{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_40966/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_40966","id":"gutenberg_40966","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/40966","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Religious","Category: Law & Criminology","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Jesus Christ -- Trial","Trials (Blasphemy) -- Jerusalem","Trials (Treason) -- Jerusalem"],"text":"Transcriber's notes\n\nVariable spelling has been retained. Minor punctuation inconsistencies\nhave been silently corrected. A list of other corrections can be found\nat the end of the book. Footnotes were sequentially numbered and placed\nat the end of the text. In the original, the \"The Gospel Narratives\" are\nprinted side by side across the page spread. In this e-book version they\nare presented individually. The Index was copied from Volume II.\n\n  Mark up: _italics_\n\n\n\n\n  THE TRIAL OF JESUS\n\n\n\n\n[Illustration: JESUS BOUND (MUNKACSY)]\n\n\n\n\n  THE TRIAL OF JESUS\n\n  FROM A LAWYER'S STANDPOINT\n\n  BY\n\n  WALTER M. CHANDLER\n\n  OF THE NEW YORK BAR\n\n\n  VOLUME I\n\n  THE HEBREW TRIAL\n\n\n  THE EMPIRE PUBLISHING CO.\n\n  60 WALL STREET, NEW YORK CITY\n\n  1908\n\n\n\n\nCopyright, 1908, by WALTER M. CHANDLER\n\n_All rights reserved_\n\n\n\n\n    TO MY MOTHER WITH SENTIMENTS OF LOVE AND VENERATION WHICH NO WORDS\n    CAN EXPRESS\n\n\n\n\nLIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS\n\n\n                                                          FACING PAGE\n\n  JESUS BOUND (Munkacsy)                                 _Frontispiece_\n\n  ST. MATTHEW (Rembrandt)                                         2\n\n  ST. MARK AND ST. PAUL (D\u00fcrer)                                   28\n\n  ST. JOHN AND ST. PETER (D\u00fcrer)                                  52\n\n  MOSES AND THE LAW (Michael Angelo)                              72\n\n  THE LAST SUPPER (da Vinci)                                      174\n\n  JESUS IN GETHSEMANE (Hoffman)                                   240\n\n  THE BETRAYING KISS (Scheffer)                                   282\n\n  THE ARREST OF JESUS (Hoffman)                                   284\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE\n\n\n                                                                  PAGE\n\n  PREFACE TO VOLUME ONE                                            xiii\n\n  THE GOSPEL NARRATIVES                                            xxx\n\n\n  PART I\n\n  _THE RECORD OF FACT_\n\n  AUTHENTICITY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT NARRATIVES, JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED 3\n\n  CREDIBILITY OF THE GOSPEL WRITERS, LEGALLY TESTED                   9\n\n\n  PART II\n\n  _HEBREW CRIMINAL LAW_\n\n  CHAPTER\n\n  I. THE MOSAIC CODE AND THE TALMUD                                  73\n\n  II. HEBREW CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS                                  91\n\n  III. HEBREW COURTS AND JUDGES                                     102\n\n  IV. HEBREW WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE                                 127\n\n  V. MODE OF TRIAL AND EXECUTION IN HEBREW CAPITAL CASES            153\n\n\n  PART III\n\n  _THE BRIEF_\n\n  WHETHER OR NOT THE GREAT SANHEDRIN EXISTED AT THE TIME OF CHRIST  175\n\n  CONCERNING THE JURISDICTION OF THE GREAT SANHEDRIN, WITH REFERENCE\n    TO ROMAN AUTHORITY, TO TRY CAPITAL OFFENSES AT THE DATE OF THE\n    CRUCIFIXION                                                     181\n\n  CONCERNING THE JURISDICTION OF THE GREAT SANHEDRIN, UNDER HEBREW LAW,\n    TO TRY THE PARTICULAR OFFENSE WITH WHICH JESUS WAS CHARGED      183\n\n  WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A REGULAR LEGAL TRIAL OF JESUS BEFORE THE\n    GREAT SANHEDRIN                                                 183\n\n  WHETHER OR NOT THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED IN THE\n    MISHNA WERE IN EXISTENCE AND ACTIVELY IN FORCE IN JUDEA AT THE\n    TIME OF THE TRIAL OF JESUS                                      186\n\n  THE NATURE OF THE CHARGE BROUGHT AGAINST JESUS AT THE TRIAL BEFORE\n    THE GREAT SANHEDRIN; AND HIS GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITH REFERENCE\n    THERETO                                                         187\n\n  POINT I: CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF THE ARREST OF JESUS IN\n    GETHSEMANE                                                      219\n\n  POINT II: CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF THE PRIVATE EXAMINATION OF\n    JESUS BY ANNAS (OR CAIAPHAS) BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE REGULAR\n    TRIAL                                                           238\n\n  POINT III: CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF THE INDICTMENT AGAINST\n    JESUS                                                           248\n\n  POINT IV: CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF TRYING JESUS AT NIGHT        255\n\n  POINT V: CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF TRYING JESUS BEFORE THE MORNING\n    SACRIFICE HAD BEEN OFFERED                                      260\n\n  POINT VI: CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF TRYING JESUS ON THE EVE OF A\n    JEWISH SABBATH AND AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE\n    PASSOVER FEAST                                                  263\n\n  POINT VII: CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF CONCLUDING THE TRIAL OF JESUS\n    WITHIN ONE DAY                                                  267\n\n  POINT VIII: CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF CONVICTING JESUS UPON HIS\n    UNCORROBORATED CONFESSION                                       271\n\n  POINT IX: CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF A UNANIMOUS VERDICT AGAINST\n    JESUS                                                           279\n\n  POINT X: CONCERNING CERTAIN IRREGULARITIES OF FORM IN TRYING AND\n    CONDEMNING JESUS                                                287\n\n  POINT XI: CONCERNING THE LEGAL DISQUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE\n    GREAT SANHEDRIN, TO TRY JESUS                                   295\n\n  POINT XII: CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF THE REFUSAL OF THE GREAT\n    SANHEDRIN TO CONSIDER THE MERITS OF THE DEFENSE OF JESUS        309\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE TO VOLUME ONE\n\n\nMany remarkable trials have characterized the judicial history of\nmankind.\n\nThe trial of Socrates before the dicastery of Athens, charged with\ncorrupting Athenian youth, with blaspheming the Olympic gods, and with\nseeking to destroy the constitution of the Attic Republic, is still a\nsublime and thrilling chapter in the history of a wonderful people,\namong the ruins and wrecks of whose genius the modern world still\nwanders to contemplate, admire, and study the pride of every master and\nthe perfection of every model.\n\nThe trial and execution of Charles the First of England sealed with\nroyal blood a new covenant of British freedom, and erected upon the\nhighway of national progress an enduring landmark to civil liberty. The\nentire civilized world stood aghast at the solemn and awful spectacle of\nthe deliberate beheading of a king. And yet, to-day, the sober, serious\njudgment of mankind stamps the act with approval, and deems it a\nlegitimate and righteous step in the heroic march of a brave and\nsplendid people toward a complete realization of the inalienable rights\nof man. The philosopher of history declares these condemnatory and\nexecutory proceedings against a Stuart king worthy of all the epoch\nmaking movements that have glorified the centuries of English\nconstitutional growth, and have given to mankind the imperishable\nparchments of Magna Charta, the Bill of Rights, the Petition of Rights,\nand Habeas Corpus.\n\nThe trial of Warren Hastings in the hall of William Rufus has been\nimmortalized by Lord Macaulay. This trial is a virtual reproduction in\nEnglish history of the ancient Roman trial of Verres. England is\nsubstituted for Rome; Sicily becomes India; Hastings takes the place of\nVerres; and Burke is the orator instead of Cicero. The indictments are\nidentical: Maladministration in the government of a province. In the\nimpeachment of Hastings, England served notice upon her colonial\ngovernors and made proclamation to the world that English conquest was\nnot intended to despoil and enslave, but was designed to carry to the\ninhabitants of distant lands her language, her literature, and her laws.\nThis message to humanity was framed but not inspired by England. It was\nprompted by the success of the American Revolution, in which Washington\nand his Continentals had established the immortal principle, that the\nconsent of the governed is the true source of all just powers of\ngovernment.\n\nThe trial of Aaron Burr, omitting Arnold's treason, is the blackest\nchapter in the annals of our republic. Burr was the most extraordinary\nman of the first half century of American national history. His powerful\nand fascinating personality conquered men and enslaved women. He was\nthe finest scholar of the Revolution excepting Thomas Jefferson. He was\nthe greatest orator of the Revolution excepting Patrick Henry. His\nfarewell address to the United States Senate caused his inveterate\nenemies to weep. His arraignment at the bar of public justice on the\ncharge of high treason--that he had sought to destroy the Country of\nWashington, the Republic of Jefferson, which is to-day the Union of\nLincoln--was the sad and melancholy close of a long and lofty life.\n\nThe trial of Alfred Dreyfus is still fresh in the minds and memories of\nmen. Troubled political seas still surge and roll in France because of\nthe hatred, prejudice, and passion that envelope the mysterious\n_bordereau_. The French Republic is still rent by two contending\nfactions: Dreyfus and anti-Dreyfus. His friends still say that Dreyfus\nwas a Prometheus who was chained to an ocean-girt rock while the vulture\nof exile preyed upon his heart. His enemies still assert that he was a\nJudas who betrayed not God or Christ, but France and the Fatherland. His\nbanishment to the Island of the Devil; his wife's deathless devotion;\nthe implacable hatred of his enemies; the undying loyalty of friends;\nand his own sufferings and woes are the warp and woof of the most\nsplendid and pathetic epoch of a century.\n\nOther trials--of Mary Stuart, the beautiful and brilliant Scottish\nqueen; of Robert Emmet, the grand and gifted Irish patriot\nmartyr--thrilled the world in their day.\n\nBut these trials, one and all, were tame and commonplace, compared with\nthe trial and crucifixion of the Galilean peasant, Jesus of Nazareth.\nThese were earthly trials, on earthly issues, before earthly courts. The\ntrial of the Nazarene was before the high tribunals of both Heaven and\nearth; before the Great Sanhedrin, whose judges were the master-spirits\nof a divinely commissioned race; before the court of the Roman Empire\nthat controlled the legal and political rights of men throughout the\nknown world, from Scotland to Judea and from Dacia to Abyssinia.\n\nThe trial of Jesus was twofold: Hebrew and Roman; or Ecclesiastical and\nCivil. The Hebrew trial took place before the Great Sanhedrin,\nconsisting of seventy-one members. The Roman trial was held before\nPontius Pilate, Roman governor of Judea, and afterwards before Herod,\nTetrarch of Galilee. These trials all made one, were links in a chain,\nand took place within a space of time variously estimated from ten to\ntwenty hours.\n\nThe general order of events may be thus briefly described:\n\n(1) About eleven o'clock on the evening of April 6th, A.D. 30, Jesus and\neleven of the Apostles left the scene of the Last Supper, which had been\ncelebrated (probably in the home of Mark) on the outskirts of Jerusalem,\nto go to the Garden of Gethsemane.\n\n(2) Jesus was arrested about midnight in Gethsemane by a band of Temple\nofficers and Roman soldiers guided by Judas.\n\n(3) He was first taken to Annas, and was afterwards sent by Annas to\nCaiaphas. A private preliminary examination of Jesus was then had before\none of these church dignitaries. St. John describes this examination,\nbut does not tell us clearly whether it was Annas or Caiaphas who\nconducted it.\n\n(4) After His preliminary examination, Jesus was arraigned about two\no'clock in the morning before the Sanhedrin, which had convened in the\npalace of Caiaphas, and was formally tried and condemned to death on the\ncharge of blasphemy against Jehovah.\n\n(5) After a temporary adjournment of the first session, the Sanhedrin\nreassembled at the break of day to retry Jesus, and to determine how He\nshould be brought before Pilate.\n\n(6) In the early morning of April 7th, Jesus was led before Pontius\nPilate, who was then stopping in the palace of Herod on the hill of\nZion, his customary residence when he came up from C\u00e6sarea to Jerusalem\nto attend the Jewish national festivals. A brief trial of Jesus by\nPilate, on the charge of high treason against C\u00e6sar, was then had in\nfront of and within the palace of Herod. The result was an acquittal of\nthe prisoner by the Roman procurator, who expressed his verdict in these\nwords: \"I find in him no fault at all.\"\n\n(7) Instead of releasing Jesus after having found Him not guilty,\nPilate, being intimidated by the rabble, sent the prisoner away to\nHerod, Tetrarch of Galilee, who was then in attendance upon the Passover\nFeast, and was at that moment residing in the ancient palace of the\nAsmoneans in the immediate neighborhood of the residence of Pilate. A\nbrief, informal hearing was had before Herod, who, having mocked and\nbrutalized the prisoner, sent Him back to the Roman governor.\n\n(8) After the return of Jesus from the Court of Herod, Pilate assembled\nthe priests and elders, announced to them that Herod had found no fault\nwith the prisoner in their midst, reminded them that he himself had\nacquitted Him, and offered to scourge and then release Him. This\ncompromise and subterfuge were scornfully rejected by the Jews who had\ndemanded the crucifixion of Jesus. Pilate, after much vacillation,\nfinally yielded to the demands of the mob and ordered the prisoner to be\ncrucified.\n\nFrom this brief outline of the proceedings against Jesus, the reader\nwill readily perceive that there were two distinct trials: a Hebrew and\na Roman. He will notice further that each trial was marked by three\ndistinct features or appearances. The Hebrew trial was characterized by:\n\n(1) The appearance before Annas.\n\n(2) The trial at the night session of the Sanhedrin.\n\n(3) The examination at the morning sitting of the same court.\n\nThe Roman trial was marked by:\n\n(1) The appearance of Jesus before Pilate.\n\n(2) His arraignment before Herod.\n\n(3) His reappearance before Pilate.\n\nThe first volume of this work has been devoted to the Hebrew trial of\nJesus, and a distinctively Hebrew impress has been given to all its\npages. The second volume has been devoted to the Roman trial, and a\ndistinctively Roman impress has been given it. Each exhibits a distinct\nview of the subject. Taken together, they comprehend the most important\nand famous judicial transaction in history.\n\nIt is not the purpose of the author of these volumes to usurp the\nfunctions or the privileges of the ecclesiastic. To priests and\npreachers have been left the discussion and solution of theological\nproblems: the divinity of Jesus, the immortality of the soul and kindred\nreligious dogmas. \"The Trial of Jesus from a _Lawyer's_ Standpoint\" is\nthe expanded title of this work. A strict adherence to a secular\ndiscussion of the theme proclaimed has been studiously observed in the\npreparation of these pages. The legal rights of the _man_ Jesus at the\nbar of _human_ justice under Jewish and Roman laws have marked the\nlimitations of the argument. Any digression from this plan has been\ntemporary and necessary.\n\nA thorough understanding of any case, judicially considered, involves a\ncomplete analysis of the cardinal legal elements of the case: the\nelement called Fact and the element called Law. Whether in ancient or\nmodern times, in a Jewish or Gentile court, of civil or criminal\njurisdiction, these elements have always entered into the legal\nconception of a case. Whether the advocate is preparing a pleading at\nhis desk, is summing up before the jury, or addressing himself to the\ncourt, these elements are working forever in his brain. He is constantly\nasking himself these questions: What are the facts of this case? What\nis the law applicable to the facts? Do the facts and law meet and\nharmonize judicially? Do they blend in legal unison according to the\nlatest decision of the court of last resort? If so, a case is made;\notherwise, not.\n\nNow many sermons might be differently preached; many books might be\ndifferently written. But an intelligent discussion of the trial and\ncrucifixion of Jesus from a lawyer's point of view must be had upon the\nbasis of an analytical review of the agreement or nonagreement of law\nand fact in the case sought to be made against the Christ.\n\nThe first question that naturally suggests itself to the inquiring mind,\nin investigating this theme, is this: Upon what facts was the complaint\nagainst Jesus based? A second question then logically follows: What were\nthe rules and regulations of Hebrew and Roman law directly applicable to\nthose facts in the trials of Jesus before the Sanhedrin and before\nPilate? It is respectfully submitted that no clear and comprehensive\ntreatment of the subject can be had without proper answers to these\nquestions.\n\nHaving learned the facts of any case, and having determined what rules\nof law are applicable to them in regard to the controversy in hand, a\nthird step in the proceedings, in all matters of review on appeal, is\nthis: To analyze the record from the viewpoint of the juristic agreement\nor nonagreement of law and fact; and to determine by a process of\njudicial dissection and reformation the presence or absence of essential\nlegal elements in the proceedings, with a view to affirmance in case of\nabsence, or reversal of the verdict in the event of the discovery of the\npresence of error.\n\nIn obedience to this natural intellectual tendency and to the usual mode\nof legal procedure in reviewing and revising matters on appeal, the\ncontents of Volume I have been divided into three parts, corresponding,\nin a general way, to the successive steps heretofore mentioned.\n\nIn Part I, the Record of Fact in the trial of Jesus has been\nauthenticated; not, indeed, according to the strict provisions of modern\nstatutes which regulate the authentication of legal documents, but in\nthe popular sense of the word \"authentication.\" Nevertheless, the\nauthenticity of the Gospel narratives, which form the record of fact in\nthe trial of Jesus, and the credibility of the Evangelists who wrote and\npublished these narratives, have been subjected to the rigorous tests of\nrules of evidence laid down by Greenleaf and by Starkie. Such an\nauthentication has been deemed necessary in a treatise of this kind.\n\nTwo main methods may be employed in investigating and proving the\nalleged occurrences of Sacred History: (1) The method which is based\nupon the evidence of spiritual consciousness and experience, derived\nfrom religious conversion and from communion with God; (2) the method\nthat rests upon the application of historic facts and legal rules to the\ntestimony of those who have asserted the existence of such occurrences.\n\nIt has been contended by many that the first of these methods is the\nsupreme test, and the only proper one, in solving religious problems and\nin reaching full and final assurance of the existence of spiritual\ntruths. It is confidently asserted by such persons that the true\nChristian who has accepted Jesus as his personal Redeemer and has\nthereby found peace with God, needs no assurance from Matthew that the\nChrist was the Heaven-begotten and Virgin-born. Such a Christian, it is\nsaid, has positive proof from within that Jesus was divine. It is\nfurther contended that all forms of religious truth are susceptible of\nthe same kind of proof. It is argued that from despairing hope, born of\nthe longing and the tears of a mother who, grief-stricken and\nbroken-hearted, kneels in prayer beside the coffin of her firstborn,\nsprings stronger evidence of a future life and of an everlasting reunion\nwith loved ones, than comes from all the assurances of immortality\nhanded down by saints and sages. The advocates of this theory contend\nthat the fact of the Resurrection of Jesus should be proved mainly by\nthe method of spiritual consciousness and experience, and only\nincidentally by the historical testimony of the sacred writers. They\nboldly maintain that the Resurrection was a spiritual fact born of a\nspiritual truth; and that within the soul of each true believer is the\nimage of the risen Jesus, reflected from Heaven in as perfect form as\nthat seen by Paul while journeying to Damascus.\n\nIt would be decidedly ungenerous and unjust to deny the force of the\ncontention that spiritual consciousness and religious experience are\nconvincing forms of proof. To do so would be to offer gratuitous insult\nto the intelligence and sincerity of millions of consecrated men and\nwomen who have repeatedly proclaimed and are still proclaiming that the\nSpirit of God and Christ within them attests the reality of religion.\n\nBut on the other hand the doctrine of religions consciousness, as a mode\nof proof, certainly has its limitations. Spiritual proofs are obviously\nthe very best means of establishing purely spiritual truths. But not\nmany truths of religion are purely spiritual. The most of them are\nencased within historic facts which may themselves be separately\nconsidered as historic truths. In a sense, all spiritual truth is born\nof historic truth; that is, historic truths, in the order of our\nacquisition of a knowledge of them, antedate and create spiritual\ntruths. The religious consciousness of the Resurrection of Jesus would\nnever have been born in our hearts if we had never read the historical\nrecords of the physical Resurrection. Nor could we have ever had a\nreligious experience of the divinity of Jesus if we had never read the\nhistorical accounts of His miracles, of His Virgin birth, His\nfulfillment of prophecy, and His Resurrection from the dead, unless\nJesus had personally communicated to us evidences of His divinity. These\nseparate and historic facts, of which spiritual truths are born, cannot\nbe proved by religious consciousness and experience.\n\nThe distinctions herein suggested are very aptly and beautifully\nexpressed by Professor Inge in his Bampton Lectures on Christian\nMysticism, in which he says: \"The inner light can only testify to\nspiritual truths. It always speaks in the present tense; it cannot\nguarantee any historical event, past or future. It cannot guarantee\neither the Gospel history or a future judgment. It can tell us that\nChrist is risen, and He is alive for evermore, but not that He rose\nagain the third day.\"\n\nFrom the foregoing, then, it is clear that in dealing with the\nhistorical facts and circumstances of the trial and crucifixion of\nJesus, we cannot remotely employ the method of proof which is based upon\nreligious consciousness and experience, since these events are matters\nof the past and not of the present. We have been compelled, therefore,\nto resort to the legal and historical method of proof; since we could\nnot assume the correctness of the record, as such an assumption would\nhave been lacking in legal requirement and judicial fitness.\n\nIt has also been thought not to be within the scope of this treatise, or\nconsistent with the purpose of the author of these volumes, to enter\ninto a discussion of the question of inspiration in the matter of the\norigin of the New Testament Gospels, as the record of fact in the trial\nof Jesus. As secular historians, rather than as inspired writers, must\nthe Evangelists be regarded in this connection; since the title of this\nwork suggests and demands a strictly legal treatment of the theme\nproclaimed. The author would respectfully suggest, however, that the day\nis past for complete reliance upon the theory of inspiration and a total\nrejection of all analysis and investigation. That the Scriptures are\nsacred and inspired, and neither need nor permit questions involving\ndoubt and speculation as to origin and authenticity will no longer meet\nthe challenge or dissipate the fears of the intellectual leaders of the\nhuman race. The Christianity of the future must be a religion of reason\nas well as of faith, else it cannot and will not endure the shocks of\ntime, or survive the onward march of the soul. If the teachings of the\nNazarene are a faithful portrayal and a truthful expression of all the\nverities of Heaven and earth, then Christianity has nothing to fear from\nthe discoveries of Science, from Roman catacombs, Arabian hieroglyphics,\nthe sands of Egypt, or the ruins of Nineveh and Babylon. Science is the\nHigh Priestess of Nature and Nature's oracles, and no single revelation\nof Science can disprove or contradict the simplest truth of Nature's\nGod.\n\nIf, on the other hand, Christianity be fundamentally and essentially\nfalse, ignorance and bigotry will not preserve and perpetuate it; all\nthe prayers of the faithful, all the martyrdom of the centuries, will\nnot suffice to save it from death and annihilation.\n\nBut the Christian need have no fear of the results of scientific\ninvestigation or historic revelation. Assyriology, arch\u00e6ology, and\npaleontology, interpreted and applied by the finest scholarship and the\nmost superb intellects of earth, have spent all their stupendous and\nconcentrated forces in the direction of the discovery of natural and\nhistoric facts that would confirm or destroy the Christian theory of\nthings. And yet not one natural or historic fact has been discovered\nthat seriously disturbs the testimony of the Evangelists or impairs the\nevidence of Christianity. A few unlettered fisherman, casting nets for a\nlivelihood in the waters of Gennesaret, framed a message to humanity\nbased upon the life and martyrdom of a Galilean peasant, their spiritual\nLord and Master, and proclaimed it to the world; and all the succeeding\ncenturies of scientific research and skeptical criticism have not shaken\nmankind's confidence in its truthfulness and its potency. If eighteen\nhundred years of scientific investigation have resulted only in proof\nand vindication of the historic asseverations of the Sacred Scriptures,\nand further investigation gives promise of still further proof and\nvindication, tending to remove all doubts and destroy all fears, nothing\nbut rank stupidity and crass ignorance will place obstacles in the way\nof ultimate analysis and complete revelation.\n\nIn Part II of this volume, following the plan heretofore suggested, the\nelement of Law has been considered. Hebrew criminal jurisprudence, based\nupon the Mosaic Code and upon the Talmud, has been outlined and\ndiscussed. A more exhaustive treatment has been given than the subject\nwould seem to justify, but the writer is convinced that the Criminal\nCode of the Jews must be of surpassing interest to the general reader,\nregardless of whether certain peculiar rules therein contained have\nreference to the trial of Jesus or not. The bulk of this Code has been\ninserted in this work because it is felt that a comprehensive view of\nany system enables the student of a particular trial under that system\nto grasp more fully and to appreciate more keenly the merits of the\nproceedings.\n\nIn Part III the legal aspects of the trial of Jesus have been reviewed.\nThe elements of Law and Fact have been combined in the form of a\n\"Brief,\" in which \"Points\" have been made and errors have been\ndiscussed.\n\nDuring the past decade, the author of this work has delivered\noccasionally, in the United States and in the Dominion of Canada, a\nlecture upon the subject, \"The Trial of Jesus from a Lawyer's\nStandpoint.\" Numerous requests have been made, from time to time, for\nthe lecture in printed form. To supply this demand is the purpose of the\npublication of these volumes. The voluminous treatment given has been in\nresponse to the demands of those who have asked for a topical treatment\nof the subject. Many auditors in his lecture audiences have asked for\nspecial treatment, from a lawyer's standpoint, of the New Testament\nGospels. Many have requested an exhaustive handling of Hebrew criminal\nlaw. Others have asked for the insertion in this work of the Apocryphal\nActs of Pilate. And still others have expressed a desire to have\nGr\u00e6co-Roman Paganism dealt with in its relationship to the trial of\nJesus. In obedience to these various demands, certain chapters have been\nincorporated in the general work that may not seem to the average reader\nto have any direct bearing upon the subject treated. It is felt,\nhowever, that in every case at least a partial relevancy exists, and\nthat in a large majority of cases the relevancy is perfect.\n\nThe writer wishes, at this time and place, to acknowledge his\nindebtedness and to express his thanks, for valuable assistance\nrendered, to all those authors mentioned under the title \"Bibliography\"\nat the end of Volume II.\n\n      WALTER M. CHANDLER.\n\n    NEW YORK CITY, July 1, 1908.\n\n\n\n\nTHE GOSPEL NARRATIVES\n\n\n\n\nMATTHEW\n\nxxvi. 47-68; xxvii. 1-26\n\n    And while he yet spake, lo, Judas, one of the twelve, came, and\n    with him a great multitude with swords and staves, from the chief\n    priests and elders of the people.... Then came they, and laid hands\n    on Jesus, and took him.... And they that had laid hold on Jesus led\n    him away to Caiaphas the high priest, where the scribes and the\n    elders were assembled.... Now the chief priests, and elders, and\n    all the council, sought false witness against Jesus, to put him to\n    death; But found none: yea, though many false witnesses came, yet\n    found they none. At the last came two false witnesses, And said,\n    This fellow said, I am able to destroy the temple of God, and to\n    build it in three days. And the high priest arose, and said unto\n    him, Answerest thou nothing? what is it which these witness against\n    thee? But Jesus held his peace. And the high priest answered and\n    said unto him, I adjure thee by the living God, that thou tell us\n    whether thou be the Christ, the Son of God. Jesus saith unto him,\n    Thou has said: nevertheless I say unto you, Hereafter shall ye see\n    the Son of man sitting on the right hand of power, and coming in\n    the clouds of heaven. Then the high priest rent his clothes,\n    saying, He hath spoken blasphemy; what further need have we of\n    witnesses? behold, now ye have heard his blasphemy. What think ye?\n    They answered and said, He is guilty of death. Then did they spit\n    in his face, and buffeted him; and others smote him with the palms\n    of their hands, Saying, Prophesy unto us, thou Christ, Who is he\n    that smote thee?\n\n    When the morning was come, all the chief priests and elders of the\n    people took counsel against Jesus to put him to death: And when\n    they had bound him, they led him away, and delivered him to Pontius\n    Pilate the governor.... And Jesus stood before the governor: and\n    the governor asked him, saying, Art thou the King of the Jews? And\n    Jesus said unto him, Thou sayest. And when he was accused of the\n    chief priests and elders, he answered nothing. Then said Pilate\n    unto him, Hearest thou not how many things they witness against\n    thee? And he answered him to never a word; insomuch that the\n    governor marvelled greatly. Now at the feast the governor was wont\n    to release unto the people a prisoner, whom they would. And they\n    had then a notable prisoner, called Barabbas. Therefore when they\n    were gathered together, Pilate said unto them, Whom will ye that I\n    release unto you? Barabbas, or Jesus which is called Christ? For he\n    knew that for envy they had delivered him. When he was set down on\n    the judgement seat, his wife sent unto him, saying, Have thou\n    nothing to do with that just man: for I have suffered many things\n    this day in a dream because of him. But the chief priests and\n    elders persuaded the multitude that they should ask Barabbas, and\n    destroy Jesus. The governor answered and said unto them, Whether of\n    the twain will ye that I release unto you? They said, Barabbas.\n    Pilate saith unto them, What shall I do then with Jesus which is\n    called Christ? They all say unto him, Let him be crucified. And the\n    governor said, Why, what evil hath he done? But they cried out the\n    more, saying, Let him be crucified. When Pilate saw that he could\n    prevail nothing, but that rather a tumult was made, he took water,\n    and washed his hands before the multitude, saying, I am innocent of\n    the blood of this just person: see ye to it. Then answered all the\n    people, and said, His blood be on us, and on our children. Then\n    released he Barabbas unto them: and when he had scourged Jesus, he\n    delivered him to be crucified.\n\n\nMARK\n\nxiv. 43-65; xv. 1-15.\n\n    And immediately, while he yet spake, cometh Judas, one of the\n    twelve, and with him a great multitude with swords and staves, from\n    the chief priests and the scribes and the elders. And he that\n    betrayed him had given them a token, saying, Whomsoever I shall\n    kiss, that same is he; take him, and lead him away safely. And as\n    soon as he was come, he goeth straightway to him, and saith,\n    Master, Master; and kissed him. And they laid hands on him, and\n    took him. And one of them that stood by drew a sword, and smote a\n    servant of the high priest, and cut off his ear. And Jesus answered\n    and said unto them, Are ye come out, as against a thief, with\n    swords and staves to take me? I was daily with you in the temple\n    teaching, and ye took me not; but the scriptures must be fulfilled.\n    And they all forsook him, and fled. And there followed him a\n    certain young man, having a linen cloth cast about his naked body;\n    and the young man laid hold on him: And he left the linen cloth,\n    and fled from them naked. And they led Jesus away to the high\n    priest: and with him were assembled all the chief priests and the\n    elders and the scribes.... And the chief priests and all the\n    council sought for witness against Jesus to put him to death; and\n    found none. For many bare false witness against him, but their\n    witness agreed not together. And there arose certain, and bare\n    false witness against him, saying, We heard him say, I will destroy\n    this temple that is made with hands, and within three days I will\n    build another made without hands. But neither so did their witness\n    agree together. And the high priest stood up in the midst, and\n    asked Jesus, saying, Answerest thou nothing? what is it which these\n    witness against thee? But he held his peace, and answered nothing.\n    Again the high priest asked him, and said unto him, Art thou the\n    Christ, the Son of the Blessed? And Jesus said, I am: and ye shall\n    see the Son of man sitting on the right hand of power, and coming\n    in the clouds of heaven. Then the high priest rent his clothes, and\n    saith, What need we any further witnesses? Ye have heard the\n    blasphemy: what think ye? And they all condemned him to be guilty\n    of death. And some began to spit on him, and to cover his face, and\n    to buffet him, and to say unto him, Prophesy: and the servants did\n    strike him with the palms of their hands.\n\n    And straightway in the morning the chief priests held a\n    consultation with the elders and scribes and the whole council, and\n    bound Jesus, and carried him away, and delivered him to Pilate. And\n    Pilate asked him, Art thou the King of the Jews? And he answering\n    said unto him, Thou sayest it. And the chief priests accused him of\n    many things: but he answered nothing. And Pilate asked him again,\n    saying, Answerest thou nothing? behold how many things they witness\n    against thee. But Jesus yet answered nothing; so that Pilate\n    marvelled. Now at that feast he released unto them one prisoner,\n    whomsoever they desired. And there was one named Barabbas, which\n    lay bound with them that had made insurrection with him, who had\n    committed murder in the insurrection. And the multitude crying\n    aloud began to desire him to do as he had ever done unto them. But\n    Pilate answered them, saying, Will ye that I release unto you the\n    King of the Jews? For he knew that the chief priests had delivered\n    him for envy. But the chief priests moved the people, that he\n    should rather release Barabbas unto them. And Pilate answered and\n    said again unto them, What will ye then that I shall do unto him\n    whom ye call the King of the Jews? And they cried out again,\n    Crucify him. Then Pilate said unto them, Why, what evil hath he\n    done? And they cried out the more exceedingly, Crucify him. And so\n    Pilate, willing to content the people, released Barabbas unto them,\n    and delivered Jesus, when he had scourged him, to be crucified.\n\n\nLUKE\n\nxxii. 47-71; xxiii. 1-24.\n\n    And while he yet spake, behold a multitude, and he that was called\n    Judas, one of the twelve, went before them, and drew near unto\n    Jesus to kiss him. But Jesus said unto him, Judas, betrayest thou\n    the Son of man with a kiss? When they which were about him saw what\n    would follow, they said unto him, Lord, shall we smite with the\n    sword? And one of them smote the servant of the high priest, and\n    cut off his right ear. And Jesus answered and said, Suffer ye thus\n    far. And he touched his ear, and healed him. Then Jesus said unto\n    the chief priests, and captains of the temple, and the elders,\n    which were come to him, Be ye come out, as against a thief, with\n    swords and staves? When I was daily with you in the temple, ye\n    stretched forth no hands against me; but this is your hour, and the\n    power of darkness. Then took they him, and led him, and brought him\n    into the high priest's house. And Peter followed afar off.... And\n    as soon as it was day, the elders of the people and the chief\n    priests and the scribes came together, and led him into their\n    council, saying, Art thou the Christ? tell us. And he said unto\n    them, If I tell you, ye will not believe: And if I also ask you, ye\n    will not answer me, nor let me go. Hereafter shall the Son of man\n    sit on the right hand of the power of God. Then said they all, Art\n    thou then the Son of God? And he said unto them, Ye say that I am.\n    And they said, What need we any further witness? for we ourselves\n    have heard of his own mouth.\n\n    And the whole multitude of them arose, and led him unto Pilate. And\n    they began to accuse him, saying, We found this fellow perverting\n    the nation, and forbidding to give tribute to C\u00e6sar, saying that he\n    himself is Christ a King. And Pilate asked him, saying, Art thou\n    the King of the Jews? And he answered him and said, Thou sayest it.\n    Then said Pilate to the chief priests and to the people, I find no\n    fault in this man. And they were the more fierce, saying, He\n    stirreth up the people, teaching throughout all Jewry, beginning\n    from Galilee to this place. When Pilate heard of Galilee, he asked\n    whether the man were a Galil\u00e6an. And as soon as he knew that he\n    belonged unto Herod's jurisdiction, he sent him to Herod, who\n    himself also was at Jerusalem at that time. And when Herod saw\n    Jesus, he was exceeding glad: for he was desirous to see him of a\n    long season, because he had heard many things of him; and he hoped\n    to have seen some miracle done by him. Then he questioned with him\n    in many words; but he answered him nothing. And the chief priests\n    and scribes stood and vehemently accused him. And Herod with his\n    men of war set him at nought, and mocked him, and arrayed him in a\n    gorgeous robe, and sent him again to Pilate. And the same day\n    Pilate and Herod were made friends together: for before they were\n    at enmity between themselves. And Pilate, when he had called\n    together the chief priests and the rulers and the people, Said unto\n    them, Ye have brought this man unto me, as one that perverteth the\n    people: and, behold, I, having examined him before you, have found\n    no fault in this man touching those things whereof ye accuse him:\n    No, nor yet Herod: for I sent you to him; and, lo, nothing worthy\n    of death is done unto him. I will therefore chastise him, and\n    release him.... And they cried out all at once, saying, Away with\n    this man, and release unto us Barabbas.... Pilate therefore,\n    willing to release Jesus, spake again to them. But they cried,\n    saying, Crucify him, crucify him. And he said unto them the third\n    time, Why, what evil hath he done? I have found no cause of death\n    in him: I will therefore chastise him, and let him go. And they\n    were instant with loud voices, requiring that he might be\n    crucified. And the voices of them and of the chief priests\n    prevailed. And Pilate gave sentence that it should be as they\n    required.\n\nJOHN\n\nxviii. 3-38; xix. 1-16.\n\n    Judas then, having received a band of men and officers from the\n    chief priests and Pharisees, cometh thither with lanterns and\n    torches and weapons.... Then the band and the captain and officers\n    of the Jews took Jesus, and bound him, And led him away to Annas\n    first; for he was father in law to Caiaphas, which was the high\n    priest that same year.... The high priest then asked Jesus of his\n    disciples, and of his doctrine. Jesus answered him, I spake openly\n    to the world; I ever taught in the synagogue, and in the temple,\n    whither the Jews always resort; and in secret have I said nothing.\n    Why askest thou me? ask them which heard me, what I have said unto\n    them: behold, they know what I said. And when he had thus spoken,\n    one of the officers which stood by struck Jesus with the palm of\n    his hand, saying, Answerest thou the high priest so? Jesus answered\n    him, If I have spoken evil, bear witness of the evil: but if well,\n    why smitest thou me? Now Annas had sent him bound unto Caiaphas the\n    high priest.... Then led they Jesus from Caiaphas unto the hall of\n    judgment: and it was early; and they themselves went not into the\n    judgment hall, lest they should be defiled; but that they might eat\n    the passover. Pilate then went out unto them, and said, What\n    accusation bring ye against this man? They answered and said unto\n    him, If he were not a malefactor, we would not have delivered him\n    up unto thee. Then said Pilate unto them, Take ye him, and judge\n    him according to your law. The Jews therefore said unto him, It is\n    not lawful for us to put any man to death.... Then Pilate entered\n    into the judgment hall again, and called Jesus, and said unto him,\n    Art thou the King of the Jews? Jesus answered him, Sayest thou this\n    thing of thyself, or did others tell it thee of me? Pilate\n    answered, Am I a Jew? Thine own nation and the chief priests have\n    delivered thee unto me: what hast thou done? Jesus answered, My\n    kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world,\n    then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the\n    Jews: but now is my kingdom not from hence. Pilate therefore said\n    unto him, Art thou a king then? Jesus answered, Thou sayest that I\n    am a king. To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into\n    the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth. Everyone that\n    is of the truth heareth my voice. Pilate saith unto him, What is\n    truth? And when he had said this, he went out again unto the Jews,\n    and saith unto them, I find in him no fault at all.\n\n    Then Pilate therefore took Jesus, and scourged him. And the\n    soldiers platted a crown of thorns, and put it on his head, and\n    they put on him a purple robe, And said, Hail, King of the Jews!\n    and they smote him with their hands. Pilate therefore went forth\n    again, and saith unto them, Behold, I bring him forth to you, that\n    ye may know that I find no fault in him.... The Jews answered\n    him, We have a law, and by our law he ought to die, because he made\n    himself the Son of God. When Pilate therefore heard that saying, he\n    was the more afraid; And went again into the judgment hall, and\n    saith unto Jesus, Whence art thou? But Jesus gave him no answer....\n    And from thenceforth Pilate sought to release him: but the Jews\n    cried out, saying, If thou let this man go, thou art not C\u00e6sar's\n    friend: whosoever maketh himself a king speaketh against C\u00e6sar.\n    When Pilate therefore heard that saying, he brought Jesus forth,\n    and sat down in the judgment seat in a place that is called the\n    Pavement, but in the Hebrew, Gabbatha. And it was the preparation\n    of the passover, and about the sixth hour: and he saith unto the\n    Jews, Behold your King! But they cried out, Away with him, away\n    with him, crucify him. Pilate saith unto them, Shall I crucify your\n    King? The chief priests answered, We have no king but C\u00e6sar. Then\n    delivered he him therefore unto them to be crucified. And they took\n    Jesus, and led him away.\n\n\n\n\nPART I\n\n_THE RECORD OF FACT_\n\n\n\n\n[Illustration: ST. MATTHEW (REMBRANDT)]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nTHE RECORD OF FACT\n\n\nThe Gospels of the New Testament form the record of fact in the trial of\nJesus. There is not a line of authentic history in the literature of the\nworld, sacred or profane, dealing originally and authoritatively with\nthe facts and circumstances of the trial and crucifixion of the Christ,\nexcepting these Gospels. A line from Philo--a dubious passage from\nJosephus--a mere mention by Tacitus--a few scattering fragments from the\nTalmud--all else is darkness, save the light that streams down through\nthe centuries from Calvary and the Cross through the books of the\nEvangelists.\n\nIn dealing with the record of fact contained in the Gospels, in the\ntrial of Jesus two questions naturally suggest themselves: (1) Are the\nGospel narratives, such as we have them to-day, identical with those\nthat were given to the world by the Evangelists in Apostolic times? That\nis, have these biographies of the Christ by the Evangelical writers been\nhanded down to us through all the ages substantially uncorrupted and\nunimpaired?\n\n(2) Are the Gospel writers--Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John--credible\nwitnesses of the facts and circumstances recorded by them in the Gospel\nhistories? That is, did they tell the truth when they wrote and\npublished these narratives to the world? Satisfactory affirmative\nanswers to these questions will establish and authenticate a perfect\nrecord of fact. The pages of Part I of this volume will be devoted to\ngiving affirmative and satisfactory answers to these questions. And, in\naccomplishing this purpose, academic reasoning and metaphysical\nspeculation will be rejected. Well-established rules of evidence, as\nemployed in modern courts of law, will be rigorously applied. So-called\n\"Higher Criticism\" has no place in a treatise of this kind, since the\ncritical niceties and dialectic quibbles of men like Strauss, Renan, and\nBaur would not be seriously considered in a modern judicial proceeding.\nReasonable probability, and not mathematical certainty, is the legal\ntest of adequacy in weighing human testimony with a view to a judicial\ndetermination.\n\nThe reader may ask: Why should not a Christian writer, in a Christian\ncountry, assume, without argument, that the testimony of Christian\nsacred writers is true? The answer is that such conduct would convert a\npurely legal treatise into a religious one, and substitute faith for\nlogic. The writer of these volumes, as a Christian, believes that the\nGospels relate the truth. As a lawyer, he is compelled to respect the\nopinions of a large proportion of mankind who differ with him, and to\nemploy judicial methods in treating a legal theme.\n\nThe two questions above mentioned involve two distinct principles or\nfeatures in the Law of Evidence: (1) Admissibility or relevancy of\nevidence; (2) Credibility of witnesses who have rendered testimony. All\nthe pages of Part I will be devoted to a consideration of these features\nin their relationship to the testimony of the Evangelists.\n\nThe first question that naturally arises is this: Is there a\nwell-established rule of the modern Law of Evidence under which the\nGospels could be introduced as evidence in a modern judicial proceeding?\nSuppose that the question of the Resurrection of Jesus--that is, the\nfact of the truthfulness or falsity of the Resurrection--should become a\nmaterial fact in issue in a suit in a modern court of law; could the\ntestimony of the Evangelists relating to the Resurrection be introduced\nin evidence? It would probably be objected that their testimony was\nhearsay; that they had not been properly subjected to the cardinal tests\nof truth: an oath, a cross-examination, and personal demeanor while\ntestifying. These objections might prevail if another rule of law could\nnot be successfully invoked. Such a rule exists, and with it we have now\nto deal.\n\nThe author can conceive of no more satisfactory way of establishing the\nprinciple of the admissibility of the Gospels in evidence under modern\nlaw than by quoting at length from the celebrated treatise on the\n\"Testimony of the Evangelists,\" by Mr. Simon Greenleaf, the greatest of\nall writers on the Law of Evidence. The opinion of Greenleaf on a\nsubject of this kind is somewhat in the nature of a decision of a court\nof last resort, and his authority in matters of this import is\nunquestioned in every land where English law is practiced. _The London\nLaw Magazine_, a few years ago, paid him the following splendid tribute:\n\"It is no mean honor to America that her schools of jurisprudence have\nproduced two of the first writers and best esteemed legal authorities of\nthis century--the great and good man, Judge Story, and his worthy and\neminent associate, Professor Greenleaf. Upon the existing Law of\nEvidence (by Greenleaf) more light has shone from the New World than\nfrom all the lawyers who adorn the courts of Europe.\"\n\nConcerning the authenticity of the Sacred Scriptures and their\nadmissibility in evidence, Greenleaf has thus written:\n\n     That the books of the Old Testament, as we now have them, are\n     genuine; that they existed in the time of our Saviour, and were\n     commonly received and referred to among the Jews as the sacred\n     books of their religion; and that the text of the Four Evangelists\n     has been handed down to us in the state in which it was originally\n     written, that is, without having been materially corrupted or\n     falsified, either by heretics or Christians, are facts which we are\n     entitled to assume as true, until the contrary is shown.\n\n     The genuineness of these writings really admits of as little doubt,\n     and is susceptible of as ready proof, as that of any ancient\n     writings whatever. The rule of municipal law on this subject is\n     familiar, and applies with equal force to all ancient writings,\n     whether documentary or otherwise; and as it comes first in order,\n     in the prosecution of these inquiries, it may, for the sake of mere\n     convenience, be designated as our first rule.\n\n     _Every document, apparently ancient, coming from the proper\n     repository or custody, and bearing on its face no evident marks of\n     forgery, the law presumes to be genuine, and devolves on the\n     opposing party the burden of proving it to be otherwise._\n\n     An ancient document, offered in evidence in our courts, is said to\n     come from the proper repository, when it is found in the place\n     where, and under the care of persons with whom, such writings might\n     naturally and reasonably be expected to be found; for it is this\n     custody which gives authenticity to documents found within it. If\n     they come from such a place, and bear no evident marks of forgery,\n     the law presumes that they are genuine, and they are permitted to\n     be read in evidence, unless the opposing party is able successfully\n     to impeach them. The burden of showing them to be false and\n     unworthy of credit is devolved on the party who makes that\n     objection. The presumption of law is the judgment of charity. It\n     presumes that every man is innocent until he is proved guilty; that\n     everything has been done fairly and legally until it is proved to\n     have been otherwise; and that every document found in its proper\n     repository, and not bearing marks of forgery, is genuine. Now this\n     is precisely the case with the Sacred Writings. They have been used\n     in the church from time immemorial, and are thus found in the place\n     where alone they ought to be looked for. They come to us, and\n     challenge our reception of them as genuine writings, precisely as\n     Domesday Book, the Ancient Statutes of Wales, or any other of the\n     ancient documents which have recently been published under the\n     British Record Commission are received. They are found in familiar\n     use in all the churches of Christendom, as the sacred books to\n     which all denominations of Christians refer, as the standard of\n     their faith. There is no pretense that they were engraven on plates\n     of gold and discovered in a cave, nor that they were brought from\n     heaven by angels; but they are received as the plain narratives and\n     writings of the men whose names they respectively bear, made public\n     at the time they were written; and though there are some slight\n     discrepancies among the copies subsequently made, there is no\n     pretense that the originals were anywhere corrupted. If it be\n     objected that the originals are lost, and that copies alone are now\n     produced, the principles of the municipal law here also afford a\n     satisfactory answer. For the multiplication of copies was a public\n     fact, in the faithfulness of which all the Christian community had\n     an interest; and it is a rule of law that\n\n     _In matters of public and general interest, all persons must be\n     presumed to be conversant, on the principle that individuals are\n     presumed to be conversant with their own affairs._\n\n     Therefore it is that, in such matters, the prevailing current of\n     assertion is resorted to as evidence, for it is to this that every\n     member of the community is supposed to be privy. The persons,\n     moreover, who multiplied these copies may be regarded, in some\n     manner, as the agents of the Christian public, for whose use and\n     benefit the copies were made; and on the ground of the credit due\n     to such agents, and of the public nature of the facts themselves,\n     the copies thus made are entitled to an extraordinary degree of\n     confidence, and, as in the case of official registers and other\n     public books, it is not necessary that they should be confirmed and\n     sanctioned by the ordinary tests of truth. If any ancient document\n     concerning our public rights were lost, copies which had been as\n     universally received and acted upon as the Four Gospels have been,\n     would have been received in evidence in any of our courts of\n     justice, without the slightest hesitation. The entire text of the\n     Corpus Juris Civilis is received as authority in all the courts of\n     continental Europe, upon much weaker evidence of its genuineness;\n     for the integrity of the Sacred Text has been preserved by the\n     jealousy of opposing sects, beyond any moral possibility of\n     corruption; while that of the Roman Civil Law has been preserved by\n     tacit consent, without the interest of any opposing school, to\n     watch over and preserve it from alteration.\n\n     These copies of the Holy Scriptures having thus been in familiar\n     use in the churches from the time when the text was committed to\n     writing; having been watched with vigilance by so many sects,\n     opposed to each other in doctrine, yet all appealing to these\n     Scriptures for the correctness of their faith; and having in all\n     ages, down to this day, been respected as the authoritative source\n     of all ecclesiastical power and government, and submitted to, and\n     acted under in regard to so many claims of right, on the one hand,\n     and so many obligations of duty, on the other; it is quite\n     erroneous to suppose that the Christian is bound to offer any\n     further proof of their genuineness or authenticity. It is for the\n     objector to show them spurious; for on him, by the plainest rules\n     of law, lies the burden of proof. If it were the case of a claim to\n     a franchise, and a copy of an ancient deed or charter were produced\n     in support of the title, under parallel circumstances on which to\n     presume its genuineness, no lawyer, it is believed, would venture\n     to deny either its admissibility in evidence or the satisfactory\n     character of the proof. In a recent case in the House of Lords,\n     precisely such a document, being an old manuscript copy, purporting\n     to have been extracted from ancient Journals of the House, which\n     were lost, and to have been made by an officer whose duty it was to\n     prepare lists of the peers, was held admissible in a claim of\n     peerage.[1]\n\nHaving secured the Gospel writings to be admitted in evidence under the\nrule laid down by Mr. Greenleaf, we are now ready to consider more at\nlength the question of the credibility of the witnesses. The reader\nshould bear in mind that there is a very important difference between\nthe admission of testimony in evidence and belief in its truthfulness by\nthe court or jury. Evidence is frequently deemed relevant and\nadmissible, and goes to the jury for what it is worth. They may or may\nnot believe it.\n\nWe are now ready to consider the credit that should be accorded the\ntestimony of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John concerning the trial and\ncrucifixion of Jesus. And at the outset it should be borne in mind that\nthere is a legal presumption that they told the truth. This presumption\noperates in their favor from the very moment that their testimony is\nadmitted in evidence. Here, again, the opinion of Greenleaf--with all\nthe weight and authority that such an opinion carries--is directly in\npoint. In the \"Testimony of the Evangelists\" he says:\n\n     Proceeding further, to inquire whether the facts related by the\n     Four Evangelists are proved by competent and satisfactory evidence,\n     we are led, first, to consider on which side lies the burden of\n     establishing the credibility of the witnesses. On this point the\n     municipal law furnishes a rule which is of constant application in\n     all trials by jury, and is indeed the dictate of that charity which\n     thinketh no evil.\n\n     _In the absence of circumstances which generate suspicion, every\n     witness is to be presumed credible, until the contrary is shown,\n     the burden of impeaching his credibility lying on the objector._\n\n     This rule serves to show the injustice with which the writers of\n     the Gospels have ever been treated by infidels; an injustice\n     silently acquiesced in even by Christians; in requiring the\n     Christian affirmatively, and by positive evidence, _aliunde_ to\n     establish the credibility of his witnesses above all others, before\n     their testimony is entitled to be considered, and in permitting the\n     testimony of a single profane writer, alone and uncorroborated, to\n     outweigh that of any single Christian. This is not the course in\n     courts of chancery, where the testimony of a single witness is\n     never permitted to outweigh the oath even of the defendant himself,\n     interested as he is in the case; but, on the contrary, if the\n     plaintiff, after having required the oath of his adversary, cannot\n     overthrow it by something more than the oath of one witness,\n     however credible, it must stand as evidence against him. But the\n     Christian writer seems, by the usual course of the argument, to\n     have been deprived of the common presumption of charity in his\n     favor; and reversing the ordinary rule of administering justice in\n     human tribunals, his testimony is unjustly presumed to be false,\n     until it is proved to be true. This treatment, moreover, has been\n     applied to them all in a body; and without due regard to the fact,\n     that, being independent historians, writing at different periods,\n     they are entitled to the support of each other; they have been\n     treated, in the argument, almost as if the New Testament were the\n     entire production, at once, of a body of men, conspiring by a joint\n     fabrication, to impose a false religion upon the world. It is time\n     that this injustice should cease; that the testimony of the\n     evangelists should be admitted to be true, until it can be\n     disproved by those who would impugn it; that the silence of one\n     sacred writer on any point should no more detract from his own\n     veracity or that of other historians, that the like circumstance is\n     permitted to do among profane writers; and that the Four\n     Evangelists should be admitted in corroboration of each other, as\n     readily as Josephus and Tacitus, or Polybius and Livy.[2]\n\nThe reader will notice from the last extract that the eminent writer\nquoted has sought to establish the credibility of the Evangelists by a\nlegal presumption in favor of their veracity. But it should be borne in\nmind that this presumption is a disputable one, and may be overturned by\nopposing evidence; that objections may be raised which will destroy the\nforce of the presumption and shift the burden again to him who asserts\nthe credibility of the witnesses. Now, let us suppose that such\nobjections have been made, and that sufficient opposing evidence has\nbeen offered to accomplish this result; what has the Christian then to\nsay in support of the credibility of the first historians of his faith?\nWhat proofs has he to offer, independent of legal presumption, that the\nfirst biographers of the Master were truthful men? Can he show that the\napplication of legal tests to their credibility will save them in the\neyes of a critical and unbelieving world? The writer believes that the\nChristian can do it, and will at once assume the task.\n\nIn \"Starkie on Evidence\" we find elaborated a rule of municipal law, at\nonce concise and comprehensive, which furnishes a complete test of the\ncredibility of witnesses. The various elements of this rule are\nconstantly operating in the mind of the successful cross-examiner in the\ncourse of any extensive cross-examination.\n\n     _The credit due to the testimony of witnesses depends upon,\n     firstly, their honesty; secondly, their ability; thirdly, their\n     number and the consistency of their testimony; fourthly, the\n     conformity of their testimony with experience; and fifthly, the\n     coincidence of their testimony with collateral circumstances._[3]\n\nLet us apply these successive tests, in the order above enumerated, to\nthe Evangelists.\n\n(1) In the first place, let us consider the question of their _honesty_.\n\nThe meaning of the word \"honesty,\" used in this connection, is peculiar.\nIt relates rather to personal sincerity than to personal integrity, and\nsuggests the idea of perjury rather than theft in criminal law. Were the\nwitnesses honest? That is, were they sincere? Did they intend to tell\nthe truth? That is, did they themselves believe what they testified? If\nso, they were honest witnesses, though their testimony was false, as a\nresult of error in judgment or mistake of fact.\n\nIn the sense, then, of _sincerity_ is the test of honesty to be applied\nto the Evangelists as witnesses of the facts which they relate in the\nNew Testament narratives. And in making this test let us bear in mind\nthe nature and scope of this work; that it is not a religious treatise,\nand that the question of inspiration must not be allowed to confuse a\npurely legal and historical discussion. As secular historians, and not\nas inspired writers, must the Evangelists be considered. And in testing\ntheir credibility, the customary standards employed in analyzing the\nmotives and conduct of ordinary men in the usual experiences and\neveryday affairs of life must be applied. To regard them as strange or\nsupernatural beings, subject to some awful influence, and acting under\nthe guidance and protection of some god or hero, is decidedly foreign to\nthe present purpose.\n\nIt is felt that only two considerations are needed in applying the test\nof sincerity to the Evangelists: (1) Character; (2) Motive. And this for\nthe reason that honest character and righteous motive are the legitimate\nparentage of perfect sincerity. Then, as a primary consideration, in\ndiscussing their sincerity, it may be reasonably contended that the\nGospel writers were either good men or bad. A middle ground is not\npossible in their case, since the issues joined and the results attained\nwere too terrible and stupendous to have been produced by negative or\nindifferent forces. Were they good men, then they believed what they\ntaught and wrote, and were sincere, else they deliberately palmed off\nan imposture on the world, which is inconsistent with the hypothesis\nthat they were good. Were they bad men, then their lives and teachings\nfurnish a contradiction in principle and an inversion in the nature and\norder of cause and effect which history has not elsewhere recorded,\neither before or since; for, in their discourses and their writings,\nthey portrayed the divinest character and proclaimed the sublimest\ntruths known to the children of men. Every serious, thoughtful mind at\nonce inquires: Could bad men, conspirators and hypocrites, have painted\nsuch a character--one whose perfect purity and sinless beauty mock and\nshame the mental and spiritual attributes of every false prophet and of\nall heathen gods? The Olympian Zeus, the sovereign creation of the\nsuperb Greek intellect, was a fierce and vindictive deity--at times a\nfaithless spouse and a drunken debauchee. Mahomet, whom two hundred\nmillions of the human race worship as the Inspired of Allah, was cruel\nand treacherous in warfare, and base and sensual in private life. The\nGreat Spirit of the Indian granted immortality to dogs, but denied it to\nwomen. Other hideous and monstrous attributes deformed the images and\nblurred the characters of pagan prophets and heathen divinities. But\nJesus of Nazareth was a pure and perfect being who claimed to be\nsinless,[4] and whose claims have been admitted by all the world,\nbelievers and unbelievers alike. The great truths taught by the gentle\nNazarene and transmitted by the Evangelists have brought balm and\nhealing to the nations, have proclaimed and established universal\nbrotherhood among men. Is it probable that such a character was painted\nand such truths proclaimed by dishonest and insincere men? Can Vice be\nthe mother of Virtue? \"Do men gather grapes of thorns or figs of\nthistles?\" If Jesus was not really the pure and holy being portrayed by\nthe Gospels, then the Evangelists have created a sublime character in a\nsuperb fiction which surpasses anything to be found in profane\nliterature, and that evil-minded men could neither have conceived nor\nexecuted. It is impossible to derive from these reflections any other\nconclusion than the absolute honesty and perfect sincerity of the\nEvangelists. Besides, the mere perusal of their writings leaves a deep\nimpression that they were pure and pious men.\n\nAgain, a second and more serious consideration than that of character,\nas affecting the sincerity of the Gospel writers, is the question of\nmotive. If the Evangelists were insincere and did not believe their own\nstory, what motive prompted them to tell it, to preach it and to die for\nit? It is not believed that all men are now or have ever been wholly\nselfish, but it is contended that desire for compensation is the main\ninducement to human action, mental and manual. Reward is the great\ngolden key that opens the door of the Temple of Labor, and some form of\nrecompense, here or hereafter, explains all the bustling activity of\nmen. The Apostles themselves acted in obedience to this law, for we find\nthem quarreling among themselves as to place and precedence in the New\nKingdom. They even demanded of the Master the exact nature of their\nreward for labors performed and sacrifices endured. To which reply was\nmade that they should sit on twelve thrones and judge the Twelve Tribes\nof Israel.\n\nNow let us apply this principle of expectation of reward to the conduct\nof the Evangelists in preaching and publishing the Gospel of the\nNazarene, and let us note particularly the result as it affects the\nquestion of motive in human conduct. But first let us review, for a\nmoment, the political and religious situation at the beginning of the\nApostolic ministry. The Master and Savior of the first Christians had\njust perished as a malefactor on the cross. The religion which the\nApostles began to preach was founded in the doctrine of repentance from\nsins, faith in the Crucified One, and belief in His resurrection from\nthe dead. Christianity, of which these elements were the essentials,\nsought to destroy and supplant all other religions. No compromises were\nproposed, no treaties were concluded. The followers of the Nazarene\nraised a black flag against paganism and every heathen god. No quarter\nwas asked and none was given. This strange faith not only defied all\nother religions, but mocked all earthly government not built upon it.\nThe small, but devoted, band, thus arrayed against themselves in the\nvery beginning all the opposing religious and secular forces of the\nearth. Judaism branded the new creed as a disobedient and rebellious\ndaughter. Paganism denounced it as a sham and a fraud, because its\ndoctrines were unknown to the Portico and the Academy, and because its\nteachings were ridiculed by both Stoics and Epicureans. The Roman State\ncast a jealous and watchful eye upon the haughty pretensions of a\nreligious system that taught the impotence of kings and sought to\ndegrade earthly royalty.\n\nIn seeking, then, to establish the new faith and to inculcate its\ndoctrines, what could and did the Evangelists expect but the bitter\nopposition which they met? Did they seriously hope to see the proud and\nhaughty Sadducee, who despised the common people, or the kingly\naristocracy of Rome, that vaunted a superhuman excellence, complacently\naccept a religion that taught the absolute equality and the universal\nbrotherhood of men? Did they not expect what they actually\nreceived--bitter persecution, horrible torture, and cruel death? Then we\nare led to ask: Was this the recompense which they sought? Again, we\npose the question: What was the motive of these men in thus acting, if\nthey were dishonest and insincere? If they knew that they were preaching\na falsehood, what reward did they expect? Was it of an earthly or a\nheavenly kind? It is unreasonable to suppose that they looked forward to\nearthly recompense when their teachings arrayed against them every\nspiritual and temporal potentate who had honors to grant or favors to\nconfer. Were they looking for heavenly reward? It is ridiculous to\nimagine that they hoped to gain this by preaching a falsehood in this\nworld. Nothing could be, therefore, more absurd than the proposition\nthat a number of men banded themselves together, repudiated the ancient\nfaith of their fathers, changed completely their mode of life, became\naustere in professing and practicing principles of virtue, spent their\nentire lives proclaiming certain truths to mankind, and then suffered\nthe deaths of martyrs--all for the sake of a religion which they knew to\nbe false. If they did not believe it to be false, they were sincere, and\none element of their credibility is established. It is not a question at\nthis time as to the absolute correctness of their statements. These\nstatements might have been false, though their authors believed them to\nbe true--it is a question of sincerity at this point; and the test of\nsincerity, as an element of credibility, rests upon the simple basis\nthat men are more disposed to believe the statement of a witness if it\nis thought that the witness himself believes it.\n\n(2) In the second place, let us consider the _ability_ of the\nEvangelists as a test of their credibility as witnesses.\n\nThe text writers on the Law of Evidence are generally agreed that the\nability of a witness to speak truthfully and accurately depends upon two\nconsiderations: (1) His natural powers of observation, which enable him\nto clearly perceive, and his strength of memory, which enables him to\nfully retain the matters of fact to which his testimony relates; (2) his\nopportunities for observing the things about which he testifies.\n\nTo what extent the Gospel writers possessed the first of these\nqualifications--that is, power of observation and strength of memory--we\nare not informed by either history or tradition. But we are certainly\njustified in assuming to be true what the law actually presumes: that\nthey were at least men of sound mind and average intelligence. This\npresumption, it may be remarked, continues to exist in favor of the\nwitness until an objector appears who proves the contrary by competent\nand satisfactory evidence. It is not believed that this proof has ever\nbeen or can ever be successfully established in the case of the\nEvangelists.\n\nAside from this legal presumption in their favor, there are certain\nconsiderations which lead us to believe that they were well qualified to\nspeak truthfully and authoritatively about the matters relating to\nGospel history. In the first place, the writings themselves indicate\nextraordinary mental vigor, as well as cultivated intelligence. The\nGospels of Luke and John, moreover, reveal that the elegance of style\nand lofty imagery which are the invariable characteristics of\nintellectual depth and culture. The \"ignorant fishermen\" idea is\ncertainly not applicable to the Gospel writers. If they were ever very\nignorant, at the time of the composition of the Evangelical writings\nthey had outgrown the affliction. The fact that the Gospels were written\nin Greek by Hebrews indicates that they were not entirely illiterate.\n\nAgain, the occupations of two of them are very suggestive. Matthew was a\ncollector at the seat of customs,[5] and Luke was a physician.[6] Both\nthese callings required more than ordinary knowledge of men, as well as\naccurate powers of observation, discrimination, and analysis.\n\nBut it has been frequently urged that, regardless of their natural\nendowments, the Evangelists were biased in favor of Jesus and His\nteachings, and bitterly prejudiced against all opposing faiths. In other\nwords, they were at the same moment both enthusiasts and fanatics. For\nthis reason, it is contended, their testimony is unreliable. This is\nwithout doubt the weakest assault ever made upon the trustworthiness of\nthe Gospel narratives. That the Gospel writers were neither fanatics nor\nenthusiasts is evident from the very tone and style of the Sacred\nWritings themselves. The language of fanaticism and enthusiasm is the\nlanguage of rant and rage, of vituperation and of censure, on the one\nhand, and of eulogy and adulation on the other. The enthusiast knows no\nlimit to the praise of those whose cause he advocates. The fanatic\nplaces no bounds to his denunciation of those whom he opposes. Now, the\nmost remarkable characteristic of the New Testament histories is the\nspirit of quiet dignity and simple candor which everywhere pervades\nthem. There is nowhere the slightest trace of bitterness or resentment.\nThere is enthusiasm everywhere in the sense of religious fervor, but\nnowhere in the sense of unbecoming heat or impatient caviling. The three\neventful years of the ministry of Jesus afforded many opportunities for\nthe display of temper and for the use of invective in the Evangelical\nwritings. The murder of the Baptist by Herod; his cunning designs\nagainst Jesus; the constant dogging of the footsteps of the Master by\nthe spies of the Sanhedrin; and His crucifixion by the order of Pontius\nPilate--what more could be desired to make the heart rage and the blood\nboil? But nowhere is there the slightest exhibition of violent feeling\nor extravagant emotion. A gentle forbearance, a mild equanimity, a\nbecoming dignity, mark every thought and utterance. The character of\nPilate, as portrayed in the New Testament, is a supreme illustration of\nthe fairness and magnanimity of the Gospel writers. Philo and Josephus\ndescribe the Roman procurator as stubborn, cruel, and vindictive. The\nonly kindly suggestion touching the character of Pilate that has come\ndown from the ancient world, is that contained in the writings of men\nwho, above all others, would have been justified in describing him as\ncowardly and craven. Instead of painting him as a monster, they have\nlinked conscience to his character and stored mercy in his heart, by\ntheir accounts of his repeated attempts to release Jesus. Fanatics and\nenthusiasts would not have done this.\n\nAgain, the absence of both bias and prejudice in the minds and hearts of\nthe Evangelists is shown by the fact that they did not hesitate to\nrecord their own ludicrous foibles and blunders, and to proclaim them to\nthe world. A disposition to do this is one of the surest indications of\na truthful mind. It is in the nature of \"a declaration against\ninterest,\" in the phraseology of the law; and such declarations are\nbelieved because it has been universally observed that \"men are not\nlikely to invent anecdotes to their own discredit.\" \"When we find them\nin any author,\" says Professor Fisher in his \"Grounds of Theistic and\nChristian Belief,\" \"a strong presumption is raised in favor of his\ngeneral truthfulness.\" Many passages of New Testament Scriptures place\nJesus and the Apostles in a most unfavorable light before the world. The\ndenial of the Master by Peter[7] and His betrayal by Judas;[8] the\nflight of the Eleven from the Garden at the time of the arrest;[9] the\nridiculous attempt of Peter to walk upon the sea and his failure because\nof lack of faith;[10] the frequent childish contentions among the\ndisciples for place and precedence in the affections of Jesus and in the\nNew Kingdom;[11] the embassy from John the Baptist to Jesus asking if\nHe, Jesus, was the Messiah, after the latter had already visited the\nformer, and had been baptized by him;[12] the belief of the family of\nJesus that He was mad;[13] and the fact that His neighbors at Nazareth\nthreatened to kill Him by hurling Him from a cliff[14]--these various\nrecitals have furnished a handle to skeptical criticism in every age.\nThey might as well have been omitted from the Gospel histories; and they\nwould have been omitted by designing and untruthful men.\n\nAgain, touching the question of bias and prejudice, it is worthy of\nobservation that skeptics fail to apply the same rules of criticism to\nsacred that they employ in profane literature. It is contended by them\nthat the Evangelists are unworthy of belief because their writings\nrecord the words and deeds of their own Lord and Master. It is asserted\nthat this sacred and tender relationship warped and blinded their\nJudgment, and disqualified them to write truthfully the facts and\ncircumstances connected with the life and ministry of the founder of\ntheir faith. But these same critics do not apply the same tests of\ncredibility to secular writers sustaining similar relationships. The\nCommentaries of C\u00e6sar and the Anabasis of Xenophon record the mighty\ndeeds and brilliant achievements of their authors; but this fact does\nnot destroy their reliability as historical records in the estimation of\nthose who insist that the Gospel writers shall be rejected on grounds of\nbias and partiality. The Memorabilia of Xenophon, \"Recollections of\nSocrates,\" is the tribute of an affectionate and admiring disciple; and\nyet, all the colleges and universities of the world employ this work as\na text-book in teaching the life and style of conversation of the great\nAthenian philosopher. It is never argued that the intimate relationship\nexisting between Xenophon and Socrates should affect the credibility of\nthe author of the Memorabilia. The best biography in the English\nlanguage is Boswell's \"Life of Johnson.\" Boswell's admiration for Dr.\nJohnson was idolatrous. At times, his servile flattery of the great\nEnglishman amounted to disgusting sycophancy. In spite of this, his work\nis a monumental contribution to historical literature. The \"Encyclopedia\nBritannica\" says that \"Boswell has produced the best biography the world\nhas yet seen\"; but why not reject this book because of its author's\nspaniel-like devotion to the man whose life he has written? If Matthew,\nMark, Luke, and John are to be repudiated on the ground of bias, why not\nrepudiate C\u00e6sar, Xenophon, and Boswell? It is respectfully submitted\nthat there is no real difference in logic between the tests of\ncredibility applicable to sacred, and those required in the case of\nprofane writers. A just and exact criticism will apply the same rules to\nboth.\n\nAs to the second qualification above mentioned, under the second legal\ntest of credibility laid down by Starkie, that is, the opportunity of\nobserving facts and circumstances about which testimony is given, it may\nsafely be said that the majority of the Evangelists possessed it in the\nhighest degree. The most convincing testimony that can possibly be\noffered in a court of law is that of an eyewitness who has seen or heard\nwhat he testifies. Now, it is reasonably certain that all of the Gospel\nwriters were eyewitnesses of most of the events recorded by them in the\nGospel histories. Both Matthew and John were numbered among the Twelve\nwho constantly attended the Master in all His wanderings, heard His\ndiscourses, witnessed the performance of His miracles, and proclaimed\nHis faith after He was gone. It is very probable that Mark was another\neyewitness of the events in the life and ministry of the Savior. It is\nnow very generally agreed that the author of the Second Gospel was the\nyoung man who threw away his garment and fled at the time of the arrest\nin the Garden.[15] If Mark was actually present at midnight in\nGethsemane peering through the shadows to see what would be done to the\nNazarene by the mob, it is more than probable that he was also a witness\nof many other events in the life and ministry of the great Teacher.\nBut, whether this be true or not, it is very well settled that the\nSecond Gospel was dictated to Mark by Peter, who was as familiar with\nall the acts and words of Jesus as was Matthew or John. The Christian\nwriters of antiquity unanimously testify that Mark wrote the Gospel\nascribed to him, at the dictation of Peter. If their testimony is true,\nPeter is the real author of the Second Gospel. That the Gospel of Mark\nwas written by an eyewitness is the opinion of Renan, the skeptic, who\nsays: \"In Mark, the facts are related with a clearness for which we seek\nin vain amongst the other Evangelists. He likes to report certain words\nof Jesus in Syro-Chaldean. He is full of minute observations, coming\ndoubtless from an eye-witness. There is nothing to prevent our agreeing\nwith Papias in regarding this eye-witness, who evidently had followed\nJesus, who had loved Him and observed Him very closely, and who had\npreserved a lively image of Him, as the Apostle Peter himself.\"[16] The\nsame writer declares Matthew to have been an eyewitness of the events\ndescribed by him. He says: \"On the whole, I admit as authentic the four\ncanonical Gospels. All, in my opinion, date from the first century, and\nthe authors are, generally speaking, those to whom they are attributed;\nbut their historic value is diverse. Matthew evidently merits an\nunlimited confidence as to the discourses; they are the Logia, the\nidentical notes taken from a clear and lively remembrance of the\nteachings of Jesus.\"[16]\n\nThat Luke was an eyewitness of many of the things recorded by him, and\nthat the others were related to him by eyewitnesses, is perfectly clear\nfrom the introductory verses of his Gospel. In addressing his royal\npatron, Theophilus, he assures him that those who communicated the\ninformation contained in the Gospel to him were eyewitnesses; and\nfollows by saying that he himself had had \"perfect understanding of all\nthings from the very first.\"[17] The evident meaning of this is that,\ndesiring full information for Theophilus, he had supplemented his own\npersonal knowledge by additional facts secured from eyewitnesses to\nthose things which, not being of the Twelve, he himself had not seen.\n\nSt. John was peculiarly well qualified to record the sayings and doings\nof the Christ. He was called \"the disciple whom Jesus loved.\" He was\nadmitted into the presence of the Savior, at all times, on terms of the\nutmost intimacy and friendship. At the Last Supper, his head reposed\nconfidingly and lovingly upon the bosom of the Master. Together with\nPeter and James, he witnessed the resurrection of Jairus' daughter; was\npresent at the Transfiguration on the Mount, and at the agony of the\nSavior in the Garden. From the cross, Jesus placed upon him the tender\nand pathetic burden of caring for His mother; and, running ahead of\nPeter, he was the first among the Twelve to arrive at the open\nsepulcher. By means of a favorable acquaintanceship with the High\nPriest, he was enabled to gain access to the palace and to be present at\nthe trial of Jesus, as well as to introduce Peter, his friend.\n\nIt is thus clearly evident that the Evangelists were amply able, from\nany point of view, to truthfully and accurately record the events\nnarrated in the Gospel histories. As eyewitnesses, being on the ground\nand having the situation well in hand, they were certainly better\nqualified to write truthful history of the events then occurring than\nhistorians and critics who lived centuries afterwards.\n\nBut it is frequently contended that, if the Evangelists were\neyewitnesses of the leading events which they recorded, they committed\nthem to writing so long afterwards that they had forgotten them, or had\nconfused them with various traditions that had in the meantime grown up.\nThere may be some little truth in this contention, but not enough to\ndestroy the credibility of the witnesses as to events such as the\nCrucifixion and Resurrection of Jesus. These are not matters to be\neasily forgotten or confused with other things. The date of the\ncomposition and publication of the different Gospels is not known. But\nProfessor Holtzmann, of Heidelberg (a man who cannot be said to be\nfavorable to Christianity, since he was for several years the leader of\nthe freethinkers in the Grand Duchy of Baden), after many years of\ncareful study of the subject, declared that the Synoptic Gospels, the\nfirst three, were committed to writing between the years 60 and 80 of\nour era.[18] This was only from thirty to fifty years after the death of\nJesus. Could men of average memory and intelligence who had been almost\ndaily preaching the life and deeds of Jesus during these thirty or\nfifty years have forgotten them? The testimony of Principal Drummond, of\nOxford, is very pertinent at this point. He says: \"If we suppose that\nthe Synoptic Gospels were written from forty to sixty years after the\ntime of Christ, still they were based on earlier material, and even\nafter forty years the memory of characteristic sayings may be perfectly\nclear.... I have not a particularly good memory, but I can recall many\nsayings that were uttered forty, or even fifty, years ago, and in some\ncases can vividly recollect the scene.\"[19]\n\nIf the Evangelists were eyewitnesses, which the records seem clearly to\nindicate, they possessed one of the strongest tests of credibility.\n\n(3) In the third place, as to their _number_ and the _consistency_ of\ntheir testimony.\n\nThe credibility of a witness is greatly strengthened if his testimony is\ncorroborated by other witnesses who testify to substantially the same\nthing. The greater the number of supporting witnesses, fraud and\ncollusion being barred, the greater the credibility of the witness\ncorroborated. But corroboration implies the presence in evidence of due\nand reasonable consistency between the testimony of the witness\ntestifying and that of those corroborating. A radical discrepancy on a\nmaterial point not only fails to strengthen, but tends to destroy the\ncredibility of one or both the witnesses.\n\nNow, the fierce fire of skeptical criticism during all the ages has been\ncentered upon the so-called discrepancies of the Gospel narratives. It\nis asserted by many critics that these inconsistencies are so\nnumerous and so palpable, that the Gospel records are worthless, even as\nsecular histories. The authors of these writings, according to the\nskeptics, mutually destroy each other.\n\n[Illustration: ST. MARK AND ST. PAUL (D\u00dcRER)]\n\nIn considering this phase of the credibility of the Gospel writers, it\nmust again be remembered that the question of inspiration has no place\nin this discussion; and that Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John must be\nregarded simply as secular historians. The reader is urged to consider\nthe biographers of the Christ as he would consider ordinary witnesses in\na court of law; to apply to them the same tests of credibility; to sift\nand weigh their testimony in the same manner; and to subject them to the\nsame rules of cross-examination. If this is done, it is felt that the\nresult will be entirely favorable to the veracity and integrity of the\nsacred writers.\n\nIn considering the subject of discrepancies it should be constantly kept\nin mind that contradictions in testimony do not necessarily mean that\nthere has been falsehood or bad faith on the part of the witnesses.\nEvery lawyer of experience and every adult citizen of average\nintelligence knows that this is true. Men of unquestioned veracity and\nincorruptible integrity are frequently arrayed against each other in\nboth civil and criminal trials, and the record reveals irreconcilable\ncontradictions in their testimony. Not only do prosecutions for perjury\nnot follow, but, in many instances, the witnesses are not even suspected\nof bad faith or an intention to falsify. Defects in sight, hearing, or\nmemory; superior advantage in the matter of observation; or a sudden\nchange in the position of one or both the parties, causing distraction\nof attention, at the time of the occurrence of the events involved in\nlitigation--all or any of these conditions, as well as many others, may\ncreate discrepancies and contradictions where there is a total absence\nof any intention to misrepresent. A thorough appreciation of this fact\nwill greatly aid in a clear understanding of this phase of the\ndiscussion.\n\nAgain, an investigation of the charge of discrepancy against the Gospel\nwriters shows that the critics and skeptics have classified mere\n_omissions_ as contradictions. Nothing could be more absurd than to\nconsider an omission a contradiction, unless the requirements of the\ncase show that the facts and circumstances omitted were essential to be\nstated, or that the omission was evidently intended to mislead or\ndeceive. Any other contention would turn historical literature\ntopsy-turvy and load it down with contradictions. Dion Cassius, Tacitus,\nand Suetonius have all written elaborately of the reign of Tiberius.\nMany things are mentioned by each that are not recorded by the other\ntwo. Are we to reject all three as unreliable historians because of this\nfact? Abbott, Hazlitt, Bourrienne, and Walter Scott have written\nbiographies of Napoleon Bonaparte. No one of them has recited all the\nfacts recorded by the others. Are these omissions to destroy the merits\nof all these writers and cause them to be suspected and rejected?\nGrafton's Chronicles rank high in English historical literature. They\ncomprise the reign of King John; and yet make no mention of the granting\nof Magna Charta. This is as if the life of Jefferson had been written\nwithout mention of the Declaration of Independence; or a biography of\nLincoln without calling attention to the Emancipation Proclamation.\nNotwithstanding this strange omission, Englishmen still preserve\nGrafton's Chronicles as valuable records among their archives. And the\nsame spirit of generous criticism is everywhere displayed in matters of\nprofane literature. The opponents of Christianity are never embarrassed\nin excusing or explaining away omissions or contradictions, provided the\nwriter is a layman and his subject secular. But let the theme be a\nsacred one, and the author an ecclesiastic--preacher, priest, or\nprophet--and immediately incredulity rises to high tide, engulfs the\nreason, and destroys all dispassionate criticism. Could it be forgotten\nfor a moment that Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John were biographers of the\nChrist, a sacred person, no difficulties would arise in the matter of\ninconsistencies, no objections would be made to their credibility. The\nslight discrepancies that undoubtedly exist would pass unnoticed, or be\nforever buried under the weight of an overwhelming conviction that they\nare, in the main, accurate and truthful.\n\nBut the Evangelists were guided by inspiration, the skeptics say; and\ndiscrepancies are inconsistent with the theory of inspiration. God would\nnot have inspired them to write contradictory stories. But the\nassumption is false that they claimed to be guided by inspiration; for,\nas Marcus Dods truthfully says, \"none of our Gospels pretends to be\ninfallible or even _inspired_. Only one of them tells us how its writer\nobtained his information, and that was by careful inquiry at the proper\nsources.\"[20]\n\nBut whether the Gospel writers were inspired or not is immaterial so far\nas the purpose of this chapter is concerned. The rules of evidence\ntesting their credibility would be the same in either case.\n\nA more pertinent observation upon the Gospel discrepancies has not been\nmade than that by Paley in his \"Evidences of Christianity,\" where he\nsays:\n\n    I know not a more rash or more unphilosophical conduct of the\n    understanding than to reject the substance of a story by reason of\n    some diversity in the circumstances with which it is related. The\n    usual character of human testimony is substantial truth under\n    circumstantial variety. This is what the daily experience of courts\n    of justice teaches. When accounts of a transaction come from the\n    mouths of different witnesses it is seldom that it is not possible\n    to pick out apparent or real inconsistencies between them. These\n    inconsistencies are studiously displayed by an adverse pleader, but\n    oftentimes with little impression upon the minds of the judges. On\n    the contrary, a close and minute agreement induces the suspicion of\n    confederacy and fraud. When written histories touch upon the same\n    scenes of action, the comparison almost always affords ground for a\n    like reflection. Numerous, and sometimes important, variations\n    present themselves; not seldom, also, absolute and final\n    contradictions; yet neither one nor the other are deemed sufficient\n    to shake the credibility of the main fact. The embassy of the Jews\n    to deprecate the execution of Claudian's order to place his statue\n    in their temple, Philo places in the harvest, Josephus in seed-time;\n    both contemporary writers. No reader is led by this inconsistency to\n    doubt whether such an embassy was sent, or whether such an order was\n    given. Our own history supplies examples of the same kind. In the\n    account of the Marquis of Argyll's death, in the reign of Charles\n    II, we have very remarkable contradiction. Lord Clarendon relates\n    that he was condemned to be hanged, which was performed the same\n    day; on the contrary, Burnet, Woodrow, Heath, Echard, concur in\n    stating that he was condemned upon the Saturday and executed upon a\n    Monday. Was any reader of English history ever skeptic enough to\n    raise from hence a question, whether the Marquis of Argyll was\n    executed or not? Yet this ought to be left in uncertainty, according\n    to the principles upon which the Christian history has sometimes\n    been attacked.[21]\n\nThe reader should most carefully consider the useful as well as the\ndamaging effect of Gospel inconsistencies in the matter of the\ncredibility of the Evangelists. A certain class of persons have imagined\nthe Gospel writers to be common conspirators who met together at the\nsame time and place to devise ways and means of publishing a false\nreport to the world. This is a silly supposition, since it is positively\nknown that the authors of the Evangelical narratives wrote and published\nthem at different times and places. Moreover, the style and contents of\nthe books themselves negative the idea of a concerted purpose to\ndeceive. And, besides, the very inconsistencies themselves show that\nthere was no \"confederacy and fraud\"; since intelligent conspirators\nwould have fabricated exactly the same story in substantially the same\nlanguage.\n\nFurthermore, a just and impartial criticism will consider not only the\ndiscrepant but also the corroborative elements in the New Testament\nhistories. It should not be forgotten that the authors of the Gospels\nwere independent historians who wrote at different times and places.\nThen, in all matters of fact in which there is a common agreement, they\nmay be said to fully corroborate each other. And it may be contended\nwithout fear of successful contradiction that, when so considered, there\nwill be found numerous cases of corroboration where there is one of\ndiscord or inconsistency.\n\nThe corroborative elements or features in the Evangelical narratives may\nbe classified under three headings: (1) Instances in which certain\nhistorical events related by one of the Gospel writers are also told by\none or more of the others. These are cases of ordinary corroboration.\n(2) Instances in which the recital of a certain fact by one of the\nEvangelists would be obscure or meaningless unless explained or\nsupplemented by another. These may be regarded as examples of internal\nconfirmation. (3) Instances in which the fact related by one Evangelist\nmust be true from the nature of the case, regardless of what the others\nhave said. This is the simple confirmation of logic or reason.\n\nA few illustrations will serve to make clear this classification.\n\nUnder the first heading of \"ordinary corroboration\" may be mentioned the\naccounts of the miracle of feeding the five thousand. All the\nEvangelists tell us of this event, and each records the fact that the\nfragments taken up were _twelve baskets full_.[22]\n\nUnder the second heading of \"internal confirmation\" the following\ninstances may be cited:\n\nMatt. xxvi. 67, 68: \"And others smote him with the palms of their\nhands, saying, Prophesy unto us, thou Christ, Who is he that smote\nthee?\"\n\nA caviling criticism would demand: Why ask of the Christ to _prophesy_\nto those in His presence? And the obscurity would be damaging, were it\nnot for an additional sentence in Luke, who records the same\ncircumstance. \"_And when they had blindfolded him_, they struck him on\nthe face, and asked him, saying, Prophesy, Who is it that smote\nthee?\"[23] The fact that Jesus was blindfolded, which is told by Luke,\nexplains the use of the word \"prophesy\" by Matthew, which would\notherwise be absurd.\n\nAgain, Matt. xiii. 2: \"And great multitudes were gathered together with\nhim, so that he went into the ship, and sat.\" Here, the definite article\npoints to a particular ship which Matthew fails to mention. But Mark\ncomes to his aid and clearly explains the statement: \"And he spake to\nhis disciples, that a small vessel should wait upon him because of the\nmultitude, lest they should throng him.\" These two passages taken\ntogether identify the ship.\n\nAgain, John vi. 5: \"When Jesus lifted up his eyes, and saw a great\ncompany come to him, he saith unto Philip, Whence shall we buy bread\nthat these may eat?\" This is one of the only two places in the Gospel\nwhere Jesus addressed this Apostle. But why ask Philip instead of one of\nthe others? Two other passages, one from John and one from Luke, furnish\nan explanation. In John i. 44 we read that \"Philip was of Bethsaida.\" In\nLuke ix. 10 we learn that the scene of the event, the miracle of\nfeeding the five thousand, was \"a desert place belonging to the city\ncalled Bethsaida.\" The reason, then, for addressing Philip, instead of\none of the other Apostles, is clear. Bethsaida was the home of Philip;\nand he would naturally, therefore, be more familiar with the location of\nthe bread shops than the others. In John vi., where the question is\nasked, neither the place of the feeding nor the apostle questioned is\neven remotely connected with the city of Bethsaida; and in Luke the\naccount of the miracle says nothing of Philip or the question put to\nhim. But when the passages are connected the striking coincidence\nappears, and the explanation is complete.\n\nAgain, John xviii. 10: \"Then Simon Peter, having a sword, drew it and\nsmote the high priest's servant, and cut off his right ear. The\nservant's name was Malchus.\" It has been objected that there is nowhere\nan account of the arrest or punishment of Peter for this assault and\nresistance to armed authority; and that, therefore, there was no such\noccurrence. A passage from Luke explains the failure to arrest. \"And\nJesus answered and said, Suffer ye thus far, and he touched his ear and\nhealed him.\"[24] The healing of the ear explains why no arrest followed;\nfor, if charges had been made, there would have been no evidence of the\ngravity of the offense. Indeed, witnesses against Peter would have been\ncompletely confounded and humiliated by the result of the miracle; and\nmight have been driven from court as malicious accusers. Then, the\nfailure to arrest is a silent corroboration of the statement that the\nevent occurred and that the miracle was performed.\n\nUnder the third heading, of the \"confirmation of logic or reason,\" a\nsingle instance will suffice.\n\nJohn xx. 4: \"And the other disciple did outrun Peter and came first to\nthe sepulchre.\" The \"other disciple\" was St. John, who is generally\nconceded to have been the youngest of the Apostles. And St. Peter, we\nmay judge from John xxi. 18, was already past the meridian of life. What\ncould be more natural than that the younger man should outrun the older\nand arrive first at the sepulcher? What better proof could be expected\nof the fact of the existence of that sweetness and modesty in youth\nwhich respects old age, and that endeared John to Jesus above all\nothers, than we have here, where the younger man awaits the arrival of\nthe older before beginning to explore the deserted tomb?\n\nExamples similar to these might be multiplied at length, since the\nGospel histories are filled with them; but those above mentioned are\ndeemed sufficient to illustrate the theory of corroboration. The\ninstances of internal confirmation in the New Testament narratives are\nespecially convincing. They are arguments and proofs in the nature of\nundesigned coincidences which, from the very nature of the case, shut\nout all possibility of collusion or fraud. In most cases they are\nexpressed in a single phrase and represent an isolated thought\ncorroborative of some other elsewhere expressed. Though small, detached,\nand fragmentary, like particles of dynamite, they operate with\nresistless force when collected and combined.\n\nOnce more attention is called to the fact that these discrepancies\nnegative completely the idea that the Gospel writers were conspirators,\nbent upon the common purpose of deceiving mankind by publishing a false\nhistory to the world. Nothing could be more absurd than to suppose that\nmen conspiring to perpetrate a fraud, would neglect a fundamental\nprinciple underlying all successful conspiracy; that is, the creation\nand maintenance of a due and reasonable consistency between the words\nand deeds of the conspirators in formulating plans for carrying out the\ncommon purpose. Then, if there was no previous concert, the fact that\nfour men, writing at different times and places, concurred in framing\nsubstantially the same history, is one of the strongest proofs of the\ncredibility of the writers and the truthfulness of their narratives. And\non this point the testimony of a very great writer may be quoted: that\n\"in a number of concurrent testimonies, where there has been no previous\nconcert, there is a probability distinct from that which may be termed\nthe sum of the probabilities resulting from the testimonies of the\nwitnesses; a probability which would remain, even though the witnesses\nwere of such a character as to merit no faith at all. This probability\narises from the concurrence itself. That such a concurrence should\nspring from chance is as one to infinite; that is, in other words,\nmorally impossible. If, therefore, concert be excluded, there remains no\ncause but the reality of the fact.\"[25]\n\nApply the theory of probability, arising from concurrent testimonies,\nwhere there has been no previous concert, to the case of the\nEvangelists, and we are at once convinced that they were truthful and\nthat their histories are true.\n\n(4) Let us now consider the _conformity of the testimony of the\nEvangelists with human experience_. This is the fourth legal test of the\ncredibility of witnesses prescribed by Starkie.\n\nThe conformity of testimony with experience is one of the most potent\nand universally applied tests of the credibility of witnesses. And it\nmay be remarked that its application is not confined to judicial\nproceedings or to courts of law. It requires no professional attainments\nto make it effective. The blacksmith and carpenter, as well as the judge\nand jury, employ it in every mental operation where the statements of\nothers are submitted to analysis and investigation. A new theory being\nproposed, the correctness of which is questioned, the test of experience\nis at once applied. If it is not in harmony with what we have seen and\nheard and felt, we usually reject it; or, at least, doubt it. If an\nexplorer should return from the Arctic regions and tell us that he had\nseen oranges, such as we import from Florida, growing on trees near the\nNorth Pole, we would not believe him. Neither would we credit the\nstatement of a traveler from South America that he had seen Polar bears\nbrowsing on the banks of the Amazon. These representations would be\nutterly inconsistent with what we know to be the essential conditions of\norange culture, and with the well-known habits and climatic nature of\nthe Polar bear. An ancient document, purporting to date from the time\nof Washington and the Revolution, and containing recitals about\nrailways, telegraphs, telephones, and electric lights, would be\nrecognized at once as spurious, because our own experience as well as\nfacts of history would tell us that there were no such things in the\ndays of Washington and the American Revolution. These are simple\nillustrations of the application of the test of experience in the mental\nprocesses of weighing and sifting the testimony of others.\n\nNow, no serious objection to the credibility of the Gospel writers has\nbeen made under the test of the conformity of their statements with\nexperience, except in the matter of miracles. It is generally admitted,\neven by skeptics, that the facts stated in the New Testament narratives\nmight have happened in the due course of nature and in harmony with\nhuman experience, except where miracles are related.\n\nA few skeptics have declared that a miracle is an impossibility and that\nthe Evangelists were either deceivers or deceived when they wrote their\naccounts of the miraculous performances of the Christ; and that, whether\ndeceivers or deceived, they are unworthy of belief. The great antagonist\nof the theory of miracles among those who assert their impossibility is\nSpinoza, who has thus written: \"A miracle, whether contrary to or above\nnature, is a sheer absurdity. Nothing happens in nature which does not\nfollow from its laws; these laws extend to all which enters the Divine\nmind; and, lastly, nature proceeds in a fixed and changeless\ncourse--whence it follows that the word 'miracle' can only be\nunderstood in relation to the opinions of mankind, and signifies nothing\nmore than an event, a phenomenon, the cause of which cannot be explained\nby another familiar instance.... I might say, indeed, that a miracle was\n_that_, the cause of which cannot be explained by our _natural\nunderstanding from the known principles of natural things_.\"\n\nThe radical antagonism of Spinoza to the doctrine of miracles, as taught\nin the New Testament scriptures, was the legitimate offspring of his\npeculiar philosophy. He was a pantheist and identified God with nature.\nHe did not believe in a personal God, separate from and superior to\nnature. He repudiated the theory of a spiritual kingdom having a\nspiritual sovereign to whom earth and nature are subject and obedient.\nTherefore, every manifestation of power which he could not identify with\na natural force he believed was unreal, if not actually deceptive and\nfraudulent; since he could not imagine anything superior to nature that\ncould have created the phenomenon. His denial of miracles was, then,\nreally nothing less than a denial of the existence of a personal God who\nspoke the earth into being in the very beginning; and has since, with a\nwatchful paternal eye, followed its movements and controlled its\ndestiny.\n\nThe question of miracles is really a matter of faith and not a problem\nof science. It is impossible to either prove or disprove the nature of a\nmiracle by physical demonstration. In other words, it is impossible to\nanalyze a miracle from the standpoint of chemistry or physics. The\nperformance of a miracle, nevertheless, may be proved by ordinary human\ntestimony, as any other event may be proved. We may testify to the fact\nwithout being able to understand or to demonstrate the cause.\n\nThose who believe that there are distinct spiritual as well as physical\nforces in the universe; that there is somewhere an omniscient and\nomnipotent Spiritual Being who has but to will the creation of a planet\nor the destruction of matter in order to accomplish the result desired,\ncan easily believe in the exercise of miraculous power. Those who\nbelieve the Bible account of the creation, that God said in the\nbeginning, \"Let there be light: and there was light\"--such persons find\nno difficulty in believing that Jesus converted water into wine or\ncaused the lame to walk, if they believe that He was this same God\n\"manifest in the flesh.\" A divinity who, in the morning of creation,\nspoke something out of nothing, would certainly not be impotent to\nrestore life to Lazarus or sight to the blind Bartimeus.\n\nThe trouble with the philosophy of Spinoza is that his own high\npriestess--Nature--seems to be constantly working miracles under his own\ndefinition; and miracles, too, that very closely resemble the wonders\nsaid to have been wrought by the Christ. Milk is taken into the stomach,\nsubjected to various processes of digestion, is then thrown into the\nblood and finally becomes flesh and bone. The ultimate step in this\nprocess of transformation is unknown and, perhaps, unknowable to\nscientists. No deeper mystery is suggested by the New Testament\nscriptures. The conversion of water into wine is no stranger, no more\nincomprehensible than the transformation of milk into flesh and bone. It\nmay be admitted that the chemical elements are the same throughout in\none process and different in the other. Nevertheless, the results of\nboth are perfectly described by Spinoza's definition, \"that a miracle\nwas _that_, the cause of which cannot be explained by our _natural\nunderstanding from the known principles of natural things_.\"\n\nIt may be truthfully remarked that nature is everywhere and at all times\nworking wonders in harmony with and parallel to the miracles wrought by\nthe spiritual forces of the universe. God's sovereign miracle may be\ndescribed as the changing of a man, with all his sins and imperfections,\ninto a winged spirit, thus fitting him to leave the coarse and vulgar\nearth for life among the stars. Nature, in her feeble way, tries to\nimitate the wonder by transforming the caterpillar into a butterfly,\nthus fitting it to leave the dunghill for life among the flowers.\n\nSpinoza insists that miracles are impossible because \"nature proceeds in\na fixed and changeless course.\" But is this really true? Are the laws of\nnature invariably uniform? Does not nature seem at times tired of\nuniformity and resolved to rise to liberty by the creation of what we\ncall a miracle, or more vulgarly, a \"freak\"? Moving in what Spinoza is\npleased to call a \"fixed and changeless course,\" nature ordinarily\nprovides a chicken with two legs and a snake with one head. But what\nabout chickens with three legs and snakes with two heads, such as are\nfrequently seen? Was nature moving in a fixed and changeless course when\nthese things were created? Could Spinoza have explained such phenomena\nby his \"natural understanding from the known principles of natural\nthings\"? Would he have contented himself with calling them natural\n\"accidents\" or \"freaks\"? Nevertheless, they are miracles under his\ndefinition; and the entire subject must be discussed and debated with\nreference to some standard or definition of a miracle. If nature\noccasionally, in moments of sportiveness or digression, upsets her own\nlaws and creates what we call \"freaks,\" why is it unreasonable to\nsuppose that the great God who created nature should not, at times,\ntemporarily suspend the laws which He has made for the government of the\nuniverse, or even devote them to strange and novel purposes in the\ncreation of those noble phenomena which we call miracles?\n\nOther skeptics, like Renan, do not deny the possibility of miracles, but\nsimply content themselves with asserting that there is no sufficient\nproof that such things ever happened. They thus repudiate the testimony\nof the Evangelists in this regard. \"It is not,\" says Renan, \"then, in\nthe name of this or that philosophy, but in the name of universal\nexperience, that we banish miracle from history. We do not say that\nmiracles are impossible. We do say that up to this time a miracle has\nnever been proved.\" Then the Breton biographer and philosopher gives us\nhis idea of the tests that should be made in order to furnish adequate\nproof that a miracle has been performed. \"If to-morrow,\" he says, \"a\nthaumaturgus presents himself with credentials sufficiently important to\nbe discussed and announces himself as able, say, to raise the dead, what\nwould be done? A commission composed of physiologists, physicists,\nchemists, persons accustomed to historical criticism would be named.\nThis commission would choose a corpse, would assure itself that the\ndeath was real, would select a room in which the experiment should be\nmade, would arrange the whole system of precautions, so as to leave no\nchance of doubt. If, under such conditions, the resurrection were\neffected, a probability almost equal to certainty would be established.\nAs, however, it ought to be possible always to repeat an experiment--to\ndo over again that which has been done once; and as, in the order of\nmiracle, there can be no question of ease or difficulty, the\nthaumaturgus would be invited to reproduce his marvelous act under other\ncircumstances, upon other corpses, in another place. If the miracle\nshould succeed each time, two things would be proved: first, that\nsupernatural events happen in the world; second, that the power of\nproducing them belongs or is delegated in certain persons. But who does\nnot see that no miracle ever took place under these conditions? But that\nalways hitherto the thaumaturgus has chosen the subject of the\nexperiment, chosen the spot, chosen the public?\"[26]\n\nThis is an extract from the celebrated \"Life of Jesus\" by Renan, and is\nintended to demolish the Gospel account of the miracles of the Christ.\nIt is not too much to say that the great skeptic has failed to exhibit\nhis usual fairness in argument. He has indirectly compared Jesus to a\nthaumaturgus, and has inferentially stated that in the performance of\nHis miracles He \"chose the subject of his experiment, chose the spot,\nchose the public.\" Every student of New Testament history knows that\nthis is not true of the facts and circumstances surrounding the\nperformance of miracles by Christ. It is true that vulgar curiosity and\ncaviling incredulity were not gratified by the presence of specially\nsummoned \"physiologists, physicists, and chemists.\" But it is equally\ntrue that such persons were not prevented from being present; that there\nwas no attempt at secrecy or concealment; and that no subject of\nexperiment, particular spot, or special audience was ever chosen. The\nNew Testament miracles were wrought, as a general thing, under the open\nsky, in the street, by the wayside, on the mountain slope, and in the\npresence of many people, both friends and enemies of Jesus. There was no\nsearching or advertising for subjects for experiment. Far from choosing\nthe subject, the spot, and the public, Jesus exercised His miraculous\npowers upon those who came voluntarily to Him suffering with some\ndreadful malady and asking to be cured. In some instances, the case of\naffliction was of long standing and well known to the community. The\nhealing was done publicly and witnessed by many people.\n\nRenan suggests that the thaumaturgus mentioned in his illustration would\nbe required to repeat his performance in the matter of raising the dead\nbefore he would be fully believed. This reminds us that Jesus wrought\nmany miracles. More than forty are recorded in the Gospel narratives;\nand in the closing verse of St. John, there is a strong intimation that\nHe performed many that were never recorded. These, it is respectfully\nsubmitted, were amply sufficient to demonstrate His miraculous powers.\n\nWhatever form infidelity may assume in its antagonism to the doctrine of\nmiracles, it will be found that the central idea is that such things are\nnot founded in experience; and that this test of credibility fails in\nthe case of the Gospel writers, because they knowingly recorded\nimpossible events. It would be idle to attempt to depreciate the value\nof this particular test; but it must be observed that nothing is more\nfallacious, unless properly defined and limited. It must be remembered\nthat the experience of one man, nation, or generation is not necessarily\nthat of another man, nation, or generation. The exact mechanical\nprocesses employed by the Egyptians in raising the pyramids are as much\na mystery to modern scientists as a Marconigram would be to a savage of\nNew Guinea. The Orient and the Occident present to each other almost\nmiraculous forms of diversity in manners, habits, and customs, in modes\nof thought and life. \"The Frenchman says, 'I am the best dyer in Europe:\nnobody can equal me, and nobody can surpass Lyons.' Yet in Cashmere,\nwhere the girls make shawls worth $30,000, they will show him three\nhundred distinct colors, which he not only cannot make, but cannot even\ndistinguish.\" Sir Walter Scott, in his \"Tales of the Crusaders,\"\nthrillingly describes a meeting between the Turkish Saladin and the\nEnglish Richard Coeur-de-Lion. Saladin asked Richard to give him an\nexhibition of his marvelous strength. The Norman monarch picked up an\niron bar from the floor of the tent and severed it. The Mahometan\ncrusader was amazed. Richard then asked him what he could do. Saladin\nreplied that he could not pull iron apart like that, but that he could\ndo something equally as wonderful. Thereupon, he took an eider-down\npillow from the sofa, and drew his keen, Damascus-tempered blade across\nit, which caused it to fall into two pieces. Richard cried in\nastonishment: \"This is the black art; it is magic; it is the devil: you\ncannot cut that which has no resistance!\" Here Occidental strength and\nOriental magic met and wrought seeming miracles in the presence of each\nother. In his great lecture on \"The Lost Arts,\" Wendell Phillips says\nthat one George Thompson told him that he saw a man in Calcutta throw a\nhandful of floss silk into the air, and that a Hindoo severed it into\npieces with his saber. A Western swordsman could not do this.\n\nObjectors to miracles frequently ask why they are not performed to-day,\nwhy we never see them. To which reply may be made that, under Spinoza's\ndefinition, miracles are being wrought every day not only by nature, but\nby man. Why call Edison \"the magician\" and \"the wizard,\" unless the\npublic believes this? But is it any argument against the miracles of\nJesus that similar ones are not seen to-day? Have things not been done\nin the past that will never be repeated? We have referred to the\npyramids of Egypt and to the lost art involved in their construction. A\nfurther illustration may be found in the origin of man. One of two\ntheories is undoubtedly true: that the first man and woman came into the\nworld without being born; or that man and woman are the products of\nevolution from lower orders of animals. No other theories have ever been\nadvanced as to the origin of the human race. Now, it is certain that\nmodern generations have never experienced either of these things, for\nall the human beings of to-day were undoubtedly born of other human\nbeings, and it is certain that the process of evolution stopped long\nago, since men and women were as perfect physically and mentally four\nthousand years ago as they are to-day. In other words, the processes\nwhich originated man are things of the past, since we have no Garden of\nEden experiences to-day, nor is there any universal metamorphosis of\nmonkeys going on. Therefore, to argue that the miracles of Jesus did not\nhappen, because we do not see such things to-day, is to deny the\nundoubted occurrences of history and developments of human life, because\nsuch occurrences and developments are no longer familiar to us and our\ngeneration.\n\nTo denounce everything as false that we have not individually seen,\nheard, and felt, would be to limit most painfully the range of the\nmental vision. The intellectual horizon would not be greatly extended\nshould we join with our own the experience of others that we have seen\nand known. Much information is reported by telegraphic despatch and\nmany things are told us by travelers that we should accept as true;\nalthough such matters may have no relation to what we have ever seen or\nheard. Else, we should be as foolish as the king of Siam who rejected\nthe story of the Dutch ambassador, that in Holland water was frequently\nfrozen into a solid mass. In the warm climate of the East Indian tropics\nthe king had never seen water so congealed and, therefore, he refused to\nbelieve that such a thing had ever happened anywhere.\n\nExperience is a most logical and reasonable test if it is sufficiently\nextended to touch all the material phases of the subject under\ninvestigation. It is a most dangerous one if we insist upon judging the\nmaterial and spiritual universe, with its infinite variety of forms and\nchanges, by the limited experience of a simple and isolated life, or by\nthe particular standards of any one age or race. A progressive\ncivilization, under such an application of the test, would be\nimpossible, since each generation of men would have to begin _de novo_,\nand be restricted to the results of its own experience. The enforcement\nof such a doctrine would prevent, furthermore, the acceptance of the\ntruths of nature discovered by inventive genius or developed by physical\nor chemical research, until such truths had become matters of universal\nexperience. Every man would then be in the position of the incredulous\ncitizen who, having been told that a message had been sent by wire from\nBaltimore to Washington announcing the nomination of James K. Polk for\nthe presidency, refused to believe in telegraphic messages until he\ncould be at both ends of the line at once. The art of telegraphy was a\nreality, nevertheless, in spite of his incredulity and inexperience. The\nAmerican savages who first beheld the ships of Columbus are said to have\nregarded them as huge birds from heaven and to have refused to believe\nthat they were boats, because, in their experience, they had never seen\nsuch immense canoes with wings. Herodotus tells us of some daring\nsailors who crept along the coast of Africa beyond the limits usually\nvisited at that time. They came back home with a wonderful account of\ntheir trip and told the story that they had actually reached a country\nwhere their shadows fell toward the south at midday. They were not\nbelieved, and their report was rejected with scorn and incredulity by\nthe inhabitants of the Mediterranean coasts, because their only\nexperience was that a man's shadow always pointed toward the north; and\nthey did not believe it possible that shadows could be cast otherwise.\nBut the report of the sailors was true, nevertheless.[27]\n\nThese simple illustrations teach us that beings other than ourselves\nhave had experiences which are not only different from any that we have\never had, but are also either temporarily or permanently beyond our\ncomprehension. And the moral of this truth, when applied to the\nstatements of the Evangelists regarding miracles, is that the fortunate\nsubjects and witnesses of the miraculous powers of Jesus might have had\nexperiences which we have never had and that we cannot now clearly\ncomprehend.\n\n(5) In the fifth and last place, as to the _coincidence of their\ntestimony with collateral circumstances_.\n\nThis is the chief test of credibility in all those cases where the\nwitness, whose testimony has been reduced to writing, is dead, absent,\nor insane. Under such circumstances it is impossible to apply what may\nbe termed personal tests on cross-examination; that is, to develop the\nimpeaching or corroborating features of bias, prejudice, and personal\ndemeanor to the same extent as when the witness is still living and\ntestifies orally. When a written narrative is all that we have, its\nreliability can only be ascertained by a close inspection of its parts,\ncomparing them with each other, and then with collateral and\ncontemporaneous facts and circumstances. The value of this test cannot\nbe over-estimated, and Greenleaf has stated very fully and concisely the\nbasis upon which it rests. \"Every event,\" he says, \"which actually\ntranspires, has its appropriate relation and place in the vast\ncomplication of circumstances of which the affairs of men consist; it\nowes its origin to the events which have preceded it, is intimately\nconnected with all others which occur at the same time and place, and\noften with those of remote regions, and in its turn gives birth to\nnumberless others which succeed. In all this almost inconceivable\ncontexture and seeming discord, there is perfect harmony; and while the\nfact which really happened tallies exactly with every other\ncontemporaneous incident related to it in the remotest degree, it is not\npossible for the wit of man to invent a story, which, if closely\ncompared with the actual occurrences of the same time and place, may\nnot be shown to be false.\"[28]\n\n[Illustration: ST. JOHN AND ST. PETER (D\u00dcRER)]\n\nThis principle offers a wide field to the skill of the cross-examiner,\nand enables him frequently to elicit truth or establish falsehood when\nall other tests have failed. It is a principle also perfectly well known\nto the perjurer and to the suborner of witnesses. Multiplicity of\ndetails is studiously avoided by the false witness, who dreads\nparticularity and feels that safety lies in confining his testimony as\nnearly as possible to a single fact, whose attendant facts and\ncircumstances are few and simple. When the witness is too ignorant to\nunderstand the principle and appreciate the danger, his attorney, if he\nconsents to dishonor his profession and pollute the waters of justice\nwith corrupt testimony, may be depended upon to administer proper\nwarning. The witness will be told to know as few things and to remember\nas little as possible concerning matters about which he has not been\npreviously instructed. The result will be that his testimony, especially\nin matters in which he is compelled by the court to testify, will be\nhesitating, restrained, unequal, and unnatural. He will be served at\nevery turn by a most convenient memory which will enable him to forget\nmany important and to remember many unimportant facts and circumstances.\nHe will betray a painful hesitancy in the matter of committing himself\nupon any particular point upon which he has not been already drilled.\nThe truthful witness, on the other hand, is usually candid, ingenuous,\nand copious in his statements. He shows a willingness to answer all\nquestions, even those involving the minutest details, and seems totally\nindifferent to the question of verification or contradiction. The\ntexture of his testimony is, therefore, equal, natural, and\nunrestrained.\n\nNow these latter characteristics mark every page of the New Testament\nhistories. The Gospel writers wrote with the utmost freedom, and\nrecorded in detail and with the utmost particularity, the manners,\ncustoms, habits, and historic facts contemporaneous with their lives.\nThe naturalness and ingenuousness of their writings are simply\nmarvelous. There is nowhere any evidence of an attempt to conceal, patch\nup, or reconcile. No introductory exclamations or subsequent\nexplanations which usually characterize false testimony appear anywhere\nin their writings. They were seemingly absolutely indifferent to whether\nthey were believed or not. Their narratives seem to say: These are\nrecords of truth; and if the world rejects them it rejects the facts of\nhistory. Such candor and assurance are always overwhelmingly impressive;\nand in every forum of debate are regarded as unmistakable signs of\ntruth.\n\nThe Evangelists, it must be assumed, were fully aware of the danger of\ntoo great particularity in the matter of false testimony, and would have\nhesitated to commit themselves on so many points if their statements had\nbeen untrue. We have already noted the opinion of Professor Holtzmann,\nof Heidelberg, that the Synoptic Gospels were committed to writing\nbetween the years 60 and 80 of our era. At that time it is certain that\nthere were still living many persons who were familiar with the events\nin the life and teachings of the Savior, as well as with the numerous\nother facts and circumstances related by the sacred writers. St. Paul,\nin I Cor. xv. 6, speaks of five hundred brethren to whom the risen Jesus\nappeared at one time; and he adds, \"_of whom the greater part remain\nunto this present, but some are fallen asleep_.\" And it must be\nremembered that this particular group of two hundred and fifty or more\nwere certainly not the only persons then living who had a distinct\nremembrance of the Master, His teachings, and His miracles. Many who had\nbeen healed by Him, children who had sat upon His knee and been blessed\nby Him, and many members of the Pharisaic party and of the Sadducean\naristocracy who had persecuted Him and had then slain Him, were\ndoubtless still living and had a lively recollection of the events of\nthe ministry of the Nazarene. Such persons were in a position to\ndisprove from their personal knowledge false statements made by the\nEvangelists. A consciousness of this fact would have been, within\nitself, a strong inducement to tell the truth.\n\nBut not only are the Gospels not contradicted by contemporaneous\nwriters; they are also not impeached or disproved by later scientific\nresearch and historical investigation. And at this point we come to make\na direct application of the test of the coincidence of their testimony\nwith collateral and contemporaneous history. For this purpose, as a\nmatter of illustration, only facts in profane history corroborative of\nthe circumstances attending the trial and crucifixion of the Master\nwill be cited.\n\nIn the first place, the Evangelists tell us that Pontius Pilate sat in\njudgment on the Christ. Both Josephus and Tacitus tell us that Pilate\nwas governor of Judea at that time.[29]\n\nIn John xviii. 31 we read: \"Then said Pilate unto them, Take ye him, and\njudge him according to your law. The Jews therefore said unto him, _It\nis not lawful for us to put any man to death._\" From many profane\nhistorians, ancient and modern, we learn that the power of life and\ndeath had been taken from the Jews and vested in the Roman governor.[30]\n\nIn John xix. 16, 17 occurs this passage: \"And they took Jesus, and led\nhim away; and he, _bearing his cross_, went forth.\" This corroborative\nsentence is found in Plutarch: \"Every kind of wickedness produces its\nown particular torment; just as every malefactor, when he is brought\nforth to execution, _carries his own cross_.\"[31]\n\nIn Matthew xxvii. 26 we read: \"When he had scourged Jesus, he delivered\nhim to be crucified.\" That scourging was a preliminary to crucifixion\namong the Romans is attested by many ancient writers, among whom may be\nmentioned Josephus and Livy. The following passages are taken from\nJosephus:\n\n    Whom, having _first scourged with whips_, he crucified.[32]\n\n    Being _beaten_, they were crucified opposite to the citadel.[33]\n\n    He was burned alive, _having been first beaten_.[34]\n\nFrom Livy, a single sentence will suffice:\n\n    All were led out, _beaten with rods_, and beheaded.[35]\n\nIn John xix. 19, 20 we read: \"And Pilate wrote a title and put it on the\ncross; and it was written in Hebrew, and Greek, and Latin.\" That it was\na custom among the Romans to affix the accusation against the criminal\nto the instrument of his punishment appears from several ancient\nwriters, among them Suetonius and Dion Cassius. In Suetonius occurs this\nsentence: \"He exposed the father of the family to the dogs, with this\n_title_, 'A gladiator, impious in speech.'\"[36] And in Dion Cassius\noccurs the following: \"Having led him through the midst of the court or\nassembly, _with a writing signifying the cause of his death, and\nafterwards crucifying him_.\"[37]\n\nAnd finally, we read in John xix. 32: \"Then came the soldiers and _brake\nthe legs_ of the first, and of the other which was crucified with him.\"\nBy an edict of Constantine, the punishment of crucifixion was abolished.\nSpeaking in commendation of this edict, a celebrated heathen writer\nmentions the circumstances of _breaking the legs_. \"He was pious to such\na degree,\" says this writer, \"that he was the first to set aside that\nvery ancient punishment, the cross, with the _breaking of legs_.\"[38]\n\nIf we leave the narrow circle of facts attendant upon the trial and\ncrucifixion of Jesus with its corroborative features of contemporary\nhistory, and consider the Gospel narratives as a whole, we shall find\nthat they are confirmed and corroborated by the facts and teachings of\nuniversal history and experience. An examination of these narratives\nwill also reveal a divine element in them which furnishes conclusive\nproof of their truthfulness and reliability. A discussion of the divine\nor spiritual element in the Gospel histories would be foreign to the\npurpose of this treatise. The closing pages of Part I will be devoted to\na consideration of the human element in the New Testament narratives.\nThis will be nothing more than an elaboration of the fifth legal test of\ncredibility mentioned by Starkie.\n\nBy the human or historical element of credibility in the Gospel\nhistories is meant that likeness or resemblance in matters of\nrepresentation of fact to other matters of representation of fact which\nwe find recorded in secular histories of standard authority whose\nstatements we are accustomed to accept as true. The relations of\nhistoric facts to each other, and the connections and coincidences of\nthings known or believed to be true with still others sought to be\nproved, form a fundamental ground of belief, and are, therefore,\nreliable modes of proof. The most casual perusal of the New Testament\nnarratives suggests certain striking resemblances between the events\ntherein narrated and well-known historical occurrences related by\nsecular historians whose statements are implicitly believed. Let us\ndraw a few parallels and call attention to a few of these resemblances.\n\nDescribing the anguish of the Savior in the Garden, St. Luke says: \"And\nbeing in an agony, He prayed more earnestly: And his sweat was as it\nwere great drops of blood falling down to the ground.\"[39]\n\nThis strange phenomenon of the \"bloody sweat\" has been of such rare\noccurrence in the history of the world that its happening in Gethsemane\nhas been frequently denied. The account of it has been ascribed to the\noverwrought imagination of the third Evangelist in recording the errors\nof tradition. And yet similar cases are well authenticated in the works\nof secular writers. Tissot reports a case of \"a sailor who was so\nalarmed by a storm, that through fear he fell down, and his face sweated\nblood which, during the whole continuance of the storm, returned like\nordinary sweat, as fast as it was wiped away.\"[40] Schenck cites the\ncase of \"a nun who fell into the hands of soldiers; and, on seeing\nherself encompassed with swords and daggers threatening instant death,\nwas so terrified and agitated that she discharged blood from every part\nof her body, and died of hemorrhage in the sight of her assailants.\"[41]\nWriting of the death of Charles IX of France, Voltaire says: \"The\ndisease which carried him off is very uncommon; his blood flowed from\nall his pores. This malady, of which there are some examples, is the\nresult either of excessive fear, furious passion, or of a violent and\nmelancholic temperament.\"[42] The same event is thus graphically\ndescribed by the old French historian, De Mezeray: \"After the vigor of\nhis youth and the energy of his courage had long struggled against his\ndisease, he was at length reduced by it to his bed at the castle of\nVincennes, about the 8th of May, 1574. During the last two weeks of his\nlife his constitution made strange efforts. He was affected with spasms\nand convulsions of extreme violence. He tossed and agitated himself\ncontinually and his blood gushed from all the outlets of his body, even\nfrom the pores of his skin, so that on one occasion he was found bathed\nin a bloody sweat.\"[43]\n\nIf the sailor, the nun, and the king of France were afflicted with the\n\"bloody sweat,\" why should it seem incredible that the man Jesus, the\ncarpenter of Nazareth, should have been similarly afflicted? If Tissot,\nSchenck, and Voltaire are to be believed, why should we refuse to\nbelieve St. Luke? If St. Luke told the truth in this regard, why should\nwe doubt his statements concerning other matters relating to the life,\ndeath, and resurrection of the Son of God? Does not Voltaire, the most\nbrilliant and powerful skeptic that ever lived, corroborate in this\nparticular the biographer of the Christ?\n\nLet us pass to another instance of resemblance and corroboration. While\ndescribing the crucifixion, St. John wrote the following: \"But one of\nthe soldiers with a spear pierced his side, and forthwith came there\nout _blood and water_.\"[44] Early skeptical criticism denied the account\nof the flowing of blood and water from the side of the Savior because,\nin the first place, the other Evangelists did not mention the\ncircumstance; and, in the second place, it was an unscientific fact\nstated. But modern medical science has very cleverly demonstrated that\nJesus, according to the Gospel accounts, died of rupture of the heart.\nAbout the middle of the last century, a celebrated English physician and\nsurgeon, Dr. Stroud, wrote a treatise entitled, \"Physical Cause of the\nDeath of Christ.\" In this book, he proved very clearly that cardiac\nrupture was the immediate cause of the death of Jesus on the cross. Many\narguments were adduced to establish this fact. Among others, it was\nurged that the shortness of time during which the sufferer remained upon\nthe cross and His loud cry just before \"He gave up the ghost,\" tended to\nprove that a broken heart was the cause of the death of the Man of\nSorrows. But the strongest proof, according to the author of this work,\nwas the fact that blood and water flowed from the dead man when a spear\nwas thrust into His side. This, says Dr. Stroud, has happened frequently\nwhen the heart was suddenly and violently perforated after death from\ncardiac rupture. Within a few hours after death from this cause, he\nsays, the blood frequently separates into its constituent parts or\nessential elements: _crassamentum_, a soft clotted substance of deep-red\ncolor, and _serum_, a pale, watery liquid--popularly called blood and\nwater, which will flow out separately, if the pericardium and heart be\nviolently torn or punctured. In this treatise numerous medical\nauthorities are cited and the finished work is indorsed by several of\nthe most famous physicians and surgeons of England.\n\nIt is very probable that St. John did not know the physical cause of the\nstrange flow of blood and water from the side of Jesus. It seems that he\nwas afraid that he would not be believed; for, in the following verse,\nhe was careful to tell the world that he himself had personally seen it.\n\"And he that _saw it_ bare record, and his record is true: And he\nknoweth that he saith true that ye might believe.\"[45]\n\nHere again modern medical science has corroborated, in the matter of the\nflowing of blood and water from the side of Jesus, the simple narrative\nof the gentle and loving Evangelist.\n\nStill another illustration of resemblance, coincidence, and\ncorroboration is furnished by the incident of the arrest of Jesus in the\nGarden. St. John says: \"As soon, then, as he had said unto them, I am\nhe, they went backward and fell to the ground.\"[46]\n\nThis is only one of several cases mentioned in history where ordinary\nmen have been dazed and paralyzed in the presence of illustrious men\nagainst whom they were designing evil. When a Gallic trooper was sent by\nSulla to Minturn\u00e6 to put Marius to death, the old Roman lion, his great\neyes flashing fire, arose and advanced toward the slave, who fled in\nutter terror from the place, exclaiming, \"I cannot kill Caius\nMarius!\"[47]\n\nAgain, we learn from St. Matthew that at the moment of the arrest in\nthe Garden, \"all the disciples forsook him and fled.\"\n\nThis is no isolated case of cowardice and desertion. It is merely an\nillustration of a universal truth: that the multitude will follow\nblindly and adore insanely the hero or prophet in his hour of triumph\nand coronation, but will desert and destroy him at the moment of his\nhumiliation and crucifixion.\n\nNote the burning of Savonarola. The patriot-priest of the Florentine\nRepublic believed himself inspired of God; his heroic life and martyr\ndeath seemed to justify his claim. From the pulpit of St. Mark's he\nbecame the herald and evangel of the Reformation, and his devoted\nfollowers hung upon his words as if inspiration clothed them with\nmessages from the skies. And yet when a wicked Inquisition had nailed\nhim to the cross and fagots were flaming about him, this same multitude\nwho adored him, now reviled him and jeered and mocked his martyrdom.\n\nNote the career of Napoleon. When the sun of Austerlitz rose upon the\nworld the whole French nation grew delirious with love and homage for\ntheir emperor, who was once a subaltern of Corsica. But when the Allies\nentered Paris after the battle of Leipsic, this same French nation\nrepudiated their imperial idol, cast down his images, canceled his\ndecrees, and united with all Europe in demanding his eternal banishment\nfrom France. The voyage to Elba followed. But the historic melodrama of\npopular fidelity and fickleness was not yet completely played. When this\nsame Napoleon, a few months later, escaped from his islet prison in the\nMediterranean and landed on the shores of France, this same French\nnation again grew delirious, welcomed the royal exile with open arms,\nshowered him with his eagles, and almost smothered him with kisses. A\nhundred days passed. On the frightful field of Waterloo, \"Chance and\nFate combined to wreck the fortunes of their former king.\" Again the\nfickle French multitude heaped execrations upon their fallen monarch,\ndeclared the Napoleonic dynasty at an end and welcomed with acclamations\nof joy the return of the exiled Bourbon Louis XVIII.\n\nAnd when the Evangelist wrote these words: \"All the disciples forsook\nhim and fled,\" he simply gave expression to a form of truth which all\nhistory reflects and corroborates.\n\nAgain, the parallels and resemblances of sacred and profane history do\nnot seem to stop with mere narratives of facts. Secular history seems to\nhave produced at times characters in the exact likeness of those in\nsacred history. The resemblance is often so striking as to create\nastonishment. For instance, who was St. Peter but Marshal Ney by\nanticipation? Peter was the leader of the Apostolic Twelve; Ney was the\nchief of the Twelve Marshals of Napoleon. Peter was impulsive and\nimpetuous; so was Ney. Peter was the first to speak and act in all the\nemergencies of the Apostolic ministry; Ney, so Dumas tells us, was\nalways impatient to open the battle and lead the first charge. Peter was\nprobably the last to leave the garden in which the great tragedy of his\nMaster had begun; Ney was the last to leave the horrors of a Russian\nwinter in which the beginning of the end of the career of his monarch\nwas plainly seen. Peter denied Jesus; Ney repudiated Napoleon, and even\noffered to bring him, at the time of his escape from Elba, in a cage to\nLouis XVIII. Peter was afterwards crucified for his devotion to Jesus\nwhom he had denied; Ney was afterwards shot for loyalty to Napoleon whom\nhe had once repudiated.\n\nThe examples heretofore given involve the idea of comparison and are\nbased upon resemblance. These illustrations could be greatly extended,\nbut it is believed that enough has been said in this connection.\nHowever, in closing this brief discussion of the human element in the\nsacred writings as evidenced by the coincidences and resemblances of\ntheir narratives to those of profane history, slight mention may be made\nof another test of truth which may be applied to the histories of the\nEvangelists. This test is not derived from a comparison which is focused\nupon any particular group of historic facts. It springs from an\ninstantaneously recognized and inseparable connection between the\nstatements made by the Gospel writers and the experience of the human\nrace. A single illustration will suffice to elucidate this point. When\nJesus was nailed upon the cross, the sad and pathetic spectacle was\npresented of the absence of the Apostolic band, with the exception of\nSt. John, who was the only Apostle present at the crucifixion. The male\nmembers of the following of the Nazarene did not sustain and soothe\ntheir Master in the supreme moment of His anguish. But the women of His\ncompany were with Him to the end. Mary, his mother, Mary Magdalene,\nMary, the wife of Cleophas, Salome, the mother of St. John the\nEvangelist, and others, doubtless among \"the women that followed him\nfrom Galilee,\" ministered to His sufferings and consoled Him with their\npresence. They were the last to cling to His cross and the first to\ngreet Him on the morning of the third day; for when the resurrection\nmorn dawned upon the world, these same women were seen hastening toward\nthe sepulcher bearing spices--fragrant offerings of deathless love. What\na contrast between the loyalty and devotion of the women and the fickle,\nfaltering adherence of the men who attended the footsteps of the Man of\nSorrows in His last days! One of His Apostles denied Him, another\nbetrayed Him, and all, excepting one, deserted Him in His death\nstruggle. His countrymen crucified Him ignominiously. But \"not one woman\nmentioned in the New Testament ever lifted her voice against the Son of\nGod.\"\n\nThis revelation from the sacred pages of the devotion of woman is\nreflected in universal history and experience. It is needless to give\nexamples. Suffice it to say that when Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John tell\nus of this devotion, we simply answer: yes, this has been ever true in\nall countries and in every age. We have learned it not only from history\nbut from our own experience in all the affairs of life, extending from\nthe cradle to the grave. The night of sorrow never grows so dark that a\nmother's love will not irradiate the gloom. The criminal guilt of a\nwayward son can never become so black that her arms will not be found\nabout him. If we pass from loving loyalty to the individual, to\npatriotic devotion to the causes of the nations, woman's fidelity is\nstill undying. The women of France are said to have paid the German war\ndebt. The message of the Spartan mother to her soldier son is too well\nknown to be repeated. When the legions of Scipio engirdled the walls of\nCarthage and desperation seized the inhabitants of the Punic city,\nCarthaginian women cut their long black hair to furnish bowstrings to\nthe Carthaginian archers. Illustrations might be multiplied; but these\nwill suffice to show that Mary and Martha and Salome, the women of the\nGospels, are simply types of the consecrated women of the world.\n\nWhen we come to summarize, we are led to declare that if the Gospel\nhistorians be not worthy of belief we are without foundation for\nrational faith in the secular annals of the human race. No other\nliterature bears historic scrutiny so well as the New Testament\nbiographies. Not by a single chain, but by three great chains can we\nlink our Bible of to-day with the Apostolic Bible. The great\nmanuscripts: the Vatican, the Alexandrian, and the Sinaitic, dating from\nthe middle of the fourth and fifth centuries, must have been copies of\noriginals, or at least of first copies. The Bible is complete in these\nmanuscripts to-day.\n\nThe Versions, translations of the original Scriptures from the language\nin which they were first written into other languages, form a perfect\nconnection between the days of the Apostles and our own. The Vulgate,\nthe celebrated Latin version of St. Jerome, was completed A.D. 385. In\nmaking this translation the great scholar has himself said that he used\n\"ancient (Greek) copies.\" Manuscripts that were ancient, A.D. 385, must\nhave been the original writings, or, at least, first copies. The\nVulgate, then, is alone a perfect historic connection between the Bible\nthat we read to-day and that studied by the first Christians.\n\nAgain, the Writings of the Church Fathers furnish a chain, without a\nsingle missing link, between the Bible of this generation and that of\nthe first generation of the followers of the Christ. It has been\ntruthfully said that if all the Bibles in the world were destroyed an\nalmost perfect Bible could be reconstructed from quotations from these\nwritings, so numerous and so exact are they. Beginning with Barnabas and\nClement, companions of St. Paul, and coming down through the ages, there\nis not a single generation in which some prince or potentate of the\nChurch has not left convincing evidence in writing that the Books of the\nOld and New Testament which we read to-day are identical with those read\nby the first propagators of our faith. The chain of proof forged from\nthe Writings of the early Fathers is made up of a hundred links, each\nperfect within itself and yet relinked and welded with a hundred others\nthat make each and all doubly strong. If these various testimonies, the\nManuscripts, the Versions, and the Writings of the Church Fathers, be\ntaken, not singly, but collectively, in support and corroboration of\neach other, we have, then, not merely a chain but rather a huge\nspiritual cable of many wires, stretching across the great sea of time\nand linking our Bible of to-day inseparably with that of the Apostolic\nAge.\n\nIf it be objected that these various writings might have been and\nprobably were corrupted in coming down to us through the centuries,\nreply may be made that the facts of history repel such suggestions. As\nMr. Greenleaf has suggested, the jealousy of opposing sects preserved\nthem from forgery and mutilation. Besides these sects, it may be added,\nthere were, even in the earliest times, open and avowed infidels who\nassaulted the cardinal tenets of the Christian faith and made the Gospel\nhistories the targets for their attacks. They, too, would have detected\nand denounced any attempt from any source to corrupt these writings.\n\nAnother and final, and probably the most cogent reason for the\nremarkable preservation of the books of the Bible, is the reverential\ncare bestowed upon them by their custodians in every age. It is\ndifficult for the modern world to fully appreciate the meaning and\nextent of this reverence and care. Before the age of printing, it must\nbe remembered, the masses of the people could not and did not possess\nBibles. In the Middle Ages it required a small fortune to own a single\ncopy. The extreme scarcity enhanced not only the commercial value but\nadded to the awful sanctity that attached to the precious volume; on the\nprinciple that the person of a king becomes more sacred and mysterious\nwhen least seen in public. Synagogues and monasteries were, for many\ncenturies, the sole repositories of the Holy Books, and the deliberate\nmutilation of any portion of the Bible would have been regarded like\nthe blaspheming of the Deity or the desecration of a shrine. These\nconsiderations alone are sufficient reason why the Holy Scriptures have\ncome down to us uncorrupted and unimpaired.\n\nThese various considerations are the logical basis of that rule of law\nlaid down by Mr. Greenleaf, under which the Gospel histories would be\nadmitted into a modern court of law in a modern judicial proceeding.\n\nUnder legal tests laid down by Starkie, we have seen that the\nEvangelists should be believed, because: (1) They were honest and\nsincere, that is, they believed that they were telling the truth; (2)\nthey were undoubtedly men of good intelligence and were eyewitnesses of\nthe facts narrated by them in the New Testament histories; (3) they were\nindependent historians, who wrote at different times and places and, in\nall essential details, fully corroborate each other; (4) excepting in\nthe matter of miracles, which skepticism has never been able to fully\ndisprove, their testimony is in full conformity with human experience;\n(5) their testimony coincides fully and accurately with all the\ncollateral, social, historical, and religious circumstances of their\ntime, as well as with the teachings and experience of universal history\nin every age.\n\nHaving received from antiquity an uncorrupted message, born of truth, we\nhave, it is believed, a perfect record of fact with which to discuss the\ntrial of Jesus.\n\n\n\n\nPART II\n\n_HEBREW CRIMINAL LAW_\n\n\n\n\n[Illustration: MOSES AND THE LAW (MICHAEL ANGELO)]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nHEBREW CRIMINAL LAW--MOSAIC AND TALMUDIC\n\n\nThe Pentateuch and the Talmud form the double basis of Hebrew\njurisprudence. \"The wisdom of the lawgiver,\" says Bacon, \"consists not\nonly in a platform of justice, but in the application thereof.\" The\nMosaic Code, embodied in the Pentateuch, furnished to the children of\nIsrael the necessary platform of justice; ancient tradition and Rabbinic\ninterpretation contained in the Talmud, supplied needed rules of\npractical application. Employing classic terminology, it may be said\nthat the ordinances of Moses were the substantive and the provisions of\nthe Talmud were the adjective laws of the ancient Hebrews. These terms\nare not strictly accurate, however, since many absolute rights are\ndeclared and defined in the Talmud as well as in the Pentateuch. Another\ndefinition, following the classification of Roman legists, describes\nMosaic injunction as the _lex scripta_ and Talmudic provision as the\n_lex non scripta_ of the Commonwealth of Israel. In other words, the\nPentateuch was the foundation, the cornerstone; the Talmud was the\nsuperstructure, the gilded dome of the great temple of Hebrew justice.\n\nBible students throughout the world are familiar with the provisions of\nthe Mosaic Code; but the contents of the Talmud are known to few, even\namong scholars and literary men. The most appalling ignorance has\nexisted in every age among the Gentile uninitiated as to the nature and\nidentity of this gigantic literary compilation. Henricus Segnensis, a\npious monk of the Middle Ages, having heard and read many things about\nthe despised heretical Talmud, conceived it to be a person and, in a\ntransport of religious frenzy, declared that he would sooner or later\nhave _him, the Talmud_, put to death by the hangman![48]\n\nFor the benefit of the average reader as well as to illuminate the\ngeneral subject, a short description of the Talmud will be given.\n\n_Definition._--Many attempts have been made to define the Talmud, but\nall definition of this monumental literary production is necessarily\ninaccurate and incomplete because of the vastness and peculiarity of the\nmatter treated. To describe it as an encyclopedia of the life and\nliterature, law and religion, art and science of the Hebrew people\nduring a thousand years would convey only an approximately correct idea\nof its true meaning, for it is even more than the foregoing descriptive\nterms would indicate. Emanuel Deutsch in his brilliant essay on the\nTalmud defines it as \"a Corpus Juris, an encyclopedia of law, civil and\npenal, ecclesiastical and international, human and divine. It is a\nmicrocosm, embracing, even as does the Bible, heaven and earth. It is as\nif all the prose and poetry, the science, the faith and speculation of\nthe Old World were, though only in faint reflections, bound up in it _in\nnuce_.\"\n\nBenny describes it as \"the Talmud--that much maligned and even more\nmisunderstood compilation of the rabbins; that digest of what Carlyle\nwould term _allerlei-wissenschaften_; which is at once the compendium of\ntheir literature, the storehouse of their tradition, the exponent of\ntheir faith, the record of their acquirements, the handbook of their\nceremonials and the summary of their legal code, civil and penal.\"\n\nTo speak of the Talmud as a book would be inaccurate. It is a small\nlibrary, or collection of books. \"Modern editions of the Talmud,\nincluding the most important commentaries, consist of about 3,000 folio\nsheets, or 12,000 folio pages of closely printed matter, generally\ndivided into twelve or twenty volumes. One page of Talmudic Hebrew\nintelligibly translated into English would cover three pages; the\ntranslation of the whole Talmud with its commentaries would accordingly\nmake a library of 400 volumes, each numbering 360 octavo pages.\"[49]\n\nIt would be well to bear in mind that the contents of the Talmud were\nnot proclaimed to the world by any executive, legislative, or judicial\nbody; that they were not the result of any resolution or mandate of any\ncongregation, college, or Sanhedrin; that they were not, in any case,\nformal or statutory. They were simply a great mass of traditionary\nmatter and commentary transmitted orally through many centuries before\nbeing finally reduced to writing. Rabbinism claims for these traditions\na remote antiquity, declaring them to be coeval with the proclamation of\nthe Decalogue. Many learned doctors among the Jews ascribe this\nantiquity to the whole mass of traditional laws. Others maintain that\nonly the principles upon which Rabbinic interpretation and discussion\nare based, can be traced back so far. But it is certain that distinct\ntraditions are to be found at a very early period in the history of the\nchildren of Israel, and that on their return from Babylonian captivity\nthese traditions were delivered to them by Ezra and his coadjutors of\nthe Great Assembly.\n\nThis development of Hebrew jurisprudence along lines of written and oral\nlaw, Pentateuch and Talmud, Mosaic ordinance and time-honored tradition,\nseems to have followed in obedience to a general principle of juristic\ngrowth. _Lex scripta_ and _lex non scripta_ are classical Roman terms of\nuniversal application in systems of enlightened jurisprudence. A\ncharter, a parchment, a marble column, a table of stone, a sacred book,\ncontaining written maxims defining legal rights and wrongs are the\nbeginnings of all civilized schemes of justice. Around these written,\nfundamental laws grow and cluster the race traditions of a people which\nattach themselves to and become inseparable from the prime organic\nstructure. These oral traditions are the natural and necessary products\nof a nation's growth and progress. The laws of the Medes and Persians,\nat once unalterable and irrevocable, represent a strange and painful\nanomaly in the jurisprudence of mankind. No written constitution,\nincapable of amendment and subject to strict construction, can long\nsurvive the growth and expansion of a great and progressive people. The\never-changing, perpetually evolving forms of social, commercial,\npolitical, and religious life of a restless, marching, ambitious race,\nnecessitate corresponding changes and evolutions in laws and\nconstitutions. These necessary legal supplements are as varied in origin\nas are the nations that produce them. Magna Charta, wrung from John at\nRunnymede, became the written basis of English law and freedom, and\naround it grew up those customs and traditions that--born on the shores\nof the German Ocean, transplanted to the Isles of Britain, nurtured and\ndeveloped through a thousand years of judicial interpretation and\napplication--became the great basic structure of the Common Law of\nEngland.\n\nWhat the Mosaic Code was to the ancient Hebrews, what Magna Charta is to\nEnglishmen, the Koran is to Mahometans: the written charter of their\nfaith and law. Surrounding the Koran are many volumes of tradition, made\nup of the sayings of Mahomet, which are regarded as equally sacred and\nauthoritative as the Koran itself. These volumes of Mahometan tradition\nare called the Sonna and correspond to the Talmud of the Hebrews. An\nanalysis of any great system of jurisprudence will reveal the same\nnatural arrangement of written and oral law as that represented by the\nPentateuch and the Talmud of the Jews.\n\nThe word \"Talmud\" has various meanings, as it appears in Hebrew\ntraditional literature. It is an old scholastic term, and \"is a noun\nformed from the verb 'limmed'='to teach.' It therefore means, primarily,\n'teaching,' although it denotes also 'learning'; it is employed in this\nlatter sense with special reference to the Torah, the terms 'Talmud' and\n'Torah' being usually combined to indicate the study of the Law, both in\nits wider and its more restricted sense.\"[50] It is thus frequently used\nin the sense of the word \"exegesis,\" meaning Biblical exposition or\ninterpretation. But with the etymological and restricted, we are not so\nmuch interested as with the popular and general signification of the\nterm \"Talmud.\" Popularly used, it means simply a small collection of\nbooks represented by two distinct editions handed down to posterity by\nthe Palestinian and Babylonian schools during the early centuries of the\nChristian era.\n\n_Divisions of the Talmud._--The Talmud is divided into two component\nparts: the Mishna, which may be described as the _text_; and the Gemara,\nwhich may be termed the _commentary_.[51] The Mishna, meaning tradition,\nis almost wholly law. It was, indeed, of old, translated as the Second\nor Oral Law--the [Greek: deuter\u00f4sis]--to distinguish it from the Written\nLaw delivered by God to Moses. The relationship between the Mishna,\nmeaning oral law, and the Gemara, meaning commentary, may be illustrated\nby a bill introduced into Congress and the debates which follow. In a\ngeneral way, the bill corresponds to the Mishna, and the debates to the\nGemara. The distinction, however, is that the law resulting from the\npassage of the bill is the effect and culmination of the debate; while\nthe Mishna was already law when the Gemara or commentary was made.\n\nAs we have seen above, Hebrew jurisprudence in its principles and in the\nmanner of their interpretation was chiefly transmitted by the living\nvoice of tradition. These laws were easily and safely handed down from\nfather to son through successive generations as long as Jewish\nnationality continued and the Temple at Jerusalem still stood. But, with\nthe destruction of the Temple and the banishment of the Jews from\nPalestine (A.D. 70), the danger became imminent that in the loss of\ntheir nationality would also be buried the remembrance of their laws.\nMoved with pity and compassion for the sad condition of his people,\nJudah the Holy, called Rabbi for pre\u00ebminence, resolved to collect and\nperpetuate for them in writing their time-honored traditions. His work\nreceived the name Mishna, the same which we have discussed above. But it\nmust not be imagined that this work was the sudden or exclusive effort\nof Rabbi Judah. His achievement was merely the sum total and culmination\nof the labors of a long line of celebrated Hebrew sages. \"The Oral Law\nhad been recognized by Ezra; had become important in the days of the\nMaccabees; had been supported by Pharisaism; narrowed by the school of\nShammai, codified by the school of Hillel, systematized by R. Akiba,\nplaced on a logical basis by R. Ishmael, exegetically amplified by R.\nEliezer, and constantly enriched by successive rabbis and their\nschools. Rabbi Judah put the coping-stone to the immense structure.\"[52]\n\nEmanuel Deutsch gives the following subdivisions of the Mishna:\n\n    The Mishna is divided into six sections. These are subdivided again\n    into 11, 12, 7, 9 (or 10), 11, and 12 chapters, respectively, which\n    are further broken up into 524 paragraphs. We shall briefly\n    describe their contents:\n\n    Section I. Seeds: of Agrarian Laws, commencing with a chapter on\n    Prayers. In this section, the various tithes and donations due to\n    the Priests, the Levites, and the poor, from the products of the\n    lands, and further the Sabbatical year and the prohibited mixtures\n    in plants, animals, garments, are treated of.\n\n    Section II. Feasts: of Sabbaths, Feast, and Fast days, the work\n    prohibited, the ceremonies ordained, the sacrifices to be offered,\n    on them. Special chapters are devoted to the Feast of the Exodus\n    from Egypt, to the New Year's Day, to the Day of Atonement (one of\n    the most impressive portions of the whole book), to the Feast of\n    Tabernacles and to that of Haman.\n\n    Section III. Women: of betrothal, marriage, divorce, etc., also of\n    vows.\n\n    Section IV. Damages: including a great part of the civil and\n    criminal law. It treats of the law of trover, of buying and\n    selling, and the ordinary monetary transactions. Further, of the\n    greatest crime known to the law, viz., idolatry. Next of witnesses,\n    of oaths, of legal punishments, and of the Sanhedrin itself. This\n    section concludes with the so-called \"Sentences of the Fathers,\"\n    containing some of the sublimest ethical dicta known in the history\n    of religious philosophy.\n\n    Section V. Sacred Things: of sacrifices, the first-born, etc.; also\n    of the measurements of the Temple (Middoth).\n\n    Section VI. Purifications: of the various levitical and other\n    hygienic laws, of impure things and persons, their purification,\n    etc.[53]\n\n_Recensions._--The Talmud exists in two recensions: the Jerusalem and\nthe Babylonian. These two editions represent a double Gemara; the first\n(Jerusalem) being an expression of the schools in Palestine and redacted\nat Tiberias about 390 A.D.; the second (Babylonian) being an expression\nof the schools in Babylonia and redacted about 365-427 A.D.\n\nThe Mishna, having been formed into a code, became in its turn what the\nPentateuch had been before it, a basis of discussion and development.\nThe Gemara of the Jerusalem Talmud embodies the critical discussions and\ndisquisitions on the Mishna by hundreds of learned doctors who lived in\nPalestine, chiefly in Galilee, from the end of the second till about the\nmiddle of the fifth century of the Christian era. The Gemara of the\nBabylonian Talmud embodies the criticisms and dissertations on the same\nMishna of numerous learned doctors living in various places in\nBabylonia, but chiefly those of the two great schools of Sura and\nPumbaditha.[54] The Babylonian Talmud is written in \"West Aram\u00e6an,\" is\nthe product of six or seven generations of constant development, and is\nabout four times as large as that of the Jerusalem Talmud, which is\nwritten in \"East Aram\u00e6an.\"[55] It should be kept clearly before the mind\nthat the only difference between these two recensions is in the matter\nof commentary. The two sets of doctors whose different commentaries\ndistinguish the two Talmuds dealt with the same Mishna as a basis of\ncriticism. But decided differences are noticeable in the subject matter\nand style of the two Gemaras represented by the two recensions of the\nTalmud. The discussions and commentaries in the Jerusalem Talmud are\nsimple, brief, and pointed; while those of the Babylonian Talmud are\ngenerally subtle, abstruse, and prolix. The dissertations in the\nJerusalem Talmud are filled to overflowing with arch\u00e6ology, geography,\nand history, while the Babylonian Talmud is more marked by legal and\nreligious development.\n\nBut the reader should not form a wrong impression of the contents of the\nTalmud. They are a blending of the oral law of the Mishna and the notes\nand comments of the sages. The characteristics of both the editions are\nlegal and religious, but a multitude of references are made in each to\nthings that have no connection with either religion or law. \"The Talmud\ndoes, indeed, offer us a perfect picture of the cosmopolitanism and\nluxury of those final days of Rome, such as but few classical or\npostclassical writings contain. We find mention made of Spanish fish, of\nCretan apples, Bithynian cheese, Egyptian lentils and beans, Greek and\nEgyptian pumpkins, Italian wine, Median beer, Egyptian Zyphus; garments\nimported from Pelusium and India, shirts from Cilicia, and veils from\nArabia. To the Arabic, Persian, and Indian materials contained, in\naddition to these, in the Gemara, a bare allusion may suffice. So much\nwe venture to predict, that when once arch\u00e6ological and linguistic\nscience shall turn to this field, they will not leave it again soon.\"\n\n_Relation of Talmud to Mishna._--The relation of the Talmud, used in the\npopular sense, to the Mishna, raises the question of the relation of the\nwhole to one of its parts. The varying meanings of Mishna, Gemara, and\nTalmud very easily confuse the ordinary reader. If these terms are\nconsidered separately in the order in which they appear in the preceding\nsentence, simple mathematical addition will greatly aid in elucidating\nmatters. The Mishna is a vast mass of tradition or oral law which was\nfinally reduced to writing about the close of the second century of the\nChristian era. The Gemara is the Rabbinical exposition of the meaning of\nthe Mishna. The Talmud is the sum of the Mishna plus the Gemara. In\nother words, the Talmud is the elaboration or amplification of the\nMishna by manifold commentaries, designated as the Gemara. It frequently\nhappens that the Talmud and the Mishna appear in the same sentence as\nterms designating entirely different things. This association in a\ndifferent sense inevitably breeds confusion, unless we pause to consider\nthat the Mishna has a separate existence from the Talmud and a distinct\nrecension of its own. In this state it is simply a naked code of laws.\nBut when the Gemara has been added to it the Talmud is the result,\nwhich, in its turn, becomes a distinct entity and may be referred to as\nsuch in the same sentence with the Mishna.\n\n_Relation of Talmud to Pentateuch._--As before suggested, the\nPentateuch, or Mosaic Code, was the Written Law and the very foundation\nof ancient Hebrew jurisprudence. The Talmud, composed of the Mishna,\ni.e., Tradition, and the Gemara, i.e., Commentary, was the Oral Law,\nconnected with, derived from, and built upon the Written Law. It must be\nremembered that the commonwealth of the Jews was a pure theocracy and\nthat all law as well as all religion emanated directly or indirectly\nfrom Jehovah. This was as true of Talmudic tradition as of Mosaic\nordinance. Hillel, who interpreted tradition, was as much inspired of\nGod as was Moses when he received the Written Law on Sinai. Emanuel\nDeutsch is of the opinion that from the very beginning of the Mosaic law\nthere must have existed a number of corollary laws which were used to\ninterpret and explain the written rules; that, besides, there were\ncertain enactments of the primitive Council of the Desert, and certain\nverdicts issued by the later \"judges within the gates\"--all of which\nentered into the general body of the Oral Law and were transmitted side\nby side with the Written Law through the ages.[56] The fourth book of\nEzra, as well as other Apocryphal writings, together with Philo and\ncertain of the Church Fathers, tells us of great numbers of books that\nwere given to Moses at the same time that he received the Pentateuch.\nThese writings are doubtless the source of the popular belief among the\nJews that the traditional laws of the Mishna had existed from time\nimmemorial and were of divine origin. \"Jewish tradition traces the bulk\nof the oral injunctions, through a chain of distinctly named\nauthorities, to 'Sinai itself.' It mentions in detail how Moses\ncommunicated those minuti\u00e6 of his legislation, in which he had been\ninstructed during the mysterious forty days and nights on the Mount, to\nthe chosen guides of the people, in such a manner that they should\nforever remain engraven on the tablets of their hearts.\"[57] This direct\ndescent of the Oral Law from the Sacred Mount itself would indicate an\nindependent character and authority. Nevertheless, Talmudic\ninterpretation of tradition professed to remain always subject to the\nMosaic Code; to be built upon, and to derive its highest inspiration\nfrom it. But, as a matter of fact, while claiming theoretically to be\nsubordinate to it, the Talmud finally superseded and virtually displaced\nthe Pentateuch as a legal and administrative code. This was the\ninevitable consequence and effect of the laws of growth and progress in\nnational existence. Altered conditions of life, at home and in exile,\nnecessitated new rules of action in the government of the Jewish\ncommonwealth. The Mosaic Code was found inadequate to the ever-changing\nexigencies of Hebrew life. As a matter of fact, Moses laid down only\ngeneral principles for the guidance of Hebrew judges. He furnished the\nbody of the law, but a system of legal procedure was wholly wanting. The\nTalmud supplied the deficiency and completed a perfect whole. While yet\nin the Wilderness, Moses commanded the Israelites to establish courts\nand appoint judges for the administration of justice as soon as they\nwere settled in Palestine.[58] This clearly indicates that the great\nlawgiver did not intend his ordinances and injunctions to be final and\nexclusive. Having furnished a foundation for the scheme, he anticipated\nthat the piety, judgment, and learning of subsequent ages would do the\nrest. His expectations were fulfilled in the development of the\ntraditions afterwards embodied in the Mishna, which is the principal\ncomponent part of the Talmud.\n\nAs before suggested, with the growth in population and the\never-increasing complications in social, political, and religious life,\nand with the general advance in Hebrew civilization, Mosaic injunction\nbegan to prove entirely inadequate to the national wants. In the time\nintervening between the destruction of the first and second Temples, a\nnumber of Mosaic laws had become utter anachronisms; others were\nperfectly impracticable, and several were no longer even understood. The\nexigencies of an altered mode of life and the changed conditions and\ncircumstances of the people rendered imperative the enactment of new\nlaws unknown to the Pentateuch. But the divine origin of the Hebrew\nsystem of law was never for a moment forgotten, whatever the change and\nwherever made. The Rabbins never formally repealed or abolished any\nMosaic enactment. They simply declared that it had fallen into\ndesuetude. And, in devising new laws rendered necessary by changed\nconditions of life they invariably invoked some principle or\ninterpretation of the Written Law.\n\nIn the declining years of Jewish nationality, many characteristic laws\nof the Pentateuch had become obsolete. The ordinance which determined\nthe punishment of a stubborn and rebellious son; the enactment which\ncommanded the destruction of a city given to idolatry; and, above all,\nthe _lex talionis_ had become purely matters of legend. On the other\nhand, many new laws appear in the Talmud of which no trace whatever can\nbe discovered in the Pentateuch. \"The Pharisees,\" says Josephus, \"have\nimposed upon the people many laws taken from the tradition of the\nFathers, which are not written in the law of Moses.\"[59] The most\nsignificant of these is the one providing for Antecedent Warning in\ncriminal prosecutions, the meaning and purpose of which will be fully\ndiscussed in another chapter.\n\n_Vicissitudes of the Talmud._--An old Latin adage runs: \"Habent sua fata\nlibelli.\"[60] (Even books are victims of fate). This saying is\npeculiarly applicable to the Talmud, which has had, in a general way,\nthe same fateful history as the race that created it. Proscription,\nexile, imprisonment, confiscation, and burning was its lot throughout\nthe Middle Ages. During a thousand years, popes and kings vied with each\nother in pronouncing edicts and hurling anathemas against it. During the\nlatter half of the sixteenth century it was burned not fewer than six\ndifferent times by royal or papal decree. Whole wagonloads were\nconsigned to the flames at a single burning. In 1286, in a letter to the\nArchbishop of Canterbury, Honorius IV described the Talmud as a\n\"damnable book\" (liber damnabilis), and vehemently urged that nobody in\nEngland be permitted to read it, since \"all other evils flow out of\nit.\"[61] On New Year's day, 1553, numerous copies of the Talmud were\nburned at Rome in compliance with a decree of the Inquisition. And, as\nlate as 1757, in Poland, Bishop Dembowski, at the instigation of the\nFrankists, convened a public assembly at Kamenetz-Podolsk, which decreed\nthat all copies of the Talmud found in the bishopric should be\nconfiscated and burned by the hangman.[62]\n\nOf the two recensions, the Babylonian Talmud bore the brunt of\npersecution during all the ages. This resulted from the fact that the\nJerusalem Talmud was little read after the closing of the Jewish\nacademies in Palestine, while the Babylonian Talmud was the popular\nedition of eminent Jewish scholars throughout the world.\n\nIt is needless to say that the treatment accorded the venerable literary\ncompilation was due to bitter prejudice and crass ignorance. This is\nwell illustrated by the circumstance that when, in 1307, Clement V was\nasked to issue a bull against the Talmud, he declined to do so, until he\nhad learned something about it. To his amazement and chagrin, he could\nfind no one who could throw any light upon the subject. Those who wished\nit condemned and burned were totally ignorant of its meaning and\ncontents. The surprise and disgust of Clement were so great that he\nresolved to found three chairs in Hebrew, Arabic, and Chaldee, the\nthree tongues nearest the idiom of the Talmud. He designated the\nUniversities of Paris, Salamanca, Bologna, and Oxford as places where\nthese languages should be taught, and expressed the hope that, in time,\none of these universities might be able to produce a translation of\n\"this mysterious book.\"[63] It may be added that these plans of the Pope\nwere never consummated.\n\n_The Message and Mission of the Talmud._--To appreciate the message and\nmission of the Talmud, its contents must be viewed and contemplated in\nthe light of both literature and history. As a literary production it is\na masterpiece--strange, weird, and unique--but a masterpiece,\nnevertheless. It is a sort of spiritual and intellectual cosmos in which\nthe brain growth and soul burst of a great race found expression during\na thousand years. As an encyclopedia of faith and scholarship it reveals\nthe noblest thoughts and highest aspirations of a divinely commissioned\nrace. Whatever the master spirits of Judaism in Palestine and Babylon\nesteemed worthy of thought and devotion was devoted to its pages. It\nthus became a great twin messenger, with the Bible, of Hebrew\ncivilization to all the races of mankind and to all the centuries yet to\ncome. To Hebrews it is still the great storehouse of information\ntouching the legal, political, and religious traditions of their fathers\nin many lands and ages. To the Biblical critic of any faith it is an\ninvaluable help to Bible exegesis. And to all the world who care for\nthe sacred and the solemn it is a priceless literary treasure.\n\nAs an historical factor the Talmud has only remotely affected the great\ncurrents of Gentile history. But to Judaism it has been the cementing\nbond in every time of persecution and threatened dissolution. It was\ncarried from Babylon to Egypt, northern Africa, Spain, Italy, France,\nGermany, and Poland. And when threatened with national and race\ndestruction, the children of Abraham in every land bowed themselves\nabove its sacred pages and caught therefrom inspiration to renewed life\nand higher effort. The Hebrews of every age have held the Talmud in\nextravagant reverence as the greatest sacred heirloom of their race.\nTheir supreme affection for it has placed it above even the Bible. It is\nan adage with them that, \"The Bible is salt, the Mischna pepper, the\nGemara balmy spice,\" and Rabbi Solomon ben Joseph sings:\n\n    \"The Kabbala and Talmud hoar\n    Than all the Prophets prize I more;\n    For water is all Bible lore,\n    But Mischna is pure wine.\"\n\nMore than any other human agency has the Talmud been instrumental in\ncreating that strangest of all political phenomena--a nation without a\ncountry, a race without a fatherland.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nHEBREW CRIMINAL LAW--CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS\n\n\nCapital crimes, under Hebrew law, were classified by Maimonides\naccording to their respective penalties. His arrangement will be\nfollowed in this chapter.[64]\n\nHebrew jurisprudence provided four methods of capital punishment: (1)\nBeheading; (2) Strangling; (3) Burning; (4) Stoning.\n\nCrucifixion was unknown to Hebrew law. This cruel and loathsome form of\npunishment will be fully discussed in the second volume of this work.\n\nThirty-six capital crimes are mentioned by the Pentateuch and the\nTalmud.\n\n_Beheading_ was the punishment for only two crimes:\n\n  (1) Murder.\n  (2) Communal apostasy from Judaism to idolatry.\n\n_Strangling_ was prescribed for six offenses:\n\n  (1) Adultery.\n  (2) Kidnaping.\n  (3) False prophecy.\n  (4) Bruising a parent.\n  (5) Prophesying in the name of heathen deities.\n  (6) Maladministration (the \"Rebellious Elder\").\n\n_Burning_ was the death penalty for ten forms of incest--criminal\ncommerce:\n\n  (1) With one's own daughter.\n  (2) With one's own son's daughter.\n  (3) With one's own daughter's daughter.\n  (4) With one's own stepdaughter.\n  (5) With one's own stepson's daughter.\n  (6) With one's own stepdaughter's daughter.\n  (7) With one's own mother-in-law.\n  (8) With one's own mother-in-law's mother.\n  (9) With one's own father-in-law's mother.\n  (10) With a priest's daughter.[65]\n\n_Stoning_ was the penalty for eighteen capital offenses:\n\n  (1) Magic.\n  (2) Idolatry.\n  (3) Blasphemy.\n  (4) Pythonism.\n  (5) Pederasty.\n  (6) Necromancy.\n  (7) Cursing a parent.\n  (8) Violating the Sabbath.\n  (9) Bestiality, practiced by a man.\n  (10) Bestiality, practiced by a woman.\n  (11) Sacrificing one's own children to Moloch.\n  (12) Instigating individuals to embrace idolatry.\n  (13) Instigating communities to embrace idolatry.\n  (14) Criminal conversation with one's own mother.\n  (15) Criminal conversation with a betrothed virgin.\n  (16) Criminal conversation with one's own stepmother.\n  (17) Criminal conversation with one's own daughter-in-law.\n  (18) Violation of filial duty (making the \"Prodigal Son\").[66]\n\nThe crime of _false swearing_ requires special notice. This offense\ncould not be classified under any of the above subdivisions because of\nits peculiar nature. The Mosaic Code ordains in Deut. xix. 16-21: \"If a\nfalse witness rise up against any man to testify against him that which\nis wrong ... and, behold, if the witness be a false witness, and hath\ntestified falsely against his brother; then shall ye do unto him, as he\nhad thought to have done unto his brother ... and thine eye shall not\npity, but life shall go for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for\nhand, foot for foot.\" Talmudic construction of this law awarded the same\nkind of death to him who had sworn falsely against his brother that\nwould have been meted out to the alleged criminal, if the testimony of\nthe false swearer had been true.\n\n_Imprisonment_, as a method of punishment, was unknown to the Mosaic\nCode. Leviticus xxiv. 12 and Numbers xv. 34 seem to indicate the\ncontrary; but the imprisonment therein mentioned undoubtedly refers to\nthe mere detention of the prisoner until sentence could be pronounced\nagainst him. Imprisonment as a form of punishment was a creation of the\nTalmudists who legalized its application among the Hebrews. According to\nMendelsohn, five different classes of offenders were punished by\n_imprisonment_:\n\n(1) Homicides; whose crime could not be legally punished with death,\nbecause some condition or other, necessary to produce a legal\nconviction, had not been complied with.\n\n(2) Instigators to or procurers of murder; such, for instance, as had\nthe deed committed by the hands of a hireling.\n\n(3) Accessories to loss of life, as, for instance, when several persons\nhad clubbed one to death, and the court could not determine the one who\ngave the death blow.\n\n(4) Persons who having been twice duly condemned to and punished with\nflagellation for as many transgressions of one and the same negative\nprecept, committed it a third time.\n\n(5) Incorrigible offenders, who, on each of three occasions, had failed\nto acknowledge as many warnings antecedent to the commission of one and\nthe same crime, the original penalty for which was excision.[67]\n\n_Flagellation_ is the only corporal punishment mentioned by the\nPentateuch. The number of stripes administered were not to exceed forty\nand were to be imposed in the presence of the judges.[68] Wherever the\nMosaic Code forbade an act, or, in the language of the sages, said \"Thou\nshalt not,\" and prescribed no other punishment or alternative, a Court\nof Three might impose stripes as the penalty for wrongdoing. Mendelsohn\ngives the following classification:\n\nFlagellation is the penalty of three classes of offenses:\n\n(1) The violation of a negative precept, deadly in the sight of heaven.\n\n(2) The violation of any negative precept, when accomplished by means of\na positive act.\n\n(3) The violation of any one of the prohibitive ordinances punishable,\naccording to the Mosaic law with _excision_, to which, however, no\ncapital punishment at the instance of a human tribunal is attached.[69]\n\nThe Mishna enumerates fifty offenses punishable by stripes, but this\nenumeration is evidently incomplete. Maimonides gives a full\nclassification of all the offenses punishable by flagellation, the\nnumber of which he estimates to be two hundred and seven. The last three\nin his list are cases in which the king takes too many wives,\naccumulates too much silver or gold, or collects too many horses.[70]\n\n_Slavery_ was the penalty for _theft_ under ancient Hebrew law. This is\nthe only case where the Mosaic law imposed slavery upon the culprit as a\npunishment for his crime; and a loss of liberty followed only where the\nthief was unable to make the prescribed restitution. Exodus xxii. 1-3\nsays:\n\n    If a man shall steal an ox, or a sheep, and kill it, or sell it, he\n    shall restore five oxen for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep ...\n    if he have nothing, then he shall be sold for his theft.\n\nPenal servitude, or slavery, was imposed only on men, never on women.\nSlavery, as a penalty for theft, was limited to a period of six years in\nobedience to the Mosaic ordinance laid down in Exodus xxi. 2.\n\n    If thou buy a Hebrew servant, six years he shall serve: and in the\n    seventh, he shall go free for nothing.\n\nIt should be remarked, in this connection, that slavery, as a punishment\nfor crime, carried with it none of the odium and hardship usually borne\nby the slave. The humanity of Hebrew law provided that the culprit,\nthief though he was, should not be degraded or humiliated. He could be\ncompelled to do work for his master, such as he had been accustomed to\ndo while free, but was relieved by the law from all degrading\nemployment, such as \"attending the master to the bath, fastening or\nunfastening his sandals, washing his feet, or any other labor usually\nperformed by the regular slave.\" Hebrew law required such kindly\ntreatment of the convict thief by his master that this maxim was the\nresult: \"He who buys a Hebrew slave, buys himself a master.\"\n\n_Internment_ in a city of refuge was the punishment for accidental\nhomicide. Mischance or misadventure, resulting in the slaying of a\nfellow-man, was not, properly speaking, a crime; nor was exile in a city\nof refuge considered by the Talmudists a form of punishment. But they\nare so classified by most writers on Hebrew criminal law. Among nearly\nall ancient nations there was a place of refuge for the unfortunate and\ndowntrodden of the earth; debtors, slaves, criminals, and political\noffenders; some sacred spot--an altar, a grave, or a sanctuary dedicated\nand devoted to some divinity who threw about the hallowed place divine\nprotection and inviolability. Such was at Athens the Temple of Theseus,\nthe sanctuary of slaves. It will be remembered that the orator\nDemosthenes took refuge in the Temple of Poseidon as a sanctuary, when\npursued by emissaries of Antipater and the Macedonians.[71] Among the\nancient Hebrews, there were six cities of refuge; three on either side\nof the Jordan. They were so located as to be nearly opposite each other.\nBezer in Reuben was opposite Hebron in Judah; Schechem in Ephraim was\nopposite to Ramoth in Gad; and Golan in Manasseh was opposite to Kedesh\nin Naphtali.[72] Highways in excellent condition led from one to the\nother. Signposts were placed at regular intervals to indicate the way to\nthe nearest city of refuge. These cities were designated by the law as\nasylums or sanctuaries for the protection of innocent slayers of their\nfellow-men from the \"avenger of blood.\" Among nearly all primitive\npeoples of crude political development, such as the early Germans, the\nancient Greeks and Slavs, certain North American savage tribes and the\nmodern Arabs, Corsicans and Sicilians, the right of private vengeance\nwas and is taught and tolerated. Upon the \"next of kin,\" the \"avenger of\nblood,\" devolved the duty of hunting down and slaying the guilty man.\nCities of refuge were provided by Mosaic law for such an emergency\namong the Hebrews. This provision of the Mosaic Code doubtless sprang\nfrom a personal experience of its founder. Bible students will remember\nthat Moses slew an Egyptian and was compelled to flee in\nconsequence.[73] Remembering his dire distress on this occasion, the\ngreat lawgiver was naturally disposed to provide sanctuaries for others\nsimilarly distressed. But the popular notion of the rights of sanctuary\nunder the Mosaic law is far from right. That a common murderer could, by\nprecipitate flight, reach one of the designated places and be safe from\nhis pursuers and the vengeance of the law, is thought by many. The\nobservation of Benny on this point is apt and lucid:\n\n    Internment in one of the cities of refuge was not the scampering\n    process depicted in the popular engraving: a man in the last stage\n    of exhaustion at the gate of an Eastern town; his pursuers close\n    upon him, arrows fixed and bows drawn; his arms stretched\n    imploringly towards a fair Jewish damsel, with a pitcher gracefully\n    poised upon her head. This may be extremely picturesque, but it is\n    miserably unlike the custom in vogue among the later Hebrews.\n    Internment in a city of refuge was a sober and judicial proceeding.\n    He who claimed the privilege was tried before the Sanhedrin like\n    any ordinary criminal. He was required to undergo examination; to\n    confront witnesses, to produce evidence, precisely as in the case\n    of other offenders. He had to prove that the homicide was purely\n    accidental; that he had borne no malice against his neighbor; that\n    he had not lain in wait for him to slay him. Only when the judges\n    were convinced that the crime was homicide by misadventure was the\n    culprit adjudged to be interned in one of the sheltering cities.\n    There was no scurrying in the matter; no abrupt flight; no hot\n    pursuit, and no appeal for shelter. As soon as judgment was\n    pronounced the criminal was conducted to one of the appointed\n    places. He was accompanied the whole distance by two\n    talmide-chachamin-disciples of the Rabbins. The avengers of the\n    blood dared not interfere with the offender on the way. To slay him\n    would have been murder, punishable with death.\n\n_Execution of Capital Sentences._ (1) _Beheading._--The Hebrews\nconsidered beheading the most awful and ignominious of all forms of\npunishment. It was the penalty for deliberate murder and for communal\napostasy from Judaism to idolatry, the most heinous offenses against the\nHebrew theocracy. Beheading was accomplished by fastening the culprit\nsecurely to a post and then severing his head from his body by a stroke\nwith a sword.[74]\n\n(2) _Strangling._--The capital punishment of strangling was effected by\nburying the culprit to his waist in soft mud, and then tightening a cord\n_wrapped in a soft cloth_ around his neck, until suffocation ensued.[75]\n\n(3) _Burning._--The execution of criminals by burning was not done by\nconsuming the living person with fire, as was practiced in the case of\nheretics by prelates in the Middle Ages and in the case of white\ncaptives by savages in colonial days in America. Indeed, the term\n\"burning\" seems to be a misnomer in this connection, for the culprit was\nnot really burned to death. He was simply suffocated by strangling. As\nin the case of strangling, the condemned man was placed in a pit dug in\nthe ground. Soft dirt was then thrown in and battered down, until\nnothing but his head and chest protruded. A cord, wrapped in a soft\ncloth, was then passed once around his neck. Two strong men came\nforward, grasped each an end, and drew the cord so hard that suffocation\nimmediately followed. As the lower jaw dropped from insensibility and\nrelaxation, a lighted wick was quickly thrown into his mouth. This\nconstituted the burning.[76] There is authority for the statement that\ninstead of a lighted wick, molten lead was poured down the culprit's\nthroat.[77]\n\n(4) _Stoning._--Death by stoning was accomplished in the following\nmanner: The culprit was taken to some lofty hill or eminence, made to\nundress completely, if a man, and was then precipitated violently to the\nground beneath. The fall usually broke the neck or dislocated the spinal\ncord. If death did not follow instantaneously the witnesses hurled upon\nhis prostrate body heavy stones until he was dead. If the first stone,\nso heavy as to require two persons to carry it, did not produce death,\nthen bystanders threw stones upon him until death ensued. Here, again,\n\"stoning\" to death is not strictly accurate. Death usually resulted from\nthe fall of the man from the platform, scaffold, hill, or other\nelevation from which he was hurled. It was really a process of\nneck-breaking, instead of stoning, as burning was a process of\nsuffocation, instead of consuming with fire.\n\nThese four methods of execution--beheading, strangling, burning, and\nstoning--were the only forms of capital punishment known to the ancient\nHebrews. Crucifixion was never practiced by them; but a posthumous\nindignity, resembling crucifixion, was employed as an insult to the\ncriminal, in the crimes of idolatry and blasphemy. In addition to being\nstoned to death, as a punishment for either of these crimes, the dead\nbody of the culprit was then hanged in public view as a means of\nrendering the offense more hideous and the death more ignominious. This\n_hanging_ to a tree was in obedience to a Mosaic ordinance contained in\nDeut. xxi. 22. The corpse was not permitted, however, to remain hanging\nduring the night.\n\nThe burial of the dead body of the criminal immediately followed\nexecution, but interment could not take place in the family burial\nground. Near each town in ancient Palestine were two cemeteries; in one\nof them were buried those criminals who had been executed by beheading\nor strangling; in the other were interred those who had been put to\ndeath by stoning or burning. The bodies were required to remain, thus\nburied, until the flesh had completely decayed and fallen from the bone.\nThe relatives were then permitted to dig up the skeletons and place them\nin the family sepulchers.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nHEBREW CRIMINAL LAW--COURTS AND JUDGES\n\n\nThe Hebrew tribunals were three in kind: the Great Sanhedrin; the Minor\nSanhedrin; and the Lower Tribunal, or the Court of Three.\n\nThe Great Sanhedrin, or Grand Council, was the high court of justice and\nthe supreme tribunal of the Jews. It sat at Jerusalem. It numbered\nseventy-one members. Its powers were legislative, executive, and\njudicial. It exercised all the functions of education, of government,\nand of religion. It was the national parliament of the Hebrew Theocracy,\nthe human administrator of the divine will. It was the most august\ntribunal that ever interpreted or administered religion to man.\n\n_The Name._--The word \"Sanhedrin\" is derived from the Greek ([Greek:\nsynedrion]) and denotes a legislative assembly or an ecclesiastical\ncouncil deliberating in a sitting posture. It suggests also the gravity\nand solemnity of an Oriental synod, transacting business of great\nimportance. The etymology of the word indicates that it was first used\nin the later years of Jewish nationality. Several other names are also\nfound in history to designate the Great Sanhedrin of the Jews. The\nCouncil of Ancients is a familiar designation of early Jewish writers.\nIt is called Gerusia, or Senate, in the second book of Maccabees.[78]\nConcilium, or Grand Council, is the name found in the Vulgate.[79] The\nTalmud designates it sometimes as the Tribunal of the Maccabees, but\nusually terms it Sanhedrin, the name most frequently employed in the\nGreek text of the Gospels, in the writings of the Rabbins, and in the\nworks of Josephus.[80]\n\n_Origin of the Great Sanhedrin._--The historians are at loggerheads as\nto the origin of the Great Sanhedrin. Many contend that it was\nestablished in the Wilderness by Moses, who acted under divine\ncommission recorded in Numbers xi. 16, 17: \"Gather unto me seventy of\nthe elders of Israel, whom thou knowest to be the elders of the people,\nand officers of them; and bring them unto the tabernacle of the\ncongregation, that they may stand with thee; and I will take of the\nSpirit that is upon thee and will put it upon them; and they shall bear\nthe burden of the people with thee, that thou bearest it not alone.\"\nOver the seventy elders, Moses is said to have presided, making\nseventy-one, the historic number of the Great Sanhedrin. Several\nChristian historians, among them Grotius and Selden, have entertained\nthis view; others equally celebrated have maintained contrary opinions.\nThese latter contend that the council of seventy ordained by Moses\nexisted only a short time, having been established to assist the great\nlawgiver in the administration of justice; and that, upon the entrance\nof the children of Israel into the Promised Land, it disappeared\naltogether. The writers who hold this view contend that if the great\nassembly organized in the Wilderness was perpetuated side by side with\nthe royal power, throughout the ages, as the Rabbis maintained, some\nmention of this fact would, in reason, have been made by the Bible,\nJosephus, or Philo.\n\nThe pages of Jewish history disclose the greatest diversity of opinion\nas to the origin of the Great Sanhedrin. The Maccabean era is thought by\nsome to be the time of its first appearance. Others contend that the\nreign of John Hyrcanus, and still others that the days of Judas\nMaccabeus, marked its birth and beginning. Raphall, having studied with\ncare its origin and progress, wrote: \"We have thus traced the existence\nof a council of Zekenim or Elders founded by Moses, existing in the days\nof Ezekiel, restored under the name of Sabay Yehoudai, or Elders of the\nJews, under Persian dominion; Gerusia, under the supremacy of the\nGreeks; and Sanhedrin under the Asmonean kings and under the\nRomans.\"[81]\n\nBrushing aside mere theory and speculation, one historical fact is clear\nand uncontradicted, that the first Sanhedrin Council clothed with the\ngeneral judicial and religious attributes of the Great Sanhedrin of the\ntimes of Jesus, was established at Jerusalem between 170 and 106 B.C.\n\n_Organization of the Great Sanhedrin._--The seventy-one members\ncomposing the Great Sanhedrin were divided into three chambers:\n\n  The chamber of priests;\n  The chamber of scribes;\n  The chamber of elders.\n\nThe first of these orders represented the religious or sacerdotal; the\nsecond, the literary or legal; the third, the patriarchal, the\ndemocratic or popular element of the Hebrew population. Thus the\nprincipal Estates of the Commonwealth of Israel were present, by\nrepresentation, in the great court and parliament of the nation.\n\nMatthew refers to these three orders and identifies the tribunal that\npassed judgment upon Christ: \"From that time forth, began Jesus to shew\nunto his disciples, how that he must go unto Jerusalem, and suffer many\nthings of the elders and chief priests and scribes, and be killed and\nraised again the third day.\"[82]\n\nTheoretically, under the Hebrew constitution, the \"seventy-one\" of the\nthree chambers were to be equally divided:\n\n  Twenty-three in the chamber of priests,\n  Twenty-three in the chamber of scribes,\n  Twenty-three in the chamber of elders.\n\nA total of sixty-nine, together with the two presiding officers, would\nconstitute the requisite number, seventy-one. But, practically, this\narrangement was rarely ever observed. The theocratic structure of the\ngovernment of Israel and the pious regard of the people for the\nguardians of the Temple, gave the priestly element a predominating\ninfluence from time to time. The scribes, too, were a most vigorous and\naggressive sect and frequently encroached upon the rights and privileges\nof the other orders. Abarbanel, one of the greatest of the Hebrew\nwriters, has offered this explanation: \"The priests and scribes\nnaturally predominated in the Sanhedrin because, not having like the\nother Israelites received lands to cultivate and improve, they had\nabundant time to consecrate to the study of law and justice, and thus\nbecame better qualified to act as judges.\"[83]\n\n_Qualifications of Members of the Great Sanhedrin._--The following\nqualifications were requisite to entitle an applicant to membership in\nthe Great Sanhedrin:\n\n(1) _He must have been a Hebrew and a lineal descendant of Hebrew\nparents._[84]\n\n(2) _He must have been \"learned in the law\"; both written and\nunwritten._\n\nHis legal attainment must have included an intimate acquaintance with\nall the enactments of the Mosaic Code, with traditional practices, with\nthe precepts and precedents of the colleges, with the adjudications of\nformer courts and the opinions of former judges. He must have been\nfamiliar not only with the laws then actively in force, but also with\nthose that had become obsolete.[85]\n\n(3) _He must have had judicial experience; that is, he must have\nalready filled three offices of gradually increasing dignity, beginning\nwith one of the local courts, and passing successively through two\nmagistracies at Jerusalem._[86]\n\n(4) _He must have been thoroughly proficient in scientific knowledge._\n\nThe ancient Sanhedrists were required to be especially well grounded in\nastronomy and medicine. They were also expected to be familiar with the\narts of the necromancer.[87] We are also led to believe from the\nrevelations of the Talmud that the judges of Israel were well versed in\nthe principles of physiology and chemistry, as far as these sciences\nwere developed and understood in those days. History records that Rabbi\nIsmael and his disciples once engaged in experimental dissection in\norder to learn the anatomy of the human frame. On one occasion a\ndeceitful witness tried to impose upon a Hebrew court by representing\nspermatic fluid to be the albumen of an egg. Baba bar Boutah was\nenabled, from his knowledge of the elements of chemistry, to demonstrate\nthe fact of fraud in the testimony of the witness. Eighty disciples of\nthe famous Academy of Hillel are said to have been acquainted with every\nbranch of science known in those days.[88]\n\n(5) _He must have been an accomplished linguist; that is, he must have\nbeen thoroughly familiar with the languages of the surrounding nations._\n\nInterpreters were not allowed in Hebrew courts. A knowledge of several\nlanguages was, therefore, indispensable to the candidate who sought\nmembership in the Great Sanhedrin. \"In the case of a foreigner being\ncalled as a witness before a tribunal, it was absolutely necessary that\ntwo members should understand the language in which the stranger's\nevidence was given; that two others should speak to him; while another\nwas required to be both able to understand and to converse with the\nwitness. A majority of three judges could always be obtained on any\ndoubtful point in the interpretation of the testimony submitted to the\ncourt. At Bither there were three Rabbins acquainted with every language\nthen known, while at Jabneh there were said to be four similarly endowed\nwith the gift of 'all the tongues.'\"[89]\n\n(6) _He must have been modest, popular, of good appearance, and free\nfrom haughtiness._[90]\n\nThe Hebrew mind conceived modesty to be the natural result of that\nlearning, dignity, and piety which every judge was supposed to possess.\nThe qualification of \"popularity\" did not convey the notion of\nelectioneering, hobnobbing and familiarity. It meant simply that the\nreputation of the applicant for judicial honors was so far above\nreproach that his countrymen could and would willingly commit all their\ninterests of life, liberty, and property to his keeping. By \"good\nappearance\" was meant that freedom from physical blemishes and defects,\nand that possession of physical endowments that would inspire respect\nand reverence in the beholder. The haughty judge was supposed to be\nlacking in the elements of piety and humility which qualified him for\ncommunion with God. Haughtiness, therefore, disqualified for admission\nto the Great Sanhedrin.\n\n(7) _He must have been pious, strong, and courageous._[91]\n\nPiety was the pre\u00ebminent qualification of a judge of Israel. Impiety was\nthe negation of everything Israelitish. Strength and courage are\nattributes that all judges in all ages and among all races have been\nsupposed to possess in order to be just and righteous in their\njudgments.\n\n_Disqualifications._--Disqualifications of applicants for membership in\nthe Great Sanhedrin are not less interesting than qualifications. They\nare in the main mere negatives of affirmatives which have already been\ngiven, and would seem, therefore, to be superfluous. But they are\nstrongly accentuated in Hebrew law, and are therefore repeated here.\n\n(1) _A man was disqualified to act as judge who had not, or had never\nhad, any regular trade, occupation, or profession by which he gained his\nlivelihood._\n\nThe reason for this disqualification was based upon a stringent maxim of\nthe Rabbins: \"He who neglects to teach his son a trade, is as though he\ntaught him to steal!\" A man who did not work and had never labored in\nthe sweat of his brow for an honest livelihood, was not qualified,\nreasoned the Hebrew people, to give proper consideration or extend due\nsympathy to the cause of litigants whose differences arose out of the\nstruggles of everyday life.\n\n(2) _In trials where the death penalty might be inflicted, an aged man,\na person who had never had any children of his own, and a bastard were\ndisqualified to act as judge._\n\nA person of advanced years was disqualified because according to the\nRabbins old age is frequently marked by bad temper; and \"because his\nyears and infirmities were likely to render him harsh, perhaps obstinate\nand unyielding.\" On the other hand, youth was also a disqualification to\nsit in the Sanhedrin. According to the Rabbis, twenty-five years was the\nage which entitled a person to be called a Man;[92] but no one was\neligible to a seat in the Sanhedrin until he had reached the age of\nforty years.[93] The ancient Hebrews regarded that period as the\nbeginning of discretion and understanding.\n\nA person without children was not supposed to possess those tender\npaternal feelings \"which should warm him on behalf of the son of Israel\nwho was in peril of his life.\"\n\nThe stain of birth and the degradation in character of a bastard were\nwholly inconsistent with the high ideals of the qualifications of a\nHebrew judge.\n\n(3) _Gamblers, dice players, bettors on pigeon matches, usurers, and\nslave dealers were disqualified to act as judges._\n\nThe Hebrews regarded gambling, dice playing, betting on pigeon matches,\nand other such practices as forms of thievery; and thieves were not\neligible to sit as judges in their courts. No man who was in the habit\nof lending money in an usurious manner could be a judge. It was\nimmaterial whether the money was lent to a countryman or a stranger.\nSlave dealers were disqualified to act as judges because they were\nregarded as inhuman and unsympathetic.\n\n(4) _No man was qualified to be a judge who had dealt in the fruits of\nthe seventh year._\n\nSuch a person was deemed lacking in conscience and unfitted to perform\njudicial functions.\n\n(5) _No man who was concerned or interested in a matter to be\nadjudicated was qualified to sit in judgment thereon._\n\nThis is a universal disqualification of judges under all enlightened\nsystems of justice. The weakness and selfishness of human nature are\nsuch that few men are qualified to judge impartially where their own\ninterests are involved.\n\n(6) _All relatives of the accused man, of whatever degree of\nconsanguinity, were disqualified from sitting in judgment on his case._\n\nThis is only a variation of the disqualification of interest.\n\n(7) _No person who would be benefited, as heir, or otherwise, by the\ndeath or condemnation of an accused man, was qualified to be his judge._\n\nThis, too, is a variation of the disqualification of interest.\n\n(8) _The king could not be a member of the Sanhedrin._\n\nRoyalty disqualified from holding the place of judge because of the\nhigh station of the king and because his exercising judicial functions\nmight hamper the administration of justice.\n\nAnd, finally, in closing the enumeration of disqualifications, it may be\nadded that an election to a seat obtained by fraud or any unfair means\nwas null and void. No respect was shown for the piety or learning of\nsuch a judge; his judicial mantle was spat upon with scorn, and his\nfellow judges fled from him as from a plague or pest. Hebrew contempt\nfor such a judge was expressed in the maxim: \"The robe of the unfairly\nelected judge is to be respected not more than the blanket of an ass.\"\n\n_Officers of the Great Sanhedrin._--Two presiding officers directed the\nproceedings of the Great Sanhedrin. One of these, styled _prince_\n(nasi), was the chief and the president of the court. The other, known\nas the _father of the Tribunal_ (ab-beth-din), was the vice-president.\n\nThere has been much discussion among the historians as to the particular\nchamber from which the president was chosen. Some have contended that\nthe presidency of the Sanhedrin belonged by right to the high priest.\nBut the facts of history do not sustain this contention. Aaron was high\npriest at the time when Moses was president of the first Sanhedrin in\nthe Wilderness; and, besides, the list of presidents preserved by the\nTalmud reveals the names of many who did not belong to the priesthood.\nMaimonides has made the following very apt observation on the subject:\n\"Whoever surpassed his colleagues in wisdom was made by them chief of\nthe Sanhedrin.\"[94]\n\nAccording to most Jewish writers, there were two scribes or secretaries\nof the Sanhedrin. But several others contend that there were three.\nBenny says: \"Three scribes were present; one was seated on the right,\none on the left, the third in the center of the hall. The first recorded\nthe names of the judges who voted for the acquittal of the accused, and\nthe arguments upon which the acquittal was grounded. The second noted\nthe names of such as decided to condemn the prisoner and the reasons\nupon which the conviction was based. The third kept an account of both\nthe preceding so as to be able at any time to supply omissions or check\ninaccuracies in the memoranda of his brother reporters.\"[95]\n\nIn addition to these officers, there were still others who executed\nsentences and attended to all the police work of legal procedure. They\nwere called _shoterim_.[96]\n\nThere was no such officer as a public prosecutor or State's attorney\nknown to the laws of the ancient Hebrews. The witnesses to the crime\nwere the only prosecutors recognized by Hebrew criminal jurisprudence;\nand in capital cases they were the legal executioners as well.\n\nThere was also no such body as the modern Grand Jury known to ancient\nHebrew criminal law. And no similar body of committee of the Sanhedrin\nperformed the accusatory functions of the modern Grand Jury. The\nwitnesses were the only accusers, and their testimony was both the\nindictment and the evidence. Until they testified, the man suspected was\ndeemed not only innocent but unaccused.\n\nThe profession of the law, in the modern sense of the term, was no part\nof the judicial system of the ancient Hebrews. There were no advocates\nas we know them. There were, indeed, men learned in the law--Pharisees\nand Sadducees--who knew all the law. There were doctors of the law: men\nwhom Jesus confounded when a youth in the Temple at the age of\ntwelve.[97] But there were no lawyers in the modern sense: professional\ncharacters who accept fees and prosecute cases. The judges and disciples\nperformed all the duties of the modern attorney and counselor-at-law.\nThe prophets were the sole orators of Hebrew life, but they were never\nallowed to appear as defendants of accused persons. Indeed, they\nthemselves were at times compelled to play the role of defendants.\nJeremiah is an illustrious example.[98] Both Keim[99] and Geikie[100]\nspeak of a Baal Rib, a counsel appointed to see that everything possible\nwas done to secure the rights of an accused person at a Hebrew criminal\ntrial. But these statements are not in accord with standard works on\nancient Hebrew jurisprudence. Indeed, Friedlieb emphatically denies that\nthere was any such person as a Baal Rib or Dominus Litis among the\nancient Hebrews.[101] It seems that in the closing years of Jewish\nnationality, specially retained advocates were known, for St. Luke tells\nus that the Jews employed Tertullus, a certain orator, to prosecute St.\nPaul.[102] But this was certainly an exceptional case. It is\nhistorically certain that in the early ages of the Jewish Commonwealth\nlitigants pleaded their own causes. This we learn from the case of the\ntwo women who appeared before King Solomon, and laid before him their\nrespective claims to a child.[103]\n\n_Compensation of Officers._--The judges of Israel were originally not\npaid anything for their services. The honor of the office itself was\nconsidered sufficient emolument for labors performed. Indeed, the office\nof teacher and judge in Israel was so highly prized that the struggles\nand sacrifices of a lifetime were not considered too great to pay for a\nplace in the Great Sanhedrin. Such high station was regarded as a sacred\nsphere into which the idea of material gain should not enter. The\nregular court days were, therefore, spent by the judge on the bench,\nwithout any expectation of reward for his services. The other days of\nthe week he spent in earning a livelihood. But in later years of the\nnational life a change seems to have taken place. The ancient rule was\nso far modified that when the services of the judge were required on\ndays when he was engaged in his private pursuits, custom and the law\ngave him the right to claim a substitute during the time he was occupied\non the bench; or, in default of a substitute, to claim remuneration for\nthe time which he had lost. Another modification was that if his legal\nduties required his entire time, the judge in Israel was entitled to\nsupport from the communal treasury, and was even permitted to accept\nfees from litigants. This practice was discouraged, however, by the\nRabbis, who looked with disfavor upon the appointment of judges who were\nnot entirely able to support themselves.\n\nThe secretaries and other officers of subordinate dignity were paid for\ntheir services.[104]\n\n_Sessions of the Courts._--In the early days of the Hebrew Commonwealth\nthe laws provided for no regular court days. The Sanhedrin convened as\noccasion required, to transact such business and dispose of such cases\nas came before it. But this practice was oftentimes found to be\nexpensive and annoying to litigants who came into Jerusalem from the\ncountry and found no courts in session. To accommodate the country folk,\nthe farmers, and shepherds, Ezra and his coadjutors of the Great\nAssembly designated Mondays and Thursdays as regular court days. This\nenactment was not prohibitive, however. Court might be held on any day\nof the week that necessity required. The reason assigned by the Rabbins\nfor the selection of Mondays and Thursdays as court days was that on\nthose days people from the country usually congregated in populous\nplaces, in their houses of worship, to hear the law read and\ninterpreted. While in attendance upon these sacred services, it was\nthought that the time was both convenient and propitious for the\nsettlement of their legal difficulties.[105]\n\nThe authorities are divided as to the exact official hours of the day\nfor holding court. \"The Sanhedrin sat from the close of the morning\nsacrifice to the time of the evening sacrifice,\" is the language of the\nJerusalem Talmud.[106] Mendelsohn says: \"The official hours for holding\ncourt were between the morning service and noon; but a suit entered upon\nduring the legal hours could be carried on until evening, and civil\ncases could be continued even after nightfall.\"[107] But in no case of a\ncriminal nature could the court continue its session during the\nnight.[108]\n\nThe Minor Sanhedrins in the provinces, as well as the local Courts of\nThree, usually held their sessions in the most public place, that is, at\nthe city gate. The two Minor Sanhedrins of Jerusalem held their sessions\nat the entrance to the Temple-mound and to the woman's department\nrespectively. The Great Sanhedrin convened in an apartment of the\nnational temple at Jerusalem, known as the _Lishkath haggazith_. This\napartment was the celebrated \"Hall of Hewn Stones.\"[109]\n\n_Recruitments._--The young Hebrew disciple who possessed the necessary\nmental, spiritual, and personal qualifications for judicial honors was\nstyled Haber, which means associate, fellow.[110] Such a disciple was\nfirst solemnly ordained and received the title of Zaken (elder) or\nRabbi. This title rendered him eligible to membership in the different\ncourts. But that he might acquire necessary experience for membership in\nthe Great Sanhedrin and became a sage worthy of Israel, he was required\nto begin at the lowest rung of the judicial ladder and work gradually to\nthe top. He was first appointed by the Great Sanhedrin to a place in one\nof the local courts, consisting of three members; he then served as a\nmember of one of the provincial Sanhedrins; was then promoted to the\nfirst, and afterwards to the second Minor Sanhedrin at Jerusalem; and\nwas elevated finally to the Great Sanhedrin itself.[111] After this\nmanner, all the courts of the ancient Hebrews were recruited and\nreplenished from time to time; the young aspirant to judicial favors\nbeginning in the local Court of Three and rising by successive steps to\nthe Great Sanhedrin at Jerusalem.\n\nThe exact method of filling vacancies and thus replenishing the\nmembership of the Great Sanhedrin is not certainly known.[112] The\nfollowing extract from the Talmud, however, is thought to be\nauthoritative:\n\n    In front of them (the judges of the Great Sanhedrin) sat three rows\n    of learned disciples; each of them had his own special place.\n    Should it be necessary to promote one of them to the office of\n    judge, one of those in the foremost row was selected. His place was\n    then supplied by one in the second row, while one from the third\n    was in turn advanced to the second. This being done, someone was\n    then chosen from the congregation to supply the vacancy thus\n    created in the third row. But the person so appointed did not step\n    directly into the place occupied by the one last promoted from the\n    third row, but into the place that beseemed one who was only newly\n    admitted.[113]\n\n_Quorum of the Great Sanhedrin._--Twenty-three members constituted a\nquorum of the Great Sanhedrin. This was the full number of the\nmembership of a Minor Sanhedrin.\n\n_Number of Votes Required to Convict._--\"In criminal trials a majority\nof one vote is sufficient for an acquittal; but for a condemnation a\nmajority of two is necessary,\" is the language of the Mishna.[114] The\nfull membership of the Great Sanhedrin was seventy-one. A condemnation\nby thirty-five acquitted the accused; a condemnation by thirty-six also\nacquitted. At least thirty-seven votes were needed to convict. If a bare\nquorum was present, at least thirteen votes were necessary to condemn.\n\nA very peculiar rule of Hebrew law provided that \"a simultaneous and\nunanimous verdict of guilty rendered on the day of trial, had the effect\nof an acquittal.\"[115] Such a verdict was considered to be lacking in\nthe element of mercy, and was thought to result more from conspiracy and\nmob violence than from mature judicial deliberation.\n\n_Jurisdiction of the Great Sanhedrin._--The jurisdiction of the Great\nSanhedrin is briefly and concisely stated in the Mishna:\n\n    _The judgement of the seventy-one is besought when the affair\n    concerns a whole tribe or is regarding a false prophet or the\n    high-priest; when it is a question whether war shall be declared or\n    not; when it has for its object the enlargement of Jerusalem or its\n    suburbs; whether tribunals of twenty-three shall be instituted in\n    the provinces, or to declare that a town has become defiled, and to\n    place it under ban of excommunication.[116]_\n\nEdward Gibbon has also defined the jurisdiction of the same court as\nfollows:\n\n    _With regard to civil objects, it was the supreme court of appeal;\n    with regard to criminal matters, a tribunal constituted for the\n    trial of all offences that were committed by men in any public\n    station, or that affected the peace and majesty of the people. Its\n    most frequent and serious occupation was the exercise of judicial\n    power. As a council of state and as a court of justice, it\n    possessed many prerogatives. Every power was derived from its\n    authority, every law was ratified by its sanction._\n\nThe Great Sanhedrin possessed all the powers and attributes of a\nnational parliament and a supreme court of judicature. It corresponded\nto the Areopagus of Athens and to the senate of Rome. It took cognizance\nof the misconduct of priests and kings. Josephus tells us that Herod the\nGreat was arraigned as a criminal before its judges, and that King\nHyrcanus himself obeyed its mandates and decrees.\n\n_Appeals._--Appeals were allowed from a Minor Sanhedrin to the Great\nSanhedrin. But there was no appeal from a mandate, judgment, or decree\nof the Great Sanhedrin. \"Its authority was supreme in all matters; civil\nand political, social, religious, and criminal.\"\n\nIt is believed that enough has been said touching the character,\norganization, and jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal of the ancient\nHebrews to satisfy the average reader. Indeed, it may be that this limit\nhas been exceeded. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a\nshort review of the Minor Sanhedrins and the Courts of Three.\n\n_Minor Sanhedrins._--There was no fixed number of Minor Sanhedrins for\nthe administration of Justice in the Hebrew Commonwealth. Wherever and\nwhenever, in any town or city inhabited by at least one hundred and\ntwenty families, the people desired a Sanhedrin of three-and-twenty\nmembers, such a tribunal was established. For this purpose, an\napplication was made to the Great Sanhedrin at Jerusalem, which\ndispatched a mandate to the town ordering the residents to assemble and\nto nominate from among themselves persons qualified to act as judges.\nThe electors were expected to bear in mind the qualifications that would\nfit a judge for membership in the Great Sanhedrin, to which all local\njudges might eventually be elevated. Accordingly, only \"good men and\ntrue\" were chosen at the town mass meeting. Immediately upon receipt of\nthe return to the mandate, an authorization was sent back from Jerusalem\nto the town or city which confirmed the election and constituted the\njudges selected a Sanhedrin of three-and-twenty members.[117]\n\n_Jurisdiction of the Minor Sanhedrins._--The jurisdiction of the Minor\nSanhedrins extended to nearly all criminal cases involving imprisonment\nor seclusion for life, internment in a city of refuge, and capital\npunishment. Adultery, seduction, blasphemy, incest, manslaughter, and\nmurder belonged to these different classes. This court condemned an ox\nto be butchered that had gored a man to death. The condemnation\nproceedings were something in the nature of a trial of the beast; and\nthe owner was severely fined where the evidence proved that he knew the\nvicious disposition and habits of the animal. The deliberations at the\ntrial of the bull were most careful and solemn, since the value of a\nhuman life was involved in the proceedings and had to be estimated in\nthe judgment.\n\nBesides jurisdiction in criminal matters, the Sanhedrins of\nthree-and-twenty members performed certain civil functions. They were\nthe tax boards of the various provinces. They constituted the regular\nagencies of government for the distribution of public charity. The\nmanagement and administration of public elementary schools were under\ntheir control. The legal standards of weights and measures were\ninspected by them and received their seals. Sanitary regulations,\nrepairing the defenses of walled cities, and maintaining the public\nhighways in good condition, were among the duties of the Minor\nSanhedrins.\n\nThe qualifications of judges of these courts were the same as those\nrequired for membership in the Great Sanhedrin. This was true because\nthe judges of the provincial courts might be promoted to the supreme\ntribunal at Jerusalem. The Minor Sanhedrins might be very aptly\ndescribed as the _nisi prius_ courts of the Commonwealth of Israel. It\nwas in these courts of three-and-twenty members that the bulk of Hebrew\nlitigation was disposed of. It seems that, though equal in number, they\nwere not all regarded as equal in learning or authority. It is\ndistinctly stated that appeals could be taken from one Minor Sanhedrin\nto another \"deemed of superior authority.\"[118] The difference was\nprobably due to the fact that in the larger towns were located colleges\nand schools, some of whose professors were doubtless either advisers or\nmembers of the local Sanhedrin. At any rate, when a difficult question,\ncivil or criminal, could not be determined, for want of an authoritative\nand registered decision, by an ordinary Sanhedrin of three-and-twenty\njudges, the matter was referred to the nearest neighboring Sanhedrin\nthought to be of greater repute. If no authentic tradition offering a\nsolution of the litigated question was in the possession of the\nSanhedrin to which appeal had been taken, the matter was then referred\nto the first Minor Sanhedrin in Jerusalem which sat in the Har-habaith.\nIf the judges of this court were themselves without precedent touching\nupon the litigated proposition, it was still further referred to the\nsecond Minor Sanhedrin of Jerusalem, located in the Azarah. If, again,\nthis Court was without the necessary tradition that would enable it to\ndecide the question, the matter was finally brought before the Great\nSanhedrin. If this august tribunal was without precedent and tradition\nthat would enable its members to dispose of the question according to\nadjudicated cases, they then decided, nevertheless, in accordance with\nthe sentiments and principles of natural justice.\n\nIt should be remembered that of the Minor Sanhedrins to which every town\nof one hundred and twenty families was entitled, two sat at Jerusalem.\nIt was left optional with a litigant from the provinces to appeal to the\nlocal Sanhedrin or to one of the Minor Sanhedrins in Jerusalem. Local\nbias or prejudice was thus avoided.\n\n_Lower Tribunals._--The lowest order of Hebrew tribunal was the Court of\nThree, composed of judges selected by the litigants themselves. The\nplaintiff chose one member, the defendant selected another, and these\ntwo chose a third. A majority opinion decided all questions. In the\nlater years of Jewish nationality, it was thought best to have at least\none authorized jurist (mumcha) in the Court of Three. This particular\njudge was probably an appointee of the Great Sanhedrin from among the\nyoung disciples (Zaken or Rabbis). This appointment was doubtless\nintended to give repute to the local court and experience to the legal\naspirant, as well as to furnish a possible recruit to the Great\nSanhedrin.[119]\n\nThese courts corresponded very nearly to the modern courts of Justices\nof the Peace. Their jurisdiction extended to civil matters of small\nimportance and to petty criminal offenses. They were not permanent,\nbeing more in the nature of referees or arbitrators, and sat only when\noccasion required. Their sessions were public and were held in the open\nair under trees, or at the city gate.\n\nThus much for the judicial system of courts and judges among the ancient\nHebrews. It was simple in the extreme, democratic to the core, and seems\nto have been thoroughly reliable and effective. It was founded upon\nuniversal suffrage, subject only to the general supervision and\noccasional appointments of the Great Sanhedrin. The judges were ever in\ntouch with the sympathies and the best interests of the people.\n\n_Peculiarities of the Hebrew System._--Certain very striking\npeculiarities marked the Hebrew system:\n\n(1) There were no lawyers or advocates. These judicial disputants have\nbeen known to every other system of enlightened jurisprudence. But there\nwere no Ciceros, Erskines, Choates among the ancient Hebrews. The judges\nwere the defenders as well as the judges of the accused. It may be\neasily read between the lines that the framers and builders of the\nHebrew judicial system regarded paid advocates as an abomination and a\nnuisance. King Ferdinand, of Spain, seems to have had the Hebrew notion\nwhen, more than a thousand years after Jerusalem fell, he sent out\ncolonists to the West Indies, with special instructions \"that no lawyers\nshould be carried along, lest lawsuits should become ordinary\noccurrences in the New World.\"[120] Ferdinand evidently agreed with\nPlato that lawyers are the plague of the community.[121]\n\n(2) There was no secret body, with the accusatory functions of the\nmodern Grand Jury, connected with the ancient Hebrew judicial system.\nThe witnesses were the accusers, and their testimony constituted both\nthe indictment and the evidence.\n\n(3) There were no public prosecutors or State's attorneys known to the\nHebrew system. Here, again, the witnesses were the informants,\nprosecutors, and, in capital cases, executioners of the accused.\n\n(4) No court, among the ancient Hebrews, could consist of a single\njudge. Three was the number of the lowest court; three-and-twenty, of\nthe next highest; and seventy-one, of the Great Sanhedrin at Jerusalem.\nA single intelligence acting judicially would have been regarded as a\nusurpation of divine prerogative. The basis of this peculiar Hebrew\nnotion is a single sentence from the Pirke Aboth, iv. 8: \"Be not a sole\njudge, for there is no sole judge but One.\"[122]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nHEBREW CRIMINAL LAW--WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE\n\n\n_Competency.--The qualifications of a competent witness, under Hebrew\nlaw, were almost identical with those of a qualified judge, mentioned in\na previous chapter. Self-evidently, all persons who were not\nincompetent, were competent._\n\n_Incompetency.--The following persons were incompetent to be witnesses:\nGentiles, women,[123] minors, slaves,[124] idiots and lunatics, deaf\nmutes, blind men, gamblers, usurers, illiterate or immodest persons,\npersons who had been convicted of irreligion or immorality, relatives by\naffinity or consanguinity, and all persons directly interested in the\ncase._\n\nThe witness must have been a Hebrew, though the Talmud mentions cases in\nwhich certain facts were allowed to stand proved upon statements \"made\ninnocently\" by a Gentile; that is, not as a witness in court.\n\nWomen were not permitted to be witnesses ordinarily, because of the\n\"levity and boldness of the sex.\"[125] In capital cases, they were not\nallowed to testify against the accused, because the law required the\nwitnesses to become the executioners of the condemned man, and it was\nnot deemed proper to impose this solemn and awful duty upon the weaker\nsex.\n\nPuberty or adolescence marked the age which qualified a person to be a\nwitness in criminal cases; that is, the thirteenth year must have been\npassed.\n\nImmoral and irreligious persons were incompetent to testify. Such men\nwere termed \"wicked\" in reference to the law as laid down in Exodus\nxxiii. 1: \"Thou shalt not raise a false report: put not thine hand with\nthe wicked to be an unrighteous witness.\" Under the stigma of the\nimmoral and irreligious came dicers, usurers, pigeon fliers, and those\nwho traded in the fruits of the Sabbatical year. Maimonides also\nmentions as incompetent \"men who showed lack of self-respect by eating\non the street, walking about naked at their work, or living openly on\nthe charity of Gentiles.\"[126] Publicans--tax-gatherers--were usually\nclassed with heathens and sinners as being among the immoral and\nirreligious. This class of persons were suspected by the Jews, not only\nbecause they were regarded as the official representatives of the Roman\noppressors of Judea, but also because extortion and cruelty were\nfrequently practiced by them. Theocritus being asked which was the most\ncruel of all beasts, replied: \"Among the beasts of the wilderness, the\nbear and the lion are the most cruel, but among the beasts of the city,\nthe Publican and the Parasite.\"[127]\n\nThe doctrine of interest as a disqualification to testify was carried to\nthe limit of declaring a person incompetent to be a witness when he was\nthe citizen of a town where claim of title to the public bath house or\nthe square was made, until he had first divested himself of all share in\nthe title to the litigated property.[128]\n\n_Number Required to Convict.--Under Hebrew law, both Mosaic and\nTalmudic, at least two witnesses were required to convict an accused\nperson. The prosecuting witness being included, three were necessary._\n\nConcerning capital punishment, the Mosaic ordinance, referring to this\nrule, runs thus:\n\n    At the mouth of _two_ witnesses, or _three_ witnesses, shall he\n    that is worthy of death be put to death; but at the mouth of _one_\n    witness he shall not be put to death.[129]\n\n    Whoso killeth any person, the murderer shall be put to death by the\n    mouth of witnesses; but _one_ witness shall not testify against any\n    person to cause him to die.[130]\n\nFrom the Talmud we learn that this Mosaic provision was maintained with\nscrupulous fidelity in the administration of justice throughout all the\nyears of Jewish nationality. It was a requirement of prudence and safety\nwhich commends itself to every logician and legist. It is not necessary\nto be a criminal lawyer of large experience to know that the blackest\nfalsehood can almost always secure at least one champion. Pliny, the\nhistorian, knew this when he wrote: \"_Nullum tam impudens mendacium est\nquod teste careat._\"[131]\n\nThe requirement of two witnesses was not, however, peculiar to the\njurisprudence of the Hebrews. Nearly every ancient code contained a\nsimilar enactment. It was especially prominent in Roman law.[132] But it\ncan scarcely be found to-day in any modern legislation. In prosecutions\nfor the crimes of treason and perjury under the Common Law of England,\ntwo witnesses were required; in almost all other cases, one positive\nwitness was sufficient.[133]\n\nThe American Constitution requires two witnesses to the same overt act,\nto convict of treason.[134] And the penal laws of the majority of the\nAmerican States have provisions requiring at least two witnesses, or one\nwitness corroborated by circumstantial evidence, to establish guilt in\nthe prosecution of certain crimes; notably, the sexual crimes of rape\nand seduction, the crime of perjury, as well as all crimes where it is\nsought to convict upon the testimony of an accomplice.\n\nMore than one hundred years ago, Montesquieu boasted of such a\nrequirement in French law and declared that those laws which condemn a\nman to death on the testimony of a single witness are fatal to\nliberty.[135] The reason of the rule proclaimed by the great French\nwriter is the same as that put forth by the ancient Rabbins. It was\nassumed that the defendant in a criminal case would plead not guilty and\ndeny the facts of the crime. His plea and denial would simply\ncounterbalance and destroy the testimony of a single witness swearing\nfor the commonwealth. The testimony of a third witness was, therefore,\nindispensable to a decision. It may be objected that this rule was\nabsurd, since a conviction was impossible unless the State could produce\nmore witnesses than the accused. But we shall learn later that the\ndoctrine of sifting testimony and weighing the credibility of witnesses\ndid not obtain so strictly among the ancient Hebrew judges as it does in\ncases of modern trial by jury under English and American law.\n\n_Agreement of Witnesses.--The witnesses were required to agree in all\nessential details; else, their testimony was invalid and had to be\nrejected._\n\nThe Talmudic provision is: \"If one witness contradicts another, the\ntestimony is not accepted.\"[136]\n\nThe illustration of the rule given by Maimonides, in his commentary on\nthis provision, is: \"For instance, if one witness were to testify to\nhaving seen an Israelite in the act of worshiping the sun, and another\nto having seen the same man worshiping the moon, yet, although each of\nthe two facts proves clearly that the man had committed the horrible\ncrime of idolatry, the discrepancy in the statements of the witnesses\ninvalidates their testimony and the accused is free.\"[137]\n\nThis rule of strict agreement, it is supposed, extended, at first, only\nto criminal cases, but it was undoubtedly afterwards applied to civil\ncauses as well. An eminent contributor to the \"Jewish Encyclopedia\"\nsays:\n\n     In civil cases, however, it is not necessary that the two witnesses\n     should agree very closely as to the time and place. Thus, if of two\n     witnesses to a loan one should say, \"A lent B a jar of oil,\" the\n     other, \"He lent him a jar of wine\"; or, if one should say, \"I was\n     present when the money was paid at Jerusalem,\" the other, \"I saw it\n     paid at Hebron\"; or, if one should say, \"I saw it paid in the month\n     of Nisan,\" the other, \"I saw it paid in Iyyar,\" their testimony\n     would be void. But if one says he saw it paid in the upper and the\n     other in the lower story; or if he says on the first of the month\n     and the other on the second of the month, such evidence is within\n     the limit of fair mistake and the testimony stands. Even less does\n     a disagreement as to circumstances other than time and place affect\n     the testimony; for instance, if one say the money is black from\n     usage, the other that it was new, this would be regarded as an\n     immaterial circumstance, and the testimony would stand. Where the\n     two witnesses vary only in the matter of quantity, the lesser\n     quantity is sufficiently proved.[138]\n\nOne of the strangest provisions of Hebrew law was the requirement that\nthe testimony of each witness to the transaction should cover the entire\ncase. This was a Talmudic rule resulting from Rabbinic construction of\nthe Mosaic ordinance, requiring at least two witnesses to establish a\ncrime. The doctors of the law construed the rule to mean that the\ntestimony of each witness was to be complete within itself and to extend\nto the whole case. Hebrew law did not permit the use of circumstantial\nevidence in criminal prosecutions. Only eyewitnesses of the crime were\ncompetent. Under English and American law a crime may be proven by any\nnumber of witnesses, each of whom testifies to a separate fact which\nconstitutes a link in the chain of circumstantial evidence. But this\nmethod of proof was forbidden by both the Pentateuch and the Talmud.\nUnder Hebrew law the capital crime of kidnaping was made up of the two\nelements of Abduction and Selling. The testimony of two witnesses--one\nto the fact of Abduction, the other to the fact of Selling--was\ninsufficient to convict. Each had to testify to the facts of both\nAbduction and Selling. This Talmudic rule of criminal procedure was\nundoubtedly based upon a supreme regard for the sanctity of human life\nand upon the fact that the Hebrews rejected circumstantial evidence\naltogether in proving crime. The extreme of the rule is declared by\nMendelsohn when he says: \"And even where there appeared a legal number\nof duly qualified witnesses, the testimony was insufficient to convict,\nunless they agreed not only with regard to the prisoner's offense, but\nalso with regard to the mode of committing it. Rabbinic law does not\nsubject a person to capital, nor even to corporal punishment, unless all\nwitnesses charge him with one and the same criminal act, their\nstatements fully agreeing in the main circumstances, and declaring that\nthey saw one another, while seeing him engaged in the crime.\"[139]\n\n_No Oath Required.--An oath, in the modern sense, was never administered\nto a Hebrew witness._\n\nTestimony was given under the sanction of the Ninth Commandment: \"Thou\nshalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.\" This solemn\nprohibition of bearing false witness was regarded by both Moses and the\nTalmudists as a sufficient safeguard against perjury. It was a settled\nmaxim of Talmudic law that: \"Whosoever will not tell the truth without\nan oath, would not scruple to assert falsehood with an oath.\" The\ndoctrine was carried still further by some of the Jewish philosophers\nwho declared that swearing was injurious in itself; and that he who\nconsents to swear should _ipso facto_ be suspected of lacking\ncredibility.[140]\n\nIn the place of an oath, the following solemn warning or adjuration was\nadministered to each witness in the presence of the entire court:\n\n    Forget not, O witness, that it is one thing to give evidence in a\n    trial as to money and another in a trial for life. In a money suit,\n    if thy witness-bearing shall do wrong, money may repair that wrong.\n    But in this trial for life, if thou sinnest, the blood of the\n    accused and the blood of his seed to the end of time shall be\n    imputed unto thee.... Therefore was Adam created one man and alone,\n    to teach thee that if any witness shall destroy one soul out of\n    Israel, he is held by the Scripture to be as if he had destroyed\n    the world; and he who saves one such soul to be as if he had saved\n    the world.... For a man from one signet ring may strike off many\n    impressions, and all of them shall be exactly alike. But He, the\n    King of the kings of kings, He the Holy and the Blessed, has struck\n    off from His type of the first man the forms of all men that shall\n    live, yet so that no one human being is wholly alike to any other.\n    Wherefore let us think and believe that the whole world is created\n    for a man such as he whose life hangs on thy words. But these ideas\n    must not deter thee from testifying to what thou actually knowest.\n    Scripture declares: \"The witness who hath seen or known, and doth\n    not tell, shall bear his iniquity.\" Nor must ye scruple about\n    becoming the instrument of the alleged criminal's death. Remember\n    the Scriptural maxim: \"In the destruction of the wicked, there is\n    joy.\"[141]\n\nIt will be observed that the two elements of this preliminary caution\nwere, first, a solemn warning against injustice to the accused through\nfalse swearing and a reminder of the inevitable retribution of Heaven\nupon the perjured swearer and his remote descendants; second, a pointed\nadmonition against timidity or fear in testifying.\n\nBound by this tremendous sanction, the Hebrew witness was prepared to\ntestify. The method was unique, but seems to have been thoroughly\neffective. Students of law will not be struck by its peculiarity. They\nare well aware that any plan or mode is legal and effective that binds\nthe conscience of the witness. Even under modern codes that impose an\noath, no fixed form is imperatively demanded. In King _v._ Morgan, I\nLeach C. L. 54, a Mahometan was sworn upon the Koran; in Omychund _v._\nBaker, I Atk. 21, a Gentoo was sworn by touching the foot of a Brahmin;\nin Reg. _v._ Entrehman, I Car. & M. 248, a Chinese witness took an oath\nby kneeling down and breaking a saucer, the oath being administered\nthrough an interpreter in these words: \"You shall tell the truth, the\nwhole truth; the saucer is cracked, and if you do not tell the truth,\nyour soul will be cracked like the saucer.\"\n\n_Examination of Witnesses._--As an act of caution against the admission\nof irrelevant testimony, and as a means of placing before the entire\ncourt, in the first instance, only such evidence as was deemed strictly\nlegal, a preliminary examination of witnesses was conducted in private\nby a special committee of the Sanhedrin appointed for that purpose. All\nirrelevant testimony developed at this private examination was\nimmediately declared inadmissible and was cast aside. The necessary\nresult of this most sensible proceeding was the discovery, in advance,\nof discrepancies in the statements of witnesses and the eradication of\nall illegal testimony. The full court sitting in regular session were\nnot, therefore, exposed to the danger of being prejudiced by the recital\nof facts that had no legal connection with the case. Modern jurists\nmight easily learn something from the ancient Hebrews in this regard.\nEvery sensible lawyer is perfectly well aware of the absurdity and\ninjustice of the modern method of criminal procedure in allowing skilled\nand designing attorneys to propose certain kinds of irrelevant testimony\nin the presence of the jury, knowing very well that it will be overruled\nby the court. These attorneys frequently deliberately draw out such\ntestimony from the witness with the expectation and understanding that\nit will be ordered stricken out. The rule of practice that allows\nincompetent testimony to be temporarily introduced upon a promise that a\nfoundation will be laid or relevancy shown, is abortive instead of\nproductive of justice. The mere clerical act of striking out incompetent\ntestimony does not, as a matter of fact, remove the impression of\nprejudice from the brain of the judge or juror. The ancient Sanhedrists\nwere men of brilliant education and superior natural endowments. They\nwere trained in powers of logical analysis, and yet they were unwilling\nto trust themselves with the possession of prejudicial facts arising\nfrom incompetent testimony. It is respectfully submitted that the modern\naverage juror, whose mind is usually undisciplined in logic and legal\nmatters, is not able to sift and disentangle the relevant from the\nirrelevant in the record of a civil or criminal trial of two or more\nweeks' duration. Theoretically, he is; but practically, he is not. Every\nimpression, good or bad, legal or illegal, received at the trial,\naffects his judgment and enters into the general summary of the case in\nreaching a verdict.\n\n_Separation of Witnesses.--The witnesses were required to give their\ntestimony separately and always in the presence of the accused._\n\nDaniel said to the people concerning the two old men who testified\nagainst Susanna: \"_Separate_ them, and I will examine them.\"[142]\n\nBy this was meant that witnesses could not be examined until they had\nbeen separated in conformity with law. Under modern practice in most\njurisdictions, witnesses may be separated and examined one at a time out\nof the presence of each other. The rule of separation is, however,\ngenerally optional with the litigant and discretionary with the court;\nthe ruling of the court being usually reversed only in case of abuse of\ndiscretion. But among the Hebrews the requirement was mandatory and\nimperative. It had to be observed in every case.\n\n_Mode of Examination of Witnesses._--The mode employed by the Hebrew\njudges in examining witnesses is without a precedent or parallel in the\njurisprudence of the world. Two distinct sets of questions constituted\nthe examination. The first set consisted of a series of interrogations\nrelating to the _time_ and _place_ of the alleged crime. These questions\nwere prescribed by law and could not be varied in the slightest. The\ntechnical name applied to the first set of questions was Hakiroth. The\nsecond set was termed Bedikoth[143] and included all interrogations\ntouching the investigation of relevant circumstances and corroborative\nfacts surrounding the case. The following seven questions, constituting\nthe Hakiroth, the first set of questions, were propounded to each\nwitness: \"Was it during a year of jubilee? Was it in an ordinary year?\nIn what month? On what day of the month? At what hour? In what place? Do\nyou identify this person?\"[144]\n\nThese seven questions were framed and applied in conformity with a\nfundamental principle of the Hebrew law of evidence that the testimony\nof any witness, if false, should admit of being impeached and\noverthrown by proof of an _alibi_ against the witness. It seems, indeed,\nthat proof of an _alibi_ against the witness was the only method of\nimpeachment known to Hebrew law. It may be readily seen that the only\nstatements capable of being thus contradicted were confined to those\nrelating to the details of _time_ and _place_. To illustrate: Suppose\nthat two witnesses had testified that the alleged crime was committed in\na certain town at a certain hour; suppose that it subsequently appeared\nin evidence that, at the stated time, one or both these witnesses were\nin a neighboring town. In such a case, the witness or witnesses stood\nimpeached, their testimony was overthrown and they, themselves, became\nsubject to the pains and penalties of perjury.\n\nThe failure of any witness to answer satisfactorily any of the seven\nquestions above mentioned entitled the accused to immediate acquittal.\nAny material disagreement between two or more witnesses required by the\nlaw in answer to any one of these questions, likewise entitled the\nprisoner to immediate discharge. These seven questions seem to have been\nframed not so much to develop truthful testimony and to promote the ends\nof justice from the standpoint of the State as to enable the defendant\nto attack and destroy the testimony of hostile witnesses. The rule and\nthe reason thereof are thus clearly and succinctly stated by Mendelsohn:\n\n    The several particulars referring to time and place must be\n    furnished with the greatest possible precision and certainty, and\n    that by the whole party of witnesses. The slightest disagreement\n    on the part of the witnesses in regard to any one of these\n    particulars invalidates the entire testimony. Even where a number\n    of witnesses greater than that required by law, as three, appear,\n    and two agree on every point, but the third differs from them as to\n    more than one day, or more than one hour in the day, the whole\n    testimony is invalidated. For time and place are the only points\n    which affect the person of the witness himself; he not being able\n    to be at more than one spot at any one time; time and place are,\n    accordingly, the only grounds on which the witness may be confuted\n    and duly punished.\n\nThe second set of questions, termed the Bedikoth, embraced all matters\nnot brought out by the Hakiroth, such as would form the basis of\nlegitimate modern direct or cross examination. The following kinds of\nevidence, however, were not admissible under either set of questions:\nEvidence of character, good or bad; previous convictions of the accused;\nand evidence as to the prisoner's antecedents. Such matters were not\nrelevant, under Hebrew law, and could not be urged against the\nprisoner.[145]\n\n_False Witnesses.--Hebrew law provided that false witnesses should\nsuffer the penalty provided for the commission of the crime which they\nsought by their testimony to fix upon the accused._\n\nThe Scriptural authority for this rule is the following:\n\n    \"And the judges shall make diligent inquisition; and, behold, if\n    the witness be a false witness and hath testified falsely against\n    his brother, then shall ye do unto him as he had thought to do unto\n    his brother.\n\n    ... And thine eye shall not pity, but life shall go for life, eye\n    for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.\"[146]\n\n    \"And they arose against the two elders, for Daniel had convicted\n    them of false witness, by their own mouth; and according to the law\n    of Moses, they did unto them in such a sort as they maliciously\n    intended to do their neighbor; and they put them to death.\"[147]\n\n    _The Accused as Witness.--The accused was never compelled, under\n    Hebrew law, to testify against himself; but was permitted and\n    encouraged to offer testimony in his own behalf. His confession of\n    guilt was accepted in evidence and considered in connection with\n    other facts of the case, but was never permitted, standing alone,\n    to form the basis of a conviction._\n\nThe following is the commentary of Maimonides on this rule of law:\n\n    We have it as a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that no\n    one can bring an accusation against himself. Should a man make a\n    confession of guilt before a legally constituted tribunal, such\n    confession is not to be used against him, unless properly attested\n    by two other witnesses. It is, however, well to remark that the\n    death sentence issued against Achan was an exceptional case,\n    brought about by the nature of the circumstances attending it, for\n    our law never condemns on the single confession of an accused\n    party.[148]\n\nIt is needless to suggest that the accused was never put under oath. His\nposition in this regard was exactly the same as that of any other Hebrew\nwitness. A special reason assigned for not swearing the accused is that\noffered in the celebrated maxim: \"In most men religion is silent when\ninterest speaks.\" Again, the inducement to perjury was so great that it\nwas thought imprudent to allow the accused to confess under the\nsolemnity of an oath.\n\nThe principle of law which rejects a bare confession of guilt as a basis\nof criminal conviction is one of the most merciful and benign known to\njurisprudence. It is intended to protect the commonwealth against\nperjury and deception on the part of the accused. It is also intended to\nprotect the prisoner against ignorance and rashness. It is a well-known\nfact that the masses of mankind are ignorant of law, both civil and\ncriminal. Not one in a thousand in the most enlightened commonwealths\ncan define successfully the elements of the crimes of the state of which\nhe is a citizen. By refusing to allow an uncorroborated confession to be\nmade the basis of a conviction, the State simply throws the mantle of\ncharity and protection around the ignorance of the prisoner who\nconfesses. It is also well known that men will frequently confess guilt\nwhen they are not guilty; sometimes, when they are even ignorant of the\nfacts constituting the offense. This is one of the strangest things\nknown to psychology and mental philosophy.[149] It is derived from the\nwell-known and universally recognized weakness of the human will when\nconfronted with a charge that threatens to blight and destroy life and\ncharacter at a single blow. A celebrated modern writer, while\ndiscussing this rule of Hebrew law, wrote the following observations\nupon the origin and motive of confession of guilt under criminal\ncharges:\n\n    The confession of the accused made no exception to the rule,\n    showing how a confession could be made the result of weakness, or\n    folly, or of interest--yes, even of interest. Some homicide on one\n    occasion confessed himself to be guilty of robbery or arson in\n    order to obtain proof of his innocence of some greater crime which\n    he had committed at the same time; a husband persisted in declaring\n    himself guilty of outrage upon a woman, really committed by some\n    unknown person, in order that, by being sentenced on this account,\n    he might prove his marital efficiency, which had been disputed by\n    his wife, who was contemplating steps to annul her marriage. Some\n    weak-minded people, unable to support the torture of a harassing\n    examination, and eager to regain their liberty, make a full\n    confession, accusing themselves in order not to be indicted, like\n    those persons who, crossing a river on a plank bridge, throw\n    themselves, through nervousness, into the rushing water, in order\n    not to fall in. Fools, from want of responsibility, or through a\n    boastful nature, accept, affirm, or confess everything of which\n    they know nothing.[150]\n\nThe reasons above stated lie at the foundation of all modern provisions\nframed for the protection of the accused against precipitate\nself-condemnation. But, strange to say, these reasons were not urged by\nthe framers or interpreters of Hebrew law. The explanation offered by\nthe Talmud was simply this: \"He is his own kin\"; and, as we have seen,\nrelatives were never permitted to be witnesses. A modern Jewish writer\nhas assigned the following reason for the rule forbidding a confession\nto form the basis of a conviction: that, if the prisoner were innocent,\nhe should not be permitted to incriminate himself by a false confession;\nif he were guilty, he was a wicked person, and, therefore, incompetent\nto testify under Hebrew law.[151] This rule was not enforced, however,\nagainst the defendant when testifying in his own behalf; an additional\nproof of the merciful regard of Hebrew law for the unfortunate position\nof a human being charged with crime. His testimony, though self-serving,\nwas given due weight when urged in his own defense. Little attention was\npaid to it when he testified against himself.\n\n_Relevancy of Hebrew Evidence.--Hearsay evidence was irrelevant under\nHebrew law._ \"Hearsay evidence was barred equally in civil as in\ncriminal cases, no matter how strongly the witness might believe in what\nhe heard and however worthy and numerous were his informants.\"[152]\n\n_Circumstantial evidence was irrelevant under Hebrew law._ \"The sages\nhad very little more confidence in circumstantial evidence given for the\npurpose of 'taking money out of' the defendant's pocket, than in that\ngiven for the purpose of inflicting the penalty of death or stripes.\nKet. ii. 10 has been cited, according to which a witness may testify\nthat, when a boy, he saw a woman walk about in maidenly attire; the\nobject being to prove that she married as a maiden, not as a widow, and\nis therefore entitled to a greater sum for her jointure. In discussing\nthis clause, the Talmud remarks that this is only arguing from the\nmajority of cases; for though in most cases those wearing maidens'\nattire are not widows, occasionally they are; and money ought not to be\ntaken out of a man's pocket on reasoning from the greater number of\ncases. In fact, circumstantial evidence was generally rejected.\"[153]\n\nThere were occasional exceptions to the rule in the administration of\nHebrew civil law, but none in criminal law. In criminal cases no Hebrew\nprisoner could be convicted upon circumstantial evidence. Every link in\nthe chain of testimony had to be forged by the direct evidence of at\nleast two competent witnesses; else the accused was acquitted and\ndischarged.\n\n_Written, or documentary evidence, was not relevant, under Hebrew law,\nin criminal prosecution._ The reason of this rule was derived from a\nliteral interpretation of the Mosaic ordinance: \"Whoso killeth any\nperson, the murderer shall be put to death by the _mouth of\nwitnesses_.\"[154] The expression, \"mouth of witnesses,\" was construed by\nthe interpreters of the law to require oral testimony and to exclude\nwriting in all criminal prosecutions.\n\n_Kinds of Oral Testimony._--Hebrew oral testimony is divided by the\nMishna into three leading classes:[155]\n\n  (1) Vain testimony.\n  (2) Standing testimony.\n  (3) Adequate testimony.\n\n\"Vain testimony\" seems to have been wholly immaterial and irrelevant. It\nwas not even conditionally admitted, but was instantly and permanently\nrejected. The New Testament seems to indicate that such testimony was\nrendered against Jesus by the \"many false witnesses\" who first came, and\nthat testimony was rejected.\n\n\"Standing testimony\" seems to have been conditionally admitted and to\nhave been allowed to remain in evidence until it was properly confirmed\nby and joined to other evidence which the law required. It was not\nvalid, however, until so connected and confirmed. We must remember that\nat least two witnesses, agreeing in all essential details, were needed,\nunder Hebrew law, to convict a prisoner. It is evident then that the\ntestimony of the first witness against the accused was necessarily\nregarded as \"standing testimony,\" until the second or confirming\nwitness, which the law required, had testified. This testimony is also\nreferred to in the New Testament when it is said that: \"At the last,\ncame two false witnesses, And said, This fellow said, I am able to\ndestroy the temple of God and to build it in three days.\"[156] The\ntestimony of the first of these witnesses was doubtless allowed to stand\nuntil it was shown that the second witness did not render testimony in\nagreement with it. Contradictory testimony was thrown out under Hebrew\ncriminal procedure; and this was done regardless of the number of\nwitnesses who testified against the accused. It seems that a rigid\napplication of the principle of exclusion based upon contradictory\nstatements would have shut out the testimony of any number of agreeing\nwitnesses, if said testimony had been contradicted in a radical and\nmaterial way by even a single witness. The sifting of evidence and the\nweighing of the credibility of witnesses, which is the peculiar\nprerogative of the modern jury, were no part of the duties of the\nancient Sanhedrists. The testimony of all the witnesses against the\naccused had to agree in all material respects, else it was wholly\nrejected. Now it necessarily follows that all testimony against a\nprisoner was of the \"standing\" or provisional kind until the last\nwitness had testified, and it was found that the evidence in its\nentirety was in legal agreement. Mark, using the almost exact technical\nexpression of the law, tells us, concerning the false testimony against\nJesus, that \"their witness agreed not together.\"[157] This disagreement\ncaused the \"standing testimony\" of the first witness to fall and the\ncharge of threatening or attempting to destroy the Temple was abandoned,\nas we shall see in a later part of this work.\n\n\"Adequate testimony,\" under Hebrew criminal procedure, was evidence that\nwas competent, material, and in legal agreement. When two or more\nwitnesses, being the entire number, against the accused agreed in all\nessential details, their testimony was considered adequate, and if the\njudges believed it to be true they based a conviction upon it.\n\n_Antecedent Warning._--It is deemed appropriate in this chapter to call\nattention to and briefly discuss a very striking peculiarity of the law\nof evidence under Hebrew criminal procedure. In the chapter on Mosaic\nand Talmudic law, reference was made to the celebrated proviso, called\n\"Antecedent Warning.\" This proviso was unknown to the Mosaic Code, being\na creation of Talmudic law, and is without a parallel in the\njurisprudence of the world. Briefly stated, Antecedent Warning, under\nHebrew law, meant simply this: That no person charged with crime\ninvolving life and death, or even corporal punishment, could be\nconvicted, unless it was shown by competent testimony that immediately\nbefore the commission of the crime the offender was warned that what he\nwas about to do was a crime, and that a certain penalty was attached\nthereto. The warning was not effective if any time elapsed between the\nadmonition and the commission of the offense. Furthermore, the warning\nwas of no force unless it was shown that the alleged criminal had duly\nacknowledged it and had expressed a willingness to suffer corporal\npunishment or to die for the act. It must have been shown that, having\nreceived the warning, the would-be offender turned to his monitor and\nsaid, \"I am very well aware of the nature of the act I am about to\ncommit, of the rules of law applicable thereto, and of the inevitable\nconsequences of my misdeed\"--else the court could not consider the\ncondition complied with.\n\nThis peculiar proviso seems to have been intended to serve three\ndistinct purposes: (1) To protect the would-be offender against his own\nignorance and rashness and to prevent the commission of crime by a\ntimely warning; (2) to aid in establishing guilty intention, that is,\ncriminal intent, at the trial of the prisoner, after the commission of\nthe offense; (3) to enable the judges to determine the exact penalty to\nassess. The first two purposes are self-evident. The third merits a\nbrief consideration. To complete the warning, it was essential that the\noffender be told the exact penalty attached to the crime which he was\nabout to commit; whether the punishment was capital or corporal, and the\nexact kind, if capital; that is, whether beheading, burning, stoning, or\nstrangling. Now, it often happened that two crimes were committed by the\nsame person in one day; the penalty for one of which being flagellation\nand the other death. And it sometimes happened that two different crimes\nwere the result of one criminal transaction. In such a case, the nature\nof the Antecedent Warning would guide the judges in decreeing\npunishment. To illustrate: The Mosaic Code forbids the killing of either\na cow or a ewe \"and her young both in one day\";[158] and a violation of\nthis prohibition, according to Rabbinic law, entails the punishment of\nflagellation. Another Mosaic ordinance imposes the penalty of death on\nthe Jewish idolater.[159] Now, it might have happened that the last two\noffenses mentioned were committed by the same person at the same time,\nas when an Israelite slaughtered a ewe and her young and sacrificed them\nas an offering to an idol. The question would at once arise: Which\npenalty should be assessed, death for idolatry, or flagellation for\nkilling the ewe and her young both on the same day? Here, the nature of\nthe Warning would determine. If the prisoner had been told that\nflagellation would be the punishment, then stripes were administered. If\nhe had been warned that death was the penalty, then capital punishment\nwas meted out to him. If the caution had included both death and\nflagellation, then death would have been administered, because of the\nenormity of the crime of idolatry and for the reason that all lesser\npunishments are merged in death.\n\nAnother illustration of the third purpose above mentioned, that is, to\nenable the judges to determine the exact punishment to administer, is\nthis: The ancient Nazarites made solemn vows of abstemiousness.[160] And\nwhen any Israelite took the Nazarite vow and violated it, he subjected\nhimself to the penalty of flagellation if he drank a certain measure (\u00bc\nlog) of wine. If he drank several such measures in succession, the\nquestion would arise how he was to be punished. Again, the antecedent\ncaution would decide. If the testimony showed that he had received due\nwarning before each drink, then he was punished for each drink\nseparately. If he had been admonished only once, he was punished only\nonce for the whole debauch.[161]\n\nThe enforcement of this proviso established a rule of criminal procedure\npeculiar to the Hebrews, and recognized by no other nation. Such a\nrequirement seems to be utterly subversive of the celebrated maxim that\nhas found place in every other enlightened system of law: _Ignorantia\njuris, quod quisque tenetur scire, neminem excusat_. Among modern\ncivilized nations, ignorance or mistake of fact in criminal law, as\nwell as ignorance or mistake of the meaning and effect of civil or\nprivate law, has sometimes been permitted to operate as an excuse in\nfavor of the victim of the ignorance or mistake; but ignorance of the\ncriminal or public law has never been permitted to be pleaded as a\ndefense to an indictment for crime. Such a plea would threaten the very\nexistence of the state by rendering the proof of crime and the\nconviction of criminals impossible.\n\nOther reasons besides those assigned above have been advanced to explain\nthe invention of such a proviso by the Talmudists. None of them is\nentirely satisfactory. Rabbinowicz has urged with great force that the\nenactment was the offspring of a constantly increasing tendency on the\npart of the framers of the Talmud to mitigate the rigors of the Mosaic\nCode, and to abolish altogether the punishment of death by making the\nconviction of criminals practically impossible.[162] But this view has\nbeen ably and probably successfully combated by Benny and others. To say\nthe least, it was a senseless provision when viewed from the standpoint\nof the state in maintaining order and preserving the commonwealth. The\nRabbins framed several exceptions to its operation which were doubtless\ndesigned to stay the progress of certain forms of crime and to preserve\nthe state. The false witness was excluded from the benefit of this\nproviso, as were also the instigator to idolatry and the burglar. The\nfalse witness was denied the benefit because of the impossibility of\nforeseeing that he would swear falsely and of forewarning him; the\nidolater was excepted because of the heinousness of the crime of\nidolatry under a theocratic commonwealth; and the burglar was denied the\nbenefit of the caution for the very peculiar reason that the \"breaking\nin,\" while committing the crime of burglary, was sufficient\nwarning.[163]\n\nSuch a rule is utterly without foundation in logic or reason from the\nsimple fact that crime in every age has been committed with every\ncircumstance of caution and concealment that criminal ingenuity could\ndevise; usually under the cover of night, often with a mask, frequently\nby the aid of accomplices to give notice of the appearance of the\nofficers of the law, and nearly always with subsequent attempts to wipe\nout evidences of the commission of the offense. To require a preliminary\ncaution, such as the Antecedent Warning of the Jews, was to handicap the\nstate most seriously and to render almost impossible the apprehension\nand punishment of public malefactors.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nHEBREW CRIMINAL LAW--MODE OF TRIAL AND EXECUTION IN CAPITAL CASES\n\n\nThe administration of Hebrew criminal law was marked by lofty conception\nof right and wrong, and was pervaded by a noble sentiment of justice and\nhumanity. From the framing of the Decalogue to the latest years of\nJewish nationality, each succeeding generation witnessed some humane and\nmerciful modification of existing rules. Talmudic interpretation\ninvented a series or collection of sayings that gave form and character\nto the whole body of later Hebrew law. These maxims were intended to\nmitigate the rigors of the Mosaic Code and to establish safeguards\nagainst negligence or injustice to the defendant in criminal trials.\nIndeed, every possible precaution was taken to render impossible the\nwrongful conviction of an accused person. The student of Hebrew law is\nat times astonished by the excessive caution inculcated in criminal\nprocedure. Certain cautionary rules are no less than pedantic, and may\nbe justly and aptly styled Judaical. The judges leaned always to the\nside of the defendant and gave him the advantage of every possible\ndoubt. They went a step farther and sought pretext after pretext that\nwould result in an acquittal. A sense of awful responsibility weighed\nupon the hearts and consciences of the judges. The services of the\nsynagogue were not conducted with deeper fervor or greater religious\nsolemnity than were the proceedings of a capital trial in the great\nJudgment Hall of the Sanhedrin. Certain sacred maxims flamed forever\nlike beacon lights along the pathway of the members of the court during\nthe solemn deliberations. \"A judge,\" says the Talmud, \"should always\nconsider that a sword threatens him from above, and destruction yawns at\nhis feet.\" The ancient adage, \"the pen of the law fears the thunder of\nHeaven,\" though of Chinese origin, is Hebraic in spirit. \"Thou shalt do\nno unrighteousness in judgment\" was the leading aphorism of Hebrew\njurisprudence. Among the earliest traditions of the Fathers, we read\nthis maxim: \"When a judge decides not according to truth, he makes the\nmajesty of God to depart from Israel. But if he judges according to the\ntruth, were it only for one hour, it is as if he established the whole\nworld, for it is in judgment that the divine presence in Israel has its\nhabitation.\" Hebrew horror of capital punishment and dread of taking\nhuman life are well expressed in the celebrated maxim of the Mishna:\n\"The Sanhedrin, which so often as once in seven years, condemns a man to\ndeath, is a slaughter-house.\"[164] And more striking and startling still\nis the terrible sentence of Rabbi Meir: \"What doth God say (if one may\nspeak of God after the manner of men) when a malefactor suffers the\nanguish due to his crime? He says, _My head and my limbs are pained_.\nAnd if he so speaks of the suffering even of the guilty, what must he\nutter when the righteous is condemned?\" The whole spirit of Talmudic\ncaution is well illustrated by the principal rule of the Pirke Aboth,\nwhich says: \"Be cautious and slow in judgment, send forth many\ndisciples, and _make a fence round the law_.\"[165]\n\nIn addition to the maxims above mentioned, which were more religious\nthan legal, four cardinal rules of criminal procedure--\"strictness in\nthe accusation, publicity in the discussion, full freedom granted\nto the accused, and assurance against all dangers or errors of\ntestimony\"[166]--molded the judgment and guided the consciences of\nHebrew judges. These sayings of the Fathers and maxims of the law were\nthe touchstones of all their judicial inquiries and meditations at the\ntrial of capital cases. With prayer in their hearts and these maxims\nupon their lips, they applied themselves to the solemn duties of their\noffice.\n\nA most interesting passage in the Mishna draws a striking contrast\nbetween capital trials and those involving questions of money only. The\nrelevancy of the passage to this chapter is so great that it is deemed\nbest to quote it entire:\n\n    Money trials and trials for life have the same rule of inquiry and\n    investigation. But they differ in procedure in the following\n    points: The former require only three, the latter three-and-twenty\n    judges.\n\n    In the former it matters not on which side the judges speak who\n    give the first opinions; in the latter, those who are in favor of\n    acquittal must speak first.\n\n    In the former, a majority of one is always enough; in the latter, a\n    majority of one is enough to acquit, but it requires a majority of\n    two to condemn.\n\n    In the former, a decision may be quashed on review (for error), no\n    matter which way it has gone; in the latter, a condemnation may be\n    quashed, but not an acquittal.\n\n    In the former, disciples of the law present in the court may speak\n    (as assessors) on either side; in the latter, they may speak in\n    favor of the accused, but not against him.\n\n    In the former, a judge who has indicated his opinion, no matter on\n    which side, may change his mind; in the latter, he who has given\n    his voice for acquittal may not change.\n\n    The former (money trials) are commenced only in the daytime, but\n    may be concluded after nightfall; the latter (capital trials) are\n    commenced only in the daytime, and must also be concluded during\n    the day.\n\n    The former may be concluded by acquittal or condemnation on the day\n    on which they have begun; the latter may be concluded on that day\n    if there is a sentence of acquittal, but must be postponed to a\n    second day if there is to be a condemnation. And for this reason\n    capital trials are not held on the day before a Sabbath or a feast\n    day.[167]\n\nThe principal features of a Hebrew capital trial before the Great\nSanhedrin were: (1) The Morning Sacrifice; (2) the Assembling of the\nJudges in the Lishkath haggazith, or the Hall of Hewn Stones; (3) the\nExamination of Witnesses; (4) the Debates and Balloting of the Judges on\nthe guilt or the innocence of the accused. These successive steps will\nbe briefly considered in this chapter.\n\n_The Morning Sacrifice._--It is not positively known what legal\nconnection, if any, the morning sacrifice had with the trial of a\ncapital case before the Great Sanhedrin at Jerusalem. Several writers\ncontend that there was no essential legal connection; that the sacrifice\nwas offered at the break of day whether a capital case was to be tried\nor not; and that the court was not dependent upon this religious\nobservance for jurisdiction in the trial of criminal cases. Other\nwriters hold opposite views, and contend that the morning sacrifice was\nessential to give jurisdiction to the court. MM. L\u00e9mann consider it an\nerror in the trial of Jesus that the morning sacrifice was not offered\nbefore the commencement of proceedings.[168] Certain passages from the\nMishna very strongly support this second view: that the court could not\nlegally convene until the morning sacrifice had been offered. \"The\nSanhedrin sat from the close of the morning sacrifice to the time of the\nevening sacrifice.\"[169] ... \"Since the morning sacrifice was offered at\nthe break of day, it was hardly possible for the Sanhedrin to assemble\nuntil an hour after that time.\"[170] These passages seem to indicate\nthat the morning sacrifice was necessary before the court could legally\nconvene. This question will be found more fully discussed under Point V\nof the Brief in this volume. The method of offering the morning\nsacrifice was as judicial in its precision as it was religious in its\nsolemnity.\n\n_The Assembling of the Judges._--At the close of the morning sacrifice,\nthe members of the court entered the judgment hall in solemn procession.\nThey took their seats, \"turbaned, on cushions or pillows, in oriental\nfashion, with crossed legs, and unshod feet, in a half-circle.\"[171] The\nhigh priest sat in the center with the other members of the court to the\nright and left of him. \"His head was crowned with a turban of blue\ninwrought with gold. On his bosom hung the priestly breastplate, in\nwhich glittered twelve precious stones, emblems of the twelve tribes of\nIsrael. A flowing robe of blue, gathered about his waist by a girdle of\npurple, scarlet, and gold embroidery, enveloped his person and set off\nthe pure white linen of his capacious sleeves. The buttons of this\ncostly robe were onyx stones. His slippered feet were half concealed\nbeneath the long fringe of his pontifical vestments, which were\ncuriously embroidered with pomegranates in gold and scarlet and crimson.\nNo Roman Catholic pontiff ever wore robes more resplendent than those in\nwhich the high priest was attired on public and state occasions.\nImmediately before him sat the scribes or clerks of the court. The one\non his left hand wrote down whatever testimony was adduced against the\naccused; what votes were cast for his condemnation. The one on the right\ntranscribed what appeared in his favor.\"[172]\n\nAccording to most writers, including Dr. Lyman Abbott, only two scribes\nwere present having seats at each end of the semicircle. According to\nBenny, however, \"three scribes were present; one was seated on the\nright, one on the left, the third in the center of the hall. The first\nrecorded the names of the judges who voted for the acquittal of the\naccused and the arguments upon which the acquittal was grounded. The\nsecond noted the names of such as decided to condemn the prisoner and\nthe reasons upon which the conviction was based. The third kept an\naccount of both the preceding, so as to be able at any time to supply\nomissions or check inaccuracies in the memoranda of his brother\nreporters.\"\n\nThe prisoner was placed in front of the high priest, in a conspicuous\nposition, where he could see all and could be seen by all.\n\nThus organized and arranged, the Sanhedrin began the work of the day.\n\n_Examination of Witnesses._--The examination of witnesses, who were also\naccusers, marked the beginning of proceedings. It is doubtful if the\nindictment against criminals was in writing. The first witness who was\nto testify was led into an adjoining room and solemnly warned. He was\nasked questions similar to the following: Is it not probable that your\nbelief in the prisoner's guilt is derived from hearsay or circumstantial\nevidence? In forming your opinions concerning the guilt of the accused,\nhave you or not been influenced by the remarks of persons whom you\nregard as reputable and trustworthy? Are you aware that you will be\nsubmitted to a most searching examination? Are you acquainted with the\npenalty attached to the crime of perjury?\n\nAfter this preliminary warning, conveyed in these questions, had been\ngiven, the most learned and venerable of the judges administered to the\nwitness the following impressive adjuration:\n\n    Forget not, O witness, that it is one thing to give evidence in a\n    trial as to money, and another in a trial for life. In a money\n    suit, if thy witness-bearing shall do wrong, money may repair that\n    wrong. But in this trial for life, if thou sinnest, the blood of\n    the accused, and the blood of his seed to the end of time, shall be\n    imputed unto thee.... Therefore was Adam created one man and alone,\n    to teach thee that if any witness shall destroy one soul out of\n    Israel, he is held by the Scripture to be as if he had destroyed\n    the world; and he who saves one such soul to be as if he had saved\n    the world.... For a man from one signet-ring may strike off many\n    impressions, and all of them shall be exactly alike. But He, the\n    King of the kings of kings, He the Holy and the Blessed, has struck\n    off from His type of the first man the forms of all men that shall\n    live; yet so, that no one human being is wholly alike to any other.\n    Wherefore let us think and believe that the whole world is created\n    for a man such as he whose life hangs on thy words. But these ideas\n    must not deter you from testifying from what you actually know.\n    Scripture declares: \"The witness who hath seen or known, and doth\n    not tell, shall bear his iniquity.\" Nor must ye scruple about\n    becoming the instrument of the alleged criminal's death. Remember\n    the Scriptural maxim: \"In the destruction of the wicked, there is\n    joy.\"\n\nAt the close of this solemn exhortation, the examination of the witness\ncommenced. The Hakiroth, seven questions prescribed by law, touching the\nidentity of the prisoner and fixing the elements of time and place, were\nasked. They were as follows: Was it during a year of jubilee? Was it an\nordinary year? In what month? On what day of the month? At what hour?\nIn what place? Do you identify this person?\n\nThese questions being satisfactorily answered, the next step was a rigid\nexamination into the facts and circumstances attending the commission of\nthe crime and the connection of the accused therewith. This process of\nexamination and cross-examination was termed the Bedikoth and embraced\nall questions not included in the Hakiroth which tended to establish the\nguilt or innocence of the prisoner at the bar.\n\nWhen the witnesses for the Commonwealth of Israel had been examined,\nwitnesses for the defendant were heard. The accused was also urged to\nsay anything he wished in his own behalf. As we have before pointed out,\nthe Hakiroth questions as to time and place could be rebutted only by\nestablishing an alibi against the witnesses for the state. If such an\nalibi was proved, the defendant was acquitted and at once discharged. A\ncontributor to the \"Jewish Encyclopedia,\" discussing this point of\nprocedure, says: \"It has been shown under Alibi how a 'set' of witnesses\nmay be convicted as 'plotters' by another set or sets proving an alibi\non them. But the opposite party may prove an alibi on the convicting set\nor in some other way show that the facts testified to by the first set\nwere impossible or untrue. Under such circumstances, a modern judge or\njury would weigh the credibility of the witnesses and the probability of\ntheir stories and decide between them accordingly. The sages did not\ntrust themselves or their successors with this discretion. If there were\nno indicia or fraud, they held that as some one was evidently lying\nthey could not decide which of them it was, and that there was no\nevidence on the point.\"[173] The result was an acquittal.\n\nIf material contradictions in the testimony of the witnesses were shown\nby the Bedikoth, the trial was at once terminated and the accused was\nfree. The failure of any witness to answer satisfactorily any of the\nseven questions above mentioned entitled the accused to immediate\nacquittal. Any material disagreement between the two or more witnesses\nrequired by the law in answer to any of these questions likewise\nentitled the prisoner to an immediate discharge. If the prosecuting\nwitnesses relied upon documentary, circumstantial or hearsay evidence to\nconvict, their testimony was at once rejected and the defendant was\nreleased.\n\nBut if the accused failed to establish an alibi against the prosecuting\nwitnesses in the matter of the Hakiroth; and if the Bedikoth developed\nevidence fairly consistent and uncontradictory; and if the testimony of\nthe witnesses was purely oral, that is, was not documentary, hearsay or\ncircumstantial, then there was legally admissible evidence to lay before\nthe Sanhedrin. The competent witnesses who could render relevant\ntestimony were then led, one at a time, before the general body and\nrequired to testify.\n\n_The Debates and Balloting of the Judges._--All the evidence, pro and\ncon, having been adduced, the tribunal began a full discussion of the\ncase, preliminary to casting ballots. Arguments could be begun only on\nbehalf of the accused. Nothing was permitted to be said against him\nuntil one of the judges had urged something in his behalf, and had said:\n\"As I view the matter, and according to such and such evidence, it seems\nto me that the prisoner should be acquitted.\" The discussion became\ngeneral for and against the accused. The entire record was then\noverhauled. Each item of evidence was carefully considered and subjected\nto the minutest criticism. Contradictions were noted and extenuating\nfacts pleaded. If one of the disciples occupying one of the three rows\nof seats could offer any cogent or valid reason why the prisoner should\nnot be convicted, he was invited to take his seat among the judges, and\nwas regarded as a member of the court during the remainder of the day.\nIf his argument resulted in the acquittal of the accused and saved a\nhuman life he was made a permanent member of the court. On the other\nhand, if one of the disciples had anything to say that would tend to\ninjure the defendant he was not permitted to raise his voice.\n\nWhen the entire case had been exhaustively discussed, the argument was\nclosed and the balloting on the guilt or innocence of the accused\ncommenced. The scribes were in readiness to record the votes and note\nthe reasons assigned therefor. The youngest members of the tribunal were\nrequired to vote first, in order that they might not be unduly\ninfluenced by the example of their seniors in age and authority. The\nhigh priest, who was generally president of the Sanhedrin, addressed a\ngentle admonition to the youngest member, who was never less than forty\nyears of age, to render a free and untrammeled verdict, and not to be\nawed or influenced by the patriarchs of the court. This admonition was\nrepeated in the case of each youthful member of the tribunal. When the\nballoting commenced, each judge arose in his place and voted; at the\nsame time making a short speech explanatory of his ballot. To secure a\nconviction it was not necessary that the members of the Sanhedrin should\nbe unanimous. Indeed a peculiar rule of Hebrew law provided that if the\nverdict was instantaneous and unanimous it was invalid and could not\nstand. If the prisoner had not a single friend in court, the element of\nmercy was wanting in the verdict, said the ancient Hebrews, and the\nproceedings were regarded in the light of conspiracy and mob violence. A\nmajority vote of at least two members was necessary to convict. A\nmajority vote of one in his favor would acquit. Any majority amounting\nto two or more that did not reach unanimity was sufficient to condemn.\nIf the accused was tried before a Minor Sanhedrin of three-and-twenty\nmembers or before the Great Sanhedrin with a bare quorum (twenty-three\nmembers, the same number as the full membership of a Minor Sanhedrin), a\nvote of thirteen members was necessary, in either case, to convict. If\neleven judges were for conviction and twelve for acquittal, the prisoner\nwas discharged at once; a majority of one vote being sufficient for that\npurpose. If twelve were in favor of conviction and eleven for acquittal,\nthe condemnation of the accused was impossible; a majority of at least\ntwo being required to condemn. According to some writers, an acquittal\nwas the result in such a case. According to others, in such a\ncontingency the following novel expedient was employed to reach a\nverdict: From the first row of disciples two additional judges were\nselected and added to the original twenty-three members. Balloting then\ncommenced anew. If the vote resulted in a majority of at least two\nagainst the prisoner, he stood convicted. If not, two more disciples\nwere added from the first row in front and this process of increasing by\ntwos the number of the Sanhedrin was continued until the requisite\nmajority was secured. If it happened that the constant additions finally\nraised the number to seventy-one, the membership of the Great Sanhedrin,\nthe process of increasing by twos was discontinued, and final balloting\nthen began. If thirty-six voted for conviction and thirty-five for\nacquittal, the whole case was reargued for a reasonable time until one\nof the thirty-six yielded and declared in favor of acquittal. In case\nthe thirty-six members persevered in their determination to convict, the\nprisoner was discharged.\n\nAt any stage of the trial, from the beginning with the three-and-twenty\njudges through all the successive additions of new members, a majority\nvote of one or more in favor of the accused would acquit; a majority of\ntwo or more, not amounting to unanimity, would convict.\n\nIn case of an acquittal the prisoner was immediately released and the\ntrial was closed. In the event of conviction sentence could not be\npronounced until the next afternoon and the session of the court was\naccordingly adjourned until the following day. Upon adjournment the\nmembers of the Sanhedrin with measured step and solemn mien left the\nchamber in which the trial had been conducted. Outside the judgment\nhall, in the open street, the judges formed themselves into groups or\nknots of five or six to discuss the trial and to lament the awful\nmisfortune impending over Jerusalem; for such was the Hebrew conception\nof the execution of a son of Israel. The nucleus of each group was\nformed of elders of the Sanhedrin; the younger members came up from\nbehind, leaned over between the shoulders of the patriarchs, and\nlistened attentively and devoutly to what they were saying about the\ncase. Gradually the groups broke up and the judges linked arm in arm, by\ntwos, walked slowly homeward, still discussing the facts and arguments\nadduced at the trial. Finally they parted and retired to their\nrespective homes. No heavy food, like meat, and no intoxicating\nbeverage, were taken for the remainder of the day or during the night.\nNothing was done that would incapacitate them for correct thinking. At\nsunset they began to make calls upon each other for the purpose of\nexamining more carefully and debating more fully the issues of the case.\nWhen these visits were concluded, in the early evening, each judge\nretired to the privacy of his own home to sleep, meditate, and pray. At\nthe dawn of day, they arose and prepared to resume again the solemn\nresponsibilities of their office. The morning sacrifice was offered and\nthe judges again assembled at sunrise in the hall of justice. They\nreseated themselves in the form of a semicircle; the prisoner was again\nled to the bar of the court; the witnesses were again produced; and the\nscribes, bringing with them the minutes of the former meeting, again\ntook seats in their accustomed places.\n\nThe second part of the trial then began. It must be remembered that\nthere were two trials of every Hebrew capital case. The second day was\nnot a trial _de novo_; but was a proceeding in the nature of an appeal\nand was intended to accomplish a review of the proceedings of the\nprevious day. Additional testimony, however, which had been discovered\nafter the close of the first trial, might be introduced. But the record\nof facts seems not to have been considered so important as the question\nof the fixed opinions of the judges. Each member of the Sanhedrin was\nrequired, on the second day, to vote again and to declare anew his\nnotions concerning the guilt or innocence of the accused. The statements\nof each judge were carefully noted by the scribes and compared with his\nstatements at the previous day. If any judge voted for conviction at the\nsecond trial and founded his judgment on reasons and arguments radically\ndifferent from those of the first day, his verdict was rejected. A\nmember who had voted for acquittal on the first day was not permitted to\nchange his vote for conviction on the second day. But one who had voted\nfor condemnation at the first trial, might, by giving valid reasons,\nvote on the second day for acquittal.[174]\n\nA most striking peculiarity of Hebrew law is to be noted in their method\nof counting votes and arriving at sums total in favor of or against the\naccused. Certain peculiar rules were to be strictly applied in\ndetermining the ultimate result. When upon examination of the record it\nwas discovered that two or more judges had advanced identical arguments,\nthough each supported his contention by different Biblical citations,\ntheir collective opinions were regarded as the common expression of a\nsingle mind and all their votes were counted only as one. Father and\nson, teacher and pupil, being members of the same court, counted also as\none, provided their votes and opinions were arrayed on the same side,\nbut not when they were placed in antagonism.[175]\n\nWhen the balloting was complete the number for and against the prisoner\nwas again announced. If a majority of at least two votes were registered\nagainst him he stood convicted a second time. But the humane and\nindulgent spirit of Hebrew law continued to operate and deferred\nimmediate sentence. The judges continued to deliberate. No one thought\nof quitting the judgment hall on the second day of the trial. No one ate\nanything, no one drank anything on this second day; for the day that was\nto condemn an Israelite to death was to be a fast day for those who\ncondemned him. It was to be a day of prayerful meditation. Ancient\nmaxims of the Fathers, framed for the protection of the accused, were\nreconsidered. All the merciful tendencies of Talmudic interpretation\nwere invoked and pleaded by the judges, the defenders of the accused. It\nwas hoped that a few hours' time would discover facts favorable to the\ndoomed man. New arguments, it was thought, might be offered and new\nwitnesses might be forthcoming in his behalf. As they continued to\ndeliberate, the fatal hour approached. There was to be no thirty or\nsixty days, as in America, between sentence and execution, during which\ntime the condemned man could make peace with God. The moment that saw\nthe judgment finally pronounced witnessed the beginning of its\nexecution. Sunset, Nature's symbol of the extinguishment of the light of\nlife, was the time fixed for both.\n\nThe death march and the final circumstances attending the execution of a\nHebrew prisoner are without parallel in the jurisprudence of the world.\nAs the culprit was led away to his doom, a man, carrying in his hand a\nflag, was stationed at the entrance of the Sanhedrin Hall. A mounted\nofficer of the court followed the procession at a convenient distance\nand kept his eyes constantly turned in the direction of the flag bearer\non the hill. A herald, carrying aloft a staff from which fluttered a\ncrimson banner, made proclamation to the gazing multitude along the way\nthat a human being was about to be executed. He cried aloud: \"AB is to\nbe put to death on the testimony of CD and XY, on such and such a\ncharge. If any man knows anything favorable to the accused, in the name\nof God let him come forth and speak, in order that the prisoner may be\nled back to the Sanhedrin Hall to be again confronted and tried by his\njudges.\"\n\nIf any witness, friend or stranger, came forth to furnish new evidence\nin favor of the condemned man, the procession was halted and the\naccused was led back to the Sanhedrin Chamber. If any member of the\ncourt still sitting in the hall of judgment bethought himself of any new\nargument in behalf of the accused that had not been offered at the\ntrial, he arose quickly in his place and stated it to his fellow-judges.\nThe flag at the gate was then waved and the mounted messenger, chosen\nfor such an emergency, saw it waving and galloped forward to stop the\nexecution.\n\nThe culprit himself could delay or prevent the accomplishment of the\ndeath sentence if he could give to the Rabbins who escorted him any\nvalid reason why he should not be put to death. He was led back as often\nas he gave any good excuse, not exceeding five times, the number\nprescribed by law. If no new witnesses appeared and if the prisoner made\nno further plea for life, the procession proceeded to within a short\ndistance of the place of execution. The convict was then exhorted to\ndeclare himself guilty of the crime of which he was charged and to make\nfull confession of all his sins. He was told that a full confession\nwould entitle him to a happy existence beyond this life, since the flood\nof death would wash away all stains of sin and cleanse the soul of all\nthe iniquities of existence in this world. If the condemned man still\nrefused to confess that he was guilty of the crime with which he was\ncharged, he was then urged to say: \"May my death prove an atonement for\nall my transgressions.\"\n\nHe was then led to the ground of execution. The death draught,\nconsisting of a mixture of frankincense and myrrh, poured into a cup of\nvinegar or light wine, was then given him. Stupefaction followed,\nrendering the culprit unconscious of his impending doom and insensible\nto the agonies of death. In Jerusalem, this benumbing and stupefying\nmixture was furnished by the Hebrew women, whose tender and merciful\nregard for the wretched and unfortunate of earth has in all ages been a\nstriking characteristic of the sex. As soon as the draught had been\nadministered the execution took place. The prisoner was either stoned,\nstrangled, burned, or beheaded, according to the nature of his crime. In\ncase of blasphemy or idolatry the dead body was afterwards hung upon a\ngallows until dusk. But ordinarily the corpse was immediately interred\nafter execution. On the outskirts of every town there were two\ngraveyards for criminals; in one of these those who had been burned or\nstoned were buried; in the other were interred those who had been hanged\nor beheaded. As soon as decomposition had taken place--that is, when the\nflesh had decayed and fallen from the bones--the relatives were allowed\nto remove the skeleton and to deposit it in the family burial ground.\n\nSoon after the execution the friends and relatives of the dead man made\nfriendly calls upon the judges who had tried and sentenced him. These\nvisits were intended to show that the visitors harbored no feelings of\nbitterness or revenge against those who, in condemning one of their\nloved ones to death, had only performed the high and righteous duties of\njust and honorable judges of Israel.\n\n\n\n\nPART III\n\n_THE BRIEF_\n\n\n\n\n[Illustration: THE LAST SUPPER (DA VINCI)]\n\n\n\n\nTHE BRIEF\n\n\nA number of difficult and confusing questions present themselves at the\nvery beginning of any extensive and impartial investigation of the trial\nof Jesus.\n\nDid the Great Sanhedrin exist at the time of Christ? If it existed, was\nit still a legally constituted court, having jurisdiction to try capital\noffenses? Did it have jurisdiction of the particular offense with which\nJesus was charged? If the Great Sanhedrin was actually in existence, had\ncriminal jurisdiction in capital cases, and was judicially empowered to\ntry the offense with which Jesus was charged, did it actually try Him?\nWere the rules of criminal procedure, prescribed in the Mishna and cited\nin this Brief, in existence and actively in force in Judea at the time\nof the trial of Jesus? What was the nature of the charge brought against\nthe Christ? Was He guilty as charged? Were forms of law duly observed in\nthe trial of the accusation against Him? Answers to these questions,\nwhich will be considered in the Brief in the order above enumerated,\nwill cover the legal aspects of the Hebrew trial of Jesus.\n\n_Did the Great Sanhedrin exist at the time of Christ?_ The answer to\nthis question is of prime importance, since the existence of a court\nhaving jurisdiction of the person and subject matter of the suit is a\nfundamental consideration in all litigation. It is generally supposed\nthat the Hebrew trial of Jesus took place before the Great Sanhedrin in\nJerusalem. But many able writers, both Jewish and Gentile, deny that\nthis court had any existence at the time of Christ. In the \"Martyrdom of\nJesus,\" Rabbi Wise says: \"But this body did positively not exist at the\ntime when Jesus was crucified, having been dissolved 30 A.C. In nowise,\nthen, any passages of the Gospels must be understood to refer to the\nGreat Sanhedrin.\" Many Jewish and several eminent Gentile authors agree\nwith this contention, which is founded upon a passage in Josephus in\nwhich it is declared that King Herod had all the members of the\nSanhedrin put to death.[176] It is contended by these writers that the\nsupreme tribunal of the Jews was then abolished and was not restored\nuntil subsequent to the crucifixion. Opposed to this assertion, however,\nis the weight of both reason and authority. Sch\u00fcrer is of the opinion\nthat Josephus did not mean literally \"all\" ([Greek: pantas]) when he\nwrote that Herod had destroyed all the members of the Great Sanhedrin;\nsince in the following book he relates that the same king caused to be\nput to death the forty-five most prominent members of the party of\nAntigonus, who must themselves have been members of this court; and\nforty-five are twenty-six fewer than seventy-one, the full membership of\nthe Great Sanhedrin.[177] The same author asserts the existence and\ndiscusses the jurisdiction of this court in the following language: \"As\nregards the area over which the jurisdiction of the Great Sanhedrin\nextended, it has already been remarked above that its civil authority\nwas restricted, in the time of Christ, to the eleven toparchies of Judea\nproper. And, accordingly, for this reason it had no judicial authority\nover Jesus Christ so long as He remained in Galilee. It was only as soon\nas He entered Judea that He came directly under its jurisdiction.\"[178]\n\nAgain, Salvador, who may be justly styled the Jewish Blackstone, wrote\nconcerning the condemnation of Jesus: \"The _senate_ declared that Jesus,\nson of Joseph, born at Bethlehem, had profaned the name of God in\nusurping it for himself, a simple citizen. The capital sentence was then\npronounced.\" Now, the word \"senate\" is properly applied nowhere in\nliterature to any other Hebrew court than the Great Sanhedrin. This High\nCourt of the Jews has been frequently compared to the senate of Rome, to\nthe Areopagus of the Greek and to the parliament of England. It should\nbe noted in this connection that the great Jewish writer not only styled\nthe body that tried Jesus \"senate\" (Great Sanhedrin) but stated that it\npronounced a capital sentence, thus declaring that the supreme tribunal\nof the Jews not only existed at the time of Jesus but had the right to\ndecree capital punishment.\n\nEdersheim, discussing the alleged abolition of the Sanhedrin by Herod,\nsays: \"The Sanhedrin did exist during his reign, though it must have\nbeen shorn of all real power, and its activity confined to\necclesiastical or semi-ecclesiastical causes. We can well believe that\nneither Herod nor the procurators would wish to _abolish_ the Sanhedrin,\nbut would leave to them the administration of justice, especially in all\nthat might in any way be connected with purely religious questions. In\nshort, the Sanhedrin would be accorded full jurisdiction in inferior and\nin religious matters; with the greatest show, but with the least amount\nof real rule or of supreme authority.\"[179] This is a powerful voice in\nfavor of the existence of the supreme tribunal of the Jews at the time\nof Christ; for Edersheim's \"Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah\" is the\nbest and most reliable biography of the Savior in any language.\n\nKeim bases his advocacy of the existence of the Sanhedrin at the time of\nChrist on New Testament authority. \"Not only,\" he says, \"does the New\nTestament speak of Synedria in the time of Jesus and the Apostles, but\nJesus Himself, in a well-established utterance, mentions the Synedrion\n(Sanhedrin) as the highest legally constituted tribunal and as having\nthe right to pass the sentence of death.\"[180]\n\nThe strongest passage in the New Testament supporting the contention of\nthe existence of the Great Sanhedrin at the time of the crucifixion is\ncontained in Acts v. 21: \"But the high priest came, and they that were\nwith him, and called the _council_ together, and all the _senate_ of the\nchildren of Israel, and sent to the prison to have them brought.\" Here,\nthe use of the words \"high priest,\" \"council,\" and \"senate\" in the same\nconnection, strongly suggests, almost accurately describes, the\npresident and members of the Great Sanhedrin; and besides, the words,\n\"sent to the prison to have them brought,\" indicate that this body was\nexercising judicial functions.\n\nAgain, the utterance of Jesus above referred to by Keim is found in two\npassages of Matthew. The first is in Chap. xvi. 21: \"From that time\nforth began Jesus to shew unto His disciples, how that He must go unto\nJerusalem, and suffer many things of the _elders_ and _chief priests_\nand _scribes_, and be killed and be raised again the third day.\" The\nsecond is in Chap. xx. 18: \"Behold, we go up to Jerusalem; and the Son\nof man shall be betrayed unto the chief priests and unto the scribes,\nand they shall condemn him to death.\" The \"elders\" and \"chief priests\"\nand \"scribes\" were the characteristic constituent elements of the Great\nSanhedrin; and the prophecy, \"they shall condemn him to death,\" ascribed\nto them the highest judicial prerogative, the right of passing the death\nsentence. In his brilliant essay on the Talmud, Emanuel Deutsch\nemphatically says: \"Whenever the New Testament mentions the 'Priests,\nthe Elders, and the Scribes' together, it means the Great\nSanhedrin.\"[181] It is impossible to refrain from contrasting this\nstatement of a most eminent and learned Jewish writer with that of Rabbi\nWise, also very scholarly and pious, \"In no wise, then, any passages of\nthe Gospels must be considered to refer to the Great Sanhedrin.\" Suffice\nit to say that the weight of authority is with Emanuel Deutsch. And\nthat which seems to conclusively disprove the whole theory of the\nnonexistence of the Great Sanhedrin at the date of the crucifixion, is\nthe fact that Josephus--whose account of the alleged killing of all the\nmembers of the Sanhedrin by Herod is the very basis of the theory--in a\nsubsequent chapter, relating to a subsequent event, describes the\nsummoning of Hyrcanus, former king and high priest, before the Sanhedrin\nto be tried by them. As a result of the trial, Hyrcanus was put to\ndeath.[182] Such a personage could have been tried and condemned only by\nthe Great Sanhedrin, which was in existence subsequent to the alleged\ndestruction of all its members by Herod.\n\nIt is believed that enough has been said to show that the contention\nthat the Great Sanhedrin did not exist at the time of Christ is not well\nfounded. As a matter of reason, the mere destruction of the members of\nthe court by Herod did not, of necessity, abolish the court itself. From\nwhat we know of the character and policy of Herod, he simply had the\nmembers of an old and unfriendly aristocracy put to death in order that\nhe might make room in the court for an entirely new body friendly to him\nand devoted to his interests. Again, it is entirely improbable that the\nRoman masters, of whom Herod was but a subject prince and tool, would\nhave permitted the destruction of the most important local institution\nof a conquered state. The policy of the Romans in this regard is well\nknown. Whenever it was consistent with the dignity and safety of the\nRoman empire, local institutions were allowed to remain intact and\nundisturbed. We are not aware of any good historical reason why the\nGreat Sanhedrin, the national parliament, and the supreme tribunal of\nthe Jews, should have been abolished thirty years before Christ, as\nRabbi Wise and other eminent scholars and theologians have contended.\nAfter all, it seems to be more a matter of dogma than of history. The\nmajority of Jewish writers rest their case upon Josephus, with their\npeculiar construction of the passage; the majority of Christian writers\nquite naturally prefer the New Testament. But the line is not closely\ndrawn. Dr. Geikie, the eminent Gentile author, supports the Jewish\nopinion, without reference, however, to the passage in Josephus. On the\nother hand, Salvador, Edersheim, and Deutsch, all writers of Jewish\nblood, support the Christian contention.\n\nThe assertion of Graetz that Jesus was arraigned before one of the Minor\nSanhedrins,[183] of which there were two in Jerusalem, is not to be\ntaken seriously, since these minor courts had no jurisdiction of the\ncrime with which Jesus was charged.[184] It is very evident from the\nweight of authority that Jesus was tried before the Great Sanhedrin, and\nthat this court had authority to pass sentence of death. Upon this\ntheory, the author will proceed in framing the Brief.\n\n_Did the Great Sanhedrin have jurisdiction to try capital offenses at\nthe time of the crucifixion?_ This question, involving great difficulty\nand much confusion in discussing the trial of Jesus, arises from the\ndivergent opinions of Bible scholars as to the exact legal and political\nstatus of the Jews at the time of Christ. Many concede the existence of\nthe Great Sanhedrin at this time, but insist that it had been shorn of\nits most important judicial attributes; that the right to try capital\ncases had been wholly taken from it; and that it retained the legal\nright to try only petty crimes and religious offenses not involving the\ndeath penalty. The Jews contend, and indeed the Talmud states that\n\"forty years before the destruction of the Temple the judgment of\ncapital causes was taken away from Israel.\" The great weight of\nauthority, however, is registered against this view. The New Testament\nteachings on the subject have just been discussed in the beginning of\nthe Brief. The opinion generally held by Bible scholars is that the\nGreat Sanhedrin continued to exist after the Roman conquest of Judea and\nafter the time of Herod; that its legislative, executive, and judicial\npowers remained substantially unimpaired in local matters pertaining to\nthe internal affairs of the Jews; and that the Roman representatives\nintervened only when Roman interests required and the sovereignty of the\nRoman State demanded. The question of sovereignty presented itself,\nindeed, whenever the question of life and death arose; and Rome reserved\nto herself, in such cases, the prerogative of final judicial\ndetermination. Both Renan and Salvador hold the view that the Sanhedrin\nhad the right of initiative, the _cognitio caus\u00e6_; that is, the right to\ntry the case. In the event of the acquittal of the accused the matter\nwas finally ended without Roman interference, but in case of conviction\nthe Roman legate or procurator certainly might review and probably was\nrequired to review the matter, and either affirm or reverse the\nsentence. This is the prevalent opinion among the best writers; and is\nplausible because it is at once consistent with the idea of the\nmaintenance of Roman sovereignty and of the preservation of the local\ngovernment of the Jews. However, many able writers, among them Rosadi\nand Dupin, assert that the Jews had lost the right, by virtue of Roman\nconquest, even to try capital cases. And it must be admitted that the\nlogic of law is in their favor, though the facts of history and the\nweight of authority are against them.\n\n_Did the Great Sanhedrin have jurisdiction of the particular offense\nwith which Jesus was charged?_ Admitting the existence of the Great\nSanhedrin at the time of Christ, and its right to initiate and try\nproceedings in capital cases with reference to Roman authority, had it\njurisdiction, under Hebrew law, of the special accusation against\nChrist? On this point there is little difference of opinion. Jesus was\nbrought before the Sanhedrin on the charges of sedition and blasphemy,\nboth of which crimes came within the cognizance of the supreme tribunal\nof the Jews.[185]\n\n_Was there a regular legal trial of Jesus before the Great Sanhedrin?_\nAdmitting that this court was in existence at the time of Christ, that\nit had competence, with reference to Roman authority, to try capital\ncases, and that it had jurisdiction under Hebrew law of the crime with\nwhich Jesus was charged, did it actually conduct a regular, formal trial\nof the Christ? Many able critics give a negative answer to this inquiry.\nJost, one of the greatest and most impartial of Jewish historians,\ndesignates the crucifixion of Jesus \"a private murder (Privat-Mord)\ncommitted by burning enemies, not the sentence of a regularly\nconstituted Sanhedrin.\"[186] Edersheim supports this view as to the\nnature of the trial.[187]\n\nA certain class of writers base their objection to a regular trial on\nthe ground of the nonexistence of the Great Sanhedrin at the time of\nChrist. If this court did not exist, they say, there could not have been\nany regular judicial proceeding, since this body was the only Hebrew\ntribunal that had jurisdiction to try the offense with which Jesus was\ncharged. Others, who hold similar views, maintain that the errors were\nso numerous and the proceedings so flagrant, according to the Gospel\naccount, that there could have been no trial at all, and that it was\nsimply the action of a mob. These writers contend that the members of\nthe Sanhedrin acted more like a vigilance committee than a regularly\norganized tribunal. Of this opinion is Dr. Cunningham Geikie.\n\nStill another class of critics insist that the Hebrew judges exercised\nonly accusatory functions, and that the examination of Jesus at night\nwas merely preparatory to charges to be presented to Pilate.\n\nOthers still apparently reverse the order, and insist that the Hebrew\ntrial was the only one; that the duty of Pilate was merely to review,\nsanction, and countersign the verdict of the Sanhedrin. Of this class is\nRenan, who says: \"The course which the priests had resolved to pursue in\nregard to Jesus was quite in conformity with the established law. The\nplan of the enemies of Jesus was to convict him, by the testimony of\nwitnesses and by his own avowals, of blasphemy and of outrage against\nthe Mosaic religion, to condemn him to death according to law, and then\nto get the condemnation sanctioned by Pilate.\"[188] Salvador and Stapfer\nagree with Renan that the Hebrew trial was regular and that the\nproceedings were legal. On the other hand, Rosadi, Dupin, Keim and many\nothers denounce the proceedings in the trial of Jesus as outrageously\nillegal.\n\nAs to the number of trials, the authorities above cited seem to be\nexceptions to the rule. By far the greater number contend that there\nwere two distinct trials: a Hebrew and a Roman, separate and yet\ndependent. The opinion of this class of writers is most clearly\nexpressed by Innes, who says: \"Whether it was legitimate or not for the\nJews to condemn for a capital crime on this occasion, they did so.\nWhether it was legitimate or not for Pilate to try over again an accused\nwhom they had condemned, on this occasion, he did so. There were\ncertainly two trials.\"[189] This is the view of the writer of these\npages; and he has, accordingly, divided the general subject into two\ntrials, devoting a volume of the work to each. It may be answered, then,\nthat there was a regular trial of Jesus before the Great Sanhedrin. The\nrelation of this trial to the Roman proceeding will be more fully\ndiscussed in the second volume of this treatise.\n\n_Were the rules of criminal procedure prescribed in the Mishna and cited\nin this Brief, in existence and actively in force in Judea at the time\nof the trial of Jesus?_ This question has been answered in the negative\nby several writers of repute. Others have answered that the matter is in\ndoubt. But it is very generally agreed that an affirmative answer is the\nproper one. Out of this question, two others arise: (1) Were the rules\nof criminal law, herein cited, obsolete at the time of the crucifixion?\n(2) Were they the legal developments of an age subsequent to that great\nevent? In either case, their citation, in this connection, is without\nreason or justification.\n\nIt is a sufficient answer to the first of these questions that none of\nthe standard works on Hebrew criminal law classes any of the rules\nherein stated as obsolete at the time of Christ. In support of a\nnegative answer to this question, it may be urged that all of the\naforesaid rules were the essential elements of an enlightened and humane\ncriminal procedure in capital cases at the date of the crucifixion.\n\nThe answer to the second question above suggested is a more serious\nmatter. It is historically true that the Mishna was not reduced to\nwriting until two hundred years after the beginning of our era. The\nJerusalem Talmud was not redacted until 390 A.D.; and the Babylonian\nTalmud, about 365-427 A.D. The question at once arises: Were the rules\nof criminal procedure, which we have herein invoked in the discussion of\nthis case, the growth of the periods intervening between the crucifixion\nof Jesus and these dates? Two valid reasons give a negative answer to\nthis question. In the first place, the criminal rules applied in the\nBrief are in nearly every case traceable to Mosaic provisions which were\nframed more than a thousand years before the trial of Jesus. In the\nsecond place, they could not have been the developments of a time\nsubsequent to the crucifixion, because less than forty years, a single\ngeneration, intervened between that event and the fall of Jerusalem,\nwhich was followed by the destruction of Jewish nationality and the\ndispersion of the Jews. This short interval was a period of national\ndecay and disintegration of the Jewish people and could not have been,\nunder Roman domination, a formative period in legal matters. After the\nfall of Jerusalem, the additions and developments in Hebrew law were\nmore a matter of commentary than of organic formation--more of Gemara\nthan of Mosaic or Mishnic growth. The decided weight of authority, then,\nas well as the greater reason, is in favor of the proposition that the\nHebrew criminal law had reached its full development and was still in\nactive force at the time of which we write.\n\n_What was the nature of the charge brought against Christ at the trial\nbefore the Sanhedrin? Was He guilty as charged?_ The questions\npreceding these were secondary, though important. If the Great Sanhedrin\ndid not exist at the time of Christ, we are forced to believe and admit\nthat the men who arrested and examined Jesus at night were nothing more\nthan an irresponsible rabble, acting without judicial authority or legal\nexcuse. If it was without criminal jurisdiction, though in existence, we\nhave erroneously spoken of a Hebrew trial. If the rules of criminal\nprocedure which we have invoked were not in existence at the time of the\ncrucifixion, we have proceeded upon a false hypothesis. Fortunately, the\nweight of authority, in every case, is so overwhelmingly in our favor,\nand our contention is, in each case, so well founded in reason, that we\nfeel justified in now proceeding to a discussion of the real merits of\nthe case, involved in answers to the questions: What was the nature of\nthe charge or charges brought against Jesus at the Hebrew trial? Was He\nguilty as charged?\n\nThe accusations against Christ were numerous, both in and out of court;\nand it will help to simplify matters and to arrive at a clear\nunderstanding, if, in the very beginning, the distinction be made and\nheld in mind between _judicial_ and _extra-judicial_ charges. By\njudicial charges are meant those made at the time of the examination of\nJesus by the Sanhedrin, assembled at night in the palace of Caiaphas. By\nextra-judicial charges are meant those made out of court at divers times\nand places in Jerusalem, Galilee, and elsewhere by the accusers of the\nChrist, and especially by the spies who dogged His footsteps during the\nlast days of His ministry on earth. Ordinarily, it would be proper, in\na work of this kind, to consider only charges made after the trial of\nthe accused had begun, and jeopardy had attached. All others are\nextra-judicial and are entitled to only passing notice. It would be\nproper to omit them altogether, if they did not serve to throw much\nlight upon the specific charges at the trial. An excellent summary of\nthe extra-judicial charges brought against Jesus at various times in His\ncareer, is given in Abbott's \"Jesus of Nazareth,\" p. 448: \"It was\ncharged that He was a preacher of turbulence and faction; that He\nflattered the poor and inveighed against the rich; that He denounced\nwhole cities, as Capernaum, Bethsaida, Chorazin; that He gathered about\nHim a rabble of publicans, harlots, and drunkards, under a mere pretense\nof reforming them; that He subverted the laws and institutions of the\nMosaic commonwealth, and substituted an unauthorized legislation of His\nown; that He disregarded not only all distinctions of society, but even\nthose of religion, and commended the idolatrous Samaritan as of greater\nworth than the holy priest and pious Levite; that, though He pretended\nto work miracles, He had invariably refused to perform them in the\npresence and at the request of the Rabbis of the Church; that He had\ncontemned the solemn sanctions of their holy religion, had sat down to\neat with publicans and sinners with unwashen hands, had disregarded the\nobligations of the Sabbath, had attended the Jewish feasts with great\nirregularity or not at all, had declared that God could be worshiped in\nany other place as well as in His Holy Temple, had openly and violently\ninterfered with its sacred services by driving away the cattle gathered\nthere for sacrifice.\"\n\nThese different charges were doubtless present in the minds and hearts\nof the members of the Sanhedrin at the time of the trial, and probably\ninfluenced their conduct and entered into their verdict. But only one or\ntwo of these accusations can be said to have any direct connection with\nthe record in this case, and, consequently, can be only indirectly\nconsidered in discussing its merits.\n\nWe come now to examine the actual charges made at the night trial before\nthe Sanhedrin. The subsequent charges before Pilate have no place in\nthis volume. A review of the proceedings at the time of the examination\nin the palace of Caiaphas reveals two distinct charges: one preferred by\nwitnesses who had been summoned by the Sanhedrin, the other preferred by\nCaiaphas himself.\n\nFirst, according to Matthew, \"At the last came two false witnesses, and\nsaid, This fellow said, I am able to destroy the temple of God, and to\nbuild it in three days.\"[190] The same testimony is thus reported by\nMark: \"And there arose certain, and bare false witness against him,\nsaying, We heard him say, I will destroy this temple that is made with\nhands, and within three days, I will build another made without\nhands.\"[191] Luke and John do not discuss the night trial before the\nSanhedrin, and therefore make no reference to the charges brought\nforward by the false witnesses. The second accusation made against\nJesus is that by Caiaphas himself, who embodies his charge in the form\nof an oath or adjuration which he administered to the accused: \"I adjure\nthee by the living God that thou tell us whether thou be the Christ, the\nSon of God.\" Then came the confession and condemnation. \"Jesus said unto\nhim, Thou hast said: nevertheless I say unto you, Hereafter shall ye see\nthe Son of man sitting on the right hand of power, and coming in the\nclouds of heaven. Then the high priest rent his clothes, saying, He hath\nspoken _blasphemy_; what further need have we of witnesses? behold, now\nye have heard his blasphemy. What think ye? They answered and said, He\nis guilty of death.\"[192]\n\nThese few words of Scripture are the essential parts of the record of\nfact of the most awful trial in the history of the universe. An analysis\nof the evidence shows the existence of two distinct charges: that\npreferred by the false witnesses, accusing Jesus of sedition; and that\nof blasphemy made by Caiaphas himself.\n\nConcerning the testimony adduced in support of the first charge, Mark\nsays: \"For many bare false witness against him, but their witness agreed\nnot together.\"[193] Now, we have seen that the concurrent testimony of\nat least two witnesses, agreeing in all essential details, was necessary\nto sustain a conviction under Hebrew law. If one witness against the\naccused contradicted any other witness against the accused, all were\nrejected. Under this rule of law, when \"their witness agreed not\ntogether,\" according to Mark, the charge of sedition was abandoned, and\nthe accusation of blasphemy then followed, which resulted in a\nconfession and condemnation. Later on, in another place, we shall\ndiscuss the illegality of a double accusation, in the same breath and at\nthe same trial. But at this point we have no further interest in the\nabandoned charge, except to say that the false witnesses, in their\nignorance and blindness, failed to grasp the Master's allegorical\nlanguage in reference to the destruction of the Temple. Their\nworldly-mindedness and purely physical conception of things centered\ntheir thoughts upon the Temple at Jerusalem, and gave a purely temporal\nand material interpretation to His words. \"Forty and six years was this\ntemple in building, and wilt thou rear it again in three days?\"[194]\nThis question asked by the original auditors, shows a total\nmisconception of the true meaning of the language of Jesus. The\nspiritual allusion to the resurrection of His own body seems never to\nhave penetrated their thoughts. Then, again, their general statement\nwas, in effect, an absolute misrepresentation. By perverting His\nlanguage, He was made to utter a deliberate threat against a national\ninstitution, around which clustered all the power, sanctity, and glory\nof the Hebrew people. He was made to threaten the destruction of the\nTemple at Jerusalem. But it is most reasonable to infer from the entire\nevidence as contained in the Sacred Writings that the words imputed to\nJesus by the false witnesses were not those which He actually used. In\nreality, He did not say: \"I _can destroy_,\" or \"I _will destroy_\"; but,\nsimply, \"_Destroy_.\" \"Destroy this temple, and in three days I will\nraise it up.\"[195] This is evidently a purely hypothetical expression\nand is equivalent to \"_Supposing you destroy this temple_.\" St. John, in\nwhose presence, it seems, this language was used, correctly interprets\nthe Savior's meaning when he says: \"He spake of the temple of his\nbody.\"[196]\n\nThe evidence of the false witnesses was so contradictory that even\nwicked judges were forced to reject it and to conduct the prosecution on\nanother charge.\n\nWe come now to consider more closely the real accusation upon which\nJesus was condemned to death. At first glance, there seems to be no\ndifficulty in determining what this accusation was, since the Gospel\nrecord specifically mentions the crime of blasphemy. It was for this\noffense that Caiaphas pronounced judgment against Jesus with the\nunanimous approval of his fellow-judges. \"Then the high priest rent his\nclothes and saith, What need we any further witnesses? ye have heard the\n_blasphemy_: what think ye? and they all condemned him to be guilty of\ndeath.\" But what had they heard that constituted blasphemy? Nothing more\nthan His own confession that He was \"the Christ, the Son of God.\" This\nseems simple enough upon its face; but a vast mass of acrimonious\ndiscussion has resulted from these few passages of the Scripture. The\nmain difficulty turns upon the meaning of the word \"blasphemy,\" as used\nby the high priest in passing condemnation upon Jesus. The facts\nadduced at the trial, or rather the facts suggested by the oath or\nadjuration addressed to Jesus, as to whether or not He was \"Christ, the\nSon of God,\" did not, in the opinion of many, constitute blasphemy under\nthe definition of that term given in the Mosaic Code and interpreted by\nthe Rabbinic writers whose opinions have been embodied in commentaries\nupon the Mishna. Eminent Jewish writers have ridiculed the idea of\nattempting to make a case of blasphemy out of a mere claim of being a\n\"Son of God.\" Rabbi Wise, in \"The Martyrdom of Jesus,\" has very tersely\nstated the Jewish position on the subject. \"Had Jesus maintained,\" he\nsays, \"before a body of Jewish lawyers to be the Son of God, they could\nnot have found him guilty of blasphemy, because every Israelite had a\nperfect right to call himself a son of God, the law (Deut. xiv. 1)\nstating in unmistakable words, 'Ye are sons of the Lord, your God.' When\nRabbi Judah advanced the opinion, 'If ye conduct yourselves like the\nsons of God, ye are; if not, not,' there was Rabbi Mair on hand to\ncontradict him: 'In this or in that case, ye are the sons of the Lord\nyour God.' No law, no precedent, and no fictitious case in the Bible or\nthe rabbinical literature can be cited to make of this expression a case\nof blasphemy. The blasphemy law is in Leviticus (xxiv. 15-20), which\nordains, 'If any man shall curse his God (i.e., by whatever name he may\ncall his God), he shall bear his sin,' but the law has nothing to do\nwith it, dictates no punishment, takes no cognizance thereof. 'But he\nwho shall curse the name of Jehovah, he shall surely be put to death,'\nbe the curser native or alien. Another blasphemy law exists not in the\nPentateuch. The ancient Hebrews expounded this law, that none is guilty\nof blasphemy in the first degree, unless he curses God himself by the\nname of Jehovah; or, as Maimonides maintains, by the name Adonai. The\npenalty of death is only threatened in the first degree. The Mishna\nstates expressly as the general law, 'The blasphemer is not guilty,\nunless he (in cursing the Deity) has mentioned the name itself' (of\nJehovah or Adonai), so that there can be no doubt whatever that such was\nthe law in Israel. It is clear that the statements made by Mark, in the\nname of Jesus, had nothing in the world to do with the blasphemy laws of\nthe Jews.\"[197]\n\nRabbi Wise was concededly an able and accomplished theologian; and in a\ngeneral way the above extract states the truth. But it does not state\nthe whole truth, and in one or two places is certainly erroneous.\nLeviticus xxiv. 15-20 is undoubtedly the blasphemy statute of the Mosaic\nCode. But Mr. Wise was assuredly wrong when he stated that \"another\nblasphemy Law exists not in the Pentateuch.\" For, if this were a correct\nstatement, other eminent Jewish authorities, as well as many Gentile\nauthors, would be all at sea. Besides, the New Testament use of the word\n\"blasphemy,\" in many places, would only serve to illustrate the dense\nignorance of the Jews of the time of Jesus as to the meaning of the\nterm, if the author of \"The Martyrdom of Jesus\" were right.\n\nIn this connection, let us now consider another Jewish authority, as\nable and even more famous than the one just cited. In Salvador's\ncelebrated treatise entitled \"Histoire des Institutions de Mo\u00efse,\" he\ndevotes a chapter to the question of the judgment and condemnation of\nJesus. Touching the nature of the charge against Christ and the real\ncause of His conviction, he says: \"But Jesus, in presenting new theories\nand in giving new forms to those already promulgated, speaks of himself\nas God; his disciples repeat it; and the subsequent events prove in the\nmost satisfactory manner that they thus understood him. This was\n_shocking blasphemy_ in the eyes of the citizens: the law commands them\nto follow Jehovah alone, the only true God; not to believe in gods of\nflesh and bones, resembling men or women; neither to spare or listen to\na prophet who, even doing miracles, should proclaim a new god, a god\nneither they nor their fathers had known. The question already raised\namong the people was this: Has Jesus become God? But the Senate having\nadjudged that Jesus, son of Joseph, born in Bethlehem, had profaned the\nname of God by usurping it to himself, a mere citizen, applied to him\nthe law in the 13th Chapter of Deuteronomy and the 20th verse in Chapter\n18, according to which every prophet, even he who works miracles, must\nbe punished when he speaks of a god unknown to the Jews and their\nfathers: the capital sentence was pronounced.\"\n\nHere we have the doctors divided; Wise saying that \"another blasphemy\nlaw exists not in the Pentateuch,\" and Salvador contending that Jesus\nwas legally convicted of blasphemy under the Mosaic Law as it was laid\ndown, not in Leviticus xxiv. 15-20, but in Deuteronomy xiii.\n\nThe law in Deuteronomy is peculiarly impressive in its relationship to\nthe charges against Jesus.\n\n\"If there arise among you a prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and giveth\nthee a sign or a wonder, And the sign or the wonder come to pass,\nwhereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us go after other gods, which\nthou hast not known, and let us serve them; Thou shalt not hearken unto\nthe words of that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams: for the Lord your\nGod proveth you, to know whether ye love the Lord your God with all your\nheart and with all your soul. Ye shall walk after the Lord your God, and\nfear Him, and keep His commandments, and obey His voice, and ye shall\nserve Him, and cleave unto Him. And that prophet, or that dreamer of\ndreams, shall be put to death; because he hath spoken to turn you away\nfrom the Lord your God, which brought you out of the land of Egypt and\nredeemed you out of the house of bondage, to thrust thee out of the way\nwhich the Lord thy God commanded thee to walk in.\"[198]\n\nThe position of Rabbi Wise cannot be defended by trying to identify this\npassage with the one in Leviticus. The law in Deuteronomy has reference\nto that form of blasphemy which is nearly identical with idolatry, that\nis, seducing the people from their allegiance to Jehovah, and inducing\nthem to go off after strange gods. The law in Leviticus applies\npeculiarly to profane epithets and to curses hurled at Jehovah Himself.\n\nAgain, Rabbi Wise ridicules the notion that Caiaphas and the Sanhedrists\nattempted to twist the use of the words \"Son of God\" into a crime. He is\nright when, quoting Deuteronomy xiv. 1, he says that \"every Israelite\nhad a perfect right to call himself a son of God.\" But here again the\neminent theologian has stopped short of the entire truth. It is not at\nall probable that he would have contended that \"every Israelite had a\nperfect right to call himself the son of God\" in the sense of being\nequal with God Himself. Should reply be made that such would be an\nunwarranted construction of Christ's confession that he was \"the Christ,\nthe Son of God,\" then the opinion of Salvador would be again invoked. In\na note to the \"Jugement de Jesus,\" he says: \"I repeat that the\nexpression 'Son of God' includes here the idea of God Himself.\"\n\nWe are not in a position, nearly two thousand years after the event\noccurred, to tell exactly what was in the mind of Caiaphas at the time.\nBut, in view of the condemnation which he passed, and of the language\nwhich he used in passing it, we are certainly justified in supposing\nthat he deliberately and designedly connected the two titles--\"the\nChrist\" and \"the Son of God\"--to see if Jesus would assume\nresponsibility for both, or if He would content himself with the simple\nappellation, \"son of God,\" to which every pious Israelite was entitled.\nThe reply of Jesus, \"Thou hast said,\" meaning \"I am\" the Christ, the Son\nof God, was an affirmation of His identity with the Father. The\ncondemnation for blasphemy immediately followed. Such a sentence would\nhave been inconsistent with any other theory than the assumption that\nJesus had claimed equality with God, or had arrogated to Himself power\nand authority which belonged alone to Jehovah. This definition of\nblasphemy is certainly different from that laid down in Leviticus xxiv.\n15-20.\n\nAs a matter of history, it is really true that both the Old and New\nTestaments reveal not only the existence of more than one blasphemy\nstatute in the Mosaic Code, but also more than one conception and\ndefinition of blasphemy at different periods in the development of the\nHebrew people.\n\nIn II Samuel xii. 14 the word \"blaspheme\" is used in the sense \"to\ndespise Judaism.\" In I Macc. ii. 6 blasphemy means \"idolatry.\" In Job\nii. 5; II Kings xix. 4-6; Hosea vii. 16, the term indicates \"reproach,\"\n\"derision.\"\n\nNot only might God be blasphemed, but the king also, as his\nrepresentative. The indictment against Naboth was: \"Thou didst blaspheme\nGod and the king.\"[199] The people of Jehovah and his Holy Land might\nalso become victims of blasphemy.[200]\n\nThe New Testament writers frequently charge the Jews with blaspheming\nJesus, when they use insulting language toward Him, or deny to Him the\ncredit that is His due.[201]\n\nIn Revelation, St. John tells that he \"saw a beast rise up out of the\nsea, having seven heads and ten horns, and upon his horns ten crowns,\nand upon his heads the name of blasphemy. And he opened his mouth in\nblasphemy against God, to blaspheme his name, and his tabernacles, and\nthem that dwell in heaven.\"[202] This beast was the symbolical\nAntichrist, and his blasphemy was simply the treasonable opposition of\nthe antichristian world to God and His kingdom.\n\nA comprehensive meaning of \"blasphemy,\" in the various senses above\nsuggested, is conveyed by the definition of the term \"treason\" under the\ngovernments of Gentile commonwealths. A single statute, 25 Edw. iii. c.\n2, defines seven different ways of committing treason against the king\nof England.[203] The _lex Julia majestatis_, promulgated by Augustus\nC\u00e6sar, was a single statute which comprehended all the ancient laws that\nhad previously been enacted to punish transgressors against the Roman\nState.[204] There was no particular statute, as Rabbi Wise would have us\nbelieve, among the ancient Hebrews, that defined all forms of blasphemy\nagainst Jehovah. But a very clear notion of the various phases of\nblasphemy may be had if we will keep in mind the various definitions of\ntreason under modern law.\n\nIt should not be forgotten that the ancient Hebrew Commonwealth was a\npure theocracy; that Jehovah was king; that priests, prophets, and\npeople were merely the subjects and servants of this king; that its\ngovernment and its institutions were the products of his brain; and\nthat the destinies of the people of Israel, the \"chosen seed,\" were\nabsolutely in his keeping and subject to his divine direction and\ncontrol. It should also be remembered that the God of Israel was a most\njealous God; that the greatest irritant of His wrath was any\nencroachment upon His rights as ruler of men and creator of the\nuniverse; that for the protection of His sovereignty, He had proclaimed\nto His people through His servant Moses the most stringent statutes\nagainst any profanation of His name or disloyalty to His person. The\nDecalogue was the great charter of Jehovah for the government of His\nchildren. The first three commandments were special statutes intended to\nexcite their gratitude and insure their attachment. He reminds them of\nthe circumstances of their deliverance, and warns them, under severe\npenalty, against going off after strange gods.\n\nBut, not content with these, He had still other statutes proclaimed,\nfurnishing safeguards against idolatry and insuring loyalty to His\nperson.[205] At the time of the establishment of the Hebrew theocracy,\nidolatry was everywhere to be found. Not only were the neighboring\npeoples worshipers of idols, but the Israelites themselves were prone to\nidolatry and to running off after strange gods. The worship of the\nGolden Calf is a familiar illustration of this truth. Thus the\nCommonwealth of Jehovah was threatened not only with idolatrous invasion\nfrom without but with idolatrous insurrection from within. Hence the\nseverity of the measures adopted for the protection of His kingdom, His\nperson, and His name, not only against idolaters but against\nnecromancers, witches, sorcerers, and all persons who pretended to\nsupernatural powers that did not proceed directly from Jehovah Himself.\nThe enforcement of and obedience to these various statutes required an\nacknowledgment of the power and authority of Jehovah in every case where\nprophecies were foretold, wonders worked, and supernatural powers of any\nkind exhibited. And throughout the Sacred Scriptures, in both the Old\nand New Testaments, we find traces of the operation of this law.\nSometimes it is an instance of obedience, as when Pharaoh wanted to\ncredit Joseph with the power of interpreting dreams. \"And Joseph\nanswered Pharaoh, saying, It is not in _me_: God shall give Pharaoh an\nanswer of peace.\"[206] At other times, it is an act of disobedience. To\nsatisfy the thirsty multitude Moses smote the rock and brought forth\nwater at Meribah. But instead of giving the Lord credit for the act,\nMoses claimed it for Aaron and himself, saying, \"Hear now, ye rebels:\nmust _we_ fetch you water out of this rock?\" Whereupon Jehovah grew very\nangry and said to Moses and Aaron: \"Because ye believe me not, to\nsanctify _me_ in the eyes of the children of Israel, therefore ye shall\nnot bring this congregation into the land which I have given them.\"[207]\nAs punishment for this blasphemous conduct, neither Moses nor Aaron was\npermitted to enter the Promised Land.[208] And that this omission to\ngive due acknowledgment to the Lord for the miraculous flow of water was\ntreasonable or blasphemous under the wider interpretation of the term,\ncannot be doubted.\n\nFrom the foregoing remarks it is clear that blasphemy among the ancient\nHebrews was subject to a twofold classification: (1) A verbal\nrenunciation and profane speaking of the name of Jehovah. To this kind\nof blasphemy the provision in Leviticus xxiv. 15-20 was applicable. This\nwas blasphemy in its generally accepted but narrower and more restricted\nsense. This kind of blasphemy indicated a most depraved and malignant\nstate of mind, and to secure a conviction it was necessary to show that\nthe word \"Jehovah\" or \"Adonai\" had been pronounced. (2) \"Every word or\nact, directly in derogation of the sovereignty of Jehovah, such as\nspeaking in the name of another god, or omitting, on any occasion that\nrequired it, to give to Jehovah the honor due to His own name.\"[209]\nThis form of blasphemy was nearly the same as treason under modern\ngovernments, and included all offenses that threatened the usurpation of\nthe throne of Jehovah, the destruction of His institutions, and that\nwithheld from Him due acknowledgment of His authority and authorship in\nall matters of miracle and prophecy.\n\nReturning to the trial in the palace of Caiaphas, let us again consider\nthe question: Was Jesus guilty of blasphemy under any of the definitions\nabove given? Had He ever cursed the name of Jehovah and thereby brought\nHimself within the condemnation of the law, as laid down in Leviticus\nxxiv. 15-20? Certainly not. Every word uttered by Him at the trial, as\nwell as every other expression elsewhere uttered at any time or place,\nwas said with reverence and awe and love in praise and glorification of\nthe name and person of Jehovah. Rabbi Wise ridicules the notion that\nJesus was ever tried upon the charge of blasphemy, because it is not\nrecorded anywhere that He ever used any but tender and affectionate\nlanguage in speaking of the Heavenly Father.\n\nHad Jesus blasphemed, in the sense of \"despising Judaism,\" and thereby\nbrought Himself within the purview of the rule as exemplified in II Sam.\nxii. 14? Certainly not. There is no record anywhere that He despised\nJudaism. Jesus revered both the Law and the Prophets. He claimed that He\ncame to fulfill, not to destroy them.[210] He frequently denounced\nPharisaic formalism and hypocrisy, but at the same time He was a most\nloyal Jew and a devoted son of Israel.\n\nHad He blasphemed by working wonders in His own name, and omitting to\ngive Jehovah credit for them; and did He thereby bring Himself within\nthe condemnation of the rule exemplified by Moses and Aaron in the\nmatter of striking water from the rock at Meribah? We are forced to\nanswer this question in the affirmative. If we regard Jesus as a mere\nman, a plain citizen, like Moses, the New Testament discloses many\ninfractions of the Law in His prophecies and miracles. It is true that\nin John v. 19 it is said, \"Verily, verily, I say unto you, The Son can\ndo nothing of himself, but what he seeth the Father do.\" Here He\naffirmed that the power was from God and not from Himself. Again, having\nraised Lazarus from the dead, Jesus said, \"Father, I thank thee that\nthou hast heard me,\"[211] thus acknowledging the intervention of Jehovah\nin the performance of the miracle. In several other places He gave the\nFather credit for the act of the Son. But these were exceptions,\nisolated cases. The law required an express acknowledgment in every case\nof prophesy or miracle working. \"Thus saith the Lord\" was either the\nprologue or epilogue of every wonder-working performance. In all the\nmiracles wrought by him in Egypt Moses had given due credit to Jehovah.\nBut this was not enough. He was made an example for all time when he\nfailed to make acknowledgment in the matter of striking the water from\nthe rock. Now Jesus worked many miracles in no other name than His own,\nand in so doing brought Himself within the operation of the rule and of\nthe precedent established in the case of Moses and Aaron. The curing of\nthe bloody issue,[212] the stilling of the tempest,[213] the chasing of\nthe devils into the sea,[214] the raising of Jairus' daughter,[215] and\nof the son of the widow of Nain[216] from the dead, were done without\nany mention of the power and guidance of Jehovah.\n\nBut these transgressions were extra-judicial offenses and have been\ndiscussed merely as an introduction throwing light upon the specific\ncharge at the trial, that Jesus had claimed to be \"the Christ, the Son\nof God.\" The question of the high priest is meaningless, unless\ninterpreted in the light of knowledge which we know the members of the\nSanhedrin had regarding the wonder-working performances of the Christ.\nThe failure of Jesus to acknowledge the power of Jehovah in working\nmiracles might be interpreted as a tacit avowal that He Himself was\nJehovah, and that therefore no acknowledgments were necessary. The\nsilence itself was a proclamation of the divinity that was in Him, which\nplaced Him above a law intended to govern the conduct of men like Moses\nand Aaron.\n\nWe are now prepared to consider the final question: Had Jesus\nblasphemed, when He confessed to the high priest that He was \"the\nChrist, the Son of God\"? Had He blasphemed in that wider sense which\nSalvador has interpreted as being the Jewish notion of blasphemy at the\ntime of Christ; that is, by claiming at once the attributes of the\nMessiah and the Son of God? Had He asserted an equality with God which\nlooked to a usurpation of His power and the destruction of His throne;\nthat is, did the confession of Jesus that He was \"Christ, the Son of\nGod,\" suggest a rivalry between Him and Jehovah which might result in\nthe dethronement of the latter and the substitution of the former as the\nLord and King and Ruler of Israel? Regarding Jesus as a mere man, a\nplain citizen, an affirmative answer to any one of these questions would\nconvict Him of blasphemy, according to the Jewish interpretation of that\nterm at the time of Christ; for the Hebrew Jehovah had repeatedly\nproclaimed that He was a jealous God, and that He would brook neither\nrivals nor associates in the government of His kingdom.\n\nThat Jesus had more than once identified Himself with Jehovah, and had\nclaimed divine attributes and powers; and that the Jews regarded all\nthese pretenses as blasphemous, is evident, and can be ascertained from\nmore than one passage of New Testament Scripture. On one occasion the\nSavior said to one sick of palsy: \"Son, be of good cheer; thy sins be\nforgiven thee. And, behold, certain of the Scribes said within\nthemselves, This _man_ blasphemeth.\"[217] According to Luke, they said:\n\"Who is this man which speaketh blasphemies? Who can forgive sins but\nGod alone?\"[218] Here, according to the Scribes and Pharisees, Jesus had\nblasphemed by claiming the power which alone belonged to Jehovah, that\nof forgiving sins; or, at least, by exercising a supernatural power\nwithout acknowledging the authorship and guidance of the Almighty. It\nshould be remembered that in this instance of alleged blasphemy Jesus\nhad not remotely cursed or profaned the name of Jehovah; but, according\nto Jewish notions of the times, had exercised a prerogative, that of\nforgiving sins, which belonged solely to Jehovah, without giving credit.\n\nAgain, we read this passage in the New Testament: \"Therefore Jews sought\nthe more to kill him, because he not only had broken the Sabbath, but\nsaid also that God was his father, making himself equal with God.\"[219]\nHere we see that the Jews of the days of Jesus, as well as Salvador in\nour own day, construed the claims of Jesus to be \"the Christ, the Son of\nGod,\" as an assertion of equality with Jehovah.\n\nAgain, on another occasion, Jesus said emphatically: \"I and my Father\nare one. Then the Jews took up stones again to stone him. Jesus answered\nthem, Many good works have I shewed you from my Father; for which of\nthose works do ye stone me? The Jews answered him, saying, For a good\nwork, we stone thee not; but for blasphemy; and because that thou, being\na man, makest thyself God.\"[220] Even before this bold declaration of\nHis identity with Jehovah, He had intimated that He was of Heavenly\norigin and had enjoyed a divine pre\u00ebxistence. He had declared that He\nwas the \"Bread which came down from Heaven,\"[221] and that \"Before\nAbraham was, I am.\"[222] The Jews regarded His statement that He had\nlived before Abraham as blasphemy, and \"took up stones to cast at him,\"\nthis being the usual punishment for blasphemous conduct.\n\nWe have said enough to emphasize the point that there was another kind\nof blasphemy known to the Jews of the days of Jesus than that prescribed\nin Leviticus; and that the confession of being \"Christ, the Son of God,\"\nas the Jews and Caiaphas interpreted the term, brought Jesus within the\nmeaning of blasphemy, in its wider signification--that of assuming\nequality with God. The numerous illustrations above furnished were\ngiven to provide means of clear interpretation of the term blasphemy, as\nused in the condemnatory sentence of the high priest. For it is clearly\nevident that he and the other judges must have had many charges against\nJesus in mind other than those that appear in the record of the trial.\nBut we repeat, these extra-judicial charges must be considered only for\npurposes of correct interpretation and as a means of throwing light upon\nthe actual proceedings in the night trial before the Sanhedrin. We\nfurther repeat that the New Testament furnishes abundant evidence that\nJesus the man, the Jewish citizen, had, at divers times and places,\ncommitted blasphemy against Jehovah, under a strict interpretation of\nthe law of God.\n\nMr. Simon Greenleaf, the great Christian writer on the Law of Evidence\nand the Harmony of the Gospels, has thus tersely and admirably\nsummarized the matter from the lawyer's point of view: \"If we regard\nJesus simply as a Jewish citizen, and with no higher character, this\nconviction seems substantially right in point of law, though the trial\nwere not legal in all its forms. For, whether the accusation were\nfounded on the first or the second command in the Decalogue, or on the\nlaw laid down in the thirteenth chapter of Deuteronomy, or on that in\nthe eighteenth chapter and the twentieth verse, he had violated them all\nby assuming to himself powers belonging alone to Jehovah. It is not easy\nto perceive on what ground his conduct could have been defended before\nany tribunal, unless upon that of his superhuman character. No lawyer,\nit is conceived, would think of placing his defense upon any other\nbasis.\"[223]\n\nBut, at this point, the reader would do well to discriminate very\ncarefully between certain matters touching the most vital features of\nthe controversy. Certain well-defined distinctions must be observed,\nelse an erroneous conclusion will inevitably follow.\n\nIn the first place, proper limitations must be applied to the person and\ncharacter of Jesus before it can be truthfully said that His conviction\nby the Sanhedrin was \"substantially right in point of law.\" It must be\nremembered that, in this connection, Jesus is regarded merely as a man,\n\"a Jewish citizen,\" to use Greenleaf's phrase. His divine character, as\nthe only-begotten Son of God, as the Second Person of the Trinity, as\nthe Savior of the human race, is not considered. But the reader may\nobject, and with reason, that this is begging the question; and is\ntherefore an inexcusable evasion; since the real issue before the\nSanhedrin was this: Is Jesus God? And to strike the Godhead of Jesus\nfrom the discussion is to destroy the real issue, and to place the\njudgment of the Sanhedrin upon an irrelevant and immaterial basis. There\nis much truth in this contention, since it is clearly evident that if\nJesus was actually God, \"manifest in the flesh,\" He was not guilty; if\nHe was not God, He was guilty.\n\nFortunately for the purposes of this treatise, the legality or the\nillegality of the proceedings in the trial of Christ is not so much\nrelated to the question of substance as to that of form. Whether Jesus\nwere God or not is a question involving His divinity, and is a problem\npeculiarly within the domain of the theologian. Whether legal rules were\nduly observed in the trial of Christ, were He man or God, is a question\ninvolving His civil rights, and belongs to the domain of the lawyer.\nUnless this distinction be recognized and held in mind, the treatment of\nthis theme from a legal standpoint has no justification. This contention\nis all the more certainly true, since proof of the divinity of Jesus, a\nspiritual problem, would rest more upon the basis of religious\nconsciousness and experience, than upon historical facts and logical\ninferences.\n\nThe author of these volumes believes that Jesus was divine, and that if\nHe was not divine, Divinity has not touched this globe. The writer bases\nhis conviction of this fact upon the perfect purity, beauty, and\nsinlessness of Jesus; upon the overwhelming historical evidence of His\nresurrection from the dead, which event \"may unhesitatingly be\npronounced that best established in history\";[224] as well as upon the\nevident impress of a divine hand upon genuine Christian civilization in\nevery age.\n\nBut the historic proofs of the divinity of Christ that have come down to\nus through twenty centuries were not before the Sanhedrin. A charitable\nChristian criticism will be slow in passing unmerciful judgment upon the\nmembers of that court for denying the claims of Jesus to identify with\nGod, when His own disciples evidently failed to recognize them. The\nincidents of the Last Supper clearly prove that those who had been\nintimately associated with Him during three eventful years did not, at\nthe close of His ministry, fully comprehend His character and appreciate\nHis message and His mission.[225] Were comparative strangers to Him and\nHis teachings expected to be more keenly discerning? After John had\nbaptized Jesus in the Jordan and the Spirit of God, in the form of a\ndove, had descended upon Him, the Baptist seems to have had some doubts\nof the Messiahship of Christ and sent an embassy to Him to ask, \"Art\nthou he that should come, or do we look for another?\"[226] If the\nForerunner of the Messiah did not know, are we justified in demanding\nperfect prescience and absolute infallibility of Caiaphas?\n\nThe most perfect proof of the divinity of Jesus is the fact of His\nresurrection from the dead, attested by Matthew, Mark, Luke, John,\nPeter, James, and Paul. And yet, although He had frequently foretold to\nthem that He would rise again, Jesus had to personally appear before\nthem and submit to physical tests before they would believe that His\nprophecies had been fulfilled.[227] And it must be remembered that the\ngreat proof of His divinity, His resurrection from the dead, was not\nbefore Caiaphas and his colleagues at the time of the trial.\n\nThe preceding suggestions and observations have not been made in order\nto excuse or palliate the conduct of the members of the Sanhedrin for\ntheir illegal conduct of the proceedings against Jesus. Under Point XI\nof the Brief we shall prove by Jewish testimony alone the utterly wicked\nand worthless character of these judges. Under Point XII we shall\nelaborate the proofs in favor of the Messiahship of Jesus and of His\ndivine Sonship of the Father, as far as the scope of this work will\npermit. We have suggested above the perplexity of the members of the\nSanhedrin and of the disciples of Jesus, concerning the divinity of the\nNazarene, to illustrate to the reader how futile would be the task of\nattempting in a treatise of this kind to settle the question of the\nidentity of Jesus with God, and thereby fix upon His judges in the\npalace of Caiaphas the odium of an unrighteous judgment. The question,\nafter all, is one to be settled in the forum of conscience, illuminated\nby the light of history, and not at the bar of legal justice.\n\nBut whether Jesus were man or God, or man-God, we are justified in\npassing upon the question of the violation of forms of law which He was\nentitled to have observed in the trial of His claims. And at this point\nwe return to a consideration of the phrase, \"substantially right in\npoint of law.\" This language is not intended to convey the notion that\nJesus was legally convicted. It means simply that the claim of equality\nwith God by a plain Jewish citizen was, under Hebrew law, blasphemy; the\ncrime which Caiaphas and the Sanhedrin believed that Jesus had\nconfessed, and for which they condemned Him.\n\nAnother distinction that must be made is that relating to the kind of\nlaw that is meant, when it is said that the conviction of Jesus was\n\"substantially right in point of law.\" Ancient Hebrew law is meant, and\nas that law was interpreted from the standpoint of ancient Judaism. The\npolicy and precepts of the New Dispensation inaugurated by Jesus can\nhardly be considered, in a legal sense, to have been binding upon\nCaiaphas and the Sanhedrin, since the very claims of Jesus to\nMessiahship and identity with God were to be tested by the provisions of\nthe Mosaic Code and in the light of Hebrew prophecy. The Pentateuch, the\nProphets, and the Talmud were the legal guides, then, of the judges of\nIsrael in judicial proceedings at this time, and furnished rules for\ndetermining the genuineness of His pretensions.\n\nMr. Greenleaf, the author of the phrase, \"substantially right in point\nof law,\" asserts that the trial was not legal in all its forms, but he\nfails to enumerate the errors. The purpose of the Brief in this work is\nto name and discuss the errors and irregularities of the Hebrew trial,\nthat is, the trial before the Sanhedrin.\n\nBut the question may be asked: Why be guilty of the inconsistency of\ndiscussing illegalities, when admission has already been made that the\ndecision was \"substantially right in point of law\"? The answer is that a\ndistinction must be made between that which is popularly and\nhistorically known or believed to be true, and that which has not been\nor cannot be proved in a court of law. Every lawyer is familiar with\nthis distinction. The court may know that the accused is guilty, the\njury may know it, the attorneys may be perfectly sure of it, but if the\nverdict of guilt returned by the jury into court is not based upon\ntestimony that came from the witness stand from witnesses who were\nunder oath, and that had submitted to cross-examination, such verdict\nwould hardly be sustained on appeal. In other words, the lives and\nliberties of alleged criminals must not be endangered by extra-judicial\nand incompetent testimony. A legal verdict can be rendered only when a\nregular trial has been had before a competent court, having jurisdiction\nof the crime charged, and after all legal rules have been observed which\nthe constitution and the laws have provided as safeguards for the\nprotection of the rights of both the people and the prisoner. However\nheinous the offense committed, no man is, legally speaking, a criminal,\nuntil he has been legally tried and declared a criminal. The presumption\nof innocence, a substantial legal right, is thrown around him from the\nvery beginning, and continues in his favor until it is overthrown by\ncompetent and satisfactory evidence. Unless such evidence is furnished,\nunder legal forms, no man, however morally guilty, can be denominated a\ncriminal, in a juristic sense, in the face of the perpetual continuance\nof this presumption of innocence.\n\nIf these rules and principles be applied to the trial of Jesus, either\nbefore the Sanhedrin or before Pilate, it can be easily demonstrated\nthat while He might have been abstractly and historically guilty of the\ncrime of blasphemy, in the wider acceptation of that term, He was not\nremotely a criminal, because He was never legally tried and convicted.\nIn other words, his condemnation was not based upon a legal procedure\nthat was in harmony with either the Mosaic Code or the Mishna. The\npages of human history present no stronger case of judicial murder than\nthe trial and crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth, for the simple reason\nthat all forms of law were outraged and trampled under foot in the\nproceedings instituted against Him. The errors were so numerous and the\nproceedings so flagrant that many have doubted the existence of a trial.\nOthers have sought to attack the authenticity of the Gospel narratives\nand the veracity of the Gospel writers by pointing to the number of\nerrors committed as evidence that no such proceedings ever took place.\nAs Renan would say, this is a species of \"na\u00efve impudence,\" to assert\nthat a trial was not had, because numerous errors are alleged; as if a\nHebrew court could not either intentionally or unintentionally commit\nblunders and many of them. Every lawyer of extensive practice anywhere\nknows from experience that judges of great ability and exalted character\nconduct lengthy trials, in both civil and criminal cases, with the most\npainstaking care, and are aided by eminent counsel and good and honest\njurors; the whole purpose of the proceedings being to reach a just and\nrighteous verdict; and yet, on appeal, it is frequently held that not\none but many errors have been committed.\n\nAt this point, a few preliminary observations are necessary as a means\nof introduction to the discussion of errors. Certain elementary\nprinciples should be clearly understood at the outset. In the first\nplace, an analysis of the word \"case,\" used in a juristic sense, shows\nthe existence of two cardinal judicial elements: the element called\nFact, and the element called Law. And whether the advocate is preparing\na pleading at his desk, is making a speech to the jury, or addressing\nhimself to the court, these elements are ever present in his mind. He is\ncontinually asking these questions: What are the facts of this case?\nWhat is the law applicable to these facts? Do the facts and law meet,\nharmonize, blend, according to the latest decision of the court of last\nresort? If so, a case is made; otherwise, not.\n\nIt is impossible to frame any legal argument upon any other basis than\nthat of the agreement or nonagreement of law and fact, in a juristic\nsense; and upon this plan errors will be discussed and the Brief will be\nframed.\n\nIn the second place, it must not be forgotten that, in matters of review\non appeal, errors will not be presumed; that is, errors will not be\nconsidered that do not appeal affirmatively upon the record. The law\nwill rather presume and the court will assume that what should have been\ndone, has been done. In conformity with this principle, only such errors\nwill be discussed in these pages that affirmatively appear in the New\nTestament Gospels which form the record in this case. By \"affirmatively\nappear\" is meant that the error is clearly apparent or may be reasonably\ninferred.\n\nIn Part II of the preceding pages of this volume, Hebrew criminal law,\nwhich was actively in force at the time of Christ, was outlined and\ndiscussed. In Part I the Record of Fact was reviewed in the light of\njudicial rules. It is the present purpose, in Part III, to enumerate,\nin the form of a Brief, the errors committed by the Hebrew judges of\nJesus, as the result of their failure to make the facts of their trial\nconform with the legal rules by which they were bound in all criminal\nproceedings where human life was at stake. The plan proposed is to\nannounce successive errors in brief statements which will be designated\n\"Points,\" in imitation of the New York method on appeal. Following the\nstatement of error will be given a short synopsis of the law applicable\nto the point suggested. Then, finally, will follow the fact and argument\nnecessary to elaboration and proof. Accordingly, in pursuance of this\nmethod, let us consider the points in order.\n\n\n\n\nPOINT I\n\nTHE ARREST OF JESUS WAS ILLEGAL\n\n\nLAW\n\n    \"Now the Jewish law prohibited _all proceedings by night_.\"--DUPIN,\n      \"Jesus Devant Ca\u00efphe et Pilate.\"\n\n    \"The testimony of an accomplice is not permissible by Rabbinic law\n      both _propter affectum_ and _propter delictum_, and no man's\n      _life_, nor his _liberty_, nor his _reputation_ can be endangered\n      by the malice of one who has confessed himself a\n      criminal.\"--MENDELSOHN, \"Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient\n      Hebrews,\" n. 274.\n\n    \"Thou shalt not go up and down as a talebearer among thy people:\n      neither shalt thou stand against the blood of thy neighbor. Thou\n      shalt not hate thy brother in thine heart: Thou shalt not avenge\n      or bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou\n      shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.\"--LEVITICUS xix. 17, 18.\n\n\nFACT AND ARGUMENT\n\nThe Bible record discloses three distinct elements of illegality in the\narrest of Jesus: (1) The arrest took place at night in violation of\nHebrew law; (2) it was effected through the agency of a traitor and\ninformer, in violation of a provision in the Mosaic Code and of a\nRabbinic rule based thereon; (3) it was not the result of a legal\nmandate from a court whose intentions were to conduct a legal trial for\nthe purpose of reaching a righteous judgment. These elements of\nillegality will be apparent when the facts of the arrest are briefly\nstated.\n\nIt was the 14th Nisan, according to the Jewish calendar; or April 6th,\nA.D. 30, according to our calendar. The Paschal Feast was at hand. The\neyes of all Israel were centered upon the Metropolis of Judaism. From\nJudea, from Samaria, from Galilee and Perea, from all parts of the world\nwhere Jews were resident, pilgrims came streaming into the Holy City to\nbe present at the great national festival. It was to be an occasion of\nprayer and thanksgiving, of sweet memories and happy reunions. Then and\nthere offerings would be made and purifications obtained. In the great\nTemple, with its gorgeous ritual, Judaism was to offer its soul to\nJehovah. The national and religious feelings of a divinely commissioned\nrace were to be deeply stirred by memories that reminded them of the\nfirst, and by hopes that looked forward to the final great deliverance.\n\nIt was probably in the home of Mark, on the outskirts of Jerusalem, that\nJesus gathered with the Twelve, on the evening of this day, to eat the\nPaschal lamb. In the Upper Room, the sacred feast was spread and the\nlittle band were gathered. Only the genius of a da Vinci could do\njustice to that scene. There was Peter, hot-headed, impetuous,\nbravado-like. There was John, as gentle, pure-minded, and loving as a\nwoman. There was Judas, mercenary, low-browed, and craven-hearted.\nThere were others who, with Peter and John, were to have temples\ndedicated in their names. In their midst was the Master of them all,\n\"God manifest in the flesh,\" who \"with His pierced hands was to lift\nempires off their hinges, and turn the stream of centuries from its\nchannel.\" No moment of history was so fraught with tragic interest for\nthe human race. There the seal of the New Covenant was affixed, the bond\nof the new human spiritual alliance was made. The great law of love was\nproclaimed which was to regenerate and sanctify the world. \"These things\nI command you, that ye love one another. And I have declared unto them\nthy name, and will declare it; that the love wherewith thou hast loved\nme, may be in them, and I in them.\" Thus the great law of love was to be\nthe binding tie, not only among the little brotherhood there assembled\nbut was to be the cementing bond between the regenerate of earth, the\nMediator, and the great Father of love, Himself. There, too, was given\nthe great example of humility which was to characterize true Christian\npiety throughout the ages. The pages of history record no other\nspectacle so thrilling and sublime, and at the same time tender and\npathetic, as that afforded by the Paschal Meal, when Jesus, the Savior\nof men, the Son of God, the Maker of all the shining worlds, sank upon\nHis knees to wash the feet of ignorant, simple-minded Galilean\nfishermen, in order that future ages might have at once a lesson and an\nexample of that genuine humility which is the very life and soul of true\nreligion.\n\nDuring the evening, a bitter anxiety, an awful melancholy, seized the\ndevoted band, whose number, thirteen, even to-day inspires superstitious\ndread. In the midst of the apprehension the heart of the Master was so\ndeeply wrung with agony that He turned to those about Him and said:\n\"Verily, verily, I say unto you that one of you shall betray me.\" This\nprediction only intensified the sadness that had already begun to fall\nover the Sacred Meal and the loving disciples began to ask: \"Lord, is it\nI?\" Even the betrayer himself joined with the others, and, with\ninconceivable heartlessness and effrontery, asked: \"Lord, is it I?\" At\nthe moment of greatest dread and consternation, Peter, bolder than the\nrest, leaned across the table and whispered to John, who was resting\nupon the bosom of Jesus, and suggested that he ask the Master who it\nwas. Accordingly, John whispered and asked the Savior: \"Lord, who is\nit?\" \"Jesus answered, He it is, to whom I shall give a sop, when I have\ndipped it. And when he had dipped the sop, he gave it to Judas Iscariot,\nthe son of Simon. And after the sop Satan entered into him. Then said\nJesus unto him, That thou doest, do quickly.\" Judas then arose from the\nfeast and vanished from the room. When he was gone, the Master began to\ndeliver to His \"little children,\"[228] to those who had loved and\nfollowed Him, those farewell words which St. John alone records, and\nthat are so \"rarely mixed of sadness and joys, and studded with\nmysteries as with emeralds.\"\n\nThere, too, doubts and fears began to burst from the hearts and lips of\nthe members of the little company. The knowledge that the gentle Jesus,\nwhose ministry had thrilled and glorified their simple peasant lives,\nand promised to them crowns of glory in the world to come, was about to\nleave them, and in a most tragic way, filled them with solicitude and\ndread. Their anxiety manifested itself by frequent questioning which\nexcites our wonder that men who had been with Him so long in the\nApostolic ministry should have been so simple-minded and incredulous.\n\"They said, therefore, What is this that he saith, A little while? We\ncannot tell what he saith.\" This verse is a simple illustration of the\ncontinued misapprehension, on this night, upon the part of the Apostles,\nof everything said by the Master. Peter was anxious to know why he could\nnot follow the Lord. Thomas wanted to know the exact way, evidently\nfailing to comprehend the figurative language of the Christ. Judas\nLebb\u00e6us also had his doubts. He became muddled by mixing the purely\nspiritual with the physical powers of sight. \"Lord, how is it,\" he\nasked, \"that thou wilt manifest thyself to us and not to the world?\"\nPhilip of Bethsaida desired to see the Father. \"Lord, show us the\nFather,\" he said, \"and it sufficeth us.\" Philip seems to have been so\ndense that he had no appreciation of the spiritual attributes and\ninvisible existence of the Father.\n\nIt was thus that several hours were spent in celebrating the great\nFeast; in drinking wine; in eating the Paschal lamb, the unleavened\nbread, and the bitter herbs; in singing hymns, offering prayers, and\nperforming the sacred rites; in delivering discourses which in every\nage have been the most precious treasures of Christians, and in\nexpressing doubts and fears that have excited the astonishment and even\nthe ridicule of the exacting and supercilious of all the centuries.\n\nAt the approach of midnight, Jesus and the Eleven left the Upper Chamber\nof the little house and stepped out into the moonlight of a solemn\nPassover night. They began to wend their way toward the Kedron that\nseparated them from the olive orchard on the Mount. Less than an hour's\njourney brought them to the Garden of Gethsemane. The word \"Gethsemane\"\nmeans \"oil press.\" And this place doubtless derived its name from the\nfact that in it was located an oil press which was used to crush olives\nthat grew abundantly on the trees that crowned the slopes. Whether it\nwas a public garden or belonged to some friend of Jesus, we do not know,\nbut certain it is that it was a holy place, a sanctuary of prayer, where\nthe Man of Sorrows frequently retired to pray and commune with His\nHeavenly Father. At the gateway Jesus left eight of the Apostles and\ntook with Him the other three: Peter, James, and John. These men seem to\nhave been the best beloved of the Master. They were with Him at the\nraising of Jairus' daughter, at the Transfiguration on the Mount, and\nwere now selected to be nearest Him in the hour of His agony. Proceeding\nwith them a short distance, He suddenly stopped and exclaimed: \"My soul\nis exceedingly sorrowful, even unto death: tarry ye here, and watch with\nme.\" Then, withdrawing Himself from them a stone's cast, He sank upon\nHis knees and prayed; and in the agony of prayer great drops of sweat\nresembling blood rolled from His face and fell upon the ground. Rising\nfrom prayer, He returned to His disciples to find them asleep. Sorrow\nhad overcame them and they were mercifully spared the tortures of the\nplace and hour. Three times did He go away to pray, and as many times,\nupon His return, they were found asleep. The last time He came He said\nto them: \"Rise, let us be going; behold he is at hand that doth betray\nme.\" At this moment were heard the noise and tramp of an advancing\nmultitude. \"Judas then, having received a band of men and officers from\nthe chief priests and Pharisees, cometh thither with lanterns and\ntorches and weapons.\" This midnight mob, led by Judas, was made up of\nRoman soldiers, the Temple guard, and stragglers from along the way. It\nis probable that the traitor walked ahead of the mob by several paces.\n\"And forthwith he came to Jesus, and said, Hail, master, and kissed him\nand Jesus said unto him, Friend, wherefore art thou come? Then came they\nand laid hands on Jesus and took him.\" But the arrest was not\naccomplished without incidents of pathos and of passion. \"Whom seek ye?\"\nasked the Master. \"Jesus of Nazareth,\" they answered. \"I am he,\" replied\nthe Savior. Then, dazed and bewildered, they fell backward upon the\nground. \"Then asked he them again, whom seek ye? and they said, Jesus of\nNazareth. Jesus answered, I have told you that I am he: if, therefore,\nye seek me, let these go their way.\" John says that this intercession\nfor the disciples was to the end that prophecy might be fulfilled.[229]\nDoubtless so; but this was not all. Nowhere in sacred literature do we\nfind such pointed testimony to the courage and manliness of Jesus. His\ntender solicitude for the members of the little band, for those who had\nquit their homes and callings to link their destinies with His, was here\nsuperbly illustrated. He knew that He was going to immediate\ncondemnation and then to death, but He ardently desired that they should\nbe spared to live. And for them He threw Himself into the breach.\n\nThe furious and the passionate, as well as the tender and pathetic, mark\nthe arrest in the garden. \"Then Simon Peter having a sword drew it, and\nsmote the high priest's servant, and cut off his right ear. The\nservant's name was Malchus.\" This was bloody proof of that fidelity\nwhich Peter loudly proclaimed at the banquet board, but which was soon\nto be swallowed up in craven flight and pusillanimous denial.\n\n\"Then the band and the captain and officers of the Jews took Jesus, and\nbound him.\"\n\nAt this point the arrest was complete, and we now return to the\ndiscussion of the illegalities connected with it.\n\nIt was a well-established and inflexible rule of Hebrew law that\nproceedings in capital trials could not be had at night. This provision\ndid not apply simply to the proceedings of the trial after the prisoner\nhad been arraigned and the examination had been begun. We have it upon\nthe authority of Dupin that it applied to the entire proceedings, from\nthe arrest to the execution. The great French advocate explicitly states\nthat the arrest was illegal because it was made at night.[230] Deference\nto this rule seems to have been shown in the arrest of Peter and John on\nanother occasion. \"And they laid hands upon them and put them in hold\nunto the next day: for it was now _eventide_.\"[231] That Jesus was\narrested at night is clearly evident from the fact that those who\ncaptured Him bore \"_lanterns_ and _torches_ and _weapons_.\"\n\nThe employment of Judas by the Sanhedrin authorities constitutes the\nsecond element of illegality in the arrest. This wretched creature had\nbeen numbered among the Twelve, had been blessed and honored, not merely\nwith discipleship but with apostleship, had himself been sent on holy\nmissions by the Master, had been given the power to cast out devils, had\nbeen appointed by his Lord the keeper of the moneys of the Apostolic\ncompany, and, if Edersheim is to be believed, had occupied the seat of\nhonor by the Master at the Last Supper.[232] This craven and cowardly\nApostate was employed by the Sanhedrin Council to betray the Christ. It\nis clearly evident from the Scriptures that the arrest of Jesus would\nnot have taken place on the occasion of the Passover, and therefore\nprobably not at all, if Judas had not deserted and betrayed Him. The\nSavior had appeared and preached daily in the Temple, and every\nopportunity was offered to effect a legal arrest on legal charges with\na view to a legal determination. But the enemies of Jesus did not want\nthis. They were waiting to effect His capture in some out-of-the-way\nplace, at the dead of night, when His friends could not defend Him and\ntheir murderous proceedings would not reach the eye and ear of the\npublic. This could not be accomplished as long as His intimates were\nfaithful to Him. It was, then, a joyful surprise to the members of the\nSanhedrin when they learned that Judas was willing to betray his Master.\n\"And when they heard it, they were glad, and promised to give him\nmoney.\"\n\nIn modern jurisdictions, accomplice testimony has been and is allowed.\nThe judicial authorities, however, have always regarded it with\ndistrust, and we might say with deep-seated suspicion. At the common law\nin England a conviction for crime might rest upon the uncorroborated\ntestimony of an accomplice, after the jury had been warned that such\ntestimony was to be closely scrutinized. In the American States the\ntestimony of an accomplice is admissible, but must be corroborated in\norder to sustain a conviction. This is the general rule. The weakness of\nsuch evidence is shown by the nature of the corroboration required by\nseveral states. In some of them the corroborating testimony must not\nonly tend to prove the commission of the crime but must also tend to\nconnect the defendant with such commission. Another evidence of the\nuntrustworthiness of such testimony is that in several states an\naccomplice is not permitted to corroborate another accomplice, so as to\nsatisfy the statutes.[233] The admission of such testimony seems to\nrest, in great measure, upon the supreme necessity of the preservation\nof the state, which is only possible when the punishment of crime is\npossible; and in very many instances it would be impossible to punish\ncrime if guilty confederates were not allowed and even encouraged to\ngive state's evidence.\n\nBut notwithstanding this supreme consideration of the necessity of the\npreservation of the state, the ancient Hebrews forbade the use of\naccomplice testimony, as we have seen from the extract from \"The\nCriminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews,\" by Mendelsohn, cited on\npage 219.\n\nThe arrest of Jesus was ordered upon the supposition that He was a\ncriminal; this same supposition would have made Judas, who had aided,\nencouraged, and abetted Jesus in the propagation of His faith, an\naccomplice. If Judas was not an accomplice, Jesus was innocent, and His\narrest was an outrage, and therefore illegal.\n\nThe Hebrew law against accomplice testimony must have been derived, in\npart at least, from the following rule laid down in Leviticus xix.\n16-18: \"Thou shalt not go up and down as a talebearer among thy people:\nneither shall thou stand against the blood of thy neighbor. Thou shalt\nnot hate thy brother in thine heart: Thou shalt not avenge, or bear any\ngrudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy\nneighbor as thyself.\" It may be objected that this is only a moral\ninjunction and not a legal rule; to which reply must be made that there\nwas no difference between morality and law among the ancient Hebrews.\nTheir religion was founded upon law, and their law upon religion. The\ntwo ideas of morality and law were inseparable. The ancient Hebrew\nreligion was founded upon a contract of the strictest legal kind. The\nAbrahamic covenant, when properly interpreted, meant simply that Jehovah\nhad agreed with the children of Israel that if they would obey the law\nas He gave it, they would be rewarded by Him. The force of this\ncontention will be readily perceived when it is reflected that the\nDecalogue is nothing but ten moral injunctions, which are nevertheless\nsaid to be the law which God gave to Moses.\n\nEvery provision in the rule laid down in Leviticus is, moreover,\ndirectly applicable to the character and conduct of Judas, and seems to\nhave been intended as a prophetic warning to him. Let us consider the\ndifferent elements of this rule in order.\n\n\"Thou shalt not go up and down as a talebearer among thy people.\"\n\nWas not Judas a talebearer among his people? Did he not go to the chief\npriests to betray his Master unto them? Was he not a \"talebearer\" if he\ndid nothing more than communicate to the chief priests the whereabouts\nof the Savior, that Gethsemane was His accustomed place of prayer and\nthat He might be found and arrested there at midnight? Are we not\njustified in supposing that Judas told the enemies of Jesus much more\nthan this? Is it not reasonable to infer that the blood-money was paid\nto secure more evidence than that which would merely lead to the arrest\nof the Nazarene? Is it not probable that Judas detailed to the chief\npriests many events in the ministry of Jesus which, it is known, He\ncommunicated only to the Twelve? If he did these things, was he not a\n\"talebearer\" within the meaning of the rule?\n\n\"Neither shalt thou stand against the blood of thy neighbor.\"\n\nDid not Judas stand against the blood of his nearest and dearest\nneighbor when he consented to be the chief instrument of an arrest which\nhe knew would result in death?\n\n\"Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart.\"\n\nIs it possible to suppose that anything less than hatred could have\ninduced Judas to betray the Christ? This question is important, for it\ninvolves a consideration of the real character of the betrayer and the\nmain motive for the betrayal. Judas was from Kerioth in Judea and was\nthe only Judean among the Twelve. Why Judas was selected as a member of\nthe Apostolic company is too deep a mystery to be solved by the author\nof these pages. Besides, the consideration of the elements of\npredestination in his case is foreign to the purpose of this work. His\ncharacter as a purely human agency is sufficient to answer the present\ndesign. Judas had undoubtedly demonstrated business capacity in some way\nbefore his appointment to the treasury portfolio of the little band. It\ncannot be doubted that greed was his besetting sin. This trait, coupled\nwith political ambition, undoubtedly accounts for his downfall and\ndestruction. He was one of those simple-minded, short-sighted\nindividuals of his day who believed that a political upheaval was at\nhand which would result in the restoration of the independence of Israel\nas a separate kingdom. He believed that this result would be brought\nabout through the agency of a temporal Messiah, an earthly deliverer of\nalmost divine qualities. He thought at first that he saw in Jesus the\nperson of the Messiah, and in the Apostolic band the nucleus of a\nrevolution. He was gratified beyond measure at his appointment to the\ntreasury position, for he felt sure that from it promotion was in sight.\nHe was perfectly contented to carry for a while the \"little bag,\"\nprovided there was reasonable assurance that later on he would be\npermitted to carry a larger one.\n\nAs the months and years rolled by, heavy scales began to fall from his\nstupid eyes and he began to be deceived not by but in Jesus. We are\njustified in believing that Judas never even remotely appreciated the\nspiritual grandeur of the Christ. He probably had intellect and soul\nenough to be charmed and fascinated by the lofty bearing and eloquent\ndiscourse of Jesus, but after all he perceived only the necessary\nqualifications of a great republican leader and successful\nrevolutionist. And after a while he doubtless began to tire of all this\nwhen he saw that the revolution was not progressing and that there was\nno possibility of actual and solid results. It is probable that\ndisaffection and treachery were born and began to grow in his mind and\nheart at Capernaum, when Jesus was deserted by many of His followers and\nwas forced to effect a realignment along spiritual lines. Judas was not\nequal to the spiritual test, and it was doubtless then that the\ndisintegration of his moral nature began, which stopped only with\nbetrayal, infamy, and death.\n\nBut by what process, we may ask, was the mercenary disposition of Judas\nconverted into hatred against Jesus? The process was that of\ndisappointment. When Judas became convinced that all the years of his\nconnection with the Apostolic company had been lost, his will became\nembittered and his resentment was aroused. In the denseness of his\nignorance and in the baseness of his soul he probably thought that Jesus\nhad deceived His followers as to His true mission and he felt enraged\nbecause he had been duped. He had looked forward to worldly promotion\nand success. He had fondly hoped that the eloquence of Jesus would\nfinally call around Him an invincible host of enthusiastic adherents who\nwould raise the standard of revolt, drive the Romans from Judea, and\nestablish the long-looked-for kingdom of the Jews. He had noted with\ndeep disappointment and unutterable chagrin the failure of Jesus to\nproclaim Himself king when, at Bethphage, the multitude had greeted His\nentrance into Jerusalem with Hosannas and acclamations. And now, at the\nLast Supper, he became convinced from the conduct and discourses of the\nMaster that his worst fears were true, that Jesus was sincere in His\nresolution to offer Himself as a sacrifice for the sake of a principle\nwhich he, Judas, did not approve because he could not understand. In\nother words, he witnessed in the resolve of Jesus to die at once the\nshipwreck of his hopes, and he made haste to vent his wrath upon the\nauthor of his disappointment.\n\nThe writer agrees with Renan that the thirty pieces of silver were not\nthe real or leading inducement to this black and monumental betrayal.\nHaving taken the fatal step, by leaving the Upper Room in the home of\nMark, to deliver his Lord and Master into the hands of enemies, a bitter\nhatred was formed at once against the innocent victim of his foul\ndesigns, on the well-known principle of human nature that we hate those\nwho have induced us to do that which causes us to despise and hate\nourselves.\n\n\"Thou shalt not avenge or bear any grudge against the children of thy\npeople.\"\n\nWhere, in the annals of the universe, do we find another such case of\nvengeance and grudge as this of Judas against Jesus?\n\n\"But thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.\"\n\nThis commandment of the Mosaic law was also the great commandment of the\nMaster of Galilee, and in violating it by consenting to betray and\nsacrifice Jesus, Judas assaulted and destroyed in his own soul the\ncardinal principle of the two great religious dispensations of his race.\n\nAnd yet this informer, conspirator, and malefactor was employed by the\nchief priests in effecting the arrest of Jesus. Was not a fundamental\nrule of Mosaic law violated? Will it be urged that the rule operated\nagainst Judas but not against the chief priests? If so, it must be\nremembered that no wicked instrument could be used in promoting Hebrew\njustice. Officers of the law were not permitted to require a citizen to\ndo an act which was forbidden by law. If Jesus was innocent, then the\narrest was illegal. If He was guilty, then Judas, his Apostle and\nfellow-worker, was an accomplice; and no accomplice could be utilized in\nfurtherance of justice, under Hebrew law, either in the matter of arrest\nor in the establishment of guilt as a witness at the trial.\n\nAccording to the Talmud, there was at least one seeming exception to\nthis rule. Renan describes it with peculiar clearness and succinctness.\n\"The procedure,\" he says, \"against the 'corrupter' (mesith), who sought\nto attaint the purity of religion, is explained in the Talmud, with\ndetails, the na\u00efve impudence of which provokes a smile. A judicial\nambush is therein erected into an essential part of the examination of\ncriminals. When a man was accused of being a 'corrupter,' two witnesses\nwere suborned who were concealed behind a partition. It was arranged to\nbring the accused into a contiguous room, where he could be heard by\nthese two witnesses without his perceiving them. Two candles were\nlighted near him, in order that it might be satisfactorily proved that\nthe witnesses 'saw him.' (In criminal matters, eyewitnesses alone were\nadmitted. Mishna, Sanhedrin VI, 5.) He was then made to repeat his\nblasphemy; next urged to retract it. If he persisted, the witnesses who\nhad heard him conducted him to the Tribunal and he was stoned to death.\nThe Talmud adds that this was the manner in which they treated Jesus;\nthat he was condemned on the faith of two witnesses who had been\nsuborned, and that the crime of 'corruption' is, moreover, the only one\nfor which the witnesses are thus prepared.\"[234]\n\nMost Gentile writers ridicule this statement of the Talmud, and maintain\nthat it was a Rabbinic invention of post-Apostolic days, and was\nintended to offer an excuse for the outrageous proceedings against the\nChrist. Sch\u00fcrer dismisses the whole proposition with contempt. Many\nJewish scholars also refuse it the sanction of their authority. But even\nif it was a Talmudic rule of law in force at the time of Christ, its\nconstitutionality, so to speak, might be questioned, in the first place;\nsince it was, in spirit at least, repugnant to and subversive of the\nMosaic provision in Leviticus cited above. It must not be forgotten that\nthe Mosaic Code was the constitution, the fundamental law of Judaism, by\nwhich every Rabbinic interpretation and every legal innovation was to be\ntested.\n\nAgain, such a law would have been no protection to the chief priests and\nto Judas against the operation of this Mosaic injunction. If such a rule\nof procedure could be justified upon any ground, it would require\ndisinterested men acting from honorable motives, in promoting the\nmaintenance of law and order. Officers of the law have sometimes, as\npretended accomplices, acted in concert with criminals in order to\nsecure and furnish evidence against them. But they were officers of the\nlaw, and the courts have held that their evidence was not accomplice\ntestimony requiring corroboration. It is very clear that Judas was not\nsuch a disinterested witness, acting in the interest of public justice.\nHe was a fugitive from the Last Supper of his Master, a talebearer\nwithin the meaning of the provision in Leviticus; and his employment by\nthe Sanhedrin was a violation of a fundamental provision in the Mosaic\nCode.\n\nThe third illegality in the arrest of Jesus was that His capture was not\nthe result of a legal mandate from a court whose intentions were to\nconduct a legal trial for the purpose of reaching a righteous judgment.\n\"This arrest,\" says Rosadi, \"effected in the night between Thursday and\nFriday, the last day of the life of Jesus, on Nisan 14, according to the\nHebrew calendar, was the execution of an illegal and factious resolution\nof the Sanhedrin. There was no idea of apprehending a citizen in order\nto try him upon a charge which after sincere and regular judgment might\nbe found just or unfounded; the intention was simply to seize a man and\ndo away with him. The arrest was not a preventive measure such as might\nlawfully precede trial and condemnation; it was an executive act,\naccomplished in view of a sentence to be pronounced without legal\njustification.\"\n\n\n\n\nPOINT II\n\nTHE PRIVATE EXAMINATION OF JESUS BEFORE ANNAS (OR CAIAPHAS) WAS ILLEGAL\n\n\nLAW\n\n    \"Now the Jewish law prohibited _all proceedings by night_.\"--DUPIN,\n      \"Jesus Devant Ca\u00efphe et Pilate.\"\n\n    \"Be not a sole judge, for there is no sole judge but One.\"--MISHNA,\n      Pirke Aboth IV. 8.\n\n    \"A principle perpetually reproduced in the Hebrew scriptures relates\n      to the two conditions of _publicity_ and liberty. An accused man\n      was never subjected to private or secret examination, lest, in his\n      perplexity, he furnish damaging testimony against\n      himself.\"--SALVADOR, \"Institutions de Mo\u00efse,\" pp. 365, 366.\n\n\nFACT AND ARGUMENT\n\nThe private examination before Annas (or Caiaphas) was illegal for the\nfollowing reasons: (1) The examination was conducted at night in\nviolation of Hebrew law; (2) no judge or magistrate, sitting alone,\ncould interrogate an accused judicially or sit in judgment upon his\nlegal rights; (3) private preliminary examinations of accused persons\nwere not allowed by Hebrew law.\n\nThe general order of events following the arrest in the garden was\nthis: (1) Jesus was first taken to the house of Annas; (2) after a brief\ndelay He was sent by Annas to Caiaphas, the high priest, in whose palace\nthe Sanhedrin, or a part thereof, had already assembled; (3) He was then\nbrought before this body, tried and condemned; (4) He remained, during\nthe rest of the night, in the high priest's palace, exposed to the\ninsults and outrages of His keepers; and was finally and formally\nsentenced to death by the Sanhedrin which reconvened at the break of\nday.\n\nThat Jesus was privately examined before His regular trial by the\nSanhedrin is quite clear. But whether this preliminary examination took\nplace before Annas or Caiaphas is not certainly known. John alone\nrecords the private interrogation of Jesus and he alone refers to Annas\nin a way to connect him with it. This Evangelist mentions that they \"led\nhim away to Annas first.\"[235] Matthew says that after the arrest of\nJesus, they \"led him away to Caiaphas the high priest,\"[236] without\nmentioning the name of Annas. Mark tells us that \"they led Jesus away to\nthe high priest\";[237] but he does not mention either Annas or Caiaphas.\nLuke records that they \"took him, and led him, and brought him into the\nhigh priest's house,\"[238] without telling us the name of the high\npriest.\n\n\"The high priest then asked Jesus of his disciples and of his\ndoctrine.\"[239] This was the beginning of the examination. But who was\nthe examiner--Annas or Caiaphas? At first view we are inclined to\ndeclare that Caiaphas is meant, because he was undoubtedly high priest\nin that year. But Annas is also designated as high priest by Luke in\nseveral places.[240] In Acts iv. 6 he mentions Caiaphas without an\nofficial title, but calls Annas high priest. It is therefore not known\nto whom John refers when he says that the \"high priest asked Jesus of\nhis disciples and of his doctrine.\" For a lengthy discussion of this\npoint, the reader is referred to Andrews's \"Life of Our Lord,\" pp.\n505-510.\n\nBut it is absolutely immaterial, from a legal point of view, whether it\nwas Annas or Caiaphas who examined Jesus, as the proceedings would be\nillegal in either case. For whether it was the one or the other, neither\nhad the right to sit alone as judge; neither had the right to conduct\nany judicial proceeding at night; neither had the right to institute a\nsecret preliminary examination by day or night.\n\nAttention has been called to the matter as involving a question of\nhistorical rather than of legal consequence. A knowledge of the true\nfacts of the case might, however, throw light upon the order and\nconnection of the proceedings which followed the same night. For if the\nprivate examination recorded by John was had before Annas, it was\ndoubtless separated by a certain interval of place and time from the\nlater proceedings before Caiaphas. Then it is reasonable to suppose that\nthe examination of witnesses, the confession and condemnation which took\nplace at the regular trial before the Sanhedrin over which Caiaphas\npresided, happened later in the night, or even toward morning, and\nwere of the nature of a regular public trial. If, on the other hand,\nAnnas sent Jesus without delay to Caiaphas, who examined Him, it is\nreasonable to conclude that witnesses were at once produced, and that\nthe adjuration and condemnation immediately followed. If such were the\ncase, a considerable interval of time must have intervened between these\nproceedings and the meeting of the Sanhedrin which was had in the\nmorning to confirm the judgment which had been pronounced at the night\nsession. But these considerations are really foreign to the question of\nlegal errors involved, which we come now to discuss.\n\n[Illustration: JESUS IN GETHSEMANE (HOFFMAN)]\n\nIn the first place, the private examination of Jesus, whether by Annas\nor Caiaphas, took place at night; and we have learned from Dupin that\n_all proceedings at night in capital cases_ were forbidden.\n\nIn the second place, no judge or magistrate, sitting alone, could\ninterrogate an accused person judicially or sit in judgment upon his\nlegal rights. We have seen in Part II of this volume that the Hebrew\nsystem of courts and judges provided no single magistrates who, sitting\nalone, could adjudicate causes. The lowest Hebrew court consisted of\nthree judges, sometimes called the Court of Three. The next highest\ntribunal was the Minor Sanhedrin of three-and-twenty members. The\nsupreme tribunal of the Jews was the Great Sanhedrin of seventy-one\nmembers. There was no such thing among the ancient Hebrews as a court\nwith a single judge. \"Be not a sole judge, for there is no sole judge\nbut One,\" is one of the most famous aphorisms of the Pirke Aboth. The\nreason of this rule is founded not only in a religious exaction born of\nthe jealousy of Jehovah, but in the principle of publicity which\nprovides for the accused, in the very number of judges, a public\nhearing. The same principle is suggested by the number of witnesses\nrequired by both the Mishna and Mosaic Code for the conviction of a\nprisoner. At least \"two or three witnesses\" were required to appear\npublicly and give testimony against the accused, else a conviction could\nnot follow.\n\nAgain, preliminary examinations of accused persons were not allowed by\nHebrew law. In the American states and in some other countries, a man\nsuspected of crime and against whom an information or complaint has been\nlodged, is frequently taken before an examining magistrate to determine\nwhether he should be discharged, admitted to bail, or sent to prison to\nawait the action of a Grand Jury. At such hearing, the prisoner is\nusually notified that he is at liberty to make a statement regarding the\ncharge against him; that he need not do so unless he desires; but that\nif he does, his testimony may be subsequently used against him at the\nregular trial of the case. But such proceedings, according to Salvador,\nwere forbidden by ancient Hebrew law. The preliminary examination,\ntherefore, by Annas or Caiaphas was illegal. The reason of the rule, as\nabove stated, was to protect the prisoner against furnishing evidence\nthat might be used against him at the regular trial of his case. The\nprivate examination of Jesus illustrates the justice of the rule and the\nnecessity of its existence, for it was undoubtedly the purpose of Annas\nor Caiaphas to gather material in advance to lay before the regularly\nassembled Sanhedrin and thereby expedite the proceedings at the expense\nof justice.\n\nIf it be contended that the leading of Jesus to Annas first, which St.\nJohn alone relates, was merely intended to give the aged Sanhedrist an\nopportunity to see the prisoner who had been causing such commotion in\nthe land for several years; and that there was no examination of Jesus\nbefore Annas--the interrogation by the high priest concerning the\ndisciples and the doctrine of Jesus being construed to refer to an\nexamination by Caiaphas, and being identical with the night trial\nreferred to by Matthew and Mark--reply may be made that, under any\nconstruction of the case, there was at least an illegal appearance\nbefore Annas, as mere vulgar curiosity to see a celebrated prisoner was\nno excuse for the violation of the spirit if not the letter of the law.\nIt is inconceivable, however, to suppose that Annas did not actually\ninterrogate Jesus concerning His disciples, His doctrine, and His\npersonal pretensions. To suppose that he demanded to see Jesus for no\nother reason than to get an impression of His looks, is to insult common\nsense. If Annas examined the prisoner, though only slightly, concerning\nmatters affecting the charges against Him that might endanger His life\nor liberty, he had violated a very important rule of Hebrew criminal\nprocedure. The question of the amount of examination of the accused is\nimmaterial.\n\nIt is not known whether Annas at this time sat in the Great Sanhedrin\nas a judge. He had been deposed from the high priesthood nearly twenty\nyears before by the procurator Valerius Gratus, for imposing and\nexecuting capital sentences. But he was, nevertheless, still\nall-powerful in the great Council of the Jews. Edersheim says that\nthough \"deprived of the Pontificate, he still continued to preside over\nthe Sanhedrin.\"[241] Andrews is of the opinion that \"he did in fact hold\nsome high official position, and this probably in connection with the\nSanhedrin, perhaps as occasional president.\"[242] Basing his criticism\nupon the words in Luke, \"Annas and Caiaphus being the high\npriests,\"[243] Dr. Plummer believes \"that between them they discharged\nthe duties, or that each of them in different senses was regarded high\npriest, Annas _de jure_, and Caiaphas _de facto_.\"[244] This is a mere\nsupposition, however, since there is no historical evidence that Annas\nwas restored to the pontificate after his deposition by Valerius Gratus,\nA.D. 14.[245] The phrase, \"Annas and Caiaphas being high priests,\"\nrefers to the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius C\u00e6sar, which was\nA.D. 26.\n\nAfter all, it is here again an historical more than a legal question,\nwhether Annas was an official or not at the time of the appearance of\nJesus before him. In either case his preliminary examination of the\nChrist was illegal. If he was a member of the Sanhedrin, the law forbade\nhim to hold an informal preliminary examination at night. He certainly\ncould not do this while sitting alone. If he was not a magistrate, as\nDupin very properly contends, this fact only added to the seriousness of\nthe illegality of subjecting a prisoner to the whimsical examination of\na private citizen.\n\nWhether a member of the Sanhedrin or not, Annas was at the time of\nChrist and had been for many years its dominating spirit. He himself had\nbeen high priest. Caiaphas was his son-in-law, and was succeeded in the\nhigh priesthood by four sons of Annas. The writer does not believe that\nAnnas had any legal connection with the Sanhedrin, but, like many\nAmerican political bosses, exercised more authority than the man that\nheld the office. He was simply the political tool of the Roman masters\nof Judea, and the members of the Sanhedrin were simply figureheads under\nhis control.\n\nAgain, the private examination of Jesus was marked by an act of\nbrutality which Hebrew jurisprudence did not tolerate. This was not\nenumerated above as an error, because it was not probably a violation of\nany specific rule of law. But it was an outrage upon the Hebrew sense of\njustice and humanity which in its normal state was very pure and lofty.\n\n\"The high priest then asked Jesus of his disciples and of his doctrine.\nJesus answered him, I spake openly to the world; I ever taught in the\nSynagogue, and in the Temple, whither the Jews always resort; and in\nsecret have I said nothing. Why askest thou me? ask them which heard me,\nwhat I have said unto them: behold, they know what I said.\" In this\nreply Jesus planted Himself squarely upon His legal rights as a Jewish\ncitizen. \"It was in every word the voice of pure Hebrew justice, founded\nupon the broad principle of their judicial procedure and recalling an\nunjust judge to the first duty of his great office.\"\n\n\"And when he had thus spoken, one of the officers which stood by struck\nJesus with the palm of his hand, saying, Answerest thou the high priest\nso?\" Again the Nazarene appealed for protection to the procedure\ndesigned to safeguard the rights of the Hebrew prisoner. \"Jesus answered\nhim, If I have spoken evil, bear witness of the evil: but if well, why\nsmitest thou me?\"[246]\n\nWe have seen that, under Hebrew law, the witnesses were the accusers,\nand their testimony was at once the indictment and the evidence. We have\nalso seen that a Hebrew prisoner could not be compelled to testify\nagainst himself, and that his uncorroborated confession could not be\nmade the basis of a conviction. \"_Why askest thou me? ask them that\nheard me_, what I have said unto them.\" This was equivalent to asking:\nDo you demand that I incriminate myself when our law forbids such a\nthing? Why not call witnesses as the law requires? If I am an evil-doer,\nbear witness of the evil, that is, let witnesses testify to the\nwrongdoing, that I may be legally convicted. If I am not guilty of a\ncrime, why am I thus maltreated?\n\nIs it possible to imagine a more pointed and pathetic appeal for justice\nand for the protection of the law against illegality and brutal\ntreatment? This appeal for the production of legal testimony was not\nwithout its effect. Witnesses were soon forthcoming--not truthful\nwitnesses, indeed--but witnesses nevertheless. And with the coming of\nthese witnesses began the formal trial of the Christ, and a formal\ntrial, under Hebrew law, could be commenced only by witnesses.\n\n\n\n\nPOINT III\n\nTHE INDICTMENT AGAINST JESUS WAS, IN FORM, ILLEGAL\n\n\nLAW\n\n    \"The entire criminal procedure of the Mosaic Code rests upon four\n      rules: _certainty in the indictment_; publicity in the discussion;\n      full freedom granted to the accused; and assurance against all\n      dangers or errors of testimony.\"--SALVADOR, \"Institutions de\n      Mo\u00efse,\" p. 365.\n\n    \"_The Sanhedrin did not and could not originate charges_; it only\n      investigated those brought before it.\"--EDERSHEIM, \"Life and Times\n      of Jesus the Messiah,\" vol. i. p. 309.\n\n    \"_The evidence of the leading witnesses constituted the charge._\n      There was no other charge: no more formal indictment. Until they\n      spoke, and spoke in the public assembly, the prisoner was scarcely\n      an accused man. When they spoke, and the evidence of the two\n      agreed together, it formed the legal charge, libel, or indictment,\n      as well as the evidence for its truth.\"--INNES, \"The Trial of\n      Jesus Christ,\" p. 41.\n\n    \"The only _prosecutors_ known to Talmudic criminal jurisprudence are\n      the witnesses to the crime. Their duty is to bring the matter to\n      the cognizance of the court, and to bear witness against the\n      criminal. In capital cases, they are the legal executioners also.\n      Of an official accuser or prosecutor there is nowhere any trace in\n      the laws of the ancient Hebrews.\"--MENDELSOHN, \"The Criminal\n      Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews,\" p. 110.\n\n\nFACT AND ARGUMENT\n\nThe Gospel records disclose two distinct elements of illegality in the\nindictment against Jesus: (1) The accusation, at the trial, was twofold,\nvague, and indefinite, which Mosaic law forbade; (2) it was made, in\npart, by Caiaphas, the high priest, who was one of the judges of Jesus;\nwhile Hebrew law forbade any but leading witnesses to present the\ncharge.\n\nA thorough understanding of Point III depends upon keeping clearly in\nmind certain well-defined elementary principles of law. In the first\nplace, it should be remembered that in most modern jurisdictions an\nindictment is simply an accusation, carries with it no presumption of\nguilt, and has no evidentiary force. Its only function is to bring the\ncharge against the prisoner before the court and jury, and to notify the\naccused of the nature of the accusation against him. But not so under\nthe ancient Hebrew scheme of justice. Under that system there was no\nsuch body as the modern Grand Jury, and no committee of the Sanhedrin\nexercised similar accusatory functions. The leading witnesses, and they\nalone, presented charges. It follows then, of necessity, that the\nancient Hebrew indictment, unlike the modern indictment, carried with it\na certain presumption of guilt and had certain evidentiary force. This\ncould not be otherwise, since the testimony of the leading witnesses\nwas at once the indictment and the evidence offered to prove it.\n\nAgain, in the very nature of things an indictment should, and under any\nenlightened system of jurisprudence, does clearly advise the accused of\nthe exact nature of the charge against him. Under no other conditions\nwould it be possible for a prisoner to prepare his defense. Most modern\ncodes have sought to promote clearness and certainty in indictments by\nrequiring the charging of only one crime in one indictment, and in\nlanguage so clear and simple that the nature of the offense charged may\nbe easily understood.\n\nNow Salvador says that \"certainty in the indictment\" was one of the\ncardinal rules upon which rested the entire criminal procedure of the\nMosaic Code. Was this rule observed in framing the accusation against\nJesus at the night trial before the Sanhedrin? If so, the Gospel records\ndo not disclose the fact. It is very certain, indeed, that the learned\nof no age of the world since the crucifixion have been able to agree\namong themselves as to the exact nature of the indictment against the\nChrist. This subject was too exhaustively discussed in the beginning of\nthe Brief to warrant lengthy treatment here. Suffice it to say that the\nrecord of the night trial before Caiaphas discloses two distinct\ncharges: the charge of sedition--the threat to destroy a national\ninstitution and to seduce the people from their ancient allegiance, in\nthe matter of the destruction of the Temple; and the charge of blasphemy\npreferred by Caiaphas himself in the adjuration which he administered to\nJesus. When the false witnesses failed to agree, their contradictory\ntestimony was rejected and the charge of sedition was abandoned. And\nbefore Jesus had time to answer the question concerning sedition,\nanother distinct charge, that of blasphemy, was made in almost the same\nbreath.[247] Did this procedure tend to promote \"certainty in the\nindictment\"? Did it not result in the complete destruction of all\nclearness and certainty? Are we not justified in supposing that the\nsilence of Jesus in the presence of His accusers was at least partially\nattributable to His failure to comprehend the exact nature of the\ncharges against Him?\n\nAgain, the accusation was, in part, by Caiaphas, the high priest, who\nwas also one of the judges of Jesus;[248] while Hebrew law forbade any\nbut leading witnesses to present the charge. Edersheim tells us that\n\"the Sanhedrin did not and could not originate charges; it only\ninvestigated those brought before it.\" If the Sanhedrin as a whole could\nnot originate charges, because its members were judges, neither could\nany individual Sanhedrist do so. When the witnesses \"agreed not\ntogether\" in the matter of the charge of sedition, this accusation was\nabandoned. Caiaphas then deliberately assumed the r\u00f4le of accuser, in\nviolation of the law, and charged Jesus, in the form of an adjuration,\nwith blasphemy, in claiming to be \"the Christ, the Son of God.\"\nConfession and condemnation then followed. Only leading witnesses could\nprefer criminal charges under Hebrew law. Caiaphas, being a judge, could\nnot possibly be a witness; and could not, therefore, be an accuser.\nTherefore, the indictment against Jesus was illegally presented.\n\nThe writer believes that the above is a correct interpretation of the\nnature and number of the charges brought against the Christ, and that\nthe legal aspects of the case are as above stated. But candor and\nimpartiality require consideration of another view. Several excellent\nwriters have contended that there were, in fact, not two charges\npreferred against Jesus but only one under different forms. These\nwriters contend that Caiaphas and his colleagues understood that Jesus\nclaimed supernatural power and identity with God when He declared that\nHe was _able_ to destroy the Temple and to build it again in three\ndays,[249] and that the question of the high priest, \"I adjure thee by\nthe living God, that thou tell us whether thou be the Christ, the Son of\nGod,\" flowed naturally from and had direct reference to the charge of\nbeing able to destroy the Temple. The advocates of this view appeal to\nthe language of the original auditors to sustain their contention.\n\"Forty-and-six years was this temple in building, and wilt thou rear it\nagain in three days?\" It is insisted that these words convey the idea\nthat those who heard Jesus understood Him to mean that He had\nsupernatural power. There is certainly much force in the contention but\nit fails to meet other difficulties. In the first place, it is not clear\nthat a threat to destroy the Temple implied a claim to supernatural\npower; in which case there would be no connection between the first\ncharge and that in which it was suggested that Jesus had claimed to be\nthe Christ, the Son of God. In the second place, the contention that the\ntwo charges are substantially the same ignores the language of Mark,\n\"But neither so did their witness agree together,\"[250] which was\ncertainly not injected by the author of the second Gospel as a matter of\nmere caprice or pastime. This language, legally interpreted, means that\nthe testimony of the false witnesses, being contradictory, was thrown\naside, and that the charge concerning the destruction of the Temple was\nabandoned. This is the opinion of Signor Rosadi and is very weighty.\n\nThose writers who maintain that there was only one charge, that of\nblasphemy, under different forms, rely upon the passage in Matthew, \"I\nam _able_ to destroy the temple of God and to build it again in three\ndays,\" and interpret it as a claim to supernatural power in the light of\nthe language used by those who heard it: \"Forty-and-six years was this\ntemple in building, and wilt thou rear it again in three days?\" Those\nwho hold the opposite view, that there were two distinct charges, rely\nupon the passage in Mark, \"I _will_ destroy this temple that is made\nwith hands, and within three days I will build another made without\nhands,\" and interpret it in the light of a similar accusation against\nStephen a few months afterwards: \"For we have heard him say, that this\nJesus of Nazareth _shall destroy this place_, and _shall change the\ncustoms_ which Moses delivered us.\"[251] This second interpretation,\nwhich we believe to be the better, establishes the existence at the\ntrial of Christ of two distinct charges: that of sedition, based upon a\nthreat to assault existing institutions; and that of blasphemy, founded\nupon the claim of equality with God. And, in the light of this\ninterpretation, the illegality in the form of the indictment against\nJesus has been urged.\n\nIf the first construction be the true one, then the error alleged in\nPoint III is not well founded, since the accusation was presented by\nwitnesses, as the law required; unless it could be successfully urged\nthat the witnesses, being _false_ witnesses, were no more competent to\naccuse a prisoner than to convict him upon their false testimony. In\nsuch a case the substance as well as the form of the indictment would be\nworthless, and the whole case would fall, through failure not only of\ncompetent testimony to convict but also of a legal indictment under\nwhich to prosecute.\n\nNeither the Mishna nor the Gemara mentions written indictments among the\nancient Hebrews. \"The Jewish Encyclopedia\" says that accusations were\nprobably in writing, but that it is not certain.[252] A passage in\nSalvador seems to indicate that they were in writing. \"The papers in the\ncase,\" he says, \"were read, and the accusing witnesses were then\ncalled.\" \"The papers\" were probably none other than the indictment. But\nof this we are not sure, and cannot, therefore, predicate the allegation\nof an error upon it. From the whole context of the Scriptures, however,\nwe are led to believe that only oral charges were preferred against\nJesus.\n\n\n\n\nPOINT IV\n\nTHE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SANHEDRIN AGAINST JESUS WERE ILLEGAL BECAUSE THEY\nWERE CONDUCTED AT NIGHT\n\n\nLAW\n\n    \"Let a capital offence be tried during the day, but suspend it at\n      night.\"--MISHNA, Sanhedrin IV. 1.\n\n    \"Criminal cases can be acted upon by the various courts during day\n      time only, by the Lesser Synhedrions from the close of the morning\n      service till noon, and by the Great Synhedrion till\n      evening.\"--MENDELSOHN, \"Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient\n      Hebrews,\" p. 112.\n\n    \"The reason why the trial of a capital offense could not be held at\n      night is because, as oral tradition says, the examination of such\n      a charge is like the diagnosing of a wound--in either case a more\n      thorough and searching examination can be made by\n      daylight.\"--MAIMONIDES, Sanhedrin III.\n\n\nFACT AND ARGUMENT\n\nHEBREW jurisprudence positively forbade the trial of a capital case at\nnight. The infraction of this rule involves the question of\njurisdiction. A court without jurisdiction can pronounce no valid\nverdict or judgment. A court has no jurisdiction if it convenes and\nacts at a time forbidden by law.\n\nOne is naturally disposed to deride the reason assigned by Maimonides\nfor the existence of the law against criminal proceedings at night. But\nit should not be forgotten that in the olden days surgery had no such\naids as are at hand to-day. Modern surgical apparatus had not been\ninvented and electric lights and the Roentgen Rays were unknown. In the\nlight of this explanation of the great Jewish philosopher the curious\ninquirer after the real meaning of things naturally asks why the\nAreopagus of Athens always held its sessions in the night and in the\ndark.[253]\n\nWe have seen that Jesus was arrested in Gethsemane about midnight and\nthat His first ecclesiastical trial took place between two and three\no'clock in the morning.[254] St. Luke tells us that there was a daybreak\nmeeting,[255] which was evidently intended to give a semblance of\nlegality and regularity to that rule of Hebrew law that required two\ntrials of the case.\n\nThe exact time of the beginning of the night session of the Sanhedrin is\nnot known. It is generally supposed that the arrest took place in the\ngarden between midnight and one o'clock. The journey to the house of\nAnnas must have required some little time. Where this house was located\nnobody knows. According to one tradition Annas owned a house on the\nMount of Olives close to the booths or bazaars under the \"Two Cedars.\"\nStapfer believes that Jesus was taken to that place. According to\nanother tradition the house of Annas was located on the \"Hill of Evil\nCounsel.\" Barclay believes that this was the place to which Jesus was\nconducted. But the tradition which is most generally accepted is that\nwhich places the palace of Annas on Mount Zion near the palace of\nCaiaphas. It is believed by many that these two men, who were related,\nAnnas being the father-in-law of Caiaphas, occupied different apartments\nin the same place. But these questions are mere matters of conjecture\nand have no real bearing upon the present discussion, except to show, in\na general way, the length of time probably required to conduct Jesus\nfrom Gethsemane to Annas; from Annas to Caiaphas, if the latter was the\none who privately examined Jesus; and thence to the meeting of the\nSanhedrin. It is reasonable to suppose that at least two hours were thus\nconsumed, which would bring Jesus to the palace of Caiaphas between two\nand three o'clock, if the arrest in the garden took place between twelve\nand one o'clock. But here, again, a difference of one or two hours would\nnot affect the merit of the proposition stated in Point IV. For it is\nbeyond dispute that the first trial before the Sanhedrin was had at\nnight, which was forbidden by law.\n\nThe question has been frequently asked: Why did the Sanhedrin meet at\nnight in violation of law? The answer to this is referable to the\ntreachery of Judas, to the fact that he \"sought opportunity to betray\nhim unto them in the absence of the multitude,\" and to the thought of\nthe Master: \"But this is your hour, and the power of God.\" Luke tells us\nthat the members of the Sanhedrin \"feared the people.\"[256] Mark informs\nus that they had resolved not to attempt the arrest and execution of\nJesus at the time of the Passover, \"lest there be an uproar of the\npeople.\"[257]\n\nJesus had taught daily in the Temple, and had furnished ample\nopportunity for a legal arrest with a view to a legal trial. But His\nenemies did not desire this. \"The chief priests and scribes sought how\nthey might take him by craft, and put him to death.\"[258] The arrival of\nJudas from the scene of the Last Supper with a proposition of immediate\nbetrayal of the Christ was a glad surprise to Caiaphas and his friends.\nImmediate and decisive action was necessary. Not only the arrest but the\ntrial and execution of Jesus must be accomplished with secrecy and\ndispatch. The greatest festival of the Jews had just commenced. Pilgrims\nto the feast were arriving from all parts of the Jewish kingdom. The\nfriends and followers of Jesus were among them. His enemies had\nwitnessed the remarkable demonstration in His honor which marked His\nentrance into Jerusalem only a few days before. It is not strange, then,\nthat they \"feared the people\" in the matter of the summary and illegal\nproceedings which they had resolved to institute against Him. They knew\nthat the daylight trial, under proper legal forms, with the friends of\nJesus as witnesses, would upset their plans by resulting in His\nacquittal. They resolved, therefore, to act at once, even at the expense\nof all forms of justice. And it will be seen that this determination to\narrest and try Jesus at night, in violation of law, became the parent of\nnearly every legal outrage that was committed against Him. The selection\nof the midnight hour for such a purpose resulted not merely in a\ntechnical infraction of law, but rendered it impossible to do justice\neither formally or substantially under rules of Hebrew criminal\nprocedure.\n\n\n\n\nPOINT V\n\nTHE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SANHEDRIN AGAINST JESUS WERE ILLEGAL BECAUSE THE\nCOURT CONVENED BEFORE THE OFFERING OF THE MORNING SACRIFICE\n\n\nLAW\n\n    \"The Sanhedrin sat from the close of the morning sacrifice to the\n      time of the evening sacrifice.\"--TALMUD, Jerus., Sanhedrin I. fol.\n      19.\n\n    \"No session of the court could take place before the offering of the\n      morning sacrifice.\"--MM. L\u00c9MANN, \"Jesus Before the Sanhedrin,\" p.\n      109.\n\n    \"Since the morning sacrifice was offered at the dawn of day, it was\n      hardly possible for the Sanhedrin to assemble until the hour after\n      that time.\"--MISHNA, \"Tamid, or of the Perpetual Sacrifice,\" C.\n      III.\n\n\nFACT AND ARGUMENT\n\nTHE fact that the Sanhedrin convened before the offering of the morning\nsacrifice constitutes the fifth illegality. This error is alleged upon\nthe authority of MM. L\u00e9mann, who, in their admirable little work\nentitled \"Jesus Before the Sanhedrin,\" have called attention to it. It\nis very difficult, however, to determine whether this was a mere\nirregularity, or was what modern jurists would call a material error.\nFrom one point of view it seems to be merely a repetition of the rule\nforbidding the Sanhedrin to meet at night. The morning sacrifice was\noffered at the break of day and lasted about an hour. A session of the\ncourt before the morning sacrifice would, therefore, have been a meeting\nat night, which would have been an infringement of the law. But this was\nprobably not the real reason of the rule. Its true meaning is doubtless\nto be found in the close connection that existed between the Hebrew law\nand the Hebrew religion. The constitution of the Hebrew Commonwealth was\nan emanation of the mind of Jehovah, the Temple in which the court met\nwas His residence on earth, and the judges who formed the Great\nSanhedrin were the administrators of His will. It is most reasonable,\nthen, to suppose that an invocation, in sacrifice and prayer, of His\nguidance and authority would be the first step in any judicial\nproceedings conducted in His name.\n\nIt is historically true that a session of the Sanhedrin in the palmiest\ndays of the Jewish Commonwealth was characterized by all the religious\nsolemnity of a service in the synagogue or the Temple. It is entirely\nprobable, therefore, that the morning sacrifice was made by law an\nindispensable prerequisite to the assembling of the supreme tribunal of\nthe Jews for the transaction of any serious business. On any other\nsupposition the rules of law cited above would have no meaning. We have\nreason to believe, then, that the offering of the morning sacrifice was\na condition precedent to the attachment of jurisdiction, and without\njurisdiction the court had no authority to act. That the morning\nsacrifice was offered each day, whether the court assembled or not, as a\nreligious requirement, does not alter the principle of law above\nenunciated.\n\nBut it may be asked: How do we know that the morning sacrifice was not\noffered? The answer is that the whole context of the Scriptures relating\nto the trial shows that it could not have been offered. Furthermore, a\nsimple and specific reason is that the time prescribed by law for\nconducting the morning service was between the dawn of day and sunrise.\nThen, if the court convened between two and three o'clock in the\nmorning, it is very certain that the sacrifice had not been offered. It\nis true that there was a morning session of the Sanhedrin. But this was\nheld simply to confirm the action of the night session at which Jesus\nhad been condemned. In other words, the real trial was at night and was\nheld before the performance of the religious ceremony, which was, in all\nprobability, a prerequisite to the attachment of jurisdiction.\n\n\n\n\nPOINT VI\n\nTHE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST JESUS WERE ILLEGAL BECAUSE THEY WERE CONDUCTED\nON THE DAY PRECEDING A JEWISH SABBATH; ALSO ON THE FIRST DAY OF THE\nFEAST OF UNLEAVENED BREAD AND THE EVE OF THE PASSOVER\n\n\nLAW\n\n    \"Court must not be held on the Sabbath, or any holy day.\"--\"Betza,\n      or of the Egg,\" Chap. V. No. 2.\n\n    \"They shall not judge on the eve of the Sabbath, nor on that of any\n      festival.\"--MISHNA, Sanhedrin IV. 1.\n\n    \"No court of justice in Israel was permitted to hold sessions on the\n      Sabbath or any of the seven Biblical holidays. In cases of capital\n      crime, no trial could be commenced on Friday or the day previous\n      to any holiday, because it was not lawful either to adjourn such\n      cases longer than over night, or to continue them on the Sabbath\n      or holiday.\"--RABBI WISE, \"Martyrdom of Jesus,\" p. 67.\n\n\nFACT AND ARGUMENT\n\nNO Hebrew court could lawfully meet on a Sabbath or a feast day, or on a\nday preceding a Sabbath or a feast day.\n\nConcerning the Sabbath day provision Maimonides offers the following\nreason for the rule: \"As it is required to execute the criminal\nimmediately after the passing of the sentence, it would sometimes happen\nthat the kindling of a fire would be necessary, as in the case of one\ncondemned to be burned; and this act would be a violation of the law of\nthe Sabbath, for it is written 'Ye shall kindle no fire in your\nhabitations on the Sabbath day.'\"[259] (Exodus xxxv. 3.)\n\nUnder modern practice, sessions of court may be adjourned from day to\nday, or, if need be, from week to week. But under the Hebrew system of\ncriminal procedure the court could not adjourn for a longer time than a\nsingle night. Its proceedings were, so to speak, continuous until final\njudgment. As the law forbade sessions of court on Sabbath and feast\ndays, it became necessary to provide that courts should not convene on\nthe day preceding a Sabbath or a feast day, in order to avoid either an\nillegal adjournment or an infringement of the rule relating to the\nSabbath and feast days.\n\nNow Jesus was tried by the Sanhedrin on both a feast day and a day\npreceding the Sabbath. And, at this point, a clear conception of the\nancient Jewish mode of reckoning time should be had. The Jewish day of\ntwenty-four hours began at one sunset and ended with the next. But this\ninterval was not divided into twenty-four parts or hours of equal and\ninvariable length. Their day proper was an integral part of time and was\nreckoned from sunrise to sunset. Their night proper was likewise a\ndistinct division of time and was measured from sunset to sunrise. An\nhour of time, according to modern reckoning, is invariably sixty\nminutes. But the ancient Jewish hour was not a fixed measure of time. It\nvaried in length as each successive day and night varied in theirs at\ndifferent seasons of the year. Neither did the Jews begin their days and\nnights as we do. Our day of twenty-four hours always begins at midnight.\nTheir day of twenty-four hours always began at one sunset and ended with\nthe next.\n\nNow Jesus was tried by the Sanhedrin on the 14th Nisan, according to the\nJewish calendar; or between the evening of Thursday, April 6th, and the\nafternoon of Friday, April 7th, A.D. 30, according to our calendar. The\n14th Nisan began at sunset on April 6th and lasted until sunset on April\n7th. This was a single Jewish day, and within this time Jesus was tried\nand executed. According to our calendar, the trial and execution of\nJesus took place on Friday, April 7th. This was the day preceding the\nJewish Sabbath, which came on Saturday, according to our reckoning. And\non a day preceding the Sabbath no Jewish court could lawfully convene.\nThis is the first error suggested under Point VI.\n\nAgain, it is beyond dispute that the Feast of Unleavened Bread had begun\nand that the Passover was at hand when Jesus was tried by the\nSanhedrin.[260] This was in violation of a specific provision of Hebrew\nlaw, and constitutes the second error alleged under Point VI.\n\nThere seems to be some conflict among the authorities as to whether\nJesus was tried on the first day of the celebration of the feast of the\nPassover or on the day preceding. But the question is immaterial from a\nlegal point of view, as the law forbade a trial either on a feast day or\non the day preceding, for reasons above stated.\n\nThis violation of the law relating to the Sabbaths and feast days, like\nthat relating to night sessions of the Sanhedrin, resulted in still\nother errors. It is necessary to mention only one of these at this\npoint. The proceedings of the Sanhedrin were recorded by two scribes or\nclerks. Their records were to be used on the second day of the trial in\nreviewing the proceedings of the first. But Hebrew law forbade any\nwriting on a Sabbath or a holy day. How was it possible, then, to keep a\nrecord of the proceedings, if Jesus was tried on a Sabbath and also on a\nfeast day, without violating a rule of law? If no minutes of the meeting\nwere kept, a most glaring irregularity is apparent.\n\n\n\n\nPOINT VII\n\nTHE TRIAL OF JESUS WAS ILLEGAL BECAUSE IT WAS CONCLUDED WITHIN ONE DAY\n\n\nLAW\n\n    \"A criminal case resulting in the acquittal of the accused may\n      terminate the same day on which the trial began. But if a sentence\n      of death is to be pronounced, it can not be concluded before the\n      following day.\"--MISHNA, Sanhedrin IV. 1.\n\n\nFACT AND ARGUMENT\n\nCARE and conservatism, precaution and delay, were the characteristic\nfeatures of the criminal procedure of the ancient Hebrews. The principal\naphorism of the Pirke Aboth is this: \"_Be cautious and slow in\njudgment_, send forth many disciples, and _make a fence around the\nlaw._\"[261] The length and seriousness of their deliberations in\ncriminal proceedings of a capital nature were due to their supreme\nregard for human life. \"Man's life belongs to God, and only according to\nthe law of God may it be disposed of.\" \"Whosoever preserves one worthy\nlife is as meritorious as if he had preserved the world.\" These and\nsimilar maxims guided and controlled Hebrew judges in every capital\ntrial. Their horror of death as the result of a judicial decree is shown\nby the celebrated saying: \"The Sanhedrin which so often as once in seven\nyears condemns a man to death, is a slaughter-house.\"[262]\n\nTo assure due deliberation and reflection in a case where a human life\nwas at stake, Hebrew law required that the trial should last at least\ntwo days, in case of the conviction of the accused. In case of an\nacquittal the trial might terminate within a single day. Before\ncondemnation could be finally decreed a night had to intervene, during\nwhich time the judges could sleep, fast, meditate, and pray. At the\nclose of the first day's trial they left the judgment hall and walked\nhomeward, arm in arm, discussing the merits of the case. At sunset they\nbegan to make calls upon each other, again reviewing among themselves\nthe facts in evidence. They then retired to their homes for further\nmeditation. During the intervening night they abstained from eating\nheavy food and from drinking wine. They carefully avoided doing anything\nthat would incapacitate them for correct thinking. On the following day\nthey returned to the judgment hall and retried the case. The second\ntrial was in the nature of a review and was intended to detect errors,\nif there were any, in the first trial.[263] It was not until the\nafternoon of this day that a final decree could be made and that a\ncapital sentence could follow.\n\nNow the Gospel record very clearly discloses the fact that Jesus was\narrested, tried, and executed within the limits of a single day. Neither\nthe exact hour of His arrest, nor of His trial, nor of His execution is\nknown. But it is positively certain that all took place between sunset,\nthe beginning of Nisan 14, and sunset, the beginning of Nisan 15. This\nwas the interval of a single Jewish day, Nisan 14. And within such an\ninterval of time it was illegal to finally condemn a man to death under\nHebrew law. Even Stapfer, who contends that the trial was legal and that\nforms of law were generally observed, admits this error. He asserts that\nthe precipitate conduct of the members of the Sanhedrin was not only\nopposed to the spirit of Hebrew conservatism in the matter of criminal\nprocedure but was a breach of a specific provision of the criminal\ncode.[264]\n\nIt is true that there were two distinct trials: one between 2 and 3\nA.M., Friday, April 7th, which is recorded by Matthew[265] and\nMark,[266] and a second about daybreak of the same day, recorded by\nMatthew,[267] Mark,[268] and Luke.[269] But both these trials were had\nwithin one day--indeed, within six hours of each other. The judges did\nnot try the case and then retire to their homes for sleep, prayer, and\nmeditation until the following day, as the law required. Even if they\nhad done so, they would not have avoided an illegal procedure, inasmuch\nas the trial had been illegally begun on a feast day and the eve of the\nSabbath, and it would have been impossible to avoid the error alleged in\nPoint VII. For if they had deferred the sentencing and execution of\nJesus until the following day it would still have been illegal, since\nthe next day was both a Sabbath and a holy day (the Passover).\n\nSeveral writers who contend that there was a regular trial of Jesus\nassert that the morning meeting of the Sanhedrin was intended to give a\nsemblance of legality and regularity to that rule of Hebrew law which\nrequired at least two trials. But it will readily be seen that this was\na subterfuge and evasion, since both trials were had on the same day,\nwhereas the law required them to be held on different days.\n\n\n\n\nPOINT VIII\n\nTHE SENTENCE OF CONDEMNATION PRONOUNCED AGAINST JESUS BY THE SANHEDRIN\nWAS ILLEGAL BECAUSE IT WAS FOUNDED UPON HIS UNCORROBORATED CONFESSION\n\n\nLAW\n\n    \"We have it as a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that no\n      one can bring an accusation against himself. Should a man make\n      confession of guilt before a legally constituted tribunal, such\n      confession is not to be used against him unless properly attested\n      by two other witnesses.\"--MAIMONIDES, Sanhedrin IV. 2.\n\n    \"Not only is self-condemnation never extorted from the defendant by\n      means of torture, but no attempt is ever made to lead him on to\n      self-incrimination. Moreover, a voluntary confession on his part\n      is not admitted in evidence, and therefore not competent to\n      convict him, unless a legal number of witnesses minutely\n      corroborate his self-accusation.\"--MENDELSOHN, \"Criminal\n      Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews,\" p. 133.\n\n\nFACT AND ARGUMENT\n\nMORE than one system of jurisprudence has refused to permit a conviction\nfor crime to rest upon an uncorroborated confession. But it remained for\nthe ancient Hebrews to discover the peculiar reason for the rule, that\nthe witness who confessed was \"his own relative\"; and relatives were not\ncompetent witnesses under Hebrew law. Modern Jewish writers, however,\nhave assigned other reasons for the rule. Rabbi Wise says:\n\"Self-accusation in cases of capital crime was worthless. For if not\nguilty he accuses himself of a falsehood; if guilty he is a wicked man,\nand no wicked man, according to Hebrew law, is permitted to testify,\nespecially not in penal cases.\"[270] Mendelsohn says that \"the reason\nassigned for this enactment is the wish to avoid the possibility of\npermitting judicial homicide on self-accusing lunatics, or on persons\nwho, in desperation, wish to cut short their earthly existence, and to\neffect this falsely accuse themselves of some capital crime.\"[271]\n\nModern jurists have assigned still other reasons for the rule as it has\nexisted in modern law.[272] Men have been known to confess that they\nwere guilty of one crime to avoid punishment for another. Morbid and\nvulgar sentimentality, such as love of newspaper notoriety, have induced\npersons of inferior intelligence, who were innocent, to assume\nresponsibility for criminal acts.\n\nBut whatever the reason of the rule, Jesus was condemned to death upon\nHis uncorroborated confession, in violation of Hebrew law.\n\n\"For many bare false witness against him, but their witness agreed not\ntogether. And there arose certain, and bare false witness against him,\nsaying, We heard him say, I will destroy this temple that is made with\nhands, and within three days I will build another made without hands.\nBut neither so did their witness agree together. And the high priest\nstood up in the midst, and asked Jesus, saying, Answerest thou nothing?\nwhat is it which these witness against thee? But he held his peace, and\nanswered nothing. Again the high priest asked him, and said unto him,\nArt thou the Christ, the Son of the Blessed? And Jesus said, I am: and\nye shall see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of power, and\ncoming in the clouds of Heaven. Then the high priest rent his clothes,\nand saith, What need we any further witnesses? ye have heard the\nblasphemy: what think ye? And they all condemned him to be guilty of\ndeath. And some began to spit on him, and to cover his face, and to\nbuffet him, and to say unto him, Prophesy.\"[273]\n\nIt will be seen from a perusal of this report of the trial that it was\nsought to condemn Jesus first on the charge of sedition, that is, that\nHe had threatened the destruction of the Temple and thereby endeavored\nto seduce the people from their national allegiance. \"But their witness\nagreed not together\"; and under Hebrew law they were required to reject\ncontradictory testimony and discharge the prisoner, if the state was\nunable to prove its case. This is what should have been done at this\npoint in the trial of Jesus. But, instead, the judges, in their total\ndisregard at law, turned to the accused and said: \"Answerest thou\nnothing? what is it which these witness against thee?\" \"But he held his\npeace, and answered nothing.\" By remaining silent, Jesus only exercised\nthe ordinary privilege of a Jewish prisoner to refuse to incriminate\nhimself. The modern rule that the accused cannot be made to testify\nagainst himself, unless he first voluntarily takes the witness stand in\nhis own behalf, was substantially true among the ancient Hebrews. But\nhere we find Caiaphas insisting that Jesus incriminate Himself. And he\ncontinues to insist in the matter of the second charge, that of\nblasphemy. \"And the high priest asked him, and said unto him, Art thou\nthe Christ, the Son of the Blessed?\" That question was illegal, because\nit involved an irregular mode of criminal procedure, and because it\nasked for a confession of guilt to be made the basis of a conviction.\nThe false witnesses had failed to agree and had evidently been rejected\nand dismissed. The judges were then without witnesses to formulate a\ncharge and furnish proof of its truth. They were thus forced to the\ndespicable and illegal method of asking the accused to condemn Himself,\nwhen they knew that no confession could be made the basis of a\nconviction. They were also guilty of the illegality of formulating a\ncharge without witnesses. We have seen that only leading witnesses could\npresent an indictment, but here the judges became the accusers, in\nviolation of law.\n\nIn answer to the high priest's question, Jesus, feeling that He could\nnot afford at such an hour and in such a place to longer conceal His\nMessiahship, answered boldly and emphatically: \"I am.\"[274] \"And they\nall condemned him to be guilty of death.\" It will thus be seen that upon\nHis own confession and not upon the testimony of at least two competent\nwitnesses agreeing in all essential details, as the law required, was\nthe Nazarene condemned to death.\n\nIf it be argued, as it has been, that the two charges of threatening to\ndestroy the Temple and of pretending to be the \"Christ, the Son of God,\"\nwere in fact but different phases of the same charge of blasphemy, and\nthat the two witnesses were the corroborators of the confession of\nJesus, then reply must be made that the witnesses were not competent,\nbeing false witnesses, nor was their testimony legally corroborated,\nbecause it was false and contradictory.\n\nAgain, it was the rule of Hebrew law that both witnesses had to testify\nto all the essential elements of a complete crime. One could not furnish\none link, and another another link, in order to construct a chain of\nevidence. Each had to testify to all the essential elements necessary to\nconstitute the legal definition of a crime. But the false witnesses did\nnot do this. Under any view of the case, then, the testimony of these\nwitnesses was wholly worthless, and the confession of Jesus was the\nsolitary and illegal basis of His conviction.\n\nThe failure of the Sanhedrin to secure sufficient and competent evidence\nto convict Jesus must not be regarded as accidental, or as attributable\nto the hour and to the surroundings. The popularity of the Nazarene,\noutside the narrow circle of the Temple authorities, was immense. The\nfriendship of Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea is proof that He had\nstanding even in the Sanhedrin itself. It was therefore difficult to\nfind witnesses who were willing to testify against Him. Besides, the\nacts of His ministry, while in no sense cowardly or hypocritical, had\nbeen, in general, very cautious and diplomatic. He seems to have\nretired, at times, into the desert or the wilderness to avoid\ndisagreeable and even dangerous complications with the civil and\necclesiastical authorities.[275] Jesus was in no sense a politician, but\nHe was not lacking in mother wit and practical resources. He saw through\nthe designs of Herod Antipas, who wished to get Him out of his\ndominions. It will be remembered that certain Pharisees, pretending\nfriendship for Him, warned Him to flee from Galilee to avoid being\nkilled by Herod. The courage and manliness of Jesus are shown by the\nfact that He remained in His native province, and even sent a\ncontemptuous message to the Tetrarch, whom He styled \"that fox.\"[276]\n\nAt other times, Christ was compelled to defend Himself against the swarm\nof spies that hovered over His pathway through Samaria, along the\nJordan, and around the Sea of Galilee. In His discussions with His\nenemies who sought to entrap Him, He displayed consummate skill in\ndebate. His pithy sayings and incomparable illustrations usually left\nHis questioners defenseless and chagrined. Oftentimes in these\nencounters He proclaimed eternal and universal truths which other\nnations and later ages were to develop and enjoy. When, holding in His\nhand a penny with C\u00e6sar's image upon it, He said, \"Render therefore unto\nC\u00e6sar the things which are C\u00e6sar's, and unto God the things that are\nGod's,\" he foretold and stamped with approval the immortal principle\nthat was to be embodied in the American constitution and to remain the\ncornerstone of the American Commonwealth; a truth repeated by Roger\nWilliams when in the forests of Rhode Island he declared that the\nmagistrate should rule in civil matters only and that man was answerable\nfor his religious faith to God alone. This declaration of the Nazarene\nis the spiritual and intellectual basis of the sublime doctrine of civil\nliberty and religious freedom that finds its highest expression in that\nseparation of the Church and State which enables men of different creeds\nand different parties to live side by side as patriots and religionists\nand as comrades, though antagonists.\n\nThe replies of Jesus to those who came to \"entangle him in his talk\"\nusually left them disconcerted and defeated, and little disposed to\nrenew their attacks upon Him.[277] The efforts of the Pharisees to\nentrap Him seem to have resulted in failure everywhere and at all times.\nAnd at the trial the Sanhedrin found itself in possession of a prisoner\nbut with no competent evidence to establish His guilt. It was least of\nall prepared to convict Him of the crime of blasphemy as founded upon\nthe claim of Messiahship, for Jesus had been exceedingly cautious,\nduring His ministry, in declaring Himself to be the Messiah. Except in\nthe presence of the woman of Samaria, who came to draw water from the\nwell, there is no recorded instance of an avowal of His Messiahship\noutside the immediate circle of the disciples.[278] He forbade the\ndevils whom He had cast out, and that recognized Him, to proclaim His\nMessiahship.[279] When the Jews said to Him, \"How long dost thou make us\ndoubt? if thou be the Christ, tell us plainly,\" Jesus simply referred\nthem to His works, and made no further answer that could be used as\ntestimony against Him.[280] He revealed Himself to His followers as the\nMessiah, and permitted them to confess Him as such, but forbade them to\nmake the matter public. \"Then charged he his disciples that they should\ntell no man that he was Jesus, the Christ.\"[281]\n\nIt will thus be seen that probably no two witnesses who were legally\ncompetent to testify could have been secured to condemn Jesus upon the\ncharge preferred at the trial. In their desperation, then, the members\nof the Sanhedrin were compelled to employ false testimony and a\nconfession which was equally illegal.\n\n\n\n\nPOINT IX\n\nTHE CONDEMNATION OF JESUS WAS ILLEGAL BECAUSE THE VERDICT OF THE\nSANHEDRIN WAS UNANIMOUS\n\n\nLAW\n\n    \"A simultaneous and unanimous verdict of guilt rendered on the day\n      of the trial has the effect of an acquittal.\"--MENDELSOHN,\n      \"Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews,\" p. 141.\n\n    \"If none of the judges defend the culprit, i.e., all pronounce him\n      guilty, having no defender in the court, the verdict of guilty was\n      invalid and the sentence of death could not be executed.\"--RABBI\n      WISE, \"Martyrdom of Jesus,\" p. 74.\n\n\nFACT AND ARGUMENT\n\nFEW stranger rules can be found in the jurisprudence of the world than\nthat provision of Hebrew law which forbade a conviction to rest upon the\nunanimous vote of the judges. A comparison instantaneously and almost\ninevitably arises in the mind between the Saxon and Hebrew requirement\nin the matter of unanimity in the verdict. The finest form of mind of\nantiquity, with the possible exception of the Greek and Roman, was the\nHebrew. One of the finest types of intellect of the modern world is that\nof the Anglo-Saxon. The Hebrew organized the Sanhedrin, and, under God,\nendowed it with judicial and spiritual attributes. The Anglo-Saxon, on\nthe shores of the German Ocean, originated the modern jury and invested\nit with its distinctive legal traits. With the Anglo-Saxon jury a\nunanimous verdict is necessary to convict, but with the Hebrew Sanhedrin\nunanimity was fatal, and resulted in an acquittal. A great modern\nwriter[282] has declared that law is the perfection of reason. But when\nwe contemplate the differences in Hebrew and Saxon laws we are inclined\nto ask, in seeking the degree of perfection, whose law and whose reason?\n\nBut, after all, the Jewish rule is not so unreasonable as it first\nappears, when we come to consider the reason of its origin. In the first\nplace, as we have seen in Part II, there were no lawyers or advocates,\nin the modern sense, among the ancient Hebrews. The judges were his\ndefenders. Now if the verdict was unanimous in favor of condemnation it\nwas evident that the prisoner had had no friend or defender in court. To\nthe Jewish mind this was almost equivalent to mob violence. It argued\nconspiracy, at least. The element of mercy, which was required to enter\ninto every Hebrew verdict, was absent in such a case.\n\nAgain, this rule of unanimity was only another form or statement of the\nrequirement that the court defer final action, in case of conviction, to\nthe next day in order that time for deliberation and reflection might\nintervene. In other words, Hebrew law forbade precipitancy in capital\nproceedings. And what could be more precipitate than an instantaneous\nand unanimous verdict? \"But where all suddenly agree on conviction, does\nit not seem,\" asks a modern Jewish writer, \"that the convict is a victim\nof conspiracy and that the verdict is not the result of sober reason and\ncalm deliberation?\"\n\nBut how did they convict under Hebrew law? By a majority vote of at\nleast two. A majority of one would acquit. A majority of two, or any\nmajority less than unanimity, would convict.[283] If the accused had one\nfriend in court, the verdict of condemnation would stand, since the\nelement of mercy was present and the spirit of conspiracy or mob\nviolence was absent. Seventy-one constituted the membership of the Great\nSanhedrin. If all the members were present and voted, at least\nthirty-seven were required to convict. Thirty-six would acquit. If a\nbare quorum, twenty-three members, was present, at least thirteen were\nrequired to convict. Twelve would acquit.\n\nThis rule seems ridiculous and absurd, when viewed in the light of a\nbrutal and undeniable crime. If the facts constituting such a crime had\nbeen proved against a Jewish prisoner beyond any possibility of doubt,\nif such facts were apparent to everybody, still it seems that the rule\nabove stated required that the defendant have at least one advocate and\none vote among the judges; else, the verdict was invalid and could not\nstand. Such a procedure could be justified on no other ground than that\nexceptional cases should not be permitted to destroy a rule of action\nthat in its general operation had been found to be both generous and\njust.\n\nNow the condemnation of Jesus was illegal because the verdict of the\nSanhedrin was unanimous. We learn this from Mark, who says: \"Then the\nhigh priest rent his clothes and saith, What need we any further\nwitnesses? ye have heard the blasphemy: what think ye? And they _all_\ncondemned him to be guilty of death.\"[284] If they _all_ condemned Him,\nthe verdict was unanimous and therefore illegal. The other Evangelists\ndo not tell us that the verdict was unanimous; neither do they deny it.\nMark's testimony stands alone and uncontradicted; therefore we must\nassume that it is true.\n\nRabbi Wise[285] and Signor Rosadi[286] call attention to the fact that\nthe verdict was unanimous. The former seeks to ridicule Mark as an\nauthority because a unanimous verdict was illegal under Hebrew law, and\nthe distinguished Hebrew writer does not conceive that Hebrew judges\ncould have made such a mistake. Such argument, reduced to ultimate\nanalysis, means, according to Rabbi Wise, that there were certain rules\nof Hebrew law that could not be and were never violated.\n\nIn this connection, it has been frequently asked: Was the entire\nSanhedrin present at the night trial of Jesus? Were Nicodemus and Joseph\nof Arimathea present? If they were present, did they vote against Jesus?\nThese questions can be answered only in the light of the authorities.\nOnly two of the Gospel writers, Matthew and Mark, tell us of the night\ntrial. Both declare that \"all the council\" were present.[287] The\n\"council\" (concilium) is the Vulgate, the Latin New Testament\ndesignation of the Great Sanhedrin. Then, if all the \"council\" were\npresent, the Great Sanhedrin were all present.\n\n[Illustration: THE BETRAYING KISS (SCHEFFER)]\n\nConcerning the number of judges at the second or daybreak meeting of the\nSanhedrin, both Matthew and Mark again declare that the full membership\nwas present. Matthew says: \"When the morning was come, _all_ the chief\npriests and elders of the people took counsel against Jesus to put him\nto death.\"[288] Mark says: \"And straightway in the morning the chief\npriests held a consultation with the elders and scribes and the _whole\ncouncil_, and bound Jesus, and carried him away, and delivered him to\nPilate.\"[289] It should be remembered that neither Luke nor John\ncontradicts even remotely the statements of Matthew and Mark concerning\nthe full attendance of the members of the Sanhedrin at either the night\nor morning trial. The first and second Gospel writers therefore\ncorroborate each other, and the presumption of the law is that each told\nthe truth.\n\nAnd yet most commentators and writers seem to be of the opinion that all\nthe members of the Sanhedrin were not present at the night trial of\nJesus. They insist that both Matthew and Mark were employing a figure of\nspeech, synecdoche, when they said that \"all the council\" were present.\nBut these same writers seem to think that these same Evangelists were in\nearnest and speaking literally when they declared that \"_all_ the chief\npriests and elders\" and the \"_whole_ council\" were present at the\nmorning trial. We shall not attempt to settle the question but will\nleave it to the reader to draw his own inferences. Suffice it to say\nthat as far as the rule stated in connection with Point IX is concerned,\nit was immaterial whether the full council was present at either\nmeeting. The rule against unanimity applied to a bare quorum or to any\nnumber less than the full Sanhedrin. It was the unanimity itself, of\nhowever few members, that carried with it the spirit and suggestion of\nmob violence and conspiracy against which Hebrew law protested.\n\nThe question of the number of members that were present at the different\nmeetings of the Sanhedrin has been discussed in the light of history,\nand as bearing upon the conduct of Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea,\nwho were friends of Jesus. Nicodemus was certainly a member of the Great\nSanhedrin. This we learn from two passages of New Testament\nscripture.[290] It is also believed that Joseph of Arimathea was a\nmember from a mere suggestion in another passage.[291] Did these friends\nof the Christ vote against Him? If they were members of the court; if\nMatthew and Mark wrote literally when they said that \"all the council\"\nwere present; and if Mark wrote literally and truthfully when he said\nthat \"they _all_ condemned him to be guilty of death\"; then it naturally\nand inevitably follows that both Nicodemus and Joseph voted against\nJesus.\n\n[Illustration: THE ARREST OF JESUS (HOFFMAN)]\n\nA number of arguments have been offered against this contention. In the\nfirst place, it is said that at a previous meeting of the Sanhedrin\nNicodemus defended Jesus by asking his fellow-judges this question:\n\"Doth our law judge any man before it hear him and know what he\ndoeth?\"[292] It is asserted that there is no good reason to believe that\nNicodemus defended Jesus at this meeting and turned against Him at a\nsubsequent one, that there is a presumption of a continuance of\nfidelity. But is this good reasoning? Did not Peter cut off the ear of\nthe high priest's servant, Malchus, in defense of Jesus at midnight, in\nthe garden, and then within three hours afterwards deny that he knew\nJesus? There is no good reason to believe that Nicodemus was braver or\nmore constant than Peter, for the former seems to have been either\nashamed or afraid to express his affection for the Master during the\ndaytime, but preferred to do it at night.[293]\n\nConcerning the part taken by Nicodemus in the final proceedings, Rosadi\nsays: \"The verdict was unanimous. The members of the Sanhedrin who were\nsecretly favorable to the Accused were either absent or else they voted\nagainst him. Nicodemus was amongst the absentees, or amongst those that\nvoted against him. At all events, he did not raise his voice against the\npronouncement expressed by acclamation.\"\n\nIf Joseph of Arimathea was a member of the Great Sanhedrin, it seems\nthat he \"had not consented to the counsel and the deed of them.\"[294]\nBut it is impossible to tell certainly to which one of the three\nmeetings of the Sanhedrin, held within the six months preceding the\ncrucifixion, this language refers. The defense of Jesus offered by\nNicodemus was certainly not at the final meeting which condemned Jesus.\nIt may be that the reference to the protest of Joseph of Arimathea also\nreferred to a prior meeting. Its connection in Luke seems to make it\nrefer to the last trial, but this is not certain. Neither is it certain\nthat Joseph was a member of the Great Sanhedrin, and his failure to\nconsent, if he were not a member, would not disturb the contention made\nin Point IX of the Brief. Even if he were a member, his failure to\nconsent would not destroy the contention, since ancient Hebrew judges,\nlike modern American jurors, could have first protested against their\naction and then have voted with them. The polling of the jury, under\nmodern law, has reference, among other things, to this state of affairs.\n\nBut we may admit that both Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea, as well as\nmany others, were absent, as Rosadi suggests, and still contend that the\nverdict against Jesus was illegal because it was unanimous, as Mark\nassures us, since the number of judges present was immaterial, provided\nthere was a quorum of at least twenty-three and their verdict was\nunanimous against the accused. According to the second Gospel writer,\nthere seems to be no doubt that this was the case in the judgment\npronounced against Jesus.\n\n\n\n\nPOINT X\n\nTHE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST JESUS WERE ILLEGAL IN THAT: (1) THE SENTENCE OF\nCONDEMNATION WAS PRONOUNCED IN A PLACE FORBIDDEN BY LAW; (2) THE HIGH\nPRIEST RENT HIS CLOTHES; (3) THE BALLOTING WAS IRREGULAR\n\n\nLAW\n\n    \"After leaving the hall Gazith no sentence of death can be passed\n      upon anyone soever.\"--TALMUD, Bab., Abodah Zarah, or of Idolatry,\n      Chap. I. fol. 8.\n\n    \"A sentence of death can be pronounced only so long as the Sanhedrin\n      holds its sessions in the appointed place.\"--MAIMONIDES, Sanhedrin\n      XIV.\n\n    \"And he that is the high priest among his brethren, upon whose head\n      the anointing oil was poured, and that is consecrated to put on\n      the garments, shall not uncover his head, nor rend his\n      clothes.\"--LEVITICUS xxi. 10.\n\n    \"And Moses said unto Aaron, and unto Eleazar, and unto Ithamar, his\n      sons, Uncover not your heads, neither rend your clothes; lest ye\n      die, and lest wrath come upon all the people.\"--LEVITICUS x. 6.\n\n    \"Let the judges each in his turn absolve or condemn.\"--MISHNA,\n      Sanhedrin XV. 5.\n\n    \"The members of the Sanhedrin were seated in the form of a\n      semicircle at the extremity of which a secretary was placed, whose\n      business it was to record the votes. One of these secretaries\n      recorded the votes in favor of the accused, the other those\n      against him.\"--MISHNA, Sanhedrin IV. 3.\n\n    \"In ordinary cases the judges voted according to seniority, the\n      oldest commencing; in a capital trial, the reverse order was\n      followed. That the younger members of the Sanhedrin should not be\n      influenced by the views or arguments of their more mature, more\n      experienced colleagues, the junior judge was in these cases always\n      the first to pronounce for or against a conviction.\"--BENNY,\n      \"Criminal Code of the Jews,\" pp. 73, 74.\n\n\nFACT AND ARGUMENT\n\nIN the trial of capital cases, the Great Sanhedrin was required to meet\nin an apartment of the National Temple at Jerusalem, known as the Hall\nof Hewn Stones (Lishkhath haggazith). Outside of this hall no capital\ntrial could be conducted and no capital sentence could be\npronounced.[295] This place was selected in obedience to Mosaic\ninjunction: \"Thou shalt do according to the tenor of the sentence, which\nthey may point out to thee _from the place which the Lord shall\nchoose_.\"[296] The Rabbis argued that the Great Council could not try a\ncapital case or pronounce a death sentence, unless it met and remained\nin the place chosen by God, which, they contended, should be an\napartment of the Great Temple. The Lishkhath haggazith was chosen, and\ncontinued for many years to be the meeting place of the supreme\ntribunal.\n\nBut Jesus was not tried or condemned to death in the Hall of Hewn\nStones, as Hebrew law required. It is clearly evident, from the Gospels,\nthat He was tried and sentenced in the palace of Caiaphas, probably on\nMount Zion. It is contended by the Jews, however, that soon after the\nRoman conquest of Judea the Great Sanhedrin removed from the sacred\nplace to Bethany, and from there to other places, as occasion required.\nAnd there is a Jewish tradition that the court returned to the\naccustomed place on the occasion of the trial and condemnation of\nJesus.[297]\n\nIn opposition to this, Edersheim says: \"There is truly not a tittle of\nevidence for the assumption of commentators that Christ was led from the\npalace of Caiaphas into the Council Chamber (Lishkhath haggazith). The\nwhole proceedings took place in the former, and from it Christ was\nbrought to Pilate.\"[298] St. John emphatically declares: \"Then led they\nJesus from Caiaphas into the hall of judgment.\"[299] This Hall of\nJudgment was the Pr\u00e6torium of Pilate.\n\nThe first irregularity, then, noted under Point X is that Jesus was\ntried and condemned in the palace of Caiaphas instead of the Hall of\nHewn Stones, the regular legal meeting place of the Great Sanhedrin.\n\nThe second error noted under Point X is that which relates to the\nrending of garments by the high priest. \"An ordinary Israelite could, as\nan emblem of bereavement, tear his garments, but to the high priest it\nwas forbidden, because his vestments, being made after the express\norders of God, were figurative of his office.\"[300]\n\nWhen Jesus confessed that He was Christ the Son of God, Caiaphas seems\nto have lost his balance and to have committed errors with all the\nrapidity of speech. \"Then the high priest rent his clothes, and saith,\nWhat need we any further witnesses? ye have heard the blasphemy: what\nthink ye? And they all condemned him to be guilty of death.\"[301] In\nthis language and conduct of the son-in-law of Annas there were several\nirregularities in procedure. The first was the rending of garments\nreported by Matthew and Mark, which act was forbidden by the provisions\nof the Mosaic Code, recorded in Leviticus and cited above.\n\nBut it is only fair to state the dissenting opinion on this point. In\nthe times of Christ it seems to have been the custom among the Jews to\nrend the garments as a sign of horror and execration, whenever\nblasphemous language was heard. Edersheim states the rule: \"They all\nheard it--and, as the law directed, when blasphemy was spoken, the high\npriest rent both his outer and inner garment, with a rent that might\nnever be repaired.\"[302] The law here referred to, however, is the\nRabbinic or Talmudic and not the Mosaic law. It should be remembered\nthat the Mosaic Code was the constitution or fundamental law of the\nancient Hebrews. The Talmudic law embodied in the Mishna was, in a\nsense, a mere commentary upon the Mosaic law. We have seen in Chapter I\nof Part II of this volume that the traditional law was based upon,\nderived from, and inspired by the written law contained in the\nPentateuch. It is true that the Talmud, while professing subordination\nto the Pentateuch, finally virtually superseded it as an administrative\ncode. But the doctors never repealed a Mosaic injunction, since it was\nan emanation of the mind of Jehovah and could not be abrogated by human\nintelligence. When an ancient ordinance ceased to be of practical value\nthe Jewish legists simply declared that it had fallen into desuetude.\nAnd whenever a new law was proclaimed to meet an emergency in the life\nof the Hebrew people the Rabbins declared that it was derived from and\ninspired by some decree which God had handed down to Moses for the\nbenefit of the nation. In other words, the Mosaic Code was Israel's\ndivine constitution which was to serve as a standard for all future\nlegislation. And as the Jewish lawmakers were not permitted to repeal a\nMosaic ordinance, neither were they allowed to establish a rule in\ncontravention of it. Now the Pentateuch forbade the rending of garments.\nThen did the Talmudists have a right to declare that the law might be\nchanged or broken in the case of blasphemy? That they did is denied by\nmany writers.\n\nBut admitting the validity of the Talmudic rule, it is nevertheless\nbeyond dispute that the high priest was forbidden to rend his clothes on\nSabbaths and holidays. And as Jesus was condemned on both a Sabbath and\na festival day, the high priest's action in rending his clothes on that\nday was illegal.[303]\n\nAgain, the proceedings against Jesus were illegal because the balloting\nwas irregular. This is the third error noted under Point X.\n\nThe Hebrew law required that each judge, when his time came to vote upon\nthe guilt or innocence of the accused, should rise in his place, declare\nhis vote, and state his reasons for so voting. In capital cases the\nyoungest judge was required to vote first, in order that he might not be\nunduly influenced by the example of his seniors in age and authority.\nThe balloting continued in this manner from the youngest member to the\nhigh priest, who was generally among the oldest. Two scribes--according\nto some writers, three--were present to record the votes and to note the\nreasons stated. These records were to be used on the second day of the\ntrial in comparing the arguments of the judges on that day with those\noffered on the first day. Judges who had voted for acquittal on the\nfirst day could not change their votes on the second day. Those who had\nvoted for conviction on the first day might change their votes on the\nsecond day, by assigning good reasons. Those who had voted for\nconviction on the first day could not vote for conviction on the second\nday, if the reasons assigned on the second day were radically different\nfrom those assigned on the first day.[304] It will thus be seen how very\nessential were the records of the scribes and how important it was that\nthey should be correctly kept. Hence the necessity, according to Benny,\nof a third scribe whose notes might be used to correct any discrepancies\nin the reports of the other two.\n\nNow are we justified in assuming that this was the method employed in\ncounting votes at the trial of Jesus? The law will not permit us to\npresume errors. We must rather assume that this was the method employed,\nunless the Gospel record indicates, either by plain statement or by\nreasonable construction, that it was not the method used.\n\nIn this connection, let us review the language of the Scriptures. \"Ye\nhave heard the blasphemy: what think ye? And they all condemned him to\nbe guilty of death.\" Is it not clearly evident, from this passage, that\nthe balloting was not done singly, the youngest voting first, as Hebrew\nlaw required? Can it not be seen at a glance that the judges voted _en\nmasse_? If they did, was it possible for the scribes to record the votes\nand make a note of the reasons assigned, as the law required? If these\nthings were not done, were the proceedings regular?\n\nAccording to Matthew, Caiaphas, before calling for the votes exclaimed:\n\"He hath spoken blasphemy.\"[305] Instead of doing this should he not,\nunder the law, have carefully concealed his opinion until the younger\nmembers of the court had voted? Is it not a matter of history that the\nopinion of the high priest was regarded as almost infallible authority\namong the ancient Hebrews? Did not this premature declaration of guilt\non the part of the high priest rob the subordinate judges of freedom of\nsuffrage?\n\nThe conduct of the case at the close, when the balloting took place,\nseems to justify the view of those writers who assert that there was no\nregular trial of Jesus, but rather the action of a mob.\n\n\n\n\nPOINT XI\n\nTHE MEMBERS OF THE GREAT SANHEDRIN WERE LEGALLY DISQUALIFIED TO TRY\nJESUS\n\n\nLAW\n\n    \"The robe of the unfairly elected judge is to be respected not more\n      than the blanket of the ass.\"--MENDELSOHN, \"Hebrew Maxims and\n      Rules,\" p. 182.\n\n    \"As Moses sat in judgment without the expectation of material\n      reward, so also must every judge act from a sense of duty\n      only.\"--MENDELSOHN, \"Hebrew Maxims and Rules,\" p. 177.\n\n    \"Nor must there be on the judicial bench either a relation, or a\n      particular friend, or an enemy of either the accused or of the\n      accuser.\"--MENDELSOHN, \"Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient\n      Hebrews,\" p. 108.\n\n    \"He (the Hebrew judge) was, in the first instance, to be modest, of\n      good repute among his neighbors, and generally liked.\"--BENNY,\n      \"Criminal Code of the Jews,\" p. 38.\n\n    \"Nor under any circumstances, was a man known to be _at enmity with\n      the accused person_ permitted to occupy a position among his\n      judges.\"--BENNY, \"Criminal Code of the Jews,\" p. 37.\n\n\nFACT AND ARGUMENT\n\nTHE Gospel records disclose the fact that the members of the Great\nSanhedrin were legally disqualified to try Jesus. This disqualification\nwas of two kinds: (1) A general disqualification, under Hebrew law, to\nact as judges in any case; (2) a special disqualification to sit in\njudgment upon the life of Jesus.\n\nAmong all the great systems of jurisprudence of the world the ancient\nHebrew system was the most exacting in the matter of judicial fitness.\nIn the palmiest days of the Hebrew Commonwealth the members of the Great\nSanhedrin represented the most perfect mental, moral, and physical\ndevelopment of the Hebrew people. A man could not be a member of this\ncourt who had any serious mental, moral, or physical defect. He must\nhave been \"learned in the law,\" both written and unwritten. He must have\nhad judicial experience; that is, he must have filled three offices of\ngradually increasing dignity, beginning with one of the local courts and\npassing successively through two magistracies at Jerusalem. He must have\nbeen an accomplished linguist; that is, he must have been thoroughly\nfamiliar with the languages of the surrounding nations. He must have\nbeen modest, popular, of good appearance, and free from haughtiness. He\nmust have been pious, strong, and courageous. And above all, he must\nhave been friendly in his attitude toward the accused.[306]\n\nThese were the qualifications of Israel's judges before Roman politics\nhad corrupted them. But at the time of Christ they had grown to be\ntime-serving, degenerate, and corrupt. Judea was then passing through a\nperiod of religious and political revolution. At such a time in any\nstate, as all history teaches us, the worst elements of society\ngenerally get the upper hand and control the political currents of the\nday. Many members of the Sanhedrin had themselves been guilty of\ncriminal acts in both public and private life. Many of them held office\nby purchase--they had bought their seats. They were thus unfitted to be\njudges in any case; especially in one involving the great question of\nlife and death.\n\nIn order to show the general disqualification, under the test of Hebrew\nlaw, of the members of the Great Sanhedrin, at the time of Christ, to\nexercise judicial functions, it is necessary to quote only Jewish\nauthorities. In \"The Martyrdom of Jesus,\" Rabbi Wise says: \"The chief\npriests, under the iron rule of Pilate and his wicked master, Sejan,\nwere the tools of the Roman soldiers who held Judea and Samaria in\nsubjection. Like the high priest, they were appointed to and removed\nfrom office by the Roman governor of the country, either directly or\nindirectly. They purchased their commissions for high prices and, like\nalmost all Roman appointees, used them for mercenary purposes. They were\nconsidered wicked men by the ancient writers and must have stood very\nlow in the estimation of the people over whom they tyrannized. The\npatriots must have looked upon them as hirelings of the foreign despot\nwhose rule was abhorred. Although there was, here and there, a good,\npious and patriotic man among them, he was an exception. As a general\nthing, and under the rule of Pilate, especially, they were the corrupt\ntools of a military despotism which Rome imposed upon enslaved\nPalestine.\"\n\nAgain, the Talmud, in which we never look for slurs upon the Hebrew\npeople, where slurs are not deserved, contains this bitter denunciation\nof the high-priestly families of the times of Christ: \"What a plague is\nthe family of Simon Boethus; cursed be their lances! What a plague is\nthe family of Ananos; cursed be their hissing of vipers! What a plague\nis the family of Cantharus; cursed be their pens! What a plague is the\nfamily of Ismael ben Phabi; cursed be their fists! They are high priests\nthemselves, their sons are treasurers, their sons-in-law are commanders,\nand their servants strike the people with staves.\"\n\nIn like manner the Talmud, in withering rebuke and sarcasm, again\ndeclares that \"The porch of the sanctuary cried out four times. The\nfirst time, Depart from here, descendants of Eli; ye pollute the Temple\nof the Eternal! The second time, Let Issachar ben Keifar Barchi depart\nfrom here, who polluted himself and profaneth the victims consecrated to\nGod! The third time, Widen yourselves, ye gates of the sanctuary and let\nIsrael ben Phabi, the wilful, enter that he may discharge the functions\nof the priesthood! Yet another cry was heard, Widen yourselves, ye\ngates, and let Ananias ben Nebedeus, the gourmand, enter, that he may\nglut himself on the victims.\"[307]\n\nIt should be borne in mind that the high-priestly families so\nscathingly dealt with by the Talmud were the controlling spirits in the\nGreat Sanhedrin at the time of Christ. Were they legally qualified,\nthen, under the ancient and honorable tests of Hebrew law, to be members\nof the highest court in the land? If they bought their offices and used\nthem for mercenary purposes, as Wise asserts, were they worthy of the\ngreat exemplar, Moses, who \"sat in judgment without the expectation of\nmaterial reward\"? If they thus secured their places and prostituted them\nto selfish purposes, were their robes to be respected any more than the\nblanket of the ass?\n\nThe ancient Hebrew judges, in the days of Israel's purity and glory,\nsubmitted their claims to judicial preferment to the suffrage of a\nloving and confiding people.[308] They climbed the rungs of the judicial\nladder by slow and painful degrees. Integrity and ability marked each\nadvance toward the top. Was this the process of promotion in the case of\nCaiaphas and his fellow-judges? Did their bought and corrupted places\nnot brand them with the anathema of the law?\n\nWe come now to consider the special disqualifications of members of the\nSanhedrin to sit in judgment upon the life of Jesus. The reasons for\nthese disqualifications were two: (1) The members of this court were, in\nthe language of Jost, \"burning enemies\" of Jesus, and were therefore\ndisqualified, under Hebrew law, to act as His judges; (2) they had\ndetermined upon His guilt, and had sentenced Him to death before the\ntrial began; and had thus outraged not only a specific provision of\nHebrew law but also a principle of universal justice.\n\nThe various causes of the hatred of the members of the Sanhedrin for\nJesus are too numerous and profound to admit of exhaustive treatment\nhere. A thorough analysis of these causes would necessitate a review of\nthe life of Christ from the manger to the sepulcher. A few reasons will\nsuffice.\n\nBut at this point a distinction should be made between that personal\nhatred which disqualifies and the hatred and loathing of the crime that\ndo not disqualify. Every just and righteous judge should loathe and hate\nthe crime itself; and a certain amount of loathing and dislike for the\ncriminal is most natural and almost inevitable. But no judge is\nqualified to sit in judgment upon the rights of life, liberty, or\nproperty of another whom he hates as the result of a personal grudge,\nborn of personal experience with the prisoner at the bar. The hatred\nthat disqualified the members of the Sanhedrin, under Hebrew law, was\nthat kind of hatred that had been generated by personal interest and\nexperience. The most merciless invective, barbed with incomparable wit,\nridicule, and satire, had been daily hurled at them by Jesus with\nwithering effect. With a touch more potent than that of Ithuriel's spear\nHe had unmasked their wicked hypocrisy and had blazoned it to the skies.\nEvery day of His active ministry, which lasted about three years, had\nbeen spent in denouncing their shameless practices and their guilty\nlives. The Scribes and Pharisees were proud, haughty, and conceited\nbeyond description. They believed implicitly in the infallibility of\ntheir authority and in the perfection of their souls. How galling, then,\nto such men must have been this declaration of an obscure and lowly\nNazarene: \"Verily, I say unto you, That the publicans and the harlots go\ninto the kingdom of God before you.\"[309] What impetuous invective this:\n\"Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye devour widows'\nhouses, and for a pretense make long prayer: therefore ye shall receive\nthe greater damnation. Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites!\nfor ye compass sea and land to make one proselyte, and when he is made,\nye make him twofold more the child of hell than yourselves.\"[310] We can\nwell imagine how these fiery darts pierced and tore the vanity of a\nhaughty and contemptuous priesthood.\n\nConsider for a moment the difference in the spheres of Jesus and of His\nenemies. He, an obscure prophet from Nazareth in Galilee; they, the\nleaders of Israel and the guardians of the Temple at Jerusalem. He, the\nsingle advocate of the New Dispensation; they, the manifold upholders of\nthe Old. He, without earthly authority in the propagation of His faith;\nthey, clothed with the sanction of the law and the prestige of a mighty\npast. Imagine, then, if you can, the intensity of the hatred engendered\nby the language and the conduct of Jesus.\n\nThat we may fully appreciate the tension of the situation let us cast a\nsingle glance at the character of the Scribes. Edersheim has written\nthese wonderfully graphic lines about them:\n\n     He pushes to the front, the crowd respectfully giving way, and\n     eagerly hanging on his utterances, as those of a recognized\n     authority. He has been solemnly ordained by the laying on of hands;\n     and is the Rabbi, \"my great one,\" Master, amplitudo. Indeed, his\n     hyper-ingenuity in questioning has become a proverb. There is not\n     measure of his dignity, nor yet limit to his importance. He is the\n     \"lawyer,\" the \"well-plastered pit,\" filled with the water of\n     knowledge, \"out of which not a drop can escape,\" in opposition to\n     the \"weeds of untilled soil\" of ignorance. He is the divine\n     aristocrat, among the vulgar herd of rude and profane \"country\n     people,\" who \"know not the law,\" and are \"cursed.\" Each scribe\n     outweighed all the common people, who must accordingly pay him\n     every honor.... Such was to be the respect paid to their sayings\n     that they were to be absolutely believed, even if they were to\n     declare that to be at the right hand which was at the left, or\n     vice-versa.[311]\n\nWhat could, then, be more terrific than the hatred of such a character\nfor an unlettered Galilean who descended from the mountains of His\nnative province to rebuke and instruct the \"divine aristocrats\" in\nreligious matters and heavenly affairs? Imagine his rage and chagrin\nwhen he heard these words: \"Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees,\nhypocrites! for ye are like unto whited sepulchres, which indeed appear\nbeautiful outward, but are within full of dead men's bones, and all\nuncleanness.... Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! because\nye build the tombs of the prophets, and garnish the sepulchres of the\nrighteous, And say, If we had been in the days of our fathers, we would\nnot have been partakers with them in the blood of the prophets.\nWherefore ye be witnesses unto yourselves, that ye are the children of\nthem which killed the prophets. Fill ye up then the measure of your\nfathers. Ye serpents, ye generation of vipers, how can ye escape the\ndamnation of hell?\"[312]\n\n\"His exquisite irony,\" says Renan, \"His stinging remarks, always went to\nthe heart. They were everlasting stings, and have remained festering in\nthe wound. This Nessus-shirt of ridicule which the Jew, son of the\nPharisees, has dragged in tatters after him during eighteen centuries,\nwas woven by Jesus with a divine skill. Masterpieces of fine raillery,\ntheir features are written in lines of fire upon the flesh of the\nhypocrite and the false devotee. Incomparable traits worthy of a Son of\nGod! A god alone knows how to kill in this way. Socrates and Moli\u00e8re\nonly grazed the skin. The former carried fire and rage to the very\nmarrow.\"[313]\n\nAre we not now justified in asserting, with Jost, that the members of\nthe Sanhedrin, who were none other than the Scribes and Pharisees above\ndescribed by Jesus, were the \"burning enemies\" of the prisoner at the\nbar? If they were, were they legally qualified to be His judges?\n\nBut it may be argued that their hatred was simply a form of righteous\nindignation provoked by His repeated assaults upon the national religion\nand the national institutions; that it was their duty as guardians of\nboth to both hate and try Him; and that they would have been derelict in\nduty if they had not done so. But it is apparent from the record and is\nevident to any fair-minded reader that the enmity of the judges toward\nJesus was more personal than political, more a private than a public\naffair. In support of this contention, in addition to the withering\nlanguage addressed to them, the matter of the purification of the Temple\nmay be mentioned. It will be remembered how Jesus, with a scorpion lash,\nscourged the money-changers and traders from the Sanctuary. Now it is\nhistorically true that Annas and Caiaphas and their friends owned and\ncontrolled the stalls, booths, and bazaars connected with the Temple and\nfrom which flowed a most lucrative trade. The profits from the sale of\nlambs and doves, sold for sacrifice, alone were enormous. When Jesus\nthreatened the destruction of this trade He assaulted the interests of\nAnnas and his associates in the Sanhedrin in a vital place. This\ngrievance was certainly not so religious as it was personal. The driving\nof the cattle from the stalls was probably more effective in compassing\nthe destruction of the Christ than any miracle that He performed or any\ndiscourse that He delivered. But whatever the cause the fact is historic\nand indisputable that the Sanhedrists were enemies of Jesus, and\ntherefore disqualified under Hebrew law to try Him.\n\nA second reason for the special disqualification of the members of the\nSanhedrin to sit as judges at the trial of Christ was the fact that they\nhad determined upon His guilt and had sentenced Him to death before the\ntrial began. This point needs no extensive argument or illustration.\nUnder every enlightened system of justice the first great qualification\nof judges has been that they should be unbiased and unprejudiced.\nJudicial proceedings are murderous and no better than mob violence when\njudges and jurors enter upon the trial of the case with a determination\nto convict the accused, regardless of the testimony. The principles\nunderlying this proposition are fundamental and self-evident.\n\nNow the Gospel narratives disclose the fact that three different\nmeetings of the Sanhedrin were held in the six months preceding the\ncrucifixion, to discuss the miracles and discourses of Jesus, and to\ndevise ways and means to entrap Him and put Him to death.\n\nThe first meeting was held in the latter part of the month of September,\nA.D. 29, about six months before the night trial in the palace of\nCaiaphas. This meeting is recorded by St. John in Chap. vii., verses\n37-53. The occasion was the Feast of Tabernacles, when Jesus made many\nconverts by His preaching, and at the same time caused much apprehension\namong the Pharisees, who assembled the Sanhedrin to adopt plans to check\nHis career. It was on this occasion that Nicodemus defended Christ and\nasked the question that shows the nature of the proceedings at that\ntime. \"Doth our law judge any man before it hear him and know what he\ndoeth?\" This was the voice, not only of Hebrew but of universal justice\ndemanding a hearing before a condemnation. Nothing definite seems to\nhave been accomplished at this meeting.\n\nThe second session of the Sanhedrin took place in the month of\nFebruary, A.D. 30, about six weeks before the crucifixion. The occasion\nof this meeting was the resurrection of Lazarus, an account of which is\ngiven in John xi. 41-53. The chief priests and Pharisees seem to have\nbeen seized with consternation by the reports of the progress of the\npropaganda of Jesus. They had often listened contemptuously and in\nsullen silence to the accounts of His miraculous performances. But when\nHe began to raise the dead to life, they decided that it was about time\nto act. At this meeting Caiaphas appealed to his associates in the name\nof the common weal. \"Ye know nothing at all,\" he said, \"nor consider\nthat it is expedient for us, that one man should die for the people, and\nthat the whole nation perish not.\"[314] This seems to have been a form\nof condemnation in which the other judges joined. \"Then from that day\nforth they took counsel together for to put him to death.\"[315] At this\nsecond session of the Sanhedrin the death of Jesus seems to have been\ndecreed in an informal way and an opportunity was awaited for its\naccomplishment.\n\nThe third meeting of the Sanhedrin took place just a few days before the\nPaschal Feast.\n\n\"Now the feast of unleavened bread drew nigh, which is called the\nPassover. And the chief priests and scribes sought how they might kill\nhim; for they feared the people.\"[316] \"Then assembled together the\nchief priests, and the scribes, and the elders of the people, unto the\npalace of the high priest, who was called Caiaphas, and consulted that\nthey might take Jesus by subtilty, and kill him. But they said, Not on\nthe feast day, lest there be an uproar among the people.\"[317]\n\nAt this third session of the court it was agreed that the arrest and\nexecution of Jesus should be accomplished at the earliest possible date.\n\nIt will be seen that at these different sessions of the Sanhedrin in the\nsix months preceding the regular trial the judges had resolved that\nJesus should be done away with at the first convenient opportunity. In\nshort, and in fact, their hatred was formed and their determination\nfixed in the matter of the proceedings to be instituted against Him.\nWere they, then, legally qualified to act as His judges?\n\nAgain, besides prejudging Him to death had they not demonstrated their\ntotal unfitness for any righteous administration of justice by seeking\nfalse witnesses against Him? Hebrew law forbade them to seek for\nwitnesses of any kind. They were the defenders of the accused and, under\nthe Hebrew system, were required to search for pretexts to acquit and\nnot for witnesses to condemn.[318] It was a maxim that \"the Sanhedrin\nwas to save, not to destroy life.\"[319] Much more were they forbidden to\nseek for false witnesses. Hebrew law denounced false witnesses and\ncondemned them to the very punishment prescribed for those whom they\nsought to convict.\n\n\"And the judges shall make diligent inquisition; and, behold, if the\nwitness be a false witness, and hath testified falsely against his\nbrother; then shall ye do unto him, as he had thought to do unto his\nbrother.... And thine eye shall not pity; but life shall go for life,\neye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.\"[320]\n\nBut here we find the judges actually seeking testimony which the law\npointedly prohibited. This matter alone establishes their utter\nunfitness to try Jesus, and is explicable only on the ground of the\ndegradation into which they had fallen at the time of Christ and on the\nhypothesis that their burning hatred had overwhelmed their judgment and\nsense of justice.\n\nIf it be objected that the points of disqualification above alleged were\nnot applicable to all the judges, a single sentence of Scripture meets\nthe objection: \"And the chief priests and _all the council_ sought for\nwitness against Jesus to put Him to death.\"[321] The fact that \"all the\ncouncil\" were willing to outrage a provision of the fundamental law is\nsufficient proof that they were all disqualified to try Christ.\n\nAnother conclusive proof of the total unfitness of the members of the\nSanhedrin to try Jesus is the fact that they so far forgot themselves\nthat they abandoned all sense of self-respect and judicial dignity by\nbrutally striking Him and spitting in His face. We would like to believe\nthat this outrageous conduct was limited to the servants of the priests,\nbut the Gospel of St. Mark, Chap. xiv., verse 65, clearly indicates that\nthe judges themselves were also guilty.\n\n\n\n\nPOINT XII\n\nTHE CONDEMNATION OF JESUS WAS ILLEGAL BECAUSE THE MERITS OF THE DEFENSE\nWERE NOT CONSIDERED\n\n\nLAW\n\n    \"Then shalt thou inquire, and make search, and ask\n      diligently.\"--DEUTERONOMY xiii. 14.\n\n    \"The judges shall weigh the matter in the sincerity of their\n      conscience.\"--MISHNA, Sanhedrin IV. 5.\n\n    \"The primary object of the Hebrew judicial system was to render the\n      conviction of an innocent person impossible. All the ingenuity of\n      the Jewish legists was directed to the attainment of this\n      end.\"--BENNY, \"Criminal Code of the Jews,\" p. 56.\n\n\nFACT AND ARGUMENT\n\nTHE actual trial of any criminal case shows, upon the record, two\nessential parts: (1) The accusation; (2) the defense. The absence of the\nelements of defense makes the proceeding _ex parte_; and there is really\nno trial. And it is impossible to conceive a proper administration of\njustice where a defense is not allowed, since the right to combat the\nallegations of the indictment is the essential principle of liberty\nunder the law. The destruction of this right is the annihilation of\nfreedom by subjecting the individual citizen to the whims and caprices\nof the governing power. An ideal code of criminal procedure would embody\nrules of evidence and practice perfectly adapted to establish truth in\nthe matter at issue between the commonwealth and the prisoner. Neither\nthe people nor the accused would be favored or prejudiced by the\nadmission or exclusion of any kind of evidence. An exact interpretation\nand administration of this code would result in a perfect intellectual\nbalance between the rights of the state and the defendant. But such a\ncode has never been framed, and if one were in existence, it would be\nimpossible to enforce it, as long as certain judges insisted on aiding\nthe prosecution and others on helping the accused, in violation of\nstandard rules of evidence.\n\nNow, the ancient Hebrew system of criminal procedure was no such ideal\none as that above described. It should be remembered that there was no\nbody, under that system, corresponding to our modern Grand Jury, to\npresent indictments. There were no prosecuting officers and no\ncounselors-at-law, in the modern sense. The leading witnesses preferred\ncharges and the judges did the rest. They examined and cross-examined\nwitnesses, did the summing up and were, above all, the defenders of the\naccused. The rights of the defendant seem to have alone been seriously\nconsidered. This startling maxim was a constant menace to the integrity\nof the government and to the rights of the commonwealth: \"The Sanhedrin\nwhich so often as once in seven years condemns a man to death, is a\nslaughter-house.\"[322] Lightfoot is of the opinion that the Jews did not\nlose the power of capital punishment as the result of the Roman\nconquest, but that they voluntarily abandoned it because the rules of\ncriminal procedure which they had from time to time adopted finally\nbecame wholly unfitted for convicting anyone. This view is unsupported\nby historic fact, but it is nevertheless true that the legal safeguards\nfor the protection of the rights of the accused had, in the later years\nof Jewish nationality, become so numerous and stringent that a\ncondemnation was practically impossible. The astonishing provision of\nHebrew law to which we have referred in Part II known as Antecedent\nWarning had the effect of securing an acquittal in nearly every case. It\nis contended by many that this peculiar provision was intended to\nabolish capital punishment by rendering conviction impossible.\n\nIn the light of the principles above suggested let us review the action\nof the Sanhedrin in condemning Jesus to death upon His uncorroborated\nconfession. The standard of thoroughness in investigating criminal\nmatters is thus prescribed in the Mosaic Code: \"Then shalt thou inquire,\nand make search, and ask diligently.\" The Mishna supplements the\nfundamental law by this direction: \"The judges shall weigh the matter in\nthe sincerity of their conscience.\" From what we know of the peculiar\ntendency of the Hebrew system to favor the accused we are justified in\nassuming that the two rules just cited were framed for the protection\nof the prisoner more than for the security of the commonwealth.\n\nNow at this point we are led to ask: Were these rules applied in the\ntrial of Jesus in any sense either for or against the accused? Did\nCaiaphas and the other members of the Sanhedrin \"inquire, and make\nsearch and ask diligently\" concerning the facts involved in the issue\nbetween Jesus and the Hebrew people? Did they weigh the whole matter \"in\nthe sincerity of their conscience?\" Is it not clearly evident from the\nrecord that the false witnesses contradicted themselves, were rejected\nand dismissed, and that Jesus was then condemned upon His uncorroborated\nconfession that He was the Christ, the Son of God? The usual and natural\nproceeding in a Jewish criminal trial was to call witnesses for the\ndefendant, after the leading witnesses had testified for the people. Was\nthis done in the case of Jesus? His own apostles deserted Him in the\ngarden, although two of them seem to have returned to the scene of the\ntrial. Is it probable, in the light of the record, that witnesses were\ncalled for the defendant? We have seen that they could not legally\nconvict Him upon His own confession. And there is nowhere the faintest\nsuggestion that witnesses other than the false ones were called to\ntestify against Him. The record is clear and unequivocal that the\nconviction of Jesus was upon His uncorroborated confession. This was\nillegal. When Caiaphas said, \"I adjure thee by the living God that thou\ntell us whether thou be the Christ, the Son of God,\" Jesus answered,\n\"Thou hast said\"; that is, \"I am,\" according to Mark. Here was an issue\nsquarely joined between the Commonwealth of Israel and Jesus of\nNazareth. It was incumbent upon the state to establish His guilt by two\ncompetent witnesses who agreed in all essential details. If these\nwitnesses were not present, or could not be secured, it was the duty of\nthe court to discharge Christ at once. This the law provided and\ndemanded. But this was not done.\n\nIf, as has been contended, the false witnesses were relied upon by the\nSanhedrin to corroborate the confession of Jesus, then under Hebrew law\nthe judges should at least have sought witnesses in His behalf, or\nshould have allowed His friends time to find them and bring them in. In\nother words, His defense should have been considered. However\noverwhelming the conviction of the judges of the Sanhedrin that the\nclaims of Jesus were false and blasphemous, they were not justified in\nrefusing to consider the merits of His pretensions. If a midnight\nassassin should stealthily creep into the room of a sleeping man and\nshoot him to death, a judge would not be legally justified in\ninstructing the jury, at the close of the people's case, to bring in a\nverdict of guilty, on the ground that nothing that the defendant could\nprove would help his case. However weak and ridiculous his defense, the\nprisoner should at least be heard; and a failure to accord him a hearing\nwould certainly result in reversal on appeal. A refusal to consider the\ndefense of a prisoner under ancient Hebrew law was nothing less than an\nabrogation of the forms of government and a proclamation of mob\nviolence in the particular case, for it must be remembered that Hebrew\ncriminal law was framed especially for the protection of the accused.\n\nIt should also be kept in mind that it would not have been incumbent\nupon Caiaphas and his fellow-judges to acquit Jesus simply because a\ndefense had been made. In other words, they were not bound to accept His\nexplanations and arguments. If they had heard Him and His witnesses,\nthey could have rejected His pretensions as false and blasphemous,\nalthough they were truthful and righteous, without incurring the censure\nof mankind and the curse of Heaven, for it would be preposterous to\nrequire infallible judgment of judicial officers. All that can be\ndemanded of judges of the law is that they act conscientiously with the\nlights that are in front of them. The maledictions of the human race\nhave been hurled at Caiaphas and his colleagues during nineteen\ncenturies, not because they pronounced an illegal judgment, but because\nthey outraged rules of law in their treatment of the Christ; not because\nthey misinterpreted His defense, but because they denied Him all\ndefense.\n\nWe should constantly keep in mind that Jesus was entitled to have the\ntwo requirements, \"Then shalt thou inquire, and make search, and ask\ndiligently,\" and \"The judges shall weigh the matter in the sincerity of\ntheir conscience,\" applied not only for but against Him. That is, before\nthe Hebrew Commonwealth rested its case against Him, He had a right to\ndemand that a _prima facie_ case be made, or in case of failure to do\nso, that He be at once discharged. This rule was as pointed and\nimperative under ancient as under modern law, and before the merits of\nthe defense were required to be considered the state had to close its\ncase against the defendant, with a presumption of guilt against Him, as\na result of the introduction of competent and satisfactory evidence.\n\nIf rules of law had been properly observed in the trial of Jesus the\nquestion of the merits of His defense would never have been raised; for\nit was practically impossible to convict Him under the circumstances\nsurrounding the night trial in the palace of Caiaphas. As has been\nbefore suggested, Jesus was very popular outside the circle of the\nTemple authorities. So great was His popularity that it is almost\ncertain that two competent witnesses could not have been secured to\nconvict Him of blasphemy in the sense that He had claimed to be the\nMessiah. We have seen, under Point VIII, that Jesus had confessed His\nMessiahship to no one excepting the Samaritan woman, outside the\nApostolic company. Judas, then, was probably the only witness who had\nheard Him declare Himself to be the Messiah that could have been\nsecured; and his testimony was incompetent, under Hebrew law, because,\nunder the supposition that Jesus was a criminal, Judas, His apostle, was\nan accomplice. As to the charge of blasphemy in the broader sense of\nhaving claimed equality with God, upon which, according to Salvador,\nJesus was convicted, it seems from the Gospel record that there would\nhave been no difficulty in legally convicting Him, if the Sanhedrin had\nmet regularly and had taken time to summon witnesses in legal manner.\nFor on many occasions Jesus had said and done things in the presence of\nboth friends and enemies that the Jews regarded as blasphemous; such as\nclaiming that He and His Father were one; that He had existed before\nAbraham; and that He had power to forgive sins. But these charges were\nnot made at the trial, and we have no right to consider them except as\nmeans of interpreting the mind of Caiaphas in connection with the\nmeaning of the claim of Jesus that He was the Christ, the Son of God. If\nCaiaphas was justified in construing these words to mean that Jesus\nclaimed identity with Jehovah, then he was justified in inferring that\nJesus had spoken blasphemy, for from the standpoint of ancient Judaism\nand considering Jesus simply as a Jewish citizen, blasphemy was the\ncrime that resulted from such a claim. But even from this point of view\nCaiaphas was not justified in refusing Jesus ample opportunity to prove\nHis equality with Jehovah, or at least that He was gifted with divine\npower. This was all the more true because the claim of Jesus was that of\nMessiahship, and according to one line of authorities in Hebrew\nMessianic theology the Messiah was to be clothed with divine authority\nand power as the messenger and vicegerent of Jehovah on earth.\n\nBut it is clearly certain that a _prima facie_ case of guilt was not\nmade by the Sanhedrin against Jesus; and, as a matter of law, He was not\ncalled upon to make any defense. He could have refused to say a word in\nanswer to the accusation. He could have asserted His legal rights by\nobjecting that a case against Him had not been made, by demanding that\nthe charges against Him be dismissed and that He be set at liberty at\nonce. But Jesus did not do this. He simply confessed His Messiahship and\nSonship of the Father. This confession was not legal evidence upon which\nHe could have been convicted, but it did help to create an issue, the\ntruth or falsity of which should have been investigated by the court.\n\nNow, let us suppose, for argument's sake, that a _prima facie_ case of\nguilt against Jesus was made before the Sanhedrin. What was the next\nlegal step under Hebrew law? What should the judges have done after\nhearing the witnesses against Him? It is beyond dispute that they should\nhave begun at once to \"inquire, and make search, and ask diligently\"\nconcerning all matters pertaining to the truthfulness and righteousness\nof His claims to Messiahship. They should have assisted Him in securing\nwitnesses whose testimony would have helped to establish those claims.\nHaving secured such testimony, they should have weighed it \"in the\nsincerity of their conscience.\" But this they did not do.\n\nIt may be asked: What proofs could have been offered that Jesus was \"the\nChrist, the Son of God,\" if complete rights of defense had been\naccorded? That question is difficult to answer, nearly two thousand\nyears after the trial. But if a _prima facie_ case of guilt had been\nmade against Him, shifting the burden of proof, and requiring that His\nclaims be proved, it may be reasonably contended that a complete defense\nwould have necessitated proofs: (1) That Jesus was the Christ, that is,\nthat He was the Messiah; (2) that He was also the Son of God, that is,\nthat He was identical with God Himself. Let us consider these two phases\nof the subject and their attendant proofs in order.\n\nAnd first, what evidence could have been offered that Jesus was the\nChrist, that is, the Messiah? What method of procedure should have been\nemployed by the Sanhedrin in investigating His claims? Let us suppose\nthat Caiaphas understood that Jesus claimed to be the long-looked-for\nMessiah who had come from Jehovah with divine authority to redeem\nmankind and to regenerate and rule the world. Let us not forget that the\nJews were expecting a Messiah, and that the mere claim of Messiahship\nwas not illegal. Such a claim merely raised an issue as to its truth or\nfalsity which was to be investigated like any other proposition of\ntheology or law. It was not one to be either accepted or rejected\nwithout demonstration. Then when Jesus acknowledged His Messiahship in\nanswer to the high priest's question it was the duty of the court either\nto admit His claim and discharge Him at once, or to summon competent\nwitnesses, by daylight, to prove that His pretensions were false and\nblasphemous. Having rested their case, it was their duty to aid the\nprisoner in securing witnesses to substantiate His claims, and according\nto the spirit of Hebrew law to view rather favorably than unfavorably\nsuch claims. It was also incumbent upon them to apply to Jesus all the\nMessianic tests of each and every school. It should be remembered that\nat the time of Christ there were radically different views of the\nattributes of the expected Messiah. No two schools agreed upon all the\nsigns by which the future Deliverer would be recognized. Only one sign\nwas agreed upon by all--that He would be a scion of the House of David.\nThe followers of Judas of Galilee believed that the Messiah would be an\nearthly hero of giant stature--a William Tell, a Robert Bruce, an\nAbraham Lincoln--who would emancipate the Jews by driving out the Romans\nand permanently restoring the kingdom of David on the earth. The school\nof Shammai believed that he would be not only a great statesman and\nwarrior, but a religious zealot as well; and that to splendid victories\non the battlefield, he would add the glorious triumphs of religion.\nRadically different from both these views, were the teachings of the\ngentle Hillel and his disciples. According to these, the Messiah was to\nbe a prince of peace whose sublime and holy spirit would impress itself\nupon all flesh, would banish all wars, and make of Jerusalem the grand\ncenter of international brotherhood and love. But even these conceptions\nwere not exhaustive of the various Messianic ideas that were prevalent\nin Palestine in the days of Jesus. Some of the Messianic notions were\nnot only contradictory but diametrically opposite in meaning. A \"prince\nof peace\" and a \"gigantic warrior\" could not well be one and the same\nperson. And for this reason it is apparent that, had an examination been\nmade, the claims of Jesus to the Messiahship could not have been\nrejected by Caiaphas and the Sanhedrin, simply because this or that\nattribute did not meet the approval of this or that sect or school.\n\nInstead of condemning Him to death for blasphemy, when Jesus answered\nthat He was the Christ, the Son of God, Caiaphas should have asked a\nsecond question: \"What sign shewest thou then, that we may see and\nbelieve thee?\" It has been contended by Jewish writers that, far from\ndenying Jesus the privilege of proving His Messiahship, He was\nfrequently asked to give signs and perform wonders. The reply to this is\nthat as far as the legal merits of the case are concerned Jesus was not\ninvited at the trial in the palace of Caiaphas to show signs or give\nproofs of His Messiahship. And as to the chances afforded Him at other\ntimes and places, they were extra-judicial and were mere street affairs\nin which Jesus probably refused to gratify vulgar curiosity and by which\nHe was not remotely bound legally or religiously. It is only when\nproperly arraigned and accused that a citizen under modern law can be\ncompelled to answer a charge of crime. The rule was more stringent under\nthe ancient Hebrew dispensation. Private preliminary examinations, even\nby judicial officers, were not permitted by Hebrew law, as Salvador\nexplicitly states. It was only when confronted by proper charges before\na legally constituted tribunal in regular session, that a Hebrew\nprisoner was compelled to answer. And at the regular trial before the\nfull Sanhedrin Jesus was not asked to give evidence that would serve to\nexculpate Him. What Caiaphas should have done was to notify Jesus, at\nthe time of the arraignment in his own house, that His life was at\nstake and that now was the time to produce testimony in His own behalf.\nIt was the duty, furthermore, of the high priest and his associates to\nconsult the sacred books to see if the Messianic prophecies therein\ncontained were fulfilled in the birth, life, and performances of Jesus,\nas these matters were developed at the trial by witnesses duly summoned\nin His behalf.\n\nIt was a matter personally within the knowledge of the judges that the\ntime was ripe for the appearance of the Deliverer. Not only the people\nof Israel, but all the surrounding nations were expecting the coming of\na great renovator of the world. Of such an arrival Virgil had already\nsung at Rome.[323]\n\nA great national misfortune had already foreshadowed the day of the\nMessiah more potently than had any individual event in the life of\nJesus. When Jacob lay dying upon his deathbed, he called around him his\ntwelve sons and began to pronounce upon each in turn the paternal and\nprophetic blessing. When the turn of Judah came, the accents of the\ndying patriarch became more clear and animated, as he said: \"Judah, thou\nart he whom thy brethren shall praise: thy hand shall be in the neck of\nthine enemies; thy father's children shall bow down before thee. Judah\nis a lion's whelp: from the prey, my son, thou art gone up: he stooped\ndown, he couched as a lion, and as an old lion; who shall rouse him up?\nThe _sceptre_ shall not depart from Judah, nor a lawgiver from between\nhis feet, until Shiloh come; and unto him shall the gathering of the\npeople be.\"[324] The Jewish Rabbinical commentators of antiquity were\nunanimously of the opinion that this prophecy of Jacob referred to the\nday of the Messiah. And for ages the people had been told to watch for\ntwo special signs which would herald the coming of the great Deliverer:\n(1) The departure of the scepter from Judah; (2) the loss of the\njudicial power.\n\nThe Talmudists, commenting on the above passage from Genesis, say: \"The\nson of David shall not come unless the royal power has been taken from\nJudah\"; and in another passage: \"The son of David shall not come unless\nthe judges have ceased in Israel.\"[325] Now both these signs had\nappeared at the time of the Roman conquest, shortly before the birth of\nChrist. At the deposition of Archelaus, A.D. 6, Judea became a Roman\nprovince with a Roman procurator as governor. Sovereignty then passed\naway forever from the Jews. And not only was sovereignty taken from\nthem, but its chief attribute, the power of life and death in judicial\nmatters, was destroyed. Thus the legal and historical situation was\nproduced that had been prophesied by Jacob. The _scepter_ had passed\nfrom Judah and the _lawgiver_ from between his feet, when Jesus stood\nbefore the Sanhedrin claiming to be the Messiah.\n\nA fair trial in full daylight, it is believed, would have called before\nHis judges a host of witnesses friendly to Jesus, whose testimony would\nhave established an exact fulfilment of ancient Messianic prophecy in\nHis birth, life, arrest, and trial. A judicial record would have been\nmade of which the following might be regarded as an approximately\ncorrect transcript:\n\n(1) _That the Messiah was to be born in Bethlehem_:\n\n    PROPHECY--But thou, Beth-lehem Ephratah, though thou be little among\n      the thousands of Judah, yet out of thee shall he come forth unto\n      me that is to be ruler in Israel; whose goings forth have been\n      from of old, from everlasting.--MICAH v. 2.\n\n    FULFILLMENT--Now when Jesus was _born in Bethlehem_ of Judea in the\n      days of Herod the king, behold, there came wise men from the east\n      to Jerusalem.--MATT. ii. 1.\n\n      And Joseph also went up from Galilee, out of the city of Nazareth,\n      into Judea, unto the city of David, which is called Bethlehem\n      (because he was of the house and lineage of David), To be taxed\n      with Mary his espoused wife, being great with child. And so it\n      was, that, while they were there, the days were accomplished that\n      she should be delivered. And she brought forth her firstborn son,\n      and wrapped him in swaddling clothes, and laid him in a manger;\n      because there was no room for them in the inn.--LUKE ii. 4-7.\n\n(2) _That the Messiah was to be born of a virgin_:\n\n    PROPHECY--Therefore the Lord himself shall give you a sign; Behold,\n      a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son, and shall call his name\n      Immanuel.--ISA. vii. 14.\n\n    FULFILLMENT--And in the sixth month the angel Gabriel was sent from\n      God unto a city of Galilee, named Nazareth, To a virgin espoused\n      to a man whose name was Joseph, of the house of David; and the\n      virgin's name was Mary.... And the angel said unto her, Fear not,\n      Mary: for thou hast found favor with God. And, behold, thou shalt\n      conceive in thy womb, and bring forth a son, and shalt call his\n      name Jesus.--LUKE i. 26-30.\n\n      Then Joseph being raised from sleep did as the angel of the Lord\n      had bidden him, and took unto him his wife: and knew her not till\n      she had brought forth her firstborn son: and he called his name\n      Jesus--MATT. i. 24, 25.\n\n(3) _That the Messiah was to spring from the house of David_:\n\n    PROPHECY--Behold, the days come, saith the Lord, that I will raise\n      unto David a righteous Branch, and a King shall reign and prosper,\n      and shall execute judgment and justice in the earth. In his days\n      Judah shall be saved, and Israel shall dwell safely: and this is\n      his name whereby he shall be called, THE LORD OUR\n      RIGHTEOUSNESS.--JER. xxiii. 5, 6.\n\n    FULFILLMENT--He shall be great, and shall be called the Son of the\n      Highest; and the Lord God shall give unto him the throne of his\n      father David.--LUKE i. 32.\n\n      But while he thought on these things, behold, the angel of the\n      Lord appeared unto him in a dream, saying, Joseph, thou son of\n      David, fear not to take unto thee Mary thy wife: for that which is\n      conceived in her is of the Holy Ghost.--MATT. i. 20.\n\n(4) _That the Messiah should not come until the scepter had departed\nfrom Judah and the lawgiver from between his feet_:\n\n    PROPHECY--The Sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor a lawgiver\n      from between his feet, until Shiloh come.--GEN. xlix. 10.\n\n    FULFILLMENT--And he saith unto them, Whose is this image and\n      superscription? They say unto him, C\u00e6sar's. Then saith he unto\n      them, Render therefore unto C\u00e6sar the things which are C\u00e6sar's;\n      and unto God the things that are God's.--MATT. xxii. 20, 21.\n\n      Then said Pilate unto them, Take ye him, and judge him according\n      to your law. The Jews therefore said unto him, It is not lawful\n      for us to put any man to death.--JOHN xviii. 31.\n\n(5) _That a forerunner like unto Elijah should prepare the way of the\nMessiah_:\n\n    PROPHECY--Behold, I will send my messenger, and he shall prepare the\n      way before me: and the Lord, whom ye seek, shall suddenly come to\n      his temple, even the messenger of the covenant, whom ye delight\n      in: behold, he shall come, saith the Lord of hosts.--MAL. iii. 1.\n\n      The voice of him that crieth in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way\n      of the Lord, make straight in the desert a highway for our\n      God.--ISA. xl. 3.\n\n    FULFILLMENT--In those days came John the Baptist, preaching in the\n      wilderness of Judea, And saying, Repent ye: for the kingdom of\n      heaven is at hand. For this is he that was spoken of by the\n      prophet Esaias, saying, The voice of one crying in the wilderness,\n      Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make his paths straight.--MATT.\n      iii. 1-3.\n\n    This is he, of whom it is written, Behold, I send my messenger\n      before thy face, which shall prepare thy way before thee. For I\n      say unto you, Among those that are born of women there is not a\n      greater prophet than John the Baptist.--LUKE vii. 27, 28.\n\n(6) _That the Messiah should begin to preach in Galilee_:\n\n    PROPHECY--In Galilee of the nations, the people that walked in\n      darkness have seen a great light.--ISA. ix. 1, 2.\n\n    FULFILLMENT--Now when Jesus had heard that John was cast into\n      prison, He departed into Galilee.... The people which sat in\n      darkness, saw great light; and to them which sat in the region and\n      shadow of death light is sprung up. From that time, Jesus began to\n      preach, and to say, Repent: for the kingdom of heaven is at\n      hand.--MATT. iv. 12-17.\n\n(7) _That the Messiah should perform many miracles:_\n\n    PROPHECY--Then the eyes of the blind shall be opened, and the\n      ears of the deaf shall be unstopped. Then shall the lame man leap\n      as a hart, and the tongue of the dumb sing: for in the wilderness\n      shall waters break out, and streams in the desert.--ISA. xxxv. 5,\n      6.\n\n    FULFILLMENT--Then was brought unto him one possessed with a devil,\n      blind, and dumb, and he healed him, insomuch that the blind and\n      dumb both spake and saw.--MATT. xii. 22.\n\n      But that ye may know that the Son of man hath power upon earth to\n      forgive sins (he said unto the sick of the palsy), I say unto thee,\n      Arise, and take up thy couch, and go into thine house. And\n      immediately he rose up before them, and took up that whereon he\n      lay, and departed to his own house, glorifying God.--LUKE v. 24,\n      25.\n\n      Jesus answered and said unto them, Go and shew John again those\n      things which ye do hear and see: The blind receive their sight,\n      and the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear,\n      the dead are raised up, and the poor have the gospel preached to\n      them.--MATT. xi. 4, 5.\n\n(8) _That the Messiah should make his public entry into Jerusalem riding\nupon an ass:_\n\n    PROPHECY--Rejoice greatly, O daughter of Zion; shout, O daughter\n      of Jerusalem: behold, thy King cometh unto thee: he is just, and\n      having salvation; lowly, and riding upon an ass, and upon a colt\n      the foal of an ass.--ZECH. ix. 9.\n\n    FULFILLMENT--And the disciples went, and did as Jesus commanded\n      them, And brought the ass, and the colt, and put on them their\n      clothes, and they set him thereon. And a very great multitude\n      spread their garments in the way; others cut down branches from\n      the trees, and strewed them in the way. And the multitudes that\n      went before, and that followed, cried, saying, Hosanna to the Son\n      of David: Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord;\n      Hosanna in the highest.--MATT. xxi. 6-9.\n\n(9) _That the Messiah should be betrayed by one of his followers for\nthirty pieces of silver which would finally be thrown into the potter's\nfield:_\n\n    PROPHECY--Yea, mine own familiar friend, in whom I trusted, which\n      did eat of my bread, hath lifted up his heel against me.--PSA.\n      xli. 9.\n\n      And I said unto them, If ye think good, give me my price; and if\n      not, forbear. So they weighed for my price thirty pieces of\n      silver. And the Lord said unto me, Cast it unto the potter: a\n      goodly price that I was prized at of them. And I took the thirty\n      pieces of silver, and cast them to the potter in the house of the\n      Lord.--ZECH. xi. 12, 13.\n\n    FULFILLMENT--Then one of the twelve, called Judas Iscariot, went\n      unto the chief priests, And said unto them, What will ye give me,\n      and I will deliver him unto you? And they covenanted with him for\n      thirty pieces of silver.--MATT. xxvi. 14, 15.\n\n      Then Judas, which had betrayed him, when he saw that he was\n      condemned, repented himself, and brought again the thirty pieces\n      of silver to the chief priests and elders, Saying, I have sinned in\n      that I have betrayed the innocent blood. And they said, What is\n      that to us? see thou to that. And he cast down the pieces of silver\n      in the temple, and departed, and went and hanged himself. And the\n      chief priests took the silver pieces, and said, It is not lawful\n      for to put them into the treasury, because it is the price of\n      blood. And they took counsel, and bought with them the potter's\n      field, to bury strangers in.--MATT. xxvii. 3-8.\n\n(10) _That the Messiah should be a man of poverty and of suffering; and\nshould be despised and rejected of men:_\n\n    PROPHECY--He is despised and rejected of men; a man of sorrows, and\n      acquainted with grief: and we hid as it were our faces from him;\n      he was despised, and we esteemed him not.--ISA. liii. 3.\n\n    FULFILLMENT--And Jesus said unto him, Foxes have holes, and birds of\n      the air have nests; but the Son of man hath not where to lay his\n      head.--LUKE ix. 58.\n\n      And they smote him on the head with a reed, and did spit upon him,\n      and bowing their knees worshipped him. And when they had mocked\n      him, they took off the purple from him, and put his own clothes on\n      him, and led him out to crucify him.--MARK xv. 19, 20.\n\nThrough reasonable diligence, witnesses might have been secured to\ntestify to a majority, at least, of the points above enumerated,\ntouching Messianic prophecy and fulfillment. Besides these are many\nothers too numerous to mention in a treatise of this kind.\n\nThe question then arises at once: Admitting that all the evidence above\nsuggested, marked \"Prophecy\" and \"Fulfillment,\" could have been\nintroduced in evidence at the trial before the Sanhedrin; were the\njudges morally and legally bound to acquit and release Jesus, if they\nbelieved this testimony to be true? We answer unhesitatingly, yes; as\nfar as the count in the accusation relating to Messiahship was\nconcerned. But we must remember that the charge against Jesus was not\nlimited to His claims to Messiahship. The indictment against Him was\nthat He claimed to be \"the Christ, the Son of God.\" \"Christ\" is the\nEnglish form of the Greek translation of the word meaning \"Messiah.\" The\nreal nature of the charge against the prisoner, then, was that He\nclaimed to be not only the Messiah but also the Son of God. We have seen\nthat \"Son of God\" conveyed to the Sanhedrin the notion of divine origin\nand of equality with Jehovah. Even to-day there is no dispute between\nJews and Christians in regard to this construction. Jews charge that\nJesus made such a claim and Christians agree with them. They are\ncompelled to do so, indeed, or else abjure the fundamental dogma of\ntheir faith--the doctrine of the Trinity.\n\nNow we approach the consideration of a phase of the subject where\ntheology and law meet and blend. It has been sought to ridicule the\ncontention that Jesus should have been heard on the charge of being the\nSon of God, in the sense that He was God Himself, because such a claim\nwas not only ridiculous and frivolous as a plea, but because it was\nblasphemous upon its face; as being opposed, by bare assertion, to the\nmost fundamental and sacred precept of the Mosaic Code and of the\nteachings of the Prophets: that God was purely and wholly spiritual;\nthat He was not only incorporeal but invisible, indivisible, and\nincomprehensible. The advocates of this theory declare that Jesus\nasserted, in the face of this primary belief of the Hebrews, a plurality\nof gods of which He was a member, and that this assertion destroyed the\nvery cornerstone of Judaism, founded in the teaching of the celebrated\npassage: \"Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God is one Lord.\" They further\ndeclare that when Jesus presented Himself in the flesh, and declared\nthat He was God, He insulted both the intelligence and religious\nconsciousness of His judges by a complete anthropomorphism; and that\nwhen He did this, He was not entitled to be heard.\n\nOne of the most radical of this class is Rabbi Wise who, in \"The\nMartyrdom of Jesus,\" says: \"Had Jesus maintained before a Jewish court\nto be the Son of God, in the trinitarian sense of the terms, viz., that\nHe was part, person, or incarnation of the Deity, He must have said it\nin terms to be understood to that effect, as ambiguous words amount to\nnothing. But if even clearly understood, the court could only have found\nHim insane, but not guilty of any crime.\" This is strong language,\nindeed, and deserves serious consideration. It means nothing less than\nthat Jesus, upon His confession of equality and identity with God,\nshould have been committed as a lunatic, and not tried as a criminal.\nAnd the real meaning of this too extreme view is that the claims of\nJesus, being a man in the flesh, to membership in a plurality of gods\nwas such an outrageous and unheard-of thing that it amounted to\ninsanity; and that an insane person was not one to be listened to, but\nto be committed and protected. The purpose of the distinguished Hebrew\ntheologian was to show by the absurdity of the thing that Jesus was\nnever tried before a Hebrew court; that He never claimed to be the Son\nof God, and that the Evangelical narratives are simply false. The same\nwriter thus continues in the same connection: \"Mark reports furthermore,\nthat Jesus did not simply affirm the high priest's question but added:\n'And ye shall see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of power, and\ncoming in the clouds of heaven.' Jesus cannot have said these words. Our\nreasons are: they are not true; none of the judges and witnesses present\never did see him either sitting on the right hand of power or coming in\nthe clouds of heaven. These words could have originated only after the\ndeath of Jesus, when the Jewish Christians expected his immediate return\nas the Messiah and restorer of the kingdom of heaven, so that those very\nmen could see him coming in the clouds of heaven. Besides, Jesus, the\nPharisean Jew, could not have entertained the anthropomorphism that God\nhad a _right hand_.\"[326] It is only necessary to add that Rabbi Wise\nmay be right, if the Gospel writers were untruthful men. Suffice it to\nsay that we have said enough in support of the veracity of the\nEvangelists in Part I of this volume. If we are right that they were\ntruthful historians when they published these biographies to the world,\nRabbi Wise is wrong; for according to these writers the Sanhedrin did\nnot take the view that Jesus was a crazy man, but that He was a\ncriminal. They accordingly tried Him to the extent of bringing an\naccusation against Him and of supporting it with a certain kind and\namount of testimony, and by then leading Him away to be crucified by the\nRomans. Our contention is that the trial was not complete, in that His\njudges did not consider the merits of the defense of Jesus in the\nproceedings which they conducted against Him.\n\nIt would be entirely consistent with the plan of this treatise and of\nthe special treatment of this theme to ignore completely the question of\nthe divinity of Jesus; since we have announced a legal and not a\ntheological consideration of the subject. But we repeat that the\ntheological and the legal are inseparably interwoven in a proper\nhandling of Point XII. If Rabbi Wise and others are right that the\nanthropomorphic pretensions of Jesus robbed Him of the protection of the\nlaw, in the sense that His claims to be God in the flesh were not worthy\nof consideration by a Hebrew court, then we are wrong in making the\npoint that the merits of His defense should have been considered.\n\nOur contention is that the claims of Jesus were not so strange and\nshocking as to place Him without the pale of the law and to deny Him its\nordinary protection; that His pretensions were not those of an insane\nman; that if He was not the Son of God He was guilty of blasphemy; and\nthat if He was the Son of God He was innocent. We further contend that\nall these things were subjects of legitimate judicial examination by\nHebrew judges under Hebrew law, and that Jesus should have had His day\nin court.\n\nA very brief examination of the question of anthropomorphism in its\nconnection with the claims of Jesus will demonstrate the fallacy of the\narguments of Rabbi Wise and of those who agree with him. Candor compels\nus to admit that the Jewish conception of Jehovah at the time of the\ncrucifixion was very foreign to the notion of a God of flesh and bone.\nHebrew monotheism taught the doctrine of one God who was purely\nspiritual, and therefore invisible, intangible, and unapproachable.\nJudaism delighted to lift its deity above the sensual, material, and\ncorporeal things of earth, and to represent Him as a pure and sinless\nspirit in a state of awful and supreme transcendence. Our first\nimpression, then, is that this dogma of divine unity and spirituality\nmust have received a dreadful shock when Jesus, a carpenter of Nazareth,\nwhose mother, father, brothers, and sisters were known, confronted the\nhigh priest and declared to him that He was God. But the shock was\ncertainly not so great that Caiaphas and his colleagues, after a\nmoment's composure and reflection, could not have concluded that the\npretensions of Jesus were not wholly at variance with the revelations of\nHebrew theology in the earlier years of the Commonwealth of Israel. They\nmight have judged His claims to be unfounded, but they were certainly\nnot justified in pronouncing Him insane, or in ignoring His rights under\nthe law to be heard and to have His defense considered. Their arrest and\ntrial of the prisoner was the consummation of a number of secret\nmeetings in which the astounding personality and marvelous performances\nof Jesus were debated and discussed with fear and trembling. The\nraising of Lazarus from the dead had created a frightful panic among the\nSadducean oligarchy. Far from regarding Him as an obscure person whose\nclaims were ridiculous and whose mind was unbalanced, the priests feared\nlest all men might believe on Him, and boldly declared that such was the\ninfluence of His deeds that His single life might be balanced against\nthe existence of a whole nation.[327]\n\nWhat the judges of the Sanhedrin should have done in examining the\nmerits of the defense of Jesus was: (1) To consider whether, in the\nlight of Hebrew scripture and tradition, a god of flesh and bone,\nrepresenting the second person of a Duality or a Trinity of gods, was\npossible; (2) to weigh thoroughly the claims of Jesus, in the light of\ntestimony properly adduced at the trial, that He was this second person\nof a Duality or Trinity of gods.\n\nIn making this examination, let us bear in mind, the members of the\ncourt were not to look forward, but backward. They were to examine the\npast, not the future, in reference to the present. Furthermore, they\nwere not to consider so much a Trinity as a Duality of gods; for it must\nbe remembered that the Holy Ghost was not a feature of the trial. The\nAthanasian creed and the proceedings of the Nicene Council were not\nbinding upon Caiaphas and his fellow-judges. Nor were the teachings of\nthe New Testament scriptures published to the world more than a\ngeneration after the trial. They were to consider the divine pretensions\nof Jesus in the light of the teachings and revelations of the Law and\nthe Prophets. They were to measure His claims by these standards in the\nlight of the evidence adduced before them.\n\nWith a view to a thorough and systematic examination of the merits of\nthe defense of Jesus, Caiaphas, as presiding officer of the Sanhedrin,\nshould have propounded to his fellow-judges the following initial\nquestions: (1) Do the Law and the Prophets reveal the doctrine of a\nplurality of gods among the Israelites? That is, has Jehovah ever\nbegotten, or has He ever promised to beget, a Son of equal divinity with\nHimself? Was this Son to be, or is He to be born of a woman; and to\nhave, therefore, the form of a man and the attributes of a human being?\nWas this Son to be, or is He to be at any time identical with the\nFather? Do the Law and the Prophets tell us unmistakably that Jehovah\never appeared upon the earth in human form and exhibited human\nattributes? Do they contain a promise from the Father that He would send\nHis Son to the earth to be the Redeemer of men and the Regenerator of\nthe world? (2) Do the credentials of Jesus, the prisoner at the bar, in\nthe light of the evidence before us, entitle Him to be considered this\nSon and Ambassador of God, sent from the Father to redeem mankind?\n\nIt follows logically and necessarily that if affirmative answers were\nnot given to the first set of questions an examination of the second\nwould be useless. Let us conceive, then, that the judges of the\nSanhedrin had employed this method. What answers, we may ask, would\nthey have developed to these questions from the Sacred Books?\n\nAt the outset it is safe to say that negative answers would have been\ngiven, if the judges had considered the claims of Jesus with reference\nalone to the prevailing Pharisaic teachings of the days of Jesus. And in\nthis connection let us note that the Hebrew conception of Jehovah had\nmaterially changed in the time intervening between the Mosaic\ndispensation and the coming of the Christ. The spiritual growth of the\nnation had been characterized at every step by marked aversion to\nanthropomorphism--the ascription to God of human form and attributes. In\nthe Pentateuch there is a prevailing anthropomorphic idea of Jehovah. He\nis frequently talked about as if He were a man. Human passions and\nemotions are repeatedly ascribed to Him. This was inevitable among a\nprimitive people whose crude religious consciousness sought to frame\nfrom the analogy of human nature a visible symbol of the Deity and a\nsensible emblem of religious faith. All early religions have manifested\nthe same anthropomorphic tendencies. Both Judaism and Christianity have\nlong since planted themselves upon the fundamental proposition that God\nis a spirit. But both these systems of religion have in all ages been\ncompelled to run the gantlet of two opposing tendencies: one of which\nsought by a living, personal communion with God through Moses and\nthrough Christ, by means of human attributes and symbols, an intimate\nknowledge and immediate benefit of the divine nature; the other, from a\nhorror of anthropomorphism, tending to make God purely passionless and\nimpersonal, thus reducing Him to a bare conception without form or\nquality, thus making Him a blank negation.\n\nThe successive steps in the progress of weeding out anthropomorphisms\nfrom the Pentateuch may be clearly traced in later Hebrew literature.\nThe Prophets themselves were at times repelled by the sensuous\nconceptions of God revealed by the writings of Moses. The great lawgiver\nhad attributed to Jehovah the quality of repentance, a human attribute.\n\"And it _repented_ the Lord that he had made man on the earth, and it\ngrieved him at his heart,\" says Genesis vi. 6. But a later writer, the\nprophet Samuel, denied that God had such a quality. \"And also the\nStrength of Israel will not lie nor repent: for he is not a man, that he\nshould repent.\"[328] And the prophet Hosea affirms this declaration when\nhe places in the mouth of Jehovah the affirmation: \"For I am God and not\nman.\"[329]\n\nAt a still later age, when the notion of the supreme transcendence of\nJehovah had become prevalent, it was considered objectionable to make\nGod say, \"I will dwell in your midst\"; as a substitute, \"I shall cause\nyou to dwell\" was adopted. \"To behold the face of God\" was not a\nrepulsive phrase in the ancient days of Hebrew plainness and simplicity,\nbut later times sought to eradicate the anthropomorphism by saying\ninstead, \"to appear before God.\"\n\nThe Septuagint, the Greek version of the Bible in use at the time of\nChrist, reveals the same tendency toward paraphrasing or spiritualizing\nthe anthropomorphic phrases of the older Bible. In this translation the\n\"image of God\" of the older Hebrew literature becomes \"the glory of\nGod,\" and \"the mouth of God\" is expressed by \"the voice of the Lord.\"\n\nThe Septuagint was written more than a century before the birth of\nJesus, and we may safely assert that at the beginning of our era the\nJews not only affirmatively proclaimed the doctrine of divine unity and\npure spirituality, in relation to the person and character of Jehovah,\nbut that they boldly and indignantly denied and denounced any attempt to\nmake of God a man or to attribute to Him human qualities. But when we\nsay \"the Jews,\" we mean the dominant religious sect of the nation, the\nPharisees. We should not forget, in this connection, that the primary\ndifference between the Sadducees and the Pharisees was in the varying\nintensity with which they loved the Law of Moses and adhered to its\nteachings. We have seen in Part II of this volume that the Mishna, the\noral law, was really more highly esteemed by the Pharisaic Jews than was\nthe Mosaic Code. But the Sadducees planted themselves squarely upon the\nPentateuch and denied that the traditions of the Scribes were of binding\nforce. \"The Sadducees were a body of aristocrats opposed to the oral law\nand the later developments of Judaism.\"\n\nNow what views, we may ask, did the Sadducees entertain of the\npossibility of God appearing to men in the flesh? In other words, what\nwas their notion, at the time of Christ, of the anthropomorphisms of the\nPentateuch, which was their ultimate guide and standard in all matters\nof legal and religious interpretation? These questions are important in\nthis connection, since Caiaphas and the large majority of his colleagues\nin the Great Sanhedrin were Sadducees and held the fate of Jesus in\ntheir hands. Candor compels us to admit that we believe that the\nSadducees agreed with the Pharisees that Jehovah was a pure and sinless\nspirit. But we feel equally sure that their knowledge of the Pentateuch,\nin which at times anthropomorphism is strongly accentuated, taught them\nthat Jehovah had not only appeared in the flesh among men in olden\ntimes, but that it was not at all impossible or unreasonable that He\nshould come again in the same form. But this much is certain: that in\ndetermining whether Jesus could be both man and God the Sadducees would\nbe disposed to ignore the traditions of the Pharisees and \"the later\ndevelopments of Judaism,\" and appeal direct to the law of Moses. Jesus\nHimself, if He had been disposed to make a defense of His claims, and\nHis judges had been disposed to hear Him, would have appealed to the\nsame legal standard. Christ more than once manifested a disposition to\nappeal to the Mosaic Code, as a modern citizen would appeal from mere\nstatutes and the decisions of the courts, to the constitution, as the\nfundamental law of the land. Mark tells us that in denouncing the\nPharisees, He used this language: \"And he said unto them, Full well ye\nreject the commandment of God, that ye may keep your own tradition....\nMaking the word of God of none effect through your tradition, which ye\nhave delivered: and many such like things do ye.\"[330] Hebrew sacred\nliterature is filled with anecdotes, often characterized by raillery and\njests, of how the Sadducces denounced the Pharisees for their attempts\nto nullify Mosaic injunction by their peculiar interpretation.\n\nNow in view of what we have just said, are we not justified in assuming\nthat if the judges had accorded Jesus full liberty of defense He would\nhave appealed to the Pentateuch, with the approbation of His judges, to\nshow that God had appeared among men in the flesh, and that a plurality\nin the Godhead was plainly taught? Would He not then have appealed to\nthe Prophets to show that Jehovah had spoken of a begotten Son who was\nnone other than Almighty God Himself? Would He not have shown from both\nthe Law and the Prophets that the angel of Jehovah, who was none other\nthan Himself, had frequently, in ages past, acted as the ambassador of\nGod in numerous visits to the earth, on missions of love and mercy among\nmen? Would He not have proved to them that this angel of Jehovah had\nbeen at certain times in the past none other than Jehovah Himself? Could\nHe not have pointed out to them that their whole sacred literature was\nfilled with prophecies foretelling the coming of this Son and Ambassador\nof God to the earth to redeem fallen man? Could He not then have\nsummoned a hundred witnesses to prove His own connection with these\nprophecies, to show His virgin birth, and to give an account of the\nnumerous miracles which He had wrought, and that were the best evidence\nof His divine character?\n\nLet us imagine that Caiaphas, as judge, had demanded of Jesus, the\nprisoner, to produce Biblical evidence that God had ever begotten or had\npromised to beget a Son who was equal with Himself. The following\npassages might have been produced:\n\n    Psa. ii. 7: Thou art my son; this day have I begotten thee.\n\n    Isa. ix. 6: For unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given: and\n      the government shall be upon his shoulder: and his name shall be\n      called Wonderful, Counselor, The mighty God, The everlasting\n      Father, The Prince of Peace.\n\nWhat closer identity, we may ask, could be demanded between the Father\nand the Son than is revealed by this language of Isaiah, \"and his (the\nson's) name shall be called The mighty God, The everlasting Father?\"\nWhat more exact equality could be asked than the same words suggest?\nWhat stronger proof of plurality in the Godhead could be demanded?\n\nAgain, let us suppose that His judges had demanded of Jesus scriptural\nproof that the divine Son of God was to be born of a woman, and was to\nhave, therefore, the form of a man and the attributes of a human being.\nThe following passages might have been produced:\n\n    Isa. vii. 14: Therefore the Lord himself shall give you a sign;\n      Behold, a virgin shall conceive and bear a son, and shall call his\n      name Immanuel.\n\n    Gen. iii. 15: And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and\n      between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou\n      shalt bruise his heel.\n\n    Enoch lxii. 5: And one Portion of them will look on the other, and\n      they will be terrified, and their countenance will fall, and they\n      will seize them when they see _that Son of Woman_ sitting on the\n      throne of his glory.\n\nThe first of these passages needs no comment. It is perfectly clear and\nspeaks for itself. Regarding the second, it may be observed that after\nthe fall of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden it was announced that the\nseed of the woman should bruise the serpent's head. This announcement\ncontained, when viewed in the light of subsequent revelations, both a\npromise and a prophecy; a promise of a Redeemer of fallen man, and a\nprophecy that He would finally triumph over all the powers of sin and\ndarkness whose father was Satan, who had entered into the serpent. The\n\"seed of the woman\" foretold that the Redeemer would have a human\nnature; His triumph over Satan suggested His divine origin and power.\n\nAgain, continuing the examination, let us suppose that Caiaphas had\ninformed Jesus that His pretensions to be God in the flesh were not only\nnot sanctioned by but were offensive to the current teachings of Judaism\nin relation to the person and character of Jehovah. Let us suppose,\nfurther, that the high priest had informed the prisoner that he and his\nfellow-judges, who were Sadducees in faith and a majority in number of\nthe Sanhedrin, did not feel themselves bound by Pharisaic tradition and\n\"the later developments of Judaism\"; that they preferred the Mosaic Code\nas a standard of legal and religious judgment; that the anthropomorphisms\nof the Pentateuch were not particularly offensive to them, for the\nreason that they had not been to Moses; and that if He, the prisoner at\nthe bar, could cite instances related by Moses where Jehovah had\nappeared among men, having the form of a human being, His case would be\ngreatly strengthened; on the ground that if God had ever appeared in the\nflesh on one occasion it was not unreasonable, or at least impossible,\nthat He should so appear again.\n\nIn proof that God had appeared in the flesh, or at least in human form,\namong men, the following passages might have been adduced:\n\n    Gen. xviii. 1-8: And the Lord appeared unto him in the plains of\n      Mamre: and he sat in the tent door in the heat of the day; And he\n      lifted up his eyes and looked, and, lo, three men stood by him:\n      and when he saw them, he ran to meet them from the tent door, and\n      bowed himself toward the ground, And said, My Lord, if now I have\n      found favour in thy sight, pass not away, I pray thee, from thy\n      servant: ... And Abraham ran unto the herd, and fetched a calf\n      tender and good, and gave it unto a young man; and he hasted to\n      dress it. And he took butter, and milk, and the calf which he had\n      dressed, and set it before them; and he stood by them under the\n      tree, and they did eat.\n\n     Gen. xvi. 10-13: And the angel of the Lord said unto her, I will\n      multiply thy seed exceedingly, that it shall not be numbered for\n      multitude. And the angel of the Lord said unto her, Behold, thou\n      art with child, and shalt bear a son, and shalt call his name\n      Ishmael; because the Lord hath heard thy affliction.... And she\n      called the name of the Lord that spake unto her, Thou God seest\n      me: for she said, Have I also here looked after him that seeth me?\n\n    Gen. xxii. 11, 12: And the angel of the Lord called unto him out of\n      heaven, and said, Abraham, Abraham: and he said, Here am I. And he\n      said, Lay not thine hand upon the lad, neither do thou any thing\n      unto him: for now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast\n      not withheld thy son, thine only son, from me.\n\n    Ex. iii. 2-6: And the Angel of the Lord appeared unto him in a flame\n      of fire out of the midst of a bush: and he looked, and, behold,\n      the bush burned with fire, and the bush was not consumed. And\n      Moses said, I will not turn aside, and see this great sight, why\n      the bush is not burnt. And when the Lord saw that he turned aside\n      to see, God called unto him out of the midst of the bush, and\n      said, Moses, Moses. And he said, Here am I. And he said, Draw not\n      nigh hither: put off thy shoes from off thy feet; for the place\n      whereon thou standest is holy ground. Moreover he said, I am the\n      God of thy father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the\n      God of Jacob. And Moses hid his face; for he was afraid to look\n      upon God.\n\nFrom the first passage above cited it is clear that Jehovah, in the form\nof a man, appeared to Abraham in the plains of Mamre. A contributor to\n\"The Jewish Encyclopedia\" declares that these three men were angels in\nthe shape of human beings of extraordinary beauty but that they were not\nat once recognized as angels.[331] The Christian commentators are\ngenerally agreed that it was Jehovah who was present in human form.[332]\nThe other members of the company are declared by some of them to be the\nsecond and third persons of the Trinity. Plausibility is given to this\ncontention by the fact that Abraham first saw one person, the Lord;\nthen he looked up and saw three; he then advanced to meet the three,\nand, addressing them, used a singular epithet, \"My Lord.\" The form of\nthe address, together with the movements of Abraham, seem to suggest\nthree in one and one in three. But with this theory we are not seriously\nconcerned, as our present purpose is to show that Jehovah occasionally\nappeared in human form upon the earth in the olden days. A plurality of\ngods is suggested, however, by the passage, if Christian interpretation\nbe applied; for if one of these men was Jehovah, as Abraham's language\nseems to indicate, and as modern Christian interpretation generally\nmaintains, why could not the other two men have also been gods in the\nform of the Son and the Holy Spirit? If the Jewish commentator's\nopinion, to which we have referred heretofore, be plausible--that the\nthree men were angels in human form--why is it not equally as plausible\nto suppose that a god or gods should also appear in human form? But at\nall events these three men were not ordinary human beings. He who\nmaintains that they were assaults the intelligence of either the\ntranslators of the Bible or of Abraham, or both; for the Hebrew\npatriarch believed that Jehovah was present as a guest in his house, and\nhe spread a hospitable meal for him. The language of Genesis very\nclearly indicates as much. And the question may be asked: If Abraham\ncould not recognize Jehovah, who could or can?\n\nIn the second of the above extracts from Genesis the angel of the Lord\nappeared unto Hagar and said to her: \"I will multiply thy seed\nexceedingly, that it shall not be numbered for multitude.\" And Hagar\nmade reply: \"And she called the name of the Lord that spake unto her,\nThou God seest me.\" This passage plainly teaches that the angel of the\nLord and Jehovah were sometimes identical.\n\nThe third passage heretofore cited from Genesis also teaches the\nidentity of the angel of the Lord and of God Himself, in the matter of\nthe attempted sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham. It was the same voice, that\nof the angel of the Lord, that said: \"For now I know that thou fearest\nGod, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son from me.\"\n\nAgain, the identity of the angel of the Lord and of Jehovah is\nunmistakably shown from the account of the voice that cried from the\nburning bush: \"I am the God of thy father, the God of Abraham, the God\nof Isaac, and the God of Jacob. And Moses hid his face, for he was\nafraid to look upon God.\"\n\nConcerning the manifestation of Jehovah to men in angelic and human form\na modern writer says: \"Much has been written concerning a certain\nMal'akh Yaweh (messenger of Jehovah) who appears in the Old Testament. I\nsay 'a certain' Mal'akh Yaweh, because it is not every Mal'akh Yaweh\nthat appears to which I refer. In most passages the Mal'akh Yaweh is\nsimply an angel sent by the Almighty to communicate his will or purposes\nto men. These angels are distinctly apprehended as created\nintelligences, wholly separate and diverse from God. But there is a\nclass of passages in which the Mal'akh Yaweh appears as a\nself-manifestation of God. He appears indeed in human form and speaks\nof God in the third person. But those to whom he appears are oppressed\nby the consciousness that they have seen God and must die. They see in\nhim an impersonation of Deity such as is found in no other angel. He is\nto their minds not merely a messenger from God but the revelation of the\nbeing of God. The Christian fathers for the most part identify him with\nthe Logos of the New Testament. But there is as much reason to adopt the\nopinion of many modern writers who hold that he is Jehovah himself\nappearing in human form, for he is explicitly addressed as Jehovah\n(Judges vi. 11-24).\"[333]\n\nThe identity of the angel of Jehovah and of Jehovah Himself could not be\nmore conclusively proved than in the appearance to Gideon, related in\nthe passage above cited, Judges vi. 11-24. The absolute identity is\nrevealed in verses 22, 23: \"And when Gideon perceived that he was an\nangel of the Lord, Gideon said, Alas, O Lord God! for because I have\nseen an angel of the Lord face to face. And the Lord said unto him,\nPeace be unto thee; fear not: thou shalt not die.\"\n\nNow let us suppose that Caiaphas and the Sanhedrin had received these\npassages favorably; that they had become convinced that Jehovah had\nappeared in the olden days in the form of angels and of men; that at one\ntime He was identical with a man, and at another with an angel whom He\nhad sent. Let us suppose further that the judges of Jesus had demanded\nof Him a passage of ancient Scriptures connecting Him even remotely\nwith this messenger of God. The following passage might have been\nproduced:\n\n    Ex. xxiii. 20, 21: Behold, I send an Angel before thee, to keep\n      thee in the way, and to bring thee into the place which I have\n      prepared. Beware of him, and obey his voice, provoke him not; for\n      he will not pardon your transgressions: for my name is in him.\n\nThe concluding paragraph of the last cited passage, \"My name is in him,\"\nis equivalent to \"I am in him.\" The mere name of God is often used to\ndenote God Himself as manifested. For instance, in I Kings viii. 29 is\ncontained the statement, \"My name shall be there\"; that is, \"There will\nI dwell.\" And when it is said that the name of Jehovah would be in the\nangel of Jehovah it is equivalent to saying that Jehovah Himself would\nbe present in His messenger which He had sent before Him. The passage\nfurther teaches that the messenger of Jehovah to the earth bore a\ncommission to pardon sin, or not to, according to his pleasure. The\nSanhedrin were undoubtedly aware that Jesus claimed the same power by\nvirtue of authority vested in Him by His Father.\n\nBut it may be imagined that Caiaphas was perfectly willing to concede\nthat Jehovah had appeared in human form upon the earth, but was not\ninclined to believe that He had ever manifested human passions and\nemotions, as Jesus had done when He denounced on several occasions the\nhypocrisy of the Pharisees; and, above all, when He overthrew the tables\nin the Temple, and, applying a lash to their backs, drove out the\nmoney-changers.[334] Let us imagine that the high priest demanded of the\nprisoner proof from the ancient Scriptures that Jehovah was possessed of\nordinary human attributes; and particularly that He was at times\ndisposed to fight. Jesus might have produced the following passages to\nshow that Jehovah, His Father, had manifested in times past the ordinary\nhuman passions and emotions of repentance, grief, jealousy, anger,\ngraciousness, love, and hate:\n\n    Ex. xv. 3, 6: The Lord is a man of war.... Thy right hand, O\n      Lord, is become glorious in power: thy right hand, O Lord, hath\n      dashed in pieces the enemy.\n\n    Gen. vi. 6: And it _repented_ the Lord that he had made man on the\n      earth, and it grieved him at his heart.\n\n    Deut. vi. 15: For the Lord thy God is a _jealous_ God among you,\n      lest the anger of the Lord thy God be kindled against thee, and\n      destroy thee from off the face of the earth.\n\n    Psa. cxi. 4: He hath made his wonderful works to be remembered: the\n      Lord is _gracious_ and full of _compassion_.\n\n    I Kings x. 9: Because the Lord _loved_ Israel forever, therefore\n      made he thee king, to do judgment and justice.\n\n    Prov. vi. 16: These six things doth the Lord _hate_: yea, seven are\n      an abomination unto him.\n\nAnd as a final step in the examination let us imagine that Caiaphas and\nhis colleagues had stated to Jesus that they were satisfied, from the\nauthorities cited, that Jehovah had, in ancient days, appeared upon the\nearth in human form and had exhibited human attributes; that Jehovah had\nbegotten a Son who was equal in power and majesty with Himself; that\nthis Son had been begotten of a woman and possessed, therefore, human\nform and attributes; that this Jehovah had sent an angel messenger to\nthe earth with a commission to pardon sins. Let us imagine further that\nthe judges had demanded of the prisoner that He present and prove His\ncredentials as the divine ambassador of God from heaven to men on earth;\nthat He conform His personal claims to heavenly Messiahship to ancient\nprophecy by producing evidence before them in court. What facts, we may\nask, could Jesus have shown to establish His claims to Messiahship and\nto Sonship of the Father?\n\nTo attempt to originate a defense for Jesus would be unnecessary, if not\nactually impertinent and sacrilegious. We are fully justified, however,\nin assuming that if called upon to prove His claims to Messiahship He\nwould have made the same reply to the Sanhedrin that He had already made\nto the Jews out of court who asked Him: \"What sign shewest thou, then,\nthat we may see, and believe thee? what dost thou work?\"[335] \"How long\ndost thou make us to doubt? If thou be the Christ, tell us plainly.\nJesus answered them, I told you, and ye believed not: _the works that I\ndo in my Father's name, they bear witness of me_.\"[336] Again, He would\nhave doubtless made the same reply to Caiaphas that He did to the\nembassy from John the Baptist who came to inquire if He was really the\nMessiah. \"Jesus answered and said unto them, Go and shew John again\nthose things which ye do hear and see: The blind receive their sight,\nand the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, the dead\nare raised up, and the poor have the gospel preached to them.\"[337]\n\nUnder a fair trial, in daylight, with full freedom of defense to the\naccused, abundant evidence could have been secured of the miraculous\npowers of Jesus and of the truthfulness of His pretensions to a divine\norigin. Testimony could have been introduced that would have been not\nonly competent but entirely satisfactory. The New Testament narratives\ntell us of about forty miracles that Jesus performed during His life.\nThe closing verse of St. John intimates that He performed many that were\nnever reported. The circumstances surrounding the working of these\nwonders were such as to make them peculiarly competent as evidence and\nto carry conviction of their genuineness, when they were once\nintroduced.\n\nIn the first place, miracles were entirely capable of being proved by\ntestimony. If those persons who had known Lazarus intimately during his\nlifetime saw him dead on one day, and on the fourth day afterwards saw\nhim alive and walking the streets, the senses would be perfectly\ncompetent to decide and the fact that a miracle had been performed would\nbe conclusively proved. And it may be added that a dozen witnesses who\nwere entirely competent to testify could have been summoned to the\ndefense of Jesus in the matter of raising Lazarus from the dead.\n\nAgain, we must remember that the miracles of Jesus were performed in the\nmost public manner, in the street, on the highway, in far-away Galilee,\nand at the very gates of Jerusalem. Both His friends and enemies, men\nand women, were witnesses of their performance. The number and publicity\nof these wonder-working performances rendered it possible for the\nSanhedrin to call before them hundreds and thousands of competent\nwitnesses who had seen and felt the manifestation of the divine power of\nthe prisoner in their presence.\n\nAgain, the miracles of Jesus were such as to render them subject to the\ntest of the senses, when submitted to examination. If Caiaphas and his\nfellow-judges had decided that there was fraud in the matter of the\nalleged raising of Lazarus from the dead, because the brother of Martha\nand Mary was not really dead, but simply swooned or slept; if they had\ndecided that the man sick of the palsy was not cured by miracle, but by\nfaith; nevertheless, they could not have charged fraud and faith cure in\nthe matter of the stilling of the tempest or the feeding of the five\nthousand or the walking on the sea. They would have been forced to\nconclude that the witnesses had lied or that miracles had been wrought.\nIn the case of the feeding of the five thousand, the witnesses would\nhave been too numerous to brand with falsehood.\n\nBut, we may ask, was the performance of miracles by Jesus, if believed\nby the Sanhedrin, sufficient evidence of the divine origin of Jesus?\nThis question we are not prepared to answer positively, either yes or\nno. We can only venture the personal opinion that the act of raising a\nperson indisputably dead, to life again, would be an astounding\nmiracle, an achievement that could be wrought by the hand of a God\nalone. The trouble with the question is that men like Elijah raised the\ndead.[338] It is true that there is no pretension that Elijah was divine\nor that he wrought the miracle by virtue of any peculiar power within\nhimself. The Scriptures plainly state that he asked God to raise the\ndead to life through him. The same is true of the raising of Lazarus by\nJesus.[339] But Christ seems to have raised the daughter of Jairus[340]\nand the son of the widow of Nain[341] from the dead by virtue of the\nstrength of His own divinity; for there is no suggestion that the power\nof God was either previously invoked or subsequently acknowledged.\n\nAs to the weight which the testimony of the miracles of Jesus should\nhave had with Caiaphas and the other members of the court, we have a\nvaluable indication in the opinion expressed by Nicodemus, who was\nhimself a member of the Sanhedrin, when he said to Jesus: \"We know that\nthou art a teacher come from God: for no man can do these miracles that\nthou doest, except God be with him.\"[342] If Nicodemus, \"a ruler of the\nJews\" and one of the leading members of their highest tribunal, believed\nthat Jesus was divine because of the wonders that He had wrought, why\nshould not a knowledge of these miracles by the other members of the\nSanhedrin have produced the same impression? Nicodemus, it is true, was\na friend of Jesus, but he was not a disciple. And the very timidity\nwith which he expressed his friendship, having come at night to pay his\ncompliments to the Master, demonstrates the deep impression that the\nmiraculous powers of the Christ had made upon him.\n\nBut the judges of Jesus were not limited to the evidence of miracles as\na proof of the divinity of the prisoner in their midst. They should have\nweighed \"in the sincerity of their conscience\" the fact that Jesus was\nborn in Bethlehem in fulfillment of the prophecy contained in Micah v.\n2; that He was sprung from the House of David in conformity with the\nteachings in Jeremiah xxiii. 5, 6; that John the Baptist was His\nforerunner like unto Elijah, who had come to prepare the way according\nto the prophecy in Malachi iii. 1; that He had begun to preach in\nGalilee, as foretold in Isaiah ix. 1, 2; that the scepter had departed\nfrom Judah and the lawgiver from between his feet, as prophesied in\nGenesis xlix. 10, which fact it was believed would herald the approach\nof the Messiah; that He had made His public entry into Jerusalem riding\nupon an ass, as foretold in Zechariah ix. 9; and that He had been\nbetrayed into their hands by one of His own friends, in fulfillment of\nprophecies contained in Psalms xli. 9 and Zechariah xi. 12, 13.\n\nThis cumulative evidence, this collective proof, must have carried\noverwhelming conviction to the minds and the hearts of fair and\nimpartial judges. More than one Nicodemus would have arisen to plead the\ncause of Jesus if this testimony had been adduced before a free-minded,\nopen-hearted, disinterested tribunal. More than one Joseph of Arimathea\nwould have refused assent in a hostile verdict against a prisoner in\nwhose favor the record of fact was so pronounced.\n\nIn determining the weight that this evidence should have had in\naffecting the decision of the judges we must not forget that a Jewish\nprisoner was not required to prove his innocence. It was incumbent upon\nthe Commonwealth of Israel to establish guilt beyond all doubt. We\nshould also remember that the peculiar tendency of the Hebrew system of\ncriminal procedure was in the direction of complete protection to the\naccused. Not reasonable doubt merely, but all doubt was resolved in his\nfavor. It was a maxim of the Hebrew law that \"the Sanhedrin was to save,\nnot to destroy life.\" Pretext after pretext was sought to acquit. \"The\nprimary object of the Hebrew judicial system,\" says Benny, \"was to\nrender the conviction of an innocent person impossible. All the\ningenuity of the Jewish legists was directed to the attainment of this\nend.\" If this generous and merciful tendency of Hebrew law had been duly\nobserved, would not the production of the evidence above noted have\nresulted in the acquittal of Jesus?\n\nBut, at this point, let us return to the consideration of the real\nmeaning of the objection urged in Point XII. The irregularity therein\nalleged is that the Sanhedrin paid no attention whatever to the defense\nof Jesus. And herein was the real error. The members of that court might\nhave rejected as false the claims of the Nazarene to Messiahship. They\nmight have denounced as fraudulent his pretensions to miraculous\npowers. They could not for this reason have been charged with judicial\nunfairness, if they had first heard his defense and had then \"weighed it\nin the sincerity of their conscience.\" Infallibility of judgment cannot\nbe demanded of judicial officers.\n\nIn closing the discussion of errors committed at the night trial in the\npalace of Caiaphas, the reader should be reminded that the twelve Points\nabove mentioned are not exhaustive of the irregularities. Others might\nbe mentioned. It seems that Jesus, being the accused, should not have\nbeen put under oath.[343] On the days on which capital verdicts were\npronounced Hebrew judges were required to mourn and fast.[344] But there\nwas evidently no mourning and fasting by Caiaphas and his colleagues at\nthe time of the condemnation of Jesus. Again, there is no evidence that\nAntecedent Warning was properly administered. Still other errors might\nbe noted, if a legal presumption in favor of the correctness of the\nrecord did not prevent. The irregularities which we have heretofore\ndiscussed, it is believed, exhaust all the material errors committed at\nthe first session of the Sanhedrin. At least, no others are revealed by\nthe Gospel records.\n\n_The Morning Session of the Sanhedrin._--About three hours after the\nclose of the night session in the palace of Caiaphas, that is about six\no'clock in the morning, the Sanhedrin reconvened in a second session.\nIn the interval between these sittings Jesus was brutalized by His\nkeepers. Exactly what the priests were doing we do not know. They were\nprobably busily engaged in perfecting plans for the destruction of the\nprisoner in their charge.\n\nThe daylight meeting is thus reported in Matthew xxvii. 1: \"When the\nmorning was come, all the chief priests and elders of the people took\ncounsel against Jesus to put him to death.\" In Mark xv. 1 the same\nsession is thus recorded: \"And straightway in the morning the chief\npriests held a consultation with the elders and scribes and the whole\ncouncil, and bound Jesus, and carried him away, and delivered him to\nPilate.\"\n\nThe exact nature of this morning sitting, whether a regular trial or an\ninformal gathering, is not certainly known. Meyer, Ellicott, and\nLichtenstein maintain that this second session was nothing more than a\nprolongation of the night trial, perhaps with a brief recess, and that\nits special object was to convene for consultation concerning the\ncarrying out of the sentence which had already been pronounced against\nJesus.[345] But this view is entirely exceptional. It is maintained by\nthe greater number of reputable authorities that the second sitting was\nin the nature of a second trial. The solution of the difficulty seems to\nturn upon the account given by St. Luke, for St. John records the\ndetails of neither the night nor the morning session. St. Luke describes\na regular trial, but it is not positively known whether his account\nrefers to the night or to the morning meeting. If his report refers to\nthe same trial as that described in Matthew xxvi. 57-68 and in Mark xiv.\n53-65, then we have only the brief notices in Matthew xxvii. 1 and in\nMark xv. 1 concerning the morning session, which indicate only a very\nbrief and informal meeting of the Sanhedrin at daybreak. On the other\nhand, if the report of St. Luke refers to the daylight meeting of the\nSanhedrin referred to by St. Matthew and St. Mark then we have received\nfrom the third Evangelist a description of a regular trial at the second\nsession of the Sanhedrin. Andrews has thus expressed himself very\ncogently concerning this matter:\n\n    Our decision as to a second and distinct session of the Sanhedrin\n    will mainly depend upon the place we give to the account in Luke\n    xxii. 66-71. Is this examination of Jesus identical with that first\n    session of Matthew xxvi. 57-68, and of Mark xiv. 53-65? Against\n    this identity are some strong objections: First, The mention of\n    time by Luke: \"As soon as it was day.\" This corresponds well to the\n    time of the morning session of Matthew and Mark, but not to the\n    time when Jesus was first led before the Sanhedrin, which must have\n    been two or three hours before day. Second, The place of the\n    meeting: \"They led Him into their council,\" [Greek: an\u00eagagon auton\n    eis to synedrion heaut\u00f4n]. This is rendered by some: \"They led Him\n    up into their council chamber,\" or the place where they usually\n    held their sessions. Whether this council chamber was the room\n    Gazith at the east corner of the court of the temple, is not\n    certain. Lightfoot (on Matthew xxvi. 3) conjectures that the\n    Sanhedrin was driven from this its accustomed seat half a year or\n    thereabout before the death of Christ. But if this were so, still\n    the \"Tabern\u00e6,\" where it established its sessions, were shops near\n    the gate Shusan, and so connected with the temple. They went up to\n    that room where they usually met. Third, The dissimilarity of the\n    proceedings, as stated by Luke, which shows that this was no formal\n    trial. There is here no mention of witnesses--no charges brought to\n    be proved against Him. He is simply asked to tell them if He is the\n    Christ (\"If thou art the Christ, tell us,\" R. V.); and this seems\n    plainly to point to the result of the former session. Then, having\n    confessed Himself to be the Christ, the Son of God, He was\n    condemned to death for blasphemy. It was only necessary now that He\n    repeat His confession, and hence this question is put directly to\n    Him: \"Art thou the Christ? tell us.\" His reply, \"If I tell you, ye\n    will not believe; and if I also ask you, ye will not answer me, nor\n    let me go,\" points backward to his former confession. To His reply\n    they only answer by asking, \"Art thou then the Son of God?\" The\n    renewed avowal that He is the Son of God, heard by them all from\n    His own lips, opens the way for His immediate delivery into\n    Pilate's hands. Fourth, The position which Luke gives (xxii. 63-65)\n    to the insults and abuse heaped upon Jesus. There can be no doubt\n    that they are the same mentioned by Matthew and Mark as occurring\n    immediately after the sentence had been first pronounced.\n\n    From all this it is a probable, though not a certain conclusion,\n    that Luke (xxii. 66-71) refers to the same meeting of the Sanhedrin\n    mentioned by Matthew (xxvii. 1) and Mark (xv. 1), and relates, in\n    part, what then took place. (Alford thinks that Luke has confused\n    things and relates as happening at the second session what really\n    happened at the first.) This meeting was, then, a morning session\n    convened to ratify formally what had been done before with haste\n    and informality. The circumstances under which its members had been\n    earlier convened, at the palace of Caiaphas, sufficiently show that\n    the legal forms, which they were so scrupulous in observing, had\n    not been complied with.[346]\n\nIf then the second session of the Sanhedrin was in the nature of a\nregular trial, what were the facts of the proceedings? St. Luke says:\n\"And as soon as it was day, the elders of the people and the chief\npriests and the scribes came together, and led him into their council,\nsaying, Art thou the Christ? tell us. And he said unto them, If I tell\nyou, ye will not believe: And if I also ask you, ye will not answer me,\nnor let me go. Hereafter shall the Son of man sit on the right hand of\nthe power of God. Then said they all, Art thou then the Son of God? And\nhe said unto them, Ye say that I am. And they said, What need we any\nfurther witness? for we ourselves have heard of his own mouth.\"[347]\n\nThe reader will readily perceive the source of the difficulty which we\nhave just discussed. This report of St. Luke points both ways, toward\nboth the night and morning sessions. \"_And as soon as it was day_\"\nclearly indicates a daybreak meeting, but the remainder of the account\nbears a most striking resemblance to the reports of the night trial\ngiven by St. Matthew and St. Mark. This seeming discrepancy is very\neasily reconciled, however, when we reflect that the second trial\nrequired by Hebrew law to be held in every case where a verdict of guilt\nhad been pronounced, was virtually a repetition of the first trial.\nBenny tells us that the second trial was a critical examination of the\ntrial of the first day, in which the questions and answers originally\nasked and made were carefully reviewed and re\u00ebxamined.[348] Is it very\nstrange, then, that at the morning trial described by St. Luke\nsubstantially the same questions are asked and answers given as are\nfound in the reports of the night trial by St. Matthew and St. Mark?\n\nWe may now ask: What was the purpose of this second trial? Why did not\nthe first trial suffice? According to the most reliable authorities, the\nanswer to this question is to be found in that provision of the Hebrew\nlaw which required two trials instead of one, in every case where the\nprisoner had been found guilty at the first trial. Not only were there\nto be two trials, but they were to be held on different days. The\nmorning session of the Sanhedrin was intended, therefore, to give a\nsemblance of legality and regularity to this requirement of Hebrew law.\nBut we shall see how completely the Sanhedrin failed in this design.\n\"What legitimacy,\" says Keim, \"might be lacking in the proceedings of\nthe nocturnal sitting of the Sanhedrin, was to be completely made up by\nthe morning sitting, without prejudice to the authority and the--in the\nmain point--decisive action of the former.... There nevertheless was no\nlack of illegality. The most striking instance of this was the fact that\nthough they wished to bring about an extension of the procedure over two\ndays they had in fact only two sittings, and not two separate days. But\ncontempt of the legal ordinances was much more seriously shown by the\nabsence of any investigation into the circumstances of the case at the\nsecond sitting, although _both law and tradition demanded such an\ninvestigation_.\"[349]\n\nIf \"both law and tradition demanded such an investigation,\" that is, if\nthe second trial of the case on the second day of the proceedings was\nrequired to be formal and in the nature of an action _de novo_; if the\nsecond trial was required by law to be characterized by all the\nformality, solemnity, and legality of the first trial; what errors, we\nmay ask, are disclosed by the reports of St. Luke, St. Matthew, and St.\nMark in the proceedings against Jesus conducted by the Sanhedrin at the\nmorning session? To be brief, reply may be made that the irregularities\nwere virtually the same as those that occurred at the night trial. The\nsame precipitancy that was forbidden by Hebrew law is apparent. This\nhaste prevented, of course, that careful deliberation and painstaking\ninvestigation of the case which the Mosaic Code as well as the rules of\nthe Mishna imperatively demanded. It is true that the second trial was\nnot conducted at night. But the Passover Feast was still in progress,\nand no court could legally sit at such a time. The Sanhedrin at the\nsecond session seems to have been still sitting in the palace of\nCaiaphas instead of the Hall of Hewn Stones, the legal meeting place of\nthe court. This we learn from a passage in St. John.[350] Again, no\nwitnesses seem to have been summoned, and the accused was convicted upon\nhis uncorroborated confession.\n\nAnd finally, the verdict at the second trial, as was the case in that of\nthe first, seems to have been unanimous, and therefore illegal. This\nunanimity is indicated by the combined reports of St. Matthew, St. Mark,\nand St. Luke. St. Matthew says: \"When the morning was come, _all_ the\nchief priests and elders of the people took counsel against Jesus to put\nHim to death.\" St. Mark says: \"And straightway in the morning, the chief\npriests held a consultation with the elders and scribes and the _whole\ncouncil_, and bound Jesus, and carried him away, and delivered him to\nPilate.\" These accounts of the first two Evangelists very clearly state\nthat the full Sanhedrin was present at the morning trial. Then St. Luke\nvery explicitly explains the nature and manner of the verdict: \"Then\nsaid they _all_, Art thou then the Son of God? And he said unto them, Ye\nsay that I am. And they said, What need we any further witness? for we\nourselves have heard of his own mouth.\"\n\nIt may be objected that no formal verdict was pronounced at the second\ntrial. Such a verdict would have been expressed in these words: \"Thou,\nJesus, art guilty.\"[351] While such words are not expressly reported by\nthe Evangelists, the account of St. Luke taken in connection with the\nreport of St. Mark of the night trial, which the morning session was\nintended to confirm, clearly indicates that such a verdict must have\nbeen pronounced. A reasonable inference from the whole context of the\nsynoptic writers in describing both trials certainly justifies such a\nconclusion.\n\nThe question again arises: If the full Sanhedrin was present at the\nmorning session and if all the members condemned Jesus, either with or\nwithout a formal verdict, is it not true that both Nicodemus and Joseph\nof Arimathea, who were doubtless members of the court, were arrayed\nagainst the Christ? If they were hostile in their attitude toward Him,\neither openly or by acquiescence at the morning session, does this fact\nnot help to support the contention made under Point IX that they voted\nagainst Him at the night trial? We are well aware that there is much\nopposition to this view, but we are, nevertheless, compelled to agree\nrather reluctantly with Keim that \"it is a pure supposition that members\nof the council who were secret friends of Jesus--whose existence,\nmoreover, cannot be established--either raised an opposition in one of\nthe sessions, or abstained from voting, or were not present.\"[352] The\nplain language of the Scriptures indicates: (1) That both Nicodemus[353]\nand Joseph of Arimathea[354] were members of the Great Sanhedrin; (2)\nthat they were both present at both trials;[355] and (3) that they both\neither voted against Him or tacitly acquiesced in the judgments\npronounced against Him.[356] We have already discussed under Point IX\nthe passage in Luke xxiii. 51 referring to the fact that Joseph of\nArimathea \"had not consented to the counsel and deed of them,\" which\nseems to furnish refutation of the contention which we have made, as far\nas such contention relates to Joseph of Arimathea. Suffice it to note\nthe opinion of Keim that \"the passage in itself can be held to refer to\nabsence or to dissent in voting.\"[357]\n\n\"And the whole multitude of them arose, and led him unto Pilate.\"\n\nThe reader may ask: Why did the Jews lead Jesus away to Pilate? When\nthey had condemned Him to death on the charge of blasphemy, why did they\nthemselves not put Him to death? Why did they invoke Roman interference\nin the matter? Why did they not stone Jesus to death, as Hebrew law\nrequired in the case of culprits convicted of blasphemy? Stephen was\nstoned to death for blasphemy.[358] What was the difference between his\ncase and that of Jesus? Why was Jesus crucified instead of being put to\ndeath by stoning?\n\nThe stoning of Stephen as a blasphemer by the Jews has been explained as\nan irregular outbreak of fanatical priests, a sort of mob violence. It\nhas also been contended that the case of Stephen was one of the rare\ninstances in which Roman procurators permitted the Jews to execute the\ndeath sentence. In any event it was an exceptional proceeding. At the\ntime of the crucifixion of Jesus and of the martyrdom of Stephen the\nJews had lost the right of enforcing the death penalty. Judea was a\nsubject province of the Roman empire. The Jews were permitted by the\nRomans to try capital cases. If an acquittal was the result, the Romans\ndid not interfere. If a verdict of guilty was found, the Jews were\ncompelled to lead the prisoner away to the Roman governor, who reviewed\nor retried the case as he saw fit. Accordingly, having condemned Him to\ndeath themselves, the Jews were compelled to lead Jesus away to the\npalace of Herod on the hill of Zion in which Pilate was stopping on the\noccasion of the Paschal Feast, to see what he had to say about the\nmatter, whether he would reverse or affirm the sentence which they had\npronounced.\n\nThe Roman trial of Jesus will be treated in the second volume of this\nwork.\n\n\nEND OF VOL. I\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] \"Testimony of the Evangelists,\" pp. 7-11.\n\n[2] \"Testimony of the Evangelists,\" pp. 25, 26.\n\n[3] I \"Starkie on Evidence,\" pp. 480-545.\n\n[4] John x. 30: \"I and my Father are one.\"\n\n[5] Matt. ix. 9.\n\n[6] Col. iv. 14: \"Luke, the beloved physician.\"\n\n[7] Matt. xxvi. 70-72.\n\n[8] Matt. xxvi. 46-50.\n\n[9] Matt. xxvi. 56.\n\n[10] Matt. xiv. 28-31.\n\n[11] Mark x. 35-42; Matt. xx. 20-25.\n\n[12] Matt. xi. 2, 3.\n\n[13] Mark iii. 21.\n\n[14] Luke iv. 28, 29.\n\n[15] Mark xiv. 51, 52.\n\n[16] \"Intro. Vie de Jesus.\"\n\n[17] Luke i. 2, 3.\n\n[18] \"Die synoptischen Evangelien,\" pp. 412-14.\n\n[19] Marcus Dods, \"The Bible, Its Origin and Nature,\" p. 184.\n\n[20] An opposite doctrine seems to be taught in Luke xii. 11, 12; xxiv.\n48, 49.\n\n[21] \"Evidences of Christianity,\" p. 319.\n\n[22] Matt. xiv. 12-20; Mark vi. 34-43; Luke ix. 12-17; John vi. 5-13.\n\n[23] Luke xxii. 64.\n\n[24] Luke xxii. 51.\n\n[25] Campbell's \"Philosophy of Rhetoric,\" c. v. b. 1, Part III, p. 125.\n\n[26] \"Intro. Vie de Jesus,\" p. 62.\n\n[27] D. L. Moody, \"Sermon on the Resurrection of Jesus.\"\n\n[28] See also I \"Starkie on Evidence,\" pp. 496-99.\n\n[29] \"Ant.,\" XVIII. 3, I.\n\n[30] See authorities cited in \"The Brief.\"\n\n[31] \"De iis qui sero puniuntur,\" p. 554.\n\n[32] P. 1080, edit. 45.\n\n[33] P. 1247, edit. 24, Huds.\n\n[34] P. 1327, edit. 43.\n\n[35] \"Productique omnes, virgisque c\u00e6si, ac securi percussi,\" Lib. XI.\nc. 5.\n\n[36] Domit. Cap. X. \"Patremfamilias--canibus objecit, cum hoc _titulo_,\nImpie locutus, parmularius.\"\n\n[37] Book LIV.\n\n[38] \"Aur. Vict. Ces.,\" Cap. XLI. \"Eo pius, ut etiam vetus veterrimumque\nsupplicium, patibulum, et cruribus suffringendis, primus removerit.\"\nAlso see Paley's \"Evidences of Christianity,\" pp. 266-68.\n\n[39] Luke xxii. 44.\n\n[40] Tissot, \"Trait\u00e9 des Nerfs,\" pp. 279, 280.\n\n[41] Joannes Schenck \u00e0 Grafenberg, \"Observ. Medic.,\" Lib. III. p. 458.\n\n[42] Voltaire, \"Oeuvres compl\u00e8tes,\" vol. xviii. pp. 531, 532.\n\n[43] De Mezeray, \"Histoire de France,\" vol. iii. p. 306.\n\n[44] John xix. 34.\n\n[45] John xix. 35.\n\n[46] John xviii. 6.\n\n[47] \"Encyc. Brit.,\" vol. xv. p. 550.\n\n[48] Mendelsohn, \"Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews,\" p.\n191.\n\n[49] Mendelsohn, p. 189, n. 1.\n\n[50] \"Jewish Encyc.,\" vol. xii. p. 1.\n\n[51] Emanuel Deutsch, \"The Talmud,\" p. 26.\n\n[52] Farrar, \"Hist. of Interpretation.\"\n\n[53] Emanuel Deutsch, \"The Talmud,\" p. 47.\n\n[54] \"Encyc. Brit.,\" vol. xxiii. p. 35.\n\n[55] Emanuel Deutsch, \"The Talmud,\" p. 58.\n\n[56] Emanuel Deutsch, \"The Talmud,\" p. 27.\n\n[57] Emanuel Deutsch, \"The Talmud,\" p. 27.\n\n[58] Deut. xvi. 18.\n\n[59] \"Ant.,\" XIII. 10, 6.\n\n[60] Horace.\n\n[61] Emanuel Deutsch, \"The Talmud,\" p. 12.\n\n[62] \"Jewish Encyc.,\" vol. xii. p. 22.\n\n[63] Emanuel Deutsch, \"Talmud,\" p. 12.\n\n[64] Maimon., \"H. Sanh.\" xv. 10-13.\n\n[65] Mendelsohn, \"Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews,\" pp.\n45-50.\n\n[66] Mendelsohn, \"Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews,\" pp.\n45-50.\n\n[67] Mendelsohn, p. 43.\n\n[68] Mendelsohn, pp. 39, 40.\n\n[69] Mendelsohn, pp. 39, 40.\n\n[70] Maimonides (\"Yad\"), \"Sanhedrin\" xix.\n\n[71] Dr. Smith's \"Hist. of Greece,\" p. 557.\n\n[72] \"Jewish Encyc.,\" vol. ii. p. 257.\n\n[73] Ex. ii. 12-16.\n\n[74] \"Sanh.\" 52b; Maim., \"H. Sanh.\" xv. 4.\n\n[75] \"H. Sanh.\" xv. 5.\n\n[76] Benny, \"Crim. Code of the Jews,\" p. 90.\n\n[77] Mendelsohn, p. 159.\n\n[78] Chap. I. 10; X. i, 2.\n\n[79] Matt. xxvi. 59.\n\n[80] \"Ant.,\" XIV. Chap. V. 4; \"Wars of the Jews,\" I. VIII. 5; \"Talmud,\"\n\"Sanhedrin.\"\n\n[81] \"Post Bibl. Hist.,\" vol. i. p. 106.\n\n[82] Matt. xvi. 21.\n\n[83] \"Commentary on the Law,\" vol. ccclxvi. recto.\n\n[84] \"Sanhedrin\" 32.\n\n[85] Benny.\n\n[86] Jose b. Halafta, I. c.\n\n[87] R. Johanan, \"Sanhedrin\" 19a.\n\n[88] Benny.\n\n[89] Benny.\n\n[90] \"Sanhedrin\" 17a; \"Menahoth\" 65a.\n\n[91] Sifre, Num. 92 (ed. Friedmann, p. 25b).\n\n[92] Yalkut, \"Exodus,\" Sec. 167.\n\n[93] Sotah 22b.\n\n[94] \"Const. of the Sanhedrin,\" Chap. I.\n\n[95] Benny, \"The Criminal Code of the Jews,\" p. 71.\n\n[96] Saalsch\u00fctz, \"Das Mosaische Recht,\" p. 58; Deut. xx. 5, 6.\n\n[97] Luke ii. 46-51.\n\n[98] Jer. xxxvii., xxxviii.\n\n[99] \"Jesus of Nazara,\" vol. vi. p. 45.\n\n[100] \"The Life and Words of Christ,\" vol. ii. p. 517.\n\n[101] \"Arch\u00e6ol.\" 87.\n\n[102] Acts xxiv. 1, 2.\n\n[103] I Kings iii. 16-28.\n\n[104] Mendelsohn, \"Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews,\" pp.\n102, 103.\n\n[105] Mendelsohn, pp. 96-98.\n\n[106] \"Sanhedrin,\" Chap. I. fol. 19.\n\n[107] Mendelsohn, p. 97.\n\n[108] Mishna, \"Sanhedrin,\" Chap. IV. 1.\n\n[109] Mendelsohn, p. 98.\n\n[110] \"Sanhedrin,\" 8b, 41a, _et al._\n\n[111] Mendelsohn, p. 101.\n\n[112] Sch\u00fcrer, \"The Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ,\" 2d Div.,\n1.\n\n[113] \"Sanhedrin,\" IV. 4.\n\n[114] \"Sanhedrin,\" IV. 1.\n\n[115] \"Sanhedrin,\" 17a, p. 176.\n\n[116] \"Sanhedrin,\" Chap. I. 5.\n\n[117] Benny.\n\n[118] Benny.\n\n[119] Benny.\n\n[120] Mendelsohn, p. 140, n. 327.\n\n[121] Montaigne, \"Essays,\" III. C. XIII.\n\n[122] \"Un homme ne jugera jamais seul; cela n'appartient qu'a Dieu.\"\n\n\"Ne sis judex unus; non est enim unicus judex, nisi unus.\"--Salvador,\n\"Institutions de Mo\u00efse,\" L. IV. Chap. II. p. 357.\n\n[123] \"But let not the testimony of women be admitted, on account of the\nlevity and boldness of their sex.\"--Josephus, \"Ant.,\" IV. 8, 15.\n\n[124] \"Nor let servants be admitted to give testimony, on account of the\nignobility of their souls.\"--\"Ant.,\" IV. 8, 15.\n\n[125] \"Ant.,\" IV. 8, 15.\n\n[126] Maimonides, I. C. XI. 6, based on \"Sanh.\" 26b.\n\n[127] Mendelsohn, p. 118.\n\n[128] \"Talmud,\" B. B. 43a.\n\n[129] Deut. xvii. 6.\n\n[130] Num. xxxv. 30.\n\n[131] \"Hist. Nat.,\" Lib. VIII. Cap. XXII.\n\n[132] L. 20, Dig. De qu\u00e6stionibus, xlviii. 18.\n\n[133] Blackstone, iv. 357.\n\n[134] Con. U. S., Art. III, Sec. 3.\n\n[135] \"Les lois qui font p\u00e9rir un homme sur la d\u00e9position d'un seul\nt\u00e9moin, sont fatales \u00e0 la libert\u00e9. La raison en exige deux; parce qu'un\nt\u00e9moin qui affirme, et un accus\u00e9 qui nie, font un partage; et il faut un\ntiers pour le vider. Les Grecs and les Romains exigeaient une voix de\nplus pour condamner. Nos lois fran\u00e7aises en demandent deux. Les Grecs\npr\u00e9tendaient que leur usage avait \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9tabli par les dieux; mais c'est\nle notre.\"--\"De L'Esprit Des Lois,\" L. XII. C. III.\n\n[136] Mishna, \"Sanhedrin,\" C. V. 2.\n\n[137] Maimonides, \"Sanhedrin,\" Chap. XX.\n\n[138] \"Jewish Encyc.,\" vol. v. p. 277.\n\n[139] \"Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews,\" p. 29.\n\n[140] Philo Jud\u00e6us, \"De Decalogo,\" III.\n\n[141] Prov. xi. 10; Mishna, \"Sanhedrin,\" IV. 5.\n\n[142] Apocrypha.\n\n[143] Benny.\n\n[144] Mishna, \"Sanhedrin,\" Chap. V. 1.\n\n[145] Benny.\n\n[146] Deut. xix. 18-21.\n\n[147] Apocrypha.\n\n[148] Maimonides, Mishna, \"Sanhedrin,\" Chap. IV. 2.\n\n[149] M\u00fcnsterberg, \"On the Witness Stand,\" \"Untrue Confessions,\" pp.\n137-171.\n\n[150] Rosadi.\n\n[151] Rabbi Wise, \"Martyrdom of Jesus.\"\n\n[152] \"Yad,\" Edut, xvii. 1.\n\n[153] \"Jewish Encyc.,\" vol. v. p. 279.\n\n[154] Num. xxxv. 30.\n\n[155] Mishna, \"Sanhedrin\" V. 3, 4.\n\n[156] Matt. xxvi. 60.\n\n[157] Mark xiv. 56.\n\n[158] Lev. xxii. 28.\n\n[159] Deut. xvii. 5; \"Sanhedrin\" VII. 4.\n\n[160] Num. vi. 2-4.\n\n[161] \"Jewish Encyc.,\" vol. vi. p. 260.\n\n[162] \"Einleitung in der Gesetzgebung,\" p. 4.\n\n[163] \"Jewish Encyc.,\" vol. vi. p. 260; Benny, \"Criminal Code of the\nJews,\" p. 97; Saalsch\u00fctz, \"Das Mosaische Recht,\" n. 560.\n\n[164] Mishna, treatise Makhoth.\n\n[165] Mishna, \"Capita Patrum,\" I. 1.\n\n[166] Salvador, \"Institutions de Mo\u00efse.\"\n\n[167] Mishna, \"Sanhedrin,\" IV. 1.\n\n[168] \"Jesus Before the Sanhedrin,\" p. 109.\n\n[169] \"Talmud,\" Jerus., Sanh., C. I. fol. 19.\n\n[170] Mishna, \"Tamid,\" C. III.\n\n[171] Geikie, vol. ii. p. 517.\n\n[172] Lyman Abbott, \"Jesus of Nazareth,\" pp. 446, 447.\n\n[173] \"Jewish Encyc.,\" vol. v. pp. 279, 280.\n\n[174] Benny.\n\n[175] Mendelsohn, p. 144.\n\n[176] Josephus, \"Ant.,\" XIV. 9, 4.\n\n[177] Sch\u00fcrer, 2d div., vol. i. p. 175.\n\n[178] Sch\u00fcrer, 2d div., vol. i. p. 184.\n\n[179] \"Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah,\" vol. ii. p. 556.\n\n[180] \"Jesus of Nazara,\" vol. vi. p. 37.\n\n[181] \"The Talmud,\" p. 32.\n\n[182] \"Ant.,\" xv. 6, 2.\n\n[183] \"History of the Jews,\" vol. ii. p. 163.\n\n[184] \"Tribus, pseudo-propheta, sacerdos magnus, non nisi a septuaginta\net unius judicum consessu judicantur.\"--\"Mishna, De Synedriis,\" i. 5.\n\n[185] \"Among the offenses of which it took cognizance were false claims\nto prophetic inspiration and blasphemy.\"--Andrews, \"The Life of Our\nLord,\" p. 510.\n\n[186] \"Gesch. d. Judenth.\" vol. i. pp. 402-409.\n\n[187] \"Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah,\" vol. ii. p. 553.\n\n[188] \"Vie de Jesus,\" pp. 303, 304.\n\n[189] \"Trial of Jesus Christ,\" p. 81.\n\n[190] Matt. xxvi. 60, 61.\n\n[191] Mark xiv. 57, 58.\n\n[192] Matt. xxvi. 64-66.\n\n[193] Mark xiv. 56.\n\n[194] John ii. 20.\n\n[195] John ii. 19.\n\n[196] John ii. 21.\n\n[197] \"The Martyrdom of Jesus,\" pp. 75-77.\n\n[198] Deut. xiii. 1-5.\n\n[199] I Kings xxi. 10.\n\n[200] Isa. lii, 5; Ezek. xxxv. 12.\n\n[201] Luke xxii. 65; Acts xiii. 45; xviii. 6.\n\n[202] Revelation xiii. 1-6.\n\n[203] \"Blackstone,\" vol. ii. pp. 75-84.\n\n[204] Greenidge, \"Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time,\" pp. 427, 507, 518.\n\n[205] Deut. iv. 15, 16; Deut. xiii.\n\n[206] Gen. xli. 16.\n\n[207] Num. xx. 10-12.\n\n[208] Num. xx. 20-24.\n\n[209] Greenleaf, \"Testimony of the Evangelists,\" p. 555.\n\n[210] Matt. v. 17.\n\n[211] John xi. 41.\n\n[212] Matt. ix. 20-22; Mark v. 25-34; Luke viii. 43-48.\n\n[213] Matt. viii. 24-26; Mark iv. 37-39; Luke viii. 23-25.\n\n[214] Matt. viii. 28-32; Mark v. 1-13; Luke viii. 26-33.\n\n[215] Matt. ix. 18-26; Mark v. 22-42; Luke viii. 41-55.\n\n[216] Luke vii. 12-15.\n\n[217] Matt. ix. 2, 3.\n\n[218] Luke v. 21.\n\n[219] John v. 18.\n\n[220] John x. 30-33.\n\n[221] John vi. 41.\n\n[222] John viii. 58.\n\n[223] \"Testimony of the Evangelists,\" p. 562.\n\n[224] Edersheim, \"Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah,\" vol. ii. p. 629.\n\n[225] John xiii.-xvii.\n\n[226] Matt. xi. 3.\n\n[227] Luke xxiv. 39-43; John xx. 24-28.\n\n[228] John xiii. 33.\n\n[229] John xviii. 9.\n\n[230] \"Jesus Devant Ca\u00efphe et Pilate.\"\n\n[231] Acts iv. 3.\n\n[232] \"Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah,\" vol. ii. p. 494.\n\n[233] See Cooley's \"Blackstone,\" vol. ii. p. 330, n. 6; also Greenleaf,\n\"On Evidence,\" vol. i. pp. 531-35 (10th edition).\n\n[234] \"Vie de Jesus,\" p. 303.\n\n[235] John xviii. 13.\n\n[236] Matt. xxvi. 57.\n\n[237] Mark xiv. 53.\n\n[238] Luke xxii. 54.\n\n[239] John xviii. 19.\n\n[240] Luke iii. 2; Acts iv. 6.\n\n[241] \"Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah,\" vol. i. p. 264.\n\n[242] \"The Life of Our Lord,\" p. 142.\n\n[243] Luke iii. 2.\n\n[244] Plummer, St. Luke, in \"International Critical Commentary,\" pp. 84,\n515.\n\n[245] Josephus, \"Ant.,\" XVIII. chap. ii. 2.\n\n[246] John xviii. 19-23.\n\n[247] Mark xiv. 58-61.\n\n[248] Matt. xxvi. 60-63.\n\n[249] Matt. xxvi. 63.\n\n[250] Mark xiv. 59.\n\n[251] Acts vi. 14.\n\n[252] \"Jewish Encyc.,\" vol. i. p. 163.\n\n[253] Fiske, \"Manual of Classical Literature,\" iii. Sec. 108; Smith,\n\"Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities,\" 89a.\n\n[254] See discussion of Point I.\n\n[255] Luke xxii. 66.\n\n[256] Luke xxii. 2.\n\n[257] Mark xiv. 2.\n\n[258] Mark xiv. i; Matt. xxvi. 4 (Consilium fecerunt ut Jesum dolo\ntenerent et occiderent).\n\n[259] Maimonides, \"Sanhedrin\" II.\n\n[260] John xviii. 28; Luke xxii. 1; Mark xiv. 1; Matt. xxvi. 2.\n\n[261] Mishna, \"Capita Patrum,\" I, 1.\n\n[262] Mishna, \"Treatise Makhoth.\"\n\n[263] See Part II, Chap. V.\n\n[264] Edmund Stapfer, \"Life of Jesus.\"\n\n[265] Matt. xxvi. 57-66.\n\n[266] Mark xiv. 55-64.\n\n[267] Matt. xxvii. 1.\n\n[268] Mark xv. 1.\n\n[269] Luke xxii. 66-71.\n\n[270] \"Martyrdom of Jesus,\" p. 74.\n\n[271] \"Criminal Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews,\" p. 133, n. 311.\n\n[272] See Part II, Chap. IV.\n\n[273] Mark xiv. 56-65.\n\n[274] Mark xiv. 62.\n\n[275] Matt. xii. 14-16; Mark iii. 7; ix. 29, 30.\n\n[276] Luke xiii. 31, 32.\n\n[277] Matt. xxii. 15.\n\n[278] John iv. 26.\n\n[279] Mark i. 34.\n\n[280] John x. 24.\n\n[281] Matt. xvi. 20.\n\n[282] Blackstone.\n\n[283] Mendelsohn, p. 143.\n\n[284] Mark xiv. 63, 64.\n\n[285] \"Martyrdom of Jesus,\" p. 74.\n\n[286] \"The Trial of Jesus,\" p. 200.\n\n[287] Matt. xxvi. 59; Mark xiv. 55.\n\n[288] Matt. xxvii. 1.\n\n[289] Mark xv. 1.\n\n[290] John iii. 1; vii. 50.\n\n[291] Luke xxiii. 51.\n\n[292] John vii. 51.\n\n[293] John vii. 50; xix. 39.\n\n[294] Luke xxiii. 51.\n\n[295] Mendelsohn, p. 98.\n\n[296] Deut. xvii. 7, 8.\n\n[297] \"It is important to notice that every time the necessities of the\ncase required the Sanhedrin returned to the Hall Gazith, or of Hewn\nStones, as in the case of Jesus and others.\"--\"Thosephthoth, or\nAdditions to the Talmud,\" Bab., \"Sanhedrin,\" C. IV. fol. 37, recto.\n\n[298] Edersheim, \"Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah,\" vol. ii. p. 556,\nn. 1.\n\n[299] John xviii. 28.\n\n[300] MM. L\u00e9mann, \"Jesus Before the Sanhedrin,\" p. 140.\n\n[301] Mark xiv. 63, 64.\n\n[302] Edersheim, \"Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah,\" vol. ii. p. 561.\n\n[303] Rabbi Wise, \"Martyrdom of Jesus,\" p. 74.\n\n[304] Benny, \"Criminal Code of the Jews,\" p. 81.\n\n[305] Matt. xxvi. 65.\n\n[306] See Part II, Qualifications of Judges.\n\n[307] \"Talmud, Pesachim, or the Passover,\" fol. 57, verso; see also\n\"Jesus Before the Sanhedrin,\" pp. 54, 55.\n\n[308] Benny, \"Criminal Code of the Jews,\" pp. 28-41.\n\n[309] Matt. xxi. 31.\n\n[310] Matt. xxiii. 14, 15.\n\n[311] \"Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah,\" vol. i. pp. 93, 94.\n\n[312] Matt. xxiii. 27, 29-33.\n\n[313] \"Vie de Jesus,\" p. 267.\n\n[314] John xi. 49, 50.\n\n[315] John xi. 53.\n\n[316] Luke xxii. 1-3.\n\n[317] Matt. xxvi. 3-5.\n\n[318] Benny, \"Criminal Code of the Jews,\" p. 56.\n\n[319] Geikie, \"The Life and Words of Christ,\" vol. ii. p. 517.\n\n[320] Deut. xix. 18-21.\n\n[321] Mark xiv. 55.\n\n[322] Mishna, Treatise \"Makhoth.\"\n\n[323]\n\n    \"Afresh the mighty line of years unroll'd,\n    The Virgin now, now Saturn's sway returns;\n    Now the blest globe a heaven-sprung Child adorns,\n    Whose genial power shall whelm earth's iron race,\n    And plant once more the golden in its place.\"--Virgil, Eclogue IV.\n\n[324] Gen. xlix. 8-10.\n\n[325] \"Sanhedrin,\" fol. 97, verso.\n\n[326] \"Martyrdom of Jesus,\" p. 76.\n\n[327] John xi. 48-50.\n\n[328] I Sam. xv. 29.\n\n[329] Hosea xi. 9.\n\n[330] Mark vii. 9-13.\n\n[331] \"Jewish Encyc.,\" vol. i. p. 583.\n\n[332] Hodge, \"Systematic Theology,\" vol. i. p. 485.\n\n[333] Steenstra, \"The Being of God as Unity and Trinity,\" pp. 192, 193.\n\n[334] John ii. 15.\n\n[335] John vi. 30.\n\n[336] John x. 24, 25.\n\n[337] Matt. xi. 4, 5.\n\n[338] I Kings xvii. 17-22.\n\n[339] John xi. 41.\n\n[340] Matt. ix. 18-26; Mark v. 22-42; Luke viii. 41-55.\n\n[341] Luke vii. 12-15.\n\n[342] John iii. 2.\n\n[343] See Friedlieb, Arch\u00e6ol., 87; Dupin, 75; Keim, vol. iii. 327.\n\n[344] Bab. Sanh. f. 63, 1: \"Cum synedrium quemquam moti adjudicavit, ne\nquidquam degustent illi isto die.\"\n\n[345] Andrews, \"The Life of Our Lord,\" p. 522.\n\n[346] \"The Life of Our Lord,\" pp. 523, 524.\n\n[347] Luke xxii. 66-71.\n\n[348] See Part II, Chap. V.; also Benny, \"Crim. Code of the Jews,\" pp.\n81-83.\n\n[349] Keim, \"Jesus of Nazara,\" vol. vi. pp. 63, 64.\n\n[350] John xviii. 28.\n\n[351] \"Thou, Reuben, art guilty! Thou, Simon, art acquitted, art not\nguilty!\" were stereotyped forms of verdicts under Hebrew criminal\nprocedure. Sanh. in Friedl., p. 89.\n\n[352] Keim, \"Jesus of Nazara,\" vol. vi. p. 74.\n\n[353] John iii. 1; vii. 50.\n\n[354] Luke xxiii. 50, 51.\n\n[355] Matt. xxvi. 59; Mark xiv. 55; Matt. xxvii. 1; Mark xv. 1.\n\n[356] Mark xiv. 63, 64; Luke xxii. 70, 71.\n\n[357] Keim, \"Jesus of Nazara,\" vol. vi. p. 74, n. 2.\n\n[358] Acts vi. 11; vii. 59.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\n  A\n\n  Abarbanel, Isaac, on the Sanhedrin, I, 106\n\n  Ab-beth-din, vice-president of the Sanhedrin, I, 112\n\n  Abbott, Lyman, on the scribes of the Sanhedrin, I, 158\n\n  Acts of Pilate, the Apocryphal,\n    modern criticism of, II, 327\n    discovery of, II, 327\n    Lardner on the authenticity of, II, 328 _seq._\n    Tischendorf on the authenticity of, II, 345 _seq._\n    antiquity of, II, 351\n    text of, II, 351 _seq._\n\n  \u00c6butius, Publius, part of, in the exposure of Bacchanalian orgies, II,\n  271 _seq._\n\n  \u00c6dile, Roman, judicial powers of, II, 36\n\n  \u00c6sculapius, Gr\u00e6co-Roman divinity, II, 198\n\n  Akiba, Jewish rabbi, Mishna systematized by, I, 79\n\n  Albanus, Roman governor, his deposition of Albanus, II, 296\n\n  Alcmene, myth of Zeus and, II, 265\n\n  Alexander, Jewish Alabarch, biographical note on, II, 299\n\n  Alexander III, pope, genuineness of \"true cross\" attested by bull of,\n  II, 63\n\n  Alexandrian MS. of the Bible, I, 67\n\n  Ananias ben Nebedeus, Jewish priest,\n    biographical note on, II, 299\n    family of, cursed in Talmud, II, 302\n\n  Ananos. See Annas\n\n  Ananus, son of Annas, Jewish high priest, biographical note on, II, 296\n\n  Anathemas, Jewish, against the Christians, II, 307, 308\n\n  Anaxagoras, Greek philosopher,\n    on the deification of natural forces, II, 225\n    his exposure of the divination of Lampon, II, 226\n\n  Annanias, author of \"Acts of Pilate,\" II, 351\n\n  Annas (Ananos), Jewish high priest,\n    examination of Christ before, I, 238-247\n    deposition of, by Gratus, I, 244; II, 20\n    Christ examined in house of, I, 256\n    biographical note on, II, 295\n    legendary examination of Joseph of Arimathea, II, 374, 376\n\n  Antecedent Warning, peculiar provision of Hebrew Criminal Law\n  regarding, I, 147-152\n\n  Antistius, L., Roman tribune, impeachment of Julius C\u00e6sar by, II, 46\n\n  Antoninus Pius, Roman emperor, persecution of Christians by, II, 78\n\n  Aphrodisia, rites of, II, 265\n\n  Aphrodite, Greek divinity, patroness of prostitutes, II, 265\n\n  Aquillius, Manlius, Roman governor, trial of, before the Comitia, II, 40\n\n  Antonius, Marcus, Roman advocate, defense of, of Manlius Aquillius, II,\n  40\n\n  Aristotle, Greek philosopher, on the licentiousness of Sparta, II, 241\n\n  Arnold, Matthew, on despair of Roman people, II, 286\n\n  Arnobius, Numidian writer,\n    on the familiar treatment of Roman gods, II, 218\n    on the lewdness of the Roman drama, II, 267\n\n  Art, effect of, in corruption of Roman and Greek morals, II, 268\n\n  Aspasia, mistress of Pericles, II, 242\n\n  Athens, domestic licentiousness of, II, 240, 241\n\n  Athronges, Jewish peasant, revolt of, II, 110\n\n  Atticus, Numerius, Roman senator, attests ascent of Augustus to heaven,\n  II, 234\n\n  Atys, myth of, represented on Greek and Roman stage, II, 267\n\n  Augurs,\n    Roman priests, II, 204\n    spectators at licentious dramas, II, 267\n\n  Augury, modes of, II, 211\n\n  Augustus C\u00e6sar, Roman emperor,\n    reign and policy of, II, 25, 26\n    care of profligate daughter Julia, II, 83\n    belief of, in omens, II, 215\n    his chastisement of Neptune, II, 222\n    deification of, II, 233\n\n  Aurelius Antoninus, Marcus, Roman emperor and philosopher,\n    persecution of Christianity by, II, 78\n    adoration of Serapis by, II, 217\n    on suicide, II, 232\n\n\n  B\n\n  Bacchanalian orgies, Livy's account of, II, 270-283\n\n  Bacchus, Roman deity, licentious festivals of, II, 265\n\n  Barabbas (Bar Abbas) released by Pilate, II, 131, 138, 363\n\n  Baring-Gould, S., on the symbolism of the Cross, II, 66\n\n  Baths, Roman, splendor of, II, 247\n\n  Beheading of criminals under Hebrew Law, I, 91, 99\n\n  Benny,\n    on the Talmud, I, 75\n    on internment in Jewish Cities of Refuge, I, 98, 99\n\n  Bernhardt, Sarah, insulted in Quebec, II, 182\n\n  Bernice (Berenice), Jewish queen, a suppliant before Florus, II, 100\n\n  Bible,\n    the manuscripts of, I, 67\n    purity of text of, I, 69\n    anthropomorphism of, I, 336-338\n    influence of, II, 4, 5\n    \"Birchath Hamminim\" Jewish imprecation against Christians, II, 308\n\n  Blasphemy,\n    discussion of charge against Christ of, I, 193-209\n    Hebrew definition of, I, 199-201\n    classification of, I, 203\n\n  Boethus, family of, cursed in Talmud, II, 301. See also Simon\n\n  Bossuet, Jacques B., French divine, on the citizenship of Christ, II,\n  108\n\n  Brothels, Roman, dedication of, to Venus, II, 265\n\n  Burning of criminals under Hebrew Law, I, 92, 99\n\n\n  C\n\n  C\u00e6sar, Caius Julius,\n    10th legion cowed by, II, 169\n    superstition of, II, 205\n    disbelief of, in immortality, II, 229\n    deification of, II, 233\n    divorces of, II, 238\n    profligacy of, II, 238, 239\n    unnatural practices attributed to, II, 263\n\n  Caiaphas, Jewish high priest,\n    accusation of, against Christ, before Sanhedrin, I, 190\n    erratic conduct of, at trial of Christ, I, 290\n    r\u00f4le of, in trial of Jesus before Pilate, II, 101\n    biographical note on, II, 295\n    legendary examination of Joseph of Arimathea by, II, 374, 376\n\n  Caligula, Roman emperor,\n    deifies his sister Drusilla, II, 234\n    depravity of, II, 234\n\n  Cantharus, family of, cursed in Talmud, II, 301\n\n  Capital Crimes under Hebrew Criminal Law, classification and\n  punishments of, I, 91-101\n\n  Carlyle, Thomas, on the life of Christ, II, 187\n\n  Cassius, Dion, on the labeling of Roman criminals, I, 57\n\n  Cato, Marcus Porcius,\n    contempt of, for the haruspices, II, 228\n    suicide of, II, 232\n    divorces of, II, 237\n    contempt of, for Lucullus, II, 246\n    merciless treatment of slaves, II, 251\n\n  Catulus, Quintus, dream of, presaging accession of Augustus, II, 214\n\n  Chanania, Jewish scribe, biographical note on, II, 314\n\n  Chanania ben Chiskia, Jewish scribe, biographical note on, II, 309\n\n  Charles IX, king of France, bloody sweat of, I, 59, 60\n\n  Christianity, conflict of, with Roman paganism, I, 16; II, 76-79\n\n  Chrysostom, St. John, on the legendary desire of Tiberius to deify\n  Christ, II, 344\n\n  Cicero, Marcus Tullius,\n    dream of, presaging accession of Augustus, II, 215\n    on Roman superstition, II, 221\n    on Roman skepticism, II, 227\n    his divorce of his wife, II, 237\n    witticism of, upon C\u00e6sar's gallantries, II, 239\n\n  Cities of Refuge, Jewish, internment in, I, 96-99\n\n  Claudia, granddaughter of Augustus,\n    marriage of, to Pilate, II, 82\n    dream of, regarding Jesus, II, 133, 355\n\n  Claudius, Roman commander, throws sacred pullets into the sea, II, 222\n\n  Clement V, pope, and the Talmud, I, 88, 89\n\n  Coliseum, the, description of, II, 260\n\n  Comitia Centuriata,\n    public criminal trials in, II, 37-43\n    miscarriage of justice in, II, 38-42\n\n  Commodus, Roman emperor, deification of, II, 234\n\n  Consul, Roman, judicial powers of, II, 36\n\n  Coke, Sir Edward, contrast between Pilate and, II, 170-172\n\n  Cornelius, son of Ceron, the elder, biographical note on, II, 321\n\n  Cross, Roman instrument of death,\n    erroneous representations of, II, 56\n    forms of, II, 62\n    use of, by various races as religious symbol, II, 64-67\n\n  \"Cross, the True,\" legends of, II, 62, 63\n\n  Crucifixion,\n    Plutarch on, I, 56\n    history of, II, 54, 55\n    mode of, II, 55\n    pathology of, II, 58, 59\n    Roman citizens exempt from, II, 54\n    of Jesus, II, 365\n\n  Cybele, Roman deity, importation of, from Phrygia, II, 199\n\n\n  D\n\n  Deification of Roman emperors, ceremony of, II, 234\n\n  Dembowski, Bishop, and the Talmud, I, 88\n\n  Demosthenes, on the women of Athens, II, 242\n\n  D\u00e9rembourg, Joseph, on the Jewish priestly families, II, 294\n\n  Deutsch, Emanuel,\n    on the Talmud, I, 74, 80\n    on the existence of the Great Sanhedrin at the time of Christ, I,\n    179, 181\n\n  Diocletian, Roman emperor, deification of, II, 233\n\n  Divination, Roman modes of, II, 211\n\n  Divorce,\n    among the Romans, II, 236-239\n    trivial pretexts for, II, 237, 238\n\n  D\u00f6llinger,\n    on the Roman view of Christianity and high treason, II, 77\n    on divorce, and the profligacy of Roman matrons, II, 236\n    on the effect of art in corrupting Greek and Roman manners, II, 268\n\n  Domitian, Roman emperor, self-deification of, II, 235\n\n  Doras, Jewish elder, biographical note on, II, 321\n\n  Dorotheas, son of Nathanael, Jewish elder, biographical note on, II,\n  321\n\n  Drama, the, licentiousness of, among Greeks and Romans, II, 266\n\n  Dreams, interpretation of, among Romans and Greeks, II, 213, 214\n\n  Druidism, annihilation of, II, 73\n\n  Drusilla, deified by Caligula, II, 234\n\n  Dysmas, legendary name of one of the thieves crucified with Jesus, II,\n  364\n\n\n  E\n\n  Edersheim, Alfred, on the existence of the Great Sanhedrin at the time\n  of Christ, I, 177\n\n  Elders, Jewish chamber of. See Sanhedrin\n\n  Eleazar ben Partah, Jewish scribe, biographical note on, II, 314\n\n  Eleazar, son of Annas, Jewish high priest, biographical note on, II,\n  295\n\n  Eleazar, son of Simon Boethus, Jewish high priest, biographical note\n  on, II, 297\n\n  Eliezer, Jewish rabbi, Mishna amplified by, I, 79\n\n  Ellicott, Dr., on the character of Pilate, II, 91\n\n  Epicurus, Greek philosopher, II, 229\n\n  Epicureanism, degradation of, among Romans, II, 230\n\n  Epitaphs, irreligious Roman, II, 222, 285\n\n  Epulos, Roman priests, II, 204\n\n  Etruria, importation of haruspices from, II, 210\n\n  Eusebius, reference of, to the \"Acts of Pilate,\" II, 329, 333, 344\n\n  Evhemere, on the Greek gods, II, 225\n\n  Evangelists,\n    honesty of, I, 12\n    character of, I, 13, 14\n    motives of, I, 15\n    ability of, I, 18\n    candor of, I, 20-24\n    discrepancies of, I, 29-33\n    corroborative elements of narrative of, I, 34-39\n    impossibility of collusion among, I, 38\n    conformity of narrative of, with human experience, I, 39\n    coincidence of testimony of, with collateral circumstances, I, 52-67\n    narrative of, confirmed by profane historians, I, 56, 57\n\n  Evidence, rules of, under Hebrew Law, I, 144, 145\n\n\n  F\n\n  False swearing under Hebrew Criminal Law, I, 93\n\n  Fathers, Church, writings of the, I, 68\n\n  Fecenia, Hispala, part of, in exposure of Bacchanalian orgies, II,\n  271 _seq._\n\n  Felix, Minucius, Christian father, controversy of, with pagans on\n  adoration of the cross, II, 64\n\n  Flagellation, under Hebrew Criminal, I, 94\n\n  Flamens,\n    Roman priests, II, 204\n    spectators at licentious dramas, II, 267\n\n\n  G\n\n  Gallio, pro-consul of Achaia, attitude of, toward Jewish clamors, II,\n  107\n\n  Gamaliel, Jewish rabbi, biographical note on, II, 304\n\n  Ganymede, depraving influence of myth of rape of, II, 262\n\n  Gavazzi, Alessandro, sermons of, in Coliseum, II, 262\n\n  Geib, on the status of Judea, II, 16 on the courts of the Roman\n  Provinces, II, 32\n\n  Geikie, Cunningham,\n    on the non-existence of the Sanhedrin at the time of Christ, I, 181\n    on the character of the trial of Jesus before Sanhedrin, I, 184\n\n  Gemara,\n    the Jerusalem and Babylonian recensions of, I, 81\n    relation of, to Mishna, I, 83. See also Talmud and Mishna\n\n  Germanicus,\n    C\u00e6sar temples profaned on death of, II, 222\n    exposure of children born on day of death of, II, 254\n\n  Gestas, legendary name of one of thieves crucified with Jesus, II, 364\n\n  Golden House of Nero, II, 246\n\n  Gibbon, Edward,\n    on the jurisdiction of the great Sanhedrin, I, 120\n    on the laws of the Twelve Tables, II, 53\n    on the extent of the Roman Empire, II, 196\n\n  Gladiatorial games,\n    origin of, II, 256\n    gigantic scale of, in Rome, II, 256, 257\n    conduct of, II, 258\n\n  Gospels, the, admissibility of, as legal evidence, I, 5-12\n\n  Governors, Roman,\n    powers of, II, 24, 27, 28, 29\n    forbidden to take wives to their provinces, II, 84, 85\n\n  Graetz, Heinrich, on the existence of the Sanhedrin at the time of\n  Christ, I, 181\n\n  Greeks,\n    superstition of, II, 223\n    philosophy of, II, 229\n    depraving effect on Romans of art, literature, and manners of, II,\n    240-244, 268, 284\n    Bacchanalian orgies introduced by, II, 270\n    invective of Juvenal against, II, 284\n\n  Greenidge, on the interpretation of native law by Roman propr\u00e6tors, II,\n  31\n\n  Greenleaf, Simon, American jurist,\n    on the admissibility of the Scriptures as legal evidence, I, 6-9\n    on the testimony of the Evangelists, I, 10, 11\n    on the legal justice of the conviction of Christ for blasphemy, I,\n    209\n\n\n  H\n\n  Hacksab ben Tzitzith, Jewish elder, biographical note on, II, 320\n\n  \"Hall of Hewn Stones,\" sessions of Sanhedrin in, I, 117\n\n  Haruspices, Roman, account of, II, 210\n\n  Helcias, Jewish treasurer, biographical note on, II, 300\n\n  Helena, Empress, legendary discovery of \"true cross\" by, II, 62\n\n  Hercules, Greek divinity, burning of, represented on Greek and Roman\n  stage, II, 267\n\n  Herder, Johann, on the character of Christ, II, 187\n\n  Herod Antipas,\n    character of, II, 120\n    his treatment of Jesus, II, 122-127\n\n  Herod I, the Great,\n    last will of, II, 119, 120\n    arbitrary changes of, in high priesthood, II, 293\n\n  Hetairai, status of, in Athens, II, 242, 243\n\n  High priest, Jewish,\n    vestments of, I, 158\n    abuses in appointment of, II, 293\n\n  Hillel, Jewish doctor, inspiration of, I, 84\n\n  Hillel, School of,\n    and the Mishna, I, 79\n    dissensions of, with School of Shammai, II, 309\n\n  Homer, the bible of the Greeks, II, 264\n\n  Honorius IV, pope, and the Talmud, I, 87\n\n  Horatius, trial of, before the Comitia Centuriata, II, 40\n\n\n  I\n\n  Ignatius, St., martyrdom of, in Coliseum, II, 261\n\n  Impalement, death by, II, 61\n\n  Infanticide, among Romans, II, 254\n\n  Inkerman, story of soldier killed at battle of, II, 191\n\n  Innes,\n    on the trials of Jesus before the Sanhedrin, I, 185; II, 10\n    on the cowardice of Pilate, II, 138\n\n  Interpreters, not allowed in Jewish courts, I, 107\n\n  Imprisonment. See Law, Hebrew Criminal, I, 93\n\n  Ishmael, Jewish rabbi, and the Mishna, I, 79\n\n  Ismael ben Eliza, Jewish scribe, biographical note on, II, 309\n\n  Ismael ben Phabi, Jewish high priest,\n    biographical note on, II, 298\n    family of, cursed in Talmud, II, 301\n\n  Isis, Egyptian deity,\n    rites of, established in Rome, II, 217\n    Roman temples of, a resort of vice, II, 269\n\n  Issachar ben Keifar Barchi, Jewish priest, cursed in Talmud, II, 302\n\n\n  J\n\n  James, brother of Jesus, condemnation of, by Ananus, II, 296\n\n  Janus, Roman god, invocations of, II, 207\n\n  Jehovah, appearances of, in human form, I, 343-349\n\n  Jerome, St., on the Jewish anathema against Christians, II, 308\n\n  Jesus, the Christ,\n    human perfection of, I, 14; II, 186\n    scourging of, I, 56, 57\n    breaking of legs of, by soldiers, I, 57\n    bloody sweat of, I, 59, 60\n    physical cause of death of, I, 61, 62\n    watery issue of, I, 60-62\n    devotion of women to, I, 66\n    resurrection of, I, 211; II, 368\n    divinity of, I, 211, 212\n    celebrates the Paschal feast, I, 220-224\n    at Gethsemane, I, 224-226\n    arrest of, I, 225\n    private examination of, before high priest, I, 238-247\n    charged with sedition and blasphemy I, 250\n    annnounces his Messiahship before Sanhedrin, I, 273, 274\n    Messianic prophecies fulfilled in Him, I, 323-328, 341, 342\n    miracles of, I, 350-355\n    at morning session of Sanhedrin, I, 356-362\n    condemned to death by Sanhedrin, I, 365\n    His teachings treasonable under Roman law, II, 72\n    before Pilate, II, 96 _seq._\n    charged with high treason before Pilate, II, 106, 352\n    indictment of, before Pilate, II, 107-109\n    acquitted by Pilate, II, 116\n    sent by Pilate to Herod, II, 118\n    before Herod, II, 119 _seq._\n    mocked, and sent back to Pilate by Herod, II, 127\n    second appearance of, before Pilate, II, 129 _seq._\n    delivered to Jews by Pilate, II, 138\n    mocked by mob, II, 139\n    tributes of skeptics to, II, 187\n    Napoleon's tribute to, II, 189, 190\n    charged by Jews with illegitimacy, II, 356\n    crucifixion of, II, 365\n    See also trial of Jesus, Hebrew, and trial of Jesus, Roman\n\n  Jesus ben Sie, Jewish high priest, biographical note on, II, 298\n\n  Jews, the political state of,\n    at time of Jesus, II, 11-23\n    discussion of their responsibility for Christ's death, II, 174-180\n    prejudices against, II, 180-187\n    distinguished, II, 185, 186\n\n  Joazar, Jewish high priest, biographical note on, II, 296\n\n  Jochanan ben Zakai, Jewish scribe, biographical note on, II, 311\n\n  John, St.,\n    at the sepulcher, I, 37\n    at the crucifixion of Christ, I, 65\n\n  John, St., Gospel of, style of, I, 19\n\n  John, Jewish priest, biographical note on, II, 299\n\n  Jonathan, son of Annas, Jewish high priest, biographical note on, II,\n  295\n\n  Jonathan ben Uziel, Jewish scribe, biographical note on, II, 306\n\n  John, son of John, Jewish elder, biographical note on, II, 321\n\n  Joseph of Arimathea,\n    presence of, at trials of Christ, I, 282-286, 364\n    biographical note on, II, 318\n    receives body of Jesus from Pilate, II, 366\n    apocryphal account of escape of, from Jews, II, 367, 373-376\n\n  Josephus, Flavius,\n    on the character of Pilate, I, 21\n    on scourging I, 56\n    on the Pharisees, I, 87\n    on the existence of the great Sanhedrin at time of Christ, I, 176\n    on the loss, by Jews, of power of life and death, II, 19\n    on the rapacity of the high priests, II, 301\n\n  Jowett, Benjamin, upon the corruption of Rome, II, 240\n\n  Judah, the Holy, Jewish rabbi, and the composition of the Mishna, I, 79,\n  80\n\n  Judas, son of Hezekiah, Jewish rebel, put to death by Herod, II, 109\n\n  Judas Iscariot, his betrayal of Christ, I, 227-235\n\n  Julia, daughter of Augustus,\n    profligacy of, II, 82\n    marriages of, II, 83\n\n  Julian, Roman emperor, his defiance of Mars, II, 222\n\n  Juno, Roman divinity, sacrifices to, II, 208\n\n  Jupiter, Roman deity,\n    multitudinous forms of, II, 203\n    sacrifices to, II, 208\n\n  Justin Martyr, reference of, to \"Acts of Pilate,\" II, 331, 346, 348\n\n  Juvenal, Satires of, on Roman social depravity, II, 240, 244, 248\n\n\n  K\n\n  Keim, Theodor,\n    on the existence of the Great Sanhedrin at the time of Christ, I,\n    178\n    on the character of Christ, II, 188, 189\n\n  Knight, R. P., on the symbolism of the Cross, II, 65\n\n  Koran, the, I, 77\n\n\n  L\n\n  Lamartine, Alphonse, on the death of Christ, II, 3\n\n  Lampon, Greek diviner, exposed by Anaxagoras, II, 226\n\n  Lardner, on the authenticity of the \"Acts of Pilate,\" II, 328 _seq._\n\n  Law, Hebrew Criminal,\n    administration of, I, 153, 154\n    basis of, I, 73, 84, 85\n    burial of bodies after execution under, I, 101, 171\n    capital punishments under, I, 91-93, 99-101\n    circumstantial evidence under, I, 144\n    Cities of Refuge under, I, 96\n    courts and judges, I, 102-126\n    execution under, I, 170, 171\n    false swearing under, I, 93\n    flagellation under, I, 94\n    imprisonment under, I, 93\n    peculiarities of, I, 125, 132, 147, 167, 168\n    slavery under, I, 95\n    tenderness of, for human life, I, 154, 155, 310\n    testimony under, I, 144-147\n    witnesses under, I, 127-144\n    written and documentary evidence irrelevant, I, 133, 145\n\n  Laws, Roman,\n    lex Appuleia, II, 69\n    Cornelia, II, 69\n    Julia Majestatis, II, 69, 80\n    Memmia, II, 46\n    Porcia, II, 54\n    Remmia, II, 49\n    Talionis, II, 53\n    Valeria, II, 37, 54\n    Varia, II, 69\n\n  Lazarus, raising of, from the dead, I, 352\n\n  Lectisternia, Roman banquets to the gods,\n    slaves released at, II, 130\n    indecencies of, II, 218\n\n  L\u00e9mann, extract from work of, on Sanhedrin, II, 291\n\n  Lepidus, Marcus, Roman patrician, magnificence of, II, 246\n\n  Livy,\n    on scourging, I, 57\n    account of Bacchanalian orgies, II, 270-283\n\n  Longinus, legendary name of soldier who pierced Christ, II, 379\n\n  Lucullus, Roman patrician, luxury of, II, 244\n\n  Luke, St., occupation of, I, 19\n\n  Luke, St., Gospel of, style of, I, 19\n\n  Lupercals, Roman priests, II, 204\n\n  Luxury of the Romans, II, 244\n\n  Lycurgus, code of, II, 241\n\n\n  M\n\n  Macarius, identification of \"true cross\" by, II, 63\n\n  Macaulay, Lord, speech of, on Jewish disabilities, II, 184\n\n  Mahomet, character of, I, 14\n\n  Malchus, ear of, cut off by Peter, I, 36, 226\n\n  Magath, Julius, extract from work of, II, 291\n\n  Maimonides,\n    on Hebrew Capital Crimes, I, 91\n    on the prohibition of nocturnal trials, I, 255, 256\n\n  Manlius, Marcus, trial of, before the Comitia Centuriata, II, 40\n\n  Marius, Caius, assassin cowed by, I, 62\n\n  Mark, St., Jesus arrested at home of, I, 220\n\n  Marriage,\n    among the Romans, II, 236\n    among the Greeks, II, 240-243\n\n  Marcius, Quintus, Roman consul, motion of, on the suppression of the\n  Bacchanalian orgies, II, 282\n\n  Mars, Roman deity, II, 208\n\n  Messiah, the,\n    prophecies regarding, and their fulfillment in Jesus, I, 322-328\n    varying expectations of Jews regarding, I, 319-322; II, 110\n    conception of Pharisees of, II, 324\n    conception of Sadducees of, II, 325\n\n  Matthew, St., occupation of, I, 19\n\n  Matthias, son of Annas, Jewish high priest, biographical note on, II,\n  296\n\n  Mendelssohn, on the Talmud, I, 75\n\n  Messalina, Roman empress, lewdness of, II, 244\n\n  Messalinus, Cotta, prosecuted for treason, II, 70\n\n  Metrodorus on the Greek gods, II, 226\n\n  Mezeray, de, on the bloody sweat of Charles IX, I, 60\n\n  Minerva, Roman deity, II, 208\n\n  Miracles,\n    probability of, I, 40-51\n    Spinoza on, I, 40-43\n    Renan on, I, 44\n    of Christ, I, 351-354\n\n  Mishna, the,\n    E. Deutsch on, I, 80\n    subdivisions of, I, 80\n    relation of Talmud to, I, 83\n    traditional view of, I, 84\n    on capital and pecuniary cases, I, 155, 156. See also Gemara and\n    Talmud.\n\n  Mommsen, Theodor,\n    on the jurisdiction of native courts of Roman subject peoples, II,\n    15\n    on Roman marital looseness, II, 243\n    on Roman extravagance, II, 247\n\n  Montefiore, Sir Moses, anecdote of, II, 180\n\n  Mosaic Code, the, a basis of Hebrew Criminal Law, I, 73, 84, 85\n\n  M\u00fcller, Johannes, explodes legend of Pilate and Lake Lucerne, II, 95\n\n\n  N\n\n  Nachum Halbalar, Jewish scribe, biographical note on, II, 314\n\n  N\u00e6vius, Marcus, accusation of Scipio Africanus by, II, 41\n\n  Napoleon I,\n    fickleness of populace toward, I, 63, 64\n    tribute of, to Jesus, II, 189\n    religious faith of, II, 190, 191\n\n  Nasi, prince of the Sanhedrin, I, 112\n\n  Nathan, Jewish rabbi, note on, II, 315, note\n\n  Neptune, Roman deity, II, 208\n\n  Nero, Roman emperor,\n    deification of, II, 234\n    Golden House of, II, 246\n\n  Ney, Michel, French marshal, compared with St. Peter, I, 64\n\n  Nicodemus, Jewish elder,\n    presence of, at trial of Christ, I, 282-286\n    defense of Christ before Sanhedrin, I, 305\n    presence and conduct of, at second trial of Jesus by Sanhedrin, I,\n    364\n    biographical note on, II, 319\n    apocryphal account of pleading of, for Jesus before Pilate, II, 360\n    Gospel of. See \"Acts of Pilate\"\n\n  Nordau, Max, on Jewish pride in Jesus, II, 188\n\n\n  O\n\n  Oaths, not administered to witnesses, under Jewish law, I, 134\n\n  Octavian. See Augustus\n\n  Omens, belief of Romans in, II, 215\n\n  Onkelos, Jewish scribe, biographical note on, II, 305\n\n  Oracle, Delphic, consulted by Romans, II, 210\n\n  Osiris, Egyptian deity, the cross a symbol of, II, 66\n\n  Ovid, Roman poet, on unnatural practices in temples, II, 269\n\n\n  P\n\n  Paganism, Gr\u00e6co-Roman,\n    conflict of, with Christianity, I, 16; II, 76-79\n    Hellenization of Roman religion, II, 199\n    importation of foreign gods, II, 200\n    origin and multiplicity of Roman gods, II, 198-204\n    Roman priesthood, II, 204, 205\n    Roman forms of worship, II, 205-209\n    perplexity of worshipers regarding deities, II, 207\n    prayer, II, 207, 208-210\n    augury and divination, II, 210-215\n    omens, II, 215, 216\n    decay of Roman faith, II, 217-220\n    Roman skepticism, II, 220-229\n    sacrilege among Romans, II, 221\n    disbelief of Romans in immortality, II, 228, 229\n    Epicureanism among the Romans, II, 229-231\n    stoicism, II, 231-233\n    deification of Roman emperors, II, 233-235\n    base deities of Romans, II, 265\n    effect of religion in Greek and Roman social corruption, II, 269\n\n  Palace of Herod, description of, II, 96, 97\n\n  Paley, William, on the discrepancies of the Gospels, I, 32, 33\n\n  Pan, Gr\u00e6co-Roman divinity, feasts of, II, 265\n\n  Paul, St.,\n    on the depravity of Rome, II, 284\n    delivery of, to Felix, II, 299\n\n  Pericles, Greek tyrant, and the divination of Lampon, II, 226\n\n  Pentateuch, the, a basis of Hebrew jurisprudence, I, 73\n\n  Permanent Tribunals (qu\u00e6stiones perpetu\u00e6), mode of trials before, at\n  Rome, II, 43-52\n\n  Peter, St.,\n    at the sepulcher, I, 37\n    compared with Marshal Ney, I, 64\n    and Malchus, I, 36, 226\n\n  Pharisees,\n    and the Talmud, I, 87\n    attitude of, toward the law, I, 338\n    dominant in priestly order, II, 302\n    their conception of the Messiah, II, 324\n    characteristics of, II, 324\n\n  Philip, St., and the feeding of the five thousand, I, 35\n\n  Phillips, Wendell, on Hindu swordsmanship, I, 48\n\n  Philo, Jewish philosopher, on the character of Pilate, I, 21; II, 89-91\n\n  Phryne, mistress of Praxiteles anecdote of, II, 242\n\n  Pilate, Pontius,\n    powers of, as procurator of Judea, II, 27-31\n    name and origin of, II, 81, 82\n    marriage of, II, 82\n    becomes procurator of Judea, II, 84\n    provokes the Jews, II, 85\n    appropriates funds from Corban, II, 86\n    hangs shields in Herod's palace, II, 88\n    slays Galileans, II, 88\n    character of, I, 21; II, 88\n    canonization of, II, 89\n    ordered to Rome by Vitellius, II, 92\n    legends regarding death of, II, 92-94\n    interrogation of Jesus, II, 112-115\n    talents of, II, 115\n    his opinion of Jesus, II, 115\n    acquits Jesus, II, 116\n    sends Jesus to Herod, II, 117\n    reconciled with Herod, II, 128\n    offers to release Barabbas, II, 130\n    warned by wife's dream of Jesus, II, 133, 355\n    washes his hands of Christ's death, II, 137, 364\n    releases Barabbas, II, 138, 363\n    summary of his conduct of Christ's trial, II, 168\n    conduct of, compared with C\u00e6sar, II, 169; with Sir Edward Coke, II,\n    170-172\n\n  Pindar, Greek poet, denunciation of, of vulgar superstitions, II, 224\n\n  Plato, Greek philosopher,\n    unnatural love of, II, 263\n    reprobation of Homeric myths, II, 264\n\n  Pliny, the Younger,\n    correspondence of, with Trajan, II, 78\n    disbelief of, in immortality, II, 229\n    on slavery, II, 203\n\n  Plutarch,\n    on crucifixion, I, 56\n    anecdotes of Lucullus, II, 244-246\n\n  Polybius, on Roman pederasty, II, 263\n\n  Pompeia divorced by C\u00e6sar, II, 238\n\n  Pompey, Cneius, the Great,\n    conquest of Palestine by, II, 11\n    defeated at Pharsalia, II, 25\n    divorce of his wife Mucia, II, 238\n\n  Pontiffs, Roman, II, 204\n\n  Popp\u00e6a, wife of Nero, deification of, II, 77\n\n  Postumius, Spurius, Roman consul, suppression of Bacchanalians by, II,\n  270-283\n\n  Pr\u00e6tor, Roman, judicial powers of, II, 36\n\n  Priesthood, Roman. See Roman religion\n\n  Priests, Jewish Chamber of. See Sanhedrin\n\n  Procurator, Roman, jurisdiction of, II, 27, 28\n\n  Provinces, Roman, classification of, by Augustus, II, 27\n\n\n  Q\n\n  Quetzalcoatle, crucified Savior, worshiped by Mexicans, II, 66\n\n\n  R\n\n  Rabbi, origin of Jewish title of, II, 315\n\n  Rabbis, Jewish, arrogance of, II, 316\n\n  Raphall, Morris, on the origin of the Sanhedrin, I, 104\n\n  Rawlinson, George, on the political state of Judea at the time of\n  Christ, II, 11\n\n  Religions, policy of Romans toward foreign, and of conquered peoples,\n  II, 72-74\n\n  Renan, Ernest,\n    on miracles, I, 44-47\n    on the \"judicial ambush\" of blasphemers, I, 235\n    on the character of Pilate, II, 90\n    on the character of Christ, II, 187, 188\n\n  Richard III, King of England, contest of, with Saladin, I, 48\n\n  Richter on the pathology of crucifixion, II, 58, 59\n\n  Rosadi,\n    on the confession of the accused under Hebrew law, I, 143\n    on the hatred of Pilate toward the Jews, II, 98\n    on the order of criminal trials in Roman provinces, II, 32\n\n  Rousseau, Jean Jacques, on the death of Christ, II, 187\n\n  Romans,\n    laws of, the basis of modern jurisprudence, II, 5\n    policy of, toward subject peoples, II, 13-15\n    responsibility of, for Christ's death, II, 174-176\n    religion of. See Paganism\n\n  Ruga, Carvilius, first Roman to procure a divorce, II, 236\n\n\n  S\n\n  Sacrifice, human, among the Romans, II, 209\n\n  Sadducees,\n    attitude of, toward the law, I, 338\n    attitude of, toward anthropomorphism of Pentateuch, I, 338\n    dominant in the Sanhedrin, I, 339\n    disbelief of, in immortality, II, 322\n    wealth and rank of, II, 322\n\n  Saladin, Saracen Sultan, contest of, with Richard III, I, 48\n\n  Salians, Roman priests, II, 204\n\n  Sallust, Roman historian, on the conspiracy of Cataline, II, 229\n\n  Salvador, Joseph, on the existence of the Great Sanhedrin at the time of\n  Christ, I, 177\n\n  Samuel, Hakaton, Jewish scribe, biographical note on, II, 307\n\n  Sanctuary, right of, among ancient peoples, I, 96\n\n  Sanhedrin, the Great,\n    origin of, I, 103\n    history of, I, 104\n    organization of, I, 105\n    chamber of scribes, I, 105; II, 303\n    chamber of elders, I, 105; II, 318\n    chamber of priests, I, 105; II, 292\n    qualifications of members of, I, 106\n    disqualifications of judges of, I, 109\n    officers of, I, 112\n    compensation of officers of, I, 115\n    sessions of, I, 116\n    recruitment of personnel of, I, 117\n    quorum of, I, 119\n    jurisdiction of, I, 119\n    appeals to, from minor Sanhedrins, I, 120\n    morning sacrifice of, I, 157\n    assembling of judges of, I, 158\n    scribes of, I, 158, 159\n    examination of witnesses by, I, 159-162\n    debates and balloting of judges of, I, 162\n    procedure of, in cases of condemnation of accused, I, 165-167\n    method of counting votes, I, 167, 168\n    death march of, I, 169, 170\n    question of existence of, at time of Christ, I, 175-181\n    jurisdiction of, in capital cases at the time of Christ, I, 181-183\n    discussion of trial of Christ before, I, 183-186\n    procedure of, in trial of Christ before, I, 186\n    illegality of proceedings of, against Christ, I, 255-259, 260-262,\n    263-266, 267-270, 287-294\n    illegality of sentence of, against Christ, I, 271-278, 279-286\n    disqualifications of members of, who condemned Christ, I, 296-308\n    morning session of, at trial of Christ, I, 356-364\n    three sessions of, to discuss Christ, I, 305, 306\n    authority of, after Roman conquest, II, 12, 16, 21\n    deprived by Romans of power of capital punishment, II, 19, 20\n    biographical sketches of members of, who tried Jesus, II, 291-326\n\n  Sanhedrins, minor,\n    appeals from, to Great Sanhedrin, I, 120\n    establishment of, I, 121\n    jurisdiction of, I, 121\n    superior rank of those of Jerusalem, I, 123, 124\n\n  Saul, Abba, Jewish scribe, biographical note on, II, 313\n\n  Savonarola, Girolamo, Florentine reformer, burning of, I, 63\n\n  Scaurus, Manercus, prosecuted for treason, II, 70\n\n  Sceva, Jewish priest, biographical note on, II, 300\n\n  Schenck, account of, of the bloody sweat of a nun, I, 59\n\n  Sch\u00fcrer,\n    on the existence of the Sanhedrin at the time of Christ, I, 176\n    on the jurisdiction of the Sanhedrin, II, 18\n    on the administration of civil law by Sanhedrin, II, 30\n\n  Scipio Africanus, trial of, before Comitia Centuriata, II, 41\n\n  Scott, Sir Walter, on the contest between Richard III and Saladin, I,\n  47, 48\n\n  Scourging,\n    of Jesus, I, 56\n    mode of, among Romans, II, 55\n\n  Scribes, Jewish, Edersheim on, I, 302\n\n  Scribes, Jewish Chamber of. See Sanhedrin\n\n  Segnensis, Henricus, anecdote of, illustrative of medi\u00e6val ignorance\n  regarding Talmud, II, 74\n\n  Semiramis, Assyrian queen, origin of crucifixion imputed to, II, 54\n\n  Seneca,\n    anecdote from, regarding political informers, II, 71\n    on the patriotic observance of the national religion, II, 226\n    on suicide, II, 232\n    on slavery, II, 252\n    on Roman myths, II, 265\n\n  Septuagint, version of the Bible, paraphrasing of anthropomorphic\n  passages in, I, 237\n\n  Sepulture, of crucified criminals forbidden, II, 58\n\n  Serapis, Egyptian deity,\n    images of thrown down, II, 73\n    Marcus Aurelius an adorer of, II, 217\n\n  Servilia, mistress of Julius C\u00e6sar, II, 239\n\n  Shammai, School of,\n    and the Mishna, I, 79\n    dissensions of, with School of Hillel, II, 309\n\n  Shevuah ben Kalba, Jewish elder, biographical note on, II, 319\n\n  Shoterim of the Sanhedrin, I, 113\n\n  Sibylline Books, II, 199, 204\n\n  Sibyl, Erythr\u00e6an, Virgil inspired by, II, 287\n\n  Simon, Jewish rebel, revolt of, II, 110\n\n  Simon, Jewish elder, biographical note on, II, 320\n\n  Simon Boethus, made high priest by Herod I, II, 296\n\n  Simon ben Camithus, Jewish high priest, biographical note on, II, 298\n\n  Simon Cantharus, Jewish high priest, biographical note on, II, 297\n\n  Simon, son of Gamaliel, Jewish elder, biographical note on, II, 305\n\n  Simon Hamizpah, Jewish scribe, biographical note on, II, 314\n\n  Sinaitic MS. of the Bible, I, 67\n\n  Slavery,\n    under Hebrew law, I, 95\n    account of, among Romans, II, 250, 251\n\n  Social life, Gr\u00e6co-Roman,\n    marriage and divorce, II, 236-240\n    prostitution, II, 242-244\n    luxury and extravagance, II, 244-249\n    poverty of Roman masses, II, 249\n    slavery, II, 249-253\n    infanticide, II, 254\n    gladiatorial games, II, 255-262\n    depravity of, traceable to corrupt myths, II, 262-270\n    practice of Bacchanalian rites, II, 270-283\n    hopeless state of, at time of Christ, II, 284-287\n\n  Socrates, Greek philosopher,\n    resemblance of charges against, to those against Jesus, II, 181\n    counsel of, to Hetairai, II, 243\n\n  Sodomy, prevalence of,\n    among Greeks and Romans, II, 262-264\n    practiced in Roman temples, II, 269\n\n  Solomon ben Joseph, Jewish rabbi, on the Talmud, I, 90\n\n  Sonnenthal, Adolf von, Jewish actor, refused freedom of Vienna, II, 182\n\n  Sparta, licentiousness of, II, 241\n\n  Spartacus, Roman gladiator, revolt of, II, 259, 260\n\n  Spartans, marital looseness of, II, 241\n\n  Spinoza, Jewish philosopher, on miracles, I, 40-44\n\n  Standards, apocryphal miracle of, at trial of Christ, II, 354 _seq._\n\n  Starkie on the credibility of testimony, I, 12\n\n  Stephen, St., stoning of, I, 365\n\n  Stephen, Sir James F. J.,\n    on the Roman treatment of Christianity, II, 76\n    on Pilate's trial of Jesus, II, 159-164\n\n  Stoicism,\n    among the Romans, II, 231\n    resemblance of, to Christian precepts, II, 331\n\n  Stoning of criminals under Hebrew law, I, 92, 99\n\n  Strangling of criminals under Hebrew law, I, 91, 99\n\n  Strauss, David,\n    on the behavior of Jesus before Herod, II, 126\n    on the character of Christ, II, 187\n\n  Stroud on the physical cause of death of Christ, I, 61, 62\n\n  Suetonius, Roman historian,\n    on the labeling of criminals before execution, I, 57\n    on divination, II, 213\n    narrative of, of dreams presaging reign of Augustus, II, 214\n    account of, of belief of Augustus in omens, II, 215\n\n  Suicide, attitude of Stoics toward, II, 232\n\n  Suspension, death by, II, 61, 62\n\n  Sweat, bloody, historical instances of, I, 59, 60\n\n\n  T\n\n  Tacitus, Roman historian, on slavery, II, 253\n\n  Talmud, the,\n    definition of, I, 74\n    recensions of, I, 81\n    contents of, I, 82\n    relation of Mishna to, I, 83, to Gemara, I, 83; to Pentateuch, I,\n    83; to Mosaic Code, I, 84, 85\n    efforts of Christians to extirpate, I, 87, 88\n    message and mission of, I, 89\n    See also Gemara and Mishna\n\n  Telemachus, St., death of, in arena, II, 261\n\n  Temples, a resort of immorality in Rome, II, 269\n\n  Tertullian, Latin father,\n    on the character of Pilate, II, 89\n    on the resort of vice to temple precincts, II, 269\n    reference of, to the \"Acts of Pilate,\" II, 329, 333 _seq._, 347, 348\n\n  Tertullus, his prosecution of Paul, II, 299\n\n  Testimony, under Hebrew Criminal Law,\n    of each witness required to cover entire case, I, 132\n    vain, I, 145\n    standing, I, 146\n    adequate, I, 147\n    of accomplices, I, 228-230, 235, 236\n\n  Theodota, the courtesan, counseled by Socrates, II, 243\n\n  Theophilus, son of Annas, Jewish high priest, biographical note on, II,\n  296\n\n  Theresa, Maria, Austrian empress, codex of, II, 54\n\n  Three, Jewish Courts of, jurisdiction of, I, 124\n\n  Tiberius C\u00e6sar, Roman emperor,\n    sway of, II, 27\n    character of, II, 70\n    prosecutions of, for treason, II, 70, 71\n    marriage of, to Julia, II, 83\n    legendary desire of, to deify Christ, II, 329, 330 _seq._\n\n  Tischendorf, Constantine, on the authenticity of the \"Acts of\n    Pilate,\" II, 345 _seq._\n\n  Tissot, account of, of the bloody sweat of a sailor, I, 59\n\n  Trajan, Roman emperor, correspondence of, with Pliny, II, 78\n\n  Trials, Roman criminal,\n    right of appeal, II, 28\n    during the regal period, II, 35\n    Roman, mode of, in the Comitia Centuriata, II, 37-43\n    mode of, in the Permanent Tribunals, II, 43-52\n    prosecutor, r\u00f4le and selection of, II, 43, 44, 49\n\n  Trial of Jesus, Hebrew,\n    nature of charge against Jesus before Sanhedrin, I, 187\n    procedure of, before Sanhedrin, I, 188\n    discussion of charge of blasphemy against Jesus, I, 193-209\n    illegality of arrest of Jesus, I, 219-237\n    illegality of private examination of Jesus before high priest, I,\n    238-247\n    illegality of indictment of Jesus, I, 248-254\n    illegality of nocturnal proceedings against Jesus, I, 255-259\n    illegality of the meeting of the Sanhedrin before morning sacrifice,\n    I, 260-262\n    illegality of proceedings against Christ, because held on the eve\n    of the Sabbath, and of a feast, I, 263-266\n    illegality of trial, because concluded in one day, I, 267-270\n    condemnation of Jesus founded on uncorroborated evidence, I, 271-278\n    Jesus illegally condemned by unanimous verdict, I, 279-286\n    condemnation of Jesus pronounced in place forbidden by law, I, 288-292\n    irregular balloting of judges of Jesus, I, 292-294\n    condemnation of Jesus illegal, because of unlawful conduct of high\n    priest, I, 290, 291\n    disqualifications of judges of Jesus, I, 296-308\n    Jesus condemned without defense, I, 309\n    second trial of Jesus by Sanhedrin, I, 356-366\n\n  Trial of Jesus, Roman,\n    discussion of Roman and Hebrew jurisdiction, II, 3-23\n    Roman law applicable to, II, 68-80\n    as conducted by Pilate, II, 96-118, 129-139\n    legal analysis of, II, 141-168\n\n  Tribune, Roman, judicial powers of, II, 36\n\n  Tryphon, son of Theudion, Jewish elder; biographical note on, II, 321\n\n  Twelve Tables, laws of the, II, 53, 208\n\n\n  U\n\n  Ulpian, Roman jurist, his definition of treason, II, 69\n\n\n  V\n\n  Vatican, MS. of the Bible, I, 67\n\n  Venus, Roman deity,\n    sacrifices to, II, 208\n    impersonated by Phryne, II, 243\n    worshiped by harlots, II, 266\n\n  Veronica, St., legend of, II, 93\n\n  Vestals, Roman priestesses,\n    guardians of sacred fire, II, 204\n    spectators at licentious dramas, II, 267\n\n  Vinicius, Lucius, Roman patrician, letter of Augustus to, II, 83\n\n  Virgil, poem of, on advent of heaven-born child, I, 321; II, 287\n\n  Virginia, legend of, II, 236\n\n  Vitellius, legate of Syria,\n    spares Jewish prejudices, II, 85\n    orders Pilate to Rome, II, 92\n\n  Vitia, Roman matron, executed for treason, II, 71\n\n  Voltaire, Fran\u00e7ois de,\n    account of, of the bloody sweat of Charles IX, I, 59\n    on character of Christ, II, 187\n\n  Vulgate, version of the Bible, I, 68\n\n\n  W\n\n  Witnesses, under Hebrew Criminal Law,\n    competency and incompetency of, I, 127-129\n    number of, required to convict, I, 129\n    agreement of, I, 131\n    adjuration to, I, 134\n    examination of, I, 136, 138\n    false, I, 140\n    the accused as, I, 141\n    separation of, I, 137\n\n  Wise, Rabbi,\n    on the non-existence of the Great Sanhedrin at time of Christ, I,\n    175, 179\n    on the \"martyrdom of Jesus,\" I, 330\n\n\n  X\n\n  Xenophanes, ridicule of, of Greek religion, II, 224\n\n\n  Z\n\n  Zadok, Jewish scribe, biographical note on, II, 310\n\n  Zeno, Greek philosopher, originator of Stoicism, II, 229\n\n  Zeus, Greek divinity,\n    character of, I, 14\n    myth of rape of Ganymede by, II, 262\n\n\n\n\nCorrections\n\nThe first line indicates the original, the second the correction:\n\n  p. 24: in the life and minstry\n         in the life and ministry\n\n  p. 189: that he flattered\n          that He flattered\n\n          God could be worshiped in any other place as well as in his\n          God could be worshiped in any other place as well as in His\n\n  p. 206: that he was \"the Christ, the Son of God\"\n          that He was \"the Christ, the Son of God\"\n\n  Index:\n\n  Dysmas, legendary name of one of thieves crucified with Jesus, II, 364\n  Dysmas, legendary name of one of the thieves crucified with Jesus, II,\n  364\n\n  Derembourg, Joseph, on the Jewish priestly families, II, 294\n  D\u00e9rembourg, Joseph, on the Jewish priestly families, II, 294\n\n  Lemann, extract from work of, on Sanhedrin, II, 291\n  L\u00e9mann, extract from work of, on Sanhedrin, II, 291\n\n  Scipio Africanus, trial of, before Comitia Centuriata\n  Scipio Africanus, trial of, before Comitia Centuriata, II, 41\n\n  Footnote 135: sont fatales a la libert\u00e9.\n                sont fatales \u00e0 la libert\u00e9.","title":"The Trial of Jesus from a Lawyer's Standpoint, Vol. 1 (of 2): The Hebrew Trial","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":107405}