[84] _Treatise of Human Nature_, Part III, sec. iii.\n\n[85] It is perhaps poor tactics on my part to complicate this matter\nwith anything else. But it is evident that \"passions\" and pains and\npleasures may be used as _evidences_ of something beyond themselves\n(as may the fact of being more than five feet high) and so get a\nrepresentative or cognitive status. Is there not also a prima facie\npresumption that all sensory qualities are of themselves bare\nexistences or occurrences without cognitive pretension, and that they\nacquire the latter status as signs or evidence of something else?\nEpistemological idealists or realists who admit the non-cognitive\ncharacter of pleasure and pain would seem to be under special\nobligations carefully to consider the thesis of the non-cognitive\nnature of all sensory qualities except as they are employed as\nindications or indexes of some other thing. This recognition frees\nlogic from the epistemological discussion of secondary qualities.\n\n[86] To readers who have grasped the thought of my argument, it may\nnot be meaningless to say that the typical idealistic fallacy is to\nimport into the direct experience the results of the intellectual or\nreflective examination, while that of realism is to treat the\nreflective operation as dealing with precisely the same subject-matter\nas the original act was concerned with--taking the good of \"reason\"\nand the good of immediate behavior to be the same sort of things. And\nboth fallacies will result from any assimilation of two different acts\nto one another through giving them both the title \"knowledge,\" and\nhence treating the difference between them as simply the difference\nbetween a direct apprehension and a mediated one.\n\n[87] Analytic realism ought to be favorable to such a hedonism; the\nfact that present-day analytic realists are not favorable would seem\nto indicate that they have not taken their logic seriously enough, but\nhave been restrained, by practical motives, from applying it\nthoroughly. To say that the moral life presents a high degree of\norganization and integration is to say something which is true, but is\nalso to say something which by the analytic logic calls for its\nresolution into ultimate and independent simples. Unless they accept\nthe pleasures and pains of Bentham as such ultimates, they are bound\nto present acceptable substitutes. But here they tend to shift their\nlogic and to make the fulfilment of some _organization_ (variously\ndefined) the standard good. Consistency would then admit the\nhypothesis that in _all_ cases an eventual organization rather than\nantecedent simples supply the standard of knowledge. Meanwhile the\nterm \"fulfilment\" (or any similar term) stands as an acknowledgment\nthat the organization in question is not something ontologically prior\nbut is one yet to be achieved.\n\n[88] It must not be overlooked that a mere reminder of an end\npreviously settled upon may operate as a sufficient stimulus to\naction. It is probably this act of calling the end to mind which the\nrealist confuses with knowledge, and therefore terms apprehension. But\nthere is nothing cognitive about it, any more than there is in\npressing a button to give the signal for an act already decided upon.\n\n[89] Upholders of this view generally disguise the assumption of\nrepetition by the notion that what is judged is progress in the\ndirection of approximation to an eternal value. But as matter of fact,\nprogress is never judged (as I have had repeated occasion to point\nout) by reference to a transcendent eternal value, but in reference to\nthe success of the end-in-view in meeting the needs and conditions of\nthe specific situation--a surrender of the doctrine in favor of the\none set forth in the text. Logically, the notion of progress as\napproximation has no place. The thesis should read that we always try\nto repeat a given value, but always fail as a matter of fact. And\nconstant failure is a queer name for progress.\n\n[90] See IX and X _ante_.\n\n[91] I use the term \"image\" in the sense of optics, not of psychology.\n\n[92] That something of the cognitive, something of the sign or term\nfunction, enters in as a catalyzer, so to speak, in even the most\naesthetic experiences, seems to be altogether probable, but that\nquestion it is not necessary to raise here.\n\n[93] The superstition that whatever influences the action of a\nconscious being must be an unconscious sensation or perception, if it\nis not a conscious one, should be summarily dismissed. We are active\nbeings from the start and are naturally, wholly apart from\nconsciousness, engaged in redirecting our action in response to\nchanges in our surroundings. _Alternative_ possibilities, and hence an\nindeterminate situation, change direct response into a response\nmediated by a perception as a sign of possibilities, that is, a\nphysiological stimulus into a perceived quality: a sensory datum.\n\n[94] Compare Woodbridge, _Journal of Philosophy and Psychology_, X, 5.\n\n[95] See Russell, _Scientific Method in Philosophy_, p. 53.\n\n[96] _Ibid._, p. 101.\n\n[97] See the essay on _The Existence of the World as a Logical\nProblem_.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\n    Analysis, 37 ff., 426 ff. _See also_ Data; Sensations.\n\n    Appreciation, 351 ff., 394.\n\n    Apprehension, simple (also Acquaintance), 15, 352, 380, 408, 420,\n      430. _See also_ Inference; Perception; Presentationalism.\n\n\n    Behavior, 221, 313, 354. _See also_ Consequences; Practical.\n\n    Bosanquet, B., 149 n.\n\n    Bush, W. T., 221 n., 250 n.\n\n\n    Conflict, as stimulus to thinking, 10 ff., 20, 24, III, 136 ff.,\n      163, 245, 341. _See also_ Practical.\n\n    Consciousness, 18, 221, 222, 234, 246.\n\n    Consequences, 31, 213, 308, 321 ff., 330 ff.\n\n    Constitutive thought, 130.\n\n\n    Data, 42 ff., 87, IV, VIII, XI, 345, 401, 427. _See also_ Sensations.\n\n    Deduction, 53, 435 ff.\n\n    Descartes, 350.\n\n    Design, 314 ff.\n\n    Desire, 364 ff.\n\n    Dialectic, 216.\n\n    Doubt, 184, 189, 195, 206, 212, 216, 248. _See also_ Conflict.\n\n\n    Ego-centric predicament, 263, 266, 410. _See also_ Subjectivity.\n\n    Ends and means, 340 ff., 367 ff., 371 ff.\n\n    Error, 398 ff.\n\n    Essence, 49, 58, 71, 288, 431 ff. _See also_ Meaning.\n\n    Evidence, 36, 39 ff., 226, 260, 392, 403. _See also_ Inference.\n\n    Experience, 2 ff., 10 n., 61 ff., 71 ff., 79, 122, 136 n., 241, 298,\n      334, 349, 412.\n\n    Experiment. _See_ Experience.\n\n\n    Facts. _See_ Data.\n\n\n    Genetic, 66, 92, 153.\n\n\n    Hedonism, 375 ff.\n\n    Hegel, 191.\n\n    Holt, E. B., 11 n.\n\n    Hume, 221 n., 350.\n\n    Hypothesis. _See_ Idea; Meaning.\n\n\n    Idea, 112, 116, 139, 179, 185 ff., VII, VIII, 239 ff., 304, 431.\n      _See also_ Meaning.\n\n    Idealism, 20 ff., 130 ff., 233 ff., 267 ff., 343, 358 n.\n\n    Illusions, 396 ff.\n\n    Image, 142 n., 251, 390.\n\n    Implication, 52 n., 433. _See also_ Inference.\n\n    Indeterminate, 334.\n\n    Inference, 36, 209 ff., 220, 259, 274 n., 280, 299, 402-13, 419 ff.,\n      423. _See also_ Data; Evidence; Ideas; Thinking.\n\n    Instrumentalism, 17, 30, 32, 38, 44, 85, 175, 230, 331.\n\n    Invaluable, 384.\n\n\n    James, William, 56, XII, 331, 348.\n\n    Jones, H., 129 n., 158, 159 n.\n\n\n    Klyce, S., 8-10 n.\n\n    Knowledge, 15 ff., 33, 64 ff., V, 222, 254 ff., 382, 429, 437 ff.\n      _See also_ Apprehension; Perception; Thinking.\n\n\n    Language, 51, 186, 416, 431, 434.\n\n    Locke, 433 ff.\n\n    Logical theory, 78, 81 ff., 97 ff., 134, 178, 201, 222, 336, 415.\n\n    Lotze, II-V, 350.\n\n\n    Mathematics, 29, 56, 64, 418, 434.\n\n    Mead, G. H., 228.\n\n    Meaning, 16 ff., 33, 46, 48, 55, 90, 115, IV, 158 ff., 199, 234,\n      309, 431 ff. _See also_ Essence; Idea.\n\n    Mechanism, 343.\n\n    Montague, W. P., 11 n.\n\n    Moore, A. W., 388.\n\n    Mill, J. S., 36, 197, 202, 220, 234 n.\n\n\n    Nature as norm, 405.\n\n\n    Organization, 5, 127, 293, 380.\n\n\n    Peirce, C. S., 306, 330.\n\n    Perception, 254 ff., 349, 390-413.\n\n    Perry, R. B., 266, 273 n.\n\n    Philosophy, 98 ff.\n\n    Practical, XII, XIII, XIV.\n\n    Pragmatism, XII, 346. _See also_ Conflict; Consequences; Purpose.\n\n    Presentationalism, IX.\n\n    Privacy, 228, 295. _See also_ Subjectivity.\n\n    Psychology, 67, 92, 94, 140, 155, 221, 296 ff., 404. _See also_\n      Logical theory.\n\n    Purpose, 12, 20, 42, 68 ff., 77.\n\n\n    Realism, 26 ff., 39 ff., 60, 72, 234, IX, X, 358, 377 n.\n\n    Reality, 437 ff.\n\n    Royce, J., 172 n.\n\n    Russell, B., XI, 336, 348, 403 ff.\n\n\n    Santayana, G., 18, 57.\n\n    Self. _See_ Subjectivity.\n\n    Sensation, 145 ff., 160 ff., 233, XI, 402 ff., 428. _See also_ Data.\n\n    Sidgwick, A., 52 n.\n\n    Sign. _See_ Evidence.\n\n    Subjectivity, 66 ff., 106, 112, 125, 142, 197, 226, 278, 325, 337,\n      364.\n\n    Suggestion, 47 ff., 437 ff.\n\n\n    Temporal place, 1, 19, 27, 95 ff., 182, 337 ff., 343.\n\n    Terms, 51 ff., 434 ff.\n\n    Thinking, 1 ff., 13, 31 ff., 75 ff., 128, 183, 235, II-VI.\n\n    Transcendence, 424.\n\n    Truth, 24, 63, 181, 224, 231, 240, 304, 310, 316, 346, 387, 392, 423.\n\n    Two worlds, 409, 434.\n\n\n    Value, 349-89.\n\n\n    Woodbridge, F. J. E., 234 n., 250 n., 398 n., 400.\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTranscriber's Notes:\n\nObvious printer's errors were repaired. Otherwise retained spellings\nand punctuation (including hypenation variations) as in the original.\n\nP. 156: \"philosophic disciplines\"; original reads \"philosophic\ndisciples.\"\n\nP. 354: \"(in a direct experience\"; original reads \"in direct a\nexperience.\" Transposition corrected.\n\nTen cases of lettered paragraph labels with closing but no opening\nparentheses were retained--\"a)\" on P. 137, 288, 407 and 426, \"b)\" on P.\n139, 289, 408 and 429, and \"c)\" on P. 410 and 430.","title":"Essays in Experimental Logic","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":109483}